

# A Function of Nuclear Capability: India's Emergence as a Global Power

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## **A Function of Nuclear Capability: India's Emergence as a Global Power**

### **Abstract**

India is a growing economic, military, and technological force in the twenty-first century. It is now the fastest growing state in Asia, and subsequently increased its military budget, allowing for the development of better nuclear technology and capability. India's recent geopolitical engagement includes attempting to establish relations with powerful neighboring China, establish itself as a global power, and continual tensions with Pakistan. These elements of economic and military development and geopolitical relations together create the conditions for India's current rising geopolitical profile.

Nuclear capability is a primary focus in twenty-first century international affairs, and through the primary lens and perspective of the theory of realism in international relations, I will analyze the ways in which the elements of India's nuclear doctrine that delineate India's resolve not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states and its No First Use stance and amendments to this stance under major, biological, or chemical weapons attack aid India on its path to emergence as a key actor in international affairs.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, Asian states continue to receive more attention for increased nuclear weapons capabilities. India in particular is at the focus of concerns over a nuclearized Asia. Beginning in 1974, India is known to possess and test nuclear weapons, and subsequently gone through massive changes and technological improvements in the last four decades. Nuclear weapons are at the root of modern defense and military technology advancements, and as states in the international community work to achieve credibility as strong military forces, more issues arise regarding nuclear capabilities. As India continues to improve its military and nuclear weapons capabilities, it also seeks to emerge as a key global actor in the international community. India's nuclear policies also underwent changes in order to lend credibility to its updated arsenal through a set guideline for use of nuclear weapons and a declaration to prevent proliferation.

India's original acquisition of nuclear weapons was in 1974, when it conducted the state's first nuclear weapons test. This original test occurred underground on May 18, 1974, and was a source of surprise to the international community, as it was followed up in July 1974 with the U.S. and the Soviet Chief signing an agreement at the Moscow Summit intended to set restrictions and guidelines for how, based on explosion size, such tests should be regarded as either peaceful or of military armament character.<sup>1</sup> At that point in time, India's test was another sign to the international community that diplomatically it was important to take steps to discourage underground nuclear tests in order to push for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons globally.<sup>2</sup> The international community's reaction, especially as it was in the midst of the Cold War, shows that while India was not considered much of a power in 1974, its nuclear

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<sup>1</sup> U.N. Gupta, *International Nuclear Diplomacy and India* (New Delhi: Atlantic, 2007), 113.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

weapons tests contributed to the formation of policies and agreements, which did lend it minimal credibility as an emerging nuclear power. In relation, it allowed India to bring its rising nuclear capabilities to the attention of the international community, and show that it was serious about becoming a global nuclear power. This is especially true as India began to develop nuclear policies and military doctrines that incorporated or addressed its nuclear capacity.

How has India's nuclear doctrine contributed to its quest to emerge as a key global power? India's nuclear doctrine has helped its goal to become a prominent international actor as it has set forth commitment to a No First Use stance, except under the condition of major attack or biological or chemical weapons attack against India, as well as a commitment to restraining from using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. These specific elements of India's nuclear doctrine, when taken in consideration with India's recent economic development and geopolitical climate aid India in its aspiration to emerge as a key international actor. When these contributing elements are viewed through the lens of realism, it is clear that India is seeking to maximize its relative power and compete regionally, while using its recent positive economic surge to advance its military and increase chances of survival in an anarchic global climate. As is apparent from regional competition, India's nuclear doctrine is rooted in both its geopolitical situation juggling Pakistan and China, and its newfound ability to invest in nuclear weapons due to recent economic expansion. The Indian military capability, economic strength, and diplomacy, indicated that the state's nuclear doctrine has a great positive impact on its emergence as a key global power.

## **Methodology**

In today's nuclearized international community, it is important to understand the ways in which states attempt to change or mold their status and gain power. I seek to find the ways in

which India has done this in recent years in order to arise in the international community as a key global actor. I look at three factors, all under the overarching umbrella of realism. Realism views control and power in the international community through diplomacy, military, and economic clout. Through these three agents of power, it is apparent that India's intentions to be recognized in the international community are well underway. Additionally, these are the three means by which I will primarily define realism's view of power, and as such the main perspectives through which I will analyze India's steps toward emergence as a global power. I will use qualitative sources and arguments in order to set these narrations of India and its actions in the global community within realist theory and ideology.

For the purposes of investigating the means by which India's nuclear policies have helped or hindered its quest to emerge as a global power, I first analyze the nature of India's nuclear doctrine. The updated 2003 Indian Nuclear Doctrine sets forth the threshold for nuclear weapons use that India will abide by, signaling its relative power and intent to use force, indicating positive steps toward emergence as a key global actor and nuclear power. India's mysterious Cold Start Doctrine also holds clues regarding India's resolve to follow through on threats of retaliation against attack, its interpretation of how best to respond to its current geopolitical climate, and how India allows itself to be interpreted by the international community. Consequently, I look to geopolitics as well, to find the ways in which India's relations with its neighboring states, Pakistan and China, influence its nuclear doctrines and status in the international community. Additionally, for the purposes of researching the ways in which India's nuclear policies have helped it in its quest to emerge as a key global power, structural realism and particularly John Mearsheimer's work and analysis provide the best definition of realism. Mearsheimer's work and structural realism are quite modern and analyze

realism in international relations in the post-Cold War world, which is the ideal framework for understanding India's development of nuclear weapons, which India undertook with real commitment beginning in 1998.

### **Why Realism?**

International relations can be analyzed through several different theories. Realism, liberalism, neoconservatism, and constructivism are among the most popular theories used for understanding international politics and how states interact and can achieve success in the international community. Liberalism argues that mutual cooperation is the best outcome as it yields the best benefits and results, especially over mutual destruction.<sup>3</sup> This fails to cover India's regional competitive drive that inherently opposes cooperation. This theory also argues that success comes from the establishment of democracy, economic interdependence, and the use of international institutions. This is insufficient in part because India has been a democracy since its 1947 founding and has since participated in international institutions such as the WTO, IMF, United Nations, and over seventy-five other such international organizations.<sup>4</sup> Liberalism would argue that India's early participation in such international institutions would lead it to rise as a successful state earlier, but India really has not until the early 2000s, when its economy and military began to strengthen. Liberalism also fails to encompass the situation in Asia that led to India's surge to emerge as a global power through the development of nuclear weapons, especially since the basic foundations of this theory are rooted in belief that world politics is a

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<sup>3</sup> Daniel W. Drezner, *Theories of International Politics and Zombies*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 51.

<sup>4</sup> "South Asia: India." Central Intelligence Agency, last modified March 29, 2016, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html>.

non-zero-sum game.<sup>5</sup> Neoconservatism is also an insufficient theory to frame analysis on how India's nuclear weapons policies are aiding it in its quest to emerge as a global power. This theory stresses the importance of democratic peace as the path to global security.<sup>6</sup> This emphasis fails to recognize the power struggles between states and importance of military power as a primary factor in the search for high status in the international community. As previously stated, since its independence, India is an established democracy, yet it is competing with established global powers, some of which are democracies, to gain recognition as a key global actor.

Constructivism is another theory of international relations. It too is insufficient as its core assumptions are centered around the social construction of reality and the importance of identity in explaining and interpreting behavior in the international community.<sup>7</sup> These assumptions indicate that economic and military strength are important, but fall behind the importance of how social structures interpret those material factors and influence how states view each other's capabilities. This fails to encompass the real and practical, not socially constructed, weight that sheer nuclear weapons capability holds in the international system. It doesn't recognize that India's nuclear policies and weapons are taken for face-value threats in the international community, as seen in U.S. and Russian reactions to India's original 1974 nuclear weapons test, independent of social constructions or state identity. Constructivism claims that identity is developed through mutual recognition and provides actors a sense of security.<sup>8</sup> However, India pre-1974 did not possess nuclear weapons, and once it acquired nuclear weapons and built up its nuclear arsenal, it self-recognized as a nuclear power in 1998. This did not require mutual

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<sup>5</sup> Daniel W. Drezner, *Theories of International Politics and Zombies*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 51.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, 89.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, 65.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, 66.



recognition with another state, as India's self-perception and new military strength was the cause of its new identity in the international community. India's identity as a nuclear power did not provide a sense of security for any other actors, as mutual recognition did not truly occur, since India put forth its own nuclear image in the international community without validation from other states. Constructivism fails to recognize this. This theory also argues that transnational norms restrict states' actions in world politics; as such, nuclear weapons are essentially meaningless as their use is restricted by transnational norms.<sup>9</sup> These three theories fail to recognize the importance of power and economic and military strength in international relations, which is the core of India's attempts to emerge as a global power through its nuclear policies.

One of the lenses through which international relations can be viewed is realism. The theory of realism can be interpreted according to six paradigms, or varying sets of assumptions. Despite the nuances of the different definitions and assumptions of realism, within these six paradigms there are several common underlying features and characteristics. Crucial to understanding the basis of realism is the emphasis on power and global anarchy, as well as the emphasis on the egoistic passions of states that inevitably lead to conflict.<sup>10</sup> States' desire to be more powerful and influential globally causes military build-up and diplomatic desire to manipulate issues or policies and agreements for self-benefit. This leads to the rise of conflict within an anarchic system. Additionally, realism generally calls for ignoring institutions due to their lack of influence on states under the system of global anarchy.

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<sup>9</sup> Daniel W. Drezner, *Theories of International Politics and Zombies*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 66.

<sup>10</sup> Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000), 10.

A prime component to the theory of realism is the idea that under the assumption of global anarchy, power is the currency of international politics.<sup>11</sup> With power as the primary motive and influential factor behind international politics, states value military capability and economic status highly. Through the lens of realism, which views the world in an anarchic state with states focused on survival by means of competition and maximizing relative power<sup>12</sup>, India's path towards becoming a recognized influential force through economic and military growth is apparent. In the post-Cold War and current post-9/11 War on Terror world, India's 2003 (updated nuclear doctrine) and 2004 (new Indian Army Doctrine) nuclear rededication and recognition of survival through possession of nuclear weapons and high status in the international community shows the value placed on power. In the eyes of realists, the primary actors in international politics are those that can guarantee their own survival; force is the "ne plus ultra of power, the actors that count are those with the greatest ability to use force- states with sizeable armed forces."<sup>13</sup> Military and economic strength signal power as they allow states to exert their influence in the anarchic global community as well as show ability to defend themselves, which also aids in preventing attack, as strong states are less vulnerable to attack.

The strengthening effect of India's recent economic growth on its global status, and how it connects to advancements in nuclear capability and technology aligns with the realist claim survival is achieved through competitive economic and military means. In addition to the obvious benefits that military and economic strength have in increasing global influence, possessing a significant amount of power in this sense also allows states to "make sure that no

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<sup>11</sup> Timothy Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 77-94.

<sup>12</sup> Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, *International Relations, 10<sup>th</sup> ed.*, (New York: Pearson, 2013).

<sup>13</sup> Daniel W. Drezner, *Theories of International Politics and Zombies*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 37.

other state sharply shifts the balance of power in its favour.”<sup>14</sup> This logic shows the importance for states to pursue establishing status as a global power and have the ability to exert its influence in the international community, as maintaining hegemony to a certain degree prevents other states from taking its power and reducing its global influence. India’s current Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s actions show his dedication to develop India into a global leader. Modi’s first year in office saw a 7.4% growth in GDP<sup>15</sup>, pushing India to be recognized as a growing global economic competitor. Modi relaxed restrictions to allow for 100% foreign direct investments<sup>16</sup> and pushed an initiative to make India a “global manufacturing hub.”<sup>17</sup> Modi’s actions and swift results while in office force the international community to take notice as India develops and emerges as an economic competitor, and regionally helps India gain influence. Modi’s initiatives coupled with his visits with U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese leader Xi Jinping raises his status as both a global and regional leader<sup>18</sup> and sets India on a path toward establishing itself as a global power and potentially maintaining hegemony regionally. As such, Modi’s actions demand recognition from the international community.

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<sup>14</sup> Timothy Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 77-94.

<sup>15</sup> "The World's Most Powerful People- #9 Narendra Modi," *Forbes.com*, November 4, 2015, <http://www.forbes.com/profile/narendra-modi/>.

<sup>16</sup> Tim Worstall, "Modi Relaxes India's FDI Constraints On Online Retail But Doesn't Go Far Enough," *Forbes.com*, March 30, 2016, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2016/03/30/modi-relaxes-indias-fdi-constraints-on-online-retail-but-doesnt-go-far-enough/#5a77a93b1492>.

<sup>17</sup> Gordon G. Chang, "India Wants To Make Everything You Buy," *Forbes.com*, March 27, 2016, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/gordonchang/2016/03/27/india-wants-to-make-everything-you-buy/#7f67dbcc87a5>.

<sup>18</sup> "The World's Most Powerful People- #9 Narendra Modi," *Forbes.com*, last modified November 4, 2015, <http://www.forbes.com/profile/narendra-modi/>.

Realism also focuses on the international distribution of power.<sup>19</sup> The distribution of power in the international community is key because it shows where the current hegemony is established, as well as what states are likely to challenge the hegemony. The power distribution dynamics also lead to the interpretation of resources as the object of intense distributional conflict.<sup>20</sup> Resources, as a function of state power and capabilities militarily and economically, are crucial for states to compete for as they are the factors that aid a state in its pursuit of survival and increase of power in the international community. For example, nuclear weapons can be viewed as one such resource. Nuclear weapons capabilities signal power and are a tangible measure of military power. As a result, nuclear weapons as a resource can be viewed as a means by which states can measure power distribution and drive competition to challenge the established hegemony. India's actions in creating and expanding its nuclear weapons capabilities in attempts to establish status as a global power is a prime example of this. India's initial 1974 and 1998 nuclear weapons tests put it on the map as an emerging nuclear power and drove regional competition with Pakistan, as the two states in the midst of continued conflict over Kashmir viewed each others nuclear capability as a measure of military strength and ability. India's post-1998 nuclear weapons build-up also served to change the international community's power distribution, which shifted to include the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Asia. This elicited increased regional competition in Asia, and allowed India to gain global recognition as a nuclear power.

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<sup>19</sup> Daniel W. Drezner, *Theories of International Politics and Zombies*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 39.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid*, 40.

Structural realism, or neorealism, argues that it is the anarchic structure of the international community that drives state desire for power.<sup>21</sup> Because the global community has no single high authority that reigns over the great global actors (like the U.S.), states feel the need to have a strong enough military and economic system to support its military and global endeavors in order to defend themselves in the event of attack. Structural realism is built upon five assumptions regarding the international community:

1. The international system is anarchic.
2. States inherently possess some offensive military capability, which gives them the wherewithal to hurt and possibly destroy each other.
3. No state can ever be certain about the intentions of other states; they cannot be certain that another state will not use its offensive military capability.
4. The most basic motive driving states is survival.
5. States are instrumentally rational; states think strategically about how to survive in the international system.<sup>22</sup>

These five assumptions are the basis upon which structural realism views international relations and the motives and ways in which states pursue global power as a means of survival in the international community. India's heightened nuclear weapons activity post-Cold War indicates recognition of what is necessary to survive in the evolving international community. Individually these statements outlining the realist perspective do not explain why states respond to situations and interact with each other the way they do. Rather, individually these assumptions hint only at survival as the outcome and motive behind actions. However in practice, survival is the bare minimum that results from the anarchic environment that defines the international community.

Aggression and competitive behavior, which is frequently the modus operandi of states in attempting to secure survival, is not the natural outcome of these assumptions taken individually.

For example, India desired survival pre-the 1974 nuclear test and subsequent nuclear weapons

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<sup>21</sup>Timothy Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 77-94.

<sup>22</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1994): 5-49.

acquisition, but became competitive and serious about nuclear weapons post-Cold War, after the 1998 nuclear weapons test, when it first officially declared itself a nuclear power. India's competitive nuclear weapons actions emerged when it realized the ways in which the Cold War altered survival methods in the international community. This was the result of uncertainty and suspicion in the anarchic international system combined with state rationality and desire for survival. As such, it is important to understand that these assumptions function together as a way to explain the competitive nature and aggression that tends to take over in international relations and within the global community.

It is the combination of these five factors that leads to competition and aggression, and results in three primary behavior patterns. When taken together and understood as the foundation upon which actors in the international community base their decisions and actions, the assumptions of realism clearly create incentives for states to act aggressively.<sup>23</sup> The three patterns of behavior resulting from the five assumptions of structural realism also provide a solid basis for analysis on how India's nuclear policies have helped it on its quest to emerge as a great global power. The three patterns explain India's actions as a function of predicted reactions in the international system of anarchy. These patterns also provide crucial insight regarding the timing of India's increase in nuclear capabilities, which is important in analyzing the ways in which India's actions help it to emerge as a global power.

The first resulting behavior pattern is fear; states in the international system fear each other, regard each other with suspicion, and worry about the possibility of war.<sup>24</sup> As a result of desire and need to survive, states inherently understand that there must be a level of suspicion

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<sup>23</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1994): 5–49.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

amongst each other, especially under the assumption that all states have some degree of military capability. This can aid understanding India's geopolitical actions and situation, as geopolitics and tensions with and suspicion of its neighboring states is at the root of how India chooses to build its nuclear arsenal, as competition with its neighbors and guesswork as to neighboring states' military capabilities play a major role.

Consequently, the continual anticipation of danger and lack of trust fuel states' actions and thought processes. Aggression and competitive behavior often emerge as the mode through which states offensively express their fear and drive to survive; aggression accomplishes flexing military power as a way to defend itself, and competitive behavior shows willingness to keep up with the possibility of foreign military capability. Political competition in the international community can lead to war under the circumstance of succumbing to aggression, further fueling mutual state suspicion and fear.

The second pattern of behavior explained by the combination of the five realist assumptions is that each state aims to guarantee its own survival.<sup>25</sup> Each state views other states as potential threats, and combined with the over-arching umbrella of a system of anarchy, states cannot rely on each other for security. A state's security can only be guaranteed by the state itself, and therefore aggression and competitive drive become ways through which a state seeks to secure survival. For example, India's path to securing survival rotates around Prime Minister Modi's focus on economic growth and India's nuclear weapons arsenal and policies. This competitive edge helps India secure its own survival as it is self-supplied and reliant upon no other states. Although states may form alliances, these alliances are temporary and dynamic, as states operate under the premise of self-help and will adjust alliances according to what is in their

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<sup>25</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1994): 5–49.

best interest as global politics cause shifts in state needs.<sup>26</sup> In 2011, the U.S. entered an official trilateral strategic grouping with India and Japan.<sup>27</sup> This ties the states together in a manner currently convenient for all three, especially in battling China's strength and international influence, whereas before this, India stayed away from becoming very diplomatically involved with the United States, as it was not strategic at that point. However, it is now strategic for India as it strengthens and becomes a threat to China. Competition and aggression play a role in this as well, as these two elements serve as influential factors in what drives alliances and what a state deems beneficial to its survival.

This dynamic shift in alliances and balancing coalitions is best understood in combination with the need to maximize relative power; "When relative gains concerns are paramount, cooperation is always ephemeral."<sup>28</sup> As such, the third pattern of behavior is that states in the international system aim to maximize their relative power positions over other states.<sup>29</sup> This is very straightforward, as by increasing power relative to other competitors, a state gains advantage both regionally and globally. This advantage translates directly into increased security and higher chance of survival. Being the most powerful state in the international community guarantees survival under anarchy. In addition, the desire to maximize relative power creates incentives to take advantage of other states including engaging in war under the right circumstances and likelihood of victory, as "the aim is to acquire more military power at the

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<sup>26</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1994): 5–49.

<sup>27</sup> Daniel Twining, "Asia's New Triple Alliance," *Foreign Policy*, February 24, 2015, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/24/asias-emerging-triple-alliance-india-china-japan-modi-obama/>.

<sup>28</sup> Daniel W. Drezner, *Theories of International Politics and Zombies*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 38.

<sup>29</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1994): 5–49.



expense of potential rivals.”<sup>30</sup> This drives competition for security as states seek to gain relative advantages while trying to avoid being taken advantage of. In India’s case, its nuclear weapons acquisition allows it to attain a relative advantage while also ensuring that neighboring states China and Pakistan do not have the ability to overpower or take advantage of India, as it has competitive military power. Under this result of competition and the assumptions of structural realism, Mearsheimer argues that peace as a concept of tranquility or mutual harmony is an unlikely outcome.<sup>31</sup> The nature of states in the anarchic international system to engage in strategic opportunism to advance their interests<sup>32</sup> is apparent in India’s strategic timing in developing its nuclear weapons program and capabilities. This principle of strategic opportunism will be utilized in analysis of why India chose to develop significant nuclear weapons capabilities when it did; just after the Cold War in 1998, and a more recent and intense surge of development and policy creation in 2004 after War on Terrorism and terrorist attacks in the U.S.

In conclusion, competition is overall the natural derivative of the assumptions of the anarchic condition of the international community under realism. The need for survival is the strongest force and inevitably leads to state competition for power in efforts to be able to defend itself under attack, as well as safeguard against threat of attack, as stronger states are less likely to be attacked than weak states.<sup>33</sup> As such, India’s build-up of nuclear weapons is about geopolitical strategy<sup>34</sup> and creating insurance against attack. Kenneth Waltz’s book *Theory of International Politics* is the foundational text for structural realism, and argues that anarchy

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<sup>30</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1994): 5–49.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Daniel W. Drezner, *Theories of International Politics and Zombies*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 50.

<sup>33</sup> Timothy Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 77-94.

<sup>34</sup> Fareed Zakaria, *The Post-American World* (W.W. Norton, 2009), 159.

leaves few options for states besides competing for power.<sup>35</sup> One state building up power creates incentive for others to balance against it in order to prevent it from dominating the global community and establishing hegemony; as such, a balance of powers (through competitive drive) is the natural state of the international community.<sup>36</sup> The natural anarchic state of the international system and the resulting actions and reactions of states leading to competition and aggression, as a case study on India reveals, is exactly what realist ideology expects. In analyzing what elements make India an emerging power, focus on the importance of economic strength, military capability, and regional competition is crucial.

## II. CASE STUDY: INDIA'S GEOPOLITICAL CLIMATE

### Introduction

Another contributing factor to what makes a state a global power is geopolitics. Geopolitics is also the use of geography and regional location as an element of power.<sup>37</sup> Geography can help a state gain status in the international community as a key actor if it is used advantageously. By utilizing geographic location to its advantage through alliances, adaptations to military capabilities and strategies, and relations with neighboring states, a state has the potential to increase its relative power and influence in the international community. This is because when used properly, the geography of a state can enhance its military through strategic

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<sup>35</sup> Timothy Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 77-94.

<sup>36</sup> Daniel W. Drezner, *Theories of International Politics and Zombies*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 39.

<sup>37</sup> Joshua S. Goldstein, and Jon C. Pevehouse, *International Relations, 10<sup>th</sup> ed.*, (New York: Pearson, 2013).

base locations and control of resources.<sup>38</sup> This is crucial in times of conflict or negotiations, and can give a state the upper hand in such matters, as geographic advantages, resources, or elements can be used as a bargaining chip or in other influential manners. Geopolitics plays a crucial role in India's quest to emerge as a global power. India's position in Southern Asia puts it in the interesting place between Pakistan and China, two nuclearized states that have issues with India and an alliance of sorts with each other. India's individual relationship with Pakistan and China, as well as its relationship with Pakistan and China together is important to analyze in terms of how it affects regional stability, nuclear weapons build-up and use, as well as regional competition. Through the lens of realism, geopolitics plays an important role in diplomacy as a source of power in an anarchic world. As according to realism each state's primary goal is survival, the geopolitical climate a state is in impacts the ways in which it seeks to achieve survival and eventual power and relative advantage over neighboring states. For India, this means that its relationship with Pakistan and China holds the key to its survival and maximizing its relative regional power. Well managed and manipulated geopolitics, and especially relations with neighboring states in combination with economic and military strength is a key component of what defines a global power in the post-Cold War international community.

### **Relationship with Pakistan**

Historically tumultuous, Pakistan and India's relationship persists today as extremely unstable and unfriendly. As India continues to improve its nuclear weapons arsenal and technology, Pakistan responds by building up its arms as well. The aforementioned territorial disputes and nuclear weapons testing toward the end of the twentieth century by both Pakistan and India really brought both states into the geopolitical climate they experience today. Because

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<sup>38</sup> Joshua S. Goldstein, and Jon C. Pevehouse, *International Relations, 10<sup>th</sup> ed.*, (New York: Pearson, 2013).

both states felt a sense of urgency to compete and engage in a miniature arms race, India and Pakistan created regional pressure and competition to survive in the new nuclearized Asian continent. As a result of constant threats of invasion and attack toward each other, India and Pakistan created a hostile environment in which diplomatic relations became awkward and strained. Diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan are inconsistent in frequency and quality, and resulted in few changes regarding Pakistani terrorist attacks against India.<sup>39</sup>

Numerous Pakistani-sponsored terrorist attacks on Indian soil have created animosity and led to the development of Indian military strategies, such as the supposed Cold Start Doctrine, that are aimed at retaliation in the event of larger attack.

Through realism this regional competition to survive can be viewed as two states struggling for relative advantage over the other in terms of military capability in light of a historical tendency to engage in conflict with one another. Both India and Pakistan want to flex their muscles regarding military and nuclear capability in order to exhibit their ability to defend themselves and win in conflict with one another. A component of this in diplomacy between the two states is Pakistani attempts to provoke India into taking the first shot, an attempt that since the late 1990s, Pakistan continues to pursue through state-sponsored terrorism on Indian soil.<sup>40</sup> In response, India employed diplomacy to respond to Pakistan's actions by trying to get the United States to designate Pakistan a rogue state; the effects of such diplomacy did indeed help India avoid a Pakistani attack as the U.S. placed restraints on Pakistan.<sup>41</sup> Therefore to a certain degree, India achieved a slight advantage over Pakistan as a result of diplomacy in the sense that it used

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<sup>39</sup> Ashok Sajjanhar, "India: Dealing with Pakistan," *The Diplomat*, January 13, 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/india-dealing-with-pakistan/>.

<sup>40</sup>U.N. Gupta, *International Nuclear Diplomacy and India* (New Delhi: Atlantic, 2007), 209.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

diplomacy to deter a Pakistani attack. As suggested by realism, diplomacy is a function of power and aids India in gaining relative power over Pakistan in a military and diplomatic sense.

### **Relationship with China**

India also has a historically tumultuous relationship with China as it engaged in numerous border wars over the years. Additionally, the diplomatic relationship between India and China historically is defined by China holding India in low regards and worth little time or concern beyond border disputes. However in today's international community and regional Asian geopolitical climate, China is a key global actor, a signed party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and an economic force to be reckoned with. With these strong indicators of global power and prestige, China regards itself as even higher above India globally and regionally. This leads to issues as India struggles and demands China give it respect as a new strong emerging economic and military power. In July 2015, India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited China and essentially told Chinese President Xi Jinping that China must reconsider its stance on issues and recognize the great potential that a mutual partnership between India and China could bring about.<sup>42</sup> However, despite Prime Minister Modi's attempts to get China to recognize India as a growing power with great potential regionally and globally, President Xi did not consider the suggestion with much gravity<sup>43</sup>, suggesting that China does not consider India worth its time diplomatically or strategically. Additionally, in terms of Chinese political matters, China's white paper on defense, where threats to China and military responses are delineated, did not even

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<sup>42</sup> Ninad D. Sheth, "Sorry, Modi– China Still Doesn't Take India Seriously," *The Diplomat*, July 17, 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/sorry-modi-china-still-doesnt-take-india-seriously/>.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

include India.<sup>44</sup> This further shows that China does not consider India to be considered a real threat or even worth mentioning.

Additionally, China continues to build up its military and nuclear weapons capability greatly, and displays its capabilities in the Asian region, namely through sending its nuclear capable submarines to Sri Lanka and seeking bases in the Indian Ocean.<sup>45</sup> In terms of realism, China is a state that is acting secure in its ability to survive regionally and internationally due to its perceived dominance and regional superiority in military, economic, and diplomatic spheres. India is reacting and trying to get China's attention through diplomacy and a suggested mutual partnership in order to elevate its status in China's eyes as well as in the international community through association with China. While China seems to have the upper hand diplomatically, India still gains regional power as China's increased military and maritime actions near India signal at least some interest in deterring conflict with India, validating to a degree India's potential as both a competitor and emerging global power. This also plays off of the assumption within realism that all states possess military capacity to some degree but do not exactly know what their neighboring states' intentions are. Because the nature of each state's military capabilities are ultimately highly classified, China's actions seem to be preemptive deterrence toward India and acknowledgement to a degree that India does have the capacity to emerge as a global power due to its strengthened economy and improvements in nuclear capability and policies.

### **The Intersection of Regional Politics: China, Pakistan, and India**

The intersection of regional politics and diplomatic relations between India, China, and Pakistan is relevant on two levels: the relationship between China and Pakistan as one entity that

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<sup>44</sup> Ninad D. Sheth, "Sorry, Modi— China Still Doesn't Take India Seriously," *The Diplomat*, July 17, 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/sorry-modi-china-still-doesnt-take-india-seriously/>.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

is somewhat founded upon problems with India, and the relationship between all three states as separate entities engaged in regional competition to survive and hold power. Realism is a useful tool for interpreting this and understanding it as a function of India's emergence as a key global power due to its nuclear doctrine and growing economy.

China and Pakistan have an interesting diplomatic relationship based upon the mutual presence of disputes with India. The Chinese and Pakistani militaries are recently working together through high level exchanges, military exercises, drills, and even the sharing of nuclear bomb designs.<sup>46</sup> This partnership has many benefits geopolitically for both China and Pakistan. For example, by cooperating together, Pakistan and China have the potential to "sharpen joint operation capabilities and make a two-pronged offensive against India possible."<sup>47</sup> This puts China and Pakistan in the regional driver's seat as the two states would be able to join forces and take down emerging India from both sides. In terms of regional survival, China and Pakistan could not have planned a better way to ensure preventing India's emergence as a regional or global power than to join forces and share military plans. This lends credibility to India's nuclear doctrine and economic growth contributing to its goal to emerge as a key global power.

Taken separately, India, China and Pakistan are all engaged in regional competition to survive and emerge as the regional power. Combined with nuclear force and capabilities in all three states, this competitive geopolitical situation puts India in the strange space of needing to build up its nuclear arsenal to garner respect and elevate status as a nuclear power, but also needing to deter Pakistan by flexing its capabilities without triggering a Chinese response and attack. While China seemingly does not acknowledge India as a threat, India still must tread

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<sup>46</sup> Ninad D. Sheth, "Sorry, Modi– China Still Doesn't Take India Seriously," *The Diplomat*, July 17, 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/sorry-modi-china-still-doesnt-take-india-seriously/>.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

carefully so as not to prompt a nuclear conflict with China. As dictated by realism, this is spurred by regional competition to survive through possession of the greatest regional economic and military power.

This regional competition led to a Cold War-like arms race in the region, and shows India's resolve to maximize power relative to its competing states. For India, this means that diplomacy is where it has the potential to jump ahead and gain a slight advantage over China and Pakistan. With the right diplomatic relations and alliances, India could create powerful connections to aid it both in its regional struggles with China and Pakistan separately and as one allied unit, as well as its desire to emerge as a key global state in international affairs. For a state in India's position in which geopolitics play such a large role, it is crucial to find ways through other alliances or partnerships to alleviate the struggle of having both neighboring states either passively or actively working against it, as with Pakistan and China's relationships and actions toward India. In terms of realism, the ability of India to find a geopolitical ally of sorts, such as Japan or Australia (as both are reasonably within India's geopolitical realm) could be the defining move to set it apart and aid it even further in its quest to emerge as a key global power.

## **Conclusion**

All in all, the geopolitical situation that India, China, and Pakistan have created and found themselves in has led to a unique regional arms race under the competitive umbrella of survival. While it certainly involves all three states to a certain degree, India's economy sets it apart from Pakistan and brings it closer to China's level of prestige and position in the international community. Geopolitically, diplomatic relations with China help Pakistan pose a credible enough threat to India. However due to India's nuclear doctrine and capability combined with its growing economy, India still continues on its path to emerging as a global power.



Through the lens of realism, the matter of geopolitics in India's case serves to push India further toward maximizing its power relative to China and Pakistan. This is especially true given the manner in which the U.S. and Russia changed the international system in the twentieth century. The United States and Russia significantly changed the international community and basic state geopolitical interactions as a result of the Cold War. The Cold War brought the reality of nuclear weapons use in conflict to the attention of the international community, and changed the way states viewed themselves and each other in terms of capability to defend themselves in conflict. India's 1998 post-Cold War resolve to test nuclear weapons again for the first time since 1974 shows that it felt nuclear weapons, as a result of what the world saw from the Cold War arms race and brinkmanship, were the key to survival in the newly shaken up international community. This happened again after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and subsequent launching of the Global War on Terror. India rededicated to acquiring and maintaining a nuclear arsenal and adjusting its policies accordingly, seen in its 2003 updated nuclear doctrine and 2004 Indian Army Doctrine and Cold Start Doctrine. The United States influences the international community and geopolitical relations greatly, and India continues to try to tap into this through its nuclear policies and ability in order to gain status in the international community.

### **III. WHAT MAKES A GLOBAL POWER: INDIA AS A CASE STUDY**

#### **Defining a Global Power**

As India develops economically and militarily, it also develops power. In international relations, the concept of power is fundamental in understanding how states interact and seek status in the international community. Power is a major factor and advantage that states seek in

international relations. With power, a state can ensure its survival in the anarchic international community, as explained through the theory of realism. The definition of power according to some scholars is a state's ability to influence other actors to do what they would not have otherwise.<sup>48</sup> Under this definition, power is a function of influence. Influence allows states to exert their will and manipulate relations and issues to their benefit. Influence itself is not power, rather it is the ability to exert influence that signals power; in other words a state must have the ability, backed financially and militarily, to exert influence. Such capability is power.

Capability, as it is tied so closely to the definition of power, must also be defined in order to comprehend what elements make a state a global power. Capability is also separate from influence and power, and can be defined as "potential...based on specific (tangible and intangible) characteristics or possessions of states- such as their sizes, levels of income, and armed forces. This is power as capability."<sup>49</sup> Capability then is the combination of state traits or possessions that allow it to have the potential to exert influence in the international community. In terms of defining a global power, a state must have the right combination of traits and possessions in order to achieve the level of influence and power necessary to be viewed as influential enough to be considered a key global power.

### **India's Economic Expansion**

Prime Minister Modi's efforts to strengthen India's economy and make India globally competitive economically results in a positive force on India's journey to emerge as a global power. . One crucial element in measuring state capability and its relation to influence and power is economic strength. Some scholars argue that the best indicator of a state's power is its

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<sup>48</sup> Joshua S. Goldstein, and Jon C. Pevehouse, *International Relations, 10<sup>th</sup> ed.*, (New York: Pearson, 2013).

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

GDP.<sup>50</sup> GDP shows economic strength, and therefore can reveal how a state can utilize its wealth to increase its status in the international community by building up military capabilities, technology, and utilizing wealth to gain influence. In his first year in office, Modi's focus on improving India's economy resulted in a GDP growth of nearly 7.4%.<sup>51</sup> Economic power, as interpreted through GDP, allows a state to allot more money to its military budget and technologies. Economic wealth also allows states to bounce back from the post-conflict economic strain of war. This is a trait of global powers as it is crucial to be able to engage in global issues and sometimes conflict and be able to support those endeavors without severely straining the nation's budget or exceed economic capability. Economic expansion is a key component to gaining status as a global power, as it indicates the wealth and power a state has to exert its influence globally

Economic expansion reaches military capability and technology, as increased economic growth allows a state to build up arms and ability to defend itself and wage war. The intersection of economics and the state of the military is where India proves itself to be an emerging power, as India's ability to fund its military is greater and can support advanced technology, research, and arms acquisition. As realism suggests, power in the international community comes from a combination of economic strength as well as military strength. India's economic growth has allowed for it to increase its military spending year to year. High allocation of finances to the military budget is characteristic of key global actors, and India has been continually moving up in military budget rankings in the last decade. The combination of economic growth, regional

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<sup>50</sup> Joshua S. Goldstein, and Jon C. Pevehouse, *International Relations, 10<sup>th</sup> ed.*, (New York: Pearson, 2013).

<sup>51</sup> "The World's Most Powerful People- #9 Narendra Modi," *Forbes.com*, last modified November 4, 2015, <http://www.forbes.com/profile/narendra-modi/>.

competition with China, and Indian nuclear capability helps India establish its status and demands other states recognize its potential as a key global actor.

### **Economic Growth**

India's recent economic growth led states in the international community to take notice, and continues to garner increased respect for the state as an emerging power. India continues to surface as an economic force in recent years as its economy continues to grow and outperform itself quarter to quarter. While most economies globally are struggling, India has managed to increase its GDP over the last few years. India's Real GDP Growth went from 6.9% in 2013 to 7.3% in both 2014 and 2015.<sup>52</sup> India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi vowed to make business easier to carry out in India. By relaxing a restriction on online commerce and marketplaces and allowing 100% foreign direct investment<sup>53</sup>, Modi's efforts raised the state's GDP, aided by an accompanying increase in manufacturing output as well as an increase in financing and insurance services. In 2013 India's GDP was tenth in the world, at 1.875 billion USD, and jumped to ninth in the world in 2014 at 2.051 billion USD.<sup>54</sup> In 2015, India jumped to seventh in the world at 2.183 billion USD.<sup>55</sup> Additionally, India's GDP based on purchasing power parity has been third in the world since 2011, and between 2011 and 2015 it has grown from 5.845 billion USD to 8.027 billion USD.<sup>56</sup> India continues to improve its global economic rankings and this growth functions as proof and another indicator of success and emergence as a

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<sup>52</sup> "World GDP Ranking 2015 Data and Charts," *Knoema.com*, March 16, 2016, <http://knoema.com/nwnfkne/world-gdp-ranking-2015-data-and-charts>.

<sup>53</sup> Tim Worstall, "Modi Relaxes India's FDI Constraints On Online Retail But Doesn't Go Far Enough," *Forbes.com*, March 30, 2016, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2016/03/30/modi-relaxes-indias-fdi-constraints-on-online-retail-but-doesnt-go-far-enough/#5a77a93b1492>.

<sup>54</sup> "World GDP Ranking 2015 Data and Charts," *Knoema.com*, March 16, 2016, <http://knoema.com/nwnfkne/world-gdp-ranking-2015-data-and-charts>.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

global power. A stronger economy gains India access into the realm of economic influence that is characteristic of major actors in international affairs and makes it regionally and globally competitive.

### **Regional Competition**

GDP is also crucial in understanding relative power and regional competition between states, as a strong economy can allow a state to build a stronger army, gain popular support, and aid in the establishment of allies.<sup>57</sup> Relative power allows comparison between two or several states' capabilities, and can help predict the outcome should war or conflict break out. This is important in understanding power on the global stage as well, since regional relative power can be a path to gaining more status in the international community as a whole. India's economy expanded faster than China's in the last several quarters, which contributes to India's emergence as a global power and regional force, since it is expanding at a faster rate than other Asian states. In comparison, China's Real GDP Growth went from 7.7% in 2013 to 7.3% in 2014, and then down again in 2015 to 6.8%.<sup>58</sup> While China's GDP is still higher than India's the growth rate is crucial to analyze, as it shows that India may surpass China economically in the coming years.

Relative power on a regional scale can help a state begin to grow its status and gain regional recognition for its capabilities that spreads to the international community. Economic strength is able to provide a state with the many resources it needs to have status as a legitimate global power, and must be taken into consideration in understanding what elements come together to allow a state to emerge as key actor in the international community.

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<sup>57</sup> Joshua S. Goldstein, and Jon C. Pevehouse, *International Relations, 10<sup>th</sup> ed.*, (New York: Pearson, 2013).

<sup>58</sup> "World GDP Ranking 2015 Data and Charts," *Knoema.com*, March 16, 2016, <http://knoema.com/nwnfkne/world-gdp-ranking-2015-data-and-charts>.

When China's economy began to expand and surpass other states, the world took notice and increased attention was given to China's potential as a global force and influential state. This was followed shortly by increased attention to China's military capability. Now, India is beginning to experience a similar phenomenon as its military capability has increased and progressed greatly and its economy is expanding at greater rates with each quarter. As the world's fastest growing large economy<sup>59</sup>, India puts itself in a secure position for future emergence as a key international actor.

### **The Intersection of Economic Growth and Nuclear Capability**

In addition, under the theory of realism with survival as the primary motivating factor for states, military capability is also a contributing element to what makes a state a global power. The recent economic growth India is experiencing allows it to allocate far more monetary resources to its military budget. The most powerful states in the international community, like the United States, have massive military budgets that take up sizable portions of GDP. By being able to dedicate a larger amount of GDP to military expenses, a state is able to signal its capabilities and subsequently its influence militarily. In 2001, India's defense budget was 11.8 billion USD, which more than doubled to 23.79 billion USD for the 2008-2009 fiscal year.<sup>60</sup> It rose again every fiscal year following that: 2009-2010 India's defense budget was 31.93 billion USD, 2010-2011 it rose to 33.20 billion USD, and 2011-2012 it jumped again to 37.05 billion USD.<sup>61</sup> India again announced intent to raise defense spending by 12% for 2014-2015, bringing

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<sup>59</sup> Tim Worstall, "India's Economic Growth Produces Real Wage Rises of 5% A Year," *Forbes*, February 23, 2016, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2016/02/23/indias-economic-growth-produces-real-wage-rises-of-5-a-year/#5aad566719e4>.

<sup>60</sup> "India Military Budget," *Global Security.org*, 2016, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/budget.htm>.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*

it to 38.35 billion USD.<sup>62</sup> This continual rise in India's defense budget allows it to continue to improve its military capabilities, and specifically its nuclear capabilities. A strong military with strong financial backing and well-managed and sophisticated nuclear weapons technology creates a combination crucial for recognition as a global power in today's post-Cold War and post-9/11 international community. Since these international crises, nuclear capability has become the method by which states compare their military strength and relative power. A state's nuclear arsenal, but specifically a properly financed, managed, stored, and maintained arsenal, signals its ability to engage in the riskiest and most costly form of conflict. This in turn signals state strength and power, as it takes great time and financial commitment to achieve this level of nuclear capability.

A well managed, strong military and sophisticated weapons programs and technologies give states a solid advantage. The United States is a prime example of how the combination of these elements can lead to an advantage, as the U.S. had the ultimate advantage in WWII due to innovative technology and military strategy in spite of being caught off guard. This is because with proper handling of weapons and a sophisticated military system, a state can be ready to engage in conflict without losing time or advantage to its adversary and risking loss. India's military strengthening through acquisition of nuclear weapons indicates an increase in capability and power in the international community. This again signals India's intent, and just as important its ability, to raise its military and weapons technology sophistication and ability to the level of established world powers, as it dedicates an increasingly large portion of its GDP toward defense spending.

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<sup>62</sup> "India Military Budget," *Global Security.org*, 2016, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/budget.htm>.

By utilizing its financial improvements to boost its military, India is able to continue to follow the steps that existing global powers paved- building a strong economy that is globally competitive, increasing military size and capabilities, improving and building up nuclear weapons capabilities, and drawing up a nuclear doctrine that spells out nuclear capability (to a certain degree that is telling but not too revealing and risking security) and threshold for use that lends credibility to the state in international affairs and relations. Herein lies the a difference between simply possessing nuclear capabilities and being considered a significant global actor with nuclear capacity. To possess nuclear capability and be considered a global power, a state must properly maintain its arsenal so that it is ready for use and poses a real threat, as well as have the financial stability to support a sophisticated and ready-for-use nuclear weapons program. Because of the key role that a strong economy plays in a state's status in the international community as a sign of power and ability to defend itself, this increase in military budget after the development and expansion of its economy is a crucial step for India as it seeks recognition as a legitimate force of influence in the international community.

India is taking large steps in establishing power over its neighboring states through regional competition. Because India's economy is growing at faster rates than China, the early 2000s poster child for booming economic growth, it is gaining relative regional power over its neighboring states, Pakistan and China. Whether or not China recognizes this has little weight, because India is showing the international community that it is rising faster and may eventually outgrow China. India's rapidly growing population, also growing at a faster rate than China's<sup>63</sup>, indicates that this trend will continue. As India has more and more women beginning to participate in the Indian economy, as estimated thirteen million people will enter the Indian

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<sup>63</sup> Chris Matthews, "India Claims It Will Surpass China as the Fastest-growing Large Economy in 2015," *Fortune*, May 18, 2015, <http://fortune.com/2015/05/18/india-china-growth/>.



workforce annually for the next fifteen years.<sup>64</sup> This huge influx into the workforce indicates great continued economic growth for India. The translation of population size to economic growth has direct geopolitical implications, “it would mean a lot more geopolitical power for India...”<sup>65</sup> This allows India to maximize its power regionally, especially when in combination with its increased military budget.

These two factors from the perspective of realism indicate an emerging global power with the capability to survive and have significant pull in the international community. It is important to understand that it is the combination of strength of economy and strength of military that allows India to be regionally and globally competitive, as one element alone does not garner enough power in an anarchic world. Both are necessary to be a great power.

## **Conclusion**

There is no single defining feature that establishes and sets apart a state as a global power. It is the combination of several elements that creates the conditions for a state to be considered a key international actor, as well as the timing of these elements coming together. A state’s GDP as a measure of its economic strength, military capability and strength, nuclear capacity and policies, and geopolitical management are the underlying factors common to global powers post-Cold War. Economic strength and growth is a crucial factor in a state’s status in the international community, as it signals influence, ability to take care of itself and its resources, and capacity to build military capability to be globally competitive. India’s recent increased rates of economic expansion set it apart as the fastest growing large economy in the world, which drastically helps its goal to become a global power. India’s growth also contributes to its current

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<sup>64</sup> Chris Matthews, "India Claims It Will Surpass China as the Fastest-growing Large Economy in 2015," *Fortune*, May 18, 2015, <http://fortune.com/2015/05/18/india-china-growth/>.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*

geopolitical position, especially when viewed through the lens of realism. By utilizing its new economic growth to its advantage by way of improving its military and gaining more influence globally, India is operating under the assumption of realism that in an anarchic world, the states with the most economic power as well as military power are decisive and achieve survival and high global status.

India's newfound economic growth allows it to maximize its power in a new way- through nuclear and military means. This indicates that India is taking the steps that a rational actor would in order to ensure global survival and raise status. Competition is a natural path to survival, and India proves that while the underlying goal is simply defensive survival, this leads to a competitive nature in order to have an advantage over other states. The three patterns of behavior resulting from competitive aggression by states<sup>66</sup> in attempts to survive and thrive in an anarchic world help explain the way that India is using its new economic pull. These patterns are as follows: that states fear each other and are suspicious, that each state aims to guarantee its own survival, and that states aim to maximize their relative power positions over other states. India's actions in raising its GDP served to help it gain power over other states and gain much greater regional status over Pakistan and pose a threat to China, as well as build up its military and nuclear capability. This is exactly how realism would expect a rational state to act in order to ensure its survival and attempt to maximize its relative power both economically and militarily, especially regionally. Therefore, India's economic growth, especially when taken in consideration with its increased nuclear capabilities and nuclear doctrine, was a necessary step in its quest to emerge as a global power.

#### **IV. CASE STUDY: INDIA'S NUCLEAR POLICIES**

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<sup>66</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1994): 5-49.

## Introduction

In international relations, military forces are often seen as the most important type of short-term capability, as well as a state's ability to produce weapons.<sup>67</sup> Military capabilities flex a state's muscle and abilities to defend itself in conflict as well as its influence in such matters, as states with stronger militaries are less likely to be attacked than weaker states. Subsequently, a strong military functions as both a defense mechanism against and under attack, as well as a signal within the international community of a state's strength. However, in order to maximize the impact of having a nuclear arsenal, a state must have clear and established doctrines or policies in order to establish credibility and a clear threshold for use. For example, in the U.S.'s case, its status as a nuclear weapons-possessing state is credible and trusted to be responsible as it has a clear nuclear policy that has been abided by for many years. Doctrines and policies set forth self-imposed regulations and standards that, if abided by, give the self-regulating state credibility for following through and establish a more trustworthy reputation in the international community.

Nuclear weapons brought in a new era of war strategies and global conflict management. At the forefront of these issues today is India's recent buildup of nuclear capabilities. As India continues to improve its military, more and more global powers pay attention to what this could mean for future conflict and India's status as a global actor. Its increase in nuclear capability, specifically since its initial 1974 underground nuclear weapons test, causes India to be viewed in a different manner specifically by the U.S., Pakistan, and China. These actors engage in dialogue with India regarding its nuclear capabilities in various manners, which are telling of where India stands as a global power. Additionally, pure nuclear capability alone does not give a state power

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<sup>67</sup> Joshua S. Goldstein, and Jon C. Pevehouse, *International Relations, 10<sup>th</sup> ed.*, (New York: Pearson, 2013).

and influence in the international community- rather it is the combination of strategic storage, handling, and approach to nuclear weapons that allows a state to gain status. This falls in line with state desire to maximize its relative power in comparison to other states in order to ensure its survival and achieve global influence.

India's nuclear policies reveal much regarding its global status and how it will interact with other nations in times of conflict. By analyzing India's nuclear policies, one can gain insight as to whether or not these policies are helping or hindering its desire to emerge as a significant global power. As a matter of international security and affairs, a newly nuclearized state evolving into a key global actor is crucial to understanding regional politics in Asia, as well as the global balance of powers between East and West. In order to gain a holistic understanding of India's status and whether or not it is developing into the strong nuclearized presence it seeks to become, it is imperative to analyze the nature of the Indian military's 2004 Cold Start Doctrine, updated 2003 nuclear policies, the nature of its arsenal, and relationships with the U.S., Pakistan, and China. These elements are telling as to whether or not India's steps toward military improvement and advancement in nuclear capabilities have helped it toward its goal to become an important global power.

### **India's Nuclear Program and Policies: Historical and Current**

#### History and Background

India tested nuclear weapons in 1974, and shortly after was sanctioned by the United States. India did not follow up the 1974 tests with more testing due to such sanctions and concern over similar repercussions, and did not immediately weaponize the device that was tested.<sup>68</sup> In 1998, after the recent end of the Cold War and in the midst of the escalation of conflicts with

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<sup>68</sup> "India," *Nuclear Threat Initiative.org*, March 2016, <http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/india/>.

Pakistan, India conducted tests again, and this time formally declared itself as a nuclearized state as well as established a National Security Advisory Board. The Cold War left the international community contemplating the role of nuclear weapons in international relations, and India responded by choosing to resume testing and acquisitions of nuclear weapons, especially given the violent manner of conflict with Pakistan.

In 1999, the new Indian National Security Advisory Board created the new Indian Nuclear Doctrine. This doctrine loosely defined India's nuclear no-first-use policy; which explains that in conflict India pledges not to be the first to employ nuclear weapons.<sup>69</sup> By claiming a no-first-use stance, India put forth the image that it would not look to utilizing nuclear weapons as a first line of defense. This shows that India does not take its position as a nuclear state lightly and regards the decision to employ nuclear weapons with great care, signaling legitimacy as a nuclear state and ability to distinguish when nuclear weapons would be necessary in conflict. This is a characteristic of a powerful global actor, because, like the U.S., India has a clear understanding of its nuclear capabilities and stable thresholds for use.

This is different from non-emerging global powers: states like Pakistan, which possesses nuclear weapons but continually lower its threshold for use, and North Korea, which continues to pursue nuclear weapons accumulation in violation of its pledges to denuclearize.<sup>70</sup> Pakistan's continual lowering of its nuclear threshold indicates instability of conditions for use and lack of credibility due to the frequently changing nuclear policy. India's sensible approach to nuclear weapons possession and implementation signals a level of commitment to maintaining a high standard for responsible nuclear capability similar to that of already established global powers.

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<sup>69</sup> India," *Nuclear Threat Initiative.org*, March 2016, <http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/india/>.

<sup>70</sup> "Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: India," *Arms Control Association*, October 2015, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/indiaprofile>.

Due to this signal of responsibility, India opened doors of opportunity within the international community. For example, as a result of India's nuclear weapons acquisition and policies, the United States entered into a nuclear agreement in July 2005 that provided India with access to American technology as well as held India to a high standard of responsibility in regards to its nuclear arsenal.<sup>71</sup>

The beginning of India's nuclear build-up shows gradual integration of nuclear weapons into the military and its strategies. This gradual integration began with the initial 1974 and 1998 tests and led to the current arsenal that India possesses today. In combination with India's current nuclear policies, specifically the 2003 Indian Nuclear Doctrine, it is apparent that India intends to establish itself as a global power capable and organized enough to utilize nuclear weapons if necessary, but responsible enough to follow the international community's guidelines for nuclear weapons possession. The build-up of its nuclear arsenal signals its competitive drive to gain power internationally and regionally, as well as establish a baseline for conflict and war management strategies. This is a sophisticated endeavor to the extent that India is able to actually carry out its plans for nuclear expansion and rational and clear nuclear doctrines and thresholds for use.

#### Current Nuclear Policies and Seeking International Cooperation

On January 4, 2003 the Indian Cabinet Committee on Security met and updated India's nuclear doctrine. The Committee subsequently released a press release that outlined the tenets of India's current nuclear doctrine. The doctrine has eight parts:

- i. Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent
- ii. A posture of "No First Use": nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere

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<sup>71</sup> Dinshaw Mistry, *The US-India Nuclear Agreement: Diplomacy and Domestic Politics* (Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 33.

- iii. Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage
- iv. Nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorized by the civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority
- v. Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states
- vi. However, in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons
- vii. A continuance of strict controls on export of nuclear and missile related materials and technologies, participation in the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty negotiations, and continued observance of the moratorium on nuclear tests
- viii. Continued commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapon free world, through global, verifiable, and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament.<sup>72</sup>

Several of these tenets in particular function as a means by which India separates itself from other nuclear-holding states as an emerging power. India's no-first-use policy helps India in its quest to emerge as a global power because it sets a clear boundary and threshold for use of nuclear weapons. By promising and holding itself accountable to not resort to nuclear weapons use first in conflict, India signals that it willingly accepts the level of nuclear responsibility that established powers are held to. Alignment with the policies and ways of already established global powers opens doors for India to access the same respect and trust given to those actors. This also allows those previously established global powers to have a foundation upon which to trust India, as similar policies create common ground. This is crucial because in attempting to establish itself as a key actor, India needs to gain respect and trust in the international community, namely through already established states ability to trust that India will not recklessly flex its nuclear muscle in order to gain respect, rather by proving itself to be responsible and sensible regarding its nuclear capabilities. As global powers are leaders, this is India's way to recognition in the international community. However, in combination with the

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<sup>72</sup> Government of India. Prime Minister's Office. "Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Progress in Operationalizing India's Nuclear Doctrine," News release, January 4, 2003. *Indian Prime Minister's Office*, <http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreng/1yr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html>.

sixth part of the nuclear doctrine, which reserves India's right to use nuclear weapons in the case of major attack, the amendment of its no-first-use stance shows willingness and determination to employ nuclear weapons under certain conditions, and establishes its status and ability as a nuclear power in the global setting, especially in times of conflict. This specifically signals that India is interested in defending itself but is responsible and sensible enough to understand that it cannot achieve global influence by carelessly threatening use of nuclear force under conflict.

The sixth part of the doctrine also establishes that India reserves the right to utilize nuclear weapons in retaliation in the event of biological or chemical weapons. This section also functions to establish India as an emerging power because this imitates Western policies on nuclear weapon use. The United States also states that under biological attack nuclear weapon retaliation would be an option. The 2003 Indian Nuclear Doctrine also states that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, which is similar to U.S. nuclear strategy shift as of 2010, in which that President Barack Obama established commitment to not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.<sup>73</sup> By filling its own nuclear doctrine with similar values and tenets as the doctrines of already established global powers, India is tapping into the same avenues utilized by established nuclear states to balance nuclear weapon possession responsibility and determination to use in order to defend its territory. This aids India in its search to emerge as a key actor in international affairs as it puts it on par with states that are already in the position it wants to be in, which allows India to posture as a great power until it is globally recognized and accepted as such.

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<sup>73</sup> Peter Baker and David E. Sanger, "Obama Limits When U.S. Would Use Nuclear Arms," *The New York Times*, April 4, 2010, [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/06/world/06arms.html?pagewanted=all&\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/06/world/06arms.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0).



The seventh and eighth part of the doctrine, which establish India's commitment to the moratorium on nuclear tests, strict control of exports of nuclear technologies and materials, and achieving a nuclear free world, sets it apart as an emerging key global actor. This is because it shows that while India continues to build up its arsenal and technology, its overall goal is in line with that of the five signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty who are established global powers. This clearly sets India apart from other states like Pakistan and North Korea who want to test and build their nuclear weapons holdings without any type of commitment or statement about reaching a nuclear weapon free global environment. India's nuclear doctrine functions as the determining factor that enables it to emerge as a global power, where other nuclear weapons-possessing states cannot due to lack of nuclear policies that effectively establish credibility and responsibility. Accepting the level of commitment to nonproliferation and responsible nuclear weapons ownership that global powers maintain, and especially through nuclear policies, India puts itself in a comparable position to already established global powers in the international community.

In 2015, the Indian government, via India's Permanent Representative to the Conference of Disarmament Ambassador DB Venkatesh Varma, pushed for "a meaningful dialogue amongst all states possessing nuclear weapons to build trust and confidence and for reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in international affairs and security doctrines."<sup>74</sup> This desire for open conversation and cooperation globally, especially with major global actors, shows India's commitment to being as responsible and legitimate in nuclear weapons possession as the already established international powers. Varma's statement again separates India as a unique emerging

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<sup>74</sup> "Government Wants Meaningful Dialogue among Nations Possessing Nuclear Weapons," *Economic Times*, April 8, 2015, [http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-04-08/news/60943036\\_1\\_nuclear-weapons-nuclear-disarmament-and-non-proliferation-meaningful-dialogue](http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-04-08/news/60943036_1_nuclear-weapons-nuclear-disarmament-and-non-proliferation-meaningful-dialogue).

state, as it shows that India is interested in taking the steps that signal legitimacy as a global power. States like Pakistan and North Korea, which possess nuclear weapons but do not seek international cooperation and dialogue as India is currently doing, will never become global powers because they are not attempting to establish trust or legitimacy in the international community.

These components of India's 2003 Nuclear Doctrine that aid it in its quest to emerge as a global power signal not only desire to establish power and maximize its relative power compared to other states both regionally and internationally, but also exhibit signs of defensive realism. Defensive realism encompasses the idea that total domination is an unwise strategy for survival, and that stability results from a balance of power systems in the international community.<sup>75</sup> India clearly wants to establish itself as a global power, but it also seems to hold a more equal global balance of powers as the preferred option to a nuclearized international community. Despite this preferred outcome, India's current nuclear doctrine sets forth principles that clearly show full intention to establish itself as a key nuclear power since a de-nuclearized world is unlikely. Therefore, in the spirit of the primary goal of survival, India's first desire is to survive in the anarchic international community, but since total global de-nuclearization is highly unlikely, it resorts to attempts to maximize its relative power through military advancements and capability improvements. As such, competition and survival drives India's nuclear doctrine to be an effective means by which India becomes closer to emerging as a key global actor.

### **Cold Start Doctrine**

What the Cold Start Doctrine Is

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<sup>75</sup> Anne-Marie Slaughter, "International Relations, Principle Theories," *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

The Cold Start Doctrine evolved out of and adapted from previous military developments and doctrines in India. In 2004, part of the Indian Army's new limited war doctrine, officially titled "Indian Army Doctrine," was dubbed colloquially as the Cold Start Doctrine because of its goal to mobilize quickly in a cold start, rather than in India's previous slow fashion.<sup>76</sup> The Indian Army Doctrine does not actually discuss limited war, except for in one section.<sup>77</sup> It is after analysis of the components of the doctrine and the section referred to as the Cold Start, that it is taken as a limited war doctrine. While the doctrine does show that limited war is the goal so as to avoid nuclear war, it is also an offensive military doctrine because of the manner in which force would be deployed and strategized. Because it is classified Indian military and government information, only the first part of the doctrine has been released. As a result, there is only speculation as to what it really contains. However, after analysis and research into what the Indian military revealed, experts gained a basic outline of what this limited war doctrine says. Despite the inability to see the full document, experts managed to delineate several clear intentions of the Cold Start Doctrine.

The doctrine's overall goal is to enable an organized reaction to Pakistani attack in order to limit or take away Pakistan's ability to act and utilize terror without abandon under its shield of nuclear power. By creating a doctrine that gives India a solid plan in the event of attack from Pakistan, India would be prepared and posturing in attempts to deter Pakistan from utilizing its nuclear weapons. Part of the overall purpose of the Cold Start Doctrine is to outline the plan for a limited war. Indian General Sundarji stated that the Indian military must be able to counter

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<sup>76</sup> Shashank Joshi, "India's Military Instrument: A Doctrinal Stillborn," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 36, no. 4 (2013): 512-40.

<sup>77</sup> Ahmed, "Cold Start: The Life Cycle of a Doctrine," *Comparative Strategy* 31, no. 5 (2012): 452-68.

offensives against Pakistan at the proper level to stop hostilities before Pakistan resorts to utilizing its nuclear weapons.<sup>78</sup>

This is key, because as in limited war, the goal is to prevent engaging in a devastating nuclear war, but also to prevent Pakistan from gaining control or causing destruction to India without retaliation. Several sources conclude that the Cold Start has three goals; “inflict significant attrition on enemy forces; retain Pakistani territory for use as a postcolonial bargaining chip; and, by limiting the depth of Indian incursions, avoid triggering a Pakistani nuclear response.”<sup>79</sup> These goals garner analysis because they reveal crucial information about how the Indian military believes the Cold Start doctrine could function and lead to a preferred outcome for India.

The Cold Start’s goal of wearing down enemy forces, here Pakistani forces, is apparent in the doctrine’s call for quick mobilization of troops and deployment of offensives on a wide front. By quickly mobilizing and launching offensives, the Indian military has the opportunity to limit the amount of time Pakistan has to respond and seek international help or backup. The Cold Start Doctrine delineates eight rapidly deployable integrated battle groups, called IBG, that are trained to quickly navigate into enemy territory and are supported by both the air force and the navy.<sup>80</sup> The IBGs would ideally enter Pakistan within seventy-two to ninety-six hours.<sup>81</sup> The goal of the IBGs is to inflict controlled attack on Pakistan, enough that Pakistan would be deterred from further attack, but meticulous and limited enough that Pakistan would not resort to using or threatening to use nuclear weapons. These battle groups would provide the necessary change to

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<sup>78</sup> Ali Ahmed, "Cold Start: The Life Cycle of a Doctrine," *Comparative Strategy* 31, no. 5 (2012): 452-68.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> Shashank Joshi, "India's Military Instrument: A Doctrinal Stillborn," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 36, no. 4 (2013): 512-40.

previous slow mobilization that hindered India in previous conflicts, as well as unify the decision making and execution of branches of military and government, leading to a more efficient and precise reaction to attack.

The goal of the Cold Start to retain Pakistani territory to use for bargaining is crucial to understanding the way the Indian military wants the doctrine to function. The plan calls for penetrating thirty to forty miles into Pakistani territory, and since Pakistan's crucial population centers are along the border, Pakistani interior communication lines could be cut.<sup>82</sup> While the actual mileage of territory that India would cut into is estimated, it is still a significant section of territory that would disrupt Pakistani forces, but likely not result in Pakistani threat of nuclear retaliation. By taking territory as a bargaining tool post-conflict, India intends to limit the amount of actual battlefield conflict and find resolution through bargaining and negotiation. However, given the fact that Pakistan continually lowers its threshold for use of nuclear weapons, the ramifications of this approach could be costly. Pakistan, given its tumultuous history with India and failure to negotiate combined with its unclear nuclear weapons threshold, could choose to react by engaging in nuclear war.

While seizing territory is aggressive and certainly indicative of an offensive strategy, India's end game, understood through its 2003 Nuclear Doctrine and 2004 Cold Start Doctrine, is to avoid entering nuclear war and reach a final end to conflict with Pakistan through bargaining. Seizing strategic territory in which the Indian army could sever lines of communication is also an aggressive enough signal that India intends to act with force to achieve its goals. While some of this may be considered posturing and deterrent, these are valuable traits of the Cold Start because

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<sup>82</sup> Shashank Joshi, "India's Military Instrument: A Doctrinal Stillborn," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 36, no. 4 (2013): 512-40.

they will likely have some effect on how Pakistan views India as an opponent in war and in potential nuclear war, as well as how Pakistan chooses to inflict terror or attack on India.

The third goal of the Cold Start to sidestep nuclear war is important to understand as indicative of the intended function of the doctrine. This is because in attempting to avoid nuclear war, India sends a message of preferred peace and avoidance of mutual destruction, but is serious about sending firm signals to Pakistan that it will not be deterred. The plan to limit the depth of infiltration into Pakistan in order to avoid triggering Pakistani use of nuclear force also indicates India's focus on achieving their goal of reaching a bargain with Pakistan, since the territory they would seize includes areas of higher populations and communication lines for Pakistani troops.

#### First Emergence and Background Leading Up to 2004 Cold Start Doctrine

In 1998, India conducted nuclear weapons testing.<sup>83</sup> Carried out in the midst of an ongoing fifty-year conflict with Pakistan and just decades after the last war between India and Pakistan, India's actions led to Pakistani nuclear testing several months later. This was the first time that both India and Pakistan declared themselves nuclear powers. At this point, India had not yet developed its first nuclear doctrine. Months later in 1999 the Kargil War, also referred to as the Third Kashmir War, broke out<sup>84</sup>. The Kargil War was a turning point because it was the first conflict that India, and Pakistan for that matter, had engaged in as a nuclear power. In the recent post-Cold War international community, this was a significant step in the evolving nature of conflict on the world stage. The Kargil War was the beginning of the modern issues and

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<sup>83</sup> "South Asia: India." Central Intelligence Agency, last modified March 29, 2016, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html>.

<sup>84</sup> Eric Patterson, ed. "Case Study: Kashmir: Religious Diversity Becomes Religious Militancy," *Georgetown University, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, & World Affairs*, August 2013, <http://repository.berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/130801BCKashmirReligiousDiversityBecomesReligiousMilitancy.pdf>

conflicts between India and Pakistan that cause great concern globally, especially in Asia, over the potential for a nuclear war between the two states.

This conflict was India's first experience in the realm of potential nuclear warfare, and as such, it showed the Indian military what it lacked in regards to equipment and strategy, especially in comparison with existing global powers like the US and Russia, which were so recently engaged in a power struggle and nuclear arms race. Because the Kargil War showed India the devastating potential of nuclear war and its effects, the Indian military had reason to take precautions against resorting to nuclear warfare. The development of nuclear weapons and implementation into the air force, navy, and army forced military strategy and objectives to shift from occupation of territory to destruction.<sup>85</sup> India responded by exercising restraint in force, to avoid reaching nuclear war with Pakistan. This shift in strategy required new methods and strategies, especially an increased importance on the air force. This necessitated new strategies and plans to be developed, which is the basis of motivation to develop the Cold Start Doctrine, as well as put India on a path to follow the footsteps of existing powers and use nuclear weapons and policies to gain power in the international community.

India's experience and lessons from fighting in the Kargil War laid the groundwork for what would eventually be the Cold Start Doctrine, as the doctrine is aimed at preparation for a quick response in the event of Pakistani attack, as well as avoiding nuclear war. The Kargil War caught the Indian army unprepared, and valuable time was lost in organizing and mobilizing troops.<sup>86</sup> During this period of conflict, the Indian Army was unprepared to respond to Pakistan's attacks, and lost time in deploying adequate numbers of troops, allowing the Pakistani military to

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<sup>85</sup> Tariq M. Ashraf, "Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces," *Military Review*, (2004): 53-62.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

“adopt a forward-deployed posture and precluded any attempt to achieve a military edge.”<sup>87</sup> This revealed that losing even the smallest amount of time in responding to threat, India faces the reality of losing any advantage they could have salvaged in conflict. Losing an advantage like time is lethal, and a hindrance to consideration as a global power, as global powers do not have such weaknesses that can be so easily fixed. Therefore, in developing the Cold Start Doctrine, with mindfulness toward increasing its power and influence internationally, the Indian military recognized the need to have a built in plan that would be ready, organized, and quickly mobilized in the event of attack.

Additionally the Kargil War revealed to the Indian military the importance of locating offensive elements of the army near the border, since during the Kargil crisis time was also lost because this was not the case.<sup>88</sup> As a result, Indian army leaders felt the need to modify the existing army doctrine to cover this base and ensure the best possibility for success in conflict. This is the origin of the components of the Cold Start Doctrine that dictate locating offensive elements near where they would be able to instantaneously launch offensives toward Pakistan. In doing so, the Indian army takes away Pakistan’s ability to seek international help or find out what India was planning. In terms of improving its status as a global actor, this strategy allows India to gain regional power and advantage over Pakistan, which ultimately translates into boosting its international power. By learning where they lost time and advantages in the Kargil War, the Indian military was able to turn it around so that they would have strategies in place to inflict those disadvantages on their enemy. The Indian military used these lessons to build a new

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<sup>87</sup> Tariq M. Ashraf, "Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces," *Military Review*, (2004): 53-62.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*



plan, the Cold Start Doctrine, which aids India in its quest to emerge as a global power due to the nuances of its strategies and development of weaknesses into strengths.

From experiences of slow mobilization and reaction times, India learned “that political and military instruments of national power must work together in a synchronized manner.”<sup>89</sup> This explains the components of the Cold Start Doctrine that call for mobilizing in a unified fashion; “It calls for a synergised effort by all instruments of the Government to ensure that these forces are moved to their areas of operations, fully-equipped and within an acceptable timeframe...”<sup>90</sup> This component of India’s Cold Start Doctrine arose from realization that efficiency is best achieved through unification of government and military branches to achieve readiness and faster reaction and mobilization time. This also functions as yet another way that India brings its military and strategies on par with existing global powers. Because India recognized the downfalls of slow reaction time, the Cold Start Doctrine attempts to correct and learn from past errors to set the Indian military up for success in the event of attack or need for defense in the event of national emergencies.

#### Indian Government Portrayal of and Statements About Cold Start...And Does It Exist?

The Indian government and military has not confirmed the existence of the Cold Start Doctrine. There are leaked reports that cause great speculation and confirm the existence of a doctrine that is almost undoubtedly what is believed to be the Cold Start Doctrine. It is supposed to be within the 2004 Indian Army Doctrine, but Indian officials continue to deny its existence. Of course, its nature as a highly classified document is likely the cause for denial of the Cold Start being real, and the comments of officials in denying it hint toward it being real. This is

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<sup>89</sup> Tariq M. Ashraf, "Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces," *Military Review*, (2004): 53-62.

<sup>90</sup> Ali Ahmed, "Cold Start: The Life Cycle of a Doctrine," *Comparative Strategy* 31, no. 5 (2012): 452-68.

significant because the classified nature of the document shows the same level of security that existing global powers assign to equally sensitive documents, and allows India to manipulate its policies and nuclear policies to be viewed as important in the international community. This garners increased interest in and respect for India's military advancements, as it postures as a great power.

The first mention of the Cold Start Doctrine was after an Indian army conference in April of 2004, during which the media claimed that a new war doctrine was presented.<sup>91</sup> These media sources revealed that the full doctrine was classified, but statements from “a senior officer had mentioned the concept of eight integrated battle groups being employed in place of the existing three large strike formations.”<sup>92</sup> This is exactly what has been deduced as a major component of the Cold Start Doctrine, despite the fact that the Indian army doctrine released in 2004 did not mention such a doctrine. The term “Cold Start” is colloquial and is the media-given name to a doctrine that may in fact exist.

The Indian military's negative response in recent years to the existence of the Cold Start Doctrine is noteworthy. This is because India's Army Chief discussed the Cold Start until 2008, after which Indian military leaders began to deny its existence.<sup>93</sup> The Indian army seems very keen on denying the existence of the Cold Start, especially since it has been the topic of much speculation and debate. The method of discussing vague strategies and releasing a component of the 2004 Indian Army Doctrine is likely due to desire to keep Pakistan in the dark as to its real

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<sup>91</sup> Jaganath Sankaran, "The Enduring Power of Bad Ideas: 'Cold Start' and Battlefield Nuclear Weapons in South Asia," *Arms Control Today* 44, no. 9 [2014], [https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/201\\_11/Features/Cold-Start-and-Battlefield-Nuclear-Weapons-in-South-Asia](https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/201_11/Features/Cold-Start-and-Battlefield-Nuclear-Weapons-in-South-Asia).

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>93</sup> United States. U.S. Congress. *Congressional Research Service*, “India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations,” By K. Alan. Kronstadt. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2011.

plans and doctrines, but derive the benefits from having the international community contemplate and take notice of what the Indian army is planning. This is a smart move both regionally and internationally, as it increases India's relative regional power, as well as shows the international community that it is utilizing policies to gain power and step into the role of an international key actor.

In November of 2009, the Obama administration raised the question of the Cold Start Doctrine, and the Indian Defense Secretary commented, "We don't know what Cold Start is. Our prime minister has said that Pakistan has nothing to fear."<sup>94</sup> This very diplomatic response portrays India as it has been viewed in the past- somewhat passive and unaggressive. This type of response by Indian officials when asked about the Cold Start is a way to maintain classification of crucial documents and plans, as well as a way to sidestep provoking Pakistan. This helps India on its journey to become a global power because it is using its nuclear policy and Cold Start Doctrine, or at the very least the idea of the doctrine, to manipulate Pakistani perception of India.

Because all responses by Indian officials say something along the lines of not knowing what it is or denying the Cold Start doctrine and claiming that the military has prepared contingencies based upon improved mobilization of forces, it is easy to imagine that the Cold Start Doctrine does exist. Whether it is actually called the Cold Start or is a combination of multiple contingencies and unified reactions to attack, it makes sense that the Indian military would have a modernized plan tailored for the nuclearized world in which they now operate. The debate over the existence of this doctrine maintains a veil of mystery around the Cold Start. This

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<sup>94</sup> Jaganath Sankaran, "The Enduring Power of Bad Ideas: 'Cold Start' and Battlefield Nuclear Weapons in South Asia," *Arms Control Today* 44, no. 9 [2014], [https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/201\\_11/Features/Cold-Start-and-Battlefield-Nuclear-Weapons-in-South-Asia](https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/201_11/Features/Cold-Start-and-Battlefield-Nuclear-Weapons-in-South-Asia).

prevents Pakistan from being outright threatened by India, as well as keeps the real workings and plans of the Indian military branches highly classified. By denying the existence of the doctrine as vehemently as the Indian government and military has recently, India minimizes the outright challenge to Pakistan that would occur from acknowledging that it exists.

This denial and classification of the Cold Start Doctrine is a solid strategy, especially given the fact that India wants to avoid nuclear war with Pakistan. Additionally, by keeping the details and name unknown and unconfirmed, the Indian military has the ability to achieve the element of surprise, should it be enacted, and have an advantage over Pakistan. Geopolitically, this lets India stay in a sort of middle ground, where it has the advantage of knowing it has the ability to succeed in conflict, but keeps Pakistan guessing as to what India's military capabilities really are. As properly managed geopolitics are a critical component to a state emerging as a key international actor, this strategy helps India use its military doctrines and nuclear policies combined with geopolitics to its advantage in its quest to emerge as a global actor.

Has It Been Implemented and Readied for Use?

There is much contention as to whether or not the Cold Start Doctrine has been implemented and integrated into the branches of the Indian military. Some argue that it has to some degree, however the general consensus is that it is in the process of being incorporated into the Indian army's actual strategy and practice. There are several limitations to what is believed to be part of the Cold Start Doctrine that require certain resources or technologies that are likely not in use or available to the Indian military currently. The Cold Start Doctrine has not yet been incorporated into practice, but it is likely that the military is laying the groundwork for its eventual use and preparing components of it. If the Cold Start Doctrine does exist, it has serious

implications for conflict in nuclearized South Asia as well as India's journey to become a global power to be reckoned with.

An issue with the idea of the Cold Start Doctrine being ready for use as of now is the fact that it calls for restricting conflict to limited war without provoking a nuclear response from Pakistan. This could be problematic in practice, because finding this balancing point is very difficult and hard to predict. Additionally, the Indian civilian government maintains a primary role in foreign and strategic decision-making, and they may not be interested in waging limited war.<sup>95</sup> Therefore, it could be a time-consuming challenge to define war objectives and implement a plan successfully and timely enough to the degree that Cold Start calls for.

Another issue pointing to the doctrine existing but not yet integrated into potential use is the level of organization and resources necessary to implement the Cold Start. India has not yet developed the required sophistication in capability and organization that is argued to be the fulcrum upon which true implementation of the Cold Start relies on; "Indian forces, resources, organizational structure, and logistics in forward positions need reconsideration and thorough re-examination, barriers which analysts expect to take another decade or so to overcome."<sup>96</sup> This means that while India may have a plan in place, they do not have the infrastructure yet in order to actually put it into practice under the right conditions. However, as India's economy continues to grow and more money is allotted to the military budget, it is possible that the infrastructure to support the Cold Start Doctrine could be built up soon. Implementing the Cold Start requires a level of coordination between the government and branches of the military that does not appear to exist yet, especially considering that once the decision to enact the Cold Start is made, there is

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<sup>95</sup> Zafar Khan, "Cold Start Doctrine: The Conventional Challenge to South Asian Stability," *Contemporary Security Policy* 33, no. 3 (2012): 577-94.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*

no time for government or military leaders to change their minds.<sup>97</sup> This means that the Indian government and military branches need to have a high degree of coordination and agreement as to when the Cold Start would be enacted. However, as India's military and geopolitical standing continue to improve, this sophisticated coordination could be developed. This coordination would be an asset, especially when combined with India's nuclear policies, in helping India build the final parts necessary to help it emerge as a global power.

In 2008, the Pakistani-originated terrorist attacks on Mumbai failed to result in Indian military action. The Indian prime minister decided against using military action to retaliate, supposedly due to worry that by launching selective strikes Pakistan would respond with increased hostility and could possibly provoke war with the potential for escalation into nuclear deployments.<sup>98</sup> Critics that argue against the existence of the Cold Start point to this as proof that the doctrine does not exist, since if it did the Indian military would have enacted it. However, it is likely that the Indian prime minister avoided using military force to retaliate because the Indian military did not have the doctrine ready for use yet, and wanted to avoid engaging in a conflict that they were not prepared for. Rather, by buying time and not provoking Pakistan, India has the ability to ready for a conflict and limited war that they could win. Waiting until the Cold Start doctrine is fully implemented gives the Indian military an advantage, and shows that it has a strategy in place in the event of attack. This organization and planning is in line with that of an already established global power, and shows that India's steps in seeking global status are beginning to help its overall goal. India must continue to use its newfound economic strength to

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<sup>97</sup> Tariq M. Ashraf, "Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces," *Military Review*, (2004): 53-62.

<sup>98</sup> Zafar Khan, "Cold Start Doctrine: The Conventional Challenge to South Asian Stability," *Contemporary Security Policy* 33, no. 3 (2012): 577-94.

fund its military and nuclear program and policies and Cold Start Doctrine in order to give it the strength to push India forward as an emerging global power.

#### Indian Military Motives for Creating Cold Start

The Indian army's motives for creating the Cold Start Doctrine follow the benefits of releasing the doctrine. Many of the benefits of the doctrine's release can be interpreted and analyzed as very valid motives. This is significant in understanding how India's military and nuclear doctrines and policies help it emerge as a global power because military strength is a key indicator of powerful international actors. The Indian army's motives also stem from desire to show the international community the validity of India's place as a nuclear force. International recognition of the Indian military's strength and resolve through policies and doctrines, especially by existing global powers, would give India credibility as a key international actor. As such, in order to understand what the Cold Start is and why the Indian army developed it, it is important to understand motives. Motives reveal much about the intended purpose and nature of the doctrine.

One motive behind developing the Cold Start Doctrine was to prove the ability to engage in limited war despite accumulation of nuclear weapons. For India, this was crucial to establish its force on the global stage as, "they feared their relevance and importance in national defense affairs was diminishing after the nuclearization of the subcontinent."<sup>99</sup> This was a very valid fear considering the precedent set by the Cold War in terms of the build up of nuclear weapons resulting in essential inability to utilize them due to risk of mutual destruction. After what the world saw regarding an arms race in the Cold War, it is important that India establish itself as a real nuclear power with real defense capability, not just a state with a large arsenal that is

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<sup>99</sup> Tariq M. Ashraf, "Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces," *Military Review*, (2004): 53-62.

practically rendered useless. To prove this, India realized the necessity in proving the real potential for limited war, should the need to engage in such conflict arise. By justifying the potential for true limited conventional war, as outlined in the Cold Start Doctrine, India would be able to build back up its place of importance as a global actor.<sup>100</sup> This allows India to utilize its limited war doctrine to prove itself capable of being an established and responsible power.

Related to justifying the potential for limited war against a nuclear weapons backdrop is India's motive to avoid nuclear war. In creating the new army doctrine in 2004, the Indian army wanted to create a plan that would sufficiently retaliate against Pakistan without being large-scale or threatening enough to trigger a nuclear response. The nature of the coordinated attacks through the IBGs would likely ensure that the Indian Army could diminish Pakistan's ability to tap into military potential in a manner "without crossing the nuclear threshold and giving the international community the time or opportunity to intercede."<sup>101</sup>

Another motive behind creating the new war doctrine is to improve India's chances of winning in conflict against Pakistan. In the event of Pakistani attack on Indian soil, India recognized a need for quick response. After learning from where it lost time and strategic advantage in previous conflicts with Pakistan, the Indian military was able to create a new doctrine that addressed those issues and change the army's approach. This motive is perhaps the most basic in terms of simplicity, because it is expected that a military would devise a plan resulting in a victorious end. However, in the Indian army's development of the doctrine, they are not looking for victory in nuclear war. They want to avoid nuclear war and reach a satisfactory end to conflict through limited war or bargaining after conflict.

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<sup>100</sup> Tariq M. Ashraf, "Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces," *Military Review*, (2004): 53-62.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.



The Cold Start Doctrine also arose out of India's motive to end terrorism of Pakistani provenance. Pakistan has used terrorism in India as a method of attack for years; the Pakistani government has used jihadist groups to challenge Indian control over the contested state of Kashmir.<sup>102</sup> Therefore, a doctrine that would enable a swift response to a large terrorist attack on Indian soil by Pakistan would be beneficial as both a deterrent and a game plan should it occur again. As a deterrent, the doctrine would show Pakistan that India is serious about ending terrorism on its soil, and will resort to engaging in military conflict in order to do so. In defending covert action, the previous head of India's foreign intelligence service claimed that, "when terrorism is used by a state as a low-cost weapon to achieve its strategic objective, what works against it is the ability and the determination of the victim state to hurt the interest of the state-sponsor in order to make it a high-cost weapon for the wielder."<sup>103</sup> This accurately sums up India's motivation to use the Cold Start Doctrine as a defense against terrorism. By developing a doctrine that establishes India as determined and capable of ending terrorism, India effectively can use the doctrine as posturing and a warning to Pakistan that should it continue to utilize terrorism as an attack mechanism, India is prepared to make it a high-cost method.

The creation of eight IBGs is an interesting point in terms of motives as well. Because the IBGs involve the army, air force, and navy, it has been argued that the Cold Start is a way for the Indian Army to gain control over the air force and navy, and demonstrate those branches' subservience to the army.<sup>104</sup> Because the Indian Army would control the actions of the IBGs, the army would have power over the actions of the other two branches of the military as well, since

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<sup>102</sup> "Kashmir: Religious Diversity Becomes Religious Militancy." *Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, & World Affairs*. Ed. Eric Patterson. Georgetown University, Aug. 2013. 31 Oct. 2015.

<sup>103</sup> Shashank Joshi, "India's Military Instrument: A Doctrinal Stillborn," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 36, no. 4 (2013): 512-40.

<sup>104</sup> Tariq M. Ashraf, "Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces," *Military Review*, (2004): 53-62.

all three units would have to work together as one in order to successfully enact the Cold Start. Because all three branches compete for the largest share of nuclear capability, it could be an effort by the army to gain primary control over nuclear resources. Additionally, it has been argued that the doctrine could be a push for integrated command by one of the branches of the military.<sup>105</sup>

Overall, the motives behind the Indian army's creation of the Cold Start Doctrine point at desire to update strategy to adapt to the changed nature of conflict in nuclearized South Asia, protect its soil from Pakistani attack and terror, and have a unified plan that would allow for quick retaliation and engagement in limited war in order to avoid nuclear war and be considered a legitimate defense force on the global stage. These motives are seen in the various elements of the doctrine, as well as in the release of the army's new doctrine in 2004. These motives also show that India's well thought out plan and management of weapons and nuclear warfare is sophisticated and responsible, as it must prove in order to be recognized as a global power and set itself apart from states like Pakistan that have unstable thresholds for nuclear use and unclear development of its nuclear arsenal.

#### Political Reasons for Developing the Cold Start Doctrine

India was under shifting rule from the sixteenth century until 1947, controlled by several different powers throughout history. When shifts in ruling entities came to an end with India's independence from Britain in August of 1947, the partition of the Indian subcontinent into Pakistan and India left the contested region of Kashmir unaccounted for. The struggle between India and Pakistan led to war a year after independence, thus creating a need for an Indian military. Since this first conflict as an independent state, India has engaged in war with Pakistan.

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<sup>105</sup> Tariq M. Ashraf, "Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces," *Military Review*, (2004): 53-62.

The Indian military has taken great strides in strategy and technology, and entered the twenty-first century as a nuclear power. In the midst of its ongoing conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir, in 2004 India developed a limited war doctrine, referred to as the Cold Start Doctrine. In April of 2004, the Indian Army revealed their new Indian Army Doctrine, a component of the doctrine came to be referred to as the Cold Start Doctrine. While only a portion of the doctrine was released, it saw much attention and speculation. This in itself was beneficial to the Indian Army, as it stirred interest, addressed the nuclearization of South Asia, and called attention to the fact that the Indian military was prepared to proactively defend itself against Pakistani terror and military incursions should they occur. The buzz surrounding this release served to help India grow towards consideration as a global power, as it revealed qualities about India, its military, and resolve to be powerful that are similar to existing global powers. By simply releasing a section of the army's new doctrine, India was able to gauge the reaction of Pakistan and the international community as a whole, which provided insight to the military and government on the degree to which Pakistan believed that India was prepared. This political and military insight could then be used to tailor preparations for conflict with Pakistan. Therefore, the publicity from the release of the new army doctrine in 2004 was as valuable in and of itself for the military as the actual contents of the doctrine during conflict. This also helps India establish itself as a serious nuclear power with strategic planning ability and desire to protect itself and emerge as the dominant state in the region.

A political benefit of the publicity around the release of the doctrine is increasing public awareness. By increasing public awareness of how the Indian military was and is adapting to the changes in conflict resolution in a recently nuclearized region, the Indian army hoped to

“enhance public awareness of its roles, functions, and importance.”<sup>106</sup> More publicity on this topic has also shown the global community what the Indian military is capable and willing to do to protect itself and its people. This is crucial, because the military is utilizing publicity to flex its muscles and reveal to the world its abilities, as well as indirectly showing Pakistan what it can do. Additionally, by allowing the doctrine to be subjected to public speculation through publicity, the Indian military can gain public support for increased security measures. Increased security measures undoubtedly require more financial support to the military, which demands public support. The Indian military believes that this would lead to greater public participation in security affairs, and ultimately influence the government’s decisions in terms of national security.<sup>107</sup> This is smart of the Indian military to do, because by utilizing the doctrine not only as a way to increase their likelihood of success in conflict with Pakistan, they also get the Indian public on board with the plan to defend the country. Gaining the support of the Indian populace is important now because of the unhappiness of the public after twenty-first century terrorist attacks in India of Pakistani origin.<sup>108</sup> Public support is crucial to success, and the doctrine helps shape national opinion in favor of it, as it claims to be in place to protect the public. This also benefits the military because by gaining public support for the doctrine, the public will be more likely to call for government support of the doctrine through funding and resources.

Another political benefit of announcing the Cold Start Doctrine in 2004 is the additional pressure put on Pakistan. By building “pressure on Pakistan’s security apparatus by indicating a hardening of Indian resolve,” India is able to show Pakistan that it is prepared and organized to

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<sup>106</sup> Tariq M. Ashraf, "Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces," *Military Review*, (2004): 53-62.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>108</sup> Shashank Joshi, "India's Military Instrument: A Doctrinal Stillborn," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 36, no. 4 (2013): 512-40.

defend itself against attack and terrorism in the age of nuclear weapons.<sup>109</sup> This shows that India considers both countries' status as nuclear powers seriously, and despite desire to avoid nuclear war would not back down under attack from Pakistan. This again aids India in its quest to emerge as a global power because its strategic political motives in creating the Cold Start Doctrine show responsible nuclear weapons management as well as similar sophisticated preparation and organization that is a defining feature of existing global powers.

The publicity around the Cold Start Doctrine drew in the international community, yet another political motive for its creation. Bringing the issue and doctrine to the attention of the international community permitted India to exert even more pressure on Pakistan. This is crucial because it showed the world that India respected its status as a nuclear power, and wanted to prove its desire to avoid resorting to nuclear war. It is also important because with more international attention on the issue, the Cold Start Doctrine functions as a deterrent. To back this up, Lt Gen J.J. Singh ordered *Exercise Poorna Vijay*, or Total Victory, to be publicized in order to send signals of validation of the new 2004 doctrine.<sup>110</sup> This is a form of posturing that contributes to the deterrence factor of the doctrine and proves to the international community and Pakistan that India is prepared and resolute. This posturing requires great effort due to India's historical and habitual pattern of being passive and restraining from use of force.<sup>111</sup> Therefore, it is an advantage in aiding India to become a global power that the Cold Start Doctrine function as a way to show the international community and Pakistan that it is working to change its previous

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<sup>109</sup> Tariq M. Ashraf, "Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces," *Military Review*, (2004): 53-62.

<sup>110</sup> Ali Ahmed, "Cold Start: The Life Cycle of a Doctrine," *Comparative Strategy* 31, no. 5 (2012): 452-68.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*

image, which in light of the recent post-Cold War nuclear backdrop, would not function very well at all as a deterrent factor.

These political motives and benefits of releasing components of the doctrine as well as the speculation on the doctrine are just as important a function of the doctrine as the actual contents of the doctrine. In this sense, it almost does not even matter if the doctrine exists or not, since a primary purpose of the idea of the doctrine is to posture and create a deterrent effect. It is important to understand the intersection of practical use of the doctrine and the mystery surrounding the emergence of the Cold Start Doctrine, because the combination of mystery and reality is how the Indian military uses the doctrine as a publicity tool to flex its muscles and manipulate public opinion and global response to the nuclearization of Asia. These elements all push India toward emergence as a global power as they solidify India's resolve and credibility in the international community.

### **Indian Nuclear Arsenal**

#### Development and Makeup of India's Arsenal

India's nuclear weapons program is "homegrown," which is why U.S. intelligence did not pick up on India's preparations for initial nuclear weapons tests.<sup>112</sup> India's tests in 1974 and 1998 spurred the advances in technology and development of its current arsenal. India used the results from the tests to alter and develop the technology it used, with the ultimate goal of increasing yield and creating a workable weapon design.<sup>113</sup> India currently holds over eleven tons of spent fuel, which increases every year, and can be converted into a serviceable arsenal.<sup>114</sup> This shows that India continues to grow its capabilities and technology, which brings it closer

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<sup>112</sup>Bharat Karnad, *India's Nuclear Policy* [Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008], 71.

<sup>113</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>114</sup>*Ibid.*

and closer to the level of major global powers and the five signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Additionally, India has been planning for the successful integration and build-up of nuclear weapons for decades. This is seen in the state's commission of a gas centrifuge plant in the early 1990s, which enriches uranium as fuel for powering India's ballistic missile firing nuclear-powered submarine (SSBN).<sup>115</sup> The Indian Navy has several SSBNs, which are more recent developments and show commitment to new nuclear technology and strategy as well as keeping up and competing with established global powers and other nuclearized states. When analyzed alongside China's recent development of SSBNs, it is apparent that India is working hard to keep up with the latest technologies and regional advances. India's possession of this type of weapon shows that it is capable of developing sophisticated nuclear technologies and implementing it into a working device that can be integrated into its military. This is unique to states that have the financial and technological resources available to pursue this level of nuclear weaponry, and sets India apart as an emerging powerful state with competitive drive and similar capabilities of established key global actors.

As of October 2015, India is estimated to hold approximately 120 nuclear warheads. Amongst India's nuclear weapons stock is one nuclear submarine, the INS *Arihant*, that just recently officially entered military service in 2016, and a second is under construction, and two more are expected to be built.<sup>116</sup> These submarines are armed with K-15 missiles, with a four hundred mile range, as well as K-4 missiles, with a two thousand mile range. This recent

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<sup>115</sup> Bharat Karnad, *India's Nuclear Policy* [Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008], 74.

<sup>116</sup> Adrian Levy, "India Is Building a Top-Secret Nuclear City to Produce Thermonuclear Weapons, Experts Say," *Foreign Policy*, December 16, 2015, [http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/16/india\\_nuclear\\_city\\_top\\_secret\\_china\\_pakistan\\_barac/](http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/16/india_nuclear_city_top_secret_china_pakistan_barac/).

development and addition to nuclear capability pushes India into the upper echelon of nuclear capabilities, as only five other nations (the U.S., the U.K., France, Russia, and China) are members of the so-called “Nuclear Triad,” or nuclear weapons capability from land, sea, and air.<sup>117</sup> By joining this small number of highly nuclear capable states, India continues to establish itself as worthy of being considered a global power. This new addition to India’s arsenal signals competitive intent to stay up with the latest nuclear developments and capabilities, as well as compete with the states that have already been established as global powers. This aids India’s journey to becoming a global power, especially when taken in consideration along with its nuclear doctrine, which pushes the importance of being able to defend itself as well as responsibly handle its nuclear capabilities. In 2005, the U.S. and India entered into a nuclear agreement that further solidified global power recognition of India as a nuclear power, since it stipulated terms for India to continue to possess nuclear weapons and gave India access to U.S. nuclear technologies.<sup>118</sup> This allots India with respect from a global power, the U.S., by default since the U.S. entered into this 2005 agreement after recognizing India’s competitive nuclear weapons acquisition and joining the ranks of established nuclear and global powers through its recent membership in the “Nuclear Triad” group. The more India emphasizes its growing capabilities and the level of importance it assigns to its role as a nuclear power, the more it begins to gain respect and attention as an emerging power, which eventually will help it to be considered as a true force in the international community.

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<sup>117</sup> David Trayner, "'Destroyer of All Enemies' Top Secret Nuclear Sub Set to Spark New WW3 Arms Race," *The Daily Star*, February 27, 2016, <http://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/latest-news/497496/INS-Arihant-india-submarine-destroyer-of-all-enemies-conqueror-nuclear-triad>.

<sup>118</sup> Dinshaw Mistry, *The US-India Nuclear Agreement: Diplomacy and Domestic Politics* (Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 129-135.



India keeps its arsenal very secretive, so the U.S. and other states do not know much regarding where or how its weapons are being stored. However, as of December 2015, Western analysts found that India is in the process of building a nuclear city in Challakere in the southern state Karnataka, which would include ten thousand acres for the Indian army and two-thousand-five-hundred soldiers, three hundred-fifty acres for the State Reserve Police, five hundred acres for a commando training center, as well as a military-run complex with nuclear centrifuges, atomic-research laboratories, and weapons and aircraft testing facilities.<sup>119</sup> This compound is expected to be completed in 2017, and would expand India's nuclear research, produce fuel for nuclear reactors, and aid in powering India's new nuclear submarines.<sup>120</sup> India's efforts in building such a facility will lead to a sharp increase in India's ability to produce and stockpile highly enriched uranium, which would allow India to dramatically increase their nuclear weapons arsenal, including development of a hydrogen bomb. India uses this facility to advance its desire to emerge as a key global actor as it is laying the groundwork for the increase of its arsenal size to be more comparable to that of already existing global powers. India's nuclear technology and steps toward increasing its capability provide the stepping-stones from overlooked Asian state to key international actor with real influence and esteem in the international community.

This new compound also functions as a means by which India uses nuclear power to gain status as an emerging power due to the indirect outcomes and speculation it brings about. The ability to build such a facility for the production and research on nuclear weapons technology signals large scale financial, political, and military commitment to high quality integration of

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<sup>119</sup> Adrian Levy, "India Is Building a Top-Secret Nuclear City to Produce Thermonuclear Weapons, Experts Say," *Foreign Policy*, December 16, 2015,

[http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/16/india\\_nuclear\\_city\\_top\\_secret\\_china\\_pakistan\\_barac/](http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/16/india_nuclear_city_top_secret_china_pakistan_barac/)

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

nuclear weapons in state affairs and military actions. Because India is in the process of building this new facility, it is clear that it intends to continue to increase its nuclear capability and likely the number of warheads and weapons in its arsenal. This increase combined with India's recent join to the "nuclear triad" group of states clearly shows that India is following a similar path of arms build up to already established key global actors- allowing India to follow an already established path to influence and respect in the international community.

### **Conclusion**

Nuclear weapons possession, as an extension of military capability, is a trait of existing key global actors, like the United States. Nuclear weapons alone do not allow a state to gain status as a global power; rather the combination of state economic strength as well as the policies in place with nuclear weapons allows a state to gain status as a global power. The Indian military's Cold Start Doctrine, in combination with its attempts to unite the international community regarding nuclear weapons through open dialogue and cooperation shows that the state is committed to effective nuclear policies and proper restraint and management of nuclear weapons so as not to engage in nuclear war. This is the sole way that India can prove itself worthy of consideration as an emerging global power; proper management and handling of nuclear weapons signals the organization and commitment characteristic of global powers. The major nuclear weapon states (the signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty), the U.S., China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom all maintain and manage their arsenals of strategic warheads and tactical weapons (lower-yield devices) properly to ensure their responsible maintenance, deployment, or dismantling.<sup>121</sup> India, while it is highly secretive regarding the management of its arsenal, clearly has the proper care and handling of its weapons in mind

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<sup>121</sup> "Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: India," *Arms Control Association*, October 2015, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/indiaprofile>.

because it is taking so many steps to ensure that its new technologies and weapons would be able to be used and integrated into the military during conflict. Additionally, India's increased financial investment in the building of facilities and new technologies shows that it is willing to put in a similar level of money and commitment towards military improvement as established key global powers. Again, India shows that by following similar modes of progress and expansion that developed and major states at the forefront of international affairs followed, it is preparing and fighting for recognition as an emerging power.

Through the lens of realism, nuclear capability is a mode by which states can exert their relative power in comparison to competing, neighboring, or threatening states. As such, a state's nuclear capacity has the ability to increase its global status if managed and manipulated properly. With survival as the prime goal of states in a world dominated by anarchy, military capability is one method by which a state can gain power and ensure its survival despite the unknown intentions of neighboring states. Under these conditions, competition and desire to survive in a dangerous world creates suspicion and fear of other states, which can lead to aggression and military confrontations.<sup>122</sup> In India's case, this is manifested in its build up of arms and nuclear capability to stay competitive with already established global powers and gain status in the international community.

## **V. CONCLUSION**

India's 2003 Nuclear Doctrine aids its quest to emerge as a global power due to the sections that outline India's commitment not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states and India's No First Use stance, except under major attack or attack by chemical or biological

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<sup>122</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1994): 5–49.

weapons; this is especially true when taken in consideration with India's rapidly growing economy and geopolitical climate. Because India's actions in the last four decades have been focused on improving nuclear capability and building the state's nuclear arsenal, growing the economy, and increasing engagement in regional and global diplomacy, it is well on its way to emerging as a key global power. By combining its growing economic power with its improvements in nuclear and military capabilities, India's growth extends beyond just regional and global survival, and enters the realm of establishing legitimate and credible power in the international community.

Additionally, though India's geopolitical climate presents challenges to its emergence as a global power through the form of China and Pakistan's working military relationship, it also serves as the spark behind continual Indian competitive drive to survive in the region and increase its power both militarily and economically. While the Pakistani-Chinese joining of forces is a negative force for India, it does not mean that it will prevent India from thriving and emerging as a global power. Because India's economy and military continue to gain strength, its power relative to China and Pakistan continues to go up. This indicates that India will be able to hold its own regionally, especially as its economy is still growing at a faster rate than that of existing regional power China. India already significantly raised its regional level of influence; even if China fails to at least publicly recognize this in terms of India's great economic growth and status as the world's fastest growing large economy.

Through the international relations principle of realism, India's pursuit of international power is credible and well underway. The anarchic nature of the international community, as it is seen by realism, leads to survival as the primary goal of rational states. When combined with the natural fear and suspicion of other states and their intentions and capabilities, desire to survive

evolves into aggression and competition among states. As seen with India, its first desire to survive regionally led to the development of nuclear capabilities and military strategies to allow it to defend itself. As it evolved, India became capable of much more, and fueled its economy by way of great rises in GDP and allocation of financial resources to its military budget. As India continued along its developmental path, its nuclear doctrine proved instrumental in establishing India as a nuclear power and a rising international force. This led to the position India is in now, with desire and capability to emerge as a competitive and legitimate global power. The great powers are characterized as the six or so most powerful states that have the world's strongest military forces and the strongest economies to pay for them, and can only be defeated by another great power.<sup>123</sup> India's underlying resources like large population, natural resources, sophisticated technology, and an educated labor force are the smaller contributing factors<sup>124</sup> that set the stage for India's development of a strong GDP as well as ability to build up a strong military with advanced nuclear technologies and emergence as a global power. India is in a prime place in the international community in terms of geopolitical climate, economic strength, military improvement, and most importantly nuclear weapons capability and doctrines, to emerge as a key global power.

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<sup>123</sup> Joshua S. Goldstein, and Jon C. Pevehouse, *International Relations, 10<sup>th</sup> ed.*, (New York: Pearson, 2013).

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*

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