

**WAR WEARINESS:
WITHIN THE 21ST CENTURY & IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR**

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Defended

March 29th, 2016

Abstract

By the end of the 2010s, the United States of America had been in several military campaigns in the Global War on Terror. In the past, U.S. interventions often were swift and decisive campaigns and rarely lasted more than five years. This research paper's main purpose is to publicize attitudes in relation to military and foreign policies within the 21st century. This was accomplished by analyzing two primary variables. This research paper looks into the correlation between military casualties in the War on Terror starting from 2004 to the present. The independent variables of this paper will be military fatalities with both the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, while the dependent variable will be the support of U.S and its allies in the War on Terror with regard to if they are winning or not. Alongside this, a Fixed Effects model using years as a metric will be used to also analyze the results of this research. President Approval polling is also used as controlling measurement of framing within the U.S. political decision making elites. The results of this research paper indicate that there are significant correlations between approvals by the American public at varying points in time.

Acknowledgments

I would like to first thank my advisor, Michael Kanner for his guidance and support throughout my entire thesis process. His comments, feedback, suggestions, and opinions helped shaped this paper throughout the academic year. This paper represents months of hard work and much patience and feedback from him. I am also grateful for Scott Adler for allowing and permitting me to be part of this process and offering invaluable advice and words during the process. Thank you, Megan Roosevelt for giving insightful information and comments assisting with me on my data and methods. Finally thank you to the I Have a Dream Foundation for allowing me to continue my higher education and to my friends, family, those who also supported me throughout this year. It is my dream and hopes to make you all proud.

Introduction

General Fred Weyard Chief of Staff of the U.S Army explained the situation of the end of the Vietnam War by stating:

“Vietnam was a reaffirmation of the peculiar relationship between the American Army and the American people. The American Army really is a people’s army in the sense that it belongs to the American people who take a jealous and proprietary interest in its involvement. The Army, therefore, cannot be committed lightly” (The New World Strategy pg. 20)

The end of conscription disconnected the relationship between civilians and soldiers. This disconnect has continued into the 21st century as the U.S. continued to have an all-volunteer military force. Nowadays, the only way that the American public maintains a relationship with the military is through politicians and the decision-making elites. The most important aspect of the U.S military is that it relies heavily on the American public’s support; under the United States system the military does not have the option of acting independent from democratically elected officials. The leader of this government, the President of the United States of America, must be able to sustain popular support in order to continue to engage in long conflicts. As noted during the Vietnam War, once a majority of public opinion began to disapprove of a war, U.S presidents implemented policy changes to address disapproval such as the gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Vietnam in 1973. Recently we have seen symptoms of war weariness or war fatigue (defined as public disapproval of a prolonged conflict) in reaction to the U.S.-led coalition in the Global War on Terror.

Under President George W. Bush’s Administration, the national security focus of the nation was changed with the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11th 2001 by Al-

Qaeda. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the U.S shifted its policies from conventional warfare and the use of deterrence against other states to counterterrorism. In a speech given at West Point in 2002, then President George W. Bush declared that:

“For much of the last century America's defense relied on the cold war doctrines of deterrence and containment. But new threats also require new thinking. Deterrence, the promise of massive retaliation against nations, means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies.”

The conflict has gone on for more than 10 years, and spans locations from Afghanistan to Iraq. What makes the topic of the Global War on Terror so significant is the fact that it is one of America’s longest wars in recent memory. The war has been waged across multiple continents and continues to play a major role within U.S. foreign and military policies. This research paper will attempt to analyze polls and public opinion of the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the prolonged conflict, and changes with regard to public support. It is the goal of this research paper to discuss whether Americans value the cost of human fatalities within war. The goal of this research paper is to analyze the consequences on foreign and security policy by understanding the effects of war fatalities on public opinion.

Yet while understanding war weariness with insights on fatalities and public opinion, it must be noted that within democracies, there is a connection with the framing of war weariness by the political elite decision makers. Framing can be done through political leaders such as the President of the United States and has often guided or established popular support on particular military and foreign policies. Framing is a key concept to understanding the relationship of war weariness. Often when political actors fail to frame a conflict, the popular support will decrease

as the framed policy has either failed expectations or has been ineffective in maintaining policies. This research paper will also discuss and analyze the relationship between President and popular support for wars. Presidents can be described as the main framer for foreign and military policies within wars. The United States has seen this rise with President George Bush framing policy in order to convince the American public that invading Iraq was a necessity for security policy essentially without providing substantive evidence or an international mandate. Regardless, the using action was the invasion of Iraq in 2003 with (not particularly overwhelming) public support.

Due to this prolonged conflict, the beginnings of war weariness or war fatigue have begun to appear throughout the United States public, and public support has slowly declined over the years with the Global War on Terror. War weariness as defined by the Merriam-Webster dictionary, is “a state of disillusion or depression felt toward the end of or immediately after a protracted war”. The public has experienced several cases of war weariness such as in the Vietnam War. Recently war weariness has appeared in the American public due to the prolonged conflict of the War on Terror. This is true as combat operations in Iraq have continued after the 2011 U.S. withdrawal and with the expansion of airstrikes into Syria under OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE. This operation was executed with an estimated 5000 troops within Iraq followed by an increased expansion of U.S. personal being involved within Syria. Yet American support and willingness for “boots on the ground” is limited by both political leaders and the American public. The public was asked by CNN/ORC Poll in December 17th-21st of 2015 with "Do you favor or oppose the United States sending ground troops into combat operations against ISIS forces in Iraq or Syria?" 55% of Americans stated that they opposed ground troops in Syria (Polling Report, 2016). This indicates that a clear majority of Americans support an air campaign

in Syria and oppose American ground combat forces in Syria. A reason for this is that many Americans view air operations and ground operations as different levels of intervention within a foreign state. President Barack Obama announced an end of all U.S. combat operations within in Afghanistan back in December 2014. Yet the country is still in civil war as indicated during the Battle of Kunduz in late 2015 with the Taliban capturing a provisional capital from local U.S.-trained Afghan forces. This prompted U.S. airstrikes to intervene and support Afghan Security Forces in fighting back the Taliban. In October 15th of 2015, President Obama announced plans to maintain troops in Afghanistan beyond 2016 for the purpose of continued support for Afghan Security Forces through the Status of Forces Agreement. Presently the U.S. maintains roughly 5,000 troops assisting in Iraqi Security Forces in the U.S. led intervention in Iraq against the Islamic State in 2014. However, the Obama Administration has stressed that it is unwilling to send combat troops into the region. Yet it has coordinated air strikes with the Kurdish *Peshmerga* alongside Iraqi Security Forces and even with Shiite militias during the battle of Tikrit in Iraq (Nissenbaum, 2015). These events have led to the continuation of American presence and military forces in the Global War on Terror.

As seen with President Barack Obama's policies, rarely does information remain in news circulation. Mass media and communication of news on U.S. forces within Iraq and Afghanistan is not regularly reported compared to news regarding ISIS and Syria. This could be explained as framing of the conflict by the political decision elites; instead of focusing on conflicts that have lasted for nearly ten years, the media focuses on new conflicts that would generate more interest. Alongside that, the concept of War Weariness comes into play as the public opinion has become detached and disinterested with present conflicts and that they are fatigued by hearing new stories from established conflicts.

Literature Review

There has been extensive research of public opinion and the use of combat forces yet there is limited research on the specific effects of war weariness. This has been due to the fact that the only wars of prolonged periods (lasting longer than 3 years) in the history of the U.S. military have been the Civil War, Korean War, and the Vietnam War. Many Americans view both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars as part of a single war, the Global War on Terror. These wars have since surpassed the Vietnam War in terms of duration and there is evidence that it may continue for quite some time as indicated with the conflict continuing to the present time of this research paper. The only time war weariness theory was incorporated in previous work was in a 1986 article that was used to analyze the Great Powers during inter-period warfare of World War I and World War II alongside the U.S. Vietnam War. This article discussed that “The war weariness hypothesis holds that a state’s involvement in a war, a particularly long and destructive war, reduces the likelihood of its involvement in subsequent wars for a certain period of time” (Morgan and Levy, 1986).

John Mueller’s *War, Presidents, and Public* describes the relationship between public, war, and the civil elite particularly with the president of the U.S. describing “Popular support influences the conduct of the conflict, since attitudes toward the war at home may reflected in changes on the battlefield” (Mueller, 1977 pg. vii)

Mueller touches on the subject of the relationship between American casualties compared to previous wars with a longer duration.

“This support was found to decline as a logarithmic function of American casualties, a function that was remarkably the same for both wars [Vietnam and Korea]. While support

for the war in Vietnam did finally drop below those levels found during Korea, it did so only after the war had gone on considerably longer and only after American casualties had far surpassed those of the earlier war” (Mueller, 1977 pg. 155)

The effect of public opinion within the Global War on Terror is the next phase of how Americans view the multiple wars that it has been engaged with. Iraq and Afghanistan is several years longer than the Vietnam War.

In *Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force* (Feaver 2004), Feaver touches on the relationship between casualties and the American public. He focuses on the U.S.’s use of force and its consequences of combat losses with the public opinion. “The casualty phobia thesis- that the American public is highly averse to taking casualties and will only support a conflict if it is essentially cost free- is arguably one of the most important strategic claims in the contemporary world” (Feaver 2004 pg. 96)

Feaver establishes the role of missions and whether military commanders are more willing to accept losses compared to their public and political elite counterparts. “With regard to high-intensity *realpolitik* missions such as the defense of Korea or Taiwan, we find that military officers tend to be more willing to tolerate casualties than civilian elites or mass public.” (Feaver 2004 pg. 97)

Feaver goes through why public opinion supports combat operations in certain conflicts compared to other conflicts, Feaver discusses the usage of humanitarian interventions and how it has affected the Kosovo conflict in 1999.

“With regard to interventionist missions, however, we find civilian elites and U.S public to be more willing to tolerate casualties than are military officers. This is especially true

for missions of humanitarian intervention such as the 1999 conflict in Kosovo.” (Feaver 2004 pg. 97)

Feaver brings up the concept of casualty phobia and how it affects political elite and public groups within the U.S. This is important as casualty phobia is necessary for understanding the effects of fatalities within the popular support for military operations in a war.

“To be sure, there is some evidence of casualty phobia- or, more precisely, there are pockets of opinion in all three groups (the general public, civilian elites, and military elites) that appear to express something like a zero tolerance for casualties. But casualty phobia is not the dominant feature of the general public. On the contrary, policymakers can tap into a large reservoir of support for missions, even missions that entail a fairly high human price, provided those missions are successful. The public is defeat phobic, not casualty phobic. From these results we conclude that while policymakers show great casualty aversion in the policies they pursue, they are either tying their own hands or responding to constraints imposed by the military. The general public is not demanding casualty-free use of military force” (Feaver 2004 pg. 97)

One of the necessary portions of understanding public support for military engagements is recognizing the cost-benefit analysis of war because Feaver describes that civilians and military leaders will differ on the view of the costs and benefits. For civilians, the benefits involve national interests and the utility of force in comparison to military cost-benefits that focus on military resources and the values of engaging combatants in particular conflicts. The example for this research paper is with the cost-benefit analysis of invading Iraq and maintaining troops within Afghanistan. Both costs and benefits greatly affect both the public and military decision making of intervening in conflicts and whether or not to use military force. This describes civilian’s benefit from feeling secure and safe while the military benefits with having a defined threat by the civilian public.

“Decisions on the use of force are cost-benefit decisions. Do the benefits of invading Iraq outweigh the costs of doing so? Civil-military relations might affect the use of force if civilians and the military differ on their estimates of these benefits and costs. The benefits involve estimations on the national interest and estimations on the utility of force, that is, whether force can achieve the goals implied by the mission. The costs involve not only crude financial costs- the dollars spent in jet fuel, exploded ordnance, military rations, and so on but also more abstract costs like potential damage to other interests and values, such as relations with allies. Importantly, there are also human costs, the dead and wounded that result from the use of force” (Feaver 2004 pg. 98)

Feaver provides definitions for casualty tolerance and willingness to tolerate them in order to accomplish mission objectives or to maintain combat operations within a conflict.

“Estimations of the human costs from a use of force are what is meant by the term “casualty sensitivity”, also sometimes called “casualty aversion”, “casualty shyness,” “casualty tolerance,” and “casualty phobia.” In this book we will distinguish among these various terms. Casualty sensitivity and casualty tolerance refer to the generic willingness to tolerate casualties to achieve an end. (Feaver 2004 pg. 98)

Understanding casualty’s relationship with the civil-military relationship is crucial for implementation of foreign and military policies that address the general public of casualty tolerance in military conflicts.

“Finally, we will reserve the term “casualty aversion” to refer to the policies that political leaders and the military implement in order to lower casualties, perhaps in response to a strong casualty sensitivity or even casualty phobia” (Feaver 2004 pg. 99)

There is presently very little research about war weariness being incorporated into the War on Terror. The reason for this is that terrorism traditionally has been classified as a criminal or as a minor aspect of conventional warfare. There is however, a tremendous amount of

research on American support for military operations and hard power¹ actions against enemies of the United States of America. In *The Pentagon's New Map* (Barnett, 2004) there is an argument that a majority of U.S interventions and military actions after the Cold War are based on the idea of preemption.²

“Right now, the biggest proposal out on the table is the U.S strategy of preemption, which, in effect, argues that whatever known rule breakers get close to obtaining of mass destruction, it is only normal and right for great powers to strike preemptively for the avowed purposes of regime change” (Barnett, 2004 page 57)

The U.S. public would only support the use of the military as directed what can be framed as “threats”. The example of this in the 21st century is the usage of rhetoric against rogue states as known as the “Axis of Evil” as he described states such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea in the State of the Union address in 2002 due to the interpretation of the Bush doctrine of preemption. This is the advent of the new U.S foreign policy in the Global War on Terror. Since 9/11, the U.S. and its allies have begun a Global War on Terror fighting across multiple countries and battlefields. Wars before the Global War on Terror had been primarily been considered as limited wars which are conflicts that have strategic objectives that are described as being restricted commitments within a conflict. The U.S. intervenes on the basis of limited action operations with specific reasons as seen in OPERATION JUST CAUSE with invading Panama to overthrow the Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega, the first invasion of Iraq in 1991 under OPERATION DESERT STORM, United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNISOM) to secure

¹ As described in Joseph's Nye's *The Future of Power* hard power is the use of force, payment, and some agenda-setting based. Soft power is the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes. (pg. 21)

² Humanitarian interventions would fit within the idea of preemption if one sees them as attempts to prevent future civil and genocidal wars.

humanitarian relief within the destabilized Somalia, and OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY with the U.S. invasion of Haiti in removing the military junta. Beginning in the 21st century there has been a shift of policy with the Bush doctrine regarding stopping rogues from developing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and states that had sponsored terrorism such as Iraq.

In *Making American Foreign Policy* (2006) by Ole R. Holsti describes and establishes what American military and foreign policies have been framed over the past few decades to the American public.

“There was indeed a strong propensity to believe that the United States should look back at the Vietnam experience in order to avoid repeating it, but the substance of those lessons seemed to range across a very wide spectrum, from “use all-out force, perhaps even nuclear weapons, to win a quick, decisive victory” to “never again undertake interventions in the Third World.” If such divergent views were also linked to other fundamental questions about U.S. foreign policy; it suggested that the manner in which Americans framed the Vietnam experience might well create deep and possibly enduring cleavages on fundamental questions about the country’s proper role in the world” (Holsti, 2006 pg. 10)

Holsti discusses the after-effects of the Iraq War and with the American Public. As the Iraq war became more unpopular, there had been clear disapproval to both political and military leaders within the U.S.

“In the light of broader controversies about the Iraq war, expectations that the civil-military gap issue would at least temporarily be eclipsed have not materialized. Captain Russel Burgos, a returned Iraq veteran, described a military culture that echoed the Ricks thesis for a “private loathing for public America” (Holsti, 2006 pg. 16)

Holsti discusses the relationship between the American public and the military sector. While the solution may not be incorporated within this research paper, there is a clear distinction between both the American civilian sector and the military sector within the U.S.

“What might be done to bridge the civil-military gap? The obvious answer- to restore the draft or at least to invoke a national service requirement including military service among several options- could provide more Americans with an opportunity to experience and perhaps better appreciate both civilian and military cultures. (Holsti, 2006 pg. 16)

In *Winning the War of Words* (Wolfe, 2008) Wolfe discusses the civil-military relationship and especially on how the U.S military has begun to look into the relationship between war and public opinion and how both the military and public apply a cost-benefit analysis when evaluating foreign affairs. Wolfe mainly looks into how public opinion often determines foreign policy and makes public opinion plays a role as a domestic source of foreign policy making. Summarized, Wolfe’s theory states that the public makes a calculation of a cost-benefit analysis which begins to decline as “casualties mount and the public develops greater reservations about the war’s value” (Wolfe, 2008 p.29). Wolfe also sees another goal-dependent fashion that states that:

“The public is more likely to accept military casualties if the operation is quick and intended to restrain a state from aggressive behavior. Conversely, if the action is intended to coerce regime change, the public is not as likely to accept casualties” (Wolfe, 2008 p.29)

This theory can be placed within the confines of prolonged wars such as the Global War on Terror and the Vietnam War. Wolfe discusses in his research such as *Bear Any Burden? How Democracies Minimize the Costs of War*, that public opinion in foreign policy intervention policy is important because it constrains and sets limits on foreign policy actions. This is important, as the U.S has seen a large change in its intervention policies which Wolfe describes as

“After the September 11 attacks, the United States began to shift its foreign policy from a defensive to an offensive approach while its relative position in the world remained

unchanged. Such a shift required calculated and effective marketing of changes from the status quo.” (Wolfe, 2008 pg. 33)

Wolfe looks into the beginning of the Bush Doctrine of establishing a preemptive war mandate against terrorism. He specifically looks into how the American public would rationalize long duration conflicts and especially give their public support for a rather time invested and potentially costly wars.

“Perhaps the most significant occurrence of the marketing of future policy is the joining of these two thematic concepts, war and terror, which previously led separate paths both in rhetoric and foreign policy, with war referring to conventional global conflict and terrorism referring to temporary counterterrorist polices. The joining of these concepts was sealed in the September 20 Address to the Joint Session of Congress and the American People speech, in which George Bush broke from the past and announced a continuous foreign policy against terrorism. The policy was framed as loss aversion, not as the pursuit of future gains. In this context, he proposed a long-term foreign policy change with no clear indicators of success and no visible timeline for conclusion. In a sense, the policy itself is an example of a loss rather than a gain frame because it describes a war with no end, thereby establishing an aspiration level that, if accepted, would place the American public in the domain of loss as a result of seeking to reach a possibly unattainable goal” (Wolfe, 2008 pg. 33)

What Wolfe incorporates into his research is the analysis of casualty’s relationship with public opinion. This is crucial to understanding the relationship and whether the American public tolerance for casualties is often framed by the political elites or whether if American casualties do affect policies. By understanding the relationship between U.S combat losses and public opinion, this paper will be able to analyze the correlations if any found in recent conflict. This is important because it is one of the first reviews looking into the correlation between war combat losses and unsupportive opinions of war.

“If the findings regarding the public’s acceptance of low-level casualties-relative to cases such as U.S involvement in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam- are robust, then the evidence also runs counter to the type of casualty aversion observations recorded during America’s humanitarian operations in the post-Cold War era, which may have significant policy implications for future low-level military operations abroad [...] The point made here is that properly framed policies, intended to avoid future losses instead of making gains only, may find more favor with an increasingly isolationist American public. If the American president has the political resources and initiative to weather through the almost inevitable instances of negative events, then the public’s casualty aversion may be as short lived as it was just months prior to President Bush’s reelection. This could have policy implications for the longevity and success of future short to mid-term humanitarian and nation building missions” (Wolfe, 2008 pg. 98)

Wolfe introduces the idea that government framing of a conflict influences public opinion in order to push for a certain agenda and policy. This relates to this research paper as such: even though fatalities may influence decision making of the public opinion, the government still influences and controls the military alongside framing particular conflicts for the American public.

“While framing may help the public organize and evaluate an issue, the evidence presented here lends support to the argument that public opinion plays a limited role in the elite dominated foreign policy process, at least in the early stages of war. Consequently, these results may aid in the isolation of a more robust variables Helene, 2015 towards better assessing the relationship between presidential framing and public support for war, such as the role of actor credibility in successful framing and counter-framing”(Wolfe, 2008 pg. 99)

Wolfe’s research allows us to review and understand that the public faces a government elite body alongside the military that creates and often forms the framing of varying military engagements. Political leaders will have a desire to control and influence the public opinion into

certain policies with varying degrees of success. The political elite and military often influence the public by framing military conflicts by placing an emphasis for the necessity that the public must support conflicts as seen with the Vietnam War and the Global War on Terror. Wolfe addresses the explanation for war weariness within the context of the Global War on Terror.

In *Selling War in the Media Age (2010)*, Andrew Frank and Kenneth Osgood discuss the relationship between the president, political elites, and the public opinion in foreign conflicts. Frank and Osgood discusses on the importance of this relationship and how it affects decision making within the executive office. This is important within this research paper as framing and decision making by the president is a crucial component of war weariness and its effects to the American public.

“Policy communication between the White House and the American people, which encompasses both explaining a policy agenda and persuading the public to support it – “comprises an integral part of modern American presidential leadership” and become a “necessary competent of governance” (Frank, 2010 pg. 2)

Frank and Osgood establish that the President serves as a key educator within addressing security and foreign policies to the American public by stating:

“Foreign policy commitments have required presidential initiative to educate and sell the country on topics of less immediate moment to people’s daily lives. The reason? Because Americans traditionally paid less attention to foreign affairs than domestic issues, and thus their significance must be explained and justified” (Frank, 2010 pg. 2)

When discussing interventions and the relationship of the President, often president must decide upon a policy action with the public in order to support policies.

“One of the realities of post-World War II U.S. foreign relations is that selling “war” takes on an entirely new meaning. During the Cold War, the “new world order,” and the

current “war on terror,” administrations have had to market foreign policies and military activities that fall well outside the conventional rubric of “war”. Undeclared conflicts, military interventions, and policy decisions in a hostile international environment have expanded the fronts on which presidents must actively engage the public to solicit support for its policies.” (Frank, 2010 pg. 10)

Frank and Osgood discuss how presidents have gone beyond their presidential authority in pursuit of wars as indicated with the following examples:

“Since World War II, American presidents have deliberately eschewed formal declarations of war. They have authorized military in Korea, Vietnam, Kuwait, Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere without ever asking Congress to approve a war declaration, acting instead on a definition of executive authority so expansive that it likely would have stunned the framers of the constitution.” (Frank, 2010 pg. 254)

Understanding that presidents value and strive to maintain public support is an essential piece of this research paper. The reason for this is that presidents need and require political support from the public as indicated with the two longest wars in the history of the United States of America with the Vietnam War and the present Global War on Terror.

“Both Johnson and George W. Bush found maintaining public support for what became America’s two longest wars far more problematic. As each conflict dragged on inconclusively, public support eroded. Chester Pach demonstrates with arresting detail how LBJ grew obsessed with the need to regain the public’s backing.” (Frank, 2010 pg. 255)

Frank and Osgood touches upon the consequences of not winning a war swiftly or achieving its objectives in a short period of time can lead to a large decline of public opinion.

“No matter how effectively presidents mobilize public support for the initiation of hostilities, however, they invariably encounter enormous difficulties in holding such support whenever a clear and decisive victory is not attained within a reasonable period

of time. Clearly, even under the best of circumstances, democratic politics grow restive during drawn-out, inconclusive wars. The leaders responsible for such conflicts typically pay the price with plummeting levels of public support. Stoler's citation of George Marshall's famous quote about democracies and wars seem particularly apt in this regard. "We could not indulge in a Seven Years' War," the general observed by way of explanation of why the United States moved "brutally fast" in Europe during World War II. "A king can perhaps do that, but you cannot have such a protracted struggle in a democracy in the face of mounting casualties." (Frank, 2010 pg. 256)

Frank and Osgood summarize how Presidents need to maintain public support for long term commitments in the Cold War era. With the Post-Cold War era, it is valuable to look into previous Presidents' approaches in maintaining this relationship of executive office with the public opinion in security policy.

"Cold War presidents from Truman to Reagan recognized the great value of having a public that was broadly supportive of major foreign policy commitments- and, conversely, they recognized the danger of not having that support. For all the policy differences that distinguished their particular approaches to the Cold War, each of those presidents appreciated the importance of mobilizing and maintaining public support for the nation's strategic commitments and massive defense spending." (Frank, 2010 pg. 256)

In *Dictators and Death: Casualty Sensitivity of Autocracies in Militarized Interstate Disputes* (Sirin 2015) Cigdem Sirin discusses the idea of sensitivity of military casualties between democracies and autocracies. The differences and standards between democracies and autocracies is crucial to understanding the importance of popular opinion within a democracy. Standards for autocracies and democracies differ greatly with different forms of government, political environments, and tolerance of fatalities. Sirin defines on how a casualty affects the policies of both democracies and autocracies.

This research is valuable as it helps audiences to better understand how democratic leaders use conflicts as a source of support for governments to build popular support for the intervention of escalating conflicts. Sirin continues to discuss the role of casualties within the politics of states alongside describing and discussing the role of civilians within democracies and autocracies.

“Casualties play a critical role in connecting domestic and international politics as well (Gartzke 2001; Gartner et al. 2004; Koch and Gartner 2005; Gartner 2008). Research suggests that when compared to authoritarian regimes, democracies fight relatively brief wars with fewer casualties (Siverson 1995). Democratic leaders’ accountability to their citizens makes democracies more sensitive to war costs (Gartner et al. 2004; Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2010). The ability of democratic leaders to achieve and maintain office depends on winning majority support of the masses and sustaining popular consent for key policy decisions (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith 1999). Because citizens primarily bear the burden of costly conflicts, they tend to withdraw their wartime support amid rising casualty trends (Gartner 2008; Myers and Hayes 2010) and ultimately punish democratic leaders who use military force irresponsibly (Ray 1995; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003; Leblang and Chan 2003). As such, scholars closely link casualties to the post-conflict fate of leaders, particularly democratic ones (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller 1992; Gartner et al. 2004; Valentino et al. 2010).” (Sirin 2015, pg. 803)

Sirin establishes the idea of democracies tolerating casualty levels within military engagement. While arguing that there are military differences and political differences alongside autocracies and democracies, Sirin establishes political constraints within democracies when engaging in military conflicts.

“In addition to the differences seen across regime types (that is, democracies versus autocracies), research suggests variation within democracies influences casualty levels. For example, Koch and Gartner (2005:875) show that the diffuseness of political

accountability affects the number of casualties a democratic government is willing to tolerate for a given conflict. Such findings reflect the general argument that different democratic structures and contexts (such as presidential versus parliamentary systems, electoral institutions, conscript versus volunteer militaries, and coalition versus single-party governments) produce variations in the political constraints leaders face, thereby affecting their conflict behavior (Ireland and Gartner 2001; Reiter and Tillman 2002; Vasquez 2005).” (Sirin 2015, pg. 803)

In *Public Opinion & International Interventions: Lessons from the Iraq War* (2012) by Richard Sobel, Peter Furia, and Bethany Barratt discusses the consequences and polices learned from the 2003-2011 Iraq War. This research provides valuable insight within the popular support for the Iraq War and how it has established numerous new doctrines and norms within the U.S. intelligence and military’s relationship with the American public.

“If American troops remain in Iraq, does their presence constitute a provocation to Iraqis who might be prepared to employ terrorist tactics against them? If American troops remain in Iraq, does that reduce the incentive for Iraqi military and police units to take an increasingly active and effective role in securing their own country? If American troops or reduced or withdrawn, would that give rise to even greater levels of violence in Iraq by removing the last effective barrier to a full-scale civil war among sectarian forces there? Would it encourage intervention by Iraq’s neighbors on behalf of one or another of its sectarian groups? Would it encourage terrorist groups to view the U.S. as a “paper tiger” and, thus, an inviting target for future attacks? Does the so-called Pottery Barn rule—because the U.S. “broke” Iraq, it now “owns” it—impose an obligation to maintain or perhaps even increase the forces there until the country is stable and secure?” (Sobel, 2012 pg. 21)

Sobel describes the success of the 2004 U.S. troop surge within Iraq in order to maintain the American public with supporting an increase of military forces within a war.

“The apparent success of the troop surge in reducing sectarian violence and America military casualties has resulted in a somewhat greater public willingness to maintain troops in Iraq until the situation there has stabilized” (Sobel, 2012 pg. 23)

Sobel further elaborates that public opinion on foreign policy should be considered as an important matter for research.

“That said, there is growing body of evidence that, while public opinion on foreign policy cannot be dismissed as irrelevant presidents have varied widely in their beliefs about, and sensitivity to, public opinion and survey data” (pg. 24)

In the *Influence of Public Opinion on Post-Cold War US Military Interventions* (2015) by Dieck Helene addresses the public opinion within the end of the Cold War. Since this was made in 2015, this is regarded as one of the most latest and recent developments within the literature review. Dieck specially discusses the experiences of the American public within the Vietnam War.

“Until the 9/11 terrorist attacks, public opinion was perceived as isolationist and unlikely to support a costly war. This perception largely stemmed from the consequences of the Vietnam War, a war between the northern communist regime and the southern government for the reunification of the country” (Helene, 2015 pg. 2)

Dieck discusses that refusal or sense of limitation as the “Vietnam Syndrome”. This syndrome inspires a sense of limitation and refusal to send U.S. troops into present and future conflicts. The war created a lasting “Vietnam syndrome,” causing the United States to be reluctant in committing to engage in long-term military adventures” (Helene, 2015 pg. 2)

Dieck addresses the public’s relationship within the executive and the political elites in the aftermath of 9/11 and in the Global War on Terror. While comparing both the Vietnam War and the Iraq War, Dieck moves into the relationship between presidential decisions making on the public opinion of wars.

“After 9/11, Congress and the public gave “a blank check to the executive to get the people who did this and make sure that it didn’t happen again.” This activist world role resulted in a massive projection of power in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the global war on terror until 2003. Nonetheless, this new sentiment was short-lived. The public’s resilience

about casualties and the absence of success in sight, as was the case during the Vietnam War, finally reached its limit. Lassitude and war fatigue became apparent during the 2006 midterm campaign and military escalations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which resulted in major debates. American public opinion about war seemed to have returned to post-Cold War features. [...] Recent qualitative studies on the relationship between public opinion and US foreign policy put decisions into the following two categories: the president tends to lead or to follow public opinion; public opinion influences decision-making, constraints the decision, or has no impact.” (Helene, 2015 pg. 3)

Dieck begins to discuss the influence of public opinion on military interventions within the post-9/11 world. Often these interventions are lengthy and long-term commitments which relates back to this research paper as it discusses on the public’s commitment to conflicts that are unclear and uncertain.

“Indeed, the question of the influence of public opinion on military interventions is essential to understanding post-Cold War and post-9/11 conflicts; interventions often characterized by their long duration in distant countries with unclear strategic interests. If public opinion is often ready to give the president the leeway to embark on military intervention, the public’s tolerance is difficult to maintain in the long term when troops are on the battlefield and victory appears difficult to define and achieve.” (Helene, 2015 pg. 5)

When discussing the importance of the president’s role with public opinion, Dieck discusses that there can be a strong relationship. The reasons for this is that presidents will

“The characteristics of public opinion can play a very important role. In particular, the president’s popularity (a weekly popular president will listen more to the public opinion than an unpopular or very popular president, a popular president could more easily execute his political agenda), the opinion cycles, the degree of public support, as well as the salience, meaning the degree of interest the public has in a given conflict.” (Helene, 2015 pg. 7)

Dieck discusses the relationship between public opinion and its evolution over the decades with the rise of technology and mass communication. Dieck specifically focuses down

on the idea that the public is divided into isolationists and internationalists thus creating set groups for the President to frame certain foreign policies for.

“The perception of the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy was challenged a few decades ago. The first reason has to do with the technological improvements in the realm of communication, which made international news coverage easier. A second is the end of the consensus on the nation’s role in the world following the Vietnam War. The public seemed to be divided between isolationists and internationalists. The final reason is the end of the Cold War and hence the end of an imminent threat of confrontation between the two superpowers, which allowed the president to avoid consulting Congress and the public.” (Helene, 2015 pg. 23)

In Dieck research discusses the concept that public opinion’s role and influence will determine the president’s actions. The reason for this is because Presidents will commit into wars that they know they will be able to win in order to make worth the human and financial costs within conflicts.

“First, the president’s popularity determines in part public opinion’s influence on military intervention. Brandice Cane-Wrone showed that a weakly popular president will listen more to public opinion than an unpopular or a very popular president. [...] Other theories stressed the role of the type of government: public opinion has more influence in democracies, thanks to the “free exchange of ideas.” Because the public is naturally prone to oppose war efforts because of its human and financial costs, and because elected officials heed the voters’ preferences, democracies are more cautious than autocracies when considering the opportunity to wage a war. As a result, democracies are often more victorious in war than dictatorships.” (Helene, 2015 pg. 25)

In discussing war weariness theory, Morgan’s main definition will be used to discuss the negative effects on wars. Morgan explains his theory,

“This status of war-weariness as an intervening variable between occurrence of one war and the outbreak of a second war lead to yet another problem. Even if it were true that somehow war-weariness or other considerations induce inhibitions in decision-makers

which leave them disinclined to initiate a war, it does not necessarily follow that they would be less likely be involved in a war” (Morgan, Levy 29.)

In war weariness theory, the concept of a reduction of involvement in military conflict is synonymous with the weariness occurs during a war as the population is affected by its costs until a new war appears.

“There are several theoretical reasons why a nation’s war of involvement might reduce the likelihood of its participation in another war in the period immediately following. As the war-weariness hypothesis suggest, war may induce a general revulsion against war and an immunity against subsequent military action until the memory of war fades, when a new generation may approach war with a new enthusiasm” (Morgan, 27)

Morgan also adds the idea that the decision-making elite will influence popular opinion and society with the policymaking process.

“A costly and unsuccessful war might induce weariness in some but demands for revenge in others. The critical questions concern what segments of society share the hypothesized war-weariness, whether these attitudes are also shared by the decision-making elite, and how much influence each of these groups has in the policymaking process” (Morgan, Levy. 28).

Morgan describes that a main point of war weariness is that people will be wary of future wars in the aftermath of ones that are deemed costly, long, and destructive.

“The war weariness hypothesis holds that a state’s involvement in a war, and particularly long and destructive war, reduces the likelihood of its involvement in s wars for subsequent a certain period of time” (Morgan, Levy 46).

Specifically, the research objective is to decisively answer how the War on Terror has created war weariness in the American people. Morgan further discusses that war weariness creates a shock within the state during conflict and because of the prolonged conflict, and

creates more costly wars under this effect. What is missing about this research is the concept of war weariness between wars. As Morgan discusses, there that there is a gap between wars leading to war weariness for future conflicts yet the U.S. has been at war for over ten years since the Invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.

Research Question

RQ: How does war weariness affect popular opinion in military and foreign policy?

The purpose of this research question is to analyze if there is a correlation between war weariness by Americans and the continued War on Terror. The question primarily focuses on the United States of America having popular support for the War on Terror in a prolonged conflict. The link is between military fatalities of U.S military personnel throughout the War on Terror and with U.S support to the War on Terror followed by the time of polling was taken. The reason for the presence of this link is between variables is because there is a positive relationship between fatalities and support for the Global War on Terror. Fatalities have much more weight and are valued as a higher loss compared to Wound in Action (WIA). As Feaver describes that the level of acceptance of fatalities is a function of how the political objectives of the conflict are perceived. So Americans will view the loss of American lives as unacceptable costs in policies. As more American personnel are killed in a conflict, the public opinion will recall its support for current military and foreign policy. This is significant as the U.S military and foreign policy is currently being reviewed for future operations against groups such as the Islamic State of Levant and Iraq (ISIS) or known simply as the Islamic State. Both civilian and military leaders have begun to frame ISIS as a national security threat to the U.S due to recent ISIS-inspired attacks in France, Belgium and in the U.S. The perception of the U.S. being under attack by radical Islam

has increased since the 2016 U.S. Presidential election has commenced. As indicated by the Pew Research Center on January 22nd, 2016, “defending the country from future terrorist attacks” stands at 75% on American public’s priority list for the Presidential election in 2016. This has caused Presidential candidates to create rhetoric with an emphasis on a new narrative to stop the rise of ISIS. Americans have recently been domestically re-exposed to the War on Terror with the San Bernardino shooting in December 2, 2015 perpetrated by ISIS-inspired domestic terrorists. This attack has made security a priority to the American and there has a recent rise of support for the Global War on Terror while seeing a shift of the American public granting support to candidates who advocate for tougher actions upon terrorist groups within Syria and Iraq.

The Independent Variable of this research question is military fatalities per a month from the period of 2004. The Dependent Variable would be popular opinion about security and foreign policy specifically if the American public believes that the U.S and its allies are winning on the War on Terror and whether if the Global War on Terror can be won. This means that whether U.S. military power should be expended in order to protect matters of foreign policies in the global world as dictated by the public. Public perception would therefore be another intervening variable that the support on the Global War on Terror. The research question specifically focused on the extent to which people are willing to continue supporting military operations even in the face of casualties and a prolonged conflict.

Hypothesis

It is the presumption that U.S fatalities will create a decrease in support for wars and fewer casualties will show a rise, or at least curb decrease, in support of combat operations in the War on Terror. The logic follows that if U.S. soldiers in conflict zones are Killed in Action (KIA), then the American public would be unwilling to commit further resources and commitment in military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. This train of thought could be traced back to political leaders such as President Barack Obama, who have been elected with a mandate to gradually withdraw U.S troops during a time when popular support to the War on Terror was in the decline. There is evidence by authors such as Wolfe and Morgan that supportive political elites and politicians are framing conflicts within the present and future wars knowing that the American public is wary of prolonged conflict and of future interventions.

Data and Evidence

Methods and Methodology

To understand the relationship between public polling and casualty rates for this research paper, quantitative methods will be used. Using both descriptive and inferential statistics, research has been done into American polls regarding America's current standing in the War on Terror while looking into U.S. casualties. Observations of trends combined with data of fatalities will serve as a measurement into understanding the values of the variables. This research will be looking into whether there is a correlation between military losses and popular support for the War on Terror. In order to achieve evaluating the relationships of the variables within this data, this paper will analyze the data through using the two tests with a Baseline and a Fixed Effects

Model. The Baseline Model uses linear methods of predicting variables and its regressions. While a Fixed Effects Model treats all variables as if the quantities were non-random. The Baseline Model will be primarily looking into correlations between the main variables and measuring the results of this. Whereas the Fixed Effects model will only look into the year and focus purely on the Independent Variable of fatalities within the Global War on Terror and its relationship with American support on the war. A third test will be used with using a Distributed Lag Model with having the Independent Variable being a month behind the Dependent Variable. The data will be primarily of U.S. Forces that are considered fatalities in the War on Terror by accessing the list of combat losses since the beginning of the 2004.

The reason for choosing these models is that by incorporating regression analysis of the Independent and Dependent Variables, this paper will be able to analyze variation between the variables. The Baseline Model was used to purely analyze these variables in order to view a bivariate plot alongside with analyzing the relationship between these variables. It is the belief of this research paper that in order to look into the relationship and estimate the coefficients of the variables, then using a Baseline Model was an important part of the process. Yet this did not create a positive relationship so in order to address the faults of the Baseline Model, it was decided that using a Fixed Effects Model in order to analyze much smaller changes in order to look at the wide range of data within the research. This allows this research paper to analyze regressions on different levels of the fixed effects of fatalities and support for the Global War on Terror. This permitted this research paper to set omitted variables bias and to introduce the variable of time into the relationship of the Independent and Dependent variable. While using the Distributed Lag Model to account for the possibility that American support was a response of the previous month. This model permitted this research paper to analyze the same effect as if it in

relation to the previous month, accounting for a lag of time. This distributed lag allowed the research to analyze the Independent Variable of fatalities within a particular set of time in order to influence the Dependent Variable of support for the Global War on Terror.

Independent Variable: Military Fatalities within the Afghanistan (2001-present) and Iraq War (2003-2011).

Dependent Variable: Support of U.S. and its allies in the Global War on Terror and whether if they are winning or not

Control Variable: President Approval rating will be used as a measurement between both variables

The goal of this is to use a Baseline model to analyze sampled data and the scale of measurement of military losses. Two models are to be used in analyzing these sets of data; one model is the Baseline model to see if there is a significant correlation between the two variables. The other model that is a Fixed Effects model to understand the relationship between popular opinion and its relationship yearly. The Fixed Effect Model uses time and incorporates this with public opinion by measurement of years. The goal is to establish whether the total fatality count is significant within the model. This will also allow for analysis to examine whether or not presidential approving ratings will account for strong correlations within popular opinion.

When the data is compiled it will be used to account for combat fatalities to be compared to popular support. US fatalities from both OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM have been incorporated as well. These figures are sourced from the Casualty Status of the U.S. Department of Defense and will be integral to analysis of the relations between conflict fatalities and overall public support. Furthermore, this research paper analyzes U.S

support for the Global War on Terror by Rasmussen Reports. Rasmussen Reports engages in monthly surveys within the American public of whether the U.S and its allies are winning in the War on Terror. This survey allows this research paper to correlate and analyze the relationship between the US public and the casualties during the Global War on Terror.

Afterwards the Baseline and Fixed Effects models will be compared to identify relationships between the two variables or differences between the proportions of the data. In doing so the research will be able to track correlations and make inferences throughout the research on casualties and popular support throughout the quarters. Utilizing the data already being gathered and collected every month of nearly every year of U.S combat losses, the goal of using quarters is to see correlations and peaks of both casualties and support throughout the years of the War on Terror. Recognizing that there will be some missing data within polls, using quarters will be the more effective measurement of looking at trends within the Global War on Terror. A Distributed Lag Model was used to account for this by having the support for the Global War on Terror analyzed based off fatalities of the previous month.

It is the hope that this will answer several questions and whether or not there is a lag of fatalities within a past period between fatalities of the previous month to a poll. It is the goal to use this model to understanding if there is variation of U.S support and whether the amount of U.S combat losses in the War on Terror has led to decrease or increase of support for continued operations. It is expected that when casualties rise, popular support decreases. In order to find variation, this research paper seeks to find results and data from the U.S. support and U.S. combat losses throughout the past ten years.

Results


The result of the correlation between military fatalities in Iraq and Afghanistan alongside U.S support to the War on Terror is inconclusive. The specific measures of looking into combat losses and American belief of winning in the Global War on terror does not match as much as expected. This signals that U.S combat losses did not affect popular support to the War on Terror and if we were winning or not. What was discovered was that there was a relationship between fatalities and support for the war using a Fixed Effects model with years. As fatalities goes up, so does the support for the war go down. Furthermore, in a Fixed Effects model, presidential support is not as significant as expected. The phenomenon of Americans influenced by only military fatalities within wars resulted in a negative correlation. Yet under a Fixed Effects model using years as a variable, the American public will be affected and influence for the war will be a positive correlation. Each data set was then correlated between the Independent and Dependent Variables, allowing regressions between observations. This allowed paper to view coefficients and standard errors as well. Using OLS Regression for support for the Global War on Terror, this research paper found significance over calculating the P value or the observed sample results relating to the models being used. Using this over the Independent Variable of Fatalities within the Baseline, Fixed Effects, and Distributed Lag Model. The result led to weak evidence with Baseline and a Lag Model yet showed strong evidence with Fixed Effects. There was also significance over with the President Approval Rating.

This is further expanded upon by using the main values of regression:


OLS regression – Support for U.S. Global War on Terror

	Baseline	Fixed Effects	Lagged Model
Fatalities	.041 (2.02)**	-.0477(-2.06)**	.069(-2.06)**
President Approval Rating	.0140 (1.61)	.132(1.2)	.068(1.5)
Constant	34.02 (8.05)***	45.37 (7.2)***	40.08(7.3)***
N	117	117	115
R2	.045	.695	.695

Using the Baseline Model did not meet expectations as shown in the graphs; there was a negative relationship. The results showed both that fatalities in a Baseline Model did not show a strong correlation and that while total fatalities within the Global War on Terror was significant in the model, it did not positively correlate with the public opinion. As shown with Figure 1 and 2, included is a scatter plot graph analyzing the relationship of the variables.



(Figure 1)



(Figure 2)

The results of these Figures show that while a Baseline Model is useful in demonstrating the relationship between fatalities and popular opinion, it does not accurately measure the relationship between the Independent and Dependent Variables. As shown in Figure 2, there is a negative relationship between Fatalities and Public Opinion.

In order to address this, this research paper used a Fixed Effects Model to focus on the time in the Independent Variables of fatalities within the Global War on Terror. This model allows this research paper to control for a constant over time and is important into looking into the effects of fatalities and only fatalities. The final model used to analyze data is the Distributed Lag Model. This model was important with analyzing the prospect that the results of the American public in support for the Global War on Terror could be a response from fatalities of the previous month. Similar to the Fixed Effects Model, it was found that there were similar results using the Fixed Effects Model and that there is a stronger relationship between the lag periods.

Analyzing R-Squared (R²) is important as it is the percentage of response to a variable variation that can be explained through my Baseline Model, Fixed Effects Model, and Distributed Lag Model. The expected result was an R² that equated to Explained Variation/Total Variation and observed value and fitted value. What this research paper focuses on is 0%-100% on variability of the response on data around its mean. Using Regression on U.S. allies winning on the Global War on Terror and for Total fatalities of Afghanistan and Iraq, regressions had been used with every variable. The goal was to analyze data using both observations and a Fixed Effects by years. The results indicate that the adjusted R² is 0.0289³ for a Baseline Model regression. Compared to a in a Linear Regression of the Baseline Model and an R² is 0.0456⁴. While using a Linear Regression with Fixed Effects by years, the R² changes to a 0.6952⁵. Compared to using a Distributed Lag Model, the R² with both a Fixed Effects regression and

³ See Annex Results and Data

⁴ See Annex Results and Data

⁵ See Annex Results and Data

correlation with the variables leads to similar results with the Fixed Effects Model with having a R2 of 0.6952⁶.

An explanation of these results is that Americans may not be keenly aware of fatalities and that a combination of mass media not reporting on deaths alongside framing by political elites may have influenced Americans that the war wasn't as costly as some predicted. There is also the possibility that other factors could've accounted for American war weariness instead of fatalities such as domestic issues within the United States. It is difficult to say with certainty on why Americans did not believe in fatalities as a measurement of war weariness as with time commitment lingered within Afghanistan and Iraq, and while there were limited fatalities, war weariness still remain in effect and support for the Global War on Terror did in fact decreased because U.S. forces remained within combat zones.

⁶ See Annex Lag Data

Conclusion

Since the initial invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the Global War on Terror will enter its 15th in the year 2016. The findings of this research paper show that the American public can be both influenced by military fatalities, and by the political elite decision makers. Popular support for the Global War on Terror has decreased over time because of both fatalities and the passage of time regarding a war/conflict; Americans have proven to be incapable of addressing this. It seems that whether or not the threat of terrorism continues and whether the U.S will completely withdraw from the Middle-East remain significant questions. Moreover, they beg the question: could the Global War on Terror truly end? The idea that Americans are weary of war seems to be a topic of debate well into the year 2016. The threat and rise of terrorist groups such as ISIS has reshaped and led politicians to reframe the threat of terrorism. The significant aspect of this research paper is in proving that the American public is willing to support and continue a war as long as fatalities are low.

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Annexes: Results and Statistical Analysis

. br

. reg usallieswinninginwaronterror totalforall presidentapprovalratings

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =	117
Model	307.897446	2	153.948723	F(2, 114) =	2.72
Residual	6441.17948	114	56.5015744	Prob > F =	0.0698
				R-squared =	0.0456
				Adj R-squared =	0.0289
Total	6749.07692	116	58.1816976	Root MSE =	7.5168

usallieswi~r	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
totalforall	.0409885	.0202715	2.02	0.046	.0008308	.0811462
presidenta~s	.1403674	.087358	1.61	0.111	-.0326882	.313423
_cons	34.02252	4.225751	8.05	0.000	25.65134	42.3937

. reg usallieswinninginwaronterror totalforall presidentapprovalratings, robust
> t

Linear regression

Number of obs = 117
F(2, 114) = 2.07
Prob > F = 0.1306
R-squared = 0.0456
Root MSE = 7.5168

usallieswi~r	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
totalforall	.0409885	.0227193	1.80	0.074	-.0040183	.0859953
presidenta~s	.1403674	.0984044	1.43	0.156	-.0545711	.3353058
_cons	34.02252	4.983714	6.83	0.000	24.14982	43.89522

. pwcorr usallieswinninginwaronterror presidentapprovalratings totalforall

	usalli~r	presid~s	totalf~l
usallieswi~r	1.0000		
presidenta~s	0.1067	1.0000	
totalforall	0.1549	-0.2337	1.0000


```
. reg usallieswinninginwaronterror totalforall presidentapprovalratings
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =	117
Model	307.897446	2	153.948723	F(2, 114) =	2.72
Residual	6441.17948	114	56.5015744	Prob > F =	0.0698
Total	6749.07692	116	58.1816976	R-squared =	0.0456
				Adj R-squared =	0.0289
				Root MSE =	7.5168

usallieswi~r	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
totalforall	.0409885	.0202715	2.02	0.046	.0008308	.0811462
presidenta~s	.1403674	.087358	1.61	0.111	-.0326882	.313423
_cons	34.02252	4.225751	8.05	0.000	25.65134	42.3937

```
. reg usallieswinninginwaronterror totalforall presidentapprovalratings i.year
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =	117
Model	4691.65817	13	360.896783	F(13, 103) =	18.07
Residual	2057.41875	103	19.9749393	Prob > F =	0.0000
Total	6749.07692	116	58.1816976	R-squared =	0.6952
				Adj R-squared =	0.6567
				Root MSE =	4.4693

usallieswi~r	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
totalforall	-.0477954	.0231828	-2.06	0.042	-.093773	-.0018177
presidenta~s	.1326681	.1107445	1.20	0.234	-.0869675	.3523037
year						
2005	-4.164553	2.15633	-1.93	0.056	-8.441125	.112019
2006	-5.997051	2.442336	-2.46	0.016	-10.84085	-1.153255
2007	-6.778351	2.697911	-2.51	0.014	-12.12902	-1.42768
2008	.0343667	3.281854	0.01	0.992	-6.474418	6.543151
2009	-3.819635	2.381246	-1.60	0.112	-8.542275	.9030048
2010	-7.737056	2.327754	-3.32	0.001	-12.35361	-3.120505
2011	-4.348014	2.416854	-1.80	0.075	-9.141273	.4452458
2012	-2.301376	2.544444	-0.90	0.368	-7.34768	2.744929
2013	-12.71229	3.335514	-3.81	0.000	-19.32749	-6.097082
2014	-17.16505	3.543419	-4.84	0.000	-24.19258	-10.13751
2015	-25.51178	2.974261	-8.58	0.000	-31.41053	-19.61304
_cons	45.3744	6.304633	7.20	0.000	32.87065	57.87815

```
. reg usallieswinninginwaronterror totalforall presidentapprovalratings i.year
> , robust
```

Linear regression

```
Number of obs = 117
F( 13, 103) = 23.72
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.6952
Root MSE = 4.4693
```

usallieswi~r	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
totalforall	-.0477954	.0213877	-2.23	0.028	-.0902129	-.0053778
presidenta~s	.1326681	.1248026	1.06	0.290	-.1148485	.3801847
year						
2005	-4.164553	1.587595	-2.62	0.010	-7.313173	-1.015933
2006	-5.997051	2.02766	-2.96	0.004	-10.01844	-1.975665
2007	-6.778351	2.509424	-2.70	0.008	-11.7552	-1.801501
2008	.0343667	3.204613	0.01	0.991	-6.321228	6.389961
2009	-3.819635	2.120668	-1.80	0.075	-8.02548	.3862093
2010	-7.737056	1.925977	-4.02	0.000	-11.55678	-3.917336
2011	-4.348014	2.829247	-1.54	0.127	-9.959158	1.263131
2012	-2.301376	2.034803	-1.13	0.261	-6.336927	1.734175
2013	-12.71229	2.315492	-5.49	0.000	-17.30452	-8.120056
2014	-17.16505	3.703406	-4.63	0.000	-24.50988	-9.820216
2015	-25.51178	2.530826	-10.08	0.000	-30.53108	-20.49249
_cons	45.3744	6.897694	6.58	0.000	31.69445	59.05435

Annexes: Lagged Data

. pwcorr totalfatalities totalforall

	totalf~s	totalf~l
totalfatal~s	1.0000	
totalforall	0.7850	1.0000

. reg usallieswinninginwaronerror totalforall presidentapprovalratings i.year

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =	117
Model	4691.65817	13	360.896783	F(13, 103) =	18.07
Residual	2057.41875	103	19.9749393	Prob > F =	0.0000
Total	6749.07692	116	58.1816976	R-squared =	0.6952
				Adj R-squared =	0.6567
				Root MSE =	4.4693

usallieswi~r	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
totalforall	-.0477954	.0231828	-2.06	0.042	-.093773 - .0018177
presidenta~s	.1326681	.1107445	1.20	0.234	-.0869675 .3523037
year					
2005	-4.164553	2.15633	-1.93	0.056	-8.441125 .112019
2006	-5.997051	2.442336	-2.46	0.016	-10.84085 -1.153255
2007	-6.778351	2.697911	-2.51	0.014	-12.12902 -1.42768
2008	.0343667	3.281854	0.01	0.992	-6.474418 6.543151
2009	-3.819635	2.381246	-1.60	0.112	-8.542275 .9030048
2010	-7.737056	2.327754	-3.32	0.001	-12.35361 -3.120505
2011	-4.348014	2.416854	-1.80	0.075	-9.141273 .4452458
2012	-2.301376	2.544444	-0.90	0.368	-7.34768 2.744929
2013	-12.71229	3.335514	-3.81	0.000	-19.32749 -6.097082
2014	-17.16505	3.543419	-4.84	0.000	-24.19258 -10.13751
2015	-25.51178	2.974261	-8.58	0.000	-31.41053 -19.61304
_cons	45.3744	6.304633	7.20	0.000	32.87065 57.87815

. *using lag fatalities

. reg usallieswinninginwaronerror totalfatalities presidentapprovalratings i.year

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =	115
Model	4570.78262	13	351.598663	F(13, 101) =	16.62
Residual	2136.26086	101	21.1510976	Prob > F =	0.0000
Total	6707.04348	114	58.8337147	R-squared =	0.6815
				Adj R-squared =	0.6405
				Root MSE =	4.599


usallieswi~r	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
totalfatal~s	.0043836	.0248094	0.18	0.860	-.0448314 .0535987
presidenta~s	.1490717	.1140556	1.31	0.194	-.0771839 .3753274
year					
2005	-3.926258	2.367108	-1.66	0.100	-8.621964 .7694474
2006	-5.546051	2.646144	-2.10	0.039	-10.79529 -2.2968124
2007	-7.058111	2.930107	-2.41	0.018	-12.87065 -1.245567
2008	2.721031	3.387368	0.80	0.424	-3.998597 9.440659
2009	-1.546786	2.557358	-0.60	0.547	-6.619897 3.526325
2010	-5.57432	2.469812	-2.26	0.026	-10.47376 -.6748776
2011	-1.872523	2.550497	-0.73	0.465	-6.932023 3.186977
2012	.845562	2.697027	0.31	0.755	-4.504614 6.195738
2013	-8.65017	3.392554	-2.55	0.012	-15.38008 -1.920256
2014	-12.86653	3.521081	-3.65	0.000	-19.85141 -5.881654
2015	-21.11544	3.12898	-6.75	0.000	-27.3225 -14.90839
_cons	40.10553	6.442716	6.22	0.000	27.32492 52.88615

```
. reg usallieswinninginwaronerror totalforall totalfatalities presidentapprovalratings i
> .year
```


Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =	115
Model	4667.57912	14	333.398508	F(14, 100) =	16.35
Residual	2039.46436	100	20.3946436	Prob > F =	0.0000
Total	6707.04348	114	58.8337147	R-squared =	0.6959
				Adj R-squared =	0.6534
				Root MSE =	4.516

usallieswi~r	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
totalforall	-.0541061	.0248356	-2.18	0.032	-.1033793	-.004833
totalfatal~s	.0134618	.0247155	0.54	0.587	-.035573	.0624966
presidenta~s	.1247852	.1125509	1.11	0.270	-.0985127	.348083
year						
2005	-4.324926	2.331586	-1.85	0.067	-8.950727	.3008738
2006	-5.940677	2.604701	-2.28	0.025	-11.10833	-.7730248
2007	-6.983575	2.877437	-2.43	0.017	-12.69233	-1.274823
2008	.2300525	3.51728	0.07	0.948	-6.748131	7.208236
2009	-3.378417	2.648214	-1.28	0.205	-8.632399	1.875564
2010	-7.422056	2.569271	-2.89	0.005	-12.51942	-2.324696
2011	-4.010174	2.689828	-1.49	0.139	-9.346715	1.326368
2012	-1.815712	2.916511	-0.62	0.535	-7.601986	3.970563
2013	-12.19511	3.707496	-3.29	0.001	-19.55067	-4.839541
2014	-16.75069	3.890156	-4.31	0.000	-24.46865	-9.032733
2015	-24.86948	3.522736	-7.06	0.000	-31.85849	-17.88048
_cons	45.08673	6.726955	6.70	0.000	31.74065	58.43282

Annexes: Graphs and Data



(Figure 1)



(Figure 2)

Annexes: War Weariness Data

Dates	US/Allies Winning in War on Terror	Fatalities in Afghanistan	Military Fatalities in Iraq	Total for all	President Approval Ratings	Dates for lag	US/Allies Winning in War on Terror By Lag	Total Fatalities
4/12/2004	48	3	140	143	52			
5/24/2004	45	9	84	93	47	4/12/2004	48	93
6/7/2004	47	5	50	55	48	5/24/2004	45	55
7/12/2004	44	2	58	60	49	6/7/2004	47	60
8/23/2004	46	4	75	79	49	7/12/2004	44	79
9/20/2004	47	4	87	91	54	8/23/2004	46	91
10/11/2004	52	8	68	76	51	9/20/2004	47	76
11/8/2004	50	7	141	148	53	10/11/2004	52	148
12/13/2004	50	2	76	78	49	11/8/2004	50	78
2/11/2005	47	1	60	61	49	12/13/2004	50	148
4/8/2005	47	18	39	57	50	2/11/2005	47	129
5/14/2005	44	4	88	92	46	4/8/2005	47	92
6/5/2005	42	27	83	110	47	5/14/2005	44	110
7/13/2005	44	2	58	60	49	6/5/2005	42	60
8/10/2005	38	15	85	100	45	7/13/2005	44	100
9/14/2005	40	11	52	63	45	8/10/2005	38	63
10/15/2005	39	7	99	106	39	9/14/2005	40	106
11/30/2005	48	3	86	89	38	10/15/2005	39	89
12/17/2005	44	3	68	71	41	11/30/2005	48	71
1/13/2006	44	1	64	65	43	12/17/2005	44	65
2/24/2006	39	17	58	75	38	1/13/2006	44	75
3/13/2006	41	7	34	41	36	2/24/2006	39	41
4/19/2006	39	1	82	83	36	3/13/2006	41	83
5/5/2006	40	11	79	90	31	4/19/2006	39	90
6/9/2006	41	18	63	81	38	5/5/2006	40	81
7/5/2006	44	9	45	54	40	6/9/2006	41	54
8/2/2006	39	10	66	76	37	7/5/2006	44	76

9/14/2006	41	6	77	83	44	8/2/2006	39	83
10/7/2006	38	10	111	121	37	9/14/2006	41	121
11/16/2006	45	7	78	85	33	10/7/2006	38	85
12/8/2006	35	1	115	116	38	11/16/2006	45	116
1/3/2007	33	0	86	86	37	12/8/2006	35	86
2/21/2007	36	14	85	99	37	1/3/2007	33	99
3/19/2007	38	5	82	87	34	2/21/2007	36	87
4/11/2007	37	8	117	125	36	3/19/2007	38	125
5/7/2007	36	11	131	142	34	4/11/2007	37	142
6/15/2007	40	12	108	120	32	5/7/2007	36	120
7/18/2007	36	14	89	103	31	6/15/2007	40	103
8/20/2007	39	18	88	106	32	7/18/2007	36	106
9/21/2007	39	8	70	78	36	8/20/2007	39	78
10/21/2007	43	10	40	50	32	9/21/2007	39	50
11/22/2007	47	11	40	51	32	10/21/2007	43	51
1/2/2008	43	7	40	47	32	11/22/2007	47	55
2/1/2008	49	1	30	31	34	1/2/2008	43	31
3/24/2008	47	8	40	48	32	2/1/2008	49	48
4/16/2008	45	5	52	57	28	3/24/2008	47	57
5/10/2008	39	17	21	38	29	4/16/2008	45	38
6/2/2008	42	28	31	59	30	5/10/2008	39	59
7/7/2008	46	20	13	33	31	6/2/2008	42	33
8/25/2008	54	22	23	45	29	7/7/2008	46	45
9/1/2008	47	27	25	52	33	8/25/2008	54	52
10/6/2008	52	16	14	30	25	9/1/2008	47	30
11/11/2008	60	1	17	18	29	10/6/2008	52	18
12/15/2008	46	3	16	19	29	11/11/2008	60	19
1/13/2009	47	15	16	31	34	12/15/2008	46	31
2/4/2009	62	15	18	33	65	1/13/2009	47	33
3/28/2009	46	13	9	22	61	2/4/2009	62	22
4/11/2009	50	6	19	25	61	3/28/2009	46	25
5/24/2009	52	12	25	37	64	4/11/2009	50	37
6/11/2009	49	25	15	40	61	5/24/2009	52	40

7/11/2009	48	45	8	53	58	6/11/2009	49	53
8/29/2009	42	51	7	58	50	7/11/2009	48	58
9/30/2009	43	40	10	50	52	8/29/2009	42	50
10/28/2009	42	59	11	70	53	9/30/2009	43	70
12/29/2009	36	18	3	21	51	10/28/2009	42	80
1/26/2010	38	30	6	36	48	12/29/2009	36	36
2/21/2010	50	31	6	37	49	1/26/2010	38	37
3/21/2010	42	26	7	33	48	2/21/2010	50	33
4/22/2010	42	20	8	28	50	3/21/2010	42	28
5/20/2010	39	34	6	40	48	4/22/2010	42	40
7/5/2010	39	65	4	69	46	5/20/2010	39	42
8/4/2010	39	55	3	58	45	7/5/2010	39	58
9/8/2010	46	42	7	49	46	8/4/2010	39	49
10/10/2010	42	50	2	52	46	9/8/2010	46	52
11/9/2010	45	53	2	55	44	10/10/2010	42	55
12/3/2010	37	33	1	34	46	11/9/2010	45	34
1/3/2011	38	25	6	31	48	12/3/2010	37	31
2/1/2011	39	20	3	23	47	1/3/2011	38	23
3/6/2011	40	31	2	33	46	2/1/2011	39	33
4/7/2011	32	46	11	57	45	3/6/2011	40	57
5/3/2011	55	35	2	37	51	4/7/2011	32	37
6/6/2011	50	47	15	62	46	5/3/2011	55	62
7/10/2011	52	37	5	42	46	6/6/2011	50	42
8/9/2011	44	71	0	71	40	7/10/2011	52	71
9/8/2011	49	42	4	46	43	8/9/2011	44	46
10/9/2011	46	31	4	35	40	9/8/2011	49	35
11/7/2011	46	18	2	20	43	10/9/2011	46	20
12/12/2011	50	15	0	15	42	11/7/2011	46	15
1/20/2012	48	26	0	26	45	12/12/2011	50	26
2/20/2012	51	16	1	17	45	1/20/2012	48	17
3/21/2012	50	18	0	18	46	2/20/2012	51	18
4/30/2012	51	35	0	35	48	3/21/2012	50	35
5/30/2012	51	40	0	40	46	4/30/2012	51	40

7/9/2012	47	41	0	41	46	5/30/2012	51	40
8/20/2012	50	39	0	39	46	7/9/2012	47	39
9/23/2012	45	19	0	19	49	8/20/2012	50	19
10/31/2012	49	16	0	16	52	9/23/2012	45	16
11/20/2012	44	16	0	16	52	10/31/2012	49	16
12/22/2012	45	13	0	13	57	11/20/2012	44	13
1/29/2013	42	3	0	3	53	12/22/2012	45	3
4/23/2013	37	13	0	13	51	1/29/2013	42	27
7/16/2013	40		0	0	47	4/23/2013	37	16
10/16/2013	36	13	0	13	43	7/16/2013	40	26
1/19/2014	39	7	0	7	40	10/16/2013	36	27
4/17/2014	35	4	0	4	44	1/19/2014	39	13
7/27/2014	35	2	0	2	41	4/17/2014	35	2
8/27/2014	25	5	0	5	41	7/27/2014	35	5
1/23/2015	23	0	0	0	49	8/27/2014	25	0
2/20/2015	19	0	0	0	46	1/23/2015	23	0
3/18/2015	33	0	1	1	45	2/20/2015	19	1
4/15/2015	29	1	1	2	46	3/18/2015	33	2
5/13/2015	25	1	1	2	47	4/15/2015	29	2
6/10/2015	27	2	0	2	45	5/13/2015	25	2
7/2/2015	27	0	0	0	46	6/10/2015	27	0
8/11/2015	25	3	0	3	46	7/2/2015	27	3
9/6/2015	25	1	2	3	46	8/11/2015	25	3
10/4/2015	26	8	1	9	47	9/6/2015	25	9
						10/4/2015	26	0