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A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE MORALITY OF CARNAL WAR-
FARE AS RELATED TO THE NUCLEAR AGE



BY
ALLEN C. ISBELL

A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE MORALITY OF CARNAL WARFARE
AS RELATED TO THE NUCLEAR AGE

A THESIS ABSTRACT

This thesis was undertaken for the purpose of clarifying the Christian's obligations regarding the military functions of his government. This study involved an investigation of several attitudes toward carnal warfare as expressed within the Christian tradition. It began with an analysis of the ever-present polemic regarding pacifism and developed into a discussion of the moral implications involved in various defense strategies. Attention was also directed to the need of solving the arms race which precariously threatens the world with unprecedented destruction.

The basic conclusion of this thesis is that the absolute nonresistant ethic is not the only possible Christian attitude toward war. Although this study has cited the difficulties in reconciling the prospects of nuclear war with the traditional just war doctrine, this moral framework has been generally viewed with favor by the writer. The major modifications in the doctrine which he suggests are in connection with what constitutes a just cause for war and with the degree of immunity from the direct violence of the war which should be granted noncombatants. This thesis has concluded that a Christian's responsibility extends to

shaping, in whatever way possible, the national conscience in matters relating to nuclear armaments and defense. The writer acknowledges a preference toward the second-strike strategy and toward serious negotiations in order to secure a stable deterrent arms control program.

A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE MORALITY OF CARNAL WARFARE
AS RELATED TO THE NUCLEAR AGE

A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Department of Bible
Abilene Christian College

THESIS
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In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Allen G. Isbell
August 1963

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MASTER OF ARTS

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

At all times, the disciple of Christ is obligated to act in accordance with Christian teaching. In ethical matters, when principles rather than precepts govern one's conduct, it is often difficult to decide the specific behavior which the Christian faith enjoins. If the opinion within Christendom is radically divided, as well, a decision becomes even more complicated. The question of Christian participation in carnal warfare is an ethical problem in which these complications are decidedly present. However, despite the difficulty in ascertaining the will of God in this matter, every sensitive conscience seeks to know whether carnal warfare is an activity in which Christians should actively and directly engage. Therefore, this study undertakes to discuss from a critical and historical standpoint what ought to be the Christian's attitude toward carnal warfare.

I. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

For the purposes of this paper, a pacifist shall be regarded as one who conscientiously opposes participation in a war. The reader should observe that there are many reasons why people refuse to engage in a particular

international war. These reasons are quite dissimilar and the advocates of each would not necessarily recognize the validity of the others. The nonresistant Christian, who interprets Matthew 5 and Romans 12 in an absolute and literal fashion, renounces war because it is a form of resistance to evil. But, there are others who do not oppose war simply because it is a form of resistance, but because it is violent resistance. In their opinion, resistance is not evil, per se, as long as it is in non-violent form. Still another person may be a conscientious objector during one war and an active supporter of another. This is because he may regard the former as unwise or unjust. Finally, there is the nuclear pacifist who assumes a pragmatic attitude. His ultimate concern is the survival of civilization, which he is convinced is threatened by the possibility of an all-out, nuclear war between major nations. This type of war continues to be possible as long as industrialized nations seek and develop nuclear weapons. Therefore, he demonstrates in parades and in other forms of protests against the "bomb."

The point is, then, that the only thing pacifists necessarily have in common is the refusal to actively engage in a war. Their reasons and methods of reaching such a common conclusion are varied and largely dissimilar.

Non-pacifism or anti-pacifism is interpreted as being the willingness to support directly or actively a

belligerence in which the Christian's nation figures. Also, it should be noted that because one rejects the pacifist ethic and engages in combat, it does not follow that he has any one particular attitude toward war itself. There is a lack of unanimity among non-pacifists regarding the desirability of warfare. The two extreme attitudes are the crusade-complex and the uneasy conscience. There are shades and degrees within these widely separated poles of thought, but by paying brief attention to these two, the possibly divergent views among non-pacifists will at least be intimated.

The crusade-complex views the war as a divine cause, a holy war in which righteousness is pitted against unrighteousness. Characteristic of this concept is the thought that the war is fought, "not so much with God's help as on God's behalf."¹ A celebrated example of the crusade-complex was Thomas Muentzer, a contemporary of Martin Luther. He expanded Nicolaus Storch's idea that the elect must exterminate all the godless. Ruthless actions were necessary preliminaries to the second advent of Christ and the inauguration of the millennium. Having fled from Zwickau to Prague, Muentzer formed a new church, but Bohemia was unc congenial to his extreme declarations. He felt the prophetic mission to

¹Roland Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War And Peace (New York: Abingdon Press, 1960), pp. 44-45.

wield the cutting scythe and so separate the elect from the non-elect by violence. Hence, his is called the "theology of violence." Finally he perished by being beheaded after leading an abortive attack during the Peasant's War.² Ralph L. Moellering comments that World War I witnessed the most striking reverberation of the crusade outlook in modern history.³ Illustrating this observation is H. W. Magoun's statement that the "followers of the Galilean" must be prepared to pay the price of "another Baptism of blood" in order to establish "international righteousness."⁴ The crusade-complex was also present during World War II. A study of the Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod, and its attitude during that war, reveals that the Allied cause was frequently equated with the righteousness of God and the Axis powers with Satanic evil.⁵ Today the crusade-complex is prevalent. As is suggested, "Those who would undertake a 'holy war' to destroy atheistic Communism are the latest

²See Ralph L. Moellering, "Attitudes Toward The Use of Violence in Thomas Muentzer, Menno Simons, and Martin Luther," Concordia Theological Monthly XXXI (July, 1960), 405-427.

³Ibid., 405.

⁴H. W. Magoun, "Ought Followers of the Galilean to be Pacifists?" Bibliotheca Sacra 73 (January, 1916), 72.

⁵Ralph L. Moellering, Modern War and the American Churches (New York: American Press, 1956), p. 37.

representatives of this school of thought."⁶

Others who reject the pacifist ethic do so with less confidence in the notion that carnal warfare is wholly in accord with God's will for the Christian. This attitude is illustrated historically, in that soldiers were required to do penance for engaging in war.

For the laity a moral taint continued to be attached to warfare up to the very threshold of the crusades. Ten years after the Norman conquest some of the participants sought counsel from their bishops as to the appeasement of their consciences for the blood they had shed. A Council at Winchester in 1076 enacted that he who had killed a man should do penance for a year. He who did not know whether his wounded assailant had died should do penance for forty days. He who did not know how many he had killed should do penance one day a week throughout his life. All archers should do penance thrice for the space of forty days.⁷

This uneasy conscience about war was evident in the report of the Federal Council of Churches. Although acknowledging the need for taking the sword and fighting upon just and necessary occasions, the report makes the admission that,

Serious Christians of every name now see in war a grievous disclosure of man's lostness and wrongness. War destroys what God creates. It hurts those whom Christ came to heal. It mocks the love of God and His commandment of love. It is the stark opposite of the way of reconciliation. It breeds hatred and

⁶Moellering, "Attitudes Toward the Use of Force and Violence in Thomas Muentzer, Menno Simons, and Martin Luther," loc. cit.

⁷Bainton, op. cit., p. 109.

deception and cruelty.⁸

Although Henri Clavier contends that resistance is a duty, as well as a right, he confesses that "no Christian man bearing arms, even for the best cause, will feel himself entirely pure and irreprehensible."⁹ The clearest example of an uneasy conscience among non-pacifists is the position Charles Clayton Morrison delineated in the pages of The Christian Century during World War II. Morrison was unable to find peace of conscience in either the Christian pacifist or the Christian militarist position. The guilt of the former was in severing himself from the corporate life of the national community. However, the combatant, he felt, also involved himself in guilt:

His is the guilt which the pacifist tries to escape -- the guilt of killing his fellow men. He will always be haunted by it. That night in no man's land when he thrust his bayonet through a fellow man as innocent as himself of any wrong -- he cannot forget the horror of it, but neither can he wash away the guilt of it. . . . He chose what he had believed to be the greater good, but his conscience accuses him for accepting the greater evil, and he can never be sure which good was the greater and which evil was the worse.¹⁰

⁸"Christian Conscience and Weapons of Mass Destruction," Christianity and Crisis X (December 11, 1950), 162.

⁹Henri Clavier, The Duty and Right of Resistance According to the Bible and to the Church (Oxford: Blackwell's, 1956), p. 45.

¹⁰Charles Clayton Morrison, The Christian and the War (New York: Willet, Clark and Company, 1942), p. 14.

Morrison brings his point to a climax by composing a hypothetical conversation between a "realist" and two draftees, the one a pacifist and the other a militarist:

"But," they persist, "is there no specifically Christian path for us to walk in?"

"Yes," the realist will reply, "the path of penitence."

"Penitence for what -- for fighting?"

"No. Horror at fighting, but penitence for the sin that makes it necessary for you to fight."¹¹

II. THE PROBLEM STATED

There have been three historic attitudes taken within Christendom toward carnal warfare. In chronological order, they are: (1) pacifism; (2) the just war doctrine; and (3) the crusade concept. The development of one concept did not eliminate the others from Christian thinking. At various times, however, each has gained the ascendancy over the others. For example, each of the three historic attitudes has achieved prominence in the religious world during some part of the twentieth century. Bainton observes:

The churches in the United States particularly took a crusading attitude toward the First World War; pacifism was prevalent between the two wars; the mood of the Second World War approximated that of the just war.¹²

¹¹ Ibid., p. 138.

¹² Bainton, op. cit., p. 15.

At present, the validity of the just war doctrine is undergoing vigorous discussion, both in Protestant and Catholic circles. Two factors are largely responsible for this current interest: (1) the military strategy of mass extermination of the enemy's population centers; and (2) the advent of nuclear weapons which make this tactic possible to a degree never before known. These factors are also responsible for the doubt cast upon the practicability of the "crusade" fervor which seeks to eliminate, by belligerent means, such world evils as Communism.

The burden of this thesis may be stated in these five objectives: (1) to discuss the key arguments advanced by both pacifist and non-pacifists; (2) to determine historically the attitude of the Ante-Nicene Church regarding carnal warfare; (3) to examine critically the just war doctrine; (4) to determine analytically the morality of various military strategies; and (5) to discuss the best solution to the problem of the spiraling arms race that makes possible a war most terrifying in its prospect.

III. LIMITATIONS

The problem of Christian participation in carnal warfare introduces one to an immense field of inquiry. It is therefore necessary to limit the scope of this thesis. The following questions, although deserving of serious

consideration, are regarded as being outside the primary purpose of this study: (1) Should a Christian serve in the judicial, legislative or executive branch of civil government? (2) Should a Christian, who opposes a war, accept a non-combatant position in the armed services? (3) Should a Christian, who opposes a war, retain or accept employment in a defense industry? (4) Should a Christian scientist assist in the development of greater and more destructive weapons? Except by an incidental observation or comment, these particular questions remain outside the immediate purpose of this thesis.

IV. METHOD OF STUDY

The method of study has been to consult a variety of sources for information relating to the subjects discussed. The Bible has been a basic source of information. In certain sections, historical information was gleaned from the writings of the early church, as well as from recognized church historians. Statistical information was gathered from government publications, from statements made by reputable experts in the field of military defense and from public sources of information. Innumerable periodicals and books were consulted in order to grasp the arguments and positions currently held with reference to the morality of warfare today.

The information has been gathered and grouped into the respective areas of discussion.

CHAPTER II

THE ARGUMENTS FOR PACIFISM AND NON-PACIFISM EXAMINED

In this chapter the most frequent and common arguments framed by pacifists and non-pacifist for their respective positions will be presented.¹

I. ARGUMENTS FOR PACIFISM

Unbelievers Equate Christianity and Pacifism

Throughout the centuries, non-Christians have interpreted Christian ethics as being pacifistic:

In the 2nd century the pagan Celsus declared that if all men were as the Christians, the empire would be overrun by lawless barbarians. In the 4th century Julian the Apostate asked the men of Alexandria whether their city had grown great on the precepts of the Galilean rather than through the prowess of its founder, Alexander the Great. In the age of the Renaissance Niccolo Machiavelli . . . ascribed the weakness of his age to "our religion." In the 19th century Friedrich Nietzsche thought the motto of Christianity should be "Hoc signo vinces -- decadence." In our own day, Alfred Leisy, having repudiated Christianity, interpreted its ethic in Tolstoyan terms. And recently Rabbi Klausner pronounced the ethic of Jesus to be destructive of the state.²

¹The reader is to understand that the presentation of an argument does not necessarily reflect this writer's opinion. He is to also understand that not every pacifist would agree with or use every argument that is listed.

²Roland Bainton, "Christian Pacifism Reassessed," The Christian Century LXXV (July 23, 1958), 847.

The behavior of the major portion of Christendom since Constantine would hardly suggest such a view. Why, then, do these unbelievers so interpret the Christian ethic? Bainton conjectures that it is because the infidels have read the Gospels without supervision!³ Anticipating the rejoinder that unbelievers are hardly qualified exegetes of the gospel, Bainton proposes that they may be splendid interpreters of Christian ethics,

. . . because, having rejected the ethic, they may be better able to keep it intact than those who, being bound by it, are under the temptation to pare it down to the level of the attainable.⁴

The Attitude of the Ante-Nicene Church

The post-apostolic Church, until the time of Constantine, was largely pacifist.⁵ Since the leaders of the Church during this period were nearer the apostles and other inspired men, than are commentators today, the argument is that they best understood the mind of the apostles regarding Christian participation in carnal warfare.⁶

No Command, Example, or Necessary Inference Supporting Christian Participation in Carnal Warfare

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵See Chapter III for evidence.

⁶John T. Lewis, The Christian and the Government (Birmingham: John T. Lewis, 1945), pp. 7-9.

Pacifists in the Churches of Christ have frequently rested their case on the fact that the anti-pacifists cannot cite a command, example, or necessary inference proving that Christians are to engage in carnal warfare. They challenge the war advocates to prove that Christians are to wage war. For example, H. Leo Boles wrote: "The burden of proof falls upon the one who affirms that Christians may or should engage in war."⁷ Pacifists assume that the silence of the Scriptures is a presumption in their favor. Moses Lard wrote: "Our denial stands good against their affirmations till they adduce the evidence on which they rest their conclusion."⁸ In a recent defense of pacifism, Wyatt Sawyer echoed similar sentiments: "If I cannot find a command to do something or an approved example or a necessary inference then I do not have the authority to do it."⁹

War Is Contrary To The Prophetic Peaceful Nature of Christianity

Numerous Old Testament prophecies are quoted in order

⁷H. Leo Boles, The New Testament Teaching on War (Nashville: Gospel Advocate Company, n.d.), p. 46.

⁸Moses Lard, "Should Christians Go To War?" Lard's Quarterly III (April, 1866), 227.

⁹Wyatt Sawyer, "Can a Christian Fight For His Government?" Teenage Christian 3 (February, 1962), 16.

to prove that the Church is to be peaceful by nature.¹⁰ In Boles' opinion, these prophecies prove that "it is the will of God that war should eventually be abolished, so far as God's people are concerned."¹¹ Guy Hershberger applies these prophetic utterances to the program of the redeemed, suggesting that the new covenant was to witness wars being done away from among those washed in the blood of the Lamb.¹²

The Spirit of Christ Vs The Spirit of War

The impression of the teaching, attitude, example and spirit of Christ is said to be contrary to that of carnal warfare. Over a century ago, Alexander Campbell argued that the gospel of Christ and the genius of war are contradictory.¹³ Eighteen years later, after the American Civil War, Lard posed as his seventh argument against Christian participation in carnal warfare the fact that there is the most palpable repugnance between the fruit of the Spirit and the spirit of war.¹⁴ Two decades ago, when he was

¹⁰Isa. 2:4; 9:6-7; 11:6-9; 60:18; Hos. 2:14; Zech. 9:10.

¹¹Boles, op. cit., p. 15.

¹²Guy F. Hershberger, War, Peace and Nonresistance (Scottsdale, Pennsylvania: Herald Press, 1953), p. 38.

¹³Alexander Campbell, "Address on War," (Murfreesboro, Tennessee: Dehoff Publication, 1953), p. 10.

¹⁴Lard, op. cit., pp. 240-241.

pleading the case for the conscientious objector, James D.

Bales stated that,

The following experiments will convince one of the full force of the impact of the spirit of Christ against the spirit of war. (1) Contrast a description of the most deadly and efficient soldier with the New Testament description of the noblest Christian. (2) Pray for the essential nature of war in Jesus' name. (3) See if Christian teaching would be accepted by the army as good pre-fight instruction.¹⁵

Sawyer wrote that he could not conscientiously take up arms in war because "Christ and His whole system are opposed to doing so."¹⁶

The frank statements by military leaders on the nature of war lend some support to this pacifist contention. For instance, only recently General Thomas D. White depicted war as "a brutal, dirty, deadly affair."¹⁷ A short time ago, Stanley P. Lovell, a former Government scientist who was dubbed "Dr. Moriarty" (after the fiendish professor in the Sherlock Holmes tales), revealed the diabolical workings of America's World War II espionage. The initial order

¹⁵James D. Bales, The Christian Conscientious Objector (Berkeley, Indiana: James D. Bales, n.d.), p. 52. Afterward referred to as The Christian Conscientious Objector. Bales has changed his position since writing this book.

¹⁶Sawyer, loc. cit.

¹⁷Thomas D. White, "Strategy and the Defense Intellectuals," The Saturday Evening Post 236 (May 4, 1963), 10.

given to him by his superior, General William J. Donovan, was: "I want every devilish, subtle device and every upper-handed operation possible to use against the Germans and Japs."¹⁸ In typical military style, "Dr. Moriarty" used his "scientific knowledge and all manner of unorthodox materials to develop precisely the kind of 'devilish, subtle devices' Donovan had asked for."¹⁹

Such activities as those of "Dr. Moriarty" are essential to the successful waging of war. Can it be supposed that Paul, who wrote, "For though we live in the world we are not carrying on a worldly war, for the weapons of our warfare are not worldly but have divine power to destroy strongholds,"²⁰ would participate in an activity that depended upon weapons and methods so sordid, grim and bloody?

War Vs The Golden Rule

In popular thought, Jesus' words, "So whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to them,"²¹ constitute the "Golden Rule" of life. Pacifists see an irreconcilable tension between this rule and carnal warfare. Fighting and

¹⁸Stanley P. Lovell, "Cloak-And-Dagger Behind the Scenes," The Saturday Evening Post 235 (March 3, 1962), 30.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰2 Corinthians 10: 3, 4. All scripture references will be from the Revised Standard Version unless otherwise stated.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Before summarizing the findings and recommendations of this thesis, it is well to re-emphasize that the nature of this study has been exploratory, probing into the various aspects of the problem that should exert influence in forming a Christian conscience toward the preparations for and possible engagement in carnal warfare.

The study has revealed that one may refuse to engage in a particular war for a variety of reasons. The nonresistant and non-violent resistant Christians will refuse to participate actively in the violent aspects of any and all wars. Their decision is absolute and is not modified by how just or necessary the war might appear. Others will possibly refuse to cooperate in certain wars, either because they regard them as being unwise or unjust. To them, each war must be adjudged individually.

The study has also demonstrated the diverse attitude that non-pacifists have toward a war in which they partici-

war is an evil, disclosing man's lostness and wrongness.

The Biblically orientated Christian desires to know whether Christ has specifically legislated regarding engagement in carnal warfare. This question has been considered in good detail. The study has also marked the development and transition of Christian thought from the ante-Nicene era, when the Church was generally pacifist, through the development of the just war doctrine. It has discussed the problem, which, in the opinion of this writer, looms as the primary issue within Christendom today, that is, whether certain key tenets of the just war doctrine continue to be valid. The study has also considered two aspects of the problem which the writer deems important: (1) a consideration of what defense strategy is both morally and strategically acceptable; and (2) a thoughtful analysis of the arms race and possible solutions to this enduring problem. It is the opinion of this writer that the Christian citizen should be as interested in these issues during a time of peace, as he is in the methods employed once war has begun.

Observations and Recommendations

As to pacifism. The writer acknowledges that this study has resulted in a modification of his view concerning pacifism. Previous to this investigation, he strongly favored the absolute pacifist position in all aspects of

dealing with evil. However, he now holds that there are occasions when resistance to evil by force is morally permissible. This alteration in opinion resulted from several considerations which were discussed in detail in the main body of the thesis. The following are some of these considerations: (1) a new understanding of the purpose and meaning of the Sermon on the Mount; (2) a belief in the right of society to employ the judicial "eye for an eye," even though this principle is denied the individual; (3) a distinction between what a Christian can do as an officer or representative of the State in performing actions legitimately assigned the State and what is permissible for him to do personally as an individual; (4) the need for civil government to prevent anarchy; (5) the necessity of the government to defend itself from its enemies; (6) a realization that love does not prohibit the exercise of force; and (7) a distinction between what a Christian may do if his enemy is strictly personal and if he is also an enemy of the State. Therefore, this writer concludes that the judicial and penal system of society should not be regarded as lying outside Christian morality. It also appears that carnal warfare may be morally acceptable if the nation has been attacked and threatened in its vital rights. The writer would also concede that if a weak nation is invaded and so threatened that another nation may enter the fracas and resist the attacking

force, even though it itself has not been assaulted.

However, this does not mean that the writer has no reservations regarding Christian participation in carnal warfare. It has been sufficiently demonstrated that the analogy between war and police action against criminals is faulty. There are some seemingly inherent aspects of carnal warfare that sorely bother the Christian conscience: (1) the exercise of almost unrestrained violence stands in contrast to the peaceful nature of the Church and the fruits of the Spirit; (2) in carnal warfare, Christian is pitted against Christian; (3) war has a brutalizing effect upon the personality and is productive of emotions distinctly unChristian; (4) modern warfare often involves practices and methods which are anti-Christian.

As to the validity of the just war doctrine. This writer believes that warfare should be guided along lines suggested by morally enlightened individuals. He is in basic agreement with the structure of the just war doctrine, holding that it is fundamentally sound. As to the immunity traditionally granted noncombatants, this study has suggested that the rights of noncombatants be re-interpreted. Their relationship to the war is altered, not because they are "guilty" of any violent behavior, but because they are significantly "relevant." For the first time in history,

masses of civilians within the enemy state can be instantaneously killed. Such killing, though unfortunate, can procure immediate victory and cessation of fighting. The moral conscience insists that precision bombing be used whenever possible and that area bombing be employed only when its results will materially affect the immediate course of the war.

As to a moral defense strategy. This study proceeded on the notion that a Christian does not necessarily have the right to pass judgment, except in a general way, on the strategic value of certain weapons and weapons systems. However, he may suggest ways in which that arsenal may or may not be morally used. This writer has concluded that it would be morally wrong to utilize a first-strike force in aggressive action, such as a pre-emptive attack or preventive war. The Christian conscience should recommend that the national defense strategy be of a second-strike character.

As to a solution for the arms race. The Christian must view the nuclear age as possessing a new quality of danger, the danger of self-extermination. The spiraling arms race is precariously weaving the web that intelligent men fear most -- the web of thermonuclear war. That such a war may occur is not an unreasonable assumption. It may occur

killing is doing to others what you do not want them to do to you -- and doing it first!²²

War Vs Applied Mercy

The New Testament teaches that the Christian is a recipient of mercy, only if he is merciful toward those who do him wrong.²³ War is the antithesis of applied mercy, especially since women, children and other non-combatants are mercilessly slaughtered.

Peter And His Sword

When the treacherous crowd came to arrest Jesus, Peter drew his sword and struck at the slave of the high priest. Jesus commanded him to put his sword back into its sheath.²⁴ Tertullian said that the Lord, in disarming Peter, unbelted every disciple. Hence, he inquired, "How will a Christian man war, nay, how will he serve even in peace, without a sword, which the Lord hath taken away?"²⁵ Boles reminds his readers that in this incident Jesus prohibited "the destruction of human life in a cause in which there

²²Lard, op. cit., pp. 239-240.

²³Matthew 5:7; James 2:13; Matthew 18:21-35.

²⁴Matthew 26:52.

²⁵Tertullian, On Idolatry, XIX, The Ante-Nicene Fathers (American Reprint Edition; Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1956), III, 73. Hereafter referred to as ANF

were the best of possible reasons for destroying it,"²⁶ following with the argument:

If the Master would not allow the sword to be used in his own defense from the hands of bloodthirsty betrayers, then for what reason do we think he would allow the sword to be used? Those who favor Christians' going to war and killing their fellow men are under obligation to show a better reason for destroying human life than is contained in this instance in which it was forbidden.²⁷

This passage is frequently connected with the one saying, "If any one slays with the sword, with the sword must he be slain."²⁸ "If these two passages do not settle the question," remarks Lard, "then must I despair of ever seeing it settled, at least by holy writ."²⁹

The sole reason why Jesus decreed that all who take the sword will perish by it, according to Lard, is

. . . because it is wrong to take the sword. If it were right to take the sword, then it would be wrong to decree that he who takes it shall die by it. To die by the sword is appointed to be the penalty of taking it; it is the punishment due him who uses it. But this it could not be, if using the sword were right. It is hence wrong, universally wrong. No Christian, then, may use it. Consequently no Christian can go to war. This conclusion seems to me wholly invulnerable. It is incapable of refutation.³⁰

²⁶Boles, op. cit., p. 22.

²⁷Ibid., p. 23.

²⁸Rev. 13:10.

²⁹Lard, op. cit., 236.

³⁰Ibid., 237.

Christ's Servants Do Not Fight

Jesus' statement to Pilate: "If my kingship were of this world, my servants would fight, that I might not be handed over to the Jews,"³¹ is the basis of another pacifist argument. The crime of murdering Jesus was the most outrageous and flagrant ever perpetrated on this earth. Yet, if, "because his kingdom is not of this world, he would not let his servants fight to prevent this crime, what crime may they yet fight to prevent, or what to avenge?"³² It is noted that to fight in this instance would not have been in order to "acquire territory, power, or gain, or to gratify lust in any of its forms, but solely to prevent the shedding of innocent blood."³³ If, in the absence of all the unworthy motives for war, fighting was not permitted, pacifists find it unreasonable to argue that the Christian can fight for a lesser motive.

These words of Jesus are interpreted as saying that war is incompatible with the nature of his kingdom and the spirit of Christianity and therefore "it belongs to other kingdoms and their subjects to fight and wage war, but to

³¹John 18:36.

³²Lard, op. cit., 234.

³³Ibid.

Christ's kingdom and its subjects such a spirit does not belong."³⁴ Pacifists customarily reason in this fashion: it is contrary to the nature of the kingdom to wage carnal warfare, but the nature of the kingdom is to be the Christian's nature, therefore, it is contrary to the Christian's nature to wage war.³⁵

Christ's Cross

Pacifists in general view the cross as the flawless example of the unlimited, suffering love for which they plead. The Mennonites' emphasis on nonresistance is rooted in the deed of Calvary.³⁶ The cross is considered the direct consequence of Jesus' pacifist ethic. C. H. C. Macgregor substantiates such a view by saying that the sudden waning of Jesus' popularity and his ultimate betrayal to the authorities was occasioned because of Jesus' counsel of submission to Rome which aroused the patriotic animus of the multitude. The pacifist principles which forbade rebellion against Rome, also ruled out any violent resistance to his enemies by Jesus. Hence, the cross was caused by Jesus'

³⁴Boles, op. cit., p. 24.

³⁵Bales, The Christian Conscientious Objector, p. 55; Bennie Lee Fudge, Can A Christian Kill For His Government? (Athens, Alabama: The C.E.I. Co., 1943), pp. 9-10.

³⁶Don E. Smucker, "The Theological Basis For Christian Pacifism," Mennonite Quarterly Review XXVII (July, 1953), 177.

teaching and practice of pacifism.³⁷

The cross typifies the possible cost of pacifism, but it also exemplifies its power. The cross has brought forth victories in abundance, even though at first it seemed to be a defeat. Likewise, the early Christians won victories through the way of suffering love, that is, by submitting to martyrdom. Pacifism, which many regard as the certain path to defeat, is claimed to possess the same power that was present in these other instances of nonresistance. Macgregor is consistent in his suggestion that a nation desiring to follow the way of the cross might feel called upon to adopt a policy of total disarmament.

It would do so . . . not with the deliberate purpose of courting martyrdom, but with the conviction that the best safety from the perils against which nations arm is to be found in a new national way of life, which would remove causes of provocation and lead progressively to reconciliation and peace. It too would risk everything on the conviction that God's way would work. But such a nation must also be willing, if necessary, to incur the risk of national martyrdom by refusing to equip itself against the possibility of aggression. And it may be that the world must wait for its redemption from warfare until one nation is ready to risk crucifixion at the hands of its possible enemies. It might lose its own national life, but it would set free such a flood of spiritual life as would save the world.³⁸

Such is the implication he discovers in the cross.

³⁷G. H. C. Macgregor, The New Testament Basis of Pacifism and the Relevance of an Impossible Ideal (Nyack, New York: Fellowship Publications, 1960), p. 48.

³⁸Ibid., pp. 74-75.

Example of Stephen

The martyrdom of Stephen and his splendid, Christ-like prayer, "Lord, do not hold this sin against them,"³⁹ is appealed to as an example of the nonresistant ethic. Referring to this incident, Sawyer comments:

The disciples could have rushed to Stephen's aid and saved him from the stones of the Jews. However, had they tried there would have been a bloody clash and bloodshed on both sides. God chose not to settle matters with a show of carnal force.⁴⁰

Paul As A Conscientious Objector

When Paul was persecuting the Church he had an army, but after his conversion, he put his armies aside. This and other facts regarding Paul's life constrained Sawyer to assert that Paul was an example of a conscientious objector.⁴¹

War and The Great Commission

Evangelistically inclined pacifists are concerned because in a war hundreds of thousands of people are killed, the majority of which have never heard the gospel. Sawyer expresses deep regret that Christians, in going to war, had killed lost men and "in doing so they have destroyed forever

³⁹Acts 7:60.

⁴⁰Sawyer, loc. cit.

⁴¹Ibid.

the opportunity of the dead man to obey the gospel and be saved."⁴² Almost a hundred years ago, Moses Lard interdicted the behavior of Christians who enter battle intent on killing those generally unprepared spiritually to die.⁴³ This concern of the evangelistically minded pacifist was aptly expressed by Bales in his written exchange with P. W. Stonestreet:

Any command which would nullify the command to preach the gospel to all men must be disregarded (Acts 5:29). All the world is embraced in the commission (Matt. 28:19). The command to kill certain enemies makes void, if obeyed, the command of Jesus to preach to all. How so? (1) War sends men with a gun to kill the very men to whom Christ has sent us with the gospel to save. . . . (2) The gospel is preached in words. Those who kill enemies cannot preach to them and they make it impossible for any one else to preach to those whom they have slain. It is likely that in many cases they also make it more difficult to preach the gospel to that dead person's father, mother, or children. These would hardly give as an attentive hearing, to the extent that they would otherwise possibly do it, to the church which sanctioned the killing, and engage in it through its members, of their loved ones. (3) The gospel is preached in deeds (1 Pet. 2:12; 3:1). The deeds which soldiers are supposed to manifest towards enemies are not deeds which are directed toward winning, or likely to win, those enemies for Christ.⁴⁴

War Pits Christian Against Christian

Norman Gottwald notes that "G. Wright Mills asks

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Lard, op. cit., 231.

⁴⁴James D. Bales and P. W. Stonestreet, The Christian and Carnal Warfare (James D. Bales, 1947), p. 37.

whether Christian history since Constantine has not been the sorry tale of Christians finding reasons for killing Christians."⁴⁵ If carnal warfare is permissible, then it is unavoidable but that Christians will be killing other Christians.⁴⁶ Yet, Christians prove they are God's children by the love which they express toward each other -- even to the point of laying down their lives for each other.⁴⁷

Not a few preachers of the Churches of Christ refused to engage in the American Civil War because Christians would be pitted against Christians. In April, 1861, J. W. McGarvey wrote in a letter:

I know not what course other preachers are going to pursue, for they have not spoken; but my own duty is now clear, and my policy is fixed. I shall vote, when called upon, according to my views of political policy, and whether I remain a citizen of this Union, or become a citizen of a Southern Confederacy, my feelings toward my brethren everywhere shall know no change. In the meantime, if the demon of war is let loose in the land, I shall proclaim to my brethren the peaceable commandments of my Saviour, and strain every nerve to prevent them from joining any sort of military company, or making any warlike preparations at all. I know that this course will be unpopular with men of the world, and especially with political and military leaders; and there are some who might style it treason. But I would rather, ten thousand times, be killed for refusing to fight, than to fall

⁴⁵Norman K. Gottwald, "Nuclear Realism or Nuclear Pacifism?" The Christian Century LXXVII (August 3, 1960), 895.

⁴⁶It is valueless to argue only one side is justified and therefore only the Christians on that side are permitted to fight. The Christian on the just side will probably be killing fellow-Christians because modern warfare includes area bombing as well as fighting on the front lines.

⁴⁷John 13:34-35; 1 John 3:10, 14-16; 4:7, 11-12, 20-21.

in battle, or to come home victorious with the blood of my brethren on my hands.⁴⁸

The editor of the American Christian Review, Benjamin Franklin, expressed the same convictions:

We cannot always tell what we will, or will not do. There is one thing, however things may turn, or whatever may come, that we will not do, and that is, we will not take up arms against, fight and kill the brethren we have labored for twenty years to bring into the kingdom of God. Property may be destroyed, and safety may be endangered, or life lost; but we are under Christ, and we will not kill or encourage others to kill, or fight the brethren.⁴⁹

The Prodigality of War

The physical prodigality of war may be measured in terms of human loss. Taking the principal wars in which the United States has figured during the past century, the human cost is seen to be overwhelming. The Civil War was waged at a fearful cost. According to the records in the office of the Adjutant General of the War Department in Washington, the Union Army lost 334,656 men by battle or disease.⁵⁰ No official records are available for the Confederate casualties,

⁴⁸Joseph Franklin and J. A. Headington, The Life and Times of Benjamin Franklin (St. Louis: John Burns Publisher, 1879), pp. 286-87.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 287.

⁵⁰The World Almanac and Book of Facts for 1956 (New York: New York World-Telegram, Harry Hansen, ed., 1956), p. 735. Hereafter referred to as The World Almanac.

but estimates vary from 133,821⁵¹ to 258,000.⁵² The casualties inflicted on both the Allied and Central Powers in World War I are as follows: 8,538,315 killed, 21,219,452 wounded, and 7,750,919 prisoners or missing in action.⁵³ World War II proved that man has become more expert in human carnage. Don E. Smucker reports that on all sides there were 30,000,000 deaths in the armed services, 60,000,000 wounded mentally and physically, 9,000,000 prisoners of war, 9,000,000 missing, 27,000,000 orphans, 15,000,000 widows, 40,000,000 dead civilians, and 30,000,000 refugees.⁵⁴ The pacifist inquires how a Christian can aid or favorably countenance an enterprise which is responsible for such horrible prodigality. The toll of war makes him stand aghast. Charles E. Raven expressed the concensus of opinion when he wrote: "War is seen to be a wastage, a misuse, a prostitution of lives fitted for better and creative

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²This is Thomas L. Livermore's figure and is quoted by John D. Hicks, The Federal Union (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin Company, Second Edition, 1952), p. 591.

⁵³The World Almanac, loc. cit.

⁵⁴Smucker, loc. cit. Of less spiritual significance, but still an important consideration is the financial waste in war. World War II cost 1116 billions of dollars. Matthew H. Earle, "Los Alamos Sermon," Best Sermons, 1947-1948 Edition (G. Paul Butler, ed., New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1947), p. 247.

ends."⁵⁵

War Is Not The Answer

Frequently, pacifists will insist that war has never really settled any issue and is not a process by which the justness of a cause can be decided.⁵⁶ During the 1930's, Athens Clay Pullias taught a course in social ethics at David Lipscomb College in which he asserted, "No war has ever improved the social or moral conditions of any nation, or solved a single problem."⁵⁷ It is even the considered opinion of Ralph Moellering, who has made a contribution in his study of the attitude of the American Churches during World War II, that that war did not really benefit the world:

Looking back, it is difficult to see what conceivable good was accomplished by our entrance into the war. The war began in 1939 with the German invasion of Poland. Poor, defenseless Poland had to be rescued from the Nazi oppressors! But instead of the promised liberation, she gained only a new domination under the heel of the Kremlin. "How has Poland benefited?" the cynic asks. And we have no answer.⁵⁸

The only clear result of America's intervention in World War

⁵⁵Charles E. Raven, War and the Christian (New York: Macmillan, 1938), p. 47.

⁵⁶See Campbell, op. cit., 11.

⁵⁷Athens Clay Pullias, "Outline Studies in the Social Teachings of Jesus" (Nashville, Athens Clay Pullias, 1936), p. 24.

⁵⁸Ralph L. Moellering, Modern War and the American Churches (New York: American Press, 1956), p. 94.

II that Moellering notes is "the emergence of the Soviet Union as a formidable world power that fills the West with dismay."⁵⁹ Was the world in any way improved by the United States' intervention? Moellering answers:

No matter how we look at the world today -- geographically, politically, or morally -- we would be blind indeed to assume that our venture into war has improved it in any way. We can only conclude that one evil was crushed to facilitate the propagation of a greater evil.⁶⁰

War Brutalizes the Individual

While granting that not every soldier is brutalized by war training or experience, the pacifists argue that the inclination of such is toward brutalization and depersonalization. The soldier is trained and taught the effective way to choke the enemy, gouge out his eyes and tear his stomach apart with the bayonet. The bestial qualities are emphasized and the gentlemanly virtues are restrained. Gordon C. Zahn, associate professor of sociology at Loyola University, Chicago, stresses that the military training program is designed to systematically depersonalize the individual and that this depersonalization is essential to achieve maximum

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 95. Moellering expresses considerable sympathy for the conscientious objector's position, but does not regard it as the best and only form of Christian witness.

military efficiency:

The self-image of the morally responsible person vanishes and is replaced by a new orientation in which the individual sees himself as an agent of destructive force completely responsive to the decisions and directives of his military superiors. This new "self-image" . . . makes it possible for him to assume the role of professional killer and to perform acts which, under other circumstances, he would have found unthinkable.⁶¹

This new orientation makes possible the gap between,

. . . the friendly repairman and the soldier spraying fiery death upon his screaming victims, between the playful collegian and the aviator lowering a blanket of death upon a flare-rimmed city.⁶²

Part of the brutalization process is in training the recruit to regard the enemy as "objects," rather than as "men with bodies that bleed and burn, with families and friends to mourn them, with loves and hopes and fears like his own."⁶³ Zahn gives the following specific example of the brutalization process:

A few years ago, a network radio program devoted a Sunday to "on the scene" interviews at one of the nation's basic training centers. One such interview featured the instructor charged with the task of training the young recruits in the use of the bayonet. He complained that he encountered a great deal of resistance from the trainees who were naturally repelled by the idea of plunging this weapon into the vitals of a living human being. But he had solved his pedagogical

⁶¹Gordon C. Zahn, "Social Science and the Theology of War," Morality and Modern Warfare (William J. Nagle, ed., Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1960), p. 112.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Ibid.

problem in a rather ingenious fashion. Experience had shown that this initial resistance faded away if the men were induced to imitate the roars and snarls of wild beasts as they charged the training dummy. To conclude the interview, a microphone was attached to the dummy so that the listening public might be entertained by the sounds of the recruits as they growled and ripped away at their mock victim.⁶⁴

Zahn, a Catholic conscientious objector during World War II, says that the hallmark of the perfectly accomplished military training program is atrocities, because they represent the ultimate in obedience to military discipline.⁶⁵ Then he notes,

Fortunately, the "ideal" is rarely achieved despite the total mobilization of psychological talent and resources. But it is achieved often enough -- or, even when the finished product falls short of that ideal, the partial success is sufficient -- to justify firm theological condemnation of that violation of God's proudest creation which depersonalization and brutalization represents.⁶⁶

That there were some successes in this depersonalization and dehumanization process is evidenced by the atrocities committed by both the Allied and Axis powers. Edgar Jones, a seasoned veteran of active warfare, described the horrors and atrocities that were committed by American soldiers:

We shot prisoners in cold blood, wiped out hospitals, strafed lifeboats, killed or mistreated enemy

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 113.

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Ibid.

civilians, finished off the enemy wounded, tossed the dying into a hole with the dead, and in the Pacific boiled the flesh off enemy skulls to make table ornaments for sweethearts, or carved their bones into letter openers.⁶⁷

War Encourages Hatred

Hatred of persons is not tolerated by Christian ethics.⁶⁸ Pacifists contend that war is based on hatred and encourages this anti-Christian emotion in its participants. They conceded that it is possible to fight in a spirit of love, but insist that "those who fight in this spirit are . . . few."⁶⁹ In the frenzy of battle when passions are unrestrained, the possibility of killing in love is remote.⁷⁰ Raven asserts that war is organized hate and could not continue a week except by the deliberate rejection of love.⁷¹ Boles held that the passions of revenge and hatred are essential to a successful conclusion of the war effort.⁷² Bainton is persuaded that "although a war may be fought in

⁶⁷Edgar Jones, "One War Is Enough," Atlantic 177 (February, 1946), 49. Jones does say that not even one per cent of the American troops committed unwarranted atrocities.

⁶⁸Matthew 5:21-22.

⁶⁹Roland Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace (New York: Abingdon Press, 1960), p. 246. Hereafter referred to as Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace.

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Raven, op. cit., p. 49.

⁷²Boles, op. cit., p. 18.

sorrowful love, it can never be won in this mood."⁷³ War is a sin against love because it "destroys the essential fellowship between human beings as children of God and members one of another."⁷⁴ War represents a "rupture of those personal relationships, apart from which both the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of man are reduced to a mere mockery."⁷⁵ In the opinion of some, this is the essential case against war.⁷⁶

Pacifists are prepared to prove their contention by quoting potent statements from military experts which bolster this point.

Lieut. Gen. Lesley J. McNair said to "get fighting mad" and that if you call that hating the enemy that we must hate them with every "fiber of our being." "We must lust for battle; our object in life must be to kill." He said that "you are going to get killing mad eventually; why not now, while you have time to learn thoroughly the art of killing?"⁷⁷

A. S. Croom quotes from a pamphlet published by the War Department:

Without a consuming personal hatred and desire to kill,

⁷³Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace, p. 248.

⁷⁴Raven, op. cit., p. 48.

⁷⁵Macgregor, op. cit., p. 77.

⁷⁶Raven, op. cit., pp. 47-48; Macgregor, loc. cit.

⁷⁷Oakland Tribune, November 12, 1942, quoted by Bales, The Christian Conscientious Objector, p. 164.

our men are not truly prepared for battle against the skillful and determined enemies they must face. . . . A soldier has to develop the primitive instinct to kill anybody who threatens him or his own. Until he hates the enemy with every instinct and every muscle, he will only be afraid. This is the primitive psychology, a cruel and inhuman one. But war is like that. Hate must become first nature to a soldier and make him want to use every trick.⁷⁸

Thou Shalt Not Kill

The common argument against engaging in carnal warfare is that "the command not to kill is clearly and repeatedly stated in Christ's message to man."⁷⁹

Treatment of Enemies

The New Testament teaches that Christians are to treat their enemies in a fashion unlike that commonly evidenced among non-Christians. The classic statement of this ethic is Jesus' words in the Sermon on the Mount.⁸⁰ Paul included a similar urging in the Roman letter.⁸¹ James alludes to the nonresistance to enemies as practised by early Christians.⁸² Peter instructs the suffering servants to bear injustice patiently.⁸³

Pacifists aver that one thoroughly imbued with the

⁷⁸Adlai Stevenson Groom, Christians and War (Enid, Oklahoma: Adlai Stevenson Groom, n.d.,) pp. 40-41.

⁷⁹Sawyer, loc. cit.

⁸⁰Matt. 5:38-48.

⁸¹Romans 12:17-21.

⁸²James 5:6.

⁸³1 Pet. 2:18-24.

spirit of these Scriptures will necessarily feel an antagonism between this Christian ethic and the spirit that prompts one to enter battle intent on taking human life. Alexander Campbell suggested that if one "desires to place in contrast the gospel of Christ and the genius of war, let him suppose the chaplain of an army addressing the soldiers on the eve of a great battle" on such as the above texts.⁸⁴ Lard comments upon Matthew 5:44 by saying,

I set it down as a thing simply indisputable, that no man, be he saint or sinner, can with the sentiment and the spirit herein named ever go to war. The spirit of the passage and the spirit of war are hopelessly irreconcilable. They can never be made to agree.⁸⁵

He asks, "Can he, then, at the instant while loving him and praying for him, and in harmony therewith, take deliberate aim at him on the battlefield, and shoot him dead?"⁸⁶ Unsatisfied with an implied answer, Lard strongly voiced the opinion that the Christian can no more shoot a man whom he loves and for whom he is praying than he can his own mother.⁸⁷ "The feeling of love must be wholly extinguished in his bosom and all his prayers hushed before he is capable of the deed."⁸⁸ The crux of the argument is that love and

⁸⁴Campbell, op. cit., 10.

⁸⁵Lard, op. cit., 238.

⁸⁶Ibid., 238-39.

⁸⁷Ibid., 239.

⁸⁸Ibid.

killing are mutually exclusive because killing is not an expression of redemptive love.

II. ARGUMENTS AGAINST PACIFISM

The following arguments form the basis for the non-pacifists' rejection of the pacifist ethic.

The Old Testament

The Old Testament is a fertile field for the non-pacifists. As Henri Clavier points out, in the Old Testament "we find no trace of what we call today 'conscientious objection.'"⁸⁹ Moses' song contains the phrase: "The Lord is a man of war."⁹⁰ There are above thirty-five references in the Old Testament in which God commanded the use of armed force.⁹¹ The author of Hebrews extols the historic conquerings of Gideon, Barak, Samson, Jephthah, David and Samuel, who "became mighty in war, put foreign armies to flight."⁹² Professor Charles Hodge, having demonstrated that the right of going to war was recognized in the Old Testament, framed the hypothesis that,

⁸⁹Henri Clavier, The Duty and Right of Resistance According to the Bible and to the Church (Oxford, England: Blackwell's, 1956), p. 26.

⁹⁰Exodus 15:3.

⁹¹Lorraine Boettner, The Christian Attitude Toward War (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1942), p. 25.

⁹²Heb. 11:30-34.

. . . as the essential principles of morals do not change, what was permitted or commanded under one dispensation cannot be unlawful under another, unless forbidden by a new revelation. The New Testament, however, contains no such revelation.⁹³

Anti-pacifists' feelings are aptly expressed by Loraine Boettner: "To say that war defies the righteousness of God is not only presumptuous, but is equivalent to saying that God himself has been unrighteous."⁹⁴

Not to kill. The Old Testament is used to interpret the New Testament command not to kill. It is stressed that "all killing is NOT the same"⁹⁵ because the Old Testament, which forbade killing, allowed some types of killing. It prescribed capital punishment as a punitive measure.⁹⁶ It did not reckon protective killing to be equal to murder.⁹⁷ It did not regard killing in warfare as a contradiction of Exodus 20:13. Hence, it is urged that the New Testament prohibition of killing is not to be interpreted as forbidding all killing.

⁹³Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology (New York: Charles Scribner, Armstrong, and Co., 1873), III, 366.

⁹⁴Boettner, loc. cit.

⁹⁵Clifton Rogers, "Thou Shalt Not Kill," Firm Foundation 76 (November 26, 1957), 756.

⁹⁶Lev. 24:16; 20:13; Num. 15:32-36; Ex. 21:15, 17.

⁹⁷Ex. 22:2.

Genesis 9:6. A specific Old Testament text that is cited by non-pacifists is Genesis 9:6: "Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; for God made man in his own image." Anti-pacifists frequently compare the opposing army with an "organized mass of murderers"⁹⁸ and believe that this verse authorizes the attacked State to punish them as such. P. W. Stonestreet affirmed that this rule is not limited by dispensational bounds. His five arguments to support this contention were:⁹⁹ First, an eternal reason is assigned for the law. Second, a parallel may be made between Genesis 3:19 and Genesis 9:6. As the former is fundamental to man's physical sustenance on earth, regardless of the dispensational bounds, so the latter is fundamental to God's moral law. As Christians do not cease to be under Genesis 3:19, so they are yet under Genesis 9:6. Third, since neither Patriarchal, Israelite, nor Christian age is specified, but simply "man," the law is general and has application to all dispensations. Fourth, Genesis 9:6 was not exclusively applied to national Israel and therefore did not pass into history when the law to Israel was forever fulfilled. Fifth, Genesis 9:6 is a principle, not a law. Laws vary from dispensation to dispensation, but the

⁹⁸W. Douglas Mackenzie, Christian Ethics in the World War (New York: Association Press, 1918), p. 41.

⁹⁹Bales and Stonestreet, op. cit., pp. 2-5, 34-35.

principles remain the same.

Self-Defense

The scholastic tradition is that self-defense is a fundamental, natural law.¹⁰⁰ Natural law also grants the State the right of self-defense against those who endanger the common good, whether they be domestic malefactors or the enemy from without.¹⁰¹ This scholastic tradition is evidenced in Protestant, as well as Catholic, writings. Charles Hodge wrote: "Nations also have the right to defend their own existence. If that be endangered by the conduct of other nations, they have the natural right of self-protection."¹⁰² Non-pacifists believe there is "no more difficulty in establishing the community's right to defend itself against unjust aggression than that of the single

¹⁰⁰John K. Ryan, Modern War and Basic Ethics (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1944), p. 10. Peculiarly, Augustine, who counseled Christians to bear arms to protect the State, denied the individual the right of self-defense. In his letter to Publicola, Augustine wrote: "As to killing others in order to defend one's own life, I do not approve of this, unless one happens to be a soldier or public functionary acting, not for himself, but in defense of others or of the city in which he resides." "Letters of St. Augustine," XLVII, 5. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Company, First Series, Philip Schaff, ed., 1936), I, 293. Hereafter referred to as NP-NF.

¹⁰¹Ryan, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

¹⁰²Hodge, op. cit., III, p. 365.

citizen."¹⁰³

Soldiers in the New Testament

The occupation of a soldier is said to be morally acceptable because the New Testament tells of numerous soldiers who sought God's law for themselves and who were never commanded to leave the army. In his letter to Boniface, Augustine referred to the various soldiers in both Testaments who pleased God while engaged in active military service.¹⁰⁴ In his letter to Marcellinus, Augustine argued,

If the Christian religion condemned wars of every kind, the command given in the gospel to soldiers asking counsel as to salvation would rather be to cast away their arms and withdraw themselves wholly from military service, whereas the word spoken to such was . . . manifestly implying no prohibition to continue in the service.¹⁰⁵

Soldiers approached John the Baptist, inquiring what they should do to bear fruits that befit repentance. The omission of any injunction to resign from the army is noted by Boettner.¹⁰⁶ Cornelius is an example of a soldier converted to Christ. The assumption is that he remained in the army

¹⁰³Ryan, op. cit., p. 12.

¹⁰⁴Augustine, "Letters of St. Augustine," CLXXXIX, NP-NF, I, p. 553.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., CXXXVIII, 11, 15, NP-NF, I, p. 486.

¹⁰⁶Boettner, op. cit., p. 32.

after becoming a Christian.¹⁰⁷ The jailor whom Paul baptized at Philippi is another example of a punitive officer of the law becoming a Christian. Again, the non-pacifists assume he remained in his position.

The Swords

At the close of his earthly ministry, Jesus instructed his disciples to do a very unusual thing: "Let him who has no sword sell his mantle and buy one."¹⁰⁸ When the disciples displayed two swords, Jesus said, "It is enough."¹⁰⁹ Anti-pacifists see nothing metaphorical or symbolical in Jesus' command.¹¹⁰ Boettner has no doubt but that Jesus really intended them to sell their mantles and to buy

¹⁰⁷James D. Bales, "The Christian's Relation to Civil Government," Abilene Christian College Lectures 1962 (Abilene, Texas: Abilene Christian College Students Exchange, 1962), p. 463. Hereafter referred to as "The Christian's Relation to Civil Government."

¹⁰⁸Luke 22:36.

¹⁰⁹Luke 22:38.

¹¹⁰Interpreters are generally perplexed as to whether Jesus' command is to be understood literally or metaphorically. The latter view is strongly suggested by the statement, "It is enough," since it appears absurd to regard two swords as adequate protection for a group against the might of Rome, or even against a band of brigands. The words, "It is enough," are probably ironical, revealing a despair at the denseness and misunderstanding of the disciples who evidently thought he was speaking literally. Also, the sequel in Gethsemane (Mt. 26:51-52) seems to refute the idea that Jesus literally intended the disciples to buy and to use swords. If Jesus was speaking symbolically, the question

weapons of defense.¹¹¹ The fact that the disciples already had two swords is said to suggest that they were "not such a meek, defenseless group as many people seem inclined to believe."¹¹²

Cleansing the Temple

The following incident in the life of Jesus is cited as a demonstration of a non-pacifist behavior against evil:¹¹³

The Passover of the Jews was at hand, and Jesus went up to Jerusalem. In the temple he found those who were selling oxen and sheep and pigeons, and the money-changers at their business. And making a whip of cords, he drove them all, with the sheep and oxen, out of the temple; and he poured out the coins of the money-changers and overturned their tables. And he told those who sold the pigeons, "Take these things away; you shall not make my Father's house a house of

is, "What was he saying?" The variety of ideas which have been offered suggests the difficulty felt in arriving at an answer. C. J. Cadoux, having ruled out a literal interpretation, concedes that "to get a satisfactory sense on any other lines is almost equally difficult." The Early Church and the World (Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 1925), p. 53. He regards Harnack's interpretation that "the sword was meant metaphorically to represent the steadfast defense of the Gospel under the persecution which was about to befall the disciples," as being the best within reach at present. Ibid. Respect is also paid to S. Hobhouse's view that "Jesus' words were an ironical suggestion that he and his followers should equip themselves like robbers, since their enemies, in fulfillment of prophecy (Isa. llii. 12), insisted on regarding them as such." Ibid.

¹¹¹Boettner, op. cit., p. 33

¹¹²Ibid., p. 35.

¹¹³Ibid., p. 30.

trade."¹¹⁴

Everyone Is Involved

Non-pacifists deny that the pacifists and the conscientious objectors dissociate themselves from the war by taking their respective religious positions. C. C. Morrison said of the pacifist:

He is involved in it willy nilly. His every act as a civilian is part of the war effort, from the paying of his taxes to the faithful performance of his job. . . . Going to a C. O. camp does not dissociate him from the war. In accepting assignment to the camp he acknowledges the authority of the war department as truly as does the man who has been assigned to the fighting service.¹¹⁵

The national community is considered to be so indivisible in its solidarity that even the pacifist himself and his job and all his civilian duties and activities are integrated in one

¹¹⁴John 2:13-16. Pacifists deny that Jesus employed or threatened violence against any person. Hershberger, op. cit., p. 302; Macgregor, op. cit., p. 17. Supposedly, it was Jesus' moral authority and commanding countenance that drove out the money-changers. Ibid. The whip is emblematic of his authority, not a weapon of offense. Ibid. If it were a weapon, they insist it was used only on the animals. Ibid.; J. W. McGarvey and Philip Y. Pendleton, The Fourfold Gospel (Cincinnati: The Standard Publishing Foundation, n. d.), p. 122. This view is challenged by William Hendriksen who states that the "all" whom Jesus drove out included the wicked traffickers as well as the sheep and oxen, New Testament Commentary, Exposition of the Gospel According to John (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1961), I, p. 123.

¹¹⁵Charles Clayton Morrison, The Christian and the War (New York: Willet, Clark and Company, 1942), p. 13.

vast military machine.¹¹⁶ The implication of this argument is that no one escapes guilt, not even the absolute pacifists.

Multiple-Relationships

The anti-pacifist sees himself involved in many relationships. He notes a relationship to God, to himself, to his family, to his brethren, to his neighbor and to his enemy. Sustaining these multiple relationships may thrust the Christian into a predicament in which a preferential decision must be made as to which relationship will be recognized at that immediate moment. One authority promotes the view that the Christian conscience came to countenance the soldier's occupation "only because military personnel were judged to stand at the point where there converged many multi-lateral relations of a Christian to his neighbors."¹¹⁷ James D. Bales' retreat from the conscientious objector's position was clearly prompted by the consideration that love for the enemy is only one of many loves which the Christian is to recognize.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶Ibid., p. 53.

¹¹⁷Paul Ramsey, War and the Christian Conscience (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1961), p. 305.

¹¹⁸Bales, "The Christian's Relations to Civil Government," p. 453ff.

War as the Lesser Evil

One of the most frequent contentions today is that war is the lesser evil between going or not going to war. This is a decided alteration from the "crusade" concept of war. Reinhold Niebuhr is probably the most illustrious exponent of this view. The journal, Christianity and Crisis, which Niebuhr helped begin, expressed the attitude that although,

. . . war is one of the most vivid revelations of sin in human history . . . there are historical situations in which refusal to defend the inheritance of civilization, however imperfect, against tyranny and aggression may result in consequences even worse than war.¹¹⁹

After admitting that "all war is contrary to the Christian moral ideal," Robert Johnson recently defended Christian participation in carnal warfare by saying, "The Christian who takes up arms or who is willing to serve his nation in uniform does so knowing that war is evil, but he chooses what he believes is the lesser of two evils."¹²⁰

This concept of "choosing the lesser evil" arises from the thinking that in an "immoral society," "moral man" is frequently faced with a choice between evils.¹²¹ This

¹¹⁹Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Christian Faith and the World Crisis," Christianity and Crisis I (February 10, 1941), 1.

¹²⁰Robert Johnson, "Can A Christian Fight For His Government," Teenage Christian 3 (February, 1962), 18.

¹²¹James Thayer Addison, War, Peace and the Christian Mind (Greenwich, Connecticut: Seabury, 1953), p. 72.

situation prevailing,

. . . the best man can strive for as an actor in this world and, more particularly as an actor on the political scene is to minimize the evil he must do and maximize the good he can attain by putting his evil acts at the service of good ends.¹²²

The Demand For Justice

One of the most severe criticisms against pacifism is that in its emphasis on the love ethic, it ignores and neglects social justice. The non-pacifists see a perennial necessity to establish justice between competing interests and conflicting wills.¹²³ Without law and order, there can be no justice for men. Yet, law and order is procured by the exercise of restraint and force. Therefore, if Christians are to be instrumental in establishing justice, whether locally or internationally, they must cooperate in the use of force. As the 1950 report of the National Council of Churches expressed:

. . . most Christians, faced with the lawlessness of our world of nations, see no way of serving the righteousness of God in the presences of brutal and irresponsible violence save by taking responsible collective

¹²²Hans Morgenthau, "The Nuclear Discussion: Continued," Christianity and Crisis XXI (December 11, 1961), 223.

¹²³Angus Dun and Reinhold Niebuhr, "God Wills Both Justice and Peace," Christianity and Crisis XV (June 13, 1955), 75-78.

action against aggression.¹²⁴

Obligation As Part of Community

Emphasis is placed on the fact that the Christian is part of the community.¹²⁵ As a member of the State, he is concerned with its orderly continuance because he believes anarchy is contrary to God's will. The choice is seen to be either to withdraw to the wilderness and monastery or to live in community.¹²⁶ The inference is that if one chooses the latter alternative, he assumes responsibility for the protection of the community, even to the point of fighting for its defense.

Civil Government As An Agent of God's Vengeance

The New Testament teaches that civil government is instituted by God for the purpose of avenging and punishing the wrongdoer.¹²⁷ The non-pacifist persuasion is that the Christian may assist the government to do the thing which God instituted it to do. As was recently asked,

Is it wrong for us to help the government to do what we may call on it to do? Can we ask it to do for us

¹²⁴"Christian Conscience and Weapons of Mass Destruction," Christianity and Crisis X (December 11, 1950), 163.

¹²⁵Johnson, loc. cit.

¹²⁶Ibid.

¹²⁷Romans 13:1-4.

what we would not do for ourselves if authorized by it to carry the sword?¹²⁸

Military And Police

Non-pacifists hold that the principle which warrants a police force exonerates the existence of a military force. As the local police are occasionally called upon to use violence in resisting criminals, so the army may be required to resist international criminals. The non-pacifists are convinced that the rightfulness of carnal warfare and the rightfulness of police action stand or fall together.

Pacifism Lacks Political Practicality

Non-pacifists conceive of pacifism as being destructive of the State. Johnson predicted that "absolute non-resistance to evil would mean the end of society."¹²⁹ The political impracticality of absolute non-resistance is noted by James Thayer Addison:

Reflection upon the factors involved in both non-resistance and passive resistance and observation of their results in action lead us to conclude that pacifism is not now a program that is politically practical. For the statesman who is responsible for the welfare and perhaps for the survival of his country it is not a feasible alternative to war.¹³⁰

¹²⁸Bales, "The Christians' Relations to Civil Government," pp. 458-460.

¹²⁹Johnson, loc. cit.

¹³⁰Addison, op. cit., p. 69.

III. DISCUSSION OF KEY ISSUES

In the preceding pages, the arguments for and against pacifism were briefly introduced. Except for an occasional note, the contentions were not argued. It is advisable to enlarge upon certain key issues that greatly affect one's decision regarding Christian participation in carnal warfare.

Did Jesus Teach Regarding Carnal Warfare?

There do not seem to be any unequivocal statements by Jesus as to whether one should or should not enlist in the army and participate in combat.¹³¹ However, Jesus did advise a specific political posture for his fellow Jews. The significance of his advice and its bearing on the issue now under discussion is best appreciated by a brief summary of the political context of the first century.

Political situation in Judea. In 63 B. C. the political independence of the Jews was severed with Pompey's arrival in Jerusalem.¹³² In 40 B. C. Herod, Antipater's son,

¹³¹One probable reason why Jesus did not explicitly teach regarding the disciples' military obligation is that apart from a small body of Temple police, the only soldiers in the Roman Army would be Gentiles. Jews were legally exempt from military service, Cadoux, op. cit., p. 51.

¹³²This historical sketch is summarized from the discussion found in Howard Clark Kee and Franklin W. Young, Understanding the New Testament (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959), pp. 28-32.

was named ruler of both Judea and Samaria, with the title of king bestowed upon him. Before he died, his sway extended over Idumea, Judea, Samaria, Perea, Galilee, and a territory north and east of the Sea of Galilee. After Herod's death, his kingdom was divided among his three sons. Archelaus, who was set over Judea proved to be offensive both to the Jews and to the Romans. Following his deposition, Jerusalem and Judea passed under direct Roman rule and were administered by a succession of procurators. Between A. D. 6 and A. D. 66, fourteen procurators were sent to Judea. Conditions worsened under their administrations:

As the years passed, tension between Rome and the Jewish people increased steadily, partly because of the character of the procurators themselves. With few exceptions, these men failed to measure up to the highest standards of Roman administrative personnel, and their caliber seemed to decline with each successive appointment. Repeatedly, they made foolish judgments in administration, and often they were guilty of inordinate cruelty in carrying out official policies.¹³³

Little wonder, then, that the land was a place of political unrest, continually threatening to precipitate a revolution. Cadoux cites the existence of the Zealots and the events of A. D. 66-70 as evidence of the explosive situation which prevailed in the days of Jesus.¹³⁴

¹³³Ibid., p. 30.

¹³⁴Cadoux, loc. cit.

Jesus' advice to the Jews. What did Jesus advise the Jews politically? It seems irrefutable that he taught the pacifist spirit of willing submission. The statement, "If any one forces you to go one mile, go with him two,"¹³⁵ undoubtedly has in view the domineering behavior of the Roman or Herodian official. The Jew could be compelled to serve as a porter to carry a load for a distance on behalf of the Roman government. This would be a galling task, but rather than chafe under this unfortunate experience, Jesus taught that the individual should act willingly and with a spirit of willingness to do even more if necessary. Such teaching discountenances inward as well as outward rebellion.

A pacifist spirit toward Rome is also displayed by Jesus' recommendation to pay the taxes to Caesar. It is to be remembered that the issue at stake was not taxation, but taxation by a foreign and oppressive power. Although many of his fellow-countrymen balked at the tax paid to Caesar, Jesus teaches it was his due. Again, Jesus is recommending submission to the foreign government.

Issue not resolved. The fact that Jesus demonstrated an aversion to the revolutionary spirit, does not necessarily resolve the issue in the pacifist favor. This aversion may have been because violence is always wrong, but it may

¹³⁵Matthew 5:41.

also have been for other reasons. Jesus might have expressed this attitude in order to avoid having the confusion regarding the true mission of the promised Messiah intensified. The hope of Israel for an earthly kingdom was concomitant with their expectation of the Messiah who would bring it into being. Jesus claimed to be the Messiah. Had he also urged political revolution, the Jews would probably have had their erroneous expectations strengthened. Or, Jesus might have counseled submission to Rome for purely pragmatic reasons. The well-trained Roman army could hardly have been defeated by the Jews. Therefore, a revolt would only terminate in profitless slaughter. Since more than one reason could account for Jesus' pacifist attitude toward Rome, the question of pacifism is not settled at this point.

The General Relevance of the Old Testament

The Old Testament is hardly an illustration of pacifism. It constitutes a prime argument for the non-pacifist. How valid are the arguments made and to what extent is the Old Testament relevant to a Christian's behavior in carnal warfare today? In arriving at meaningful answers, notice must be made as to the pacifists' attitude toward Israel's wars.

The early Church's attitude. A curious fact is that although the early Christians accepted the Old Testament as

inspired of God, they were pacifists. The question is: "How did they reconcile their pacifism with the wars of the Old Testament?" Cadoux makes the suggestion that these early Christians retained the ancient Hebrew wars in a separate compartment of the mind from the principles of Christian living; the former simply exercised no influence upon their individual, daily conduct.¹³⁶

It was inevitable that the Christians would confront the issue of the ancient wars. Marcion awakened the Church to the problem by his rejection of the God of the Old Testament, since he blessed the ruthless conquerings of Israel. Tertullian undertook to answer Marcion by distinguishing between the covenants: one was the old injunction, but Christ now bade his followers to embrace a new kind of patience.¹³⁷

Origen also devoted attention to the problem of the brutality and warfare in the Old Testament. The wars were to be spiritually interpreted. Only those with special insight could appreciate the ineffable mysteries which the Old Testament stories of bloodshed and battle concealed.¹³⁸

Some modern attitudes. C. J. Cadoux avers that both

¹³⁶Cadoux, op. cit., p. 185.

¹³⁷Tertullian, Against Marcion, IV, 16. ANF III, 370.

¹³⁸Origen, De Principiis, IV, 1, 14. ANF IV, 363.

Tertullian and Origen missed the proper understanding and interpretation because neither possessed "the modern key, viz. a theory of the progressive revelation of the Divine character."¹³⁹

Macgregor accepts the growing revelation of God concept, adding that the Old Testament represents a sub-Christian attempt to express proper relationships. The insight which comes to us from the New Testament must be utilized in interpreting the Old.¹⁴⁰

Liberal theologians evade the ethical implications of the Old Testament by asserting that the records of the battles are spurious.¹⁴¹ Higher Biblical criticism regards such instructions as Deuteronomy 7:1-2; 13:15-16, as being anachronistically placed into the mouth of Moses.¹⁴² Raven, a liberal pacifist, admits that if the Old Testament is accepted as infallible, war is sanctioned.¹⁴³ Hence, they must deny the historicity of such occurrences.

Ralph L. Moellering cautions against the assumption that all the militarism of the Old Testament was approved by

¹³⁹Oadoux, op. cit., p. 271.

¹⁴⁰Macgregor, op. cit., p. 65.

¹⁴¹Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace, p. 52.

¹⁴²Ibid., p. 47.

¹⁴³Raven, op. cit., p. 17.

God. It is to be remembered that the Bible presents an unblushing portrayal of what actually transpired. Numerous things were done, even by the best of God's people, that were not favored by him. Therefore, many of the insane cruelties and wars of that era are rightfully nauseating to the regenerated man.¹⁴⁴ With reference to the times when God actually commanded bloodshed, Moellering applies the concept of God's justice as being the basic key to understanding. God's holiness "obliges Him to use punitive measures in effacing evil."¹⁴⁵ Moellering also cites Israel's unique role among nations as a significant fact to be considered when interpreting her varied actions:

In view of Israel's God-appointed role as the harbinger and vehicle of redemption, the many wars of the Old Testament begin to take on a different meaning. The descendants of Abraham could claim, as no other people could, that they represented a divine purpose.¹⁴⁶

Because of Israel's unique position, "whoever dared to interfere with them deserved to suffer the consequences of incurring divine wrath."¹⁴⁷

Guy F. Hershberger devotes considerable attention to this one problem. His rather novel view may be summarized

¹⁴⁴Moellering, op. cit., p. 17.

¹⁴⁵Ibid.

¹⁴⁶Ibid., p. 23.

¹⁴⁷Ibid., p. 24.

as follows: God has always had one fundamental moral law, the essence of which is stated in the ten commandments. The commandment of love and the injunction "thou shalt not kill" are part and parcel of this moral law. The Mosaic civil code, with its lower standards of retaliation, represents a temporary concession on God's part to the moral and spiritual immaturity of Israel.¹⁴⁸ For a time, God winked at the inferior moral behavior of his people, but in Jesus Christ, God's fundamental moral law has been reasserted and the temporary concession to such behavior as retaliation is ended. In the Christian era, warfare and bloodshed can have no place in the new life.¹⁴⁹

Attempting to prove too much. Frequently, non-pacifists attempt to prove too much by the Old Testament. This is particularly true when Genesis 9:6 is cited as justifying carnal warfare. Modern warfare involves the killing of the innocent, as well as the guilty. A bombardier, guiding and releasing lethal projectiles over a sleeping city filled with noncombatants can hardly comfort his conscience by reciting: "Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed." Also, if Genesis 9:6 were actually applied to the war situation, every soldier who killed

¹⁴⁸Hershberger, op. cit., p. x.

¹⁴⁹Ibid., p. 16.

someone who had not also killed, should himself be killed!

Value of the Old Testament to the issue. The Old Testament is of value to the discussion of carnal warfare because it corroborates the contention that in order to prevent anarchy and to assure its national sovereignty, a nation must maintain a militia.¹⁵⁰ Perhaps the chief contribution of the Old Testament to the discussion of this issue is in its revelation of the fact that the command not to kill may not deny to society, as organized in the State, to take a life. Along this line of thinking, the Old Testament also demonstrates that there is a difference between personal morality (what an individual may morally do) and social morality (what a State may morally do).⁷ Further elaboration on this point is reserved until later.

The Ethic of Love and Nonresistance

An exhaustive study of the ethic of love is outside the limits of this thesis. The sole intention is to deal with the primary question as to whether love can ever be harmonized with resistance and force. For the following

¹⁵⁰In the opinion of this writer, Hershberger's theory that Israel's wars resulted solely from a refusal to embrace God's fundamental moral law and that if she had been wholly obedient to that law her many wars would have been avoided, is naive, failing to allow for the possibility of an unwarranted attack upon Israel by a belligerent nation. See ibid., p. 45.

reasons, the writer believes it can: (1) God is love, yet he resists the evil and employs force against the wicked;¹⁵¹ (2) Jesus was the perfect example of love in action on earth. Yet, he resisted evil;¹⁵² (3) The Old Testament enjoined love to enemies, but also provided for the punishment of evildoers; (4) Paul resisted his enemies who intended to take his life by appealing to the civil authorities for protection;¹⁵³ (5) Parents are to love their children. However, they are to resist, with corporal punishment if necessary, whenever their children incline toward evil.¹⁵⁴ These suffice to show that absolute nonresistance is not the only method of showing love. Love may resist and

¹⁵¹Psalms 136. Addison's statement is not to be ignored: "At this point it must be acknowledged that when we take it upon ourselves to follow the example of God's love not only in exercising friendly persuasion and sensitive sympathy but also in using force and inflicting punishment, we are taking grave risks. God can use force and inflict punishment on the basis of complete knowledge and in the exercise of a love that is utterly pure. We can act only as a result of imperfect knowledge and at the behest of a love often alloyed with base elements. . . . But aside from this general consideration, we need to remember that to refuse on principle to employ force and punishment is to incur risks quite as grave as those we run when we advocate their use." Op. cit., p. 55.

¹⁵²John 2:13-16.

¹⁵³Acts 23:16-24. Although Paul did not himself exercise violent resistance, he did resist. If one concedes the right to non-violent resistance, he acknowledges that the nonresistant ethic is not absolute.

¹⁵⁴Proverbs 13:24; 25:13-14, 22:15.

even use punishment. Of course, this is not to license indiscriminate resistance or punishment.

Treatment of Enemies

Briefly, the pacifist contention regarding the Christian's treatment of enemies is: (1) he is not to resist one who is evil; (2) he is to "turn the other cheek;" (3) he is to show love to the enemy; (4) he is to pray for the enemy. It is clearly seen that Matthew 5:38-48 are key verses in this contention.

Understandably, non-pacifists feel constrained to reconcile their position with the ethics taught in Matthew 5:38-48. Attention is paid to some of the anti-pacifist replies to this teaching.

Anti-pacifist replies. One non-pacifist tactic, championed by Reinhold Niebuhr in his book, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, is to interpret the "love-your-enemy" ethic as absolutely as do the nonresistant pacifists, only to dismiss the ethic as being impossible to attain. Niebuhr suggests:

The modern pulpit would be saved from much sentimentality if the thousands of sermons which are annually preached upon these texts would contain some suggestions of the impossibility of these ethical demands for natural man in his immediate situation. Nowhere is the ethic of Jesus in more obvious conflict with

both the impulses and the necessities of ordinary men in typical social situations.¹⁵⁵

Another tactic by non-pacifists is to place in juxtaposition with this ethic, another duty, arguing that it is impossible to fulfill both obligations and that since the "love-your-enemy" ethic is the least obligatory, preference may be made in favor of the other duty. This strategy constitutes the basis of the recent recantation by James D. Bales of the pacifist position he once stoutly defended. As a participant during the April, 1962, Bible Lectures at Abilene Christian College, Dr. Bales denied the contention he once made -- that love for one's enemies precluded taking their lives in carnal warfare. Bales' present thesis is that the requirement to love one's enemies is not unlimited and is not the supreme love or responsibility of the Christian.¹⁵⁶ In his April presentation, Bales erected a descending scale of obligatory loves, arguing that certain relationships have priority and take precedence over other obligations. Topping the scale is the love or responsibility a Christian has for himself and his family.¹⁵⁷ Second on

¹⁵⁵Reinhold Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (New York: Living Age Books, Meridian Books, 1956), p. 50.

¹⁵⁶Bales, "The Christian's Relation to Civil Government," pp. 450-458.

¹⁵⁷Ibid., p. 451.

the scale is the obligation one sustains toward those who are brethren in the Church. Third on the scale is the responsibility one has toward the neighbor.¹⁵⁸ Evidently fourth and last is the love a Christian is to have toward his enemies. The first three loves transcend the requirement of the fourth. Therefore, the argument is that in circumstances in which it is impossible to love both the neighbor and the enemy, the love to the neighbor must have precedence.¹⁵⁹ This showing preference to other responsibilities may procure the death or punishment of the enemy. His attitude toward killing the enemy is succinctly stated: "The way I harmonize it is to take the position that the love of our enemy is not the supreme love."¹⁶⁰

1. Critique of James D. Bales' position. Dr. Bales' alteration in viewpoint will be significant in shaping the opinion of those in the Churches of Christ. This is undoubtedly true because of his established reputation as a Christian scholar, his position as Professor of Christian Doctrine at Harding College, and because he was once a vigorous proponent of pacifism, having authored a volume on the subject, as well as defending the position in a written

¹⁵⁸Ibid., p. 452.

¹⁵⁹Ibid., p. 454.

¹⁶⁰Ibid., p. 454.

debate with P. W. Stonestreet. Obviously, his new approach must be closely scrutinized. This writer is convinced that it is subject to a serious critique.

That his reasoning and analysis are faulty is proved by the fact that they would inevitably terminate in unscriptural behavior. For example, his reasoning would have prompted the suffering servants to act in a fashion utterly unlike that taught them by Peter. The situation which existed was the cruel masters were causing their Christian servants to suffer unjustly. The question was, "What response should a Christian servant make when he and others were so treated?" Had Dr. Bales' logic and attitude been prevalent, the servants would have risen up in resistance. It is to be recalled that his basic argument is that one's responsibility toward himself, his family, his brethren, and his neighbor transcends the obligation he has toward an enemy, meaning that the Christian must show more love for these than for the enemy. Added to this basic argument is the notion that if one does not come to the aid of the mistreated, even if this might entail violent means, he is showing more love for the enemy and is not proving neighborly toward the mistreated. Observe his question: "Are we to love the enemy of our neighbor, who is hurting our neighbor, more than we love the neighbor in need?"¹⁶¹ Note also his

¹⁶¹Ibid., p. 455.

statement of opinion to the effect that,

. . . the prisoners of war in North Korea should have done whatever was necessary (emphasis mine, AI) to have kept a certain brutal soldier from throwing out in the cold, to freeze to death, fellow prisoners of war because they were sick and did not smell good. They could not be neighborly toward the sick without resisting the heartless (emphasis mine, AI). And yet, other soldiers did nothing. . . . Were they not passive participants in this evil (emphasis mine, AI).¹⁶²

Since the merciless masters were afflicting the Christian and his fellow-brethren, he could not prove neighborly toward the mistreated without doing whatever was necessary in resisting the heartless. Bales' logic also demands the conclusion that if the Christians did not resist that they were passive participants in evil.

It is unmistakably clear that Dr. Bales' method of analysis would have made resistance the only "Christian" response. However, the apostle Peter instructed the servants to be submissive and patient, even in duress.¹⁶³ A false premise issues in a false conclusion. It is clear that an application of Bales' logic would have concluded in behavior contradictory to that taught by Peter. Therefore, his premise and method are faulty.

Dr. Bales' new position is also subject to the

¹⁶²Ibid., p. 456.

¹⁶³ Peter 2:18-20.

criticism that it empties the ethic of loving one's enemies of any vital meaning. To acquiesce in his interpretation and method of application is to concede that a Christian does not have to "outlove the world" or to partake of the "divine nature" in order to comply with this requirement, for an atheistic humanist might well applaud his attitude toward enemies. Would he not agree to doing good to any enemy -- IF that enemy did not endanger him, his family, his fellow-humanists, or any others? Yet, Jesus impressed his auditors with the fact that citizenship in the kingdom of God required the acceptance of an ethic so stringent that unregenerated men and women would not find it palatable.¹⁶³ This is further demonstration that Bales' new method of applying this ethic is faulty. Perhaps it would be well for him to recall what he once wrote in regard to the difficulty of accepting the true consequences of the "love-your-enemy" ethic:

This love is so difficult, so contrary to the natural man, that some followers of Christ have often tried to explain it away to the extent that they become like those who love only their own and thus treat the enemy as the world treats its enemies.¹⁶⁴

A correct understanding of Matthew 5:38-48. The crucial error most frequently committed in interpreting

¹⁶³Matthew 5:44-46.

¹⁶⁴Bales, The Christian Conscientious Objector, p. 25.

Matthew 5 :38-48 is in laboring under the conception that Jesus was setting aside the Old Testament law and was instituting a new and distinctive ethic.¹⁶⁵ The view taken in this thesis is that Jesus was neither pitting himself against what God had taught in the Old Testament nor announcing a new ethic, but was interpreting properly the ethics inculcated in that ancient covenant.¹⁶⁶ This view is supported by the statement of explanation given by Jesus at the first of his sermon: "Think not that I have come to abolish the law and the prophets; I have come not to abolish them but to fulfill them."¹⁶⁷ The aim or purpose of the

¹⁶⁵See James Virgil Bliss, "An Interpretation of New Testament Teaching on the Subject of Christians Going to Law" (An unpublished thesis presented to the faculty of the Bible Department, Abilene Christian College, 1961), pp. 66-67. His error in so understanding the Sermon on the Mount results in the absolute nonresistant position regarding law suits, etc.

¹⁶⁶This writer anticipates the rejoinder that Jesus' teaching in the Sermon on marriage and divorce is a clear example of a modification in the Old Testament ethic. His answer is that in regard to marriage and divorce, there has been no alteration in God's moral will whatsoever. There was, however, a legislative concession, designed not to permit but to regulate an evil, during a time of "hardness of heart." That this legislative concession was temporary and was not to be regarded as a lasting element of the law of Moses is proved by Malachi 2:13-16. This passage also shows that the Mosaic concession was not in effect until replaced by Jesus' "new" teaching. Therefore, in Matthew 5:31-32, Jesus is declaring fully the will of God on marriage as it was originally intended and should have been observed by the Jews.

¹⁶⁷Matthew 5:17-20.

sermon is revealed in the pivotal words "abolish" and "fulfill." The Greek word for the first is katalusai, meaning dissolve or abrogate.¹⁶⁸ The Greek word for the second term is plērosai, meaning the full tale, the full measure or complement of something.¹⁶⁹ Therefore, Jesus was not abrogating the law and the prophets, but was giving the full meaning of them.

It was necessary that Jesus emphatically stress his agreement with the law and the prophets for the following reason: his teachings in the sermon glaringly contradicted the interpretations of the law and the prophets by the scribes and Pharisees. These were commonly acknowledged to be the true interpreters of the Old Testament. Therefore, since Jesus contradicted their doctrines, the disciples might have erroneously concluded that Jesus was abrogating the law and the prophets. Jesus disavows this thought by the aforementioned corrective statement. To regard the Sermon as the charter of a new and higher law or system of morality is to ignore the obvious import of Jesus' words.

If Jesus was not enlarging upon (much less replacing) the Old Testament ethics, why the series of contrasts (cf.

¹⁶⁸John Murray, Principles of Conduct (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1957), p. 149.

¹⁶⁹Ibid., pp. 149-150. In Col. 1:25 plērosai is translated "to make fully known."

5:21, etc.)? He was countering the rabbinical perversions and heterodoxical exegeses of the law and the prophets. The particular section now under treatment clearly shows this to be true. The injunction to love one's enemy is Jesus' answer to the teaching, "You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy." What is the source of the doctrine which he counters? Certainly not the Old Testament because it required love to be shown to the enemy.¹⁷⁰ Evidently, the statement, "You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy," was a perverted interpretation of Leviticus 19:17 which the scribes and Pharisees were foisting upon the people. As R. C. H. Lenski comments: "With their vicious corollary about hating our enemies, the scribes and Pharisees had . . . fallen from the ancient moral height."¹⁷¹ Jesus was returning the people to that moral summit by focusing attention to the true understanding of the Old Testament's system of morality.

Since Jesus was bringing the people to a rediscovery of the Old Testament ethics, his instruction as to how one

¹⁷⁰See Leviticus 19:17; 24:22; Ex. 23:4, 5; Prov. 25:21-22. It is regrettable that the scholarly J. W. McGarvey erroneously claimed that "it is a true representation of the law . . . in its practical working, that it taught hatred of one's enemies." Fourfold Gospel (Cincinnati: The Standard Publishing Foundation, n.d.), p. 247.

¹⁷¹R. C. H. Lenski, The Interpretation of St. Matthew's Gospel (Columbus: The Wartburg Press, 1943), p. 246.

ought to treat his enemies is best understood by examining the method or methods of dealing with them in the Old Testament. Two emphases are apparent in the Mosaic economy. On the one hand, a judicial and penal system was prescribed by which the enemies of the State (those who violated public laws) were tried and punished.¹⁷² On the other hand, the individual was to treat enemies kindly and with love.¹⁷³ The Old Testament is sufficient proof that establishing justice by a judicial code does not negate the possibility of showing love to the enemy and that a command to show love to an enemy does not annul the right of society, as organized in the State, to seek compensation for an infraction of its rules. Charity does not preclude a legally prescribed punishment for a legal infraction. Why, then, should it be presumed that Jesus, when echoing these sentiments of showing love to enemies, rejected the morality of the State's legal apparatus in dealing with enemies of the State?

It may be asserted that Jesus abrogated the moral right of the State to punish criminals and to avenge injustice when he said, "You have heard that it was said, 'An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. But I say to you,

¹⁷²Exodus 21:22.

¹⁷³Exodus 23:4-5; Prov. 25:21-22.

Do not resist one who is evil."¹⁷⁴ The cause for the general misunderstanding on this point is plain. The Old Testament did use the "eye for an eye" terminology.¹⁷⁵ However, the contexts show that this was a judicial principle, given for the purpose of insuring that the punishment of the criminal would be commensurate with the crime. The "eye for an eye" statements were not intended to license the individual to personally carry out vendettas or to avenge his own injuries or to rectify injustice apart from the judicial apparatus of society. Rather, the individual was expressly prohibited from seeking any eye for an eye: "Do not say, 'I will do to him as he has done to me; I will pay the man back for what he has done.'"¹⁷⁶ To understand the Old Testament properly, this verse must be harmonized with Exodus 21:23. That such harmonization is possible is made clear by the following illustration: X steals five sheep from Y. Exodus 21:23 did not license Y to personally avenge his loss by stealing sheep from X. As an individual, he was under the restraints of Proverbs 24:29. However, since X's action was a crime against society, as well as against Y, the judicial system was established by which society could

¹⁷⁴Matt. 5:38.

¹⁷⁵Ex. 21:23; Lev. 24:17-21; Dt. 19:21.

¹⁷⁶Proverbs 24:29.

avenge this crime by impartially decreeing a punishment commensurate with the crime (an eye for an eye). Hence, Proverbs 26:29 and Exodus 21:23 do not contradict, but complement each other.

The importance of one's understanding of the intent of the Sermon on the Mount is now brought into clear focus. If Jesus is pitting his teaching against the Old Testament system, then his rejection of the "eye for an eye" concept issues in the irresistible conclusion that society no longer has the moral right to avenge injustice or to punish a public enemy. But if the thesis of this paper is correct, and Jesus is interpreting properly the Old Testament code by contrasting it with erroneous interpretations that were then current, this conclusion does not follow. The question is: "What did Jesus have in mind when he spoke these words and why did he use the 'eye for an eye' terminology?" This writer is in agreement with Arthur Pink's cogent observation:

This Divine statute . . . had been grossly perverted by the scribes and Pharisees. They had wrested its purport and design by giving it a false application. Instead of confining it to the magistrates in the law courts, they had made the statute a promiscuous one. The Jewish leaders had so expounded this precept as though God had given permission for each individual to take the law into his own hands and to avenge his own wrongs. They intimated that it allowed each person to take private revenge upon his enemies: if thy neighbor smite thee and destroyeth one of thine eyes, then go thou and do likewise to him. Thus a spirit of

resistance was cherished and the act of retaliation condemned.¹⁷⁷

If Jesus did have this perverted teaching in mind, it means that he was denying to the individual what was always denied him -- the right to personally avenge his enemy by returning evil for evil. However, it does not follow that Jesus denied the right of society to remedy social injustice and to mete out punishment against public enemies. To the contrary, since Jesus was seeking to re-establish the true ethic as contained in the ancient covenant, it is to be presumed that rather than abrogating the right of society to employ the judicial "eye for an eye," he assumed its rightful continuance.

Personal enemy vs. enemy of the State. A discussion of the treatment of enemies will eventuate in inaccurate presumptions if the distinction between an enemy of the State and a personal enemy (one who treats another unfairly without necessarily violating any legal statute) is ignored. It is possible for one of three situations to confront the Christian: (1) his personal enemy may not be an enemy of the State; (2) his personal enemy may also be an enemy of the State; (3) an enemy of the State may not be his personal enemy. In each of these three situations, a Christian is

¹⁷⁷Arthur W. Pink, An Exposition of the Sermon on the Mount (Baker Book House: Grand Rapids, 1959), p. 113.

not to hate or to personally avenge the injury by repaying the enemy in his own coin. He is to have a benevolent interest in the welfare of the enemy, praying and acting on his behalf.¹⁷⁸ However, this writer's conviction is that beyond this disposition, some variation of response is possible in each of the three situations. An analysis will assist in clarifying this position.

1. When a personal enemy is not an enemy of the State. Regarding the first possible situation, a Christian is to endure patiently and to await for God to avenge this personal wrong. That this analysis is true may be proven by the examples in the New Testament in which the Christians' personal enemies were not enemies of the State. For example, Herod laid violent hands on some of the Church, even killing James and imprisoning Peter.¹⁷⁹ Herod was a personal foe, but not an enemy of the State. In this predicament, the Christians did not initiate rebellion, sabotage, or seek life for life. Rather they looked to God for their source of retribution. This method of treating personal enemies is also exemplified by the suffering servants whose enemies, the overbearing masters, were not enemies of the State. The

¹⁷⁸Matt. 5:43-44; Rom. 12:17-19.

¹⁷⁹Acts 12:1-2.

admonition to them was patient endurance.¹⁸⁰ Therefore, when the enemy of the Christian is strictly personal, his behavior is unmistakably revealed, both by text and example. He is not to take things personally in hand to get even by repaying evil for evil. He has no alternative but to have faith in God as the avenger of the personal injustice.¹⁸¹

2. When a personal enemy is also an enemy of the State. If the Christian's enemy is also an enemy of the State, a different situation prevails because the wrongdoer is not only at variance with the Christian but with society as well. If his behavior is unchecked it will ultimately destroy any meaningful structure of society and anarchy will prevail. It is obvious, then, that more than the Christian's welfare is at stake. In such situations, what measures may a Christian take? He may appeal to the judicial apparatus of the State for relief and protection. This is also proved by the examples in the New Testament. For instance, Paul cooperated with the soldiers who were rescuing

¹⁸⁰ Peter 2:17-19.

¹⁸¹ A wrong may be avenged by one of three agencies: (1) the courts; (2) the individual; (3) God. The first agency is ineffective in this situation because no legal infraction has occurred. The second agency is expressly denied to Christians. Therefore, God is the only agency through which retribution is to come in a situation such as assumed in this case.

him from the violent crowd.¹⁸² The mob's behavior was contrary to the interests of the State as well as of Paul's. Another time, Paul, having learned of a plot to ambush and kill him, sent word to the tribune which resulted in his being protected by the legal sword of the State.¹⁸³ The intended action of the more than forty Jews made them enemies of the State. Another time, Paul protected himself from his personal enemies whose intentions were contrary to the State by appealing to the court system of the Roman Empire.¹⁸⁴ Apostolic example demonstrates that a Christian can take the legal measures which are available to him in order to protect himself from a personal enemy who is also an enemy of the State.

3. When an enemy of the State is not a personal enemy. It may be that an enemy of the State is not an enemy of the Christian. For illustration, a government which outlaws the Christian religion technically makes every Christian an enemy of the State. This does not make it mandatory that Christians regard themselves as enemies. The government's labeling of some person or group as an enemy, does not necessarily demand that Christians acquiesce in this

¹⁸²Acts 21:35.

¹⁸³Acts 23:16-24.

¹⁸⁴Acts 24:1-21; 25:6-11; 26:1-29.

decision or co-operate in effecting it. The Christian ever has the duty to judge the righteousness of the government's action.

The Problem of Justice

Involved in the question of pacifism is the problem of justice in secular society. To discuss this key issue, several fundamental questions demand consideration: (1) Is there a need for justice in secular society? (2) Is justice in secular society of Christian concern? (3) How is justice to be procured?

The need for justice. Secular society, composed in the main of unregenerated mankind is not an environment in which justice will naturally prevail. This is because a society partakes of the nature of its members. Unregenerated mankind is darkened in understanding, calloused, hardened in heart, immoral, ambitious with the will-to-power, greedy, covetous, and filled with malice.¹⁸⁵ Such men create a secular society in which justice is not easily procured, but is a perennial necessity.

Is justice in secular society of Christian concern?
Pacifists in general have a habit of deprecating justice as

¹⁸⁵Eph. 4:17-19; Col. 3:5-10.

a virtue. When writing as a conscientious objector, Bales expressed the typical conviction that justice is not a distinctly Christian virtue.¹⁸⁶ In juxtaposition with justice, he placed the virtue of mercy, contending that the Christian is an object of mercy and can deal with evil on no other basis:

We are not allowed to follow the law of justice, which is an eye for an eye. . . . If we, who have received mercy do not dispense mercy instead of justice we shall be like the servant of Matt. 18:23-24 who was an object of mercy and yet who dealt with his debtor on the basis of justice. By operating on the level of exacting justice from another he placed himself under that law and his master then dealt with him on the plane on which he had chosen to deal with others. . . . Deal with others on the basis of law and God will not deal with you, in the judgment, on the basis of mercy for you have been content to live on another plane.¹⁸⁷

The brief attention that Hershberger devotes to the matter of justice is to accuse the Corinthians of being at fault because they sought it.¹⁸⁸ To defend his argument that Christians are to refrain from legal suits, James Virgil Bliss interprets the Sermon on the Mount as meaning that "a Christian is not to repel, or oppose, or set himself against

¹⁸⁶Bales and Stonestreet, op. cit., p. 129.

¹⁸⁷Ibid.

¹⁸⁸Hershberger, op. cit., p. 53. Seeking justice was not the fault of the Corinthians. The defective behavior was in seeking it in a dispute between brethren at the heathen courts. Seeking justice is not prohibited, for the instruction was to appeal the case in dispute before the Church. Surely, the Church was to hand down a just decision.

the evildoer. The evildoer is to have his way."¹⁸⁹ Justice is hardly attainable if the evildoer is to have unrestricted sway. A common attitude among pacifists is that the vindication of injustice is the duty and responsibility of the civil government. But they stipulate that Christians are not to serve as agents of the government in this respect because it must employ methods which do not harmonize with the New Testament way of nonresistance.¹⁹⁰

Justice in secular society is of rightful concern to the Christian. The law of love requires and demands the child of God to alleviate the oppressed and to gain justice for the ill-treated in so far as he is able. God has always extolled the virtue of justice and has demanded his people to assist in procuring it. Judges were expressly forbidden to show partiality in their verdicts. The solemn charge was: "Justice and only justice you shall follow."¹⁹¹ "The Lord loves justice," sings the Psalmist.¹⁹² One of the sins which separated the people from God was injustice.¹⁹³ Isaiah laments that justice was far from the people and had been

¹⁸⁹Bliss, op. cit., p. 150.

¹⁹⁰Bales and Stonestreet, op. cit., p. 90; Herberger, op. cit., p. 160.

¹⁹¹Dt. 16:18-20.

¹⁹²Psa. 37:28.

¹⁹³Isa. 59:8.

turned back.¹⁹⁴ Amos pleaded: "Let justice roll down like waters."¹⁹⁵ The classic text is: "He has showed you, O man, what is good; and what does the Lord require of you but to do justice, and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with your God?"¹⁹⁶ It is true that the previous texts and thoughts are gleaned from the Old Testament. However, is it to be presumed that justice has ceased to be of vital concern to God and his people? No, for Jesus emphasized the need for justice in the here and now. He accused his contemporaries of neglecting justice, which he terms one of the weightier matters of the law of God.¹⁹⁷ Is it to be thought that Jesus condemned the Pharisees for neglecting the very thing which he himself did not consider of prime importance? Paul thought as much of justice in secular society as he did of self-control and judgment to come.¹⁹⁸ It is evident that he did not believe that if Felix were to become a Christian, he could no longer operate on the basis

¹⁹⁴Isa. 59:9, 14.

¹⁹⁵Amos 5:24.

¹⁹⁶Micah 6:9.

¹⁹⁷Mt. 23:23. On the word translated "justice" in this text, Cadoux remarks: "Most commentators take it as "just conduct" in general; but it doubtless includes, if it is not quite coincident with the administration of public justice." Op. cit., p. 38.

¹⁹⁸Acts 24:25.

of justice. To the contrary, the emphasis was that if he became a Christian, he would follow "justice and justice only." The writer of Hebrews celebrates the memory of those who enforced justice.¹⁹⁹ Justice in the here and now is of Christian concern.²⁰⁰

How is justice to be procured? Pacifists sometime suggest that justice will be achieved by the display of nonresistant love. The example of Onesimus and Philemon is elevated as the method the church used in eradicating the social injustice of slavery. The pacifists inductively reason that "Paul's approach in this case is the Christian solution for every form of injustice."²⁰¹ The boast of the pacifist is that "if we aim at love we shall establish justice,"²⁰² and that evil will be rooted out by love.²⁰³

¹⁹⁹Heb. 11:33.

²⁰⁰Reinhold Niebuhr's thought is worthy of consideration: "Every sensitive Christian must feel a sense of unworthiness when he is compelled by historic destiny to act as an instrument of God's justice." "Christian Faith and the World Crisis," Christianity and Crisis I (February 10, 1941), 1.

²⁰¹Cadoux, op. cit., pp. 185-186. The Philemon-Onesimus case was a case involving regenerated men. The large issue concerns the problem of attaining justice in secular society when one or both parties in the dispute are unregenerated.

²⁰²Macgregor, op. cit., pp. 67-68.

²⁰³Cadoux, op. cit., p. 46.

The optimistic faith is that self-sacrificial love will redeem and change the evil will.²⁰⁴

This writer finds the optimistic attitude that non-resistance will induce justice too naive for acceptance. Although the sight of suffering will occasionally move an evil person to repentance, it will not do so frequently or consistently enough, in all circumstances, to function as a practical means of attaining justice in the here and now. The bitter suffering and wailing of the Israelites were not what moved Pharaoh to let God's people go. It was not the sight of the suffering Christ that prompted the cry, "What shall we do?" The nonresistance and prayer of Stephen did not stop the stones. In immoral society, justice is seldom procured by the demonstration of nonresistance. Calloused and hardened men are persuaded to desist from injustice by matched or superior forces. To prevent the total victory of evil, a balance of power must be achieved. Resistance is clearly indispensable to the attainment of justice. It may be violent or non-violent, covert or overt, but the threat of force must always be present. This being true, non-resistance will not satisfy as a method of accomplishing

²⁰⁴Macgregor, op. cit., p. 69.

justice in a complex, evil-filled society.²⁰⁵

The Christian and Civil Government

Closely related to the previous discussion, is the question of the responsibility the Christian has toward the culture and State of which he is a part and to the government which gives co-ordination to that State. Varied views are held upon this subject.

Pacifist views. First, the ultra-radical attitude among nonresistant pacifists will be noted. This extreme is represented by the thought of such men as Leo Tolstoy and David Lipscomb. Tolstoy considered the State and the Christian faith absolutely incompatible because the former is based on power and the exercise of force, whereas the latter requires nonresistance.²⁰⁶ Not content to withdraw and to live a semimonastic life, he became "a crusader against culture under the banner of the law of Christ."²⁰⁷ David Lipscomb, a very influential writer, preacher and educator among the Churches of Christ during the latter part of the

²⁰⁵significantly, many pacifists admit that law and order depend upon jails, police and a department of justice, and that these may be necessary for the successful operation of the State, see Hershberger, op. cit., p. 160.

²⁰⁶H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1956), p. 61. He has an excellent discussion of the Tolstoyan philosophy.

²⁰⁷Ibid., p. 60.

nineteenth century, promulgated some radical notions regarding the origin and destiny of civil government. Among these were: (1) that civil government constitutes the organized rebellion of man against God;²⁰⁸ (2) that God has always forbidden his people to support, hold office, or be agents of civil government;²⁰⁹ (3) that the governments of the world are the works of the devil and are enemies of God;²¹⁰ (4) that the Church and civil government are perpetual antagonists;²¹¹ (5) that ultimately the Church will destroy and consume the governments of the world.²¹²

Lipscomb's peculiar treatment of the origin and destiny of civil government resulted in conclusions that, if adopted by Christendom at large, would create the unmistakable impression that Christianity is anti-cultural. He was persuaded

²⁰⁸David Lipscomb, Civil Government (Nashville: McQuiddy Printing Company, 1913), p. 11. Earl West has written that Lipscomb did not believe that "Civil Government is itself rebellion against God, but only that it originates among men who are in rebellion." "David Lipscomb," Abilene Christian College Annual Bible Lectures 1962 (Abilene, Texas: Abilene Christian College Students Exchange, 1962), p. 391. However, compare Lipscomb's own words: "It (human government, AI) was the organized rebellion of man against God and his government." Lipscomb, loc. cit.

²⁰⁹Ibid., p. 90.

²¹⁰Ibid., pp. 60, 82-84.

²¹¹Ibid., pp. 46, 79, 72.

²¹²Ibid., pp. 25, 27-28, 87.

that it was improper for a Christian to seek the friendship of the civil government, to seek public office, to serve on juries, or even to vote.²¹³

A less extreme view of civil government is represented by the Mennonites. Their position was elucidated at Dortrecht, Holland, in 1632:

We also believe and confess, that God has instituted civil government, for the punishment of the wicked and the protection of the pious; and also further, for the purpose of governing the world -- governing countries and cities; and also to preserve its subjects in good order and under good regulations. Wherefore we are not permitted to despise, blaspheme, or resist the same; but are to acknowledge it as a minister of God and be subject and obedient to it, in all things that do not militate against the law, will, and commandments of God; yea, "to be ready to every good work;" also faithfully to pay it custom, tax, and tribute, thus giving it what is its due; as Jesus Christ taught, did himself and commanded his followers to do. That we are also to pray to the Lord earnestly for the government and its welfare, and in behalf of our country, so that we may live under its protection, maintain ourselves and "lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty." And further, that the Lord would recompense them (our rulers), here and in eternity, for all the benefits, liberties, and favors which we enjoy under their laudable administration.²¹⁴

Mennonites are doubtful whether a nonresistant Christian could hold a major executive, legislative, or judicial position (including such offices as mayor or councilman) because of the connection between these offices and the police,

²¹³Ibid., pp. 28, 52, 58, 79, 84.

²¹⁴Article XIII of the Dortrecht Confession. This is printed in Hershberger, op. cit., p. 317.

penal, and military functions of the State.²¹⁵

A more liberal view than the Mennonites is represented by the Quakers. This is especially true in regard to the positions one may occupy in government. Their attitude is well demonstrated by William Penn's experiment in America. Bainton makes the observation that the Quakers, to a degree, "have sought peace through politics."²¹⁶

Non-pacifist view. Christian non-pacifists do not count "Caesar" as supreme. They readily acknowledge that the obligations and duties one has toward civil government are subordinate to those he has toward Christ. Every demand of the civil authorities is to be scrutinized in the light of Christian teaching.

Non-pacifists abhor anarchy and regard the establishment of government as the beneficent act of God. Because God has ordained the State, it has the right to exist. The right to exist presumes the right to protect that existence.²¹⁷ Non-pacifists act under the conviction that the State must be preserved. This is because Christianity ✓

²¹⁵Ibid., pp. 160-161.

²¹⁶Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War And Peace, p. 157.

²¹⁷Johnson, op. cit., p. 17.

advances better in an orderly society than under anarchial conditions,²¹⁸ and because no cultivation and development of the moral life is possible if anarchy prevails. So, Robert Johnson suggests that absolute nonresistance to evil would possibly mean "the destruction of the moral personality it- self."²¹⁹ Mackenzie says,

That which stands out as an indubitable fact is that some kind of State, some measure and form of centralized government, is essential to the well-being and the moral development of mankind.²²⁰

In the present age, non-pacifists regard national governments as being not only a political necessity, but a moral necessity as well.²²¹ Since the existence of the State is a moral necessity, the contention is that it is the moral duty of the State to engage in belligerent actions when its continuance is jeopardized.²²²

The crucial issue. The pacifists and non-pacifists are generally agreed on a variety of matters relating to civil government. They agree that it is God-appointed; that it is his servant in protecting the good and in punishing

²¹⁸Ibid., p. 20.

²¹⁹Ibid., p. 22.

²²⁰Mackenzie, op. cit., p. 19.

²²¹Boettner, op. cit., p. 41.

²²²Mackenzie, op. cit., pp. 23, 75, 175.

the evil; that it is absolutely necessary in a sinful society; and that it must exercise force in fulfilling its divinely-appointed mission. The crucial issue upon which they fail to agree is whether the Christian can act on behalf of the government and as its agent in exercising this force.

1. Pacifist attitude. The pacifists' view as to whether the Christian can act as the agent through whom the government bears the sword is stated succinctly in the declaration adopted by the Mennonite General Conference in August, 1951:

We recognize that in a world where the evil and the good exist side by side by side, there is a necessary place, authorized by God Himself, for the use of force by the state in the restraint of evil and the protection of the good, though always under restrictions deriving from the higher laws of God. But we hold that the Christian cannot be the executor of this force, his call being to operate on the basis of love. If he abandons this way, he effectually destroys the only hope for the world, since force can never create righteousness or a Christian society; it can at best only restrain the evil in varying degrees.²²³

2. Non-pacifist attitude. If asked what obligation the Christian has toward the government when it is called upon to use the sword, the non-pacifists reply that he owes

²²³"Peace, War, and Nonresistance," (Scottsdale, Pennsylvania: Mennonite Publishing House, 1951), 5. See also Fudge, op. cit., pp. 7, 11-13; Lipscomb, op. cit., p. 86.

his cordial support and assistance. James D. Bales asks,

Is it wrong for Christians to submit to the government and help it to do the very thing we teach that it is ordained of God to do, i.e., carry the sword against evildoers?²²⁴

The respondent to Moses Lard's article in the Lard's Quarterly argued that if a Christian cannot morally serve as the agent of the government in the business of swordbearing, then no man can "for no man is allowed by the divine laws to do wrong."²²⁵

Excursus: a discussion of Romans 13:1-7. The Christian's relationship to the civil government occupies the attention of several writers in the New Testament. Of particular importance is Paul's treatment of the subject in Romans 13:1-7.

What is meant in the assertion that "there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God?"²²⁶ Several opinions may be noted: Macgregor takes it to mean primarily that the principle of civil government is instituted by God.²²⁷ Lard takes the

²²⁴Bales, "The Christian's Relation to Civil Government," p. 458.

²²⁵J. S., op. cit., 356.

²²⁶Romans 13:1-7.

²²⁷Macgregor, op. cit., p. 84.

words in a more literal sense, holding that any particular government which happens to be in power is instituted by God. However, he qualifies his position by saying that God appoints a type of government that is willed by the people.²²⁸ Others argue that the context shows that only a government functioning properly is instituted by God:

To teach that a government by mere fact of its existence, and wholly without relationship to its character and function, is ordained of God is to overlook the fact that Paul speaks of governments which punish the evil and praise the good.²²⁹

If the authorities depart from this proper function, the Christian ceases to have the obligation of submission.

This latter view raises two questions: (1) is there such a thing as an "apostate" or "outlaw" government? (2) can the Christian ever instigate or participate in a revolution?

1. Apostate governments. James D. Bales suggests the possibility of an apostate government by expressing the thought that,

. . . just as a Christian may apostatize from his standing as a Christian, just so a government may

²²⁸Moses Lard, Commentary on Paul's Letter to Romans (Delight, Arkansas: Gospel Light Publishing Company, n.d.), p. 398.

²²⁹Bales, "The Christian's Relation to the Civil Government," p. 446.

apostatize from its standing as a minister of God avenging evil and praising good.²³⁰

In essence, this is the same argument used by P. W. Stonestreet in his polemic against Bales (when Bales was a conscientious objector). Rather than "apostate" governments, Stonestreet spoke of "outlaw" governments.

Is the "apostate" or "outlaw" government concept valid? One recalls the effective way in which Bales replied to Stonestreet in the aforementioned debate:

We observe: First, Christians do not have the right . . . to declare that one power is an outlaw power and that another is not. The term "outlaw" government is without New Testament sanction. There is no power but of God. The powers that be, not those we prefer, are ordained of God. . . . Thus Stonestreet's theory of outlaw government falls.²³¹

The most troublesome fact that plagues the "apostate" government concept is that the New Testament writers taught submission to the Roman government which would qualify as an "apostate," if indeed there is such. Even after the government proved to be an official persecutor of the Church, the apostles taught the Christians to show loyalty

²³⁰Ibid., p. 447.

²³¹Bales and Stonestreet, op. cit., pp. 43-44.

and honor to the existing powers.²³²

2. The question of revolution. If it is true that a government may apostatize from its position as being God-appointed, then revolution is permissible, if not mandatory. Yet, the rightfulness of revolution is not only denied by pacifists,²³³ its lawfulness is debated among non-pacifists.²³⁴ Revolution is of questionable morality, especially since the Christians were not to revolt against a government as evil as the Roman.²³⁵

3. Romans 13 and the war question. How relevant is

²³²Titus 3:1; 1 Peter 2:13-17. The significance of the latter scripture is that "it was certainly written at a time when persecution, and that of an official character, had begun, yet the commands of St. Paul are repeated and even with greater emphasis." William Sanday and Arthur C. Headlam, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1930), p. 371.

²³³See Hershberger, op. cit., pp. 55-56; Lipscomb, op. cit., p. 133.

²³⁴See Edward T. Gargan, "Conscience and the Modern Tyrant," Commonweal LXXVI (May 18, 1962), 207.

²³⁵The troublesome and elusive question is, "How bad and wicked does a government have to become before it is apostate and revolution is justified?" Shall the pragmatic assessment of Walter Luthi serve as the "rule of thumb?" "There are well-fitting and ill-fitting shoes, and the same applies to governments. The few people the shoe of state 'pinches,' the better the state is. If the shoes of state pinches the majority of people, then it is time to change shoes." The Letter to the Romans (trans. by Kurt Schoonenberger, London: Oliver and Boyd, 1961), p. 192.

this scripture to the war question? Non-pacifists are prone to regard it as "a clear and positive statement against pacifism." This analysis is disputed by pacifists and is questionable. It is probable that the war issue was not in Paul's mind when he wrote this scripture. Such is the observation of Franz Leenhardt who interprets the "sword" as referring to "the sword of the magistrate (jus gladii), not the sword of the soldier."²³⁶

It is hardly profitable for non-pacifists to contend that this scripture teaches the lawfulness of the Christian engaging in carnal warfare, for if it teaches this today, it did so when first written. Yet, if it did so then, Paul must have been teaching that Christians may fight on behalf of a pagan, totalitarian, conquering dictatorship, engaging in traditionally unjust, aggressive warfare.

The safest interpretation is to understand that Romans 13:1-7 teaches that the Christian is to be subject to the civil government because it is God's instrument for achieving social justice and punishing evil in secular society.⁷

Excursus: Can a Christian do things as an officer of the State that he could not morally do as an individual?

²³⁶Franz Leenhardt, The Epistle to the Romans (London: Lutterworth Press, 1959), p. 333.

This writer believes that a Christian can act as an officer of the State in a way not necessarily permitted him as an individual. The State has certain rights that do not belong to the private citizen. Therefore, it may require its agents to do things that they could not morally or legally do apart from an official capacity. This is illustrated in the following example: The New Testament clearly teaches that it is the prerogative of the government to tax its constituents. An individual, in the service of the government and on a mission in its behalf, could demand a payment of one hundred dollars from citizen Z. However, if, as a private citizen, he personally demanded a comparable amount from citizen Z, he would be guilty of attempted theft, both in the sight of God and the law of the land. Yet, his behavior and demands are identical in both instances. The obvious difference is that in the first he is acting impersonally as an agent of the government, whereas in the latter he is acting as a private individual. This example illustrates that a Christian can do things as an officer of the State that he could not morally or legally do as an individual. Of course, the individual cannot do just anything the government might require. The government must first have the right to demand the action. The relevance of this analysis is obvious for if the government has the moral right to exercise the sword, and if the Christian can serve

as a government agent, then a Christian may act officially in a way not permitted him personally.

Carnal Warfare and the Police Principle

Non-pacifists frequently justify carnal warfare by asserting that the work of a soldier and the work of a policeman are analogous.²³⁷ The absolute nonresistant Christian agrees that there is no ethical difference between the two.²³⁸ However, to the Christian who distinguishes between moral and immoral use of force, there are certain particulars connected with modern warfare that separate it ethically from the work of the policeman. The disturbing fact is that modern means of warfare produce indiscriminate and almost irresponsible violence, while the police force employs discriminate and responsible violence. James Thayer Addison makes the following observation on the comparison between the customary police work and war:

. . . the police act only against those who actually break the law or are suspected of breaking it. They are expected to confine their energies to finding and arresting the guilty, and only those pronounced guilty by judge or jury are eventually punished. In war, on the contrary, the work of armed forces is so indiscriminate that no effort is made to confine the penalty of suffering to persons genuinely guilty. In addition to the vast destruction of property, thousands and even millions of innocent people on

²³⁷Boettner, op. cit., pp. 59ff.

²³⁸Hershberger, op. cit., pp. 162, 174.

both sides are killed or wounded. If city police, in the process of arresting a burglar, succeeded in destroying ten city blocks by fire and in shooting a hundred innocent citizens, their conduct would be open to public criticism. Yet such free-for-all "police" work is taken for granted in war.²³⁹

It appears that the theory behind the use of violence in carnal warfare is that since the real culprit is beyond immediate punishment, it is permissible to punish him indirectly by attacking his women-folk and children. Would a Christian approve of a law that would legalize the electrocution of a murderer's family and friends in the event he is not apprehended? It is clearly seen that carnal warfare is only remotely similar to the function of the police powers in society. It is possible, then, for a Christian to oppose modern warfare and yet to cooperate with and approve the police's action in putting down obvious criminals. Charles Raven's comment is pertinent:

My duty as a Christian citizen to arrest a burglar or to protect a lonely woman from rape has no sort of bearing upon my duty to smash up the homes and torture the families of men who are no more guilty than I am of any offense against morals or religion.²⁴⁰

War As A Lesser Evil

The contention that war is the lesser evil and is therefore justifiable is a disquieting concept and deserves

²³⁹Addison, op. cit., p. 18.

²⁴⁰Raven, op. cit., p. 152.

deeper analysis. The Christian with a conservative orientation toward the Scriptures, searches them for a justification of such a concept. Yet, he fails to discover an example in the Bible in which a Christian faced a predicament in which there was no behavior other than doing evil possible. Nor does he find instructions to guide his behavior in such instances (if such instances do occur). Rather, he is confronted with certain truths and commands that militate against doing evil at all.²⁴¹ The lesser evil concept invites a philosophical inquiry, posited in two questions: First, "Does God's providence place a Christian in a predicament in which he can do only evil?" Second, "Does a lesser evil lose its immoral nature if it is the better of two possible choices or if it results in good?" This concept also introduces the need for a practical evaluation, since its proponents are concerned with results of one's actions. Is thermo-nuclear war really a lesser evil? Not all are convinced that it is. Thomas Merton comments:

It is pure sophistry to claim that physical annihilation in nuclear war is a "lesser evil" than the difficult conditions under which these Christians (in Russia, AI) continue to live, perhaps with the heroism and sanctity preserving their faith and witnessing very effectively to Christ in the midst of atheism.²⁴²

²⁴¹See John 3:20; Rom. 3:8; 12:9; 1 Thess. 5:22; Rev. 22:11.

²⁴²Thomas Merton, "Nuclear War and Christian Responsibility," Commonweal LXXV (February 9, 1962), 51C.

The "better dead than red" slogan is countered with the calmer observation: "Certainly it is better to live in a 'red' society and have the opportunity to personally act for the inevitable humanizing of it, than simply to be incinerated."²⁴³

The opinion of this writer is that the lesser evil concept is a seductively dangerous principle and is without Scriptural basis. Therefore it must be rejected. The issue involved is whether war is ever a legitimate and lawful action by the Christian. If so, when it is waged, it should not be regarded as a "lesser evil," but as a moral course of conduct because it is right.

²⁴³Justus George Lawler, "Catholics and the Arms Race," Commonweal LXXVI (May 18, 1962), 201.

CHAPTER III

THE ANTE-NICENE CHURCH AND CARNAL WARFARE

In this chapter, attention will be focused on the opinion of the ante-Nicene Church regarding Christian participation in carnal warfare. An attempt will be made to understand what factor or factors induced this opinion.

Significance of the Ante-Nicene Church's Opinion

The position of the Church¹ from the period after the apostles until the Council of Nicea is significant because its teachers were frequently those who had personal contact, either with inspired men or with those who had. The writings during this period are also important because the authors were able to deal with Christian concepts without having their thoughts cluttered by a multitude of interpretations and prejudices, such as came in later centuries. Because of their obvious advantages, the ante-Nicene writers may be regarded as a primary source for checking one's interpretation of the New Testament. Religious groups are evidently cognizant of this fact for when their particular interpretation of the Scriptures is borne out by the

¹The term "Church" is used in this thesis in the broad sense of "Christendom." Its use does not necessarily mean that the writer believes that this "Church" was the same in doctrine or practice as the Church described in the New Testament.

ante-Nicene writers, they cite this agreement.

It is true that what the ante-Nicene Church taught and practiced does not constitute an inerrant commentary on the New Testament. Yet, it appears reasonable that if a modern interpretation or practice is at variance with the early post-apostolic Church, those advocating the belief or practice ought to demonstrate what advantage enables them to have a more accurate understanding of the teaching of the New Testament in this particular matter. The position of the early post-apostolic Church becomes more significant if it is consistently held for a considerable period of time.

I. ANTE-NICENE CHURCH'S OPINION

Opinion of Church Historians

C. J. Cadoux wrote that,

The evidence of a single Christian soldier between 60 and about 165 A.D. is exceedingly slight; and . . . the appeal of Celsus bears undeniable witness to a general aversion on the part of Christians to military service.²

Roland Bainton, the recently retired Titus Street Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the Yale Divinity School, relates that,

The age of persecution down to the time of Constantine was the age of pacifism to the degree that during this

²C. J. Cadoux, The Early Church and the World (Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 1925), pp. 275-276.

period no Christian author to our knowledge approved of Christian participation in battle.³

Also affirmed is that "from the end of the New Testament period to the decade A.D. 170-180 there is no evidence whatever of Christians in the army."⁴ Kenneth Scott Latourette listed engagement in carnal warfare as one of the issues regarding which the early Church was at variance with the Graeco-Roman world, adding that "for the first three centuries no Christian writing which has survived to our time condoned Christian participation in war."⁵ In his recent apology for the just war doctrine, Paul Ramsey concedes that "it seems fairly well established that the first Christians known to have been soldiers were recruits under the Stoic Marcus Aurelius fighting in the provinces on the Danube in A.D. 177."⁶

Evidence From Early Non-Canonical Documents

A pacifist attitude is clearly apparent in the earliest non-canonical documents.

³Roland Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War And Peace (New York: Abingdon Press, 1960), p. 66.

⁴Ibid., pp. 67-68.

⁵Kenneth Scott Latourette, A History of Christianity (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), pp. 242-243.

⁶Paul Ramsey, War and the Christian Conscience (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1961), pp. xvi-xvii.

Ignatius. Ignatius of Antioch, condemned as a Christian and sent to Rome to become prey to the wild beasts, exhorted the Ephesians to conquer their adversaries' harsh tempers by gentleness and meekness. He cited 2 Timothy 2:24-25 in urging them not to strive against the enemy. The Ephesians were not to avenge themselves when injured. In this they were to imitate the Lord.⁷ His exhortation is clearly that of a pacifist.

Justin Martyr. Justin Martyr (A.D. 110-165) assures the Emperor Antoninus Pius and the sovereign's adopted sons that Christians were amenable to governmental rule:

. . . everywhere we, more readily than all men, endeavour to pay to those appointed by you the taxes both ordinary and extraordinary, as we have been taught by Him; for that time some came to Him and asked Him, if one ought to pay tribute to Caesar; and He answered, "Tell me, whose image does the coin bear?" And they said, "Caesar's." And again He answered them, "Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's." Whence to God alone we render worship, but in other things we gladly serve you, acknowledging you as kings and rulers of men, and praying that with your kingly power you be found to possess also sound judgment.⁸

Despite this recognition of the kings and rulers, the

⁷Ignatius, Epistle to the Ephesians, x. The Ante-Nicene Fathers (American Reprint Edition; Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1956), I, 54. Hereafter referred to as ANF.

⁸Justin Martyr, The First Apology of Justin, xvii. ANF I, 168.

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Christians refused to wage war, as Justin remarks in his Dialogue with Trypho.

. . . we who were filled with war, and mutual slaughter, and every wickedness, have each through the whole earth changed our warlike weapons, -- our swords into plowshares, and our spears into implements of tillage, -- and we cultivate piety, righteousness, philanthropy, faith and hope. . . .⁹

Irenaeus. Irenaeus (A.D. 120-202) infers that the word of God caused such a transformation that the swords and war-lances were changed into plowshares and pruning hooks; that those adhering to the Lord became unaccustomed to fighting and when smitten offered the other cheek.¹⁰

Athenagoras. Another apologist, Athenagoras (circa 177), addressed an appeal to Marcus Aurelius and Commodus in which he charged that the Christians were plundered because of a name, rather than because of any unjust deeds. He, like Justin, emphasized that the Christians were most piously and righteously disposed towards the government.¹¹ But that they were pacifists, unwilling even to avenge themselves, is clearly stated:

We have learned, not only not to return blow for blow,

⁹Justin Martyr, Dialogue With Trypho, cx. ANF I, 254.

¹⁰Irenaeus, Against Heresies, IV, xxxiv, 4. ANF I, 512.

¹¹Athenagoras, A Plea For The Christians, i. ANF II, 129.

nor to go to law with those who plunder and rob us, but to those who smite us on one side of the face to offer the other side also, and to those who take away our coat to give likewise our cloak.¹²

Tertullian. Tertullian (A.D. 145-220) boasts of Christian participation in carnal fighting. In his Apology he refers to letters written by Marcus Aurelius in which the emperor bore "testimony that that Germanic drought was removed by the rains obtained through the prayers of the Christians who chanced to be fighting under him."¹³ In the same document is the boast: "We sail with you, and fight with you."¹⁴ In other writings, however, Tertullian unequivocally opposes Christians engaging in carnal warfare:

. . . now inquiry is made whether a believer may turn himself unto military service, and whether the military may be admitted unto the faith, even the rank and file, or each inferior grade, to whom there is no necessity for taking part in sacrifices or capital punishments. There is no agreement between the divine and the human sacrament, the standard of Christ and the standard of the devil, the camp of light and the camp of darkness. One soul cannot be due to two masters -- God and Caesar. . . . How will a Christian man war, nay, how will he serve even in peace, without a sword, which the Lord hath taken away? . . . The Lord . . . in disarming Peter, unbelted every soldier.¹⁵

The Chaplet, or De Corona, was written because a Christian

¹²Ibid.

¹³Tertullian, Apology, v. ANF III, 22.

¹⁴Ibid., xlii. ANF III, 49.

¹⁵Tertullian, On Idolatry, xix. ANF III, 73.

soldier, refusing to wear the laurel crown, was martyred. Tertullian comes to his defense and scathingly rebukes those who were in the same army, but less steadfast. In this treatise he argues that warfare is improper for Christians:

Shall it be held lawful to make an occupation of the sword, when the Lord proclaims that he who uses the sword shall perish by the sword? Shall the son of peace take part in the battle when it does not become him even to sue at law? And shall he apply the chain, and the prison, and the torture, and the punishment, who is not the avenger even of his own wrongs? . . . And shall he keep guard before the temples which he has renounced? . . . Then how many offences there are involved in the performances of camp offices, which we must hold to involve a transgression of God's law, you may see by a slight survey.¹⁶

How shall these two attitudes expressed by Tertullian be reconciled? One common explanation is that he changed his mind, that when he wrote the Apology he was a Catholic and not a pacifist, but that when he wrote On Idolatry he had joined the Montanists and was therefore a pacifist. Bainton answers that the Apology was not anti-pacifist, referring to the sentence in which Tertullian says, "for what war should we not be fit, not eager, even with uneven forces, we who so willingly yield ourselves to the sword, if in our religion it were not counted better to be slain than to slay."¹⁷ He also argues that On Idolatry must be

¹⁶Tertullian, The Chaplet, xi. ANF III, 99-100.

¹⁷Tertullian, Apology, xxxvii. ANF III, 45.

ascribed to a date prior to Tertullian's conversion to Montanism.¹⁸ C. J. Cadoux agrees, saying, "The chronology of his writings show that his disapproval of military service for Christians dated from the beginning of his literary career, and was not a late development."¹⁹ Cadoux reconciles Tertullian's boast of the presence of Christians in the army and his argument, in other treatises, that the military service is inappropriate for Christians by saying,

Unless a writer is under an obligation to explain his whole mind on a subject every time he mentions it in a purely incidental way, the charge of disingenuousness is unwarranted. Each time that Tertullianus spoke to pagans of Christian soldiers without reproaching them, he was simply adverting to an obvious and admitted fact in order to prove something else. It would have been futile and irrelevant to introduce into a demonstration to pagans of the ubiquity and large numbers of the Christians a discussion on quite a different topic, particularly one upon which Christian opinion was divided. And as it happens, he does mention to the pagans quite plainly and in the immediate context the Christian objection to killing people in war.²⁰

Minucius Felix. A contemporary of Tertullian, Minucius Felix, wrote a polemic to the charge that Christians murdered an infant and drank its blood as an initiatory rite. This was a preposterous accusation for, in Minucius Felix's words, "To us it is not lawful either to see or to hear of

¹⁸Bainton, op. cit., p. 76.

¹⁹Cadoux, op. cit., p. 428.

²⁰Ibid.

homicide; and so much do we shrink from human blood, that we do not use the blood even of eatable animals in our food."²¹

Hippolytus. Hippolytus (A.D. 170?-235), prominent in Rome, wrote what he conceived to be the apostolic tradition. Two of the "Hippolytean Cannons" specified:

13. Persons who possess authority to kill, or soldiers, should not kill at all, even when it is commanded them, and should not utter any evil word.

14. No Christian should go and become a soldier, unless he is compelled to. Let not a commander, who has a sword, draw any (guilty of) bloodshed upon himself.²²

Origen. Origen (A.D. 185-254) undertook to answer the keen criticisms of Celsus. At one place he says, "We no longer take up 'sword against nation,' nor do we 'learn war any more,' having become children of peace, for the sake of Jesus who is our leader."²³ Later in the treatise, Origen answers the taunt that Christians ought to fight for the king by saying that the Christians gave the emperor divine help. He even boasts that their prayers were a more effective defense of the commonwealth than that made by arms. Origen's document reveals that the Christians were not

²¹Minucius Felix, The Octavius of Minucius Felix, xxx. ANF IV, 192.

²²Apostolic Tradition, quoted by Cadoux, op. cit., pp. 432-433.

²³Origen, Against Celsus, V, xxxii. ANF IV, 558.

totally unconcerned about the empire and its fate, for they wrestled in prayer to God "on behalf of those who are fighting in a righteous cause, and for the king who reigns righteously, that whatever is opposed to those who act righteously may be destroyed!"²⁴ This concern for the commonwealth, however, was not expressed by engaging war: "We do not indeed fight under him, although he require it; but we fight on his behalf, forming a special army -- an army of piety -- by offering our prayers to God."²⁵

Cyprian. Cyprian (A.D. 200?-258), Bishop of Carthage, displayed a pacifist conviction in his remark that,

the whole world is wet with mutual blood; and murder, which in the case of an individual is admitted to be a crime, is called a virtue when it is committed wholesale. Impunity is claimed for the wicked deeds, not on the plea that they are guiltless, but because the cruelty is perpetrated on a grand scale.²⁶

Arnobius. Arnobius (died c. A.D. 326) alleged that wars were in great measure diminished because of the restraining influence that Christianity had upon the furious passions of men. The Christian ideal was inimical to warfare:

²⁴Ibid., VIII, lxxii. ANF IV, 667-668.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Cyprian, The Epistles of Cyprian, I, vi. ANF V,

. . . we . . . have learned from His teaching and His laws that evil ought not to be requited with evil, that it is better to suffer wrong than to inflict it, that we should rather shed our own blood than stain our hands and our conscience with that of another, an ungrateful world is now for a long period enjoying a benefit from Christ, inasmuch as by His means the age of savage ferocity has been softened, and has begun to withhold hostile hands from the blood of a fellow-creature.²⁷

Lactantius. Lactantius (c. A.D. 220-330) was unequivocal in his stand against Christians engaging in battle:

. . . when God forbids us to kill, He not only prohibits us from open violence, which is not even allowed by the public laws, but He warns us against the commission of those things which are esteemed lawful among men. Thus it will be neither lawful for a just man to engage in warfare, since his warfare is justice itself, nor to accuse any one of a capital charge. . . . Therefore, with regard to this precept of God . . . it is always unlawful to put to death a man whom God willed to be a sacred animal.²⁸

II. REASON FOR THE ANTE-NICENE CHURCH'S PACIFISM

Why the ante-Nicene Church expressed a pacifist attitude is a subject on which varied opinions are entertained. Undoubtedly, each of the factors that are commonly offered in explanation had a degree of influence over the Church's decision. However, it is desired to know the one factor

²⁷Arnobius, Against the Heathen, I, vi. ANF VI, 415.

²⁸Lactantius, The Divine Institutes, VI, xx. ANF VII, 187.

that most influenced the early Christians to adopt the pacifist position.

Forced Pacifism

One explanation is that the Christians were in a predicament in which any other action than passiveness would have been senseless. Clavier observes that,

. . . neither Jesus nor Stephen, nor Peter and John ever used means of resistance other than those of speech and behaviour. Some will draw from this fact the conclusion that under no circumstances can Christian resistance be expressed otherwise. Is this limitation in the outward expression of resistance the result of an imperative and essential claim, which is the same for all men at all times and in all places, or does it arise in regard to particular circumstances and callings? No other form of resistance was possible in the early Church. . . . Any revolt, individual or collective, would have been mere insanity.²⁹

Reply. In reply to this explanation it may be said that to suggest that the five thousand men who believed and who were in Jerusalem at the stoning of Stephen had to stand by passively is an incredible assumption. Also, Tertullian called attention to the fact that "we are but of yesterday, and we have filled every place among you," and that the Christians could have been a formidable foe for an army to

²⁹Henri Clavier, The Duty and Right of Resistance According to the Bible and the Church (Oxford: Blackwell's 1956), p. 49.

face had they chosen this method and manner of life.³⁰ The Church's pacifism does not seem to have been dictated primarily by an unalterable circumstance of weakness.

Social Aloofness

The pacifism of the ante-Nicene Church is attributed to its social aloofness. Clavier says that to have a real appreciation of the cause for the early Church's nonresistant attitude, one must not underestimate the fact that it did not have any special culture, country or nation to defend.³¹

Reply. The supposition that the Christians were pacifists because they were socially indifferent is untenable. Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, and Origen contend that the Christians were righteously and piously disposed towards the government. More readily than all other men did the Christians pay their taxes and acknowledge the role of kings and rulers in the affairs of men. Moreover, the early Christians were portrayed as wrestlers in prayer to God on behalf of the king and the cause of justice.³²

³⁰Tertullian, Apology, loc. cit.

³¹Clavier, op. cit., p. 61.

³²Justin Martyr, The First Apology of Justin Martyr, loc. cit.; Athenagoras, loc. cit.; Origen, Against Celsus, V, xxxii. ANF V, 558.

It is true that if read out of context, some of the early non-canonical documents might leave the impression of social indifference. For instance, Tertullian comments that the affairs of state were entirely foreign to most Christians.³³ An examination of the context reveals that this "indifference" was not due to social aloofness, but because of a concern for the whole world. Tertullian explains his remarks by saying, "We acknowledge one all-embracing commonwealth -- the world."³⁴ Further, he instructs his readers of the fact that Christians prayed for the prevalence of peace, which is an expression of present concern.³⁵

Aversion to a Persecuting Power

A third explanation is that the Church was pacifist because of its aversion to Rome as a persecuting adversary. Charles Hodge asserted that this was the real source of the Christians' opposition to entering the army.³⁶

Reply. This contention hardly squares with the claims of the Christians that they were prayerfully disposed towards the government, nor does it fit the historical facts.

³³Tertullian, Apology, XXXVIII. ANF III, 45-46.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid., XXXIX.

³⁶Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology (New York: Charles Scribner, Armstrong, and Company, 1873), III, 367.

Although the Christian religion was illegal and involved constant peril in the form of sporadic, local persecutions, there was no universal and systematic persecution until A.D. 250 when Decius (A.D. 249-251) attempted to return to the old gods and to eliminate the newer religions, such as Christianity.³⁷ Yet, the Church's most consistent and absolute pacifist witness was during the time prior to A.D. 250. Another historical fact that refutes the idea that the Christians were pacifist because Rome was a persecuting power is that the first known instance of Christians belonging to the army (after the New Testament times) is during the reign of Marcus Aurelius (A.D. 161-180) who initiated a brief period of persecution against the Church.

Fear of Idolatry

A fourth reason adduced for the aversion of the ante-Nicene Church to military service is the problem of idolatry in connection with the cult of the deified emperor. Ramsey claims that,

The early Christians avoided the life of a soldier . . . in order to avoid the requirement of emperor-worship, since everyone whose office was that of a soldier or commander, judge or magistrate, was forced on numerous occasions to throw incense on the altar.³⁸

³⁷Williston Walker, A History of the Christian Church (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, Revised Edition, 1959), pp. 43, 80.

³⁸Ramsey, op. cit., p. xv.

Therefore, he conjectures: "A religious refusal to commit idolatry may have been the main motive, and not always a refusal, on ethical grounds, to engage in war."³⁹

Reply. Undoubtedly, idolatry was a problem in some circumstances. However, Tertullian infers that the rank and file soldier was under no necessity to take part in the idolatrous sacrifices.⁴⁰ Tertullian's claim that idolatry was avoidable in the army is probably true for,

. . . one cannot well understand how the Church could have permitted its members -- as it did -- to remain in the service even in peacetime in the pre-Constantinian period, if idolatry had been unavoidable.⁴¹

Eschatology

The eschatological expectations of the early Christians is suggested as the cause of their pacifism. The belief that the Lord was to come immediately supposedly made the Christians indifferent to matters of a temporal nature. Cadoux, claiming that the early Church believed that Jesus would again be sent by God within the lifetime of that generation, observes:

It was obviously impossible to anticipate the break-up of the existing order of things at any time within

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Tertullian, On Idolatry, loc. cit.

⁴¹Bainton, op. cit., p. 74.

the next thirty years, without having one's whole attitude to the conditions of earthly life profoundly modified by the belief. The obvious effect of such a view was to foster a sentiment of "other-worldliness," in which all the usual tasks, enterprises, and interests of human life faded into comparative insignificance.⁴²

Reinhold Niebuhr asserts that the ethical rigor of the early Church was maintained through the hope of the second coming of Christ and that when the hope of the parousia waned, the rigor of the Christian ethic gradually dissipated.⁴³

Reply. This hypothesis may be successfully answered. The early Church was not unconcerned about temporal matters.⁴⁴ Further, the pacifist writers in the ante-Nicene Church did not necessarily expect or desire the parousia of Jesus immediately. Tertullian said that the Christians prayed for the delay of the final consummation!⁴⁵ That the pacifism of the early Church was not due to its eschatological expectations is evident from the fact that "in the period when pacifism was prevalent in the early Church . . . the expectation of the Lord's speedy return was long since

⁴²Gadoux, op. cit., pp. 84-85.

⁴³Reinhold Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), pp. 60-61.

⁴⁴See pp. 24-25 of this thesis.

⁴⁵Tertullian, Apology, loc. cit.

waning."⁴⁶ Bainton points out that Hippolytus and Lactantius placed the second coming several hundred years after their time and that Origen spiritualized the entire concept.⁴⁷ It would be difficult to trace these men's pacifism to their eschatological expectations!

Ethical Convictions

It seems only reasonable to this writer to assume that the early ante-Nicene Church refused to participate in carnal warfare because of ethical convictions. A Christian was forbidden to retaliate when injured and the ethic of love for all men was regarded as denying recourse to bloodshed.⁴⁸

III. CHANGE FROM ABSOLUTE PACIFISM

The ante-Nicene Church was not absolutely consistent in its pacifist persuasion. The historical facts are that no extant writings indicate the presence of Christians in the army prior to the decade A.D. 170-180.⁴⁹ However, from

⁴⁶Bainton, op. cit., p. 75.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 76.

⁴⁸See Tertullian, Apology, xxxvii, ANF III, 45; Of Patience, vi. ANF III, 711; Cyprian, On The Advantage of Patience, xvi. ANF V, 488. Ramsey is forced to acknowledge this view, op. cit., p. xvi. Bainton is of this persuasion, op. cit., p. 77 and so is Gadoux, op. cit., p. 103.

⁴⁹See Bainton, op. cit., pp. 67-68; Gadoux, op. cit., pp. 275-276; Ramsey, loc. cit.

A.D. 180-250, there is evidence of a considerable number of Christians serving in the imperial armies.⁵⁰ This change from pacifism (until Constantine's accession) was not a radical one and appears to have been influenced to some extent by the geographical location of the churches. Bainton discovered that "pacifism best flourished within the interior of the Pax Romana and was less prevalent in the frontier provinces menaced by the barbarians."⁵¹ He also conjectures that Rome (lenient in many matters) "may have been ahead of other Christian communities in relaxing opposition to the military profession."⁵² The greatest objector to Christians being in the army seems to have been the Hellenistic East.⁵³

Constantine's vision and subsequent victory over Maxentius at the Mulvian bridge on October 28, 312, were to radically change the Church's opinion regarding the morality of carnal warfare. The Imperial Church will formulate a Christian ethic of war which will become known

⁵⁰Gadour, op. cit., pp. 417-418.

⁵¹Bainton, op. cit., p. 69.

⁵²Ibid., p. 70. He finds this plausible because "of the pre-Constantinian inscriptions mentioning Christian soldiers, one is from Desancon, one from Phrygia and six from Rome." Ibid.

⁵³Ibid., pp. 71-72.

as the just war doctrine. In subsequent centuries, the major portion of Christendom will hold to this doctrine.⁵⁴

⁵⁴The new attitude was not universally acceptable. Cadoux observes that "the 'Testament of our Lord,' which forbids a soldier to be baptized unless he leaves the service, and forbids a Christian to become a soldier on the pain of excommunication, was compiled in Asia Minor (or possibly Syria) not earlier than the middle of the fourth century. The 'Egyptian Church-Order,' which lays down the same ruling, with the modification that, if a soldier has been received into membership and is commanded to kill, he is not to do it, and if he does he is to be rejected, is usually thought to belong to the first half of the fourth century. . . . The existence of these Church-Orders is conclusive proof that, in large sections of the Christian community, the decision taken by official Christendom . . . was not accepted." *Op. cit.*, p. 590. Several examples demonstrate that some in the Church were still sensitive to the Church's earlier position of pacifism. Theogenes of Phrygia refused to allow himself to be enrolled in the legions, despite the presence of other Christian soldiers; Martin of Tours left the army the day before a battle; Victricius took a similar step; Paulinus of Nola (c. 400 A.D.) wrote a letter persuading a friend to do the same; Basilus rendered the opinion that those who had shed blood in war should abstain from communion for three years. See *ibid.*, p. 591.

CHAPTER IV

THE JUST WAR DOCTRINE

In this chapter, the requirements of the just war will be delineated, along with a discussion of their present-day validity. Special attention will be given to the rights of noncombatants and the effect of the tactic of obliteration bombing on those rights.

It is well to state the contribution of this chapter to the subject of this thesis. The pertinency of this chapter lies in the fact that those who uphold Christian participation in warfare prefer that some moral restraints be observed. The purpose of this chapter has been to discuss the restraints commonly urged. The most pertinent issue is the rights of noncombatants and how those rights are affected by the modern practice of obliteration bombing.

I. GENERAL INFORMATION

As the preceding chapter showed, the early Christians refused to serve in the military. Ironically, the time was to come when only Christians could serve as soldiers. Theodosius the Younger (A.D. 408-450) proved his Christian avidity by excluding the adherents of paganism from the army

and other public offices.¹ The change from pacifism to active militarism was caused by the accession of Constantine. Under him, the Church embraced the belief that Rome and Christianity were conjoint works of God and that to defend the one was to defend the other. This thinking was further encouraged by the fact that the invading tribes were also Arians. This drastic transition in thinking made a Christian ethic of warfare inevitable.² The Church sought a golden mean between absolute pacifism and the barbaric notion that force is not subject to moral restraints. The attempted mean is called "the just war doctrine."

Requirements of the Just War Doctrine

The basic framework of the just war doctrine, as it has been traditionally received, may be stated in a series of fundamental propositions. These propositions may be listed as follows:³ First, war must be the last resort.

¹John Lawrence Von Mosheim, Ecclesiastical History (New Haven: A. H. Maltby, 1832), I, 371.

²Ambrose, educated in Rome for a civil career and appointed governor over a considerable part of northern Italy before his election to the bishopric of Milan, appears to have been the first to compose a Christian ethic of war. See Roland Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace (New York: Abingdon Press, 1950), p. 35.

³These tenets are universally recognized as forming the framework of the traditional just war doctrine. See John K. Ryan, Modern War and Basic Ethics (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1944), pp. 39-40; Felayo Zamayon, "Morality of War Today and In The Future," Theology Digest V (Winter, 1957), 2; Bainton, op. cit., pp. 244-246.

All pacific methods to effect reconciliation must be exhausted before belligerent methods are justified. The grave injury must be in no other way reparable than by taking up arms.

Second, only one side is justified in fighting. This legacy from Augustine is echoed by John K. Ryan who observes that war is "always wrong on at least one side."⁴ Therefore, it is correct to say that war is always wrong, that is, it is always wrong for one side. Although both antagonists may believe themselves in the right, this is impossible. Also, both parties may be equally at fault. If so, neither is justified in continuing the conflict.

Third, the war must have an adequate cause. To gratify ambition or cupidity is evil. The war must have purer causes. Angus Dun and Reinhold Niebuhr assert that "a war 'to defend the victims of wanton aggression,' where the demands of justice join the demands of order, is today the clearest case of a just war."⁵ Wanton aggression is not the only injury which is regarded as an adequate cause for war. John K. Ryan maintains that an injury to honor or reputation, as well as a refusal to grant the rights of

⁴Ryan, op. cit., p. 38.

⁵Angus Dun and Reinhold Niebuhr, "God Wills Both Justice and Peace," Christianity and Crisis XV (June 13, 1955), 78.

trade and travel constitute a just cause for resorting to arms.⁶

Fourth, the war must have a legitimate aim. This may be either to restore peace or to chastize the evildoer.

Fifth, the war must be prosecuted in a proper spirit. The spirit that is to characterize the Christian soldier is love.

Sixth, the war must be waged by the proper authority in the community. Loraine Boettner reminds his readers that the right of judgment concerning war has been committed of God to the government in much the same way that the right of judgment concerning accused persons is committed to the courts.⁷

Seventh, the execution of the war must be just. Certain rules of behavior have been acknowledged as proper wartime deportment. Wanton violence, atrocities, profanation of sacred institutions, and direct attack upon noncombatants are a few actions banned in a morally prosecuted war.

Eighth, the war must have the promise of beneficial victory. If the probable havoc outweighs the benefits of victory, a nation, though suffering injustice, is not justified in waging a war. The grievance in this instance

⁶Ryan, op. cit., p. 30.

⁷Lorraine Boettner, The Christian Attitude Toward War (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1942), p. 69.

must remain unavenged. Calculation of probable favorable consequences does not in itself establish the rightfulness of a belligerent action, but it must be made before war is resorted to.

The just war doctrine has never been a frozen formula, but has been amplified and modified as circumstances changed. This fluidity has as its peril the possibility that each generation will pragmatically justify what it intends to do by embracing dubious alterations in these moral guidelines. Ramsey cautions against this conscience-easing impulse, suggesting that if modern warfare is unjustifiable and necessarily immoral, it must be so admitted.⁸

II. VALIDITY OF THE DOCTRINE

Changes, technical and otherwise, call for moralists to reassess accepted ethical principles in the light of immediate circumstances and then to render a judgment as to the relevancy of these principles. The evolution of certain battle tactics, coupled with the demolitionary potential of nuclear weapons, elicits the controverted question as to whether a modern war can be prosecuted within the ethical precincts delineated by the historical just war doctrine. In this debate regarding the validity and applicability of

⁸Ramsey, op. cit., p. xxii.

the just war doctrine, three positions are taken: (1) that the principles are still valid and must be applied; (2) that the principles must be modified to become relevant; and (3) that the principles cannot be made relevant.

Principles Are Still Valid

An eminent advocate of these historic principles, John K. Ryan, writes:

It is far from being true that the essential scholastic doctrine is dead, or that it will not bear critical examination and must, therefore, be dismissed as being devoid of logical reality for a political order such as that which obtains in the modern world.⁹

This claim is apodictically verified by the argument that as human nature remains constant, the general ethical laws governing behavior will subsist.¹⁰ Ryan also cites as proof the fact that,

Even the most brutal and cynical aggressors insist that they are defending only their own rights and that they have turned to war as a last resort, having exhausted all peaceful means. In other words, all people and governments at war strive to convince the world that they fulfill the demands of the scholastic ethic of a justifiable war.¹¹

In defending Christian participation in warfare, Loraine Boettner affirms that "there is such a thing as just

⁹Ryan, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 3.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 3-4.

war."¹²

Applicable but abandoned. There is an imposing group who claim that the traditional doctrine is applicable, but that it has been abandoned in modern times. John Courtney Murray, a Jesuit scholar and editor of Theological Studies, points out that,

. . . the tendency to query the uses of the Catholic doctrine arises from the fact that it has for so long not been used, even by Catholics. That is, it has not been made the basis for a sound critique of public policies, and as a means for the formation of a right public opinion.¹³

The classic example which Professor Murray cites to illustrate the abandonment of the doctrine is the policy of unconditional surrender during World War II. This policy, in his estimation, clearly violated the requirement of the "right intention" principle of the just war doctrine. He adds, "I think it is true to say that the traditional doctrine was irrelevant during World War II."¹⁴

Thomas E. Murray, a Roman Catholic who served on the Atomic Energy Commission, insists that "human reason has never refuted these high principles; the will of man has

¹²Boettner, op. cit., p. 9.

¹³John Courtney Murray, "Theology and Modern War," Morality and Modern Warfare, ed. William J. Nagle (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1960), p. 83. Hereafter referred to as Morality and Modern Warfare.

¹⁴Ibid.

simply abandoned them."¹⁵ This abandonment is held to be responsible for the present international insecurity. Murray says, "This and not the discovery of atomic energy, lies at the root of the terror experienced by the world at the thought of war."¹⁶ He urges that it is imperative to reclaim a fidelity to these norms.¹⁷

Principles Must Be Modified

A second position regarding the relevancy of the just war doctrine is that the traditional demands are too arbitrary and unrealistic for modern circumstances. However, by a slight modification, the principles can be made once more relevant. For instance, the proposition that only one side is justified appears to portray international conflicts as a wholly good vs. wholly evil struggle. Therefore, some, regarding such an appraisal as the acme of naivete, modify this demand so that one side must possess only a "margin of justice." In essence, war must be viewed as a grey vs. darker grey contest. No one side is exclusively right or wrong.¹⁸

¹⁵Thomas E. Murray, "Morality and Security: The Forgotten Equation," Morality and Modern Warfare, p. 61.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 66.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 66-67.

¹⁸Bainton remarks: "Most Christian adherents of the just-war theory have given up the claim to exclusive justice, and now maintain only an edge of justice." Op. cit., p. 244.

Another modification is regarding what constitutes an adequate cause for armed action. John Ryan believes that the justifying causes have not substantially changed from earlier centuries. In his comparatively modern study of the just war doctrine, he postulates that an injury to honor and a refusal to grant the rights of trade and travel constitute a justification for war.¹⁹ Professor Murray and others dissent from this view, saying, "No minor infraction of the rights will suffice, much less any question of national prestige."²⁰ Murray interprets Pius XII as saying that no sovereign state has the right to redress any infringed legal right.²¹ The traditional causes for war must be revised to read that a nation may battle only if it is unjustly attacked and menaced in its vital rights; therefore having to act to assure its survival.

Principles Cannot Be Made Relevant

The third position is that the traditional doctrine is not now relevant and cannot be made so by a mere revision of some of its tenets. Edward T. Gargan, associate professor of history at Loyola University, acknowledges that "we admit privately, though hardly ever in public discussion;

¹⁹Ryan, op. cit., p. 30

²⁰John Courtney Murray, op. cit., p. 79.

²¹Ibid., pp. 75-76.

that the doctrine of the just war has played no role in modern history."²² He meaningfully adds: "We do not expect it to be significant."²³ Gordon C. Zahn, a Catholic sociologist, contends that the unwillingness of Church spokesmen to denounce a war as being unjust once their nation is engaged in it, reduces "the whole structure of the 'just war-unjust war' theology to the status of a patently useless and socially meaningless intellectual exercise."²⁴ The report presented to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in 1951 stated that "any doctrine of the Just War which is based upon the idea of an accepted code of behaviour to be enforced upon, or accepted by, warring powers is unreal in the present circumstances."²⁵ An appropriate summary-statement of this position was made by the Archdeacon of Stoke-on-Trent in the minority report for the Anglican Committee on the Church and the Atom:

I suggest that the whole conception of the just war should be abandoned and that the Church should start with the actual facts of modern war and consider them

²²Edward T. Gargan, "Conscience and the Modern Tyrant," Commonweal LXXVI (May 18, 1962), 208.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Gordon C. Zahn, "Social Science and the Theology of War," Morality and Modern Warfare, p. 118.

²⁵Quoted by G. H. C. Macgregor, The New Testament Basis of Pacifism and the Relevance of an Impossible Ideal (Nyack, New York: Fellowship Publications, 1960), p. 98.

de novo in the light of the New Testament revelation of the character of the will of God.²⁶

Why validity of the doctrine is denied. There are several reasons why the above men are convinced that the traditional doctrine is irrelevant and inapplicable. One reason is because they regard the tenets declaring that only one side is justified and that the war must have an adequate cause as useless, having no practical value since the individual has no way of discovering such facts. To be of value, the margin of justice (if this be all that is insisted upon) and the adequacy of the cause must either be perceptible to the individual or in some way made known to him. In the absence of a truly impartial judicator, how is the Christian to know these things? Who should make these qualitative decisions?

Should the individual be held responsible for making such momentous decisions? Boettner urges every Christian to keep himself intelligently informed regarding world events so that he can act responsibly in a crisis.²⁷ The obvious difficulty is that an individual is deprived of classified information and is often misled by erroneous information

²⁶Quoted by Ralph L. Moellering, Modern War And The American Churches (New York: American Press, 1956), pp. 121-122.

²⁷Boettner, op. cit., p. 69.

purposely given out by the government.

The U.S. News and World Report revealed that on October 29, 1962, Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, admitted that the government had been "managing" and "controlling" news reports during the Cuban crisis. Mr. Sylvester described news as,

. . . part of the weaponry that a President has in the application of military force and related forces to the solution of political problems, or to the application of international political pressure.²⁸

He further added that in a strained situation, news becomes a weapon of the government and that "the results, in my opinion, justify the methods we used."²⁹ On October 31, 1962, the Washington "Evening Star" commented editorially:

It subsequently was revealed that only those portions of the news were made available by Mr. Sylvester which he and other omniscient manipulators of public opinion decided, in their infinite wisdom, would best serve to create the "image" of this country's activities they wished to manufacture and place before our people and the world. . . .

The kind of world "we live in" seems now to be a world in which the truth given the American people . . . is that part of the truth selected by officialdom to piece together a desirable image.³⁰

The Charlotte, North Carolina, "News" recalled that on

²⁸"Managed News -- A New Weapon In U.S. Arsenal," U.S. News and World Report LIII (November 12, 1962), 48.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Quoted by ibid.

October 15 and 16, after pictures had been taken of the Soviet missiles, the State Department assured newsmen that the Russian buildup in Cuba was defensive.³¹

To make an intelligent decision regarding the justness of a war, the Christian needs an objective appraisal of the circumstances, not a managed, image-creating report. If the individual is deprived of necessary information, and if he is purposely deceived by the government through the news media, can he make an intelligent decision?³²

Should the hierarchy of a religious group be held responsible for making the decision as to the justness of the war on behalf of the individual member? The hierarchy is scarcely in a better position to make a valid moral pronouncement concerning such issues than is the individual. Propaganda and subtle social pressures will influence the decision that the ecclesiastics will render. A study by Zahn, concerning the attitude of the German Catholic episcopacy toward Hitler's wars, demonstrates that the hierarchy is not a dependable source for the decisions in question. The study reveals,

. . . overwhelming evidence that the German bishops in general supported these wars, that the truly great

³¹ Quoted by ibid.

³² Zahn suggests that the individual should carefully note the information that is available and then make the best moral judgment possible. Op. cit., p. 119.

Von Galen, Faulhaber, and Conrad Brober gave their positive moral weight to the wars, and that the Catholic Military Bishop made the Nazi war effort virtually a sacred service for the Catholic soldier.³³

Should the individual simply permit his government to decide upon these matters? If the individual is doubtful as to his ability to make an incontrovertible decision as to the justness of the war, Boettner suggests "he should obey the order from his government . . . realizing that as a private citizen he may not be in possession of all of the important facts."³⁴

As a solution to this vexing problem, it has been suggested that the individual not concern himself too much over it, because such decisions must be postponed until a future time since known justice is something reserved for the future historian who will have access to the files of both nations. Ryan states:

The justice of the issues involved is often unknown and cannot be known by the politicians who decide for war and especially by the people who fight and suffer. Known justice is hence said to be something for future historians and the readers of history yet to be written. . . . Hence it sometimes happens that only after the struggle is over, if even then, is it possible to discern moral realities, to establish which of the two contestants was actually the unjust aggressor, which, if either, was acting in just self-defense.³⁵

³³Quoted by Gargan, op. cit., 209.

³⁴Boettner, op. cit., p. 69.

³⁵Ryan, op. cit., p. 121.

This prudent postponement was the attitude of the German Catholic episcopacy during World War II. In a pamphlet issued by a Catholic publisher, a German theologian considered the question of what was to be done. His advice was:

This is not the time to even raise the question of the just war; instead, the only course open to the individual is to do his best with faith in the cause of his people. A scientific judgment concerning causes and origins of the war is absolutely impossible today because the prerequisites for such a judgment are not available to us. This must wait until a later time when the documents of both sides are available.³⁶

The validity of the doctrine is also denied because it unrealistically demands that war be prosecuted in the spirit of love. That it is possible for some to fight without rancor and in a benevolent disposition is not disputed, but the possibility is remote "in the frenzy of battle when passions are unleashed and hate becomes the slogan."³⁷

The validity of the doctrine is also denied because the modus operandi which a nation must employ to be victorious in a grim-visaged hostility is incompatible with the demand that the war be morally executed. The specific point in question pertains to the rights and protection

³⁶Quoted by Zahn, op. cit., pp. 118-119.

³⁷Bainton, op. cit., p. 246. This point will be more fully discussed as one of the arguments against a Christian participating in warfare.

traditionally offered to noncombatants by the doctrine. The discussion regarding modern warfare and noncombatants is entitled to special attention because it is the crux of the debate regarding the pertinence of the just war doctrine.

III. COMBATANTS AND NONCOMBATANTS

The scholastic doctrine stipulates that noncombatants are to be distinguished from combatants. These two groups are referred to as the "innocent" and the "guilty." However, this may be a confusing distinction because noncombatants may be more psychologically and spiritually "guilty" than a front line soldier. An elderly woman may be more emotionally vicious against the enemy and cherish a less charitable heart than an actual combatant. But, because she does not add to the actual strength of the forces that must be repelled, she is termed "innocent" or "noncombatant."

Definition of Noncombatant

Who is a noncombatant? What determines the difference between a combatant and a noncombatant? John G. Ford says that the latter are those

. . . innocent of the violent and destructive action of war, or of any close participation in the violent and destructive action of war. It is such participation alone that would make them legitimate targets of violent repression themselves.³⁸

³⁸John G. Ford, "The Hydrogen Bombing of Cities," Morality and Modern Warfare, p. 98.

In earlier centuries, it was apparent who was and who was not a combatant. However, a clear distinction is now difficult for many to affirm. A few seem to clearly stand outside the immediate hostilities: children, the elderly, the infirm, the afflicted and possibly the conscientious objectors. Outside of these, universal agreement as to who can be designated as a noncombatant ceases.

The most liberal estimate of the number of noncombatants is the figure given by Ford who estimates, for example, that 75% of the people in the New York-Newark area are not legitimate targets for direct attack.³⁹ He arrives at such a liberal figure because of his conviction that making a contribution to the war effort does not necessarily make one a combatant. His illustration is:

A ten year old girl saves bottle caps for the scrap steel drive. She contributes to the war effort. In fact, she helps to make munitions. May I shoot her down on the theory that she is a combatant?⁴⁰

Not everyone accepts Ford's estimate or his analysis.⁴¹

This disagreement is caused, in part, by a prior dispute over the character of modern war.

³⁹Ibid., pp. 99-100.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Lawrence L. McReavy, a Roman Catholic, insinuates that only infants are innocent in modern war. See Ramsey, op. cit., pp. 73-75.

The character of modern war. The significant factor which makes modern belligerency radically different from that of former times is that today all of a nation's human and natural resources are absorbed and ultimately utilized in prosecuting a struggle to a successful end. Modern war is epithetically referred to as "total." The report presented to the Federal Council of Churches differentiated between war being "total" because it involves a mobilization of all resources for the war effort, and war being "total" because all moral restraints are cast aside, with the battle being fought on the basis of sheer military expediency.⁴² Ford adamantly denies that modern war is "total" in the first sense mentioned in the report. He asserts that war is not total because "all civilians, or almost all of them, or anywhere near the majority of them, are waging it, that is, prosecuting it by violent action, or by cooperating closely in its violent prosecution."⁴³ War is total only because "the civilian population can be subjected to total violent attack and totally annihilated by it."⁴⁴

Is war total because all resources, both human and

⁴²"Christian Conscience and Weapons of Mass Destruction," Christianity and Crisis X (December 11, 1950), 164. Hereafter referred to as "Christian Conscience And Weapons of Mass Destruction."

⁴³Ford, op. cit., p. 99.

⁴⁴Ford, ibid.

natural, are mobilized for the effort, or only because the civilians can be totally annihilated? The diversity of persuasion on this question divides those who believe that the scholastic distinction between combatants and noncombatants is valid and must be observed and those who deny this.

Protection of Noncombatants Is No Longer Necessary

William V. O'Brien, an authority in international law, shows that the principle of protecting noncombatants, once a firmly established principle among nations, "has collapsed under the pressures of modern wars, and can no longer be relied upon as a legal limitation of modern weapons."⁴⁵ Right or wrong, nations no longer feel constrained to consider the immunity of noncombatants as inviolable. Why has this once firmly established principle collapsed? Several factors probably account for this.

Concept of total war. One reason is because modern warfare is claimed to involve the energies of the whole nation. As the report to the Federal Council of Churches stated, in the event of a major war the involvement of the whole nation is unavoidable.⁴⁶ Accordingly, the cities are

⁴⁵William V. O'Brien, "Nuclear Warfare and the Law of Nations," Morality and Modern Warfare, p. 135.

⁴⁶"Christian Conscience and Weapons of Mass Destruction," loc. cit.

war arsenals, providing factories, power plants, fuel refineries, transportation and communication facilities, and a host of other services designed to aid the war enterprise. The citizens of these cities are vital, even in their civilian pursuits, to the war program. Therefore, they lose their identity as non-participants in the war. Because their contribution is pertinent, they may be regarded as active in the war and are therefore proper targets of attack. The character of modern war makes it practically impossible to distinguish between the guilty and the innocent. C. C. Morrison undertook the task to show that all Americans were implicated in World War II. For all practical effects, his statement removes any distinction between combatants and noncombatants:

We are all in the war -- Christians and nonChristians, pacifists and nonpacifists. And we are all fighting. . . . These (pacifists, AI) all fight by virtue of their implication in the indivisible solidarity of their national community whose total resources, including the pacifist himself and his job and all his civilian duties and activities are integrated in one vast military machine.⁴⁷

Indiscriminate weapons. A second reason why the principle of the inviolability of noncombatants collapsed is because modern weapons are indiscriminate in character. The swords, muskets, and small cannons of an earlier era

⁴⁷C. C. Morrison, The Christian and the War (New York: Willet, Clark and Company, 1942), p. 58.

were directly controllable and inflicted comparatively little damage. It was possible to use these and to observe the requirement that noncombatants be granted immunity from the direct violence of war. However, modern artillery, aerial bombers, and submarines are very indiscriminate when compared with these earlier instruments of death. When a flying missile or an atomic bomb is used, all are consumed, both combatants and noncombatants, in the explosion.

Lesser evil. A third reason why the principle of the inviolability of noncombatants collapsed is because it is considered better to disregard their traditional rights than to suffer an irremediable tyranny. The presumption is that tyranny would triumph if these rights were insisted upon in an unyielding manner because a nation could not then resist with modern means of destruction. For instance, it was decided to bomb Hamburg, Dresden, Berlin and other cities in order to defeat Nazi Germany. The number of noncombatant fatalities was staggering, but which was the greater evil, the triumph of Hitler or the violence directed against these civilians? Such a question causes O'Brien to write that "it would appear that an unyielding insistence on the rights of noncombatants as those rights existed before the advent of modern weapons may be neither practical nor even just."⁴⁸

⁴⁸O'Brien, op. cit., p. 138.

He further suggests that rather than concentrating on the disastrous effects of nuclear war, it is more appropriate to inquire whether the death of a widow or infant is a greater catastrophe than their survival in a society where not only the aged will be deprived of moral freedom, but the young may grow up in ignorance of the fact that such freedom could exist.⁴⁹

Military necessity. A fourth reason why the principle of the inviolability of noncombatants collapsed is because wars began to be prosecuted by pragmatic, rather than by moral judgments. Military necessity rules the decisions regarding strategy. If the shortest route to victory is by annihilating a metropolis, this is considered acceptable. Professor Macgregor illustrates how one leading religious spokesman, Dr. J. H. Oldham, surrendered to military authorities the right to prosecute the war in the most militarily feasible way, without regard for the moral principle granting immunity to noncombatants. In October, 1940, Dr. Holdham unequivocally stated that "the deliberate killing of noncombatants is murder," and that if war degenerates into willful slaughter of the innocent, Christians should either become pacifists or give up their religion.⁵⁰ By May, 1943,

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 147.

⁵⁰Quoted by Macgregor, op. cit., p. 95.

he had retreated from such dogmatism. No longer is the immunity of noncombatants so absolute. The question as to who may be attacked is not even a topic for Christian moralists, but must be left entirely to the military and governmental authorities!⁵¹ In July, 1943, Dr. Oldham admitted that "if you accept war, military necessity, in so far as it is a real necessity, must prevail."⁵²

What is military necessity? A capsule definition would be that it is whatever is necessary to achieve the object of the war. The phrase has bad connotations because resorting to this plea can dispel moral misgivings over the most startling brutalities. Robert Tucker observes: "A sense of guilt about the methods of employing force can always be dampened, if not wholly dispelled, by an appeal to the military necessities imposed by war."⁵³ This explains the reticence of Christian writers to employ this phrase. Usually it is modified in some respect, as when O'Brien, in order to assure his readers that he does not advocate purposeless violence, speaks of a "legitimate" military necessity.⁵⁴

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Robert Tucker, The Just War: A Study in Contemporary American Doctrine (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1961), p. 92.

⁵⁴O'Brien, op. cit., p. 142.

The Old Testament examples. A fifth reason why the principle of the inviolability of noncombatants is not insisted upon is that the wars of the Old Testament are examples of the noncombatants suffering the direct violent consequences of war. The book of Joshua contains the following description of the slaughter that accompanied the defeat of Jericho: "Then they utterly destroyed all in the city, both men and women, young and old, oxen, sheep, and asses, with the edge of the sword."⁵⁵ The extermination of Ai was likewise complete. Other victories included the massacre of every person in Makkedah, Libnah, Lachish, Eglon, Hebron, Debir and many other cities. "So Joshua defeated the whole land; . . . he left none remaining, but utterly destroyed all that breathed, as the Lord God of Israel had commanded."⁵⁶ These examples suffice to show that the people of God did not distinguish between combatants and noncombatants when they resorted to violent action.

Protection Of Noncombatants Is Necessary

Having noted the arguments advanced by those who no longer regard the immunity of noncombatants inviolable, it is necessary that this study pay respect to the position which advocates that for a war to be morally waged the

⁵⁵Joshua 6:21.

⁵⁶Joshua 10:40.

traditional protection afforded noncombatants must be maintained.

Methodology is subject to moral restraints. The basic premise is that the methods and means of warfare are subject to moral restraints; that violence, though directed against an evil adversary, may itself be immoral. In its 1950 report, the Federal Council of Churches acknowledged that military expediency is a test of action, but expressed the belief that this test must be subordinated to moral considerations. It stated:

Military victory is not an end in itself. Just as death is preferable to life under some conditions, so, too, victory at any price is not worth having. If this price is for us to become utterly brutal, victory becomes a moral defeat. . . . Hence the way we fight and the means we use are of crucial importance.⁵⁷

The means are considered to be of crucial importance because to destroy the industrial fabric and a large percentage of the population can make the post-war recovery of a decent and well-ordered society almost impossible. A reckoning of the means employed in war and the consequences is regarded as a part of the Christian decision. That ethical principles must direct the employment of power is the emphasis of Professor John Courtney Murray:

⁵⁷"Christian Conscience and Weapons of Mass Destruction," loc. cit.

"Power without a sense of direction. . . may drain life of its meaning." . . . Power can be invested with a sense of direction only by moral principles. It is the function of morality to command the use of power, to forbid it, to limit it; or, more in general, to define the ends for which power may or must be used and to judge the circumstances of its use.⁵⁸

In what ways is morality to circumscribe the use of force? What determines if violence is moral or immoral? Is intensity alone the determinant? Professor Connery replies in the negative:

Although the regret and distaste may increase with the degree of violence demanded by the situation, neither the intensity of the distress nor the measure of the violence resorted to can be used as independent moral yardsticks.⁵⁹

Morality seeks to limit and direct the use of force in two ways: (1) The force used must be proportionate to the need. "The moral conscience," writes Connery, "will allow for adequate defense, but it will not tolerate unnecessary or disproportionate violence."⁶⁰ (2) The force must be used only against proper targets. The traditional teaching decrees that noncombatants are not proper objects of direct attack. This latter limitation is insisted upon today by a very impressive group of scholars.

⁵⁸John Courtney Murray, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-91.

⁵⁹John R. Connery, "Morality of Nuclear Armament," *Theology Digest* V (Winter, 1957), 9.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*

Scholastic distinction is valid and noncombatants must be protected. Earlier it was mentioned that Professor Ford avows that 75% of the population in an area similar to the New York-Newark vicinity are noncombatants. Aligning with him in contending for a present-day distinction between the unjust aggressor and the innocent civilians of the aggressor state is an impressive portion of the religious and scholarly world. John K. Ryan expresses that even in total war "it is impossible for various reasons to admit that all the inhabitants of a country . . . have assumed the quality of belligerents,"⁶¹ adding that,

Even with a whole nation in arms, the cooperation, moral and physical, of the generality of men, women and children is not so immediate in time, place or character as to give them the same essential status as active combatants in the field, on ships, or in the air.⁶²

To the argument that a "nation in arms" means that the ordinary citizen is a war participant, Ryan replies that if pushed to its last conclusion, such an argument infers that "the child in the cradle or in its mother's womb is part of the war potential."⁶³ To further demonstrate the necessity of retaining this classic feature of the just war, Ryan reasons that if a citizen becomes a war participant by

⁶¹Ryan, op. cit., p. 109.

⁶²Ibid., p. 118.

⁶³Ibid., pp. 110-111.

virtue of his helping to manufacture products that will be assigned to the military forces, then neutral nations who trade with the enemy may qualify for an obliterating attack. A neutral country may, without altering its peacetime pursuits and commercial habits, contribute more significantly to the conduct of the war than the general population of one of the belligerents. Shall a massacre of a neutral nation's civilian population be regarded as just? Such is possible, if the distinction between actual combatants and noncombatants is neglected, for as Ryan states,

The reasons advanced for classing the civil population of a country at war as combatants could be equally applied to all neutral countries. If all industry, agriculture, and transportation are militarized, and if all engaged in those activities are to be considered as war workers, combatants, and fair objects of attack, it is hardly possible to restrict the conclusion to the countries at war.⁶⁴

In his discussion of America's policy for a justly conducted war, Professor Tucker affirms that the noncombatants of even an aggressor state,

. . . ought not to be made the direct and deliberate object of attack and should be spared from injuries not incidental to military operations directed against combatant forces and other legitimate military objectives.⁶⁵

These sentiments are also echoed by Professor Paul Ramsey

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 111.

⁶⁵Tucker, op. cit., pp. 85-86.

who proposes that during an international armed conflict, the Christian ethic has no alternative "but to renew and re-create its own articulation in the rule or principle which surrounds noncombatants with immunity from direct killing."⁶⁶ The major emphasis in Ramsey's recent book is that the only justified war is one fought in a counter-forces strategy. Another states that although the concept of "total war" has been recently advanced, "a distinction between combatants and noncombatants must still prevail."⁶⁷ The late Thomas E. Murray voiced strong opposition to the military policies based upon the use of high megaton bombs against cities. He wrote: "The bald fact that large nuclear bombs can wipe out whole civilian populations does not put an end to the claim of the civilian to immunity from the violence of war."⁶⁸ After conceding that it will be difficult "to draw the line at which the civilian claim to immunity from violence in war asserts itself in the face of the counsels of military expediency," Murray insists that this claim "is made in the inviolable name of justice and that all military operations -- defensive or retaliatory -- must respect it."⁶⁹

⁶⁶Ramsey, op. cit., pp. 189-190.

⁶⁷Connery, loc. cit.

⁶⁸Thomas E. Murray, op. cit., p. 62.

⁶⁹Ibid., pp. 60-61.

Excursus: The Relevancy of Noncombatants to the War

Two points are customarily overlooked in most discussions regarding noncombatant immunity. First, in earlier centuries, noncombatants were, in fact, indispensable to the war effort. Because wars were prolonged contests, the productivity of the civilians supplied essential food-stuffs and munitions. Also, since firepower could be concentrated only by amassing individuals, each with a weapon of limited destruction, a large population was advantageous for supplying immediate and potential combatants. The nation that faltered economically or numerically during these long wars, had to surrender. Hence, it would appear that during the time prior to World War II, a distinction between guilty and innocent could have been quite obscure. It is significant that during the time when almost every civilian pursuit made an important contribution to the war effort, theologians insisted that noncombatants were to be distinguished from combatants and also decreed that they were not to be directly attacked.

Second, modern technology has radically altered this situation. No longer are destructive capabilities enhanced by a large standing army, needing the steady supply of goods and services from civilians. Modern technology permits firepower to be stored and kept in being. One nuclear bomb can do far more damage than any large army. It seems clear

that civilians are less a part of the actual war effort today than ever before. If they are "guilty," it is because of their role prior to the war in designing, producing and mantling the arsenal that is kept in being.

This writer is convinced that the relationship of the noncombatants to war must be reinterpreted. This new interpretation should not seek to portray them as a military threat, but should consider them militarily significant. Civilians in metropolitan centers are militarily significant because if the cities of a possible enemy are under the threat of annihilatory attack, their leaders are less likely to make an aggressive attack.

In some quarters, this holding of the enemy's population under threat of attack in order to insure against an attack, is disdainfully referred to as "nuclear blackmail." The opponents of "nuclear blackmail" frequently reduce the situation to an analogy:

If a man attacks me unjustly and tries to kill me, and to make sure of getting at me kills my wife and children first, I do not see that that gives me the right to kill his wife and children on the ground that she cooks his meals and they keep his spirits up when he gets discouraged about his chances of murdering me.^{69a}

However, if it could be shown that by holding the wife and children as hostages (in a way that does not interfere with

^{69a}John Ford, "The Morality of Atomic Bombing," broadcast talk, quoted by Ramsey, op. cit., pp. 72-73.

their legitimate behavior) the man would desist from his plan to kill me, would not this be a legitimate act of self-defense? If it were reasonably certain that by failing to hold them hostage the man would proceed to kill my wife, children and myself, would it not be immoral not to hold his wife and children as hostage? In the same way, it may be argued that it is better to hold the enemy's civilian population hostage (in a way that does not interfere with their legitimate behavior) and thus deter war, than to remove this deterrence and risk world-wide destruction.

What if the deterrence fails, would it be moral to proceed with attacks upon noncombatants? This cannot be answered with an unqualified yes or no. If it is reasonably certain that the enemy's will to fight can be swiftly broken by attacks upon a selected number of metropolitan centers and if it is reasonably certain that the ensuing destruction would not be unproportionate to the good sought, this strategy would seem permissible. However, if the attacks would not substantially lessen the duration of the war, or if a greater degree of destruction would result than if the war is allowed to continue, no attacks should be made. For instance, if a company of soldiers captured a village, it would be an affront to any moral conscience if the noncombatants were lined against a wall and shot. The extermination of a single village would not sufficiently increase the

likelihood of the enemy's capitulation. Therefore, under some conditions the noncombatant population may be directly attacked, in other circumstances, it would be immoral to do so.

Summary

The just war doctrine has traditionally excluded noncombatants as proper objects of direct attack. Today there is a dispute as to whether such a stipulation is valid. Those who no longer accept the principle of the inviolability of noncombatants, do so principally because: (1) it is claimed that a major war involves the energies of the whole nation; (2) the weapons necessary to be victorious in a modern war do not allow such a careful protection of noncombatants; (3) it is regarded a lesser evil to kill the noncombatants than to lose the war; (4) the quickest way to victory is by demoralizing the enemy state through obliterating attacks upon its major cities; and (5) the Old Testament is replete with examples of noncombatants suffering direct violence along with combatants.

Not all voices, however, are stilled that would argue for the traditional protection of noncombatants. It is still insisted that methodology is subject to moral restraints, one of which is that civilians are not to be subjected to direct attack.

This writer has suggested the possibility of

reinterpreting the position of the noncombatant in regard to the war. It is stressed that civilians are not "guilty" in the sense that the term is traditionally understood. However, civilians are militarily relevant in that they may be held as hostages in such magnitude that their leaders will be wary of initiating an offensive assault which would result in their constituents' immediate and wholesale demise.

IV. OBLITERATION BOMBING

The dispute concerning what immunity, if any, is to be granted the civilian population enters into sharp focus in the controversy over the practice of obliteration bombing. P. W. Stonestreet's declaration that the death of civilians during war time is accidental, unless done by outlaw nations and soldiers,⁷⁰ betrays an astonishing unawareness of modern military tactics. During World War II aerial attacks were made upon major metropolises. Only the unversed could assert that such killings were "accidental." Such assaults upon civilian centers, commonly referred to as obliteration bombing, is a matter of ethical concern, especially to those who stipulate that noncombatants are to have immunity from the direct violence of the war.

⁷⁰James D. Bales and P. W. Stonestreet, The Christian and Carnal Warfare (James D. Bales, [n.p.] 1947), p. 35.

A Brief History of Obliteration Bombing

Obliteration bombing is based upon the principle of extermination. The advent of the airplane provided new possible dimensions of this principle. Although throughout World War I, the airplane was restricted to attacks upon military targets, strategic bombing was followed by area bombing during World War II

Prior to the time when the airplane was actually employed in obliterating attacks upon civilian centers, the tactic was vigorously discussed in military circles. Lewis Mumford sketches the initial stages of this war strategy:

The principles upon which the strategy of extermination was based were first enunciated by fascist military theorists, notably General Douhet, who believed . . . that a small air force could take the place of a large army by confining its efforts to mass attacks on civilians and undermining the national will to resist.⁷¹

Although Mumford claims that this strategy was first enunciated by the fascists and that it evoked a response of moral horror on the part of the English speaking nations, the British have sought the dubious distinction of being the first to contrive the strategy of indiscriminate bombing. Air Marshal Arthur Harris belittled the German tacticians for not perceiving that the bomber would be a more effective

⁷¹Lewis Mumford, "The Morals of Extermination," Atlantic 204 (October, 1959), 39.

weapon against civilians than soldiers.⁷² The former Principal Secretary of the Air Ministry, J. M. Spaight, boasted that the "splendid decision" to attack cities could be traced to a brainstorm by British military experts in 1936.⁷³

The United States did not readily accept this new strategy. In 1939, President Roosevelt addressed an appeal to the German and Polish governments in which he affirmed:

The ruthless bombing from the air of civilians in unfortified centers of population . . . has profoundly shocked the conscience of humanity . . . I am therefore addressing this urgent appeal to every government to affirm its determination that its armed forces shall in no event and under no circumstances undertake bombardment from the air of civilian populations or unfortified cities.⁷⁴

America's subsequent actions hardly squared with the above appeal! However, it is to her credit that as late as 1942, her strategists were still hesitant as to the morality of obliteration bombing. In the spring of that year, a memorandum was circulated among military advisors in Washington propounding this dilemma:

If by fighting the war against Japan by orthodox methods it might require five or ten years to conquer the enemy, which with incendiary air attacks on Japanese cities Japan's resistance might be broken in a year or two, would it be morally justified to

⁷²Moellering, op. cit., p. 98.

⁷³Cited by ibid., p. 97.

⁷⁴Quoted by Bainton, op. cit., p. 225.

use the second means?⁷⁵

The history of obliteration bombing includes some interesting facts. First, the Germans sought a prewar agreement to limit the attacks on cities, but the British rejected it.⁷⁶ Second, the British, not the Germans, were the first to breach deliberately the fundamental rule that hostilities are to be waged only against opposing combat forces.⁷⁷ Allied propaganda created the popular opinion that indiscriminate bombing began with Germany's Luftwaffe blitz over England. The truth is that the British air raid on Western Germany, May 11, 1940, marked the first departure from the traditional code of civilized warfare.⁷⁸ The Germans' departure cannot be dated prior to September 7, 1940, when they launched the night bombing of London.⁷⁹ The bombing of London may be described as a reprisal because previous to this Britain had attacked Berlin six times. Before the last attack, Hitler warned that if the RAF did not cease the night bombings, he would retaliate in kind

⁷⁵Mumford, loc. cit.

⁷⁶John K. Moriarty, "Technology, Strategy and National Military Policy," Morality and Modern Warfare, p. 45.

⁷⁷Moellering, op. cit., pp. 97-98.

⁷⁸Ibid.

⁷⁹Moriarty, loc. cit.

against London.⁸⁰

The allied nations applied the policy of massive extermination very systematically, pulverizing the enemy's cities. The climax was attained on August 6, 1945, when America dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima, killing 78,150, wounding 37,425, and leaving 13,083 missing.⁸¹

The Morality of Obliteration Bombing

Since World War II, opinions have differed sharply concerning the morality of this combat tactic. The reversal from moral horror to the practice of obliteration bombing is styled by Lewis Mumford as "Nazidom's firmest victory and democracy's most servile surrender."⁸² It is his opinion that the acceptance of the policy of obliteration bombing has "undermined all the moral inhibitions that have kept man's murderous fantasies from active expression."⁸³ This

⁸⁰Ibid. Curiously, a navigational error by a dozen German bombers on the night of August 23, 1940, was responsible for Britain's decision to attack Berlin. William L. Shirer writes, "Directed to drop their loads on aircraft factories and oil tanks on the outskirts of London, they missed their mark and dropped bombs on the center of the capital, blowing up some homes and killing some civilians. The British thought it was deliberate and in retaliation they bombed Berlin the next evening." "Reaping the Whirlwind The Last Days of The Third Reich," Reader's Digest 80 (May, 1962), 254.

⁸¹"Question of Outlawing Nuclear Weapons," The Congressional Digest 37 (October, 1958), 226.

⁸²Mumford, loc. cit.

⁸³Ibid., 40.

represents the minority view, for the majority seemingly accept the practice of obliteration bombing as a logical, rightful means of prosecuting a war.

The air raids during World War II were ghastly debacles. An eyewitness to the bombing of Berlin reported: "It was nerve-shattering to see women, demented after the raids, crying continuously for their lost children, or wandering speechless through the streets with dead babies in their arms."⁸⁴ In the attack on Hamburg, "the heat was so intense that even in cellar shelters bodies were incinerated more completely than in the process of cremation."⁸⁵ The firestorms, ignited by ordinary incendiary bombs in World War II, are estimated to have killed 300,000 people at Dresden in a single night; some 70,000 at Hamburg; some 200,000 at Tokyo.⁸⁶ One who is familiar with the previous and similar accounts of the aerial attacks, seeks to know what factors convinced some moral theologians that this practice is a rightful means of prosecuting a war. How can obliteration bombing be squared with a Christian code of civilized warfare?

Justifications of obliteration bombing. Those who

⁸⁴Bainton, op. cit., p. 228.

⁸⁵Ibid.

⁸⁶Gerard Piel, "The Illusion of Civil Defense," Vital Speeches XXVIII (February 1, 1962), 242.

justify obliteration bombing do so on the following grounds:

1. Cities are military citadels. The first grounds for justification is the claim that the cities are actually military centers, providing the goods and services that are necessary for the war effort. Since these citizens furnish indispensable services, it is held that the distinction between innocent and guilty has paled into insignificance. Hence, to obliterate a city is to raze a citadel of the enemy.

2. Effects an early surrender. Obliteration bombing is justified on the grounds that it effects an early surrender. The presumption is that the extermination of a few cities will terrorize and demoralize the enemy nation, thereby destroying its will to resist.

3. Saves lives. Obliteration bombing is justified on the grounds that by effecting an early surrender lives are saved. Military tacticians say that the traditional methods of warfare, in which armies attack only armies, are a lengthy process, resulting in appalling slaughter. Ending the hostilities quickly, even though some cities suffer disproportionately, saves many lives that would be lost in a prolonged war. This is the logic that prompted the decision to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Henry

Stimson, the Secretary of War during World War II, vindicated his part in the decision to use the new cataclysmal weapon by saying:

I felt that to extract a genuine surrender from the Emperor and his military advisors, they must be administered a tremendous shock which would carry convincing proof of our power to destroy the Empire. Such an effective shock would save many times the number of lives, both American and Japanese, that it would cost.⁸⁷

4. Only defense. Hypothetical situations can be conjured in which air attacks on the enemy's cities are the only possible effective defense. The first situation assumes that the enemy has made an invasion and that the attack can be repelled only by an air raid on his principal sources of supplies, which are the productive industrial areas. A second hypothetical circumstance is suggested by Professor Connery:

An important consideration . . . in deciding between precision bombing and large-scale bombing of an industrial area is the military strength of the enemy. Thus, for instance, if my enemy were in possession of nuclear bombs which I had good reason to believe he would use, it would be suicidal for me to choose the more leisurely precision bombing. His possession of such weapons would never justify a direct attack on his civilian population but it would give me the sufficient reason to knock out his war potential as quickly and as effectively as possible, even with a tremendous loss of civilian life.⁸⁸

⁸⁷Henry Stimson, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," Harper's (February, 1947), 101.

⁸⁸Connery, op. cit., pp. 95-96.

5. Principle of double effect. The preceding statement from Professor Connery demonstrates that area bombing is not reprehended as an immoral means, ipso facto, by every one who enjoins protection to noncombatants. These attempt to justify the practice by an appeal to the rule of double effect.

The principle of double effect states that an act may produce two consequences, one good and the other evil. The morality of the deed is adjudged by the nature of the intended effect.⁸⁹

Originally, the principle was applied to instances in which one killed in self-defense. The direct intention in self-defense was considered to be the protection of one's own life; the death of the assailant was regarded as an unintended consequence.⁹⁰ Later moralists decided that the rule of double effect did not properly apply to a situation of self-defense because the death of the unjust aggressor came to be considered a legitimate or rightful intention. The rule was then applied to cases involving the death or

⁸⁹ Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas (Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne Ltd., n.d.) Part II, Q. 64, Art. 7, pp. 208-209.

⁹⁰ It is notable that Aquinas and those before him justified the death of an unjust assailant only by this rule; they did not regard the killing of an attacker as inherently permissible.

hurt of innocent people. Stated simply, the rule permits the death or injury of an innocent person if the death is the unavoidable effect of an action primarily intended to secure a good result. It is apparent that this principle is significant in determining the morality of certain military methods and incidents that result in the deaths of noncombatants.

The rule of double effect applies if certain conditions are fulfilled. These are: First, the intentional act must be moral, or at least amoral, *per se*. Second, there must be a proper proportion between the good desired and the evil which could conceivably be a consequence. To use an illustration, one may not kill an insect on another's person by wielding a lethal blow. Third, both the good and the evil effects must follow synchronously; the good cannot be the result of the evil. Fourth, the good effect must be the only one intended.⁹¹ When these conditions are met, the death or injury of noncombatants is given license, even by some who urge that protection must be granted to noncombatants. Ramsey, a strong voice for noncombatant immunity, notes that the innocent may be killed "incidentally" when it is necessary to obtain victory. "Thus," he says, "an army has a right to burn cities and to destroy forts and citadels,

⁹¹See Ryan, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-105; Ramsey, *op. cit.* pp. 47-48.

even if the death of innocent victims is inevitable."⁹²

The argument based on the rule of double effect, then, is that the deaths of noncombatants as a result of area bombing, though multitudinous, are an incidental effect, the direct intention being to restore tranquility by eliminating the military value of these cities and by demoralizing the enemy. Since the civilian deaths are an unavoidable indirect effect, no guilt is to be assigned to the agent of these deaths.

Obliteration bombing is not justified. Not all acquiesce in the foregoing persuasion. Examining the issue of area bombing from an ethical, as opposed to a military view, a significant number has concluded that the practice can not be morally vindicated. Having related the position of those who accept obliteration bombing as a rightful means of warfare, it is proper to bring to notice the opposite conviction.

A number of religious groups and leaders have protested the practice. The Federal Council of Churches, in its 1950 report, referred to the widespread acceptance of the bombing of cities as an unavoidable part of modern war as "an overwhelming break-through in the weak moral defenses

⁹²Ibid., p. 35.

erected to keep war in some bounds."⁹³ One of the social issues discussed at the 1961 conference in New Delhi was the Christian's responsibility during wartime. The opinion expressed was that,

Christians must . . . maintain that the use of nuclear weapons, or other forms of major violence, against centers of population is in no circumstances reconciliable with the demands of the Christian gospel.⁹⁴

In October, 1962, the Protestant Episcopal Bishops, assembled in Columbia, South Carolina, specified in a public statement that the concept of massive retaliation marked by the obliteration bombing of masses of people is unchristian and ought to be repudiated by the government.⁹⁵ One of the leading Catholic moralists, John C. Ford, voiced a courageous protest to the practice of obliteration bombing during World War II. In a more recent article, written in view of the propensities of the hydrogen bombs, Professor Ford declares that an attack upon a metropolitan center, such as the New York-Newark area, is not morally permissible, even if it would procure victory in a just war.⁹⁶ Pelayo Zamayon

⁹³"Christian Conscience and Weapons of Mass Destruction," op. cit., 163.

⁹⁴John C. Bennett, "New Delhi Faces Three Social Issues," Christianity and Crisis XXI (January 22, 1962), 250.

⁹⁵Louis Cassels, "Episcopal Bishops Take Hard Swing at Tough Moral Problem," United Press International, Carlsbad [New Mexico] Current-Argus, November 23, 1962.

⁹⁶Ford, op. cit., p. 98.

expresses the conviction that major instruments of violence, such as atomic bombs, could not be used on cities composed mainly of noncombatants.⁹⁷ In his discussion on America's policy of nuclear deterrence, Norman Gottwald attacks the very essence of the strategy of massive retaliation, saying, "It would be morally wrong for the West to initiate a nuclear attack on Russian cities under whatever euphemism or excuse."⁹⁸

Political analysts, and even governmental officials, have expressed disapproval of the practice of obliteration bombing. Regarding the annihilatory attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Thomas E. Murray claimed that they effectively ratified "the immoral decision that the civilian population has no claim to immunity from destruction in war."⁹⁹ George F. Kennan, who has served the nation in responsible posts in Berlin, Vienna, Prague, Moscow, and Washington stunned many with his frank appraisal that,

In taking responsibility for such things as the bombing of Dresden and Hamburg, to say nothing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, Americans went beyond what

⁹⁷Felipe Zamayo, "Morality of War Today and in the Future," Theology Digest V (Winter, 1957), 5.

⁹⁸Norman K. Gottwald, "Moral and Strategic Reflections on the Nuclear Dilemma," Christianity and Crisis V (January 8, 1962), 239.

⁹⁹Thomas E. Murray, op. cit., p. 59.

it seems to me the dictates of Christian conscience should have allowed.¹⁰⁰

Lewis Mumford draws a thought-provoking analogy between the extermination camps in which the Nazis incinerated over six million Jews and what he styles, "the urban crematoriums our air force improvised in its attacks by napalm bombs on Tokyo."¹⁰¹ Is it consistent to be shocked by the inhumane treatment of the Jews and yet to assert that the napalm bomb attacks on Japan were moral?

1. Critique of the five justifications. The reply to each of the five justifications for obliteration bombing is as follows: first, regarding the military importance of cities and civilians, this controversy is detailed earlier in this chapter and so shall not detain us here; second, regarding the pragmatic evaluation that this method ends the war more quickly and therefore probably saves lives, most would answer that the end does not justify immoral means or methods; third, regarding the hypothetical situations in which obliteration bombing is suggested as the only defense, it may be said that if the alternative were ever surrender or the use of immoral methods, the Christian must choose the former; fourth, regarding the appeal to the rule of double

¹⁰⁰George F. Kennan, "Foreign Policy and Christian Conscience," Atlantic (May 1959), 47-48.

¹⁰¹Mumford, loc. cit.

effect, it is acknowledged that this is the most crucial justification and therefore, the most heatedly discussed among theologians. Clearly, were it not for the refuge which some seem to discover in this principle, moralists would either have to abandon the basis of the just war doctrine, or unanimously object to this decisive tactic, thus incurring the displeasure of military and governmental officials.

2. Relevance of the doctrine of double effect. The neat allegation that the principle of double effect morally vindicates the practice of area bombing is vigorously challenged by those opposing obliteration bombing. The attempt is made to demonstrate that the act itself is in violation of the conditions of the rule of double effect.

First, it is affirmed that the direct intention of this type of bombing is immoral. What is the direct intention? The emphasis is that the carnage of civilian population cannot logically be considered an unintended effect, but must be acknowledged as the very purpose of area bombing. It is unrealistic to presume that the military planners of this tactic do not directly intend to kill the civilians. Their design is clearly revealed by the following considerations: (1) to incinerate the vast residential districts of a city is wholly unnecessary, unless the intention is to slay

the inhabitants of these districts. The physical layout of metropolitan centers is such that the vast residential tracts are separate and distinct from the industrial and administrative facilities. Therefore, it is idle to speak of the principle of indirection in the annihilatory attacks upon these districts. As John Ryan wrote:

To rain explosives and incendiary bombs upon the vast residential tracts . . . on the score that this is only incidental to attack on munition plants and administrative headquarters in other parts of the city cannot stand the slightest critical examination either moral or logic, as an instance of the principle of double effect.¹⁰²

If the desire were to avoid the slaughter of the innocent and to eradicate only the militarily relevant targets, the strategists could use precision bombing. Ford reminds that in World War II, "when we really wanted to hit only military targets, as in the bombing of Rome, we made sure that was all we hit."¹⁰³ (2) It is officially admitted that the purpose of obliteration bombing is to intimidate the civilian population. In his article, Ford documents this assertion by saying,

The United States Strategic Bomber Survey declared that area bombing was "intended primarily to destroy morale, particularly that of the industrial worker." An official Army Air Force publication, Target:

¹⁰²Ryan, op. cit., p. 105.

¹⁰³Ford, op. cit., p. 100.

Germany, made it clear that the purpose of the bombing was "terror and devastation carried to the core of the warring nation."¹⁰⁴

"Terror bombing," writes Ford, "means killing and maiming noncombatants in order to frighten the resistance out of those who survive."¹⁰⁵ (3) The stockpiling and further development of high megaton weapons betray the real purpose for which these bombs will be used. How many military targets are there that would demand such an arsenal? It is clear that the actual intent of these weapons will be to gain victory by laying in ruins the enemy's chief civilian centers. (4) The mere bulk of the immediate effect makes it absurd to claim that the deaths of noncombatants is merely an incidental effect.

There comes a point where the immediate evil effect of a given action is so overwhelmingly large in its physical extent, in its mere bulk, by comparison with the immediate good effect, that it no longer makes sense to say that it is merely incidental, not directly intended.¹⁰⁶

Second, it is affirmed that the good desired as a result of this tactic is not proportionate to the evil which is also a consequence. Ford asserts,

It is illegitimate to appeal to the principle of the rule of double effect when the alleged justifying

¹⁰⁴Ibid.

¹⁰⁵Ibid.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 101.

cause is speculative, future, and problematical, while the evil effect is definite, enormous, certain, and immediate.¹⁰⁷

Especially is this thought to be true when the weapons now possessed are shockingly destructive.

Third, it is affirmed that the good and evil effects do not follow synchronously, but that the good results from the evil. When a city is obliterated, the military objectives are incidentally achieved as a consequence of the evil effect. Particularly is this true if the justification for obliteration bombing is that it procures a surrender by demoralizing the enemy. It is evident that the desired good would come only as a consequence of the evil effect. Further, it is not certain that the good effect will materialize; it is certain that the evil will.

Fourth, it is affirmed that it is impossible not to will the evil effect. This thought is illustrated by asking:

If I saw a black widow spider crawling across the shiny bald pate of my neighbor, could I take a sledge hammer and swing it down full on the spider, intending directly only the death of the spider? Could I honestly say I had no intention of killing the man?¹⁰⁸

The idea that the air-strategist can drop his high megaton bombs on a metropolis and not will the resultant deaths of millions of noncombatants, is considered incredible. Ford

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 102.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., p. 101.

remarks,

Given the size and power of the destructive weapon chosen, given the size and character of the area aimed at, and given the immense extent of the human carnage involved, it does not seem possible any longer to say: "I am making an attack on certain precise and quite limited military targets; all the rest I reluctantly permit as incidental to this military attack." Especially when I have at hand smaller weapons capable of destroying these precise military targets without the mass human carnage.¹⁰⁹

Hypothetical Situations Considered

The question is raised: "What if there is a strategic military installation in a metropolitan center?" The answer given is that precision bombing must be used. The deaths of the few civilians who might be on the base at the moment of attack would be a real instance in which the principle of double effect would apply. In such instances, the air-strategist could truthfully assert that his only intention was to eliminate a military installation. The noncombatants are killed or maimed completely outside of his intention. To carry the inquiry further, let it be presumed that there are two military bases in the same vicinity of a metropolitan area, but that they are separated by a residential district. It is possible to lay waste both plants with one super-bomb, but with the concomitant annihilation of the civilian area. It is also possible to attempt precision bombing. Which

¹⁰⁹Ibid., pp. 101-102.

method should be chosen? Professor Connery answers,

If I can achieve my goal with precision bombing of the individual plants, I would not be allowed to bomb the whole industrial area. But if precision bombing would be very costly to me both in money and in the lives of my own men, so that I could honestly say that my losses in such bombing would be proportionate to the loss of civilian life in bombing the industrial area, the use of the super bomb would be morally justified.¹¹⁰

The weakness in Connery's article is that he fails to specify how one calculates whether the losses in precision bombing would be proportionate to the civilian losses in area bombing. Is it to be decided on a quantitative basis, man for man, or on a qualitative basis, in which ten of "our" men are worth more than one hundred of the enemy?

Summary

The issue of noncombatant immunity raises the question as to whether obliteration or area bombing is a morally acceptable strategy. This is relatively a modern controversy since the practice of bombing civilian centers did not become common until World War II. At first, it was resisted by many of the morally enlightened world leaders. Finally, though, the majority of these succumbed to the pressure to employ such a tactic. They rationalized such behavior by one or more of the following five arguments: (1) the cities are military citadels; (2) the practice effects an early

¹¹⁰Connery, op. cit., 11.

surrender; (3) by securing an early surrender, the practice saves lives; (4) it is possible that such tactics may be the only effective defense; and (5) the deaths of noncombatants are only an incidental effect.

Obliteration bombing is still opposed by a number of religious, political and governmental spokesmen as being basically immoral. The moralists are especially alert to the contention that the principle of double effect justifies such a method. The contention is denied on the grounds that, (1) the direct intention of obliteration bombing is to kill noncombatants; (2) the evil which results is not proportionate to the good hoped for; (3) the good effect results from the evil effect; and (4) it is impossible not to will the evil effect.

It is this writer's opinion that area bombing is a regretful tactic because its immediate effects are grave and irremediable. The effort to square this practice with the just war doctrine, as traditionally interpreted, is a hopeless endeavor. Clearly, the tactic is diametrically opposed to the immunity traditionally granted the civilian. Three possibilities confront moralists and theologians: (1) They can insist on the traditional doctrine and resolutely oppose the strategy of area bombing. This undoubtedly would incur the displeasure of military planners, governmental officials and the majority of the people who accept this as a necessary

method. This displeasure would be accentuated because obliteration bombing is a cornerstone of the United States' war strategy. In essence, they would be objecting to the basic method of fighting. (2) They can accept area bombing as a necessary means and abandon the just war doctrine regarding noncombatant immunity. (3) They may reinterpret the rights of noncombatants and their relevance to the war enterprise as suggested in this paper.

The moral conscience insists that precision bombing be used whenever possible and that area bombing be employed very sparingly and only when its necessity and advantage is apparent.

CHAPTER V

A MORAL DEFENSE STRATEGY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

In this chapter, attention will be given to various defense strategies that are open to the United States. These will be analyzed as to their effectiveness and moral implications, especially in terms of the just war doctrine.

I. GENERAL INFORMATION

Statement of the Nuclear Dilemma

At present, two colossi are in a stage of confrontation, each possessing the capability of obliterating the other. The situation is even more grave because if a major war between these two does occur, the neutral nations of the world will also suffer immeasurably from the fallout and other deleterious effects.

Current weapons systems make it doubtful whether a meaningful victory is possible in a major war. That the plight may seem as real as it is, the destructive potential of nuclear weapons may be cited in more familiar terms. A one kiloton nuclear explosion is equal to the energy released by 1,000 tons of TNT; a one megaton nuclear explosion is equal to 1 million tons of TNT; and a one kilomegaton nuclear explosion is equal to 1 billion tons of TNT. At present, the United States' weapons stockpile is estimated

as constituting the explosive power equal to 35 kilomegatons.¹ Were this much explosive power in the form of TNT, it would fill a string of freight cars stretching from the earth to the moon and back fifteen times.² Russia's nuclear capability is not anemic. Donald G. Brennan states that every projection points to the conclusion that by the late 1960's, "the USSR might be able to launch a strike that would extinguish 90 per cent of our populace."³

If the capability of current weapons is not sufficiently impressive, it may be mentioned that devices which may become practical in the future will dwarf this capability. Thomas E. Murray states that "there is no upper limit to the size of bombs that can be made."⁴ With a little effort, America could have several 500-megaton bombs in its arsenal.⁵ Kahn insists that there is a complete

¹Arthur T. Hadley, The Nation's Safety And Arms Control (New York: The Viking Press, 1961), p. 3.

²Ibid.

³Donald G. Brennan, "Setting and Goals of Arms Control," Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security, ed. Donald G. Brennan (New York: George Braziller, 1961), p. 29. Hereafter referred to as Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security.

⁴Thomas E. Murray, "Morality and Security; The Forgotten Equation," Morality and Modern Warfare, ed. William J. Nagle (Baltimore: The Helicon Press, 1960), p. 29. Hereafter referred to as Morality and Modern Warfare.

⁵Hadley, op. cit., p. 27.

technological revolution in the art of war approximately every five years.⁶ In an address before the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Hugh L. Dryden predicted that "the freedom of space combined with the great power of nuclear energy for destruction forecasts the future development of weapons systems now only dimly understood."⁷ Nuclear weapons, although frightening in their potential, are not the ultimate. General LeMay prophesied that "our national security in the future may depend on armaments far different from any we know today."⁸ These future weapons may be of a beam-directed variety, travelling across space with the speed of light.⁹

These weapons of destruction, plus the fact of the cold war, pose a vexing dilemma: although nations presently possess weapons too destructive to be rationally used, they must continue the arms race, lest the potential enemy gain a strategic technological advantage. Yet, a continued arms race is a precarious route, bringing the world to the brink of self-destruction. The acuteness of this dilemma is

⁶Herman Kahn, "The Arms Race and Some of its Hazards," Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security, p. 109.

⁷Hugh L. Dryden, "The Lunar Exploration Program," Vital Speeches XXVIII (March 15, 1962), 339.

⁸Curtis E. LeMay, "Military Implications of Space," Vital Speeches XXVIII (May 15, 1962), 454.

⁹Ibid.

stressed by John K. Moriarty:

On the one hand, the consequences of allowing the Soviet Union a clear military superiority might well be disastrous; on the other hand, the arms race is an ever-accelerating ordeal which can at any moment precipitate a war of mass destruction. Reason demands that a way out of the dilemma be found; the human mind cannot indefinitely confront two such dreadful alternatives.¹⁰

Public Apathy

Notwithstanding the seriousness of the nuclear dilemma, there is a general apathetic attitude on the part of the public and churches regarding the implications of this dilemma. Thomas Merton upbraids the public for being passive, inert, morally indifferent, and irresponsible regarding the contemporary problems of nuclear armaments and defense policy.¹¹ Nagle inveighs against the apathetic attitude within Catholic circles. The book, Morality and Modern Warfare, which he edited, was for the purpose of stimulating Catholic scholars to wrestle with this issue and to shake them from their want of interest. Nagle acknowledges that the volume clearly seems to have failed this purpose.¹² Bennett expresses astonishment over the fact that

¹⁰John K. Moriarty, "Technology, Strategy, And Military Policy," Morality and Modern Warfare, pp. 43-44.

¹¹Thomas Merton, "Nuclear War and Christian Responsibility," Commonweal LXXV (February 9, 1962), 513.

¹²"Where Are The Theologians?" Commonweal LXXVI (May 18, 1962), 203.

there is so little serious discussion concerning the ethics of nuclear war among American Protestants.¹³

Reasons for this apathy. There are several possible explanations for this dearth of discussion. For one, it has been hoped that peace would prevail and war deterred by the threat to use nuclear weapons in massive retaliation against an aggressor. To impugn the ethical merits of such a retaliation might have endangered the credibility of such a deterrent.

Bennett suggests as another explanation the fact that Americans developed a callousness toward violence during World War II:

I think that we need also to see the silence of most of us against the background of developments during the second world war when it came to be widely taken for granted in this country that it was justifiable to use any degree of violence against the enemy at a distance.¹⁴

A third possible factor is that America is in the very unenviable position of being the only Western nation capable of maintaining an arsenal that can deter the Soviet Union. As Bennett observes, "The objective responsibility of their country . . . has certainly been one factor in

¹³John C. Bennett, "The Debate on the Nuclear Dilemma," Theology Today XVIII (January, 1962), 412.

¹⁴Ibid.

preventing Americans from engaging in much public debate about the use of nuclear weapons."¹⁵

A fourth reason for this apathy is because the religious community has continued to assume that the situation still allowed for the waging of a just war. Religious leaders are slowly awakening to the possibility that the destructive propensities of nuclear weapons might render the traditional doctrine obsolete. As indicated by the previous chapter, many theologians are re-examining the applicability of the just war doctrine. Also indicated was the fact that some doubt its applicability. One of these theologians, Arthur C. Cochrane, has written a perceptive article in which he affirms the unique position that John Calvin himself would oppose engaging in a general nuclear war because in the wake of such a holocaust the commonwealth could not be preserved and anarchial chaos would prevail.¹⁶

This apathy is incredible, however, especially since the nuclear dilemma forces thoughtful Christians to ponder a number of vital questions: what ought to be the Christian's attitude toward the production and use of multi-megaton weapons? What defense strategy is both effective and moral? Is nuclear war inimical to the just war doctrine?

¹⁵Ibid., 414.

¹⁶Arthur C. Cochrane, "John Calvin and Nuclear War," The Christian Century LXXIX (July 4, 1962), 839.

II. MORALITY AND MILITARY POLICY

The Moralists' Role

Does the moralist and other enlightened individuals have a proper role in shaping the national military strategy, or are the issues so specialized and refined that only military experts qualify as sources of guidance? Lawler remarks that,

The general feeling of our society, when it has not been purely apathetic, is that these issues are so specialized and refined that the layman's judgment is necessarily impaired, and that he must rely almost entirely on the experts.¹⁷

Lawler contends that this reliance on experts has not been beneficial.

What is the moralist's role, if indeed he does have one, regarding military strategy? He is not qualified as a moralist to pass judgment on the adequacy or inadequacy of any weapons system, except in a general way. However, as Connery has stated, the moralist can "set up the moral framework for the licit use of such weapons."¹⁸ Paul Ramsey says that the moralist can insist that "if the weapon facts are these and the use proposed for them is this, then he cannot see how such action can be squared with the tradition

¹⁷Justus George Lawler, "Catholics and the Arms Race," Commonweal LXXVI (May 18, 1962), 200.

¹⁸John R. Connery, "Morality of Nuclear Armament," Theology Digest V (Winter, 1957), 11.

of civilized warfare."¹⁹ Ramsey also suggests that "the moralist, with his findings as to the moral law, and the military planner, with his findings of fact, need together to determine the nature of . . . a weapons system."²⁰

There is an urgent need for morally enlightened people to speak out because the fruit of a morally blind military policy is invariably bitter. Zahn cites examples of this bitter fruit:

This tendency to shy away from uncomfortable moral responsibilities, blinding one's eyes and stopping one's ears if need be, bore bitter harvest in the ghastly scandal of World War II. From it stemmed the willingness of German Catholics to resign themselves to active and unquestioning service in the Nazi armies. And this was matched on the Allied side by the moral default of Catholics who collaborated without compunction in the unprecedented slaughter of noncombatant civilians to gain the morally questionable objective of "unconditional surrender."²¹

The enlightened Christian has the right to examine and to make recommendations concerning national defense. If he believes it is permissible to wage war, providing certain conditions prevail, he should feel a moral obligation to become a student of the issues and to exert as much

¹⁹Paul Ramsey, War and The Christian Conscience (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1961), pp. 137-138.

²⁰Ibid., p. 273.

²¹Gordon C. Zahn, "Social Science and the Theology of War," Morality and Modern Warfare, p. 105.

influence as possible to insure that those conditions do prevail. Even the Christian who is convinced that warfare is wholly inimical to the Christian faith can provide a positive witness in the matter of national defense strategy. In this the Quakers have usually furnished a noble example. Roland Bainton remarks, "The Quakers were ready to address pleas to rulers and even to offer counsel as to the use of the sword, while themselves refraining from its employment."²² It seems evident that a military policy, devoid of ethical guidance, will tend to brutalize a nation and desensitize the national conscience. Pacifists can be as alert to these tendencies as anyone else. It is possible that they can be more alert, since they are less involved in hostilities. The light which they can furnish in the matter of establishing an acceptable military strategy should not be refused.

Morality and Strategy

Weapons of force are in themselves morally neutral. They attain the quality of being moral or immoral by the manner in which they are used. The considerations that command their development and employment, then, become a crucial point of discussion. Several considerations may direct

²²Roland Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War And Peace (New York: Abingdon Press, 1950), p. 157.

their development and employment. First, technology may direct the development of instruments of force and may, simply because it has developed them, be responsible for their use. Ramsey claims that technology itself "has determined the shape of our weapons program and our defense policy."²³ This is also the complaint of Thomas E. Murray:

For the last decade or more our weapons program has been dictated by what we can do, scientifically and technologically, rather than by what we ought to do, militarily, politically, and morally.²⁴

Such a course is fatal because technology is a very poor directing agent of military strategy. It exploits scientific possibilities simply because they are possibilities. It places at the disposal of armed forces the weapons of catastrophic capabilities, not because they are vital, but because they are possible.

Second, military requirements alone may direct the development and employment of weapons of violence. However, these should never be accepted as the ultimate consideration for to be directed by military requirements alone is to drift toward barbarism.

Third, moral principles may direct the development and employment of instruments of force. John Courtney Murray stresses that power must have a sense of direction and that

²³Ramsey, op. cit., p. 278.

²⁴Murray, op. cit., p. 40.

it can be invested with a sense of direction only by moral principles. He writes that the function of morality is "to command the use of power, to forbid it, to limit it; or more in general, to define the ends for which it may or must be used and to judge the circumstances of its use."²⁵

III. VARIOUS DEFENSE STRATEGIES

An analysis of possible defense strategies from the standpoint of their military effectiveness and moral acceptability is in order. Fundamentally, America's defense strategy has been one of deterrence. The philosophy of deterrence is that if one threatens to respond with a severely punitive measure in the event a specific act is committed, the feared action, in all probability, will not occur. The United States has based its hope of peace on having a military capability that will go unchallenged by any other nation. In September, 1960, General Nathan F. Twining asserted that "the American capability for decisive, war-winning response to any attack . . . is the only reliable guarantee of the peace."²⁶ The principle of deterrence is responsible for the stress on developing new and versatile nuclear weapons. President Kennedy has explained that,

²⁵John Courtney Murray, "Theology and Modern War," Morality and Modern Warfare, pp. 90-91.

²⁶Quoted by Hadley, op. cit., p. 29.

. . . until mankind has banished both war and its instruments of destruction, the United States must maintain an effective quantity of nuclear weapons, so deployed and protected as to be capable of surviving any surprise attack and devastating the attacker. Only through such strength can we be certain of deterring a nuclear strike, or an overwhelming ground attack, upon our forces and allies. . . . And that deterrent strength, if it is to be effective and credible when compared with that of any other nation, must embody the most modern, the most reliable, and the most versatile nuclear weapons our research and development can produce.²⁷

The principle of deterrence is responsible for the military strategy of threatening massive retaliation upon any aggressor.

Massive Retaliation

In 1953, the strategy of massive retaliation with nuclear weapons was formalized and placed into effect under the name, "The New Look."²⁸ This stopgap policy was prompted by the threat of creeping Communist expansion in the world. "By adopting the policy of massive retaliation, the United States hoped to frighten the Soviets out of their peripheral arson."²⁹

²⁷John F. Kennedy, Review of Operations of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 8, 1962), p. 53. Hereafter referred to as Review of Operations of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

²⁸Maxwell D. Taylor, "Our Changing Military Policy," Vital Speeches XXVIII (March 15, 1962), 348.

²⁹James E. Dougherty, "The Political Context," Morality and Modern Warfare, pp. 18-19.

Strategic analysis. There are contradictory opinions as to the military value of this threat. Some authorities claim that the threat did in fact serve as a deterrent. Moriarty, although not favorable to the strategy, admits that "the threat to civilian and economic targets, in a strategy of massive retaliation, does have a certain deterrent utility."³⁰ Those who style themselves "nuclear realists," are strong advocates of the theory of peace through the threat of massive retaliation. Gottwald states that the nub of the nuclear realist's position is the contention that "by manufacturing and threatening to use nuclear weapons, we can insure that they will never have to be used."³¹ The chief publication holding this position is Christianity and Crisis. Its basic theory is that "the threat of all-out war is the only pathway out of the present power conflict until softening of relations and solid joint settlements offer more permanent relaxation of tension."³²

However, the critics of the massive retaliation policy have been constant and vociferous. The concept is ludicrously illustrated by Hadley:

³⁰Moriarty, op. cit., p. 52.

³¹Norman K. Gottwald, "Nuclear Realism or Nuclear Pacifism," The Christian Century LXXVII (August 3, 1960), 895.

³²Ibid., 896.

More bang for a buck has placed America in a strategic situation similar to that in an old Wild West Town where the legendary sheriff was slow on the draw. He would have to walk around town with his guns always in his hands. One can see him telling a stranger, "This here is a peace-loving town and I aims to keep it thataway. But I'm a little slow on the draw, which is why I always walk around town with my guns loaded and pointed at people."³³

Teller remarks that the only result of the doctrine of massive retaliation was to create a militaristic image of the United States.³⁴

For a number of reasons, the strategy of massive retaliation is considered ineffective in meeting the real defense needs. First, such a threat is useless against irrational leaders. Like small children, madmen have a way of ignoring the most severe threats. It would take an irrational leader to start a nuclear war and the warning of an all-out retaliation is not likely to aver his decision.

Second, the policy produces an intolerable arms race that will probably precipitate a war. Verne H. Fletcher writes: "The nervous finger is poised on the button. This is the poisoned atmosphere of deterrence. To imagine that

³³Hadley, op. cit., pp. 19-20.

³⁴Edward Teller, "The Feasibility of Arms Control and the Principle of Openness," Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security, p. 132.

it can continue indefinitely would be naive."³⁵ Muste argues that "an armament race is not in any basic or permanent sense a deterrent but the opposite. Once a Rome-Carthage pattern develops, war in the light of all the evidence results."³⁶ If the threat of a catastrophic response to any form of aggression is actually believed by the enemy, he will be deterred until he achieves the capability of destroying the United States' retaliatory force. Hence, the threat of massive retaliation may furnish the incentive for the enemy to initiate a major nuclear war, rather than simply a brushfire revolution!

Third, the strategy is actually impotent in dealing with piecemeal aggression. Moriarty discards the boast that such a policy can deter peripheral wars because "it is doubtful if the American military themselves would be in favor of initiating all-out war directly with the Soviet Union over a 'brushfire' in Southeast Asia."³⁷ To rely solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation is to restrict the nation's flexibility in responding to less-than-total non-nuclear aggression.

³⁵Verne H. Fletcher, "What Chance For Peace?" The Christian Century LXXIX (July 25, 1962), 911.

³⁶A. J. Muste, "The H-Bomb As a Deterrent," Christianity and Crisis XIV (June 14, 1954), 77.

³⁷Moriarty, loc. cit.

Fourth, the assumption that might give the strategy some credence is actually untrue. The assumption is that the enemy's population is hostage and will meet an unattractive fate if the leaders act unwisely. However, it is not certain that the Russian population is held hostage. Kahn has testified that,

There are lots of places to evacuate to in the Soviet Union. Let me give some orienting numbers. There are less than 50 million people in the largest 135 Russian cities. As far as we can tell it is perfectly possible to evacuate 80 per cent of this urban population and have all vital functions in the cities performed. This would leave only 10 million people at risk in 135 cities. Having been alerted, these could evacuate on very short notice.³⁸

The Subcommittee before which Kahn testified further learned that "recent studies of Soviet civil defense indicate that a substantial program was recently instituted to train the entire Soviet population in basic survival techniques."³⁹

Fifth, the threat of massive retaliation becomes ineffective as Russia hardens her missile sites and in other ways attains a second-strike capability. Even if the United

³⁸Herman Kahn, Biological and Environmental Effects of Nuclear War. Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 893. Hereafter referred to as Biological and Environmental Effects of Nuclear War.

³⁹Biological and Environmental Effects of Nuclear War, Summary-Hearings. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 52. Hereafter referred to as Biological and Environmental Effects of Nuclear War, Summary-Analysis.

States launched a first-strike assault, Russia would be able to counter with sufficient force to deface substantially the United States. It is incredible to presume that the United States will risk mutual annihilation because the Communists have inspired a revolution in a territory "which the vast majority of Americans would have a hard time locating on a map."⁴⁰

Moral analysis. There are those who claim that the strategy of massive retaliation is immoral. It is interdicted on three grounds: First, it destroys spiritual and moral values. Erich Fromm postulates that even if the strategy is militarily successful, it is still a moral failure:

To live for any length of time under the constant threat of destruction creates certain psychological effects in most human beings -- fright, hostility, callousness, a hardening of the heart, and a resulting indifference to all the values we cherish. Such conditions will transform us into barbarians -- though barbarians with the most complicated machines.⁴¹

Gottwald inquires:

Does not reliance on weapons of extermination tend to erode the moral and spiritual realities which the weapons professedly defend? . . . When we accept as

⁴⁰Dougherty, op. cit., p. 19.

⁴¹Erich Fromm, "The Case for Unilateral Disarmament," Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security, p. 190.

necessary the contemplation of the radiological murder -- of millions of Russians and millions of Americans -- can any one doubt that our society is brutalized thereby? If a Christian believes that political and social orders are possibly only through threatening an act which dissolves all recognizable human order, what is left of his belief in God the Creator?⁴²

Second, it transgresses the limits to the measures a nation may morally threaten to take in responding to the aggressive use of force. Moriarty, for example, indicts the policy as not meeting the time-honored test of acceptability in its consequences.⁴³ Teller charges that the threat of massive retaliation is not only impractical, but is immoral because it responds to evil with a much greater evil.⁴⁴

Third, it is contrary to the counter-forces requirement of the just war doctrine. The strategy of massive retaliation is to annihilate the enemy's metropolitan centers. This is inimical to the requirement that noncombatants be granted immunity from the direct violence of war.

Excursus: morality of developing and producing multi-megaton nuclear weapons. If it is immoral to use multi-megaton nuclear weapons in retaliation, is it moral to develop such a capability? Almost a decade ago, Muste raised

⁴²Gottwald, op. cit., 896.

⁴³Moriarty, op. cit., p. 50.

⁴⁴Teller, loc. cit.

this issue by asking, "What is the moral or Christian justification for preparing to do what by definition we have no right to do?"⁴⁵ The Catholic pacifist, Gordon C. Zahn, writes,

Moralists can no longer indulge in the luxury of esoteric discussions of hypothetical battleships sailing the high seas, discussions which have thus far protected nuclear warfare from theological condemnation. Megaton-sized bombs and the missiles which will deliver them are being built not for battleships but for cities. Our Catholic spiritual leaders would seem to have a clear obligation to condemn any and all weapons which are suited only to uses which are unquestionably immoral and to inform the faithful that any war involving or anticipating recourse to such unjust means would automatically be an unjust war.⁴⁶

Kevin Walsh, a Catholic physicist, troubled by the moral factors involved in his participation in various developments, wrote the editors of Commonweal, pleading for guidance from Catholic leaders as to his duty. He wrote:

In order to guide those Catholics who have occupational moral hazards, the Church has provided in some cases, e.g. for doctors, moral analyses of most of the situations in which these people may find themselves during their professional life. However, the Church has failed miserably to provide any effective guidance for those people who are intimately concerned with the killing and maiming of millions of people. I refer specifically to those Catholics who are involved in the design of mass destruction weapon systems and techniques.⁴⁷

⁴⁵Muste, loc. cit.

⁴⁶Zahn, op. cit., p. 108.

⁴⁷Kevin Walsh, "Nuclear War, A Letter to the Editors," Commonweal LXV (March 22, 1957), 641-642.

From a Protestant viewpoint, Ramsey says that "any weapon whose every use must be for the purpose of directly killing noncombatants . . . is a weapon whose every use would be wholly immoral."⁴⁸ He adds: "The manufacture and possession of a weapon whose every use is that just described . . . is likewise immoral."⁴⁹

Ramsey's qualification that a weapon is immoral if its every use is for the purpose of directly killing noncombatants is a convenient loophole for those who want to justify the further development of high-megaton weapons. By devising hypothetical military targets for which these weapons could be used, they feel no compunction in supporting their development. However, it seems evident that the primary purpose of these weapons will be to destroy civilian, not military, centers. It seems obligatory for Christian thinkers to adjudicate the morality of the present and planned weapons system on the basis of the intended and probable use of these weapons.

Excursus: The Morality of Fighting A Major Nuclear War

Closely related to the issues involved in the strategy of massive retaliation is the question as to the feasibility and morality of engaging in a major nuclear war.

⁴⁸Ramsey, op. cit., p. 162.

⁴⁹Ibid.

This is a war in which the objective of the war is not limited to pushing the enemy across a certain parallel, river, or boundary but is full victory and the complete default of the enemy. In this type of war, nuclear weapons of a variety of types and sizes will be an integral part of the military strategy.

The moral verdict against such a war. Total war in this sense is under the ban of moral proscription by the just war theorists. Pius XII, when asked if total war were permissible, replied in the negative.⁵⁰ The concept of total war which looks to the collapse of the enemy nation is styled by Thomas Murray as "regression toward barbarism."⁵¹ Morgenthau writes that without qualification, a thermonuclear war cannot be justified on moral grounds.⁵² These moralists and theologians condemn a major nuclear war because there is no prospect of beneficial victory in such a war. The conviction is that a general nuclear war will result in genocide; a consequence that under no circumstances

⁵⁰Cited by Zamayon, op. cit., 4.

⁵¹Murray, op. cit., p. 58.

⁵²Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Nuclear Discussion: Continued," Christianity and Crisis XXI (December 11, 1962), 223.

is morally permissible.⁵³ Merton sees the Christian's obligation to be that of taking the stand "that all-out nuclear, bacterial or chemical warfare is unacceptable as a practical solution to international problems."⁵⁴ So adamant is he in this conviction that he suggests that if a total war seemed inevitable,

. . . it would become . . . obligatory for all sane and conscientious men everywhere in the world to lay down their weapons and their tools and starve and be shot rather than cooperate in the war effort.⁵⁵

Possibility for victory and recuperation. In order to test the contention of those who regard a major nuclear war as immoral, it is necessary to analyze the possibility for victory and recuperation in a nuclear war.

It is difficult to grasp the cataclysm which a nuclear war promises. Numerical estimates of the holocaust make it seem incredible that any one would press the button to start such a war. However, someone may do just that. Therefore, an estimate as to the effects of a major nuclear war is in order. It has already been noted that many are convinced that a meaningful victory is impossible. Such an

⁵³This is the conviction of T. Murray, loc. cit. Zamayon, op. cit., 5; Thomas Merton, op. cit., 512; Stuart Chase, "Principles For the Nuclear Age," Saturday Review (May 6, 1961), 32.

⁵⁴Merton, op. cit., 513.

⁵⁵Ibid., 513.

assertion is not unrealistic, perhaps, when one considers the potential destructive power of only one thermonuclear bomb. Brennan says that "a single high-yield thermonuclear weapon can release more energy than all the high explosives used in the whole of World War II."⁵⁶

Others, such as Edward Teller and Herman Kahn, believe that a nuclear war can be won and that recuperation would be made within a decade after such a war. In 1959, Kahn appeared before the Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and testified that he and his colleagues possessed experimental and theoretical data which prompted them to calculate that the United States and Russia could survive a major nuclear war.⁵⁷ His book, On Thermonuclear War, is an extensive defense of this view.⁵⁸

To determine if an all-out, nuclear war threatens genocide, or if it is a catastrophe from which recuperation is probable, a calculation of the probable consequences of such a war is necessary. In an unprecedented action, a Congressional Committee analyzed the consequences of a hypothetical nuclear attack upon the United States. The

⁵⁶Brennan, op. cit., p. 32.

⁵⁷Kahn, Biological and Environmental Effects of Nuclear War, p. 905.

⁵⁸Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961). Hereafter referred to as On Thermonuclear War.

time of the presumed attack was 7 A.M. eastern standard time, on a typical October day. The weather conditions used in plotting the fallout patterns and the effects of meteorological factors were those recorded for October 17, 1958.⁵⁹

The hypothetical attack,

. . . assumed 263 nuclear weapons in 1, 2, 3, 8, and 10 megaton sizes with a total yield of 1,446 megatons were detonated on 224 targets within the United States. An additional 2,500 megatons were assumed to have been detonated elsewhere in the Northern Hemisphere in attacks on overseas U.S. bases and in retaliation against the aggressor homeland.⁶⁰

According to expert testimony and scientific data, such an attack, under present civil defense conditions,

. . . would have cost the lives of approximately 50 million Americans, with some 20 million others sustaining serious injuries. More than one-fourth . . . of the dwellings in the United States would have been destroyed and nearly 10 million others would have been damaged. Some 13 million additional homes would have been severely contaminated by radioactive fallout. Altogether, approximately 50 per cent of existing dwellings in the United States would have been destroyed or rendered unuseable for a period of several months.⁶¹

As a consequence of the hypothetical attack of 1,446 megatons, the fifty-three largest metropolitan centers would be devastated; one-third of the population would be dead; and one-half of the industrial capacity would be destroyed.

⁵⁹Biological and Environmental Effects of Nuclear War, Summary-Analysis, p. 10.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 4.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 5.

To calculate the possibilities for recuperation, the committee examined what remained. Although the attack destroyed the "A" country (composed of the metropolitan regions), it is considered the most expendable portion of the nation. While the "A" country cannot subsist without the "B" country (composed of lesser cities and rural districts), the "B" country is self-sufficient. The committee was informed that the "B" country is able to rebuild the "A" country in approximately one decade.⁶²

This writer is convinced that several objections can be stated to the committee's conclusion that recuperation is possible. First, although losing one-third of the population and one-half of the industrial capacity is a somber prospect, it appears that this is still too optimistic a hope. If the Soviets attack America's metropolitan centers, it is unlikely that they will limit themselves to 1,446 megatons. On February 22, 1963, Russia's Defense Minister Marshal Malinovsky stated that in the event of a third world war, the Soviet Union "will wipe out civil and military objects of the United States and annihilate countries which have United States' weapons."⁶³ Should the Soviet Union

⁶²Ibid., p. 50.

⁶³"Reds Threaten War to Protect Castro," United Press International, Carlsbad [New Mexico] Current-Argus, February 22, 1963.

choose to fulfill this pledge and elect to initiate a 30,000 megaton attack, 120 million people will probably be killed. Recovery would be far more difficult in such an event.

Second, the assumption that the "B" country will survive can be reasonably challenged. The "B" country is as vulnerable as the "A" country. A 1,000 megaton explosion, detonated at satellite altitude, could set six western states afire.⁶⁴ If the enemy desired to destroy the "B" country, it could do so. The chances of the "B" country's survival are further lessened by the presence of strategic missile bases distributed throughout its area. The enemy would have to attack all of these sites in order to avoid the retaliatory missiles. To do this will mean the utter devastation of the "B" country. For instance, a study has shown that 300 megatons would have to be laid in a few minutes upon the 18 hardened Titan bases that ring Tucson in order to eliminate them.⁶⁵ Further, in order to destroy the hardened missile sites, nuclear groundbursts are required. Such bursts maximize the local fallout hazard. With heavy megaton ground bursts throughout the "B" country, its ability to survive is questionable.

Third, the 1959 Congressional study cannot be relied

⁶⁴Gerard Piel, "The Illusion of Civil Defense," Vital Speeches XXVIII (February 1, 1962), 242.

⁶⁵Ibid., 243.

upon as a portrayal of the effects of a general nuclear war because the situation assumed by the committee was the event of a single attack, not a continuing conflict.

Fourth, there are several considerations that reduce the possibilities of a meaningful survival. The post-attack problems are prodigious and seemingly unwieldy. A few merit brief attention. Perhaps the most immediate need after a nuclear attack will be medical services. The millions who are maimed will not survive if they are not treated. But will treatment be available? The doctors in Massachusetts examined the consequences for that state if a nuclear assault is incurred. Flato reports that,

Taking the 1959 Hollifield Committee estimates of the effect of a "mild" (10 bomb, 56-megaton) attack on the state of Massachusetts, and the committee count of casualties in that state (2,800,000 dead, 2,000,000 injured) as their yardstick, the doctors have taken a look at the medical consequences, in terms of the kinds of injuries . . . and their severity, the number of physicians who will be alive and uninjured to take care of the maimed, the number of hospital beds that will be available, the drugs that will be needed. . . . Even if the attack is restricted to a single 56-megaton single strike . . . medical services will virtually be wiped out.⁶⁶

For every surviving, functioning doctor, there will be between 1,000 and 1,700 injured people.⁶⁷ Trained personnel and essential drugs will be unavailable.

⁶⁶Charles Flato, "Is There A Doctor In The Rubble?" Nation 194 (June 9, 1962), 508.

⁶⁷Ibid.

Another need will be for uncontaminated food. Will it be available? The Congressional study acknowledges that "the postulated nuclear attack would have very significant effects on the agricultural and food resources in the United States."⁶⁸ Two consequential factors were ignored by the committee in considering the problem of post-attack food supply: (1) it did not estimate the damage that an uncontrolled, wind-swept fire would inflict on the fertile, vegetated districts. Fire is a menace, not only because of its immediate destruction of crops, but also because it subjects the land to permanent erosion. New dust bowls could conceivably result after the war; and (2) although allowing that local fallout would destroy crops in the entire region east of the Mississippi River, it ignored the fact that the crops west of the river would also be menaced by local fallout, resulting from heavy megaton ground bursts in the "B" country.

Also needed will be an organized system of authority and decision-making. In the midst of the rubble such as will be created by thermonuclear blasts, anarchy would be catastrophic. But with both the "A" and the "B" country devastated, will any kind of organized system remain?

Another consideration is the psychological well-being of the survivors. If the 100 million people are

⁶⁸Biological and Environmental Effects of Nuclear War, Summary-Analysis, p. 42.

killed⁶⁹ and all appearances of civilization ceased, will the survivors be psychologically capable of making a meaningful recuperation?

There are, of course, other factors that must be considered in any extensive study of possible recuperation after a nuclear assault. The above are indicative of the severe obstacles and seemingly insurmountable barriers in the way of true recovery. Perhaps Kahn's confidence in the possibility of a recuperation within a decade is because he and his associates did not study the interaction among the effects of a nuclear war.⁷⁰

Actually, it is impossible to prognosticate accurately the effects of a nuclear attack because of certain variable factors. Two of these are (1) The size and extent of an attack. This variable makes considerable difference because every megaton is capable of devastating sixty to seventy square miles, and of inflicting grave damage to an area well beyond that.⁷¹ (2) The attacker's strategy also determines to a great extent the number of civilian casualties. For instance, if the enemy diverted 10 per cent of a

⁶⁹It is not unreasonable to assume that as many as 100 million people could be killed. See Hadley, op. cit., p. 27; Chase, loc. cit.; Piel, op. cit., 243.

⁷⁰Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, pp. 91-92.

⁷¹Hanson Baldwin, "Limited War," Atlantic 203 (May, 1959), 38.

30,000 megaton attack to civilian targets, 120 million people could be killed.⁷²

Analysis of the no-cities doctrine. In a speech at Ann Arbor, McNamara spoke of a new strategy for fighting a general nuclear war which would supposedly allay the fear of genocide resulting. Actually, it is a reversal of the massive retaliation doctrine, as postulated during Eisenhower's administration. McNamara explained that,

The United States has come to the conclusion that to the extent feasible, basic military strategy in a possible general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. That is to say, principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war . . . should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population.⁷³

This strategy has acquired the nomenclature "no-cities" or "counter-force" doctrine. The theory is that the first response the United States would make to a direct attack would be to strike only at Soviet missile sites and military installations; then an ultimatum would be given the enemy to either quit shooting or suffer destruction of his cities.

A similar tactic is explained by Kahn, only in his book he assumes that it is the enemy that chooses a no-cities

⁷²Piel, loc. cit.

⁷³Robert McNamara, "The United States and Western Europe," Vital Speeches XXVIII (August 1, 1962), 628.

doctrine in its initial attack. The enemy,

. . . can adopt the following tactic, which, if it works, may save him a great deal of damage; if it does not work, it will cost him very little in relation to his possible gains. This tactic is to avoid the cities deliberately and to concentrate his first waves on our offensive forces and air defense. . . . The enemy could then make some ferocious threats that might well cause us to be discriminating in our later counterattacks. He could say, for example, "I have deliberately avoided your cities. I have treated them as open cities, and I wish you to treat my cities in the same way. . . . However, from now on for every city of mine you destroy I will destroy five of yours."⁷⁴

Thomas C. Schelling also believes a coldly calculating enemy might consider it wise not to attack the United States' population at first. Then, "the threat of killing them gives him something to bargain with in the course of the war or at its termination."⁷⁵

The no-cities doctrine, however, does not appear plausible for several reasons. First, under present circumstances, a nuclear war that followed a no-cities strategy would still result in over 70,000,000 deaths in the United States alone.⁷⁶ Second, it is unrealistic. An Air Force General reportedly said: "You just can't control these

⁷⁴Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, p. 163.

⁷⁵Thomas C. Schelling, "Reciprocal Measures For Arms Stabilization," Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security, p. 184.

⁷⁶Stewart Alsop, "Our New Strategy The Alternatives to Total War," Post 235 (December 1, 1962), 17.

weapons that easily. . . . It's like asking us to play a Beethoven sonata with one hand tied behind our backs and the other in a boxing glove."⁷⁷ Third, an enemy cannot destroy the United States' capability for retaliation without attacking the civilian centers because many second-strike weapons ring the major cities. Fourth, it is unrealistic because it presumes that after launching a first-strike against the United States and after absorbing a retaliatory blow against their remaining missiles and bombers, the Soviet Union would still possess a force of sufficient strength to "bargain" over cities. This seems highly unlikely because it is only reasonable to assume that America will intend to destroy all of Russia's remaining missiles and bombers in the counter-forces blow, unless McNamara's policy is to permit all military installations near Russian cities to remain unattacked! Fifth, the policy will become increasingly infeasible as Russia acquires a secure second-strike force of its own. The Soviet Union is pursuing the policy of making their nuclear forces invulnerable to attack by developing underground missiles, similar to the Minuteman, and missile-launching submarines, similar to the Polaris.⁷⁸ When Russia acquires such a force, the threat of a

⁷⁷Ibid.

⁷⁸"Defense," Time LXXI (February 8, 1963), 15.

counter-forces attack will hardly be a deterrent, for it is practically impossible to know the position of such forces, and even if such knowledge were possible, it requires too many weapons from America's stockpile to attempt their elimination.⁷⁹ Hence, for several reasons, the "no-cities" doctrine is not a strategically sound approach and does not relieve the possibility of a major nuclear war being a holocaust from which no meaningful recuperation is possible.

Limited Response To Limited Aggression

A shift in strategy. During 1961, a reorientation of America's military strategy was begun which emphasized the development of a capability to engage in limited, "brush-fire" aggression. In his State of the Union address, President Kennedy clarified his administration's approach to national defense:

. . . our strength may be tested at many levels. We intend to have at all times the capacity to resist non-nuclear or limited attacks -- as a complement to our nuclear capability, not as a substitute. We have rejected any all-or-nothing posture which would leave no choice but inglorious retreat or unlimited retaliation.⁸⁰

⁷⁹"The Dilemma and The Design," Time LXXI (February 15, 1963), 24.

⁸⁰John F. Kennedy, "The State of the Union," Vital Speeches XXVIII (February 1, 1962), 232.

Later in the year, he injected this cautionary observation in his address to West Point's graduating class: "It is wholly misleading to call this the nuclear age or to say that our security rests only on the doctrine of massive retaliation."⁸¹ The United States, they were told, must prepare for another type of war,

. . . new in its intensity, ancient in its origin -- war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins-- war by ambush instead of combat, by infiltration instead of aggression -- seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him.⁸²

The type of war that the President had in mind is frequently called "a war of liberation." McNamara described the operation of the Communists in "a war of liberation," as being "in the twilight zone between political subversion and quasi-military action."⁸³ The military tactics in such a war are those of the sniper, the ambush, and the raid. The Secretary of Defense said that America intends to help the people of threatened nations by teaching them appropriate strategy and furnishing them appropriate means.⁸⁴ At present, all four Services are training fighters who can

⁸¹John F. Kennedy, "For Each Other," Vital Speeches XXVIII (July 1, 1962), 547.

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³Robert S. McNamara, "The Communist Design For World Conquest," Vital Speeches XXVIII (March, 1962), 298.

⁸⁴Ibid.

teach people of other nations how to fight for their freedom. The conflict in South Vietnam is typical of this type of warfare and America's assistance in such a war. The conflict was recently described in these words:

The fighting in South Vietnam, where each hour deepens the U. S. commitment, is many things. It is the whirl of helicopter blades in the steaming air; it is the stench of cloying jungle mud, teeming with parasitic infestation; it is monotony punctuated by songs of insects; it is the closeness of an invisible enemy who strikes out of green ambush with the suddenness of crackling death.⁸⁵

The article also reported that some "12,000 uniformed Americans are deployed in South Vietnam, many as front-line advisers to Vietnamese troops fighting Communist guerrillas."⁸⁶

Definition. A precise definition of a limited war is difficult because it means different things to different people. As Moriarty has pointed out, "The term has been used so often by so many different people to mean so many different things that it has almost lost the capacity to communicate an idea."⁸⁷ The term has been used to denote limitations in the geographical area of conflict, the extent of the fighting, the type of targets to be attacked, the number of participating nations, the type of weapons used,

⁸⁵"We Wade Deeper Into Jungle War," Life 54 (January 25, 1963), 22.

⁸⁶Ibid.

⁸⁷Moriarty, op. cit., pp. 48-49.

and the political objectives to be sought.⁸⁸ It appears, however, that a limited war is to be understood as one in which certain geographic and strategic limits are observed by both sides.⁸⁹

Feasibility of the limited war concept. The crucial issue is whether a limited war will remain limited. It is obvious that skirmishes and "brushfires" have occurred and remained limited. It is probable that more will come to pass. Whether they remain limited depends on several factors. First, it depends on the area in which the war begins. In Asia or Africa a limited war can probably be contained, but there are areas so strategically sensitive that it appears absurd to speak of fighting a limited war over them. For instance, Gottwald states that the notion of a limited war in Europe is "hardly more than a tactician's fantasy."⁹⁰

Second, whether it remains limited depends on the

⁸⁸See ibid; Baldwin, op. cit., 36.

⁸⁹Schelling has an interesting explanation as to how the limits are achieved in a limited war. He says they are not attained by verbal bargaining, "but by maneuver, by actions, and by statements and declarations that are not direct communication to the enemy." Op. cit., p. 176. To establish the limits, "each side tends to act in some kind of recognizable pattern, so that any limits that it is actually observing can be appreciated by the enemy and each tries to perceive what restraints the other is observing." Ibid.

⁹⁰Gottwald, loc. cit.

nationality of the participants. If the war pits Soviet troops directly against American troops, it is hardly likely that the war will remain limited. Neither side would accept defeat at the hands of the other when it has in reserve greater weapons that might turn the tide of defeat. What political party could hope for re-election if it negotiated surrender to Russia without employing all possible means for victory?

Third, whether the war remains limited depends upon the type of weapons used. This point introduces the current controversy over whether the United States should rely on a limited nuclear or a limited conventional strategy. A distinction should be noted between a limited nuclear and a limited conventional or high-explosive (HE) war. Because one favors a limited response, does not mean that he favors using tactical nuclear weapons. The disadvantages of using tactical nuclear weapons in a limited war must be recognized. One disadvantage is the diplomatic loss which any nation will suffer if it introduces the use of nuclear weapons. Since most of the neutralist nations of the world have vigorously opposed the use of such weapons, "there would be great diplomatic losses for either the Soviet Union or the United States in initiating the use of such weapons."⁹¹

⁹¹Donald G. Brennan and Morton H. Halperin, "Policy Considerations of a Nuclear-Test Ban," Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security, p. 237.

A second disadvantage is that the United States has no clear military strategy as to its conduct. The failure on the part of the Defense Department to devise a coherent, plausible strategy for such a war "makes an American policy based on initiating the use of tactical nuclear weapons a highly questionable one."⁹² Kissinger has written that while,

. . . it is feasible to design a theoretical model for limited nuclear war, the fact remains that fifteen years after the beginning of the nuclear age no such model has ever achieved general agreement.⁹³

A third disadvantage is that nuclear weapons would result in a greater cataclysm than would conventional forces. The prospects of the physical destruction such weapons would perpetrate, coupled with the internecine potential of these devices, should make America hesitant about introducing their use. Brennan and Halperin say:

Nobody has been able to suggest a plausible strategy for limited nuclear war that would be unlikely to involve a mass destruction of the populace and the industry of the country being defended. The use of a few thousand tactical weapons in the kiloton range (certainly conceivable in such a war) would result in the devastation of several thousand square miles and possibly in many millions of civilian casualties.⁹⁴

⁹²Ibid., p. 236.

⁹³Henry A. Kissinger, "Limited War: Convention or Nuclear? A Reappraisal," Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security, p. 143.

⁹⁴Brennan and Halperin, op. cit., p. 237.

A fourth disadvantage of initiating the use of nuclear weapons in a limited war is that such introduction "destroys the advantage the United States would have in a conventional war because of its vastly larger gross national product (GN) and industrial capability."⁹⁵ This is graphically illustrated by the concept of the saturation level:

If we define saturation level as the force needed to destroy completely a given target, it is clear that the amount of productivity and the cost of destroying a particular area is much less if nuclear weapons are used. Thus, the Russians and the Chinese could easily match us in destructive capability in a limited nuclear war but either would have a great deal of difficulty in doing so in a large-scale conventional war.⁹⁶

Hadley points out that "the Free World is superior in industrial capacity to the Communist bloc, and it is in non-nuclear wars that industrial potential becomes a strategically decisive factor."⁹⁷

The fifth disadvantage of a limited nuclear war is that it is more likely not to remain limited than one fought with HE weapons. The danger of escalation is acute because the line between conventional and nuclear weapons is a distinct line. However, once it is crossed it is difficult to know what limit would be observed to keep the limited war

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 238.

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 239.

⁹⁷Hadley, op. cit., p. 70.

from becoming a major nuclear war. There is certain evidence that provides reasonable proof that a limited nuclear war will not remain limited. In army field exercises and in war games "the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons has had a very great tendency to lead to an unlimited expansion of the war."⁹⁸ The "pencil and paper" analyses (these are theoretical studies by private students of military policy) "have led to the conclusion that the use of tactical nuclear weapons would break one of the major barriers to the escalation of limited wars."⁹⁹

Obviously, not everyone agrees that the use of tactical nuclear weapons is disadvantageous in a limited war. Teller argues very persuasively for a nuclear capability that is usable in waging minor conflicts. Teller is convinced that the only way for the West to compensate for the natural military advantages of the Communist world is by light tactical nuclear weapons.¹⁰⁰

Perhaps a mediating position would be to support the development of a capability with light tactical nuclear weapons, but not employ them until the enemy uses similar arms.

⁹⁸Brennan and Halperin, op. cit., p. 236.

⁹⁹Ibid.

¹⁰⁰Teller, "The Feasibility of Arms Control And The Principle of Openness," p. 133.

Limited response as an ethical and moral solution.

The concept of limited warfare is suggested as the ethical denouement to the Scylla of nuclear holocaust and the Charybdis of nonresistant surrender to an irremediable enemy. Dougherty says that the revival of the notion of keeping war limited "represents a commendable effort to resolve the dichotomy of modern Western thought, polarized as it is between the extremes of absolute pacifism and the militarism of total war."¹⁰¹

First-Strike Strategy

The United States has a tremendous first-strike force, i. e., one that is effective only if it attacks first. Hadley claims that such is basically the character of the United States' military force today.¹⁰² This type of capability was necessary to make the threat of massive retaliation credible. There are three situations in which a nation might use a first-strike force: (1) in an act of pure aggression; (2) in a preventive war;¹⁰³ and (3) in a

¹⁰¹Dougherty, op. cit., p. 22.

¹⁰²Hadley, op. cit., p. 20.

¹⁰³A preventive war is one that a nation starts because it feels that a war between itself and a political or economic antagonist is inevitable and that the side striking first will possess a telling edge. The strategy is to wait for the advantage of a favorable imbalance of strength and then to launch an attack.

pre-emptive attack.¹⁰⁴

The traditional American policy and its possible reversal. The American policy has been to disavow the use of its military might in either an aggressive or preventive war. The Chief Counsel for the United States in the prosecution of Germany's leaders after World War II, set forth the American attitude toward aggressive warfare:

We must make it clear to the Germans . . . that the wrong for which their fallen leaders are on trial is not that they lost the war, but that they started it. . . . Our position is that no grievances or policies justify resort to aggressive war.¹⁰⁵

During the Korean conflict, President Truman said, "We do not believe in aggressive or preventive war. Such war is the weapon of dictators, not of free democratic countries."¹⁰⁶ Secretary of State Acheson stated that the very idea of a preventive war "is a thoroughly wicked thing . . . immoral

¹⁰⁴A pre-emptive attack is when a nation attacks because it is convinced that the enemy is on the verge of attacking. It is called a "blunting attack," Hadley, op. cit., p. 140; and an "anticipatory retaliation," Kahn, "The Arms Race and Some of Its Hazards," p. 99.

¹⁰⁵"Statement by Robert H. Jackson, Chief Counsel for the U.S. in the Prosecution of Axis War Criminals," Department of State Bulletin XII (August 8, 1945), 228. Quoted by Robert Tucker, The Just War: A Study In Contemporary American Doctrine (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1961), p. 12.

¹⁰⁶Harry S. Truman, "Address to the Nation," September 1, 1950. Quoted by ibid.

and wrong from every point of view."¹⁰⁷ However, the United States has not been so unequivocal on the possibility of launching a pre-emptive attack. In a television interview on March 5, 1962, Dr. Ralph Lapp quoted from the congressional report of the Defense Department Appropriations, 1961:

In the final analysis, to effectively deter a would-be aggressor, we should maintain our Armed Forces in such a way, and with such an understanding that should it ever become obvious that an attack upon us or on our allies is imminent we can launch an attack before the aggressor has hit either us or our allies. This is an element of deterrent which the United States should not deny itself.¹⁰⁸

It is uncertain whether the United States will continue to repudiate the aggressive or preventive war tactic. Strong military and political voices are drumming for the strategy of striking first in other than pre-emptive situations. Admiral Arleigh Burke says,

The first signs for a refurbished wisdom will be found in a frank, conscious and determined use of our power -- in all its forms -- to determine the course of international events in the modern world.¹⁰⁹

Clare Booth Luce berates the American tradition of not fighting until attack. In her vituperative address, she says,

¹⁰⁷Dean Acheson, "Television Interview," September 10, 1950. Quoted by ibid.

¹⁰⁸The text of this interview is found in Review of Operations of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, p. 29.

¹⁰⁹Arleigh Burke, "Washington's Farewell Speech Revisited," Vital Speeches XXVIII (February 15, 1962), 266.

The idea that a nation, although the mightiest power on earth, has no moral obligation to war, no less to punish the international hoodlum who is raping the independence of nations whose interests are closely tied to its own, until it is first attacked . . . is so far from being moral, that it has long been viewed in the chanceries of the world as a moral aberration, of a peculiarly stupid -- and dangerous -- sort.¹¹⁰

The strategy of employing this first-strike ability for aggressive purposes will undoubtedly gain a wider acceptance, both by the public and the government, as it is openly advocated and endorsed by such people. There is unmistakable evidence that such a strategy has already made its favorable impression on key governmental advisors. In October, 1962, the government precariously toyed with the notion of launching an aggressive attack against Cuba because of the missile sites deployed by Russia on that island. The behind-the-scenes discussions of what action the United States should make is intriguingly reported by Stewart Alsop and Charles Bartlett, two personal friends of President Kennedy. According to their story, the President sought counsel from his "Crisis Cabinet" and three elder statesmen. At first, these advisors were divided into "hawks" (those favoring an air strike against Cuba with or without warning) and "doves."¹¹¹

¹¹⁰Clare Booth Luce, "American Morality and Nuclear Diplomacy," Vital Speeches XXVIII (February 15, 1962), 266.

¹¹¹Stewart Alsop and Charles Bartlett, "In Time of Crisis," Post 236 (December 8, 1962), 20.

Although the "doves" were able to dissuade the President from a violent response, there is no guarantee that they will be able to do so in another crisis. It seems clear that the United States is not unequivocally committed to the idea that an aggressive or preventive war is a thoroughly wicked and evil instrument of policy. This represents a dangerous alteration of thought.

Wisdom and usefulness of a first-strike capability. Is the buildup and maintenance of a large first-strike capability wise or useful? This is a world of "over-kill," meaning that both the United States and the Soviet Union possess far more than is needed to destroy substantially the other, even after being attacked. For instance, in war games it is frequently assumed that the Russians, after suffering an attack, could deliver a 2.5-kilomegaton attack against the United States. By the mid-sixties, the Soviet Union will be able to return a 5-kilomegaton attack because they are now hardening their missile sites.

A 5-kilomegaton attack against the United States in the present state of civil defense preparation will kill about 140 million people, between 75 and 80 per cent of America's population, in the first sixty days. . . . The number of dead will continue to rise over a further period as long-term fallout, epidemics, lack of shelter, food, and medical supplies all take their toll.¹¹²

¹¹²Hadley, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

Therefore, it seems useless to rely upon striking first for victory.

The buildup and maintenance of a large first-strike capability is also unwise. It may well precipitate a nuclear war. The possession by one side of an exorbitant first-strike force can set in motion a series of self-fulfilling prophecies that will cause the opposing side to either pre-empt or to perform in such a manner as to cause the other side to do so. For illustration, let it be supposed that "A" and "B" are rivals. "A" has an extensive first-strike force. "B" reasons that the possession of such a weapons system proves, a priori, that "A" is planning to attack at a convenient time. Therefore, "B" initiates a vigorous arms buildup. "A," aware of "B's" sudden emphasis on armaments, is convinced that he intends to attack. At this point, both are persuaded that the other intends to attack at a favorable moment. Now begins a series of "self-fulfilling prophecies." "A" may drastically increase its own military expenditures in order to compensate for the other's buildup, thus fulfilling "B's" suspicions, causing him to pre-empt. Or, "B" may make further maneuvers, such as placing missile sites near "A's" borders, confirming "A's" fears about "B's" intentions, thus causing him to pre-empt. Hadley points out that "the mere indication that pre-emption might be the United States doctrine increases the temptation

of the Soviets to pre-empt the pre-emption."¹¹³

A moral analysis of the first-strike strategy as it might be used in an aggressive war. As previously stated, one situation in which a nation might use a first-strike force is that of an aggressive war. What is the moral verdict regarding aggressive war today? Once it was morally permissible to wage an aggressive war in order to gain an advantage or to redress wrongs. War was regarded as an instrument for the extension of national policy. The moral principle that vindicated such action was the same that justifies capital punishment. Just as men may be punished because they represent a menace to the welfare of the community, so nations could be legitimately attacked because they represented a threat to the well-being of the community of nations. However, all aggressive wars are morally proscribed by the just war theorists today. Ryan rhetorically asks,

Can the demands of the natural moral law for a just war be met under the conditions that obtain when the decision is made to wage aggressive war as an instrument of national policy? Can a completely modern war be decided on and used as a legitimate means to some ideological or political end?¹¹⁴

¹¹³Ibid., p. 42.

¹¹⁴John K. Ryan, Modern War And Basic Ethics (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1944), p. 120.

He was unable to admit that it can because in the modern world no search can reveal a cause proportionate to the destruction wrought by a modern nuclear war. In his interpretive discussion of Pius XII's position on modern warfare, John Courtney Murray states that,

He seems therefore to deny to individual states . . . the jus belli (competence de guerre) of the modern era of the unlimited sovereign state, sc., the rights of recourse to war, on the sovereign judgment of the national state, for the vindication of legal rights and legitimate interests. The use of force is not now a moral means for the redress of violated legal rights. The justness of the cause is irrelevant; there simply is no longer a right of self-redress; no individual state may presume to take even the cause of justice into its own hands. Whatever the grievance of the state may be, and however objectionable it may find the status quo, warfare undertaken on the sovereign decision of the national state is an immoral means for settling the grievance and for altering existent conditions.¹¹⁵

Referring to this alteration in the just war doctrine, Ramsey says,

This proscription of aggression under any circumstances, even to correct some sorely unjust condition, is probably the most significant alteration in the formulation of the just-war theory that has been brought about by the enormous destructiveness of modern warfare.¹¹⁶

An aggressive war, therefore, is no longer considered morally justifiable.

¹¹⁵John Courtney Murray, op. cit., pp. 75-76.

¹¹⁶Ramsey, op. cit., pp. 80-81.

A moral analysis of the first-strike strategy as it might be used in a preventive war or pre-emptive attack.

The second and third possible uses of a first-strike force is in launching a preventive war or a pre-emptive attack. These may be differentiated from a purely aggressive war because the nation believes that in launching the initial attack it is acting in self-defense. The preventive war strategist believes that actual hostilities are inevitable and that by striking first, he will gain an advantage. The pre-emptive attack strategist is convinced that the other side is about to strike and therefore insists that he is acting only in self-defense. The use of a first-strike force in either of these two situations may be called an aggressive-defensive act.

Some theologians have justified the aggressive-defensive strategy by appealing to the analogy of defense against a threatening murderer. Hodge wrote:

A war may be defensive and yet in one sense aggressive. In other words, self-defense may dictate and render necessary the first assault. A man is not bound to wait until a murderer actually strikes his blow. It is enough that he see undeniable manifestations of a hostile purpose. So a nation is not bound to wait until its territories are actually invaded and its citizens murdered, before it appeals to arms. It is enough that there is clear evidence on the part of another nation of an intention to commence hostilities.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁷Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology (New York: Scribner, Armstrong and Company, 1875), III, 365.

International conflicts and tensions are too complex to permit such a simple analogy. The promised effects of a nuclear assault are too grave to permit the perilous aggressive-defensive strategy. Considering the grave consequences that would attend an initial assault, the strategy is inadvisable, especially since an innocent activity may be mistaken for a threatening gesture. In the nuclear age, there is no chance for a helpful repentance in the event of a mistake.

Excursus: who is the aggressor. The previous discussion suggests that an initial attack may be defensive, rather than offensive. This introduces the question: "Who is the aggressor?" Driver claims that the question of who initiates an attack is a moot point because "it contains the unrealistic assumption that the primary responsibility for a fight rests with the side that strikes the first blow."¹¹⁸ He further suggests that "it is possible -- through foolishness or malice -- to goad an adversary into violence, and this is true of nuclear as well as other kinds of warfare."¹¹⁹ Niebuhr indicted the whole concept of the war trials as being "a project that only the pride of victors could have dictated," asking, "In the absence of a genuine international

¹¹⁸Tom F. Driver, "The Nuclear Dilemma And The Mind of Tragedy," Christianity and Crisis XXI (November 27, 1961), 211.

¹¹⁹Ibid.

community who is to determine what distinguishes an aggressive from a defensive war?"¹²⁰ The recent Cuban crisis illustrates the difficulty of deciding who is responsible for a war's beginning. In response to the buildup of strategic missile sites in Cuba, President Kennedy ordered a naval quarantine of that island. This has been recognized as a military action. However, the President justified himself for taking this step because the Russians made a prior provocative step. In a truly historical moment, President Kennedy announced that,

Nuclear weapons are so destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift that any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace.¹²¹

Had war finally flared, future historians would have been hard pressed in deciding who was the aggressor.

Second-Strike Strategy

A second-strike capability differs from a first-strike in that it is "the ability to survive an attack and launch a retaliatory blow large enough to inflict intolerable

¹²⁰Reinhold Niebuhr, "What Is Justice?" Love And Justice, D. B. Robertson, ed. (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1957), p. 230.

¹²¹John F. Kennedy, "Text of President Kennedy's Address," United Press International, Carlsbad [New Mexico] Current-Argus, October 23, 1962.

damage on the opponent."¹²² Nuclear forces are secured by hiding, by hardening (digging them in and pouring concrete around them), and by building defense weapons to protect them.

The advantages of a second-strike capability are obvious: it is a better deterrent because the enemy knows there is no escape from an intolerable retaliatory blow; it is responsible for a calmer international atmosphere since nations do not have to be trigger happy; and it makes unnecessary the morally questionable tactic of a preventive war or a pre-emptive attack.¹²³

The present second-strike capability of the United States is very impressive. Even if Russia (or some other enemy) launched a surprise attack, it would not escape an intolerable strike-back. After absorbing a nuclear assault, the United States reportedly has the following retaliatory power:

From SAC bases in the U.S. -- more than 350 B-52 and B-58 jet bombers, each with a load of H-bombs totalling up to 50 megatons, and some carrying Hound Dog missiles to be fired at enemy targets 500 miles off.

¹²²Hadley, op. cit., p. 140.

¹²³As McNamara has stated: "Because we have a sure second-strike capability, there is no pressure on us whatsoever to preempt. . . . One point I was making in the Ann Arbor speech is that our second-strike capability is so sure that there would be no rational basis on which to launch a pre-emptive strike." Stewart Alsop, "McNamara Thinks About The Unthinkable," Post 235 (December 1, 1962), 18.

From U.S. Missile bases -- nine to 10 Atlas or Titan ICBM's, survivors of an original force of 90, equipped with five-megaton bombs, able to sweep Russia with atomic bombs and rockets.

From Navy carriers at sea -- one half of the fleet's 800 jet bombers, many of them capable of striking 1,000 miles into Russia with megaton loads of nuclear weapons.

From under the seas -- six of the Navy's nine Polaris submarines, ready with a total of 96 city-busting nuclear missiles.

From remaining bases -- some 175 other missiles of various types -- ranging from a handful of 1,500-mile Thors and Jupiters to many Mace, Matador and Regulus missiles, all able to reach well inside Soviet Russia's borders from land bases or ships.¹²⁴

Altogether, "a mighty armada of 1,250 nuclear bombers and almost 300 missiles of all types now close in from every direction on the 19,000-mile borders of Krushchev's Russia."¹²⁵ This strike-back capability is being augmented and improved at a very considerable pace.

The security of America's second-strike weapons system. However, there is reason to question the workability of this second-strike weapons system during actual combat. One of the complex after-effects of a high altitude (100 miles) test made by Russia in September, 1961, was a

¹²⁴"Why Krushchev Doesn't Dare To Attack," U.S. News and World Report LIII (August 13, 1962), 41.

¹²⁵Ibid.

blacking out of certain communications for 2,500 miles in all directions for an entire day.¹²⁶ The imperative question is whether America's second-strike force, which depends on electronic guidance systems, as well as complicated communication systems, will prove workable if the attacking enemy explodes multi-megaton bombs at high altitudes. It appears significant that Russia's last 40 tests included some very large explosions. During the 1961 tests, Russia detonated a super-bomb of 58 megatons, which was three times as large as any United States test blast at that time.¹²⁷

Moral evaluation of a second-strike strategy. The second-strike strategy is certainly less objectionable than a first-strike policy. However, even it does not deliver the just war theorists from the crucial moral issue involved in modern warfare: "Is it ever just to intentionally attack the noncombatants of the enemy nation?"

¹²⁶"What's Known and Unknown About Nuclear Tests," U.S. News and World Report LII (March 19, 1962), 45.

¹²⁷Ibid. Krushchev claims that the Soviet Union has a 100-megaton nuclear bomb. Joseph W. Grigg, "Nikita Tells World of U.S. Arms," United Press International, Carlsbad [New Mexico] Current-Argus, January 16, 1963.

CHAPTER VI

THE ARMS RACE AND ARMS CONTROL

In this chapter, the immediate status of the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union will be discussed. The dangers of a continuing arms race will be pointed out. Arms control, as a possible solution to this predicament, will be discussed. The advisability of various arms control proposals will be explored.

I. GENERAL INFORMATION

In August, 1945, the United States possessed and used the first atomic bombs. This monopoly continued until September, 1949, when Russia exploded its first atomic device. In November, 1952, the United States announced the development of the world's first hydrogen bomb. These are only a few key dates in a continuing arms race, a race that at present is a plague upon the world.

The atomic era is a unique and awesome age. As President Kennedy told the American people on March 2, 1962, when man unleashed the power of the atom, he "took into his hands the power of self-extinction."¹ Curiously, both major

¹John F. Kennedy, "Nuclear Testing and Disarmament," Text of address found in Review of Operations of The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Hearings before a

participants in this arms race have sought to expand and refine this suicidal power. By August, 1962, the United States invested an estimated 50 billion dollars in the atom and Russia spent an estimated 20 to 30 billion dollars.²

It is doubtful if there has been a genuine pause in this spiraling arms race, despite the fact that both parties agreed to a nuclear test moratorium in 1958. During this cessation of testing, both sides continued to develop and design weapons on the basis of the information gained by previous tests. President Kennedy also charged that the Soviet Union clandestinely prepared for new tests during the many months prior to September, 1961, when the Soviet Union abruptly ended the moratorium by a 2-month series of more than 40 nuclear tests.³ However, it appears the United States was not totally inactive during the moratorium for on September 5, 1961, the President was able to authorize resumption of underground testing.⁴ The Russian tests

Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Seventh Congress, Second Session, March 8, 1962 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 52. Hereafter referred to as Review of Operations of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

²"After 17 Years of the Atom," U.S. News and World Report, LIII (August 6, 1962), 47.

³Kennedy, op. cit., p. 53.

⁴Ibid.

provided a reason for a further intensification of the arms race.

Present Status of the Arms Race

Any estimate regarding facts and figures as to who is winning the arms race must, of course, be based on unofficial information. However, there is some assurance as to the relative accuracy of these estimates because those in official and knowledgeable positions agree that the United States could win a war with the Soviet Union. Brennan says, "It is probably true that our present forces could . . . assure a purely military victory . . . in a conflict."⁵ McNamara contends that the United States has a definite nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union.⁶ His statement is that "the size, variety and power of our strategic retaliatory forces still greatly exceed those of the Soviets."⁷ Regarding the supposed Soviet superiority in missiles, about which much was said during the last Presidential campaign,

⁵Donald G. Brennan, "Setting And Goals of Arms Control," Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security, ed. Donald G. Brennan (New York: George Braziller, 1961), p. 28. Hereafter referred to as Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security.

⁶"The Dilemma and the Design," Time LXXXI (February 15, 1963), 22.

⁷"Defense," Time LXXXI (February 8, 1963), 15.

McNamara says, "This nation created a myth of its own weakness."⁸ By comparison, the United States has developed some 30 types of nuclear weapons, the Russians 10 to 15 types. The United States has an estimated 40,000 nuclear bombs and warheads on hand, the Russians an estimated 20,000. Besides this, the United States has many times more bombers, ships, and missiles to deliver its nuclear weapons than has the Soviet Union.⁹

Why America Continues The Arms Race

Why does America continue to augment this military capability that is already an "over-kill" arsenal? Why not retire from the arms race if the present weapons system represents the power of self-extinction? The first reason is in order to insure against an unfavorable arms gap. An arms gap is precarious because the nation with the superior force may choose to take advantage of its position by attacking the weaker nation. Even if the favored nation does not make aggressive use of its force, a serious arms gap may still precipitate a nuclear war. Being able to bargain from a position of preponderate strength, a nation may formulate an injudicious foreign policy so intolerable to the weaker

⁸Stewart Alsop, "McNamara Thinks About the Unthinkable," Post 235 (December 1, 1962), 18.

⁹"What's Known and Unknown About Nuclear Tests," U.S. News and World Report LII (March 19, 1962), 44.

nation that it may, in desperation, initiate the hostilities -- inspired by such slogans as "Better Dead Than Red." The fear of an arms gap is the catalyst that keeps the arms race in motion. It is also the "whipping boy" when a nation must convince its own people, as well as the neutrals of the world, that its new nuclear tests are not indicative of a warmongering spirit.

The second reason why America continues to participate in the arms race is to acquire new types of weapons systems. Future means of waging war may dwarf present devices. The warning has been issued that there is a revolution in the art of war every five years.¹⁰ What are some of these new weapons systems that may become the deterrent of tomorrow? One such system is the "Death of Earth" (DOE) or "Doomsday Machine." This widely noted hypothetical device was invented in the imagination of Rand Corporation physicist, Herman Kahn. The sole function of the DOE machine is to destroy all human life.¹¹ At present, the world is about

¹⁰Herman Kahn, "The Arms Race and Some of Its Hazards," Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security, p. 109.

¹¹Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 145. Kahn points out that the DOE machine is not generally acceptable to decision makers because, (1) it is too expensive; (2) it is an uncontrollable weapon; and (3) to build one is considered by many to be a provocative act. Ibid., pp. 145-148.

one-eighth along the way to DOE. If there were a simultaneous detonation of the entire United States and Soviet Union stockpiles (55 kilomegatons), the world would have achieved one-eighth of DOE.¹² However, this does not mean that if present stockpiles were increased eight times that a complete DOE would occur. Trying to eradicate all life by nuclear radiation is like trying to put out a raging fire with water. Although a few tons of water will greatly diminish the fire, many more tons are required in order to extinguish the last ember.¹³

A more practical weapons system is based on such devices as the Laser (rhymes with "razor") Beam. The Laser Beam is a powerful concentration of light rays. It makes probable the scientific fantasy of ray guns. A recent article stated that the scientific world is "amazed at what can be done by taking ordinary light and, through the laser process . . . turning it into . . . the most intense radiant energy that is known to man."¹⁴ Although the peaceful uses of the Laser Beam are limitless, so are its military

¹²Arthur T. Hadley, The Nation's Safety and Arms Control (New York: The Viking Press, 1961), pp. 4, 36.

¹³Ibid., pp. 36-37. Hadley says, "Thus, while 55 kilomegatons is considered one-eighth DOE, 500 kilomegatons is often cited as only one-half DOE." Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁴"The 'Miracle Ray' Is Coming of Age," U.S. News and World Report LIV (February 25, 1963), 80.

possibilities. An article recently revealed that the following weapons concepts are being considered in secret laboratories across the nation: anti-missile rays, ray guns, orbiting beams, and anti-satellite rays.¹⁵

II. NUCLEAR WAR: THE PERIL OF THE ARMS RACE

The major peril of the present weapons systems and of any future armaments is the fact that they may actually be used. Kahn frequently reminds his readers: "Thermonuclear war may be unthinkable, but it is not impossible."¹⁶ A thermonuclear war may be started by any one of several circumstances.

Accidental War

The world may be the scene of a holocaust that is accidentally touched off. Such a war may be started in several ways.

Mechanical Failure. It may accidentally begin by a mechanical failure. Despite all precautionary measures, a missile may accidentally fire. For example,

In the spring of 1960, a group of Air Force officers were sitting down to dinner at an Atlantic seaboard Bomarc missile base. Suddenly they saw in horror out the mess-hall window that one of the nuclear

¹⁵Ibid., 82.

¹⁶Kahn, "The Arms Race and Some of Its Hazards," p.90.

Bomarc missiles had set itself for firing. Its nose was pointing into the air ready for take-off, and fumes were coming out its tail pipe.¹⁷

Fortunately, these men noticed the incident in time to avert the actual firing. Next time, however, the world might not be so fortunate. The Bomarc missile illustration is ample testimony to the possibility of freakish circumstances setting off the most secure missile. Although there is no real understanding as to what series of factors caused the electronic brain controlling the Bomarc firings to issue the fire order,

The hypothesis is that a combination of the radio signals from passing police cars plus the tunes being played by a local disk jockey happened, in one of those improbable occurrences of statistical probability, to combine into a signal that fed itself into the electronic brain as a fire order.¹⁸

The danger of war starting accidentally through mechanical error will be enhanced if the proposal to use armed space vehicles is realized. From time to time satellites fall and start earthward themselves. The question is appropriately raised, "What occurs when a signal is sent out to an errant United States satellite to destroy itself forthwith and through communications failure nothing happens?"¹⁹

¹⁷Hadley, op. cit., p. 89.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 90.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 95.

Human error. A thermonuclear war may be accidentally touched off by human error. The plot of Two Hours to Doom (published in America as Red Alert), a novel by Peter George (he used the pseudonym Peter Bryant), is that a deranged American general takes upon himself the responsibility of sending bombers to blast the Soviet Union. This is not an unrealistic possibility, as is witnessed by this historical happening:

In 1958 twenty-five French planes bombed the town of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef in neutral Tunisia near the Algerian border. At the time the French government took full responsibility for the attack. A week later the French Foreign Minister admitted that the French government . . . had not known the attack would take place. The local air force commander had decided to make the raid on his own because reportedly the Algerian rebels were using the town as a base from which to infiltrate into Algeria.²⁰

What happens when a deranged general of the Strategic Air Command decides personally to end the Soviet problem once and for all?

Self-fulfilling prophecies. A thermonuclear war may accidentally begin if a chain of self-fulfilling prophecies is set into motion. Kahn comments on this:

It is perfectly conceivable for one side's temporizing action to be observed by the other side and to be misinterpreted as being aggressive rather than defensive, thus causing the other side also to make some temporizing defensive move. This second defensive

²⁰Ibid., pp. 31-32.

move can in turn be misread by the side originally alerted as confirming his suspicions, so he may make some further moves. It is then possible for reactions and signals to be set into motion which trigger off further reactions and signals by both sides until a point of no return is reached.²¹

War By Miscalculation

If a nation miscalculates the consequences of its policies or actions, a thermonuclear war may start, even though neither side really is in favor of it. The danger is of a nation "painting itself into a corner" by irrevocable pronouncements which leave no alternative but war. One of the facts about foreign policy is the impossibility of calculating precisely the consequences of any major decision. Speaking from vast experience in various foreign and governmental posts, George F. Kennan says,

I can testify from personal experience that not only can one never know, when one stakes a far-reaching decision in foreign policy, precisely what the consequences are going to be, but almost never do these consequences fully coincide with what one intended or expected.²²

"Brinkmanship" in foreign policy (method of making gains by "either-or" pronouncements that bring the opponent to the brink of nuclear war) is extremely dangerous. The practice is also very exciting. The article, "In Time of

²¹Kahn, "The Arms Race and Some of its Hazards," pp. 91-92.

²²George F. Kennan, "Foreign Policy And Christian Conscience," Atlantic 203 (May, 1959), 44.

Crisis," is a tremendously intriguing story of the behind-the-scenes strategy and maneuvering during the October, 1962, crisis over Cuba. The use of terms like "hawks" brings nostalgic remembrances. Phrases like, "There wasn't one of us that wasn't pretty sure that we'd have to sink a Russian ship," and "We're eyeball to eyeball, and I think the other fellow just blinked," feed the national ego.²³ However, few Americans appreciate the catastrophe that will result if, during an eyeball to eyeball crisis the other fellow does not blink, and we do sink one of his ships! Nations are tempted to resort to brinkmanship because of the common notion that since "no one wants war" the opponent will back down. However, the possibility is that due to political pressure, either at home or abroad, the other nation may be more willing to accept war than the alternative. Nations are also tempted to resort to brinkmanship because of past success with such a policy. Having the adversary back down is a heady experience for a nation, as well as for the individual. It is ego-boosting and tempts many to view the international situation unrealistically. Usually, after brinkmanship has been successful during a crisis, there is public applause and clamor for a "get tougher" policy. However, it is sobering to recall that the fate of all

²³Stewart Alsop and Charles Bartlett, "In Time Of Crisis," Post 236 (December 8, 1926), 15-21.

"bullies" is to have their bluff finally called. Those who demand that national leaders threaten to use the atomic arsenal in order to achieve certain goals deceptively present the case as if it were simply a matter of bringing the world to the brink of a thermonuclear war. To state the case accurate and realistically, they should say, "This objective must be pursued, even at the cost of 60 to 100 million American lives."

How does one avoid "painting himself into a corner?" How does a nation avoid a war by miscalculation? For one thing, America would do well to re-examine the notion that it should support a "Monroe Doctrine For The World." For another, political negotiations should be carried on with finesse and, as Kahn suggests, should,

. . . take on the aspects of a normal commercial transaction in which both sides gain, the exact division of the gains depending on their relative skill, but in which neither is driven to the wall.²⁴

Except on the gravest issues, a nation should not become intransigent. Usually, its position should be flexible, reasonable and generally open to negotiation. "Nuclear muscles" should be flexed only when one is willing to use them.

Catalytic War

A thermonuclear war may be started by a third party

²⁴Kahn, "The Arms Race and Some of Its Hazards," p.95.

which believes that its position in the international hierarchy may be improved if the top two nations become embroiled in a life or death struggle. The third nation, by using its military and diplomatic agencies, will attempt to force the chief nations of the world to confront each other in a major war. Amron Katz is credited with naming this a "catalytic war."²⁵ In a sense, World War I was a catalytic war with Serbia and Austria serving as the catalysts. Kahn sketches several situations in which a third nation may succeed in setting off a major war.²⁶ A catalytic war is very possible in these times of close allies or satellites and mutual defense treaties.

Intentional War

Contrary to common belief, a thermonuclear war may be intentionally started by a nation. Although the idea of a general nuclear war is considered irrational by Western leaders, and judging from their public statements at this time, by the Soviet Union, it is not so considered by Red China.²⁷ Despite their public disavowal of the rationality of a nuclear war, Russia might at a later time decide that the damage of such a war is more tolerable than existing

²⁵Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, p. 231.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid., p. 229.

situations. During World War II, the Soviet Union suffered from 20 to 30 million casualties and lost about one-third of its wealth.²⁸ This demonstrates Russia's willingness and capacity for absorbing an overwhelming tragedy. As both sides develop extensive civil defense and an anti-missile program, they might be more inclined toward intentional war. One must not, therefore, rule out the possibility of a calculated, intentional war.

III. ARMS CONTROL AS AN ANSWER TO THE ARMS RACE

One may choose from among several attitudes toward solving the dilemma posed by the presence of nuclear weapons systems and the continuing arms race. First, one may pretend or convince himself that there are no new problems created by the possession of these armaments, nonchalantly dismissing the issue by claiming that nuclear weapons are only "bigger bangs" and that the world faces no greater problem than it faced with the invention of gun powder. However, this "bigger bang" places the present weapons systems in a unique category in that the nations now face the grave possibility of self-extermination.

Second, one may so firmly believe in the principle of deterrence as to suggest the creation of even more terrible

²⁸Kahn, "The Arms Race And Some Of Its Hazards," p. 98.

armaments in order to insure that the weapons will never be used. This, however, is an extremely precarious course because the availability of any weapons system may assure its use, either in a desperate attempt to turn the tide of defeat or to obtain a swifter victory.

Third, one may despair of any solution and believe that ultimately the major nations will destroy themselves as well as a large portion of the world. This thinking is responsible for the colonization of remote areas in the world where men and women hope to preserve some vestige of civilization after the cataclysm of a nuclear war. Grant A. Flint, who spent several months in direct contact with groups preparing to escape the holocaust by forming such expeditions, has written a very interesting article in which he reports that,

A Greek Orthodox group is preparing to go to Brazil; the Simon Society will go to Rangtira Island, approximately 480 miles southeast of Wellington, New Zealand; a Quaker group of seven families from California has relocated in the isolated Lardean Valley in British Columbia; a group of sixty will flee from Iowa to the east coast of Mexico early next year. The "X" group (which desires anonymity) is completing its selection of 150 members; single men will emigrate to an island near Australia in February or April, single women and families will follow when houses have been constructed.²⁹

Flint points out that the ones forming these groups are not

²⁹Grant A. Flint, "Flight From Doomsday," Nation 194 (January 20, 1962), 53.

"crack-pots;" some are doctors, lawyers, college professors, and other intelligent people.

Fourth, one may hope for the acceptance of a grandiose scheme of arbitrary rules and regulations regarding the moral conduct of war. This is neither a novel nor a new hope. Roland Bainton writes that in France and Germany during the first half of the eleventh century, there was a campaign to promote the Peace of God and the Truce of God. The Peace of God "limited those involved in war by increasing enormously the category of the exempt."³⁰ The Truce of God, designed to limit the time for military activity, decreed that no fighting should be done "from Advent through Epiphany nor from Septuagesima until the eighth day after Pentecost, nor on Sundays, Fridays, and every one of the holy days throughout the year."³¹ It is Bainton's further observation that "the more war has improved at the point of technology, the more it has deteriorated at the point of moral discrimination."³²

Fifth, one may envision a scheme of world organization which will be able to enforce the peace. Grenville Clark, an influential figure during the past world wars, is

³⁰Roland Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War And Peace (New York: Abingdon Press, 1960), p. 110.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid., p. 246.

focusing his legal talents on establishing a system of world law. In 1944, Clark published his draft for an effective world government. To be successful, it must have those powers necessary to maintain peace which include,

. . . a world legislature with a carefully worked-out system of proportional representation; an executive council chosen by and responsible to the legislature; a world police force composed of volunteers (by quota, to prevent any country or bloc of countries from exerting undue influence); international courts and other tribunals to deal with all disputes between nations; and a reliable world revenue system with funds collected through each country's tax machinery.³³

There are many who look to the establishment of a world government as the solution to the nuclear dilemma and the problem of war. Stuart Chase writes, "It seems axiomatic that only controlled, universal disarmament, together with legal agencies to resolve conflicts between nations, can make a viable world in the nuclear age."³⁴ He also contends that a warless world must have "a world police force to implement the findings of the courts, and to break up unlawful military adventures."³⁵ Teller remarks that a supra-national authority must be established which has the moral

³³James Daniel, "Grenville Clark and His Plan for Peace," Reader's Digest 80 (May, 1962), 143.

³⁴Stuart Chase, "Principles For The Nuclear Age," Saturday Review (May 6, 1961), 33.

³⁵Ibid., 34.

and physical strength to maintain peace.³⁶ Senator Hubert Humphrey says,

We must work not only for disarmament but also for the other ingredients of a rule of law throughout the world, backed by a world police force and a system of world courts. Unpalatable though these suggestions may be to our superpatriots, I look upon them as building the only firm foundation of a secure world for our children and grandchildren.³⁷

On September 25, 1961, President John F. Kennedy set forth among other objectives, the following two:

(1) The disbanding of all national armed forces and the prohibition of their reestablishment in any form whatsoever other than those required to preserve internal order and for contributions to a United Nations peace force;

(2) The elimination from national arsenals of all armaments, including all weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery, other than those required for a United Nations peace force and for maintaining internal order.³⁸

Despite the stature of those who have voiced favorable opinions for a supra-national, world government, it is this writer's conviction that such a scheme is impractical and dangerous. It is impractical because, as Robert R. Bowie has observed, the present political climate will not tolerate the Soviet Union and the United States agreeing to

³⁶Quoted by Daniels, op. cit., 144.

³⁷Hubert Humphrey, Review of Operations of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, p. 4.

³⁸John F. Kennedy, Review of Operations of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, p. 8.

the creation of an international agency with sufficient power to coerce their compliance.³⁹ Were the present political cleavage removed, it is doubtful whether there would still be a real need for a sovereign world government. Kahn states that "it is a digression to dwell on such possibilities as a possible solution for the problems of the sixties. And the problems of the sixties are important."⁴⁰

The proposal to create an international army to enforce the legislative, judicial, or executive directives of this world government is especially dangerous. For this army to be effective, it must possess equal, if not superior, strength to any one nation or possible bloc of nations. As things stand at present, this would necessitate this world army being endowed with a nuclear arsenal comparable to that of the United States or the Soviet Union. The establishment of such a force would be a destabilizing factor because it would mean the creation of a third party possessing the means of plunging the world into a nuclear nightmare. If it is suggested that this will not be necessary since the United States and the Soviet Union will disarm, the reply is that then the world army (whether possessing a nuclear or

³⁹Robert R. Bowie, "Basic Requirements of Arms Control," Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security, p. 52.

⁴⁰Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, p. 7.

conventional capability) will emerge as the supreme power of the world. The military commander of such a force would essentially be the supreme arbiter of the world's destiny. The United States would lose, for all practical purposes, its ability to make sovereign decisions. It is alarming that the President of the United States would list the disarmament of America and the arming of a world force with a superior arsenal as one of his objectives.

Sixth, one may look to a plan of arms control as the most reasonable and hopeful answer to the nuclear dilemma and the arms race. It is in regard to arms control that the remaining portion of this chapter is devoted.

Definition of Arms Control

The phrase "arms control" does not refer to any one program of arms limitation. The phrase is used to represent a variety of persuasions, as Bowie points out:

The concept of "arms control" includes any agreement among several powers to regulate some aspect of their military capability or potential. The arrangement may apply to the location, amount, readiness, ⁴¹ or types of military forces, weapons or facilities.

There is, however, a common feature to all these schemes: "They presuppose some form of cooperation or joint action among the several participants regarding their military

⁴¹Bowie, op. cit., p. 43.

programs."⁴²

The Need For Arms Control

The government of the United States has frequently stated that one of the most pressing tasks confronting mankind is to make progress in the area of disarmament.⁴³ Senator Humphrey has said, "I believe that of all the risks before us today, none offers better hope than controlled, verified, realistic, painstakingly prepared disarmament."⁴⁴ Even Kahn, who is frequently vilified as being too militaristic, pauses to admit that,

. . . if we are to reach the year 2000, or even 1975, without a cataclysm of some sort . . . we will almost undoubtedly require extensive arms control measures in addition to unilateral security measures.⁴⁵

Not everyone is enthusiastic as to the need or wisdom of arms control. Kahn remarks that military planners do not generally favor arms control schemes.⁴⁶ Admiral Arleigh Burke bears out that comment. He levels the charge that "in a schizoid manner we have balanced a Department of Defense

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³See Congressional Digest 37 (October 1958), 232.

⁴⁴Humphrey, loc. cit.

⁴⁵Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, p. 224.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 232.

with a committee on Disarmament."⁴⁷ Teller expresses the fear that "arms control may well lead to a change in the balance of power with the result that the Russians could gain overwhelming superiority."⁴⁸ He also insists that "disarmament may lead to frustration, friction, and failure," and therefore "there is at least some doubt whether or not arms control is the proper first step in creating a peaceful atmosphere."⁴⁹

Objectives Of Arms Control

Arms control advocates do not assert that the primary purpose of their proposals is to create a peaceful atmosphere. Rather, they openly acknowledge that,

The basic origins of world tensions (and therefore of armament, with the consequent possibility of war) are hostilities between nations, and conflicting national goals. No one would seriously maintain that arms control per se could solve these problems, or that arms control measures are certain to survive in that long run if these problems are not solved.⁵⁰

Hadley assures that "arms control does not try to alter

⁴⁷Arleigh Burke, "Washington's Farewell Address Revisited," Vital Speeches XXVIII (April 1, 1962), 363. Senator Humphrey disagrees with this notion, saying, "Disarmament and national defense are not contradictory but are two equal sides of the same coin." Op. cit., p. 3.

⁴⁸Edward Teller, "The Feasibility of Arms Control and the Principle of Openness," Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security, p. 122.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 123.

⁵⁰Brennan, op. cit., p. 37.

human nature and usher in perpetual peace."⁵¹ Of course, it is possible that an arms control program could contribute to the reduction of these tensions by proving the sincerity and trustworthiness of the contracting parties. The primary objective of arms control is to reduce the risk of war and to minimize the destructiveness if that war does occur.

Historical Survey of Arms Control⁵²

It is erroneous to presume that arms control is a matter of recent interest and concern. As another states,

Throughout recorded history, dedicated men and women have sought to limit the destructive effect of human quarrels and reduce their incidence by controlling or eliminating the instruments with which men fight. The effort has been largely futile. It has been likened to the legendary medieval quest for the Holy Grail, that "cup hanging in the sky like a burning jewel" for which so many knights of the Round Table searched in vain.⁵³

Traditionally, the sixth century B.C. is assigned as the first recorded effort toward arms control. The Chinese states of the Yangtze Valley, tired of recurrent wars over

⁵¹Hadley, op. cit., p. 108.

⁵²The material in this section is gleaned largely from Hadley, op. cit., pp. 44-61; Congressional Digest, op. cit., 227-233; William R. Frye, "Characteristics of Recent Arms-Control Proposals and Agreements," Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security, pp. 68-85. Jerome B. Wiesner, "Comprehensive Arms-Limitation Systems," Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security, pp. 198-234.

⁵³Frye, op. cit., p. 68.

who could loot what parts of the Shanghai River, entered a pact that reportedly lasted one hundred years.⁵⁴

History of the United States' participation in arms control negotiations prior to World War I. The history of arms control negotiations in which the United States figures as a participant, begins with the Rush-Bagot agreement of 1817. In this treaty, Great Britain and the United States, recent enemies in the war of 1812, agreed to limit their naval powers on the Great Lakes. Ultimately, the principle of demilitarization was extended to the land, resulting in an undefended border stretching for more than three thousand miles.

Czar Nicholas II of Russia called the Hague Peace Conference of 1899. Although no significant reduction in arms was achieved, an interesting aspect of this conference is that the United States, then militarily inferior to other nations, "played the role of spoilsport" by insisting on immunity from any force reduction and balked at proposals to prohibit new weapon development. Hadley says,

The United States was particularly concerned at plans to bar "dumdum" bullets and projectiles fired from balloons, arguing that such weapons might make war cheaper, quicker and less harmful.⁵⁵

⁵⁴Hadley, op. cit., p. 44; Frye, op. cit., pp. 68-69.

⁵⁵Hadley, loc. cit.

In 1907, a second Hague Peace Conference was held, but was also unable to avert or mitigate the havoc of World War I.

History of the United States' participation in arms control negotiation from World War I to World War II. On January 8, 1918, President Wilson appeared before Congress and delivered his famous "Fourteen Points" address. The fourth point was that national armaments should be reduced to the lowest level consistent with domestic safety. This was later incorporated as Article VIII of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Although the United States did not accept the Treaty of Versailles, a separate peace treaty was negotiated with Germany in 1921. This treaty encompassed the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.

On November 12, 1921, the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy convened in the beautiful Memorial Continental Hall in Washington for the first great conference on naval armament. On February 6, 1922, the Five-Power Naval Treaty was signed, limiting armaments by declaring a ten-year naval holiday during which the signatories were to construct no capital ships. Any achievement in disarmament was canceled by the narrowness of the agreement. The arms race merely shifted to smaller craft.

In 1924, at Geneva, the United States and other nations signed a protocol prohibiting the use of poisonous

gases and bacteriological warfare. However, the protocol was not ratified by the Senate.

On August 27, 1928, the Pact of Paris (Kellogg-Briand agreement) was signed by the United States and fourteen other powers. The signatories were bound to renounce war as an instrument of national policy.

On January 21, 1930, another five-Power naval conference began sessions in London. After prolonged and acrimonious debate, a treaty was signed on April 22.

In 1932, the League of Nations sponsored a general conference on disarmament. Sixty nations were present. At this disarmament conference, the Soviet Union pushed a spectacular plan, devised by Maxim Litvinoff, which called for the reduction to zero of all arms. This was supported by the Germans and Turks. Great Britain recommended outlawing such "new" weapons as submarines, bombers, and gas. The United States urged that the conference effect some measure to protect populations against aerial bombing. The general conference on disarmament continued to meet spasmodically until May 31, 1937.

Unfortunately, the efforts at world organization, disarmament, and outlawery of war did not avert World War II. On December 29, 1934, Japan announced that beginning December 31, 1936, it would no longer abide by the Naval Limitation Treaty of 1922. In 1935, Germany denounced the disarmament

clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. On October 2, 1935, Italian troops violated Ethiopia's borders. In 1937, the war between Japan and China began. On September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland. In 1940, the Tripartite Pact, providing for the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis, was signed.

History of the United States' participation in arms control negotiations during the nuclear era (1945 -). As the nations emerged from the havoc of World War II, they envisioned once more world organization and disarmament. From August 21 to October 7, 1944, at Dumbarton Oaks, representatives from China, Great Britain, Russia and the United States earnestly attempted to draft a charter for a new world government. This conference envisioned many of the proposals, including those respecting disarmament, which were later embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.

On February 11, 1945, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin signed the Yalta protocol, section 3 of which called for the total disarmament of Germany. From July 17 to August 2, 1945, Truman met with Stalin and Churchill around a circular table in a Potsdam palace near Berlin. Two momentous documents emerged from these days, the first decreed the disarming of Japan and the second called for the abolition of all German troops and armaments as well as the elimination or control of all German industry.

On October 24, 1945, the Charter of the United Nations became effective (it was signed on June 26, 1945). This organization was assigned the major responsibilities in the field of disarmament.

The spectrum of nuclear energy made arms control the topic of greatest concern among nations. From 1945 to the present, numerous plans have been submitted which were designed to remove the world from beneath the Damoclean sword of nuclear warfare. On November 15, 1945, Canada, Great Britain, and the United States proposed that a system of international controls be established which would assure the peaceful use of atomic energy as well as eliminating the development of this power for destructive or war purposes. In December, 1945, at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, it was agreed to sponsor a resolution establishing the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. This commission, created January 23, 1946, was a 12-nation agency composed of the members of the Security Council and Canada.

In 1946, the United States government authorized a committee (headed by Dean Acheson and assisted by David E. Lilienthal) to draw up proposals for the control of atomic energy which were to be presented to the United Nations. On March 28, the results of this study were published in the "Report On International Control of Atomic Energy," commonly referred to as the "Acheson-Lilienthal Report."

On June 14, 1946, Bernard Baruch presented a somewhat amended version of the Acheson-Lillenthal report. The Baruch plan promised that the United States would give up all of its atomic materials and weapons and transfer them to an international agency for complete control, providing all other nations agreed not to continue the atomic business as an individual nation.⁵⁶

On June 19, 1946, Andrei Gromyko presented the Soviet Union's counter-proposal, calling for the destruction of all atomic weapons and stockpiles within a three month period, after which the Soviet Union would consider formulating a control plan. Further, Russia stipulated that any plan was to be formulated within the Security Council framework in which the veto-power prevailed.

From 1948 to 1954, numerous arms control schemes were deliberated before various organs of the United Nations. During this span of years, it became obvious that the Baruch plan was no longer practical, since the United States' atomic monopoly had been broken. After May, 1954, "the key features of the Baruch Plan -- ownership and management -- began to disappear from American proposals."⁵⁷ Also during this span, the world passed the point of no return because

⁵⁶Review of Operations of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, p. 23.

⁵⁷Frye, op. cit., p. 73.

such a large quantity of fissionable material was produced that no inspectorate could ever be certain of tracing it all in order to ascertain that it was being used solely for peaceful purposes.

The demand for a new approach was met on December 8, 1953, when, in a speech before the United Nations, President Eisenhower suggested his famous "Atoms For Peace" plan. This proposal called for,

. . . a cooperative international effort in the field of atoms for peace, revolving around a pool or bank of nuclear fuel to be contributed by the "haves" and used primarily by the "have-nots." Bypassed by the industrial revolution, the latter thus would benefit from its atomic counterpart in the twentieth century. In return, they would forswear atomic energy for war and accept UN inspection.⁵⁸

On March 19, 1955, Harold E. Stassen was appointed as Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament. This action of elevating "disarmament policy review to Cabinet-level status was unprecedented in world history. It was a significant example of the United States determination to explore every possible approach to peace."⁵⁹

On May 10, 1955, the Soviet's "peace offensive" took tangible form in a proposal that Western experts considered

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 74.

⁵⁹Congressional Digest, op. cit., 229.

to be Russia's first serious effort at negotiation.⁶⁰ Although certain objectionable features were included in the proposal, such as the prior elimination of United States overseas bases and an unsatisfactory German settlement, the Soviet Union admitted that atomic weapons could be clandestinely produced and that the primary need was for protection against surprise attack. The plan proposed that inspectors be stationed at fixed points where they could detect any large-scale preparations that would indicate surprise attack.

On July 21, 1955, during the famous Summit Conference at Geneva, Eisenhower offered his "Open Skies" plan, proposing that the United States and the Soviet Union exchange complete blueprints of military establishments and that each check the other by aerial reconnaissance.

On March 21, 1956, the United States offered the following as the first stage of a comprehensive arms control plan:

- (1) control and inspection against surprise attack and for verifying agreed force levels;
- (2) a first-stage reduction of armaments, manpower, and military expenditures to occur before settlement of major political issues;
- (3) advance notification of armed forces movement;
- (4) halt on nuclear production;
- (5) limitation of nuclear weapons test.⁶¹

⁶⁰This "peace offensive" began in the fall of 1954 and was partially occasioned by the death of Stalin, see Frye, op. cit., p. 75.

⁶¹Congressional Digest, op. cit., 230.

Beginning March 18, 1957, the Disarmament Subcommittee opened what was to become the longest and most intensive series of negotiations in its history. During these talks, three major proposals were on the agenda: an Anglo-French plan, a Soviet plan, and a United States plan. America's plan contained the essential features of the March 21, 1956, proposal and "additional provisions for the peaceful development of outer space, suspension of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, and protection against surprise attack."⁶² During the summer negotiations, the differences among the Western powers were resolved and on August 29 they presented the "Four Power Proposals" to the Soviet Union, but the latter declared them unacceptable. On November 14, 1957, the General Assembly of the United Nations approved the proposals by a vote of 57 to 9, with 15 abstentions.

The year 1958 was pivotal in the effort for arms control. On February 16, Harold Stassen resigned his position. Twelve days later James J. Wadsworth was appointed United States Representative on Disarmament. Also at this time, a special four-man board, composed of Alfred Gruenther, John J. McCloy, Robert Lovett and Walter Bedell Smith, was appointed by the President to advise Secretary of State

⁶²Ibid.

Dulles on disarmament.

On March 31, the Soviet Union announced that it was halting nuclear tests and called upon the United States and Great Britain to do the same. Several months later, on August 22, Eisenhower stated that beginning on October 31, the United States would agree to a one-year test moratorium, providing,

(1) that the Soviet Union continue its present unilateral ban on tests; and (2) that it meet October 31 with Western powers to discuss a permanent suspension of testing and more far-reaching nuclear disarmament proposals, and agree that starting on that date there would be no further tests for one year.⁶³

This moratorium continued until September 1, 1961, when the Soviet Union conducted a series of more than forty nuclear tests. In response, the United States resumed its testing program.

On July 25, 1963, Great Britain, Russia and the United States announced that their negotiators had reached agreement on a limited nuclear test ban. The participants agreed to outlaw nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in space and under the water.⁶⁴ At the time of this writing, this agreement is not officially approved. To become a binding treaty, the United States Senate must approve it by a

⁶³Ibid., 231.

⁶⁴"Hopes and Doubts," The New York Times, July 28, 1963.

two-thirds vote.

Problems in Achieving An Arms Control Agreement

The United States and the Soviet Union have been engaged in "talk marathons" for the past seventeen years on the issues of nuclear control and disarmament. Until recent days, these deliberations have proven fruitless.

Why past negotiations have failed. Several factors are responsible for the negligible results from seventeen years of negotiations. First, lack of sincere desire to reach an agreement has had its effect. Second, there has been a lack of preparation on the part of the participants in the conferences which would enable them to negotiate with confidence. Third, there has been a lack of any definite knowledge as to the national position on arms control.⁶⁴ Fourth, the element of distrust is largely responsible for the failure of the negotiations. As Wiesner says,

In conflict situations between individuals, and in conflict situations in which individuals act for nations, statements of antagonists are evaluated not in terms of the intended meanings, but rather in terms

⁶⁴Hadley points out that while the diplomatic corps was proposing one plan, the government was frequently making contradictory moves. For instance, while the United States was presenting the Baruch Plan to the United Nations which called for international control and ownership of atomic energy, Congress passed the McMahon Act of 1946 which was designed to keep the atom American and civilian. Op. cit., p. 47.

of the most threatening alternatives. This is particularly true when survival is believed to be at stake. When this happens, there can be no meaningful communication. Every proposal by either side is scanned for the hidden purpose. The entire history of the atomic control negotiations is a demonstration of this effect. Starting with the Baruch-Lilienthal plan and coming up to the present negotiations with the Soviet government regarding a nuclear test ban, there has been a reluctance by all parties to consider that such proposals are put forward in good faith.⁶⁵

Yet, if past experiences have a right to enter a nation's thinking, then the United States has no alternative to distrusting the Soviet Union. Historically, the Soviet Union has proven untrustworthy in keeping its promises. On February 6, 1958, Senator Bridges made the following comments on the floor of the Senate:

It is a common principle of human relations that men are wary of those who prove unreliable.

Time and time again we have found that we cannot rely upon any promises by the Communists which depend merely upon future good faith. It took 2 years and 575 meetings to negotiate the agreement which ended the Korean fighting. Then the Communists soon violated many of the armistice provisions. They kept only the provisions which served their interest.

In the past quarter century, the Soviet Union has violated 50 out of 52 agreements with nations of the world.

Our own Nations' experience bears out the same dismal story. According to the January 17, 1958, issue of the U.S. News and World Report, 3 American Presidents traveled 40,454 miles and spent 36 days talking with Soviet Foreign Ministers.

⁶⁵Wiesner, op. cit., p. 199.

The sum total result of these efforts is that after 19 top-level conferences, 40 agreements were made, and only 3 agreements were kept by the Soviet Government.⁶⁶

There has been no evidence of a change in the Soviet Union's attitude toward telling the truth. On the contrary, their untrustworthiness was amply proved during the October, 1962, Cuban crisis. On Monday, October 22, the President recounted to the American people some of the false statements given him by the Soviet government concerning the arms build-up in Cuba:

Only last Thursday, as evidence of this rapid offensive build-up was already in my hand, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko told me in my office that he was instructed to make it clear once again, as he said his government had already done, that Soviet assistance to Cuba "pursued solely the purpose of contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba," that "training by Soviet specialists of Cuban nationals in handling defensive armaments was by no means offensive," and that "if it were otherwise, the Soviet government would never become involved in rendering such assistance." That statement also was false.⁶⁷

Achieving An Arms Control Agreement

Despite the Soviet Union's past record, the United States has continued to negotiate for an arms control pact.

⁶⁶Styles Bridges, "Should Development of Nuclear Weapons Be Prohibited by International Agreement?" Congressional Digest, op. cit., 235.

⁶⁷John F. Kennedy, "Text of President Kennedy's Address," United Press International, Carlsbad [New Mexico] Current-Axis, October 23, 1962.

How can an acceptable arms control program be achieved with an untrustworthy participant? To answer, one must appreciate why nations comply with international rules. Roger Fisher has a perceptive treatment of this subject in which he asserts that governments comply with rules for four reasons: First, because of apprehension of action by the other party to the agreement.

The deterrent effect of the fear of retaliatory action by those "on the other side" is well known. It supports not only rules against the use of gas, but rules establishing diplomatic immunity, rules keeping arms out of the Antarctic, and most other rules limiting the behavior of one government with respect to another.⁶⁸

Second, because of the effect of violating an agreement on third parties. "In a world in which actions speak louder than words, governments which engage in propaganda weigh the effect of their actions on third states."⁶⁹ Third, because of individual morality.⁷⁰ Fourth, because of institutional resistance to breaking established rules or customs.

Once a rule is established and a government is complying with it, any breach requires a change in governmental direction. Sheer inertia will tend to keep the government doing what it was doing before.⁷¹

⁶⁸Roger Fisher, "Constructing Rules That Affect Governments," Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security, p. 58.

⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 59.

Two practical suggestions for reaching an acceptable arms control pact are: (1) the initial stage of the program ought to involve "low-risk measures that can be carried out in the atmosphere of suspicion and fear, but which clearly leads to ultimate objectives;"⁷² and (2) the agreement must serve "the national interests of each of the parties, as its leaders conceive those interests,"⁷³ that is, the formal or informal agreement should offer benefits which the participants are not likely to want jeopardized. The recent limited test ban agreement appears to coincide with these two suggestions.

Some Arms Control Proposals

How extensive the first arms control measures ought to be is disputed. Some of the suggested proposals are rather comprehensive, while others are quite limited in scope. In this section, various arms control proposals will be discussed.

Nuclear test ban. In 1958, the United States and the Soviet Union voluntarily subscribed to a test moratorium. There was considerable opposition to this action at the time. Numerous arguments were stated in opposition to the nuclear

⁷²Wiesner, op. cit., p. 200.

⁷³Bowie, op. cit., p. 53.

test ban, five of which deserve mention. First, Dr. Arthur Compton claimed that America's defense requirements were not yet satisfactorily met and that America could not be confident that its weapons were adequate unless tests were continued. In his judgment, tactical nuclear weapons were essential, but could not be developed if testing were discontinued.⁷⁴ Second, it was Teller's opinion that the only means of attaining "clean" weapons (free from harmful radioactivity) was by continued testing. As to the need for "clean" weapons, Dr. Teller wrote:

We must have the clean weapons to save the innocent bystander, to save our allies and, when we defend ourselves against any enemy attack, to save our own people. We must have these clean weapons and stoppage of nuclear tests would prevent us effectively from developing them.⁷⁵

Third, Teller urged that further testing was necessary in order to learn peaceful employment of nuclear energy.⁷⁶

Fourth, Teller argued that to stop testing would enable the Soviet Union to eventually catch up with the United States in its nuclear knowledge. In his words,

If both of us would stop nuclear tests, then there is no doubt that through espionage the Russians would find out . . . what we know, and then we would have lost our last advantage.⁷⁷

⁷⁴Arthur Compton, from a letter to Senator Symington that appeared in the Congressional Digest, op. cit., 241.

⁷⁵Teller, Congressional Digest, op. cit., 247.

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷Ibid., 249.

Fifth, it was feared that to suspend testing would result in the disintegration of the scientific personnel and programs such as existed at Livermore and Los Alamos.⁷⁸

The fact that the United States agreed to the moratorium, however, indicates that there were influential voices in its favor. Several reasons prompted America's compliance. First, world opinion was a considerable factor. The Soviet Union scored a propaganda point on March 31, 1958, when it suddenly announced the cessation of tests, especially since the neutral powers of the world were highly in favor of the elimination of such tests. Second, the prospect that the nuclear club would be enlarged prompted Dr. Harrison Brown to express a favorable attitude toward the ban.⁷⁹ Frye comments that the ban against nuclear testing,

. . . is a measure designed tangentially to ease the "fifth" (or *n*th) country problem, that is, to help prevent the spread of nuclear-weapon technology. Few countries will invest the formidable amount of money and man-hours necessary to build a nuclear weapon if they may not legally test that weapon, once produced, and thus become thoroughly familiar with its performance. To bar testing, therefore, is to discourage the manufacture of the weapon.⁸⁰

⁷⁸Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, p. 253.

⁷⁹Harrison Brown, from a lecture given at the University of Minnesota, the text of which appeared in the Congressional Digest, op. cit., 244.

⁸⁰Frye, op. cit., p. 78.

Third, since the United States was in a superior position regarding nuclear technology, the freezing of future testing was considered a way to guarantee the retention of that superiority.⁸¹ Fourth, perhaps the most formidable appeal was the argument that nuclear tests were contaminating the atmosphere with radiological fallout. This was a very practical issue.⁸²

In 1957 an advisory committee to the AEC had reported that to continue testing at the level of 10 megatons a year for one hundred years would result in an average strontium-90 accumulation in the human bones of three times the maximum safe dose. The AEC group further estimated that such testing would result in 2,500 to 13,000 genetically defective children born a year.⁸³

In a retrospective appraisal, Hadley says, "The pro-banners, squeezing the maximum amount of horror from incomplete, complex figures later proved inaccurate, painted a vivid picture of a world peopled by deformed freaks."⁸⁴

The danger of radiation from nuclear tests is still a

⁸¹National Planning Association, a statement released on July 20, 1958, appeared in the Congressional Digest, op. cit., 250.

⁸²Radiological contamination of the atmosphere is an ethical issue also. Is it justifiable to perform acts that will increase the likelihood of leukemia and other bone and genetic defects in future generations? Ramsey, in his chapter on nuclear testing, suggests the application of the principle of double effect to this problem. Op. cit., pp. 210-217.

⁸³Hadley, op. cit., pp. 50-51.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 51.

controversy. Hadley humorously warns that "to move into the radiation damage controversy in anything more lightly armored than a heavy tank is to risk immediate mutilation from one flank or the other."⁸⁵ That the fallout problem is real is indicated by the fact that the AEC spends between 20 and 30 million dollars a year studying the problem.⁸⁶

Although the 1958 moratorium was broken in 1961, the United States continued to be interested in negotiating another test ban. Although potential costs are involved in a test ban, Brennan and Halperin say that "these costs at worst do not outweigh the possible gains of a test ban, at least for the next five or ten years."⁸⁷ What are these gains? One is that since the United States is slightly favored in its ability to fight conventional limited wars, "we might . . . gain from a test ban under which the Soviets refrained from developing a greater arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons."⁸⁸ Another gain would be that a test ban would strengthen the distinction between nuclear and

⁸⁵Ibid.

⁸⁶Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, p. 552.

⁸⁷Donald G. Brennan and Morton H. Halperin, "Policy Considerations of a Nuclear-Test Ban," Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security, p. 234.

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 239. The recent limited test ban would not give this advantage since underground nuclear tests are permissible.

non-nuclear weapons by implicitly recognizing that nuclear weapons are not conventional. This would, perhaps, reinforce the hope that they would not be used in a limited war. Still another gain is that since the proposal is envisaged as having adequate inspection, it will partially serve to open up the Soviet Union and to further establish the principle of openness.⁸⁹

As the previous sentence suggests, the United States is not in favor of another unpoliced test ban. President Kennedy made this clear by saying, "We know enough now about broken negotiations, secret preparations, and the advantages gained from a long test series never to offer again an uninspected moratorium."⁹⁰ Yet, it is difficult to agree on an inspection system that would be able to detect clandestine tests or preparations for those tests. The Soviet Union fears too much openness (appraising their "closed" society as a military asset). The United States is fearful that if there is not a great degree of openness, the Soviets will engage in clandestine testing. Because of the divergent natures of our two societies, a far more extensive program

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 245.

⁹⁰Review of Operations of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, p. 34. It is not known how extensive the inspection system will be under the new limited test ban agreement.

is required to inspect the Soviet Union than to inspect the United States. The unresolved question is whether it is possible to establish an adequate inspection system that is acceptable to the Soviet Union. It should be noted that infallibility is not the criterion. An inspection system is adequate if it is sufficiently reliable to convince a potential violator that he will probably be caught. Bowie contends that the "crucial question is not whether the inspection system could discover every technical evasion, but what prospects it offers for detecting any significant one."⁹¹

It is impossible to devise a system that would detect preparations for a test series because such a system would require a degree of openness wholly unacceptable to the Russians. This is a particularly disquieting fact because it can not be hoped that the intelligence service will be an effective safeguard against such preparations. In his testimony, Foster acknowledged that it was possible for the Soviet Union to make massive preparations for their series of tests without the United States being aware of the magnitude or the intent of those preparations.⁹² Teller reminds that "the first Soviet atomic bomb test and the Soviet

⁹¹Bowie, op. cit., p. 50.

⁹²Review of Operations of the Arms Control And Disarmament Agency, loc. cit.

hydrogen bomb test were not predicted by our intelligence."⁹³

Is it possible to devise a system of detecting actual tests that might be made illegally under a test ban? There is reasonable assurance that any significant violation in the form of atmospheric tests may be detected.⁹⁴ The detection of tests made in interplanetary space is less assured. Teller explains how nuclear explosions up to 500-kilotons can be concealed in space tests.⁹⁵ The only method of insuring against clandestine interplanetary experiments is by inspecting the space vehicles before they are launched.

The most vexing problem is the detection of underground tests.⁹⁶ It is difficult because

. . . the only way presently known to detect underground explosions is by the vibrations they produce in the earth, and these vibrations or seismic signals are markedly similar to those of earthquakes.⁹⁷

The only marked distinction between an earthquake and a nuclear explosion underground is that the former gives a complicated, irregular signal, while the latter gives a simpler one. However, Teller explains how this distinction can be wiped

⁹³Teller, "The Feasibility of Arms Control and the Principle of Openness," op. cit., p. 128.

⁹⁴This is conceded by Teller, ibid., p. 125.

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 128.

⁹⁶The recent limited test ban agreement does not prohibit underground testing.

⁹⁷Hadley, op. cit., p. 52.

out:

Two or more explosions could be cleverly arranged in such a way as to produce a type of signal or signature which is not characteristic of a single nuclear explosion and appears more like a disturbance of the earthquake type.⁹⁸

Several conferences have been held in an attempt to devise some scheme of identifying underground nuclear explosions. The July, 1958, Geneva conference was an unfortunate experience for the United States because the American delegates came to the conference with the data from only one underground explosion, the Ravier test in Nevada. On the basis of that one test, they concluded that a "180-station system could detect underground nuclear explosions of 5 kilotons or more, and identify them as man-made about 90 per cent of the time."⁹⁹ To the chagrin of the experts, less than six months later it was learned that the system would not be nearly as effective as first believed. After the Geneva conference, the Hardtack II series was conducted. A board headed by Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner was designated to evaluate the data from the underground explosions and came to conclude that "the ability to distinguish between nuclear explosions from earthquakes was a lot less than previously

⁹⁸Teller, "The Feasibility of Arms Control And the Principle of Openness," op. cit., pp. 129-130.

⁹⁹Hadley, op. cit., pp. 52-53.

thought."¹⁰⁰ The Berkner Board also reported that the "proposed Geneva system could identify only underground explosions about 20 kilotons."¹⁰¹ The inadequacy of the Geneva proposal was further demonstrated by the Rand physicist A. L. Latter and his associates who investigated the possibility of hiding nuclear explosions in underground cavities. The theory of the "big hole" is that "if the nuclear explosion takes place in a vast enough space underground, the seismic signal is not transmitted with customary force to the earth around the hole."¹⁰² It is held that this procedure is capable of reducing the transmitted explosion as much as three hundred times.¹⁰³ This means that a 20-kiloton explosion,

. . . would produce a seismographic signal corresponding to 67 tons of TNT only. Under the Geneva system this would mean that even a 100 kiloton explosion would go undetected.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁰Ibid., pp. 53-54.

¹⁰¹Ibid.

¹⁰²Ibid., p. 54.

¹⁰³Teller says that the "big hole" process could be further perfected "by placing in the cavity substances which can absorb the energy of the nuclear explosion without producing a corresponding pressure," and therefore it is entirely possible that the muffling factor can be increased by several thousand. "The Feasibility of Arms Control and The Principle of Openness," op. cit., p. 129.

¹⁰⁴Hadley, loc. cit.

At later conferences, because of these subsequent findings, the United States was understandably embarrassed by having to argue against conclusions to which it had already agreed!

The only apparent way to insure against illegal underground testing is to have on-site inspection of seismic disturbances. Yet, in the Soviet Union there are approximately 5,000 natural earth movements annually that give the kind of seismic signals produced by a decoupled 20-kiloton nuclear explosion. Almost all of these movements would be suspicious. To inspect a sufficient number, in order to insure that clandestine tests were not being conducted, would require the continual presence of a very large inspectorate. The Soviet Union has been adamant in its stand against allowing foreign inspectors on its soil. The problem is further aggravated by the fact that,

. . . our most efficient seismographs can localize disturbances only imperfectly, to within an area of about 100 square miles. An underground test within that area, conducted with sufficient care, would leave no surface marks differing from an earthquake's. To find radioactivity the experts would have to hunt underground by drilling to various depths. Proof of a nuclear explosion thus could be obtained only by desperate wildcatting.¹⁰⁵

At present, there does not seem to be any truly satisfactory method of detecting underground nuclear explosions. Dr. Teller says,

¹⁰⁵Edward Teller, "Plan For Survival," Reader's Digest 80 (April, 1962), 108.

It is possible that eventually reliable methods of detection will be developed, but it is most likely that if this is at all possible it will take a period of the order of ten years.¹⁰⁶

Possibly, this is why underground nuclear tests were not included in the recent limited test ban agreement.

Control of space. The space race is very exciting and is perhaps best epitomized by the frantic rush to the moon. A variety of motives is responsible for the emphasis on space exploration. Each novel achievement is a tremendous source of world propaganda. There are doubtlessly innumerable advantages, both peacetime and military, which will attend the perfection of interplanetary space travel.

The most ominous motive for space exploration is the desire to utilize it for military purposes. General G. I. Pokrovsky of Russia, two days prior to the launching of the first Sputnik, announced that "the struggle in and for outer space . . . will have tremendous significance in the armed conflict of the future."¹⁰⁷ General Schriever, chief of the United States military space program, has said that in the future "the important battles may not be sea battles or air

¹⁰⁶Teller, "The Feasibility of Arms Control And The Principle of Openness," op. cit., p. 130.

¹⁰⁷Quoted by Stewart Alsop, "Outer Space: The Next Battlefield?" Post 235 (August 4, 1962), 15.

battles, but space battles."¹⁰⁸ The environment of space can be used for military purposes in several ways. First, information can be gathered by orbiting satellites which are designed for reconnaissance and surveillance. The Samos satellite is credited with being able to identify 10-foot objects from 300 miles in space.¹⁰⁹ Thanks to the nothingness of space, a 300-mile high satellite can perform as effectively on photographic missions as can the U-2 which flies at an altitude of less than fourteen miles. When the Midas satellite is refined, it will be able to detect enemy missile firings with infrared equipment and by sensing the exhaust heat of rockets as they rise above the atmosphere. The Midas will give this country 30 minutes' warning of an enemy attack.¹¹⁰ Second, space is militarily relevant because it can be used defensively in destroying menacing space vehicles such as an enemy ICBM, a hostile orbiting satellite, or a manned space craft. Third, the area of space can be used in active offense. Satellites, armed with nuclear explosives, are planned which can be electronically controlled and sent plunging toward a city or other earth targets. One of the many ways to use space as a means of

¹⁰⁸Ibid.

¹⁰⁹"Where the Space Race Stands Now," U.S. News And World Report LIII (August 27, 1962), 33.

¹¹⁰Ibid.

destroying the enemy is by detonating at orbital altitudes (say 150 miles) a limited number of devices of very large yield. "The thermal effects from such a high-yield device could set fire to a large fraction of a continent."¹¹¹

The present techniques of space exploration are at a primitive level, compared with the sophisticated methods that will be possible by the end of the sixties. By 1969, it is very likely that a manned space vehicle will have landed and taken off from the moon.¹¹² At this stage, it is not known how practical some of the space projects will be eventually. Hadley claims that the vulnerable satellite weapons represent a "quantum jump toward insecurity."¹¹³ One hazard of unmanned space satellites is the complexity of their communications system. It is disturbing to contemplate what will happen if a satellite's communication system goes on the blink and it uncontrollably wobbles back toward the earth.

If there is to be any control over space, it must begin now while the nations are yet in the elementary stage of space knowledge. Frye warns that "if agreement is long delayed, the day may soon arrive when 100 percent effective

¹¹¹This is an idea of Dr. Brennan and is quoted by Alsop, "Outer Space: The Next Battlefield?" op. cit., 18.

¹¹²Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, p. 489.

¹¹³Hadley, op. cit., p. 94.

missile control may become . . . a technical impossibility."¹¹⁴ In September, 1960, Eisenhower appeared before the United Nations and proposed that all space craft launchings should be verified in advance by a United Nations inspection team and that there should be established an agency through which an exchange of information regarding outer-space could be made. He appealed for the nations to unite for the peaceful investigation and employment of this 20th century frontier. Some time later, the United Nations established a Committee On Outer Space. It would not be too difficult to achieve a relatively fool-proof inspection system at this time. An international agency could be created that would inspect all outgoing space vehicles in order to insure that no nuclear devices were aboard.

Unilateral disarmament. From some quarters, there is an appeal for unilateral disarmament. In his book, Christian Attitudes Toward War And Peace, Roland Bainton writes that the most obvious and imperative step in the direction of eliminating war is world disarmament, expressing the wish that "our nation would disarm unilaterally" and that "the churches would urge such a course."¹¹⁵ Bainton suggests a possible bright effect of unilateral disarmament:

¹¹⁴Frye, op. cit., p. 80.

¹¹⁵Bainton, op. cit., p. 256.

Such an unparalleled renunciation might have an amazing effect. . . . If a nation possessed of strength should voluntarily renounce its advantage . . . the enemy might respond with alacrity and relief.¹¹⁶

Fromm asserts that the most likely result of unilateral disarmament will be the prevention of war:

The main reason which could impel either the Soviet Union or the United States to atomic war is the constant fear of being attacked and pulverized by the opponent. . . . If, indeed, the main cause of war lies in mutual fear, then the disarmament of either the Soviet Union or the United States would most likely do away with this major cause and, thus, with the probability of war.¹¹⁷

One practical program of unilateral disarmament or disengagement is called "graduated unilateral disarmament."

It is explained in this way:

The basic idea underlying this concept is that of a radical change of our method of negotiating multilateral disarmament. This change implies that we give up the present method of bargaining in which every concession we make is dependent on a corresponding and guaranteed concession on the part of the Russians; that, instead, we take, unilaterally, gradual steps toward disarmament in the expectation that the Russians will reciprocate and that, thus, the present deadlock in the negotiations for universal disarmament can be broken through.¹¹⁸

The hope of the graduated unilateral disarmament advocates

¹¹⁶Ibid., p. 265.

¹¹⁷Erich Fromm, "The Case For Unilateral Disarmament," Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security, p. 189.

¹¹⁸Ibid., p. 187.

is that the Soviet Union is as anxious to avoid war as is the United States and that once any reason for suspicion or fear is removed, they will reciprocate. It is further hoped that after mutual trust has been established through this process that agreement can be reached for a complete bilateral disarmament.¹¹⁹

The obvious peril in any scheme of unilateral disarmament is that tyranny will be the consequence. This peril must be balanced against the possibility that such a program would initiate a beneficent chain reaction in the favor of peace. It appears that a government with the responsibility of the well-being of the American people as well as the free world at large should be very cautious before agreeing to a program of unilateral disengagement.

Universal and complete disarmament. A realistic appraisal forbids the expectation that a general and complete disarmament program is possible in today's world. Further, it is doubtful if a zero system is to be preferred. Hadley makes the point that a zero system places an incredible premium on cheating:

. . . in a zero system, if Russia succeeds in hiding ten 5-megaton weapons when the United States has none, the Soviets have the world. Not only could they practically blackmail America into immediate

¹¹⁹Ibid., p. 188.

submission, the Russians could announce they were resuming nuclear production, mobilize their army to defend their borders, and use their ten nuclear weapons to destroy the production facilities of America as fast as they were built. In this way Russia would soon have not ten nuclear weapons to America's zero, but one hundred. Then it would all be over.¹²⁰

It is clear that only a minor amount of cheating would prove decisive under a zero system. Therefore, such a system is not practical or preferable as the arms control scheme for the present world.

Stable deterrent system. One widely discussed arms control plan is the stable deterrent system.¹²¹ Under such an agreement, each participant would be restricted to a certain number of nuclear weapons which would be invulnerable and of sufficient strength to destroy any aggressor. The plan seeks to freeze this deterrent, and thereby stabilize the arms race, by halting nuclear explosive production, nuclear testing, and by inspecting stockpiles and delivery vehicles. It has also been suggested that the agreement should expressly prohibit the development of an anti-missile weapon.¹²² The stable deterrent system does not require as

¹²⁰Hadley, op. cit., p. 109.

¹²¹See Wiesner, op. cit., pp. 215-223; Hadley, op. cit., pp. 107-127; Thomas C. Schelling, "Reciprocal Measures for Arms Stabilization," Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security, pp. 180-181.

¹²²Wiesner, op. cit., p. 217.

extensive an inspection system as does the zero plan, but a rather comprehensive one is required.

The advantage of the stable deterrent system over a zero system is that minor cheating does not become a serious problem. As Wiesner points out,

. . . a stable deterrent agreement which permits relatively large missile forces to remain in national hands requires less assurance regarding the existence of a small clandestine missile force than an agreement completely outlawing missiles.¹²³

The number of permitted weapons must be larger than that only needed to pulverize the enemy. This is to compensate for possible sabotage and clandestine production of missiles. If a nation has between 750 to 1,000 invulnerable ICBM's, it would virtually be impossible for an enemy to secretly build a force that could successfully destroy this secure deterrent, nor could the enemy sabotage sufficient missile sites to avert disaster, were they to attack. Therefore, with each nation being permitted a large force, worries about cheating and sabotage are minimal. Making cheating ineffective is a better method of protection against it and prevention of it than any inspection system per se.

¹²³Ibid.

by accident, miscalculation, catalytically, or intentionally. The more man applies his intelligence to the creation of greater destructive devices, the more horrible the cataclysm of nuclear war will be. The Christian is therefore eager to arrest the arms race. The most logical answer to the arms race, it appears to this writer, is a program of arms control. The most meritorious arms control plan is the stable deterrent system. A ban against all atmospheric and interplanetary nuclear tests should be included in the program.

Negotiations for an arms control pact are frequently frustrating. The hopes for a successful agreement wax and wane. When the prospects are dim, there is a temptation to call off the efforts. This would be a regretful error. Regardless of how unpromising the hopes for success may be, the United States should be willing to negotiate for an arms control agreement. A cautionary word is appropriate. As important as an arms control agreement is, the United States should refuse to consent to one lacking provisions for adequate inspection. The Soviet Union has shown itself untrustworthy. Therefore, any scheme for arms control must be

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