

University of Groningen

Special issue

De Jong, Gjalt; Van Ees, Hans

Published in:
European management review

DOI:
[10.1111/emre.12022](https://doi.org/10.1111/emre.12022)

IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from it. Please check the document version below.

Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

Publication date:
2013

[Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database](#)

Citation for published version (APA):
De Jong, G., & Van Ees, H. (2013). Special issue: Firms and corruption. *European management review*, 10(4), 171. <https://doi.org/10.1111/emre.12022>

Copyright

Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

The publication may also be distributed here under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the "Taverne" license. More information can be found on the University of Groningen website: <https://www.rug.nl/library/open-access/self-archiving-pure/taverne-amendment>.

Take-down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): <http://www.rug.nl/research/portal>. For technical reasons the number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.



Special Issue: Firms and Corruption

Introduction

Corruption is not a new topic, but it has increasingly become a central policy issue around the world. Many countries have launched periodic spring cleansing through anticorruption campaigns. Nonetheless, corruption persists. Although the (empirical) literature on corruption and economic performance at the country level has been relatively well developed, a firm-level perspective remains a relatively underexplored area of research. The aim of this special issue is to complement existing corruption research and increase understanding of the determinants and consequences of firm-level corruption in different contexts.

The main research questions that are addressed in the special issue are twofold:

- (1) What are the determinants of firm-level corruption?
- (2) What is the relationship between corruption and organizational behavior and performance?

The more specific purposes of this special issue are the following. Its first aim is to investigate whether there is a relationship between firm characteristics, firm context, and corruption. Firm characteristics may influence the willingness to be corrupt due to specific forces created by organizational traits. Within-firm characteristics may create conditions of force or need, thus stimulating predisposition for corruption. In addition, the business context may explain firms' engagement in corruption. For example, (perceived) competitive environments may present external forces for organizations to be corrupt. Although firm-level bribery has been empirically investigated, little is known about the impact of organizational characteristics (internal force) and contextual conditions (external force) on corruption. Therefore, the first aim of this special issue is to understand whether and, if so, how variations in firm and context characteristics determine the variation in firm-level corruption.

The second aim of the special issue is to study to investigate the possible relationship between corruption and organizational behavior and performance. In this respect, the special issue focuses on the characteristics of the organization as the unit of analysis. Organizations – in a transition economy but also elsewhere – can choose whether to engage in corruption (e.g., use bribes to manipulate officials to obtain contracts or loans). This

does not imply that all organizations actively engage in corruption; on the contrary, some are more involved in it than others. Organizations, for example, do not respond to bribery demands uniformly and, likewise, do not supply the same amount of bribes to the same government officials at the same time for similar products and services. Firms presumably are corrupt to improve performance or other organizational outcomes such as innovation or successful market entry. Therefore, this special issue aims to understand whether and to what extent corruption determines organizational behavior and performance.

Planning

Papers on antecedents or consequences of firm-level corruption are invited to the special issue for *European Management Review*. Papers may include both, qualitative or quantitative studies of corruption. The planning for the special issue is as follows:

- 1) deadline for submission of papers: 28 February 2014
- 2) decision for review procedure: 28 March 2014
- 3) due date review reports: 15 May 2014
- 4) deadline for revised version of papers: 1 July 2014
- 5) final decision of papers: 1 September 2014

Submissions shall be provided via EMR Manuscript Central System at: <http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/emr>

All submissions will be subject to the regular double-blind peer review process.

For further information:

Gjalt de Jong (University of Groningen): g.de.jong@rug.nl

Hans van Ees (University of Groningen): h.van.ees@rug.nl

Guest Editors

Gjalt de Jong (University of Groningen)

Hans van Ees (University of Groningen)