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## **The role of political leaders' emotions in shaping international rivalries: The case of former Bolivian president Evo Morales**

### **Abstract**

This study applies the Appraisal Theory of Emotions to explore how they influence leaders' responses in the context of long-standing rivalries between states. It argues that policymakers' emotions towards a rival country can help elucidate periods of higher and lower tensions in their bilateral relationship. Focusing on the Bolivian–Chilean rivalry, this study examines the case of Bolivia's former president Evo Morales to shed light on the noticeable change in foreign policy towards Chile during two of his presidential terms. The findings reveal that Morales's emotions were distinctly different during the period of cooperation or de-escalation compared to the period of escalation of tensions. The period of cooperation is characterised by strategies that promote contact, aligning with motive-consistent appraisals of events. Conversely, the period of escalation is marked by strategies that favour distance, stemming from motive-inconsistent appraisals.

### **Introduction**

Political leaders play a crucial role in shaping foreign policy decisions. This is especially true in the context of rivalrous relationships between states. Research on rivalries has shown they develop in a unique context which differs from the usual competition among countries. What makes rivalries distinctive is their recurrent and protracted nature, proneness to escalation (Goertz and Diehl 1992; Maoz and Mor 1996; Thompson 1995) and the presence of socio-psychological factors shaping their dynamics (Bar-Tal 2007; 2013). Due to the escalatory potential and adverse effects on international security, there seems to be an increasing

consensus in the field of International Relations about the relevance of conducting research which improves our understanding of these rivalries' dynamics.

Growing research has shown that emotions are a crucial factor in conflicts between states. One strand of this scholarship has focused on the role of group-based emotions in conflicts considered intractable. According to this literature, emotions which emerge in these conflicts are particularly powerful (Halperin and Pliskin 2015) and can help explain policy choices (Reifen-Tagar, Federico, and Halperin 2011). These emotions are part of the so-called socio-psychological infrastructure of these conflicts, which play a role in their development, continuation and resolution, as well as in reconciliation (Bar-Tal 2007). While very insightful, this literature has largely emphasised the study of societies involved in these conflicts rather than focusing on the relevant individual decision-makers. Moreover, research on rivalries has mainly focused on explaining their resilience; however, there is very little present understanding of why these conflicts undergo variation over time (Thies 2001; Thompson 1995). Considering political leaders play a central role in foreign policy decision-making, understanding the potential effects of emotions herein is relevant to our greater comprehension of rivalries' life cycles. However, despite the importance of foreign policy elites, there is still insufficient understanding of their role in shaping periods of escalation, cooperation and de-escalation. The agent-centred approach of this study intends, then, to advance the understanding of the role of leaders' emotions in steering rivalries' variation over time.

The literature on interstate rivalries has focused heavily on high-profile conflicts which continue to develop in physically violent and heavily militarised contexts (e.g., the protracted Israel–Palestine one). While these studies have contributed significantly to the recognition

that socio-psychological elements shape these conflicts, there is still a very limited understanding of rivalries experiencing lower levels of violence within different geopolitical contexts. This study expands the scope of this literature, then, by analysing the Bolivian–Chilean rivalry and examining the effects of former Bolivian president Evo Morales’s emotions in shaping his country’s bilateral relationship with its neighbour. The inception of the Bolivian–Chilean rivalry goes back to the War of the Pacific between Chile and a Bolivian–Peruvian alliance which lasted from 1879 to 1883. As a result of this War, Bolivia lost territory and access to the Pacific Ocean – becoming a landlocked country. The viciousness of this armed conflict and Bolivia's considerable losses engendered tensions which have persisted until today, taking the form of ongoing political impasses, the absence of diplomatic relations, threats, and the recent filing of two lawsuits before the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

The choice of this specific case relies on two main factors. First, the rivalry between these countries is notorious for presenting an important emotional component, especially in the case of Bolivia, which makes it a very good prism for studying its role in decision-making. Second, while the bilateral relationship between Bolivia and Chile has developed in a rivalrous context, the conflict has undergone periods of escalation and de-escalation. From a leadership approach to understanding changes in foreign policy, these shifts could be attributed to changes in Bolivia’s administration; different presidents implemented different policies. However, during Morales’s extended time in office (2006–2019), Bolivia's foreign policy towards Chile showed marked variation between a cooperative and a more hostile approach. This shift observed under the same presidency provides an ideal setting for understanding the relevance of leaders’ appraisals of the context and determining how their psychology can shape foreign policy decisions and change.

The study of emotions within the IR field presents an important challenge related to the limited offering of reliable methods with which to assess them. While Psychology has established a robust body of theories and methods to evaluate emotions, these advances do not seem to have yet permeated the IR domain. This is problematic because although IR scholars have acknowledged the need for a better understanding of and more research into emotions, there is no clear methodological path to guide their inclusion as a relevant variable in analysing foreign policy decisions. This study intends to continue building bridges between these two academic fields by addressing this lacuna, proposing a qualitative content analysis method to assess leaders' emotions within the framework of the appraisal theory of emotions.

In sum, the objective of this article is twofold. First, it aims at enhancing our understanding of the role of leaders' emotions in shaping rivalries' life cycle by including an understudied enduring conflict which has developed in a context of low militarisation. Second, this work intends to present a novel methodology to assess leaders by employing the appraisal theory of emotions. It specifically asks: Why did Bolivia's foreign policy towards Chile change during Morales's presidency? Is there a relationship between Morales's appraisals of events and emotions and the variation seen in his country's rivalry with Chile? The main argument made is that the changes observed in Bolivia's approach towards Chile under the presidency of Morales can be in part explained by shifts in his emotions about the rivalry and the rival country. Thus, the study of rivalries between states should include the analysis of policymakers' emotions. To this end, such works should employ the theories and methods offered by Psychology to make sense not only of the protracted features of rivalries but also to shed light on the reasons underpinning periods of cooperation and escalation over time.

### **The emotional component of the Bolivian–Chilean rivalry**

Throughout the course of this rivalry, Bolivia's main objective has been to regain sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. This demand is partially based on the claim that the Treaty of 1904, which ended the armed conflict, took place in a context where Bolivia was overpowered by Chile and left with no choice but to sign an unfavourable agreement. Therefore, from the Bolivian perspective, regaining access to the ocean is a fair request and a matter of historical justice.

In this overall rivalrous and negative context, the relationship between Bolivia and Chile has undergone periods of escalation and cooperation or de-escalation. Such variation was particularly evident during Morales's time in office. His behaviour towards Chile and foreign policy decisions changed markedly between his first and second presidential terms. During his first four years in office, the relationship with Chile improved. This period was characterised by the development of trust and the beginning of negotiations between the two countries. However, Morales's positive tone changed drastically during his second presidential term. As a result, Bolivia's foreign policy towards Chile took a negative turn, leading to several diplomatic impasses and the filing of a lawsuit against Chile at the ICJ.

The development of this rivalry has been marked by an emotional component, especially in the case of Bolivia. The claim to regain sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean has been crucial to keeping this conflict alive. Undoubtedly, this rivalry has concrete material grounds; as a landlocked state, Bolivia's development has been, in part, undermined by its geographical condition. However, Bolivia's claims and behaviours towards Chile cannot be fully explained by these circumstances alone. The significance that Bolivia attaches to its maritime loss and its historical claim to regain access to the Pacific Ocean encompasses elements that extend

beyond mere material factors. The long-term struggle to regain such access has been overloaded with symbolism and emotionally charged components. Recovering sovereign access to the ocean has been a central demand in the rhetoric of various policymakers, historians, and political analysts.

The rivalry with Chile plays a central role in Bolivian politics. The conflict has prompted the creation of institutions, the writing of books and constant propaganda in the official media and on government websites. Relevant Bolivian decision-makers confirm the emotional and symbolic components of this rivalry. For instance, former President Carlos Mesa refers to the ocean as part of Bolivia's identity, calling it “the greatest spiritual cohesive agent of the country” and describes its loss as an “emotional tattoo” rooted in Bolivia's history (2016, 25–6). In an interview, Morales acknowledges the rivalry with Chile and the issue of sovereignty, noting that they both carry psychological and emotional components:

It is not only a matter of sovereignty or dignity. Yes, it is an economic issue, but it is also a psychological issue. To have access to the sea is to dignify ourselves, not only because of the nefarious historical facts which forced us to lose it but because recovering the ocean would be a great relief, an asset, a joy. Having the sea back is something big for Bolivia. I have travelled quite a lot, accompanied by my comrades, and some of them have seen the ocean for the first time. They were in tears, saying, 'This is the sea we've lost.' They asked themselves when and how we could have our ocean back. We feel an emptiness. I also get emotional when I look at the sea. (Morales 2009, 182–3; author's own translation)

Most of the scholarly work developed to understand the features of this rivalry has been conducted from historical or diplomatic perspectives. Although these studies have explicitly and implicitly referred to the relevance of psychological variables in explaining the development of these rivalries, psychology-informed analyses of these conflicts are scant, leaving open important gaps in the literature. The effects of the War are usually described

using psychological and emotionally charged concepts. For instance, Bolivian diplomat Jorge Siles (2012, 35) refers to Bolivia's landlocked condition as a "mutilation and a lack of a vital organ."

Scholarly works have also stressed the role of individuals in shaping both the resilience and variation of this rivalry. Quiroga and Guerrero (2016) declare the importance of elite narratives in maintaining the conflict between these countries. Wehner (2011) refers to the positive shift that the relationship took under Morales's and Bachelet's presidencies and their role in creating mutual trust. Similarly, González and Ovando (2016) discuss Morales's shift from a pragmatic stance towards Chile during Bachelet's administration to an "emotional" attitude during Piñera's presidency. While these studies have recognised political leaders as relevant factors in shaping this rivalry, the systematic assessment of their psychology has been neglected.

#### *Bolivia's foreign policy change under Morales's presidency*

In January 2006, Morales assumed the presidency of Bolivia. A few months later, Michelle Bachelet became the first woman president of Chile. Over the subsequent four years, bilateral relations took, as noted, a positive turn. On the whole, the relationship transitioned to one of relative friendship, trust and cooperation. During this period, the most important milestone was the signing of a plan named the "13-Point Agenda," aimed at promoting negotiations on 13 relevant bilateral issues – including the maritime dispute. This agenda introduced a new form of internal political representation and a new phase in the bilateral relationship (Correa and García 2012).



During Morales's second term (2010–2014), the relationship with Chile took a discernible negative turn. This period coincided with Sebastián Piñera's election to the Chilean presidency. While Morales initially displayed a willingness to maintain the positive terms of Bolivia's relationship with Chile, by 2011 this had noticeably changed. Morales's rhetoric grew more aggressive and confrontational, marking an increase in tensions – culminating with the filing of a lawsuit against Chile at the ICJ in 2013. Following this announcement, the relationship continued to be marked by diplomatic impasses, leading to further deterioration.

This shift in Bolivia's foreign policy under Morales is widely recognised by scholars and policymakers, marking two distinctive periods: a phase of cooperation during his first term, and a period of increased tensions in his second (see González and Ovando 2016; Mesa 2016; Morales 2011; Tapia 2014). It is relevant to point out that while these changes in foreign policy may seem moderate, in the specific context of a rivalry that is neither physically violent nor militarised, they do reflect a substantial negative shift, as they continue to undermine cooperation.

One potential explanation for this noticeable shift is that it resulted from the change in the Chilean administration and the context of the rivalry. Morales and Bachelet not only epitomised two underrepresented groups now in power but also shared a left-leaning political stance. These common features, along with the purportedly good personal relationship between these leaders, could shed light on the positive turn in the bilateral relationship. Immediately after both presidents took office, scholars and politicians were hopeful that this new setting would open fresh perspectives and opportunities for both countries (e.g., Garretón 2006; Walker 2006). Piñera's ascent to power represented a significant change in the Chilean administration; Piñera was the first right-wing party representative to win the

presidential election after Pinochet's dictatorship, ending nearly twenty years of left-leaning governments. Consequently, the political differences between both leaders could potentially explain the rise in tensions during this period. In other words, similar beliefs or worldviews led to cooperation, whereas strong divergences led to hostile behaviour.

While the role of ideologies and personal affinities in shaping bilateral relations cannot be disregarded, they only partially explain the variations in the Bolivian-Chilean rivalry, as cooperation has occurred under leaders with very different ideologies. For instance, both countries witnessed progress in negotiations between former right-wing Bolivian dictator Hugo Banzer and Ricardo Lagos, a left-leaning and leading opponent of the Chilean dictatorship. Both presidents worked on an agreement that would allow Bolivia to export natural gas through Chilean ports. Moreover, during periods when both countries were led by presidents with similar ideologies, the relationship did not dramatically change. Instead, it remained relatively stable or even deteriorated. A prime example of this is the period after Piñera's presidency when Bachelet was elected for a second term. During her term, bilateral relations with Bolivia under Morales continued to deteriorate, culminating in Chile filing a lawsuit against Bolivia. A similar situation also occurred during the presidencies of Patricio Aylwin in Chile and Jaime Paz in Bolivia. Both presidents who were allegedly friends and faced the aftermath of a dictatorship in their respective countries, initially promised to restore diplomatic relations and sign an economic complementation agreement. However, the relationship ended on a harsh note when Paz accused Chileans of being 'cavemen' for failing to resolve his country's maritime issues (Lizón 2011).

Another common explanation for the variation in this rivalry pertains to Bolivia's use of diversionary foreign policy tactics. The prevailing argument suggests that Bolivian politicians

tend to invoke the maritime issue as a diversion during times of internal strife, which raises tensions (e.g., Moreira 2011; Piñera 2011; Tuma 2011; Valdivieso 2007). However, Bolivia's longstanding claim for access to the Pacific Ocean transcends partisan politics and is not merely a temporary strategy for gaining support or electoral advantages (Caballero 2012). Moreover, in 2008 when Bolivia faced a severe political crisis, Bachelet had a pivotal role as president pro-tempore of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) in helping Morales stabilise the country and avert further escalation of the conflict. Thus, diversionary foreign policy does not fully explain the negative turns in the Bolivian-Chilean rivalry, as domestic unrest has not always led to the escalation of the rivalry. On the contrary, it has prompted cooperative behaviours.

In this regard, although changes in context can lead to shifts in foreign policy, they do not dictate the nature of the decisions to be made, including whether or not rivals will choose to cooperate. Thus, the variation of the rivalrous interaction should consider elements pertaining to the micro-foundations of foreign policy and focus on understanding decision-makers' psychology. To this end, previous work by Thiers (2021) has shown that Morales's change of behaviour towards Chile resulted from a process of learning regarding the rivalry; Morales understood the need to be less optimistic and cooperative, shaping his subsequent foreign policy towards Chile. While these results shed light on Bolivia's shift in stance, the analysis focused on Morales's beliefs, which belong to the cognitive aspect of his psychology. The analysis of beliefs offers a relevant – yet incomplete – explanation of the situation. As the next section of this article suggests, leaders' appraisals of the context produce emotions that influence how they act in response to certain events. Hence, determining leaders' appraisals and emotions in this rivalry can help expand our understanding of its variation over time.

## Emotions in International Relations and Rivalries

The relevance of emotions has been acknowledged by scholars working in the IR field, leading to an increasing number of studies and publications on the topic (e.g., Åhäll and Gregory 2015; Ariffin, Coicaud, and Popovski 2016; Clément and Sangar 2018; Crawford 2000; Mercer 2006; Sasley 2011). The literature on what has been referred to as “the emotional turn in IR” (Clément and Sangar 2018) has stressed the importance of including the study of emotions in IR debates. Scholars have blamed the limited research on emotions on the pervasive assumption of rationality in IR theories as well as on unresolved methodological concerns (Crawford 2000; Mercer 2006).

The emotional turn has developed a theoretical and empirical blind spot for decision-making in the context of rivalries. Political leaders’ emotions, such as humiliation, contempt, victimhood, anger or hope, are often simply assumed, remaining largely under-theorised and understudied. The reasons for this neglect in the subfield of FPA are in line with the overall disregarding of emotions in IR: namely, the assumed superiority of rationality (McDermott 2018) and the difficulties in defining and measuring emotions (Geva and Skorick 2006). While it is possible to find growing scholarly work focusing on the use of emotions as a way to help shed light on foreign policy decision-making processes, research of this ilk is still embryonic (e.g., Dolan 2016; Geva and Skorick 2006; Larson and Shevchenko 2014).

### *What do we know about emotions and the psychology of rivalries?*

Although the psychological angle of rivalries is quite evident, research on this topic does not always include this variable. An influential strand of the literature on rivalries has recognised the relevance of psychological factors in helping explain the durability of these types of

conflicts. Scholars have referred to rivalries as developing in “psychologically charged contexts” (Thompson 1995, 558) and stressed the “psychological hostility,” which arises naturally from “persistent disagreements” (Vasquez 1996, 533). While these approaches have attributed a relevant role to psychological factors, the use of related methods to explain these conflicts remains underdeveloped. This observation is especially true in less prominent rivalries in the Global South, such as the one in this study.

To fill this gap, Bar-Tal (1998; 2007; 2013), who has extensively studied what he refers to as intractable conflicts, proposes making sense of their characteristics by taking a socio-psychological approach. His research has shown that a central element observed in societies implicated in such conflicts is the perception of their goals being indispensable for the group’s survival and, at the same time, incompatible with the ones harboured by the rival in question. Bar-Tal posits that these conflicts have a socio-psychological infrastructure based on a repertoire encompassing shared beliefs, attitudes, motivations and emotions. Specifically, regarding emotions, the historical dimensions of these conflicts play a crucial role in defining the emotional dynamics seen throughout the conflict. Furthermore, certain emotions become collective emotional orientations through socialisation in a specific culture involved in intractable conflicts (Bar-Tal 2001).

Within this approach, Halperin, Sharvit, and Gross (2011) developed the “appraisal-based framework for emotions and emotion regulation in conflicts.” This model consists of a sequence where the psychological process commences with the exposure to the emotion-provoking stimulus, which can be a current event or remembered information concerning the conflict. As a result of the appraisal of this exposure, an emotional reaction is experienced. Each emotion is linked to specific goals; to address them, individuals may adopt or strengthen

certain political attitudes or support particular lines of political action (Halperin and Pliskin 2015).

The emphasis placed on socio-psychological elements in these conflicts provides a valuable framework for understanding some of the dynamics within rivalries. However, these explanations primarily focus on the societal level of analysis, rather than on the specific leaders responsible for decision-making. Moreover, while group-based emotions play a central role in illuminating the overall emotional context of a rivalry, understanding how policymakers interpret this information and their specific emotional responses to the rival are key to both the resilience and variation of the respective conflict over time. Consequently, this study proposes to move beyond the analysis of collective emotions, focusing instead on policymakers' appraisals and emotional responses to the rivalry in question.

#### **Application of the Appraisal Theory of Emotions to the Bolivian-Chilean Rivalry**

This study employs the appraisal theory of emotions to assess those of Morales in the Bolivian–Chilean rivalry. Appraisal models posit that emotions arise from the meaningful interpretation of an object by an individual. Thus, the interpretation, not the events per se, is what determines which emotions will be felt (Roseman 1984). The separation between emotional response to stimuli and its replacement with a cognitive assessment of the significance of the organism–environment relationship is the core of the emotion process in humans (Smith and Lazarus 1990). The basic premise of these theories is that “emotions are adaptive responses which reflect appraisals of features in the environment that are significant for the organism’s well-being” (Moors et al. 2013, 119). Thus, emotions are only generated

when we recognise that we have something to gain or lose, meaning that the outcome of a transaction is relevant to our goals and well-being (Lazarus 1991).<sup>1</sup>

The appraisal theory of emotions, as described by Lazarus (1991), posits a complex and unique relationship between emotions and cognitions. This theory asserts that emotions are always a response to cognitive activity, which in turn generates meaning. Consequently, cognitions are viewed as both a necessary and sufficient condition for emotions. This perspective signifies that thoughts are capable of producing emotions and emotions cannot occur devoid of some form of thought. Moreover, emotions can also influence subsequent thoughts, generate feedback about their consequences, and engender further emotional thoughts. In this regard, emotions are considered a superordinate concept that encompasses cognition, in line with the principle of reciprocal determinism. As Smith and Lazarus (1990) note, emotions strongly influence people's behaviour, motivating diverse reactions to different events; for example, joy can enhance commitment while anger can motivate us to seek justice. Emotions indicate our personal assessments of our environment, playing a pivotal role in our adaptation, and sparking action tendencies tailored to specific situations.

In the context of rivalries, leaders' decisions have the potential to result in gains or losses for the state, implying a personal stake. Consequently, from the perspective of appraisal theory, responses should inherently possess an emotional component. Appraisal theories were chosen for this study over other theories such as basic emotions and constructionist theories for three main reasons. First, as noted, there is a precedent for using appraisal theories in the context of rivalries, which provides a good starting point. Second, the emphasis appraisal

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<sup>1</sup> For a more comprehensive discussion on the distinctions between "cold" non-emotional knowledge and appraisals, refer to Lazarus (1991).

theories place on individuals' interpretations aligns with the extensive scholarly focus on the role of leaders' cognitions in decision-making (e.g., Schafer and Walker 2006). Finally, a practical reason informed this choice: this analysis primarily revolves around leaders' public utterances. In such a context, direct physiological data or the opportunity for experimentation are not readily available.

Appraisal theories regard emotions as processes rather than static states (Moors et al. 2013), which makes them valuable for understanding how fluctuations in leaders' emotions can shape state rivalries over time. Furthermore, these theories incorporate a social dimension, acknowledging the pivotal role of social context, norms, values, and justice, as well as individual and social identity (Ellsworth and Scherer 2003). This perspective can be especially advantageous in the study of rivalries. Appraisal theories also propose that cognitions contribute to emotions and can help distinguish between emotions based on their appraisal criteria or variables (Moors et al. 2013). This aspect can prove valuable in identifying different sets of emotions among the leaders involved in rivalries.

Among the diverse array of approaches available, this study employs the 'Emotions System Model' proposed by Roseman (1984; 2001; 2011; 2013) to organise and inform its assessment of Morales. Roseman posits that "conceptualizing emotions as an organized system of coping responses and identifying the specifics of that system can help us understand why humans have the particular emotions that researchers have identified, why these emotions are aroused and differentiated as specified in appraisal theories, and why they vary as they do" (Roseman 2013, 141). Considering that this framework has not been previously used to evaluate political leaders, a significant part of this study involved adapting this model to assess leaders' emotions based on their public addresses. The logic underpinning this work



suggests that identifying leaders' appraisals of situations will allow us to deduce the emotions they experience, thereby providing insights into their foreign policy behaviour towards rivals. By analysing what leaders say publicly, it will be possible to unveil two elements that bridge leaders' responses with their environment – appraisals and emotions.

Roseman's model (2001) identifies seven appraisals of events which influence emotions directly (see Table 1 below). Different combinations of the specified appraisals determine which of the 17 emotions will occur in response to a given event. In combination, these appraisals elicit four types of emotions: *contacting emotions* such as hope, joy, relief, love and pride; *distancing emotions* such as fear, sadness, distress, dislike and regret; *attack emotions* such as frustration, anger and guilt; and *rejection emotions* such as contempt, shame and disgust (Roseman 2013, 142). Roseman's (2011) model posits that individuals cope with emotions using different strategies, providing a coherent set of ways to handle one's environment (contacting, distancing, attack, rejection). These strategies include moving, preparing to move, suspending movement, ceasing movement, moving towards, moving away, moving something else away or moving against something. Together with the original appraisal patterns, they form an organised system of emotion.

[Table 1 here](#)

## **Methods**

As noted earlier, the appraisal theory of emotions has not previously been employed to directly assess political leaders' emotions. Hence, this study takes a plausibility probe approach to provide an initial assessment of the potential utility of emotion-based analysis to make sense of periods of cooperation and escalation of rivalries by using content analysis

methods. The case of Morales and the changes in Bolivia's foreign policy offer a unique opportunity. Given the significant role emotions are believed to play in the dynamics of this conflict, it stands as a most likely case for testing the applicability of the appraisal theory. Moreover, Morales's leadership has seen two distinct periods - one of cooperation, followed by a period of escalating tensions. This clear set of changes provides an excellent basis for examining the influence of emotions.

In line with the appraisal theory of emotions, the main hypothesis of this study is that there is a relationship between the leader's appraisal of the rivalry and the variation seen in it over time. The expectation is that the differences in these appraisals will result in emotions making the leader more prone to either cooperation or escalation. In the Emotion System Model, if an event is perceived as consistent with one's current motives, getting more of it is likely to be adaptive. Thus, if an event is appraised as motive-consistent, it will probably elicit contacting emotions such as joy, which will increase the interaction with the stimuli (Roseman 2013). Therefore, based on Roseman's (2013) model, I expect that during Morales's first presidential, characterised by cooperation and de-escalation in the rivalry, his appraisals of the situation will generate emotions that lie in the positive realms. Hence, his strategies will align with the *contacting family* of appraisal emotions. On the other hand, I also anticipate that in his second presidential term, characterised by an escalation of tensions, Morales's emotions will primarily fall within the negative spectrum. Consequently, strategies to cope with the rivalry will correspond with the *distancing, rejecting, or attacking* families of appraisal emotions.

#### *Data collection and analysis*

Appraisal theories generally rely on people's verbal reports of their emotional experiences to assess emotions (Ellsworth and Scherer 2003). However, given that this method cannot be directly applied to this case to evaluate emotions, I carry out the analysis based on the main theoretical premise of the at-a-distance assessment of political leaders' frameworks, namely, that their psychological characteristics can be evaluated via systematic analysis of what they say (Hermann 2003; Weintraub 2003; Winter 2005). Previous scholarly work that has employed verbal utterance to assess emotions has used semantic indicators, for example, emotional language or emotionally loaded words, to determine the type of emotion felt by individuals (Heller 2018; Koschut 2018).

In line with the appraisal theory of emotions, this study proposes a different approach by adding a previous step and focusing on the analysis of people's appraisals of the situation, which will shed light on the potential emotions experienced by leaders. To this end, instead of directly assuming the emotions felt by the leader by analysing their use of words, the assessment of the verbal material will focus on the way they evaluate events related to the rivalry based on the seven appraisals proposed by Roseman (see Table 1 above). While this may lengthen the process, it will provide a clearer picture of leaders' emotions that consider the context and does not analyse them in isolation.

This study will then test whether what leaders say can provide a reliable path to assess their appraisals of the rival country, and hence, determine the emotions experienced within the appraisal theory framework. If this approach proves effective in accurately assessing leaders' appraisals and emotions through verbal content, it could establish a methodology for better understanding periods of escalation and de-escalation and even predicting states' foreign

policy behaviour in rivalries. Although this information may not enable precise prediction of responses, it narrows the scope of potential reactions within a rivalrous context.

I use verbal material delivered by Morales to evaluate and compare his appraisal of events and emotions in the context of the rivalry with Chile. I consider two time periods in Morales's presidency: the period of cooperation or de-escalation from 2006 to 2010, and the period of escalation from 2010 to 2014. Though the level of tensions did not remain exactly the same throughout these two periods, dividing the verbal material into two large units of analysis facilitates a broader understanding of Bolivia's foreign policy and minimises the risks of accounting for changes potentially resulting from isolated events. It is relevant to point out that this study does not focus on how emotions shape specific decisions, but rather on the prevailing tone of the relationship, which acts as a baseline.

I analysed his public addresses and interviews, focusing on the sections where he refers to Chile. This material includes several different sources: speeches given at the United Nations, annual addresses to the nation, speeches delivered on specific conflict-related dates (e.g., the commemoration of battles), and any speech where he talked about a particular event involving both countries (e.g., before or after filing a lawsuit). The documented material also comprises interviews found in media outlets and official websites. The LexisNexis database facilitated the acquisition of relevant material from media outlets, enabling a chronological search for information based on a few keywords. These included the president's name and the rival country within a specific time frame. I also used the Wayback Machine digital archive to access information no longer available on the web. This study analysed 31,786 words contained in 47 documents (20 from the first term and 27 from the second period). This

corpus represents all publicly available documents on this topic.<sup>2</sup> The entirety of the verbal material examined was delivered or written in the Spanish language.

The study employs qualitative content analysis assisted by Provalis QDAMiner software to address the research questions. This software is a qualitative data analysis package which helps code textual and graphical data. This software was particularly useful in comparing periods of cooperation and escalation in the rivalry, as it helped organise the information and provided quantitative data. As the only coder, I checked for intra-rater reliability by testing consistency and recoding the same segments twice (Schmidt 2021).

### *Coding*<sup>3</sup>

The coding process comprised two main stages. First, as appraisals occur in response to a specific stimulus, I thoroughly reviewed Morales's speeches and interviews to identify the main themes present in this material (see Table 2 below). Determining the main themes was relevant to fulfilling the premise of the appraisal theory, which posits that stimuli need to be meaningful to elicit emotions. Second, to assess Morales's emotions, the verbatim material was divided into short segments (the units of analysis) based on when it appeared that the topic or subtopic had changed. These segments were then coded in line with the identified themes and Roseman's seven appraisals of events influencing emotions (see Table 1 above). Throughout this process, some codes were added, deleted, and merged. Passages that did not refer to any specific event concerning the rivalry were not coded (e.g., when greeting the public).

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<sup>2</sup> On the challenges of accessing this data in Latin America, see Brummer et al. (2020)

<sup>3</sup> For a detailed explanation of the coding system, refer to the supplementary material.

*Determination of main themes:* The main topics found in Morales's verbatim material, which were employed to carry out the subsequent coding, are listed in Table 2 below.

Table 2 here

*Coding of appraisals:* The challenges involved in applying Roseman's model (2013) as well as the adaptations and modifications carried out during the coding process, are outlined below. This detailed explanation is intended to assist other researchers in conducting similar analyses in the future.

Situational state: Research suggests that one central problem in intractable conflicts is the perception of incompatible goals held by rival countries (Bar-Tal 1998; 2013). Accordingly, to determine the situational state, Bolivia's primary goal - namely, regaining sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean - was first defined. Subsequently, each unit of analysis was categorised depending on whether the event was consistent or inconsistent with Bolivia's primary objective. For instance, if Morales referred to the War of the Pacific, the situational state was likely "*inconsistent*." Conversely, if the leader mentioned international support for their cause or an improvement in relations with the rival, then the segment was labelled as " *motive-consistent*." During the process, a third category, labelled "*ambivalent*," was introduced to account for units of analysis referring to situations in which Morales described the event as compatible with his goals but also highlighted unwanted characteristics of the situation. This label was used, for instance, when Morales discussed Bolivia's heroic reactions in response to Chile's negative behaviour, or when he contrasted Bolivians' positive traits against Chileans' negative ones.

Motivational state: The assessment of this element was likewise based on the event (theme) that triggered the appraisal. Events were labelled as “*aversive*” when the leader demonstrated intentions to avoid or distance themselves from the negative situation. This included efforts to ameliorate a negative outcome or to terminate, exclude, or remove an adverse event (e.g., when repudiating Chile's invasion during the war). Conversely, the segment was coded as “*appetitive*” when the leader aimed to gain more rewards by celebrating a positive outcome, striving to restore a previous positive state, hurting the rival, or seeking revenge (e.g., when celebrating the support of the international community or engaging in negotiations with Chile).

Probability: Assessing this element proved to be a challenge, as it could not be directly inferred from the leader's statements. Therefore, to classify the segment in terms of probability, a temporal element was introduced into the analysis, leading to the creation of a new category: tense. When the leader referred to the past (e.g., expressions describing historical events or concrete actions), the segment was classified as “*certain*.” In contrast, when the leader alluded to the future, it was categorised as “*uncertain*” (e.g., statements that referred to promises or threats). Given that several units of analysis simultaneously referred to the past, present, and future, a third category was incorporated: “*both certain and uncertain*.” This classification was used, for instance, when the leader articulated thoughts along these lines: 'We lost access to the Pacific Ocean (certain), and we will file a lawsuit in the hope that it will help us regain sovereign access to the ocean (uncertain).'

Agency: Frequently, Morales referred to more than one agent as a potential cause of the situation at hand. Thus, two additional categories were introduced: “*self-other*” to account for events perceived by the leader as being the joint responsibility of both Chile and Bolivia

(e.g., negotiations), and *“self-other (not Chile)”* to capture instances where the leader mentioned Bolivia and a third country, person, or institution as a potential cause of the incident in question (e.g., Bolivia’s support received from the international community).

Control potential: Units of analysis were categorised as *“high control”* when Morales expressed that measures could be taken to alter the current situation in Bolivia. Even when the leader referenced an adverse event from the past, it was still considered *“high control”* as long as he also spoke of a current action taken to rectify it (e.g., Bolivia’s losses during the war and the filing of a lawsuit to regain access to the ocean). Conversely, the segment was labelled as *“low control”* when Morales merely described the situation without alluding to actions taken by Bolivia or if he only requested or pleaded for help from others.

Problem type: Events were labelled as *“instrumental”* when Morales referred to a specific action carried out by himself or another party, which was motive-inconsistent (e.g., Chile’s invasion of Bolivia). An event was categorised as *“intrinsic”* when the issue was attributed to an inherent characteristic of the self or another (e.g., Chile’s expansionism resulting in Bolivia’s loss of access to the sea). The segment was also labelled as *“intrinsic”* when the leader used generalisations implying a negative characteristic of a specific group or ideology (e.g., oligarchies, imperialist interests). Given the addition of the *“ambivalent”* category, this appraisal was also assessed in the segments classified as such but focusing exclusively on the motive-inconsistent element. It’s worth noting that according to Roseman’s model, this appraisal is relevant only in helping distinguish between motive-inconsistent (negative) emotions. Hence, it was only assessed in those instances.

Unexpectedness: This element posed a challenge to assess, as Morales’s addresses provided no clear cues that could straightforwardly indicate whether he expected a certain event to



happen. Given the context of rivalries where the overall relationship between two states is characterised by negativity, most events - at least in theory - should be perceived as expected unless there is a specific occurrence which disrupts the rivalry cycle either positively (a sudden act of cooperation) or negatively (a sudden escalation of tensions). Based on this assumption, units of analysis were only labelled as “*unexpected*” when the leader explicitly referred to the event as such (e.g., “this is a surprise”). According to Roseman’s model, this appraisal leads only to the emotion of surprise, which arises when an event is unexpected and is considered both positive and negative (this is the only emotion described in this manner).

## **Results**

### *Analysis of themes*

Figure 1 below illustrates the primary themes addressed by Morales during the periods of cooperation/de-escalation and escalation respectively (each segment could contain more than one theme). During the former, the most frequently mentioned topic pertains to the efforts to improve bilateral relations with Chile, succeeded by the need for reparations and rectification of Bolivia’s wartime losses. Morales also speaks of Bolivia’s positive traits and the support the country’s cause has garnered from the international community. In contrast, during the latter period, the most mentioned topic was the necessity for reparations and restoration of the past, followed by remarks about the War of the Pacific and the loss of access to the Pacific Ocean. Other vital topics include Chile’s current negative behaviour towards Bolivia and Bolivians standing up against Chile. Morales also portrays certain positive internal characteristics of Bolivia and Bolivians at large, reiterates past international support received, and appeals for further aid from the international community.

The themes of repair and restoration are present in both periods. However, analysis of the material indicates that the rhetoric underpinning this claim varies significantly. During the period of high tensions, Morales's rhetoric exhibits signs of irredentism. In contrast, during the phase of cooperation or de-escalation, he focuses on achieving Bolivia's objectives in partnership with Chile. It's also noteworthy that during this less hostile period, motive-aversive content was mainly attributed to entities other than Chile directly (i.e., oligarchies, imperialism).

Figure 1 here

#### *Analysis of appraisals*

As depicted in Table 3 below, the analysis of data reveals a stark contrast in Morales's appraisals of the rivalry with Chile between his first and second presidential terms, reinforcing the initial hypothesis that a correlation exists between a leader's appraisal of the rivalry and the variation observed within it. The percentages noted below represent the number of times each segment met the defined appraisal criteria, divided by the total number of segments analysed in both periods.

Situational state: During the period of cooperation or de-escalation, most events are perceived as consistent with Bolivia's goals (84.6 per cent), namely, regaining access to the Pacific Ocean. Conversely, during the period of escalating tensions, most events are appraised as either inconsistent (47.5 per cent) or ambivalent (23.8 per cent) relative to Bolivia's objectives. These results lend weight to the notion that the primary element sustaining rivalries is the aforementioned perception of goal incompatibility, which Bar-Tal, Kruglanski, and Klar (1989) characterise as the "conflict schema." Thus, escalation is likely when the

leader activates this schema, whereas cooperation and de-escalation are probable when leaders perceive an opportunity to accomplish their goals. Notably, the perception of events as ambivalent primarily occurred during the escalation period, wherein Morales appeared to simultaneously denounce the adverse context and counterbalance it with a positive outlook on his prospects for mitigating the situation's negative effects.

Motivational state: In the period of cooperation or de-escalation, most events are perceived as appetitive (88.5 per cent), suggesting that the primary motivation is the pursuit of greater rewards. Conversely, during the period of escalating tensions, the motivational state oscillates between appetitive (57.5 per cent) and aversive (42.5 per cent), with the former largely aligning with the emotion of anger. These results are consistent with Morales's decision to cooperate with Chile, an approach in line with his goal of achieving sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean; hence, his primary motivation is the continued progression towards Bolivia's primary objective. Decisions leading to escalation are predominantly characterised by a need to counteract the perceived undesirable situation, either through avoidance or opposition.

Probability: The period of escalation is characterised by certainty, signifying that events are appraised as definitive, requiring Bolivia's response (67.5 per cent). During the period of cooperation or de-escalation, events are primarily perceived in an ambivalent manner, indicating that part of the event is assessed as definite and the remainder as possible (55.8 per cent). The portion of the event evaluated as certain pertains to Chile's or Bolivia's past or present actions, while uncertainty surrounds future conflict developments. In the period of cooperation or de-escalation, Morales's tendency to perceive events in a more ambivalent fashion can be interpreted as openness to a future, inherently uncertain, resolution to the

problem. Although not included in Roseman's model, the analysis of this rivalry suggests a need to incorporate a temporal component when assessing this appraisal in future research.

Agency: During periods of heightened tensions, events are predominantly appraised as being caused by the other party (55.0 per cent). In contrast, during periods of cooperation or de-escalation, they are primarily perceived as the responsibility of both Bolivia and Chile (69.2 per cent). Given that during escalation, events are generally seen as motive-inconsistent, it's safe to surmise that negative aspects of the other (Chile) are magnified, with the rival also blamed for adverse outcomes. Conversely, in times of cooperation or de-escalation, where events are largely seen as motive-consistent, the perception of the other becomes more positive, and self-agency is portrayed as a key element in improving relations.

Control potential: The period of cooperation or de-escalation is characterised by Morales's perception of high control potential (80.8 per cent). In contrast, during the period of escalation, the perception is evenly balanced between low and high control potential (47.5 and 52.5 per cent, respectively). These results align with Morales's actions during his first term, where he actively proposed cooperation strategies in line with Bolivia's goals. Adverse events occurring in the escalation period were primarily perceived as instigated by the rival, leading to a lower perception of control potential.

Problem type: In both periods, the problem is primarily seen as instrumental (62.5 per cent and 63.2 per cent respectively). This implies that it is evaluated as undesirable due to hindering Bolivia's goals, rather than being an internal characteristic of the rival country. This element can also be associated with the dominance of the emotion of hope in Morales, who appears to believe that the current state of events can change because the problem primarily stems from what the rival does, rather than who the rival is (more on this in the next section).

Unexpectedness: As previously mentioned, units of analysis were categorised as unexpected only when the leader labelled the situation as such, with the remaining segments classified as expected. The data reveals that the appraisal of an event as unexpected was low and mainly occurred during the period of de-escalation/cooperation.

Table 3 here

### *Analysis of emotions*

Following Roseman's model (2013), the appraisal function within the emotion system is designed to guide emotional responses. Appraisals encode and process situational information that can help predict which emotions may be most adaptive for a particular situation (Roseman 2013). Applying this framework, we can deduce Morales's emotions from his appraisals of events. As such, units of analysis were coded according to these appraisals to identify potential emotions. For example, if a segment was deemed motive-inconsistent, appetitive, demonstrating high control, instrumental, and caused by others, it was labelled as anger (refer to Roseman 2013, 144 for more details). The percentages given below represent the number of times each segment met the specified emotion criteria, divided by the total number of segments assessed. Results suggest an important difference in Morales's most common emotions between both presidential terms. Overall, the period of cooperation/de-escalation is dominated by positive emotions (85.0 per cent), whereas in the one of escalation, most emotions are negative (49.0 per cent). A combination of ambivalent emotions is also present (22.0 per cent) in this period (see Figure 4 below). These results lend weight to the initial expectation of this study that the type of emotions experienced by the leader can help make sense of changes in these rivalries' dynamics.

The analysis of the combination of appraisals in Morales's public addresses suggests that the most common emotion during the period of cooperation/de-escalation is hope (30.4 per cent), followed by the combinations of love-hope (16.1 per cent) and love-joy (10.7 per cent). Other common emotions in this period are hope-joy (8.9 per cent), joy (7.1 per cent), dislike (3.6 per cent) and pride-hope (3.6 per cent). In the period of escalation, meanwhile, Morales's most prominent emotion is dislike (37 per cent), followed by the combination of anger-pride (11.1 per cent). The emotion of hope is also present (11.1 per cent). Other relevant emotions in order of relevance are anger-hope (8.6 per cent), anger (7.4 per cent), love-hope (6.2 per cent), pride-hope (4.9 per cent) and love-joy (1.2 per cent) (see Figure 2 below). It is worth noting that ambivalent emotional states mainly occurred in the period of escalation. When hostilities arise, Morales combines negative emotions about the Other with positive emotions about the Self. In this context, the most common negative emotion is anger, which prompts him to take actions against Chile.

During his first term in office, Morales's emotional state was dominated by hope, alongside a blend of positive emotions about the self and others. Hope was also present during escalating tensions, either singly or combined with another emotion, thereby heightening its relevance to the case. In his second term, two primary negative emotions became apparent within Morales. These were associated with two distinct instances: dislike, typically related to past or current events out of his control (e.g., Chile's invasion), and anger, either in isolation or combined with other emotions. Anger was linked with circumstances where he had some degree of control, either in the present or anticipated in the future.

In terms of the strategies employed by Morales to manage the conflict in question, and consistent with one of the expectations of this study, the analysis of the data reveals that

during periods of cooperation or de-escalation, the most frequently exhibited emotion family is overwhelmingly within the realm of contact (84.6 per cent), followed by distancing-related emotions (11.5 per cent). Overall, during escalating tensions, the most common family of emotions falls within the distancing realm (36.3 per cent), followed by contact-related emotions (28.8 per cent) and a combination of attack-contact emotions (17.5 per cent). This period is dominated by families of negative emotions (49.0 per cent) (see Figures 3 and 4 below). These results lend weight to the idea that changes in foreign policy in the context of rivalries can be associated with differences in leaders' strategies – seeking to either establish contact or maintain distance.

*Figures 2, 3 and 4 here*

### **Conclusion**

This paper advanced our understanding of the role of leaders' emotions in shaping the variations seen in interstate rivalries. It employed the Emotion System Model proposed by Roseman (1984; 2001; 2011; 2013). The article used an agent-centred approach to analyse the Bolivian–Chilean rivalry, focusing on former Bolivian President Evo Morales. The aim was to make sense of the noticeable shift in Bolivia's foreign policy towards Chile during two distinct periods of his presidency. The results suggest that changes in Morales's appraisals of events and the subsequent emotions played a significant role in shaping periods of cooperation and escalation of tensions in his country's rivalry with Chile. The results also demonstrate that the period of cooperation was associated with the presence of positive contacting emotions, while the period of heightened tensions was primarily characterised by negative emotions, leading to distancing strategies towards the rival.

By proposing a new approach to interpreting the variation of rivalries, this study fills a gap in the literature, which has predominantly focused on explaining the reasons for their resilience. This work positions political leaders at the forefront of decision-making processes in rivalries, showing that periods of cooperation and escalation of tensions can be partly attributed to changes in their appraisal of the context and emotions towards the rival.

This work represents an initial effort to overcome one of the main challenges in the study of emotions in International Relations, namely, the absence of a consistent method for their assessment. The Emotion System Model was adapted to evaluate Morales's appraisals and emotions as reflected in his verbal utterances, employing qualitative content analysis. This method has proven to be effective in identifying leaders' appraisals and emotions through their spoken words, successfully correlating them with periods of escalation and de-escalation in the rivalry. While this study cannot confirm with absolute certainty the specific emotions experienced by the leader, it can assert that, in line with the theoretical framework, by analysing leaders' appraisals expressed in their rhetoric, we can infer the presence of certain emotions which may elucidate the leader's strategies in managing rivalrous situations. Therefore, this approach provides a more reliable assessment of emotions, grounded in a theoretically established set of appraisals, rather than on speculative interpretations of supposed emotional states.

While there is plenty of room for improvement to tailor this approach more directly to leaders and rivalries, this study provided an initial probe into the argument that leaders' emotions shape rivalry dynamics and that the Emotions System Model can be adjusted successfully and applied to shed light on foreign policy decisions. This novel method for assessing emotions



paves the way for new research avenues that will contribute to a deeper understanding of rivalries. For instance, effectively assessing emotions in rivalries will enable more nuanced analyses of the evolution of emotions over time and across various topics or audiences. Doing so could potentially forecast the escalation of a rivalry. Moreover, since the appraisal function is to guide emotional responses to external events, changing these interpretations can alter strategies. Therefore, if we can identify specific appraisals and how their combinations elicit emotions, we can also employ this information to shape diplomatic negotiations and peace initiatives.

The primary limitation of this study pertains to the generalisation of the results, as the analysis was based solely on one case. In the future, this method of assessing leaders' emotions could be extended to the analysis of additional cases from different world regions and other rivalries. Moreover, incorporating new emotions and themes specific to rivalries could refine the analysis. For instance, the emotion of humiliation has been acknowledged as significant in rivalries, and it would be valuable to develop a method to evaluate it based on leaders' statements (Bar-Tal, et al. 1989; Bar-Tal et al. 2009).

While this study concentrated on the role of emotions in rivalries, the approach could also be applied to help understand foreign policy decisions more broadly. Regarding the method, future research could focus on creating an automated quantitative content analysis tool, inspired by other established techniques for assessing leaders at a distance (e.g., Leadership Trait Analysis, Operational Code Analysis). Such advancements would enhance the reliability and replicability of these assessments. Additionally, it would enable systematic comparisons between leaders and facilitate the use of larger samples of subjects and texts.

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**Table 1.** Types of appraisals

Appraisal	
Unexpectedness	Not Unexpected/Unexpected (Whether the event violates one's expectations).
Situational state	Motive-Consistent/Motive-Inconsistent (Whether the event is wanted or is unwanted by the person).
Motivational state	Aversive/Appetitive (Whether the event is related to a desire to get less of something punishing or more of something rewarding).
Probability	Uncertain/Certain (Whether the occurrence of motive-relevant aspects of the event is merely possible or is definite).
Agency	Circumstances/Other/Self (What or who caused the motive-relevant event).
Control potential	Low/High (Whether there is nothing or something one can do about the motive-relevant aspects of an event).
Problem type	Instrumental/Intrinsic (Whether a motive-inconsistent event is unwanted because it blocks the attainment of a goal or is unwanted due to some inherent characteristic).

Source: Author's own elaboration, based on Roseman (2001).

**Table 2.** Main Themes in Morales's Verbatim Speeches


Fix the past	Includes references to mending the damage inflicted by Chile on Bolivia. The tone can be either positive or negative, ranging from acknowledgement of constructive actions taken by Bolivia or Chile to resolve Bolivia's landlocked condition, to rhetoric characterised by condemnation of past actions.
War, invasion, loss of the sea	Consists of all mentions of historical events during the War of the Pacific, including Chile's invasion and references to treaties and armistices signed.
Chile's current negative behaviour	Encompasses mentions of any recent hostile actions carried out by Chile.
Bolivia standing up	Involves mentions of Bolivia's past, present, or future efforts to actively oppose Chile's behaviour.
Depiction of Bolivia or Bolivians	Refers to mentions of Bolivia's or Bolivians' intrinsic qualities (e.g., "Bolivia is a peaceful country" and "our courageous fighters").
Dialogue with Chile	Includes mentions of any attempts to engage in positive relations with Chile.
Ask for support	Entails requests for international support for Bolivia's cause.
Acknowledgement of support	Refers to mentions and acknowledgements of support from the international community or external actors.

**Table 3.** Comparison of Morales's Appraisals in the Two Studied Periods


	Count De- escalation/ Cooperation (N=52)	Percentage De- escalation/ Cooperation	Count Escalation (N=80)	Percentage Escalation
<b>Situational state</b>				
Consistent	44	84.6%	23	28.7%
Inconsistent	7	13.5%	38	47.5%
Ambivalent	1	1.9%	19	23.8%
<b>Motivational state</b>				
Aversive (avoid-distance)	6	11.5%	34	42.5%
Appetitive (challenge-contact)	46	88.5%	46	57.5%
<b>Probability</b>				
Certain	20	38.5%	54	67.5%
Uncertain	3	5.8%	0	0.0%
Both (certain and uncertain)	29	55.8%	26	32.5%
<b>Agency</b>				
Self	3	5.8%	4	5.0%
Other	3	5.8%	44	55.0%
Circumstance	6	11.5%	0	0.0%
Self-other	36	69.2%	26	32.5%
Self-other (no Chile)	4	7.7%	6	7.5%
<b>Control potential</b>				
Low control	10	19.2%	38	47.5%
High control	42	80.8%	42	52.5%
<b>Problem type</b>				
Instrumental	5	62.5%	36	63.2%
Intrinsic	3	37.5%	21	36.8%
<b>Unexpectedness</b>				
Unexpected	4	7.7%	1	1.3%
Not-unexpected	48	92.3%	79	98.8%

Note: The N for *Problem Type* is 8 (Escalation) and 57 (De-escalation) as this appraisal is only coded when the situational state is inconsistent or ambivalent.







**Figure 1.** Comparison of main themes addressed by Morales. The percentages correspond to the number of times each segment met the individual theme criteria divided by the total number of themes coded (N=85 Cooperation/De-escalation; N=169 Escalation).



**Figure 2.** Comparison of Morales’s Primary Emotions in the Two Studied Time Periods



**Figure 3.** Comparison of Morales's Family of Emotions in the Two Studied Time Periods



**Figure 4.** Comparison of Morales's Positive and Negative Emotions in the Two Studied Time Periods