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Abstract

Recent conflict resolutions have attempted to explain the best route of resolving ethnic conflicts within divided societies. This research attempts to engage in the recent debate surrounding conflict resolution which highlights the effects of partition and power-sharing programs upon democratic consolidation. By using a focused-structured comparison of three cases, partition is found to be insufficient in attaining democracy. A combination of partition and power-sharing leads to more democratic consolidation within divided societies. Further, a society which is affluent and gender equal, neighbors other liberal democracies, and fully develops power-sharing institutions will enjoy significant advantages in securing stable and lasting democratic outcomes.

PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN ETHNICALLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES: THE BENEFITS OF COMBINING PARTITION AND POWER-SHARING

Abigail Carter

***Abstract:** Recent conflict resolutions have attempted to explain the best route of resolving ethnic conflicts within divided societies. This research attempts to engage in the recent debate surrounding conflict resolution which highlights the effects of partition and power-sharing programs upon democratic consolidation. By using a focused-structured comparison of three cases, partition is found to be insufficient in attaining democracy. A combination of partition and power-sharing leads to more democratic consolidation within divided societies. Further, a society which is affluent and gender equal, neighbors other liberal democracies, and fully develops power-sharing institutions will enjoy significant advantages in securing stable and lasting democratic outcomes.*

INTRODUCTION

Conflicts typically arise from deep-rooted differences between populations within a society. These differences can be ethnic, religious, and racial, among others. Ethnic hatred is regarded as the root of most civil conflict.¹ Ethnic civil wars are characterized by deeply rooted ethnic identities and strong religious overtones.² Much of the fighting is triggered by atrocities on both sides, and revenge tactics are the basis of much of the violence. It has been proven that ethnic differences have led to the most long-lasting and violent forms of intrastate conflict.³ Many divided societies with significant ethnic tension will experience large-scale violence when one or both sides of the conflict feel that there is no alternative strategy.⁴

Tensions between ethnic communities are generally thought to undermine government legitimacy, social tolerance, and interpersonal trust.⁵ Divided societies are widely assumed to face challenges in holding democratic elections, maintaining political stability, and accommodating rival communities. Therefore, it is harder to build lasting and high quality democracy in divided post-conflict societies. It is one thing to settle a conflict but quite another to consolidate democracy afterwards. Some believe peace to be an essential criterion for successful democratic resolutions⁶; however, peace may be necessary but it is not a sufficient criterion for democratic consolidation. Conflict resolutions should establish pathways for divided societies to develop into liberal democracies.

A liberal democracy can be characterized as a system with the existence of political rights in terms of electoral processes, political pluralism, and the functioning of government.⁷ The existence of civil liberties, which include freedom of speech and association, rule of law, and personal rights, is also an indicator of liberal democracies. The establishment of a liberal democracy allows all groups in

¹ Norris 2008

² Sambanis 2000, 439

³ Kaufmann 1998

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Norris 2008

⁶ Simonsen 2005, 301

⁷ Norris 2008

society to be on an equal playing field in both politics and society as a whole. Hence, peace may be necessary for democracy, but the establishment of liberal democracy may also be the first step of maintaining peace and stability in multiethnic societies.

Given the importance of building democracy in divided societies, scholars are concerned with identifying strategies for democratic consolidation. Two major approaches are typically prescribed to promote peace and democracy within divided societies. Social scientists and policymakers remain divided on which path better reduces conflict and promotes democratic institutions. While some believe that separating the two or more groups by partition leads to the best prospects for peace and democracy, others believe that implementing power-sharing institutions is necessary to make peace last and give all the major actors a stake in making democracy work. Partitions promote more security for groups since they have their own territory, but this process also uproots people's lives and can lead to more violence. On the other hand, political scientists debate whether power-sharing governments can reduce political instability in societies experiencing conflict, or whether these arrangements may reinforce ethnic hatred or even create a resurgence of communal violence.⁸

Questions about whether to use partitions or power-sharing regimes to establish more democratic regimes in ethnically divided societies do not have a definitive answer, yet it is vital for the international community and domestic reformers to understand which route will be most effective in promoting and sustaining democratic reforms.⁹ The aim of this research is to examine whether partition alone is enough to secure both peace and democracy by analyzing three post-partition societies with differing degrees of power-sharing institutions. These societies have all experienced high degrees of violence which ended in a partition or population transfer between the feuding groups. The hope is that this research will lead to more insight for states experiencing ethnic conflict, so that others concerned with peace and democratic stability understand what works best and what they should adopt in their negotiating process.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The Theory of Partition

Many scholars believe that physically separating conflict populations is the best solution to the most intense ethnic conflicts.¹⁰ The theory of partition focuses on the sanction of territorial separation as a means of giving feuding groups autonomy and sovereignty over their territory. Political partitions involve a separation, defined as having at least a partially novel border, cut

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid., 22

¹⁰ Kaufman 1998

through one or more of the national community's homeland(s).¹¹ The territory is divided into sections marked with borders that may be reinforced by walls, fences, or official posts with security checkpoints. Such structures can be seen in the walls between Belfast communities in Northern Ireland or the partitioned UN buffer zone in Cyprus. Partition is typically a political decision reached by a group from the international community which believes that irreconcilable differences between the feuding groups prevent future cooperation.¹²

The basis of the partition argument is the concept of a security dilemma which will not allow peace between the feuding populations. The dilemma creates a situation in which no group can provide its own security without encroaching on the security of the other group.¹³ It becomes more difficult for the feuding groups to defend their communities without going on the offensive to cleanse their areas of members from the enemy group. This cleansing is undertaken with the goal of creating ethnically reliable and defensible communities for those worried about attack.¹⁴ As long as both sides fear attack from their enemies, neither can trust its security on the hope that the other will practice restraint.¹⁵ If members of the enemy groups come into contact, they will inevitably lash out and violence will ensue.¹⁶ Advocates of partition essentially argue that the international community should work together to partition these societies for at least some conflicts; otherwise, war will separate the divided populations anyway, but at the cost of human lives.¹⁷

Some scholars further argue that partitioning separate ethnic territories secures a group's desire for access to political, economic, and social rights and resources.¹⁸ When groups are separated, the hostility and intolerance among them becomes irrelevant, because each group would gain complete independence and control over rights and access to resources within their territory. The fulfillment of this basic drive for self-determination should lead to more democratic societies in each post-partition state.

¹¹ O'Leary 2007, 886

¹² *Ibid.*, 903

¹³ First outlined by Kaufman in "Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century," 122. Later cited by Kuperman, Alan J. 2006. "Power-sharing or Partition? History's Lessons for Keeping the Peace in Bosnia". In *Bosnian Security after Dayton: New Perspectives*. New York: Routledge. Sambanis, Nicholas. 2000. "Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature." *World Politics*. 52. no. 4: 437-483.

¹⁴ Posen, "Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," pp. 108-111. Kaufman, "Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century," 121.

¹⁵ Kaufman 1998, 122

¹⁶ First described in Kaufmann, Chaim D. 1998. "When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century". *International Security*. 23, no. 2. (Autumn): 121. Later reiterated in Kuperman, Alan J. 2006. "Power-sharing or Partition? History's Lessons for Keeping the Peace in Bosnia". In *Bosnian Security after Dayton: New Perspectives*. New York: Routledge, pg 4.

¹⁷ Kaufman 1998

¹⁸ Blagojevic 2007, 555

Criticism of Partition

Partition critics cite several reasons why partition and population transfer should not be introduced in divided societies. Population transfers can inflict enormous suffering on the divided populations. The loss of homes, livelihoods, and social, religious, and cultural ties is unavoidable.¹⁹ Also, since the dissatisfied minority ceases to be a minority anymore, new minorities can emerge in the new societies.²⁰ The new state often inherits a significant minority from the old majority group. Since successor states are rarely “pure,” the new minorities may reject the newly formed state. In Northern Ireland, for example, partition resulted in an outbreak of more than twenty years of violence.

Indeed, some studies have found that partition may inspire new conflict. They argue that partitions often transform intra-national conflicts to international ones.²¹ Thus, the new states use the new border as the battleground against each other instead of within their old communities. Also, complete separation and independence among ethnic groups is difficult to achieve in many situations due to geographical and demographic dispersion or intermixture of groups.²²

Further, all feuding groups must agree to the partition or it could be seen as an infringement on their rights and ability to access resources from the state. If all groups do not agree, and if partition is imposed from outside, the new state(s) can be seen as illegitimate and undemocratic. Since some partitions create states that are undemocratic and culturally homogeneous, interstate hatred grows and leads to cross-border violence.²³

Power-sharing Regimes

Instead of dividing feuding societies, some scholars find that the best route of democracy building is allowing the enemy groups to share power. Power-sharing regimes are states or societies characterized by formal institutional rules which give multiple political elites a stake in the decision-making process.²⁴ This process is also known as ‘consociational democracy’. The primary idea of implementing power-sharing institutions into multiethnic societies is to turn political enemies into cooperative partners. When a settlement or agreement is put in place to end conflict, the leaders of all significant factions in society are guaranteed a stake in national or regional governments.

Many of the societies that adopt power-sharing institutions have proportional electoral systems with low vote thresholds which usually produce multiparty parliaments, with many minor

¹⁹ Kaufman 1998, 121

²⁰ Tullberg and Tullberg 1997, 240

²¹ Sambanis 2000

²² Blagojevic 2007, 556

²³ Kaufmann 1998, 123

²⁴ Norris 2008, 23

parties each representing distinct segmented communities.²⁵ In these cases, political leaders have an interest in negotiating and cooperating with opposing parties in order to gain a coalition government which could lead to the parties' attainment of high-level government positions. This type of executive power-sharing is believed to temper extreme demands and dampen expressions of ethnic intolerance among elites. The hope in this process is that the feuding groups will accept the legitimacy of the agreement, moderate their demands, and collaborate with their rivals.²⁶

When parties and politicians who represent diverse ethnic communities are included in the decision making process, segmented societies will allow groups to peacefully coexist within the borders of a state.²⁷ Even if a society has a super majority, such as Pakistan after partition, power-sharing would allow for newly segmented groups to have some say in government. The only realistic type of settlement capable of attracting agreement among all factions in post-conflict divided societies is a power-sharing regime which avoids the dangers of winner-take-all outcomes.²⁸ Power-sharing institutions are believed to be valuable for democracy in all states, but vital for containing and managing inter-communal tensions in multiethnic societies emerging from civil conflict, thereby helping to sustain fragile democracies.²⁹

Some scholars further argue that conflict settlements are more stable the more they institutionalize power-sharing and power-dividing across four dimensions of society: political, economic, military, and territorial.³⁰ The more highly institutionalized power-sharing is in society, the lower the risk of a return to civil war and the more likely democratic consolidation³¹. The most salient categories of power-sharing are constitutional design, electoral system design, and decentralization/federalism.³² The range of options for negotiated settlements provides a large number of possibilities of addressing deep divisions within a society. Parliamentary systems have been found to be the most stable choice in post-conflict societies.³³ Proportional representation and federalism are the most preferred systems of the parliamentary choices for divided societies since they will allow minorities to have a stake in the politics.

Advocates of power-sharing contend that arrangements must include certain characteristics in order to promote democracy. The state must not be dominated by a majority group, there should be relative equilibrium between groups, and there should be no significant socio-economic

²⁵ Norris 2008, 24

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 25

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 27

²⁸ Lijphart 1999

²⁹ Norris 2008, 3

³⁰ Wolff 2011, 30

³¹ Hartzell and Hoddie 2003

³² Simonsen 2005, 307

³³ Simonsen 2005, 308

differences between the feuding populations.³⁴ Parties, whether ideologically or ethnically divided, also need to agree on the conditions of the power-sharing arrangements.³⁵ The more agreement on the network of power-sharing institutions, the less likely groups will return to the use of armed violence to settle their disputes. Power-sharing advocates propose that international forces should support rival parties in their attempts to structure power-sharing institutions and encourage them to create a diverse network of power-sharing institutions.

Critics of Power-sharing

Although there are many supporters of power-sharing regimes, there are also critics who challenge the core assumptions and claims surrounding power-sharing solutions. Some claim that power-sharing regimes, which recognize existing community boundaries, assume that ethnic divisions are intractable and persistent.³⁶ Power-sharing regimes then institutionalize ethnic cleavages, which in turn deepen social differences. Some leaders may even exploit and exaggerate these cleavages, and further promote social tensions, ethnic hatred, and politics of fear. By failing to produce leaders who promote cooperation, these tensions generate greater political instability, rather than facilitating toleration of communal differences.³⁷ Power-sharing regimes that are based upon formal recognition of divided groups may provide electoral incentives for politicians and parties to heighten appeals based on distinct ethnic identities. Creating an emphasis on ethnic rights may make it more difficult to generate cooperation in society by reducing incentives for cross-cutting compromises³⁸, thus creating undemocratic policies and an illiberal society.

Other scholars focus on the security claims that bolster the partition argument. The aim to restore multiethnic civil politics and to avoid population transfers, such as power-sharing institution building and identity reconstruction, cannot resolve ethnic civil wars because they do not resolve the security dilemma created by multiethnic societies.³⁹ Since the security dilemma still exists, outbreaks of violence will occur as they have in the past in Cyprus in 1963, Lebanon in 1975, and Northern Ireland in 1974.

Another important issue with power-sharing regimes is how these regimes are created. Some regimes are created by negotiated agreements between all major players in society. Some are created by a definite victory by one party which then takes control of the state following an armed conflict. Others are created from peace settlements which are controlled by the international community and external forces. Regimes set up by the latter arrangement are the least likely to maintain peace and

³⁴ Schneckener 2002, 211

³⁵ Horwitz and Hoddie 2003, 339

³⁶ Norris 2008

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 28

³⁸ Simonsen 2005

³⁹ Kaufmann 1998, 141-145

promote long lasting democracy.⁴⁰ People are unlikely to support an agreement that is forced upon them. Once the outside forces leave, the chances of sustained peace remain low, which does not promote stable democracy. Some scholars estimated that 40% of civil wars will reoccur within a decade after peacekeeping forces leave.⁴¹

Some power-sharing institutions also produce undesirable characteristics that do not promote democracy. There are potential dangers of political stalemate, immobility, and deadlock between the executive and legislature; the lack of an effective opposition holding the government accountable and providing voters with a clear-cut electoral choice; a loss of transparency in government decision-making; and the fragmentation of party competition in the legislature.⁴² Thus, power-sharing arrangements may not promote democracy and can even lead to illiberal and unequal societies.

Three testable hypotheses derive from the theories of partition and power-sharing and the critics of those arrangements.

- H1: Partition may be an adequate way of ending violence by suppressing the security dilemma in a deeply divided society, but it is not sufficient to produce democracy in post-partition societies.
- H2: A combination of partition and power-sharing institutions will allow for the most democratic institutions in post-conflict societies.
- H3: The more articulated and expansive power-sharing institutions in a society, the more democratic a country.

RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGY

This study employs a focused comparison of three cases in order to test the hypotheses outlined above. This type of comparison maximizes control through the careful selection of countries that are analyzed using a middle level of conceptual abstraction.⁴³ Since this research contains such a small number of countries, an analysis will produce outcomes which are the product of multiple causal factors. The main benefit of this design is that it allows the researcher to compare similarities and differences among the cases rather than analytical relationships between the variables. Researchers can use less abstract ideas that are more grounded in the specific contexts under scrutiny.⁴⁴ This will allow for a greater understanding of the differences between the societies by intensely studying each individual case.

⁴⁰ Norris 2008, 30

⁴¹ Collier and Sambanis 2005

⁴² Norris 2008, 27

⁴³ Landman 2008, 28

⁴⁴ Landman 2008, 25

The level of analysis will be at the macro level and the unit of analysis will be the state. The term “state” should be used flexibly since not all of these societies have full autonomy and sovereignty. The design roughly follows the Most Similar Systems approach outlined by Lijphart, among others. A most similar design seeks to compare political systems that share a host of common features in an effort to neutralize some differences while highlighting others.⁴⁵ The main independent variable, however, will be power-sharing regimes, and that does differ amongst these cases. My dependent variable will be level of liberal democracy. The cases of Northern Ireland, Cyprus, and Pakistan all have a varying degree of liberal democracy, as measured by their the Freedom House Score.

Therefore, I will be analyzing the unique differences between the countries which could explain how each country ended up with a varying degree of liberal democracy. The cases I have selected come from a small population of post-ethnic conflict and post-partitioned societies. Each case experienced a conflict between at least two ethnic groups, and the extreme amount of violence during each conflict led to the partitioning of the feuding communities. The cases were also all colonial entities of Great Britain prior to partition, which allows for the control of certain path dependent factors.

In Northern Ireland, years of extreme violence between the Catholic and Protestant communities led to an independence movement for the Irish island. In 1921, the United Kingdom divided the Irish isle between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, which was formed in the Ulster province. In Pakistan, the push for independence from Great Britain culminated in a resistance movement that included both Muslim and Hindi Indians. However, the differences between the two groups sparked riots and violence that ultimately led to the partition of British India. In 1947, the land was divided into Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India. In Cyprus, conflict between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots promoted inter-communal violence between the two groups. In 1974, a de facto partition separated the two groups between the North and South of the island. While the partition did not create two separate states, it enforced population movements of the Turkish to the North and Greeks to the South of the island.

A focused, structured comparison of these cases will allow me to determine whether a combination of power-sharing and partition promotes more democracy in post-conflict societies. Since these countries have similar backgrounds in conflict and violence, they will allow for an analysis of how each country has developed with differing degrees of democratic success. Although I will not attain maximal control in my small-N design, I will be able to generalize my findings to a larger population of countries that have dealt with or are currently dealing with ethnic conflict. The

⁴⁵ Ibid., 70

variables used in this research have been incorporated into Table 1 so that differences between the dependent variable can be explained across the cases.

Table 1: Variables that Affect Democratization

	Northern Ireland	Pakistan	Cyprus
Partition	Yes	Yes	Yes
Former British Colony	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peaceful Partition?	No	No	No
High Violence prior to partition?	Yes	Yes	Yes
International pressure for partition?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Partition	1921	1947	1974
Type of Partition	Full	Full	De Facto
Peace Settlement after Partition?	Two	Three	One
International Violence?	No	Yes, four conflicts with India	No
Current Disputed Territory?	No	Yes, Kashmir	Yes, Northern Cyprus
Type of Government	Devolved Constitutional Monarchy and Commonwealth	Federal Republic	Presidential Republic
Gender Inequality Score	0.209	0.573	0.141
GDP per capita	\$25,302	\$1,194	\$30,670
Current division of ethnic groups	48% Protestant 36% Catholic 16% Other/ None	95% Islam 5% Other	77% Greek Cypriot (Greek Orthodox) 18% Turkish Cypriot (Muslim) 5% Other
Neighboring Countries' Average Liberal Democracy Score	1	5.3	3.6
Power-Sharing Institutions	Yes	No	Incomplete (Turkish Cypriots refuse to take seats)
Liberal Democracy Score	1	4.5 (Disputed =5.5)	1 (Disputed =2)

My dependent variable is level of liberal democracy. Liberal democracy can be defined as a system with the presence of political rights, such as electoral processes and political pluralism; and civil liberties, such as freedom of speech and association. Liberal democracy is measured by the Freedom House score⁴⁶, which ranges from 1 (the most democratic) to 7 (the least democratic). This is a standard measure of democratization. Some scholars, such as Norris, believe that including different measures of democracy provides greater validity and reliability. If data were available for each of my cases, I would have been able to extend the measure to include Polity IV as well. However, this score was not available, so I did not include it in my democratization measure.

Several of the independent variables listed in Table 1 can be eliminated as causal factors. Existence of partition, past control by Britain, peaceful partition, high violence prior to partition, international pressure for partition, and international violence do not vary and therefore cannot account for variations in the dependent variable. Nominal measures of these variables will be explained in the history of each case and can also be found in the CIA Factbook. According to the literature, these variables have an effect upon the dependent variable in some cases. However, since the first five variables are constant, they cannot account for variation on the dependent variable in this research. There are some variables (year of partition, type of partition, number of peace settlements, type of government, and existence of a disputed territory) which differ amongst the cases and could shed some light upon what affects the dependent variable; however, they do not co-vary with the dependent variable in the predicted ways.⁴⁷

Having analyzed these variables, five factors correlate in expected ways with liberal democracy scores. The existence of power-sharing institutions is the focus of this study. The establishment of a system which allows for power-sharing between ethnic groups is the basis of this variable. This variable is measured by an analysis of the current political system in each case. According to scholars, power-sharing has a vital effect upon democratic consolidation in a society. In-depth case studies attempt to show the role of power-sharing, in conjunction with other variables identified as promoting democracy in Table 1, in explaining democratic consolidation (or lack of it) in post-partition societies.

Two variables that have an effect on liberal democracy can be seen as vital characteristics of advanced democracies. Gender equality is necessary for equal political rights and civil liberties; therefore, this variable should have an effect on the liberal democracy score of each case.⁴⁸ This

⁴⁶ The Freedom in the World score from Freedom House is used in this research. Freedom House scores each country by both political rights and civil liberties. These two scores are then averaged together to get the score represented in the table.

⁴⁷ Source: CIA Factbook

⁴⁸ Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel 2003

factor is measured by the Gender Inequality Index (GII).⁴⁹ The measure is relatively new and was introduced in the 2010 Human Development Report created by the United Nations Development Programme. The scores range from 0 (most equal) to 1 (most unequal). The index analyzes the loss of achievement due to gender inequality by focusing on reproductive health, empowerment, and labor market rights.

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in each case also affects the dependent variable and can be associated with the gender empowerment measure. GDP per capita can be defined as the overall economic output per person in a country. It is measured using data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. According to scholars, including Norris, the assumption that wealth sustains democracy has become one of the most widely recognized generalizations in political science. The measure may not be sufficient to produce democracy, but it does not hurt democratic consolidation. Therefore, this measure should have a positive influence on the liberal democracy score of each case.

The current demographics of a society also have a major effect upon the liberal democracy score. A balance of population size between segmented groups is a necessary condition of power-sharing and democracy.⁵⁰ If there is a super-majority group, they may try to dominate the minority group, which would lead to undemocratic institutions. Further, if there are too many ethnic groups, it will be hard to establish democratic institutions, specifically power-sharing ones, which allow for the groups to cooperate. This factor can account for some of the variance upon the liberal democracy scores of divided societies. The demographics of each society are measured by the CIA Factbook.

The neighboring countries' average liberal democracy score is measured by the Freedom House score. Since the area in which a state evolves can have an effect upon its own democratic consolidation, this measure could have an influence on the dependent variable. It is measured by averaging the five closest countries' liberal democracy scores together. Since the same number of countries is used, this allows for the measure to be reliable across the cases. This variable, combined with power-sharing and the other democracy promoting factors, will allow for an extensive analysis of democratic consolidation in these three case studies.

CASE STUDIES

The cases involved in this research each have been partitioned after ethnic violence but contain varying degrees of power-sharing in their society today. Each case can be analyzed to

⁴⁹ The Gender Inequality Index relies on data from major publicly available databases, including the maternal mortality ratio from UNICEF's *The State of the World's Children*; adolescent fertility rates from the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs' *World Population Prospects*; educational attainment statistics from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics educational attainment tables and the Barro-Lee data sets; parliamentary representation from the International Parliamentary Union; and labor market participation from the International Labor Organization's LABORSTA database.

⁵⁰ Lijphart 1977

understand the effect that power-sharing and the other variables listed above have upon their current liberal democracy score. Northern Ireland can be seen as the poster child for power-sharing, Pakistan as the perfect example of democratic failure, and Cyprus as a mixed case.

Northern Ireland

The influence of the United Kingdom in Ireland dates back hundreds of years. Tensions between Catholic and Protestant communities plagued the country during British occupation. Catholic communities were predominately republic minded, meaning they believed in an independent Irish isle. Protestant communities were loyal to the crown and believed that being part of the United Kingdom was vital to their identity. A Catholic-sponsored independence movement in the early 1900s led to more strife between the communities. This movement was met with resistance from the Protestant communities in the Ulster province of the country. The northern six counties made up the Ulster province and contained large numbers of the Protestant minority in Ireland. Since the Protestants wanted to remain with the United Kingdom, they fought to create a new nation which would break from Ireland and remain part of Great Britain. During independence, the Irish isle was partitioned into The Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland now contained a new minority of Catholics and a new majority of Protestants within its territory.

The development of a new minority, a critical problem with partitions, led to decades of violence between the Catholic and Protestant communities in Northern Ireland. Therefore, Northern Ireland's partition may have been successful through the 1960s but it failed to consolidate democracy. The Catholic communities felt oppressed by the Protestant majority in terms of representation and civil rights. Peaceful protests were met with violent backlash and the infiltration of British troops resulted in thirty years of violence. The use of paramilitaries, the Irish Republican Army and splinter groups for the Catholics, and the Ulster Volunteer Force and Ulster Defense Force for the Protestants, led to atrocities and revenge tactics on both sides. After a ceasefire in 1994, the Good Friday Agreement was signed in Belfast, which brought thirty years of violence to an end through the implementation of power-sharing and disarmament.

Northern Ireland's current demographics include 48% Protestant, 36% Catholic, and 16% other or do not identify with either group. However, there is a growing Catholic population which could provide the number of votes needed to reunite the island. Since the Good Friday Agreement was put into effect, both communities have voted in a referendum over their autonomy and sovereignty. The majority of Northern Irish people have voted for their own government authority within the state, instead of a full reunion with either Great Britain or the Republic.⁵¹ Since there is not an overwhelming majority, that may be the driving force behind the communities' ability to

⁵¹ Northern Irish Life and Times Survey 2010

cooperate. Since the society cannot function without each of the communities, this may reinforce power-sharing institutions.

Also, Northern Ireland's surroundings promote democracy within its borders. Its average neighboring liberal democracy score is a 1 on the Freedom House scale. Its devolved parliament within the United Kingdom is a defining factor in its democratic consolidation. Further, the connection with the highly liberal democracies in the Republic of Ireland, UK, and Western Europe helps to reinforce democracy.

Northern Ireland upholds characteristics considered to be vital for an advanced democracy, which help its development into an equal and affluent society. The Gender Inequality Index score for Northern Ireland is 0.209. Since the most equal society is a 0, Northern Ireland is a relatively equal society. This equality would be seen as a vital factor in its democratic consolidation.⁵² The GDP per capita of Northern Ireland is \$25,302, placing it among the wealthiest societies in the world. Therefore, its affluence only helps the country to sustain its democratic institutions. These measures most likely benefit from having a devolved parliament within the United Kingdom. Affluence and gender equality show Northern Ireland's progress and ability to transform into a liberal democracy.

These factors contribute to democracy, but critically for this study, Northern Ireland has also established an extensive power-sharing system. The Good Friday Agreement created a power-sharing political system within Northern Ireland, as well as North-South Irish and Irish-British connecting bodies. Today, the Northern Irish Assembly is a unicameral legislature. The legislature is based upon safeguards which ensure that all sections of the community participate and work together successfully.⁵³ The allocation of seats is based on party-list proportional representation. The First Minister and Deputy First Minister are the head of government and have equal power. Therefore, a Protestant and Catholic will have equal power in the head of state position. The allocation of Committee Chairs, Ministers, and Committee membership are filled in proportion to the party strengths within the legislature.⁵⁴ This method is used to ensure equal representation within the legislature.

Although the agreement promotes democracy, there are some scholars who claim that the legislature is in a political stalemate and there is no official opposition to hold the government accountable.⁵⁵ However, the power-sharing institutions are seen as extremely successful in promoting cross-community relations and democratic consolidation. Northern Ireland's power-sharing institutions promote democracy within a society that already fits within the norm of affluent, democratic countries that surround it.

⁵² Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel 2003)

⁵³ Good Friday Agreement, Strand 1

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ruane and Todd, 2007

Cyprus

Cyprus, on the other hand, has reached a partially divided form of democracy. Cyprus has historically been divided between those who identify themselves as Greek Cypriots and those who identify as Turkish Cypriots. Greek Cypriots predominantly identify as Greek Orthodox and would like to be an entity of Greece, while the Turkish Cypriots heavily identify as Muslim and wish to be united with Turkey. The British occupation of Cyprus in 1878 attempted to promote cooperation between the two groups. In 1955, an independence movement began with the support of Greek Cypriots wishing to be reunited with Greece. The movement then pushed Turkish Cypriots to rally for partition, since they did not want to assimilate with Greece. British authorities then allowed Turkish police to end the movement, which created an outbreak of violence.

The ethnic violence was not effectively dealt with by the British powers in the state. The United Kingdom granted Cyprus independence in 1960 without remedying the violent situation. Cypriots created a constitution after independence in the hope of uniting the feuding communities. Power-sharing institutions were established but subsequently failed and large-scale violence broke out in 1963. A temporary partition of Greek and Turkish communities into individual enclaves occurred, but was undermined by the security dilemma. In the early 1970s, many were hopeful for peace between the two communities; however, a Greek coup d'état against the Cypriot government ruined this hope. Military forces invaded Cyprus after the overthrow and took control of the northern part of the state. After failed negotiations, ethnic cleansing began on both sides. Turkish forces held about forty percent of the country and implemented a de facto partition. The Turkish proclaimed the independence of Northern Cyprus which, to this day, is only recognized by Turkey.

The partition of Cyprus is seen as one of the most brutal and atrocious in history because it divided the communities almost completely. Over 250,000 Cypriots became refugees and were forced to move either North or South to their ethnically controlled area. The United Nations did step in after the mass population transfer to establish a buffer zone which would create physical space between the communities. The buffer zone, which doubled as a no crossing zone until 2003, has been the only location of deaths between the communities since partition. The partition succeeded in preventing more violence by dealing with the security dilemma; however, it inflicted mass suffering and agony upon the people of Cyprus and did not lead to unequivocal democracy. The enormity of the partition can be seen in the pictures in Figure 1.

The current make-up of the state is 77% Greek Cypriot, 18% Turkish Cypriot, and 5% other or those who do not identify. It seems that the demographics should have a significant effect upon the dependent variable given that the other two cases show that the higher percentage of the majority ethnicity, the lower a liberal democracy score. However, this relationship does not exist in the case of Cyprus. This unconformity may be explained by the populations being divided and having their own

autonomy and sovereignty over their territory. The existence of these rights might contradict the fact that there is a majority ethnicity within the state. The liberal democracy score of the proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is a 2 on the Freedom House scale, which is lower than the Republic's score of 1. Although these scores are slightly different, the make-up of the state does not lead to an undemocratic Northern Cyprus, which would be expected considering its Muslim influence and its Turkish minority within the Republic of Cyprus.

Compared to Pakistan or Northern Ireland, Cyprus's surroundings do not seem to have as large of an effect. Since its neighboring countries' liberal democracy scores average a 3.6, one would assume that Cyprus's score would be less democratic than a 1 on the Freedom House scale. It is an island that stands alone, which may account for the reduced influence of this variable. Cyprus is the only case that does not have a bordering neighbor or direct devolution from other states. The recent integration of Cyprus into the European Union may increase its democratic capabilities. Many believed that EU membership would foster a more pluralistic, democratic, and tolerant Cyprus through the broadening of civil society, a theory which seems to be accurate since Cyprus has been able to maintain a functioning liberal democracy. Therefore, EU membership might be the more relevant "neighbor group" when assessing its location.

Similar to Northern Ireland, Cyprus's affluence and gender equality help to sustain democratic institutions within the society. Its GDP per capita is \$30,670, slightly higher than that of Northern Ireland and much higher than Pakistan's GDP. This variable has a positive effect upon the liberal democracy score when comparing the cases in Table 1. Cyprus further demonstrates how the affluence of a country can reinforce democratic institutions. The gender inequality score is a 0.141 on the Gender Inequality Index, meaning that it has more gender equality than both Northern Ireland and Pakistan. This score can also account for Cyprus's liberal democracy score and reinforces what scholars claim to know about the influence of gender equality upon democratic consolidation.⁵⁶

In the 1960 constitution, power-sharing institutions were established to accommodate Turkish Cypriots in the government and further promote democracy. Since the Turkish Cypriots claim Northern Cyprus as their own territory, they refuse to take seats within the Cyprus parliament. Therefore, power-sharing is not being implemented between the ethnically divided societies. However, there have been several failed attempts at power-sharing between the two communities since partition. In 2002, the UN pushed for an agreement which would bring the communities on the island closer together, and in 2004 the Annan plan was introduced to reconcile the populations on the island. The Plan called for the creation of a United Republic of Cyprus, which would constitute a

⁵⁶ Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel 2003

Greek-Cypriot state and a Turkish-Cypriot state under the power of a federal government.⁵⁷ While the plan was overwhelmingly supported by the Turkish Cypriots, it was admittedly opposed by the Greek Cypriots.⁵⁸ ⁵⁹ The power-sharing institutions created with the constitution promote Cyprus's high liberal democracy score since Greek parties share power. However, the failure to attain power-sharing between the once feuding communities leads to a lower liberal democracy score in the Turkish area of the state.

Pakistan

Unlike the previous cases, Pakistan can be seen as the perfect storm of democratic failure among partitioned states. An independence movement after World War II within British India sparked violence between the Muslim and Hindu populations. Historically, the Muslim populations felt oppressed by the Hindu majority within the state, and when the push for independence came about, they saw a chance to create a 'Muslim homeland' outside of India. In 1947, the land was partitioned into West Pakistan, East Pakistan, and India. West Pakistan would eventually become Pakistan as it is known today. After partition, international violence broke out between Pakistan and India over the Kashmir region. This transfer from intra-national to international violence is another example of a negative effect of partition which leads some to claim that the partition of Pakistan was a failure.

The Kashmir region has been a negative influence upon Pakistan's democratic consolidation and has reinforced the militaristic overtones of its government. Kashmir is located in the Northeast region of Pakistan and Northwest region of India. Both India and Pakistan lay claims to the land since it has a Muslim majority but a Hindu head of state. The people of Pakistan believe that it is their responsibility to liberate the Muslims in this region. The liberal democracy score in Kashmir is a 5.5 on the Freedom House scale, which is lower than that of Pakistan at 4.5. However, absorbing this region could lead to an even lower liberal democracy score unless Pakistan institutes power-sharing into its political system so that it can accommodate both communities that exist within the region.

Pakistan's current demographic breakdown is 95% Islamic and 5% other, mostly Hindus and Christians. The super-majority of the Islamic population can account for the low democracy score within the state. Within the Arab world, Muslim states are known to be virtually undemocratic in all aspects of society.⁶⁰ The Muslim influence does have a highly negative effect upon other variables within this research, but specifically upon power-sharing because a super-majority would not think it

⁵⁷ Ladisch 2007, 92

⁵⁸ The Turkish Cypriots approved the plan with 69.41% in favor, while the Greek Cypriots overwhelmingly rejected it with 75.38% being against the plan. The root of this rejection was that the Greeks believed that the Plan was giving into all of the Turkish Cypriots' demands.

⁵⁹ Ladisch 2007, 93

⁶⁰ Pryor 2007

necessary to establish power-sharing institutions with groups that make up less than 5% of the population. If there is a super-majority group, they may try to dominate the minority group through majoritarian rule.⁶¹ Therefore, some of Pakistan's undemocratic institutions may result from a lack of motivation for the Muslim population to include any other religious faction in the decision-making process, which may, in turn, result in the country's lack of power-sharing. After partition, Pakistan's Muslim population further divided into six different subgroups rooted in the linguistic and regional differences among them.⁶² According to the literature, too many segmented population groups are unfavorable since cooperation is extremely difficult between more than four groups.⁶³ Therefore, power-sharing between newly segmented populations is vital for democracy but has not yet been achieved due to ethnic and linguistic differences.

Pakistan's geographic location also has a negative effect upon its liberal democracy score. Pakistan is surrounded by predominately Muslim countries, along with India, which have an average liberal democracy score of 5.3. Since this score is so undemocratic, it hinders Pakistan's potential for democratic growth, especially when compared to cases such as Northern Ireland. The surroundings in which a country develops and the other states it is in constant contact with will affect the democratic consolidation of a state. Pakistan's location is a determining factor in its low democratic development.

The low affluence and gender inequality in Pakistan further undermine its liberal democracy score. The country's GDP is \$2,800, far lower than the other two cases in this research. Pakistan's inability to maintain democracy reinforces the scholarly literature that suggests countries with a GDP lower than \$4,000 have a harder time sustaining democratic institutions.⁶⁴ Along with GDP, the gender inequality within its society promotes undemocratic institutions. Pakistan's inequality score is a 0.573, which is significantly lower than the more democratic cases in this research. This score may also be tied to the religious influence within the country. Inequality has been shown to correlate negatively with the liberal democracy score, and many believe that gender equality is vital to democratic consolidation.⁶⁵ Therefore, Pakistan has not yet attained the necessary characteristics for an advanced democracy

Pakistan's history of political instability has undermined its ability to establish adequate power-sharing institutions within the state. Government overthrows and military elites have thwarted each attempt. The establishment of a presidential republic in 1956 led to a constitution which attempted to promote power-sharing amongst the linguistic and regional factions in the state.

⁶¹ Krienbuehl 2010

⁶² Chakrabarti 2012, 16

⁶³ Lijphart 1977

⁶⁴ Norris, 2008

⁶⁵ Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel 2003

However, the constitution was dissolved by a military coup which proclaimed martial law. Pakistan's first democratic elections came about in 1970 in the hopes of reducing military power and establishing democratic institutions. A power-sharing arrangement was established but subsequently dissolved by another military coup d'état in 1977, which produced another military president.⁶⁶ The parliament was dissolved, political parties were banned, and the 1973 constitution was suspended until 1988. It was not until 1997 that there was substantial hope for power-sharing arrangements. However, that hope was soon eroded by the establishment of authoritarian rule in 1999. In 2008, promising power-sharing institutions were established which were unlike any previous attempt. The parties seemed to overcome their differences and worked together to promote power-sharing institutions; however, this period of cooperation too was short-lived. Pakistan's constant instability was exacerbated by the military elite and the inability of parties to work together. Pakistan will have to revamp its institutions in order to promote future power-sharing institutions within its society.

CONCLUSIONS

Each of the independent variables outlined above has an effect upon democratic consolidation in each of the cases. These variables are in no way the only factors that influence democratic consolidation, but they are the most relevant to this research. It can be concluded that power-sharing institutions are vital to democratic consolidation in post-partitioned states that have faced ethnic conflict. These societies must continue to promote cooperation between the once feuding groups so that they can achieve a full liberal democracy. Although power-sharing has a vital impact upon the liberal democracy score, other factors help to promote democracy within these societies. The ideal criteria for a partitioned state that has experienced ethnic conflict seems to be one in which power-sharing institutions are successfully established. Along with power-sharing, it certainly helps if the country is affluent, post-modern in terms of gender equality, and situated in a democratic neighborhood. These criteria are vital to the development of an ethnically divided state to establish a liberal democracy. Societies concerned with ethnic conflict today should analyze these factors when deciding whether to adopt power-sharing, partition, or a combination of both.

The Future of Palestine?

Palestine is the most prominent case in the power-sharing and partition debate today. With a recent ceasefire and UN recognition of the state of Palestine, the future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is questionable. Since it seems that two-state separation will be the solution to the conflict, international powers concerned with the transition from violence to a liberal democracy need to focus on the above factors to promote democracy. Although they are not recognized by many data sources, the West Bank and Gaza Strip have a combined liberal democracy score of 5.75 on the

⁶⁶ Mushtaq, 2011

Freedom House scale. The most democratic nation in the area is Israel with a 1.5 score of the Freedom House scale. Therefore, there could be hope for democratic influence from that country. If these powers can establish power-sharing institutions between the Muslim and Jewish communities, progress toward democratic consolidation may occur.

Poverty, gender inequality, and the general neighborhood make democracy in Palestine an uphill battle, but that only underscores the importance of getting the institutional structure right in order to give significant political power to all the key stakeholders. Since the disputed territory is already deemed not free, much progress needs to be made for there to be full democratization. The country would have to achieve affluence and promote gender equality within its society, something that has been hard to achieve for many Middle Eastern countries. It seems that the establishment of power-sharing institutions between the Jewish and Muslim populations in the area could lead to more democratization, but the other factors could undermine the struggle for democratic consolidation.

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