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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING IN MISSISSIPPI

A Thesis

Presented for the

Master of Criminal Justice

Degree


The University of Mississippi

Christy L. Babb

December 2009

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


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


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
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
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A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Wesley B. Bales", written over a horizontal line.

Date

A handwritten date in black ink, "December 4, 2009", written over a horizontal line.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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ABSTRACT

The attacks of 9/11 had a huge impact on the intelligence community, the federal government, state and local police departments, and every American citizen. For many law enforcement agencies, their daily operations have been greatly affected. The terrorist attacks made them realize that their estrangement from one another had to be eliminated in an effort to prevent future attacks. If agencies were to be successful they needed to better communicate, share information, assist each other, and become familiar with new policies and procedures. Those new procedures included the implementation of intelligence-led policing (ILP) - a proactive approach to crime prevention. The principle document of this new concept in the United States is the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) which contains twenty-eight recommendations, each of which suggests ways to properly implement ILP in state and local police departments. These recommendations include increased communication between agencies of all levels, additional training and funding for agencies, and enhanced information sharing. However, debate remains as to whether ILP is part of a police officer's routine and if the recommendations from the NCISP are being followed. To date, there have been few systematic studies that have explored these exact questions. With new and emerging threats to the United States, it is important that all levels of law enforcement work together to fight terrorism. In order to determine if ILP is being implemented in agencies in Mississippi, an anonymous survey was fielded to every state and local law enforcement agency in the state.

Voluntary participants answered the survey in hard copy or online; a response rate of 47% was realized. In order to compare Mississippi to the rest of the United States, a survey was also fielded to the participants at the FBI National Academy in Quantico, Virginia. Data regarding the implementation of ILP were subjected to statistical analysis to determine the extent to which ILP has been implemented in Mississippi, how Mississippi compares to the rest of the United States, and what independent variables (agency size and agency type) affect the implementation of ILP.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The key to combating terrorism lies with the local police and the intelligence they can provide to federal authorities (Hess and Orthmann, 2009, p.298)

The attacks of 9/11 had a huge impact on the intelligence community, the federal government, state and local police departments, and every American citizen. Law enforcement agencies at all levels – federal, state, local, and tribal – realized that their estrangement from one another had to be eliminated in an effort to prevent future attacks. In the days following 9/11, agencies pledged to better communicate, share information, assist each other, and become familiar with new policies and procedures. Those new procedures included the implementation of intelligence-led policing (ILP) - a proactive approach to crime prevention. The principle document in the United States that lays out this new concept is the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) which was written by the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global). Global serves as a Federal Advisory Committee and advises the U.S. Attorney General on justice information sharing and integration initiatives (Department of Justice, 2003). The NCISP contains twenty-eight recommendations which suggest ways to properly implement ILP in state and local police departments¹.

¹ See Appendix A

These recommendations include increased communication between agencies at all levels, additional training and funding, and enhanced information sharing.

However, is ILP policing being implemented in Mississippi? This study examines five areas:

1. To what extent ILP is being implemented in Mississippi law enforcement agencies;
2. How familiar are Mississippi agencies are with the NCISP recommendations;
3. How Mississippi compares to other law enforcement agencies in the United States;
4. How agency size affects the implementation of ILP; and
5. How agency type affects the implementation of ILP.

To date, there have been few systematic studies that have explored these exact questions². According to Peterson (2005), ILP is judged to be the form of policing most efficacious in preventing terrorist attacks. The dearth of empirical studies reflecting the implementation of ILP is a huge gap in criminal justice research; this paper seeks to partially fill that gap.

With new and emerging threats to the United States, experts have suggested that it is imperative that all levels of law enforcement incorporate this type of policing into their daily routine (Peterson, 2005); like federal agencies, local and state law

² See, for example, RAND (2002) and Mallory (2007).

enforcement agencies have had to make their own adjustments. Local police departments know their streets and communities better than anyone else. They also know when something looks out of place or if there is a suspicious individual lurking around. Adopting ILP techniques should better able departments – whether rural or urban – to identify these new threats. In order to determine if ILP is being implemented in agencies in Mississippi, an anonymous survey³ was fielded to every state and local law enforcement agency in the state. Voluntary participants answered the survey in hard copy or online; a response rate of 47% was realized. In order to compare Mississippi to the rest of the United States, a survey was also fielded to the participants at the FBI National Academy in Quantico, Virginia. Data regarding the implementation of ILP were subjected to statistical analysis to determine the extent to which ILP has been implemented in Mississippi, how familiar agencies are with the NCISP, how Mississippi compares to the rest of the United States, and what independent variables (agency size and agency type) affect the implementation of ILP.

The results of this study were examined to determine the involvement of Mississippi agencies in ILP methods. It was assumed that type of agency and size of agency are some of the independent variables that influence the extent to which this method of policing is being used. The first area of the study examined the extent to which agency personnel believed that ILP was being implemented in their agency. Because Mississippi is made up of mostly small agencies, it is not likely that most agencies have the personnel to integrate an entirely new method of policing. Because of size and limited budgets, not all agencies can employ intelligence analysts or

³ See Appendix B

intelligence officers (Peterson, 2005). Mississippi is also ranked the poorest state in the United States; therefore, it is likely that the state is not involved in ILP because it lacks the resources to provide sufficient training or hire full time intelligence analysts. In addition, Mississippi ranks 29th in total crime in the United States, which suggests that there is room for significant improvement.⁴ The results reveal what method of policing is being used the most by law enforcement agencies in Mississippi and what percentage is ILP.

The second area examined was how familiar agencies are with the NCISP. If an agency is not familiar with the NCISP's recommendations, it is unlikely that ILP is being used. It is assumed that the larger an agency, the more likely it is that the NCISP recommendations will be utilized. While smaller local agencies are unlikely to have dedicated intelligence staff, they constitute the majority of the departments in the U.S. It is vital that they, like larger departments, participate in intelligence sharing and practice ILP such as the NCISP recommends (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2002). However, the NCISP suggests that training, funding, and equipment must be available to agencies in order to encourage the implementation of ILP. It may be that agencies are unaware that these incentives exist. This study will examine familiarity with the NCISP and if familiarity is linked to the implementation of ILP. It will also reveal if the NCISP recommendations are seen as a benefit to agency personnel.

⁴ See Literature Review "Mississippi Crime Statistics"

The third area examined was how Mississippi compared to the rest of the United States in the implementation of ILP. The percentage that ILP is being used in Mississippi was compared to other states and also revealed how familiar other states are with the NCISP. The study also examined whether one independent variable (agency size) influenced the data gathered in other states compared to Mississippi.

The fourth area examined was how the size of an agency affects the implementation of ILP. It is assumed that the larger the agency, the more likely ILP will be implemented. As previously stated, because Mississippi is made up of mostly small agencies, it is not likely that most agencies have the personnel to integrate an entirely new method of policing. Because of size and limited budgets, not all agencies can employ intelligence analysts or intelligence officers (Peterson, 2005).

The fifth area examined was how the type of agency affects the implementation of ILP. Since training is not required at all for Sheriff's departments in Mississippi each year, it is likely that police departments would have received more training regarding ILP than Sheriff's departments.

This study is important for several reasons. It will shed some light on the state of ILP in Mississippi. Some agencies may have been successful with other methods such as problem-oriented or community oriented policing; however, ILP can be used in combination with these methods. Second, it will bring awareness to the NCISP. The NCISP outlines the responsibility of local agencies, how they can be involved in ILP, and how to improve the intelligence and information sharing process (Mallory, 2007). Third, it will identify if there is a need for increased funding, training, and resources, such as state fusion centers. Fourth, it will indicate which type of agency (large vs.

small; police vs. sheriff) has best implemented ILP. Fifth, it will highlight how Mississippi compares to the rest of the United States. Finally it may shed some light on enhancing officer and community safety by encouraging a proactive approach to policing. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 should not just teach government agencies lessons about how to prevent terrorist attacks, but rather how they can prevent all types of criminality.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

HISTORY OF INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence gathering dates back to ancient times. Essentially a military function, references to intelligence can be found in early Chinese writings (Sun Tzu) as well as the Bible in the book of Numbers where Moses sent his men to gather information on the land of Canaan (Petersen, 2005). Regarding the Revolutionary War, George Washington said, "There is nothing more necessary than good intelligence to frustrate a designing enemy, and nothing that requires greater pains to obtain" (Rose, n.d.). By the time the Civil War ended many years later, the Union Army's Bureau of Military Information was a leading agency in military intelligence, although it was quickly dismantled in the postwar period. Gradually, intelligence gathering was adopted primarily in Europe by "specialized bureaucracies" outside the military. These bureaus collected information by way of espionage and analyzed it for importance. By the time World War I ensued, intelligence was an essential technique. It now included technical sources like aircraft photography and signals intelligence (Boyer, 2001).

During this time the United States was not as advanced as some of its allies, although the use of intercepted and gathered information proved to be vital in most of the country's conflicts. Although there were no formal, structured intelligence departments within the federal government, some city police departments organized units that became known as Red Squads. These specialized units only gathered

information on local political or social groups and were thought of as a countermeasure to Communists, labor unions, and anarchists (Donner, 1990). Within the federal government, intelligence was conducted sporadically and with no organization by various departments. However, before the United States entered World War II, the federal government started to catch up to the level of intelligence technology already in use by others which provided valuable information throughout the war (Boyer, 2001). In 1942, President Roosevelt established the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the first structured intelligence agency within the United States. It was the first time that American intelligence efforts were coordinated under one organization. The OSS was dismantled after the war but was restructured and transformed into the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as we know it today.

Through the years, positive public opinion of the CIA and the intelligence community as a whole began to dwindle. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal, the reins were pulled back on intelligence agencies and units. After years of minimal oversight, evidence that the CIA and other agencies had been involved in questionable, if not illegal, activities mounted up against them. These activities included spying and creating files on over 1 million Americans, attempting to assassinate foreign leaders such as Fidel Castro, seizing and opening the mail of regular American citizens, as well as speculation of drug experiments and influencing the media (Wolf, 2001). Even the activities of Red Squads had intensified over the years to include spying and gathering information on all types of protest movements (Donner, 1990). As a result, the Church Commission, or the Select Committee to

Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, was formed to investigate suspected abuses of power.

Once the investigation was complete, the committee called for a permanent Congressional oversight committee called the Select Committee on Intelligence; this committee acts as an oversight and investigatory committee for the nation's intelligence services (Lowenthal, 2006). The committee also temporarily banned covert actions, scrutinized intelligence agency employees, and established an Inspector General's Office within the CIA. It caused President Ford to establish Executive Order 11905 which stated that intelligence agencies can no longer participate in, assist in or direct a third party to assassinate a foreign leader (Ford, 1976). Most importantly it resulted in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) which created the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. This act enables federal agents to conduct surveillance on those suspected of espionage within the United States only by obtaining warrants in a secret court. Although seemingly minimal, the FISA court has provided some oversight and accountability to domestic intelligence gathering by federal agents (Lowenthal, 2006). This also ended the official use of Red Squads in city police departments (Donner, 1990).

It is evident that the intelligence community has not been able to act with ease throughout the years as originally intended. In the United States, intelligence gathering gained a bad reputation and the concept was somewhat put on the back burner in the eighties and nineties. Police departments were historically not involved in the concept and concentrated their efforts on other models of policing at this time. However, the

terrorist attacks of 9/11 brought the idea of intelligence back to the minds of law enforcement agencies of all levels.

WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE?

Swanson (2008) states that intelligence is data and information that has been evaluated, analyzed, and produced with careful conclusions and recommendations. He goes on to say that it is also a product created from systematic and thoughtful examination placed in context and provided to law enforcement executives or policy-makers with facts and alternatives that can influence critical decisions. Swanson explains that when analyzing intelligence there are three main considerations:

- The role of intelligence is to limit surprise on national security.
- Intelligence includes considering alternative viewpoints aside from what has happened in the past.
- Intelligence focuses on the prediction of future events.

Peterson (2005) says that the word intelligence is often misused. She states that the most common mistake is to consider intelligence as synonymous with information. Peterson argues that information is not intelligence but that intelligence is what is produced after the gathered information is evaluated and analyzed. She says the simplest definition of intelligence is “information plus analysis equals intelligence.” This formula distinguishes between collected information and produced intelligence. Petersen notes that without analysis, there is no intelligence; intelligence is not what is collected, it is what is produced after collected data is evaluated and analyzed (Peterson, 2005).

THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

Since 9/11, actually producing intelligence has undergone a major overhaul. The intelligence cycle (Figure 2.1) which has been in use by the military and federal intelligence agencies for years, was introduced throughout the law enforcement community. It also helps to make sense of this new model of policing. Many policy-makers and police administrators are familiar with the intelligence cycle. The phrase “intelligence process” refers to the steps or stages in intelligence, from policy makers or agencies perceiving a need for information to the community’s delivery of an analytical product (Lowenthal, 2006). The typical intelligence process consists of five steps. However, Lowenthal (2006) states that there are two more steps that are beneficial. These steps are identifying requirements, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination with the addition of consumption and feedback.




Figure 2.1: The Intelligence Cycle (FBI, n.d.)

The first step in the intelligence process is identifying the requirements. These requirements typically are provided by the policy-maker or administrator and are generally based on need. The policy-maker or administrator usually angles these requirements towards his or her own agenda. Sometimes the current intelligence collection is replaced by whatever the policy-maker or administrator considers a priority and all other “missions” must be placed on the back-burner. Once the requirements have been set, the type of intelligence is decided upon. Whether it is human intelligence, signal intelligence, image intelligence or open source intelligence, this decision leads to the next step in the process (Lowenthal, 2006).

Collection, the second step, is vital; however, it can be tedious, confusing, and expensive. According to Lowenthal (2006), there are five major types of intelligence collection: Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) which is the gathering of intelligence by interception of electronic signals; Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) or Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) which is the exploitation and analysis of satellite information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth; Human Intelligence (HUMINT) which is the gathering of information through secret agents; Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) is acquiring information from publicly available sources and analyzing it to produce actionable intelligence; and Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) which includes activities that bring together disparate elements that do not fit within the definitions of the major disciplines mentioned above. The type of intelligence that is utilized depends on what the policy-maker or administrator is after. Sometimes more than one type is used. However, collection methods only produce information, not intelligence

(Lowenthal, 2006). It is difficult at this stage to separate the ambiguous information from the clear. Often more information is gathered than is needed but this is necessary in order to pursue the truth.

Once information is gathered it is handed over to the intelligence analysts to decipher and piece together what is relevant and what is not. This step in the process is called processing and exploitation. Interpreting imagery, decoding messages, translating foreign-language broadcasts, reducing telemetry (radio transmission) to meaningful measures, preparing information for computer processing, storage and retrieval, placing human-source reports in a form and context to make them more comprehensible - all constitute processing and exploitation (Gulflink, n.d.). Analysts are not part of the collection process and they are often handed enormous amounts of information in which they are expected to sift through. There is often a communication gap between what policy-makers or administrators want and what analysts conclude. However, policy-makers or administrators are not legally bound to abide by the answers that intelligence uncovers (Lowenthal, 2006).

The analysis and production stage is the process by which an analyst dissects information and turns it into intelligence. Analysts receive information from many sources and are responsible for evaluating the information and testing it against other information; they use their knowledge in and expertise to come up with conclusions in order to make forecasts about the future. They often must juggle their focus between short-term and long-term intelligence; whatever is currently relevant to the policy-maker or administrator.

The next step in the intelligence process is dissemination and consumption. When information has been tested and analyzed, the finished product is then called intelligence. It becomes intelligence when the human mind is applied to the information collected (Krizan, 2006). It is put into a report and is then disseminated through different channels for consumption.

The last step in the process is feedback. This step is often forgotten about and can be frustrating for analysts. At this stage, policy-makers or administrators have often moved on to a more pressing issue and if not, they are so absorbed with another, more current intelligence issue that they provide no feedback at all to the analyst (Lowenthal, 2006). Sometimes the policy-maker's or administrator's agenda has changed or the intelligence that was discovered does not coincide with his intended direction. As previously stated, there is often a communication gap between what policy-makers and administrators want and what the analyst produces. In essence, it all depends on what the policy-maker or administrator considers useful. More often than not, however, they rely on the intelligence they are given and act on it (Lowenthal, 2006).

WHY INTELLIGENCE IS CRITICAL

Peterson (2005) also states that intelligence is critical for four reasons: decision-making, planning, strategic targeting, and crime prevention.

- Decision-making – Law enforcement officers are plagued by large amounts of information, yet decisions are often based on information that may be incomplete, inaccurate, or misdirected. The move from information gathering to decision-making depends on the analytic process, and results in a best estimate of what will happen.
- Planning - Intelligence is crucial to effective planning and subsequent action. In many agencies, action is planned without an understanding of

the crime problems facing the jurisdiction and without enough operational input. In these instances, strategic planning bears no resemblance to strategic analysis or strategic intelligence. Instead, it relates only to funding issues and operational constraints.

- Strategic Targeting - Law enforcement agencies with tight budgets and personnel shortages must use their available resources with caution. They must be selective with the individuals they target and only choose operations that promise the greatest results and the best chances for success.
- Crime Prevention – Indicators from previous crimes can be created and shared among law enforcement agencies. By comparing these indicators analysts can anticipate crime trends and agencies can take preventive measures to intervene or diminish the impact of those crimes (Peterson, 2005, p.3).

INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING IS INTRODUCED

The concept ILP was born in Great Britain almost twenty years ago. In the early 1990s, ILP was defined as a new approach to crime control that it is “strategic, future-oriented and targeted” and “built around analysis and management of problems and risks, rather than reactive responses” (Maguire and John, 2006). During her tenure, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher pushed for greater efficiency and effectiveness in policing in the latter years of her administration. This ultimately introduced ILP into British law enforcement (Maguire and John, 2006).

In 1995, the Kent Constabulary developed an interest in the concept. In 1995, Sir David Phillips, Chief Constable of Kent, made the first attempt to introduce ILP in an efficient manner into the daily routine of ordinary police officers in response to sky-rocketing property-related offenses. He believed that a small number of people were responsible for the majority of crime and positioned intelligence at the center of police decision making. This meant that the intelligence unit directed aspects of daily police activities; for example, patrol officers were tasked to gather specific

information later usable in planning target operations (Maguire and John, 2006). The Kent Policing Model minimized response to service calls by prioritizing calls and referring less serious calls for general non-police services to other agencies. In turn, more police time was available to create intelligence units to focus on property-related offenses in each of the jurisdiction's service areas. The result was a 24% drop in crime over three years (Petersen, 2005).

Petersen (2005) says that ILP focuses on key criminal activities. Once problems are identified through intelligence assessments, key criminals can be targeted for investigation. Because the groups and individuals targeted in Kent were those responsible for significant criminal activity, there was a substantial reduction in crime. The Constabulary stated that "It has given the Kent Constabulary the ability to confront crime in an active, rational fashion and to build continually on each success."

By the year 2000, a paradigm shift was taking place in policing in the United Kingdom. In his research, Maguire (2000) stated:

In essence, it was observed, rather than simply responding to individual crimes as they are reported by the public, the police—often in collaboration with other public sector agencies—were acting increasingly proactively in relation to perceived risks, putting substantial effort and resources into planned strategies to identify and to 'target' offenders, locations or activities that appeared to present a sufficient level of threat or nuisance to the community to merit priority attention. What was developing... was 'a strategic, future-oriented and targeted approach to crime control, focusing upon the identification, analysis and 'management' of persisting and developing 'problems' or 'risks' (which may be particular people, activities or areas), rather than on the reactive investigation and detection of individual crimes.

In 2000, the National Intelligence Model (NIM) was introduced into England and Wales. The NIM "represents an effort to promote effective ILP on a national basis and to standardize intelligence-related structures, processes and practices across all

police services in England and Wales. It is essentially the design for a comprehensive 'business process' to rationalize and systematize the ways in which the police service handles information and makes key decisions about the deployment of resources" (National Center for Policing Excellence, 2005).

The NIM is built around the production and use of four broad categories of 'product'.

- Analytic products - Primarily brief reports drawn up by specialist intelligence units on the basis of analysis of information and intelligence from a variety of sources;
- Intelligence products - Analytical products are combined or developed into intelligence products, which may be broadly subdivided into strategic assessments; tactical assessments; target profiles; and problem profiles;
- Knowledge products - These are products that will inform future development of the Model itself and maintain quality within it.
- System products - These are designed to ensure that appropriate technical and computer equipment is available to the Model for its effective operation and to minimize inefficient practices that act as a barrier to the sharing of information (National Intelligence Model, 2005, p.7).

The key users of these products which drive the entire process are intelligence analysts and senior officers with operational responsibilities. They meet regularly to assess hot spots and series of crimes and plan, co-ordinate, and manage police responses. In doing so, they use and request the further development of intelligence products, the contents and conclusions of which should inform prioritization and operational decisions. (National Center for Policing Excellence, 2005)

Per Maguire and John (2004), "The Model adopts a holistic view of the resources (including human resources) available to the intelligence unit to develop actionable products or to create new information and intelligence on subjects that have been prioritized." Its inclusive approach to intelligence responsibilities, whereby

specific tasks are given, for example, to patrol officers as well as designated proactive staff, is potentially an important factor in creating a general ‘intelligence culture’ and resolving some of the difficulties associated with the use of intelligence in the police service (National Center for Policing Excellence, 2005). This model became the premiere document of ILP in the United Kingdom.

INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING IN THE UNITED STATES

After the corruption of the 1970s, strict guidelines had to be followed to even peek inside an intelligence file. The CIA – the United States’ premiere intelligence gathering agency – now had a bad reputation. However, other intelligence initiatives commenced which kept the concept alive. Some of these initiatives, such as the Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) centers did not even use the term “intelligence” (Petersen, 2005). These centers were created so that law enforcement agencies could share information and effectively communicate. However, they did not operate without restriction. The primary basis for intelligence was the Criminal Intelligence System Operating Policies (28 Code of Federal Regulations Part 23) and applied to RISS Centers (Petersen, 2005). In addition, organizations were formed such as the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (IALEIA) so that agencies could enhance information sharing, professionalism, and communication.

During the 1980s and 1990s in the United States, the philosophy of community-oriented policing was utilized among police departments and communities nationwide. Community-oriented policing is a policing strategy based on the notion that community interaction and support can help control crime and reduce fear, with

community members helping to identify suspects, detain vandals and bring problems to the attention of police (Committee on Law and Justice, 2004). With the riots, civil disobedience, and flat-out civil unrest of the sixties and seventies due to the Vietnam War, the Civil Rights Movement, and the introduction of harder-core drugs, it seemed logical, if not imperative, for police officers to begin to go straight to the source and into the communities for help. They needed a new approach so they began to hit the streets and develop relationships with business owners and residents of their jurisdictions. That enabled them to target certain high crime areas known as hot spots and to use the new relationships they had formed as sources of information.

The community-oriented policing model allowed law enforcement agencies to become more familiar with their jurisdictions. However, they were shielded and restricted from anything outside their jurisdiction. They had no reason – nor were they allowed – to fight, prevent, or deter crime outside of their boundaries. They did not communicate laterally about cases nor was there any upward communication with the federal agencies. If a criminal in their jurisdiction was apprehended for a federal crime, the FBI often came in and took over the case. Thompson (2003) states that federal law often inhibited vital information sharing and cooperation with local law enforcement prior to 9/11. Although frustration may have been felt, most agencies were probably complacent about the arrangement.

But all of that changed shortly after the terrorist attacks in New York City on September 11, 2001.

The attacks demonstrated that the United States was now facing a new enemy – one that was virtually unknown on U.S. soil. This new enemy was not a nation. It

used single incidents of surprise, brutality, and most of all terror, to make a point. Terrorists did not care about the “collateral damage” inflicted on civilians; they did not care about their own lives or families. Their reward was not one of victory or of earthly value, but one they received in heaven. How does one stop such an asymmetric enemy? This realization has forced local police departments to focus a massive amount of their attention on the need to improve law enforcement intelligence operations (Swanson, 2008). But are law enforcement agencies making an improvement? In some agencies, policing has since gone from Community-oriented to Intelligence-led.

In the post 9/11 world, local and state law enforcement agencies were expected to play a role in homeland security and the new “War on Terror.” Obviously, the events of 9/11 represented how critical it is for local law enforcement to be involved in every facet of whatever it takes to keep the United States safe. After all, they spent years combing through the streets of their jurisdictions and were experts on anything that looked out of place. Incorporating local law enforcement agencies into the “War of Terror” meant opening up the lines of communication and implementing a new intelligence-led model of policing.

INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING DEFINED

Now that intelligence production appears to be on the forefront of policing, departments had to come up with a new model to guide them. Swanson (2008) defines ILP as a collaborative enterprise based on improved intelligence operations stemming from community policing and problem-solving strategies. Ratcliffe (2008) describes it as a business model and managerial philosophy where data analysis and crime

intelligence are pivotal to an objective, decision-making framework that facilitates crime and problem reduction, disruption and prevention through both strategic management and effective enforcement strategies that target prolific and serious offenders. The Department of Justice (n.d.) states that intelligence-led policing focuses on key criminal activities. Once crime problems are identified and quantified through intelligence assessments key criminals can be targeted for investigation. In other words, intelligence-led policing is being proactive as opposed to reactive with regard to terrorism or any criminal activity (violent, enterprise, street crime). It does not replace community-oriented policing but simply builds on it. According to Carter (2004), each model has a goal of prevention and relies on consistent information input. However, community-oriented policing is incident driven and intelligence-led policing is threat driven. Jensen (2008) goes on to say that one important distinction between the two is that law enforcement is concerned with evidence that must hold up in court whereas intelligence produces information that is “good enough” to be used against a threat. He adds that a primary goal of intelligence is to protect its sources (Personal Communication, November 3, 2008).

NATIONAL CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SHARING PLAN

In 2003, the Department of Justice released the NCISP. It is an extensive set of twenty-eight recommendations for law enforcement agencies to design a plan to share criminal intelligence. According to some studies, the biggest hindrances to sharing information were lack of communication, inadequate technology, poor policies, insufficient analysis, and poor working relationships (Department of Justice, 2005). In short, NCISP emphasizes prediction as opposed to reaction and response; it proposes

increasing funding and training; and most importantly, it stresses the importance of increased communication at all levels of law enforcement. According to the rationale for the NCISP, the barriers of intelligence sharing are as follows: there is no structured process in place for intelligence to be gathered, given or received; a complicated “chain of command” exists within the law enforcement and intelligence agencies; access to intelligence information other than an agency’s own is strictly prohibited; technology is not sufficient enough for such a massive amount of information to be shared amongst such a large community; and inadequacies in information analysis persist (Department of Justice, 2005).

The NCISP presents its “mission and vision” which begins with the model for the plan itself. It suggests what else is needed which includes a mechanism to promote intelligence-led policing; a blueprint to build an intelligence system; a model for principles and policies; a plan to respect the privacy of citizens; a technology infrastructure to provide the secure sharing of information; intelligence training; an outreach plan to provide timely sharing of information; and a plan that connects existing networks yet provides room for improvement (Department of Justice, 2005). Whether or not these plans can be implemented within the approximately 18,000 law enforcement agencies in the United States is much more complicated. However, experts suggest that the NCISP recommendations provide the sufficient guidance needed to begin the implementation of ILP (Peterson, 2005).

IMPLEMENTATION OF INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING

Peterson (2005) states that in order for intelligence to work effectively it should operate so that any agency, regardless of size, can integrate it into its daily

routine. In order to decide what measures should be taken to integrate ILP, an agency should first evaluate how much intelligence is currently incorporated. Peterson (2005) states that there are four levels of intelligence operations which categorize law enforcement agencies' capabilities.

- Level 1 Intelligence – This is the highest level of intelligence operations. This is the “ideal intelligence-led policing scenario” in which agencies produce tactical and strategic intelligence products that are used by their own departments as well as other law enforcement agencies. These agencies typically have a hierarchical intelligence squad which focuses its efforts entirely on intelligence-led activities.
- Level 2 Intelligence – The agencies that fall into this category produce tactical and strategic intelligence entirely for their own use. They apply this intelligence to their own investigations rather than future operations and generally do not share this information freely with other agencies.
- Level 3 Intelligence – This is the most common level of intelligence function in the United States. These agencies generally rely on intelligence products developed by other agencies such as fusion centers, RISS centers, or other state or federal agencies. These agencies do not directly hire an officer as an intelligence analyst yet will name an officer in house for whatever task needs to be completed.
- Level 4 Intelligence – These agencies are small and do not employ intelligence personnel. If someone is assigned to an intelligence operation, they usually have multiple responsibilities within the agency (Peterson, 2005, pp12-13).

Peterson (2005) recommends that a law enforcement agency begin ILP by implementing these ten steps:

1. Create a proper environment, which includes educating and gaining the support of all parties involved and the community.
2. Establish the criminal intelligence unit as a proactive crime prevention operation that supports the concepts of community-oriented policing.
3. Design a unit mission statement focused on specific criminal activities.
4. Select qualified intelligence personnel.
5. Obtain separate, secure quarters for the unit
6. Implement and enforce professional guidelines for all unit procedures.
7. Provide training.
8. Partner with neighboring agencies and participate in regional and state criminal intelligence networks.

9. Require both strategic and tactical products from the unit and evaluate its operations on a regular schedule.
10. Ensure the chief executive officer meets regularly with the supervisor of the criminal intelligence unit to provide appropriate direction (Peterson, 2005, p.15).

Petersen points out that the Global Intelligence Working Group has designed its own set of steps entitled “10 Simple Steps to Help Your Agency Become Part of the NCISP (as cited by Petersen, 2005, p.15).” She lists the 7 most important to the process. The steps are as follows:

1. Recognize your responsibilities and lead by example—implement or enhance your organization’s intelligence function using the action steps in the NCISP.
2. Establish a mission statement and a policy for developing and sharing information and intelligence within your agency.
3. Connect to your state criminal justice network and regional intelligence databases and participate in information sharing initiatives.
4. Ensure that privacy issues are protected by policy and practice. These can be addressed without hindering the intelligence process and will reduce your organization’s liability concerns.
5. Access law enforcement web sites, subscribe to law enforcement listservs, and use the Internet as an information resource.
6. Provide your agency members with appropriate training on criminal intelligence.
7. Partner with public and private infrastructure sectors for the safety and security of the citizens in your community (Peterson, 2005, p.15).

In addition, Petersen also states that the following should be taken into consideration:

- The training standards of the NCISP be considered the minimum. All law enforcement personnel involved should be trained according to their position within the agency.
- The agency should obtain the support of the chief executive, political officials, and the community in order for intelligence operations to be successful.
- The security of the agencies networks and computer hardware as well as physical security should be evaluated.

- Concern for citizens' rights to privacy and civil liberties. Information within intelligence files should be checked by the following guidelines:
 - Information entering the intelligence system should meet a reasonable suspicion and should be evaluated to check the reliability of the source and the validity of the content.
 - Information entering the intelligence system should not violate the privacy or civil liberties of its subjects.
 - Information maintained in the intelligence system should be updated or eliminated every 5 years.
 - Agencies should keep a dissemination trail of who received the information.
 - Information from the intelligence system should be disseminated only to those personnel who have a right and a need to know in order to perform a law enforcement function (Peterson, 2005, p.20).

Petersen finally states that the ongoing need for information sharing should be emphasized and evaluation criteria should be designed to gauge if the intelligence operations within the agency are successful.

Fuentes (2006) has produced his own ILP guide for the New Jersey State Police (NJSP). The Guide states that it is a reference document for officers on patrol, detectives in the field, analysts, and senior leadership. It acknowledges that the primary responsibility of state and local police organizations is to prevent crime and terrorism. The starting point for first preventers is to influence an intelligence system that increases communication, enhances information sharing with other agencies, and focuses resources according to a commander's intent (Fuentes, 2006).

Because one-third of the victims of 9/11 resided in New Jersey, NJSP was well aware that "terrorism is truly a local issue." Although the NJSP has a history in intelligence-led activities, there was a major need for reorganization within the agency. Therefore *The NJSP Practical Guide to Intelligence-led Policing* (Guide) was introduced from an order of the Superintendent. It stated that in order to secure the

homeland and continue their way of life the NJSP must reform the manner in which they police (Fuentes, 2006).

To begin, the NJSP adopted the 3i Model of ILP (Figure 2.2) introduced by Ratcliffe (2003) which revolves around three activities: interpreting the criminal environment, influencing decision makers, and impacting the criminal environment. The Guide states that collecting and analyzing information to produce finished intelligence products will make decision-makers aware of challenges and help them understand the operating environment. Decision-makers can then plan on how to make a difference in that environment (Fuentes, 2006).




Figure 2.2: Ratcliffe's 3i Model of Intelligence-Led Policing (Ratcliffe, 2003).

The Guide promotes the notion that intelligence-led policing is a collaborative effort in which information comes from all positions within the agency; it further stresses the need for support from its leadership. The Guide presents an excellent summary of the process of intelligence-led policing:

Intelligence-led policing is a collaborative philosophy that starts with information, gathered at all levels of the organization that is analyzed to create useful intelligence and an improved understanding of the operational environment. This will assist leadership in making the best possible decisions

with respect to crime control strategies, allocation of resources, and tactical operations. The adoption of ILP processes requires a concerted effort by all parties, including analysts, operators, and senior leaders. For analysts the key components of this process include the creation of tactical, operational and strategic intelligence products that support immediate needs, promote situational awareness, and provide the foundation for longer-term planning. For operators it requires becoming both better data collectors and better consumers of intelligence related products. This means shifting from emphasizing post-event evidence collection to constantly gathering all relevant data and ensuring it is provided for entry into appropriate databases, as well as drawing from the intelligence analysts and relevant databases all the information that is needed to support ongoing operations. Finally, adopting the ILP process requires senior leadership to actively engage the analysts and the operators to ensure the leadership has a sufficient picture of the operating environment and that it can act to distribute resources according to conclusions and priorities drawn from this understanding (Fuentes, 2006 p. 3).

The Guide calls itself a “comprehensive resource” of how to implement ILP into any agency but incorporates steps derived from its own struggles. The Guide lays out four components for implementing ILP:

1. The reorganization of the Investigations Branch to better facilitate rapid deployment of intelligence and investigative assets as needed;
2. The adoption of the Intelligence Cycle to support better situational awareness;
3. The creation of a Regional Operations and Intelligence Center (ROIC), which is designed to provide tactical situational awareness;
4. The use of strategic planning and intelligence-driven analyses to set priorities and allocate resources (Fuentes, 2006, p.2).

The Guide specifically lays out the roles and expectations of each officer active in an intelligence operation as well as the need for fusion centers and other state and federal agencies. Just like the NCISP, it encourages communication at all levels of government (Fuentes, 2006).

A large portion of the focus of the Guide is the importance of the intelligence report. Once information is collected and analyzed, it must be arranged so that it is

easy to understand for the reader. The Guide states that the objective of intelligence reports is to provide the most pertinent information necessary for preventing crime, identifying targets, influencing future operations and policy decisions, and guiding resource allocation (Fuentes, 2006). Each and every intelligence report becomes part of a “larger mosaic of information” in the intelligence system. However, it is important to understand the difference between an intelligence report and an investigative report. The Guide lays out a few key differences of each in order to assist law enforcement agencies in shifting their mindset (Fuentes, 2006).

An investigative report has the following characteristics:

- Is evidentiary in nature.
- It presents information that, when taken as a whole, satisfy the elements of proof of a past criminal offense.
- It must describe what is to be reported without opinion or amplification.
- The manner in which information is gathered must conform to strict rules of criminal procedure if defendants are to be prosecuted.

An Intelligence report has the following characteristics:

- Reporting is premonitory (provides advance notice).
- Prosecution is not the main objective.
- It is intended to direct organizations toward potential criminal activities that require focused investigations or alert them to future threats requiring tactical responses.
- It is not responsible for meeting the expectations as an investigative report.

Not only do these show key differences between the reports but also important differences on a broader scale between intelligence and other law enforcement activities. The NJSP Guide gives many examples of the different types of reports that officers should familiarize themselves with (Fuentes, 2006).

An important aspect of ILP is being able to make sense of the intelligence that is produced. So much information comes from so many different directions that if not organized, it can be overwhelming to an agency new to the concept. Some intelligence may not be active at the moment but can be stored for use on operations in the future. The Guide suggests dividing the intelligence products into four categories:

- Current Intelligence – addresses day-to-day events, seeking to apprise consumers of new developments and related background, to assess their significance, to warn of their near-term consequences, and to signal potentially dangerous situations in the near future. Current intelligence is presented in daily, weekly, and some monthly publications, and frequently in memorandums and oral briefings to senior officials.
- Estimative Intelligence – A calculation of what might happen. Starts with the available facts, but then migrates into the unknown. The main roles of estimative intelligence are to help policymakers navigate the gaps between available facts by suggesting alternative patterns into which those facts might fit and to provide informed assessments of the range and likelihood of possible outcomes.
- Warning Intelligence – Gives notice to policymakers. It signifies urgency and implies the need for action.
- Research Intelligence – is represented by the contributions of subject matter experts, professors, students, etc. The more that is known about the many different facets of intelligence, the more prepared an agency will be (Fuentes, 2006, pp. 26-27).

The Guide expresses the importance of knowing who your audience is when relaying important intelligence-related information. Sometimes agencies may communicate intelligence information to someone who is familiar with the wordage used in reports. However, agencies also produce reports or relay information to political officials or the community who may not be aware of a particular type of terminology. It is also important that agencies are well aware of the purpose of the intelligence product. The Guide states that particular attention should be paid to what type of intelligence is being communicated – current, estimative, warning, or research.

Is it long-term or short-term? That may ultimately affect the outcome of the operation. Only the most pertinent information should be shared but an agency should always be prepared to share details and answer questions from its audience (Fuentes, 2006).

STUDIES REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ILP

Mallory (2007) conducted a small study of 12 analysts from various departments in Mississippi that either have an intelligence function or are planning to establish a unit. According to this research, small police departments, which are predominant in Mississippi, have little exposure to the intelligence process as compared to the considerable assets of a city such as New York. However, Mallory also suggests that these small departments have the capacity to develop and disseminate valuable information ranging from national security to crime trends and organized crime. However, their strategies may be different than those of larger agencies. He states that if effective police strategies are created by skilled and enthusiastic decision makers who are influenced by effective intelligence products, crime reduction will be the result.

Mallory (2007) also examined how other models of policing, such as CompStat and problem-oriented policing, can be combined with ILP. He states that ILP, which focuses on accurate information to guide police operations, can result in better application of other models of policing. An agency does not have to give up its current method entirely but should incorporate the intelligence process to complement the department's mission.

Mallory's research in Mississippi found that there were very few departments or agencies in the state that have full time intelligence analysts. The intelligence

analysts that are employed in Mississippi stressed the need for more training as they were not aware of the difference between the role of a crime analyst and an intelligence analyst. Other concerns were the lack of funding, support, and resources for intelligence functions as well as lack of proper technology and personnel. Mallory went on to argue that it was not just Mississippi agencies that had a lack of understanding of the intelligence process, but many agencies in the United States.

To date, there have been no comprehensive studies conducted that gauge the level of ILP in all state and local law enforcement agencies. However, in 2004 RAND Corporation was involved in two studies. The original study was entitled *When Terrorism Hits Home: How Prepared are State and Local Law Enforcement?* and examined domestic preparedness among law enforcement agencies. The results of that study were later analyzed in 2005 with an intelligence element added and published in a study entitled *State and Local Intelligence in the War on Terror*. The report examines how state and local intelligence activities have developed in the post 9/11 environment (Riley, Treverton, Wilson, Davis, 2005). It points out how essential the capabilities of state and local agencies can be in the war on terror. Local police know their communities and the streets better than any federal agent. They are aware of crime trends, hot spots, and any shift in demographics in their jurisdictions. RAND argues that law enforcement officers should be involved in intelligence related activities to the fullest extent. The RAND study assesses what those agencies are doing differently since 9/11 and how prepared they are for another attack. It also examined communication and coordination with other agencies and the caliber of additional training received after 9/11 (Davis, Riley, Ridgeway, Pace, Cotton, 2005).

The results of RAND study did indicate that there are four major areas that need to be addressed:

- The sustainability of state and local law enforcement agency intelligence activity is in question. State and local law enforcement agencies state that the federal government is not funding intelligence activities but is being supplied by their budgets. The question remains whether law enforcement agencies will continue to fund intelligence activities on their own when other demands on them increase. In addition, it is unclear whether intelligence activities assist with or detract from traditional crime prevention activities at the local level.
- The training of law enforcement agencies' personnel involved in intelligence activity appears insufficient. There is a definite need for more training, especially in analysis, at the state and local level. Current efforts vary widely among the states. Organizations must also develop clear mission statements, adopt minimum standards for data collection, develop proper file maintenance standards, and implement appropriate staff training and certification processes.
- Scant doctrine for shaping state and local law enforcement agencies intelligence activity exists. Agencies are unaware of how to develop an intelligence unit within their division.
- The courts—the federal courts in particular—will continue to strike the balance between privacy and civil liberties, on the one hand, and national security on the other. Agencies feel they have little guidance when deciding what they should do with information they collect—especially about American citizens. It will be up to the courts to enforce guidelines when constitutional or statutory standards apply and to put pressure on the executive branch to issue clear guidelines when such standards do not apply (Riley, et al, 2005, p.xvi).

In addition, the RAND study found that the intelligence function is concentrated among larger departments and awareness of the need stemmed from the Oklahoma City bombings and the September 11 attacks. However, the survey does not reveal how the larger departments and agencies are organizing, resourcing, and conducting their intelligence efforts (Riley, et al, 2005). The RAND study also points out that since it was conducted in 2005, it is not an accurate depiction of where departments are currently.

RAND Corporation also conducted a study regarding state and local law enforcement's contribution to the fight against terror. The study examined what agencies perceived to be the major state and local threats, how many terrorist incidents have been experienced, and the perceived likelihood that they will experience terrorist incidents in the future. It did not, however, directly measure the implementation of ILP.

FUSION CENTERS

An important asset to ILP that spun off of the attacks of 9/11 is the creation of the fusion center concept. According to the Department of Justice (2004), a fusion center is an effective and efficient mechanism to exchange information an intelligence, maximize resources, streamline operations, and improve the ability to fight crime and terrorism by merging data from a variety of sources. In addition, fusion centers are a conduit for implementing portions of the NCISP (Department of Justice, 2004). Swanson (2008) defines them more simply: data centers within police agencies that serve as intelligence clearinghouses for all potentially relevant homeland security and crime information that can be used to assess local terror. He goes on to say that fusion centers distribute relevant and timely information, incorporating a simultaneously vertical and horizontal approach within a given jurisdiction. According to the Department of Homeland Security (n.d.), these centers are state and locally created yet have the support of the federal government. The Department of Homeland Security provides some of these centers with staff that have the necessary skills to analyze information being reported. The purpose of this support is to:

- Help the classified and unclassified information flow;
- Provide expertise;
- Coordinate with local law enforcement and other agencies, and;
- Provide local awareness and access (Department of Homeland Security, n.d.).

Information flows to the centers from everywhere. Personnel comb through millions of criminal records, including parole and probation files, criminal complaints, 911 calls, and national crime and public records; these records date back more than ten years in some cases (Swanson, 2008). Analyzing this data helps to identify persons of interest, hot spots, and hot targets. The goals of fusion centers according to Swanson (2008) are as follows:

- To support the broad range of activities undertaken by a police department relating to detection, examination, and investigation of a potential terrorist or criminal activity.;
- To support operations that protect critical infrastructure & key resources in a given region; support major incident operations; support specialized units charged with interdiction and investigative operations; and assist in emergency operations and planning as well as eliminate high value and high risk targets;
- To maintain public “tip lines,” and;
- To assist police in making better informed decisions.

Not only do fusion centers evaluate criminal information, they also examine public information. This has sparked some debate with human rights organizations in that it could be an infringement on the right to privacy. Fusion centers are very tight-lipped about the information they gather and on whom. In 2007, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has stated several potential problems with these centers. The first problem it has identified is that the lines of authority are not clearly defined. With

so many different levels of law enforcement contributing to fusion centers, the ACLU states that they are able to manipulate federal, state, and local laws in order to find loopholes in what can be collected and on whom. The ACLU refers to this as “policy shopping.” Another potential problem is the participation of the private sector. By incorporating the private sector, the ACLU thinks fusion centers exploit the employees and customers of these companies by narrowing the relationship between public and private organizations. Military participation is also another problem, although there was no sufficient argument to back up that statement. The obvious assumption would be that fusion centers are using military personnel to gather information on civilians and that, in itself, is concerning. The ACLU also goes on to argue that data fusion equals data mining. There is no restriction on who sees this data that is being collected nor do we know on whom. Of course, the final argument of the ACLU is excessive secrecy and the lengths fusion centers go to maintain it. There is little if any public oversight which, the ACLU states, brings their ultimate value into question (American Civil Liberties Union, 2007). Just like any other new organization, it will take some time to iron out the policies and procedures.

Research suggests that ILP is not a new concept and that law enforcement agencies have many different tools to aid them in learning this style of policing. The NCISP states that additional training, increased funding, and enhanced communication and coordination will come from the federal government but agencies have to be willing to shift to this new model. Fusion centers are also a valuable tool in assisting law enforcement agencies by sifting through vital information. It is important to notice the role of local and state police departments in the fight against terror. They are the

first responders in their communities and will be the first heroes should an attack of any nature take place. So insisting that ILP be utilized as part of an officer's daily routine is imperative. A review of the literature indicates that no measures of ILP implementation have been conducted to date. This is a glaring gap, in that ILP is judged to be the form of policing most efficacious in preventing terrorist attacks (Peterson, 2005).

MISSISSIPPI CRIME STATISTICS

The 2008 crime statistics in Mississippi are as follows:

Mississippi had an estimated population of 2,938,618 which was approximately 20,000 more than the previous year. This ranked the state 31st in population. For that year, the state had a total Crime Index of 3,224.7 of reported incidents per 100,000 people which ranked the state as having the 29th highest total Crime Index in the country. For violent crime Mississippi had a reported incident rate of 284.9 per 100,000 people. This ranked the state as having the 34th highest occurrence for violent crime among the states. For crimes against property, the state had a reported incident rate of 2940.8 per 100,000 people, which ranked as the state 25th highest in the country. Also in the year 2008 Mississippi had 8.1 Murders per 100,000 people, ranking the state as having the 4th highest rate for murder which was the highest ranking since 2005. Mississippi's 30.3 reported forced rapes per 100,000 people, ranked the state 29th highest in the country but was the lowest ranking the state has had since 1987. For robbery, per 100,000 people, Mississippi's rate was 102.6 which ranked the state 26th highest in the nation for robbery. Also in 2008, the state had 143.9 aggravated assaults for every 100,000 people, which indexed the state as having the 42nd highest position for this crime among the states. The number of aggravated assaults has dropped significantly in the state to less than half of the incidents reported in the year 2000. For every 100,000 people there were 885.6 Burglaries, which ranks Mississippi as having the 14th highest standing among the states. Larceny/theft was reported 1838.7 times per hundred thousand people in Mississippi which ranks as the 15th highest among the states. Vehicle Theft occurred 216.2 times per 100,000 people in 2008, which fixed the state as having the 34th highest ranking for vehicle theft among the states (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009).

Although Mississippi is ranked almost halfway between having the highest and lowest crime rate in the country, there is obviously need for significant improvement especially when the state is ranked as having the 4th highest murder rate. The Kent Constabulary was successful with using ILP methods in that it resulted in a 24% drop in property-related offenses over three years. New York City has the largest police department in the United States and it has been said that the NYPD has America's best counter-terror force (Dickey, 2009). Since 2001, New York City has emphasized anti-terror programs in its anti-crime initiatives. A Real Time Crime Center (fusion center) was established with a database for criminal information for police investigation (Marks, 2009). Overall, the entire state of New York was ranked 47th in overall crime out of the 50 states and District of Columbia in 2008 (1st being the highest crime rate). That is impressive considering the state has a population of almost 19.5 million people making it the 3rd largest in the United States (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009). The New Jersey State Police (NJSP) has integrated ILP almost entirely into their daily routine. The agency even published a manual entitled, *A Practical Guide to Intelligence-Led Policing* which provides an example of the fundamental processes that state and local law enforcement are adopting to "operationalize" ILP (Fuentes, 2006). New Jersey had a population of 8,682,661 in 2008 is ranked 45th in overall rate of crime in the United States. The state's total crime has dropped from 3160.5 per 100,000 people in the year 2000 to 2619.9 incidents per 100,000 people in 2008 (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009). The state of Mississippi has a much smaller population than New Jersey and New York yet the crime rate in Mississippi is much higher overall.

Mississippi is ranked 49th in health and education in the United States. It is ranked 46th in the nation for economic growth and is also considered to be the poorest state in the United States. Mississippi has a poverty rate of 21.6% and an average income per capita of just over \$28,000 (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2009). Since Mississippi generally falls short in other areas compared to the rest of the United States, it is unlikely that the state implements ILP in any meaningful way. It is possible that Mississippi agencies are not aware of possible outside sources of funding. As a result, it is likely that the state is not involved in ILP because it lacks the resources to hire full time intelligence analysts or provide sufficient training. Currently, the state only requires 24 hours of in-service training per year for police officers and none for Sherriff's deputies. Some of the training is paid for by state grants but a majority is reimbursed to the agencies by the Mississippi Department of Public Safety. Approximately \$1.7 million was reimbursed in the year 2008 (personal communication, 2009) which seems relatively low once divided among the approximately 168 police departments in the state. Perhaps the reason for this low amount spent on training is that agencies are not aware of the possible additional funding provided by the federal government for intelligence-related training initiatives. Since training is not required at all for Sherriff's departments each year, it likely that police departments would have received more training regarding ILP than Sherriff's departments.

In the 2000 census, only 2% of the 46,907 square miles is developed or "urbanized" and an additional 2.7% is made up of small towns with fewer than 2500 people (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2009). To that end, Mississippi is made up of

mostly small agencies that cover mostly rural areas. However, experts suggest that it is vital that they, like larger departments, participate in intelligence sharing and practice ILP (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2002). Previous studies have shown that agency size has an effect on an agency's ability to operate. For example, large agencies should be able to devote greater resources to homicide clearance (Wellford and Cronin, 1999). On the other hand, if an agency is large yet has a limited budget, they are far less able to devote enough resources necessary to clear cases (Thompson, Chinoy, and Vobejda, 2000). However, there have also been studies conducted that conclude that variations in size and practice do not affect clearance rates (Greenwood and Petersilia, 1975). Early studies suggest that smaller agencies may even have higher rates of clearance because the officers are more familiar with their jurisdictions (Willmer, 1970). Willmer also suggested that small rural areas usually have citizens that observe, recognize and report suspicious behavior therefore, rural areas should have less crime and higher rates of clearance. Saunders (1970) found that information contained in agency files was expected to vary by agency size as well. The flow of information in small agency would likely be better than that in a large agency as small agencies may have more time to conduct follow-up investigation. It is assumed that agency size and location also has an effect on the implementation of ILP.

Perhaps integrating ILP entirely into an officer's daily routine or in combination with other models would provide positive results for the state of Mississippi as it did for the Kent Constabulary or more recently, the NYPD and NJSP. However, there is a noteworthy need for awareness brought to this relatively unfamiliar model of policing.

MISSISSIPPI'S INVOLVEMENT IN INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING

The results of this study were examined to determine the involvement of Mississippi agencies in ILP methods. If the agencies are not involved on any level, the survey exposed their significant shortcoming. It was assumed that type of agency and agency size are two of the most significant independent variables that influence the extent to which this method of policing is being used.

The first area examined the extent to which agency personnel believed that ILP was being implemented in their agency. Because Mississippi is made up of mostly small agencies, it is not likely that most agencies have the personnel to integrate an entirely new method of policing. Because of size and limited budgets, not all agencies can employ intelligence analysts or intelligence officers (Peterson, 2005). The results reveal what method of policing is being used the most by law enforcement agencies in Mississippi and what percentage is ILP.

The second area examined was how familiar agencies are with the NCISP. If an agency is not familiar with the NCISP's recommendations, it is unlikely that ILP is being used. It is assumed that the larger an agency, the more likely it is that the NCISP recommendations will be utilized. This study will examine familiarity with the NCISP and if familiarity is linked to the implementation of ILP. It will also reveal if the NCISP recommendations are seen as a benefit to agency personnel.

The third area examined was how Mississippi compared to the rest of the United States in the implementation of ILP. The percentage that ILP is being used in Mississippi was compared to other states and also revealed how familiar other states are with the NCISP. The study also examined whether two independent variables

(agency size and type of agency) influence the data gathered in other states compared to Mississippi.

The fourth area examined was how the size of an agency affects the implementation of ILP. It is assumed that the larger the agency, the more likely ILP will be implemented. As previously stated, because Mississippi is made up of mostly small agencies, it is not likely that most agencies have the personnel to integrate an entirely new method of policing. Because of size and limited budgets, not all agencies can employ intelligence analysts or intelligence officers (Peterson, 2005).

The fifth area examined was how the type of agency affects the implementation of ILP. Since training is not required at all for Sherriff's departments each year, it likely that police departments would have received more training regarding ILP than Sherriff's departments, if at all.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

With new and emerging threats to the United States, experts have suggested that it is imperative that all levels of law enforcement incorporate ILP into their daily routine (Peterson, 2005); like federal agencies, local and state law enforcement agencies have had to make their own adjustment since the 9/11 attacks. In order to examine the level of implementation of ILP in Mississippi and how that compares to the rest of the United States, five hypotheses were tested.

RESPONDENTS

Mississippi Agencies

An anonymous survey was fielded to law enforcement executives in every state and local law enforcement agency in Mississippi. Voluntary participants answered the survey in hard copy or online; a response rate of 47% was realized with 152 agencies responding. Of those agencies, 113 were police departments, 25 were Sheriff's departments, and 14 were state agencies. Each agency had between 1 and 600 sworn officers. Data regarding the implementation of ILP were subjected to statistical analysis to determine the extent to which ILP has been implemented in Mississippi, how familiar agencies are with the NCISP, how Mississippi compares to the rest of the United States, and whether independent variables (agency size and type of agency) affect the implementation of ILP.

Control Group

In order to compare Mississippi to the rest of the United States, a survey was also fielded to the participants at the FBI National Academy in Quantico, Virginia (NA). A 76% response rate was realized which yielded 204 valid surveys. The NA was selected because students that attend are drawn from every state in the United States. It consists of leaders and managers of state and local police, sheriffs' departments, military police organizations, and federal law enforcement agencies (FBI, n.d.). Students of the NA must possess these qualifications:

- Be a regular, full-time officer of a duly-constituted law enforcement agency of a municipality, county, or state, having at least five years of substantial and continuous experience;
- Be at least 25 years old;
- Be in excellent physical condition, capable of strenuous exertion and regular participation in the use of firearms, physical training, and defensive tactics, which will be confirmed by a thorough physical examination (submitted when requested by the FBI) by a medical doctor of the nominee's choosing and at the nominee's expense;
- Possess an excellent character and enjoy a reputation for professional integrity;
- Exhibit an interest in law enforcement as a public service, a seriousness of purpose, qualities of leadership and enjoy the confidence and respect of fellow officers;
- Have a high school diploma or high school equivalency certificate;
- Agree to remain in law enforcement for a minimum of three years after graduating from the FBI National Academy (FBI, n.d.).

HYPOTHESES

The results of this study were examined to determine the involvement of Mississippi agencies in ILP methods. It was assumed that type of agency and number of sworn officers are two of the most significant independent variables that influence the extent to which this method of policing is being used.

H(1): ILP is not the predominant method of policing in Mississippi.

Because Mississippi is made up of mostly small agencies, it is not likely that most agencies have the personnel to integrate an entirely new method of policing. Because of size and limited budgets, not all agencies can employ intelligence analysts or intelligence officers (Peterson, 2005). Mississippi is also ranked the poorest state in the United States; therefore, it is likely that the state is not involved in ILP because it lacks the resources to provide sufficient training or hire full time intelligence analysts. In addition, Mississippi has the 29th highest crime rate in the United States, which suggests that there is room for significant improvement.⁵ A T-Test was used to compare the means of each model of policing assumed to be used in Mississippi.

H(2): The NCISP is not in widespread use in Mississippi.

If an agency is not familiar with the NCISP's recommendations, it is unlikely that ILP is being used. It is assumed that the larger an agency, the more likely it is that the NCISP recommendations will be utilized. While smaller local agencies are unlikely to have dedicated intelligence staff, they constitute the majority of the departments in the U.S. According to Peterson (2005), it is vital that they, like larger departments, participate in intelligence sharing and practice ILP such as the NCISP recommends (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2002). However, the NCISP suggests that training, funding, and equipment is available to agencies in order to encourage the implementation of ILP. It may be that agencies are unaware that these incentives exist. This study will examine familiarity with the NCISP and if familiarity is linked to the implementation of ILP. It will also reveal if the NCISP

⁵ See Literature Review "Mississippi Statistics"

recommendations are seen as a benefit to agency personnel. The following areas were examined based on the NCISP recommendations:

- The existence of an intelligence squad;
- Full time personnel engaged in intelligence collection and analysis;
- Receipt of funding to enhance intelligence/collection;
- Receipt of funding based on the NCISP recommendations;
- The existence of a centralized site that shares data and analytic tools among agencies;
- Receipt of outreach materials, updates, or new policy and procedure memos from the federal government that promote the concepts of standards-based intelligence and ILP;
- Maintenance of intelligence files;
- Participation in professional intelligence organizations;
- Time off to participate in activities/conferences conducted by professional intelligence organizations;
- The existence of a secure communications network in order to exchange sensitive information with the law enforcement community;
- The conducting of fingerprint-based background checks on sworn and unsworn individuals prior to allowing access to sensitive information.

The size and type of agency in Mississippi (police, sheriff, or state agency) are the independent variables determined to affect these variables. Statistical tests were conducted on the data from the control group and the results were compared to see if there was a difference between Mississippi and the rest of the United States.

H(3): Being from Mississippi affects the level of implementation of ILP.

The percentage that ILP is being used in Mississippi was compared to other states and used to gauge how familiar other states are with the NCISP. The study examined what independent variables (agency size and agency type) influence the data gathered in other states compared to Mississippi.

H(4): Agency size affects the implementation of ILP in Mississippi.

It is assumed that the larger the agency, the more likely ILP will be implemented. As previously stated, because Mississippi is made up of mostly small agencies, it is not likely that most agencies have the personnel to integrate an entirely new method of policing. Because of size and limited budgets, not all agencies can employ intelligence analysts or intelligence officers (Peterson, 2005).

H(5): Agency type affects the implementation of ILP in Mississippi.

Since training is not required at all for Sherriff's departments each year, it likely that police departments would have received more training regarding ILP than Sherriff's departments, if at all.

STATISTICAL TESTS

The following statistical tests were used as appropriate to test hypotheses 1 through 5. All statistical tests assumed a significance level of .05 and below.

T-Test

The t-test assesses whether the means of two groups are statistically different from each other. This analysis is appropriate whenever you want to compare the means of two groups (Trochim, 2006).

Chi-Squared

Chi-square is a statistical test commonly used to compare observed data with data we would expect to obtain according to a specific hypothesis. The chi-square test is always testing what scientists call the null hypothesis, which states that there is no significant difference between the expected and observed result (Greenwood and Nikulin, 1996).

Pearson's R

A statistical technique used to assess the magnitude and the direction of the relationship between two variables. Values of the Pearson r can range between -1 and +1. The continuum of -1 to 0 indicates the degree of strength of an inverse relationship. The continuum of 0 to +1 indicates the degree of strength of a positive relationship. A Pearson r of 0 indicates no linear relationship.

Spearman's Rho

A statistical calculation that takes two rankings and produces a numerical relation from 1 to -1. A score of 1 means that the lists are identical (1,2,3,4 vs. 1,2,3,4). A score of -1 means that the lists are reversed (1,2,3,4 vs. 4,3,2,1). A score of 0 (zero) means that there is no relation whatsoever between the two lists (Greenwood and Nikulin, 1996).

Descriptive Statistics with Frequencies

Descriptive statistics are used to describe the basic features of the data in a study. They provide simple summaries about the sample and the measures. Together with simple graphics analysis, they form the basis of virtually every quantitative analysis of data (Trochim, 2006). Because the N in at least one independent variable

(type of agency) was low, more sophisticated methods of analysis could not be employed; therefore descriptive statistics were used.

Correlation

A correlation is a single number that describes the degree of relationship between two variables.

- Partial correlation - measures the degree of association between two random variables, with the effect of a set of controlling random variables removed.
- Bivariate correlation - the correlation of two variables while controlling for a third or more other variables (Garson, 2009).

RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY

Reliability was achieved in this study in part by asking the same questions of participants. As law enforcement executives, these participants all work in similar settings and conduct the same daily activities. The questions are easy to understand and the jargon is simple. The questions cannot be interpreted in multiple ways which determines interrater reliability. Since the questions asked refer to an officer's normal daily activities, there should be no change in the underlying condition of what is being measured (stability reliability). Furthermore, the questions in the survey were compiled based on the recommendations of the NCISP. Experts agree⁶ that the NCISP is the principle document in the United States that suggests the best guidelines to implement ILP. NCISP was written by the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global) which serves as a Federal Advisory Committee to the U.S. Attorney General on justice information sharing and integration initiatives (Department of

⁶ See Literature Review for Peterson (2005) & Mallory (2007)

Justice, n.d.). The NCISP contains twenty-eight recommendations which suggest ways to properly implement ILP in state and local police departments (see Appendix A). These recommendations include increased communication between agencies at all levels, additional training and funding, and enhanced information sharing.

In the survey, questions of the same nature were grouped together to ensure internal consistency.

Face validity was assured by taking questions directly from recommendations contained in the premiere document of ILP, NCISP. Because the NCISP is considered the principle document on the implementation of ILP, the results of the study are generalizable (external validity). Internal validity was determined by taking the survey's questions from the NCISP recommendations; great care was taken to interpret the recommendations precisely into question form on the survey. Fusion center support in Mississippi was also measured but was not included in the results; the fusion center in Mississippi goes by another name so this would not have accurately measured this variable. Additionally, alternative explanations for the lack of implementation of ILP were considered such as budget restraints and insufficient manpower.

Validity was further ensured by fielding a pilot survey to a police officer from the Memphis Police Department and two agents from the FBI to ensure that the questions were easy to understand and the survey could be completed with ease. These surveys were not included in the final results.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

H(1): ILP IS NOT THE PREDOMINANT METHOD OF POLICING IN MISSISSIPPI.


TABLE 4.1: MODELS OF POLICING

	Mean
Traditional Policing	49.8
Community Policing	24.58
Problem-Oriented Policing	17.59
Intelligence-Led Policing	12.03

According to self-reported information, ILP is not the predominant method of policing in Mississippi with a mean of 12%. Traditional Policing is still the most widely used model of policing, followed by Community Policing and Problem-Oriented Policing. This result offers support for H(1).


H(2): THE NCISP IS NOT IN WIDESPREAD USE IN MISSISSIPPI.

TABLE 4.2: MISSISSIPPI FAMILIARITY WITH NCISP



According to self-reported information, 20% of law enforcement agencies in Mississippi are very familiar with the NCISP and 21% are somewhat familiar. This suggests that 41% of agencies in Mississippi are at least somewhat familiar with NCISP. However, 29% of agencies are somewhat unfamiliar with NCISP and 12% are unfamiliar which totals 41%. The percentage of agencies that are at least somewhat familiar is equal to the percentage of agencies that at least somewhat unfamiliar. This result suggests that almost half of the agencies in Mississippi are familiar with NCISP which does not support H(2).

TABLE 4.3: IMPLEMENTATIONS BASED ON NCISP RECOMMENDATIONS



According to self-reported information, law enforcement agencies in Mississippi do not implement most of the NCISP recommendations. These results offer support for H(2) except for implementation #2, #6, #10, and #11. .

1. Intelligence squad – Only 11% of participating agencies reported having an intelligence squad. 89% of agencies reported that they do not. This offers support to H(2).
2. Time off – 45% reported that their agency provides time off to participate in activities/conferences conducted by professional intelligence organizations.

- 42% reported that their agencies do not. This result suggests that agencies that provide time off almost equal the agencies that do not provide time off. This does not support H(2).
3. Full time personnel in intelligence collection/analysis – 16% of agencies stated that they have full time personnel engaged in intelligence collection and analysis. 82% reported that they do not. This offers support for H(2).
 4. Funding for intelligence analysis/collection – 6% of participating agencies reported that they receive outside funding to enhance intelligence analysis/collection from other sources (federal, state, local, private). 78% reported that they do not receive outside funding. This offers support for H(2).
 5. Funding based on NCISP recommendations– 1% of agencies stated that they have received funding based on the NCISP recommendations however, 74% reported that they have not. This offers support for H(2)
 6. Centralized site to share data and analytic tools – 45% of agencies reported that they have access to a centralized site that shares data and analytic tools among law enforcement agencies. 41% of participating agencies reported that they do not. This suggests that the agencies that do have access to a centralized site are almost equal to the agencies that do not. This does not support H(2).
 7. Outreach materials – 32% of participating agencies reported that they do receive outreach materials, updates, or new policy and procedure memos from the federal government that promote the concepts of standards-based intelligence and ILP. 47% of agencies stated that they do not receive outreach materials. This offers support for H(2).

8. Maintain intelligence files – 31% of participating agencies reported that they do maintain intelligence files within their agency. 60% reported that they do not. This offers support for H(2).
9. Funding of participation in intelligence organizations – 16% of participating agencies reported that their agency funds participation in professional intelligence organizations. 71% of agencies stated that their agency does not. This offers support for H(2).
10. Secure communications network – 52% of participating agencies reported that they have a secure communications network in order to exchange sensitive information with the law enforcement community. 41% reported that they do not. This does not support H(2)
11. Fingerprint-based background checks – 71% of participating agencies reported that their agency conducts fingerprint-based background checks on sworn and unsworn individuals prior to allowing access to sensitive information. 23% of agencies do not. This does not support H(2).


H(3): BEING FROM MISSISSIPPI AFFECTS THE LEVEL OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ILP.

TABLE 4.4: COMPARISON OF IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICING MODELS BETWEEN MISSISSIPPI AND NON-MISSISSIPPI AGENCIES

	Mean Difference	Significance
Traditional	-1.029	0.696
Community-oriented Policing	3.053	0.074
Problem-oriented Policing	-0.241	0.878
Intelligence-led Policing	2.45	0.068

According to self-reported information, being from Mississippi does not appear to significantly affect the model of policing being implemented. This does not support H(3).

TABLE 4.5: FAMILIARITY WITH NCISP: MISSISSIPPI VS. NON-MISSISSIPPI




According to the results, 41% of agencies are at least somewhat familiar with NCISP in Mississippi. 38% of non-Mississippi agencies are at least somewhat familiar with NCISP. With regard to self-reported information, it appears, based on descriptive statistics, that Mississippi agencies are just as familiar with NCISP as non-Mississippi agencies. This does not support to H(3).

TABLE 4.6: MISSISSIPPI VS. NON-MISSISSIPPI FAMILIARITY WITH NCISP

	Correlation Coefficient	Significance
Mississippi vs Non-Mississippi	0.038	0.638

Being from Mississippi does not significantly affect familiarity with NCISP; this further does not support H(3).

TABLE 4.7: MISSISSIPPI VS. NON-MISSISSIPPI IMPLEMENTATIONS OF NCISP RECOMMENDATIONS



1. Intelligence squad – 11% of participating agencies in Mississippi reported having an intelligence squad. 52% of non-Mississippi agencies reported having an intelligence squad. This offers support for H(3).

2. Time off – 45% of agencies in Mississippi reported that their agency provides time off to participate in activities/conferences conducted by professional intelligence organizations. 60% of non-Mississippi agencies reported that their agencies provide time off. Although more non-Mississippi agencies provide time off, a large percentage of Mississippi agencies do as well. However, this still offers support for H(3).
3. Full time personnel in intelligence collection/analysis – 16% of Mississippi agencies stated that they have full time personnel engaged in intelligence collection and analysis. 43% of non-Mississippi agencies reported that they have full time personnel in intelligence collection/analysis. This offers support for H(3).
4. Funding for intelligence analysis/collection – 6% of participating Mississippi agencies reported that they receive outside funding to enhance intelligence analysis/collection from other sources (federal, state, local, private). 12% of non-Mississippi agencies reported that they receive outside funding. Although the percentage of non-Mississippi agencies that receive funding from other sources is low, this still offers support for H(3).
5. Funding based on NCISP recommendations– 1% of Mississippi agencies stated that they have received funding based on the NCISP recommendations. 10% of non-Mississippi agencies reported that they have received funding based on the NCISP recommendations. Although the percentage of non-Mississippi agencies that have received funding based on NCISP recommendations is low, this still offers support for H(3).

6. Centralized site to share data and analytic tools – 45% of Mississippi agencies reported that they have access to a centralized site that shares data and analytic tools among law enforcement agencies. 82% of non-Mississippi agencies reported that they have access to a centralized site. Although almost half of participating Mississippi agencies have access to a centralized site, this still offers support for H(3).
7. Outreach materials – 32% of Mississippi agencies reported that they do receive outreach materials, updates, or new policy and procedure memos from the federal government that promote the concepts of standards-based intelligence and ILP. 53% of non-Mississippi agencies stated that they also receive outreach materials. This offers support for H(3).
8. Maintain intelligence files – 31% of Mississippi agencies reported that they do maintain intelligence files within their agency. 58% of non-Mississippi agencies reported that they also maintain intelligence files. This offers support for H(3).
9. Funding of participation in intelligence organizations – 16% of Mississippi agencies reported that their agency funds participation in professional intelligence organizations. 43% of non-Mississippi agencies stated that their agency funds participation in professional intelligence organizations. This offers support for H(3).
10. Secure communications network – 52% of Mississippi agencies reported that they have a secure communications network in order to exchange sensitive information with the law enforcement community. 80% of non-Mississippi

agencies reported that they have a secure communications network. This offers support for H(3).

11. Fingerprint-based background checks – 71% of Mississippi agencies reported that their agency conducts fingerprint-based background checks on sworn and unsworn individuals prior to allowing access to sensitive information. 84% of non-Mississippi agencies conduct fingerprint-based background checks. Although a large percentage of Mississippi agencies do conduct fingerprint-based background checks, this still offers support for H(3).

TABLE 4.8: MISSISSIPPI VS. NON-MISSISSIPPI, CONTROLLING FOR AGENCY SIZE

	Correlation	Significance
Intelligence Squad	-0.414	0.000
Time off	-0.219	0.000
Full time personnel in intel collection/analysis	-0.337	0.000
Funding for intelligence analysis/collection	-0.220	0.001
Funding based on NCISP	-0.297	0.000
Centralized site to share data & analytic tools	-0.365	0.000
Outreach materials	-0.324	0.000
Maintain intelligence files	-0.354	0.000
Funding of participation in intelligence organizations	-0.344	0.000
Secure communications network	-0.378	0.000
Fingerprint-based background checks	-0.168	0.002

For every NCISP recommendation that was tested, there was a statistically significant difference between Mississippi and non-Mississippi agencies when controlling for agency size. Non-Mississippi agencies were much more likely to be implementing the recommendations from the NCISP than Mississippi agencies; this offers support for H(3).

H(4): AGENCY SIZE AFFECTS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ILP IN MISSISSIPPI.

TABLE 4.9: MODELS OF POLICING USED IN MISSISSIPPI

	Pearson Correlation	Significance
Traditional Policing	-0.041	0.614
Community Policing	-0.138	0.099
Problem-Oriented Policing	0.144	0.085
Intelligence-Led Policing	0.158	0.064

Agency size does not significantly affect self-reported levels of the implementation of ILP in Mississippi. This does not support H(4).

TABLE 4.10: EFFECT OF AGENCY SIZE ON FAMILIARITY WITH NCISP

	Correlation Coefficient	Significance
	-0.168	0.039

Agency size in Mississippi does affect familiarity with NCISP. The larger the agency, the more familiar they claim to be with regard to the NCISP; this offers support for H(4).

TABLE 4.11: MISSISSIPPI VS. NON-MISSISSIPPI: THE EFFECT OF AGENCY SIZE ON NCISP RECOMMENDATIONS

	Spearman's Correlation	Significance
Intelligence Squad	-0.353	0.000
Time off	-0.242	0.005
Full time personnel in intel collection/analysis	-0.248	0.002
Funding for intelligence analysis/collection	-0.239	0.006
Funding based on NCISP	-0.160	0.086
Centralized site to share data & analytic tools	-0.207	0.016
Outreach materials	-0.136	0.132
Maintain intelligence files	-0.313	0.000
Funding of participation in intelligence organizations	-0.391	0.000
Secure communications network	-0.353	0.000
Fingerprint-based background checks	-0.152	0.067

It appears that agency size does affect the implementation of NCISP recommendations in Mississippi. This offers support to H(4). The larger the agency, the more likely it is to implement the recommendations with the exception of receiving outreach materials and conducting fingerprint-based background checks.


H(5): AGENCY TYPE AFFECTS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ILP.

TABLE 4.12: POLICE VS. SHERIFF VS. STATE: DIFFERENCE IN IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICING MODELS

	Mean Difference	Significance
Traditional Policing	-4.739	0.381
Community-oriented Policing	2.106	0.581
Problem-oriented Policing	1.140	0.737
Intelligence-led Policing	4.308	0.040


It appears that agency type does not have an effect on the use of Traditional Policing, Community-Oriented, and Problem-Oriented Policing between police, Sheriff's departments, and state agencies. However, the type of agency does affect the implementation of ILP. This offers support for H(5).

TABLE 4.13: MISSISSIPPI POLICE, SHERIFF AND STATE FAMILIARITY WITH NCISP



It appears that 37% of police departments are at least somewhat familiar with NCISP. 40% of Sheriff's departments are at least somewhat familiar and 78% of state agencies are at least somewhat familiar with NCISP. This offers support to H(5).

TABLE 4.14: MISSISSIPPI POLICE VS. SHERIFF VS. STATE, IMPLEMENTATION OF NCISP RECOMMENDATIONS



Because the N of responding agencies was too low to run inferential statistics, descriptive statistics were used instead. Based on descriptive statistics, state agencies have a higher level of implementing NCISP recommendations.

1. Intelligence squad – 7% of police departments reported having an intelligence squad. The participating Sheriff’s department reported that they do not have an intelligence squad. 64% of state agencies reported that they have an intelligence squad. This offers supports for H(5).
2. Time off – 53% of police departments reported that their agency provides time off to participate in activities/conferences conducted by professional

intelligence organizations. 33% of Sheriff's departments reported that their agencies provide time off. 71% of state agencies stated that their agency provides time off. This offers support for H(5).

3. Full time personnel in intelligence collection/analysis – 10% police departments stated that they have full time personnel engaged in intelligence collection and analysis. 12% of Sheriff's departments reported that they have full time personnel in intelligence collection/analysis and 83% of state agencies. This offers support for H(5).
4. Funding for intelligence analysis/collection – 4% of participating Mississippi agencies reported that they receive outside funding to enhance intelligence analysis/collection from other sources (federal, state, local, private). Sheriff's departments stated that they have not received funding. 83% of state agencies reported that they have received funding for intelligence collection and analysis. This offers supports for H(5).
5. Funding based on NCISP recommendations– Police departments stated that they have received no funding based on the NCISP recommendations. Sheriff's departments also reported that they have received no funding based on NCISP. However, 33% of state agencies have received funding based on the NCISP recommendations. This offers support for H(5).
6. Centralized site to share data and analytic tools – 48% of police departments reported that they have access to a centralized site that shares data and analytic tools among law enforcement agencies. 52% of Sheriff's departments reported that they have access to a centralized site. However, 89% of Mississippi state

agencies reported that they have access to a centralized site. This offers support for H(5).

7. Outreach materials – 39% police departments reported that they do receive outreach materials, updates, or new policy and procedure memos from the federal government that promote the concepts of standards-based intelligence and ILP. 26% Sheriff's departments stated that they also receive outreach materials. 100% of state agencies reported that they have received outreach materials. This offers support for H(5).
8. Maintain intelligence files – 30% of police departments reported that they do maintain intelligence files within their agency. 27% of Sheriff's departments reported that they also maintain intelligence files. 75% of state agencies in Mississippi maintain intelligence files. This offers support for H(5).
9. Funding of participation in intelligence organizations – 18% of police departments reported that their agency funds participation in professional intelligence organizations. 4% of Sheriff's departments stated that their agency funds participation in professional intelligence organizations. 67% of state agencies stated that their agency funds participation in intelligence organizations. This offers support for H(5).
10. Secure communications network – 51% of police departments reported that they have a secure communications network in order to exchange sensitive information with the law enforcement community. 59% of non-Mississippi agencies reported that they have a secure communications network and 89% of

participating state agencies stated that they have a secure communications network. This offers support for H(5).

11. Fingerprint-based background checks – 71% of police departments reported that their agency conducts fingerprint-based background checks on sworn and unsworn individuals prior to allowing access to sensitive information. 83% of Sheriff's departments conduct fingerprint-based background checks and 91% of state agencies conduct fingerprint-based background checks. This offers support for H(5).

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

H(1): ILP is not the predominant method of policing in Mississippi.

According to self-reported information, ILP is the model of policing that is least used in Mississippi. It appears that traditional policing is still the predominant method of policing in Mississippi with a mean of 50%. Because Mississippi is the poorest state in the United States, it could be that Mississippi lacks the resources to adopt a new model of policing. In order to transform an entire department, funding must be available for training, and there should be sufficient enough manpower to cover those that are in training. The majority of Mississippi agencies are small and in rural areas so it is not likely they will undertake the task of implementing a new model. This result offers support for H(1).

It could also be that agencies are resistant to change because they have always relied on the traditional model of policing. Problem-oriented policing only exceeded ILP by 5% and community-oriented policing by 13%. Those models have been successful since the 1970s yet it seems Mississippi is reluctant to adopt them as well.

In 2008, Mississippi ranked 29th in overall crime in the United States and has the 4th highest murder rate. Since there is a significant amount of crime in Mississippi, it could be that agencies can only employ models of policing that are reactive in nature, such as the traditional model, due to time constraints. In other words, agencies do not have time to prevent crime, such as ILP suggests, because they are preoccupied with reacting to a large amount of currently open cases.

H(2): The NCISP is not in widespread use in Mississippi.

According to self-reported information, 41% of Mississippi agencies are at least somewhat familiar with NCISP. This was an unexpected result in that it was assumed Mississippi was not familiar with any aspect of ILP. This result suggests that information about NCISP has circulated throughout agencies in Mississippi. However, another 41% of the participating agencies reported that they are at least somewhat unfamiliar with the NCISP. The percentage of agencies that are familiar equal the percentage of agencies that are unfamiliar. Regardless, this does not support H(2).

Many recommendations of the NCISP were tested to see if they are implemented in Mississippi. The results suggested that agencies do not implement most of the recommendations. However, according to self-reported information, some of the recommendations are being implemented. Mississippi agencies implement the following recommendations:

1. Time off to participate in activities/conferences conducted by professional intelligence organizations.
2. A centralized site to share data and analytic tools among law enforcement agencies.
3. A secure communications network in order to exchange sensitive information with the law enforcement community.
4. Fingerprint-based background checks on sworn and unsworn individuals prior to allowing access to sensitive information.

Although these are recommendations from the NCISP, they are somewhat standard procedures for agencies anyway. It could be that Mississippi agencies are

implementing these recommendations not because of their familiarity with the NCISP, but that they would implement them regardless.

The survey asked two questions regarding funding. One question asked if agencies have received funding to enhance intelligence analysis/collection from any source; another question asked if agencies have received funding based on the NCISP recommendations. It was realized that agencies may not have been able to distinguish between the two questions although there was a lower percentage of agencies that reported receiving funding based on the NCISP. The NCISP suggests funding for training, equipment, and other resources whereas the other question only included funding for intelligence collection/analysis.

H(3): Being from Mississippi affects the level of implementation of ILP.

When comparing Mississippi agencies to the rest of the United States, it appears that Mississippi agencies implement ILP as much as other agencies do. As Mallory (2007) suggests, it is not just Mississippi agencies that need to better familiarize themselves with ILP but all agencies. This does not support H(3).

In accordance with the above findings, it also appears that Mississippi agencies are just as familiar with NCISP as other agencies in the United States. It is surprising that Mississippi's familiarity with NCISP is equal to that of other agencies in the United States in that research suggests that Mississippi is usually behind the rest of the nation in important issues. In fact, Mississippi agencies are slightly more familiar with NCISP (a difference of 2%). This does not support H(3)

However, when the NCISP recommendations were tested, it appears that non-Mississippi agencies implement the recommendations more than Mississippi agencies

do. Although Mississippi agencies reported being slightly more familiar with NCISP, they are not implementing the recommendations. This could be that Mississippi agencies do not have the funding to provide time off, funding for intelligence collection/analysis, or for participation in intelligence organizations. Additionally, Mississippi may not have sufficient manpower to create intelligence squad, appoint personnel to engage in intelligence analysis full time, or to maintain intelligence files. It also may be that Mississippi agencies do not believe the recommendations of the NCISP could be a benefit to their agency. Another reason may be that many Mississippi agencies are small. When comparing Mississippi agencies to non-Mississippi agencies of the same size however, non-Mississippi agencies still implement the recommendations more than Mississippi agencies. This offers support for H(3).

H(4): Agency size affects the implementation of ILP in Mississippi.

Agency size does not affect self-reported levels of implementation of ILP in Mississippi. ILP is not being implemented regardless of the size of agency in Mississippi. This does not support H(4). However, the larger an agency the more familiar they are with NCISP. This could be because larger agencies communicate with each other better as well as with the federal government. Larger agencies could also be more proactive in looking for new initiatives that can enhance officer safety and reduce crime in their jurisdictions because they have more officers on the streets. Regardless of whether they implement NCISP, statistical tests show that they are more aware of it. This offers support for H(4).

The NCISP recommendations were tested which suggested that the larger the agency, the more likely the recommendations are being implemented. Larger agencies have more resources such as funding, equipment, and manpower than smaller agencies. This could be the reason why larger agencies implement more of the recommendations than smaller agencies with fewer resources. This offers support for H(4). There was a statistically significant difference in all recommendations tested except outreach materials and fingerprint-based background checks. This suggests that participating agencies, regardless of size, receive outreach materials from the federal government and conduct fingerprint-based background checks. However, these are generally standard policies and procedures among all agencies. This does not support H(4).

H(5): Agency type affects the implementation of ILP.

Agency type does not appear to have an effect on the use of Traditional Policing, Community-Oriented and Problem-Oriented Policing between police, Sheriff's departments, and state agencies. However, agency type does affect the implementation of ILP. According to self-reported results, state agencies implement ILP more than any other type. This could be that state agencies are typically larger and have better resources to expend on training and personnel. State agencies also have a mandate to organize and run the state fusion center which allows them more access to sensitive information; this demands enhanced communication and information sharing which, in turn, allows state agencies to take a proactive approach to crime prevention. Agencies at the state level also interact more with the federal government. They are required to investigate more complex crime such as drugs and other organized crime

which may call for assistance from the federal law enforcement. This offers support for H(5).

Because of the previous results it is not surprising that state agencies are more familiar with NCISP. It could be that they receive outreach materials about NCISP and training initiatives about ILP from the federal government before and more often than police or Sheriff's departments. This offers support for H(5).

When the recommendations of NCISP were tested, the results showed that state agencies have a higher level of implementing all of the recommendations. The results of police and Sheriff's departments with regard to implementation were mixed. As previously stated this could be because state agencies are larger and have more resources than police or Sheriff's departments. This offers support for H(5).

DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

One significant finding in this study is that the majority of participating Mississippi agencies are familiar with the NCISP yet they are not implementing the recommendations like non-Mississippi agencies with equal familiarity. Further research could be conducted to find the reason for this. Possible reasons could be a lack of resources, inadequate training, or insufficient manpower in Mississippi agencies.

Although fusion center support was examined in this study, it was realized that the fusion center in Mississippi is called Mississippi Analysis and Information Center (MSAIC). It could be that agencies are familiar with MSAIC but not with the term "fusion center." Additional research could be conducted to see if Mississippi agencies are familiar with and receive support from MSAIC.

In addition, it could be that the concept of ILP is still relatively new. To that end, Mississippi agencies may implement ILP as time passes or more resources become available. Mississippi agencies are not aware of the funding or training initiatives suggested by NCISP. Perhaps given enough time, Mississippi will adopt more of the NCISP recommendations and integrate ILP more into their routine. Another study could be conducted in the future to test the implementation of ILP. Those results could be compared to the results of this study to see if ILP is being implemented to a greater degree.

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APPENDIX A

Recommendations of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan

The primary purpose of ILP is to provide public safety decision makers the information they need to protect the lives of our citizens. The following recommendations detail the essential elements of the *National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan*.

Recommendation 1: In order to attain the goals outlined in this Plan, law enforcement agencies, regardless of size, shall adopt the minimum standards for ILP and the utilization and/or management of an intelligence function as contained in the *National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan*. The standards focus on the intelligence process and include elements such as mission of the function, management and supervision, personnel selection, training, security, privacy rights, development and dissemination of intelligence products, and accountability measures. The agency chief executive officer and the manager of intelligence functions should:

- Seek ways to enhance intelligence sharing efforts and foster information sharing by participating in task forces and state, regional, and federal information sharing initiatives.
- Implement a mission statement for the intelligence process within the agency.
- Define management and supervision of the function.
- Select qualified personnel for assignment to the function.
- Ensure that standards are developed concerning background investigations of staff/system users to ensure security (of the system, facilities, etc.) and access to the system/network.
- Ensure appropriate training for all personnel assigned to or impacted by the intelligence process.
- Ensure that individuals' privacy and constitutional rights are considered at all times.
- Support the development of sound, professional analytic products (intelligence).
- Implement a method/system for dissemination of information to appropriate components/entities.
- Implement a policies and procedures manual. The intent of the manual is to establish, in writing, agency accountability for the intelligence function. The manual should include policies and procedures covering all aspects of the intelligence process.
- Implement an appropriate audit or review process to ensure compliance with policies and procedures.

- Promote a policy of openness when communicating with the public and all interested parties regarding the criminal intelligence process, when it does not affect the security and integrity of the process.

Recommendation 2: In order to provide long-term oversight and assistance with the implementation and refinement of the *National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan*, a Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC) should be established as contemplated in the IACP *Criminal Intelligence Sharing Report*. The purpose of the CICC is to advise the Congress, the U.S. Attorney General, and the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security on the best use of criminal intelligence to keep our country safe. The CICC should operate under the auspices of the Global Advisory Committee (GAC). The CICC should consist of representatives from local, state, tribal, and federal agencies and national law enforcement organizations. The GIWG will act as the interim CICC until such time as the CICC is operational.

Recommendation 3: The CICC should monitor the implementation of the *National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan*, in order to gauge the success of the Plan. A report on the progress of the Plan will be submitted to the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) beginning December 31, 2004, and annually thereafter.

Recommendation 4: This Plan is designed to strengthen homeland security and foster intelligence-led policing. There is a critical need for more national funding to accomplish these goals. Without adequate funding, many of the recommendations contained herein, such as improving training and technical infrastructure, will not occur, and the country will remain at risk. The CICC, the GAC, and the U.S. Departments of Justice and Homeland Security should partner to identify and fund initiatives that implement the recommendations contained in this report.

Recommendation 5: In order to publicly recognize the creation of the Plan and demonstrate a commitment by all parties involved, a National Signing Event should be held where law enforcement and homeland security agency heads, from all levels, and other relevant groups come together to “sign on” to the *National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan*. The National Signing Event should be held before December 31, 2003.

Recommendation 6: All parties involved with implementing and promoting the *National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan* should take steps to ensure that the law enforcement community protects individuals’ privacy and constitutional rights within the intelligence process.

Recommendation 7: Local, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement agencies must recognize and partner with the public and private sectors in order to detect and prevent attacks to the nation’s critical infrastructures. Steps should be taken to establish regular communications and methods of information exchange.

Recommendation 8: Outreach materials prepared by the CICC should be utilized by law enforcement agency officials to publicize and promote the concepts of standards-based intelligence sharing and intelligence-led policing, as contained within the

National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, to their agency personnel and the communities that they serve.

Recommendation 9: In order to ensure that the collection/ submission, access, storage, and dissemination of criminal intelligence information conforms to the privacy and constitutional rights of individuals, groups, and organizations, law enforcement agencies shall adopt, at a minimum, the standards required by the Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies Federal Regulation (28 CFR Part 23), regardless of whether or not an intelligence system is federally funded.

Recommendation 10: Law enforcement agencies should use the IACP's *Criminal Intelligence Model Policy* (2003 revision) as a guide when implementing or reviewing the intelligence function in their organizations.

Recommendation 11: In addition to Federal Regulation 28 CFR Part 23, law enforcement agencies should use the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU) *Criminal Intelligence File Guidelines* as a model for intelligence file maintenance.

Recommendation 12: The International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (IALEIA) should develop, on behalf of the CICC, minimum standards for intelligence analysis to ensure intelligence products are accurate, timely, factual, and relevant and recommend implementing policy and/ or action(s). These minimum standards should be developed by June 30, 2004. Law enforcement agencies should adopt these standards as soon as developed and approved by the CICC.

Recommendation 13: To further enhance professional judgment, especially as it relates to the protection of individuals' privacy and constitutional rights, the *National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan* encourages participation in professional criminal intelligence organizations and supports intelligence training for all local, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement personnel.

Recommendation 14: To foster trust among law enforcement agencies, policymakers, and the communities they serve, the *National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan* promotes a policy of openness to the public regarding the criminal intelligence function, when it does not affect the security and integrity of the process.

Recommendation 15: The *National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan* promotes effective accountability measures, as expressed in 28 CFR Part 23, the LEIU *Criminal Intelligence File Guidelines*, and the *Justice Information Privacy Guideline*, which law enforcement agencies should employ to ensure protection of individuals' privacy and constitutional rights and to identify and remedy practices that are inconsistent with policy.

Recommendation 16: Law enforcement agencies involved in criminal intelligence sharing are encouraged to use, to the extent applicable, the privacy policy guidelines provided in *Justice Information Privacy Guideline: Developing, Drafting and Assessing Privacy Policy for Justice Information Systems*. The goal of the *Justice*

Information Privacy Guideline is to provide assistance to justice leaders and practitioners who seek to balance public safety, public access, and privacy when developing information policies for their individual agencies or for integrated (multiagency) justice systems.

Recommendation 17: The CICC, in conjunction with federal officials, should identify technical means to aid and expedite the production of unclassified “tear-line” reports. These reports are the declassification of classified data needed for law enforcement purposes, with the sensitive source and method of collection data redacted, yet retaining as much intelligence content as feasible. The technical means for production of these reports should be identified by June 30, 2004.

Recommendation 18: Training should be provided to all levels of law enforcement personnel involved in the criminal intelligence process. The training standards, as contained within the *National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan*, shall be considered the minimum training standards for all affected personnel. Additionally, recipients of criminal intelligence training, as recommended in the *National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan*, should be recognized and awarded certificates for successful completion of training.

Recommendation 19: The CICC shall foster a working relationship with the International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training (IADLEST) organization, the IACP State and Provincial Police Academy Directors Section (SPPADS), and other relevant training organizations, in order to obtain their assistance with implementing the recommended *National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan* training standards in every state.

Recommendation 20: In order to support agency tactical, operational, and strategic needs, law enforcement agencies are encouraged to consider an automated, incident-based criminal records tracking capability, in addition to traditional case management and intelligence systems, to use as an additional source for records management and statistical data. These systems should be Web-based and configured to meet the internal reporting and record-keeping needs of the component, in order to facilitate the exportation of desired data elements—without the need for duplicate data entry or reporting—to relevant statewide and federal criminal information programs.

Recommendation 21: The Regional Information Sharing Systems® (RISS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Law Enforcement Online (LEO) systems, which interconnected September 1, 2002, as a virtual single system, shall provide the initial sensitive but unclassified secure communications backbone for implementation of a nationwide criminal intelligence sharing capability. This nationwide sensitive but unclassified communications backbone shall support fully functional, bidirectional information sharing capabilities that maximize the reuse of existing local, state, tribal, regional, and federal infrastructure investments. Further configuration of the nationwide sensitive but unclassified communications capability will continue to evolve in conjunction with industry and the development of additional standards and the connection of other existing sensitive but unclassified networks.

Recommendation 22: Interoperability with existing systems at the local, state, tribal, regional, and federal levels with the RISS/LEO communications capability should proceed immediately, in order to leverage information sharing systems and expand intelligence sharing.

Recommendation 23: The CICC shall work with Global's Systems Security Compatibility Task Force to identify and specify an architectural approach and transitional steps that allow for the use of existing infrastructures (technology, governance structures, and trust relationships) at the local, state, tribal, regional, and federal levels, to leverage the national sensitive but unclassified communications capabilities for information sharing. This strategic architectural approach shall ensure interoperability among local, state, tribal, regional, and federal intelligence information systems and repositories.

Recommendation 24: All agencies, organizations, and programs with a vested interest in sharing criminal intelligence should actively recruit agencies with local, state, tribal, regional, and federal law enforcement and intelligence systems, to connect to the nationwide sensitive but unclassified communications capability. Such agencies, organizations, and programs are encouraged to leverage the nationwide sensitive but unclassified communications capability, thereby expanding collaboration and information sharing opportunities across existing enterprises and leveraging existing users. Moreover, participant standards and user vetting procedures must be compatible with those of the currently connected sensitive but unclassified systems, so as to be trusted connections to the nationwide sensitive but unclassified communications capability.

Recommendation 25: Agencies participating in the *National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan* are encouraged to use *Applying Security Practices to Justice Information Sharing* as a reference document regarding information system security practices. The document was developed by the Global Security Working Group (GSWG) to be used by justice executives and managers as a resource to secure their justice information systems and as a resource of ideas and best practices to consider when building their agency's information infrastructure and before sharing information with other agencies.

Recommendation 26: Agencies are encouraged to utilize the latest version of the Global Justice Extensible Markup Language (XML) Data Model (Global JXDM) and its component Global Justice XML Data Dictionary (Global JXDD)¹⁰ when connecting databases and other resources to communication networks. The Global JXDM and Global JXDD were developed to enable interoperability through the exchange of data across a broad range of disparate information systems.

Recommendation 27: In order to enhance trust and "raise the bar" on the background investigations currently performed, law enforcement agencies must conduct fingerprint-based background checks on individuals, both sworn or non-sworn, prior to allowing law enforcement access to the sensitive but unclassified communications capability. Background requirements for access to the nationwide sensitive but

unclassified communications capability by law enforcement personnel shall be consistent with requirements applied to the designation and employment of sworn personnel, as set by the participating state or tribal government, so long as, at a minimum, those requirements stipulate that a criminal history check be made through the FBI and the appropriate local, state, and tribal criminal history repositories and be confirmed by an applicant fingerprint card. Additionally, a name-based records check must be performed on law enforcement personnel every three years after the initial fingerprint-based records check is performed.

Recommendation 28: The CICC, in conjunction with OJ Pand the connected sensitive but unclassified systems, shall develop an acquisition mechanism or centralized site that will enable law enforcement agencies to access shared data visualization and analytic tools. The CICC shall identify analytical products that are recommended for use by law enforcement agencies in order to maximize resources when performing intelligence functions, as well as a resource list of current users of the products. The CICC will submit a report on these tools to OJP by June 30, 2004 (NCISP, 2003).

APPENDIX B

Dear Law Enforcement Executive,

I am inviting you participate in a research project to study the implementation of intelligence led policing in law enforcement agencies throughout Mississippi and the United States. Along with this letter is a short questionnaire that asks a variety of questions about intelligence led policing in your agency. Your participation is greatly appreciated! It should take you about 20 minutes to complete the survey.

The results of this project will be used to determine the extent to which the concepts of intelligence led policing are being used by United States police agencies. Ultimately, this should provide insight that could lead to enhanced safety for our communities and law enforcement personnel.


There are no foreseeable risks to you if you decide to participate in this survey. We are not asking any identifying questions about you and I guarantee that your responses will not be identified with you or your agency. Participation in this survey is strictly voluntary.

Regardless of whether you choose to participate, please let me know if you would like a summary of my findings. To receive a summary, please contact me at the address on our letterhead.

If you have any questions or concerns about completing the questionnaire or about being in this study, you may contact me at (662) 915-1947. The Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Mississippi has approved this study. If you have any concerns about your rights as a participant in this study you may contact the Human Research Protection Office at (662) 915-7482.

Thank you in advance for your participation in this most important study!

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Christy L. Babb". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Christy" being the most prominent part.

Christy L. Babb
Graduate Assistant

CENTER FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY STUDIES

School Applied Sciences, University of Mississippi

Please return this survey to Christy Babb (clbabb@olemiss.edu).

1. ON A DAILY BASIS, WHAT PERCENTAGE OF EACH MODEL OF POLICING IS YOUR AGENCY INVOLVED IN?

Traditional Policing _____%

Community-Oriented Policing _____%

Problem-Oriented Policing _____%

Intelligence-led Policing _____%

Must equal 100%

2. DOES YOUR AGENCY HAVE A FULL/PART TIME REPRESENTATIVE IN YOUR STATE'S FUSION CENTER?

Yes No Don't Know

If Yes:

Number of Sworn: _____

Non-Sworn: _____

If part time, please list percentage of time for each:

3. TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE WITH THIS STATEMENT:
MY STATE FUSION CENTER PROVIDES SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT TO MY AGENCY.

Strongly Agree **Agree** **Neutral** **Disagree** **Strongly Disagree**

4. TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE WITH THIS STATEMENT:
STATE FUSION CENTERS HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCED COMMUNICATION BETWEEN MY AGENCY AND OTHER AGENCIES.

Strongly Agree **Agree** **Neutral** **Disagree** **Strongly Disagree**

5. WITHIN YOUR AGENCY, WHO HAS RECEIVED TRAINING REGARDING INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING?

Please indicate all that apply.

- Patrol Officers
- Criminal Investigators (non-narcotic)
- Criminal Investigators (narcotic)
- Command Staff
- Front Line Supervisors
- Middle-Management
- Warrant/Fugitive Officers
- Non-Sworn Officers
- Public Service officers

Please describe the training received:

6. DOES YOUR AGENCY HAVE AN INTELLIGENCE SQUAD?

- Yes No Don't Know

7. DOES YOUR AGENCY HAVE FULL TIME PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS?

- Yes No Don't Know

If Yes:

Total Number _____

Number Sworn _____

Number non-sworn _____

8. HOW FAMILIAR IS YOUR AGENCY WITH THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SHARING PLAN?

**Very
familiar**

**Somewhat
familiar**

Neutral

**Somewhat
unfamiliar**

Unfamiliar

9. HAS YOUR AGENCY RECEIVED ANY FUNDING TO ENHANCE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS/COLLECTION FROM ANY SOURCE?

- Yes No Don't Know

If yes, what source? Please indicate all that apply.

- Federal
 State
 Local
 Private

10. HAS YOUR AGENCY RECEIVED ANY FUNDING BASED ON THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SHARING PLAN'S RECOMMENDATIONS?

- Yes No Don't Know

11. HOW HAS COMMUNICATION CHANGED BETWEEN YOUR AGENCY AND OTHER FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL AGENCIES SINCE 9/11?

Please rate (1 – degraded significantly; 2 – degraded somewhat; 3- no change; 4- improved somewhat; 5 – improved significantly).

FBI	1	2	3	4	5
DEA	1	2	3	4	5
MBN	1	2	3	4	5
ATF	1	2	3	4	5
Other State Agencies	1	2	3	4	5
Other Local Agencies	1	2	3	4	5
Other Federal Agencies	1	2	3	4	5

12. DOES YOUR AGENCY HAVE ACCESS TO A CENTRALIZED SITE THAT SHARES DATA AND ANALYTIC TOOLS AMONG AGENCIES?

Yes No Don't Know

13. DOES YOUR AGENCY RECEIVE OUTREACH MATERIALS, UPDATES, OR NEW POLICY AND PROCEDURE MEMOS FROM THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT THAT PROMOTE THE CONCEPTS OF STANDARDS-BASED INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING?

Yes No Don't Know

14. DOES YOUR AGENCY MAINTAIN INTELLIGENCE FILES?

Yes No Don't Know

Please explain.

15. DOES YOUR AGENCY FUND PARTICIPATION IN PROFESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS?

Yes No Don't Know

16. DOES YOUR AGENCY PROVIDE TIME OFF TO PARTICIPATE IN ACTIVITIES/CONFERENCES CONDUCTED BY PROFESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS?

Yes No Don't Know

17. DO OTHER AGENCIES COOPERATE WITH YOUR AGENCY WHEN THERE IS A NEED FOR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO BE DECLASSIFIED AND DISSEMINATED?

Yes No Don't Know

18. DOES YOUR AGENCY HAVE A SECURE COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK IN ORDER TO EXCHANGE SENSITIVE INFORMATION WITH THE LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNITY?

Yes No Don't Know

19. DOES YOUR AGENCY CONDUCT FINGERPRINT-BASED BACKGROUND CHECKS ON SWORN AND UNSWORN INDIVIDUALS PRIOR TO ALLOWING ACCESS TO SENSITIVE INFORMATION?

Yes No Don't Know

20. HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE YOUR POSITION WITHIN YOUR AGENCY?

- Patrol officer
- Detective
- Supervisor
- Upper level manager
- Agency head

21. HOW MANY SWORN OFFICERS ARE IN YOUR AGENCY?

Number:

22. IN WHAT STATE IS YOUR AGENCY LOCATED?

State:

23. MY AGENCY IS A:

- Police Department
- Sheriff's Department
- State Agency
- Federal Agency
- Tribal Agency
- Other (please describe): _____

23. IS YOUR AGENCY LOCATED IN A RURAL OR URBAN AREA?

- Rural
- Urban
- Suburban
- Other (please describe): _____

24. ARE THERE ANY OTHER COMMENTS YOU WISH TO MAKE?

Thank you for taking the time to answer this survey. Your responses are very important to helping us understand how intelligence-led policing is being used in policing.

VITA

Christy L. Babb was born in Memphis, TN to Dan and Marsha Babb on June 10, 1980. She grew up in Olive Branch, MS and attended Olive Branch High School. Upon graduation, Ms. Babb enrolled in Northwest Community College where she earned an Associate of Arts degree with a major in Business Administration.

Ms. Babb developed an interest in criminal justice and decided to pursue a Bachelor's degree in that field. She enrolled at the University of Mississippi in 2006. The emphasis of her degree was Homeland Security but she was also interested in corrections. During her coursework at the University of Mississippi, she studied abroad at the University of Northampton in England where her coursework focused on crime, punishment, globalization, human rights, and terrorism. Ms. Babb also traveled to Washington, DC for a semester where she interned at the American Correctional Association (ACA) in Alexandria, Virginia. During her internship she became a Certified Corrections Manager through ACA and developed their internship program. Ms. Babb maintained a GPA of 3.9 as an undergraduate and was named Most Outstanding Student in 2008 at the University of Mississippi Desoto campus. Ms. Babb was inducted into Sigma Alpha Lambda and Alpha Lambda Delta Honor Societies and graduated with a Bachelor of Applied Science in Criminal Justice in 2008.

Ms. Babb is planning to graduate in December 2009 with a Master's degree in Criminal Justice with a Homeland Security emphasis. She is a Graduate Assistant at