

AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

Ellen Weihe Gorsevski for the degree of Master of Arts
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Abstract Approved: _____

Robert S. Iltis

This thesis examines the rhetoric (persuasive discourse) of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, the exiled spiritual and temporal leader of Tibet. The analysis of this thesis provides an historical foundation of understanding for the international campaign of rhetoric which the Dalai Lama has been leading for the past forty years, culminating with his Nobel Peace Prize award in 1989. The thesis provides an overview of the Dalai Lama's persuasive tactics spanning his time spent campaigning in exile, from 1959 to the present time (1995). The Dalai Lama has been a strong leader in the movement to raise support and international awareness for Tibetans in Chinese controlled Tibet. Specifically, this thesis presents an analysis of two of the Dalai Lama's most well known speeches: the Five Point Peace Plan, presented to members of the United States Congress

on September 27, 1987, and the Strasbourg Proposal, presented to members of the European Parliament on June 15, 1988.

The Dalai Lama's discourse is examined from the perspective of rhetorical criticism, using the theories of Kenneth Burke as the framework for understanding the texts. This analysis incorporates Burke's theories on mortification, scapegoating, victimage, and transcendence, as well as the tragic and comic frames for presenting a vision of dramatic conflict. The Dalai Lama's rhetoric is also analyzed for its cross cultural implications according to Geert Hofstede's dimensions of cultural variability. This thesis includes a discussion of the Dalai Lama's role as a social movement leader with a charismatic persona and a strong ability to organize and manage a diverse international following while working to preserve the Tibetan diaspora in exile. Lastly, the ethical groundings of the Dalai Lama's rhetoric are taken into consideration.

The purpose of this thesis is to introduce to communication students the significance of the Dalai Lama's body of work, and to indicate potential directions for future research. The rationale behind the thesis is this: in rhetorical theory and social movement theory, there exist numerous studies of the nonviolent rhetoric and social movement leadership of both Dr. Martin Luther King of the United States and

Mahatma Gandhi of India; yet the Dalai Lama, whose work I show to be comparable in many ways to that of King and Gandhi, has remained unexamined by scholars in many disciplines, most notably rhetorical criticism and social movement theory. The intent of this thesis is to focus upon the Dalai Lama's rhetoric and communication skills in order to stimulate an enduring interest in him as a remarkable orator and leader, from whom we may gain insight into improving our ability to communicate and to manage conflict in a nonviolent manner.

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The Rhetoric Of The Dalai Lama

by

Ellen Weihe Gorsevski

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APPROVED:

Redacted for Privacy

Major Professor, representing Speech Communication

Redacted for Privacy

Associate Professor, representing Speech Communication

Redacted for Privacy

Professor, representing History

Redacted for Privacy

Chair of Department of Speech Communication

Redacted for Privacy

Dean of Graduate School

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Ellen Weihe Gorsevski, Author

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION.....	1
Theoretical Convergence	9
Leadership and Rhetoric of a Nonviolent Movement	15
The Dalai Lama and the East in the West: Thriving Anew	19
A Rhetoric of Simplicity	29
Of Rhetoric and Riots.....	31
Conclusion	33
 CHAPTER TWO: ANCIENT PAST, UNCERTAIN PRESENT.....	 35
The History of Tibet	35
Phase One: The Rise of Kings and of Buddhism in Tibet	35
Phase Two: Mongol Rule Over Tibet	38
Phase Three: The Legacy of Tsong Khapa	39
Phase Four: The Europeans Arrive and Suzerainty is Confirmed	44
Phase Five: Left Alone	48
Phase Six: The Cultural Revolution and Subsequent Reform in Tibet	53
Figurehead of an Historic Dispute	59
Interpreting History: Two Views	60
Tibet's Questionable Past	63

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

	<u>Page</u>
Suzerainty vs. Sovereignty	66
What, and Where, Is Tibet?	68
Human Rights Redefined	70
CHAPTER THREE: THE CROSS CULTURAL RHETORIC OF THE DALAI LAMA	78
A Language of Cultural Pairings	78
Of Words and Word Views	80
CHAPTER FOUR: CONSUMMATE CHARISMA	95
A Charismatic Leader	95
A Strong Face	97
A Greater Vision	104
CHAPTER FIVE: REVELING IN CONTRADICTION: A RHETORICAL STRATEGY	116
Introduction	116
Background	116
Timing and Audience	119
The Five Point Peace Plan	128
Linked Speeches	148
The Next Audience: The European Parliament	150
The Strasbourg Proposal: Finding Transcendence in a Middle Way	155

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

	<u>Page</u>
Reactions to the New Plan	176
Conclusion	182
CHAPTER SIX: A TRAGICOMIC FRAMEWORK FOR THE TIBET QUESTION	187
The Opening of the Wisdom Eye	187
The Comic Frame	189
Religious Persuasion	191
Irony and Awareness	193
The Tragic Frame: A Sentimental Side	199
CHAPTER SEVEN: ETHICS AND NONVIOLENT PERSUASION	213
The Ethics of a Nonviolent Rhetor	213
Ethics and the Active Audience	217
CHAPTER EIGHT: AN ENDURING RHETORIC	226
Conclusions: The Significance of the Dalai Lama's Discourse	226
Areas for Future Research	229
BIBLIOGRAPHY	234

LIST OF TABLES

<u>Table</u>	<u>Page</u>
1. Tibet's Dalai Lamas	43
2. Members of the U.S. Congress Subcommittee on Human Rights	120

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my grandparents: Dorothy Greenwood Eldridge, a gutsy lady who showed me that we can do it; to John Eldridge, Jr., a hero: for all the memories which might have been; to Lois Weihe, for showing me that strength exists in gentle kindness; and to Kenneth Weihe, for his love of literature and words.

Preface

The idea of researching the Dalai Lama for this thesis sprang from a combination of interests. From my parent's bookshelves, groaning with the weight of old issues of the National Geographic, I learned about different cultures, customs, social histories, and religions. Also, from my friends and travels abroad, I gained an appreciation for taking a different perspective, for trying to see things through a new lens.

As far as research methodology is concerned, I have always enjoyed literature and literary criticism, so when, in the course of my graduate studies, I became acquainted with rhetorical criticism, it seemed that my passion for language and my natural curiosity and determination in getting to the bottom of things could truly be satisfied. Therefore, by being able to analyze the language, culture, history, and rhetoric of someone from a very far off place--indeed, the Dalai Lama's country, Tibet, is known as the "roof of the world"--conducting research for this thesis has been an ideal experience. My biggest frustration has been in discerning what to study and what to set aside for later. There is so much to learn, and, after having researched the life's work of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama

of Tibet, and the thesis having been completed, I feel as if I've only just begun.

On that note, I would like to say that issues relating to Tibet in general remain touchy subjects. During the course of my research, I have found it rather difficult to find objective analyses on the question of Tibet. Insofar as my biases are concerned, I chose the Dalai Lama as a subject of study because I consider his life's work and person extraordinary. So, within the context of a qualitative study, I believe the findings of my research as presented in this thesis are well founded and as carefully documented as possible. Therefore, if any interpretive inaccuracies do exist in this thesis, I am confident they arise from my Western and American perspective, and I hope that the reader will forgive them as such. If anything, I hope that this thesis invites others to pick up where I have left off, reinterpreting where necessary, and finding new information where I have left any stones unturned.

THE RHETORIC OF THE DALAI LAMA

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Rhetoric is a branch of communication studies explored by scholars at least as early as the civilizations of ancient Greece and Rome. These first students and practitioners of rhetoric sought to explain what rhetoric was, and how it worked. In his Rhetoric, Aristotle defines rhetoric as being a method or faculty of awareness for discovering all the available means of persuasion (1984, p.24). While Aristotle's view endures, the ancients could never quite agree upon a single definition or conception of rhetoric.¹ Today, the tradition of rhetorical study continues, and various views on just what rhetoric consists of continue to be debated. For

¹One of the most important disputes about rhetoric among the ancients involved the purpose and motives for the "art" of rhetoric. The Sophists ran schools for training aspiring leaders the skills of persuasive oration. Protagoras (fifth century B.C.E.), an early Sophist, "denied the existence of one single truth," believing that "every assertion is subject to controversy, since a person can always argue either for or against it" (Perelman, 1990, p. 1072). In Protagoras' view, rhetoric serves to present one side of an argument: the orator's side.

Isocrates (436 - 330 B.C.E.) considered rhetoric primarily as a speaker-oriented discipline for leaders and politicians that would enable them to better handle affairs of state. For Isocrates, who was a Sophist, rhetoric was the skill of persuasive oration that could be used to promote Panhellenic unity (1971, pp. 46-70).

Plato (427 - 347 B.C.E.) believed that rhetoric, when employed with dialectic, could serve more noble ends for the philosopher. Plato's vision of rhetoric assumes ethical dimensions. As a consequence, the focus of rhetoric is not just on the orator, but also on the audience and the relationship between speaker and listener. Rhetoric, according to Plato, involves the speaker's (or writer's) scientific aim in matching an ultimate "Truth" with the "souls" of the audience (Plato, Gorgias and Phaedrus; Burke, 1950, pp. 53-54).

the most part, however, many scholars would agree that rhetoric, as an art or discipline, provides tools for senders of messages to make their messages not only more readily received and understood, but also more apt to be agreed to or acted upon. In short, rhetoric endows writers and speakers with the power to persuade audiences.

Rhetoric has been studied in contexts ranging from politics to mass communication. As global communication increases, so will the necessity for, and frequency of, connections among the peoples of countries worldwide. For cross cultural rhetoric to be effective, it must transcend the barriers which separate us, barriers such as national borders, cultures, languages, and political systems or religious beliefs. This thesis will be an analysis of the rhetoric of the exiled spiritual and secular leader of Tibet, Tenzin Gyatso, who is known as the Fourteenth Dalai Lama. The following analysis will show that the Dalai Lama's speaking and writing reflect a rare capacity for surmounting global obstacles to communication.

A self proclaimed "simple monk," this leader of the exiled Government of Tibet has, for more than forty years, conducted high profile diplomatic relations with world leaders such as Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai of China, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Khrushchev of Russia, and, more recently, with heads of state such as Michail Gorbachev of the Former Soviet Union, former President George

Bush and President Bill Clinton. He likewise maintains ties to religious leaders such as Pope John Paul II.

In 1989 he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his advocacy of nonviolent protest in the continuing efforts of Tibetans both inside and outside of Tibet to secure an autonomous secular and religious role and to eliminate alleged political oppression under China's rule. The Nobel Committee explained the reason why he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize:

The Committee wants to emphasize the fact that the Dalai Lama in his struggle for the liberation of Tibet consistently has opposed the use of violence. He has instead advocated peaceful solutions based upon tolerance and mutual respect in order to preserve the historical and cultural heritage of his people. The Dalai Lama has developed his philosophy of peace from a great reverence for all things living and upon the concept of universal responsibility embracing all mankind as well as nature. In the opinion of the Committee, the Dalai Lama has come forward with constructive and forward-looking proposals or the solution of international conflicts, human rights issues, and global environmental problems (Dalai Lama and Rowell, 1990).

This praise is indicative of how many audiences readily accept the ethos and the rhetoric of the Dalai Lama. In fact, Dawa Norbu, a scholar of Tibetan studies, affirms that "The Nobel Peace Prize may be taken as an indicator of Western if not the world's public opinion" (1991, p.371). However, while The Dalai Lama's rhetoric has been influential in promoting his message, and while his own personage has become highly regarded, coverage of the Dalai Lama's protest

movement has remained curiously limited and unanalyzed in the Western press in comparison to other Nobel laureates (Spectator, 1989, p.5). Thus, largely as a result of the comparatively sparse coverage of the situation in the Dalai Lama's country, Tibet, the Nobel Committee observed that "political support [for the Tibet question] from the outside world remains conspicuous by its absence, apart from a few rather toothless U.N. resolutions that were adopted in 1961 and 1965" (Dalai Lama and Piburn, 1990, p. 20). Ironically, the Nobel Committee, which possesses both the power to generate media attention and internationally visible political clout, conceded that the Dalai Lama had been on their waiting list of persons to be considered for the award, and that his selection for the Nobel Prize was precipitated by the global indignation at the events of China's brutal suppression of the student protesters in Tiannanmen Square, which occurred just three months after the Tibetans' anti-Chinese protests and riots in Lhasa, Tibet (Rule, 1989).

Evidence of the Dalai Lama's influence must be understood in terms of his foremost role as a religious leader. Similarly, to find empirical evidence of the efficacy of the Dalai Lama's rhetoric, we must look to his primary audience--his followers. His followers are comprised of three groups, first, Tibetans, second, religious adherents, and third, political supporters worldwide. While the Dalai Lama is not yet a household name in Europe or North America, he maintains at minimum recognition, and at most, an

impressive following among not only Buddhists, but also the adherents and students of many world religions and countries. Primarily, the Dalai Lama's influence on his own people, the Tibetans, is unshaken despite the four decades he has spent in exile. According to Ronald Schwartz, a scholar in Tibetan studies, "Tibetan loyalty to the Dalai Lama has been strengthened through protest...tapes and videos of the Dalai Lama speaking on political as well as religious subjects are very much in demand and circulate underground among Tibetans" inside Tibet (1994, pp. 7-8). The Dalai Lama advocates nonviolent protest, but in Chinese controlled Tibet--where the government makes no distinction between nonviolent protest and violent protest--any and all protest is allegedly punishable by imprisonment or death. Consequently, for these Tibetans to continue to listen to contraband speeches of the Dalai Lama, and to act upon the Dalai Lama's recommendations in those speeches, reveals the efficacy of his rhetoric. Another clue that indicates the influence of the Dalai Lama's rhetoric is that "new terms have...entered the Tibetan political vocabulary" (p.1). These terms, such as democracy and human rights, are ubiquitous in the Dalai Lama's religious and political writings and speeches. While the introduction of such terms to Tibet can in part be attributed to the influences of foreign tourism, the Dalai Lama's use of such terms imparts an aura of importance and value which would further encourage Tibetans to use them in their language and to respect them in their society.

Apart from Tibetans, the Dalai Lama's influence over Westerners is evinced in the myriad followers of Buddhism and organizations that exist to support the causes the Dalai Lama espouses. "There are an estimated half-million [Buddhist] adherents in North America and western Europe," for whom the Dalai Lama is known and respected (Goodman, 1986, p. 319). Non-religious organizations that support the Dalai Lama include The Tibet Information Network (TIN), which, based in London, is "devoted to research and documentation of contemporary Tibet" (Schwartz, 1994, p.5); Tibet House in New York City; and Campaign for Tibet in Washington, DC. These followers, Tibetans and foreigners, Buddhists and others, combine to evince the Dalai Lama's influence in sum. Schwartz affirms that "there has certainly been a feedback effect between protest inside Tibet and international endeavors on behalf of Tibet, with each reinforcing the other" (pp. 8-9). Without the vigorous lobbying, campaigning, and rhetoric of the Dalai Lama, the existence of these supporters might possibly not have come about. Moreover, the direction and enthusiasm expressed by these followers is usually attributed by them to the Dalai Lama. Tom Grunfeld, author and expert on Tibetan affairs as they relate to international politics, maintains that "there are Tibetans and Chinese who believe the recent reforms in Tibet are a direct result of the Dalai Lama's successful efforts to publicize the Tibetan issue around the world" (1988, p. 27). Peter Williams, a British diplomat involved in British-

Tibetan relations since 1944, maintains that the Dalai Lama is an "element affecting Western thinking" (1988, p. 146). Williams states that the Dalai Lama has "held on to the world's attention and admiration by sustaining his own, his country's and his people's claim to separate identity and a measure of control of their own destinies. This he does in moderate terms, emphasizing...this aim non-violently, as the Buddhist faith requires" (1988, p.146).

The Dalai Lama's Nobel acceptance speech highlights his mission: "The suffering of our people during the past forty years of occupation is well documented. Ours has been a long struggle. We know our cause is just. Because violence can only breed more violence and suffering, our struggle must remain nonviolent and free of hatred. We are trying to end the suffering of our people, not to inflict suffering upon others" (1989, p.ix). This clear and concise message has, in recent years, gained perceptibly increasing worldwide popular (if not political) support. In the context of social movement theory, Herbert Simons posits that leaders "must adapt to several audiences simultaneously. In an age of mass media, rhetorical utterances addressed to one audience are likely to reach others" (1970, p.7). Based upon the influence of his message, the Dalai Lama appears to be well aware of this multifaceted aspect of modern communication. The themes and words the Dalai Lama has used in his speeches and writings are voiced time and time again by the Dalai Lama's allies and foes alike among the international press

and political corps. The widespread repetition of the Dalai Lama's views is important to this discussion because "...a good measure of the effectiveness of rhetorical discourse is the extent to which themes or key terms are echoed by audiences in other discourse," (Brummet, 1981, p. 262). Moreover, the Dalai Lama has displayed solid "intercultural competence," which is the ability to draw upon "culturally different identities that are salient in [each given] situation" (Collier, 1993, p.43). Especially when dealing with international media and echelons of political power, the Dalai Lama's intercultural competence has served as one more skill to propel his persuasive speech. Williams comments upon the Dalai Lama's most "salient" and cross culturally universal attributes:

His open-mindedness, the simplicity he can [distil] from immense complexity, his sense of humor and the cheerfulness he, like his people, can sustain in the face of adversity and great hardship make him an outstanding person by any standard. The word charisma is...appropriate...(1988, p.146).

Thus the Dalai Lama's ability to use the right words, in tandem with the most universally acceptable attributes such as charisma and a good sense of humor, make him a stronger force to be reckoned with in both political and rhetorical exchanges.

In terms of rhetorical analysis, I am interested in examining precisely how, in terms of language use, composition, symbolic and thematic motifs, the Dalai Lama has

managed to inspire the awe and respect of the West while also inciting the publicly pronounced ire of every Chinese leader since Mao himself was in office. While the goals the Dalai Lama has sought have not yet been realized (Rule, 1989, p. A-10), his tactic in the protest movement has been to use a globally targeted rhetoric to instigate foreign political influence on China. This political influence, he hopes, will serve to change China's current policies in Tibet. The Dalai Lama "has traveled assiduously to bring the Tibetan case and the plight of his people to as wide an international audience as possible" (Williams, 1988, p. 146). "Instead of war, the Dalai Lama's idea of struggle is to travel the world, drawing attention to his cause and trying to persuade world leaders to exert pressure on China" (Buchsbaum, 1993). The Dalai Lama's unique brand of rhetoric has proven to be his greatest asset in communicating internationally. My question is, what can we learn from it to improve our own forms of communication and to better understand rhetoric in the Aristotelian sense?

Theoretical Convergence

This analysis proceeds according to the general principles of rhetorical criticism, which encompass audience, ethos (a speaker's personal history and attributes), and the historical constraints of the speaking or writing situation. This analysis will advance a clearer understanding of the Dalai Lama's audience, his own personal background and how it

impinges on his speech, the historical situation surrounding the discourse, and how it serves to constrain and define what has been said. In addition, this criticism will draw upon theories from three key areas which converge as they relate to the rhetoric of the Dalai Lama: Kenneth Burke's rhetorical theory, social movement theory, and cross cultural communication. Rhetorical theory will be foremost because its focus on principles of persuasion aligns most closely with the purpose of this thesis; the latter theories will be used to support and advance claims relating to rhetorical theory. In full, this study will be grounded firmly in findings from historical research about the Dalai Lama's worldwide movement to protest the Chinese occupation of Tibet. This historical basis will necessarily cover the history of Tibet as it relates to the Dalai Lama's claims about Tibet's sovereignty.

Thus, first, the rhetorical theories of Kenneth Burke's 'dramatism' will form the basis of my analysis of the Dalai Lama's persuasive discourse. The Dalai Lama's speaking will be discussed in light of Burke's conceptions of identification, mortification, victimage, and transcendence, as based upon Burke's discussion of them in A Grammar of Motives (1969, pp. 59, 332-333; 406-408; 420-422) and A Rhetoric of Motives (1950, 13; 19-23; 41; 43-46; 53-54; 137-141; 252-267; 333). Burke's theories on the use of comic and tragic frames, as Burke presents them in Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose (1935, pp. 82-91; 247-250; 283-

286) and Attitudes Toward History (1984), will also be incorporated into a discussion of the Dalai Lama's persuasive strategies.

As tools for analysis, Burke's theories help reveal how the Dalai Lama, in his public addresses, cuts across the boundaries of accepted norms for diverse world views, thereby overcoming the formalities of political, cultural, and social contexts. Through Burke's concept of identification we can observe how the Dalai Lama drives and times his discourse to identify himself with his far flung audience, "all human beings," in order to align people to his cause. The Dalai Lama fosters the appearance of being simultaneously great and small enough for all members of his audience to achieve a sense of identification with himself, and, as a consequence, with his movement. He can call himself "a simple monk" and thereby place himself with the plain and lowly (and vice versa), while in the same text wielding phrases such as "my entourage," "my cabinet," and "my land and my people," which underscore his greatness and stature as a leader in order for his cause to be grouped among the causes of the politically powerful leaders of the world.

With Burke's concept of mortification, or self punishment, the Dalai Lama's motivation for conducting a relentless one-man campaign to spread his message to the world becomes more understandable. Burke's concept of victimage, or scapegoating, illuminates the Dalai Lama's harsh castigation of the Chinese for their excesses in Tibet

(especially during the Cultural Revolution), while simultaneously skirting Chinese accusations that he himself was a leader of a "serfdom" with its own cruelties. Burke's thoughts on transcendence through language reveal how the Dalai Lama transforms Tibet's "sins" of being overly isolationist and backwards into positive attributes that the rest of the world clamors for, such as the simple but ever elusive state of peace and tranquillity that Tibet is often touted as fostering, or the Tibetan monks' remarkable meditative techniques which amaze and perplex present day Western scientists who study them. Burke's theory of the comic frame is aligned to the Dalai Lama's use of non-violent rhetoric, which views the enemy not as evil, but rather as a "fool" which needs to be educated so that things may be set aright in the world. Conversely, the perspective of the tragic frame of language makes understandable the Dalai Lama's use of scapegoating and blame for the woes of Tibet during the last half of the twentieth century.

To address the second area of theoretical convergence, I will analyze the Dalai Lama's discourse from the perspective of the rhetoric of social movements. I shall employ social movement theory to explicate the Dalai Lama's rhetoric surrounding the globally publicized Tibetan protests in Lhasa, Tibet between 1987 and 1989. Simons has formed a "leader-centered conception of persuasion in social movements" and "the intentional symbolic acts of those who lead social movements" (p.2). I will deploy Simons' theory

to explore the Dalai Lama as the symbolic leader of a social movement. I will consider the tactics the Dalai Lama uses to lead a worldwide social protest movement from his precarious expatriate position in Dharamsala, India, where the local Indian population resents the Tibetans. Moreover, the country of India, as a whole, prefers the Dalai Lama not to exacerbate its ceaselessly tense relations with China (The Economist, 1994, p. 39).

Leland Griffin first approached social movement theory from an historical perspective, encouraging the student of social movement theory to build a broad, sweeping view of the movement in question (1952, pp. 184-188). Later, Griffin aligned his orientation with Burke's dramatism (Griffin, 1969, pp.456-478). Both of Griffin's views will be incorporated in a theoretical middle ground which will encompass the historic and dramatic elements of the Dalai Lama's rhetoric. First, I will cover the historical aspects of the Dalai Lama's struggle to lead an international social movement, including his publicity program which was designed to bring about world awareness of Tibet. The Dalai Lama's publicity efforts have been designed to reverse the isolation and anonymity of Tibet, a nation that had, since ancient times and even well into the twentieth century, purposefully shut itself off from the rest of the world. Second, I will examine the tactics the Dalai Lama has successfully used in propelling the drama of this tiny, isolated country upon the world stage, and even making that tiny country's story heart-

rending enough--and persuasive enough--to merit international action on its behalf.

The final area I will use to support the rhetorical analysis is cross-cultural communication theory. Throughout his campaign to influence action on behalf of Tibet, the Dalai Lama's discourse has evinced cross cultural elements. The Dalai Lama has attempted to maintain the leadership of, and to preserve in exile, his country's culture, while also adapting to, and manipulating in his rhetoric, the symbols, meanings, and norms that are characteristic of Western cultures. Culture, which is central to the Dalai Lama's ethos, refers to the "historically transmitted system of symbols, meanings, and norms" around and through which groups of people live their lives (Collier, 1993, p. 36). I shall draw upon the work of theorists who have examined the intersection of cross cultural communication and rhetoric. Cecil Blake maintains that "the universality of rhetoric ought to be more fully recognized now than ever before because of the changing drama of world relations..." (1979, p.85). Blake also asserts that there have been misunderstandings about the Eastern rhetorical tradition (p.87). Following Blake's guidelines for the "comparative rhetorician," my analysis of the Dalai Lama's discourse shall:

attempt to unearth the constituent parts of the society [being studied] and attempt to account for the parts that receive most emphasis...through an examination of the culture as a whole, attempt to conceptualize the peculiar rhetorical theory

exhibited by [the] society under investigation...[and ascertain the] identifiable and communicable symbols... (pp.88-89).

In addition, I shall employ Geert Hofstede's dimensions of cultural variability, which have proven to help Westerners understand the world views of diverse societies and to communicate better with culturally diverse peoples.

Hofstede's dimensions point to ways that Westerners understand cultural phenomena: a person's place in the social structure (power distance); the society's preference for either group activity (collectivism) or individual action; the values a culture places on material things or on nurturing and affection (pp.89-109, 1992).

Leadership and Rhetoric of a Nonviolent Movement

Just as Gandhi in India and Martin Luther King in the United States advocated nonviolent protest in order to gain support for their causes, so has the Dalai Lama persisted for four decades to maintain a nonviolent stance in Tibet's fight for independence (and more currently for religious and political autonomy) from China. In rhetorical theory and social movement theory in particular, there exist manifold studies on the persuasive abilities of both Gandhi and King. These studies encompass analyses of rhetorical strategies such as Gandhi's satyagraha (soul-force or truth-force), ahimsa (nonviolence), and King's ability to draw upon nonviolent tenets as well as develop strong emotive appeals

to a modern power establishment's media, government, and social structure in order to strengthen the effect of his persuasive discourse. Such critical analysis of the rhetoric and social movement tactics of Gandhi and King have been the subject of countless scholarly articles and books. Yet despite the striking similarities in magnitude, intent, and, as I will argue, significance, among the respective rhetorics of Gandhi, King, and the Dalai Lama, the discourse of the Dalai Lama alone remains unexamined critically by scholars in the fields of rhetorical criticism and social movement theory.²

² Significant studies on both Gandhi and King as social movement leaders include: Sharp, Gene (1971). Exploring nonviolent Alternatives. Boston, MA: Porter Sargent Publisher; Seifert, Harvey. (1965). Conquest by suffering: the process and prospects of nonviolent resistance. Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press. Communication studies on King include: Meier, August, "On the role of Martin Luther King," New Politics, 4, 1965, 52-59; Fulkerson, Richard, "The public letter as a rhetorical form: structure, logic, and style in King's 'Letter from Birmingham Jail,'" Quarterly Journal of Speech, 44, 1979, 121-136; Snow, Malinda, "Martin Luther King's 'Letter from Birmingham Jail' as Pauline Epistle," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 71, 1985, 318-334; Smith, Donald, "Martin Luther King, Jr.: in the beginning at Montgomery," Southern Speech Communication Journal, 34, 1968, 8-17; Lucaites, John and Condit, Celeste, "Reconstructing <equality>: culturetypal and counter-cultural rhetorics in the martyred black vision," Communication Monographs, 56, 1990, 5-24; Gorden, William, "A stormy rally in Atlanta," Communication Quarterly, 11, 1963, 18-21.

Communication studies on Gandhi include: Beatty, Michael; Behnke, Ralph; Banks, Barbara, "Elements of dialogic communication in Gandhi's second round table conference address," Southern Speech Communication Journal, 44, 1979, 386-398; Singh, Kusum, "Gandhi and Mao as mass communicators," Journal of Communication, 29, 1979, 94-101; Merriam, Allen, "Symbolic action in India: Gandhi's nonverbal persuasion," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 61, 1975, 290-306; Carlson, Cheree, "Gandhi and the comic frame: 'ad bellum purificandum,'" Quarterly Journal of Speech, 72, 1986, 446-455; Bowen, Harry "A realistic view of nonviolent assumptions," Communication Quarterly, 15, 1964, 9-10; Narain, Laxmi, "Mahatma Gandhi as a journalist," Journalism Quarterly, 42, 1965, 267-270; Chaudhary, Anju and Bryan, Carter, "Mahatma Gandhi: journalist and freedom propagandist," Journalism Quarterly, 51, 286-291.

This is a serious omission of a rhetor whose discourse, as I will show, has been effective in moving audiences. Considering the Dalai Lama is a Nobel laureate and popular world figure, who as recently as 1990 had an internationally best-selling autobiography, this omission from critical study seems all the more curious. In fact, at the time of this writing, not only have none of the major speech communication journals carried any critical treatments of the Dalai Lama's discourse or leadership, but also (with the notable exception of a scant few political science or theological journals, cited herein) neither have any of the other academic journals or even books which I have surveyed contained a single treatment of the Dalai Lama as a rhetor or as an influential and popular social movement leader. This lack of critical or scholarly study of the Dalai Lama is also evident in journals and books on peace studies, cross cultural communications, Asia studies, and history.³ It is my purpose in this thesis to begin to remedy this lack of critical examination.

Although the Dalai Lama is a charismatic religious and social movement leader like Gandhi and King, the former is distinct from the latter in significant ways. For instance, unlike Gandhi and King, who often lead marches and gave speeches in person, the Dalai Lama is compelled to lead a

³ Communications journals in which I have sought but have not found any mention of the Dalai Lama include, but are not limited to, the following: Communication Monographs, Western Journal of Speech Communication, Southern Speech Communication Journal, Communication Quarterly, Quarterly Journal of Speech, Central States Speech Journal, Communication Quarterly, Speech Monographs.

resistance movement that is physically removed from the actual site of the alleged injustices; for forty years and up through the present time, the Dalai Lama has been unable to return to Tibet. But in spite of his direction of the protest movement from afar, it is clear that "...his authority over all Tibetans, a position that holds no parallel in the world today, holds his own potential hotheads, both within and outside Tibet, in check" (anonymous, Spectator, 1989). In addition, he is compelled, from his expatriate position, to enlist followers who are not only not his own countrymen and women, but also those who do not share the same ethnic or religious background, and most often, those who do not even speak his native language, nor the languages and backgrounds of other followers to his movement. Thus, while the overarching principle of nonviolence shapes his movement's actions, the obstacles of physical, linguistic, and cultural separation force him to employ alternative rhetorical strategies to garner support for what he calls "the plight of my people." A special leader, and an effective rhetoric is required for leading, organizing, and maintaining such a diverse international following. I suggest that the Dalai Lama is a leader who possesses a cross cultural ability to persuade, and hence his work merits study.

Indeed, the adversary of his movement is a formidable one, and to be as influential and popular as he has been seems nothing short of miraculous. After all, it has been

observed, "no country is going to pick a fight with China over Tibet" (anonymous, The Economist, 1987, p.35). The Dalai Lama recognizes the reality of the great odds against him, saying, "Sometimes I really feel desperate. The Tibetan nation, with its unique cultural heritage, is now facing a real danger of extinction." Yet at the same time, he is determined in his mandate, affirming, "We need to raise world awareness about Tibet, to tell the truth about what is really happening. An ancient nation with a precious culture is almost dying" (Buschsbaum, 1993, p.8).

The Dalai Lama and the East in the West: Thriving Anew

"Owing in large measure to the logical and systematic nature of its doctrines, Buddhism has proven an appealing philosophy in today's rational and scientific world," says Michael Goodman, a biographer of the Dalai Lama (1986, p.). The appeal of the Dalai Lama to Western audiences, especially in America and Europe, arises not only from his own charisma and buoyant public persona, but also from his ability to capitalize upon the last hundred years of advancement and acceptance by Western audiences of concepts such as Zen and Buddhism. Many western writers, poets, and scholars became acquainted with Buddhism during the nineteenth century as travelers' accounts about Asia reached Europe and America. Writers such as Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman were all influenced by their readings of interpretations and translations of Buddhist philosophy and religion (Ellwood,

1987; Inada and Jacobson, 1984; Tweed, 1990, pp. 65-92).

Eastern philosophy has flourished most recently in the United States, for instance, during the 1960's and 1970's with the Hippies and anti-war protest movements; Tibet even became a fad for many young Americans, who were called "dharma-freaks" (Sanchez, 1985,p.15). Today, Eastern thought in religion and philosophy continues to gain a following and popularity under the latest mantle of New Age literature, music, and activities such as yoga or meditation.

Supported by this foundation of the gradual inroads of Eastern thought, the Dalai Lama's move into the international spotlight is timely. The Dalai Lama's own individualism and magnetic personality appear to have fostered a greater acceptance by Western audiences, whose values place individualism high on a scale of critically important or desirable traits, all the more so in a rhetor (Hofstede, 1992). He always makes public appearances in his maroon and gold monk's robes, and is noted for sporting a pair of comfortably practical brown oxford shoes (Holt, 1993, p.21). He has been described in Western media as boyish, cherubic, impish, and even cute.⁴ But his smiling appearance belies his seemingly endless knowledge, which is made clear in his speech. His firm, authoritative baritone voice is also advantageous to public discourse. "His voice has a melodic,

⁴ Chinese media, in contrast, have described the Dalai Lama in a far different light, calling him a "political corpse, bandit and traitor," and a "red-handed butcher who subsisted on people's flesh," as well as a "wolf in monk's clothing" (Anonymous, 1989, p.134; Dalai Lama, 1993).

resonant quality, and although his English is limited...his language is precise and controlled" (Goodman, 1986, p. 318).

The Dalai Lama affiliates himself with this media spawned image of the innocent, boyish god-king, saying, "Occasionally I feel very untrained for the job of political leader" (Norman, 1993, p. 18). Also, his audacity at fleeing his nation from the reign of Communist China yet continuing obstinately to lead an impossible fight, using only words as weapons to rail against China's alleged occupation of Tibet, further enables Western audiences to liken him to a kind of weirdly garbed rebel--a rebel with a cause. Hence his message tends to strike a familiar chord to the psyche of the Western, and in particular, American audience.

Over the last two decades, he has slowly edged his way into the limelight of Western popular culture; he has been photographed by Annie Leibovitz, and feature articles about him (and the cause of Tibet) have appeared in recent years in popular magazines such as Time, Life, The New York Times Magazine, US News and World Report, and Vanity Fair.⁵ The Dalai Lama has also been successful at persuading the powerful Hollywood publicity machine to ply his cause.⁶ As

⁵ Iyer, P. "Tibet's Living Buddha," Time, 131, 1988, 58-60; Nickson, L. "The Dalai Lama," Life, 11, 1988, 21-25; Dreifus, C. "The Dalai Lama," The New York Times Magazine, November 28, 1993, 52-55; Rosellini, L. "The days of a holy man," US News & World Report, 109, 1990, 92-94; Shoumatoff, A. "The Silent Killing of Tibet," Vanity Fair, 54, 1991, 76-104.

⁶ For many years the popular actor Richard Gere has been an advocate for the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan issue. Gere "devoted his Academy Award acceptance speech" in April of 1993 "to the Dalai Lama's cause" (Norman, p. 18). The celebrated filmmaker Bernardo Bertolucci's 1994 film "Little Buddha" was about exiled Tibetan monks who seek the reincarnation of a fellow lama. This film starred popular actors Keanu

British journalist Jane Dibblin observes, "Never have I seen a roomful of journalists and photographers warm so quickly to a political figure: no country could hope for a better ambassador" (New Statesman, 1988, p.7). Such skills are vital for one who has, for forty years, been "the guest of a nation that would prefer him to remain silent [India] and the enemy of a nation that much of the world is trying to court [China]" (Iyer, 1988, p.60). Not surprisingly, the Dalai Lama is aware of his precarious position and his popularity, commenting, "The Fourteenth Dalai Lama may be the most popular Dalai Lama of all. If the Chinese had treated the Tibetans like real brothers, then the Dalai Lama might not be so popular. So all the credit goes to the Chinese!" (p.58).

As Tibet's exiled spiritual leader, he likewise appeals to Western audiences because of his emphasis on open-

Reeves, Bridget Fonda, and singer/actor Chris Issak. Bertolucci received advice on the direction of the film from the Dalai Lama himself. Also, as recently as September 11, 1994, the Discovery Channel aired a special program entitled "Mustang: The Hidden Kingdom," which was narrated by the famous actor Harrison Ford. "Hidden Kingdom" was the story of an aging, high ranking monk of the Dalai Lama's inner entourage who undertakes a journey to the Kingdom of Mustang. Once there, the lama performs religious ceremonies, and brings with him a tape recorded message from the Dalai Lama which he plays before a Tibetan audience in a temple in Mustang. In the message, the Dalai Lama states in his booming voice that the Chinese have destroyed the Tibetan culture in Tibet, and that it is up to the 'last Tibetans' in Mustang to work to preserve their precious culture.

His mission thus completed, the elder lama returns to Dharmasala, India, where the Dalai Lama reigns in exile, with two young boys who are to be educated for the purpose of returning to Mustang as teachers in the future. The documentary styled drama features much footage of the elderly lama's consultations with the Dalai Lama himself, as well as horrific footage of brutal beatings and killings of Tibetan protesters by the Chinese (including black and white film clips of rebellion in Tibet in the 1950's and 60's as well as the more recent riots of 1989 in Lhasa).

mindedness with regard to all religions. Theologist Paul Williams notes:

The Dalai Lama has made it quite clear that he opposes the idea of only one religion, whether an existing religion or a composite 'pick-n-mix' creation. And he has stated equally firmly that he does not want everyone to convert to Buddhism. Rather, religious believers should follow wholeheartedly their own traditions...It is no use trying to convince others with missionary zeal of the supposed inferiority of their own beliefs (1991, p.520).

Such expansive and all embracing notions are increasingly welcome to a world audience burdened with ostensibly irresolvable civil wars tinged with religious fervor.

Yet at the same time, the Dalai Lama's religious significance is tempered with all of the requirements of a modern, educated Western audience. Articles by and about him have appeared in periodicals such as Omni and Scientific American.⁷ He broaches topics with logic, objectivity, and lauds the achievements of science and progress. He encourages "free thinkers in the West" to explore the "spirit of open, critical inquiry that descends from...Buddha" (1981). He even goes so far as to concede that if science can disprove a Buddhist tenet beyond all reasonable doubt, then the Buddhist idea would be abandoned, and the scientific proof extolled (1985, p.45). The Dalai Lama has in recent years lectured at universities worldwide, including Oxford,

⁷ Harary, K. "Dalai Lama: his resolutions," Omni, 13, 1991, 66-70; Holloway, M. "Profile: the Dalai Lama--a subtle mind contemplates science," Scientific American, 265, 1991, 33-34.

Cornell, and Harvard. In his rhetoric, he juxtaposes the valued ancient traditions, which he maintains are part and parcel of the mortally endangered Tibetan culture, next to the latest scientific achievements and technological advancements. Through this linkage of the alien (Tibetan culture) with the familiar (Western science and technology), he makes the audience identify with himself, his people, and his cause. Through a marriage of scientific and religiously toned discourse, he makes people see the potential value in becoming actively involved in promoting the Tibetan issue.⁸

His popular recognition is at present the greatest leverage he has in placing global, especially Western, pressure on China to, as he puts it, ensure "the welfare and happiness of six million Tibetans in Tibet" (Norbu, 1991, p.352). On the other hand, Norbu suggests that it is equally clear that the Dalai Lama has a long way to go:

It may be argued that the Dalai Lama's lack of, if not the absence of, power to negotiate on equal terms with the Chinese is compensated by popular western pressure on China. This is doubtful, however, because the increase in western moral pressure on China since the mid 1980's coincided with the hardening Chinese position on the Tibetan question as an emotional reaction. This is not to suggest that popular western pressure must cease but the level of support has to be elevated to political and diplomatic actions in order to produce adequate impacts on the Chinese policy towards the Tibetan question.

⁸ For instance, with the advice of the Dalai Lama, and in hopes of gaining insight for Western medicine and science, neurosurgeons have examined the abilities of Tibetan monks to perform feats of unusual physical and mental prowess as a result of intense meditation in the ancient Tibetan Buddhist tradition (Goleman, D., Thurman, R., 1991, pp. vii-6).

Therefore it is clear that the popular pressure on politicians is necessary, but is as yet insufficient, for Western leaders to be motivated to actually put themselves on the line (at the level of President or Prime Minister) and confront China with the Dalai Lama's concerns. Yet headway is being made. In 1993 he was dubbed "a God who knows how to lobby," and it was noted that "fifteen years ago the Dalai Lama had difficulty obtaining a visa to visit America. Five years ago, the Foreign Office wavered before permitting him to enter Britain. But in the last two years he has been received by everyone from John Major to Vaclav Havel to George Bush" (Norman, 1993, p.18). To date, neither Bush nor President Clinton have used China's most favored nation (MFN) status as a leverage to promote rights for the Tibetans. However, the current trend in popular opinion, if it were to continue along its present trajectory, has potential for becoming influential in changing the MFN status of China, and, as a result, the situation in Tibet.

In his prolific lectures and writings, the Dalai Lama emphasizes the importance of understanding Tibet's struggle for self determination as a human struggle. The symbolic value of this is enormous, because it empowers his rhetoric in a unique way: by simplifying and reducing all national, cultural, political or religious disparities to a common denominator. "We are the same human beings. The purpose of our lives is happiness and satisfaction," he has said (1994).

Pressing further, he has also said that "...it may be helpful to look deeper into human nature. Then we can communicate better," (Harary, 1991). It appears as though he holds up Tibet, the once strictly isolationist nation, as the example to the world of the oppression and evil which can take place if all human beings fail to make vigilant efforts to communicate.

"He is a reluctant player on the world stage; but he also feels keenly that the position thrust upon him...is a grave responsibility" (Spectator, 1989). Given this position, it seems that he wishes, in his role as a skilled communicator himself, to teach the world, and for the human beings of the world, as his students, "to learn" from Tibet's isolationist mistakes "the bitter lesson that the world has grown too small for any people to live in harmless isolation" (Dalai Lama, 1960, p. 87). This isolation, we may infer, comes from improper, ineffective, propagandistic, or, even worse, from nonexistent international communication. Conversely, as rhetor, he attempts to turn this situation around, both for his countrymen and for those whom he calls "all sentient beings." Thus, as rhetor, he may serve as the paragon of open, clearly understood, and mutually beneficial communication.

Furthermore, the Dalai Lama, more than just aware of mutual understanding, is alert to the vagaries of international communication. For instance, in his first major book following his escape to exile, My Land and My

People, he observes the effects of the use of a single word on various audiences:

The Chinese [leadership] had an extraordinary way of mixing trivial demands with those of the highest importance...they insisted that the word "reactionaries" should always be used to describe the Khampas [one clan of Tibetans] who had taken arms against them. The word had a special emotional significance for Communists, but of course it had none for us. Everybody, in the government and out, began to use it as a synonym for guerrillas. To Communists, no doubt, it implied the height of wickedness, but we used it, on the whole, in admiration. It did not seem to matter to us or to the Khampas, what their fellow Tibetans called them; but later, when I innocently used the word in writing, it did cause confusion among our friends abroad (1962).

It is statements such as this that I will use as the cornerstones of my analysis; I will cover his persuasive efforts to "set the record straight" to the world about events which have occurred after China's invasion of Tibet, pinpointing rhetoric resulting from the recent crisis events in the late 1980s. First, I will critically examine his "Five-Point Plan" speech before members of the U.S. Congress in 1987. I will also study his Strasbourg speech of 1988, which augmented the five-point plan speech and "proposed...to have a local democratic system in association with China which controls Tibet's foreign relations and defense needs." These speeches are significant because they were acknowledged by both the West and by China as being influential enough to move the Dalai Lama's adherents in Lhasa, Tibet, to take to the streets in protest (Schwartz, 1994, pp. 7,8, 10, 28, 54,

225; Dreyer, 1989, p. 284; Roy, 1987, pp. 50-51; Gere and Thurman, 1987, p. 69). These protests led to riots in Tibet, which became fodder for news headlines around the world (Gargan, 1987, p.A1; Gargan, 1987, p. A-9; Wischmann, 1987, pp. 1118-1119; Deshingkar, 1989, pp. 18-19; Dreyer, 1989, pp. 281-289).

What did the Dalai Lama say that was persuasive enough to move people, under threat of death, to act? The Dalai Lama claims that it was merely the conditions in Tibet which caused the riots to erupt. But even if alleged conditions of human rights abuses exist, his speeches nonetheless proved effective in pushing the Tibetans to raise the illegal flag of Tibet in front of Chinese troops. At the same time, Western officials were put in the position of having to make some commentary regarding these riots and the Chinese actions in response to the riots. The Dalai Lama's words moved them all to action.

Each of the speeches discussed a newly proposed status for Tibet, one that establishes Tibet as a "zone of peace" in which China's control would be relinquished except for only foreign defense matters. According to Norbu, "...this 'new' arrangement entails not only granting Tibet a semi-independent status such as existed in Sino-Tibetan history between 1720 and 1911; it also calls for changing the ideological coloring of a Tibet Autonomous Region" (p.367). But surely such a proposal itself cannot have been earth shattering enough to instigate riots. I will attempt to show

that the way the Dalai Lama worded his messages added enough fuel to its content to arouse the people of Tibet's ancient capital city, while also complicating diplomatic ties between China and Western nations.

A Rhetoric of Simplicity

It is evident that the Dalai Lama has many rhetorical constraints stacked against him, most visibly those of history, political ideology, and the international desire to have China as a partner in trade. Investigating the way that the Dalai Lama has, to a large extent, overcome such awesome constraints is incumbent upon me in this rhetorical critique. The Dalai Lama's English has been described as "halting," therefore his strategy for communication must extend beyond mere language skills, and must rely more heavily upon universally accepted themes of humanity.⁹ As he stated in his 1993 autobiography, Freedom in Exile, "I have decided to tell my story in English...[even though] my ability to express myself in this language is limited. Furthermore, I am aware that some of the subtler implications of what I say may not be precisely what I intended..." Such an awareness of the impact of his words reveals his conscious effort to communicate (and to persuade) skillfully, even while he admits the inevitable degrees of human fallibility in

⁹"Setting aside his prepared text to speak in halting English about what he termed the 'universal responsibility' Americans should feel for conditions in Tibet, the Dalai Lama was greeted with applause and cheers..." Ifill, G. "Lawmakers cheer Tibetan in Capitol rotunda," *The New York Times*, April 19, 1991, A-7.

achieving mutual understanding. But while his simple choice of language and his emphasis on equalizing humanity quite possibly helps expand his international audience, it can also work against him when he must promote his cause to the influential echelons of global power politics which is so vital to his fight. He admits to this, saying,

One of my drawbacks...when I meet a president or a prime minister or a foreign secretary or just a beggar--to me there's not much difference. If I'm talking to an ordinary person who shows real interest in Tibet, I tend to do so just as if I was speaking with a big politician. Then, when I meet someone important, someone my advisors tell me I need to really impress, if [this person does not] show much interest, I find I cannot respond with much enthusiasm (Norman, 1993).

It is this humble attitude which often comes through in his speeches. Showing his sympathies as lying with the "ordinary person" is what helps promote identification between himself and his audience.

In my analysis I will concede and allow for the literary disadvantage of his rhetoric in English, coupled with the evident shortfalls of a Buddhist perspective in international politics (such as equalizing "a prime minister" with "a beggar"). I will analyze and explicate his language using rhetorical criticism, with the expectation of targeting mainly his use of patterns and structures, themes and symbols; exact word usage and poetics will not be at the forefront of my study. Also, given the voluminous nature of the Dalai Lama's rhetoric that is available for analysis, and

for the purpose of narrowing my study into a more lucid and realistic scope, I plan to concentrate primarily, but not exclusively, upon the most recent crisis phase in occupied Tibet which led to more specifically targeted and created rhetoric by The Dalai Lama at the time.

Of Rhetoric and Riots

Specifically, I will base this thesis upon the Dalai Lama's discourse prior to, and resulting from, the sudden Tibetan uprisings and subsequent alleged oppression of Tibetans by the Chinese authorities between 1987 and 1989. For although the alleged atrocities against the Tibetans by the Chinese have been reported as consistently ongoing for forty years (during this period of time an estimated 1.2 million Tibetans have allegedly been killed by the Chinese), these particular outbursts received unprecedented international acknowledgment because of the presence of foreign observers in Lhasa who could actually verify the events.

In December of 1987 the Dalai Lama replied that the riots in Lhasa occurred, not because of inflammatory statements he had made during a recent visit to the United States, but because of "the Chinese colonization of the Tibetan highlands. If the move to bring in a Chinese population is not stopped, Tibetans will soon be a minority in their own country, swamped by masses of Chinese settlers." He then added, alluding to the holocaust in Nazi Germany:

It is serious for us, for our culture, and for our ancestral heritage, and Tibetans realize it. In a way, it is a final solution to the Tibetan problem, Chinese style. If international opinion does not take notice, this will be the annihilation of the Tibetan people and its civilization" (emphasis added) (Buhner, 1987, p. 21).

But despite his refusal to acknowledge that his words pushed the Tibetans to protest, the international press and the Chinese assert otherwise. For this reason, I will examine the speeches which many claim to have helped foment the riots.

In these texts, it is the themes, symbols, and patterns of communication that I seek to explore through a survey of the Dalai Lama's rhetoric. In addition to rhetorical style and strategy, I will examine the ethical implications of the rhetoric. The Dalai Lama's cognizance of the mutual role of communicating and understanding one another points to a respect for his audience. He is clear in differentiating between respectful communication and one-sided communication. I intend to investigate his rhetoric carefully in order to see if this perceived and stated respect for a two-way flow of communication and mutually beneficial direction of communication is borne out in the rhetorical artifacts available for scrutiny.

Conclusion

Numerous essays, exposés, articles, interviews, film documentaries, and books exist about the Dalai Lama's life and his nation's trials. Yet to date, absolutely nothing has been written about the Dalai Lama specifically to investigate his enormous capacity as a rhetor. Moreover, his adept handling of persuasive discourse in a cross cultural, multimedia setting, and on an international stage, makes this lack of scholarly critique all the more astonishing. The rhetoric of the Dalai Lama merits study because it serves as a model in surmounting the rhetorical constraints of contemporary communication. Therefore, I propose to attack this study using the literature available, in order to open up in the field of communication what I believe will be a useful discussion of a remarkable rhetor.

The existing analyses of the political implications of the Dalai Lama's mission indicate he has made headway in developing a rapprochement with the Chinese in regard to the Tibetan question (Norbu, p.372). Popular media treatment of The Dalai Lama has made him a revered figure in the arena of the Western cult of personality. Tibetan studies experts agree his influence over Tibetans inside and outside of Tibet continues to be strong. My analysis will examine the Dalai Lama's rhetoric from the perspective of rhetorical criticism. This study of the Dalai Lama's dramatic speech will fall within Kenneth Burke's theoretical parameters. As part of the study of rhetorical criticism, the Dalai Lama's discourse

will be explicated in light of social movement theory as the speech of a charismatic leader of a social protest movement. The phenomenon of the Dalai Lama is likewise noteworthy for its precedent of miraculously maintaining from an expatriate position the organization and support required to propel the movement successfully. Also, as part of the rhetorical analysis, I will study how the Dalai Lama's discourse encompasses international and cross cultural components. I will look at ways that the Dalai Lama's rhetoric features the ability to surmount barriers which normally impede communication--an unrivaled capacity which allows him to cross fluidly into the persuasive realm of diverse cultures, languages, and world views.

CHAPTER TWO
ANCIENT PAST, UNCERTAIN PRESENT

The History of Tibet

This chapter will impart two important pieces of information. First, I will present a summary of Tibetan history, and second, based upon an understanding of that history, I will present an analysis of the different interpretations of Tibet's history as they relate to the Dalai Lama's discourse and the positions he takes on historiographical issues. For the purposes of this study, Tibet's long and intricate recorded history will be divided into six distinct periods of rule and development. The time line in Figure 1 below shows the main points of historical import from these six periods. The following discussion of Tibet's history will tersely cover the points in Tibetan history which bear most heavily upon the Dalai Lama's discourse.

Phase One: The Rise of Kings and of Buddhism in Tibet

The first period of Tibet's recorded history begins in 500 C.E. and runs through the mid-800s; this era "roughly coincides" with China's T'ang dynasty (618-905) (Goodman, 1986, p. 121). Tibet's history as a united nation began in 617 C.E. Reaching a peak of influence during the reign of King Songtsen Gampo, for the next two hundred years,

History of Tibet: Important Historic Milestones

Note: Timeline not drawn to scale.




Figure 1. Key Events in Tibetan History in Relation to Chinese History

"Tibet's central Asian empire dominated parts of India, Nepal...Burma to the South, Sinkiang to the North, China to the East, and ...parts of present day Pakistan to the west" (p.121). By the 700s, Buddhism, which had already taken hold in India, started to permeate Tibetan culture via trade routes. During the eighth century, various Tibetan rulers fought over the supremacy between the Bon, which was an early Tibetan shamanistic religion, and Buddhism. In an overview of Tibetan history, Grunfeld notes that "despite the small victories of the forces of Bon, Buddhism continued to make major strides, particularly during the reign of King Ralpachen, from 815-38 (1987, p.34).

In 821-823, a pact of nonaggression defined Sino-Tibetan boundaries. In particular, the agreement declared that "all to the east is the country of Great China and all to the west is...the country of Great Tibet" (Goodman, 1986, p. 121). This treaty was called the "Treaty of Uncle and Nephew," and it would set the stage for later historical developments between Tibet and China (Grunfeld, 1987, p. 34). Evidence of this treaty exists in the form of a stone pillar that was erected at the foot of the Potala palace in Lhasa, Tibet at the time of the treaty; the pillar is carved with the terms of the agreement.¹⁰

In 842 King Lang Darma, who was an opponent of Buddhism, was assassinated, which caused the united Tibetan kingdom to

¹⁰ After 1959, the Chinese moved the pillar to a walled-in compound at a site distant from the Potala.

disintegrate into "numerous tribes, principalities and regional hegemonies that were constantly at war with each other" (Grunfeld, 1987, p. 35). By this time, nonetheless, Buddhism was growing as the main religion of Tibet. During the next four hundred years, China's declining T'ang dynasty would recover most of the provinces ruled by Tibet under Lang Darma. Thereafter, any "contact between the two nations was limited...to frontier clashes" and periodic trade, religious, and diplomatic relations (Goodman, 1986, p. 122).

Phase Two: Mongol Rule Over Tibet

The second era into which I have divided Tibetan history for this discussion involves the overrunning and subsequent expulsion from Tibet of the Mongol armies of Genghis Khan's clan; this phase lasted from about 1239 to 1350. During this period of time the Mongols strengthened trade routes along the Silk Road, thereby increasing social exchanges among Mongolia, China, and Tibet. Similar to the uncle-nephew agreement described above, Mongol-ruled Tibet formed the beginnings of a "priest-patron" system, in which highly placed religious lamas offered their Buddhist teachings in return for the power and security of being closely associated with Mongol rulers (1987, p. 37). Tieh-Tseng Li, a historian of Tibetan history and politics, notes that "Kublai Khan found the...Tibetans hard to rule, and resolved to reduce them to a condition of docility through the influence of religion. Buddhism was reaffirmed as the religion best

calculated to [do so]...as it had already secured a firm foothold there" (1960, p. 19).

This theocratic and vassal system would continue even after Tibet and China had expelled the Mongols, and would last throughout the Qing Dynasty (van Walt van Praag, 1990, p. 67). At the end of this era, in approximately 1358, Manchu China and Tibet regained their respective territories that had been controlled during the Mongol rule.

Phase Three: The Legacy of Tsong Khapa

Between 1337 and 1338, an Indian leader named Muhammad Tughluq attempted to undertake a military campaign to overtake Tibet and potentially China (Li, 1960, p. 23). Tughluq's campaign failed as Tibetan mountaineers fended off up to 100,000 soldiers on Himalayan passes, leaving a few stragglers to return to India (p. 23). The Indian conquest thus foiled, "the emperors at [Beijing] could comfortably afford to leave the Tibetans alone and not meddle in their affairs" (p. 24). From 1350 to 1642, Tibet was ruled by its own nobles and theocratic establishment. This period was characterized, however, by sporadic diplomatic, religious, and trade relations with China.

From approximately 1357 to 1417, Tibet's ruler was Tsong Khapa. Tsong Khapa reasserted the influence of Buddhism on the Tibetan people by reforming Buddhists into the Gelugpa sect and by ordering the construction of Ganden, Sera and Drepung monasteries, each of which housed between three and

seven thousand monks. These monasteries would become the most influential seats of Tibetan power and government. Tsong Khapa's legacy as a religious leader and reincarnated lama formed the foundation for the reign of the Dalai Lamas (Grunfeld, 1987, pp. 38-39). Tsong Khapa worked to refine Tibetan Buddhism so that its teachings resembled more closely its Indian roots. At the same time, Buddhist tenets were also incorporated into political structures as well. For example, the tenet of reincarnation assumed temporal meanings. As a central Buddhist belief, reincarnation refers to "the cycle of birth and death [which] is repeated until the individual becomes enlightened... When [enlightenment] happens, the cycle... ceases and the individual may enter nirvana" (Layman, 1976, p. 10). So, during Tsong Khapa's reign, to ensure a concentration of Gelugpa power in succeeding rulers, the ancient concept of reincarnation was expanded so that it could be understood in a political sense. Thus reincarnation, as existing in conjunction with temporal rule, assumed political overtones (Grunfeld, 1987, p. 38). In addition, other nonviolent beliefs of Buddhism also became augmented in order to fashion the existing political structure. Following rules of nonviolence, for instance, helped keep the monks and peasants compliant to the leaders' rule (pp. 38-39). This political and religious melange set the stage for the line of Dalai Lamas which extends to Tenzin Gyatso, the present day's Fourteenth Dalai Lama. Regents handled the affairs of state during periods between the death

of a Dalai Lama and the discovery and appointment of the next reincarnation.

The title of Dalai Lama is in fact Mongolian in origin.¹¹ The third Dalai Lama was bestowed with this title when, during a visit to Altan Khan in 1578, he converted the Khan to Buddhism. From 1644 to 1911, Tibet garnered the position of being a self-run state under the protectorate agreement with China that China would extend defenses, when necessary, to fend off any Mongol invaders. The first part of this phase lasted until 1720, when the Manchus gained control of Tibet and Beijing. Until then, the Dalai Lama rulers became increasingly established. The religious and temporal role and symbolism of the Dalai Lama was as a leader

of the Buddhist church and the administration of the country. He is an emanation of the bodhisattva Chenresi, the patron saint of Tibet who has returned to earth to guide [humankind] on the path to salvation. Normally he assumed his temporal rule at the age of eighteen, and his authority in both spheres was in theory absolute; as a divinity ruling on earth there can be no direct opposition to his orders... The dual nature of the Dalai Lama's position was reflected in the governmental structure beneath him, which was divided into two branches, one civil and the other monastic. Each consisted of approximately 175 officials, but during the last two decades of [alleged] Tibetan independence, from 1930 to 1950, there were approximately 200 of the former and 230 of the latter (Goodman, 1986, p. 81).

¹¹ The title of Dalai Lama encompasses many ideas: "Dalai Lama Vajradhara:" dalai, Mongolian for ocean; lama, Tibetan for priest; and vajradhara, Sanskrit for holder of the thunderbolt...Tibetans...usually call their leader "Gyalwa Rinpoche," [meaning] "Victorious One;" "Kyabngon Rinpoche," [meaning] "Precious Protector," or the "Wish Fulfilling Gem" who never dies but "goes to heavenly fields for the benefit of other living creatures" (Grunfeld, 1987, p.39).

The first officially sanctioned Dalai Lama was Gedun Truppa (1391-1474), who was designated as the reincarnation of Tsong Khapa. By the time of the fourth Dalai Lama, the institution of Dalai Lama as religious leader was "undisputed," (p.39). The fifth Dalai Lama, Ngwang Gyatso (1617-82), known to Tibetans as the "Great Fifth," was the first religious leader to also gain temporal powers. Following his death, a regent ruled for many years until the sixth Dalai Lama, Tsangyang Gyatso (1682-1707), was found. The sixth Dalai Lama, known as the "Merry One," was a notorious libertine. The sixth's reputation was enough cause for concern that religious leaders sought a replacement for him, but the Tibetans always viewed the originally named lama as the true one (Grunfeld, 1987, p. 41).

The seventh Dalai Lama, Kelzang Gyatso (1708-58), ascended to the throne in 1720, and, over time, markedly increased the temporal powers associated with the role of the Dalai Lama (p. 43). Table 1 below lists all of the Dalai Lamas, noting where possible their historical significance, and their dates of rule.¹²

In 1788, a portion of Tibet was overtaken by the Gurkhas of Nepal. The Tibetans negotiated to pay off the Gurkhas to get them to leave, which they did. But the Tibetans failed to pay the debt, and the Gurkhas returned in 1791 (Li, 1960,

¹² Little is known about the Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Dalai Lamas (Goodman, 1986, p. 84).

	Dalai Lama and Historical Significance	Dates of Rule
	Tsong Khapa · Founded the Gelugpa, or Yellow Hat sect.	1357 - 1417
1	Gedün Truppa · Close disciple of Tsong Khapa who strengthened Yellow Hat sect.	
2	Gedün Gyatso · Propagated Gelugpa faith.	1475 - 1542
3	Sonam Gyatso · Was the first to gain title of Dalai Lama.	1543 - 1588
4	Yonten Gyatso	1589 - 1617
5	Ngwang Lozang Gyatso · Known as "The Great Fifth." · Constructed the Potala Palace in Lhasa.	1617 - 1682
6	Tsangyang Gyatso · Known as "The Merry One" for his rakish behavior.	1682 - 1707
7	Kesang Gyatso · Increased the temporal power of the Dalai Lama as a leader.	1708 - 1758
8	Jampal Gyatso	1758 - 1804
9	Luntok Gyatso	1806 - 1815
10	Tsultrim Gyatso	1816 - 1837
11	Khendrup Gyatso	1838 - 1856
12	Trinley Gyatso	1856 - 1875
13	Thupten Gyatso · Fled to exile in India and declares Tibet independent from China.	1876 - 1933
14	Tenzin Gyatso · Awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his nonviolent protest leadership. · Has been instrumental in successfully leading and organizing the Tibetan Diaspora's move into modern life in exile while preserving Tibetan culture and customs.	1935 -

Table 1. Tibet's Dalai Lamas

p. 52). The Chinese army was summoned to repel the Gurkhas. The Gurkhas were defeated. The weakened Tibetan theocracy was subjugated to the Chinese Emperor, and the Dalai and Panchen Lamas were nominally compelled to "report to the [Chinese] Residents and ask their orders" (p. 53).

It was during this period of time that the system of selecting reincarnations showed a tendency to cull discovered incarnations from noble families, such as the female child incarnation of the Grand Lama Cheptsundampa (pp. 57-58). As a consequence, under Chinese mandate, for a short time the selection process was substituted with "the drawing of lots" in cases where there was more than one contender for high offices such as Dalai Lama or Panchen Lama (p. 58). This period of Chinese influence lasted until the early nineteenth century, when the Sino-Anglo Opium War in China virtually ended Chinese influence in Tibet (p. 59).

Phase Four: The Europeans Arrive and Suzerainty Is Confirmed

By the turn of the nineteenth century, the Russians and British vied for influence over Tibet. "From 1895 to 1911, Tibet was to become a pawn in the struggle for world domination between London and St. Petersburg" (Grunfeld, 1987, p. 48). Aside from geographical "explorations and surveys...and...interests in trade...Russia's chief connection with Tibet was through [the] Buriat subjects who were followers of the Yellow Hat sect" (Li, 1960, p. 84).

In the mid 1800s, the Chinese Manchu empire was in decline and its influence on Tibet and the selection of theocratic succession was reduced to token approval by the Emperor (Li, 1960, p. 59). In 1855, Tibet was again invaded by the Gurkhas, and although China's power had been greatly weakened, the Chinese Emperor once more sent troops to defend Tibet. An agreement was arrived at in 1856, stipulating that both Tibet and Nepal would "acknowledge allegiance to the ... Emperor of China" (p. 61).

But by 1865 in Tibet, a "transfer of...real power to the Dalai Lama" was taking place (Li, 1960, p. 64). In addition to power, Tibet was also able to regain border territory (p. 62). China's influence on Tibet and neighboring countries was rapidly eliminated through a series of agreements, including Chinese recognition of British control over Sikkim in 1890 and the protocol of 1901 between European countries and China's Imperial Court (p. 63).

In 1903, Lord Curzon, British Viceroy to India, "ordered a military expedition to Tibet under Colonel Francis Younghusband" (Goodman, 1986, p. 124). The mission having been accomplished, the British then initiated the Lhasa Convention, which established British trade on the Tibet-Sikkim border and also stipulated that the British would have final control over Tibet's interaction in foreign affairs, including relations with China (Goodman, p. 125; van Walt van Praag, 1990, p. 67). While Russia had to settle for limited trade access in Tibet, the Convention's definition of Tibet

as a buffer state among India, British controlled territories, and Russia, was acknowledged by Russia as acceptable (Li, 1960, pp. 120-123).

Following the brief invasion of Tibet by British troops in 1903-1904, the "suzerainty" arrangement of the early Twentieth century, like the former protector-protected system, was established with China. Political scientist Gary Bullert defines suzerainty as follows: "Under international law, a suzerain state acts as an international guardian while the vassal state is given internal autonomy or self-governance" (1986, p.35). In this case, the "suzerain state" was China and the "vassal state" was Tibet.

Tibet's suzerainty arrangement was the agreement between China and Tibet that each should remain separately peopled and ruled nations, with the distinction that, should Tibet (as a small and peaceful nation lacking a military) require assistance in defense of foreign attack, that China would aid Tibet. In exchange for this protective service, Tibet would pay tributes and monies periodically to the rulers of China, such as that paid to China when the Fourteenth Dalai Lama was first chosen as the reincarnation of his predecessor. The Chinese only released the designated child incarnation to travel to Lhasa after the Tibetan government paid a ransom consisting of a full set of religious writings and a large sum of money (Li, 1960, pp.177-180).

The suzerainty arrangement was acknowledged by Great Britain and India by treaty at the 1913 Conference at Simla.

Goldstein's research confirms that the "British Foreign Office...examined the meaning of suzerainty... [and] concluded that all the evidence showed that Tibet was not merely a portion of China, but, rather, had a clear international identity of [its] own" (1989, p. 716). According to British delegates, Tibet's delegates to the Simla Conference represented an "independent nation recognizing no allegiance to China" (van Walt van Praag, 1990, p. 68). Because Chinese delegates refused to sign the treaty, Tibet's delegates and the British signed a Joint Declaration which "bound themselves not to recognize Chinese suzerainty or special rights in Tibet unless China signed the...Simla Convention" (van Walt van Praag, 1990, p. 69). Following the Simla Conference, Tibet's international relations involved the "British, Chinese, Nepalese, and Bhutanese...When India became independent, the British mission in Lhasa was replaced by an Indian one" (van Walt van Praag, 1990, p. 69).

Great Britain's Sir Arthur Henry McMahon presided over the Simla Conference, and the British proposal of establishing new mountain borders along Tibet's western, or outer Tibet region, was instituted as the McMahon Line (Li, 1960, pp. 135-140). It was not until 1949 that China's government (as yet not Communist) "denounced" the Simla Conference and "repudiated...[any] validity" to the document which was signed (p. 142).

Phase Five: Left Alone

In the fifth period of Tibet's past, from 1914 to 1950, Tibet was essentially left to its own devices and remained purposefully aloof from the rest of the world. Even the First and Second World Wars went largely unnoticed by Tibet, which remained neutral (van Walt van Praag, 1990, p. 69). Tibet escaped, by and large, the influences of the modern world in the first part of the twentieth century for three reasons. First, Tibet had its Himalayan passes as natural barriers that required enormous diplomatic and financial investments on the part of interested parties wishing to cross over them to gain access to Tibet. Second, Tibet's most powerful neighbors, including Russia, China, and British controlled India, were experiencing great turmoil internally, which diverted their attentions inwards, and away from Tibet. Third, Tibet's ruling administration, having been burned by the recent past's British and Chinese incursions into their nation, exercised an extremely strict isolationist policy, and kept any contact whatsoever with foreign persons and diplomats to a bare minimum.¹³ Consequently, before, during, and after World Wars I and II, little or none of the diplomatic exchanges or technological advancements such as electricity or automobiles reached Tibet--apart from the

¹³ Heinrich Harrer, in his book Seven Years in Tibet, recounts the great physical barriers presented by the Tibetan topography and the administrative obstacles put up by Tibetan magistrates who attempted to keep him out of the country during the early 1940s.

Dalai Lama's own experiences with such novelties which were otherwise rare to nonexistent in Tibet.

Inside Tibet, with the death of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama in 1933, the theocratic government was in uproar. Indeed, "at one time the Tibetan political situation was so tense that civil war seemed quite possible" (Li, 1960, p. 165). Despite Chinese overtures for administrative and military support during this period of crisis, Tibet's "Lhasa authorities were not yet ready to place their trust and reliance on the Chinese government of the day" (p. 170). Eventually a degree of peace was restored among Tibet's ruling factions. By 1940, the newly selected incarnation of the Dalai Lama had been installed at the Potala (p. 183). In the interim between the death of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama and the succession of this Fourteenth Dalai Lama, the Regent maintained the affairs of state in Tibet. In the mean time, the child lama undertook a period of arduous religious and academic studies.

It was not until the late 1940s that Tibet's Regent and administration began to realize the importance of developing external allies. In 1947 India gained independence from Great Britain; this loss of British control meant for Tibet the loss of a close relation with a power that had consistently acted on Tibet's behalf--albeit for British interests--to maintain Tibet as a buffer state with regard to Russia and China. India's position toward Tibet would remain similar to the previously held British position only for a

short time under Mr. Nehru.¹⁴ In addition, with the sudden growth of Mao's power in China, coupled with his promises of gaining Taiwan and Tibet as territories, the Tibetans saw the need to begin opening up lines of communication with the outside world.¹⁵

Most notable in Tibetan attempts to rectify their extreme isolationism was the Tibetan trade mission, whose purpose was to secure diplomatic ties through agreements with foreign nations to expand their respective trade markets in Tibet (Goldstein, 1989, p. 572). The mission's goals were also to buy "gold abroad to secure Tibet's currency" and "to gain direct access to foreign currency" (p. 571).¹⁶ The trade mission failed on all accounts. In their lack of diplomatic powers and their "refusal to recognize the new Indian government as Britain's successor," the mission offended India (p. 574). The Tibetan trade mission's next obstacle was its attempt to deal with the British, who "now preferred to avoid... entanglements in Sino-Tibetan politics and did

¹⁴ Li maintains that at the Asiatic Conference in 1947, separate delegations for China and Tibet were received by India, and there was displayed "a hug map of Asia on which Tibet was drawn outside the boundary of China" (p. 195).

¹⁵ According to Gary Bullert, "In early January, 1950, Marshall Chu Teh, Vice-Chairman of the People's Republic, announced the [planned] 'liberation of Tibet.' Mao Tse-Tung spoke of the forthcoming invasion of Tibet in June, 1950" (1986, p. 21).

¹⁶ For China's part, research indicates that The Chinese had two basic goals with regard to the Tibetan mission: first, either to dissuade them from visiting America and England, or, if this were not possible, to entice them into using Chinese passports; and, second, to induce them...to attend the upcoming National Assembly meeting that was being convened to elect a president and vice-president (Goldstein, 1989, pp. 579 - 580).

not want to go out of [their] way to aid or encourage Tibet in its struggle to maintain its de facto independence" (p. 576). While the British allowed the mission to pass through Hong Kong, the mission was prevented from visiting England (p. 576).

Lastly, the trade mission attempted to negotiate with the United States through the U.S. Embassy in Delhi, India, but the U.S. by then affirmed its support of "China's sovereignty over Tibet" and refused to enter into formal negotiations unless the Tibetans would trade in their Tibetan passports for Chinese passports. In the absence of China's sanctioning of the mission's trip, the U.S. would only offer them "an informal reception" (p. 578). Not long after the trade mission visited China, it sought to visit the U.S. Like Great Britain, the U.S. "State Department saw no reason to alienate the Chinese and precipitate a major diplomatic incident by ignoring Chinese wishes and treating the Tibetans as a mission from an independent nation" (p. 585). Through the State Department's use of administrative loopholes regarding visas, the Tibetans were able to visit the U.S. on their Tibetan passports. But they were unable to meet with President Truman as they had been led to believe they would be able to, since the stipulation for a meeting was that the mission be accompanied by the Chinese ambassador. The Tibetans refused such an arrangement, and instead met alone with Secretary of State Marshall. Unable to purchase U.S. gold, the mission left and traveled to London (again, via

finagled visas on Tibetan Government passports). The English refused to enter into currency dealings, and the mission returned to India empty handed (pp. 598 - 604). There, after lengthy negotiations, they were able to procure \$250,000 for the purchase of American gold bullion (p. 606).

Meanwhile, a publicity campaign to inform the world about Tibet was introduced by Lowell Thomas (an American) and his son. Thomas's "dramatic visit and the broadcasting records he made during his stay in Tibet, and the statement he issued on his return, aroused great interest in the Tibetan situation and produced ...comment throughout the world" (Li, 1960, p. 200). The Austrian mountain climber and explorer, Heinrich Harrer, also made efforts in Europe on behalf of Tibet, including writing his best-selling book, Seven Years in Tibet, which was published in many languages. But in the end, the Tibetans' belated efforts at securing allies through publicity, trade, and diplomacy proved fruitless. In a last ditch effort at isolation, they expelled all Chinese from Tibet in 1949 (Goldstein, 1989, pp. 613 - 614). But Mao's threats were to be realized in 1950, when the Communist Red Army crossed into Tibetan territory and began to engage in bloody skirmishes easily won over the ill equipped and outnumbered Tibetan Khampas (Bullert, 1986, p. 23).

Phase Six: The Cultural Revolution and Subsequent Reform in Tibet

The sixth phase of Tibetan history begins with the invasion (or liberation) of Tibet by China in 1950 and continues to the present day. It was during this time frame that the Dalai Lama experienced the final transition of Tibet from a nation isolated from Chinese control to a nation that was to become merely another portion of China's vast countryside and administration. So while the rest of the world turned its attention to the start of the Korean War, in 1950-1951, the small, Tibetan bands of poorly armed and equipped Khampas were quickly overcome by Mao's Red Army troops. Finally, the Chinese troops marched into Lhasa to assume control over the ancient theocratic regime of which the young Dalai Lama was the head.

The issue of suzerainty was one of the most significant reasons for the lack of foreign support for Tibet in fending off the Chinese. The Indian and Western understanding of Tibet's relation to China through suzerainty created the perfect opportunity for the Chinese to invade and for India and the West to look the other way. Tibet's suzerainty arrangement was complicated because the Chinese did not actually sign the Simla agreement.¹⁷ The Simla agreement

¹⁷ Norbu claims that China's refusal to ratify the Simla Conference was due to

...the Sino-Tibetan failure to reach an agreement on the China-Eastern Tibetan frontier. China pressed for a common boundary through Gyam-da, only about 125 miles from Lhasa... [which] shows that the early Chinese Republican government...conceded to the British division of Tibet into

formally established, in terms of modern international law, that Tibet was a vassal state with its own "internal sovereignty and self-governance." Even though, by most accounts, this Tibetan de facto autonomy was the case, China's refusal to sign proved critical. In 1949, protecting Tibet's suzerain status was thus easily dismissed by Great Britain and India at the time when an invasion of Tibet by Chinese troops loomed ahead.¹⁸

The questionable clarity of the suzerainty concept enabled the transfer of Tibet back into China's tight rein. With the arrival of the Chinese troops in 1950-1951, Tibet appealed, to no avail, to the United Nations for help. One reason why help was not forthcoming was that all Chinese reports of the suzerainty relationship were altered to stop any international outcry. Any Chinese documentation changed all references of suzerainty by translating them as "sovereignty" (Bullert, 1986, p. 24). In this manner, China became the supreme controller, instead of friendly protector of Tibet, all according to international law. Political

two spheres of influence...that of the Chinese (inner Tibet) and that of the British (outer Tibet) (1987, p. 274).

¹⁸ Great Britain's and India's ignoring the Simla Treaty was possible because since China had not signed at Simla, India and Britain's own agreement over Tibet's status was deemed politically inexpedient to affirm (Altschiller, 1994, p.192):

Contrary to charges of British imperialism...Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India, stated that the British didn't want Tibet and preferred to have the Chinese protect it against Russia as a northern buffer for India. Curzon regarded suzerainty of China over Tibet to be a "constitutional fiction," not actual control, utilized only for convenience of both the British and the Chinese (Bullert, 1986, p.35).

scientist Julian Weiss states that "when Britain and India chose to obstruct rather than support the Tibetan appeal for help, nothing was done. Lhasa did not even receive a reply to its last agonized telegram to the U.N. requesting neutral observers to be sent to Tibet to confirm that they were in fact being invaded by the Communist Chinese" (p.388). The United Nations, then, had apparently accepted the Chinese translations and the attendant meaning change from suzerainty to sovereignty.

The years of 1950 to 1959 are sometimes referred to as a "honeymoon" period. During this time frame, while there was building tension and anxiety about China's takeover of Tibet, there was also a good deal of attendant hope for progress and modernization of Tibet. But as the years passed, Chinese officials increasingly usurped Tibetan administrative powers. This became a source of frustration and anger for both Tibetans and Chinese. The Tibetan theocratic establishment, headed by the kashag (Tibet's cabinet of elder statesmen) and the teenaged Dalai Lama, felt their powers rapidly eroding. This reduction in power was keenly felt by the kashag, who were ordered to be replaced or to resign when they showed signs of intransigence. At the same time, the frustrations of the Tibetan people were reaching a peak because they were undergoing food shortages which had never been experienced before, as well as sudden price inflation due to the presence of the large numbers of troops in the formerly sparsely populated country. Meanwhile, the Chinese could not grasp

why the "backward" Tibetans stalled all Chinese attempts to enable Tibet to be modernized by communism.

The Tibetans and Chinese came to loggerheads in early March of 1959, when the Dalai Lama was invited to attend a theatrical performance at the Chinese generals' headquarters in Lhasa. The Tibetans feared foul play, and converged around the Potala to protect the Dalai Lama and to prevent him from attending the performance. At least ten thousand Tibetans in Lhasa crowded around the Potala palace to protect the Dalai Lama from what they believed would be his kidnapping by Chinese leaders (Grunfeld, 1987, pp.130-133; Barber, 1960, pp.106-107). The throngs of Tibetans were of course problematic to the Chinese generals, whose troops ordered them to disperse. But the crowd refused to leave. This went on for days. Finally, fearing that the troops would open fire on the crowds and the palace, the Dalai Lama and his entourage and family were able to slip out through the crowds and journey over the Himalayan passes into India, unseen by Chinese search planes overhead (anonymous, The New York Times, 1959, p.A-12). The Dalai Lama has remained exiled in India ever since.

The history of Tibet from 1959 through to 1976 parallels that of China during this time. Propaganda and political indoctrination campaigns, massive destruction of cultural icons, religious establishments, monasteries, villages, and families have been widely documented and are acknowledged by Western, Tibetan and, more recently, Chinese historians and

government officials alike. Hundreds of thousands, and perhaps even millions, of Tibetans and Chinese were killed in the process of Mao's Cultural Revolution. There was widespread collaboration by Tibetans with the Chinese administration. Those Tibetans who were not killed or who would not collaborate fled into exile into India, Nepal, Burma, Bhutan, and some ended up in European countries or in the United States. The steady stream of refugees from Tibet continues to pour over the Himalayas to this day, causing problems for India politically in terms of its relations with China, and socially and culturally, in terms of clashes between Tibetan refugees and many Indians who resent the Tibetans' incursion into India.

Border conflicts resurged during this period and continue to exist along the Himalayas. There was a border war in 1962 between India and China; border territories still remain in dispute. Also, "with the fall of Tibet there has been an intense... arms race between India and China. From both sides there has been a progressive diversion of scarce resources... to arms building" (Norbu, 1987, p. 289).

At Mao's death in 1976, and during Deng Xiaoping's subsequent rise to power, efforts were begun to redress the excesses which had occurred in Tibet as elsewhere in China. Culminating with newly instituted religious freedoms in the 1980s, the Tibetans were given more rights, and even tax breaks, in order to restore order in the poor regions of the former Tibet, especially in the Tibetan Autonomous Region

(TAR), or outer Tibet. Gradual reform measures, however, have taken place in Tibet more slowly than they have in the rest of China. Nonetheless, religious freedoms have slowly and incrementally been restored; even if they are severely restricted, their allowance is in stark contrast to the outright banning of any religious activity which characterized the 1960s up through the mid 1970s.

At the same time, the unproductive and unworkable results of communist farming collectives have been recognized by the Chinese leaders in Beijing. During the past decade, land has been returned to peasants to rent and farm, and nomads are, comparatively speaking, more free to roam Tibet as they have done traditionally.¹⁹ Schools, roads, airports, administrative facilities, hotels and restaurants have been constructed, and other material signs of infrastructure modernization have taken place in Tibet since China's takeover in 1950. The influx of Chinese settlers in Tibetan regions due to job, wage, and housing incentives offered by the Chinese central government has allegedly made Tibetans a distinct minority in Tibet; the exact population figures

¹⁹ Some reforms have backfired. Schwartz maintains that The resurgence of the natural economy where Tibetan producers cling to their self-sufficient ownership [i.e., minimal consumption of goods]... is an undesirable outcome of the reform policies of the 1980s. The same is true for the revival of traditional religion, which consumes economic resources and reinforces the traditional way of life and traditional modes of production. The expanding Chinese market economy is... used as a standard against which Tibetan cultural attitudes are measured (1994, p. 200).

The Chinese are thus confounded when Tibetans continue to pour their meager salaries into rebuilding monasteries instead of buying goods from the market. The TAR continues to operate at a deficit.

regarding numbers of Chinese and Tibetans in inner and outer Tibet remains unclear.²⁰

Figurehead of an Historic Dispute

Tenzin Gyatso was born in the Tibetan village of Takster in 1935. In a tradition spanning the centuries, he was selected as Dalai Lama at the age of two by high official monks following the mysterious omens and directives given by Tibet's state oracle. After the child had passed a series of tests which confirmed he was the reincarnation of his predecessor, he was taken from his peasant family and instituted at the capital of Tibet, Lhasa, where he was to begin an eighteen-year long education in the philosophy of metaphysics, religion, and the affairs of running the government of Tibet. But his life of peaceful study and preparations for assuming full control of leadership was abruptly curtailed.²¹ At the age of fifteen, he was catapulted into leadership of the nation due to the arrival of Chinese Communist Army troops in 1950-1951. For nearly a decade, the Dalai Lama attempted to deal with the Chinese, and was able to maintain an uneasy alliance in the interests

²⁰ Zhu Li writes in the Beijing Review (October 12, 1987) that, "according to 1986 statistics, there were 2,024,938 people in the whole region, of whom 1,937,379 were Tibetans. The 73,534 Hans accounted for only 3.6 percent of the total population..." (p.4). Yet reliable Western sources as well as the Tibetan government in exile dispute these figures. In addition, when Zhu Li does not specifically refer to the TAR, and instead only mentions "the whole region" in general the boundaries for assessing Tibetan population counts is also in dispute.

²¹ Traditionally, a Regent headed up the affairs of state until the young Dalai Lama had passed his doctoral examinations. But in the case of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, the urgency of the situation speeded up the transfer of power from the Regent to the Dalai Lama.

of his people. He traveled with the Panchen Lama to Beijing to attend meetings and diplomatic events. He was also able to make a trip to India, during which time he made the acquaintance of Mr. Nehru and other Indian ministers.

Increasingly, however, he found the administrative powers of his cabinet, or Kashag, abridged by the Chinese leaders' threats and manipulation. Finally, in 1959 he fled Tibet following the uprising of Tibetans in Lhasa against the Communist Chinese.

The above sketch of Tibet's history having been completed, the next section of this chapter will examine the Dalai Lama's stance on Tibet's history. The following section provides an analysis of how history is used by the Dalai Lama (and to a lesser extent, his rhetorical adversaries) to persuade audiences of the veracity and importance of certain claims regarding events in Sino-Tibetan history.

Interpreting History: Two Views

History is paramount in the debate over the status of Tibet. Goldstein correctly observes that

Two diametrically opposing views of Tibet's status vis-à-vis China have dominated both the popular and the scholarly literature. The pro-Tibetan school argues that Tibet had been an independent state conquered by the Chinese Communists and was wrongly incorporated into the Chinese state. The pro-Chinese school sees Tibet as a traditional part of China...which was rightly reunited with China in 1951. In both schools, impartiality often takes third place to polemical oratory and political expedience, with selected international events used

in isolation to substantiate one position or the other (1989, pp.xix-xx).

The "pro-Tibet school" rhetoric is found in most Western media and academic treatments; the "pro-Chinese school" rhetoric is found, first, among Chinese leadership, and, through the lack of action on behalf of Tibet or through tacit support of China, in Western and Indian political levels. The significance of this historical cleft has created an obstacle to dialogue between the Dalai Lama himself and the Chinese leadership.²² The "pro-Tibet

²² Dawa Norbu explains the importance of the historical issue to the present and future communication between the Dalai Lama and Chinese leadership:

Chinese hard-liners object to the very concept of independence that might have existed in the pre-1950 Tibetan history...The [Chinese] pragmatists, however, particularly Deng Xiaopeng and Hu Yaobang, might have been contented with the Dalai Lama's acceptance of the fact that since 1950 China had gained sovereignty over Tibet and that it is on that basis that he wishes to negotiate an 'associate' status for Tibet. The pragmatists would realistically reason that the possibility of future Tibetan independence--as a result of the Dalai Lama's claim that Tibet prior to the Communist takeover in 1950 was independent--is rather slim because China continues to be the third military power in the world...and the possibility of armed external intervention on behalf of the Tibetans is most unlikely... (p.367).

Yet the Dalai Lama has been so bold as to play up this latter possibility during the Gulf War, when he lauded the United States coming to the defenses of Kuwait as a small, independent nation, with the obvious implications of comparing Tibet's invasion in 1950 to Kuwait's in 1991. As one article in The Economist put it: "If Kuwait deserves liberation from an aggressor, why not Tibet? The question enrages China...Yet it is a question raised with increasing effect by Tibet's exiled spiritual Leader, the Dalai Lama" (emphasis added)(April 27, 1991,p.41). It may seem especially curious that the Dalai Lama praised U.S. military action because war's violence is paradoxical to the his stated nonviolent (Buddhist) stance for conflict resolution. On the other hand, the Dalai Lama maintains that, "According to the Buddhist view point, result and motivation are more important than method... The main difficulty in such cases is determining after serious and careful consideration whether there is any possible alternative to violence" (Goodman, 1986, p. 327).

school," led by the Dalai Lama, claims the Chinese have "attempted to rewrite the history of Tibet to serve their own purposes" (Weiss, 1989, p. 395). The Chinese say otherwise, and the tacit acceptance of Chinese moves by Western diplomatic corps serves to back the Chinese leadership's position.²³

Certainly, from a Westerner's perspective, one of the Dalai Lama's chief rhetorical tools is the documented history of Tibet as a self ruled country. "This... debate on pre-1950 Tibetan history might continue to be problematic in Sino-Tibetan dialogue," posits Norbu; however, it could also prove to be useful in the persuasive realm of publicity to sway world opinion. In mustering support for his cause, the acknowledged veracity of history is useful to the Dalai Lama's "polemical oratory." The relative historical "truth" of Tibet's past self rule, with regard to social movement and rhetorical theory, serves as a factual mechanism which "unmasks" the establishment, which in this case is the Chinese and Western leaders who back each other. This

²³ Beckwith comments that

If the present status of Tibet may be compared with small-scale crime, it is precisely as if the media of a major city were to broadcast news about the rape and torture of a victim as a criminal slowly murders her, while the police make public announcements to the effect that the criminal is too important and too good a "friend" for them to interfere. The problem, in short, is that such criminal activity finds widespread condonation in spite of international law (1988, p.627).

unmasking therefore aids the cause in augmenting the popular pressure to sway the establishment's leadership.²⁴

In his second autobiography, Freedom in Exile (1990), the Dalai Lama concedes that he is vexed by the fact that even though the Chinese have "lost face" in front of the whole world over the Tibetan issue and the mistakes made by the Gang of Four and the Cultural Revolution, China seems relatively unfazed and continues to go about its alleged business of human rights abuses and political excesses. Nonetheless, the Dalai Lama continues to push the historical facts to the fore in his persuasive campaign. Norbu likewise confirms that "the Dalai Lama has indicated that he refuses to rewrite Tibetan history in the way the Chinese wish him to do" (p. 367).

Tibet's Questionable Past

According to testimony before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1992, "Tibet defined itself as a unique culture and predominantly Buddhist civilization during its imperial age, which lasted for two centuries and ended soon after 800 AD" (Altschiller, 1994, pp.190-191). The next phase in Tibetan history

saw the rise of an extremely powerful and unified nation under the rule of King Songtsen Gampo, military expansion into China and Nepal and adoption of Buddhism as Tibet's religion. Since

²⁴ Not unlike the fact of the high body counts of both civilians and military personnel in Vietnam helped 'unmask' the U.S. government's public claims that America had the upper hand in the Vietnam conflict.

then, the history of Tibet has been, internally, that of the formation of a system of government representing the religious and lay elements, under the supreme leadership of Dalai Lamas. Externally, there has been a history of invasions by Mongols, Gurkhas, and Chinese forces and their subsequent expulsion (van Walt van Praag, 1979, p.296).

On these general points, the Dalai Lama, Chinese, and Western scholars and leaders all seem to agree. But beyond the time period of the first Chinese rule during the Yuan dynasty lies the debate over Tibet's past. For the Chinese, the Yuan dynasty is an historical marker; it is an historic first like the flag planted on the moon. In fact, Tibet split from the Yuan dynasty and then rejoined China during the Ming dynasty; Tibet's departure from the Ming was ended in the eighteenth century with the Manchu dynasty.²⁵

For the Dalai Lama, 1911 is the milestone from which Tibetan history is counted as independent.²⁶ Thus the ebb and flow of Tibetan control and the uncertainty created by history forms one unifying theme in the Dalai Lama's discourse: the theme of relationship. This theme serves to downplay the conflicting historic markers and to shift the

²⁵ Under the Manchu agreement, the Dalai Lama [was] to become the spiritual guide of the Manchu emperor and accepted patronage and protection in exchange...Manchu influence did not last for very long and was entirely ineffective by the time the British...invaded Tibet in 1903-1904, and ceased entirely with the overthrow of the Qing dynasty in 1911 (Altschiller, 1994, p.191).

²⁶ Stewart, Smith, and Denton maintain that "social movements attempt to alter perceptions of the past...by presenting positive or negative versions of events, situations, heroes, villains, and effects by comparing and contrasting the past with the present, by correcting historical accounts, and by producing revelations about the past" (1989, p. 123).

focus to human interaction. This relationship theme alludes to the "patronage and protection" system of controller and controlled, of powerful and powerless. Each faction, as human individual or as group, needs something from the other. To that end, in his Oxford Union Address, the Dalai Lama says,

When I look at the past...Tibet acted as a buffer state, which was not only a benefit to the Tibetan people themselves, but also provided the best safety for both India and China. So in a future Tibet I'm determined that irrespective of her political status, Tibet should be demilitarized, should be a zone of peace...That will provide the best safety for both our two neighbors (1991, p.4).

He establishes that these three nations, their peoples, and their futures are united in their relationship as "neighbors." And "irrespective" of who has the upper hand in "political status" or power, each one needs the other. Thus, in discourse mirroring the patronage-protection system, the theme of relationship reflects a contemporary usefulness. The Dalai Lama contends that many people could benefit in the future if they could make the relationship work, indeed, as it worked in the past. Even if each "school" in the debate cannot agree upon when Tibet became a part of China, neither side disputes that in the past Tibet did form an effective "buffer state" among the powers of the region.

Suzerainty vs. Sovereignty

Despite the blurring of the importance of historic markers by the theme of relationships, it is important for the Dalai Lama to move the focus of debate into the modern era. This is essential because Tibet's more recent history includes entanglements with now powerful Western nations. These entanglements extend the idea of the relationship of protector-protected in three ways. First, the relationship of geographic neighbors is related to the power relationship of nuclear weapons politics and responsibility of the great powers to avoid nuclear Armageddon. Second, in the arena of human relations, the West's prior involvement in Tibet strengthens the idea of one's moral responsibility to a friend. Concentrating the history of Tibet in the present century bolsters the moral relationship through the political intrigues of the West's recent past. It also improves the Dalai Lama's ethos by extracting his own personage, with all its associations of a distant and easily dismissed "mediaeval serfdom," and reinserting himself, historically, into today's realpolitic of international power strategies. Third, by updating his personality and power relationships with Western countries, his stature and message are elevated to levels of political leadership, where negotiations will ultimately take place if his goals for Tibet are to be realized.

The Dalai Lama states that although Tibet was indeed within ancient China's empire at intervals during times past, Tibet was definitively self ruled until China's takeover of

Tibet in 1950-1951. Over the years the Dalai Lama has reminded the West of its culpability in its passive acceptance of this change.

While hinting at Western culpability, the Dalai Lama claims that Britain has a special responsibility to Tibet:

As every Tibetan who knows anything about history knows, Britain is the only country outside Tibet with whom we have ever had direct links. Britain is the only country who knows the real situation. So there is a very close link. Also, I think that Britain has...very good relations with China, so there is a role for Britain to play...What I am not so certain about is Britain's attitude towards China. At the moment, there is only praise, trying to please, not daring to criticize. If I were Chinese, then I think I would begin to wonder whether Britain is being completely sincere. But this is not my business (Spectator, 1988, p.13).

Thus the Dalai Lama uses historical fact to influence the Western powers with whom Tibet was formerly tied. The Dalai Lama attempts to influence the West by raising issues of accountability and strengthening the historically validated bonds between the West and Tibet. At the same time, he embarrasses and unmask Western leaders, making them appear as foolish and cowering servants of China who are "trying to please, not daring to criticize." Conversely, he tries to instill doubt in Chinese leadership about Western motives and reliability, advising China "to wonder whether Britain is being completely sincere."

What, and Where, Is Tibet?

Another theme which the Dalai Lama employs in discourse over history is the actual designation of what, exactly, constitutes Tibet. In Peter Bishop's book, The Myth of Shangri-La: Tibet, Travel Writing and the Western Creation of Sacred Landscape (1989), he argues that Tibet is not just a physical place, it is also a state of mind. Travel accounts, novels, and archaeology, as well as Western nostalgia for a mythic imperialist grandeur, have all served to promote a visible niche for Tibet in our collective Western consciousness (pp. 1-24).

India, China, and the Tibetans themselves each have different ideas about the borders of Tibet. One article in The Times of India states that

The Tibetan case is complicated further by the fact that there is near-total confusion about what is meant by the term Tibet. If Tibet is to include all areas inhabited by ethnic Tibetans, as the Dalai Lama...implies, it can mean a "Greater Tibet" that includes not only the Tibetan autonomous region (TAR) but also the whole of eastern Tibet (Kamdo) and parts of Sichuan, Qinghai, and Gansu provinces in China (Deshingkar, 1989, p. 19).

The problem of cartography and the elusive boundaries of the real Tibet is resolved in the rhetoric of the Dalai Lama. He circumvents China's limiting Tibet to the TAR by eschewing the use of the Chinese designation of TAR. Instead, the Dalai Lama makes concrete allusions to objects that are Tibetan, and lets the audience figure out the rest. He states that Panda bears are not Chinese, but are Tibetan;

Pandas are found in the Sichuan region of China, which extends far beyond China's designated TAR. In his Five-Point speech to members of US Congress in 1987, he refers to Tibet's geography in the vaguest of terms:

Tibet's highly strategic position in the heart of Asia, separating the continent's great powers-- India, China, and the USSR--has throughout history endowed it with an essential role in the maintenance of peace and stability. This is why, in the past, Asia's empires went to great lengths to keep one another out of Tibet. Tibet's value as an independent buffer state was integral to the region's stability (p.4).

The purposefully vague language he uses serves his rhetoric in three ways. First, by avoiding specific boundary issues, it enables the listener to picture the greater issue, that regional war must be avoided. Wars and petty border disputes can be ended by preserving, or actually reinstituting, this idea of Tibet as a "buffer" zone. The Dalai Lama's implied question works like this: If Tibet as "buffer state" can exist in imagination, and has existed in the past in actuality, why then cannot it not exist now, in the present, in reality? Second, by downplaying details and specifics, he is able to speak in lofty terms which are consistent with his high religious post and all its associated ideals of peace and harmony. Also, while enhancing his ethos, again, greater issues, higher moral standards and ideals are touched upon. By being vague in his discourse, he is lifted up above the political infighting over minutiae and so fulfills his post as a true leader. Lastly, by elevating the status of Tibet

from that of a tiny region to that of a concept, Tibet becomes equated with international peace. It is the responsibility of world leaders to work for peace; it is then, too, their responsibility to work for reinstating Tibet as a buffer state.

Human Rights Redefined

Although the Chinese have, for the most part, successfully quelled international scolding, they have been unable to stamp out the continuing internal unrest of the Tibetans, despite alleged torture, jailings, genocide, and other crimes against humanity (which have been documented debatably by the International Commission of Jurists and more reliably by Amnesty International and Asia Watch, among other humanitarian groups).²⁷ China claims that not only Tibet, but China, too, suffered as a result of the Cultural Revolution. In response, the Dalai Lama redefines the human rights issue

²⁷ See also: (1) Amnesty International, Tibet (People's Republic of China): compilation document, 1992, which refers to "detention without trial, ill treatment of detainees and police shooting of civilians in Tibet in February 1988; torture and ill-treatment in detention of Tibetans, February 1989; one year under Martial Law: an update on the human rights situation, March 1990, recent reports on political prisoners and prisoners of conscience in Tibet, October 1991; Amnesty International's concerns in Tibet, January 1992." (2) Asia Watch, "Evading scrutiny: violations of human rights after the closing of Tibet: supplement to the Asia Watch report on human rights in Tibet," 1988. (3) Ackerly, J. The suppression of a people: accounts of torture and imprisonment in Tibet. Physicians for Human Rights, Somerville, MA, 1989. (4) Tibet, its ownership and human rights situation, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Beijing, China, 1992. (5) Dumbaugh, K. Tibet: disputed facts about the situation. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, 1988.

in terms of transgressions that the Western audience would understand.

The alleged human rights abuses is a central theme in the Dalai Lama's discourse. He presents a sweeping vista of carnage accumulated through time. The relationship theme works with the human rights theme, conjoining the rest of humanity with China in guilt for what has purportedly transpired. From his discourse the audience may surmise that the West is deemed as guilty as China for the West has, through inaction, allowed the alleged carnage to continue. In his Five-Point plan, he states:

Human rights violations in Tibet are among the most serious in the world. Discrimination is practiced in Tibet under a policy of "apartheid" which the Chinese call "segregation and assimilation." Tibetans are, at best, second class citizens in their own country. Deprived of all basic democratic rights and freedoms, they exist under a colonial administration in which all real power is wielded by Chinese officials of the Communist Party and the army (1987, p.9).

The mere euphemism, "human rights," suddenly comes to life via an array of tangible terms.²⁸ Human rights is no longer a nebulous, disembodied idea, it is "discrimination" and "segregation and assimilation." He uses the latter terms from China so that their actions are revealed and explained by a Western term and understood clearly. He plays upon

²⁸ Stewart, Smith and Denton hold that "Social movements often attempt to alter perceptions of the present by redefining actions, events, and situations through renaming them" (emphasis in original) (1989, p.123). The Dalai Lama's discourse reflects this attempt at changing perceptions through the renaming process.

traditional Western disdain for anything even mildly relating to Communism by equating the "Chinese officials" with the "Communist Party and the army." He conjures up for the democracy loving Westerner the stark despair of a people who are "deprived of all basic democratic rights and freedoms." The West and China are linked in their "violations" since not just China is responsible for human rights abuses, but other nations have their own abuses which are "among the most serious in the world." He also elicits guilty feelings on the part of Western audience members because their own national histories entail their respective, only recently dealt with problems of "colonial administration," sanctioning of "apartheid," and treating peoples of African or Indian descent as "second class citizens in their own country."

This historical vista of human rights abuses is the newest incarnation of the Dalai Lama's sentimental style of rhetoric. For contemporary political oration, hysteria in speeches would not be effective. The above text is an example of the metered sentimental style in the Dalai Lama's discussion of human rights. The terms are chosen from Western political history and language, and are widely used and understood. Black maintains that "in a milieu in which emotional expression is severely regulated...a special caution will be exercised in those circumstances in which strongly emotional expression is allowed. The sentimental style is a superb instrument for such a situation" (1992, p. 102). International diplomacy is certainly such a "milieu."

The sentimental style is even more obvious in the Dalai Lama's earlier phase of his rhetorical campaign.

It is instructive to contrast the calm and calculated terminology of the Dalai Lama's recent discourse on human rights with that of a much earlier phase. Chapter six of this thesis includes a discussion of Edwin Black's notion of the "sentimental style," in which "no scintilla of reaction is left for the auditor's own creation; every nuance of effect is regulated by the speech...[which] seeks a total control over consciousness" (1992, p.101). The Dalai Lama's historically drenched speech at present reveals the earlier roots of an impassioned campaign rife with sentimental stylistics. So in spite of the Dalai Lama's frequent use, at present, of dry and at times even boring terminology, at its wellspring lies the bloody imagery of a highly sentimental discourse. This earlier discourse, while unfamiliar to the uninitiated in the debate, is recalled by the political elites with whom the Dalai Lama must negotiate if Tibet's future is to be changed.

The Dalai Lama presents this human rights talk as evidence of "historiographical genocide," particularly with regard to the Chinese population transfer policy and the international cooperation, via the passivity of U.N. member nations, with China's alleged abrogation of international law by its invading/liberating Tibet (Beckwith, 1988, p.627). But the Dalai Lama also claims that hope is not to be lost. He says that in the recent past, during

... the sixties and early seventies, the Tibetan issue seemed almost hopeless...in the meantime in our own country destruction, immense destruction was happening. However, during this period we never gave up hope, and I think that the most important thing is that inside Tibet the determination of the people, especially the younger generation, was never shaken...So because of human determination and constant effort, things can change (1992, p.2).

By discussing the past in terms of a future, "younger generation," the Dalai Lama transforms the history of hopelessness into a future history of "change." Through "determination and constant effort," he says, there is hope for the future.

According to the Dalai Lama, so deep does the ancient history of Buddhist religion and unique culture run in Tibetan society, that the Tibetans are remarkably hardy and persistent in their struggle for "basic" human rights. In addition to citing religious and cultural advantage over the Chinese in his fight, the Dalai Lama also notes that historical artifacts are on his side, serving as proof and testimony that Tibet ought to return to being a self ruled state, free from China's interference. He cites a document detailing human rights abuses was recently uncovered by Tibetans from Chinese storage. He maintains that an obelisk which stood in front of the Potala, his palace-monastery in Lhasa, proclaimed an ancient agreement between Tibet and China that each would remain respectfully separate countries. The Chinese have moved from its original site and walled in this obelisk: by hiding the truth of the past from Tibet,

their freedom is curtailed. He asserts that ancient library holdings from monasteries also confirm Tibet's historic independence from China. Much of this, however, he claims the Chinese withhold or have destroyed.

A theme that is central to his rhetoric is one he terms "universal responsibility," which, to Westerners, simply means accountability. According to this ideal, each human being should act and feel compelled to be responsible for one's fellow human beings. In relation to the invasion of Tibet by China, and his subsequent escape into exile, the Dalai Lama appears to hold not only India and Great Britain accountable, as intoned in the above quote, but also the United States. In terms of universal responsibility, the US, as a great western power, shirked its duty to help repel the Chinese from entering and taking over Tibet. He recounts how one of the members of his entourage who fled with him in 1959 was keeping the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) abreast of their movement and progress via radio. So through claims such as this, the Dalai Lama establishes an historical relationship between the West and Tibet.

In the rhetoric of the Dalai Lama, the accountability of the West for the fall of Tibet does not end in 1959. It extends far beyond into the present and future. As Business Week observed in October, 1987, "Rioting by Tibetans against Chinese oppression has brought out of the closet a political skeleton in US-Chinese relations: human rights" (Becker, J. and Javetski, B., 1987, p.53). The rhetoric of the Dalai

Lama, like the rioting, appears to aim to have the same effect. The Dalai Lama states that the CIA maintained operatives in Tibet and trained and supplied the Freedom Fighters (the Tibetan Khampas) with arms for ongoing guerrilla warfare against Chinese troops (Dalai Lama, 1990, pp. 121-122). His statements imply this: if the West knew about the circumstances in Tibet, and was willing to use its money and expertise to aid Tibetans in the fight against the Chinese, how could the West, in terms of accountability and communication with the rest of the world, turn a deaf ear and close its collective mouth regarding the alleged genocide of Tibetans by the Chinese? And even worse, how can the West live with this fact? How can the West not feel the weight of guilt on its national morale? How can the West, in its passivity, let inaction promote continued human rights abuses?

The Dalai Lama links the past with universal responsibility because, clearly, under this tenet, it is never too late to begin to care or to take the right action. Thus his rhetoric urges two different things for two key audiences. First, the West (especially the US as an involved operative in the Tibetan resistance movement), must take action, or at minimum, join the Dalai Lama in communicating to the world its displeasure at these alleged gross acts of torture and genocide by the Chinese. Second, China must stop committing these alleged crimes and recognize that the world is aware of Chinese actions and could act to counter them.

Through historical anecdotes and references, he develops a foundation for his argument that the relationship between Tibet and the West cannot be cut off by political snubbing or through the passage of time. By drawing upon the guilty actions of Western nations in the past, he attempts to make the Western audience feel culpable for the fate which befell Tibet. In order to incite Westerners to action on behalf of Tibet, he uses historical fact to play upon their guilt. He points out that the only way that redemption of their guilt can occur is by acting now, in the present. Through the Dalai Lama's persistent use of the tenet of universal responsibility, he makes it clear that it is not too late for the West to act to help Tibet. He also makes it clear that the West is accountable for its past actions. Those actions cannot be erased by time--only action can redeem the past mistakes and the West's guilt for having committed them.

CHAPTER THREE

THE CROSS CULTURAL RHETORIC OF THE DALAI LAMA

A Language of Cultural Pairings

This chapter will present an analysis of the Dalai Lama's selective use of language, symbols, and historical allusions, showing how these components, as tools of persuasion, are all culture based. Taking the Dalai Lama's earlier, and more overtly antagonistic rhetoric, as well as more recent and congenial discourse, I will show how the Dalai Lama's discourse reflects the verbal pairings of cultural symbols and values. I will discuss the aspects of the Dalai Lama's discourse which indicate that he is able to combine values and symbols which are important in different ways to the East and West, and combine them so that a clear and unified interpretation is available to the audience, regardless of each audience member's cultural orientation. Using excerpts from his first autobiography, My Land and My People (1962), his Oxford Union Address in 1991, as well as more recent essays, I will show how the culturally based orientation of the Dalai Lama's discourse forms a tactic of persuasion.

The passages described below reflect well the cross cultural language that appears in much of the Dalai Lama's political and persuasive discourse. The texts which are analyzed in this chapter may be seen as representative of the

Dalai Lama's persuasive discourse as a whole. However, the conclusions drawn regarding the cross cultural impact and strategies evident in these texts are not in any way limited to the passages offered below, but are instead based upon careful study of many of the Dalai Lama's speeches, interviews, and essays. The discussion of this particular chapter is limited to analyzing several germane passages, and the substance of this thesis overall is limited to an in-depth analysis of two key speeches. But to avert the risk of appearing overly simplistic, the reader should note that the conclusions I draw in this chapter are based upon information gleaned from diverse texts studied for this thesis--texts which cover forty years in the evolution of the Dalai Lama's rhetoric.

The analysis to be presented in this chapter corresponds to Cecil Blake's conception of the manner in which we should examine cross cultural rhetoric:

...the comparative rhetorician must deal not only with speechmaking but also with all the other various forms of communication in the culture [in question]... Communication occurs in a cultural context comprised of many factors--sociopsychological, historical, epistemological, and philosophical--all influenced by the traditions of the culture 1979, pp.92-93).

The Dalai Lama's discourse combines the cultural and historical traditions of two general world orientations, East and West. He links the symbols from each tradition to effect persuasion. The Dalai Lama points to the progressive

successes of Western countries, such as Western democracies that promote scientific and material progress, while also praising (directly or indirectly) the respect he has for the ancient traditions of Buddhism and even the enduring strength of the Chinese people as a nation. He also compares and contrasts diverging world views, such as Western individualism versus Eastern collectivism. Lastly, his discourse shows his understanding of the universal human need for ordering and hierarchy, and how that need is manifested in different ways in the East and the West.

Of Words and World Views

The persuasive tactics of the Dalai Lama as a cross cultural communicator can also be made evident in light of Geert Hofstede's "dimensions of cultural variability" (1980; 1984). Hofstede's dimensions have been noted for being particularly suitable for analyzing communication contexts that are tailored to Western thought and a Western cultural mind-set (Johnson and Tuttle, p.467-468). Since the focus here is on the efficacy of the Dalai Lama's discourse targeted for Western audiences, then the application of Hofstede's dimensions should be fruitful.

Hofstede's theory was initially developed to promote business management understanding. Considering it is the business of the Dalai Lama to manage international organizers and lobbyists, it seems fitting to apply Hofstede's theory

to the Dalai Lama's discourse. In brief, Hofstede's dimensions can be summarized as follows:

individualism-collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity-femininity. Individualistic cultures emphasize the individual's goals, while collectivistic cultures stress that group goals have precedence over individual goals. High power-distance cultures value inequality, with everyone having a rightful place, and the hierarchy reflects existential inequality. Low power-distance cultures, in contrast, value equality. Uncertainty avoidance involves the lack of tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity [in settings of communication exchange]. Cultures high in uncertainty avoidance have high levels of anxiety, a great need for formal rules, and a low tolerance for groups that behave in a deviant manner. Masculinity...involves valuing things, money, assertiveness, and unequal sex roles. Cultures where people, quality of life, nurturance, and equal sex roles prevail...are feminine (Gudykunst; Nishida, 1989).

It bears mentioning here that because I find the nomenclature of the masculinity/femininity dimension to be misnomers, for the purpose of my study I will relabel Hofstede's masculinity dimension as "resourcism" and the femininity dimension as "nurturism." Resourcism, I think, more aptly reflects the general social tendency, whether by men or women, to value money, things, and, often as a consequence, "unequal roles" for members of different sexes, races, or other socially distinctive categories, such as ethnic groups. Similarly, nurturism as a term more clearly represents the general cultural phenomenon, as embraced by both women and men, of valuing intangible things, such as caring for others, lowering social barriers which can separate different races, sexes, or ethnic groups in order to foster equality and

social harmony. Thus "feminine," that is, "quality of life" in Hofstede's conception, is hereby relabeled without a reference which classifies a specific sex. Put simply, unlike the terms "masculinity" and "femininity," the terms resourcefulness and nurturance enhance the objectivity of the social phenomena which they denote by stripping away the stereotypical or prejudicial connotations which the former terms, being sex-specific, tend to connote. This term change is recommended for future communications research because, while it retains Hofstede's original meaning, it also promotes objectivity in scientific inquiry. This brief digression thus completed, let us continue with the discussion of the Dalai Lama's rhetoric and its cross cultural aspects.

The rhetoric of the Dalai Lama is effective in part because he is adroit in his handling of all of the above dimensions of cross cultural exchange. The Dalai Lama takes dimensions which would normally appear to be contradictory or opposing, and combines aspects in ways that make such opposition not only complementary, but perfectly seamless. An illustration of this would be the description he gives for the Tibetan culture. The Dalai Lama's description appears to be the perfect mix of all of the most laudable attributes (from a Western perspective) of Hofstede's cultural dimensions. For example, the Dalai Lama asserts that the Tibetan culture is worthy of saving for the following reasons: it is a collectivistic culture in that the lives of

the people are centered around religion. The Dalai Lama maintains that "the sense of religion pervaded even the wildest places, one would often see its symbol, too, in the poorest tents of the nomads: the altar with the butter lamp before it" (1962, p.64). The government of the country was historically a theocracy, which held nurturism in high regard, even to the extreme of viewing as equals every sentient being from humans to animals and fish down to the lowliest insects. In 1962, the Dalai Lama wrote that

probably ten percent of the total population were monks and nuns. This gave a dual nature to the whole of our social system. In fact, it was only in my position as Dalai Lama that lay and monastic authority was combined...Outside the monasteries, our social system was feudal...But on the other hand, promotion to higher ranks...was democratic (pp.59-60).

Thus even in a feudal system, shades of democracy existed. But overall, it was a "dual" system, which combined the moral standards of religion with the practical matters of running the administration of a nation-state. The affirmation of democratic elements in the society is vital to promoting identification with Western audience members who are likely to favor democratic ideals and forms of government.

The Dalai Lama's following statement from his Oxford Union address in 1991 reveals his attempt at showing Westerners the value which they might find in the Tibetan culture:

According to...scientists' presentations in America, thirteen percent of the whole population [there] have some form of mental illness. Actually, this morning when I met the Prime Minister [of Great Britain] I also mentioned that...You see, the real cause of that kind of high percentage of mental illness, according to the explanations of the scientists...is the lack of human compassion, in society as well as in the family...Love and affection only comes from human beings or sentient beings. Even if it is a poor animal, it can provide us with affection. But for a machine, no matter how sophisticated, it is almost impossible...(1991, p.3)

The Dalai Lama heightens his own ethos through his assertion of a high power distance relationship to his audience by associating himself with a powerful Prime Minister of a great Western nation. At the same time, he shows that the West's love of technology cannot surpass the need for "human compassion" that is integral to Tibetan society. The West lacks this proclivity, and, as the "mental illness" statistics indicate, the West appears to desperately need it. He relies upon the Western audience's credulity in "the explanations of the scientists" to further the persuasive impact of such a delicate cross cultural observation. Leaders trying to gain supporters do not normally insult prospective followers. The Dalai Lama manages, through pairing Tibetan and Western cultural symbols, to educate the audience with his discourse without breaking the fragile trust which the uncertainty dimension of intercultural exchanges entails.

Appealing to Western materialism, the Dalai Lama describes Tibet's culture as being full of resourcism in that

Tibet's 6,000 monasteries, nunneries, and holy places were stocked with priceless religious objects of devotion, from golden butter lamps and enormous gilded Buddha statues to murals painted in gold and encrusted with jewels. However, this material splendor was not the result of wanton materialism because the finery existed in the name of religion. So via religion, this Tibetan resourcism is associated with nurturism and compassion. Reminiscing about his former palace, which housed most of the government functions, he says

Here there were rooms full of thousands of priceless scrolls, some a thousand years old. Here were strong rooms filled with golden regalia of the earliest kings of Tibet...and the sumptuous gifts they received from the Chinese or Mongol emperors, and the treasures of the Dalai Lamas who succeeded the kings...In the libraries were all the records of Tibetan culture and religion, 7,000 enormous volumes...Some were written on palm leaves imported from India a thousand years ago. Two thousand illuminated volumes of the scriptures were written in inks made of powdered gold, silver, iron, copper, conch shell, turquoise, and coral, each line in a different ink (1962, p.54).

The repetition of the word "thousand" tends to expand the imagery of richness in the scene which he describes. The Dalai Lama contends that, not in a monetary sense but for the religious and cultural sense, one of the most egregious travesties incurred by the Chinese was the destruction of all but a handful of the thousands of monasteries and nunneries, as well as the theft of the vast majority of the nation's riches of priceless works of religious art and environmental

resources. It would appear that as a direct result of the Dalai Lama's rhetoric and campaigning on these themes, the Western press has made much of the alleged loss of wildlife in Tibet, land destruction from metals mining, topsoil erosion from improper farming methods, and land wastage due to nuclear weapons storage and dumping (Shoumatoff, 1991, pp. 76-104).²⁹

In his address at Oxford in 1991, he appeals to Westerners' resourcism by likening Tibet to a fabulous vacation resort. After describing Tibet's magnificence, he comments:

Sometimes I jokingly tell people that the Tibet of the future will be rather like a holiday resort: those people from London or New York, exhausted due to the speed of life or due to the [pollution] and these sorts of things--go to Tibet and spend a few weeks. That will be of mutual benefit! You bring more dollars--that's our benefit, and you get some mental peace--that's your benefit! (p.6)

He plays on the West's cultural emphasis on hard work and money, as well as relying on the cultural tradition of a

²⁹ The figures and statistics on Tibet vary wildly between most Western sources and notably the Chinese sources. Western scholars claim there are 6 million Tibetans left in Tibet, and that as a direct result of the Chinese presence 1.2 million Tibetans have died. China maintains there were only 3 million Tibetans in pre-1950 Tibet, and that this number has remained more or less constant. Western sources claim there were 6,000 monasteries in pre-1950 Tibet and that today only a handful remain. China alleges that only 1,300 monasteries existed in pre-1950 Tibet and that the Chinese destruction of the monasteries has been more than compensated for by the "billions of dollars" in Chinese investments in Tibet for agriculture, infrastructure, and rebuilding several monasteries. The Dalai Lama deploys Western figures in his rhetoric as they are more damaging to the Chinese. It is difficult to verify the accuracy of these figures. Where analysis of such statistics is necessary, I have attempted to verify them through reputable journalistic sources.

Westerners' annual migration to a vacation "resort" to take a break from "the speed of life." He develops a complete linkage and reversal of cultural representations: Tibet has and promotes peace of mind, which is what Westerners need; Westerners have and promote "dollars," which is what Tibet needs. All of this transfer leads to "mutual benefit." By equalizing the cultural attributes which each society has and lacks, he avoids the potential for a distasteful sermonizing quality in the discourse. Instead, the Dalai Lama gives the audience a compliment. Compliments foster persuasion.³⁰

Thus we see how the Dalai Lama turns what might be considered avaricious resourcism on its head through the symbolic function of the religious life of the average Tibetan. It is widely known that religion is the overarching world view under which all other Tibetan cultural dimensions are subjugated. The Dalai Lama has used this fact to his rhetorical advantage, and it has proven to be very appealing to Western audiences. The Dalai Lama, for instance, takes pains to clarify that an individual human being, and hence the dimension of individualism which is so valuable in Western perception, is only an individual in the truest meaning, when she or he has "peace of mind," "happiness," and "freedom from suffering." This peace of mind, the Dalai Lama says, can only be gained through collectivism, or other-oriented behavior, which he calls universal responsibility.

³⁰ In his Rhetoric, Aristotle states that "To praise a [person] is in one respect akin to urging a course of action" (line 1368a, 1984, p. 61).

He states that the "belief in rebirth should engender a universal love, [because] all living beings and creatures in the course of their numberless lives and our own, have been our beloved parents, children, brothers, sisters, friends. And the virtues our [Tibetan] creed encourages are those which arise from this universal love--tolerance, forbearance, charity, kindness, compassion" (1962, p. 51).

The religious themes in the Dalai Lama's discourse heighten the power-distance dimension, which empowers him to his people to the point that, whereupon seeing the Dalai Lama, Tibetans fall to the ground and perform prostrations in honor and respect. The office of the Dalai Lama in and of itself reflects the "existential inequality" that is characteristic of a high power-distance culture. Yet all the while, the belief in reincarnation and the inherent value (and by correlation, equality) of all sentient beings, balances the scale with the traits of a low power-distance, or equality oriented culture. Wischmann confirms that "separating the government from religion was impossible before the Chinese came to power" in Tibet (1987, p.1118). Therefore, in the Dalai Lama's discourse, the Chinese have yet to come to power, thus the "inextricable mix of sacred and secular" is reflected in his speeches (p.1118). One anecdote serves to illustrate the rhetorical implications of this mix. Following the Lhasa riots in 1987, the US State Department complained specifically that the Dalai Lama's speech before the US Congress in 1987 was political, when it

should have been strictly religious (p.1119). Such a separation between church and state is not possible in the Dalai Lama's discourse, for inherent in his title and office are the concerns of politics. This works to his advantage when he is told by countries such as India or Great Britain or the US that he must not make political statements; he then just incorporates references to Tibet into his religious teachings.

Finally, with regard to the dimension of uncertainty avoidance, again the Dalai Lama presents a view of his culture as being perfectly balanced. In Tibet, the Dalai Lama contends, traditionally there have been very strict formal rules of etiquette as well as an intolerance for deviant behavior. Tibetan butchers, for example, were traditionally social outcasts because they kill other beings--animals--for meat.³¹ Such strict adherence to social rules and the emphasis placed on social strata and customs indicates high levels of uncertainty avoidance in the Tibetan culture. On the other hand, Tibet's culture is exceedingly religious; it embraces mystery, uncertainty, and ambiguity, which again lowers their overall uncertainty avoidance and anxiety. The link in the lowered anxiety likewise promotes culturally valued senses of mutual respect, understanding, and peace of mind. Such attributes are, in the Western view,

³¹ Grunfeld states that in pre-1951 Tibet, "A number of professions were considered unclean...There were professional, hereditary beggars, metal workers, fishermen and women...smiths,...butchers and undertakers" (1987, p.15).

certainly desirable and useful in everyday life in general, and to effective communication in particular.

In short, the Dalai Lama's persuasion is enhanced through the use of pairings of culturally rooted symbols that are important to the West and to Tibet (or the East in general), and most effective, shared by all. The Dalai Lama combines the mystery of the Buddhist faith with the certainty and methodical accuracy which Westerners perceive science and technology to possess:

If we expect to solve all human problems with a computer or through a machine, this is a wrong conception, a wrong expectation. Human mental problems must be solved through mental attitude, through mental training. So therefore today it seems that even some great scientists are showing genuine interest in the inner world and mental development or mental state...when we talk about mental peace or mental calmness then there is a direct spiritual involvement...(1991, pp.3-4).

He matches the desire for mental peace, and the Tibetan cultural renown in attaining this peace, with the Western desire for material progress balanced with mental peace. He compares the West's political and religious traditions of revolution for freedom and the Western desire for geopolitical stability with Tibet's situation: "...the Tibetan national struggle...is far more than political freedom, [it] is also for spiritual freedom, which is not only of benefit to Tibetans alone, but also to larger communities..." (1991, p.5).

Communication scholar Luther Jerstand observes that "in Tibetan [theatrical] dramas of propaganda, [we] can actually witness manifestations of good and evil battling for the hearts of [people]" (1967, p. 202). The Dalai Lama's persuasive discourse offers a similarly dramatic rendering of events past, present, and potentially in the future. An illustration of a dramatic rendering of the future's potential is the following commentary on the Dalai Lama's Strasbourg Proposal. The Strasbourg Proposal, as we shall see in Chapter Five, offers a pragmatic program that would enable Tibet to have an associated status with China, while still being an internally self governed democracy. In 1992, four years after having delivered the Strasbourg Proposal, the Dalai Lama described his hopes for the proposal and the possible results of the plan, if it were to become enacted:

It is my hope that China's leaders will work with their own people, with their neighbors, with the rest of the world to live in harmony and peace. Only then will their ancient country, now constituting a quarter of humanity, finally assume its rightful place in the global family. This is in keeping with the Buddhist vision of a world based on compassion; a world without enemies, a world of peace and true happiness (p.29).

He presents a hopeful and idealistic vision for the Chinese, who in this drama play the role of the "evil manifestation," to join the fold of Western democratic nations, who are implied as being the "good manifestation." He also invokes the West's deeply felt moral superiority resulting from the demise of many Communist states. This is done by hinting

that the distasteful aspects of China's Communist "leaders" can only be shed by China if it accepts the Strasbourg proposal, for "only then will" China "finally assume its rightful place in the global family." Yet the Eastern perspective of China, with its "ancient" longevity to be extended by this proposal, helps to equalize the East's equally deeply felt moral superiority over the comparatively younger civilizations of the West. He affirms an idealistic resolution for that problem, "to live in harmony and peace" and in "a world based on compassion." The tranquil terms, "harmony and peace," are juxtaposed with China, signaling an opposition between right (peace) and wrong (China's present policies). He refers to the great power of China, both in terms of sheer population, or "a quarter of humanity" with all its impugned might, while in the same breath pointing to both the desire of both East and West to integrate China into some conception of a new world order.

In summary, through the examples and analysis provided above, we see evidence that the Dalai Lama incorporates cultural dimensions into his discourse, using cultural orientations as rhetorical tools to incite Westerners to action. Lest this analysis appear to be an oversimplification, it bears mentioning that these particular passages were chosen because they illustrate well the Dalai Lama's ability to communicate and persuade audiences across cultures. However, the assumptions and claims presented in this Chapter are by no means limited to the discourse

examined here. I have come to these conclusions based upon patterns that I have observed in a wide range of the Dalai Lama's texts, including both of his autobiographies (1962; 1990) as well as numerous interviews of him and speeches by him. Therefore, I would venture to say that if one were to select at random a text by the Dalai Lama (aside from strictly religious teachings), one would be likely to find at least one, if not more, of the cross-cultural tactics which I have described in this chapter.

By using Hofstede's dimensions of cultural variability as a grounds for understanding the Dalai Lama's perspectives and discourse, it is possible to ascertain some of the specific tactics the Dalai Lama uses to bridge the communication gap between two otherwise divergent and culturally bound perspectives. These contrasting cultural perspectives, which Hofstede finds useful in the context of international business management, are individualism versus collectivism, nurturism versus resourcism, uncertainty avoidance, and power distance. The Dalai Lama's discourse reveals his ability to jibe Eastern and Western cultural dimensions in a persuasive manner. The Dalai Lama accomplishes this fusion of cultural contrasts by presenting pairings of what we would see as the most mutually praiseworthy cultural attributes. Science and faith; materialism and intangible mental peace; the natural and the supernatural are just a few of the culturally based pairings which impel his discourse. Each pairing reveals world views,

values, relationships between social strata, and emotion based myths which have been historically transmitted by human interaction to the respective cultures. The Dalai Lama's cross cultural rhetoric is targeted to promote western activities on behalf of his movement to save what little culture and cultural artifacts he alleges are left remaining in Tibet. Above all, it is discourse that is designed to promote identification among the disparate audience members around the world and to urge them to act.

CHAPTER FOUR
CONSUMMATE CHARISMA

A Charismatic Leader

The charisma of the Dalai lama is a central force behind the movement to free Tibet from China's control. Essential to the perpetuation and expansion of any social movement is strong leadership. Franz Michael states that the success of the Tibetan community in exile "is an outstanding example of what faith and loyalty to one's culture can accomplish under great leadership" (1985, p. 738). This chapter will examine how the Dalai Lama's personality, actions, and abilities serve him well in his work to organize and support his own people, and especially in his campaign to influence international diplomats and the media.

In Persuasion and Social Movements, authors Stewart, Smith, and Denton state that "a leadership position is attained in a social movement when members perceive a person to possess one or more of three attributes: charisma, prophecy, or pragmatism" (1989, p.39). While the Dalai Lama has been criticized for his lack of "pragmatism" by members of his own movement (Kaye, 1987,p.60; McDonald, 1993, p.24) as well as his rhetorical and political opponents, especially China (anonymous, Beijing Review, 1987, p.14; Zi, 1989, p.28-29), and also the West (Jenkins, 1988,p.18-19), his charismatic and prophetic appeal are widely acknowledged (Michael,1985, pp.738-740; Norbu, 1991, p. 371).

Stewart, Smith, and Denton also state that charisma is a strong attribute for a leader of a social movement:

The charismatic leader's source of legitimacy lies in his or her apparent access to a higher source or divine inspiration...The charismatic leader tends to be a showperson with a sense of timing and the rhetorical skills necessary to articulate what others...cannot put into words (1989, pp.39-40).

The "higher source" and "divine inspiration" of the Dalai Lama comes, of course, from his religion. He is commonly referred to in Western media as being the Buddhist equivalent to the Pope.³² He is known for rising at 4:00 a.m. to pray, and for studying scriptures for at least four hours every day. The Dalai Lama is noted for maintaining this strict regimen regardless of where in the world he has traveled to in his very active speaking and teaching schedule.

The Dalai Lama's quality of having charisma is beneficial to his position as a leader, for "in our [Western] society,... [this] capacity is sometimes called tact, savoir faire, diplomacy, or social skill" (Goffman, 1967, p.13). Goffman's notion of the tactful and skilled diplomat also translates, in the realm of international negotiation, into

³² In 1984, when asked about the comparison of the current Polish Pope to the Polish people and the Dalai Lama to the Tibetan people, the Dalai Lama responded,

There are great similarities. But in the case of Tibet and the Dalai Lama, it is not only the present generation who is concerned. The relationship goes back for centuries. In this sense, it is much deeper than the relationship between the present Pope and the Polish people. On the other hand, the Papal institution is worldwide, a recognized and independent institution. The Dalai Lama is just a refugee. [He laughs] (1986, p. 128).

the concept of an interculturally competent diplomat. Communication competence in diplomatic circles entails the ability to adapt to rapidly changing argumentative contexts and their attendant cultural implications. The diplomat's role in displaying charisma, tact, and social skill is crucial to persuasion in negotiations (Cohen, 1991, pp. 78-79).

In organizing the exiled Tibetan community in India, the Dalai Lama's persona and skills in diplomacy were put to the test. Since 1960, when the Dalai Lama organized the Tibetan government in exile, he has been working tirelessly to continue in his role of "authority over [Tibetan] civil life as well as over the structure and practice of the Tibetan Buddhist faith" (Michael, 1985, p. 741). Michael attests that the Dalai Lama "persuaded the Indian government to provide areas of uncultivated land... where, with Indian help, the Tibetans were given ownership of about an acre per person" (emphasis added) (1985, p. 741). Considering India's enormous population and traditional land disputes amongst its populace, it is noteworthy that the Dalai Lama was able--through "persuasion"--to secure for his people "several thousand acres each in several [Indian] states and regions" (Michael, 1985, p. 741).

A Strong Face

The concept of "face" relates to "intangible issues such as... status, pride, honor, power, and dignity" (Cohen,

1991, p. 132). Indeed, the relevance of face concerns is a crucial consideration in the Dalai Lama's campaign leadership. In addition to his charisma and diplomatic skills, the Dalai Lama's appearance is often commented upon and described in Western media in a manner that links him to both the average person and to God. There is an everyman quality that lends to the Dalai Lama's charisma and common appeal. Take, for example, the following description, which effectively encapsulates the remarks frequently found in Western commentary about the Dalai Lama:

He wears the same maroon robes with saffron waistcoat as any other monk and, for footwear, plain, thickly soled brown shoes which lend a workmanlike air to his appearance that his blue-tinted spectacles do nothing to undermine. His hair is cropped to a shadow like all the other monks. Yet in spite of this apparent ordinariness, there is something in his bearing that invites reverence: he looks holy... (emphasis added)(1988, p. 12).

This description (like myriad others I read while conducting the literature review) emphasizes the Dalai Lama's commonality and links him to not just other monks, but also to the common worker, through his "workmanlike air" and his "ordinariness." But while having a workmanlike air, he still maintains his lofty stature and pride since "he looks holy," which certainly cannot hurt his "image" or "face;" after all, who could argue with a God and win? As the symbolic figurehead of Tibetans and as the leader of the Tibetan

Government in exile, it is imperative that the Dalai Lama maintain a certain image of power, sagacity, and endurance.

The news media have, at times, also hinted at the possibility that the Dalai Lama himself possesses observant powers to see into the future. For instance, in one article, the Dalai Lama is quoted as saying, "...whilst in the past I feel that I was able to contribute something to Tibet as a nation, to Tibetan culture, to Buddhism--for the future I don't know;" then the interviewer suggests precisely the prophetic ability of the Dalai Lama, commenting: "Then [the Dalai Lama] laughed...Clearly, he knew perfectly well [what the future would be]" (Norman, 1988, p. 12). In fact, most of the printed interviews highlight the question of Tibet's future, asking the Dalai Lama to make a prediction.³³ So while the reporters likely have as much factual information as the Dalai Lama about the Tibet question, they nonetheless ask for, and report on, the Dalai Lama's insight into the future. Ultimately, then, the news media help to promote the image of the Dalai Lama as apparently possessing prophetic powers. Consequently, such media treatment serves to help him maintain his prophetic image.

The implications for his face carry over into the potential to negotiate from a position of great strength with

³³ Articles in which the reporter specifically solicits the Dalai Lama's opinion or projection about the future include: The Christian Science Monitor, July 30, 1984; The Washington Times, September 21, 1984; The Tampa Tribune, October 13, 1984; MacLean's, September 29, 1986 (as reprinted in The Collected Statements, Articles and Interviews of His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama, Information Office, Central Tibetan Secretariat, 1986).

China in the future. That is why it is extremely helpful for his campaign to have the media continually depict him as both holy and charismatic while also making him seem to be a truly likable person, who possesses all the "ordinariness" of any one of us. Through the Dalai Lama's diplomatic savoir faire and skills, he garners status, pride, and power by his association with international diplomatic circles.

Conversely, through the Dalai Lama's often remarked upon "ordinariness," he gains the acceptability associated with Western concerns for democracy and representative forms of government, since he appears to be as like his fellow Buddhist monks as anyone could be, and therefore is best qualified to represent them, as well as the generally religious Tibetan populace at large. In addition, commentary highlighting his "ordinariness" helps to debunk the assertion by Chinese leaders that the Dalai Lama was the leader of a "serfdom" who lived in opulent splendor while the general Tibetan populace suffered in poverty. Western media, by showing how ordinary the Dalai Lama appears to be, and by emphasizing his strict regimen of religious study, shows that his lifestyle is definitely not luxurious.

The Dalai Lama's charisma and disciplined character, therefore, enhances his authority as a leader. He is seen as being empowered by and connected to the gods, while also supported by, and connected to, the followers in his movement. Especially for Tibetans, Michael affirms that the Dalai Lama,

whose authority continues to be derived from the belief in his Incarnation of Chenrezi (Avalokitesvara),³⁴ an emanation of the Buddha's compassion shared and maintained by all Tibetans, retains his role as highest executive authority, decision maker, guide, and teacher of his people in both religious and secular matters... by his charisma as much as tradition, the whole religious establishment... is more united than it has ever been. This... authority concurs with a fully retained and recognized worldly authority that has enabled him to play his leadership role in rebuilding the hope and confidence of his people in exile, a role which has in turn been reaffirmed by the unique part he played in salvaging the Tibetan polity" (1985, p. 743).

Since 1960, in addition to establishing a modern, democratic form of Government in exile, the Dalai Lama has set up numerous organizations to educate Tibetan children. He has also organized the development of Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and universities in India, and worked to establish work programs to keep Tibetans employed (Michael, 1985, pp. 740-743). To date, these institutions are operating successfully and are expanding, receiving more Tibetan refugees, gaining more sponsors, and constructing new facilities.

As far as the Dalai Lama's political organizing and campaigning is concerned for Tibetans still inside Tibet, Schwartz believes that

The Dalai Lama [is] a symbol and rallying point of Tibetan protest... since he epitomizes both the Tibetan religious and political past and a bridge to the modern world. The sense of constituting a

³⁴ Chenrezi, or Avalokitesvara, is considered to be the protector deity and patron saint of all Tibetans.

political community is condensed into the figure of the Dalai Lama, who represents not only the pre-1959 government in Lhasa, which continues in exile in India, but a remembered political history sketching back to the time of the ancient kings (1994, p.221).

The Dalai Lama's authority and appeal is certainly not limited to his own people. Through largely complimentary treatment in the media (as discussed above briefly, and in greater detail in Chapter One), the Dalai Lama's authority extends into the West. The Dalai Lama's simultaneous appeal to the common and to the holy, as well as his ethos-strengthening symbolism, is what has made the Dalai Lama's message so hard for the Chinese leadership to counter, and Western diplomats to refuse.

The charismatic appeal of the Dalai Lama has made it difficult for Western leaders to continue to shut him out from diplomatic relations--for surely a Western leader can ignore a common man, but they could not easily deny a god-king (Norman, 1993, pp.18-21). So it has happened that Western leaders (and even leaders in Asia from countries such as Thailand) have risked the wrath of China and welcomed the Dalai Lama into their capitals to speak on behalf of the Tibetan people about human rights and the situation in Tibet (anonymous, The New York Times, 1994, p.A-7); Lintner, 1993, pp.10-11; Doherty, 1991, p.1002).

By the same token, the imagery of vision, insight, and perceptiveness is dominant in the Dalai Lama's rhetoric, and helps to strengthen his stature. There is a theme of

"perceptiveness," that is prevalent in the Dalai Lama's books, interviews, speeches, and public statements. For instance, the title of one book he wrote is Kindness, Clarity, and Insight (1984). The Dalai Lama presents himself as being the all seeing, all knowing ruler who has been displaced, exiled, from his land. Yet through the eyes of his people, and empowered by the truth of their visions, we can infer that he sees beyond his own horizons into the areas that China shields from the rest of the world (Dalai Lama, 1960; 1990). One way the Dalai Lama (1993) contends that he is equipped with special insight into the Tibetan-Chinese conflict is that he receives current information in the form of constant, secret contact with Tibetans inside Tibet, as well as narratives from refugees who stream into India to escape the oppression which they aver they cannot endure in Tibet (Michael, 1985, p. 737-738).

In the metaphysical realm, the Dalai Lama's "third eye," or supernatural capacity to comprehend the otherworldly realm and tap into sources of knowledge that most mortals cannot know, further enhances his own image as being visionary in the fullest sense. Particularly for Tibetan followers, the Dalai Lama's purported supernatural ability is valuable because "magical signs and omens, and millenarian hopes for salvation, are also elements of Tibetan popular religion. These elements... provide a...supernatural gloss to current political developments" (Schwartz, 1994, p. 226). The implication is that the physical exile of the Dalai Lama is

simply that, physical, or geographical. The Dalai Lama's followers may feel that to a certain extent (perhaps on the spiritual plane) he is able to reach into current events and provide a presence of support.

A Greater Vision

In G. Gordon's book, Persuasion: the Theory and Practice of Manipulative Communication, the author maintains that "prophecy at large may influence the destiny of a total culture, but its influence is rarely discrete or measurable, filtered, as it is, from prophet to social field to myth and then into the future" (1971, p.505). Stewart, Smith and Denton state that one of the roles a social movement leader may fulfill is that of the prophet: "the prophet's source of legitimacy lies in his or her apparent proximity to the writings of the social movement, its ideology...the prophet knows the truth and sets a moral tone for the social movement" (1989, p.41).

In his role as charismatic leader, the Dalai Lama also fulfills the leadership role of prophet. He makes frequent references to the bright future of Tibet, and often mentions the fall of the Communist Soviet bloc when discussing China's present society, predicting the same fall for China's Communist system. In April of 1992, his annual statement for the anniversary of the Tibetan national uprising was entitled, "Future Tibet Will Be an Oasis of Peace." In the speech, the Dalai Lama offers the following predictions:

I am more optimistic than ever before about the future of Tibet. This optimism stems from the determination of the Tibetan people inside Tibet and also from the dramatic changes that have taken place everywhere in the world, particularly in the erstwhile Soviet Union. I feel certain that within the next five to ten years some major changes will take place in China.

Such affirmations of a bright future function in much the same way as Dr. Martin Luther King's "I Have a Dream" speech. By offering the movement's followers a vision of hope, an image of a brighter future, the speaker downplays the wretched indecision and lack of progress in the present time. This hopeful rhetoric also serves to spur the followers into action, to make that vision a reality. Thus while the prophetic "influence" is not "discrete," it does serve to make the myth potentially a reality through the audience's potential for action. "The professional prophet," remarks Gordon, "enhances the personal feeling of importance of his audience..." (1971, p.508).

Moreover, there exists in Tibet a sense of millenarianism. Therefore, the Dalai Lama's persuasive discourse is more apt to be taken seriously in that context. Schwartz states that

Millenarianism is just one expression of the challenge posed by the [alleged] destruction of traditional Tibetan society and culture to Tibetan religious beliefs. The problem of finding meaning in the calamity of the Chinese occupation, and some basis for hope for the future, is one that is felt by all Tibetans (1994, p.229).

Therefore when the audience of the Dalai Lama receives both his hopeful messages together with his more pessimistic statements, the apparent contradiction is lessened through this millenarian viewpoint. The "calamity" of the present situation and the hope for a better future go hand in hand.

While the Dalai Lama admits humbly that his own prophetic capacity is limited, this limitation is offset by the closeness and accessibility of a follower who can improve the Dalai Lama's prophetic authority. This person is someone with unquestionable and inexplicably accurate "supernatural" powers of vision and insight: the Tibetan oracle who remains with the Dalai Lama's exiled government at all times (Dalai Lama, 1962; 1990). Thus the Dalai Lama's own prophetic powers are coupled with a greater vision in that he is aided by incomprehensible supernatural abilities. John Avedon describes the import of the Nechung oracle:

For 1,300 years Tibet's chief oracle has been consulted by the nation's leaders on virtually every key decision of state. Although on sacred occasions the oracle would appear before up to 80,000 people in Lhasa [specifics about the Nechung oracle remained a secret]... As part of Tibet's entry into the world... the Dalai Lama agreed to have some details... revealed (1984, p. 199).

Therefore, in keeping with tradition and his secular and religious office, the Dalai Lama invokes the import of the Nechung oracle in his discourse to strengthen his authority and apparent ability to see beyond what ordinary humans are able to see. Perhaps a reliance upon a mysterious, ancient

tradition may seem peculiar to future-oriented Westerners who tend to value a logical, rational approach in their leaders.³⁵ On the other hand, the use of antiquated methods to gain insights is not limited to the Dalai Lama's leadership. Americans may be reminded of a similarly "peculiar" habit of one of America's most popular presidents: Ronald Reagan is known to have consulted horoscope experts before scheduling key meetings throughout his two-term presidency. Even in the West, mysticism thrives, for example, regardless of whether they are considered believable or not, the fact remains that many major Western newspapers continue to print daily horoscopes.

In stark contrast to the Dalai Lama's own alleged awareness and insight, the Dalai Lama describes the Chinese government as a leadership without vision, or, in the case of Mao, as headed by leaders unable to realize their visions in a humane manner. Likewise, he describes the Chinese people as a whole as mysterious--"I can not yet fathom the Chinese mind" (Dalai Lama, 1990). What may be inferred from this statement is that, to the contrary, he does understand the results of Chinese actions, but what he does not understand is the motivation behind them. For when he refers to "mind," he refers to the Chinese leadership's ability to continue to rationalize in their own minds their allegedly inhumane

³⁵ Referring to the Tibetan reliance upon mystical weather predictors, astrologers, and oracles, the Dalai Lama affirms that "these mysterious experiences [exist] and will remain, although what involvement they will have in the [future modern Tibetan] Government I can't say" (1986, pp. 174-175).

actions despite the subsequent and inevitable loss of face their alleged actions continue to invoke. The Dalai Lama laments, "I had hoped that the Chinese cared about international opinion, but [even United Nations resolutions] had no noticeable effect on them" (1962, p. 230). The Dalai Lama thus expresses exasperation with this alleged Chinese perverseness and illogic in the face of "facts" and "international opinion." For instance, the Dalai Lama claims that much of the "progress" that the Chinese proudly tout as having been the result of their investments in Tibet really only amount to "dzuma," which in Tibetan means "eye-wash" or a "sham" (1990, p. 108).

He asserts that this supposed lack of Chinese vision, within the context of their behavior, has hurt their ability to rule effectively while also hurting the Tibetans. In terms of the Chinese economy, this is not far from the truth. Dreyer, for instance, states that the Chinese central government has lost large quantities of money from its investments in Tibet, rather than gained from them (1993, p. 257). Tibet today remains the only area of China which is operating at a deficit (Dreyer, 1993, pp.257-258). Yet Chinese leadership, in an effort to save face, maintain that Tibet's "development" has been marked and quantifiable (anonymous, Beijing Review, 1987, pp.24-25).

The Dalai Lama continually pokes and prods at this alleged Chinese blindness to the facts. The Dalai Lama comments on the attention to superficialities within the

early Communist Chinese regime he witnessed before he fled Tibet:

With [the Chinese troops] came Generals..., who...were [with] a Tibetan in national costume and fur hat. As they entered the room, this man made three formal prostrations. I thought this rather strange as he was evidently a member of the Chinese delegation. It turned out that he was the interpreter, and a loyal supporter of the Communists. When I later asked why he was not wearing the same Mao suits as his companions, he replied good naturedly that I must not make the mistake of thinking that the Revolution was a revolution in dress; it was a revolution of ideas. (1993, p.72).

Thus the Dalai Lama reveals how he sees through the facade of behavior. The Tibetan was a "loyal supporter" of the Communists, helping enable the Chinese in their program to eliminate the old order of Tibet--of which the Dalai Lama himself is an integral part. Yet this Tibetan maintains the superficial dress of the old order, so he can facilitate, with his friendly and "good natured" manner, the process of eliminating the old order and instituting the new. The Tibetan interpreter's "three formal prostrations" are likewise shown to be part of the "dzuma." The prostrations constitute a sham due to the fact that the interpreter was operating for the Chinese Communists, which alters the normal interpretation of the prostration as a symbol of deep respect and subservience into a physical motion--a mere formality used to hasten the demise of the system from which the prostration arose in the first place. Hence, the Dalai Lama shows that he has the unique ability to see beyond the

Chinese actions and into their motives. Thus the Dalai Lama illustrates, in the manner of The Emperor's New Clothes fable, that he has the courage to convey his unique insight to the rest of the world.

Another example of the Dalai Lama's self-proclaimed insight into the Chinese administration's duplicity are his observations about Mao Tse-tung. For example, after the Dalai Lama describes Mao's apparently friendly attitudes toward him, he offers insight into how Communist "projects" in China that were unfolding apace in the name of "progress" also portended the destruction of Tibet's traditional culture and infrastructure in the name of similar progress in Tibet:

My final interview with this remarkable man [Mao] was toward the end of my visit to China... By then, I had been able to complete a tour of the Chinese provinces, and I was able to tell him truthfully that I had been greatly impressed and interested by all the development projects I had seen. Then he started to give me a long lecture about the true form of democracy, and advised me how to become a leader of the people and how to take heed of their suggestions. And then he edged closer to me on his chair and whispered: "I understand you very well. But of course, religion is poison. It has two great defects: It undermines the race, and secondly it retards the progress of the country. Tibet and Mongolia have both been poisoned by it."

I was thoroughly startled; what did he mean to imply? I tried to compose myself, but I did not know how to take him. Of course, I knew he must be a bitter enemy of religion. Yet he seemed genuinely friendly and affectionate toward me... (1962, pp. 117-118).

This vignette shows that the Dalai Lama's instinctive reaction reveals his insight into the situation. The Dalai Lama, in being "thoroughly startled" at Mao's apparently

malevolent motives for Communist change in Tibet, indicates that he fears the worst. Mao's motives seem all the more unspeakable since they are "whispered." In asking the rhetorical question, "what did he mean to imply?" we as readers fill in the answer--we, too, share the Dalai Lama's insight of Mao's contradictory position of being "a bitter enemy of religion" and the "genuinely friendly and affectionate" man. Moreover, Mao's whispered comments are a contradiction of his earlier comment to the Dalai Lama that "Buddhism was quite a good religion" (1962, p.116). These statements, plus the reader's knowledge of history, affirm the answer to the rhetorical question because the reader knows that Mao's position as "enemy" superseded that of "affectionate" friend.

In his description of yet another incident involving Mao, the Dalai Lama implies that Mao attempted to befriend the Tibetans so as to use them for hastening the demise of the Tibetan state. The Dalai Lama recounts how Mao's actions in participating in a Tibetan celebration mocked the Tibetans:

I also gave a dinner party in Peking, to celebrate the Tibetan New Year by returning some of the hospitality I had received [while visiting China]. Everything was done according to the traditions and customs of Tibet...I had the pleasure of meeting many Chinese officials on this occasion, including Mao Tse-tung, and I was struck again by their charm of manner and courtesy and culture. We had no religious ceremonies at the party, but we had the usual New Year decorations and a special kind of cake which is made in Tibet for this season. It is our custom to take a small piece of this cake and throw it up to the ceiling as an offering to

Buddha. When Mao Tse-tung was told of this custom, he threw a piece up to the ceiling, and then with a mischievous expression, he threw another piece down on the floor (1962, p. 121).

Mao's insolent action and his "mischievous expression" therefore betray his true feelings about the "traditions and customs of Tibet." Mao's duplicity is revealed to be symbolic of the Chinese in general, as well as ironic. Mao's behavior is symbolic, since it foreshadows the literal destruction of Tibetan monasteries and religious life; it is ironic since Mao's mockery of a Tibetan custom contradicts the Dalai Lama's observation that on the surface the Chinese officials exhibited "charm of manner and courtesy and culture." Here again, the Dalai Lama does not come right out and explain his insight, but rather he lets the reader arrive at such conclusions from the vivid picture he paints of the event.

Another example of the Dalai Lama's insight is his often repeated claim that the Chinese keep Tibet hidden from international observers because, contrary to Chinese claims, Tibetans are not happy with the current situation there. The Dalai Lama often brings out the contradiction that if things are going so well in Tibet, then why does the Chinese leadership continue to ban most foreigners from the region? In an article by the Dalai Lama printed in the New York Times on February 3, 1979, he declares:

If the majority of people in Tibet are really happy and willing to live under the Chinese rule, it

would be foolish and unreasonable on the part of the 100,000 Tibetans in exile to stubbornly act contrary to their wishes... But we must first know for certain that the Tibetans are completely satisfied and happy. So far it is only the Chinese publicity organs and their recognized spokesmen in the West who claim that the Tibetans in Tibet are happy... During the past thirty years there has been much propaganda about the tremendous progress made by China in virtually every field, contrary to what was actually happening in the country... If the Tibetans are genuinely contented with the present state of affairs, there is a way in which the Chinese can easily convince us and the world of this... Tibet should be opened so that Tibetans within and without can freely visit each other... Such an opportunity will help us in "seeking truth from facts," a popular slogan in China today (1986, pp. 200-201).

Subsequently, the Chinese acquiesced to these requests. A Tibetan group of delegates from the Dalai Lama's government in exile was mobbed by Tibetans in Lhasa, much to the chagrin and surprise of Chinese officials in Tibet who apparently underestimated the staying power of the long exiled Dalai Lama. The Chinese offer of Tibetans in exile to return to visit Tibet, however, was not without its political implications--the Tibetans were allowed to return home provided they permanently exchanged their Tibetan passports for Chinese passports. In addition, the 1980s ushered in a brief period of limited tourism in Tibet, which was brought abruptly to a halt in the aftermath of the riots in Lhasa in 1987 and 1988 (Schwartz, 1994).

Consequently, by seeing beyond the alleged sham, the Dalai Lama can see the "truth." His leadership power is enhanced by not only being able to see the truth at the

present time; he can also see the truth in the future. With the oracle at his dispense, the Dalai Lama maintains an image of possessing prophetic knowledge. For instance, the Dalai Lama states:

At the beginning of 1956, during Losar [a religious festival], I had a very interesting encounter with the Nechung oracle, who announced that "the light of the Wish Fulfilling Jewel [one of the names by which the Dalai Lama is known to Tibetans] will shine in the West." I took this to indicate that I would travel that year to India, though I now see that the prophesy had a deeper implication (1993, p. 105).

This "deeper implication," of course, is the fact that in these very words, a Westerner is reading from the autobiography by the Dalai Lama. Therefore this person in the West is in the process of learning from the Dalai Lama's words, and thus is being enlightened by him: that is, "the light" of the Dalai Lama is "shining in the West." This "deeper implication" of "the prophesy" then, bolsters the Dalai Lama's ally, the "Nechung oracle," and by association in the fact that the oracle works solely for the Dalai Lama, the prophetic powers of the Dalai Lama himself are raised. "The greatest psychological value of the intelligent oracle...is not that [she or] he dulls the edge of a necessarily frightful future, but rather that [she or] he exculpates people from the anxiety of the past" (Gordon, 1971, p.513). The Dalai Lama, himself having narrowly escaped from the alleged clutches of the Chinese Communist

terrors, likewise relieves not only his own anxieties, but also the anxieties of the international Tibetan Diaspora.

In conclusion, this chapter has looked at the ways that the Dalai Lama capitalizes upon his diplomatic skills, charisma, and allegedly unique insight to further persuasion in politics and to maintain his position of authority over Tibetans and international supporters. The Dalai Lama's ability to strengthen his "face" for negotiations also carries over into much of the Western news media's treatment of him and his leadership qualities. One Western reporter, for instance, suggests that "in good measure because of his campaigning, the world increasingly sees the Tibetans as impoverished outcasts in their own ecologically devastated homeland" (McDonald, 1993, p.26). As a social movement leader who must be able to anticipate and handle the moves of his political adversaries, both the charisma and the renowned vision of the Dalai Lama as reported in the media have served to create a strong image. The Dalai Lama's stature in international negotiations has become elevated so that where he was once shunned by leaders and diplomats, he is now frequently hosted by them. The next chapter will examine two speeches that the Dalai Lama delivered as a result of this more recent open-door policy by Western leaders.

CHAPTER FIVE

REVELING IN CONTRADICTION: A RHETORICAL STRATEGY

Introduction

This chapter forms the center of this thesis, and provides two kinds of analysis. First, I offer a contextual analysis of the settings and aftermath of two of the Dalai Lama's most important speeches so as to establish an understanding of the background which set the stage for the Dalai Lama's delivery of each speech, as well as the reasons for why it may have been received and responded to as it was. Second, I provide in this chapter substantive analytical and rhetorical criticism of each speech. The analysis of each speech covers the following points: (1) a discussion of the historical, contextual background of the speech; (2) audience analysis, (3) textual analysis and criticism, and (4) a discussion of audience response and events in the aftermath of the speech.

Background

International discussion over the Tibet question has flourished in the face of media suppression and diplomatic efforts to downplay the events surrounding Tibet (McDonald, 1993, p. 24). The riots in Lhasa, Tibet during the late 1980's showed to the world that the issue will continue to be problematic for both China and the West, internally as it relates to politics and internationally in the form of

diplomacy. In heated exchanges between 1987 and 1989, China and Western nations had to face up to the contradictions that existed in the public dialogue over Tibet.

The main contradiction that existed for China was that its proclaimed reforms and relaxation of strict policies of religious suppression in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) only resulted in a redoubled effort on the part of Tibetans to protest the Chinese presence there. Between 1987 and 1989 a series of riots broke out. The riots in the Tibetan capital, Lhasa, were covered by international media and witnessed by western tourists. As a result, tourists and reporters were summarily rounded up and expelled from the region, and tourism in Tibet was suspended indefinitely by the Chinese authorities. For prominent Western nations, such as Great Britain, France, and the United States, the contradiction existed in the manner of implementing foreign policy and handling internal politics: the West's stated respect for human rights stopped abruptly short of diplomatic relations, especially where trade and economic policies were concerned. With regard to the United States, Vause affirms that "...the 'Tibet Question' raised by Congress is potentially more serious because it raises political issues that cut to the very heart of deeply held convictions of both the Chinese and the Americans" (1989, p.13). These "political issues" were defense, human rights, including religious freedom, and trade. Presenting such issues in a persuasive and palatable manner is a monumental task.

Kenneth Burke vouches for this. "Religion, politics, and economics," he says, "are notoriously touchy subjects..." (1950, p.32).

Knowing this to be the case, the Dalai Lama capitalized upon the contradictions in policy regarding these "touchy subjects" in two speeches. According to both Chinese and Western sources, the speeches contributed to outbreaks of rioting in Lhasa, Tibet (Vause, 1989, p.13). In the aftermath of the 1987 riots, the New China News Agency stated that "Yesterday's riot is regarded as a direct outcome of the Dalai's activities to split the motherland as an exile engaged in political activities" (Gargan, 1987, p.A-1).³⁶ Behind closed doors in diplomatic circles, Western politicians were rebuked by China for having allowed the Dalai Lama to air his views and play up the contradictions in the Tibet issue (Sciolino, 1987, p.A-1; Doherty, 1991, p.1002; anonymous, 1994, p.A-7). The first speech, which the Dalai Lama presented to the US Congress's Subcommittee on Human Rights on September 21, 1987, was to be the precursor, in both form, content, and riotous effect, to his second

³⁶ Another Chinese official declared:

Last September [1987] the Dalai Lama made a five-point statement to the Human Rights Sub-Committee of the US House of Representatives, soon after which, separatists in Tibet declared their support for the five-point statement. The riots in Lhasa followed. These things are very clear...I only want to talk about the apparent connections between the two events. The Dalai Lama should not have done things like this which are irresponsible to his nation and religion (anonymous, Beijing Review, 1988, p.20).

speech, which was to be given before the European Parliament in Strasbourg on June 15, 1988.

Timing and Audience

The "Address to Members of the United States Congress: Five Point Peace Plan for Tibet" introduced into the debate over the Tibet Question for the first time a comprehensive intertwining of the elements in East-West diplomacy that are contradictory. Whereas formerly the issues of trade and human rights, plus the stakes of war, peace, and security measures had been separated largely into unrelated, or at best, loosely related affairs in the Dalai Lama's discourse, this speech marks the first time he takes the bold step of embracing all of the issues and holding the contradictions forth for the immediate and global audience to contemplate. The speech also introduces a comprehensive outline for specific measures about which the Chinese and Tibetans, with the help and diplomatic pressure of the West, could negotiate to improve the situation in Tibet.

"Concern in the American Congress about the human rights situation in Tibet had been building for months before the [1987] demonstrations began" and a series of debates took place and amendments were passed regarding Tibet (Vause, p.13). Unable to secure the full joint session of Congress as he had hoped, the Dalai Lama had to settle on giving his speech to the Congressional Subcommittee on Human Rights. Table 2 below lists the members of the subcommittee. His

reception on Capitol Hill was nonetheless reported to have been enthusiastic (Ifill, 1987, p.A-7) and singularly unprecedented (Vause, 1989, p.14). In fact, "Congress even passed a bill welcoming the Dalai Lama to the United States" (U.S.G.P.O. doc. 82-962, 1988, p.1).

Member Name	Affiliation/Representative
Jaime B. Fuster	Puerto Rico
Tom Lantos	California
Edward F. Feighan	Ohio
Ted Weiss	New York
Gary L. Ackerman	New York
Gerald B.H.Solomon	New York
Christopher H. Smith	New Jersey
Jan Meyers	Kansas
John Miller	Washington
Mark J. Tavlarides	Subcommittee Staff Director
David Lonie	Minority Staff Consultant
Bernadette Paolo	Subcommittee Staff Consultant
Kerry Bolognere	Subcommittee Staff Consultant

Table 2. Members of the US Congress Subcommittee
on Human Rights

Through channels of media, the speech of the Dalai Lama reached the wider world audience. This speech, either alone or in conjunction with at least the token verbal support of the US Congress, allegedly spurred the Tibetans to action. The timing of the speech, too, may be part of the reason for its impact. "October 7, 1987 was the thirty-seventh anniversary of the Communist Chinese Army's

invasion/liberation of Tibet" (Vause, 1989, p.16).³⁷ Thus for the Dalai Lama to have spoken at a time that was diplomatically advantageous, as well as symbolically meaningful to Tibetans, certainly promoted the impact of the speech.

It appears as though the Dalai Lama's goals were realized. It does not seem impossible that the Dalai Lama had specifically planned to give the speech just prior to a date that marked the deepest cleavage in Chinese-Tibetan relations--the date of the invasion/liberation of Tibet. By giving the speech in just enough time in advance, it would have time to reach across the world and permeate the censored channels of Tibet and China's media through the communication black market.³⁸ In this way, the speech's import could be understood by the date that is a celebration for the Chinese and a day of mourning for Tibetans.

³⁷ Vause confirms there were undeniable connections between the Dalai Lama's speech and the riots:

On September 27, 1987, within days of the Dalai Lama's appearance before the Congressional Human Rights [Subcommittee], a ...demonstration was held at Tibetan Buddhism's most holy site, the Jokhang Temple in Lhasa...On September 30 Congressman Lantos reported to the press information he had received that the Chinese government had executed at least two Tibetan nationalists as a political message in reprisal for the speeches given by the Dalai Lama during his visit to the US...Representatives of the Dalai Lama in New York provided the [report] to Lantos (1989, p.16).

³⁸ The penalties are stiff for Tibetans caught with any materials perceived as anti-communist, pro-Tibetan, or independence oriented. Schwartz cites, for example, the case of three Tibetans who were charged on November 10, 1989, for "the printing and distribution of literature explaining the Dalai Lama's Five Point Peace Proposal and his speech to the European Parliament in June 1988" (1994, pp. 169-170). These three Tibetans received sentences of between two to five years in prison.

In garnering the receptive Congressional audience, he was able to have secured a strong enough link to diplomatic circles with a Western nation that could influence China. Representative Lantos voiced the contradiction between the human rights policy and foreign policy of the United States:

Critics of the Congressional initiatives on Tibet, including administration officials, question the wisdom of Congress in making its concerns about human rights in this region known. In response, I would quote Secretary of State Shultz, who said that "human rights is at the core of American foreign policy because it is central to America's conception of self." In keeping with the Secretary's policy pronouncement, the subcommittees³⁹ hope to determine whether there is a core to American foreign policy toward China on the Tibet issue (p.2).

The import of the speech in the hands of the Chinese would be a political embarrassment;⁴⁰ in the hands of the Western press, the "core" foreign policies of nations of the so-called free world would be questioned; in the hands of Tibetans, it would be just the right impetus for protest.⁴¹

³⁹ Lantos is referring to the Subcommittees on (1) Human Rights and International Organizations and (2) on Asian and Pacific Affairs, as well as to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

⁴⁰ As Norbu puts it, "The Dalai Lama...inside or outside Tibet, continues to be a pain in the neck to China. Hence, wherever possible China has tried to stop his activity abroad" (1987, pp. 287-288).

⁴¹ Vause sums up the events as follows:

On October 1 violence had erupted in Lhasa, leaving...persons dead...arrested, and considerable property damaged...Chinese response was swift and certain. Beijing issued one of its harshest attacks on the Dalai Lama, whom it blamed for inciting the riot, and immediately dispatched additional security forces to Lhasa...Tibet was [then]...sealed off from the outside world. A curfew was imposed, foreign journalists...and Western reporters...were expelled (1989, pp.16-17).

The Dalai Lama's visit had been organized by members of the Democratic Congress as well as supporters of the Dalai Lama and lobbyists for human rights in Washington, DC. The then Democrat-controlled Congress supported debates by Congressional supporters of human rights issues, including members of the Congressional Subcommittee on Human Rights. In addition to passing a bill specifically to welcome the Dalai Lama to Washington, Congress passed a bill expressing concern for human rights issues in China, featuring

an amendment to the State Department authorization bill which passed the House and Senate unanimously. The House version called upon the People's Republic of China to respect human rights. The Senate went a step further by attaching the exchange of "defense articles" to China with compliance to human rights provisions (U.S.G.P.O. doc. 82-962, 1988, p.1).

Clearly, the Dalai Lama's reception in Washington to speak before Congress was established with the knowledge of the State Department and the united cooperation of both the Senate and the House. Moreover, the "exchange of 'defense articles'" that would be dependent upon China's compliance with human rights conditions firmly tied trade issues to human rights issues with the State Department's acquiescence. At the center of the impetus for these actions, was the Dalai Lama himself, and his imminent appearance on Capitol Hill. Thus the bills that were passed to welcome the Dalai Lama to Congress and to confirm the relationship between Sino-American trade and China's alleged human rights abrogations

also indicated that Congress both recognized and established--with the recognition of the State Department--a link between the Dalai Lama as a person who was related to China and as a person who is publicly known as a political as well as religious figure.

However, following the Dalai Lama's speech and the riots in Lhasa afterwards, the US State Department attempted to deny that linkage. The State Department reconfirmed its position that Tibet was part of China, while also complaining that the Dalai Lama should not have spoken about politics. The State Department claimed that the US had issued him a travel visa under the assumption that during his stay he would stick to religious, and not political speeches.⁴² Charles Rose, Representative in Congress from North Carolina, noted the quandary in which the US found itself as a result of the Dalai Lama's speech:

The Dalai Lama did not come to Washington asking us to help him establish the independence of Tibet. Nowhere in our conversations with him has he talked about that, although that has been picked up on and emphasized in the press a great deal...So His Holiness...makes a speech that is a model of moderation, his followers get excited about what has taken place in Washington, the fact that the House and the Senate are interested in the plight of the people [of] Tibet, and [referring to the riots] you all know the rest of the story...

⁴²This claim seems mendacious in light of the fact that the Dalai Lama's visit had been scheduled well in advance and had been preceded by numerous very political debates in Congress regarding the Tibet question, China, and the Dalai Lama. Also, the Congress and Senate's passing of bills on Tibet related issues that year and during the years beforehand indicates that it was well understood on Capitol Hill and at the State Department that the Dalai Lama's significance was not strictly religious, but was also political.

Rose's observation that the speech was moderate and at the same time provoked interpretations of independence which led to rioting is accurate. Only a very deft and well timed rhetoric can be simultaneously "moderate" and riot causing. The way in which the Dalai Lama presented the "core" problem (the problem of the contradiction between the West's two-policy view toward the Tibet issue) lies at the heart of the efficacy of the Dalai Lama's speech. Benjamin Gilman, Congressman from New York, observed that "the Dalai Lama's five point peace proposal seems to me and many of my colleagues to provide the desired framework for an equitable solution (U.S.G.P.O. doc. 82-962, 1988, p.9)"

The Dalai Lama was persuasive in his targeting the US, and by international political solidarity, the Western audience in general, for their collective policy of separating human rights from foreign policy and trade issues. Reflecting later, the Dalai Lama revealed this view, saying, "I held the view that the US was the champion of freedom...[but] as I have come to know the [US] better, I have begun to see that, in some ways, the American political system does not live up to its own ideals" (1990, p. 198).

The effect of the speech was that Westerners apparently felt compelled to respond to it and to specifically address the guilt which the Dalai Lama's discourse provoked. The following official commentary is one such illustration of this phenomenon. In an attempt at extirpating the US guilt

over its contradictory policy, J. Stapleton Roy, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, scolds the Dalai Lama for the irresponsible rhetoric of his Five Point Plan speech. Yet in so doing, Roy also sinks deeper into the contradiction which the Dalai Lama's speech brings to light:

...the US Government considers Tibet to be a part of China and does not in any way recognize the Tibetan government in exile that the Dalai Lama claims to head.

It is important to distinguish in this connection between the Administration's strong and unwavering support for human rights and our position on the political claims of the Dalai Lama and on the status of Tibet...This distinction is crucial to understanding why the Administration disavows any support for the Dalai Lama's five-point program. Neither the United States nor any other member of the United Nations recognizes or has ever recognized Tibet as a sovereign state independent of China....⁴³I urge the conferees on the State Department authorization bill to make clear the distinction between their legitimate concern for human rights in Tibet and the question of support for a political program relating to Tibet (1987, 49-51).

This statement reflects the political quagmire into which the West was thrown as a result of the Dalai Lama's speech before Congress. Therefore, while the Dalai Lama's speech was not effectual in producing political action for the plan it presented, it was effective in fostering debate over issues which had lain dormant for years. These issues were, as

⁴³ Mr. Roy errs on this point. In 1961, El Salvador supported Tibet by introducing bills to the United Nations which were passed which both condemned China's invasion of Tibet and supported Tibet as a sovereign nation. Despite this fact however, the bills were without teeth and no action was taken on them.

Congressman Rose stated above, "picked up on and emphasized in the press a great deal." For the Dalai Lama to have accomplished this in light of the fact that his authority in, and recommendations regarding, foreign affairs was rejected by the West, attests to the efficacy, and intent, of his discourse. The New York Times reported, "the Dalai Lama responded with dry humor to Chinese [and Western] charges that he was responsible for the violence in Lhasa. 'I am happy to be a scapegoat,' he said" (Hazarika, 1987, p.A-8).

The Dalai Lama's speech had two main effects. It invoked collective guilt over the West's contradictory policy (US Government, doc. no. 82-962, 1988) and it embarrassed Chinese leaders who were eager to improve their international reputation (Norbu, 1991). The speech fueled debate, which is essential to keeping the issue alive.⁴⁴ Such discussion is what could ultimately lead to a push for negotiations and a change in China's administration of Tibet (Norbu, 1991). This reasoning evidently is what caused the Dalai Lama to repeat, and expand upon his Five Point Plan a year later in his Strasbourg Address. The backdrop for this drama thus

⁴⁴ Vause claims that not since the days of the newly founded United States was the established balance of power system in the US so tested (1989, pp. 10-43). The views of the State Department under the Reagan Administration were in direct opposition to the views of Congress, even though the State Department accepted the passing of the bill that made the "exchange of 'defense articles'" dependent upon human rights compliance by China. The Administration publicly backed China, while Congress publicly backed the Dalai Lama's position and human rights advocates. Vause maintains that as a consequence of this overt disagreement in policy, and its implications for potentially imperiling Sino-American relations, there was discussion by government officials of the need for an overhaul of the US system of diplomacy, in which international powers of negotiation and decision making would be placed more clearly in the hands of either Congress or the Administration (Vause, 1989).

established, we may inspect the contents of the Five Point Plan itself.

The Five Point Peace Plan

In brief, the Five Point Peace Plan provides a reason for the West in general and the US in particular to be concerned about Tibet. It establishes that Tibet is a strategic region that at present is in turmoil, but which could, with the West's help, potentially become a region of peace and stability that would contribute to global peace. The five points that the Dalai Lama proposes are as follows:

1. Transformation of the whole of Tibet into a zone of peace;
2. Abandonment of China's population transfer policy which threatens the very existence of the Tibetans as a people;
3. Respect for the Tibetan people's fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms;
4. Restoration and protection of Tibet's natural environment and the abandonment of China's use of Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons and dumping of nuclear waste;
5. Commencement of earnest negotiations on the future status of Tibet and of relations between the Tibetan and Chinese peoples.

Each of these components, however idealistic it appears to be, does reflect pragmatic concerns while also serving as a kind of religious lesson in nonviolence toward humans and nature.

The themes of the speech may be seen as corresponding to the points on the physical structure of the Buddhist stupa, or shrine. A stupa is square at its base, with a series of

steps leading upward; atop the steps of the base sits a spherical form (a kind of cupcake shape), which is finally crowned by a pointed cone. The four corners which comprise the foundations of this speech are the interlocking relationships between the "strong and the weak;" the "brothers and sisters." These themes unite the top and bottom of the hierarchy. The steps of the base constitute the "peace" which must be attained at the "national, regional, and global" levels. The next series of steps leading upward constitutes the past, present, and future: the Dalai Lama speaks to us "today," telling us that in the future, the "world [will be] increasingly interdependent," and that "we need each other more than in the past." The round object which rests upon these steps is the "planet," which we are "destined to share." And, "above all," at the top of this structure is the cone, which ends in a point in the sky: "the principles" which should guide all human life, those of "love and compassion."

The Dalai Lama opens the speech by saying that "The world is increasingly interdependent, so that lasting peace--national, regional, and global--can only be achieved if we think in terms of broader interest rather than parochial needs." This statement invites the listener to picture the world as an interlocking puzzle, which cannot be complete without stability and peace in each of its parts. The world has become a place that is too "interdependent" for its nations to each be selfishly obsessed with "parochial needs."

This theme of interdependence is woven throughout the text. It enhances the ability of this mysterious "god-king" from a fabled land and alien culture to get members of the Western audience to identify with himself and with his message. Interdependence is congruous with Kenneth Burke's conception of "consubstantiality" (1950, pp.20-23). Burke states that

A is not identical with...colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are joined, A is identified with B. Or [A] may identify [herself or] himself with B even when their interests are not joined, if [A] assumes that they are, or is persuaded to believe so...

In being identified with B, A is "substantially one" with a person other than [herself or] himself. Yet at the same time, [A] remains unique, an individual locus of motives. Thus [A] is both joined and separate, at once a distinct substance and consubstantial with another (emphasis in original) (1950, pp.20-21).

It is clear that through his emphasis on the theme of "interdependence," the Dalai Lama, and by extension all of Tibet, is the "A" of Burke's scenario. The Dalai Lama, as "A," wishes "B," that is, the West, to realize that "their interests are joined." It is the purpose of the speech to "persuade" the West that although "unique," it is still responsible for its counterpart, Tibet. During the course of the speech, the Dalai Lama develops numerous illustrations of ways in which his cause and the interests of the West are "both joined and separate."

At the outset, the Dalai Lama affirms his ethos, stating, "I speak to you today as the leader of the Tibetan people and as a Buddhist monk devoted to the principles of a religion based on love and compassion. Above all, I am here as a human being who is destined to share this planet with you and all others as brother and sisters." By calling himself "the leader of the Tibetan people" and "a Buddhist monk," he alludes to his "parallel role to the papacy," (Wentz, 1990, p.133). This reference enhances his stature while also aligning the elusive Eastern religious tradition to the familiar Western tradition. By calling himself merely "a human being," he places himself among the great masses of humanity. When this strategy is examined according to Burke's conception of "hierarchy," it becomes apparent that the Dalai Lama is doing something unusual when he places himself at opposing ends of the hierarchy, or social order. According to Burke's "hierarchical principle," a speaker must work within the confines of the existing social hierarchy, using language and symbols to confirm and reiterate the presence of that order (Burke, 1950, pp.138-141; Coyne, 1973, pp.66-70). The Dalai Lama, in acknowledging that order, places himself at either ends of this pyramid of social order. In so doing, his speech aims to achieve maximum audience receptivity by inspiring the awe and respect of "underlings" as well as "overlords" (Burke, 1950, p. 138; Coyne, p.70).

It should be pointed out that this is not the Dalai Lama's attempt at employing the tactics of the politician who contrives to use the "plain folks appeal." This is not the case because, through the phenomenon of the universal (Tibetan) belief in reincarnation, the entire Tibetan culture and its social order holds the idea that any human can become, through mental training, a higher incarnation, or even a deity. So while the Dalai Lama in his leadership post is at the zenith of the hierarchy, and is considered by many to be the manifestation of a deity in human form, the well known story of his humble peasant birth serves to confirm, rather than dissipate, his appeal as a human being among the greater masses of the hierarchy. A similar phenomenon, in terms of symbolism, can be observed when Americans cast Abraham Lincoln, as martyred leader, in a nearly deified imagery, all the while we are conscious of, and often reminded of, the fact that he was born and raised in a log cabin.

His ethos thus established, the Dalai Lama restates the theme of the "interdependence" of nations by saying that "As the world grows smaller, we need each other more than in the past. This is true in all parts of the world, including the continent I come from." This opening paragraph provides a vision of a world that needs Tibet, just as Tibet needs the help of the world. The introduction also provides a small foreshadowing of the structure of the speech as a whole.

In the second paragraph, the Dalai Lama recapitulates the "open conflicts" existing in "the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and in my own country, Tibet." He claims that "unless comprehensive solutions are formulated...piecemeal or merely expedient measures will only create new problems."⁴⁵ The responsibility for averting such future problems rests on the actions of those involved in the negotiation process. The Dalai Lama refers to the region's "great powers," and says that "all relevant countries and peoples, large and small" have to be a part of the process to resolve the conflict. Again, the interdependence of nations entails not only acting out of "broader interest," but also to avoid future conflicts. We may infer that as a great diplomatic power, the US is "relevant" to the process of preventing conflicts. Again, the steps of the structure, this "regional" peace, cannot be stable without the help of those at the base, the "strong and the weak."

The third paragraph describes how "the Tibetan people are eager to contribute to regional and world peace..." At this point, the Dalai Lama also reaffirms Tibet's unique, nonviolent history while also reiterating its "strategic

⁴⁵ This claim is well founded. J.T. Dreyer, a political scientist specializing in Asian studies, maintains that

Unless the negotiation process [between the Dalai Lama and China] can be restarted soon, a likely scenario is the emergence of a Northern Ireland-type situation, in which religious festivals or the anniversaries of previous uprisings become occasions for outpourings of popular discontent. Each new outpouring of discontent may provide more martyrs. Avenging the honor of the martyrs will provide the excuse for future uprisings in Tibet (1989, p.289).

position in the heart of Asia..." In this way, the Buddhist history of "respect to all forms of life," which alludes to the highest goals or principals at the top of this thematic stupa, is also linked to the base of the stupa, where the physical levels of peace (national, regional, global) anchor the higher ideals (love and compassion). The "regional" level of peace at the base is also linked to the stupa's sphere, which is the "world."

Next, the Dalai Lama offers three examples of the instability of this regional peace: the invasion of Tibet in 1949/1950; his own "flight to India in 1959;" and the China-India "border war in 1962." These examples support his claim in the second paragraph that only "piecemeal or merely expedient measures will only create new problems." He then declares that the "border demarcation" is only a symptom of the real problem, "China's illegal occupation of Tibet." The next paragraph reiterates the Dalai Lama's vision of Tibet's history:

Since Tibetan emperors unified Tibet, over a thousand years ago, our country was able to maintain its independence until the middle of this century. At times Tibet extended its influence over neighboring countries and peoples and, in other periods, came itself under the influence of powerful foreign rulers--the Mongol Khans, the Gorkhas of Nepal, the Manchu Emperors and the British in India.

Note that he uses the words "unified Tibet," which reveal the goal of his speech: to unify the disparate regions of the former Tibet (which he alleges the Chinese to have broken

apart). Similarly, he follows this thought with the word "independence" as if to confirm the notion of a "unified Tibet." Then he repeats the word "influence" twice: this is a reminder that Tibet has influenced other nations in the past, and will continue to do so in the future. Other nations, such as Great Britain and India, are mentioned to encourage them to exert their own influence to stabilize political conflicts over Tibet.

In the next paragraph he combines Tibet's past history with its present by stating, "under international law Tibet today is still an independent state." As part of the rhetorical process in aggrandizing the importance of Tibet, the word "one thousand" is repeated. In the second paragraph, he had stated, "Buddhism was introduced to Tibet over one thousand years ago;" here he states that Tibet became a "unified" entity "over a thousand years ago." The Dalai Lama presents in this manner the theme of the human potential to promote conflict or peace. The theme of this human potential evolves in the section on the Chinese "population transfer policy," (discussed below) when the "thousands" become "millions." In the mind's eye of the listener, the potential for problems associated with a Chinese controlled Tibet expands at an alarming rate. Conversely, were the help of allies made palpable, the potential for peace could likewise expand.

He then states that, were it not "for China's occupation, Tibet would still, today, fulfill its natural

role as a buffer state maintaining and promoting peace in Asia." He reaffirms the "sincere desire" of all Tibetans to resume Tibet's role as a buffer state that could "further the cause of world peace and the well-being of mankind and the natural environment we share." He describes the "holocaust inflicted upon" the Tibetans and the Chinese government's "misuse [of] the opportunity for a genuine dialogue." Next, ready to introduce the fundamental components of his peace plan, he states: "it is against this background and in response to the tremendous support and encouragement" of the West that he will "clarify the principal issues and to propose...a first step towards a lasting solution." Here, too, the Dalai Lama offers his speech as a way of shoring up the base of the stupa, it is a "first step" at the bottom of the negotiation process which leads to the "lasting solution" at the top.

As stated above, the Dalai Lama's five-point plan introduces the following plan:

1. Transformation of the whole of Tibet into a zone of peace;
2. Abandonment of China's population transfer policy which threatens the very existence of the Tibetans as a people;
3. Respect for the Tibetan people's fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms;
4. Restoration and protection of Tibet's natural environment and the abandonment of China's use of Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons and dumping of nuclear waste;
5. Commencement of earnest negotiations on the future status of Tibet and of relations between the Tibetan and Chinese peoples.

Through these five points, the Dalai Lama evokes the contradiction in not just the US's "conception of self," but also the entire block of Western nations which share the policy of considering Tibet an internal affair of China, and not a sovereign nation which has been transgressed by another nation. The contradiction which the Dalai Lama introduces in this address to Congress is that the human rights issue and the foreign policy issue cannot be separated to assuage the guilt of politicians and world leaders.

The Dalai Lama, through these five points, implies that the nations who attempt to advance this separation of truly united policy issues may find that their founding principles dissipate when pragmatic political issues appear.⁴⁶ The two issues are, "at the core," parts of the same policy. As opposite ends of the same policy, the Dalai Lama implies the issues cannot, logically or justifiably, be separated. The contradiction makes it impossible for the West to be exonerated from guilt for being an accomplice in its participation with China's policies in Tibet. The contradiction would be grating to China because China had taken great pains to improve its image on reform policies and to appear, internationally, more modern in its administration of government policies.

⁴⁶ In an interview with The Times of London on August 20, 1985, the Dalai Lama was asked to comment on British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's position on Tibet. He replied that "... her silence is very unfortunate... Apart from the moral standpoint, the British Government, among Western nations, has had the closest political relations with Tibet" (1986, p. 157).

"Burke maintains that one of the consequences of being a language user is guilt...the sources of guilt in [humans] are to be found in [our] symbol systems..." (Coyne, 1973, p.66). Thus the Dalai Lama has discovered the error, and consequent guilt, in the Western symbol system of government and its administration. This error is the illogical separation of otherwise wholly integrated policies for expedient political and economic gains. The rest of the speech reveals the tactics that the Dalai Lama uses in his attempt to expose and deepen this guilt in his immediate Western audience, as well as in the omnipresent ear of the Chinese leadership.

Regarding the first point of the peace plan, he proposes "that the whole of Tibet, including the [disputed] provinces of Kham and Amdo, be transformed into a zone of 'Ahimsa,' a Hindi term used to mean a state of peace and nonviolence." This, he claims, "would be in keeping with Tibet's historical role as a peaceful and neutral Buddhist nation and buffer state separating the continent's great powers." By using the word "ahimsa," the Dalai Lama offers an allusion to Gandhi's forcing the British Empire to bow out of India. Ahimsa was an integral concept in Gandhi's writings on nonviolent protest. Through this reference, he becomes the great activist-leader, Gandhi; and China becomes Great Britain who must logically relinquish its control of the land it usurped and the peoples who dwell there. A first step in implementing this "ahimsa" would entail removing Chinese troops from Tibet. Doing so, he says, would yield two

immediate benefits. First, it would enable Indian troops to depart from borders. Second, Tibetans, for whom "the vast occupation force...is a daily reminder...of the oppression and suffering they have all experienced," could be assured that "in the future a meaningful relationship might be established with the Chinese, based on friendship and trust." The mention here of "the oppression and suffering" serves as a transition for broaching his second point.

He calls "the population transfer of Chinese into Tibet" a "'final solution' to the Tibetan problem." This, of course, is an allusion to the holocaust of Jews in Hitler's Nazi Germany. By such an allusion, China assumes Germany's odious historic role; and the Tibetans become the victims, the Jews. At this point, he brings in the statistics involving enormous numbers, which serve to extend the imagery of suffering in the listener's mind:

The massive transfer of Chinese civilians into Tibet...threatens the very existence of the Tibetans...In the Amdo province, for example, where I was born, there are...2.5 million Chinese and only 750,000 Tibetans...Today, in the whole of Tibet 7.5 million Chinese settlers have already been sent, outnumbering the Tibetan population of 6 million. In central and western Tibet...Chinese sources admit the 1.9 million Tibetans already constitute a minority of the region's population. These numbers do not take the estimated 300,000 to 500,000 troops in Tibet into account--250,000 of them in the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region.

For the Tibetans to survive as a people, it is imperative that the population transfer is stopped and Chinese settlers return to China. Otherwise, Tibetans will soon be no more than a tourist attraction and a relic of a noble past.

The dizzying array of numbers transforms the problem of "massive transfer of Chinese" into a looming and growing horror. This scenario provides a perfect parallel to the Nazi holocaust. But instead of Jews being carted off in trains to be killed in Nazi concentration camps, there is a terrible and ironic reversal. The new holocaust victims, Tibetans, are being "swamped" and drowned out by the influx of "Chinese settlers" who are flooding into Tibet via China's policy of "population transfer." This discourse appears to be an attempt to summon for the audience images of torture and death at the hands of ChiNazis. Therefore the audience is primed for the third point of the peace plan, that of human rights.

The Dalai Lama asks that "Fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms...be respected in Tibet." His discussion here is brief. He affirms that "The Tibetan people must once again be free to develop culturally, intellectually, economically and spiritually and to exercise basic democratic freedoms." He defines the human rights violations as "apartheid...segregation and assimilation" and states that "Tibetans are, at best, second class citizens in their own country." Referring to China's frequently voiced defense that it is rebuilding destroyed monasteries, the Dalai Lama holds that,

Although the Chinese government allows Tibetans to rebuild some Buddhist monasteries and to worship in them, it still forbids serious study and teaching of religion. Only a small number of

people, approved by the Communist Party, are permitted to join the monasteries.

While Tibetans in exile exercise their democratic rights under a constitution promulgated by me in 1963, thousands of our countrymen suffer in prisons and labour camps in Tibet for their religious or political convictions.

This statement serves to show that the Chinese are lying about their claims. It is the Tibetans, the Dalai Lama says, and not the Chinese, who are rebuilding the monasteries anyway. The old Western fear and mistrust of Communism is played upon⁴⁷ by illustrating that only those "approved by the Communist Party," are able to study religion. The moral superiority felt by the immediate Western audience, an audience which presumably regards themselves as good, democracy-loving people (particularly the members of Congress) would surely be inclined to believe that no member of the Communist Party, which is traditionally atheistic, could be serious about religious study. In effect, the Dalai Lama means that the Communist Chinese allow no one at all to study or teach religion. Next, having tapped into the audience's fears and negative connotations of Communists, he then turns to a discussion of the legacy of Communists as nuclear war adversaries.

The fourth point the Dalai Lama makes is that "serious efforts must be made to restore the natural environment in Tibet" because Tibet, he alleges, is being "used for the

⁴⁷ The audience for this speech is viewing the world before the crumbling of "The Berlin Wall." The Communist threat, therefore, should have been perceived by them at this point in time as still very real.

production of nuclear weapons and the dumping of nuclear waste." This is in the face of a people who "have a great respect for all forms of life," whose "Buddhist faith...prohibits the harming of all sentient beings, whether human or animal." He states that Tibet was formerly "an unspoiled wilderness sanctuary" but after the arrival of the Chinese, "the wildlife and the forests of Tibet have been almost totally destroyed." He urges his listeners to help turn this around, saying "What little is left in Tibet must be protected and efforts must be made to restore the environment to its balanced state." Lastly, he emphasizes the nuclear threat which the Chinese have created in Tibet, and which "other countries" allegedly condone:

China uses Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons and may also have started dumping nuclear waste in Tibet. Not only does China plan to dispose of its own nuclear waste but also that of other countries, who have already agreed to pay [Beijing] to dispose of their toxic materials.

The dangers this presents are obvious. Not only living generations, but future generations are threatened by China's lack of concern for Tibet's unique and delicate environment.

The Dalai Lama is able to combine the Western paranoia over Communism and the Communist nuclear threat with the humanist plea for helping to save "not only living generations, but future generations" from environmental and perhaps global devastation of the environment and the people who inhabit it. The temporal dimensions reflected in this point, like all the previous points, cover past, present, and future. The past

is the time "prior to the Chinese invasion;" the present exists in "living generations," and the future will be bleak for "future generations" who "are threatened by China's lack of concern." The Dalai Lama attacks China's actions directly, as well as those of the "other countries" who allegedly dump waste in Tibet.

On this point, he also implies the West's complicity in this nuclear threat and environmental devastation lies in passively sanctioning the Chinese invasion. Their guilt for this passive allowance would be increased if the West does not make "efforts" on behalf of Tibet "to restore [Tibet] to its balanced state." According to Burke's "principle of perfection," humans tend to "create...ideals which can never be attained," and, "as a result of the continuing failing of the real and the ideal to match each other, [people] feel guilt" (Coyne, 1973, p.68). The West then, is confronted with the contradiction between its ideal of upholding human rights and democracy and its real state, which is one of not upholding those rights in the name of trade.

Finally, in his fifth point, the Dalai Lama discusses the need for "negotiations on the future status of Tibet and the relationship between the Tibetan and Chinese peoples." He concludes that the Tibet question must be negotiated "in a reasonable and realistic way, in a spirit of frankness and conciliation and with a view to finding a solution that is in the long term interest of all: the Tibetans, the Chinese, and all other peoples concerned."

He then reiterates the notion which his historical claims support, that "Tibetans and Chinese are distinct peoples, each with their own country, history, culture, language, and way of life." On the other hand, he says that these differences "need not...form obstacles to genuine cooperation where this is in the mutual benefit of both peoples." This juxtaposition of the divergent themes of the uniqueness and potential for togetherness of Tibetans and Chinese presents a central problem to the speech; this problem, however, is resolved in the person of the Dalai Lama himself. This thematic oxymoron is that "distinct peoples" are presently mutual "obstacles" while there exists the potential for them to be of "mutual benefit." The identification of this oxymoron shows the Dalai Lama's belief in the audience's benevolent attitude towards different peoples, races, ethnicities, and religions. At the same time, when considering the Dalai Lama's own religious persona, this oxymoron may be viewed as a potential source for effecting persuasion in the audience. This divergent co-theme is prevalent in the Dalai Lama's discourse in general. The use of these opposing themes relates the idea that the world, with its increasing population density, is correspondingly losing, or at least modifying, its historic borders of "culture, language, and way of life."⁴⁸ Two examples of this come to mind. The first is the inevitable elimination of apartheid in South Africa. The second is the

⁴⁸ This notion is attributable to discussions with S. Gollah, Oregon State University, during 1994-95.

European Community's (EC's) progression, beginning in the 1950's, of lowering historic barriers to trade and everyday life by implementing plans for adopting a common currency (the Eurodollar), a common language of diplomacy (English), and other jointly decided measures. While these nations which comprise the EC are extremely different in terms of history, culture, and language, they have been able, thus far, to agree to join forces for the common good.

Admittedly, this joining of forces, for South Africa, has entailed white army attacks and terrorism, and for Europe, it has not been without the xenophobic rhetoric of politicians such as Jean Marie LePen of France and the sporadic campaigns of neo-Nazi violence against new immigrants in Germany.

However, such problems of integration are summarily decried, and, to the credit of these governments, there are continual attempts to end strife related to differences among diverse peoples who share regions and nations. Thus the main problem of the intercultural communicator as persuasive communicator becomes this: how does one mediate the primal human need to maintain uniqueness and a link to some special identity (linguistic, cultural, historical), while also proclaiming that there is an equally pressing need, in the name of a common good ("world peace"), to integrate, "cooperate," and "negotiate" with some other contrastingly unique entity?

The Dalai Lama's continual proclamations of the distinctness of Tibetans should fall on sensitive ears to an international audience who understands that while integrating

diverse races and ethnic groups throughout the world is inevitable and difficult, it cannot be acceptable for it to be done through forced "population transfers." In hindsight, an example of international sensitivity to ethnic "transfers" would be the albeit precarious presence of United Nations troops in the former Yugoslavia. The motivation for keeping troops there is not only to contain the civil war, but also to attempt to prevent or reduce the "ethnic cleansing" forms of population transfers that have happened, to the world's horror, during the course of that civil war; the U.N. presence indicates the belief on the part of member nations of the U.N. that population transfers in or out of regions are wrong and should be stopped. Therefore, as the international concern for the former Yugoslavia shows, the Dalai Lama has accurately gauged the world opinion about population transfers. He highlights the fact that, especially for Western nations, China's population transfer policy is at best unsavory and at worst fostering an ecological and cultural genocide in Tibet. By showing how morally odious China's population transfer policy is, he provides a sufficient reason for Western action on behalf of Tibet to stop this policy. Similarly, if the United States Congress felt it important enough to host the Dalai Lama, who is the symbol and perfect encapsulation of the Tibetan people's unique religion, ethnicity and culture, then the US should be justified in acting to defend and preserve the people whom the Dalai Lama represents. Therefore, the Dalai

Lama makes it obvious that the clearest way for the US to act to help Tibetans would be to condemn China's population transfer policy not only with words, but with actions or even sanctions. The Dalai Lama's own presence as a speaker before Congress is an indicator that such "action" by the US to condemn China's policies is not only possible, it is already happening. The Dalai Lama's plea, then, is for the US and the West in general to extend their actions beyond symbolic efforts and translate the symbolic event into political and tangible efforts to influence China's leadership in their policy making and implementation.

The Dalai Lama's last statement regarding the call for negotiations and "genuine cooperation" also refers to a belief held by many political scientists that China will never gain effective control over Tibet without the help, and even better, the presence of the Dalai Lama. Here the Dalai Lama shows that he needs China's help to improve the situation of his people. He underscores the notion that China will continue to flounder in its administration of Tibet irregardless of the Dalai Lama's alleged "separatist activities." This last point, then, seems particularly directed towards China: "We must all exert ourselves to be reasonable and wise, and to meet in a spirit of frankness and understanding."

In his concluding statements, the Dalai Lama thanks the Subcommittee "for the concern and support which you and so many of your colleagues and fellow citizens [have] expressed

for the plight of oppressed people everywhere." Again, this presses upon the human rights issue as it relates to the core of foreign diplomacy of democratic nations like the US. Then, playing upon Western guilt for its duplicity in verbally patting Tibetans on the back over human rights abuses while refusing to take firm diplomatic stances with China (such as UN initiatives, MFN trade sanctions or boycotts), he says, "The fact that you have publicly shown your sympathy for us Tibetans, has already had a positive impact on the lives of our people inside Tibet." The audience's feelings of guilt thus primed, he then urges them to act to redeem themselves of their false political posturing and inaction: "I ask for your continued support in this critical time in our country's history. Thank you."

Linked Speeches

Just as the Five Point Peace Plan speech was said to have been at least one of the instigating factors for the riots in Tibet in 1987, observers have noted a similar relationship exists between the protests in Tibet which followed the Dalai Lama's Strasbourg proposal. The March 1988 riots were "the largest, best-organized and most destructive demonstrations in Tibet to date," and led the Chinese central government to "impose martial law on the region" (Dreyer, 1989, p.281).⁴⁹ Months later, on December

⁴⁹ In the aftermath of the March protest events, "during a trip to Washington, DC, Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian branded the Dalai Lama as 'an exile who attacks and smears the People's Republic of China'" (Mann, 1988, p. 12).

10, 1988, Tibetans in Lhasa risked death to demonstrate on the fortieth anniversary of International Human Rights Day (Schwartz, 1994, p. 137).⁵⁰

Immediately following the Strasbourg speech, the Chinese "accused the Dalai Lama of trying to internationalize the issue of Tibet," while also "inviting him to come to Beijing for negotiations" (Dreyer, 1989, p.288). Norbu maintains that "the main Chinese objection [to the Strasbourg proposal] was the underlying assumption by the Dalai Lama that Tibet had historically been an independent state prior to the Communist takeover in 1950. This assertion is repeated three times in the Five Point Peace Plan and again three times in the Strasbourg Statement" (1991, pp.355-356).

Aside from Chinese and Western interpretations of the Strasbourg proposal, the Tibetans' perceptions of the speech must be taken into account. The ineffectiveness of the Dalai Lama's nonviolent messages on a segment of his Tibetan audience may, in part, stem from

the rise of a new generation of militant Tibetans...[who] revere the Dalai Lama as a temporal

⁵⁰ Regarding the selection of this particular day for their protest, Schwartz posits that

Demonstrating on this day served two purposes...it gave evidence of the...desire of Tibetans to protest against Chinese rule in Tibet...(and it) was staged with an international audience in mind and with a clear intention to embarrass the Chinese government. It was an act of defiance in the face of attempts by the Chinese administration to use the prospects of negotiations to quell protest. At a time when...negotiations with the Dalai Lama were still anticipated, the demonstration reiterated the Tibetan commitment to independence, while explicitly linking Tibetan nationalist protest with international issues of democracy and human rights (1994, p. 137).

and a spiritual leader, but they apparently find no inconsistency between these professions of unswerving devotion and their rejection of the Dalai Lama's message of nonviolence. The young Tibetans have threatened a campaign of terrorism against the Chinese and may be beyond the control of their god-king (Dreyer, 1989, pp.288-289).

In April of 1994 the Dalai Lama acknowledged the lack of support his speeches had from these young Tibetans: "...I am conscious of the fact that a growing number of Tibetans, both inside as well as outside Tibet, have been disheartened by my conciliatory stand not to demand complete independence for Tibet." Nonetheless, until very recently he has stood by the proposals, stating in his own defense that "internationally, my initiatives and proposals have been endorsed as realistic and reasonable by many governments, parliaments, and non-governmental organizations" (Tibetan Review, Apr. 1994, pp.16-17).

The Next Audience: The European Parliament

Herman and Lodge state that the ultimate purpose of the European Parliament, as a supporting branch of the European Community (EC), is to "perform certain functions in respect of the public, namely communication, education and information" (emphasis in original) (1978, p.68). The European Parliament was founded in the late 1950's as an assembly to support the EC, its tasks involved serving as "an inspiration and a help for the activities of the [EC] and [to bring] public opinion of the [EC] to the support of all steps

or endeavors made in the service of Europe" (1978, pp.24-25). It appears that the Dalai Lama chose well his venue for presenting his new proposal for Tibet's status. What better audience could one find to propagate one's ideas than an audience whose sole purpose was "communication, education, and information?"⁵¹

In addition, considering Great Britain is a powerful member of the EC and a nation which deals heavily with China, especially with regard to the status of Hong Kong, the European Parliament was an appropriate base from which the Dalai Lama chose to transmit his message. Moreover, other European nations represented at the European Parliament also have interests in the Tibet question, particularly as human rights issues in Tibet and throughout China impact trade relations. "Foreign businesses are investing more and more

⁵¹ On the other hand, K.L. de Gucht, an official of the European Parliament, in his 1987-88 report on political affairs and human rights, observes that

The fact is that [the European Parliament's] human rights work can only be credibly pursued if Parliament's public position on human rights is seen to be well-founded and informed, and...sustained by a broad consensus in the House...

Regrettably, however, there have...[been] instances where [the European Parliament] has undermined its own credibility... One need only mention the reaction by the Assembly of the People's Republic of China to a Parliamentary resolution of 15 October 1987 critical of Chinese policy in Tibet, which led to a 'fence-mending' public statement by [the European Parliament's] Bureau. It is the strongly held view of [myself and]...senior Members of the Political Affairs Committee and its Human Rights Subcommittee who have been consulted that this sort of supine response does nothing but damage to [the European Parliament's] credibility in human rights--particularly since on the Tibet issue there is general international recognition that human rights abuses have been perpetrated by the Chinese authorities on a massive scale (1988, p. 50).

money in China... [they] also are vying to establish footholds in the country to sell their products... since 1979, foreign investors have poured \$141 billion into business ventures in [China]..." (Cooper, 1994, p. 315). Foreign investment, however, is not immune to human rights issues. Andrew Nathan reports that as a result of the Tiananmen massacre and the publicized crackdowns of Tibetans in Lhasa between 1987 and 1988, "China experienced a two-year decline in its credit rating, foreign investment, export orders, and tourism" (1994, p. 635). Nathan also maintains that China's human rights problems continue to impact Western foreign policy and decision making about China (1994, pp. 633-643).

Vause states that the Dalai Lama's Strasbourg Address represents "a dramatic shift" in which the Dalai Lama "reversed both positions...of strong opposition to the Chinese military presence in Tibet" and "little or no acknowledgment of any legitimate Chinese interests in Tibet" such as "China's right to handle Tibet's foreign affairs" (1989, p.21). Other experts "said the plan represents a significant shift in position by the Dalai Lama" (Mann, 1988, p. 12). Another report called the Strasbourg proposal "a radical new plan" (Palmer, 1988, p. 8). I would argue, however, that the Strasbourg Address does not constitute a dramatic shift, but rather a logical progression of political maneuvering that is based squarely on the five point plan which he presented to Congress a year earlier.

Surveying the events in China and elsewhere in the world at the time when he gave the speech, it seems likely that the Dalai Lama took the reality of the Tibet situation, combined it with the exigencies of geopolitics, and fashioned the Strasbourg proposal accordingly. In Tibet itself, Qiao Shi, head of a Chinese internal security force in Tibet, visited Lhasa and its environs on June 15, 1988 "to handle any further outbursts by Tibetans" (Schwartz, 1994, p.109). At that time, Shi pronounced publicly a policy of "merciless repression" for dealing with any obstreperous Tibetans and protest activities (p. 110). The Dalai Lama was more than likely apprised of these happenings in Tibet proper, and he probably took them into consideration in the preparation and delivery of the speech.

A US official remarked that "It sounds like [the Dalai Lama] has modified his approach. There are some new elements here. Last fall [in the Five Point Peace plan], the Dalai Lama would not come out against the idea of independence for Tibet" (Mann, 1988, p. 12). Thus, rather than an abrupt about-face, the Strasbourg Proposal represents a "modified approach." Indeed, the Dalai Lama himself says

I was pleased to receive an invitation to speak to a group of concerned politicians at the European Parliament later in 1988. This coincided with several western leaders calling on China to open negotiations with myself on the future of Tibet.

Thinking that this invitation offered an opportunity to re-state the Five-Point Peace Plan, and, in particular, to expand on its fifth component, I gladly accepted (1990, p. 258).

The prior Five Point Plan, then, was the springboard for his Strasbourg speech. The Dalai Lama "chose the occasion to reveal his strategy for 'securing a compromise negotiated agreement' with China (Palmer, 1988, p. 8).

The Dalai Lama's immediate audience was not "the full European Parliament;" instead, he "spoke in a conference room in the parliament building to two hundred people, journalists and parliamentarians" (Oregonian, 1988, p. A-5). The Washington Post made an editorial decision to downplay the significance of the Dalai Lama's audience, reporting that the speech "was prepared for delivery to the European Parliament...[but that] the speech subsequently was canceled because of fears his appearance would offend the Chinese government. He spoke with reporters after copies of his speech were distributed" (1988, p. A-34).

The Dalai Lama himself simply states that he delivered the Strasbourg speech on June 15, 1988, and does not mention the reported speech cancellation (1990, p. 258). It is clear that copies of the speech were available. The Los Angeles Times reported that the speech was "distributed by the Dalai Lama's representatives in Europe and the United States" (Mann, 1988, p.12). Whether or not the cancellation of the speech itself was foreseen by the Dalai Lama and his backers is not known; it is clear that they were prepared for this to happen, since pre-arranged copies were already being circulated worldwide.⁵²

⁵² As far as the context for the speech is concerned, all news and journal reports of the Strasbourg proposal report that the formally

This context for the delivery of the speech thus established, the following section of this chapter will provide an analysis of the text of the Strasbourg speech.

The Strasbourg Proposal: Finding Transcendence
in a Middle Way

Departing from issues of guilt, which are repeated in the Five Point Peace Plan, the Dalai Lama relies in the Strasbourg speech on the theme of transcendence. This shift in strategy proved to be a risky but wise choice because

planned speech was canceled out of fears that it would offend the Chinese. It is noteworthy that both major Western news publications and scholarly sources, however, fail to include specific details about the cancellation of the formal speech event beyond what I have provided in the above discussion. Sources in which I sought, but did not find any details on the context and background of the speech include the following: The European Parliament's Guide to Documents and Publications, 1987-1988, Luxembourg; East, R. (ed.) Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 34, 1988, Longman Group UK Limited, 1988, p. 36001; The World Today, 44, 1988, (Jul., Aug., Sept., Oct. issues); The Europa Year Book 1988: A World Survey, Vol. I, Europa Publications, Inc. 1988; L'Express, 1988, (Jun., Jul. issues); Der Spiegel, Jul. 1988.

An exemplary omission of any commentary about the Strasbourg speech is found in Current History, 87, Sept., 1988. The title of this issue is: "The People's Republic of China, 1988." The entire issue is devoted to articles exclusively about China, including articles on Sino-American relations, politics, human rights issues, economics, and Chinese society. Yet in the entire issue there are merely two curt sentences that mention the Dalai Lama's Strasbourg Proposal.

What reports such as these exclude is information regarding (1) exactly when it was known that the formal delivery of the speech would be canceled; (2) who was involved in making the decision to cancel the speech event; and (3) whether or not last minute lobbying efforts on the part of Chinese caused the speech to be canceled, or whether the decision was made on the part of European Parliament members by themselves, or by the French Government, since the European Parliament meeting was held in Strasbourg, France--or whether the cancellation occurred as a result of a combination of these and other factors. The Dalai Lama's own account (1990), too, excludes this same information. In light of the commentary by K.L. de Gucht on the European Parliament's history of "supine response" to Chinese pressure (see above, footnote no. 50), it is likely that the decision to cancel the speech event was made by members of the European Parliament themselves, who, ironically, were the ones who had invited the Dalai Lama to Strasbourg to speak in the first place.

immediately following the speech, there were renewed communications between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese leadership, which stopped just short of actual negotiations over the Tibet question (the details of the speech's aftermath will be discussed in the next section).⁵³

In terms of Kenneth Burke's schema for dealing with human guilt, there are three tactics that apply to this discussion. First, one can blame oneself, which is mortification; second, one can blame others, which is scapegoating; and third, one can rise above the situation through transcendence, when one transforms the error or blame, through a shift in emphasis, into a virtual nonentity (Burke, 1950, pp. 192-195; Brummet, 1981, p. 256). Barry Brummet comments that as far as rhetorical tactics are concerned, audiences "prefer not to feel guilty. They will transcend potential guilt if manifest problems can be attributed to some cause other than themselves" (Brummet, 1981, p. 264). Through transcendence, one is able to "deny guilt" by anticipating the mere "threat of guilt" and then "transforming it" (Brummett, 1981, p. 256). Thus "transcendence permits seeing one's struggle within a larger

⁵³ According to Schwartz, the more open and liberal minded factions of the Chinese leadership, especially Yan Mingfu, then "head of the United Front Work Department of the CPC," were already considering a strategy of winning over Tibetan allegiance by stating their "willingness to negotiate with the Dalai Lama...[provided that] the Dalai Lama renounce any claim to independence for Tibet" (1994, p.133). One indicator of the effectiveness of the Dalai Lama's Strasbourg Proposal is that while the Dalai Lama's speech stops short of totally renouncing independence, which was a "precondition" of the United Front's plans for negotiating (p. 133), the Chinese leadership still called for negotiations and set in motion plans for arranging meetings with the Dalai Lama after the speech was delivered.

hierarchy that prevents guilt" (Brummett, 1981, p. 256). Burke states that transcendence "allows the member of an underprivileged minority... to confront the world at once specifically and generically" (1950, pp. 194-195). For Burke, "any improvement in social status is a kind of transcendence" (1950, p. 193).⁵⁴

In the Strasbourg speech, the shift away from guilt, or the avoidance of the "threat of guilt" for causing Tibet's woes is transferred from China to a general notion of all people's mistakes in general--that is, Chinese, Western, and Tibetan. Moreover, China's "sins" become moot because of the realization that there is nothing that can be done about the excesses of the past, particularly those which occurred during the Cultural Revolution.⁵⁵ In the social hierarchy in

⁵⁴ Each party in the Tibetan scenario holds a unique place in the social hierarchy that is germane to the drama unfolding. The West comprises nations of the first world, whose governments value liberty and human rights; Westerners must preserve their place of power by continually acting to prove these values. China's place in the social hierarchy is one of power, as a nuclear superpower and as a formidable trading partner; China, too, must act to preserve its position. Tibetans are placed at the pinnacle of spiritual matters within the social hierarchy, and their unique culture and history must be preserved in order for them to maintain their status as leaders in spiritual matters. Thus each party is, in its own way, continually reaffirming the hierarchy and attempting to improve its status. Burke states that "...an individual attempt at the transcending of inferior status gets increased poignancy from the fact that, atop all the intensity of such effort in itself, there is a working at cross-purposes" (1950, p. 193). Burke also says that

Where there are... many intense conflicts of an extraverbal sort, no merely verbal manipulations can remove them. But verbal manipulations may offer a more orderly approach to them, permitting them to be contemplated with less agitation. And where this is the case, verbal manipulations are the very opposite of the "evasive" (1950, p. 195).

The Strasbourg Proposal, by delineating a "transcendent" and "orderly approach," presents precisely the balm this conflict needs because the Dalai Lama's "verbal manipulations" provide for negotiations "with less agitation."

⁵⁵ Brummett states that

which moral individuals hold the power, China's status is considered inferior; but through the option presented by the Dalai Lama, the Chinese may improve their social status, and thus transcend the situation. By the same token, the Western place in the social hierarchy is determined by the way Westerners overvalue materialism, which allows Western nations to ignore alleged nuclear waste dumping in Tibet in order to maintain good relations with China. However, the Strasbourg plan offers for the West a role as facilitator in key negotiations among Chinese, Tibetans, and concerned international parties whose national security would be impacted by changes in Chinese control of the Tibetan region. Westerners, as facilitators, could then avert guilt by acting to help others. Therefore the West could improve its international "social status," thus transcending its present place in the scenario by showing that materialism can be tempered with other-oriented behavior. Lastly, Tibetan guilt for the excesses of self sacrifice in the name of nonviolent

When guilt is collective within a group or nation, the leaders of the group may, through public rhetorical pronouncements, transcend, bemoan, and redeem guilt for the group. Thus, public rhetoric may sometimes be explained by the ways in which it expresses a sense of guilt and enacts a means of resolving or transcending guilt for the public. One would especially expect rhetoric to take the form of scapegoating, mortification, or transcendence 1) when pressing problems threaten the national well-being and realize the possibility that guilty actions have caused those woes, and 2) when the national social order is under examination (1981, p.257).

In the case of Tibet, the "pressing problems" are alleged human rights abuses and ecological and cultural devastation. In addition, the "national social order" of communism in China as a whole and particularly its administration in Tibet continues to be "under examination."

protest (mortification) can be avoided by finally giving up the idea of total independence. Tibetans would improve their "social status" within the international political community by yielding a measure of idealism in exchange for a more workable and realistic resolution: by relinquishing demands for total independence and by working constructively with China to create a better relationship, Tibetans would transcend the current situation. In the Strasbourg Proposal the Dalai Lama intones that, as far as the need for taking any constructive actions are concerned, only the present and future are critical for helping Tibet. The past is irrelevant to improving the situation and to improving the "social status" of the three parties to the conflict. In this way, the shift in blame takes place, and transcendence is achieved for all concerned.

In the Five Point Peace Plan, whether it was the isolationist Tibetans themselves (mortification), the overzealous communist Chinese or the callous Westerners who export nuclear waste to be buried in Tibet (scapegoating), the guilt rests more equally among members of the immediate Western audience as well as the Chinese leadership abroad. In the Strasbourg speech, it is only China as a whole who bears the brunt of guilt for Tibet's suffering--Tibetans and the rest of the world's people's may transcend any guilt and move beyond it on the basis of what is deemed the highest order in the hierarchy: freedom. Even then, China itself has its sin of excesses turned into "not-a-sin" (Brummett,

1981, p. 256) because all it need do is cooperate with the Dalai Lama in following his Strasbourg Proposal. The Strasbourg Proposal's underlying implication is that by adhering to the Dalai Lama's agenda for a new arrangement, China's sin could become effaced. This tactic leaves room for the Dalai Lama to emerge successfully from the debate over Tibet because he presents as near as possible--given the enormous constraints of the scenario--a plan for a win/win outcome.

In the opening statement of the speech, the Dalai Lama states that, given our socially interdependent hierarchy of world order, power and inspiration need only be coalesced into action on behalf of Tibet to improve the situation there. Establishing the theme of universal responsibility at the outset, the Dalai Lama says, "We are living today in a very interdependent world. One nation's problems can no longer be solved by itself. Without a sense of universal responsibility our very survival is in danger." By using the theme of universal responsibility, the Dalai Lama appeals to the moral nature of the audience. At the same time, through the notion of "cooperation" and joining of world power, he implies that transcendence over the problems of Tibet can be achieved.

The Dalai Lama cites as an example of such transcendence what was accomplished in Europe after the Second World War:

I have...always believed in the need for better understanding, closer cooperation and great respect among the various nations of the world. The

European Parliament is an inspiring example. Out of the chaos of war, those who were once enemies have, in a single generation, learned to co-exist and to cooperate.

The Dalai Lama moves from this concrete example of transcendence to the potential example, Tibet. Paralleling the idea of the "chaos of war," he states that "Tibet is undergoing a very difficult period...under Chinese occupation..." In contrast to the "occupation," the Dalai Lama introduces the theme of freedom:

The Tibetans...yearn for freedom and justice and a self-determined future...For over a thousand years, we Tibetans have adhered to spiritual and environmental values...inspired by Buddha's message of non-violence and compassion and protected by our mountains, we sought to respect every form of life and to abandon war as an instrument of national policy.

Here the theme of freedom works in three ways. First, it serves to commend the Western democracies for having political systems that value "freedom and justice" as well as self-determination. Second, freedom also is aligned to Tibetans through their "thousand years" of history in which, "protected by... mountains," they were free from China's dominion. Third, freedom is the idea that unites the otherwise very different traditions of East and West, of Tibet and Europe, because the Western conception of "freedom and justice" entails notions of equality, which is not unlike the Tibetan ideal "to respect every form of life..."

This relationship having been established, the Dalai Lama then reasserts his often repeated views on Tibetan history, which he says stretches "back more than two thousand years." He makes it clear that Tibet's state in the past was "one of independence." He refers to any period of rule by "neighbors--Mongol, Manchu, Chinese, British and the Gurkhas of Nepal" as having been "brief and the Tibetan people have never accepted them as constituting a loss of national sovereignty." It is crucial that the Dalai Lama reasserts this overview of an independent Tibetan history at the beginning of the speech, for it sets the tone for the rest of the speech. Proclaiming Tibet's prior independence at the start also serves to lessen the impact of the proposal for Tibet's status to be "in association with" China, especially in the eyes of the more radical Tibetans who stubbornly call for total independence at near impossible odds. By using the theme of Tibet's history as an agreed upon base within the Dalai Lama's followers, he again emphasizes common ground.

The idea of a win/win scenario is then introduced. The Dalai Lama first sets the tone for the guilt of both the Chinese (scapegoating) and the Tibetans (mortification), while also opening the door for an opportunity for transcendence from that guilt. The Chinese guilt lies in the structurally violent actions such as government repression of culture as well as physically violent actions such as the alleged genocide and destruction of monasteries; the Tibetan

guilt exists in their loss of over one million citizens through its forty years of nonviolent resistance:

In 1949 the People's Republic of China forcibly invaded Tibet. Since that time, Tibet has endured the darkest period in its history. More than a million people have died as a result of the occupation. Thousands of monasteries were reduced to ruins. A generation has grown up deprived of education, economic opportunities and a sense of its own national character. Though the current Chinese leadership has implemented certain reforms it is also promoting a massive population transfer policy onto the Tibetan plateau. This policy has already reduced the six million Tibetans to a minority...our tragedy continues.

The opportunity for the Chinese to transform their guilt into a non-guilt would be, logically, to end the "massive population transfer" and to expand its limited "reforms" by rising to the global ideal set forth earlier in the speech, the ideal of working to ensure freedom.

In the next paragraph, he describes how the Chinese are doing the exact opposite of working for freedom. Even though the Dalai Lama says he has "always urged my people not to resort to violence in their efforts to redress their sufferings," the Chinese have "violently suppressed" the Tibetans with "Chinese police and military." The Dalai Lama at this point washes his hands of responsibility for future violence in the face of such alleged repression, saying,

I will continue to counsel [Tibetans] for nonviolence, but unless China forsakes the brutal methods it employs, the Tibetans cannot be responsible for a further deterioration in the situation.

Again, the offer for Chinese transcendence is repeated in the directive for China to "forsake the brutal methods" now in place.

Next, the Dalai Lama sets the agenda for relinquishing the theme of Tibetan mortification and replacing it with transcendence by showing how the Tibetan strategy of "sacrifice" has fallen short of its "precious goal" of freeing Tibet from China's throat-hold:

Every Tibetan hopes and prays for the full restoration of our nation's independence. Thousands of our people have sacrificed their lives and our whole nation has suffered in this struggle. Even in recent months, Tibetans have bravely sacrificed their lives to achieve this precious goal...[Yet] the Chinese totally fail to recognize the Tibetan people's aspirations and continue to pursue a policy of brutal suppression.

Note the phrase "sacrificed their lives" is offered twice before he concludes that the "policy of brutal suppression" continues nonetheless. The Dalai Lama reiterates the imagery of Tibetan suffering and sacrifice in the face of the Chinese power structure while also hinting at a certain degree of acknowledgment of the marginal efficacy of this orgy of self sacrifice. This acknowledgment prepares the audience for an explanation of a way out, through, and beyond the present situation in Tibet.

His acknowledgment of the excesses of Tibetan suffering is explained in the next paragraph, when the Dalai Lama states that he has thought about this dilemma "for a long

time" in an effort "to achieve a realistic solution to...[Tibet's] plight" (emphasis added). This indicates that the above described excesses of self sacrifice have not worked, and that such mortification is not "realistic." Next, pointing to tangible solutions that he and the kashag ⁵⁶ have devised, he restates the ideas he set forth in the Five Point Peace Plan. It is in this place in the Strasbourg Proposal where the Dalai Lama clearly uses the Five Point Peace Plan as a launch pad for more tangible and realistic resolutions. Specifically, he states, "the fifth point of the peace plan called for earnest negotiations between the Tibetans and the Chinese. We have therefore taken the initiative to formulate some thoughts which may serve as a basis for resolving the issue of Tibet." These "thoughts" are, in fact, very concrete and potentially realizable plans.

The first of these items is the one that would be most disappointing to followers who stand adamantly on a free-Tibet platform. For although the Dalai Lama affirms the principle of freedom and the Western ideal form of government, he also establishes the "association" status for Tibet, while also rejecting China's limitation of the geographical place of Tibet to the TAR by stating that "the whole of Tibet" refers to "Cholka-Sum--U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo." The second item is to allow China to handle Tibet's foreign policy, while, in yet another fence-straddling

⁵⁶ The kashag is the cabinet of advisors and ministers of the Tibetan Government in exile.

position, "Tibet should, however, develop and maintain relations, through its own foreign affairs bureau" in diverse fields including "tourism" and "non-political activities." The third item introduced is to set up a Western democracy, "founded on a constitution or basic law" which "provides for a democratic system of government...ensuring economic equality, social justice and protection of the environment." This latter item is a particular dig at the guilt of the Chinese, for it alludes to the fact that the Communist Chinese leadership's Marxist ideals of "economic equality" have fallen far short of their reality.⁵⁷ Then, in rhetoric reminiscent of the free-Tibet movement's rallying cry, "Tibet for the Tibetans," he states, "This means that the Government of Tibet will have the rights to decide on all affairs relating to Tibet and the Tibetans." Offering more detail about this government formula, the Dalai Lama also shows how Tibet can transcend its current situation:

As individual freedom is the real source and potential of any society's development, the Government of Tibet would seek to ensure this freedom by full adherence to the Universal

⁵⁷ In many of the interviews of and writings by the Dalai Lama, he is fond of saying how he holds nothing against Marxism in theory, but that the Chinese have utterly failed to make it work in practice. For instance, in Freedom in Exile (1990), he observes,

[In 1954]...The more I looked at Marxism, the more I liked it. Here was a system based on equality and justice for everyone, which claimed to be a panacea for all the world's ills. From a theoretical standpoint, its only drawback as far as I could see was its insistence on a purely materialistic view of human existence. This I could not agree with. I was also concerned at the methods used by the Chinese in pursuit of their ideals. I received a strong impression of rigidity (p. 90).

Declaration of Human Rights, including the rights to speech, assembly, and religion. Because religion constitutes the source of Tibet's national identity, and spiritual values lie at the very heart of Tibet's rich culture, it would be the special duty of the Government of Tibet to safeguard and develop its practice.

In repeating the Western ideal of "individual freedom" as a goal for Tibet, the Dalai Lama shows the Western diplomats that his plan is, in a kind of reverse-domino-theory fashion, a goal that is worthy of support by Western leaders. In other words, if the West could expend so much staffpower and money in the past to stop the spread of Communism (such as that expended for wars in Korea and Viet Nam), why not expend a little diplomatic energy toward ensuring a peaceful stop to the spread of Communism by promoting the spread of democracy? Also, by pinpointing religion as "the source of Tibet's rich culture," the Dalai Lama is again showing how the atheistic Communist regime is an alien force in Tibet, and how only Tibetans themselves can properly safeguard what is valuable to them.

According to the Dalai Lama, by allowing a greater measure of freedom and democratic reform inside Tibet, China can transcend guilt for the excesses of destructively rigid communist programs in Tibet. The Chinese system of repression in Tibet is what holds the Chinese leadership down in a position of being guilty: only by embracing democratic practices and recognizing the mutually beneficial results of democratic institutions in Tibet can the Chinese find a way

through and beyond the current system of repression. This repression must be let go because it only fosters continued instability in Tibet, including the loss of lives (of both Chinese and Tibetans); tourist dollars; and "face" for the Chinese government. China's transcendence, then, lies in its potential for reaching the realization that supporting a measure of autonomy as well as democratic reform in Tibet is the only way for China to better manage the region as well as reduce or eliminate the loss of international bargaining power due to issues of human rights.

The Dalai Lama offers a Western style democracy structure, "comprised of popularly elected Chief Executive, a bi-cameral legislative branch, and independent judicial system" located in Lhasa. Moreover, the "social and economic system of Tibet" would be "determined" by the Tibetan people, bearing in mind especially the need to "raise the standard of living of the entire population." Once again, the former statement is an appeal for Western support for the plan and the latter is a jab at the current Chinese system which rewards Chinese workers, replaces the native Tibetan language with the Chinese language, and which tends to leave Tibetans with a substandard level of education and opportunity.

The next item the Dalai Lama introduces is the commitment of the newly installed "Government of Tibet" to protect the environment, including "wildlife and plant-life." Next, with regard to the "sin" of nuclear weaponry and its side effects, he proposes that

The manufacture, testing, stockpiling of nuclear weapons and other armaments must be prohibited, as well as the use of nuclear power and other technologies which produce hazardous waste. It would be the Government of Tibet's goal to transform Tibet into our planet's largest natural preserve.

Here the Dalai Lama offers another way that the Chinese to stop their negative actions. Changing Tibet from a place of suffering to "the planet's largest natural preserve" would "transform" Tibet, and in so doing, would be a benefit to the "planet" as a whole. Thus Tibet would be transformed from a nuclear waste dump site to a "natural" place of sanctuary; both China and Tibet could then transcend the "technologies which produce hazardous waste" while also serving as a model of international peace through the reduction of military weapons.

In order to achieve this scaling back of nuclear weapons and weapons stockpiling, the Dalai Lama proposes to set up "a regional peace conference" that would work to ensure "peace through demilitarization." The Dalai Lama allows that "until such a peace conference can be convened and demilitarization and neutralization achieved, China could have the right to maintain a restricted number of military installations in Tibet...solely for defense purposes." So while he replaces a bellicose slogan with his own pacifist slogan, he also backs the idea by offering his plan for a "peace conference" which would serve to decide the details for reducing the military establishment in Tibet.

By saying that the Chinese military in Tibet would be used "solely for defense," he also alludes to the idea that, for India, China's present forces are a threat, and for the Tibetans, the forces are used improperly against Tibetan civilians. This allusion to China's misuse of its troops is brought out in the next statement, in which the Dalai Lama demands "the Chinese Government should cease its human rights violations in Tibet and abandon its policy of transferring Chinese to Tibet." If the peace conference could actually result in a reduction of Chinese troops in Tibet, it is made to seem possible that these problems could be overcome.

The proposal thus set forth, the Dalai Lama turns to address Tibetans specifically. In speaking to Tibetans, he acknowledges their dismay at what may be seen as giving away too much--namely, independence--to Chinese leadership. But he also describes how they must view their role in accomplishing the proposal as a transcendent act:

I am aware that many Tibetans will be disappointed by the moderate stand...Undoubtedly, there will be much discussion in the coming months within our own community, both in Tibet and in exile. This, however, is an essential and invaluable part of any process of change. I believe [this proposal is]... the most realistic means by which to reestablish Tibet's separate identity and restore the fundamental rights of Tibetan people while accommodating China's own interests.

Thus relinquishing adamant demands for independence is the act, or "process of change," that will cause transcendence.

The Dalai Lama next addresses the Chinese leadership, presenting a demand that any changes must occur with the approval of not just the Chinese, but more importantly, the Tibetans:

I would like to emphasize...that whatever the outcome of the negotiations with the Chinese may be, the Tibetan people themselves must be the ultimate deciding authority. Therefore, any proposal will contain a comprehensive procedural plan to ascertain the wishes of the Tibetan people in a nationwide referendum.

In this demand, the Dalai Lama pairs the Tibetan sacrifice of independence with the Chinese sacrifice of control over decision-making, since the final say would be determined through "a nationwide referendum" which excludes Chinese input. Once more, this shows that while the Dalai Lama concedes that the role of China in Tibet has been, and would continue to be, that of a controlling power, the psychological and intangible nature of an independent Tibet exists "nationwide" within the "Tibetan people."

Accordingly, the Dalai Lama must then set to rest any uncertainties about his own role in this Chinese controlled, yet psychologically independent, Tibet.⁵⁸ He declares that

⁵⁸ Particularly for the Tibetan protest movement within Tibet, Schwartz notes that the Dalai Lama's role is crucial to their sense of purpose and identity:

...the Dalai Lama is...important as the central religious and political symbol for Tibetans. The dual nature of his role...as both political and religious leader--has been an important...resource for them. The Dalai Lama embodies the central formula of Tibetan politics: "religion and politics combined." In the conditions of Chinese rule this formula has gained a new significance that contrasts with its

he does not "wish to take active part in the Government of Tibet." This indicates, too, that he wants the Tibetans to rise above what he has often voiced as their over-reliance upon the Dalai Lama himself. Also possible, is that this assertion may be viewed as a message to the Chinese, that, should this "new" arrangement for a "Government of Tibet" end up being a sham, such as that under the 1950-1959 Communist Chinese administration, that the Dalai Lama refuses to return to playing the role of an impotent puppet-leader for the Chinese regime. Then, underscoring the Dalai Lama's stature and symbolic power, he states, "I will continue to work as much as I can for the wellbeing and happiness of the Tibetan people as long as it is necessary." This statement, too, can be seen as a comforting message to reassure Tibetans he will continue to play a central part in Tibetan society, while also warning the Chinese that he will not give up his efforts at changing the status quo in Tibet "as long as it is necessary."

Regarding this proposal, the Dalai Lama then indicates that the Tibetan Government in Exile is "prepared to meet

meaning in traditional Tibetan society, where it legitimized the... Dalai Lama's government. As a formula for political legitimacy, it derives its force from the figure of the Dalai Lama, who remains a potent yet ambiguous symbol--thus enabling the formula to be applied creatively to the present situation in Tibet. Tibetans understand the formula as being essentially open-ended; they have no difficulty equating its political side with democracy, since the Dalai Lama is acknowledged as a world leader who symbolizes democracy and human rights (1994, p. 124).

Thus the Dalai reaffirms his desire to work to help Tibetans, albeit without a government role. This ensures that the Dalai Lama has a working relationship with the system but one that allows him to act independently of the government so that he can remain a "potent yet ambiguous symbol."

with the Chinese to discuss the details." He affirms the proposal is "aimed at achieving an equitable solution" to the problem of Tibet. The Dalai Lama also flexes his political muscle, saying, "We are encouraged by the keen interest being shown in our situation by a growing number of governments and political leaders, including former president Jimmy Carter of the United States." By saying that among his supporters is the former leader of a power as great as the US, the Dalai Lama rises to meet Chinese leaders at their level of power. The Dalai Lama also mentions his supporters who number even among the Chinese: "recent changes in China...have brought about a new group of leadership, more pragmatic and liberal." This indicates to the Chinese that they may transcend the legacy of the Cultural Revolution era leaders by realizing their abilities as "pragmatic and liberal" leaders.

The Dalai Lama next places more pressure on the Chinese, and restates the opportunity for their "sins" to become "not sins:"

We urge the Chinese ... leadership to give serious... consideration to the [proposal]. Only dialogue and willingness to look with honesty and clarity at the reality of Tibet can lead to a viable solution. We wish to conduct discussions with the Chinese Government bearing in mind the larger interests of humanity. Our proposal will therefore be made in a spirit of conciliation and we hope that the Chinese will respond accordingly.

That said, China would appear unreasonable not to "respond accordingly." The Chinese are encouraged "to look...at the reality" of the situation so that they, too, may transcend it

through "a viable solution." The theme of universal responsibility is echoed in terms of "the larger interests of humanity." In presenting the proposal, the Dalai Lama has already given up enough, he has overcome great obstacles; for the Chinese to banish their guilt for past sins, they must "respond accordingly."

In the next paragraph, the Dalai Lama restates themes he introduced in the Five-Point Peace Plan. Having just presented a solid and realistic proposal for Tibet's future, these themes appear fitting and workable. He reminds the audience that Tibet has a "unique history and a profound spiritual heritage," thus referring to Tibet's past independence as well as the moral value of working to save it on the basis of its spiritual worth. He also offers one last reminder of Tibet's role in international affairs, saying, "Its historic status as a neutral buffer state, contributing to the stability of the entire continent, can be restored." By doing so, he claims "Peace and security for Asia as well as the world at large can be enhanced." Again, providing an emphasis on the strategy of transcendence, he reiterates Chinese guilt but also shows the possibilities if actions are taken to reverse that guilt:

In the future, Tibet need no longer be an occupied land, oppressed by force, unproductive and scarred by suffering. It can become a free haven where humanity and nature live in harmonious balance; a creative model for the resolution of tensions afflicting many areas throughout the world.

The Chinese leadership need to realize that colonial rule over occupied territories is today anachronistic. A large genuine union or

association can only come about voluntarily, when there is satisfactory benefit to all parties concerned.

The Dalai Lama's comment about "colonial rule" is ubiquitous in his discourse; it shows the irony of how the Communist Chinese--who have traditionally castigated Western nations such as the British and Americans as being "imperialists" and "colonists"--are truly themselves guilty of precisely the same kind of "colonial rule" they find so repugnant in other nations. Finally, the Dalai Lama points out that the proposal can help all parties to transcend the conflict over Tibet, and "throughout the world," because it will serve as "a creative model for the resolution of tensions."

Again, stroking his audience, the Dalai Lama declares that "The European Community is a clear example of this [model of conflict resolution]. The Dalai Lama at this point adds a contrasting counter-example, while also alluding to the label the Chinese use for him: "splittist;" the Dalai Lama states: "On the other hand, even one country or community can break into two or more entities where there is lack of trust or benefit, and when force is used as the principal means of rule" (emphasis added).

Finally, the Dalai Lama reminds his immediate audience of the benefits which a self-ruled Tibet could provide for Europe:

I would like to end by making a special appeal to the honorable members of European Parliament and through them to their respective constituencies to

extend their support to our efforts. A resolution of the Tibetan problem within the framework that we propose will not only be for the mutual benefit of the Tibetans and Chinese people but will contribute to regional and global peace and stability. I thank you for providing the opportunity to share my thoughts with you.

This conclusion effectively encapsulates the theme of universal responsibility. These concluding remarks also show how the European Parliament, by enabling the Dalai lama to use their session as a venue for presenting his plan, may participate in transcendence over not just Tibet's problems, but also the world's conflicts, thereby achieving "global peace and stability."

Reactions to the New Plan

The Strasbourg proposal "outlined the framework for a Hong Kong-style settlement...Most outside observers found the agenda constructive, noting that for the first time, the exiled leader had formally asked for an arrangement short of total independence" (Dreyer, 1989, pp.284, 288). The Strasbourg speech exerted a tangible influence on China and the West. Grunfeld maintains that "there are Tibetans and Chinese who believe the recent reforms in Tibet are a direct result of the Dalai Lama's successful efforts to publicize the Tibetan issue around the world" (1988, p. 27).

Tenzin N. Theton, the Dalai Lama's spokesperson in the United States, said, "I don't think independence has been conceded...this is the first time he's made such detailed

proposals" (Mann, 1988, p. 12). Inside Tibet, the Tibetans' reactions to the speech were mixed:

Tibetans were torn between trust in the Dalai Lama and willingness to acquiesce in his judgments...and their obvious mistrust of Chinese intentions...the prospect of giving up the goal of complete independence was generally viewed with suspicion in Lhasa, where the Chinese government's announcement of its willingness to negotiate with the Dalai Lama was seen as a propaganda ploy to quell the demonstrations (Schwartz, 1994, p. 134).

As far as Chinese publicity was concerned, however, the Chinese reaction to the plan was rejection. On June 22, 1988, "the Chinese embassy in New Delhi issued a press release which stated that... the Dalai Lama or 'his deputy are welcome to [visit] Beijing for talks and every issue except the independence of Tibet is open for discussion'" (Tibetan Bulletin, 1988, p.3). This statement reveals that, while in the view of many Western analysts the issue of independence seemed to be weakened, from the Chinese perspective the speech presented a continued threat. The Chinese press release offers a response to that threat:

...[regarding] the change in tune of the Dalai Lama's speech at the European Parliament at Strasbourg and in the USA last year, the essence was that he was still trying to tamper with history to deny the fact that Tibet is an inalienable part of Chinese territory and China exercises sacred sovereignty over Tibet. This the Dalai Lama was trying to do in attempt to turn the question of Tibet into an international issue...this is something which we can never tolerate. No independence for Tibet is allowed. No semi-independence is allowed. No independence in any disguised form is allowed, either. The attempt of

splitting the motherland⁵⁹ with the backing of foreign forces will lead him nowhere" (Tibetan Bulletin, 1988, p.3).

Thus while the Dalai Lama's Western backers and many Tibetans saw the speech as virtually giving up on independence, China certainly did not. To the contrary, China saw the speech as formulating a plan for a "disguised form" of independence.

Dreyer observes that the Strasbourg proposal--although rejected outright both by many Tibetans and by the Chinese leadership--may ultimately be the best plan for Tibet's future stability because

If...the alternative to Tibetan self-government is dealing with a financial running sore and a human rights embarrassment, the advantages of allowing a Hong Kong-type of internal self-government in Tibet...may well outweigh the disadvantages. It remains to be seen whether the Dalai Lama can persuade his militant supporters to accept such a plan (1989, p.289).⁶⁰

⁵⁹ While the Dalai Lama has not overtly made any specific observations about the Chinese leadership's common use of the phrase "splitting the motherland," or their calling the Tibetan protesters and government in exile "splittists," the Dalai Lama's discourse does point to an understanding of the rhetorical weaknesses of this chosen imagery. To say that something is "split" indicates, to a certain degree, that fault lines or a nominal cleft was preexisting. As a consequence, the resulting "split," due to pressure, seems more natural. It appears, from the Dalai Lama's discourse, that the alleged history of separation between Tibet and China is exactly this kind of fault line or cleft which would make the "split" both natural and inevitable.

⁶⁰ The Times of India also supports this view:

...The Chinese have not said the last word on this question. The fact is that China is already operating a "one country, several systems" arrangement. Special systems are in operation in China's special economic zones. For the future, Chinese leaders are committed to permitting radically different systems to exist in Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. There is no reason why they cannot conceive and implement yet another system for Tibet with the cooperation of the Dalai Lama (Deshingkar, 1989, p.19).

It is possible that the Chinese will continue to hold out in the face of "human rights embarrassment." There are indications at present that China, in its best economic and military interests, will continue to lobby hard to counter the Dalai Lama's claims and to downplay any international criticism over human rights. On the whole, the Chinese leadership's efforts at lobbying in the diplomatic circles of the West have been extremely successful during the past ten years, and shows few signs of weakening now that Western businesses wanting access to the greater Chinese market are supporting China's lobbying efforts (Awanohara, 1994, pp.24-26). It is clear, however, that human rights concerns will continue to be an issue of concern in negotiating with the Chinese. Therefore, even if human rights concerns are considered as only marginally influential in bargaining and negotiating with the Chinese, the more intangible concern associated with human rights--"face"--will continue to shape international relations with China. So while China's market looms large in Western desires for trade access, human rights issues still cast shadows over every negotiation that takes place. To save or maintain face, the Chinese government must anticipate, react, and respond to Western concern over human rights issues. Thus the Chinese will be continually challenged and forced to expend energy and resources on international publicity campaigns and lobbying efforts to downplay human rights issues (Awanohara, 1994, pp.24-26).

In the short term, the speech did raise hopes that productive negotiations between the Dalai Lama and Chinese leaders would take place. For instance, shortly after the Strasbourg speech, the Chinese and the Dalai Lama began to make arrangements for discussions to take place. Unfortunately, the Chinese suddenly imposed extra stipulations without which, they said, the discussions could not take place. The Chinese diplomats set a condition that no outsiders be present at the negotiations. The Dalai Lama's government in exile wished to employ the services of a Dutch attorney, which the Chinese refused to allow. Then the Chinese conveyed that Beijing would be the only place they would negotiate, instead of Europe, which the Dalai Lama preferred. In addition, the Chinese would not agree to any members of the kashag to be present at the negotiations (Dalai Lama, 1990, p. 259). Lastly, the Chinese stated that they would enter into no discussions unless the issue of independence was declared out of the range of discussion. The Tibetan exiled government would not acquiesce to these demands, and the planned meetings were called off (Dreyer, 1989, p. 288). There has been little productive communication between China and the Dalai Lama since that time. So, perhaps in part because of the Dalai Lama's awareness of China's lobbying strength, more recently he has all but abandoned the plan outlined in the Strasbourg proposal. Another reason for letting the Strasbourg plan drop is the unwillingness of Chinese leaders to negotiate

openly with the Dalai Lama on the points proposed. As the incident above illustrates, the Chinese prefer to negotiate strictly on their own terms.

In his statement issued on the thirty-fifth anniversary of the Tibetan uprising in Lhasa, which was delivered on March 10, 1994, the Dalai Lama declared:

The ideas put forward in my Five-Point Peace Plan for Tibet in 1987 and the Strasbourg Proposal in 1988 envisage a solution which does not ask for the complete independence of Tibet. However, the Chinese government has even refused to enter into negotiations of any kind...I had hoped that my middle-way approach would eventually create an atmosphere of mutual trust...[but] the Chinese government has rejected my overtures one after another and has consistently attempted to confuse the real issue...I must now realize that my approach has failed to produce any progress...If [this continues to be the case] then I will no longer be able to pursue this policy with a clear conscience.

What the next policy might be has yet to be determined. Above all, the Dalai Lama has far from given up his campaign of persuasion. His stream of writings, lectures, and published interviews continues at present in a strong flow. His most recent books include A Flash of Lightning in the Dark of Night: A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life (1994) and The World of Tibetan Buddhism: An Overview of Its Philosophy and Practice (1995). The future impact of the Dalai Lama's persuasive campaign is uncertain, but the discussion above does indicate that his influence continues, at minimum, to uncomfortably pique the policy makers of China and the West.

Conclusion

The Dalai Lama's Five Point Peace Plan offers a clear yet idealistic framework for resolving the problems besetting Tibet. The first four points of the plan are quite idealistic: to convert Tibet into a zone of peace and nonviolence (ahimsa); to end China's population transfer policy; to improve the human rights situation; and to preserve Tibet's environment. The last point, which is a call for negotiations in earnest between Tibetans and the Chinese, is the most pragmatic. The Dalai Lama approaches the idealistic points from the vantage point of his own strong ethos and the moral and political conviction that Tibet's historic independence should be reconfirmed and, with the help of the West, regained.

In the Five Point Plan, mortification is a key theme: the Dalai Lama presents an image of Tibetans as the suffering servants of humanity, offering themselves as sacrifice for the guilt of the Chinese leadership's flailing and malevolent policies in Tibet. The ideal reason for the sacrifice is a Gandhian goal of ahimsa, so the Dalai Lama holds forth the idealistic image of a future Tibet that is free from suffering and conflict. With Western support and efforts, the Dalai Lama says that Tibet could emerge from all of this suffering and sacrifice to serve as a buffer zone to enhance the safety of the world. At the same time, the Dalai Lama casts the Chinese in the role of intransigent and

unreasonable people, who are guilty for the tragedy which has occurred in Tibet. Thus the Chinese serve as scapegoats for Tibet's inability to establish on their own an international recognition of Tibet's de facto independence. By the same token, the West is scapegoated, although to a much lesser degree than the Chinese. The West is hinted at being an overly materialistic society that rationalizes sending nuclear refuse to be dumped on Tibet while it duplicitously praises democratic ideals, especially the ideal of valuing human rights. The Dalai Lama confirms Tibet's independence through history, and calls for the Chinese to end their inhumane actions in Tibet. He also calls for the West to intervene and lobby with China on behalf of Tibet; helping stabilize the region for the sake of the West and international peace, as well as for the Tibetans themselves, would be in line with the West's stated concern for human rights and global stability.

The Strasbourg Proposal provides a different approach to resolving the problem of Tibet. Using the central five points of the Five Point Plan as a basis, he expounds upon the last point, offering a far more pragmatic approach. The Strasbourg proposal proposes the following actions: first, to allow China to handle Tibet's foreign policy; second, to allow Tibet its own government and constitution; third, to establish a Tibetan government with an elected chief executive, a bicameral legislature, and an independent legal

system; and fourth, to demilitarize Tibet but allow for some Chinese installations for defense only.

The crucial difference in the Strasbourg Speech is that, unlike the first four points of the Five Point Plan, this speech indicates a shift towards a realistic and workable solution. This shift occurs in two key ways. First, the Dalai Lama reveals that he recognizes that total Tibetan independence must be the token of exchange for a productive and mutually beneficial arrangement with the Chinese in Tibet. Second, the Dalai Lama trades most of the mortification and scapegoating which appears in the Five Point Plan, and instead favors a tactic of transcendence. By offering a realistic and mutually beneficial approach for the future, the Dalai Lama offers the Chinese a way to avert their guilt for the tragic excesses they caused in the past. The Dalai Lama offers Tibetans a way beyond their guilt over their inability to garner independence and the cumulative excesses of a forty year long program of self sacrifice in the name of an unattainable independence. The Tibetans, quite simply, are to give up the ideal of total independence. The Dalai Lama also presents the West--for whom human rights are supposedly a great concern--with a way to avoid being blamed for looking the other way while Tibetans were being persecuted and killed. The West is offered the role of facilitator in regional negotiations to demilitarize the Tibetan plateau and thus reduce nuclear weapons proliferation and the nuclear threat in that part of the world.

The audience is thus presented with a practical way to see beyond the troubling present and into a productive and much improved future. The transcendence of all parties involved in the question of Tibet is ensured by a transformation of past guilty actions, or sins, into potential positive actions, thus averting future sins. The Strasbourg Proposal provides a detailed plan that would resolve future conflicts not only in Tibet, but also with regard to the nuclear threat, in the entire hemisphere as well. The cost to the Free-Tibet movement occurs in the Dalai Lama's acquiescence to agree to giving Tibet an "associated" status with China. In a sense, this action is the symbolic mortification that the Dalai Lama offers in exchange for the physical mortification in terms of the loss of Tibetan lives. Giving up the ideal of total independence for Tibet effectively ends the physical thrust of the movement because the needless loss of lives would be ended; yet the Free-Tibet movement remains symbolically intact, in fact, it is strengthened in its transcendence, because it would gain freedom and democracy through self rule--a mental and social independence. Thus, through the clear and practical items delineated in the Strasbourg Proposal, the Dalai Lama enables all parties to emerge without guilt, thus victoriously transcending the current situation.

This chapter has shown how the Dalai Lama's speeches were contextually apt, carefully tailored for each audience, and, as a result, influential. The above discussion has

highlighted in particular the Dalai Lama's use of the rhetorical tactics of mortification, victimage, and transcendence. The next chapter provides a discussion of the rhetorical framework through which the Dalai Lama transmits his messages. Just as a painting's colors and hues are enhanced or subdued in the viewer's eyes by the artist's use of well chosen mattings and frames for the work of art, so are the points of a speaker's discourse made more powerful and effective by using what Kenneth Burke calls "frames." Specifically, the next chapter presents an analysis of the Dalai Lama's use of the "comic frame" and the "tragic frame," explaining how the use of these frames serves to make his speech more compelling and persuasive.

CHAPTER SIX

A TRAGICOMIC FRAMEWORK FOR THE TIBET QUESTION

The Opening of the Wisdom Eye

Among his prolific writings on religion is the Dalai Lama's book, The Opening of the Wisdom Eye (1966). The purpose of the book was to heighten the reader's awareness of the world of human beings around them. Through instruction on compassion and understanding, the Dalai Lama presents ways that readers can reach for a course of life that is directed toward attaining wisdom and happiness. In his political writings the Dalai Lama has taken kernels of dissent in the form of books, lectures, and interviews, and planted them in audiences throughout the world. The Dalai Lama states that the goal of the political discourse, like the religious, is to foster, ultimately, awareness and happiness and ultimately world peace.

In terms of Kenneth Burke's analytical framing of human conflict, the rhetoric surrounding the Tibet question involves both comedy and tragedy. "Comedy censures those who separate [people] from each other; tragedy destroys those who separate [people] from gods" (Burke, 1959, p. 59; Brummet, 1984, p.218). Thus while comedy deals with human conflicts relating to society, tragedy deals with human conflicts that violate God-given directives (Burke, 1959, p. 59; Brummet, 1984, p. 219). In the conflict that has thus far impeded

negotiations about Tibet, rhetoric molded in the comic frame points to the errors which have been made in Tibet as arising from China's Cultural Revolution and its leaders' very human mistakes. The rhetoric that is patterned after the tragic frame castigates the Chinese for being "evil" and the West for lacking the moral backbone to do anything about the alleged genocide and ongoing human rights abuses in Tibet (Weiss, 1987; Bullert, 1986).

The rhetoric of both frames serves to alleviate the public "guilt that arises when people violate hierarchies" (Brummet, 1984, p.217). Barry Brummet asserts that "rhetorical critics may find these theories of comedy and tragedy useful in explaining how and why public communication takes the form that it does" (Brummet, 1984, p. 221). The Dalai Lama's rhetoric has capitalized upon both approaches to promoting understanding of the conflict over Tibet.

This chapter is a brief examination of how the Dalai Lama's nonviolent stance toward protesting human rights violations in Tibet has been communicated in a tragicomic manner. The Dalai Lama uses what Kenneth Burke termed the "comic frame" (1959, p.93). Coupled with the comic frame is a highly sentimental, tragic frame for his discourse. Communications scholar A. Cheree Carlson has noted that researchers have studied the use of nonviolent rhetoric in conflict situations, most notably the communication patterns of Martin Luther King, Jr. in the United States and Mohandas K. Gandhi in India (1986, p.446). Yet the omission of the

Dalai Lama, a Nobel Peace Prize winner, from these paradigmatic models of nonviolent movement leadership and communication is a glaring one. This part of my analysis will augment these earlier studies with a critical analysis of the Dalai Lama's rhetoric according to these two frames.

The Comic Frame

According to Carlson, "movements rising from the comic ritual may be identified as those like Gandhi's that rely on a strategy of peaceful civil disobedience to achieve social change..." (p.448). This is precisely the type of movement that the Dalai Lama leads in his conflict with Chinese leaders and with international and particularly Western political leadership. The Dalai Lama's communication is likewise comic because it too is "pragmatic;" it evinces "a strong sense of irony" (p.450); "it aims at creating 'maximum consciousness'" of both villain and victim as being potentially one and the same (p.447); and it is highly "religious" (p. 452).

Furthermore, for the leader of the social movement to "free Tibet" from China's allegedly inhumane domination, "comedy is an agent of change" that enables humans "to correct the errors of the guilty party and to bring him or her back to the social fold which his or her actions have threatened. The principle the fool may have violated is not as important as the community which needs to be made whole again." (Brummet, p.220;219). The Dalai Lama employs the

comic frame in discussing how "to correct the errors" of China and the West, who are the "guilty parties." His five-point peace plan was introduced in his speech on September 21, 1987 before members of the US Congress, and was reiterated in his 1988 Strasbourg address before the European Parliament. The five-point plan presents a schema for how China and the West, who are the "fools," can be exonerated of their guilt for their mistakes. If they would only implement the five-point plan, then the "community" of Tibet, and perhaps even the whole world, could be made "whole again." Moreover, by extrapolating the importance of Tibet, which holds "a strategic position in the heart of Asia, separating the continent's great powers," indeed, the "community" relations of the world could also be improved (Dalai Lama, 1989, p.4).

If the comic frame is a way of "publicly" and "vicariously" alleviating guilt, of what then, are China and the West guilty? In his five point address to Congress, the Dalai Lama openly claims China is guilty of breaking "international law," of incurring an "holocaust," and of disrupting negotiations for a peaceful settlement over the Tibet question (1989, pp.5-6). In his Strasbourg address, he alleges "China forcibly invaded Tibet," killing over "a million" Tibetans and destroying "thousands of monasteries" (p.11). In both addresses he accuses China of using Tibet as a dumping ground for nuclear waste.

In implicating the West as a "fool," the Dalai Lama is softer. He implies in the speech to Congress that the West is guilty of being counted among the nations that did not "condemn" China's "aggression," for "virtually," but not "all nations of the free world" did condemn it. By inference, those who are aware of how the West turned a blind eye to Tibet's pleas for help would understand that this statement relates to the US (Weiss, 1987; Bullert, 1986). In the Strasbourg address, he reminds the West that "we are living...in a very interdependent world...Without a sense of universal responsibility our very survival is in danger." So if the West continues to ignore the conflict in Tibet, it is endangering not just the future of Tibetans, but the peoples of the West as well.

Religious Persuasion

The comic frame is consistent with the Dalai Lama's religious position because "it provides a charitable attitude towards people" (emphasis in original) (Burke, 1959, p.166). It is equally useful for his position as "leader of the Tibetan people" because it fulfills his political ends by fostering "purposes of persuasion and cooperation" (p. 166). Thus, through a "charitable attitude" towards China and the West, the Dalai Lama may gain ground in resolving the conflict. Burke notes that "the comic frame should enable people to be observers of themselves, while acting. Its ultimate [aim] would not be passiveness, but maximum

consciousness;" so that the guilty parties could "transcend" themselves "by noting [their] own foibles" (emphasis in original) (p. 171). In this way, the Dalai Lama's role as a spiritual leader and teacher is realized. Not only is he devising a reasonable solution to the conflict, but he is also acting to improve humankind's "consciousness" of the world around them. The issues of human rights and nuclear arms and waste are issues about which he affirms the world must be aware. The Dalai Lama often speaks of the universal responsibility which all humans should feel for each other. Universal responsibility, a nonviolent tenet, enhances our awareness of each other; accordingly, universal responsibility promotes correct and humane actions, especially when dealing with conflicts.

"The comic frame identifies social ills as arising from human error, not evil, and thus uses reason to correct them" (Carlson, 1986, p. 448). The five-point peace plan appears to have been designed as a plan that "uses reason to correct" Tibet's conflict. It defines Tibet's role in the "interdependent world" in order to ensure the peace of the "planet" as a whole" (Dalai Lama, 1989, p.11). Each of the five components of the Dalai Lama's Strasbourg proposal (discussed above in Chapter 5) reflects "reason" while also serving as a kind of religious lesson in nonviolence toward humans and nature. The five points relate to the comic frame because "comedy sees guilt in terms of community" (Brummet, p.225). By turning "Tibet into a zone of peace," the world

community's safety is improved. By ending "China's population transfer policy" the community of Tibet is strengthened. By showing "respect for the Tibetan people's fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms," the West's democratic communities can prove that they really support such ideals, either at home or abroad. By protecting the environment and by reducing nuclear proliferation, the safety of the world as a community, again, is enhanced. Lastly, beginning in "earnest negotiations" on these points, is an action that fosters a sense of community in the region and in the world.

Irony and Awareness

"The structure of comic revelation is that of dramatic irony, in which the audience sees the tension between the image projected and what actually" exists (Brummet, 1984, p.225). The five-point peace plan shows for the audience the "tension between image" and reality because it makes the notion of world peace seem so simple, so reducible to five points, while it highlights the inaction and bungling of those "fools" who have the control over world issues but who have continued to make mistakes. The most "ironic" issues which are pointed out to the audience are those of nuclear weapons, waste dumping, and human rights. These issues seem antithetical to "community" and to "reason," and yet the West and China are revealed to be the guilty parties, the "fools"

who must be reminded to "negotiate" in order to rectify these serious problems.

"The comic frame, in making [someone] the student of himself, makes it possible for him to 'transcend' occasions when he has been tricked or cheated, since he can...put...[errors in the] 'assets' column, under the head of 'experience.' Thus we can 'win' by subtly changing the rules of the game...we make 'assets' out of 'liabilities'" (Burke, 1959, p.171). The Dalai Lama's five-point peace plan attempts to transform the "experience" of the alleged "holocaust" in Tibet from a global liability of "holocaust" and "waste" into an "asset," a "zone of peace" that would serve to improve international peace. Tibet, if used as "a buffer state," could correct the "tensions" which "escalated into the border war in 1962" between India and China (1989, p.5). In this way, the fools, India, China, and the West, could learn from their past mistakes and remove the border conflicts by negotiating to reinstate Tibet as a free state.

The Dalai Lama alludes to Gandhi's nonviolent tactics, stating, "I propose that the whole of Tibet...be transformed into a zone of 'Ahimsa,' a Hindi term used to mean a state of peace and nonviolence" (p.7). Invoking "the strategy of nonviolent resistance has important symbolic uses. It creates a drama" that shows "an unjust situation" of such magnitude that "the community has no choice but to confront it" (Carlson, 1986, p. 450). Holding the conflict up to the light of the moralistic tenets of nonviolence helps to

underscore the irony of the democratic West's lack of commitment to democratic ideals such as "fundamental human rights."

It is worth noting here that it is not uncommon in the Dalai Lama's rhetoric, and in popular criticism of it, to see allusions to Gandhi. Conversely, in the academic realm, the fields of rhetorical criticism and social movement theory are bereft of this comparison. The Dalai Lama's discourse, while paralleling Gandhi's discourse in intent (to free his people from a colonial ruler) and substance (nonviolent protest), also draws persuasive strength from the powerful legacy of Gandhi's success in leading his people and expelling the British colonial rule from India. In Freedom in Exile, the Dalai Lama observes that he felt inspired by Gandhi in one particular visit; and on another, deeply moved at a place where the Buddha had given lectures.⁶¹ Similarly, this

⁶¹ The Dalai Lama states,

...I made a pilgrimage to Rajghat...where Mahatma Gandhi was cremated. It was a calm and beautiful spot and I felt very grateful to be there, the guest of a people who, like mine, had endured foreign domination; grateful also to be in the country that had adopted Ahimsa, the Mahatma's doctrine of nonviolence. As I stood praying, I experienced simultaneous great sadness at not being able to meet Gandhi in person and great joy at the magnificent example of his life (1990, p.116).

At Bodh Gaya, India, when, after having met with a group of Tibetan refugees, the Dalai Lama ordained monks for the first time. He writes,

A very moving moment followed when [the refugees'] leaders came to me and pledged their lives in the continuing struggle for a free Tibet. After that, for the first time in this life, I ordained a group of 162 young Tibetan novices...I felt greatly privileged to be able to do this at the Tibetan monastery which stands within sight of the Mahabodhi temple, next to the Bodhi Tree under which the Buddha finally attained Enlightenment (1990, p.157).

allusion carries over into Western media about the Dalai Lama. One public relations book by John Avedon, which features interviews with the Dalai Lama and articles about him, is titled the Bodgaya Interviews. Bodgaya is the name of the place where Gandhi lectured and the Buddha is said to have achieved enlightenment. In a piece on the Dalai Lama by actor Richard Gere and professor of religion A.F. Thurman (both are activists for Tibet), printed in Rolling Stone in 1987, the reference to Gandhi is prominent:

...the Dalai Lama continues to speak out for the six million Tibetans who still look to his leadership and guidance. In protest, Gandhi abstained from salt, a staple of the Indian diet, and the British Empire trembled. The Dalai Lama abstains from tea.

Tea, which is a staple of the Tibetan diet, was traditionally a chief product imported into Tibet from China. By parallel, we infer that China, as Great Britain before it, "trembles."

The Dalai Lama claims that the alleged holocaust of Tibetans could be reversed by simply stopping the population transfer policy. On this point, the Dalai Lama's rhetoric and actions can be likened to those of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Here, the parallel is evident in the Dalai Lama's often voiced concern that "Tibetans have become a minority in their own country." Just as King led the American Civil

Through discourse such as this, the Dalai Lama shores up the link between his people and the people of India, as well as making a strong comparison between himself and Gandhi, and as we see from the passage above, perhaps even between himself and the Buddha.

Rights movement to ensure African Americans would someday have the same rights as Americans of European descent, the Dalai Lama pushes the issue of civil rights and human rights to the fore in his discourse about the situation inside Tibet. The Dalai Lama calls the population transfer policy "the greatest threat to the continuation of Tibetans as a distinct race;" he also claims this policy has engendered in Tibet "discrimination" and "outright apartheid" against Tibetans (1990, pp. 250-251). Another noteworthy parallel exists between King and the Dalai Lama. When Dr. King was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his nonviolent efforts on behalf of African Americans, American diplomats protested that the award represented interference in America's internal affairs; three decades later, when the Dalai Lama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his nonviolent work for Tibetans, China complained that the Nobel Committee was meddling in the internal affairs of China. In each case, the leader--with the help and support of the Nobel Committee--made the huge world power appear as the "fool."

The Dalai Lama states that "the restoration and protection of Tibet's natural environment" could be ensured by ending the nuclear dumping and production occurring in Tibet. The dramatic irony evident in these issues is that China denies any such policies are in existence, yet Western media claim that they have evidence that such things are, in fact, going on (anonymous, 1993, p. 14). The final point of the Dalai Lama's plan, the call for negotiations, is ironic

because it shows the Dalai Lama's comic frame of perspective: it reveals his "sense of identification among the opposing forces of humanity" (Carlson, 1986, p. 450). In other words, China and the West must be equal partners with him in negotiations if any real progress is to be made in resolving the conflict over Tibet.

"The notion that ritual conflict can create epiphany is one of the hallmarks of the comic perspective, and nonviolent civil disobedience is one strategy that can facilitate this process" (Carlson, 1986, p.452). The "epiphany" out of conflict that the Dalai Lama appears to be seeking provides a seamless quality to his religious leadership and the didactic quality of his discourse. His professed adherence to nonviolent principles in achieving a more independent status for Tibet has endowed his speech with persuasive powers characteristic of the comic frame. Through the comic frame, he can maintain his status as "religious," while still identifying with his rhetorical opponents as being "human beings" in the global "community."

Finally, the comic frame is an effective tool in reducing the moral and divisive dimensions of the conflict into manageable, and mutually beneficial, terms. The comic frame serves the Dalai Lama's rhetoric by promoting "pragmatic" resolutions that are worded so as to make the parties to the conflict appear as equals at the bargaining table. At the same time, the comic frame is beneficial to resolving the conflict because it highlights ways that the

members in conflict can learn from their mistakes and work towards preventing such errors from recurring. Most importantly, it fosters "identification," which propels the persuasive message, which is sorely needed to get these parties to negotiate in the first place.

The Tragic Frame: A Sentimental Side

Just as the Dalai Lama employs the comic frame to further his persuasive appeal, when appropriate, he likewise finds it advantageous to use the tragic frame. Just as charitable, comically framed rhetoric is ubiquitous in his speeches, so it is not uncommon to find discourse that is tragic and highly sentimental. This sentimental discourse is emotion laden, and at times fraught with images of great sorrow or even horror.

In Rhetorical Questions: Studies of Public Discourse, Edwin Black writes that the use of a tragic, sentimental style of discourse indicates the rhetor's wish

to shape response. No scintilla of reaction is left for the auditor's own creation; every nuance of effect is regulated by the speech...The sentimental style seeks a total control over consciousness...(1992, p.101).

Thus by using the sentimental style to convey the tragedy that has allegedly befallen Tibet, the Dalai Lama exerts a strong guiding influence over his audience. As a social movement leader, the Dalai Lama may find this style useful

because it serves "either to instruct new initiates or to renew the faithful" (Black, 1992, p.112).

In contrast to the comic frame, which presents guilt in terms of a "fool" versus a "community," presenting events through the tragic frame means depicting guilty actions as having taken place against some principle; "Burke describes that guilt as being against the cosmos or the nature of things" (Brummet, 1984, p.218). In this case the guilty actions depicted are those of China, and, to a certain extent, the West and India for their tacit agreement or support of China through political and economic channels. Burke's conception of the use of tragedy in discourse is that

Tragedy subjects the ...hero to trial...Scapegoating and mortification...are the tragic modes of exacting suffering and purgation from the guilty. Tragedy vicariously punishes guilt in the audience by flaying the hero...The hero, and vicariously the public, are led to enlightenment through punishment; purgation of the guilt leads one to an awareness that one has sinned (Brummet, 1984, p. 219).

Thus the use of the sentimental style, when set in tragic frame, places Tibetans in the position of being the "flayed heroes," while the Chinese and Westerners, as well as Tibetans who escaped into exile, may be exonerated of guilt. With regard to the Tibetans' guilt for having escaped or for existing under Chinese domination, the Dalai Lama often expresses the opinion that the Chinese imposed "tragedy" was the result of some accumulated "bad karma" on the part of all Tibetans. Indeed, Buddhist concepts such as karma or

emptiness fit well into the tragic framework. For instance, note how the Dalai Lama incorporates Buddhist ideas into his explanation of Tibet's tragedy:

One important Buddhist philosophy or concept is that things are relative, things are of an interdependent nature... Looking at an event in one way it seems a tragedy; very sad. But... from another angle it seems a good opportunity. Now with this belief in mind, in the 1960s and early 1970s, the Tibetan issue seemed almost hopeless. Even some of our best friends thought sadly that the Tibetan issue was a dead issue, with no hope. And in the meantime in our own country destruction, immense destruction was happening. However, during this period we never gave up hope, and I think that the most important thing is that inside Tibet the determination of the people, especially the younger generation, was never shaken, always very firm. So because of human determination and constant effort, things can change. (1991, pp.1-2).

For Tibetans, guilt for their nation's tragedy is explained in terms of Buddhism; the tragedy, while "immense," must be considered as "relative." For Westerners, guilt may be explained in terms of the tragic frame, for Westerners, as the "best friends" of Tibet, had already left Tibet for "dead."

In his second and most recent autobiography, the Dalai Lama often uses the tragic frame to present the situation in Tibet. In gut-wrenching imagery so characteristic of the sentimental style, he describes the Nazi-like atrocities which the Chinese allegedly committed:

crucifixion, vivisection, disemboweling and dismemberment of victims was commonplace. So too were beheading, burning, beating to death and burying alive, not to mention dragging people behind

galloping horses until they died or hanging them upside down or throwing them bound hand and foot into icy water. And, in order to prevent them [from] shouting out, "Long live the Dalai Lama" on the way to execution, the [Communist Chinese] tore out their tongues with meat hooks (1990, p.124).

This sentimental discourse presents tragic images that are not easily forgotten by the reader. The description provides intimate details for the tragic events; these details, in turn, offer the audience a near-participatory experience, which heightens the potential for achieving a sense of vicarious "purgation of guilt" since the Dalai Lama still expresses hope for Tibet's future even in the face of the atrocities he describes.

The Dalai Lama's use of the tragic drama in his discourse has been tempered over the course of time. Today, it appears comparatively less frequently in his discourse, so that vociferous, tragic examples such as the one described in the passage above are limited. In the Dalai Lama's earlier discourse, the tragic description was both more common and perhaps a degree more vivid. The following excerpt of the Dalai Lama's earlier discourse is an example of his description of the tragedy of Tibet. This passage is taken from his first autobiography:

Tens of thousands of our people have been killed, not only in military actions, but individually and deliberately. They have been killed, without trial, on suspicion of opposing communism...or for no reason at all. But mainly and fundamentally they have been killed because they would not renounce their religion. They have not only been shot, but beaten to death, strangled, hanged, scalded, buried

alive, disemboweled, and beheaded...in public. The victims' fellow villagers and friends and neighbors have been made to watch them...Men and women have been slowly killed while their own families were forced to watch, and small children have even been forced to shoot their parents (1960, pp.221-222).

It is through this vividly dramatic approach to his presentation of tragedy that the pacifistic speech of a "simple monk" becomes the speech of a frenetic activist and leader of a social movement. This is the discourse of a leader charged with gaining supporters, organizing activities, forming international alliances, and propagating information. "Burke links tragedy specifically to purpose, and argues that when we find someone striving to do something, we should look for the tragic mechanism at work. This is because purpose requires action, and action is always at the base of tragedy" (Burke, 1969, p. 38; Brummet, 1984, p. 220). The Dalai Lama's purpose is to get political support for his cause and place pressure on China to amend its policies in Tibet; the actions the Dalai Lama describes show the valiant efforts of the tragic heroes, with himself at the helm, as well as the malign actions of the Communist Chinese who allegedly perpetrated the crimes.

The tragic frame through which the Dalai Lama presents Tibet's drama is simple: the Communist Chinese (and perhaps, through karma, the Tibetans as well) have violated the principle of universal responsibility. The following passage is from the Dalai Lama's statement, presented on March 10, 1963, to mark the Fourth Anniversary of the Tibetan People's

National Uprising. The statement evinces strong discourse which works to shape one's perceptions completely. In describing the aftermath of the Chinese "liberation" of Tibet, the Dalai Lama clearly presents the drama through the tragic frame, and in language characteristic of the sentimental style:

A year has rolled by since I spoke to my beloved people on this memorable day to mark the spontaneous upsurge of the peace-loving and devout people of Tibet against their ruthless and insensate conquerors [the Chinese]. Since then there has been no respite in the struggle of my unfortunate people for peace and freedom. The night of terror still continues. Hundreds of people are being massacred to satisfy the greed and impious ambition of the Chinese military leaders. The revered places of worship are being destroyed or converted into arsenals for conquest and oppression. Famine and starvation stalk our beloved land. Refugees are fleeing to the neighboring States to escape from cruel and inhuman persecution. The passive resistance of our people still continues. Vivid accounts of unspeakable misery are still being brought to us in exile. The situation continues to be desperate and hopeless...I pray with all earnestness and fervour that the great Avaloketeswara may grant my beloved people courage and determination to enable them to continue their passive struggle against tyranny and oppression (1986, p. 8).

The Dalai Lama pits the "devout" and "peace-loving" Tibetans, who are the heroes of the tragedy, and who valiantly mount a "passive struggle" against the Chinese. The Chinese, as the source and cause of the heroes' suffering, are depicted as "ruthless and insensate conquerors" who wreak "unspeakable misery" upon Tibet.

"Famine and starvation" are personified so that they become

the twin soldiers of the Chinese to further their "cruel and inhuman persecution." The use of themes within the context of tragedy is common to the sentimental style, which "works by consolidating the perceptions that it sponsors with precisely defined feelings" (Black, 1992, p.111). The themes that the Dalai Lama uses are those of the "horrors" experienced by the peaceful Tibetans. By using the sentimental style, "feelings are rehearsed in the auditor, and repeatedly associated with the same class of objects" (Black, 1992, p. 111). The Dalai Lama's use of repetition of themes and words in his discourse works to "rehearse" the feelings of his audience; this strategy of persuasion is also in sync with the Tibetan form of dramatic presentation.⁶² Moreover, these "associations may become fixed," and potentially form a "stock response" to similar discourse (Black, 1992, p. 111).

In the Dalai Lama's statement on the Fifth Anniversary of the Tibetan People's National Uprising, again, he "rehearse the audience" by using the themes of horror inflicted on the "peace-loving" Tibetans by the callous Chinese "conquerors" ever since the Chinese arrived in Tibet:

Tyranny and oppression prevailed... and finally the unarmed citizens of Lhasa rose in a body against the violence of the Chinese Communist authorities, and the torch of freedom was lit once again in every corner of Tibet. Since then my unfortunate people have made great sacrifices. Thousands of

⁶² Jerstad observes that "there is a great deal of repetition in all Buddhist writing and in [dramatic plays]... In such oral communication repetition is not wearisome in the least, but is part of the respectful supplication which wins merit for listener and reciter" (1967, p. 209).

them have been massacred. Thousands of them have been rendered homeless. Thousands of them have escaped to neighboring States. But the barbarous atrocities, even to the extent of exterminating the race and religious belief of the Tibetans, still continue, and the struggle of the people still goes on (1986, p. 11).

The Dalai Lama "rehearses" for the audience the idea of the numbers of people involved--"thousands." He likewise reaffirms the Tibetans' role as heroes, the brave, "unarmed citizens" who dared to fight the Chinese "Tyranny and oppression." The Chinese role as villains in the tragedy is made clear by calling them "Communist" and accusing them of committing "barbarous atrocities."

A year later, in 1965, on the Sixth Anniversary of the Tibetan People's National Uprising, the Dalai Lama's discourse once more works to shape and delineate carefully what the audience ought to see and understand about the tragedy in Tibet:

This being the situation today, it is necessary for us, Tibetans and other peace-loving people alike, to rouse the conscience of the world and to lodge a strong protest against the barbarous and inhuman treatment of the Tibetans by the Chinese conquerors. Today, I wish to call upon all Tibetans to renew their faith... Today in the name of humanity I call upon all the peoples of the world to come to the rescue of the unfortunate and unhappy people of Tibet (1986, p. 15).

Here, too, it is clear that the Dalai Lama seems to aim, in characteristic sentimental fashion, at making the listener's "associations fixed." The associations for the Chinese would

be that of "inhuman" and "conqueror." The associations for the Tibetans would be the "unfortunate and unhappy people" who are suffering. The association for the West, as a potential ally capable of succor for Tibetans, assumes the role of the new hero who can "come to the rescue" of the victims in Tibet.

Again, in 1966, the Dalai Lama's annual address reconfirms the associations the audience is led to conjure along the lines of the sentimental discourse. The Chinese are the villains, the Tibetans are the victims, and the Westerners are the potential heroes who can--and who are already making attempts--to aid the sacrificial heroes, the Tibetans, in the name of freedom and anti-communism:

It is now seven years since that historic day when the people of Tibet rose in spontaneous revolt against the tyranny and oppression of the Chinese Communist military occupation. Against fearful odds and in utter self-sacrifice, our people stood up as one against the might of their conquerors. Many died in the struggle and others suffered torture and humiliation before being killed. It is to the memory of these martyrs... and the cause for which they have made their supreme sacrifice that we dedicate this day...

Since the invasion of Tibet by the Chinese Communists in 1949, our people were reduced to the status of a subject race under the shackles of an alien conqueror bent on wiping every vestige of our national and cultural heritage. In flagrant violation of the truth the Chinese have tried to cover up their inhuman and brutal treatment of the Tibetan people under the names of 'liberation' and 'progress.' They have killed and tortured our people; they looted the ancient treasures of Tibet; they have deprived our people of even the smallest traces of fundamental freedom and have made the Tibetans a second-class citizen existing only to serve the Chinese. In short the Tibetans have become victims of Han imperialism....

On behalf of those of our people who have given up their lives for freedom, those who heroically continue to resist the Chinese in Tibet and those in exile, I would like to thank the governments of El Salvador, Ireland, Malaysia, Malta, Nicaragua, the Philippines and Thailand for sponsoring [at the General Assembly of the United Nations] the resolution calling for the immediate cessation of oppression and the restoration of fundamental freedom in Tibet... (1986, p. 17).

The Chinese, then, are depicted as Communists who are "alien conquerors." The Tibetan victims are "martyrs." The nations that the Dalai Lama names who are trying, through the United Nations, to help Tibet, serve as indicators and models for the rest of the West to follow suit and work for "the restoration of fundamental freedom in Tibet." The Dalai Lama then closes the speech with a paraphrasing of the tragedy: "To us Tibetans these are hard and tragic times... we realise and feel the full anguish and sorrows of our brothers who are... victims of brutality and aggression." The sentimental style operates so as to leave as little space as possible (ideally, none) for the auditor to integrate his or her own ideas or interpretations with what the speaker has just said. Considering that the Dalai Lama's annual addresses are presented in one published volume, it is clear that the sentimental style would be even more effective when the reader literally has no mental escape from the contiguous presentation of discourse in this style.

The use of the sentimental style within the overarching schema of the tragic frame works because the sentimental style "is transitory" (Black, 1992, p. 111). Therefore, just

as the drama shifts and changes over time, so does the sentimental style adapt accordingly. Black observes that "to an audience not [familiar with prior sentimental discourse by a given rhetor], the sentimental style will be boring and overdone" (1992, p. 112). Perhaps that is why, in a critique of the Dalai Lama's second autobiography, Carlyne Moorehead observes, "[This] is a temperate book, at times even bland, for all the Dalai Lama's anguish over the destruction of his country" (1990, p. 44). The action taken by the Dalai Lama is to continue to speak out on these alleged events. Through his discourse, the Dalai Lama is dramatically reliving the experience time and time again. So while the repetition may be perceived as "bland," when set in the tragic frame, it enables audiences both familiar and unfamiliar with the Tibet question to purge guilt vicariously.⁶³

In summary, the Dalai Lama alters his discourse in turns from comic to tragic as the audience, situation, and context merit. Such shifts are specially noteworthy in "those cases where tragic and comic treatments of the same transgression compete for public attention and participation, for at those times the difference between the tragic and the comic in general may become especially clear" (Brummet, 1984, p. 221). For the Dalai Lama, in attempting to negotiate with the Chinese leadership, the comic frame may be more advantageous

⁶³ Regarding the Dalai Lama's first trip to the United States in 1979, he observes that "although...I held the view that the US was the champion of freedom actually very few people had any knowledge of the fate of Tibet" (1990, p.198). Thus in repeatedly relaying the message of Tibet's tragedy, the Dalai Lama's action is to counter and thereby alleviate the audience's added guilt for the "sin" of ignorance.

or persuasive because it casts the Chinese in the position of being the "fool," who has wronged the Tibetans but who is far from evil; instead, their errors need only be corrected by following the prescriptions the Dalai Lama offers, such as the plans he laid out in the Five Point Peace Plan and the Strasbourg Proposal. Burke states that "Like tragedy, comedy warns against the dangers of pride, but its emphasis shifts from crime to stupidity" (emphasis in original) (1959, p.41). Based upon the survey of discourse undertaken for this analysis, I believe that it is the comic frame which prevails in the Dalai Lama's discourse. According to Burke, it is more advisable to use the comic frame since it "seeks healing rather than punishment" (Brummet, 1984, p. 227).

Nonetheless, in dealing with the West and with Tibetans, the Dalai Lama's use of the tragic frame may, in many instances, be more effective in persuading audiences to act because it highlights the urgency of tragedy and the need to move swiftly; at the same time, the tragic frame also assuages the audience's guilt for past situations when they avoided their responsibilities to act on behalf of Tibet. This chapter has illustrated the Dalai Lama's selective use of the tragic frame and sentimental style, which tend to operate in the rhetorical realm of a speaker-oriented discourse. The aim of speaker-oriented discourse is to generate a single conception of meaning on an audience--the speaker's. Speaker-oriented discourse stands in opposition to a discourse that promotes a meaning mutually determined by

both audience and speaker. According to Black, the sentimental style appears to be the extreme of a speaker oriented discourse, for not only does the speaker shape the audience's perceptions, but also his or her own perceptions to the exclusion of all else. Black states that the sentimental style shields both the speaker and the audience from other, more compelling, moral issues (1992, p. 102). If the sentimental style is truly operative in much of the Dalai Lama's discourse, then what other moral issues are we being averted from observing? The goal of ending the population transfer policy was noted in Chapter Five, above. The Dalai Lama's emphasis of this goal could possibly be considered as a moral exclusion maneuver.⁶⁴ The Dalai Lama's discourse on the population transfer policy is potentially one in which a moral issue--promoting the equality of all humans--is being set aside in the name of equality and quality of life for Tibetans only. So in the face of shrinking land space, and despite the fact that one in five people on the face of the entire earth are Chinese, the Dalai Lama asks for the Chinese to depart and never return, leaving the six million Tibetans to enjoy a space of land that is roughly the size of France. As a consequence, one may ask, is the Dalai Lama setting

⁶⁴ In an interview in 1986, when the Dalai Lama was asked about China's population transfer policy, the Dalai Lama replied:

...China invaded our country and now colonizes it... Now it is time for them to leave. They should go home and tend to the problems of their own country. This would be better for them as well as for the Tibetans. We have a right to follow our own destiny, to live according to our own culture and identity. Nobody has the right to colonize others" (emphasis added) (1986, p. 180).

aside ethics in order to effect persuasion? The next chapter examines the ethical implications of the Dalai Lama's rhetorical strategies.

CHAPTER SEVEN

ETHICS AND NONVIOLENT PERSUASION

The Ethics of a Nonviolent Rhetor

Ought we to consider the excruciatingly detailed images the Dalai Lama offers as mere propaganda, half-truths, or exaggeration? Indeed, regarding the use of the sentimental style, Black holds that "it is the manifestation of a disposition to subordinate all values to aesthetic values. As such, it is the fallible sign of an evasion of moral responsibility" (1992, p.109). Is it not sufficient for the Dalai Lama to simply state that human rights violations are occurring, or that they have occurred in the past? Why must so much descriptive and repetitive detail and drama appear in the Dalai Lama's discourse? The Chinese leadership's exasperation over the Dalai Lama's speech does not appear to be without a degree of just cause. However, whether or not the Dalai Lama can be accused, as a Chinese diplomat did, of conducting a "smear campaign;" and whether or not the Dalai Lama's discourse "evades" ethics, should be carefully explored. This chapter will examine the Dalai Lama's ethical grounding for his discourse.

It seems fair for the Chinese to ask what the purpose is of rehashing alleged tragic events, especially since the Chinese unabashedly concede that the same agonies befell Chinese victims, too, during the Cultural Revolution. The

answer to the questions posed above is found in the Gandhian concept of "satyagraha," to which the Dalai Lama adamantly adheres. Satyagraha means, literally, "soul-force," or "truth-force," and it is the counterpart to "ahimsa," or nonviolence. To better understand the Dalai Lama's rhetoric, we must also understand the theoretical underpinnings of the Dalai Lama's outlook as a nonviolent leader of a social movement.

The Dalai Lama's free-Tibet movement is showing signs that it may soon break away from the Dalai Lama's desire for peaceful demonstrations, and move into a more militant phase. Of his political adversaries, it bears repeating that the Dalai Lama says, "they too are human beings who struggle to find happiness and deserve our compassion" (1992, p. 70). At the same time, the Dalai Lama must address his more militant followers and express appropriate indignance over the turmoils in Tibet. Thus the Dalai Lama's tragic and sentimental discourse ought to be understood not as discrete commentary, but within the total framework of satyagraha.

Reaching for guidance, the Dalai Lama has said he finds inspiration in Mahatma Gandhi. Thus to glimpse into Gandhi's vision of nonviolent protest, we may gain insight into the Dalai Lama's perspectives as well. In Gandhi's essay, "On Satyagraha," Gandhi maintains that the truth gives power to nonviolent resistance. This truth, says Gandhi, is the only power which can render words stronger than arms:

...if nonviolence of thought is to be evolved in individuals or societies or nations, truth has to be told, however harsh or unpopular it may appear to be for the moment. And mere nonviolent action without the thought behind it is of little value...

The way of peace is the way of truth...The truth of a few will count, the untruth of millions will vanish ...like the chaff before a whiff of wind" (emphasis added)(Holmes, R. [ed.], 1990, pp. 55-56).

By using the tragic frame and sentimental style as a way of presenting his discourse, the Dalai Lama's "truth," while "harsh" and most certainly "unpopular," is apparently aimed at making "the untruth of millions," that is, the alleged cover-ups of the Dalai Lama's political adversaries, "vanish."

Similarly, the Dalai Lama's followers, either current or potential, are jolted into an awareness of the "truth," and in this way they are encouraged to act on the basis of that truth. Under the tenet of satyagraha, the Dalai Lama-- provided he truly believes his harsh words--can justify his use of the sometimes terrifying imagery he conveys through the sentimental style and the tragic frame. The Dalai Lama's belief in soul-force is "the thought behind" the words. In this belief in satyagraha, the Dalai Lama's words gain power, and the Dalai Lama may retain an ethical foothold in spite of the elusiveness of ascertaining "truth" regarding the Tibet question.

Also, Gandhi states that nonviolence ought not to be equated with "passive resistance," for there is "nothing

passive about nonviolence," indeed, "nonviolence requires feverish activity" (Holmes, 1990, p.55). Therefore, if the tragic and gruesome imagery which the Dalai Lama creates is at the heart of his nonviolent action, if it is "the thought" propelling the social movement into "feverish activity," then the Dalai Lama's rhetoric becomes anchored in a pragmatic basis. A pragmatic leadership helps ensure longevity for any organization. When the Dalai Lama's discourse is viewed from this realistic perspective, and considering his organization bears the weight of the very existence of Tibetan culture, the use of the tragic frame and sentimental style becomes less frivolous. So, in this situation, rather than being an "evasion of moral responsibility," the use of these two rhetorical strategies is transformed into an embracing of universal responsibility.

In David Frank's discussion of nonviolent rhetoric, In Search of Peace (1983), Frank asserts that "a rhetoric of nonviolent action" must be tailored to the given "conflict situation." Frank posits that the "nonviolent rhetor should have at her or his disposal a large reservoir of possible rhetorical actions and messages to use" (1983, p. 44). Clearly, then, the Dalai Lama has felt constrained enough in his campaign of awareness about Tibet to use the sentimental style and tragic frame when he finds it necessary. Frank asserts that "an artistic choice [is]... governed by the principle of kairos, which allows the nonviolent rhetor to choose a fitting response" adapted to the conflict scenario

(p. 44).⁶⁵ The Dalai Lama's dramatic strategies of mortification, victimage, and transcendence, as well as his use of the tragic and comic frames, are all ways that the Dalai Lama's kairos is manifested.

Ethics and the Active Audience

By reading or listening to the Dalai Lama's discourse, the audience is actively participating in the unfolding drama of Tibet. Clearly, this participation is active because it is largely at the audience's discretion. For although the Dalai Lama regularly travels and speaks to select audiences worldwide, he has yet to become regular nightly news fare in Western countries. The Dalai Lama's audience, for the most part, must themselves seek out the Dalai Lama to read or to hear his views.

In his essay, "Persuasion and Ethics" (1964), B.J. Diggs asserts that in persuasive communication, there is a dual responsibility. There is the responsibility of the persuader, but there is also a responsibility on the part of the "persuadee" (p. 364). For the persuader, Diggs goes on to say, ethics enters into the picture because

...the speaker has a responsibility... the kinds of persuasion exercised on people are important elements in their logical and moral training. Just as any act may have some tendency to fix a person's character, so a persuasive speech may tend to

⁶⁵ Frank defines Kairos as "the adaptation of the speech to the manifold variety of life, to the psychology of speaker and hearer... The term dictates the choice of organization, means of proof, and other elements of a rhetorical message" (1983, p. 44).

undermine or support the general acceptance of sound principles (1964, p. 366).

The Dalai Lama, as first and foremost a religious leader, speaks most often on religious or intellectual topics. The central focus of this thesis has been an analysis of two speeches which focus on Tibet. But while the Tibet issue bobs up at will within his discourse on a variety of topics (either as prompted by the audience or by the Dalai Lama himself), Tibet's situation is far from being all consuming in his discourse in general. Speaking as a religious teacher, the Dalai Lama's role is to instruct his audience in "kindness," which is the ubiquitous theme of his speeches and books, such as his "Oxford Union Address" (1991) and his books Kindness, Clarity, and Insight (1984) and Ocean of Wisdom (1990). In the Oxford Union Address, he emphasizes the importance of kindness to our lives,

... religions are the business of the individual. However, the matter of love and compassion and human affection: the whole of humanity needs that... I believe that the very existence of human beings depends on human affection... without human affection, there is no purpose in life" (1991).

Certainly the Dalai Lama's discourse on themes of kindness and universal responsibility are the "sound principles" that Diggs indicates an ethical speaker would "support."

In the Dalai Lama's role as a monk, it seems natural for the Dalai Lama to evince in his discourse the kind of paradox

and mystery that religious discourse allows for. Kenneth Burke states that this kind of discourse is found at times

...when orientations are in confusion--for it is at such times that the certainties we live by are most easily and inevitably brought into question. The mystic seeks a sounder basis of certainty than those provided by the flux of history. He seeks the ultimate motive behind our acts--which... is the equivalent to his seeking an ultimate situation common to all [people] (1936, p. 283).

The "ultimate situation common to" humanity which the Dalai Lama seeks to promote is quite simply world peace. The Dalai Lama's reliance upon concepts that are alien to most Westerners, such as emptiness, or upon oracles and other mystical notions that he incorporates into his discourse, may be considered as ethical because his motive is to unite people who are in dispute and bring them to a common ground. Particularly in the Dalai Lama's discourse about the Tibet situation, prominent among his motives is the desire to resolve conflict and bring order out of "confusion." To accomplish this he emphasizes our "common situation" as humans, thus his use of mysticism appears to be, at least in his unique situation, warranted and ethically sound.⁶⁶

⁶⁶ Burke adds that

Mysticism... [flourishes] when traditional ways of seeing and doing (with their accompanying verbalizations) have begun to lose their authority... at times like ours, where the entire commercial ethic shaping our contingent demands has brought us to extremities, and where so many patterns of living require us to slight or repress the most rudimentary needs... One must go in search of authoritarian tests that lie deeper (1936, p.285).

In The Ethics of Rhetoric, Richard M. Weaver states that "rhetoric moves the soul with a movement which cannot finally be justified logically" (1985, p. 23). So in the Dalai Lama's reliance upon mysticism to bolster his ethos (as discussed above in Chapter Four), or upon his use of the sentimental style to move his supporters to action (as illustrated above in Chapter Six), he is attempting to "move the soul" of his audience. At the same time, the Dalai Lama's reliance upon dialectic in his international lecture tours and question-answer format in his interviews with the media indicates that he "desires not to devour" his audience, but rather "to shape" the audience "according to the gods as far as mortal power allows" (Weaver, 1985, p.25). The vast majority of the Dalai Lama's publications, speeches, and press conferences are structured in a question-answer, or dialectic, format. MindScience: An East-West Dialogue is a prime example of the Dalai Lama's preference for dialectical teaching. MindScience provides transcripts of the Dalai Lama's lectures and question-answer sessions as part of a Harvard forum on neuroscience; the Dalai Lama fields complicated questions from Western experts in scientific fields ranging from psychology to neurosurgery. The book The Collected Statements, Addresses, and Interviews of the Dalai Lama (1986) contains reprints of question-answer interviews of the Dalai Lama from the 1960s to the mid 1980s,

The Dalai Lama offers precisely the sort of moral "ways of seeing and doing" as well as the authority that people find attractive in the present period of turmoil and "extremities."

in which the Dalai Lama responds to manifold questions from reporters on diverse topics ranging from religion and politics to his own hobbies, or the supernatural components of Tibetan life, or the general state of human affairs.

The Dalai Lama's use of a dialectic format is consistent with the Dalai Lama's lifelong training as a Buddhist monk. A main feature of Tibetan Buddhist training is mastering the art of dialectics. The Dalai Lama maintains that

"A monk's ability at this unique form of disputation is the criterion by which his intellectual achievements are judged. For this reason, as Dalai Lama, I had to have not only a good grounding in Buddhist philosophy and logic but also proficiency at debating. I therefore began to study these subjects in earnest when I was ten years old and at twelve I was appointed two tsenshap, experts who coached me in the art of dialectics (1990, p. 26).

In order for him to attain his degree of Doctor of Metaphysics (shortly before he fled to India), he had to undergo lengthy debates with learned scholars, in which he had to prove his knowledge. Bearing this in mind, it is interesting to note that the Dalai Lama most often arranges for the popular media treatment of himself to appear in the form of interviews with him, instead of articles about him.

Clearly, from the perspective of a leader of an international campaign of persuasion, reliance upon dialectic is not only a preference arising from the Dalai Lama's education, but it is also a strategy to enhance persuasion.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ On the other hand, Frank asserts that

Not surprisingly, in the course of conducting a biographical survey of literature on the Dalai Lama, the most damaging editorial commentary was found in descriptive articles about the Dalai Lama (Jenkins, 1988). In contrast, almost without exception in published interviews, through a combination of his own charisma and his use of simple and compelling logic, the Dalai Lama manages to elicit a positive response from even the most skeptical and contrary interviewer.⁶⁸

Weaver maintains that "rhetoric at its truest," that is, a charitable rhetoric, "seeks to perfect [people] by showing them better versions of themselves, links in that chain extending up toward the ideal, which only the intellect can apprehend and only the soul can have affection for" (1985,

Nonviolent action.. [entails] inductive, deductive, and quasi-logical reasoning in order to determine the most reasonable truth in the given conflict situation... an experiment with truth, [such reasoning] is not bound by the demands of strict rationality and seeks to find the strongest value that might be created, evolved, or preserved in the conflict situation (1983, pp. 36-37)

Thus, when the Dalai Lama's dialectical reason breaks away at times when he employs the sentimental style, the nonviolent tenet of illogic for the sake of truth makes it possible for the Dalai Lama to retain an ethical stance.

⁶⁸ Weaver explains the use of dialectic in the context of an ethical rhetoric as follows:

What a successful dialectic secures for any position...is not actuality but possibility; and what rhetoric thereafter accomplishes is to take any dialectically secured position...and show its relationship to the world of prudential conduct...what the... rhetorical plea asks of us is belief, which is a preliminary to action...

... when we say that rhetoric instills belief and action, we are saying that it intersects possibility with the plane of actuality and hence of the imperative (1985, pp.27-28).

So when the Dalai Lama relies upon publicity which strengthens his dialectical approach, his rhetoric becomes more convincing because his statements are shown to be arrived at from a "secured position." By the same token, the actions he urges are shown to be useful "in the world of prudential conduct."

p.25). Based upon my research, I would suggest that the Dalai Lama's discourse is representative of such idealistic and charitable rhetoric. This is particularly evident in the Dalai Lama's reliance upon the comic frame in his discourse. The comic frame, as we have seen, operates in ways that promote a charitable attitude toward one's transgressor(s). But even the Dalai Lama's use of the tragic frame and sentimental style must not totally be seen as an attempt at using rhetoric to express a narrow and propagandistic vision. The use of tragedy and sentimental language must be considered in light of the basis upon which the discourse is founded: satyagraha. In remembering the Dalai Lama's nonviolent stance and the notions of satyagraha, the Dalai Lama is able to avoid the pitfalls of making rhetoric that is merely a one-sided propaganda bombardment. Frank notes that

...the proper ethical grounding for a rhetoric of nonviolence might be based upon the concept of rhetorical relativism... [which] assumes that values held by cultures and individuals are established through social persuasion. Since values are established through persuasion, then values should and can be changed through persuasion (1983, p. 37).

The Dalai Lama's reliance upon the tenets of nonviolence ensures that the tragic frame and sentimental style produce in his audience a cathartic experience. Therefore, the persuasion that the Dalai Lama uses change the values by which that persuasion is judged.

By presenting constructive and pragmatic resolutions to problems in Tibet, such as those outlined in the Dalai Lama's Five Point Peace Plan and the Strasbourg Proposal, the Dalai Lama's discourse is shown to be persuasive from a nonviolent perspective. Frank states that "nonviolent rhetors should attempt to envision the possible in the conflict situation and should attempt to construct novel actions and messages...in order to overcome the conflict..." (1983, p. 52). Frank's description of the ideal of nonviolent rhetoric aligns to Weaver's conception of an ethical rhetoric, which "intersects possibility with the plane of actuality" (Weaver, 1985, p.28). The Dalai Lama's speeches offer examples of this kind of intersection between "possibility" and "actuality."

In sum, the Dalai Lama relies upon nonviolent perspectives and dialectical discourse, which indicates that he approaches persuasion from an ethical vantage point. In addition, his own ethos tempers his tactics of persuasion with his desire to respect and educate his audience. The fact that he has "traveled assiduously to bring the Tibetan case and the plight of his people to as wide an international audience as possible" indicates that his goal is to help people--persuasion is simply a means to that end (Williams, 1988, p. 146).⁶⁹ This ethos-building history of the

⁶⁹ Franz Michael states that the Tibetan story is an outstanding example of what faith and loyalty to one's culture can accomplish under great leadership: an almost miraculous recovery from a grievous...disastrous blow... major credit belongs to the

Dalai Lama's actions "reflect good will," which Wieman and Walter find essential to a rhetor's ability to "understand" and "appreciate" the audience (1957, p. 269).⁷⁰

In the final chapter which follows, I discuss the ramifications of the Dalai Lama's rhetoric which has been examined in this thesis. I also provide recommendations for future research and study of the Dalai Lama's discourse.

Dalai Lama, whose clear understanding of the essence of Tibet's religious foundations and the meaning of its institutions, along with his great compassion, has enabled him to provide the leadership that united the Tibetans in exile, reconstituted their social and political organizations, and strengthened their faith and political will (1985, p. 738).

⁷⁰ The Dalai Lama has been recognized internationally for his humanitarian work; his awards include the Palketta Award of Norway (1973), the Peace Medal of the Asian Buddhist Committee for Peace (1979), the Leopold Lucas Prize in West Germany (1987), the Albert Schweitzer Humanitarian Award (1987), the Raoul Wallenberg Congressional Human Rights Award (1989), and the Nobel Peace Prize (1989) (McGuire, 1992, p. 70).

CHAPTER EIGHT
AN ENDURING RHETORIC

Conclusions: The Significance of the Dalai Lama's Discourse

The Dalai Lama's discourse may be studied from a multitude of perspectives. This thesis has offered a qualitative study from one Westerner's point of view. Select passages of the Dalai Lama's discourse have been analyzed in light of historiographical research into the background of the Dalai Lama and his country, Tibet. Specifically, the focus of my study was a rhetorical analysis of two important speeches by the Dalai Lama. I analyzed through Burkean critical perspectives "The Five Point Peace Plan" of 1987 and the "Strasbourg Proposal" of 1988. I also considered the Dalai Lama's skills in cross-cultural communication, his perspectives and abilities as the leader of a nonviolent social movement, and the ethical grounding of his discourse.

In the critical analysis, I have endeavored to show that the Dalai Lama's discourse has been influential on his audience, which encompasses Tibetan and foreign followers, political allies and opponents, world leaders and decision makers. As a rhetorical critic, I have attempted to illuminate the Dalai Lama's tactics and strategies for persuading his audience, including his use of mortification, scapegoating, and transcendence, as well as the comic and tragic frames as conceived by Kenneth Burke. Communications

scholar Loren D. Reid maintains that the job of a rhetorical critic is to unearth worthy examples of excellence in rhetoric and "to bestow praise when other [critics] have passed them by" (1944, pp. 416-422). In assessing the research findings presented in this thesis, I believe it is apparent that the Dalai Lama, as a writer and speaker skilled in persuasion, is exactly one such rhetor who heretofore has been "passed by" in the field of rhetorical criticism.

As a student of speech communication, I have presented an assessment of the cross-cultural implications of the Dalai Lama's discourse. The Dalai Lama adapts his discourse to meet the psychological needs of his diverse and far flung audiences. I have shown ways that he tailors his discourse through themes and symbols to meet his audience's needs. His language use is shaped by his own culture, yet his experience in dealing with international scenarios has--after some mistakes--made him adept at handling intercultural communication exchange and negotiation.

As a student of history, I have focused upon the history of one social movement's leader and how he has perpetuated a public debate about historic events. I have compared the history of Tibet as it has been recounted by Western, Chinese, and Tibetan historians, politicians, and media. I have taken the approach of the cautious historiographer who must carefully hold up diverse accounts of the same event in an attempt to arrive at the most accurate picture possible of what actually transpired in the past. I have then taken that

surmised picture and contrasted it with the picture presented by the Dalai Lama in his rhetorical campaign. I have indicated how the presentation of Sino-Tibetan history has, over time, impacted the Dalai Lama's discourse. Also, I have drawn some parallels between the work and discourse of the Dalai Lama as a social movement leader and that of Mahatma Gandhi and Dr. Martin Luther King. Lastly, I have illustrated the constraints placed upon the Dalai Lama which impact his rhetoric, including his own ethos or personal history, his world views, and the internal and external political, religious, social, and cultural factors that impinge upon and shape his discourse.

This thesis has also presented a discussion of the strategies that the Dalai Lama uses as a social movement leader, including maintaining a busy schedule of international travel and managing a comprehensive body of followers who organize and support the Tibet cause. Not only has the Dalai Lama organized in exile the construction and expansion of numerous Buddhist monasteries and Tibetan universities, but he has also fostered a thriving community in which the Tibetan identity, language, customs, and culture flourishes despite the at times strained relations with its host nation, India (Michael, 1985, pp. 737-744). The Dalai Lama's supporters include leading Chinese intellectual dissidents, leaders in the European Parliament, neighbors of China who risk their political futures to welcome the Dalai Lama to visit, and famous filmmakers and actors in Hollywood.

The Dalai Lama's main themes, such as universal responsibility, freedom, kindness, history, and a respect for nature, appear not only in his own rhetoric, but also in "the dialectic in the moral arena"--his themes are responded to in his adversaries' rhetorical efforts as well.

What I hope to have brought out in this thesis is that the Dalai Lama, as a winner of the Nobel Peace Prize and as the exiled leader of six million Tibetans, fulfills with remarkable skill the many roles associated with his leadership. He is the spiritual leader of all Tibetans; he is the charismatic social movement leader who travels constantly around the world, lecturing and raising awareness and support for his cause; he is a persuasive speaker and writer; he is a teacher and educator whose topic and mission is promoting world peace.

Areas for Future Research

Based upon this initial study of the Dalai Lama and his work, I am convinced that not just the discipline of speech communication stands to gain much from further study of the Dalai Lama, his leadership, discourse, and actions, but many other disciplines have much to gain as well, including sociology, history, political science, and religion; although these fields have begun to publish analyses regarding the Dalai Lama, which I was able to use herein, a great deal of research lies ahead, for the Dalai Lama's entire range of work remains largely unexamined. First, in the field of

rhetorical criticism, "rhetorical scholars have tended to study presidential rhetoric, but have neglected presidential peace rhetoric" (Frank, 1983, p. 13). A study of the Dalai Lama's peace rhetoric may help illuminate future studies of presidential peace rhetoric and the rhetoric of nonviolence in general. Also, an obvious area for future research on the Dalai Lama that I would recommend for students of rhetorical criticism is a comprehensive study of the Dalai Lama's annually delivered March 10 addresses, which commemorate the Tibetan national uprising that led to his flight into exile in India. Every year since 1959, on March 10, the Dalai Lama has delivered a speech about the situation in Tibet in terms of Tibetans inside and outside of Tibet, and in terms of Tibet's relationship to the international community. A study of these speeches according to analog criticism has yet to be undertaken; I believe such a study would be a didactic exercise and would greatly augment existing studies in rhetorical criticism.

Similarly, I believe that the growing discipline of intercultural communication stands to gain much from studying the Dalai Lama's style of international diplomacy and communication. While ethnographic studies abound in cross-cultural and intercultural communication, I believe the field stands to gain much from studying individuals who are paragons of successful intercultural communication. Even though the Dalai Lama has failed--as yet--to negotiate successfully with the Chinese leadership to resolve the

conflict over Tibet, I believe the current stalemate is in good measure due to purely external geopolitical and economic pressures rather than to the Dalai Lama's own abilities in intercultural communication. The Dalai Lama has, in fact, shown himself to be a diplomat and international communicator par excellence, and therefore his discourse and strategies merit study by students of intercultural communication.

In the field of peace and conflict studies, again, I would recommend the conduct of an in-depth analysis of the Dalai Lama's strategies toward resolving conflicts, as well a study of his successful humanitarian endeavors which have helped the Tibetan culture flourish in exile. The Dalai Lama's successful organization in helping Tibetans adapt and succeed in exile could serve as a model for other struggling cultural minorities around the world. By the same token, the scholastic scales are unbalanced between studies of peace and conflict, tipping heavily on the conflict side. David Frank asserts that

It is unfortunate that different standards have been used to evaluate the efficacy of violent and nonviolent actions. First, critics point to specific cases of nonviolent action that have failed and then proceed to damn the entire concept as being naive and impotent. Yet, when physical violence fails in specific cases, the failures are blamed upon inadequate strategic and tactical planning and not upon the technique itself. Second, historians [and other critics] tend to glorify and romanticize military victories; nonviolent victories tend to be ignored and minimized by these same scholars... many individuals appear to equate nonviolent action with pacifism, two different and distinct philosophies and techniques. By applying inconsistent

standards, nonviolent action is rejected as impractical, naive and ineffective (1983, p. 13).

Based upon a purview of my own Western education as well as the research I have conducted up to this point, I feel compelled to agree with Frank's assessment that academia in general manifests a tendency to, if not "glorify" military actions, then at minimum to expend far too much energy upon them. The end result of this apparent over-emphasis on bellicose subjects is quite possibly that we are being educated into perpetuating a combative mentality. I think that not only in peace and conflict studies, but in a wide range of other disciplines, it is incumbent upon students to reverse this detrimental yet thriving trend. As a start toward that end, I believe that all of the above disciplines would greatly benefit from studying the work of this extraordinary leader and proponent of nonviolence: the Dalai Lama.

In conclusion, I have argued that the Dalai Lama, as a nonviolent leader and communicator, is as significant and worthy of study in his own right as both King and Gandhi are. I suggest that the Dalai Lama's untiring work as a social movement leader, prolific writer, educator, and rhetor merits study, too. I hope I have illustrated in this thesis that the Dalai Lama represents an exciting and immensely valuable subject of study from whom students of many disciplines may gain new insights in their respective areas of interest. It is my wish that the foregoing analysis serve to broach,

particularly in the fields of rhetorical criticism and social movement theory, an enduring interest in the nonviolent discourse and life's work of the Dalai Lama.

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