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Spaniards First. Notes on Hate Speech towards Migrants on Twitter

Resumen: En un contexto político de gran polarización ideológica como el actual, en el que nacen nuevos partidos populistas, resulta crucial atender a los mensajes de odio difundidos a través de los medios de comunicación, y especialmente, de Twitter, que se ha convertido en fuente primaria de información para millones de personas. El presente artículo está dedicado a analizar el lenguaje xenófobo y racista a partir de un corpus compuesto por una selección de respuestas en la red de microblogging a la cuenta oficial del partido Vox. Nuestro propósito es doble: por un lado, sondearemos los marcos conceptuales más frecuentes que articulan el lenguaje de la extrema derecha y que calan entre los más jóvenes; por otro, trataremos de buscar la correlación entre esos marcos y los que partidos populistas como Vox retroalimentan a través de Twitter.

1 Introduction

Since the 2010s, the emergence of social networks -and in particular Twitter, halfway between a blog and a social network- has revolutionized the political communication strategies of the parties, which now have a fundamental tool to interact with their potential followers and voters in a direct and much more effective way. Without a doubt, it is interesting to examine the speech acts of an emerging discourse such as that of Twitter, which is based on apparently more democratic "horizontal" communication pillars, and where all opinions seem to have the same value (although not the same impact).

We start from the basis that the debates created in the heat of this network allow a kind of asymmetric communication in which the issuer can filter the comments that each of his writings receives, freely choosing whether to allow the opinions of others or, on the contrary, prefers to block them (Mancera/Pano 2013). To this we must add a particularly relevant feature: the limitation of characters, which makes it essential to synthesize the messages going to the heart of the topics, which can lead to the simplification of ideas, except in those cases in which elaborate threads are presented.

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Political parties, forced to position themselves in the public arena to make their ideas known among their potential followers, use Twitter to launch messages that are consistent with their slogans and framework ideas and try to guide the public debate according to their interests. Naturally, in the specific field of political discourse on networks, we must bear in mind that burning national or international current issues can be controversial, which, in general, ends up leading to a growing ideological polarization. In fact, the algorithm of the network itself contributes to promoting this polarization by "suggesting" friends or topics to the user, so that, in a short time, it is easy for the profiles to communicate more and more with those people who think like them, for what the messages of the dissenters are answered with greater radicalism and intolerance.

This form of communication sets in motion processes of identity construction (although it is a simplified, almost schematic form of identities), as pointed out by Olmos et al. (2020). In addition, we cannot forget that, in many cases, anonymity contributes the dissemination of radical messages, which becomes a breeding ground for populist discourse, which precisely tends to take advantage of exclusionary nativism to connect with people who are dissatisfied with the system, which allowing them to expand their voter base.

Usually, right-wing populist parties are attributed autarchic approaches that end up reproducing in arguments focused on the fear of diversity. In recent years, Spanish public opinion has progressively moved away from a more tolerant position towards immigration (Gutiérrez-Peris 2018, 104). Not surprisingly, 40% of Spaniards would vote for a party that promised to reduce immigration, which explains, in part, Vox's interest in polemicizing on this issue. It is likely that the economic crisis of 2008 represented an important turning point for the emergence of populism in Spain (Rama/Santana 2019, 19), which is characterized by providing simple solutions to complex problems. Specifically, the far-right tends to blame immigrants for the lack of job opportunities for Spaniards in times of high levels of unemployment.

The truth is that, in recent years, the dissemination of racist or hateful messages to those who are different has increased, and this may be due in part to the undoubted support of ultra-conservative populist parties. These hate messages and the political speeches of the far-right parties, whose feedback is evident, have three elements in common:

a) Preventive rejection of different people (from other cultures, countries, religions or races).
b) Conceptualization of the "illegal immigrant" as an antagonist
c) Direct correlation between immigration and crime

All this, together with other social factors, can partly explain the worrying increase in hate crimes in Spain. As we already explained in Sánchez García (2021),

hate crimes committed through the Internet and social networks, according to the Ministry of the Interior (2019) represented 54.9% and 17.2% respectively. Between 2018 and 2019, there was an increase of 6.8 in hate crimes in Spain according to the 2019 Report of the Ministry of the Interior.

In this context, it is of special interest to analyze the discursive frameworks in the xenophobic or discriminatory reactions to the Twitter accounts of Vox Spain. Unlike the approach developed in previous works (Sánchez García/Sosinski 2022), we will not study what the leaders say; on this occasion, we are interested in examining the reactions (without filters or self-imposed limits from the political sphere) of their supporters, in which they let prejudices emerge that lead to discriminatory messages, such as the one we reproduce below (figure 1):

Figure 1: Reply to a tweet from the official Vox account (August 2019).

Examples like this show to what extent the parties light the fuse of the confrontation, but it is the sympathizers who complete the task, spreading and viralizing the political messages in a much more aggressive tone, which almost always highlights the fear of migrants.

2 Theoretical Framework

2.1 The Populist Discourse of the Far-right Parties

Firstly, it is worth clarifying what we are talking about when we speak of "extreme right" or "Populist Radical Right". There is some consensus on the attributes that all parties of this ideology have in common: nativism, authoritarianism,

and populism. In other words, these three traits converge in a combination of "xenophobia and nationalism" (Mudde 2007, 22). At first glance, it is not clear that Vox's ideology fits among the postulates of populism, since appeals to the people or the popular will are less frequent than in other discourses (for example, that of Podemos; cf. Sánchez García 2019), although an *us/them* contrast based on an excluding nativism is made explicit, thanks to its undisguised defense of the "national" against any external (or internal) threat that could attack the signs of identity of the Spanish people, whose essences have to protect yourself above all else.

The Vox political party has cultivated these clearly populist ingredients since its foundation in 2013 as a split from the Popular Party. Like other European "homologous" parties, it seeks to be recognized as a kind of "saving movement" (Charaudeau 2009), to the extent that, from the party's point of view, only Vox, and in particular its leader Santiago Abascal, can stand as a champion of the Spanish essence to fight for the integrity of the nation, its traditions, its culture, its values, and its lifestyle. In this way, the *nation* is understood as a homogeneous ideal, and, therefore, incompatible with, for example, peripheral identity sensitivities such as those represented by Catalan, Basque and Galician nationalisms, and much more incompatible with the minorities that arrive in Spain. from Africa, for example, especially if they are Muslim (Görlach 2018, 39).

Vox shares with other far-right parties in Europe (Marine Le Pen's National Grouping in France, Matteo Salvini's Northern League in Italy, Golden Dawn in Greece or Viktor Orban's party in Hungary) they share a radical ultra-conservative ideology and an identical discourse, based on in a powerful patriotic anchor that takes the form of aggressive messages against illegal immigration. Formally, they use a simple, close, and effective language with which solutions to complex issues seem easy. Ultimately, it is about making the "problem" visible to potential voters, taking advantage of an unfavorable situation that can be understood as the beginning of a crisis.

According to the hypothesis of the "populist moment" defended by Laclau (2005) and Mouffe (2012), some periods of socioeconomic stagnation in which an economic crisis converges with the decline of the traditional "establishment" parties lead to the emergence of populism, which forces the values commonly associated with the concept of Western democracy to be loaded with "exclusive, nativist and authoritarian nationalist notions" (Haynes 2019, 119). These messages, reproduced by the mass media (Van Dijk 1999; Casero Ripollés 2007), legitimize the exclusion of "the others" and end up permeating the unconscious of the citizenry.

Indeed, the activation of the "nationalist identity cleavage" is evident, linked to the "assumption of part of the nativist and xenophobic discourse of right-wing populism" (Haynes Campos 2019, 140). Precisely, "the issue of immigration is the focus of the discourse and programs of all the radical right-wing populist parties

in Europe" (Kaya 2017, 55), which appear linked to "illegality, crime, violence, drugs, radicalism, fundamentalism, conflicts, and, in many other aspects, they are represented in a negative way" (Kaya 2017, 63–64).

2.2 The Discourse of the Far-right on the Internet

The existing feedback between political discourse and journalistic discourse, or what is the same, between the media agenda and the political agenda, is well known, so that many times it is the media related to certain parties or circles of power that responsible for "preparing the ground" to spread the message they want to convey. In the Spanish case, the editorial lines of the media are easily recognizable, so that nobody is surprised that they support or criticize the party in government or those in opposition. But it happens that the most extremist or radical parties do not enjoy, a priori, the sympathy of the mainstream media, which makes it necessary to deploy new tools to make their arguments known and connect with their potential followers in a more direct and free way. the criticism or caricature to which they are exposed by most of the newspapers or TV channels. At a time when the conventional media is increasingly discredited and post-truth is prevailing (Martínez de Carnero 2020), viral messages and tweets filtered by the parties themselves are increasingly gaining credibility among broad sectors of the population. As Laura Camargo points out:

> It is not surprising by trial and error that the *Vox Communication Manual* (2019) states that social networks are its main communication channel 'because they have the advantage that they allow us to transmit our messages without any mediation from the media. Our messages reach the Spaniards just as we want' (Camargo 2021, 65).

Parliamentary groups have been adapting their communication strategies in recent years to the changing reality of an increasingly digital and interconnected world. Thus, what was initially used to experiment with in the electoral campaign has ended up becoming a first-rate loudspeaker for leaders, and what is more important, to give voice and prominence to their followers, who have now become broadcasters of the message between your own contacts. This is what is known as an "expansive use of social networks" (Pérez Castaños/García Hípola 2021).

The great advantage of Twitter, halfway between a blog and a social network, is that it offers the possibility of establishing a (necessarily asymmetrical) relationship between the party and the citizenry (Mancera/Pano 2013). For example, Castells (2012) offers a positive (and almost utopian) vision of social networks, understood as "platforms for mass self-communication and spaces for communicative autonomy favorable to promoting the transition from indignation to hope".

But the network also offers an unfavorable side: Merino and López highlight the advance of xenophobia and the growth of hate speech on the internet based on the Raxen Report of 2016. Other authors, such as Ortega (2017), also correlate hate crimes with the discourse of intolerance propagated through social networks such as Twitter (cited in Merino/López 2018, 214).

Vox, of course, has taken advantage of the undoubted benefits of the popular microblogging network to spread and viralize its argument (Sánchez García 2021, 122). Thanks to Twitter, the leaders of Vox have a very powerful loudspeaker to spread their ideas about sensitive and especially controversial issues such as the one at hand. These statements would not be reproduced by most of the media other than to be the object of harsh criticism, they can now be published without intermediaries.

This potential to unite the mass of followers is fundamental, since the algorithm and the inertia of Twitter's operation tend to limit the interaction of its users with those who "think and express themselves like them" (Sánchez García 2021, 126). In this regard, it should be borne in mind that the anonymity of the networks encourages digital haters to express themselves on controversial issues without any type of self-censorship. As Buson points out,

> There is a depersonalization of the author, who is transformed, stops being who he really is. This goes far beyond what Jenkins (2006) comments on as fans of a particular show or topic. They are disturbed by simply reading, viewing audiovisual material or someone who does not agree with their ideas. They make extremely offensive verbal attacks, sometimes reaching physical attacks, clearly influenced by messages posted on social networks by other trolls. [. . .] We find the normalization of hate in sometimes really worrying comments, which could even be classified as criminal acts, such as when the integrity of the authors of a certain content is threatened (Busón Buesa 2020, 122).

We agree with Losada, Zamora and Martínez that precisely "hate is one of the most recurrent emotions in the virtual world. In fact, the expression "cyberhate" has been coined to refer to hate behavior that is visible through the network, which, in most cases, takes the form of racist, xenophobic and violent propaganda spread by means of digital systems [. . .]". Not in vain, the emotions shared through the Internet "have a resonance in those who publish them and in those who read or see them, producing an emotional response with a high concentration of feeling", so that "intense emotions in any positive-negative polarity they spread easily in the digital world and are enormously contagious" (2019, 196).

In any case, a medium that prioritizes depersonalization and alienation is fertile ground for the development of digital hatred, fueled by the emotional component that permeates the language of the networks. In the words of Piedad Bonnett:

> Social networks are at the same time a favorable vehicle for the propagation of hate speech. Of course, they are a medium that favors the democratization of opinion, to the extent that they make visible all those traditionally marginalized from the great communication channels [. . .] It is not the networks, then, that are guilty in themselves, but the use that thousands of people make of them. The question is why are they such a conducive avenue for propagating hate speech? (2019, 182).

The author attributes the radicalization of messages to simplification and "binary" thinking (lack of nuances in the expression of opinions on sensitive issues) and to the emotional exacerbation generated by interaction with other users. Consequently, slogans prevail here and complex arguments, balance with the position of the other, and therefore, empathy, are left aside.

3 Methodology and Corpus

In recent years, some researchers have investigated the discourse of the political leaders of Vox on Twitter. Thus, for example, Camargo (2021) devoted himself to studying the treatment of false news (hoaxes) and the dehumanization with which far-right politicians describe migrants; We also had the opportunity to address the issue from a didactic approach (Sánchez 2021), and more recently, we have approached the statements of the leaders of Vox regarding the refugee crisis from Afghanistan (Sánchez/Sosinki 2022, in press). However, we believe that there are still no studies that have dedicated to delving into the form and content of the messages of their followers, which undoubtedly amplify the main frames of the party and exaggerate them, stripping them of any euphemistic or politically correct layer. Precisely for this reason, we find it especially interesting to explore the keys to hate speech towards migrants on the Internet in Twitter replies.

This work conforms to the methodological perspective of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), for which we must refer here mainly to Fairclough (1992), Van Dijk (1999), Charaudeau (2009) and Wilson (2001). As we have been explaining, in this study we will try to better understand the conceptual frameworks of the digital resentment discourse. Our corpus is made up of a selection of 100 Twitter responses to entries from the official Vox party account, in a period between September 1, 2021 and February 28, 2022.

Once the texts have been filtered and classified, they have been processed through the AntConc v.4.0.5 software to extract a list of the most frequent lexical units by issuer. From the tables obtained, we have dispensed with the grammatical forms (prepositions, conjunctions, articles), to keep only the notional words (nouns, adjectives, verbs and adverbs).

4 Results

Before delving into the analysis of the data, it is worth explaining what the profiles of the users examined are like. Anonymous profiles predominate (for example: Democracy, Justice and Freedom, Free Group, There will be no Peace, The howl of Spain, ADN Vox, Spain Forever, or The Spanish citizen). Naturally, users identified by their first and last names also express their opinions, although there are frequent express references to their ideology with icons of shamrocks or green circles (corporate color of the party), in addition to the Spanish flag.

Once the statistical count of the most frequent vocabulary was carried out using the AntConc v.4.0 software, we have obtained the following records and their corresponding frequency index (Table 1):

Table 1: Results obtained (lexicon and frequency index).

Rank	Words	Freq.	%
1	moros (*moors*)	51	1,82
2	menas (*minors unaccompanied by their parents*)	45	1,61
3	menores (*minors*)	45	1,61
4	No	41	1,46
5	expulsión (*expulsion*)	31	1,10
6	España	15	0,53
7	edad (*age*)	14	0,50
8	Vox	14	0,50
9	país (*homeland*)	13	0,46
10	ilegales (*illegals*)	12	0,42
11	ya (*yet*)	12	0,42
12	fuera (*out*)	11	0,39
13	inmediata (*immediate*)	10	0,35
14	africanos (*africans*)	8	0,28
15	todos (*all*)	8	0,28
16	casa (*home*)	7	0,25
17	Marruecos (*Morocco*)	7	0,25
18	padres (*parents*)	7	0,25
19	escoria (*human waste*)	7	0,25
20	delincuencia (*delinquency*)	6	0,21
21	calle (*street*)	5	0,17
22	centro (*city center*)	5	0,17
23	extranjeros (*foreigners*)	5	0,17
24	Gobierno (*Government*)	5	0,17
25	grupo (*group*)	5	0,17
26	inmigrantes (*immigrants*)	5	0,17
27	miedo (*fear*)	5	0,17

Table 1 (continued)

Rank	Words	Freq.	%
28	nada (*nothing*)	5	0,17
29	países (*countries*)	5	0,17
30	ahora (*now*)	4	0,14
31	caso (*case*)	4	0,14
32	dedican (*they dedicate*)	4	0,14
33	dicen (*they say*)	4	0,14
34	esos (*that*)	4	0,14
35	esto (*this*)	4	0,14
36	estén (*they were*)	4	0,14
37	hacer (*to do*)	4	0,14
38	hijo (*son*)	4	0,14
39	ilegal (*illegal*)	4	0,14
40	izquierda (*right-wing parties*)	4	0,14
41	ley (*law*)	4	0,14
42	mayores (*adults*)	4	0,14
43	mierda (*shit*)	4	0,14
44	nuestros (*ours*)	4	0,14
45	políticos (*politicians*)	4	0,14
46	robar (*to steal*)	4	0,14
47	Sánchez	4	0,14
48	muchos (*many*)	4	0,14
49	cárcel (*jail*)	4	0,14
50	frontera (*borders*)	4	0,14

The results obtained leave no doubt about the racism of the messages studied: the most frequent record is the derogatory word *moors* (51 occurrences) with a frequency rate of 1.82% of the total number of words that make up the corpus, followed by *menas* (acronym in Spanish for 'unaccompanied minors') and *minors* (both with 45 occurrences, 1.61%). It is striking that the insult is above the common descriptor to refer to these immigrant minors.

As can be seen, the rest of the registered units contribute to building an openly discriminatory story: the words *expulsion* stand out (31 occurrences, 1.10%), *illegal* (12, 0.42%), *scum* (7, 0.25%), *delinquency* (6, 0.21%), among others. In short, as we will describe later in more detail, the correlation between "immigrant minors" and "crime" or "state parasitism" is explicitly established.

Although not all the messages are accompanied by hashtags, the most frequent in the responses to the Vox tweets are the following (Table 2):

As can be seen, some of these hashtags are a carbon copy of those used by the party, which supporters or party members make their own when addressing any issue on the political agenda marked by Vox: the vote for the party is openly

Table 2: Percentage of hashtags in relation to the total amount of entries.

Rank	Hashtags	%
1	#Vox	15
2	#menas	12
3	#ilegales	11
4	#delincuencia	9
5	#MenasFuera	9
6	#YoVotoVox	8
7	#FueraMenas	8
8	#VoxExtremaNecesidad	7
9	#TeamVox	5
10	#SoloQuedaVox	5
11	#GobiernoDimisión	4
12	#PrimeroVox	3
13	#PorEspaña	3
14	#EspañaAbrelosOjos	1
15	#EspañaSiempre	2
16	#PrimeroLosEspañoles	2
17	#EspañaLoPrimero	1
18	#noconmisimpuestos	1
19	#RefugeesGoHome	1
20	#Niunpasoatrás	1
21	#RecuperemosEspaña	1
22	#StopIslaMigration	1

appealed to, highlighting the "loose" allusion to the party, and also #YoVotoVox, #VoxExtremaNecesidad (play on words that responds to the accusation that Vox is a party of the "extreme right"), #TeamVox or #PrimeroVox. Equally striking are the patriotic outbursts: #ForSpain, #SpainForever, #FirstTheSpanish (in line with Donald Trump's famous campaign slogan in the US, "America First").

It is convenient to delve into the examination of the texts without losing sight of the set of tweets, and, therefore, their context. Next, let's consider the most prominent conceptual frameworks with some specific examples (in Spanish, the translation is ours):

a) IMMIGRANT MINORS ARE DELINQUENTS.
According to this frame, for the followers of Vox, all the migrant minors sheltered in Spain represent a threat, and they must be automatically and indiscriminately deported. It seems clear that the main framework is the one that correlates these migrant minors with criminal acts. We highlight some examples of this alarming message:

1) The Menas from the Casa de Campo Center continue to besiege the Venta del Batán, whose complaints are piling up, while the neighbors continue to demand the transfer of the center. It is confirmed, once again, that there is no relationship between illegal immigration and crime . . . #Safe Neighborhoods

2) Last weekend I went to take some photos at the Casa de Campo, and a man in his 70s told me: be careful, they can steal it. Who do I ask? The MENAS. ☹ ☹ 😖 😩 😩 I went home scared. I want VOX in Madrid. I want less good words and as much bullshit

3) Transnational crime and organized crime serve to import scum like this.

b) Immigrant minors are violent.

Fearmongering the citizens is a constant that structures the backbone of many of the examples studied. In the following examples, the fear of violence that, according to some testimonies echoed by the commentators of the Vox tweets, the "means" would be capable of, is clearly addressed:

4) At 12:30 tonight, a gang of menas surrounded the son of my friend and companion, in Cesáreo Alierta, and he suffered a brutal attack. In emergencies. This Government imports crime with the approval of all the parties that vote against its expulsion ^

5) All my support to so many security guards and inspectors who are attacked by ores in Catalonia. Immediate expulsion. With Vox, nothing will be the same.

6) Spain is that country where some menas hit a young autistic and a demonstration is called in defense of the aggressors for saying they were foreigners and I don't know what nonsense of racism. This country is going to shit. Expulsion of all illegal immigration. #Menasout

c) Immigrant minors are illegal and they should be deported.

In line with the examples described above, and regardless of whether they commit crimes or not, for most of the Twitter users examined, the minors are in Spain in an irregular situation, which would be sufficient reason for their expulsion from the country, although in some cases it is specified that these deportations should be applied to those who commit crimes:

7) Expulsion of menas and illegal immigrants!

8) I use Twitter to ask for the expulsion of illegals and ores.

9) Immediate expulsion of immigrants who commit crimes!

10) A group of ores brutally beat a 19-year-old boy. Immediate expulsion of all of them.

d) There are too many Muslims in Spain/They are invading Spain.

Once again, the exclusionary nativism of the extreme right emerges in many tweets that focus on the "excess" of foreigners of sub-Saharan or Moroccan origin

in Spain, just because they are Muslim. In line with the #EfectoInvasion tag line, which we had occasion to comment on in our previous work (Sánchez and Sosinski 2022, in press), a clearly Islamophobic framework is used in these examples:

11) The government of Spain has yielded to what many called a silent invasion by Morocco. It began with the arrival of thousands of illegal immigrants to our peninsula, almost all men of military age, then the "menas" arrived.

12) As long as we don't wake up, in less than two years we are celebrating Ramadan and our women are wearing headscarves. Immediate expulsion of all menas and illegals #TeamVox

13) Sanchez kneels before Morocco. Sánchez redoubles his submission to Rabat: he will not return to Morocco the menas with known parents

e) Immigrant minors are subsidized by the Government.

We also find a few examples that refer to the usual conservative mantra, according to which immigrant minors would be receiving subsidies or monthly payments at the expense of Spanish taxes:

14) We will call them MoMeSubs, subsidized minor Moors. Chaos mercenaries whom we candidly call "MENAS" and treat (including pay) better than our elderly or sick dependents.

15) Those who are in favor of receiving all minor Moors, that they put them in their fucking home, and they pay the expenses. I don't want my taxes to go to those who, once they are of legal age, come out and are given a payment of €400. Enough of being silly.

16) You are right, we should not tell them less, they are Moors, minors, and criminals. That they are under the tutelage of the State and that they do what they do with the weekly pay they are given in the centers for Moors, minors, and delinquents

f) It takes a strong hand/Only Vox can solve the problem.

All the arguments that we have been presenting unequivocally lead to an obvious conclusion for most of the broadcasters analyzed: it is necessary to tackle the "problem"", and the "social communist" Government of Spain (the coalition formed by the Socialist Party and the far-left party Podemos) is not in a position to do anything, so Vox is the only alternative.

17) Indeed. I tell my children: If you want your children to go out safely on the street, you have no choice but to vote @vox_es They have it very clear! #SoloQuedaVox

18) Let's give the absolute majority to Vox. Can you imagine the happiness of throwing the Frankenstein government out of our country forever, outside illegal immigrants, outside menas, the occupation of homes resolved in 24 hours and the Social-Communists with a rubber ball and police force.

19) When lefties talk to you about poverty . . . #Soloqueda Vox. Expulsion of menas to Morocco already.
20) The expulsion of the Moors from the peninsula with the reign of the Catholic Monarchs will remain in its infancy like when Vox enters the Government. There is going to be a lack of wood in Spain to make boats to put illegal immigrants, communists, separatists, and various mob in it.

5 Conclusions

The examples examined above allow us to get a glimpse of some clues about the hate speech towards young migrants, who are described by the followers of extreme right-wing parties as a threat to the freedom and rights of Spaniards: either as criminals, potential terrorists, or in the best of cases, a hindrance for the middle class (the accusation that they receive large subsidies is recurrent). The predominant framework is that of a hypothetical "invasion" of sub-Saharans or Muslims (from time to time, the hashtag #efectoinvasion is recurrent on Twitter, spurred on from the official account of the far-right party), which can only be prevented, according to its approach, by coercive and unsupportive policies.

Figure 2: Vox electoral poster during the run-up to the regional elections in Madrid.
Source: El Español.

As can be seen in Figure 2, in the Madrid regional campaign of April 2021, Vox focused on the alleged favorable treatment of unaccompanied foreign minors by the state administration. The strategic cleavage of Vox is clear: it connects with the

fears of Spanish society, based on false data (obviously, a minor immigrant does not receive 4,700 € per month) to generate discontent among uninformed citizens, relatively permeable to messages based on confrontation with the foreigners.

Likewise, we have been able to verify the evident correspondence between the frameworks outlined by Vox's communication strategy and those managed by the followers in the responses to the party's account, which trace the argument of the leaders (they even explicitly mention Vox as the only solution possible: "Only Vox remains"), although they show more radical approaches, completely devoid of euphemisms that mitigate the reference to immigrants. It could be inferred, therefore, that supporters get feedback from the messages launched by the leaders of Vox, such as Santiago Abascal, Macarena Olona, Hermann Tertsch or Espinosa de los Monteros and amplify them, somehow "translating" the party slogans into a more direct and crude language, and, therefore, openly racist, in deeply discriminatory terms.

Obviously, social networks are not axiologically negative, since on Twitter we can also find expressions of condemnation and rejection of discriminatory behavior, and denouncement of social injustices, but the increase in hate messages in recent years is worrying. In line with the far-right populist parties in the rest of Europe, a "preventive rejection" of migrants is taking hold. The defense of the essences of Spanish culture and values are put before any consideration of solidarity or reception of young migrants unaccompanied by relatives (MENAS), appealing to an exclusive nativism loaded with prejudices towards racialized or Muslim people.

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