

THE ERA OF MISINFORMATION: UNITED STATES, RUSSIA AND EUROPEAN UNION

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The US elections mean the opening of a new era in the search for global rebalancing, in the triangular relationship between the United States, Russia, and China. The election of Donald Trump sparked a wave of unprecedented protests in America's electoral history. It exposes an anti-system image that purports to erase policy options implemented by its predecessors, as well as externally reassess the role of NATO. Misinform is a concept that was introduced by Vladimir Putin on a scale of a possible hybrid war with the United States and the European Union. It is therefore important to understand how the European Union will position itself in international relations, by adapting its foreign, defense and security policies, in addition to the consequences of Brexit, needing to rediscover its way in the name of European construction with the emergence of new actors from the BRICS to cyberspace.

Keywords: European union, United States of America, BRICS; World order.

Introduction: A Europe in Readjustment?

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, in 2016, submitted to the European Council the Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. This document reveals the official position at a juncture both at European level and internationally.

In the European context, there is a time of great political, social, ideological and economic tension between the Member States, in addition to Brexit and the negative impact that it may have, not only internally on aspects related to economic issues, but in what it represents symbolically as a kind of fractured European project and its inability to maintain internal unity and cohesion in the name of an identity and the past. In the international sphere, we highlight the whole entourage of the US elections for President and spring from a new way of conducting politics and project the ambitions of a president to the international arena.

In fact, the election of Trump marks the beginning of a new stage in international relations, the search for the rebalancing of powers, notably between the United States, Russia and the People's Republic of China, possibly remaining the European Union as the Trump-Putin-Xi Jinping.

The strategy presented by Federica Mogherini highlights the main values of the EU and its system on security and defense issues as an actor in international relations, in an uncertain world and on a clear path towards paradigmatic change. It is important to highlight the sensitive moment that the present Europe is experiencing, particularly in the scenarios of political choices and the continuity of the terrorist threat in its territory. This strategy expresses the idealistic and aspirational nature in the name of European construction following World War II, to prevent a new war from erupting and decimating new victims.

Opting for the idealistic path instead of following the realist recalls an expressed will to opt for another path and, above all, to bring the European citizens back together in identity, values, democracy, and security. National strategies within each Member State tend to arise within the realistic framework, having a binding nature aligned with political, government and clearly in line with the defense of the national interest as sovereign entities with an Anthem, Flag, territory, and border.

However, the EU needs to take a new turn, particularly in the sphere of links between the Member States and their citizens and not in its singular form, in recognition and articulation at the external level. At a turning point in the transition of global policies, the EU should strategically base its options on the domestic and external, in a logic of freedom, democracy, and integration. Federiga Bindi (2010, pp. 36-37) recalls the position of Tony Blair, United Kingdom, and Jacques Chirac, France, in secretly dealing with EU defence issues, resulting in the Declaration of Saint-Malo on 4 Of December 1998, which encouraged the EU to play a leading role in the international arena, and it is, therefore, essential to have a certain autonomy, credible military forces to respond effectively to the international crises that may arise.

The United States, at the time, had no alternative but acceptance, however, imposing certain conditions such as (1) not to sever NATO's European Security and Defence Policy; (2) not duplicate capabilities; (3) not discriminate against non-NATO States. It is precisely in the aftermath of 9/11 and the Madrid (2004) and London (2005) attacks that the EU started a political dialogue on counterterrorism with the United States, Russia, India, Pakistan, Australia and Japan (Bindi, 2010, pp. 38) in the areas of prevention, protection, persecution, and response, in line with the conventions and protocols of the United Nations (UN).

It is therefore necessary to revitalize European defence to meet the challenges of the 21st century, for example: (1) real predictability of economic crisis in Europe and the world; (2) fragmentations and internal divisions within the ideological framework; (3) the effects of the Arab Spring which are still felt, both by migratory waves and by political and societal instability in Libya, Egypt and Tunisia; (4) instability in the Middle East, along with the emergence of the Islamic State, Daesh; (5) successive terrorist attacks not only on European soil but on a global scale, resulting in the deaths of thousands of human beings; (6) the exponential migratory flow resulting from conflicts at the European borders in the Mediterranean area, as in the case of Syria and Turkey.

In this context, it is important to analyse and verify whether this European Union has in fact not reached its own limits or whether, in the context of security and defence, on the one hand, Germany, which in its White Paper sets out strategic priorities for defence The need for structured cooperation, a Europeanisation of the defence industry beyond the creation of a civil / military operational headquarters and, on the other hand, France, which considers it unthinkable that Member States can act on the fringes of NATO, hence both Germany and France intend and defended the creation of a 27-seat headquarters for missions and operations in this area of defence and security through the enhanced cooperation between NATO and the EU in the face of the unpredictability of the world and where the BRICS seek to assume an increasingly dominant and alternative role in the world.

The Geostrategic Relevance of the BRICS

The emergence of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) in the world arena, not only due to Jim O'Neill in his report *Building Better Global Economic BRICs* (2001) on demand of an alternative that responded to the new dynamics and international reality, even more to coincide with the terrorist attacks in North American territory in 9/11, as well as, if it was intended to introduce in the global investment agenda, the idea of economic and financial potential of the BRICS. Later, the economic downturn of 2008/2009 gave the BRICS a major role vis-a-vis the United States and Europe, demonstrating its capacity to respond in times of global crisis, as well as sustainable economic growth (O'Neill, 2013).

In this sense, from the decade of 2010, the BRICS chose, as an informal structure, to group together politically, admitting South Africa as a new member. Jacob Zuma, President of South Africa, participated

in the BRICS summit in Sanya, in the People's Republic of China, stating this statute (Pipper, 2015). As for South African inclusion, this consisted of geopolitically referring to the importance of this country to Africa and above all to being one of the economies of greater potential and development. From this Forum summit of BRICS, repositioned to 5 countries, interconnection, to design a kind of international cooperation platform in the spheres of commerce, politics and culture against the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the domain of the West in this matter, thereby shifting the IMF - West to BRICS - global axis (Westcott, 2014).

It is to be remembered that the G20 emerged in 2009, which led to the replacement of the G7/8 by precisely including the BRICS and constituting perhaps the grouping of countries in a forum of the utmost importance for the deliberation on international economic governance. In this context, it should be emphasized that the BRICS are positioned in the field of international relations, both economically and politically, as political actors whose focus is to enable the current world order to take an alternative course to leave the hegemonic sphere of influence of the States United.

In fact, because of political convergence, it was decided to launch a bank, the BRICS Development Bank, headquartered in Shanghai, draft agreement at the fifth Summit in Durban, South Africa, on March 27, 2013 And effectively founded on July 15, 2014, at the sixth summit in Fortaleza, Brazil, with a reserve currency fund of approximately US \$ 100 billion and capital of the same amount. The Bank's role is to finance infrastructure-related projects that contribute to economic development as an alternative to the World Bank and the IMF. It should be emphasized that priority is given to infrastructure, education, health, women's rights, climate change, among others, in addition to focusing on productive sectors such as energy investment.

Consequently, BRICS reinforces its positioning on a new scale, the global one whose effect is produced in an approach to differentiated development and in the relationship in axis, South - South (Patricio, 2007) To some extent to Brazil, in addition to coexistence and the necessary convergence of the following factors: (1) contribute to stability and domestic growth; (2) strengthen participation in international fora within the multilateral and regional framework, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO); (3) press for the alignment of BRICS Bank policies in the name of sustainable development; (4) promote democratization and transparency in the management of this bank, contributing to respect for human rights, social impact and the environment (Watson, 2013).

From Coning's perspective (2015, pp.171-174), the principle of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity as expressed in the Charter of the United Nations confers the regulatory principle of international law in the current world order. However, one of the interesting factors to be highlighted in the framework of the BRICS lies, at the same time, in terms of sovereignty and territorial integrity, both conservative and reactionary, depending on the context of its use, depending on the protection of the regimes in each of these States in case of resistance to international criticism for alleged abuses of human rights violations. It is, therefore, evidence of growing tension between these states and the international community for behavioral issues and respect for international law, partly because of Western pressure to adopt liberal economic policies, which prompts the possibility to manipulate conduct in international politics to maintain an apparent image of non-violation of those same rights or sovereignty.

On the contrary, the interests of the BRICS as political actors (Kobayashi-Hillary, 2007) are confused with economic issues, for example, it is imperative for this group to recognize *de facto* that developing countries be treated as equal partners and rights in the name of their affirmation in the global arena (Nel, 2010). Incidentally, the commitment of the BRICS in the name of Human Rights and respect for sovereignty emerges in part from the development and projection of the instruments emanating from the Institutions and/or extra and intra-BRICS financial instruments. In addition, however, in terms of sovereignty, all BRICS, except for South Africa, is in territorial disputes (Coning, 2015, p.173). As a rule, disputes over sovereignty and respect for human rights, in addition to the issue of climate change, generate tensions between the BRICS in the face of this principle of interference. The commitment of these states to human rights, political, civil, social and economic rights must be mentioned. Brazil follows them in their domestic and foreign affairs; South Africa vigorously promotes social advancement, justice,

and human security; In contrast to Russia, the People's Republic of China and India, take on other moral positions.

In this regard, Russia argues that respect for human rights differs from its principles and historical characteristics, India tends not to accept the concept of responsibility for protection, in addition to committing itself to human rights or territorial integrity. Thus, there is an intra-BRICS "easing" assumed in each of its foreign policy vectors, positively manifesting the protection aspects of values and human rights, provided that domestically there is no interference of any kind. However, the "pact" assumed between the BRICS of non-mutual aggression and in the legal basis of equality between these states becomes the aspect of greater sensitivity or else in that which can compromise or hurt the unity of this group, Announce the Chinese perspective of its border with India, or Japan to China, as well as maritime space as a threat to the freedom and safety of shipping; Or from Moscow's view of China's interference with Georgia in 2008 or China's abstention in the Security Council of the annexation of the Crimea in 2014.

One of the key strategic vectors of the EU's role in international relations is its economic integration, positioning itself as a strategic partner, expressing a robust economy following the United States. The EU has been using its economic engine to strengthen its political component in the global arena, specifically with its neighbours in the Mediterranean and beyond, by promoting not only internal / external security issues, but also Institutional structures aimed at boosting cooperation and trade at global level through multilateralism, to protect itself from possible intra and extra-European crises (Keukeleire, 2011).

At present, the EU - BRICS relationship makes it possible to observe the current reality of another prism in terms of power, given that the EU is characterized by its capacity to position itself and generate changes in the external environment, to be read in the extra - European space. According to Keukeleire (2011), the particularity of the EU's relations with the BRICS not only are expressed in its aspects of relational power, soft power or even hard power, particularly in coercion, conflicts and crises, but also by the power structure, that is, with competence to influence political, economic, legal and legal structures with third countries.

However, let us emphasize that the EU, despite expressing and possessing aspirations for changes in the external environment, specifically as a platform to influence both domestic policies and societal structures, ends up not enjoying such an international projection, either because of intra-conflicts with sovereignty and human rights.

This is precisely the tendency to comply with the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, thereby giving rise to an ambivalent position, about Moscow-Beijing-EU relations, as it includes matters relating to violations of Human Rights, minorities or Issues of international sensitivity, energy and the fight against terrorism. Traditionally, both Moscow and Beijing end up rejecting criticism or intentions on the part of the EU on internal issues. If on the one hand, according to Shambaugh (2008) agreements are accepted that prevail socioeconomic reforms and technical assistance, on the other hand, the dialogue, the Beijing authorities, is refusing to advance the road to a democratic and pluralistic society Concerning Human Rights.

For Matlary (2004, 141-143), the model emphasized by the EU in foreign policy reveals the application of the power of legalization, in international norms, in the quest to legitimize its action. Clearly aware of this legitimization of certain standards applied to regimes where human rights are practicing violation raises disparate interpretations of the distinction between the right ways and wrong, which of course may focus on certain systems over others, particularly in the hierarchy of Conditioning the consolidation of democratic development that may not keep pace with the economic sector in a globalized and interdependent world.

The question that arises is to dissect the connection between the concept of legitimacy and human rights. In this respect, coercive diplomacy is introduced to obtain results in the justification of the EU's political action in the name of the national interest, Member States. The affirmation of the European identity in the promotion of its convictions in the matter of Human Rights ends up juxtaposing itself to the interests of the individual to the collective, also reinforcing its sphere of influence as a political actor.

In the framework of the construction of the identity both the EU and the BRICS, it becomes evident its construction in the name not of a convergence or political, economic and cultural identity, but of the result of the accumulation of different positions and roles assumed in the global governance. The inability of the BRICs to achieve a positive outcome at the G20 or even at the World Trade Organization is reiterated, despite the continued cooperation and development of networks for linking interactions resulting from cooperative development (Duggan, 2015, pp. 20-22).

In this context, the EU does not have a specific relationship with the BRICS, derived from their difference, in addition to representing a non-formal group ad hoc development process and affirmation. It should be noted that within the BRICS itself, the perception of the EU is negative, of a declining structure that has difficulties in solving its problems, which confirms beyond any doubt the importance of the implementation of strategic partnerships (Keukeleire, Bruyninckx, 2011, pp. 400-402).

The EU Foreign Policy, Security, and Defence

The definition and projection of a European foreign policy with the BRICS reproduce the essential step of an initial cooperation model for the progressive creation of strategic partnerships. Considering that the second half of the twentieth century is the era of regional integration, in commercial, economic and institutional processes. The original European model reflects a project that essentially goes beyond regional economic integration or the different stages in building a common market and the eurozone, free movement of goods, services, and individual mobility.

The pursuit of a solid and gradual common foreign, security and monetary policy requires a solid integration in the consolidation of the different policies, identities, values, and cultures, respecting the sovereignty of each member state, in its relations now intra- or extra-European. From this perspective, outside Europe, the EU seeks to manage its external relations by moving its sphere of influence beyond its borders and the Mediterranean natural zone (Yvars, 2010, pp. 274-280).

At present, with the effect of maintaining not only the regional balance to deal with new crises, from terrorism to successive migratory waves as a result of the war in Syria and to instability on two sides, Africa and the Middle East, the EU responds through Of the implementation of a multi-vectorial foreign policy that faces a double challenge: on the one hand, the reinforcement of pragmatism and, on the other hand, the guarantee of stability of the continuous process of regional and international integration. According to Susanne Gratius (2011), the EU is multilateral in nature and vocation, expressing the sharing of sovereignty as a single collective actor, in pursuing and fulfilling its aspirations, reducing unilateral behaviour and increasing aspects related to international law, Principle of equality negotiation, and an evident commitment to the international system in a multipolar world order, where the United States tries to maintain its position as a superpower.

But the analysis of Tiersky (2010, pp 1-13) the influence of the EU in international politics obeys three types of power: soft power, hard power, and transformative power. While hard power means coercion and choose or by war or by peace or by the imposition of sanctions before an international conflict; soft power translates the opposite side, intending to influence other countries to opt for the decision that is most convenient for the interested party, prevailing cooperation by the force of attraction and co-option, translated into economic and/or political inclusion advantages. In turn, transformative power reflects the power of enlargement and the special relationship that lead to considerable reforms and lead to substantial political changes among those governments that want to or belong to the EU or withdraw economic advantages.

Hence Taylor (2010, pp. 133-159) defends the EU's winning position in the process of globalization by gaining a place in world trade by forming the United States and the People's Republic of China as one of the major partners and International trade since 2004, because of the increase of its exports in addition to the peripheral regions. Indeed, Renard (2016) emphasizes in terms of strategic partnerships those linked to the security sector to make the EU stand out as a "global" security actor. In this context, the European Security External Strategy 2003 and the 2010 Security Internal European Strategy identify the

threats that the EU will face, most notably the following: (1) terrorism, for human losses and put across Europe at risk; (2) proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, posing the greatest threat to European territory; (3) regional conflicts; (4) organized crime; (5) failed states; (6) energy security sector; (7) climate change; (8) cybersecurity.

As Bickerton points out (2011, pp. 103-105), the defense sector reflects the construction of democratic sentiment as it emerges as an agent of EU democratization, i.e. the concept of democratic legitimacy presupposes a greater capacity for integration, both in terms of Performance in participation and/or identity. The areas of defense and security imply an aggregate link between the domestic and the external, translating into reality the political limitations whose effect will be felt in terms of the democratic deficit. Indeed, the development of external co-operation expresses the real progress of the convergence of the various national interests advocated by each State in its internal effectiveness to provide security for Europe. Thus, MacKenzie and Zwolski (2013) denote the role of the EU in its extra-EU relationship, with the United States, as a strategic partner and key interlocutor in ensuring regional and global rebalancing. In this sense, Léonard and Kaunert (2013) insert this cooperative framework in post-9 environment / 11 surveillance and the adoption of measures likely to contain the constant terrorist threat without harming bilateral relations with other powers or partners. The development of EU foreign policy includes the adoption of counter-terrorism instruments and to intensify cooperation in the different sectors sharing information on the intelligence community.

The soft power capacity of the EU that was introduced in its foreign policy has helped to reduce the sphere of influence of countries such as Russia, which observes Europe as a unit in erosion or fragmentation, as a result not only of its expansion to the former satellites of the former Soviet Union as well as the rejection of the constitutional draft and the difficulties in ensuring financial stability in the Mediterranean countries as Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece.

At the same time, emerging problems related to energy, Russia, and investment, China, at points of access and passage of oil and gas pipelines in Europe, dividing the positions of the United States, read here the geopolitical design, South Stream (Wijk, 2015, pp. 119-134), assuming equally links global resources resulting from the complexity of the mutual dependencies (a) energy, (b) water, (c) food, (d) and mineral resources soil resources.

In fact, according to a study by the Rand Corporation it is possible to establish a precise measurement as the power capacity of a State, in this case, the analysis of three variables: (1) GDP, depending on the degree of wealth, it is possible from a positive negotiating framework; (2) innovation, to be necessary to achieve prosperity and modernize military equipment; (3) conventional military capacity. The combination of these variables can decide on the definition of the foreign policy of a state, here, in this case, the EU.

This position proves to be decisive in power projection in international relations and particularly the successful implementation of foreign policy (Tellis, 2000). Precisely according to Hill and Wong (2011) the European foreign policy-making process involves the complex coordination between different types of states, asymmetrically, from small to big powers, in addition to the persistence of external policies implemented by each country sovereign and individual.

This Europeanization of foreign policy translated into one implies procedures, attitudes and common political positions that identify with the identity grounded in the following aspects (Hill, Wong, 2011, pp. 210-212.): (a) a common position, both formal informal; (b) these common positions can sometimes cause difficulties in bilateral relations or in domestic policies; (c) attempts to pursue national priorities, not only through the collective means of action of the EU; (d) positive underwriting the values and principles expressed by the EU in its international activity, sharing an image and an identity.

In fact, Hill and Wong (2011, p. 220) regard as likely to promote the Europeanisation of domestic foreign policy the following factors: (1) the role of institutions; (2) socialization; (3) effective leadership; (4) external Unifying; (5) range of policies; (6) legitimizing role on a global scale and, finally, (7) the geo-cultural identity. It is evident that only with the combination of all these principles the EU will hold the full ability to determine their foreign policy on security and defense with one voice, otherwise hardly

respond to the uncertainties of the international system or surpass certain obstacles as the future in terms of integration.

Now, therefore, in view of Monteleone (2016), the guarantee of peace and security throughout the Cold War period and Peaceful Coexistence between the two blocks, on the one hand, the United States and NATO, and, on the other hand Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, was due certainly to the consensus generated intra-European and response efforts with one voice, so as not to repeat a new world war, European causes and global consequences, demonstrating a correlation between cohesion and collective European identity feeling.

The EU towards Old Times, New Times?

In the context of European foreign policy, according to Hill and Wong (2011, p. 227) there are only five possibilities: (1) ignore what has collectively been held and carried, based on the independence of traditional diplomacy; (2) actively oppose or obstruct the attempt to create common positions; (3) trying to use the European foreign policy in the specific promotion in the name of national purposes, i.e. uploading; (4) seek a majority consensus through the formulation of institutional policies, or downloading; (5) promote interaction with EU partners, either as a whole or through multiple groups and intensification of bilateral relations, i.e., cross loading.

In this new Era Trump 2.0 that was started by Donald Trump election where tweets won an absolute domain. The United States is thus in this global game of chess as a superpower, where for Nuno Rogeiro (2017, p. 17), it is suspected that the enemy of President Trump is his own person, i.e. his program. The speech of investiture of Donald Trump on January 20, 2017, opens an unprecedented time of transition in the history of international relations. Thus, Trump presents a speech under the inspiration of two of former Presidents Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) and John Kennedy (1961-1963), finding two styles differ widely, but complementary, between a connection to the country and ambition national projection of the United States in the global arena.

In the opinion of Richard Haass (2017), considering all these recent changes in the international environment, from the United States, BRICS the EU and Russia, generate a new redesign of the global balance setting, especially for not being likely to consider only respect for sovereignty and their complementarity in the power balance of system will respond to this operating model. Thus, the author argues that we live in a World Order 2.0 which results from over four hundred years under the Peace of Westphalia. In fact, Haass examines this new World Order 2.0 by embracing the concept of sovereignty and the right to independence.

The World Order 1.0 consisted, in its view, of building a system of protection and of the prerogations of States, which today has become inadequate as a result of globalization, since what happens or happens in a country is not If considered as local or internal, but a problem that can affect other states on a planetary scale, from tourism, terrorism, climate change, greenhouse gas emissions, migratory waves, the multiplication of the human species, or We live in a World Order 2.0, where closing borders, prohibiting the movement of people, limiting the exchange of services and goods has become unthinkable. Such evidence would only be possible, provoking an unparalleled regression against everything and everyone by imperial policies out of alignment with reality and the current international system resulting from interdependence on a global scale. The 1.0 World Order 1.0 consisted in that it was founded around the protection and the prerogatives of states, and thus inadequate to current times, because of globalization. Virtually nothing is local, all went on a global scale, from tourism to infectious diseases, in addition to any internal conflict is likely to become international.

Nevertheless, it is not only to guarantee the sovereignty, on the contrary, highlights the imperative of each state meet the obligations of others, here we introduce the concept of obligation of sovereignty as opposed to the responsibility of sovereignty to act in an interconnected and interdependent world, involving the major powers such as China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Russia and the United Kingdom, in addition to the role that the EU, the G-20 or the UN can play.

In this world order 2.0, will be necessary consultations and discussions, among others, in the field of global health, climate change and cyberspace or concerning preventive action to curb nuclear proliferation and arms both bilaterally and multilaterally to obtain the required support of to prevent the uncontrolled path and violence.

To that end, the EU, according to Gariup (2009, pp. 192-193) to consider the European Security and Defence Policy as an inclusion and response system to crises and/or international conflicts without damaging the playing field of NATO, but working in a complementary manner, it is endowed with capacity to face this new world order that Haass introduces as 2.0, to ensure the possibility of development in the progressive operation of its intervention capacities strategically in Europe's pivotal role.

The existence of problems and shared responsibilities in this Order 2.0 reveals a central component of commitment in behavior in relation to the power of the major powers, the United States, Russia and the EU concerning the equation of survival by mutual interest and guarantee the principle of a common security. This approach from the perspective of Buzan and Lawson (2015, pp. 300-304) takes to take on the national security agenda of each power, acting on behalf of security with and not against the security, with the common threats to climate change, cyberspace and all its surroundings hackers to cyber war, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, space and, above all, the global economy.

Conclusion: New World Order?

The historical legacy of the old European continent represents an immeasurable wealth in this contemporary world where we are witnessing a growing and volatile dynamics of global transformation. Transformation is in acceleration and in continuing uncertain environment, the growing interdependence, alluded by Teilhard de Chardin in the *Human Phenomenon* (1955), in which the policymaker, who governs, is placed in global confrontation beyond traditional boundaries physical and inclusion of cyberspace tool which increasingly appears as a new "player" of international relations, giving the possibility of handling not only the information or the production of fake news, such as the ability to change the distance the country course, a region, a continent, a world of devastating consequences for the common good of humanity. This growing complexity introduced by Teilhard de Chardin which assumes that divergence is not opposition, but rather a convergence in the continuing evolution without rupture, where the past meets the future (Maltez, 2014, p. 89), between policy actions and humanity.

Therefore, it opens the way to a new era, the end of the order of the Westphalian Peace, designed in 1648, ending the Thirty Years' War, and basing a balance of sovereignty, in the name of non-interference, inaugurating the modern international system, hailed and strengthened following the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and finally by the hand of the Versailles Treaty of 1919.

However, the world today is the legacy of a past, of a time long ago, a Europe still to exist and be out of the false consciousness spectrum of the world distorted visions. The EU is at a crossroads in pursuit of its integration project and contributing to building a better world, where the Brexit and all internal electoral processes in each Member State acquire another meaning.

Finally, it denotes the importance of the United States, by the voice of Trump, what consist of foreign policy, security, and defense, emphasizing its diplomatic role, economic, military within the Atlantic Alliance and European security. Uncertainties from Trump personality indirectly creates a redefinition and EU rehabilitation planning, negotiation and implementation of foreign policy, particularly in sensitive areas such as: (1) the future of compromise between the United States and NATO; (2) the possibility of a rapprochement between the United States and Russia, between Trump and Putin, which can reduce the EU 's area of operation; (3) the uncertainty of the dynamics of Sino-US relations, specifically on Taiwan; (4) nuclear renegotiations with Iran, which reduces the US interest to remove Syrian President Bashar al-Assad; (5) the reduction of nuclear weapons proliferation in countries such as Japan, Saudi Arabia and South Korea; (6) the issue of the US border, migration control; (7) in the name of counterterrorism, the increase in surveillance operations for the Five Eyes Alliance (FVEY) -

Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States; (8) increased investment in defence and security of the United States in the region of 300 billion US \$ for a period of 4 years; (9) the future of elections in France and which respects the free trade agreements such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (Black, Hall, Cox, Kepe, Silfversten, 2017).

For that reason, the Brexit and Trump's victory reflected the opening of new, old times in regression, with unpredictable levels unparalleled, alongside the continuing terrorist threat in Europe, which is pressing against a European strategy capable of to respond to these new challenges in foreign policy, security and defence, as the new model to be adopted in the UK-EU relationship.

So, Trump and Putin are faced with this new chessboard, where democracy is replaced by authoritarian ways of conducting political and economic vectors, relegating to the statement of Vladimir Nabokov in if the free man does not lack a god. In fact, we are living in times of prospects of misinformation of facts and fantasies materialized in political support that will transform the world, by the regression of everything that our ancestors conquered in the name of a project to take care of the common house, by the way, this theme is addressed in *Laudato si'*, the second encyclical of Pope Francis. Precisely, this new World Order, or Westphalian system 2.0, where the sovereignty is surpassed by the divine intervention of the cyberspace in electoral time to return to its national interest, adapting in this way its foreign policy to this reality of needs and pretensions. In addition, this new order urgently requires an expansion and application of a new normative set, entitled to a reform of NATO and the UN with its Humanist/Machiavellian legacy since both do not respond to the needs and desires of Humanity.

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