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Is Populism Truly Advanced in the World?

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Is Populism Truly Advanced in the World? *

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ISA Investigaciones Sociales Aplicadas / Mexico

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Abstract

It is fashionable to affirm that populism is advancing in the world. Examples of governments assuming positions that can be qualified in this way are abundant. But it seems pertinent to really dimension the existence and magnitude of this phenomenon and not only attend to a casuistic vision, largely focused on the Western world.

That is why this paper will seek to measure the growth during the 21st century in terms of votes and seats in the lower national assemblies and the participation in the governments of the world of parties, differentiated according to their populist orientation.

Today there are reliable sources of information to do this type of exercise. In particular, we will use the data compiled by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project to compare the electoral presence and success and the ability to lead or be part of the government coalitions of the parties according to their adherence to populist logics.

To do this, after an introduction related to the same concept of populism, the source of information to be used in this text and the indices that will be used for analysis will be characterized. Subsequently, the results of the measurement of the behavior of these indices in the world in the period 2000-2019 and their relationship with the achievements of the parties in terms of votes, seats and participation in government coalitions will be presented in a synthetic way. Finally, the meaning of the data compiled, displayed and analyzed will be discussed.

The analyzed data allow us to advance in the finding of a relationship between populist discourse and the adoption of a position contrary to elitism and that the position to the right in the political-ideological spectrum tends to make an organization less likely to adopt a populist rhetoric. However, there would be a long way to go to achieve a full explanation of the phenomenon of populism in this century and it is not insignificant progress in achieving electoral support and integration into governments that has been detected during the last decade. This forces us to think of new paths and alternative sources for understanding the phenomenon that occupies the center of attention in this essay.

Key words: elections, populism, elitism, 21st Century, V-Dem.

Introduction

The central concern that is the subject of attention in this essay is the relative weight that Populist Party options have had in the world during the present century and whether this has changed significantly between the first and second decades of the century. This, with the understanding that it is commonplace to notice the presence of something that is usually described as a “populist wave” that affects the West, Latin America and Eastern Europe.

Approaching this requires carrying out a review and analysis of the electoral results in terms of votes, seats and participation in party governments in the world due to their location on an elitism-populism axis, defined from a conception operational, retrieved from the primary data source used: the party database produced and made publicly available by the Varieties of Democracy project. The cases to be analyzed are all the countries with elections in the world during the period 2000-2019.

This essay adopts the conventional format called IMRD (Introduction, Methods, Results and Discussion), also known by the acronym IMRyD in Spanish, or IMRaD in English, which is a common organizational structure model for original research articles for scientific publications (Sollaci and Pereira, 2004) and that is recommended for empirical studies in the Publications Manual of the American Psychological Association (APA, 2019).

This model assumes that research articles for publication are distanced from the thought process to facilitate an orderly and clear presentation, which begins with a review of the literature on the topic, to later externalize the reasons for carrying out the study, including the research question. and the proposed hypothesis, continue with the description of the sources, materials and methods used for the study, then with the presentation of the results in general and with respect to the proposed hypothesis, to close with the reflection on the implications of the findings and the open research perspectives. This will be the scheme followed throughout this essay.

Theoretical framework

What is populism?

The dictionary definition tells us that it is a political trend that aims to attract the popular classes (DRAE, 2022), although the dictionary itself warns that this concept is usually used in a pejorative sense. And it is clear that political tendency refers to the fundamental elements that a movement, party or segment thereof upholds and, therefore, to the political doctrine and rhetoric that is used as an organization and by its leadership.

However, trying to delve deeper into this definition, one runs into problems, because although this concept is always linked to the appeal to a claimed people (Agulhon *et al.*, 1997:239), it is usually used to designate political realities and practices very diverse (Yllari, 2015: 179). This has promoted readings that deny scientificity to the very concept of populism, given its use to qualify extremely dissimilar realities and expressions (Adamovsky, 2015).

In general, the concept of populism usually refers today, adopting an approach that is classified as ideational, to an ideology - understood as a normative set of emotions, ideas and collective beliefs that are compatible with each other and that refer to behavior. human social—based on the polarized and contrasting distinction between an entity that is supposed to be sovereign, identified under the concept of people, and the groups holding power that form elites (Mudde and Rovira, 2019).

By taking this definition, these authors in some way follow Canovan (1981), not in their rejection of the adoption of a clear definition of the concept, but in their understanding of this concept as an expression of the contrast between good people and corrupt elite.

Theorists of this current have described populism as a “thin” ideology, as it is poorly developed, with limited concepts, which motivates it to resort to elements from other ideologies, which brings its expression closer to right-wing currents like left.

In this same logic, Norris and Inglehard (2016:6-7) suggest that, despite their heterogeneity, those who promote a populist discourse share three distinctive elements: an anti-

system logic, an authoritarian attitude and nativism, thereby contrasting the representative democracy, liberalism that protects minority rights and cosmopolitanism.

Based on these considerations, these authors develop what could be described as a “heuristic model of populism based on two different axes: economic and cultural” (Gandesha, 2018), where the first has to do with the level of state management of the economy and the second with the presence of traditional values, opposed to progress.

For Norris and Inglehart, it is cultural aspects that provide the most consistent information and the most parsimonious explanation of support for the vote of populist parties, although by concentrating on populist expressions that could be classified as right-wing, these authors could have biased their analysis and imposed relationships that could be casuistic and not generic, as Mudde (2017:10) assumes.

The above, remembering that populist movements normally arise in response to the anomic impacts of social change. Thus, according to Calhoun (2010), populism is a movement of discontent and reaction and, as such, it does not represent a well-reasoned program to advance, but only a defensive uprising, a social demand for stability, centrality and dignity. What do they think the people should have?

Rosanvallon (2020) makes a fundamental contribution by presenting populism as a way of responding to the constitutive aporias of democracy, by resolving through simplifications - resorting to unrefined cognitive tools, "refractory to distinctions and analysis", which transform particular concepts into universals (Merker, 2009:6)—the indeterminacy and disenchantment typical of the democratic experience, placing populism as a borderline figure that can turn against itself, but that cannot be excluded from theorizing about contemporary democracy.

For his part, Müller (2016) offers a differentiation between left and right variants of populism, warning that if the division occurs along class lines, left-wing populism will be faced, while if it is an expression of the classes media would be right-wing (Morelock and Zarita, 2018).

The polarized perspective of populist rhetoric leads its critics to see in it a positioning that is more strategic than ideological (Weyland, 2017), understanding by strategy the methods and instruments to gain and exercise power (Weyland, 2001:12). , which leads this author to contrast populism with Clientelism, by placing emphasis on people as individuals and not on informal groups. Not alien to this reading is the view that for populism “voting is a method for

citizens to participate directly in the act of legislating, so that the law is the will of the people” (Riker, 1982).

This leads to extreme positions of questioning populist rhetoric, identifying it with demagoguery, as Dahrendorf (2006:304) does. More nuanced, other authors define populism as a rhetorical procedure aimed at exalting supposedly natural virtues of the people, with a view to motivating their mobilization, without necessarily assuming that it is a rhetoric that supports unrealizable proposals as its coupling with demagoguery would imply.

This is how populism should be understood, in addition to as a political practice and a way of doing politics, as a social and discursive phenomenon (Rosanvallon, 2011). It is a phenomenon that would take place in the life world (Habermas, 1989) and therefore demands to be examined on its own terms, not reduced to systemic expression.

For the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project, which we will take as a guide for the empirical analysis presented in this essay, populism is defined as the condition of use by the representatives of a party of rhetoric strictly defined as populist, considering two different components: anti-elitism, referring to the resort to rhetoric contrary to those relatively small groups that have more voice than others in a society due to their political, economic power or their social position; and by the centralization of the discourse in the people, as long as the party leaders “glorify” the common people—considered as a homogeneous entity, alien to divergent social interests and values and with a unified political will that must guide political action. —, identify with it and supposed to represent it.

There are authors (Ungureanu and Serrano, 2018) who propose confronting the phenomenon of populism as a political story, placing imagination and political emotions as the center of attention. Populism would be constituted by elementary narrative patterns that are politicized through a logic of exacerbation of antagonistic emotions.

It must be remembered that those who assume a populist discourse usually understand the people as something virtuous (Wiles, 1969) that turns out to be homogeneous and close to those who assume that rhetoric. In this sense, populism, as a mechanism of political-ideological expression, hides behind the concept of people social diversity and the existence of varied interests and values, assuming that there is a single political will that must be a guide for political action.

On the other hand, elites are understood as minority groups in society that monopolize the capacity of expression and decision in a nation, due to their political, economic, social or even ideological power, although in each country the groups that make up these elites can be different and that it is difficult to specify what they are with any certainty unrelated to the interests of different groups or parties.

It is from this vision that interpretations that have had weight in the literature on populism have considered it as the best form of political organization, by giving representation to classes and groups traditionally relegated in societies, thus being a modality of institutionalization of a broad process of social inclusion (Martín Raus, 2010).

An example of this is Ernest Laclau (2005), for whom populism would therefore enrich the democratic life of nations, or Panizza (2005), for whom populism is not always and only about a crisis of representation, but also the beginning of the representation of previously excluded subpopulations.

For Laclau, populism must be understood as an ontological and not ontic category, so its meaning should not be found in any political or ideological content that would enter into the practices of a specific group, but in a way of articulating those social contents. , political or ideological, whatever they may be (Panizza, 2009:9); Ergo, every movement or organization will have a certain degree of populism depending on how and how much they assume the people as historical agents.

Going beyond this vision, Incisa (2015) defines populism as those “political formulas by which the people, considered as a homogeneous social group and as the exclusive repository of positive, specific and permanent values, are the main source of inspiration and constant object of reference.” , describing it as a syndrome rather than a doctrine and noting its competitive and divergent condition with ideologies such as socialism, which supposes a class struggle ignored by the homogenizing perspective of populism.

What then is the flip side of populism?

For some theorists, populism is opposed to elitism, since it adopts a discourse of approximation and exaltation of one pole to the detriment of the other. However, for others, this contrast would assume from the outset the very logic of the populist discourse, the division of society into two artificially homogenized groups, so the counterpart of populism would really

be pluralism, in which the existence of a multiplicity is recognized of groups, attitudes and social expressions, irreducible to a binary scheme as those who adopt populist discourse claim.

There are even those who would maintain, perhaps pertinently, that the scheme that places populism and elitism at opposite poles represents a horseshoe system, where the balance point would be occupied by pluralism, but thereby generating an axis orthogonal to the populism scheme. -elitism that would oppose plurality to homogeneity.

Some authors then postulate the convenience of defining an axis orthogonal to the conventional right and left, which would correspond to a dimension that would distinguish the high from the low in a society (Ostiguy, 2017), where populism would be observed as a peculiar political relationship between leadership and social base, established and articulated through those “lowers” of societies and the exaltation of their antagonism with the “highers”.

Now, under the umbrella of populism, a strategy used by political-ideological currents that tend to claim the role of the State as defender of the general interests of the people is usually designated, through actions that can favor interventionism and promote universal security policies social, although this is not necessarily the expression of all leaderships, movements and parties that qualify as populist. A central point of attention in this essay will be precisely to try to recognize the links between parties that assume a populist discourse and other vectors that make up party identity.

To close with this preliminary review, it is pertinent to comment that, paradoxically, by assuming the political nuclei that raise populist rhetoric that they are repositories of the correct interpretation of the spirit of the people, they assume an elite condition that would deny the very polarity raised, since they would be seeing the privileged condition of others from a privileged positioning of themselves.

Source and methods

Defining certain concepts in political science is extremely complicated. This happens in the case of that palimpsest known as populism. That is why, leaving behind the relevant theoretical discussion on this concept, we must arrive at an operational definition that allows carrying out a systematic measurement of the phenomenon, in order to be able to quantify the relative participation of the parties in the votes and seats that are distributed in societies around the world in which an election system has been adopted for the formation of citizen representation and its consequences in terms of participation or not of these parties in governments.

A reliable, complete and relatively up-to-date source for this analysis is the party database produced and made publicly available by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project, which includes the electoral results data required for the parties that achieved the most of five percent of the vote or some seat in the national assembly in elections around the world since 1900, in addition to measurements and classifications related to the characteristics and positioning of the organizations and their leaders, based on an evaluation of experts (Pemstein *et al.*, 2021).

The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project is carried out by a permanent body, founded by Professor Staffan I. Lindberg in 2014. Its headquarters are at the V-Dem Institute of the Department of Political Science of the University of Gothenburg, Sweden.

In the first years of the project, the Kellogg Institute of International Studies at the University of Notre Dame played a fundamental role in its construction and establishment, as it was one of the founding bodies of the project and as such responsible for data collection in the Western hemisphere. Additionally, the Notre Dame Research Computing Center developed the research database and web interfaces that were used through fall 2014.

As the project grew, the V-Dem Institute in Gothenburg progressively assumed responsibility for these functions and became the project's headquarters. Recognizing the changing roles, in 2018 the Kellogg Institute formalized its current role as the V-Dem Regional Center in North America (The V-Dem Project, 2022).

Starting in recent years, V-Dem has complemented its offer with a database on political parties and their electoral results (Lindberg *et al.*, 2022a), with its respective codebook (Lindberg *et al.*, 2022b).

This database covers electoral data from 1900 to the present, although expert coding, essential for analyzes such as the one attempted, is generally available from 1970 onwards. These reports include data from organizations that nominated candidates for office in the lower houses of each nation and who achieved seats or at least five percent of the vote in a given election.

With this information, a comparison exercise is carried out between the distribution between parties according to position in the elitism-populism dimension, taking only the data by election in 174 nations from the year 2000 to 2019, which allows us to compare what was observed during the first decade of this century (2000-2009) with what was observed in the second decade (2010-2019).

This includes nations with democratic systems, with periodic elections and competition between various parties, which are the most, and some few cases in which elections have been held with a single party contender—because it achieves representation in the assembly or exceeds the threshold. of voting required to be included in the base or faces only independent candidacies—or that continuity has been lost in the celebration of electoral processes due to war conflicts, occupation of its territory by another nation or other causes. This type of situation affects around three percent of elections that were considered for the analysis.

It should be noted that in this exercise there is no attempt to go further back in time, given that it is from the beginning of the current century that the geo-political divisions in the world have been stabilized, since even in the previous decade the impact of the formation, disappearance and redefinition of boundaries of and between nations, a consequence of the end of the Cold War and other events that occurred in those years that affected borders and redefined maps. In fact, these adjustments, by themselves, would affect around five percent of the sovereignties included in this study, which would make the assessment of the data and therefore the analysis that is intended to be carried out complex.

The unit of analysis used in this study is the party-election, corresponding precisely to a party in a given election that occurred in a specific country and year. Thus, each organization can be included on several occasions in a given period, be included only once if it only

participated in one election, as is generally the case, or not be included, having not participated in any contest.

For the purposes of this analysis, the electoral coalitions that could form different parties that competed as separate entities in an election are not considered, because these alliances can and usually group together organizations with different locations on the elitism-populism axis that is constructed. However, reference is made to whether or not the parties have participated in any electoral alliance.

In the particular case of the distribution of parties according to whether or not they were part of the government resulting from an election, those that result from elections in which a new government was not produced are considered absent cases.

An important observation about the quality and reliability of the data that serve as a source for this analysis: the data incorporated into the V-Dem databases correspond to different types of measures, ranging from objective and directly observable, which are coded by assistants of research, to subjective or latent, as a result of the qualification carried out by national experts (Coppedge *et al.* 2021), a procedure that ensures that particular estimates of each expert have a significant weight in the final assessments and that the margins of precision and reliability are smaller.


The assessment underlying the construction of the indicators used to construct the index of positioning of the parties on the elitism-populism axis is of this type and is therefore affected by appreciative elements of those responsible for the codification (Pemstein *et al.*, 2023). This means that the populism index itself may contain appreciative elements that limit its objectivity.

Thus, not only does the evaluation of the variables that serve as a source for the generation of the index in question involve a subjective trait, but the evaluators can have different interpretations and even make errors or express biases when attributing values in the ordinal options provided, problems that try to be eliminated using various statistical techniques, but that do not mean they are completely absent.

It should be noted that, apart from what has already been indicated, it is possible that the construction of the indicator on the elitism-populism positioning of the parties may be influenced by the fact that it refers to rhetorical behavior and not necessarily to a factual procedure.

In fact, the problem of consistency of data involving assessments is clear. Thus, and as an example, as the number of occasions in which a given political party has competed in elections during the period under study increases, the mean of the populism index decreases and the standard deviation between estimates increases, which causes an increase substantial in the variability of this meter (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Mean, standard deviation and coefficient of variation of the populism index according to the number of elections in which a political party has competed (2000-2019)



SOURCE: Based on Lindberg *et al.*, 2022a.

The specific variables used in this analysis and with which a public database was generated, derived from V-Party (version 2), made up of 50 fields and 3930 cases (De la Peña, 2022), are:

First group of variables: case identifiers.

- The country where each election was carried out, according to the numerical code assigned by V-Dem (renamed “nopais”) and by its name (renamed “pais”), which allows, together with the “year” field, to generate a field where each election It has a unique record, made up of up to three digits for the country, followed by four digits for the year (variable called “election”).

- The political-geographic region in which a country is located (field named “region”), an imported variable (Teorell *et al.*, 2020) that classifies countries into six regions: Eastern

Europe and Central Asia; Latin America and the Caribbean; Middle East and North Africa, including Israel and Türkiye, but excluding Cyprus; Sub-Saharan Africa; Western Europe and North America, including Cyprus, Australia and New Zealand; Asia and the Pacific, excluding Australia and New Zealand.

- A four-digit variable of the year of each election, coded by the project's research assistants (field labeled “year”), a variable with which a reclassification variable was generated that allows cases to be grouped into two packages: the value 0 to refer to the elections that occurred between 2000 and 2009 and the value 1 for those that occurred from 2010 to 2019 (field called “decade”) and another field to indicate the five-year period in which the elections included in the base were held (field “five”), which would allow us to approximate the typical electoral cycle of the countries.

- A single numerical variable (called “party”) for party identification, taken from Döring and Regel (2019) for use by V-Dem (Lindberg *et al.*, 2022c).

- A dichotomous variable (called “alliance”) for the precision of whether parties were part of an alliance for the election, drawn from Döring and Düpont (2020) for use by V-Dem (Lindberg *et al.*, 2022c).

Second group of variables: electoral results.

- The share of votes that each party won in a given lower house election, coded by project staff from Döring and Düpont (2020) and recoded by the author on a scale from zero to one (numeric variable renamed “vote”).

- The share of seats each party won in a given lower house election, coded by project staff from Döring and Düpont (2020) and recoded by the author on a scale from zero to one (numeric variable renamed “seating”).

- The condition of participation in the government, corresponding to whether a party supported the government formed immediately after a given election, whether as a majority, minor or without representation, or if it did not support said government (cases in which it was not formed are eliminated). government as a result of the election), variable coded by project staff with support from national experts (renamed “integob”) and also recoded as dichotomous

according to whether a party supported the government or whether it was positioned as an opponent (field called “partgob”).

Third group of variables: indicators used to construct the populism index.

Anti-elitism: corresponding to the responses to a question about the importance for each party of anti-elite rhetoric, coded by national experts on an appreciative scale of five categories (not at all important, not important, somewhat important, important, very important), translated linearly according to the posterior probabilities that the estimates fall into a given category, with scores that must be given purely heuristic meaning (field renamed “ospanel”). This version of the variable is included because it is the one incorporated into the process of measuring the populism index generated by V-Dem.

A field is added to the database relating to the number of evaluators per election for this variable (“resanel”), which reports an average of 4.4 evaluators per election with 2.1 evaluators as a standard deviation.

Likewise, and for the purposes of classifying the populism vector, a field for grouping the cases is included in a dichotomous variable that locates the parties according to their level of anti-elitism (“dicanel” variable).

People-centered: Corresponding to responses to a question about whether party leaders exalt ordinary people and espouse a rhetoric of identification centered on them, coded by national experts on a five-category rating scale (labeled: never, usually not, about half the time, usually and always), translated linearly according to the posterior probabilities that the estimates fall into a given category, with scores to which purely heuristic meaning must be given (field renamed “ospcepu”). This version of the indicator is included because it was incorporated into the measurement process of the populism index generated by V-Dem.

A field is added to the database relating to the number of evaluators per election for this variable (“rescepu”), which reports an average of 4.3 evaluators per election with 2.21 evaluators as a standard deviation.

Likewise, and for the purposes of classifying the populism vector, a field for grouping the cases is included in a dichotomous variable that locates the parties according to the people-centeredness of their leaders' discourse (“dicepu” variable).

Fourth group of variables: left-right positioning of the parties.

The number of evaluators of this indicator per election (“resizde” field), which reports an average of 4.2 evaluators per election with 2.2 evaluators as a standard deviation.

The linear location of parties in terms of their general ideological stance on economic issues, corresponding to an original scale assigned by national experts linearly translated according to the posterior probabilities of the estimates falling into a given category, but with scores to which should give merely heuristic meaning (field renamed “ospizde”).

It is possible to know the relationship between the values assigned on one scale with those calculated on another when the values are limited to an interval (which in this case is [0,1]), by fitting a logistic curve, which is defined from Verhulst in 1838 (Bacaër, 2011), as

$$P(\beta) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-\beta}}$$

Where P is the probability of a given odds ratio, e is Euler's constant and β the logarithm of the odds ratio, estimated through the maximum likelihood method as


$$\beta = \ln\left(\frac{p_i}{1 - p_i}\right)$$

Where p_i is the probability of occurrence of a given event.

When reviewing the relationship of the values assigned to the parties on the left-right scale with those calculated for the populism index, it is found that with a constant of 1.646 and a β of 3.861, the coefficient of determination is barely 0.106, with a significance of less than 0.001, with a sense of the relationship that reflects the presence of a higher level of populism towards the left side of the ideological spectrum (Figure 2a).


It is also interesting to review the relationship of the values attributed to the parties on the left-right scale with those calculated for the anti-pluralism index. By doing so, a constant of 5.858 is found with a β of 0.546, for a coefficient of determination of 0.009, whose significance is less than 0.001, so it can be stated that there is no statistical relationship between the assigned location on the left-wing political spectrum right and the (anti)pluralism detected in a party, although the greater the inclination towards the right of an organization, the less its attachment to pluralism (Figure 2b).

Figure 2a. Logistic curve fitting of the left-right scale according to populism



SOURCE: Based on Lindberg *et al.*, 2022a.

Figure 2b. Logistic curve fitting of the left-right scale according to anti-pluralism



SOURCE: Based on Lindberg *et al.*, 2022a.

- The most probable category of location of each party according to its position regarding pluralism, on an ordinal scale that corresponds to the classification derived from the application to the original indicator of a procedure that allows identifying relatively homogeneous groups of cases using an algorithm that allows assigning each observation the closest group in terms of the mean, using the Euclidean distance, which allows managing a high number of cases and specifying the number of groups that are intended to be generated.

Based on this exercise, a field (“ordizde”) was generated with six categories: extreme left, left, center left, center right, right and extreme right.

Because the definition of the groups of cases is based on the processing of a single variable, the classification carried out generates contiguous blocks that are clearly separated and differentiated, with very small standard deviations and decreasing variability, which makes their values extremely reliable as a reference for the weight of the grouped cases, as can be seen in Table 1:

Table 1. Cases, ranges and mean values by category on the left-right scale

LEFT-RIGHT SCALE	Cases		Left-Right Index						
	N	%	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Median	Mean	S.D.	C.V.
Extreme left	275	9%	0.040	0.228	0.188	0.180	0.165	0.047	0.281
Left	433	14%	0.228	0.345	0.117	0.302	0.297	0.036	0.121
Center left	641	20%	0.346	0.465	0.119	0.394	0.398	0.036	0.090
Center right	666	21%	0.465	0.598	0.133	0.524	0.530	0.037	0.070
Right	750	24%	0.598	0.721	0.123	0.657	0.661	0.035	0.052
Extreme right	421	13%	0.721	0.961	0.240	0.771	0.777	0.042	0.054
Total	3186	100%	0.040	0.961	0.921	0.511	0.504	0.188	0.372

SOURCE: Based on Lindberg *et al.*, 2022a.

- A recoding field of the cases grouped into a dichotomous variable that places the parties on the left or right (“dicizde” variable).

Fifth group of variables: anti-pluralism index.

- The party anti-pluralism index reported by V-Dem, referring to the extent to which each organization shows a lack of commitment to democratic norms prior to the elections (“idxplan”). The index was calculated as a transformed weighted average of various variables, using the formula:


$$idxplan_i = 1 - \Phi \left(\frac{0.5 ospopp + 2 ospplur + ospmin + ospviol}{4.5} \right)$$

Where i indexes the observations; Φ is the standard normal cumulative density function; “ospopp” measures whether before the election the party leadership made severe personal attacks against opponents; “ospplur” the commitment to free and fair plural elections and to freedoms of expression, media and association; “ospmmin” the prevalence in the party leadership of the idea that the will of the majority must be implemented, even violating the rights of minorities; and “ospviol” the attitude of discouraging the use of violence by the party leadership.

These versions of these four variables are then included in the database as they have been incorporated into the process of measuring the anti-pluralism index generated by V-Dem.

When the relationship between the anti-pluralism index and the populism index is analyzed, by estimating the logistic curve of the relationship of the latter with the former, a constant of 3.836 and a β of 0.652 are found, with a coefficient of determination of just 0.029, for a significance of less than 0.001, so these would be two estimators independent of each other (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Logistic curve fitting of the populism index according to anti-pluralism



SOURCE: Based on Lindberg *et al.*, 2022a.

- The most probable category of location of each party according to its position regarding pluralism, on an ordinal scale that corresponds to the classification derived from the application to the index of a procedure that allows identifying relatively homogeneous groups of cases using an algorithm that uses distance Euclidean, which allows managing a large number of cases and specifying the number of groups to be generated.

Based on this exercise, a field (“ordplan”) was generated with six categories: extreme pluralism, pluralism, moderate pluralism, moderate anti-pluralism, anti-pluralism and extreme anti-pluralism.

Because the definition of the groups of cases is based on the processing of a single variable, the classification carried out generates contiguous blocks that are clearly separated and differentiated, with very small standard deviations and decreasing variability, which makes their values extremely reliable as a reference for the weight of the grouped cases, as can be seen in Table 2:

Table 2. Cases, ranges and mean values by category on the anti-pluralism scale

ANTI-PLURALISM SCALE	Cases		Anti-Pluralism Index						
	N	%	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Median	Mean	S.D.	C.V.
Pluralismo extremo	1076	34%	0.014	0.151	0.137	0.052	0.063	0.036	0.570
Pluralismo	513	16%	0.152	0.322	0.170	0.246	0.239	0.049	0.203
Pluralismo moderado	447	14%	0.324	0.489	0.165	0.409	0.407	0.044	0.109
Antipluralismo moderado	371	12%	0.490	0.657	0.167	0.569	0.572	0.046	0.081
Antipluralismo	389	12%	0.658	0.836	0.178	0.742	0.743	0.052	0.070
Antipluralismo extremo	390	12%	0.840	1.000	0.160	0.940	0.934	0.048	0.052
Total	3186	100%	0.014	1.000	0.986	0.325	0.388	0.311	0.802

SOURCE: Based on Lindberg *et al.*, 2022a.

- A recoding field of the cases grouped into a dichotomous variable that places the parties as pluralist or anti-pluralist (“dicplan” variable).


Sixth group of variables: populism index.

- The party populism index reported by V-Dem, referring to the extent to which the leadership of each organization uses populist rhetoric, in the strict sense (“idxelpo”), for practical purposes. The index was calculated as the harmonic mean, or the inverse of the arithmetic mean of the reciprocals, of the posterior distributions of the variables “ospanel” and “ospcepu”, using the following formula:

$$idxelpo_i = \frac{2}{\frac{1}{ospanel} + \frac{1}{ospcepu}}$$

The mean value of the populism index is 0.395, with a standard deviation of 0.246. And if in advance a distance is observed between the range frequencies and the normal curve in the values reported for this index (Figure 4), the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality for a sample indicates that the hypothesis of normality of the distribution reported by V-Dem for this index, finding a statistic of 0.081, whose significance is less than 0.001 when the Lilliefors correction is performed (IBM, 2022:139-142).

Figure 4. Histogram of the populism index



SOURCE: Based on Lindberg *et al.*, 2022a.


The Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality test allows us to compare the observed cumulative distribution function of a variable with a given theoretical distribution, which in this case is the normal distribution, whose Z is calculated from the largest difference between the theoretical cumulative distribution functions and observed, with a goodness-of-fit test that tests whether the set of observations could reasonably come from the specified distribution, using the Lilliefors correction to estimate the *p-value* and thereby establish asymptotic significance in a bilateral test.

Although in the very explanation of how the populism index is constructed it is noted that the values observed in the indicators used for its generation are not taken directly, but rather the posterior distribution of them for each observation (Linberg *et al.*, 2021b : 21), the explanatory capacity of these variables in their original version can be calculated with respect to

the level of populism appreciated by the evaluators, using an estimation procedure to generate a logistic curve referring to the populism index (IBM, 2020: 105).

As a result of this exercise, a curve is found that relates the anti-elitism indicator to populism with a constant of 8.439 and a slope of 0.079, with a coefficient of determination of 0.762, which expresses a significance of 0.000 (Figure 5a).

Figure 5a. Logistic curve fitting of the populism index according to anti-elitism




SOURCE: Based on Lindberg *et al.*, 2022a.

For its part, the relationship between the people-centered discourse indicator with populism shows a constant of 10.758 and a β of 0.106, with a coefficient of determination of 0.500 and a significance of 0.000 (Figure 5b).


This would reflect a greater weight in determining the level of populism derived from the anti-elitist condition detected by experts for the various parties in each election than the impact that the perception of an attitude of the leadership that leads them to focus on the people would have party speech.

Figure 5b. Logistic curve fitting of the populism index according to people-centeredness



SOURCE: Based on Lindberg *et al.*, 2022a.

Figure 6. Logistic curve fitting of anti-elitism according to people-centeredness



SOURCE: Based on Lindberg *et al.*, 2022a.

The components of the populism index are not completely independent of each other. When calculating the logistic curve that relates them, taking anti-elitism as independent and people-centered as dependent, a constant of 3.314 and a β of 0.320 are found, with a coefficient of determination of 0.272, for a significance less than 0.001, as shown in Figure 6.

- The most probable category of location of each party according to its ideological-discursive position regarding the elitism-populism vector, on an ordinal scale that corresponds to the classification derived from the application to the “idxelpo” index of a procedure that allows identifying groups of cases relatively homogeneous using an algorithm that uses Euclidean distance and that allows managing a large number of cases and specifying the number of groups to be generated.

Based on this exercise, a field (“ordelpo”) was generated with six categories: extreme elitism, elitism, moderate elitism, moderate populism, populism and extreme populism.

Because the definition of the groups of cases is based on the processing of a single variable, the classification carried out generates contiguous blocks that are clearly separated and differentiated, with very small standard deviations and decreasing variability, which makes their values extremely reliable as a reference for the weight of the grouped cases, as can be seen in Table 3:

Table 3. Cases, ranges and average values by category on the populism scale

POPULISM SCALE	Cases		Populism Index						
	N	%	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Median	Mean	S.D.	C.V.
Elitismo extremo	714	22%	0.019	0.168	0.149	0.103	0.103	0.037	0.360
Elitismo	598	19%	0.169	0.298	0.129	0.235	0.233	0.038	0.165
Elitismo moderado	660	21%	0.299	0.442	0.143	0.362	0.363	0.040	0.111
Populismo moderado	493	15%	0.443	0.598	0.155	0.518	0.521	0.047	0.091
Populismo	396	12%	0.599	0.768	0.169	0.671	0.676	0.047	0.070
Antipluralismo extremo	326	10%	0.770	0.994	0.224	0.850	0.860	0.059	0.069
Total	3187	100%	0.019	0.994	0.975	0.346	0.395	0.246	0.623

SOURCE: Based on Lindberg *et al.*, 2022a.

- A field of recoding of the cases grouped into a dichotomous variable that places the parties as elitist or populist (“dicelpo” variable), accepting that the phenomenon is a continuum, so the discrete typology constructed is only a tool for of analysis.

Seventh group of variables: cross classifiers.

- A cross-classification field of dichotomies according to location on the left-right axis and on the populism axis, with four categories: left-wing populism, left-wing elitism, right-wing elitism and right-wing populism (“crepid” field).

- A cross-classification field of dichotomies according to location on the anti-pluralism axis and on the populism axis, with four categories: pluralist populism, pluralist elitism, anti-pluralist elitism and anti-pluralist populism (“creppa” field).

Eighth group of variables: party identity indicators.

- Arithmetic means of the coded responses for various indicators of party identity in each election, which allow greater granularity in the processing of the data. These indicators, used as continuous variables in statistical exercises aimed at explaining the phenomenon under study, with their respective reagents rated by external evaluators of V-Dem, are:

- Anti-elitism indicator (“indante” field). Question: How important is anti-elite rhetoric for this party?
- People-centered indicator (“indcepu” field). Question: Do the leaders of this party glorify the common people and identify themselves as part of them?
- Political opponent indicator (“indopp” field). Question: Before this election, have leaders of this party used harsh personal attacks or demonization tactics against their opponents?
- Political pluralism indicator (“indplur” field). Question: Before this election, to what extent was the leadership of this political party clearly committed to free and fair multi-party elections, freedom of expression, media, assembly and association?
- Minority rights indicator (“indmin” field). Question: According to the leadership of this party, how often should the will of the majority be followed even if doing so violates the rights of minorities?
- Rejection of violence indicator (“indviol” field). Question: To what extent does the leadership of this party explicitly discourage the use of violence against domestic political opponents?
- Immigration indicator (“indmig” field). Question: What is the party's position regarding immigration to the country?

- LGBT social equity indicator (“indlgbt” field). Question: What is this party's position towards social equality for the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) community?
- Cultural superiority indicator (“indcul” field). Question: To what extent does the party leadership promote the cultural superiority of a specific social group or the nation as a whole?
- Religious principles indicator (“indreg” field). Question: To what extent does this party invoke God, religion or sacred/religious texts to justify its positions?
- Gender equity indicator (“indigenous” field). Question: What is the proportion of women in leadership positions at the national level of this political party?
- Female labor indicator (“indfem” field). Question: To what extent does this party support the equal participation of women in the labor market?
- Left-right indicator (“index” field). Question: Locate the party in terms of its general ideological stance on economic issues.
- Well-being indicator (“indbien” field). Question: To what extent does the party promote universal welfare or means-tested policies?
- Clientelism indicator (“indclint” field). Question: To what extent do the party and its candidates provide specific and excludable goods and benefits in an effort to maintain and win votes?

To deepen the understanding of the populism index constructed by V-Dem, the analysis of results gives way to logistic regression models, which allow estimating the influence of party identity indicators on the elitism-populism condition of the cases.

In general, regression analysis is a process used to estimate relationships between variables that helps understand how the value of the dependent variable varies by changing the value of an independent variable, while keeping the value of the remaining variables fixed. In particular, binary logistic regression is a type of analysis used to predict the outcome of a categorical variable based on various independent or predictor variables, useful for modeling the probability of occurrence of an event based on other factors (Fox, 2016).

Logistic regression models, which are part of the set of Generalized Linear Models (GLM) and which use the logit function as a link, allow identifying and quantifying the relationship between each explanatory variable and the dependent variable, with an output

domain of the function bounded to the interval [0,1], by calculating regression coefficients (β) of the independent variables, to calculate their marginal contribution on the probability of occurrence of the dependent variable or “odds ratio” (L), which corresponds to the risk of having the effect evaluated for a certain value with respect to the value decreased by one unit. A positive value of (β) for an independent variable means that said variable has a certain probability of having a positive effect on the dependent variable, while a negative value means a negative effect. The equation used for these calculations is of the type:

$$P_L = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(\beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{1,i} + \dots + \beta_k x_{k,i})}}$$

These models use maximum likelihood to estimate the goodness of fit and have a meter of the statistical significance of the calculations that helps differentiate results that are the product of chance from those that can be said to really impact the phenomenon analyzed (Kleinbaum and Klein, 2010), although causality cannot be inferred, which can only be supported theoretically.


Additionally, at the end of the trial, classification trees are built (Breiman *et al.*, 1984), an automated learning technique that allows the generation of recursive binary partitions of the data into homogeneous groups (Arana, 2021), which seeks to explain the elitism-populism bipolar scheme by resorting to dichotomies derived from both the anti-elitism and people-centered indicators used to construct the index and the external left-right and pro-anti-elitism dichotomies.

Results of the study

During the period of twenty years under observation for this study, there are just over three thousand parties that have a record because they have been contenders in some election, achieving at least five percent of the vote or obtaining a seat in their party. National Assembly. Thus, between the first and second decades of the century there is a seven percent growth in the number of parties reported in the V-Dem database that meet any of these characteristics.

At the aggregate level, the populism index constructed by V-Dem does not present a significant level of relationship with the vote achieved by the political parties in the elections under observation. Thus, although it is true that the higher the vote, a slightly lower level of populism is detected, in a curve with a constant of 2.215 and a β of 0.879, whose coefficient of determination is only 0.002 and its significance is 0.024 (Figure 7a).

Figure 7a. Logistic curve fitting of the populism index according to voting percentage




SOURCE: Based on Lindberg *et al.*, 2022a.

When what is seen are the seats that are obtained based on said vote (Figure 7b), although the relationship is a little higher and again such that a higher proportion of seats would tend to

a lower level of populism detected, with a constant of 2.223 and a β of 0.882, the coefficient of determination detected is only 0.003, for a significance of 0.003, which is not enough to make this relationship statistically relevant.

Figure 7b. Logistic curve fitting of the populism index according to percentage of seats



SOURCE: Based on Lindberg *et al.*, 2022a.

This leads us to affirm that in general there is no relationship between the level of populism shown by the leadership of a political party and its electoral success measured in achieving votes or seats. Therefore, a party with a populist discourse can achieve a low or high proportion of citizen support and this undoubtedly does not depend on its rhetorical position, but on the peculiarities of the party system in which it competes and the specific distribution of support therein, a product of historical causes and concrete conditions of electoral competition in a society.

In general and in accordance with the construction of the populism index carried out by V-Dem and the grouping into categories and subsequent assignment of values to the cases in a dichotomy, 36 percent of the parties that have participated in an election in the world held from 2000 to 2009 and who have achieved representation in the national assembly or obtained at least five percent of the votes can be classified as populists, with 64 percent being those who would

be located on the other side of the spectrum and could be classified as populists-elitist (Table 4a).

Table 4a. Parties, voting and seats according to elitist-populist condition (2000-2009)

POPULISM	2000-2009					
	%			Votes / party	Seats / party	Seats / votes
	Parties	Votes	Seats			
Elitism	64%	67%	68%	1.06	1.06	1.00
Populism	36%	33%	32%	0.90	0.89	1.00
Extreme elitism	23%	27%	26%	1.15	1.11	0.96
Elitism	20%	23%	22%	1.15	1.08	0.94
Moderate elitism	20%	18%	20%	0.87	0.99	1.14
Moderate populism	14%	12%	13%	0.81	0.89	1.09
Populism	12%	11%	11%	0.95	0.88	0.93
Extreme populism	10%	9%	9%	0.95	0.91	0.96
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	1.00	1.00	1.00

SOURCE: Based on Lindberg *et al.*, 2022a.

When what is observed is the distribution of votes and seats, it is detected that in this period there was a better capacity to obtain support among the electorates for the parties outside of a populist discourse, which achieved 67 percent of votes and 68 percent of seats, than that of those who raise populist rhetoric, who reach the remainder of 33 percent of votes and 32 percent of seats.

Table 4b. Parties, voting and seats according to elitist-populist condition (2010-2019)

POPULISM	2010-2019					
	%			Votes / party	Seats / party	Seats / votes
	Parties	Votes	Seats			
Elitism	60%	62%	63%	1.02	1.05	1.02
Populism	40%	38%	37%	0.96	0.93	0.97
Extreme elitism	22%	24%	24%	1.10	1.12	1.02
Elitism	18%	17%	18%	0.99	1.00	1.01
Moderate elitism	21%	21%	21%	0.98	1.01	1.03
Moderate populism	16%	14%	14%	0.84	0.85	1.02
Populism	13%	14%	12%	1.06	0.96	0.91
Extreme populism	11%	11%	11%	1.04	1.01	0.97
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	1.00	1.00	1.00

SOURCE: Based on Lindberg *et al.*, 2022a.

A decade later, in the period 2010-2019, the situation had changed, although not radically, as parties with a populist discourse represented two-fifths of the party offer in elections in the world that meet the conditions of achieving representation or exceed the lower limit

established to be included as particular observations in the database used as a reference (Table 4b).

In general, the relative success of parties depending on whether or not they adopt a populist discourse is not significantly affected by the fact that the party is located on one side or the other of the political-ideological spectrum of left and right (Tables 5a and 5b), although it is interesting to observe that the greater relative acceptance of each organization among the electorate is greater among right-wing elitist parties and not in the case of parties with an elitist discourse but located towards the left of the political spectrum.

Table 5a. Parties, voting and seats according to elitism-populism typology (2000-2009)

POPULISM	2000-2009					
	%			Votes / party	Seats / party	Seats / votes
	Parties	Votes	Seats			
Left-wing populism	22%	21%	19%	0.97	0.89	0.91
Left-wing elitism	21%	22%	23%	1.01	1.05	1.05
Right-wing elitism	42%	46%	45%	1.09	1.07	0.98
Right-wing populism	15%	11%	13%	0.78	0.89	1.13
Pluralist populism	22%	20%	18%	0.93	0.81	0.88
Pluralistic elitism	43%	42%	37%	0.99	0.88	0.88
Anti-pluralist elitism	21%	25%	30%	1.19	1.43	1.20
Anti-pluralist populism	15%	13%	15%	0.85	1.01	1.19
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	1.00	1.00	1.00

SOURCE: Based on Lindberg *et al.*, 2022a.

Table 5b. Parties, voting and seats according to elitism-populism typology (2010-2019)

POPULISM	2010-2019					
	%			Votes / party	Seats / party	Seats / votes
	Parties	Votes	Seats			
Left-wing populism	22%	21%	21%	0.95	0.95	0.99
Left-wing elitism	19%	19%	20%	0.97	1.01	1.04
Right-wing elitism	41%	43%	44%	1.05	1.07	1.02
Right-wing populism	18%	17%	16%	0.97	0.90	0.92
Pluralist populism	24%	24%	20%	0.97	0.82	0.85
Pluralistic elitism	39%	39%	35%	1.00	0.89	0.90
Anti-pluralist elitism	21%	22%	28%	1.07	1.34	1.24
Anti-pluralist populism	15%	15%	17%	0.96	1.10	1.15
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	1.00	1.00	1.00

SOURCE: Based on Lindberg *et al.*, 2022a.

The pluralism of a party does not result favorably in the achievement of votes and seats for said organization in general and in particular it does not do so regardless of whether or not the party raises populist rhetoric. Ergo, it seems that the strategy of positioning itself as an anti-

pluralist entity is an electorally effective resource for the parties, regardless of other elements that configure their positioning before the electorate, although it would be necessary to delve deeper into the factors that affect the electoral results of the parties according to their pro or anti-pluralist position, which goes beyond the objectives of this analysis and must be left as pending work for a future occasion.

Returning to the central issue that is the subject of this study, the adoption or not of a populist discourse by political parties not only affects the achievement of support among the citizens of each nation, without seeming to affect the parties' ability to join a government, establishing a limit in accordance with their vote and the proportion of seats they achieve with it in their attendance at the formation of governments.

Thus, if the parties that could be classified as elitist support the government on almost three out of every five occasions, the parties that adopt a populist discourse do so in less than two out of every five cases, which has not changed significantly from decade by decade of the 21st century (Tables 6a and 6b).

Table 6a. Participation in governments by elitist-populist condition (2000-2009)

POPULISM	2000-2009					
	TOTAL	Government				Opposition
		Participate	Majority	Minority	No positions	
Elitism	100%	59%	28%	25%	6%	41%
Populism	100%	37%	17%	16%	4%	63%
Extreme elitism	100%	62%	30%	28%	5%	38%
Elitism	100%	57%	26%	28%	4%	43%
Moderate elitism	100%	56%	27%	20%	10%	44%
Moderate populism	100%	42%	18%	19%	4%	58%
Populism	100%	35%	17%	13%	5%	65%
Extreme populism	100%	33%	16%	14%	3%	67%
TOTAL	100%	51%	24%	22%	5%	49%

SOURCE: Based on Lindberg *et al.*, 2022a.

This would be the result of both the lower achievement by populist parties of a majority position in the assemblies, and the fact that their logic of alliance does not give them a better condition in attending the formation of governments. And it is still relevant that the parties positioned towards extreme elitism are those that obtain a majority on a greater proportion of occasions and that join governments on a higher average, in such a way that in the most recent decade their inclusion in governments It is their electoral solution on more than two out of every three occasions, managing to be the majority in almost one of every three elections.

Table 6b. Participation in governments by elitist-populist condition (2010-2019)

POPULISM	2010-2019					
	TOTAL	Government				Opposition
		Participate	Majority	Minority	No positions	
Elitism	100%	58%	24%	25%	9%	42%
Populism	100%	38%	17%	16%	5%	62%
Extreme elitism	100%	68%	32%	28%	9%	32%
Elitism	100%	59%	22%	27%	9%	41%
Moderate elitism	100%	48%	19%	20%	9%	52%
Moderate populism	100%	39%	12%	19%	8%	61%
Populism	100%	39%	22%	14%	3%	61%
Extreme populism	100%	36%	18%	13%	4%	64%
TOTAL	100%	50%	21%	21%	8%	50%

SOURCE: Based on Lindberg *et al.*, 2022a.**Table 7a. Participation in governments by elitism-populism typology (2000-2009)**

POPULISM	2000-2009					
	TOTAL	Government				Opposition
		Participate	Majority	Minority	No positions	
Left-wing populism	100%	39%	20%	14%	5%	61%
Left-wing elitism	100%	60%	27%	26%	7%	40%
Right-wing elitism	100%	58%	28%	25%	6%	42%
Right-wing populism	100%	34%	13%	18%	3%	66%
Pluralist populism	100%	34%	15%	16%	4%	66%
Pluralistic elitism	100%	51%	21%	26%	4%	49%
Anti-pluralist elitism	100%	75%	41%	24%	10%	25%
Anti-pluralist populism	100%	41%	21%	15%	4%	59%
TOTAL	100%	51%	24%	22%	5%	49%

SOURCE: Based on Lindberg *et al.*, 2022a.**Table 7b. Participation in governments by elitism-populism typology (2010-2019)**

POPULISM	2010-2019					
	TOTAL	Government				Opposition
		Participate	Majority	Minority	No positions	
Left-wing populism	100%	38%	19%	13%	7%	62%
Left-wing elitism	100%	54%	21%	24%	10%	46%
Right-wing elitism	100%	60%	26%	25%	8%	40%
Right-wing populism	100%	38%	15%	20%	3%	62%
Pluralist populism	100%	31%	12%	16%	3%	69%
Pluralistic elitism	100%	52%	20%	26%	7%	48%
Anti-pluralist elitism	100%	69%	33%	22%	13%	31%
Anti-pluralist populism	100%	49%	24%	16%	9%	51%
TOTAL	100%	50%	21%	21%	8%	50%

SOURCE: Based on Lindberg *et al.*, 2022a.

And when the data on integration into governments is analyzed according to the adoption or not of a populist discourse and the parties' positioning as left or right, which is presented in Tables 7a and 7b, it is found that the relationship between positioning of parties and access to government is different depending on whether they are organizations that adopt a populist discourse or not, since it seems that the achievement of a majority or attendance at governments is greater among populist parties when they adopt an alignment towards the left than when they do. They move to the right, while in the case of parties that do not promote a populist discourse, it is more appropriate for them to join governments or reach a majority when they also acquire a position located towards the right of the political spectrum.

As observed in the case of the achievement of votes and seats, the combination of a discourse foreign to populist positions with a position contrary to pluralism results in a greater proclivity to join governments and even to achieve majority status, although this has been dampened in the most recent decade.

On the contrary, in the case of parties with a populist rhetoric of their leadership, the strategy of adopting a position contrary to pluralism has an impact on the achievement of a majority and integration into governments in a greater proportion of occasions than when a position is assumed more favorable to plurality, which has also deepened from one decade to the next.

Now, the previous data speaks of the proportion of parties that have adopted or not adopted a populist discourse and its repercussions on electoral success measured by the achievement of votes, seats and the ability to attend the formation of governments. However, this does not speak of the factors that are behind and that give content to the populist discourse raised by the leaders of the organizations.

To do this, other variables have been observed, both those that are the basis for the generation of the populism index and others that, being external to its calculation, could have some relationship with the type of discourse adopted by the organizations. This is achieved, as anticipated, by resorting to data regression techniques.

For the binary logistic regression that is performed, the stepwise selection method is used, with input tests based on the significance of a score statistic and elimination tests based on the probability of a likelihood ratio statistic based on conditional parameter estimates.

Table 8. Logistic regression model for populism with generating variables

Variable in the equation	β			Standard error	Inclusion	Wald	df	Significance	Exp(β)
	Total	2000-2009	2010-2019						
Constant	-12.538	-12.361	-12.826	0.551	0	517.860	1	0.000	0.000
Anti-elitism indicator (mean)	17.657	16.970	18.620	0.790	1	499.762	1	0.000	46588786
People-centered indicator (mean)	8.919	9.030	8.821	0.548	2	264.501	1	0.000	7469.836

SOURCE: Based on Lindberg *et al.*, 2022a.

This model allows the correct prediction of 92 percent of cases, 94 percent in the case of records identified as elitism and 89 percent for those of populism.

Table 9. Logistic regression model for populism with additional variables

Variable in the equation	β			Standard error	Inclusion	Wald	df	Significance	Exp(β)
	Total	2000-2009	2010-2019						
Constant	4.570	4.765	4.434	0.407	0	126.362	1	0.000	96.529
Political opponents indicator	-4.339	-4.609	-4.072	0.262	1	274.299	1	0.000	0.013
Left-right indicator (mean)	-3.983	-4.142	-3.883	0.266	2	224.852	1	0.000	0.019
Political pluralism indicator	2.949	3.115	2.895	0.298	3	97.838	1	0.000	19.090
Immigration indicator (mean)	-1.962	-2.323	-1.706	0.307	4	40.716	1	0.000	0.141
Minority rights indicator (mean)	-1.371	-1.248	-1.508	0.242	5	32.133	1	0.000	0.254
Clientism indicator (mean)	-1.320	-1.373	-1.248	0.222	6	35.386	1	0.000	0.267
Female labor indicator (mean)	-1.589	-1.591	-1.691	0.336	7	22.327	1	0.000	0.204
Well-being indicator (mean)	0.855	0.795	0.937	0.265	8	10.422	1	0.001	2.350

SOURCE: Based on Lindberg *et al.*, 2022a.

Regarding the determination feasible to be attributed to these variables together or the proportion of variance of the dependent variable explained by the predictor variables, the model shows a high R^2 in the corrected version of Nagelkerke (Aguayo, 2017: 14), of 0.851, as expected. In other words: this duet of variables generating the populism index alone explain 85% of the variance of the constructed dichotomous variable that accounts for the populism or elitism condition of a record.

The indicators of rejection of violence, social and gender equality, cultural superiority and religious principles are left out of the model, as they do not reach the required significance in both periods.

There is some risk involved in predicting from this model, as it allows correct location in only 74 percent of cases, 85 percent in those labeled as elitism and 56 percent in those labeled as populism. That is to say: 26 percent of the cases would be predicted by variables other than those observed, a proportion that increases to 44 percent in the case of records classified as populist.

Regarding the determination feasible to be attributed to these variables together or the proportion of variance of the dependent variable explained by the predictor variables, the model

shows a relatively low R^2 in the Nagelkerke corrected version, which barely reaches 0.326. In other words: this set of variables would explain only a third of the variance of the dichotomous elitism-populism variable constructed, so most of the variance of this estimator would be attributable to unobserved factors.

Discussion

What does the above mean? One way to synthesize the data found when applying multiple regression techniques is to approach the same data, but with resources that, although not parametric, do allow a more visual and simplified reading of the relationships found.

To do this, one option is to resort to automated learning methods, such as classification based on trees^o, which is done again both for the variables that generate the populism index and for external variables that could influence the phenomenon of adoption of a discourse populist or be linked to say decision.


When the two components of the calculation of the populism index are seen simultaneously and through the technique of constructing a classification tree, it is discovered that the pro-anti elitism dichotomy is fundamental to differentiate cases in which a party assumes populist rhetoric, since this factor alone explains a third of the division of cases, while the centralization in the people of the discourse has a complementary impact that is marginal (Figure 8a).

However, when the result of applying both factors at the same time is looked at, it is discovered that doing so allows us to detect a segment of parties that would be assuming a populist discourse and that not only have a position contrary to elitism, but also focus their rhetoric in the people. In contrast, when a party adopts an elitist position it tends to simultaneously assume a discourse that is unrelated to populism in most cases, regardless of whether or not it focuses its rhetoric on the people.

With this classification tree, a correct prediction of membership according to elitist or populist pole is achieved in 92 percent of cases, the prediction being correct in 93 percent of cases when the party is classified as elitist and in 91 percent of cases in which it is considered populist, so the difference in the capacity of correct assignment or its counterpart the risk of wrong classification is very similar if the party is grouped towards one side or the other of the elitism-populism axis.

^o Because the used version of the program with which the classification based on trees were generated is in Spanish, some concepts could not be translated into English.


Figure 8a. Populism classification tree based on its generators



SOURCE: Based on Lindberg *et al.*, 2022a.

In the case of external factors that are related to the adoption of a populist discourse by party leaders, the variable with the greatest differentiating force is undoubtedly the adoption of a political-ideological positioning towards the left or the right (Figure 8b), causing a position specific to the right to be more repellent to populist discourse, while the left would almost indifferently choose to adopt populist rhetoric or not for its leadership, which speaks to the fact that the motivations that influence this are fact that is unrelated to the observed variables and that would force us to look for other elements that could explain the phenomenon of populism.

Figure 8b. Populism classification tree based on external vectors



SOURCE: Based on Lindberg *et al.*, 2022a.

With this classification tree, a correct prediction of membership according to elitist or populist pole is achieved in 63 percent of cases, the prediction being correct in 67 percent of cases when the party is classified as elitist, but only in 57 percent of the cases in which it is considered populist, so the difference in the capacity for correct assignment is greater when it comes to the populist pole than when it refers to the elitist pole of the created elitism-populism axis.

It is worth mentioning that the explanatory force of the elitism-populism division attributable to external factors is less than those of the dichotomies of the index generators. In fact, the improvement in the predictive capacity of the classification achieved with the generators is negligible when external vectors are included for the search for explanation, which is why

more extensive classification models that simultaneously consider the four dichotomized variables that are relevant are not presented. .

Thus, although it can be said that the data analyzed allows us to advance in finding a relationship between populist discourse and the adoption of a position favorable or contrary to elitism, which is a truism, and that the position towards the right on the political spectrum - ideological tends to make an organization less inclined to adopt populist rhetoric, there would be a long way to go to achieve a full explanation of the phenomenon of populism in the present century and it is not insignificant progress in achieving electoral support and integration for governments that are detected during the last decade.

This forces us to think about new directions and alternative sources for understanding the phenomenon that occupies the center of attention in this essay. For now, the analysis of the data that has served as a basis on this occasion remains here.

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