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Recent Legal Literature

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Recent Legal Literature

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RECENT LEGAL LITERATURE

CENTRALIZATION AND THE LAW. By Melville M. Bigelow, Brooks Adams, Edward A. Harriman, and Henry S. Haines. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1906. pp. xvii, 296.

This book is a distinct contribution to jurisprudence. It deals with fundamental principles in a broad and comprehensive way that challenges and holds the attention. A purpose is apparent upon every page, namely, to arouse the profession and the public to a realization of the facts that the law should be a vital thing in all of its relations, that it springs naturally and logically from the dominant forces in society, and, therefore, should always conform to present conditions, and that it must necessarily fail in accomplishing just results whenever it arbitrarily imposes upon the present, principles that sprang from an older environment and that have nothing in common with modern purposes and modern methods. In brief, the purpose of the book is to show that the necessities of the present should make the law and that its administration should be influenced by the dead past only so far as the principles of the past naturally survive in present conditions.

The book is a collection of several lectures delivered by the gentlemen named above before the Law School of Boston University. As published, these lectures are preceded by an introductory chapter by Dr. Bigelow upon *The Extension of Legal Education*, wherein he develops the idea that as the law should be a present, living thing, springing from the social and economic conditions of the day, it should be studied, not as a body of fixed and unchangeable principles and rules imposed by sovereign authority, but as a resultant of the dominant forces of the times in all departments of life, and studied with all the light that can be obtained from present conditions in the social, political and business world. "The law," says the author, "should be taught as a practical living thing of the living present, flexible and responsive to social and economic changes in life. The law schools should aim to fit their students to help provide for and administer in the most skilful way, whether in the courts or the legislature, through the press or otherwise, whatever in the affairs of our day pertains to the law."

The first and second lectures, by Mr. Adams, are respectively upon the *Nature of Law*, together with a discussion of the *Methods and Aim of Legal Education* and *Law Under Inequality; Monopoly*, wherein the author deals effectively with social and economic history, and finds the law of today emerging from the conflicts of present or recent social and economic forces. His general attitude toward the questions and the nature of his conclusions are indicated in the following quotations: "Unless I profoundly err, there are, as I have endeavored to explain, no abstract legal principles, any more than there is an abstract animal apart from individual animals, or an abstract plant apart from individual plants. The law is the envelop with which any society surrounds itself for its own protection. The rules of the law are established by the self-interest of the dominant class, so far as it can impose its will upon those who are weaker. These rules form a corpus which

is more or less flexible according to circumstances, and which yields more or less readily to pressure." And again, "Law is not the command of a sovereign, assuming the sovereign to be a power apart from the subject community. Law is a resultant of social forces, and the sovereign is the vent through which this resultant expresses itself. Various forces being always in conflict, they become fused in the effort to obtain expression, and this fusion creates a corpus juris, the corpus inclining in the direction of the predominant force in the precise degree in which it predominates." Throughout these lectures, as indeed throughout the entire book, the notion is brought prominently to the fore, that the traditional legal education in principles and rules should be supplemented by a careful study of the great social and economic forces of the times, "those new forces which are making trusts, which are building up trade unions, which are consolidating our municipalities, and which are lending intensity to the growing energy of the Federal Jurisdiction."

In the third lecture, which is by Dr. Bigelow, the author evolves what he suggests as a working definition of the term law, as viewed in the light of the law being "the resultant of actual, conflicting forces in society," and in doing this he finds it necessary to clear the way by showing that the current definition given by Blackstone that "law is a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state, commanding what is right and forbidding what is wrong" is not only unsatisfactory but, under modern conditions particularly, is essentially unsound and misleading. "The chief objection," says the author, "is that the definition as a whole naturally suggests, and in connection with Blackstone's context and the practice of the time clearly teaches that the sovereign of a people may be external, and by implication that the law begins with, and is founded upon, abstract principles. Its language indeed suggests a theocratic original; the definition, especially in connection with the discussion accompanying it, reads like an attempt to generalize the decalogue, with the substitution of the words 'prescribed by the supreme power of the state' for 'And God spake all these words'; the analogy being plain that the supreme power in a state is external to the people, as God is external to his people, and so declares the law forever." After showing with particularity that in his judgment the definition is also unsound and misleading in its details, the author suggests the following as a general definition: "Municipal law signifies the existence of binding relations, direct and collateral, of right and duty between men or between the state and men; or legislative grant of authority under which such relations may be created; each in virtue of freedom to do whatever is reasonable. * * * Remedial law signifies the existence of relations of right and duty between the state and the members of the same, in consequence of a breach of duty, binding the state to enforce compensation in civil, and punishment, subject to pardon, in criminal cases. Procedure, it may be added, signifies the means provided by the state for enforcing the law, original and remedial." It should be said that these conclusions are preceded by a thoughtful and scholarly consideration of what, in the judgment of the author, are the essential elements of a comprehensive definition of law, namely, the binding relations, direct and col-

lateral, of right and duty that exist between persons or between the state and persons and that arise by virtue of freedom to do what is reasonable.

Having arrived in the third lecture at what he suggests as a working definition of law, Dr. Bigelow in the fourth, treats of the Scientific Method in Law. This, he contends, is not to be found in the so-called analytical school or, in any considerable degree, in the historical school. The former planted itself "on its own conception of an inherent nature of rights and law. On that footing Bentham could serve up codes and constitutions according to taste." But the method, as applied to law, could not be regarded as scientific. The historical school, according to the author, "standing for the idea that the law is all found in the books, teaches the doctrine of abstract principles. All the law being found in books, the law there found governs; there is no place for conditions essentially different from those of past times." This the author regards as fatal. And while recognizing that historical sources, so far as they throw light upon the law as actually administered in the courts at any particular time are valuable, and that their study to that extent must be a necessary part of a sound legal education, he contends that legal history as such is for the historian; "that the historical school in professing to teach existing law through history, confuses history with (what certainly should be taught) the sources of law in the proper sense of the word." After preliminary reference to the different schools of jurisprudence, Dr. Bigelow proceeds to explain what he regards as the scientific method in law, the central and controlling ideas of his exposition being that law is the product of the times, the resultant of conflicting forces of the present, and that that method only can properly be regarded as scientific either in the study or the administration of the law that recognizes present conditions as the fundamental and controlling element; that the scientific method in law means not only a recognition of the law of today as a present product, but the further recognition that in its administration everything from the past that is unsuited to the conditions of the hour, should be at once and without hesitation abandoned. The lecturer shows by numerous striking illustrations that much in the law of today that is the subject of intelligent and legitimate criticism, is a survival of the past that is unsuited to the conditions of the present, a survival that in some cases has been due to accident, in others to the technicalities of pleading and procedure and in others still to illogical reasoning by the courts. "Procedure," says the author, "has been a prison-house for the law. Many a crippled rule of substantive law traces its appearance back sooner or later to some phase of procedure—to set forms of action, jurisdiction, 'niceties' of pleading. * * * Enough to allude to the fact that the common law, standing in the early and middle period of English history for all the ordinary internal affairs of men, was for centuries imprisoned within the narrow walls of some half-dozen forms of action." And again, "The artificial modes of thinking handed down for centuries could not but affect the legal profession, even after the change which swept away the substance of false ideas. Mediæval ideas, mediæval modes of reasoning have not yet entirely let up their grip." In brief, the scientific method in law, according to the author, stands for a complete adaptation of the law of the necessities of the present.

The dominant idea of this lecture may be gathered from the following quotation: "The law should be an ever-living fact, a fact of the life of the present day. It should be for us who now live; tomorrow it will perchance, under change of conditions, be another thing—it will be for our successors. The law should be suited to him who needs its protection, whenever he may live, in accordance with times and the pursuits of men. When this ideal is reached, the year 1800 will be no more to the people, so far as the law is concerned, than the year 1700 or 1600 or 1300. All of that, so far as it fails to shed light upon our own path, will be turned over to the historian, or used for another purpose than teaching our law. The historian of the law of yesterday will have his place, as has the historian of other things; he will have his place on the bench, for the bench will always need men of broad mind and learning; but in proportion as the ideal is reached, the judges should find less and less need of seeking authority in the Year Books or in Coke, or in the worthies of much later times for their decisions. The life of another and different age will not bind our successors in the day of the full consummation. If we govern ourselves today by laws laid down yesterday, it is or should be because those laws are suited to us; they are our own laws, not a priori laws made for us by another set of men. Are we, then, in accordance with such a school of ideas, to overrule the past, with all its accumulations? Clearly not; we have only to leave it alone where it fails to serve us. The past served its purpose in its day; why should it have a posthumous life to trouble men living under other conditions? After the period of the reasonable life of a decision, let the decision, as a binding authority, die. * * * The laws peculiar to our own day will go, because they ought to go, the same way; the only difference, when the new order of things comes fully into operation, being that their day in ordinary cases will be shortened. Let them live a reasonable time, that is, so long as they serve the social order—then let them die. It will be no cause for fear to see 'authority' of the kind relaxing its hold upon the administration of justice."

It should be added that in this as in the preceding lectures the importance of making the scientific method in law, as therein explained, the fundamental idea in legal education is constantly emphasized. And it is suggested that the schools should teach: "first, the law as we have it, that is to say as it is actually administered in our courts of justice; secondly, the nature of the defects discovered in the connection between the law as it is and the theory of rights, together with the duty of earnest, persistent endeavor to bring about a full conformity of the law to the actual affairs of life; and thirdly * * * subjects related to the law, including the sources of the same, with a view of broadening the student's intelligence."

The fifth lecture upon *Law as an Applied Science* emphasizes the importance to the practicing lawyer of a knowledge, in addition to principles which he gets from the books, of the facts and conditions of the life that is the field of his activity; while the sixth upon *Rate-Making* is introduced as an object-lesson in the extension of legal education for which the book as a whole stands. For this extension involves study by the law student in such related fields as those of business, economics and history. Much could be said in favor of this proposed extension. It would necessarily mean a

material lengthening of the law course and possibly a shortening of the undergraduate college course for law students, a change that in the opinion of many would not be undesirable. That the study of such related subjects as transportation, interstate commerce, insurance, banking, municipal government, international law and consular affairs in connection with the technical study of the law, would serve greatly to broaden the field of the student goes without saying. And to study such subjects as a part of a law course would undoubtedly give better results than would come from their study in a preparatory course, as their related value and importance would more clearly appear.

While the leading notion of this book that law should be a present, living thing, adapted to present conditions and necessities, commends itself at once to the thinking reader, the associated notion that the entire doctrine of the existence of certain abstract legal principles must go, will not probably meet with general approval. Undoubtedly very much, perhaps most, of the law springs as a resultant from present conditions, but it might prove to be a correct conclusion also to say that much of it rests in abstract principles of right and justice that are applied, as occasion demands, to the solution of present problems.

H. B. HUTCHINS.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ENGLAND. By Edward Wavell Ridges, of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-law. London: Stevens & Sons, Limited, 1905, pp. xxxii, 459.

This book presents a comprehensive view of the government of the United Kingdom and her colonies. It is not a treatise upon the constitutional law of England, in the sense that Story's and Cooley's great works are treatises on the constitutional law of our country, but rather a treatise on English political institutions, with a brief account of their history and development. It is a book for the general reader who desires to be informed as to the governmental machinery of the English people and its practical operation, as well as for one with technical learning in the law.

The book is divided into six parts. Part I deals with the "Nature and Sources of English Constitutional Law." Part II, with the "Legislature and the Public Revenue," with chapters on "The Meeting and Termination of Parliament," "The House of Commons," "The House of Lords," "Public, Private and Money Bills," and "The Public Revenue." Part III is occupied with a discussion of "The Executive," and includes chapters on "The Crown," "The Privy and Cabinet Councils" and "The Members of the Executive." Part IV deals with "The Judiciary," treating of English judicial institutions in the period preceding and including the reign of Edward I; that following the reign of Edward I. to the Judicature acts of 1873-1902, and that under the Judicature acts. Part V discusses "The Church, the Navy and the Army," and Part VI, the countries subject to the laws of England, with separate chapters on "The United Kingdom," "The Colonies," "The Indian Empire," and on "Protectorates and Miscellaneous Possessions."

The chapters on the Judiciary will furnish as much of interest to lawyers

as any other portion of the book, and present, in less than a hundred pages, a very clear view of English jurisprudence, the development, historically, of the various courts, their relations and jurisdiction.

The author presents a brief study in comparative constitutional law in which he writes this paragraph: "The Constitution of the United States is contained in a document containing seven articles, which was drawn up by a convention of the various states in 1787. This document was ratified by nine states, and came into force on June 21, 1788. The ratification by the last of the states, thirty-seven in number, who now compose the Union, was that of Rhode Island in 1790." (p. 15). This paragraph presents some difficulties to the American student, particularly when known to have been written in 1904 or 1905. In speaking of the powers of the President it is said: "He is empowered to fill up vacancies in the senate as they occur" (p. 17), etc. Further, in criticism of our executive, it is said: "Through the multitude of appointments, which are in the hands of the President, he has little time to attend to other matters" (p. 18). This last has a foundation of truth, but would certainly fail in its application to the present executive and many who have preceded him. These are errors indicating that the author is less familiar with our, than with his own institutions. They are not characteristic of the book, which is certainly most valuable in the field it was written primarily to cover. It is doubtful if anywhere else, in the same compass, there can be found so much information about English institutions, so enterprisingly presented.

V. H. LANE.

CONDITIONAL AND FUTURE INTERESTS AND ILLEGAL CONDITIONS AND RESTRAINTS IN ILLINOIS. By Albert Martin Kales, Associate Professor of Law at the Law School of Northwestern University. Chicago: Callaghan & Co., 1905, pp. xlv, 453.

This book is dedicated to Professor John C. Gray, the author's former instructor; and by the preface we are informed that it is written to make the Illinois bar familiar with Professor Gray's learning and discrimination in handling the fundamental problems in the law of future interests. In keeping with this purpose, our author makes frequent mention of statements made by Professor Gray in lecturing to his classes in Harvard Law School or afterwards in letters to the author while this book was being written. Professor Kales' work is in fact a substantial contribution to American legal literature. It has been prepared with great care, and it is doubtful if any single topic of the law has ever been more thoroughly wrought out in any book designed merely to present the law of a single state as to such topic. As each question is taken up the leading authorities in the other states generally and England are presented, and then the Illinois decisions are carefully reviewed. Considering the inherent difficulty of the subject treated, and the lack of adequate treatment of it in recent text-books, there is no doubt that this book would be useful even to lawyers in other states than Illinois.

JOHN R. ROOD.

THE LAW OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS AND TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS, BOTH FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC. By Joseph Henry Beale, Jr., Bussey Professor of Law in Harvard University. Boston: William J. Nagel, 1904, pp. xxvi, 1149.

This is a comprehensive work by Professor Beale, containing the statutory and case law of the difficult subjects indicated in the title brought well down to date. The statutes have been examined to January, 1904, the American case law to June, 1904, and the English case law through the Annual Digests for 1903. The laws of Hawaii, England, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Ontario, and Quebec, are included.

The thirty-four chapters of the six titles include besides the Introduction, The Nature and Creation of Corporations; State Laws for the Formation of Corporations; The Domicile, Residence and Citizenship of a Corporation; Nature and Powers of a Corporation Outside the State of its Charter; How Far a Corporation May Act in a Foreign State; Suits by Corporations; Suits Against Corporations; Procedure in Suits Against Corporations; Jurisdiction Over the Internal Affairs of a Foreign Corporation; Meetings; Officers, Office, and Books of the Corporation; Stock and Bonds; Statutory Liability of Stockholders and Directors; The Enforcement Abroad of Stockholders' or Directors' Liability; General Principles of Taxation; Taxation of Tangible Property; Taxation of Intangible Property; Taxation Laws of the States, General Business Corporations; Taxation of Special Corporations, Manufacturing Companies; Banks; Insurance Companies; Public Service Companies; Incorporation Tax; Privilege Tax; Taxation of Shares of Stock; Taxation and Interstate Commerce; Two-State Corporations; Receivers of Foreign Corporations; The Insolvency of a Foreign Corporation; The Dissolution of a Foreign Corporation; and an Appendix "to exhibit in tabular form such information as to the relative merits of the corporation laws of the several states as can be put into so small a compass."

A careful examination, supplemented by use in several instances, shows the whole work to be thoroughly well done. Chapter XI, "Suits Against Corporations," and Chapter XXX, "Taxation of Interstate Commerce," are especially valuable, while Chapter XXXI, "Two-State Corporations," formerly published in the Columbia Law Review, contains much the best discussion of this perplexing subject that has come under our observation.

From § 205, one gets the idea that a corporation incorporated in one state where its operations (as mining or manufacturing) are carried on, but whose directors hold their regular meetings in another state, is "doing business" in the latter state. *People v. Horn Silver Mining Co.*, 105 N. Y. 76, is cited in support of this view. We understand that case, (by inference at least,) and *People v. Feitner*, 77 App. Div. 189 (1902), in regard to taxation, to have held the contrary, where no other business is done than holding directors' meetings, and it was expressly so ruled in *Bradbury v. Waukegan, etc., Mining Co.*, 113 Ill. App. 600 (1903), and a somewhat similar view was taken in *Honeyman v. Colorado Fuel, etc., Co.*, 133 Fed. 96 (1904). These last two cases probably were not yet printed when the work under review was published, and so there is no fault in not referring to them. They are noted

here to show how rapidly the law is developing along these lines, and how difficult it is to determine what is "doing business" in a state by a foreign corporation.

The author criticises the opinions of the English Privy Council, and the Supreme Court of the United States, in *Huntington v. Attrill* [1893] A. C. 150, 146 U. S. 657, both holding that the statutory liability of a director, who files false reports, for the corporate debts, is not penal to the extent that it will not be enforced outside of the state imposing it. His view is that such a doctrine was not necessary to the decision in either case, "and cannot be regarded as sound in principle."

On the whole, the typographical work seems to have been well done, though some mistakes have occurred, as an interchange of lines 1 and 2 p. 636; 'sue' should be 'use,' p. 638, 5th line from bottom; and 'creditors' should be 'conditions,' p. 923, 3d line from bottom.

The work cannot fail to be helpful to those considering questions relating to the powers and obligations of corporations organized in one state and doing business in another.

H. L. WILGUS.

THE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF BUSINESS CORPORATIONS. By Walter C. Clephane, LL.M. St. Paul: The West Publishing Co., 1905, pp. xxvi, 246.

This small work is the result of a series of lectures delivered before the classes in the Law Department of The George Washington University of Washington, D. C. The purpose is indicated in the words of the author in his preface: "Those lectures form the basis of this treatise, which has been compiled as a text-book for the classes studying this subject in The George Washington University. The author has also had in view the needs of many lawyers who may not have had the advantages of practical corporation office work, and who, therefore, may desire some guide along the lines referred to. It is believed, too, that many laymen who are officers of corporations will find the book useful to them in carrying on their work."

The treatment is in eleven chapters and includes Introduction; Selection of a Domicil; Incorporators and Subscriptions to Stock; Certificate of Incorporation; Essentials of Initial Meetings of Incorporators; Proceedings at First Meeting of Incorporators; By-Laws; First Meeting of Directors; Stock; Meetings; Amendment of Charter; Reorganization.

The most important chapter is probably the one on the "Selection of a Domicil," in which is given a digest and analysis of the laws of Maine, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, District of Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia, South Dakota, Nevada, and Porto Rico. Some 15 questions relating to the laws of these states are answered quite fully. These questions are valuable and suggestive in considering the corporation laws of any state.

In the chapter on Incorporators and Subscribers Professor Collins' rules are given, including the one to the effect that there is no difference between a present subscription and an agreement to subscribe to the stock of a cor-

poration thereafter to be created, without indicating that such authors as Morawetz (§ 49) and Clark and Marshall (§ 442), make this distinction, and that there are many cases in which this distinction is made. See note, 93 Am. St. Rep. p. 352.

The work contains general forms for stock certificates, minutes of meetings, by-laws, subscriptions, certificates of incorporation, proxy, inspectors' oaths and certificate, transfers, voting trusts, registered and coupon bonds, etc. These are of such a character that they can be used with safety in nearly any state, and will be found helpful to the student and to the layman who finds himself a corporate officer.

The work will be useful mainly to the student, and lay corporate officer. It is well indexed, and the matters in it are easily found. Many of the references are to standard works on corporation law, instead of to the cases.

H. L. WILGUS.

A TREATISE ON THE INCORPORATION AND ORGANIZATION OF CORPORATIONS, Created Under the "Business Corporation Acts" of the Several States and Territories of the United States. By Thomas Gold Frost, I.L.D. of the New York Bar, and General Counsel of the National Incorporating Company. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1905, pp. xlv, 622, 2d Edition, February, 1906, pp. xv, 698.

The object of this work is to furnish a "practical guide to the formation of business corporations under the laws of every state;" to show under the laws of which state the objects of any proposed corporation can best be attained; and to give "full instructions as to drafting charters, holding meetings, drawing up by-laws, and keeping records." These matters are set forth under the following headings:

Introduction. Part I: Incorporation and Organization of Corporations, including Drafting the Charter; Procuring the Charter; Organizations of Corporations after Incorporation; Issuance and Payment of Capital Stock; Legislative Control over Domestic Corporations; Legislative Control over Foreign Corporations.

Part II: Synopsis Digest of the Incorporation Acts of the Several States and Territories, including the laws of the Dominion of Canada, Manitoba, Hawaii, Philippines, and Porto Rico.

Part III: Forms and Precedents, including Specific Object Clauses; General Object Clauses; Clauses Regulating Business; Preferred Stock Clauses; Forms for Drawing Charters in all the States and Territories; Composite Forms of Minutes and By-Laws for Arizona, Delaware, District of Columbia, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, South Dakota, and West Virginia; Miscellaneous Forms and Precedents, including Subscription Agreements, Agreement for Sale of Real and Personal Property in Exchange for Capital Stock, Trust Agreement to get stock back into the treasury as full paid and non-assessable, so it can be sold below par, Certificates of Common and Preferred Stock, Resolution Authorizing Contracting of a Specific Debt, Appointment of Agent, with Various Powers of Attorney, Resolutions decreasing, and increasing Capital Stock, changing name, declaring dividends, Certificates

of Extension of Corporate Existence, Amendments, Foreign Corporations, Trust Deed for Issue of Bonds, Bonds and Coupons, Underwriting, and Voting Trust Agreements.

In addition there are extensive tables for all states and territories showing for each the organization and annual franchise fees and taxes for both domestic and foreign corporations, and a tabulation of the principal questions and answers one wishes to know concerning incorporating in any state.

In the particulars set forth above, this is a very complete and useful work; the synopsis-digest of the corporation laws of all the states seems to be very carefully and accurately done, brought down to January, 1906 (in the 2d. Edition). This is accompanied by careful citations both of statutes and recent decisions. The tabulated questions and answers, numbering 67 for each state and territory, enable one very quickly to get a general answer to the troublesome question as to "where is the best place to incorporate for a particular purpose?;" and finally the 340 forms given seem to have been carefully collected from authoritative sources, and are much more satisfactory than is usual in such collections.

Part I, is mainly a summary of the general principles of corporation law upon the topics treated, such as is to be found in nearly any recent work on corporation law, but with a somewhat more specific application to questions sure to arise when one is called upon to incorporate a company in any particular state. Chapter IV, on the "Issuance and Payment of Capital Stock," contains a very full discussion of this topic, and particularly that part relating to payment in property; after short discussions of the "true value" and "good faith" rules, the author enters into an elaborate defense of the "speculative value" rule, which permits the unlimited issue of stock in the payment of patents, copyrights, and mining properties, etc., or in all such speculative enterprises. To those who believe that this sort of high finance is a growth to be encouraged, the author's argument will be convincing; to those who believe that it is wise to let him who wishes to speculate, do so at his own risk, instead of that of some one else, the argument, and the few cases that can be mustered in support of it, will hardly be convincing.

The work is well printed, and will be found to be a handy and useful manual that every lawyer who has anything to do with corporations can afford to own, and can not well afford to do without.

The first edition contains a table of cases which, for some reason not stated, is left out of the second edition.

H. L. WILGUS.

YEARBOOK OF LEGISLATION, 1904. Published by the New York State Library, Melvil Dewey, LL.D., Director; Robert H. Whitten, Editor. Albany: New York State Educational Department, 1905.

This volume contains the three bulletins issued by the New York State Library in 1905, dealing with the legislation of 1904. The first of these bulletins is a digest of the messages of governors, including also related topics discussed in the president's message. From this digest one is enabled to ascertain what important recommendations have been made concerning cur-

rent problems. Such a summary as this is most interesting and valuable to those whose duties require them to observe economic, legal and political tendencies.

In the second bulletin—the summary and index of legislation—over 2,000 constitutional amendments and laws are indexed and summarized. The first and second bulletins are classified in the same way so that reference from one to the other is facilitated. To any one who finds it necessary to know what changes have been made in laws on special subjects this part of the volume will be especially valuable. The digesting appears to have been accurately done and the classification is such that one can easily find what legislation was had on any subject during the period covered by the volume.

The Review of Legislation—the third bulletin—is made up of the contributions of some forty specialists, each of whom reviews the year's progress in his particular field. Among the most important articles in this bulletin are those of Dr. C. E. Merriam, professor of political science at the University of Chicago, who reviews legislation relating to state government, law-making and elections; of Dr. Charles V. Chapin, superintendent of public health, Providence, R. I., who discusses public health and safety regulations; of E. Dana Durand of the U. S. Bureau of Corporations, who writes on corporation laws; of Dr. John A. Fairlie, professor of administrative law at the University of Michigan, and Dr. Delos F. Wilcox, secretary of the Civic Club of Grand Rapids, who write on municipal government; of Prof. Frank A. Fetter of Cornell University, on taxation; of Dr. Adna F. Weber, chief statistician of the New York State Department of Labor, on labor legislation; and of Dr. W. D. Bigelow of the U. S. Bureau of Chemistry, on food adulteration.

The volume furnishes a most complete guide to the legislation of the year, useful not only to any one interested in any specific movement, but also to anyone interested in the general trend of legislation. The remarkably small price (\$1.00) for which it may be obtained places it within reach of all.