



UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository)

Planning with the chaos of everyday life

Exploring the governance regimes of mixed-use public spaces, taking urban street markets as a case study

Lin, Y.-T.

Publication date

2023

Document Version

Final published version

[Link to publication](#)

Citation for published version (APA):

Lin, Y.-T. (2023). *Planning with the chaos of everyday life: Exploring the governance regimes of mixed-use public spaces, taking urban street markets as a case study*. [Thesis, fully internal, Universiteit van Amsterdam].

General rights

It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

Disclaimer/Complaints regulations

If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: <https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact>, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.




Planning With the Chaos of Everyday Life

Exploring the Governance Regimes of Mixed-Use Public Spaces, Taking Urban Street Markets as a Case Study

Ying-Tzu Lin

Planning With the Chaos of Everyday Life

Ying-Tzu Lin



Planning With the Chaos of Everyday Life
Exploring the Governance Regimes of Mixed-Use Public Spaces, Taking Urban Street
Markets as a Case Study

ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam
op gezag van de Rector Magnificus
prof. dr. ir. P.P.C.C. Verbeek

ten overstaan van een door het College voor Promoties ingestelde commissie,
in het openbaar te verdedigen in de Aula der Universiteit
op woensdag 22 november 2023, te 14.00 uur

door Ying-Tzu Lin
geboren te Taipei

Promotiecommissie

<i>Promotores:</i>	prof. dr. ir. L. Bertolini prof. dr. M.T. Tasan-Kok	Universiteit van Amsterdam Universiteit van Amsterdam
<i>Copromotores:</i>	dr. N. Verloo	Universiteit van Amsterdam
<i>Overige leden:</i>	dr. A.A. Nikolaeva dr. J. de Vries prof. dr. R.K. Jaffe prof. dr. J.J.M. Hemel prof. dr. A.J.J. van der Valk dr. S.M. Huang	Universiteit van Amsterdam Universiteit van Amsterdam Universiteit van Amsterdam TU Delft Wageningen UR National Taiwan University

Faculteit der Maatschappij- en Gedragwetenschappen

Ying-Tzu Lin, 2023
Cover design: Joris Maes
Layout: Andy Díaz Sánchez
Printed in Amsterdam, 2023

This manuscript is dedicated to my grandparents, who were street market vendors in Taipei's inner city, as well as my personal daycare providers. My grandmother would take my little hand to stroll through the street markets, and my grandfather would take me on walks in the park on workday afternoons. With unconditional love and care, they anchored my early childhood experiences in the essence of the city. Yet they left this world before being able to see what would grow out of it.

PLANNING WITH THE CHAOS OF EVERYDAY LIFE:

Exploring the Governance Regimes of Mixed-Use Public Spaces,
Taking Urban Street Markets as a Case Study

YING-TZU LIN

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES, TABLES AND PICTURES	11
CHAPTER 1 Introduction	13
1.1 Setting the Stage	13
1.2 The Script: Planning as Ordering Chaos?	16
1.3 Research Questions and Aims	18
1.4 Acts of the Play	19
CHAPTER 2 The scaffolding to understand ‘mixed-use’	23
2.1 Introduction	23
2.2 Situating Urban Mixed-Use Public Spaces in Urban Theory	24
2.2.1 Concept one: Cité and Ville	25
2.2.2 Concept two: Techne and Metis	28
2.2.3 Conclusion: Beyond the Planning Framework	30
2.3 Situating the governance regime through New Institutionalism	32
2.4 The Governance Regime: the synthetic concept to depict mixed-use public spaces	36
2.5 Conclusion	41
CHAPTER 3 Methodology	43
3.1 Introduction	43
3.2 Operationalisation of the Research	44
3.2.1 Why Street Markets?	44
3.2.2 Research Sub-Questions	45
3.2.3 The Multi-Sited Case Study	46
3.2.4 Case Selection	48
3.3 The Method of Ethnography	49
3.3.1 Organisational Ethnography	51
3.3.2 Spatial Ethnography	52
3.4 Data and Sensemaking	53
3.4.1 Data Gathering/Foraging	53
3.4.2 The Sensemaking of “Data”	57
3.5 Reflexivity and Ethics	63
3.5.1 Research Ethics	64
3.5.2 Access is Capital	65
3.5.3 Being a Novice Ethnographer	66
CHAPTER 4 The Governance Regime of Street Markets in the City of Amsterdam	69
4.1 The Official Side of Amsterdam’s Street Market Governance Regime	69
4.2 The Dynamic Configuration of the Governance Regime	77

4.3 Challenges for the Current Governance Regime	81
4.3.1 Intra-Level Communication as Informal Institution	82
4.3.2 Colliding Values Between the Production and Management of Public Spaces	88
4.3.3 The Collision of Techne and Metis on the Dappermarkt	91
4.4 “Markets Need to Change,” but how?	93
CHAPTER 5 Street Ethnography in Amsterdam	97
5.1 Case Introduction	97
5.2 The Misperception	104
5.3 The Different Sense of Time	108
5.4 Micro-spatial negotiations	110
5.5 Conclusion	113
CHAPTER 6 Amsterdam Case Analysis	115
6.1 Characteristics of Amsterdam’s Governance Regime	115
6.2 The Autonomous Street Actors and Their Sense of Distrust	122
6.3 The Mismatch	125
6.4 Conclusion	129
CHAPTER 7 The Governance Regime of Street Markets in the City of Taipei	131
7.1 Organisational Structure Change in Street Market Governance	132
7.1.1 Brief Development History of Market Policy and the Taipei City Market Administration Office	132
7.1.2 Current Structure of the Taipei City Market Administration Office	135
7.1.3 Two Versions of the Street Market Governance Regime in Taipei	140
7.2 Multiple Markets in One	143
7.2.1 Walking in the Donmen Market	143
7.2.2 Unfolding the Territorial Border of Donmen Market	150
7.2.3 The Actual Shape of the Governance Regime in the Donmen Market	159
7.3 Conclusion	160
CHAPTER 8 Street Ethnography in Taipei	163
8.1 Markets and Their Gatekeepers	163
8.2 The Tension Between Policy and Politics in Markets and Neighbourhoods	166
8.3 When Politics Meet Policy	170
8.4 Conclusion	176
CHAPTER 9 Taipei Case Analysis	177
9.1 The Characteristics of Taipei’s Governance Regime	178
9.2 The Semi-Legal Market, the Street Lacking Infrastructure, and Tactical Politics	185

9.3 Twisting the Narrative: From Apparent Chaos to the Integration of Different Orders	189
9.4 Conclusion	193
CHAPTER 10 Synthesis of Fieldwork Findings in Taipei and Amsterdam	195
10.1 Unpacking the Complexity of Mixed-Use	195
10.2 Existing Challenges in Planning and Governing Mixed-Use Public Space	199
10.3 The Role of Planning in Mixed-Use Public Spaces	205
10.4 Conclusion	207
CHAPTER 11 Conclusion: From Ordering Chaos to Navigating Complexity	209
11.1 Unpacking “Everyday Chaos” Through the Lens of the Governance Regime	209
11.2 Navigating Complexity	211
11.3 Research Limitations	214
11.4 Future Research Avenues	214
APPENDIX	219
Appendix 1 List of interviews	219
Appendix 2 Consent Form	221
BIBLIOGRAPHY	223
DISSERTATION SUMMARY	237
SAMENVATTING	239
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	241

LIST OF FIGURES, TABLES AND PICTURES

Figures

- Figure 2.1 The normative approach of planning institutions and organisations 36
- Figure 2.2 The governance regime approach to how mixed-use public spaces are governed
- Figure 2.3 The governance regime with institutional nuances
- Figure 4.1 Organisational map of Amsterdam's street market governance regime
- Figure 4.2 Main management characters of Amsterdam's street markets
- Figure 5.1 Meeting invitation to redesign the streets and public spaces of Dapperbuurt
- Figure 5.2 Design draft in section of Dapperstraat
- Figure 6.1 The governance regime of Amsterdam's street markets
- Figure 7.1 The human resource analysis of MAO in 2020
- Figure 7.2 Mapping the street markets in Taipei
- Figure 7.3 Numbers of markets and stalls in each legal type
- Figure 7.4 Mapping the three legal types of market within the Donmen markets
- Figure 7.5 Number of stalls within each legal type of market within the Donmen markets
- Figure 7.6 The organisational network governing retail markets
- Figure 7.7 The organisational network governing the semi-legal market
- Figure 7.8 The organisational network governing non-legal markets
- Figure 9.1 Map of the street market governance regime in Taipei

Pictures

- Picture 5.1 A daily scene in the Dappermarkt
- Picture 5.2 The pavement during market hours
- Picture 5.3 A characteristically empty market on a weekday afternoon
- Picture 5.4 Public petition against the rising parking fees by vendors
- Picture 5.5 Micro-violation of space
- Picture 7.1 The outskirts of the non-legal market in the residential neighbourhood
- Picture 7.2 Unified billboards in the market
- Picture 7.3 Illegal parking with chauffeur waiting to pick up groceries
- Picture 7.4 Busy semi-legal market
- Picture 7.5 The shop that rents its front space to another stall
- Picture 7.6 Multiple layers of stall arrangement in the non-legal market
- Picture 7.7 Multi-layered stall arrangement in the non-legal market
- Picture 7.8 Rubbish awaiting collection after the market
- Picture 7.9 Recycling corner and mini-terrace in the street

Table

- Table 10.1 Concluding Insights of the Research

CHAPTER 1 Introduction

Planning mixed-use public spaces is extremely challenging as they are sites of highly complex socio-spatial dynamics that sit between chaos and order, presenting opportunities for both formal and informal interactions. In this dissertation, I argue that in order to develop a deeper understanding between urban planning and the complex socio-spatial dynamics of urban mixed-use public spaces, it is necessary to explore the governance regimes they contain. I understand “governance regime” to indicate the network of organisations, connected through institutions at multiple governance layers, that interact with mixed-use public spaces. The term offers an analytical lens through which to observe how organisations, institutions, and their interactions shape the dynamics of mixed-use public spaces.

Though lively and convivial public spaces are widely seen to play an important role in making cities liveable, pleasurable spaces, planning has often seemed to struggle to come to terms with their apparent unruliness (Hou, 2010; Roy, 2009; Sankalia, 2014). What are the challenges to planning mixed-use public spaces that research into the topic has not yet tackled? These long-running questions remain highly relevant in contemporary planning theory and practice, and are still in need of further elaborations and answers. As such, my research adopts a governance perspective to study the planning of mixed-use public spaces, that is, the planning stage in the overall process of producing public space, which also includes design, use, and management (Carmona, 2014, 2019).

This dissertation aims to fill the gap between, on the one hand, a theoretical understanding of the values and functions that urban public spaces provide, and, on the other, how these spaces are planned. By conducting spatial and organisational ethnographies and analysing fieldwork findings through a governance lens, I hope to connect different bodies of literature and shed light on the ways in which urban planning might relate to the spontaneity and surprises of everyday life.

1.1 Setting the Stage

Lively and convivial mixed-use public spaces seem to thrive at the boundary between order and chaos. It is the aim of the present research to explore this boundary. Mixed-use public spaces, given the nature of the locations they occupy, have to accommodate a variety of continuously evolving and largely unpredictable uses, and users operating in and across different timescales. These combined socio-spatial-temporal conditions generate complexity in the public space, as well as unique challenges for planning and governance. Synergies that might be built upon constantly emerge, but so too do conflicts, and all in complex ways. The negotiation of complexity among organisations and institutions in mixed-use public spaces effectively shapes

the dynamics of socio-spatial relationships along with the practice of everyday life (de Certeau, 1998).

Scholars in urban studies have produced an abundant literature on the production, functions, and uses of urban public spaces. Early research into urban planning and design like Lynch (1964) emphasised how physical design and aesthetics can foster a sense of civic identity. Beyond visual signifiers and monumental symbols, morphological studies into developing spatial pattern languages later expanded the design discourse to the larger scale of the town (Alexander, 1977). As such, technical design-oriented scholarship pays more attention to the representation of spaces than to the power structures and political ideologies that produce them.

Also in the 1960s, meanwhile, urban sociologists began to reflect upon the impact of public life on urban public spaces against a backdrop of rapid modernisation in North American urban development. Foundational pieces of urban scholarship, such as Jane Jacobs' *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (1961) and Richard Sennett's *The Uses of Disorder* (1970), pointed out how modernist urban planning had changed the socio-spatial dynamics of urban public space to the detriment of potential social richness and openness. One of the major critiques from this period was that urban planning, under the influence of modernity, was being employed as a tool for social control, reinforcing social inequality through the ordering and distribution of spatial resources (Berman, 1983). At the level of macro discourse, urban sociologists and geographers working on the political economy of cities and urban spaces offered analytic lenses through which to examine the political aspect of spatial production (Harvey, 1995; LeFebvre, 1992). These critical urban theories addressed urban space as more than merely an empty stage for human activity, instead embedding it in a broader context of social, economic, and political relations.

Building on both these physical and social enquiries, William H. Whyte investigated the socio-spatial arrangement of small-scale urban public spaces in 1970s New York City, from the perspective of their users. In the book and documentary *The Social Life of Small Urban Spaces*, Whyte (1980) documented insights into what does and does not work in designing and planning public spaces for socialising through observations, and developed these findings into operable principles. Both Whyte's methods of documentation and his primary argument were innovative when they first appeared, and they remain influential in research and practice in urban design and planning to this day.

More recently, scholars have produced extensive studies of how the production and performance of public space intersect with different political ideologies, economic interests, and social values (Brenner et al., 2009; Mitchell, 2003; Smith & Low, 2013; Vale, 2002). Meanwhile, the emergence of a more empirical approach to

design studies has returned to the perspective of the human scale (Gehl, 2013; Mehta, 2013), and to the relationship between the social and behavioural aspects of public space (Mehta, 2007, 2014). Still others have focused on how the spatial practices of everyday life in urban public space, such as reappropriation, reconstruction, and temporary occupation, can lead to empowerment and civic agency (Chase et al., 2008; Crawford, 2005; Hou, 2010).

New methods for studying public spaces have also been explored. Kim (2015) proposed a spatial ethnographic approach to studying the sidewalk in Ho Chi Minh City, focusing on vending and property rights. Carmona (2008, 2015) has set forth the necessity of developing mixed methods for a comprehensive study of public space beyond existing theories. As part of a long-term study of public spaces in London, he proposed that new paradigms and normative principles—including physical design, planning, and social management—should be developed (Carmona, 2015). Above all, I conclude that what is required is a more balanced view of urban public spaces, one that recognises the complexity of spatial types and stakeholders within them. In studying the planning of mixed-use public spaces, it is just as important to observe the socio-spatial dynamics of the spaces as it is to investigate how they are shaped by dominant planning frameworks and regulatory mandates.

Urban planning occupies a peculiar position in this debate (Tonnelat, 2010). The urban planning discipline shows a strong tendency to fix the socio-spatial context within its normative culture in the space (Oswalt et al., 2013). Nevertheless, the growing appreciation of mixed-use spaces—which contribute positively to a vibrant and liveable urban environment—challenges the dominant ideas and methods in urban planning (Rowley, 1996; Hoppenbrouwer & Louw, 2005). The term “mixed-use” is both vague and unarticulated in modernistic planning (Grant, 2002; Molinaro, 1993). On one hand, mixed-use simply means the attribution of more than one zoning function to a space. On the other, apart from subscribing to the land-use function as a regulatory tool, there is little discussion of the quality of mixed-use public spaces compared to urban design.

Carmona (2014, 2019) demonstrated the cycle of the production of urban public space, from planning and design to use and management. Specifically, he pointed out that planning urban public space is very much about designing the process of spatial production (Carmona, 2019). In line with this, I consider urban planning to occupy a subtle position in shaping the strategic decision-making framework. This prefigurative framework, which consists of a set of regulatory tools, directs the demand, types, and functions of public space before the actual delivery of the detailed spatial design. Therefore, any study of public space planning should focus on both the procedural perspective (how planning is situated in the process of spatial production), and how these planned spaces are used accordingly (or not).

What is missing in the body of public space scholarship above is a link between the macro and micro perspectives on public space, or how public spaces are produced and shaped in a specific governance framework, while acknowledging the agency and indeterminacy that are collectively practised by users. The macro-scale focuses on how urban public spaces are interrelated to the larger political, social, and economic context. The micro-scale, meanwhile, addresses how professional design, planning practices, and everyday usage shape public space. To bridge this gap, I propose to explore the complexity and pluriformity of mixed-use urban public spaces by investigating how they are governed. If urban planning represents a prefigurative framework for the spatial production of public space, governance is where norms are established for the institutions and organisations that enable every phase of the life cycle of public space.

1.2 The Script: Planning as Ordering Chaos?

My research sets off from a simple question: between too much and too little order, how can urban planners formulate concepts that articulate the values appropriate for mixed-use spaces? This appears all the more paradoxical as, whilst literature from the Global South documents lively and convivial mixed-use public spaces, the same are often negatively perceived as chaotic, with the eviction of vendors representing an imposition of order (Spire & Choplin, 2018; Deore & Lathia, 2019; Onodugo et al., 2016). At the same time, current trends such as tactical urbanism and related placemaking movements advocate the introduction of various spontaneous and serendipitous activities and events to under-used public spaces (Lydon et al., 2012; Silva, 2016). Of course, it goes without saying that when a public authority simply let go of its power in governance over a mixed-use public space, alternative organisations are likely to come forward and begin ordering it anew. This may result in the domination of a few, powerful interests, and a lack of transparency and accountability in matters of decision-making and citizens' right to the space. Nevertheless, the substantial question for planners is: what kind of tools can be developed to leverage these values? If the literature in Section 1.1 has already pointed out the benefits of having mixed-use public spaces in the city, what are the struggles that prevent local authorities from acting accordingly? Are there challenges to planning mixed-use public spaces that research has not addressed?

To face the challenge of planning with complexity in mixed-use public space, I adopt the lens of the governance regime: a body that entails multiple layers of governance which interact with mixed-use public spaces. The governance regime serves as an analytical tool to tease out the ways in which organisations, institutions, and their interactions construct the dynamic of a mixed-use public space. As part of the process of conducting organisational and spatial ethnographies on urban mixed-use public

spaces, I collected an extensive amount of data, which I then read, processed, and analysed through the lens of the governance regime.

The example of a mixed-use public space that I employ here is the urban street market. Indeed, the urban street market is a particularly interesting case: it is one of the most recognisable and mundane scenes that one may encounter in cities around the world. However, it also represents an extreme kind of mixed-use public space, containing highly mixed usages across various socio-spatial-temporal dimensions. Street markets are popular destinations for citizens and travellers alike, but very often headaches for municipalities. Some argue that markets represent the origin of cities and should be preserved for their significant functions, while others claim that they belong to the past (Cresswell & Hoskins, 2008; Morales et al., 1995; Morales, 2000; Polyák, 2013). From the perspective of spatial governance, street markets constantly challenge notions of order and chaos. Their intensely mixed-use status threatens at times to overwhelm otherwise established hierarchies with a degree of mixing that could descend into anarchy at any moment. Such a state, however, is also a vital field of convivial, social, and economic activities. It is precisely this multifaceted character of street markets that makes them such a fascinating object of study.

From the very beginning of urban history, street markets have been pivotal public spaces for urban development (Calabi, 2004). Over the course of the modernisation and digitalisation of society, retail and online commerce have largely replaced the commercial function of the street market in many developed cities, better suited as they are to the flexibility, adaptations, and demands of contemporary urban lifestyles. In many other contexts, however, street markets still play an important role in cities and villages for the commercial, social, cultural, and touristic value that they provide (Watson, 2006). Furthermore, the spontaneous and temporary basis—often daily or weekly—on which many street markets operate represents a low-cost entry into entrepreneurship for vulnerable groups to make a living in cities around the world (Hiebert et al., 2015). Illicit borders between legal and illegal spaces are found in street markets, and formal and informal lines are sometimes blurred. Yet, it is because of these very particular socio-spatial arrangements that users tend to take over street spaces spontaneously and temporarily, thereby highlighting the unplanned feature. The heritage and contemporary characteristics of the street market make it one of the most representative everyday mixed-use public spaces in contemporary cities.

I have selected the cities of Amsterdam and Taipei as sites for case studies that illustrate the workings of two different mixed-use public space governance regimes. Within a spectrum that ranges from the over-regulation of informal trade spaces to no regulation whatsoever, the governance in both Taipei and Amsterdam maintains a certain level of regulatory flexibility, although the markets in both cases face significant challenges to their ongoing operation. The case of Amsterdam leans more

towards the regulated side of the spectrum while losing its vitality, or a seeming excess of order, whereas Taipei's weaker planning agency struggles with street markets deemed "too lively", or a seeming excess of chaos. This mix of similarity and difference provides very fertile material for research.

Adapting an ethnographic methodology allows me to distance myself from the existing value frameworks related to street markets. My ethnographic fieldwork reveals that the daily operation of keeping mixed-use public spaces running is a demanding and complex process that requires a set of regulations and actors to be involved in their flexible/situated application. The lens of the governance regime—inspired by the new institutionalism (Scott, 2013)—helps to unpack the nuances of how multiple influential user groups strive to dominate and order the public space, ultimately affecting the power of public governance. The sociological and economic perspectives of new institutionalism enable researchers to study the interactions between organisations and individual actors, the influence of their behaviours on both formal and informal institutions, and the power relations therein (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Dobbin, 1994; North, 1991). New institutionalism also offers insights into the impacts that these relational nuances have on the socio-spatial dynamics of mixed-use public spaces. Against this backdrop, I will demonstrate where planning stands and what it entails in dealing with mixed-use public spaces such as street markets.

1.3 Research Questions and Aims

The overarching aim of my research is to understand the complexities of planning mixed-use public space. This can be broken down into a number of distinct areas of enquiry. First, the practice of governance in mixed-use public spaces. Which institutions and organisations are in charge of which parts of the space? Second, what are users' daily interactions with mixed-use public spaces on governance? Third, what are the resulting socio-spatial dynamics? Fourth, what position does planning occupy within this dynamic, and what are its possible impacts therein? I believe that teasing out the nuances of what constitutes complexity is a substantial step towards planning better mixed-use public spaces in our built environment. Therefore, this dissertation's main research question is:

How do governance regimes accommodate complexity in planning mixed-use public spaces?

This research question contains several layers to be elaborated upon, and terms to be defined. I will describe why the governance perspective matters to urban planning, as well as the importance of the cycle of production of mixed-use public spaces. I will also discuss the term "governance regime" in more depth, a concept that I identify as an analytical tool with which to study mixed-use public space.

The significance of studying the governance perspective within mixed-use public space, and of reflecting on how to plan mixed-use public space, lies in the fact that the performance of the socio-spatial dynamics of public spaces is a continuous engagement with human and non-human actors in time. As much as one may want to study different methods and ideologies to plan and design mixed-use public spaces, the life of these spaces only begins once they are built. Therefore, to understand how these spaces actually function and connect back to their planning, design, and management, a governance perspective is required. An inquiry into how urban public spaces are governed and regulated within wider social structures can offer great insights for urban planning—in terms of both research and practice—to think about designing processes that enable multiple opportunities and cope with the multiple conflicts that mixed-use public spaces may present. The governance regime is a conceptual intervention that I will develop and adapt to this research, built upon the analysis of institutions and organisations that are active in the spaces under study. I will further extend the building blocks of this concept in the chapter on my theoretical framework.

The scientific contribution of this thesis is twofold. In terms of theory, I propose the concept—inspired by the new institutionalism—of the governance regime to understand the complexity of planning mixed-use public space. In terms of methodology, I adapt an ethnographic approach to the study of mixed-use public spaces. I then analyse my ethnographic findings through the lens of the governance regime, including the actor landscape of the study fields, and the formal and informal institutions involved in the socio-spatial dynamics.. In so doing, I develop a systemic analysis to tease out complexities in the planning and design of mixed-use public spaces. This research has social relevance too: I aim to address how planning professionals can better understand their position and offer tools with which to approach matters of planning mixed-use public spaces. The advantage of placing urban planning in the wider context of the governance network is that it highlights coordination as the core in the urban planning profession. Moreover, it will potentially open up new discussions on the agency of urban planning in mixed-use public spaces.

1.4 Acts of the Play

To sum up what has been said so far, this dissertation is about examining urban planning in the production of mixed-use public spaces. The research question was developed as a result of linking questions from literature and various social and spatial phenomena. To answer it, I stood on the shoulders of a variety of different scholars to look for a new angle from which to approach my topic. I also adopted a distinctive research tool with which to forage empirical findings in the universe of street markets. Ultimately, these 14 chapters present an adventurous research jour-

ney in thoughts and action. Before rolling out the full story, the following presents teasers for each chapter.

Following this introductory chapter, I lay out the building blocks of the theoretical framework. In Chapter 2, I develop four such blocks as follows: first and second, two intersecting sets of dialectical concepts, Sennett's *cit  v. ville* (2018), and Scott's *metis v. techne* (1998), allow me to pinpoint the position on (the making of) mixed-use public spaces in the context of the modernist planning paradigm. I then turn to the scholarship on governance, specifically in the new institutionalism. Here I give a definition of "institution," "organisation," and "governance," inspired by the new institutionalism's focus on relational nuance and behavioural connections in the process of institutionalisation. The fourth block is the analytical concept of the governance regime, where I link the relational aspect of governance and map out its impact on mixed-use public spaces.

Chapter 3 explores ideas on how to operationalise the research, develop my approach to ethnography, make sense of the data, and process the positionality of the research in the ethnographic fieldwork. I present the research sub-questions and case study selections first. Then comes a discussion of how I process and adapt organisational ethnography and spatial ethnography into empirical research. Following the anthropological tradition, I then offer extensive reflections upon the ethnographic research experiences of data sense-making, positionality, and ethics.

The first empirical case study in Amsterdam covers Chapters 4 to 6. Chapter 4 mainly discusses the organisational ethnographic fieldwork on governance arrangements that the municipality of Amsterdam uses to deal with street markets. Chapter 5 combines an archival study of the history of the Dappermarkt and how individual and organisational street actors respond to the network of governmental organisations and formal institutions that they act upon in the street markets. A picture of the governance of street markets in Amsterdam is presented in Chapter 6, along with an analysis that reads the ethnographic findings through the concept of the governance regime.

Chapters 7 to 9 follow the same order, but focus on Taipei. I look at how three different legal types of street markets coexist under the same name, in a continuous streetscape, using the Donmen market as an illustration. Of the three types, I pay more attention to the semi-legal part of the market, as it seems to perform the best balance between too much and too little order and represents the most complex configuration of the governance regime. In Chapter 8, I discuss how various informal institutions have been developed to compensate for the weaknesses of formal institutions, and how these dynamics limit the actual changes in formal institutional arrangements. A

more detailed discussion of the internal dynamics of important stakeholders is given in Chapter 9, once the overall picture of the governance regime has been introduced.

Finally, Chapter 10 serves as a synthesis through which to reflect upon the two cases and the empirical grounds that they provide in answer to the main research question. Unpacking the multiple complexities of the case studies, I revisit the rhetorical point of departure: what is order, and what is chaos? Where does urban planning sit amidst the complex everyday socio-spatial dynamics of mixed-use public spaces? How can it affect them? The Conclusion contends that the governance regime perspective provides a lens through which urban planning scholars and professionals can rethink the meaning of order and chaos. This then anticipates the question of how urban planning might prepare itself to navigate the inherent complexity of mixed-use public spaces, designing spaces in such a way as to preserve, rather than proscribe, this complexity

CHAPTER 2 The scaffolding to understand ‘mixed-use’

2.1 Introduction

The point of departure for any introduction to the theoretical blocks that form the foundation of this dissertation is now a long-standing difficulty. Since the 1960s, critical urban scholarship has reflected on the failure of post-war modernist urban planning and its destructive impact on public spaces and urban life (Jacobs, 1961; Sennett, 1970). Half a century later, the disciplines of design and planning are still caught between the ghost of the Athens Charter¹ and attempts to undo the damage done by modernist planning and its zealous taste for order. The urbanist Alex Krieger (2006) described the historical significance of the Athens Charter, which turned urban planning into a profession, as “a mediation between plan and project.” Modernist urban planning went from functionalism to professionalism in dealing with technical issues and mediating interdisciplinary interactions. Even today, functionalism still plays a significant role in contemporary urban planning practices: from zoning systems, design and planning guidelines, to the entire geographic information system on how spaces can be categorised and layered, etc. Meanwhile, generations of design and planning scholarship have attempted to develop new visions, lenses, and stories to improve cities’ social and environmental liveability. However, spatial design and planning are still products of modernism. Rather than compiling a catalogue of planning scholarship to compare their differences and approaches to public space, therefore, I will instead revisit those theories that address the ideological framework of planning itself.

The epistemology of “mixed-use” as a type of public space seems not to fit predetermined categories in the context of modernist planning. Public space scholarship has broadly documented the phenomenon of mixed-use public space that I addressed in Chapter 1.1. Despite arguments and theories that support the diverse uses of such public space, urban planning as a professional practice and tool of statecraft has been discussed relatively little.

What is largely unarticulated, however, is not entirely unaddressed. Kim (2012) examined the major paths of enquiry within ongoing studies of mixed-use public space. Of the fields of study identified, she summarised three major categories: monumental spaces (such as squares and parks), the practice of “humble” public spaces (such as pavements), and the temporary spatial transformation of public spaces. Nevertheless, few have discussed the mixed-use epistemology in relation to the framework of modernist planning, that is, how cities are categorised into differ-

¹ An urban planning charter that had a significant influence on post-WWII urban development. It was published in 1933 after the Congrès International d'Architecture Moderne (CIAM) in Athens. The charter was based on the Swiss architect Le Corbusier's idea of a functional city.

ent types of land use, zoning codes, and other regulations that prescribe legitimate ways to use the space. In short, discussions of mixed-use public spaces in planning theory are lacking.

This chapter is composed of four main theoretical blocks. In the first and second blocks, I will revisit the contemporary planning history of mixed-used public spaces, and the epistemological development that constructs urban planning as a professional discipline responsible for—among other things—mixed-use public spaces. In order to see beyond the limited framework of urban planning as straightforwardly the domain concerned with mixed-use public spaces, I seek to understand the wider picture in which urban planning is itself embedded. This brings me to the third block: governance. Here, I outline the sociological and economic perspectives of new institutionalism. By looking at the relationship between organisations, institutions, and the behavioural nuances within them, I position urban planning in a wider network of governance.

In a fourth block, I develop an understanding of the complexity inherent in planning mixed-use public spaces, taking inspiration from new institutionalism. Within this context, I focus on the concept of the governance regime as this project's major theoretical contribution, aiming to analyse urban planning issues by looking at the governance landscape and how it interacts with the street-level socio-spatial dynamics of the empirical case studies to come. To be specific, I employ the new institutionalism as an analytical lens for understanding governance. I argue that the dynamic, multi-actor, and seemingly chaotic realities of mixed-use public spaces require an approach informed by the new institutionalism to understand and plan them. Based on these theoretical blocks, then, I propose the analytical concept of the governance regime to understand and navigate the mist which, as indicated earlier, surrounds the planning of mixed-use public spaces.

2.2 Situating Urban Mixed-Use Public Spaces in Urban Theory

This section gives a theoretical overview of planning as an intervention and framework through which to order society. Between order and disorder, (multi-)function and dysfunction, one paradigm and another, what are the relational nuances which, if properly understood, could illuminate the complexity of planning mixed-use public spaces?

Here, I interrogate the encounter between planning and mixed-use public space by discussing two sets of prototypical concepts. The first is *cité v. ville*, which Richard Sennett (2018) developed in his book *Building and Dwelling: Ethics for the City*. The second set is *metis v. techne*, from *Seeing Like a State* by James C. Scott. By examining the planning of mixed-use public spaces through these concepts, I aim

to identify the specificity of the position that mixed-use public spaces occupy within the world of spatial production and the autonomous adaptation of public space.

2.2.1 Concept one: Cité and Ville

Through a discussion of three works by Richard Sennett, this first building block attempts to contextualize why planning mixed-use public space is a significant issue in contemporary urban planning. In his book *Building and Dwelling: Ethics for the City* (2018), Richard Sennett stressed the relationship between the living and built environment in the city. Early in the book, Sennett offers a linguistic history of two concepts that developed in French over the course of the medieval period to distinguish between the city as a purely physical space, and, as he framed it, the city as “a mentality compiled from perceptions, behaviours, and beliefs” (p.15): ville and cité (Le Goff, 2019). The two terms were initially used only as markers of scale, in which ville indicated the city as a whole, and cité referred to particular spaces within the bigger city.

Sennett’s intention was to revive the old definitions of cité and ville, and to use them to elaborate on emerging urban challenges. According to him, cité can be taken to designate the liquid state of the city, a question of how people (want to) dwell together in the city. This implies a collective, place-oriented consciousness produced between certain socio-spatial settings. To grasp this sense of cité, one has to understand the kind of mental states at work in individuals’ interactions with the built environment, and the collective consciousness that this constructs. Ville, meanwhile, is the material state of the city. However, Sennett argues that ville cannot be understood only as the built environment, but the built environment along with the dynamics between buildings, urban forms, infrastructure, and nature. The different forms that ville may take both reflect the economic and political condition of the society and, in Sennett’s words, “the product of makers’ will.(p.17)” In the book, Sennett points to Ildefons Cerdà’s Barcelona, Georges-Eugène Haussmann’s Paris, and Frederic Law Olmsted’s Central Park in New York City as three examples that demonstrate how great urbanists have mobilised socio-political power to realise their visions for cities. These three changed their respective cities and how they function by giving them a new shape of ville: streets and blocks were reshaped and new axes of avenues and public spaces were created to make new relations between the city and its citizens.

Cité and ville can be seen as the minor and major keys that compose a city. While cité is a bottom-up collective practice always being made and remade by citizens, ville is the outcome of conscious institutional action. Sennett points out that in the 19th century, great urbanists such as Georges-Eugène Haussmann and Frederick Law Olmsted sought to connect cité and ville in their practice. This ambition, however, had

largely disappeared by the beginning of the 20th century: *cité* and *ville* had gradually moved apart and eventually divorced². It was also at this time, however, that modernist planning was born, with a focus on *ville*. Meanwhile, the theoretical focus on *cité* remained the purview of the Chicago School and the broader scholarship network in the social sciences. Although the knowledge development and institutions bound up with it continued after the divorce of *cité* and *ville*, some scholars and writers never abandoned the project of bringing the two together. Among them were Jane Jacobs and Lewis Mumford, who proposed alternative ideal cities by refocusing on the value of *cité*–street life and the organic relationship between people and their living spaces (ibid:155).

For his part, Sennett saw top-down, pre-planned cities in which a rigid framework directs everyday life as akin to freezing citizens in a permanent state of adolescence which prohibits personal growth. In his book *The Uses of Disorder: Personal Identity and City Life* (1970) he argued that although the functioning that dominated urban planning—highly important in guidelines, planning tools, and zoning, etc.—might be useful to give order to the city, this order would nevertheless have to be maintained by instrumental tools and bureaucratic systems and would, in the long run, be harmful to the city, preventing its inhabitants from growing. To widen the imagination of an alternative urban future, Sennett contrasted this tame functional urban order (the reality in North America in the 1960s) with what he advocated as ‘anarchy and disorder’: letting go of control, confronting conflicts, and letting people learn how to accommodate difference on their own (p.322). He imagined that the fruit of any such anarchy and disorder period would be a heightened understanding on the part of the citizens of how to behave and place themselves within the life of the city. Forms of control would then be less necessary, and more fluid and diverse communities would have the opportunity to develop, ultimately building a more socially and culturally resilient city.

Half a century later, Sennett co-authored *Designing Disorder* (2020)—the sequel to *The Uses of Disorder*—with the urban design scholar and practitioner Pablo Sendra. Sennett admitted that *The Uses of Disorder* lacks material answers (2020: p.9), and that he had felt a sense of incompleteness throughout his urban planning career as a result. In the new book, he elaborates on the notion of disorder in the context of

² Sennett particularly criticises the Chicago School and the teachings of Robert E. Park, whose specialism was in analysing communities that disconnect people and places in the city. Sennett felt that too much focus was paid to *cité*, with the concept of *ville* relatively neglected. The city, for the Chicago school, is composed of social relations and locations regardless of their relationship to the actual built environment. As Sennett commented: “They imagined the shape of the city in primitive 2D terms, and thought about 3D built forms, not at all.” (p136) As a result, their lack of interest in the relationship between society and the built environment meant that the Chicago School was largely absent from the design and planning scene and propositional politics where questions of changing the socio-spatial arrangement were concerned. Their analysis had no impact on actual changes to cities. Whereas with support from academia—Harvard University in particular—urbanism and urban planning officially became only about *ville*.

urban planning in two stages. First, he considers modernist urban planning that is oriented towards technical questions—or forms of city-making in which the concept of *ville* is dominant—to have radicalised the distinction between order and disorder. Here, activities and spaces that occur without state intervention are considered forms of disorder and informality. This is not only the denial of *cit *, but also limits improvisation and social interaction, the foundation of civil society. Second, Sennett looks for common ground between *cit * and *ville*, calling this “the open city” (p.26). He considers urban planning and planners to be in need of liberation from closed, technocratic systems whose impact on the city and built environment are heavily felt in the form of zoning, building laws (p.21), and bureaucratic imperatives. To free up the city, Sennett argues that we need to be allies of informality and make experimentation possible within existing urban forms.

Disorder is a strong term. From the arguments above, however, one can understand it to mean simply leaving room for the growth of organic socio-spatial dynamics. Following his experience in urban planning, Sennett upgraded his argument from the ‘70s and brought the spirit of the manifesto into the built form. He proposed to build an open city, where three configurations of “Urban DNA” can be deployed: passage territories, incomplete objects, and non-linear narratives (p.27). These three configurations can be understood as principles for urban planners and designers on how to leave room for the growth of organic socio-spatial dynamics. According to the scale, this may mean implementing porous structures and allowing citizens to innovate ways of using the space, or leaving room for citizens to advance their sense of being and writing their own version of socio-spatial narratives. This is where *cit * and *ville* find common ground.

Based on the above, I find mixed-use public spaces to offer a particularly rich reflexive ground for urban planning. First, the definition of mixed-use public space in modernist urban planning means that more than one use permission is registered to the space. Street markets, for example, are public spaces for commerce, recreation, and transportation. Although planning uses regulations—in accordance with the principle of *ville*—to specify what can and cannot happen in a given space, the ways in which usage develops and hybridises are difficult to dictate. The overlapping of boundaries in mixed-use public spaces is constant. To fully grasp the essence of ‘mixed-use,’ the *ville* perspective—functional subjects of multiple usages for the public space—is not enough. The concept of *cit * provides a substantial perspective for an understanding of how mixed-use public spaces function and blend the social fabric into the space.

Furthermore, in mixed-use public spaces, certain dynamics incorporate both formal and informal—indeed, often seemingly chaotic—rules that interact with one another. Without understanding the dynamics of the space (*cit *), the state can struggle to mitigate tensions among users, and frequently invests in advanced surveillance sys-

tems to maintain legal order, though this often fails. In other words, what Jacobs (1961) called a “fine-grained” mixture, the desired mix, should be built upon the mobilisation of *cité* and *ville*.

The Nehru Place market in New Delhi is an example that Sennett returns to in both books. The physical space itself is perceived as incomplete and chaotic from the surface due to its messiness. This incompleteness, however, contributes to what Sennett calls a “porous city” (2018:409): the looseness allows for urban vitality. It brings people together and stimulates economic opportunities and creativity; social interaction and social mobility thus synchronise with barely any state intervention. In fact, inspired by Nehru Place, Sennett and his team had planned a high mixed-use function program for the National Hall in Washington D.C. in 2012. Sennett (2018) writes of his regret, however, that the event only confused and disoriented users with over-stimulation and too much on offer; their top-down approach had failed to emulate the bottom-up example they took inspiration from.

These examples of successful and failed mixed-use public spaces reveal that it is not enough to merely understand the planning of such spaces through principles and programs. Rather, it is important to learn from organically run mixed-use public spaces, as Sennett demonstrated. To further investigate the mixed boundaries and how users in public spaces interact with both each other and the planning regime, I will now discuss the need to take an even closer look at the daily interactions in mixed-use public spaces and the system governing the space, whether open or closed.

2.2.2 Concept two: *Techne* and *Metis*

Sennett’s starting point was his observation that different urban forms create different socio-spatial arrangements. Interestingly, the anthropologist James C. Scott took an almost diametrically opposed approach. In his book *Seeing like a State* (1998), Scott explains why state-led development programs have generally tended to fail. He walks readers through various cases, revealing the epistemology and practices of statecraft used to establish so-called legibility in governance, which he identifies as the core of the problem. In these cases, from global north to global south, cities to the countryside, Scott (1998:4) argues that to make society legible—easy to read, calculate, and control—the state implements the following four approaches to social engineering as part of its governance:

1. An administrative ordering of nature and society.
2. A high modernist ideology.
3. A rise in authoritarianism.
4. A prostrate and disempowered civil society.

Scott further clarifies this fairly sound anarchist reasoning. He argues that his focus on these four elements in order to examine cases ranging from scientific farming to modernist urban planning in Brasilia is to point out that these projects often over-emphasise the socio-technical order of the top-down regime. This planned order is the product of modernist ideology, techno-scientific ideals, and a desire to assume a controlling overview, not only of the organically formed social order, but from which to define the formal and the informal, along with their accompanying values. The formal schematic order tends to exclude the informal aspects of practical and local knowledge from the exercise of public power. Scott argues that the formal schema, though once parasitic of informal processes—after all, statecraft cannot exist without an actual social foundation—will turn to oppress the informal from which it grew to stabilise its power.

As two ideal types of knowledge system, *metis* represents complex, context-dependent knowledge, while *techne* provides a universal explanation for even the most seemingly divergent phenomena. Scott makes no attempt to conceal his opposition to the imperialism of *techne*, this high modernist, planned social order and mentality that excludes local knowledge and existing social orders. In line with this position, he conceptualised practical and informal knowledge in contrast to imperial and formal knowledge as *metis* v. *techne*.

The term *metis* comes from ancient Greek. It represents practical skills and acquired intelligence that accommodate rapid changes in a social and natural environment. Scott incorporated *metis* into a knowledge system that is comprehensive and practical: *metis* is far more than craftsmanship or a single dimension of skills. Rather, Scott demonstrates that *metis* requires a complex set of knowledge and skills drawn not only from bodily practices but also accumulated experiences to develop forms of comprehensive reaction capable of adapting to different situations and sudden change. It is a knowledge system that resists any simplified, “boot camp” style of training. Once the context changes, a whole new set of knowledge to be learned and adapted appears.

The opposite of *metis* is *techne*: technical and epistemic knowledge. While *metis* represents knowledge developed in certain contexts, *techne* is a simplified, abstract system of knowledge built upon logical deduction. In other words, *techne* is a system based on principles and propositions. Once the rules have been learnt, these principles can be applied rapidly in different situations. Technical knowledge is universal and can be organised into logical steps. Just like Lego, it can be taken apart, duplicated, and verified. As a matter of fact, *techne* at its broadest represents a science, such as mathematics, geometry, or physics. It provides scientific explanations for a wide range of phenomena.

In contemporary urban planning, *metis* and *techne* can be said to oppose one another, with constant negotiation necessary to prevent one from dominating the other. If one looks at the planning of mixed-use public spaces, for instance, we see that planning regulation and zoning plans identify certain spaces and attribute to them a status as public spaces, with a set of associated user permissions. This can be regarded as technical knowledge with which urban planners attempt to shape the city. However, to properly activate and preserve the mixed-use dynamic, planning and design professions need detailed knowledge of the context: who uses the space? What are their needs? What are the specific social and physical conditions of the site? What are the social dynamics around the site? Without understanding this knowledge in context, that is, without *metis*, the projected space built without a grasp of its users and their needs could create more problems than it is intended to solve. When planning mixed-use spaces, planners must, therefore, incorporate both knowledge systems in the process of realisation.

2.2.3 Conclusion: Beyond the Planning Framework

In the above, the first and second blocks of my theoretical framework, I have honed in on the position that mixed-use public spaces occupy in cities with the help of two sets of ideals as developed by Richard Sennett and James C. Scott. Sennett distinguished between *cit * and *ville* to illuminate two particular forces that shape cities and their influence on one another. Revisiting contemporary urban planning history, he pointed to the rise of modernist planning as the period in which *cit * and *ville* came to the fore. While *cit * became restricted to the field of academic research, which focused on communities without spatial context, *ville* took over urban planning by establishing the technocratic system and forms of scholarship dominant therein. This led to radically polarised debates on the subjects of order and disorder, and formal and informal spaces in the built environment. More recently, reflecting on his work, Sennett has envisaged a reconciliation and reunion of *ville* and *cit *. Taking inspiration from various cities in different contexts, he proposes a conceptual common ground as a reason to hope that the gap between *cit * and *ville* will be bridged early this century.

Unlike Sennett, who identified his position in urban planning from the very beginning, James C. Scott focuses on the dichotomy between two systems that produce very different kinds of knowledge: *metis* and *techne*. He argued that to achieve legible governance, authorities seek to develop an all-seeing perspective and its associated interventions by which to categorise, map, and control resources. For this task, *techne* is preferred over *metis* for its efficacy and potential applications. Here, Scott holds a position very similar to Sennett's, in which he associates the distinction between formal and informal with the development of modernist urban planning. Indeed, the strictly formal planning which he criticised heavily oversimplified reality and often

failed in its ambition to solve problems. Interestingly, it is precisely in the domain of mixed-use public spaces that *techne* cannot succeed on its own. Without the input of knowledge from *metis*, the spaces can hardly function. For any formal scheme, seemingly chaotic mixed-use public spaces are perhaps the most difficult to tame. Yet from Scott's perspective, they are probably the most interesting places where *metis* still thrives. It is precisely because such spaces are messy, with *metis* and *techne* constantly colliding, that they present myriad possibilities and alternative models for planning cities.

Both perspectives provide an entry point into my research as they highlight the relevance of studying mixed-use public spaces. However, both approaches are also limited within the planning framework, in which planning practices are built on the exercise of specific regulatory tools. These tools, such as rules, guidelines, regulations, and laws are designated to be part of a larger social system which carries certain values. Therefore, in order to understand the complexity of planning mixed-use public spaces, we must look beyond the planning framework itself.

Using Scott's terminology, we can consider urban planning as a form of statecraft embedded in the larger context of the governance system. The governance system is composed of networks of institutions and organisations. Planning in this context has a pivotal role, as it follows a designated procedure to distribute resources. The role of distributor connects planning to other organisations and institutions in the governance network. Depending on the circumstances, certain internal and external dynamics between specific institutions and organisations may give rise to different consequences in terms of socio-spatial arrangements.

Indeed, the complexity of both the planning and reality of a mixed-use public space as I have described reveals that any single planning framework would be insufficient to accommodate the potential uses of the space or keep it alive. Therefore, to understand this complexity, I propose that an alternative perspective is required from which to study mixed-use public spaces, one which will enhance not only planning but the life of the space beyond. This will enrich our grasp of how planning frameworks are produced and embedded within larger networks of institutions and organisations.

This brings us to the third block in my theoretical framework: I will draw on the new institutionalism to approach the governance of planning mixed-use public spaces. This will prove highly useful in analysing and articulating the complexity described above, by positioning urban planning in the broader context of governance.

2.3 Situating the governance regime through New Institutionalism

By examining how urban planning is embedded in a governance regime, we are able to zoom in on the relational nuances between the various institutions and organisations involved in the process. Therefore, in this section, I will begin by introducing the new institutionalism as my second theoretical building block. The purpose of examining governance from the perspective of new institutionalism is to discover what the influences are on the complexity within planning mixed-use public spaces, beyond the distinctions of formal and informal, chaos and order, within the planning framework.

The goal of this section is to decipher the relational nuances of governance. Here, governance is understood to be a practice that links organisations to institutions through sets of norms. The key contribution of new institutionalism makes it possible to analyse existing governance networks and actors. Therefore, this section's theoretical overviews will focus specifically on that perspective. The entry to this brief introduction to new institutionalism is the development of organisational sociology, and North's (1991) elaboration of economic history.

The study of the relationship between individuals and the collective system, and more specifically how actors interact to shape social frameworks, is a standard theme in European sociology. In the first half of the 20th century, after Weber's (1946) work on bureaucracy and bureaucratisation had been translated into English and published in North America, Merton et al. (1952) began the empirical study of organisation, which would lay the foundation for the subdiscipline of organisational sociology, or institutional theory in broader social scientific terms. Among them, Selznick (1957) distinguished between organisation and institution, following on from his two previous empirical works: *TVA and the Grass Roots* (1953) and *The Organizational Weapon* (1952). In Selznick's (1996) own words: '*As an organisation is 'institutionalised' it tends to take on a special character and to achieve a distinctive competence or, perhaps, a trained or built-in incapacity. Monitoring the process of institutionalisation-its costs as well as benefits-is a major responsibility of leadership.* (p.271)'

That is to say, when an organisation is trying to become more stable, ordered, and socially integrated from organic, unstable, and loosely-organised beginnings, it takes certain values and techniques to assist the transformation. He defines those tools (values and techniques) that help to form specific processes, strategies, and outlooks as institutions (Selznick, 1957).

Institutional theory, or (old) institutionalism, focused on its analysis of structures and their form. Scott (2013) saw this newly established discipline as one that addressed

institutional arguments and structures, as well as examining the behaviour of organisations in the 1950s. Institutional theory remains a widely accepted theoretical stance that emphasises productivity, ethics, and legitimacy.

The so-called new institutionalism was born in the 1970s, and shifted attention away from intra-organisational processes to how the relation between institutions and organisations is shaped by cognitive frameworks as well as cultural and environmental dynamics (Scott, 2013). According to DiMaggio (1998), the rise of new institutionalism was a response to the old institutionalism that overemphasised structural components and rejected the growing interest in accounting for individualism. As such, the new institutionalism pays close attention to individualism and behaviour as part of interactions between institutions and organisations.

Moreover, it focuses on the constraining and enabling effects of formal and informal rules on the behaviour of individuals and groups (*ibid*). This approach is particularly interesting for an analysis of the interactions and inter-dynamics between different user groups in mixed-use public spaces.

The rise of new institutionalism had a significant impact on the social sciences and established an extensive scholarship that has covered sociology, political science, economics, and business management studies since the late 1980s. In what follows, I will introduce two sub-approaches that provide constructive inspiration for my theoretical framework, and help to disentangle the scene of apparent chaos in my empirical study. One is a sociological approach that holds that institutions are socially constructed. The other is the economic approach proposed by North (1991; 1993), in which he identified institutions as comprising formal rules and informal constraints.

Within the sociological tradition, the (old) institutionalism drew on empirical works that studied the organisational culture within an organisation, such as a company, factory, or a specific public sector. When organisational sociologists broadened their empirical working scales and looked at the driving forces behind the process of institutionalisation across multiple organisations, they saw that it would be necessary to tease out the sources of these driving forces. Among them, sociologists Meyer and Scott (1977, 1992) argued that the rational action models containing actors, interests, and preferences described in the old institutionalism were socially constructed. This social-constructionist neo-institutionalism (SCN) focuses on informal institutions as opposed to formal rules (DiMaggio, 1998). By looking at organisational behaviours, SCN marked an attempt to describe the processes by which and reasons why certain nationalities are constituted in different regimes (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Dobbin, 1994).

Building upon the (old) institutionalism's definition of institution—as a tool (a set of techniques and values) that facilitates the institutionalisation of organisations—Scott

(2013) expands the definition of the institution as comprising “regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life.” (p.56)

Scott (2013) categorised the institution into three systems: regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive. These are central elements within institutional structures. Each represents different symbolic systems and tools with which institutionalised organisations can guide their behaviour and resist change. They define legal, moral, and cultural boundaries to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. It is here that the question of behaviour really becomes central.

In Scott’s (2013) taxonomy, the regulative system is represented by laws, rules, and sanctions. The normative aspect mobilises moral value, and imposes certain social expectations and ideas of what is appropriate to govern actors and organisations. Finally, in the cognitive-cultural system, the institution imposes beliefs. More than moral guidelines, these beliefs dissolve into common sense and become taken for granted, often in the form of unspoken actions. Although these three systems work at different levels of social life, Scott (2013) emphasises that they all encompass associated behaviours and material resources as a foundation. In other words, rules, norms, and meanings can only be produced by interactions between actors, resources, and activities, that is, behaviours. Moreover, through behavioural practices, institutions are not only produced and reproduced, but can be changed.

Meyer and Scott’s (1992) analysis is particularly relevant for my empirical focus on mixed-use public spaces. Such spaces are not themselves an organisation, but instead a physical realm encompassing different interactions, functions, and regulations. To unpack the complexity of planning mixed-use public spaces, it is far more important to investigate the dynamics between these users, functions, and regulations rather than monotonously looking at how regulations shape the space. Those three pillars—rules, norms, and meanings—that apply to the planning and governance of mixed-use public spaces offer a broader framework through which I am able to translate a seemingly chaotic street scene into readable interactions.

In addition to sociologists, economists have also proved eager to understand the role of the institution in economic performance. In 1991, North published a groundbreaking paper under the title ‘Institutions.’ In this paper, he defined institutions as the manmade limitations of formal rules and informal constraints. Formal rules include constitutions, laws and property rights, and contractual relationships. Informal constraints are taboos, customs, traditions, and all other social dynamics that set the structure of social, political, and economic interactions. For North (*ibid*), institutions throughout human history have come about to establish order and reduce uncertainty. From the point of view of profitability, institutions can provide incentive

structures to engage in economic activity. Meanwhile, changes to institutions can shape the direction of economic trends.

To expand the analytical toolbox on institutions, North (1991) examined the early modern economic history of Europe, looking for the kinds of institution that foster innovation, and therefore enhance economic performance. Yet his major contribution lies in taking institutions beyond formal rules and structures. Identifying informal constraints as institutions mobilised by individual actors can be just as powerful in bringing about economic change.

Unlike sociological studies, the new institutionalism simplified institutions into formal regulatory tools and property rights, namely legal constraints on economic activity, and the rest informal constraints that influence actors to adhere to formal rules. The underlying assumption is of course that actors—including individuals and organisations—who interact with institutions are aiming to maximise their economic benefits. The general idea of new institutionalism is that formulating an account of behavioural and relational interactions within institutions and actors produces a highly persuasive model for examining differences in economic choice. My decision to bring the economic perspective of new institutionalism to an understanding of the complexity of planning mixed-use public spaces is rather pragmatic. That is, for certain individuals and organisations in the actors' landscape, the priorities that structure decision-making are based on the economic performance of a space. Although this is a study primarily focused on unpacking the complexity of socio-spatial arrangements in public spaces, I am far from naive about the profit-driven forces behind the societal change in such spaces. In between institutions that put constraints on the pursuit of economic profit yet establish an order that reduces uncertainty and risk in economic activity, the new institutionalism offers a new perspective for understanding how stakeholders navigate the socio-spatial dynamics in mixed-use public spaces.

In a nutshell, while scholarship in (old) institutionalism is interested primarily in different static models and the cultures that construct the institution, the new institutionalism looks at the dynamics of how actors, activities, and resources shape behaviours. This is its innovative aspect, as Scott argued:

Although institutions function to provide stability and order, they themselves undergo change, both incremental and revolutionary. Thus, our subject must include not only institutions as a property or state of an existing social order, but also institutions as a process, including the processes of institutionalization and deinstitutionalization. (p.57)

Understanding the institution as a dynamic process enables the analytical lens to develop into a multi-dimensional theoretical instrument. It can demonstrate the dif-

ferent kinds of relational nuance—spatial, temporal, and other levels of the institution within organisations—that operate in the field. This is why the new institutionalism is a suitable tool for building the analytic framework through which I will interrogate the planning of mixed-use public spaces. It enables me to unpack how formal and informal actors and behaviours constitute institutions in the field. Moreover, it also allows me to observe how institutions attempt to condition the behaviour of individuals and organisations to make change in public space. The mapping of institutions, organisations, and their relational nuances involved in the governance of mixed-use public space provides me with an overview of the kind of institutional dynamics in which urban planning is embedded.

2.4 The Governance Regime: the synthetic concept to depict mixed-use public spaces

Following the new institutionalism, I will bring together the other two theoretical building blocks described in section 2.2 so as to define the main conceptual framework of this dissertation. I use the governance regime as an analytical tool to map out the network of organisations and institutions involved in the governance of mixed-use public spaces. The governance regime is **an institutional system that contains organisations and actors dealing with, regulating, facilitating, and ordering the use of mixed-use public spaces. In short, it is a set of institutional practices comprising both formal rules and informal interactions.**

Liberating Other Perspectives Through a Governance Regime Lens

In this section, I will revisit the two sets of ideal types that I introduced as ways to situate mixed-use public spaces: *cité v. ville*, and *metis v. techne*, through a governance regime lens. Each set was proposed as a dialectical framework, indicating the ambiguity inherent to planning mixed-use public spaces. One thing they have in common, however, is that the theorists behind them—Sennett and Scott—both stress that modernist planning as invented statecraft established a harsh boundary between the formal and informal, associating them with order and chaos respectively. Thus, ordering chaos became central to the mission and techniques of modernist planning, leaving little room for what might lie outside of the framework.

Even within a formal framework, establishing institutions to order public spaces involves many informal interactions and behaviours within the governance regime. As a matter of fact, when individuals in one organisation interact with other organisations within the governance regime or users of the space, keeping these interactions within a purely legal framework is simply impossible. In order to properly reach out to, communicate, and negotiate a certain consensus with other stakeholders, a diversity of interaction skills comes into play depending on the gen-

eral moral or cognitive-cultural context. New institutionalism argues not only that these informal interactions are just as important when it comes to governance as formal procedures, but that they are the key to understanding why certain forms of governance succeed or fail (Scott, 2013).

If we apply this lens to Richard Sennett's *cit  and ville*, it is clear that *cit * refers to informal interactions with institutions. In Sennett's own view, *cit * might be crooked, but it is certainly not just an amorphous collection of random coincidences. Scott (2013) sees *cit * as built upon the collective uses that citizens make of an institution's moral and cognitive-cultural pillars. Conversely, *ville* aligns with the formal and legal framework of the institution. Let us return to the instructive case of Nehru Place, the famous square that recurs in Sennett's work. Through the lens of the governance regime, we might say that this seemingly chaotic public space has failed as far as the governance of formal institutions is concerned. However, the space actually performs a significant social and economic function because the institutions brought about by informal interactions have moved to fill the absence left by formal components. Here, "informality" is just a lazy tag that lumps together everything seen to lie outside of formal frameworks. The so-called chaos is in fact a highly organised set of institutional practices among actors and non-governmental organisations within the space.

Likewise, Scott's (1998) logic in *Seeing Like a State* is to take a dialectical approach to *metis* and *techne*, opposing the two in order to represent their differences as knowledge systems. His anarchist analytic perspective is not in favour of a stateless society, but rather points out that the damage done when state governance only works through formal institutions to impose spaces and people can be much worse than the absence of the state. In the absence of the state organisations move in to establish informal interactions as institutions through which to stabilise the overall structure. Although Scott built his arguments primarily on different types of knowledge system that lead to the production of space, the abstract and professionalised knowledge represented by *techne* largely groups the domains of law, regulation, contracts, and scientific guidelines. In the language of North (1991), these are called institutions of formal rules.

On the other hand, *metis* is more of a practical and comprehensive knowledge system, with more room for informal interactions as institutions. *Seeing Like a State* argues that *metis* should not be excluded, undervalued, or pushed outside of the frame in which humans practise socio-spatial arrangements for living, whether this be urban planning or agricultural plantation. Through a governance regime lens, it becomes possible to examine how *techne* and *metis* might relate to each other across the common ground of stabilising social, political, or cultural structures, regardless of their status of (in)formality.

Returning to the discipline of urban planning, Sennett and Scott both criticised the narrow framework that urban planning created for itself as a technocratic arm of the state. They felt that forms of planning that only focus on formal rules are unable to understand how cities actually function. Labelling things informal (villages, transport, street markets, etc.) and focusing on ways to limit or prevent them entirely meant that perspectives on inclusion often went largely undeveloped. When thinking about seemingly chaotic urban contexts, we should remember that urban planning can do far more than just decide how to best order the chaos. It would be far more productive to go beyond the binaries of chaos and order, formal and informal, and rather ask how they can be synergised. This represents a journey of discovery which, reflecting upon mixed-use public spaces through a governance regime lens, can encompass a broader understanding of institutions. Such a project has the potential to liberate discussions of urban planning from the “either or” of binary distinctions, and to look more closely into the relational nuances within socio-spatial dynamics, asking how certain institutions are consolidated through informal interactions to become formal rules and vice versa.

Visualising Complexities Through the Conceptual Model

Mapping out the governance regime of a mixed-use public space produces an overview of the organisational structure within the governance system. It offers the framework with which to tease out those organisations and institutions that impose certain dynamics on mixed-use public spaces, as well as the activities that activate or deactivate the interrelations between governmental organisations, institutions, and spaces. The governance regime helps to visualise the complexities of mixed-use public spaces in several ways by adopting a spatial-organisational perspective. First, there is the organisational landscape that imposes its institutions on the space. This is already a matter of exploring the relations and tools between organisations under the governance system. Second, it is important to recognise the territorial relationship between organisations, and when and where in the space they impose institutions. Which organisation governs which part, or dictates a certain use, of the space? Then, eventually, we can ask: how is urban planning embedded in this network, this spatial-organisational landscape? Is there a lead coordinator in this mixed-use landscape of organisations and public space? Is that the job of urban planning? Whose responsibility is it?

The first step in concept-building is to expand the single relation of urban planning—the planning authority imposes its regulatory tools on the space (Figure 2.1)—to a governance perspective. That is, to the set of governmental organisations that bring their institutions to bear on each other, as well as on mixed-use public spaces.

Figure 2.2 presents the organisational landscape that operates this socio-spatial arrangement of mixed-use public spaces. In Figure 2.2, I distinguish between institu-

tions as formal rules and informal interactions. Formal rules, as taken from North’s framework (1991), can be understood as a regulative pillar, to use Scott’s terminology(1993). Scott (ibid) discusses the regulative relationship between organisations, and from organisations to public spaces. These formal rules take the shape of laws, regulations, and contracts. There are, however, also informal interactions that represent moral and cultural pillars in Scott’s framework. North perceived these as “informal constraints”(1991) in economic studies, but when it comes to understanding how mixed-use public spaces are planned and governed, informal interactions are not necessarily negative constraints. Quite the opposite, in fact: certain organisational cultures and shared moral standards are practised without regulative tools, but play an important role in stabilising the various operations within a space. Therefore, in Figure 2.2, the planning authority is just one of many organisations embedded in the landscape with formal and informal institutions. Together they impose their governance on the mixed-use public space.




Figure 2.1 The normative approach of planning institutions and organisations (Source: author)




Figure 2.2 The governance regime approach to how mixed-use public spaces are governed (Source: author)

What makes the mixed-use public space appear chaotic is that, besides the governmental organisations, there are a number of non-governmental organisations and users interacting both with each other and other actors in the space. Each group of individual actors and non-governmental organisations has both a formal and informal associations with the governance regimes. This may be the contractual relationship between a planning authority and planning consultancy, where a consultancy company is hired to communicate with certain actors or other interested parties in the space. Or it may be that certain stakeholders are able to mobilise their networks in negotiating with governmental organisations. As Figure 2.3 indicates, governmental organisations within the governance regime can impose their formal rules on certain actors and the space alike. Conversely, other actors are also able to interact with the governance regime through informal interactions to influence the formal rules.




Figure 2.3 The governance regime with institutional nuances (Source: author)

Once we understand the dynamic behind which institutions and organisations in the governance regime shape and interact with non-governance elements in mixed-use public spaces, a clearer picture emerges of the complexity of planning mixed-use public spaces.

The multilevel analytical framework makes it possible to depict the formal and informal impacts of the governance regime on organisations and the mixed-use public space, therefore helping make sense of how at the street level, actors and related non-governmental organisations engage with the governance regime on site. To understand these behaviours, empirical observation in space is essential to grasp where they came from, and how they change or remain unchanged due to direct or indirect interventions from the governance regime. Here, the question of how urban planning navigates these complicated, sometimes chaotic-seeming socio-spatial arrangements returns.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has laid out the theoretical backbone of this dissertation. The discussion of *cit * and *ville*, and *metis* and *techne*, helped to pinpoint the blind spot in modernist urban planning, which is insufficiently equipped to deal with socio-spatial complexities.

Urban mixed-use public spaces occupy a subtle position that resonates with some of the problems that Scott and Sennett's binary schemes highlighted. As mixed-use public spaces are planned and designed to accommodate diverse and interlocking functions for users, the boundary between order and chaos—which modernist urban planning emphasises—is blurred. This means that urban planning must account for the diverse and constantly evolving users and usages of such spaces. Instead of ordering the chaos, planning must find a balance between forms of excessive order that prevent genuine mixed-use dynamics from flourishing, and excessive insouciance that would see the space fall into complete formlessness. The debates of Scott and Sennett play a key role in grounding the importance of looking beyond modernist approaches when studying the complexity in planning mixed-use public spaces. However, other tools are required to develop an alternative perspective capable of liberating the binary pairs of order/chaos and formal/informal.

To map the relationships between individual actors, as well as the governmental and non-governmental organisations that interact via a set of different institutions in mixed-use public spaces, I propose the governance regime as a theoretical lens. With the inputs from my empirical research, a mapping process will tease out how different types of institution are enacted by different organisations and actors involved in the socio-dynamics of mixed-use public spaces. This will ultimately serve to help me decipher the complexities of planning and governance in mixed-use public spaces.

An understanding of how and why this is a complex issue that goes beyond formal and informal ways of making and negotiating the use of space will allow us to see where the statecraft of urban planning stands, and what a more sensitive form of urban planning might look like. Based on the building blocks above, my research will investigate mixed-use public spaces and analyse them through the lens of the governance regime.

CHAPTER 3 Methodology

3.1 Introduction

As the previous chapter's theoretical framework laid out, my research aims to make sense of how urban planning is embedded in a broader governance network, and how institutions and organisations shape mixed-use public spaces. The empirical base for the research is the urban street market, as it is one of the most complex types of urban mixed-use public space. Methodologically, this thesis seeks to capture the behavioral motion of the governance of mixed-use public spaces through its everyday practices. This entails looking at how individuals within organisations and on street markets interact through both formal and informal institutions. As Fairbanks and Lloyd claim, ethnography enables researchers to forge conceptual links “between site-specific phenomena and the structural forces that explain their existence and survival” (2011:5). From their argument, I understand ethnographic fieldwork as more than simply revealing how human configurations play out in the socio-spatial dynamics of mixed-use public spaces, but as focusing on the production and negotiation of human agency. This then offers ways to understand how street-level actors and others that enact regulatory strategies of governance shape and reshape mixed-use public spaces. Following this line of thought, I carried out ethnographic fieldwork in urban street markets and the administrative bodies which govern them in Amsterdam and Taipei as case studies to answer my research question.

Through ethnographic research methods, I explore how governance regimes are formed and practised in the everyday context of street markets. As far as my methodology is concerned, the fieldwork involved a varied set of tools to collect data and make sense of them in answer to my research questions. The ethnographic methods that I used include participatory observation, narrative interviews, policy analysis and regime analysis. Ethnography offers a particularly rich approach to understand how, in everyday mixed-use public spaces, governance structures and users are intertwined, and how they navigate each other to get along with each other in cities. My observations demonstrated that mixed-use public spaces are sites of constant negotiation, and not simply of state-imposed rules and codes, nor of users accommodating each other in a purely self-organising fashion.

Ethnography is anything but a straightforward research process. The abductive process of sensemaking is rather a back-and-forth journey of contextualization, understanding, and theorising, as opposed to testing theories and reducing the field to variables and causal relations (Zakhour, 2020). Nevertheless, in the following sections, I attempt to be as straightforward as possible in how I handle this process, without it becoming procedural. Firstly, I will introduce the operationalisation of the empirical research. Then, by laying out the major steps I took during fieldwork, I offer a sketch of I conducted the ethnography. The sensemaking comes later, when I discuss my fieldwork process in the light of ethnographic literature. This step is

then key to puzzling out how and why ethnography is an appropriate method for investigating governance in mixed-use public spaces. Finally, and inevitably, I offer an evaluation of my methods, reflecting on being a novice ethnographer and on my positionality in particular, as a researcher employing herself as a research tool in the field, and how this shapes the framework of my research.

3.2 Operationalisation of the Research

This section lays out the operation of my research. It elaborates on my choices for the case studies and sub-questions. Furthermore, based on the criteria for selecting my case studies, I will briefly introduce the two markets in Amsterdam and Taipei that I selected as street-level fieldwork sites.

3.2.1 Why Street Markets?

Urban public spaces are always contested sites due to the rapid changes brought about by their reorganisation and reinterpretation by users and the imposition of governance over time (Fraser, 1990; Crawford, 1995). In the previous chapter, I introduced the concept of the governance regime as a means to decipher the intertwined complexity of socio-spatial and governance levels in mixed-use public spaces. My empirical research should be capable of sketching how administrative and regulatory dynamics interact with the daily operation of these spaces. An ethnographic approach allows for a detailed exploration of how governance is carried out through both written language and unwritten words, spoken manners and other forms of power negotiation within the everyday context of mixed-use public spaces, as well as how street level actors respond to, interpret, negotiate, and even manipulate certain governance practices (Fairbanks, 2012; Bertolini & Verloo, 2020)

The empirical object of my research is two-sided. On one hand, it comprises the socio-spatial arrangement and dynamics of mixed-use public spaces. On the other, the governance regimes of those spaces. Among the extensive range of mixed-use public spaces, the street market is a particularly interesting one. For their physical complexity and significant place identity, I opt to focus on urban street markets in Amsterdam and Taipei as case studies for my empirical investigation.

Four reasons emerge for why I believe that street markets as mixed-use public spaces are appropriate for an in-depth study of the complexities in their planning. First, the urban street market has a significant degree of place identity in our cities. By definition, it facilitates collective entrepreneurial activities at regular intervals on known streets. The form of the space has a historical root: villagers from elsewhere would send their merchants to trade in the city at specific transportation nodes (Calabi, 2004). Nowadays, vendors make private profits in public spaces under conditions

negotiated with the governance regime. Whether street markets are a major arena for the urban economy in contemporary cities or not, the authenticity of their place identity remains their origin as spaces composed of a mixture of merchants and attracting a diverse public.

Secondly, streets are open public spaces. Consumers can enter a street market freely and without any controls via the entrance or exit. This high level of accessibility offers citizens a wide range of possibilities for interaction in public spaces. Thirdly, urban streets and the built environment more generally are public spheres with a high level of mixed-use. Besides hosting street markets, a space may also provide various functions for the city: retail, residence, transport, and socialisation for both public and private usages. Each of these functions is facilitated by certain institutional landscapes and organisational networks—the governance regime, along with its tensions.

Lastly, in the empirically complex urban street market, the borders between legal and illegal spaces are spontaneously and temporarily blurred, as is the line between formal and informal. The boundary between order, apparent chaos, and actual chaos is also subtly present in this socio-spatial arrangement. In a nutshell, street markets provide four interrelated layers that together allow for a study of the tense relationship between the governance regime and street-level experience.

3.2.2 Research Sub-Questions

In this research, the governance regime is my unit of analysis. Street markets and organisations which constitute governance regimes are the units of observation. Methodology and research methods are frameworks that help to develop ways of answering the research questions, of which the main one is: **How do governance regimes accommodate the complexity of planning mixed-use public spaces?**

In order to answer the main research question and support the operation of the empirical research, I have developed a number of sub-questions. They will allow me to investigate the shapes, forms, and dynamics of the governance regime in each of the study cases, and how street actors interact with these governance regimes. These sub-questions are: Which governmental and non-governmental organisations constitute the organisational landscape of the governance regime of street markets? How do actors and organisations mobilise formal and informal institutions within the governance regime? Furthermore, to tease out the behavioural and relational nuances within the governance regime and mixed-use public spaces, I will examine how formal and informal institutions are applied in governing mixed-use public spaces, and how actors in mixed-use public spaces deal with governance. Lastly, to reflect upon the role of urban planning, I will ask what the position of urban planning is from the perspective of the governance regime, how it is influenced by the governance regime,

and how it might shape it. Note that these sub-questions are neither addressed in strict sequence, nor answered separately. I use them to think through the process of my fieldwork, and to structure the writing process of my findings.

To address these sub-questions, in total 12 months of ethnographic fieldwork were conducted in the cities of Amsterdam and Taipei. In each city, I adapted narrative interviews, policy analysis, archival studies, and regime analysis to examine the organisational landscape and formal institutions that these organisations mobilise within their respective street market governance regime, and their specific socio-historical context. Furthermore, I used participatory observation and narrative interviews to understand how the practices of informal institutions interact with the governance regime, and how individuals within various organisations interact with each other.

3.2.3 The Multi-Sited Case Study

This research looks at two cities as examples of the planning and governance of mixed-use public spaces. In each of the case studies—Amsterdam and Taipei—I studied the respective city’s governance regime and further selected a specific street market as an in-depth case study. In this section, I will address my thought process behind the multiple case study by engaging with the scholarship on case study research (Yin, 2009), comparative urbanism (Dear, 2005; Jaffe, 2016; Nijman, 2007), the ordinary cities perspective (Robinson, 2013), and multi-sited ethnography (Marcus, 1995; Tsing, 2015), exploring how each shapes the multiple cases of this research.

The standard research design textbook on case study research in the social sciences clearly indicates different frameworks for designing research with multiple case studies and how they should be operationalised (Yin, 2009). The selection of two cities for my case study, with each case focusing on one street market, falls into the category of embedded case studies as discussed by Yin (2009). However, the choice to include two case studies and how they serve the research is another matter. Yin distinguished between literal replication and theoretical replication, where the former is designed to validate the theory and the latter tends to cover the broader reach of the theory in different conditions (Ebneyamini & Sadeghi, 2018). The research design of this thesis adopts theoretical replication to examine case studies in different contexts that are relevant to the core question: a case that leans more towards the ordered end of the governance spectrum (Amsterdam), and one that leans more towards the chaotic end of the governance spectrum (Taipei).

Comparative urbanism sheds light on how to work on different cities in a contextualised approach. Michael Dear (2005) called for comparative studies of cities to focus on the urban process to contextualise common tendencies and dynamics. Nijman (2007), meanwhile, elaborated on the question of comparing cities. He argued that both convergence and divergence matter in contextualising common-

alities and differences. To go beyond the dichotomy of commonality and difference, Jaffe (2016: 23) situated the comparative approach in urban ethnographic research on two Caribbean cities as “practicing a form of comparison that attends to analogous historical and contemporary socio-ecological processes while explicitly acknowledging the specificities of different localities and points in time.” This offered a more in-depth understanding of how to do multiple ethnographic case studies. My research into socio-spatial processes in the city of Amsterdam and Taipei involved looking at each city’s history of urban development. To reveal differences, of course, does not mean focusing the analysis solely on the differences. Quite the opposite: the site-specific layout presents the mundaneness of each case in the context of everyday life, while still reflecting on the central issue of this dissertation.

My research sets out to explore relational nuances in the governance of mixed-use public spaces, and the extent to which urban planning navigates the complexity therein. The social, economic, and cultural contexts for my two cases are very different. Nonetheless, the aim is not to compare their differences or similarities, so much as to examine how each case might reveal the relational nuances between how these mixed-use public spaces are governed, and how users interact with this governance. This approach subscribes to an understanding of cities as “ordinary cities” (Robinson, 2013). My case study does not pick on any label that would mark each city according to great contrasts such as, for example, global divisions on geopolitics, the development index, or (in)formality. By focusing on one of the most mundane, diverse, yet complicated sites in a city, the street market, I am responding to both ontological and postcolonial critiques of the theorisation of the urban. McFarlane (2010) argues that the dominance of a generation oriented strongly towards western epistemologies reproduces the colonial gaze of comparison. This gaze would see the street markets in both cities as presenting the same controversial, convivial, seemingly chaotic traits. Yet underneath the general perception, there are very different governance regimes.

In my fieldwork, I did not simply stumble upon one street market. My fieldwork took me to different sites, from municipal offices, street markets, and planning consultants’ offices to those of local politicians. This approach is inspired by multi-sited ethnography (Tsing, 2015). However, many multi-sited ethnographers design research topics around the world system, thus the “multi-sited” is dependent on where events and activities relevant to a given theme occur, even beyond human actors. For example, Tsing (2015) explores the possibility of life in capitalist ruins through the value transition chain of matsutake mushrooms. To reveal the symbolic meanings of this type of mushroom at different stages in the value chain, the ethnographer conducted various pieces of ethnographic fieldwork. The formation of my fieldwork has a similar aspect, but on a far smaller scale. I decided to follow leads that had impacts

on the socio-spatial dynamics of the spaces under study. Ultimately, however, both the multiple sites and replication of case studies in this research aim to shed light on this challenging planning issue, which are relevant in cities across the globe.

3.2.4 Case Selection

My research looks at how different governance regimes deal with mixed-use public spaces, using urban street market regimes in the city of Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and the city of Taipei, Taiwan as study cases. Questions of accessibility according to language and geographical proximity aside, street markets in both cities are regulated by the public authority. Amsterdam leans more towards strict regulation, while Taipei represents a regulated but tolerant setting, with room for grey zone vending. In what follows, I lay out three criteria involved in the selection of specific street markets to study in depth:

1. Given that the core of the research is an enquiry into how governance regimes deal with the complexity of planning mixed-use public spaces, each market selected for study has to have the involvement of a full governance regime, including both formal and informal dimensions. In other words, informal, underground, or black markets without any formal recognition are not of interest to the present study.
2. My goal in studying street markets is to take them as a critical type of mixed-use public space in the fabric of everyday life. “Mixed-use” here refers to both spatial syntax and social function. As such, the second criterion is that selected cases must be located on regular urban streets which are publicly accessible and that have other functions, and for there to be a mix of merchants doing business at the market. Markets selling only one type of merchandise (flowers, books, fabrics) therefore fall out of the remit. Similarly, markets located on permanently car-free squares and indoors do not meet the criteria of sitting within a mixed spatial syntax.
3. I regard the street market as a collective routine use of the street, as opposed to an irregular street event. The vendors who organise the market belong to a network that involves everyday practices. This collective network interacts with both the neighbourhood and street over the long term. I am also interested in this organisational level, and how everyday street experiences in markets are produced as well as how they interact with the governance regime. Therefore, markets that fulfil the necessary criteria to be selected have to be the same organisation

on a daily basis. Those which allow for different types of market and organiser within the same location fall outside of my case selection.

Based on these three criteria, the first of my two market case studies is the Dappermarkt, located in the east of Amsterdam. The market is legally operated and open six days a week. According to the municipality of Amsterdam's categories, the Dappermarkt is a general commodity market, which is a mixed type of market. It has 250 stalls, and is a local service-oriented market. In the city of Taipei, my second market case study is the Donmen market. This one big market is in fact composed of three markets with different legal statuses and over 400 stalls. It is also a general commodity market open six days a week. The market is embedded within two residential blocks in the city centre. Detailed introductions to each case will be given in later chapters.

3.3 The Method of Ethnography

Qualitative methods are common in urban planning studies. Yet adopting an ethnographic lens to study how cities are governed and planned is less of a choice in the urban planning discipline than it is for urban anthropologists. Traditionally, classic anthropologists used ethnography to study faraway tribes and attempt to answer various essentialising questions about human beings. By deploying ethnography methods in their fieldwork—that is, making close observations in an immersive environment—these anthropologists documented the rituals and daily behaviours of the natives. Their often exoticising and colonial gaze has, more recently, been the subject of fierce criticism by later anthropologists. This reflexive turn aims to engage the method with broader themes taken from the social sciences (Foley, 2002; Davies, 2008).

In more simple terms, ethnography is a method in which the researcher deploys herself as a research tool in the field. There are two distinct levels to the process of ethnographic research: first, the researcher tries to immerse herself into the lives of others in the field (Schatz 2008; Yanow 2012; Wedeen 2000). Second, from the materials gathered in the field, the researcher can explain and theorise how they understood the perspectives and practices that they were able to observe in context (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow 2012:18).

These two distinct levels are the famous (and contested) “emic–etic” (experience-near–experience-distant) approach put forward by Geertz (1974). According to Geertz, experience-near (emic) refers roughly to what individuals subjectively feel, think, see, and imagine, as part of the process of understanding the world naturally and effortlessly. In contrast, experience-distant (etic) refers to abstractions that thinkers and intellectuals develop collectively to advance their scientific, philosophical, or practical aims. The emic perspective in ethnography allows researchers to collect

data and narratives from subjective (experience-near) experiences that they study in the field. By extension, analysing these experience-near narratives allows researchers to relate, reflect upon them, and work with experience-distant concepts that already exist. The writing then produced from the emic-etic interweave thought process is what Geertz (1973) calls “thick description.”

To unpack the units of observation in my empirical research—the street markets and organisations that compose governance regimes—it is essential that both make sense in the context of how governance and street activities impose daily practices on the spaces involved. The main method in this research is ethnography, which I understand to mean a methodology that develops knowledge from meaning-making and actions in situ (Jerolmack and Khan, 2014).

Facing the two very different objects of my research and with the aim of exploring their complexity, I believe that adapting ethnography is an appropriate decision that enables me to dive into the world of actors in both the governance system and the everyday socio-spatial practices of street markets. This focus on both grassroots and professional actors is known as a “vertical slice approach” (Nader, 1980). Such an approach broadens the traditional on-the-ground—or colonial “studying down”—perspective in anthropology. By “studying up,” anthropologists look into connected sites and communities that belong to different strata in society (Jaffe, 2016), and can therefore explore and articulate critiques of how politics and power play a part in the situated framing of research.

The immersion process meant that I was able to understand how decision-making and daily practices are handled at street level. Moreover, ethnography allowed me to operate on the two levels that are crucial for understanding the various contexts and narratives that I encountered in the field research on the one hand, while being able to articulate the findings at a theoretical level in answer to the research questions on the other.

Most importantly, however, my ethnographic research process of analysing mixed-use public spaces through the lens of a governance regime is a challenge to traditional ways of understanding urban planning, by going beyond the given technocratic framework. As the political scientists Yanow & Schwartz-Shea point out, ethnographic research in political science often sets off from “a dissatisfaction with existing approaches” (2006:xxiv). Even if my approach has little to do with dissatisfaction per se, ethnography as a whole makes it possible to shake off assumptions and existing frameworks that are taken for granted, to re-evaluate, and to open up new perspectives for thinking about the themes under discussion. In this case, the overarching discussion is about understanding urban planning as embedded in a governance regime, or, ways of making cities beyond statecraft.

My two rather different units of observation require different strategies of approach. Below, I will introduce organisational ethnography and spatial ethnography as the beginning of my journey as an ethnographer fresh to the field.

3.3.1 Organisational Ethnography

Portraying a governance regime empirically requires an understanding of the institutions, organisations, and interactions involved in the process of governing street markets. This is a puzzle designed to draw together scattered institutions and organisations from their isolated bureaucratic positions and hierarchies, and reshape them into a model of governance with a specific place at its centre. Furthermore, this model makes it possible to look at how formal and informal institutions are practised to stabilise (or destabilise) the governance of street markets.

This exploration of the dynamics within a governance regime resonates deeply with Kapiszewski, MacLean, & Read's description of organisational ethnography as a form of "gathering evidence in context—within the settings where the political decisions, events, and dynamics of interest took place or are recorded" (2015:9). In the process of policy-making, implementation, and the daily management of street markets, what are the meetings, encounters, and communication platforms that coordinate organisations and institutions into actions? Beyond the façade of regulatory instruments on paper, what are the unwritten rules and non-verbal gestures that move individual actors in the governance regime to certain practices?

Here, organisational ethnography allows me to approach such complex relationships within the governance regime. These relationships are not only non-linear, they are messy. As De Volo & Schatz argued, organizational ethnography is suitable "in cases where government statistics are suspect, media outlets are controlled by political interest, and poverty, lack of infrastructure, illiteracy, or political violence impede survey research" (2004:269). This is not to say that other qualitative methods have failed to interpret the nuances of governance and its implications. Yet a context-sensitive approach to the embedded nature of individual agencies in broader social settings (Ybema et al., 2009) does help one to understand why certain socio-spatial arrangements are made visible or invisible in mixed-use public spaces.

In my case studies, I investigate specifically how public officials work on street markets through institutions, and how they relate to other organisations and institutions within the governance regime. This touches upon the claim made by Ybema et al. (2009) that organisational ethnography pays particular attention to the hidden dimensions of governance and power relations in everyday life. This allows me to look beyond policy documents and into the complex reality of everyday life in the street market.

3.3.2 Spatial Ethnography

The second unit of observation is the mixed-use public space itself, specifically the urban street market. To study what goes on in urban street markets, ethnographic perspectives have become widely used (Jansens, 2014; Male, Ng & Chim, 2015; Pottie-Sherman, 2013; Schappo & van Melik, 2016; Watsons, 2009). Through my fieldwork, I first need to narrate the performance of the street market in terms of its mixed-use character. Only then will it be possible to discuss how the governance regime interacts with actors in this arena.

Among related studies, the spatial ethnography developed to study mixed-use public spaces by Annette Miae Kim (2015) offers a very significant reference. In the book *Sidewalk City: Remapping Public Space In Ho Chi Minh City*, Kim (2015) integrates social science with urban design and planning to research pavement spaces in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. She argues that although social science research has developed methodologies capable of understanding complex social situations, they do not pay particular attention to physical environment analysis. Urban design and planning, however, do have tools for analysing the built environment, but lack a proper mechanism through which to understand the social world, and this leads to a constant tension in urban planning: the detachment of physical arrangement from social reality in situ. Therefore, Kim combined an ethnographic approach with visual analysis tools from the world of design and planning as a new methodology.

The spatial ethnography made me pay extra attention to how governance regimes make rules and distribute resources at an abstract level that could influence the physical and social arrangements of mixed-use public space. It also made me sensitive to the extent to which everyday socio-spatial reality in mixed-use public spaces shapes the practice of governance.

My research deals with the interactions and disjunctions between mixed-use public spaces and the policy process. Apart from adapting the ethnographic lens to understand the field in which policies take shape (Reinhold, 1994; Shore & Wright, 2003), Van Hulst (2008) summarised the core skills necessary for ethnographers to immerse themselves in the field: 1) Gaining and maintaining access to field organisations. 2) Making observations, participating, and shadowing activities. 3) Conversing with and interviewing actors in the field. 4) Compiling relevant archives and gathering artefacts from the field. 5) Taking interpretative and reflexive field notes. These were precisely the skills that I sought to employ in collecting, analysing, and interpreting the data, as elaborated in the next section.

3.4 Data and Sensemaking

In this section, I will discuss how I collected my research materials, and how I made sense of them. The act, or process, of mobilising different qualitative research skills in order to understand what is happening in the field under study is the core of ethnography. As a qualitative researcher trained in sociology, I initially felt that the “deep hanging out” (Geertz, 1998) of ethnographic research was rather unstructured and fragmented, and I struggled to make sense of what I was searching for. Rather than a data collector, I felt more like a data forager, seizing upon every detail that I encountered in the field. Only when it came to abstracting the data did I begin to reflect on how I engaged in the fieldwork, to select and make sense of what and how those materials related to my research questions. This is embedded in the process of selecting information, and of writing and rewriting both empirical and discussion chapters. My overarching impression is that rather than simply a question of writing up one’s findings, doing and writing ethnography is closer to documentary editing, which implies a very different process and set of results than other qualitative forms of research.

3.4.1 Data Gathering/Foraging

Overall, I carried out 12 months’ worth of ethnographic fieldwork in Amsterdam and Taipei, spending nine months in the former and three in the latter. In each city, I investigated the governance regime of street markets, and took one street market as an example in each case to observe specifically how governance is implemented and how users react to it. There are two major reasons for this difference: first, it took much longer to figure out the shape of the governance regime and contact the relevant authorities in Amsterdam due to the nature of the bureaucratic culture there; this is something I will return to in Chapter 5. Second, the fieldwork in Taipei was cut short due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Instead of deep hanging out, therefore, fast and intense encounters over a short period of time shaped the research there. The compensation is that, as a native speaker and having grown up not only in Taipei but specifically the area where the street market is located, my prior knowledge, networks, and experiences proved invaluable in getting me into the context much faster than in Amsterdam.

In both cities, I conducted desk research prior to reaching out for interviews. One advantage of this desk research is that allowed me to understand the historical context of the street markets and their policy changes. Moreover, reading policy documents and getting a sense of the bureaucratic structures in both cities prepared me to navigate the governance regime that it is my aim to decipher via the fieldwork. Upon leaving the desk, however, it was quickly obvious that the process of fieldwork is closer to foraging than the systematic collection in which I was trained as a sociologist.

On the face of it, the fieldwork seemed simple: identifying who is in charge of what in the mixed-use public space, and how users engage with this socio-spatial arrangement. In reality, however, the process of getting one clue and working out how it led to another largely relied on informal contacts from my personal network and spontaneous street encounters.

I would argue that framing the process of gathering data as a kind of foraging, rather than the traditional “snowballing” approach to finding informants in qualitative research, is an attempt to stress that conducting fieldwork is an embodied experience. As Hammersley & Atkinson (1983) emphasise, social scientists cannot study the social world without being part of it. There is no way to understand the complexity of urban street markets other than being there. When immersed in the field, one’s eyes and ears must be constantly open, sensitive to both non-official daily encounters and official appointments. In Amsterdam in particular, my position as a non-native speaker facing relatively opaque government bodies, I had no choice but to call on my social network and deploy my “street smart” senses in every possible way to figure out the workings of the governance regime (other than waiting eternities for replies to my e-mails). Compared to the non-ethnographical snowballing approach, the experience of foraging in the field resonated with some of the feelings and processes that informants expressed on the subject of navigating the governance regime. Yet it also required a higher degree of emotional labour, and ambiguous boundaries between my professional and private life.

Despite using the term foraging to describe the process of data collection, the actual skills and methods that I employed for the fieldwork were primarily interviews and participatory observation. The selection of interviewees can be understood as expert sampling within the category of purposive sampling (Etikan et al., 2016). Interviewees either hold extensive knowledge about the field, or work in key positions both in organisations and at street level (see appendix 1). In Amsterdam, I conducted 24 interviews with public officials, street vendors, and others either closely or marginally involved with the governance of street markets. Of these, four were exploratory interviews, in the sense that the interviewees were not involved in the market under observation, but they gave me important contextual information as part of the background to my fieldwork. The other 19 interviews were conducted as narrative interviews. In narrative interviews, there are no standard interview questions; rather, the interviewer engages interviewees in conversation on their own understanding of how and with whom they work to govern the street market. The aim is to offer minimal guidance, to allow the narrator to describe how they as individuals relate to the governance regime (Ayres, 2012). During these interviews, I started by asking the narrator to explain his or her routine work as the only condition to developing their narrative structure. Then, depending on their narratives, I would pick up on

a relevant topic and encourage them to elaborate on the meaning or possible interpretation of their story (Chase, 1995; Polanyi, 1985). In each interview, I co-drafted a diagram of the governance regime with the interviewee, based on their own perception of their work. By combining different pieces from the narrative interviews, I was able to collate a full picture of what the governance regime looks like in each case.

In Taipei, I conducted one exploratory interview and 13 narrative interviews with public officials, local politicians, and vendors who actively participated in self-organisation. Note the one exploratory interview, conducted with the former head of the Taipei Market Administrative Office. This interview opened up a fast track to other public officials, and allowed me to grasp the context of the policy quickly and easily. This then enabled me to complete the fieldwork in a short period of time.

In addition to the interviews, I also engaged in participatory observation, (the “deep hanging out” of anthropology, as referred to above) to understand street-level interactions in street markets. This involved walks during which I not only paid close attention to the social interactions and small talk between street actors. Most of my observation went towards the spatial arrangement of the mixed-use public spaces. How, for example, different days of the week, different seasons, and changes in the weather could affect the spatial arrangements, usages, and popularity of these mixed-use spaces. By observing and documenting who was doing what and where, I developed the socio-spatial sensitivity to capture the complexity in mixed-use public spaces.

In Amsterdam, I visited the Dappermarkt at least three or four times a week over a period of six months. Each week, I visited the site at different times of the day to observe how the street market was operating. By doing this, I became a familiar face in the market, able to have daily interactions with vendors and market managers and be part of a network of daily information exchange. My socio-spatial observations onsite often offered me material with which to start conversations with street actors. For example, topics such as the arrangement of stall spots and stall decorations always led to discussions on how vendors related to the governance of the markets. Despite engaging in conversations, I always took both still and moving images and field notes to document any nuances in or changes to the socio-spatial arrangement of the market. These tools helped me to immerse myself and be more sensitive to the socio-spatial environment while doing the fieldwork. This ultimately created research input for further analysis.

In Taipei, I had less time to conduct my field research due to the disruption of the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, being a native speaker and having grown up near to the market helped me to immerse myself in the environment immediately. On top of this “home advantage,” I adapted Kusenback’s “go-along” street phenomenological method (2003). This method is distinctive for sitting between interview and

participatory observation. Walking along with both familiar characters and first-time visitors to the markets helped me to pick up on more socio-spatial nuances at the market through the eyes of others.

Lastly, during my fieldwork in Taiepi, a number of public meetings to discuss the future of the street market that I was studying were held. I conducted participatory observations in these meetings, and this helped me immensely to understand the dynamics between vendors, public officials, and local politics. Again, being a native speaker and resident of the city, I was able to interpret both spoken and non-spoken gestures in these meetings. I was able to discuss my observations and interpretations from these meetings with my key informant in the field, as well as to clarify and confirm certain themes that I documented in my field notes.

Observation, as an open-ended process that enables ethnographers to get close to people (Gans, 1999), has long been the hallmark of ethnographic fieldwork. That said, the point of departure for my fieldwork was a particular statement, or at least a vague direction to go in; as vague as in actual foraging, where people go out to look for something without knowing where to find it, or what to expect. As a matter of fact, the researcher has very little idea of or control over where their fieldwork goes. Indeed, the process of ethnographic fieldwork is absolutely non-linear. It entails two things: first, I have limited control in choosing my field encounters or planning interviews in the order that I would like. The narratives and street observations that I gather enter a feedback loop with my sensemaking of the fieldwork. As the political scientist Karim Zakhour describes, this process means the researcher has “to continuously traverse the line between epistemological uncertainty and certainty, by searching for, and questioning, meaningmaking” (2020: 83). For me, this fieldwork process was rather like a fast and intense period of learning. For every moment that I was in the field, I picked up something new, which I was then constantly comparing with information that I already had and either deciding to keep it or move on. The process of field foraging was absolutely not one of aimlessly wandering (although sometimes it felt like it). Instead, it required a high level of concentration and rapid onsite judgement to determine whether to leave or follow a thread that might have popped up.

Second, I myself became part of an information exchange network onsite. Every new piece of information learned in the field or an interview became a potential resource to fuel the next interview or field encounter. In some cases, revealing the extent of my knowledge about the field to interviewees would encourage them to share more with me. In other cases, by sharing my professional knowledge about how planning regulations work with vendors, I was able to earn their trust, and this opened the gate for me to meet other stakeholders and gain further information from the field. In retrospect, this action was itself an unforeseen product of studying informal institutions within networks of information and informal contacts.

I use the metaphor of foraging to emphasise two strands in my process of ethnographic data collection: the unpredictable circumstances in the field, and the gathering of impressions and materials in mixed-use socio-spatial dynamics. Through the process of sensemaking, the information, image materials, and narratives that I gathered in Amsterdam and Taipei form the basis of my four empirical chapters.

3.4.2 The Sensemaking of “Data”

My fieldwork allowed me to gather research materials which primarily took the form of recordings and transcripts, field notes, and image materials from participatory observations of street markets, public meetings, and public officials at work. In addition to the preparatory policy document analysis and archival studies, these are major sources that I will draw on in what follows. Here, my research questions and sub-questions provide a framework to recall the point of departure for the research. However, the process of ethnographic writing is what Yanow calls abductive reasoning: “[it] begins with a puzzle, a surprise, or a tension, and then seeks to explicate it by identifying the conditions that would make that puzzle less perplexing and more of a ‘normal’ or ‘natural’ event” (Yanow 2011:27).

The processing and sensemaking of my data is also the process of revisiting, rebuilding, and refining my research framework. Research questions and sub-questions are polished and sharpened through their dialogue with empirical data. Not that I made up new questions to fit the data, but through the theoretical framework and empirical data I am able to stress the core concern of this research. There are three major themes that I would like to reflect upon regarding how I make sense of the field materials and analyse them into research findings. These are 1) Puzzling narratives and organisational ethnography. 2) The embodiment practice as a market-goer and an urban planner. 3) Turning gossip into science.

Puzzling Narratives and Organisational Ethnography

To understand which organisations and institutions are used in planning and governing mixed-use public spaces, I conducted narrative interviews with public officials involved with the street markets, as well as other stakeholders who could shed light on how governance functions in street markets, such as planning consultants and retired public officials.

In these narrative interviews, I started by asking interviewees to explain their daily work. I would then ask them to lay out who they worked with, in which departments they worked regarding street markets, and how they work. By unpacking the relational perspective, I was able to map the landscape of institutions and organisations in the governance regime. In most interviews, I invited interviewees to draw the map of the organisational network as they perceived it through their work with me. This map

was to include their organisation, who they work with, and the hierarchy of these organisations. Are the organisations connected to each other? Is there coordination between different organisations within the network? And most importantly, how do these individual public officials relate to their organisation and the street markets that they work with?

This was a very interesting exercise with public officials, particularly when it came to observing how they make sense of their working position within the governance regime. For example, in my fieldwork in Amsterdam, public officials have a less clear mental map of their organisation and who they are supposed to work with than in Taipei. The interviewee who worked in the management of the Market Office in Amsterdam had an organisational map in his diary to explain the office hierarchy to other public officials in the municipality. It is part of this interviewee's daily work to explain where the Market Office stood within the municipality, and to justify the involvement of the office in coordinating various affairs related to the street market site.

The process of data collection in Taipei stood in stark contrast with the situation in Amsterdam. Basic information for which I had to expend great effort to get in Amsterdam, such as organisational maps and contacts relevant to street markets affairs, is all publicly available on the council's website. Moreover, this public information contains inter-departmental contacts, and cross-departmental coordinations are pre-assigned to specific public officials in the department. Nevertheless, only when I started to interview public officials and politicians did I realise that this seeming transparency is in fact a façade required by the organisational culture. This public information does not detail the power dynamics as they actually exist within the organisational hierarchy in administrative bodies. More importantly, the pre-assigned roles and tasks given on the website do not necessarily align with those who actually execute them. It took in-depth narrative interviews to make sense of the gap between what is written on paper and what actions are taken in the Taipei case.

Besides conducting narrative interviews, the location where I conducted these interviews also matters. Through visiting public officials' offices and work environments, I was able to grasp a sense of their everyday life. For example, talking to public officials who work on the street market, or strolling with them in the market, gives a very different perspective from those sitting in the meeting room in the office. Being in the offices of public officials in Taipei, and seeing piles of documents on tables and employees' obvious exhaustion, also made me aware of the bureaucratic work that goes on behind the scenes in the organisation.

Researchers reflecting on organisational ethnography have described it as more than a simple research method, but rather a way of imagining the social (Gaggiotti et al, 2017), in the sense that it allows the researcher to connect both the sociological

(Mills, 1959) and ethnographic imagination (Atkinson, 1990; Willis, 2000). Rather than simply acquiring information at a distance from both the larger social context and the local situation, the ethnographic imagination offers an embodied aspect by diving into the everyday work of individuals within an organisation. As a researcher trained in sociology, I have struggled to understand the difference in field engagement between ethnographic narrative interviews and half-structured interviews. The sensuousness of the ethnographic imagination liberates me to think with different narratives, seeing the embodiment of multiple realities through the eyes of my interviewees. That said, it does not prevent me from returning to sociological analysis to puzzle these narratives together.

The Embodiment Practice as a Market-Goer and as an Urban Planner

Besides the organisational ethnography focus on interviews and interactions with key stakeholders in Amsterdam and Taipei, at street level I adapted a spatial ethnography approach to immerse myself in the street markets under study. As in traditional ethnography, concepts such as Malinowski's "natives' point of view" and "living with and living like those who are studied" (Van Maanen 1988) offer a set of guidelines for ethnographic researchers to enter into their fieldwork (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007; Lofland 1995; Prasad 2005). I took field notes, as well as still and moving images to document my social and spatial participatory observations in street markets.

However, the objects of my study were hardly unknown to me, nor were they somewhere I am completely unfamiliar with. In fact, I have a very close relationship with my fieldwork sites in both cities: I live in the same neighbourhood as the Dappermarkt, and grew up visiting the Donmen market regularly. In other words, I am a market-goer first, and a researcher who studies street markets second. Furthermore, as a researcher embedded in an urban planning group, there is also, albeit indirectly, a professional closeness with many of my interviewees and their everyday challenges. Contemporary organisational ethnographers reflect upon the importance of living closer to the site of their fieldwork, perhaps living in the same world as it, and minimising the alienating processes of entering and exiting as much as possible. Such fieldwork awareness and strategies for maintaining the boundary between distance/strangeness and immersion/familiarity have been developed by Van Maanen (1995) and Ybema and Kamsteeg (2009).

Therefore, in my street ethnography, I developed two different embodiment practices: one as a market-goer, and one as an urban planner. Each role involved different embedded bodily practices. Through my documentation, I captured moments of social encounter and embodiment practices as a market-goer and as an urban planner. Of course, it is not always possible to separate these two characters during fieldwork. During most of my time in the street, they were intertwined with one another. The

importance of distinguishing between them and reflecting upon them here is to point out my strategies for navigating the boundary between immersion and distancing. As a market-goer, I walk closer to the stalls. My eyes sharply scan vendors and the products that they sell. I compare prices. I do not like waiting in a queue or being stared at by the vendor. Through years of experience, my body knows how to judge the right moment to engage a vendor: when to stand closer to the stall, the proper distance and pace to walk at while observing without being interrupted or asked whether I am interested in certain products. On the other hand, body language and engagement create the space for interaction. When is the best time to have small talk with a vendor, and when to step back so as not to block their business? During these daily interactions as a market-goer, I became the familiar face of my fieldwork: I popped out. I did my grocery shopping at the market. Vendors and market managers would greet me and I greeted them back. In my field notes, I wrote down stories that they told me, recorded my interactions with them, and noted other events that happened during my walk.

As an urban planner, I am embedded in a different sense of body through which to experience and observe mixed-use public spaces. Walking in the street markets, my urban planner body and mind would pay attention to the attribution of space. What is the pedestrian flow like? How do vendors exhibit their products and deal with their waste? What kind of other market-goers are to be found in the street markets? I took pictures of corners where recycling is collected, of different user populations, infrastructure, and pavements in the markets. I spent time there during business hours and also afterwards, to see how the street is cleaned and reorganised. I wrote about micro-spatial negotiation and violations committed by vendors of the rules they are supposed to follow in my field notes.

The role of the market-goer is closer to the actual atmosphere in the fieldwork, while the urban planner role kept something of a distance. Nevertheless, the two roles were not neatly separated; indeed, they are very often connected. I needed the social interaction as a market-goer to bring me into the social situation of the street, so that the urban planner role could access the space and ask questions related to the research. Moreover, the daily observations and interactions as a market-goer uncovered socio-spatial nuances that were not physically visible. Without understanding the context, the slang, and the key figures in the market, the urban planner role would hardly have understood what was happening, and therefore ask the right questions.

During the fieldwork, I had to constantly switch between these two roles to fit the circumstances. I was unaware of this embodiment and switching until a particular informal interview situation in Taipei. I was sitting at the bar of a herbal shop and trying to understand the local political dynamics between non-legal markets and the actual governance of the street. The owner of the shop is also the leader of the

local neighbourhood. I was sitting there for around half an hour. The conversation was lively, animated variously by the owner of the shop, customers, and neighbours coming and going. It was mostly small talk, but occasionally I would ask a more serious question, such as who handles the waste in this part of the market. I received different opinions and answers, and the chitchat carried on somewhere else. It was a friendly and casual social situation. At some point, a man with a backpack walked into the shop. In one hand he had a reporter's book, and from the other wrist hung a camera. He talked in a polite and official tone to the shop owner: "Hello, my name is xxx. I work in the Architect's office. My office is working on a renovation of a historical building around the corner. I am doing a site investigation. Can I ask if any of you know when the building was still in use?" There was nothing wrong or odd about his question, but his professional tone got in the way of people wanting to engage. Very unlike the situation prior to his entry, they simply told him that they did not know and that there was nothing they could offer. It was at that moment that I realised I was unconsciously playing two embodied roles to navigate the fieldwork in street markets

Instead of reflexively distancing myself after completing the fieldwork, however, my closeness meant that I was unable to leave the world of fieldwork behind me entirely. The multiple roles that I had adopted not only helped me to develop a boundary between immersion and distancing, but on certain occasions, I was able to glean insights from fieldwork by being deeply immersed in the situation as a market-goer, while still able to switch to a more distant perspective as an urban planner. This resonates with what de Jong et al. (2013) propose as a strategy of "distancing by immersion" for navigating the boundary between familiarity and estrangement that may help fieldworkers to develop detached viewpoints and interpret data. More than this switching of mindset, however, I stress the differences in embodied senses, as attention to spatial arrangement is key when conducting spatial ethnography.

Turning Gossip Into Science

In my months of daily strolling through street markets and the periods of processing data and writing that followed, I had a strong feeling that my fieldwork had a lot to do with collecting gossip and anecdotes. In Amsterdam, I got to know the personal histories of vendors and market managers. I sat on the street with vendors and heard what kind of customer they found most attractive. I was told which vendors make a profit and which do not. In Taipei, by sitting in the market's food sections, or in public meetings with vendors, I was party to a large number of anecdotes, interpersonal information, and histories concerning people in the market. The question of what to do with all these stories and anecdotes imposed itself. More concretely, what might anecdotes have to do with my research questions? In this section, I attempt to make sense of what gossip means to the fieldworker, and how I will incorporate and interpret these anecdotes in my research. Ultimately, my thorough engagement with

relevant literature helped me see that fieldwork materials in the form of anecdotes and gossip can flesh out the nuances of everyday interactions in mixed-use public spaces. The data from my spatial ethnography fieldwork consists of fragments of small talk, and observations presented in the form of texts and images. Unlike in organisational ethnography, I sat down with interviewees to make sense of their work or role in the spaces under study. As part of my daily engagement with the street markets, my fieldwork experiences were unstructured: I walked through the same markets every few days with my senses highly focused, hoping that there would be some “catch of the day” for me to document. After months of accumulating anecdotes and gossip, the question of how to process the information I was collecting and answer the research question began to weigh more heavily. As a researcher, how was I to abstract the messages behind the daily conversations, and match them with spatial observation?

Niko Besnier (2019) wrote an extensive introduction, on the topic of gossip from an ethnographic perspective, in *The Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation* (Giardini&Wittek, 2019). In the chapter, Besnier states that ethnography values gossip as a set of interactions embedded in a larger context of social life. He defines gossip in ethnography on both the macro and micro levels. On a macro level, ethnographers approach gossip “as a social activity that could be analyzed interpretively based on what people said about it, the ethnographer’s participant observation in gossip contexts, and the analyst’s understanding of how gossip articulates with other spheres of activity in the society in which it takes place” (p.104). On the micro level, gossip is understood as an interactional structure in the social situation. This means that the framework of communication is more than just the literal aspect of language: spoken and unspoken words are just as important under the circumstances of interaction. As Goodwin (1982:801) analysed the role of the gossip giver and receiver: “to be the recipient of appropriate gossip talk one must be a potential player in the larger event.”

Having now written up my empirical chapters, I see that gossip and anecdotes can be said to play roles in my field research from three perspectives. First, these daily conversations and exchanges of information are signs of my gaining access to the field. That the interviewees and those I encountered in the street began to share anecdotes with me demonstrated their trust in our relationship. I consider this both a recognition and approval of my understanding of the field in its relevant context.

Particularly noteworthy is that during my fieldwork in Taipei, anecdotes and gossip were mostly delivered in Taiwanese. The official language in Taiwan is Mandarin, and I conducted most of my interviews in Mandarin. My Taiwanese is not very fluent, and a good number of those that I encountered in the market would laugh at my accent, or reassure me that I could speak in Mandarin. Most of the time, I would mix both languages. However, for many vendors and street actors, Taiwanese

is the language that they use daily and feel comfortable with. In some interviews, including those with public officials, interviewees would switch to Taiwanese when sharing anecdotes, gossip, or personal opinions. To me, this switch signified a sense of unofficial but intimate communication. This intimacy is rooted in a feeling that it is more authentic to recount certain situations in the mother tongue, and being able to communicate in Taiwanese manifests a deeper layer of trust in the fieldwork.

Second, gossip and anecdotes can in many ways be seen as short and fragmented conversations. Information exchange carried out via these short conversations presumes that the interlocutors share a mutual understanding of a certain socio-spatial context. For example, when a vendor told me which vendors made a profit from the market, and which ones have to have a second job, they presumed that I understood the broader economic landscape and the financial struggles of the vendors. Without situating these conversations in the socio-spatial context where the conversation takes place, they comprise little more than random information. Conversely, by understanding the transitory context, this exchange can be understood to demonstrate this vendor's willingness to reveal detailed information about retail performance in the street market and its relation to the general decline of street commerce. This is all the more evident when one considers the backdrop to the conversation: a busy mixed-use public space with a flow of market-goers, in which the vendor sacrificed potential business time to talk to me. From this point of view, gossip and anecdotes can be interpreted as an efficient way of exchanging information through symbols between insiders.

Third, at a more explicit level, I discovered from my fieldwork in Taipei that gossip is a tactic through which vendors exercise their political influence. To be precise, it allows them to leverage their powerlessness and voice their demands through local politicians to the public sector. This perspective on how gossip functions as everyday resistance, and as a supplement to power imbalances, ties in with the rich anthropological literature on gossip as the political effect of power (Brison, 1992; Besnier, 2019).

3.5 Reflexivity and Ethics

This dissertation is a piece of urban planning research that adapts the lens of ethnography to study the socio-spatial dynamics of mixed-use public spaces. In the scholarship on the reflexive turn in contemporary anthropology, reflecting upon the positionality of the researcher, and unpacking the subjective engagement that is inevitable when the researcher uses herself as a research tool, is itself a crucial part of the research. This section discusses the ethics of reflexivity as a first-time ethnographer.

The section will develop as follows: I will first address how I handled the question of consent forms in my fieldwork. Second, I will reflect upon how I utilised my social and cultural capital to gain access to the field, and how I managed my image so as to navigate the power dynamics between myself and interviewees in the field. Lastly, I will reflect on my position as a researcher using myself as a research tool. I believe that by revealing the researcher's positionality and how it relates to strategies in fieldwork, avenues of intersectionality in research can be opened up.

3.5.1 Research Ethics

The research ethics of this dissertation adhere to the ethical review published by The Amsterdam Institute For Social Science Research Ethical Advisory Board. The following reflections are the result of my engagement with a set of questions provided by the advisory board.

The informants in my research were predominantly public officials in the cities of Amsterdam and Taipei, local politicians, vendors, and other experts from the related field of retail consultancy. I conducted narrative interviews with most of the informants, except for vendors that I encountered in the street markets and with whom I had short talks. I began every interview by asking for the consent of the participant involved, and in most cases they were willing to sign the consent form. In a few cases in Taipei, informants opted for oral consent rather than written consent. Handing over one's signature on paper has more privacy implications in the Taiwanese social context than perhaps in Europe. In the consent form, I made it clear that the interview would be anonymous, and that the data would be subject to strict security guidelines. Informants also had the right to read and agree to the interview transcripts, which in a few cases some did request. I of course obliged.

The narrative interviews mainly focused on how the informants make sense of their work and relate it to the wider governance network. On the street, conversations with vendors were documented in my field notes. None of the interviews or field notes was shared with a third party. In the thesis itself, all names have been substituted for pseudonyms and their personal background have been concealed. In the case of Amsterdam, I blurred each informant's specific position due to the specificity of the organisational structure. In Taipei, however, I have specified the organisational position of my informants because all those who worked in the municipality left their role after I finished my fieldwork. Because my research looks at the governance of mixed-use public spaces, the research content has no need to detail the personal information of informants. As such, there is very little chance that they would be exposed to risk through their participation.

During my fieldwork, I did not encounter any issues relating to my own personal safety. I am aware of and sensitive to the different projections and gazes of my informants. This particular issue will be looked at in more depth in a later section.

3.5.2 Access is Capital

In the previous section, I wrote about data foraging in the research process. In what follows, I will reflect on a more micro-level observation made of myself as I interacted and engaged with the field. Recent literature on the critical ethnographic method has addressed the need not only to acknowledge the necessary labour, but to reflect upon how emotions and power intersect with data collection and the process of writing up (McQueeney & Lavelle, 2017). Hoffmann (2007) argues that developing a greater awareness of power dynamics and emotional labour would help the researcher to better understand the nuances of data and potentially facilitate greater insights into their topic. To explore this in my own work, I started by examining the relationship between personal social capital and access to the field.

In terms of gaining access to the site, I adopted a number of very different strategies in my two case studies. In Amsterdam, I had a small personal network. Interview invitations and appointment-making were sent via email. In only a few cases were such conversations arranged through oral communication in the market itself. In Taipei, however, most of the interviews were arranged through personal connections. Instead of making official appointments, I was often given the time and location by a middleman. I found that if one informant was happy to take part in an interview, I would receive a phone call to arrange other interviews soon after. Unlike in the Dutch context, where the normative communication framework is to plan meetings ahead, in Taipei, things tended to be done more spontaneously, with a friendliness and openness to share connections that could be useful for my fieldwork.

For example, In Taipei, I had an interview with a vendor who was initially not very friendly. Throughout our conversation, we exchanged a substantial amount of information. I drew on my professional urban planning knowledge to explain the practical procedures of the urban regeneration process, which he was confused by and felt negative about. By showing myself keen to help, and having brainstormed with him on the question of how street markets can be operated differently, I earned his trust. By the end of the interview, when I asked if he knew other vendors that I could talk to, he immediately took me to the market and introduced me to other vendors.

During my fieldwork, I was aware of this dynamic of give-and-take with my informants. Interactions and trust built upon the exchange of information require a high degree of onsite awareness, boundary setting, and image management. Establishing certain kinds of personal social and cultural capital might help me to access more

information, but one must be careful about what to share. Most of the time, I tended to use my background as an urban planner and share professional planning knowledge. Revealing this professional background helped build trust and a sense of connection with public officials.

In street fieldwork, image management is somewhat more complicated. Approaching people by saying “I am a researcher” or “I am an urban planner” does not always help. In Taipei, I was first introduced to vendors as the daughter of my mother (a senior market-goer), or my father’s daughter to the politician to open up field access, before I was a researcher studying street markets in my own right. Therefore, further on in the interview, I would strategically refer to my own experiences as a market-goer, or even share that my grandparents used to be vendors, to soften the image of a stiff researcher. In my street fieldwork in Amsterdam, I am perceived as an Asian female. Most of the time, the conversation began with where I came from. Interestingly, many vendors consider Asia to have a better street market culture. Then in many circumstances, introducing the Taiwanese night market was a critical beginning to building a connection with vendors.

Building upon the normative interactive framework, this switching between researcher, market-goer, urban planner, and even more personal identities (often in the same interaction) challenges the boundary-setting of the fieldworker. More than the traditional frontstage and backstage model of image management (Goffman, 1959), the so-called backstage performance is also a part of the fieldworker’s strategy for gaining access to the field. The switching of image management during an interview also calls on the fieldworker’s sense of the power dynamic. In certain interviews with public officials, I had to fine-tune my language to fit a conversation between professionals, while taking care not to present myself as more professional than the interviewee. I mobilised this power dynamic, in which I only showed certain kinds of professional knowledge, so that the interviewee would regard me as someone worth explaining things to. As such, I refrained from challenging them so as not to inhibit their demonstration of a professional image to me.

Lastly, there is an inevitable emotional labour involved in the subtle maintenance of these boundaries, managing a set of images, and navigating through the power dynamics of interaction. By reflexively digesting this emotional labour, I hope to shed light on a more intimate perspective of being a fieldworker in studies of urban planning.

3.5.3 Being a Novice Ethnographer

One of the distinctive characteristics of both ethnographic writing and ethnographers is a certain open reflexivity and a commitment to analysing positionality, emotional vulnerability, and sometimes the sense of insecurity that a researcher may feel

during fieldwork. This relative liberation of course comes in the wake of the reflexive turn in the discipline. Documenting the mental process in fieldwork is common in ethnographic writing. The infamous *Innocent Anthropologist* (Barley, 2000), *The Vulnerable Observer* (Behar, 1996) and the “novice ethnographer” (Verdery, 2018) that involved revealing the mental states of the author during the fieldwork, are not at all presented as such to demonstrate the weakness or anecdotal nature of the research. Rather, works such as these are valued as documents of self-empowerment, and encourage other ethnographers to normalise the sometimes uncomfortable and uncertain nature of fieldwork. The process of reading and digesting my own fieldwork reflection is what I will now discuss as an urban planner becoming a fresh ethnographer.

At the beginning of my fieldwork, I was not fully aware that the positionality of the researcher had an impact on the process of data collection. Reading the work and reflections (Barley, 2000) of others did not immediately resonate with my daily practice. The important realisation came from recognising the lingering self-doubt that would accompany the unexpected exhaustion following field interactions, even when they were short. I would often feel awkward during field interactions, even though everything may have seemed to be going smoothly. I was confused as to how and why the energy that I felt in the field could leave me so soon after I stepped out of that context. On writing up the methodology chapter, re-reading what I had already read but not fully registered in the body, I came to fully grasp what image management and emotional labour really mean in fieldwork.

The major realms of my fieldwork are the (ageing) street markets and the public sector. It did not take me long to feel the gaze of others in the field, but it took me longer to understand exactly what that is. In both contexts and cities, my appearance, gender, and age inevitably influenced my interactions in the fieldwork. In Taipei, I realized that I had more social and cultural capital to mobilize than simply an exotic (yet still young) newcomer. Talking my way to earning the trust of informants initially meant not minding being relatively short, and switching tones and languages at the right moment to relate to the informants. Swapping these identities as a researcher, market-goer, and a granddaughter of vendors in order to ask questions from different perspectives was also quite a common strategy of mine.

In Amsterdam, however, I was very often seen as an exotic young female. This prefigurative assumption of my image frequently started at the moment of interaction. On the street, I received the smiling gaze of vendors, potential invitations to go somewhere, and even attempts to bring me “inside the shop” to talk. Understanding that these are part of street flirting, I did not feel harassed thanks to the clear boundary setting that I had established for myself. Nevertheless, acknowledging that my gender and age did play a role in activating interactions and street encounters

is another mental process in justifying the materials that I gathered. Accepting the prefigurative image of others and acting upon the stereotype while attempting to extract information from the interaction is a complex package of emotional and intellectual labour.

It is also the case, however, that the same profile might be an obstacle when interacting with public officials, as sometimes I was not perceived as a “serious” person to talk to. At best I might receive a surprised look that I was actually a serious researcher. In this case, other strategies such as mobilising social capital presented an alternative way to gaining access. For example, revealing the international nature of the project, or talking from the perspective and in the terms of an urban planner. Overall, I found it fairly straightforward to demonstrate a professional image during the fieldwork.

As a final remark for this chapter, being a novice in ethnography is also about unpacking and learning hidden knowledge, and taking time to process anxiety, insecurity, guilt for not advancing quickly enough, and the sense of not doing enough. It takes time to allow oneself to step back from the fieldwork, whether the object of study is near or far, and developing the emic–etic perspective was an important takeaway for me. As ethnography is often described as a kind of craftsmanship, exploring the various facets of the research process is indeed an endless enterprise. Although I would not be the novice again, I hope that laying out the process and my experience of it offers a guide to other urban planners who intend to go on this journey.

CHAPTER 4 The Governance Regime of Street Markets in the City of Amsterdam

This chapter presents the results of my organisational ethnography fieldwork in Amsterdam. Through narrative interviews and document analysis, the first section introduces the governance regime of Amsterdam, and specifically the case of the Dappermarkt, at the time of my first investigation in 2019. This includes the major organisational structures and formal institutions that these organisations work with. I will then analyse the historical background and the various different influences that shape the regime. Lastly, I will deploy an analytical framework to present the individual and organisational challenges of the governance regime.

I began the fieldwork by setting out to understand the basic functional structure of the municipality of Amsterdam through the information available to the public on its official website. My intention was to identify the organisations and institutions involved in the street markets above the basic structure. I soon realised, however, that the website is very much tailored to a user-oriented experience. In other words, any public information given is as a service guide for citizens' needs. It does not offer a full picture of the organisational hierarchy, nor provide any further details about the organisational structure, positions and people, contact information etc. Since there was no way to figure out who was doing what through public information, I soon turned to personal networks to scout for pilot interviewees able to provide this information.

Throughout the process of data foraging through narrative interviews, I learned that the municipality is a huge organisation currently undergoing a long process of organisational transformation. Indeed, being able to describe or offer insights into the governance system's general administrative structure is valued as an expertise even among public officials. The point to make here is that puzzling out the governance of Amsterdam is more a question of concerted research than common knowledge among stakeholders. This offers a perspective from which to begin to think through the position of individuals within the governance regimes of street markets as mixed-use public spaces, as I will throughout this chapter.

4.1 The Official Side of Amsterdam's Street Market Governance Regime

In 2019, the organisational structure of the municipality of Amsterdam consisted of one service support team, five expertise clusters, and seven borough governments. Behind this, years' worth of organisational transition was being undertaken, which primarily meant the transfer of centralised tasks previously organised by each borough government to the expertise clusters.

The basic structure of Amsterdam’s street market governance regime is composed of three major strands, which occupy different levels in the organisational hierarchy. Institutionally speaking, they mostly work independently, with their own tasks, formal institutions, and visions. The three strands are: **policy-making, policy implementation, and the governance of mixed-use public spaces at the neighbourhood level** (see figure 4.1). The following sub-sections will describe each of the strands in their organisational structure and the formal institutions that they work with.




Figure 4.1 Organisational map of Amsterdam’s street market governance regime (Source: author)

Economic Affairs Committee and the Making of Policies

Street markets are considered part of the remit of economic governance in Amsterdam. The Economic Affairs Committee (*Economische Zaken*, hereafter referred to as EZ) is the primary organisation responsible for policy-making when it comes to street commerce and street markets in Amsterdam. EZ is situated within the “Space and Economy” cluster (*Ruimte en Economie*). According to the website of the City of Amsterdam, this cluster groups professionals in economics, all scales of urban planning and design, and engineers in urban physical infrastructure. Within EZ, street market affairs are categorised under the larger rubric of retail business. There is a team of five public officials who work on policy for street markets.

For the first time in Amsterdam’s history, a process is underway to come up with policies dedicated specifically to street commerce and street markets. The policymak-

er who works for EZ with whom I conducted a narrative interview (#11) revealed that the historical origin of institutionalised street markets and vending systems in Amsterdam was the move to tolerate so-called free peddlers in the 19th century. The literature also demonstrated that in order to passively prevent the peddlers from peddling throughout the city illegally, certain streets and squares were appointed as places where such vendors could sell their wares with legal licence. One of these locations was in the Dapperbuurt (which later became the Dappermarkt). Vendors and the city made peace with one another, so long as vendors paid the vending fee and stayed within the area demarcated for their activities (CVP, 1914; Huberts, 1940; Jansens, 2017; Kar, 1982; Kistemaker et al., 1984).

After more than a century of passively regulated street commerce in the city, the municipality decided to actively intervene in street commerce. There were three major reasons for this decision. First, according to the policy analysis report published by the city of Amsterdam in 2018, street commerce businesses had been locked in a recession that had started with the global economic crisis of 2008, but had not stopped when the most intense period of that crisis was over. This is in no small way due to the growth of e-commerce as a major competitor of more traditional retail businesses, including street commerce. Second, the street market corruption case of 2012 was an important trigger for the municipality to change the management of vendors and markets (Jansens, 2017). Third, national policy to do with streamlining bureaucracy within municipal structures kicked off a wave of transformation in organisational structures. As a result, the policy and governance of street commerce were centralised from borough governments to EZ. This transformation has enabled EZ to take on the responsibility of policy planning for street commerce and street markets.

In terms of making a new policy for street markets, there are three steps to EZ's process: coming up with a vision, carrying out an in-depth survey, and producing new legislation. First, in early 2018 and with the cooperation of the Central Association for Ambulatory Trade (CVAH), the Market Office, and the Department of Research, Information, and Statistics (OIS), EZ published the first document to kick-start the process: *Marktvisie* (Market Vision). In the *Marktvisie 2018-2026* (Economische Zaken, 2018), quantitative and qualitative investigations into street markets in Amsterdam were conducted. The results as summarised show that:

1. Qualitatively, non-food products for sale in the market have failed to compete with e-commerce and budget retailers (such as Action and Primark) both in terms of price and quality. Supply has failed to meet demand from the primarily middle-class consumers.
2. Quantitatively, the average occupancy rate of street markets in Amsterdam has fallen below 85%, with some specific locations at times dropping to 50%. As a result, markets are emptying.

3. Concerning the demographic profile, the rate of ageing is particularly striking for both sellers and consumers. This indicates low numbers of young visitors, as well as the limited inflow and rapid outflow of young vendors.
4. Spatially, there is an uneven distribution of street markets in the city. Some areas have no market at all, while others have many markets close together. Some have a market several days a week, while many only have one or two days a week.

One of EZ's municipal officers sums up their investigation and points for further action thus: "street commerce and markets are experiencing a serious recession, but sellers lack of the ability to react to the change" (#12). In response to the results of the investigation, EZ made a decision to take progressive action on policy-making. Internally, the number of public officials working on this issue increased from one to five people. Externally, they hired professional planning consultants that specialise in city centres and retail commerce to conduct more holistic surveys as inputs for future policy-making.

The new policy is intended to address two main issues: first, economic policy for retail, including markets. Second, to utilise the social, cultural, and economic resources of the public spaces where street markets are located. Moreover, after the Market Vision report was published in 2018, a planning consultancy was commissioned by EZ to conduct an in-depth survey of street markets from a regional perspective. They divided the city into four regions according to the geographic proximity of street markets, and reports that address each region will be delivered. Finally, and based on the outcome of an in-depth survey, EZ will put forward different scenarios for street markets in each region. These scenarios will be handed to the relevant stakeholders to discuss, with the final decision made by each borough's government. Policy and regulations will be officially written and implemented in this phase.

Professional technocrats at EZ involved OIS, the city's research department, the Market Office, the Central Association for Ambulatory Trade (CVAH), and an external planning consultancy to analyse and understand the current state of affairs for street markets in Amsterdam, forming part of the governance regime. Based on these investigations, EZ will make a new policy which they will then hand to the other two parts of the regime to implement.

The Market Office and Others Who Keep Public Spaces Functioning

The second part of the governance regime concerns the implementation of policy and the daily management of street markets. The organisation occupying centre stage here is the Market Office (Marktbureau, hereafter referred to as MB), in addition to many other organisations that work on the daily maintenance of the public spaces that host street markets (see fig 4.1).

The Market Office is the primary organisation in charge of the management of street markets and vendors. In my narrative interview with the public official who has a management position in MB (#8), I was given a detailed account of the context for this newly established organisation. Since 2014, affairs related to the management of street markets and the licensing of mobile entrepreneur leases had been centralised in MB for all seven of Amsterdam's borough governments. In 2019, there were around 55 people working in this department. Within the Market Office, there is one manager and three different types of team, each with different functions. One team takes care of the administration of vendor licences, one works on internal coalition building, and the largest team is responsible for managing the markets.

The new centralised management scheme contains three types of position: market master (marktmeester), market manager (marktbeheerder), and market broker (marktmakeelaar). Market masters and managers are those who are responsible for the daily operation of the street markets. The managerial team is composed of five managers, who together manage 29 street markets, categorized into one of four regions in the city. Market managers have two main tasks: first, they implement governance and policy decisions in markets. For example, if the manager of MB decides that there should be fewer vegetable stalls in one market, managers then need to find ways via existing mandates to deliver this. Second, managers are also in charge of managing market masters, who are in the markets daily. In the past, each market master worked in a specific market. Nowadays, however, market masters no longer work in just one market, but rotate between different sites across the city. The job of the manager is to determine the shifts, and to occupy a steering role over the market masters. As for market brokers, they work closely with vendors. They allocate stall plots for vendors, make sure that all vendors follow the market regulations, check their licences, and collect the vending fee with a card reader. Their job is to maintain day-to-day order in the markets. In parallel to the daily operation system, market brokers work at the inter-office level.

There are four regions in the city, each with its own broker. Each market broker covers several markets, of which they have an overview. They mainly work on negotiation and facilitation when it comes to issues between organisations that need to be resolved cooperatively. For example, they host monthly meetings in the markets that they work in, with market managers, vendors, neighbourhood-level public officials, and representatives from the Central Association for Ambulatory Trade (CVAH) to discuss certain issues in the market that need to be dealt with. The market brokers are also the communication channel between EZ and MB when it comes to policy feedback.




Figure 4.2 Main management characters of Amsterdam's street markets (Source: author)

The management team in the MB works with a set of formal hierarchical institutions to manage the markets. The city of Amsterdam formulated its own general market regulation: *marktverordening* based on the national legal framework, which applies to all street markets in the city, and covers most vendor rights. For example, the general rules about noise regulation and safety requirements apply to all street markets. Moreover, there are different types of market in the city: some occupy a square, others a street. Some run six days a week, some others only two. Some have a specific focus such as flowers and books, while others provide general everyday products. To adjust to these specific needs, secondary regulations were introduced to fit into a particular socio-spatial situation. These regulations are: *inrichtingsbesluit* (furnishing decision), *instellingsbesluit* (setting decision) and *marktreglement* (market regulation). *Inrichtingsbesluit* concerns the specific spatial arrangements of a market: how it will look, where to park cars, where to set up stalls, and where to store boxes. *Instellingsbesluit* deals with the setting of the market, including its location and opening hours. *Marktreglement* is essentially the handbook for market masters and vendors to consult. It details the uses, design, and implementation of stalls and sales facilities, the energy and water supply to the market, matters of order and safety in the market, waste collection and the disposal of waste in the market, the issue of marketplaces in an experimental market zone, and the replacement of market vendors on a stall. These regulatory instruments shape markets in the city down to the last centimetre. Note that among them, only *marktverordening* can be found on public websites. I was able to collect the rest through interviews with public officials.

At the time of my fieldwork, the position of MB within the municipal hierarchy was still subject to change. This explains why it was not visible in any of the clusters or organisational structures on the city of Amsterdam website. The manager of the *Marktbureau* (#8) told me that it took five years to find the right place for MB.

Until 2019, Marktbureau was temporarily part of the central borough government (stadsteel centrum). The department was established to deal urgently with corruption: in 2012, several market managers were accused of receiving money from vendors to arrange better spots in the market. At the time, the larger organisational transformation had not yet started. Only in 2021 did the Marktbureau join the City Works (Stadswerker) team within the City Management (Stadsbeheerd) rubric. The City Works department is responsible for street work, including cleaning, green spaces, infrastructure and services, civil construction, logistics, operational support, and the maintenance of public space. According to the manager of the Marktbureau, the location of markets in the street is the reason for MB's inclusion in the City Works department. Together with the departments for waste and enforcement, they work as a cluster to manage daily activities in the city.

From various narrative interviews with public officials (#6, #7, #10, #13, #15), I collected a wealth of information about the organisations and institutions involved in the day-to-day running of the public spaces that host street markets. In fact, from a spatial perspective, the Market Office is one of many organisations managing the spaces that host the markets, for they are only in charge of those spaces within business hours. Outside of the markets' business hours, the spaces that host them are managed by the Department of Public Space, as part of the Space and Economy cluster. As general streets and public spaces, these spaces apply to municipal regulation such as the Algemene Plaatselijke Verordening (APV, General Local Regulation), which is the formal institution for the maintenance of public order and safety. In terms of the design of the spaces themselves, all of the city's public spaces are subject to the Puccinimethode³ design guideline.

Besides MB and the Department of Public Space, there are other departments and offices working on the maintenance of public spaces. At the level of maintenance, the Department of Cleaning, Department of Waste, and Department of Enforcement (THOR)—all of which fall under the City Management (Stadsbeheerd) cluster—are responsible for the everyday security and cleaning of street markets. From the perspective of hygiene, food sellers in street markets should follow the hygiene code as laid out by the Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA). Concerning facilities in public space, the Maintenance Department is in charge of these. Some markets have parking issues, because there are parking lots on the street, or because the market itself occupies designated parking spaces. In this case, the parking department would need to be involved in making rules, signs, and regulations concerning temporary parking permissions, and prohibiting certain sites. Lastly, the borough governments still retain some power, as they have to agree with granting a market permission to use certain public spaces.

3 <https://www.amsterdam.nl/wonen-leefomgeving/puccinimethode/puccinimethode/>

This second strand of street market governance in Amsterdam, therefore, is composed of various organisations that have different roles in maintaining street markets and the public spaces that host them. Each works with its own formal institutions and priorities. Streets and street markets are the intersections that they share.

The Governance of Mixed-Use Public Space at the Neighbourhood Level

The third strand of the governance regime of Amsterdam's street markets is the area team (*gebiedsteam*) in the neighbourhoods that host the markets. The *gebiedsteam* consists of an area manager and area broker, who work at the neighbourhood level under each of the borough governments. Rather than executing specific policies with mandates, they are instead—in the words of one of my informants—a borough government's “eyes and ears” (#7).

What area managers and area brokers usually do is connect residents in the neighbourhood who may have different issues with the municipality that they want resolved. From my interviews with neighbourhood-level public officials (#7, #13), and in my participatory observation in the residency office that they set up on the Dapperplein square to host the market, I got to understand that these officials cannot access many potentially powerful regulatory instruments. Instead, they work as communication channels, delivering messages from citizens to public officials who do have regulatory instruments to work with. In their daily work, they help to orient residents looking to navigate the municipality and have their requests heard, listen to and pass on complaints from residents, negotiate with other departments, explain policies, and organise community events.

In neighbourhoods that host street markets, helping residents and shop owners to deal with issues related to the markets is naturally a part of the work of the neighbourhood-level officials. This may include neighbourhood security and cleaning, or the opinions of shop owners behind market stalls, etc. Take the Dappermarkt, which is located in the neighbourhood of Dapperbuurt. There are two area brokers and one coordinator who work with this neighbourhood, and one of the specific tasks of this local Area Team is to negotiate the issues of shop owners whose shops are on the same street as the market. For instance, rubbish left by vendors after market hours may cause problems for restaurants and bars to put out their terrace seats. In this case, the area broker would assume the role of communicator with market managers and market brokers.

One of the two neighbourhood brokers described her role in the interview (#7). She revealed that there are not many formal institutions or executive powers that the local Area Team can work with. Facing the everyday complaints of citizens, they must try hard to find ways to reach out and work with other public officials to make

decisions. They nevertheless try to develop their visions for the neighbourhood, though they have few resources with which to carry out this work.

In Dapperbuurt, the Area Team was looking for ways to solve the problem posed by the market stalls which overwhelmingly occupy the square and shopping street. With the ambition of revitalising the neighbourhood's main square—the Dapperplein—on days when there is no market, the local Area Team managed to rent a shop space from the housing association there as a co-creation hub where they could experiment with small interventions in the square. For example, civil servants took shifts in the space, meeting as many residents as possible and organising events on the square. Another intervention was to build a coalition with housing associations that owned shop spaces in the neighbourhood, and together hire a private consultancy firm to evaluate the retail environment and ways to improve it.

Interviews #6 and #13, in addition to my participatory observations, clearly indicated that the Area Team knew that their job was to be close to the neighbourhood, and to solve problems therein. Because the work required spending a lot of time in the neighbourhood, they felt invested and responsible for everything that happened there. However, the downside was that even if they thought of possible changes that would be beneficial for the area, they had no real power to make them happen.

Interrelated but not Together

To sum up the above points, these three strands from central to neighbourhood level together form the street market governance regime in Amsterdam. To take an overview of the formal institutions that these organisations work with, my observations and interviews revealed that the more public officials there are working close to the site, the fewer regulatory instruments and power they have.

Most of the officials that I interviewed knew each other and were quick to mention the importance of working as a team because everything happens in and around street markets. There is never a simple, clear-cut division of tasks and responsibilities: everything is always interrelated, and needs collective efforts to reach a satisfactory conclusion. However, the fact that they know each other does not mean that they are able to mobilise the structure and make real changes. In reality, these public officials work in different offices with different mandates and tasks, all of which belong to different levels in the municipal hierarchy. There is no formal institution that specifies that they have to work together.

4.2 The Dynamic Configuration of the Governance Regime

The description of Amsterdam's street market governance regime as detailed above gives a static sense of how governmental organisations connect to the formal institu-

tions that they work with. In reality, a governance regime is a dynamic configuration that changes over time. As the previous section implied, the current configuration is an ongoing process embedded within the transformation of a municipal organisation. To further develop the dynamic perspective of how the governance regime works on mixed-use public spaces, it is now necessary to understand when and why the transformation took place, the impacts it had, and the direction it is heading in. Based on material from my narrative interviews, I will pinpoint two events that have had a critical influence on the dynamic configuration of the governance regime. These are the Dutch policy of abolishing sub-municipalities, and the corruption case in Amsterdam street markets of 2012.

The Centralisation of Municipal Power and Organisational Reform

Until 2014, street markets in Amsterdam were looked after by the borough governments. The move to centralise the management of street markets came as a result of the Municipalities Act, which set out to abolish this extra layer of bureaucratic oversight. In 2010, following the order of the Dutch government, the city of Amsterdam reduced the number of its sub-municipalities from 14 to seven. Then, in 2013, the States General of the Netherlands decided to abolish this layer of sub-municipality altogether (Vermeulen, 2013). From 2014, and following the new Municipalities Act, the autonomous city district council and services were replaced by a slimmed-down version of a district committee (*stadsdeelcommissie*). The local district committee in the borough government remains elective, but policy-making and implementation were transferred to a centralised department within the municipality structure.

Following this organisational reform, public officials who used to work under different borough governments with their own formal institutions now work directly for municipalities within functionally-oriented clusters that draw on the same formal institutions that apply to the whole city. This huge transition, involving organisational reform and the integration of formal institutions, was brought about to improve governance efficiency. The question is, has it done so?

Two public officials that I interviewed, one of whom worked on policy-making (#12) and the other on planning project management (#9), described this centralising turn in positive terms. They felt that the overall benefit is that this organisational change has made political promises easier to realise. Critical urban issues are now led by aldermen within the central municipality, along with policymakers who now have an overview of resources, current situations, and formal institutions at the level of the city. The system, as a result, is now more amenable to the mobilisation of resources and introduction of new policies.

There are two examples that relate directly to my case study. First, the fragmented policies and formal institutions of street markets under borough governments made

an overview of many issues difficult (Tasan-Kok & Özogul, 2021). These included questions such as: how are markets in Amsterdam faring? How many vendors work in how many plots of stalls? What are the occupancy rates of stalls in public spaces? Without being able to answer questions such as these, generating policies for the city as a whole was immensely challenging. The centralised scheme allows policymakers to examine these realities, hence the comments of the policymaker from EZ who claimed that it was the first time that policy for street commerce was being made. The second example concerns parking policy. As the urban planner working for the city's project management bureau (#9) put it, before centralisation, urban policy was fragmented between each borough government, and there were no general guidelines for the central government to take any lead. Making progress was very difficult. With the new citywide policy, and borough governments having no influence at the local level, implementation from the centre has become much easier. To take parking fees as an example, some borough governments were pro-parking, while others were against it. Whenever a progressive plan to reduce parking spaces in the city was put forward, the liberal party (who are in favour of car use in the city) in the borough government would always reject it, and the plan would never be realised. Now the central municipal alderman, who is in favour of reducing parking, works on parking issues with the dominant green-left and the social democratic party that support the idea. With the central system of policy-making, parking spaces across the city can be calculated, and strategic assessments of how to discourage car use can be carried out.

However, the public officials that I interviewed who work on policy implementation and daily maintenance described the daily disruption that they faced due to the organisational transformation. The major obstacle is that cross-departmental communication has become more difficult. As the market manager (#23) explained, public officials who used to work on cleaning, rubbish, and maintenance at the borough level had close contacts and coordinated easily with other departments. They occupied the same office building and knew each other. When there were problems in a neighbourhood's public spaces, they could coordinate a response in a short time. Now, however, they all work for different departments, in different offices. In fact, many are still working on new coalition-building, that is, searching for the right contact. Reaching out to each other is itself a significant task. In this respect, they have taken a step backwards, with many complaining that their work is less efficient than before.

Corruption-Proof Organisational Design

The new governance regime of street markets is of course embedded within the municipality's general organisational restructuring. However, cases of corruption, for which three market managers were arrested in 2012, accelerated the process of reconfiguration far earlier than other departments working on city management.

In 2010 and 2012, market managers in several street markets in the Cental, East and new West districts of Amsterdam were accused of having taken bribes from vendors, who in turn were given the most desirable stalls. The case, and the policy recommendations from the integrity report published by the city's Integrity Bureau the same year, both played a role in shifting the management of street markets from the borough level to the centralised model (Jansens, 2017). According to the analysis in the integrity report (2012), the enforcement tasks of the market managers were insufficient. One of the factors that could potentially risk or damage integrity is that market managers have developed close, long-term relationships with the markets and market vendors. The report specifically highlighted this bond and the fact that the market offices are located near to the markets as a possible breeding ground for corruption and fraud. The centralisation of governance and management was suggested to take responsibility away from the market managers. By separating task enforcement, the day-to-day facilitation of markets, resource distribution, and negotiation out to different roles in a structured, centralised bureaucratic system, the new model is expected to clear away the problems with the old system.

In relation to the urgent need to deal with structural corruption, the centralised Market Office was set up in 2014 shortly after the reorganisation process began. Meanwhile, other organisations with important tasks related to street markets were slower to join the process of centralisation. As mentioned, it took five years to find the right cluster for Market Office to join.

According to the manager of MB (#8), the most significant effect of the Market Office not having a stable position within the municipal structure is that it puts the department in a weaker position when it comes to negotiating and cooperating with other departments. As one of the former market brokers (#6) recalled, their temporarily adoption by the central borough government meant they faced certain political difficulties in trying to persuade other borough governments to work together. Moreover, they had a smaller budget to work with because they only received financial resources from the weakening sub-governance level.

An anecdotal field note that I made on the subject of interviewing the manager of MB (#8) reflects upon the awkward position of MB in the larger governmental structure:

After our interview, I asked her if I could take a picture of the diagram which she used to explain the organisation position, division of work, and different job functions inside of the Market Office to me. Because that was exactly what I always ask interviewees to draw with me. It saved us a lot of time that she already had it. I thanked her and asked if she did it as preparation for our interview. She said no. She always had this diagram in her notebook.

Because she has to explain where the Market Office is and what they do on a daily basis to other colleagues in the municipality. (03,04,2019)

In the run-up to the inclusion of the Market Office in the City Management cluster, the manager of the Market Office hired an interim team to build a new working coalition around market affairs with other departments. However, the impact of being late to the new cluster was that they have to deal with internal politics. As one of the market managers (#11) put it, the manager of the Market Office has to “persuade” other managers to work with the Market Office, which does not always work. As another public official within the MB softly confided: “it’s always a battle for getting attention. And it also takes time to build the routine” (#23).

This section has detailed the broader context of the city of Amsterdam’s organisational reconfiguration, within which the governance regime of street markets sits. Zooming in on the impacts that individuals within the organisation have encountered has allowed for a more lively portrait of what it is to work surrounded by the changing dynamics of the governance regime.

4.3 Challenges for the Current Governance Regime

The current governance regime of Amsterdam’s street markets is the result of the reconfiguration of the city’s municipal structures. It benefits from the structural changes, but also has to work with the deficiencies of the new municipal structure. Concerning the markets, street commerce in Amsterdam is experiencing a historical decline. What are the challenges that the governance regime has to deal with?

In Chapter 2, I explained that institutions in the governance regime can be classed as either formal institutions or informal institutions. The previous two sections have focused on the relationship between governmental organisations and the formal institutions that they work with. However, in many of the narrative interviews that I conducted, public officials reflected upon how they have adapted their daily work to the ongoing transformations within the governance regime. From these reflections, in addition to complaints aired during the interviews, it is clear that although Amsterdam’s street market governance regime is framed by sets of formal institutions affiliated to different levels of organisation, there are very few informal institutions at the intra-level between these organisations. This absence produces three challenges that the governance regime has to face.

4.3.1 Intra-Level Communication as Informal Institution

Colleague Hunting

As outlined above, the change to the governance regime meant that departments and even offices were re-categorised and moved into different functional clusters. The major impact of this change was the obstacles to communication that it created. This became a fundamental challenge for public officials and the execution of tasks related to street markets.

In the narrative interviews that I conducted with public officials working in the governance regime of street markets, I always asked interviewees about their position within the municipal structure, and how much they knew about others in the same regime. In every interview, on the topic of who my interviewees were supposed to work with outside of their own office, there was a common complaint about the difficulty of working as a team, how much time they spent on communication, and how inefficient it was. They all felt that managing mixed-use public spaces requires effective teamwork, but said that they were not working as a team, and found it difficult to even know who they should be working with.

The market broker (#10) who worked on policy for markets vividly described her predicament, trying to pull people together to work on everything from cleaning issues upwards. If there had been a problem with street cleaning before the restructuring, the market management team would have contacted the neighbourhood area team, who would have sorted out the problem and communicated to that effect. After the organisational change, this is what happened:

Because of the reorganisation last year, everybody moved. So we didn't know who to talk to. First I called the area team, they used to have their guys and they would call and do it. And now I called them, and they said: 'Yeah I don't know.' 'Who can I talk to? We need to talk to them...' 'I don't know...' 'Ok. Who knows?' 'Nobody knows...' We have a challenge! This is one of the challenges we are working with, but those are actually daily operations to get the baseline in order. (market broker, #10, Amsterdam, 17/04/2019)

In order to get their daily operations in order, public officials have to spend more time fixing the basic communication network than on what their job title implies. As the same market broker put it:

Next to that, is my job with market vision and the renewal of markets, but if this isn't working, it makes my job a lot harder. So I also spend a lot of time trying to get to the base.

On top of this, though finding the right contact is a challenge, getting them to execute the task is even harder. Essential to getting different institutions to work together and collectively maintain a certain baseline is effective communication, negotiation, and prioritising. Issues concerning rubbish on the Dappermarkt are a perfect example of institutional fragmentation in the governance regime. As a result of centralisation, street cleaning and rubbish collection now belong to different departments within the City Management cluster. When it comes to cleaning up after street markets, tensions that rise between vendors and shop owners can remain unresolved by the system. Public officials in both the area team and the Market Office are aware of the issue, but do not have power to coordinate the network and fix the problem.

A logical arrangement would be for vendors to leave their rubbish on site, provided they had sorted it according to regulations, and municipal cleaners would pick it up and clean the street after the market had closed. Meanwhile, bar and restaurant staff could be putting out their terrace seats in preparation for the evening. The street should be clean and ready by then. However, this is not the case. The neighbourhood area broker (#7) explained things thus:

Vegetable vendors, they have these crates, but that [does not] go into the bag. They have to fold them, but they don't do it. They just put it like that out there. And it's a lot of them. One entrepreneur wants to build up his terrace at 5 o'clock. That's the time when vendors leave, and they leave all [their] garbage. So his terrace is filled up with crates this high [indicates a human-height pile], with rotten fruits inside and you know... sometimes garbage bags get torn open by people who search for useful stuff inside. The wind comes; it blows everything everywhere, just one big mess. Around 5, vendors left, around 7 the cleaning comes, so they pick up the garbage but they also have to clean the street. There is quite a big time gap.

So how to deal with this gap? And who should deal with it? The area broker understood that the street master should be responsible for enforcement within the street market, and should therefore be the one to address this issue. She continued:

The major problem is that there is no enforcement. Because of the time schedule now, there has to be 2 handhavers at the start of the day because of the 'eyes' principle, and their shift ends like 3 or 4, so 5 o'clock, when everybody leaves, when all the trash is out there, nobody was there to correct them. And this is something I figured out 2 years ago. I thought, wow this is an easy one we need to fix it, but it's still not fixed. It's hard to change because of the old rules and regulations, everything is connected. So everything, the whole system has to change to be able for them to change,

or there has to be more money to hire more people. There are handhavors from the market, stadsteel and municipality, which I still don't understand. Who does what, is very confusing.

On the other hand, the market broker (#10) understood the situation differently. There is an enforcement executor from THOR in the market, who has the power to issue fines if vendors contravene market regulation. However, they are only in the market three times a week, and only stay for a few hours. Moreover, the market broker also struggled to identify a contact related to cleaning within the new governance regime. As she explained:

Last year, if there was something, I could call them. They would make sure it would happen. Because now you also have in the city works, that's the cleaning but it's also if something is broken in the public space, we also need them. I find it very difficult to understand [because] cleaning and garbage in my opinion should be together. It's not. They are two different identities with their priorities and agenda. To get those together, we don't have any saying in that, because we are here somewhere, we are in parallel not hierarchy.

This highlights out a crucial deficiency in the governance regime: there is neither a formal institution to facilitate departments or offices to work together, nor are there informal institutions such as a culture of coordination, oral agreements between different departments, or even basic contact forms to indicate who works where. However, coordination between the organisations responsible for mixed-use public spaces such as street markets is crucial to keep the space functioning. In this respect, the transformation of organisational structure hardly helped. To continue with the market broker's cleaning story:

Our challenge is, at this point you see all those different things... the city is [organised] like this, and for the market we need this. And the tricky question, you don't have the authority... I can say the market ends at 5 for example, so they are gone by 6, then I need the stall setter to remove stalls, at 6.30 I need the garbage to pick up the garbage; then at 7 I need the cleaning to clean everything... Some markets work perfectly, some markets not. Then the problem is we don't talk to each other enough. Now it's more difficult for us to work together. In general, I think it's good to have a centralised scheme. Then also you see now that seven views have to become one. But they had their internal problems and we came again... 'Hi! Market! I need priority please' [raises a hand].

Centralisation Without Facilitation Means Fragmentation

The reconfiguration of the governance regime without established informal institutions does not only turn coordination into a competition for attention. Displacing public officials from what were geographically-oriented working environments also dilutes the sense of belonging felt by those within the governance regime.

I conducted a narrative interview with the former market manager of the Dappermarkt (#4). A large part of our conversation focused on how, during the localised scheme, street security, safety, and the economy of the neighbourhood were brought together by the solidarity between vendors, public officials, and residents. Their obvious emotion revealed their pride in hard work and the conviction that “people who work for the street should stay on the street.” However, following the centralisation, the solidarity and sense of community between residents, vendors, and shop owners are no longer as strong as before.

However, the local area team is now busy rebuilding the social bonds and trust among residents. Their aim is to create opportunities for livelihoods in public spaces, whether or not there is a market in the neighbourhood. This positive development has grown out of the coalition between the local area team and the Market Office, but their contacts with public space management were still lacking. As the area coordinator (#13) told me:

The public space people also made a move from being well-known, responsible for certain parts to central organisation. They got really hidden, far away somewhere in the West, we did not know whom to reach and contact, so that took place in a similar situation.

I think it’s important for the development of the Dapperbuurt that all these separate issues interact with each other, literally. People that feel responsible for the market also have contact with the surroundings and with citizens (people who live here) to talk about what sort of market it needs to be and where it should be situated and what sort of products do we need on this market?

Reflecting on these different narratives around the same issue, it is abundantly obvious that in the context of mixed-use public space, centralisation means fragmentation. Fragmented governance means that power and mandates are distributed throughout different organisations. To avoid giving too much power—and the attendant risk of corruption—to those who work on the daily operation of the market, centralisation splits once cohesive teams into individuals in separate teams. In the centralised model of mixed-use public space governance, public officials have to spend far more time

communicating about priorities and negotiating between parallel institutions to get anything done.

The longer individual officials work within the governance regime, the more specialist tactics and informal institutions are innovated to cope with this fragmentation. In my interview with a market broker (#11), I shared my frustration at having contacted several public officials without receiving any response. She told me that I was not alone in this. Deal with colleagues who do not respond but with whom she has to work was, she said, part of her work:

When I need to do an extra market, it's a lot of work. For example, if I write [an] email to parking department but no one feels responsible. Then I have to find a person... 'Hi Bart! How are you? For that day I want to organise a market. Can you help me?' Bart says: 'Yes, I'll ask a co-worker.' Then I called Bart: 'Is it ok? Did you check it? Can you write down an email?' 'Yes' 'Thank you Bart.' If it's not okay... 'Bart, what's the problem?' Because I can't go to the department. I don't know who is doing that. **In every department, you need to have friends.** A person with [their] name, phone number, and email address.

The exceptional situation of organising an extra market day is an example of just how many different offices—public and private—need to be involved to run a market in a public space. According to the market broker (#11) and the document she provided me with, organising a market day involves both administration and operational procedures. In terms of the administrative procedure, the market broker must first acquire the permission of the borough government, and check with the area team that there is no other event at the same time. Once the borough government has granted permission, the operational procedure kicks in, and the department of rubbish collection, cleaning, parking, enforcement (safety), the car towing service, those responsible for temporary road signage, and the stall builder all have to confirm their availability for the extra market day. Only when they all agree can the market be opened. However, even the market broker does not have the contact details for all of these different departments. Nor is it simply a question of sending an email; the specific contact in each department must be known, and they may take a long time to respond.

Similar situations also apply to daily operations in the market. The market manager (#23) in the Dappermarket identified two distinct levels that he had to work on to cope with the fragmented communication within the governance regime:

I do two things, one practical thing to get the job done and one for the future. I always work on my relationship on a lower level. Because I try to

reach the people I know I need. I don't take his manager or his boss, I've called directly to him and said, 'Can you do this for me? Can you come tomorrow and put this away?' Or, 'can you make a hole in the ground for me?' I let him know that I need [him] and we are glad you'd like to hear. I gave him credits for his job that he saw. Give him the respect and you need a good job. We both know that it's not official. It's always difficult when we talk to each other but we can make the problem disappear. The practical way to try to get his numbers then later comes to official.

On an official level, we put B and R to make it official, and try to build a good relationship. Because if we don't make it official, it will always stay like this. And we must make the transformation an official thing.

"B and R" as mentioned here were the interim team facilitators in the Market Office. Although there is no mandate to make public officials in different organisations work together to solve certain problems, as the major organisation in the governance of street markets, the Market Office recognised the necessity of team building, and of developing informal institutions to facilitate coordination.

Marktbureau is set to clear up all the mess 2014-17. After that we said 'when you don't want to do something, we do.' Then we are bigger and we do almost everything from the market. Also from waste picking. Two years ago we said garbage is not for us, but every problem speaking to us is about garbage. So we say 'Okay. You think that we are doing it. Okay.' So we have taken a lot of jobs alongside. (Manager of Marktbureau #8)

It is not an obligation for the Market Office to take a coordinating role within the governance regime. Their job is simply to keep the markets running. However, there are several obstacles to "just" making sure the markets run as they should. As a consequence, the MB is always in a battle for attention and prioritisation. To cope with this, the manager mobilised her professional network to hire a temporary contracted facilitator to build bridges with the various offices that work on street markets. The main task of the facilitator was to organise training sessions that would build up a team from within the Market Office as well as other offices that play a role in street markets, such as cleaning, rubbish collection, enforcement, and the neighbourhood area team. As such, the Market Office took the initiative to develop informal institutions in an attempt to join up the fragmented departments.

It is worth noting that to do so, MB hired a well-connected interim facilitator who was experienced in working with several municipalities from around the Amsterdam region. As for the task of building informal institutions, the facilitator (#15) explained to me the reason for the fragmented communication:

There are more than 12,000 colleagues who work for the municipality. If you come here to work, they don't have a phone book or map or something—'here is your place, good luck!'—everybody has to find his own path to glory... Everybody's very occupied with [their] own things, and with a bigger picture. For example, the people who are collecting the waste, they have certain surroundings they take, that makes them stay at six o'clock here and seven o'clock there. But the other departments have another schedule. So they don't meet on the right points. So that makes one of the guys wait for an hour before he can do his job.

My main thing is to show and to let people understand, to feel what's going on. Everybody is just walking his own path. But together, we have to do something else. To form a team, to serve people on the street, which we are here for, not for our own business.

We make some scripts, about all things that could go wrong, did happen, and then ask the people what [would] you do? What do you think we have to do in that situation? Who do you need? What do you need? What kinds of appointments do you have? How do you make it better? We started with that, three series of sessions. Now we have ended that and everybody now knows where the problems are and what do you have to do to solve it. The next step is to reach other layers in the organisations, people who are in charge of the other departments to make them also responsible for the total result. We are together responsible for the total result.

In this section, I have discussed the pros and cons of organisational reconfiguration in a municipality. However, the findings of my organisational ethnography suggest that from the perspective of mixed-use public space, centralised organisational design without proper facilitation can have serious negative consequences. One such consequence is passing the costs of centralisation on to the users of public spaces.

4.3.2 Colliding Values Between the Production and Management of Public Spaces

Zooming out from the daily challenges, this section will look more closely at the fragmentation of policy-making and implementation. In addition to the spatial management of Amsterdam's street markets being fragmented, the production side of public spaces is detached from the management side within the governance regime. In the current set-up, the Marktbureau, City Management cluster, and borough governments are the main stakeholders in managing and maintaining the city's street markets. In terms of planning, design, and physical interventions, spatial involvement as such belongs to almost another system. Here, different values collide.

Policy-making, planning, and the design of public spaces are mostly handled by various offices in the Space and Economy cluster. They work almost parallel to the daily operation, management, and maintenance of public spaces. In the case of street markets, the proposal and making of policy is the responsibility of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The position of the policymaker is clear: the goal of any policy is to find out the best combination of economic policy for retail business and spatial policy for quality public spaces for citizens to enjoy:

You have to have a motivation for using space for commercial activities. What's the motivation? One is, we have shops in Amsterdam, but we want to have markets additional to that. That means you can buy things on markets that you can't buy in the shop. That's very essential, otherwise people can go to [the] shop. [They say] 'We don't need to use this public space.' And secondly we said that markets could be valuable meeting places for different kinds of people in Amsterdam who will not meet easily as in shops. Those two are aims for the markets. (Policymaker, #12)

There is a goal, but are there forces wrapped up in this top-down approach to planning other than daily management? Influenced by the history of the highly autonomous sub-governance system, it is nevertheless unusual for EZ to be involved in the planning of public space for markets at the level of the city. Before, such a task was either taken up by individual borough governments, or a part of regional/master planning. In the latter case, as the policymaker above made clear, urban planning is always about money in Amsterdam. The city owns the land, and started with calculations. Conventional urban planning in Amsterdam has always been a question of building and land, rather than activities in space.

Within this conventional view, public spaces are no more than pieces of infrastructure that need to be counted in the development plan to meet zoning law: how many square metres of public space should be planned given the number of planned dwellings, how many shops should there be around the space, and the most important question of all: how many euros per square metre should be invested? Therefore, to deploy a mid-scale planning vision specific to public spaces and street commerce within the existing planning system, EZ must engage not only with these existing planning systems but also with emerging governance schemes.

The question that follows the issue of policy and planning, is who is in charge of implementing the physical intervention along with the top-down planning? In the current system, tasks involving necessary spatial refurbishment or interventions are handed to the project management department, and the urban planners working there. Their role can be understood as an internal consultancy office within the municipality, and one of the department's jobs is to bridge gaps within projects. Once

a policy decision is made by the central municipality, the budget for the project is cornered, and planners in the project management department set about assembling interdisciplinary teams from different sectors in the municipality. The team, with its focus on implementation, only works on delivering projects, and is not responsible for anything outside of the implementation period. Most important of all, they answer only to the central municipality, and cannot be mobilised by either the individual borough governments, the Market Office, or area teams, who have closer ties with citizens and users of the public spaces and are likely to know their actual needs best.

Although the logic behind the centralised governance scheme was to allow different borough governments to share one central governance system, it weakens the power and scope of both bottom-up initiatives and neighbourhood public officials when it comes to street markets. On this point, three major constraints can be deduced from my interviews with public officials in the neighbourhood area teams.

First, because physical interventions into public space can only be mobilised by the central municipality, then handed to the project management team, any physical changes to public space have to pass through even more bureaucratic layers before they can be carried out than when the borough governments were the responsible authority. Nowadays, a proposed intervention in a public space must travel from the neighbourhood governance level to the central municipal level. Once a decision has been made at both of these levels, another team takes over. It practically takes longer to negotiate between the various governmental institutions than for any physical change to become noticeable.

The neighbourhood area team of the Dapperplein, for example, is working on taking advantage of the square's multi-use character outside of market hours. According to the team, the current spatial arrangement of the square does not accommodate multi-uses well for the community. However, given that the square was recently renovated, and that the neighbouring Eerst Swintonstraat is undergoing a 2 million euro overhaul, it is unlikely that the central government will allocate more resources to changing the square any time soon. As such, soft interventions are being trialled. For instance, the area team is negotiating with the Market Office to change the layout of stalls on the square.

Second, on the subject of the square's hostility to neighbourhood uses despite having been renovated only recently, the area coordinator revealed to me that the designers responsible for the square's design simply sat in the office and came up with it. They had no connection with the neighbourhood whatsoever. What the area coordinator really wanted was for the square to be for the community and made by the community. However, given that the current workflow of the production of public

spaces in Amsterdam is very much of a top-down nature, and that the management side has little influence on the production side, such a dream will not easily become reality.

Third, many are simply frustrated that, though they see changes to and the decline of street markets and the local economy, they do not have any say in the governance structure nor power to change. Such frustrations are commonly spread among public officials working on the daily operation of those same markets and the surrounding public space. In light of the complicated dynamics within mixed-use public spaces, any small change could have a huge impact. Yet public officials closely observe such changes, and cannot do much about them.

Just this year, the parking fee around the Dappermarkt has doubled, from three euros an hour to six. Vendors panicked that this might—or already had—impact the already struggling business in the market. Therefore, they together raised a public petition asking for the fee to be halved. I asked the market master for his opinions and observations on this affair. He confirmed the vendors' panic, and said that the higher fee did have a visible impact. However, the only thing he could do was hang the protest t-shirt on the bulletin in front of the Market Office to show his support. The same goes for the area team. They work hard to animate the neighbourhood's social dynamic, particularly on the Dapperplein. This summer they opened a new work and co-creation space on the square. Instead of using property owned by the municipality, they rented the shop space from a social housing association with an anti-squat short contract. Addressing the use of public housing property to stimulate public interest in the community, the shop space on the other side of the square is owned by another institution in the municipality, which does not share the “neighbourhood first” values of the neighbourhood team.

4.3.3 The Collision of *Techne* and *Metis* on the Dappermarkt

The last challenge that I observed in my organisational ethnography was the fear to reach out to the public in street markets. There are two elements at work here. The first derives from what was said in section 4.2 about corruption. Avoiding unnecessary contact with vendors was recommended. The second is the adoption of top-down policy planning from EZ.

In order to take the development of street markets to the level of the city, EZ deploys the lens of a top-down approach to urban planning to examine street markets. In addition to a business analysis, EZ officers also carry out a geographical analysis of the distribution of street markets around the city. When I mentioned my background as an urban planning researcher in my interview with a municipal officer from EZ, he seemed happy to relate his thoughts on their work in urban planning:

We saw that market days are not well enough spread over the city, some [areas] have no markets, and [others] have markets close together, and also more days in a week. So there is a misbalance in the city. And then we said we have to make *marktvisie*. What kind of markets are well suited for Amsterdam also in future? So not [reacting] to things but [looking] ahead. Just like you do urban planning. (Policymaker, #12)

What he meant by “Just like you do urban planning” was a techne-oriented form of top-down strategic planning in the governance of mixed-use public spaces. As he went on:

Sellers on the markets perceive markets as their possession. They can sell what they want. While in the vision of the city, as you do urban planning, you ask what kind of city [do] we want to be? For whom and where? What do they want? Also that open space in Amsterdam within the ring has become more crowded. We have to determine where we intend to have activities and where not. And what kinds of activities are suitable for the place?

This narrative of techne-oriented planning is also in line with the steps that EZ takes to make policy. It starts with abstract vision-making. The vision identifies certain problems and goals that the planners intend to reach. Or, in the words of the retail consultant: “Market visions show there are several buttons you can turn on to make it [the market] better” (consultant, #5). With certain problems and goals in mind, in-depth investigations were carried out, the results of which will later inform decision-making. Official policy will then come afterwards. This workflow and outcome will surely resolve the problems that EZ posed above, in their own narrative.

However, what this techne-oriented scheme aims to govern is the irreducible metis-practice reality of mixed-use public spaces. Public officials are clearly aware of this. The fact that formal institutions have specific regulations tailor-made to apply to the context of each street market is proof. Furthermore, each market has its own micro-politics of stakeholders using the space. Any vision-planning must accommodate these highly differentiated metis-oriented spaces.

Every market is completely different with [its] own vendors, neighbourhood, and own politics. And they also have their own customers. There is no market in Holland you can compare to another market. (Consultant, #5)

This was the point of view of a retail consultant working on street and retail commerce, discussing the challenge of vision-planning. Therefore, even if EZ correctly diagnosed the problems facing street markets at the city scale, and identified common problems such as ageing vendors, or vendors being outperformed by e-commerce

etc., there is no promise that any one solution could be applied to similar issues in different markets.

To return to the Dappermarkt, various contributions from different positions revealed a controversial side to the *techne* and *metis* perspective of problem-solving. According to a survey as well as daily observations, business in the Dappermarkt does not do so well during weekdays. The question is, what can be done?

From the point of view of EZ, shortening the market days from 6 to 3 would encourage consumers to go to the markets at the same time as reducing the cost of maintaining the market. This is a piece of rational, cost-effective, abstract thinking. Meanwhile, for stakeholders on the ground, in addition to a former market manager (#4), a consultant (#5), and the conversations that I had with market masters, each market has its own distinct culture, customers, residents, and politics. Declining business is “just the tip of the iceberg” (consultant, #5).

For this latter group, understanding the neighbourhood and the people who work and live on and around street markets requires effort if the goal is to identify specific problems and find ways to deal with them. For example, another consultant (#18) mentioned one of the issues affecting street markets most commonly mentioned, that bars and restaurants want to infringe on the space designated for market stalls and extend their terraces. However, *Horace* on the Dapperplein can barely stay afloat. Bars are closing because they do not have enough customers, which severely impacts their ability to pay rent. In this case, whether shorter market days will affect street and retail commerce for the better remains an open question.

In a nutshell, imposing a top-down strategy on highly territorial street markets is a challenge for the governance regime. A collision between a *techne* approach—to “fix” street commerce and maximise the use of public space through strategic planning—and a *metis* approach—which values territorial mixed-use public spaces with their specific micro-politics and their own ways of looking at things—is expected to come in the near future.

4.4 “Markets Need to Change,” but how?

“Street markets need to change”—this sentence appeared in every interview that I conducted. As a matter of fact, street markets in Amsterdam have changed a lot over the past few years. What is less clear, however, in this call for change is: what do street markets need to be changed into? For whom? Who can make the change, and how?

During my investigation, I found that the governance regime of Amsterdam’s street markets had completely changed since 2014. The centralisation of the municipal

hierarchy, in addition to the steps taken following the corruption scandal, saw the governance regime's highly localised model replaced by a centralised management structure.

The aim of the organisational reform was to reduce the layers of hierarchical governance, and to have Amsterdam function like one city instead of seven small ones. After the reform, many issues that had previously been handled by the various borough governments and their own mandates could finally be governed with a much broader overview. Visionary planning with a single mandate became possible, including for public spaces. The Ministry of Economic Affairs is already doing this with street markets and outsourced consultancy partners.

However, the consequence of this centralisation on the governance of mixed-use public spaces at the institutional level was fragmentation. From a place-based point of view, the governance regime—which used to comprise a compact network integrated into the places it worked with—has been split into tiers and spread over different centralised departments. In the case study, the real impact of fragmentation was that public officials struggled to set up even the most essential communication channels, and all efforts went towards ensuring that public spaces simply meet basic requirements. Those working closely with a public space no longer have the power to change it. As a result, it takes longer to build new coalitions and develop a new governance model. The top-down approach to governance not only diluted the sense that belonged within the governance regime, but also separated the production of public space from how it is managed.

The thing preventing everything from falling apart in this new governance regime is the rigidity of its regulations and mandates. Therefore, even though the channels for inter-department cooperation are disconnected, nothing can go very wrong provided that everyone follows the rules and just works on their own. At the same time, however, this rigidity also proved a major flaw, as it became a barrier to cooperation and the improvement of governance due to the fact that every mandate had its own priorities and limitations. The goal of simplifying higher-level governance became confused with the level of mixed-use public spaces, and to solve this situation, a new position was created to establish communication channels and train public officials to work as a team.

Apart from the organisational change, the rise of e-commerce and other changes to the retail environment are making businesses in street markets more precarious than ever. Both vendors and consumers in street markets are losing fast. Markets used to be popular, so much so in fact that cases of corruption—such as I discussed above—made the headlines, because the more desirable spots were in such high demand. Now however, the need to save the markets is most often cited by policymakers as

the reason why change is so necessary. As for the vendors and public officials who work at street level, change is not only a question of business, but the loss of a sense of place. The new governance regime is partially designed to prevent anyone from becoming so involved with the markets that they slide into corruption. Against this backdrop, however, a feeling of disorientation is common at street level. In the next chapter, I will analyse the approach of the new governance regime to the streets.

CHAPTER 5 Street Ethnography in Amsterdam

In Chapter 4, I showed how the organisational network and its formal institutions work within the governance regime of Amsterdam's street markets. Keeping the composition of organisations and the governance regime's regulative tools in mind, this chapter will focus on how street actors interact with the governance regime on site. In particular, I will take the Dappermarkt—which is located on the East side of the city—as an in-depth study case. Combining archival research and spatial ethnography, I will attempt to understand the socio-spatial dynamics of the Dappermarkt from a socially contextualised perspective.

In the following sections, I will first establish the case and its history for the ethnographic findings to come, by introducing the Dappermarkt and discussing a number of the market's historical moments. Then, to unpack how street actors interact with the governance regime, I will structure my ethnographic findings around three topics: how vendors and public officials perceive each other, how vendors and public officials share a different sense of time, and the growth of trust and mistrust through daily interactions.

5.1 Case Introduction

The Dappermarkt is one of Amsterdam's largest daily street markets. It is located in the Dapperbuurt neighbourhood, in the city's Eastern borough. Six days a week, stall operators sell up and down the 500 metre-long Dapperstraat and on the Dapperplein square, with the Dapperstraat capable of hosting around 250 stalls. As one of the city's general markets, the Dappermarkt comprises both food and non-food merchants. Market stalls in the Dappermarkt are mostly fixed, with a canvas roof, wooden planks, and metal trusses (see picture 5.1), with the stall provider also considered the vendor. In a few exceptional cases, fish, bread, nuts, and French fries are sold from separate food trucks.

On the Dapperstraat, during the day, people mostly walk on the car-free street instead of the pavements, which become a buffer zone between stalls and shops. In some extreme cases, the pavements near to the stalls act as a kind of backstage area, with crates and boxes piled up there (see picture 5.2). Under these circumstances, therefore, shops on the Dapperstraat receive relatively less attention than the market stalls. Some commercial units, such as greengrocers, shoe shops, and kebab shops, rent stalls in front of their permanent premises as an extension of their space. Bars and restaurants opt primarily for street corners with more space for their terraces. Nevertheless, the general retail shops on the street are not very active. At night, the spaces that had hosted stalls become parking spaces. Above the ground floor on both sides of the street are residential apartments.



Picture 5.1 A daily scene in the Dappermarkt (Source: author)



Picture 5.2 The pavement during market hours (Source: author)

This is the environment in which I conducted my in-depth case study in Amsterdam. Coincidentally, I live on one of the side streets that joins the Dapperstaart. As an Asian-looking, non-Dutch, non-native-speaking female resident of the neighbourhood, I used a variety of different approaches to understand my chosen field. For seven months, I strolled intensively around the market to observe its daily dynamics. I encountered street-level bureaucrats, such as the market masters and enforcement officers, as well as vendors, and immersed myself as one of the market's familiar faces. Despite my limited language capacity, I collected titbits and anecdotes on the street. To gain a broader perspective of the field, I also took information that I collected on the street as a point of departure, and dug deeper into archives about the past of the Dappermarkt and the neighbourhood. In this section, I will combine street ethnography and archival study to discuss four historical moments that offer insight into the characteristics of Dappermarkt and the Dapperbuurt neighbourhood.

1. A Citizen-Initiated Market in the Late 19th Century

The city of Amsterdam and its markets have long been indelibly intertwined. Amsterdam established its competitive status as a world city by coming to lead the world trade network in the 17th century. From regional and colonial markets to the financial stock markets, this trademark of the city is precisely anchored in the very well-served domain of trade business, including many street markets. However, that was not the case when the Dappermarkt was established.

In the late 19th century, the industrial revolution arrived in Amsterdam. New urban infrastructure, such as canals and train stations, was built. Immigrants from rural areas came to work in the modernisation of the city. New residential neighbourhoods such as De Pijp and Dapperbuurt were quickly and cheaply built to accommodate this new working class in the city, a period known as the new urban expansion of Amsterdam.

Before these newly built, densely populated neighbourhoods developed everyday retail businesses, such as shops and street markets, street peddlers identified an opportunity for business (Huberts, 1940). The main streets of these neighbourhoods, such as the Alber Cuypstraat in De Pijp or the Dapperstraat in Dapperbuurt were popular targets for street peddlers, who competed to occupy the best spots for their business. Eventually, these illegal clusters became informal street markets (Kistemaker et al., 1984).

At that time, the governance of market businesses had already been established in Amsterdam. The Department of Market Affairs was set up to deal with both wholesale and retail markets in the city. While the department's activities focused more on food logistics in the wholesale market, retail street markets and vendors were seen as objects that had to be regulated as a matter of public order. The newly formed informal vending clusters, such as the "pre-Dappermarkt," however, were not seen to fall under the aegis of this governance system.

In 1891, the city authority decided to take action based on the concept of designated tolerance. Although they did not like the illegal gatherings of vendors on the street, which they saw as a threat to public order, they could not deny the necessity of the services that the vendors were offering to families in these neighbourhoods, to compensate for the shortage of shops. The city's move to tolerate this activity came with the designation, from West to East, of three streets—Albert Cuypstraat, Dapperstraat, and Ten Katestraat—where vendors were allowed to sell their wares under the surveillance of the police.

Note that these three streets were still not officially authorised street markets as we know them today. Vendors were given a “place card” from the authority as their licence of permission. They did not have to pay a market fee, and there was no supervision from the Department of Market Affairs. Nor were there inspections of merchant quality, hygiene, and price; vendors were simply being contained on these streets to allow the authority to keep other streets vending-free. It was no more than a temporary pragmatic solution to cope with provision demand in fast-growing neighbourhoods (CVP, 1914).

Despite the scepticism of the city authority towards these streets, all of these semi-legal street markets became widely popular among citizens, and expanded rapidly. Indeed, the police had to institute a waiting list for contested spots and try to control the growing sprawl of the markets. In August 1913, the list reached around 200 applicants, and the huge popularity of these semi-legal street fixtures eventually led to their de facto becoming street markets. The Department of Market Affairs included these streets in the list of official markets under their charge. Jurisdiction, inspection, and vending fees (that is, rent) were introduced (COTM, 1914). Nevertheless, they remained popular spaces for which vendors queued to be able to participate.

2. Citizen-Led Urban Regeneration in the 1970s-1980s

Almost a century after urban expansion, those apartments built cheaply and quickly to accommodate industrial labourers were dilapidated. Families who could afford better housing had moved out of the rundown neighbourhood. At that time, the Dapperbuurt was primarily home to social minorities and students. In 1972, the municipal planning department submitted the urban regenerative project Plan Duyff, which aimed to renew the neighbourhood from scratch (Huijbers, 2013).

In this bulldozing urban renewal plan, the tight urban fabric was to be replaced by the model of the garden city. Housing units were to halve, from 5600 to 2300, with more open space between settlements. The Dappermarkt, which is at the neighbourhood's centre, was set to be replaced by a shopping centre close to the Muiderpoort train station.

Unsurprisingly, this renewal plan was not popular with residents and vendors, and together with the student group de Sterke Arm and shop owners, they protested against it (Stichting Ondernemerscomitee Dapperbuurt, 1974). This urban social movement was successful in halting most of the plan (Pruijt, 2004). Moreover, a more democratic and participatory plan for regeneration was proposed to avoid any radical demolition. That is, over the next 15 years, citizens and vendors came together to work with municipal Dapperbuurt Project Groups on a community-led renewal plan.

In this plan, streets and the general urban fabric were preserved at their original scale. Schools and the street market remained, and residential buildings were to be redesigned and tailored to local needs. In addition to the residents' working groups for architectural renewal, shop owners and street vendors also organised their own working groups to work with the municipal project group (Ligtenberg, 2014).

In 1975, the vendors set up a foundation—Stichting Ondernemerscomitee Dapperbuurt (SOC)—as a legal collective (rather than dispersive individuals) to negotiate with the government. Archival research (Projektgroep Dapperbuurt, 1975) into various processes and issues of renewal plans revealed that later in its life, SOC appeared in different project groups. For example, there was a group for street vendors called the Ambtelijke Projectgroep, which would be invited to participate in meetings with other residential groups to discuss the needs of vendors to have storage spaces in new residential buildings.

From the archive files that document the renewal process, the most revealing event in terms of the participation of street vendors in the process concerned the redesigning of the neighbourhood's key bit of public space, the Dapperplein. From spring to autumn 1979, the Dapperplein project group held intensive neighbourhood meetings to discuss redesigning the space (see figure 5.1, 5.2). Issues such as the building line, the width of pavements and streets, the traffic plan, and vendors' workspace were addressed (Projektgroep Dapperbuurt, 1979). In the same archive box, documents⁴ reveal that such participatory design meetings were organised every few weeks. The needs of the different work groups involved were collected and discussed during the evening meeting at the de Werf neighbourhood centre, with each meeting beginning at 8:00 p.m. and lasting about two or three hours. One of the meeting invitations encourages the vendors' workgroup in particular to attend and participate, because the discussion was partly about their workspace.

⁴ Documentatie Dapperbuurt, Documentatie vormgevingsproject Dapperbuurt/Dapperfestival, map met reclame folders, correspondentie, notulen, nota's en notities, pamfletten, publicaties uit Nederland. (Doos 07, Map 4.), International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

It is safe to say that citizens' collective efforts in the 1970s and 1980s played a fundamental role in shaping the public spaces and housing of the Dapperbuurt of today. The street market was preserved not just spatially, but with improved infrastructure and housing. Socially speaking, the results of this episode of autonomous citizens coming together and working in solidarity can be seen in the diversity and affordability of the neighbourhood and its street markets to this day.




Figure 5.1 Meeting invitation to redesign the streets and public spaces of Dapperbuurt (source: International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, the Netherlands)




Figure 5.2 Design draft in section of Dapperstraat (source: International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, the Netherlands)

3. The Fall From Glory After 2008

Decades after the demolition crisis, the Dappermarkt was as busy and vibrant as it ever had been. In 2007, the busy street market that has served the city for over a century was selected as the best market in the Netherlands and one of the Top 10 Shopping Streets in the World by the National Geographic Traveller (Het Parool, 2007).

The Dappermarkt is famous for bargains and its range of multi-ethnic produce. Shoppers and street vendors from Surinamese, Asian, North African, Mediterranean, and white working-class backgrounds buy, sell, and socialise side by side. Indeed, the diversity of the working class population in the market resonates with the residential composition and cultural atmosphere of the neighbourhood more broadly.

However, the market that had previously flourished suffered greatly when the effects of the world economic crisis hit the Netherlands in 2008. Businesses in street markets started to contract, and this decline continued even after the initial economic crisis. The recession affected both the revenue of street vendors and the empty spaces in street markets. For the first time in the history of the Dappermarkt, the question became how to improve business rather than mitigating overcrowding (See picture 5.3).



Picture 5.3 A characteristically empty market on a weekday afternoon (Source: author)

With the three historical periods sketched above in the back of my mind, I started my fieldwork in 2018. From March to October 2018, I conducted an intensive period of

street ethnography in the Dappermarkt. In addition to my participatory observation as a marketgoer, I also frequently spoke to vendors and market masters in the market. During that period, a demonstration followed by a public petition was initiated by vendors to protest the rising price of parking fees in the Dapperbuurt. Vendors claimed that the doubling in parking fees (from 3 to 6 euros per hour) had had an immediate impact on their business, hence their move to express their dissatisfaction and demand a response from the municipality (Picture 5.4). In later sections, I will further elaborate on my fieldwork findings related to this event.



Picture 5.4 Public petition against the rising parking fees by vendors (Source: author)

5.2 The Misperception

One of the most recurring themes in my fieldwork was complaints. Public officials complained about the vendors, and the vendors complained about the public officials. As my role in the fieldwork was to investigate how street markets are governed, it was important that I talk to stakeholders on all sides to develop a balanced understanding of all perspectives.

Looking into the ways in which the various stakeholders contextualised and presented their complaints, I realised that both vendors and public officials shared a perceptual misunderstanding. That is, each side perceived the other as a homogeneous block: many vendors see the organisational landscape within the public entity as cold and authoritarian, and it is not uncommon for public officials at the policy-making level to see vendors as a group of stubborn and corrupt street sellers. In fact, through my investigations into both sides, it quickly became clear that both camps contain highly dispersed individuals with their own complicated micro-politics.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the organisational network within the public entity of the governance regime is rather fragmented. Communication and the division of tasks are highly inefficient. The public official that I interviewed were quick to express how much they struggled to identify and communicate with colleagues, and reflected on how the centralisation and reorganisation of the municipality have affected their work. However, most street vendors either have little knowledge of, or little interest in, how fragmented the organisational network is. To many of them, it barely functions and is simply “the government” and “that bureaucratic stuff” dictating everything that they are not fond of but have to deal with.

In my daily hanging-out with street vendors on the Dappermarkt, I asked how they saw the municipality. These conversations about the public sector were much shorter than those about their experiences interacting with market-goers. Discussing “the government,” they pointed to the market masters and managers with whom they came into contact daily, and their responses were typically unimpressed: “now is more bureaucratic” (#22); “managers back in the time [knew] more things, but now they only do administrations” (#20); or simply “the government is slow” (#20). All of these comments have some truth in them. Yet I would interpret their responses as indicating that while they did experience the change of governance in their work, they did not realise what caused the change and why. To them, the street-level bureaucrats that they deal with on a daily basis represent the public authority. Yet in fact, those bureaucrats are only assigned to execute policy, and have little power to change or even express their opinions on policy decisions.

The parking fee event enabled me to interview an urban planner (#9) in the municipality and to ask where the price hike came from. Parking planning and policy in the city of Amsterdam were for a long time overseen by the individual borough governments. The mobility and transportation department was unable to come up with a holistic plan for the number of cars the city should accommodate. Thanks to the centralisation overhaul, however, the municipality was able to have all parking-related data to hand in one department that could propose further strategies for reducing car traffic in the city. The territorialisation of parking fees across the city is one of the consequences of the new policy: parking is more expensive the closer it is to the city centre. The Dapperbuurt, which is located right next to the canal ring, falls into a parking band one degree outside of the city centre.

The policy, with its focus primarily on questions of sustainable mobility, did not engage with the question of Dapperbuurt’s economic development. As per its historical identity, the Dappermarkt is a working-class street market situated within a neighbourhood dominated by social housing. It accommodates working-class customers in the metropolitan region who, according to the street vendors, come not only from the immediate neighbourhood but also drive in from the outskirts of

the city. The doubling of the parking fee did have an impact on this kind of travel to the Dappermarkt.

In a context such as this, the fragmentation of governance and the various misperceptions related to it can be observed explicitly on the street. Although the street-level bureaucrats agreed with vendors about the impact caused by the higher parking fees, the most they could do to show their support without influence on policy was to hang the protest T-shirt outside the onsite market office, and suggest that vendors collect signatures from marketgoers for their petition. In my conversations with the main organisers of the petition, it was not clear that they knew what to do once they had collected the signatures, or where to send the petitions. The direct action on the street was to channel their anxieties about the impact on their businesses, but was not enough to manoeuvre their voice through the fragmented governance landscape to target the right organisation within the municipality.

In interviews with street vendors from CVAH (#16, #19), I learned that even vendors who work for their organisations found communicating with fellow vendors hard. Although they are all licensed vendors with permission to conduct business in street markets, they are a highly diverse group in terms of race, age, what they sell, etc. The findings of my street ethnography also indicated that although there is a self-organisation group among some vendors in the Dappermarkt (mostly those with permanent licences), it is not sufficiently representative of all those working there. In my daily interactions with these vendors, many of them talked about the importance of being free and autonomous—“I do what I like (#22)” —which was an attitude that practically became their work identity.

A significant proportion of my informants from CVAH mentioned the difficulties they had in organising their colleagues, and the experiences of one of the CVAH coordinators (#19) when trying to organise meetings among vendors resonated significantly with one of my findings in the archive, that vendors were strongly encouraged not to skip public meetings (part 2 in section 5.1). Since most vendors live relatively far from where they work, they commute to the market with their products in a van and leave right after business hours. As such, it is difficult to make them stay for meetings after market hours, both for logistical reasons and because they are mentally and physically tired after a long day's work. My street informant told me that due to the decline in street business, some vendors even have to rush to a second job to make ends meet. The work style of street vendors, therefore, means that organising gatherings is a real challenge.

Nor are vendors the most easy-going individuals when it comes to communication, as they themselves admit. Vendors and street-level bureaucrats often mentioned the heterogeneity across vendors of different races in terms of language capacity, culture,

and politics, stressing the communication channel between them. Street bureaucrats in the Dappermarkt, for example, told me that their preferences in terms of which markets they work with are very much race-related. Those with Surinamese backgrounds felt more comfortable working in the Dappermarkt and street markets in Zuidoost, where there is a large Surinamese population. However, female street bureaucrats and those with a Surinamese background are less comfortable in markets with a primarily Islamic population, due to differences in language and gender perceptions. Likewise, micro-political disagreements exist between vendors due to similar issues.

I also found a similar mentality among individual vendors. The independent and autonomous mentality is partly the reason that they choose this career. Businesses competing with each other or insisting on their own view of things can easily generate tension and conflict. It is little wonder that vendors resent any homogenous grouping of themselves.

Though my street ethnography revealed the high degree of diversity among vendors, I also noticed that in the eyes of non-street bureaucrat public officials, this highly autonomous and heterogeneous group of vendors is often flattened into a collection of difficult people who think they can break the law. In this narrative, vendors are stubborn vendors who take advantage of highly valued public space in the city without using it to its fullest potential.

Instead of putting more effort into communication to better understand vendors and street business, policymakers opt instead to keep to themselves before making big decisions. To get around actual communication, a private consultancy firm was hired by the policy-making department to carry out surveys in street markets as an alternative form of policy input. The survey aimed to collect both quantitative and qualitative information about the opinions of vendors. Nevertheless, mediated or compensated communication through an independent third party can only achieve so much, and it is unrealistic to imagine that such project-based communication could really fill gaps or clarify misperceptions between vendors and the public entity. As one vendor described the survey: “it doesn’t work [if] they [the policymakers] send someone to the market to ask some questions. Everything is situational here in our market. A few questions would not help them to understand us better” (#19).

From a narrative analysis of the complaints I collected in my fieldwork, one can conclude that both vendors and public officials within the governance regime underestimate each other’s heterogeneity, and judge each other based on stereotypes. Without effective communication, such misperceptions lead easily to mistrust among these stakeholders in the governance regime of the street market.

5.3 The Different Sense of Time

In addition to the shared underestimation of how diverse both street vendors and public sector workers are, a different sense of time is another fundamental factor that created friction between street actors and the governmental organisation network.

The rhythms of the street markets are organised daily. Day in and day out, stalls are set up in the early morning and taken down in the late afternoon. Market managers allocate spots to vendors depending on the number of vendors and how old their licences are, then collect the daily rent. Depending on the weather, season, or other specific reasons, the number of marketgoers, types of product, and location of vendors may all differ from day to day. Such daily changes within an otherwise stable running framework are what Jansens (2017) calls a “comfortable surprise”: “In the market, people feel comfortable enough to be open to the unexpected, to learn from other stories and adapt their own.” (p.157)

For vendors, an important survival skill is to be autonomous and able to adapt to these unpredictable daily changes: from weather and customer flow to their neighbouring merchants. For example, in unstable summer weather, a vendor who sells sunglasses would only be able to assess whether he stands a chance of earning more than the daily rent according to that morning’s weather forecast. Another vendor used the metaphor “we are not made of sugar that melts in the water” to describe her attitude to rainy days. However, the weather may influence vendors to arrange their products differently in an attempt to attract more customers. In addition to these rhythms, I observed that vendors are sensitive to all kinds of daily changes and tend to adapt to them rapidly.

In another example, only three weeks after the new parking fee was applied in Dapperbuurt, vendors in the Dappermarkt had already sensed the economic impact it was having on their business. In response, they took immediate action by organising petitions and demonstrations to express their dissatisfaction, as discussed above.

Unlike the daily sense of time and speed of reaction in the markets, public officials in charge of policy-making work with a slower sense of time. It is no exaggeration to say that if street actors live their time by day, then the governmental network runs its system by year. For example, it was only after nearly two years of research, and once it had been published, that the Market Office communicated its 2018 *Marktvisie* (Market Vision) report with vendors.

It then took the policy-making department another year to commission a private consultancy firm to make a detailed survey that would feed into their policy on new street markets in the city. According to my interviews with policymakers and a

consultant (#12, #18), the policy was planned in 2020—four years after the municipality had realised that there was something wrong with the street markets—with a few scenarios as policy proposals. These scenarios would be circulated among the borough governments and other stakeholders and, if things went smoothly, a final decision about the future policy plan for street markets would be made after the communication process with stakeholders.

In my interview with one of the market brokers (#11), I tried to get a sense of the changes to be made to markets after a new scenario and policy are made, and when. She told me that policymakers have 8-10 years for it. Before then, there will be no big change, and the street markets will continue to take place every day. Immediacy is not something that governmental organisations value highly in policy-making and formal institutions. This is especially true in the case of mixed-use public spaces: in the eyes of the public sector, multi-stakeholders in and usages of street markets deserve a considered distribution of public resources, and that takes time; it should not be hurried.

All stakeholders in the governance regime of Amsterdam’s street markets are aware of the need to change the current situation. Nevertheless, the difference in pace between street actors and public officials in governmental organisations will inevitably lead to clashes. In the Dappermarkt, complaints such as “the municipality is too slow” were very common among vendors. They saw governmental organisations as cumbersome and clumsy machines controlled by arrogant public officials, incapable of reacting to their problems in good time.

As mentioned above, many public officials struggled with the time it takes to reach colleagues in other sectors due to the organisational transformation. With the careful roll-out of policy planning, street-level bureaucrats also share the feeling of being trapped in red tape. However, with policymakers and managers at a distance from the street, I saw less empathy from them for the daily struggle of vendors. On top of that, the fact that policymakers chose not to communicate their timeline and process to vendors does not improve the misunderstanding between each group, but deepens the sense of insecurity felt by the economically precarious street vendors. As one of the interviewees from the retail consultancy business pointed out:

In Amsterdam specifically, I think they are doing much too slow. If I [was] a vendor, and I hear at the beginning of 2018 things are going to change. And I have to put myself on the list to talk about my future, and I do that, and then in 2020, I will be presented with what they are going to do. It’s too long.(#5)

Let us return to the petition on lowering the parking fee. Although actions were taken by the vendors within a few weeks of the policy change, the signatures collected

from citizens and marketgoers seem to have been lost in the labyrinth of municipal bureaucracy. No one has heard about it since. One year on, when I asked a vendor about the follow-up, he rolled his eyes and waved his hand, saying “well let’s just forget about this even happening.” (#22)

5.4 Micro-spatial negotiations

In this section, I will use the notion of trust to discuss how street actors respond to the daily practice of governance in the street. During my daily deep hanging-out in the Dappermarkt, I observed the micro-spatial negotiation and coordination that go on between vendors and market managers, and which are essential for market managers to win (or lose) the trust of street actors.

What is trust? The narratives of vendors on trusting public officials that I collected in my fieldwork turn around the question of whether they know “how to deal with things.” At least, this is how vendor (#22) in the Dappermarkt explained it to me. Institutionally speaking, there is a set of regulations for both general street markets and site-specific markets that market managers have to enforce which involve vendors’ business activities, business hours, behaviour, and environmental settings. Nevertheless, understanding and working with a location’s specific socio-spatial context is more of a pressing issue for vendors. As one vendor (#19) pointed out, a qualified market manager should know these specific socio-spatial contexts and handle spontaneous situations onsite.

A good example of the tension between vendors’ practices and management is the stall territories within which vendors can display their goods. According to the regulation, vendors should keep their goods within the space of the stall that they rent, though they have the freedom to display their goods how they wish within their rented territory. However, some vendors would go against the regulation by tactically displaying their goods a few centimetres outside of their allocated space on the pedestrian side, thereby making their display slightly more visible than others (see picture 5.5).

This is a minor violation of the market regulation, by just a few centimetres. If there are more important things to do, such as collecting the daily rents of a lot of vendors, market masters might err on the side of leniency where this kind of infraction is concerned. However, a failure to process these minor violations might lead to other vendors following suit and putting their goods outside their allocated space. Those who keep to the regulations might think that the market manager favoured certain vendors by letting them off the hook, and this might mean that in other issues, they refuse to respect or follow what the market manager asks them to do.



Picture 5.5 Micro-violation of space (Source: author)

This is one of many micro-dramas that take place in street markets. Before the organisational transformation and shift rotations were introduced, market managers only worked for specific markets. They were able to accumulate a wealth of practical and site-specific know-how, such as who tends to challenge the regulations, who can be aggressive to other vendors, which vendor gets along with most people, or who disagrees with who. These stories, which almost verge on gossip or anecdote, are nevertheless essential information when it comes to dealing with things. As far as many vendors are concerned, experienced managers should know how to tackle these problems by establishing deep relationships with vendors, or at the very least allocating spots in such a way as to prevent vendors who are likely to practice micro-violations from being near each other.

At street level, vendors and market managers build trust by minimising daily violations and preventing micro-dramas from developing into conflicts. This ensures that business can continue, and that the governance of the street market does not become impossible as a result of this subtle demarcation.

However, due to the corruption-proof rotating shifts of the market managers, vendors complained that new street managers were losing their grip on the market. As explained, the purpose of the rotation is a strategy of detachment, to keep any

of the managers from growing too close to a specific market and therefore avoid potential corruption. Yet the fact is that, without an in-depth understanding of the social context of specific markets, small tensions could easily escalate into conflicts as a result of market managers' insensitive and overzealous mitigations.

Interestingly, the higher-level market manager (#23) responsible for managing the rotation system gave a very similar perspective when talking about the constraints of his work. In his opinion, some managers had better chemistry with certain markets, because they knew the vendors' mentality, cultural background, and working rhythms better. Under the rotation system, the challenge is how to pass on the knowledge of those market managers to others with less experience.

Using peer pressure between vendors to handle micro-violations is another strategy from the side of management. The idea is to have the older, more experienced vendors persuade their younger counterparts to respect the "newbie" market masters. For example, the same manager described how female market managers struggled in street markets around the area of Nieuw West, where vendors are mostly of Islamic heritage, and many of the younger ones do not respect them. An uncertain dynamic may then impose itself, in which micro-violations are not serious enough to merit a fine but not being able to keep order in the markets remains frustrating. In this case, it would be much more appropriate to have a market master with an Islamic background, or who can speak Arabic. With similar cultural backgrounds and a shared language, communicating and getting things done would be far simpler.

To compromise between efficiency in governance and the enforcement of rules, the market manager would pair a market master of Islamic heritage with a female market master to work in the same market. Meanwhile, he would communicate with younger vendors and tell them to follow the example of the older vendors who respect the female market masters. Handling tensions in a way that is slightly less official but friendly and communicative builds trust in the government. For the street-level bureaucrats who deal with vendors, this is key to their work. "We took trust away due to the corruption, now we need to find ways to put it back," the market manager (#23) concluded.

Why does trust matter at street level? And what is wrong with instrumental market managers only enforcing market regulations? The daily rhythm of street markets can be understood as what Jacobs referred to as a "street ballet" (1961). Infrastructure is the stage, and regulations are the script. To choreograph a dance, the chemistry—or in this case, tactical agreement between street actors and street-level bureaucrats—is essential. Subtle interactions based on understanding each other and responding to each other's needs are what is framed as trust on the street.

Without trust, the governance of street markets could collapse as in the domino effect. If vendors were to lose trust in the government (again, public officials represent the whole public entity in vendors' eyes), a failure to deal with a few centimetres' worth of micro-violation correctly or communicate policy effectively could snowball, only reinforcing the view that the government is not trustworthy. Mistrust not only makes street-level bureaucrats work harder, but also adds to the difficulties of public officials who seriously want to solve problems but are mistreated by vendors. As one of the vendors (#19) explained, both vendors and public officials share a responsibility for miscommunication and distrusting each other. In other words, a consensus cannot be reached without trust.

5.5 Conclusion

To conclude, I would like to refer back to the three historical perspectives provided at the beginning of this chapter. The first two showed that on the Dappermarkt, there is a history of negotiating the legitimate use of street spaces as markets. As the municipality was reluctant to formalise the market, planning instead to move it to a shopping centre, it was the collective resistance and solidarity of the street vendors and surrounding community that safeguarded this vibrant mixed-use public space. The current streetscape of the Dapperstraat, in particular, is the product of collaborative planning conducted in the 1980s.

Until early 2010, as Janssens' fieldwork on the Dappermarkt show, strong local organisations always characterised the market and neighbourhood. However, when I walked into the Dappermarkt in 2018, things did not seem to be as glorious as I had read. In my fieldwork, I found street actors trapped in the crisis engulfing street businesses and with much to complain about public officials. Affected by the transformation of the government's organisational landscape and the corruption-proof arrangement, street vendors and their organisations were confused and frustrated that their actions were not being heard, and their expectations of the public sector dismissed.

Ultimately, an analysis of the findings of my ethnographic fieldwork revealed three major factors that contribute to the mistrust between governmental organisations and street actors: the misperception of each other as individuals or a collective; the different sense of time; and the question of trust and micro-spatial negotiations in street markets.

In section 5.2, I concluded that both vendors and public officials, in particular within the policy-making domain, were not aware quite of how fragmented the other camp was. On one hand, the vendors' sense of being trapped in red tape can be read as a feeling of disenfranchisement such as "the government doesn't care about us" or

“they don’t see us struggle.” The “they,” however, is in fact a loose and fragmented organisational network, staffed by individuals struggling just as much with issues of communication and coordination.

On the other hand, the daily rhythms of the street actors versus the yearly rhythm of the public entity also create disappointment and frustration. While vendors address issues that they may have on site immediately and in a hands-on way, the public entity cleaves to a different set of values and speeds. Mistrust grew out of this gap: vendors expect the issues that they care about to be solved “tomorrow”, or as soon as possible, whereas the careful and rather slow pace of reaction from the public entity disappoints them. Finally, the market managers’ loss of site-specific knowledge, or metis, due to the corruption-proof policy has done nothing to improve the growing mistrust caused by the perceptual misunderstandings outlined above.

CHAPTER 6 Amsterdam Case Analysis

Over the course of the previous two chapters, I first investigated the institutional and organisational structure that makes up the governance regime of Amsterdam’s street markets, to then see how street-level actors engage with it. A summary of the shape of the governance regime is presented in Figure 6.1 below. In this chapter, I will attempt to decipher the findings from my fieldwork through the lens of my theoretical framework. The first section will analyse the characteristics of the governance regime in terms of both its strong formal institutions and weak informal institutions. Then, attention will shift to disoriented street actors who feel a sense of distrust in their everyday practice on the streets. Lastly, I will analyse the extent to which technе-dominated formal institutions are not enough to accommodate the complexity of the socio-spatial dynamics in Amsterdam’s street markets.




Figure 6.1 The governance regime of Amsterdam’s street markets (Source: author)

6.1 Characteristics of Amsterdam’s Governance Regime

In Chapter 4, I analysed the structure of Amsterdam’s street market governance regime and the changing landscape of organisations within the municipality. Moreover, through an investigation into the dynamics and division of tasks involved in administering the city’s street markets, I was able to examine the fragmentation within the governance regime. The major tool to keep everything intact was a set of market regulations, which range from a municipal to an individual level. In other words, Amsterdam’s street market governance regime is composed of very present formal regulations on one hand, and little informal institutions that bridge between stakeholders on the other.

I began my research in 2018, by which time the city governance had already begun its process of organisational transformation. The role of the local borough governments had been weakened, and governance tasks were reorganised under the umbrella of centralised workgroups instead of at the borough level. That is to say, city tasks such as street cleaning, parking, market management, public space management, and waste management had previously been handled at the borough government level. Each borough government had its own organisational structure and formal institutions that were slightly different from each other. The major transition was to have each of the above tasks managed by one department across all borough governments. Within the transition process, street market management was one of the earliest city tasks to be centralised, in response to the urgency of the corruption scandal of 2012, according to the high ranking officer of the Market Office (#8); other tasks took longer to prepare for the organisational and institutional change. My fieldwork was conducted at a time when the general transition was still a work in progress. Nevertheless, the organisational ethnography that I collected is sufficient to offer insights into how the changes in the organisational landscape reflect the operation of institutions in the governance regime.

Strong Formal Institutions

The historical overview offered in Chapter 5 revealed that for centuries, street businesses have been well regulated in the city of Amsterdam. Although market regulations might have operated slightly differently across the various boroughs, the rights and responsibilities of vendors were ascribed in the form of formal institutions and worked stably.

The current version of general market regulation in Amsterdam, *marktverordening*, is the formal institution that applies to all licensed vendors in the city. In addition, each market has its own site-specific regulations made by the market brokers, including establishment decisions (*inrichtingsbesluit*), institution decisions (*instellingsbesluit*), and market regulations (*marktreglement*), as introduced in Chapter 4. As well as being a set of formal institutions that regulate Amsterdam's street markets, these can also be regarded as a contractual product created between street vendors and the public sector. For decades, market regulation has been the backbone of the institutions governing street markets in the city of Amsterdam.

Particularly significant is that, faced with the changes to the organisational landscape and the forthcoming institutional change at the national level, these formal institutions are important manuals within the governance regime that individual public officials and vendors can cleave to. Note that these formal institutions can play very different roles in the daily practices of different actors in the organisational landscape.

For public officials, especially those working in the Market Office, formal institutions are the tools that guide their daily work. Following the corruption scandal, the organisational change within the Market Office was to detach market managers from specific markets, in order to prevent the same situation from occurring again. Therefore, formal institutions are designated for market managers who can take on and practice the regulations to manage a market. Other tasks such as cleaning and waste management all have their own formal institutions that set standards for their operation. In the language of Scott's *metis v. techné* (2008), Amsterdam's street market governance regime has a strong *techné* character in guiding the behaviour of individuals in the system.

In these formal institutions, moreover, critical pieces within the rules also indicate street vendors' rights and responsibilities. The operation of the licensing system and stall arrangement is clearly stated, for example. This is the result of a long-term collaboration between the public sector and the Central Association for Ambulant Trade (Centrale Vereniging voor de Ambulante Handel), the trade union of street vendors. As a professional organisation, the association and its representatives are involved in policy advocacy and represent vendors' rights from the local to the national level. The impacts of their advocacy can be seen in formal institutions, such as vocational security. For example, vendors with permanent licences have priority in choosing their stalls, and are able to pass on their licences to their offspring. Formal institutions stabilise vendors' working conditions.

The strong formal institutions in Amsterdam's street market governance regime, therefore, provide public officials with clear working guidelines, and guarantee vendors certain professional rights. However, when it comes to adapting to change, formal institutions are not best suited to facilitating new situations. In section 5.3, I discussed the fact that implementing changes to policies and formal institutions is a lengthy process. As a result, formal institutions are often unable to react to changes within street markets in good time. Indeed, they are not made to accommodate such changes whatsoever. As Scott (2013) puts it, regulaitve institutions are tools to stabilise and institutionalise organisations.

Formal institutions anchor the daily operations of public officials to some degree. However, cross-organisational negotiation is also required elsewhere when it comes to governing mixed-use public spaces. For example, to settle conflicts between shop owners and vendors on the street, or to coordinate different cleaning-related departments. Since there are no guidelines for this kind of cooperation, nor are there contacts for cross-organisational communication, this is a weak spot in the governance regime. However, much that has to do with mixed-use public spaces, and street markets in particular, does require cross-organisational coordination. In my interviews, public officials expressed their frustration with the state of communication, and in some

extreme cases, the Market Office hired an external communication facilitator, with expertise in social networks and knowledge of navigating communication within the municipality, to foster cross-organisational coordination.

As for vendors, the long-term vocational security guaranteed by the formal institution made many of them less able to adapt to changes in the retail climate. The reason for creating the formal institutions was to resolve the situation in which there were too many vendors and too few spots for them. Now however a new predicament has emerged: too few vendors. Facing the decline of street business, the only thing that vendors with permanent licences can hold on to is the guarantee of their rights as written in the formal institutions.

As much of the literature highlights, street businesses in public spaces bring vitality, diversity, and opportunities to city life (Morales et al., 1999; Watson, 2009; Oran-ratmanee & Sachaku; 2014). In Amsterdam's street markets, well-formulated formal institutions provide a stabilised socio-spatial framework for such street businesses. However, my fieldwork shows that the rigid framework of the techne-oriented governance regime has become an obstacle to adapting to the decline in business. This obstacle acts in two ways: first, the institutions restrict the possibility of experimenting with creative ways to arrange street businesses, because of the rigidity of how, when, and in what order vendors are allowed to arrange their goods. The limited access to street business licences also prevents a younger generation with new ideas from entering the field. Second, both vendors and public officials who are familiar with the existing formal institutions displayed a greater tendency to resist changes or adaptations to the crisis affecting street businesses.

Vendors, with the guarantees of the formal institutions, are not obliged to change anything as long as they do not violate any rules. The very idea of managing the markets was born out of a desire to prevent nuisance. When street markets become too quiet, there is no regulation to make vendors behave actively. Indeed, some felt stuck within the rigid system, and unhappy about it, as indicated in sections 5.2 and 5.3.

Others, meanwhile, refused to follow the thinking of organisations such as CVAH or the Market Office about how to change for the better, and were angry about other changes to the formal institutions that might have negative impacts on existing crises. For example, they accused the institutions of being uninterested in improving their market strategies, and were not amused by the audiences brought from art events to see the markets. Conversely, when the change to the parking fee happened in the neighbourhood around the Dappermarkt, vendors were able to quickly organise themselves and protest. Many also felt insecure and frustrated about the proposed abolishment of the permanent licence system. Instead of finding new ways to stimulate business, their insecurities led to protesting these changes, and arguing for no change.

Analysing the empirical findings in Chapters 4 and 5 through the theoretical framework into how formal institutions regulate street markets in Amsterdam indicates that the more rigid, formal institutions are backfiring. To a certain degree, this resonates with Scott's (1998) argument on why techne-oriented governance often fails. With current vendors hanging on to the formal institution like a lifebelt, it is perhaps not surprising that when policymakers proposed systemic changes—such as a change of business hours, channels for younger vendors who do not have a permanent licence, and the removal of the permanent licence system—they faced considerable resistance. The refusal to change, especially from vendors seeking to protect formal institutions, frustrates policymakers whose goal is to bring life back to the streets and street businesses. Under these circumstances, formal institutions block any possibility of such rejuvenation.

Weak Informal Institutions

In the theory and language of new institutionalism, behavioural and relational interactions are not the product of regulative tools, yet they are nevertheless practised to stabilise social and economic frameworks (North, 1991; Scott, 2013). As such, behavioural and relational interactions can be considered informal institutions. An informal institution can be an oral agreement, negotiation, or cultural or ritual practice through which a mutual consensus among organisations and individuals is reached.

In the previous section, I discussed organisations in Amsterdam's governance regime that had difficulties with cross-organisational communication. In the language of new institutionalism, we might consider this a difficulty to practise informal institutions. In this section, I will use three examples to examine how weak informal institutions result in obstacles when it comes to governing street markets in Amsterdam.

Let us begin with cross-organisational communication. As mentioned in Chapter 4, a large proportion of public officials working in the municipality of Amsterdam share experiences to do with a loss of horizontal communication. In several of my narrative interviews, public officials in different positions expressed their frustration at the difficulties they had in reaching contacts in other departments with whom they were supposed to work. There is neither an official channel nor a set of guidelines available for public officials to identify whose field they overlap with. Consequently, in mixed-use public spaces such as street markets, which involved many overlapping tasks and public officials that work in different departments, coordination requires a great deal of effort when the informal institutions are so under-equipped. In circumstances that require cross-organisational coordination to fulfil tasks, communication became a problem that began with simply looking for the right person to contact.

In my interviews with market brokers and neighbourhood brokers, public officials in both of these positions talked about how a large part of their time was spent on “colleague hunting”: figuring out who they should contact to collaborate with, reaching out to them, calling on personal connections, and hoping that they will reply to emails or calls in time. The costs of this communication became higher the more that the municipality’s organisational landscape was transformed. One market manager recalled the nature of his work before the transformation. Since many of his colleagues all worked under the same borough government, he could simply walk to his colleagues to arrange work with them. The centralisation not only robbed him of this short distance, everyday ease, but introduced colleague hunting as a major new task for public officials involved with coordination. In street markets, this is a particularly large obstacle.

The next level is the implementation of an anti-corruption mechanism, in which the Market Office intends to cut down on the informal institutions that existed previously between onsite market management teams and vendors. In the previous section, I described how detailed formal institutions operate as manuals that allow different market management officials to work as hands-on as possible. The underlying logic is that the fewer market management officials there are attached to certain markets, the less possible it is for corruption to take root. Nevertheless, in my field investigation, both vendors and market masters said that managing a market requires much more than simply following formal institutions.

Why is this a problem? Let us recall Chapter 2.1, where I used the concepts of *cit  v. ville* (Sennett, 2018) and *metis v. techne* (Scott, 1998) to situate the distinctive position of mixed-use public spaces in the context of the city and urban planning. The intersection of these two sets of ideal types revealed that *techne*—the abstract knowledge system—produces city and urban spaces akin to *ville*. *Cit *, meanwhile, represents spaces that are shaped by accumulated socio-spatial interactions, and arranged by practical knowledge, or *metis*. Mixed-use public spaces such as street markets are a form of *cit *, and require an approach informed by *metis* to understand and arrange them. That is to say, efforts to disengage street level bureaucrats from street markets for the sake of anti-corruption measures removes *metis* knowledge from their governance. Preventing market masters from knowing too much about specific street markets might be an effective way to stymie any opportunity for corruption. At the same time, however, a shortage of *metis* will, as Scott (1998) describes, make it far harder to develop a deep understanding of the subject being governed.

Bearing the distinctive difference between *metis* and *techne* in mind and looking at street markets in Amsterdam, it is no surprise that *techne*-oriented institutions alone cannot cover the complexity of *cit *. In addition to rules and regulations, there are certain nuances to take into account that go beyond the mere distribution of rubbish

bags and collection of vending fees. Vendors value and judge market masters and managers according to how much they know or do not know things. These “things” have to do with the social and interpersonal dynamics of the markets, and the capacity to mobilise informal institutions to keep these market dynamics steady and stable.

For instance, vendors in the Dappermarkt are very culturally diverse and rooted in decades of history. Experienced market masters, who acknowledge the history and social relationships in the market, know how to arrange spots for vendors to minimize potential conflicts, whether on the grounds of personal antipathy, culture, or religion, for example. They know how to communicate in such a way as to de-escalate tension. Without such practical knowledge, or informal institutions, a lack of familiarity with local insight could result in conflicts within the street market. With the rotation system of market masters and the ongoing transformation of the organisational landscape in the governance regime, vendors are far from happy about the fragmented communication and absence of informal institutions. This only goes to demonstrate that to govern a mixed-use public space properly, *metis* is as important as *techne*.

Lastly, the findings of my organisational ethnography revealed a clear disconnection between everyday onsite management and policy-making for the future within the governance regime. The economic affairs division within the Space and Economy cluster is responsible for policy-making related to street markets and the public spaces that host them. However, organisations responsible for policy-making do not always synchronise with organisations responsible for onsite management. Examples such as the parking fee issue at the Dappermarkt indicate that communication between organisations is very weak. Onsite management officials have no channel through which to report or share insights or practical knowledge with other organisations in the governance regime. Nor can they direct street actors to a particular department in the municipality that they could contact, because they do not know themselves. The only thing that they can do is hang a protest T-shirt at the front of the market office to show their support. Meanwhile, they were on the receiving end of vendors’ and market-goers’ frustrations about the change of policy. In fact, in many of my narrative interviews with neighbourhood brokers and market managers, they expressed a sense of disorientation in the face of the labyrinthine municipal system.

In a nutshell, my ethnographic findings on streets and within organisations revealed that informal institutions, such as oral agreements, verbal communication, and practical knowledge about the social and personal dynamics in street markets are important skills in stabilising the socio-spatial dynamics of a space, from both a moral and cultural-cognitive perspective (Scott, 2013). For vendors, the ability to understand how practical arrangements work was even more important than formal institutions.

Meanwhile, public officials who felt that they lacked the ability to cultivate informal institutions were frustrated at work.

To conclude, my ethnographic findings and theoretical framework make it clear that strong formal institutions do indeed furnish the basic infrastructure needed for running street markets in Amsterdam. Vendors benefit from their vocational organisation CVAH's capacity to guarantee their right to certain formal institutions. On the other hand, strong formal institutions alone cannot fully exhaust the governance needs of mixed-use public spaces. As such, my fieldwork exposed that, when facing challenges such as the change of the organisational landscape and the decline of the street economy, the governance regime's weak spot is its lack of informal institutions. Without informal institutions such as oral communication and the ability to share basic information with co-workers in the municipality, Amsterdam's street market governance regime struggles to adapt to change. This means that communication and decision-making are unnecessarily arduous processes, due to the effort required to coordinate across organisations.

To compensate for the shortage of informal institutions, the policy-making division recruited non-public organisations such as a planning consultancy firm to conduct research and surveys as a form of policy input. As such, communication was strategically outsourced to an independent third party. However, as this approach lacked the language and gestures that constitute practical knowledge, what might have been a good intention was not well received by the street actors it was designed to engage.

6.2 The Autonomous Street Actors and Their Sense of Distrust

In Chapter 5, I observed that street actors and public officials had a different sense of time to one another, and that they perceived each other in ways that led to mistrust. I then examined how, within the governance regime, a lack of facility with and support from informal institutions led to higher costs and more lengthy processes when it came to cross-organisational coordination in affairs concerning street markets. The fragmentation of organisational landscape within the municipality caused confusion for both the onsite managers of mixed-use public spaces and the street actors who use them, as well as influencing how they practised their work. Based on previous analytical viewpoints, this section will focus on understanding the position of street actors contextually by zooming in on the case of the Dappermarkt.

As mentioned in previous chapters, street businesses in Amsterdam nowadays enjoy a stable, regulated system that has been running for decades. Nevertheless, historical events and street ethnography alike reveal that street vendors have a specific autonomous character that results in the urban landscape as it is today. In section 5.1's historical investigation, I reviewed the urban regeneration project and related social

movements of the 1970s and 1980s in the Dapperbuurt, where the Dappermarkt is located. At the time, the original plan was to remove the Dappermarkt and build a shopping centre in combination with the city's Muiderpoort station. Through social movements and collaborative planning, the plan was blocked, and instead, the neighbourhood and street markets were regenerated collaboratively. Besides housing renewal, meeting memos and design drafts from the archive show that vendors did participate in discussions about the design and planning of public spaces such as the street and square (the Dapperstraat and Dapperplein).

However, pride in a certain toughness and freedom was a recurring theme in my chats with vendors during my deep hanging out in the Dappermarkt. In section 5.3, I described vendors' survival skills as having to with being autonomous and able to adapt to daily changes. What has not so far been discussed is vendors' economic autonomy. In one of my interviews (#22), we talked about what it is to be a vendor. In the corresponding field note, I wrote:

He mentioned that he has been a street vendor in various places in the Netherlands. He enjoyed the freedom that this job brought. He said back in the time when the market was still very popular, in summer, he only had to work three days a week to earn enough. Even when he was working at the market, he would just go to the beach after the market was over. He also enjoyed driving to France or Italy to get his products. You don't have this kind of life if you own a shop. (28, 20, 2019)

In other conversations, I met a young food truck vendor who came to the Dappermarkt to try out his new Italian sandwich business. He left his job as a cook in a restaurant because having a food truck and selling homemade food made him feel like he was taking control of his life. Characteristics such as toughness, enjoying freedom, and taking life into your own hands revealed the autonomy of the street vendors. When asked how they felt about the municipality's dealings with the street market, these free spirits often did not talk much. The most common answer was a frown and simple comments about "too much bureaucracy." "But I do whatever I want," said an old vendor who had been on the market for more than 30 years (#20).

Much of the literature on street vendors and vending spaces in cities draws on the discussion of informal urban economies, and sees street vendors as a self-organised business network driven by a deficit in formal urbanisation (Bromley, 2000; Roy, 2005; Cross & Morales, 2007). However, in the case of Amsterdam, my street ethnography revealed that vendors on the Dappermarkt are not forced to work on the street, but that it is a voluntary choice. In fact, in Amsterdam, as section 4.1 demonstrated, to be a street market vendor requires one to fully understand and be able to navigate how all of the market regulations work. Administratively speaking,

the bureaucratic cost of being a street vendor is much complicated than being an employee in an institutionalised organisation. Moreover, the queue to become a certified street vendor in a public market is very long, to the extent that street markets are popping up on private holidays due to the demand.

The concept of non-state space (Scott, 1998; Sadam, 2010; Atkinson et al, 2017) will help us to make sense of the autonomous character of street vendors on the Dappermarkt. In his book *The Art of Not Being Governed*, Scott (2009) talks about indigenous populations in South Asia who escaped state governance. Adopting the concept of non-state space, I consider the approach of vendors in the Dappermarkt to the markets as a kind of semi-non-state space. Instead of being shop owners, tied to properties, tax, contacts etc., they voluntarily choose a more autonomous style of doing business.

The addition of “semi” to “non-state space” is to reflect the institutional framework as negotiated between the governance regime and the CVAH. Rules ascribed via regulative tools represent the minimal formal interaction that street vendors have with the state. It is worth mentioning here that, in my understanding from interactions with them, vendors in the Dappermarkt perceive their entrepreneurial practices as an enclave of freedom. In practice, once vendors have their licence, the rest is primarily a question of paying the daily rent and selling their goods. This day-to-day operation gives them the freedom to be flexible and mobile. What is more, street vendors are generally very positive about the social interactions that they have with market-goers. As vendors, they know that working in a shop or through an online platform would be an easier way to make money. However, many have mentioned that working in street markets allows them to make friends and have a social life at the same time. Even once they reach retirement age, they continue to do it out of passion rather than financial need. Understanding street vendors contextually as vendors under state regulation, yet who choose to have the least possible contact with the state, is a fundamental step towards unpacking their relationship with the governance regime.

It is unsurprising that, when these autonomous street vendors come into contact with the governance regime, which prefers to conduct its business with formal institutions and rigid organisations, they tend to collide. In Chapter 5, I discussed how besides a lack of informal institutions such as oral communication, vendors and the governance regime work with very different senses of time. The former demands an immediate response, while the latter struggles with the basic task of message delivery. In addition to this, while most street vendors have little interest in state organisations, they often mix a sense of public-sector-as-organisation, and the individual public officials working in these organisations, together. The public official is perceived as “the government,” whereas in Chapter 4 I pointed out that Amsterdam’s governance

regime is a scattered and loose landscape of organisations with poor horizontal connections to each other (Tasan-Kok & Özogul, 2021). This misperception and the different senses of time led to miscommunication and a mistrust of one another.

Faced with the decline in business and the change of governance dynamics, vendors felt more disoriented than positive about collaborating with the governance regime (or even associating themselves with it), and patiently waited for years until new policy plans that the market vision document proposed were drawn up by policymakers. This feeling led to the protest against the rising parking fee in the Dapperbuurt, when vendors demonstrated their autonomy and capacity to mobilise to show how the higher fee had made an impact on their business in just a few weeks. Nonetheless, since they are not people who take much interest in organisational change, or which complex organisational composition in the municipality works best, most vendors and even the head of the vendors' organisation did not know where the changes came from and which organisation in the municipality to send their petitions to. The sense of loss and of being neglected by the government eventually crossed the subtle boundary from autonomy to mistrust.

For decades, autonomous street vendors in Amsterdam have worked in balanced socio-spatial dynamics in street markets. Within the framework of negotiated formal institutions, they have a degree of freedom to practice their business in public space with minimal state intervention. For example, when street markets were still popular, vendors were able to work only three days to earn a living, and therefore had the freedom to choose how much they worked. The more vendors that worked fewer days meant a ready availability of spots for other vendors. Market-goers also benefited from this more frequent rotation of vendors, as there was simply more to see and a greater diversity of goods on offer.

However, during my fieldwork, the decline in business forced vendors with permanent licences to work five or six days on the market to earn enough income. In addition, the governance regime was changing within the organisational landscape, and initiating the amendment of regulative tools. This section has examined two major factors that contribute to vendors' struggles with the governance regime: their autonomous vocational character, and the fundamental indifference of both the municipal organisation and street actors to perceptual and cultural norms in navigating the crisis.

6.3 The Mismatch

In the two previous sections of this chapter, I used the lens of the governance regime to read the findings of my ethnographic fieldwork. Taking the Dappermarkt in Amsterdam as an in-depth case study, I teased out the ways in which street actors have responded to the governance regime and the recent changes to the business

climate in the market. Along the way, I implicitly contended that the governance of street markets in Amsterdam represents a typically *techne*-oriented system trying to address *cit * spaces in which actors have views that differ significantly from the top-down perspective. In this section, I will focus specifically on this mismatch in governing mixed-use public spaces by interrogating the intersectionality between *cit  v. ville* and *metis v. techne*.

As I have mentioned repeatedly, street markets are places of *cit *. They are the kind of public space where what counts is not so much their design or planning, but rather the collective socio-spatial practices of market-goers and merchants, and a certain indifference to private commercial spaces. Moreover, open access to public spaces means that both market-goers and merchants can engage with each other and the surroundings for more than the single purpose of trade. Over the years, the experience, social interactions, and general atmosphere of street markets have been deeply carved in the urban landscape. The collective cultivation of a sense of place has made the Dappermarkt a part of the collective memory of citizens.

In my daily stroll around them, I saw elderly people spending time together, the younger generation bringing older family members or friends by car, and grandparents taking their grandchildren walking, all in the markets. This aligns fairly directly with the research of Sophie Watsons (2006), who observed that market-goers from all generations do not necessarily come to the market for shopping. A market is also a social space where one can meet friends old and new, or simply enjoy the liveliness of the street on a sunny day. It is a mixed-use space where both merchants and market-goers co-create a lively atmosphere that cannot be planned. The Dappermarkt's place identity very much represents the east of the city. In one random street conversation, someone told me that he no longer goes to the Dappermarkt for shopping. But when I talked about the market being in crisis, he firmly stated that "Dappermarkt cannot be disappeared. It's part of my memory in east."

However, in Amsterdam, *cit * spaces such as street markets have been stretched to fit the city's strong modern planning culture, and this produces *ville*. As much as they can be, street markets in Amsterdam are regulated by strong formal institutions. In other words, we might see street markets as an enclave of *cit * in what is otherwise a city of *ville*. They are allowed to exist, but these *cit * spaces must make compromises under the governance of *techne*-dominated organisations and institutions.

However, in my organisational ethnography fieldwork, individuals working closely with the onsite management of street markets and vendors working for the CVAH all raised the importance of market managers knowing the *metis* aspect of the markets. At the organisational level, market managers and neighbourhood brokers are required to be able to mobilise informal institutions and coordinate cross-or-

organisational affairs. Officers who can call meetings and reach colleagues from other departments are assets. The same goes in the street markets, where officers who are considered good managers by vendors are those who can bridge between *techne* and *metis* and execute their work under two knowledge frameworks. Meanwhile, vendors who work for the CVAH or the local market collective will only win respect if they can navigate the diversity of other vendors and deliver messages to the governance regime.

In all honesty, my fieldwork in Amsterdam was primarily spent listening to complaints. The intersectional lens of *cit  v. ville* and *metis v. techne* helps me to make sense of where the complaints of all stakeholders were coming from. I conclude that the fundamental problems derive from the mismatch produced as the *techne*-dominated governance regime excludes the *metis* perspective in governing *cit * spaces. This mismatch operates on two levels: daily operation and policy-making. It is worth noting, however, that it was not particularly an issue when the markets were still vital and dynamic public spaces: the autonomous vendors were less bothered given that they only had to work three days a week to get by. In the present crisis though, problems surface as the tide of money is low.

At the level of daily operations, market managers before the corruption scandal of 2012 were put to work in the markets to fix problems (with both formal and informal institutions) on site. Nevertheless, with the organisational changes aiming to combat corruption (see section 4.2), the *techne*-oriented regime decided against making space for *metis* knowledge within the governing institutions. They withdrew the market manager to work in an office far from the market, and established a rotation system for market masters to work onsite with manuals. Of the market masters who still work onsite every day, some are familiar with certain markets and some are not. As such, the rotations destabilised the management of markets. According to an observation made by a member of the CVAH who also works as a vendor in the Dappermarkt (#19), market masters who understand the local context can effectively eliminate potential conflicts between vendors in the market. In the opposite scenario, public officials' lack of *metis* knowledge stokes mistrust and conflict.

“There is a crisis in the market. We have to change.” (#10) In Chapters 4 and 5, I mentioned that talking about change was a common topic in my fieldwork in Amsterdam. For the *techne*-oriented governance regime, naturally, the approach to a crisis is to address it from an abstract analytical perspective. This entails processes such as locating where problems are and developing problem-solving strategies. To take action, an investigation of the current situation must be undertaken whose results take the form of a “market vision”: a survey is outsourced to a private consultancy firm, which is then used as an input for possible planning scenarios; discussions and negotiations are held with stakeholders and a timeline is produced for the implementation of the

chosen solution. Such a schedule takes years. As the market broker told me in our interview, “we will take our time. We are not in a hurry.” (#11)

This techne-dominated style of crisis management completely fails to address individual experience. The careful planning of policymakers consists of questions such as future population change, trends in the retail climate and consumer demand, and the maximisation of the public and economic value of public spaces for market-goers and vendors. But the knowledge, visions, and processes that urban planners and policymakers are familiar with do little to ease the insecurity felt by street vendors at all. As mentioned, vendors live in a “now or never” time frame. Planning for the future is a techne approach to thinking which does not help at the immediate practical level of improving business tomorrow.

One of the many consequences of the exclusion of practical knowledge from the governance regime is that it was not available as a tool to help vendors better navigate their changing business environment. For example, the vendors’ rapid response to the impact of the parking fee ended up lost in red tape. On top of that, the weakness of informal institutions also contributes to the sluggish, lengthy, and non-adaptive nature of the regime’s framework. In contrast to the speed of the initial protest and petition, the slowness of the regime’s response made the vendors feel neglected, and their mistrust of the governance regime grew from there. Although, as we now know from my organisational ethnography, this slowness was a symptom of the convoluted organisational structure, this event contributed to a serious breakdown of the vendors’ trust in the governance regime.

In the organisational landscape of the governance regime, a vocational organisation such as the CVAH can be seen as an intermediate stakeholder between individual vendors and the public sector. Not only does the CVAH assist individual vendors in communicating and interacting with the public sector, it is also able to represent vendors’ rights through the language of abstract knowledge. The organisation is equipped with experts in law, and knows the trick of hiring private consultancies to offer inputs from their investigations.

Sitting as they do between autonomous actors and the public sector, interviewees from CVAH expressed their frustration at the clashes between techne- and metis-minded parties. In particular, both anonymous consultants and CVAH were critical of the policymaking process for not being sufficiently communicative with vendors. Not only did the failure to mobilise informal institutions pave the way for the vendors’ opposition from the start, but the implementation of policy without proper communication risks pushing vendors and organisations to pressure politicians to halt the policymakers directly. “That will be a lose-lose situation,” commented the anonymous consultant (#5).

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter began by identifying the characteristics of the governance regime in Amsterdam's street markets. My analysis of the findings that I collected as part of my organisational ethnography revealed that the governance regime in Amsterdam operates through a combination of strong formal institutions and weak informal institutions. In the case of the public sector, strong formal institutions provide a rigid framework that accommodates ongoing organisational transformations within the municipality. In the case of the street markets, it represents a negotiated framework in which vendors have a minimum formal contractual relationship with the state. However, during the crisis, these strong formal institutions became obstacles to dealing with what was happening in a flexible manner. As for the governance regime's weak informal institutions, these are particularly prevalent in arranging horizontal cross-organisational communication within the regime and handling practical knowledge about social and personal dynamics in street markets. In mixed-use public spaces such as street markets, proper coordination between the different managing organisations and users is one of the most important factors in keeping the space functioning. My research found that individual public officials within the governance regime struggle with the weakness of these informal institutions.

On the street, aside from the fact that the governance regime did not prioritise practical knowledge of the social and personal dynamics in street markets at an institutional level, the results of my historical analysis and street ethnography indicate that vendors are a highly autonomous group of vendors. Rather than going towards other professions, trading in the street offers them a sense of freedom and social interaction that they appreciate. Their mentality of keeping their distance from the state, however, does not help them to understand how the governance regime works. Rather, miscommunication and misperception characterise the relationship between these autonomous street actors and the governance regime, and we see disoriented vendors developing a mistrust of the regime as a result.

Finally, the intersectional perspective on *cité v. ville* and *metis v. techne* opens up just how complex the struggles in Amsterdam's street markets are. As an enclave of *cité* in a *ville*-dominant city, street markets in Amsterdam cannot escape from the *techne*-dominated governance regime. However, evidence shows that the abstract technical knowledge within the governance and planning of mixed-use public spaces is not enough to accommodate their complexity. Quite apart from any and all mixed-use functions, public spaces already contain several different layers of socio-spatial dynamics. A blinkered focus on spatial form or planning vision is an incomplete frame for understanding what Sennett (2018) called "the crooked *cité*." In this time of crisis, it is highly unlikely that more *techne* policies from the governance regime

will solve any problems without the contribution of a metis perspective on cité spaces such as street markets.

CHAPTER 7 The Governance Regime of Street Markets in the City of Taipei

The city of Taipei, and specifically the Donmen market, is the second case study of my research into how governance regimes deal with mixed-use public spaces. In this chapter, I will present how Taipei's street market governance regime functions.

I began my research with a document analysis, looking at websites, policy documents, legal mandates, and regulations. This desk-based research helped me to acquire an overview of the shape of Taipei's street market governance regime. My main source of information at this stage was the website of the Taipei City Market Administration Office (henceforth MAO). MAO is the organisation in charge of all market affairs, from wholesale to vendors in the city of Taipei. There are different subdivisions under the MAO, each assigned to a certain scale of market. The website⁵ provides information about each division, such as which civil servant is in charge of which tasks, office contact numbers, and related mandates.

The Donmen market, as it is known to the public, is in fact composed of three different markets with different legal statuses: the legal marketplace, the semi-legal vending site, and the illegal extension of the other two parts. Each belongs to a different subdivision within the MAO and is subject to different formal institutions. Note that in this, the Donmen market is not an exceptional case. Within the city of Taipei, big neighbourhood markets are often structured in this way. To get a clear overview of who and which mandate administers which part of the Donmen market, I conducted 13 narrative interviews with civil servants, local politicians, and the leader of the market's vendor association. These narrative interviews helped me to get a fuller sense of how the governance regime is practised in street markets in Taipei.

In what follows, I will first outline the organisational structure of the street market governance regime in Taipei. Second, I will introduce the case of the Donmen market as an example. By mapping out different parts of the market, their legal status, the form of governance, and the specific nuances in one geographical territory, I will demonstrate how the governance regime orchestrates different sectors to manage the mixed-use public space in practice. Lastly, I will address the political dynamic in the markets, and how local politics play a role in negotiating the governance of street markets within the public entity.

⁵ <https://www.tcma.gov.taipei/>

7.1 Organisational Structure Change in Street Market Governance

To understand how street markets are governed in Taipei, one must approach the question from two angles: the historical development of policy, and the spatial typology of street markets. The development of and changes to policy indicate that at different historical moments, street markets were regulated according to different rationales, from public sanitation to maximising the use of urban development. On the street level, in response to changing governance strategies, vendors have developed a variety of tactics to interact with the regime. As such, the shape of the street market governance regime today reflects these intertwined histories of governance and tactics for survival.

7.1.1 Brief Development History of Market Policy and the Taipei City Market Administration Office

To summarise this historical overview of market regulation, it is clear that managing street markets in Taiwan has been a complicated task covering public sanitation, economic development, and socio-spatial orders. Different formal institutions have been implemented in attempts to limit the informal urban economy. Nevertheless, the exercise of governance power has not succeeded in reaching this goal, and as a result, some compensatory regulations have been introduced to legitimate temporary exceptions. These regulations and mandates have been built up one on top of another. Consequently, historical governance in this area has produced the landscape of street markets as it is today, a mix of legal, semi-legal, and non-legal under one governance regime.

Japanese Colonial Governance (1895-1945)

Contemporary street market governance in Taiwan was introduced as part of Japanese colonisation in 1895. Before then, markets had remained unregulated under the Qing dynasty. The first policy intervention was to charge vendors fees that were used to improve the public sanitation facilities. Then, in 1898, the regime started to tax vendors. This was a rather indirect policy for governing markets (Matsuda, 2005). However, the newly arrived regime took this opportunity to acquire a basic overview of the city's markets and vendors.

The second stage began in 1904. With its governing power gradually strengthening, the colonial regime started to develop a public marketplace and the related regulatory instruments. Marketplaces were built as public facilities, and governed by local administrative institutions. In 1911, the first regulation—the “Regulation of Banning Taiwanese Markets”—was decreed by the Government-General of Taiwan. This regulation officially distinguished between formal and informal markets and vendors, and gave the police the juridical right to inspect vendors suspected of illegality. Up until this point, maintaining public sanitation had still been the policy's priority.

It was only in the 1920s that the major organisation governing markets went from being a public sanitation and police department to an economic department: the “Regulation of Marketplaces.” Formal institutions related to management, trade, and sanitation were grouped together as one regulatory instrument, to reflect the shifting of market management from environmental sanitation to urban economic affairs. In 1936, the marketplace was officially regarded as an urban public facility with its planning code in Taiwanese Urban Planning Law.

Matsuda (2005) analysed the changes to governance that took place under Japanese colonisation. There are four major trends regarding the markets within these changes: (1) the move from completely unregulated to regulated under modern planning governance; (2) a shift in stated aims, from improving public sanitation to controlling the urban economy; (3) a change in the management regime, from centralised inspection to local administrative institutions; (4) the eventual enshrinement in law of regulatory instruments developed from inspection rules. The Japanese colonial governance of marketplaces in Taiwan then formed the basis of the next regime’s governance when it arrived on the island after 1945, and the rules and divisions of the contemporary street market governance regime are rooted in this period. Two major adjustments were: (1) marketplaces were considered public facilities with a planning code; (2) vendors outside marketplaces were regarded as informal and illegal, to be inspected by the police.

Post-war Governance (1945-)

After the second world war, the Republic of China took control of Taiwan, and this new regime brought nearly 2 million refugees from the Chinese Civil War in 1949. This made for a rather chaotic period for the island’s societal situation. The change of regime also meant that, in street markets and marketplaces, policies and regulations left over from Japanese colonial governance had to be abolished.

In big cities such as Taipei, the new government struggled to accommodate the refugees fleeing war in addition to the immigrants coming from rural areas. Becoming a vendor was seen as “the poor’s profession,” their only option to make a living (Yin, 1994). Nevertheless, the government tolerated street business around marketplaces much more than had previously been the case. Also during this period, the national government established the “Regulation governing street vendors of Taiwan province” in 1952, which laid out a basic scheme for managing the enormous amounts of vendors that had emerged. First, it appointed a police officer to be in charge of issuing vending licences and to conduct enforcement. Second, the regulation stipulated that local municipalities should aggregate vendors around marketplaces. If this was not possible, they were to find other public spaces for the vendors, instead of simply letting them spread themselves out around the streets. These alternative sites were then instructed to form their own autonomous associations, to give vendors a

degree of self-government on temporary terms, resulting in the so-called “temporary vendor concentration field”⁶. Neither a legal marketplace nor illegal street vending, these semi-legal street markets survived in this grey zone within the legal system.

Between 1966-1971, Taiwan’s Urban and Housing Development Committee (UHDC) worked with experts from a UN advisory group on a project funded by the United Nations Development Program. The ensuing investigation and policy research culminated in the creation of the Urban Planning Act of 1973 (Chen, 2011). Influenced by the western planning paradigms, the act had three major impacts on street markets and marketplaces. First, marketplaces regained their planning codes and regained their status as spaces for public facilities. This then had to be taken into account in any new masterplan concerning undeveloped or redeveloped sites. Second, the regulation also decreed that new markets could not be built less than 200 metres away from existing markets. Finally, the policy encouraged the municipality to develop marketplaces within multi-function buildings that house other public functions (Lin & Liao, 2016).

These new rules made it impossible to fully legalise existing semi-legal street markets, because most of them were in fact extensions of marketplaces. Meanwhile, many marketplace buildings were redeveloped into multi-function public buildings in the 1970s: the ground floor and first floor were given over to market stalls, and the rest could be parking spaces, public libraries, or public offices. Not all of the new buildings had enough capacity to take vendors from the old ones, however, and to compensate, licensed vendors who were left out from the new sites were permitted to stay in the street. Markets with semi-legal status are officially called “temporary vendor concentration fields,” but the municipality refers to them as “open-air markets.”⁷ However, in the interests of coherence with this research’s categorisations based on legal status, I will use the term ‘semi-legal’ markets. In a nutshell, these new policies neither reduced the number of vendors on the streets, nor brought illegal markets within the legal system, but formed new markets instead. The semi-legal temporary vendor gathering fields were created to fill the policy gap.

Moreover, not only was the government building new and modern marketplaces in the 1970s, but the policy was also proving less and less friendly to licensed vendors. Since 1972, the requirements needed to apply for a vending licence in Taipei have been similar to those for social welfare (Yin, 1994). Here too, the system associated vendors with poor people who had no option other than to make a living on the street, hoping they would disappear as the economy grew.

6 https://english.tma.gov.taipei/News_Content.aspx?n=067DF16A3C570455&sms=1D1F2E708CCC2390&s=5BBBD11379FA73E2A

7 https://bilingual.gov.taipei/News.aspx?n=AD6BEFFD17B96AFF&sms=07B778C3B77F8F91&_Query=6af33d88-bbd3-4d64-95ab-967741490599&page=153&PageSize=20

Contrary to the government's expectations, however, the number of vendors in big cities actually increased along with the economic boom and urbanisation of the 1980s (Wang, 2005). So much so, in fact, that enforcing and managing both semi-legal and illegal street business became too great for the police authority. In 1985, with the amendment of the street vending management regulation, the city of Taipei officially transferred the responsibility of managing licensed vendors and semi-legal street markets to the Market Administration Office, leaving the issue of illegal vendors to the police. In the same year, vending licences were also suspended. Existing licensed vendors could still renew their licences, but no new licences have been issued since then, except for a very limited number of social minorities. Street markets which are neither public marketplaces nor semi-legal temporary vendor gathering fields are, in principle, illegal. A small number of vendors operating as an extension to the former two categories are tolerated by the MAO, in so-called gathering fields with 20 or more unlicensed vendors. These fields have an ambiguous existence, somewhere between legal and illegal, for which I will use the term "non-legal." On top of these three categories, fully illegal guerrilla vendors represent a fourth category, and lie outside of the frame for this thesis.

7.1.2 Current Structure of the Taipei City Market Administration Office

The primary organisation currently governing Taipei's street markets is the Taipei City Market Administration Office (MAO). According to its website⁸, the MAO grew out of the municipal livestock auction company immediately after WWII, and later became the management office of the livestock auction market (the Department of Construction, renamed as the Department of Economic Development in 2007). In 1977, the office emerged under the Department of Construction which was then in charge of planning, building, and managing public marketplaces. In 1985, the management of licensed vendors became the responsibility of the MAO, though the control of illegal vendors remained with the police. Since 1997, the MAO has been situated within the Department of Economic Development, and its principal responsibilities involve the management and maintenance of various markets ranging from wholesale, public marketplaces, individual licensed vendors, unlicensed but semi-legal markets (mostly on streets), and other publicly-owned retail spaces.

In 2020, The MAO comprises 241 members of staff working in six subdivisions and various administrative offices⁹. Retail Market Management and Vendor Management are the two most relevant subdivisions to this research, as they are engaged with the governance of what I am calling street markets. Other subdivisions, such as Market Alteration and Renovation Maintenance, and Market Asset Management, have minor

8 <https://www.tcma.gov.taipei/cp.aspx?n=E23F614FDBE596E3>

9 <https://www.tcma.gov.taipei/cp.aspx?n=BD6A463DBE747ADC>

supporting roles in other tasks. In terms of human resources, there are 51 members of staff working under the subdivision of Retail Market Management, and 26 in Vendor Management. Retail Market Management is in charge of the city’s legal public marketplaces, whereas Vendor Management deals with semi-legal, non-legal, and illegal street markets and vendors, licensed or unlicensed.

In terms of numbers, 51 staff members working in Retail Market Management are responsible for 48 public retail markets, including 7,697 stalls. The 26 staff who work in Vendor Management, meanwhile, have far too many unofficial markets and vendors to administer. In total, there are 41 so-called temporary vendor gathering fields (henceforth semi-legal markets) which include 4,887 vendors, 38 gathering fields with 20 or more unlicensed vendors (henceforth non-legal markets) which include approximately 4,310 unlicensed vendors, and 515 licensed vendors elsewhere. In sum, there are 79 unofficial markets and over 9,197 vendors, both licensed and unlicensed. In fact, according to some of my interviews with public officials who worked for the MAO, these numbers can only be regarded as approximate measures. The actual figure is impossible to establish. Figures 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3 summarise the statistical information.



Figure 7.1 The human resource analysis of MAO in 2020 (Data source: information from MAO website; figure: author)

2.6 M population 127 markets

Public market (48)

▼ All items

Semi-legal market (41)

▼ All items

Non-legal market (38)

▼ All items

source: the municipality of Taipei




Figure 7.2 Mapping the street markets in Taipei (Data source: open information from MAO website; figure: author)




Figure 7.3 Numbers of markets and stalls in each legal type (Data source: open information from MAO website; figure: author)

In terms of work content, the website of the Retail Market Management subdivision reveals that these 51 staff members comprise market managers and cleaners in each public retail market. There are also administrators who operate as communication bridges to other departments in the municipality. In contrast, the 26 staff of the Vendor Management subdivision comprise 8 planners hired on temporary contracts for policy and spatial planning. The remaining 18 permanent staff are responsible for the administrative, desk-based ‘hardware and software’ work, both onsite and of policy planning, required to manage 79 semi-legal and non-legal markets.

How could it be possible for such a small number of public officials to manage thousands of vendors across the various legal types of market? The answer is that it required some creative mechanisms and flexibility in governance regimes. Within the category of semi-legal (temporary vendor gathering) fields, there are regulations for the self-governance of vendors. They state that vendors should form a managing committee. As members of the committee, individual vendors pay an administrative fee to a market manager that they collectively hire to do the required bureaucratic work, and cleaners to maintain their working environment. Each semi-legal market must deliver annual management reports to the MAO for the extension of their temporary use permit. We can understand the fact that the managing committee covers most of the work in semi-legal markets as a way of outsourcing market management. Interestingly, some of these semi-legal markets exist alongside legal ones. The extension of temporary use permits is granted on a year-by-year basis, but now that it has lasted for almost half a century, it is a sort of “permanent temporality.”

In my field notes about a conversation I had with two junior staff working in Vendor Management, against the backdrop of messy office cubicles piled high with folders, they talked about having simply too many markets and vendors on their hands. Their working hours were only enough to complete basic bureaucratic paperwork, and they had little time to actually visit the markets. Most of the time, they were trapped at their desk with tasks such as renewing existing vending licences, collecting other administrative reports from the managing committees of semi-legal markets, or helping them apply for new extensions. The division of work is sorted into the city’s 12 districts, with each staff member responsible for one or two of the overall. As I recorded in my field notes, one staff member pointed to a colleague who was sitting in the corner and told me that “this poor newbie is in charge of the Wan-Hua district, the oldest area in the city which has eight semi-legal markets and four non-legal markets. He could barely juggle among them, let alone those illegal ones.”

On the subject of non-legal markets and illegal vendors, both the high-ranking manager of the Vendor Management division (#27) and junior staff admitted that they could only keep an eye on the non-legal ones. In response to the difficulties in managing non-legal and semi-legal markets, the chief of Vendor Management told

me that one of the major shortcomings was that his division has no control over the policing of illegal vendors. All they could do was inform the police that illegal vendors were congregating in certain places, and the police would then carry out their enforcement. However, coordination with the police authority was not always successful, because delivering fines to vendors was simply not a priority for them. In a presentation that the MAO gave to the city council, they explained that the shortage of staff in the Vendor Management division was making it impossible to manage all the markets which are not on the legal spectrum: they could only prioritise those areas that would block public construction work or present a fire hazard. For example, one of the policy plans in the near future was to merge the semi-legal and non-legal markets into the same semi-legal category. To do so, Vendor Management would have to hire more staff on temporary contracts to help vendors in non-legal markets to organise management committees.

In my interview with the high-ranking executive officer of the Department of Economic Development (#28), which is the authority directly above the MAO, I raised the question of this uneven distribution of the workload between the two subdivisions that form the primary organisational structure of street market governance in Taipei. The head of the department himself was a planner, and though he agreed with my observation, he simply blamed it on the rigidity of the bureaucratic structure and said that recruitment and expansion throughout Taiwan's public sector are heavily restricted by both the Civil Service Employment Act and the municipality's annual tax income. There was little chance that he would have been able to change the current situation. He had to be cunning, and use a special budget to hire officers with temporary contracts. He also pointed out, however, that street markets are highly politically contested: different local politicians have their supporters in these markets, and in return for vendors' support, a local politician will back vendors and their potentially ambiguous legal status in the markets. Because the use of special budgets has to be permitted by the city council, there is a significant risk in making changes to hire new staff without drawing too much attention. He concluded his explanation thus: "That is why for the past two mayors, markets have not been a popular topic in governance." It is clear that what lies behind these rhetorical explanations is a diplomatic narrative which aligns with interviews from civil servants in MAO (#26, #27): these civil servants are all fully aware that the markets are complicated to deal with. However, interventions into these contested socio- and spatio-economic sites take structural efforts to equip the necessary people with enough governance tools and resources. Since street markets are not a priority for most politicians, it is simply impossible to achieve major changes to tools and resources. They consider it better to leave the markets as they are, as long as no one makes much of a fuss.

7.1.3 Two Versions of the Street Market Governance Regime in Taipei

The historical development of Taipei's policies concerning street markets reveals that there are two versions at play in the city's street market governance regime: the official one, which is to be found on the MAO website and which only highlights the legal parts, and another, which includes all markets, whether legal, semi-legal, or non-legal.

Thanks to Taipei's policy of informational transparency, the MAO's website is a source of clear information about the division of tasks within the office, providing a description of every role, public officials' office contact numbers, and the mandates that they work with. This makes identifying the first version of the governance regime easy. The website lists six subdivisions under the director's office. These are: Retail Market Management, Wholesale Market Management, Market Operation Management & Planning, Vendor Management, Market Alteration & Renovation Maintenance, and Market Asset Management.

Within these subdivisions, Retail Market Management and Vendor Management are those which are mainly in charge of everyday life in the city's markets, and divide tasks between them according to a market's legal status. Retail Market Management takes all the legal marketplaces: those who work in this subdivision are responsible for managing, marketing, and maintaining proper hygiene in their markets. There is also a team assigned to establish communication with other national and municipal departments related to market affairs, such as the Ministry of Economics, the Agricultural and Food Agency, the Department of Urban Development, Public Works, the Department of Health (for matters of food safety), and the Department of Environmental Protection (for matters of public hygiene, cleaning, and waste). Meanwhile, the Vendor Management subdivision is in charge of affairs related to all markets without legal status, and vendors. This overarching categorisation includes the management of hundreds of licensed vendors and semi-legal street markets, tracking non-legal street markets, and reporting thousands of illegal vendors to the police. Staff in this subdivision are assigned their tasks roughly according to administrative districts in the city, which each worker responsible for one or two districts' worth of semi-legal markets and vendors.

When I dug into other statistical reports and regulations on the MAO's website, I realised that the question of who is in charge of Taipei's street markets and how they are handled is in fact rather nuanced. For a start, I discovered that there are twice as many staff in the Retail Market Management subdivision as there are in Vendor Management. Conversely, Vendor Management has twice as many markets to manage as Retail Market Management. What is more, the director of Vendor Management explained in our interview that the subdivision categorises vendors and markets outside of the legal sectors into three types:

(A) Semi-Legal Temporary Vendor Gathering Fields

There are 41 markets in this category, which tend to be much older than existing legal marketplaces. Due to the limited number of spaces in the renewal projects as discussed above, many licensed vendors were left out when these indoor slots were distributed. Moreover, the Urban Planning Act imposed a serious constraint by prohibiting future markets or vendors from setting up closer than 200 metres from existing fields. To compensate for these shortcomings in both governance and planning, the municipality gave existing vendors temporary permission to keep their businesses where they were, which in most cases was a direct connection to legal marketplaces. This permission is renewable every year. The management committee of each of these semi-legal fields is the official civil organisation allowed to apply for this renewal. In other words, the MAO outsources the management and governance of the semi-legal temporary vendor gathering fields to the vendors themselves. In the beginning, these vendors were mostly licensed. However, since the municipality stopped issuing new licences in the 1980s, these semi-legal gathering fields are now a mix of both licensed vendors and unlicensed vendors.

(B) Non-Legal Gathering fields With 20 or More Unlicensed Vendors

The 38 non-legal gathering fields with 20 or more unlicensed vendors are markets whose status falls between legal and illegal. Officially speaking, they are illegal street markets with unlicensed vendors. Many of them are attached parasitically to legal or semi-legal markets and neighbourhoods. However, it is precisely their proximity to legal or semi-legal markets, and their sheer number, that means that neither the police nor the MAO can handle the situation: there is neither a channel through which to incorporate these vendors within semi-legal markets, nor the police capacity to deliver fines every day in the hope of chasing them away. So they are just there. Many of them are even night markets with important economic and tourist value for the city. The MAO therefore invented this category for these markets, to guarantee a minimum of governance, and to keep a close eye on them. This almost equates to a reminder that “we know you exist, and we have marked it on our map” (#27). If necessary, the MAO could ask the police to practice enforcement, but most of the time they keep the peace with these non-legal markets.

(C) The Remaining Licensed Vendors Outside of the Markets

This category contains the lowest quantity of vendors. They are mostly social minorities who got their licences before the 1980s and still run their businesses in public spaces, outside of markets. The long-term trend in this category is one of decline. However, according to the report of national investigations into vendors, the overall numbers in Taipei remain stable. This means that the number of unlicensed vendors is growing. There is little in the way of governance regulation to deal with unlicensed vendors other than police inspections.

Other than for the semi-legal markets of type A, which are loosely connected to the network of the governance regime, the MAO does not have official regulatory instruments to govern the non-legal markets and unlicensed vendors that are spread around types A and B. Most of the time, the MAO would not actively intervene in the running of these markets, simply because of their shortages in human resources. The only exception, as the high-ranking officer in the Vendor Management division (#27) told me when I interviewed him in early 2020, strikes a rather sour tone: from time to time, there are special temporary projects, initiated top-down by the mayor, such as “cleaning vendors or illegal markets.” In such projects, and following the commands of higher-level public officials, various departments supposedly involved in the management of semi-legal or non-legal markets (that is to say, those departments mentioned in formal institutions but which do not normally involve themselves in market affairs) are forced to make site visits to carry out inspections and see the onsite reality. As the Vendor Management officer put it:

Even in these special projects, other departments such as health or environment protection would not be in the markets unless we in the MAO take the lead. Much less would they, in normal times, volunteer to check what’s happening in these markets. (#27)

Interestingly, in some extreme and exceptional cases such as for some popular night markets, the municipality prefers to maintain its public image for international tourists and deploys special public budgets to make improvements to the infrastructural environment. In one popular night market, for example, the municipality spent money on pavements to improve the pedestrian environment. In other special projects, the municipality established low-waste night markets by providing vendors with stainless tableware and installing a central dishwashing system. A more recent case from late 2019 was to turn a non-legal night market into a semi-legal night market. One ambiguous aspect of these special cases is that vendors are not legal entities that can receive public subsidies. The MAO has to work with other departments to come up with creative solutions that bypass bureaucratic constraints. By doing this, the municipality has shown itself to be in ambivalent support of these markets outside of the law.

An overarching conclusion that can be drawn about the governance regime of Taipei’s street markets is that while one-third of legal markets are administered by clear organisations with formal institutions, the other two-thirds are kept under the radar by various municipal departments which are supposed to govern them. The reasons for keeping these markets in an ambiguous position between legal and illegal are mainly pragmatic. The public entity is incapable of getting rid of them, but cannot provide them with legal status. Unless these markets come into serious conflict with urban planning and public constructions, or fall victim to disaster, the

municipality charts its course with only the first map of the governance regime. In the next section, I will use Donmen market as an explicit case to demonstrate the different versions of the governance regime.

7.2 Multiple Markets in One

In the previous section, I introduced the different categories of market according to their legal standing and where they came from. My sketch of the organisational components made it clear that there are legal, semi-legal, and non-legal markets in Taipei. Each of these categories adapts to different regulatory instruments and forms of management. However, mapping the organisational landscape is not enough to explain how markets are really operated in the city of Taipei, and one of the main reasons for this is that the three types of market are very often geographically intertwined. Indeed, visitors to the markets might not necessarily notice any difference or border between the three types, in addition to which, there are other commercial spaces and illegal vendors in between. In this section, the Donmen market in Taipei will serve as a case study. I will map which part of the market is governed by whom, and this will reveal how the governance regime of street markets operates in Taipei. I will begin by presenting a selection of my field notes as well as my personal experience of strolling in the Donmen markets, as a lens through which to take readers to the market with me. I will then analyse these observations and experiences, through an examination of the legal status of these spaces and the ways in which they are governed.

7.2.1 Walking in the Donmen Market

I spent my childhood very near to the Donmen market, as it was then. Even after we moved, my father's office was still nearby, in the same block. As a child, my parents told me that the Donmen market had been bigger, and spread out over a single plot. It was later split into two parts because of the expansion of the Jinshan South Road. In fact, for most of my life, I have generally entered the market from the Jinshan South Road. This road is always very busy, and cars park illegally on the street, waiting for others who are quickly buying things in the market. I was in this position myself many times, waiting for my mother to grab something inside. There are entrances to the market on both sides of the Jinshan South Road (see figure 7.4). Close to these entrances, one can expect to see vendors with their small trolleys selling street food or fruit. They predate the stalls in the market. There were always rumours, too, about a certain old lady selling rice cakes in front of the market at the east side of the entrance, which she did to keep from getting bored. All these memories floated back to me as I walked around the market again.



Figure 7.4 Mapping the three legal types of market within the Donmen markets (Source: author)

In a few cases, going from my father's office, we would walk through lanes within the block and arrive at the market from the back. The buildings along these lanes are mostly residential. Only when getting close to the market do the vendors and their goods begin to appear on street corners (Picture 7.1). Then I knew we were almost there. My mom always mentioned the corner shop, which sells squid soup, and which was her favourite place for lunch when she was a teenager, working part-time in her cousin's office. That shop is still going strong.



Picture 7.1 The outskirts of the non-legal market in the residential neighbourhood (Source: author)

I was surprised to realise that the official entrance to the Donmen market is on Xinyi Road. Compared to the hectic traffic on the Jinshan S. Road, the official entrance looked rather like a ruin: there were barely any people walking by. A small number of clothes shops line the side of Xinyi Road, though their products are out of date and they have no customers. The market block itself has two entrances, both of which lead towards dark and empty stalls. The official entrance, with a billboard, is the worst: very dark, not always open, and to be honest quite uninviting. Nevertheless, I still went in that way as part of my research. It was close to noon, when the market is supposed to be at its most popular. However, over half of the stalls were closed, and it remains uncertain whether they are still running at all. In some, there is little more than a fridge, and the sound of machines. The market is a bit smelly, and during my visit I saw rats. From the second entrance on Xinyi Road, things were slightly better. It is a covered and narrow lane, with bright electrical billboards, and though it was still empty and quiet with no crowds, some shops were open. In fact, some of these shops are something of a backstage preparation area. For example, there is a shop full of staff making dumplings. A sign in the window reveals it to be the central kitchen of a very famous dumpling and dim-sum shop at the entrance from the Jinshan South Road. Via this narrow lane, we entered the legal market again. In this part of the market, stalls have standardised billboards and most are butchers. A few stalls turn into Japanese food bars in the evening (Picture 7.2).



Picture 7.2 Standardised billboards in the market (Source: author)

I was walking with my mother. Most of the time, she did her groceries on the other, east side of the Jinshan South Road. While we strolled along the dark lanes in the market, I asked her why she barely came to this side. If this part of the market was not popular, why should it even exist? She told me that, in general, the prices on this side of the market were more expensive than on the other side. Although customers did seem relatively few and far between, many stalls do in fact have loyal, and wealthy, customers, and focus for the most part on providing them with high-quality products. As we left this side of the market onto the Jinshan South Road, we saw a black BMW parked illegally on the street. A lady came out from the market. The car door opened, and a driver in a suit came to help her. He took her purchases, put them in the boot of the car, then opened the door for the lady (Picture 7.3). My mother and I exchanged a glance; this was exactly what she was referring to. The only really popular place on this side of the market is a side lane with eateries, where many go for lunch in either the cafeteria or the rice noodle soup shop. The latter occupies several shop fronts. Environmentally speaking, this lane also has better lighting, a more pleasant smell, and better pavement compared to other parts of the market.



Picture 7.3 Illegal parking with chauffeur waiting to pick up groceries (Source: author)

Eventually, we crossed the street to the other side of the market. The entrance here is a short, covered, arcade-like lane with stalls and shops on either side (Picture 7.4). My mother went to one of the stalls to pick up some tofu that she had ordered earlier from a popular tofu shop of which my family is one of many loyal customers. We have not lived in the neighbourhood for 20 years, but my mother continues to come

here for the tofu. Every day, the stall owner travels from another city in the early morning, and only leaves the market once everything is sold out. On busy days, he might not finish before 10 p.m. As such, my mother would always call the owner beforehand to reserve her order. If ever he leaves early, he will trust latecomers' orders to the neighbouring butcher's stall. I was introduced by my mother as the daughter who lives abroad and is doing research about street markets. He was friendly and said that I could ask him questions if I wanted. The last shop on the right at the end of the covered market is an oriental herbalist shop, with a counter in which most of the herbs are stored. The owner rents half of the space out to another vendor who sells homemade food (Picture 7.5). From here, the boundary between shops and vendors became somewhat blurred.



Picture 7.4 Busy semi-legal market (Source: author)



Picture 7.5 The shop that rents its front space to another stall (Source: author)

After roughly 40 more metres in the short covered lane, we came to an intersection bathed in bright daylight. Vendors and shops spread out in both directions: from this point, the market spreads roughly 180 metres east to west, and 130 metres north to south. To the east, there are many more vendors and shops compared with parts of markets seen previously. Working our way further through the uncovered market, the louder volume was obvious, as was the increase in light and, most importantly, the smell of fish and meat had gone. On this 4-metre-long lane, vendors and shops are mixed, beginning with shop spaces on either side. Some shop spaces are fixed, such as the oriental herbalist shop, fishmonger, jeweller, fruit seller, and soup shop. There is also a good number of empty shop spaces available to mobile street vendors to rent on a daily basis. Then, a second layer of street businesses occupies the space between shopfronts and the street. The street lines are mostly painted red, which forbids parking. Within these narrow spaces—generally no wider than 1-1.2 metres—vendors use buckets and planks to display their goods. They pay a daily rent to the shop owner, in exchange for the use of the space and other facilities from the shop, such as the canvas awning for shade, as well as water and electricity (Picture 7.5, 7.6). Finally, vendors stand in the middle of the street with their trollies, or set up their small stalls along the sides of buildings, the entrance to apartment blocks, or by a neighbourhood park. This multiple layer of stalls constitute the uncovered part of the Donmen market. Compared to the section previously discussed, there are far more customers strolling around here, and the general atmosphere is more vital and clean.



Picture 7.6 Multiple layers of stall arrangement in the non-legal market (Source: author)


The experience of walking around the open-air part of Donmen market is very diverse: there is a lot to see, whether food or non-food; vendors organise their displays in creative ways; some of the non-food vendors call to passers-by to attract their attention; and fruit or homemade food sellers offer samples. In this ambience, people walking around the market stop regularly to check out different stalls. It is not uncommon to see elderly people exploring the market too, sometimes with caretakers or in a wheelchair, and there is generally no space during business hours for anything larger—such as cars, bikes, or scooters—to get through.



Picture 7.7 Multi-layered stall arrangement in the non-legal market (Source: author)

After strolling along the east-west axis of the open-air market, my mother and I returned to the north-south lane to have lunch in the stinky tofu shop, where we are familiar clients. It was around 1 p.m. when we got there, and the market was almost ready to close. While we ate, the shop owner chatted with the fishmonger from across the street. They started by agreeing that the fruit which the fruit seller had given to them was excellent. Then they gossiped about one food vendor's business which had become very popular after some media exposure. The vendor had even bought himself a new Mercedes with the small fortune that he had made. Their conversation indicated that those who share the markets, whether covered or open-air, know each other well.

When we went back out onto the street after finishing our food, vendors were already clearing up. Many were loading vans and mini trucks that they had driven into the market, and some had already gone. Fruit and vegetable boxes were piled up in the recycling corner, and packed rubbish bags had been left at the front of the shop. Some of the bags were semi-transparent, while others were the municipal green variety (picture 7.7). A small group of elderly people were using an upside-down fruit crate as a chess table, playing in the street. Gradually, the market disappeared and the street emptied, leaving very little trace of what had been (picture 7.8). In the space of half an hour, it had returned to being a normal neighbourhood lane for cars again. We left the market via the south end, and took the metro home from a new stop that was established seven years ago.



Picture 7.8 Rubbish awaiting collection after the market (Source: author)



Picture 7.9 Recycling corner and mini-terrace in the street (Source: author)

7.2.2 Unfolding the Territorial Border of Donmen Market

My desk research made it clear that the Donmen market is in fact composed of three markets with different legal statuses and four different stakeholders. From my experience of walking through the market, I saw that it is spread over various urban fabrics, along lanes and alleys. The only obvious physical border is the Jinshan South Road, which splits the market into two parts. The western part of the market comprises the legal marketplace and semi-legal stalls. The eastern part contains semi-legal stalls and the non-legal sections of the market. Note that within the non-legal part, there are three types of business in the street: those in shop spaces, those in front of shops, and so-called illegal vendors. Overall, there are 61 stalls in the legal market, 144 stalls in the semi-legal market, and over 200 stalls in the non-legal market (see figures 7.4 and 7.5). In this section, I will go into specific detail about the actual governance regime for each category within the Donmen market.




Figure 7.5 Number of stalls within each legal type of market within the Donmen markets (Source: author)

The “Inner” Market: The Donmen Public Retail Market

The official name of the legal part of the market is Taipei City Donmen Public Retail Market. It is one of 48 public retail markets in the city of Taipei. The zoning map shows that the market is coded as a public facility. According to the MAO’s statistical report, the Taipei City Donmen Public Retail Market has 61 stalls, including 20 butchers, 10 fishmongers, 10 eateries, 5 fruit and vegetable sellers, and 16 others. According to the brief introduction on the MAO’s website, the Taipei City Donmen Public Retail Market was established in 1928, making it one of the oldest public markets in the city. It was built during the period of Japanese colonisation, and was fully refurbished in 1989 and 2009.

The market is a ground-floor building with multiple points of entry which are well-connected and embedded within the existing urban fabric. In the media and among visitors, this part of the market is called the “inner market,” and its entrances are connected to the covered semi-legal markets in the lanes. Although the official entrance to the market is on the main avenue, Xinyi Road, the primary customer flow is from the side entrances. One has to cross the semi-legal market to get to the public market inside, hence the “inner.” The unified billboards and tiled floor are signifiers that indicate the government’s investment in the interior space of the market. Apart from this, the border between the legal inner market and semi-legal outer market is blurred.

The parts of the legal market that each governmental organisation (figure 7.6) is supposed to be in charge of are given in the Retail Market Management Regulation. Article 3¹⁰ states that:

- A. *The main authority of the retail markets is the Department of Economic Development. The executive policy institution is the MAO under the Department of Economic Development.*
- B. *The Police Authority is in charge of maintaining public order and monitoring unlicensed vendors outside of the market.*
- C. *The Department of Environmental Protection is responsible for public sanitation outside of the market.*
- D. *The Department of Health is responsible for monitoring food security in the market.*




Figure 7.6 The organisational network governing retail markets (Source: author)

In addition to this, Article 8 of the regulation states that the MAO should assist vendors in improving their business equipment, marketing, and business plan. Article 19 states that the market should deploy a manager to maintain and monitor public order and public sanitation, to make sure vendors pay their rent on time, and to guarantee that there are no unlicensed vendors within 200 meters of the market. Articles 8 and 19 also justify the human resource capacity in the MAO's Retail Market Management subdivision. Nevertheless, as discussed above, it seems that 51 workers are not enough to handle 48 public markets in the city. From the

¹⁰ <https://www.laws.taipei.gov.tw/Law/LawSearch/LawArticleContent?lawId=P04G1001-19970107&realID=04-07-1001&lawArticleContentButton=>

website alone, one can see that the manager of the Donmen market has another two markets to administer.

To compensate for this shortage, Article 20 states that each market should form its own vendors committee. The committee would work closely with the MAO, and follow the guidelines of the Public Retail Market Self-Governance Committee Management¹¹. Article 8 of these guidelines binds the vendors committee to maintaining public safety, public order, public sanitation, facility maintenance, vendors' behaviour, and to monitor unlicensed vendors. These tasks are practically identical to those in the Retail Market Management Regulation. In other words, the guidelines make the vendors committee responsible for market management. As such, the departments supposed to look after the public markets state in Article 3 of the Retail Market Management Regulation that they in fact play a secondary role in the socio-spatial governance of the market. The division of work within the actual governance regime, therefore, separates the authority's responsibility from actual policy execution. That is to say, though the market manager is given as the primary contact in the market's governance regime, they do not work in the market, nor do they have an office in the market, but rather a phone line (that connects to a desk) in the offices of the MAO. The actual contact for the market is the head of the vendors committee.

In my interviews with both current and retired MAO public officials (#25, #27) on how the governance regime is practised in the market, they mentioned that they had to pull strings hard in order to involve other departments. For example, although the Department of Health should take responsibility for food safety inspections, there is no actual contact who is responsible for street markets. On the Department of Health's website, it states that the food safety inspection division groups its staff by district. This means that a small team of officials has to check the food safety of an entire district. Markets, therefore, are not their priorities. A similar situation applied to the police. As one official told me:

These departments would only work with us when there is a special project and they're told to by higher command, otherwise, they wouldn't even answer our requests. And normally after collaborating on those projects, they say 'sayōnara' ['goodbye' in Japanese] to us.

In a nutshell, the Retail Market Management Regulation—as a formal institution—is the main regulatory instrument for governing legal markets in the city. In the regulation, the departments involved in the governance of markets, their obligations, and the rights of vendors are written in law. However, in the practice of governance,

11 <https://www.laws.taipei.gov.tw/Law/LawSearch/LawArticleContent?lawId=P04G1009-20101209&realID=04-07-1009&lawArticleContentButton=>

legal markets lean heavily on the vendors committee and coordination with the market manager.

The “Outer” Market: Donmen’s semi-legal market

Donmen’s outer market looks at first glance as if the covering of the inner market had spread out to envelop areas outside it. The official name of the outer market is the Donmen outer vendor gathering field, and it comprises a total of 144 stalls. Historically speaking, the development of the outer market occurred at the same time as that of the inner market. In 1979, the expansion of the Jinshan South Road split the outer market in two. Even though the Retail Market Management Regulation decrees that no vendor is allowed to operate within 200 metres of the main market, given the history and citizens’ dependency on the outer market, the municipality moved to officially tolerate it in 1986 by including it in The Guidelines of Taipei City Temporary Vendors’ Gathering Fields Setting Management¹².

These guidelines represent the only formal institution governing the semi-legal market. Article 3 of the official guidelines states that “To improve local transportation and environment conditions, the Department of Economic Development must select licensed vendors and set up temporary vendor gathering fields in certain locations.” However, Article 14 states that if a temporary vendor gathering site violates public safety, its permission has not been extended, it is less than 200 metres from the public market, or the government chooses to seize the site either for the public good or economic development, then vendors can be dismissed with three months’ notice. The guidelines start by laying out the rationale that to improve the public environment, the government granted vendors a temporary exception to form an alternative market. They end by making clear that the government has the right to cancel the market for a wide range of reasons. There is substantial room for interpretation when both improving the public environment by setting up the market and cancelling the market are held as being in the public interest. In my interview with MAO public officials (#26, #27), they explained to me that the logic is that the regulation’s core aim is to set up grey zones that allow semi-legal situations to exist.

Furthermore, the guidelines detail the conditions for setting up a temporary gathering site. The most important element is that vendors form their own self-governance committee. The committee is the legal body that applies for permission to set up the site. According to Articles 7 and 12, the committee must provide detailed management proposals along with legal land leases or ownership documents in its application to the MAO. The committee is also responsible for setting up infrastructural facilities such as water, electricity, lighting, cleaning, garbage, toilets, and so on. Once every

¹² <https://www.laws.taipei.gov.tw/Law/LawSearch/LawArticleContent?lawId=P04H3002-20130326&realID=04-08-3002&lawArticleContentButton=>

three years, the committee has to apply for its permission to be extended. From the guidelines, as I have outlined, it is clear that the MAO outsources the governance of these temporary fields to the vendors themselves; the government will only help with street drainage and maintenance. Within the MAO’s Vendor Management sub-division, public officials are not involved with the actual governance of these fields, but are instead merely a contact for the purposes of paperwork. Apart from formal institutions that legitimise the semi-legal market, vendors with licences that stay in the semi-legal markets are also subject to the Guideline of Taipei City Vendors’ Management¹³. A summary of the above can be found in Figure 7.7.




Figure 7.7 The organisational network governing the semi-legal market (Source: author)

The head of the vendors committee (#34), explained in our interview how the organisation works, and the nature of its relationship with the Vendor Management division under the MAO. Within the committee, there has to be one representative for every 17 vendors. Representatives then vote for a head of the representatives, and a head of the committee. The current figure of 144 vendors in the outer market means that there are nine representatives on the committee. In addition to representatives being picked from the larger body of vendors, the committee also hires two managers and two cleaners. The financial resources for the market employees’ salaries come from a monthly fee that all vendors have to pay. Currently, this fee is 1,100 NTD (approx-

13 <https://www.laws.taipei.gov.tw/Law/LawSearch/LawArticleContent?lawId=P04H1001-20110712&realID=04-08-1001&lawArticleContentButton=>

imately 33 euros); from its 144 vendors, the committee generates around 158,400 NTD (4800 euros) to pay the salaries of the market employees, as well as cleaning and rubbish disposal fees, and utility bills. Every three months, the committee has to have a representative meeting, after which they must hand over minutes from the meeting and all other paperwork to the MAO. The most important thing is, once the committee is running and handing in its paperwork on time, the MAO will not call the police to inspect it. According to the head of the vendors committee, the outer market in this respect has always had a peaceful relationship with the police.

The spatial conditions in most parts of the outer market are not good: along the major axis of the outer market, stalls are simply attached to the walls of buildings along the lanes, and a covering for a roof. To compensate for the shortage of light sources, vendors hang orange light bulbs in front of their stalls. The stalls themselves are in a fairly rough state: aged wooden structures, grey concrete slabs, and rusty cages for live poultry. As the head of the vendors committee (#34) argued, the outer market is the most representative part of the Donmen market:

Around the market, there used to be military dormitories and the residences of upper-class military families. Even now that the community is no longer here, loyal customers still come back to the market, because they trust the quality of our products and are willing to pay a higher price for them. Our customers are mainly middle- and upper-class; they order products directly from us and come to pick them up. Some famous actresses, a former first lady, and the wife of the current mayor are all customers of ours.

He is right. Even though we moved out of the community over 20 years ago, my mother still goes to the semi-legal market for specific groceries. Most of the media coverage about the Donmen market is also about the food in this part. From the experience of strolling around with my mother, the most crowded entrances to the market are indeed those that go to the outer market. On the market's west side, the flow of customers is heaviest in the outer market, and thins out before getting to the inner market. On the other side, the entrance to the outer market is always very crowded, though the flow is eventually channelled as it moves towards the uncovered, non-legal part. In contrast to the relative darkness of the physical space, the outer market is the star of the Donmen market. The crowds, the smell of food and raw fish, the sound of knives against chopping boards, and the hubbub of conversation all provide a real sense of being in the market. Just as the orange light bulbs compensate for the darkness of the covered lanes.

The only thing that I struggled to understand was, according to Article 14 of The Guidelines of Taipei City Temporary Vendors' Gathering Fields Setting Management, this kind of semi-legal gathering place cannot be closer than 200 metres to the legal

public market. When I asked about this, he explained that there are exceptions for older fields such as the outer market, because they have existed alongside the legal market from the very beginning. However, unlike the tenants in the public market, they do not enjoy any legal stability. They consider themselves the minority of the market, and hope that the temporary status that the government grants them will last.

Neither Legal nor Illegal: The Non-Legal Market on the Radar

Besides the parts of the Donmen market already introduced, there is another, just next to the outer market. This one runs the length of the long lanes within the market block, and is in fact something of an organic aggregation of small businesses which extend from the outer market but are much bigger than it. The total number of vendors fluctuates from day to day. In the MAO's categorisation, the official name of markets such as this is Gathering fields With 20 or More Unlicensed Vendors. As far as the actual number of vendors in this part of the market is concerned, the MAO's director of Vendor Management estimated that it is somewhere between 150 and 200 stalls, or more. This is approximately the total number of vendors in the inner and outer markets combined.

The vendors refer to this part of the non-legal market as Linyi Street to differentiate it from the inner and outer markets, because the two main axes of this market are branches of Linyi Street. The streetscape of the market is composed of three different types of street entrepreneur: unlicensed mobile vendors, daily shop space renters, and permanent shops. First of all, along the lanes, there are shops on the ground floor. Most of these are everyday services such as eateries, fruit and vegetable sellers, fishmongers, pharmacies, and so on. These shops are open daily during market hours. This layer of the market is made up of vendors who rent empty shop spaces and storefronts, of which there are many alongside the permanent shops. The owners of these spaces rent them out on a daily term to vendors. In this way, vendors come in the morning, unload their goods, and make business. After market hours, they load up their goods again and return the space to the landlord. Vendors who choose to use these spaces mostly sell non-food products which take more space but are easier to transport, such as clothes, plates, books, or toys.

We then arrive at the level of storefront rentals, which occupy the narrow space between a storefront and the street itself. Although these spaces are rather small and lack facilities, they offer the best exposure to market-goers. Vendors rent the storefront space from the shop owner. They then maximise their presence in the small space by hanging posters, using amplifiers to promote their business, or handing out free samples to market-goers. These storefront vendors occupy the street spaces where pedestrians would normally walk. As a result, their stalls push pedestrians to walk on the street where cars and scooters would usually be. However, since during the market hours the market-goers largely occupy the street space, it becomes almost

entirely pedestrianised. The “almost” is due to the fact that, strictly speaking, cars and scooters can still use the space, but trying to navigate a street full of pedestrians in a car is not easy. Since it is not a major service axis, the traffic police tend not to bother the pedestrians covering the street.

Lastly, in the midst of the busy pedestrian flow and shopfront stores, unlicensed mobile vendors make their way along the street. They push their trolleys, trying to catch market-goers’ attention by occupying visible spots such as the middle of the street or the entrance to the market. Most sell homegrown vegetables or homemade food. They operate their businesses on a micro scale, as either they do not have much to sell, or cannot afford to rent a fixed space. Both of these reasons also give a clear sense of the social and economic precarity of the mobile vendors. However, they are not particularly welcomed by other vendors, nor by the police. Indeed, many vendors go so far as to call them “cockroaches,” due to their roaming. In the literature, there is a detailed description of the business tactics of these vendors, and of how they avoid inspection by the police authority (Chiu, 2013; Chang, 2017). Here, I would only like to point out that in non-legal markets such as this, the risks are highest for the mobile vendors, as they are the first target of police attention.

In terms of the administrative bodies at work in the non-legal market, only very few organisations and formal institutions have ever been involved (Figure 7.8). Perhaps the only organisation keeping track of it is the Vendor Management division of the MAO. However, since the division is already spread far too thinly over the semi-legal markets and vendors under its jurisdiction, it lacks the extra resources needed to do much about the non-legal markets. These markets are, nevertheless, on the radar of the MAO. In the presentation of its annual work that the MAO gave to the city council, its representatives were clear about the existence of these markets, but said that they would only be able to address them if they had more resources and support from the municipality.




Figure 7.8 The organisational network governing non-legal markets (Source: author)

In one of my interviews with public officials in the MAO, a policymaker (#30) explained the fragmentation of responsibility concerning the non-legal street markets. The MAO is only responsible for the unlicensed mobile vendors in the market, and the only thing that they can do is instruct the police to issue fines. As for the daily shop and storefront renters, since they conduct their business on the premises of the building, it is the job of the Municipal Commercial Bureau to keep track of business permissions, tax, and rent following the zoning code. However, there is no official contract between these renters and their landlords in practice. The vendors exist in a grey area, in which they pay the shop owner to use the shop space but whose business is not regulated by any public sector. It is very much an underground economy.

The bottom line is that the question of whether or not these autonomous pedestrian markets can exist is more or less entirely down to borough-level politicians and the local political climate. As the director of the Vendor Management subdivision rather wryly told me, “some borough leaders welcome markets and vendors as their bread and butter providers, and some hate them to the core.” (#27) Taking the Donmen non-legal market as an example, the borough leader in whose area the market is located is fairly positive about its being there. Apart from being the elected borough leader, he is also the owner of an oriental herbalist shop in the non-legal market. On top of this, he rents his storefront to other vendors. As he sees it, these vendors are economic minorities in need of help, and is happy to see what he considers a “win-win” situation in his neighbourhood. In contrast, as the Vendor Management director explained, if a borough leader does not like certain non-legal markets or vendors, they would only need to call the MAO and police and request enforcement. However, as mentioned previously, the police do not necessarily do what the MAO asks. Moreover, if vendors have a good relationship with certain local politicians, they can complain to them about any trouble. The police would then be likely to receive political pressure from those politicians. The chief of police has even been known to have to pay fines out of his own pocket. All of these various strands influence the day-to-day existence of non-legal markets.

Finally, in mid-2020, the municipal policymaker within the MAO made something of a breakthrough. A new guideline was issued that grants non-legal markets access to gain semi-legal status. In doing so, the policymaker expressed their ambition that in a few years, non-legal markets will be a thing of the past.

7.2.3 The Actual Shape of the Governance Regime in the Donmen Market

Having had a close look at the organisations and institutions involved in three types of market within the Donmen markets, we can conclude that the actual governance regime of street markets in Taipei is much more complicated than public governmental information suggests. The division of the MAO into two subdivisions

separates the management of public retail markets from all other vending businesses. Comparing the number of markets that these two subdivisions work with, Vendor Management has more than twice the amount of markets on its hands than Retail Market Management.

Concerning the legal public retail market, the institutions that ought to be responsible for governance and the related regulatory instruments are clearly stated in the market regulation. On the other hand, Vendor Management is in charge of all sorts of vending businesses, including semi-legal markets, non-legal markets, and other forms. This gives vendors in the public retail section of the Donmen market a stable status. The municipality also invests in improvements to the infrastructural facility. The governance of semi-legal markets, meanwhile, is outsourced to the vendors committee by the Vendor Management division. The official guidelines state that the vendors committee assumes the primary responsibility for keeping the market in order. This is the condition for the renewal of their temporary permission. Although the “temporary” semi-legal section of the Donmen markets has been operating for more than 35 years, there is still no promise of a permanent status from the municipality. In fact, the guidelines also state that the municipality has the right to dismiss the market with only three months’ notice. The non-legal markets, meanwhile, are beyond the reach of the MAO. Since the MAO does not have the legal right to crack down on unlicensed vendors, they can only keep a watch on their markets. As I have already mentioned, the only method for governing these unlicensed vendors is to instruct the police to practice enforcement: issuing fines and asking vendors to leave the site. However, since the municipality stopped issuing vending licenses 35 years ago, the number of unlicensed vendors far exceeds the possibility of policing them. As a result, there is barely any governance in the non-legal markets.

Interestingly, of the three types of market, it is the Donmen public retail market that receives the least attention from customers. Meanwhile, the open-air non-legal market looks after its environment the best. When the market is not there, the streets are clean. That is to say, when seen at street level, the markets in the legal grey area that adapt to flexible governance are far more popular than official ones. What is more, in the landscape of street market governance, the more peripheral vendors are, the more organised they are. This brings us to the question of the extent to which urban planning and management function in mixed-use public spaces.

7.3 Conclusion

As part of this chapter’s investigation into the governance regime of Taipei’s street markets, I traced its historical development in order to examine how it has taken the shape that it has today. Understanding where and how street markets are contextualized in the socio-spatial order of contemporary planning, I compared and

analysed the differences between the current street market governance regime on paper, and how it functions in reality.

In this concluding section, I would first like to address the fact that, historically speaking, the development of a governance regime always lags behind the development of street businesses. That is to say, the governance regime of street markets in Taipei has always been trying to catch up with the actual situation in the markets. The first attempt was made by the Japanese colonial government, which spent almost half a century trying to catch up and in fact almost made it, before having to hand over power. Yet the change of government after WWII and the Chinese Civil War made for an entirely new set of circumstances, and everything started all over again.

In order to accommodate the 2 million political refugees newly arrived on the island, the post-Civil War government became more tolerant towards street business as a way to make a living. However, the growth of street business exceeded the government's capacity to handle it: before the government was ready to institutionalise markets and vendors, the number of vendors came to be more than public land could take. To compensate for this imbalance, a temporary semi-legal market and the related regulatory instruments were developed as a form of flexible governance. Moreover, the fact that the non-legal markets were under the watch of the public entity marks this moment as a further step for the governance regime to have taken. Since these markets have not been fully legalised, however, human resources in the governmental organisation cannot be properly attributed to them: it is not possible to work on things that are not legal. Individual public officials within the public entity must work out a way to balance the reality with their limited governance resources.

This chapter used the Donmen market—one market containing three markets of varying legal status—as a case through which to examine the complexity of the governance regime's workings. Note that the Donmen market is not a special case. In the map of Taipei's markets, the different colours that represent different legal statuses overlap to a large extent. It is not unusual to see the flexibility (to put it positively) or the loophole created by the governance regime as leaving room for street vendors and their customers to co-create vitality in the urban street.

This “permanent temporariness” (Yiftachel, 2009) produces tension at the boundary between legal and non-legal street markets and their governance regimes. The legal part has more rights from the government, but fewer business opportunities. The semi-legal and non-legal parts have very limited access to the public sector, and are often threatened by law enforcement. To avoid getting into trouble, however, they maintain a more secure and tidy business environment. What is more, this part of the market is always more popular with customers.

Arguably, flexible governance could allow more room to accommodate street vendors. Moreover, refusing them access to the official governance landscape creates a huge problem: they come to be seen as an informal economy which pays no tax and occupies public space for private interest. As such, the public entity is not willing to invest in improving the facilities of these markets in the grey zone. Just as the governance regime seems clear on the MAO's website, when in fact the contacts listed there have little to do with it, this only confirms the mismatch between the official governance structure and reality.

CHAPTER 8 Street Ethnography in Taipei

In the previous chapter, I discussed how the different parts of Taipei's street market governance regime function. Due to socio-historical circumstances, however, the position of the executive power of the public sector has always been fairly weak, in the sense that it is too overstretched to properly regulate street markets and vendors. To resolve this relative weakness, a set of flexible regulatory instruments was created to address street markets and vendors in the grey zone of semi-legality. For the market vendors themselves, this has meant that they have to develop tactics to manoeuvre within the grey zone and survive.

This chapter will discuss three examples to reveal how street actors in the Donmen market deal with the government's organisational network and formal institutions. The first is that of the local neighbourhood leader as a gatekeeper—or “gatecloser”—to semi-legal or non-legal markets. The second example focuses on how markets play a role in local politics and elections, accumulating the social and political capital that will allow them to secure their position. The final example draws on the fact that, during my fieldwork, the municipality threatened the stability of the outer market's “permanent temporary” legal status, and this move provoked a significant political drama. My ethnographic observations recorded the subtle moves made by street actors in relation to this event. The image that emerged is one in which, due to unstable and flexible governance, vendors outside of the legal public retail markets must make their way by leveraging between local politicians and public policy.

8.1 Markets and Their Gatekeepers

In the previous chapter, I mentioned that in the non-legal part of the Donmen market, the local chief of the borough is the gatekeeper of the market. Since the public entity has very limited resources for the vast number of semi-legal and non-legal markets that it governs, it is very much up to the borough chief to decide whether or not to tolerate these markets in their territory.

Why does the chief of the borough have such power to decide whether a market can remain or not? What is their role? To understand the context, we must begin by looking at how this position functions in the Taiwanese democratic system. According to the Local Government Act, the borough is one level down from that of the district. However, while the chief of the district is appointed by the elected mayor, the chief of the borough is a position elected by registered citizens in the borough. Since this position is therefore decided via a democratic election, the chief of the borough is not recognised as a public official, who receives a monthly salary from the local government. Article 61 of the Local Government Act states that “Chiefs of the village [borough] shall receive no remuneration. The township/city office or

the district office shall formulate a budget for subsidising the chiefs of the village [borough] in their affairs; the subsidy item and standards shall be following law¹⁴.” The borough chief is an elected official who acts upon the final branch of public administration. The position is, as such, somewhere between that of a local politician and a sounding board for public policy. Although it does not come with a salary, this ambiguous role between local politics and the policy executor provides room for each borough chief to leverage the benefits of each side (Yang, 2015).

The position of the borough chief in Taiwan carries with it a history of political patronage that has been embedded within factional local politics since the time of authoritarian state governance. Weingrod (1968) defined political patronage as politicians using public resources for their own ends, by exchanging favours for votes. During the period of authoritarian state governance (which ended in 1987), the ruling KMT party forged a patron-client bond with the native Taiwanese elites. The foreign regime came after 1949 to consolidate its governance power by channelling state resources to local factions (Bosco, 1992). The local borough chief (often controlled by the local factions), along with the administration attached to the role, was the primary site of these socio-material bonds. Today, the borough chief has access to various resources and state subsidies covering diverse fields from public construction to social care. He or she has the power to decide how and on whom their budget can be spent, which sets up the perfect conditions for patron-clientelism. If we take the street market as an example, the local borough chief has the power to choose whether to spend the public construction budget on improving the environmental infrastructure of the market, or on hostile measures that make it harder for vendors to stay in the street.

Therefore, the relationship between the local borough chief and the street markets is critically important. A street market with the support of the local borough chief will have a completely different fate to one that its borough chief sees as an enemy. This is even more the case for semi-legal and non-legal markets, where a strong bond with the local borough chief could, for example, spare vendors from overzealous policing. Moreover, these semi-legal markets have very limited access to any public support from the municipality. The material aspect of a local borough chief’s support, therefore, could have a considerable impact, with the chief using his or her powers to help vendors apply for the public facilities and services that they need.

Each of the Donmen markets is attached to a different neighbourhood, yet all have fixed relationships with the local borough chief. In the non-legal market, the borough chief C (#35)–the one who owns a herbalist shop and rents out his storefront to other vendors–helped to contact the local councillor, and together they negotiated with the

14 <https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=A0040003>

Department of Environmental Protection to clean the drainage ditch on the market street. Interestingly, in our interview, chief C did not frame this action as a favour to the market. As he explained, these unlicensed vendors are already doing their best: they leave as little rubbish as possible, and keep the street as clean as possible. However, when the streets are cleaned, it is impossible to prevent smaller pieces of rubbish from being swept into the drainage ditch. This debris clogs and is impossible for individuals to clean. To keep the street clean and avoid unpleasant smells, it is therefore necessary to keep the ditches clean, and that is the job of the municipality. He was just facilitating communication and accelerating public efficiency.

In chief C's view, his work is "taking care of everyone." This care is not only limited to residents of his neighbourhood, but also the vendors who he recognises as socio-economic minorities. He does not see unlicensed vendors as a problem. Rather, he is proud of the self-discipline of these vendors, who keep their streets even cleaner than the semi-legal and legal markets. The daily autonomous rhythm of the markets remains, of course, and police sometimes come and issue fines. However, chief C is happy with his efforts in facilitating communication between residents and vendors:

With some communication, almost everyone knows that they should move their car away before the market starts, so vendors can unload their stuff. If not, I will call the police to help. The police can inform the car owner but if they park legally, it's up to car owners to decide to move or not. [...] All these vendors on my street are just making a living, they are not earning a big fortune. Sometimes the police might come but not too often. It's also a form of tax since vendors don't pay tax. It's all right (#35).

In contrast to the counter-argument, as put forward by the director of the Department of Economic Development, that vendors are stealing public spaces to make a private profit, chief C sees the market and the neighbourhood as coexisting in a symbiotic relationship: "residents are used to and happy with the convenience of having a nice market nearby. It's becoming a reason why some of them buy a house or run an Airbnb here. We also attract tourists."

However, it is important not to forget that the Donmen market is made up of three markets. Although each market enjoys the support of the local borough chief, in certain situations, this attachment can exacerbate territorial competition between neighbourhoods, and their links to political factions. For example, the public retail market sits in a comfortable position with its legal status. However, vendors in the legal market and their friend the borough chief belong to a different political party than the vendors in semi-legal and non-legal ones. Each side is also connected to specific city councillors that take care of certain issues. As such, some of my interviewees would say things such as "this part is under that city councillor, if you want to know,

you should go talk to his/her team. This part is under the other one.” This demonstrates that regardless of a market’s legal status, each has its own gatekeepers who are deeply involved with local politics (or, indeed, gateclosers in unfortunate cases).

In section 8.3, I will further discuss the impact of these local territorial relationships on spatial planning. Yet to understand how these relationships are possible in the first place, it is necessary to get a sense of vendors’ capital when it comes to leveraging between politics and policy. How do these leveraging tactics help them to minimise their precarity in the market? I will explore this in the next section.

8.2 The Tension Between Policy and Politics in Markets and Neighbourhoods

In this section I will discuss the ways in which street markets constitute influential public realms for local politics. I will also examine how vendors leverage their capital between local politics and public policy to minimise the precariousness of their position within the governance regime.

“Thiāu-á-kha”: The Vote Broker

As we saw in the previous section, the role of borough chief is a fairly ambiguous one in the Taiwanese local political system, in which the elected official receives subsidies from the municipality in order to communicate policy and deliver social welfare. Since the local borough chief is appointed via public election, candidates must organise their campaigns around seeking support from borough residents. The political aspects of this role mean that candidates strategically ally themselves with local city councillors who belong to the same electoral district, and this political alliance constitutes the basic scheme of Taiwan’s local political system. The local borough chief receives municipal resources to execute policy, but also uses the political capital gained from their association with party politics to negotiate certain issues and acquire more resources. In this context, local street markets represent a pivotal arena as an everyday stage for the performances of local politicians, and where local politics confronts policy decisions.

In the literature on local Taiwanese politics and factions in rural areas, Bosco (1992) described the role of “thiāu-á-kha” (which translates directly as “pile foot”): the vote broker in local Taiwanese elections. Thiāu-á-kha represents a certain figure capable of mobilising a critical amount of votes in the local neighbourhood. In rural regions, thiāu-á-kha can be village leaders, farmers associations, religious groups, or someone from an important family. These thiāu-á-kha use their relational capital to mobilise votes within their social network. This network then works as a fundamental pillar for local factions in the political ecosystem, with each able to estimate how many votes they could gain from the personal tie. After the election, once they prove that

their votes have been delivered, these thiāu-á-kha would receive rewards in the shape of resources from the faction, one way or another.

The Power of Gossip

In urban settings nowadays, thiāu-á-kha does not necessarily function exactly as Bosco studied it in the 1990s. More recently, Kuo (2016) analysed local elections in the district where the Donmen market is situated. Kuo concludes that local borough chiefs still function as a thiāu-á-kha for city councillors. However, instead of the vertical patron-client relationship of rural areas, the relationship between thiāu-á-kha and the electoral candidates is rather more symbiotic. In fact, thiāu-á-kha is not only limited to certain roles within the community. In various interviews that I conducted during my field research, the importance of street markets as thiāu-á-kha for city councillors was mentioned by various stakeholders.

This all leads back to the social essence of street markets. In the markets, people walk along the street, going from one stall to the next. They browse products. Conversations run as they go: “Boss, how much is this?” “Two bunches for 70 NTD, three for 100 NTD” “Did the price go up recently?” “Yes because the weather change influences the auction price, but you don’t need to worry about the quality. We offer the best quality we can get. The wife of the mayor is also a customer.” A street market is a place full of small talk, vendors hawking, and gossip. As with every trade, there is always some extra information on top of the essential. In fact, it is quite impossible to go to a street market and “just” pay for groceries. For example, in food stalls, vendors may promote certain products by sharing the recipe with the customer, handing out free samples to taste, or offering a better price to sell more. Customers may also ask vendors about their products. When I visited the market with my mother, she bought the tofu from the vendor and then, while they were packing up our order, introduced me as her daughter who is researching street markets.

Another example came while I was interviewing the borough chief of the non-legal market street, while a steady flow of customers came in and out of his shop. We had to pause the interview as he packed herbs for various clients. However, the client and I would share some chit-chat while the borough chief was busy. I would introduce myself and my research in Taiwanese. These waiting customers might then comment on the market, join in with our interrupted conversation, or add something else. At one point, I was trying to get a sense of how some unlicensed vendors manage to sell in front of the entrance to apartment buildings. An elderly gentleman passed by, heard our conversation, and intervened to say:

Well, some of these vendors made deals with the apartment residents. These vendors are there anyway (no matter whether the residents like it or not), if

they pay small rent to residents, why would residents refuse the payment? And that also gives each of them some stability. These vendors have a sort of fixed place, and at least residents know whom to find when they have opinions. (#36)

In under five minutes, I had got the answer to the question that I'd been asking. This man just came out with the key information while waiting for his herbal medicine, and left the shop. Small conversations such as the above are to be found everywhere in the gaps between payment, change, and packing. Day by day, the small talk shared during these moments by hundreds of vendors and thousands of market-goers, forms a universe of gossip.

As a matter of fact, during the market days, the street is flooded with the sound of non-stop conversations and chat. In this foggy wall of sound, information spreads fast from one end of the street to the other. Small talk and gossip are a feature of every trade, and in the chit-chat between vendors, market-goers, residents, and even random passers-by, it is easy to overhear things. Political information is certainly not exempt from this universe of market gossip. Opinions about which local politicians are friendly and help which part of the market are no secret in the markets themselves. Meanwhile, politicians also know well enough how information can spread in street markets. Therefore, during election season, markets are always a hot spot for candidates: from local councillors to potential presidents, every one begins every day of their campaigns in the street markets, shaking every hand, bowing to everyone, smiling, and saying "please vote me". Street markets are the place where everyone goes, and are therefore natural choices for candidates seeking exposure. Here, vendors become political sounding boards in the universe of gossip. They comment on the politicians, gossiping to each other and the market-goers about who truly cares for the people and the market, and who only shows up during the campaign. The power of this gossip can then have a huge impact on how the community of market-goers and vendors votes. Hence why politicians and public officials all regard street markets as important *thiâu-á-kha* in local politics.

The Market as the Vote Broker

An awareness of how gossip in the street markets can affect local politics is essential to understanding how street markets—with or without legal status—maintain a sort of symbiotic relationship with local politicians. These politicians tend to see requests from the neighbourhood and markets as a form of "voter service." By observing these daily voter services, politicians establish trust in their voters, and prove that they are worthy of office. As the local city councillor L (#29) explained:

In Taiwanese culture, people are used to contacting city councillors in their neighbourhood when they encounter problems with the public sector. One

reason is that the city councillor presents an image of themselves steering the municipality and being a voice for the people in democratic society. Although the municipality also offers a service line for citizens to file complaints, the bureaucracy is way less efficient than ours. Why? Because city councillors have control over the municipal budget. Public officials would prioritise our requests over those sent via the general service line. Especially public issues that need cross-departmental negotiation, we are more experienced in dealing with it.

This councillor has a large network of supporters in the semi-legal and non-legal parts of the Donmen market. Moreover, his chief officer and this officer's family are rooted in the neighbourhood where the market is located. L first encountered the vice president of the vendors association 10 years ago, when he stood for election. The association no longer exists, but the vice president was in the vendors committee of the semi-legal part of the market. Through this connection, he was able to meet residents and vendors in the neighbourhood. Naturally, when he was elected, he kept his promises and carried out his services to the market.

Over the past few years, city councillor L has assisted the vendors committee in cross-departmental mediation, negotiation, and in finding ways to improve the infrastructural facilities of the semi-legal markets. Issues such as building a public toilet, or improving the capacity of electrical meters in the semi-legal markets, are all fundamentally important to the safety and hygiene of those who work there. Vendors and their committee in the semi-legal market have very little ability to ask for anything from the municipality, according to the official guidelines by which they are governed. Indeed, these guidelines simply state that the committee has to resolve issues on their own. The MAO, meanwhile, has too few resources to fairly distribute between every market and is far too busy with those it administers. Nevertheless, with the city councillor as mediator, stakeholders such as the MAO, other departments in the network of governmental organisations, the local borough, and vendors can convene and find ways to address their issues within the legal grey zones, inventory resources, and identify budgets that can be used.

In Taiwanese terms, this mediation is called “chiao,” which means to move things around and find a space for them to fit in. In the case of the street markets, local politicians mobilise their political capital to help their supporters navigate the bureaucratic red tape in the municipality and have their requests fulfilled. Through this, vendors who occupy more peripheral positions in the governance landscape are able to access resources that they could hardly take from the public entity otherwise. In return, vendors will spread the news in the gossip universe of the markets. The local politician thus consolidates their symbiotic relationship with the market as *thiâu-á-kha*.

The Donmen market is not the only market with a local politician behind it. Public officials are well aware of the symbiotic relationship between street markets and local politics. Interestingly, they often blame this relationship as a barrier to their policies, or to inspections. As mentioned above, a local politician may also put pressure on the local police authority not to inspect unlicensed vendors too often, to allow business in the market to continue without harassment. Conversely, according to both the local borough chief and the city councillor, the problematic regulations, along with the guidelines inherited from the municipality, meant that they had to take up the role of mediator for the vendors. Instead of seeing themselves as managing factions and thiāu-á-kha in elections, they accused public officials of being unable to handle real issues in the market (such as electricity meters), and of all but killing markets with their defective mandates and policy.

During my field research, the tension between local politics and policy surprisingly found a temporary peace: the policymaker in the MAO came up with a 10-year plan to semi-legalise the city's non-legal markets. The policymaker (#30) had the following to say on the matter:

Our city councillors all care very much about issues affecting street markets. This plan hasn't received much opposition from city councillors. After all, street markets are important thiāu-á-kha for them. Shifting non-legal markets to a more legal footing should be good news for them.

8.3 When Politics Meet Policy

The End of the “Temporary Permanence” of the Outer Market

In January 2020, during my interview with the director of Vendor Management at the MAO, I learnt that the mayor was pushing an urban renewal project on the site of the Donmen public retail market. The plan is to overhaul the building that houses the public retail market, and rebuild it as a high-rise. There will be a market on the ground and first floors, and the rest will be other public facilities and social housing. However, in order to make space for construction, the municipality will have to get rid of those vendors in the semi-legal market whose stalls are too close to the retail market building. As such, the MAO will have to dismiss the semi-legal market which, though strictly temporary, has long been permitted. The director of Vendor Management told me that the first public meeting was scheduled for the following day and invited me to attend.

To dismiss the Donmen semi-legal market would be a huge disruption. Who came up with this idea? The director of Vendor Management explained that it is part of a broader project that also involves a project to renew the Nanmen market in the

same district. In 2016, the municipality decided to rebuild the Nanmen market due to building security. The Nanmen market is embedded within a high-rise building, and the materials used in that building's construction in the 1970s are no longer deemed safe. Therefore, the municipality formulated the rebuild plan. The new building project was started in early 2020, and is expected to be finished in 2023. The municipality built an intermediate market to temporarily relocate vendors from the Donmen and Nanmen markets at the end of 2019. This temporary market space was slated to last for six years, until the end of 2025, which means that it will remain open for two years once the Nanmen market has been reopened. Given the establishment of this temporary market building, the mayor decided to push forwards with the renewal of the Donmen market while there is the space to temporarily relocate its vendors.

However, there are a lot of uncertainties concerning this new plan for the Donmen market. The Nanmen market was already embedded in its building, the rest of which was given over to public facilities. As a result, the question of stakeholders is fairly straightforward. In the Donmen market, however, the site is embedded within its block and is surrounded by many small-scale property owners. On top of that, there is the semi-legal market to consider. Stakeholders in this case are, therefore, much more complex. I asked the officer of Vendor Management for his opinion about the mayor's policy idea. He shrugged and said: "Well, the mayor has his perspective, but he only has three years left. It's not enough to execute the project. We will see how it goes. For now, we are just delivering the message handed down from the mayor's office." (#27)

The time of the public meeting was a weekday afternoon. At the entrance to the meeting room was a desk where some young public officials were receiving the participants. All participants had to sign their names on a list. I signed my name and gave the institution that I represented on the same list, and saw that other public officials representing different departments were present, such as the Department of Public Construction and the Centre for Urban Renewal. In the end, there were around 30 people present. Half of them were public officials, while the rest were vendors and assistants of city councillors. The director of Vendor Management (who I had interviewed the day before) was the host of the meeting, during which he gave a presentation. His voice was emotionless. His eyes did not look at the crowd. He was like a different person from the one I had talked to the day before. In the presentation, he revealed the municipality's renewal plan. He presented the draft of the new zoning plan, and the steps to be taken in order to make the plan work. Finally, as the representative of the MAO, he announced that although the plan was only to include the 61 vendors of the public retail market, the MAO had decided to make an exceptional offer to vendors in the semi-legal market: to also include them in the relocation plan to the intermediate market. After that, however, they would have to figure themselves out.

The neutral, cold tone of the presentation seemed to trigger one of the audience members. During the Q&A, a young vendor addressed the director of Vendor Management angrily, accusing of him being one of the arrogant, obnoxious public officials who did not care about vendors at all. In response to this emotional charge, the director repeated what he had said in his presentation: “This is a proposal. It is not yet a fixed plan. Everyone is welcome to express their opinions. However, in the public sector, every step of action has to follow the mandate.” This did not calm the young vendor, but only enraged him further. Almost shouting, he replied: “What mandate? We are the property owner and we do business on our property! During the whole process, we only received a letter from the municipality saying we have to go. There is no room for further information at all!” To this, the director answered:

That is why we are here today, right? On the subject of property owners around the market, it’s completely legal to enact compulsory acquisition for public construction according to the Land Expropriation Act. But this is not my area, the Planning Department should answer this. Do we have people from the Development Bureau here? No? Well, then they will answer you in the next meeting.

Here, the head of the vendors committee in the semi-legal market (#34) came forward and tried to mediate the conflict:

The chief and I have known each other for a long time. He has always been helpful to our market. I hear him speaking, and I can understand that he is in an awkward position and that there is much he is not allowed to say in his position. But I can try to speak for him, as well as for the vendors. We are not against the renewal project, but we also have to make a living. And don’t forget, the outer market is a famous spot city-wise. If the municipality can include us, and not only the vendors in the public retail market in the renewal plan, it will be a win-win situation. Does everyone agree with me?

This triggered others to express their pride in being vendors in the semi-legal markets, serving customers such as the ex-first lady and celebrities. Seeing the discussion getting out of hand, the director concluded by saying that he would take the vendors’ opinions back to the office. Meanwhile, the head of the vendors committee also promised to collect more opinions from other vendors.

As an observer of the meeting, it struck me that there were layers of unspoken messages underlining the presentation. First of all, in the interview, the director of Vendor Management did not seem to have much support for the plan. However, in the meeting, he had to present it to citizens. I noticed that he presented himself as an emotionless bureaucrat in order to detach from his own opinion. However, this

strategy did not go down well with vendors. In fact, he was accused of being a cold public official. Every time he was attacked, he would take a deep breath as if he was swallowing his emotion and opinions, and would reply by simply reaffirming their adherence to the regulations and mandates. Regarding the audience, the officer for the city councillor L was also present. He did not say anything in response to the presentation. However, when the meeting was over, the head of the vendors committee nodded to the director, then immediately went to talk to the councillor's officer. At that moment, I realised that the meeting was a political performance: the presentation of the planning proposal had to be delivered and someone had to voice the opposition in order to create tension. Off the stage, everyone knows each other very well. The angry young vendor notwithstanding, the main stakeholders in the meeting were there just to observe and collect information. The real negotiation is not there.

Off the Stage

The first public meeting about the market renovation plan was held just before the Lunar New Year of 2020. This is the busiest period for street markets. Therefore, vendors and the municipality decided to meet again after the holidays. Meanwhile, I used this window of opportunity to interview different stakeholders in the meeting.

I started with the city councillor L, who had sent his chief officer to the meeting. When I asked his opinion about the market renewal plan, he commented that the whole thing was nonsense! As he went on to explain, the idea had come from the mayor, because although he lives right next to the market, he does not visit it, and indeed knows nothing about the local context. In fact, the semi-legal market that he intended to get rid of is the very market where his wife does her daily groceries. He made his position perfectly clear:

To be fair, since the 70s, most of the market renewal plans which put street markets into marketplace buildings have been proven to fail. They are all 'buildings for mosquitos' now, awaiting renewal. It doesn't make any sense to repeat the historical mistake and kill another good market. (#29)

On the renewal plan's visibility, and whether vendors in semi-legal markets would have to worry about their future, L was relatively at ease. As he put it:

There are still many uncertainties about this plan. For example, the municipality still has to manage to get the extension of the land lease for the location of the intermediate market. Without the extension, the two years' time after is not enough to accommodate the rebuild plan. The public meeting last time was a testing ground. The MAO was testing the scale of opposing opinions.

His words corroborated my impressions about the political performance following the meeting. When I asked what he was going to do to prevent the renewal plan from happening, he told me that it was better to sit and wait, and to not make too much noise at the beginning, since the municipality and the MAO were already struggling to resolve certain uncertainties in the plan. Nevertheless, the role of the city council is to control the municipal budget. To fully activate the renewal plan, the municipality will have to enforce compulsory acquisition to take the land from small property owners around the site. However, the municipality will first have to persuade the city council to approve the compensation budget to allow the acquisition to go ahead. “We will keep our eyes on the budget,” L concluded his account by promising.

After interviewing L, I gradually began to puzzle things together: he, the chief of the borough for the non-legal market street and the head of the vendors committee in the semi-legal market are allies. Later, in my interview with the head of the vendors committee in the semi-legal market W (#34), he revealed that the renewal plan is also about the distribution of resources among factions within the Donmen market. He is between 50 and 60 years old, and has been working in the market for over 30 years, since taking over the stall from his father. Again and again, he repeated that he and his fellow vendors in the semi-legal markets are not necessarily against the renewal plan; they just want to be included in it. However, the problem is that vendors in the public retail market and the borough chief have connections with city councillors from different political parties. They strongly oppose the inclusion of vendors from the semi-legal markets. According to him, there has long been a degree of enmity between the inner and outer markets, due to the fact that the outer markets do much better than the inner markets. This had not always been the case, however: their relationship has once been better, and they had even shared certain facilities such as the public toilet. When things turned sour, vendors in the inner market put a lock on the toilet, and it was then that vendors from the outer market asked councillor L to help them negotiate for a toilet for themselves.

Aware of the disagreements between vendors and local political factions, W remained hopeful about the environmental upgrade for all of the Donmen markets:

I am advocating for the renewal of the whole market neighbourhood instead of the renewal of a single building. There is a reason why, although we are not fully legal, we still make good business: because we offer the best quality of food, that is what makes the market survive. We also want to do our business with dignity. We glorify the city’s foodscape, and just hope the municipality sees us. Building a new house to accommodate the market that has few customers, but destroying the market that has good customers does not make any sense, although everything is legal and plays by the rules. (#34)

As the market leader, he spoke his mind in simple terms, but saw very clearly the long-term inadequacies of the policy, governance, and planning of street markets.

Back to the Stage

A few days after I had spoken to W , there was the second public meeting. This time around, it was organised on a bigger scale, with at least 120 people in attendance, including more than six city councillors or their representatives. On the municipal side, the meeting host was the deputy mayor Peng. The heads of the Department of Economic Development, Urban Development, Public Construction, and the Centre for Urban Renewal were all at the table. As I wrote in a note, “It’s gonna be a big show!”

Unsurprisingly, all of the politicians took a long time to express their opinions before the start of the meeting, both supporting and opposing the plan. Interestingly, councillor L did not attend, but again sent his chief officer who sat next to W and the angry young vendor from before. The meeting did not bring forward any new messages, but rather provided a platform for different stakeholders to express their opinions. However, barely any vendors came forward. The climax of the meeting came when the head of the outer market’s vendors committee, W , said that everyone knew that they had always been the best part of the whole market, and that it was the simple incompetence of the inner market that meant it always had to hide under public protection. This triggered the head of the inner market’s vendors committee, P, who was representing vendors in support of the municipality, to attack back: “We also have popular vendors, and we deserve our rights!” When the subject was broached of whether the renewal plan should focus on the whole market block, or only rebuild the architecture (and destroy the outer market), a female vendor asked all those vendors who had remained silent in the meeting: “if you agree that the municipality should focus on renewing the whole block, clap your hands!” More than half of the people present clapped their hands. P and her fellow vendors from the inner market angrily left, and the meeting more or less ended without much in the way of a conclusion.

The next day, the news that the outer market will likely disappear in the next few years was a major news item. In one article, the journalist wrote: “The mayor and his wife also went to the outer market to ask for support during the election campaign, but after his re-election, he has turned his back on the vendors.”¹⁵ This comment neatly summarises the relationship and conflicts between street markets and local politics in the governance of the former. A year after the meeting, a press release¹⁶ by

15 https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/life/breakingnews/3071125?fbclid=IwAR04zCGlZ2wcAdLrBlvJ-SKL_ADb2bEWvG16gDRcBqZPg-6XuBfxe7XXwY

16 <https://udn.com/news/story/7323/5179948>

the MAO stated that there was still no news about the extension of the intermediate market. The renewal plan is still on hold.

8.4 Conclusion

This chapter has used three examples to demonstrate how street vendors take advantage of the social and relational capital that they gain in the course of conducting their business to ally with local political forces. Street actors who have limited sway when it comes to engaging with decisions made by the public entity draw on their relationships with local politicians to leverage their benefits and secure their otherwise precarious position in the market. In doing so, they actively involve themselves in another part of the governance regime.

Vendors bring economic activity into the borough. These are semi- or non-legal street businesses with little resources to change their environment, but here the local borough chief is significant, as they do have access to resources. This mutually beneficial situation not only keeps the market alive and provides convenient groceries for residents, but the coordination between vendors and this elected official at the neighbourhood level is key to autonomous market management.

The alliance between vendors and the local borough chiefs is not only beneficial at the level of market business, however. It also has an impact in the network of local politics. Street markets are places of social interaction, local news, and gossip. If vendors are satisfied with the help that they have received from local politicians, they are more likely to share their gratitude by promoting these politicians to their customers and fellow vendors. Meanwhile, for local politicians, delivering on the services they have promised by helping vendors to negotiate public affairs that they may not be able to tackle directly is an effective way of building substantial support in the neighbourhood. This symbiotic relationship has become the main avenue by which vendors interact with the public entity.

However, the political drama around the planning that I described in section 8.3 revealed that markets are also territorial places, with different political factions and supporters. Clashing interests within markets can easily escalate into political manipulation and struggle. Moreover, policy plans are easily disrupted by politics. This is where the forms of flexible governance that I have mentioned in previous chapters suffer. The governance dilemma ends up caught between sticking to the regulations but disappointing citizens' needs in the street markets, or doing as local politicians do: moving resources around to find mutual benefits for stakeholders.

CHAPTER 9 Taipei Case Analysis

In this analytical chapter, I will attempt to create a dialogue between my ethnographic fieldwork findings and theoretical framework. It is here that I will practice “thick description” (Geertz, 1974) to reflect upon the emic–etic perspective in my research. Where do my fieldwork findings in Taipei stand in relation to my theoretical framework, and how might this intersection help to understand the planning of mixed-use public space there? How might theories help me to tease out what I observed in my fieldwork in Taipei?

In the case of Taipei, my most significant finding is that there are three different markets in terms of legal and spatial arrangement that coexist in the same continuous urban fabric, and share the same name. In Chapter 7, I analysed the causes of the differentiation and described the organisational network and formal institutions that govern each type of market. In Chapter 8, the findings from my ethnographic fieldwork revealed how street actors navigate the governance regime by leveraging political resources. A summary of the shape of the governance regime is presented in Figure 9.1 below. Now, the aim of the current chapter is to read my ethnographic fieldwork findings through the lens of my theoretical framework: what are the characteristics of Taipei’s street markets as mixed-use public spaces, and what are the institutions and organisations that make up the governance regime?

There are three main topics that I will raise in this chapter. I will begin by focusing on the characteristics of Taipei’s street market governance regime. My second point begins with the observation that, among the different legal types within the Donmen markets, the semi-legal market showed the strongest autonomy in relation to the governance regime. By analysing how both governmental and non-governmental organisations interact with formal and informal institutions to administer the semi-legal market, I will be able to extract insights about how different logics of order combine in the space. Lastly, I will return to the principle that street markets are mixed-use public spaces to reflect on the ambiguous boundary between order and chaos in such spaces, and how actors in the governance regime approach this ambiguity.




Figure 9.1 Map of the street market governance regime in Taipei (Source: author)

9.1 The Characteristics of Taipei's Governance Regime

In Chapter 7, I concluded that due to historical shifts and policy changes, the governance regime of Taipei's street markets is rather complicated. I demonstrated that in the case of the Donmen market, which is representative of other markets in the city, three legal types of market coexist under the same umbrella name. For market-goers, these constitute different sections of the market. However, each of the legal types has its own different formal institutions and organisations.

Organisationally speaking, an analysis of human resource allocation in the major organisation of the governance regime, the MAO, shows that the number of public officials assigned to work on legal markets far exceeds the number of those who work on semi-legal and non-legal markets. However, as mentioned previously, there are twice as many semi-legal and non-legal markets as legal ones. My participatory observation in the MAO office also revealed that public officials in the Vendor Management subdivision—which is in charge of all semi-legal, non-legal, and other types of vendor—are barely able to cover the necessary bureaucratic paperwork. Moreover, their heavy workloads mostly kept them in the office instead of the street markets.

In terms of formal institutions—the regulatory instruments that define the “dos and don'ts” and legal positions for street markets—the three parts of the Donmen markets have their own legal institutions. The Taipei City Retail Market Management Regulation clearly states the organisational structure of the legal market. Yet through my fieldwork, I found that the market's daily operations lean heavily on the vendors committee and rely on coordination with the market manager. As for

the semi-legal market, The Guidelines of Taipei City Temporary Vendors' Gathering Fields Setting Management¹⁷ is the formal institution that provides legal permission for vendors to stay in the grey zone. The guidelines also specify that vendors should set up committees to handle daily operations. Unlicensed vendors, meanwhile, are simply prohibited from the non-legal market. However, since the MAO does not have the jurisdictional right to truly enforce this rule, the only thing they can do is ask the police to fine unlicensed vendors and ask them to leave. The question to be unpacked here is: given that the human resources designed to administer the markets are distributed unevenly, that their regulatory instruments are in places insufficient, and that there are serious tensions between the three parts of the Donmen markets, how does Taipei's street market governance regime keep these markets going?

The first thing to emerge from a reading of my fieldwork material through a theoretical framework inspired by new institutionalism is that, compared to the governance regime in Amsterdam, Taipei's street market governance regime is relatively weak in formal institutions. There are many loopholes that cause regulatory instruments to collide. For example, the Taipei City Retail Market Management Regulation states that there should be no other markets or vendors within 200 metres of an existing public market. In reality, however, not only are there semi-legal and non-legal markets right next to legal public markets under the permission of public authorities but in almost all cases, they perform better in terms of both business and environmental maintenance. Another clear example is the "permanent temporary" status of the semi-legal market. I will discuss this further in the next section.

In terms of the gap between state regulation and what happens onsite, my findings suggest that although the public information and regulatory instruments appear to provide a clear definition of the organisational tasks involved in governing street markets, onsite market managers and vendors committees are the protagonists in terms of the markets' daily operations. At the same time, the division of organisational tasks as written in the regulatory instruments does allow for clear and straightforward inter-sectoral communication within the municipality. Departments that oversee related tasks within street markets must all send representatives to public meetings.

Despite the governance regime's formal institutions and organisational capacity, it is under-equipped to deal with both the number of street markets in the city and the overlapping of different legal types of market on the same site. My fieldwork findings show that informal institutions and self-organisation each play a pivotal role in actual governance. These informal institutions take two forms: oral agreement

17 <https://www.laws.taipei.gov.tw/Law/LawSearch/LawArticleContent?lawId=P04H3002-20130326&realID=04-08-3002&lawArticleContentButton=>

and political negotiation, and are widely applied by and between public officials, vendors, and local politicians.

Oral Agreement: “Kóng-hó”

In situations where formal institutions are out of reach, oral agreements based on trust are an essential element in peripheral governance. Within municipal organisations, there is no obligation for different departments to work together. For example, the separation of jurisdiction rights and the management of street markets was an issue that I observed in my fieldwork. The MAO has no right to inspect unlicensed vendors. As such, if they wanted such inspections to be carried out, they would have to inform the police. The problem is then that such inspections might not be a priority for the police. Sometimes, however, the opposite occurred, as the high-ranking manager of the Vendor Management division(#27) told me:

Sometimes police went to non-legal markets to issue lots of tickets to unlicensed vendors. These markets are under our watch. There is a mutual consensus that we, the neighbourhood, are fine with them being there. I would then receive angry calls from local politicians asking what was going on. Normally the solution would be that the police chief uses their bonus grant to pay the fine [as the price to break the oral agreement].

In another interview, the former director of the MAO (#25) explained how he had “fixed up” with the police. According to him, both the MAO and the police are aware of the policy loophole that left the police to inspect unlicensed vendors. The reason is fairly obvious: first, in the government’s own account, the number of vendors did not go down at all once the municipality stopped issuing licences to vendors. Second, it is unfair and unrealistic to ask the police to monitor these vendors all day, as they have more pressing tasks. However, the leader of the MAO had no option but to do something to stop the exponential spread of street vendors. The solution, in the end, came when he was able to contact the higher echelons of the police force through a connection in his personal network. Together, they agreed that unlicensed vendors around the city’s metro stations represented a higher priority for inspections than unlicensed vendors in non-legal markets. The latter fall under the MAO’s jurisdiction and are more or less embedded within the existing governance regime. The majority of vendors in non-legal markets also belong to a lower socioeconomic class. There is, therefore, a sense of offering them a space for survival in those markets. The large numbers of unlicensed vendors around metro stations, however, not only have a greater impact on commuter safety, but the vendors also tend to be young people trying out their small businesses. Without street vending, they still have the option of selling at private festivals, holiday markets, or creators markets. With the oral agreement on the necessity of inspection, this unofficial division of labour was fixed.

Besides oral agreements between public officials, vendors (and especially unlicensed vendors) are also highly dependent on all sorts of oral agreements for their daily survival, as shown in section 8.2. For example, the mutual consensus that unlicensed vendors are allowed in non-legal markets under the watch of the MAO entails a raft of socio-spatial arrangements based on oral agreements. Take a look at Linyi Street, the largest non-legal sector in the Donmen market: during market business hours from Tuesday to Sunday, the alleys are pedestrianised, based on oral agreements. Residents around the neighbourhood know that while they can officially, parking in the alley where the market takes place is impossible, and generally move their cars before the market starts. Likewise, it would be drastically unwise to try to drive a vehicle through these alleys during market hours. Again, this would be legally possible, and sometimes a vehicle has accidentally ended up in the market streets. The consequences of this, however, are always a mess: vendors and market-goers have to make room for the car to pass. Cars can become practically stranded in streets packed with pedestrians, only able to inch forwards under a barrage of irritation and judgement from everyone in the market.

In section 8.2, I examined how gossip and small talk function in street markets, and used as an example the way in which I learnt about the unlicensed vendors who sell at the entrances of apartment buildings. Here, it is worth noting the language that the elderly gentleman used. When he said: “some of these vendors made deals with the apartment residents” he used the term “kóng-hó,” which in Taiwanese means “made deals.” This signifies an oral agreement in Taiwanese: kóng-hó is the term for many things that are arranged in street markets.

Another example came when I asked how vendors in the non-legal market deal with rubbish and waste management. How is the street so clean after a market? Kóng-hó was the answer. The conversation continued thus:

The rubbish arrangement is also kóng-hó. The municipal rubbish truck comes twice a day to pick up the waste. There is this recycling guy at the corner. He collects recycled paper and sells it. Vendors would normally leave cupboards at the recycling guy’s corner. The rubbish depends: some take it away with them, some pack their rubbish and recycling in the municipal bags and then ask neighbours to throw it out when the truck comes. Myself, I help the vendor who rents out my space to deal with the rubbish. It’s not a big deal. (local resident, #36)

From informal communication between public officials and vendors to the socio-spatial arrangement and operation of street markets in Taipei, kóng-hó—an oral agreement—is key to the daily practices of all stakeholders. One of the new institutionalism’s insights is that social and cognitive cultural interactions between stakeholders can be

as powerful as regulative institutions (Scott, 2013). In the case of Taipei, my research findings demonstrate that oral agreements based on personal negotiations and social consensus at different levels within the governance regime are essential informal institutions. These are built upon the collective practices of *metis* (Scott, 1998) to compensate for the shortcomings of under-equipped formal institutions.

Political Negotiation

In Chapter 8, I discussed the ways in which local politics and neighbourhood politicians are bound up with street-level politics in Taiwan, and particularly in street markets. My fieldwork findings also showed how street market vendors form symbiotic relationships with local political networks to secure their precarious state. This relationship can be seen as another form of informal institution, built to supplement the under-equipped formal institutions of the governance regime.

In Chapter 7, I laid out the governance regime of street markets in Taipei. One of my conclusions was that due to historical policy decisions, vendors in semi-legal and non-legal markets have few channels through which to communicate with organisations in the governance regime. The limited formal institutions also mean that public officials are often unable to intervene or implement much. As their greatest compromise is to allow markets in the grey zone to stay there, they can do little else.

Later in section 8.3, my fieldwork story demonstrated how the symbiotic relationship between vendors and local political networks brings out the interwoven nature of policy and politics. Local political networks need vendors to promote them to other market traders in the election campaign. In return, they are willing to help vendors solve issues by mobilising their political capital.

The lack of formal institutions locks vendors in the semi-legal and non-legal markets into a situation in which they are unable to seek help from the official public system. As a result, they turn to their local political network, going through negotiations between politicians and the municipality. Political pressure from city councillors onto the public sector becomes a major force for aiding semi-legal and non-legal markets.

Where daily maintenance is concerned, the borough chief has the authority to request various kinds of cleaning from the Department of Environmental Protection, but vendors and non-legal street markets do not. Likewise, the permanent temporary status of the semi-legal markets has a negative effect when it comes to infrastructural issues such as safer electrical systems or public toilets for vendors. As shown in section 8.2, in the Donmen market, however, the local councillor and his team were able to make a request to the MAO concerning such specific tasks as building a public toilet for vendors in the semi-legal market. Through political pressure from

the city council and occasionally the support (or direct order) of someone higher up in the municipality hierarchy, the MAO is obliged to act. Their task is then, first, to figure out how to situate the requested project within the existing formal institutional landscape. Once a legitimate position can be found in this context, the MAO can call on organisations and public sector entities to form a special mission group. It is the job of this group to bring the toilet building project to fruition. For their part, the local councillor and his team may steer the process by participating in coordination meetings, site investigations, or even requesting official presentations from the MAO.

Political negotiation as an informal institution in street market governance can be seen as a form of compensational governance (North et al, 2009; Goodfellow, 2020). However, this compensation for the lack of formal institutions also has a price. There is a risk of generating extra complications or exacerbating existing conflicts between different political forces in the market. In the case of the Donmen markets, as discussed in section 8.3, the legal public part and semi-legal part are affiliated with opposing political forces. The conflicts between these forces, and the benefits that they fight to obtain for each part of the market, are entirely intertwined. So much so, in fact, as to create daily micro-aggressions in the market, such as the toilet being locked so that only vendors in the semi-legal market can access it.

To mobilise political negotiations and pile pressure on the governance regime to allow exceptions has a rather high cost in terms of communication. It can also be an exclusive process to consolidate the symbiotic benefits for certain politicians' *thiāu-á-kha*. Rather than politicians and the municipality allying to push for structural and institutional change together, the governance of public space can easily be hijacked by certain groups with politicians behind them, as shown in the public meeting discussed in section 8.3. More substantially, political negotiation can only solve problems to a certain degree. When issues go beyond simple daily maintenance to questions of urban development, such as neighbourhood regeneration, political negotiations have a far smaller impact than the changing scope of the governance regime (which applies to more than just the market).

Self-organisation

As elaborated in section 7.2.2, there are two vendor committees in the Donmen market: the legal and the semi-legal. In each committee, vendors are responsible for arranging the daily maintenance of the market. According to the formal institutions that adapt to each market, each committee is also obliged to maintain contractual and bureaucratic relationships with the public sector. However, my fieldwork findings show vendors committees to be more than sub-contractual management groups under the MAO. These committees have a robust capacity for self-organisation and are highly autonomous.

As an intermediate organisation between individual vendors, politicians, and the public sector, they represent a pivotal node in the organisational network of the governance regime. On one hand, the committee keeps friendly relationships with the public sector and fulfils the institution's requests. On the other, it gathers the opinions of its members and mobilises its political influence in exchange for the care of the local political network.

During public meetings, as illustrated by the example discussed in section 8.3., while most vendors stay silent, the leaders of the vendor committees speak for their members about what they want. As part of their public performance, these leaders also tend to reveal their political connections as well as how they maintain a harmonious relationship with the public sector. This may include sitting next to a certain politician and referring to an affinity or friendship with both public officials and politicians, as symbols of political capital and agency.

Why should this show of agency and political capital matter? During our interview, the high-ranking manager of the Vendor Management division (#27) made a subtle point:

If the committee has a consolidated alliance with the local political network, this gives a certain stability to management, which is less troublesome for us in the MAO. However, there is also the possibility that if the committee engages in organised crime, it will be a headache for us. It depends on each market.

For better or worse, such political capital—and the negotiations that go along with it—is an important informal institution (Scott, 2013; Goodfellow, 2020) and a major characteristic of the governance regime of Taipei's street markets.

In this section, I have highlighted the use of oral agreements, political negotiations as informal institutions, and the strong self-organisation of vendor committees as three characteristics of Taipei's street market governance regime. These three characteristics have a considerable impact across the different legal types of street market, such as compensation for the gaps left that formal institutions and organisations cannot reach. In the non-legal markets, oral agreements are practically the foundation of everything, while legal and semi-legal markets are more dependent on the capacity for self-organisation. Among the three legal types of street market, the semi-legal type has the highest levels of agency and self-organisation. It is also the most popular section of the market. In the next section, I will take a closer look at how this part of the market stands out, as it presents an important analytical point of view in the case of Taipei.

9.2 The Semi-Legal Market, the Street Lacking Infrastructure, and Tactical Politics

In March 2020, a newspaper revealed that the municipality was considering rebuilding the inner—or legal—Donmen market (see section 8.3). The plan could potentially spell the end of the outer—or semi-legal—market. The news triggered an immediate public discussion.

As discussed in section 7.2, the Donmen market is more than just a neighbourhood street market. With its long history in the centre of Taipei, it has always been popular among middle-class residents across the neighbourhood. Journalists covering the story wrote about the favourite stalls of celebrities and politicians.¹⁸ In recent years, it had gained public attention from culinary writers and restaurateurs describing where they shopped. Following the trend, young bloggers, vloggers, and YouTubers also produced content about the market's food and history.^{19,20}

Through this exposure, the public learnt that the most famous shops, stalls, and eateries in the Donmen market belonged to the semi-legal part. In the past, several famous markets and night markets in Taipei had suffered severely as a result of being relocated and rebuilt (Lin & Liao, 2016). Knowing that shops and stalls in the Donmen might disappear triggered more opinions both online and offline. The media started to count which shops, stalls, and eateries would be affected and newspapers, unsurprisingly, began to run stories under titles such as “Anticipating the end of the market” and “Repeating the historic failure.”²¹

What makes the semi-legal market so popular? Putting the culinary aspect to one side, let us revisit what Richard Sennett described in his typology of cities, as discussed in Chapter 2. Following Sennett's definition of *cit * and *ville*, the semi-legal market, and even the non-legal market, is definitely an example of *cit *—a collective place-oriented consciousness produced by certain socio-spatial settings. The space's site specificity is much more closely aligned to the everyday interactions that occur there than the form of the physical space.

Certain conversations and relationships only make sense in that specific space: people come to the market to buy and sell. As highlighted in sections 7.2 and 8.2, amidst the commercial activity, friendships, information exchange, and even political messages are built up, based on trade talk and years of trust.

18 <https://udn.com/umedia/story/12749/4265740>

19 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F6eWkZr-sWY>

20 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qdLzfR64Tew>

21 <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/life/paper/1362247>

Moreover, in the semi-legal market, and unlike vendors in the non-legal markets, stall arrangement differs daily. Under the arcade which blocks out the sky between buildings, each vendor has their fixed spot, with stalls sprawling along the alleys, and growing out from the walls. Old concrete blocks and wooden structures define the shape and space of each stall on the tarmac of the alley. Yellow light bulbs hang naked. The roughness of built materials signifies the market's semi-legality and temporariness, even though it has been running for decades.

In the visually unprepossessing setting of the market, against a backdrop of trading and goods, market-goers and vendors have carved out a sense of place, and a real attachment to the space. As one walks through the market, the air is filled with the sounds of chatting and conversation between vendors and market-goers. In contrast to the non-legal market, in which precarious vendors without fixed spots vie for attention, most vendors in the semi-legal market have a very stable customer base. As such, they have no need to attract the attention of more market-goers. Indeed, they chat leisurely with each other and their customers. The latter arrange orders, ask for cooking tips, catch up on each other's lives, etc. When I went with my mother, we stopped at the tofu stall. Apart from wanting to introduce me, my mother also had to check whether, if she comes to pick up her order after the vendor leaves, it can be left with the butcher next door. Yes, it would be possible for her to give the money to the butcher. The reason for having this conversation about the arrangements for collection is that my mother no longer lives close to the market, but must travel for nearly 40 minutes to get there. This is just one example among many, demonstrating that this humble setting is contextualized by decades of socio-spatial fabrics. It is a *cité* whose value lies in its being charged with social, cultural, and political capital.

In Taipei, the semi-legal Donmen market is not one of the only *cité* fields that remain. Throughout the modern, *ville*-dominated grid of the city, the status of semi-legality within the governance regime is an important way of securing small and scattered pieces of mixed-use public space. How does this part of the market survive? What makes it stand out from the other legal types of street market? A combination of my fieldwork materials and theoretical framework might produce some clues that can help to answer these questions.

As Chapter 7 and the previous section pointed out, while the legal section of the market is organised primarily according to formal institutions and the non-legal market leans heavily on informal institutions, both formal and informal institutions are equally important in the semi-legal section. Formal institutions here grant the legal legitimacy for the semi-legal market to exist in a state of permanent temporariness (Yiftachel, 2009). Nevertheless, as indicated in Chapter 8, unlicensed vendors must co-organise any necessary daily maintenance and bureaucratic affairs according to official guidelines, self-organisation is still key to mobilising informal institutions that

compensate for what the formal institution is unable to do to stabilise the running of the market.

To draw again on James C Scott's terminology, close observation of official guidelines is a matter of *techné*. Unlicensed vendors and their committees are obliged to behave according to the official guidelines, which themselves represent technical and epistemic forms of knowledge about matters of governance, even more than vendors in the legal section of the market. Since these unlicensed vendors are essentially granted temporary permission to stay, they are required to practice self-governance and have very opportunities for negotiation if they fall on hard times or the government decides to move them on. In this respect, licensed vendors are rather like tenants of market stalls. As long as they pay their rent on time, there is no problem whatsoever.

As the former head of the MAO (#25) explained, when the municipality established the guidelines that allow unlicensed vendors to stay temporarily: "it was rather like a sunset provision, the assumption being that either vendors will find other jobs and move on, or after a few years their business will turn down and we close it without too many protests. After all, only aggregated businesses can be called markets." It is now clear that, for one reason or another, this sunset has become permanent after more than three decades of the semi-legal market's existence.

Surviving in the semi-legal market is more than just a matter of self-governance and reporting to the MAO, however. A large part of the tactics needed to survive in the street market is excluded from the *techné*. *Metis* also plays a crucial role. First of all: maintaining good relationships with the neighbourhood and other vendors is the most important kind of street knowledge. As the vendors themselves put it: "we are all very familiar with each other," the subtext of which is that there is a mutual consensus between vendors and the neighbourhood on how to approach the daily socio-spatial arrangement of the markets. This mutual consensus is largely built upon oral agreements. Even if things go wrong, open channels exist for communication. This is extremely important to the semi-legal market: its semi-legality and temporary permission mean that there is little tolerance for nuisances. Avoiding complaints from the neighbourhood is absolutely key to their survival.

Second, vendors in the semi-legal section are highly conscientious: they behave within the rules of the temporary scheme and are passionate about their business, and it is through the latter that they accumulate their social capital. In public meetings about the potential change of the market, discussed in section 8.3, knowing that they were at risk and that they had little recourse to official contestation according to the formal institutions, vendors often spoke about how they were proud to serve their customers and how much society needs them. A typical opening comment went something like this: "I mean, I am [x] years old, and having been more than 30 years

in this business, I could have retired. But....” Arguments that follow this “But” might be that their long-term customers, who often included celebrities and people of high economic or political status, need them more than the other way around; or that the long-standing history of the market is almost like a heritage that they are a part of. These arguments are all built on one thing: although they are unlicensed, the vendors work enormously hard and have great faith in the products that they provide to their customers. They thanked the MAO for kindly supporting them in the campaign to stay, but were clear that they were also applying pressure to the MAO to act as their protector.

Meanwhile, it is worth recalling Chapter 8’s discussion of gossip in the form of political capital in street markets. The only certainty about rumours and gossip is how extensively they can spread information. Vendors in the semi-legal section have the most solid customer base, and in this context, politicians clearly know how the gossip dynamic works. In the second public meeting, six out of eight city councillors and one assistant to the district’s congressmen were present. It is very unusual that a discussion around a potential policy attracted so much attention. During the meeting, with the exception of one councillor who has long stood with the legal section of the market and thus supported the regeneration plan, all politicians addressed the importance of negotiation and said that any change should come with a minimum of damage to the existing situation. On the other hand, the number of local politicians present in the public meeting served as a message to the municipality about political sensitivity. This matter was important enough to gain the attention of almost all local politicians, a clear sign that the aspect *cité* was still strong in the Donmen markets. Vendors mobilised their practical street knowledge—*metis*—to navigate and survive their long-term precarity. Even when their survival was at stake, they managed to determine the direction of travel.

To me, as an observer in the meeting, it was very interesting to see the interwovenness of *techne* and *metis* over a planning issue, and to observe that *cité* is more socially legitimised than *ville*. The public officials in the meeting represented the *techne* perspective in announcing the change to the mixed-use public space from *cité* to *ville*: the end of semi-legality, gridding the non-standard lanes, and creating a building to house vendors. In opposition to this, unlicensed vendors mobilised their social and political capital to back up their defiance as hard-working and precarious street vendors. They were able to articulate arguments, propose possible negotiating scenarios to avoid being displaced, and had most politicians on their side. This made the public officials, who were just reading out the regulations over and over, look somewhat ridiculous. Vendors from both legal and semi-legal markets were highly aware of the precariousness of their situation, and did not talk much in the meeting, instead sitting silently and letting the leaders of their committee and politicians speak for them. Yet they did know how to use their voice. They mobilised their networks.

They clapped loud, loud enough to dismiss any doubt about their position, after every public speech. It was striking to see these semi-legal vendors surviving behind their semi-permanent stalls in streets lacking infrastructure, and showing their strength via non-verbal expression.

9.3 Twisting the Narrative: From Apparent Chaos to the Integration of Different Orders

In previous sections, I have used the lens of the governance regime to tease out the ways in which different orders—in the form of formal and informal institutions—have interacted with actors on the ground to shape the socio-spatial dynamics of the Donmen market. In this section, I will address the impact of these different institutions on both the presentation of the mixed-use public space and the craft of governing it.

Organised chaos: the Coordination of Orders

Street markets have quite a history as symbols of disorder, chaos, and lax governance—sites that need to be fixed—in both the profession and theory of urban planning and design (Brown, 2004, 2006; Falla & Valencis, 2019; Stillerman, 2006; Tucker & Devlin, 2019). Of course, bearing in mind the theories of Sennett and Scott, it is possible to argue that these characterisations are very much a syndrome of modernism. Establishing a sharp border between order and chaos becomes an intervention: planning as statecraft. Nevertheless, in my fieldwork in Taipei, from public meetings to narrative interviews, I realised that the order that public officials are actually concerned with has more to do with public hygiene and environmental cleaning in the markets, than visual aesthetics or conceptual debates about order and disorder in the abstract. On this topic, a comparison of the spatial performance of the three legal types of market in the Donmen markets reveals some interesting insights.

As mentioned in Chapter 8, of the three sections of the market, the legal one has the best infrastructural provisions. There is running water, electricity, and support with cleaning from the governance regime. However, it also has the most issues when it comes to public sanitation and environmental cleaning. There are too many stalls and, given that they do not receive enough light under the old arcade structure, this has created dark corners that are a paradise for rats. The lighting in the semi-legal section is also suboptimal, but because most stalls are operated during market hours, the daily tasks of cleaning and tidying happen in the market. As for the non-legal market, it is mostly open-air and, as such, has the best natural light (though it is also exposed to rain). In this section, everything on the street during market hours has to be carried away as soon as business hours end. The assembly and dismantling of stalls, cleaning, and disposal of rubbish must leave the street as if the market had never been there, day in and day out. That is to say, the fewer legal protections a section has, the more self-organised an environment it is in the Donmen market.

This striking observation completely inverts conventional assumptions about chaos and order. The markets and vendors traditionally regarded as outlaws and disruptive are the most environmentally organised, and vice versa. This contrast reflects how the governance regime works: it takes more than formal institutions to govern a mixed-use public space. In the legal section of the market, everything is taken care of by formal institutions and allocated human resources by the MAO. But with too few users and vendors to take care of and occupy the space, even other species have moved in to fill it. Its legality did not guarantee vitality so much as a set of tedious orders.

As a matter of fact, the public entity is aware of this contrast in the Donmen market, and it was partly for this reason that the mayor proposed the renovation of the legal section as part of the urban renewal project, as discussed in section 8.3. By investing more to change the business environment, the hope was to save the market. In the public meeting accounted in section 8.3, the deputy mayor justified the exclusion of semi-legal markets from the new plan. He claimed that the current situation was not fair for licensed vendors, whose business was being divided and taken away by the large numbers of unlicensed vendors. To “straighten” what is not right: creating proper environments for licensed vendors was the mayor’s idea of what progress should look like. It was this that triggered the reaction of both the leader of the semi-legal market’s vendors committee and the borough chiefs.

It was interesting to hear the borough chiefs speak about the importance of keeping the street economy alive. Achieving this would not have to mean a large-scale renewal project of buildings and planning in the area. In fact, the borough chiefs would prefer the municipality to work on simply upgrading the street infrastructure to accommodate the flow of visitors. In line with these local politicians, Mr Chang spoke as the leader of the vendors committee in the semi-legal section, and turned to the municipality to request safer and better facilities for the sake of street sanitation. On one hand, he argued that since their section was the star of the Donmen market, not only should they not be demolished, but they deserve a respectful vocational environment in which to continue their business. In this, he was in agreement with the local politicians. On the other hand, he changed his tone to criticise licensed vendors (#35):

Everyone knows that street markets struggle to survive once moved. There are plenty of examples in the city. And I am very sure that in our case, these licensed vendors’ stalls are already barely staying afloat. Not including us would be a death sentence for this historical market that we are all proud of.

This comment was certainly provocative to licensed vendors. There is nevertheless a certain truth in it, about the historical fate of renovated markets. But most impor-

tantly, it was a political statement aimed at the municipality, as if to say that it is not worth challenging those 144 vendors in the outer market who have a business and political influence over the 61 vendors awaiting rescue.

“Someone has to... but not me”

Given my research findings and analysis, the evidence clearly shows that in the Donmen market, collaboration between governmental and non-governmental organisations can successfully mobilise informal institutions to compensate for the weakness of formal institutions. However, this is not yet to draw a final judgement.

As highlighted by my interviews, due to historical circumstances and the policy turns that accompanied them, civil servants were forced to work with formal institutions that they found problematic, and regulatory instruments that were not always workable. In order to make things work, they were obliged to find compromises between the regulation and the practical situation. Both oral agreement and political negotiation can be seen as instances in which practical knowledge–metis—is crucial.

Public officials, as individuals who work for organisations, are aware that collaborating with informal organisations represents a compromise. In an ideal situation, there would be structural change at both the regulative and organisational levels. However, administratively and politically, the cost of such structural change in street markets is very high. Since most of those who work for the MAO are already busy juggling administrations, management, and balancing between formal and informal institutions, there is simply neither the space nor the resources to make structural changes to policy and formal institutions. Instead of taking on this high-stakes responsibility, most of the public officials I encountered in the MAO seemed frustrated with their workload. In fact, a year after my fieldwork, everyone that I had interviewed in the MAO had left their positions.

My gatekeeper in the field, the former head of the MAO, offered the following retrospective look at his career:

The political pressure [for change] is very present. The city council has power over the budget. If your policy is not in favour of most vendors, they mobilise their gossip power with the local councillors, and then we face a crisis of budget cutting. The boss [mayor] won't like it either because you made him lose the vote. A term is four years, with a maximum of two terms for eight years. But structural change might take decades. No one appreciates your 'vision.' You earn the same salary with or without making a change. To be honest, there is just not much incentive to make changes within the bureaucracy, but much more discouragement and blame when you push for change. (#25)

This gives a very clear idea of why public officials would rather passively work via loopholes with vendors to make peace, rather than on new policies for change.

The permanent temporary state of the semi-legal market gives vendors very little power to ask for better and safer infrastructure, except in a small number of semi-legal night markets with touristic values (Lin & Liao, 2016). In those cases, the municipality might allocate special budgets for the purpose of touristic promotion to finance the improvement of certain infrastructures (#27). Likewise, in the non-legal market, visitors are at greater risk in the case of an emergency: if, for example, a fire erupts within one of the residential buildings, firefighters would have great difficulty arriving in time to prevent serious danger. Of course, the chances of such a disaster happening are relatively low, but the price of collective procrastination could be extremely high. The former head of the MAO gave the following account of the mentality in public official culture:

It is extremely difficult to overhaul market affairs in a short time. So what do you do? You hope you are lucky enough to avoid disasters when you are in your role. Like in the '90s, there was a disastrous fire that took four lives at the Qingguang street market in Taipei. That incident did force the mayor to implement better disaster prevention guidelines.

The temporary status of most semi-legal and non-legal markets, therefore, just keeps on unless it collides with something.

After his anecdotes on the efforts he made for change, I asked this interviewee: why bother? If, as he said, the bureaucratic system is not the right place for individuals to solve problems? The answer turned out to be quite personal. This 67-year-old with a degree in law was allocated the task of managing markets as a public official fresh out of school. Faced with what he described as a big mess, his academic ambition drove him to find breaches within the bureaucratic system where change could be effected, as a reward in his otherwise tedious routine. This personal passion finally brought him attention when certain of his experimental changes worked. These included, for example, synchronising the working days of wholesale and retail markets. Over the years, the understanding that he accumulated of how politics, bureaucratic systems, and socio-spatial dynamics in street markets work together earned him considerable social capital to build a career as a retail consultant within different public sectors. It is worth pointing out here that most public officials in the MAO that I spoke to were aware of the importance of a contextual understanding of the socio-spatial dynamics in street markets, since a significant part of their work involved navigating the grey zones between laws. To adopt Scott's language once more, they seemed aware that *metis* is as important as *techne* in governance.

In a passive bureaucratic culture that deals with the highly complicated and ambiguous realm between the legal and illegal, as well as social needs and juridical demand, I asked my gatekeeper for his perspective on the “someone can do it but not me” mentality. Interestingly, the reason he gave was “social mobility.”

Markets can be a mess; bureaucracy can be a pool of dead water. That’s the given environment. Vendors work hard to survive. I have sympathy for their agency and conscientiousness. Their hard-working spirit drives social mobility. Their offspring get a better life. And now we see the foreign spouses from South East Asia (female immigrants who have come through marriage) becoming vendors in the street markets. I think it’s important to value the street market as a place for social mobility but not to see them as a total evil taking advantage of public spaces. I often told my staff and vendors, agency and conscientiousness do make things different. Not only vendors but we public officials also kept to this principle. Things will be different eventually. (#37)

I do not think I would be able to draw a better conclusion than this from my interviewee about navigating the governance regime.

In this section, I have engaged with my fieldwork materials and theories to reveal that, in Taipei’s street market governance regime, there is no alternative to public officials incorporating practical knowledge into their *techne* in the practice of governance. Quite contrary to Scott’s (1998) criticism of the state excluding the use of practical knowledge by establishing formal technical knowledge, public officials in Taipei seem to need and prefer to work with practical, or *metis*, knowledge around the ambiguous boundary of legality than to work on changing the problematic formal institution immediately before them. By embracing and seeking to balance between different institutions (instead of the formal institution monopolising the truth and legibility when it comes to public spaces), Taipei’s street market governance regime presents an interesting institutional and organisational landscape, in which *metis* and *techne* forms of knowledge collaborate in the daily operation of mixed-use public spaces.

9.4 Conclusion

In this concluding section of my Taipei case study, I would like to start with a consideration of the street market as a *cité*. It is a mixed-use public space in which the socio-spatial context plays a more formative role than the physical environment. The different legal and spatial fabrics in the Donmen market make it a place where *cité* meets *ville*. Although the *techne* intervention—expansion of the Jinshan South Road—did split the market in two, the intertwining of the crooked but thick socio-spatial fabric with street trading is rooted in the city’s grid.

Historical reviews on the policy changes discussed in Chapter 7 explain that a turn in national economic policy led to the sunseting of licensed vendors in Taipei in the 1980s. Nevertheless, street markets and businesses did not disappear as the government had anticipated. The public entity had to create temporary institutions and allocate organisations to offer vendors and street markets a semi-legal status. On top of this, the sprawling street businesses around existing legal and semi-legal sections were also kept under watch instead of inspection. Three legal types of market thus coexist on one continuous scale and under one name,

In my analysis of the Donmen market's governance regime, I highlighted the role of informal institutions—oral agreements and political negotiations—in addition to the self-organisation of vendors in largely compensating for the shortage of formal institutions and the MAO's limited human resources (North, 1991; Scott, 2013). Moreover, public officials also tend to draw on informal institutions and local politicians to reduce their workloads. In a radical sense, the implementation of new formal institutions in street markets can be regarded as a successful negotiation with other informal institutions in the governance regime (Goodfellow, 2020). This marks the ending of a fixation on the process of negotiation as opposed to bringing about change.

Knowing that the governance regime's formal institution is relatively weak and full of obstacles, public officials are aware that they have to incorporate existing order, or as James C. Scott (1998) put it, “practical knowledge,” in the street market. The case of Taipei shows that the techne of high modernism did much to shape urban space through the use of urban planning tools. It was in this way that the Donmen market was separated into different legal types, each with its own set of regulations. However, the governance regime cannot neglect the strong socio-spatial dynamic that survives as *metis* within the cracks of planned grids: in between buildings, where alleys have not yet been implemented, or the strip between building and street. A contextual study of how these cracks survive offers insights for urban planners and researchers to rethink the ways in which mixed-use public spaces can be fluid and functioning at the same time.

CHAPTER 10 Synthesis of Fieldwork Findings in Taipei and Amsterdam

In previous chapters, I have gone through the empirical findings of both my organisational and street ethnography. In the discussion chapters for each case study, I analysed the ways in which urban street markets, as mixed-use public spaces, are situated as products of spatial planning. Furthermore, through the theoretical lens of the governance regime I teased out the relational nuances in my fieldwork findings.

This chapter serves as a synthesis of my fieldwork findings in Taipei and Amsterdam, before the final conclusion of this dissertation. The main purpose here is to reflect upon the main research question by comparing and contrasting my empirical findings in light of the theoretical framework. In what follows, I will first explore the multi-dimensional complexity of mixed-use public spaces. Second, I will discuss the ways in which the governance regimes in each of my case studies interact with actors in street markets, to reflect upon the paradoxical notions of planning and autonomy in mixed-use public spaces. Based on the discussions in these two sections, the final section will conclude by proposing elements that emerge as essential for the planning of mixed-use public spaces.

10.1 Unpacking the Complexity of Mixed-Use

Mixed-use public spaces represent an odd category in the urban planning system. The term “mixed-use” is used to contrast such spaces with those that have a single function. This distinction—between single and mixed-use spaces—is rather a new innovation of modernist spatial planning techniques. In forms of planning used as a branch of statecraft, spaces are categorised according to a set of zoning systems and subjected to specific regulatory tools. Each zoning code serves specific functions of the space. Mixed-use in this context means that there is more than one function registered to the space.

Furthermore, the zoning system and regulatory tools also draw a harsh boundary between formal and informal. That is, behaviours in a space where they are not registered within the zoning framework can be interpreted as informal. For example, if a street space is registered for transportation use only, then vending or playing there would be regarded as an informal use from the perspective of planning regulations. As Scott (1998) argued in *Seeing Like a State*, the distinction between formal and informal is a purely social construction.

It is quite evident that behaviors within mixed-use public spaces that conform to authorized usages are formal and lawful, and conversely, those that do not comply with them are not. While other scholars (Bodnar, 2014; Brown & Mackie, 2017;

Kudva, 2009; McFarlane & Waibel, 2012; Roy, 2005) challenge the notion of informality as a practice in various social contexts, this dissertation opts to shift away from the debate around (the social constructed) informality in public space. As such, I am more interested in exploring how the discipline of urban planning can define and practice the production of mixed-use public spaces beyond existing planning frameworks.

My thought process began with the paradoxical value judgement of mixed-use spaces. Urban street markets offer a vivid example of the positive connotations attached to mixed-use as denoting “lively,” and the negative connotations as “messy and chaotic,” implying that such spaces are in need of being ordered. To explore the fine line between lively and chaotic, I put aside any such preconceptions from the literature (Metha & Bosson, 2021; Metha, 2013; Oranratmanee & Sachakul, 2014). Through my ethnographic fieldwork, I have attempted to understand the multi-dimensional complexity of mixed-use public spaces.

By interpreting my fieldwork findings with a concept drawn from new institutionalism, the governance regime, I was able to tease out three basic layers that contribute to the complexity of mixed-use public spaces:

1. Their multiple users and usages;
2. The multiple organisations involved in governing them;
3. The formal and informal institutions that organisations and users mobilise there.

The fundamental difference between mixed-use public spaces and mono-functional public spaces is that mixed-use spaces allow a certain openness when it comes to users’ interpretations of how to use them. Taking street markets as an example, the basic affordance is that traders are allowed to sell their goods in the street. However, people also adapt the space for socialising, for performing arts, to practise care, and for political campaigns. Furthermore, the temporary aspect of street markets also signifies that the street itself has different functions at different times of day. The street space can be temporarily transformed into a market at certain hours, and have a different set of users for the rest of the day.

The first layer, therefore, is the complexity of users and usages in mixed-use public spaces. With street markets in particular, the basic socio-spatial framework of street trade allows for a large amount of spare room in which users can use the space for different purposes. The diversity of collective behavioural practices gives the space its mixed-use status. Moreover, the overlapping of different usages in the same space creates a complexity of socio-spatial dynamics. This complexity needs to be

negotiated and communicated in certain ways by stakeholders in order to keep the space functioning.

The street spaces of my case investigation are managed by several public and non-public organisations, directly and indirectly. Each organisation is subject to its own regulatory tools according to the field it is working in. My research findings show that in both cases, most of the public organisations in charge of these mixed-use public spaces belong to the same municipality. However, the existence of both official and unofficial channels within these organisations for the division of tasks creates tensions. In other words, the involvement of multiple organisations in administering mixed-use public spaces is not the only source of complexity in daily governance. The fragmentation of the organisational landscape in the governance regime of mixed-use public spaces sometimes creates more disruptions than it should solve (Taşan-Kok, & Özogul, 2021).

In Chapter 4, my fieldwork in Amsterdam demonstrated that a lack of coordination around street cleaning, rubbish collection, and stall closing at the end of each markets caused problems for shop owners trying to set up their terraces for evening service. Chapter 7, meanwhile, explained that, in Taipei, the separation of juridical rights and the management of unlicensed vendors indirectly produced the city's non-legal markets. Examples such as these indicate that organisational complexity plays a central role in the governance of mixed-use public spaces.

Lastly, the framework of the governance regime—and the distinction between the formal and informal institutions behind the socio-spatial dynamics of mixed-use public spaces in particular—allowed me to tease out certain behavioural connections between stakeholders within such spaces. It also facilitated my analysis of the impact of these connections on the socio-spatial dynamics of mixed-use public spaces.

My analysis of institutions has revealed that, in both Amsterdam and Taipei, formal and informal institutions play a significant role in the daily operation of mixed-use public spaces. Managing street markets is not only a question of managers following a set of regulations on user permission, space maintenance, and spatial infrastructure. It is also about negotiation and communication between users and different organisations within the space. As Chapters 6 and 9 indicated, informal institutions such as oral agreements, political negotiations, stall arrangements, and coordination between different workforces are just as important in managing street markets.

Informal institutions, while invisible to formal institutions, are highly involved in the interpersonal relationships that exist between individuals representing organisations and users in public spaces. These informal institutions are either related to

shared social and cultural frameworks or the socio-political context of the society in question. Working with the social and cultural framework requires an understanding of the specific practical knowledge of a site. In Amsterdam, street vendors value onsite market managers to the extent that they know how to deploy practical knowledge that can prevent tensions from rising between vendors. In both Amsterdam and Taipei, street actors' trust in the governance regime depends on how well street-level bureaucrats such as market managers mobilise informal institutions to facilitate daily operations.

As for the socio-political context, my findings from Taipei show that local politicians may help unlicensed vendors and semi-legal markets which are under-resourced to request improvements to infrastructure. In exchange for politically-initiated negotiations as a form of informal institution, vendors would then spread favourable opinions about the politician in question among their customers during election campaigns. In Amsterdam, meanwhile, one of the downsides of the organisational landscape's fragmentation is that it made communication much harder between the policy-making department and the department responsible for managing street markets, when regular contact between the two is essential. The shortage of informal institutions such as political influence to bridge the communications gap between the street and policymakers, and the lack of assistance for street-level actors to adapt to the transformation of the organisational landscape, all created various degrees of disruptions in the management of mixed-use public spaces.

Understanding the existence and role of these three layers allows us to contextualise the complexity of mixed-use public spaces. As such, both *metis* and *techne* knowledge systems show themselves to be key to planning and running mixed-use public spaces. A close reading of both cases through the lens of my theoretical framework reveals that Taipei's street markets, though seemingly chaotic in terms of visual presentation and the incomplete formal institutions that they work with, are in fact supported by stakeholders' collective practice of informal institutions. Conversely, street markets in Amsterdam are only apparently ordered and fixed by a complete set of formal institutions. In fact, and rather ironically, the lack of informal institutions to facilitate the space's complex socio-spatial dynamics is very often criticised by stakeholders who say that it is "a mess."

To return to Sennett's dialectical discourse on *cité* and *ville* (2018), this dissertation's focus on the complexity of mixed-use public spaces reflects the presence and value of *cité* in cities. As Sennett argued, contemporary urban planning is a form of statecraft that produces cities according to the model of *ville*. As a set of tools, it has not yet developed to accommodate *cité* spaces in the city. Unpacking the complexity of *cité* is, therefore, a useful starting point for thinking about how urban planning can develop to facilitate complex socio-spatial schemes.

10.2 Existing Challenges in Planning and Governing Mixed-Use Public Space

With the intention of unpacking the complexity of governing and planning mixed-use public spaces, I chose the cities of Amsterdam and Taipei as my study cases. My aim was to contextually examine how different governance systems deal with mixed-use public spaces. This research, as an analytical reading of my fieldwork findings through the lens of the governance regime, has produced insights of both a conceptual and practical nature regarding the extent to which urban planning sets out to order space. Mixed-use public spaces and urban street markets in particular are a ripe terrain for such questions, and present a wealth of debates for urban planners to reflect upon.

This section contributes to a synthesis of my findings. I will first go through the characteristics of each governance regime and any challenges in each of the cases. The multiple case study puts forward two aspects that I would particularly like to discuss. First is the role of formal institutions as gatekeepers to mixed-use public spaces. Second is the mobilisation of informal institutions as a way of adapting to the changing socio-spatial dynamics of mixed-use public spaces.

Table 10.1 presents a summary of the case studies in Chapter 6 and Chapter 9, and highlights their findings. In the case of Amsterdam, the governance regime revealed itself to be structured by strong formal institutions and a fragmented organisational landscape. In the case of Taipei, meanwhile, informal institutions were largely practised by individuals within both public organisations and vendors' self-organised organisations to compensate for the weakness of formal institutions, and incorporate street actors and other stakeholders in the field.

Table 10.1 Concluding Insights of the Research

	AMSTERDAM	TAIPEI
Governance regime	<p>Strong formal institutions Weak informal institutions Fragmented organisational landscape</p>	<p>Weak formal institutions Strong informal institutions Strong self-organisation among street actors</p>
Street level	<p>Highly autonomous street actors Compensatory governance: outsourced organisations Dependent on formal institutions Sense of loss attached to economic and organisational change</p>	<p>Semi-legal market performs best out of the three legal types Stakeholders prioritise maintaining harmonious relationships with each other Highly conscientious vendors Mobilising local political capital, “power of gossip”</p>
Synthesis	<p>Mismatch between ville-oriented governance and cité-like spaces Techne as dominant norm, little room for metis to be practised Frustrated public officials Disoriented vendors</p>	<p>Organised chaos: different orders coexist in one mixed-use public space Metis is practised to supplement incomplete techne Difficulties in integrating metis and techne Risks: political climate, individual public officials, changes of politicians can have huge consequences</p>

At street level, despite their independent personalities and business attributes, vendors also relied to a fairly large extent on formal institutions. Character-wise, they are a group of highly autonomous individuals who had opted for decades-long careers in

the street over owning shops. However, having long been part of the vending system, they also relied exclusively on rights and benefits secured by formal institutions, and were against policy changes that might threaten their benefits. In Taipei, a policy report (Control Yuan, 2010) has indicated that a failed policy in the 1980s closed the legal channel for becoming licensed vendors. The number of vendors did not fall—as had been the intention of the policy—but most street market vendors since then have been forced to be unlicensed. To accommodate this reality, the city authority tolerates these vendors via temporary formal institutions. Their position in the legal grey zone has made them reserved and highly conscientious. Nevertheless, many of them, especially organisers in the vendor committees, are skilled in mobilising their local political influence when they need their voice to be heard.

Looking at performance in the two cases, the challenge facing street markets in Amsterdam has mainly to do with the difficult vitalisation of street business and mixed-use public spaces upon well-built physical infrastructures. In Taipei, the popular street markets are mostly the semi-legal and non-legal ones. A lack of long-term policy from the municipality regarding street businesses has produced grave imbalances in resource distribution when it comes to the governance of street markets. The governance regime's well-established collaboration with informal institutions is a symbol of its failure in not being able to make necessary infrastructural improvements.

In Amsterdam, the city's street markets are physically structured by rigid planning and design regulations, and run by a set of management regulations. In Taipei, the semi-legal markets are regulated by the temporary permitted guidelines, which focus mostly on the self-governance of vendors. The public retail markets, however, receive the most infrastructural and system support from formal institutions, and yet perform worse than the semi-legal and non-legal markets in terms of both business and the physical space environment. My discussion of the two cases raises the question of how formal institutions position themselves in supporting mixed-use public spaces.

Gatekeep vs. Gatecloser: semi-legal markets in Taipei and markets in Amsterdam

As I mentioned above, formal institutions act to stabilise Amsterdam's street market governance regime, since the organisational landscape is fragmented (Tasan-Kok & Özogul, 2021) and its informal institutions are weak. The formal institutions within the governance regime entail the zoning plan and urban design guidelines that define the physical ville-oriented space of the street market as a mixed-use public space. Then comes a set of market regulations, subject to the requirement of setting up vending businesses and permitted behaviours in street markets. In Chapter 6, I concluded that this instrumental, rationality-oriented form of governance holds the fragmented organisational landscape together, but also limits and weakens the agency of individual public officials and street vendors. At the level of the street, this framed order is pivotal in stabilising socio-spatial arrangements and dynamics.

Nevertheless, during the period of organisational transformation, which involved both the reorganisation of the municipal structure and the economic decline of street businesses, the rigid formal institutions proved inflexible, and hardly inspired individuals to adapt to the change.

Where individual public officials and vendors are concerned, my fieldwork findings revealed that there is a common dependency on formal institutions, yet this dependency is understood in wholly different terms. Public officials are aware of the reasons for the poor performance of the city's street markets. However, due to the high costs required to communicate and mobilise administrative resources towards action, street-level bureaucrats prefer not to voice their boss and just follow the regulatory tools that they are subject to. Until formal institutions on the policymakers' side have conducted research and reached a policy decision, officials do not expect changes that would allow for adjustments to emerging issues at street level. In short, everything should be played by the book regardless of the specific circumstances.

For street vendors, the general decline of their businesses has pushed many of them to hold more tightly onto regulations that exclusively benefit them. As a result of the fear of insecurity that the crisis produced, many resist proposed institutional changes, such as the change to the permanent licence system, or the idea of opening the markets up to new vendors.

All of these paradoxical attitudes—simultaneously unsatisfied with but still very much dependent on formal institutions—ultimately create the rather bizarre phenomenon that I observed in my fieldwork: every stakeholder was talking about how the market should change, and at the same time they all—whether in the street or organisations—seem perfectly happy to continue leaning on formal institutions and broadly avoiding structural problem-solving through changes to regulations. In this sense, I regard formal institutions as a “gate closer” to the governance regime. While regulatory tools may offer stability, they also limit flexibility when it comes to reacting to changes in the socio-spatial dynamics of mixed-use public spaces, such as letting new vendors join the markets..

Quite contrary to what I found in Amsterdam, the imperfectness of Taipei's semi-legal markets offers a valuable reference point in this discussion of formal institutions as gatekeepers. In Chapter 7, I laid out the structural factors that produced these markets, an intervention to compensate for policy failures in the 1980s. What is interesting here is the role of formal institutions in regulating these semi-legal markets.

As the legal tool with which to compensate for incomplete governance, the management guideline for the semi-legal market came out of the Taipei vendors management autonomous regulation. This was originally developed for licensed vendors who

were not assigned a space in the public retail markets. According to Article 11 of the regulation, the municipality has the right to set up temporary vendor gathering fields (that is, what I have been referring to as semi-legal street markets) for licensed vendors. At first, the guideline was set to last for three years in the 1980s, with room for the contract to be extended. Eventually, these contract-based markets that were designed to be temporary maintained their temporary status for decades, and are still alive and kicking today. Indeed, it is the most popular of the three sections in the Donmen market.

The semi-legal market management guidelines are a sub-contractual agreement that outsources daily governance tasks to self-organising vendors in the markets. Except for issues relating to drainage and the pavement of streets, which are infrastructural matters that the municipality can allocate a budget to improve, vendors are obliged to organise all other questions of hardware and management on their own, under the inspection of the governance regime. The guidelines state that the municipality has the right to suspend operations in the market if the self-organising vendors do not apply the requisite care, or when there are other urban development needs.

In practice, running the semi-legal market means that vendors must set up their own committee and honour all of the requirements that the guidelines lay out. This entails hiring their own manager and cleaners, making arrangements for waste and recycling, collecting vendor fees, and financial transparency with regard to the MAO. While these responsibilities must be observed, however, their self-governance allows vendors in the semi-legal market a certain freedom to run the market as they see fit. For example, since cleaning and waste management in the market are primarily required by food sellers, non-food sellers pay a smaller vendor fee because they use the cleaning service less. At the end of the year, if there is money left over from the vendors' fees, the committee might arrange a day trip or a social event to bring vendors together.

The management guidelines for semi-legal street markets in Taipei can be regarded as a gatekeeper: it is the guidelines themselves that are the gate connecting the vendor committees and the public sectors. On one hand, the market's self-governance is regulated by formal institutions. This creates a grey zone between legal and illegal statuses in which vendors can operate, with conditions. On the other hand, self-governance leaves some space for vendors to maintain order as their practical knowledge allows. The flexibility that comes under such conditions of control leaves street actors more adaptive to change.

It is important to understand that Taipei's semi-legal markets and management guidelines are to compensate for policy failure. I have explained the constraints of the markets' semi-legal status in previous chapters. The present discussion is only

to highlight the insight that flexibility can be built into formal institutions, as can room for metis-oriented knowledge.

The Mobilisation of Informal Institutions

In Chapter 2, I explained that a governance regime's informal institutions are the cultural, moral, and familiar frameworks through which stakeholders interact with each other. Their informality refers to the fact that they are not prescribed by the law, but are largely practices based on mutual consensus. This section will discuss how informal institutions functioned and could be mobilised in each of my case studies.

In Amsterdam, stakeholders struggle with a lack of informal institutions. In mixed-use public spaces such as street markets, every act in the space from policy-making to daily operations will change the socio-spatial dynamics. While the presence of formal institutions is keenly felt in their attribution of different responsibilities to various parts of the markets, there is no rule for regulating horizontal communication channels. The findings from my organisational ethnography demonstrate that public officials are frustrated by the difficulty they experience in trying to identify and reach out to colleagues in other departments with whom their work overlaps. In more extreme cases, such as during the period when the Market Office's organisational position was undefined, workers in the office had to explain their position in the changing organisational landscape to convince other public officials to work with them.

The problem of a lengthy and inefficient communication process echoes my own experience of fieldwork. In my seventh month of fieldwork in Amsterdam, a large part of the time was taken up with looking for who held what position, how to reach them, and making appointments. Then, in my interviews with these public officials, hearing them complain about lost channels of spoken communication, difficulty in finding colleagues, and the hope that their emails would receive a reply again reinforced the sense of a governance regime lacking in informal institutions. The result of such a lack is a highly drawn-out process of communication and decision-making. This then weakens the trust of street actors. In a nutshell, poor or non-existent informal institutions have a direct impact on the fragmented organisational landscape in the governance regime and cause a decline in street actors' trust.

Conversely, in Taipei, the incomplete formal institutions in semi-legal and non-legal markets were redeemed by strong informal institutions in the governance regime. First of all, there was a strong culture within organisations in the municipality of contact information transparency. Information about which department and who within it was in charge of what could easily be found. Indeed, anyone could make a call and talk directly with the relevant public official. Second, informal institutions also played a key role in cross-department negotiations and communication. For

instance, in the preliminary informal meeting about the plan to rebuild the Donmen public retail market, various departments related to the plan were obliged to attend. Crucially, the collective presence of the governance regime's organisational landscape allowed individual actors both within the regime and on the street to reach out to each other without going through the hunting period characteristic of the bureaucracy in Amsterdam. Incidentally, it also saved me a lot of fieldwork.

As mentioned in Chapter 9, political negotiation is another strong informal institution with which vendors can work. Street actors who do not have direct access to public officials tend to mobilise their social capital to engage local politicians to take up their requests and negotiate for certain services that they need. In return, street actors will help these politicians as a "vote broker" in an election campaign, garnering them support by spreading the story of what they did and how they helped. The risk of this, of course, is that once the political climate changes, it takes the socio-political and spatial dynamics with it, and everything that had been negotiated can flip.

To conclude this section, my two case studies have revealed the challenges of planning and managing mixed-use public spaces. These primarily concern an understanding of the complexity of a space's socio-spatial dynamics, and of the extent to which institutions and organisations impact a space's governance. In the next section, I will explore the role of planning further.

10.3 The Role of Planning in Mixed-Use Public Spaces

My aim in this dissertation has been to explore the complexity of planning urban mixed-use public spaces. To pinpoint this specific type of space in existing discussions of urban theory, and situate mixed-use public spaces in the contemporary urban planning discipline, I have drawn on two sets of ideal types: *cité v. ville*, and *metis v. techne*. Since modernist urban planning is a form of statecraft that produces spaces according to the model of *ville*, and relies on *techne*, both Sennett (2018) and Scott (1998) argue that it sets the boundary between what is deemed formal and what is considered informal, ordered, and chaotic spaces.

That is to say, describing a place as "chaotic" or "informal" is somewhat rhetorical. The message underlying the label can be understood in another way: places that are not produced or managed by abstract knowledge (*techne*), and that therefore need to be ordered by it. This binary approach to judging spaces overshadows other ways of reading and understanding them. Indeed, this argument is not new. From classical works in the field such as Jane Jacobs (1961), to more recent such as Jan Gehl's *Cities for People* (2013), generations of scholars have worked to articulate the social values of cities.

Following on in this scholarly tradition, I was curious about how these chaotic—or seemingly chaotic—mixed-use public spaces are orchestrated at the practical level. To find out, I used a theoretical lens inspired by the new institutionalism—that of the governance regime—to unpack the multi-dimensional complexity of mixed-use public spaces. A systematic reading of my ethnographic fieldwork material has allowed me to tease out how the various layers of complexity orchestrate the socio-spatial dynamics of mixed-use public spaces.

Note that the core idea of planning a mixed-use public space is to allow for different usages. The space would only be functional once it can incorporate multiple different usages from different users. That is to say, it is a spatial type that challenges urban planners to order complexity at the same time as leaving room for it.

Through my two case studies, my research has showcased the use of the governance regime as a tool capable of providing a structural analysis of the socio-spatial dynamics of mixed-use public spaces, and their relationship to the landscape of organisations and institutions. As a tool for layering these different types of socio-spatial interaction, it revealed that these seemingly chaotic spaces are actually the impressive outcome of skilled ordering by both formal and informal institutions. Their stigmatisation by public authorities and modernist planners as chaotic was primarily due to a difficulty in recognising different logics of order and negotiated spatial dynamics. As a matter of fact, these spaces provide a wealth of inspiration to reflect upon how urban planning can develop further.

To return to my research question: how do governance regimes accommodate complexity in planning mixed-use public spaces? My research findings and analysis demonstrate that using the concept of the governance regime as an analytical tool to read mixed-use public spaces is highly fruitful. It can help stakeholders and urban planners to understand how different formal and informal institutions are mobilised by users and organisations. In terms of crafting new regulatory tools, maintaining the subtle boundary between order and chaos, and thus cultivating liveliness, in mixed-use public spaces is essential for policymakers and planners, though it is a challenge. My case studies have produced the following three insights to reflect upon in the process of planning:

1. Urban planners need to have a contextualised understanding of the mixed-use public space. They must be able to identify which abstract and practical forms of knowledge are enhanced in the dynamics of space, and how they interact.
2. Urban planners have to be aware of the structure of the governance regime, as well as their location within it. A knowledge of the structural dynamics of the governance regime is crucial to understanding

how planners can intervene and influence the shape of the governance regime in reaching its planning goals.

3. Based on the previous two points, urban planners should have an understanding of the composition of institutions and organisations capable of supporting the convivial dynamics of the mixed-use public space. They should identify, in advance, those substantial elements to be ascribed to regulatory tools.

10.4 Conclusion

This research set out to explore the boundary between order and chaos in planning urban mixed-use public spaces. My two case studies have made it possible to see beyond the rhetorical order and chaos traditionally associated with mixed-use public spaces, to find a bundle of intertwined complexities threaded through both the socio-spatial fabric and the techniques for managing the dynamics embedded there.

My research findings have revealed that spaces that seem well-ordered visually can in fact be a mess in terms of the communication process and other consequences of fragmented governance, whereas those that might seem chaotic are actually the result of careful negotiation and arrangements. In light of my extensive exploration of the complexity of mixed-use public spaces, the value of allowing such spaces to cultivate their own informal institutions—or, in Sennett's (2018) words, to plan *cité* spaces in which a sense of belonging can grow—could not be clearer. The question that remains is quite how readily urban planners can design “half-baked” mixed-use public spaces—that is, spaces with sufficient infrastructural support yet where the power of the informal institution is acknowledged and conserved in the design process.

CHAPTER 11 Conclusion: From Ordering Chaos to Navigating Complexity

The point of departure for this dissertation was the debate between order and chaos in mixed-use public space. From there, I developed a problem statement to explore the boundary between “too much” and “not enough order” in planning mixed-use public spaces. To refine my approach further, I employed a concept drawn from new institutionalism—the governance regime—to study mixed-use public space in urban planning research.

Investigating a problem of planning through a governance perspective opened up a few lines of enquiry that activated the research. My primary use of the lens of the governance regime, however, was as an analytical tool, and I adapted it to read the findings of my ethnographic fieldwork from street markets in Amsterdam and Taipei. This enabled me to tease out how organisations, institutions, and their interactions construct the dynamic of a mixed-use public space, and to reflect upon urban planning as a profession embedded within the network of governance.

This final chapter of the dissertation contains four parts. I will first review the key findings and implications of my research. I will abstract key insights from my findings in order to reflect more broadly on how urban planning as a discipline could navigate the complexity of mixed-use public spaces. As any closure opens up new beginnings, I will also explore the limitations of my research, and offer a set of perspectives on moving from the theoretical to the practical as an avenue for future research.

11.1 Unpacking “Everyday Chaos” Through the Lens of the Governance Regime

As I laid out in my introduction, there is a mismatch between urban studies scholarship and the actual development of space: mixed-use public spaces are widely cherished in theories of urbanism (Amin, 2008; Carmona, 2010; Low et al., 2015), yet in reality, bustling mixed-use public spaces are often stigmatised as places of chaos that need better planning and ordering. Of such spaces, the urban street market is a critical yet commonplace variant that is frequently perceived as a problem in the city.

As a result, I have undertaken a journey of theoretical and empirical research to understand where this gap in research lies, and how to position it in a research frame that I can then operationalise. My main research question was: how do governance regimes accommodate complexity in planning mixed-use public spaces? To answer it, I processed the findings of my ethnographic fieldwork through the theoretical framework that I had established. My analysis not only maps the shape of the

governance regimes in my case studies, but also unpacks the relational nuances between institutions, organisations, and actors in mixed-use public spaces.

Table 10.1 summarises the concluding remarks of my research, as discussed extensively in chapters 4 to 9. It details the insights that I learnt from both case studies about the governance regime and street level, and a synthesis of the two. Table 10.1 crystallises my research journey of unpacking the layered complexity of planning mixed-use public spaces. This meant understanding the complexity of the socio-spatial dynamics in mixed-use public spaces, then searching for a theoretical language to explain the complexity of the governance of mixed-use public spaces, and ultimately reflecting upon how urban planning as a discipline of spatial production might navigate and work with this complex phenomenon.

Interestingly, what seems chaotic and is negatively valued by the public authority can be the most popular. In Taipei, for example, there are three legal types of street markets spread across a continuous scale. This presents a highly orchestrated landscape of different approaches to order, and a variety of formal and informal institutions. Within the space, it is the legal public market that performs the least well in terms of both business and public environment. The semi-legal public market, meanwhile, though only partly supported by the formal institution, is the most popular part of the Donmen market. The non-legal market is an extension of the previous two, which unlicensed vendors have spread throughout the neighbourhood fabric. The semi-legal public market is mostly self-governed by informal institutions, and tolerated by the public authority; it also has the tidiest public environment and most vibrant street dynamic of the three types. Conversely, street markets in Amsterdam are subject to rigid spatial order due to the strong formal institutions of tight market regulations, zoning plans, and design guidelines. Moreover, Amsterdam's organisational landscape is highly fragmented due to a lack of informal institutions and the lengthy process of organisational transformation within the municipality. This has resulted in organisational fragmentation in the governance regime. Empty markets, frustrated public officials, and disoriented vendors are the products of this particular fragmentation.

As a brief answer to the main research question, the analytical lens of the governance regime allows urban planners and researchers to apprehend mixed-use public spaces not as apparent chaos, but as a readable complexity. Furthermore, as my research has illustrated, only when we understand the complexity of mixed-use public spaces and their socio-spatial dynamics can we develop complexity thinking. To what extent is urban planning embedded in the interactions of institutions and organisations within the governance regime? What is its positionality, and what tools can urban planning mobilise? I have argued that what counts is not to order a space solely to an official standard, but to negotiate different orders to achieve a balanced set of socio-spatial dynamics.

11.2 Navigating Complexity

I closed the previous section by contending that urban planning as a discipline should redefine itself away from a modernistic attachment to ordering chaos, and instead negotiate different orders in the planning of mixed-use public spaces. To elaborate further, I propose three principles for navigating the complexity of mixed-use public spaces. These are: formal and informal institutions both matter; *metis* and *techne* are equally essential; and urban planning should facilitate, coordinate, and design the process of spatial production. I will use my two case studies to illustrate these points.

Formal and Informal Institutions Both Matter

Approaching my case studies as both everyday yet critical representations of mixed-use public spaces, I situated each within the broader context of historical urban development, read through their mundaneness in the context of everyday life, and reflected upon the central issue that this dissertation set out to explore. Inspired by new institutionalism, I analysed the complexity of the cases' everyday socio-spatial dynamics through the interactions between organisations and the mobilisation of formal and informal institutions.

In Chapters 6 and 9, I mapped out both the formal and informal institutions that had an impact on the socio-spatial dynamics of each of the case studies. In the case of Amsterdam, we learned that formal institutions provide well-equipped physical infrastructure and job security to existing vendors with permanent licences. Nevertheless, an overemphasis on formal institutions and a failure to value informal institutions contributed in part to the crisis engulfing the city's street markets. It is difficult to find actors for this street ballet, no matter how well equipped the stage. In the fieldwork, the need for better communication between organisations and street actors was repeatedly mentioned by interviewees, whether public officials, individual vendors, or other stakeholders. Informal institutions are needed in a governance regime to work with its formal institutions, in order to properly activate the dynamics of a mixed-use public space.

In Taipei, the formal institutions are incomplete: laws, regulations, and guidelines at various levels contradict each other, and none are able to create a consistent standard of governance to accommodate the street markets. To compensate for this, not only are street markets sorted into legal, semi-legal, and non-legal categories, but all actors and individuals within the government organisations must interact via various informal institutions—such as oral agreements, verbal communication, and political mobilisation—to maintain basic order in the markets. However, this over-dependency on informal institutions can become a barrier to amending formal institutions. Thus, neither the poorly performing businesses in the legal markets nor the popular but under-equipped semi-legal markets got the support they needed

from formal institutions. Over time, a bizarre phenomenon has emerged in which empty legal markets become surrounded by overcrowded semi-legal and non-legal markets. This overcrowding, given the lack of physical infrastructure, presents a high risk to public health and safety. The overarching conclusion to be drawn from my cases, therefore, is that formal and informal institutions are equally important for planning mixed-use spaces.

Metis and Techne are Equally Essential in Planning Mixed-Use Public Spaces

Scott (1998) discusses different cases in which the over-domination of techne in governing cities and nature can result in disastrous failures. To this, he contrasts the concept of metis, as part of his critique of high modernism and its impacts. My fieldwork in street markets made it clear that both types of knowledge are essential to the production of mixed-use public spaces.

My fieldwork findings in Amsterdam and Taipei revealed that in order to navigate the complexity of mixed-use public spaces, an implicit and practical form of knowledge that employs elements such as informal communication and gossiping is essential. In Amsterdam, to avoid conflicts in the markets, market managers have to wield much more knowledge than when merely following market regulations. In Chapter 5, I explored the correlation between vendors' respect for market managers and the latter's practical knowledge. For example, it is extremely important when allocating spots not to put vendors together who have histories of difficult relationships, so as to prevent unnecessary conflict. This is of course not part of the market regulation, but without practical knowledge such as this, market managers would barely be able to manage a street market.

In Taipei, both semi-legal markets and non-legal markets—where techne is largely absent—are highly dependent on the collective practice of metis, which creates an alternative order to compensate for the absence of techne-oriented governance. For example, vendors in the non-legal market would give their recycling to someone who lives on collecting recycled materials. Likewise, some shop owners who rent out vending space would also help their tenant vendors sort their rubbish for the municipal services. Day in and day out, these alternative orders coexist with the normative order of the spaces that host the market. The collective practices of unlicensed vendors, such as tidying the spaces they use, are key to their survival. As long as residents do not complain or call the police, these markets are tolerated by the MAO. However, without collective consensus and a practice of metis, these markets would descend into anarchy.

It is worth highlighting here that Amsterdam's techne knowledge is highly effective at providing the markets with safe and well-equipped physical infrastructure. Licensed vendors are embedded in the system, and enjoy job security, regulated stall

rental fees, and a high standard of physical infrastructure. In contrast, the absence of *techne* in Taipei not only exposes vendors to unsafe working environments and job insecurity. By turning a blind eye to huge swathes of street businesses, or simply stigmatising them as an underground economy, the public authority avoids responsibility on many levels.

That the principles of *metis* and *techne* ought to coexist in the production of mixed-use public spaces resonates with Sennett and Sendra's (2020) concept of "infrastructures of disorder." The eponymous book proposes the idea of "open-ended" and collective spatial design, which I interpret as tolerating the practice of *metis* on the basis of certain *techne* frameworks. These "open-ended" (*ibid*)—or as I term them, half-baked—mixed-use public spaces leave room for users' collective practices of practical knowledge. I see this as the soul of livable, viable, mixed-use public space.

Urban Planning Should Facilitate, Coordinate, and Design the Process of Spatial Production

Let us return to the question of what urban planning can do in light of this dissertation's overall findings. My spatial ethnography demonstrated the importance for urban planners of understanding the relational nuances of the socio-spatial dynamics in mixed-use public spaces. By understanding the nuances of these dynamics, both in space and in the governance regime, urban planners can better reflect upon where they stand in the network of organisations, and what tools they have in terms of formal and informal institutions to plan for mixed uses in public space.

Both cases illustrate this vividly. In Amsterdam, for instance, we can look back at the urban regeneration of the Dapperbuurt and Dappermarkt in the 1980s, where different aspects of the regeneration were facilitated by a project group within the municipality. Archive documents show that the project group facilitated meetings in which different user groups could discuss the new design of the market street and vendors' needs. Those works played a fundamental role in laying the foundations for the well-equipped facility of the Dappermarkt today.

In the case of Taipei, a telling example came from the former head of the MAO, who largely focused on crafting regulations but also spent a huge amount of effort negotiating with the police—who held the juridical right—on the boundary for unlicensed vending. This demonstrates the importance of coordination and of facilitating the complex socio-spatial dynamics of mixed-use public spaces.

My fieldwork has allowed me to gain an in-depth understanding of the crafting of regulatory tools, the coordination of inter-organisational communication, and the facilitation of collective decision-making. This echoes Carmona's (2018) contention that planning public spaces is a question of "designing the process" of spatial production.

11.3 Research Limitations

The major limitation of my fieldwork in Amsterdam was my limited language capacity. I conducted my fieldwork there in a mixture of Dutch and English. This had less of an impact on my organisational ethnographic fieldwork, however, since most interviewees spoke English. Yet to understand law and regulations as formal institutions, I had to depend on translations and a limited understanding of specific legal terminology. As for the spatial ethnography, although I do have a basic level of Dutch with which to initiate conversations with street actors, most were not fluent in English. This mixed-language communication worked to some degree, but I am aware that a native speaker would likely have detected a difference in nuance.

As a different type of challenge to the language barrier, my fieldwork in Taipei was cut short due to the COVID-19 pandemic. For my organisational ethnographic fieldwork, however, the overall time needed to find and communicate with contacts was much less in Taipei than in Amsterdam. Of course, compared to the nine months in Amsterdam, I was unable to spend as much time in Taipei's street markets due to the government's policy of encouraging citizens to risk exposing themselves to the virus as little as possible. Nevertheless, with my native languages of Taiwanese and Mandarin, I was able to grasp more nuances even though I spent less time in the field.

Despite my language capacity limiting my access to fieldwork information somewhat, I closely followed changes in the use and governance of Amsterdam's street markets during the COVID-19 pandemic. There are two reasons why I chose not to include research related to the pandemic period in this dissertation. First, international travel was to a large degree impossible. Therefore, travelling to Taipei to conduct fieldwork on mixed-use public spaces during the pandemic was simply unrealistic. Second, although it was interesting to observe changes in mixed-use public spaces during the COVID-19 period, I considered changes due to a state of emergency outside of the scope of this dissertation. Such enquiries, therefore, offer a potential avenue for future research.

11.4 Future Research Avenues

Considering avenues for future research, what follows are some thoughts on broadening the scope of my analysis to include different types of mixed-use public space, and engaging more fully with what I considered secondary questions here. These are: the role of digital platforms in mixed-use public spaces, the inclusive and innovative character of street markets, street-level governance, and legal pluralism and urban planning.

The Role of Digital Platforms in Mixed-Use Public Spaces

Throughout my fieldwork observations, and after the COVID-19 pandemic in particular, it became clear that various digital platforms were emerging as significant actors in mixed-use public spaces. During the period of lockdown between 2020 and 2021 in Amsterdam, platform services for groceries were growing quickly. In Taipei, vendors in the semi-legal street markets started to receive orders for vegetable boxes through communication apps. In some cases, vendors even became social media influencers to grow their street business through digital platforms. The impact of such factors on mixed-use public spaces is an emerging research field. I would be keenly interested to adapt the lens of the governance regime to a study of platform urbanism and public space.

The Inclusive and Innovative Character of Street Markets as a Mixed-Use Public Space

The major arena of my fieldwork has been the governance of street markets. However, part of my fieldwork also revealed that there is a variety of very different values—and judgements of those values—at play in street markets as mixed-use public spaces. In Amsterdam's street markets, for example, economic values tend to dominate social ones in the eyes of the municipality. Other values, however, are more important to citizens. In Taipei, street markets constitute a strong food culture within society. The realm not only offers inclusivity and a diversity of products and prices, but is also a site of experimentation for immigrants and young people trying out new businesses, whether food-related or otherwise. An interesting avenue for research would be to look at how different values contest or co-create street markets, or the extent to which these markets might serve as spaces in which to experiment with different social, spatial, and cultural arrangements.

Urban Governance and Street-Level Bureaucrats

A large part of my fieldwork focused on the interaction between the so-called street-level bureaucrat and street markets. In Chapter 6, I discussed how market managers work daily, and sometimes unsuccessfully, to establish the trust of vendors. Both the concept of trust and the street-level bureaucrat have their own histories of scholarship in political science and urban sociology (Blokland, 2012; Destler, 2017; Hardin, 1996; Hupe&Hill, 2007; Hudson, 1993; Lipsky, 2010). To specifically address the relationship between market managers and the practice of informal institutions in building trust within mixed-use public spaces.

Legal Pluralism and Urban Planning

Lastly, it would be interesting to explore the role of regulatory tools in urban planning through the lens of legal pluralism and legal anthropology. The state of the art of urban planning is built upon sets of regulatory tools within the hierarchy of laws: laws concerning land use, property, and infrastructure; regulations on zoning and urban design; and guidelines for ordering behaviour in public space. These tools serve

as a backbone in processes of spatial production, distribution, and use. The ways in which modernist urban planning manifests its functionalist approach and rationalist interventions in the development of regulatory tools are well known. However, the role of such tools as structural conditions for shaping space is rather less discussed in the scholarship on planning as it is simply taken as a given.

The scholarship on legal pluralism within legal anthropology offers a critical examination of the social contexts for rule-making (Moore, 1978; Berman, 2012). This line of thought resonates with my analysis of the position of formal institutions in governing mixed-use public spaces, in the sense that mixed-use public spaces can only function once they are able to incorporate the multiple uses of different users. This unique type of space presents a strong challenge to dogmatic ideas about how rule-making can facilitate socio-spatial dynamics.

The groove maker of street ballet

In the writing period of this dissertation, the covid-19 pandemic has come and left. Streets and street markets went through stages of lockdown and fears to full-blown alive again. Politicians who had a strong will to re-plan the Donmen market has stepped down. Public officials who tried to organise the Dappermarkt have left. From the beginning to the end, what has never changed, is generations of vendors standing on the streets, street bureaucrats who facilitate the day-to-day coordination, and citizens who manifest these spaces with their presence.

Planning is about dealing and co-existing with uncertainties (Faludi, 2004). This dissertation dived into everyday narratives on how mixed-use public spaces are used, organised, and governed. On street markets, behaviours and actions linger around grey zones might be highly-coordinated actions that co-exist with long-term potential threats and policy failures. And the seemingly organized spatial arrangement could also be a façade of disorienting organisational drama in governance. Underlying policy documents, archive materials, stories, and gossip revealed endless attempts and failures to order street markets from both cases, it is refreshing to reflect upon what are priorities that planners should keep in mind amid navigating through uncertainties in mixed-use public spaces.

As Sennett and Sendra (2020) remarked in ‘Designing Disorder’:

Today’s planner has an arsenal of technological tools...we have more resources to use than in the past, but we don’t use these resources very creatively. This paradox can be traced to one big fault: the overdetermination of both the city’s visual forms and its social functions. The technologies which make possible experimentation have been subordinated to a regime of power which wants order and control; in the grip of rigid images and precise delineations, the urban imagination lost its vitality. (2020:23)

This dissertation tells a story to say, to plan convivial mixed-use public spaces, there is no shortcut to skip the work of understanding and dealing with relational nuances and all sorts of socio-spatial complexities. Only by loosening up the will of control, looking into detailed but substantial socio-spatial relationships that trigger the dynamics, we will start to understand the craft of rule-making, and use rules to enabling and not hampering the process of spatial production: to incorporate space, people, and everything in between. That is to say, to choreograph the street ballet as Jacobs (1961) framed, there are elements: the script, the stage, and the dancers. And here is the planner as the producer of this street play. We have to make these elements shine and groove.

APPENDIX

Appendix 1 List of interviews

Amsterdam

#	Function	Organization	Date
1	Retired market manager		27/02/2019
2	Retired professor		28/02/2019
3	Former Professor	University of Amsterdam	14/03/2019
4	Retired market manager		28/03/2019
5	Retail consultancy	Retail consultancy company	01/04/2019
6	Public official	Municipality of Amsterdam	01/04/2019
7	Neighbourhood level public official	Municipality of Amsterdam	02/04/2019
8	Public official at the Marktbureau	Municipality of Amsterdam	03/04/2019
9	Public official at the Projectmanagement bureau	Municipality of Amsterdam	03/04/2019
10	Market broker (marktmakelaar)	Municipality of Amsterdam	17/04/2019
11	Market broker (marktmakelaar)	Municipality of Amsterdam	29/04/2019
12	Policy maker	Municipality of Amsterdam	03/05/2019
13	Neighbourhood level public official	Municipality of Amsterdam	05/06/2019
14	Consultant		15/07/2019
15	Public official at the Marktbureau	Municipality of Amsterdam	15/08/2019
16	Officer	Centrale Vereniging voor de Ambulante Handel	19/08/2019
17	Consultant	Research and survey consultancy firm	22//08/2019
18	Consultant	Urban planning consultancy firm	11/09/2019
19	Vendor's representative	Centrale Vereniging voor de Ambulante Handel	23/10/2019
20	Vendor	Dappermarkt	23/10/2019
21	Artist	Markttheatre	25/10/2019
22	Vendor	Dappermarkt	28/10/2019

23	Market manager	Municipality of Amsterdam	05/11/2019
24	Vendor's representative	Centrale Vereniging voor de Ambulante Handel	09/11/2019

Taipei

#	Function	Organization	Date
25	Retired public official		17/01/2020
26	Policy maker	Municipality of Taipei	20/01/2020
27	Public official at MAO	Municipality of Taipei	20/01/2020
28	Commissioner of Department of Economic Development	Municipality of Taipei	01/02/2020
29	City council member	Taipei City Council	01/02/2020
30	Policy maker at MAO	Municipality of Taipei	04/02/2020
31	Public official at MAO	Municipality of Taipei	04/02/2020
32	Vendor	Dong Men Market	07/02/2020
33	Vendor	Dong Men Market	07/02/2020
34	Head of Vendors' self-organization	Dong Men Market	09/02/2020
35	Leader of neighbourhood	Dong Men Market	12/02/2020
36	Local resident	Dong Men Market	12/02/2020
37	Retired public official		13/02/2020

Participatory observation events

Amsterdam

#	Event	Location	Date
1	Neighborhood outdoor event on Dapperplein	Dapperplein	21/08/2019

Taipei

#	Event	Location	Date
1	Public meeting on market renewal plan	Zhongzheng district assembly hall	21/01/2020
2	Public meeting on market renewal plan	Nanmen temporary market hall	17/02/2020

Appendix 2 Consent Form

My name is Ying-Tzu Lin. I am a PhD researcher at the Center of Urban Studies, University of Amsterdam. I am conducting research about the governance and management of street markets in the city of Amsterdam and the city of Taipei. Contemporary lifestyle in work and the use of technology changed our ways to use the city, public spaces and shopping drastically. However, street markets still remain very important public spaces for local residents and tourists to hang out in the city. My research aims to explore insights and daily practices on what makes street markets important public spaces in the city. What kind of challenges do people working around street markets face? And how do they deal with these challenges? In my studies of different cities, I am looking for a better understanding of the knowledge used in planning public spaces, but also hope to bridge different experiences and practitioners to meet.

Interviews will generally last about one hour. Participation of the interviewees is voluntary; during the interview the interviewee has the opportunity to ask questions and to withdraw from the interview without consequences at any time. I will preferably record the interview to make efficient use of the time. The information from the interviews is used for writing my thesis and may be also used for publishing an academic article based on my thesis. In my thesis and academic articles I may use the analysis of transcripts or direct quotes from the interviews. I will, however, never mention the source of the interview: I guarantee confidentiality and anonymity. I also guarantee to store the interview material and data in a digital environment that allows my use and access only. I guarantee that I will not circulate the raw material (transcripts, recordings, and notes) under any circumstances, and destroy them after the completion of my thesis.

If any questions may arise after the interview, you can contact me by email (Y.T.Lin@uva.nl) or by phone (0617588936).

Informed consent

I have agreed to participate voluntarily in this project as an interviewee. I have given permission for the recording and use of the interview material for research purposes (including master thesis and academic publications) with **strict preservation of anonymity**.

Name of the interviewee/

Signature:

Date:

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alexander, C. (1977). *A pattern language: towns, buildings, construction*. Oxford university press.

Alex, K. (2006). HDM symposium: can design improve life in cities? Closing Comments. Harvard Design Magazine, no.24, 'The Origins and Evolution of "Urban Design," 1956–2006'

Atkinson, P., & Hammersley, M. (1994). Ethnography and participant observation. In N. K.

Atkinson, P. (2014). *The ethnographic imagination: Textual constructions of reality*. Routledge.

Atkinson, R., Parker, S., & Morales, E. R. (2017). Non-state space: the strategic ejection of dangerous and high maintenance urban space. *Territory, Politics, Governance*, 5(4), 443-458.

Ayres, L. (2008). Narrative interview. *The Sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods*, 1, 545.

Barley, N. (2000). *The innocent anthropologist: Notes from a mud hut*. Waveland Press.

Bateson N, (1984). *Data Construction in Social Surveys* (Allen and Unwin, London)

Behar, R. (1996). *The vulnerable observer: Anthropology that breaks your heart*. beacon press.

Bertolini, L., & Verloo, N. (2020). *Seeing the city: Interdisciplinary perspectives on the study of the urban*. Amsterdam University Press.

Berman, M. (1983). *All that is solid melts into air: The experience of modernity*. Verso.

Berman, P. S. (2012). *Global legal pluralism: A jurisprudence of law beyond borders*. Cambridge University Press.

Besnier, N. (2009). *Gossip and the everyday production of politics*. University of Hawaii Press.

Besnier, N. (2019). Gossip in ethnographic perspective. *The oxford handbook of gossip and reputation*, 100.

Blokland, T. (2012). Blaming neither the undeserving poor nor the revanchist middle classes: A relational approach to marginalization. *Urban Geography*, 33(4), 488-507.

Brison, K. J. (1992). *Just talk: Gossip, meetings, and power in a Papua New Guinea village* (No. 11). Univ of California Press.

Bosco, J. (1992). Taiwan factions: Guanxi, patronage, and the state in local politics. *Ethnology*, 31(2), 157-183.

Bodnar, J. (2015). Reclaiming public space. *Urban studies*, 52(12), 2090-2104.

Brenner, N., Marcuse, P., & Mayer, M. (2009). Cities for people, not for profit. *City*, 13(2-3), 176-184.

Bromley, R. (2000). Street vending and public policy: A global review. *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*.

Brown, A. (2004). Claiming rights to the street: The role of public space and diversity in governance of the street economy. *Paper presented December*, 1-17.

Brown, A. M. B. (2006). *Contested space: street trading, public space, and livelihoods in developing cities*. itdg Publishing.

Brown, A., & Mackie, P. (2017). Urban informality and 'rebel streets'. In *Rebel streets and the informal economy* (pp. 1-16). Routledge.

Calabi, D. (2004). *The Market and the City: Square. Street and Architecture in Early Modern Europe*, Marlene KLEIN (trans J, Aldershot 2004, p. 31.

Carmona, M., De Magalhaes, C., & Hammond, L. (2008). *Public space: the management dimension*. Routledge.

Carmona, M. (2014). The place-shaping continuum: A theory of urban design process. *Journal of Urban Design*, 19(1), 2-36.

Carmona, M. (2015). Re-theorising contemporary public space: a new narrative and a new normative. *Journal of Urbanism: International Research on Placemaking and Urban Sustainability*, 8(4), 373-405.

Carmona, M. (2019). Principles for public space design, planning to do better. *Urban Design International*, 24(1), 47-59.

- Chase, S. (1995). Taking narrative seriously. *The narrative study of lives*, 3, 1-26.
- Chase, J., Crawford, M., & Kaliski, J. (2008). *Everyday urbanism: Updated and expanded*. New York, NY: Monacelli.
- Chen, H. (2011). A historical Research on the 'Urban Planning Act' Presented by Urban and Housing Committee (UHDC) and UN Advisor Group. *Journal of Environment and Art*, 9, 47-67.
- Chiu, C. (2013). Informal management, interactive performance: street vendors and police in a Taipei night market. *International Development Planning Review*.
- Chang, Z. R. (2017) Daily Reorganization of Street Market: Tracing Cross-market Mobility in Vending and Mooring.
- Cole, J. W. (1977). Anthropology comes part-way home: Community studies in Europe. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 6(1), 349-378.
- Control Yuan, (2010) Research Report on Vendor Counseling Management Issues
- COTM. (1914). Leidraad voor de behandeling in de commissie en voor het onderzoek naar de plaats welke de dagmarkten innemen in het economische leven. Amsterdam: Municipality Archive 462, Inventory number 26 (Commissie tot Onderzoek van den Toestand van het Marktwezen).
- Crawford, M. (1995). Contesting the public realm: Struggles over public space in Los Angeles. *Journal of Architectural Education*, 49(1), 4-9.
- Cresswell, T., & Hoskins, G. (2008). Place, persistence, and practice: evaluating historical significance at Angel Island, San Francisco, and Maxwell Street, Chicago. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 98(2), 392-413.
- Cross, J., & Morales, A. (2007). Street entrepreneurs. *People, place and politics in local and global perspective*. London: Routledge.
- CVP. (1914). De vrije markten. Amsterdam: Municipality Archive 462, Inventory number 29 (Commissaris van politie).
- Davies, C. A. (2008). *Reflexive ethnography: A guide to researching selves and others*. Routledge.

De Certeau, M., & Mayol, P. (1998). *The Practice of Everyday Life: Living and cooking. Volume 2* (Vol. 2). U of Minnesota Press.

Dear, M. (2005). Comparative urbanism. *Urban Geography*, 26(3), 247-251.

Deore, P., & Lathia, S. (2019). Streets as public spaces: Lessons from street vending in Ahmedabad, India. *Urban Planning*, 4(2), 138-153.

Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *Handbook of qualitative research* (pp. 248-261). Thousand Oaks, CA, US: Sage Publications, Inc

Destler, K. N. (2017). A matter of trust: Street level bureaucrats, organizational climate and performance management reform. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 27(3), 517-534.

DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. *American Sociological Review*, 48(2), 147-160.

DiMaggio, P. (1998). The New Institutionalisms : Avenues of Collaboration. *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 154(4), 696-705.

Dobbin, F. (1994). Cultural models of organization: The social construction of rational organizing principles. *The sociology of culture: Emerging theoretical perspectives*, 118.

Ebneyamini, S., & Sadeghi Moghadam, M. R. (2018). Toward developing a framework for conducting case study research. *International journal of qualitative methods*, 17(1), 1609406918817954.

Economische Zaken of Municipality Amsterdam (2018) *Marktvisie 2018-2026*
<https://www.amsterdam.nl/ondernemen/markt-straathandel/marktvisie/>

Etikan, I., Musa, S. A., & Alkassim, R. S. (2016). Comparison of convenience sampling and purposive sampling. *American journal of theoretical and applied statistics*, 5(1), 1-4.

Faludi, A. (2004). Spatial planning traditions in Europe: Their role in the ESDP process. *International Planning Studies*, 9(2-3), 155-172.

Fairbanks, R. P., & Lloyd, R. (2011). Critical ethnography and the neoliberal city: The US example. *Ethnography*, 12(1), 3-11.

Fairbanks, R. P. (2012). On theory and method: Critical ethnographic approaches to urban regulatory restructuring. *Urban Geography*, 33(4), 545-565.

Falla, A. M. V., & Valencia, S. C. (2019). Beyond state regulation of informality: understanding access to public space by street vendors in Bogotá. *International Development Planning Review*, 41(1).

Foley, D. E. (2002). Critical ethnography: The reflexive turn. *International journal of qualitative studies in education*, 15(4), 469-490.

Fraser, N. (1990). Rethinking the public sphere: A contribution to the critique of actually existing democracy. *Social text*, (25/26), 56-80.

Gaggiotti, H., Kostera, M., & Krzyworzeka, P. (2017). More than a method? Organizational ethnography as a way of imagining the social. *Culture and Organization*, 23(5), 325-340.

Gans, H. J. (1999). Participant observation in the era of “ethnography”. *Journal of contemporary ethnography*, 28(5), 540-548.

Geertz, C. (1973). Chapter 1/Thick Description: Toward an interpretive theory of culture. *The interpretation of cultures: Selected essays*, 3-30.

Geertz, C. (1974). “From the native’s point of view”: On the nature of anthropological understanding. *Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, 26-45.

Geertz, C. (1998). Deep Hanging Out: Review of James Clifford, *Routes, Travel, and Translation in the Late 20th Century* and Pierre Clastres, *Chronicle of the Guayaki Indians*. *The New York Review of Books* 45(1):69.

Gehl, J. (2013). *Cities for people*. Island press.

Giardini, F., & Wittek, R. (Eds.). (2019). *The Oxford handbook of gossip and reputation*. Oxford University Press.

Goffman, E. (1959). *The presentation of self in everyday life*. Garden City: Doubleday.

Gold, R. (1958). Roles in sociological field observation. *Social Forces*, 36, 217-223

Goodfellow, T. (2020). Political informality: Deals, trust networks, and the negotiation of value in the urban realm. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 56(2), 278-294.

Goodwin, M. H. (1982). "Instigating": Storytelling as social process. *American ethnologist*, 9(4), 799-816.

Grant, J. (2002). Mixed use in theory and practice: Canadian experience with implementing a planning principle. *Journal of the American planning association*, 68(1), 71-84.

Hardin, R. (1996). Trustworthiness. *Ethics*, 107(1), 26-42.

Harvey, D. (2006). The political economy of public spaces. In S. Low & N. Smith (Eds.), *The politics of public space* (pp. 17-34). New York, NY: Routledge.

Hammersley, M. (2001). Atkinson, P. (1983). *Ethnography: Principles in practice*.

Hoffmann, E. A. (2007). Open-ended interviews, power, and emotional labor. *Journal of contemporary ethnography*, 36(3), 318-346.

Hoppenbrouwer, E., & Louw, E. (2005). *Mixed-use development: Theory and practice in Amsterdam's Eastern Docklands*. *European Planning Studies*, 13(7), 967-983.

Hiebert, D., Rath, J., & Vertovec, S. (2015). Urban markets and diversity: Towards a research agenda. *Ethnic and racial studies*, 38(1), 5-21.

Hou, J. (2010). *Insurgent public space: guerrilla urbanism and the remaking of contemporary cities*. Routledge.

Huberts, V. R. A. D. (1940). *De amsterdamse venters: Een sociografische monografie*. Amsterdam: Van Campen.

Huijbers, M. C. P. (2013). *Ontmoeting en verbinding de jaren '70 en nu een plek van en voor de Dapperbuurt*. (Master's thesis)

Hudson, B. (1993). Michael Lipsky and street level bureaucracy. *The policy process: A reader*, 386-398.

Hupe, P., & Hill, M. (2007). Street level bureaucracy and public accountability. *Public administration*, 85(2), 279-299.

Integriteit. (2012). *Risicoanalyse warenmarkten Amsterdam*. Amsterdam: Bureau Integriteit.

Jacobs, J. (1961). *The death and life of great American cities*. Vintage: New York.

Jaffe, R. (2016). *Concrete jungles: urban pollution and the politics of difference in the Caribbean*. Oxford University Press.

Janssens, F. (2014). Street food markets in Amsterdam: Unravelling the original sin of the market trader. In *Street Food* (pp. 116-134). Routledge.

Janssens, F. (2017). The politics of public domain: Ethical urbanism around marketplaces in London, Amsterdam & Istanbul

Jerolmack, C., & Khan, S. (2014). Talk is cheap: Ethnography and the attitudinal fallacy. *Sociological Methods & Research*, 43(2), 178-209.

Junker, B. H. (1960). *Field work: An introduction to the social sciences*. University of Chicago Press.

Kar, J. v. d. (1982). *De geschiedenis van de markt en straathandel*. Amsterdam: Kosmos.

Kapiszewski, D., MacLean, L. M., & Read, B. L. (2015). *Field research in political science: Practices and principles*. Cambridge University Press.

Kim, A. M. (2012). The mixed-use sidewalk: Vending and property rights in public space. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 78(3), 225-238.

Kim, A. M. (2015). *Sidewalk city: remapping public space in Ho Chi Minh City*. University of Chicago Press.

Kistemaker, R., Wagenaar, M., & Assendelft, J. (1984). *Amsterdam marktstad. Amsterdam: Dienst van het Marktwezen*.

Kusenbach, M. (2003). Street phenomenology: The go-along as ethnographic research tool. *Ethnography*, 4(3), 455-485.

Kudva, N. (2009). The everyday and the episodic: the spatial and political impacts of urban informality. *Environment and Planning A*, 41(7), 1614-1628.

Kuo, Y. C. (2016). The Role of Chief of Borough in Local Elections-A Case Study on Zhongzheng District in 2014 Taipei Municipal Council Election. *National Taiwan University Graduate Institute of National Development Master's Thesis*.

LeFebvre, H. (1992). *The production of space*. New York, NY: Wiley-Blackwell.

Ligtenberg, H. (2014). De wijk centraal. Een historische analyse van beleidsvoering gericht op democratisch burgerschap en bestuur in stadswijken (Master's thesis).

Lin, Y. T., Liao, Y. C., (2016). Mapping Modernity Through Historicizing and Spatializing Marketplaces In Taipei. *10th conference of the Pacific Rim Community Design Network*.

Lipsky, M. (2010). Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public service. *Russell Sage Foundation*.

Low, S., & Smith, N. (Eds.). (2013). *The politics of public space*. Routledge.

Lydon, M., Bartman, D., Woudstra, R., & Khawazard, A. (2012). Tactical urbanism 1. Shortterm action, long-term change. Street Plans Collective.

Lynch, K. (1964). The image of the city. *MIT press*.

Marcus, G. E. (1995). Ethnography in/of the world system: The emergence of multi-sited ethnography. *Annual review of anthropology*, 95-117.

Matsuda, J. (2005). The development of markets in Taipei area during the Japanese colonization (1895-1937). *National Chi Nan University Department of History Master's Thesis*.

McFarlane, C. (2010). The comparative city: Knowledge, learning, urbanism. *International journal of urban and regional research*, 34(4), 725-742.

McFarlane, C., & Waibel, M. (Eds.). (2012). Urban informalities: reflections on the formal and informal. *Ashgate Publishing, Ltd*.

McQueeney, K., & Lavelle, K. M. (2017). Emotional labor in critical ethnographic work: In the field and behind the desk. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, 46(1), 81-107.

Mehta, V. (2007). Lively streets: Determining environmental characteristics to support social behavior. *Journal of planning education and research*, 27(2), 165-187.

Mehta, V. (2013). *The street: a quintessential social public space*. Routledge.

Mehta, V. (2014). Evaluating public space. *Journal of Urban design*, 19(1), 53-88.

Mehta, V., & Bosson, J. K. (2021). Revisiting lively streets: Social interactions in public space. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 41(2), 160-172.

- Mele, C., Ng, M., & Chim, M. B. (2015). Urban markets as a 'corrective' to advanced urbanism: The social space of wet markets in contemporary Singapore. *Urban Studies*, 52(1), 103-120.
- Merton, R. K., Gray, A. P., Hockey, B., Selvin, H. C. (1952). *Reader in Bureaucracy*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony. *American Journal of Sociology*, 83(2), 340–363.
- Meyer, J. W., & Scott, W. R. (1992). *Organizational environments: Ritual and rationality*. SAGE Publications, Incorporated.
- Mills, C. W. (2000). *The sociological imagination*. Oxford University Press.
- Mitchell, D. (2003). *The right to the city: Social justice and the fight for public space*. Guilford press.
- Molinaro, J. (1993). Building On Common Ground (from *Planning Commissioners Journal*,12) [On-line]. Available: < <https://plannersweb.com/1993/10/building-on-common-ground/>>.
- Moore, S. F. (1978). *Law as process: an anthropological approach*. LIT Verlag Münster.
- Morales, A., Balkin, S., & Persky, J. (1995). The value of benefits of a public street market: The case of Maxwell Street. *Economic Development Quarterly*, 9(4), 304-320.
- Morales, A. (2000). Peddling policy: street vending in historical and contemporary contest. *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*.
- Nader, L. (1980). The Vertical Slice: Hierarchies and Children. In: *Hierarchy and Society: Anthropological Perspectives on Bureaucracy*. Gerald M. Britan and Ronald Cohen eds. Institute for the Study of Human Issues.
- Nijman, J. (2007). Introduction—comparative urbanism. *Urban Geography*, 28(1), 1-6.
- North, D. C. (1991). Institutions. *Journal of economic perspectives*, 5(1), 97-112.
- North, D. C. (1993). Institutional change: a framework of analysis. *Institutional change: Theory and empirical findings*, 35.

North, D. C., Wallis, J. J., & Weingast, B. R. (2009). *Violence and social orders: A conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history*. Cambridge University Press.

Onodugo, V. A., Ezeadichie, N. H., Onwuneme, C. A., & Anosike, A. E. (2016). The dilemma of managing the challenges of street vending in public spaces: The case of Enugu City, Nigeria. *Cities*, 59, 95-101.

Oranratmanee, R., & Sachakul, V. (2014). Streets as public spaces in Southeast Asia: Case studies of Thai pedestrian streets. *Journal of Urban Design*, 19(2), 211-229.

Oswalt, P., Overmeyer, K., & Misselwitz, P. (2013). *Urban catalyst*. Berlin: DOM publishers.

Polanyi, L. (1985). *Telling the American story: A structural and cultural analysis of conversational storytelling*. Praeger.

Polyák, L. (2013). Exchange in the street: Rethinking open-air markets in Budapest. In *Public space and the challenges of urban transformation in Europe* (pp. 48-60). Routledge.

Pottie-Sherman, Y. (2013). Vancouver's night markets: intercultural encounters in urban and suburban Chinatowns (Doctoral dissertation, University of British Columbia).

Projektgroep Dapperbuurt. (1975). *Discussiestuk Voorstel-beleidslijn t.a.v ondernemerspromatiek in de Dapperbuurt* Projektgroep Dapperbuurt. Documentatie Dapperbuurt, Ondernemers/Projektgroep Dapperbuurt/woningtoewijzing/onderwijs, map met tijdschriftartikelen, gemeentelijke stukken, correspondentie, notulen, nota's en notities, publicaties uit Nederland. (Box 04, Folder 2), International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, Netherlands.

Projektgroep Dapperbuurt. (1979). *Stedebouwkundige programma omgeving Dapperplein t.b.v uitwerking 7*. Documentatie Dapperbuurt, Inspraak Dapperplein, map met correspondentie, notulen, pamfletten, plattegronden uit Nederland (Doos 07, Map 6.), International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

Pruijt, H. (2004). The impact of citizens' protest on city planning in Amsterdam. *Cultural heritage and the future of the historic inner city of Amsterdam*, 228-244.

Reinhold, S. (1994). Local conflict and ideological struggle: 'positive images' and Section 28 (Doctoral dissertation, University of Sussex).

Robinson, J. (2013). *Ordinary cities: between modernity and development*. Routledge.

Rowley, A. (1996). *Mixed-use development: ambiguous concept, simplistic analysis and wishful thinking?*. *Planning Practice & Research*, 11(1), 85-98.

Roy, A. (2005). Urban informality: Toward an epistemology of planning. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 71(2), 147-158.

Roy, A. (2009). Strangely familiar: Planning and the worlds of insurgence and informality. *Planning Theory*, 8(1), 7-11.

Sadan, M. (2010). Review of *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia* by James C. Scott (New haven: Yale University Press, 2008). *Reviews in History*, (903).

Sankalia, T. (2014). The median picnic: Street design, urban informality and public space enforcement. *Journal of Urban Design*, 19(4), 473-495.

Schappo, P., & van Melik, R. (2017). Meeting on the marketplace: on the integrative potential of The Hague Market. *Journal of Urbanism: International Research on Placemaking and Urban Sustainability*, 10(3), 318-332.

Scott, J. C. (1998). Seeing like a state. In *Seeing Like a State*. Yale University Press.

Scott, J. C. (2009). *The art of not being governed: An anarchist history of upland Southeast Asia*. Nus Press.

Scott, W. R. (2013). *Institutions and organizations: Ideas, interests, and identities*. Sage publications.

Selznick, P. (1952). *The organizational weapon: A study of Bolshevik strategy and tactics* (Vol. 18). Quid Pro Books.

Selznick, P. (1953). *TVA and the grass roots: A study in the sociology of formal organization* (Vol. 3). Univ of California Press.

Selznick, P. (1957). *Leadership in administration*. Berkeley.

Selznick, P. (1996). Institutionalism "old" and "new". *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 270-277.

Sennett, R. (1970). *The uses of disorder: Personal identity and city life*. Verso Books.

Sennett, R. (2018). *Building and dwelling: Ethics for the city*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Sennett, R., & Sendra, P. (2020). *Designing disorder: Experiments and disruptions in the city*. Verso Books.

Silva, P. (2016). Tactical urbanism: Towards an evolutionary cities' approach?. *Environment and Planning B: Planning and design*, 43(6), 1040-1051.

Shore, C., & Wright, S. (Eds.). (2003). *Anthropology of policy: Perspectives on governance and power*. Routledge.

Spire, A., & Choplin, A. (2018). Street vendors facing urban beautification in Accra (Ghana): eviction, relocation and formalization. *Articulo-Journal of Urban Research*, (17-18).

Stichting Ondernemerscomitee Dapperbuurt. (1974). *Open brief betreffende Bestemmingsplan Dapperbuurt*. Documentatie Dapperbuurt, Ondernemers/Projektgroep Dapperbuurt/woningtoewijzing/onderwijs, map met tijdschriftartikelen, gemeentelijke stukken, correspondentie, notulen, nota's en notities, publicaties uit Nederland (Box 04, Folder 2), International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

Stillerman, J. (2006). The politics of space and culture in Santiago, Chile's street markets. *Qualitative Sociology*, 29, 507-530.

Tonnelat, S. (2010). The sociology of urban public spaces. *Territorial evolution and planning solution: experiences from China and France*, 84-92.

Tucker, J. (2017). City-stories: Narrative as diagnostic and strategic resource in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay. *Planning Theory*, 16(1), 74-98.

Tucker, J. L., & Devlin, R. T. (2019). Uncertainty and the governance of street vending: a critical comparison across the North/South divide. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 43(3), 460-475.

Tsing, A. L. (2015). *The Mushroom at the End of the World*. In *The Mushroom at the End of the World*. Princeton University Press.

Uprichard, E., & Byrne, D. (2006). Representing complex places: a narrative approach. *Environment and Planning A*, 38(4), 665-676.

Vale, L. J., & Vale, P. L. J. (2002). *Reclaiming public housing: A half century of struggle in three public neighborhoods*. Harvard University Press.

Van Hulst, M. J. (2008). Quite an experience: Using ethnography to study local governance. *Critical policy analysis*, 2(2), 143-159.

Verdery, K. (2018). *My life as a spy: Investigations in a secret police file*. Duke University Press.

Vermeulen, F. (2013) *Goodbye, city district councils. You will be missed for at least one unexpected reason*, Center of Urban Studies, University of Amsterdam <https://urbanstudies.uva.nl/content/blog-series/goodbye-city-district-councils.html?origin=RkIy9bW8Q4G0e%2FaGMRg%2FOA>

Wang, J. S., 2005. The study on the vendors managerial policy of Taipei city. *National Taiwan Normal University Graduate Institute of Political Science Master's Thesis*.

Watson, S. (2006). *City publics: The (dis) enchantments of urban encounters*. Psychology Press.

Watson, S. (2009). The magic of the marketplace: Sociality in a neglected public space. *Urban Studies*, 46(8), 1577-1591.

Weber, M. (1946). *From Max Weber: essays in sociology*. Translated and edited by Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press

Weingrod, A. (1968). Patrons, patronage, and political parties. *Comparative studies in Society and History*, 10(4), 377-400.

Whyte, W. F. (1955). *Street Corner Society. The Social Structure of an Italian Slum*. Enlarged Edition. University of Chicago Press.

Whyte, W. H. (1980). *The social life of small urban spaces*. Washington, DC: The Conservation Foundation.

Willis, P. (2013). *The ethnographic imagination*. John Wiley & Sons.

Yang, Y. N. (2015). The Study on the Use of Infrastructure funds for Li (sub-district) and Lin (neighborhood) of Li(sub-district) Chief: A Case Study of Xin-Yi District, Taipei City

Ybema, S., Yanow, D., Wels, H., & Kamsteeg, F. H. (Eds.). (2009). *Organizational ethnography: Studying the complexity of everyday life*. Sage.

Yiftachel, O. (2009). Theoretical notes on gray cities?: The coming of urban apartheid?. *Planning theory*, 8(1), 88-100

Yin, P. N. (1994). Women and policy of public market in Taipei: a case study on Chien-ho Market. *National Taiwan University Graduate Institute of Building and Planning Master's Thesis*.

Yin, R. K. (2009). *Case study research: Design and Methods*. SAGE publications.

DISSERTATION SUMMARY

Mixed-use public spaces are pivotal to urban life. These spaces facilitate a variety of users in making a living, socialising, and roaming around alone without feeling lonely. Due to the highly complex socio-spatial dynamics that these spaces ought to accommodate, mixed-use public spaces are also extremely challenging to plan. In planning theory and practice, mixed-use public space represents a specific spatial type that challenges the debate on how urban planning can navigate the realm between order and chaos. Although the essential role of lively and convivial mixed-use public spaces in making cities liveable is widely recognised, planning often struggles to come to terms with their apparent unruliness and chaos. From a rational perspective, planning mixed-use public space is subject to regulatory tools in urban planning, such as law and regulation, that allow mixed-use public spaces. These tools form the backbone of the spatial production process and the use of such spaces.

Meanwhile, in practice, these tools are insufficiently equipped to pay attention to the socio-spatial complexities that mixed-use public spaces present. Unsurprisingly, the current regulatory tools in urban planning fall short of enabling and accommodating vitalities in mixed-use public spaces. This dissertation aims to fill the gap between, on the one hand, a theoretical understanding of the values of and functions that mixed-use public spaces provide and, on the other hand, the production side of how these spaces can be better planned.

This research positions urban planning within a broader context of governance. It uses urban street markets as a case to study the complexity of how to plan mixed-use public space using a governance approach. Inspired by new institutionalism, I propose ‘governance regime’ as the key analytical framework, which is defined as the network of organisations connected through formal and informal institutions at multiple governance layers, interacting with mixed-use public spaces. The main research question is: **How do governance regimes accommodate the complexity of planning mixed-use public spaces?** To answer this question, I conducted 12 months of ethnographic fieldwork, investigating the operation of street markets and their governance regimes in Amsterdam and Taipei on both street and organisational levels. These fieldwork findings were then analysed through the lens of the governance regime to unpack relational nuances among institutions, organisations, and socio-spatial dynamics in mixed-use public spaces. The operationalisation of the research integrated different scholarly fields to understand the complex realities of socio-spatial dynamics and shed light on how urban planning could respond to the spontaneity and surprises of everyday life.

My research findings reveal that spaces that seem well-ordered physically can be disorganized, stemming from fragmented communication and governance process-

es. Moreover, those that seem visually chaotic may be organised by careful formal and informal stakeholder negotiations and arrangements. Based on my extensive exploration of the complexity of mixed-use public spaces, the value of allowing such spaces to cultivate their own informal institutions became incredibly apparent. The challenge posed to urban planners is to design mechanisms for the production of such half-baked mixed-use public spaces. This can be achieved with sufficient infrastructural support that acknowledges informal institutions' power as essential to formal institutions that enable mixed use in the design process.

Based on the research findings, I conclude that the activation of convivial mixed-use public space should go beyond ordering a space solely to an official standard. Instead, different orders should be negotiated to achieve a balanced set of socio-spatial dynamics. Looking through the lens of the governance regime to analyse mixed-use public spaces proves to be instrumental. It shows that it allows urban planners and researchers to apprehend mixed-use public spaces not as apparent chaos but as a readable complexity. To conclude, my research has illustrated that only when we understand the complexity of mixed-use public space and their socio-spatial dynamics it becomes possible to develop systemic thinking about the extent to which urban planning should facilitate, coordinate, and design the process of spatial production beyond ordering chaos.

SAMENVATTING

Openbare ruimtes met gemengd gebruik zijn cruciaal voor het stadsleven. Deze ruimtes maken het voor allerlei gebruikers mogelijk om rond te komen, te socialiseren of rond te dwalen zonder zich eenzaam te voelen. De complexe sociaal-ruimtelijke dynamieken van deze plekken maken ze een planologische uitdaging. In de planningstheorie en -praktijk dagen openbare ruimtes voor gemengd gebruik het debat uit over hoe planning navigeert tussen orde en chaos. Hoewel de essentiële rol van levendige en gezellige openbare ruimtes voor gemengd gebruik bij het leefbaar maken van steden algemeen wordt erkend, worstelt de planologie vaak met hun schijnbare weerbarstigheid en chaos. Vanuit een rationeel perspectief gezien zijn openbare ruimtes met gemengd gebruik onderhevig aan allerlei wetten en regels die gemengd gebruik mogelijk maken. Deze vormen de ruggengraat van het ruimtelijke productieproces en het gebruik van zulke ruimtes.

Ondertussen zijn deze instrumenten in de praktijk onvoldoende toegerust om aandacht te besteden aan de sociaal-ruimtelijke complexiteit die openbare ruimtes met gemengd gebruik met zich meebrengen. Niet verrassend schieten planologische regelgeving en instrumenten soms tekort in het mogelijk maken van de vitaliteit van openbare ruimtes met gemengd gebruik. Dit proefschrift heeft tot doel de kloof te dichten tussen enerzijds een theoretisch begrip van de waarden en functies die deze openbare ruimtes bieden, en anderzijds de productiekant van hoe deze ruimtes beter kunnen worden gepland.

Dit onderzoek positioneert stadsplanning binnen een bredere context van governance. Het proefschrift gebruikt stedelijke straatmarkten als casus om de complexiteit van het plannen van openbare ruimte met gemengd gebruik te bestuderen vanuit een governance-aanpak. Geïnspireerd door het nieuwe institutionalisme stel ik het concept 'governance regime' voor als het voornaamste analytische kader. Dit wordt gedefinieerd als het netwerk van organisaties die verbonden zijn via formele en informele instellingen op meerdere bestuurslagen, en die interactie aangaan met openbare ruimtes met gemengd gebruik. De hoofdonderzoeksvraag luidt: **hoe kunnen governance regimes omgaan met de complexiteit van het plannen van openbare ruimtes met gemengd gebruik?** Om deze vraag te beantwoorden heb ik twaalf maanden lang etnografisch veldwerk verricht, waarbij ik de werking van straatmarkten en hun governance regimes in Amsterdam en Taipei onderzocht, zowel op straatniveau als op organisatorisch niveau. Deze bevindingen werden vervolgens geanalyseerd door de lens van het bestuursregime om de relationele nuances tussen instellingen, organisaties en hun sociaal-ruimtelijke dynamieken te ontrafelen. Het onderzoek integreert verschillende wetenschappelijke benaderingen om sociaal-ruimtelijke complexiteit te begrijpen. Ook werpt het licht op hoe planologen beter kunnen omgaan met de spontaniteit en verrassingen van het dagelijks leven in de stad.

Uit mijn onderzoeksresultaten blijkt dat ruimtes die fysiek goed geordend lijken, chaotisch kunnen zijn, als gevolg van gefragmenteerde communicatie- en bestuursprocessen. Ogenscheinlijk chaotische projecten kunnen in feite goed georganiseerd zijn door zorgvuldige formele en informele afspraken tussen belanghebbenden. Gebaseerd op mijn uitgebreide verkenning van de complexiteit van openbare ruimtes met gemengd gebruik, werd de waarde van het toestaan dat dergelijke ruimtes hun eigen informele betrekkingen cultiveren ongekend duidelijk. De vraag is hoe planologen mechanismen kunnen ontwerpen om dergelijke halfbakken openbare ruimtes voor gemengd gebruik te creëren. Daarvoor is voldoende infrastructurele ondersteuning nodig, waarbij de macht van de informele instituties wordt erkend als essentieel voor formele instituties die gemengd gebruik mogelijk maken in het ontwerpproces.

Het onderzoek concludeert dat het aanwakkeren van levendige en gezellige openbare ruimtes voor gemengd gebruik verder moet gaan dan het ordenen van een ruimte in navolging van officiële standaarden. In plaats daarvan moeten verschillende ordes worden bedongen om te komen tot een evenwichtige set van sociaal-ruimtelijke dynamieken. Kijken door de analytische lens van het governance regime naar openbare ruimtes voor gemengd gebruik blijkt van vitaal belang te zijn. Het stelt stedenbouwkundigen en onderzoekers in staat om openbare ruimtes voor gemengd gebruik niet te zien als een schijnbare chaos, maar als een leesbare complexiteit. Tot slot illustreert mijn onderzoek dat alleen als we de dynamieken en complexiteit van de openbare ruimte voor gemengd gebruik begrijpen, we pas systemisch denken kunnen ontwikkelen over de mate waarin stadsplanning het proces van ruimtelijke productie moet faciliteren, coördineren en ontwerpen, voorbij het scheppen van orde in chaos.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

As the famous saying goes: “It takes a village to raise a child”. I often feel that it has taken several communities’ mutual support to accomplish this PhD journey. First, I would like to express my gratitude to everyone I have encountered during my fieldwork in Amsterdam and Taipei. Without civil servants in both municipalities generously revealing their daily duties and struggles to me, I would never have grasped how tasks are managed behind their desks. I enjoyed every daily conversation and encounter with vendors and fellow marketgoers in street markets. Their hard work and persistent strolling on street markets are substantial to make active street scenes thrive. A shout out to street markets!

Retrospectively, I was not fully aware of what I signed up for at the beginning of this journey. I am immensely grateful to my promoters, Luca Bertolini and Tuna Tasan-Kok, who took my hand along the way. Your critical intellectual advice and feedback challenged me to seek my own voice in research. You supported me through highs and lows, gave me the confidence that I am mature enough to do this on my own, and patiently dealt with my messiness and confusion. This PhD journey has also been a psychological process to get rid of the ‘not good enough’ mantra and slowly build up confidence. I could not have made it without your support. I give special thanks to Luca for taking care of most administrative tasks involved in this PhD. Life without administrative drama is a blessing. I am also grateful to my co-promotor, Nanke Verloo, for guiding me through the world of ethnography with rigorous and giving sharp comments on methods.

The department of GPIO is a truly inspiring environment to work in. To the PUMA group: Marco te Brömmelstroet, Meredith Glaser, Samuel Nello Deakin, George Liu, Ori Rubin, Edda Bild, Kim Schönfeld, Beatriz Pineda, Lisa Buldeo Rai and many others I am greatly indebted. I always got energy from our inspiring discussions, actions and collaborations. The PUMA culture has profoundly influenced me: ‘We are here for everyone’. This humble mindset creates a secure and warm academic community that promotes curiosity and having fun rather than showing-off and competition. Special thanks to Anna Nikolaeva for the encouragement and wise advice in difficult times. It was a pleasure working with you. You demonstrated how to lead a collaborative project with care and with fair division of labour. I have learned a lot from you. I want to thank my neighbour and colleague Federico Savini for our inspiring conversations and for demonstrating that a life combining activism, academia and music is possible. I look forward to future collaborations. To Jannes Willems, thank you for joining the Food Commons project. I enjoyed the times we spent both at work and after work. Our trip to Lodz was great fun. I want to thank my fellow PhD colleagues in room B4.12 for years of companionship, coffee break chats and lunchtime conversations: Arend Jonkman, Irene Lugue, Sara

Özogul, Debra Solomon, Francesca Ranalli and Emanuele Sessa. You offered me a warm work environment, daily small talk on sharing tips and encouragement to keep spirits high. To Daan, my dear friend and Dutch brother, thank you for always being there to help. I love every moment we spend together working, travelling and just hanging out doing nothing. Thank you for bringing me into your family and sitcom. PhD life would be very different had I never met you.

Outside the urban planning group, I always enjoy chats around the coffee corner and CREA with Richard Ronald, Rowen Arundel and Dominic Teodorescu. I also want to thank Willem Boterman for co-initiating the #WASTE seed grant project together. To Carolina Frossard, Ceylin Idel and Afra Foli, thank you for the warm care and conversation whenever we meet. I always enjoy conference trips and intellectual discussions about planning and sociology with Michiel Stapper; thank you for the time we spent together. I simply cannot imagine my life and PhD journey in Amsterdam without Letizia Chiappini. Letizia, my fellow slutty urbanist, dearest friend and messy sister. It takes two crazy souls to make a good party; you are my forever partner in crime. More than that, we've shared countless moments of love and good laughs, tears and sadness at home and on the road. You are such a bright, brave and caring soul full of passion. You took me in your arms when I was in pieces and told me to rest. You were a guardian angel in the darkest times in my life. You appreciate my quirkiness and sarcastic jokes, and together we turn our anger into an amazing, fierce working collective. I am deeply grateful to have you in my life, to grow and shine together.

On the journey of becoming an ethnographer, I am deeply grateful to have met Reinhilde Sotiria König. You patiently sat down with me to unpack my fear and told me I was good enough to carry my research into the first year of my PhD. You took me to the hospital when I had a traffic accident. You are my angel in Mokum. Annamarie Mol is the most inspiring teacher I have ever met during my PhD. Your sharpness and critical lens on ethnography opened up a new horizon for me to understand how to study a social reality and be reflexive as much as possible. I always felt healed after talking to you. To dear Sarita Jarmack, thank you for bringing me to the swimming world in Amsterdam. Those times we sat by the water in summer and intimately talked about feelings, emotions, research, and how to make sense of life are gold to me. In addition to my UvA community, I want to thank Aimee Albers for bringing a historical perspective to my research. My Taiwanese PhD friends Chia-Shuo Tang, Fang-I Chu and Cinco Yu, thank you for our intellectual conversation with food sharing.

I owe special thanks to Arnold van der Valk. Arnold, you picked me up when I was falling apart and witnessed me being back in shape. I am forever thankful for those Monday corona walks we had during lockdown. Those experiences you shared

with me convinced me not to panic about my brief research hiatus (and process our Wageningen memories). Moreover, you encouraged me to face my struggles and not to feel guilty about being slow. You inspired me to keep spirits high, and told me that there is light at the end of the tunnel. It is true. Besides being a mentor in life, thank you for introducing me to the Food and Planning community in Amsterdam. I also want to thank Maria for caring and lifting my spirits whenever I visit you both. I really enjoyed the dinners we prepared together.

During my PhD, the food and planning community has always been a side project that occupied a soft spot in my heart. I would like to thank Ciska Ulug the most for running this network together. Also my thanks go out to Jeffery Spangenberg, Quoc Thai Nguyen, Fiona and Roel from Cascoland, Anna Kooi, Tobia Jones, Stella Archontaki and Peter van Dam. It's been my pleasure and honour to work with all of you on various small projects. Our concerted efforts will eventually improve the city's food environment.

The other intellectual community that I have been adopted into is Geert Lovink and the Institute of Network Cultures. I started to go to INC when I slowly restarted my research work during lockdown. It wasn't like my research had anything to do with INC's research focus. It was purely out of caring that Geert took me in, allowing me to sit there when everything else was closed. Over the years, INC has become an essential pillar for navigating the complexity of societal change and the ways in which research can make a contribution. I want to thank Tomasso Campagna, Jordi Viader and Valeria Ferrari for being such inspiring and caring friends in my life. It is our mutual care for each other and the world that connects us and our work. I hope there will be lots more fun and collaboration. Special thanks to Andy for designing my book.

Amsterdam has become my second home. Home is not a home without dear friends; we care for each other like family. In particular, those who we survived together during COVID-19 and kept each other sane. To Hyeisoo, Luuk, Yang Ah, Fahrettin, Appie, Choro, Jaehun, Sander, Alessandra, and Mig, I enjoyed every witty conversation, food sharing, hanging out in the city and everything we did together that revolved around caring for each other. Ianthe and Maaïke, whom I first met in the squatted garden in De Pijp 12 years ago for my master thesis when my life started in Amsterdam: life would be very different without you these past years. I can't believe so much time has passed; it feels so long and short at the same time. I am glad we still have each other. To Zeno, Janneke, Joris, Stijn, Davide and Giovanni, I enjoyed every moment we spent together. I also want to thank Joris for our walking and talking time. And thank you so much for designing my thesis cover.

Filmhuis CAVIA and close friendships with volunteers there substantially influenced some of my PhD years. Erwin, I love our midnight texting and hope you find inner peace. To Meester Jeroen, I miss the countless time we spent at gigs. I am always happy to spend time with you, Martine. Thanks to my music community, aka the coolest venue in town, De Ruimte. Being part of the artistic community is so inspiring on so many levels. The seemingly messy but highly coordinated improv music is truly inspiring in both life and research. Being able to work as a volunteer after a whole day of brain-intensive work and enjoy the best improvisation music in town is a true luxury. Shout out to Bart, Robert, Darly, Vicky, Michal, Julie, Thomas and many more De Ruimte heroes and musicians.

Friends and mentors in Taiwan always offered unconditional support even before I embarked on this journey. To John K.C Liu, Yu-Zhen Chen and Tsung-Chi Tsai, I am forever indebted to you for shaping my mindset of how a spatial planner should act in society. To my partners in crime in *Eyes on Place*: I-Hsin Chen, Tzu-Ning Hu, Yu-Li Chen, Ya-Ting Chen, Richard Hsieh, Po-Hsiu Wu. I am proud to be part of the most fabulous planners' community. I also want to thank comrades at Parks and Playground For Children by Children in Taiwan: Christine, Zoe, Ariel and their children. I have learned so much from working with kids and how public spaces are essential for them. I love how we mix work and gossip, yet we are highly efficient in delivering change. Dear Peiwen Lu, thank you for always being energetic, curious, supportive and encouraging me to advance. I am very much looking up to you. We will do something fun together for sure. To Tsai-Her Cheng, Shu-Mei Hunag, Shu-wei Huang, Ying-Fen Chen, Wei-Hsiu Chang, Shu-Wei Hunag, Jeff Hou and Chun-Kai Lin, thank you for inspiring me and showing me what research and academic practice can be both inside and outside of academia. Your research and practices made me understand that knowledge production only makes sense if it serves the greater purpose of our society. Finally, to my sociology big sisters, Chia-Ying Wu and Hui-Chun Liu, thanks for the psychological company, intellectual conversations and thoughts on female life choices over the years. I hope we all have become more comfortable with our lives.

Special thanks to Chun-Chieh Mei and his Cafe Mei. All my essential decisions in life have something to do with this place and the friends that surround it. Shout out to the best underground music scene in Taipei, Senko Issha, my forever hang-out place: Chi-Kuang Wang, Yu-Chi Lai, I-Cheng Lin, Jyun-Ao Lin, Etang Chen, Chi-Yu Yang, Byu Hunag, Yu-Ling Huang, Lala and many others. In music, food and ruins, we glorified each other's souls. My dearest Wan-Shu Lin, Ting-Hao Huang, Pin-An Chen, and Leeaa have been with me since NTU. We have lived through ups and downs in life. I love you forever. I need to express special gratitude to Chi-Cheng Huang. Thank you for caring about me no matter where I am near and far. I want to become a better being with your company over the years.

Besides Taipei and Amsterdam, friends and family in Sweden have always offered me a safe space with immense care and joy. Since we met 16 years ago, Finn (later joined by Lucy and Stuart) has always been around despite our physical distance. You encouraged me to be brave and explore the world. To my dearest Rosa Danenberg, we did it together! I am so lucky to have you around to share life and work, fun and fear, and care for each other along this journey. Thank you for being you and, most importantly, for bringing our friends and family together. To my adopted Swedish family, Sherif, thank you for being a loyal friend and getting me and Rosa into your family. I don't have an older brother; in so many ways, Karim is like my big brother. You always know much more and have such an assured, chill, but critical attitude to life. Thank you also for walking me through the thought process of ethnography as a methodology. Yet, most importantly, food matters at the end of the day. I have endless admiration for Natha for how witty, generous and robust you are. I will forever remember how you virtually dragged me to Stockholm to live with you and took care of me. You made me realize love comes from those who help you when you need it the most. Our fun has changed since Sami arrived, but it has really only improved. To Annika, Barakat and Elinor, thank you for the care, good laugh, food and drinks we shared. I also want to thank Sofie, Em, Camilo and the fabulous Antje for being such genuine friends that I never feel we are far apart.

I was always a challenging child to raise. I always asked too many questions and had my own opinions and judgements. I am deeply grateful to my parents for providing a safe environment that allowed me to grow into myself. My father enlightened me to be curious from the beginning of my life. He shaped my moral justice, intellectual passion and cultural taste. I hope I did not let you down. To mom, thank you for tolerating such a weird daughter. We might be very different, but your generosity towards people profoundly influences me. It is hard for a parent to trust your kid when she constantly goes outside the box, but here I am. All of my siblings mean so much to me in different ways. I have loved Hsuan since my memory began and will love you forever. You are the purest soul I have ever known. To Ethan, I am glad we grew up together and shared so many things in common. I want you to be happy with whatever decision you make. If Gina hadn't visited me last year, I wouldn't have known my little sister had grown into such a fantastic being. I am so happy we found each other as sisters in our adulthood. I love you for the way you are.

Last but not least, non-human actors play as essential as human communities in this journey. My cat Meiko has guarded my sanity every day since we met. More than half of this dissertation was written on the long brown sofa in my house, with Meiko sleeping next to me. This image represents the long writing process for PhD dissertation writing and will forever stay in my heart.

To Matthias, you are the best gift I have found at the end of this journey.