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Incidence and Patterns of Representation Campaign Tactics A Comparison of Manufacturing and Service Unions

Thomas F. Reed

Using data on 430 campaigns provided by organizers employed by eight U.S. unions, this paper examines the incidence and patterns of organizing tactics in representation campaigns. Three issues are addressed: how prevalent are various organizing strategies and tactics?; do tactics differ by union type?; and do patterns exist among campaign tactics?

The decline in union density in the United States has led researchers (e.g. Lawler 1990; Kochan 1985) and the labor movement (e.g. Report of the AFL-CIO Committee on the Evolution of Work 1985) to examine problems in union organizing. Among its many recommendations, the AFL-CIO report encouraged unions to explore new organizing methods. Some unions have experimented with new organizing techniques, and a few labor-oriented consulting firms now assist unions to implement new, and often aggressive, strategies and tactics. Not much is known, however, about the use of union tactics in representation campaigns.

This paper examines the incidence and patterns of organizing tactics in a sample of representation campaigns. Three issues are addressed. First, how prevalent are various organizing strategies and tactics? Prior research, which has focused on individual cases or

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descriptions of a few campaigns, suggests that new organizing techniques may be increasing in importance (Craft and Extejt 1983). Are new organizing methods gaining widespread acceptance among union organizers, or is their importance exaggerated in the business, popular, and scholarly literatures?

Second, do tactics differ by union type? Researchers have tended to ignore differences among unions. Lewin and Feuille described the problem as "the 'union as a black box' weakness: researchers in all disciplines often treat the union as nothing more than a present-or-absent dummy variable. Such treatment assumes that a union is a union, but this is clearly an erroneous assumption" (1983:359). In an apparent response to calls for studies that explore the differential effects of unions, researchers recently have explored the effects of union characteristics on organizing outcomes (Maranto and Fiorito 1987) and bargaining outcomes (Fiorito and Hendricks 1987).

Our concern in this paper is the differential use of tactics by manufacturing and service unions. Prior research suggests that service unions employ a different breed of organizer than manufacturing unions (Reed 1990a). Organizers employed by service unions tend to be younger, more highly educated, more socially mobile, and much more likely to be female and *not* former rank-and-file union members than are their colleagues employed by unions that organize manufacturing sectors of the economy. These differences among organizers may result in the use of different tactics by service union and manufacturing union organizers.

Prior research also suggests that service unions conduct fundamentally different campaigns than manufacturing unions (Reed 1990b). Service unions are much more likely than manufacturing unions to obtain first contracts; they organize much larger units, take longer to do so, and organize more efficiently. These differences in campaign characteristics suggest that service unions may employ different tactics than manufacturing unions.

Third, do patterns exist among campaign tactics? Craft and Extejt (1983) offered one conceptualization of how tactics may be grouped together in campaigns. This paper explores their classification of tactics and then empirically investigates relationships among tactics to determine which ones tend to be used in conjunction with one another, and which tactics tend not to be used together.

ORGANIZING STRATEGIES AND TACTICS

Craft and Extejt (1983) provided an overview of strategies and tactics in union organizing. The authors identified four approaches used

by unions: (1) the classical approach; (2) corporate power strategy; (3) community acceptance and integration; and (4) collective bargaining strategy. The present paper is concerned with the use of the first three strategies, and the descriptions are based on Craft and Extejt's research.

The Classical Approach is the highly decentralized ("retail") approach to union organizing that has been used for decades. In fact, it might be useful to think of this as the "default" approach to union organizing. The union organizer makes contact with workers and mobilizes their job dissatisfaction into support for the union. The organizer emphasizes the instrumentality of the union for achieving the workers' goals. He or she makes contact with as many workers as possible by visiting them in their homes, holding meetings, and forming organizing committees. Folklore holds that an organizer sometimes takes a job in the plant he or she is trying to organize.

The second organizing strategy is a new one, the Corporate Power approach. Pressure to recognize the union is put on management by the organizer and union supporters. The union's research department investigates interlocking directorates (Pennings 1980), and publicizes directors' professional (and personal) activities and affiliations that might prove embarrassing to the targeted company. The union pressures company directors, and the other firms on whose boards they serve, to use their influence to secure adherence by the firm to the letter and spirit of the law and, possibly, to immediately recognize the union. Picketing is conducted at the plant, company headquarters, and the annual stockholders' meeting. The union withdraws, or threatens to withdraw, its own pension fund investments in the company. Additionally, the union solicits threats of disinvestment by other organizations such as religious groups, unions, or local governments. Finally, the union organizes a boycott of the company's products to exert consumer and financial pressure on the firm to recognize the union, or to reduce its opposition to the union.

The third and final strategy also is a new one, which may be called the Community Acceptance and Integration approach. Unions tend to use this organizing strategy in locations where there is not a strong union presence. The union uses paid advertisements to convey labor's message to both targeted workers and the general public. The union builds coalitions with community and religious organizations to secure additional legitimacy and resources. To facilitate the development of union support among workers, the union may use petitions rather than confidential authorization cards, and otherwise publicize the names of key members of the organizing committee and other supporters of the union.

We know very little about the incidence of these various tactics, and the impact of tactics on representation campaign outcomes. Some recent evidence suggests that coalition-building is associated with an increased union percent vote and an increased probability of a union victory, while paid advertisements is associated with reduced votes and a reduced probability of a union victory (Reed 1989). Another study found that increasing participation by workers in the organizing committee is associated with an increased probability of the union securing a first contract, while coalition-building is associated with a dramatic reduction in the probability of the union gaining a first contract (Reed in press). The dearth of research on union tactics, and the potentially important role that tactics play in organizing campaigns, suggest that it is a worthwhile topic for investigation. This paper attempts to fill some of the void in our understanding of union campaign tactics by answering the following three questions: (1) how prevalent are various strategies and tactics?; (2) do tactics differ by union type?; and (3) do patterns exist among union tactics?

HYPOTHESES

We expect there will be differences in the use of tactics by service and manufacturing unions. Specifically, we hypothesize that manufacturing unions will use the Classical Approach to organizing more than service unions. This is because manufacturing unions are less likely than service unions to employ the "new breed" of organizer identified by Reed (1990a) and discussed above. These "traditional" organizers may be more inclined to use the classical approach to organizing because of the socialization processes they go through as members and employees of manufacturing unions. Therefore, we expect that organizers from manufacturing unions will visit a greater proportion of workers in their homes (*Home Visits*); will have greater worker participation in meetings (*Meeting Attendance*) and organizing committees (*Committee Participation*); will have contact with a greater proportion of workers in the election unit (*Contact*); will take a job in the plant with more frequency (*Job in Plant*); and will use *Leaflet Distribution* to communicate with workers more often than organizers from service unions.

Further, we hypothesize that service unions will use the Corporate Power strategy and Community Acceptance and Integration strategy more often than manufacturing unions. As stated above, there are two reasons for this. First, service unions are more likely than manufacturing unions to employ the "new breed" of organizer (Reed, 1990a), and these organizers may be more willing than their manufacturing union counterparts to experiment with new organizing techniques. Second,

there is evidence that campaigns conducted by service unions differ from those conducted by manufacturing unions (Reed 1990b). These differences in campaigns may lead to different types of tactics being chosen by service union organizers. Specifically, we expect that the differences in campaigns will lead organizers to forsake the default set of tactics (i.e. Classical Approach tactics) for the new Corporate Power tactics and Community Acceptance and Integration tactics.

Under the Corporate Power strategy, we expect that picketing at the plant (*Plant Picketing*), company headquarters (*H.Q. Picketing*) and stockholder meetings (*Stockholder Picketing*), as well as threats of pension fund disinvestment (*Pension Threat*) and product or service boycotts (*Company Boycott*) will more likely be used by organizers from service unions rather than manufacturing unions.

Under the Community Acceptance and Integration strategy, we expect that service unions will be more likely to make *Public* the names of union supporters, to use *Petitions* rather than authorization cards during the preliminary stage of the campaign, to use the media to disseminate the union message (*Paid Advertisements*), and to build coalitions with community and religious groups (*Built Coalitions*) than manufacturing unions.

METHODS

Data on organizing tactics were obtained from surveys completed by union organizers employed by eight unions. An Organizing Campaign Survey elicited information on each organizing campaign managed by the organizer for the years 1982 through 1986. A total of 435 surveys were returned by 64 organizers (mean = 6.87; standard deviation = 7.96). Missing values reduced the usable sample to 430 or 425, depending on the variable being examined. The response rate for the survey was 44 percent.

The survey contained a list of tactics and requested the organizer to place a check mark next to those tactics he or she used in the campaign. These tactics were coded to equal one if used in the campaign, and to equal zero otherwise. The survey also requested the organizer to estimate the percentage of workers in each campaign who received home visits, attended at least one meeting, participated in the organizing committee, or had personal contact with the organizer. The organizers were instructed by the researcher and their union's director of organizing to consult files and archives to obtain information needed to accurately complete the survey.

As an initial test of the hypotheses, T-tests were computed to compare the incidence of tactics used by manufacturing and service unions. Then a logistic regression analysis was conducted with the dependent variable, *Service*, set equal to one if the campaign was conducted by a service union, and set equal to zero if the campaign was conducted by a manufacturing union. The purpose of this procedure was to perform a multivariate test of the relationship between the incidence of tactics and the type of union. The reader should note that in the presence of exogenous variables that are not normally distributed (such as the dichotomous variables used in this study), logistic regression – not discriminant analysis – is the maximum likelihood estimator (Maddala 1983). It is also worth noting that the purpose of this analysis is not to "explain" the dependent variable (service versus manufacturing union), but to determine whether a nonlinear combination of tactics variables can discriminate between the two types of unions.

Finally, to explore the pattern of relationships among tactics, a correlation table is presented, and these correlation coefficients are then used as similarity measures in a multidimensional scaling procedure (Kruskal and Wish 1989; Green and Rao 1972; Green and Carmone 1970).

RESULTS

Incidence of Old and New Strategies and Tactics

Classical approaches to organizing such as *Home Visits*, *Meeting Attendance*, *Committee Participation*, direct personal *Contact* between workers and the organizer, and *Leaflet Distribution* were used often in this sample of representation campaigns (see Table 1). In less than one percent of the campaigns, however, did the organizer take a *Job in Plant*.

Overall, new organizing tactics were not widely adopted by unions in the sample. For example, tactics grouped under the Corporate Power strategy heading were rarely used. Organizers engaged in *Plant Picketing*, *H.Q. Picketing*, *Stockholder Picketing*, *Pension Threat*, or *Company Boycott* in no more than five percent of the campaigns.

Tactics grouped under the Community Acceptance and Integration heading were used more often than the Corporate Power strategy tactics. Organizers made *Public* the names of union supporters in six out of ten campaigns, and *Built Coalitions* with religious and community groups in one of out five campaigns. *Petitions*, rather than confidential authorization cards, however, were used in only 11 percent of the

campaigns, and *Paid Advertisements* were used in fewer than one out of ten campaigns.

TABLE 1
Incidence of Union Organizing Tactics
in Representation Campaigns

<i>Tactic</i>	<i>Incidence</i>	<i>Stand. Dev.</i>
Service Union	.18	.38
<i>Classical Approach</i>		
Home Visits (%)	.28	.34
Meeting Attendance (%)	.54	.31
Committee Participation (%)	.21	.23
Contact (%)	.68	.30
Job in Plant	.01	.08
Leaflet Distribution	.88	.32
<i>Corporate Power Strategy</i>		
Plant Picketing	.05	.21
H.Q. Picketing	.01	.10
Stockholder Picketing	.01	.12
Pension Threat	.01	.08
Company Boycott	.03	.16
<i>Community Acceptance and Integration</i>		
Public	.62	.49
Petitions	.11	.31
Paid Advertisements	.09	.29
Built Coalitions	.21	.41
N	430-425	

Differences in Tactics by Union Type: Service Versus Manufacturing

Table 2 contains comparisons of the mean incidence of tactics when the sample is divided into manufacturing unions and service unions. Eighteen percent of the campaigns were conducted by service unions. As hypothesized, under the Classical Approach, organizers from manufacturing unions experienced greater *Meeting Attendance* and *Committee Participation* than did organizers from service unions. None of the other differences between manufacturing and service unions were significant, however.

As hypothesized, under the Corporate Power strategy, service unions were more likely than manufacturing unions to engage in *Plant Picketing*, *Stockholder Picketing*, and to use threats of a *Company Boycott*.

Finally, as hypothesized, under the Community Acceptance and Integration strategy, organizers from service unions were much more likely than organizers from manufacturing unions to make *Public* the identities of supporters, to use *Petitions* rather than authorization cards, and to *Build Coalitions* with other organizations. A surprising result is that organizers from manufacturing unions were more likely to use *Paid Advertisements* than organizers from service unions.

TABLE 2

**Incidence of Union Organizing Tactics in Campaigns
Conducted by Manufacturing and Service Unions**

<i>Tactic</i>	<i>Manufacturing</i>	<i>Service</i>	<i>Significance*</i>
<i>Classical Approach</i>			
Home Visits (%)	.27	.33	ns†
Meeting Attendance (%)	.57	.42	.001
Committee Participation (%)	.22	.17	.042
Contact (%)	.68	.66	ns
Job in Plant	.01	.01	ns
Leaflet Distribution	.88	.87	ns
<i>Corporate Power Strategy</i>			
Plant Picketing	.02	.17	.001
H.Q. Picketing	.01	.01	ns
Stockholder Picketing	.01	.05	.001
Pension Threat	.01	.01	ns
Company Boycott	.01	.07	.001
<i>Community Acceptance and Integration</i>			
Public	.57	.84	.001
Petitions	.10	.17	.030
Paid Advertisements	.11	.01	.004
Built Coalitions	.17	.42	.001
N	352	76	

* Significance of one-tailed t-test

† No significant difference between means.

The results in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that all the Corporate Power tactics are rarely used in representation campaigns by the eight unions in this sample. Overall, nine of the fifteen differences in means between service and manufacturing unions were statistically significant, however, and only one, *Paid Advertisements*, possessed a sign contrary to the hypothesis.

The logistic regression results reported in Table 3 also lend support to a number of hypotheses. Unfortunately, seven of the fifteen variables under consideration had to be excluded from this analysis because these tactics were used too infrequently to be included in the logistic regression.

As predicted, campaigns run by service unions had lower *Meeting Attendance* than those conducted by manufacturing unions. Service unions were more likely than manufacturing unions to make *Public* the names of union supporters and to use *Petitions*, rather than confidential authorization cards, during the preliminary stages of the campaign. Service unions also were more likely than manufacturing unions to have *Built Coalitions* with other groups during the campaign. A surprising result is that service union organizers had greater *Contact* with workers than did manufacturing union organizers when the incidence of other tactics is controlled for statistically. This relationship between *Contact* and the dependent variable, *Service*, failed to reach statistical significance at conventional levels, however ($p < .10$, one-tailed test).

TABLE 3
Logistic Regression Results
 (standard errors in parentheses)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>p-Value</i> ^a	<i>Partial Derivative</i> ^b
Intercept	-2.220 (0.560)	.001	-
Home Visits	0.225 (0.513)	.331	.04
Meeting Attendance	-1.754 (0.621)	.003	-.15
Committee Participation	-0.506 (0.861)	.278	-.06
Contact	0.778 (0.597)	.096	.14
Leaflet Distribution	-0.309 (0.420)	.231	-.04
Public	1.403 (0.348)	.001	.29
Petitions	0.691 (0.418)	.049	.13
Built Coalitions	1.020 (0.330)	.001	.20
-2 (Log-Likelihood Ratio)	337.53	.001	
N	415		

Dependent variable: Service equals 1 if organizer employed by a service union.

a One-tailed t-tests.

b The formula used to calculate the derivatives is contained in Petersen, 1985.

The partial derivative associated with each variable is reported in the last column in Table 3. This provides a measure of the magnitude of the effect of each independent variable on the probability that the union which used the specific tactic is a service union rather than a manufacturing union, holding all else constant. Two examples are offered. First, each one percent increase above the mean in *Meeting Attendance* decreased by fifteen percent the probability that the union

which used this tactic is a service union. Second, if the union *Built Coalitions*, the probability that the union was a service union increased by 20 percent.

Patterns Among Campaign Tactics

We shall now turn to the investigation of the pattern of tactics. Table 4 contains a correlation table of union tactics. To aid the reader, boxes are drawn around the correlations for the variables grouped under each of the three categories of tactics proposed by Craft and Extejt (1983). The upper-most triangle contains the tactics grouped under the Classical Approach. *Home Visits*, *Meeting Attendance*, *Committee Participation*, and *Contact* are all significantly correlated with one another. These tactics tended to be used together in this sample of campaigns, whereas there is little evidence of an association between these variables and the other variables in the Classical Approach category, namely *Job in Plant* and *Leaflet Distribution*.

All of the tactics grouped under the Corporate Power strategy, and contained in the middle triangle, are significantly correlated with one another. Although these tactics were rarely used in this sample of campaigns (see Tables 1 and 2), when these tactics were used they tended to be used together.

The tactics grouped under the Community Acceptance and Integration category, appearing in the bottom triangle, did not occur together very often in this sample. Only *Paid Advertisements* and *Built Coalitions* tended to be used together.

To obtain a better understanding of the pattern of interrelationships among the tactics, the correlations presented in Table 4 were used as similarity measures in a multidimensional scaling procedure. These results are contained in Figure 1.

To aid in an interpretation of the plot, the horizontal and vertical axes have been named, with the former termed "Confrontational - Nonconfrontational" and the latter termed "Retail - Wholesale."


We shall first consider the horizontal dimension. Tactics plotted on the left side of the figure, particularly the bottom left quadrant, tend to be more confrontational in nature than those on the right side of the figure: *Plant Picketing*, *Pension Threat*, *H.Q. Picketing*, *Stockholder Picketing*, *Built Coalitions*, *Boycott*, and the direct appeals to the worker embodied in the tactics *Contact*, *Meeting Attendance*, *Committee Participation*, and *Home Visits*. Tactics plotted on the right side of the figure, on the other hand, tend to be less adversarial or confrontational in nature: *Public*,

Leaflet Distribution, Paid Advertisements, and the organizer surreptitiously taking a Job in Plant.

We now turn our attention to the vertical dimension, labelled "Retail - Wholesale." Tactics plotted in the upper two quadrants tend to be directed at individual workers (i.e. retail), either on a one-to-one or small group basis (*Contact, Meeting Attendance, Committee Participation, Home Visits, Public*). Tactics plotted in or near the bottom two quadrants tend to be directed at larger audiences (i.e. wholesale); for instance, the firm and its management (*Plant Picketing, Pension Threat, H.Q. Picketing, Stockholder Picketing, Coalition Building*) or community members (*Company Boycott, Coalition Building, and Paid Advertisements*), or large groups of workers (*Petitions, Leaflet Distribution, Paid Advertisements*).

FIGURE 1

Multidimensional Scaling of Union Tactics



Key

- | | |
|----------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Home Visits | 9. Stockholder Picketing |
| 2. Meeting Attendance | 10. Pension Threat |
| 3. Committee Participation | 11. Company Boycott |
| 4. Contact | 12. Public |
| 5. Job in Plant | 13. Petitions |
| 6. Leaflet Distribution | 14. Paid Advertisements |
| 7. Plant Picketing | 15. Built Coalitions |
| 8. H.Q. Picketing | |

Care should be taken in interpreting this multidimensional scaling, however, because of the very low incidence of some of the tactics. Although this scaling has an $R^2 = .80$, the Kruskal's stress statistic of .18 is relatively high. This may indicate reliability problems in the analysis. These results should be viewed, therefore, as a preliminary attempt to discover some insights into patterns of union tactics in representation campaigns.

DISCUSSION

Two conclusions may be drawn from these results. First, most traditional tactics were widely used, but most new organizing strategies and tactics were infrequently used in this sample of representation campaigns. None of the Corporate Power tactics was used in more than five percent of the campaigns. The Community Acceptance and Integration tactics tended to be used less often than the Classical Approach tactics, but much more often than the Corporate Power tactics.

Second, service unions tended to use the Classical Approach tactics less often, and the Corporate Power tactics and Community Acceptance and Integration tactics more often, than manufacturing unions. Every significant difference between the manufacturing union and service union classification was in the expected direction except *Paid Advertisements*. Perhaps manufacturing unions used the media more often than service unions because they have more resources at their disposal to do so.

The reported correlations and the preliminary insights gained from the multidimensional scaling suggest that Craft and Extejt's (1983) classification of tactics into three groupings has some empirical support, particularly for the Classical Approach and Corporate Power categories. Further, multidimensional scaling suggests that union tactics may be classified along two dimensions, "Confrontational - Nonconfrontational" and "Retail - Wholesale." Further research needs to be conducted on this latter issue, however, because of potential reliability problems caused by the low incidence of some of the tactics.

In conclusion, the importance of "new" organizing strategies and tactics appears to have been exaggerated in the scholarly, business, and popular literatures. While service unions do use many of these new tactics more than manufacturing unions, their incidence is small even within service unions. While service unions and manufacturing unions use a variety of common tactics, the incidence of some tactics appears to differ by union type. Additionally, the correlation table and

multidimensional scaling provide some evidence that organizers may not use all tactics in all campaigns, but selectively choose tactics based on characteristics of the individual campaigns.

Future research should examine the determinants of union campaigns tactics and the effects of tactics on representation elections and first contract outcomes. One could consider logistic or multinomial logistic models that contain union tactics as the dependent variable. What factors explain why certain tactics are used in representation campaigns? In the data set used in this study, the low incidence of most of the Corporate Power tactics and Community Acceptance and Integration tactics precludes their use in these types of multivariate analyses. Data on many more campaigns would need to be gathered to allow these multivariate analyses.

Little evidence currently is available concerning whether new or traditional tactics help unions, hurt unions, or make no difference in determining representation election outcomes and first contract outcomes (Reed 1989; Reed in press). Further research on this issue is needed.

The results reported in this paper suggest that significant differences in the use of tactics may be related to the type of union conducting the campaign. After controlling for campaign characteristics variables, do service unions still use different tactics than manufacturing unions? Future research should explore differences in union characteristics and how these differences affect organizing processes and outcomes.

Finally, to what extent are unions heeding the call to reorient their organizing efforts? What impact are these changes having on their ability to recruit new members? And how do these experiences feed back through the union and affect the union's organizational structure and future activities? Along with increasing our understanding of the union organizing process, answer to these questions also may contribute to building organizational theories of labor unions.

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Comparaison de l'organisation syndicale entre les syndicats du secteur manufacturier et ceux du secteur des services

Cet article étudie l'incidence et les modèles de tactiques d'organisation à l'aide d'un échantillon de campagnes d'organisation syndicale. Trois sujets sont traités. D'abord, quelle est l'étendue de certaines stratégies et tactiques d'organisation? Ensuite, les tactiques varient-elles selon le type de syndicat? Finalement, y a-t-il des modèles de tactiques d'organisation syndicale?

Utilisant les données de 430 campagnes d'organisation fournies par 64 organisateurs de huit syndicats américains, l'auteur recourt aux tests-T, à l'analyse de régression logistique, aux corrélations et à une échelle multidimensionnelle pour jauger l'incidence et les tendances dans les tactiques d'organisation. Les résultats indiquent que les approches dites classiques, telles les visites à la maison, la présence aux assemblées syndicales, la participation à des comités et le contact direct avec les travailleurs ont souvent été utilisées. Les nouvelles tactiques d'organisation, regroupées sous le vocable de stratégie du pouvoir coopératif (piquetage à l'usine, au siège social, chez les actionnaires, menace à la pension et boycott de la compagnie), ne furent utilisées que dans au plus cinq pourcent des cas. Finalement, les nouvelles tactiques regroupées sous le vocable d'intégration et acceptation communautaire (publicisation des noms des supporteurs syndicaux, pétitions, publicité payée) furent plus utilisées que les stratégies de pouvoir corporatif et moins que les approches classiques.

La comparaison dans l'utilisation des tactiques entre les syndicats du secteur manufacturier et ceux du secteur des services démontre qu'en général les organisateurs de syndicats du secteur manufacturier ont tendance à utiliser plus souvent les tactiques de l'approche classique et moins souvent les tactiques de pouvoir corporatif et celles d'intégration et d'acceptation communautaire que leurs collègues des syndicats du secteur des services.

L'analyse de régression logistique a permis la formulation d'un certain nombre d'hypothèses. Tel que prévu, les campagnes menées par les syndicats du secteur des services ont connu une participation moindre à leurs assemblées que celles des syndicats du secteur manufacturier. De plus, les syndicats du secteur des services étaient plus enclins que leur contrepartie manufacturière à rendre publics les noms de leurs supporteurs et à utiliser des pétitions que de recourir à la signature confidentielle de cartes durant les stades préliminaires de leurs campagnes. Les syndicats du secteur des services étaient également plus portés que ceux du secteur manufacturier à utiliser des coalitions avec d'autres groupes durant leurs campagnes.

L'utilisation de corrélations et de l'échelle multidimensionnelle a également permis de dégager des tendances parmi les différentes tactiques utilisées. Plus spécifiquement, les tactiques de pouvoir corporatif ont tendance à être utilisées ensemble et simultanément. C'est également le cas de certaines tactiques de l'approche classique. L'échelle multidimensionnelle a aussi permis de conclure

que les tactiques pouvaient être classées en deux dimensions: «confrontation, non-confrontation» et «gros et détail».

On peut tirer deux conclusions de ces résultats. D'abord, on a beaucoup plus utilisé les tactiques traditionnelles que les nouvelles stratégies d'organisation. Aucune tactique de pouvoir corporatif ne fut utilisée dans plus de cinq pourcent des campagnes d'organisation. Les tactiques d'intégration et d'acceptation communautaire sont moins utilisées que les tactiques de l'approche classique mais plus que celles du pouvoir corporatif.

Ensuite, les syndicats du secteur des services recourent moins souvent aux tactiques de l'approche classique et plus souvent à celles de pouvoir corporatif et à celles d'intégration et d'acceptation communautaire que leur contrepartie manufacturière. Toutes les différences significatives entre les deux types de syndicats étaient dans la direction attendue à l'exception de la publicité payante. Peut-être que les syndicats du secteur manufacturier ont utilisé plus souvent les médias simplement parce qu'ils avaient plus de ressources à leur disposition.

Les corrélations rapportées et les résultats préliminaires de l'échelle multidimensionnelle suggèrent que la classification de tactiques selon les trois groupes de Craft et Extejt (1983) trouve un appui empirique, particulièrement en ce qui a trait aux approches classiques et aux catégories de pouvoir corporatif. De plus, cette méthode suggère que les tactiques syndicales peuvent être classifiées selon deux dimensions: confrontation, non-confrontation et gros et détail. Cependant, vu les problèmes potentiels de fiabilité causés par l'incidence très basse de certaines tactiques, ce dernier aspect exige plus de recherche.

En conclusion, il semble que l'importance des «nouvelles» stratégies et tactiques d'organisation a été exagérée dans les publications universitaires, d'affaires et populaires. Certes, les syndicats du secteur des services utilisent d'avantage plusieurs nouvelles tactiques que leur contrepartie manufacturière, mais leur incidence est petite même à l'intérieur du secteur des services. Alors que les deux types de syndicat utilisent une variété de tactiques similaires, l'incidence de certaines tactiques semble différer selon le type de syndicat. De plus, la table de corrélation et l'échelle multidimensionnelle suggèrent que les organisateurs n'utilisent pas toutes les tactiques dans toutes leurs campagnes. Ils choisissent plutôt les tactiques à être utilisées selon les caractéristiques de chacune des campagnes.