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A Typology of Shop Stewards

A Confirmatory Factor Analysis

Yonathan Reshef

In this study, a typology of shop steward modes of role behavior was developed and tested. Three ideal types of role behavior — passive, cooperative, and radical — were derived based on a theoretical framework consisting of Marxist, pluralist, and structural-functionalist approaches. Two behavioral modes were added to the theoretical typology to provide for the possibilities of failed and erratic stewardship styles. The five role behaviors were subjected to confirmatory factor analysis resulting in a four-facet behavioral typology. The typology and its measuring tool can be used to generate and guide future research.

A paucity of research exists on American shop steward behaviors and attitudes. In an attempt to add to our knowledge, this study conceptualizes and measures five modes of steward role behavior — radical, cooperative, passive, erratic, and failed.

The first three types are derived from a theoretical framework which is based on the Marxist, pluralist, and structural-functionalist approaches. Two behavioral patterns are added to account for erratic and failed behavioral possibilities. The theoretical typology is subjected to empirical test of confirmatory factor analysis using the LISREL VI program.

Until the end of the 1950s, research had conceived of the American stewards as «the leader of the people in the plant» (Miller and Rosen, 1957, p. 516) or, «the nerve structure of the union» (Barbash, 1948, p. 160). Some scholars argued that, «it is essential to understand him [the steward], to know his motivations and his attitudes, to see both how he resembles and differs from the rank-and-file union member» (Seidman *et al.*, 1958, p. 165). Alas, in years gone by very little research has been done in this direc-

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tion (for a literature review see Nash, 1983). Actually, there exists only one comprehensive research study that has been devoted to American shop stewards (Peck, 1963).

In the beginning of the 1960s, shop stewards had been largely viewed as a symbol of industrial democracy and as grievance handlers who had no significant imprint on the substance of the local industrial relations systems. American stewards, argued Barbash (1961, pp. 127-128), «do not normally constitute an autonomous power center... [they are] characteristically a part of the main line of union leadership rather than contenders for power in opposition to the local-wide leaders». It might be that such a conception of shop stewards has been prevalent in recent decades and has reduced interest in stewards for purposes of academic research.

However, with the growing need to discover new strategies to cope with dwindling union institutional and political power, labor leaders might contemplate stewards as one answer to the problem. Stewards' daily contacts with members and management representatives make them potential, useful messengers of the union cause at the shop level. If trained properly they can be instrumental in strengthening the bonds of solidarity among union members, inculcating in the members the notion that unions are a social movement as well as an economic organization, and preventing decertifications. Hence, an in-depth research of steward modes of behavior and their determinants might provide a basis for achieving this purpose. Here it is assumed that, the way towards this goal should start with the conceptualization of steward role behavior. How can one systemize different stewardship styles in a way that will enable researchers and practitioners to understand different behavioral patterns of stewards in a meaningful manner? The following is an attempt to answer this question.

THE PREVAILING TAXONOMIES

The literature includes very few taxonomies of shop stewards. These taxonomies evolve around different criteria which render it difficult to apply them directly here.

Miller and Form (1964, pp. 393-400) have distinguished three types of stewards according to role orientation and reference group criteria: (a) *the job- or management-oriented* — his main purpose is to do such an effective job that management feels it cannot do without him. He is usually not an ardent unionist, and hopes to be promoted to a foreman position, that is, to develop a career within the employing organization; (b) *the union-oriented* — he is a zealous unionist who seeks a political career within the union. This

steward is a highly committed unionist who sees his steward position as a springboard to a higher position within the union ranks, and (c) *the employee-oriented* — he views his main task in helping the workers. This view may occasionally lead him to clashes with higher union officials or management representatives.

The Sayles and Strauss' (1967, pp. 49-51) taxonomy is very similar to the one above. Their three ideal-types are the *self-seeker*, *active unionist*, and *social leader* which generally correspond to Miller and Form's types (a), (b), and (c) respectively.

While the above taxonomies hint at important steward role aspects they, nevertheless, suffer from two shortcomings. First, these classifications are based on a combination of reference group and role orientation criteria, and thereby, do not pinpoint modes of behavior. Second, these typologies have to be taken on good faith since no empirical analysis has been done to validate them¹.

The most recent and most elaborate typology of shop stewards has been produced by Batstone, Boraston, and Frenkel (1977) in the United Kingdom. Their major concern was to investigate two dimensions of the steward role — the extent to which stewards show a commitment to union principles, and the degree to which there is an emphasis upon a representative rather than delegate role in stewards' relations to their constituents. The two dimensions yield four ideal-types: leaders, nascent leaders, cowboys, and populists (*ibid*, pp. 34-37). The «leader» steward is able to play representative role in relation to his members, as he attempts to implement union principles. By contrast, the «populist» lacks commitment to union principles and acts as a delegate rather than as a representative. The «nascent leader» who is often sponsored by a «leader» is committed to union principles, but is unable to perform effectively without the help of his fellow stewards. The «cowboy is able to play a representative role at least in the short-term, but is not committed to union principles» (*ibid.*, p. 35).

Batstone *et al.*'s typology has been criticized by Willman (1980), and by Marchington and Armstrong (1983) on the following grounds: (1) stewards may vary their style to fit the occasion; (2) the British scholars never defined what they meant by union principles; (3) in addition to being vague and ambiguous, the union principles dimension actually attempts to measure in-

¹ In 1981, Norman Dufty tried to corroborate empirically a nine-facet typology of shop stewards which was, to a certain extent, an elaboration on Miller and Form's. Since he wanted to avoid dealing with ideal-types he subjected his 260-steward sample to cluster analysis using nine behavioural facets as clustering criteria. Unfortunately, he does not report any significant test which could render his final six clusters externally valid. Hence, his analysis lacks any generalizability.

tegration into the steward network; (4) the representative-delegate dimension actually measures two different things — the willingness and ability of the steward to lead his own members, and his willingness to go along with the steward organization; and (5) the cowboys and the nascent leaders did not receive adequate research attention.

Other problems with the study are: (1) an insufficient theoretical background to support the developed taxonomy; (2) steward behaviors were measured against two criteria only; (3) there is no explanation why delegate and representative role behaviors constitute the opposing ends of a continuum; (4) due to the unequal research attention given to the four steward types, leaders and populists are perfectly intermeshed with the representative and delegate role behaviors respectively, and (5) the sample was over-represented by senior, more experienced stewards, a fact which might have led the researchers to deal only with the more established behaviors, (*i.e.*, leaders and populists).

The models reviewed here ignore important behavioral aspects of the steward role behavior. Employing them to classify stewards along behavioral criteria might thus lend the observer to ignore role activities that are consistent and meaningful. To avoid inconclusive predictions about steward behaviors, a more comprehensive typology is needed which covers a wide range of different behavioral modes in an orderly and logical fashion.

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework used here draws upon three different perspectives — Marxist, pluralist, and structural-functionalist² — for the study of steward modes of role behavior. The assumption is that each one of these approaches assumes a unique steward role behavior. Each approach imposes idiosyncratic theoretical, conceptual, and normative constraints on the social actors in society which are rigid enough to maintain a unique stewardship style. Together the three theoretical schools constitute a comprehensive theoretical framework whose components complement each other in forming a useful analytical tool. This tool is expected to shed light on and systemize different aspects of steward activities. The following is an attempt to briefly highlight major relevant concepts in each theory which can later be operationalized and related to each behavioral category.

² This ideas was first introduced by the British scholar Michael Poole in 1974.

Marxism

The Marxist or radical steward confronts three major problems which penetrate deep into Marxist and Neo-Marxist writings: (a) *structural* — who are the working class members whose cause he should represent?; (b) *cognitive* — how should he facilitate the process of helping workers attain class consciousness?; and (c) *behavioral* — how can he help to mobilize the workers from class structure to class action?

The radical steward believes in an alternate, better society³. Contemplating that no change can be accomplished unless the current plant political order is abolished, he views the plant as a «contested terrain», to use Edward's (1976, p. 16) expression. For the radical steward every dispute between management representatives and workers turns into a component of the larger class struggle.

In his employing organization this steward views management and workers as two adversaries, as «them» and «us». Committed to this perception he tries to enhance cohesion among the workers. The radical steward devotes time and energy to contact and persuade as many workers as possible that they all share a common cause. He does not differentiate between his constituency and other workers, and uses his in-plant mobility opportunities to get in touch with and help as many as he can.

To sharpen belligerence with management he encourages workers to file grievances and not to give up when they are harassed by management representatives. Since for him the contract is no more than a set of recommendations he does not hesitate to go along with workers who break it, if they have reacted to an unfair treatment on the part of management. When collective disputes arise he urges the workers to stick together, and thereby use their collective power to extract more concessions from management. He uses such opportunities for the purpose of tightening the bonds of worker solidarity, convincing them that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

³ I agree with the anonymous referee that the description of the radical type is not easily distinguished from simple militancy. Behaviourally, any of these stewards might resent the high degree of managerial authority he encounters in the plant and attempts to mobilize his fellow workers to defend their collective interests. What distinguishes the radical from the simple militant is the possession of broader political ambitions by the former for his fellow workers. Since no causal analysis is incorporated into the study to solve the problem I prefer to call the Marxist theory's derivative «radical» steward.

Pluralism

Despite differences in nuances among pluralists it is feasible to identify three core themes which are the bedrock of the approach within the frame of institutionalist pluralism⁴. First, the importance of the established rules of the game to regulate actors' behaviors. The crux of the theme is that the ability of workers and their representative organizations and employers and their agencies to cope with the challenges imposed on them by the environment and each other depends on the degree of institutionalization of the labor agreement.

Second, the political function of interest group competition which contributes to an effective operation of democratic institutions of interest representation. Finally, the societal function of interest group competition which helps maintain balanced and harmonious relationships among different social actors. Mutual tolerance and recognition in the right of each group to exist and pursue its interests, combined with a mutually agreed commitment to relevant values and behavioral norms bind the system together (Clegg, 1960, p. 20). The moral facet is supported by the even distribution of power in society. Thus processes of power concentration and its potential abuse are held in check by the countervailing power of other groups (Galbraith, 1956, p. 111).

The pluralist approach gives rise to the cooperative steward. This shop steward views himself as the property as well as the leader of his work group. He perceives the plant as comprised of many interest groups all of which are subordinated to the same normative code. He complies with the existing political structure of the plant and believes that, basically, it is in the interest of everybody in the plant to cooperate with each other in order to benefit from the working life.

The cooperative steward listens to his members' complaints and helps them solve their problems insofar as he can. He raises issues in their behalf when he feels that injustice has been committed. On the other hand, he does not hesitate to squash grievances whenever he believes that the aggrieved worker has no case.

The cooperative steward conceives of the work place social interactions as a positive-sum type. Everybody benefits when people are tolerant of each other and understand that their interests cannot always be realized. Therefore, he tries to maintain a good relationship with management representatives as well as with other stewards.

4 The radical pluralism variant has been omitted since it is presumed that no significant difference exists between radical pluralism and Marxism in relation to steward role behavior.

Central to his behavior is his strict adhesion to the plant contract. For him rules are not just a set of recommendations but are the law of the plant, and thus must be obeyed and respected by everybody. That is why he tries to set an example by strictly following the contract rules.

Structural-Functionalism

Here, Parsons' four-aspect functional model is adapted to the needs of this study. Stewards are perceived as one mechanism that helps the organization, as a condition of equilibrium, to solve its four basic problems — adaptation, integration, goal attainment, and pattern maintenance (*e.g.*, Parsons and Smelser, 1956, pp. 46-57). Stewards are viewed almost as an ancillary arm of management or as supervisors' right-hand men. They are expected to express a conservative behavior which defends and perpetuates the plant social order and production routine (*e.g.*, see: Dahrendorf, 1959, p. 263; Crouch, 1982, p. 179). Put differently, the functionalist steward should strive to bring worker behaviors in accord with the organization's collective needs for order, stability, and predictability. He should inculcate in his constituents the ideas that the collective interest of everyone in the plant is more important than any particular demands and that workers and management share the same web of interests.

In behavioral terms such a steward might appear as a passive one. Advocating behavioral modes and a normative code which are conducive to management interests might be disapproved by his members. On the other hand, such a steward can survive his role conception if he does not appear too management oriented but concomitantly is not too active in behalf of his members. Passivity might be a possible outlet for this steward.

The passive steward has to follow his group members from time to time in what might be seen to him as a disruptive behavior. Although he is generally not receptive to changes in the plant social routine, there are occasions where he should give in to local pressures and follow his work group demands. He understands that if he systematically refuses his group's demands it can act on its own and eventually make him irrelevant.

To sum up, using a three-part theoretical framework a typology has been developed which consists of three steward role behaviors — radical, cooperative, and passive. The theories employed here, however, are all theories of action which do not provide for a failed or unsuccessful role behavior. Since life provides enough opportunities for any steward to withdraw into himself and turn apathetic to his close environment, the study of a failed steward is worth including. In addition, a major criticism

of the Batstone, Boraston, and Frenkel's (1977) study is the inadequate research attention given to the «cowboy» type (e.g. Willman, 1980). Since these three scholars themselves have identified the «cowboy» as a unique behavioral pattern, it is included here under the title the «erratic» steward.

The final typology model, thus, encompasses five modes of steward role behavior. These types are expected to cast light on steward role behaviors from different angles and to render meaningful and interpretable what otherwise might be perceived as an inconsistent array of steward activities. If the empirical analysis indicates that this typology holds true, it might be used in further research which will attempt to explain the variation in each type of role behavior by using relevant independent variables.

A note on the interrelationship of the five modes of performance is in order. The three theories used here are mutually exclusive regarding the societal orders they envision. Seemingly, the derived performance patterns should be mutually exclusive as well. However, this logic has to be relaxed in order to give the theoretical framework more analytical vigor.

A steward performs under a host of situational restrictions stemming from his work group's pressures, the rules of the workplace, the union's directions, structural factors (e.g., technology, size and dispersion of his work group), and his own past experience. The combined effect of all these constraints impedes the developing of a «pure» stewardship style.

To reconcile theory and reality, it is argued now that the five behavioral constructs should be viewed as different ideal typical behavioral styles, a certain combination of which governs a steward's behavior. Any steward, for example, might have a certain «dose» of or propensity for passivity, however, be dominated by another behavioral mode at a certain point in time. Put differently, every steward might have the potential to exhibit all the five types of role performance. When in action, a steward can show a behavioral mode which is the cross-product of two or more ideal types of role performance. Currently, for the sake of simplicity each behavioral pattern is treated separately.

SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY

Between January and April, 1985, questionnaire⁵ data were collected from 298 shop stewards. After controlling for missing values there remain 282 valid cases. The data were secured through mail and steward classes and

⁵ The items used for the purpose of the present typology are part of a larger questionnaire which is available upon request.

conferences. One hundred and thirty questionnaires were mailed out of which 70 were completed and returned (response rate of 53,8%). The remaining cases were obtained through classes and conferences held by the Labor Education Program of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign⁶. The shop stewards came from the Midwest and were from 25 different unions. The majority of the sample is comprised of whites (87%) and males (79%). Respondents' age ranged from 21 to 67 years with a mean of 41 years and 4 months. Their role seniority is between one month and 26 years with a mean of 8 years and 2 months. Brief definitions of the concepts of the 5 steward role behaviors are outlined below.

Failed

This steward becomes indifferent to what goes on around him. Generally, he tries to avoid workers and is reluctant to deal with their problems. Whenever he must help workers he tries to push issues upward, thus unloading the burden from his own shoulders. Overall, the failed steward has withdrawn from the shop community and tries to concentrate on doing his job as a worker.

Passive

Things tend to happen «on their own» for this steward. He does not raise issues or initiate activities in behalf of his members but waits for them to come to him with problems and push him to action. He appears as the group property because he will not act without the members' push and stimulation.

Cooperative

This steward tries to shape the issues with which he has to deal by initiating ideas or amending those raised by the members. On the one hand, he helps and protects his group members whenever they get into trouble. On the other hand, he is fully cognizant that there are other interest groups in the enterprise and that compromise and concession are needed by everyone to get the maximum benefit from working life. He attempts to strictly follow the contract which for him is the rule of the work place and a statement of the union principles.

⁶ Preliminary analysis suggests that no significant differences exist between the characteristics of the mailed and other questionnaires.

Erratic

This steward does not let union directives or management orders prevent him from exhausting all means available, formal and informal, to win a case in which he is interested. However, it is hard to forecast which cases he will pursue and which he will let go by. He is a quick-tempered person who does not hesitate to «raise hell» whenever management representatives do not agree with him. In short, he is an active steward whose reactions to members' demands and supervisors' activities are unpredictable.

Radical

He devotes time and energy explaining to any workers that things might look different if they all stick together and use their collective power against management. Faithful to his collectivist values he, for example, encourages and helps every worker, irrespective of work group affiliation, to file grievances whenever a worker feels that he has been treated unfairly. Contemplating himself as the workers' leader at the work place he will not hesitate to extend help to any worker who has broken the labor agreement for, what he sees as, a just reason.

Analytical Approach

The behavioral criteria with which one can measure the above concepts are numerous. Like any social investigation that must, in some measure, abstract from the mass of available criteria, I also have to confine myself to a small number of measures to operationalize the five behavioral types. Currently, four Likert-type items per concept are used including the following measures: grievance handling, keeping up with the contract, and relationships with workers (of work group and in general) and management representatives.

The validity of the theoretical typology is examined through a confirmatory factor analysis. Through the confirmatory process a particular model (*i.e.*, the one developed through the theoretical analysis) is imposed on the data in order to find whether it is compatible with them. Using the confirmatory approach one can assess the degree of the adequacy of the model, or put differently, how good the hypothesized model fits the observed data.

TEST OF THE MODEL


The confirmatory process was used to test two hypotheses: (1) that the five-dimension structure of the role behavior typology adequately fits the data set, and (2) that the nature of the relationship among the factors is orthogonal, that is, the factors are not associated with one another.

The analysis was conducted using the LISREL VI (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1984) program. LISREL provides two major advantages over other analytic techniques relative to the confirmatory analysis. First, it allows the researchers to specify latent variables (factors) when multiple indicators are used, and second, it allows flexibility in the specification of the error terms so that in some instances correlated error terms can be specified and estimated (LaRocco, 1983, p. 817). Correlated errors indicate that not all the variation in responses can be accounted for by the researcher's manipulation or by one underlying attitude plus random error (Bagozzi, 1981, p. 616). By correlating error terms, systematic error variance, which is due to the effect of unincluded variable(s), is accounted for and partialled out. Whereas the specific correlations among the error terms are not of interest in themselves, their incorporation into the model provides more precise estimates of the causal parameters⁷ (Mortimer and Lorence, 1979, p. 1370).

LISREL provides several indicators of goodness-of-fit to determine the extent to which the estimated parameters can reproduce the original input correlation matrix. The most commonly used one is X^2 (chi-square) goodness-of-fit test. The target is to get a ratio between the model's X^2 and degrees of freedom which yields a probability level greater than .05. Given such a probability level the researcher can claim that the tested model predicts a matrix of correlations which is not significantly different from the one actually obtained. Nevertheless, even at that point the researcher should be very cautious in making his causal inference. All that he can argue is that the model seems reasonably consistent with the data, but there probably exist other models which would do so as well (Schmitt and Bedeian, 1982, p. 815).

⁷ This argument is true under the proviso that the error term correlations are not excessively high. High error term correlations indicate that a large portion of the variation of a certain attitude construct (*i.e.*, latent variable) is not a consequence of that construct. In other words, a large portion of the variation of certain observed variables is generated by causes other than their respective latent or theoretical construct. Correlated errors across constructs might occur as well. The latter suggests the existence of some unmeasured cause(s) generating systematic variation in the observed variables in addition to that arising from the latent variables. The unmeasured cause(s) might be systematic measurement biases or unincluded variables (Bagozzi, 1980, pp. 184-185).

FIGURE 1
The Quadratic LISREL Model of Steward Role Behaviors:
The Confirmatory Analysis



Note: Standardized solution. All coefficients are significant at the .05 level using a two tail test. $\chi^2 = 96.30$; $df = 82$; $P = .134$; $N = 282$. Error correlations are as follows:

- | | |
|------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| $\delta_1\delta_{11} = .185$ | $\delta_6\delta_{13} = -.141$ |
| $\delta_3\delta_{14} = .139$ | $\delta_9\delta_{14} = -.149$ |
| $\delta_3\delta_{15} = .151$ | $\delta_{11}\delta_{13} = -.156$ |

Table 1
Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations
of Variables in the Model

Variable	X1	X2	X3	X4	X5	X6	X7	X8	X9	X10	X11	X12	X13	X14	X15
1. Failed 1	.079														
2. Failed 2	.290	.12													
3. Failed 3	.323	.009	.250												
4. Failed 4	-.004	.018	.005	.046											
5. Passive 1	.049	.271	.186	.177	.145										
6. Passive 2	.138	.222	.090	.13	.127	.277									
7. Passive 3	.222	.203	.189	.282	.140	.398	.404								
8. Passive 4	-.060	.050	-.015	-.031	.274	.149	.011	.064							
9. Radical 1	-.111	.073	-.093	-.084	.129	.186	-.002	-.084	.232						
10. Radical 2	-.117	-.013	-.095	-.151	.098	-.046	-.010	-.060	.275	.146					
11. Cooperative 1	-.084	-.066	-.107	-.082	.159	.177	.030	-.050	.221	.186	.140				
12. Cooperative 2	.035	-.098	.058	.093	-.001	-.069	-.020	-.169	.087	.089	-.038	.152			
13. Erratic 1	.051	-.087	.010	.048	.185	-.004	.125	-.009	.049	.048	-.113	-.004	.237		
14. Erratic 2	.087	-.030	.005	.086	.105	.009	.164	.045	-.022	.013	.051	.009	.203	.325	
15. Erratic 3	1.36	2.84	1.37	1.43	3.00	2.57	1.81	2.02	3.88	4.04	3.91	3.90	1.45	1.83	1.90
MEAN	.85	1.44	.79	.85	1.42	1.50	1.13	1.23	1.31	1.14	1.18	1.34	.92	1.18	1.26
SD															

Note: N = 282

Several runs of the model had been conducted before an adequate fit between the model and the data was achieved⁸. The final model shown in Figure 1 is a standardized solution and is based on the correlation matrix reported in Table 1. The probability level of .134 indicates a good fit of the model to the data. However, this model differs in four respects from the predicted model. First, it is based on a reduced, 15-item correlation matrix. Five items were removed from the analysis due to their very low significance levels. Second, the item «failed 2» turned out to be loaded on the passive behavior construct. Next, the number of role behaviors' was reduced from five to four. Instead of the predicted radical and cooperative role patterns there has emerged an unexpected behavioral pattern — the representative — which is comprised of five items. These five items represent three, initially perceived as different, steward behaviors.

Finally, the assumption about the orthogonal nature of the inter-factor relations was refuted. There are factors which are associated with each other — the passive with the failed, and the failed with the representative. These significant correlations indicate that some unspecified variables jointly affect each pair of associated factors. The fact that the correlation between the failed and the representative role behaviors is not excessively large indicates, however, that the estimated parameters would not change substantially if those unspecified variables were incorporated into the model (Mortimer and Lorence, 1979, p. 1376). In contrast the high correlation between the failed and passive role behaviors suggests that these two behavioral patterns, while still representing different role concepts, belong in the same hypothetic construct. For example, these two role behaviors might represent different patterns of steward inactivity which are a corollary of the joint effect of similar role orientations or background characteristics.

DISCUSSION

Based on a three-part theoretical framework consisting of Marxism, pluralism, and structural-functionalism this study has predicted four ideal typical steward role behaviors. A fifth role behavior has been added to the theoretical typology to cover the possibility of an apathetic or a failed stewardship style. These five role behaviors were subjected to a confirmatory factor analysis resulting in a four-type rather than the expected quintuple model.

⁸ The preliminary models are not presented in order to conserve space. However, they are available upon request and so is the full, 20-item correlation matrix.

The resultant empirical typology calls forth three noteworthy results. The first is the inapplicability of the Marxist theory — as measured here — to explaining American steward role behavior. The content of the two radical items which did not enter the analysis (*i.e.*, radical 3 and 4) suggests that, American stewards try to avoid politicizing workers in the shop. They do not invest efforts in explaining to workers why it is important that they have more say in how the plant is managed. In addition, stewards are not enthusiastic supporters of the strike activity which according to some Marxists has a built-in educational value. It is through such collective experiences that worker solidarity can develop and class consciousness might be attained. On the other hand, the possibility of a complete cooperative and strictly legalistic steward was refuted as well. The two cooperative items which were left outside the analysis (*i.e.*, cooperative 3 and 4) indicate that, stewards are not strictly legalistic and do not always strive to peacefully solve their members' problems.

Secondly, the analysis has discovered an unpredicted role behavior, the representative, which is a combination of what was initially assumed as radical, passive, and cooperative behavioral aspects. The combined picture is of a steward who is willing to help workers irrespective of work group affiliation, initiates and pushes issues on behalf of his constituents, tries to abide by the labor agreement but follows, from time to time, his members' wishes even though he does not fully agree with them.

Finally, the existence of three predicted role behaviors has been confirmed. Erratic, passive, and failed behaviors appear as unique stewardship styles which, together with the representative pattern, can help to distinguish among stewards according to the way they handle similar problems.

The fact that this study has identified and empirically corroborated four ideal types of steward role behavior does not, however, imply that stewards always exhibit behavioral patterns which are consistent with only one of the four role behaviors. Instead, it is preferable to talk about a central tendency or general propensity on the part of the stewards to perform their role in a certain way. So that if four behavioral scales are constructed by which steward behavior is measured it is probable, for example, that stewards will score high on one scale, medium on another, and low on the other two scales.

An important question that should be accounted for concerns the external validity of the current findings: to what extent can we generalize from this study? The way the data were collected incorporated two limitations into the analysis. First, all the respondents came from the Midwest. Second,

77 percent of the respondents were contacted during classes or conferences. Even the names of the other 23 percent, who completed mailed questionnaires, were taken from previous steward classes' rosters. Hence, it might be that only stewards who wanted to participate in educational programs were studied. Therefore, in order to increase the generalizability of the present typology, this study should be replicated using other samples from different places.

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Typologie des délégués d'atelier: une analyse des facteurs confirmative

Il n'existe que peu de recherches sur les comportements et les attitudes des délégués d'atelier aux États-Unis. Dans un effort destiné à augmenter nos connaissances, le présent article conçoit et apprécie cinq modalités différentes de leur comportement: radical, changeant, coopérateur, passif et malhabile.

Les quatre premiers types découlent d'un cadre théorique fondé sur des approches marxistes, pluralistes et structurelles-fonctionnelles. On a ajouté un cinquième modèle de comportement pour tenir compte de la possibilité d'attitudes malhabiles. La typologie théorique est soumise au test empirique de l'analyse confirmative des facteurs en utilisant le programme LISREL VI.

La typologie qui en dérive donne trois résultats dignes d'attention. Le premier est l'inapplicabilité de la théorie marxiste (telle qu'on l'apprécie ici) pour expliquer le comportement des délégués d'atelier aux États-Unis. Le contenu des deux éléments

du type «radical» qu'on ne retrouvait pas dans l'analyse, (soit «radical» 3 et 4), sous-entendent que les délégués d'atelier américains essaient d'éviter de politiser les travailleurs dans l'établissement. Ils ne font pas d'efforts pour expliquer aux travailleurs pourquoi il est important qu'ils aient davantage à dire sur la façon de gérer l'usine. De plus, les délégués ne sont pas des partisans enthousiastes de l'action de grève qui, selon certains marxistes, a une valeur éducative remarquable, car c'est au moyen de telles expériences collectives que l'on peut développer la solidarité ouvrière et parvenir à la conscience de classe. D'autre part, l'existence de délégués d'atelier entièrement collaborateurs et strictement légalistes s'est aussi avérée fautive. Les deux éléments du type coopératif ou collaborateur, qu'on ne retrouve pas dans l'analyse (c'est-à-dire le type «coopérateur» 3 et 4), indiquent que les délégués ne sont pas essentiellement légalistes et qu'ils n'essaient pas toujours de résoudre pacifiquement les problèmes des travailleurs.

Deuxièmement, l'analyse a permis de découvrir un type de comportement imprévu, soit celui de représentant, qui consiste dans un mélange de diverses caractéristiques à la fois des types radical, passif et coopérateur. L'image qui en ressort, c'est celle d'un délégué d'atelier qui, voulant aider les travailleurs indépendamment de l'affiliation du groupe, entreprend et défend la cause de ses commettants, s'efforce de se conformer à la convention collective, mais sait répondre de temps en temps aux exigences de ses compagnons de travail, même s'il n'est pas tout à fait d'accord avec eux.

Enfin, l'existence de trois comportements typiques a été confirmée. Les attitudes radicales, passives et maladroitement apparaissent comme des styles uniques de délégué qui, associées au modèle du comportement dit de représentant, peuvent aider à différencier les délégués d'atelier selon la façon dont ils traitent des problèmes similaires.

Le fait que cette étude a identifié et attesté quatre types idéaux de comportement chez les délégués d'atelier ne signifie pas, toutefois, que ceux-ci révèlent des modèles de comportement qui soient compatibles avec un seul des quatre comportements-types. Au contraire, il est préférable de parler d'une tendance convergente ou d'une propension générale de la part des délégués d'atelier à remplir leur rôle d'une certaine manière. Ainsi, si on établit quatre échelles de comportement de façon à le mesurer, il est probable que les délégués d'atelier obtiendront des résultats élevés sur une échelle, moyens sur une autre et faibles sur les deux dernières.

Une question importante dont il faudrait tenir compte se rapporte à la valeur extérieure des présentes investigations: dans quelle mesure pouvons-nous généraliser à partir de cette étude? La façon dont les données ont été recueillies limite l'analyse sur deux points. En premier lieu, tous les répondants sont du Midwest. Deuxièmement, 77 pour cent d'entre eux furent rencontrés au cours de sessions d'études ou de conférences. Même les noms des 23 pour cent qui restent, qui ont rempli un questionnaire par correspondance, sont tirés de listes de délégués qui ont participé à des réunions antérieures. En conséquence, il se peut que seuls les délégués qui ont participé à des programmes éducatifs aient fait l'objet de l'analyse. Aussi, pour rendre plus générale la typologie présente, faudrait-il la recommencer en utilisant de nouveaux échantillons en provenance de milieux différents.