

THE ARSENAL OF THE RED WARRIORS: U.S. PERCEPTIONS OF STALIN'S
RED ARMY AND THE IMPACT OF LEND-LEASE AID ON THE
EASTERN FRONT IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

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Through the U.S. Lend-Lease program, President Franklin D. Roosevelt sought to keep Joseph Stalin's Red Army fighting Adolf Hitler's forces to prevent a separate peace and Nazi Germany's colonization of Soviet territory and strategic resources during the Second World War. Yet after the Red Army's 1943 counterattacks, Roosevelt unnecessarily increased Soviet Lend-Lease aid, oversupplying Stalin's soldiers with more armament than they required for the Soviet Union's defense and enabling their subsequent conquest of East Central Europe and large parts of East Asia. Roosevelt's underestimation of the Red Army's capabilities, his tendency to readily rely on Soviet-influenced advisers, and his unquestioning acceptance of Stalin's implicit threats to forge a separate peace all contributed to his excessive arming of Moscow from 1943 forward. Expanding on the findings of other scholars, this work identifies and explains the impact of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty on Roosevelt's reasoning, the key role of the Arctic convoys in delivering material to the Red Army, and how the unnecessary aid routes through Iran and Alaska resulted in the oversupplying of Stalin's troops. Had Roosevelt not opened these unnecessary routes, the Arctic convoys could have continued to sufficiently supply the Red Army's defensive efforts without empowering it to aggressively spread Communism at gunpoint.

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INTRODUCTION

We've got to quit wasting resources all over the world – and still worse – wasting time. ***If we're to keep Russia in*** [against Germany], save the Middle East, India and Burma; we've got to begin slugging with air at West Europe; to be followed by a land attack as soon *as possible*.¹

– Dwight D. Eisenhower

In the summer of 1941, Nazi German Fuehrer Adolf Hitler launched his armies in a surprise attack against his former strategic partner in dividing occupied Eastern Europe, Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin. Within days of Hitler's sudden offensive, President Franklin D. Roosevelt unfroze Soviet assets in the United States and initiated a process of delivering vast amounts of material aid to help Stalin's Red Army repulse the Nazi invaders. Despite facing initial resistance from political critics reluctant to help a former adversary, Roosevelt dispatched his top officials to Moscow and began mobilizing U.S. industrial might to support the beleaguered Soviets. Between 1941 and 1945, U.S. Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union ensured a steady flow of war material to the Red Army and sustained Stalin's successful counterattacks and offensives, leading to the Allied victory and Communist expansion in Eastern Europe.

The primary research questions that this dissertation seeks to answer relate to the perceived needs, problems, successes, and overall effectiveness of U.S. Lend-Lease aid to Stalin's Soviet Union. How did Roosevelt manage to persuade Congress and the American people to support Stalin's war against the Nazi invaders despite decades of anti-Communist tension and mistrust, what were his true motives for keeping the Soviets supplied and resisting, and what part did Soviet espionage and disinformation agents in the federal government play in influencing his grand strategic decisions? What, if anything, did the Arctic convoys contribute to the Red Army's 1943 victories at Stalingrad and Kursk, and was it necessary to renew Soviet

¹ Boldface italics added.

Lend-Lease and expand it over two other major routes that year? What were the inherent problems in the three main supply routes to the Soviet Union and how did the Allies overcome these odds? Ultimately, this dissertation seeks to establish the contribution of U.S. Lend-Lease aid to the Red Army's transition from retreat to advance and to determine its role in winning the Second World War while sowing the seeds of the Cold War.

Following the U.S. entry into the war after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the full mobilization of the American economy, Lend-Lease supplies began arriving in the Soviet Union in great quantities, sustaining the Red Army with critical amounts of food and ordnance. To effectively support Stalin and the Red Army's war effort, U.S. military planners mapped several routes over which the Allied leaders could transport supplies to the Soviet Union.² Lend-Lease architects Edward R. Stettinius and Harry Hopkins oversaw the deliveries of massive aid to the Soviet Union, while Allied officials executed daring naval and merchant marine operations to protect convoys in the Arctic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans destined for the North Russian, Iranian, and Siberian ports.³

While German submarines and aircraft targeted these Allied convoys and sank many merchant ships, mostly along the North Russian route, the U.S., British, and Canadian merchant mariners managed to deliver a considerable amount of material aid to the Soviet ports during the critical period of fighting between 1942 and 1943. Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev later admitted that American US6 "Studebaker" trucks, motorcycles, and jeeps enabled the Red

² Hubert P. van Tuyll, *Feeding the Bear: American Aid to the Soviet Union, 1941-1945* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), xii, 3-4; Albert L. Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver: Lend-Lease Aid to the U.S.S.R. in World War II* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), 24-25.

³ Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 24-25.

Army to transition from defensive to offensive operations.⁴ Khrushchev also credited U.S. food shipments with keeping Soviet soldiers fed and ready for battle, while aluminum and steel deliveries enabled Soviet factories to continue producing tanks and aircraft.⁵

This doctoral research project addresses several fields of study in European, Military, and American history. By determining the exact role of Lend-Lease in the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany, the dissertation demonstrates the importance of the program in the outcome of the Second World War for millions of people across Eastern and Central Europe for much of the twentieth century. Few scholars can question the fact that while the Western Allies liberated France, the Low Countries, and western Germany from totalitarian tyranny, Eastern Europeans experienced Stalin's bloody campaign of terror immediately and long after Hitler's defeat. In Poland, this oppression began with the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact of 1939, but all countries east of the Elbe River fell into Stalin's grip in 1945 and languished under Communism for another four-and-a-half decades. By assessing the decision of U.S. leaders to increase Lend-Lease aid to the Red Army after renewing the program in 1943, this dissertation explores the possibility that Roosevelt excessively supplied Stalin beyond his defensive needs, directly impacting Eastern Europe's history for the remainder of the twentieth century.

In addition to assessing the vital role of Lend-Lease food, raw materials, and ordnance in the Red Army's victory, this study establishes the importance of the Arctic convoy route and compares this with the Iranian and Siberian routes emphasized by scholars such as Robert H. Jones, Hubert P. van Tuyll, and Albert L. Weeks, adding a military perspective to the

⁴ Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, ed. and trans. Strobe Talbott (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), 185-187.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 237-238.

historiography of the Lend-Lease program.⁶ The overall tactical and strategic role of Lend-Lease tanks, aircraft, trucks, and other vehicles are discussed to assess the impact of U.S. aid on Stalin's war effort. The memoirs of General Henry "Hap" Arnold, Eddie Rickenbacker, Edward Stettinius, Jr., and several Red Army commanders and veterans are also consulted to determine the military impact of Lend-Lease on the Eastern Front.⁷

The domestic debates within Congress and the American public regarding Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union contribute a U.S. perspective to this topic, in addition to clarifying the role of Soviet spies within the Roosevelt administration and their influence on U.S. foreign policy. The key roles of many of these agents, especially Assistant Treasury Secretary Harry Dexter White, assured Stalin of a strong support structure within the Roosevelt administration and contributed heavily to Soviet subversion of the Lend-Lease program to obtain American and British state secrets.⁸ Few Western scholars today are aware of the level to which Stalin's NKVD and military intelligence (GRU) infiltrated Roosevelt's administration and the impact that this had on influencing the president's closest Lend-Lease advisers including Stettinius and Hopkins. This dissertation explores the degree of Soviet espionage and disinformation in the

⁶ Robert Huhn Jones, *The Roads to Russia: United States Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969), vii-xii, 83-87; Van Tuyl, *Feeding the Bear*, 49-52; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 1-4, 4-7.

⁷ Henry H. Arnold, *Global Mission* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), 248-249; Nikolai Litvin, *800 Days on the Eastern Front: A Russian Soldier Remembers World War II*, ed. and trans. Stuart Britton (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007), 9, 48-51; Dmitriy Loza, *Commanding the Red Army's Sherman Tanks: The World War II Memoirs of Hero of the Soviet Union Dmitriy Loza*, ed. and trans. James F. Gebhardt (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 57, 73; Justin Pastorfield-Li, "An excerpt from an interview with a Soviet soldier who survived the Battle of Stalingrad," *Digital Public Library of America*, 19 January 2008, <https://dp.la/primary-source-sets/world-war-ii-s-eastern-front-operation-barbarossa/sources/1696>; Edward V. Rickenbacker, *Rickenbacker* (New York: Fawcett Crest, 1969), 389; Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., *Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory* (New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1944), 257.

⁸ John Koster, *Operation Snow: How a Soviet Mole in FDR's White House Triggered Pearl Harbor* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery History, 2015), 15; Herbert Romerstein, and Eric Breindel, *The Venona Secrets: The Definitive Exposé of Soviet Espionage in America* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery History, 2000), 3-4; Benn Steil, *The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 303, 328-329, 334.

wartime U.S. government and explains the reasons for Roosevelt's prioritization of deliveries to Stalin's Red Army over Great Britain, China, and the other major Allied Powers.⁹

Since the 1960s, historians have generally concluded that while initial Lend-Lease deliveries in the first years after the Pearl Harbor attack had only a minor impact on the fighting on the Eastern Front, the program contributed significantly to the Red Army's major offensives later in the war. While few of these scholars have failed to properly credit Stalin's Red Army and the Soviet people for their courageous defiance of Hitler and their destruction of Germany's war machine at a staggering human cost, they have sought to answer the question of exactly how effective the Soviet Lend-Lease program proved to be.¹⁰ Apart from several memoirists, Soviet officials remained curiously quiet on the subject other than occasionally degrading the quality of Western armor and aircraft in comparison to Soviet weaponry, making it difficult for scholars to obtain an honest account of the program's impact from Soviet sources.¹¹

In the 1959 book *The Decision to Aid Russia, 1941* Raymond H. Dawson introduced scholars to the roots of Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union in the first work to address the program's origins.¹² Dawson states that the first six months after the German surprise assault proved crucial to Roosevelt's efforts to generate U.S. support for Stalin's beleaguered forces as the president repeatedly emphasized the tenacity that Red Army units continued to display.¹³

⁹ Koster, *Operation Snow*, 15; Romerstein and Breindel, *The Venona Secrets*, 3-4; Steil, *The Battle of Bretton Woods*, 303, 328-329, 334.

¹⁰ Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 263-265, 266-269; Van Tuyll, *Feeding the Bear*, 137-140, 141-143; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 124-126.

¹¹ Litvin, *800 Days*, 9, 48-51; Loza, *Commanding the Red Army's Sherman Tanks*, 57, 73; Pastorfield-Li, "An excerpt from an interview with a Soviet soldier,"; Boris V. Sokolov, "The Role of Lend-Lease in Soviet Military Efforts, 1941-1945," trans. David Glantz, *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Vol. 7, Issue 3 (September 1994), 567-586, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13518049408430160>.

¹² Richard H. Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia, 1941* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1959), xii-xiii.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 126-128.

Dawson concludes that while some congressmen urged Roosevelt to allow the Soviet and Nazi tyrannies to destroy each other, mounting tensions with the Axis Powers and increasing German submarine activity led to vital domestic support for the program by the end of 1941.¹⁴

In his 1969 work *The Roads to Russia: United States Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union*, Robert Jones launched the first scholarly inquiry into Lend-Lease's effect on the Soviet war effort in contrast to Dawson's focus on the domestic debate in the United States. Jones argues that the positive role of Lend-Lease began with the Red Army's counteroffensive at the 1942 Battle of Stalingrad with thousands of U.S. Studebaker trucks boosting the Red Army's mobility.¹⁵ Crediting the Anglo-American forces operating the Iranian route or "Persian Corridor" with delivering the most vehicles between 1943 and 1945, Jones concludes that Lend-Lease served as a far greater contribution to the Red Army's anti-Nazi struggle than the Soviet leadership wished to admit.¹⁶ In 1973, George Herring, Jr. revisited Dawson's emphasis on the diplomatic role of the Soviet Lend-Lease program in *Aid to Russia, 1941-1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War*, largely dismissing Jones's arguments regarding the program's effectiveness as a military tool in Stalin's war effort.¹⁷ Yet despite breaking with Jones over the military impact of Lend-Lease aid, Herring nevertheless concedes that U.S. raw materials, food, factory tools, and railroad lines greatly boosted the Soviet war effort and maintained the alliance during the war's most crucial years, helping Stalin to avoid food riots and continue Soviet military production.¹⁸

¹⁴ Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia*, 162, 165-166, 227.

¹⁵ Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 220-221.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 257, 282.

¹⁷ George C. Herring, Jr., *Aid to Russia, 1941-1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), viii-ix.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 235-237, 244.

Revisiting the controversy ignited by Jones's claim that Lend-Lease played a key role in the Red Army's victory over Hitler, Hubert P. van Tuyll argues in his 1989 book *Feeding the Bear: American Aid to the Soviet Union, 1941-1945* that Lend-Lease aid greatly hastened Germany's defeat.¹⁹ Emphasizing the improvements that were made in the Persian Corridor beginning in late 1942, van Tuyll concurs with Jones's argument that this route served as the most important and reliable aid conduit to the Red Army, providing thousands of trucks, jeeps, raw materials, and attack aircraft beginning in mid-1943.²⁰ In his 2004 book *Russia's Life-Saver: Lend-Lease Aid to the U.S.S.R. in World War II*, Albert Weeks reexamines the scholarly debate surrounding Lend-Lease's effectiveness on the Eastern Front.²¹ Citing documents located in the newly opened Russian State and Military Archives that were unavailable to Western scholars during the Cold War, Weeks establishes the total of U.S. \$12,500,000,000 as the correct monetary value of the war material contributed by the United States to supply Stalin's war effort rather than the figure of \$11,300,000,000 cited by Jones.²²

In 2021, historian Sean McMeekin contributed a new perspective to Soviet Lend-Lease historiography, arguing that Lend-Lease deliveries to the Soviet Union should have been severely curtailed or perhaps ended altogether in 1943 in *Stalin's War: A New History of World War II*.²³ McMeekin's arguments in this volume have since attracted both considerable commendation and controversy, rightly receiving praise from some scholars such as Dr.

¹⁹ Van Tuyll, *Feeding the Bear*, xii, 3-4.

²⁰ Ibid., 27, 71, 83-84, 122-124.

²¹ Dmitriy Loza, *Attack of the Airacobras: Soviet Aces, American P-39s, and the Air War Against Germany*, ed. and trans. James F. Gebhardt (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 39-42 78-79; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 52-53.

²² Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 52-53, 122, 126-127.

²³ Sean McMeekin, *Stalin's War: A New History of World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 2021), 516-519, 536-537.

Geoffrey Wawro and fair, constructive criticism from others such as Dr. Vojin Majstorovic.²⁴

While his conclusions regarding Soviet Lend-Lease have proved controversial enough, much of the criticism directed at McMeekin's work appears to result largely from his main arguments emphasizing Stalin's role, rather than Hitler's alone, in helping ignite the Second World War in Europe.²⁵

In keeping with my focus on the necessity and impact of Roosevelt's Soviet Lend-Lease program, this dissertation does not delve into McMeekin's arguments regarding Stalin's alleged planning for an aggressive war on Germany, his documented aggression against smaller countries, or his overall role in the conflict.²⁶ While very intriguing and perhaps meriting further scholarly exploration, a deep discussion of such issues could greatly distract from this dissertation's purpose of identifying the necessity, effectiveness, and overall impact of Soviet Lend-Lease and they are therefore not discussed in the chapters that follow. In his chapters focusing on Soviet Lend-Lease, however, McMeekin has made an important historiographical contribution that must be addressed, and this dissertation investigates his conclusions regarding the program's necessity and effectiveness in arming Stalin's Red Army.²⁷ I thereby hope to help enhance the previous findings of the experts by identifying and examining how the Allies appear to have sufficiently supplied Stalin by 1943, Roosevelt's true motives for expanding Soviet aid,

²⁴ Vojin Majstorovic, "H-Diplo Roundtable XXIV-5 on McMeekin, *Stalin's War*," Review of McMeekin, Sean, *Stalin's War: A New History of World War II* (2021), *H-War, H-Net Reviews*, 26 September 2022, https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/10685214/h-diplo-roundtable-xxiv-5-stalin%E2%80%99s-war#_Toc111672159.

²⁵ Ibid.; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 1-6, 7-10.

²⁶ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 1-6, 7-10.

²⁷ Ibid., 347-379, 389-390, 403-408, 427-432, 540-545.

and a possible alternative that may have defeated Berlin while preventing Moscow from subjugating Eastern Europe.²⁸

While Jones and van Tuyll emphasize the importance of the Allied Persian Corridor route through Iran to the delivery of crucial Lend-Lease material to the Soviet Union, Weeks focuses his study on the air route between Alaska and Siberia, known as Alaska-Siberia (ALSIB), while relegating the importance of the Arctic convoys to secondary status. Established in November 1941, ALSIB served as a major supply route for the delivery of aircraft manufactured in U.S. factories to Stalin's Red Army Air Forces, eventually delivering more than 8,000 combat planes.²⁹ McMeekin also mentions the dangers to the Allied ships and, by extension, the Soviet supplies, of the Arctic route to North Russia's ports and emphasizes the enormous tonnage of material delivered to Stalin's Red Army over the Pacific Ocean and through Iran.³⁰

Yet the Soviet pilots had to fly the ALSIB-delivered aircraft across the vast Siberian landscape before reaching the battlefields of Soviet Europe, while the violent sandstorms of the Persian Corridor proved hazardous for both aircraft and motor vehicle engines until major improvements were made after April 1943.³¹ These factors indicate that the Arctic convoy route, despite being imperiled by Nazi airpower and submarine activity, likely played a more vital role in sustaining the Soviet Union's war effort than these scholars have previously concluded.³² It

²⁸ Henry C. Cassidy, "Soviet Offensive Is Speeded By American War Supplies; U.S. HELP SPEEDS SOVIET OFFENSIVE," *The New York Times*, 6 March 1943, <https://www.nytimes.com/1943/03/06/archives/soviet-offensive-is-speeded-by-american-war-supplies-us-help-speeds.html>.

²⁹ Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 236; Van Tuyll, *Feeding the Bear*, 88-89, 111; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 126-127.

³⁰ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 419-420, 422.

³¹ Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 236.

³² McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 371-373, 382-384; Alexander Hill, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-45: A Documentary Reader* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 172-173, 174-176; Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 139, 243-244; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 118, 122-123; Steven J. Zaloga, *Soviet Lend-Lease Tanks of World War II* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2017), 6-8.

appears, therefore, that Stalin's forces may have received enough supplies to resist and repulse Hitler's fiercest attacks by the spring of 1943, rendering the subsequent expansion of the supply centers in Iran and Alaska unnecessary and counterproductive for postwar peace.³³

This dissertation expands on the findings of the works written by these scholars by not only addressing the helpful and counterproductive aspects of Lend-Lease aid to Stalin's forces but by pinpointing the specific reasons for Roosevelt's prioritization of Soviet aid deliveries and the Arctic convoys' role in accomplishing the mission of sufficiently supplying the Red Army by 1943. While McMeekin's work proposes that Soviet aid could reasonably have been discontinued in 1943, this dissertation explains how the Arctic convoys managed to deliver the material that boosted the Red Army's crucial counterattacks at Stalingrad and elsewhere that year. In turn, the findings of this work strongly suggest that Roosevelt's subsequent expansion of the Persian Corridor and ALSIB resulted in oversupplying Stalin and empowering his armies to surge into Europe and Asia, thereby contributing to previous scholarly analysis of Lend-Lease aid to the Red Army by identifying the specific means by which Washington excessively armed the Soviets. Adding further to the previous conclusions of Jones, van Tuyll, Weeks, McMeekin, and other experts, this work also identifies the impact of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on the motivations of Roosevelt and his advisers to prioritize and expand their Soviet aid program, and Stalin's role in exploiting their fears to obtain excessive quantities of war material, including the components for atomic bomb construction.³⁴

While this dissertation, like previous works, emphasizes Stalin's infiltration of Roosevelt's White House through the effective planting of spies in the U.S. administration and

³³ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 419-420, 422, 516-519, 536-537.

³⁴ Stettinius, Jr., *Lend-Lease*, 215; Van Tuyll, *Feeding the Bear*, 83.

the president's naivete and misplaced affection for the Soviet premier, it also tackles several questions that have, until now, remained unanswered. In emphasizing the Arctic convoys' contribution to the Red Army's defensive war effort by 1943, Roosevelt's underestimation of Stalin's character and capabilities, and the fears of a second Brest-Litovsk in Washington, I hope to help demonstrate how and why the Western Allies excessively armed the Soviets and how this could have been avoided while keeping them in the war. Jones, van Tuyll, and McMeekin credit the Persian Corridor with serving as the main delivery route over which thousands of U.S. Studebakers arrived in time to boost the Red Army's counterattack at Stalingrad in late 1942.³⁵ Yet the Persian Corridor initially served as a poor supply route and became effective only after Roosevelt transferred control of U.S. supply facilities in Iran to the U.S. Army Air Corps in spring 1943, helping Major General Donald H. Connolly to improve the route by building more supply centers, recruiting local Iranian delivery drivers, and clearing more roads through Iran's cold northern mountains and vast, arid deserts.³⁶

As a result of Connolly's efforts, the Persian Corridor only became effective beginning in the late spring of 1943, suggesting that most of the vehicles used during the Red Army's Stalingrad operation had been delivered over the Arctic convoy route.³⁷ While Jones and van Tuyll ascribe little importance to the Arctic convoys, Weeks assesses it as the second most important supply route after the ALSIB air route. Yet few of the items that Weeks describes as helpful to the Red Army, such as eggs, canned meat, aluminum for producing tank motors and

³⁵ Alexander Hill, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-45: A Documentary Reader* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 172-173, 174-176; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 371-373, 382-384; Steven J. Zaloga, *Soviet Lend-Lease Tanks of World War II* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2017), 6-8.

³⁶ Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 84, 122-126, 209; Rickenbacker, *Rickenbacker*, 389; Thomas H. Vail Motter, *The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia* (Washington, D.C.: The Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1952), 3-5; Van Tuyll, *Feeding the Bear*, 87, 94-96, 101.

³⁷ Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 139; Vail Motter, *The Persian Corridor*, 3-5, 124-127.

aircraft armor, and trucks, arrived in Soviet East Asia over this route as only attack aircraft, bombers, and transport planes capable of carrying few supplies were delivered from Alaska.³⁸

While the Arctic convoy route to the Soviet ports of Murmansk and Archangel has been largely overlooked in previous scholarly works focusing on Soviet Lend-Lease, this dissertation seeks to determine the route's importance in sustaining Stalin's fighting men and women at a crucial period in the war. The memoirs of Lend-Lease officials and Allied mariners suggest that Stalin may have received sufficient material aid over this route to execute the powerful counterattacks that wore down the Nazi armies in their 1942 summer offensives and crushed them at Stalingrad that winter.³⁹ This study examines the effectiveness of the Arctic convoys to determine their impact on sustaining Stalin's soldiers during the crucial months of combat that culminated in the Soviet victory at Stalingrad in February 1943.⁴⁰

Accordingly, the necessity of the U.S. Congress's 1943 decision to renew the Soviet Lend-Lease program is also examined to determine whether the Roosevelt administration excessively and inadvertently armed Stalin's Red Army for military aggression or continued providing aid desperately needed to drive the Nazis out of the occupied Soviet territories.⁴¹ In a 5 January 1943 telegram to Roosevelt, Stalin acknowledged the tremendous amount of U.S. material delivered by the Allies, without thanking the president, and the crucial role it had played

³⁸ Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 243-244; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 118, 122-123.

³⁹ Jack Broome, *Convoy is to Scatter* (London: William Kimber and Co. Limited, 1972), 206-207; William Craig, *Enemy at the Gates: The Battle for Stalingrad* (Old Saybrook, CT: Konecky & Konecky, 1973), xiv-xvii, 341-343; John R. Deane, *The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Cooperation with Russia* (New York: The Viking Press, 1947), 21; Alfred Grossmith Mason, *Arctic Warriors: A Personal Account of Convoy PQ18*, ed. Julie Grossmith Deltrice (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword, 2013), 7-8; Stettinius, Jr., *Lend-Lease*, 234-235; Michael G. Walling, *Forgotten Sacrifice: The Arctic Convoys of World War II* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2016), 170.

⁴⁰ Jochen Hellbeck, *Stalingrad: The City That Defeated the Third Reich* (New York: Public Affairs, 2015), 24-25.

⁴¹ *Congressional Record – United States Senate and House of Representatives*, 78th Congress, 1st Sess. (1943), pt.?, Government Publishing Office, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1943-pt2/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1943-pt2-6.pdf>.

in the fighting. While urging Roosevelt to continue ensuring aid deliveries over all the supply routes and prioritizing the Arctic convoys, Stalin's words expressed far less urgency than in his previous letters to the president.⁴² Less than a month later, the Soviet 62nd Army conquered its battered, encircled German 6th Army opponent at Stalingrad, suggesting that by the beginning of 1943, Stalin had already received enough aid to repulse the Nazis.⁴³

The necessity of renewing Lend-Lease assistance to the Red Army in 1943 remained a topic largely overlooked in previous works focusing on the Soviet aid program until the publication of McMeekin's *Stalin's War*. Together with an investigation into the program's effects on Stalin's war effort before its renewal and the Red Army's subsequent victories as the supplies continued arriving, this dissertation establishes a connection between the war's crucial turning points and the successful deliveries of war material. As discussed in the chapters ahead, the findings of this research appear to demonstrate that Lend-Lease played a crucial strategic role in propelling the Red Army to victory as well as strengthening Stalin's aggressive endeavors that led to the long and costly Cold War.⁴⁴

As U.S. war production began to rise considerably in early 1942, the Soviet Lend-Lease program gained momentum as Roosevelt prioritized arms, ammunition, and raw material shipments to satisfy Stalin's pleas for more aid. After tasting a bitter defeat at the outskirts of Moscow, enabled in part by the success of Stalin's spies in helping to exacerbate the U.S.-

⁴² U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Roosevelt to Stalin January – June 1943," *The White House*, Washington, D.C., 1943, *National Archives and Records Service Franklin D. Roosevelt Library*, http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/_resources/images/mr/mr0052.pdf.

⁴³ Vasili Chuikov, *The Battle for Stalingrad* ed. and trans. Harold Silver (New York: Ballantine Books, 1968), 236-239, 322-324; Craig, *Enemy at the Gates*, 374-377, 383-384; Hellbeck, *Stalingrad*, 87-88, 138-139; Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York: Ishi Press, 2020), 87-88; Van Tuyl, *Feeding the Bear*, 129.

⁴⁴ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 419-420, 422, 516-519, 536-537.

Japanese tensions that led to Pearl Harbor, Hitler's armies resumed their offensives inside the Soviet Union without the Japanese military support they had counted on.⁴⁵ As the Red Army's soldiers doggedly resisted the Nazi onslaught in the spring of 1942, Stalin's demands that Churchill and Roosevelt immediately open a "second front" and simultaneously deliver more Lend-Lease material increased in desperation.⁴⁶ Much of his correspondence to his Western allies during this period reveals that the Soviet premier placed special emphasis on receiving Western aid through the Soviet Arctic ports due to their relative proximity to the battlefield.⁴⁷

In many of his 1942 telegrams to Roosevelt, Stalin especially emphasized the need for massive deliveries of Lend-Lease aluminum, aircraft, and trucks. Food also appears to have ranked high on his list of needs as the war progressed into late spring and summer as German forces captured more territory in eastern Ukraine and southwestern Russia in their advance towards the Caucasus Mountains and Stalingrad.⁴⁸ These regions, like the Ukrainian territories already under Hitler's control since September 1941, served as the Soviet Union's breadbasket, providing nourishment to the country's war workers and soldiers alike. Hitler's capture of these vital agricultural areas threatened to deny daily sustenance to millions of Soviet citizens, leading Lend-Lease officials to fear worker and soldier uprisings like those of the First World War.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Koster, *Operation Snow*, 114, 132-135, 136-138; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 43-44, 261-164, 379, 386-388.

⁴⁶ U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Roosevelt to Stalin May – December 1942."

⁴⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman 1941-45* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1958), "Message from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr. W. Churchill," 12 April 1943, 117-118; David Reynolds and Vladimir Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters: Stalin's Wartime Correspondence with Churchill and Roosevelt* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), 227, 232; U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Roosevelt to Stalin."

⁴⁸ Chuikov, *The Battle for Stalingrad*, 218; Craig, *Enemy at the Gates*, 102-103, 106-107, 140-143; Hellbeck, *Stalingrad*, 87-88, 138-139; Pastorfield-Li, "An excerpt from an interview with a Soviet soldier,"; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 133-134; U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Stalin to Roosevelt July – December 1942," *The White House*, Washington, D.C., 1942, *National Archives and Records Service Franklin D. Roosevelt Library*, http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/_resources/images/mr/mr0051a.pdf.

⁴⁹ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 331-332, 347-349, 424-427.

Roosevelt, Hopkins, and Stettinius appear to have been concerned that Nazi propagandists could capitalize on the growing food scarcity in the Soviet Union to ignite mutinies in the Red Army, as had Lenin and Trotsky against the Provisional Government of Alexander Kerensky in 1918. In January 1942, Roosevelt established his “Map Room” in the White House, from which he communicated to his Allied counterparts through frequent telegrams. In his Map Room correspondence with Stalin and Churchill, Roosevelt sought to assure the Soviet premier of his resolve to keep the Red Army supplied and, in the field, while urging the British Prime Minister to continue his navy’s support for the Arctic convoys.⁵⁰

In addition to Roosevelt’s Map Room papers, I have found several other fantastic primary sources to be especially helpful in researching this topic. The online archival collections of the U.S. Navy Department Library, the War Department’s Chief of Finance records, and the U.S. Department of State’s *Soviet Supply Protocols* also proved helpful in determining the amount of Lend-Lease aid shipped and delivered to the Soviet Union between the fall of 1941 and the summer of 1945.⁵¹ The Congressional Record also provided useful insights into U.S. wartime perceptions of Stalin’s Soviet regime and the decision to continue prioritizing Lend-Lease aid to the Red Army.⁵²

⁵⁰ U.S. President, “Map Room Papers Box 8 Roosevelt to Stalin May – December, 1942,” *The White House*, Washington, D.C., 1942, *National Archives and Records Service Franklin D. Roosevelt Library*, http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/_resources/images/mr/mr0051.pdf.

⁵¹ Office, Chief of Finance War Department, “Lend-Lease Shipments World War II,” 31 October 1946, <http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/LL-Ship/index.html>; Pastorfield-Li, “An excerpt from an interview with a Soviet soldier,”; The Navy Department Library, “Lend-Lease Act, 11 March 1941,” *Naval History and Heritage Command*, <https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/l/lend-lease-act-11-march-1941.html>; U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols* (Washington, D.C.: Government Publishing Office, 1948), iii-iv.

⁵² *Congressional Record – United States Senate and House of Representatives*, 78th Congress, 2nd Session (1944), pt. 6, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1944-pt6/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1944-pt6-7.pdf>; U.S. President, “Report to Congress on Reverse Lend-Lease,” *The White House*, Washington, D.C., 11 November 1943, *The American Presidency Project*, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/report-congress-reverse-lend-lease>; U.S. President, “Lend-Lease Policy Toward the Soviet Union,” *The White House*, Washington, D.C., 3 July 1945, *Harry S. Truman Presidential Library & Museum*, <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/node/401220>.

Titled “Cold War Origins,” Collection 27 of the Wilson Center Digital Archive contains documents on U.S.-Soviet wartime relations including diplomatic interactions between Stalin and U.S. officials.⁵³ Hero of the Soviet Union Dmitriy Loza commanded a battalion of U.S. M4 Sherman tanks and I have found his memoir *Commanding the Red Army’s Sherman Tanks: The World War II Memoirs of Hero of the Soviet Union Dmitriy Loza* to be extraordinarily insightful.⁵⁴ Nikolai Litvin served as a Red Army private during the war’s last two years and commends U.S. wartime deliveries of food, clothing, and trucks for enabling the Red Army’s victorious offensives between 1943 and 1945 in his memoir *800 Days on the Eastern Front: A Russian Soldier Remembers World War II*.⁵⁵ I have also found Justin Pastorfield-Li’s 19 January 2008 interview of Red Army veteran and biology professor Vadim Medish to be valuable in providing an insightful firsthand recollection of the Battle of Stalingrad in which thousands of U.S. Lend-Lease vehicles appear to have played a key supporting role.⁵⁶

Several other excellent primary sources that were immensely helpful in researching this work include Churchill’s *Memoirs of the Second World War*, Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke’s *War Diaries 1939-1945*, and the second volume of Sir Henry Pownall’s *Chief of Staff: The Diaries of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall*.⁵⁷ Several key archival documents housed at the British National Archives, Kew, have provided even more information on the Arctic convoys

⁵³ *Wilson Center Digital Archive, Collection 27, “Cold War Origins,” “Report from Mikoyan to Stalin and Molotov Regarding Lend-Lease Shipments from the United States From 1 October 1941 to 1 May 1944,” 1 May 1944,* <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collection/27/cold-war-origins/3>.

⁵⁴ Loza, *Commanding the Red Army’s Sherman Tanks*, 57, 73.

⁵⁵ Litvin, *800 Days*, 9, 48-51.

⁵⁶ Pastorfield-Li, “An excerpt from an interview with a Soviet soldier,”; The Navy Department Library, “Lend-Lease Act.”

⁵⁷ Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, *War Diaries 1939-1945* (London: Phoenix Press, 2001), 416-417; Winston S. Churchill, *Memoirs of the Second World War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987), 406-407; Pownall, *Chief of Staff*, 39-40, 41-42.

that proved vital to this dissertation's development and completion. The collections C. B. 3305 (4) *Naval Staff History – Second World War: Battle Summary No. 22, Arctic Convoys 1941-1945* and "PREMIER 3 393/8: Convoy JW 52" have proved invaluable. Examining these documents gave me a firsthand view into the inter-Allied tensions and London's desperation to keep Stalin's soldiers fighting during a crucial period of the war and helped in determining the importance and capability of the Arctic convoys in achieving this crucial strategic objective while revealing that Churchill and Roosevelt were of one mind in their desperation to avert a Nazi-Soviet truce.⁵⁸

Emphasizing the Red Army's tenacious defiance of the Nazi juggernaut, Roosevelt, as well as Hopkins and Stettinius in Washington, D.C., Ambassador Admiral William H. Standley, and Military Mission Chief John R. Deane in Moscow expressed their convictions that the Soviet Union merited priority deliveries.⁵⁹ These men, all leading U.S. officials with great influence on Lend-Lease operations, sought nothing short of total victory over their Axis adversaries and were determined to take the war into Germany to prevent Berlin's continued resurgence as a threat. They seem to have regarded Stalin's ruthlessness and the Red Army's struggle to repulse Hitler's forces as key assets in defeating the European Axis Powers and feared repeating the debacle of a second Brest-Litovsk Treaty, a specter that appears to have haunted them until late in the war.⁶⁰

During a brief return to Washington for consultation on Soviet Lend-Lease protocol in December 1942, Ambassador Standley voiced his concerns to Roosevelt, Hopkins, General

⁵⁸ *The National Archives of the UK, C. B. 3305 (4) Naval Staff History – Second World War: Battle Summary No. 22, Arctic Convoys 1941-1945* (Ministry of Defence, London: Historical Section Admiralty, 1954), 5-7; *The National Archives of the UK, "PREMIER 3 393/8," "First Sea Lord,"* 14 December 1942.

⁵⁹ Deane, *The Strange Alliance*, 87-89; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 396-398, 400-402; William Harrison Standley and Arthur Ainsley Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1955), 75, 118; Stettinius, Jr., *Lend-Lease*, 227-229, 230-232.

⁶⁰ Arnold, *Global Mission*, 466-470, 529-530; Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (New York: Avon Books, 1968), 69-70, 489-490; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 635-637, 639-641.

George C. Marshall, and General Hap Arnold that while the Red Army could win at the ongoing Battle of Stalingrad, he feared, “what course of action Stalin would take if the war continued into the next summer without tangible help from the Western Allies.”⁶¹ After complaining to no avail about Hopkins’s hand-picked head of the U.S. War Supply Mission in Moscow, Brigadier General Philip R. Faymonville, Standley repeated his concerns to Roosevelt’s first ambassador to the Soviet Union, William C. Bullitt. Giving Bullitt and others the impression that Soviet Lend-Lease required urgent expansion, Standley later recalled of his visit, “I gave him [Bullitt] my standard prediction of that period – the Red Army would hold out against the Nazis through the winter. I couldn’t predict what would happen in Russia if the War continued into the Summer, without [a] marked improvement in the [supply] situation.”⁶²

Standley’s report may have inadvertently undermined his attempts to persuade Roosevelt to obtain concessions from the Soviets in exchange for further aid as he advised the president to, “Stop acting like a Santa Claus, Chief And let’s get something from Stalin in return,” complaining that General Faymonville unquestioningly promised to supply, “everything in the world they ask for.”⁶³ Rather than convincing the White House to attach conditions to Soviet aid, Standley appears to have succeeded only in reinforcing Roosevelt and Hopkins’s conviction that the Lend-Lease supply routes in Iran and Alaska needed improvement to increase the flow of supplies to the Red Army and keep its troops in the field.⁶⁴ Eddie Rickenbacker voiced

⁶¹ Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 308-309.

⁶² Orville H. Bullitt, *For the President – Personal and Secret: Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), v-vi; Joseph E. Davies, *Mission to Moscow* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1941), xiii-xiv; Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 312-313.

⁶³ Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 308-309.

⁶⁴ U.S. President, “Statement on Raw Materials, Munition Assignments, and Shipping Adjustment Boards,” *The White House*, Washington, D.C., 26 January 1942, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-raw-materials-munition-assignments-and-shipping-adjustment-boards>.

similar concerns in conversations with administration officials after returning from the Soviet Union in the summer of 1943, further indicating that wartime Washington's prevailing policy centered on keeping the Red Army fighting by increasing Soviet aid.⁶⁵

Fearing a repeat of Brest-Litovsk and seeking to avoid replicating what they regarded as a strategic blunder that temporarily imperiled Allied efforts during the First World War, many senior U.S. Lend-Lease officials and congressmen sought to prevent the Red Army's collapse at all costs.⁶⁶ Their concerns were amplified by their perception of Hitler's Germany as posing a much greater danger due to its rapid conquest of most of Europe and reputed mastery of mobile armored operations supported by attack aircraft. Stalin and his regime appeared to many of them as a less threatening force by comparison, and their wartime concern of keeping his soldiers fighting effectively while preventing a second Brest-Litovsk motivated their efforts to continue feeding and arming the Red Army's ranks.⁶⁷

While a scholarly consensus has been reached among U.S. and Western historians, with recent crucial input from Russian historians Boris Sokolov and Vladimir Kotelnikov, regarding the contributions of the Persian Corridor and ALSIB routes to the Red Army's victorious offensives later in the war, the Arctic convoys' role in the Soviet Union's defense has, until now, received little attention.⁶⁸ This dissertation does not, therefore, seek to rehash or dispute the well-researched and convincing conclusions of the experts regarding which route supplied the

⁶⁵ Rickenbacker, *Rickenbacker*, 400-401, 402-403.

⁶⁶ Cornell University Library, *Proceedings of the Brest-Litovsk Conference: The Peace Negotiations Between Russia and the Central Powers – 21 November, 1917-3 March, 1918* (Washington, D.C.: Government Publishing Office, 1918), 7-8.

⁶⁷ Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, 25, 489-490.

⁶⁸ Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 263-265, 266-269; Vladimir Kotelnikov, *Lend-Lease and Soviet Aviation in the Second World War* (West Midlands, UK: Helion & Company, 2017), 45-47, 49-53, 54-57; Boris V. Sokolov, *The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War: A Re-Examination* (West Midlands, UK: Helion & Company, 2013), 48-52, 53-55, 56-59; Van Tuyl, *Feeding the Bear*, 137-140, 141-143; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 124-126.

most material to Stalin's forces, but rather seeks to answer the question of whether the Western Allies needed to expand their program by opening the routes over which most of the aid arrived. In seeking to address McMeekin's questioning of the necessity of Soviet Lend-Lease aid after 1943, I have devoted a chapter to reexamining the key contribution of the Arctic convoys to the Red Army's victorious counterattacks that turned the tide of the war.⁶⁹ While most historians such as Jones, Weeks, and McMeekin have rightly emphasized the dangers that the Allied mariners faced on the Arctic route to North Russia and the larger deliveries enabled by the two other routes' expansion, this dissertation seeks to reassess the part that the convoys played in the Soviet Union's defense.⁷⁰

Throughout the war, the shadow of Brest-Litovsk continued to haunt the Allied leaders in Washington and London as the war on the Eastern Front raged across Nazi-occupied Soviet Europe, and Stalin appears to have sought to exploit these fears to obtain greater amounts of Lend-Lease aid. While not presenting Roosevelt and Churchill with an open, outright threat to conclude a separate peace with Hitler, the Soviet premier nevertheless seems to have strongly implied that he could be forced to do so by events at the front in his telegrams with his Allied counterparts. His diplomats' insistence that Allied material aid paled in comparison to the sacrifices being made by the Soviet government and people appears to have amplified U.S. perceptions that the Red Army, if not massively supplied by the West, could collapse in a repeat

⁶⁹ Hill, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, 185; Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 263-265, 266-269; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 391-393, 407-409, 419-420, 422; Van Tuyll, *Feeding the Bear*, 137-140, 141-143; Walling, *Forgotten Sacrifice*, 9-10; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 25-27; David Wragg, *Sacrifice for Stalin: The Cost and Value of the Arctic Convoys Re-assessed* (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Maritime, 2005), xii-xv, 72-73.

⁷⁰ Hill, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, 185; Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 139-140, 152-153; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 391-393, 407-409, 419-420, 422; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 25-27.

of 1918, removing the threat to Hitler's eastern borders, and delivering massive Soviet resources to the Nazi war machine.⁷¹

In his memoir, U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull recalls that Sir Anthony Eden and other British officials shared American fears of Stalin feeling alienated by the West and concluding a separate peace with Hitler, just as the Soviet premier had done in August 1939 while assigning the blame for his action to the alleged failure of London and Paris to negotiate with Moscow in earnest.⁷² Recalling, "They feared lest, in those circumstances, Stalin might negotiate a separate peace with Germany," Hull suggests that Churchill and Eden shared the concerns of their U.S. counterparts regarding the possibility of a second Brest-Litovsk and were, like Roosevelt and Hopkins, duped into unconditionally aiding the Red Army.⁷³ Stung by Stalin's claims that former Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's allegedly insincere attempts at negotiating with Moscow had supposedly led the Soviet premier to conclude a pact with Hitler, Churchill and Eden eventually accepted the Kremlin's demands for territorial concessions in Eastern Europe.⁷⁴

Stalin appears to have detected these fears and implicitly and repeatedly raised the specter of a second Brest-Litovsk in his dealings with Roosevelt and Churchill to secure excessive, unconditional aid for the Red Army and their consent, reluctant and grudging in

⁷¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 10," 3 September 1941, 20-22; Pownall, Sir Henry, *Chief of Staff: The Diaries of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall*, Vol. 2, ed. Brian Bond (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1974), 39-40, 41-42; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 40-41; *The National Archives of the UK*, "PREMIER 3 393/8: Convoy JW 52," December 1942-February 1943, "First Sea Lord," 14 December 1942.

⁷² Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. II* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1948), 1167-1168.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 1171-1173.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 1169, 1171-1173; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 103: For Marshal Stalin from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill," 19 August 1943, 83; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 287-288; U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Roosevelt to Stalin January – June 1943."

London's case, to his eventual expansion.⁷⁵ In his 1975 memoir *Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin 1941-1946* W. Averell Harriman strongly implies that Roosevelt continued to fear the possibility of a second Brest-Litovsk and sought to prevent this by assuring Stalin of further unconditional aid even as Soviet forces crushed the Germans at Stalingrad.⁷⁶ Stalin is said to have coldly declined to meet with the president at Casablanca, Morocco due to, "affairs connected with the front" that demanded his presence in Moscow, a claim that he repeated after Roosevelt proposed moving the meeting to March.⁷⁷ "Concerned over Stalin's absence [at Casablanca]" according to Harriman, Roosevelt offered to send General Marshall to Moscow to help boost Soviet morale and to assure the Soviet premier in the strongest possible terms that he and Churchill intended to carry on the war to Berlin while seeking no terms but Germany's unconditional surrender.⁷⁸

Having already refused to attend the Casablanca Conference at which Roosevelt and Churchill publicly declared their unconditional surrender and total war policy against Germany, Stalin rejected the president's offer to send Marshall to Moscow.⁷⁹ Harriman recalls that Roosevelt expressed deep concern at Stalin's absence during the Casablanca Conference and states that the president confided to him at the time that he feared repeating President Woodrow Wilson's perceived mistake in not ensuring Germany's total and unquestioned defeat by taking the war into Berlin in 1918.⁸⁰ With Wilson's perceived failures weighing heavily on his mind at

⁷⁵ Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, 69-70; Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 1171-1173.

⁷⁶ W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, *Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin 1941-1946* (New York: Random House, 1975), 179; U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Roosevelt to Stalin January – June 1943."

⁷⁷ Harriman and Abel, *Special Envoy*, 179; U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Roosevelt to Stalin January – June 1943."

⁷⁸ Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, 489-490; Harriman and Abel, *Special Envoy*, 179, 190, 192.

⁷⁹ Harriman and Abel, *Special Envoy*, 179, 190.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 190, 192.

Casablanca, Roosevelt doubtlessly regarded Stalin's absence as an indication that the Soviet leader may seek a separate peace, and desperately sought to demonstrate his resolve in keeping Moscow at war with Hitler.⁸¹

While the emphasis that U.S. officials placed on avoiding a repeat of Brest-Litovsk at all costs is understandable considering the historical precedent on which they based their fears and Hitler's perceived invincibility in the early 1940s, Roosevelt grossly underestimated Stalin's duplicity and military capabilities. In doing so, he appears to have far oversupplied the Red Army in his desperation to keep Stalin in the war by expanding the Persian Corridor and ALSIB in 1943 rather than relying on the Arctic convoys to continue supplying the Soviet Union's defense. Roosevelt's underestimation of the Red Army and overestimation of the Germans, combined with his misplaced affinity for Stalin that Soviet-influenced advisers helped to inculcate, led him to send extravagant aid to Moscow, including the tools for atomic bomb production. While their role has often been relegated to a solely political one by scholars emphasizing the Iranian and ALSIB routes' enabling of larger deliveries, the Arctic convoy crews appear to have ensured the Soviet Union's defense by 1943, rendering Roosevelt's subsequent actions unnecessary and harmful, and I hope that my research will, in some way, contribute to an understanding of their importance in delivering this vital Anglo-American aid.⁸²

⁸¹ Harriman and Abel, *Special Envoy*, 190, 192.

⁸² Michael Curtis, "Lend-Lease: How U.S. Kept the Soviets Afloat in World War II," *American Thinker*, 13 June 2020, https://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2020/06/lendlease_how_the_us_kept_the_soviets_afloat_in_world_war_i.html; *The National Archives of the UK*, "PREMIER 3 393/8," "Telescope No. 152. Following for Keenlyside for Ministry of War Transport," 20 January 1943.

CHAPTER 1

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS BEFORE THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THE ORIGINS OF LEND-LEASE

Throughout the Second World War, Roosevelt's Soviet Lend-Lease program appears to have been driven in large part by his concern that Stalin could potentially seek a separate peace with Hitler if the Soviet premier deemed Allied aid insufficient and continued suffering costly defeats. These fears were rooted in history and based largely on the Allied experience in the First World War, in which German leaders had obtained a peace treaty from the young Soviet regime that eliminated the two-front war they had been waging contrary to their strategic prewar planning. Allied strategy in the Second World War focused on the total defeat of Hitler and his Axis partners, and concerns over Moscow forging a separate peace pact seem to have motivated not only Roosevelt's apparent zeal in aiding Stalin but that of his senior advisers as well. While Soviet spies within his administration are now known to have played a role in helping to shape U.S. wartime policy in a pro-Soviet direction, Roosevelt's emphasis on aiding Stalin seems to have been partially influenced by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk's frightening shadow.

The Brest-Litovsk Treaty not only provided First World War Germany with crucial resources that threatened to undermine the British naval blockade of German ports but allowed Berlin to refocus the bulk of its armed might on the Western Front with no fear of being attacked from the east.⁸³ To avoid a repeat of this dangerous situation and ensure Nazi Germany's ultimate defeat, Roosevelt and other U.S. leaders sought to keep Stalin's soldiers armed, fed, and motivated to carry on the anti-Nazi struggle and drive deep into the Reich's heartland.

⁸³ B. H. Liddell Hart, *The Real War 1914-1918* (New York: Little, Brown and Company), 75, 113, 116, 142, 313, 472, 473, 476; Cornell University Library, *Proceedings of the Brest-Litovsk Conference*, 30-34, 39-42.

Accordingly, it is necessary for this work to first examine early U.S.-Soviet relations and the reasons for which the specter of a potential second Brest-Litovsk seems to have later haunted U.S. leaders, steeling their resolve to aid Stalin while asking little in return. This chapter also discusses the extent to which Stalin managed to attract prominent American businessmen and skilled technicians to strengthen his industrialization program in the 1930s, forging connections that later enhanced Soviet Lend-Lease.

The roots of Russia's 1917 revolutions that overthrew the country's monarchy, swept the Communists into power, and triggered an Allied military intervention in the ensuing Civil War and subsequent U.S.-Soviet hostility lie in the country's military disasters suffered in the First World War.⁸⁴ By the beginning of 1917, Russia's military failures and enormous battlefield losses had only succeeded in deepening the country's internal problems and pushing relations between the ruling Romanov monarchy and much of the Russian population to the breaking point.⁸⁵ Tsar Nicholas II's enforcement of food rationing and his family's perceived indifference to the suffering that the war brought to ordinary Russians strengthened revolutionary movements such as the Socialist Revolutionary Party, or Trudoviks, and Bolshevik Party, later renamed the Communist Party.⁸⁶ On 15 March 1917, Nicholas II abdicated the Romanov throne on his own behalf and that of his son and heir Alexei, then aged twelve, in favor of his brother, Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich, following a week of mass rioting and demonstrations in the country's capital, Petrograd.⁸⁷

⁸⁴ Sean McMeekin, *The Russian Revolution: A New History* (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 64-65, 73.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 121-122; Alan Moorehead, *The Russian Revolution* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), 149.

⁸⁶ Evan Mawdsley, *The Russian Civil War* (London: Pegasus Books, 2009), 5-6; McMeekin, *The Russian Revolution*, 101-102.

⁸⁷ *Alpha History Authors*, "The Abdication Decree of Tsar Nicholas II (1917)," McMeekin, *The Russian Revolution*, 121-122; Mawdsley, *The Russian Civil War*, 16-17; McMeekin, *The Russian Revolution*, 108; McMeekin, *The Russian Revolution*, 73-74; Carl J. Richard, *When the United States Invaded Russia: Woodrow*

The grand duke immediately declined the imperial crown, effectively ending three centuries of Romanov royal rule in the Russian Empire.⁸⁸ Under the leadership of Socialist Revolutionary President Alexander Kerensky, the Provisional Government of Russia placed the Romanovs under protective custody at their former royal palace in Petrograd. In April, Kerensky's new government vowed to honor the previous regime's commitments to the Allies and continued prosecuting the war against the Central Powers on the Eastern Front.⁸⁹

Until this point in the war, President Woodrow Wilson had continually reassured Americans that he intended to keep their country neutral despite escalating tensions with Germany because of Berlin's policy of unrestricted submarine warfare.⁹⁰ Enacted by German Kaiser Wilhelm II, this policy targeted the Allies' Atlantic trade as Great Britain's Royal Navy tightened its blockade of German ports, and it gradually began angering many Americans. Despite his growing frustration with the German submarine menace, Wilson is said to have expressed unease about entering the war on the side of the Allies due to the autocratic nature of Russia's tsarist regime.⁹¹ Nicholas II's perceived disinterest in introducing democratic reforms

Wilson's Siberian Disaster (Lanham, MD: 2013), 10-11.; *Seventeen Moments in Soviet History: An on-line archive of primary sources*, "February Revolution," Michigan State University, <https://soviethistory.msu.edu/home>.

⁸⁸ Mawdsley, *The Russian Civil War*, 105; McMeekin, *The Russian Revolution*, 121-122.

⁸⁹ *Alpha History Authors*, "Milyukov's Note to the Allies (1917)," McMeekin, *The Russian Revolution*, 149, 152; Richard, *When the United States Invaded Russia*, 13.

⁹⁰ Martin Gilbert, *The First World War: A Complete History* (New York: Owl Books, 1996), 157; S. L. A. Marshall, *World War I* (New York: Mariner Books, 2001), 166; Theodore Roosevelt, "Theodore Roosevelt on the Sinking of the Lusitania, 1915," *The Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History*, 23 June 1915, <https://www.gilderlehrman.org/sites/default/files/inline-pdfs/t-08003.pdf>; Herbert Temple, "LUSITANIA TORPEDOED: Sinking of Great Liner May Involve United States – Fate of Passengers and Crew Uncertain – Victim of Submarine Sinks off Irish Coast in Thirty Minutes," *The San Diego Union-Tribune*, 7 May 1915, <https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/150-years/sd-me-150-years-may-7-20180425-htmlstory.html>; U.S. President, "President Woodrow Wilson's Proclamation of Neutrality," *Naval History and Heritage Command*, 4 August 1914, <https://www.history.navy.mil/research/publications/documentary-histories/wwi/1914/ttl-president-woodro.html>.

⁹¹ McMeekin, *The Russian Revolution*, 23-24, 26, 61; Geoffrey Wawro, *A Mad Catastrophe: The Outbreak of World War I and the Collapse of the Habsburg Empire* (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 192-193, 229; U.S. President, "President Wilson's Proclamation."

contributed heavily to Wilson's initial attempts to remain neutral, and for several years he continued resisting Allied pressure to join the war even as tensions with Wilhelm II's Berlin mounted.⁹²

In January 1917, the discovery and decoding of the Zimmermann Telegram, in which the German leadership promised support for a Mexican campaign into the southwestern United States, pushed relations between Washington and Berlin to the edge.⁹³ Wilhelm II's escalation of his submarine campaign the following month strained relations further as domestic U.S. support for entry into the war as a member of the Allies increased, pressuring Wilson to act.⁹⁴ Even as war appeared increasingly unavoidable, the president expressed his concern that the United States could not claim to be supporting, "democracy" because of the tsar's membership in the Allied Powers.⁹⁵

Russia's February Revolution and the resulting overthrow of Romanov imperial rule had profound consequences that significantly altered the course of the First World War by rendering the Allied cause more appealing to officials in Washington. Expressing his relief that U.S. involvement no longer required an alliance with the autocratic Romanov dynasty, Wilson appears to have regarded the new Kerensky government as a democratic force worth aiding.⁹⁶

⁹² U.S. President, "President Wilson's Proclamation,"; Wawro, *A Mad Catastrophe*, 192-193, 229.

⁹³ Gilbert, *The First World War*, 312; Marshall, *World War I*, 275; McMeekin, *The Russian Revolution*, 125-126; Richard, *When the United States Invaded Russia*, 10; U.S. Department of State, "Telegram with a Translation of the Zimmermann Telegram," 24 February 1917, *The National Archives*, <https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/zimmermann>.

⁹⁴ U.S. President, "April 19, 1916: Message Regarding German Actions," 19 April 1916, University of Virginia – Miller Center: Presidential Speeches – Woodrow Wilson Presidency, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/april-19-1916-message-regarding-german-actions>.

⁹⁵ Richard, *When the United States Invaded Russia*, 10; U.S. President, "April 2, 1917: Address to Congress Requesting a Declaration of War Against Germany," University of Virginia – Miller Center: "Presidential Speeches – Woodrow Wilson Presidency," <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/april-2-1917-address-congress-requesting-declaration-war>.

⁹⁶ McMeekin, *The Russian Revolution*, 125-126; U.S. President, "April 2, 1917,"; Robert L. Willett, *Russian Sideshow: America's Undeclared War* (McLean, VA: Potomac Books, 2006), xxix-xxxii.

Praising Russia's revolutionary upheavals as positive and heart-warming events, Wilson portrayed Russian society as having always been traditionally democratic while implying tsarist autocracy to be Germanic in origin in his pro-war speech to Congress on 2 April 1917.⁹⁷

Combined with public outrage over the Zimmerman Telegram and Berlin's continued submarine attacks, the latter being a mistake repeated by Hitler that allowed Roosevelt to generate support for Soviet Lend-Lease, the tsar's removal proved decisive in the U.S. declaration of war on Germany on 6 April 1917.⁹⁸

Wilson immediately issued Proclamation 1364 aimed at preempting sabotage operations by, "alien enemies" aged fourteen and older living in the United States, an act that appears to have contributed to a strong domestic fear of Germans and an association of them with anti-U.S. activities.⁹⁹ Foreshadowing the popular prejudice against Eastern and Southern European immigrants during the Red Scare, this hysteria culminated in lynching and threats against German immigrants in some parts of the country as patriotic fervor swept the public.¹⁰⁰ According to Mary J. Manning, suspicions and fears of the disloyalty allegedly harbored by German immigrants and Americans of German origin continued to mount throughout 1918 with the administration's codifying of the Alien Enemy Act of 1798.¹⁰¹ Similarly, Roosevelt later

⁹⁷ U.S. President, "April 2, 1917."

⁹⁸ McMeekin, *The Russian Revolution*, 125-126; U.S. President, "April 6, 1917: Proclamation 1364," 6 April 1917, University of Virginia – Miller Center: Presidential Speeches – Woodrow Wilson Presidency," <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/april-6-1917-proclamation-1364>; U.S. President, "American troops in Siberia: Message from the President of the United States," *The White House*, Washington, D.C., 22 July 1919, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=loc.ark:/13960/t01z4q15t&view=1up&seq=1>.

⁹⁹ U.S. President, "April 6, 1917."

¹⁰⁰ John Deml, "'Get the Rope!': Anti-German Violence in World War I-era Wisconsin," *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (January 1919), 101-102, <http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/1/>; Mary J. Manning, "Being German, Being American: In World War I, They Faced Suspicion, Discrimination Here at Home," *Prologue* (Summer 2014), 14-22, <https://www.archives.gov/files/publications/prologue/2014/summer/germans.pdf>.

¹⁰¹ Manning, "Being German, Being American," 16-17.

helped shift Americans' fears away from Communism and refocused them on immigrants and children of immigrants from Axis countries, signing an order that led to the incarceration of thousands of Japanese-Americans in internment camps.¹⁰²

Ten days after the congressional declaration of war, Bolshevik Party leader Vladimir Lenin returned to Russia armed with \$5,000,000 in German gold marks to rally his followers and lead a Communist revolution against the Provisional Government.¹⁰³ Sensing a crucial opportunity to exploit Russia's turbulent atmosphere and force the country out of the war, Generals Paul von Hindenburg and Erich von Ludendorff had earlier concluded that Germany's strategic interests lay in financially backing Lenin's bid for power.¹⁰⁴ Lenin immediately began calling for the overthrow of Kerensky's Provisional Government and the rule of *soviets* or "councils" of soldiers and workers to represent the people and implement Communist reforms.¹⁰⁵

Mass demonstrations against the Provisional Government erupted following more military defeats in July 1917, prompting Kerensky to order Lenin's arrest as a German agent, and the Bolshevik leader fled into hiding in Finland. From Bolshevik safehouses in Helsinki, Lenin continued agitating for a Communist revolution and gained many more supporters with his promises of land, food, and peace after three years of devastating conflict.¹⁰⁶ His success in

¹⁰² U.S. President, "Executive Order 9066, February 19, 1942," *The White House*, Washington, D.C., 19 February 1942, *National Archives and Records Administration*, <https://www.archives.gov/historical-docs/todays-doc/?dod-date=219>.

¹⁰³ McMeekin, *The Russian Revolution*, 128, 132.

¹⁰⁴ John M. House, *Wolfhounds and Polar Bears: The American Expeditionary Force in Siberia, 1918-1920* (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2016), 10-12; Vladimir I. Lenin, *Lenin Collected Works*, Vol. 41, trans. Yuri Sdobnikov (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), 397-398; Marshall, *World War I*, 321; McMeekin, *The Russian Revolution*, 20, 46, 132, 165-166, 173; John Lukacs, "America and Russia, Americans and Russians," *American Heritage*, Vol. 43, No. 1 (February-March 1992), <https://www.americanheritage.com/america-and-russia-americans-and-russians>.

¹⁰⁵ Lenin, *Lenin Collected Works*, Vol. 41; McMeekin, *The Russian Revolution*, 173, 176.

¹⁰⁶ *Alpha History Authors*, "Lenin Calls for Revolution (1917),""; David R. Francis, *Russia From the American Embassy: April, 1916-November, 1918* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921), 19, 31, 52-55, 57-59; House, *Wolfhounds and Polar Bears*, 19; Marshall, *World War I*, 324; McMeekin, *The Russian Revolution*, 173.

exploiting the growing agony of ordinary Russians that resulted from military defeats and food shortages later motivated Roosevelt's prioritizing of Soviet Lend-Lease, as the president sought to save Stalin from sharing Kerensky's fate.¹⁰⁷

On 7 November 1917, a fleet of Bolshevik sailors entered Petrograd harbor after Lenin's deputy and leader of the city's *soviet*, Leon Trotsky, promised to organize Bolshevik support for a military coup.¹⁰⁸ Fighting erupted as thousands of soldiers organized into *soviets*, abandoning their officers and occupying government buildings. On the following day, the soldiers captured the Winter Palace, overthrowing the Provisional Government while Lenin and Trotsky announced the formation of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR).¹⁰⁹

On Lenin's orders, soldiers abandoned their battlefield posts and organized *soviets* to support the victorious Bolsheviks' "October Revolution" against the threat of counterrevolution by the Party's socialist, democratic, and monarchist rivals.¹¹⁰ Lenin's deputies immediately acted on their proposed programs, issuing a peace declaration, confiscating private property, and nationalizing the country's industries.¹¹¹ In December, they initiated a series of peace talks with German officials, yet negotiations temporarily collapsed, and German forces immediately resumed their offensive, capturing a large swathe of land between the Baltic and Black Seas.¹¹²

¹⁰⁷ Francis, *Russia From the American Embassy*, 115-117, 128-130, 134; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 306-308.

¹⁰⁸ McMeekin, *The Russian Revolution*, 212; Moorehead, *The Russian Revolution*, 245.

¹⁰⁹ Alpha History Authors, "Lenin Calls for an October Revolution (1917)," McMeekin, *The Russian Revolution*, 215, 217.

¹¹⁰ House, *Wolfhounds and Polar Bears*, 23; McMeekin, *The Russian Revolution*, 226-227; *Seventeen Moments in Soviet History*, "Vladimir Lenin, Proclamation to Soldiers and Sailors. November 22, 1917."

¹¹¹ Alpha History Authors, "Decree Establishing a Soviet Government (1917)," Lenin, *Lenin Collected Works*, Vol. 41; *Seventeen Moments in Soviet History*, "Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, Decree on Peace. November 8, 1917."

¹¹² *Seventeen Moments in Soviet History*, "The Socialist Fatherland is in Danger! Soviet of People's Commissars, Proclamation. February 21, 1918."

On 3 March 1918, Lenin and Trotsky surrendered this enormous area, populated by 56,000,000 people from Estonia to Ukraine, to Wilhelm II in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.¹¹³ Lenin's treaty with Berlin triggered an immediate and dramatic shift in the overall strategic situation in Europe, carrying ramifications that reverberated across the continent and onto the French and Belgian battlefields. By concluding peace with the Bolsheviks, the German High Command had effectively neutralized the threat from the east and proceeded to concentrate its military efforts in a major offensive against the Western Allies.¹¹⁴

In March 1918, Ludendorff launched Germany's Spring Offensive against the increasingly exhausted Anglo-French armies.¹¹⁵ Yet as pointed out by Dr. Geoffrey Wawro in *Sons of Freedom: The Forgotten American Soldiers Who Defeated Germany in World War I*, U.S. troops had begun arriving in France in large numbers by the spring of 1918.¹¹⁶ Under General John J. "Blackjack" Pershing, the fighting men of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) gradually emerged as outstanding soldiers and played a crucial role in delivering the fatal blow that felled Berlin's armies later in the year.¹¹⁷ As Wawro explains, however, the German

¹¹³ Christopher Dobson and John Miller, *The Day They Almost Bombed Moscow: The Allied War in Russia 1918-1920* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), 43-44; Gilbert, *The First World War*, 401-402; Marshall, *World War I*, 334; McMeekin, *The Russian Revolution*, 226-227; *Seventeen Moments in Soviet History*, "Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, March 3, 1918."

¹¹⁴ Francis, *Russia From the American Embassy*, 223-227, 229; The German General Staff, "Erich Ludendorff on the Opening of the 1918 Spring Offensive, 21 March 1918," Charles F. Horne (ed.) *Source Records of the Great War, Vol. VI*, (New York: National Alumni, 1923), https://www.firstworldwar.com/source/kaiserbattle_ludendorff.htm.

¹¹⁵ The German General Staff, "Erich Ludendorff."

¹¹⁶ Geoffrey Wawro, *Sons of Freedom: The Forgotten American Soldiers Who Defeated Germany in World War I* (New York: Basic Books, 2018), viii, 122-124.

¹¹⁷ General John J. Pershing, "MY EXPERIENCES IN THE WORLD WAR; Enemy Growing Exhausted. New Offensives Planned. Wearing Down the Germans. Artillery and Tanks Needed. Our Plans Badly Disrupted. 1,200,000 Yankee Soldiers in France. A Regiment Sent to Russia. Against Dissipating a Great Effort Force to Russia to Guard Stores. First American Army Ordered. Harbord Named to Head S.O.S.," *The New York Times*, 7 March 1931, <https://www.nytimes.com/1931/03/07/archives/my-experiences-in-the-world-war-enemy-growing-exhausted-new.html>; Wawro, *Sons of Freedom*, 129.

troops initially gained ground as Wilson's beleaguered British and French allies began to falter and collapse in several key locations.¹¹⁸ In the first week of their grand offensive, German forces captured 963 Allied artillery guns and 100 tanks and destroyed ninety-three aircraft while advancing on the town of Maisonnnette and striking Paris with long-range artillery.¹¹⁹

The Brest-Litovsk Treaty also provided Germany with vital access to the abundant resources of the former Russian Empire, including Ukraine's vast wheatfields, and appeared to Allied leaders at the time as a frightening development that had altered the strategic situation to their detriment.¹²⁰ Facing no further resistance from the east, Berlin could potentially reinvigorate its war effort by exploiting the resources of the territories surrendered by Lenin, thereby supplying its armies to fight on indefinitely and reducing the effectiveness of Great Britain's naval blockade. Allied fears grew in April as German troops arrived in Finland following Berlin's 7 March 1918 peace treaty with Helsinki, triggering concerns that the kaiser could now seize Russia's strategic Arctic port of Murmansk and nearby Archangel on the White Sea.¹²¹

Fearing a German attack, the local Murmansk *soviet* requested assistance from the British government, and Prime Minister David Lloyd George landed a small contingent of troops on the

¹¹⁸ Wawro, *Sons of Freedom*, 129.

¹¹⁹ The German General Staff, "Erich Ludendorff."

¹²⁰ Cornell University Library, *Proceedings of the Brest-Litovsk Conference*, 47-49, 51-54, 56, 61-65; E. M. Halliday, *When Hell Froze Over: The Secret War Between the U.S. and Russia at the Top of the World* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 21-23; Field-Marshal Lord Ironside, *Archangel: 1918-1919* (Uckfield, East Sussex, UK: Naval & Military Press, 2007), 45-46, 51, 55-56; *Seventeen Moments in Soviet History*, "Treaty of Brest-Litovsk."

¹²¹ Henry P. Beers, "U.S. Naval Forces in Northern Russia (Archangel and Murmansk) 1918-1919," *Office of Records Administration, Administrative Officer, Navy Department*, 1943, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015011359273&view=1up&seq=1>; John Bradley, *Allied Intervention in Russia* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 8-9, 15-16; Deutscher Reichsanzeiger, "Treaty of peace between Finland and Germany. Signed at Berlin, 7 March, 1918," *Deutscher Reichsanzeiger*, 8 March 1918, [https://documentsdedroitinternational.fr/ressources/TdP/1918-03-07-TraitedeBerlin\(Finlande\)\(enanglais\).pdf](https://documentsdedroitinternational.fr/ressources/TdP/1918-03-07-TraitedeBerlin(Finlande)(enanglais).pdf); Francis, *Russia From the American Embassy*, 261-162, 264-265, 278, 296, 297, 301-304.

morning after Lenin signed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.¹²² To counter the rise of domestic anti-Communist opposition groups, Trotsky began organizing thousands of soldiers and peasants into a new military force that he called the Red Army in honor of the Bolshevik Party's flag.¹²³ Upon joining Trotsky's Red Army, soldiers swore an "Oath of the Red Warrior" in which they promised to fight to uphold, enforce, and expand the government's political ideology.¹²⁴ Although they represented a diverse range of ideologies ranging from tsarism to democratic socialism and sometimes fought each other, the Russian anti-Communists became collectively known as the White Army.¹²⁵

Angered by Lenin's treaty with the kaiser, British and French leaders reacted with hostility towards the young Soviet regime, perceiving its separate peace as a deadly act of betrayal and fearing its aggressive calls for a worldwide Communist revolution.¹²⁶ Dismissing Allied fears, Wilson initially praised Lenin's efforts against tsarist autocracy and monarchism in general in an 11 March 1918 telegram delivered to the Seventh Party Congress at which the

¹²² Dobson and Miller, *The Day They Almost Bombed Moscow*, 43-44; Halliday, *When Hell Froze Over*, 21-23; Clifford Kinvig, *Churchill's Crusade: The British Invasion of Russia, 1918-1920* (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2007), 26-27.

¹²³ James Carl Nelson, *The Polar Bear Expedition: The Heroes of America's Forgotten Invasion of Russia 1918-1919* (New York: William Morrow, 2020), 13, 29; *Seventeen Moments in Soviet History*, "Soviet of People's Commissars, Formation of the Worker-Peasant Red Army. January 28, 1918."

¹²⁴ *Alpha History Authors*, "The Oath of the Red Warrior (1918)."; *Seventeen Moments in Soviet History*, "Solemn Oath on Induction into the Worker-Peasant Red Army. 1918."

¹²⁵ House, *Wolfhounds and Polar Bears*, 26-27; Joel R. Moore, Harry H. Meade, and Lewis E. Jahns, *History of the American Expedition Fighting the Bolsheviks: U.S. Military Intervention in Soviet Russia, 1918-1919* (Detroit: Polar Bear Publishing, 1920), 9, 49, 57; UK Prime Minister, "Papers of David Lloyd George, 1st East Lloyd George of Dwyfor (as filmed by the AJCP) [microfilm] : [M1124-1125], 1903-1944," Series F/File 2/01/1932, "L.S. Amery to Lloyd George," 24 December 1918.

¹²⁶ Dobson and Miller, *The Day They Almost Bombed Moscow*, 63, 70; Halliday, *When Hell Froze Over*, 26-27, 225; Kinvig, *Churchill's Crusade*, 20; *Seventeen Moments in Soviet History*, "Soviet of People's Commissars, An Appropriation for the Support of World Revolution. December 26, 1917."

Bolsheviks officially changed their party's name to the Russian Communist Party.¹²⁷ Wilson appears to have initially welcomed the Communists as an ideologically progressive political party, yet he increasingly expressed alarm over Lenin's handing over of Ukraine's abundant resources to Berlin.¹²⁸

During Russia's years of participation in the struggle against the Central Powers, both Nicholas II and Kerensky had stockpiled large amounts of excess war material provided by the Western Allies in the Arctic ports of Murmansk and Archangel and Vladivostok on the Pacific coast.¹²⁹ First utilized for this purpose in the First World War, these three ports later served as key destinations for the Allied deliveries of a much greater amount of Lend-Lease aid to the Red Army. Wilson shared Allied fears that if German forces in Finland again resumed the offensive to seize what Berlin might not gain through diplomacy, they could capture the first two ports, located in the far north of European Russia, and the Allied war material stored in them.¹³⁰ Regarding the Pacific Ocean port of Vladivostok, he also feared the possibility of the Allied supplies there either falling into Japanese hands or being given to Germany by a victorious, pro-Berlin Soviet government.¹³¹

¹²⁷ U.S. Department of State, "Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, Volume I: The Acting Secretary of State to Consul General at Moscow, Washington, March 11, 1918," 11 March 1918, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1918Russiav01/d398>.

¹²⁸ Beers, "U.S. Naval Forces in Northern Russia,"; Francis, *Russia From the American Embassy*, 261-162, 264-265, 278, 296, 297, 301-304; Halliday, *When Hell Froze Over*, 26-27, 225; Ironside, *Archangel*, 47-49.

¹²⁹ Halliday, *When Hell Froze Over*, 26-27; Ironside, *Archangel*, 47-49; Richard, *When the United States Invaded Russia*, 37-38; Willett, *Russian Sideshow*, 22.

¹³⁰ House, *Wolfhounds and Polar Bears*, 9; Gibson Bell Smith, "Guarding the Railroad, Taming the Cossacks: The U.S. Army in Russia, 1918-1920," *Prologue*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Winter 2002), *U.S. National Archives*, <https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2002/winter/us-army-in-russia-1.html>; U.S. President, "American Troops in Siberia."

¹³¹ Francis, *Russia From the American Embassy*, 261-162, 264-265, 278, 296, 297, 301-304; U.S. President, "American Troops in Siberia,"; Willett, *Russian Sideshow*, 28-29.

At a 27 May 1918 meeting of the British War Cabinet, Prime Minister Lloyd George and Lord Robert Cecil addressed the ongoing carnage unleashed by Ludendorff's Spring Offensive and spoke hopefully of the oncoming U.S. divisions that they viewed as critical Allied reinforcements.¹³² Addressing the situation in Russia, Lord Cecil voiced concern over the fate of the Czechoslovak Legion, stating that its men sought to avoid embroilment in Russia's Civil War and to somehow reach the Western Front to fight in the Allied ranks. Announcing that he planned to meet with the French Secretary of State that night, Lord Cecil informed the War Cabinet that Allied officials intended to hold a crucial discussion on Lenin's perceived pro-German stance and how they hoped to reopen the Eastern Front.¹³³

Alarmed at these developments and increasingly concerned that Allied supplies in Russia could fall into German hands, the Anglo-French leaders began urging their U.S. counterparts to support a military intervention against Lenin's Bolsheviks.¹³⁴ Initially reluctant, Wilson voiced his concern that such action could result in the restoration of the Romanovs and refused to commit U.S. forces to a campaign focused on overthrowing Communism. The president had framed the U.S. war mission as a crusade to protect democracy in his speeches to the American public, and he initially refused to send troops.¹³⁵

¹³² *The National Archives of the UK*, "The Cabinet Papers: The Western Front," British War Cabinet, "Cabinet Conclusion 1. The Western Front. 27 May 1918," <http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pdfs/small/cab-23-6-wc-419-41.pdf>.

¹³³ British War Cabinet, "Cabinet Conclusion 1,," UK Prime Minister, "Papers of David Lloyd George," Series F/File 2/01/1932, "L.S. Amery to Lloyd George," 24 December 1918.

¹³⁴ George F. Kennan, *Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920, Vol. II: The Decision to Intervene* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), 482-485; Kinvig, *Churchill's Crusade*, 20; Richard, *When the United States Invaded Russia*, 37-38; U.S. Department of State, "The Secretary of State to the Allied Ambassadors: Aide Memoire," 17 July 1918, http://pbma.grobbel.org/aide_memoire.htm.

¹³⁵ Beers, "U.S. Naval Forces in Northern Russia,," Dobson and Miller, *The Day They Almost Bombed Moscow*, 66; Kennan, *Soviet-American Relations*, 482-485; Lukacs, "America and Russia,," *The National Archives of the UK*, "Spotlights on history: Allied intervention in Russia, 1918-19 – Fighting the Bolsheviks in North Russia – Catalogue reference 30/71/4 (15 August 1919),"

As the fighting between the Allied and German forces in France and the Red and White Armies in Russia raged throughout the summer of 1918, Allied officials continued urging Wilson to dispatch a contingent of U.S. troops to North Russia and Siberia.¹³⁶ The Allied leadership desperately sought to restore the Eastern Front to again force Berlin into a two-front war and grew increasingly fearful that the Soviet government constituted a pro-German regime. As daily clashes with German troops continued, Wilson gradually decided to aid the White Army, hoping that a limited U.S. presence could help train its troops, promote democratic values, and ensure the safe passage of the Czechoslovak Legion to the Western Front.¹³⁷ The pre-revolutionary Russian High Command had authorized these former Czech and Slovak prisoners-of-war (POWs) to be trained to return and overthrow Habsburg rule and restore national independence to their respective homelands in Vienna's floundering empire.¹³⁸

In March 1918, Lenin's Commissar for Nationalities, Joseph Stalin, authorized free passage for the Czechoslovak Legion to travel to Vladivostok and board ships to sail for the Western Front.¹³⁹ A hostile encounter with a local Bolshevik commander in Chelyabinsk led to violence, and, in an insubordinate act for which Stalin appears to have never forgiven him, Trotsky subsequently ordered the legionnaires to be disarmed, arrested, and executed.¹⁴⁰

<https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/firstworldwar/spotlights/allies.htm>; U.S. Department of State, "The Secretary of State to the Allied Ambassadors."

¹³⁶ Richard, *When the United States Invaded Russia*, 43; John Swettenham, *Allied Intervention in Russia, 1918-1919* (Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2019), 64, 164-165; *The National Archives of the UK*, "Spotlights on history – Fighting the Bolsheviks,"; UK Prime Minister, "Papers of David Lloyd George," Series F/File 2/01/1932, "L.S. Amery to Lloyd George," 24 December 1918.

¹³⁷ Beers, "U.S. Naval Forces in Northern Russia,"; Bradley, *Allied Intervention*, 113; Richard, *When the United States Invaded Russia*, 45-47; Swettenham, *Allied Intervention*, 97.

¹³⁸ Bradley, *Allied Intervention*, 93-94; Marshall, *World War I*, 334; *The National Archives of the UK*, "Spotlights on history – Fighting the Bolsheviks."

¹³⁹ Stephen Kotkin, *Stalin: Paradoxes of Power, 1878-1928* (New York: Penguin Press, 2014), 103; Willett, *Russian Sideshow*, xxxii.

¹⁴⁰ Jason Dawsey, "Trotsky's Struggle Against Stalin: Joseph Stalin was a hangman whose noose could reach across oceans," The National World War II Museum – New Orleans, 12 September 2018,

Trotsky's action provoked Czechoslovak defiance, and the men subsequently seized a large portion of the Trans-Siberian Railroad and advanced on the Ural Mountain town of Ekaterinburg in July 1918 as Soviet troops there executed the imprisoned Nicholas II and his Romanov royal family.¹⁴¹

Emphasizing his staunch support for “self-determination” and democracy, Wilson grew increasingly concerned about the plight of the legionnaires and sought to help facilitate their safe passage to the Western Front by sending U.S. troops.¹⁴² He also began expressing distaste for Communism after Lenin and Trotsky launched the Red Terror at the hands of their *Cheka* secret police agency, later renamed the NKVD during Stalin's rule, in August 1918.¹⁴³ Following peasant resistance to the Soviet regime's seizure of private property and farms, Lenin's secret police organized the mass executions and incarcerations of those suspected of harboring counterrevolutionary thoughts.¹⁴⁴

From the Soviet capital Moscow, U.S. Ambassador DeWitt Clinton Poole expressed alarm following a 3 August 1918 speech by Lenin declaring Soviet Russia to be at war with the Allies as more British and French reinforcements arrived in Archangel. The following month, a successful coup by an uneasy alliance of democratic-socialist White Army factions in Archangel and Murmansk led to the establishment of the Provisional Government of the Northern Region.¹⁴⁵ As the Russian Civil War and Red Terror raged, with Lenin and Trotsky voicing

<https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/trotsky-struggle-against-stalin>; Kotkin, *Paradoxes of Power*, 103; Donald Rayfield, *Stalin and his Hangmen: The Tyrant and Those Who Killed for him* (New York: Random House, 2005), 49, 89-90, 92; Richard, *When the United States Invaded Russia*, 45-47.

¹⁴¹ Kotkin, *Paradoxes of Power*, 103; Richard, *When the United States Invaded Russia*, 45-47.

¹⁴² Bradley, *Allied Intervention*, 94.

¹⁴³ Beers, “U.S. Naval Forces in Northern Russia.”

¹⁴⁴ McMeekin, *The Russian Revolution*, 266-267.

¹⁴⁵ Chief of the Imperial General Staff, “Revolutionary Russia – A British View: Poole, F C,” 1-37, 12 January 1919, “King's Collections: The Serving Soldier,” King's College London,

increasingly hostile anti-Allied sentiments, Ambassador Poole's reports from Moscow appeared to lend credence to Allied fears that the Communists were German puppets.¹⁴⁶ These concerns were amplified by Poole's alarm at the Soviets' signing of several, "supplementary treaties of Brest-Litovsk" on 27 August, rendering a reopening of the Eastern Front more urgent from the contemporary Allied perspective.¹⁴⁷

After a discussion with U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, Wilson agreed to dispatch a limited force of about 13,000 troops to assist the White Army in North Russia and Siberia through guard duty, recruitment, and training.¹⁴⁸ He then authored an "aide memoire" stating that he intended the limited and temporary U.S. effort to bolster the White Army's democratic factions while focusing on protecting Allied supplies from falling into German hands.¹⁴⁹ Wilson's stated objectives later created confusion and led to many problems for the U.S. troops that he sent to aid the Allied forces assisting the White Army in North Russia and Siberia. The president expressly forbade U.S. forces from launching sustained offensive operations against the enemy while imploring them to remain officially neutral in the Russian Civil War and simultaneously train the White Army's often-reluctant soldiers to defeat the Bolsheviks.¹⁵⁰

<https://kingscollections.org/servingsoldier/collection/revolutionary-russia-a-british-view/>; DeWitt Clinton Poole, *An American Diplomat in Bolshevik Russia*, ed. Lorraine M. Lees and William S. Rodner (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2014), 149-152.

¹⁴⁶ Chief of the Imperial General Staff, "Revolutionary Russia," 9-10.

¹⁴⁷ Pershing, "MY EXPERIENCES,"; Poole, *An American Diplomat*, 149-152; UK Prime Minister, "Papers of David Lloyd George," Series F/File 2/01/1932, "L.S. Amery to Lloyd George," 24 December 1918.

¹⁴⁸ Moore, Meade, and Jahns, *History of the American Expedition*, 49; U.S. President, "American Troops in Siberia."

¹⁴⁹ Kennan, *Soviet-American Relations*, 482-485; U.S. Department of State, "The Secretary of State to the Allied Ambassadors,"; Moore, Meade, and Jahns, *History of the American Expedition*, 52-53; Willett, *Russian Sideshow*, xxix-xxxii.

¹⁵⁰ John Cudahy, *Archangel: The American War with Russia, By a Chronicler* (Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Company, 1924), 19-21; Moore, Meade, and Jahns, *History of the American Expedition*, 57; Nelson, *The Polar Bear Expedition*, 11; The American Sentinel (Unattributed Report), "Still, One Never Knows his Allies up Here," *The American Sentinel*, No. 8, 1 February 1919, <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/polar/3241550.0001.008/3?page=root;size=100;view=text>.

On 15 August 1918, 7,950 troops of the American Expeditionary Force, Siberia (AEF-Siberia) under U.S. General William S. Graves landed to somewhat support, but also cautiously observe, the ongoing Japanese military campaign at Vladivostok in Russian East Asia.¹⁵¹ Serving in the ranks of these men, U.S. Army ordnance officer Philip Faymonville later became a key Lend-Lease official in Moscow between 1941 and 1943. Faymonville's great personal rapport with Soviet officials and his faith in the Red Army's martial talents, an unconventional U.S. view at the time, later earned him the trust and appreciation of Roosevelt's friend Harry Hopkins.¹⁵²

Totaling 4,500 troops in three battalions, the men of the U.S. Polar Bear Expedition landed in Archangel on 4 September 1918 to help their British and French Allies guard the Arctic port and the surrounding villages against the Red Army's raids.¹⁵³ Placed under the overall command of British General Frederick C. Poole, the "Polar Bears" initially found themselves involved in several attacks on the enemy against Wilson's orders.¹⁵⁴ After a State Department complaint to London and Poole's subsequent replacement by General Edmund Ironside in October, the men assumed a static, defensive role. After several meetings with his superiors in London before his North Russian deployment, Ironside quickly realized that he

¹⁵¹ Deane, *The Strange Alliance*, 21; William S. Graves, *America's Siberian Adventure 1918-1920* (New York: Peter Smith Publishing, Inc., 1941), 4-5, 55-57; Nelson, *The Polar Bear Expedition*, 11; The New York Times (Unattributed Report), "GRAVES TO LEAD OUR SIBERIAN ARMY," *The New York Times*, 8 August 1918, <https://www.nytimes.com/1918/08/08/archives/graves-to-lead-our-siberian-army-former-assistant-chief-of-general.html>.

¹⁵² James S. Herndon and Joseph O. Baylen, "Col. Philip R. Faymonville and the Red Army, 1934-43," *Slavic Review: Interdisciplinary Quarterly of Russian, Eurasian, and East European Studies* Vol. 34, Issue 3 (September 1975), 483-505, https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/2473C57D215570C91E8F1F5B225876DD/S0037677900071722a.pdf/col_philip_r_faymonville_and_the_red_army_193443.pdf.

¹⁵³ Cudahy, *Archangel*, 41-43; The American Sentinel, "Still, One Never Knows his Allies up Here."

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.; Halliday, *When Hell Froze Over*, 62-64, 124-125.

could expect no reinforcements and vowed to honor Wilson's wishes by refraining from an aggressive campaign.¹⁵⁵

Throughout the winter months of 1918 and 1919, Trotsky's forces struck the White Army and the Allies in North Russia as many local villagers proved reluctant to join the anti-Communists and rallied to the Soviet cause.¹⁵⁶ Playing on nationalist sentiments, the Communists portrayed themselves as Russia's true defenders and successfully incited mutinies in the White Army's ranks while turning some local populations against the Allies.¹⁵⁷ Denied further reinforcements from Washington and London and restrained from launching sustained offensive operations against the Red Army's strongholds, U.S. forces in North Russia and Siberia suffered 424 casualties before their withdrawal on 1 April 1920.¹⁵⁸

While Trotsky's small cadres of Soviet partisans largely ceased their operations against

¹⁵⁵ Associated Press, "ALLIES PAY TRIBUTE TO YANKS OVERSEAS: Troop in Russia Feast on Delicious Wild Turkey," *The Morning Oregonian*, 29 November 1918, <https://oregonnews.uoregon.edu/lccn/sn83025138/1918-11-29/ed-1/seq-18/>; Halliday, *When Hell Froze Over*, 62-64, 124-125; Ironside, *Archangel*, 47-49; Moore, Meade, and Jahns, *History of the American Expedition*, 117; *Parliamentary Record – House of Commons*, 1st Session (1918), <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1918-10-17/debates/8bea1019-0383-4875-9914-7bf2dbde4f29/ArchangelGovernment>; Pershing, "MY EXPERIENCES,"; The American Sentinel, "Yanks Took Part in Big Fighting Here: Historians Will Find Americans Played Important Role in Campaign in North Russia," *The American Sentinel*, No. 25, 31 May 1919, <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/polar/3241550.0001.025/1?page=root;rgn=full+text;size=100;view=image>; U.S. President, "Proclamation 1496 – Thanksgiving Day, 1918," *The American Presidency Project*, 16 November 1918, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/proclamation-1496-thanksgiving-day-1918>; UK Prime Minister, "Papers of David Lloyd George," Series F/File 2/01/1932, "L.S. Amery to Lloyd George," 24 December 1918.

¹⁵⁶ Associated Press, "ALLIES PAY TRIBUTE TO YANKS OVERSEAS,"; Cudahy, *Archangel*, 90-94; The American Sentinel, "Still, One Never Knows his Allies up Here,"; *Parl. Rec. – House of Commons*, 1st Sess. (1918).

¹⁵⁷ Moore, Meade, and Jahns, *History of the American Expedition*, 117; Nelson, *The Polar Bear Expedition*, 107; *Parl. Rec. – House of Commons*, 1st Sess. (1918); *The National Archives of the UK*, "Spotlights on history – Fighting the Bolsheviks."

¹⁵⁸ Moore, Meade, and Jahns, *History of the American Expedition*, 278; *Parl. Rec. – House of Commons*, 1st Sess. (1918); The American Sentinel, "Yanks Took Big Part in Fighting Here,"; The New York Times (Unattributed Report), "ALLIES TO QUIT ARCHANGEL IN EARLY SPRING; Baker Announces That All Our Forces in North Russia Will Be Withdrawn. ORDERED BY PRESIDENT Secretary Baker Instructed to Give Reasons to Military Committees of Congress. WARNING OF MASSACRE R.E. Simmons Tells Senate Committee Slaughter Would Follow Withdrawal of Allies in North. ALLIES TO QUIT ARCHANGEL SOON RED PROPAGANDISTS BUSY IN ARCHANGEL American Soldiers Get Leaflets Urging Them to Demand That They Be Sent Home," *The New York Times*, 18 February 1919, <https://www.nytimes.com/1919/02/18/archives/allies-to-quit-archangel-in-early-spring-baker-announces-that-all.html>.

AEF-Siberia during the harsh winter months of late 1918 and early 1919, his Red Northern Army increased its activities against the Polar Bears. As White Army defections to the Soviets mounted during the winter months, swelling the Red Army's ranks to more than 600,000 men by June 1919, United States Senators Hiram Johnson (R-CA), Robert M. LaFollette (R-WI), and William E. Borah (R-ID) challenged Wilson's Russian policy.¹⁵⁹ Arguing that the Allied armistice with Germany and the Czechoslovak Legion's recent neutrality pact with the Soviet government rendered the intervention's initial purpose obsolete, the senators urged the president to withdraw all U.S. forces from Russian soil.¹⁶⁰

Johnson also pointed out that recent expressions of resentment and open hostility towards the Allied presence in North Russia highlighted the foolishness of leaving small bodies of U.S. troops to guard isolated village outposts whose inhabitants may suddenly turn against them.¹⁶¹ Wilson's supporters countered that the United States had entered the war to promote democratic governments and the self-determination of nations and argued that the U.S. soldiers were fulfilling this mission by temporarily remaining in Russia.¹⁶² Dismissing the growing unrest and desertions in the White Army's ranks as isolated incidents, the president's allies echoed his argument that the limited U.S. effort could help inspire many Russians to embrace democracy.¹⁶³

As the Allies continued engaging a growing number of enemy forces that were inadvertently bolstered by Wilson's restraints on the Polar Bears and rising local support for the

¹⁵⁹ *Congressional Record – United States Senate*, 65th Congress, 3rd Session (1918), pt. 1, Government Publishing Office, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.31210026472934&view=1up&seq=1>; Ironside, *Archangel*, 52-53, 57; Richard, *When the United States Invaded Russia*, 67; U.S. President, "Proclamation 1496."

¹⁶⁰ *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate*, 65th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1918), pt. 1; Richard, *When the United States Invaded Russia*, 67.

¹⁶¹ *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate*, 65th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1918) pt. 1.

¹⁶² House, *Wolfhounds and Polar Bears*, 180; Richard, *When the United States Invaded Russia*, 67.

¹⁶³ *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate*, 65th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1918) pt. 1.

Bolsheviks, Senator Johnson and his colleagues continued arguing for a U.S. troop withdrawal. In a 14 February 1919 Senate session, Johnson introduced a motion to withdraw all U.S. forces from Russia that quickly gained momentum as more lawmakers began voicing their support.¹⁶⁴ Johnson convincingly argued that not only had the fighting in Europe already ended with Germany's defeat but that the growing strength of the Bolsheviks, accompanied by mounting resistance to the Allies in North Russia, amplified the level of danger faced by the Americans.¹⁶⁵

Johnson proceeded to opine that unless Wilson intended to authorize a far larger force to enter Russia and decisively defeat the Red Army, the decision to maintain such a small number of men in an increasingly hostile country constituted the height of arrogance and folly.¹⁶⁶ Shortly after the senator's appeal, Wilson committed to a "phased withdrawal" of the Polar Bears and AEF-Siberia from Russian territory.¹⁶⁷ Due to the much higher level of violence in North Russia, the Polar Bears' exit from Archangel and Murmansk received priority and concluded in the summer of 1919, while AEF-Siberia completed its pullout the following spring.¹⁶⁸

Although a limited and reluctantly executed military campaign, Wilson's brief intervention proved sufficiently helpful for Lenin and Trotsky's portrayal of the United States as

¹⁶⁴ *Congressional Record – United States Senate*, 65th Congress, 3rd Session (1919), pt. 4, Government Publishing Office, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.31210023079575&view=1up&seq=5>.

¹⁶⁵ Associated Press, "ALLIES PAY TRIBUTE TO YANKS OVERSEAS,"; *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate*, 65th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1919) pt. 4; Richard, *When the United States Invaded Russia*, 67; The American Sentinel, "Yanks Took Big Part in Fighting Here,"; U.S. President, "Proclamation 1496."

¹⁶⁶ *Cong. Rec. United States Senate*, 65th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1919) pt. 4; House, *Wolfhounds and Polar Bears*, 154-155; The Alaska Daily Empire (Unattributed Report), "Yankees Back From Russia Deny Mutiny," *The Alaska Daily Empire*, 15 July 1919, <https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84020657/1919-07-15/ed-1/seq-1/>.

¹⁶⁷ Nelson, *The Polar Bear Expedition*, 133; Pershing, "MY EXPERIENCES," Richard, *When the United States Invaded Russia*, 67; The American Sentinel, "Yanks Took Big Part in Fighting Here,"; U.S. Department of State, "Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, Russia: The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Russia (Poole)," 29 March 1919, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1919Russia/d685>.

¹⁶⁸ Graves, *America's Siberian Adventure*, 349; The Alaska Daily Empire, "Yankees Back From Russia Deny Mutiny,"; The American Sentinel, "Yanks Took Big Part in Fighting Here,"; *The National Archives of the UK*, "Spotlights on history: British support for 'Whites' in Siberia – Catalogue reference WO 158/741 (18 January 1919),"; The New York Times, "ALLIES TO QUIT."

a land of imperialist aggressors.¹⁶⁹ In addition to the souring of relations between Washington and Moscow, the campaign also marked a shift in U.S. foreign policy regarding Russia as a crucial strategic theater of war due to the temporarily detrimental impact of Brest-Litovsk. Despite eventually viewing the Communists as a threat, Wilson's motives for the intervention originated in the Allies' desire to reopen the Eastern Front and challenge Germany's unhindered access to Russia's vast resources.¹⁷⁰ Allied animosity toward the early Soviet regime resulted more from its treaty with Berlin rather than its political ideology, a factor that later fueled Roosevelt's quest to keep the Soviets sufficiently armed and killing the Nazis in the field at all costs.¹⁷¹

Beginning with the U.S. military intervention in Russia's Civil War, fear of Communism became widespread in the American public, resulting in prejudice against immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe during the Red Scare of the early 1920s. The slogans of revolutionary political movements such as the International Workers of the World (IWW) also reminded some U.S. veterans of the North Russian campaign of Bolshevik slogans.¹⁷² These fears increased after Lenin and Trotsky successfully reconquered many of the Russian Empire's former territories and declared the birth of the Soviet Union on 30 December 1922 after

¹⁶⁹ Ironside, *Archangel*, 68-70; Pershing, "MY EXPERIENCES,"; *The National Archives of the UK*, "Spotlights on history: Fighting the Bolsheviks."

¹⁷⁰ Ironside, *Archangel*, 125, 126-128; Pershing, "MY EXPERIENCES,"; The Alaska Daily Empire, "Yankees Back From Russia Deny Mutiny,"; The American Sentinel, "Yanks Took Big Part in Fighting Here,"; U.S. President, "Proclamation 1496."

¹⁷¹ British War Cabinet, "Cabinet Conclusion 1,"; Dobson and Miller, *The Day They Almost Bombed Moscow*, 63, 70; Halliday, *When Hell Froze Over*, 26-27, 225; Kinvig, *Churchill's Crusade*, 20; Poole, *An American Diplomat*, 149-152; *Seventeen Moments in Soviet History*, "Soviet of People's Commissars, An Appropriation for the Support of World Revolution. December 26, 1917,"; The Alaska Daily Empire, "Yankees Back From Russia Deny Mutiny,"; U.S. Department of State, "The Secretary of State to the Allied Ambassadors."

¹⁷² Moore, Meade, and Jahns, *History of the American Expedition*, 120.

emerging victoriously in the country's Civil War.¹⁷³ During the Red Scare, mistrust of Eastern Europeans became so pronounced that many African American jobseekers fleeing segregation in the southern U.S. states found work in northern cities preferring them over immigrants.¹⁷⁴

Between 1919 and 1921, U.S. Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer oversaw a series of law enforcement raids on the offices of U.S. labor unions and the Communist and Socialist Parties as the wartime anti-German hysteria evolved into postwar fears of a Communist takeover.¹⁷⁵ Emphasizing the outrages committed by Lenin and Trotsky's regime as they consolidated their power in Russia, Palmer portrayed the U.S. Communist Party as a foreign force seeking to undermine the government and advocated the arrest and deportation of all alleged, "reds."¹⁷⁶ Just as Trotsky's propagandists had undermined the White Army's cause to an extent by portraying its leaders as Western-backed puppets, Palmer's statements appear to have led to the labeling of almost any labor movement or immigrant as Communist.¹⁷⁷

In his position as Wilson's Attorney General, Palmer also publicized a collection of various speeches and writings attributed to Communist politicians to make his case for deporting Eastern and Southern European immigrants, labor union activists, and other alleged Communists in 1920.¹⁷⁸ The specific statements to which Palmer's Justice Department called attention included not only those of actual Communist leaders, but members of the IWW and other

¹⁷³ Weeks, *Stalin's Other War: Soviet Grand Strategy, 1939-1941* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 36-37.

¹⁷⁴ Malaika Adero, *Up South: Stories, Studies, and Letters of This Century's African-American Migrations* (New York: The New Press, 1993), 54-55.

¹⁷⁵ *Primary Sources: The 1920s*, "Red Scare," "Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer Makes 'The Case against the Reds,'" 1920, Christopher Newport University, <https://cnu.libguides.com/1920s/redscare>.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ *Congressional Record – House of Representatives*, 66th Congress, 2nd Session (1920), pt. 1, Government Publishing Office, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=hvd.32044019271584&view=1up&seq=7&skin=2021>.

¹⁷⁸ U.S. Department of Justice, "Red Radicalism as Described by its own Leaders," 1920, Government Publishing Office, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.31951001556727y&view=1up&seq=1&skin=2021>.

political movements as well.¹⁷⁹ These actions appear to have led many U.S. government officials and civilians at the time to associate most organized labor movements with Communism, despite the competing and often hostile relations between rival socialist political parties both domestically and abroad.¹⁸⁰

Throughout the 1920s, American presidents consistently refused to recognize the Soviet regime and discouraged private entrepreneurs from conducting business with Soviet officials. In the Soviet Union, Stalin steadily rose to power in the Communist Party's ranks following Lenin's death in January 1924.¹⁸¹ By 1927, he had fully consolidated his position, established the office of General Secretary of the Communist Party, and exiled many political rivals, including Trotsky, before eventually having him assassinated in 1940. Stalin perfected the dictatorship established by his predecessors, and despite his public claims of withdrawing from their aggressive policies, many Americans remained fearful of Soviet Communism.¹⁸²

While counting on his public denials of expansionist motives to allay the fears of Western leaders, Stalin appears to have remained committed to strengthening the Soviet Union militarily while abandoning Trotsky's loud, boastful rhetoric threatening the imminent export of Communist revolution. Through a mass industrialization campaign, Stalin appears to have sought to modernize the country and the Red Army while hoping for the West to lower its guard.¹⁸³ Throughout the following decade, he successfully exploited the global economic turmoil to the Red Army's advantage by attracting U.S. industrialists to invest in Soviet military

¹⁷⁹ U.S. Department of Justice, "Red Radicalism."

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Stephen Kotkin, *Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929-1941* (New York: Penguin Press, 2017), 73.

¹⁸² Rayfield, *Stalin and his Hangmen*, 136, 145-146; 457-458; Romerstein and Breindel, *The Venona Secrets*, 3-4.

¹⁸³ Kotkin, *Waiting for Hitler*, 113-115.

power, convincing some Americans, including future Lend-Lease officials, that he had abandoned Lenin's aggressive strategy. Developments in the 1930s provided Stalin with more opportunities to forge relations with the West, and motivated U.S. diplomats and private citizens alike to reach out to the Soviet Union, a process that began as the 1920s ended.¹⁸⁴

In May 1929, the architect Albert Kahn of the Detroit, Michigan-based firm Albert Kahn Associates signed a contract with the Soviet government's trading company, Amtorg Trading Corporation, to build the Stalingrad Tractor Plant with U.S. steel components and machinery.¹⁸⁵ Although officially a tractor factory only, the Stalingrad plant also served as a mass production center for tanks and armored vehicles and later proved crucial to Soviet armaments production in the Second World War. Christina E. Crawford of Harvard University's Weatherhead Center for International Affairs states that Kahn's designs also led to the construction of the Kharkov Tractor Plant, the structure of which closely resembled the Stalingrad location.¹⁸⁶ Before signing his contract with Amtorg, Kahn had designed and built the Ford Motor Company's massive River Rouge Plant, and he based his work on the designs he had produced for his friend and business acquaintance, Henry Ford.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁴ Weeks, *Stalin's Other War*, 37-38.

¹⁸⁵ Margaret Bourke-White, *Eyes on Russia* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1931), 118-119, 123-124; Irene Brisson, "How Albert Kahn helped the Soviet Union industrialize: exploring the little-known history of the Architect of Detroit's impactful relationship with the USSR," *Detroit Curbed*, 13 December 2019, <https://detroit.curbed.com/2019/12/13/21012559/albert-kahn-russia-ussr-detroit-world-war-ii>; Danielle Dreilinger, "Built in the U.S.S.R. (by Detroit)," *LSA Magazine* (Fall 2019), University of Michigan, <https://lsa.umich.edu/lsa/news-events/all-news/search-news/built-in-the-u-s-s-r---by-detroit-.html>; Stateside Staff, "Detroit architect Albert Kahn helped pave the way for Soviet victory in WWII," *Michigan Radio*, 10 August 2018, https://www.michiganradio.org/arts-culture/2018-08-10/detroit-architect-albert-kahn-helped-pave-the-way-for-soviet-victory-in-wwii?_amp=true.

¹⁸⁶ Bourke-White, *Eyes on Russia*, 123-124; Christina E. Crawford, "Soviet Planning Praxis: From Tractors to Territory," *Centerpiece*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Spring 2015), Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, <https://wcfa.harvard.edu/publications/centerpiece/spring2015/feature-crawford>.

¹⁸⁷ Architect Staff, "The USA, the USSR, and Architecture: An exhibition at the Canadian Centre for Architecture explores American influences on Soviet culture," *Architect*, 15 November 2019, https://www.architectmagazine.com/design/exhibits-books-etc/the-usa-the-ussr-and-architecture_o; Deane, *The Strange Alliance*, 100-103; Sonia Melnikova-Raich, "The Soviet Problem with Two 'Unknowns': How an American

Shortly after Kahn began his work building Soviet industry, reportedly constructing 531 factories and training more than 4,000 of Stalin's engineers, Ford himself became interested in the project as U.S. firms felt the financial sting of the October 1929 Stock Market Crash and the Great Depression's onset.¹⁸⁸ According to Professor Boris M. Shpotov of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Ford Motor Company's technicians completed work on an "automobile" assembly plant, actually another tank and armored car factory, at Nizhny Novgorod on 1 February 1930.¹⁸⁹ Later that year another assembly plant in Moscow began production as Soviet engineers toiled alongside their U.S. counterparts using American steel and technical skills to help meet the industrialization goals dictated in Stalin's first "Five-Year Plan."¹⁹⁰

Ford's representatives agreed to supply technical expertise until 1938, while Stalin committed to purchasing U.S. \$13,000,000 worth of Ford vehicles and parts, providing business for the Detroit entrepreneur while upgrading the Soviet Union's military production capabilities. Engineers completed work on another plant, known as Gorki, in 1933, and the Red Army began producing the GAZ and BA series of armored combat vehicles based on the chassis of the Ford Model-A.¹⁹¹ For his investment in Soviet industrial production, Ford received the honorific title

Architect and a Soviet Negotiator Jump-Started the Industrialization of Russia, Part I: Albert Kahn," *The Journal of the Society for Industrial Archaeology*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (January 2010), 57-80, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/262098142_The_Soviet_Problem_with_Two_Unknowns_How_an_American_Architect_and_a_Soviet_Negotiator_Jump-Started_the_Industrialization_of_Russia_Part_I_Albert_Kahn.

¹⁸⁸ Crawford, "Soviet Planning Praxis,"; Historic Detroit (Unattributed Report), "Albert Kahn (March 21, 1869-Dec 8, 1942)," *HistoricDetroit.org*, <https://historicdetroit.org/architects/albert-kahn>; Melnikova-Raich, "The Soviet Problem with Two 'Unknowns'," 67-73.

¹⁸⁹ Boris M. Shpotov, "The Ford Motor Company in the Soviet Union in the 1920s-1930s: Strategy, identity, performance, reception, adaptability," Institute of World History, Russian Academy of Sciences, 1-7 (n. d.), <https://studylib.net/doc/8309060/the-ford-motor-company-in-the-soviet-union-in-the-1920s>; Antony C. Sutton, *National Suicide: Military Aid to the Soviet Union* (Las Vegas, NV: Dauphin Publishing, 1973), 112-113.

¹⁹⁰ Bourke-White, *Eyes on Russia*, 123-124, 125-127; Shpotov, "The Ford Motor Company in the Soviet Union," 3-5.

¹⁹¹ Sutton, *National Suicide*, 126; Steven J. Zaloga and James Grandsen, *Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles of World War Two* (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1984), 43, 94.

of “Hero of the Soviet Union,” and the U.S. industrialist later contributed to the Allied victory through war production at his Detroit plant, eventually shipping an entire factory to Stalin in 1943.¹⁹²

The conditions created by the Great Depression enabled Stalin to continue utilizing U.S. ingenuity to the Soviet Union’s advantage, attracting the attention of inventors and industrialists seeking to make a profit as the Great Depression destroyed the livelihoods of many Americans. He delivered speeches referring to the growth of Communist parties in the West and ordered the Red Army’s commanders to begin developing powerful weaponry while preaching his allegedly peaceful intent and simple goal of national survival.¹⁹³ Stalin’s desire to strengthen the Red Army motivated Amtorg’s purchasing of two prototype tanks disguised as tractors and built by U.S. engineer John Walter Christie, whose invention had previously been rejected by U.S. Army officials, on 30 December 1930.¹⁹⁴ Improving upon Christie’s revolutionary suspension system and overall design, Soviet engineers produced two series of tanks based on his prototypes, equipping the vehicles with sloped frontal armor and developing them into the fast-moving BT-7 and powerful T-34 tanks.¹⁹⁵

In 1930 alone, more than 600 Americans from the Ford and Hercules Motor Companies

¹⁹² Deane, *The Strange Alliance*, 100-103; Boris Egorov, “How the newborn Soviet state took capitalist help and hushed it up,” *Russia Beyond*, 25 July 2018, <https://www.rbth.com/history/328834-soviet-state-took-capitalist-help/>; Anne O’Hare McCormick, “When Henry Ford Was the Hero of the Soviet Union,” *The New York Times*, 9 April 1947, <https://www.nytimes.com/1947/04/09/archives/when-henry-ford-was-the-hero-of-the-soviet-union.html>; *Seventeen Moments in Soviet History*, “Cars for Comrades,”; Boris M. Shpotov, “Business without Entrepreneurship: the Ford Motor Company and the Soviet Industrialization, 1920s-1930s,” Institute of World History, Russian Academy of Sciences, 1-13 (n. d.), <https://ebha.org/ebha2007/pdf/Shpotov.pdf>.

¹⁹³ Kotkin, *Waiting for Hitler*, 113-115.

¹⁹⁴ Sutton, *National Suicide*, 112-113; Alexander Vershinin, “Christie’s chassis: An American tank for the Soviets,” *Russia Beyond*, 18 May 2015, https://www.rbth.com/defence/2015/05/18/christies_chassis_an_american_tank_for_the_soviets_46135.html.

¹⁹⁵ Zaloga and Grandsen, *Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles*, 166; Sutton, *National Suicide*, 112-113; Vershinin, “Christie’s chassis.”

arrived in the Soviet Union to provide technical expertise and manual labor for Stalin's factories, setting a precedent for his later procurement of U.S. aid as his diplomats became acquainted with prominent Americans.¹⁹⁶ To be sure, the population of American workers in Stalin's factories built by Ford and other U.S. industrialists paled in comparison to the numbers of Soviet laborers whose strenuous efforts helped the Soviet premier to achieve his goal of industrializing the country and strengthening its military production capabilities. According to Professor Peter Kenez, a scholar of Eastern European and Soviet history, the number of Soviet factory workers and technicians rose from 11,500,000 in 1928 to roughly 24,000,000 in 1932, and their contribution to Stalin's industrialization program naturally dwarfed the efforts of the comparatively miniscule number of American workers at the Ford and Hercules production plants.¹⁹⁷ Yet while the American engineers were few in number compared to their Soviet counterparts, the expertise that the U.S. industrialists provided nevertheless played a key part in boosting Stalin's production capabilities and, as recalled by John Scott, an American chemist, foreman, and welder who worked at the Magnitogorsk factory between 1932 and 1941, Soviet engineers had mastered the techniques of modern industrial production by the time of his arrival in the country.¹⁹⁸

Following the example of his recently deceased father, the former U.S. Assistant Secretary of War, Vice President Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. of General Motors also invested in Stalin's industrialization, working with Soviet officials such as Anastas Mikoyan.¹⁹⁹ A key

¹⁹⁶ Bourke-White, *Eyes on Russia*, 125-127; Sutton, *National Suicide*, 124; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 82-83.

¹⁹⁷ Peter Kenez, *The Birth of the Propaganda State* (New York: University of Cambridge Press, 1985), 82-83, 85-86, 89-90, 93-94, 98, 100.

¹⁹⁸ Bourke-White, *Eyes on Russia*, 125-127; Robert Vincent Daniels, *The Stalin Revolution: Foundations of the Totalitarian Era* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 182; John Scott, *Behind the Urals: An American Worker in Russia's City of Steel* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 42, 137.

¹⁹⁹ Romerstein and Breindel, *The Venona Secrets*, 49-50, 137.

Politburo member to whom Stalin entrusted the Soviet regime's major international business agreements, Mikoyan later served in a key role as Moscow's top diplomat involved in overseeing the procurement of specific Lend-Lease items. With a reputation for being a shrewd negotiator, Mikoyan appears to have forged an effective working relationship with Stettinius, and the two men later cooperated closely as the latter served as Roosevelt's Lend-Lease Administrator between March 1941 and September 1943.²⁰⁰

The investments made by U.S. industrialists in helping to industrialize the Soviet Union may have been partially influenced by the normalization of Soviet society as portrayed for American audiences by the documentary photographer Margaret Bourke-White. In 1930, Bourke-White received the Soviet government's permission to enter the country and photograph various factories and industrial projects in the Stalingrad area and elsewhere under the careful watch of Soviet officials.²⁰¹ By her admission, Bourke-White's photographic documentation of the enormous leaps in Soviet industry resulted from her fascination with capturing the historic development of a society in transition from a medieval peasant past to a modern, mechanized world of industrial efficiency.²⁰²

Stalin's approval of her government-guided tour of the Soviet Union, a rare opportunity for Westerners at the time, appears to have been motivated by his desire to advertise the successes of the first Five-Year Plan, and she enjoyed a rare visit with the Soviet premier's

²⁰⁰ Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia, 1941*, 65-66; John Kelly, *Saving Stalin: Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Cost of Allied Victory in Europe* (New York: Hachette Books, 2020), 16.

²⁰¹ Margaret Bourke-White, "SILK STOCKINGS IN THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN; Despite the Soviet Drive and the New Order of Things, Russia's Women Are Still Feminine," *The New York Times*, 14 February 1932, <https://www.nytimes.com/1932/02/14/archives/silk-stockings-in-the-fiveyear-plan-despite-the-soviet-drive-and.html>.

²⁰² Bourke-White, *Eyes on Russia*, 22-23.

mother in his mountainous, Georgian homeland.²⁰³ Noting that, “The Stalingrad [factory] group has been designed by Albert Kahn of Detroit,” Bourke-White observed that, “All the machinery has come new and glistening from Germany and America” during her visit to the Soviet factories.²⁰⁴ The Soviet workers in these factories, which were built with prewar U.S. aid and supplied with Lend-Lease aluminum, steel, and machine tools during the war, later produced the weapons by which Hitler’s hordes tasted decisive defeat at the hands of the red warriors wielding them in battle.²⁰⁵

On 16 November 1933, newly-elected President Roosevelt extended official U.S. recognition to the Soviet regime, ending the period of mutual hostility that followed Wilson’s brief intervention in the Russian Civil War.²⁰⁶ Like his later attempts to prevent a separate peace between Stalin and Hitler and thereby prevent a second Brest-Litovsk, Roosevelt’s initial diplomatic overtures to the Soviet premier appear to have been influenced by his growing apprehension at the rise of the Nazis.²⁰⁷ Appreciating Stalin’s assurances that he had abandoned Trotsky’s aggressive endeavors, the president sought to lay the groundwork for cooperation with Moscow in the event of renewed belligerency from a militant, reinvigorated Germany. As later indicated by his refusal to impose conditions on Soviet Lend-Lease and his underestimation of Stalin’s duplicitous character and the Red Army’s capabilities, Roosevelt’s foresight regarding Hitler’s aggression does not appear to have extended to his perception of the Soviet premier.²⁰⁸

²⁰³ Bourke-White, “SILK STOCKINGS IN THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN.”

²⁰⁴ Bourke-White, *Eyes on Russia*, 118-119.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.; Sokolov, *The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War*, 53-55.

²⁰⁶ *The National Security Archive, Vol. II*, “Episode 1 Cold War Documents: Roosevelt-Litvinov – The White House, Washington, November 16, 1933,” <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/coldwar/documents/episode-1/fdr-ml.htm>; Weeks, *Russia’s Life-Saver*, 82-83.

²⁰⁷ *The National Security Archive, Vol. II*, “Episode 1 Cold War Documents.”

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

Following this formal recognition of Stalin's regime, American businessmen, attracted to the idea of industrializing a nation while earning a profit, could continue conducting business with the Soviets free of federal scrutiny, limited although such scrutiny appears to have been.²⁰⁹ These financial investments and the technical expertise of many American men, including prominent individuals such as Stettinius, Ford, and Kahn, continued to help to build massive factories in the Ural Mountains and around Stalingrad.²¹⁰ In 1937, the Electric Boat Company of Groton, Connecticut received the Roosevelt administration's approval to build submarines and ordnance for the Soviet Red Fleet as a result of the president's desire to provide U.S. Navy men with work.²¹¹

On 26 January 1934, Stalin forecasted, "a new [global] war" on the horizon in a report to the Seventeenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and, after claiming that he sought only peaceful coexistence, stated that the Red Army could spare no effort in its military preparations.²¹² Assigning inevitable blame for such a potential future conflict on the Western powers, Germany, and Japan, Stalin then told his Party comrades that the Soviet Union had made great strides in strengthening its industrial capacity. Omitting to mention the contributions of U.S. engineers and industrialists to his massive program, Stalin praised the Red Army's military achievements and predicted that it could rely on the support of faithful Communists throughout the world in the event of a second global conflict.²¹³

Enabled by Roosevelt's establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviets, U.S.

²⁰⁹ Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 82-83.

²¹⁰ Kotkin, *Waiting for Hitler*, 44-45.

²¹¹ Sutton, *National Suicide*, 153, 157.

²¹² Joseph V. Stalin, *Selected Works* (Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific, 2002), 393.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, 399; Weeks, *Stalin's Other War*, 112-115, 116-117.

observers also appear to have taken notice of Stalin's successful expansion of Soviet heavy industry and the Red Army's war potential throughout the 1930s. While many Western leaders initially dismissed the Red Army as a primitive force incapable of withstanding the perceived invincibility of Hitler's army, some U.S. officials later provided key support for the Soviet Lend-Lease program. Chief among these individuals, Colonel Faymonville recognized the Red Army's potential and later played an important early role in arguing for the necessity of supplying the Soviets in the fight against the Axis Powers.²¹⁴

According to scholars James S. Herndon and Joseph O. Baylen, Faymonville served as a U.S. military observer under Roosevelt's personal friend and his first U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, William C. Bullitt, beginning in January 1934.²¹⁵ A veteran of AEF-Siberia, Faymonville established an excellent rapport with many Russians and mastered their language during the U.S. intervention.²¹⁶ After observing Soviet training maneuvers in 1935 and 1936, Faymonville authored a report commending the Red Army's soldiers and officers as being physically fit, politically committed, and capable of extraordinary military exploits. Rebutting the early 1937 claims by exiled tsarist officers, Faymonville concluded that the Red Army possessed, "excellent" military capabilities.²¹⁷

Famous for shamefully referring to Stalin's mass starvation of Ukrainian peasants between 1932 and 1933 as, "a big scare story in the American press about famine in the Soviet Union," British-American journalist Walter Duranty also contributed to early U.S. perceptions of

²¹⁴ Herndon and Baylen, "Col. Philip R. Faymonville," 483-484; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 358, 361, 369-370; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 385, 395, 496.

²¹⁵ Bullitt, *For the President*, 57-59, 62-65; Herndon and Baylen, "Col. Philip R. Faymonville," 486-488; Kelly, *Saving Stalin*, 26-29.

²¹⁶ Herndon and Baylen, "Col. Philip R. Faymonville," 492-493.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

the Red Army.²¹⁸ In a February 1934 report for *The New York Times*, Duranty quoted Marshal Kliment Voroshilov, Stalin's close comrade and Defense Commissar, as boasting that, "[the] Red Army is up to or above western levels" during an enormous military parade in Moscow.²¹⁹ Duranty's report the following year appears to have further concurred with Faymonville's conclusions regarding the Red Army's improved mechanization under Stalin.²²⁰

While other U.S. military officials are said to have criticized Faymonville's findings as being suspiciously pro-Soviet, a reputation that he reportedly began acquiring during his service in AEF-Siberia, his arguments fell on the sympathetic ears of U.S. Commerce Secretary Harry Hopkins.²²¹ Frustrated by the pessimistic views of other U.S. officials in Moscow following Hitler's 1941 attack, Hopkins is said to have enthusiastically embraced Faymonville's opinion that Stalin's Red Army merited U.S. aid. According to Admiral William Standley, Hopkins ordered Faymonville promoted to Brigadier General, and he continued serving zealously in his virtually autonomous role, defying the ambassador while unquestioningly agreeing to Stalin's demands.²²²

In 1938, Hopkins, the architect of Roosevelt's New Deal program, left his position as the

²¹⁸ Walter Duranty, "RUSSIANS HUNGRY, BUT NOT STARVING; Deaths From Diseases Due to Malnutrition High, Yet the Soviet is Entrenched. LARGER CITIES HAVE FOOD Ukraine, North Caucasus and Lower Volga Regions Suffer From Shortages. KREMLIN'S 'DOOM' DENIED Russians and Foreign Observers In Country See No Ground for Predictions of Disaster," *The New York Times*, 31 March 1933, <https://www.nytimes.com/1933/03/31/archives/russians-hungry-but-not-starving-deaths-from-diseases-due-to.html>.

²¹⁹ Walter Duranty, "RUSSIAN REDS SEE MECHANIZED ARMY; 2,000 Delegates to Congress Review Great Parade in Moscow's Red Square. BIG NEW TANKS DISPLAYED Voroshiloff Says Bolsheviki Are Ready 'To Hold Every Inch of the Fatherland,'" *The New York Times*, 10 February 1934, <https://www.nytimes.com/1934/02/10/archives/russian-reds-see-mechanized-army-2000-delegates-to-congress-review.html>.

²²⁰ Walter Duranty, "SOVIET WAR GAMES OPEN ON BIG SCALE; Manoeuvres in Kiev Region Said to Be the Largest Ever Held by Red Army," *The New York Times*, 15 September 1935, <https://www.nytimes.com/1935/09/15/archives/soviet-war-games-open-on-big-scale-manoeuvres-in-kiev-region-said.html>.

²²¹ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 358n, 361, 369-370; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, xv, 385, 395, 496.

²²² Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 62, 127, 235, 247, 285, 309-310.

Administrator of the Works Progress Administration (WPA) and became the U.S. Secretary of Commerce, a position in which he served only until late 1940 due to severe health issues.²²³ Nevertheless, Hopkins appears to have displayed a dogged determination in serving his friend Roosevelt, often staying the night at the White House at the president's insistence, and he later became a key assistant to Stettinius, managing many aspects of Lend-Lease between 1941 and 1945. Hopkins's support for Soviet Lend-Lease aid proved crucial for Stalin following Hitler's attack, and the zealous enthusiasm with which he oversaw the shipment of massive quantities of material to the Red Army helped ensure the Nazi tyrant's defeat. While not a Soviet spy, Hopkins voiced strong admiration for Stalin's leadership and the Red Army's determined defense and played a key role in supplying the Soviet Union with uranium, thorium, and other materials related to atomic research.²²⁴

In 1934, Roosevelt's Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau appointed a respected economist named Harry Dexter White to work as one of his assistants.²²⁵ Throughout the decade, White gradually expanded his reputation, earning the trust of Roosevelt and Morgenthau, and working as a spy for Stalin's NKVD and military intelligence (GRU).²²⁶ In his position as a key Treasury Department official, White exerted a strong influence on Morgenthau's economic policies, and he appears to have used this authority to push the administration's increasingly

²²³ Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 87-88; Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatoli Sudoplatov, *Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness – A Soviet Spymaster* (New York: Little, Brown & Company, 1995), 222, 226-227.

²²⁴ *Congressional Record – House of Representatives*, 81st Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions (1949-1950), pts.?, <https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/NHC/NewPDFs/USAAF/United%20States%20Strategic%20Bombing%20Survey/USSBS%20Shipment%20of%20Atomic%20Material%20to%20the%20Soviet%20Union%20during%20WWII.pdf>; George Racey Jordan, *Major Jordan's Diaries* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1952), 39; U.S. Air Force, *Project Rand Research Memorandum: The Soviet Union and the Atom: The 'Secret' Phase* (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1957), 27-34.

²²⁵ Koster, *Operation Snow*, 15.

²²⁶ M. Stanton Evans and Herbert Romerstein, *Stalin's Secret Agents: The Subversion of Roosevelt's Government* (New York: Threshold Editions, 2013), 185-187, 196.

confrontational economic sanctions on Japan, angering Tokyo. As argued by historians John Koster, Ben Steil, and Sean McMeekin, White's boldness in his proposals for economic sanctions on Japan was motivated by his mission to strategically aid Stalin by provoking tensions between Tokyo and Washington.²²⁷

According to the testimonies of two confessed former Communist spies and defectors to the FBI, Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers, Alger Hiss, a U.S. State Department assistant, also aided Stalin's espionage efforts beginning in the 1930s.²²⁸ In his postwar congressional testimonies, U.S. Army Major George Racey Jordan, a key Lend-Lease expeditor, stated that he recalled his Soviet counterparts receiving copies of State Department documents.²²⁹ Describing his wartime interactions to the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) in 1949 and 1950, Jordan recalled observing Hiss's signature on the copies held by the Soviets during the war, and former NKVD agent Pavel Sudoplatov later recalled his superiors' assessment of the State Department attorney as, "highly sympathetic to the Soviet Union."²³⁰

In May 1937, a Soviet aircrew made U.S. headlines by flying over the North Pole in a successful flight to San Jacinto, California in a demonstration of Moscow's growing aerial

²²⁷ Koster, *Operation Snow*, 15.

²²⁸ Whittaker Chambers, *Witness* (Southbend, IN: Regnery, 1952), 413-415, 415-417; *Congressional Record – House of Representatives*, 80th Congress, 2nd Session (1948), pt.?
<https://web.archive.org/web/20100721003156/http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/hiss/8-17testimony.html>; VENONA Decrypts, "Silvermaster Folder NY 65-14603 'Alger Hiss,'" *Internet Archive Wayback Machine*, n. d., https://web.archive.org/web/20120310003840/http://www.education-research.org/PDFs/splitfiles/splitprocessed/Silvermaster006_Folder/Silvermaster006_page106.pdf; William Fitzgibbon, "The Hiss-Chambers Case: A Chronology Since 1934," *The New York Times*, 12 June 1949, <https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/97/03/09/reviews/chambers-chronology.html>.

²²⁹ *Cong. Rec. – House of Representatives*, 81st Cong. 1st and 2nd Sess. (1949-1950).

²³⁰ Ibid.; Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatoli Sudoplatov, *Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness – A Soviet Spymaster* (New York: Little, Brown & Company, 1995), 222, 226-227, 227-229, 230.

capabilities.²³¹ After landing in the United States, the men were invited as guests to the home of First World War fighter ace Captain Eddie Rickenbacker, with whom Soviet copilot Andrei Yumachev established a friendly and solid personal rapport. Rickenbacker enthusiastically entertained Yumachev and the Soviet crew at his New York home, and the Soviet copilot later became a general during the Second World War and recalled the kind treatment that the American fighter pilot had provided him after the First World War ace visited Moscow. Before Rickenbacker's 1943 volunteer mission to the Soviet capital, Yumachev had been appointed to command, "one of the most sensitive military operations in Russia" regarding the role of U.S. P-39 "Airacobra" aircraft in Moscow's defense, and he proudly gave a demonstration of the planes' contribution to his former American host.²³²

Between 1936 and 1938, Joseph E. Davies served as the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, replacing Roosevelt's personal friend and first U.S. ambassador, William Bullitt, in Moscow.²³³ According to U.S. diplomat Charles E. "Chip" Bohlen, then serving as an assistant to Davies in Moscow, the new U.S. ambassador displayed a positive opinion of Stalin and echoed the "pro-Soviet line" attributed to some of Roosevelt's chief advisers on Soviet affairs.²³⁴ Davies appears to have largely accepted without question Stalin's explanations that those

²³¹ Harold Denny, "SOVIET FLIERS LAND PLANE AT NORTH POLE FOR A BASE FOR FLIGHTS TO AMERICA; CAMP MADE ON ICE, Party Begins Clearing of Field for Permanent Scientific Station THREE PLANES TO FOLLOW Buildings Will Be Erected for Four Men Who Will Remain a Year Near Pole RADIO REPORTS TO STALIN Expedition Sends Regrets for Fear Caused by Failure of Wireless Before Landing Field Base at Pole Planned SOVIET FLIERS LAND NEAR NORTH POLE Dog Will Warn of Bears Climax to Years of Effort SOVIET FLIERS WHO LANDED NEAR NORTH POLE," *The New York Times*, 22 May 1937, <https://www.nytimes.com/1937/05/22/archives/soviet-fliers-land-plane-at-north-pole-for-a-base-for-flights-to.html>.

²³² Madera Tribune (Unattributed Report), "RUSSIANS REACH SAN JACINTO LACK OF GAS CAUSES HALT LONG FLIGHT Pole Vaulting Plane Made Forced Landing in Cow Pasture Near Town VILLAGE IN TURMOIL Flyers Were Unaware That March Field Is But 20 Miles Away," *Madera Tribune*, 14 July 1937, <https://cdnc.ucr.edu/?a=d&d=MT19370714.2.18&e=-----en--20--1--txt-txIN----->; Rickenbacker, *Rickenbacker*, 399-400.

²³³ Bullitt, *For the President*, xiii-xiv, 57-59, 62-65.

²³⁴ Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History, 1929-1979* ed. Robert H. Phelps (New York: Norton, 1973), 51-52.

executed during the Great Purge show trials of the late 1930s in Moscow were Trotskyist intellectuals collaborating with Germany and Japan to plot an attack on the Soviet Union. Like the Allied leaders in 1918, Davies associated Trotsky and his followers with pro-German plots, a view that Stalin encouraged, and this later played a key part in shaping his support for the Red Army as he served as an assistant to Secretary of State Cordell Hull beginning in 1939.²³⁵

Despite the U.S.-Soviet diplomatic hostility that began with Wilson's reluctant and limited intervention in the Russian Civil War and the subsequent Red Scare, Stalin appears to have secured the support of several key U.S. industrialists. His portrayal of the Soviet regime as having abandoned Trotsky's aggressive calls for Communist expansion appears to have been met with a warm reception by top Roosevelt administration officials. Had Roosevelt and his senior advisers not adopted a fresh approach and unknowingly hired several influential Soviet agents into key governmental posts, Stalin may not have secured the vast aid that he later obtained from U.S. Lend-Lease. Inadvertently aided by Roosevelt's desire to forge political relations, conduct business, and confront Axis belligerency, Stalin ended the 1930s with a key diplomatic foothold in Washington that endured his 1939 pact with Hitler and the subsequent global war that it helped ignite.²³⁶

²³⁵ Davies, *Mission to Moscow*, 275-277.

²³⁶ Bohlen, *Witness to History*, 51-52; Bullitt, *For the President*, xiii-xiv, 57-59, 62-65; *Cong. Rec. – House of Representatives*, 81st Cong. 1st and 2nd Sess. (1949-1950); Davies, *Mission to Moscow*, 275-277; Fitzgibbon, "The Hiss-Chambers Case,"; David Kaiser, *No End Save Victory: How FDR Led the Nation into War* (New York: Basic Books 2015), 27, 54, 74; Koster, *Operation Snow*, 15; Kotkin, *Waiting for Hitler*, 685-686, 692-695; B. H. Liddell Hart, *History of the Second World War* (London: Pan Books, 2011), 33-35, 36-39; Rayfield, *Stalin and his Hangmen*, 370, 378, 393, 413.

CHAPTER 2

U.S. DOMESTIC CONTROVERSY, DEBATES, AND THE NECESSITY OF SUPPLYING THE SOVIETS

Despite Roosevelt's success in establishing relations with the Soviet Union, tensions in Europe led to a temporary reversal of the president's fortunes in altering U.S.-Soviet relations to the perceived benefit of U.S. national interests. Stalin's non-aggression pact with Hitler, the subsequent Nazi-Soviet invasion and division of Poland, and the Red Army's attack on Finland reignited anti-Communist fervor in the United States, prompting Roosevelt to declare a "moral embargo" on the Soviet Union. Yet as this chapter demonstrates, Roosevelt's anger at Stalin's perceived duplicity in suddenly and unexpectedly concluding a pact with Berlin appears to have faded quickly and did not alter his chief advisers' readiness to aid the Red Army once Hitler betrayed the Soviet premier.²³⁷

This work's second chapter explores how U.S. public opinion gradually shifted in the Soviet Union's favor by the time of the Pearl Harbor attacks, reversing the sour attitudes towards Stalin's regime that occurred following his pact with Hitler.²³⁸ The chapter also demonstrates the careful ways in which Roosevelt, inadvertently aided by Hitler's growing submarine attacks, contributed to this shift in public perceptions of the Red Army as a force worthy of Lend-Lease aid as the Nazi menace gradually overtook Stalin as the perceived greater threat to U.S. national interests and security by late 1941. It also discusses the initially slow, but increasingly rapid, expansion of Soviet Lend-Lease in the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor, as well as Roosevelt's preparations for an eventual U.S. entry into the war and the psychological

²³⁷ Kaiser, *No End Save Victory*, 27, 54, 74; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 144, 291.

²³⁸ Kaiser, *No End Save Victory*, 27, 54, 74.

conditioning of Americans in identifying the Axis threat.

As German, Italian, and Japanese aggression increased throughout the late 1930s, Roosevelt delivered a series of speeches identifying the three major Axis Powers as the foremost threat to U.S. security.²³⁹ By recognizing the Soviet Union and denouncing Axis expansion, Roosevelt appears to have believed that he could persuade Stalin to help the West contain the Nazi and fascist regimes in Europe and Asia, as discussed in the previous chapter.²⁴⁰ Following Stalin's non-aggression pact with Hitler and his invasion of Finland in late 1939, Roosevelt declared a "moral embargo" on the Soviet Union.²⁴¹ Yet in his private conversations with Hopkins, Roosevelt repeatedly expressed his hopes that Stalin could be persuaded to recognize the danger posed by Hitler's expansionist policies and turn against his Nazi strategic partner.²⁴²

As Nazi forces advanced throughout Western Europe, North Africa, and the Balkans with the help of Soviet raw materials between May 1940 and June 1941, Roosevelt desperately sought to assist British Prime Minister Winston Churchill with material aid.²⁴³ The Nazi defeat of the Anglo-French forces and subsequent occupation of France in May 1940 appears to have greatly alarmed Washington, and on the night of Hitler's Paris visit, Roosevelt invited Commerce Secretary Hopkins to stay at the White House, and the two men began discussing the need to arm Great Britain. In a 17 December 1940 "Fireside Chat" address to the American people, Roosevelt proposed the Lend-Lease program to support Great Britain and China against Axis

²³⁹ Burton W. Folsom, Jr., and Anita Folsom, *FDR Goes to War: How Expanded Executive Power, Spiraling National Debt, and Restricted Civil Liberties Shaped Wartime America* (New York: Threshold Editions, 2013), 222.

²⁴⁰ Franklin Delano Roosevelt, *Great Speeches*, ed. John Grafton (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1999), 64-65.

²⁴¹ Kaiser, *No End Save Victory*, 320; Roosevelt, *Great Speeches*, 73-74.

²⁴² Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 137-138.

²⁴³ Churchill, *Memoirs*, 406-407; Liddell Hart, *History of the Second World War*, 95-98, 107-109, 110-111.

aggression.²⁴⁴ Emphasizing the unexpected collapse of the French Army, previously perceived as one of Europe's finest by many U.S. officials, Roosevelt repeatedly asked his listeners if Americans could afford to watch as Churchill's soldiers struggled alone against the rising tide of tyranny.²⁴⁵

Against strong opposition from congressional isolationists led by Senator Robert Taft (R-OH), the U.S. Congress passed H.R. 1776, the Lend-Lease bill proposed by Roosevelt and his supporters and largely developed with Hopkins's help, on 11 March 1941.²⁴⁶ The new policy authorized the president to provide material assistance to any country resisting aggression if he deemed that country's national security vital to the defense of the United States. Senator Taft's opposition to H.R. 1776 lay rooted in the vast powers that it entrusted to the president, yet his arguments received only limited support as Nazi tanks and bombers continued to menace British armies and independent countries in the Balkans and North Africa in the spring of 1941, while Stalin's Soviet resources poured literal fuel onto Hitler's spreading fire. Hoping to mask Hopkins's influence on the new U.S. policy and appease congressional southern Democrats and Republicans, Roosevelt appointed industrialist Edward Stettinius as Administrator of the Office of Lend-Lease Administration, and U.S. trade vessels carrying bacon, eggs, arms, and other goods requested by Churchill began sailing for Great Britain.²⁴⁷

Due to the Red Army's attack on Finland in November 1939, Stalin initially could not have been considered as a beneficiary of Lend-Lease upon its inception, and such a suggestion may have been loudly condemned in Congress had Roosevelt advised it at the time due to the

²⁴⁴ Kaiser, *No End Save Victory*, 13-14, 17, 20, 22-23, 25; Roosevelt, *Great Speeches*, 79-80.

²⁴⁵ Roosevelt, *Great Speeches*, 90.

²⁴⁶ The Navy Department Library, "Lend-Lease Act."

²⁴⁷ Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., *Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory* (New York: Pocket Books, 1944), 52.

Soviet premier's pact with Hitler, although the power that the program granted the president gave him the sole authority to designate recipients of U.S. aid. After Finnish leaders Kyoesti Kallio and Carl Gustav Mannerheim refused Stalin's demands for a stretch of land across the Karelian Isthmus and several Gulf of Finland islands, Soviet troops invaded Finland and, after facing a determined resistance executed by Finnish snipers and ski infantry, the "Winter War" ended in March 1940 with the Red Army capturing the desired areas.²⁴⁸ The Finns' tenacious resistance and the Red Army's eventual success in capturing the territories demanded by Stalin, reportedly at a cost of more than 200,000 casualties, influenced the perceptions of many Americans against Moscow and temporarily disrupted Roosevelt's diplomatic efforts at drawing Stalin away from Hitler. Yet as Nazi forces subsequently invaded and occupied Norway, Denmark, the Low Countries, and France, Hitler gradually replaced Stalin as the main face of aggression and threat to democratic governments, especially after his bombers struck London and other British cities in "The Blitz" between September 1940 and May 1941.²⁴⁹

Despite his anger at Stalin's aggression against Finland, Roosevelt's "moral embargo" on the Soviet Union appears to have lasted only until October 1940, at which point the president resumed his efforts to engage with Stalin, rendering export licenses the only remaining obstacles for U.S. companies willing to accept Soviet orders.²⁵⁰ According to U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau's diary entry for 1 March 1941, Stalin's purchasing company, Amtorg, had

²⁴⁸ Kotkin, *Waiting for Hitler*, 268, 334, 406, 693, 720, 722, 726-727; Liddell Hart, *History of the Second World War*, 54-55, 55-59, 68, 736-737, 738, 750.

²⁴⁹ Joachim C. Fest, *Hitler*, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Harcourt, 1974), 640-643.

²⁵⁰ Kaiser, *No End Save Victory*, 320; U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Diaries of Henry Morgenthau, Jr., April 27, 1933-July 27, 1945," Series 2: Morgenthau Presidential Diaries, "Russian Clearance Problems Requiring Immediate Attention," 1 March 1941, *Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library & Museum*, <http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/archives/collections/franklin/index.php?p=collections/findingaid&id=535&q=&roocontentid=189777>.

placed a total of 19,403 orders for machine tools, 167 orders for various, “aircraft products,” and 1,798 orders for motor vehicles from U.S. companies by 15 February 1941.²⁵¹ Apparently, the Soviet premier anticipated a pressing need for improved production efforts at his factories and felt confident enough in Roosevelt’s conciliatory approach towards him to order a large number of American-manufactured products before the enactment of Lend-Lease. According to Morgenthau’s records, most of the companies, including Bellis Heat-Treating Company, Babcock and Wilcox, Acme Well Supply Company, and Gardner-Denver Company accepted Amtorg’s orders and agreed to fulfill them between March and July 1941.²⁵²

Acting on his long-held, genocidal plans to annihilate Eastern Europe’s Jewish and Slavic peoples, Hitler broke his non-aggression pact with Stalin and launched a massive, three-pronged surprise offensive code-named Operation *Barbarossa* against the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941.²⁵³ Because Hitler’s generals perceived the Red Army as weak due to its considerable losses in the war with Finland, they did not prepare for a winter campaign that required warm uniforms and frost-resistant fuel, causing Stalin to dismiss prior reports of an imminent Nazi invasion despite his expectations of an eventual war.²⁵⁴ Sharing their overoptimistic expectations of a quick victory, Hitler reportedly boasted of his alleged goal to station German

²⁵¹ U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Diaries of Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,” Series 2, “Russian Clearance Problems.”

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Paul Carell, *Hitler Moves East 1941-1943*, trans. Ewald Osers (New York: Bantam Books, 1966), 5-7, 12-15; Clark, *Barbarossa*, 65-67; Frank Ellis, *Barbarossa 1941: Reframing Hitler’s Invasion of Stalin’s Soviet Empire* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015), xi-xv, 41-43; Fest, *Hitler*, 648-649; Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Mariner Books, 1999), 15, 38, 93, 95, 109, 120, 129, 147, 157, 300-308, 327, 447, 454, 454, 626, 630, 637-640.

²⁵⁴ David Glantz, *Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War, 1941-1943* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 5-6; Oleg V. Khlevniuk, *Stalin: New Biography of a Dictator*, ed. and trans. Nora Seligman Favorov (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015), 143; Boris Sokolov, *Marshal K. K. Rokossovsky: The Red Army’s Gentleman Commander* (Warwick, UK: Helion & Company, 2015), 79-80; Georgy Zhukov, *Marshal of Victory Vol. 1: The WWII Memoirs of Georgy Zhukov through 1941*, ed. and trans. Geoffrey Roberts (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2015), 281-282.

troops, “from Vladivostok to Gibraltar” according to Berlin-based U.S. commercial official Sam E. Woods in a report to Secretary of State Cordell Hull.²⁵⁵ The attack surprised Stalin, and German bombers quickly destroyed thousands of Soviet aircraft on the ground, allowing the Nazi ground forces to quickly encircle and overwhelm the Red Army’s forward operating bases, many of which were unprepared for conducting immediate defensive operations.²⁵⁶

Almost immediately, Roosevelt and his top administration officials grasped the strategic importance of exploiting Hitler’s sudden betrayal of the Nazi-Soviet pact and began signaling to Soviet diplomats their eagerness to supply the Red Army in its moment of urgent need on 24 June 1941.²⁵⁷ On 25 June, Stalin appointed Anastas Mikoyan, with whom Lend-Lease Administrator Stettinius had been acquainted in the 1930s, to the position of Soviet Trade Commissar to place orders for war material from the United States as German troops quickly captured airbases, factories, and farms.²⁵⁸ Churchill immediately offered British support to the embattled Red Army, and Roosevelt, quietly and unofficially at first due to U.S. public opinion, began discussions with Stettinius to officially include the Soviet Union as a recipient of Lend-Lease aid.²⁵⁹

While largely unopposed due to Great Britain’s ongoing state of war with Nazi Germany, Churchill’s pledge to immediately provide all possible aid to the Red Army also met with little

²⁵⁵ Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 967. Hull explains here that Woods reported hearing of Hitler’s alleged boast from, “a German friend who, though an enemy of the Nazis, was closely connected with the Reichs ministries, the Reichsbank and high Party members,” at some point after the Nazi leadership began officially but secretly meeting to discuss the planned invasion beginning in August 1940.

²⁵⁶ David M. Glantz, *Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 102-103; Vyacheslav Molotov and Felix Chuev, *Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics*, ed. and trans. Ivan R. Dee (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993), 12-15.

²⁵⁷ Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia*, 65-66.

²⁵⁸ Kelly, *Saving Stalin*, 16; Molotov and Chuev, *Molotov Remembers*, 37-39.

²⁵⁹ George W. Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 152, 157; Churchill, *Memoirs*, 476-479.

enthusiasm from senior British officials such as Lieutenant General Sir Henry Pownall.

Expressing his reservations in a 29 June 1941 diary entry, Pownall denounced both Hitler and Stalin as, “the two biggest cut-throats in Europe,” adding that, “I only hope Stalin will make a deep gash in Hitler’s throat” before estimating the conquest of Soviet Europe to take no longer than three months.²⁶⁰ Identifying the most important issue for Great Britain as the Red Army’s continued resistance to Hitler beyond the Ural Mountains, Pownall recorded his hope that even after losing Moscow, Stalin could, “still maintain a front somewhere – even in the Urals.”²⁶¹

Roosevelt sought to provide immediate support to the Red Army but also feared that Stalin may seek a compromise with Hitler or that Soviet forces may be defeated before help could arrive. Like many of his senior officials, the president appears to have based his fears on Lenin and Trotsky’s Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Berlin in 1918, and despite the risks that supplying Stalin inevitably involved, many of his advisers quickly concluded that it remained the best available option as it provided an unprecedented opportunity to harm Germany.²⁶² Echoing General Pownall’s sentiments in Great Britain, many of Roosevelt’s cabinet members and congressional Republicans initially urged him to remain strictly neutral and allow the two totalitarian tyrants to settle their affairs as violently as they wished.²⁶³ Yet many bipartisan U.S. lawmakers gradually changed their views over time as the United States edged closer to war, and by the end of 1941, much of the American public, despite its deep-rooted mistrust of Moscow,

²⁶⁰ Pownall, *Chief of Staff*, 29; Zaloga, *Soviet Lend-Lease Tanks*, 4.

²⁶¹ Pownall, *Chief of Staff*, 29.

²⁶² Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 306-308; Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 23-24, 31.

²⁶³ Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 31; Herring, Jr., *Aid to Russia*, 53, 60.

had somewhat altered its perception of Stalin's Red Army.²⁶⁴

Although ill and recovering at home at the time of the Nazi assault, Secretary of State Hull called Roosevelt from his bedside telephone and insisted to the president that the United States must, "give Russia all aid to the hilt."²⁶⁵ While recovering, Hull remained in daily contact with Roosevelt and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, insisting that Stalin could not be allowed to falter and should receive constant assurances of U.S. material aid to prevent the Red Army from collapsing. After returning to Washington on 4 August, Hull began regularly receiving Soviet Ambassador Konstantin Umansky and military intelligence (GRU) General Filipp I. Golikov to obtain regular reports on the Red Army's immediate needs and assure them of oncoming aid while dismissing the pessimistic views of some U.S. military observers predicting Stalin's defeat.²⁶⁶

U.S. and British officials appear to have quickly concluded that the sudden outbreak of war between Hitler and Stalin offered a critical opportunity to maintain a two-front war in Europe by ensuring the Red Army's survival while attaching no conditions to Soviet aid. According to Herbert Feis, Roosevelt's Economic Advisor for International Affairs, the president ordered Soviet aid requests to be reviewed without delay on 21 July 1941 and emphatically explained that the Red Army's continued resistance to Hitler served as the sole condition that he sought to impose on Stalin.²⁶⁷ While fearing that the Red Army could not indefinitely withstand the Nazi assault, U.S. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox told Roosevelt on the day after the

²⁶⁴ Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia*, 16, 32, 71-73, 87-88; Herring, Jr., *Aid to Russia*, 44-47, 49, 84-85, 103-105; Ronald Smelser and Edward J. Davies II, *The Myth of the Eastern Front: The Nazi-Soviet War in American Popular Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 28, 31-34.

²⁶⁵ Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 967.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 973-974.

²⁶⁷ Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 9-12.

German invasion that he could not afford to squander the opportunity provided by Hitler's sudden attack. While concurring with some of his military colleagues that Stalin's forces could only resist, "from six weeks to two months," before their inevitable defeat, Knox nevertheless urged the president to give the Red Army the material needed to hand Hitler a pyrrhic victory.²⁶⁸

Barely a month after Hitler's troops surged across the Soviet frontier, Edward C. Carter, the former head and founder of the Institute of Pacific Relations, presided over a New York meeting at which he and others from his former non-governmental organization (NGO) formed a new group to support Stalin's beleaguered Red Army.²⁶⁹ After being officially incorporated in New York State as the Russian War Relief Fund but popularly known as Russian War Relief (RWR), Carter's new organization officially began operating in support of the Red Army on 12 September 1941.²⁷⁰ Throughout the war, the RWR raised funds and shipped medical supplies to Stalin's soldiers, with its first U.S. \$35,000 load of operating equipment being shipped to the Soviets on 3 October 1941. According to Carter in an August 1944 article, the organization held an "immensely successful" rally to raise U.S. \$1,000,000 to "Help Russia – Hasten Victory" in New York on 27 October 1941, the first of many such wartime occasions.²⁷¹

²⁶⁸ Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin*, 9-12.

²⁶⁹ Edward C. Carter, "Russian War Relief," *The Slavonic and East European Review: American Series*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Aug. 1944), 61-74, https://www-jstor-org.libproxy.library.unt.edu/stable/3020236?seq=7#metadata_info_tab_contents; Smelser and Davies II, *The Myth of the Eastern Front*, 31-34.

²⁷⁰ Carter, "Russian War Relief," 67; Smelser and Davies II, *The Myth of the Eastern Front*, 31-34.

²⁷¹ Ibid; Columbia University Library Digital Collections, "Allen Wardwell, RWR Chairman, to Herbert H. Lehman," Russian War Relief, Inc., 14 October 1942, http://www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/digital/collections/rbml/lehman/pdfs/0941/ldpd_leh_0941_0014.pdf; Cornell University Library Digital Collections, "What Russia Means to Us: A Speech by Albert Einstein. English Version," Jewish Council for Russian War Relief, 25 October 1942, <https://digital.library.cornell.edu/catalog/ss:21072652>; The Harvard Crimson (Unattributed Report), "BENEFIT TUESDAY NIGHT FOR RUSSIAN WAR RELIEF," *The Harvard Crimson*, 18 February 1944, <https://www.thecrimson.com/article/1944/2/18/benefit-tuesday-night-for-russian-war/>; The New York Times (Unattributed Report), "Addresses of Litvinoff, Hopkins and Green at Russian War Relief Rally in Madison Sq. Garden," *The New York Times*, 23 June 1942, <https://www.nytimes.com/1942/06/23/archives/addresses-of-litvinoff-hopkins-and-green-at-russian-war-relief.html>.

As the German Army initially advanced quickly into Soviet territory and inflicted staggering losses on the unprepared Red Army, the shadow of Brest-Litovsk appears to have occupied the thoughts of U.S. officials seeking to use the opportunity to weaken Hitler by aiding Stalin.²⁷² Two weeks after Hitler's attack, former Ambassador Davies, then a key assistant to Hull, authored a memorandum for Harry Hopkins, strongly implying that U.S. policy should focus on avoiding a second Brest-Litovsk scenario at all costs, raising the specter of such a possibility early on.²⁷³ Davies's memorandum further strengthened Roosevelt's arguments favoring the inclusion of the Soviet Union in Lend-Lease, stating that the Red Army's defeat could lead to, "a Trotzkyite [sic] pro-German" seizing power from Stalin and concluding a separate peace, following Lenin and Trotsky's 1918 example.²⁷⁴ Reflecting the 1918 Allied perceptions of Trotsky and Lenin as pro-German agents, Davies stated that even if Stalin preempted a coup, the Soviet premier could himself be forced to conclude peace with Hitler and give him unrestricted access to the vast resources of Ukraine and European Russia.²⁷⁵

In such a situation, Davies argued, Churchill's Great Britain may not only be facing the European Axis alone as before, but a Germany further strengthened by its army's full, unhindered domination of Soviet Europe's industrial and agricultural capacity.²⁷⁶ While acknowledging that many Americans remained staunchly anti-Communist and alleging that this amounted to many of them wishing for a Nazi victory, Davies stated that by no means could

²⁷² Carell, *Hitler Moves East*, 38-43, 62-64, 73-77, 77-78; Clark, *Barbarossa*, 65, 67-69, 70-73; Sokolov, *Marshal K. Rokossovsky*, 137-140, 140-143; Zhukov, *Marshal of Victory Vol. 1*, 281-282.

²⁷³ Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 39; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 306-308.

²⁷⁴ Kaiser, *No End Save Victory*, 260; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 306-308.

²⁷⁵ Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 306-308.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

Washington afford to provide Stalin's Red Army with anything less than maximum aid.²⁷⁷

Falling on sympathetic ears, Davies's analysis strongly influenced the administration's management of Soviet Lend-Lease as he urged Hopkins and Roosevelt to resist any temptation to demand concessions from Stalin, dismissing the notion that Communism could threaten either Europe or the United States even in the event of a Soviet victory. Rather than attach conditions to Soviet aid, Davies argued, Washington must follow London's example by assuring Stalin of, "all out" U.S. support to keep the Red Army fully supplied to ensure Hitler's total defeat.²⁷⁸

Davies's memorandum appears to have proven decisive in amplifying the fears of a second Brest-Litovsk in Washington and bolstering Roosevelt and Hopkins's determination to prevent a repeat of the perceived disaster of March 1918 by assuring Stalin that he could expect them to spare no effort in aiding him. While somewhat understandable considering the seemingly invincible Nazi advance that the administration and the world faced in the turbulent atmosphere of summer 1941, Davies's assurances that aggressive Soviet Communism could not pose a postwar threat, "for many years" proved naïve.²⁷⁹ Yet his emphasis on preventing a repeat of March 1918 galvanized U.S. aid efforts as Roosevelt carefully prepared the groundwork for Soviet Lend-Lease, first dispatching Hopkins to Great Britain before later authorizing him to approach Stalin. For Roosevelt, Davies's use of the phrase "all out" meant that all resources must be given to ensure total victory over Germany's perceived military might, including arming Stalin's forces to the maximum possible extent, to wage the traditional

²⁷⁷ Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 39; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 306-308.

²⁷⁸ Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 39; *National Archives and Records Administration*, "Letter from Joseph E. Davies to Samuel Rosenman, January 22, 1945," *Harry S. Truman Presidential Library & Museum*, <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/research-files/letter-joseph-e-davies-samuel-rosenman>; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 306-308.

²⁷⁹ Davies, *Mission to Moscow*, 275-277, 278-280, 285-287; Kaiser, *No End Save Victory*, 260; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 306-308.

American, total way of war described by historian Russell F. Weigley.²⁸⁰

In *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*, Weigley states that the U.S. government adopted a total war approach or, “strategy of annihilation” developed by Union General Ulysses S. Grant during the Civil War and applied again in the Plains’ Indian Wars and the European Theater of the Second World War.²⁸¹ This strategy requires the full mobilization of the military, civilian sector, and industry in the execution of all-out war to ensure the complete defeat and overthrow of the enemy’s military forces, civilian support structure, and political system. Roosevelt is said to have adopted this approach after the Pearl Harbor attack, yet his foresight in assessing the threat posed by the Axis led him to begin preparing for an inevitable war by supporting the Allies to the maximum possible extent in the hope of wearing Germany down before U.S. forces could take the field. The possibility of a second Brest-Litovsk appeared frightful to many U.S. observers until later in the war, and Roosevelt and his aides sought to prevent such a development from threatening their total war approach to defeating Hitler, especially as Davies predicted that the Red Army could prevail with sufficient U.S. aid.²⁸²

Arguing that Stalin’s regime could remain in power in Soviet Asia if Hitler’s forces managed to reach the Ural Mountains, Davies pointed out that German troops could be further weakened in their occupation of Soviet Europe through partisan raids and civilian resentment of the occupiers.²⁸³ These arguments appear to have resonated deeply and profoundly with

²⁸⁰ Kaiser, *No End Save Victory*, 260; *National Archives and Records Administration*, “Letter from Joseph E. Davies,”; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 306-308; Weigley, *The American Way of War*, 316-317, 357-359.

²⁸¹ Weigley, *The American Way of War*, 128-129, 150-152, 162-163, 357-359.

²⁸² Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, 69-70; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 306-308.

²⁸³ Davies, *Mission to Moscow*, 475-476, 487-489, 490-494, 495-497; Kaiser, *No End Save Victory*, 260, 375n50; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 306-308.

Hopkins and Roosevelt as the Red Army continued resisting the merciless Nazi offensive into the late summer and early fall, despite suffering horrendous casualties. While Stalin remained in power and the Red Army persevered in the field, the opportunity to ensure a two-front war for Hitler remained too enticing a prospect for Roosevelt to ignore in his total war approach that gathered greater momentum and public support after the U.S. entry into the war. Following Davies's and his own instincts, he sought to provide Stalin with enough aid to thwart any potential coup and maintain the Red Army's resistance to the invader, while keeping it supplied to eventually carry the battle to Hitler and ensure his total defeat.²⁸⁴

While staying in London to discuss Lend-Lease matters with Churchill, Hopkins expressed his belief to Roosevelt that despite the Soviets' ongoing battlefield defeats, Stalin must be provided with the means to, "maintain a permanent front" at all costs.²⁸⁵ Volunteering to travel to Moscow from London and serve as Roosevelt's, "personal envoy" to Stalin and assess his character and the Red Army's military needs and capabilities, Hopkins proceeded to emphasize his conviction that while the situation appeared temporarily bleak, no effort should be spared in prolonging the Red Army's survival. Roosevelt quickly agreed to his friend's proposal, and on 30 July 1941, Hopkins departed London for Moscow to meet with Stalin, analyze the situation, and report his findings to the president accordingly.²⁸⁶

After arriving in the Soviet capital, Hopkins immediately sought the perceptions of other U.S. officials in the city to obtain an initial report of the situation developing at the front before beginning his discussions with Stalin. He displayed frustration at the pessimistic mood of

²⁸⁴ Davies, *Mission to Moscow*, 475-476, 487-489, 490-494, 495-497; Kaiser, *No End Save Victory*, 260, 375n50; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 306-308.

²⁸⁵ Kaiser, *No End Save Victory*, 260, 375n50; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 317-318.

²⁸⁶ Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 37; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 317-318; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 45-46.

military observers such as Major Ivan D. Yeaton, whose reports predicted the Red Army's swift collapse and Stalin's inability to remain in power in the face of the rapid Nazi advance.²⁸⁷ Only four days after Hitler's assault, Major Yeaton had requested U.S. Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt to obtain instructions from Washington on the need to evacuate in the event of a Nazi advance on Moscow. Yeaton initially sought to accompany Steinhardt in the event of an evacuation, while inquiring whether his assistant, Major Joseph A. Michela, should remain in the city, "until the entry of German troops," and his fear of the Red Army's imminent doom angered Hopkins.²⁸⁸

While visiting Moscow, Hopkins expressed great appreciation for the more optimistic views of Colonel Faymonville regarding the Red Army's military potential and its ability to resist the Nazi invasion, and recommended the former ordnance officer for promotion to Brigadier General. Described as an "asset" of the Soviets by Sean McMeekin, Faymonville subsequently played a key part in transmitting Stalin's demands directly to Hopkins, an action that offended his official superior, Admiral Standley, with whom Roosevelt replaced Ambassador Steinhardt in the spring of 1942 due to Soviet complaints.²⁸⁹ At Hopkins's urging, Faymonville subsequently replaced Yeaton in his key role as an adviser to the U.S. War Supply Mission in Moscow due to his insistence that the Red Army could triumph over the odds and

²⁸⁷ Kelly, *Saving Stalin*, 26-29; Khlevniuk, *Stalin*, 213-215; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 327; U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, General, The Soviet Union, Volume I: The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State," 26 June 1941, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1941v01/d839>; Georgy Zhukov, *Marshal of Victory Vol. 2: The WWII Memoirs of General Georgy Zhukov, 1941-1945*, ed. and trans. Geoffrey Roberts (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2015), 12-13.

²⁸⁸ Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 39; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 330; U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941."

²⁸⁹ Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 139-140; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 403-404.

merited full, unquestioned, and unconditional U.S. Lend-Lease aid.²⁹⁰

During Hopkins's visit to Moscow, photographer Margaret Bourke-White received permission to visit the Soviet capital to photograph Stalin and the anticipated Nazi bombing raids on the city that Soviet and U.S. officials expected the German Air Force to execute to coincide with the former Commerce Secretary's visit.²⁹¹ As Hopkins arrived in late July and the Nazi bombers struck Moscow as expected, Bourke-White captured for U.S. public consumption numerous photographs of the struggle between the city's defiant defenders and their brutal assailants. The images that she captured were subsequently published in *Life* magazine and helped portray to American audiences the bold efforts of Stalin's Red Army, Red Army Air Forces, and the Soviet people in their anti-Nazi struggle.²⁹²

Her photographs of Stalin and Hopkins standing together in the Kremlin conveyed the message that the Soviet premier and his people were reliable allies against Axis aggression and that the American people should come to the aid of their Soviet comrades resisting Berlin's brazen assault.²⁹³ Upon meeting Stalin, Bourke-White appears to have been initially unimpressed by the Soviet premier's pock-marked face and his small physical stature at less than five-feet, five-inches tall. Recalling that "My own height is five feet five, and Stalin was shorter than I am," Bourke-White states that she quickly realized her error in judgment as the Soviet premier's, "granite face" exuded an admirable determination and his supreme, unchallenged authority.²⁹⁴ Far from appearing as a weak man cowering behind a primitive country and army

²⁹⁰ Kelly, *Saving Stalin*, 26-29.

²⁹¹ Ibid.; Margaret Bourke-White, *Portrait of Myself* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1963), 176-177.

²⁹² Bourke-White, *Portrait of Myself*, 186, 191; Kelly, *Saving Stalin*, 26-29; Smelser and Davies II, *The Myth of the Eastern Front*, 28.

²⁹³ Bourke-White, *Portrait of Myself*, 186, 191; Smelser and Davies II, *The Myth of the Eastern Front*, 28.

²⁹⁴ Kelly, *Saving Stalin*, 26-29; Bourke-White, *Portrait of Myself*, 183-184.

on the brink of collapse, Stalin impressed both Hopkins and Bourke-White with his stolid, unshakeable firmness, convincing them both of his commitment to Hitler's defeat and his need for U.S. arms and aid.²⁹⁵

In a chance episode that appears to have made a strong and deep impression on Hopkins, Stalin quickly ushered his American guest to his personal car as German bombers attempted five times to breach Moscow's air defenses that night.²⁹⁶ Escorted by his NKVD chief and fellow ethnic Georgian, Lavrenti Beria, the Soviet premier paused for a moment and called Hopkins's attention to the distant sky as Soviet anti-aircraft gunners suddenly struck two Ju-88 bombers sweeping over the city.²⁹⁷ Pointing to the planes as they stalled, sputtered, and fell to the earth, the Soviet leader boldly declared to Hopkins that such a fate inevitably awaited all enemies of Soviet power according to Stalin biographer Oleg Khlevniuk.²⁹⁸

Combined with reports of Red Army tenacity and local success in slowing the German advance, this show of confidence made a powerful impression on Hopkins and contributed heavily to his and Roosevelt's increasingly firm conviction regarding the pressing need to arm Stalin's soldiers.²⁹⁹ After returning to Washington, Hopkins convinced Roosevelt that Stalin's unbending resolve and the Red Army's tenacity served as a lethal combination and key factor in halting Hitler's armies and corroborated the views of Hull, Knox, Davies, and others that the

²⁹⁵ Bourke-White, *Portrait of Myself*, 187-188.

²⁹⁶ Khlevniuk, *Stalin*, 211-212.

²⁹⁷ Rayfield, *Stalin and his Hangmen*, 344, 349-353.

²⁹⁸ Khlevniuk, *Stalin*, 211-212.

²⁹⁹ David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House, *When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 1-2; Kelly, *Saving Stalin*, 26-29; Catherine Merridale, *Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006), 394-395; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 323.

Soviet Union must be included in Lend-Lease.³⁰⁰ Deeply impressed by Hopkins's report, Roosevelt immediately authorized him to arrange the details of full Lend-Lease support to the Red Army, while temporarily remaining silent on the matter in his public speeches, and to provide Stalin with any material that he requested.³⁰¹

Following Roosevelt's decision, Hopkins and Stettinius immediately began working to arrange the delivery of war material to the Soviet Union. Perceiving Stalin to be a crucial ally in the fight against Hitler, the two men embraced their task zealously, displaying a determination described as fanatical by their associates.³⁰² Naturally, the program also received the support of Harry Dexter White, an increasingly influential Treasury Department official whose role in Lend-Lease and influence over Secretary Morgenthau further ensured that Stalin's needs were prioritized in the realms of U.S. economic and foreign policy.³⁰³

Despite Hopkins's positive appraisal of Stalin, Roosevelt understood that the American public generally had little appreciation for the Soviet regime, even though major industrialists such as Henry Ford, Albert Kahn, and Edward Stettinius had conducted business in the Soviet Union.³⁰⁴ Believing that no effort could succeed without broader public support, Roosevelt began a campaign to win the approval of isolationists in the Congress and the American public by emphasizing the greater threat posed by Hitler. Throughout the summer and fall of 1941, a

³⁰⁰ Glantz and House, *When Titans Clashed*, 52-53; Khlevniuk, *Stalin*, 211-212; Merridale, *Ivan's War*, 128, 262, 264-265; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 45-46.

³⁰¹ Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 37; 120-122; Herring, Jr., *Aid to Russia*, 53, 60.

³⁰² Deane, *The Strange Alliance*, 87-89, 90-94; Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 75, 118.

³⁰³ Koster, *Operation Snow*, 15, 132-135; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 43-44, 261-264; Steil, *The Battle of Bretton Woods*, 57-58.

³⁰⁴ Architect Staff, "The USA, the USSR, and Architecture,"; Bourke-White, *Eyes on Russia*, 123-124; Brisson, "How Albert Kahn helped the Soviet Union industrialize,"; Crawford, "Soviet Planning Praxis,"; Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia, 1941*, 65-66; Melnikova-Raich, "The Soviet Problem with Two 'Unknowns,'" ; Shpotov, "The Ford Motor Company in the Soviet Union."

series of violent confrontations between German submarines and U.S. ships provided the president with the crucial rhetorical ammunition that he required for arguing his position.³⁰⁵

Even before Hitler broke his pact with Stalin, the Nazi tyrant's submarines had been increasingly inflicting damage on U.S.-German relations by striking U.S. merchant ships, especially after the birth of Lend-Lease in March 1941 as a tool for aiding London's war effort. On 21 May 1941, a German submarine torpedoed and sank the SS *Robin Moor*, a U.S. merchant vessel in the South Atlantic, and Roosevelt subsequently emphasized the Nazi naval raid in his Fireside Chats to the American people.³⁰⁶ On 4 September, the German submarine *U-652* fired at the USS *Greer*, narrowly missing the destroyer operating out of Iceland in support of British convoys carrying war material to North Russia. The next day, a German bomber sank the U.S. merchant ship SS *Steel Seafarer* during its voyage to an Egyptian Red Sea port operated by British forces, providing the president with more legitimate grievances against Berlin to emphasize in his speeches.³⁰⁷

In addition to overcoming the American public's initial reluctance to support the Soviet Union, Roosevelt had to address congressional concerns that the Red Army may collapse as Kerensky's army had done in 1917. In August and September 1941, the Red Army suffered a series of staggering defeats as German troops encircled and captured large Soviet forces defending the cities of Kiev and Smolensk.³⁰⁸ Reportedly resulting in the loss of 975,000 Soviet soldiers and officers, these defeats presented a challenge for Roosevelt as he sought to persuade

³⁰⁵ Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia*, 75-76, 77-79; Kaiser, *No End Save Victory*, 114, 143, 197, 207-209; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 320-322, 328-330, 332-334.

³⁰⁶ Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia*, 82-85; Roosevelt, *Great Speeches*, 106-107.

³⁰⁷ Kaiser, *No End Save Victory*, 114, 143, 197, 207-209; Roosevelt, *Great Speeches*, 106-107.

³⁰⁸ Clark, *Barbarossa*, 160-165; Ellis, *Barbarossa 1941*, 330-332, 335-337; Heinz Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, ed. and trans. Constantine Fitzgibbon (New York: Da Capo Press, 1996), 234-235; Weeks, *Stalin's Other War*, 132-133.

Congress of the need for a Soviet Lend-Lease program, while quietly approving of Churchill's diversion of U.S. arms to the Red Army and accepting Ambassador Umansky's orders for aid.³⁰⁹

Reeling from the recent death of his mother, Roosevelt addressed the American people on 11 September 1941, denouncing the *Greer* incident as piracy and issuing a "shoot on sight" order to all U.S. Navy and Coast Guard commanders.³¹⁰ Describing the German attacks as unprovoked, he denounced the Nazi regime, emphasizing the importance of freedom of the seas to U.S. trade and arguing that Hitler's actions posed the greatest threat to the American economy and way of life. Drawing parallels with the plundering of U.S. trade ships by the Barbary Pirates during Thomas Jefferson's presidency, Roosevelt urged his listeners to support Lend-Lease for all the European Allies including the Soviet Union as the Red Army fought fiercely against the Nazi aggressors.³¹¹

On 29 September 1941, Stalin and Foreign Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov met with U.S. and British officials Averell Harriman, Admiral Standley, and Lord Beaverbrook in Moscow at the Three Powers Conference to discuss the Red Army's long-term needs in the war against Germany.³¹² The men discussed specific details including the transportation of tanks, planes, and trucks to strengthen the Red Army's striking capabilities, paving the way for the Soviet Lend-Lease program.³¹³ Acknowledging the Red Army's setbacks at the front and

³⁰⁹ David M. Glantz, *Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War, 1941-1943* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 88-89; Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, 234-235; Zhukov, *Marshal of Victory Vol. 1*, 284-285.

³¹⁰ Kaiser, *No End Save Victory*, 114, 143, 197, 207-209; Roosevelt, *Great Speeches*, 106-107.

³¹¹ Kaiser, *No End Save Victory*, 114, 143, 197, 207-209; Roosevelt, *Great Speeches*, 109-110, 111-112; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 110-111.

³¹² Churchill, *Memoirs*, 484; Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador*, 74; The New York Times (Unattributed Report), "THIRD TALK HELD BY STALIN ON AID; Harriman and Beaverbrook See Premier Again After a Long Parley Together PRIORITIES ARE DISCUSSED Biggest Task Is to Find Ships to Carry Arms and Supplies Diverted from Britain," *The New York Times*, 1 October 1941, <https://www.nytimes.com/1941/10/01/archives/third-talk-held-by-stalin-on-aid-harriman-and-beaverbrook-see.html>.

³¹³ Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 111-112.

repeating the verbal list of needs that he had presented to Hopkins, Stalin emphasized the importance of ammunition, small arms, fighter aircraft, aluminum, and tanks as the items that he needed the most urgently for the Soviet war effort.³¹⁴ Three days later, the U.S. diplomats returned home to discuss with Roosevelt a blueprint for the First Protocol of Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union, committing the United States to fulfilling Stalin's orders before 30 June 1942, after which point the U.S. Congress could renew the successive Second, Third, and Fourth Protocols if the president deemed it necessary.³¹⁵

Despite Stalin's record of aggression and, following orthodox Communist political ideology, his suppression of domestic religious freedoms, Roosevelt attempted to portray the Soviet Constitution as permitting both religion and the freedom to oppose it in a 30 September 1941 press conference.³¹⁶ His comments provoked swift condemnation from Congressman Hamilton Fish (R-NY), and the New York lawmaker confidently stated that more than ninety percent of U.S. church leaders disagreed with the president's claim in a 6 October opinion piece for *The New York Times*.³¹⁷ Acting on the advice of Hopkins, the president then employed a new tactic by emphasizing the anti-religious policies of the Nazi regime as he repeatedly denounced Hitler's blatant aggression and the brave fight being waged by the Red Army.³¹⁸

In their 2008 book *The Myth of the Eastern Front: The Nazi-Soviet War in American*

³¹⁴ Churchill, *Memoirs*, 485-486; Khlevniuk, *Stalin*, 211-212; The New York Times, THIRD TALK HELD BY STALIN ON AID."

³¹⁵ Churchill, *Memoirs*, 485-486; The New York Times, THIRD TALK HELD BY STALIN ON AID,"; U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, 1-3.

³¹⁶ Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia*, 259; Office, Chief of Finance War Department, "Lend-Lease Shipments World War II."

³¹⁷ Hamilton Fish, "Article 6," *The New York Times*, 6 October 1941, 3, <https://www.nytimes.com/1941/10/06/archives/article-6-no-title.html>.

³¹⁸ Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia*, 265-269; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 353-354; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 396-398, 400-402.

Popular Culture, Professors Ronald Smelser and Edward J. Davies II argue that by late 1941, many Americans had begun viewing the Red Army in a more positive light than its Nazi foe due in part to the tenacious resistance that many Soviet units displayed in battle.³¹⁹ Smelser and Davies identify the beginning of this shift in the American public's mood as the opening days of *Barbarossa* as the deceitful nature of Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union inadvertently helped Stalin win the psychological war for Americans' sympathy early on.³²⁰ By the time of the Pearl Harbor attack and Hitler's subsequent declaration of war on the United States, the hostility of many U.S. lawmakers to Roosevelt's Soviet Lend-Lease proposals had begun to evaporate, and the two hostile acts of the Axis partners appear to have dried it up completely. As emphasized by Smelser and Davies, Stalin's 1942 revival of the Russian Orthodox Church appeared to many Americans as a sign of his regime's moderation in comparison to Hitler's, and the Soviet premier's alleged confession to a British diplomat that, "he too believed in God" won him much praise in U.S. news articles.³²¹

During these critical months of late 1941, German submarines continued to sink merchant ships in the North Atlantic and exchanged fire with a U.S. Navy destroyer, further exacerbating tensions and generating more sympathy for Roosevelt's arguments. In the weeks after Congressman Fish's criticism of the president's speech, U.S. public opinion continued to shift in favor of supporting Hitler's enemies as a practical measure to safeguard U.S. interests and national security.³²² Congressional isolationists gradually began to view Lend-Lease as a

³¹⁹ Smelser and Davies II, *The Myth of the Eastern Front*, 9-11, 28.

³²⁰ Ibid.

³²¹ Ibid., 18-20, 27, 31-34, 35-36.

³²² Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia*, 285-287; Kaiser, *No End Save Victory*, 114, 143, 197, 207-209; Roosevelt, *Great Speeches*, 107-109, 110-112; Smelser and Davies II, *The Myth of the Eastern Front*, 18-20, 26-27, 28, 31-34, 35-36.

measure to avoid deploying U.S. troops into another European war, and an opinion poll of 17 October 1941 revealed that fifty-one percent of Americans supported aiding the Red Army.³²³

On 16 October 1941, German submarines struck the USS *Kearny* docked at Reykjavik, Iceland, killing eleven American sailors during a Nazi raid against a nearby British convoy. Combined with the previous German attacks denounced by Roosevelt, the *Kearny* incident reinforced public outrage and support for Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union.³²⁴ Two weeks later, German submarines torpedoed the USS *Reuben James* escorting merchant ships to Iceland, killing 100 sailors and solidifying support for Roosevelt's increasingly assertive approach.³²⁵ As Smelser and Davies point out, the Nazi invasion had already, "made the Soviet Union appear as a victim rather than as a victimizer," and by late 1941, Moscow had replaced Berlin as the lesser evil in the eyes of many Americans fearing, in their words, "that if Hitler conquered Russia, he might be unstoppable."³²⁶

As emphasized by George Herring, Jr. and Raymond Dawson, while Roosevelt and Hopkins's rhetorical attempts to silence congressional opposition to aiding the Red Army achieved some limited successes, congressional infighting enabled the president's supporters to include Stalin as a Lend-Lease recipient.³²⁷ The most potent wartime challenge to Roosevelt's decision to add the Soviet Union to his aid program appears to have occurred in October 1941 after Congressman Robert F. Rich (D-PA) proposed an amendment to exclude the Red Army

³²³ Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia*, 285-287; Smelser and Davies II, *The Myth of the Eastern Front*, 18-20, 26-27, 28, 31-34, 35-36.

³²⁴ Deane, *The Strange Alliance*, 62; Roosevelt, *Great Speeches*, 107-109, 110-112.

³²⁵ Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia*, 292; Smelser and Davies II, *The Myth of the Eastern Front*, 18-20, 26-27, 28, 31-34, 35-36.

³²⁶ Smelser and Davies II, *The Myth of the Eastern Front*, 9-11.

³²⁷ Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia*, 279-281; Herring, Jr., *Aid to Russia*, 20, 93.

from Lend-Lease. Cautiously observing developments that could undermine Roosevelt's attempts to aid his struggling forces, Stalin appears to have grasped the urgency of the president's emphasis on Hitler's anti-religious policies and began introducing the rhetoric of faith into his speeches.³²⁸ Naturally, Stalin had other motives for appealing to the faith of Soviet citizens besides helping Roosevelt to make his case for aiding the Soviet Union, such as his urgent need to boost morale and patriotism in the Red Army's ranks and combat Hitler's attempts to undermine the Soviet regime by portraying the German Army as a liberating force that tolerated religious freedom. Yet Stalin's sudden inclusion of religion in his rhetoric helped Roosevelt and Hopkins to argue in favor of supporting the Red Army, even though the Soviet premier had other, equally pressing reasons for appealing to faith as he sought desperately to reverse the ongoing massive losses at the front and counterattack the invaders.³²⁹

As Rich's supporters and opponents debated on the House floor in late October 1941, Stalin issued a broadcast in which he called on the Soviet people to flock to the Red Army's ranks to defend, "Holy Russia" from the invading Nazi hordes, and Roosevelt subsequently cited the Soviet premier's sly appeal to religion in conversations with congressional isolationists.³³⁰ To further defang the proposed "Rich amendment" to Lend-Lease, Roosevelt is also said to have obtained and emphasized a statement from Pope Pius XII in which the Roman Catholic pontiff

³²⁸ *Congressional Record – House of Representatives*, 77th Congress, 1st Session (1941), pt. 7, Government Publishing Office, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.31210018789337&view=1up&seq=1&q1=rich%20amendment>; Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia*, 279-281; Herring, Jr., *Aid to Russia*, 20, 93; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 791-793, 796, 802; Joseph Stalin, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, ed. and trans. Harry F. Ward (New York: International Publishers, 1945), 20-22, 23.

³²⁹ Stalin, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, 20, 22-23.

³³⁰ *Cong. Rec. – House of Representatives*, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) pt. 7; Herring, Jr., *Aid to Russia*, 20, 93, 112-117, 120-122, 124-128; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 349-350, 722n4; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 791-793, 796, 802; Stalin, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, 35-38.

differentiated arming Stalin's soldiers from giving aid to global Communism.³³¹ To mask Hopkins's influence in his aid program and appeal to congressional conservatives, Roosevelt had already appointed former industrialist Edward Stettinius, Jr. as Lend-Lease Administrator in March 1941, and he later repeated this tactic to again appease his critics by replacing Stettinius with Leo Crowley in late 1943. Crucially, Roosevelt carefully concealed his plan to attach no conditions to Soviet Lend-Lease aid, save for Stalin's continued prosecution of the war against Hitler, and strongly implied that he and Stettinius intended to use the program as a bargaining chip to compel the Soviet premier to repay U.S. aid.³³²

In making his case before Congress, Roosevelt insisted that while he, Morgenthau, and Stettinius could effectively manage the aid program and prevent Stalin from essentially stealing U.S. war aid without repaying it, timing remained crucial. Implying that a second Brest-Litovsk and the restoration of a single Nazi front in the west against Churchill remained a dangerous possibility as the lawmakers debated, Roosevelt argued that his hands should not be, "tied in any way" in determining Lend-Lease recipients as such a move could disastrously impact Soviet morale.³³³ A combination of Roosevelt's arguments and Hitler's ongoing advances into Soviet territory appears to have persuaded several key congressional isolationists to participate in voting down the Rich amendment as even Congressman Fish declined to vote in favor of amending

³³¹ Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia*, 279-281; Herring, Jr., *Aid to Russia*, 20, 93, 112-117; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 791-793, 796, 802.

³³² *Cong. Rec. – House of Representatives*, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) pt. 7; Folsom, Jr., and Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 230-235, 340-342n40-44; Herring, Jr., *Aid to Russia*, 20, 93, 112-117, 120-122, 124-128; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 791-793, 796, 802.

³³³ *Cong. Rec. – House of Representatives*, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) pt. 7; Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia*, 273, 274-278, 279-281; Herring, Jr., *Aid to Russia*, 20, 93, 112-117, 120-122, 124-128.

Lend-Lease to prevent the president from designating aid recipients.³³⁴

Congressman John Taber (R-NY), Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, then delivered a fatal blow to the Rich amendment. Arguing that while he detested the Soviet Union's Communist political system, Taber expressed his conviction that he thought it highly unwise to obstruct the president, as Commander-in-Chief, from exercising his judgment in supplying those that he and his advisers deemed worthy of U.S. aid.³³⁵ On 20 October 1941, a vote of 328 to sixty-seven crushed the Rich amendment in the House, and, despite their professed distaste for Soviet Communism, neither Rich, Taber, nor Fish appear to have again attempted to amend Lend-Lease to exclude Stalin's Red Army after the United States entered the war that December.³³⁶

In a somewhat heated 27 October 1941 U.S. Senate debate, Roosevelt's supporters and opponents discussed the matter of appropriations for a supplemental Lend-Lease bill intended to more effectively ensure the shipment of the materials requested by Churchill and Stalin.³³⁷ Senator Burton Wheeler (D-MT) voiced strong support for Roosevelt's proposal to supply all of the food, arms, and raw material requested by the European Allies, including Stalin's Soviet Union, to help them halt Nazi aggression.³³⁸ Senator Taft quickly rose in opposition but conceded defeat after several of his colleagues provided a detailed briefing of Nazi resources in

³³⁴ *Cong. Rec. – House of Representatives*, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) pt. 7; Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia*, 273, 274-278, 279-281; Folsom, Jr., and Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 230-235, 340-342n40-44; Herring, Jr., *Aid to Russia*, 20, 93, 112-117, 120-122, 124-128; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 349-350, 722n4.

³³⁵ *Cong. Rec. – House of Representatives*, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) pt. 7; Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia*, 279-281; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 349-350, 722n4.

³³⁶ *Cong. Rec. – House of Representatives*, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) pt. 7; Herring, Jr., *Aid to Russia*, 20, 93, 112-117.

³³⁷ *Congressional Record – United States Senate*, 77th Congress, 1st Session (1941), pt. 8, Government Publishing Office, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1941-pt8/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1941-pt8-4.pdf>.

³³⁸ Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia*, 276.

occupied Europe and the desperate struggle faced by London and Moscow, summoning memories of Brest-Litovsk by emphasizing the danger of Soviet resources falling to Berlin.³³⁹

On 28 October 1941, the Senate passed the supplemental bill authorizing an additional \$5,980,000,000 in appropriations to finance Lend-Lease operations.³⁴⁰ Watching with satisfaction and already armed with the immense presidential authority that Congress had earlier given him in designating which countries qualified for Lend-Lease aid, Roosevelt prepared to officially announce the Soviet Lend-Lease program on 7 November after already opening up a \$1,000,000,000 credit line for Soviet war material purchases free of interest.³⁴¹ Although the Red Army continued suffering major setbacks as Nazi forces pushed closer to Moscow and besieged Leningrad that fall, Stalin's soldiers had already begun receiving small quantities of U.S. arms even as Roosevelt kept quiet on the matter publicly, and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor soon guaranteed an even greater flow of aid.³⁴²

A major obstacle to Roosevelt's efforts to effectively supply the Red Army lay in the difficulties involved in the supply routes to the Soviet Union. U.S. supplies transported by Great Britain's Royal Navy had been reaching the Soviet Arctic ports since the late summer of 1941 and Stalin and his top diplomats continued expressing their preference for this northern route throughout the war.³⁴³ In October 1941, small numbers of U.S. ships also began transporting supplies to Soviet East Asia, and Stettinius began advocating for a supply route to be opened in

³³⁹ *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate*, 77th Cong. 1st Sess. (1941) pt.8.

³⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁴¹ U.S. President, "Franklin Roosevelt Administration: Stalin Replies to Roosevelt Letter of 30 October 1941 (November 4, 1941)," *The White House*, Washington, D.C., 4 November 1941, <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/stalin-replies-to-roosevelt-letter-of-october-30-1941-november-1941>.

³⁴² Deane, *The Strange Alliance*, 89; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 380-381, 382-384, 389-392; U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, 1-3, 9-12; U.S. President, "Franklin Roosevelt Administration."

³⁴³ Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 94-95; U.S. President, "Box 8 Roosevelt to Stalin May – December 1942."

Iran as U.S. and British engineers slowly began the work needed to improve that country's road networks.³⁴⁴ Despite initial difficulties, Anglo-American officials eventually managed to transform each of these routes into potent pipelines flowing with arms and ordnance to the Red Army, helping its fighting men and women to counterattack the Nazi invaders before oversupplying them to bring the battle to Berlin.³⁴⁵

As the fighting on the Eastern Front continued into late 1941 with German troops advancing closer to Moscow despite the Red Army's dogged defense, Roosevelt, Hopkins, and their supporters in the administration hastened to provide Stalin with the war material that he requested.³⁴⁶ Stalin's demands for U.S. aircraft intensified as the fierce fighting raged into the fall, and Major Yeaton declined to comment on the situation at the front to inquiring journalists as reported in *The Daily Iowan* on 30 October 1941.³⁴⁷ Yeaton had previously repeated his earlier view that the Red Army could not continue to resist the Germans and expressed concern that U.S. material shipped to the Soviet Arctic ports as demanded by Stalin may be captured by the Nazi invaders, prompting a swift rebuke from Hopkins.³⁴⁸

Upon her return from the Soviet Union, photographer Margaret Bourke-White and her husband Erskine Caldwell publicly called on Americans to relinquish their fears of aiding the Red Army in its hour of need, praising Stalin's leadership in a 3 November 1941 statement to

³⁴⁴ Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 254; Stettinius, Jr., *Lend-Lease*, 237.

³⁴⁵ U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, 1-3, 9-12.

³⁴⁶ Alexander Werth, *Russia at War, 1941-1945: A History* (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 1992), xiii-xv, 148-149.

³⁴⁷ The Daily Iowan (Unattributed Report), "Soviets Have Suffered Heavy Defeat But Are Not Finished: Foreign Observers Declare Reds Need Planes 'Desperately'," *The Daily Iowan*, 30 October 1941, <http://dailyiowan.lib.uiowa.edu/DI/1941/di1941-10-30.pdf>.

³⁴⁸ Kelly, *Saving Stalin*, 26-29; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 395-396; The Daily Iowan, "Soviets Have Suffered."

The New York Times.³⁴⁹ The celebrity couple argued that without official, immediate, and substantial U.S. aid, the Soviet forces may crumble in the face of Hitler's brutal offensives, leaving the Nazi Fuehrer with unchallenged access to Soviet Europe's vast resources. The report quoted Bourke-White and Caldwell as stating bluntly to their compatriots that, "we will all be helling' [sic] Hitler within the next eighteen months" unless Americans rallied behind Roosevelt's proposals to provide, "all-out aid" to Stalin's beleaguered Red Army.³⁵⁰

Initially, Great Britain supplied the bulk of the material as Royal Navy warships and Merchant Navy transport vessels braved the hazardous seas and Nazi submarines operating out of Norway on their route to Archangel and Murmansk.³⁵¹ The Nazi submarine and aerial menace to these Allied "Arctic convoys" did not fully materialize as a major threat to Stalin's supplies from the West until after the route captured Hitler's attention in December 1941 however, and the first few convoys of August and September that year managed to safely supply the Soviets. On the day of Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union, Prime Minister Churchill immediately pledged Great Britain's full support of the Red Army's struggle against the invaders, and on 8 July he initiated the first of his and Roosevelt's many telegram exchanges with Stalin.³⁵²

³⁴⁹ The New York Times (Unattributed Report), "MISS BOURKE-WHITE PRAISES STALIN; Back After Photographing Him in Moscow, She Says He Has Extraordinary Personality," *The New York Times*, 3 November 1941, <https://www.nytimes.com/1941/11/03/archives/miss-bourkewhite-praises-stalin-back-after-photographing-him-in.html>.

³⁵⁰ The New York Times, "MISS BOURKE-WHITE PRAISES STALIN."

³⁵¹ Hill, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, 180.

³⁵² Alexander Hill, "British Lend-Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort, June 1941-June 1942," *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 71, No. 3 (July 2007), 773-808, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/30052890>; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 1: Personal Message from Mr. Churchill to Monsieur Stalin," 8 July 1941, 11; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 23.

In one such telegram on 3 September 1941, the Soviet premier thanked the British prime minister for promising to send a further 200 aircraft in addition to 200 others that he had previously pledged to ship, using the term, “sell” to shame Churchill into attaching no conditions to the aid by implying that London sought to make a profit at Moscow’s expense.³⁵³ Stalin then strongly emphasized the heavy losses suffered by Soviet industry after Hitler’s recent reinforcing of his invasion force with between thirty and thirty-four more infantry divisions backed by armor, airpower, and forty-six fresh Romanian and Finnish divisions. He then emphasized the importance to the Soviet war effort of aluminum, steel, and iron, and urged Churchill to begin shipping, “30,000 tons of aluminum by the beginning of October” along with, “a minimum *monthly* aid of 400 aeroplanes and 500 tanks (of small or medium size).”³⁵⁴ These specific raw materials and weapons were more urgently needed, Stalin added, due to the Red Army’s loss to the Germans of the largest Soviet aluminum plants in Tikhvin near Leningrad and Zaporozhia on the Dnieper River, three motor production plants, and four aircraft factories in Ukraine and Leningrad.³⁵⁵

Stalin’s emphasis to Churchill that Hitler’s capture of these key facilities represented a “mortal danger” to the Soviet war effort and the Red Army’s ability to continue fighting seems to justify Sean McMeekin’s claim that without Western aluminum shipments after the fall of Tikhvin and Zaporozhia, Soviet resistance may have crumbled and collapsed.³⁵⁶ The Soviet

³⁵³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin’s Correspondence*, “No. 10: Personal Message from Premier Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill,” 3 September 1941, 20-22; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 40-41.

³⁵⁴ Churchill, *Memoirs*, 481-482; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin’s Correspondence*, “No. 10,” 3 September 1941, 20-22, italics and parentheses in the original; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 40-41.

³⁵⁵ McMeekin, *Stalin’s War*, 330-334; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin’s Correspondence*, “No. 10,” 3 September 1941, 20-22; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 40-41; Sokolov, *The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War*, 53-55.

³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

premier's urging of Churchill to commit to supplying his forces with a combined monthly minimum total of 900 aircraft and "small or medium" tanks also appears to support Alexander Hill's claim that Lend-Lease armor played a considerable part in Moscow's 1941 defense.³⁵⁷ While Anglo-American aid shipments may have provided only a small amount of material in 1941, Churchill and Roosevelt quickly responded to Stalin's pleas for help even before the attack on Pearl Harbor led to Washington's official entry into the war.³⁵⁸

From the time of his first telegram exchanges with Churchill and Roosevelt, the Soviet premier appears to have sensed their desire to prevent a second Brest-Litovsk and, while he may not have considered forging a separate peace with Hitler, began playing on their fears to obtain crucial aid. Claiming that the Red Army, "will be defeated or weakened" to the point of passivity in the field without the specific supplies that he requested, along with the opening of a, "second front" against the Nazis in either France or Norway, Stalin immediately raised over Churchill the specter of a separate peace.³⁵⁹ Feigning regret at having to inform Churchill of the dire circumstances that Hitler's capture of half of Ukraine and advance on Leningrad had inflicted on the Soviet war effort, Stalin deployed the implicit diplomatic threat of a second Brest-Litovsk in his 3 September 1941 correspondence with the British prime minister.³⁶⁰

Stalin's implied threat appears to have spurred urgent action from Churchill as the British prime minister replied on the following day with a promise to send from Great Britain's

³⁵⁷ Hill, "British Lend-Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort," 775-779; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 10," 3 September 1941, 20-22; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 40-41; U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, 9-12, 13-15.

³⁵⁸ Hill, "British Lend-Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort," 781-783, 785-787.

³⁵⁹ Churchill, *Memoirs*, 476-479; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 10," 3 September 1941, 20-22; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 40-41.

³⁶⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 10," 3 September 1941, 20-22; Pownall, *Chief of Staff*, 39-40, 41-42; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 40-41.

domestic production half of the weaponry requested by the Soviet premier.³⁶¹ Expressing hope that the United States could supply the remainder of the Red Army's urgent needs, Churchill hastened to inform Stalin that he had cabled Roosevelt to request the swift arrival in London of Averell Harriman and the initiation of a discussion on supplying the Soviets.³⁶² While stating that he could not yet open a second front against Germany in Europe, even as his men faced Hitler and Mussolini's armies in Libya, Churchill praised the Red Army's tenacious resistance and committed to opening a new supply route to the Soviet Union through Iran, which had been jointly seized by British and Soviet troops in August. Seeking to assure Stalin of his total commitment to Hitler's defeat, Churchill vowed to attach no conditions to aid in the same spirit, "as the American Lend-Lease Bill, of which no formal account is kept in money" and to threaten Finland with war if Helsinki's troops advanced past its original borders.³⁶³

In a diary entry two days after Stalin's 3 September telegram to Churchill, General Pownall recorded his perception that while the Red Army faced an arduous struggle, the Soviet premier appeared to be, "blackmailing" London into aiding Moscow's fight by dangling the prospect of separate peace.³⁶⁴ After criticizing Harriman and Roosevelt for their perceived eagerness to supply the Soviets, Pownall lamented that Beaverbrook, despite London's other global naval commitments, seemed ready, "to say 'yes' to anything that the Russians may ask – prepared to offer them the Earth."³⁶⁵ By the end of 1941, 2,010 field telephones were delivered to the Red Army instead of the original 6,000 requested by Stalin, prompting complaints from

³⁶¹ Hill, "British Lend-Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort," 781-783, 785-787.

³⁶² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 11: Prime Minister Churchill to Monsieur Stalin," 4 September 1941, 22-23.

³⁶³ Ibid.

³⁶⁴ Pownall, *Chief of Staff*, 39-40, 41-42.

³⁶⁵ Ibid.

the Soviet premier even as the Royal Navy struggled in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Pacific.³⁶⁶ Facing the threat of German forces in North Africa and across the English Channel, Churchill informed his Soviet counterpart that Great Britain could not offer the Spitfire aircraft that he desired, shipping Hurricane fighters instead while expressing hope that U.S. industry could soon accommodate the Kremlin's pressing needs.³⁶⁷

The entrance of the United States into the war as a member of the Allies largely stifled isolationist sentiments, gradually created a vigorous wartime economy, and guaranteed a far greater flow of Lend-Lease material to the Red Army. Initially, major difficulties arose regarding Lend-Lease shipments to the Soviet ports in East Asia, forcing Stalin's generals to fight without some of the desired military items he and they had requested by the end of 1941.³⁶⁸ Yet Churchill's decisiveness and Roosevelt's determination to provide aid to Stalin's struggling soldiers resulted in urgently needed arms deliveries before the year ended, despite these initial shipments being much smaller than either Moscow or Washington desired. Four days after the Pearl Harbor attack, Hitler and his Italian fascist ally Benito Mussolini declared war on the United States, and German submarines launched operations along the Atlantic seaboard in an act that rallied Americans to their country's war effort and ultimately doomed the Axis to defeat.³⁶⁹

While Hitler's aggression may have eventually rendered the U.S. entry into the Second World War inevitable, Stalin's loyal agents working within Roosevelt's administration appear to

³⁶⁶ Alanbrooke, *War Diaries*, 416-417; Hill, "British Lend-Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort," 785-787, 788-792, 793-794; U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, 13-15, 16-17.

³⁶⁷ Carl-Frederik Geust, "Aircraft Deliveries to the Soviet Union," *Lend-Lease History and People*, 6 July 2019, <https://lend-lease.net/articles-en/aircraft-deliveries-to-the-soviet-union/>; Hill, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, 181.

³⁶⁸ Herring, *Aid to Russia*, 229-231, 236-237, 340-342; Hill, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, 187; U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, 9-12, 13-15.

³⁶⁹ Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia*, 294.

have helped hasten the president's increasingly belligerent stance toward the Axis Powers.³⁷⁰ Despite the considerable influence of some key administration officials now known to have served as Soviet spies, Stalin could not have hoped for success in executing this careful strategic maneuver had Roosevelt not refocused the American public and government on preparing to face the Axis.³⁷¹ Inadvertently aided by Hitler's submarine attacks and his sudden, frightening advances in Europe, Roosevelt managed to gradually shift the attention of many Americans, including many congressional critics, away from Communism and toward the more immediate Axis threat. Roosevelt's foresight in combating Axis expansion, while commendable, appears to have paved the way for Stalin's agents to influence U.S. policy to further the Soviet Union's strategic interests, and they were aided in this by the president's underestimation of the Soviet premier's long-term objectives and the Red Army's military potential.³⁷²

Of particular importance to Stalin's successful manipulation of Roosevelt's foreign policy, an endeavor that may have failed had the president not underestimated the Soviets so greatly while understandably focusing on the Axis, is the influence of Treasury Department official Harry Dexter White.³⁷³ As previously mentioned, White joined Roosevelt's Treasury Department under the president's close friend Henry Morgenthau in 1934 and, according to several confessed former spies including Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley, began aiding Moscow later in the decade.³⁷⁴ By the time of the Second World War's outbreak in 1939,

³⁷⁰ Koster, *Operation Snow*, 15-17, 204-205, 215; Steil, *The Battle of Bretton Woods*, 55-57.

³⁷¹ Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia*, 296-298; Herring, Jr., *Aid to Russia*, 317-319, 322-324; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 278-280, 328, 644, 657-658, 746-747, 752, 755-757.

³⁷² Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 103-105, 107; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 364-367, 403-405; Van Tuijl, *Feeding the Bear*, 26-27; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 45, 131-133.

³⁷³ Steil, *The Battle of Bretton Woods*, 53-55.

³⁷⁴ Fitzgibbon, "The Hiss-Chambers Case,"; VENONA Decrypts, "13. Hoover to Matthew Connelly, 12 September 1945," *Internet Archive Wayback Machine*,

White had proven himself to be a reliable economist and had become a close friend of Morgenthau that the Treasury Secretary depended heavily on. Historians John Koster, Ben Steil, and Sean McMeekin point out that by 1941 White's importance to Morgenthau had captured the interest of Soviet officials, and he is said to have met with Soviet GRU agent Vitali Pavlov in May to discuss exacerbating U.S.-Japanese tensions through hostile economic measures.³⁷⁵

White appears to have embraced his task zealously, and he began laboring to help make Stalin's alleged dream of igniting a war between the United States and Japan a reality almost immediately after discussing Operation *Snow* with Pavlov over lunch at Washington's Old Ebbitt Grill.³⁷⁶ As emphasized by Koster, McMeekin, and Steil, Operation *Snow*'s objectives carried tremendous importance from Stalin's perspective regarding the Soviet Union's strategic global interests.³⁷⁷ Relations between Washington and Tokyo had continued to sour following Roosevelt's denunciation of Japan's partnership with Berlin and its invasions of China, Manchuria, and former French Indochina after Hitler's June 1940 occupation of France. In the event of a U.S.-Japanese war, Stalin could avoid waging a two-front war in Europe and Asia and focus on arming his troops to resist Hitler, as his non-aggression pact appeared to be crumbling by early 1941, and he hoped to buy precious time to sufficiently strengthen the Red Army.³⁷⁸

On 6 June 1941, White authored a Treasury Department memorandum in which he argued for the importance of a stronger position against further Japanese expansion in East Asia

<https://web.archive.org/web/20071114214743/https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/13.gif>.

³⁷⁵ Koster, *Operation Snow*, 1-4, 5-8, 19-22, 37-41; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 261-264; Steil, *The Battle of Bretton Woods*, 53-55; VENONA Decrypts, "13. Hoover to Matthew Connelly."

³⁷⁶ Ibid.

³⁷⁷ Ibid., 132-135, 137, 215; *ibid.*, 261-264, 379; *ibid.*

³⁷⁸ Ibid., 160-165; *ibid.*, 379, 396, 399; *ibid.*

while advocating economic overtures that were highly favorable to the Soviet Union.³⁷⁹

Apparently attracting little suspicion from Morgenthau and Roosevelt due to the administration's already deep focus on opposing the Axis through limited but increasingly strong means while attempting to lure Stalin away from Hitler, White's 6 June memorandum laid the groundwork for several key elements of Soviet Lend-Lease.³⁸⁰ After ridiculing the supposedly tepid and weak response of the U.S. State Department to Axis aggression, White painted a grim picture of the United States facing Berlin, Rome, and Tokyo alone, playing on Morgenthau and Roosevelt's fears.³⁸¹ Cleverly feigning hope that hostilities with Japan could be avoided, White brazenly advised that the United States should offer the withdrawal of all naval forces from the Pacific and a 10-year non-aggression pact with Tokyo on the strict condition that Hirohito remove his forces from all occupied territories and conclude financial agreements with Washington.³⁸²

White proceeded to state that to avoid economic penalties as punishment for its record of aggression, Tokyo must agree to finance, at two percent, a 1,000,000,000-yen loan to the Chinese government, grant most-favored-nation status to the United States and China, and lend the Americans fifty percent of Japan's naval and air forces for three years.³⁸³ Further insisting that the U.S. officials be given sole authority to decide exactly which Japanese ships and aircraft should be loaned, he then stated that Tokyo must also replace its yen currency at a rate subject to the joint approval of the United States, Great Britain, and China. Should Hirohito reject these

³⁷⁹ U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Diaries of Henry Morgenthau, Jr., April 27, 1933-July 27, 1945," Series 1: Morgenthau Diaries, "Memo for Secretary: 471 – 6/6/41 HDW," 6 June 1941.

³⁸⁰ U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Diaries of Henry Morgenthau, Jr." Series 2, "Russian Clearance Problems."

³⁸¹ Koster, *Operation Snow*, 137, 165; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 43-44, 261-164; U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Diaries of Henry Morgenthau, Jr.," Series 1, "Memo for Secretary."

³⁸² Koster, *Operation Snow*, 132-135, 137, 203-204, 215; U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Diaries of Henry Morgenthau, Jr.," Series 1, "Memo for Secretary."

³⁸³ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 261-164, 379; Steil, *The Battle of Bretton Woods*, 129, 137-140; U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Diaries of Henry Morgenthau, Jr.," Series 1, "Memo for Secretary."

terms and conditions and thereby refuse such a “peaceful solution,” White argued, the United States must immediately enact, “a complete embargo on imports from Japan” as a crucial economic, “first step.”³⁸⁴ White deliberately designed this memorandum to offend Tokyo, and eventually succeeded in this quest, later influencing his superior Morgenthau to pressure Roosevelt to enact a somewhat different but equally forceful approach in a 26 July oil embargo against Japan.³⁸⁵

Significantly, at the time of White’s 6 June memorandum to Morgenthau, Hitler had not yet attacked the Soviet Union, yet the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact had slowly been coming apart, and, as previously shown, Roosevelt’s “moral embargo” against Stalin seems to have lasted in practice only until October 1940.³⁸⁶ This factor appears to have emboldened White to propose that the administration further coax Stalin into forging friendlier relations with the West while providing the Soviet premier with easier access to U.S. war material, at a period in which neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had yet gone to war with Germany. Implying that Moscow expected war, a factor that is said to have motivated Stalin’s GRU to contact him, White’s memorandum advocated the delivery of any arms or raw materials requested and purchased by the Kremlin to Soviet ports, “In the event of war between Russia and any major power.”³⁸⁷ In such a situation, White stated, the U.S. government must immediately embargo the imports of any country that may go to war with the Soviet Union and permit Stalin to purchase U.S. \$2,000,000,000 in material per year while concluding a five-year “Mutual

³⁸⁴ U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Diaries of Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,” Series 1, “Memo for Secretary.”

³⁸⁵ Kaiser, *No End Save Victory*, 234, 250; Koster, *Operation Snow*, 111-112, 117, 123; Steil, *The Battle of Bretton Woods*, 55-57; VENONA Decrypts, “13. Hoover to Matthew Connelly.”

³⁸⁶ U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Diaries of Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,” Series 2, “Russian Clearance Problems.”

³⁸⁷ Koster, *Operation Snow*, 132-135, 137, 215; McMeekin, *Stalin’s War*, 261-264, 379; U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Diaries of Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,” Series 1, “Memo for Secretary,”; VENONA Decrypts, “13. Hoover to Matthew Connelly.”

Economic Assistance Pact.”³⁸⁸ White also advised that the Soviet Union should receive most-favored-nation status and immediately place an embargo on all exports from Germany and countries under Nazi occupation, suggestions that seem to have later influenced Roosevelt and Hopkins as indicated by their prioritizing of Soviet Lend-Lease and desire to placate Stalin.³⁸⁹

While White’s initial recommendations were not immediately embraced by Morgenthau and Roosevelt in June, he later revised its more aggressive elements that were approved and incorporated into the infamous “Hull note” handed to Japanese Ambassador Kichiasaburo Nomura and peace envoy Saburo Kurusu by Secretary of State Hull on 26 November 1941.³⁹⁰ White’s audacious proposals, with which Morgenthau, Hull, and Roosevelt appear to have largely agreed, amounted to an outrageous threat from the perspective of Hirohito’s war cabinet, claiming that Japan could avoid, “certain defeat” and have, “peace at once” but on terms dictated solely by Washington.³⁹¹ As emphasized by Koster, White’s deliberately aggressive proposals received not only Morgenthau’s approval but Hull’s, as the Secretary of State later handed them personally to Japanese officials with Roosevelt’s authorization.³⁹²

Although ascribed to Secretary Hull, the document’s contents had been authored by a desperate White at a time in which it appeared, frightfully from his perspective, that Hirohito and Prime Minister Hideki Tojo’s diplomats were making limited progress with U.S. officials in the middle of November 1941. Tojo, then a new prime minister known as *kamisori* or “the razor”

³⁸⁸ Koster, *Operation Snow*, 132-136, 137; U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Diaries of Henry Morgenthau, Jr.”

³⁸⁹ Steil, *The Battle of Bretton Woods*, 53-55; U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Diaries of Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,” Series 1, “Memo for Secretary.”

³⁹⁰ Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 1062-1067, 1074-1076; Steil, *The Battle of Bretton Woods*, 53-55.

³⁹¹ U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Diaries of Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,” Series 1, “Memo for Secretary.”

³⁹² Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 1062-1067, 1074-1076; Kaiser, *No End Save Victory*, 259, 335; Koster, *Operation Snow*, 132-135, 137, 203-204, 215; Steil, *The Battle of Bretton Woods*, 53-55.

due to his reputed razor-sharp, clear focus on international diplomacy, appears to have been prepared to agree to some of Roosevelt's demands that Japanese forces withdraw from many of the occupied territories.³⁹³ He refused, however, to withdraw Tokyo's troops from occupied Manchuria and Korea, hoping to forestall the popular domestic resentment that such action could generate and to keep the areas as strong military bases from which Japanese troops could resist Soviet incursions. Although Stalin had concluded an April 1941 non-aggression pact with Hirohito, Japanese anti-Communism, motivated by the tsar's murder and Tokyo's 1918 Siberian intervention, remained potent, and while Japan's leaders stayed neutral in the Soviet premier's anti-Hitler struggle, they remained wary of potential future expansion by Moscow.³⁹⁴

On 17 November 1941, White delivered another memorandum to Morgenthau that included many of his previous proposals as well as others that he appears to have designed to help push U.S.-Japanese relations to the breaking point, although, unknown to White at the time, Tojo's admirals had already embarked for the Pearl Harbor operation.³⁹⁵ Described as a "hysterical missive" by John Koster, White's "November Memorandum," like his introductory speech as U.S. Chairman at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, fully revealed his conviction that economic attrition served as a vital war weapon at least as important as battlefield victories.³⁹⁶ Combining praise of Morgenthau and Roosevelt with the specter of the Red Army's potential collapse and, by implication, a second Brest-Litovsk at a time in which the Nazis

³⁹³ Kaiser, *No End Save Victory*, 234, 250; Koster, *Operation Snow*, 125-127, 130; U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Diaries of Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,"

³⁹⁴ Koster, *Operation Snow*, 132-135, 137.

³⁹⁵ Francis Pike, *Hirohito's War: The Pacific War, 1941-1945* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), xxvi, 108, 111, 115, 133, 137, 141, 147, 156-157, 160, 163-164, 170-173.

³⁹⁶ Koster, *Operation Snow*, 132-135, 137; Kurt Schuler and Andrew Rosenberg, *The Bretton Woods Transcripts* (New York: Center for Financial Stability, 2013), 41; U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Diaries of Henry Morgenthau, Jr.," Series 1, "Suggested Approach for Elimination of United States-Japanese Tension," 17 November 1941.

appeared poised to storm Moscow, White argued for the application of stronger penalties on Japan. Comparing the administration's recent attempts to continue discussions with Japanese officials to the alleged Anglo-French betrayal of Czechoslovakia to Hitler at the 1938 Munich Conference, White stated, "We must cut loose from that outdated and decayed pattern of diplomacy."³⁹⁷

Without knowing that the Japanese leadership had already deployed its fleet to strike Pearl Harbor, White then proposed a series of demands that he hoped might be deemed unacceptable, offensive, and threatening by Hirohito, urging that Secretary Hull demand the full withdrawal of Japanese military and financial support for any non-nationalist Chinese government, including Tokyo's puppet regime in Manchuria. Another of White's conditions required Japan to sell the United States three-fourths of its armaments, "including naval, air, ordnance and commercial ships" at an exact price to be determined solely by Washington rather than Tokyo.³⁹⁸ Emphasizing that he sought to help end the current, "uncertain status" and tensions between the administration and the Japanese leadership, White played on Roosevelt's emotions at the possibility of being seen as presiding over a "Far East Munich."³⁹⁹ By entertaining Japanese counterproposals and not insisting on Tokyo's full troop withdrawal from all parts of China, White argued, Roosevelt risked playing the part of Judas Iscariot in the betrayal of Christ, "over thirty blood-stained coins of gold [sic, silver]."⁴⁰⁰

After approving much of White's new, more forceful memorandum the following day,

³⁹⁷ Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 1062-1067, 1074-1076; Koster, *Operation Snow*, 132-135, 137; U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Diaries of Henry Morgenthau, Jr.," Series 1, "Suggested Approach."

³⁹⁸ U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Diaries of Henry Morgenthau, Jr.," Series 1, "Suggested Approach."

³⁹⁹ Steil, *The Battle of Bretton Woods*, 53-55; U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Diaries of Henry Morgenthau, Jr.," Series 1, "Suggested Approach."

⁴⁰⁰ Koster, *Operation Snow*, 132-135, 136-138; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 379n; Steil, *The Battle of Bretton Woods*, 53-55; U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Diaries of Henry Morgenthau, Jr.," Series 1, "Suggested Approach."

Morgenthau forwarded it to Roosevelt and Hull, and the president ordered the Secretary of State to deliver it to his Japanese counterparts after reportedly becoming enraged at reports of Japanese reinforcements arriving in Indochina from occupied Chinese territory.⁴⁰¹ White followed up his 17 November memorandum, the core demands of which were included by Hull in his 26 November meeting with Nomura and Kurusu with Roosevelt's approval, with an invitation for RWR Chair Edward Carter to come to Washington. According to historian Ben Steil, White asked Carter, known for his staunchly pro-Soviet positions, to aid him in lobbying against any further diplomatic overtures to the Japanese.⁴⁰²

Even before rejecting Hull's conditions as aggressive, insulting, and unacceptable demands, conceived of and authored by White, Tojo and his cabinet had already begun preparations to launch their fleet against the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and White's desperate, last-ditch attempt to provoke a war appears to have been unnecessary in this regard.⁴⁰³ Yet White's authorship of the "Hull note" reveals his fanatical determination to serve Stalin's Pacific strategy by helping to ensure that Washington and Tokyo did not arrive at an understanding before the outbreak of hostilities and, by taking this desperate action, he helped to guarantee that Tojo and Hirohito did not abandon their plan of attack by heaping insults on their pride as the leaders of an imperial power and further provoking their anger. Aware of Hirohito and Tojo's redirecting of their ambitions against the Americans rather than Soviet East Asia, a course of action that White alone did not trigger but certainly contributed to, Stalin began

⁴⁰¹ Kaiser, *No End Save Victory*, 234, 250; Steil, *The Battle of Bretton Woods*, 53-55; U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Diaries of Henry Morgenthau, Jr.," Series 1, "Suggested Approach."

⁴⁰² Carter, "Russian War Relief," 67; Steil, *The Battle of Bretton Woods*, 53-55.

⁴⁰³ Kaiser, *No End Save Victory*, 17, 50, 259, 335; Koster, *Operation Snow*, 139-140; Liddell Hart, *History of the Second World War*, 269, 272-276, 276-278; Pike, *Hirohito's War*, xxvi, 108, 111, 115, 133, 137, 141, 147, 156-157, 160, 163-164, 170-173.

rushing forty Red Army divisions across the Trans-Siberian Railroad from the Chinese and Mongolian borders to Moscow. As Sean McMeekin points out, Stalin's Tokyo-based spy Richard Sorge had informed the Soviet premier of Japanese intentions to immediately attack the United States upon the failure of diplomacy.⁴⁰⁴

According to McMeekin, Sorge's information allowed Stalin to order the immediate transfer of eleven Red Army divisions from Siberia, including 1,700 tanks and 1,800 aircraft, between the end of September and the beginning of October 1941.⁴⁰⁵ To be sure, Stalin still possessed a vast pool of military reserves in Soviet East Asia from which he could draw reinforcements besides those on the Soviet Union's border with Japanese-occupied Manchuria in late 1941 even as Hitler's generals launched their offensive against Moscow, code-named Operation *Typhoon*, on 30 September. As pointed out by David Glantz, the Red Army boasted several large "nonoperating fronts" in the Siberian interior consisting of reserve troops that Stalin began transferring to the frontlines of Soviet Europe in July, well before the Japanese leadership began preparations to launch the assault on Pearl Harbor.⁴⁰⁶

Notwithstanding Stalin's ability to tap into other reserve units in Soviet Asia other than the Red Army's border guards, Sorge's reports doubtlessly eased the Soviet premier's concerns that Japanese occupation forces in Manchuria and Korea could suddenly surge into Soviet territory, allowing him to deploy more divisions to defend Moscow without worrying that Tokyo was plotting to force him into an imminent two-front war. These critical reinforcements began engaging German forces at Borodino, a city near Moscow, by 14 October, and by late November the Soviet premier could transfer many more troops to the front as Tojo's admirals had already

⁴⁰⁴ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 376-377.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁶ Glantz, *Colossus Reborn*, 152-153, 153-154.

embarked in preparation for the Pearl Harbor operation even before rejecting Hull's conditions. On 6 December, the reinforced Red Army counterattacked the Germans outside of Moscow, halting Hitler's advance on the Soviet capital. On the following day, Stalin officially gained a powerful new ally as Japan's sudden, surprise strike on Pearl Harbor guaranteed the U.S. entry into the war and a gradual but crucial and tremendous increase in Soviet Lend-Lease aid.⁴⁰⁷

The U.S. entry into the war galvanized Stettinius, Hopkins, and White to prioritize Lend-Lease shipments to the Soviet Union as anti-Japanese prejudice combined with patriotic resentment of the Axis Powers and temporarily overshadowed public fears of Communism.⁴⁰⁸ White's success at provoking war with Tokyo continued to pay dividends and temporarily allowed him and other Soviet agents to cover their tracks while capitalizing on the anti-Japanese hysteria that their actions had helped enable after Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066 on 19 February 1942. This act led to the forced internment of 112,000 Japanese-Americans during the war, allowing White and others to become more brazen in their pro-Soviet positions as Americans were advised to embrace the Red Army's supposed fight for freedom.⁴⁰⁹

Acting on the orders that he received during his weekly meetings with Soviet agent Pavlov, White also played a part in advising the administration on the diversion of financial resources to the acquisition of many of the specific items desired by Stalin.⁴¹⁰ White's open emphasis on aiding Stalin's struggle naturally fell on sympathetic ears during the war as

⁴⁰⁷ Carell, *Hitler Moves East*, 136-142, 144-146, 148, 155-157; Clark, *Barbarossa*, 184-185, 190-193, 202; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 376-377; Sokolov, *Marshal K. K. Rokossovsky*, 137-140, 140-143, 147-149, 150-153; Zhukov, *Marshal of Victory Vol. 1*, 281-282, 285, 287-289.

⁴⁰⁸ Folsom, Jr., and Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 228; Koster, *Operation Snow*, 160-165.

⁴⁰⁹ U.S. President, "Executive Order 9066, February 19, 1942,"; Emily Yellin, *Our Mothers' War: American Women at Home and at the Front During World War II* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 40-41.

⁴¹⁰ Koster, *Operation Snow*, 10-11, 19-22, 37-41; Kenneth D. Rose, *Myth and the Greatest Generation: A Social History of Americans in World War II* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 5, 31, 82-83; Steil, *The Battle of Bretton Woods*, 57-58; VENONA Decrypts, "13. Hoover to Matthew Connelly,"; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 23, 45.

Morgenthau, Hopkins, and Stettinius readily agreed to provide anything to Washington's newfound Soviet ally and removed any obstacles to the Soviet leader's aid orders. Enabled by the administration's zeal for the Soviet war effort, White's influence in the Treasury Department appears to have eventually aided in the shipment of 1,465 pounds of U.S. uranium chemicals and one kilogram of uranium metal to the Soviet Union, reportedly with Hopkins's approval.⁴¹¹

White's treason and pro-Soviet espionage and disinformation efforts, together with those of Alger Hiss and others in Roosevelt's administration, created almost limitless opportunities for Stalin to influence and, to an extent, hijack through his agents certain aspects of U.S. foreign policy during the war.⁴¹² Yet this could not have happened without Roosevelt's warm embracing of the Red Army's cause and his naivete in underestimating Soviet duplicity and Communism's appeal among some in his administration, an attitude enhanced by his fears that Stalin could be forced to sign a separate peace with Hitler. Determined to preside over Germany's total and final defeat and prevent a second Brest-Litovsk from blemishing his record and wrecking Washington's strategy, Roosevelt worked to avoid repeating the perceived errors that occurred on Wilson's watch and zealously embraced the Red Army's struggle as vital to an Allied victory in Europe. In full agreement with the president in this regard, Hull, Hopkins, Stettinius, Feis, Standley, and Knox, none of whom are known to have been Soviet agents, zealously executed the supplying of Stalin's forces on a massive scale to prevent Berlin from rising again, only to empower Moscow.⁴¹³

⁴¹¹ Jordan, *Major Jordan's Diaries*, 41-43.

⁴¹² Chambers, *Witness*, 415-417, 421-424; *Cong. Rec. – House of Representatives*, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1948); Fitzgibbon, "The Hiss-Chambers Case,"; Sudoplatov and Sudoplatov, *Special Tasks*, 222, 226-227, 227-229, 230; VENONA Decrypts, "Silvermaster Folder NY 65-14603 'Alger Hiss.'"

⁴¹³ Chairman of the Board, Tennessee Valley Authority, "Lend-Lease Program With Russia," 23 and 26 September 1942, *National Archives at Atlanta*, https://www.archives.gov/atlanta/exhibits/item81_full.html; Eisenhower,

CHAPTER 3

REEXAMINING THE NECESSITY OF THE ARCTIC CONVOYS AND THE OPENING OF THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR AND ALSIB

Following the Pearl Harbor attack and Hitler's declaration of war on the United States, Roosevelt began to rapidly strengthen Washington's Soviet Lend-Lease program as the remaining congressional opposition, having already somewhat diminished by late 1941, largely collapsed. With the United States officially involved in the war as a full belligerent power in the Allied ranks, the mission of supplying Stalin's soldiers rapidly gained momentum.⁴¹⁴ While Pearl Harbor's immediate aftermath led to a highly urgent prioritization of equipping the U.S. military for a modern, mobile conflict and led to a brief decrease in Lend-Lease exports in December 1941, Roosevelt quickly refocused Washington's attention to arming the Soviets in March 1942. The question remained, however, as to how the administration could accomplish this task to Stalin's satisfaction with the Pacific supply route now closed to U.S. vessels by the Japanese.⁴¹⁵

This third chapter focuses on the hurdles and advantages within each supply route that Roosevelt and Churchill faced as they sought to keep Stalin's Red Army in the war and actively fighting Hitler's forces to avoid a repeat of the March 1918 Brest-Litovsk fiasco. Each route's effectiveness is assessed alongside the question of the role that Soviet Lend-Lease played in the

Crusade in Europe, 69-70, 489-490; Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin*, 9-12; Folsom, Jr., and Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 228, 246-249, 251.

⁴¹⁴ The New York Times (Unattributed Report), "HARMONY IN DRIVES FOR RELIEF SOUGHT; Meeting of Organizations for Aid Abroad to Be Held Soon, E. C. Carter Reports," *The New York Times*, 3 January 1942, <https://www.nytimes.com/1942/01/03/archives/harmony-in-drives-for-relief-sought-meeting-of-organizations-for.html>.

⁴¹⁵ Deane, *The Strange Alliance*, 88-89, 103, 202; Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin*, 9-12; Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 967, 973-974, 979-981; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 517-518, 536-537; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 791-793, 796, 802; Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 355-359; Stettinius, Jr., *Lend-Lease*, 248-249, 250, 252, 253-254, 257.

Red Army's resistance to Hitler's brutal offensives and Stalin's later transition to attacking Nazi territory. Stalin's requests to Roosevelt for war material are also examined in this chapter to help identify the specific items that proved to be vital for the Soviet Union's defense and the routes that served as the most effective means to deliver these goods at the war's most crucial stages. Accordingly, this chapter emphasizes the logistical difficulties of and successes in arming Stalin's forces and examines Sean McMeekin's question of whether it remained necessary for Washington to continue doing so after the Red Army's victorious 1943 counterattacks.⁴¹⁶

The three major Lend-Lease supply routes to the Soviet Union ran from Great Britain's Loch Ewe to the Soviet Arctic ports of Archangel and Murmansk, from the respective Iranian and Iraqi ports of Abadan, Bushehr, and Basra to the Soviet Caucasus region, and from Fairbanks, Alaska to the Siberian cities of Krasnoyarsk and Uelkel.⁴¹⁷ While many historians have correctly emphasized the political aspect of the Arctic route's importance by pointing to the need for Roosevelt and Churchill to demonstrate their commitment to aiding Stalin's war effort, few appear to have explored the possibility that its deliveries significantly aided the Red Army's struggle. While rightly commending the courage of the crews braving the fierce Arctic gales, ice, and enemy attacks, scholars such as David Wragg and Michael Walling have also emphasized the route's role in the Soviet Union's defense as being unappreciated by Stalin and therefore not worth the Western leaders' efforts.⁴¹⁸ Yet Stalin's emphasis on the convoys'

⁴¹⁶ Alanbrooke, *War Diaries*, 416-417; Hill, "British Lend-Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort," 785-787, 788-792, 793-794; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 516, 517-518, 534-536; The New York Times, "HARMONY IN DRIVES FOR RELIEF SOUGHT; U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, 13-15, 16-17.

⁴¹⁷ Arnold, *Global Mission*, 211-212, 385-387; Alexander B. Dolitsky, Victor D. Glazkov, and Henry Varnum Poor, *Pipeline to Russia: The Alaska-Siberia Air Route in World War II*, trans. James F. Gebhardt (Anchorage: Alaska Affiliated Areas Program National Park Service, 2016), 79-80, 84-85; Van Tuyl, *Feeding the Bear*, 22-23; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 3-4, 7-8.

⁴¹⁸ Walling, *Forgotten Sacrifice*, 9-10; Wragg, *Sacrifice for Stalin*, xii-xv, 72-73.

importance and the frustration that he expressed in telegrams following their brief suspension indicates otherwise, suggesting that Washington's subsequent increase of Soviet Lend-Lease aid over the other routes may have been unnecessarily excessive.⁴¹⁹

As briefly discussed in the previous chapter, British vessels initially transported the bulk of equipment to Stalin's beleaguered forces as Churchill promised to supply all forms of aid to his newfound and, perhaps somewhat understandably, suspicious Soviet ally.⁴²⁰ On Churchill's orders, British naval forces launched the first of many Arctic convoys carrying supplies to the Soviet northern ports on 21 August 1941 in a small, successful convoy simply dubbed "Dervish."⁴²¹ The next month, a second convoy code-named PQ-1 embarked on its Arctic journey, and the subsequent convoys sailed largely unopposed until the Nazi submarine *U-454* sank the destroyer HMS *Matabele* on 17 January 1942, killing 209 sailors as the British vessel escorted the eight merchant ships of Convoy PQ-8 on its otherwise successful voyage to North Russia.⁴²² With Great Britain's Royal Navy already stretched thin across the globe by Hitler's submarines and even more so by his Japanese comrades after December 1941, Churchill's government grew increasingly reliant on the Merchant Navy to execute its task of supplying Stalin.⁴²³

⁴¹⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 58: Prime Minister to Premier Stalin," 31 July 1942, 57; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 133-134; U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Stalin to Roosevelt July – December 1942."

⁴²⁰ Alanbrooke, *War Diaries*, 416-417; Hill, "British Lend-Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort," 775-779, 781-783, 785-787, 788-792, 793-794; U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, 13-15, 16-17.

⁴²¹ *The National Archives of the UK, C. B. 3305 (4) Naval Staff History*, 5-7; Wragg, *Sacrifice for Stalin*, 57-58.

⁴²² Sir Ian Campbell and Donald MacIntyre, *The Kola Run: A Record of Arctic Convoys 1941-1945* (London: Frederick Muller Limited, 1959), 19-21; Michael Wadsworth, *Arctic Convoy PQ8: The Story of Capt Robert Brundle and the SS Harmatris* (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Maritime, 2009), 4-5, 71-72.

⁴²³ Campbell and MacIntyre, *The Kola Run*, 13-15; Hill, "British Lend-Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort," 781-783, 785-787; *The National Archives of the UK, C. B. 3305 (4) Naval Staff History*, 5-7; Wadsworth, *Arctic Convoy PQ8*, 2-3.

As U.S. war production soared to increasingly higher levels following the Pearl Harbor attack, Roosevelt, Hopkins, and Stettinius labored zealously to ensure that their military arms buildup did not detrimentally impact Soviet Lend-Lease aid.⁴²⁴ Even as U.S. Army Chief of Staff Marshall and Navy Secretary Knox scrambled to update and supply the U.S. Armed Forces' equipment and prepare young Americans to fight a modern, mobile war, the administration demanded that Stalin's war effort receive top priority. As pointed out by Sean McMeekin, Roosevelt's approach to Germany's total defeat appears to have played a central part in the president's emphasis on keeping Stalin well-supplied to carry on the war throughout 1942.⁴²⁵ German forces resumed their offensive operations on the Eastern Front early in the year and it appeared vital to Roosevelt, Churchill, and their respective advisers that a repeat of March 1918 be avoided and that Stalin remain in the war and in control of the Red Army and Soviet people as they faced merciless Nazi attacks.⁴²⁶

Beginning in August 1941, shortly after Hopkins's return to Washington from Moscow and his glowing report on Stalin to Roosevelt, U.S. and British military officials started working to improve the port facilities in Anglo-Soviet-occupied Iran to increase the flow of material through the country. The Iranian ports of Abadan and Bushehr, together with the nearby port of Basra in British-occupied Iraq, eventually grew into massive delivery centers for Lend-Lease material destined for Stalin's soldiers.⁴²⁷ Together with the ALSIB air route and, to a lesser extent, the Soviet naval transportation of material across the North Pacific, the Persian Corridor increased in importance to the Soviet Lend-Lease program from 1943 forward, speeding Stalin's

⁴²⁴ Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 544-546; Stettinius, Jr., *Lend-Lease*, 230-232.

⁴²⁵ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 425-427.

⁴²⁶ Chairman of the Board, Tennessee Valley Authority, "Lend-Lease Program With Russia,"; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 544-546; Stettinius, Jr., *Lend-Lease*, 230-232.

⁴²⁷ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 534-536; Vail Motter, *The Persian Corridor*, 3-5.

offensives that defeated Hitler while exporting Communism.⁴²⁸

These U.S.-British efforts to improve Iran's port facilities, U.S.-Soviet efforts at organizing the ALSIB air route, and Soviet-Japanese diplomacy to agree on terms acceptable to Tokyo regarding the transportation of material across the Pacific increased after Pearl Harbor but also took crucial time for development.⁴²⁹ Despite Stalin's strict neutrality, if not unofficial collaboration with Hirohito in the Pacific Theater as argued by McMeekin, the Japanese leadership remained suspicious of Moscow's motives and initially refused to permit Allied arms to travel through Tokyo's territorial waters. The Americans could therefore initially only ship non-military items, such as food and raw materials, to Vladivostok and only in Soviet ships flying the Red Fleet's banner, influencing Roosevelt's transfer of sixty-three U.S. ships to Stalin's control by the summer of 1943 as Moscow had few transport vessels in the Pacific.⁴³⁰

Likewise, U.S. and Soviet officials did not fully establish the ALSIB route, by which roughly half of the Lend-Lease aircraft ultimately supplied to the Soviets are said to have been delivered, until late 1942 due to Stalin's consistent rejections of Roosevelt's offer to have U.S. pilots fly the planes to Siberia. The agreement finally reached by late 1942 essentially placed Soviet pilots in charge of the entire route, providing them with a base located in Fairbanks,

⁴²⁸ Evgenii Altunin, "On the History of the Alaska-Siberia Ferrying Route," *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Vol. 10, Issue 2 (June 1997), 85-96, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13518049708430292?journalCode=fslv20>; Geust, "Aircraft Deliveries to the Soviet Union,"; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 534-536; Vail Motter, *The Persian Corridor*, 124-127; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 131-133.

⁴²⁹ Otis Hays, Jr., *The Alaska-Siberia Connection: The World War II Air Route* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1996), xi-xii, 22-25, 38-39; Stettinius, Jr., *Lend-Lease*, 237-238, 240-242, 244; Vail Motter, *The Persian Corridor*, 124-127.

⁴³⁰ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 534-536; The New York Times (Unattributed Report), "JAPAN LETS RUSSIA GET OUR SUPPLIES; Map in Lend-Lease Report to Congress Reveals Shipments Made by Route to Siberia THESE ARE UNMOLESTED Cargoes Moving in Russian Vessels Are Mostly of Food So Far, Capital Hears," *The New York Times*, 13 March 1943, <https://www.nytimes.com/1943/03/13/archives/japan-lets-russia-get-our-supplies-map-in-lendlease-report-to.html>.

Alaska from which they could take control of the planes and fly them to Siberia.⁴³¹ Until Allied personnel significantly improved Iran's Persian Gulf ports and desert and mountain roads by which they delivered trucks, jeeps, and other vehicles crucial to Stalin's war effort in the late spring of 1943, the Persian Corridor could supply only small quantities of Lend-Lease goods.⁴³²

Before the inherent problems of the ALSIB route and the Persian Corridor were largely resolved by the middle of 1943, the bulk of material aid provided to Stalin's beleaguered Red Army appears to have been successfully delivered by the Arctic convoys to North Russia's ports.⁴³³ This route, while very dangerous for the Allied sailors involved and the precious cargo that they transported to arm the Red Army's anti-Nazi struggle and feed its foot soldiers, also served as the geographically shortest, most practical, and direct route to the Soviet Union. For this reason, Churchill established the route and ordered Great Britain's Royal Navy and Merchant Navy to begin convoying supplies to Stalin's soldiers in the late summer of 1941, and the Soviet premier insisted that the convoys be continued in his letters to his Anglo-American counterparts well into 1943.⁴³⁴ Yet due to the constant perils to which the Arctic convoys were subjected, such as facing the arduous sea conditions and Hitler's forces, and the overall smaller volume of supplies that they delivered to the Red Army, this supply route has often been

⁴³¹ Altunin, "On the History of the Alaska-Siberia Ferrying Route," 85-87; Arnold, *Global Mission*, 211-212, 385-387; Dolitsky, Glazkov, and Poor, *Pipeline to Russia*, 69-70; Geust, "Aircraft Deliveries to the Soviet Union,"; Hays, Jr., *The Alaska-Siberia Connection*, 38-39, 51-52; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 420, 422, 438-439, 518-519; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 114-115.

⁴³² Hill, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, 185; Vail Motter, *The Persian Corridor*, 136-138; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 25-27.

⁴³³ Walter S. Dunn, *The Soviet Economy and the Red Army, 1930-1945* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), 80-81; *The National Archives of the UK, C. B. 3305 (4) Naval Staff History*, 129-130.

⁴³⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 138: Personal and Secret Message from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr. W. Churchill," 2 April 1943, "No. 145: Personal and Secret Message from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr. W. Churchill," 12 April 1943, 117-118; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 227, 232; U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Roosevelt to Stalin January – June 1943."

unfavorably portrayed in comparison to its Iranian and Siberian-Pacific counterparts.⁴³⁵

While the two other major Soviet Lend-Lease routes have long been known to scholars as having supplied a larger total amount of material aid to Stalin's war effort, the question of the Arctic convoys' contribution to Moscow's survival during the war's most trying moments appears to have received little attention. Roosevelt's initial success in selling Lend-Lease to the American public and Congress resulted in many ways from his definition of the program as a defensive effort to serve U.S. interests by arming and feeding others already resisting Axis aggression. Naturally, the president and his closest associates appear to have had a much broader definition of "defense" than many Americans at the time, viewing the continued supplying of Stalin after 1943 as a crucial part of their strategic approach to Hitler's total defeat while saving American lives. Yet the Arctic convoys that delivered between 1,530,000 and 1,630,000 tons of Lend-Lease material between 1942 and 1943 may have served the practical purpose of ensuring the Soviet Union's defense, effectively rendering subsequent aid unnecessary and excessive from a sensible standpoint.⁴³⁶

The Arctic convoys to the Soviet Union's northern European ports at Archangel and Murmansk that Churchill launched in August 1941 with the successful "Dervish" voyage quickly increased in importance and gained momentum as larger convoys began sailing following the U.S. entry into the war.⁴³⁷ According to Alexander Hill and Steven Zaloga, while initial British

⁴³⁵ Geust, "Aircraft Deliveries to the Soviet Union,"; Hill, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, 185; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 420, 422, 518-519; Van Tuyl, *Feeding the Bear*, 26-28; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 25-27.

⁴³⁶ Dunn, *The Soviet Economy and the Red Army*, 80-81; Hill, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, 185; *The National Archives of the UK, C. B. 3305 (4) Naval Staff History*, 129-130; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 25-27; Whitehall History Publishing – Ministry of Defence, *The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys: A Naval Staff History*, ed. Malcolm Llewelyn-Jones (London: Routledge, 2007), x-xii.

⁴³⁷ *The National Archives of the UK, C. B. 3305 (4) Naval Staff History*, 5; Wragg, *Sacrifice for Stalin*, 65-66.

aid shipments may have supplied the Red Army with little equipment overall, London's naval forces managed to deliver enough tanks and aircraft to help fortify Moscow's defenses in late 1941.⁴³⁸ Due to the massive losses suffered by Soviet forces in the months following Hitler's attack, these deliveries appear to have contributed considerably to the Red Army's defense of the Soviet capital as further indicated by Stalin's late 1941 pleas to Churchill, Roosevelt, and Hopkins. As emphasized by Sean McMeekin, Stalin's Siberian divisions that he rushed to the Moscow front upon learning of Tojo's coming attack on Pearl Harbor subsequently spearheaded the Red Army's successful counterattack with significant help from these Lend-Lease deliveries.⁴³⁹

By 12 October 1941, the 126th Fighter Air Regiment of the Red Army Air Forces under Viktor Naidenko had been equipped with U.S.-supplied P-40 attack aircraft, and Soviet pilots subsequently employed these planes in helping the Red Army maintain the "Road of Life" supply line to Leningrad as Nazi forces besieged the city.⁴⁴⁰ British Matilda and Valentine tanks and U.S. M3 Stuart tanks also began to reinforce Stalin's depleted armored divisions late in the year and, although still serving as only a fraction of the Red Army's tank park, served the Soviet commanders' immediate needs in somewhat replenishing their severe losses in armor.⁴⁴¹ While these vehicles alone, like the U.S. P-40s and British Hurricane fighter planes, cannot be said to have won the Battle of Moscow, they appear to have helped the Red Army's commanders to

⁴³⁸ Hill, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, 172-173, 174-176; Zaloga, *Soviet Lend-Lease Tanks*, 6-8.

⁴³⁹ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 376-377.

⁴⁴⁰ Hill, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, 174-176; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 381-383; George Mellinger, *Soviet Lend-Lease Fighter Aces of World War II* (Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2006), 25, 26-27.

⁴⁴¹ Alexander Hill, "British 'Lend-Lease' Tanks and the Battle for Moscow, November-December 1941 – A Research Note," *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Vol. 19, Issue 2 (September 2006), 289-294, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13518040600697811>; Loza, *Commanding the Red Army's Sherman Tanks*, xvii-xviii, 41-43; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 381-383; Zaloga, *Soviet Lend-Lease Tanks*, 6-8, 18-20, 22-24.

compensate for appalling losses as the Soviet premier himself indicated.⁴⁴² Soviet tank crews manning their British tanks appear to have contributed to some of the crucial actions in the fighting as the Battle of Moscow raged in the first weeks of December 1941, suffering a loss of seventy-seven of these vehicles from a total of 182.⁴⁴³

In early 1942, the crucial year in which Stalin's soldiers began irreversibly repulsing the Nazi invaders as emphasized by Dr. Robert Citino in *Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942*, Roosevelt acted decisively to ensure that Soviet Lend-Lease received top priority.⁴⁴⁴ Alleging that Soviet needs were not being met by U.S. war production, the president scoldingly wrote to his war agency directors on 7 March ordering that all aid requested by Stalin for the First Protocol period be prepared and shipped immediately, "regardless of the effect of these shipments on any other part of our war program."⁴⁴⁵ Roosevelt thereby created a situation in which Lend-Lease officials had only to mention his order to their subordinates to ensure that Soviet aid shipments received immediate prioritization, and between April and June 1942 forty-four U.S. Liberty ships delivered 300,000 tons of material to North Russia.⁴⁴⁶

On 16 March 1942, Roosevelt informed Stalin of the desperate action that he and his senior Lend-Lease advisers had taken to prioritize the Red Army's battlefield needs and fulfill

⁴⁴² Ibid.; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 10," 3 September 1941, 20-22, "No. 20: "Personal Message from Premier Stalin to Prime Minister Churchill," 8 November 1941, 33-34, "No. 22: Message from Premier Stalin to Prime Minister Churchill," 23 November 1941, 35-36, "No. 4: J. V. Stalin to F. Roosevelt," 3 October 1941, and "No. 6: J. V. Stalin to F. Roosevelt," 4 November 1941; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 40-41, 67-68, 72-73, Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 327-330, 337-341, 387-388; 396-398.

⁴⁴³ Hill, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, 174-176; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 381-383; Zaloga, *Soviet Lend-Lease Tanks*, 6-8.

⁴⁴⁴ Robert M. Citino, *Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007), 152-153, 180-182.

⁴⁴⁵ Deane, *The Strange Alliance*, 89; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 403-405, 407-409; Stettinius, Jr., *Lend-Lease*, 229; U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, 13-15, 16-17.

⁴⁴⁶ Office, Chief of Finance War Department, "Lend-Lease Shipments World War II,"; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 544-546; Stettinius, *Lend-Lease*, 230-232.

the Soviet premier's First Protocol orders of war material. Seeking to assure the Soviet dictator that his requests were not going unanswered in Washington and thereby preempt any possibility, however remote, of a second Brest-Litovsk, Roosevelt promised Stalin that, "we are going to bend every possible effort to move these supplies to your battle lines."⁴⁴⁷ After receiving no reply from his Soviet counterpart, possibly an intentional move by Stalin, Roosevelt again wrote the Kremlin leader on 12 April, lamenting the fact that they had not yet met in person and describing such a meeting as being, "of the utmost military importance."⁴⁴⁸ Perhaps sensing Roosevelt's desperation to keep the Red Army fighting and avoid a repeat of March 1918, Stalin briefly replied on 20 April with an offer to send Molotov to Washington in May, thus refusing to meet him as an equal and fueling his fears.⁴⁴⁹

On 4 May, Roosevelt expressed to Stalin his regret at the difficulties faced by the Arctic convoys as Hitler's admirals, upon discovering the potential dangers to Berlin's eastern campaign being posed by the Allied ships sailing supplies to North Russia, had begun targeting them.⁴⁵⁰ Nevertheless, he promised his Soviet ally, "that no effort will be spared to get as many ships off as possible," before thanking him for warmly receiving Admiral William Standley as U.S. Ambassador in Moscow and vowing to fully accommodate Molotov at the White House.⁴⁵¹ Seeking to obtain more unconditional U.S. aid by keeping Roosevelt concerned that he may

⁴⁴⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 16: His Excellency Joseph Stalin, President of the Soviet of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.," 16 March 1942, 22.

⁴⁴⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 17: Personal Message from the President to Mr. Stalin," 12 April 1942, 22-23; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 96-97.

⁴⁴⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 18: J. V. Stalin F. Roosevelt," 20 April 1942, 23-24; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 98.

⁴⁵⁰ Campbell and MacIntyre, *The Kola Run*, 19-21; Wragg, *Sacrifice for Stalin*, 67-68.

⁴⁵¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., "No 19: For Mr. Stalin," 4 May 1942, 24; U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Roosevelt to Stalin May – December 1942," Molotov and Chuev, *Molotov Remembers*, 1-3, 41-43, 52-53.

forge a separate peace with Hitler, Stalin replied only on 15 May, the latest date by which he had promised Molotov's departure, blaming inclement weather for the Foreign Commissar's delayed journey and urging the Anglo-American leaders to maintain the convoys despite the dangers.⁴⁵² Despite Ambassador Standley's proposals to open a Lend-Lease air route between Alaska and Siberia and the efforts of Roosevelt and Churchill to expand the Persian Corridor's capacity, Stalin repeatedly insisted on the vital necessity of maintaining the Arctic route to North Russia, and his Western Allies, haunted by Brest-Litovsk, obliged to keep the Red Army fighting.⁴⁵³

As more U.S. and Panamanian merchant vessels arrived to participate in delivering Lend-Lease material to North Russia in January and February 1942, British Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet Admiral Sir John Tovey, to whom Churchill had entrusted the protection of the Arctic convoys, labored to provide naval forces for their defense. On 12 March 1942, the fifteen merchant ships and one oiler of Convoy PQ-12 arrived safely in Murmansk after narrowly avoiding an encounter with the feared German battleship *Tirpitz* that Hitler had ordered to Trondheim, Norway.⁴⁵⁴ Shortly after the success of PQ-12 and the fifteen homebound ships of QP-8, with the lone exception of, "the straggler *Ijora*" being sunk by the Nazi destroyer *Friedrich Ihn* according to the British Naval Staff's history, the Arctic convoys faced growing dangers beginning in March 1942.⁴⁵⁵

⁴⁵² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 20: J. V. Stalin to F. Roosevelt," 15 May 1942, 24-25; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 110; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 544-546.

⁴⁵³ Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, "Texts of Roosevelt-Churchill Messages," *The New York Times*, 12 June 1972, [⁴⁵⁴ Campbell and MacIntyre, *The Kola Run*, 19-21, 22, 24-26; Brian B. Schofield, *The Russian Convoys* \(London: B. T. Batsford, 1964\), 43-45, 47-48; *The National Archives of the UK, C. B. 3305 \(4\) Naval Staff History*, 3, 5-7, 17-19, 21-22.](https://www.nytimes.com/1972/06/12/archives/texts-of-roosevel Churchill-messages.html#:~:text=Letter%20by%20Roosevelt%20to%20Churchill%2C%20March%2018%2C%201942%3A,either%20your%20Foreign%20Office%20or%20my%20State%20Department; Standley and Ageton, <i>Admiral Ambassador to Russia</i>, 154, 248; Walling, <i>Forgotten Sacrifice</i>, 121-122.</p></div><div data-bbox=)

⁴⁵⁵ *The National Archives of the UK, C. B. 3305 (4) Naval Staff History*, 13-15.

Yet despite Allied fears of raids by Hitler's surface vessels, the German Navy remained somewhat limited in its northern operations due to Grand Admiral Erich Raeder and Vice Admiral Otto Ciliak's concerns that deploying *Tirpitz* and their other precious, rare surface vessels exposed them to great dangers for little gain.⁴⁵⁶ Following PQ-12's success, the two men advocated for the continued use of *Tirpitz* and other surface ships in their primary role of coastal defense in the event of an Allied invasion of Norway, and Hitler subsequently ordered further interdiction raids against the Arctic convoys to be executed primarily by submarines and aircraft. Nazi *Reichsmarschall* Hermann Goering subsequently deployed more of the German Air Force's He-111 and Ju-88 bombers and torpedo planes to occupied Norway to target the Allied vessels, and Hitler demanded that construction on the planned aircraft carrier *Graf Zeppelin* be intensified, the latter task ending in a futile, vain effort.⁴⁵⁷

Laboring to prioritize Soviet Lend-Lease deliveries and keep the Red Army armed and fighting as Stalin's soldiers continued clashing with the Nazi invaders during the fierce spring engagements, Roosevelt and Navy Secretary Knox deployed Task Force 99 for Arctic convoy escort duty in April 1942.⁴⁵⁸ Consisting of the cruiser USS *Tuscaloosa* and the destroyers USS *Emmons*, USS *Rodman*, HMS *Onslaught*, HMS *Martin*, and HMS *Marne*, Task Force 99 executed key support operations for the convoys. Admiral Tovey later lamented the *Tuscaloosa*'s return to the United States and the subsequent cancelation of Task Force 99,

⁴⁵⁶ Schofield, *The Russian Convoys*, 43-45, 47-48; *The National Archives of the UK, C. B. 3305 (4) Naval Staff History*, 21-22; Walling, *Forgotten Sacrifice*, 52-53, 55.

⁴⁵⁷ Leonard Mosley, *The Reich Marshal: A Biography of Hermann Goering* (New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1975), 350-353, 355-359; Schofield, *The Russian Convoys*, 37-38, 39-41, 43-44, 51-53; *The National Archives of the UK, C. B. 3305 (4) Naval Staff History*, 21-22.

⁴⁵⁸ Georges Blond, *Ordeal Below Zero: The Heroic Story of the Arctic Convoys in World War II* (London: Souvenir Press, 1959), 24-26; *The National Archives of the UK, C. B. 3305 (4) Naval Staff History*, 72-73; Walling, *Forgotten Sacrifice*, 44, 56-57.

recalling, “This force had provided a welcome reinforcement to the Home Fleet at a time when its strength was much reduced.”⁴⁵⁹ Describing U.S. Vice Admiral Robert C. Giffen as, “a loyal and enthusiastic colleague,” Tovey assessed the force’s men as, “admirable” in their tenacity, their sinking of the Nazi minelayer *Ulm* on 24 August, and their successful delivery of two squadrons of Hampden fighter aircraft to Archangel in support of Convoy PQ-18.⁴⁶⁰

While many convoys successfully repulsed the Germans with depth charges, carrier-based aircraft, and deck cannon fire during the winter, the constant daylight during the Arctic summer months enabled the attackers to strike for more prolonged periods.⁴⁶¹ In the late spring of 1942, Nazi bombers struck Convoy PQ-16 for five days, sinking eight ships while the remaining twenty-four arrived and unloaded safely at Murmansk and Archangel on 30 May.⁴⁶² Between 4 and 9 July, Convoy PQ-17 under Captain Jack Broome suffered a loss of twenty-three ships carrying 57,176 tons of cargo during another five days of Nazi submarine and air assaults. The cargo lost totaled 430 tanks, 3,350 trucks, jeeps, and other transport vehicles, and 210 aircraft in addition to 153 men killed at a time in which every vehicle mattered as the Red Army struggled against Hitler’s ongoing offensive aimed at Stalingrad and the Caucasus.⁴⁶³

⁴⁵⁹ *The National Archives of the UK, C. B. 3305 (4) Naval Staff History*, 72-73.

⁴⁶⁰ The German Naval Staff, “War Diary: German Naval Staff Operations Division September 1942,” *Internet Archive*, https://archive.org/stream/wardiarygermann371942germ/wardiarygermann371942germ_djvu.txt; *The National Archives of the UK, C. B. 3305 (4) Naval Staff History*, 72-73.

⁴⁶¹ Campbell and MacIntyre, *The Kola Run*, 36-37, 41-42; Mason, *Arctic Warriors*, 103; Schofield, *The Russian Convoys*, 64-66; Walling, *Forgotten Sacrifice*, 128-129.

⁴⁶² Blond, *Ordeal Below Zero*, 66-67, 69-71; Schofield, *The Russian Convoys*, 69-71, 72-74; Walling, *Forgotten Sacrifice*, 149-150.

⁴⁶³ British Admiralty, “Supplement to The London Gazette of Friday, 13th October, 1950: Convoys to North Russia, 1942,” *The London Gazette*, 17 October 1950, <https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/LondonGazette/39041.pdf>; Broome, *Convoy is to Scatter*, 190-191, 206-207; Mark Lardas, *Arctic Convoys 1942: The Luftwaffe Cuts Russia’s Lifeline* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2022), 4-7, 60-61; The New York Times (Unattributed Report), “U.S. Freighters in Convoy,” *The New York Times*, 9 July 1942, <https://www.nytimes.com/1942/07/09/archives/us-freighters-in-convoy.html>; Walling, *Forgotten Sacrifice*, 166-167, 169-171; Richard Woodman, *Arctic Convoys 1941-1945* (London: John Murray Ltd., 1994), 258.

PQ-17's massive losses appear to have resulted in many ways from a communication in which Admiralty officials in London mistakenly stated that the convoy faced imminent attack from the Nazi battleship *Tirpitz* and its potent cruiser and destroyer escort forces and ordered the convoy to, "scatter."⁴⁶⁴ Following naval procedure and in full compliance with London's orders, Captain Broome obediently and bravely prepared his men to face the perceived oncoming threat from *Tirpitz* and its destroyer escorts while ordering the merchantmen to proceed to North Russia. The Admiralty's order for Broome to scatter the convoy, conceived in an atmosphere of uncertainty and nervousness due to the *Tirpitz*'s mere presence in Norwegian waters and London's fear of losing too many U.S. vessels, inadvertently exposed the merchant ships to the real danger of air and submarine attack.⁴⁶⁵ Due to *Tirpitz*'s brief, earlier action against PQ-12, the Admiralty does not appear to have been aware of Hitler's subsequent reluctance to again expose his few surface ships, and as Broome's men courageously prepared to face the Nazi battleship, Nazi submarines and aircraft struck the exposed merchantmen.⁴⁶⁶

Writing in his war diary about three weeks after PQ-17's disastrous journey, Soviet Northern Fleet Admiral Arseni Golovko stated that London had alerted Moscow on 4 July that the *Tirpitz* and the cruiser *Admiral Hipper* had left their base at Trondheim, Norway after Nazi reconnaissance aircraft had discovered the convoy.⁴⁶⁷ While both German warships and their

⁴⁶⁴ Broome, *Convoy is to Scatter*, 190-191, 206-207; Campbell and MacIntyre, *The Kola Run*, 87-89; Charlie Erswell and John R. McKay, *Surviving the Arctic Convoys: The Wartime Memoir of Leading Seaman Charlie Erswell* (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Maritime, 2021), 33-34; Lardas, *Arctic Convoys 1942*, 64-66, 72-73; The New York Times, "U.S. Freighters in Convoy,"; Walling, *Forgotten Sacrifice*, 169-171; Woodman, *Arctic Convoys 1941-1945*, 259-262.

⁴⁶⁵ British Admiralty, "Supplement to The London Gazette,"; Broome, *Convoy is to Scatter*, 190-191, 206-207; Erswell and McKay, *Surviving the Arctic Convoys*, 33-34; Schofield, *The Russian Convoys*, 79-80, 83-84, 85, 87-88, 91-92; Walling, *Forgotten Sacrifice*, 172-173.

⁴⁶⁶ Broome, *Convoy is to Scatter*, 190-191, 206-207, 209-210; Erswell and McKay, *Surviving the Arctic Convoys*, 34-35; Lardas, *Arctic Convoys 1942*, 64-66, 72-73; The New York Times, "U.S. Freighters in Convoy."

⁴⁶⁷ Arseni G. Golovko, *With the Red Fleet: The War Memoirs of the Late Arseni G. Golovko*, ed. Sir Aubrey Mansergh, trans. Peter Broomfield (London: Putnam, 1965), 96-97, 98-100.

accompanying escort destroyers are said to have had initially been assigned to attacking PQ-17, somewhat justifying the concerns of Churchill's admirals both in London and at sea, they were quickly redirected to Altenfjord, Norway. This fact, initially unknown either to the Admiralty or to Hero of the Soviet Union Captain Nikolai Lunin, whose submarine *K-21* bravely set out to intercept the Nazi warships, appears to have influenced the Admiralty's decision to scatter the convoy.⁴⁶⁸ After firing four torpedoes in a daring but unsuccessful attack on the *Tirpitz*, Lunin observed that the German battleship and its escort force of two cruisers and seven destroyers appeared to be changing course away from PQ-17 on 5 July, by which point Broome and his comrades had received London's order.⁴⁶⁹

The heavy losses incurred during the relentless German attacks on PQ-17 forced Churchill, at the British Admiralty's urging and against Roosevelt's wishes, to temporarily halt all further Arctic convoys in the remaining summer months of 1942.⁴⁷⁰ Churchill's decision angered Stalin, and the Soviet premier immediately expressed his frustration, ridiculing the Royal Navy's performance and minimizing its sacrifices in delivering the material in comparison to the Red Army's suffering.⁴⁷¹ In the late summer, Roosevelt began urging Churchill and Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, the latter man having always taken a rather dim view of the Arctic route, to accept the likelihood of further losses and to resume the convoys to North Russia.

While the Anglo-American Allies diplomatically wrangled with Stalin's constant complaints

⁴⁶⁸ Golovko, *With the Red Fleet*, 102-103; Lardas, *Arctic Convoys 1942*, 64-66, 72-73.

⁴⁶⁹ Golovko, *With the Red Fleet*, 103-105, 107-109; The New York Times, "U.S. Freighters in Convoy."

⁴⁷⁰ UK Prime Minister, "Former Naval Person to President: Personal and Secret," 14 July 1942, *Churchill Archive for Schools*, <https://www.churchillarchiveforschools.com/themes/the-themes/key-events-and-developments-in-world-history/was-churchill-really-worried-about-the-battle-of-the-atlantic-and-if-so-why/the-sources/source-8>.

⁴⁷¹ Alanbrooke, *War Diaries*, 254; Deane, *The Strange Alliance*, 109; Golovko, *With the Red Fleet*, 107-109; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 56: W. Churchill to J. V. Stalin," 18 July 1942, 52-55 and "No. 57: Message from Premier Stalin to Prime Minister Churchill," 23 July 1942; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 124-127, 129; Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 157.

about the Royal Navy, U.S. tank quality, and his need for aluminum, food, trucks, and “pursuit planes,” Soviet General Vasili Chuikov’s 62nd Army fought tenaciously as the Nazi troops and tanks of General Friedrich von Paulus’s 6th Army stormed into Stalingrad.⁴⁷²

Despite Berlin’s attempts at interdiction, the vast majority of Lend-Lease convoys operating along the Arctic route successfully reached Murmansk, Molotovsk, and Archangel, delivering thousands of tanks, planes, trucks, and jeeps for the Red Army and Red Army Air Forces’ operations.⁴⁷³ In 1944, Edward Stettinius proudly reported that many U.S. Liberty ships carrying Lend-Lease supplies had arrived safely alongside their British and Canadian counterparts, stating that, “Enough supplies did get to [North] Russia, however, to be of real value in the summer fighting of 1942” including 2,000 tanks and 1,300 planes delivered by June.⁴⁷⁴ In addition to weaponry, the ships delivered food and raw materials such as eggs, meat, wheat, steel, aluminum, and machine tools produced in American farms and factories as U.S.

⁴⁷² Alanbrooke, *War Diaries*, 285-286; Chuikov, *The Battle for Stalingrad*, 116-120, 194; Churchill, *Memoirs*, 478-479; Glantz and House, *When Titans Clashed*, 143-147, 171-172, 176-177, 186-187, 190; Hellbeck, *Stalingrad*, 87-88, 138-139; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin’s Correspondence*, “No. 58: Prime Minister to Premier Stalin,” 31 July 1942, 57; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 132-133; Roosevelt and Churchill, “Texts of Roosevelt-Churchill Messages,”; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 545; Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 307; U.S. President, “Map Room Papers Box 8 Stalin to Roosevelt July – December 1942,”; Werth, *Russia at War*, 148-149, 152-153, 171, 243, 249-252. In these communications with Roosevelt, Stalin repeatedly called attention to the Red Army Air Forces’ preference for the U.S. P-39, rating the “Aircobra [sic]” favorably in comparison to other attack aircraft.

⁴⁷³ Mason, *Arctic Warriors*, 155; The New York Times (Unattributed Report), “SOVIET HAILS VICTORY OF MURMANSK CONVOY; Russians Guard Allied Vessels in Air and Sea Fight,” *The New York Times*, 20 July 1942, <https://www.nytimes.com/1942/07/20/archives/soviet-hails-victory-of-murmansk-convoy-russians-guard-allied.html>; Walling, *Forgotten Sacrifice*, 270-271.

⁴⁷⁴ Stettinius, Jr., *Lend-Lease*, 230-232; U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, 9-12, 13-15, 16-17. As further clarified by Roosevelt’s former speechwriter Robert Sherwood, a close friend of Hopkins, eighty-four Liberty ships reportedly left U.S. ports for North Russia between April and June 1942 after the president’s urgent directive in March, carrying 522,000 tons of supplies on board. Inclement weather is said to have forced some of the ships to either return or to temporarily dock in British ports, while vicious enemy attacks also inflicted losses. Yet forty-four Liberty ships successfully sailed with the spring convoys and delivered much of the material, safely bringing 300,000 tons of Lend-Lease cargo from the United States to the North Russian ports by the end of the First Protocol period on 30 June 1942, while the men of the very large Convoy PQ-18 and its successors in the JW series of Arctic convoys subsequently delivered more material between late 1942 and early 1943, much of which arrived safely, fueling the Red Army’s ongoing fight. See McMeekin, *Stalin’s War*, 403-405, 407-409; and Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 544-546.

war production soared and Roosevelt and Hopkins spared no effort to aid Stalin while preventing a separate peace between Moscow and Berlin.⁴⁷⁵

Despite PQ-17's horrific losses and Churchill's agreement with the Admiralty's decision to immediately suspend the Arctic convoys, Roosevelt and Hopkins came to Stalin's aid as the Red Army faced Hitler's most merciless offensives in the Nazi drive on Stalingrad in late summer and fall 1942.⁴⁷⁶ Fretting over Brest-Litovsk's shadow as Stalin's demands for either a resumption of, "the northern [convoy] route" or the opening of a second front grew in desperation, the American president began urging the British prime minister to resume the convoys, stating, "the Russians are today killing more Germans and destroying more equipment than you and I put together."⁴⁷⁷ The two great Western leaders also redoubled their efforts to improve the supply flow through Iran and Alaska, yet Stalin's insistence that neither route could substitute for the deliveries to North Russia soon led them to resume the convoys as the Stalingrad bloodbath raged daily.⁴⁷⁸ Their desire to ensure Hitler's total defeat and prevent Stalin's overthrow or a Nazi-Soviet peace, events that could easily have spelled doom for their strategic total war approach to vanquishing Germany, led the U.S. and British leaders to launch a convoy even larger than PQ-17 in August 1942.⁴⁷⁹

⁴⁷⁵ Sokolov, *The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War*, 53-55; Stettinius, Jr., *Lend-Lease*, 249, 252; Van Tuyl, *Feeding the Bear*, 83.

⁴⁷⁶ Chuikov, *The Battle for Stalingrad*, 116-120, 194; Craig, *Enemy at the Gates*, 102-103, 106-107, 140-143; Hellbeck, *Stalingrad*, 98-102, 117-125; Werth, *Russia at War*, 152-153, 157, 162-164.

⁴⁷⁷ Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 94, 96; Roosevelt and Churchill, "Texts of Roosevelt-Churchill Messages,"; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 545; U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Stalin to Roosevelt July – December 1942."

⁴⁷⁸ Glantz and House, *When Titans Clashed*, 143-147, 171-172, 176-177, 186-187, 190.

⁴⁷⁹ Erswell and McKay, *Surviving the Arctic Convoys*, 34-35; Roosevelt and Churchill, "Texts of Roosevelt-Churchill Messages,"; U.S. President, U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Stalin to Roosevelt July – December 1942,"; Dwight Jon Zimmerman, "Lend-Lease to Russia: The Persian Corridor," *DefenseMediaNetwork*, 8 November 2012, <https://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/lend-lease-to-russia-the-persian-corridor/>.

In an indication of the Anglo-American leadership's respective desire to assure Stalin of their commitment and keep him from forging a separate peace, Churchill flew to Moscow for a meeting with the Soviet leader on 14 August 1942 in a show of Allied solidarity as Red Army General Georgi Zhukov and his subordinates faced Hitler's Stalingrad offensive.⁴⁸⁰ Despite this public, political display of support, tensions ran deep between the two leaders as Churchill informed Stalin that he and Roosevelt could not open a "second front" in Europe at any point in 1942.⁴⁸¹ The Soviet premier angrily reminded the prime minister of Roosevelt's promise of a second front in 1942 to Molotov during the Foreign Commissar's White House visit in May, yet he carefully neglected to mention that Moscow had declined the offer after the president stated that such an effort required a reduction in Soviet Lend-Lease aid.⁴⁸² After delivering the news of the Arctic convoys' planned resumption and the planning of Operation *Torch* in North Africa, Churchill enjoyed an impromptu Kremlin dinner with Stalin and his daughter Svetlana before departing for London and privately denouncing the Soviet premier to his bodyguards.⁴⁸³

Under the command of Rear Admiral Edye K. Boddam-Whetham, the forty merchant ships and four naval auxiliaries of Convoy PQ-18 departed from Loch Ewe on 2 September 1942 and joined with several Fighting Escort Groups totaling seventy-six British warships sailing from Reykjavik, Iceland.⁴⁸⁴ As described by Michael Walling in *Forgotten Sacrifice: The Arctic Convoys of World War II*, Admiral Tovey called Churchill's attention to the irony in PQ-18's

⁴⁸⁰ Chuikov, *The Battle for Stalingrad*, 125-126, 157-162, 175; Glantz and House, *When Titans Clashed*, 143-147, 171-172, 176-177, 186-187, 190; Hellbeck, *Stalingrad*, 173, 181.

⁴⁸¹ David Carlton, *Churchill and the Soviet Union* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 101-102.

⁴⁸² McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 407-408; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 112-113.

⁴⁸³ Carlton, *Churchill and the Soviet Union*, 101-102.

⁴⁸⁴ Mason, *Arctic Warriors*, 11-12, 13-15; Peter C. Smith, *Arctic Victory: The Story of Convoy PQ 18* (London: William Kimber & Co. Limited, 1975), 31; Walling, *Forgotten Sacrifice*, 213-215; Woodman, *Arctic Convoys 1941-1945*, 262-264.

freighters carrying the most advanced Hurricane fighters to Stalin while its lone aircraft carrier *Avenger* boasted only twelve older models and three Swordfish planes for defense.⁴⁸⁵ On 12 September, eight Nazi submarines struck but quickly withdrew after 9:00 p.m. under fire from the *Avenger's* aircraft and after the sinking of *U-88* by HMS *Faulknor* as recalled by Royal Navy veteran Charlie Erswell in his 2021 memoir.⁴⁸⁶

The enemy submarines struck again the next day and sank the Soviet freighter *Stalingrad* and the U.S. oil tanker *Oliver Ellsworth*, and a swarm of eighty-five Ju-88 and He-111 torpedo aircraft emptied their lethal loads in a fanatical attack at close range that proved suicidal for several bombers as flames spewed by the destroyers' guns danced across the sky.⁴⁸⁷ As the courageous crews of HMS *Offa* and HMT *St. Kenen* struggled to rescue as many survivors as possible from the sinking Allied ships, the attackers regrouped to refocus their efforts on striking the convoy's escort vessels. On the following day at 12:35 p.m., two groups totaling more than twenty German torpedo bombers focused their respective assaults against the *Avenger* and the cruiser HMS *Scylla* in an unsuccessful attack resulting in eleven Nazi aircraft downed and no Allied losses. The crews of HMS *Ulster Queen*, HMS *Wheatland*, and HMS *Wilton* executed a tenacious defense alongside the *Avenger's* pilots that managed to quickly scramble into the sky and repulse many Nazi aircraft despite the enemy's successful avoidance of radar detection by sweeping in low.⁴⁸⁸

⁴⁸⁵ Erswell and McKay, *Surviving the Arctic Convoys*, 38-39; Mason, *Arctic Warriors*, 54-55; Walling, *Forgotten Sacrifice*, 213-215.

⁴⁸⁶ Erswell and McKay, *Surviving the Arctic Convoys*, 43-44; Smith, *Arctic Victory*, 11-12; The German Naval Staff, "War Diary,"; Walling, *Forgotten Sacrifice*, 213-215; Woodman, *Arctic Convoys 1941-1945*, 262-264.

⁴⁸⁷ Walling, *Forgotten Sacrifice*, 213-215.

⁴⁸⁸ Erswell and McKay, *Surviving the Arctic Convoys*, 44-45; Lardas, *Arctic Convoys 1942*, 74-75; Smith, *Arctic Victory*, 192-193; Woodman, *Arctic Convoys 1941-1945*, 264-265, 266; *The National Archives of the UK, C. B. 3305 (4) Naval Staff History*, 78-79.

According to the British Naval Staff's postwar report housed at the British National Archives, Kew, Allied radar, having improved since the PQ-17 disaster, quickly warned of another bombing raid by a squadron of twelve Ju-88s shortly after 1:00 p.m., narrowly saving the *Avenger's* crew from a direct hit.⁴⁸⁹ A subsequent attack by twenty-five torpedo aircraft resulted in the sinking of SS *Mary Luckenbach* and the loss of three Hurricanes whose pilots were quickly rescued from the frigid Arctic waters by destroyer crews. Beginning at 12:45 p.m. on 15 September, roughly fifty Nazi aircraft repeatedly swept over PQ-18 for about three hours, menacing the convoy with bombs but failing to strike any ships as the escort gunners and fighter pilots mounted an effective, defiant defense, downing three German planes.⁴⁹⁰ The Nazis also lost the submarine *U-457* to fire from HMS *Impulsive* that day, prompting German Group Command North to withdraw and refocus its eleven remaining submarines in the area on the homebound convoy QP-14 that suffered a loss of several ships and a Catalina aircraft.⁴⁹¹

Two days after the Soviet destroyers *Gremyashchi* and *Sokrushitelni* relieved Rear Admiral Burnett of escort duty as he withdrew the *Scylla*, HMS *Alynbank*, *Avenger*, and the submarines *P-614* and *P-615* to assist QP-14 on the afternoon of 16 September, Nazi forces made a desperate, final effort to deprive Stalin's Red Army of PQ-18's precious cargo.⁴⁹² At 8:20 a.m. on the morning of 18 September 1942, twelve Nazi torpedo bombers and several Ju-88s struck at the convoy's flanks for slightly more than two hours, eventually sinking the U.S.

⁴⁸⁹ Landas, *Arctic Convoys 1942*, 74-75; Mason, *Arctic Warriors*, 71-73; *The National Archives of the UK, C. B. 3305 (4) Naval Staff History*, 80-81.

⁴⁹⁰ Erswell and McKay, *Surviving the Arctic Convoys*, 52-53; Smith, *Arctic Victory*, 192-193; Woodman, *Arctic Convoys 1941-1945*, 267-270; *The National Archives of the UK, C. B. 3305 (4) Naval Staff History*, 80-81.

⁴⁹¹ Schofield, *The Russian Convoys*, 116-117; The German General Staff, "War Diary,"; *The National Archives of the UK, C. B. 3305 (4) Naval Staff History*, 80-81, 82-83; Woodman, *Arctic Convoys 1941-1945*, 267-270.

⁴⁹² Mason, *Arctic Warriors*, 87-89, 90; Smith, *Arctic Victory*, 194-196; Woodman, *Arctic Convoys 1941-1945*, 271-272, 273-275.

Liberty ship *SS Kentucky* and retreating after suffering a loss of four aircraft. Two days later, twelve Ju-88s launched an unsuccessful hour-long assault as PQ-18, despite losing one-third of its ships, neared Archangel that afternoon with vast amounts of material. Despite the best efforts of Hitler's admirals to repeat their brutal assault on PQ-17, the men of PQ-18 persevered and repulsed repeated enemy air and submarine assaults and docked safely at Archangel's harbor on 21 September 1942.⁴⁹³

The twenty-eight surviving freighters of PQ-18 delivered a crucial amount of the specific materials that Stalin had urged Roosevelt to prioritize in Anglo-American aid shipments, ranging from attack aircraft and trucks to food, machine tools, and raw materials.⁴⁹⁴ British sailor Leonard H. Thomas marveled in his diary at the colossal crates of food being brought ashore from the U.S. Liberty ship *SS Patrick Henry*, stating, "every time we looked at her she seemed to be unloading food from the endless stocks she had in her."⁴⁹⁵ In his diary, British merchant mariner Alfred Grossmith Mason also recorded his amazement as Soviet stevedores and crane drivers unloaded an army's worth of weaponry from the *SS Empire Baffin* alone, the vessel on which he served. Recalling the sight of, "Bren carriers, large and small tanks, troop carriers, and heavy duty wagons" emerging from the ship alongside carefully-crated aircraft, Mason described the ship as, "a huge, floating Pandora's box" from which an endless stream of arms and ordnance flowed.⁴⁹⁶

⁴⁹³ Blond, *Ordeal Below Zero*, 149-150; Landas, *Arctic Convoys 1942*, 82-83; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 419-420, 422; Smith, *Arctic Victory*, 197-199, 201-202; The German Naval Staff, "War Diary,"; *The National Archives of the UK*, C. B. 3305 (4) *Naval Staff History*, 80-81; Woodman, *Arctic Convoys 1941-1945*, 276-280, 282-283.

⁴⁹⁴ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 419-420, 422; Smith, *Arctic Victory*, 203-205; Sokolov, *The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War*, 53-55, 57-59; Woodman, *Arctic Convoys 1941-1945*, 276-280, 282-283.

⁴⁹⁵ Thomas, Leona J. *Through Ice and Fire: A Russian Arctic Convoy Diary, 1942*, (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Fonthill Media Limited, 2015), 147-148.

⁴⁹⁶ Mason, *Arctic Warriors*, 155-156.

In late December, Hitler's forces suffered another humiliating setback at the Battle of the Barents' Sea that appears to have significantly salted the wounds inflicted by their Stalingrad debacle and PQ-18's considerable role in boosting the Red Army's successful counterattack in the city.⁴⁹⁷ Anxious to keep Stalin's soldiers supplied, Roosevelt and Churchill launched Convoys JW-51A and JW-51B, with the former docking safely at Murmansk and Molotovsk on 25 December undetected and unmolested by the Nazis as Goering redeployed many aircraft from Norway to face Operation *Torch*, the Anglo-American landings in North Africa.⁴⁹⁸ As JW-51B entered the Barents' Sea near Norway's northern coast at 8:00 a.m. on 31 December, Vice Admiral Oskar Kummetz launched Operation *Regenbogen* (Rainbow) against the convoy's main body of ships on orders from the German Naval Staff, having learned of its existence from Nazi patrol pilots a week earlier. After spotting Kummetz's force, Captain Robert Sherbrooke of HMS *Onslow*, aided by the captains of HMS *Obdurate*, HMS *Obedient*, and HMS *Orwell* prepared to face the enemy while ordering HMS *Achates* to proceed ahead with the merchant ships.⁴⁹⁹

In a bold, calculating move, Sherbrooke and his comrades feigned a torpedo attack on the German warships, and Kummetz, fearing Hitler's wrath as the Nazi Fuehrer had warned him not to risk Germany's prized surface ships unnecessarily, swallowed the bait and ordered his

⁴⁹⁷ Hellbeck, *Stalingrad*, 173, 181; Stephen J. Thorne, "Hitler, Raeder, and the demise of the *Kriegsmarine*," *Legion: Canada's Military History Magazine*, 2 October 2019, <https://legionmagazine.com/en/hitler-raeder-and-the-demise-of-the-kriegsmarine/>.

⁴⁹⁸ K. C. Fraser, "73 North: The Battle of the Barents' Sea 1942," *Reference Reviews*, Vol. 14, No. 6 (1 June 2000), 14, <https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/rr.2000.14.6.14.281/full/html>; Landas, *Arctic Convoys 1942*, 4-7, 82-83, 84; Mosley, *The Reich Marshal*, 350-353, 353-355, 355-359; *The National Archives of the UK*, C. B. 3305 (4) *Naval Staff History*, 89-90; George Walker, "Fiasco in the Barents' Sea," *Naval History Magazine*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (April 2018), 14-17, <https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2018/april/contact>.

⁴⁹⁹ Schofield, *The Russian Convoys*, 132-135; Walling, *Forgotten Sacrifice*, 246-248.

Admiral Hipper to withdraw.⁵⁰⁰ After executing this cautionary maneuver, *Admiral Hipper's* crew resumed the attack on *Onslow*, damaging the ship, wounding Sherbrooke, and killing seventeen British sailors. Emboldened by this success, Kummets then sent *Admiral Hipper* and the Nazi destroyer *Friedrich Eckholdt* north, sinking the British minesweeper *Bramble*, which they had mistaken for a destroyer, and the *Achates*.⁵⁰¹ These attacks quickly caught the attention of the crews of HMS *Sheffield* and HMS *Jamaica*, and both cruisers then badly damaged *Admiral Hipper* in a surprise attack, forcing the Nazi warship into a desperate retreat.⁵⁰²

Mistaking the *Sheffield* for the *Admiral Hipper*, the German captains of *Friedrich Eckholdt* and *Richard Beitzen* attempted to get into formation with the British cruiser, only to find themselves being fired upon, with the former of the two Nazi vessels sinking.⁵⁰³ Attempting to strike JW-51B from the east and link up with *Admiral Hipper*, the Nazi destroyer *Luetzow* unexpectedly encountered the *Jamaica* and *Sheffield* before returning to base while its British foes rejoined their convoy and sailed with its fourteen merchant ships safely to North Russia.⁵⁰⁴ Enraged by his admirals' failure to interdict another important Arctic convoy as the Soviet bear's claws lashed von Paulus's encircled 6th Army at Stalingrad, Hitler threatened to enact an order to scrap Germany's surface fleet and force the German Navy to focus strictly on submarine

⁵⁰⁰ Blond, *Ordeal Below Zero*, 152-153; Campbell and MacIntyre, *The Kola Run*, 159-162; Fraser, "73 North," 14; *The National Archives of the UK, C. B. 3305 (4) Naval Staff History*, 92-94; Walker, "Fiasco in the Barents' Sea," 15-16."

⁵⁰¹ *The National Archives of the UK, C. B. 3305 (4) Naval Staff History*, 97-98.

⁵⁰² Campbell and MacIntyre, *The Kola Run*, 159-162; Fraser, "73 North,"; Schofield, *The Russian Convoys*, 132-135; Thorne, "Hitler, Raeder, and the demise of the *Kriegsmarine*,"; Walker, "Fiasco in the Barents' Sea," 15-16,"; Walling, *Forgotten Sacrifice*, 246-248.

⁵⁰³ Erswell and McKay, *Surviving the Arctic Convoys*, 93-95; *The National Archives of the UK, C. B. 3305 (4) Naval Staff History*, 101-102.

⁵⁰⁴ Blond, *Ordeal Below Zero*, 158-160; Campbell and MacIntyre, *The Kola Run*, 164-165; Fraser, "73 North,"; *The National Archives of the UK, C. B. 3305 (4) Naval Staff History*, 101-102; Walker, "Fiasco in the Barents' Sea," 15-16."

operations. In a further indication of the Arctic convoys' contribution to Moscow's war effort, he also accepted the resignation of Grand Admiral Raeder and replaced him with Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz following the battle, angered at his admirals' inability to prevent the flow of vital goods from sustaining Stalin's Red Army.⁵⁰⁵

On 17 January 1943, as Soviet Generals Zhukov and Chuikov continued grappling with their encircled Nazi foes in embattled Stalingrad, the crews of the forty-three total ships of Convoy JW-52 began their journey to Murmansk to deliver more Lend-Lease aid to the Red Army as Churchill and Roosevelt spared no effort to ensure a crippling defeat for Hitler.⁵⁰⁶ According to U.S. merchant mariner Herman Melton, then serving on the Liberty ship SS *Cornelius Harnett*, a Nazi BV-138 reconnaissance aircraft appeared on 23 January and escaped to report the convoy's position after attracting Allied anti-aircraft fire.⁵⁰⁷ Three He-115 torpedo bombers struck at the *Harnett* the next day and received a resounding rebuff at the hands of the ship's tenacious anti-aircraft gunners under the courageous leadership of Lieutenant Richard Stone boldly directing the men in firing their newly-installed 5"/38 caliber deck guns added in Philadelphia.⁵⁰⁸

JW-52's safe arrival in Murmansk on 27 January, followed by the success of Convoy JW-53 the following month, appears to demonstrate the Allies' ability to repulse Nazi air and

⁵⁰⁵ Blond, *Ordeal Below Zero*, 152-153, 161-163; Fraser, "73 North," 14; Pastorfield-Li, "An excerpt from an interview with a Soviet soldier,"; *The National Archives of the UK*, C. B. 3305 (4) *Naval Staff History*, 101-102; Stephen J. Thorne, "Raeder's defence: German admiral fights for his doomed fleet," *Legion: Canada's Military History Magazine*, 30 October 2019, <https://legionmagazine.com/en/raeders-defence-german-admiral-fights-for-his-doomed-fleet/>; Walker, "Fiasco in the Barents' Sea," 17.

⁵⁰⁶ Chuikov, *The Battle for Stalingrad*, 215-217, 227-229; Pastorfield-Li, "An excerpt from an interview with a Soviet soldier."

⁵⁰⁷ Herman Melton, *Liberty's War: An Engineer's Memoir of the Merchant Marine, 1942-45*, ed. Will Melton (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017), 31, 33.

⁵⁰⁸ Campbell and MacIntyre, *The Kola Run*, 164-165; Fraser, "73 North," 14; Melton, *Liberty's War*, 34-35, 37, 72-73; Walker, "Fiasco in the Barents' Sea," 17.

naval assaults and deliver enough material to North Russia in 1943 to help the Red Army counterattack the invaders.⁵⁰⁹ Contemporary documents housed at the British National Archives, Kew, reveal that preparations for JW-52 began on 14 December 1942 as Churchill emphasized the need to maintain a steady flow of supplies to Stalin's forces in a note to First Sea Lord Sir Dudley Pound.⁵¹⁰ After commending the Red Army's splendid and ongoing successes at Stalingrad in a 29 December telegram, Churchill excitedly informed Stalin that he intended to, "send a full convoy of thirty or more ships in January," while cautioning that the vessels could potentially sail in two separate convoys depending on naval developments.⁵¹¹

Implicitly dangling the threat of a second Brest-Litovsk over Churchill's head during this period, Stalin's top diplomats in London faithfully maintained their barrage of accusations alleging that the Western Allies were somehow attempting to remain on the sidelines while Soviet soldiers fought, bled, and died defending their homeland. In early January 1943, Admiral Pound informed Churchill that Soviet Ambassador Ivan Maisky had complained about London's decision to divide the planned convoy into two groups, alleging that the prime minister had promised a thirty-ship convoy, "in January and February [each]."⁵¹² In his reply to Pound, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, and First Lord of the Admiralty Sir Alfred V. Alexander on 9 January, Churchill fumed that Maisky had misquoted him, stating that he had promised Stalin nothing of the sort and had rather cautioned him that a single convoy may be divided in two. Already burdened by Stalin and Roosevelt's demands to maintain the convoys no matter the cost,

⁵⁰⁹ Campbell and MacIntyre, *The Kola Run*, 164-165; Erswell and McKay, *Surviving the Arctic Convoys*, 96-98; Melton, *Liberty's War*, 74-76.

⁵¹⁰ Fraser, "73 North," 14; *The National Archives of the UK*, "PREMIER 3 393/8," "First Sea Lord," 14 December 1942; Walker, "Fiasco in the Barents' Sea," 17.

⁵¹¹ Hellbeck, *Stalingrad*, 173, 181; *The National Archives of the UK*, "PREMIER 3 393/8," "Prime Minister to Premier Stalin," 29 December 1942.

⁵¹² *The National Archives of the UK*, "PREMIER 3 393/8" "Prime Minister," n. d.

Churchill sniped that, “Maisky should be told that I am getting to the end of my tether with these repeated Russian naggings and that it is not the slightest use trying to knock me about any more.”⁵¹³

The documents contained in the National Archives, Kew provide a key window into Churchill’s strenuous efforts to organize and sail more Arctic convoys even as the Soviet victory at Stalingrad appeared imminent, attesting to his and Roosevelt’s determination to keep Stalin satisfied and fighting Hitler.⁵¹⁴ Determined to preempt even the slightest possibility of a second Brest-Litovsk, the British prime minister and American president had undertaken every effort, at the latter’s insistence, to resume the Arctic convoys after the PQ-17 tragedy and keep them sailing as the Stalingrad fighting raged.⁵¹⁵ Ambassador Maisky’s pointed complaints, including a 2 January note to Foreign Secretary Eden alleging British, “arrears” regarding Second Protocol deliveries and insisting that London immediately double its proposed shipment of 100 Hurricane fighters, enhanced these fears.⁵¹⁶ Written in an almost disinterested and apathetic tone, Stalin’s very brief 15 January reply to Churchill’s detailed message from five days earlier informing him of JW-52’s progress had the same effect and served to exacerbate the prime minister’s concerns.⁵¹⁷

Reflecting his exasperation with Stalin’s implied dissatisfaction and the ramifications that

⁵¹³ Ibid., “Foreign Secretary. First Lord. First Sea Lord,” 9 January 1943.

⁵¹⁴ Ibid.

⁵¹⁵ Alanbrooke, *War Diaries*, 319-320, 327-328, 387; Arnold, *Global Mission*, 259; Churchill, *Memoirs*, 742-744, 745-747; Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, 69-70; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 713-714; Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 331-333; U.S. President, “Map Room Papers Box 8 Stalin to Roosevelt July – December 1942,”; U.S. President, “Map Room Papers Box 8 Roosevelt to Stalin January – June 1943.”

⁵¹⁶ *The National Archives of the UK*, “PREMIER 3 393/8,” “Copy. Secret.” 2 January 1943; U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, 32-34, 35-36, 46-47.

⁵¹⁷ Office, Chief of Finance War Department, “Lend-Lease Shipments World War II,”; *The National Archives of the UK*, “PREMIER 3 393/8,” “Prime Minister to Premier Stalin,” 10 January 1943, and “Premier Stalin to Premier Churchill,” 15 January 1943.

he and Roosevelt feared could potentially result from this situation, Churchill simply replied, “Lamentable” after receiving Admiral Pound’s report that four of the twenty merchant ships planned for JW-52 could not sail for various reasons.⁵¹⁸ Subsequently expressing his concerns to Eden, Churchill lamented that, “This will make our position with the [Soviet] bear even worse than it is now” in a further indication of his perception that Stalin could be tempted to forge a separate peace.⁵¹⁹ As strongly suggested by the documentary record of the time, Brest-Litovsk’s shadow continued to impact Churchill and Roosevelt’s execution of Soviet Lend-Lease aid, at least until Tehran in November 1943, as they labored to keep Stalin’s Red Army in the war and resisting Berlin’s brazen attacks.⁵²⁰

Further feeding into Churchill’s fears and frustrations and Stalin’s rhetorical ammunition that he fired at his Western allies, the British Admiralty reported on 20 January that while JW-52 had embarked on schedule three days earlier, another two ships had failed to join the convoy. The Admiralty’s report listed the six total vessels that could not sail for a host of reasons ranging from “boiler defects” to shifted cargo as the British freighters *Dover Hill*, *Llandaf*, *Empire Kinsman*, and *Atlantic*, the British oil tanker *Marathon*, and the U.S. Liberty ship *Israel Putnam*.⁵²¹ While such setbacks frustrated Churchill, Eden, and their chief subordinates, they do not appear to have diminished the importance to the Soviet war effort of the items that arrived

⁵¹⁸ The National Archives of the UK, “PREMIER 3 393/8,” “Prime Minister,” 18 January 1943, and “Most Secret. Mr. Keenlyside,” 19 January 1943.

⁵¹⁹ Ibid., “Stratagem No. 100. Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary,” 19 January 1943.

⁵²⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin’s Correspondence*, “No. 103: For Marshal Stalin from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill,” 19 August 1943, 83; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 287-288; *The National Archives of the UK*, “PREMIER 3 393/8,” “Stratagem No. 100. Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary,” 19 January 1943; U.S. President, “Map Room Papers Box 8 Stalin to Roosevelt July – December 1942,”; U.S. President, “Map Room Papers Box 8 Roosevelt to Stalin January – June 1943.”

⁵²¹ *The National Archives of the UK*, “PREMIER 3 393/8,” “Telescope No. 152. Following for Keenlyside for Ministry of War Transport,” 20 January 1943.

safely at the North Russian ports, and the ships that could not sail on 17 January were simply repaired, reorganized, and sent with the next successful convoy, JW-53.⁵²²

After JW-52's safe arrival and unloading at Murmansk on 27 January 1943, Herman Melton witnessed firsthand the value to the Red Army Air Forces of Lend-Lease U.S. P-39 aircraft as German bombers based nearby at Petsamo, Finland struck the city on 19 and 20 February, losing ten planes to the Soviet shoreline artillerists.⁵²³ Having completed their mission in Murmansk, the convoy crews reassembled in their ships and prepared for their return voyage as RA-53 on 28 February, and the Nazi attackers returned shortly after 12:00 p.m. to target the ships in a brutal bombing raid. As the homebound Westerners returned fire, Soviet fighter pilots based at nearby Vaenga bravely struck the screaming swarm of Ju-87 dive-bombers, known as *Stukas*, soaring into the sky in their prized P-39 aircraft.⁵²⁴

Unable to hear Lieutenant Stone's order to cease firing their ship's Philadelphia-built gun in the chaotic fighting that ensued, one of the *Harnett's* men tragically erred in striking a Soviet P-39 as the plane's pilot doggedly pursued a Nazi Ju-87 attempting to escape. In an earlier episode in December 1942, Soviet officials had complained bitterly to Rear Admiral Douglas Fisher, the Senior British Naval Officer (SBNO), North Russia, about the inadvertent loss of a Soviet airman and his Lend-Lease *Kobrushka* or "little cobra," as the Soviet pilots affectionately called their P-39s, to Allied fire.⁵²⁵ As JW-53 delivered its cargo to Molotovsk on 27 February

⁵²² Erswell and McKay, *Surviving the Arctic Convoys*, 93-95; *The National Archives of the UK*, "PREMIER 3 393/8," "Telescope No. 152. Following for Keenlyside for Ministry of War Transport," 20 January 1943.

⁵²³ Kotelnikov, *Lend-Lease and Soviet Aviation*, 173-175, 191-192, 193-195; Loza, *Attack of the Airacobras*, 30-31, 47-49, 52-53, 57-62; Melton, *Liberty's War*, 48-49.

⁵²⁴ Melton, *Liberty's War*, 48-49.

⁵²⁵ Kotelnikov, *Lend-Lease and Soviet Aviation*, 173-175, 191-192, 193-195; Loza, *Attack of the Airacobras*, 30-31, 47-49, 52-53, 57-62; Melton, *Liberty's War*, 50, 74-76; Senior British Naval Officer, North Russia, "Report of SBNO (extracts) – December 1942."

with the *Israel Putnam*, *City of Omaha*, *Francis Scott Key*, and other U.S. Liberty ships accompanied by their British, Panamanian, and Soviet counterparts, SBNO Fisher recorded another instance in which three Allied vessels opened fire on a Soviet aircraft. According to Fisher, the Soviet airman had failed to, “carry out recognition procedure” and flew too close to JW-53 as the Allied gunners and other Soviet fighter pilots repulsed a mixed squadron of between twenty-two and twenty-four Ju-88s and Bf-109s sweeping over the convoy.⁵²⁶

Armed and delivered to the Soviets with a 37mm nose cannon and four machine guns, the P-39Q, an advanced version of the U.S. aircraft that constituted the bulk of the 4,700 P-39s supplied to the Red Army Air Forces, appears to have made a crucial difference in the steady hands of Soviet fighter pilots in North Russia’s skies by 1943.⁵²⁷ Stalin had consistently voiced a favorable opinion of this American attack aircraft and repeatedly emphasized its importance to the Soviet war effort in his telegrams to Roosevelt, along with Lend-Lease trucks, aluminum, and food.⁵²⁸ By the time of JW-52’s arrival in Murmansk in January 1943, the aircraft had become a favorite of the Soviet aces in whose hands it served as a formidable weapon, saving countless Allied ships, lives, and the precious cargo that the men brought for Stalin’s Red Army. Recalling his time ashore at Murmansk as Nazi bombers twice attempted to breach the city’s air defenses in late February 1943, U.S. merchant mariner Melton states that Soviet fighter pilots spoke fondly of their beloved P-39s and rated their speed, maneuverability, and firepower favorably in comparison to the enemy’s Finland-based Fw-190s and Bf-109s.⁵²⁹

⁵²⁶ Erswell and McKay, *Surviving the Arctic Convoys*, 96-98; Senior British Naval Officer, North Russia, “Report of SBNO (extracts) – Feb-Apr 1943.”

⁵²⁷ Loza, *Attack of the Airacobras*, 39-42; Mellinger, *Soviet Lend-Lease Fighter Aces*, 45-47, 48, 59-61; Melton, *Liberty’s War*, 74-76; Rickenbacker, *Rickenbacker*, 407-408, 409.

⁵²⁸ U.S. President, “Map Room Papers Box 8 Stalin to Roosevelt July – December 1942,”; U.S. President, “Map Room Papers Box 8 Roosevelt to Stalin January – June 1943.”

⁵²⁹ Melton, *Liberty’s War*, 74-76.

While the successes of PQ-18, JW-52, JW-53, and many other Arctic convoys appear to have contributed significantly to the Soviet Union's defense by keeping the Red Army supplied in its hour of need at Stalingrad and beyond, serving the stated purpose of Lend-Lease by boosting its defensive capabilities, Roosevelt remained determined to do more.⁵³⁰ Along with Churchill, the president labored to keep Stalin in the war as the Soviet premier continued refusing their proposals for a, "very essential meeting between our three governmental heads," until late 1943, keeping them guessing as to his motives regarding Germany's total defeat.⁵³¹ Had Washington's top officials comprehended the Arctic convoys' impact on the Red Army's victories and stopped fearing a possible second Brest-Litovsk after Stalingrad, they may have realized that there had been no need to increase Soviet Lend-Lease aid. Yet due to these concerns that continued haunting Roosevelt and many U.S. officials and lawmakers, until Stalin arrived at the Tehran Conference, they worked to increase the supply flow to the Red Army by improving the Persian Corridor and ALSIB, unnecessarily and excessively arming Moscow.⁵³²

In the summer of 1943, veteran fighter pilot Eddie Rickenbacker voluntarily traveled to Iran and witnessed the improvements that the U.S. Army's efforts had made to the route, ensuring more effective deliveries to the Soviets.⁵³³ By the end of the spring, the uncompromising approach of Major General Donald Connolly in recruiting and training many

⁵³⁰ Erswell and McKay, *Surviving the Arctic Convoys*, 96-98, 107-109, 109-111; *The National Archives of the UK*, "PREMIER 3 393/8," "Prime Minister," 18 January 1943, and "Most Secret. Mr. Keenlyside," 19 January 1943; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 791-793, 796; U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Roosevelt to Stalin January – June 1943."

⁵³¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 103: For Marshal Stalin from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill," 19 August 1943, 83; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 287-288; U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Roosevelt to Stalin January – June 1943."

⁵³² Arnold, *Global Mission*, 211-212, 385-387; Van Tuyll, *Feeding the Bear*, 117-119; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 115-117, 120-121.

⁵³³ Associated Press, "Rickenbacker and Two of Stimson's Aides In Moscow on a Mission for War Secretary," *The New York Times*, 24 June 1943, <https://www.nytimes.com/1943/06/24/archives/rickenbacker-and-two-of-stimsons-aides-in-moscow-on-a-mission-for.html>; Rickenbacker, *Rickenbacker*, 389.

local Iranian drivers and focusing U.S. efforts on clearing and expanding railroads and the Army's truck assembly plants had resulted in improved delivery routes through Iran's arid southern deserts and icy northern mountains. Beginning with Connolly's promotion in the spring of 1943 and continuing until early 1945, thousands of planes and trucks and many tons of food and raw materials began flowing through Iran into the Soviet Union's Caucasus republics.⁵³⁴

In April 1942 Roosevelt appointed Admiral William Standley as the U.S. ambassador and chief representative of the U.S. War Supply Mission to the Soviet Union based in Moscow following Stalin's complaints alleging Ambassador Steinhardt to be a defeatist.⁵³⁵ Over time, Standley began clashing with Hopkins's favorite observer, General Faymonville, over his eagerness to supply the Red Army without obtaining any concessions from the Soviet government, eventually leading him to resign his official post in late 1943. Perhaps intentionally, Stalin and Molotov often aggravated Standley by directing their aid requests directly to Roosevelt and Hopkins through Faymonville, bypassing the U.S. ambassador and Chief of the War Supply Mission.⁵³⁶ In response, Standley requested several personal meetings with Stalin, during which the Soviet leader repeatedly accused Washington of trickery and secretly planning to discontinue the Arctic convoys as the ambassador, echoing Roosevelt's telegrams, sought to emphasize the importance of expanding the ALSIB and Iranian routes.⁵³⁷

Following his visit to Iran, Rickenbacker traveled to Moscow to meet with Stalin's Foreign Commissar Molotov and to assess the impact of U.S. P-39 fighters, now manned by

⁵³⁴ Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 139-140.

⁵³⁵ Ibid., 61-62; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 403-404.

⁵³⁶ Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador*, 153.

⁵³⁷ Ibid., 160.

Soviet fighter pilots, on the Eastern Front.⁵³⁸ In his memoir, Rickenbacker states that he questioned Soviet General Andrei Yumachev, the copilot of the first Soviet polar flight whom he had met, befriended, and entertained at home in 1937, on the reluctance of Nazi bombers to attack Moscow despite executing raids on cities more than 500 miles behind the Soviet capital. Yumachev motioned to Rickenbacker before activating an air raid siren and opening an underground airbase revealing more than 100 P-39 fighters, which Rickenbacker claims to have counted within thirty-nine seconds.⁵³⁹ Recalling his surprise at witnessing the planes rush into the sky, Rickenbacker states that by the summer of 1943 Lend-Lease aircraft had begun playing a key defensive role in the skies over Moscow, helping the Soviets to contest Nazi air superiority.⁵⁴⁰

According to Rickenbacker, Brest-Litovsk's shadow continued hanging over U.S. Ambassador Standley and his assistant General Michela, Roosevelt, Generals Arnold and Marshall, and the U.S. War Department as Congress prepared to vote overwhelmingly to renew Lend-Lease in spring 1943.⁵⁴¹ Pointing out that Nazi forces remained 500 miles deep inside Soviet Europe and lethally dangerous from the prevailing, contemporary U.S. perspective in June 1943, Rickenbacker recalls the grim view that administration officials expressed to him as they feared the Red Army's collapse, underestimated its capabilities, and insisted on oversupplying Stalin. Stating that, "forthright reports" on the Red Army's use of U.S. Lend-Lease material

⁵³⁸ Associated Press, "Rickenbacker and Two of Stimson's Aides in Moscow,"; Rickenbacker, *Rickenbacker*, 399-400.

⁵³⁹ Denny, "SOVIET FLIERS LAND PLANE AT NORTH POLE,"; Rickenbacker, *Rickenbacker*, 399-400, 407-408.

⁵⁴⁰ Rickenbacker, *Rickenbacker*, 409.

⁵⁴¹ Arnold, *Global Mission*, 259; Associated Press, "RICKENBACKER HOME FROM MOSCOW TRIP; He Reports to Stimson on the Results of Tour Abroad," *The New York Times*, 12 August 1943, <https://www.nytimes.com/1943/08/12/archives/rickenbacker-home-from-moscow-trip-he-reports-to-stimson-on-the.html>; Rickenbacker, *Rickenbacker*, 400-401.

were not forthcoming from Stalin, Zhukov, or their subordinates, Rickenbacker emphasized that, “The War Department could not be positive of any action the Russians might take [in June 1943].”⁵⁴² Stalin’s silence on the issue and his continued refusal to meet with Roosevelt until that November seems to have added greatly to these concerns, spurring the administration’s efforts to expand the Persian Corridor and ALSIB, while transferring many U.S. Pacific Ocean ships to Soviet control.⁵⁴³

Crucially, Rickenbacker sums up the shared attitude of the War Department officials in Washington and Standley’s diplomats in Moscow as one of desperation to keep Soviet soldiers fed and fighting in the field, indicating that Stalin’s questionable commitment to Germany’s unconditional surrender motivated their desire to not only renew, but increase, Lend-Lease aid.⁵⁴⁴ Referring to the prevailing perception of the U.S. leadership regarding Stalin and the Red Army’s war effort at the time, Rickenbacker recalled, “If they [the Soviets] collapsed, as in 1917, or signed a separate peace, several German armies would be released to resist us in the west. Or did the Russians have the capability and the determination to carry the war on to Germany?”⁵⁴⁵ Seeking to prevent the first two possibilities at all costs, Roosevelt and his senior officials ensured that Stalin’s soldiers remained determined and obtained the capability of bringing the war to Hitler’s doorstep, and their success at sending more U.S. material through Iran and from Alaska in the Third Protocol helped Eastern Europeans to trade one tyrant for another.⁵⁴⁶

⁵⁴² Rickenbacker, *Rickenbacker*, 402-403.

⁵⁴³ McMeekin, *Stalin’s War*, 534-536; The New York Times, “JAPAN LETS RUSSIA GET OUR SUPPLIES.”

⁵⁴⁴ Associated Press, “RICKENBACKER HOME FROM MOSCOW TRIP,”; Rickenbacker, *Rickenbacker*, 402-403.

⁵⁴⁵ Rickenbacker, *Rickenbacker*, 402-403.

⁵⁴⁶ McMeekin, *Stalin’s War*, 534-536; Office, Chief of Finance War Department, “Lend-Lease Shipments World War II,”; The New York Times, “JAPAN LETS RUSSIA GET OUR SUPPLIES,”; U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, 55, 57-61, 66-71, 76, 79-83.

In a strong endorsement of the Arctic convoys' importance to the Soviet war effort, Stalin voiced staunch opposition to Roosevelt and Churchill's postponement of further deliveries to North Russia in the spring of 1943 as the Western leaders concentrated their efforts on increasing the Persian Corridor's volume. In a 2 April telegram reply to the British prime minister, the Soviet premier decried the Anglo-American decision as causing a, "catastrophic cut in the delivery of strategic raw materials and munitions to the Soviet Union by Great Britain and the U.S.A."⁵⁴⁷ Lamenting that, "the Pacific route is limited in shipping and none too reliable, and the southern [Iranian] route has small clearance capacity, which means that those two routes cannot make up for the cessation of deliveries by the northern [Arctic] route" Stalin concluded that, "this circumstance cannot but affect the position of the Soviet troops."⁵⁴⁸ Yet the Soviet leader appears to have severely miscalculated and underestimated the quantity and quality of the aid that he subsequently received through these two routes over which his Allies delivered a flood of material and oversupplied the Red Army well beyond its defensive needs from 1943 forward.⁵⁴⁹

Following the strategy on which they had agreed after PQ-17's disastrous voyage and PQ-18's comparatively striking success, Roosevelt and Churchill halted the Arctic convoys until the middle of November 1943, shortly before meeting Stalin at Tehran, Iran, and resumed them

⁵⁴⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 138: Personal and Secret Message from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr. W. Churchill," 2 April 1943, 112; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 227.

⁵⁴⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 138: Personal and Secret Message from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr. W. Churchill," 2 April 1943, 112; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 227.

⁵⁴⁹ Dunn, *The Red Army and the Soviet Economy*, 80-81; Hill, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, 185; *The National Archives of the UK*, C. B. 3305 (4) *Naval Staff History*, 129-130; Vail Motter, *The Persian Corridor*, 136-138; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 25-27; Whitehall History Publishing – Ministry of Defence, *The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys*, x-xii.

at the Soviet premier's insistence only during the winter months until 1945.⁵⁵⁰ By this point, however, the Arctic convoys' deliveries to the Soviet war effort had already been greatly surpassed by the Anglo-American leaders' efforts to keep the Red Army fighting by expanding the Persian Corridor and the ALSIB air route. From the summer of 1943 forward, larger volumes of Lend-Lease material began flowing to Stalin's soldiers over the greatly improved Iranian railroads to the Soviet Caucasus region and by air from Great Falls, Montana, to Fairbanks, Alaska, to Krasnoyarsk and Uelkel in Soviet Siberia.⁵⁵¹ In addition, Roosevelt's transfer that summer of many West Coast U.S. Liberty ships to Stalin's control, an action unnecessary for the Soviet Union's defense as the Arctic convoys had already achieved this goal, also ensured that Soviet Lend-Lease aid grew from a steady North Russian stream into a Pacific tsunami.⁵⁵²

After the U.S. Congress renewed Roosevelt's Lend-Lease program for all the Allied Powers including the Soviet Union in spring 1943, Stalin again expressed anger at his Western counterparts' reluctance to open a, "second front" in Europe and implicitly dangled the specter of Brest-Litovsk in a telegram to Churchill.⁵⁵³ Earlier, in 1942, the British prime minister had been forced to intervene and object after Roosevelt, haunted by Moscow's separate peace with Berlin in March 1918, appeared ready to send Anglo-American forces into Western Europe long before

⁵⁵⁰ Churchill, *Memoirs*, 742-744, 745-747; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 199: Personal and Most Secret Message from the Prime Minister, Mr. Winston Churchill, to Marshal Stalin," 1 October 1943, 166-169; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 316-318.

⁵⁵¹ Arnold, *Global Mission*, 211-212, 385-387; Dolitsky, Glazkov, and Poor, Pipeline to Russia, 64-66, 79-80, 84-85.

⁵⁵² McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 518-519; U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, 55, 57-61, 66-71, 76, 79-83.

⁵⁵³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 165: Personal and Secret Message from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr. W. Churchill," 24 June 1943, 136-138; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 267-270.

they were prepared, hoping to please Stalin.⁵⁵⁴ Now, in the summer of 1943, the Soviet premier stated, “I must tell you that the point here is not just the disappointment of the Soviet Government, but the preservation of its confidence in its Allies, a confidence which is being subjected to severe stress.”⁵⁵⁵ Even though the Arctic convoy crews’ perseverance had already served Lend-Lease’s stated purpose by keeping the Red Army armed and fed well after the Stalingrad counterattack, Roosevelt and Churchill persisted in their efforts to expand the Persian Corridor and ALSIB by June 1943, unleashing an avalanche of aid to Stalin.⁵⁵⁶

The origins of the Persian Corridor date to the Anglo-Soviet invasion and occupation of wartime Iran, codenamed Operation *Countenance*, in August 1941, a mission executed to overthrow the allegedly pro-Axis monarch Reza Shah Pahlavi and replace him with his son and heir Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi.⁵⁵⁷ The Allies regarded the younger monarch as a trustworthy, pro-Allied leader and hoped to use their influence in his regime to begin building an effective supply route to the Soviet Union’s Caucasus region through northern Iran.⁵⁵⁸ Despite Stalin’s consistent dismissals of the Iranian route’s potential value as a reliable supply line to the Red Army, Roosevelt and Churchill continued working to develop the major roads and railroads of the country from late 1941 forward even as the Arctic convoys sustained the Soviet war effort.

⁵⁵⁴ Carlton, *Churchill and the Soviet Union*, 101-102; McMeekin, *Stalin’s War*, 406-408.

⁵⁵⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin’s Correspondence*, “No. 165,” 136-138; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 267-270.

⁵⁵⁶ Mason, *Arctic Warriors*, 155-156; Melton, *Liberty’s War*, 74-76; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin’s Correspondence*, “No. 103: For Marshal Stalin from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill,” 19 August 1943, 83; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 287-288; U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, 55, 57-61, 66-71, 76, 79-83; U.S. President, “Map Room Papers Box 8 Roosevelt to Stalin January – June 1943,”; *The National Archives of the UK*, “PREMIER 3 393/8,” “Stratagem No. 100. Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary,” 19 January 1943; Thomas, *Through Ice and Fire*, 147-148.

⁵⁵⁷ Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, 29; Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 65, 110-111; Frank N. Schubert, “The Persian Gulf Command: Lifeline to the Soviet Union,” *Pars Times – Greater Iran & Beyond* (March 2005), 305-315; Van Tuyll, *Feeding the Bear*, 5, 49.

⁵⁵⁸ Vail Motter, *The Persian Corridor*, 141-143, 259-262, 319-320, 341-344; Van Tuyll, *Feeding the Bear*, 26-27, 51, 73.

Under Colonel Don D. Shingler of the United States Military Iranian Mission, U.S. Army engineers began working alongside their British counterparts in southern Iran to develop the region's ports of Abadan and Bushehr, together with the neighboring Iraqi Shatt al-Arab River port of Basra, from November 1941 forward.⁵⁵⁹

After Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt, Hopkins, and Stettinius redoubled their efforts to improve the Iranian supply route to Soviet Azerbaijan and to surmount the obstacles posed by the slow progress by addressing the problems of Iran's sand-swept desert roads that damaged aircraft engines.⁵⁶⁰ As the administration struggled to equip the U.S. Armed Forces to counterattack Tojo's Pacific tide, battle Hitler's submarines along the East and Gulf Coasts, and keep Stalin in the war by sailing the Arctic convoys, the Persian Corridor's progress commenced slowly. In late 1942, Roosevelt replaced Colonel Shingler with General Connolly and on 1 April 1943 the U.S. Army Air Corps officially assumed control of aircraft assembly efforts at Abadan, Iran, a responsibility previously entrusted under contract to Douglas Aircraft Company. In this way, Roosevelt, Hopkins, and General Marshall sought to fulfill Stalin's orders more effectively and quickly for aircraft deliveries in the Third Protocol period between July 1942 and June 1943, despite the Soviet premier's constant dismissals of the route's potential.⁵⁶¹

⁵⁵⁹ Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 49, 65, 110-111; Schubert, "The Persian Gulf Command," 308-309; Van Tuyll, *Feeding the Bear*, 26-27, 51, 73; U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Roosevelt to Stalin January – June 1943."

⁵⁶⁰ William H. Lawrence, "LEND-LEASE HELP TO RUSSIA TO RISE; Proposals for New Protocol, to Go Into Effect June 30, Delivered to Moscow GAIN FROM SHORTER ROUTE Opening of Mediterranean to speed Supply – Stettinius Gives Figures to April 30," *The New York Times*, 15 June 1943, <https://www.nytimes.com/1943/06/15/archives/lendlease-help-to-russia-to-rise-proposals-for-new-protocol-to-go.html>; Stettinius, Jr., *Lend-Lease*, 240-242, 244-246, 248; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 111-112; Zimmerman, "Lend-Lease to Russia."

⁵⁶¹ Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 139-140, 143, 208-209; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 199: Personal and Most Secret Message from the Prime Minister, Mr. Winston Churchill, to Marshal Stalin," 1 October 1943, 166-169; Office, Chief of Finance War Department, "Lend-Lease Shipments World War II,"; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 316-318; U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Roosevelt to Stalin,"; Vail Motter, *The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia*, 215-217.

During the period of Douglas's aircraft assembly operations at Abadan between 20 November 1941 and 31 March 1943, U.S. aircraft deliveries to Soviet pilots in Iran averaged about seventy-five planes per month according to U.S. Army historian Thomas H. Vail Motter in his 1952 book *The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia*.⁵⁶² After the Army's takeover of the Abadan facilities on 1 April 1943, aircraft assembly operations steadily surged to unprecedented levels, resulting in the transfer of more than 182 planes per month for a total of 2,902 delivered through the Persian Corridor during the Third Protocol between 1 July 1943 and 30 June 1944. Between March 1942 and April 1945, nearly half of the 409,526 U.S. Lend-Lease trucks shipped to Stalin's Red Army arrived in the Soviet Caucasus through the Persian Corridor, with eighty-eight percent of these being assembled by U.S. Army engineers based at the facilities in Andimeshk and Khorramshahr, Iran.⁵⁶³ In January and February 1943, General Connolly opened two schools in Tehran and Andimeshk to train local Iranian drivers, interpreters, and instructors to increase the volume of trucks, particularly the US6 "Studebakers" that formed the bulk of American motor vehicle shipments, to be delivered to the Soviet forces.⁵⁶⁴

Stettinius and Hopkins generally viewed the supply route through Iran as the most effective and least dangerous route due to the small numbers of enemy submarines in the Indian Ocean and the presence of Soviet troops in northern Iran.⁵⁶⁵ Believing this route to be ideal for

⁵⁶² Vail Motter, *The Persian Corridor*, 19-20, 21-23, 26-27, 93-96, 143-147, 149, 152-155; Zimmerman, "Lend-Lease to Russia."

⁵⁶³ Office, Chief of Finance War Department, "Lend-Lease Shipments World War II,"; Stettinius, Jr., *Lend-Lease*, 240-242, 244-246, 248; Vail Motter, *The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia*, 139, 240-241; Van Tuyl, *Feeding the Bear*, 54.

⁵⁶⁴ Dunn, *The Red Army and the Soviet Economy*, 74; Office, Chief of Finance War Department, "Lend-Lease Shipments World War II,"; U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, 55, 57-61, 66-71, 76, 79-83; Vail Motter, *The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia*, 312-313; Zimmerman, "Lend-Lease to Russia."

⁵⁶⁵ Schubert, "The Persian Gulf Command," 310-312; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 545, 799; Stettinius, Jr., *Lend-Lease*, 241; Zimmerman, "Lend-Lease to Russia."

supplying the Red Army, they worked to develop an effective road system in Iran for transporting U.S. military vehicles and aircraft. Major obstacles such as desert roads and violent dust storms created problems for driving the vehicles and, until Connolly's spring 1943 improvements, often damaged the aircraft engines, limiting the initial Anglo-American aid deliveries over the Persian Corridor to a trickle.⁵⁶⁶

Connolly's opening of the training schools for Iranian drivers and his significant expansion of the two major American truck production plants at Andimeshk and Khorramshahr ensured a tremendous boost in the Red Army's mobile offensive operations from 1943 forward, gradually helping Soviet forces to seize the strategic initiative and reverse Hitler's gains.⁵⁶⁷ As emphasized by Sean McMeekin, General Zhukov's magnificent, "mobile flanking operation" at Stalingrad appears to have been aided, "just in time" by the arrival of thousands of U.S. Studebaker trucks and Willys jeeps by late fall 1942, 27,000 of which boosted the counterattack.⁵⁶⁸ Yet at the time of Zhukov's brilliant execution of Operation *Uranus*, most of the Lend-Lease vehicles employed in the tide-turning counterattack had been delivered by the Arctic convoy crews as Connolly's efforts in Iran finally bore fruit only in late spring 1943.⁵⁶⁹ This, in turn, suggests that it remained unnecessary from a practical standpoint for U.S. officials to increase the aid flow to Stalin over Iran's roads and Alaska's skies as the aid deliveries to Murmansk and Archangel had already supplied the Red Army's defense and enabled it to

⁵⁶⁶ Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia*, 198; Schubert, "The Persian Gulf Command," 305-307; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 116; Zimmerman, "Lend-Lease to Russia."

⁵⁶⁷ Stettinius, Jr., *Lend-Lease*, 240-242, 244-246, 248; U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, 55, 57-61, 66-71, 76, 79-83; Zimmerman, "Lend-Lease to Russia."

⁵⁶⁸ Hellbeck, *Stalingrad*, 173, 181; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 409-410, 412-414, 416-417, 423-424, 425-427; Sokolov, *Marshal K. K. Rokossovsky*, 173-175, 177, 179-181, 215; Zhukov, *Marshal of Victory Vol. 2*, 79-80, 287-289, 411.

⁵⁶⁹ Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 110-111, 112-113, 139-140, 143; Vail Motter, *The Persian Corridor*, 312-313, 316-319; Van Tuyll, *Feeding the Bear*, 5, 26-27, 49; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 111-112.

overcome the invaders as acknowledged by Secretary Hull.⁵⁷⁰

Yet Roosevelt, still unable to obtain a meeting with Stalin until late November 1943, persisted in ensuring that the Red Army could take the offensive, preventing the possibility of a second Brest-Litovsk while equipping Stalin's soldiers to fight their way to Berlin. Because of Connolly's successful execution of the Iranian mission, 4,200,000 tons of Lend-Lease material arrived in the Soviet Caucasus from Iran by the end of the war in 1945, a slightly higher tonnage total than was delivered to North Russia in the same period.⁵⁷¹ Yet by 1943 the Arctic convoys had already enabled the Red Army's execution of mobile defensive maneuvers aided by aircraft in counterattacking the Germans, while the aluminum and food they delivered helped feed Soviet workers and keep them producing Stalin's superior tanks and aircraft. Roosevelt's subsequent expansion of the Persian Corridor and the ALSIB air route, therefore, appears to have been unnecessary, yet his officials oversaw the rapid growth of truck production facilities in Iran to ensure that the Red Army could wrest the strategic initiative from the Nazis and drive them from Soviet soil to obliterate any possibility of a separate peace.⁵⁷²

While the thousands of P-39s and tons of Lend-Lease aluminum for aircraft armor and tank motor production delivered to the Soviets helped the Red Army Air Forces to challenge and ultimately break the German Air Force's air superiority over the battlefields, the tens of

⁵⁷⁰ "The New York Times (Unattributed Report), "HULL PRAISES RED ARMY; Says Stalingrad Marks Troops as Equal of Any in War," *The New York Times*, 4 February 1943, <https://www.nytimes.com/1943/02/04/archives/hull-praises-red-army-says-stalingrad-marks-troops-as-equal-of-any.html>; TIME (Unattributed Report), "World Battlefronts: THE BATTLE OF RUSSIA: The Beginning of Disaster?" *TIME*, Vol. XLI, No. 4 (25 January 1943), 1-2, <https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,850230,00.html>.

⁵⁷¹ Dunn, *The Soviet Economy and the Red Army*, 80-81; Hill, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, 185; Schubert, "The Persian Gulf Command," 313-315; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 25-27; Zimmerman, "Lend-Lease to Russia."

⁵⁷² Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, 25, 69-70; Hill, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, 185; Zimmerman, "Lend-Lease to Russia."

thousands of Studebakers and other trucks boosted the Red Army's mobile operations.⁵⁷³ By placing the Soviet infantry on wheels, Lend-Lease officials made it possible for Stalin's soldiers to reconquer the occupied territories and ultimately drive into Europe, a task that could not have been achieved by aircraft alone. Before Connolly's improvements of spring 1943, Lend-Lease shipments could only reach the Persian Corridor after traveling halfway around the world from the U.S. East Coast around the southern tip of Africa and into the Persian Gulf, keeping the flow of supplies to the Soviets over the route at a bare minimum. Rather than following the pattern of 1942 and continuing to rely primarily on the Arctic convoys to deliver Lend-Lease goods to Stalin, U.S. officials began flooding the Red Army with trucks, jeeps, and planes built in Iran, hastening the delivery of weaponry to the Soviets and tremendously expanding the flow of aid.⁵⁷⁴

Frustrated by the inherent limitations in the Pacific route due to Japanese expansion, Roosevelt ordered Army Air Corps General Arnold and General Follett Bradley to develop an air route from Alaska to Siberia after Stalin reluctantly agreed to Washington's proposal.⁵⁷⁵ Between 1942 and 1945, the Soviet leader repeatedly rejected General Arnold's offers to send American pilots to deliver U.S. aircraft directly to the Siberian airfields and emphasized the importance of the northern supply route from the U.S. East Coast to the Soviet Arctic ports.⁵⁷⁶ In August 1942, after their Soviet counterparts appeared open to the idea, General Bradley established a supply center in Great Falls, Montana to serve as a base for U.S. pilots to fly P-39

⁵⁷³ Hill, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, 187-188, 190; Sokolov, *The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War*, 53-55.

⁵⁷⁴ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 419-420, 422; U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, 55, 57-61, 66-71, 76, 79-83; Van Tuyl, *Feeding the Bear*, 5, 26-27, 49; Zimmerman, "Lend-Lease to Russia."

⁵⁷⁵ Arnold, *Global Mission*, 248-249; Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power*, 165; Blake W. Smith, *Warplanes to Alaska* (Blaine, WA: Hancock House Publishers, 1998), 14, 17, 45-47; Stettinius, Jr., *Lend-Lease*, 257.

⁵⁷⁶ Arnold, *Global Mission*, 254; U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, 55, 57-61, 66-71, 76, 79-83.

fighters, A-20 bombers, B-25 bombers, C-47 transport planes, and other U.S.-designed aircraft to the Ladd Field airbase in Fairbanks, Alaska. In Fairbanks, Soviet pilots were to acquire the aircraft and fly them across the Bering Strait to the Siberian cities of Uelkel and Krasnoyarsk once these cities' airports had been prepared to accommodate more air traffic.⁵⁷⁷

According to Otis Hays, Jr., Stalin's objections, expressed as late as 19 September 1942 through Soviet Purchasing Commission Chairman Major General Alexander Belyaev in Washington, again delayed the opening of the ALSIB air route until October that year.⁵⁷⁸ Soviet officials appear to have had a change of opinion regarding the route's suitability as the Stalingrad fighting raged, and ALSIB operations began shortly after the arrival in Fairbanks of the 1st Ferrying Aviation Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Pavel Nedosekin on 24 September.⁵⁷⁹ Deliveries were disappointingly small during the first several months after ALSIB's opening, with only forty-three Lend-Lease aircraft transferred to the Soviet ferrying pilots in October 1942. Hazardous winter weather conditions along the route and the limited number of landing strips at many airbases between Great Falls and the Siberian airports also created problems that initially caused many crashes and limited the number of aircraft that could be delivered.⁵⁸⁰

Yet from April 1943 forward, Arnold and Bradley succeeded in addressing many of these issues as U.S., Canadian, and Soviet officials launched a joint effort to increase the number of landing strips at key airports located along the route, helping to exceed the monthly goal of 142

⁵⁷⁷ Arnold, *Global Mission*, 211-212, 385-387; Dolitsky, Glazkov, and Poor, *Pipeline to Russia*, 10, 52-53, 55-57; Smith, *Warplanes to Alaska*, 23-27, 29-31; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 122.

⁵⁷⁸ Hays, Jr., *The Alaska-Siberia Connection*, 37-38, 41, 43-45, 49; Smith, *Warplanes to Alaska*, 45-47, 54-56.

⁵⁷⁹ Dolitsky, Glazkov, and Poor, *Pipeline to Russia*, 36-37, 40-41, 47-49; Hays, Jr., *The Alaska-Siberia Connection*, 45, 47.

⁵⁸⁰ Hays, Jr., *The Alaska-Siberia Connection*, 49; Smith, *Warplanes to Alaska*, 55-56; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 1-4, 4-7, 114-115.

aircraft per month by the Second Protocol's expiration on 30 June 1943.⁵⁸¹ Working closely with Red Army Air Forces Colonel Anatoly Kotikov, Captain George Jordan served as a Lend-Lease control officer for the U.S. Army Air Corps at the Great Falls airbase between 1942 and 1944 after being transferred from the airbase at Newark, New Jersey. During this time, Jordan earned the praise of his Soviet counterparts due to his effective work in overseeing the transfer of thousands of U.S. planes to Soviet pilots and earned a promotion to Major on Kotikov's recommendation.⁵⁸² By the end of 1944, Jordan had reportedly transferred 8,094 fighter planes into Soviet hands over the air route from Great Falls to Krasnoyarsk, and despite the problems posed by dangerous weather, the improved airport conditions along the route enabled the safe arrival of most of these aircraft.⁵⁸³

At roughly the same time that Arnold and Bradley worked to improve ALSIB by helping to coordinate the successful U.S., Canadian, and Soviet efforts to increase air traffic capacity, Roosevelt authorized the transfer of more U.S. Liberty ships in the Pacific to Soviet control. By the summer of 1943, Soviet merchant ships, built in the United States, were safely transporting enormous amounts of food, raw materials, machine tools, and transport vehicles through Japanese territorial waters as Stalin clung to his April 1941 non-aggression pact with Hirohito.⁵⁸⁴ As emphasized by Sean McMeekin, the Soviet dictator even imprisoned U.S. bomber pilots from General James "Jimmy" Doolittle's famous Tokyo air raid in 1942 after some of the men were forced to crash land in Soviet territory. While Ambassador Standley received permission to visit

⁵⁸¹ Arnold, *Global Mission*, 211-212, 385-387; Hays, Jr., *The Alaska-Siberia Connection*, 57-58; Office, Chief of Finance War Department, "Lend-Lease Shipments World War II,"; U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, 32-34, 35-36, 46-47.

⁵⁸² Jordan, *Major Jordan's Diaries*, 19; Smith, *Warplanes to Alaska*, 94-95, 98-99.

⁵⁸³ Van Tuyl, *Feeding the Bear*, 116-117; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 120.

⁵⁸⁴ Sokolov, *The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War*, 53-55, 57-59.

the American POWs, the men were refused pardon as the Soviet leader continued placating Tokyo even as his newly acquired Liberty ships transported a total of 8,200,000 tons of material to Vladivostok by 1945 unmolested by the Japanese Navy and Air Force.⁵⁸⁵

The exorbitant amount of aid that Stalin received from the Western Allies over the Persian Corridor and through ALSIB-Pacific appears to have been unnecessary for the Soviet Union's defense as these routes were improved and capable of delivering such enormous tonnage only after early 1943.⁵⁸⁶ Until that point in time, the mariners of the Arctic convoys had served the Allied cause and greatly assisted Stalin's war effort to help the Red Army boost its defensive operations and begin driving the Germans back at Stalingrad, and they continued their courageous efforts into 1945 during the winter months only.⁵⁸⁷ As the support of countries whose defense Roosevelt deemed vital to U.S. interests served as the proclaimed purpose of Lend-Lease, it appears that opening and expanding the Persian Corridor and ALSIB were unnecessary acts that enabled Stalin's aggression. The Western Allies may have benefitted strategically by weakening Hitler's armies and preventing Stalin's subsequent expansion by merely maintaining the convoys to North Russia, which ran only during the winter yet still proved capable of boosting Soviet defenses, rather than oversupplying Moscow from Iran and Alaska.⁵⁸⁸

⁵⁸⁵ Dunn, *The Soviet Economy and the Red Army*, 80-81; Hill, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, 185; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 534-536; The New York Times, "JAPAN LETS RUSSIA GET OUR SUPPLIES."

⁵⁸⁶ Dolitsky, Glazkov, and Poor, *Pipeline to Russia*, 52-53, 55-57; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 534-536; Smith, *Warplanes to Alaska*, 113-115, 122; The New York Times, "JAPAN LETS RUSSIA GET OUR SUPPLIES."

⁵⁸⁷ Erswell and McKay, *Surviving the Arctic Convoys*, 107-109, 109-111, 131-135, 135-137, 142-144, 148-149.

⁵⁸⁸ Dolitsky, Glazkov, and Poor, *Pipeline to Russia*, 60-63, 72-75, 79-80, 84-85; Dunn, *The Red Army and the Soviet Economy*, 74, 80-81; Hays, Jr., *The Alaska-Siberia Connection*, 38-39, 51-52, 57-58; Smith, *Warplanes to Alaska*, 161-165, 173-176; Van Tuyl, *Feeding the Bear*, 54; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 124-126.

As emphasized by historian Malcolm Llewelyn-Jones of the British Naval Historical Branch, in his Preface to *The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys: A Naval Staff History*, scholars have often been somewhat misled by the sheer totals of Lend-Lease equipment delivered to the Red Army over the various supply routes.⁵⁸⁹ Llewelyn-Jones states that while the other routes delivered a larger amount of supplies, totaling more than seventy-seven percent of all deliveries as stated by London's wartime Trade Division Director Brian B. Schofield, the nearly twenty-three percent delivered by the Arctic convoys proved crucial.⁵⁹⁰ Anglo-American naval personnel faithfully delivered this aid at a time in which Stalin's Red Army faced its greatest challenges, and the 5,350 war weapons and 168,500 tons of explosives and other goods carried by PQ-18 alone, much of which arrived safely at Archangel, doubtlessly sustained many red warriors at Stalingrad and elsewhere.⁵⁹¹ Such considerable deliveries of trucks, attack aircraft, aluminum, machine tools, and food to North Russia's ports at a point in time in which all aid mattered tremendously to the Red Army surely helped to boost Stalin's fortunes at Stalingrad and the subsequent battles that crushed the Nazi invaders.⁵⁹²

⁵⁸⁹ Whitehall History Publishing – Ministry of Defence, *The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys* x-xii.

⁵⁹⁰ Schofield, *The Russian Convoys*, 206.

⁵⁹¹ Whitehall History Publishing – Ministry of Defence, *The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys*, x-xii. Jones provides the exact figures for the equipment transported by PQ-18 as totaling, "4,000 Vehicles, 800 Tanks, 550 Aircraft, 11,000 Tons of TNT, 157,500 Tons of miscellaneous and very valuable cargo."

⁵⁹² Chuikov, *The Battle for Stalingrad*, 236-239, 322-324; Whitehall History Publishing – Ministry of Defence, *The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys*, x-xii.

CHAPTER 4

CONGRESSIONAL RENEWAL OF LEND-LEASE, SOVIET ESPIONAGE AND DISINFORMATION, AND U.S. POPULAR PORTRAYALS OF STALIN'S RED ARMY

As discussed previously, U.S. Army and Army Air Corps Generals Arnold, Connolly, and Bradley succeeded in massively increasing Soviet Lend-Lease aid deliveries after spring 1943 due to their resilience in improving the conditions that had previously caused problems with the Persian Corridor and ALSIB.⁵⁹³ Roosevelt's spring 1943 transfer of many U.S. Liberty ships to Stalin's control also greatly boosted the Soviet Pacific merchant fleet's efforts to deliver supplies to the port of Vladivostok, while the Soviet premier's adherence to his neutrality pact with Tokyo prevented Japanese forces from blocking these shipments.⁵⁹⁴ Yet these efforts were undertaken after the Arctic convoys had adequately supplied the Red Army's defensive needs between 1942 and 1943, and had U.S. leaders continued relying primarily on the North Russian route, they may have armed the Soviets sufficiently without oversupplying them. Roosevelt's fears of a second Brest-Litovsk, fears with historical roots that were exacerbated by the continued presence of German troops on Soviet soil in 1943 and Stalin's delay in meeting him until the Tehran Conference, prevented him from making such a rational, pragmatic move, ensuring the oversupplying of the Red Army during the Third Protocol period.⁵⁹⁵

This chapter discusses the results of Roosevelt's decision and the ways in which Stalin's Red Army appears to have benefitted from the overwhelming amount of Lend-Lease material

⁵⁹³ Arnold, *Global Mission*, 211-212, 385-387; Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power*, 165; Dolitsky, Glazkov, and Poor, *Pipeline to Russia*, 10, 52-53, 55-57; Smith, *Warplanes to Alaska*, 23-27, 29-31; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 122.

⁵⁹⁴ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 534-536; The New York Times, "JAPAN LETS RUSSIA GET OUR SUPPLIES."

⁵⁹⁵ Arnold, *Global Mission*, 259; Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, 25, 69-70; Office, Chief of Finance War Department, "Lend-Lease Shipments World War II,"; U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, 55, 57-61, 66-71, 76, 79-83.

that flowed primarily from U.S. military supply centers in Iran and Alaska after the congressional renewal of the program in spring 1943. It also discusses the role of the U.S. home front in producing war material for the Red Army, the popular media's portrayal of Stalin's soldiers for American public consumption, and the successes of Soviet spies and agents of influence in aiding Moscow's espionage and disinformation efforts. While the Soviet victories at Stalingrad and Kursk were hailed and recognized by Allied leaders at the time as vitally important to Germany's defeat, Roosevelt opted to ensure that Brest-Litovsk could not be repeated and gambled on speeding the Soviet offensives that launched the Red Army into Europe. Resulting from Washington's underestimation of the Red Army and total commitment to Germany's unconditional surrender, these efforts hastened Hitler's defeat while simultaneously ensuring that Stalin could dominate Eastern Europe as Roosevelt miscalculated in his estimation of the Soviet leader's character.⁵⁹⁶

As the U.S. wartime economy gathered strength through massive production throughout 1942, Stalin's diplomatic efforts bore fruit as Roosevelt and Hopkins gradually assumed greater responsibility and continued zealously supplying their Soviet ally.⁵⁹⁷ Alexander Hill states that while the Red Army alone had defended Moscow and won at Stalingrad, with the crucial help of Lend-Lease supplies, by the middle of 1943 U.S. trucks, jeeps, and railroad cars had begun helping Soviet forces transition to the strategic offensive.⁵⁹⁸ During the desperate months of fighting to drive back the Nazi assault, Soviet factory workers had produced thousands of tanks and aircraft, with the help of U.S. aluminum in 1942 and 1943, while motorized transportation

⁵⁹⁶ Folsom, Jr., and Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 246-249, 251; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 347-350, 352-357, 370-371.

⁵⁹⁷ Chairman of the Board, Tennessee Valley Authority, "Lend-Lease Program With Russia,"; U.S. President, "Statement on Raw Materials, Munition Assignments, and Shipping Adjustment Boards."

⁵⁹⁸ Hill, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, 183, 187.

had been largely neglected.⁵⁹⁹ As emphasized by Robert Jones, Walter Dunn, and Sean McMeekin, Lend-Lease deliveries more than compensated for the Red Army's lack of trucks and helped enable Zhukov's powerful, mobile counteroffensive at Stalingrad.⁶⁰⁰

As shown in the previous chapter, many of these trucks and jeeps that aided in Operation *Uranus* had been delivered by the Arctic convoys by the time of Zhukov's famous counterattack, and Roosevelt's subsequent expansion of the Persian Corridor and ALSIB appears to have far overcompensated for Soviet industry's lagging motor vehicle production. As Stalin's commanders gradually assumed the offensive, delivering powerful blows to the Nazi invaders after Stalingrad, Lend-Lease Studebaker trucks assumed tremendous importance, serving as infantry and artillery transportation to the frontlines.⁶⁰¹ The trucks also served as mounting platforms for the formidable Katyusha multiple-rocket launchers known to German troops as "Stalin's Pipe Organs."⁶⁰² While the Soviet arsenal already boasted powerful ordnance, Hill argues that Lend-Lease transport vehicles enabled the victorious offensives conducted by Stalin's generals by transporting more firepower to the battlefield, allowing the Red Army to seize the strategic initiative.⁶⁰³ Albert Weeks concludes in his 2004 book *Russia's Life-Saver* that without Stalin's successful procurement of U.S. transport vehicles, the Red Army may have suffered even greater losses in driving the Germans out of Nazi-occupied Soviet territory.⁶⁰⁴

In the summer of 1943, Soviet forces followed up the Stalingrad victory by inflicting

⁵⁹⁹ Ibid., 183, 187; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 115-117.

⁶⁰⁰ Dunn, *The Red Army and the Soviet Economy*, 74; Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 139, 152; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 409-410, 412-414, 416-417, 423-424, 425-427.

⁶⁰¹ Chuikov, *The Battle for Stalingrad*, 215-217, 227-229; Clark, *Barbarossa*, 273, 278; Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, 238-239.

⁶⁰² Clark, *Barbarossa*, 273, 278.

⁶⁰³ Hill, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, 187; Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, 238-239.

⁶⁰⁴ Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 126-127.

another resounding defeat on the Nazi invaders at the Battle of Kursk as the Western Allies landed troops in Sicily, heralding a bloody campaign as the Anglo-American forces fought their way up the Italian Peninsula against well-entrenched German forces.⁶⁰⁵ As Sean McMeekin points out, Generals Hermann “Papa” Hoth and Erich von Manstein had deployed many of Berlin’s new Panther and Tiger tanks, the former of which should not have been built due to its multiple problems according to tank authority Steven Zaloga, for Operation *Citadel*, their Kursk offensive.⁶⁰⁶ Yet Generals Zhukov and Konstantin Rokossovsky had cleverly prepared a series of anti-tank death traps for the Germans, and the Soviet T-34 crews successfully lured many of them into hidden land mines and lethal ambushes from concealed, entrenched Soviet tanks and artillery pieces. After achieving victory after several bloody months during the Battle of Kursk, Zhukov’s armies continued racing ahead, recapturing Soviet territory and remaining on the offensive as they continued receiving an avalanche of Lend-Lease trucks, planes, and raw materials and Hitler transferred several powerful German divisions to face the Allied advance in Italy.⁶⁰⁷

Throughout 1944, the Red Army carried out ten powerful “Stalinist blows” against German forces from the Arctic to Romania, recapturing vast territories and ultimately reaching the borders of Hitler’s Third Reich.⁶⁰⁸ By the beginning of the year, the successful deliveries of transport vehicles to the North Russian ports, to Soviet Azerbaijan from General Connolly’s U.S. Army assembly plants in Iran, and from U.S.-built Soviet merchant ships in the Pacific had resulted in a mass accumulation of wheeled motor vehicles. Lend-Lease deliveries continued

⁶⁰⁵ Glantz, *Colossus Reborn*, 22, 27, 40-41, 43, 58.

⁶⁰⁶ McMeekin, *Stalin’s War*, 457-462, 465-473.

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁸ Hill, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, 220-221; Stalin, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, 144.

into 1945, eventually resulting in a combined total of 471,257 trucks and jeeps, with U.S. Studebakers forming the largest portion of these vehicles.⁶⁰⁹ This preponderance of military transport vehicles provided by Lend-Lease helped Stalin and his senior commanders to produce a fully motorized, mobile Red Army capable of maintaining the strategic offensive against Germany.⁶¹⁰

As mentioned previously, thousands of Lend-Lease Studebakers, delivered through the routes to North Russia and Iran, formed the mobile backbone of Zhukov's exemplary counteroffensive at Stalingrad, reportedly resulting in 300,000 German casualties.⁶¹¹ The Studebakers enabled Stalin to strengthen the Red Army with the creation of mobile infantry units, equipping Soviet infantrymen with faster striking capability and the ability to quickly reinforce the armored units. The Arctic convoys delivered thousands of these trucks to North Russia in the spring and summer of 1942 and some began arriving in Iran near the end of the year, allowing the Red Army to rush infantry units to the Stalingrad region to support the November counterattack.⁶¹² During the 1943 Battle of Kursk and the subsequent offensives, Studebakers continued to reinforce the Red Army's advance, providing mobile infantry support and serving as platforms for the powerful Katyusha rockets.⁶¹³

In addition to the overwhelming numbers of Studebakers delivered to the Soviet Union, several types of U.S. Army infantry support and armored fighting vehicles were also delivered in significant quantities, further increasing the Red Army's battlefield mobility. Produced in large

⁶⁰⁹ Hill, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, 239; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 124-126.

⁶¹⁰ Office, Chief of Finance War Department, "Lend-Lease Shipments."

⁶¹¹ Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 232.

⁶¹² Ibid., 60-62; Pastorfield-Li, "An excerpt from an interview with a Soviet soldier."

⁶¹³ Clark, *Barbarossa*, 212.

numbers by the White Motor Company in Cleveland, Ohio, the M3A1 “White” armored scout car greatly improved the Red Army’s reconnaissance and infantry support capabilities.⁶¹⁴ In his memoir, Eddie Rickenbacker recalls his Soviet driver making positive comments about the performance of U.S. jeeps while escorting him in one to view Soviet P-39 fighters during his June 1943 visit to the Soviet Union.⁶¹⁵ Between 29 June and 4 July 1943, Soviet forces recaptured the region around Minsk, inflicting more than 140,000 casualties on the Nazi occupiers as the Red Army surged forward in tanks and aircraft built with the help of U.S. aluminum and supported by mobile infantry driven in American-provided Studebaker trucks.⁶¹⁶

While junior Red Army commanders often rated the quality of British and U.S. tanks poorly, the vehicles bought crucial time for Soviet workers to produce domestic models in greater quantities and helped compensate for battlefield losses of Soviet models.⁶¹⁷ As previously noted, Hitler’s forces had captured entire factories and industrial centers during their 1941 advance into Soviet Ukraine, and while Stalin’s commissars had overseen the transportation of many factories to safety beyond the Ural Mountains, many others quickly fell into enemy hands.⁶¹⁸ Due to the loss of several enormous ammunition factories, Stalin’s diplomats requested and began receiving large amounts of ammunition and Thompson submachine guns from the United States as the Lend-Lease program gained momentum in 1942.⁶¹⁹ Throughout 1942 and 1943, ammunition and small arms from U.S. factories helped to

⁶¹⁴ Ibid., 143; Weeks, *Russia’s Life-Saver*, 122.

⁶¹⁵ Rickenbacker, *Rickenbacker*, 403.

⁶¹⁶ Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 246; Stalin, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, 103, 122, 133-134.

⁶¹⁷ Hill, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, 184, 186-187; Loza, *Commanding the Red Army’s Sherman Tanks*, 57; McMeekin, *Stalin’s War*, 417, 430, 460-461, 542, 642.

⁶¹⁸ Glantz, *Colossus Reborn*, 172-173.

⁶¹⁹ Stettinius, Jr., *Lend-Lease*, 234-235.

reinforce the Red Army's dogged resistance, and after the expansion of the Iranian supply route, guns and bullets flowed to Stalin's troops in the field at an unprecedented and excessive level.⁶²⁰

While the U.S. Sherman tanks lacked the sloped frontal armor and wide tracks of the Soviet T-34s, their battlefield presence enabled the Red Army's commanders to reinforce their units while factory workers struggled to produce the higher quality Soviet models.⁶²¹ Alexander Hill points to the participation of many British Valentine and Matilda tanks in the Red Army's counterattack around Moscow on 6 December 1941. During the spring fighting of 1942, Sherman tanks began arriving in North Russia and Iran in growing numbers, and by 1943 General Zhukov had organized entire tank battalions of Lend-Lease vehicles.⁶²²

U.S. aluminum played a vital role in the Soviet war effort, enabling Soviet workers to continue producing the world's most effective combat vehicles, the T-34 and IS-2 "Stalin" tanks.⁶²³ Together, the medium T-34 and the heavy IS-2 served as a powerful armored duo capable of destroying the strongest German tanks in the field and have rightly been credited by scholars as the tools that helped the Red Army to outfight the Nazi invaders and form the armored spearheads of its subsequent thrust into Hitler's doomed Reich. These machines also required aluminum alloy motors, an ingredient that Hitler's forces had jeopardized with their 1941 capture of the Zaporozhia and Tikhvin aluminum production centers, and Soviet technicians depended heavily on U.S. aluminum shipments to continue producing them.⁶²⁴

⁶²⁰ Werth, *Russia at War*, 171, 243, 249-252.

⁶²¹ Zaloga, *Soviet Lend-Lease Tanks*, 34-35.

⁶²² Forczyk, Robert A. *Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller* (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword, 2017), 231, 245; Hill, *The Great Patriotic War*, 185-186.

⁶²³ Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 220-221; Stettinius, Jr., *Lend-Lease*, 252.

⁶²⁴ Hill, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, 191; Zaloga and Grandsen, *Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles of World War Two*, 166.

U.S. aluminum also helped the Soviet war industry to maintain air support for the Red Army by providing the factory workers with a key component for the construction of aircraft armor.⁶²⁵ Soviet aircraft engineers had designed aluminum armor for the I-16 and Il-2 *Sturmovik* fighters, and Stalin consistently requested the material in his telegrams to Churchill and Roosevelt throughout the war and in his meeting with Hopkins in the Kremlin in July 1941.⁶²⁶ Ultimately, U.S. aluminum shipments provided more than fifty-five percent of the aluminum used in the Soviet wartime production of aircraft armor and tank motors, helping the Red Army to outproduce and outmatch its Nazi opponent in the air and on the battlefield.⁶²⁷

In addition to military transport, Lend-Lease also provided Soviet frontline troops and factory workers with more than 4,500,000 tons of food during the war and, as previously discussed, food deliveries appear to have increased significantly by the time of PQ-18's successful voyage in September 1942.⁶²⁸ This sustenance, along with Stalin's vicious enforcement of military discipline by ordering the executions of alleged deserters, appears to have helped the Red Army's generals and GRU agents to combat Nazi propaganda efforts aimed at inciting Soviet soldiers to mutiny as Russian troops had done in 1917.⁶²⁹ U.S. canned goods and other foodstuffs supplied through Lend-Lease helped the Red Army's commanders to keep their men and women fed, fighting, and ready to take the battle to their hated enemy while the Lend-Lease aluminum and machine tools that Stalin emphasized as crucial helped Soviet workers to continue producing the armaments needed for the task.⁶³⁰ Hitler's occupation of the

⁶²⁵ Stettinius, Jr., *Lend-Lease*, 254.

⁶²⁶ Kotelnikov, *Lend-Lease and Soviet Aviation*, 144-145.

⁶²⁷ Curtis, "Lend-Lease."

⁶²⁸ Hill, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, 187.

⁶²⁹ Khlevniuk, *Stalin*, 212, 213-214.

⁶³⁰ Ibid., 215; Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, 238-239.

Soviet Union's major agricultural centers in Ukraine is said to have often caused Stalin to privately express fears of mutiny in the Red Army ranks.⁶³¹

One of the first historians to emphasize the importance of food to the Red Army, Weeks concludes that without the bacon, canned beef, eggs, soup, and vegetables supplied by Lend-Lease, mass starvation may have forced Stalin to the bargaining table.⁶³² In the spring of 1942, U.S. farmers began helping to sustain the Red Army by producing the eggs, meat, beef, and powdered milk delivered through Lend-Lease. Spam and eggs reportedly became the favorite foods of Soviet soldiers, and these crucial deliveries allowed Soviet workers to continue their production efforts despite Stalin's strict enforcement of rationing.⁶³³ This sustenance helped Stalin's NKVD propagandists to combat Nazi propaganda efforts aimed at persuading Soviet soldiers to mutiny against the Communists as the Russian Army had done against Kerensky's Provisional Government in 1917.⁶³⁴ Despite the Germans' capture of much of Ukraine's farmland in 1942, U.S. canned goods and other food items helped Stalin to keep the Red Army's men and women fed and ready for battle and thereby allocate the available Soviet-produced food to Soviet workers.⁶³⁵

The Red Army's 1944 "Stalinist blows" that Lend-Lease helped to enable included sweeping Nazi forces from long-besieged Leningrad, recapturing Minsk, defeating Finland and Romania, recapturing the Baltic States, liberating the Crimean Peninsula, and driving into

⁶³¹ Sudoplatov and Sudoplatov, *Special Tasks*, 226-227.

⁶³² Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 133.

⁶³³ Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, 195-196.

⁶³⁴ Khlevniuk, 212, 215.

⁶³⁵ Nikolai Litvin, *800 Days on the Eastern Front*, 9, 50; Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, 238-239.

Hungary and the Carpathian Mountains.⁶³⁶ No longer able to assume the strategic initiative, even temporarily, Nazi forces braced for the defense of German soil as Stalin's newly mechanized Red Army continued to surge forward rapidly. As the tank divisions spearheaded the advancing armies of Generals Zhukov, Rokossovsky, and Ivan Konev, they were constantly reinforced by steady streams of Soviet infantrymen riding into battle in their Studebakers.⁶³⁷

As the T-34 and IS tanks advanced, powered by diesel motors made from U.S. aluminum, their crews could fight confidently knowing that streams of mobile infantry support followed closely behind, preventing them from becoming isolated "islands" surrounded by a hostile sea of enemies.⁶³⁸ This increased combat effectiveness, enhanced by a constant flow of U.S. Lend-Lease material, propelled the Red Army to victory as Soviet troops evicted the Nazi occupiers, liberating countless starving prisoners from the horrors of Hitler's death camps.⁶³⁹ As they advanced throughout late 1944 and into early 1945, however, Stalin's commanders were also followed closely by NKVD and GRU men to help ensure the rise of Communist regimes in the liberated countries, regimes that subsequently resumed the oppression of Eastern Europeans for another half-century.⁶⁴⁰

In addition, the Red Army's liberation operations that saved many innocents from the Nazis' murderous clutches did not always bring health and safety to Hitler's victims and targets of extermination. In some ways, the actions of Stalin's soldiers can also be said to have

⁶³⁶ Hill, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, 241-243; Stalin, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, 128-130.

⁶³⁷ Glantz, *Colossus Reborn*, 614-615; Sokolov, *Marshal K. K. Rokossovsky*, 173-175, 177, 179-181, 215; Zhukov, *Marshal of Victory Vol. 2*, 79-80, 287-289, 411.

⁶³⁸ Zaloga and Grandsen, *Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles of World War Two*, 154-155.

⁶³⁹ Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 133.

⁶⁴⁰ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 650-652, 653-657; Weeks, *Stalin's Other War*, 181-183, 185-188.

exacerbated the problems faced by many Holocaust survivors as the Red Army struck deep into Nazi-occupied Eastern Europe, even as the Soviet troops liberated many death camps and concentration camps.⁶⁴¹ In his insightful article “Red Army Troops Encounter the Holocaust: Transnistria, Moldavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Austria, 1944-1945,” Dr. Vojin Majstorovic points out that Soviet forces burdened the Jewish citizens of Subotica, Yugoslavia in October 1944 with demands that they furnish them with warm clothing, pillows, and blankets.⁶⁴²

According to Dr. Majstorovic, Red Army commanders sometimes threatened the newly liberated Jewish communities with death for not prioritizing the comfort of the advancing Soviet soldiers over their own wellbeing, further impoverishing many families already long suffering from the ravages of Hitler’s persecution.⁶⁴³ As Stalin’s forces advanced through Hungary in December 1944, Soviet commanders ordered local civilians, including many Jews that had been forced to perform mine-clearing operations by the Nazis, to be treated as prisoners of war. This action is said to have resulted in more than 30,000 Hungarian Jews being deported to imprisonment in Soviet captivity.⁶⁴⁴

While the Red Army’s leadership did not systematically target Jewish civilians for cruel treatment based on their heritage as the Nazis had done, Stalin’s Kremlin also appears to have refused any official recognition of the sufferings of Hitler’s Jewish victims while subjecting

⁶⁴¹ Vojin Majstorovic, “Red Army Troops Encounter the Holocaust: Transnistria, Moldavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Austria, 1944-1945,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, Vol. 32, Issue 2 (Fall 2018), 249-271.

⁶⁴² Majstorovic, “Red Army Troops Encounter the Holocaust,” 253-254.

⁶⁴³ Majstorovic, “Red Army Troops Encounter the Holocaust,” 257-259.

⁶⁴⁴ Ibid.; McMeekin, *Stalin’s War*, 610-611.

them to the same forced confiscation and theft of property as their non-Jewish compatriots.⁶⁴⁵ Despite not being condoned or incorporated into official Soviet government policy at the time, such self-serving acts on the part of some Red Army officers and soldiers demanding and taking the property of Hitler's victims seem to indicate a demand for compensation in exchange for liberating countless people targeted for death by the Nazis as they advanced. In April 1945, the 1st and 2nd Belarusian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts, respectively under Zhukov, Rokossovsky, and Konev fought their way into Berlin and captured the Nazi capital on 2 May even as they attacked each other to obtain Stalin's favor, reportedly inflicting another 300,000 casualties in their own Red Army ranks.⁶⁴⁶

Yet for all their martial talents, Stalin's commanders may have sustained much heavier losses and been greatly delayed first in executing their tide-turning counterattacks and later switching to the strategic offensive had they been denied their regular, reliable shipments of Lend-Lease trucks, aircraft, aluminum, machine tools, and food.⁶⁴⁷ Equally, had Roosevelt and Churchill not endeavored to keep Stalin in the war as a member of the Allies, the U.S., British, Canadian, Australian, Polish, Free French, and other Allied armies that stormed Nazi-occupied Normandy on 6 June 1944 may have been driven back into the sea. Ultimately, it was this combined Allied effort that stymied Hitler's attempt to dominate Eurasia, yet the Anglo-American leaders also appear to have unnecessarily increased the flow of arms and aid to Stalin's soldiers beginning in 1943. This effort, while valiantly ensuring Hitler's defeat, also proved deadly in over-arming Stalin's forces, enabling them to conquer Eastern Europe, and had

⁶⁴⁵ Majstorovic, "Red Army Troops Encounter the Holocaust," 261-262; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 610-611.

⁶⁴⁶ Clark, *Barbarossa*, 453-455, 490-495, 503-504; Glantz, *Colossus Reborn*, 614-615, 617-619, 623-627; Sokolov, *Marshal K. K. Rokossovsky*, 173-175, 177, 179-181, 215; Zhukov, *Marshal of Victory Vol. 2*, 79-80, 287-289, 411.

⁶⁴⁷ Sokolov, *The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War*, 57-59; U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Diaries of Henry Morgenthau, Jr.," Series 2, "Russian Clearance Problems."

Roosevelt not expanded his Soviet supply program in 1943, he may have been able to thwart the aims of two tyrants rather than one.⁶⁴⁸

Stalin's Red Army appears to have been greatly boosted, particularly in its mobility, by the Lend-Lease deliveries that helped enable the Stalingrad counterattack, yet some U.S. journalists, such as Henry Cassidy and Leland Stowe, seem to have concluded that more needed to be done. While Lend-Lease aid appears to have already begun making a crucial, positive contribution to the Soviet war effort by 1943, a discernible fact at the time as indicated by Hull's praise of the Red Army in *The New York Times*, Americans continued to produce for Stalin as newspapers and magazines extolled Moscow's valiant fight.⁶⁴⁹ Just as Roosevelt, Hull, Hopkins, Knox, and other leading U.S. officials seem to have readily embraced the need to supply Stalin's Red Army almost from the moment that Hitler attacked his former strategic partner, popular news reports began extolling the bold efforts by the Soviet soldiers resisting Berlin's aggression. Margaret Bourke-White's photographs of the German bombing of Moscow in the summer of 1941 that were subsequently published in *Life* magazine humanized the Soviet struggle for American readers, and her praise of Stalin's leadership appeared in *The New York Times* even before the Pearl Harbor attack.⁶⁵⁰

As the fighting on the Eastern Front raged in early 1942, Americans were increasingly subjected to portrayals of Stalin as a courageous war chief leading a bold, defiant people against freedom's greatest enemies in Berlin. Ronald Smelser and Edward Davies point out that even the most traditionally conservative Americans began to express admiration for the characteristics of Generals Zhukov and Semion Timoshenko as newspaper reports and popular magazine

⁶⁴⁸ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 605-608; U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, 147-149, 155-156.

⁶⁴⁹ The New York Times, "HULL PRAISES RED ARMY."

⁶⁵⁰ Bourke-White, *Portrait of Myself*, 183-184, 187-188.

articles emphasized both men's humble beginnings.⁶⁵¹ Throughout 1942 and 1943, these two Red Army generals, among others, were portrayed as rugged, freedom-loving outdoorsmen that preferred family time, fishing, and horseback riding to waging war or praising Communism. Such reports appear to have contributed to a popular wartime perception of Stalin and his senior military commanders as essentially being Communists in name only and men that were merely fighting to defend their families, culture, and even faith from Teutonic barbarity and therefore merited nothing less than the maximum support that Americans could provide.⁶⁵²

While Smelser and Davies emphasize the fact that these perceptions evaporated rapidly after the Allied victory in 1945, they certainly appear to have remained the prevailing U.S. view of Stalin's military leadership and the Red Army while Berlin and Tokyo remained the most immediate threats to free men and women.⁶⁵³ Moreover, as prominent Americans met with Stalin, a wartime image of the Soviet premier as a rational, businesslike leader emerged as popular media portrayed him as a moderate Communist that readily embraced capitalists, an image that appears to have contributed to Roosevelt's misjudgment of the Kremlin leader.⁶⁵⁴ On 5 October 1942, former Republican presidential candidate Wendell Willkie, then serving as a special envoy for Roosevelt, published a gushing report on Stalin in *Life* magazine about his recent visit to the Soviet premier in Moscow, praising the Red Army's, "great fight" against the Nazis.⁶⁵⁵ Enhanced by several accompanying photographs of Soviet combat units, Willkie's

⁶⁵¹ Detroit Evening Times, "Drive on Caucasus Oil Smashed,"; Smelser and Davies II, *The Myth of the Eastern Front*, 35-38.

⁶⁵² Detroit Evening Times, "Drive on Caucasus Oil Smashed,"; Smelser and Davis II, *The Myth of the Eastern Front*, 35-38.

⁶⁵³ Smelser and Davis II, *The Myth of the Eastern Front*, 7-8, 9-11.

⁶⁵⁴ Melvin Small, "How We Learned to Love the Russians: American Media and the Soviet Union During World War II," *The Historian*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (May 1974), 455-478, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24443747>.

⁶⁵⁵ Wendell Willkie, "STALIN: 'GLAD TO SEE YOU, MR. WILLKIE' Through LIFE Roosevelt's personal representative reports on his interview on war in the Kremlin," *LIFE*, 5 October 1942, 35-38.

article proceeded to emphasize Stalin's commitment to defending Soviet soil at all costs regardless of the losses of Ukrainian farmland before turning to his brief command post visit with the Soviet leader.⁶⁵⁶

In a 5 September 1942 *Indianapolis Times* article, war correspondent Leland Stowe, whose reports sometimes quoted Stalin's ridicule of U.S. tanks and demands for a second front, painted a vivid picture of the Red Army's valiant defensive efforts for his readers, discussing the clothing of local villagers and the daily struggle they faced as the fighting raged near Rzhev.⁶⁵⁷ While the horrors of the Holocaust were still virtually unknown, many Americans, including their president, were familiar with the German Army's reputation for cruelty during the First World War, and Stowe's report emphasized the brutality of Nazi soldiers in starving locals and reportedly striking Soviet babies crying in hunger according to local eyewitnesses.⁶⁵⁸ News articles such as Stowe's appear to have led a growing number of Americans to sympathize with the Soviet people and admire the Red Army's determined struggle, and the enormous amount of metal scrap that Americans contributed in numerous "scrap drives" across the country continued to fuel U.S. war production, boosting Lend-Lease.⁶⁵⁹

As the war progressed, Americans continued to receive regular reports on the Red Army's efforts even as U.S. soldiers and Marines fought doggedly against their Japanese

⁶⁵⁶ Willkie, "STALIN: 'GLAD TO SEE YOU, MR. WILLKIE,'" 35.

⁶⁵⁷ Leland Stowe, "Stowe, in Visit to Rzhev Sector Which Is Ideal for Mechanized Warfare, Marvels at Success of Russian Defenders," *Indianapolis Times*, 5 September 1942, <https://newspapers.library.in.gov/?a=d&d=IPT19420905.1.5&e=-----en-20--1--txt-txIN----->. For one such example of Stowe's quoting of a young Red Army major parroting Stalin's line on Lend-Lease tanks and expressing a desire to receive more, "Airacobras or other first-class American warplanes," see Leland Stowe, "Russian Question: When Will U.S. Help?" *Indianapolis Times*, 3 November 1942, <https://newspapers.library.in.gov/?a=d&d=IPT19421103.1.20&e=-----en-20--1--txt-txIN----->.

⁶⁵⁸ Stowe, "Stowe, in Visit to Rzhev Sector."

⁶⁵⁹ Leland Stowe, "The Evolution of the Red Army," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1943, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1943-10-01/evolution-red-army>.

adversaries in the Pacific Theater and the Nazi enemy in North Africa and the Mediterranean.⁶⁶⁰

In addition to major newspapers such as *The New York Times*, newspaper reports regularly appeared in the *Evening Star*, *Indianapolis Times*, and others commending the Red Army's stubborn defiance of the merciless Nazi war machine.⁶⁶¹ In addition to regular media reporting in newspapers and popular magazines in the civilian sector, U.S. military publications sometimes featured stories on the Soviet war effort and kept American servicemen and servicewomen informed of events on the Eastern Front.⁶⁶²

Edward Carter's RWR continued holding mass rallies in support of donating medical supplies to the Red Army in Madison Square Garden, and on one such occasion in 1942, Hopkins and Soviet Ambassador Maxim Litvinov attended to voice their staunch support for the Soviet cause and RWR's efforts, with the former committing the United States to, "A second front? Yes, and if necessary, a third and a fourth front."⁶⁶³ At this 22 June 1942 event marking

⁶⁶⁰ Detroit Evening Times (Unattributed Report), "Drive on Caucasus Oil Smashed, Reds Claim Nazis Lose 95,000 at Kharkov, Huge Battle Reported Near End, *Detroit Evening Times*, 31 May 1942, <https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn88063294/1942-05-31/ed-1/seq-1/ocr/>; Madera Tribune (Unattributed Report), "Reds Approaching Kiev; RUSS ARMIES CUT GERMAN DEFENSE ARC; Berlin Command Has Ordered Evacuation Of Key City Started," *Madera Tribune*, 11 October 1943, <https://cdnc.ucr.edu/cgi-bin/cdnc?a=d&d=MT19431011.2.14&e=-----en--20--1--txt-txIN-----1>.

⁶⁶¹ Leland Stowe, "Miracles of Red Army Credited In Large Part to Its Women: Thousands Serve as Guards, Gunners, Telegraphers, Storekeepers and Nurses," *Evening Star*, 31 October 1942, https://www.newspaperarchive.com/gazete/evening_star/1942-10-31/7/; The Brainerd Daily Dispatch, "BATTLE ON DON RIVER BANK; Report Big Air-Sea Battle Fought," *The Brainerd Daily Dispatch* (Unattributed Report), 10 July 1942, <https://newspaperarchive.com/brainerd-daily-dispatch-jul-10-1942-p-1/>.

⁶⁶² Conrad H. Lanza, "Russo-German War Part II: Second Phase of the War – Smolensk and Uman," *The Field Artillery Journal* (July 1942), 512-522, https://tracofcoeccafcoepfwprod.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/fires-bulletin-archive/1942/JUL_1942/JUL_1942_FULL_EDITION.pdf; Small, "How We Learned to Love the Russians," 457-462; Leland Stowe, "Nazi Army Fears Second Winter Of War in Russia, Reds Claim; Captured Germans Say Morale of Hitler's Forces Is Low as Bitter Cold Sets In," *Evening Star*, 2 November 1942, https://www.newspaperarchive.com/gazete/evening_star/1942-11-02/26.

⁶⁶³ Carter, "Russian War Relief," 67; Jordan, *Major Jordan's Diaries*, 9; The New York Times, "Addresses of Litvinoff, Hopkins and Green,"; The New York Times (Unattributed Report), "MILLION A MONTH AID IS SHIPPED TO SOVIET; Russian War Relief Hopes to Continue Rate Through 1943," *The New York Times*, 27 April 1943, <https://www.nytimes.com/1943/04/27/archives/million-a-month-aid-is-shipped-to-soviet-russian-war-relief-hopes.html>.

the first anniversary of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, Hopkins publicly vowed to Litvinov that, “nothing shall stop us from sharing with you all that we have and are in this conflict” after praising the Red Army’s effective anti-Nazi efforts for providing, “all humanity a service that can never be repaid.”⁶⁶⁴ The former Commerce Secretary and Lend-Lease architect labored to make good on his public promise that he made in Litvinov’s presence and reportedly proceeded to authorize the transfer of highly sensitive material to satisfy Stalin and keep him in the war against Hitler.⁶⁶⁵

A 6 October 1942 report for *The Tampa Tribune* emphasized recent statements by Soviet Ambassador Litvinov in Washington telling Under Secretary Sumner Welles that the Red Army required more material aid. The report further alleged that deliveries up to that point were not enough considering the Soviet Union’s immense sacrifices, essentially parroting the Kremlin’s claims.⁶⁶⁶ The article concluded by echoing Litvinov’s complaint about Welles’s alleged unwillingness to discuss the urgent need for, “a second front,” while quoting Stalin’s claim that the Red Army continued facing, “the main force of the German Fascist” with, “little effective” aid from the West.⁶⁶⁷

Upon returning to the United States from the Soviet Union in February 1943, war correspondent Cassidy stated that “the Russian people” were in full agreement with the Soviet premier’s recently voiced satisfaction with the ongoing Anglo-American efforts in North

⁶⁶⁴ Carter, “Russian War Relief,” 67; Jordan, *Major Jordan’s Diaries*, 9; The New York Times, “Addresses of Litvinoff, Hopkins and Green,”; McMeekin, *Stalin’s War*, 487-488.

⁶⁶⁵ *Cong. Rec. – House of Representatives*, 81st Cong. 1st and 2nd Sess. (1949-1950); Jordan, *Major Jordan’s Diaries*, 36-38, 40-41, 42-44; McMeekin, *Stalin’s War*, 531-534.

⁶⁶⁶ Associated Press, “U.S., Britain To Ask Russian Clarification,” *The Tampa Tribune*, 6 October 1942, <https://www.newspapers.com/newspage/327196525/>.

⁶⁶⁷ Associated Press, “U.S., Britain to Ask.”

Africa.⁶⁶⁸ In an interview with Clark Lee of *Evening Star*, Cassidy stated that Stalin had gleefully referred to the Operation *Torch* landings as a “prelude” to a second front and believed that the Red Army could take the offensive in 1944 with the help of more Lend-Lease aid.⁶⁶⁹ On 4 January 1943, *TIME* magazine named Stalin “Man of the Year” and published a glowing article about the Soviet premier. Playing on American perceptions of the Red Army as the underdog in its anti-Nazi struggle, the *TIME* report hailed Stalin’s military leadership as the key factor in repelling the Nazis at Moscow and Stalingrad, while openly praising Cassidy’s reports, portraying Stalin as non-revolutionary, and blaming American, “prejudice” for previous tensions.⁶⁷⁰

In a 28 June 1944 article for *The New York Times*, William H. Lawrence trumpeted Stalin’s recent meeting with U.S. Chamber of Commerce President Eric Johnston in Moscow in the presence of Ambassador Harriman. In keeping with wartime media tradition and Washington’s prevailing perceptions at the time, Lawrence’s report included for his readers an appraisal of the Soviet premier as pro-business and open to moderation, citing his “high praise to the job done by American business, labor and agriculture and by the United States government in aiding the Soviet Union’s victorious war effort.”⁶⁷¹ On 9 July, the Soviet newspaper *Izvestia* published a letter from Johnston to Stalin in which the U.S. Chamber of Commerce official

⁶⁶⁸ Clark Lee, “Threat of Allies-Stalin Crisis Averted, A. P. War Writer Says; Cassidy, Back From Moscow, Sees Russia Satisfied on Second Front Issue,” *Evening Star*, 28 February 1943, <https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83045462/1943-02-28/ed-1/seq-18/>.

⁶⁶⁹ Lee, “Threat of Allies-Stalin Crisis Averted.”

⁶⁷⁰ *TIME* (Unattributed Report), “INTERNATIONAL: Die, But Do Not Retreat,” *TIME*, Vol. XLI, No. 1 (4 January 1943), 1-6, <https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,790648,00.html>.

⁶⁷¹ William H. Lawrence, “STALIN LAUDS U.S. FOR AID TO SOVIET; Cites ‘Remarkable’ Production Job in Long Interview With Johnston and Harriman,” *The New York Times*, 28 June 1944, <https://www.nytimes.com/1944/06/28/archives/stalin-lauds-us-for-aid-to-soviet-cites-remarkable-production-job.html>; Small, “How We Learned to Love the Russians,” 457-462.

praised the massive leaps in Soviet industry and commended the Soviet leader's ongoing efforts to lead the Red Army to victory. Ambassador Harriman forwarded the letter to Secretary Hull and, summing up the administration's official, prevailing views, Johnston subsequently authored an article in *Reader's Digest* echoing its contents, praising Stalin's, "inspiring" leadership and wishing him, "good health for many years and [a] speedy victory over our common enemy."⁶⁷²

Reports such as these that praised Stalin in various ways and portrayed him as a moderate Communist leader with capitalistic tendencies appear to have helped contribute to Roosevelt's naivete regarding the Soviet ruler and fueled his perception that extravagant U.S. aid could motivate him to turn away from orthodox Communism. The earlier experience of industrialists like Stettinius, Henry Ford, Albert Kahn, and other leading American businessmen that Stalin welcomed to conduct business in the 1930s doubtlessly contributed to Roosevelt's false sense of security in believing that the Kremlin could not enforce its totalitarian rule for much longer.⁶⁷³ As discussed previously, the earlier experiences of these men, several of whom worked in Roosevelt's administration or contributed to Soviet Lend-Lease in other ways, appears to have played a part in the president's official recognition of Stalin's regime in 1933. As his friend William Bullitt discovered after trying to persuade him to get concessions from Stalin, Roosevelt had long ago fallen for the Soviet premier's clever ruse that masked his adherence to Communist orthodoxy, and his portrayal in wartime U.S. media only reinforced this view.⁶⁷⁴

⁶⁷² Eric Johnston, "My Talk with Joseph Stalin," *Reader's Digest*, (October 1944), 1-10; U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, Europe, Volume IV – The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State," 11 July 1944, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1944v04/d884>.

⁶⁷³ Small, "How We Learned to Love the Russians," 457-462; The New York Times (Unattributed Report), "FORD TIRE FACTORY WILL GO TO RUSSIA: It Is Being Bought by Our Government for Shipment Under Lend-Lease Plan," *The New York Times*, 31 October 1942, <https://www.nytimes.com/1942/10/31/archives/ford-tire-factory-will-go-to-russia-it-is-being-bought-by-our.html>.

⁶⁷⁴ Bullitt, *For the President*, 576-580, 587; Henry Raymond, "Bullitt Letter to Roosevelt in 1943 Urged Invasion of Balkans to Deter Soviet Advance," *The New York Times*, 26 April 1970,

In a summer 1944 visit to the Soviet Union, U.S. war correspondent William White experienced a guided tour to a major Soviet aircraft factory involved in the production of IL-2 *Sturmovik* attack planes. White expressed shock that the Soviet Union's aluminum supply, on which the country's production of aircraft armor for the IL-2s depended heavily, appeared to remain desperately low even at the time of his visit to the country.⁶⁷⁵ His account of the deficiencies in Soviet wartime domestic production appear to indicate that U.S. aluminum shipments helped greatly in the manufacturing of these excellent combat aircraft. White also spoke to many Soviet fighter pilots that expressed deep appreciation for the American P-39s and indicated that these planes helped the Red Army Air Forces to somewhat supplement the otherwise superior IL-2, apparently helping Stalin's airmen to continue countering Nazi attempts to regain air superiority over the battlefield even at times of low IL-2 production.⁶⁷⁶

The Red Army's advances that continued into 1945 were helped greatly by the continued congressional renewal of Lend-Lease, and on 1 March 1943, the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations invited Lend-Lease Administrator Stettinius and Navy Secretary Knox to discuss the renewal of the program to the Allies during the first session of the seventy-eighth U.S. Congress. Titled S.813, the proposed bill contained the power, "to extend for one year the provisions of an act to promote the defense of the United States, approved March 11, 1941," renewing Roosevelt's authority to continue designating the countries he deemed worthy of Lend-Lease aid for the next year.⁶⁷⁷ During his presentation, Stettinius emphasized the impact of

<https://www.nytimes.com/1970/04/26/archives/bullitt-letter-to-roosevelt-in-1943-urged-invasion-of-balkans-to.html>; Small, "How We Learned to Love the Russians," 457-462; Smelser and Davies II, *The Myth of the Eastern Front*, 31-34.

⁶⁷⁵ William L. White, *Report on the Russians* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1945), 43-44.

⁶⁷⁶ White, *Report on the Russians*, 122-123.

⁶⁷⁷ *Congressional Record – United States Senate*, 78th Congress, 1st Session (1943), pt. 3, Government Publishing Office, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.31951d02094619s&view=1up&seq=1>.

Lend-Lease trucks, munitions, and food on the Soviet victory at Stalingrad, stating that the Red Army still required much more to keep Stalin's soldiers fed and fighting as, "The food situation in the Soviet Union is now critical. It will grow increasingly critical for some time to come."⁶⁷⁸ Senator Alben Barkley (D-KY) questioned the effectiveness of Lend-Lease aid on the Eastern Front, and Stettinius replied that U.S. aluminum and machine tools remained vital to Soviet aircraft and tank production.⁶⁷⁹

Stettinius then gave the senators a detailed description of the goods provided to the Red Army's war effort up to 1 January 1943, citing a "dollar value" of U.S. \$1,300,000,000 consisting of 130,000 submachine guns, 174,000 pounds of brass and copper, 98,000 pounds of toluol and TNT, 6,200 U.S. and British tanks and 5,600 aircraft, "and 85,000 other military motor vehicles."⁶⁸⁰ Emphasizing the administration's position that aluminum and nourishment remained crucial to the Soviet war effort, Stettinius then explained to Senator Barkley that, "other munitions, raw materials, and food" amounted to a large percentage of the Lend-Lease aid delivered to the Soviet Union in 1942.⁶⁸¹ Insisting that Lend-Lease be renewed to guarantee Stalin's continued prosecution of the war, Stettinius implied that the Western Allies could not afford to risk the possibility of a second Brest-Litovsk.⁶⁸²

Following Stettinius's presentation, Navy Secretary Knox advocated for the need to increase the flow of attack aircraft to the Soviet Union and highlighted the administration's efforts to improve the Persian Corridor and ALSIB the next day. Senator Barkley and Senator

⁶⁷⁸ *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate*, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) pt. 3.

⁶⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸² *Ibid.*

Wallace H. White (R-ME) then asked Knox to confirm whether he agreed with the need, “to send all the airplanes we can send to Russia” to offset the German Air Force’s alleged numerical superiority that Stalin had continued to emphasize in his telegrams to Roosevelt.⁶⁸³ Knox confirmed his view on the matter and the senators continued to debate the issue.⁶⁸⁴

As Congress debated the need to renew Lend-Lease to the Allies, including the Soviet Union, U.S. Ambassador Standley in Moscow voiced frustration that the Soviet people were not being informed about the American people’s generosity by their government.⁶⁸⁵ Standley had recently returned after consulting with Roosevelt and, in addition to being angered by Stalin’s perceived indifference to the dangers to which the Arctic convoys were subjected, grew increasingly frustrated by General Faymonville’s zeal in unquestioningly agreeing to anything the Kremlin requested. After failing to obtain public praise from any top Soviet officials for the U.S. Lend-Lease contribution to the Red Army’s struggle, Standley held a press conference at which he voiced his frustration in a desperate attempt to force Moscow’s hand as he expressed fear that Congress’s decision could be delayed if it seemed that Stalin cared little for the aid he received. Standley’s wife and daughters were also heavily involved in Carter’s RWR, and the ambassador, reflecting Roosevelt’s views, had long advocated for improving the Iranian and Alaskan supply routes to keep Stalin in the war by providing much more war material, yet his comments appear to have angered many congressmen that viewed them as counterproductive.⁶⁸⁶

⁶⁸³ *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate*, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) pt. 3; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin’s Correspondence*, “No. 58: Prime Minister to Premier Stalin,” 31 July 1942, 57; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 132-133; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 545; U.S. President, “Map Room Papers Box 8 Stalin to Roosevelt July – December 1942.”

⁶⁸⁴ *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate*, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) pt. 3.

⁶⁸⁵ McMeekin, *Stalin’s War*, 464-465, 517-518, 538; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 705; Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 331-333, 335-338. 339-343, 346-349.

⁶⁸⁶ McMeekin, *Stalin’s War*, 464-465, 517-518, 538; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 705; Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 331-333, 335-338. 339-343, 346-349.

On 9 March 1943, the day before deciding on the renewal of Lend-Lease for the next year, the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives debated Ambassador Standley's comments and the need for the Allies to maintain a united front against the Axis by renewing Lend-Lease aid. Senator Tom Connally (D-TX) assailed Standley's comments as divisive and unnecessary, pointing to Stettinius's detailed report of, "a great variety of items of a distinctly American type" and criticizing the U.S. ambassador in Moscow for his perceived, "ineptness."⁶⁸⁷ Pointing out that, "Two-thirds of all shipments from the United States have been made in American ships," Senator Connally argued that the Soviet fighting men and women had little choice but to know the origin of the, "2,900,000 tons of war supplies" that they had received by March 1943.⁶⁸⁸

In the House of Representatives, Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Sol Bloom (D-NY) likewise characterized Standley's complaint as ridiculous, citing a 6 March 1943 article by U.S. war correspondent Cassidy that emphasized the "American trucks and jeeps" that Red Army soldiers and commanders rode to the battlefield in.⁶⁸⁹ After further quoting Cassidy's article on the quantity and quality of American food and aircraft delivered to the red warriors, Bloom's comments triggered a brief debate as Congressman Fish challenged his fellow New York representative to seriously consider Standley's complaint. The debate ended with most of the congressmen present arguing for the need to maintain amity and close cooperation with all the "United Nations" in their shared strategic approach to resisting the Axis.⁶⁹⁰

⁶⁸⁷ *Congressional Record – United States Senate and House of Representatives*, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) pt? <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1943-pt2/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1943-pt2-6.pdf>; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 464-465, 517-518, 538.

⁶⁸⁸ *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate and House of Representatives*, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 331-333, 335-338. 339-343, 346-349.

⁶⁸⁹ *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate and House of Representatives*, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 331-333, 335-338. 339-343, 346-349.

⁶⁹⁰ *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate and House of Representatives*, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943).

Echoing Chairman Bloom's conclusions and those of most of his House colleagues, Congressman John Kee (D-WV) called attention to the immediate crisis, stating, "In less than 20 years, Germany, a nation we had beaten to her knees, rose to undreamed of power and soon plunged the world into the bloodiest war in human history."⁶⁹¹ Asking his House colleagues, "Are we going to repeat our mistakes of 25 years ago?" Congressman Kee challenged Fish and others advocating on Standley's behalf to prove whether they cared more for ensuring Hitler's defeat by renewing Lend-Lease or bickering over allegedly trivial matters.⁶⁹² Kee's comments and the subsequent congressional renewal of Lend-Lease appear to mirror Roosevelt's perception that in early 1943 a second Brest-Litovsk remained a disturbing possibility as Nazi occupation forces remained on Soviet soil and Stalin had not yet agreed to meet Roosevelt in person. Determined to avoid repeating past errors during a global war, leading U.S. lawmakers renewed Roosevelt's Allied aid program that automatically included the Soviet Union as Lend-Lease uniquely gave the president sole authority to designate countries that he deemed meriting aid as pointed out by Sean McMeekin.⁶⁹³

Following the October 1941 defeat of Congressman Rich's proposed amendment to Lend-Lease in the House, even Congressman Fish, despite expressing his distaste for Stalin's regime and briefly challenging Chairman Bloom to consider Standley's complaints, declined to mount a serious effort at amending Roosevelt's program.⁶⁹⁴ As repugnant as these men rightly

⁶⁹¹ *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate and House of Representatives*, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 705.

⁶⁹² *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate and House of Representatives*, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 464-465, 517-518, 538.

⁶⁹³ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 517-518, 534-536.

⁶⁹⁴ *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate and House of Representatives*, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 464-465, 517-518, 538; Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 331-333, 335-338, 339-343, 346-349; The New York Times (Unattributed Report), "STANDLEY'S TALK STIRS WASHINGTON; Observers Wonder Whether the Ambassador Spoke for Himself or Government EFFECT ON BILL POSSIBLE Restrictive Amendments Might Be Attached to Lend-Lease Act, It Is Declared," *The New York Times*, 9 March

determined Stalin's Communist regime to be, they found it unwise during a second global war to remove Roosevelt's authority, granted to him by Congress in 1941, to designate recipients of U.S. war aid. The unique nature of the Lend-Lease Act meant that while Congress continued to execute its constitutional duty of authorizing and appropriating funds for the war effort, the president, as Commander-in-Chief, bore the responsibility of determining the recipients of the war material that congressional funding produced.⁶⁹⁵ Following the Rich amendment's defeat, no serious challenges emerged as the war raged in March 1943 because many congressmen, including Fish and Taber, concluded that removing Roosevelt's authority required them to repeal H. R. 1776 to produce and approve new legislation to limit his ability to designate aid recipients.⁶⁹⁶

Fish and others appear to have feared that repealing Lend-Lease to revise it and limit Roosevelt's authority, essentially crafting an entirely new piece of legislation, may have endangered their ongoing efforts to aid Great Britain and China, a possibility made even more frightful by the prevailing U.S. perception of Hitler's army as a potentially unbeatable opponent in spring 1943.⁶⁹⁷ They also seem to have agreed with the administration's staunch congressional allies that such action could potentially damage Allied morale by leading Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek to fear for their own support and question the long-term reliability of

1943, <https://www.nytimes.com/1943/03/09/archives/standleys-talk-stirs-washington-observers-wonder-whether-the.html>.

⁶⁹⁵ The New York Times, "STANDLEY'S TALK STIRS WASHINGTON,"; U.S. Department of State, "'Lend-Lease Act,' March 11, 1941," *Peace and War – United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941*, <https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Dip/PaW/200.html>.

⁶⁹⁶ *Cong. Rec. – House of Representatives*, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) pt. 7; Folsom, Jr., and Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 230-235, 340-342n40-44; Herring, Jr., *Aid to Russia*, 20, 93, 112-117, 120-122, 124-128; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 791-793, 796, 802; Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 331-333, 335-338, 339-343, 346-349; The New York Times, "STANDLEY'S TALK STIRS WASHINGTON."

⁶⁹⁷ *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate and House of Representatives*, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 464-465, 517-518, 538; Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 331-333, 335-338, 339-343, 346-349.

Washington to continue supplying their troops until the defeat of the Axis.⁶⁹⁸ Once the Soviet Union had been added to Lend-Lease after the Rich amendment's defeat in late 1941, removing it became impractical as drafting and passing new legislation with more limits on Roosevelt's role could have jeopardized aid to the British and Chinese forces, even if temporarily, a risk that most lawmakers opted not to take in 1943.⁶⁹⁹

In late 1943, Senator Connally of Texas, a staunch supporter of Lend-Lease, further ensured that no serious attempts to repeal and revise the program to exclude Stalin's forces could be mounted as he sponsored Senate Resolution 192 in a public display of Allied solidarity in prosecuting the war.⁷⁰⁰ A propaganda measure that further committed Congress to supporting the president's wartime policies, Connally's resolution passed the Senate vote virtually unopposed, effectively framing opposition to aiding any of the Allied Powers as tantamount to inviting defeat.⁷⁰¹ Senator Connally's success that November appears to have been an unnecessary effort, however, as the president's few wartime critics in Congress declined to launch an effort to remove his Lend-Lease powers in March, and Standley's criticism of the Kremlin's attitude failed to negatively impact the program's renewal in spring 1943.⁷⁰²

Congress subsequently proceeded to vote overwhelmingly to renew Lend-Lease aid to all forty-four countries at war with the Axis Powers, with the Senate voting eighty-two to zero in

⁶⁹⁸ Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 331-333, 335-338, 339-343, 346-349; The New York Times, "STANDLEY'S TALK STIRS WASHINGTON."

⁶⁹⁹ *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate and House of Representatives*, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 464-465, 517-518, 538; Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 331-333, 335-338, 339-343, 346-349; The New York Times, "STANDLEY'S TALK STIRS WASHINGTON."

⁷⁰⁰ *Congressional Record – United States Senate*, 78th Congress, 1st Session (1943), pt? Government Publishing Office, <https://www.senate.gov/about/resources/pdf/russell-cr-1943.pdf>.

⁷⁰¹ *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate*, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943).

⁷⁰² *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate and House of Representatives*, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 464-465, 517-518, 538; Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 331-333, 335-338, 339-343, 346-349; The New York Times, "STANDLEY'S TALK STIRS WASHINGTON."

favor of continuing the program, and Roosevelt gladly signed off on the bill on 12 March 1943.⁷⁰³ Seeking to further ensure that Ambassador Standley's complaints continued to be ignored in Washington, Soviet Ambassador Litvinov immediately expressed deep gratitude for Lend-Lease aid to the Red Army on behalf of the Soviet government and people in the pages of *The New York Times*.⁷⁰⁴ Roosevelt proceeded to hail his program as the key to defeating the Axis, emphasizing the recent Soviet victories and the need to deliver even more aid to Moscow as Generals Connolly, Arnold, and Bradley labored to increase the flow of aid to the Red Army from Iran and Alaska.⁷⁰⁵

According to Ambassador Standley and Roosevelt's former presidential aide and speechwriter Robert Sherwood, the president remained desperate and determined in his attempts to obtain a personal meeting with Stalin to discuss the war's continued prosecution well into 1943.⁷⁰⁶ In a further strong indication that the fear of a second Brest-Litovsk continued to haunt Roosevelt's mind even after the Stalingrad victory as Stalin kept him at arm's length and repeatedly put off a personal meeting, the president dispatched former Ambassador Joseph Davies to Moscow in early May 1943. Standley and Sherwood's respective accounts indicate that Roosevelt, aware that Churchill's August 1942 meeting with Stalin had ended poorly and that tensions remained chilly between London and Moscow, sought to, "break the ice" with the

⁷⁰³ *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate*, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) pt. 3; William H. Lawrence, "SENATE VOTES 82-0; President Signs Bill – Says Axis Weakens as Our Aid Grows TOTAL NOW \$9,632,000,000 Litvinoff Hails Help to Red Army and Says Soviet People Deeply Appreciate It A LEND-LEASE TOAST WITH LEND-LEASE MILK LEND-LEASE VOTED, PRESIDENT SIGNS," *The New York Times*, 12 March 1943, <https://www.nytimes.com/1943/03/12/archives/senate-votes-820-president-signs-bill-says-axis-weakens-as-our-aid.html>.

⁷⁰⁴ The New York Times (Unattributed Report), LITVINOFF'S THANKS PUBLISHED IN RUSSIA; Excerpts From Speech by Roosevelt Printed," *The New York Times*, 14 March 1943, <https://www.nytimes.com/1943/03/14/archives/litvinoffs-thanks-published-in-russia-excerpts-from-speech-by.html>.

⁷⁰⁵ Lawrence, "SENATE VOTES 82-0,"; The New York Times, "LITVINOFF'S THANKS PUBLISHED IN RUSSIA."

⁷⁰⁶ Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 733; Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 355-359.

Soviet premier and ensure his continued prosecution of the war against Hitler.⁷⁰⁷ As noted previously, Davies had been among the first U.S. officials to warn Roosevelt and Hopkins of the need to prevent a reoccurrence of Brest-Litovsk at all costs in summer 1941, and the former U.S. ambassador agreed to serve as the “Special Representative of the President.”⁷⁰⁸

This desperate diplomatic overture by Roosevelt at the beginning of May 1943 met with initial failure as Stalin warmly welcomed the pro-Soviet advocate Davies but continued putting off a meeting with the president, keeping him guessing until finally agreeing early that fall to go to Tehran in November. Offended by yet another perceived slight from Washington that enabled further insubordination of his authority as U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, Admiral Standley offered his resignation in a letter to Roosevelt on 3 May 1943, and the president replaced him that October with Averell Harriman.⁷⁰⁹ Harriman had led Standley and other U.S. delegates at the Harriman-Beaverbrook Conference with British and Soviet officials that resulted in the birth of the Soviet Lend-Lease program’s First Protocol that began in late 1941. Roosevelt hoped that Stalin would discern and appreciate this warm gesture and reciprocate by remaining in the war until Germany’s total defeat, the goal that the president had identified early on as the sole condition that he intended to attach to Soviet Lend-Lease aid.⁷¹⁰

In a 1 November 1943 congressional debate, Senator Richard Russell (D-GA) characterized Roosevelt’s handling of Lend-Lease affairs as a “prodigal hand” that placed U.S. interests behind those of the other Allied countries and subsequently launched an investigation of

⁷⁰⁷ Carlton, *Churchill and the Soviet Union*, 101-102; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 733; Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 355-359.

⁷⁰⁸ *National Archives and Records Administration*, “Letter from Joseph E. Davies,”; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 306-308, 733; Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 355-359.

⁷⁰⁹ Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 733; Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 355-359.

⁷¹⁰ Office, Chief of Finance War Department, “Lend-Lease Shipments World War II,”; U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, 9-12, 13-15, 49, 51-53.

the program.⁷¹¹ While publicly ridiculing this rare wartime senatorial probe, Roosevelt acted quickly in a public compromise with his conservative southern Democrat critics by firing Under Secretary Sumner Welles and further masking Hopkins's influence on Lend-Lease by incorporating the program into the newly formed Foreign Economic Administration (FEA). Headed by Leo Crowley, a businessman that the president's opponents viewed favorably in comparison to Hopkins and Stettinius, the latter man having become known to many congressmen as a friend of the New Deal architect by late 1943, the FEA incorporated Lend-Lease into its program and the senatorial investigators subsequently canceled their probe.⁷¹²

On 26 April 1944, Senator Connally chaired a session of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations as he and other lawmakers discussed the need to again renew Lend-Lease to all Allied countries, including Stalin's Soviet Union, until 30 June 1945 through H. R. 4254.⁷¹³ The gathering of United States senators listened in rapt attention as FEA Head Crowley gave a detailed account of the enormous amount of aid that U.S. farmers and factory workers had delivered to the Allied Powers through their strenuous war production efforts. Stating, "Every dollar's worth of war supplies we and the British Commonwealth send to Russia enables the Red Army to strike harder blows at our common enemy," Crowley emphasized the need to continue Lend-Lease in the interest of hastening victory.⁷¹⁴

Continuing, Crowley stated emphatically that "Already the Red Army has put out of action millions of Nazi soldiers and tens of thousands of Nazi planes, tanks, and guns," before

⁷¹¹ *Congressional Record – United States Senate*, 78th Congress, 2nd Session (1943) pt. 7, Government Publishing Office, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1943-pt7/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1943-pt7-7-1.pdf>.

⁷¹² McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 536-537; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 432-433, 565-566, 567-568.

⁷¹³ *Congressional Record – United States Senate*, 78th Congress, 2nd Session (1944) pt. 7, Government Publishing Office, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.31951d02094618u&view=1up&seq=1>.

⁷¹⁴ *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate*, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1944).

concluding, “And every Nazi soldier killed and every German plane, tank, or gun destroyed by the Red Army means less opposition for American and British forces when the western invasions are launched.”⁷¹⁵ Crowley’s arguments before the Senate summarized the administration’s strategic approach to Nazi Germany’s defeat in a way that many congressmen could appreciate. Reflecting Washington’s desire to avert a second Brest-Litovsk, he emphasized the crucial role of Lend-Lease food, stating, “The Ukraine is the Soviet Union’s bread basket. Just now liberated, it has been under the Nazi heel for 2 years. The resulting food shortage in Russia has been acute.”⁷¹⁶ Congress proceeded to pass H. R. 4254, renewing Lend-Lease for the remainder of the war, and guaranteeing that the Red Army continued to sweep onward to victory as Stalin continued receiving more aid than he required for the Soviet Union’s defense from the U.S. supply bases in Iran and Alaska.⁷¹⁷

The Red Army’s victories at Stalingrad and Kursk and Stalin’s comments to Roosevelt regarding Soviet Lend-Lease appear to support Sean McMeekin’s argument that by 1943 the Soviet Union had received enough material aid from the West to effectively ensure its defense against Germany.⁷¹⁸ At the Allies’ November 1943 Tehran Conference held in the Iranian capital, Stalin praised Roosevelt and credited U.S. industry with supplying the Soviet war effort with an enormous amount of material that had proved invaluable to the Red Army’s victories.⁷¹⁹ Echoing his earlier emphasis on the considerable contribution to Soviet successes of U.S. combat aircraft such as the P-39, Stalin praised Roosevelt’s role in prioritizing Lend-Lease aircraft

⁷¹⁵ Ibid.

⁷¹⁶ *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate*, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1944).

⁷¹⁷ Arnold, *Global Mission*, 211-212, 385-387.

⁷¹⁸ Glantz, *Colossus Reborn*, 22, 27, 40-41, 43, 58, 142-143, 244.

⁷¹⁹ Bohlen, *Witness to History*, 149-150; Carlton, *Churchill and the Soviet Union*, 106-107.

deliveries to the Soviet Union, stating, “Without the use of those machines, through Lend-Lease, we would lose this war.”⁷²⁰ After contrasting U.S. aircraft production with that of Great Britain and ridiculing London’s focus on manufacturing, “principally heavy bombers” rather than the attack planes that he requested, Stalin openly acknowledged the crucial impact of Lend-Lease on the Soviet war effort in a rare admission to his Allied counterparts.⁷²¹

While it appears that U.S. Lend-Lease aid and British assistance delivered by the Arctic convoys had assured the Soviet Union’s defense by 1943, canceling the program, in addition to being difficult for lawmakers for the previously mentioned reasons, may have conflicted with Roosevelt and Churchill’s total war approach to defeating Germany. Many statements by the American president and British prime minister and their respective top officials including men such as Standley, Stettinius, Bohlen, Alanbrooke, and Pownall, appear to indicate that they did not view an end to Soviet aid as an option even after the Red Army’s 1943 victories.⁷²² With the First World War as their most relevant reference point for facing the immediate threat from the Axis, Roosevelt’s advisers sought to save Stalin from the fate of either Nicholas II or Kerensky in 1918. Underestimating the Red Army’s capabilities and comparing it to its tsarist predecessor, even after Stalingrad, they seem to have embraced the idea that it could not possibly occupy Eastern Europe and that therefore no amount of aid could transform the Soviet Union into the

⁷²⁰ Arnold, *Global Mission*, 466-470; Bohlen, *Witness to History*, 149-150; U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943,” White House Files – Log of the Trip, 27 November-2 December 1943, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943CairoTehran/d353>.

⁷²¹ Arnold, *Global Mission*, 466-470; Bohlen, *Witness to History*, 149-150; U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Relations: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran.”

⁷²² Alanbrooke, *War Diaries*, 285-286; Bohlen, *Witness to History*, 130-133; Churchill, *Memoirs*, 749-750; Eisenhower, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, 66; Pownall, *Chief of Staff*, 39-40, 41-42; Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 237, 246-247, 255, 260, 355-359, 374-375; Stettinius, Jr., *Lend-Lease*, 230-232, 240-241, 253-254, 257.

aggressive military power that Germany had long been.⁷²³

While some British leaders such as Pownall and Alanbrooke appear to have displayed a more realistic view of the Soviets' duplicitous tendencies, Roosevelt rejected their concerns, and London agreed that the aid flow to Moscow be continued even as Stalin questioned whether he could consider Churchill as, "my friend" at the Tehran Conference.⁷²⁴ While later adding a note in his *War Diaries* that he may have misread U.S. intentions at the time of the Tehran Conference, Alanbrooke nevertheless recorded his contemporary perception that Roosevelt and Harriman sought to flatter Stalin at Great Britain's expense.⁷²⁵ Roosevelt is said to have used the occasion, as well as others, to poke fun at Churchill after noticing that Stalin appeared to find it amusing and reportedly burst into laughter as the British prime minister turned red in embarrassment. Roosevelt dismissed the notion that Stalin could pose a postwar threat to the West, and the Soviet premier's comment at Tehran chiding Alanbrooke for his allegedly negative view of the Soviet people appears to have been a rhetorical snipe at the British general's more cautious view of the Kremlin.⁷²⁶

Following Standley's resignation and return to the United States, Roosevelt also demoted Generals Faymonville and Michela due to the former ambassador's constant complaints about insubordination and sent General John Deane to serve as the new Chief of the U.S. Military Mission in Moscow.⁷²⁷ Roosevelt appears to have hoped to simultaneously satisfy both Stalin

⁷²³ Arnold, *Global Mission*, 259; Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, 69-70, 489-490.

⁷²⁴ Alanbrooke, *War Diaries*, 254; Arnold, *Global Mission*, 466-470; Bohlen, *Witness to History*, 149-150; Carlton, *Churchill and the Soviet Union*, 106-107; Pownall, *Chief of Staff*, 29; U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Relations: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran,"; Zaloga, *Soviet Lend-Lease Tanks*, 4.

⁷²⁵ Alanbrooke, *War Diaries*, 486-487; Carlton, *Churchill and the Soviet Union*, 106-107.

⁷²⁶ Alanbrooke, *War Diaries*, 486-487; Bohlen, *Witness to History*, 149-150; Carlton, *Churchill and the Soviet Union*, 106-107; U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Relations: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran."

⁷²⁷ The New York Times (Unattributed Report), "GENERAL IS REDUCED AFTER DUTY IN SOVIET; Faymonville Now a Colonel – Michela Also to Lose Rank," *The New York Times*, 18 November 1943,

and his critics such as Standley and Bullitt by sending Harriman as the new U.S. ambassador and replacing Faymonville with General Deane. Yet soon after assuming Faymonville's former post in late 1943, Deane strongly advised Roosevelt to somewhat reduce Lend-Lease aid to demonstrate U.S. economic leverage as a sign of strength to Stalin and expressed his concern that the Red Army had begun receiving more than it required.⁷²⁸

Replying that he perceived himself and Hopkins as capable of judging Stalin's character, Roosevelt stubbornly insisted that by providing unconditional aid he could later secure Soviet participation against Japan while preventing the Soviet leader from striking another deal with Hitler.⁷²⁹ Despite the Red Army's outstanding victories at Stalingrad and Kursk, Roosevelt appears to have assumed that so long as Soviet forces had not reached German soil, the possibility that Stalin could conclude a separate peace remained a legitimate concern and continued to cite the Soviet premier's continued participation in the war as the only condition that he sought to impose. While the fears in Washington of a second Brest-Litovsk may have been greatly diminished after Roosevelt's long-sought and important personal meeting with Stalin in Tehran in November 1943, the president's reaction to Deane's advice indicates that he remained concerned over such a possibility so long as the Red Army had not advanced into Nazi territory.⁷³⁰

Roosevelt's old friend and the first U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, William Bullitt, also wrote to the president repeatedly during this period, urging him to consider attaching

<https://www.nytimes.com/1943/11/18/archives/general-is-reduced-after-duty-in-soviet-faymonville-now-a-colonel.html>.

⁷²⁸ Deane, *The Strange Alliance*, 88-89, 103.

⁷²⁹ *Ibid.*, 88-89.

⁷³⁰ *Ibid.*; Rickenbacker, *Rickenbacker*, 403-404, 418-419; U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Relations: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran."

conditions to further Soviet Lend-Lease deliveries and cautioning him on Stalin's duplicitous character and quiet desire for expansion.⁷³¹ Preferring the advice of Davies and Hopkins, Roosevelt repeatedly rejected Bullitt's advice on obtaining concessions from Stalin as counterproductive to ensuring Germany's total defeat and unconditional surrender. The president appears to have regarded the Red Army's rapid advance from 1944 forward as critical to hastening Germany's defeat, and he continued foolishly viewing Stalin as incapable of remaining in control of Eastern Europe for an extended period.⁷³²

Roosevelt's insistence on hastening Germany's collapse by oversupplying Stalin's forces during the war's final years appears to have been connected to his desire to ensure a crushing defeat for Berlin to keep it from rising again as a major European power that could disturb the peace a third time. Although Bullitt persisted in his attempts to convince Roosevelt to either attach conditions to Soviet Lend-Lease, open a second front in the Balkans in 1943, or obtain concessions from Stalin, the president adhered to his strategy of unconditionally aiding the Red Army.⁷³³ Roosevelt's staunch commitment to his generals', "strategy of annihilation" against Germany described by Russell Weigley appears to have been inextricably connected to his oversupplying of the Red Army from 1943 forward and his rejection of peace offers by anti-Nazi German officials that he dismissed as scheming, "East German Junkers."⁷³⁴

On several occasions after Roosevelt's January 1943 unconditional surrender declaration, the president reportedly rebuffed offers by German intelligence (*Abwehr*) Director Admiral

⁷³¹ Bullitt, *For the President*, 576-580; Raymont, "Bullitt Letter to Roosevelt."

⁷³² Bullitt, *For the President*, 576-580; Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 39; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 306-308.

⁷³³ Bullitt, *For the President*, 587-588, 602-604; Raymont, "Bullitt Letter to Roosevelt."

⁷³⁴ Thomas Fleming, *The New Dealers' War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the War Within World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 204-205, 464-465; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 450-452, 731n31-33; Weigley, *The American Way of War*, 128-129, 150-152, 162-163, 357-359.

Wilhelm Canaris, Baron Kurt von Lernser of distant Jewish heritage, and the devoutly Catholic Baron Franz von Papen.⁷³⁵ These men had secretly initiated several meetings in neutral Istanbul, Turkey with U.S. naval observer and former Pennsylvania Governor George H. Earle and proposed to lead an anti-Hitler coup if Roosevelt could renounce his unconditional surrender policy and allow the German Army to resist Soviet expansion. After repeatedly ignoring Earle's initial reports, Roosevelt received the American diplomat at the White House in May 1944 and listened to his concerns before brushing them aside. Roosevelt listened as Earle urged action and stated that the anti-Nazi plotters could not execute their coup as many German officers remained loyal to Hitler due to the unconditional surrender policy that they perceived as hatefully anti-German.⁷³⁶

After Earle attempted to persuade him that, "the real menace is not Germany. It is Russia," Roosevelt replied, "George, Russia is a nation of 180 million people speaking 120 different dialects. When the war is over, she will fly to pieces like a cracked centrifugal machine at high speed."⁷³⁷ In reflecting on the experience of the First World War, Roosevelt appears to have distrusted all German officials, even those proposing Hitler's overthrow, and clung to his total war strategy to crush Germany rather than negotiate peace with a post-Nazi regime. Ascribing the outbreak of war to Germany's aristocratic "Junkers" rather than a solely Nazi plot,

⁷³⁵ George H. Earle, "F.D.R.'s Tragic Mistake!" *Confidential*, 14 (August 1958), http://www.oldmagazinearticles.com/1943-german-peace-feelers_pdf; Heinrich Hohne, *Canaris: Hitler's Master Spy*, trans. J. Maxwell Brownjohn (New York: Cooper Square Press, 1999), 483-484; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 450-452, 737n31-33; Michael Mueller, *Canaris: The Life and Death of Hitler's Spymaster*, trans. Geoffrey Brooks (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 220-221; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 791; John Waller, *The Unseen War in Europe: Espionage and Conspiracy in the Second World War* (New York: Random House, 1996), 280-285; Martin Weil, *A Pretty Good Club: The Founding Fathers of the U.S. Foreign Service* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1978), 136-137.

⁷³⁶ Earle, "F.D.R.'s Tragic Mistake!" 14; Folsom, Jr., and Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 246-249; Hohne, *Canaris*, 483-484; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 450-452, 731n31-33; Waller, *The Unseen War in Europe*, 280-285.

⁷³⁷ Earle, "F.D.R.'s Tragic Mistake!" 14.

the president sought the country's total and unquestioned defeat to ensure that it could not rise again as a major European power.⁷³⁸ Roosevelt's comments reveal that as late as May 1944 he regarded Stalin's forces as incapable of dominating Europe and believed that oversupplying them remained essential to defeating ethnically and linguistically homogeneous Germany and temporarily prolonging the Soviet Union's national survival.⁷³⁹

Roosevelt casually acknowledged the concerns of Earle and Bullitt and Stalin's record of aggression but stated his firm belief that he and Hopkins had a "hunch" that Hitler's duplicity and the West's eagerness to help had convinced the Soviet leader to abandon such thinking.⁷⁴⁰ Stubbornly insisting that his discussions with Hopkins and Stalin at Tehran had convinced him that Hitler's attack had somehow redirected the Soviet premier's motives, Roosevelt downplayed the potential threat posed by a reinvigorated Red Army. His responses to the concerns voiced by Standley, Deane, Bullitt, and Earle indicate that he severely underestimated Stalin's cunning character while overestimating his ability to charm the Soviet leader through his unconditional support of the Red Army.⁷⁴¹

Basing his views of the situation on the Allied experience in the First World War, he appears to have much preferred a Red Army presence in Eastern Europe over a German military presence, even a non-Nazi one, and refused to allow Berlin the chance to regain power once again and potentially unleash a third world war. Vastly underestimating the Red Army's long-

⁷³⁸ Ibid.; Fleming, *The New Dealers' War*, 204-205, 464-465; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 450-452, 731n31-33; Mueller, *Canaris*, 220-221.

⁷³⁹ Earle, "F.D.R.'s Tragic Mistake!" 14; Fleming, *The New Dealers' War*, 204-205, 464-465; Folsom, Jr., and Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 246-249; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 450-452, 731n31-33; Weil, *A Pretty Good Club*, 136-137.

⁷⁴⁰ Bullitt, *For the President*, 587-588; Folsom, Jr., and Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 251; Raymont, "Bullitt Letter to Roosevelt."

⁷⁴¹ Bullitt, *For the President*, 593-599; Deane, *The Strange Alliance*, 88-89, 103; Kaiser, *No End Save Victory*, 337, 392; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 376-377; Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 308-309.

term occupation capabilities, Roosevelt simply believed that Stalin's armies could not enforce Moscow's political ideology outside of Soviet borders for long. He appears to have concluded that Lend-Lease inherently gave the United States enough leverage to tempt Stalin into accepting some form of capitalism by causing him to rely on massive U.S. aid to rebuild the territories that Hitler's attack had ravaged and that subsidizing Moscow guaranteed postwar peace.⁷⁴²

Regardless of their intentions, Roosevelt and his senior Lend-Lease advisers all but ensured that a third world war could be launched, not by Berlin, but by Moscow, as they supplied Stalin with key secret ingredients for atomic bomb construction in the naïve belief that the Soviet atomic program could not become effective for many years. The most current research indicates that after Soviet officials requested thorium, cadmium, heavy water, and uranium, their U.S. counterparts dangerously concluded that refusing to ship such sensitive material may have indicated its true importance and potential to Stalin's scientists.⁷⁴³ Gambling on the importance of not offending Moscow's rulers and keeping the Red Army in the war, Roosevelt and Hopkins opted to keep their unfortunate 1942 pledge to share everything in Washington's arsenal with Stalin. Their gamble boomeranged harmfully against U.S. security interests and global stability in the postwar years and virtually guaranteed that tyrannical aggressors could intimidate, invade, and occupy other nations with virtual impunity and threaten the nuclear destruction of those that resisted them.⁷⁴⁴

On three occasions between April 1943 and June 1944 Soviet officials reportedly

⁷⁴² Bullitt, *For the President*, 593-599; Folsom, Jr., and Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 246-249, 251; Kaiser, *No End Save Victory*, 337, 341, 392-394; Raymont, "Bullitt Letter to Roosevelt."

⁷⁴³ *Cong. Rec. – House of Representatives*, 81st Cong. 1st and 2nd Sess. (1949-1950); Jordan, *Major Jordan's Diaries*, 36-38, 40-41, 42-44; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 531-534; The New York Times (Unattributed Report), "RUSSIA AND THE BOMB," *The New York Times*, 24 September 1949, <https://www.nytimes.com/1949/09/24/archives/russia-and-the-bomb.html>; U.S. Air Force, *Project Rand*, 1-7, 43-54.

⁷⁴⁴ Bullitt, *For the President*, 593-599; Folsom, Jr., and Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 246-249, 251.

managed to secure U.S. uranium through the Lend-Lease supply center in Great Falls. In an early 1943 telephone conversation, Hopkins ordered Major Jordan to expect and approve in advance a shipment of “special priority” material that arrived several days after their conversation.⁷⁴⁵ Unaware of uranium’s atomic potential at that time, Jordan expressed his concern that Soviet officials were undermining Lend-Lease by procuring materials omitted from the official records.⁷⁴⁶ Following a visit with Jordan after returning to the United States from his visit to Moscow and other Allied capitals, Eddie Rickenbacker relayed the information to General Marshall in Washington, and later noted his confusion at the general’s lack of concern.⁷⁴⁷

In a 1944 report to Stalin, Mikoyan assessed the quantities of Lend-Lease munitions, food, and raw materials provided by the United States and Great Britain. His report also alludes to the unofficial acquiring of U.S. uranium by briefly stating that several important “additional items” of American origin were intentionally omitted from the report.⁷⁴⁸ Mikoyan’s 1944 report appears to offer strong supporting evidence of Major Jordan’s diary entries recording the shipments of aluminum, thorium, and other sensitive materials to the Soviets in 1943 and 1944. Mikoyan’s emphasis to Stalin that his report did not include some important items shipped from the United States appears to lend further supporting evidence to Jordan’s recollections and

⁷⁴⁵ *Cong. Rec. – House of Representatives*, 81st Cong. 1st and 2nd Sess. (1949-1950); Daily News (Unattributed Report), “Uranium Missing but Most Recovered,” *Daily News*, 19 May 1949; <https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/2804617?downloadScope=page>; Jordan, *Major Jordan’s Diaries*, 48-49; The New York Times (Unattributed Report), “THAT LOST URANIUM,” *The New York Times*, 20 May 1949, <https://www.nytimes.com/1949/05/20/archives/that-lost-uranium.html>.

⁷⁴⁶ *Cong. Rec. – House of Representatives*, 81st Cong. 1st and 2nd Sess. (1949-1950); Jordan, *Major Jordan’s Diaries*, 48-49.

⁷⁴⁷ Associated Press, “RICKENBACKER HOME FROM MOSCOW TRIP,”; Rickenbacker, *Rickenbacker*, 418-419.

⁷⁴⁸ *Wilson Center Digital Archive, Collection 27, “Cold War Origins.”*

congressional testimony that Hopkins had specifically ordered that all such material, “is not to go on the records.”⁷⁴⁹

Yet as Albert Weeks and Sean McMeekin point out, pouring such extravagant and ultimately counterproductive aid into Stalin’s war effort even after the Red Army’s outstanding Stalingrad and Kursk victories does not seem to have disturbed Roosevelt in the least as the president virtually delegated to Hopkins all authority concerning the details of specific Soviet Lend-Lease shipments.⁷⁵⁰ While the president’s concerns over the possibility of a second Brest-Litovsk may have somewhat diminished after meeting Stalin in Tehran, he remained determined to help the Soviet premier’s forces oust the remaining Nazi troops from Soviet soil and carry the war into Germany. Weeks points out that, “FDR wanted to do all he could to keep the Red Army juggernaut rolling westward,” a process that began with the Stalingrad victory in February 1943, and attempted a “stunning personal gesture” in a vain effort to woo the Soviet premier and keep him in the war.⁷⁵¹ Having declared Germany’s unconditional surrender to be the U.S. strategic objective in the European Theater, Roosevelt believed that he could not afford to risk the possibility of Stalin forging a separate peace with Hitler and appears to have concluded that speeding the Red Army’s offensive into Nazi territory remained the best way to achieve this objective.⁷⁵²

This determination to hasten Germany’s total, unquestioned defeat and prevent the country from again rising and plunging Europe and the world into a third world war appears to

⁷⁴⁹ Jordan, *Major Jordan’s Diaries*, 38-39.

⁷⁵⁰ McMeekin, *Stalin’s War*, 397-398, 487-489; U.S. Air Force, *Project Rand*, 27-34; Weeks, *Russia’s Life-Saver*, 22-24, 47-49.

⁷⁵¹ Pastorfield-Li, “An excerpt from an interview with a Soviet soldier,”; Weeks, *Russia’s Life-Saver*, 129-131.

⁷⁵² Folsom, Jr., and Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 246-249, 251; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 812, 883-884, 957; U.S. President, “Map Room Papers Box 8 Roosevelt to Stalin January – June 1943.”

have contributed to Washington's excessive supplying of Lend-Lease aid to Moscow. Leaning heavily on Hopkins and the pro-Soviet former U.S. Ambassador Davies for advice, Roosevelt does not appear to have considered the possibility that Stalin's soldiers could become an effective postwar occupation army and naively believed that he could woo the Soviet leader into moderating.⁷⁵³ Supplying extravagant U.S. aid, both officially through Lend-Lease and unofficially and secretly outside of the program, appears to have been an effort on Roosevelt and Hopkins's behalf to tempt Stalin into moderating his stance on claiming territory for Communism in Eastern Europe. As historian Alexander Dolitsky points out, Roosevelt failed in his underestimation of Stalin's commitment to seizing the opportunity to export Communism across the Soviet Union's borders and, despite acting out of sincere intentions, inadvertently planted the Cold War's seeds while attaching no conditions to Soviet Lend-Lease.⁷⁵⁴

Despite Roosevelt's efforts to impress and gradually convert him to a moderate view of the Western world and capitalism, Stalin could not be persuaded to adopt democratic reforms or permit them in the territories that Soviet soldiers liberated from the Nazis. Rather than working to moderate his regime and anti-Western political stance as Roosevelt and Hopkins appear to have vainly hoped for, Stalin seized the opportunity provided by unconditional Lend-Lease aid to strengthen the Soviet Union's military expansionism in postwar Europe and Asia.⁷⁵⁵ As Dolitsky concludes, the president had not only underestimated the Red Army's military potential that such aid could help to unnecessarily enhance, but also the Soviet premier's faithful

⁷⁵³ Davies, *Mission to Moscow*, 275-277; Folsom, Jr., and Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 246-249, 251; *National Archives and Records Administration*, "Letter from Joseph E. Davies,," Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 306-308, 791-793; Sudoplatov and Sudoplatov, *Special Tasks*, 193, 196, 227-229; U.S. Air Force, *Project Rand*, 27-34, 43-54.

⁷⁵⁴ Dolitsky, Glazkov, and Poor, *Pipeline to Russia*, 18-22, 38-39, 42-46; Folsom, Jr., and Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 228; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 124-126.

⁷⁵⁵ Deane, *The Strange Alliance*, 168-169, 202; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 791-793, 796, 812.

adherence to Communist ideology and his ability to remain in control of the liberated territories.⁷⁵⁶

Yet as the Red Army continued to surge forward and maintain the strategic offensive against Germany during the war's final years, Roosevelt, in increasingly ill health, insisted on clinging to his costly, "hunch" that he could win the Soviet premier's heart and mind, soften his stance on capitalism, and ensure a peaceful postwar world.⁷⁵⁷ According to John Beasant and Albert Weeks, Roosevelt decided to ship to Stalin a load of silver bullion ingots worth U.S. \$26,000,000 and weighing more than 2,000 pounds between the Tehran Conference and the next "Big Three" meeting at Yalta on the Soviet Union's Crimean Peninsula in February 1945. The president decided to ship this special gift to Stalin through the Persian Corridor that he, Hopkins, and Stettinius favored rather than with the Arctic convoys that they continued but felt to be riskier.⁷⁵⁸

On 19 July 1944, the men of the U.S. Liberty ship *John Barry* sailed around South Africa's Cape of Good Hope and into the Indian Ocean bound for the Iranian port of Abadan with their precious cargo that Roosevelt sought to offer as a gift to Stalin as further confirmation that no conditions were attached to his generous Lend-Lease aid.⁷⁵⁹ As the *Barry* neared Oman's Arabian Sea coast on 28 August, the Nazi submarine *U-859* struck the vessel, and while most of its crew members were rescued by a nearby Dutch trawler, the ship's treasure sank to a depth of

⁷⁵⁶ Dolitsky, Glazkov, and Poor, *Pipeline to Russia*, 38-39, 42-46, 82-84; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 124-126.

⁷⁵⁷ Bullitt, *For the President*, 576-580; Earle, "F.D.R.'s Tragic Mistake!" Folsom, Jr., Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 251; Raymont, "Bullitt Letter to Roosevelt,"; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 812, 883-884, 957.

⁷⁵⁸ John Beasant, *Stalin's Silver: The Sinking of the USS John Barry* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 4-6, 8-9, 10-13; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 129-131, 131-133.

⁷⁵⁹ Associated Press, "US Warship Sunk in 1944 Yields Treasure," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 10 November 1995, <https://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/amphtml/1995/1110/10144.html>.

8,500 feet below the surface.⁷⁶⁰ The *Barry's* contents largely remained a mystery to the world's public until a French research group assisted by Beasant, an Oman-based British journalist, Captain Brian Shoemaker, California businessman Jay Fiondella, and a Florida-based U.S. deep-sea diving team explored the shipwreck in fall 1994.⁷⁶¹

Known as the Ocean Group Consortium, the research group also received aid from the German government and Captain Jan Jebsen, the former captain of *U-859*, in locating the wreck, along with the financial backing of the Yemeni and Omani governments in an effort led by the Yemeni-born Omani businessman *Shaykh* Ahmed Farid al-Awlaki.⁷⁶² On investigating the wreckage, the salvage team discovered that the *Barry's* cargo also included more than U.S. \$1,000,000 in 3,000 silver Saudi riyal coins that were reportedly intended for Saudi Arabia's King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud with the bulk of the ship's silver being meant for Stalin.⁷⁶³ Contemporary reports from the *Barry's* discovery indicate that the divers discovered and brought back to the surface only a portion of the material loaded onto the Liberty ship, providing just one

⁷⁶⁰ Beasant, *Stalin's Silver*, 116-117, 118-120, 121-123; Arthur Clark, "The Silver Ship," *Saudi Aramco World*, Vol. 48, No. 2 (March/April 1997), <https://archive.aramcoworld.com/issue/199702/the.silver.ship.html>; Associated Press, "US Warship Sunk in 1944,"; Michael Huggins, "Saudi treasure fails to find buyer," *UPI*, 16 November 1995, <https://www.upi.com/amp/Archives/1995/11/16/Saudi-treasure-fails-to-find-buyer/4576816498000/>; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 129-131, 131-133.

⁷⁶¹ Beasant, *Stalin's Silver*, 143-145, 161-163; Clark, "The Silver Ship,"; Tara Patel, "Giant pliers pluck treasure from the deep," *New Scientist*, Issue 1956 (17 December 1994), <https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg14419561-300-giant-pliers-pluck-treasure-from-the-deep/>; Reuters, "Liberty Ship, Sunk off Oman, Begins Yielding Treasure Trove: Eighteen tons of silver coins minted for Saudi Arabia and worth some \$70 million have been recovered," *The Journal of Commerce online*, 14 November 1994, https://www.joc.com/maritime-news/liberty-ship-sunk-oman-begins-yielding-treasure-trove_19941114.html; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 129-131, 131-133.

⁷⁶² Beasant, *Stalin's Silver*, 143-145, 153-157; Clark, "The Silver Ship,"; Orlando Sentinel (Unattributed Report), "Silver Salvaged from Ship Sunk in WWII Displayed," *Orlando Sentinel*, 27 November 1994, <https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/os-xpm-1994-11-28-9411270345-story.html>; Reuters, "Liberty Ship, Sunk off Oman,"; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 129-131.

⁷⁶³ Associated Press, "US Warship Sunk in 1944,"; Clark, "The Silver Ship,"; Huggins, "Saudi treasure fails to find buyer,"; Orlando Sentinel, "Silver Salvaged from Ship,"; Patel, "Giant pliers pluck treasure,"; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 129-131.

example of Roosevelt's desperation to keep Stalin's Red Army in the war and demonstrate U.S. generosity.⁷⁶⁴

In his 1945 book *Report on the Russians*, a firsthand account of his travels to the Soviet Union during the previous summer, U.S. war correspondent White recalls witnessing a strange machine described by his Soviet guide as a cyclotron used for splitting atoms during a 1944 visit to Leningrad.⁷⁶⁵ Without knowing the significance of such a scientific process at the time, White noted that his Soviet guides stated that the machine, "was made to the order of the great Russian physicist, [Abram] Joffe, who has been engaged in splitting the atom."⁷⁶⁶ The guides then proceeded to degrade the device as outdated, while boasting that the Soviet Union possessed far more advanced machines for splitting atoms behind the Ural Mountains, indicating that Soviet atomic research capabilities had grown considerably during the war.⁷⁶⁷

Throughout the war, Roosevelt continued reminding the American people and Congress of the important contributions made by the Lend-Lease program to the Allies in Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China.⁷⁶⁸ On 27 August 1943, he stated that more than U.S. \$13,900,000,000 in supplies had been delivered to the Allies as of 31 July, portraying the aid as a necessary contribution to defending democracy from a common foe and maintaining peace after victory.⁷⁶⁹ After dispatching Harriman to Moscow to replace Admiral Standley as U.S.

⁷⁶⁴ Associated Press, "US Warship Sunk in 1944,"; Beasant, *Stalin's Silver*, 143-145, 153-157; Clark, "The Silver Ship,"; Huggins, "Saudi treasure fails to find buyer,"; Orlando Sentinel, "Silver Salvaged from Ship,"; Patel, "Giant pliers pluck treasure,"; Reuters, "Liberty Ship, Sunk off Oman,"; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 131-133.

⁷⁶⁵ White, *Report on the Russians*, 102.

⁷⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁷ Jordan, *Major Jordan's Diaries*, 49-50; White, *Report on the Russians*, 102.

⁷⁶⁸ Roosevelt, *Great Speeches*, 126-128.

⁷⁶⁹ Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Lend-Lease," *The New York Times*, 27 August 1943, 16, <https://www.nytimes.com/1943/08/27/archives/lendlease.html>.

Ambassador to the Soviet Union that December, the president continued to portray Stalin's Red Army as more than paying back Lend-Lease aid through inflicting massive losses on the Nazi enemy at an enormous cost in Soviet lives, stating, "Hitler will not be able to use these men on the western front."⁷⁷⁰ Even as he continued to insist upon Great Britain's repayment of Lend-Lease aid, Roosevelt consistently defended his refusal to attach conditions to Stalin's arms deliveries, portraying the Red Army's operations as, "Reverse Lend-Lease" in his 23 August 1944 report to Congress.⁷⁷¹

Harriman's role in the First Moscow Protocol meetings of September 1941 had earned him the reputation as a strong proponent of aid to the Soviet Union and, as previously mentioned, Roosevelt hoped in vain that Stalin might perceive the new ambassador's appointment as a signal of friendship.⁷⁷² In 1944, Roosevelt enlisted the help of Air Corps General Arnold in persuading Stalin to permit a U.S. Army Air Corps base in the recaptured Poltava region to allow U.S. bombers to attack the Romanian oilfields.⁷⁷³ Stalin accepted, enabling the Americans to strike the Ploesti oilfields critical to the Nazi war effort, and Roosevelt interpreted the agreement as a diplomatic success and a reciprocal gesture of trust.⁷⁷⁴

In his November 1943 and August 1944 reports to Congress on Lend-Lease operations, Roosevelt again emphasized the role of the Red Army in repulsing Hitler's most powerful offensives. While the president's report focused on materials delivered to Great Britain and

⁷⁷⁰ Beasant, *Stalin's Silver*, 64-67; Harriman and Abel, *Special Envoy*, 316; Roosevelt, "Lend-Lease,"; U.S. President, "Lend-Lease Policy Toward the Soviet Union."

⁷⁷¹ Beasant, *Stalin's Silver*, 55-57, 64-67; *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate and House of Representatives*, 78th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1944) pt.6; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 364-366, 658-659; U.S. President, "Report to Congress on Reverse Lend-Lease."

⁷⁷² Harriman and Abel, *Special Envoy*, 319.

⁷⁷³ Arnold, *Global Mission*, 587; Van Tuyll, *Feeding the Bear*, 71-73.

⁷⁷⁴ Arnold, *Global Mission*, 587; Van Tuyll, *Feeding the Bear*, 71-73, 79-80, 81.

Churchill's financial reimbursement efforts, he also referenced the Red Army's performance and the need to maintain support for the Soviet Union.⁷⁷⁵ Describing Allied successes on all fronts as, "Reverse Lend-Lease," Roosevelt portrayed Stalin's victories as a contribution to ending the war at a comparably smaller cost in American lives.⁷⁷⁶

Yet as the president and his senior aides persisted in their constant attempts to justify the massive aid to Stalin's Red Army, Soviet spies in powerful administration posts such as Harry Dexter White and Alger Hiss continued their espionage activities to ensure that Stalin's expansionist goals were not obstructed by the few, meddlesome anti-Communists in Washington.⁷⁷⁷ As discussed in this work's second chapter, White had played a part in helping to push U.S.-Japanese relations to the breaking point and triggering a war between Tokyo and Washington in 1941, somewhat earlier than it may have otherwise occurred, thereby helping Stalin's strategic maneuvering in several ways. Emboldened by Washington's intense wartime focus on fighting the Axis, White advised his superiors to refocus U.S. machine tool production to favor Stalin's aid requests barely two weeks after the Pearl Harbor attack according to Sean McMeekin.⁷⁷⁸

White's advantageous position as a trusted Treasury Department economist on whom Roosevelt's close friend Secretary Morgenthau relied heavily allowed him to exert even greater

⁷⁷⁵ Beasant, *Stalin's Silver*, 55-58, 64-67; *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate and House of Representatives*, 78th Cong, 2nd Sess. (1944) pt. 6; U.S. President, "Report to Congress on Reverse Lend-Lease."

⁷⁷⁶ Beasant, *Stalin's Silver*, 64-67; *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate and House of Representatives*, 78th Cong, 2nd Sess. (1944) pt.6; U.S. President, "Report to Congress on Reverse Lend-Lease."

⁷⁷⁷ *Cong. Rec. – House of Representatives*, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1948); Fitzgibbon, "The Hiss-Chambers Case,"; Koster, *Operation Snow*, 152-157, 160-165; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 570, 571, 573, 575, 580, 657; Sudoplatov and Sudoplatov, *Special Tasks*, 222, 226-227, 227-229, 230; VENONA Decrypts, "Silvermaster Folder NY 65-14603 'Alger Hiss.'"

⁷⁷⁸ Koster, *Operation Snow*, 15-17, 171-172, 179-181; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 396; VENONA Decrypts, "13. Hoover to Matthew Connelly."

influence on U.S. policy on Stalin's behalf, and in 1942 he authored a document titled L-208 that quickly became wartime law.⁷⁷⁹ According to Major Jordan, White's authorship of L-208 further served Stalin's interests by shutting down 4,000 gold mines across the United States and allowing the Roosevelt administration to ship the equipment to the Soviet Union.⁷⁸⁰ Much of this equipment reportedly passed through the Great Falls, Montana Lend-Lease base during Jordan's time as Hopkins's supply expeditor there in 1943 and 1944 and is said to have been shipped to the Soviet merchant ships sailing from the West Coast.⁷⁸¹

White's action appears to have helped equip Soviet gold mining operations in Siberia at the expense of the U.S. gold industry, and, according to historians John Koster and Ben Steil, he is also said to have become more brazen and arrogant throughout the war, authoring the infamous "Morgenthau Plan" that proposed turning Germany into a permanent agrarian state.⁷⁸² Roosevelt initially went along with this proposal before various protestations within his administration forced a change of policy, and, as emphasized by McMeekin, U.S. troops were expected to follow JCS 1067, also authored by White to permanently destroy German economic potential, as they advanced into Germany in 1945.⁷⁸³ The contents of JCS 1067 expressly forbade U.S. commanders and their troops from in any way contributing to the revitalization of the German economy once the country had been defeated, divided, and occupied by the Allies.⁷⁸⁴

⁷⁷⁹ George Racey Jordan, *Gold Swindle: The Story of Our Dwindling Gold* (New York: The Bookmailer, Inc., 1959), 8-10; U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Part 3093 – Gold Mining (Limitation Order L-208)," *Federal Register*, 9 October 1942, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1942-10-09/pdf/FR-1942-10-09.pdf>.

⁷⁸⁰ Jordan, *Gold Swindle*, 8-10; U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Part 3093 – Gold Mining."

⁷⁸¹ Jordan, *Gold Swindle*, 12-14, 42-43, 44-46.

⁷⁸² Ibid., 12-14, 95-96; Koster, *Operation Snow*, 166, 167-168; Schuler and Rosenberg, *The Bretton Woods Transcripts*, 41; Steil, *The Battle of Bretton Woods*, 268-270, 273-274.

⁷⁸³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Directive to the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Occupation Forces (JCS 1067) (April 1945)," German History in Documents and Images, https://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=2297.

⁷⁸⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Directive to the Commander in Chief."

Such punitive measures, originating in White's desire to serve Stalin's long-term strategic interests by ensuring that Germany remained permanently crippled after Hitler's defeat and therefore incapable of challenging Soviet expansion, angered General Marshall after German units began fighting the Allied advance fanatically.⁷⁸⁵ White's proposals, which were briefly adopted as the planned U.S. policies for a defeated Germany, reportedly spurred German commanders to fight harder and led to Marshall's heated complaints to Morgenthau, eventually contributing to a more conciliatory occupation approach. Going by his espionage pseudonym "Jurist," White boasted to a Soviet agent identified only as, "Koltsov" in a 4 August 1944 correspondence that he and his wife were fully prepared, "for any self-sacrifice" in his ongoing efforts to influence U.S. policy in a pro-Soviet direction.⁷⁸⁶ According to John Koster, Stalin's NKVD agreed to pay for White's daughter to attend college as a reward for his espionage activities and his success in helping to further aggravate U.S.-Japanese tensions to the point of no return in 1941.⁷⁸⁷

As White persisted in his pro-Stalin espionage during the war, Hiss continued aiding the Soviet premier's agents in various ways in his key role as a State Department attorney and played a part in arguing in favor of the Soviet Union's geostrategic interests at the 1945 Yalta Conference.⁷⁸⁸ At this crucial meeting of the "Big Three" Allied leaders and their senior military and diplomatic aides in the coastal Crimean Peninsula town between 4 and 11 February, Hiss is

⁷⁸⁵ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 581; Schuler and Rosenberg, *The Bretton Woods Transcripts*, 41; VENONA Decrypts, "13. Hoover to Matthew Connelly."

⁷⁸⁶ National Security Agency, "Koltsov's Account of a Conversation with 'Jurist,'" 4 August 1944, https://www.nsa.gov/portals/75/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/venona/dated/1944/4aug_conversaion_harry_dexter_white.pdf.

⁷⁸⁷ Koster, *Operation Snow*, 165.

⁷⁸⁸ *Cong. Rec. – House of Representatives*, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1948); Fitzgibbon, "The Hiss-Chambers Case,"; Schuler and Rosenberg, *The Bretton Woods Transcripts*, 41; Sudoplatov and Sudoplatov, *Special Tasks*, 222, 226-227, 227-229, 230; VENONA Decrypts, "13. Hoover to Matthew Connelly."

said to have assisted in convincing Roosevelt to insist on an alliance between Chiang Kai-shek's nationalists and Mao Zedong's Communists in the postwar Chinese government. Hiss also worked closely with Stalin's GRU before and during the war according to Communist defectors Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers and, as described by Major Jordan in his postwar congressional testimony, appears to have played a part in supplying State Department documents to the Soviets.⁷⁸⁹

Stalin's wartime espionage campaign could not have succeeded without the willing and eager participation of agents such as White and Hiss, neither of whom appear to have been official members of the U.S. Communist Party but were rather drawn by their ideological convictions to serve the Soviet cause.⁷⁹⁰ Nor could the effort have succeeded had it not been for the tremendous naivete of Roosevelt, Hopkins, and others such as former U.S. Vice President Henry Wallace, whose 1944 visit to the Soviet Union led to his subsequent authorship of the book *Soviet Asia Mission* in 1946. In his glowing firsthand account of his time in Siberia and other parts of Soviet Asia, Wallace characterized the towns of the Kolyma region of northeastern Siberia and particularly its major urban center, Magadan, as having, "wonderful air" and strong, healthy inhabitants.⁷⁹¹ Soviet officials carefully guided Wallace's tour of the region, showing him young, healthy men hard at work, leading him to accept his host Commissar Ivan Nikishov's claim that the local people were, "big, husky young men who came out to the Far East from

⁷⁸⁹ *Cong. Rec. – House of Representatives*, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1948); Fitzgibbon, "The Hiss-Chambers Case,"; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 606; Sudoplatov and Sudoplatov, *Special Tasks*, 222, 226-227, 227-229, 230.

⁷⁹⁰ *Cong. Rec. – House of Representatives*, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1948); Chambers, *Witness*, 415-417, 421-424, 425-427, 441-443; Fitzgibbon, "The Hiss-Chambers Case,"; Koster, *Operation Snow*, 15, 132-135; Sudoplatov and Sudoplatov, *Special Tasks*, 222, 226-227, 227-229, 230; VENONA Decrypts, "13. Hoover to Matthew Connelly."

⁷⁹¹ Elinor Lipper, *Eleven Years in Soviet Prison Camps* (London: The World Affairs Book Club, 1950), 111-114; Henry A. Wallace, *Soviet Asia Mission* (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock Publishers, 1946), 34-37, 38-41.

European Russia” and only a handful of women.⁷⁹²

Nikishov had treated the U.S. vice president to an elaborately disguised fiction, however, as Kolyma’s true inhabitants were not the young, strong NKVD men engaged in sham construction work, but were men and women that their colleagues had arrested and sentenced to a cruel and torturous prison camp existence. According to forced labor camp survivor Elinor Lipper, a Jewish Lithuanian woman arrested by Stalin’s NKVD and imprisoned in Kolyma, the Magadan location housed about 300,000 prisoners, many of them starving and constantly subjected to Nikishov’s physical and verbal abuse, at the time of Wallace’s visit.⁷⁹³ Stating that the former vice president neglected to mention half of Kolyma’s actual population, Lipper recalls that many inhabitants were, in fact, Jewish, Christian, and other women, including many former nuns, arrested for their faith and enslaved in female-only parts of the prison camp system. Male and female prisoners alike in the Kolyma region worked in the hills outside of the various towns that Wallace described mining for gold with very little food under horrendous conditions that virtually guaranteed a death sentence for many of them.⁷⁹⁴

Some of these tortured, hungry women and men from all parts of the Soviet Union may have been forced to labor in the appalling, freezing Siberian winter conditions of Kolyma while using the U.S. gold-mining equipment that White appears to have played a part in obtaining for Stalin’s labor camp commandants through L-208.⁷⁹⁵ In her 1950 memoir *Eleven Years in Soviet*

⁷⁹² Lipper, *Eleven Years in Soviet Prison Camps*, 111-114; Wallace, *Soviet Asia Mission*, 34-37, 38-41.

⁷⁹³ Vadim J. Birstein, “Three Days in ‘Auschwitz without Gas Chambers’: Henry A. Wallace’s Visit to Magadan in 1944,” *Wilson Center: Cold War International History Project*, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/three-days-auschwitz-without-gas-chambers-henry-wallaces-visit-to-magadan-1944>.

⁷⁹⁴ Birstein, “Three Days in ‘Auschwitz without Gas Chambers,’”; Wallace, *Soviet Asia Mission*, 41-44, 47-49, 58, 62-65, 99-100.

⁷⁹⁵ Jordan, *Gold Swindle*, 8-10, 12-14, 42-43, 44-46; Lipper, *Eleven Years in Soviet Prison Camps* 111-114, 117-119; U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Part 3093 – Gold Mining.”

Prison Camps, Lipper recalls that gold mining and the construction of more regional towns to hold many more prisoners served as the main functions of Kolyma's inmates during her time there between 1937 and 1948. Guided by his watchful Soviet hosts, Wallace understandably could not see the horrific realities of life at Magadan and other prison towns in Kolyma and seems to have accepted Nikishov's claim that, "Magadan has 40,000 inhabitants and all are well housed."⁷⁹⁶

Like Roosevelt and Hopkins in their dealings with Stalin, Litvinov, and other Soviet officials, Wallace had been duped by Soviet disinformation tactics that obscured and distorted the truth behind the deceptive picture presented to him by Nikishov and his NKVD hosts. Throughout the war, the Kremlin maintained a steady barrage of disinformation through Stalin's diplomats and agents as the Soviet premier sought to accuse both his opponents and wartime allies of conspiring to commit deeds that he and his henchmen had either plotted or committed themselves.⁷⁹⁷ Stalin's response to the discovery of a mass grave in Nazi-occupied Soviet territory filled with the corpses of thousands of Polish POWs that were later confirmed as having been executed by the NKVD in the Katyn Massacre serves as another example of Soviet wartime disinformation. After the exiled Polish leadership in London demanded an independent investigation into the matter by the International Red Cross in the spring of 1943, Stalin responded by breaking off diplomatic relations with the exiled Poles and denouncing their supporters as Hitler's, "helpmates" as emphasized by McMeekin.⁷⁹⁸

⁷⁹⁶ Birstein, "Three Days in 'Auschwitz without Gas Chambers,'" Lipper, *Eleven Years in Soviet Prison Camps*, 127-129, 134-135; Wallace, *Soviet Asia Mission*, 41-44, 70-73.

⁷⁹⁷ Evans and Romerstein, *Stalin's Secret Agents*, 117-120, 126-128, 147-149; Folsom, Jr., and Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 240, 241-245, 246-249; *The National Archives of the UK*, "PREMIER 3 393/8" "Prime Minister," n. d.

⁷⁹⁸ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 441-443, 445-447, 450; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 103: For Marshal Stalin from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill," 19 August

German troops had discovered the mass grave, and the fact that the site lay in Nazi-occupied Soviet territory played into Stalin's hands, allowing him to temporarily dupe Churchill and Roosevelt, the latter of whom required little persuasion, into publicly agreeing with his claim that the slain Poles were more of the many victims of Nazi terror.⁷⁹⁹ The atrocity's location also allowed the Soviet premier to effectively claim that because of Nazi control over the occupied area, no wartime investigation could be conducted independently and free of manipulation by Hitler's propagandists. In this instance, the Soviet secret police, rather than their Nazi counterparts, were responsible for the carnage, yet Roosevelt swallowed Stalin's lies unquestioningly, reportedly telling George Earle, "George, this is entirely German propaganda and a German plot. I am convinced the Russians did not do this."⁸⁰⁰ By ascribing his war crime to Hitler, Stalin obscured the facts surrounding the killings, and U.S. officials did not recognize the Katyn Massacre as a Soviet atrocity until well after the war.⁸⁰¹

In addition to their espionage activities, Stalin's agents in Washington also engaged in disinformation in their portrayals to Roosevelt of non-Communist Allied heads of state and other world leaders. According to former Romanian Communist intelligence director General Ion Mihai Pacepa and Professor Ronald J. Rychlak, Soviet agents began spreading slanderous rumors through a 1945 *Radio Moscow* broadcast that Pope Pius XII had served as, "Hitler's

1943, 83; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 287-288; U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Roosevelt to Stalin January – June 1943."

⁷⁹⁹ Folsom, Jr., and Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 240, 241-245, 246-249.

⁸⁰⁰ Earle, "F.D.R.'s Tragic Mistake!" 14; Folsom, Jr., and Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 246-249; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 103: For Marshal Stalin from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill," 19 August 1943, 83; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 287-288; U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Roosevelt to Stalin January – June 1943."

⁸⁰¹ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 441-443, 445-447, 450.

Pope” during the war and had done nothing to prevent Berlin from perpetrating the Holocaust.⁸⁰² Pius is said to have abhorred Hitler’s genocidal anti-Semitism and provided shelter in the Vatican for many Jews fleeing Nazi persecution, yet Stalin’s slander campaign proved to be an effective disinformation tactic that triggered considerable controversy and, to an extent, tarnished the papacy’s reputation.⁸⁰³

University of Cambridge Professor Christopher Andrew and former KGB operative Oleg Gordievsky state in their 1990 book *KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev* that Soviet officials informed Ambassador Harriman late in the war that numerous Soviet citizens were residing in Germany, France, and elsewhere in Nazi-occupied Western Europe.⁸⁰⁴ Many of these individuals had never been Soviet subjects but were Russian refugees that had fled Communist rule after Lenin and Trotsky’s victory in the Russian Civil War, yet Roosevelt and Churchill, with the prodding of Stalin’s agent Hiss and his unwitting dupe Hopkins, agreed at Yalta to the Soviet premier’s request that these people be repatriated. In a tragic example of Stalin’s successful disinformation campaign, the White House ordered Operation *Keelhaul*, forcibly deporting roughly 2,000,000 Russian exiles and Soviet POWs seeking refuge in Western Europe to the Soviet Union.⁸⁰⁵

⁸⁰² Ion Mihai Pacepa and Ronald J. Rychlak, *Disinformation: Former Spy Chief Reveals Secret Strategies for Undermining Freedom, Attacking Religion, and Promoting Terrorism* (New York: Midpoint Trade Books, 2013), v, 5, 8-9, 49-51.

⁸⁰³ Stephane Courtois, Mark Kramer, Nicolas Werth, and Jean-Louis Panne, *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), trans. Jonathan Murphy, 26; Michael Fumento, “A Church Arson Epidemic? It’s Smoke and Mirrors,” *The Wall Street Journal*, 8 July 1996, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB836760439744561500>; Ronald J. Rychlak, “Cardinal Stepinac, Pope Pius XII, and the Roman Catholic Church during the Second World War,” *Catholic Social Science Review*, Vol. 14 (2009), 367-383, https://www.pdenet.org/cssr/content/cssr_2009_0014_0367_0383.

⁸⁰⁴ Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev* (New York: HarperCollins, 1990), 343.

⁸⁰⁵ Evans and Romerstein, *Stalin’s Secret Agents*, 195-198, 207, 228; Folsom, Jr., and Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 240, 241-245, 246-249; Robert K. Wilcox, *Target: Patton: The Plot to Assassinate General George S. Patton* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2010), 215-217, 227-230.

Knowing that they faced certain execution by the NKVD as the Kremlin accused many former White Army tsarist exiles and Red Army POWs alike of being Nazi sympathizers, many of these people attempted to escape, take their own lives, or provoke the Allied soldiers sent to round them up into shooting them.⁸⁰⁶ In one gruesome episode, a group of 400 liberated Red Army POWs in Dachau, Germany, whose only crime appears to have been being captured by the Nazis while fighting for their country, wept bitterly and begged the U.S. troops to execute them rather than forcibly repatriate them to face Stalin's accusations of cowardice and treason.⁸⁰⁷ After refusing to harm the former captives, the American servicemen watched in horror and tried to intervene as the Soviet POWs raced around the room, with some attempting to hang themselves or find a steep location from which to jump to their fate. In a desperate attempt to avoid being sent to Stalin's hangmen, one soldier reportedly rammed his head through a closed window and repeatedly raked his throat over the shards of broken glass.⁸⁰⁸

In addition to his disinformation victories over the Polish exile government, Pius XII, and numerous Soviet POWs and tsarist exiles in Western Europe, Stalin, with the help of his agents such as Hiss at the Yalta Conference, gradually succeeded in turning Roosevelt and Churchill against non-Communist Allied resistance leaders and heads of state.⁸⁰⁹ As emphasized by Sean McMeekin, Stalin's targets of disinformation included the Yugoslav *Chetnik* commander,

⁸⁰⁶ John Loftus, *The Belarus Secret* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), 48; Charles Lutton, "Stalin's War: Victims and Accomplices," *Journal of Historical Review*, Vol. 20 (2001), 4, <http://vho.org/GB/Journals/JHR/1/4/Lutton371.html>.

⁸⁰⁷ Andrew and Gordievsky, *KGB*, 343; Loftus, *The Belarus Secret*, 48; Lutton, "Stalin's War," 4; Wilcox, *Target: Patton*, 337-338, 446n10-11.

⁸⁰⁸ Andrew and Gordievsky, *KGB*, 343; Loftus, *The Belarus Secret*, 48; Lutton, "Stalin's War," 4; Wilcox, *Target: Patton*, 337-338, 446n10-11.

⁸⁰⁹ Chambers, *Witness*, 415-417, 421-424, 425-427, 441-443; *Cong. Rec. – House of Representatives*, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1948); Fitzgibbon, "The Hiss-Chambers Case,"; Koster, *Operation Snow*, 15, 132-135; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 606; Sudoplatov and Sudoplatov, *Special Tasks*, 222, 226-227, 227-229, 230; VENONA Decrypts, "13. Hoover to Matthew Connelly."

General Dragoljub “Draza” Mihailovic, and Chinese Nationalist Premier Chiang Kai-shek.⁸¹⁰ In late 1943, Harry Dexter White and Solomon Adler, another Treasury Department economist now known to have been a Soviet agent, authored several reports alleging that Chiang had misused and embezzled funds while collaborating with Japanese occupation forces in China, abandoning Mao Zedong’s Communists to fight the invaders by themselves. Adhering to Moscow’s classic disinformation technique, White and Adler had ascribed Mao’s duplicitous actions to Chiang, as the Chinese Communist leader had, in fact, benefitted from Stalin’s neutrality pact with Tokyo.⁸¹¹

Since October 1940, Stalin had secretly negotiated a series of truces with Hirohito by which Japanese commanders and Mao’s guerrillas refused to attack each other, giving the Chinese Communists crucial time to refit, regroup, and recruit while the invaders focused their fury on Chiang’s army.⁸¹² Adler had served as the U.S. Treasury Department representative in Chiang’s headquarters in Chungking, and his distortion of the truth influenced Roosevelt’s decision to gradually reduce the non-Communist Chinese leader’s already meager Lend-Lease aid allotment to a mere trickle in comparison to U.S. deliveries to Stalin and Churchill. Ruthlessly wielding his authority to designate Lend-Lease recipients, Roosevelt threatened Chiang’s aid program in the way that Bullitt, Deane, and Standley advised him to handle support to Stalin by attaching conditions to further U.S. aid after White and Adler’s late 1943 reports. While firmly rejecting the advice of anyone seeking to obtain concessions from Stalin, Roosevelt

⁸¹⁰ McMeekin, *Stalin’s War*, 474-478, 478-481, 482-485, 492-494, 496-498, 511-515.

⁸¹¹ Evans and Romerstein, *Stalin’s Secret Agents*, 147-149; McMeekin, *Stalin’s War*, 492-494, 496-497, 511-515, 743n17; Laurence E. Salisbury. “Report on China,” *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 13, No. 23 (15 November 1944), 211-213, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3022138>.

⁸¹² Evans and Romerstein, *Stalin’s Secret Agents*, 147-149; McMeekin, *Stalin’s War*, 492-494, 496-497, 511-515, 743n17.

began curtailing Lend-Lease shipments to Chiang's forces, insisting that the Chinese premier, "democratize" his government and establish a "united government with the Communists at Yen-an" as emphasized by McMeekin.⁸¹³

Once Treasury Secretary Morgenthau discovered that U.S. \$200,000,000.00 in aid to China's armies had been delayed, White, Adler, and Frank Coe, another confirmed Soviet agent serving in the Treasury Department, promptly explained that Chiang, who they portrayed as collaborating with Tokyo, could no longer be allowed to embezzle or misuse the aid that Roosevelt promised him. In his memoir, Lieutenant Colonel Frank Dorn recalls that his wartime superior in the China Burma India Theater, General Joseph Stilwell, backed Roosevelt's reduction of aid to Chiang and received orders from Washington to prepare the Chinese Nationalist leader's assassination after Japanese troops captured the city of Changsha in a brutal 1944 offensive.⁸¹⁴ While Dorn later expressed his relief that Stilwell never ordered Chiang's assassination, despite preparing for it, the picture of the Chinese premier that White, Adler, and Coe had painted by 1944 destroyed his image, leading Roosevelt to commend the supposedly noble fight being waged by Mao's Communists in a conversation with his son, Elliott.⁸¹⁵ Through his faithful agents in Washington, Stalin had executed a victorious disinformation war against Chiang while helping to plant the seeds of Mao's later rise to power as the Chinese

⁸¹³ Folsom, Jr., and Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 240, 241-245, 246-249; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 492-494, 496-497, 511-515; Salisbury, "Report on China," 211-213.

⁸¹⁴ Frank Dorn, *Walkout: With Stilwell in Burma* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1971), 75-76; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 746n54; Anthony Kubek, *How the Far East Was Lost: American Foreign Policy and the Creation of Communist China, 1941-1949* (New York: Twin Circle Publishing Company, 1972), 205-206, 209; Salisbury, "Report on China," 211-213.

⁸¹⁵ Dorn, *Walkout*, 75-76; Kubek, *How the Far East Was Lost*, 205-206, 209; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 511-515, 746n53.

Nationalists gradually lost the favor of the White House.⁸¹⁶

Like White and his State Department associates in their influence on Roosevelt's abandonment of Chiang's armies, Stalin's disinformation agents in Great Britain also appear to have played a part in turning Churchill against Yugoslav *Chetnik* leader Mihailovic. After Nazi forces invaded and occupied Yugoslavia in response to an anti-Axis coup that seized control in Belgrade in March 1941, Mihailovic affirmed his allegiance to the country's exiled monarchy and launched his resistance movement against the invaders from bases in Serbia.⁸¹⁷ Following Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union in June, Communist politician Josip Broz Tito began leading the Yugoslav Partisans in a separate struggle in his group's Croatian and Bosnian strongholds.⁸¹⁸

In July 1942, Soviet disinformation agent James Klugmann, a British intelligence officer working for London's MO4 intelligence agency based in Cairo, Egypt, spearheaded the Kremlin's disinformation war against the *Chetniks* by alleging that Mihailovic had been cooperating with the Nazi troops and crediting Tito's fighters with more victories than they had achieved. Tito also benefitted from the efforts of another of Stalin's loyal agents, Guy Burgess, a *BBC* reporter whose broadcasts portrayed the Yugoslav Communist leader as a heroic, legendary figure on whom the Allies could depend to strike the enemy relentlessly. Simultaneously, Tito personally transmitted a barrage of disinformation to Churchill's hand-picked representative to the Yugoslav Partisans, Major General Fitzroy Maclean. Maclean

⁸¹⁶ Evans and Romerstein, *Stalin's Secret Agents*, 149, 152; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 511-515, 746n53; Rayfield, *Stalin and his Hangmen*, 201, 313; Salisbury, "Report on China," 211-213; Wilcox, *Target: Patton*, 357, 447n7-8.

⁸¹⁷ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 474-478, 478-481, 482-485; TIME (Unattributed Report), "THE BALKANS: Area of Decision," *TIME*, 9 October 1944, 1-5, <https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,803304-1,00.html>.

⁸¹⁸ Evans and Romerstein, *Stalin's Secret Agents*, 149, 152; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 474-478, 478-481, 482-485; Rayfield, *Stalin and his Hangmen*, 201, 313; TIME, "THE BALKANS," 1-5; Wilcox, *Target: Patton*, 357, 447n7-8.

visited and remained with Tito's insurgents for nearly a month in late 1943 before issuing a report to his superiors that October urging London to switch its support to the Communists.⁸¹⁹

Maclean does not appear to have witnessed the battles that Tito and his lieutenants claimed to have won against the Germans during his stay, but rather foolishly parroted their accounts of resounding victories over the occupiers in his report to Churchill. By late 1944, Churchill had entirely redirected his Cairo-based intelligence unit's support from Mihailovic to Tito, airlifting nearly 27,000 tons of supplies to the Yugoslav Communists in comparison to a total of 272 tons delivered to the *Chetniks* before London abandoned them.⁸²⁰ A 9 October 1944 *TIME* article subsequently portrayed Tito as a preferable choice to Mihailovic as a Yugoslav leader worthy of Allied support. Parroting the myths that Tito had used to mislead Maclean, such as his claims to command vast legions of men in every corner of the country that won every engagement that they fought with the Germans, the *TIME* article proceeded to champion the Communist leader as, "a man of decision" whose forces had, "struck the Germans at every chance, captured their supplies and arms."⁸²¹

Stalin's smear campaigns against Chiang and Mihailovic could not have been effective without the help of agents of influence such as Adler, Klugmann, Burgess, White, and others. Nor could these men have succeeded in their quest to serve the Kremlin's interests without Roosevelt's gullibility towards Stalin and Mao and Churchill's stubborn insistence on, "even-

⁸¹⁹ Evans and Romerstein, *Stalin's Secret Agents*, 149, 152; Rayfield, *Stalin and his Hangmen*, 201, 313; *TIME*, "THE BALKANS," 1-5; Wilcox, *Target: Patton*, 357, 447n7-8.

⁸²⁰ Folsom, Jr., and Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 240, 241-245, 246-249; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 474-478, 478-481, 482-485; Rayfield, *Stalin and his Hangmen*, 201, 313; Wilcox, *Target: Patton*, 357, 447n7-8.

⁸²¹ Evans and Romerstein, *Stalin's Secret Agents*, 149, 152; Folsom, Jr., and Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 240, 241-245, 246-249; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 474-478, 478-481, 482-485; *TIME*, "THE BALKANS," 1-5.

handedness” in supplying the Yugoslav resistance.⁸²² Yet in each respective case, their disinformation campaigns were unwittingly aided by key non-Communist dupes such as Generals Stilwell and Maclean whose negative perceptions of Chiang and Mihailovic influenced their leaders’ policies that ultimately benefitted the Communists in China and Yugoslavia. As previously noted, Vice President Wallace shared Roosevelt’s desire to aid the Red Army and his underestimation of Stalin and preferred the advice of those with similar views, and he reportedly planned to promote Harry Dexter White to Treasury Secretary upon assuming the presidency.⁸²³

Due to a fortunate change in the Democratic Party ticket during the 1944 presidential election, Wallace did not remain vice president, and Harry S. Truman, a former United States senator from Missouri that had expressed his desire to see Hitler and Stalin destroy each other in 1941, rose to the position.⁸²⁴ Yet in his total war approach to Hitler’s defeat, Roosevelt continued to rely on those that shared his underestimation of Stalin’s duplicitous nature and the Red Army’s potential to occupy Eastern Europe into 1945, and during the Yalta Conference, he agreed to Hopkins’s argument that “I don’t think we should let them [the Soviets] down.”⁸²⁵ Suffering from ill health and, like Hopkins, with only a short time left to live as he sought to keep Stalin’s forces surging westward and Hitler’s remaining armies on the defensive, the

⁸²² Folsom, Jr., and Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 240, 241-245, 246-249; McMeekin, *Stalin’s War*, 474-478, 478-481, 482-485; Rayfield, *Stalin and his Hangmen*, 201, 313; TIME, “THE BALKANS,” 1-5; Wilcox, *Target: Patton*, 357, 447n7-8.

⁸²³ Evans and Romerstein, *Stalin’s Secret Agents*, 86, 113, 132, 151, 227; Folsom, Jr., and Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 240, 241-245, 246-249; Wilcox, *Target: Patton*, 241, 252-253.

⁸²⁴ David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Touchstone, 1992), 254, 257, 345-348; Wilcox, *Target: Patton*, 241, 252-253.

⁸²⁵ McMeekin, *Stalin’s War*, 605-608; Office, Chief of Finance War Department, “Lend-Lease Shipments World War II.”

president conceded to a Soviet sphere of influence in Manchuria and Korea in hopes of eventually obtaining Soviet participation against Japan.⁸²⁶

Roosevelt had already agreed to Stalin's demands regarding a pro-Soviet government in Poland at the November 1943 Tehran Conference, and at Yalta, he quickly agreed to the Soviet premier's offer to break his non-aggression pact with Hirohito and seize Japanese conquests in exchange for more Lend-Lease aid. Sensing success in obtaining Stalin's commitment to betraying his pact with Tokyo, Roosevelt hastily agreed to the Soviet leader's conditions, and he promptly gave General Deane a list of supplies sufficient to equip an army of 1,500,000 men by the Fourth Protocol's 30 June 1945 expiration. Stalin's U.S.-built Pacific merchant fleet transferred much of this material, totaling 1,066,140 tons, to Vladivostok in preparation for the assault that brought Soviet forces to the gates of two key East Asian capitals.⁸²⁷

After Roosevelt's death in April 1945, U.S. leaders continued to focus their efforts on ensuring Stalin's eventual participation in the war against Japan as Hitler committed suicide in his Berlin bunker with Red Army troops only a short distance away and his genocidal Third Reich collapsing around him.⁸²⁸ In July 1945, U.S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes accompanied President Truman as Allied leaders gathered in the Berlin suburb of Potsdam to discuss postwar Europe and Soviet entry into the war against Japan. Byrnes noted Stalin's lack of concern after the president informed him of the atomic bomb's existence, a factor likely resulting from the Soviet atomic advances enabled by Lend-Lease uranium.⁸²⁹ While U.S. aid had played a vital role in defeating one adversary, it had also propelled the rise of another as

⁸²⁶ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 605-608; Office, Chief of Finance War Department, "Lend-Lease Shipments World War II,"; U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, 95-97, 104-107, 141-145.

⁸²⁷ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 605-608; U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, 147-149, 155-156.

⁸²⁸ Fest, *Hitler*, 747-750.

⁸²⁹ James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), 263.

Stalin began issuing demands and expressing increasingly aggressive intentions that he believed served Soviet interests.⁸³⁰

Following the Potsdam Conference, Stalin broke his pact with Emperor Hirohito and began deploying the Red Army on the borders of countries under Japanese occupation. On 9 August 1945, Soviet troops delivered a crushing surprise attack on the Japanese occupation forces in Manchuria, China, and Korea, rapidly encircling entire Japanese armies, bypassing strongholds, and quickly capturing major cities.⁸³¹ Stalin annexed the Japanese territories of southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands and transferred excess war material acquired through Lend-Lease to Communist guerrillas in China and North Korea, enabling the rise of Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung.⁸³²

Lend-Lease Studebakers, sometimes still painted with the large blue “U.S.” on their hoods, propelled the Red Army’s advance into the Japanese-occupied territories, allowing the Soviet troops to bypass strongholds of dogged Japanese resistance and capture large cities. With their mobile operations greatly enhanced by four years’ worth of American Lend-Lease trucks, Stalin’s forces surged forward and, with the help of elite paratrooper units, captured cities such as Khynnam, Port Arthur, Pyongyang, Mukden, and others.⁸³³ They also fought their way across the Great Khingan Range and the marshes surrounding the Amur, Ussuri, and Sungari Rivers aided by the Studebakers. In less than two weeks, Stalin had captured enormous territories aided by the fruits of wartime U.S. industry, and while the Red Army did not remain in control of these

⁸³⁰ McCullough, *Truman*, 403-404, 405, 447-450, 452-453.

⁸³¹ Weeks, *Stalin’s Other War*, 175-180.

⁸³² S. L. A. Marshall, *Pork Chop Hill: The American Fighting Man in Action Korea, Spring, 1953* (New York: Berkley Books, 2000); 4-5, 7-12; Evans and Romerstein, *Stalin’s Secret Agents*, 205-206; Kim Il Sung, *The Selected Works of Kim Il Sung* (New York: Prism Key Press, 2011), 7-8, 8-10; Weeks, *Stalin’s Other War*, 180-181.

⁸³³ McMeekin, *Stalin’s War*, 650-652, 653-657; Weeks, *Stalin’s Other War*, 181-183, 185-188.

countries, its brief presence helped to strengthen the local Communist Parties that subsequently fought their way into power in mainland China and North Korea.⁸³⁴

Although Lend-Lease had helped remove the threat to the democratic Western world posed by Hitler and his Axis partners, the program had also succeeded in empowering Stalin with a stronger, more mobile military capable of crushing opponents and spreading Communism by force. The more dangerous world that emerged in 1949 as Mao's Communists rose to power in mainland China and Stalin's scientists successfully tested the Soviet Union's first atomic bomb guaranteed the continuation of aggression and ushered in a new world full of horrifying new possibilities in the event of a third world war.⁸³⁵ As the global Cold War began with Stalin's demands for more territorial concessions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the rise of powerful Communist Parties in Italy and France, and the exposure of Soviet agents in Washington, Western leaders reflected on Roosevelt's Lend-Lease legacy and its ramifications.⁸³⁶

At a 21 February 1946 U.S. Senate session, Senator Styles Bridges (R-NH) called attention to recent reports of Soviet espionage in the United States and Canada and expressed deep concern over Stalin's apparent success at subverting U.S. government officials and obtaining crucial secrets from them. Bridges quoted the statements made by former Ambassador Davies in which he said that Stalin's regime had the "moral" right to obtain military secrets,

⁸³⁴ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 650-652, 653-657; Weeks, *Stalin's Other War*, 181-183, 185-188.

⁸³⁵ U.S. Air Force, *Project Rand*, 27-34, 43-54.

⁸³⁶ Alexei Markov, "Stalin's secret war plans," *Saturday Evening Post*, 20 September 1942, <https://vividmaps.com/stalins-secret-war-plans/amp/>; Marshall, *Pork Chop Hill*, 4-5, 7-12; James S. Olson and Randy Roberts, *Where the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam, 1945-2010* (Hoboken, NJ: 2014), vii-viii, 62-65; U.S. Air Force, *Project Rand*, 27-34, 43-54.

including atomic secrets, from its former allies in the West by any means, including theft.⁸³⁷ The United States senator proceeded to cite three articles from the *Times-Herald*, the *Washington Daily News*, and the *New York Daily Mirror* discussing Davies's verbal defense of Moscow's espionage efforts and Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King's speech announcing the capture of several Soviet spies.⁸³⁸

Bridges then pointed to the case of an agent identified by the name of Shimishenko who had been caught while attempting to purchase the blueprints for a new U.S.-designed jet aircraft. The New Hampshire senator then stated that while the FBI had sought to have Shimishenko arrested and charged, the State Department had intervened on the Soviet spy's behalf and allowed him to sail home with his wife on 6 January without the blueprints.⁸³⁹ Bridges then emphasized the case of a second Soviet spy briefly detained in Bremerton, Washington who, "not only had plans of the atomic bomb, but samples of the metal from which the bomb is made."⁸⁴⁰ After stating that, "The agent had sailed for Russia," with atomic secrets on board and the State Department's approval despite various U.S. law enforcement agencies' attempts to charge him, Bridges concluded by assessing some Washington officials' desire to placate Stalin as a horrendous betrayal of U.S. national security tantamount to treason.⁸⁴¹

In a 16 April 1946 House of Commons session, MP Colonel Sir Oliver Crosthwaite-Eyre asked Prime Minister Clement Attlee to provide Parliament with, "a comprehensive statement" of the material aid with which the British Empire had furnished the Soviet war effort, along with

⁸³⁷ *Congressional Record – United States Senate*, 79th Congress, 1st Session (1946), pt. 2, Government Publishing Office, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1946-pt2/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1946-pt2-3.pdf>.

⁸³⁸ *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate*, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1946) pt. 2.

⁸³⁹ *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate*, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1946) pt. 2.

⁸⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴¹ *Ibid.*

the financial cost of the aid, from 1 October 1941 until the Allied victory.⁸⁴² Calling attention to London's Official Report, Attlee proceeded to cite the figures of 5,218 tanks including 1,388 Canadian vehicles and 7,411 aircraft including 3,129 U.S. Lend-Lease planes, along with raw materials, machinery, medical equipment, and other items. Listing a financial sum of 428,000,000 British pounds' worth of cargo delivered to North Russia, a figure also cited in the British Naval Staff's report on the Arctic convoys, Attlee clarified that the official figures did not account for the additional costs incurred by the Royal and Merchant Navies delivering the aid.⁸⁴³ Stating that Nazi submarines, aircraft, and surface ships had menaced the mariners relentlessly, "especially on the route followed by the Northern Convoys," Attlee emphasized the "fortitude and endurance" of those whose efforts had ensured a steady stream of priceless aid to the Red Army totaling nearly 4,000,000 tons.⁸⁴⁴

Anticipating Stalin's refusal to repay Lend-Lease aid in full as the global Cold War began, President Truman initially requested that the Soviet Union only reimburse the U.S. government for U.S. \$2,500,000,000 to cover civilian supply costs.⁸⁴⁵ In 1960, Nikita Khrushchev angrily refused an offer from the Eisenhower administration to pay \$300,000,000 in exchange for the U.S. government writing off the remaining official \$11,000,000,000.⁸⁴⁶ Echoing Stalin's arguments for refusing to pay in 1945, Khrushchev stated that while Lend-Lease played a vital role, the Red Army had already paid its fair share by absorbing the bulk of

⁸⁴² *Parliamentary Record – House of Commons*, 1st Session (1946), <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1946/apr/16/russia-british-empire-war-assistance>.

⁸⁴³ British Admiralty, "Supplement to The London Gazette"; *The National Archives of the UK*, C. B. 3305 (4) *Naval Staff History*, 129; *Parl. Rec. – House of Commons*, 1st Sess. (1946).

⁸⁴⁴ *Parl. Rec. – House of Commons*, 1st Sess. (1946); Whitehall History Publishing – Ministry of Defence, *The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys*, x-xi.

⁸⁴⁵ McCullough, *Truman*, 382, 398; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 131-133.

⁸⁴⁶ Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, 436.

Hitler's attacks.⁸⁴⁷ More than two decades after Khrushchev's parroting of Stalin's well-worn excuse, President Ronald Reagan negotiated an agreement with Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s to pay \$300,000,000 within thirty years, a deadline finally reached by the Russian government in August 2006.⁸⁴⁸

In over-arming the Red Army's soldiers from the Third and Fourth Lend-Lease Protocols forward, Roosevelt helped to hasten Hitler's defeat in Europe while giving Stalin the ability to replace him as the dominant tyrant and seize Hirohito's East Asian conquests.⁸⁴⁹ Washington's successful 1943 expansion of ALSIB and the Persian Corridor had unnecessarily fueled Stalin's ability to capture and hold vast territories with his fully mobile, motorized Red Army. American productivity and perseverance greatly strengthened the Allied cause and ensured the defeat of Axis aggression for the better of millions of innocent people in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. In increasing Soviet Lend-Lease aid rather than keeping it limited to the wintertime Arctic convoy deliveries, however, U.S. officials were equally effective in oversupplying Stalin's strategic stockpile and helping him sow the seeds of future wars.⁸⁵⁰

⁸⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁴⁸ Edmund Conway, "Reborn Russia clears Soviet debt," *The Telegraph*, 22 August 2006, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2945924/Reborn-Russia-clears-Soviet-debt.html>; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 134.

⁸⁴⁹ Weeks, *Stalin's Other War*, 175-180.

⁸⁵⁰ U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, 95-97, 104-107, 141-145; U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Stalin to Roosevelt July – December 1942," *The White House*, Washington, D.C., 1942, *National Archives and Records Service Franklin D. Roosevelt Library*, http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/_resources/images/mr/mr0051a.pdf.

CONCLUSION

I want to tell you, from the Russian point of view, what the President and the United States have done to win the war. The most important things in this war are machines.... The United States, therefore, is a country of machines. Without the use of those machines, through Lend-Lease, we would lose this war.

– *Joseph Stalin*

A potent alliance of American industry, British bravery, and Soviet stubbornness on the battlefield combined to crush the Axis Powers in the Second World War in a truly Allied endeavor that would not have succeeded without such a powerful effort on the part of each respective country's sacrifices and skills.⁸⁵¹ Stalin's determination to avoid the fates of the tsar and Kerensky, the Red Army's willingness to fight Hitler to the finish, and Roosevelt and Churchill's combined efforts to prevent a repeat of Brest-Litovsk led to Berlin's fall in 1945. Yet had U.S. officials not prioritized Soviet Lend-Lease and had their British counterparts not sacrificed many resources of their own, the Red Army's survival would not have been assured. The Soviets may have been defeated and colonized by the Germans. Nevertheless, the Western Allies, the United States and Great Britain, must be criticized for the indiscriminate way in which they poured in obviously excessive aid to placate Stalin and his agents in Washington and London. A balance should have been struck – enough aid to sustain the Soviets, but not enough to facilitate their conquest of East Central Europe, Manchuria, parts of Japan, and their control of northern Korea.⁸⁵²

⁸⁵¹ Liddell Hart, *History of the Second World War*, 908-910.

⁸⁵² Arnold, *Global Mission*, 211-212, 385-387; Dolitsky, Glazkov, and Poor, *Pipeline to Russia*, 64-66, 79-80, 84-85; ; Hays, Jr., *The Alaska-Siberia Connection*, 37-38, 41, 43-45, 49; Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 266-269; Mason, *Arctic Warriors*, 209-210; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 650-652, 653-657; Melton, *Liberty's War*, 67-68; Smith, *Warplanes to Alaska*, 45-47, 54-56; Sokolov, *The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War*, 53-55; Stettinius, Jr., *Lend-Lease*, 249, 252; *The National Archives of the UK*, C. B. 3305 (4) *Naval Staff History*, 78-79; Thomas, *Through Ice and Fire*, 147-148; Vail Motter, *The Persian Corridor*, 141-143, 259-262, 319-320, 341-344; Van Tuyl, *Feeding the Bear*, 137-140, 141-143; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 135-136; Woodman, *Arctic Convoys 1941-1945*, 264-265, 266, 308-309.

While the zeal of Roosevelt, Hopkins, Stettinius, and others certainly helped to keep the Red Army well-supplied and fed on its path to victory in the Second World War, there can be little doubt that the tremendous increase in Lend-Lease aid that the Persian Corridor and ALSIB enabled also helped strengthen Stalin's aggressive endeavors. As acknowledged and emphasized by scholars such as McMeekin, Koster, and Steil, the role of Soviet spies and disinformation agents such as Harry Dexter White and Alger Hiss certainly aided Stalin's quest to serve Soviet interests through U.S. policy.⁸⁵³ As McMeekin adds, the naivete of Roosevelt, Hopkins, Wallace, and other top administration officials towards Stalin's adherence to aggressive, rigid Communist orthodoxy also contributed, even if inadvertently, to the Soviet Union's rise as a military superpower.⁸⁵⁴ While the extent to which the president may have continued trying to placate Stalin after Hitler's defeat is not possible to determine, his wartime policies indicate that he underestimated the Soviet premier's duplicitous nature.⁸⁵⁵

Yet while this appears to be verifiably accurate, based on Roosevelt's wartime correspondence with Stalin, his refusal to attach conditions to Soviet Lend-Lease, and his comments to Hopkins and others, it is equally crucial to recall the global environment in which he and other U.S. officials lived and worked.⁸⁵⁶ Based on his statements relating to Soviet Lend-Lease, Roosevelt, like many of his advisers and U.S. congressmen, greatly underestimated

⁸⁵³ Chambers, *Witness*, 425-427, 441-443; *Cong. Rec. – House of Representatives*, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1948); Fitzgibbon, "The Hiss-Chambers Case,"; Koster, *Operation Snow*, 140-143, 152-157; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 606; Sudoplatov and Sudoplatov, *Special Tasks*, 222, 226-227, 227-229, 230; VENONA Decrypts, "Silvermaster Folder NY 65-14603 'Alger Hiss.'"

⁸⁵⁴ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 347-350, 352-357, 370-371.

⁸⁵⁵ Folsom, Jr., and Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 228, 251.

⁸⁵⁶ Bullitt, *For the President*, 576-580, 587-588, 593-599; Earle, "F.D.R.'s Tragic Mistake!" 14; Folsom, Jr., and Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 246-249; Raymont, "Bullitt Letter to Roosevelt,"; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 544-545, 791-793, 796, 802; Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 355-359; U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Roosevelt to Stalin January – June 1943."

Stalin's military capabilities and made the same mistake as Hitler in assuming the Red Army to be an inferior and inherently primitive force. In Roosevelt's case, this false perception, a prevailing one among U.S. officials at the time, presented a terrifying possibility in the form of a Nazi victory in the east and all its devastating ramifications.⁸⁵⁷

For Roosevelt and many of his associates, the risk of arming Stalin appeared to be far less than the strategic horror of a Nazi conquest of Soviet Europe and Berlin's successful exploitation of its land and people. Were Stalin's Red Army to falter and collapse on the battlefield, as had the armies of both Nicholas II and Kerensky in the First World War, Hitler could have been virtually assured of triumph.⁸⁵⁸ Without Stalin's uncompromising ruthlessness in prosecuting the war and the soldiers of the Red Army remaining in the field and fighting tenaciously for their homeland, Hitler's forces may have achieved much more than the second Brest-Litovsk feared by Roosevelt and Churchill.⁸⁵⁹

During the tumultuous period in which they served as Americans' public servants, Roosevelt, Hopkins, Stettinius, and others could not escape the image of Germany and any powers allied with Berlin as the greatest potential adversaries of the United States. Basing their perceptions of the Soviet Union on Tsarist Russia's poor performance in the First World War, they failed to comprehend Stalin's ruthlessness and ability to reorganize the Red Army into an effective and deadly military machine rivaling the Nazi opponent that they viewed as virtually

⁸⁵⁷ Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, 25, 489-490; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 20: J. V. Stalin to F. Roosevelt," 15 May 1942, 24-25; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 110; Rickenbacker, *Rickenbacker*, 400-401, 402-403; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 544-546; Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 308-309, 312-313.

⁸⁵⁸ Rickenbacker, *Rickenbacker*, 400-401, 402-403; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 306-308; Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 308-309, 312-313.

⁸⁵⁹ Merridale, *Ivan's War*, 124, 394-395; Werth, *Russia at War*, 148-149, 152-153, 171, 243, 249-252.

unstoppable.⁸⁶⁰ Fearing a repeat of Brest-Litovsk, a potentiality rendered more frightful by Hitler's genocidal goals and Nazi Germany's reputed mastery of armored warfare and airpower, they sought to keep Stalin sufficiently motivated and fully equipped to bring the war to Berlin.⁸⁶¹

The memoirs of Standley, Deane, Arnold, and Rickenbacker, and Roosevelt's interactions with Hopkins, Churchill, and others seem to indicate that for U.S. leaders a repeat of the First World War had to be avoided at all costs and the final defeat of Germany assured. While exuding naïveté and foolishness in their assessments of Stalin, these men appear to have genuinely sought to serve U.S. national interests through the annihilation strategy described by Russell Weigley.⁸⁶² From their perspective, that manner of overthrowing the enemy's entire political system and utterly breaking its will to defy the United States ensured the defeat of the Axis and arming the Soviets seemed to them the most effective means by which to secure total victory.⁸⁶³

Yet Hopkins's authorization of shipments to Moscow of uranium, thorium, and other materials necessary to produce atomic bombs serves as a testament to his and Roosevelt's inexcusable refusal to recognize the dangers in enhancing Stalin's nuclear capabilities.⁸⁶⁴ No doubt fearing the possibility that Hitler's and Hirohito's scientists could potentially develop atomic capabilities of their own, U.S. Lend-Lease officials may have decided that by speeding

⁸⁶⁰ Earle, "F.D.R.'s Tragic Mistake!" 14; Fleming, *The New Dealers' War*, 204-205, 464-465; Folsom, Jr., and Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 246-249; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 450-452, 731n31-33; Weil, *A Pretty Good Club*, 136-137.

⁸⁶¹ Dolitsky, Glazkov, and Poor, *Pipeline to Russia*, 64-66, 79-80, 84-85; Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, 25, 489-490; Hays, Jr., *The Alaska-Siberia Connection*, 37-38, 41, 43-45; Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 266-269; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 419-420, 422, 650-652, 635-657; U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Relations: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran,"; Van Tuyl, *Feeding the Bear*, 5, 26-27, 49; Zimmerman, "Lend-Lease to Russia."

⁸⁶² Weigley, *The American Way of War*, 316-317, 357-359.

⁸⁶³ Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, 69; Weigley, *The American Way of War*, 318-319, 330-332, 352-354.

⁸⁶⁴ *Cong. Rec. – House of Representatives*, 81st Cong. 1st and 2nd Sess. (1949-1950).

Stalin's atomic research they could ensure an Allied nuclear edge. However, in their underestimation of Stalin's duplicity and adherence to spreading Communism at gunpoint, they failed to consider that such actions sowed the seeds of a more dangerous reality.⁸⁶⁵

This perception appears to have led to Hopkins's authorizing of uranium and other vital atomic bomb components to be shipped to the Soviets. According to Major Jordan's diary entries and subsequent congressional testimony, Hopkins's first order for such material to be supplied to Soviet officials and kept out of official Lend-Lease records came shortly after Roosevelt's order for all Soviet aid to be prioritized.⁸⁶⁶ In supplying Stalin with the material for atomic bomb production, Roosevelt's advisers appear to have underestimated Soviet scientific potential just as they underestimated the Red Army's combat capabilities.⁸⁶⁷

It is crucial that the years in which Stalin reportedly received the initial shipments of this material left out of official Lend-Lease records, between 1942 and early 1943 according to Major Jordan, were also the years that saw the Red Army appear on the verge of collapse before counterattacking the Nazis at Stalingrad and Kursk.⁸⁶⁸ According to Jordan's wartime diary entry, the Soviets received 13,440 pounds of thorium in 1942 and another 11,912 pounds in 1943.⁸⁶⁹ Jordan provided these figures during his postwar congressional testimony, and Chief Council Frank Tavenner of HUAC confirmed the 1943 shipment, immediately producing, "a shipper's export declaration showing the exact figure 11,912 pounds of thorium nitrate shipped

⁸⁶⁵ Jordan, *Major Jordan's Diaries*, 45-47; National Security Agency, "Koltsov's Account of a Conversation with 'Jurist,'" ; Romerstein and Breindel, *The Venona Secrets*, 484-490.

⁸⁶⁶ *Cong. Rec. – House of Representatives*, 81st Cong. 1st and 2nd Sess. (1949-1950); Fitzgibbon, "The Hiss-Chambers Case,"; Jordan, *Major Jordan's Diaries*, 36-38, 40-41, 42-44; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 531-534.

⁸⁶⁷ Deane, *The Strange Alliance*, 89; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 403-405, 407-409; Stettinius, Jr., *Lend-Lease*, 229; U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, 13-15, 16-17.

⁸⁶⁸ Glantz, *Colossus Reborn*, 142-143, 244; Jordan, *Major Jordan's Diaries*, 10-13.

⁸⁶⁹ *Cong. Rec. – House of Representatives*, 81st Cong. 1st and 2nd Sess. (1949-1950); Jordan, *Major Jordan's Diaries*, 10-13.

January 30, 1943, from Philadelphia on the Steamship *John C. Fremont*, the exporter being Amtorg Trading Corp.”⁸⁷⁰ In his official capacity as Hopkins’s Lend-Lease Expeditor to the Soviet Union, Jordan initially oversaw the shipment of materials from the Newark, New Jersey base to the various Lend-Lease supply routes, although it remains unclear whether the *John C. Fremont* sailed for the Persian Corridor or joined Convoy JW-53’s journey to North Russia.⁸⁷¹ Regardless of the specific supply route over which the *Fremont*’s cargo traveled, Tavenner’s confirmation of the exact amount of weight in thorium that the ship contained, and the date of 30 January 1943, strongly supports Jordan’s recollections.⁸⁷²

Wartime Washington’s excessive catering to Stalin’s demands, while somewhat understandable regarding Lend-Lease’s intended role as a practical measure to ensure the defense of Allied countries opposing the Axis, seems less excusable regarding the apparent strengthening of his atomic program.⁸⁷³ The conventional aid delivered through Lend-Lease, especially the aluminum and machine tools that assured the continued production of Soviet tanks and aircraft, and the food, planes, and trucks that fueled and spearheaded the Red Army’s mobile operations, helped the Soviets to sustain and repulse Hitler’s attacks.⁸⁷⁴ The same cannot be said for what appears to be Roosevelt’s dismissal of the possibility that Stalin could use nuclear

⁸⁷⁰ *Cong. Rec. – House of Representatives*, 81st Cong. 1st and 2nd Sess. (1949-1950); Fitzgibbon, “The Hiss-Chambers Case,”; Jordan, *Major Jordan’s Diaries*, 10-13.

⁸⁷¹ Jordan, *Major Jordan’s Diaries*, 5-7, 8-9, 10-13, 15-16; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 588.

⁸⁷² *Cong. Rec. – House of Representatives*, 81st Cong. 1st and 2nd Sess. (1949-1950); Jordan, *Major Jordan’s Diaries*, 10-13.

⁸⁷³ Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, 263; Jordan, *Major Jordan’s Diaries*, 10-13.

⁸⁷⁴ Sokolov, *The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War*, 53-55, 57-59.

material acquired through Lend-Lease to power his capabilities for expansion, leading to a dangerous postwar world.⁸⁷⁵

To be sure, Stalin's decision to act on his political and ideological convictions and misuse the enormous amount of war material delivered through Lend-Lease to ruthlessly occupy Eastern Europe can only have originated with the Soviet premier himself, and his deceitful actions cannot be ascribed to his wartime Western Allies.⁸⁷⁶ Yet Roosevelt, in full knowledge of Stalin's record of revolutionary activity, mass murder, and military aggression, displayed outstanding naivete in underestimating the Soviet premier's duplicitous character, a factor that led to him oversupplying the Red Army while attaching no conditions to Soviet Lend-Lease even after Stalingrad and Kursk in 1943.⁸⁷⁷ While much less naïve towards Stalin, Churchill had been forced to embrace his Soviet ally after Hitler's 1941 attack, and he had little choice but to continue sending aid to Moscow as the war progressed and events spiraled further away from his control and into Roosevelt's aging and increasingly infirm hands.⁸⁷⁸

In 1865, Union General Ulysses S. Grant observed, "This is a very suggestive age...but it will always be found in the end that the only way to whip an army is to go out and fight it."⁸⁷⁹

⁸⁷⁵ Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, 263; Earle, "F.D.R.'s Tragic Mistake!" 14; Folsom, Jr., and Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 246-249; Hohne, *Canaris*, 483-484; Jordan, *Major Jordan's Diaries*, 10-13; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 450-452, 731n31-33; Waller, *The Unseen War in Europe*, 280-285.

⁸⁷⁶ Bourke-White, *Portrait of Myself*, 186, 191; Carter, "Russian War Relief," 67; Kelly, *Saving Stalin*, 26-29; Small, "How We Learned to Love the Russians," 457-462; Smelser and Davies II, *The Myth of the Eastern Front*, 18-20, 27, 31-34, 35-36; Stowe, "Stowe, in Visit to Rzhev Sector,"; The New York Times, "Addresses of Litvinoff, Hopkins and Green,"; The New York Times, "MILLION A MONTH AID IS SHIPPED TO SOVIET,"; Willkie, "STALIN: 'GLAD TO SEE YOU, MR. WILLKIE,'" 35.

⁸⁷⁷ Bullitt, *For the President*, 576-580, 587-588, 593-599; Deane, *The Strange Alliance*, 88-89, 103; Earle, "F.D.R.'s Tragic Mistake!" 14; Folsom, Jr., and Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 246-249; Raymont, "Bullitt Letter to Roosevelt."

⁸⁷⁸ Alanbrooke, *War Diaries*, 486-487; Bohlen, *Witness to History*, 149-150; Carlton, *Churchill and the Soviet Union*, 106-107; Churchill, *Memoirs*, 476-479; Pownall, *Chief of Staff*, 29; *The National Archives of the UK*, "Foreign Secretary. First Lord. First Sea Lord," 9 January 1943; U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Relations: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran,"; Zaloga, *Soviet Lend-Lease Tanks*, 4.

⁸⁷⁹ Peter G. Tsouras, *Civil War Quotations: In the Words of the Commanders* (New York: Sterling Publishing Co., Inc., 1998), 106.

As emphasized by Weigley, Grant's thinking appears in many ways to have guided and influenced Roosevelt and Eisenhower's strategic approach to Germany's defeat in the Second World War, and Soviet Lend-Lease played a crucial part in ensuring the Reich's total and lasting collapse.⁸⁸⁰ Under Stalin's leadership, the fighting men and women of the Red Army undeniably achieved this goal many times over, and their courage, steadfastness, and tenacity broke the back of Hitler's brutal and merciless military machine. Yet while Soviet blood and armor served as the key factors in the destruction of Nazi Germany's armies, U.S. Lend-Lease greatly helped both the Red Army and Soviet war workers to withstand and repulse the invaders, essentially sustaining their successful defense of Soviet soil before oversupplying them for aggression.⁸⁸¹

Following the Soviet victory at Kursk in the summer of 1943 and the earlier congressional renewal of Lend-Lease that spring due to the perceived threat from the Germans still maintaining a foothold in Soviet territory, Stalin's forces continued receiving enormous amounts of Western aid.⁸⁸² The avalanche of war material that poured in from the second half of 1943 until the war's end ensured that the Soviets could maintain the strategic initiative against their Nazi foes and eventually bring the battle to Berlin, a goal that served U.S. national interests at that time from Roosevelt's perspective. The enormous quantities of U.S.-supplied trucks and attack aircraft that Stalin continued receiving after Congress's 1943 renewal of Lend-Lease ensured that his armies could continue their advance after evicting German forces from Soviet soil, thereby relieving Roosevelt's advisers from the fears of a second Brest-Litovsk.⁸⁸³ As has

⁸⁸⁰ Eisenhower, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, 66; Weigley, *The American Way of War*, 316-317, 357-359.

⁸⁸¹ Glantz and House, *When Titans Clashed*, 52-53, 58, 71-73, 103, 105, 142-143, 175-176; Merridale, *Ivan's War*, 124, 128, 262, 264-265, 394-395.

⁸⁸² Glantz, *Colossus Reborn*, 142-143, 244.

⁸⁸³ *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate and House of Representatives*, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 534-536.

been shown, much of this armament, as well as the aluminum and food supplied through Lend-Lease, arrived by way of the Persian Corridor, ALSIB, and the Soviet merchant ships in the North Pacific, speeding Stalin's 1944 offensives that felled Hitler's forces.⁸⁸⁴

Yet as McMeekin adds, it also propelled Stalin's subsequent aggression against the Japanese forces in Manchuria and strengthened Communist dictatorships in East Asia, creating horrific circumstances on the Korean Peninsula that continue contributing to regional instability.⁸⁸⁵ And while few Western historians have denied the overall importance of Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union's offensive operations from 1943 forward, it appears that the program also contributed heavily to the Red Army's successful defense of its home soil between 1941 and 1943. Soviet soldiers and workers applied much of this earlier aid, consisting of the specific weapons, raw materials, and food items demanded by Stalin, and delivered by Roosevelt and Churchill, in halting Hitler's offensives at Stalingrad and Kursk and turning the Nazi advance into a retreat. Despite the constant perils that they faced, the Allied sailors of the Arctic convoys defied the odds and helped to ensure that the Red Army could sustain and repulse Hitler's most brutal blows and eventually counterattack the invaders.⁸⁸⁶

While Alexander Hill's claim that Great Britain's initial 1941 deliveries of U.S. and British armor and aircraft to the Soviet Arctic ports enabled the Red Army's repulse of the Germans at Moscow that December may be somewhat overstated, it appears that the overall deliveries of the much larger 1942 Arctic convoys helped to render the victorious Stalingrad

⁸⁸⁴ Sokolov, *The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War*, 53-55, 57-59.

⁸⁸⁵ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 534-536, 650-652, 653-657; Weeks, *Stalin's Other War*, 175-177, 182-183.

⁸⁸⁶ Erswell and McKay, *Surviving the Arctic Convoys*, 93-95; *The National Archives of the UK*, "PREMIER 3 393/8," "Telescope No. 152. Following for Keenlyside for Ministry of War Transport," 20 January 1943; Whitehall History Publishing – Ministry of Defence, *The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys*, x-xii; Woodman, *Arctic Convoys 1941-1945*, 264-265, 266, 308-309, 327-328, 332, 406-409.

counterattack possible.⁸⁸⁷ Despite inflicting horrific losses on PQ-17, the Germany Navy and Air Force failed to interdict the majority of the 1942 convoys, and the bulk of the aid that Stalin urged his allies to deliver in his hour of need appears to have successfully reached Murmansk, Archangel, or Molotovsk. There is, therefore, no need to exaggerate the role of the initial Lend-Lease deliveries in the Red Army's 1941 defense of Moscow, which was partially enabled by Stalin's spy Harry Dexter White's efforts to provoke the Pearl Harbor attack that allowed Siberian reinforcements to rush to the Soviet capital's defense.⁸⁸⁸

Hill and McMeekin appear to be correct, however, in concluding that Lend-Lease had already ensured the Soviet Union's successful defense by 1943 and that it can therefore be argued that Stalin may not have required further U.S. or British aid in ensuring his country's survival.⁸⁸⁹ As has been shown, while Lend-Lease deliveries appear to have ensured the Red Army's ability to outlast its Nazi opponent and effectively execute the Soviet Union's defense by 1943, this did little to calm Roosevelt's fears, and those of his chief advisers, regarding the possibility that Stalin could still be forced into seeking a separate peace with Hitler. From the contemporary perspective of senior U.S. officials from the president down, the prospect of a second Brest-Litovsk remained a frightful possibility so long as German troops remained in occupation of any part of Soviet soil. While Stalin may not have seriously considered such an action, he appears to have discerned Roosevelt's and, to an extent, Churchill's fears of this

⁸⁸⁷ Hill, "British 'Lend-Lease' Tanks," 289-294; Mason, *Arctic Warriors*, 209-210; Melton, *Liberty's War*, 67-68; Thomas, *Through Ice and Fire*, 147-148; Walling, *Forgotten Sacrifice*, 9-10, 270-271; Woodman, *Arctic Convoys 1941-1945*, 308-309.

⁸⁸⁸ Hill, "British 'Lend-Lease' Tanks," 289-294; Koster, *Operation Snow*, 15; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 376-377; Romerstein and Breindel, *The Venona Secrets*, 3-4; Steil, *The Battle of Bretton Woods*, 303, 328-329, 334.

⁸⁸⁹ Hill, "British 'Lend-Lease' Tanks," 289-294; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 516, 517-518, 534-536.

potential outcome and their desire to prevent it from occurring by supplying the Red Army.⁸⁹⁰

As indicated in many of the Soviet premier's communications with his U.S. and British comrades, he sought to keep them sufficiently afraid of the possibility of a second Brest-Litovsk while stopping short of verbally threatening them with such action, further reinforcing the demands of U.S. officials that Soviet aid had to be prioritized.⁸⁹¹ The shared convictions of Roosevelt, Hopkins, Hull, Stettinius, Harriman, Standley, and others that such a potentiality threatened their total war approach to Germany's defeat and had to be prevented at all costs further galvanized their desire to strengthen the Soviets.⁸⁹² This fervor motivated Roosevelt's insistence to Churchill that the Arctic convoys be continued in the bloody aftermath of PQ-17 due to Stalin's understandable insistence on keeping the North Russian route open, no matter the risk to American, British, and Canadian lives. As Hitler's forces renewed their efforts against the Red Army in the spring of 1942 and Stalin continued emphasizing the importance of the Arctic convoys, the goal of preventing a second Brest Litovsk engulfed the immediate strategic thinking of U.S. officials as Roosevelt ordered all Soviet aid deliveries to receive urgent priority.⁸⁹³

The Soviet leader also sought to shame his Western allies and exploit the sense of guilt that he inculcated in them through his telegrams and at Allied summits, with the assistance of his

⁸⁹⁰ Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, 489-490; Harriman and Abel, *Special Envoy*, 179; Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 1171-1173; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 10," 3 September 1941, 20-22; Pownall, *Chief of Staff*, 39-40, 41-42; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 40-41; Rickenbacker, *Rickenbacker*, 400-401, 402-403; U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Roosevelt to Stalin January – June 1943."

⁸⁹¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 103: For Marshal Stalin from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill," 19 August 1943, 83; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 287-288; U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Roosevelt to Stalin January – June 1943."

⁸⁹² *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate*, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) pt. 3; Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, 69-70, 489-490; Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin*, 9-12; Folsom, Jr., and Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 228, 246-249, 251; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 791-793, 796.

⁸⁹³ Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 154, 248; Walling, *Forgotten Sacrifice*, 121-122.

loyal agents such as Hiss at Yalta, for not opening the second front that he repeatedly demanded in northwestern Europe until 1944. As has been shown, Stalin's constant complaints and implicit threats to conclude a separate peace with Hitler helped him to exploit Roosevelt and Churchill's fears of a second Brest-Litovsk and continue obtaining unconditional aid from them.⁸⁹⁴ By keeping the Red Army well-fed and fighting, the Anglo-American leaders doubtlessly rendered the Second World War shorter and prevented Hitler from crushing their armies on Normandy's shores while inadvertently strengthening Stalin to spread Communist dictatorships at gunpoint in Europe and Asia.⁸⁹⁵

The key contribution to the Red Army's decisive Stalingrad and Kursk counterattacks made by the often-uncredited Allied sailors serving on the Arctic convoys appears to have been crucial in sustaining Stalin's struggle to repulse Hitler's hordes and thereby ensure the Red Army's ability to tie down its opponent.⁸⁹⁶ Had Roosevelt and Churchill not resumed the convoys despite the severe losses suffered by PQ-17 and had the men of their respective merchant navies not braved the icy Arctic waters and Hitler's bombers and submarines, the Nazi tide at Stalingrad may have been far harder to check. These facts surrounding the Arctic convoys' successes and the initial limitations of the other Lend-Lease supply routes appear to somewhat justify Sean McMeekin's argument that U.S. officials could arguably have

⁸⁹⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 103: For Marshal Stalin from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill," 19 August 1943, 83; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 287-288; *The National Archives of the UK*, "PREMIER 3 393/8" "Prime Minister," n. d.

⁸⁹⁵ Dolitsky, Glazkov, and Poor, *Pipeline to Russia*, 60-63, 72-75, 79-80, 84-85; Dunn, *The Red Army and the Soviet Economy*, 74, 80-81; Hays, Jr., *The Alaska-Siberia Connection*, 38-39, 51-52, 57-58; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 650-652, 653-657; Van Tuyl, *Feeding the Bear*, 54; Smith, *Warplanes to Alaska*, 161-165, 173-176; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 124-126.

⁸⁹⁶ Erswell and McKay, *Surviving the Arctic Convoys*, 43-44; Smith, *Arctic Victory*, 11-12; The German Naval Staff, "War Diary,"; Walling, *Forgotten Sacrifice*, 213-215; Woodman, *Arctic Convoys 1941-1945*, 262-264.

discontinued Soviet aid after 1943.⁸⁹⁷ Despite the notorious losses incurred by PQ-17, the larger PQ-18, in addition to most of its predecessor and successor convoys, appears to have contributed significantly to sustaining the Soviet Union's defense, thereby serving the stated purpose of Roosevelt's program.⁸⁹⁸

And while the Arctic convoys suffered losses inflicted by Nazi bombers and submarines, improved radar usage and tactics such as sailing only during the winter months greatly reduced these dangers, limiting total losses in tonnage to only slightly more than seven percent by the Second World War's end. The Arctic winter conditions along the Allied convoy route to North Russia's ports imposed severe restrictions on Hitler's admirals as Raeder and Doenitz feared risking both their few surface vessels and Goering's precious aircraft pilots in the seasonal fog and icy waters around northern Norway.⁸⁹⁹ As mentioned in this dissertation's third chapter, Roosevelt and Churchill's willingness to take such bold risks and continue sailing the Arctic convoys during the winter months, a time that greatly reduced their ships' visibility to the enemy, succeeded in keeping the Red Army sufficiently supplied and fighting at Stalingrad. After General Connolly's success in improving the U.S. Lend-Lease supply facilities in Iran and General Follett Bradley's opening of the ALSIB route, the Arctic convoys continued to sail in the winter months only and remained largely successful in delivering more war material to Stalin's forces into 1945.⁹⁰⁰

It appears, therefore, that Roosevelt's 1943 expansion of the size, production centers, and

⁸⁹⁷ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 516, 517-518, 534-536.

⁸⁹⁸ Ibid., 419-420, 422; UK Prime Minister, "Former Naval Person to the President," 14 July 1942; U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, 55, 57-61, 66-71, 76, 79-83.

⁸⁹⁹ Mosley, *The Reich Marshal*, 350-353, 353-355, 355-359.

⁹⁰⁰ Erswell and McKay, *Surviving the Arctic Convoys*, 107-109, 109-111, 131-135, 135-137, 142-144, 148-149; Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 139-140; Vail Motter, *The Persian Corridor*, 141-143, 259-262, 319-320, 341-344; Van Tuyl, *Feeding the Bear*, 26-27, 51, 73.

carrying capacity of the Persian Corridor's ports, supply bases, and roads, the growing deliveries of U.S. aircraft over the ALSIB route, and the expanded Soviet transportation of U.S. materials to Vladivostok were unnecessary to ensure the Soviet Union's defense. McMeekin correctly points out, however, that due to the immense authority granted to Roosevelt in determining the recipients of Lend-Lease, the president tied together the needs of all Allied countries into a single piece of legislation.⁹⁰¹ By voting to continue Lend-Lease aid for non-Communist Allied powers such as Great Britain and China, U.S. lawmakers had no choice but to continue renewing aid to the Soviet Union, rendering post-1943 aid shipments to Stalin an inevitability.⁹⁰²

As explained in this work's second and fourth chapters, through H. R. 1776 in March 1941, Congress retained its constitutional duty to approve and appropriate funds for Lend-Lease but authorized Roosevelt, through the act's "good faith clause," to designate the countries and leaders that he deemed in need of U.S. aid in the uncertain atmosphere of global war.⁹⁰³ As has been shown, the Rich amendment received a resounding rebuff in the House as even Congressman Fish, despite his disgust at Roosevelt's desire to aid Stalin, agreed with Chairman Taber of the Appropriations Committee that it seemed unwise to remove the president's authority to designate aid recipients.⁹⁰⁴ As described by McMeekin, Section 3 of the Lend-Lease Act contained a, "sunset clause" that made it possible for Congress to either renew or terminate the program by 30 June 1943, yet with the war still raging on all fronts as Nazi forces remained

⁹⁰¹ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 516, 517-518, 534-536.

⁹⁰² *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate*, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) pt. 3; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 516, 517-518, 534-536.

⁹⁰³ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 516, 517-518, 534-536; U.S. Department of State, "'Lend-Lease Act,' March 11, 1941."

⁹⁰⁴ *Cong. Rec. – House of Representatives*, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) pt. 7; Folsom, Jr., and Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 230-235, 340-342n40-44; Herring, Jr., *Aid to Russia*, 20, 93, 112-117, 120-122, 124-128; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 791-793, 796, 802.

deep inside Soviet territory that spring, Congress voted overwhelmingly to renew aid to all the Allied Powers.⁹⁰⁵ Adding to McMeekin's conclusion that any congressional attempt in 1943 to revoke Roosevelt's authority to aid Stalin inherently jeopardized Great Britain and China as well, this work's preceding chapters demonstrate that Brest-Litovsk remained on the minds of the president, his advisers, and many U.S. lawmakers as indicated in the arguments of Congressman Kee, Senator Connally, and others.⁹⁰⁶

As McMeekin correctly states, voting against the entire program, the only option available to the wartime congressional leaders in 1943, appears to have been an unthinkable act due to the fates of Churchill and Chiang being intertwined with that of Stalin regarding the renewal of Lend-Lease.⁹⁰⁷ Further adding to the conclusions of Jones, van Tuyl, Weeks, and McMeekin, however, this work's findings on the importance of the Arctic convoys' deliveries of crucial aid to North Russia's ports by 1943 suggest that the Soviet Union's wartime defense could have been maintained without expanding the program.⁹⁰⁸ Had the Allied leadership not invested heavily in increasing the flow of Soviet aid through the Persian Corridor and over the ALSIB route, reliance on the Arctic convoys to deliver all Lend-Lease material may have proved sufficient to continue supplying the Soviet Union's defense after 1943. This work adds to these scholars' findings by demonstrating that Lend-Lease did not need to be discontinued in 1943 to

⁹⁰⁵ *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate and House of Representatives*, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate*, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); Lawrence, "SENATE VOTES 82-0,"; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 516, 517-518, 534-536; Rickenbacker, *Rickenbacker*, 402-403; Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 331-333, 335-338, 339-343, 346-349; U.S. Department of State, "'Lend-Lease Act,' March 11, 1941."

⁹⁰⁶ *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate and House of Representatives*, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 705.

⁹⁰⁷ *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate*, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) pt. 3; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 516, 517-518, 534-536.

⁹⁰⁸ Erswell and McKay, *Surviving the Arctic Convoys*, 107-109, 109-111, 131-135, 135-137, 142-144, 148-149; Mason, *Arctic Warriors*, 155-156; Melton, *Liberty's War*, 74-76; *The National Archives of the UK*, "PREMIER 3 393/8," "First Sea Lord," 14 December 1942; Thomas, *Through Ice and Fire*, 147-148; Walling, *Forgotten Sacrifice*, 9-10, 270-271; Woodman, *Arctic Convoys 1941-1945*, 308-309.

prevent Soviet expansion or increased to prevent a second Brest-Litovsk, but merely limited to the Arctic convoys that sailed only in the winter yet proved capable of sufficiently supplying Zhukov's 1943 counterattacks that crippled the Nazi invaders.⁹⁰⁹

By Roosevelt's definition, the support of any country resisting Axis aggression whose defense the president deemed vital to that of the United States served as the purported purpose of the Lend-Lease program from its inception.⁹¹⁰ After Roosevelt's official inclusion of the Soviet Union in the program in November 1941, congressional opposition to aiding Stalin became an impossibility unless a lawmaker sought to go on record as also opposing aid to Churchill and Chiang.⁹¹¹ There were, however, wartime actions that Roosevelt and Churchill could have taken that may have helped to limit the Red Army's advance into Europe and Asia, and had they not devoted vast resources to improving the Iranian roads to the Caucasus and supplying more attack aircraft through ALSIB, and instead relied solely on the Arctic convoys from 1943 forward, they could have greatly reduced the possibility of Soviet expansion.⁹¹² As this fact appears to have been discernible at the time due to the Red Army's well-publicized and victorious counterattack at Stalingrad, there seems to have been no need for Roosevelt's expansion of the other Lend-

⁹⁰⁹ Chuikov, *The Battle for Stalingrad*, 116-120, 194; Craig, *Enemy at the Gates*, 102-103, 106-107, 140-143; Hellbeck, *Stalingrad*, 173, 181; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 409-410, 412-414, 416-417, 423-424, 425-427; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 103: For Marshal Stalin from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill," 19 August 1943, 83; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 287-288; Sokolov, *Marshal K. K. Rokossovsky*, 173-175, 177, 179-181, 215; U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Roosevelt to Stalin January – June 1943,"; Zhukov, *Marshal of Victory Vol. 2*, 79-80, 287-289, 411.

⁹¹⁰ Kaiser, *No End Save Victory*, 147-148, 150, 153; Roosevelt, *Great Speeches*, 79-80; The Navy Department Library, "Lend-Lease Act."

⁹¹¹ *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate*, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) pt. 3; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 516, 517-518, 534-536.

⁹¹² Mason, *Arctic Warriors*, 155-156; Melton, *Liberty's War*, 74-76; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 103: For Marshal Stalin from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill," 19 August 1943, 83; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 287-288; *The National Archives of the UK*, "PREMIER 3 393/8," "Stratagem No. 100. Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary," 19 January 1943; U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Stalin to Roosevelt July – December 1942,"; U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Roosevelt to Stalin January – June 1943."

Lease routes over which Stalin subsequently received the bulk of aid.⁹¹³

While the men that braved the freezing, ferocious Arctic seas and enemy aircraft and submarines are said to have delivered roughly a quarter of all Soviet Lend-Lease aid, their successful transfer of this material to the North Russian ports during the most crucial year of the war appears to have saved the Soviet Union.⁹¹⁴ Had Roosevelt and Churchill not followed through with their insistence on increasing the flow of supplies through the Iranian mountains and the Siberian skies, they could have simply maintained the wintertime Arctic convoys while emphasizing their crucial contribution to the Soviet victories.⁹¹⁵ The Anglo-American ships sailing to North Russia's ports provided the Red Army with most of the 79,000 trucks and jeeps that it received in 1942 alone and proved at least as crucial to Stalin's defensive victories as the far greater quantities delivered via the other routes proved to his subsequent conquests.⁹¹⁶

Considering the critical impact of these vehicles on the 1942 fighting, Stalin's urging of his Western allies to continue delivering most of the Red Army's Lend-Lease supplies, including crucial food, machine tools, trucks, aircraft, and raw materials for tank and aircraft production, to Archangel and Murmansk appears to be somewhat understandable.⁹¹⁷ Ironically, had Roosevelt

⁹¹³ Chuikov, *The Battle for Stalingrad*, 236-239, 322-324; Craig, *Enemy at the Gates*, 341-343, 383-384; Hellbeck, *Stalingrad*, 98-102, 117-125; The New York Times, "HULL PRAISES RED ARMY."

⁹¹⁴ Churchill, *Memoirs*, 679-683; Citino, *Death of the Wehrmacht*, 1-3, 5-8, 161-165, 172-175, 180-182; 303-305, 307-309; Dunn, *The Red Army and the Soviet Economy*, 74; Liddell Hart, *History of the Second World War*, 623-627, 631-635; Office, Chief of Finance War Department, "Lend-Lease Shipments World War II,"; Schofield, *The Russian Convoys*, 206; U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, 55, 57-61, 66-71, 76, 79-83; Whitehall History Publishing – Ministry of Defence, *The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys*, x-xii.

⁹¹⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 103: For Marshal Stalin from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill," 19 August 1943, 83; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 287-288; U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Stalin to Roosevelt July – December 1942."

⁹¹⁶ Dunn, *The Soviet Economy and the Red Army*, 75; Sokolov, *The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War*, 53-55, 57-59.

⁹¹⁷ Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 133-134; Sokolov, *The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War*, 53-55, 57-59; U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Diaries of Henry Morgenthau, Jr.," Series 2, "Russian Clearance Problems,"; U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Stalin to Roosevelt July – December 1942."

and Churchill entertained Stalin's rude, rash remarks and resisted their urge to rely less on the Arctic convoys by increasing the capacity of the Iranian and ALSIB routes, they may have inadvertently prevented his subsequent domination of Eastern Europe, in effect displaying agreement with his emphasis on the route's importance in comparison to his ridicule of the others.⁹¹⁸ As late as 21 September 1943, only days after agreeing to the Tehran Conference, Stalin, through Molotov, persistently urged Churchill to resume the remarkably helpful deliveries of Lend-Lease shipments to North Russia, and the Anglo-American wintertime convoys continued into 1945.⁹¹⁹ The key role of the Arctic convoys and the comparatively smaller role of the other two routes in delivering aid in 1942 therefore indicates that the Allies could have safely ensured Hitler's defeat on the Eastern Front while abandoning their unnecessary efforts to increase aid to Stalin through Iran and Alaska.⁹²⁰

By discontinuing, rather than improving, the Persian Corridor and opening up ALSIB in late 1942, at which point the Red Army had received most of its Lend-Lease material from the Arctic convoys, the Anglo-American leaders could have continued to ensure a two-front war for

⁹¹⁸ Sokolov, *The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War*, 53-55, 57-59.

⁹¹⁹ Churchill, *Memoirs*, 742-744, 745-747; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 199: Personal and Most Secret Message from the Prime Minister, Mr. Winston Churchill, to Marshal Stalin," 1 October 1943, 166-169; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 316-318. It is interesting to note that in these late 1943 telegram exchanges with Churchill, after Molotov, "insisted" on the resumption of the Arctic convoys, Stalin again emphasized the North Russian route's importance and ridiculed the Iranian one, stating, "As experience has shown, delivery of armaments and military supplies to the U.S.S.R. through Persian ports cannot compensate in any way for those supplies which were not delivered by the northern route." While agreeing to send a series of four convoys each consisting of thirty-five U.S. and British ships between November 1943 and February 1944, Churchill subsequently informed Roosevelt that he had, "received a telegram from U.J. ['Uncle Joe,' Stalin's pseudonym] The Soviet machine is quite convinced that it can get everything by bullying, and I am sure it is a matter of some importance to show that this is not necessarily always true," to no avail as the president still refused to attach conditions to Soviet Lend-Lease.

⁹²⁰ Mason, *Arctic Warriors*, 155-156; Melton, *Liberty's War*, 74-76; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 103: For Marshal Stalin from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill," 19 August 1943, 83; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 287-288; U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, 55, 57-61, 66-71, 76, 79-83; U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Roosevelt to Stalin January - June 1943,"; *The National Archives of the UK*, "PREMIER 3 393/8," "Stratagem No. 100. Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary," 19 January 1943; Thomas, *Through Ice and Fire*, 147-148.

Berlin. By continuing to give Stalin enough aid to fight Hitler, but not utterly vanquish him, Roosevelt and Churchill could have safely removed the haunting prospect of a second Brest-Litovsk while continuing to fuel the Red Army's struggle sufficiently to wear down its Nazi opponent. Yet reflecting on their respective First World War experiences and being unable to imagine a scenario in which Germany did not pose the ultimate threat to Western democratic governments, they appear to have far overestimated Berlin's capabilities while underestimating Moscow's.⁹²¹ This appears to have led them to insist upon opening and improving the other routes by which to supply Stalin's armies more extravagantly to ensure that Hitler could not attempt a repeat of the kaiser's coup at Brest-Litovsk in 1918, however remote such a possibility may have been after 1943.⁹²²

Nazi Germany's outright and total military defeat remained the primary goal of the U.S. approach to the Second World War in Europe, and Roosevelt's prioritizing of Soviet Lend-Lease served wartime Washington's immediate strategic interests by ensuring that the Red Army could remain on the battlefield.⁹²³ Yet the Arctic supply route to North Russia appears to have effectively achieved this goal by the end of 1942, and by simply maintaining this route rather than expanding the others, the Allies could have avoided a reoccurrence of Brest-Litovsk by enabling Stalin's soldiers to tie down Berlin's best divisions without oversupplying the Kremlin. The Red Army's talents and tenacity, enhanced by the Lend-Lease supplies delivered to North

⁹²¹ Bullitt, *For the President*, 593-599; Earle, "F.D.R.'s Tragic Mistake!" 14; Folsom, Jr., and Folsom, *FDR Goes to War*, 246-249, 251; Kaiser, *No End Save Victory*, 337, 341, 392-394; Raymont, "Bullitt Letter to Roosevelt."

⁹²² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., "No 19: For Mr. Stalin," 4 May 1942, 24; Molotov and Chuev, *Molotov Remembers*, 1-3, 41-43, 52-53; Rickenbacker, *Rickenbacker*, 402-403; Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 308-309, 312-313; U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Roosevelt to Stalin May - December 1942."

⁹²³ Dunn, *The Red Army and the Soviet Economy*, 74, 80-81, 85, 87-88, 94; Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, 263-265, 266-269; Kaiser, *No End Save Victory*, 234, 237, 259, 261; Van Tuyl, *Feeding the Bear*, 137-140, 141-143; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, 124-126.

Russia's ports, had proved by the beginning of 1943 that there remained no need to expand the supply facilities in Iran or Alaska, an action that inadvertently assured Stalin of postwar expansion. By canceling their unnecessary attempts to improve the Iranian and ALSIB routes, Roosevelt and Churchill could still have assured an Allied victory by keeping Stalin's soldiers fed and supplied through the North Russian ports.⁹²⁴

Yet having witnessed Hitler's merciless, mechanized rout of the Anglo-French armies on the continent in 1940 and the German Air Force's subsequent and brutal bombing of London, Coventry, and other cities, the Western leaders could not imagine liberating all of occupied Europe on their own, as indicated by Churchill's prudent saving of American and British lives by convincing Roosevelt not to entertain Stalin's demands for an ill-advised "second front" in 1942.⁹²⁵ It also appears that the thought of maintaining the Arctic convoys as the primary supply route to the Soviets at the expense of the other two routes did not occur to the Allied leaders, other than Stalin.⁹²⁶ Despite the spectacular successes of most Arctic convoys, the disastrous fate of PQ-17 proved far too traumatic for the Western leaders, and Churchill, understandably, did not wish to bear such a tremendous responsibility on his shoulders should such a slaughter occur once again.⁹²⁷

Yet at Roosevelt's insistence and in an acknowledgement of the Arctic convoys' key role in preventing a second Brest-Litovsk, the British prime minister reopened the North Russian

⁹²⁴ Blond, *Ordeal Below Zero*, 152-153, 161-163; Fraser, "73 North," 14; Office, Chief of Finance War Department, "Lend-Lease Shipments World War II,"; Stettinius, Jr., *Lend-Lease*, 240-242, 244-246, 248; *The National Archives of the UK*, C. B. 3305 (4) *Naval Staff History*, 101-102; Vail Motter, *The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia*, 139, 240-241; Van Tuyl, *Feeding the Bear*, 54; Walker, "Fiasco in the Barents' Sea," 17.

⁹²⁵ Carlton, *Churchill and the Soviet Union*, 101-102; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 407-408.

⁹²⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 103: For Marshal Stalin from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill," 19 August 1943, 83; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 287-288; U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Roosevelt to Stalin January – June 1943."

⁹²⁷ UK Prime Minister, "Former Naval Person to the President," 14 July 1942.

route, shortly after temporarily pausing it, and thereby helped to render the Red Army's late 1942 and early 1943 counterattacks possible.⁹²⁸ Had they kept the Red Army sufficiently supplied to resist, but not conquer, Germany after 1943 however, the Anglo-American leaders may also have prevented the long, costly global Cold War and its horrific ramifications while also ensuring Hitler's defeat and saving many of his victims.⁹²⁹ As previously discussed, in spring 1943 Roosevelt had yet to meet Stalin in person, and he appears to have perceived the Soviet premier's repeated postponement of a meeting as a frightening possibility that he could conclude a separate peace with Hitler, leading to his decision to unnecessarily increase the flow of aid from U.S. supply bases in Iran and Alaska.⁹³⁰ The Kremlin contributed to these fears by refusing to express gratitude publicly or allow U.S. observers near the front, and only after Admiral Standley's complaint in early 1943 and Stalin's commendation of U.S. aid deliveries at Tehran that November did Soviet officials publicly acknowledge the key role of Lend-Lease.⁹³¹

Despite his consistent refusals to publicly thank Roosevelt and Churchill for their aid, Stalin could rest assured that his loyal agents in Washington and London were wielding their considerable influence in the Western governments to procure excess war material and shape Allied policy. Agents such as Harry Dexter White, Alger Hiss, Frank Coe, Solomon Adler, and James Klugmann effectively manipulated the information that Roosevelt and Churchill received on Chiang Kai-shek and Draza Mihailovic, serving Moscow's geostrategic interests by

⁹²⁸ Ibid.

⁹²⁹ Roosevelt and Churchill, "Texts of Roosevelt-Churchill Messages,"; U.S. President, U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Stalin to Roosevelt July – December 1942."

⁹³⁰ Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, 489-490; Harriman and Abel, *Special Envoy*, 190; Rickenbacker, *Rickenbacker*, 402-403; Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 308-309, 312-313; U.S. President, "Map Room Papers Box 8 Roosevelt to Stalin January – June 1943."

⁹³¹ Associated Press, "U.S., Britain to Ask,"; *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate*, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) pt. 3; Lawrence, "SENATE VOTES 82-0,"; Lee, "Threat of Allies-Stalin Crisis Averted,"; Standley and Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, 355-359.

influencing the Allied leaders to either curtail or cancel aid deliveries to these non-Communist, anti-Axis resistance leaders.⁹³² As discussed in this work's fourth chapter, these men, all serving in key governmental posts, waged an effective disinformation campaign that turned Roosevelt and Churchill against those that could have potentially thwarted Stalin's postwar expansion across Eurasia. Their positions as important government officials helped them to successfully dupe military leaders such as Generals Stilwell and Maclean into swallowing their pro-Stalin lies and unwittingly aiding their efforts to cut off aid to the Kremlin's enemies, and, in the case of Operation *Keelhaul*, deport anti-Communist Russian exiles and Soviet POWs to face the NKVD's wrath.⁹³³

No less than Stalin's spies serving in powerful positions in the American and British governments, the Soviet premier's dupes and agents in the Western media further enabled him to shape Western policies to the Soviet Union's advantage. Leland Stowe and Henry Cassidy's parroting of Stalin's complaints created a false impression that Lend-Lease deliveries were insufficient and fed into Roosevelt's counterproductive decision to expand the Persian Corridor and ALSIB in 1943, thereby vastly oversupplying the Red Army.⁹³⁴ Margaret Bourke-White's photographs of Stalin and Hopkins for *Life* magazine and her calls to urgently include the Soviet Union in Lend-Lease likewise played a part in temporarily mellowing American attitudes toward the Soviet Union, while Guy Burgess's anti-Mihailovic reporting for *BBC* influenced Churchill's

⁹³² Dorn, *Walkout*, 75-76; Evans and Romerstein, *Stalin's Secret Agents*, 147-149; Kubek, *How the Far East Was Lost*, 205-206, 209; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 511-515, 746n53; Salisbury, "Report on China," 211-213.

⁹³³ Evans and Romerstein, *Stalin's Secret Agents*, 149, 152; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 474-478, 478-481, 482-485; Rayfield, *Stalin and his Hangmen*, 201, 313; TIME, "THE BALKANS," 1-5.

⁹³⁴ Associated Press, "U.S., Britain to Ask,"; Lee, "Threat of Allies-Stalin Crisis Averted,"; Stowe, "Stowe, in Visit to Rzhev Sector."

decision to switch London's support to Tito's Communists.⁹³⁵ Through their reports, Wendell Willkie and Eric Johnston also proved to be Stalin's useful dupes, portraying the Soviet premier as a pro-business, Communist-in-name-only leader for American readers, while former Ambassador Joseph Davies and Vice President Henry Wallace were similarly duped into viewing the Soviet regime in a positive light and dismissing the possibility that the Red Army could pose a serious postwar threat to the West.⁹³⁶

These highly influential government officials, business leaders, and media personalities all served Stalin's interests by exaggerating for the Western public and key decision-makers in Washington and London the long-term threat posed by Berlin and dismissing the threat from Moscow, further influencing Roosevelt and Churchill's strategic decisions that excessively strengthened the Red Army. While not all of them were Soviet agents, the non-Communists such as Willkie, Johnston, Wallace, Stilwell, and Maclean were nevertheless duped by Stalin and Molotov or their agents such as White, Hiss, Coe, Adler, Burgess, and Klugmann into adopting positions that served the Soviet premier's grand, strategic maneuvering in Europe and Asia.⁹³⁷ Other influential non-Communists such as Bourke-White, Stowe, and Cassidy proved equally naïve in accepting Stalin's claims that Lend-Lease paled in comparison to the Red Army's sacrifices, and their reporting likewise influenced Americans' wartime perceptions of the Soviet premier and strengthened Hopkins's pro-Soviet convictions. Each of these individuals wielded

⁹³⁵ Bourke-White, *Portrait of Myself*, 187-188; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 474-478, 478-481, 482-485; The New York Times, "MISS BOURKE-WHITE PRAISES STALIN,"; TIME, "THE BALKANS," 1-5.

⁹³⁶ Birstein, "Three Days in 'Auschwitz without Gas Chambers,'" Johnston, "My Talk with Joseph Stalin," 1-10; Lawrence, "STALIN LAUDS U.S. FOR AID TO SOVIET; Lipper, *Eleven Years in Soviet Prison Camps*, 127-129, 134-135; Wallace, *Soviet Asia Mission*, 41-44, 70-73; Willkie, "STALIN: 'GLAD TO SEE YOU, MR. WILLKIE,'" 36-37.

⁹³⁷ Dorn, *Walkout*, 75-76; Kubek, *How the Far East Was Lost*, 205-206, 209; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 511-515, 746n53.

considerable influence in one form or another, and their success in shaping Roosevelt's perception of Stalin and the Red Army attests to the Kremlin's historical adeptness at using spies, agents of influence, dupes, and disinformation to undermine its adversaries (including "allied" powers) and to advance its strategic designs on a global scale.⁹³⁸

In continuing to unravel the remaining mysteries surrounding the overall impact of Soviet Lend-Lease aid, future scholars can hope to once again be granted access to the Russian archives that were gradually opened after the Soviet Union's 1991 collapse and subsequently consulted by scholars such as Weeks and McMeekin. As these scholars point out, these military archives, together with the Russian Naval Archives in Murmansk that Michael Walling consulted, likely contain much more important and interesting information.⁹³⁹ Due to current tensions between the United States and the Russian Federation, however, these archives appear to be currently closed to American researchers and could potentially remain so for some time still, inevitably making it more difficult for English-speaking scholars to obtain a more complete picture of Soviet Lend-Lease from all perspectives as during the Cold War.⁹⁴⁰

Should these archives again become available to U.S. researchers, scholars can then seek to determine the level to which Roosevelt's fears of a second Brest-Litovsk were legitimate. This, of course, will also depend on whether such a document exists that conclusively proves that Stalin's diplomats met with their Nazi counterparts in neutral Sweden during the war as stated by Heinz Hohne in his 1976 biography *Canaris: Hitler's Master Spy*, the source cited by McMeekin

⁹³⁸ Birstein, "Three Days in 'Auschwitz without Gas Chambers,'" Johnston, "My Talk with Joseph Stalin," 1-10; Lawrence, "STALIN LAUDS U.S. FOR AID TO SOVIET; Lipper, *Eleven Years in Soviet Prison Camps*, 127-129, 134-135; Wallace, *Soviet Asia Mission*, 41-44, 70-73; Willkie, "STALIN: 'GLAD TO SEE YOU, MR. WILLKIE,'" 36-37.

⁹³⁹ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 5-6; Walling, *Forgotten Sacrifice*, 276; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, ix-x.

⁹⁴⁰ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 5-6; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, ix-x.

in *Stalin's War*.⁹⁴¹ Citing Admiral Canaris's account of a talk with his subordinate Edgar Klaus, Hohne reports that Soviet NKVD agent Boris Yartsev offered, "peace in a week" in exchange for a return, "to the 1939 frontiers" at a meeting initiated by the Kremlin in Stockholm, Sweden between April and August 1943, a period coinciding with Eddie Rickenbacker's visit to Moscow and the increased supply flow over the Persian Corridor.⁹⁴²

Canaris reportedly ordered the supposed talks to be ended due to, "Hitler's violent objections" on 29 August 1943, yet if researchers are able at some point to verify the German intelligence chief's claim, they can then demonstrate that U.S. officials had every reason to fear that Stalin could conclude a separate peace as German troops were still deep inside Soviet territory.⁹⁴³ Did Nazi-Soviet peace talks occur in Stockholm or elsewhere in 1943? And, if so, did Stalin genuinely seek a separate peace with Berlin, or did the Soviet premier have other motives for initiating the meetings? Answers to these questions may not be forthcoming for many years, yet future scholars armed with the necessary language skills and travel access can contribute to a more complete account of Soviet Lend-Lease if documents describing the alleged meetings exist and become available.⁹⁴⁴

Yet through its focus on U.S. perceptions of Stalin's Red Army and the impact of Lend-Lease on the Second World War's Eastern Front in Europe, this dissertation reveals that the fear of a second Brest-Litovsk gripped U.S. officials and influenced their decision to increase the aid flow in Iran and Alaska in 1943.⁹⁴⁵ Whether or not Stalin genuinely sought a separate peace

⁹⁴¹ Hohne, *Canaris*, 479-480; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 452-453, 454-455, 737n34.

⁹⁴² Hohne, *Canaris*, 479-480, 483-484; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 452-453, 454-455, 737n34.

⁹⁴³ Hohne, *Canaris*, 479-480; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 452-453, 454-455, 737n34.

⁹⁴⁴ McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 5-6; Walling, *Forgotten Sacrifice*, 276; Weeks, *Russia's Life-Saver*, ix-x.

⁹⁴⁵ Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, 25, 69-70, 489-490; Rickenbacker, *Rickenbacker*, 402-403.

with Hitler, Roosevelt and other U.S. leaders certainly regarded this as a possibility and sought to preempt it as they oversupplied the Red Army from 1943 forward to hasten the defeat of the greater perceived threat to Americans. Roosevelt consistently overrated the power of the Germans and underrated the power of the Soviets. This seems to have stemmed from several factors: his age and infirmity, his sentimental regard for Stalin, his competitive relationship with Churchill, and the incessant work of Communist agents inside the U.S. government who warped the information that he was consuming while making grand strategic decisions.

As the Red Army continued grappling with the Nazi invaders that remained deep in Soviet territory in the summer of 1943, Lend-Lease officials acted desperately to preempt any possibility that Stalin could forge a separate peace. Seeking to reverse Hitler's gains and prevent a repeat of March 1918, they worked feverishly to put Stalin's soldiers on the offensive and hasten Berlin's defeat by expanding the ALSIB and Persian Corridor supply routes to the Red Army as they executed Washington's total war strategy. Stalin's refusal to meet with Roosevelt until late that November at Tehran appears to have contributed heavily to the president's concerns and his desperation to keep the red warriors fighting and killing German troops in the field while giving them the mobility to race to Berlin.⁹⁴⁶

While it may be some time before the Russian archives are reopened to U.S. scholars, accessing the considerable amount of available material at present reveals several important points that have helped this work to contribute to the conclusions of other scholars, and which are briefly recapitulated here. The example of Brest-Litovsk in 1918 motivated Roosevelt and other U.S. leaders to keep Stalin well-supplied once Hitler launched his 1941 surprise attack, and

⁹⁴⁶ *Cong. Rec. – United States Senate*, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1944); Deane, *The Strange Alliance*, 87-89, 168-169, 202; Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, 489-490; Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin*, 9-12; Harriman and Abel, *Special Envoy*, 190, 192; Rickenbacker, *Rickenbacker*, 403-404, 418-419; U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Relations: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran."

the Soviet premier's implicit threats to conclude a separate peace combined with the presence of German troops on Soviet soil to galvanize the supply efforts of Lend-Lease officials. The Arctic convoys proved vital to the Soviet Union's defense, achieved this strategic objective by 1943, and could have continued doing so without Roosevelt opening and expanding the Persian Corridor and ALSIB.⁹⁴⁷ For his part, Stalin repeatedly delayed meeting Roosevelt, thereby contributing to U.S. fears that he could forge a separate peace with Hitler if the Red Army collapsed and feeding into the oversupplying effort that transformed it into a force for expansion.⁹⁴⁸

The lessons of Roosevelt's Soviet Lend-Lease program appear to demonstrate that a limited but steady stream of effective material aid can potentially alter situations to Washington's strategic advantage by ensuring that those under attack can resist their assailants. Lend-Lease deliveries sustained the Red Army and enabled Soviet workers to continue producing tanks and aircraft, and the wintertime Arctic convoys proved capable of executing this important task by 1943, helping to repulse the Nazis and prevent a second Brest-Litovsk. A virtually unlimited aid flow that essentially opens a floodgate to a tidal wave of weaponry, such as what occurred after Roosevelt oversupplied the Soviets through the Persian Corridor and ALSIB, may guarantee victory against one aggressor while inadvertently arming another one for

⁹⁴⁷ Blond, *Ordeal Below Zero*, 152-153, 157-162; Erswell and McKay, *Surviving the Arctic Convoys*, 107-109, 109-111, 131-135, 135-137, 142-144, 148-149; Landas, *Arctic Convoys 1942*, 82-83; Mason, *Arctic Warriors*, 155-156; McMeekin, *Stalin's War*, 419-420, 422; Melton, *Liberty's War*, 74-76; Smith, *Arctic Victory*, 197-199, 201-202; The German Naval Staff, "War Diary,"; *The National Archives of the UK*, "PREMIER 3 393/8," "Prime Minister," 18 January 1943, and "Most Secret. Mr. Keenlyside," 19 January 1943; Thomas, *Through Ice and Fire*, 147-148; Woodman, *Arctic Convoys 1941-1945*, 276-280, 282-283.

⁹⁴⁸ Dolitsky, Glazkov, and Poor, *Pipeline to Russia*, 60-63, 72-75, 79-80, 84-85; Hays, Jr., *The Alaska-Siberia Connection*, 38-39, 51-52, 57-58; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence*, "No. 20: J. V. Stalin to F. Roosevelt," 15 May 1942, 24-25; Office, Chief of Finance War Department, "Lend-Lease Shipments World War II,"; Reynolds and Pechatnov, *The Kremlin Letters*, 110; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 544-546; Smith, *Warplanes to Alaska*, 161-165, 173-176; U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, 55, 57-61, 66-71, 76, 79-83; Vail Motter, *The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia*, 312-313; Zimmerman, "Lend-Lease to Russia."

expansion.⁹⁴⁹ Strengthened by a surging torrent of U.S. war supplies from 1943 forward, Stalin's Red Army emerged from the Second World War as a mechanized military force capable of aggression and conquest on a global scale.

⁹⁴⁹ U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, 55, 57-61, 66-71, 76, 79-83.

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