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# Are climate and environment- and peace and security-related policy outputs coherent? A policy coherence and awareness analysis for climate security

The increasingly interconnected nature of our world means that failing to achieve coherence between climate- and peace and security-related policy domains forms a significant climate-related security risk. Poorly designed climate policies that are insensitive to pre-existing insecurities and conflict dynamics may undermine political stability, amplify social inequalities and grievances, and accelerate a loss of biodiversity and climate change-related impacts. Peace and security policies that do not account for climate risks may conversely promote ineffective and unresponsive interventions and risk locking communities into vicious cycles of insecurity and climate vulnerability. This work contributes to the climate security-proofing of policy outputs by developing a methodological framework that assesses the degree to which policy outputs and strategy documents display awareness of climate-related security risks and climate-peace opportunities. This framework is used to assess policies and strategies from across eight African countries. We find that despite some limited recognition of often place-specific climate-related security risks, a clear and shared conceptual understanding of the climate, peace and security nexus is generally lacking; climate and environment-related policies are generally more aware of climate security and have greater cross-sectoral engagement than peace and security-related policies; and that opportunities exist for the integration of climate security-related considerations into existing strategic priorities, instruments and programmatic activities.

**Keywords**: climate security, policy coherence, policy analysis, climate security policy, climate security-sensitivity

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## Introduction

The increasingly interconnected nature of our world means that failing to achieve coherence between climate- and peace and security-related policy domains forms a significant climate-related security risk. Poorly designed climate policies that are insensitive to pre-existing insecurities and conflict dynamics may inadvertently undermine political stability, amplify social inequalities and grievances, and indirectly accelerate detrimental climate change-related impacts. Peace and security policies that do not account for the evolving role played by climate change in adding further complexity to intervening contexts may conversely undertake ineffective and climate-insensitive interventions, and thereby risk locking communities into vicious cycles of insecurity and climate vulnerability. This work contributes to improving the sensitivity of policy outputs from climate and environment and peace and security policy sectors to climate-related security considerations by developing a methodological framework that assesses the degree to which, firstly, policy outputs and strategy documents display awareness of climate-related security risks and, secondly, recognise opportunities for achieving co-benefits between building climate resilience, conflict prevention and peacebuilding objectives.

## Literature review

### Policy coherence for an effective climate change response

The impacts of climate change and variability will be experienced in varying and uneven ways depending on the different extents to which countries, communities and individuals are exposed and vulnerable to climate change impacts or possess adaptive capacity (Pörtner et al., 2022). Exposure and vulnerability are dynamic and vary across temporal and spatial scales, while being driven by 'patterns of intersecting socio-economic development, unsustainable ocean and land use, inequity marginalisation, historical and ongoing patterns of inequity such as colonialism, and governance' (Pörtner et al., 2022, 12). As a consequence of this uneven and complex landscape – in which biophysical, socio-economic, political and cultural factors intertwine – policymakers are often confronted with seemingly competing strategic priorities. Take, for instance, a coastal setting at risk of sea level rise. Governing authorities may need to simultaneously physically protect the communities who live there, ensure the continuation of economic activity and livelihoods, maintain tourism and conserve the local natural habitat. The policy actions that need to be undertaken to achieve each of these things are likely very different from each other, yet policy options must be chosen that do not necessarily close the door on others and, where possible, act in a synergistic manner to strengthen a set of collective goals and desired outcomes.

Ensuring cross-scalar and cross-sectoral coherence has therefore become a priority for research. Within the climate policy realm specifically, the growing complexity of the global multi-level climate governance architecture has further highlighted the need for both vertical (between different scales of governance) and horizontal (between sectors operating at the same level of governance) coherence. The 2022 Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) report, for instance, stresses that effective climate action requires multi-level governance from the local and community level to national, regional and international levels (IPCC, 2022). The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change's (UNFCCC) multi-level governance efforts range from relatively top-down agenda and objective setting, strategic prioritisations and targets through to bottom-up, country-led policy frameworks and mechanisms (such as the National Adaptation Plans and the Nationally Determined Contributions) and their sub-national level implementation processes. Yet this structure is also becoming increasingly fragmented due to the growing recognition that the framing of the climate domain or problem structure is broad and interconnected with a variety of other fields and sectors. The broader an environmental domain, the more likely it touches upon other environmental and non-environmental spheres and their associated institutions (Zelli and van Asselt, 2013). Effective public policy must therefore consider the fact that a variety of complex challenges including growth, poverty reduction and climate change are all hugely interwoven, and that considerations must be given to interconnections between environmental, social and economic realms (OECD, 2016; Stern, 2015).

## Conflict risk associated with incoherent climate and peace and security policies

A failure to recognise these interconnections and make provisions within climate policy design, formulation and implementation process to avoid negative externalities may at best undermine policy efficacy, and at worst have actively negative local social, economic and environmental impacts. If climate adaptation and mitigation objectives and activities are at odds with (local) development strategies and growth plans – or fail to account for local particularities – they may inadvertently undermine the human security of communities and households. Climate adaptation policies, for instance, if designed in ways that are insensitive to interconnections across scales and sectors – as well as local socio-cultural and economic characteristics – can have a variety of unintended spill over effects and negative externalities, potentially causing maladaptation. Maladaptation can be defined as 'action taken ostensibly to avoid or reduce vulnerability to climate change that impacts adversely on, or increases the vulnerability of other systems, sectors, or social groups' (Barnett and O'Neill, 2010, 211). The roots of maladaptation often lie in the lack of consideration of long-term adapta-

tion commitment and a short-sighted and short-term engagement often characterised by actions that focus on risks and sectors in isolation of the broader risk landscape within which they are situated. These maladaptive responses to climate change can, according to Pörtner et al. (2022) 'create lock-ins of vulnerability, exposure, and risks that are difficult and expensive to change and exacerbate existing inequalities' (Pörtner et al., 2022, 27).

The risks linked to maladaptation are moreover not spread equally across society. They especially affect the most vulnerable and marginalised groups that often lack the social, economic or political capital to weather shocks or ensure sufficient participation and buy-in into policy design and implementation processes. In doing so, maladaptation can disproportionately burden the most vulnerable, undermine already existing sources of resilience and adaptive strategies, and potentially serve to reinforce pre-existing inequalities (particularly for ethnic minorities, indigenous peoples, low-income households and other groups subjected to structural inequalities) (Pörtner et al., 2022; Barnett and O'Neill, 2010). Maladaptive policies or programmes may therefore – particularly in contexts already characterised by fragility, conflict or a legacy of conflict – inadvertently incentivise violent coping strategies and serve to exacerbate traditional socio-economic and political drivers of conflict, such as poor or uneven economic growth, intergroup inequalities and relative deprivation, political discrimination and exclusion, and illiberal and corrupt state institutions (Cederman et al., 2011; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006; Østby, 2008; Schipper, 2020). In describing this phenomenon, Swatuk et al. (2021) delineate between local level side effects of insensitive climate action and the negative effects of these local level side effects rebounding back onto the state, labelled as the 'boomerang effect'. Within this paper, emphasis is placed on the former of these.

With regards to climate mitigation policies and activities, Gilmore and Buhaug (2021) outline a typology of potential pathways to armed conflict, including through increasing food and fuel prices, a loss of targeted livelihoods, and adverse distributional effects along pre-existing social cleavages; corruption, rent seeking and unequal distribution of benefits locally and internationally; increased consumer vulnerability to commodity and trade shocks, price increases and reduced income; and changes in patterns of economic growth and employment opportunities with winners and losers. Mirumachi et al. (2020) similarly argue that the integration of mitigation priorities into development trajectories through low carbon development plans can have notable implications for security. These include those associated with the potentially uneven effects of low carbon development, in which depoliticised conceptualisations of growth give rise to technocratic solutions that reproduce patterns of inequality and differential accrual of benefits depending on socio-economic status or geographical location; the over-securitisation of perceptions and imaginaries of the global south and a normative bias towards a Westphalian state building model, which permeate

decision-making around low carbon development; and the fact that low carbon development pathways may exacerbate exclusion and marginalisation by incentivising dispossession of rural livelihoods in the name of clean energy and progressive development.

If local climate action directly or indirectly imposes additional social, economic or environmental costs on affected households and communities, this may therefore – particularly in settings characterised by pre-existing fragility and conflict – increase social tensions, perpetuate existing forms of inequalities, and heighten the risk of conflict. The opposite is also true, however, in that policy efforts to promote peace and security – through, for instance, peacekeeping missions, stabilisation strategies, conflict prevention programmes, post-conflict recovery strategies and peacebuilding efforts – can become ineffectual or at worst actively do harm by failing to recognise the role played by climate change. Peacebuilding efforts that do not consider, for example, how climate change may reshape local social, political and economic realities – including how climate factors are likely to influence root and proximate drivers of conflict – risk producing unresponsive programmes and projects that are unable to adapt or adjust to shifting socio-ecological conditions and the potential new conflict dynamics these may produce. More 'hard' security measures, such as military interventions, furthermore, often have negative impacts on the livelihoods and resilience of local populations, for instance by contributing to displacement or restricting the viability of legal livelihood strategies. Traditional approaches to conflict prevention, stabilisation and peacebuilding also tend to struggle to account for the complex and evolving relationship between climate change and conflict for a variety of reasons. These include difficulties in coordinating between the variety of actors involved in enacting both short- and long-term interventions for humanitarian response and resilience building (often simultaneously) and the need to remain responsive to ever evolving interactions between social, economic and ecological realms in post-conflict settings (Krampe, 2017).

Moreover, recent research has shown that beyond the need to 'do no harm' (Anderson, 1999), coherent climate and peace strategies have the potential to produce significant co-benefits for one another. Climate action, for instance, contains clear entry points for contributing to a sustainable peace, whilst – vice versa – stabilisation and peacebuilding efforts can create an enabling environment for effective adaptation and mitigation (Morales-Muñoz et al., 2022). Whilst further work is needed at the programmatic level to facilitate the emergence of integrated climate-peace programming, effective integration on climate-related security risks must also be present at the policy level – particularly between climate and environment-related and peace and security-related policies.

## Existing approaches and understandings of policy coherence

Whilst existing approaches to ensuring that policy design, formulation and implementation processes adequately include environmental and climate-related considerations do exist, these are not specific to ensuring coherence on climate-related security matters and do not necessarily account for the specific characteristics of coherence across climate and environment-related and peace and security-related policy fields. Furthermore, despite the growing prominence of the concept of coherence in policymaking circles, the principle does not necessarily have a robust definitional foundation. Understandings of cross-scalar and cross-sectoral policy coordination are myriad, with various related concepts pervading academic debates. These include policy interaction – conceptualised as when one policy measure influences the effect of a second measure (Boonekamp, 2006); policy integration, defined as creating interdependencies between two or more policy domains or the use of specific instruments designed to integrate a set of considerations or issues across different domains (Candel and Biesbroek, 2016; Tosun and Lang, 2017); and policy coordination, understood as different actors working together in relatively non-hierarchical networks (Jordan and Schout, 2006). For the purposes of this paper, we follow Lenschow et al. (2018) in viewing interaction, coordination, cooperation and other related concepts as different mechanisms by which coherence can be achieved, all of which help provide 'synergic and systematic support towards the achievement of common objectives within and across individual policies' (den Hertog and Stross, 2013,4).

The most well-known policy principles and approaches through which environmental and climate-related considerations have thus far been integrated into this set of common objectives across policy initiatives include principles of Environmental Policy Integration (EPI) and the more incipient Climate Policy Integration (CPI). The concept of EPI first emerged in the 1990s as a lagged response to the urgent need to systematically connect apparently divergent goals, such as economic competitiveness, social development and environmental protection. It has received widespread political backing at the international level, but particularly within the EU, where it enjoys a prominent status. It enshrines the notion of affording 'principled priority' to environmental objectives vis-à-vis other policy areas, rather than merely balancing various objectives, ensuring that the 'long-term carrying capacity of nature becomes a principle or overarching societal objective' (Jordan and Lenschow, 2010; Lafferty and Hovden, 2003, 9). However, despite the EU making some attempts to move beyond this normative understanding and effectively operationalise the principle of EPI in the late 1990s and early 2000s – including, for instance, green budgeting, integrated policy appraisal and impact assessments, and programmatic planning – enshrining EPI through a unified structured set of practices and processes remains elusive. Instead, sector-specific niches of EPI have emerged, meaning that what EPI looks like in practice is often situational (Jordan and Lenschow, 2010). Similar problems

have plagued the otherwise relatively incipient concept of CPI. Conceptualisations of what CPI means both as a normative principle and in practice are fairly divergent (Adelle and Russel, 2013). Many, however, draw heavily on Lafferty and Hovden's (2003) definition of EPI, arguing that CPI is a process giving principled priority to climate objectives over those of other policies (Mickwitz et al., 2009). In practice, CPI – similarly to EPI – has struggled to gain traction, with the literature on how to actually undertake CPI generally lacking. Both the concepts of EPI and CPI, however, relate primarily to a broader notion of mainstreaming, focusing on the integration of one specific policy area into other areas, rather than seeking to build coherence between two specific sectors viewed on equal footing (as in the case of climate and environment- and peace and security-related policy areas).

Similarly, with regards to existing approaches to analysing and evaluating policy coherence, there is something of a gap with regards to analysing coherence specifically from the perspective of climate security. The OECD's PCSD framework, for example – arguably one of the most readily accessible tools for policy- and decision-makers seeking to improve cross-sectoral coherence and containing analytical, institutional and monitoring components – is designed to be flexible and adaptable to diverse national and institutional contexts, meaning it can be deployed broadly across a variety of policy areas (OECD, 2016). Its analytical component contains evaluation criteria related to actors, political leadership, policy interlinkages, enabling and disabling conditions, sources of finance and transboundary and intergenerational impacts. Yet the framework arguably does not contain a sufficient degree of specificity if seeking to assess coherence across different policy areas on climate security specifically, currently instead emphasising a set of normative governance and policymaking norms and processes – visible for example in the emphasis on stakeholder involvement and political leadership – rather than analysis of interactions, synergies or conflicts between specific policy and strategy documents (Nilsson et al., 2012).

Despite the salience of ensuring cross-sectoral coherence between climate and environment-related and peace and security-related policy areas and on ensuring conflict- and climate-sensitivity within these policy areas respectively, surprisingly little work has therefore been carried out to analyse policy coherence specifically between these fields. Existing examples of policy coherence analyses conducted on climate and environment-related policy and strategy documents focus variously on coherence between climate and livestock (Ashley, 2019); between climate policy at the national and regional level in specific geographies, such as amongst Small Island Developing States (SIDS) or the Caribbean (Lewis and Su, 2021; Scobie, 2016); between national level adaptation goals and specific sectors (England et al., 2018; Kalaba et al., 2014; Ranabhat et al., 2018); between climate and tourism policies (Santos-Lacueva and Velasco González, 2018), amongst other examples. Specific analysis of how climate and environment- and peace and security-related policies interact is, however, generally absent.

This paper therefore seeks to contribute to existing literature by proposing an analytical framework to specifically evaluate the degree to which climate and environment- and peace and security-related policies and strategies produced in a particular context are coherent with one another, and the degree to which these policies display recognition of climate-related security risks. To test this framework, a diagnostic analysis is conducted, which – grounded in the research questions set out below – identifies trends and patterns in the way sectoral actors across different countries have engaged with the topic of climate security and the degree to which coherence exists between these sectors both horizontally (at the national level) and vertically (between national and regional levels). Specifically, this paper will seek to answer the following questions:

- To what extent are climate and environment- and peace and security-related policies and strategies 'aware' of the topic of climate security and specific climate-related security risks that may exist in intervening contexts?
- To what extent do policies and strategies that do demonstrate awareness of climate-related security risks translate this awareness into strategic priorities and objectives?
- To what degree do policies and strategies contain specific programmatic activities, projects, and other implementation strategies that are climate security-sensitive and coherent across climate and environment- and peace and security-related realms?

On the basis of this analysis, a set of recommendations is made to policymakers and planners to further the coherence between policy domains and the effective integration of climate-related security risks into policy outputs.

## Methodology

Our method for analysing policy coherence between climate and environment- and peace and security-related policy documents builds upon a variety of approaches for assessing and understanding policy coherence, with different approaches often making use of different modalities through which an assessment is undertaken. Our method, however, whilst using these previously deployed principled of policy coherence analysis, diverges from previous analysis by employing climate security-specific variables within our assessment framework (Table 1).

Different existing approaches were considered and incorporated on the basis of several analytical considerations. Firstly, as we hypothesised that the majority of policy and strategy documents would have very limited engagement or entirely fail to engage with climate security as a topic and area of concern, part of our analysis necessarily focused on assessing 'awareness', or conceptual clarity. Lenschow et al. (2018) refer to this as assessing synergy or conflict between policies at the level of 'problem definition',

which this paper understands and defines as conceptual understanding and a cross-sectoral alignment of climate security definitions (see definitional coherence, Table 1). The definition of climate security considered as most appropriate here – and against which 'definitional coherence' was assessed – encompasses the 'prospect of conflict stimulated by changes in social systems driven by actual or perceived climate change impacts' (Barnett and Adger, 2007, 640). These 'stimulations' are here understood to occur through how climate affects human security (in combination with a broader range of socio-economic factors, such as poverty, the degree of support or conversely discrimination that a community receives from the state, access to economic opportunities, degree of social cohesion, policy effectiveness, amongst others) in various ways, in essence acting as an intermediary variable between climate change impacts and conflict (Barnett and Adger, 2007; Daoudy, 2021).

Secondly, a distinction was made between climate security awareness, coherence at the strategic level and objective-setting components, and coherence at the implementation level and implementation-related components of a policy or strategy. Nilsson et al. (2012), for instance, understand an assessment of coherence to encompass policy outputs – 'the decisions on objectives and instruments that are meant to achieve policy goals' – and policy implementation, or 'the arrangements by authorities and other actors for putting policy instruments into action' (Nilsson et al., 2012: 3). Schnabel and Witt (2022) similarly distinguish between policy coherence at the strategic level – including strategic orientation and planning activities – and the implementation level, encompassing the instruments and specific activities outlined in a given policy or strategy. As such, our method evaluates coherence at the strategic and objective-setting level – such as whether specific objectives relating to climate security, or the mitigation of climate-related security risks are present across different policies or strategies – as well as at the implementation level. For the latter, our method evaluates the presence and coherence of policy instruments (either entirely new ones created for the purpose of climate security or the integration of climate security considerations into existing ones), specific programmatic activities outlined in action plans, and the identification of specific communities or beneficiaries at risk of climate-related security risks (Table 1). Importantly, coding was centred around both implicit and explicit climate security considerations. This means that for instance an objective or programmatic activity which did not explicitly address climate-related security risks – but which indirectly contributed to the mitigation of said risks, for instance through engaging in climate smart agricultural (CSA) practices and thereby reducing livelihood insecurity – was coded as implicitly contributing to the mitigation of climate-related security risks and thereby forming an opportunity for further integration of climate-related security considerations.

Thirdly, our method enables the evaluation of policy and strategic coherence both horizontally (at the same level of governance) and vertically (across different levels of

governance). This is in line with den Hertog and Stross (2013), who – in their analysis of EU law and foreign policy – emphasise the need for a multi-level understanding of coherence and to examine its achievement in both a horizontal and a vertical sense. Interconnections between policies and strategies at different levels are as such assessed through whether a policy or strategy document makes reference to or builds upon a policy or strategy produced at a different level of governance (restricted to either regional or national levels within this paper) (Table 1).

The method used for evaluating awareness of climate-related security risks and coherence between the policy areas included in this analysis was designed in a hybrid manner, cognisant of the fact that whilst empirical results were required for effective cross-comparison of trends, patterns and results, policy analysis remains a qualitative and subjective analytical exercise. The method was also created to possess sufficient specificity to produce useful insights with regards to which thematic or technical areas a policy output or strategy could be argued to fall short in. As such, the hybrid framework is composed of both directed content analysis and an empirical scoring system, with the former acting as the foundations for the latter. Directed content analysis can be utilised to validate or extend conceptually a pre-existing theoretical framework or theory, and is therefore useful in the *ex-ante* creation of analytical categories through which bodies of text can be assessed (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). In line with our research questions and building on previous understandings and assessments of coherence within existing literature, a number of analytical categories were thus created to analyse coherence in a deductive manner (Table 1).

Each of the categories outlined in Table 1 therefore represents a domain deemed of relevance for coherence and the adequate incorporation of climate-related security risks, based on which an evaluation could be made by the researchers. To do so in a way that produced empirical and quantifiable results, one to two questions were developed within each category which the researcher would answer with either a 'yes' or a 'no' (corresponding to a 1 or a 0 respectively). This subsequently formed the basis of a policy scoring system in which the lowest attainable score is 0 and the highest is 12.

To ensure the validity of our results, we deployed a number of quality assurance techniques at various stages of the analysis. Firstly, it was important to consider whether the concepts and categories we developed were adequately reflective of the phenomenon under assessment. To ensure this, a small sub-set of the selected documents (around 15–20 per cent) were utilised to check the appropriateness of the categorisations, after which a series of small adjustments were made to the framework (Islam and Asadullah, 2018). These adjustments mainly centred around clarifying and narrowing the assessment criteria, such as establishing what exactly constituted an acceptable definition of climate security, what represented recognition of specific climate-conflict linkages within policy documents, and how to define what comprised an implicit contribution to the mitigation of climate-related security risks. Secondly,

aware that researchers must compensate for the fact that there exists always a degree of interpretation when analysing a text (Granheim and Lundman, 2004), analysis was conducted by more than one person and the coding process was subjected to an internal cross-check system, in which multiple researchers evaluated a document subsequent to the initial round of content analysis in order to ensure inter-coder reliability and coherence.

**Table 1 Analytical categories**

| Category type | Analytical category | Explanation |
|---|---|---|
| Awareness | Definitional coherence | Conceptions of what encompasses security as well as what encompasses climate security differ within and across organisations and across mandates. What climate security means cannot therefore be taken for granted. Furthermore, whilst the presence of a clear overarching definition of climate security reflects a clear conceptual picture of how the climate security nexus operates, the absence of an overarching definition may hint at a lack of this. Documents were therefore awarded a score of 1 if they presented a clear definition of climate security broadly in line with our working definitions, and a score of 0 if they failed to provide said definition. |
| | Temporal coherence | Peace operations conventionally undertake activities to ensure stability, development and inclusivity in social, political and economic realms. Climate change impacts have been recorded as influencing each of these dimensions in temporally and spatially diffuse ways, as social, political and economic processes are impacted by different climate change impacts in various ways. It is therefore important for integrated climate-peace policy and programming to reflect on the long-term and temporally complex interplay between social, political and ecological processes in post-conflict countries and how these affect the propensity for conflict and peace (Krampe, 2017). There increasingly exists a need, for instance, for peace operations to deal with sudden onset shocks and stressors such as drought – which can suddenly deprive thousands of their primary livelihoods and increase the need for immediate humanitarian assistance – whilst simultaneously maintaining longer-term visions of peace and stability. A score of 1 was therefore awarded to policies that in some way appeared to reflect or integrate the complex temporal interplay between social, political and ecological processes, whilst a score of 0 was awarded to those policies that did not appear to reflect on this. |

| Category type | Analytical category | Explanation |
|---|---|---|
| | Depth of engagement | Policy and strategy documents extracted from both climate and environment- and peace and security-related policy areas may demonstrate awareness of the topic of climate security, but only do so implicitly or at a surface level without identifying specific climate-related security risk pathways. Conversely, policy and strategy documents may demonstrate awareness of the specific pathways present in intervening contexts. A score of 1 was therefore awarded to documents that actively identified climate-conflict pathways that specifically recognise the role that climate may play in exacerbating existing conflict or the root and proximate causes of conflict and insecurity. A score of 0 was awarded to documents that failed to identify some of the specific channels and mechanisms whereby climate could act to increase the risk of conflict and insecurity. |
| Strategic | Horizontal acknowledgement 1 and 2 | These categories are designed to reflect whether or not a document acknowledges other climate security-relevant policy areas at the same level of governance. Acknowledgement category 1 is scored 1 if, for instance, a document identifies another policy field relevant to the climate security nexus (does a climate policy identify a peace and security-related policy field and vice versa). Acknowledgement category 2 is scored 1 if the document then also mentions a specific policy, strategy or instrument in said area. |
| | Vertical acknowledgement 1 and 2 | These categories are designed to reflect whether a document acknowledges a policy operating at a higher level of governance (regional or international). For vertical acknowledgement 1, a score of 1 is awarded if the policy makes reference to a climate and environment-related policy or strategy produced at another level of governance. For vertical acknowledgement 2, a score of 1 is awarded if the policy makes reference to a specific peace and security-related policy or strategy produced at another level of governance. |
| | Cross-sectoral coordination | This category is designed to capture whether a document mentions or proposes specific instruments, structures or work processes that relate to improving coherence between ministries or other implementing partners. A score of 1 is awarded if any of the above appears in the documents, whilst a score of 0 is awarded if no mention of cross-sectoral or cross-ministerial coordination coherence is made at all. |
| | Objectives | Whether or not a policy document sets out a specific set of synergistic objectives and priority areas that seek to build connecting bridges across different policy fields is a key first step in moving from acknowledging climate security as an issue to actively seeking to deal with it. As such, documents were awarded a score of 1 when the presence of integrated objectives was detected, and a score of 0 when no objectives that bridged climate and peace and security-related fields were detected. |

| Category type | Analytical category | Explanation |
|---|---|---|
| Implementation | Policy instruments | This category reflects whether a document identifies a specific policy instrument that can be seen to help promote or facilitate a specific set of integrated climate security-sensitive policies. A score of 1 was awarded if a document included a synergistic policy instrument that made reference in some way to both climate and peace and security-related fields (such as a regulatory framework, market incentives, education, capacity building or awareness raising, or monitoring mechanisms). A score of 0 was awarded to documents in which this was absent. |
| | Community/ beneficiary identification | This category captures whether a policy document successfully identifies specific communities, sets of beneficiaries or geographic areas to which a specific set of activities should be targeted and from which said constituencies should receive tangible co-benefits. This forms a key step in the implementation of a policy. Documents received a score of 1 if specific societal groups or communities were identified as being at risk of climate security risks and identified as relevant policy beneficiaries. A score of 0 was awarded if the document omitted identifying specific constituencies. |
| | Activities | The final level of implementation within the scope of this analysis is whether a policy or strategy identifies or contains a specific set of climate security-sensitive policy activities. A score of 1 was awarded to policies in which this was detected (for example, specific policies relating to reducing the reliance of a population on charcoal production, which is both a source of emissions *and* helps underpin and sustain a war economy). A score of 0 was awarded to documents in which no specific synergistic policy activities were detected. |

A total of sixty national-level and twenty-five regional-level policies and strategies were analysed from across all eight countries and the respective regional institutions within which they are active.[1] Climate and environment- and peace and security-related policy documents were extracted from eight African countries – Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe. These countries are representative of the different geographies in sub-Saharan Africa. The selected countries also capture the diversity of levels of peace in sub-Saharan Africa, including countries with medium levels of peace (Senegal, Uganda and Kenya), low levels of peace (Nigeria and Zimbabwe) and very low levels of peace (South Sudan, Somalia and Mali), according to the measure and classification of the Global Peace Index (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2022). Countries within these parameters were selected as these represent national contexts where coherent and synergistic climate and environment and peace and security sector policies and strategies are arguably

1 See Annex 1 for a full list of policies subjected to analysis.

urgently needed. Due to the complex feedback processes that exist between climate change and climate vulnerability on the one hand and conflict and fragility on the other, these contexts in particular are arguably at high risk of becoming locked into hard-to-break cycles of climate vulnerability, insecurity and conflict. Addressing these interlinkages in policy and maximising the co-benefits of climate action, conflict prevention and peacebuilding is therefore acute. The rationale for focusing on Africa draws from the increasing interest on the topic in the continent as illustrated by the Bamako Declaration on Access to Natural Resources and Conflicts between Communities released in 2019 in which the African Union acknowledged the interconnections between climate and conflict and called for the need to develop effective policy responses to address these interconnected risks (African Union Peace and Security Council, 2019).

In order to identify and extract relevant policy and strategy documents produced by national governments and regional level entities, a keyword search strategy was developed based on the key concepts identified by the research questions. Boolean operators were used to help enhance and narrow down the keyword search by establishing relationships between the different terms through the use of the connector 'AND', used to only retrieve the documents that mention all of the terms included in the search (for instance, searching for 'climate' AND 'policy' AND '[country]'). These Boolean operators were deployed in the New Climate Institute's Climate Policy Database and the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment's Climate Change Laws of the World Database, as well as throughout relevant climate and environment- and peace and security-related ministerial websites across the eight countries subjected to analysis. A set of inclusion and exclusion criteria for extracted policy and strategy documents was subsequently developed based on the thematic priorities identified by the research questions, and helped establish the sectoral, temporal and geographical scope of the analysis. The scope of analysis was limited to policy and strategy documents extracted from climate and environment-related fields climate change fields (i.e. adaptation and mitigation) and from peace and security-related fields (e.g. social cohesion, conflict prevention/transformation, and peacebuilding; counterterrorism and extremist prevention; stabilisation and post-conflict recovery).

These inclusion criteria were developed as the scope of this research is focused on assessing awareness of and coherence on climate security specifically within climate and environment- and peace and security-related policies and strategies. Although – as we identified previously – climate-related security risks are frequently cross-sectoral and cross-scalar in nature, we consider coherence and synergies between climate and environment- and peace and security-related policies as the primary entry point for integrated climate-peace programming. Furthermore, this focus does not discount the fact, however, that in assessing the degree to which said policies engage with other

policy areas and documents, we record whether a policy makes reference to a field deemed as relevant to climate security. Sectors deemed relevant to climate security are defined as sectors likely to be able to play a significant role in mitigating the emergence of key climate-related security risks, such as those linked to food insecurity and food availability, natural resource stress, livelihood insecurity and human mobility. For the purposes of this paper, a climate security-relevant policy field is therefore defined as climate and environment, peace and security, development, agriculture, natural resource management and disaster risk reduction. Only documents published after 2010 were included in the analysis in order both to assure their continued relevancy, and to reflect the fact that the topic and field of climate security remains nascent, suggesting that older documents would not contain references to the nexus and therefore be of limited analytical utility.

Some limitations of the analysis include that we do not analyse or evaluate policy effectiveness or the degree to which implementation has truly occurred, which is beyond the scope of this analysis. Additionally, due to our dataset being limited to policies and strategies available and accessible online, documents potentially missed by our keyword search strategy are not included in the dataset. Our analysis is therefore not necessarily exhaustive. Finally, we recognise the limitations inherent to deploying a binary scoring system. Whilst utilising a binary coding method simplifies the coding process, to some extent removes inter-coder variability and potential differences in interpretation, and facilitates using a larger dataset, there are also shortcomings. These primarily include the fact that the varying extent to which different policies and strategies may engage with climate-conflict linkages, for instance, is not captured. A singular instance of engagement was considered as sufficient to fulfil the requirements of our framework, therefore removing a degree of nuance with regards to which policies substantially engage with climate-conflict linkages versus those that engage only limitedly with the topic. Furthermore, the usage of this framework precludes more detailed textual or thematic analysis, as an emphasis is placed on analysing a larger dataset as opposed to specific meanings, themes or discourses within the text.

## Results

**Table 2 Analytical results displayed as a decimal figure expressing percentage scores within samples**

| Analytical categories | National (60) | | Regional (25) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Climate and Environment (44) | Peace and Security (16) | Climate and Environment (15) | Peace and Security (10) |
| Definitional Coherence | 0.09 | 0.25 | 0.20 | 0.10 |
| Temporal Coherence | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Depth of Engagement | 0.64 | 0.38 | 0.73 | 0.00 |
| Acknowledgment (horizontal) I | 0.80 | 0.56 | 0.67 | 0.50 |
| Acknowledgment (horizontal) II | 0.25 | 0.13 | 0.07 | 0.10 |
| Acknowledgement (vertical) I | 0.91 | 0.06 | 0.93 | 0.60 |
| Acknowledgement (vertical) II | 0.11 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.60 |
| Cross-sectoral Coordination | 0.84 | 0.94 | 0.87 | 0.60 |
| Objectives | 0.48 | 0.38 | 0.60 | 0.20 |
| Policy Instruments | 0.34 | 0.31 | 0.40 | 0.20 |
| Community/Beneficiary Identification | 0.39 | 0.19 | 0.33 | 0.10 |
| Activities | 0.45 | 0.31 | 0.40 | 0.10 |

### Awareness of climate security and context-specific climate-related security risks

Discussion of the results generated by the analysis is structured around answering the aforementioned research questions that helped frame our inquiry. Regarding our first research question – which focused on the degree to which policies and strategies displayed awareness of climate security as a topic, and whether they identified any specific climate-related security risks or mechanisms in their respective intervening contexts – our results suggest that conceptual understanding and coherence across climate and environment- and peace and security-related sectors is relatively low. Whilst there are slight differences across environment and climate- and peace and security-related policy areas, both policy areas did at least to some extent recognise and engage with specific climate-conflict linkages and pathways (depth of engagement) but were much less likely to do so whilst also locating these within a clear and coherent climate security conceptual framework (definitional coherence). Sixty-four per cent of national level and 73 per cent of regional level climate and environment-related policies and strategies demonstrated at least some degree of engagement with

specific climate security pathways and mechanisms, whilst only 38 per cent of national and 0 per cent of regional level peace and security-related policies did so (Table 2). Clear definitions of climate security in line with the working understanding deployed in this paper were however rare, with only 9 per cent and 20 per cent of national and regional climate and environment-related policies respectively displaying evidence of an applicable understanding of climate security in line with our definition. Peace and security-related policies and strategies were slightly more likely to deploy a conceptually appropriate understanding (25 per cent of national level and 10 per cent of regional level documents).

Similarly, recognition of differing rates of change within climate- and socio-economic, political and development processes – and how this may impact the emergence of climate-related security risks – was extremely rare, with only 2 per cent of climate and environment-related and no peace and security-related policies and strategies displaying evidence of awareness regarding this, across both the assessed scales of governance (temporal coherence) (Table 2). It is also notable that at both the national and the regional level, climate and environment-related policies and strategies were much more likely to recognise specific climate-related security risks or conflict outcomes than peace and security-related documents, although they were slightly less likely to make use of a conceptually sound understanding of climate security. Overall, therefore, awareness of how climate may affect conflict risk in specific contexts is to some degree present, however, the usage of a clear conceptual understanding and cross-sectoral coherence with regards to a shared conceptual basis across climate and environment- and peace and security-related policies and strategies is limited.

## Climate security-sensitive strategic priorities and objectives

Secondly, with regards to our second research question on the degree to which climate security features at the strategic level of analysed policies and strategies – and the extent to which these are present across climate- and environment and peace and security-related sectors – it is evident that whilst cross-sectoral policy interaction is present, climate security coherence at the strategic level is limited. 80 per cent of national level and 67 per cent of regional level climate and environment-related policies were, for instance, recorded as in some way referencing or recognising interconnections with another policy area relevant to climate security at the same level of governance (Table 2). Peace and security-related policies and strategies were slightly less likely to do so (56 per cent of national level policies and 50 per cent of regional level policies) (horizontal acknowledgement 1). Policies and strategies were much less likely, however, to engage with a *specific* policy or strategy from another policy sector, suggesting that where interconnections are made, they are primarily at the surface level, without necessarily exploring specific strategic- or implementation-related interconnections (horizontal

acknowledgement 2). Notable again here is the fact that climate and environment-related policies are more likely to have horizontal cross-sectoral interactions than peace and security-related policies.

This trend continues with regards to vertical coherence, with the vast majority of climate and environment-related policies and strategies referencing a policy area relevant to climate security at a different level of governance (91 per cent of national level and 93 per cent of regional level documents). Only 6 per cent of national level and 60 per cent of regional level peace and security-related policies, however, did the same. Both sectors were, again, generally less likely to demonstrate connections with a specific policy or strategy produced at a different level of governance (vertical acknowledgement 2). The majority of policies and strategies from both sectors, however, did reference at least one body, entity or instrument for helping facilitate cross-sectoral coordination and coherence (cross-sectoral coordination). Peace and security-related policies produced at the regional level were the least likely to do so (60 per cent).

In terms of whether policies and strategies outlined strategic priorities and objectives either implicitly or explicitly linked to climate security, it is evident that climate and environment-related policies were more likely to do so than peace and security-related policies. Forty-eight per cent of national level and 60 per cent of regional level climate and environment-related policies contained objectives and strategic priorities that represent current efforts to mitigate climate-related security risks or immediate entry points to include climate-conflict considerations. However, only 38 per cent of national level and 20 per cent of regional level peace and security-related policies displayed evidence of this.

## Coherent and climate security-sensitive programmes, projects and implementation strategies

Thirdly, in terms of our third research question focusing on the extent to which implementation-related policy components appear to make climate security-related considerations – and whether these are coherent across climate and environment- and peace and security-related sectors – evidence for integrated programmatic activities is once again restricted. Policy instruments that were either explicitly related to climate security or that were found to offer opportunities for the integration of climate-related security considerations were found in 34 per cent of national level climate and environment-related and 31 per cent of peace and security-related policies and strategies, whilst 40 per cent of regional level climate and environment-related policies displayed evidence of containing relevant policy instruments (Table 2). Only 20 per cent of regional level peace and security-related policies, however, contained an instrument in which climate security was present or opportunities for integration exist.

A similar trend emerges with regards to the presence of specific projects and programmatic activities. Forty-five per cent of national level and 40 per cent of regional level climate and environment-related policies – as well as 32 per cent of national level peace and security-related policies – were found to contain activities and programmatic interventions either explicitly or implicitly related to climate security. Regional level peace and security-related policies and strategies were the least likely to contain specific programmatic interventions related directly or indirectly to climate security. Finally, climate and environment-related policies and strategies demonstrated a greater tendency to identify specific communities and geographies at risk of climate change impacts or climate-related security risks. Thirty-nine per cent of national and 33 per cent of regional climate and environment-related policies and strategies displayed the level of granularity needed to truly undertake responsive programming, whilst only 19 per cent of national level and 10 per cent of regional level peace and security-related policies and strategies did so. It should be noted, however, that despite climate and environment-related generally outperforming peace and security-related policies and strategies in all of the implementation-related evaluation categories, the overall presence of instruments, specific programmatic interventions, and the degree to which specific at risk-communities and geographies were identified in a climate security-relevant manner is low. Regional level peace and security-related policies performed particularly poorly in this regard.

## Discussion and recommendations

Firstly, it is apparent that whilst both climate and environment- and peace and security-related policies and strategies do engage with (and demonstrate awareness of) specific climate-conflict linkages, these are much less likely to be underpinned by a robust conceptual understanding of the concept of climate security. Although climate-related conflict and security implications are quite regularly recognised as being present in intervening contexts, the frequent absence of a clear and workable definition of climate security perhaps indicates a lack of appropriate frameworks of understanding for how climate change may undermine human security (and how responses to alleviating said insecurity can contribute to conflict and violence). It is also the case, however, that climate and environment-related policies are at both the national and regional level more likely to contain recognition of climate-conflict linkages. The fact that a shared conceptual understanding is often lacking amongst policies and strategies of both policy areas additionally limits opportunities for cross-sectoral coherence, as policymakers active in different policy spaces are not able to operate within the same conceptual framing. A broad and crucially shared conceptual basis facilitates the ability for a common problem definition, and can therefore help inform the design of policies and programming able to mitigate the potential

for climate change to contribute to insecurity and conflict, whilst also maximising its potential to contribute to cooperation and the building of social cohesion. Academic and practitioner fields have, however, thus far struggled to facilitate cross-fertilisation between competing ontological positions, epistemological foundations and methodological approaches on the relationship between climate change and violent conflict (Ide et al., 2023), which may also influence and prohibit the development of effective policy.

Secondly, our results suggest that climate and environment-related policies and strategies are generally more likely to recognise specific instances of climate-conflict linkages; display interconnectedness with either other sector-specific policieos and strategies or overarching development and growth strategies; contain objectives and strategic priorities at least implicitly related to mitigating climate-related security risks (therefore displaying the greatest opportunity for integrating climate security-related concerns); and outline specific programmatic activities and projects either directly or indirectly related to mitigating climate-related security risks. Peace and security-related policies – both at the national and regional levels, but particularly the latter – are far less likely to engage with other sectors or display integration into overarching, cross-sectoral strategies or contain opportunities for the integration of climate security-related considerations at the strategic and implementation levels. Whilst current cross-sectoral policy linkages therefore do not appear to be sufficiently present for an effective, integrated approach to climate security policymaking, regional peace and security-related strategies in particular currently display very minimal opportunity for the incorporation of climate security. These results may partially, however, be a reflection of the fact that less peace and security-related policies and strategies were extracted and included in the dataset used for this analysis than climate and environment-related policies.

Thirdly, it is apparent that – despite evidence for a sophisticated understanding of climate security being limited – the *potential* for climate security-related considerations to be integrated into existing objectives, strategic priorities, policy instruments, baseline assessments and identifying at risk areas and groups, and specific programmes and projects does exist. A substantial number of objectives, the policy instruments used to transpose these to local levels, and the local level programmes and activities that help achieve priorities locally, were found to implicitly mitigate climate-related security risks and pathways, primarily by seeking to alleviate climate-related impacts on human security. Consideration of co-benefits for peace, security and social cohesion, however, is limited in the vast majority of these instances. It therefore appears that policy- and decisionmakers face challenges in transforming their awareness of climate security and specific manifestations of the relationship between climate change and conflict into credible and coherent policy responses to challenge the complex interconnections between climate change, insecurity and conflict.

A number of recommendations can be made in order to respond to these trends and shortcomings. Firstly, it is imperative that both academic and practitioner literature achieves a greater degree of conceptual clarity on how to frame and operationalise the relationship between climate change and violent conflict (Ide et al., 2023). Our research has shown that this likely extends beyond the purely academic realm and represents more than an intellectual exercise. There may therefore be utility for policymakers from across climate and environment- and peace and security-related policy areas to access a shared conceptual space where interconnections and synergies between climate and security can be explored and maximised, particularly in identifying specific programmes, projects or initiatives where climate and conflict sensitivity and peace responsiveness could be better integrated.

Innovation and the scaling-up of innovative developments within the field of climate security (including the development of climate security-specific programmatic interventions) requires the buy-in of a multitude of interconnected and interdependent stakeholders active in the space that can form coalitions of change (Sartas et al., 2020). For climate security, these are likely to include (but not necessarily be limited to) researchers from across diverse epistemologies, both climate action and peace practitioners, multilateral institutions, states and sub-national and community-level organisations. The construction of these coalitions requires stakeholders being able to learn about one another's context and perspectives, discover how they depend on one another to fulfil their ambitions, develop common starting points to build upon, and develop mutual relationships and trust (Kahan and Rapoport, 2014). This facilitated learning and negotiation process cannot occur, however, without these diverse stakeholders operating on the basis of a common definition and using a widely accepted set of terms, approaches, frameworks and data types – the absence of which is clear on the basis of our policy analysis. Ensuring a unified conceptual base is therefore a key priority for government actors within the field of climate security.

Given how context-specific recognition of climate-conflict linkages is to some degree present however, it is also critical for academics and practitioners to strengthen their ability to learn from the policy community itself (and those informing the policy-making process). In particular, researcher and practitioner communities should invest to a much greater degree in localised and bottom-up knowledge co-creation processes. This has proved challenging, however, given the limited availability of information and data that can help paint a picture of specific local dynamics and the variables and drivers involved in them. A greater emphasis should therefore be placed on working together with relevant government agencies, sub-national and community-level structures to co-define climate-related security risks and co-design potential interventions to address these, underscoring the importance of knowledge co-creation and decolonising the field of climate security (Siddiqi, 2022).

Secondly, our results imply that peace and security-related policies and strategies – particularly at the regional level – demonstrate a somewhat more limited engagement with climate-related security risks and contain less immediate opportunities for the integration of climate security-related considerations. Policymaking actors and institutions active in the peace and security space in particular should therefore more actively consider the role of climate change in contributing to risks of conflict and threats to social cohesion, whilst also reflecting to a much greater degree the opportunities climate change may bring for cooperation in their strategic priorities, objectives and programmatic activities. Furthermore, as our results suggest that cross-sectoral interaction between peace and security-related policies and strategies and other policy areas is much more limited than is the case for climate and environment-related policies, there is a need to construct more robust cross-sectoral linkages and make sure of existing vehicles and spaces for coordination for the purposes of climate security coordination. One practical method through which a greater awareness of the relationship between climate change and conflict amongst those working in peace and security could be to, firstly, undertake training needs assessments (TNAs) within key country and regional level bodies and entities in order to assess gaps in understanding, skills or capacities with regards to the topic of climate security. This should be followed, secondly, by specific climate security-related capacity building efforts to respond to potential shortcomings in understanding and capacity.

Finally, as our analysis suggests that (particularly in climate and environment-related policies and strategies) the opportunity for incorporating climate security-related considerations and priorities is quite substantial, efforts to chart how and to integrate co-benefits for peace, security and social cohesion into existing programmatic activities and projects should be undertaken in a systemic manner. To do so, those working in technical capacities within relevant ministries, agencies and other policymaking entities could engage in internal analytical and mapping exercises such as those outlined by Morales-Muñoz et al. (2022) Making use of a system dynamics model and creating causal loop diagrams can, for example, can help chart context-specific relationships with the climate-conflict and climate-peace nexus, the intermediate variables that influence the intensity and speed at which said relationships may manifest, and identify correlations and feedbacks between these (both positive and negative). This in turn would allow climate and environment- as well as peace and security-related institutions and entities to identify exactly where in this complex set of relationships they are likely able to either amplify positive or mitigate negative correlations between climate change and social systems, and which specific programmatic activities may be required to do so. Integrating such exercises at the very beginning of a policy formulation process can help better integrate climate security considerations in a systematic manner. Furthermore, incorporating a more diverse set of experts and expert organisations into said policy design and formulation stages – including those

working on peace and security, climate adaptation, disaster risk reduction and development – will likely further assist in the development of clear climate-peace theories of change around which concrete programmatic activities can be designed.

## Conclusion

This paper has assessed climate and environment- and peace and security-related policies and strategies – extracted from eight African countries – for the purposes of assessing climate security awareness and cross-sectoral and cross-scalar coherence. To do so, it makes use of an innovative policy analysis method designed to capture and evaluate analytical variables that are specifically relevant to assessing the presence of climate security-related considerations in the policy documents, as well as the degree to which coherence appears to exist across climate and environment- and peace and security-related fields. Using this method, this paper finds that although specific climate-conflict linkages are to a certain extent recognised within policies from both sectors, a clear and shared conceptual understanding of climate security is mostly lacking; climate and environment-related policies and strategies are generally more aware of climate security and have greater cross-sectoral linkages than peace and security-related policies and strategies, which appear to operate in a more siloed manner; and that there are – particularly within climate and environment-related policies and strategies – opportunities for the integration of climate security-related considerations into existing objectives and strategic priorities, instruments and programmatic activities and projects. As a consequence of these findings, this paper recommends that academic and practitioner climate security research fields work to achieve a greater degree of conceptual clarity and cooperates more effectively with government agencies, sub-national entities and communities to generate context-specific understandings of climate security; that peace and security policy-making institutions – particularly at the regional level – undertake internal TNAs to assess shortcomings in knowledge and capacities with regard to climate security and design capacity building efforts as appropriate; and that current opportunities for the integration of climate security-related considerations and climate-peace co-benefits are identified more clearly through the use of exercises such as system dynamics modelling, which can be included in the policy design and formulation process.

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## Annex 1

List of policies and strategies

| Title | Year | Actor/ country | Scale | Sector |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Somalia National Adaptation Programme of Action to Climate Change | 2013 | Somalia | National | Climate and Environment |
| Six Pillar Strategy | 2012 | Somalia | National | Peace and Security |
| Security Pact | 2017 | Somalia | National | Climate and Environment |
| National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism | 2016 | Somalia | National | Peace and Security |
| Zimbabwe Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) | 2017 | Zimbabwe | National | Climate and Environment |
| Sectoral Action Plans for Nigeria's Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) | 2017 | Nigeria | National | Climate and Environment |
| Multidisciplinary Focus Group on Security Sector Reform | 2016 | Mali | National | Peace and Security |
| Uganda National Climate Change Policy | 2015 | Uganda | National | Climate and Environment |
| 'National Climate Change Communication Strategy (2017/2021)' | 2018 | Uganda | National | Climate and Environment |
| 'National Policy for Disaster Preparedness and Management' | 2011 | Uganda | National | Climate and Environment |
| National Security Strategy | 2019 | Nigeria | National | Peace and Security |
| Somalia's INDCs | 2015 | Somalia | National | Climate and Environment |
| Submission of Kenya's Updated Nationally Determined Contribution | 2020 | Kenya | National | Climate and Environment |
| Kenya National Adaptation Plan 2015–2 030 | 2016 | Kenya | National | Climate and Environment |
| National Climate Change Action Plan 2013–2 017 | 2013 | Kenya | National | Climate and Environment |
| National Climate Change Action Plan 2018–2 023 | 2018 | Kenya | National | Climate and Environment |
| Zimbabwe's Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) Submitted to the UNFCCC | 2015 | Zimbabwe | National | Climate and Environment |

| Title | Year | Actor/ country | Scale | Sector |
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| National Adaptation Plan (NAP) Roadmap for Zimbabwe | 2019 | Zimbabwe | National | Climate and Environment |
| Zimbabwe's National Climate Change Response Strategy | 2014 | Zimbabwe | National | Climate and Environment |
| Nigeria's National Action Plan to Reduce Short-Live Climate Pollutants | 2018 | Nigeria | National | Climate and Environment |
| Nigerian National Security Strategy | 2019 | Nigeria | National | Peace and Security |
| Counter-Terrorism Centre Strategic Report | 2018 | Nigeria | National | Peace and Security |
| Policy Framework and National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism | 2017 | Nigeria | National | Peace and Security |
| 'Security Sector Development Plan (SSDP) 2015/16 – 2019/20' | 2016 | Uganda | National | Peace and Security |
| National Strategy and Action Plan to strengthen human resources and skills to advance green, low-emission and climate-resilient development in Uganda 2013–2 022 | 2013 | Uganda | National | Climate and Environment |
| National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPA) to Climate Change | 2016 | South Sudan | National | Climate and Environment |
| South Sudan National Development Strategy: Consolidate Peace and Stabilise the Economy | 2018 | South Sudan | National | Peace and Security |
| South Sudan First State of Environment and Outlook Report 2018 | 2018 | South Sudan | National | Climate and Environment |
| Intended Nationally Determined Contribution – Republic of South Sudan (Draft) | 2015 | South Sudan | National | Climate and Environment |
| National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (2018–2 027) | 2018 | South Sudan | National | Climate and Environment |
| Sector Plan for Security, Peacebuilding, and Conflict Management (2013–2 017) | 2013 | Kenya | National | Peace and Security |
| Sessional Paper No, 5 of 2014 on National Policy for Peacebuilding and Conflict Management | 2014 | Kenya | National | Peace and Security |
| Sector Plan for Drought Risk Management and Ending Drought Emergencies 2013 | 2013 | Kenya | National | Climate and Environment |
| Sessional Paper No. 09 of 2013 on National Cohesion and Integration | 2013 | Kenya | National | Peace and Security |
| Sessional paper on the National Environment Policy (2014) | 2014 | Kenya | National | Climate and Environment |

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| Defence White Paper | 2017 | Kenya | National | Peace and Security |
| Nigeria's INDCs | 2017 | Nigeria | National | Climate and Environment |
| Nigeria's Updated NDCs | 2021 | Nigeria | National | Climate and Environment |
| Uganda's INDCs | 2015 | Uganda | National | Climate and Environment |
| National Reconciliation Framework (2019) | 2019 | Somalia | National | Peace and Security |
| National Stabilisation Strategy (2018–2 020) | 2018 | Somalia | National | Peace and Security |
| Nigeria's Second National Communication under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change | 2014 | Nigeria | National | Climate and Environment |
| Nigeria's Third National Communication under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change | 2020 | Nigeria | National | Climate and Environment |
| Nigeria's National Adaptation Plan Framework | 2020 | Nigeria | National | Climate and Environment |
| A Climate Risk Management Framework for Kenya | 2016 | Kenya | National | Climate and Environment |
| Somalia's Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) | 2015 | Somalia | National | Climate and Environment |
| The Initial National Communication for Somalia to the UNFCCC | 2018 | Somalia | National | Climate and Environment |
| National Climate Policy | 2017 | Zimbabwe | National | Climate and Environment |
| National Policy on Climate Change | 2013 | Nigeria | National | Climate and Environment |
| National Action Plan on Gender and Climate Change for Nigeria | 2020 | Nigeria | National | Climate and Environment |
| Politique Nationale sur les Changements Climatiques | 2011 | Mali | National | Climate and Environment |
| Plan National Sécheresse du Mali 2020–2 5 | 2020 | Mali | National | Climate and Environment |
| Seconde Communication Nationale du Mali sur les Changements Climatiques | 2011 | Mali | National | Climate and Environment |

| Title | Year | Actor/ country | Scale | Sector |
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| Troisieme Communication Nationale du Mali a la Convention Cadre des Nations Unies sur les Changement Climatiques | 2017 | Mali | National | Climate and Environment |
| Deuxième communication nationale à la Convention Cadre des Nations Unies sur les Changements Climatiques | 2011 | Senegal | National | Climate and Environment |
| Troiroisième Communication Nationale du Senegal a la Convention Cadre des Nations-Unies sur les Changements Climatiques | 2015 | Senegal | National | Climate and Environment |
| South Sudan National Action Plan 2015–2 020 on UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and Related Resolutions | 2015 | South Sudan | National | Peace and Security |
| Initial National Communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change – Republic of South Sudan | 2018 | South Sudan | National | Climate and Environment |
| Mali's INDCs | 2015 | Mali | National | Climate and Environment |
| Senegal INDCs | 2015 | Senegal | National | Climate and Environment |
| EAC Climate Change Master Plan 2011–2 031 | 2011 | EAC | Regional | Climate and Environment |
| EAC Climate Change Policy | 2011 | EAC | Regional | Climate and Environment |
| EAC Climate Change Strategy 2011–2 016 | 2011 | EAC | Regional | Climate and Environment |
| Lake Victoria Basin Climate Change Adaptation Strategy and Action Plan 2018–2 023 | 2018 | EAC | Regional | Climate and Environment |
| SADC REDD Programme | 2011 | SADC | Regional | Climate and Environment |
| SADC Policy Paper Climate Change | 2012 | SADC | Regional | Climate and Environment |
| SADC Climate Change Adaptation for the Water Sector (2011) | 2011 | SADC | Regional | Climate and Environment |
| ECOWAS Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform and Governance | 2016 | ECOWAS | Regional | Peace and Security |
| Biennial Report on the Programme of Action for the Implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2 030 in Africa | 2020 | African Union | Regional | Climate and Environment |
| Draft Africa Climate Change Strategy 2020 – 2030 | 2020 | African Union | Regional | Climate and Environment |

| Title | Year | Actor/ country | Scale | Sector |
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| ECOWAS counter-terrorism strategy implementation plan | 2019 | ECOWAS | Regional | Peace and Security |
| Guidelines on Women, Peace, and Security (PAPS) | 2020 | ECOWAS | Regional | Peace and Security |
| Action Plan for Implementation of the Central Africa Gender Responsive Regional Strategy for Risk Prevention, Disaster Management and Climate Change Adaptation Action Plan for Implementation of the Central Africa Gender Responsive Regional Strategy for Risk Prevention, Disaster Management and Climate Change Adaptation | 2020 | ECCAS | Regional | Climate and Environment |
| Central Africa Regional Strategy for risk reduction, disaster management and climate change adaptation | 2015 | ECCAS | Regional | Climate and Environment |
| Draft African Strategy on Climate Change and the Intra-ACP Climate Services Programme | 2019 | AU | Regional | Climate and Environment |
| Action Plan for the Implementation of the African Union Strategy on the Control of Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons | N.D. | AU | Regional | Peace and Security |
| Youth Silencing the Guns Intergenerational Dialogues: Policy Report 2020 | 2020 | AU | Regional | Peace and Security |
| Continental Framework for Youth, Peace and Security | 2020 | AU | Regional | Peace and Security |
| African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) | 2015 | AU | Regional | Peace and Security |
| Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework | 2015 | AU | Regional | Peace and Security |
| CEWARN Strategy Framework | 2012 | IGAD | Regional | Peace and Security |
| Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism | 2020 | IGAD | Regional | Peace and Security |
| Plan d'action pour la mise de la SPRGC. 2ème Conférence Ministérielle Afrique Centrale sur la. Réduction des Risques de Catastrophes (RRC) | 2015 | ECCAS | Regional | Climate and Environment |
| Programme on climate change adaptation and mitigation in the Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA-EAC-SADC) region | 2011 | COMESA | Regional | Climate and Environment |
| Draft African Union Strategy on Climate Change | 2014 | AU | Regional | Climate and Environment |