

Succinct Arguments over Towers of Binary Fields

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Abstract

We introduce an efficient SNARK for *towers of binary fields*. Adapting Brakedown (CRYPTO '23), we construct a multilinear polynomial commitment scheme suitable for polynomials over tiny fields, including that with 2 elements. Our commitment scheme, unlike those of previous works, treats small-field polynomials with *zero embedding overhead*. We further introduce binary-field adaptations of HyperPlonk's (EUROCRYPT '23) product and permutation checks, as well as of Lasso's lookup. Our scheme's binary PLONKish variant captures standard hash functions—like Keccak-256 and Grøstl—extremely efficiently. With recourse to thorough performance benchmarks, we argue that our scheme can efficiently generate precisely those Keccak-256-proofs which critically underlie modern efforts to scale Ethereum.

1 Introduction

Succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge, or SNARKs, have witnessed a recent surge in interest, driven largely by their application to blockchain protocols. Though long hindered by poor prover performance, SNARKs now represent a viable solution to the issue of blockchain scalability, thanks to a renewed focus on improving their concrete efficiency.

Many modern SNARK constructions follow a framework that compiles *polynomial interactive oracle proofs* into succinct arguments of knowledge using *polynomial commitment schemes*. This framework's formalization appears in Bünz, Fisch and Szepieniec [BFS20] and Chiesa et al. [Chi+20]. The latter work—along with several previous works, like Maller, Bowe, Kohlweiss, and Meiklejohn's *Sonic* [MBKM19] and Gabizon, Williamson, and Ciobotaru's *PlonK* [GWC19], in which the polynomial IOP framework is implicit—uses the celebrated polynomial commitment scheme of Kate, Zaverucha, and Goldberg (KZG) [KZG10], which relies on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem in elliptic curve groups.

Ben-Sasson et al.'s highly influential *Fast Reed-Solomon IOP of Proximity* (FRI) [BBHR18a] has reenergized an alternative approach—dating originally to Killian [Kil92]—which, in contrast with that based on elliptic curves, instead achieves succinct arguments with the aid of linear error-correcting codes and collision-resistant hash functions. The most popular exemplar of this approach is the *Scalable Transparent Arguments of Knowledge* (STARK) protocol of Ben-Sasson, Bentov, Horesh, and Riabzev [BBHR18b]. Subsequent expositions of this line of work have reinterpreted STARKs in the polynomial IOP framework discussed above (see for example Haböck [Hab22]); in this light, we freely refer henceforth to the *FRI polynomial commitment scheme*, or FRI-PCS.

FRI-PCS is not the sole polynomial commitment scheme that leverages linear codes and hash functions. Golovnev et al.'s *Brakedown* polynomial commitment scheme [Gol+23], which distills ideas from Bootle, Chiesa, and Groth [BCG20] and Ames, Hazay, Ishai, and Venkatasubramanian [AHIV23], also uses linear error-correcting codes, and operates within the IOP model. Asymptotically, Brakedown's verifier and proof size both grow on the order of the square root of the size of the polynomial being committed. (We use terminology somewhat expansively in this work, by classifying as “SNARKs” those protocols whose verifier complexity is merely sublinear, as opposed to strictly polylogarithmic, in the witness size.) Diamond and Posen [DP23] improve the concrete efficiency of Brakedown by a factor of roughly two. While Brakedown's asymptotic verifier complexity is inferior to that of FRI, in many settings of practical interest, the difference in concrete efficiency is minimal, so that Brakedown's highly efficient prover yields a compelling tradeoff.

The technique of *recursive proof composition* further mitigates the impact of Brakedown’s less-efficient verifier. Instead of proving an entire statement or virtual machine execution in a single SNARK, one can often split up the statement in such a manner that it may be verified incrementally. Valiant [Val08] shows that *incrementally verifiable computation* can be realized through recursive SNARK composition, so that a long virtual machine execution, say, might be proven using only SNARKs for circuits of bounded size. By composing a series of inner SNARKs with large proof sizes but fast proving times with an outer SNARK with a small proof and a relatively slower proving time, one obtains a hybrid system featuring both a small proof *and* a fast proving time.

Three major factors account for the performance advantage enjoyed by FRI-PCS and Brakedown-based SNARKs over those based on elliptic curve assumptions.

- **Operation over small fields.** Elliptic curve groups must be large—on the order of 256 bits—to attain standard security levels. The *ethSTARK* [Sta21] and *Plonky2* [Pol22] systems pioneer an alternative design, characterized by the use of smaller fields (specifically, of prime fields on the order of 64 bits). By leveraging the relative efficiency of small-field arithmetic, these systems achieve state-of-the-art proving performance. Moreover, these protocols’ use only of small-field elements reduces their storage requirements, which in turn leads to better cache-efficiency on CPUs.
- **Flexibility in field selection.** These schemes tend to use fields that are not just small, but are, moreover, computationally structured. *Plonky2* [Pol22], for example, highlights the *Goldilocks field* \mathbb{F}_p , where $p = 2^{64} - 2^{32} + 1$. This prime modulus is a *Solinas prime*—that is, a prime of the form $\phi^2 - \phi + 1$, where here $\phi = 2^{32}$ —and so admits an especially efficient modular reduction algorithm.
- **Cheaper cryptographic primitives.** Standard-issue collision-resistant hash functions are much faster than elliptic curve primitives.

As a rough comparison, committing 1 MiB of data with the FRI-based polynomial commitment scheme in the Goldilocks field using Keccak-256 is about 7-fold faster than committing with KZG [KZG10] over the BN254 bilinear group. We note that polynomial commitment accounts for the majority of the prover’s cost in most SNARKs.

Given the performance gains that smaller finite fields stand to unlock, in this work, we extend this trend to its logical conclusion: SNARKS over the smallest field, \mathbb{F}_2 .

Binary fields. Finite fields of characteristic 2, or *binary fields*, have a rich history in cryptography. The AES block cipher and the GMAC message authentication code, standardized for use alongside AES, famously use the binary fields \mathbb{F}_{2^8} and $\mathbb{F}_{2^{128}}$, respectively. A further important line of research pertains to cryptographically secure elliptic curves over binary fields; these curves feature highly efficient circuit instantiations. We recall some basic properties of binary fields which account for their applicability in cryptography. The elements of the field \mathbb{F}_{2^k} can be unambiguously represented in k bits; for example, there is a bijection between bytes of data and the finite field \mathbb{F}_{2^8} . Field addition corresponds to the logical exclusive or (XOR) operation on these bit representations. Also, squaring elements of a binary field is significantly less expensive than multiplying two distinct elements, thanks to the fact that $(x + y)^2 = x^2 + y^2$ for each pair of elements x and y in these fields (an identity sometimes called the “freshman’s dream”).

In this work, we present a SNARK construction over the field \mathbb{F}_2 that competes favorably with state-of-the-art systems built with prime fields. Moreover, we argue that when proving computations that depend heavily on bitwise operations, such as the SHA-256 and Keccak-256 hash functions, our system outperforms prime field-based alternatives. We must acknowledge that ours is not the first work to consider SNARKS over characteristic-2 fields; it is the first we are aware of, however, to give an implementation-oriented SNARK construction over \mathbb{F}_2 specifically, and which moreover avoids *embedding overhead*, a phenomenon we now explain. While the work [BBHR18b] does present a STARK construction over characteristic-2 fields, naïvely applying small field techniques cannot yield superior concrete efficiency over \mathbb{F}_2 , for a simple reason: the alphabet of each Reed–Solomon code must be at least as large as its block length. Aside from this limitation, which pertains to the FRI IOP of proximity, the *ALI* protocol in STARK—as well as the *DEEP-ALI* protocol of the successor work of Ben-Sasson, Goldberg, Kopparty, and Saraf [BGKS19]—uses fast polynomial multiplication techniques. Fast multiplication techniques for polynomials over \mathbb{F}_2 entail

embedding the polynomials’ \mathbb{F}_2 -coefficients into an extension field, effectively mandating the use of a field at least as large as the witness.

An influential line of recent works—which includes *Spartan* [Set20], *HyperPlonk* [CBBZ23], and *CCS* [STW23a]—holds the promise of overcoming these limitations. These works develop a toolkit that yields SNARKs that bypass polynomial multiplication; instead, they leverage the classical *multivariate sumcheck* protocol of Lund, Fortnow, Karloff, and Nisan [LFKN92]. These protocols use multilinear polynomial IOPs and multilinear polynomial commitment schemes, rather than these objects’ univariate analogues. We see that, equipped with the polynomial commitment schemes of [Gol+23] and [DP23]—which do not mandate the use of Reed–Solomon codes, and in fact work for general linear codes—the multilinear regime stands to deliver efficient SNARKs over \mathbb{F}_2 with no embedding overhead.

While Reed–Solomon codes are far from the only choice available, they nonetheless remain attractive. They are efficiently encodable and maximum-distance separable, and, moreover, admit a strengthened proximity-gap result—due to Ben-Sasson, Carmon, Ishai, Kopparty, and Saraf [Ben+23]—which improves upon the best currently-available analogues proven for general linear codes.

We propose two concrete polynomial commitment schemes over \mathbb{F}_2 , both based on Brakedown. We recall that Brakedown works at a high level by shaping the committed polynomial’s coefficients into a two-dimensional matrix, encoding it row-wise, and then randomly sampling and testing matrix columns for proximity to the code and consistency with prover-supplied messages. One option for an \mathbb{F}_2 -multilinear polynomial commitment is to instantiate Brakedown with a *concatenated code*, itself constructed using a Reed–Solomon outer code and an ad-hoc inner code (whose small message and block lengths, we emphasize, make ad-hoc code construction techniques highly effective). Targeting prover efficiency and implementation simplicity, we propose a second option, which generalizes Brakedown but permits the use of Reed–Solomon codes alone, using a technique we call *block-level encoding*. This second proposal draws inspiration from the concatenated code-based approach, but simplifies its proving and verification procedures by omitting the inner code. The idea is to pack the elements of each message into extension field elements, to encode each resulting message using a Reed–Solomon code, and finally to randomly sample and test blocks of contiguous columns from the encoded matrix—which themselves correspond to Reed–Solomon symbols in the extension field—as opposed to sampling and testing individual columns. Though this approach yields slightly larger proofs than does the concatenated code-based method in certain cases, we argue that its simplicity and its implementation advantages make the tradeoff worthwhile.

Using this block-level encoding technique, our protocol attains the remarkable property that its commitment phase imposes *zero embedding overhead*. That is, the cost of committing a ν -variate multilinear polynomial $t(X_0, \dots, X_{\nu-1})$ over \mathbb{F}_2 is nearly identical—aside from small data transposes—to that of committing a $\nu - \kappa$ -variate polynomial $t'(X_0, \dots, X_{\nu-\kappa})$ over the extension field $\mathbb{F}_{2^{2^\kappa}}$ (which contains the same quantity of information). On the other hand, t ’s evaluation proofs are still more expensive than t' ’s are, for both the prover and the verifier. Finally, the sumcheck protocol also runs less efficiently on t than it does on t' , a consequence of the fact that its challenges come from a cryptographically-sized extension field (like $\mathbb{F}_{2^{128}}$). This latter issue is ameliorated in part by certain optimizations to the sumcheck protocol available only in the small-field setting, which we discuss in Subsection 4.2.

For these reasons, we do not end our investigation of SNARKs over binary fields at \mathbb{F}_2 . Rather, we push this approach further by utilizing a full tower of extensions over \mathbb{F}_2 , of the form $\mathbb{F}_2 \subset \mathbb{F}_{2^2} \subset \mathbb{F}_{2^4} \subset \mathbb{F}_{2^8} \subset \dots \subset \mathbb{F}_{2^{128}}$. In this way, we introduce a new sort of flexibility into our scheme’s arithmetization procedure, whereby it may use finite fields that appropriately capture the respective data types used within the high-level program it is arithmetizing.

One key example that clearly illustrates the utility of tower fields at the constraint system level is the arithmetization of the hash function *Grøstl* [Gau+11]. Grøstl has undergone extensive cryptanalysis and was a finalist candidate in the SHA-3 competition. The hash function’s design is based on AES’s and uses the same *Rijndael S-box* as AES does. Like AES, Grøstl is, in a sense, natively defined over \mathbb{F}_{2^8} , and so admits an efficient arithmetization in any constraint system which features native \mathbb{F}_{2^8} -operations. We believe that this fact makes Grøstl an attractive candidate hash function for the SNARK system presented here. This observation resembles one made by Ben-Sasson, Bentov, Horesh, and Riabzev [BBHR18b, § E], who note that hash functions based on the *Rijndael-160 cipher* possess simple arithmetic descriptions. Accordingly, we expect low recursion overheads for SNARKs that use this work’s techniques and are instantiated with Grøstl. This fact marks a notable benefit over prime field-based SNARKs, which rely, for the sake of efficient

recursive verification, on more recent—and less battle-tested—*arithmetization-optimized* hash functions like *Poseidon* [Gra+19].

Our use of binary field towers confers several further advantages beyond the arithmetization layer. In Subsection 2.3 below, we resurface an explicit, iterated construction of binary tower fields introduced originally by Wiedemann [Wie88]. This tower construction features certain remarkable computational properties, which were observed by Fan and Paar [FP97]; namely, the multiplication, and even the inversion, of elements in the tower field \mathbb{F}_{2^k} can be carried out with asymptotic complexity $O(k^{\log_2 3})$, a consequence of Karatsuba-based techniques. The multiplication of field elements with subfield elements has even better computational complexity, as we explain in Subsection 2.3. Chen et al. [Che+18] have exploited precisely this property of tower fields to improve the performance of polynomial multiplication in binary fields. In our performance evaluation in Section 6 below, we discuss the implications of the recently introduced Intel *Galois Field New Instructions* (GFNI) instruction set extension on software implementations of Wiedemann’s tower that target capable processors.

Our contributions. We summarize our contributions in this work as follows.

1. **A formal definition of *small-field polynomial commitment schemes*.** While small field techniques appear in several existing SNARKs—such as *Plonky2* [Pol22] and *RISC Zero* [BGT23]—the security of these schemes depends on a certain undocumented soundness property, whereby the committed polynomial’s coefficients *actually reside* in the required ground field, as opposed to in the extension field from which the polynomial’s evaluation query is drawn. (See Definition 3.3.)
2. **A proof that [DP23] achieves a small-field polynomial commitment scheme.** Indeed, we prove that the construction [DP23, Cons. 4.6]—with appropriate minor modifications—actually yields a small-field scheme in the strong sense outlined above, and so provides “better-than-advertised” security. (See Theorem 3.13.)
3. **A generalization of [DP23], which uses *block-level encoding*.** Our generalized construction yields an efficient small-field polynomial commitment scheme, for \mathbb{F}_2 -polynomials, which uses Reed–Solomon codes, and which imposes zero embedding overhead during the commitment phase. (See Subsection 3.4.)
4. **An adaptation of *PLONKish* to the binary tower setting, and a SNARK for it.** We adapt the *PLONKish* arithmetization relation of HyperPlonk [CBBZ23, Def. 4.1] to our setting, and introduce several modifications (most importantly, a generalized constraint system, defined over a tower of fields, as opposed to just one). (See Subsection 5.1.)
5. **An adaptation of the *Lasso* lookup argument [STW23b] to the binary tower setting.** Setty, Thaler and Wahby’s *Lasso* [STW23b] differs from prior lookup arguments—including that given in HyperPlonk [CBBZ23, § 3.7]—in that it explicitly exploits the relative cheapness of committing to small-valued elements. While the authors of [STW23b] highlight this benefit only in the setting of elliptic curve-based polynomial commitments, we show how to capture it moreover in our tower setting. (See Subsection 4.4.)
6. **An efficient shift argument for polynomials over the boolean hypercube.** That is, we define an operator, which, on input a multivariate polynomial f , maps f to the multilinear extension of that polynomial which takes the values of f on the hypercube at arbitrarily *rotated* points. This answers an open problem posed in HyperPlonk (see [CBBZ23, p. 52] of the full version). (See Subsection 4.3.)
7. **A performance evaluation of field arithmetic, the polynomial commitment scheme, and the sumcheck protocol, in the tower setting.** We moreover compare our software implementation to those of state-of-the-art prime field SNARKs. Our multilinear polynomial commitment scheme can commit a 2^{28} -coefficient \mathbb{F}_2 -polynomial about 50-fold faster than can *plonky2*’s [Pol22] Goldilocks-based implementation of FRI-PCS, and about 150-fold faster than Hyrax [Wah+18]. (See Section 6.)
8. **An arithmetization of the Keccak- $f[1600]$ permutation.** This permutation resides at the core of the Keccak-256 hash function enshrined in the Ethereum protocol, and represents a key bottleneck facing attempts to prove statements about the Ethereum blockchain. (See Appendix A.)

Prior works. We discuss various relevant previous works. We have already mentioned above the *eth-STARK* [Sta21] and *Plonky2* [Pol22] systems, which introduce the use of 64-bit prime fields (and extensions thereof). The ALI [BBHR18b] and DEEP-ALI [BGKS19] protocols—also discussed above—appear to work even over binary fields, albeit with embedding overhead.

The *ECFFT* sequence of works of Ben-Sasson, Carmon, Kopparty and Levit [BCKL23; BCKL22] presents an alternative to ALI and DEEP-ALI which makes applicable DEEP-ALI’s *cyclic-group-based* approach in arbitrary fields (i.e., as opposed to merely in FFT-friendly prime fields). We note that ECFFT entails a form of embedding overhead twice as burdensome as that which DEEP-ALI imposes, as we now explain. Indeed, for a characteristic p (say, 2) and a witness size parameter k fixed, that work [BCKL22, Prop. 1] guarantees the existence of an acceptably sized elliptic curve E —that is, one whose group of \mathbb{F}_q -rational points contains an order- 2^k cyclic subgroup—only over a *doubly* large field extension of \mathbb{F}_p , of size $q \geq \Omega(2^{2 \cdot k})$. In other words, it requires that the curve’s field of definition \mathbb{F}_q be roughly as large as the *square* of the witness. (This fact relates to the Hasse–Weil bound; we refer to the proof of [BCKL22, Cor. 1].) Moreover, the work’s Reed–Solomon codewords (in the sense of [BCKL22, Thm. 12]) have \mathbb{F}_q -entries, in general. We see that those messages with entries in the alphabet \mathbb{F}_2 , say, yield codewords that are $2 \cdot k$ -fold larger than rate considerations alone demand. For this reason, we find that work unlikely to be competitive with ours.

An interesting work of Cascudo and Giunta [CG22] directly targets the use of Ligerio on witnesses valued in \mathbb{F}_2 . We briefly recall the approach of that work. Key to that work is the idea of a *reverse multiplication-friendly embedding*, a notion which originates with Cascudo, Cramer, Xing and Yuan [CCXY18]. In short (we restrict our discussion to the case of characteristic $p := 2$), a $(k, e)_2$ -RMFE is a pair of \mathbb{F}_2 -linear maps $\varphi : \mathbb{F}_2^k \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{2^e}$ and $\psi : \mathbb{F}_{2^e} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^k$ for which, for each pair of elements x and y of \mathbb{F}_2^k , $x * y = \psi(\varphi(x) \cdot \varphi(y))$ holds (here, we denote by $*$ componentwise multiplication, or bitwise AND). The insight of [CG22] is that RMFEs serve to “export” R1CSs relations defined over \mathbb{F}_2 to related ones defined over \mathbb{F}_{2^e} ; here, crucially, e is sufficiently large that Ligerio can be applied off-the-shelf. Specifically, that work replaces each R1CS relation $A \cdot w * B \cdot w = C \cdot w + b$, where $w \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$ say, with a related relation defined on the image $\tilde{w} := \Phi(w) \in \mathbb{F}_{2^e}^{n/k}$ (here, Φ denotes the block-wise extension of φ). On the one hand, Ligerio can be used to decide this latter relation. On the other, the latter relation moreover implies the former, *provided* that \tilde{w} is indeed in the image of Φ ; [CG22] describes further “lincheck” protocols which serve to convince the verifier of this fact.

The first key question is how e relates to k . Cascudo and Giunta [CG22, § 2.2] note, first of all, the lower bound $e \geq 2k - 1$, so that a blowup of at least twofold is inevitable. On the positive side, using sophisticated techniques, [CCXY18, Thm. 5] shows that asymptotically, $e = \Theta(k)$ can be achieved; moreover, when $p := 2$, the implicit constant can be taken to be less than 5 [CCXY18, Cor. 2]. Finally, [CG22, § A.1] presents practical constructions which show that, in essentially all parameter regimes of practical interest, e/k can be taken to be less than 4.

In any case, we find that [CG22] stands to induce a factor-of-4 blowup in the size of the statement upon which Ligerio is run, *as well as* to impose further computational costs associated with its linchecks. Our work, on the other hand, adapts Ligerio so as to make that work operate “natively” over \mathbb{F}_2 -elements, and induces no blowup. For these reasons, we find that work unlikely to compare favorably with ours.

We finally note various works which build zero-knowledge proofs specifically for the *boolean circuit* model of computation, and which moreover feature asymptotically linear-time provers. Ron-Zewi and Rothblum [RR22] and Holmgren and Rothblum [HR22] develop an interesting approach based on tensor codes and “code switching”; their approach, moreover, internally invokes a sequence of Spielman codes respectively defined over successive extension fields of characteristic 2. A further line of work applies techniques from MPC; we refer for example to Weng, Yang, Katz and Wang’s *Wolverine* [WYKW21], as well as to the survey of Baum, Dittmer, Scholl and Wang [BDSW23]. These works, while interesting, face limited practical usability for various reasons. They feature either private-coin verifiers [WYKW21; RR22; BDSW23], linearly-sized proofs [WYKW21; RR22; BDSW23], non-negligible soundness error [RR22], or else unspecified large constants [HR22]. We note finally that our PLONKish arithmetization (see Subsection 5.1 below) exposes a computational model significantly richer than that made available by boolean circuits. Indeed, our arithmetization features native $\mathbb{F}_{2^{2^k}}$ -operations (for arbitrary k), as well as custom gates, copy constraints, and lookups. For these reasons, our computational model can capture with much less overhead those statements of practical interest in blockchains.

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2 Background and Notation

We write \mathbb{N} for the set of nonnegative integers. For sets S and T , we write S^T for the set of maps $T \rightarrow S$. Below, we require that all fields be finite. We fix an arbitrary finite field K (though do focus on the case when K is of characteristic 2). For each $\nu \in \mathbb{N}$, we write \mathcal{B}_ν for the ν -dimensional *boolean hypercube* $\{0, 1\}^\nu \subset K^\nu$. We occasionally identify \mathcal{B}_ν with the integer range $\{0, \dots, 2^\nu - 1\}$ lexicographically; that is, we identify each $v = (v_0, \dots, v_{\nu-1})$ in \mathcal{B}_ν with the integer $\sum_{i=0}^{\nu-1} 2^i \cdot v_i$, and moreover write $\{v\}$ for this latter integer.

2.1 Polynomials

We recall certain basic facts pertaining to multivariate polynomials, referring throughout to Thaler [Tha22, § 3.5]. We recall the ring $K[X_0, \dots, X_{\nu-1}]$ of ν -variate polynomials over K . We write $K[X_0, \dots, X_{\nu-1}]^{\leq d}$ for the set of ν -variate polynomials over K of *individual* degree at most d in each variable. *Multilinear polynomials* are multivariate polynomials of individual degree at most 1 in each variable (see [Tha22, Def. 3.4]); the set of all such polynomials is $K[X_0, \dots, X_{\nu-1}]^{\leq 1}$. A degree- d *multivariate extension* of a map $f \in K^{\mathcal{B}_\nu}$ is a polynomial $\hat{f} \in K[X_0, \dots, X_{\nu-1}]^{\leq d}$ for which $\hat{f}(x) = f(x)$ holds for each $x \in \mathcal{B}_\nu$.

Each map $f \in K^{\mathcal{B}_\nu}$ admits a *unique* degree-1 multivariate extension $\hat{f} \in K[X_0, \dots, X_{\nu-1}]^{\leq 1}$ (see [Tha22, Fact 3.5]). We thus refer freely to *the* degree-1 multivariate extension of f ; we write \tilde{f} for this polynomial and call it f 's *multilinear extension* (MLE). We recall the *equality indicator function* $\text{eq} : \mathcal{B}_\nu \times \mathcal{B}_\nu \rightarrow \mathcal{B}_\nu, (x, y) \mapsto x \stackrel{?}{=} y$, as well as its MLE, the *equality indicator polynomial* (see [Tha22, Lem. 3.6]):

$$\widetilde{\text{eq}}(X_0, \dots, X_{\nu-1}, Y_0, \dots, Y_{\nu-1}) = \prod_{i=0}^{\nu-1} X_i \cdot Y_i + (1 - X_i) \cdot (1 - Y_i).$$

For each $f \in K^{\mathcal{B}_\nu}$, we have the following explicit representation of f 's multilinear extension $\tilde{f} \in K[X_0, \dots, X_{\nu-1}]^{\leq 1}$:

$$\tilde{f}(X_0, \dots, X_{\nu-1}) = \sum_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} f(v) \cdot \widetilde{\text{eq}}(v_0, \dots, v_{\nu-1}, X_0, \dots, X_{\nu-1}).$$

The proof that \tilde{f} is f 's multilinear extension is straightforward (see [Tha22, Lem. 3.6], for example).

For each fixed $(r_0, \dots, r_{\nu-1}) \in K^\nu$, the vector $(\widetilde{\text{eq}}(v_0, \dots, v_{\nu-1}, r_0, \dots, r_{\nu-1}))_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu}$ takes the form

$$\left(\prod_{i=0}^{\nu-1} v_i \cdot r_i + (1 - v_i) \cdot (1 - r_i) \right)_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} = ((1 - r_0) \cdots (1 - r_{\nu-1}), \dots, r_0 \cdots r_{\nu-1}).$$

We call this vector the *tensor product expansion* of the point $(r_0, \dots, r_{\nu-1}) \in K^\nu$, and denote it by $\bigotimes_{i=0}^{\nu-1} (1 - r_i, r_i)$. We note the recursive description $\bigotimes_{i=0}^{\nu-1} (1 - r_i, r_i) = (1 - r_0) \cdot \bigotimes_{i=1}^{\nu-1} (1 - r_i, r_i) \parallel r_0 \cdot \bigotimes_{i=1}^{\nu-1} (1 - r_i, r_i)$. This description yields a $\Theta(\nu)$ -time algorithm which computes $\bigotimes_{i=0}^{\nu-1} (1 - r_i, r_i)$ (see e.g. [Tha22, Lem. 3.8]).

2.2 Error-Correcting Codes

We adapt the notation of Diamond and Posen [DP23, § 2]. A *code* of block length n over the alphabet Σ is a subset of Σ^n . In Σ^n , we write d for the Hamming distance between two vectors (i.e., the number of components at which they differ). We again fix a field K . A linear $[n, k, d]$ -*code* over K is a k -dimensional linear subspace $C \subset K^n$ for which $d(v_0, v_1) \geq d$ holds for each unequal pair of elements v_0 and v_1 of C .

Given a linear code $C \subset K^n$ and an integer $m \geq 1$, we have C 's m -fold interleaved code, defined as the subset $C^m \subset (K^n)^m \cong (K^m)^n$. We understand this latter set as a length- n block code over the alphabet K^m . In particular, its elements are naturally identified with those matrices in $K^{m \times n}$ each of whose rows is a C -element. We write matrices $(u_i)_{i=0}^{m-1} \in K^{m \times n}$ row-wise. By definition of C^m , two matrices in $K^{m \times n}$ differ at a column if they differ at any of that column's components. That a matrix $(u_i)_{i=0}^{m-1} \in K^{m \times n}$ is within distance e to the code C^m —in which event we write $d^m\left((u_i)_{i=0}^{m-1}, C^m\right) \leq e$ —thus entails precisely that there exists a subset $D := \Delta^m\left((u_i)_{i=0}^{m-1}, C^m\right)$, say, of $\{0, \dots, n-1\}$, of size at most e , for which, for each $i \in \{0, \dots, m-1\}$, the row u_i admits a codeword $v_i \in C$ for which $u_i|_{\{0, \dots, n-1\} \setminus D} = v_i|_{\{0, \dots, n-1\} \setminus D}$. We emphasize that the subset $D \subset \{0, \dots, n-1\}$ is *fixed*, and does not vary as the row-index $i \in \{0, \dots, m-1\}$ varies. In this circumstance, following the terminology of [Ben+23], we say that the vectors $(u_i)_{i=0}^{m-1}$ feature *correlated agreement* outside of the set D , or that they feature *e-correlated agreement*. We note that the condition whereby the vectors $(u_i)_{i=0}^{m-1}$ feature *e-correlated agreement* with C^m implies *a fortiori* that every element in $(u_i)_{i=0}^{m-1}$'s row-span is itself within distance at most e from C .

We recall Reed–Solomon codes. For K again fixed, $S = \{s_0, \dots, s_{n-1}\}$ a subset of K , and a message length $k \leq n$, the *Reed–Solomon code* $\text{RS}_{K,S}[n, k]$ is defined as the subset $C := \text{RS}_{K,S}[n, k] = \{p(s_0), \dots, p(s_{n-1}) \mid p(X) \in K[X]^{<k}\}$. In words, $\text{RS}_{K,S}[n, k]$ is the set of n -tuples which arise as the *evaluations*, over the n points of S , of some polynomial $p(X) \in K[X]$ of degree less than k . Here, we identify $K[X]^{<k}$ with K^k using the monomial K -basis $1, X, \dots, X^{k-1}$ of $K[X]^{<k}$. The code $\text{RS}_{K,S}[n, k]$ is of distance $d = n - k + 1$ (see e.g. Guruswami [Gur06, Def. 2.3]). Lin, Chung, and Han show in recent work [LCH14] that, for K a binary field, and $S \subset K$ an appropriately chosen \mathbb{F}_2 -affine linear subspace, the encoding function of $\text{RS}_{K,S}[n, k]$ —or at least of a code isomorphic to it—can be computed in $\Theta(n \cdot \log k)$ time. (The code $C \subset K^n$ of [LCH14] differs from $\text{RS}_{K,S}[n, k]$ by precomposition with a K -isomorphism on K^k , and so inherits $\text{RS}_{K,S}[n, k]$'s properties in full.)

2.3 Binary Towers

In this subsection, we review towers of field extensions. The following explicit construction is due to Wiedemann [Wie88], and appears also in Cohen [Coh92] and Fan and Paar [FP97], for example; we refer the reader to Blake, Gao, Mullin, Vanstone and Yaghoobian [Bla+93, § 3.4] for further historical remarks. We define a sequence of rings inductively, by setting $\mathcal{T}_0 := \mathbb{F}_2$, $\mathcal{T}_1 := \mathbb{F}_2[X_0]/(X_0^2 + X_0 + 1)$, and, for each $\iota > 1$, $\mathcal{T}_\iota := \mathcal{T}_{\iota-1}[X_{\iota-1}]/(X_{\iota-1}^2 + X_{\iota-2} \cdot X_{\iota-1} + 1)$. It is shown in [Wie88, Thm. 1] that, for each $\iota > 1$, the polynomial $X_{\iota-1}^2 + X_{\iota-2} \cdot X_{\iota-1} + 1$ is irreducible in $\mathcal{T}_{\iota-1}[X_{\iota-1}]$. We conclude by induction that, for each $\iota \geq 0$, the ring \mathcal{T}_ι is a *field*, isomorphic precisely to $\mathbb{F}_{2^{2^\iota}}$.

For each $\iota > 0$, we naturally realize $\mathcal{T}_{\iota-1}$ as a subfield of \mathcal{T}_ι , corresponding to (the equivalence classes of) the *constant polynomials*. Applying induction, we obtain a natural tower construction $\mathcal{T}_0 \subset \mathcal{T}_1 \subset \dots \subset \mathcal{T}_\iota$. Moreover, for each $\iota \geq 0$, we have a straightforward identification of rings:

$$\mathcal{T}_\iota = \mathbb{F}_2[X_0, \dots, X_{\iota-1}]/(X_0^2 + X_0 + 1, \dots, X_{\iota-1}^2 + X_{\iota-2} \cdot X_{\iota-1} + 1).$$

This identification respects the tower structure in the obvious way; indeed, $\mathcal{T}_{\iota-1} \subset \mathcal{T}_\iota$ is precisely the subring consisting of the equivalence classes of those polynomials in which only the variables $X_0, \dots, X_{\iota-2}$ appear.

It holds—say, by Gröbner basis considerations—that, for each $\iota \geq 0$, each equivalence class in \mathcal{T}_ι has a *unique* multilinear representative. We conclude that the set of monomials $1, X_0, X_1, X_0 \cdot X_1, \dots, X_0 \cdots X_{\iota-1}$ gives a basis of \mathcal{T}_ι as an \mathbb{F}_2 -vector space; we call this basis the *multilinear basis*. For each $v \in \mathcal{B}_\iota$, with boolean components $(v_0, \dots, v_{\iota-1})$, say, we write $\beta_v := \prod_{i=0}^{\iota-1} (v_i \cdot X_i + (1 - v_i))$; that is, β_v is that basis vector corresponding to the product of precisely those indeterminates among the list $X_0, \dots, X_{\iota-1}$ indexed by v 's components. Slightly abusing notation, we occasionally write $\beta_0, \dots, \beta_{2^\iota-1}$ for this latter basis; in other words, we define $\beta_{\{v\}} := \beta_v$, where we again identify $\{v\} = \sum_{i=0}^{\iota-1} 2^i \cdot v_i$. More generally, for each pair of integers $\iota \geq 0$ and $\kappa \geq 0$, the set $1, X_\iota, X_{\iota+1}, X_\iota \cdot X_{\iota+1}, \dots, X_\iota \cdots X_{\iota+\kappa-1}$ likewise gives a \mathcal{T}_ι -basis of $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}$; we again write $(\beta_v)_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\kappa}$ for this latter basis. That is, for each $v \in \mathcal{B}_\kappa$, we write $\beta_v := \prod_{i=0}^{\kappa-1} (v_i \cdot X_{\iota+i} + (1 - v_i))$.

We briefly survey the efficiency of tower-field arithmetic. In practice, we represent all \mathcal{T}_ι -elements in coordinates with respect to the multilinear \mathbb{F}_2 -basis, which we moreover sort in lexicographic order. In particular, each \mathcal{T}_ι -element α admits a length- 2^ι coordinate vector $(a_0, \dots, a_{2^\iota-1})$, with components in \mathbb{F}_2 ;

we note, in light of our lexicographic basis-ordering, that this vector’s 0th and 1st *halves* respectively define $\mathcal{T}_{\ell-1}$ -elements α_0 and α_1 for which $\alpha = \alpha_1 \cdot X_{\ell-1} + \alpha_0$ in fact holds.

Throughout, addition amounts to bitwise XOR. We multiply \mathcal{T}_ℓ -elements in the following way. To multiply the elements $\alpha_1 \cdot X_{\ell-1} + \alpha_0$ and $\alpha'_1 \cdot X_{\ell-1} + \alpha'_0$ of \mathcal{T}_ℓ , say, we first use the Karatsuba technique—that is, we use three recursive multiplications in $\mathcal{T}_{\ell-1}$ —to obtain the expression $\alpha_1 \cdot \alpha'_1 \cdot X_{\ell-1}^2 + (\alpha_0 \cdot \alpha'_1 + \alpha_1 \cdot \alpha'_0) \cdot X_{\ell-1} + \alpha_0 \cdot \alpha'_0$. We then reduce this latter polynomial by subtracting $\alpha_1 \cdot \alpha'_1 \cdot (X_{\ell-1}^2 + X_{\ell-2} \cdot X_{\ell-1} + 1)$ from it; this step itself entails computing the product $\alpha_1 \cdot \alpha'_1 \cdot X_{\ell-2}$ in $\mathcal{T}_{\ell-1}$.

It is shown by Fan and Paar [FP97, § III] that, in the Wiedemann tower, each such “constant multiplication”—that is, each multiplication of a \mathcal{T}_ℓ -element by the constant $X_{\ell-1}$ —can be carried out in *linear* time $\Theta(2^\ell)$. In light of this fact, and using the “master theorem” for recurrence relations (see e.g. Cormen, Leiserson, Rivest, and Stein [CLRS22, Thm. 4.1]), we conclude that this recursive, Karatsuba-based approach features complexity $\Theta(2^{\log 3 \cdot \ell})$ (we refer also to [FP97, § IV] for a thorough analysis).

We finally record a further key property, whereby field-elements may be multiplied by *subfield*-elements especially efficiently. In slightly more detail, the complexity of multiplying a \mathcal{T}_ℓ -element by a $\mathcal{T}_{\ell+\kappa}$ -element grows just linearly in the extension degree of $\mathcal{T}_{\ell+\kappa}$ over \mathcal{T}_ℓ . We express this precisely as follows. For each element $\alpha \in \mathcal{T}_{\ell+\kappa}$, with coordinate representation $(a_v)_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\kappa}$ with respect to the multilinear \mathcal{T}_ℓ -basis of $\mathcal{T}_{\ell+\kappa}$, say, and each scalar $b \in \mathcal{T}_\ell$, the representation of $b \cdot \alpha$ with respect to this basis is $(b \cdot a_v)_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\kappa}$. We conclude that the multiplication of a $\mathcal{T}_{\ell+\kappa}$ -element by a \mathcal{T}_ℓ -element can be carried out in $2^\kappa \cdot \Theta(2^{\log 3 \cdot \ell})$ time. This property—that is, that whereby elements of differently-sized fields can be efficiently multiplied—has been noted by previous authors; we refer for example to Bernstein and Chou [BC14, § 2.4].

Comparison with classical binary fields. We contrast this work’s tower-based approach with the classical, univariate treatment of binary fields. Informally, towers feature both *efficient embeddings* and *efficient small-by-large multiplications*; classical binary fields lack both of these properties. We record the details. For $f_\ell(X) \in \mathbb{F}_2[X]$ irreducible of degree 2^ℓ , the quotient ring $\mathbb{F}_2[X]/(f_\ell(X))$ is isomorphic to $\mathbb{F}_{2^{2^\ell}}$, and admits the \mathbb{F}_2 -basis $1, X, \dots, X^{2^\ell-1}$, which we call the (univariate) *monomial basis*. We again fix ℓ and κ in \mathbb{N} . Clearly, on the level of abstract fields, we have an embedding $\mathbb{F}_{2^{2^\ell}} \hookrightarrow \mathbb{F}_{2^{2^\ell+\kappa}}$ (in fact, we have 2^ℓ choices, by Galois-theoretic considerations). Identifying these objects with $\mathbb{F}_2^{2^\ell}$ and $\mathbb{F}_2^{2^\ell+\kappa}$, respectively—by means of their monomial bases—we obtain a mapping $\mathbb{F}_2^{2^\ell} \hookrightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{2^\ell+\kappa}$ of \mathbb{F}_2 -vector spaces. What is the bit-complexity of this mapping? When $\mathbb{F}_{2^{2^\ell}}$ and $\mathbb{F}_{2^{2^\ell+\kappa}}$ are constructed as univariate quotients, the answer is, “it’s complicated”. (Informally, given $a_0 + \dots + a_{2^\ell-1} \cdot X^{2^\ell-1}$, how do we determine the coefficients of its image in $\mathbb{F}_{2^{2^\ell+\kappa}}$?) Obviously, using binary matrix multiplication, we cannot do worse than $O(2^{2^\ell+\kappa})$ bit-operations. Given irreducible polynomials $f_\ell(X)$ and $f_{\ell+\kappa}(X)$ sufficiently carefully chosen, one may be able to do better; we refer to Bosma, Cannon and Steel [BCS97] for a thorough treatment of this issue.

In our tower setting, the embedding $\mathcal{T}_\ell \hookrightarrow \mathcal{T}_{\ell+\kappa}$ of fields again induces—via these fields’ respective *multilinear* bases—a mapping $\mathbb{F}_2^{2^\ell} \hookrightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{2^\ell+\kappa}$ of \mathbb{F}_2 -vector spaces. This latter mapping, on the other hand, is free! Indeed, it amounts to a trivial zero-padding operation.

A similar issue affects the multiplication of $\mathbb{F}_{2^{2^\ell+\kappa}}$ -elements by $\mathbb{F}_{2^{2^\ell}}$ -elements. Indeed, to multiply an element $\alpha \in \mathbb{F}_{2^{2^\ell+\kappa}}$ by $b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^{2^\ell}}$, say (and in fact, even to give sense to this operation), we could fix a *particular* embedding $\mathbb{F}_{2^{2^\ell}} \hookrightarrow \mathbb{F}_{2^{2^\ell+\kappa}}$, and multiply α by b ’s image under this embedding. The cost of this operation, however, would be—beyond that of embedding b —the same as that of a standard $\mathbb{F}_{2^{2^\ell+\kappa}}$ -multiplication; in other words, it would fail to exploit the fact that b comes from the subfield $\mathbb{F}_{2^{2^\ell}} \subset \mathbb{F}_{2^{2^\ell+\kappa}}$. Alternatively, we could pick an arbitrary $\mathbb{F}_{2^{2^\ell}}$ -basis of $\mathbb{F}_{2^{2^\ell+\kappa}}$, express $\alpha = (a_0, \dots, a_{2^\ell-1})$ in coordinates with respect to this basis, multiply α by b componentwise, and finally convert the result back, let’s say. This approach, however, would require two conversion operations, which could each cost as many as $\Omega(2^{2^\ell+\kappa})$ (i.e., quadratically many) $\mathbb{F}_{2^{2^\ell}}$ -operations in the worst case. In fact, our tower approach, arguably, begins with precisely the insight whereby, by representing $\mathbb{F}_{2^{2^\ell+\kappa}}$ -elements *continually* in coordinates with respect to some $\mathbb{F}_{2^{2^\ell}}$ -basis, we might avoid these conversions.

A family of bases at multiple scales. To illustrate this point, we fix quantities ℓ and κ as above, as well as an element $\alpha \in \mathcal{T}_{\ell+\kappa}$. Of course, $\alpha = (a_0, \dots, a_{2^\ell-1})$ admits some representation with respect to the multilinear \mathcal{T}_ℓ -basis of $\mathcal{T}_{\ell+\kappa}$; on the other hand, both \mathcal{T}_ℓ and $\mathcal{T}_{\ell+\kappa}$ have their *own* respective multilinear \mathbb{F}_2 -bases, so that both α and its components $(a_0, \dots, a_{2^\ell-1})$ in \mathcal{T}_ℓ have corresponding representations as

$2^{\ell+\kappa}$ -bit and 2^ℓ -bit strings (respectively). We phrase the key compatibility property at hand as follows. Indeed, the respective \mathbb{F}_2 -basis representations of α itself and of its components $(a_0, \dots, a_{2^\kappa-1})$ are related by concatenation, so that the equality $\alpha = a_0 \parallel \dots \parallel a_{2^\kappa-1}$ of $2^{\ell+\kappa}$ -bit strings holds (here, we interpret each symbol as a string of bits, using in each case the appropriate multilinear \mathbb{F}_2 -basis). In other words, we may express any $\alpha \in \mathcal{T}_{\ell+\kappa}$ —given by its \mathbb{F}_2 -coordinates—in coordinates with respect to $\mathcal{T}_{\ell+\kappa}$'s multilinear \mathcal{T}_ℓ -basis simply by splitting its coordinate representation into 2^ℓ -bit substrings (with no linear algebra or computation necessary).

3 Small-Field Polynomial Commitments

In this section, we introduce *small-field polynomial commitment schemes*, and moreover supply several instantiations based on binary tower fields. In Subsection 3.2 below, we define the basic cryptographic abstraction. We then instantiate this abstraction in two different ways. In Subsection 3.3 below, we outline a “simple” instantiation, suitable for polynomials whose coefficient field coincides with the alphabet of an available code. In Subsection 3.4 below, we introduce a further variant, designed to support the commitment of polynomials over fields *even smaller* than the alphabet of the code selected for use. Both schemes follow the Brakedown-inspired scheme of Diamond and Posen [DP23, § 4], with appropriate adaptations.

We are motivated in Subsection 3.4 by the goal of committing to polynomials over *very small fields* (like \mathbb{F}_2) while, simultaneously, making use of the Reed–Solomon code over *larger alphabets* (like $\mathbb{F}_{2^{16}}$). In Subsection 3.4, we attain this goal, in a way, no less, which imposes essentially no overhead beyond that inherent to, say, the commitment of an $\mathbb{F}_{2^{16}}$ -polynomial of equal size in bits. In other words, we pay only for the size, in bits, of our polynomial at hand, regardless of the size of its field of definition.

3.1 The Extension Code

Before proceeding, we pause to record a certain key coding-theoretic construction, which figures prominently in what follows. Informally, given some fixed code, with symbols in a field, our construction “lifts” the code to one with symbols in a vector space over that field. The resulting object inherits many of the same properties—most essentially, the distance—of the original code.

Definition 3.1. We fix a $[n, k, d]$ -code $C \subset K^n$, with generator matrix $M \in K^{n \times k}$, say, as well as a K -vector space V over K . The *extension code* $\widehat{C} \subset V^n$ of C is the image of the map $V^k \rightarrow V^n$ which sends $t \mapsto M \cdot t$.

In other words, the code $\widehat{C} \subset V^n$ simply reuses C 's generator matrix; we note that the action of a K -matrix on a V -vector is well-defined.

The object $\widehat{C} \subset V^n$ isn't, strictly speaking, a linear code; indeed, its symbols take values in V , which is *not* (in general) a field. On the other hand, \widehat{C} inherits C 's distance, as the following theorem shows:

Theorem 3.2. *The extension code $\widehat{C} \subset V^n$ has distance d .*

Proof. We write η for the dimension of V over K , and fix a K -basis $(\alpha_0, \dots, \alpha_{\eta-1})$ of V , as well as two unequal messages t_0 and t_1 in V^k . Expressing these messages' components in coordinates with respect to this basis, we obtain corresponding vectors $t_{0,h}$ and $t_{1,h}$, in K^k , for *each* index $h \in \{0, \dots, \eta - 1\}$. Our hypothesis $t_0 \neq t_1$ implies that, for at least one index $h^* \in \{0, \dots, \eta - 1\}$, the slices t_{0,h^*} and t_{1,h^*} are unequal as elements of K^k . Since \widehat{C} 's generator matrix consists of K -elements, the encodings $u_0 := \text{Enc}(t_0)$ and $u_1 := \text{Enc}(t_1)$ of t_0 and t_1 are themselves given, slice-wise, by the respective encodings of the slices $(t_{0,h})_{h=0}^{\eta-1}$ and $(t_{1,h})_{h=0}^{\eta-1}$. We conclude that the *slices* u_{0,h^*} and u_{1,h^*} , viewed as elements of K^n , differ at at least d positions, and thus finally that the elements u_0 and u_1 of V^n also do. We see that the distance of \widehat{C} is at least d . Conversely, we may easily construct unequal codewords in V^n of distance exactly d . Indeed, given unequal messages t_0 and t_1 in K^k whose encodings differ at exactly d positions, we embed both t_0 and t_1 componentwise into V along the basis vector α_0 . We see that the resulting messages' encodings u_0 and u_1 in V^n differ at exactly d positions; indeed, their discrepancies all arise from their respective 0th-indexed slices, since these codewords' positive-indexed slices are all identically zero. This completes the proof. \square

As V isn't necessarily itself a field, \widehat{C} 's “dimension” over V is of course not well-defined in general; we note, however, that $\widehat{C} \subset V^n$ is a V -linear $[n, k, d]$ -code whenever V/K is a degree- η field extension.

3.2 Definition of Small-Field Polynomial Commitment Schemes

We now define small-field polynomial commitment schemes, adapting the definitions [DP23, Defs. 4.1–4.3], which themselves closely follow Setty [Set20, § 2.4]. Our adaptation requires that each multilinear polynomial $t(X_0, \dots, X_{\ell-1})$ at hand reside in $K[X_0, \dots, X_{\ell-1}]$, for a user-specified field K , allowed to be arbitrarily small. On the other hand, we allow each evaluation query point $(r_0, \dots, r_{\ell-1}) \in L^\ell$, as well as each claimed evaluation result $s \in L$, to be defined over an extension L / K of K . Thus, in short, Definition 3.3 below furnishes a commitment scheme for polynomials over *small* fields, which can nonetheless be queried at points over *large* extension fields of the polynomial’s field of definition.

Definition 3.3. A *small-field multilinear polynomial commitment scheme* is a tuple of algorithms $\Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{Commit}, \text{Open}, \text{Prove}, \text{Verify})$, with the following syntax:

- $\text{params} \leftarrow \Pi.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \ell, K)$. On input the security parameter λ , a size parameter ℓ , and a field K , $\Pi.\text{Setup}$ samples params , which includes (possibly among other things) a field extension L / K .
- $(c, u) \leftarrow \Pi.\text{Commit}(\text{params}, t)$. On input a multilinear polynomial $t(X_0, \dots, X_{\ell-1}) \in K[X_0, \dots, X_{\ell-1}]^{\leq 1}$, $\Pi.\text{Commit}$ returns a commitment c to t , together with an *opening hint* u .
- $b \leftarrow \Pi.\text{Open}(\text{params}, c; t, u)$. On input a commitment c , a multilinear polynomial $t(X_0, \dots, X_{\ell-1}) \in K[X_0, \dots, X_{\ell-1}]^{\leq 1}$, and an opening hint u , $\Pi.\text{Open}$ verifies the claimed decommitment t of c , using u .
- $\pi \leftarrow \Pi.\text{Prove}(\text{params}, c, s, (r_0, \dots, r_{\ell-1}); t, u)$. On input a commitment c , a purported evaluation $s \in L$, an evaluation point $(r_0, \dots, r_{\ell-1}) \in L^\ell$, a multilinear polynomial $t(X_0, \dots, X_{\ell-1}) \in K[X_0, \dots, X_{\ell-1}]^{\leq 1}$, and an opening hint u , $\Pi.\text{Prove}$ generates an evaluation proof π .
- $b \leftarrow \Pi.\text{Verify}(\text{params}, c, s, (r_0, \dots, r_{\ell-1}), \pi)$. On input a commitment c , a purported evaluation s , an evaluation point $(r_0, \dots, r_{\ell-1}) \in L^\ell$, and a proof π , $\Pi.\text{Verify}$ outputs a success bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$.

We note that, for Π to be efficiently computable, it’s necessary that $\ell = O(\log \lambda)$, as well as that the sizes $\log(|K|)$ and $\log(|L|)$ grow at most polynomially in λ . We assume as much throughout what follows.

We define the security properties *binding* and *extractability*, for small-field multilinear polynomial commitment schemes, following [DP23, Def. 4.2] and [DP23, Def. 4.3], respectively, with various minor modifications.

Definition 3.4. For each small-field multilinear polynomial commitment scheme Π , size parameter ℓ , input field K , and PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , we define the *binding experiment* $\text{Binding}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\Pi, \ell, K}(\lambda)$ as follows:

1. The experimenter samples $\text{params} \leftarrow \Pi.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \ell, K)$, and gives params to \mathcal{A} .
2. The adversary outputs $(c, t_0, t_1, u_0, u_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{params})$, where c is a commitment, $t_0(X_0, \dots, X_{\ell-1})$ and $t_1(X_0, \dots, X_{\ell-1})$ are multilinear polynomials in $K[X_0, \dots, X_{\ell-1}]^{\leq 1}$, and u_0 and u_1 are opening hints.
3. The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if $t_0 \neq t_1$, $\Pi.\text{Open}(\text{params}, c; t_0, u_0)$, and $\Pi.\text{Open}(\text{params}, c; t_1, u_1)$ all hold; otherwise, it is defined to be 0.

The small-field multilinear polynomial commitment scheme Π is *binding* if, for each PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , there is a negligible function $\text{negl}(\lambda)$ for which, for each security parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ and each choice of ℓ and K , it holds that $\Pr[\text{Binding}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\Pi, \ell, K}(\lambda)] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

Definition 3.5. For each small-field multilinear polynomial commitment scheme Π , security parameter λ , values ℓ and K , PPT query sampler \mathcal{Q} , PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , expected PPT emulator \mathcal{E} , and PPT distinguisher \mathcal{D} , we define two random variables $\text{Real}_{\mathcal{Q}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D}}^{\Pi, \ell, K}(\lambda)$ and $\text{Emul}_{\mathcal{Q}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D}}^{\Pi, \ell, K}(\lambda)$, each valued in $\{0, 1\}$, as follows:

1. The experimenter samples $\text{params} \leftarrow \Pi.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \ell, K)$, and gives params to \mathcal{A} , \mathcal{Q} and \mathcal{E} .
2. The adversary outputs a commitment $c \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{params})$.
3. The query sampler outputs $(r_0, \dots, r_{\ell-1}) \leftarrow \mathcal{Q}(\text{params})$.
4. The experimenter proceeds in one of two separate ways:

- $\text{Real}_{\mathcal{Q}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D}}^{\Pi, \ell, K}(\lambda)$: Run $(s, \pi) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(r_0, \dots, r_{\ell-1})$. Output the single bit $\mathcal{D}(c, s, \pi)$.
- $\text{Emul}_{\mathcal{Q}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D}}^{\Pi, \ell, K}(\lambda)$: Run $(s, \pi; t, u) \leftarrow \mathcal{E}^{\mathcal{A}}(r_0, \dots, r_{\ell-1})$. Output the single bit $\mathcal{D}(c, s, \pi) \wedge (\text{II.Verify}(\text{params}, c, s, (r_0, \dots, r_{\ell-1}), \pi) \implies (\text{II.Open}(\text{params}, c; t, u) \wedge t(r_0, \dots, r_{\ell-1}) = s))$.

The small-field multilinear polynomial commitment scheme Π is *extractable* with respect to the query sampler \mathcal{Q} if, for each PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , there is an expected PPT emulator \mathcal{E} such that, for each PPT distinguisher \mathcal{D} , the distributions $\left\{ \text{Real}_{\mathcal{Q}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D}}^{\Pi, \ell, K}(\lambda) \right\}_{(\ell, K), \lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ and $\left\{ \text{Emul}_{\mathcal{Q}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D}}^{\Pi, \ell, K}(\lambda) \right\}_{(\ell, K), \lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ are statistically close.

We note that, critically, the polynomial $t(X_0, \dots, X_{\ell-1})$ extracted by \mathcal{E} must reside in $K[X_0, \dots, X_{\ell-1}]$, by definition of II.Open .

The following definition is analogous to [DP23, Def. 4.4]; we refer to [DP23, Rem. 4.5] for further discussion of this definition.

Definition 3.6. The query sampler \mathcal{Q} is *admissible* if, for each λ, ℓ and K , and each parameter set $\text{params} \leftarrow \text{II.Setup}(1^\lambda, \ell, K)$, containing L/K , say, the evaluation point $(r_0, \dots, r_{\ell-1}) \leftarrow \mathcal{Q}(\text{params})$ is uniform over L^ℓ .

3.3 Basic Small-Field Construction

We now give our simple small-field construction. This construction generalizes [DP23, Cons. 4.6], so as to make that scheme instantiate the small-field abstraction of Definition 3.3. In our generalization, we allow the polynomial's coefficient field and the code's alphabet to be small, though we require that these fields be equal to *each other* (cf. Subsection 3.4 below). We obtain security by the means of a cryptographically sized field extension. Our construction closely follows [DP23, Cons. 4.6], making only minor modifications throughout.

Construction 3.7 (Simple small-field polynomial commitment scheme).

We define $\Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{Commit}, \text{Open}, \text{Prove}, \text{Verify})$ as follows.

- $\text{params} \leftarrow \text{II.Setup}(1^\lambda, \ell, K)$. On input $1^\lambda, \ell$, and K , choose integers ℓ_0 and ℓ_1 for which $\ell_0 + \ell_1 = \ell$, and write $m_0 := 2^{\ell_0}$ and $m_1 := 2^{\ell_1}$. Return an extension field L/K for which $|L| \geq 2^{\omega(\log \lambda)}$, an $[n, m_1, d]$ -code $C \subset K^n$ for which $n = 2^{O(\ell)}$ and $d = \Omega(n)$, and a repetition parameter $\rho = \Theta(\lambda)$.
- $(c, u) \leftarrow \text{II.Commit}(\text{params}, t)$. On input $t(X_0, \dots, X_{\ell-1}) \in K[X_0, \dots, X_{\ell-1}]^{\leq 1}$, express $t = (t_0, \dots, t_{2^\ell-1})$ in coordinates with respect to the Lagrange basis on $\{0, 1\}^\ell$, collate the resulting vector into an $m_0 \times m_1$ matrix $(t_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$, and encode $(t_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ row-wise, so obtaining a further matrix $(u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$. Output a Merkle commitment c to $(u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ and the opening hint $u := (u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$.
- $b \leftarrow \text{II.Open}(\text{params}, c; t, u)$. On input $t(X_0, \dots, X_{\ell-1}) \in K[X_0, \dots, X_{\ell-1}]^{\leq 1}$, opening hint $(u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$, and commitment c , verify that $(u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ Merkle-hashes to c . Collate t into a matrix $(t_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$, encode the resulting matrix row-wise, and verify that $d^{m_0} \left((\text{Enc}(t_i))_{i=0}^{m_0-1}, (u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1} \right) \stackrel{?}{<} \frac{d}{3}$.

We define II.Prove and II.Verify by applying the Fiat–Shamir heuristic to the following interactive protocol, where \mathcal{P} has $t(X_0, \dots, X_{\ell-1})$ and $(u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$, and \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} have $c, s \in L$, and $(r_0, \dots, r_{\ell-1}) \in L^\ell$.

- \mathcal{P} sends \mathcal{V} the matrix–vector product $t' := \bigotimes_{i=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1 - r_i, r_i) \cdot (t_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ in the clear.
- For each $i \in \{0, \dots, \rho - 1\}$, \mathcal{V} samples $j_i \leftarrow \{0, \dots, n - 1\}$. \mathcal{V} sends \mathcal{P} the set $J := \{j_0, \dots, j_{\rho-1}\}$.
- \mathcal{P} sends \mathcal{V} the columns $\left\{ (u_{i,j})_{i=0}^{m_0-1} \right\}_{j \in J}$, each featuring an accompanying Merkle path against c .
- \mathcal{V} computes $\widehat{\text{Enc}}(t')$. For each $j \in J$, \mathcal{V} verifies the Merkle path attesting to $(u_{i,j})_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$, and moreover checks $\bigotimes_{i=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1 - r_i, r_i) \cdot (u_{i,j})_{i=0}^{m_0-1} \stackrel{?}{=} \widehat{\text{Enc}}(t')_j$. Finally, \mathcal{V} requires $s \stackrel{?}{=} t' \cdot \bigotimes_{i=0}^{\ell_1-1} (1 - r_i, r_i)$.

In the last step, we write $\widehat{\text{Enc}}$ for the encoding function of the extension code $\widehat{C} \subset L^n$ (see Subsection 3.1).

Though Construction 3.7 is both binding and extractable, we refrain from proving as much; instead, we defer our proofs of security to Subsection 3.4 below. The proof of security of Construction 3.7 above can be obtained by specializing that subsection’s scheme’s proof to the case $\kappa := 0$.

3.4 Block-Level Encoding

In this subsection, we describe a further variant of the polynomial commitment scheme given in Subsection 3.3 above, suitable for polynomials over fields *smaller* than the alphabet of the linear block code selected for use. We refer throughout to Guruswami [Gur06].

The simple scheme given in Construction 3.7 mandates the internal use of a code $C \subset K^n$ over *the same* field K as that passed into $\Pi.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \ell, K)$. In other words, it requires that $\Pi.\text{Setup}$ return a code V whose alphabet K is *identical to* the coefficient field K of the commitment scheme’s message space $K[X_0, \dots, X_{\ell-1}]^{\leq 1}$. This restriction presents no obstacle in theory, since constant-distance, constant-rate families of codes exist even over arbitrarily small, fixed-size fields (this fact follows from the Gilbert–Varshamov bound; see [Gur06, § 2.1]). Moreover, concretely good codes over small alphabets may be obtained constructively using *concatenated codes* (see [Gur06, § 2.3]).

On the other hand, this restriction precludes the use of “plain” Reed–Solomon codes in Construction 3.7, at least for certain combinations ℓ and K ; indeed, a Reed–Solomon $[n, k, d]$ -code over K can exist only when $|K| \geq n$. Reed–Solomon codes remain attractive, however, for various practical reasons. They attain the Singleton bound, and so maximally favorably negotiate the tension between distance and rate. Separately, they admit efficient encoding algorithms. Specifically, each code $\text{RS}_{K,S}[n, k]$ ’s encoding function $K^k \rightarrow K^n$ may be computed in $\Theta(n \cdot \log k)$ time, at least for certain alphabets K and evaluation sets $S \subset K$. Crucially, we may number among these favorable alphabets the fields K of characteristic 2, due to relatively recent work of Lin, Chung and Han [LCH14] (in that work, the evaluation sets $S \subset K$ are certain \mathbb{F}_2 -affine linear subspaces of K). We specialize from this point onwards to the binary tower setting (see Subsection 2.3).

Concatenated codes. In order to develop certain intuitions essential to our packing scheme, we first examine the effect of instantiating Construction 3.7, as written, on a concatenated code. A *concatenated code* $C \subset \mathcal{T}_\nu^n$ is defined in terms of an *outer* $[n_{\text{out}}, k_{\text{out}}, d_{\text{out}}]$ -code $C_{\text{out}} \subset \mathcal{T}_{\nu+\kappa}^{n_{\text{out}}}$, say, where $\kappa \in \mathbb{N}$, and an *inner* $[n_{\text{in}}, k_{\text{in}}, d_{\text{in}}]$ -code $C_{\text{in}} \subset \mathcal{T}_\nu^{n_{\text{in}}}$, where here we require $k_{\text{in}} = 2^\kappa$. The resulting concatenated code is an $[n, k, d]$ -code over $C \subset \mathcal{T}_\nu^n$, where here we write $n := n_{\text{out}} \cdot n_{\text{in}}$, $k := k_{\text{out}} \cdot k_{\text{in}}$, and $d := d_{\text{out}} \cdot d_{\text{in}}$ (we refer to [Gur06, § 2.3] for further details). For example, upon concatenating the *outer* $[2^{15}, 2^{14}, 2^{14} + 1]$ -code $\text{RS}_{\mathcal{T}_4}[2^{15}, 2^{14}]$ over \mathcal{T}_4 with the *inner* $[2^5, 2^4, 2^3]$ -code $\text{RM}_{\mathcal{T}_0}[2, 5]$ over \mathcal{T}_0 , we would obtain a $[2^{20}, 2^{18}, 2^{17} + 2^3]$ -code over \mathcal{T}_0 (here, $\text{RM}_{\mathcal{T}_0}[2, 5]$ denotes a *Reed–Muller code*).

The concatenated code construction requires that the inner code’s message space coincide with the outer code’s alphabet. On the other hand, above, we leverage the natural identification $\mathcal{T}_\nu^{2^\kappa} \cong \mathcal{T}_{\nu+\kappa}$ of \mathcal{T}_ν -vector spaces (see Subsection 2.3). In different words, we may interpret *blocks* of adjacent tower-field elements as *elements* of a larger tower field. That is, given integers ν and κ in \mathbb{N} , we may “pack” each block of 2^κ \mathcal{T}_ν -elements into a single $\mathcal{T}_{\nu+\kappa}$ -element.

We recall that the concatenated code $C \subset \mathcal{T}_\nu^n$ ’s encoding procedure entails the following steps:

- *pack* the initial message in \mathcal{T}_ν^k into a vector in $\mathcal{T}_{\nu+\kappa}^{k_{\text{out}}}$,
- *encode* the resulting vector using the outer code C_{out} ’s encoder, so obtaining a codeword in $\mathcal{T}_{\nu+\kappa}^{n_{\text{out}}}$,
- *unpack* each individual symbol of the resulting codeword into a message, in $\mathcal{T}_\nu^{k_{\text{in}}}$, and finally
- *encode* each such message, using the inner code C_{in} , into a codeword in $\mathcal{T}_\nu^{n_{\text{in}}}$, and concatenate them.

Construction 3.7, upon being instantiated with a concatenated code $C \subset \mathcal{T}_\nu^n$, and with the extension field $\mathcal{T}_\tau / \mathcal{T}_\nu$, say, would stipulate that the verifier perform the encoding operation attached to the corresponding extension code $\widehat{C} \subset \mathcal{T}_\tau^n$. This code is clearly well-defined (we recall Subsection 3.1); on the other hand, its encoding procedure is significantly more complicated than C ’s is. We have already discussed above how one might pack blocks of 2^κ \mathcal{T}_ν -elements into $\mathcal{T}_{\nu+\kappa}$ -elements; in contrast, the corresponding packing operation on blocks of 2^κ \mathcal{T}_τ -elements is more subtle.

The subtlety arises from the interplay of the three fields \mathcal{T}_ℓ , $\mathcal{T}_{\ell+\kappa}$, and \mathcal{T}_τ . In a sense, the packing operation operates over a different “dimension” than does the field extension $\mathcal{T}_\tau / \mathcal{T}_\ell$; that is, it acts *across* \mathcal{T}_ℓ -elements, instead of extending them. For the sake of intuition, we suggest imagining the parameterization $\ell := 0$, $\kappa := 4$, and $\tau := 7$, as well as the concatenated code sketched above, throughout what follows.

Sketch of our approach. We explain the encoding procedure of a concatenated code’s *extended code* in the following way. We define a certain data structure, which “packs” a number of \mathcal{T}_ℓ -elements into a rectangular array. This data structure is depicted in Figure 1 below.




Figure 1: A depiction of our “tower algebra” data structure.

Figure 1 depicts an array of $2^{\tau-\ell}$ rows and 2^κ columns (where, again, each cell is a \mathcal{T}_ℓ -element). The *extended* concatenated code’s encoding procedure stipulates that we first pack each block of 2^κ consecutive \mathcal{T}_τ -elements into exactly such an array, that we then apply the outer code—whose alphabet is $\mathcal{T}_{\ell+\kappa}$ —row-wise, and that, finally, we then apply the inner code, again row-wise, to each resulting array.

In pursuit of an even simpler construction, we simply omit the inner code—equivalently, we use the *identity* inner code—and use the Reed–Solomon outer code. Were we to apply Construction 3.7 naïvely to this latter code, we would encounter a relatively inefficient verifier; indeed, this particular concatenated code features a relative distance k_{in} -fold *worse* than the simple Reed–Solomon code’s. Instead, though we *do* omit the inner code, we compensate by decreeing that the verifier test entire packed *blocks* of the prover’s committed matrix, instead of testing individual columns. Crucially, we no longer view our code’s encoding procedure as a \mathcal{T}_ℓ -linear one; rather, our code’s “symbols” are, now, packed vectors of \mathcal{T}_ℓ -elements. To resuscitate our security analysis—which itself depends fundamentally on the *proximity gap* phenomenon exhibited by error-correcting codes—we must investigate in what sense the rows of our committed matrix are, in fact, codewords of *some different code*. As it turns out, the array of Figure 1 can be endowed with a certain algebraic structure—which we describe thoroughly throughout what follows—which, serving in the capacity of the alphabet of a certain extension code, makes possible our adaptation of [DP23]’s security analysis.

Interestingly, our block-level testing scheme achieves a proof size profile close to that which Construction 3.7 can attain even on a nontrivial concatenated code. (Comparing these approaches is of course difficult—and in the limit, impossible—since the latter approach mandates the selection of an ad-hoc inner code for each statement size. We opt simply to select the highest-distance known inner code for each statement size we benchmark, and to avoid asymptotic comparisons.) At the same time, it’s significantly simpler, as well as more efficient for the prover. These observations affirm our contention that, taken in full, this section’s construction represents a compelling tradeoff. Indeed, we seek first of all to deliver a highly efficient prover; on the other hand, this measure imposes only a limited cost on the verifier. We thoroughly benchmark these schemes’ proof sizes in Table 1 below.

The tower algebra. We discuss, first informally and then precisely, two *distinct* multiplication operations, defined on $2^{\tau-\iota} \times 2^\kappa$ -sized arrays over \mathcal{T}_ι like that in Figure 1. To multiply the entire array by a \mathcal{T}_ι -element, we may simply proceed cell-wise. We may moreover coherently define multiplication operations involving elements of certain larger fields. For example, to multiply the entire array by a \mathcal{T}_τ -element $r \in \mathcal{T}_\tau$, we may interpret the array’s *columns* as \mathcal{T}_τ -elements—respectively called $\gamma_0, \dots, \gamma_{2^\kappa-1}$, say—and overwrite $\gamma_i \times = r$ for each column index $i \in \{0, \dots, 2^\kappa - 1\}$. On the other hand, we may moreover interpret each of the array’s *rows* as a $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}$ -element. We thus further define multiplication by $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}$ -elements; that is, to multiply the entire matrix by an element $s \in \mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}$, we interpret the array’s *rows* as $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}$ -elements—called $(\zeta_0, \dots, \zeta_{2^{\tau-\iota}-1})$, say—and overwrite $\zeta_i \times = s$ for each $i \in \{0, \dots, 2^{\tau-\iota} - 1\}$.

This “dual view” of the array—that is, *either* as an array of 2^κ \mathcal{T}_τ -elements, with a \mathcal{T}_τ -vector space structure *or* as an array of $2^{\tau-\iota}$ $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}$ -elements, with a $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}$ -vector space structure—will prove crucial throughout our exposition of the packing scheme. Essentially, our packing scheme entails packing \mathcal{T}_ι -elements “horizontally”, into $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}$ -elements, in order to encode them; in order to obtain cryptographic security, on the other hand, we moreover extend them “vertically”, into \mathcal{T}_τ -elements.

To make precise our packing scheme, we introduce a certain polynomial ring.

Definition 3.8. For parameters ι, κ , and τ in \mathbb{N} , where $\tau \geq \iota$, we define the *tower algebra* $A_{\iota, \kappa, \tau}$ as:

$$A_{\iota, \kappa, \tau} := \mathcal{T}_\tau[Y_0, \dots, Y_{\kappa-1}] / (Y_0^2 + X_{\iota-1} \cdot Y_0 + 1, Y_1^2 + Y_0 \cdot Y_1 + 1, \dots, Y_{\kappa-1}^2 + Y_{\kappa-2} \cdot Y_{\kappa-1} + 1),$$

where we understand $X_{\iota-1}$ as a \mathcal{T}_τ -element (and slightly abuse notation by letting $X_{-1} := 1$ in case $\iota = 0$).

We note that $A_{\iota, \kappa, \tau}$ admits a natural description as a 2^κ -dimensional vector space over \mathcal{T}_τ , via the basis $1, Y_0, Y_1, Y_0 \cdot Y_1, \dots, Y_0 \cdots Y_{\kappa-1}$ (cf. the \mathcal{T}_ι -basis $(\beta_v)_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\kappa}$ of $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}$ from Subsection 2.3). This basis gives rise to an isomorphism $a_{\iota, \kappa, \tau} : \mathcal{T}_\tau^{2^\kappa} \rightarrow A_{\iota, \kappa, \tau}$ of \mathcal{T}_τ -vector spaces, which we call the *natural embedding*. The restriction of this embedding to its domain’s 0th factor $\mathcal{T}_\tau \subset \mathcal{T}_\tau^{2^\kappa}$ maps \mathcal{T}_τ isomorphically to the subring $A_{\iota, 0, \tau} \subset A_{\iota, \kappa, \tau}$ consisting of the *constant* polynomials in the indeterminates $Y_0, \dots, Y_{\kappa-1}$.

We understand the tower algebra in the following way. The formal variables $Y_0, \dots, Y_{\kappa-1}$ define “synthetic analogues” of the variables $X_\iota, \dots, X_{\iota+\kappa-1}$, which would—upon being adjoined to \mathcal{T}_ι —yield the field extension $\mathcal{T}_\iota \subset \mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}$; moreover, these synthetic variables are designed to behave like their genuine analogues (by means of the relations defining $A_{\iota, \kappa, \tau}$). In fact, this design gives rise to a certain key property of the tower algebra, whereby the subring $A_{\iota, \kappa, \iota} \subset A_{\iota, \kappa, \tau}$ consisting of those polynomials whose coefficients reside exclusively in the *subfield* $\mathcal{T}_\iota \subset \mathcal{T}_\tau$ is precisely $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}$. We restate this essential property as follows:

Theorem 3.9. *The restriction $a_{\iota, \kappa, \tau}|_{\mathcal{T}_\tau^{2^\kappa}} : \mathcal{T}_\tau^{2^\kappa} \rightarrow A_{\iota, \kappa, \tau}$ of the natural embedding to the subset $\mathcal{T}_\tau^{2^\kappa} \subset \mathcal{T}_\tau^{2^\kappa}$ is an injection of \mathcal{T}_ι -vector spaces, whose image, the subring $A_{\iota, \kappa, \iota} \subset A_{\iota, \kappa, \tau}$, is isomorphic as a ring to $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}$.*

Proof. Indeed, the subring $A_{\iota, \kappa, \iota} \subset A_{\iota, \kappa, \tau}$ is easily seen to be identical to $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}$, albeit with the variables $X_\iota, \dots, X_{\iota+\kappa-1}$ respectively renamed to $Y_0, \dots, Y_{\kappa-1}$. \square

We implicitly, and unambiguously, understand $A_{\iota, \kappa, \tau}$ as a \mathcal{T}_ι -vector space in the first part of the statement of Theorem 3.9; indeed, this action arises from the subring $\mathcal{T}_\iota \subset A_{\iota, \kappa, \tau}$ consisting of those *constant* polynomials in the indeterminates $Y_0, \dots, Y_{\kappa-1}$ whose constant—i.e., only—term resides in the subfield $\mathcal{T}_\iota \subset \mathcal{T}_\tau$.

On the other hand, Theorem 3.9 shows that, over certain fields strictly larger than \mathcal{T}_ι , the ring $A_{\iota, \kappa, \tau}$ admits multiple—and incompatible—vector space structures, a fact which we now take pains to explain carefully. Of course, $A_{\iota, \kappa, \tau}$ has an obvious \mathcal{T}_τ -action—already noted above—coming from the subring $\mathcal{T}_\tau \cong A_{\iota, 0, \tau} \subset A_{\iota, \kappa, \tau}$ consisting of *constant* polynomials in the indeterminates $Y_0, \dots, Y_{\kappa-1}$. To distinguish this subring from Theorem 3.9’s, we call it the *constant subring* throughout what follows. On the other hand, Theorem 3.9 further realizes the field $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa} \cong A_{\iota, \kappa, \iota} \subset A_{\iota, \kappa, \tau}$ as the subring consisting of those *arbitrary-degree* polynomials in the indeterminates $Y_0, \dots, Y_{\kappa-1}$ whose coefficients, on the other hand, reside in $\mathcal{T}_\iota \subset \mathcal{T}_\tau$. We refer to Theorem 3.9’s subring, throughout what follows, as the *synthetic subring*. We take care below, whenever we understand $A_{\iota, \kappa, \tau}$ as an algebra or as a vector space, to carefully specify the particular field, and the particular vector space structure, that we intend. As a rule, whenever we speak of $A_{\iota, \kappa, \tau}$ as a \mathcal{T}_τ -algebra, we understand the *constant subring*; whenever we speak of it as a $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}$ -algebra, we understand the *synthetic subring*. (The constant and synthetic subrings appear in Figure 1 as the vertical and horizontal shaded regions, respectively.)

We write $(\beta_v)_{v \in \mathcal{B}_{\tau-\iota}}$ for the multilinear \mathcal{T}_ι -basis of \mathcal{T}_τ (i.e., for the basis $1, X_\iota, X_{\iota+1}, X_\iota \cdot X_{\iota+1}, \dots, X_\iota \cdots X_{\tau-1}$; we refer again to Subsection 2.3). We finally note that $(\beta_v)_{v \in \mathcal{B}_{\tau-\iota}}$ *simultaneously* yields a $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}$ -basis of $A_{\iota,\kappa,\tau}$ —where we of course endow the latter ring with the synthetic $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}$ -vector space structure—provided that we identify each $\beta_v \in \mathcal{T}_\tau$ with the *constant* polynomial β_v in the indeterminates $Y_0, \dots, Y_{\kappa-1}$.

For each ι, κ , and τ in \mathbb{N} , each tower algebra $A_{\iota,\kappa,\tau}$, and each standard $[n, k, d]$ -code $C \subset \mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}^n$ over the alphabet $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}$, we recall the *extension code* construction of Definition 3.1. That is, in view of the *synthetic* $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}$ -vector space structure—i.e., that of Theorem 3.9—on $A_{\iota,\kappa,\tau}$, C 's generator matrix induces a map $\widehat{\text{Enc}} : A_{\iota,\kappa,\tau}^k \rightarrow A_{\iota,\kappa,\tau}^n$ of $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}$ -vector spaces; we write $\widehat{C} \subset A_{\iota,\kappa,\tau}^n$ for this map's image. (Equivalently, we may simply embed C 's generator matrix entry-wise along the subring $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa} \subset A_{\iota,\kappa,\tau}$ of Theorem 3.9, and view it as an $A_{\iota,\kappa,\tau}$ -matrix.) It is shown in Theorem 3.2 above that $\widehat{C} \subset A_{\iota,\kappa,\tau}^n$ has distance d .

Importantly, we note that $\widehat{\text{Enc}}$ is *simultaneously* \mathcal{T}_τ -linear, where now we understand both $A_{\iota,\kappa,\tau}^k$ and $A_{\iota,\kappa,\tau}^n$ as \mathcal{T}_τ -vector spaces (via the *constant embedding* on each factor). To show this, we observe first that $\widehat{\text{Enc}}$ amounts to a matrix–vector product over the ring $A_{\iota,\kappa,\tau}$ (where we again synthetically embed $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa} \subset A_{\iota,\kappa,\tau}$). On the other hand, any \mathcal{T}_τ -linear combination of $A_{\iota,\kappa,\tau}^k$ -vectors can itself be expressed as a scalar–vector combination over the ring $A_{\iota,\kappa,\tau}$ (where we now embed $\mathcal{T}_\tau \subset A_{\iota,\kappa,\tau}$). The \mathcal{T}_τ -linearity of $\widehat{\text{Enc}}$ thus amounts to a distributive matrix identity over $A_{\iota,\kappa,\tau}$; on the other hand, matrix multiplication is certainly distributive for arbitrary commutative rings.

We finally prepare the ground for our packing construction by recording a *proximity gap* result—that is, an analogue of [DP23, Thm. 3.1]—for tower algebras. In the below theorem, we give meaning to the row-combination $\bigotimes_{i=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1 - r_i, r_i) \cdot (u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ by means of the *constant* \mathcal{T}_τ -vector space structure on $A_{\iota,\kappa,\tau}$. The key difference between [DP23, Thm. 3.1] and Theorem 3.10 below, then, is that the code at hand has symbols in the \mathcal{T}_τ -vector space $A_{\iota,\kappa,\tau}$, though the combination vector $\bigotimes_{i=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1 - r_i, r_i)$ nonetheless still has entries in the ground field \mathcal{T}_τ .

Theorem 3.10 (Diamond–Posen [DP23, Thm. 3.1]). *Fix an arbitrary $[n, k, d]$ -code $C \subset \mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}^n$, with extended code $\widehat{C} \subset A_{\iota,\kappa,\tau}^n$, and a proximity parameter $e \in \{1, \dots, \lfloor \frac{d-1}{3} \rfloor\}$. If elements u_0, \dots, u_{m_0-1} of $A_{\iota,\kappa,\tau}^n$ satisfy*

$$\Pr_{(r_{\ell_1}, \dots, r_{\ell-1}) \in \mathcal{T}_\tau^{\ell_0}} \left[d \left(\left[\bigotimes_{i=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1 - r_i, r_i) \right] \cdot \begin{bmatrix} - & u_0 & - \\ & \dots & \\ - & u_{m_0-1} & - \end{bmatrix}, \widehat{C} \right) \leq e \right] > 2 \cdot \log m_0 \cdot \frac{e}{|\mathcal{T}_\tau|},$$

then $d^{m_0} \left((u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}, \widehat{C}^{m_0} \right) \leq e$.

Proof. The proof goes through almost exactly as does that of [DP23, Thm. 3.1], with select modifications. Indeed, we require only a substitute for the Schwartz–Zippel-based argument given in [DP23, Lem. 3.4]. In our setting, each locus $C_{b,j} \subset \mathcal{T}_\tau^{\ell_0-1}$ is, now, the vanishing locus in $\mathcal{T}_\tau^{\ell_0-1}$ of a certain polynomial expression in the variables $(r_{\ell_1}, \dots, r_{\ell-1})$, whose *coefficients*, on the other hand, *reside in* $A_{\iota,\kappa,\tau}$ (and moreover are not all zero). Decomposing each such coefficient into a 2^κ -tuple of \mathcal{T}_τ -elements, using the natural \mathcal{T}_τ -basis $1, Y_0, Y_1, \dots, Y_0 \cdots Y_{\kappa-1}$ of $A_{\iota,\kappa,\tau}$, we see that the vanishing locus $C_{b,j}$ is the *intersection* in $\mathcal{T}_\tau^{\ell_0-1}$ of 2^κ vanishing loci, each itself the vanishing locus of a certain combination of the $\ell_0 - 1$ -variate, multilinear Lagrange basis polynomials in the standard polynomial ring $\mathcal{T}_\tau[R_{\ell_1}, \dots, R_{\ell-2}]$. Moreover, *at least one* among these latter combinations features a nonzero combination vector. Applying Schwartz–Zippel to all 2^κ loci, then, we see that at least one among these loci is bounded from above in mass by $(\ell_0 - 1) \cdot \frac{e}{|\mathcal{T}_\tau|}$, so that their intersection also is. This completes the argument that $\mu(C_{b,j}) \leq \frac{\ell_0-1}{|\mathcal{T}_\tau|}$. We note that an identical adaptation, in the univariate setting, must also be made to the proof of [DP23, Thm. 2.1]. Up to these adjustments, the proof of [DP23, Thm. 3.1] otherwise goes through in our setting without change. \square

Our construction. We now define our packing-based construction, which adapts and extends Construction 3.7 above. Slightly restricting that construction's signature, we require that K take the form \mathcal{T}_ι , for some ι (and that II.Setup directly accept the parameter ι , instead of K).

Construction 3.11 (Block-level encoding-based polynomial commitment scheme).

We define $\Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{Commit}, \text{Open}, \text{Prove}, \text{Verify})$ as follows.

- $\text{params} \leftarrow \Pi.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \ell, \iota)$. On input 1^λ , ℓ , and ι , choose integers ℓ_0 and ℓ_1 for which $\ell_0 + \ell_1 = \ell$, and write $m_0 := 2^{\ell_0}$ and $m_1 := 2^{\ell_1}$. Return an integer $\kappa \geq 0$, a tower height $\tau \geq \log(\omega(\log \lambda))$, an $[n, \frac{m_1}{2^\kappa}, d]$ -code $C \subset \mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}^n$ for which $n = 2^{O(\ell)}$ and $d = \Omega(n)$, and a repetition parameter $\rho = \Theta(\lambda)$.
- $(c, u) \leftarrow \Pi.\text{Commit}(\text{params}, t)$. On input $t(X_0, \dots, X_{\ell-1}) \in \mathcal{T}_\iota[X_0, \dots, X_{\ell-1}]^{\leq 1}$, express $t = (t_0, \dots, t_{2^\ell-1})$ in coordinates with respect to the multilinear Lagrange basis and collate the result row-wise into an $m_0 \times m_1$ matrix $(t_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$. By grouping the column indices $\{0, \dots, m_1 - 1\}$ into 2^κ -sized chunks and, for each row, applying the natural embedding chunk-wise, realize $(t_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ as an $m_0 \times \frac{m_1}{2^\kappa}$ matrix, with entries in $A_{\iota, \kappa, \iota} \subset A_{\iota, \kappa, \tau}$. Apply \widehat{C} 's encoding function row-wise to each of $(t_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$'s rows, so obtaining a further, $m_0 \times n$ matrix $(u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$, again with entries in $A_{\iota, \kappa, \iota} \subset A_{\iota, \kappa, \tau}$. Output a Merkle commitment c to $(u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ and the opening hint $u := (u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$.
- $b \leftarrow \Pi.\text{Open}(\text{params}, c; t, u)$. On input $t(X_0, \dots, X_{\ell-1}) \in \mathcal{T}_\iota[X_0, \dots, X_{\ell-1}]^{\leq 1}$, opening hint $(u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$, and commitment c , verify that $(u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ Merkle-hashes to c . Collate t into a matrix $(t_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$, encode the resulting matrix as above, and verify that $d^{m_0} \left((\text{Enc}(t_i))_{i=0}^{m_0-1}, (u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1} \right) \stackrel{?}{<} \frac{d}{3}$.

We define $\Pi.\text{Prove}$ and $\Pi.\text{Verify}$ by applying the Fiat–Shamir heuristic to the following interactive protocol, where \mathcal{P} has $t(X_0, \dots, X_{\ell-1})$ and $(u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$, and \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} have c , s , and $(r_0, \dots, r_{\ell-1}) \in \mathcal{T}_\tau^\ell$.

- \mathcal{P} computes the matrix–vector product $t' := \bigotimes_{i=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1 - r_i, r_i) \cdot (t_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$, here interpreting the matrix $(t_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ as an unpacked, $m_0 \times m_1$ matrix with entries in \mathcal{T}_ι . \mathcal{P} sends \mathcal{V} t' in the clear.
- For each $i \in \{0, \dots, \rho - 1\}$, \mathcal{V} samples $j_i \leftarrow \{0, \dots, n - 1\}$. \mathcal{V} sends \mathcal{P} the set $J := \{j_0, \dots, j_{\rho-1}\}$.
- For each $j \in J$, \mathcal{P} sends \mathcal{V} the column $(u_{i,j})_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$, interpreted as a vector with entries in the subring $A_{\iota, \kappa, \iota} \subset A_{\iota, \kappa, \tau}$, as well as an accompanying Merkle authentication path against c .
- First, \mathcal{V} requires $s \stackrel{?}{=} t' \cdot \bigotimes_{i=0}^{\ell_1-1} (1 - r_i, r_i)$ (i.e., a simple dot-product over \mathcal{T}_τ). \mathcal{V} then applies the *natural embedding* to the \mathcal{T}_τ -vector t' , chunk-wise, so realizing it as a length- $\frac{m_1}{2^\kappa}$ vector with entries in $A_{\iota, \kappa, \tau}$, and finally encodes this latter vector, writing $u' := \widehat{\text{Enc}}(t')$, say. For each $j \in J$, \mathcal{V} verifies the Merkle path attesting to $(u_{i,j})_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$, and moreover checks $\bigotimes_{i=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1 - r_i, r_i) \cdot (u_{i,j})_{i=0}^{m_0-1} \stackrel{?}{=} u'_j$, where we use the *constant* \mathcal{T}_τ -action on $A_{\iota, \kappa, \tau}$ on the left, and the equality is one of $A_{\iota, \kappa, \tau}$ -elements.

We again require that $\iota \in O(\log(\lambda))$, lest the scheme fail to be efficiently computable; we moreover assume that $\tau \geq \iota$, so that the tower algebra $A_{\iota, \kappa, \tau}$ is well-defined. We note that the growth requirement $\tau \geq \log(\omega(\log \lambda))$ captures precisely the condition whereby $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{T}_\tau|}$ is negligible in λ . Indeed, while requiring $\tau \geq \Omega(\log \lambda)$, say, would more-than-guarantee our scheme's asymptotic security, the more delicate allowance $\tau \geq \log(\omega(\log \lambda))$ in fact suffices, and moreover figures centrally in our sharp asymptotic *efficiency* analysis below (see Theorem 3.14).

We emphasize that Construction 3.11's setup routine $\Pi.\text{Setup}$ returns a code C over the alphabet $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}$, which—in general—is *larger than* the coefficient field \mathcal{T}_ι at hand. On the other hand, the efficiency of Construction 3.11 is identical to that which Construction 3.7 above *would* feature if it were run on a $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}$ -matrix of size $m_0 \times \frac{m_1}{2^\kappa}$. In other words, Construction 3.11 makes possible the use of a code over an alphabet 2^κ -fold larger, say, than \mathcal{T}_ι , and yet simultaneously “compensates” for this expense by shrinking the prover's matrix.

Construction 3.11's completeness amounts to the “commutativity” of a certain sequence of actions on the \mathcal{T}_ι -matrix $(t_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$; that is, $(t_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ either is *combined*, *packed*, and then *encoded*, or else is *packed*, *encoded*, and then *combined*. Since the natural embedding is \mathcal{T}_τ -linear, the first pathway's *combination* and *packing* operations can be interchanged. On the other hand, the interchangability of the *combination* and *encoding* operations entails exactly the \mathcal{T}_τ -linearity of $\widehat{\text{Enc}}$, which we have already established above.

We note that the security results below draw significantly from [DP23, § 4], and repeat certain swathes of that work verbatim.

Theorem 3.12. *The scheme of Construction 3.11 is binding.*

Proof. Deferred to Appendix B. □

Theorem 3.13. *If the query sampler \mathcal{Q} is admissible, then the scheme of Construction 3.11 is extractable.*

Proof. Deferred to Appendix B. □

3.5 Efficiency

In this subsection, we discuss the efficiency of Construction 3.11, with a view towards attaining certain *concrete soundness* thresholds. We note that a somewhat more rudimentary treatment of this section’s material appears in [DP23].

Verifier cost. Departing slightly from standard efficiency analyses, we analyze both *proof size* and *verifier runtime* under one banner; indeed, we view both metrics as disparate aspects of a unified *verifier cost*. (This approach comports well with the cost structure of Ethereum, say, in which each transaction’s *calldata size* and *verification complexity* contribute jointly to its gas cost.) We define the relevant variables as follows:

- **b**: The cost, to the verifier, of each bit transmitted to it.
- \mathfrak{F}_ι : The cost, to the verifier, of multiplying two \mathcal{T}_ι -elements.
- \mathfrak{F}_τ : The cost, to the verifier, of multiplying two \mathcal{T}_τ -elements.
- **Enc**: The cost, to the verifier, of encoding a message in $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}^{m_1/2^\kappa}$.
- **Hash**. The cost, to the verifier, of hashing a single $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}$ -element.

We recall that a \mathcal{T}_τ -element and a \mathcal{T}_ι -element can be multiplied together with cost $2^{\tau-\iota} \cdot \mathfrak{F}_\iota$. Finally, we ignore throughout the cost of addition (which amounts to bitwise XOR).

We reckon the verifier’s costs as follows. The prover must transmit to the verifier the message t' , which consists of m_1 \mathcal{T}_τ -elements, as well as the ρ m_0 -element columns $(u_{i,j})_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$, for $j \in J$, each valued in $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}$. The total proof size is thus $2^\tau \cdot m_1 + 2^{\iota+\kappa} \cdot m_0 \cdot \rho$ bits. Computationally, the verifier must first compute the tensor-expansions $\bigotimes_{i=0}^{\ell_1-1} (1 - r_i, r_i)$ and $\bigotimes_{i=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1 - r_i, r_i)$. Using the algorithm [Tha22, Lem. 3.8], the verifier can compute these using m_1 and m_0 \mathcal{T}_τ -multiplications, respectively. To encode the message t' , the verifier must perform $C \subset \mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}^n$ ’s encoding operation $2^{\tau-\iota}$ times. In addition, the verifier must perform $\rho \cdot 2^\kappa$ \mathcal{T}_τ -by- \mathcal{T}_ι dot products, each of length m_0 . The total cost of these latter dot-products equals that of $m_0 \cdot \rho \cdot 2^\kappa \cdot 2^{\tau-\iota}$ \mathcal{T}_ι -multiplications. Finally, the verifier must perform ρ Merkle-path verifications. Each such verification entails hashing a column of m_0 $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}$ -elements (as well as performing l_1 further hash evaluations, which we ignore).

Adding all of these components, we obtain the following total verifier costs:

- **b**: $2^\tau \cdot m_1 + 2^{\iota+\kappa} \cdot m_0 \cdot \rho$.
- \mathfrak{F}_ι : $m_0 \cdot \rho \cdot 2^{\tau-\iota+\kappa}$.
- \mathfrak{F}_τ : $m_0 + m_1$.
- **Enc**: $2^{\tau-\iota}$.
- **Hash**. $\rho \cdot m_0$.

We pause to record to the following fundamental asymptotic guarantee:

Theorem 3.14. *For each fixed $\iota \in \mathbb{N}$, and arbitrary ℓ and λ in \mathbb{N} , Construction 3.11 can be instantiated in such a way as to impose verifier cost $\tilde{O}\left(\sqrt{\lambda} \cdot 2^\ell\right)$, counting both bits transferred and bit-operations performed.*

Proof. Deferred to Appendix B. □

We note that the analyses of both Brakedown [Gol+23, Thm. 1] and of Diamond and Posen [DP23, § 4] measure only *field-elements transferred* and *field-operations*. Theorem 3.14 performs a sharper asymptotic analysis; it shows that—provided that it chooses τ sufficiently carefully—Construction 3.11 in fact attains square-root verifier efficiency, in both in the security parameter and the polynomial’s size, even at the level of bits.

Concrete soundness. We identify and discuss, in concrete terms, the various sources of soundness error which arise throughout Theorem 3.13. We refer throughout to the parameters $d, n, \rho, \iota, \kappa, \tau, m_0$ and m_1 , recalling their roles in Π .Setup.

- **Tensor batching error Ξ_B .** This is the probability, taken over the query sampler’s choice of $(r_0, \dots, r_{\ell-1}) \leftarrow \mathcal{T}_\tau^\ell$, that, though $d^{m_0} \left((u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}, \widehat{C}^{m_0} \right) \geq \frac{d}{3}$, we nonetheless have $d(u', \widehat{C}) < \frac{d}{3}$, where we write $u' := \bigotimes_{i=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1 - r_i, r_i) \cdot (u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$. By Theorem 3.10 (see also Lemma B.1), $\Xi_B \leq 2 \cdot \ell_0 \cdot \frac{d}{3 \cdot |\mathcal{T}_\tau|}$.
- **Non-proximal per-query error Ξ_N .** This is the probability, taken over the verifier’s choice of a single index $j \leftarrow \{0, \dots, n-1\}$, that, though $d(u', \widehat{C}) \geq \frac{d}{3}$, nonetheless $u'_j = \text{Enc}(t')_j$ holds. The analysis of Lemma B.1 shows that $\Xi_N \leq 1 - \frac{d}{3 \cdot n}$.
- **Proximal per-query error Ξ_P .** This is the probability, taken over the verifier’s choice of a single index $j \leftarrow \{0, \dots, n-1\}$, that, in the case $d(u', \widehat{C}) < \frac{d}{3}$ but the message $t' \neq \bigotimes_{i=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1 - r_i, r_i) \cdot (t_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ is wrong, nonetheless $u'_j = \text{Enc}(t')_j$ holds. The analysis of Lemma B.2 shows that $\Xi_P \leq 1 - \frac{2 \cdot d}{3 \cdot n}$.

Putting these three sources of error together, and following the analyses of Lemmas B.1 and B.2, we define the protocol’s *total soundness error* as follows:

$$\Xi := \Xi(d, n, \rho, \tau, \ell_0, \ell_1) = \max(\Xi_B + \Xi_N^\rho, \Xi_P^\rho).$$

We justify this definition in the following way (in fact, this is a very rough summary of the proof of Theorem 3.13). We note that either the prover’s committed matrix $(u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ satisfies $d^{m_0} \left((u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}, \widehat{C}^{m_0} \right) < \frac{d}{3}$ or it doesn’t. If it doesn’t, then the analysis of Lemma B.1 bounds the verifier’s acceptance probability from above by $\Xi_B + \Xi_N^\rho$. If it does, then the message list $(t_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ is well-defined, so that t' is either correct or it’s not; in the latter case, Lemma B.2 bounds the verifier’s probability of acceptance by Ξ_P^ρ . Barring all of these failure events, we indeed have that $s = t(r_0, \dots, r_{\ell-1})$. We note that we slightly simplify our treatment here by analyzing Construction 3.11 as an *IOP*, and ignoring the runtime of the emulator \mathcal{E} , as well as the probability that \mathcal{E} aborts on a successful proof (say, because it fails to extract $(u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$). This simplification, in the setting of concrete analysis, is justified in Brakedown [Gol+23, p. 211], for example.

We define the *bits of security* obtained by Construction 3.11 as $\lambda := -\log(\Xi)$.

Case studies. In order to concretely assess the performance characteristics of Construction 3.11, we study various instantiations of that scheme. For comparison, we also explore various approaches based on the use of concatenated codes in Construction 3.7. In each the following examples, we set $\iota := 0$ (that is, we commit to \mathbb{F}_2 -polynomials), as well as $\ell := 32$, so that the total size of the polynomial at hand is 512 MiB. Throughout each example, we attain 100 bits of security. To standardize the case studies’ respective prover complexities, we consider only codes with the fixed relative rate $\gamma := \frac{1}{4}$.

Example 3.15 (Reed–Solomon code with block-level testing). We begin with the efficiency of Construction 3.11. We first remark that the alphabet size parameter $\kappa := 4$ makes available *only* those width parameters ℓ_1 at most 18; indeed, the Reed–Solomon requirement $|K| \geq n$ demands that $|\mathcal{T}_\kappa| = 2^{2^\kappa} \geq \frac{1}{\gamma} \cdot \frac{2^{\ell_1}}{2^\kappa}$, so that $2^\kappa \geq 2 + \ell_1 - \kappa$. In fact, we set $\kappa := 4$, $\ell_0 := 14$ and $\ell_1 := 18$ (these choices yield the smallest possible proofs). We thus have $m_1 = 2^{18}$, $k = 2^{14}$, and $n = 2^{16}$. Setting $\tau := 7$ —and using $d = n - k + 1 = 2^{16} - 2^{14} + 1 = 49,153$ —we compute $\Xi_B \leq 2 \cdot 14 \cdot \frac{d}{3 \cdot 2^{128}} \approx 2^{-109.193}$. Moreover, we compute the non-proximal per-query error

$\Xi_N \leq 1 - \frac{d}{3 \cdot n} \approx 0.75$ and the proximal per-query error $\Xi_P \leq 1 - \frac{2 \cdot d}{3 \cdot n} \approx 0.5$. Using a direct computation, we see that the total soundness error Ξ of equation (3.5) drops below 2^{-100} just when the number of queries ρ becomes 241 or greater. Using the expression for \mathbf{b} given above, we compute directly the proof size of 11.531 MiB, or about $2^{26.527}$ bits.

Example 3.16 (Concatenated code with trivial inner code). For reference, we compare Example 3.15 to the construction whereby a trivial concatenated code—i.e., with Reed–Solomon outer code and identity inner code—is used in Construction 3.7 (i.e., *without* block-level testing). We again set $\kappa := 4$, $\ell_0 := 15$ and $\ell_1 := 21$. In this setting, the resulting *binary* code has distance $d = 49,153$ identical to the code of the above construction; on the other hand, its message length $k = 2^{18}$ and block length $n = 2^{20}$ are both 2^κ -fold higher. We thus obtain the identical batching error $\Xi_B \approx 2^{-109.193}$; our non-proximal and proximal per-query errors, on the other hand, are $\Xi_N = 1 - \frac{d}{3 \cdot n} \approx 0.984$ and $\Xi_P = 1 - \frac{2 \cdot d}{3 \cdot n} \approx 0.969$. Again calculating directly, we see that 4,402 queries are required to obtain 100 bits of soundness. This scheme’s queries, however, are each 16-fold cheaper than Example 3.15’s are; we obtain a total proof size of 12.598 MiB, or about $2^{26.655}$ bits.

Example 3.17 (Nontrivial concatenated code). We finally examine the efficiency of Construction 3.7’s instantiation on a *nontrivial* concatenated code (i.e., with nonidentity inner code). In order to run an apples-to-apples comparison—i.e., between schemes whose prover costs are comparable—we set both our inner code and outer code’s rates to be $\frac{1}{2}$, so that our concatenated code has rate $\frac{1}{4}$. Specifically, we set $\kappa := 4$, and set $C_{\text{out}} \subset \mathcal{T}_4^{n_{\text{out}}}$ to be the Reed–Solomon code $\text{RS}_{\mathcal{T}_4}[2^{15}, 2^{14}]$; for $C_{\text{in}} \subset \mathcal{T}_0^{k_{\text{in}}}$, we use the Reed–Muller [32, 16, 8]-code $\text{RM}_{\mathcal{T}_0}[2, 5]$. (We note that 8 is actually the *best possible* distance that a binary [32, 16]-code can attain; we refer to the database of Grassl [Gra].) We see that our concatenated code satisfies $k = 2^{18}$ and $n = 2^{20}$, and has distance $d = 8 \cdot (2^{14} + 1) = 131,080$. We accordingly compute $\Xi_B \leq 2 \cdot 14 \cdot \frac{d}{3 \cdot 2^{128}} \approx 2^{-107.778}$, as well as $\Xi_N = 1 - \frac{d}{3 \cdot n} \approx 0.958$ and $\Xi_P = 1 - \frac{2 \cdot d}{3 \cdot n} \approx 0.917$. We calculate that 1,629 queries suffice to deliver 100 bits of soundness, and obtain a proof size of 7.182 MiB, or $2^{25.844}$ bits.

Remark 3.18. We find it plausible that, in the setting of Example 3.15, the stronger proximity gap result of Ben-Sasson, Carmon, Ishai, Kopparty, and Saraf [Ben+23, Thm. 1.4] could be brought to bear. Indeed, that result guarantees that, in the Reed–Solomon setting, even for those proximity parameters $e \in \{0, \dots, \lfloor \frac{d-1}{2} \rfloor\}$ allowed to range as high as the unique decoding radius, we nonetheless obtain a proximity gap, albeit with the false witness probability $\frac{n}{\tau}$ slightly worse than that of $\frac{e+1}{\lfloor \frac{d-1}{2} \rfloor}$ guaranteed by [DP23, Thm. 2.1] (we refer to [DP23, Rem. 3.7] for further comparison of these results). Of course, to apply that result to Example 3.15, we would need an analogue of Theorem 3.10 above; that is, we would need a result in the *algebra* setting which adapts [Ben+23, Thm. 1.4], precisely as Theorem 3.10 adapts [DP23, Thm. 3.1]. While we feel confident that such an adaptation should be possible, we have not undertaken it. *If* that adaptation were available, then, in Example 3.15, we would obtain the rather better proof size of 8.625 MiB, or $2^{26.109}$ bits.

We record selected proof size benchmarks in the below table. We record the benchmarks derived above, which pertain to the case $\ell = 32$ (so that the total data size is 512 MiB), as well as benchmarks for the further case $\ell = 36$ (corresponding to 8 GiB of total data).

Construction Used	Num. Variables ℓ	Parameters (ℓ_0, ℓ_1, κ)	Proof Size (MiB)
Reed–Solomon with block-level testing. (See Example 3.15.)	32	(14, 18, 4)	11.531
	36	(15, 21, 5)	66.527
Reed–Solomon, assum. prox-gap $\lfloor \frac{d-1}{2} \rfloor$. (See Remark 3.18.)	32	(14, 18, 4)	8.625
	36	(15, 21, 5)	50.500
Concatenated code w/ ad-hoc inner code. (See Example 3.17.)	32	(14, 18, 4)	7.182
	36	(16, 20, 5)	33.063

Table 1: Proof size benchmarks.

In the final benchmark—that describing a concatenated code with $\kappa := 5$ —we use the ad-hoc inner [64, 32, 12]-code of Grassl [Gra+19] (this code is a subcode of an *extended BCH code*). As Grassl’s database

indicates, we are able neither to construct nor to rule out the existence of a binary [64, 32, 16]-code. The existence of just such a code would further improve the benchmark given in the last row.

We present comprehensive benchmarks in Section 6 below.

4 Polynomial IOPs for Binary Tower Fields

In this section, we review and develop several interactive protocols and polynomial IOPs, which we moreover specialize to the setting of binary tower fields. Certain among these protocols adapt already-known techniques, but surface further performance improvements made possible by the tower setting. We refer throughout to Chen, Bünz, Boneh and Zhang’s *HyperPlonk* [CBBZ23, Def. 4.1], though we modify rather significantly that work’s formalisms.

4.1 Definitions and Notions

We fix throughout what follows a maximal tower height $\tau \in \mathbb{N}$; we understand $\tau := \tau(\lambda)$ as depending on an available security parameter.

Definition 4.1. A *polynomial IOP* $\Pi = (\mathcal{I}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V})$ is an interactive protocol in which the parties may freely use a certain *multilinear polynomial oracle*, which operates as follows, on the security parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$:

FUNCTIONALITY 4.2 (polynomial oracle).

A tower height $\tau := \tau(\lambda)$ and a binary tower $\mathcal{T}_0 \subset \mathcal{T}_1 \subset \dots \subset \mathcal{T}_\tau$ are fixed.

- On input (**submit**, ι, ν, t) from \mathcal{I} or \mathcal{P} , where $\iota \in \{0, \dots, \tau\}$, $\nu \in \mathbb{N}$, and $t \in \mathcal{T}_\iota[X_0, \dots, X_{\nu-1}]^{\leq 1}$, output (**receipt**, $\iota, \nu, [t]$) to \mathcal{I} , \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} , where $[t]$ is some unique handle onto the polynomial t .
- On input (**query**, $[t], r$) from \mathcal{V} , where $r \in \mathcal{T}_\tau^\nu$, send \mathcal{V} (**evaluation**, $t(r_0, \dots, r_{\nu-1})$).

Definition 4.3. The polynomial IOP $\Pi = (\mathcal{I}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V})$ for the indexed relation R is *secure* if, for each PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists an expected PPT emulator \mathcal{E} and a negligible function negl , such that, for each security parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ and each pair (\mathbf{i}, \mathbf{x}) , provided that the protocol is run on the security parameter λ , writing $\text{vp} := \mathcal{I}(\mathbf{i})$ and $\text{w} \leftarrow \mathcal{E}^{\mathcal{A}}(\mathbf{i}, \mathbf{x})$, we have $|\Pr[\langle \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{i}, \mathbf{x}), \mathcal{V}(\text{vp}, \mathbf{x}) \rangle = 1] - \Pr[R(\mathbf{i}, \mathbf{x}, \text{w}) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

We note that we grant \mathcal{E} full internal access to \mathcal{A} . In particular, \mathcal{E} may intercept all outbound messages sent by \mathcal{A} , *including* those messages (**submit**, ι, ν, t) \mathcal{A} sends directly to the polynomial oracle, as well as, of course, those it sends to \mathcal{V} . We note that, in practice, our emulator \mathcal{E} will be *straight-line* (i.e., non-rewinding) and strict polynomial-time, though these latter properties aren’t required by Definition 4.3.

It is shown in [BFS20, § E] that, by inlining an extractable polynomial commitment scheme (in the sense of Definition 3.5) into a secure polynomial IOP (in the sense of Definition 4.3), one obtains a secure argument of knowledge for the relation R .

Definition 4.4. For parameters ι, ν , and μ in \mathbb{N} , ν -variate, μ -ary *polynomial predicate* over \mathcal{T}_ι is a boolean-valued function $\Phi_{\iota, \nu} : \mathcal{T}_\iota[X_0, \dots, X_{\nu-1}]^\mu \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$.

Example 4.5. We record certain key polynomial predicates, roughly following HyperPlonk [CBBZ23].

1. **Query.** On parameters ι and ν in \mathbb{N} , $s \in \mathcal{T}_\tau$, and $r \in \mathcal{T}_\tau^\nu$, sends **Query**(r, s) $_{\iota, \nu} : T \mapsto T(r_0, \dots, r_{\nu-1}) = s$.
2. **Sum.** On parameters ι and ν in \mathbb{N} and $e \in \mathcal{T}_\iota$, sends **Sum**(e) $_{\iota, \nu} : T \mapsto \sum_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} T(v) = e$.
3. **Zero.** On parameters ι and ν in \mathbb{N} , sends **Zero** $_{\iota, \nu} : T \mapsto \bigwedge_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} T(v) = 0$.
4. **Product.** On parameters ι and ν in \mathbb{N} , the binary *product predicate* sends **Product** $_{\iota, \nu} : (T, U) \mapsto \prod_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} T(v) = \prod_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} U(v) \wedge \bigwedge_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} (T(v) = 0 \iff U(v) = 0)$.
5. **Multiset.** On parameters ι, ν , and μ in \mathbb{N} , the $2 \cdot \mu$ -ary *multiset predicate* sends **Multiset**(μ) $_{\iota, \nu} : (T_0, \dots, T_{\mu-1}, U_0, \dots, U_{\mu-1}) \mapsto \{(T_0(v), \dots, T_{\mu-1}(v)) \mid v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu\} = \{(U_0(v), \dots, U_{\mu-1}(v)) \mid v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu\}$, where we understand both objects on the right-hand side as *multisets* (counted with multiplicity).

6. **Permutation.** On parameters ι , ν , and μ in \mathbb{N} , and a bijection $\sigma : \{0, \dots, \mu - 1\} \times \mathcal{B}_\nu \rightarrow \{0, \dots, \mu - 1\} \times \mathcal{B}_\nu$, the μ -ary *permutation predicate* sends $\text{Permutation}(\sigma)_{\iota, \nu} : (T_0, \dots, T_{\mu-1}) \mapsto \bigwedge_{(i, v) \in \{0, \dots, \mu-1\} \times \mathcal{B}_\nu} T_{i'}(v') = T_i(v)$, where we write $(i', v') := \sigma(i, v)$ for each $(i, v) \in \{0, \dots, \mu-1\} \times \mathcal{B}_\nu$.

7. **Lookup.** On parameters ι and ν in \mathbb{N} , sends $\text{Lookup}_{\iota, \nu} : (T, U) \mapsto \bigwedge_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} \exists v' \in \mathcal{B}_\nu : U(v) = T(v')$.

We note that each predicate $\text{Query}(r, s)_{\iota, \nu}$ can be evaluated directly by the verifier, on any handle $[t]$, by means of a single query to the polynomial oracle.

Our product predicate diverges from HyperPlonk’s [CBBZ23, § 3.3] in various respects. Their predicate requires that the “denominator” U be everywhere-nonzero on the cube, as well as that the product $\prod_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} \frac{T(v)}{U(v)}$ equal a prescribed value. We simplify that predicate by specializing this prescribed value to 1; on the other hand, we also more correctly handle the case of “division by zero” (their protocol actually *fails* to assert that U is everywhere-nonvanishing on the cube). Though our product predicate indeed admits a generalization which more closely follows [CBBZ23, § 3.3]—i.e., where the product $\prod_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} \frac{T(v)}{U(v)}$ can be arbitrary, *and* where we moreover correctly handle those denominators U which vanish—this generalization is complicated, and we have opted not to present it. We discuss this matter further in Remark 4.18 below. Finally, we present a permutation predicate slightly more sophisticated than HyperPlonk’s [CBBZ23, § 3.5]; specifically, ours supports permutations which act across multiple “columns”.

The following notational abstraction figures extensively in what follows.

Definition 4.6. A ν -variate *virtual polynomial* over \mathcal{T}_ι is a list of handles $[t_0], \dots, [t_{\mu-1}]$, each representing a polynomial defined over \mathcal{T}_ι , together with an arithmetic circuit, whose leaves are either indeterminates in the list $X_0, \dots, X_{\nu-1}$ or else constants in \mathcal{T}_ι , and in which we permit not just the binary gates $+$ and \times , but moreover, for each $i \in \{0, \dots, \mu - 1\}$, the ν_i -ary gate $t_i(X_0, \dots, X_{\nu_i-1})$ (assuming that t_i is ν_i -variate). We write $T \in \mathcal{T}_\iota[X_0, \dots, X_{\nu-1}]$ for the polynomial represented by the circuit, and $[T]$ for the virtual polynomial.

We note that each virtual polynomial $[T]$ may be evaluated at any input $(x_0, \dots, x_{\nu-1}) \in \mathcal{T}_\nu^\nu$ —albeit in general, not efficiently—by any machine which can query the handles $[t_0], \dots, [t_{\mu-1}]$. We now treat *efficient* protocols for virtual polynomials.

Definition 4.7. A *virtual polynomial protocol* for the μ -ary polynomial predicate $\Phi_{\iota, \nu}$ is an interactive protocol $\Sigma = (\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V})$ which takes as common input a list $([T_0], \dots, [T_{\mu-1}])$ of ν -variate virtual polynomials. The protocol Σ is *secure* with respect to $\Phi_{\iota, \nu}$ if, for each PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , there is a negligible function negl for which, for each $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ and each input list $([T_0], \dots, [T_{\mu-1}])$, if the protocol is run on the security parameter λ , then we have $\Pr[\langle \mathcal{A}(T_0, \dots, T_{\mu-1}), \mathcal{V}([T_0], \dots, [T_{\mu-1}]) \rangle = 1 \wedge \Phi_{\iota, \nu}(T_0, \dots, T_{\mu-1}) = 0] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

We note that, in the cases we treat below, a *single* negligible function negl suffices for all adversaries \mathcal{A} , though this state of affairs is not mandated by Definition 4.7.

We highlight, in particular, the special case of Definition 4.7 in which $\Phi_{\iota, \nu}$ takes the form $\text{Query}(r, s)_{\iota, \nu}$.

Definition 4.8. An *evaluation protocol* for the ν -variate virtual polynomial $[T]$ over \mathcal{T}_ι is a family of virtual polynomial protocols, parameterized by $r \in \mathcal{T}_r^\nu$ and $s \in \mathcal{T}_s$, for the predicates $\text{Query}(r, s)_{\iota, \nu}$ on the input $[T]$.

In practice, we often attach to each virtual polynomial T an appropriate evaluation protocol, and refer to the resulting bundle as an *evaluable* virtual polynomial.

Example 4.9 (Compositions). A certain particularly simple sort of virtual polynomial consists of a list of ν -variate handles $[t_0], \dots, [t_{\mu-1}]$, together with a μ -variate *composition polynomial* $g \in \mathcal{T}_\iota[X_0, \dots, X_{\mu-1}]$, and represents the composition $T := g(t_0(X_0, \dots, X_{\nu-1}), \dots, t_{\mu-1}(X_0, \dots, X_{\nu-1}))$. We note that $[T]$ admits an efficient evaluation protocol, at least if g is succinct; indeed, to decide the predicate $\text{Query}(r, s)_{\iota, \nu}$, \mathcal{V} may directly query each of the handles at r , evaluate g *itself* on the results, and finally compare the result to s .

Example 4.10 (Piecewise multilinear). A further sort of virtual polynomial arises in the following way. For integers ι , ν , and μ in \mathbb{N} , where $\mu = 2^\alpha$ is a power of 2, say, and ν -variate handles $[t_0], \dots, [t_{\mu-1}]$ over \mathcal{T}_ι , we introduce a piecewise function $T \in \mathcal{T}_\iota^{\mathcal{B}_\nu + \alpha}$, defined so that, for each $v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu$ and $u \in \mathcal{B}_\alpha$, $T(u \parallel v) = t_{\{u\}}(v)$ holds (we recall the identification $\{u\} := \sum_{i=0}^{\alpha-1} 2^i \cdot u_i$). We finally identify T with its multilinear extension $T(X_0, \dots, X_{\nu+\alpha-1}) \in \mathcal{T}_\iota[X_0, \dots, X_{\nu+\alpha-1}]^{\leq 1}$. We note that T defines a valid virtual polynomial in the

handles $[t_0], \dots, [t_{\mu-1}]$; moreover, T is evaluable, provided μ is small. Indeed, to decide $\text{Query}(r, s)_{\iota, \nu + \alpha}$, say, \mathcal{V} may destructure $(r_0, \dots, r_{\nu + \alpha - 1}) := r$, query the polynomials $[t_0], \dots, [t_{\mu-1}]$ at $(r_\alpha, \dots, r_{\nu + \alpha - 1})$, obtaining the results $s_0, \dots, s_{\mu-1}$, say, and finally output $s \stackrel{?}{=} \bigotimes_{i=0}^{\alpha-1} (1 - r_i, r_i) \cdot (s_i)_{i=0}^{\mu-1}$ (here, $\bigotimes_{i=0}^{\alpha-1} (1 - r_i, r_i)$ is a tensor product expansion in the sense of Subsection 2.2, and can be computed in $\Theta(\mu)$ time). The correctness of this procedure is essentially [Tha22, Lem. 3.6]. We write $[T] := \text{merge}([t_0], \dots, [t_{\mu-1}])$ for this construction.

We finally note that virtual polynomials can be composed. Indeed, upon replacing some among the handles $[t_0], \dots, [t_{\mu-1}]$ of some virtual polynomial $[T]$ with *further* virtual polynomials, we may nonetheless “unroll” the resulting object into a proper virtual polynomial $[T']$ in its own right. Finally, if $[T]$ and all of the sub-virtual polynomials are efficiently evaluable, then the composed virtual polynomial $[T']$ also is.

4.2 Prior Virtual Polynomial Protocols

By way of background, we briefly recall various well-known virtual protocols, for use below. We refer primarily to Thaler [Tha22] and HyperPlonk [CBBZ23, § 3].

Sumcheck. The *sumcheck* protocol is a virtual polynomial protocol for the predicate $\text{Sum}(e)_{\iota, \nu} : T \mapsto \sum_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} T(v) = e$. Internally, on input an evaluable, ν -variate virtual polynomial $[T]$, sumcheck invokes $[T]$'s implicit $\text{Query}(r, s)_{\iota, \nu}$ protocol, on parameters $r \in \mathcal{T}_\tau^\nu$ and $s \in \mathcal{T}_\tau$ derived during the course of the sumcheck. The definition of the sumcheck protocol, as well as a proof that it securely evaluates $\text{Sum}(e)_{\iota, \nu}$ in the sense of Definition 4.7, appear in Thaler [Tha22, § 4.1]. The protocol's soundness error is at most $\frac{\nu \cdot d}{|\mathcal{T}_\tau|}$, where d is the maximum *individual* degree exhibited by any of T 's variables (plus the error inherent to $[T]$'s evaluation protocol). We emphasize that the known, highly-efficient algorithms for the sumcheck protocol's prover *require* that $[T]$ take the particular form given in Example 4.9 (i.e., that $[T]$ be a composition of multilinear); we refer to [Tha22, Lem. 4.5] for a discussion of these algorithms.

Zerocheck. We recall the predicate $\text{Zero}_{\iota, \nu} : T \mapsto \bigwedge_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} T(v) = 0$, as well as the *zerocheck* protocol of HyperPlonk [CBBZ23, § 3.2] (see also *Spartan* [Set20]).

PROTOCOL 4.11 (Zerocheck).

Parameters ι, ν , and τ in \mathbb{N} and a ν -variate virtual polynomials $[T]$ over \mathcal{T}_ι is fixed.

- \mathcal{V} samples $r \leftarrow \mathcal{T}_\nu^\tau$, and sends r to \mathcal{P} .
- \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} run the sumcheck protocol, with statement 0, on the virtual polynomial $[T'] := \widetilde{\text{eq}}(r_0, \dots, r_{\nu-1}, X_0, \dots, X_{\nu-1}) \cdot T(X_0, \dots, X_{\nu-1})$.

We note first of all that $[T']$ is a valid virtual polynomial, which moreover admits its own evaluation protocol. Indeed, to decide $\text{Query}(r', s')_{\tau, \nu}(T')$, say, \mathcal{V} may, after first *locally* evaluating $a := \widetilde{\text{eq}}(r, r')$ —which takes $O(\nu)$ work—immediately return $s' \stackrel{?}{=} 0$ in case $a = 0$, and otherwise proceed with the appropriate protocol (i.e., that attached to $[T]$) deciding $\text{Query}\left(r', \frac{s'}{a}\right)_{\iota, \nu}(T)$.

Theorem 4.12. *Protocol 4.11 securely decides the predicate $\text{Zero}_{\iota, \nu}$ on T .*

Proof. Assuming that $\text{Zero}_{\iota, \nu}(T) = 0$, we show that $\text{Sum}(0)_{\tau, \nu}(T') = 1$ holds with negligible probability over \mathcal{V} 's random coins. Our hypothesis implies precisely that T 's MLE $\tilde{T} = \sum_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} T(v) \cdot \widetilde{\text{eq}}(v_0, \dots, v_{\nu-1}, X_0, \dots, X_{\nu-1})$ is not identically zero. By the Schwartz–Zippel lemma, the probability, over \mathcal{V} 's choice of $r \leftarrow \mathcal{T}_\nu^\tau$, that $\tilde{T}(r) = 0$ is thus at most $\frac{\nu}{|\mathcal{T}_\tau|}$. On the other hand, if $\tilde{T}(r) \neq 0$, then $\sum_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} T(v) \cdot \widetilde{\text{eq}}(v_0, \dots, v_{\nu-1}, r_0, \dots, r_{\nu-1}) \neq 0$, so that $\text{Sum}(0)_{\tau, \nu}(T') = 0$, as required. \square

The soundness error of the zerocheck protocol thus $\frac{\nu}{|\mathcal{T}_\tau|} + \frac{(d+1) \cdot \nu}{|\mathcal{T}_\tau|}$, where d , again, is the maximum individual degree exhibited by any of T 's variables (*plus*, again, the error inherent to $[T]$'s implicit evaluation protocol). The first of these two terms is a zerocheck-specific soundness error; the term $\frac{(d+1) \cdot \nu}{|\mathcal{T}_\tau|}$ arises from zerocheck's internal use of the sumcheck on $[T']$.

Product check. We now record a protocol for the product predicate $\text{Product}_{\iota, \nu} : (T, U) \mapsto \prod_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} T(v) = \prod_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} U(v) \wedge \bigwedge_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} (T(v) = 0 \iff U(v) = 0)$ above, roughly following Setty and Lee’s *Quarks* [SL20, § 5] and HyperPlonk [CBBZ23, § 3.3].

PROTOCOL 4.13 (Product check).

Parameters ι and ν in \mathbb{N} , and ν -variate virtual polynomials $[T]$ and $[U]$ over \mathcal{T}_ι , are fixed.

- \mathcal{P} defines the function $f \in \mathcal{T}_\iota^{\mathcal{B}_\nu}$ as follows. For each $v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu$ \mathcal{P} sets $f(v) := \frac{T(v)}{U(v)}$ if $U(v) \neq 0$, and $f(v) := 1$ otherwise. \mathcal{P} submits (`submit`, $\iota, \nu + 1, f'$) to the oracle, where $f' \in \mathcal{T}_\iota[X_0, \dots, X_\nu]^{\leq 1}$ is such that, for each $v \in \mathcal{B}_{\nu+1}$, both $f'(v \parallel 0) = f(v)$ and $f'(v \parallel 1) = f'(0 \parallel v) \cdot f'(1 \parallel v)$ hold.
- Upon receiving (`receipt`, $\iota, \nu + 1, [f']$) from the oracle, \mathcal{V} submits (`query`, $[f'], (0, 1, \dots, 1)$) to the oracle; \mathcal{V} requires that the response (`evaluation`, $f'(0, 1, \dots, 1)$) satisfy $f'(0, 1, \dots, 1) \stackrel{?}{=} 1$.
- \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} define a $\nu + 1$ -variate virtual polynomial $[T']$ as follows:

$$[T'] := \text{merge}([T], [f'](\cdot \parallel 1)) - \text{merge}([U], [f'](0 \parallel \cdot)) \cdot \text{merge}([f'](\cdot \parallel 0), [f'](1 \parallel \cdot)).$$

\mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} run a zerocheck on the virtual polynomial $[T']$.

Above, the expression $[f'](\cdot \parallel 0)$ denotes the ν -variate virtual polynomial which one obtains from the $\nu + 1$ -variate handle $[f']$ upon fixing that function’s last argument to be 0; its variants are analogous.

We modify the protocol given in [CBBZ23, § 3.3] in two distinct ways. On the one hand, our prover constructs the auxiliary function f in such a way as to appropriately handle the vanishing of the “denominator” U within the cube; we discuss this issue further in Remark 4.18. Separately, we define the virtual polynomial $[T']$ above—that is, the target of the zerocheck reduction—differently than does [CBBZ23, § 3.3], as we presently explain. The work [CBBZ23, § 3.3] sets (adapting their notation to ours) $[T'] := \text{merge}([T] - [U] \cdot [f'](\cdot \parallel 0), [f'](\cdot \parallel 1) - [f'](0 \parallel \cdot) \cdot [f'](1 \parallel \cdot))$. While this construction is correct—and in fact agrees with our $[T']$ identically on $\mathcal{B}_{\nu+1}$ —it suffers from the defect whereby $[T']$ is *not* a *composition of multilinear*s in the sense of Example 4.9, *even if* T and U are themselves multilinear, and so fails to admit an (obvious) efficient sumcheck. Our construction remedies this issue, in that our $[T']$ *is* a composition of multilinear, at least if T and U are themselves multilinear. We emphasize that our protocol is correct and secure regardless of T and U ; on the other hand, the efficiency of its implementation may require that T and U be multilinear (as they will be in our applications below).

Theorem 4.14. *Protocol 4.13 securely decides the predicate $\text{Product}_{\iota, \nu}$ on $[T]$ and $[U]$.*

Proof. Assuming that \mathcal{V} accepts and that $\text{Zero}_{\iota, \nu+1}(T') = 1$, where T' is the virtual polynomial constructed during Protocol 4.13, we show that $\text{Product}_{\iota, \nu}(T, U) = 1$ holds with probability 1. It follows directly from the definition of `merge` that, under our hypothesis $\text{Zero}_{\iota, \nu+1}(T') = 1$ we have, for each $v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu$, that both $T(v) = U(v) \cdot f'(v \parallel 0)$ and $f'(v \parallel 1) = f'(0 \parallel v) \cdot f'(1 \parallel v)$ hold. This latter equality, in light of [SL20, Lem 5.1], implies that $\prod_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} f'(v \parallel 0) = f'(0, 1, \dots, 1)$, which itself equals 1 whenever \mathcal{V} accepts. Taking the product of the former equality over all $v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu$, we thus conclude immediately that $\prod_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} T(v) = \prod_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} U(v)$. Separately, from the relation $\prod_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} f'(v \parallel 0) = 1$, we conclude that, for each $v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu$, $f'(v \parallel 0)$ is individually nonzero, so that the guarantee $T(v) = U(v) \cdot f'(v \parallel 0)$ in particular implies $T(v) = 0 \iff U(v) = 0$. \square

The product check protocol—once fully unrolled—makes just one query each to $[T]$ and $[U]$. Its soundness error is thus that of the zerocheck protocol, when run on $[T']$, together with whatever error arises from $[T]$ $[U]$ ’s respective implicit query protocols.

Remark 4.15. Were we to remove the conjunct $\bigwedge_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} (T(v) = 0 \iff U(v) = 0)$ from the predicate $\text{Product}_{\iota, \nu}$ above, Protocol 4.13 would cease to be complete. Indeed, upon initiating Protocol 4.13 on polynomials T and U for which, at the point $v^* \in \mathcal{B}_\nu$ let’s say, $U(v^*) \neq 0$ and $T(v^*) = 0$ both held—and for which $\prod_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} T(v) = \prod_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} U(v)$ moreover held, let’s say (so that $U(v) = 0$ for some $v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu \setminus \{v^*\}$)— \mathcal{P} would find itself unable to generate a passing proof. Indeed, to pass, \mathcal{P} would have to set $f'(v^* \parallel 0) = 0$; this would necessitate, in turn, that $\prod_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} f'(v \parallel 0) = f'(0, 1, \dots, 1) = 0$. Separately, assuming $U(v^*) = 0$ and $T(v^*) \neq 0$, \mathcal{P} would become unable to select $f'(v^* \parallel 0)$ so as to cause $T(v^*) = U(v^*) \cdot f'(v^* \parallel 0)$ to hold.

Multiset check. We recall the $2 \cdot \mu$ -ary *multiset predicate* $\text{Multiset}(\mu)_{\iota, \nu} : (T_0, \dots, T_{\mu-1}, U_0, \dots, U_{\mu-1}) \mapsto \{(T_0(v), \dots, T_{\mu-1}(v)) \mid v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu\} = \{(U_0(v), \dots, U_{\mu-1}(v)) \mid v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu\}$, where the equality is *of multisets*. HyperPlonk [CBBZ23, § 3.4] defines a protocol for $\text{Multiset}(\mu)_{\iota, \nu}$ in two steps, first by reducing $\text{Multiset}(1)_{\iota, \nu}$ to $\text{Product}_{\iota, \nu}$, and then by reducing $\text{Multiset}(\mu)_{\iota, \nu}$, for $k > 1$, to $\text{Multiset}(1)_{\iota, \nu}$. Though our treatment is similar to HyperPlonk’s, we reproduce the details for self-containedness.

PROTOCOL 4.16 (1-dimensional multiset check [CBBZ23, § 3.4]).

Parameters ι, ν and τ in \mathbb{N} , and ν -variate virtual polynomials $[T_0]$ and $[U_0]$ over \mathcal{T}_ι , are fixed.

- \mathcal{V} samples $r \leftarrow \mathcal{T}_\tau$, and sends r to \mathcal{P} .
- \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} run a product check on the virtual polynomials $[T'] := r - [T_0]$ and $[U'] := r - [U_0]$.

Theorem 4.17. *Protocol 4.16 securely decides the predicate $\text{Multiset}(1)_{\iota, \nu}$ on $[T_0]$ and $[U_0]$.*

Proof. We follow [CBBZ23, Thm. 3.4], with appropriate adaptations. Assuming $\text{Multiset}(1)_{\iota, \nu}(T_0, U_0) = 0$, we argue that $\text{Product}_{\tau, \nu}(T', U') = 1$ holds with negligible probability over the verifier’s random coins. Our hypothesis entails directly that the degree- 2^ν , univariate polynomials $\widehat{T}(Y) := \prod_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} (Y - T_0(v))$ and $\widehat{U}(Y) := \prod_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} (Y - U_0(v))$, which we now view as elements of $\mathcal{T}_\tau[Y]$, are unequal. We see that the difference $\widehat{T}(Y) - \widehat{U}(Y)$ is not identically zero, and moreover of degree at most 2^ν ; we write $R \subset \mathcal{T}_\tau$ for its roots. If $r \notin R$, then $\prod_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} (r - T_0(v)) \neq \prod_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} (r - U_0(v))$, so that $\text{Product}_{\tau, \nu}(T', U') = 0$ necessarily holds. \square

Remark 4.18. We compare our treatment of the product and multiset predicates to HyperPlonk’s [CBBZ23, §§ 3.3–3.4]. HyperPlonk’s product protocol [CBBZ23, § 3.3] purports to securely decide the predicate $(T, U) \mapsto \bigwedge_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} U(v) \neq 0 \wedge \prod_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} \frac{T(v)}{U(v)} = e$, where $e \in \mathcal{T}_\iota$ is a statement. In words, HyperPlonk’s *stated* predicate requires that the denominator U be nowhere-vanishing on the cube, as well as that the product, over the cube, of the pointwise quotient between T and U equal e . In actuality, that protocol decides a significantly-more-complicated predicate, as we presently explain. The predicate actually decided by that protocol *allows* U to vanish on the cube, albeit with caveats. Indeed, it requires in this case merely that the numerator T *also* vanish wherever U does, and moreover stipulates that, *if* U vanishes anywhere on the cube, then T and U fulfill a weaker variant of the product relationship whereby, if $e \neq 0$, then T is *nonzero* wherever U is. In simple terms, by setting T and U both equal to 0 at $v^* \in \mathcal{B}_\nu$, say, the prover may cause the verifier to accept for *arbitrary* e (provided, again, that T is *nonzero* wherever U is, a circumstance which the prover can easily arrange). This breaks the security guarantees of [CBBZ23, § 3.3] as stated. We note that, in this situation, our relation $\prod_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} T(v) = \prod_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} U(v)$ *does* hold, while HyperPlonk’s does not; the issue is an illegal “division by 0”. In fact, our relation $\text{Product}_{\iota, \nu}$ above is precisely the specialization of the “complicated” relation just described to the case $e := 1$ (where significant simplifications emerge). We note that the $k = 1$ multiset check of Protocol 4.16 above—which is identical to [CBBZ23, § 3.4]—is nonetheless still secure, and with a simpler proof of security no less. Indeed, if HyperPlonk’s product protocol *actually* decided the stated relation of [CBBZ23, § 3.3], then its multiset protocol would fail to be perfectly complete.

We now present the protocol for $2 \cdot \mu$ -ary multiset check; our treatment of this protocol is identical to HyperPlonk’s [CBBZ23, § 3.4].

PROTOCOL 4.19 (μ -dimensional multiset check [CBBZ23, § 3.4]).

Parameters ι, ν , and τ in \mathbb{N} , as well as ν -variate virtual polynomials $[T_0], \dots, [T_{\mu-1}]$ and $[U_0], \dots, [U_{\mu-1}]$ over \mathcal{T}_ι , where $\mu > 1$, are fixed.

- \mathcal{V} samples random scalars $r_1, \dots, r_{\mu-1}$ from \mathcal{T}_τ , and sends them to \mathcal{P} .
- \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} run a 1-dimensional multiset check on the virtual polynomials $[T'] := [T_0] + r_1 \cdot [T_1] + \dots + r_{\mu-1} \cdot [T_{\mu-1}]$ and $[U'] := [U_0] + r_1 \cdot [U_1] + \dots + r_{\mu-1} \cdot [U_{\mu-1}]$.

Theorem 4.20. *Protocol 4.19 securely decides the predicate $\text{Multiset}(\mu)_{\iota, \nu}$ on $([T_i])_{i=0}^{\mu-1}$ and $([U_i])_{i=0}^{\mu-1}$.*

Proof. Assuming that $\text{Multiset}(\mu)_{\iota, \nu}(T_0, \dots, T_{\mu-1}, U_0, \dots, U_{\mu-1}) = 0$, we show that $\text{Multiset}(1)_{\iota, \nu}(T', U') = 1$ holds with negligible probability over \mathcal{V} 's random coins. We follow the proof strategy of [CBBZ23, Thm. 3.5]. We write $T := \{(T_0(v), \dots, T_{\mu-1}(v)) \mid v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu\}$ and $U := \{(U_0(v), \dots, U_{\mu-1}(v)) \mid v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu\}$ for the multisets at hand, as well as $\widehat{T} := T \setminus U$ and $\widehat{U} := U \setminus T$, where we understand all set-differences as *multiset* operations. Since T and U are equally sized as multisets, \widehat{T} and \widehat{U} necessarily also are; moreover, our hypothesis entails precisely that \widehat{T} and \widehat{U} are nonempty. We fix an element $t^* \in \widehat{T}$. We write $R := \{(1, r_1, \dots, r_{\mu-1}) \mid (r_1, \dots, r_{\mu-1}) \in \mathcal{T}_\tau^{\mu-1}\}$; moreover, for each $r \in R$, we write $\varphi_r : \mathcal{T}_\tau^\mu \rightarrow \mathcal{T}_\tau$ for the map $\varphi_r : (a_0, \dots, a_{\mu-1}) \mapsto a_0 + r_1 \cdot a_1 + \dots + r_{\mu-1} \cdot a_{\mu-1}$. Finally, for each $u \in \widehat{U}$, we set $R_u := \{r \in R \mid \varphi_r(t^*) \stackrel{?}{=} \varphi_r(u)\}$. If the verifier's challenge $r \notin \bigcup_{u \in \widehat{U}} R_u$, then $\text{Multiset}(1)_{\iota, \nu}(T', U') = 0$ certainly holds; indeed, in this case, the count of the element $\varphi_r(t^*)$ in the multiset $\{\varphi_r(t) \mid t \in T\}$ necessarily exceeds by at least 1 the count of this element in $\{\varphi_r(u) \mid u \in U\}$, so that $\{\varphi_r(t) \mid t \in T\} \neq \{\varphi_r(u) \mid u \in U\}$. On the other hand, each R_u is precisely the intersection in \mathcal{T}_τ^μ between the affine hyperplane R and the normal hyperplane $\{r \in \mathcal{T}_\tau^\mu \mid r \cdot (t^* - u) = 0\}$ (which is necessarily non-degenerate, by our choice of t^*). Each R_u is thus a *proper* affine subspace of R , and so covers a proportion consisting of at most $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{T}_\tau|}$ of R 's points. The union $\bigcup_{u \in \widehat{U}} R_u$ thus covers at most $|\widehat{U}| \cdot \frac{1}{|\mathcal{T}_\tau|} \leq \frac{2^\nu}{|\mathcal{T}_\tau|}$ among R 's points (where $|\widehat{U}|$ here is a *multiset* cardinality). This completes the proof. \square

Permutation check. We finally describe a protocol for the predicate $\text{Permutation}(\sigma)_{\iota, \nu} : (T_0, \dots, T_{\mu-1}) \mapsto \bigwedge_{(i, v) \in \{0, \dots, \mu-1\} \times \mathcal{B}_\nu} T_{i'}(v') = T_i(v)$ above; here, as before, we fix a bijection $\sigma : \{0, \dots, \mu-1\} \times \mathcal{B}_\nu \rightarrow \{0, \dots, \mu-1\} \times \mathcal{B}_\nu$. Though we follow HyperPlonk [CBBZ23, § 3.5], our protocol decides a more sophisticated variant of that work's predicate, which, in particular, allows *multiple* inputs, as well as permutations which act *across* these inputs.

Our protocol takes as common input a list $[T_0], \dots, [T_{\mu-1}]$ of virtual polynomials. It also—unlike the protocols already given above—makes use of the *indexer*; specifically, the protocol takes as common input further handles $[s_{\text{id}}]$ and $[s_\sigma]$, which jointly capture the permutation $\sigma : \{0, \dots, \mu-1\} \times \mathcal{B}_\nu \rightarrow \{0, \dots, \mu-1\} \times \mathcal{B}_\nu$. We argue first that we may freely assume that $\mu = 2^\alpha$ is a power of 2; indeed, we may always extend σ by the identity map, as well as pad the list $[T_0], \dots, [T_{\mu-1}]$ with further virtual polynomials (set to be identically zero, say). Clearly, the padded predicate holds if and only if the unpadded one does.

We fix an arbitrary injection $s : \{0, \dots, \mu-1\} \times \mathcal{B}_\nu \hookrightarrow \mathcal{T}_\tau$ (we assume without further comment that τ is sufficiently large). For each $i \in \{0, \dots, \mu-1\}$, we define mappings $\text{id}_i : \mathcal{B}_\nu \rightarrow \mathcal{T}_\tau$ and $\sigma_i : \mathcal{B}_\nu \rightarrow \mathcal{T}_\tau$ by setting $\text{id}_i : v \mapsto s(i, v)$ and $\sigma_i : v \mapsto s(\sigma(i, v))$. We finally write $s_{\text{id}} := \text{merge}(\text{id}_0, \dots, \text{id}_{\mu-1})$ and $s_\sigma := \text{merge}(\sigma_0, \dots, \sigma_{\mu-1})$, following Example 4.10. We stipulate that the indexer output $[s_{\text{id}}]$ and $[s_\sigma]$ *directly* as $\nu + \alpha$ -variate handles (though this latter measure is not necessary, it improves efficiency).

PROTOCOL 4.21 (Permutation check [CBBZ23, § 3.4]).

Parameters ι , ν , and τ in \mathbb{N} , a bijection $\sigma : \{0, \dots, \mu-1\} \times \mathcal{B}_\nu \rightarrow \{0, \dots, \mu-1\} \times \mathcal{B}_\nu$, ν -variate polynomials $[T_0], \dots, [T_{\mu-1}]$, and finally the further handles $[s_{\text{id}}]$ and $[s_\sigma]$ constructed above, are fixed.

- \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} construct the virtual polynomial $[T] := \text{merge}(T_0, \dots, T_{\mu-1})$.
- \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} run a 4-ary multiset check on the $\nu + \alpha$ -variate pairs $([s_{\text{id}}], [T])$ and $([s_\sigma], [T])$.

Theorem 4.22. *Protocol 4.21 securely decides the predicate $\text{Permutation}(\sigma)_{\iota, \nu}$ on $[T_0], \dots, [T_{\mu-1}]$.*

Proof. Assuming that $\text{Multiset}(2)_{\iota, \nu}(s_{\text{id}}, T, s_\sigma, T) = 1$, we show that $\text{Permutation}(\sigma)_{\iota, \nu}(T_0, \dots, T_{\mu-1}) = 1$ holds with probability 1. We write $\widehat{T}_{\text{id}} := \{(s_{\text{id}}(u), T(u)) \mid u \in \mathcal{B}_{\nu+\alpha}\}$ and $\widehat{T}_\sigma := \{(s_\sigma(u), T(u)) \mid u \in \mathcal{B}_{\nu+\alpha}\}$ (both viewed as multisubsets of \mathcal{T}_τ^2). We let $(i, v) \in \{0, \dots, \mu-1\} \times \mathcal{B}_\nu$ be arbitrary, and write $(i', v') := \sigma(i, v)$. We note that the multisets \widehat{T}_{id} and \widehat{T}_σ each admit precisely one element whose 0th component equals $s(i', v')$; indeed, these elements are exactly $(s(i', v'), T_{i'}(v'))$ and $(s(i', v'), T_i(v))$, respectively, by construction of s_{id} , s_σ , and T . By the assumed equality of \widehat{T}_{id} and \widehat{T}_σ of multisets, we conclude that $T_{i'}(v') = T_i(v)$. \square

4.3 New Virtual Polynomials

We now introduce a handful of *new* virtual polynomial constructions. Each of these constructions—on input a handle, or even a further virtual polynomial—materializes a virtual polynomial, which relates to its input in a specified way.

Packed virtual polynomials. We fix integers ι , κ , τ , and ν in \mathbb{N} . We recall from Subsection 2.3 the multilinear \mathcal{T}_ι -basis $(\beta_v)_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\kappa}$ of $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}$. We finally fix a vector $f \in \mathcal{T}_\iota^{\mathcal{B}_\nu}$.

We define the *packing operator* $\text{pack}_\kappa : \mathcal{T}_\iota^{\mathcal{B}_\nu} \rightarrow \mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}^{\mathcal{B}_{\nu-\kappa}}$ in the following way:

$$\text{pack}_\kappa(f) := \left(\sum_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\kappa} f(v \parallel u) \cdot \beta_v \right)_{u \in \mathcal{B}_{\nu-\kappa}}.$$

Intuitively, pack_κ iteratively processes “chunks” consisting of 2^κ lexicographically adjacent \mathcal{T}_ι -elements; it assembles the constituents of each such chunk into a single $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}$ -element.

We now record a virtual polynomial materialization of $\text{pack}_\kappa(f)$. For $f \in \mathcal{T}_\iota^{\mathcal{B}_\nu}$ again as above, we write $\tilde{f} \in \mathcal{T}_\iota[X_0, \dots, X_{\nu-1}]^{\leq 1}$ for the MLE of f ; we moreover write $\widetilde{\text{pack}_\kappa(f)} \in \mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}[X_0, \dots, X_{\nu-\kappa-1}]^{\leq 1}$ for the MLE of $\text{pack}_\kappa(f)$. We finally note the following explicit expression for $\widetilde{\text{pack}_\kappa(f)}$:

$$\widetilde{\text{pack}_\kappa(f)}(X_0, \dots, X_{\nu-\kappa-1}) = \sum_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\kappa} \tilde{f}(v_0, \dots, v_{\kappa-1}, X_0, \dots, X_{\nu-\kappa-1}) \cdot \beta_v,$$

where we destructure $(v_0, \dots, v_{\kappa-1}) = v$ for each $v \in \mathcal{B}_\kappa$. Indeed, for each $(u_0, \dots, u_{\nu-\kappa-1}) = u \in \mathcal{B}_{\nu-\kappa}$, $\widetilde{\text{pack}_\kappa(f)}(u_0, \dots, u_{\nu-\kappa-1}) = \text{pack}_\kappa(f)(u)$ necessarily holds; moreover, the polynomial above is multilinear.

When \tilde{f} is given as a handle $[f]$, the expression $\widetilde{\text{pack}_\kappa(f)}$ above defines a $\nu - \kappa$ -variate virtual polynomial, in the sense of Definition 4.6. In fact, this virtual polynomial moreover admits an evaluation protocol, as we now argue. We fix a query $\text{Query}(r', s')_{\nu-\kappa, \iota+\kappa}$. We note that the evaluation $\widetilde{\text{pack}_\kappa(f)}(r') = \sum_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\kappa} \beta_v \cdot \tilde{f}(v_0, \dots, v_{\kappa-1}, r'_0, \dots, r'_{\nu-\kappa-1})$ is itself the sum, over the cube \mathcal{B}_κ , of the κ -variate polynomial:

$$\widetilde{\text{pack}_\kappa(f, r')}(Y_0, \dots, Y_{\kappa-1}) := \tilde{f}(Y_0, \dots, Y_{\kappa-1}, r'_0, \dots, r'_{\nu-\kappa-1}) \cdot \tilde{\beta}(Y_0, \dots, Y_{\kappa-1}),$$

where we write $\tilde{\beta} \in \mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}[X_0, \dots, X_{\kappa-1}]^{\leq 1}$ for the MLE of $(\beta_u)_{u \in \mathcal{B}_\kappa}$. It thus suffices for the verifier to decide $\text{Sum}(s')_{\nu-\kappa, \tau}$ on $\widetilde{\text{pack}_\kappa(f, r')}$. Using the sumcheck protocol, the verifier may in turn reduce this predicate to $\text{Query}(r, s)_{\nu-\kappa, \tau}$, say, on $\widetilde{\text{pack}_\kappa(f, r')}$. To decide this latter predicate, \mathcal{V} may simply check $\tilde{\beta}(r) \cdot \tilde{f}(r \parallel r') \stackrel{?}{=} s$. We assume that κ is sufficiently small that \mathcal{V} may evaluate $\tilde{\beta}(r)$ itself; on the other hand, \mathcal{V} may ascertain $\tilde{f}(r \parallel r')$ by means of one query to $[f]$.

Shifted virtual polynomials. We again write $\mathcal{T}_\iota \subset \mathcal{T}_\tau$ for an arbitrary tower subfield, and fix an integer $\nu \in \mathbb{N}$. We recall the identification introduced in Section 2, which, for each $k \in \{0, \dots, \nu\}$, maps $v \in \mathcal{B}_k$ to $\{v\} := \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} 2^i \cdot v_i$.

For each *block size parameter* $b \in \{0, \dots, \nu\}$ and each *shift offset* $o \in \mathcal{B}_b$, the shift operator, on input $f \in \mathcal{T}_\iota^{\mathcal{B}_\nu}$, partitions f 's index set \mathcal{B}_ν into b -dimensional subcubes, and then circularly rotates each resulting sub-array by o steps (where we, implicitly, flatten each sub-array lexicographically). We make this precise in the following way. For $b \in \{0, \dots, \nu\}$ and $o \in \mathcal{B}_b$ and above, we define the *shift mapping* $s_{b,o} : \mathcal{B}_\nu \rightarrow \mathcal{B}_\nu$ by declaring, for each input $v = (v_0, \dots, v_{\nu-1}) \in \mathcal{B}_\nu$, that $s_{b,o}(v) := u$, where $u = (u_0, \dots, u_{\nu-1})$ is such that the most-significant substrings $(u_b, \dots, u_{\nu-1})$ and $(v_b, \dots, v_{\nu-1})$ agree, and $\{u\} + \{o\} \equiv \{v\} \pmod{2^b}$ moreover holds. We define the *shift operator* $\text{shift}_{b,o} : \mathcal{T}_\iota^{\mathcal{B}_\nu} \rightarrow \mathcal{T}_\iota^{\mathcal{B}_\nu}$ by mapping each $f \in \mathcal{T}_\iota^{\mathcal{B}_\nu}$ to the vector $\text{shift}_{b,o}(f) := (f(s_{b,o}(v)))_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu}$. We note that, provided that we write down the mappings f and $\text{shift}_{b,o}(f)$ as flattened vectors—that is, using the lexicographic identification $v \mapsto \sum_{i=0}^{\nu-1} v_i \cdot 2^i$ —we find that $\text{shift}_{b,o}(f)$ has precisely the effect of circularly rotating each contiguous 2^b -sized block of f downward by $\{o\}$ steps. We sometimes abuse notation, below, by writing $\text{shift}_{b,o}(f)$ and $\text{shift}_{b,\{o\}}(f)$ interchangeably.

We initiate an *arithmetic* characterization of the shift operator, which expresses each shifted vector $\text{shift}_{b,o}(f)$ as a virtual polynomial on its input f . In fact, our construction moreover admits a linear-time—that is, a $\Theta(b)$ -time—evaluation algorithm, as we explain below. Our approach is inspired by, and generalizes, the “adding 1 in binary” multilinear indicator of Setty, Thaler, and Wahby [STW23a, Sec. 5.1].

We first define the length- b , o -step *shift indicator* function $\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}_{b,o} : \mathcal{B}_b \times \mathcal{B}_b \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, in the following way:

$$\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}_{b,o}(x, y) \mapsto \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \{y\} \stackrel{?}{\equiv} \{x\} + \{o\} \pmod{2^b} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

For b and $(o_0, \dots, o_{b-1}) = o \in \mathcal{B}_b$ again fixed, we realize the shift indicator function $\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}_{b,o}$ inductively, by means of a *sequence* of functions $\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}'_{k,o}$ and $\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}''_{k,o}$, each mapping $\mathcal{B}_k \times \mathcal{B}_k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, for $k \in \{0, \dots, b\}$. That is, for each $k \in \{0, \dots, b\}$, on arguments x and y in \mathcal{B}_k , we define the function $\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}'_{k,o}(x, y)$ so as to detect the condition $\{y\} \stackrel{?}{\equiv} \{x\} + \{o\}$, and define $\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}''_{k,o}(x, y)$ so as to detect the condition $\{y\} \stackrel{?}{\equiv} \{x\} + \{o\} - 2^k$, where, in both expressions, we interpret $o = (o_0, \dots, o_{k-1})$ as an element of \mathcal{B}_k by truncating its bits. In words, $\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}'_{k,o}$ detects the condition whereby the k -bit strings x and y differ exactly by the *binary addition* of o 's least-significant k bits, and without overflow no less; $\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}''_{k,o}$ detects the analogous condition, modulo an overflow into the k^{th} -indexed bit position. We finally note that $\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}_{b,o} := \mathbf{s}\text{-ind}'_{b,o} \vee \mathbf{s}\text{-ind}''_{b,o}$.

We now supply an inductive—and arithmetically friendly—description of the functions $\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}'_{k,o}$ and $\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}''_{k,o}$, for $k \in \{0, \dots, b\}$. For typographical convenience, we give meaning to expressions of the form $\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}'_{k-1,o}(x, y)$ and $\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}''_{k-1,o}(x, y)$, for arguments x and y in \mathcal{B}_k —i.e., rather than in the domain of definition \mathcal{B}_{k-1} —by stipulating that the functions simply ignore their arguments' respective most-significant (that is, $k-1$ -indexed) bits. Finally, below, we understand the expression $x_{k-1} \stackrel{?}{=} o_{k-1} + y_{k-1}$ and its variants *over the integers* (i.e., as integer expressions over the arguments x_{k-1} , y_{k-1} , and o_{k-1} in $\{0, 1\} \subset \mathbb{Z}$).

case $k = 0$.

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{s}\text{-ind}'_{0,o} &= 1. \\ \mathbf{s}\text{-ind}''_{0,o} &= 0. \end{aligned}$$

case $k > 0$.

$$\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}'_{k,o}(x, y) = \begin{cases} \mathbf{s}\text{-ind}'_{k-1,o}(x, y) & \text{if } x_{k-1} + o_{k-1} \stackrel{?}{=} y_{k-1} \\ \mathbf{s}\text{-ind}''_{k-1,o}(x, y) & \text{if } x_{k-1} + o_{k-1} + 1 \stackrel{?}{=} y_{k-1} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

$$\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}''_{k,o}(x, y) = \begin{cases} \mathbf{s}\text{-ind}'_{k-1,o}(x, y) & \text{if } x_{k-1} + o_{k-1} \stackrel{?}{=} y_{k-1} + 2 \\ \mathbf{s}\text{-ind}''_{k-1,o}(x, y) & \text{if } x_{k-1} + o_{k-1} + 1 \stackrel{?}{=} y_{k-1} + 2 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

The correctness of this inductive description may be explicitly checked. We note that certain among the case-expressions above can only hold in particular settings; for example, $x_{k-1} + o_{k-1} \stackrel{?}{=} y_{k-1} + 2$ holds if and only if x_{k-1} and o_{k-1} both equal 1 and y_{k-1} is 0. Finally, we note that $\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}_{b,o}(x, y) = \mathbf{s}\text{-ind}'_{b,o}(x, y) + \mathbf{s}\text{-ind}''_{b,o}(x, y)$ holds for each $(x, y) \in \mathcal{B}_b \times \mathcal{B}_b$.

Exploiting the inductive description just given, we now *arithmetically* characterize the MLEs in $\mathcal{T}_L[X_0, \dots, X_{k-1}, Y_0, \dots, Y_{k-1}]^{\leq 1}$ of the shift-indicator functions $\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}'_{k,o}$ and $\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}''_{k,o}$.

case $k = 0$.

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{s}\text{-ind}_{0,o} &= 1. \\ \widetilde{\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}}''_{0,o} &= 0. \end{aligned}$$

case $k > 0$.

$$\widetilde{\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}}'_{k,o}(X, Y) = \begin{cases} \widetilde{\text{eq}}(X_{k-1}, Y_{k-1}) \cdot \widetilde{\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}}'_{k-1,o}(X, Y) + (1 - X_{k-1}) \cdot Y_{k-1} \cdot \widetilde{\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}}''_{k-1,o}(X, Y) & o_{k-1} \stackrel{?}{=} 0. \\ (1 - X_{k-1}) \cdot Y_{k-1} \cdot \widetilde{\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}}'_{k-1,o}(X, Y) & o_{k-1} \stackrel{?}{=} 1. \end{cases}$$

$$\widetilde{\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}}''_{k,o}(X, Y) = \begin{cases} X_{k-1} \cdot (1 - Y_{k-1}) \cdot \widetilde{\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}}''_{k-1,o}(X, Y) & o_{k-1} \stackrel{?}{=} 0. \\ X_{k-1} \cdot (1 - Y_{k-1}) \cdot \widetilde{\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}}'_{k-1,o}(X, Y) + \widetilde{\mathbf{eq}}(X_{k-1}, Y_{k-1}) \cdot \widetilde{\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}}''_{k-1,o}(X, Y) & o_{k-1} \stackrel{?}{=} 1. \end{cases}$$

Above, we denote by $\mathbf{eq} : \mathcal{B}_2 \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ the boolean equality function $(X_{k-1}, Y_{k-1}) \mapsto X_{k-1} \stackrel{?}{=} Y_{k-1}$, and by $\widetilde{\mathbf{eq}}$ its \mathcal{T}_l -multilinear extension. We again stipulate that the functions $\widetilde{\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}}'_{k-1,o}$ and $\widetilde{\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}}''_{k-1,o}$, upon being fed k -variate arguments, simply ignore these arguments' respective last variables.

Finally, we define $\widetilde{\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}}_{b,o} := \widetilde{\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}}'_{b,o} + \widetilde{\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}}''_{b,o}$.

Theorem 4.23. *The polynomial $\widetilde{\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}}_{b,o} \in \mathcal{T}_l[X_0, \dots, X_{b-1}, Y_0, \dots, Y_{b-1}]$ just given is the MLE of $\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}_{b,o}$.*

Proof. The function $\widetilde{\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}}_{b,o}$'s pointwise agreement with $\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}_{b,o}$ over $\mathcal{B}_b \times \mathcal{B}_b$ is self-evident. Its multilinearity holds by induction; indeed, for each $k \in \{1, \dots, b\}$, we note that both $\widetilde{\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}}'_{k,o}$ and $\widetilde{\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}}''_{k,o}$ are sums of products between some *multilinear* function of X_{k-1} and Y_{k-1} and either $\widetilde{\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}}'_{k-1,o}$ or $\widetilde{\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}}''_{k-1,o}$, functions which themselves are—by induction—multilinear in the variables $(X_0, \dots, X_{k-2}, Y_0, \dots, Y_{k-2})$. Each such product expression is necessarily multilinear in the variables $(X_0, \dots, X_{k-1}, Y_0, \dots, Y_{k-1})$. \square

We finally note that the polynomial $\widetilde{\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}}_{b,o}$ admits a $\Theta(b)$ -sized, layered arithmetic circuit; this circuit's description arises straightforwardly from the function's inductive characterization just given above.

We return to the shift operator $\mathbf{shift}_{b,o} : \mathcal{T}_l^{\mathcal{B}_\nu} \rightarrow \mathcal{T}_l^{\mathcal{B}_\nu}$ already introduced. Leveraging the arithmetized shift-indicator functions just treated, we now present an arithmetical description of $\mathbf{shift}_{b,o}$. Indeed, for each $f \in \mathcal{T}_l^{\mathcal{B}_\nu}$ and each $v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu$, we have the equality:

$$\mathbf{shift}_{b,o}(f)(v) = \sum_{u \in \mathcal{B}_b} f(u_0, \dots, u_{b-1}, v_b, \dots, v_{\nu-1}) \cdot \mathbf{s}\text{-ind}_{b,o}(u_0, \dots, u_{b-1}, v_0, \dots, v_{b-1}).$$

Finally, we write $\widetilde{\mathbf{shift}}_{b,o}(f) \in \mathcal{T}_l[X_0, \dots, X_{\nu-1}]^{\geq 1}$ for the MLE of $\mathbf{shift}_{b,o}(f)$. We note the explicit expression:

$$\widetilde{\mathbf{shift}}_{b,o}(f)(X_0, \dots, X_{\nu-1}) = \sum_{u \in \mathcal{B}_b} \widetilde{f}(u_0, \dots, u_{b-1}, X_b, \dots, X_{\nu-1}) \cdot \widetilde{\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}}_{b,o}(u_0, \dots, u_{b-1}, X_0, \dots, X_{b-1}).$$

Indeed, the polynomial above is clearly multilinear, and agrees pointwise with $\mathbf{shift}_{b,o}(f)$ over \mathcal{B}_ν .

When $[f]$ is a handle, the expression $\widetilde{\mathbf{shift}}_{b,o}(f)$ defines a virtual polynomial, which we again claim is efficiently evaluable. We fix a query $\mathbf{Query}(r', s')_{l,\nu}$. We note that the evaluation $\widetilde{\mathbf{shift}}_{b,o}(f)(r')$ is *itself* the sum, over the cube \mathcal{B}_b , of the b -variate polynomial:

$$\widetilde{\mathbf{shift}}_{b,o}(f, r')(Y_0, \dots, Y_{b-1}) := \widetilde{f}(Y_0, \dots, Y_{b-1}, r'_b, \dots, r'_{\nu-1}) \cdot \widetilde{\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}}_{b,o}(Y_0, \dots, Y_{b-1}, r'_0, \dots, r'_{b-1}).$$

It thus suffices for \mathcal{V} to decide $\mathbf{Sum}(s')_{\tau,b}$ on $\widetilde{\mathbf{shift}}_{b,o}(f, r')$; using a sumcheck, \mathcal{V} may in turn reduce this predicate to $\mathbf{Query}(r, s)_{l,b}$ on $\widetilde{\mathbf{shift}}_{b,o}(f, r')$, for values $r \in \mathcal{T}_\tau^b$ and $s \in \mathcal{T}_\tau$ derived during the sumcheck. As before, \mathcal{V} may decide this latter predicate itself, by locally evaluating $\widetilde{\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}}_{b,o}(r_0, \dots, r_{b-1}, r'_0, \dots, r'_{b-1})$ and querying $f(r_0, \dots, r_{b-1}, r'_b, \dots, r'_{\nu-1})$.

We will occasionally find reason to insist on the nonexistence or the existence of an overflow. In these cases, respectively, we may simply replace the shift-indicator function $\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}_{b,o}$ with its simpler analogues $\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}'_{b,o}$ and $\mathbf{s}\text{-ind}''_{b,o}$, in the expression for $\mathbf{shift}_{b,o}$ above. We write $\mathbf{shift}'_{b,o}$ and $\mathbf{shift}''_{b,o}$ for the resulting *overflow-free* and *overflow-mandated* shift operators.

Example 4.24. We set $\iota := 0$ and $b := 5$, and fix $\nu \geq 5$ and $o := (o_0, \dots, o_4) \in \mathcal{B}_5$ arbitrarily. For each vector $f \in \mathcal{T}_0^{\mathcal{B}_\nu}$ —which we view as a length- 2^ν column of bits, by means of the lexicographic flattening $v \mapsto \sum_{i=0}^{\nu-1} 2^i \cdot v_i$ —the operator $\mathbf{shift}_{b,o}(f)$ breaks f into 32-elements chunks, and then *circularly rotates* each chunk downwards by $\{o\}$ steps (or equivalently, upward by $32 - \{o\}$ steps). On the other hand, the overflow-free shift operator $\mathbf{shift}'_{b,o}(f)$ rotates each chunk downwards by $\{o\}$ steps, without rotation; that is, it 0-fills the first $\{o\}$ components of each chunk. Finally, the operator $\mathbf{shift}''_{b,o}(f)$ acts by upwardly shifting f by $32 - \{o\}$ steps, 0-filling the *bottom* $32 - \{o\}$ elements of each chunk.

Remark 4.25. Our shift construction answers in the affirmative an open problem posed by HyperPlonk [CBBZ23, p. 52]. Indeed, the construction [CBBZ23, Lem. 3.13] (that is, Lemma 3.9 of the full version) yields a virtual polynomial which does something like a one-step circular shift; specifically, that construction’s permutation leaves the origin fixed, and rotates the rest of the vector in *some*—not lexicographic—order (determined by the action of a multiplicative generator). Though that construction can be iterated, the complexity of the iterated virtual polynomial grows exponentially in the number of iterations (i.e., the number of rotation steps). Our shift construction, on the other hand, performs a true circular rotation—that is, without a degenerate orbit at the origin—and moreover operates in lexicographic order. Interestingly, our shift construction’s complexity is moreover *completely independent* of the rotation offset. Rather, our virtual polynomial grows linearly in the block size; critically, however, it admits an evaluation protocol—which itself leverages the sumcheck—whose complexity grows only *logarithmically* in the block size.

The saturation operator. We record a final, and very simple, virtual polynomial construction, which we use in our multiplication gadget below (see Subsection 5.3). For $\nu \geq 0$ fixed, and given *block size* and *offset* parameters $b \in \{0, \dots, \nu\}$ and $o \in \mathcal{B}_b$ as above, the saturation operator, on input $f \in \mathcal{T}_t^{\mathcal{B}_\nu}$, partitions f ’s index set \mathcal{B}_ν into b -dimensional subcubes, and “saturates” each resulting block with a single value (i.e., that which f takes at the block’s o^{th} position). More precisely, we define the *saturation mapping* $r_{b,o} : \mathcal{B}_\nu \rightarrow \mathcal{B}_\nu$ by setting $r_{b,o}(v_0, \dots, v_{\nu-1}) := (o_0, \dots, o_{b-1}, v_b, \dots, v_{\nu-1})$, for each $v = (v_0, \dots, v_{\nu-1}) \in \mathcal{B}_\nu$; finally, we define the *saturation operator* $\text{sat}_{b,o} : \mathcal{T}_t^{\mathcal{B}_\nu} \rightarrow \mathcal{T}_t^{\mathcal{B}_\nu}$ by setting $\text{sat}_{b,o}(f) := (f(r_{b,o}(v)))_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu}$.

We record a virtual polynomial realization of the saturation operator. Indeed, for $b \in \{0, \dots, \nu\}$ and $o \in \mathcal{B}_b$ as above, and for each $f \in \mathcal{T}_t^{\mathcal{B}_\nu}$ and $v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu$, we have that:

$$\text{sat}_{b,o}(f)(v) = f(o_0, \dots, o_{b-1}, v_b, \dots, v_{\nu-1});$$

writing $\widetilde{\text{sat}}_{b,o}(f) \in \mathcal{T}_t[X_0, \dots, X_{\nu-1}]^{\leq 1}$ for the MLE of $\text{sat}_{b,o}(f)$, we conclude that:

$$\widetilde{\text{sat}}_{b,o}(f)(X_0, \dots, X_{\nu-1}) = \widetilde{f}(o_0, \dots, o_{b-1}, X_b, \dots, X_{\nu-1}).$$

The polynomial above is clearly multilinear, and agrees pointwise with $\text{sat}_{b,o}(f)$ over \mathcal{B}_ν .

When f is a virtual polynomial, $\widetilde{\text{sat}}_{b,o}(f)$ clearly also is, and can be evaluated as efficiently as f can.

4.4 Binary-Field Lasso

In this subsection, we discuss the work *Lasso* of Setty, Thaler and Wahby [STW23b] and adapt that work to our binary tower setting.

We develop a distilled, conceptually minimal approach to Lasso, by teasing apart its various components. Indeed, we contend that Lasso ultimately amounts to a combination of the following components:

- **A virtual polynomial abstraction, which materializes large tables.** Indeed, Lasso’s “SOS tables” [STW23b, § 3.2] can be viewed as *composition virtual polynomials* in the sense of Example 4.9 above, which, operating over subtables, virtually materialize large tables.
- **A small-table lookup procedure.** Lasso’s core contribution is, arguably, its single-table lookup procedure [STW23a, Claim. 3], a virtual polynomial protocol which—using *offline memory-checking* in the sense of Blum, Evans, Gemmell, Kannan, and Naor [Blu+91]—proves that the values taken over the cube by one virtual polynomial represent a subset of the values taken over the cube by another virtual polynomial. More precisely, Lasso’s lookup procedure reduces precisely this predicate to a multiset predicate on certain further virtual polynomials.
- **A multiset-check.** Finally, Lasso employs a virtual protocol which securely decides the multiset predicate [STW23a, Claim. 4], in the sense already developed in Subsections 4.1 and 4.2 above.

Leveraging our abstractions, already developed above, for virtual polynomials and multisets, we thus record a minimal rendition of Lasso, which, in particular, isolates its memory-checking component. Importantly, we excise the table-virtualization process from the jurisdiction of the lookup itself, and subsume

it into the constraint-satisfaction apparatus already furnished by the higher-level SNARK (see Section 5 below). This separation of concerns yields a conceptually simpler framework.

Separately, we adapt Lasso to the setting of binary fields. We note first of all that the key technical result [STW23a, Claim. 2] assumes that the field at hand is prime, with large characteristic (i.e., larger than the length of the looked-up column). Moreover, this restriction is essential, in the sense that [STW23a, Fig. 3] as written is actually insecure in the small-characteristic setting. We adapt that work by introducing a *multiplicative* version of it; that is, we stipulate that the prover and verifier jointly increment the protocol’s various “memory counts” not by adding 1 to them, but rather by multiplying them by a multiplicative generator of an appropriate binary field. Our multiplicative adaptation, however, introduces further complications. Indeed, unlike the incrementation operation, the *multiply-by-generator* operation on a field induces an action which is *not* transitive, but rather features a singleton orbit (at 0, of course). Since this fact too can be used to attack the protocol, we must further require that the prover submit an everywhere-nonzero vector of read counts. We achieve this guarantee in our treatment below, at the cost of requiring that the prover commit to an additional polynomial (we discuss our remedy further in Remark 4.28 below).

We now record our protocol for the lookup predicate $\text{Lookup}_{\iota, \nu} : (T, U) \mapsto \bigwedge_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu} \exists v' \in \mathcal{B}_\nu : U(v) = T(v')$.

PROTOCOL 4.26 (Lasso-based lookup [STW23a]).

Parameters ι and ν in \mathbb{N} , and ν -variate virtual polynomials $[T]$ and $[U]$ over \mathcal{T}_ι , are fixed.

- \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} set $\zeta \geq 0$ minimally so that $|T_\zeta| - 1 > 2^\nu$ holds (equivalently, they set $\zeta := \lceil \log(\nu + 1) \rceil$); \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} moreover fix a generator $\alpha \in \mathcal{T}_\zeta^*$ of \mathcal{T}_ζ ’s multiplicative group of units \mathcal{T}_ζ^* .
- \mathcal{P} defines arrays R and F in $\mathcal{T}_\zeta^{\mathcal{B}_\nu}$ as follows. \mathcal{P} initializes $F := (1)_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu}$, and then executes:

-
- 1: **for** each $v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu$, in *any* order, **do**
 - 2: pick an arbitrary $v' \in \mathcal{B}_\nu$ for which $U(v) = T(v')$ holds.
 - 3: assign $R[v] := F[v']$.
 - 4: overwrite $F[v'] \times = \alpha$.
-

\mathcal{P} sets $R' := \left(\frac{1}{R(v)} \right)_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu}$ to be the pointwise reciprocal of the vector R . \mathcal{P} submits the multilinear extensions $(\text{submit}, \zeta, \nu, \tilde{R})$, $(\text{submit}, \zeta, \nu, \tilde{R}')$, and $(\text{submit}, \zeta, \nu, \tilde{F})$ to the oracle.

- \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} run a zerocheck on the ν -variate virtual polynomial $R \cdot R' - 1$ over \mathcal{T}_ζ .
- \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} define further ν -variate virtual polynomials as follows. They set $O : (X_0, \dots, X_{\nu-1}) \mapsto 1$ to be the identically-1 polynomial, and set $W := \alpha \cdot R$. \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} finally run a 4-ary multiset check on the $\nu + 1$ -variate pairs $(\text{merge}(T, U), \text{merge}(O, W))$ and $(\text{merge}(T, U), \text{merge}(F, R))$.

Above, our F corresponds to Lasso’s array of “final counts”, R correspond to its array of inline read counts, and W corresponds to its array of inline write counts. We refer to [STW23a, Claim 3]. Protocol 4.26’s completeness amounts to a more-or-less straightforward, albeit slightly subtle exercise, and essentially follows from [STW23a, Claim 2]. We suggest the following inductive proof. Indeed, assuming that R is *initialized* to the all-zero array $(0)_{v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu}$, we argue that the the equality

$$\{(T(v), 1) \mid v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu\} \cup \{(U(v), \alpha \cdot R(v)) \mid v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu\} = \{(T(v), F(v)) \mid v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu\} \cup \{(U(v), R(v)) \mid v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu\} \quad (1)$$

of multisets is an *algorithmic invariant* of the main loop above (that is, it holds as of the beginning of each iteration). The base case is clear (both multisets at hand equal $\{(T(v), 1) \mid v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu\} \cup \{(U(v), 0) \mid v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu\}$). We fix an iteration index $v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu$ of the above loop. The assignment 3 entails removing $(U(v), 0)$ from *both* multisets, as well as adding $(U(v), \alpha \cdot F[v'])$ to the left multiset and $(U(v), F[v'])$ to the right. On the other hand, the update 4 entails removing $(T(v'), F[v'])$ from the right multiset and adding $(T(v'), \alpha \cdot F[v'])$ to the right multiset. Since $T(v') = U(v)$, these changes balance; assuming that the equality held at the loop’s beginning, we conclude that it likewise holds as of the loop’s end. This completes the proof of completeness.

Theorem 4.27. *Protocol 4.26 securely decides the lookup predicate on T and U .*

Proof. We adapt Setty, Thaler, and Wahby [STW23a, Claim 3] to the multiplicative setting. Assuming that $\text{Zero}_{\zeta,\nu}(R \cdot R' - 1) = 1$ and $\text{Multiset}(4)_{\tau,\nu+1}(\text{merge}(T, U), \text{merge}(O, W), \text{merge}(T, U), \text{merge}(F, R)) = 1$ both hold, we show that $\text{Lookup}_{\iota,\nu}(T, U) = 1$ holds with probability 1. Our assumption $\text{Zero}_{\zeta,\nu}(R \cdot R' - 1) = 1$ immediately implies that, for each $v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu$, $R(v) \cdot R'(v) = 1$, so that $R(v) \neq 0$. Our second assumption is precisely the equality (1) of multisets. From it, we conclude *a fortiori* that

$$\{(U(v), R(v)) \mid v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu\} \subset \{(T(v), 1) \mid v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu\} \cup \{(U(v), \alpha \cdot R(v)) \mid v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu\} \quad (2)$$

as multisets. We suppose, for contradiction, that $v_0 \in \mathcal{B}_\nu$, say, were such that, for each $v' \in \mathcal{B}_\nu$, $U(v_0) \neq T(v')$ held. Our hypothesis on v_0 implies that $(U(v_0), R(v_0)) \notin \{(T(v), 1) \mid v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu\}$; we thus conclude from (2) that $(U(v_0), R(v_0)) \in \{(U(v), \alpha \cdot R(v)) \mid v \in \mathcal{B}_\nu\}$, so that $v_1 \in \mathcal{B}_\nu$, say, is such that $(U(v_0), R(v_0)) = (U(v_1), \alpha \cdot R(v_1))$. Since $U(v_1) = U(v_2)$, applying (2) again to the pair $(U(v_1), R(v_1))$, we find as before an element $v_2 \in \mathcal{B}_\nu$, say, for which $(U(v_1), R(v_1)) = (U(v_2), \alpha \cdot R(v_2))$. Proceeding in this way, we obtain a sequence of elements $v_i \in \mathcal{B}_\nu$, for $i \in \{0, \dots, 2^\nu\}$, for which, for each $i \in \{0, \dots, 2^\nu - 1\}$, we have $R(v_{i+1}) \cdot \alpha = R(v_i)$. Since $|\mathcal{B}_\nu| = 2^\nu$, by the pigeonhole principle, we must have a collision $v_i = v_j$, for unequal indices $i < j$, say, in $\{0, \dots, 2^\nu\}$. We conclude that $R(v_i) = \alpha^{j-i} \cdot R(v_j) = \alpha^{j-i} \cdot R(v_i)$; using our guarantee whereby $R(v_i) \neq 0$, we finally conclude that $\alpha^{j-i} = 1$. Since $j - i \in \{1, \dots, 2^\nu\}$, and α 's multiplicative order is exactly $|\mathcal{T}_\zeta| - 1 > 2^\nu$, we obtain a contradiction. We conclude that $\text{Lookup}_{\iota,\nu}(T, U) = 1$, as desired. \square

Remark 4.28. The naïve multiplicative adaptation of Spark [STW23a, Fig. 3] would neglect to include the pointwise reciprocal R' in Protocol 4.26 above. We argue that this reciprocal is necessary by exhibiting an attack on this simpler variant of Protocol 4.26 (i.e., that which omits R'). (In other words, the everywhere-nonvanishing of R —used in our proof of Theorem 4.27 above—is essential.) Indeed, to attack that protocol, \mathcal{P} may, on an *arbitrarily chosen* statement U , simply set R identically zero and F identically 1. Having begun in this way, and otherwise proceeding honestly (i.e., in the multiset check), \mathcal{P} will convince the verifier. Indeed, we see directly that, in this setting, W will likewise be identically zero, and that the equality (1) of multisets will hold. This attack's root cause is that the element $0 \in \mathcal{T}_\zeta$ constitutes a degenerate orbit—of size 1—under the multiplicative α -action on \mathcal{T}_ζ . The pairs $(U(v), 0)$ and $(U(v), \alpha \cdot 0)$ thus *balance* the right and left multisets, respectively, regardless of $U(v)$ (i.e., regardless of whether it equals $T(v')$ for some $v' \in \mathcal{B}_\nu$).

5 A SNARK over Binary Tower Fields

We now present a practical SNARK, suitable for general statements over binary tower fields. Its arithmetization scheme—that is, the method by which it algebraically captures general computations—refines the *PLONKish* scheme of Grigg, Bowe, Hopwood and Lai [GBHL22], and in particular its adaptation, due to Chen, Bünz, Boneh and Zhang's *HyperPlonk* [CBBZ23, Def. 4.1], to the multivariate setting. The PLONKish arithmetization arranges its witness data into a computational trace, called a *trace matrix*, of field elements. The scheme moreover makes use of a plurality of *gate constraints*; these are multivariate polynomials, to be evaluated over certain subsets of the trace matrix.

Our treatment differs from HyperPlonk's primarily in that we do not confine ourselves to a single finite field. Rather, we partition our trace matrix's column set into regions, each in turn corresponding to *different* subfields in the tower. For example, our trace matrix might feature certain columns defined over \mathbb{F}_2 , others over \mathbb{F}_{2^8} , and still others over $\mathbb{F}_{2^{32}}$, say. Our gate constraints, moreover, may express polynomial relations defined over *particular* subfields of the tower. In fact, even a single gate constraint may freely act on columns which themselves belong to *unequally* sized subfields; indeed, each among the tower's subfields embeds unambiguously into each of its larger fields.

We pause to emphasize the utility of the virtual polynomial abstraction constructions in our SNARK. Indeed, the “virtual polynomial-centric” approach we pursue serves to vastly reduce the number of trace columns which the prover must explicitly commit to. That is, instead of requiring that the prover commit to certain auxiliary columns, and only then ensuring that they relate as prescribed to the trace columns, the verifier may instead directly materialize the needed auxiliary columns virtually. The verifier may then, finally, check that the relevant polynomial relations—each defined over a collection consisting of both explicit *and* virtual columns—hold.

5.1 The PLONK relation

We define the indexed relation R_{PLONK} on tuples of the form $(\mathbf{i}, \mathbf{x}; \mathbf{w})$, where the *index* \mathbf{i} captures the public parameters of the constraint system, the *statement* \mathbf{x} represents the circuit’s public inputs, and the *witness* \mathbf{w} includes further inputs to the circuit.

The index is defined to be a tuple of the form $\mathbf{i} = (\tau, \nu, \xi, n_\varphi, n_\psi, \iota, a, g, \sigma)$, where:

- $\tau \in \mathbb{N}$ is the height of the maximally-indexed tower step \mathcal{T}_τ in use,
- $\nu \in \mathbb{N}$ is the base-2 logarithm of the number of trace rows (we require $\nu \leq 2^\tau$),
- $\xi \in \{0, \dots, \nu\}$ is the base-2 logarithm of the statement length,
- $n_\varphi \in \mathbb{N}$ is the number of *fixed columns*,
- $n_\psi \in \mathbb{N}$ is the number of *witness columns*,
- $\iota : \{0, \dots, n_\psi - 1\} \rightarrow \{0, \dots, \tau\}$ is a mapping, which assigns to each witness column a tower field index,
- $a \in (\mathcal{T}_\tau^{\mathcal{B}_\nu})^{n_\varphi}$ is the array of *fixed columns*,
- $(g_0, \dots, g_{\mu-1})$ is a list of ν -variate virtual polynomials, each of which operates over $n_\varphi + n_\psi$ handles,
- $\sigma : \{0, \dots, n_\varphi + n_\psi\} \times \mathcal{B}_\nu \rightarrow \{0, \dots, n_\varphi + n_\psi\} \times \mathcal{B}_\nu$ defines a plurality of global copy constraints.

The statement is $\mathbf{x} := x \in \mathcal{T}_\tau^{\mathcal{B}_\nu}$, a vector of input values. The witness is $\mathbf{w} := w \in (\mathcal{T}_\tau^{\mathcal{B}_\nu})^{n_\psi}$, an array of witness columns.

We record several remarks. We assume throughout that τ is sufficiently large that an injection $s : \{0, \dots, n_\varphi + n_\psi\} \times \mathcal{B}_\nu \hookrightarrow \mathcal{T}_\tau$ exists. Above, we slightly abuse notation by calling the objects $(g_0, \dots, g_{\mu-1})$ “virtual polynomials”; more properly, these are circuits which operates over “placeholder” handles (i.e., handles which don’t exist yet). Once the relevant handles become available—i.e., after the indexer and prover commit to the fixed and witness columns, respectively—the verifier may, by “plugging in” the appropriate handles, create from each of these circuits a genuine virtual polynomial. On the other hand, upon being fed real polynomials (as opposed to handles), these virtual polynomials of course become standard polynomials.

For convenience, we write $\text{pad}_\nu(x) \in \mathcal{T}_\tau^{\mathcal{B}_\nu}$ for the zero-extension of the vector $x \in \mathcal{T}_\tau^{\mathcal{B}_\nu}$ to the domain \mathcal{B}_ν ; we moreover write $c \in (\mathcal{T}_\tau^{\mathcal{B}_\nu})^{n_\varphi + n_\psi}$ for the concatenation of columns $c := a \parallel w \parallel \text{pad}_\nu(x)$. The indexed relation $\mathcal{R}_{\text{PLONK}}$ holds, by definition, if and only if:

1. For each $i \in \{0, \dots, \mu - 1\}$, the polynomial $g_i(c_0, \dots, c_{n_\varphi + n_\psi - 1})$ is identically zero over \mathcal{B}_ν .
2. For each $(i, v) \in \{0, \dots, n_\varphi + n_\psi\} \times \mathcal{B}_\nu$, it holds that $c_i(v) = c_{i'}(v')$, where we write $(i', v') := \sigma(i, v)$.
3. For each $(i, v) \in \{0, \dots, n_\psi - 1\} \times \mathcal{B}_\nu$, it holds that $w_i(v) \in \mathcal{T}_{\iota(i)} \subset \mathcal{T}_\tau$.

These three conditions capture, respectively, the witness’s satisfaction of all gate constraints, its satisfaction of all global copy constraints, and finally its satisfaction of all subfield constraints. The first two conditions are standard across PLONKish variants (see e.g. [CBBZ23, Def. 4.1]); the third condition is new, and pertains specifically to our tower setting. We note that we do *not* isolate so-called *selector columns*, as prior formalizations do (see e.g. [CBBZ23, Sec. 4.1] and [STW23a, Sec. 2.2]); instead, we subsume these into our fixed columns a .

5.2 Our Protocol

We now present a tower field multilinear polynomial IOP for the indexed relation R_{PLONK} . On the input \mathbf{i} , the indexer \mathcal{I} , for each $i \in \{0, \dots, n_\varphi - 1\}$, submits (**submit**, τ, ν, \tilde{a}_i) to the oracle, where \tilde{a}_i is the MLE of the fixed column $a_i \in \mathcal{T}_\tau^{\mathcal{B}_\nu}$, and receives (**receipt**, $\tau, \nu, [a_i]$). Moreover, \mathcal{I} performs the *permutation check*’s setup procedure—already described in detail in advance of Protocol 4.21 above—with respect to the permutation $\sigma : \{0, \dots, n_\varphi + n_\psi\} \times \mathcal{B}_\nu \rightarrow \{0, \dots, n_\varphi + n_\psi\} \times \mathcal{B}_\nu$; in this way, \mathcal{I} obtains further handles $[s_{\text{id}}]$ and $[s_\sigma]$. Finally, \mathcal{I} outputs the list of handles $\text{vp} := ([a_0], \dots, [a_{n_\varphi - 1}], [s_{\text{id}}], [s_\sigma])$.

PROTOCOL 5.1 (main polynomial IOP for R_{PLOOK}).

On the security parameter λ , and common input \mathbf{i} and \mathbf{x} , \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} proceed as follows.

- Both \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} compute the zero-extension $\text{pad}_\nu(c_i)$, as well as its MLE $\widetilde{\text{pad}}_\nu(c_i)$.
- For each $i \in \{0, \dots, n_\psi - 1\}$, \mathcal{P} sends $(\text{submit}, \iota(i), \nu, w_i)$ to the polynomial oracle.
- For each $i \in \{0, \dots, n_\psi - 1\}$, upon receiving $(\text{receipt}, \iota_i, \nu, [w_i])$ from the oracle, \mathcal{V} checks $\iota_i \stackrel{?}{=} \iota(i)$.

We abbreviate $([c_0], \dots, [c_{n_\varphi+n_\psi-1}]) := ([a_0], \dots, [a_{n_\varphi-1}], [w_0], \dots, [w_{n_\psi-1}])$.

- For each $i \in \{0, \dots, \mu - 1\}$, \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} zerocheck the virtual polynomial $g_i([c_0], \dots, [c_{n_\varphi+n_\psi-1}])$.
- \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} run a permutation check, with statement σ , on the input $([c_0], \dots, [c_{n_\varphi+n_\psi-1}])$.

Theorem 5.2. *Protocol 5.1 securely computes the relation R_{PLOOK} .*

Proof. We construct an emulator \mathcal{E} . Our emulator \mathcal{E} operates as follows, given access to \mathcal{A} , and to \mathbf{i} and \mathbf{x} :

1. \mathcal{E} independently runs $\text{vp} := \mathcal{I}(\mathbf{i})$, internally simulating the existence of the polynomial oracle.
2. Using vp , and playing the role of \mathcal{V} , \mathcal{E} runs \mathcal{A} internally, and in particular intercepts its submissions $(\text{submit}, \iota_i, \nu, w_i)$ intended for the polynomial oracle. As \mathcal{V} would, \mathcal{E} aborts if, for any index $i \in \{0, \dots, n_\psi - 1\}$, either \mathcal{A} fails to submit the expected witness w_i or the tower height $\iota_i \neq \iota(i)$ is wrong.
3. \mathcal{E} continues to simulate the role of \mathcal{V} internally to \mathcal{A} , during the course of the virtual protocols prescribed by Protocol 5.1. If, at any point, the verifier \mathcal{V} in \mathcal{E} 's head aborts, then \mathcal{E} does too (i.e., it outputs \perp).
4. \mathcal{E} outputs $\mathbf{w} := (w_0, \dots, w_{n_\psi-1})$ and terminates.

We argue that \mathcal{E} fulfills the requirements of Definition 4.3 with respect to the relation R_{PLOOK} . We note first that \mathcal{E} outputs \mathbf{w} in step 4 above with *the same* probability with which \mathcal{V} accepts. It follows that the relevant discrepancy $|\Pr[\langle \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{i}, \mathbf{x}), \mathcal{V}(\text{vp}, \mathbf{x}) \rangle = 1] - \Pr[R(\mathbf{i}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{w}) = 1]|$ is equal to the probability with which \mathcal{A} submits a well-formed witness \mathbf{w} for which $R(\mathbf{i}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{w}) = 0$ holds *and* \mathcal{V} nonetheless accepts. This latter probability is negligible precisely in virtue of the security—in the sense of Definition 4.7—of the *zerocheck* and *permutation check* virtual protocols which \mathcal{V} runs with \mathcal{A} in Protocol 5.1. \square

5.3 Gadgets

In this subsection, we record composable gadgets for various key operations, including (arithmetic) addition and multiplication. In our setting, a “gadget” is a special sort of virtual polynomial protocol in which the predicate at hand may apply not just to input columns—that is, to polynomials known to both parties before the protocol begins—but moreover to further virtual polynomials which arise during the protocol. Informally, a gadget is a virtual protocol in which, if the verifier doesn’t abort, the parties output a *further* virtual polynomial, which necessarily relates to the protocol’s inputs in a prescribed way. This slight relaxation of Definition 4.7 doesn’t change the spirit of that definition.

Addition. We record a simple gadget for the *arithmetic* addition of unsigned integers. Our construction, informally, captures the raw relationship at the level of *bits*, using a few simple \mathbb{F}_2 -constraints, as well as a shift (see Subsection 4.3); it then uses the packing operator to materialize the relevant bit-columns into virtual columns of blocks.

We fix a column size $\nu \geq 0$ and a bit-width $b \in \{0, \dots, \nu\}$. On inputs X, Y , and Z in $\mathcal{T}_0^{\mathcal{B}_\nu}$, the *addition predicate* sends $\text{Add}_{\nu,b} : (X, Y, Z) \mapsto \bigwedge_{v \in \mathcal{B}_{\nu-b}} \{\text{pack}_b(X)(v)\} + \{\text{pack}_b(Y)(v)\} \equiv \{\text{pack}_b(Z)(v)\} \pmod{2^{2^b}}$. That is, the addition predicate requires that, for each $v \in \mathcal{B}_{\nu-b}$, the elements $\text{pack}_b(X)(v)$, $\text{pack}_b(Y)(v)$, and $\text{pack}_b(Z)(v)$ of \mathcal{T}_b respectively have monomial basis representations $x = (x_0, \dots, x_{2^b-1})$, $y = (z_0, \dots, z_{2^b-1})$, and $z = (z_0, \dots, z_{2^b-1})$ for which $\{x\} + \{y\} \equiv \{z\} \pmod{2^{2^b}}$ holds (as usual, we write $\{v\} := \sum_{i=0}^{2^b-1} 2^i \cdot v_i$).

PROTOCOL 5.3 (Addition gadget).

Parameters $\nu \in \mathbb{N}$ and $b \in \{0, \dots, \nu\}$ and ν -variate virtual polynomials $[X]$ and $[Y]$ over \mathcal{T}_0 are fixed.

- By performing $2^{\nu-b}$ independent 2^b -bit ripple-carry additions, \mathcal{P} obtains the vector of carry-outs $c_{\text{out}} \in \mathcal{T}_0^{\mathcal{B}_\nu}$. \mathcal{P} submits $(\text{submit}, 0, \nu, \widetilde{c_{\text{out}}})$ to the oracle.
- \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} define ν -variate virtual polynomials $c_{\text{in}} := \text{shift}'_{b,1}(c_{\text{out}})$ and $Z := X + Y + c_{\text{in}}$ over \mathcal{T}_0 .
- \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} zerocheck the ν -variate virtual polynomial $X \cdot Y + X \cdot c_{\text{in}} + Y \cdot c_{\text{in}} - c_{\text{out}}$ over \mathcal{T}_0 .
- \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} output Z .

Theorem 5.4. *Protocol 5.3 securely decides the predicate $\text{Add}_{\nu,b}$ on $[X]$, $[Y]$ and $[Z]$.*

Proof. Indeed, assuming that $\text{Zero}_{0,\nu}(X \cdot Y + X \cdot c_{\text{in}} + Y \cdot c_{\text{in}} - c_{\text{out}}) = 1$, we show that $\text{Add}_{\nu,b}(X, Y, Z)$ holds with probability 1. Protocol 5.3 captures the action of a ripple-carry adder on each 2^b -bit chunk of the inputs X and Y . Indeed, our hypothesis entails exactly that the \mathbb{F}_2 -identity $X \cdot Y + X \cdot c_{\text{in}} + Y \cdot c_{\text{in}} = c_{\text{out}}$ holds identically over \mathcal{B}_ν . This shows that, logically, $c_{\text{out}} = X \wedge Y \vee X \wedge c_{\text{in}} \vee Y \wedge c_{\text{in}}$ holds identically over \mathcal{B}_ν , so that c_{out} relates as required to X , Y and c_{in} . On the other hand, the relationship between c_{in} and c_{out} is correct, by definition of $\text{shift}'_{b,1}$. We conclude that $Z := X + Y + c_{\text{in}}$ has the required property. \square

Multiplication. We now describe a gadget which captures unsigned integer multiplication. For each $\nu \geq 0$ and $b \in \{0, \dots, \nu\}$, we define the *multiplication predicate* $\text{Mult}_{\nu,b}(X, Y, Z) \mapsto \bigwedge_{v \in \mathcal{B}_{\nu-b}} \{\text{pack}_b(X)(v)\} \cdot \{\text{pack}_b(Y)(v)\} \equiv \{\text{pack}_b(Z)(v)\} \pmod{2^{2^b}}$.

Informally, our multiplication gadget executes the schoolbook algorithm on a -bit words, where a , a tunable parameter, controls the size of a certain lookup table. We check the relevant word-by-word multiplications using lookups; the remaining work amounts to appropriately combining the results of the various word-wise multiplications.

We fix a *lookup table size parameter* $a \in \{0, \dots, b-1\}$. We recall the multilinear \mathcal{T}_a -basis $1, X_a, X_{a+1}, X_a \cdot X_{a+1}$ of \mathcal{T}_{a+2} . We define the *multiplication lookup table* $T \in \mathcal{T}_{a+2}^{\mathcal{B}_{2^a} \times \mathcal{B}_{2^a}}$ as follows:

$$T : (x, y) \mapsto x \cdot 1 + y \cdot X_a + z_0(x, y) \cdot X_{a+1} + z_1(x, y) \cdot X_a \cdot X_{a+1}.$$

Above, we first identify the \mathcal{B}_{2^a} -elements x and y with \mathcal{T}_a -elements, by means of the multilinear \mathbb{F}_2 -basis of \mathcal{T}_a . Moreover, we write $z_0(x, y)$ and $z_1(x, y)$ for the unique \mathcal{T}_a -elements for which $\{z_0(x, y)\} + 2^{2^a} \cdot \{z_1(x, y)\} = \{x\} \cdot \{y\}$ holds; here, the right-hand quantity is a simple product of integers. In words, $z_0(x, y)$ and $z_1(x, y)$, on the level of bits, respectively give the lower and upper halves of the $2 \cdot 2^a$ -bit integer product $\{x\} \cdot \{y\}$. Informally, the lookup table T takes, as its values over the $2^a + 2^a$ -dimensional hypercube, precisely the concatenations $x \parallel y \parallel x \cdot y$ of the “legal” multiplication triples (this concatenation takes place in \mathcal{T}_{a+2}).

We now have the following virtual polynomial protocol:

PROTOCOL 5.5 (Multiplication gadget).

Parameters $\nu \in \mathbb{N}$, $b \in \{0, \dots, \nu\}$, and $a \in \{0, \dots, b-1\}$, as above, the lookup table $T \in \mathcal{T}_{a+2}^{\mathcal{B}_{2^a+1}}$, and finally ν -variate virtual polynomials $[X]$ and $[Y]$ over \mathcal{T}_0 are fixed.

- \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} initialize the identically-zero ν -variate virtual column $[Z]$ over \mathcal{T}_0 .
- For each $u \in \mathcal{B}_{b-a}$, \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} proceed as follows:
 - \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} define $X_u := \text{shift}'_{b-a,u}(\text{pack}_a(X))$ and $Y_u := \text{sat}_{b-a,u}(\text{pack}_a(Y))$.
 - \mathcal{P} constructs the array $\mathbf{cross}_u := (z_0(X_u(v), Y_u(v)) + z_1(X_u(v), Y_u(v)) \cdot X_a)_{v \in \mathcal{B}_{\nu-a}}$ in $\mathcal{T}_{a+1}^{\mathcal{B}_{\nu-a}}$, where z_0 and z_1 are as above, and submits $(\text{submit}, a+1, \nu-a, \widetilde{\mathbf{cross}_u})$ to the oracle.
 - \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} perform a lookup on $U_u := X_u \cdot 1 + Y_u \cdot X_a + \mathbf{cross}_u \cdot X_{a+1}$ against T .

- For each parity bit $j \in \{0, 1\}$, \mathcal{P} defines $\mathbf{aux}_{u,j} \in \mathcal{T}_0^{\mathcal{B}^\nu}$ by concatenating the bits of the $2^{\nu-a-1}$ \mathcal{T}_{a+1} -elements of the substring $(\mathbf{cross}_u(j, v_1, \dots, v_{\nu-a-1}))_{v \in \mathcal{B}_{\nu-a-1}}$. \mathcal{P} submits $(\text{submit}, 0, \nu, \widetilde{\mathbf{aux}}_0)$ and $(\text{submit}, 0, \nu, \widetilde{\mathbf{aux}}_1)$ to the oracle. \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} run a zerocheck on the $\nu - a$ -variate polynomial $\text{merge}(\text{pack}_{a+1}(\mathbf{aux}_{u,0}), \text{pack}_{a+1}(\mathbf{aux}_{u,1})) - \mathbf{cross}_u$ over \mathcal{T}_{a+1} .
- By running the addition gadget twice, each time with block parameter b , \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} update $Z \leftarrow Z + \mathbf{aux}_{u,0} + \text{shift}'_{b,2^a}(\mathbf{aux}_{u,1})$.

- \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} output the virtual polynomial $[Z]$.

In the last line of the main loop, we slightly abuse notation by writing $\text{shift}'_{b,2^a}$ to signify $\text{shift}'_{b,o}$, where $o \in \mathcal{B}_b$ is chosen so that $\{o\} = 2^a$ holds; that is, we set $o := (0, \dots, 0, \underbrace{1, 0}_{a}, \dots, 0)$.

The completeness of Protocol 5.5 is a straightforward, though delicate, exercise. We note that, for each $u \in \mathcal{B}_{b-a}$, the elements \mathbf{aux}_0 and \mathbf{aux}_1 of $\mathcal{T}_0^{\mathcal{B}^\nu}$ are defined precisely so that $\text{pack}_{a+1}(\mathbf{aux}_{u,0})$ and $\text{pack}_{a+1}(\mathbf{aux}_{u,1})$ respectively yield the *even* and *odd* substrings of \mathbf{cross}_u . In other words, the equality $\text{merge}(\text{pack}_{a+1}(\mathbf{aux}_{u,0}), \text{pack}_{a+1}(\mathbf{aux}_{u,1})) = \mathbf{cross}_u$ ensured during the zerocheck holds essentially by fiat. The completeness of the lookups follows directly from the construction of \mathbf{cross}_u .

Theorem 5.6. *Protocol 5.5 securely decides the predicate $\text{Mult}_{\nu,b}$ on $[X]$, $[Y]$ and $[Z]$.*

Proof. If \mathcal{V} accepts, then $\text{Lookup}(T, U_u) = 1$ holds for each $u \in \mathcal{B}_{b-a}$; in particular, for each $u \in \mathcal{B}_{b-a}$ and each $v \in \mathcal{B}_{\nu-a}$, we have the equality $\{\mathbf{cross}_u(v)\} = \{\text{shift}'_{b-a,u}(\text{pack}_a(X))(v)\} \cdot \{\text{sat}_{b-a,u}(\text{pack}_a(Y))(v)\}$ of unsigned, 2^{a+1} -bit integers. Unwinding the definitions of $\text{shift}'_{b-a,u}$ and $\text{sat}_{b-a,u}$, we conclude further that, for each iteration $u \in \mathcal{B}_{b-a}$ as above and each chunk index $(v_{b-a}, \dots, v_{\nu-a-1})$, the vector \mathbf{cross}_u , restricted to the chunk indexed by $(v_{b-a}, \dots, v_{\nu-a-1})$, contains exactly the 2^{b-a} double-width cross terms $\{\text{pack}_a(X)(s_0, \dots, s_{b-a-1}, v_{b-a}, \dots, v_{\nu-a-1})\} \cdot \{\text{pack}_a(Y)(u_0, \dots, u_{b-a-1}, v_{b-a}, \dots, v_{\nu-a-1})\}$, where the strings $s := (s_0, \dots, s_{b-a-1})$ are such that $\{s\}$ ranges through the list $(0, \dots, 0, 1, 2, \dots, 2^{b-a} - 1 - \{u\})$. In words, $(\mathbf{cross}_u(w_0, \dots, w_{b-a-1}, v_{b-a}, \dots, v_{\nu-a}))_{w \in \mathcal{B}_{b-a}}$ yields precisely the $\{u\}^{\text{th}}$ row of the triangular array associated with the schoolbook multiplication of $(\text{pack}_a(X)(w_0, \dots, w_{b-a-1}, v_{b-a}, \dots, v_{\nu-a-1}))_{w \in \mathcal{B}_{b-a}}$ and $(\text{pack}_a(Y)(w_0, \dots, w_{b-a-1}, v_{b-a}, \dots, v_{\nu-a-1}))_{w \in \mathcal{B}_{b-a}}$, which we understand 2^{b-a} -limb integers. Each cell of this array, moreover, is double-width—that is, 2^{a+1} bits—and needs to be reduced.

To “fold” the elements of this row, with carries, we use a trick. Working modulo 2^{2^b} , we must add the 2^{b-a} 2^{a+1} -bit elements of each chunk of \mathbf{cross}_u , after shifting each successive element moreover by 2^a *further* positions (and truncating the most-significant 2^a bits of the last-indexed element in each chunk). Upon writing each integer in its proper place, we find that the even-indexed components of the chunk—corresponding to those indices $(0, w_1, \dots, w_{b-a-1}, v_{b-a}, \dots, v_{\nu-a-1})$, for $(w_1, \dots, w_{b-a-1}) \in \mathcal{B}_{b-a-1}$ —don’t overlap; the odd-indexed components $(1, w_1, \dots, w_{b-a-1}, v_{b-a}, \dots, v_{\nu-a-1})$ similarly lack overlaps. We thus “lift” both of these respective substrings to bit-vectors, so that we can add them. The bit-vectors $\mathbf{aux}_{u,0}$ and $\mathbf{aux}_{u,1}$, we see, are defined to be the respective lifts to $\mathcal{T}_0^{\mathcal{B}^\nu}$ of the even and odd substrings of \mathbf{cross}_u ; the verifier’s zerocheck ensures that they take exactly this form. It thus remains only to show that, for each block index $(v_{b-a}, \dots, v_{\nu-a-1})$, we have that $\sum_{w \in \mathcal{B}_{b-a}} 2^{\{w\} \cdot a} \cdot \{\mathbf{cross}_u(w_0, \dots, w_{b-a-1}, v_{b-a}, \dots, v_{\nu-a-1})\} \equiv \{\text{pack}_b(\mathbf{aux}_{u,0})(v_{b-a}, \dots, v_{\nu-a-1})\} + \{\text{pack}_b(\text{shift}'_{b,2^a}(\mathbf{aux}_{u,1}))(v_{b-a}, \dots, v_{\nu-a-1})\} \pmod{2^{2^b}}$. We observe finally that the two terms on this expression’s right-hand correspond precisely to its left-hand sum’s even-indexed and odd-indexed subset sums. This completes the proof. \square

We finally remark upon the efficiency of Protocol 5.5. Protocol 5.5 entails $O(2^{b-a})$ executions of the addition gadget, as well as 2^{b-a} lookups, each into tables T and U_u sized $2^{2^{a+1}}$ and $2^{\nu-a}$, respectively. The parameter $a \in \{0, \dots, b-1\}$, we see, mediates a tradeoff between *more lookups* and *more expensive lookups*; those choices of a for which these costs become similar appear to be the best.

Example 5.7. In the case $\nu := 20$ and $b := 5$, Protocol 5.5 yields a multiplication gadget for 32-bit integers. Setting $a := 3$, we obtain a *limb size* of $2^3 = 8$ bits, as well as a lookup table T —of size $2^{2^{3+1}} = 2^{16}$ —which contains all possible byte-by-byte products. Finally, each looked-up column U_u is of size $2^{20-3} = 2^{17}$. These

sizes thus all-but balance, and seem to be optimal. In this setting, we see that Protocol 5.5 proceeds by performing the schoolbook method, chunk-wise, on pairs of 4-limb integers, using lookups to handle each individual product of bytes.

6 Performance Evaluation

We implemented certain key subroutines of our system in Rust. We focus our performance evaluation here on the polynomial commitment and sumcheck tasks, which together dominate the prover’s overall computation. Our software of course implements the required tower field arithmetic primitives. We use the Intel *Galois Field New Instructions* (GFNI) instruction set extension to accelerate the fundamental multiplication and inversion operations. The GFNI extension includes the SIMD instruction `GF2P8MULB`, which multiplies elements of the field $\mathbb{F}_{2^8} \cong \mathbb{F}_2[X]/(X^8 + X^4 + X^3 + X + 1)$. Though this instruction assumes a *monomial*—as opposed to a tower— \mathbb{F}_2 -basis of \mathbb{F}_{2^8} , we convert between these representations using the further instruction `GF2P8AFFINEQB`; that is, by using both instructions together, we obtain a short sequence of CPU instructions which multiplies \mathbb{F}_{2^8} -elements expressed in coordinates with respect to the tower basis. For those towers \mathcal{T}_ι for which $\iota > 3$, we use the binary, recursive Karatsuba approach discussed above (see Subsection 2.3), though we terminate its recursion at the base case $\iota = 3$.

We benchmark our polynomial commitment scheme’s performance on polynomials over 1-bit, 8-bit, 32-bit, and 64-bit binary fields. The schemes of Section 3 permit any collision-resistant hash function to be used; we instantiate them with Grøstl, which—as has been discussed—is both performant and recursion-friendly. We use the Reed–Solomon code with rate $\frac{1}{2}$ throughout. We present benchmarks for both single-threaded execution, in Table 2, and multi-threaded execution, in Table 3, though we note that our code does not yet implement multi-threading in a thoroughly optimized manner.

We compare our polynomial commitment scheme’s implementation to two high-performance software implementations of alternative schemes. We benchmark against the *Lasso* open-source project’s¹ implementation of Wahby et al.’s *Hyrax* [Wah+18], using the BN254 elliptic curve. Our choice of this latter library hinges upon its reliance on the well-known *arkworks* project [ark22], as well as its use of certain further optimizations specific to the commitment of small-valued field elements. The Lasso project makes efficient use of multithreading in its commitment phase. We also benchmark against *plonky2*², which implements FRI-PCS, itself parameterized so as to target 100-bits of *conjectured* security. Even though plonky2’s FRI-PCS is univariate—while the other schemes we benchmark here are multivariate—we find it to be a useful point of comparison because of its highly-regarded performance characteristics. Like our construction, the FRI-PCS allows the use of any collision-resistant hash function, as well as of a Reed–Solomon code with rate chosen arbitrarily. We thus present performance results for both the Poseidon and Keccak-256 hash functions; we note that Poseidon, though slower, is often used in practice for its recursion-friendliness. We moreover use the rate- $\frac{1}{2}$ Reed–Solomon code, to match that used in our benchmarks of our own construction. The plonky2 system also implements multithreading, but optimizes for batched polynomial commitments, as opposed to single polynomial commitments. Seeking a fairer comparison, we show moreover how FRI-PCS performs on batched commitments, as well as on opening proofs pertaining to batches of 256 committed polynomials, each with 256-fold fewer coefficients. We find, as expected, that the FRI-PCS commits elements smaller than 64 bits no faster than it does 64-bit elements; we thus only show the unified results.

Table 4 describes our sumcheck prover’s performance. The sumcheck protocol’s performance profile depends on the form of the virtual polynomial upon which the protocol is applied. We adopt the standard course whereby we benchmark only multivariate polynomials defined as products of several multilinear. Specifically, we include in the table results corresponding to the products of 2, 3, and 4 multilinear. We first benchmark our sumcheck prover in the tower field $\mathcal{T}_7 \cong \mathbb{F}_{2^{128}}$. We moreover benchmark the sumcheck prover’s performance in the *monomial-basis* binary field $\mathbb{F}_{2^{128}} \cong \mathbb{F}_2[X]/(X^{128} + X^{127} + X^{126} + X^{121} + 1)$. This field—and in particular, its irreducible polynomial—appears in Gueron, Langley and Lindell’s *RFC 8452* [GLL19, § 3], and figures in that document’s *POLYVAL* polynomial authenticator. This particular field makes available a certain highly optimized multiplication algorithm, which appears, for both the *x86_64*

¹<https://github.com/a16z/Lasso.git>

²<https://github.com/0xPolygonZero/plonky2>

and the *ARM64* instruction sets, in Thomas Pornin’s *BearSSL*³ (these implementations use the *PCLMULQDQ* and *PMULL* instructions, respectively). We note that each given sumcheck prover may, in practice, elect to explicitly convert between the tower field \mathcal{T}_7 and the isomorphic monomial-basis field $\mathbb{F}_{2^{128}}$ —for the sake of computational efficiency—*without* thereby necessitating any change to the relevant protocol’s verification logic. Finally, we characterize the performance of the sumcheck prover over the BN254 scalar field, as that prover appears in Lasso’s implementation.

We ran all benchmarks on an Amazon Web Services *c7i.16xlarge* compute-optimized cloud instance, with a 4th-generation Intel *Xeon Scalable* (“Sapphire Rapids 8488C”) processor, 64 virtual cores, and 128 GiB of RAM.

³<https://bearssl.org/>

Commitment Scheme	Num. Coefficients	Size (bits)	Commit (s)	Prove (s)	Verify (s)
Hyrax, BN254 G_1	2^{20}	1	0.3328	0.2817	0.02251
		8	0.5550	0.2792	0.02243
		32	1.606	0.2790	0.02261
		64	3.258	0.2795	0.02270
	2^{24}	1	5.240	2.816	0.07090
		8	7.641	2.922	71.232
		32	22.38	2.917	0.07100
		64	40.959	2.894	0.07082
	2^{28}	1	84.65	54.72	0.2378
		8	118.5	55.72	0.2389
		32	287.1	55.73	0.2394
		64	597.7	55.08	0.2392
FRI-PCS, Goldilocks-64, Poseidon	2^{20}	64	3.068	1.217	0.01016
	2^{24}	64	50.11	19.93	0.01358
	2^{28}	64	824.5	326.6	0.001728
FRI-PCS, Goldilocks-64, Keccak-256	2^{20}	64	1.168	0.5371	0.003998
	2^{24}	64	19.89	8.884	0.005193
	2^{28}	64	342.4	149.4	0.006509
Batched FRI-PCS, Goldilocks-64, Poseidon	2^{20}	64	0.3552	0.1438	0.00783
	2^{24}	64	5.752	0.3860	0.01041
	2^{28}	64	97.654	8.228	0.01327
Batched FRI-PCS, Goldilocks-64, Keccak-256	2^{20}	64	0.07485	0.06851	0.002408
	2^{24}	64	1.326	0.1815	0.003438
	2^{28}	64	28.617	8.168	0.004466
Our construction	2^{20}	1	0.006090	0.007672	0.01159
		8	0.04163	0.005218	0.02261
		32	0.1564	0.01547	0.03611
		64	0.2230	0.05640	0.03685
	2^{24}	1	0.04337	0.1180	0.03353
		8	0.3629	0.07936	0.06968
		32	1.470	0.2412	0.1286
		64	2.575	0.8953	0.1370
	2^{28}	1	0.5703	1.856	0.1265
		8	4.934	1.252	0.2722
		32	18.67	3.381	0.1827
		64	37.63	14.28	0.3044

Table 2: Single-threaded performance of commitment schemes for polynomials with coefficients of varying bit-lengths.

Commitment Scheme	Num. Coefficients	Size (bits)	Commit (s)	Prove (s)	Verify (s)
Hyrax, BN254 G_1	2^{20}	1	0.02535	0.2357	0.02483
		8	0.02835	0.2431	0.02565
		32	0.06567	0.23749	0.002331
		64	0.1271	0.2410	0.02497
	2^{24}	1	0.1904	0.9233	0.07479
		8	0.2405	0.9294	0.07398
		32	0.7117	0.9152	0.07267
		64	1.266	0.9254	0.07140
	2^{28}	1	2.592	4.421	0.2374
		8	3.518	4.323	0.2367
		32	8.619	4.347	0.2367
		64	18.55	4.377	0.2352
FRI-PCS, Goldilocks-64, Poseidon	2^{20}	64	0.1690	0.3110	0.008183
	2^{24}	64	3.495	6.033	0.01128
	2^{28}	64	64.07	107.4	0.01501
FRI-PCS, Goldilocks-64, Keccak-256	2^{20}	64	0.1009	0.2867	0.003521
	2^{24}	64	2.386	5.676	0.004669
	2^{28}	64	44.87	99.40	0.005895
Batched FRI-PCS, Goldilocks-64, Poseidon	2^{20}	64	0.02384	0.01369	0.007848
	2^{24}	64	0.2407	0.1761	0.01039
	2^{28}	64	5.186	7.396	13.438
Batched FRI-PCS, Goldilocks-64, Keccak-256	2^{20}	64	0.004309	0.02017	0.002416
	2^{24}	64	0.04893	0.1724	0.003427
	2^{28}	64	2.545	7.430	0.004574
Our construction	2^{20}	1	0.03715	0.006876	0.03295
		8	0.2172	0.004718	0.1050
		32	0.8271	0.01548	0.1849
		64	1.052	0.05643	0.2231
	2^{24}	1	0.1640	0.1057	0.1181
		8	1.321	0.07364	0.3588
		32	5.283	0.2416	0.6586
		64	6.521	0.8947	0.6761
	2^{28}	1	1.025	1.672	0.4251
		8	8.306	1.149	1.301
		32	13.687	3.827	0.7312
		64	17.56	14.28	0.8522

Table 3: Multi-threaded performance of commitment schemes for polynomials with coefficients of varying bit-lengths.

Field	Num. Variables ℓ	Composition Degree	Time (s)
BN254 \mathbb{F}_7	20	2	0.119
		3	0.1401
		4	0.1756
	24	2	1.626
		3	1.908
		4	2.482
	28	2	24.83
		3	46.66
		4	72.01
\mathcal{T}_7 , tower basis	20	2	0.08228
		3	0.081812
		4	0.1510
	24	2	0.7168
		3	1.3281
		4	1.928
	28	2	11.94
		3	19.99
		4	29.99
$\mathbb{F}_{2^{128}}$, monomial basis	20	2	0.06221
		3	0.08993
		4	0.09911
	24	2	0.6048
		3	0.6979
		4	1.158
	28	2	7.707
		3	12.00
		4	15.98

Table 4: Multi-threaded performance of the sumcheck prover on products of multilinear polynomials.

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A Case Study: Keccak-256 Arithmetization

In this appendix, we supply a *PLONKish* arithmetization (in the sense of Section 5.1 above) for the KECCAK- $f[1600]$ permutation [BDPV11, § 1.2], which resides at the heart of the KECCAK family of sponge functions. The *Keccak-256* hash function in particular represents a core bottleneck facing modern efforts to scale Ethereum using SNARKs. Our arithmetization captures the correct computation of KECCAK- $f[1600]$, and exploits the unique advantages of our tower-field setting.

We recall the full KECCAK- $f[b]$ permutation. We follow the treatment of that algorithm given in [BDPV11, § 1.2], as well as a pseudocode description given online⁴. The permutation state consists of a b -bit-array $A \in \mathbb{F}_2^{5 \times 5 \times w}$, where $w := 2^\ell$ for some power $\ell \in \{0, \dots, 6\}$ (below, we in fact fix $\ell := 6$, so that $b = 1600$). We understand A throughout as a 5×5 array of *lanes*, or w -bit words (see [BDPV11, Fig. 1.1]), and index into it accordingly. We define addition and multiplication on lanes componentwise; to avoid confusion, we denote using the symbol $*$ the componentwise multiplication of lanes (i.e., the bitwise AND operation). The intermediate value B below takes the same shape as A does; the objects C and D below are one-dimensional, length-5 arrays of lanes. We understand all indices into these arrays modulo 5. We moreover make use of various constants. That is, we have a number n_r of *rounds* (per KECCAK’s specification, we set $n_r := 12 + 2 \cdot \ell = 24$); as well as a 5×5 array $r \in \{0, \dots, w - 1\}^{5 \times 5}$ of *rotation offsets*, whose derivation is explained in [BDPV11, § 1.2]. We finally have an array RC of *round constants*, whose construction is again detailed in [BDPV11, § 1.2]; for each $i_r \in \{0, \dots, n_r - 1\}$, $\text{RC}[i_r] \in \mathbb{F}_2^w$ is a single binary word. We reproduce the KECCAK- $f[b]$ permutation in full in Algorithm 1 below.

Algorithm 1 (KECCAK- $f[b]$ permutation [BDPV11].)

```

1: procedure KECCAK- $f[b](A)$ 
2:   for  $i_r \in \{0, \dots, n_r - 1\}$  do
3:     for  $x \in \{0, \dots, 4\}$  do  $C[x] := A[x, 0] + A[x, 1] + A[x, 2] + A[x, 3] + A[x, 4]$ .           ▷ begin  $\theta$  step
4:     for  $x \in \{0, \dots, 4\}$  do  $D[x] := C[x - 1] + \text{rot}(C[x + 1], 1)$ .
5:     for  $(x, y) \in \{0, \dots, 4\} \times \{0, \dots, 4\}$  do  $A[x, y] += D[x]$ .
6:     for  $(x, y) \in \{0, \dots, 4\} \times \{0, \dots, 4\}$  do  $B[y, 2 \cdot x + 3 \cdot y] := \text{rot}(A[x, y], r[x, y])$ .           ▷  $\rho$  and  $\pi$  steps
7:     for  $(x, y) \in \{0, \dots, 4\} \times \{0, \dots, 4\}$  do  $A[x, y] = (B[x + 1, y] + 1) * B[x + 2, y]$ .           ▷  $\chi$  step
8:      $A[0, 0] += \text{RC}[i_r]$ .                                           ▷  $\iota$  step

```

We build our PLONK constraint system for KECCAK- $f[1600]$ over two tower fields, \mathcal{T}_0 and \mathcal{T}_6 . We take the liberty of defining the constraint system over committed columns of different lengths, linking them by means of a packing argument (see Subsection 4.3). The constraint system has 2^5 rows, so that it can accommodate $n_r = 24$ rounds; it uses one row per round. It uses two fixed columns:

- $q_{\text{round}} \in \mathcal{T}_0[X_0, \dots, X_4]^{\leq 1}$ is the selector for the round computation. It takes the value 1 on those cube points lexicographically indexed $\{0, \dots, 23\}$ and 0 on the points indexed $\{24, \dots, 31\}$. This polynomial has a simple description as a multilinear extension over the dimension-5 cube, and so can be efficiently evaluated locally by the verifier (i.e., without the aid of a commitment or an opening proof).
- $\mathbf{RC} \in \mathcal{T}_6[X_0, \dots, X_4]^{\leq 1}$ is the column of 64-bit round constants.

The permutation state is committed in the following group of columns:

- $\mathbf{A} \in (\mathcal{T}_0[X_0, \dots, X_{10}]^{\leq 1})^{5 \times 5}$ captures the 25 lanes of state, as of the beginning of each successive round.
- $\mathbf{C} \in (\mathcal{T}_0[X_0, \dots, X_{10}]^{\leq 1})^5$ represents C in the θ step above.
- $\mathbf{D} \in (\mathcal{T}_0[X_0, \dots, X_{10}]^{\leq 1})^5$ represents D in the θ step above.
- $\mathbf{A}^\chi \in (\mathcal{T}_0[X_0, \dots, X_{10}]^{\leq 1})^{5 \times 5}$ captures the state of A as of the conclusion of the χ step.

⁴https://keccak.team/keccak_specs_summary.html

We further define a series of virtual polynomials:

- $\mathbf{A}^\theta \in (\mathcal{T}_0[X_0, \dots, X_{10}]^{\leq 1})^{5 \times 5}$ represents the state of A as of the conclusion of the θ step. For each $x \in \{0, \dots, 4\}$ and $y \in \{0, \dots, 4\}$, we define $\mathbf{A}_{x,y}^\theta := \mathbf{A}_{x,y} + \mathbf{D}_x$.
- $\mathbf{B} \in (\mathcal{T}_0[X_0, \dots, X_{10}]^{\leq 1})^{5 \times 5}$ represents the state of B as of the conclusion of the π and ρ steps. For each $x \in \{0, \dots, 4\}$ and $y \in \{0, \dots, 4\}$, we define $\mathbf{B}_{y,2x+3y} := \mathbf{shift}_{6,r(x,y)}(\mathbf{A}_{x,y}^\theta)$.

We impose the following gate constraints:

- For each $x \in \{0, \dots, 4\}$, $\mathbf{C}_x - \sum_{y=0}^4 \mathbf{A}_{x,y} = 0$.
- For each $x \in \{0, \dots, 4\}$, $\mathbf{C}_{x-1} + \mathbf{shift}_{6,1}(\mathbf{C}_{x+1}) - \mathbf{D}_x = 0$.
- For each $(x, y) \in \{0, \dots, 4\} \times \{0, \dots, 4\}$, $\mathbf{A}_{x,y}^X - ((1 - \mathbf{B}_{x+1,y}) \cdot \mathbf{B}_{x+2,y}) = 0$.
- $q_{\text{round}} \cdot (\mathbf{pack}_6(\mathbf{A}_{0,0}^X) + \mathbf{RC} - \mathbf{shift}_{5,-1}''(\mathbf{pack}_6(\mathbf{A}_{0,0}))) = 0$.
- For each $(x, y) \in \{0, \dots, 4\} \times \{0, \dots, 4\} \setminus \{(0, 0)\}$, $q_{\text{round}} \cdot (\mathbf{shift}_{5,-1}''(\mathbf{pack}_6(\mathbf{A}_{x,y})) - \mathbf{pack}_6(\mathbf{A}_{x,y}^X)) = 0$.

Provided that these constraints are fulfilled, we see that the arrays $(\mathbf{pack}_6(A_{x,y})(v))_{(x,y) \in \{0, \dots, 4\} \times \{0, \dots, 4\}}$ for the row-indices $\{v\} = 0$ and $\{v\} = 24$ respectively, are related exactly by the KECCAK- $f[1600]$ permutation.

B Deferred Proofs

Proof of Theorem 3.12. We fix a tuple (c, t_0, t_1, u_0, u_1) for which $\Pi.\text{Open}(\text{params}, c; t_0, s_0)$ and $\Pi.\text{Open}(\text{params}, c; t_1, s_1)$ both hold. Barring a collision in the random oracle, we have that $u_0 = u_1$; we write $(u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ for the common hint. By hypothesis, the respective encodings $(\text{Enc}(t_0, i))_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ and $(\text{Enc}(t_1, i))_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ of t_0 and t_1 satisfy $d^{m_0} \left((\text{Enc}(t_0, i))_{i=0}^{m_0-1}, (u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1} \right) < \frac{d}{3}$ and $d^{m_0} \left((\text{Enc}(t_1, i))_{i=0}^{m_0-1}, (u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1} \right) < \frac{d}{3}$. By unique decoding, we conclude that $(\text{Enc}(t_0, i))_{i=0}^{m_0-1} = (\text{Enc}(t_1, i))_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$. Because Enc is injective, we finally conclude that $t_0 = t_1$ as *packed* matrices; because the natural embedding is injective (see also Theorem 3.9 above), we finally deduce the equality of t_0 and t_1 unpacked matrices, and hence as polynomials in $\mathcal{T}_\ell[X_0, \dots, X_{\ell-1}]$. \square

Proof of Theorem 3.13. We define an emulator \mathcal{E} in the following way. Given access to \mathcal{A} , and on inputs params , c and $(r_0, \dots, r_{\ell-1})$, \mathcal{E} operates as follows:

1. \mathcal{E} internally runs \mathcal{A} on the further input $(r_0, \dots, r_{\ell-1})$ in a straight-line manner, until \mathcal{A} outputs s and π . If $\Pi.\text{Verify}(\text{params}, c, s, (r_0, \dots, r_{\ell-1}), \pi) = 0$, then \mathcal{E} outputs $(s, \pi; \perp, \perp)$ and terminates.
2. Having already obtained \mathcal{A} 's commitment c and observed \mathcal{A} 's random oracle queries, \mathcal{E} runs the straight-line extractor of [BCS16, § A.1], and so obtains $u := (u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$, or else outputs $(s, \pi; \perp, \perp)$ if it fails.
3. \mathcal{E} writes $(r_{0,0}, \dots, r_{0,\ell-1})$ for the randomness it used above and t'_0 for the message sent by \mathcal{A} during the course of its initial proof, and moreover proceeds as follows:

Algorithm 2

- 1: assign $i := 1$.
 - 2: **while** $i < m_0$ **do**
 - 3: rewind \mathcal{A} to its initial point (i.e., immediately after outputting c).
 - 4: freshly sample $(r_{i,0}, \dots, r_{i,\ell-1}) \leftarrow \mathcal{Q}(\text{params})$.
 - 5: run \mathcal{A} again on $(r_{i,0}, \dots, r_{i,\ell-1})$, with fresh verifier randomness, until it outputs (s, π) .
 - 6: **if** $\Pi.\text{Verify}(\text{params}, c, s, (r_{i,0}, \dots, r_{i,\ell-1}), \pi)$ **then**
 - 7: write t'_i for the message sent by \mathcal{A} during its proof.
 - 8: increment $i += 1$.
-

\mathcal{E} checks if the $m_0 \times m_0$ matrix $\left(\bigotimes_{j=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1 - r_{i,j}, r_{i,j})\right)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ is singular. If it is, \mathcal{E} outputs $(s, \pi; \perp, u)$.

4. Otherwise, using the *constant* \mathcal{T}_τ -vector space structure on $A_{\ell,\kappa,\tau}$, \mathcal{E} performs the matrix operation:

$$\begin{bmatrix} - & t_0 & - \\ & \dots & \\ - & t_{m_0-1} & - \end{bmatrix} := \begin{bmatrix} - & \bigotimes_{j=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1 - r_{0,j}, r_{0,j}) & - \\ & \dots & \\ - & \bigotimes_{j=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1 - r_{m_0-1,j}, r_{m_0-1,j}) & - \end{bmatrix}^{-1} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} - & t'_0 & - \\ & \dots & \\ - & t'_{m_0-1} & - \end{bmatrix}.$$

If the entries of $(t_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ do *not* reside entirely in the subring $A_{\ell,\kappa,\iota} \subset A_{\ell,\kappa,\tau}$, then \mathcal{E} outputs $(s, \pi; \perp, u)$. Otherwise, \mathcal{E} recovers the *unpacked* matrix $(t_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ by reversing the \mathcal{T}_ℓ -isomorphism of Theorem 3.9, sets $t(X_0, \dots, X_{\ell-1}) \in \mathcal{T}_\ell[X_0, \dots, X_{\ell-1}]$ the polynomial whose coefficients (in the multilinear Lagrange basis) are given by the concatenation of $(t_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$'s rows, and outputs $(s, \pi; t, u)$.

We now argue that \mathcal{E} meets the requirements of Definition 3.5. We first argue that \mathcal{E} runs in expected polynomial time in λ . We write ε for the probability that \mathcal{A} passes, *conditioned* on its state as of the point at which it outputs c (this latter probability is taken over the coins of both \mathcal{Q} and \mathcal{V} , and over the further coins of \mathcal{A}). We note that, for each c , \mathcal{E} enters Algorithm 2 above with probability exactly ε , and, moreover, satisfies the condition of line 6 with probability exactly ε per iteration of that algorithm (since \mathcal{E} simulates the same view to \mathcal{A} during each successive iteration of Algorithm 3 as it does during its initial execution of \mathcal{A}). We conclude that \mathcal{E} 's total expected runtime is at most $1 + \varepsilon \cdot \frac{m_0-1}{\varepsilon} = m_0$ times the time it takes to run Construction 3.7 once; this total time is thus polynomial in λ (and independent of c and ε).

We now analyze the distribution returned by \mathcal{E} . We note that the outputs (c, s, π) upon which \mathcal{D} runs are identically distributed in the real and emulated distributions. It thus suffices to show that it holds in at most negligibly many executions of \mathcal{A} , \mathcal{Q} and \mathcal{E} that, simultaneously, $\Pi.\text{Verify}(\text{params}, c, s, (r_0, \dots, r_{\ell-1}), \pi) = 1$ and *either* $\Pi.\text{Open}(\text{params}, c; t, u) = 0$ or $t(r_0, \dots, r_{\ell-1}) \neq s$.

We write $Q(\lambda)$ for the number of queries \mathcal{A} makes to the random oracle during one execution. By [BCS16, Lem. 3], it holds with probability at most $\frac{Q(\lambda)^2+1}{2^\lambda}$, which is negligible, that *either* \mathcal{E} fails to extract c in step 2 *or* that \mathcal{A} outputs inconsistent Merkle leaves during its initial proof π . We thus freely assume that \mathcal{E} successfully extracts the opening hint $u := (u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ in step 2 and that, throughout its initial proof π , \mathcal{A} outputs Merkle leaves $(u_{i,j})_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ consistent with $(u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$.

We recall the extension code $\widehat{C} \subset A_{\ell,\kappa,\tau}$ of the code $C \subset \mathcal{T}_{\ell+\kappa}^n$ output by $\Pi.\text{Setup}$ (i.e., see Subsection 3.1). The following lemma shows that we may, moreover, safely restrict our attention to the setting in which the extracted matrix $(u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ features correlated agreement with \widehat{C} . Though the matrix $(u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ has, by definition, entries in the synthetic subring $A_{\ell,\kappa,\iota} \subset A_{\ell,\kappa,\tau}$, for the purposes of the below lemma, we temporarily view it as a matrix with entries in $A_{\ell,\kappa,\tau}$.

Lemma B.1. *If its matrix satisfies $d^{m_0}\left((u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}, \widehat{C}^{m_0}\right) \geq \frac{d}{3}$, then \mathcal{A} passes with negligible probability.*

Proof. We abbreviate $u' := \bigotimes_{i=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1 - r_i, r_i) \cdot (u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$. Under the hypothesis of the lemma, Theorem 3.10, applied with the proximity parameter $e := \lfloor \frac{d-1}{3} \rfloor$, implies that, if the second part $(r_{\ell_1}, \dots, r_{\ell-1}) \in \mathcal{T}_\tau^{\ell_0}$ of the verifier's random point resides *outside* a set of mass at most $2 \cdot \ell_0 \cdot \frac{d}{3 \cdot |\mathcal{T}_\tau|}$ in $\mathcal{T}_\tau^{\ell_0}$, then we have $d(u', \widehat{C}) \geq \frac{d}{3}$. For such $(r_{\ell_1}, \dots, r_{\ell-1})$, we thus have in particular that $d(u', \text{Enc}(t')) \geq \frac{d}{3}$, since $\text{Enc}(t')$ is a codeword. It follows that $\Pr_{j \leftarrow \{0, \dots, n-1\}} [u'_j = \text{Enc}(t')_j] \leq 1 - \frac{d}{3 \cdot n}$. Finally, by our assumption about \mathcal{A} 's Merkle paths, we have that $\bigotimes_{i=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1 - r_i, r_i) \cdot (u_{i,j})_{i=0}^{m_0-1} = u'_j$ for each column $(u_{i,j})_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ output by \mathcal{A} . We see that \mathcal{A} 's chance of passing (over the coins of \mathcal{Q} and \mathcal{V}) is at most $\ell_0 \cdot \frac{2 \cdot d}{3 \cdot |\mathcal{T}_\tau|} + \left(1 - \frac{d}{3 \cdot n}\right)^\rho$. As $|\mathcal{T}_\tau| \geq 2^{\omega(\log \lambda)}$ holds by construction, and d and ℓ_0 are polynomial in λ , $\ell_0 \cdot \frac{2 \cdot d}{3 \cdot |\mathcal{T}_\tau|}$ is negligible. On the other hand, because $d \in \Omega(n)$ and $\rho \in \Theta(\lambda)$, we likewise have that $\left(1 - \frac{d}{3 \cdot n}\right)^\rho \leq (1 - \Omega(1))^{\Theta(\lambda)}$ is negligible. This completes the proof of the lemma. \square

Indeed, the lemma shows that it holds only for a negligible proportion of executions that $d^{m_0}\left((u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}, \widehat{C}^{m_0}\right) \geq \frac{d}{3}$ and \mathcal{E} proceeds into step 3. We may thus safely ignore these executions. We

accordingly assume throughout what follows that $d^{m_0}((u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}, \widehat{C}^{m_0}) < \frac{d}{3}$. In particular, it holds that the respective messages underlying \mathcal{A} 's initial matrix $(u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ are well-defined; we write $(t_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ for these messages. The following lemma shows that we may *further* restrict our attention to the case in which \mathcal{A} correctly outputs $t' = \bigotimes_{i=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1 - r_i, r_i) \cdot (t_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ during its initial proof.

Lemma B.2. *If its message $t' \neq \bigotimes_{i=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1 - r_i, r_i) \cdot (t_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$, then \mathcal{A} passes with negligible probability.*

Proof. We again fix $e := \lfloor \frac{d-1}{3} \rfloor$ and abbreviate $u' := \bigotimes_{i=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1 - r_i, r_i) \cdot (u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$; we moreover write $v' := \bigotimes_{i=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1 - r_i, r_i) \cdot (\text{Enc}(t_i))_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$. By our assumption above, $d^{m_0}((u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}, \widehat{C}^{m_0}) \leq e$ holds; in particular, $d(u', v') \leq e$. On the other hand, our hypothesis implies that $\text{Enc}(t') \neq v'$. Finally, since \widehat{C} is \mathcal{T}_τ -linear (as discussed above), $v' \in \widehat{C}$ is a codeword. By the reverse triangle inequality, we thus have:

$$d(u', \text{Enc}(t')) \geq |d(\text{Enc}(t'), v') - d(u', v')| \geq d - e.$$

As above, we conclude that $\Pr_{j \leftarrow \{0, \dots, n-1\}} [u'_j = \text{Enc}(t')_j] \leq 1 - \frac{d-e}{n}$; moreover, we again have that $\bigotimes_{i=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1 - r_i, r_i) \cdot (u_{i,j})_{i=0}^{\ell-1} = u'_j$ for each $j \in J$ queried by the verifier. We thus upper-bound \mathcal{A} 's probability of passing by $(1 - \frac{2 \cdot d}{3 \cdot n})^\rho$. This again completes the proof, in light of the guarantees $d \in \Omega(n)$ and $\rho \in \Theta(\lambda)$. \square

The following lemma is specific to our setting, and doesn't appear in [DP23]. In the following lemma, we continue to assume that $(u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ has entries in the synthetic subring $A_{L,\kappa,\ell} \subset A_{L,\kappa,\tau}$, as well as that $d^{m_0}((u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}, \widehat{C}^{m_0}) < \frac{d}{3}$ holds.

Lemma B.3. *The matrix of messages $(t_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ also has entries in the subring $A_{L,\kappa,\ell} \subset A_{L,\kappa,\tau}$.*

Proof. We suppose for contradiction that the row t_{i^*} , say, where $i^* \in \{0, \dots, m_0 - 1\}$, satisfies $t_{i^*,j^*} \notin A_{L,\kappa,\ell}$, for some component $j^* \in \{0, \dots, \frac{m_1}{2^\kappa} - 1\}$. We recall the $\mathcal{T}_{L+\kappa}$ -basis $(\beta_v)_{v \in \mathcal{B}_{\tau-\ell}}$ of $A_{L,\kappa,\tau}$ introduced above. Expressing each component of t_{i^*} in coordinates with respect to this basis, we express t_{i^*} as a collection of $2^{\tau-\ell}$ vectors $t_{i^*,v} \in \mathcal{T}_{L+\kappa}^{m_1/2^\kappa}$, for $v \in \mathcal{B}_{\tau-\ell}$. Our hypothesis on t_{i^*} entails precisely that at least one *nonzero-indexed* slice—indexed $v^* \in \mathcal{B}_{\tau-\ell} \setminus \{(0, \dots, 0)\}$, say—is *not* identically zero (i.e., as $\mathcal{T}_{L+\kappa}^{m_1/2^\kappa}$ -element).

Again exploiting the fact that \widehat{C} 's generator matrix has entries in $\mathcal{T}_{L+\kappa}$, we see that the encoding $\text{Enc}(t_{i^*}) \in A_{L,\kappa,\tau}^n$ is precisely given, slice-wise, by the respective slice-encodings $\text{Enc}(t_{i^*,v})$, for $v \in \mathcal{B}_{\tau-\ell}$. Since t_{i^*,v^*} is not identically zero, we conclude that $\text{Enc}(t_{i^*,v^*}) \in \mathcal{T}_{L+\kappa}^n$ is necessarily nonzero at *at least* d positions.

Since u_{i^*} is defined over $A_{L,\kappa,\ell}$, its $v^{*\text{th}}$ slice u_{i^*,v^*} is identically zero. We conclude that $d(u_{i^*}, \text{Enc}(t_{i^*})) \geq d$; this contradicts the inequality $d(u_{i^*}, \text{Enc}(t_{i^*})) < \frac{d}{3}$, itself a direct consequence of t_{i^*} 's construction. \square

Lemma B.3 shows that, under the hypothesis $d^{m_0}((u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}, \widehat{C}^{m_0}) < \frac{d}{3}$ —and assuming, as usual, that $(u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ is defined over $A_{L,\kappa,\ell} \subset A_{L,\kappa,\tau}$ —we actually obtain the stronger conclusion $d^{m_0}((u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}, C^{m_0}) < \frac{d}{3}$. Indeed, for each $i \in \{0, \dots, m_0 - 1\}$, since $t_i \in A_{L,\kappa,\ell}^{m_1/2^\kappa}$ (by Lemma B.3), we conclude that $\text{Enc}(t_i) \in A_{L,\kappa,\ell}^n$.

We thus restrict our attention to the case in which \mathcal{A} 's initial proof π verifies, \mathcal{E} successfully extracts $(u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$, and *both* $d^{m_0}((u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}, C^{m_0}) < \frac{d}{3}$ and $t' = \bigotimes_{i=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1 - r_i, r_i) \cdot (t_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ hold. We denote:

$$\delta := \frac{\ell_0}{|\mathcal{T}_\tau|} + \left(1 - \frac{2 \cdot d}{3 \cdot n}\right)^\rho + \frac{Q(\lambda)^2 + 1}{2^\lambda}.$$

Since δ is negligible in λ , $\sqrt{\delta}$ also is. In this light, we may simply ignore each execution for which \mathcal{A} 's probability of success $\varepsilon \leq \sqrt{\delta}$, since in that case \mathcal{E} proceeds into step 3 in the first place with negligible probability. We thus assume that $\varepsilon > \sqrt{\delta}$ in what follows.

We first show that, with overwhelming probability, as of the conclusion of *each* iteration $i \in \{1, \dots, m_0 - 1\}$ of Algorithm 2, we have $t'_i = \bigotimes_{j=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1 - r_{i,j}, r_{i,j}) \cdot (t_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$.

Lemma B.4. *The probability that $t'_i \neq \bigotimes_{j=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1 - r_{i,j}, r_{i,j}) \cdot (t_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ for any $i \in \{1, \dots, m_0 - 1\}$ is negligible.*

Proof. We write V for the event in which \mathcal{A} submits an accepting proof, and E for the event in which \mathcal{A} outputs the correct message $t' = \bigotimes_{i=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1 - r_i, r_i) \cdot (t_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$. By the argument of Lemma B.2, if \mathcal{A} submits Merkle leaves consistent with $(u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$, then \mathcal{V} accepts with probability at most $(1 - \frac{2 \cdot d}{3 \cdot n})^\rho$. By a union bound, we conclude that $\Pr[V \mid \neg E] \leq \frac{Q(\lambda)^2 + 1}{2^\lambda} + (1 - \frac{2 \cdot d}{3 \cdot n})^\rho \leq \delta$. Our assumption $\varepsilon > \sqrt{\delta}$ thus implies:

$$\sqrt{\delta} < \varepsilon = \Pr[V] = \Pr[V \wedge E] + \Pr[V \mid \neg E] \cdot \Pr[\neg E] \leq \Pr[V \wedge E] + \Pr[\neg E] \cdot \delta,$$

so that $\Pr[V \wedge E] > \sqrt{\delta} - \Pr[\neg E] \cdot \delta \geq \sqrt{\delta} - \delta$.

By Bayes' theorem—and using the facts noted above—we conclude that:

$$\Pr[E \mid V] = \frac{\Pr[V \wedge E]}{\Pr[V \wedge E] + \Pr[V \mid \neg E] \cdot \Pr[\neg E]} > \frac{\sqrt{\delta} - \delta}{\sqrt{\delta} - \delta + \delta} = 1 - \sqrt{\delta}.$$

We thus see that, under our assumption, the probability that *all* of \mathcal{E} 's iterations $i \in \{1, \dots, m_0 - 1\}$ satisfy $t'_i = \bigotimes_{j=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1 - r_{i,j}, r_{i,j}) \cdot (t_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ is greater than $(1 - \sqrt{\delta})^{m_0-1}$, which is overwhelming. Indeed, by a standard binomial approximation, we have that $1 - (1 - \sqrt{\delta})^{m_0-1} \leq (m_0 - 1) \cdot \sqrt{\delta}$, which is negligible. \square

The following lemma is the last remaining step.

Lemma B.5. *The probability that the rows $\left(\bigotimes_{j=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1 - r_{i,j}, r_{i,j}) \right)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ are linearly dependent is negligible.*

Proof. We fix an arbitrary proper \mathcal{T}_τ -linear subspace $A \subset \mathcal{T}_\tau^{m_0}$, and moreover define its preimage $S := \left\{ (r_{\ell_1}, \dots, r_{\ell-1}) \in \mathcal{T}_\tau^{\ell_0} \mid \bigotimes_{i=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1 - r_i, r_i) \in A \right\}$ under the tensor map. We first argue that $\mu(S) \leq \frac{\ell_0}{|\mathcal{T}_\tau|}$. It suffices to prove the result only in case A is a hyperplane. We write $a = (a_0, \dots, a_{m_0-1}) \in \mathcal{T}_\tau^{m_0}$ for a vector of coefficients, *not* all zero, for which $A = \{u \in \mathcal{T}_\tau^{m_0} \mid u \cdot a = 0\}$ holds. By construction, $(r_{\ell_1}, \dots, r_{\ell-1}) \in S$ if and only if $\bigotimes_{i=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1 - r_i, r_i) \cdot a = 0$.

We note that $S \subset \mathcal{T}_\tau^{\ell_0}$ is nothing other than the vanishing locus of that combination of the ℓ_0 -variate multilinear Lagrange polynomials given by the coefficient vector a . Because a is not identically zero and these polynomials are linearly independent, we conclude that the combination is itself nonzero. Applying Schwartz-Zippel, we conclude that its vanishing locus $S \subset \mathcal{T}_\tau^{\ell_0}$ is of mass at most $\mu(S) \leq \frac{\ell_0}{|\mathcal{T}_\tau|}$, as desired.

As before, we write V for the event in which \mathcal{A} submits an accepting proof; slightly abusing notation, we denote also by S the event in which \mathcal{Q} 's query satisfies $(r_{\ell_1}, \dots, r_{\ell-1}) \in S$. By the above argument, we have that $\mu(S) = \frac{\ell_0}{|\mathcal{T}_\tau|} \leq \delta$. On the other hand, by our assumption $\varepsilon > \sqrt{\delta}$, we have:

$$\sqrt{\delta} < \varepsilon = \Pr[V] \leq \mu(S) + \Pr[V \mid \neg S] \cdot (1 - \mu(S)),$$

so that $\Pr[V \mid \neg S] \cdot (1 - \mu(S)) > \sqrt{\delta} - \mu(S) \geq \sqrt{\delta} - \delta$.

Again using Bayes' theorem, and using the above facts, we have that:

$$\Pr[\neg S \mid V] = \frac{\Pr[V \mid \neg S] \cdot (1 - \mu(S))}{\Pr[V \mid \neg S] \cdot (1 - \mu(S)) + \Pr[V \mid S] \cdot \mu(S)} > \frac{\sqrt{\delta} - \delta}{\sqrt{\delta} - \delta + \delta} = 1 - \sqrt{\delta}.$$

We now consider the successive vectors $(r_{i,\ell_1}, \dots, r_{i,\ell-1}) \in \mathcal{T}_\tau^{\ell_0}$ collected by \mathcal{E} over the course of its *successful* executions of the main loop of Algorithm 3. For each $i^* \in \{1, \dots, m_0 - 1\}$, writing $A \subset \mathcal{T}_\tau^{m_0}$ for the span of the vectors $\left(\bigotimes_{j=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1 - r_{i,j}, r_{i,j}) \right)_{i=0}^{i^*-1}$, we conclude that, with probability greater than $1 - \sqrt{\delta}$, the vector $(r_{i^*,\ell_1}, \dots, r_{i^*,\ell-1}) \in \mathcal{T}_\tau^{\ell_0}$ collected during the i^* th iteration satisfies $\bigotimes_{j=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1 - r_{i^*,j}, r_{i^*,j}) \notin A$. We see that the rows $\left(\bigotimes_{j=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1 - r_{i,j}, r_{i,j}) \right)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ are independent with probability greater than $(1 - \sqrt{\delta})^{m_0-1}$, which is overwhelming, as $1 - (1 - \sqrt{\delta})^{m_0-1} \leq (m_0 - 1) \cdot \sqrt{\delta}$ is negligible. This completes the proof of the lemma. \square

We finally argue that the values t and $u = (u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ extracted by \mathcal{E} satisfy $\text{II.Open}(\text{params}, c; t, u)$ and $t(r_0, \dots, r_{\ell-1}) = s$. Indeed, under the condition guaranteed by the successful execution of step 2 above, \mathcal{A} 's initial matrix $(u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ is well-defined, and hashes to c , and moreover is successfully extracted by \mathcal{E} . Under the condition guaranteed by Lemma B.1, a matrix $(t_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ with entries in $A_{\ell, \kappa, \tau}$ for which $d^{m_0} \left((\text{Enc}(t_i))_{i=0}^{m_0-1}, (u_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1} \right) < \frac{d}{3}$ exists and is unique. Under the conditions guaranteed by Lemmas B.4 and B.5, \mathcal{E} extracts precisely this matrix $(t_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$ in steps 3 and 4. By Lemma B.3, this matrix is *a posteriori* defined over $A_{\ell, \kappa, \ell}$, and—up to reversing Theorem 3.9's \mathcal{T}_ℓ -isomorphism—defines a polynomial $t(X_0, \dots, X_{\ell-1}) \in \mathcal{T}_\ell[X_0, \dots, X_{\ell-1}]^{\leq 1}$, as required. Finally, Lemma B.2 guarantees that \mathcal{A} 's first message satisfies $t' = \bigotimes_{i=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1-r_i, r_i) \cdot (t_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1}$; on the other hand, $\text{II.Verify}(\text{params}, c, s, (r_0, \dots, r_{\ell-1}), \pi)$ implies that $s = t' \cdot \bigotimes_{i=0}^{\ell_0-1} (1-r_i, r_i)$. We conclude that $s = \bigotimes_{i=\ell_1}^{\ell-1} (1-r_i, r_i) \cdot (t_i)_{i=0}^{m_0-1} \cdot \bigotimes_{i=0}^{\ell_0-1} (1-r_i, r_i) = t(r_0, \dots, r_{\ell-1})$, as required. This completes the proof of the theorem. \square

Proof of Theorem 3.14. We recall first of all the guarantee $\ell = O(\log \lambda)$, which holds by assumption throughout Construction 3.11; we moreover assume that, for $\iota \geq 0$ arbitrary, each \mathcal{T}_ℓ -multiplication imposes a cost polynomial in the bit-length 2^ι .

We set $\rho := \lambda$ and $\tau := \lceil \log(\log^2(\lambda)) \rceil$, as well as $\ell_1 := \lceil \frac{1}{2} \cdot (\ell + \log \rho) \rceil$ and $\ell_0 := \ell - \ell_1$, and finally write $m_0 := 2^{\ell_0}$ and $m_1 := 2^{\ell_1}$. Since the statement is asymptotic and ι is constant, we assume freely that $\tau \geq \iota$. We note that m_0 and m_1 differ by at most a factor of 2 from, respectively, $\frac{1}{\sqrt{\rho}} \cdot \sqrt{2^\ell}$ and $\sqrt{\rho \cdot 2^\ell}$. We fix the *rate* $\gamma := \frac{1}{2}$, and moreover set $\kappa \geq 0$ *minimally* so that $|\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}| = 2^{2^{\iota+\kappa}} \geq \frac{1}{\gamma} \cdot \frac{m_1}{2^\kappa}$ holds (equivalently, so that $2^{\iota+\kappa} + \kappa \geq -\log \gamma + \ell_1$ holds). We note that this minimal κ necessarily satisfies $\kappa \leq \ell_1$. Indeed, the choice $\kappa = \ell_1$ itself certainly satisfies $2^{\iota+\ell_1} + \ell_1 \geq 1 + \ell_1 = -\log \gamma + \ell_1$, as required. We conclude that $2^\kappa \leq m_1$; we finally write $k := \frac{m_1}{2^\kappa}$ and $n := \frac{1}{\gamma} \cdot k$, and set as $C \subset \mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}^n$ the Reed-Solomon code $\text{RS}_{\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}}[n, k]$. We note that, by our choice of κ , this code exists. On the other hand, by the *minimality* of κ , we moreover have the upper-bound $2^{\iota+\kappa} \leq 2 \cdot (-\log(\gamma) + \ell_1 - \kappa) = O(\ell)$. We note that the values ρ, τ, κ , and $C \subset \mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}^n$ chosen in this way fulfill the requirements of II.Setup .

We assume that each bit received imposes constant cost; we see immediately that the protocol's total communication-attendant cost is $2^\tau \cdot m_1 + 2^{\iota+\kappa} \cdot m_0 \cdot \rho = O\left(\log^2(\lambda) \cdot \sqrt{\rho \cdot 2^\ell} + \ell \cdot \sqrt{\frac{2^\ell}{\rho}} \cdot \rho\right) = \tilde{O}(\sqrt{2^\ell})$.

Again by our choice of τ , we see that each \mathcal{T}_τ -operation costs polynomially in $2^\tau = O(\log^2 \lambda)$, and so costs $\tilde{O}(1)$. We see that the total cost of all \mathcal{T}_τ -operations is $\tilde{O}(m_0 + m_1) = \tilde{O}(\sqrt{\lambda \cdot 2^\ell})$. We analyze the total cost of all \mathcal{T}_ℓ operations in the following way. Since $2^\kappa \leq 2^{\iota+\kappa} = O(\ell)$, and since the cost of $2^{\tau-\iota}$ \mathcal{T}_ℓ -operations is certainly at most that of one \mathcal{T}_τ -operation, we see that the total cost imposed by $2^\kappa \cdot 2^{\tau-\iota}$ \mathcal{T}_ℓ -operations is at most $O(\ell) \cdot \tilde{O}(1) = \tilde{O}(1)$. The total cost of all \mathcal{T}_ℓ -operations is thus $\tilde{O}(\rho \cdot m_0) = \tilde{O}(\sqrt{\rho \cdot 2^\ell}) = \tilde{O}(\sqrt{\lambda \cdot 2^\ell})$.

Using the upper-bound $2^{\iota+\kappa} = O(\ell) = O(\log \lambda)$, we see that each $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}$ -operation costs $\tilde{O}(1)$. On the other hand, the result [LCH14] ensures that the cost of \mathfrak{Enc} is equal to that of $O(n \cdot \log k) = O\left(\frac{1}{\gamma} \cdot \frac{m_1}{2^\kappa} \cdot \log\left(\frac{m_1}{2^\kappa}\right)\right) = \tilde{O}(\sqrt{2^\ell})$ $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}$ -operations, and so is itself $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{2^\ell})$. The total cost of all $2^{\tau-\iota}$ encoding operations is thus $O(\log^2 \lambda) \cdot \tilde{O}(\sqrt{2^\ell}) = \tilde{O}(\sqrt{2^\ell})$, as required.

We assume, as Brakedown's analysis does (see [Gol+23, § 1]), that the cost \mathfrak{hash} of hashing a $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}$ -element is comparable to that of performing a $\mathcal{T}_{\iota+\kappa}$ -operation. The total cost of each \mathfrak{hash} operation is thus $\tilde{O}(1)$, so that the total cost of all $\rho \cdot m_0$ \mathfrak{hash} -operations is $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{\rho \cdot 2^\ell}) = \tilde{O}(\sqrt{\lambda \cdot 2^\ell})$. \square