

# **An assessment of how well social movement theory explains the emergence and development of Rape Crisis Cape Town.**

By

Alison Cook CKXALI004

A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Degree of Master Social Science.

Department of Politics  
University of Cape Town  
2004

## Declaration

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I would like to thank my supervisor Jeremy Seekings for his help and advice. Karen Buckingham for her help navigating Rape Crisis's records and checking the thesis for factual errors. Mikki van Zyl for her valuable comments and help with editing. Guy, Radesh and my father for reading and commenting on my final draft.

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my grandfather Thomas Cook.

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## **Abstract**

### **An assessment of how well social movement theory explains the emergence and development of Rape Crisis Cape Town?**

This thesis uses three social movement theories to analyse the growth and development of Rape Crisis Cape Town (Rape Crisis). Rape Crisis provides counselling to rape victims, education and advocacy. The thesis also uses Rape Crisis to assess the analytic power of these theories, which were developed in the USA and Europe, in South Africa.

This thesis seeks answers to several key questions about Rape Crisis's history. It emerged in 1976 at a time when there was relatively little self-conscious feminist activity in South Africa. How was Rape Crisis able to emerge and grow despite hostility from authorities and other left wing organisations; why Rape Crisis went from a modified collective to a collective when feminist organisations usually follow the opposite path; why Rape Crisis maintained its collective structure for much longer than most feminist organisations; why Rape Crisis changed dramatically in terms of structure and organisational culture after 1992?

This work uses interviews, documentary evidence, and secondary sources to build a picture of Rape Crisis's development and the issues it confronted. The thesis covers the period 1976 to 2000. The main chapters consider a phase of Rape Crisis's development using the three social movement theories under consideration: resource mobilisation theory, political process theory and generational theory. The analytical power of each theory is considered.

The thesis concludes that the theories considered offer a cogent analysis of Rape Crisis and combining the theories creates a strong analysis. The theories were able to provide answers to the key questions outlined above.

The shortfalls identified in the theories were not caused because the theories were unsuitable for examining an organisation in South Africa. The problems stemmed from the failure of the theories to consider the impact of emotion on organisations. Thus, the criticism is applicable to these theories whenever they are dealing with social movement organisations that engage in emotional work. The key emotions for the purposes of this thesis were stress and those associated with trauma. These emotions impacted on decision-making, organisational structure and collective identity. However, the thesis concludes that the existing theories can be adapted to consider the impact of emotion.

Rape Crisis's ability to emerge and grow without a sponsor organisation challenges the theories' arguments about the importance of social movement organisations being based in organisationally rich social sectors.

## Introduction

### An assessment of how well social movement theory explains the emergence and development of Rape Crisis Cape Town?

This essay examines the foundation and growth of Rape Crisis Cape Town (Rape Crisis), a social movement organisation (SMO) that addresses rape. The organisation has been working to reduce the level of rape in South Africa and improve the response to rape victims for the past twenty-eight years. It is among the oldest Rape Crisis centres in the world and can be credited as the pioneer organisation in South Africa. The organisation confronts one of the most pressing and complex issues confronting South Africa, the ubiquity of violence against women<sup>1</sup>.

Rape Crisis emerged in 1976 during the heyday of feminism in the USA and Europe,<sup>2</sup> but at a time when there was very little self-conscious feminist activity in South Africa. The majority of new civics that emerged in South Africa over this period focused on the apartheid issue, and many organisations and individuals condemned Rape Crisis as a distraction from the task of ending apartheid. The organisation faced hostility and obstruction from authorities but had to try to maintain a working relationship with the police and courts. It managed to co-operate with several service provision organisations, but its feminist stance set it apart (marginalised it from both status quo and struggle). Despite these problems Rape Crisis survived and was able to sustain a counselling and public education service, even managing to grow, obtaining a dedicated office and employing workers. It supported an alternative feminist organisational culture based on collectivism and was supportive of homosexuality.

The beginning of the negotiated transition to democracy in South Africa saw the situation confronting Rape Crisis change greatly. The level of hostility and obstruction from authorities dropped dramatically. Rape Crisis's focus on gender-based violence was no longer condemned by progressive organisations and more organisations emerged to address the issue. Gender-based violence moved from being a marginal issue to one that both politicians and the public felt should be addressed

This thesis uses social movement theory to try to explain the genesis and development of this unusual South African SMO. In particular, it examines how the organisation managed to emerge and survive in a largely hostile environment; why the organisation became a collective and then maintained this organisational form despite the numerous problems associated with it; why its structure changed so much after 1992; and finally, why its organisational culture changed after 1992.

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<sup>1</sup> For a brief discussion violence against women in South Africa please see Appendix 1, *Rape in South Africa*  
<sup>2</sup> Verta Taylor and Nancy Whittier, 'The New Feminist Movement,' in Laurel Richardson and Verta Taylor eds *Feminist Frontiers 3; Rethinking Sex, Gender and Society* (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1992).

Verta Taylor suggests using social movement theory to examine feminist social movements, which highlight the role of human agency in the promoting of social change. Taylor argues that by focusing on deconstructionist and cultural accounts of change, many feminist theorists have neglected the significance of human agency<sup>3</sup>.

North American and European scholars have dominated the development of social movement theory, often focusing on social movements in their own regions. This essay presents an opportunity to assess the usefulness of these theories for explaining the development of a social movement outside North America or Europe.

### Social Movement Theory

Social movements can be defined as '*collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilise and engage in collective action*'<sup>4</sup>. In contrast to interest groups, social movements attempt to mobilise a large group of people to effect change. Interest groups rely on paid organisers and try to effect change by direct contact with institutional leaders. They always act with institutionally mandated authorities and follow procedures. Social movements may work with authorities and follow procedures, but they may also break rules and be disruptive in order to achieve their goals. Interest groups may call on their constituency for support, but their predominant method of operation is interaction between group leaders and responsible officials. Social movements rely in some way on the mass mobilisation of their constituency in order to accomplish their goals.<sup>5</sup>

SMOs are the carriers of social movements. That is they help build mass movements and try to direct protest<sup>6</sup>. Rape Crisis is a SMO; it has consistently tried to build the (anti) gender based violence movement into a mass women's movement. Rape Crisis mobilises its supporters to provide most of its services. Its members have traditionally been very wary of co-operation with institutionally mandated authorities and have sought ways to tackle the problems outside of an institutional framework.

Rape Crisis is examined from the perspective of three theories: resource mobilisation, political opportunities, and generation theory. The first two of these theories are well recognised in the field of social movements; and Zald, McCarthy and McAdam are recognised as their foremost proponents. Neither generation theory nor Whittier, the proponent focused on here, is as well known; yet, Whittier's work features in collections on social movement theory alongside McAdam, McCarthy and Zald<sup>7</sup>. In addition, she regularly collaborates with Verta Taylor<sup>8</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> Verta Taylor. 'Gender and Social Movements; Gender processes in women's self help movements,' in *Gender and Society* 13:1 (Feb: 1997) p.23

<sup>4</sup> Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer N Zald, 'Introduction,' in Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer N Zald eds *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* p.4.

<sup>5</sup> Paraphrased from Michael Schwartz and Simon Paul 'Resource Mobilisation Versus the Mobilisation of People: Why Consensus Movements Cannot Be Instruments Of Social Change,' in Aldon D Morris and Carol McClurg eds *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992) p222.

<sup>6</sup> This view is held by resource mobilisation theorists. Please see the discussion of it in Chapter one.

<sup>7</sup> Morris and McClurg eds *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992)

Whittier's version of generation theory is particularly suited to this thesis because it was developed based on research about the development of the feminist community in Columbus, Ohio over a thirty-year period.

## Rape Crisis and Social Movement Theory

A recent development in social movement theory is a desire to combine theories based on political opportunities, and on organisational form and resources with the 'new social movement theory' that emphasises identity and culture<sup>9</sup>. Rape Crisis Cape Town makes an ideal case study to explore the possibilities of this synthesis: it has had a range of organisational forms and resource levels; it has operated under differing sets of political opportunities; and has been associated with a strong feminist collective identity

Rape Crisis Cape Town helps to expose some of the common shortfalls of social movement theory. Rape Crisis centres, in general, reveal that educational and health institutions deserve to be considered by social movement theorists as sites of social movement activity<sup>10</sup>. Social movement theory tends to focus on social movements targeting national level politics<sup>11</sup> and state institutions<sup>12</sup>. Rape Crisis centres, including Rape Crisis Cape Town, frequently target local rather than national level institutions and politics<sup>13</sup>.

Rape Crisis centres, including Rape Crisis Cape Town; reveal the importance of emotion in organisations. They show that the stress and trauma caused by working in an emotionally demanding field affects most aspects of a social movement, from decision-making and organisational form to culture.<sup>14</sup>

Rape Crisis Cape Town faces similar challenges to those confronting other Rape Crisis centres around the world. The difficulty of balancing client service and internal democracy<sup>15</sup>, whether to co-operate with law enforcement and judicial authorities or oppose them<sup>16</sup>, how to handle relations with other progressive organisations, and how to respond to the charge that feminism's focus on the patriarchy and the private sphere led it to be unconsciously racist<sup>17</sup>.

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<sup>8</sup> Verta Taylor and Nancy Whittier, 'Collective Identities in Social Movement Communities: Lesbian Feminist Mobilization,' in Morris and McClurg eds *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*. Taylor and Whittier, 'The New Feminist Movement'.

Verta Taylor and Nancy Whittier (eds) 'Special issue on Gender and Social Movements,' *Gender and Society* 13:1 (Feb: 1997)

<sup>9</sup> For collections aimed at promoting this synthesis please see. Morris And McClurg eds *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*. Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer N Zald eds *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*.

<sup>10</sup> Frederika E Schmitt and Patricia Yancey Martin. 'Unobtrusive Mobilisation by an Institutionalised Rape Crisis Centre: "All we do comes from the victims,"' in *Gender and Society* 13:3 (June 1999) pp 364 -384

<sup>11</sup> Sydney Tarrow. 'States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movements,' in Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer N Zald (eds) *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*

<sup>12</sup> Taylor. 'Gender and Social Movements' p.17

<sup>13</sup> Schmitt and Martin. 'Unobtrusive Mobilisation by an Institutionalised Rape Crisis Centre'

<sup>14</sup> Laura Schauben and Patricia Frazier. 'Vicarious Trauma: The effects on female counsellors of working with sexual violence survivors,' in *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 19:1 (1995) pp. 49-64.

<sup>15</sup> Jan E Thomas. "'Everything about US is feminist": the significance of ideology in organisational change,' in *Gender and Society* 13:1 Spring (Feb 1999) 101-119.

<sup>16</sup> Schmitt and Martin. 'Unobtrusive Mobilisation by an Institutionalised Rape Crisis Centre'

<sup>17</sup> Thomas. "'Everything about US is feminist"

Elaine Salo, *South African Feminism: Whose struggles, Whose Agenda?* Institute for Historical Research and the Department of History, University of The Western Cape, *South African Contemporary History Seminar*, ([Bellville]: np,



The context in which Rape Crisis Cape Town worked, however, has affected the way it has responded to these common challenges.

## Epistemology and Theoretical Perspective

This thesis is written from a feminist theoretical perspective that includes a constructionist epistemology. A constructionist perspective acknowledges the possibility of differing interpretations of the same phenomenon. It does not necessarily, however, imply that all interpretations are equally plausible. Some interpretations may fit better with accepted 'facts', events, or other interpretations, and thus be granted plausibility. Nevertheless, this plausibility carries the caveat that it ultimately rests on interpretation. The position of this thesis is neatly summarised in the following:

There is no objective truth waiting for us to discover it. Truth, or meaning comes into existence in and out of our engagement with the realities of the world. There is no meaning without a mind. Meaning is not discovered, but constructed. In this understanding of knowledge, it is clear that different people may construct meaning in different ways, even in relation to the same phenomenon.<sup>18</sup>

This thesis puts forward a version of Rape Crisis's development that is anchored in evidence from primary and secondary sources. This version is open to challenge by others, especially by those who were involved in the events described and viewed them differently. Differing interpretations do not have to be viewed as competitors. Instead, the dialogue between different interpretations helps to highlight the multiple ways Rape Crisis was experienced and can help future interpretations of the organisation. This approach is based on Collin's feminist epistemology<sup>19</sup>. This thesis is also a contribution to the dialogue surrounding Rape Crisis's emergence and development.

## Method and Methodology

The evidence on which this thesis is based is of two types: documentary and oral. The documentary evidence comes from Rape Crisis's archives and internal records; the oral evidence from Rape Crisis members and volunteers, past and present.

Rape Crisis's former archivist and resource manager was contacted to advise on the availability and location of documentary sources<sup>20</sup>. Although it was apparent that archives were no longer complete and some of the sources she referred to had been destroyed or misplaced, the surviving material was extensive.

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1994) Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> April 1994 2pm. Cheryl de La Rey, 'South Africa feminism, race and racism,' in Agenda No.32 1997

<sup>18</sup> Michael Crotty, 'Introduction,' in *The Foundations of Social Research* (London: Sage, 1998) p.8-9

<sup>19</sup> Patricia Hill Collin, *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge Consciousness, and Empowerment* (New York: Routledge, 1991) p.204

<sup>20</sup> Rape Crisis no longer has this post, archiving is done on an ad hoc basis by a variety of volunteers.

Present volunteer and staff members and - subsequently - former volunteer and staff members, were asked to suggest possible participants and provide contact information. It was possible to build a sample of interviewees from across the relevant time period who had held various positions within the organisation. It was necessary to rely on referrals from past and present members because the documentary evidence rarely referred to people using their full name.

The interviews were based on interview schedules (to ensure comparability and consistency in the evidence collected) with some less structured elements (to ensure a proper match between epistemology and methodology, allowing interviewees scope to explore their own views and so recognised that meaning is constructed and may vary from participant to participant).

The interviews took place at the Rape Crisis offices, in private homes and workplaces. The interviews had different foci since those involved in training and public education were able to answer questions about Rape Crisis's framing activities for external audiences better than counsellors who were more focused on clients. Members who had been involved in management were better placed to answer questions about the structure and organisation of Rape Crisis than those who had not.

Based on the questions in the interview schedule the interviews (which were recorded onto mini disc) were broken down into tracks. A track index, based on the questions in the interview schedule, was produced for each recording. The track index also included a summary of the participants' responses.

When planning a section of the thesis all relevant tracks were identified, using the track index, and listened to. A selection of representative quotations were transcribed and put into the section's notes along with notes based on documentary evidence.

Every effort was made during interviews to be sensitive to the feelings of the participants and not to 'push' on issues that they found distressing. At their requests the participants have remained anonymous. This essay will be given to Rape Crisis for their archives and members of the organisation were invited to comment on a rough draft.

## Chapter Outline

The first chapter presents a brief introduction of the three theories considered, it utilises examples from the case study at hand, as far as possible, to illustrate them. The next three chapters each focus on a different period of the first 24 years of Rape Crisis. The divisions are based on internal changes rather changes in the organisation's environment. These chapters examine how well the theories' analyses explain the organisation's behaviour over the period. The conclusion considers the merits of each theory with regard to Rape Crisis and highlights the explanatory power of a synthesis of the different approaches. It reviews factors that influenced Rape Crisis's development but fell outside the scope of the theories considered. It asks whether they can be incorporated into these theories, or whether a new approach is needed.

## Chapter One

### Resource Mobilisation Theory, Political Process Theory and Generation Theory

This chapter introduces the three theories used in this thesis. It only considers those parts of the theories that are relevant. Some additional description is done later in the thesis where necessary.

#### Resource Mobilisation Theory

Resource mobilisation theory lay behind the resurgence of social movement theory in the early 1970s. Its core questions concerned the circumstances in which aggrieved people act on their grievances, and its answers focus on the role played by resources in the mobilisation efforts and success of social movements. Resource mobilisation scholars focus on the availability, mobilisation, and allocation of resources by collective actors, their allies and opponents.

Previous explanations had focused on the disrupted psychological state of participants<sup>21</sup>. These states were caused by structural strains in society such as wide scale migration or unemployment. Once a sufficient number of individuals had developed a disrupted psychological state a social movement emerged as a means to ameliorate the psychological state. Resource mobilisation viewed structural strain as ubiquitous and therefore insufficient to explain episodes of mobilisation<sup>22</sup>.

Resource mobilisation theorists argued that social movement action was purposive not driven by emotion, as the psychological accounts argued<sup>23</sup>. This focus on the purposive and rational nature of social movement action lead resource mobilisation theorists to examine the wider environment in which social movements operated in order to explain their behaviour.

The seminal developers of resource mobilisation theory and the writers to which the theory owes its name are Mayer Zald and John McCarthy<sup>24</sup>. They introduced key concepts such as

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<sup>21</sup> Examples of such theories are; mass society theory, status inconsistency, and collective behaviour. Mass society theory identified the absence of intermediary organisations to help individuals fit into society as the source of structural strain and alienation the resulting affect. Status inconsistency identifies severe and widespread inconsistency in a person's status, for example highly educated individual of privileged background in a low skill low wage occupation, as the source of social strain and cognitive dissonance as the state leading to the social movement. Collective behaviour is the broadest of the three approaches arguing any social change can create system strain and lead to a psychological state of ambiguity that then helps to prompt the social movement. Paraphrased from Doug McAdam 'The Classical Model of Social Movements Examined' in *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982) p.6 -9

<sup>22</sup> John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, 'Resource mobilisation and social movements: a partial theory,' in John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, eds *Social Movements in an Organisational Society: Collected Essays*. (New Brunswick USA: Transaction Publishers, 1987) p.18

<sup>23</sup> William Gamson, 'Introduction,' in McCarthy and Zald, *Social Movements in an Organisational Society: Collected Essays*.

<sup>24</sup> This assessment of McCarthy and Zald's work is taken from p.xi of the 'Introduction' of (eds) Bert Klandermans, and Suzanne Staggenborg *Methods of Social Movement Research* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota University Press, 2003)

social movement organisation (SMO), social movement industry (SMI), social movement sector (SMS), and countermovement. These concepts helped to explore the environment of social movements. Before their work organisations were viewed as peripheral to social movements rather than central to them. This focus on organisations as the carriers of movements lead McCarthy and Zald to look at role-played by organisational infrastructure in mobilising and allocating resources.

## Resources and Infrastructure

Definitions of what constitute resources differ among scholars but generally include: legitimacy, money, facilities, and labour power<sup>25</sup>. The definition of resources has been expanded to include ideational items such as paradigms, but extending the concept can make it all embracing so that it becomes meaningless and diminishes the explanatory capacity of the theory. The aggregation of resources and their transformation into goal-orientated activity requires organisation. The organisational structures of interest include organisational infrastructure, the organisational structures available through sponsoring organisations<sup>26</sup>, allies<sup>27</sup>, mobilising networks formal and informal, and the society in which a movement is situated.

McCarthy and Zald argue the infrastructure and resources available to a SMO is influenced by the society in which it is situated<sup>28</sup>. More important, however, are the infrastructure and resources of the social sector in which it's based because they are the most accessible to it. SMOs based in organisationally rich social segments will do better than those based in organisationally poor sections.

## Environment

McCarthy and Zald introduced the concept of social movement industry (SMI) to describe the immediate environment of an SMO. SMIs are clusters of social movements, authorities and counter movements (that have emerged to challenge the SMOs) linked by common concerns. The definition is quite flexible as industries can be narrowly or broadly defined, for example, Rape Crisis can be viewed as part of the women's movement SMI or the anti gender-based violence SMI. McCarthy and Zald argue SMIs are subject to competitive forces. The SMS is a conglomeration of all SMIs in a nation.

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<sup>25</sup> McCarthy and Zald, 'Resource mobilisation and social movements: a partial theory,' in McCarthy and Zald, eds *Social Movements in an Organisational Society: Collected Essays*. p.22

<sup>26</sup> Craig J. Jenkins and Charles Perrow 'Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Workers Movements, 1946 – 1972' *American Sociological Review* 42: pp249 - 68

<sup>27</sup> Hanspeter Kriesi, 'The Organisational Structure of new social movements in a political context' in Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer N Zald (eds) *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* pp.185-204

<sup>28</sup> McCarthy and Zald comment: '(T)he cadre and networks of adherents and activists grow out of, build upon, and use the repertoires of action, the institutional forms and physical facilities of the larger society.' McCarthy and Zald, 'Introduction,' to Part 2 in McCarthy and Zald, eds *Social Movements in an Organisational Society* p.46

## Economy

The economy is central to Zald's theory, because SMS-giving benefits from the satiation of other wants, *ceteris paribus*<sup>29</sup>. As societies grow richer and the amount of discretionary income increases Zald predicts the absolute and relative amount of resources available to the SMS sector will grow. Zald and McCarthy view the people who choose to give to SMOs as rational actors. Thus the people most likely to give or participate are wealthier people because they have more discretionary income, and possibly leisure time, that they can donate to the SM without sacrificing their own comfort<sup>30</sup>. Wealthy individuals have more satiated personal needs and wants compared to other sections of the society. Thus they are less likely to support SMOs for personal benefit and more likely to support them for conscience reasons. Further, social movements and SMOs are likely to emerge to cater for the concerns of elite groups because they have the resources to support such groups.

Poorer sections of the population are less likely to donate to SMOs even when these are acting in their interests, because of the greater cost to themselves and because if the SMO does secure the interests they will benefit anyway. This is Olson's free rider problem and it confronts SM and SMOs who are trying to secure benefits that they cannot restrict to their own members<sup>31</sup>. Thus, SMOs must also work to reduce the costs of participation and create incentives towards participation<sup>32</sup>.

## **Resource Mobilisation Theory and Rape Crisis**

Resource mobilisation theory stresses the role of resources and organisational structures in the emergence of new SMOs. The resources and organisational structures can be based either among the beneficiary community or among non-beneficiary supporters of the cause but they must be available to the embryonic SMO. Once a SMO has successfully emerged resource mobilisation theory concentrates on its environment, its infrastructure and the resources that are available to it to explain its development. Resource mobilisation theorists would expect the actions of the organisation to be purposive and its members to act 'rationally' based on the information they had.

## **Political Process Theory**

McCarthy and Zald view the political process or political opportunities model as part of the resource mobilisation group of theories. However, leading proponents of the tradition such as Doug McAdam don't share that view, pointing to the difference between the two groups view of issues like the dispersal of power in the polity. McCarthy and Zald suggest that poor groups of the population are not capable of starting or sustaining SMOs without elite allies to provide

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<sup>29</sup> McCarthy and Zald 'Resource mobilisation and social movements' p.25 .

<sup>30</sup> Ibid p.26 .

<sup>31</sup> Mancur Olson, M. Jr. *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge MA.: Harvard University Press, 1965)

<sup>32</sup> McCarthy and Zald 'Resource mobilisation and social movements' p.19 .

resources. McAdam argues that all but the very poorest sections of society are capable of starting and in some cases sustaining social movements and SMOs without elite beneficence.

Although a social sector of society does not need to be materially rich to support an SMO, McAdam agrees, with Zald and McCarthy, that it must be organisationally rich. McAdam argues that the absence of organisations that can be co-opted is likely to prevent the development of the movement because it is much harder to recruit members and to keep them. Nor is there a stock of existing leaders to direct the new SMO. The absence of pre-existing organisations makes it difficult to communicate with the target population. McAdam also shares with Zald and McCarthy an emphasis on the rationality of members of social movements, and the movements themselves.

McAdam does not share McCarthy and Zald's benign view of elite sponsorship of social movements. He argues that elites are likely to act in a self-interested manner. Elites help movements in order to gain control over them or because the movements' aims and tactics in some way benefit the elite. The difference stems from the definition of elite, rather than a difference over how elites in power will act. When Zald and McCarthy use the term "elite" they are usually referring to economic elites, those rich in resources but not necessarily rich in political power. McAdam appears to use the term to refer to those who are in control of institutions and hold formal political power. Rape Crisis did have limited elite support in Zald and McCarthy's sense because they were able to draw some support from highly economically privileged sections of society but they did not have allies in politically influential sections.

### Political opportunities

The political process model is usually used to explain the emergence of movements, their form and their success. It focuses on changes in political opportunities, but the concept has been given widely different interpretations. I have adopted Doug McAdam's delineation of the concept<sup>33</sup>, which has four aspects:

1. Relative closed or openness of institutional politics.
2. The stability of the broad set of elite alignments that support most politics.
3. Presence of elite allies.
4. The state's capacity and propensity for repression.

The benefit of this version of the concept is that it clearly limits itself to formal and informal political dimensions of opportunity. McAdam excludes temporal factors, such as the organisation's position in a cycle of protest, from his discussion because they are not

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<sup>33</sup> Doug McAdam 'Conceptual Origins, Problems and Future Direction,' in McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (eds) *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* p.27

themselves political opportunities<sup>34</sup>. The position of the organisation in the cycle of protest is only relevant to this theory in as far as it effects one of the four dimensions of political opportunity<sup>35</sup>, i.e., if a social movement enters a cycle of protest at its peak the elite alignments underlying the polity may already be weak.

These four variables can be used to compare political opportunities across nations. They can also be used to look at the opportunities confronting a social movement within a polity at either national or local level<sup>36</sup>.

### **Political Process Theory and Rape Crisis**

A political opportunity account of Rape Crisis's emergence, like the resource mobilisation account, stresses the importance of organisational strength in the social sector being targeted for mobilisation. A political opportunity account of Rape Crisis's subsequent development would focus on changes in the political opportunities of the organisation.

### **Generation Theory**

Generational theories focus on trying to explain social changes by using the concept of generations. As it is applied to social movements it is a macro and meso level theory focusing on explaining changes in social movements, SMOs and even societies, but the basis of these explanations are the individuals within the movement and their actions. Generations in Whittier's theory are based on collective identities that develop during participants' early years as activists<sup>37</sup>. Collective identities act as cognitive schemata affecting how activists perceive the world and thus how they act. Change in social movements is explained by the rise of a new generation with a new collective identity whose perception of the world, and therefore choice of action change.

#### **Collective identity**

Whittier argues that collective identities develop in small micro cohorts, composed of people who joined a movement at similar times and share key experiences<sup>38</sup>. This indicates that in order to share the collective identity that defines a micro cohort you must have interacted with the other members of it. Whittier's term 'micro cohort' seems to be similar to Mannheim's

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid

<sup>35</sup> Charles Brockett, C. 1991 'The Structure Of Political Opportunities And Peasant Mobilisation In Central America' in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* p.254

<sup>36</sup> Sidney Tarrow, 'States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movements,' in McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (eds) *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*

<sup>37</sup> Mannheim the lead exponent of generation theory argued that chronological age was the base of generation identity see: Karl Mannheim, 'The Problem of Generations' *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge and Paul Kegan Ltd, 1952) p.302. Whittier uses Schneider's adaptation of this theory. Schneider adapted the theory as a result of her research on the patterns of political activism in women's lives. It was Schneider who first argued for a focus on activist age rather than chronological age. Beth E. Schneider, 'Political Generations And The Contemporary Women's Movement' *Sociological Inquiry* 58:4 1993

<sup>38</sup> Whittier comments: "Activist cohorts, then, are characterised by a collective identity that is constructed through their initial interaction in the movement." Nancy Whittier, 'Political Generations, Micro Cohorts and the Transformation of Social Movements,' in *American Sociological Review* (62:5, 1997) pp.763



'generation unit'<sup>39</sup>. Mannheim argued that new perspectives emerged out of the intensive interaction and discussion that took place within generation units. Whittier and Mannheim would expect new SMOs to emerge out of 'concrete groups'<sup>40</sup> and then spread to people who share a similar social location or characteristic with the group. Thus both Mannheim and Whittier indicate that social movements and SMOs are more likely to emerge from sections of society that have dense social networks and are organisationally rich.

Micro cohorts within the same movement that emerge at a similar time are likely to be similar, even if they don't interact, if the external environment around them is similar. The micro cohorts' collective identity is influenced by the broader collective identity associated with its movement, but the difference between cohorts can lead to intra-generational conflict. Whittier proposes that the regular addition of new micro cohorts normally leads to gradual change within a social movement. However, if there is a dramatic change in the external environment of the movement, the collective identity developed by new activists cohorts is likely to differ greatly from previous years and this leads to a new generation within the movement. Whittier highlights the role of political opportunities in creating a different external environment, rather than the availability of resources or the dominant social culture<sup>41</sup>.

Whittier argues that collective identities are consistent over time. Women who adopted the radical feminist collective identity in the USA in the 1960s and 1970s remained radical feminist through the hostile 1980s and 1990s. The influence of radical feminism lies in how these women's collective identity prompts them to act. But what is missing is an explanation of how this identity became so salient that it is able to remain, guiding action, when the networks and movements that first fostered it become weak.

## Identity Theory

The answer to this problem lies in Stryker's identity theory<sup>42</sup>, which is derived from structural symbolic interactionism. Thus, the theory of identity reflects recognition that identity emerges from interactions with others that shape shared meanings about the self. The self-concept in turn affects interactions with others<sup>43</sup>. The shared meanings that emerge from these interactions are not purely the result of choices and interpretation of participants: the existence of social structures helps influence choice.

The self-concept we develop is based on identities and characteristics; identities are based on internalised role relations, which have developed through repeated interactions with

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<sup>39</sup> This term refers to groups of similarly aged people who interact with each other regularly. The 'generation unit' is capable of spawning a distinct generation outlook. Once a new perspective emerges, however, it can spread to others who are similarly socially located to the concrete group but not directly attached Mannheim, 'The Problem of Generations' p.304

<sup>40</sup> Groups that interact regularly, as Mannheim used the term it implied face-to-face contact.

<sup>41</sup> Nancy Whittier, *Feminist Generations: The Persistence of the Radical Feminist Movement* (Columbus: Temple University Press, Philadelphia 1995)

<sup>42</sup> Sheldon Stryker 'Identity Competition: Key to Differential Social Movement Participation,' in (eds) Sheldon Stryker, Timothy J Owens, and Robert W. White, *Self, Identity and Social Movement* (Minneapolis :University of Minnesota Press, 2000) p26-8

<sup>43</sup> Stryker, 'Identity Competition' p26 .

others<sup>44</sup>. Stryker suggests that people can have as many identities as they have roles, and that these identities are organised into a hierarchy based on their salience. Salience refers to the likelihood that an identity will come into play in a variety of situations. The identities that are most salient are usually those rooted in intensive networks of interaction because they are frequently used to interpret situations and this process reinforces the identity, making it likely to be enacted again. An identity so rooted is also likely to become psychologically central because people value identities that give a sense of belonging, providing, of course they value the group to which the identity allows them to belong to.

Neither Whittier nor Stryker explain how individual identities become aligned with collective identities. Nor do they examine how existing personal identities interactive with collective identities. To answer this we need Snow and McAdams work on identities and Snow's work on framing.

### Frames and identity

Snow shares Stryker's structural version of symbolic interactionism. He argues that movements create collective identities for much the same reason they create collective action frames<sup>45</sup> – to motivate people to act. Snow and McAdam identify three key types of identity work that movements must undertake: creation of a viable collective identity, propagation of this identity and maintenance of this identity in the face of competition from other identities. They describe two groups of processes for achieving the propagation of a collective identity: convergence and construction.

Convergence occurs in two situations. The first is when individuals whose own identity coincides with the SMO's collective identity seek out the SMO. Snow and McAdam view this situation as unusual in the case of new SMOs. The more common convergence process, and one that Snow and McAdam view as typical of new social movements, is the linking of an SMO's activities to an established organisation inside the population targeted for mobilisation, that has a collective identity of its own. The SMO, however, hopes to develop its own collective identity during these activities. McAdam and Snow suggest that SMO's that can not

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<sup>44</sup> Stryker 'Identity Competition' p28 .

<sup>45</sup> Collective action frames are cognitive schemata and they perform two major functions, focusing and punctuation; and, attribution and articulation.

Focusing and punctuation, they accent or embellish the seriousness of an injustice or redefine as unjust and immoral what was previously tolerated in order to define the injustice as deserving of remedial action.

Attribution (diagnostic and prognostic); the diagnostic element identifies what is to blame for the injustice and the prognostic suggests what is to be done.

Articulation, collective action frames allow activists to align vast array of events and experiences so they hang together in a relatively unified and meaningful fashion.

Collective action frames tend to be specific, a master frame that is general but shares the same functions as collective action frames usually links them. For example, the early radical feminist collective action frames were linked to the civil rights master frame. For a further discussion of collective action frames and master frames please see: David A Snow and Robert D Benford 'Master Frames and Cycles of Protest' in (eds) Morris And McClurg, *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory* pp. 133-153

follow this process face great difficulties because they will not be able to use identity verification as an incentive for participation<sup>46</sup>.

More common than convergence processes are construction processes, and these processes are strongly related to the framing processes<sup>47</sup> described by Snow. This is the central difference between Whittier and Snow and McAdam. For Whittier all forms of participation seem to have an equal effect, whereas McAdam and Snow indicate that framing activities have a greater effect. As both frames and identities are cognitive schemata, it does seem likely that actions intended to alter how a situation is framed would have an effect on identity.

We suspect that identity construction, whatever its form, can be accounted for largely by framing processes, by engagement in collective action itself, or by a combination of both. Framing processes that occur within the context of social movements constitute perhaps the most important mechanism facilitating identity construction processes, *largely because identity constructions are an inherent feature of framing activities*<sup>48</sup>.

Unsurprisingly, the terminology and processes involved in identity construction are very similar to those used by Snow to describe framing. Those relevant to this thesis are frame amplification and identity amplification, and frame extension and identity extension.

In frame amplification, values and beliefs held by the person are emphasised in order to increase the mobilisation power of an interpretative frame that is congruent with the movement's collective action frame. In identity amplification an existent identity that is congruent with the movements collective identity is emphasised to increase its motivational power and the likelihood of the adoption of the collective identity<sup>49</sup>.

Frame extension is similar to the concept of identity extension; both are attempts to make an existent schema more widely applicable. Frame extension involves a frame being extended to programmes that previously were not relevant to it, for example, the extension of the civil rights frame to the situation of women. In identity expansion an existent identity is expanded so it becomes congruent with the movement. The identity becomes more salient as involvement in the movement increases the frequency with which it is enacted<sup>50</sup>.

Snow and McAdam examined the mechanisms that link framing to identity:

(A)t a more concrete level, the construction of identities through framing occurs in the course of identity talk among adherents and activists, when preparing for and giving formal testimony at movement functions, when explaining the movement to others in the course of recruitment and proselytising activities, when preparing press releases and making

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<sup>46</sup> David Snow and Doug McAdam, 'Identity Work Processes in the context of social movements,' in (eds) Sheldon Stryker, Timothy J Owens, and Robert W. White, *Self, Identity and Social Movement* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000) p.50

<sup>47</sup> David Snow et al 'Frame Alignment Processes' p.470

<sup>48</sup> David Snow and Doug McAdam, 'Identity Work Processes in the context of social movements,' p 53

<sup>49</sup> Ibid p.54

<sup>50</sup> Ibid p.54

public pronouncements,...and when adherents are engaged in frame disputes or debates.<sup>51</sup>

People are more likely to adopt frames that resonate in some way with an existing frame or identity that they hold. Resonance is composed of three factors: empirical credibility, experiential commensurability, and narrative fidelity. Empirical credibility pertains when the evidential basis of the frame's diagnosis appears credible to the targets of mobilisation. Experiential commensurability pertains when the targets for mobilisation have experienced the problem directly. Narrative fidelity describes a situation where the central ideas of the frame are close to those held by the target population<sup>52</sup>.

### Collective action frames and collective identity

Snow's work on framing can help to explain how shifts in external circumstances lead to shifts in identities. In Snow's theory the emergence of new collective action frames is linked to the disruption of 'taken for granted constraints' or the existence of arenas without settled patterns of constraints<sup>53</sup>. For Snow, the changes involved in prompting the emergence of a new frame do not have to be broad social ones, like those associated with new generation units. He argues that the disruption of normal expectations by some harm could be sufficient to lead to questioning of the dominant frames<sup>54</sup>.

Collective action frames are sensitive to change in the external environment and the emergence of a new collective action frame would, according to Snow's theory, create a variation in the collective identity of adherents using that frame. The external changes could affect the attribution function of the frame, which gives a diagnosis of the cause of the problem and the parties responsible, and a prognosis that suggests action to remedy the situation. The early collective action frame in Rape Crisis diagnosis of the problems surrounding rape included the failings of the medico-legal system, the impact of socialisation and of sexist cultural values. This diagnosis was similar in later frames. For example, Rape Crisis's diagnosis of the institutional response to rape indicated it was inadequate and often compounded trauma. The prognosis varied between strategies that favoured co-operation with the police to improve service and more confrontational tactics that promoted public criticism of the police.

Snow and McAdam suggest that framing activities are more important in building the salience of identities than other forms of collective action. In contrast Whittier suggests that collective actions that occur early in an activists involvement in a movement have a greater impact on activists, irrespective of the type of collective action.

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<sup>51</sup> Snow, McAdam, 'Identity Work Processes in the context of social movements.' p. 54

<sup>52</sup> Snow and Benford 'Master Frames and Cycles of Protest'

<sup>53</sup> David Snow, 'Extending And Broadening Blumer's Conception Of Symbolic Interactionism' *Symbolic Interaction* 2001 24: 3 p.373-4

<sup>54</sup> Snow, 'Extending And Broadening Blumer'

## **Generation Theory and Rape Crisis**

Like McAdam, and McCarthy and Zald Snow feels that SMOs are more likely to emerge in social sectors that are already organisationally rich because they can use existing collective identities to motivate action. The organisation's development is explained by monitoring how external changes, especially political opportunities, change the collective identity of SMO members. Changes in collective identity are then used to account for changes in organisational behaviour.

## Chapter Two

### Rape Crisis 1976 - 1981: Emergence

The years 1976 to 1981 cover the period from the foundation of Rape Crisis Cape Town to the decision in 1981 to openly identify as a feminist organisation. Rape Crisis began to deliver public education in the forms of talks and workshops, as well as a counselling service. The organisation developed its own training course based on the research conducted by members. Members who worked in relevant professions such as psychology, social work and law facilitated the course. It vetted new members and allocated them to either counselling duty or public speaking duty based on their performance in the training course.

#### Rape Crisis's development

Ann Levett and Anne Mayne sparked off the emergence of Rape Crisis Cape Town when they placed an article in the Cape Times about the problem of rape. The article ended by saying that any women concerned by the problem, or interested in helping to set up a Rape Crisis organisation should contact them, and provided Levett's number.

Mayne is widely recognised as the initiator of the SMO. In 1976 she was a recent convert to feminism, having taken a crash course at the United Nations' International Year of the Woman Conference in Mexico City in 1975. After the conference she spent several months in the USA helping to set up Rape Crisis centres. She had a background in progressive politics, and had been active in the Progressive Party since 1967.

In the early years of Rape Crisis many members were attracted to the organisation through pieces in newspapers and magazines. 'Those of us dealing with all of this talked angrily about it when we went public speaking, we made angry statements to the press and women's magazines, and slowly we attracted more and more women with various skills to the organisation.'<sup>55</sup>

In the first couple of years the organisation's activities centred on reading groups to help the women interested build up an understanding of the issue and develop relevant skills such as counselling. In 1977 Anne Mayne, Lorraine Jones and Simone Witkin began to provide a counselling service with Mayne providing the majority of the face-to-face counselling.

#### Overview

Key aspects of Rape Crisis during this period are identified in the table below. It is divided into external and internal sections. The external section deals with the environment around Rape Crisis. Focusing on Rape Crisis's relations with important actors in South Africa: the authorities, institutions that dealt with rape survivors, and anti-apartheid organisations. Rape

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<sup>55</sup> Anne Mayne 'Early Memories of Rape Crisis', *Rape Crisis Newsletter* (np: 1985) June p.4

1976 - 1981	
<b>External</b>	
Relations with authorities	Poor
Ability to influence relevant institutions (medical, police, judicial)	Poor
Relations with mixed sex anti-apartheid organisations	Poor
Relations with women only anti-apartheid organisations	N/A
<b>Internal</b>	
Organisational structure	Modified collective
Maximum number of paid posts.	0
Key debates	Feminist identity and role in anti-apartheid struggle.

Crisis's relation with authorities reflects both the level of repression the organisation was subject to and its influence on authorities. These authorities also form part of the group of institutions that Rape Crisis was trying to influence along with medical institutions. The table focuses on Rape Crisis's relationship with anti-apartheid SMOs rather than mental health organisations because the anti-apartheid movements dominated the SMS for much of Rape Crisis's history. The attitude of anti-apartheid movements towards Rape Crisis was crucial because they represented the attitude of progressive organisations toward gender-based violence.

The internal section focuses on changes in Rape Crisis's organisational structure. This section highlights the unusual pattern of development Rape Crisis followed. For most of this period the organisation was a modified collective. A core group of professional women (Anne Mayne and the other founders) made decisions about other members' roles in the organisation, but all members debated organisational issues. There were no paid positions within the organisation so the decision makers were not staff. The key debates section highlights the issues that caused controversy within the organisation over this period. The key debate was whether or not the organisation should identify as feminist, and the consequences this would have. A second and less prominent debate was Rape Crisis's role in the anti-apartheid movement.

## **Sources**

The information used in this section is drawn from interviews with women who were members during this period. It also draws from documents created at the time both by members of the organisation and researchers from outside. In addition, secondary sources, such as interviews with Rape Crisis members featured in other publications were used.

Letter	Role(s) in Rape Crisis	Period of involvement
A	Volunteer, coordinator	1978-1992
F	Volunteer, Chair of Steering Committee Board member	1988-2001
M	Volunteer, coordinator	1984-1988
O	Volunteer, coordinator	1977-1992
N	Researcher, University of Cape Town Department of Criminology.	N/A

## **Rape Crisis and Resource Mobilisation Theory**

In some ways the emergence of Rape Crisis seems to fit very well with resource mobilisation theory since the emergence of the organisation was not prompted by change in structural strains in South African society. There is no evidence suggesting that in 1976 rape was receiving more publicity than in previous years.

It is difficult to say whether or not there was a rise in number of rapes reported to the police in the period immediately preceding Rape Crisis's foundation: between 1967 and 1975 the police did not publish information about rape in the crime statistics. There was a rise between 1966 and 1975/76 from 42.3 per hundred thousand to 56.7 per hundred thousand<sup>56</sup>.

Only later, between 1979 and 1981, was there a 'moral panic'<sup>57</sup>. However, Rape Crisis were not pleased about the tone of the media coverage during this period and according to Participant O they worked to counteract it. Thus, it does not seem that publicity about rape was automatically good for Rape Crisis or was welcomed by the organisation.

## **Infrastructure and Resources**

Anne Mayne and Ann Levett had to use the media to try to reach people sympathetic to their cause. Women and men who sympathised with the plight of rape survivors were not connected to each other through pre-existing links. However, the relative success of their initial, and subsequent, articles indicate that there were sympathetic members of the population in the mid 1970s. McCarthy terms a situation where sentiments favourable to social change exist but there is no infrastructure linking those sentiments, an 'infrastructure deficit'<sup>58</sup>. Access to mass media outlets helped Rape Crisis overcome this deficit.

<sup>56</sup> Figures taken from Annexure 1 of Patricia Schonstein (comp.) *Rape, Criminology Source Book*, with an introduction by Mana Slabbert ([Cape Town]: Institute of Criminology, University of Cape Town, 1983). Annexure 1 is based on police reports. To confirm the claim in this sourcebook that no rape statistics were recorded the author checked the South African Police Service, *Annual Report of the Commissioner of South African Police* (Pretoria: South African Police Service, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, and 1975). In addition the author checked South African Institute of Race Relations, *A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa*, (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974 and 1975)

<sup>57</sup> Slabbert 'Introduction,' in Patricia Schonstein (comp.) *Rape, Criminology Source Book*, ([Cape Town]: Institute of Criminology, University of Cape Town, 1983) p.1

<sup>58</sup> John D. McCarthy, 'Pro-life and Pro-choice mobilisation: Infrastructure deficits and new technologies,' in McCarthy and Zald (eds), *Social Movements in an Organisational Society* p.58



Some resource mobilisation theorists view organisational sponsors as vital for SMO success<sup>59</sup>. An organisational sponsor provides facilities and sometimes loans supporters to a new social movement. Often the organisational sponsor helped to create the new movement. Rape Crisis's struggle to attract funding and members in the first years indicates why theorists have claimed this.

Rape Crisis had few domestic allies in its early years; those it did have were from the mental health sector rather than the nascent women's movement. Although Rape Crisis attracted women who were feminist, there were few existing feminist organisations for it to ally with, and many of the women who joined had not been exposed to the women's movement or feminism before.

Rape Crisis could count itself as part of an international women's movement, and Mayne had benefited from her contact with feminists in North America, particularly in the anti-rape movement. It was through contact with movements in North America that she gained experience in founding Rape Crisis organisations. Rape Crisis Cape Town drew heavily on literature and counselling models developed overseas during the early years. Further, the organisation was dependent for its existence on the ideational innovation that presented rape not as a personal issue but as a social one, capable of being resolved. However, the overseas centres did not provide any material support in the first few years.

### Networks and fundraising

McCarthy and Zald suggest that once a SMO has formed it acts like other organisations – as if survival were the primary goal. This does seem to be supported by Rape Crisis's actions in the first couple of years of its existence. Rape Crisis strengthened its links with other mental health organisations despite the difference in the values of the different organisations. Lorraine Jones came from Lifeline, and helped Rape Crisis establish links with that organisation. In 1980 Rape Crisis affiliated to the Cape Mental Health (CMH) organisation, which gave them access to a professional bookkeeper as well as a fundraising number to use in appeals. Through its affiliation with CMH, Rape Crisis also gained access to donors such as the Community Chest, a body that raised funds for distribution to organisations around Cape Town. Rape Crisis also sought and received funding from such distinctly un-feminist groups as Rotary and Lions Clubs.

This evidence fits with McCarthy and Zald's argument that, contrary to the grievance-based perspective, SMOs actually raised resources from population groups unaffected by the issue<sup>60</sup>. They also note that organisation and individuals may provide resources and yet have no commitment to the values underlying the movement. Rape Crisis's donors appear to confirm this model and the presence of donors prepared to give to the organisation despite

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<sup>59</sup> Craig J. Jenkins and Charles Perrow 'Insurgency of the Powerless'

<sup>60</sup> McCarthy and Zald, 'Resource mobilisation and social movements: a partial theory,' p.19 .

not benefiting from its work helps explain how Rape Crisis managed to establish itself as an organisation.

Rape Crisis's behaviour fits McCarthy and Zald's model in another important way. Rape Crisis's program of public talks and articles was designed to create support for its views. McCarthy and Zald describe this process as transforming bystanders into supporters. The talks and media presentations can also be viewed from an economic perspective. Rape Crisis was attempting to increase demand for itself as an SMO by providing donors with a thought-provoking product that would hopefully increase their demand for an SMO focusing on the issue of rape and thus increase the flow of resources to the organisation. Anne Mayne's reflections on this time show both these dynamics at work:

As demands grew for us as public speakers, a heady sense of power gripped those of us on the 'talk circuit'. We saw ourselves as very important members of the community, which we actually were, because of our special concern, but we only half realised that the reason why we were so much in demand was because of the novelty of our topic and the intriguing, voyeuristic entertainment value it had for some people. But we nevertheless educated and influenced some women and men wherever we spoke.<sup>61</sup>

Public speaking and articles in the press also helped to build recognition of Rape Crisis among the general public and other service providers. Recognition was vital both for fundraising and carrying out work, as this quotation from Anne Mayne reveals.

The agencies we were dealing with knew nothing of Rape Crisis as yet and we were either laughed at as lunatics or patronised as kind hearted, but misguided 'little ladies'. We had no credibility at community work level, and we often returned from a police station in a state of impotent rage.<sup>62</sup>

Rape Crisis's actions in these early years do appear to fit the Zald and McCarthy model. The infrastructure deficit the organisation faced made it difficult to mobilise sympathisers, and this combined with the absence of organisational sponsors restricted the organisation's growth. The organisation appears to have reacted rationally to its situation, stressing its identity as a service provider in order to gain allies and access to resources they controlled, as well as targeting non-beneficiary groups for support (conscience constituents).

## Internal structure

Rape Crisis's organisational infrastructure developed over the first five years. The original common weekly meeting where the group undertook reading changed to a general meeting supplemented by additional meetings on public education, and counselling. Later in the 1970s meetings emerged for sub-groups focused on improving the organisation, planning training courses, fundraising and creating educational displays. Although counselling and education

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<sup>61</sup> Anne Mayne 'Early Memories of Rape Crisis', *Rape Crisis Newsletter* (np: 1985) June

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid* p.2

meetings ran fairly regularly the others were more ad hoc. The training course was established in 1977 and this became the principle means of disseminating Rape Crisis's analysis of rape to new members. Rape Crisis's ability to generate and compile the material for the training course and to run one on a yearly basis is a tribute to its organisational capacity. Attendance on the training course became a prerequisite for membership.

Participant A recalls that when she joined, the organisation seemed quite hierarchal. She recalls that there were a group of professional women who held a lot of decision making power in terms of who could join the organisation and what tasks new members were suited to. In contrast to Participant A, Participant O recalls that the organisation was collective in structure. However, Participant O recalls that the older members of Rape Crisis did try to influence decisions. Both Participants felt that they were joining an organisation that was focused on service delivery.

### Environment

The political economy of societies is important to Zald's theory. He argues that SMS are most likely to emerge in capitalist societies because the state is separated from civil society, there is a rational legal bureaucratic authority and a large sector of private voluntary associations<sup>63</sup>. This description is only partly true for South Africa because the state did intervene in civil society, especially among "non-white" population groups. The state bureaucracy had based its recruitment partly on ethnic identity, providing jobs for Afrikaans males, and by the 1970s it was becoming an increasingly corrupt system. The state was also heavily involved in industry, again using nationalised companies to help promote Afrikaner interests. Nor did the state follow its own laws (particularly in security matters).

Although highly restrictive to non-whites the political system did grant whites such as Anne Mayne and the other Rape Crisis members sufficient civil liberties to form Rape Crisis and to participate in political life, in large part because Rape Crisis's activities were not as obviously political as the Black Sash. Yet it was still a highly sexist system with few female politicians or women in significant decision-making roles.

The absence of representative legislators or decision makers is a restrictive factor not considered by Zald and McCarthy and yet it is relevant. They do, however, highlight the impact of centralised government and party structures in restricting the access of local movements to decision makers. In South Africa this was compounded by sexist attitudes prevalent in the National Party. Rape Crisis could nevertheless have tried to influence minor political parties such as the Progressive Party. The sexism experienced by Anne Mayne during her time with that party prompted her to argue that Rape Crisis would not find allies in

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<sup>63</sup> Mayer N. Zald and Roberta Ash Garner, 'The Political Economy of Social Movement Sectors,' in Zald and McCarthy, *Social Movements in a Organisational Society*

the national democratic struggle, since the organisations were as sexist as the pro-apartheid groups<sup>64</sup>.

Although the South African system was centralised, local magistrates and branches of the South African Police Service did control some processes. Therefore, Rape Crisis was able to reach some of the authority figures it wished to influence. It was also able to suggest reforms to procedures, i.e. it lobbied (but failed, because of procedural legislation) for the introduction of one-way glass during identity parades<sup>65</sup>.

The apartheid system helped to limit the appeal of Rape Crisis's work to black and coloured women, although they remained more vulnerable to assault than their economically privileged white counter-parts. The apartheid system forced black South Africans to live and work in appalling conditions. Thus it is not surprising that addressing these issues was the prime concern of many SMOs based in the black community.

Most black (as defined by the Employment Equity Legislation) South Africans were relegated to the status of migrant worker and were expected to maintain their homesteads in the rural areas<sup>66</sup>. They were subject to stringent controls and had to deal with a great deal of bureaucracy. Townships were meant to be temporary dormitories for these workers and the few urban families who had permission to live in them<sup>67</sup>.

During this period Rape Crisis did attract some members from the coloured community based in Mitchell's Plain, but it failed to attract any members from African townships. Rape Crisis did have contact with township communities. It participated in the alternative schooling initiative that followed the closure of many township schools in 1980<sup>68</sup>. Participant O reported that the women's organisations in the townships and the trade unions were sympathetic to Rape Crisis. The absence of African members may be explained by the poor public transport linking townships to Cape Town, especially the lack of transport in the evening. However, one reason it attracted no African members at this point was that other issues were perceived as more important within that community. Participant F commented that at this point the majority of women in the townships were involved in Stokvels or church groups and were not setting the political agenda in the townships.

Zald's observation about the impact of a dual economy on the protest of the under-privileged seems to be at least partly relevant to the situation of black township residents in the 1970s.

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<sup>64</sup> Anne Mayne 'Conference Reflection' in *Rape Crisis Newsletter* (np, 1984) May

<sup>65</sup> Rape Crisis 'Letter to the Minister of Law and Order' in *Rape Crisis Newsletter* (np: 1985) May

<sup>66</sup> Robert M Price, *The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa 1975-1990* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) 20.

<sup>67</sup> Accordingly in the late 1960s the government allocated most spending for new houses to the designated homelands. Prior to the 1970s the government has also allocated most spending on black education to the homelands, but a chronic skills shortage prompted an expansion in the provision of schools in the townships. The infrastructure of townships was deliberately neglected and when attempts were made in the late 1970s and 1980s to upgrade the infrastructure it proved too costly to implement on a wide scale. In light of the living and working conditions of those designated as "non-white" it is understandable that few organisations were interested in gender-based violence.

For a description of the conditions in the townships and homelands as well as of apartheid policies please see. Price, *The Apartheid State in Crisis* p.54, p.109 - 111

<sup>68</sup> Participant O, written summary of interview.

Zald defines a dual economy as one in which there is a pronounced split between workers based in unionised industries and those based in the non-unionised sector. He based his observations on the economies of northern Europe and the US in the 1950s and 1960s<sup>69</sup>.

The unions of the privileged section are described as corporatist and therefore having a guaranteed role in the negotiation of wages and conditions. The members of these unions represent a relatively privileged economic group likely to resist pressure for large-scale reform. The non-unionised workers are typically economically marginal and in favour of reform, but, without access to unions they are restricted to forms of protest like rioting that require little organisation. Zald and Garner characterise this as desperate and unlikely to secure more than short-term remedial action by the state. The non-unionised thus represent a distinct group to the unionised employed and can be organised separately. However, as they are difficult to organise outside the work place forming a union remains the most potent way to mobilise. But this could lead to their interests becoming identical with other unionised workers.

In the early 1970s strikes occurred in several heavy industries in Natal demanding recognition of African unions<sup>70</sup>. In 1979 the Wiehahn labour reform laws legalised black unions. This seems an extraordinary move, as Price notes: 'Control of the workplace is one of the few levers of power potentially available to South Africa's resource poor black population.'<sup>71</sup> The state judged that formalising black unions would reduce strikes and allow the government to regulate the use of union funds and prevent unions becoming political. It failed, although initially some unions were prepared to limit their activities to economic concerns<sup>72</sup>. Unions emerged as an important organising force in wider protests helping to make them more sustainable.

It is significant from a Rape Crisis perspective that although in the 1970s 36.2% of African women were economically active<sup>73</sup> they were concentrated in sectors that were not unionised<sup>74</sup>. Even when African women worked in unionised industries very few held union positions. Maggie Magubane, a veteran trade union activist, commented in 1992: "How much longer are women going to be seen as minors even by our political organisations and trade unions?"<sup>75</sup> Women had difficulty in raising issues around gender-based violence and

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<sup>69</sup> '(T)he (*dual*) economy has two private sectors: a monopoly sector of very large enterprises (some of which were actually monopolies, while others were oligopolies) and a competitive sector of small capital... The monopoly, or concentrated sector had strong unionisation (although not all monopoly enterprises were unionised); the competitive sector had low wages and drew on the reserve army of the unemployed'

Mayer N. Zald and Roberta Ash Garner, 'The Political Economy of Social Movement Sectors,' in Zald and McCarthy, *Social Movements in a Organisational Society* p.302

<sup>70</sup> Price 'Apartheid State' 62.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid' 62.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid 62.

<sup>73</sup> Pundy Pillay, 'Women in Employment in South Africa: Some Important Trends and Issues,' *Social Dynamics* 11, 2(1985): 23.

<sup>74</sup> Pillay 'Women in Employment in South Africa' 27.

<sup>75</sup> Shamin Meer (eds) 'Women Workers,' in *Women Speak!* (Johannesburg: Kwela Books 1998) p.50

discrimination in the unions<sup>76</sup>. Thus, unions – a vital part of the national democratic movement – were not addressing gender-based violence.

## Economy

In South Africa in 1976, location in the social strata was largely determined by racial identity. Whites were protected from the worst extremes of poverty with generous benefits and preference in hiring. Thus, Rape Crisis was trying to mobilise a section of the population that was economically privileged and according to McCarthy and Zald more likely to generate SMOs.

White women who benefited from the dual economy, but still suffered discrimination because of their sex, founded Rape Crisis. White women faced some formal restrictions on the basis of their sex, for example they were excluded from many occupations and married women could not conduct financial transactions without their husbands' permission. The biggest problem confronting white women was the high level of sexist beliefs that permeated South African society. Rape Crisis was in the fortunate position of trying to mobilise an economically privileged group who had multiple grievances that could be made the basis of SMO action. Those women who joined the organisation were predominantly middle class whether they were black or white<sup>77</sup>.

However, white women earned considerably less than equivalently qualified white men<sup>78</sup> and thus had less discretionary income with which to support social movements. This feature of the economic system may explain why Rape Crisis targeted male-dominated organisations such as Rotary for financial resources. Fundraising targeted group who would give Rape Crisis money without strings attached was a target.

## Social Movement Industries

In the late 1970s Rape Crisis could be viewed as part of two SMIs, the relatively well-established mental health SMI and the emergent women's movement. There was not at this time anything resembling an anti gender-based violence SMI. In both these spheres it engaged with authorities. In the mental health sphere the authorities largely consisted of state run health facilities. In the women's movement sphere the authorities ranged from health authorities to legislative and legal authorities.

Rape Crisis did not face any direct competition in either SMI. Life Line and other mental health organisations were happy to have Rape Crisis take over the counselling of rape survivors. In the women's movement, no second Rape Crisis organisation emerged until 1978 in Pietermaritzburg and the geographical distance prevented it being a competitor. On the contrary, these organisations cooperated with one another.

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<sup>76</sup> Meer 'Women Workers,' 49 -50

<sup>77</sup> Participants N and F.

<sup>78</sup> Pillay, 'Women in Employment in South Africa' 29 (Table 13)

Zald and McCarthy argue that authorities often become counter movements because they wish to resist the changes proposed by the movements. However, in the late 1970s the authorities with which Rape Crisis was dealing (the South African Police Force, the attorney general, and medical authorities) had not yet become counter movements. The actions of the Attorney General Neil Roussow seem at first glance to be helpful to Rape Crisis. In 1979 and 1980 he manipulated the timing of rape cases in Western Cape courts by allocating them to the high court and running several in succession. This created the impression that the incidence of rape had increased<sup>79</sup>. In fact the reported rape level rose modestly between 1978 and 1979 from 62.4 per hundred thousand to 67.9 per hundred thousand. While these actions created a greater media interest in Rape Crisis's issue the organisation felt the tone of the media coverage fostered greater division between South Africa's racial groups. Rape Crisis tried to counteract the tone of the media coverage with public education sessions that stressed that most rapes were intra-racial and committed by acquaintances not strangers<sup>80</sup>.

Rape Crisis Pietermaritzburg was resource-poor, like the Cape Town one, but the two groups did communicate and appear to have shared resources such as literature and counselling advice. In 1979 another Rape Crisis centre opened in Durban followed in 1980 by POWA (People Opposing Women Abuse) in Johannesburg. POWA focused on domestic violence as well as rape. In 1980 the first conference of feminist violence against women centres was held. The reports from these conferences in Rape Crisis's newsletter indicate that they were important morale building exercises as well serving as information sharing and strategising opportunities. In 1980 Rape Crisis was still having a heated internal debate about whether or not the organisation should identify as feminist, it is possible the emergence of other centres that did identify as feminist helped lend strength to arguments of those who favoured becoming openly feminist.

The problem that most constrained Rape Crisis lay not in its relationships with other SMOs, but at the level of the SMS. Most left-leaning SMOs were concerned with addressing the issue of apartheid, and this issue dominated the SMS. This fact helps explain the lack of organisational sponsors or allies from among the political SMO community. The Black Sash, a multi-racial organisation dominated by white politically active women appears on paper to be the ideal sponsor for Rape Crisis. It had advice offices that could act as counselling sites and a network of adherents and constituents who may have found Rape Crisis appealing. However, the Sash was explicitly focused on apartheid at this point. Those women's issues it did examine were directly linked to the apartheid system – such as the failure of the state to recognise customary unions and the subsequent economic vulnerability of customary wives in cases of desertion or the civil marriage of her husband to another women<sup>81</sup>.

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<sup>79</sup> Slabbert 'Introduction,' p.2

<sup>80</sup> Participant O

<sup>81</sup> Black Sash Archives, BC 668, File B

The Black Sash also had a different outlook to that of Rape Crisis, viewing rape as a non-political issue. Anglicans who opposed abortion dominated Black Sash. Rape Crisis was trying to liberalise abortion. Most members of Black Sash were also opposed to feminism. Diana Bishop, a Black Sash leader around this period, explained the organisation's position: 'because our concern and activity is focused on political issues we haven't grappled with women's issues the way that we might otherwise have done.'<sup>82</sup>

### Impact of emotion

Rape Crisis appears to have encountered problems because of the emotional cost of involvement in the SMO. Early members were not willing to participate in traumatising activities such as counselling, or to subject themselves to speculation and rumour by participating in the anti-rape talks. Rape Crisis did reduce the cost of participation by creating reading groups and other ways for women to participate, but it was left with a desperate need for women who were willing to counsel because Anne Mayne was exhausted by being the principle counsellor by the late 1970s<sup>83</sup>.

### Feminism

The main problem with the resource mobilisation paradigm is that it struggles to explain the decision to openly call Rape Crisis Cape Town a feminist organisation. The decision followed a steady increase in the number of members that Rape Crisis drew from the women's movement at the University of Cape Town (UCT). From 1978 left-wing women within the women's movement began to join Rape Crisis because it offered a chance to work with 'ordinary' women<sup>84</sup>.

By 1980 Rape Crisis had begun to be seen by a number of 'left-wing' feminists as a relevant place to work. The membership was younger than it had been, more schooled in feminism. The new members were not all rape survivors as the initial membership had been. Members were also more open about their sexuality. This change was helped by a gradual acceptance of feminism in the broader society, although there was still a lot of opposition from the left and the right. On the left feminists were seen as 'bourgeois feminists' and feminism was a dirty word largely irrelevant to the struggle.<sup>85</sup>

This influx of younger members was of considerable help to the organisation. They had more time available for activities because they did not have jobs or children and they were more willing to undertake tasks like counselling. Because they had more time and shared a similar outlook with the most active members of Rape Crisis (Dr Ayesha Mohammed, Anne Mayne, Ray Lazarus) the new members were able to influence the direction of the organisation.

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<sup>82</sup> Diana Bishop a Black Sash leader in the late seventies and eighties, this quote is taken from her interview in Diana E. H. Russell, *Lives of Courage; Women for a New South Africa* (New York: Basic Books, 1989) p.214

<sup>83</sup> Mayne 'Early Memories'

<sup>84</sup> Paraphrased from an extract of Shirley Walters 'Democratic Participation within Rape Crisis: A Case History' 1984, in the *Rape Crisis Newsletter* June 1985 p.7

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid* p.7



Participant A joined Rape Crisis after completing her studies at the UCT because she perceived it as being a feminist organisation. Her experience during the training course confirmed this perception:

It was very mixed [Rape Crisis] there were certainly very strong feminists in the organisation and there were some women who might initially not been comfortable with the label (*feminist*). Perhaps from more conventional backgrounds ... but, it's funny when I think of the women who were running the show and running the training when I did the course in '78 they certainly seemed very feminist to me. There was a Dr, who, you know they may not of, I don't know whether they used the label, but certainly at a gut level they were very feminist...<sup>86</sup>

Rape Crisis developed a training course for new members to help prepare its members for the tasks of counselling and public speaking. Many of the new members who joined in 1978 were in their mid and early twenties. Therefore, training was seen as a priority as it was felt the new recruits did not have sufficient personal experience to allow them to counsel. The training course was also a way of transferring the analysis of the problem that had been developed within Rape Crisis.

Keeping the new members from the Women's Movement within Rape Crisis was important for the organisation's survival. In order to maintain the counselling and public education service, that were crucial for fund raising, the organisation needed members prepared to deliver them. However, there was still widespread hostility to feminism and the members who objected to the term argued that identifying as feminist would hamper the organisation's ability to function. Following the decision to call the organisation feminist many members quit:

... at our General Meeting the debate raged as to whether we should identify ourselves as feminist or not. Some women stated categorically that they were not feminists and that if we wanted our organisation to be accepted by the rest of the community we must not identify ourselves as such. Others said that Rape Crisis organisations arose out of a feminist analysis of rape and that the community in general must learn to accept us.<sup>87</sup>

Given the importance of recognition and credibility with other service providers such as the police, it is curious that Rape Crisis did decide to declare it was a feminist organisation in 1981. Although attitudes to feminism had softened a little in the intervening five years, they were still hostile and likely to impact negatively on the group's access to financial support, recognition and credibility:

It [feminism] got very married in with how do we locate ourselves within South Africa and within the struggle. There were often heated conflict about that where it [feminism] was seen as divisive. I mean I remember some one called Rachel she was an Australian radical Marxist coming and speaking on campus ... in the early 80s and her saying the

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<sup>86</sup> Participant A, my italics.

<sup>87</sup> Mayne, 'Early Memories', p.4

women's movement is divisive and it must be left until the real revolution is accomplished

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Nor did the debate in Rape Crisis, as it is reported above, appear to be based on considerations such as the retention of the most active section of the membership versus the potential loss of resources. The debate centred on the question of identity, with members reacting strongly to the feminist identity and pushing other issues aside. This does not fit with McCarthy and Zald's argument that, once formed, SMOs are primarily concerned with their own survival.

The decision to identify the organisation as feminist also increased the cost of participation for members who faced criticism from friends and family of their feminist identity. Participant F, who joined Rape Crisis in 1988, remembers the way that feminism was discussed in the press in the late 1970s and early 1980s:

I remember in the 1970s when, gosh, I must have been ... twelve... seeing things in the newspaper, you know, which is always like the mad feminists, I mean the whole tone of the paper in those days was like very hostile...

Participant F also recalled that many members were criticised for working at Rape Crisis by their families who viewed the organisation as a waste of time. Thus the members of Rape Crisis appeared to have acted irrationally according to Zald and McCarthy's description by intentionally increasing the cost of their participation in the organisation.

### **Rape Crisis and Resource Mobilisation Theory: Conclusion**

McCarthy and Zald's model seems inappropriate for broadly explaining South African social movements over this period. It suggests that movements will rarely emerge from disadvantaged sections of the population because they lack the resources to sustain them. Yet communities that were economically disadvantaged by apartheid created and sustained many organisations. Further, there was a blossoming of SMOs in the 1980s, at a time when South Africa's economy was in recession and McCarthy and Zald's theory suggests that the SMS should be contracting.

Despite resource mobilisation's shortcomings it does offer an interesting insight into the early years of Rape Crisis. The organisation was very focused on resources and infrastructure at this time, probably because it had so little of both. Rape Crisis was disadvantaged by the dominance of the anti-apartheid issue at the SMS level.

Importantly, resource mobilisation theory examines a wide range of factors in trying to explain organisational behaviour. This is valuable when considering Rape Crisis because issues from the focus of the SMS to the origins of its members affected it.

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<sup>88</sup> Participant A, my italics

However, resource mobilisation theory cannot explain the decision to openly identify as feminist. This failure stems from resource mobilisation's narrow definition of rationality. Assuming that social movement members resemble an idealised 'economic' man renders their behaviour difficult to understand because it excludes motives other than avoiding cost and seeking gain.

## **Rape Crisis and Political Process Theory**

Political process theory argues that changing political opportunities are the factor most likely to prompt the emergence of a new social movement. Like resource mobilisation theory it emphasises the importance for a SMO of being based in a organisationally rich social segment.

### **Socio-economic changes**

McAdam suggests that changes in political opportunity take place because of broad socio-economic changes in the society. South Africa's economy had grown at about 6% per annum in the 1960s. This increase had primarily benefited the white population, although there was some improvement in black industrial wages<sup>89</sup>. An increasing proportion of white women were drawn into the economy<sup>90</sup> and the number of men and women in tertiary education increased<sup>91</sup>. White women's wages remained below the level of that of white men, even where the level of education was the same<sup>92</sup>.

### **Political opportunities**

The state did begin to examine its approach to apartheid in the late 1970s in response to complaints by the business sector<sup>93</sup>. The reforms at this stage, however, did not address Rape Crisis's primary areas of interest the criminal justice system and gender disparities in South Africa. Rape Crisis was not directly affected by the government's increased openness to reform. In addition, Rape Crisis did not have any politically elite allies at this time to help it<sup>94</sup>.

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<sup>89</sup> Price, *The Apartheid State in Crisis* p.25

<sup>90</sup> Pillay, 'Women in Employment in South Africa' 29 (Table 1)

<sup>91</sup> Ibid (Table 16)

<sup>92</sup> Ibid (Table 13)

<sup>93</sup> The state became more responsive to the complaints of the manufacturing sector that labour laws, education policy and influx controls were undermining the sector. These were not new complaints, but by the 1970s a considerable number of the industrialists making them belonged to the National Party's core constituency – Afrikaners. The manufacturing sector had also grown and become the dominant sector in South Africa's economy; the overall growth of the country was therefore linked to its fate. In 1975 and 1976 the economy faltered badly. The apartheid system of influx controls was proving to be both expensive and ineffective. The Soweto uprising also demonstrated that apartheid was not delivering peaceful race relations as its architects had claimed it would. This section is paraphrased from Price *The Apartheid State in Crisis*

<sup>94</sup> Mayne 'Early Memories' p.2

The state's capacity for repression actually increased as a result of the strikes in the early 1970s and the Soweto uprising<sup>95</sup>. However, it was not concerned with policing organisations like Rape Crisis, whose aims did not directly challenge its power.

At the Carlton Conference in 1979 Prime Minister P. W. Botha acknowledged the legitimacy of businesses' criticism of the over regulation of the economy<sup>96</sup>. This probably helped strengthen the relationship between state and business. Nor does there appear to have been a breakdown in the relationship between the state and security forces. Price argues that the South African Defence Force actually supported reform because this helped it resolve the internal contradiction caused by its increasing reliance on 'coloured', Indian and black troops<sup>97</sup>. The state was trying to meet the needs of both these groups in the late 1970s and early 1980s and both groups appear to have believed their needs could be met. Thus in the 1970s the elite alliances that supported the polity remained intact.

### Women's organisations in South Africa

Although there was an indigenous tradition of white women mobilising in South Africa in the form of the suffrage movements, this movement does not seem to be the inspiration for the later feminist movement. The suffrage movement cannot be described as feminist or even proto feminist because the desire for the vote was not based on a desire to abolish discrimination against women, objection to the gender based division of work, or human rights. White women gained the vote at the expense of black men in 1930 and displayed a condescending rather than supportive attitude to black women's protests and widened the gap between white and black women.

(T)he anti-pass protests and the food and beer hall riots engaged in by black women at the time were described rather flippantly by members of the WEAU [Women's Enfranchisement Association Union] as 'amusing incidents' and the 'stirrings' of the local native women. The activity of black women at the time could hardly be described as mere 'stirrings'.<sup>98</sup>

In the 1950s the Federation of South Africa Women (FEDSAW) was formed. It was based on organisational membership and drew from trade unions and political groups. It produced the women's charter in 1954 that demanded full equality with men. In 1955 it helped ensure that a wide range of women's views were reflected in the Freedom Charter. FEDSAW combined seeking to improve the status of women with mobilising them against apartheid. 'Their objective was to mobilise women for the general struggle against apartheid, whilst also

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<sup>95</sup> Participant O commented that in 1980 and 1981 the left in the Western Cape was fractured as a result of the banning of the Black Consciousness Movement.

<sup>96</sup> Information Services of South Africa 1980 'Meeting Between the Prime Minister and Business Leaders, Carlton Centre, Johannesburg, 22 November 1979' in *Towards a Constellation of States in Southern Africa*.

<sup>97</sup> Price *The Apartheid State in Crisis* p.45

<sup>98</sup> Amanda Gouws and Rhoda Kadalie, 'Women in the struggle: the past and the future,' in eds Ian Liebenberg, Fiona Lortan, Bobby Nel and Gert van der Westhuizen, (eds) *The Long March: The story of the struggle for the liberation in South Africa* (Pretoria: Haum, 1994) p.216

introducing a women's perspective into that struggle'.<sup>99</sup> Within Rape Crisis, pursuing women's equality was not viewed as necessarily compatible with anti-apartheid work. Mayne had reservations about the receptivity of anti-apartheid movements to feminism. Participant O and Participant A recalls that some members in the 70s and 80s argued that joining in anti-apartheid movement would endanger Rape Crisis's reform program. Thus, FEDSAW does not appear to have acted as an inspiration for Rape Crisis.

It appears that the emergence of a self-consciously feminist movement in the 1970s owes more to activities in the USA and Europe than in South Africa. McAdam recognises that protest cycles can spill over national boundaries and create spin-off movements that are not explicable with reference to their own country's political opportunities. The diffusion of ideas and organisational models developed by the feminist movements overseas informed the South African feminist movement.

The diffusion of ideas allowed what McAdam describes as a process of 'cognitive liberation' to take place without significant changes in domestic political opportunities. Cognitive liberation refers to the process through which people begin to doubt the legitimacy of the existing system, and define their position as unjust, before finally reaching the belief that their actions can make a difference. McAdam suggests that normally this process takes place because as the objective domestic political opportunities change the style of interaction between people and political system alters, creating a corresponding change in their subjective view of the situation. In the case of Rape Crisis and other women's movement organisations, ideas from overseas, rather than changes in domestic political opportunities, helped them to recognise the injustices in their position and the potential for action in their current situation.

## Allies

In 1976 there was no obvious organisation that Rape Crisis could use to reach potential adherents. The emergence of a strong Women's Movement at UCT in the late 1970s was a boon to Rape Crisis and helped in recruitment and in access to facilities. Participant A recalls that the decision to form a Women's Movement was inspired partly by the Black Consciousness Movement. She recalled that the first group to separate from the broader left at UCT was black students. Next, women (mainly white) separated in order to set up their own consciousness-raising group. The UCT Women's Movement was supplemented in the 1980s by a growing group of activists drawn from the lesbian community. The parallels between the growth of Rape Crisis and the emergence of the UCT Women's Movement support the emphasis on infrastructure of both resource mobilisation theory and process theory.

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<sup>99</sup> Dr Sheila Meintjes, *A Critical perspective on women and feminism in South Africa* Conference Paper ([Bellville]: University of the Western Cape, 1997) 31 March - 2 April p.5

Rape Crisis did not have any formal links to anti-apartheid movements over this period. It did participate in the alternative schooling initiative in the townships around Cape Town in 1980. Participant O recalled that Rape Crisis's work was generally well received and that relations with other progressive organisations involved in the initiative were good. Although Rape Crisis was cautious about involvement in the anti-apartheid movement, Participant O felt it could play an important role. In 1978 Participant O visited Lusaka and discussed Rape Crisis with Ray Alexander, the head of the ANC underground in the Western Cape. Participant O told Alexander she felt the organisation could be useful in the struggle, but that some members had reservations about becoming involved. Alexander suggested Participant O remain in Rape Crisis and try to involve it in the liberation struggle. Thus, although the organisation itself was not aligned with the anti-apartheid movement it was identified by the ANC as a potential partner.

### **Rape Crisis and Political Process Theory: conclusion**

Like resource mobilisation theory, political process theory overstates the importance of organisational density for the emergence of social movements. Rape Crisis did not emerge in an organisationally dense social sector. Nor do changing political opportunities in South Africa explain the emergence of Rape Crisis. However, political process theory does acknowledge the possibility of organisations being initiated by factors other than a change in domestic circumstance. McAdam's concept of cognitive liberation acknowledges that ideas from other societies can prompt the emergence of a movement. Cognitive liberation is a useful concept when analysing the emergence of Rape Crisis.

### **Rape Crisis and Generational Theory**

Generation theory suggests that new SMO, like new perspectives, are more likely to emerge out of social sectors that are organisationally rich. This is because the interaction between individuals is key for the development of an innovative perspective and/or SMO. Although a 'concrete group' is needed to develop a new perspective it can then spread to other individuals who share a similar social location.

## Identity work

Identity amplification and extension are, according to Snow, characteristic of the early stages of an SMO when it emerges from its organisational sponsors to function as an independent entity. Although Rape Crisis did not emerge from an organisational sponsor, its early identity work does seem to fit this model. Once a training course was established in 1977 there were selection interviews that determined not only the potential ability of the applicant, but also whether they held opinions and values that were congruent with the feminist stance of the organisation. Rape Crisis acted in a manner that suggests recognition that it is easier to build a group based on identity amplification and extension than transformation or consolidation:

We always screened people, they had an interview on their own and erm I mean that was from the start... People were asked quite a lot of general questions to see if they would cope in the organisation... when people were screened they were told we have a feminist analysis of rape which means we believe this and this and this are myths about rape... and checking that somebody felt comfortable and that made sense to them.<sup>100</sup>

Unusually, Rape Crisis benefited from the convergence of existing identities with its own<sup>101</sup>. Women leaving the UCT Women's Movement joined Rape Crisis because it was one of the few viable feminist organisations Cape Town.

It was a natural step for lots of us [joining Rape Crisis] because we had had a political home in the UCT Women's Movement and then leaving university it was, you know, one, one of the, the really viable going feminist concerns that one could join<sup>102</sup>.

Snow and McAdam's theory give us an insight on how personal identities and collective identities become aligned and highlight the importance of pre-existing sympathies to the success of alignment. The members coming from UCT Women's Movement held feminist personal identities that were consistent with Rape Crisis's. Not everyone joining was a feminist. Walter's report<sup>103</sup> indicates a range of motives for women joining Rape Crisis, including a desire to do welfare work, a desire to do practical feminism, a desire to belong to a non-hierarchical organisation, and a desire to help fellow rape survivors. Snow and McAdam's work suggest these motives for joining Rape Crisis would influence the emphasis individuals placed on the collective identity.

Stryker's theory suggests that identities are likely to become more salient if they are enacted. Rape Crisis provided a way to put a feminist identity into practice by being activists, or to build

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<sup>100</sup> Participant A

<sup>101</sup> According to Snow and McAdam convergence processes are unusual in new social movement organisations. See discussion in chapter one.

<sup>102</sup> Interview with participant

<sup>103</sup> Walters, 'Democratic Participation' p1, 2

on existing identities that were consistent with supporting a feminist analysis of violence against women<sup>104</sup>.

## Collective identity

An examination of the early experiences of Rape Crisis members exposes how they were very quickly drawn into an intensive training course that was based on building strong relations of trust within small sub groups:

In the training course one would talk about very personal experiences, if someone had been raped, there was a period in the course when you were in a small group and the same small group and the idea was that you had an atmosphere of trust so that you could really speak...<sup>105</sup>

The new members were then paired with existing members during their early counselling or public speaking work. The training course helped to create strong micro cohort identities, but as soon as members began to work in the organisation they were mixed in with members from other cohorts.

## Framing and South African feminism

Snow's theory of framing offers the best explanation of the emergence of radical and liberal feminism in South Africa. In his terminology, the feminism frames developed in the USA and Europe 'resonated' with some groups of women in South Africa and were adopted. The 'radical feminist' rape frame had empirical credibility and was appealing to women who had been raped. It removed blame from victim and downgraded the standard criticisms of survivors to the status of myths. It also had experiential commensurability. Many women involved in progressive politics in South Africa had experienced being marginalized; many like Anne Mayne had directly experienced domestic violence or rape or discrimination in the workplace.

The conflict that emerged within Rape Crisis over the decision to identify the organisation as feminist could also be explained using frames. Those that supported the adoption of the label had been exposed to a wide range of feminist frames early in their activism with the women's movement. Those who opposed the change were drawn from movements other than the women's movement and had only used feminist frames instrumentally to tackle issues around rape. The source of the difference in opinion lies, as Whittier suggests, in the different experiences of the adherents during their early period as activists, and as Snow suggests it is linked to exposure to and adoption of different frames.

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<sup>104</sup> Walters, 'Some Statistics from the Research Study into Education for Democratic Participation within Rape Crisis', (np, 1984) p.1. Participant M was typical in this respect; she had been involved in the Women's Movement and in feminist reading groups but had never focused on gender-based violence before she joined Rape Crisis.

<sup>105</sup> Participant A



## **Rape Crisis and Generation Theory: conclusion**

Rape Crisis's history indicates that Snow's focus upon pre-existing organisational links as a condition for the emergence of a new SMO may have been overstated. All three of the theories examined in this thesis make this claim. Political process theory and generational theory, however, both acknowledge the possibility of movements being initiated by factors other than changes in domestic circumstances or the presence of resources favourable to organisation. Snow's concept of resonance can be used to examine the influence of frames developed outside of South Africa on the women who founded Rape Crisis.

The behaviour of Rape Crisis members, especially the debate over publicly becoming a feminist organisation, indicates the weaknesses in resource mobilisation theory and political process theory's narrow definition of rationality. Generation theory is clearly an improvement on this situation because it indicates that we need to examine individuals to understand their behaviour. Their pre-existing beliefs, the framing and identity work they were exposed to when they joined an organisation, and their work within the organisation need to be considered when trying to understand how they will behave.

## Chapter Three

### Rape Crisis 1981 – 1992: Feminism

The period 1981 to 1992 covers the period when Rape Crisis was an openly feminist organisation and its organisational practices began to reflect feminist beliefs about the importance of democracy, participation, and non-hierarchical structures. The organisation grew during this period both in terms of members and income. In the early 1980s it established a permanent office and employed its first fulltime worker. In the late 1980s the organisation opened a battered women's shelter. Rape Crisis was also drawn into the national liberation struggle over this period.

#### Overview

The table below summarises the situation over this period. Over this period the anti-apartheid movement increased in size and importance and Rape Crisis formed alliances with anti-apartheid groups. Rape Crisis became a collective. This organisational form was popular with progressive movements in South Africa, although some organisations like the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the United Women's Congress (UWCO) were more hierarchal. Over this period Rape Crisis began to employ staff members and although these staff did not have any more formal power than other members over the period they did begin to exert a bigger influence. In this period there were numerous debates reflecting the culture of discussion in the organisation.

<b>1981 - 1992</b>	
<b>External</b>	
Relations with authorities	Poor
Ability to influence relevant institutions (medical, police, judicial)	Poor
Relations with mixed sex anti-apartheid organisations	Reasonable
Relations with women only anti-apartheid organisations	Good
<b>Internal</b>	
Organisational structure	Collective
Maximum number of paid posts	5 (1989)
Key debates	Internal democracy, role in anti-apartheid struggle, dominance of lesbians in the organisation and transport.

## **Sources**

The information used in this section is drawn from interviews with women who were members during this period, documents created at the time both by members of the organisation and researchers from outside and the Rape Crisis Newsletter. The newsletter was published once a month throughout this period and contained all the minutes from meetings as well as articles culled from other publications or specially written. A complete set of newsletters is archived at Rape Crisis Observatory along with other documents from the time.

Letter	Role(s) in Rape Crisis	Period of involvement
K	Volunteer; director	1982-87, 1996-2000
C	Training and Public Awareness coordinator, volunteer, board member	1994-1996 1997-1998 2001 -
B	Volunteer, counselling coordinator	1992-1995
A	Volunteer, coordinator	1978-1992
F	Volunteer, Chair of Steering Committee	1988-2001
M	Volunteer, coordinator	1984-1988
I	Volunteer; Training Coordinator; Community Worker	1983-1991
O	Volunteer, coordinator	1977 - 1992

## **Rape Crisis and Resource Mobilisation Theory**

Resource mobilisation theory suggests that social movements are carried by SMOs and that the actions of the activists within SMOs, and thus the SMOs, can be predicted by examining the environment in which the SMO operates and infrastructure and resources. This suggestion rests on the assumption that social movement actors are 'rational': they act according to an analysis of the cost and benefits of action. They seek to minimise participation costs and increase benefits to attract members. For the organisation, they seek to maximise the resources it has and to maximise its chances of survival by adapting to the environment they face and attempting to influence it.

### **Environment**

The 1980s were a period of increasing polarisation and conflict in South Africa. By the mid 1980s violent protest and violent repression by the state had become commonplace. The 'Total Strategy' devised by P W Botha in the late 1970s in response to rising levels of protest was unable to implement the domestic reforms designed to reduce the causes of discontent. It failed because it was an inadequate response but also because the recession squeezed the resources available, as did the rising cost of repressing protest and conducting war in Angola. Despite its failure, particularly the inability of the government to implement a tricameral parliament and co-opt the Indian and coloured population, the 'Total Strategy' remained in place until the mid 1980s.

The economy began to falter as domestic investment dropped and foreign investment was deterred by the state of unrest and, in the mid 1980s, by the enforcement of sanctions against South Africa. The nation's foreign creditors refused to roll over the country's debt and the country was forced to place a temporary moratorium on debt repayment.

In contrast to the increasing problems faced by the economy, the SMS enjoyed rapid growth in the 1980s. Between 1978 and 1984 there was a proliferation of radical organisations from trade unions to street committees. In 1983 the UDF was formed by the ANC to coordinate the efforts of the various anti-apartheid groups. Most organisations began by focusing on services, then gradually escalating their activities as the activist became more confident of their constituents willingness to protest. Activists were helped in the task of radicalising the townships by the overreaction of the police. Foreign donors were willing to finance organisations engaged in anti-apartheid work, thus the SMS sector benefited from foreign funds while the formal economy was being starved of them.

### Relationships with anti-apartheid movements

In a situation of rising polarisation and with 'conscience' constituents supporting the anti-apartheid movement, resource mobilisation theory suggests that Rape Crisis would respond by aligning itself with the anti-apartheid social movement in order to help secure resources from the conscience constituents and to gain influence over the agenda of the new SMOs<sup>106</sup>. However, because alignment with the anti-apartheid movement is associated with creating a powerful counter movement (in the form of the state), resource movement theory suggests that this move would be tempered. Rape Crisis's behaviour over this period does fit this description.

The feminist centres (Rape Crisis organisations and POWA) did discuss their relationship to the growing anti-apartheid movement for several years; it was a key issue in the 1983 conference and was not resolved until the 1984 conference. At this conference the centres jointly declared that they were opposed to the use of violence to control the people of South Africa, forced removals and relocations, the migrant worker system, the increased militarisation of South African society, detentions, bannings and the imprisonment of opponents of the government<sup>107</sup>. These condemnations were backed by a resolution to 'carefully consider and be cautious in all our dealings with organisations, government and other, whose aims appear to be in conflict with our own'<sup>108</sup>.

Rape Crisis embraced the democratic struggle but it also remained cautious, both of what it perceived as the male-dominated left, and because many movements on the left accused the women's movement of being divisive and a distraction. To resolve this tension Rape Crisis sought to align itself to the national democratic struggle through other women's organisations.

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<sup>106</sup> Zald, and Garner, 'The Political Economy Of Social Movement Sectors'

<sup>107</sup> Paraphrased from *Rape Crisis/POWA National Conference Resolutions 1984* (np: 1984)

<sup>108</sup> *Rape Crisis/POWA National Conference Resolutions 1984* (np: 1984)

One of its principle allies was the United Women's Organisation (later the United Women's Congress). The two organisations jointly ran a project entitled 'Campaign Against Sexual Assault' in 1986. However, Rape Crisis did not become formally linked to UWCO until it helped re-establish the Federation of South African Women (FEDSAW) in 1987 and became an affiliate.

At national conferences and so on we were talking seriously about how we would be part of a wider umbrella of anti-apartheid women's organisations and we were.... in the 1980s whenever there were festivals or conferences, I mean Rape Crisis was known for being incredibly hard working, we were the ones taking people home at three in the morning and sorting out crises when buses didn't arrive...<sup>109</sup>

Where Rape Crisis did co-operate with mixed sex anti-apartheid organisation it still strove to maintain its focus on women and sexual assault. For example, Rape Crisis provided a group of members to work with the 'Repression Monitoring Group' (RMG) a coalition of organisation monitoring conditions in detention. The Rape Crisis group worked with the section of RMG that monitored sexual abuse in detention<sup>110</sup>. Rape Crisis worked actively with the RMG from 1985-1987<sup>111</sup> but once the section dealing with sexual abuse was wound down their involvement dropped off although they remained affiliated. In 1989 Participant C went as part of a joint Rape Crisis Cape Town-Detention Treatment Team to Windhoek to train SWAPO members about rape and sexual assault in detention.

Rape Crisis's relatively low level of involvement in the liberation movement before 1987 meant it was subject to a lot less harassment than other organisations. However, it was still able to describe itself as an anti-apartheid organisation to donors. It also provided members who wanted to engage in anti-apartheid activism an avenue to do so within the organisation. Thus, in accordance with Zald and McCarthy's predictions, the organisation acted in a manner that enabled it to exploit the benefits of aligning with the anti-apartheid movement while trying to contain the costs. Participant F commented that becoming involved with the anti-apartheid movement helped fund-raising from international donors, however, she was adamant that this was not why Rape Crisis joined. Another feature of Rape Crisis's behaviour that accords with resource mobilisation theory is that the State of Emergency, which put pressure on all the anti-apartheid organisations, preceded Rape Crisis's decision to become more involved in the anti-apartheid movement. Resource mobilisation theory suggests co-operation is more likely when social control threatens the existence of some SMOs<sup>112</sup>.

Resource mobilisation sees co-operation within an SMI as exceptional, and although Rape Crisis co-operated with several organisations in its SMIs, this co-operation fits the resource

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<sup>109</sup> Extract from interview with participant A

<sup>110</sup> They provided counselling training and information about the impact of sexual abuse, as well as trying to help the RMG publicise this abuse. They also used the opportunity to develop the theoretical links between gender-based violence and the state's use of violence as a tool of repression.

<sup>111</sup> Rape Crisis newsletters carry brief reports of their involvement between 1985 – 1987 and then after the end of their work group there is no further mention of joint activities.

<sup>112</sup> Zald and McCarthy 1989 'Social Movement Industries: Competition and Conflict among SMOs' p.173

mobilisation theory. Its co-operation with UWCO and the RMG are explicable because the movements had different, but not contradictory, task specialisations<sup>113</sup>. Its long running co-operation with the other feminist centres is explicable because all the centres involved felt that speaking in a coordinated way and perhaps building a national body would help them to be more effective. Rape Crisis cooperated with organisations in its own region as well as other provinces; between 1987 and 1992 it helped to found the Salvation Army battered women's shelter, the Heideveld women's group, and Ilitha Labantu. Further, Zald and McCarthy do not consider an important motive for the co-operation between feminist centres: the centres drew moral support from each other.

### Rape Crisis, allies and counter movements

The gender-based violence SMI grew during the 1980s in South Africa when a number of SMOs in townships began to focus on the problem. A typical example comes from the pages of *Speak*<sup>114</sup> and concerns a report about Port Alfred's Women's Organisation<sup>115</sup> organising a strike in protest at the failure of the police to arrest a known rapist. Rape Crisis also began to train more community groups in the 1980s and to stay in contact with these groups in order to offer ongoing support. By the early 1990s, Rape Crisis was able to report having sister groups in areas like Heideveld, Grassy Park, Lavender Hill, Stellenbosch and Guguletu. However, comments in the newsletters from the early 1990s make it clear that the task of maintaining these groups fell on the staff and few Rape Crisis volunteers were involved. The lack of volunteer involvement meant that these groups were left without support after the 1992 financial crisis. Rape Crisis also lost a significant ally in 1990 when the Durban Rape Crisis centre closed.

Rape Crisis was able to build the number of allies it had in the 1980s and benefited from the expansion of its SMIs, but it also had to contend with the emergence of counter movements in the form of the police and the judiciary. Of these two bodies Rape Crisis had the most contact with police services because far more rapes were reported than prosecuted.

In the 1970s Rape Crisis lacked recognition among the police and trying to establish contact and recognition seems to have caused problems. However, by 1981 Rape Crisis had sufficient recognition to be able to set up a meeting between the Chair and Vice Chair of the Steering Committee and the Attorney General of Western Province and Divisional Chief of the CID in the Western Province. The Attorney General, Neil Roussow, also had a motive for meeting Rape Crisis. He had helped to create a great deal of concern about rape in the Western Cape; '(H)e had deliberately grouped together a number of rape cases on the Supreme Court roll in Cape Town to draw attention to the seriousness of the problem of rape'<sup>116</sup>. The impact of this action was to create the impression that the number of reported

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<sup>113</sup> *Ibid* p.172

<sup>114</sup> *Speak* was a feminist journal in the 1980s and early 90s that sought to highlight women's role in politics.

<sup>115</sup> Shamim Meer (ed), 'No to Rape, Say Port Alfred Women,' in *Women Speak!* p.13

<sup>116</sup> Slabbert 'Introduction,' p.2

rapes had risen dramatically. Rape Crisis was not supportive of his action and recognised that much of the media coverage around the issue helped to deepen racial divisions by fostering a fear of black men<sup>117</sup>. Yet, Roussow's claim that he was concerned about rape probably helped the organisation to secure a meeting with him.

The report of this meeting in the newsletter reveals that relations between Rape Crisis and authorities were poor at this point: the Divisional Chief of the CID was upset that Rape Crisis members had called him to complain about the treatment of rape victims by the police and of Rape Crisis's public criticism of the techniques used during police investigations of rape. The Attorney General was concerned by what he perceived as interference by Rape Crisis in trials, and their criticism of issues such as the inclusion of women's sexual history in trials.

According to Mr Roussow and the Brigadier we could help them by leaving the relevant work to the relevant professionals. By 'interfering', even with the women's best intentions, we do not serve the women's interests, they said<sup>118</sup>.

McCarthy and Zald suggest that authorities become counter movements only after the social movement has been relatively successful. Their theory seems to be borne out here. The police and the judiciary did not formally meet with Rape Crisis and suggest that the organisation desist from pressuring their institutions to change until five years after the organisation's foundation. At this point Rape Crisis had succeeded in raising its profile locally and making its message more public.

The Chair and Vice Chair of Rape Crisis adopted a diplomatic stance in order to lay the foundation for future co-operation. In their summary of the meeting the Chair and Vice Chair claim the meeting dispelled the false image of Rape Crisis in these two men's eyes, established personal contact, a willingness to co-operate and credibility for Rape Crisis. The meeting resulted in promises to arrange further meetings between Rape Crisis and members of the police as well as public prosecutors.

The co-operative stance towards the police seems to have continued into 1982, with the March newsletter referring to members of Rape Crisis who were responsible for fostering relationships with police stations and their station commanders. The members were supposed to deliver Rape Crisis literature twice a month and trying to meet with commanders regularly. Thirteen stations are mentioned, 5 in 'coloured' areas and 8 in 'white' areas. In addition, in May 1982 an article on rape that had appeared in the police journal *Servamus* was reprinted in the Rape Crisis newsletter. The article advocated reforms to the police and judiciary along the lines of those suggested by Rape Crisis. The response to this article in the Rape Crisis newsletter is surprise, which suggests these views were not common among the police Rape Crisis members met.

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<sup>117</sup> Participant O

<sup>118</sup> Petrus Pietersen, and Ingrid Weideman, 'Meeting with the Attorney-General and Divisional C.I.D. Chief of the Western Cape' *Rape Crisis Newsletter* (np: December January 1981/2) p. 3

Working with the police caused tension within the organisation. Unusually it was the radical feminists who were in favour of working with the police and trying to win reform within the existing system. In other countries radical feminists sought to distance themselves from authorities. Those who wanted to minimise contact with the police described themselves as socialist feminists and were in favour of closer links with the anti-apartheid movement. Possibly the reason the socialist feminist were opposed to building a co-operative relationship with the police is that anti-apartheid movements were advocating the isolation of state formations.

There is evidence of the relationship between Rape Crisis and the police beginning to founder before the 1984 national conference declaration that formally suggested distancing the feminist organisations from authorities. Rape Crisis had not secured much access to the police as a result of the 1981 meeting. Walter's report indicates that only 5 out of 115 talks and workshops delivered between 1981 and 1984 were delivered to the police<sup>119</sup>. In 1983 Rape Crisis had to help represent a client who had been raped by a policeman and whose case the police were refusing to investigate. In May 1984, before the national conference, Rape Crisis Cape Town started to record complaints against the police in order to monitor them. Even given the growing complaints about the police the national conference did not advocate a break with them, or any other authorities, merely the exercising of caution when dealing with them. Rape Crisis adopted an uneasy stance of seeking co-operation from the police to deal with clients and trying to seek access to police training while maintaining records of complaints about the police and attempting to pursue these. The situation became even more strained once Rape Crisis members who were involved in anti-apartheid rallies began directly experiencing police violence.

It was very difficult, even just at the level of just counselling somebody, now you have to engage with state structures and yet you are anti-state. Y'know how d'ya deal with the police in an effective way for the person you're counselling when the police are the absolute enemy of the nation and two days later you are facing the police batoning you and tear gassing you and a week later you are having to go to the police station and they must be nice to your survivor, it was a terrible tension...<sup>120</sup>

Rape Crisis had much less contact with the judiciary than the police, Walter's report does not indicate any workshops or talks delivered to the judiciary between 1981 and 1984<sup>121</sup>, nor is there any evidence in the newsletter of any talks or training courses after this. Rape Crisis's limited relationship with the judiciary deteriorated dramatically after the South African Law Commission's 1985 report 'Women and Sexual Offences in South Africa'. Rape Crisis had sought to contribute to the writing of the report by recording complaints about the police handling of rape cases. However, their meeting with the commission in 1984 was fairly

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<sup>119</sup> Walters, 'Some statistics' p.3

<sup>120</sup> Participant M

<sup>121</sup> Walters, 'Some statistics'



hostile. When the report came out it criticised all the feminist centres for their amateurism and suggested that they be co-opted into state structures such as the proposed centres in state hospital for victims of sexual violence. The Rape Crisis newsletter reflects the alarm that the organisation felt at these proposals. In an article entitled 'Rape Crisis in the last decade'<sup>122</sup> the authors participant I and another member claims that Rape Crisis was so concerned at the Law Commission's proposals it employed a fundraiser to secure adequate independent funding for the organisation so it could resist any cooption effort.

The ability of Rape Crisis and the prosecuting authorities to continue to oppose each other without directly coming into conflict, reflects Zald and McCarthy's observation that the counter movement and movements are often loosely coupled Rape Crisis could only partly achieve its aims, continuing to raise awareness of rape and to raise awareness in the public sector of the shortfalls of the system. It could not, without co-operation from the judicial system, change the system. Nevertheless, the Rape Crisis-judiciary interaction is more typical according to Zald and McCarthy than Rape Crisis's relationship with the police, which often took the form of face-to-face contact, albeit on an individual rather than group basis.

The organisation was wary of repression and was careful to avoid providing the authorities with excuses. Thus, in 1988 it asked all its members to refrain from giving advice on illegal abortions even in their personal capacity because this could endanger the organisation. This move by Rape Crisis agrees both with Zald and McCarthy's resource mobilisation theory and their specific writing on countermovement-movement interaction because it can be viewed either as Rape Crisis adapting to a more hostile environment, or as a response by Rape Crisis to the authority's tactic of seeking reasons to regulate and control it.

### Resources and Infrastructure

McCarthy and Zald argue that the amount of activity toward the achievement of a goal is a function of the resources available to that organisation<sup>123</sup>. Walters's report on democracy in Rape Crisis has a section on the rise in membership that suggests a rise in the number of active members from 39 to 65 from 1981–1984<sup>124</sup>. In late 1984 Rape Crisis employed its first fulltime worker. Rape Crisis did not succeed in securing funding for the post and after the Law Commission's report it stopped seeking state funding. The worker was described as the co-ordinator, and her first task was to raise sufficient funds for her salary and an office.

The amount of funding increased over the decade, with Botilda, a Swedish based women's group, emerging as a major donor in the mid 1980s. Much of Botilda's funding was focused on CAB (Coordinated Action for Battered Women)<sup>125</sup> project; Rape Crisis was a dominant member of this group. Involvement in CAB increased Rape Crisis's contact with funding agencies and with agencies involved in other areas of gender based violence.

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<sup>122</sup> Author not named *Rape Crisis Newsletter* (np, 1990) June

<sup>123</sup> McCarthy and Zald 'Resource Mobilisation and Social Movements' p.22

<sup>124</sup> Walters, 'Some statistics' p.1

<sup>125</sup> The group was founded by Nicro and involved twenty-eight groups that worked with battered women.

## Infrastructure

The form of the organisation shifted over this period. At the opening of the period the organisation had a steering committee that had been set up under the constitution established in 1980 so that Rape Crisis could affiliate to Cape Mental Health Trust (CMH) and this steering committee functioned as a management body. In 1983 the General Meeting took over most of the Steering Committee's responsibilities and instead of members being elected to serve a role on the Steering Committee for six months they were elected to serve the roles at the General Meeting. Those areas not taken over by General Meeting were taken over by a management committee. They reduced the quorum at general meetings to a third of all active members. Urgent decisions were made by co-opting work group delegates to the management committee and then voting on the decision at the next general meeting, where a simple majority would do. These changes were driven by the desire to make Rape Crisis more democratic.

## Participatory democracy

Rape Crisis strove to be a participatory democracy; 'participatory democracy tries to enable everyone to become meaningfully involved in making decisions that affect them'<sup>126</sup>. In addition to making Rape Crisis more democratic it was thought that this method of running the organisation would empower<sup>127</sup> members by increasing their self-confidence, and allow the organisation to draw on the skills of all its members. Rape Crisis recognised the potential for positions to become powerful within the organisation, so initially they mandated the rotation every six months for unpaid positions and every year for paid positions. They also claimed that racism could affect participation but there was no specific mechanism for dealing with this. Before the opening of the office in Observatory the group had tried meeting in Mitchell's Plain to make it easier for coloured women who wanted to be involved. The practice stopped because many white members felt threatened by Mitchell's Plain and they had trouble finding a suitable venue.

Decisions within the organisation were supposed to be based on consensus, 'It [consensus] is a synthesis, all positions are heard and even those rejected contribute. All ideas and inputs are gathered and synthesised'<sup>128</sup>. There were guidelines for consensus decision-making.<sup>129</sup> Members were only supposed to block consensus on matters of principle, although they could withdraw their support without blocking.

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<sup>126</sup> Rape Crisis, 'Democracy,' in *Rape Crisis Handbook* (np: 1987) p.2

<sup>127</sup> Participatory democracy was seen as enabling women to make decisions without deferring to experts because it provided space for recognising their own knowledge about an issue.

<sup>128</sup> Rape Crisis, 'Democracy,' p.7 my italics

<sup>129</sup> Members were told they had to look for grounds for co-operation, foster respect for each other, trust each other, avoid long speeches or put downs, and carry out any obligation they undertook.

## Problems in Rape Crisis

By the late 1980s problems were emerging with Rape Crisis's structure. Following the advent of paid workers, volunteers began shifting responsibility to the workers. This process helped to create demand among workers in the 1990s for a greater say in the organisation because they felt they were conducting most of the work. Even in the late 1980s divisions began to emerge over the issue of workers as incumbent workers pushed for the creation of permanent contracts rather than one or two year contracts. These demands were couched in terms of increasing the organisations efficiency, and by the time they were raised in the organisation in 1991 at least one worker had had her two year contract renewed signalling that rotation of posts was not as strictly enforced as it had been earlier. The financial crisis of 1992 temporarily halted the debate over structure because all the paid workers were retrenched.

From the perspective of resource mobilisation theory, what is most significant about the increase in democracy in Rape Crisis is that it increased the potential within the organisation for factions and splits. 'A faction is an identifiable sub group opposed to other subgroups; a split occurs when a faction leaves a movement organisation.'<sup>130</sup> The condition that the two identify as increasing the chances of this is heterogeneity in the social base of an SMO and the second is a doctrinal base of authority. While becoming more democratic did not necessarily make the basis of the organisation heterogeneous, it did reaffirm feminism and feminist values as the basis for decision-making. Authority could be challenged if it wasn't in accordance with these values. As feminism is a diverse political theory it was possible for contradictory decisions to be in accordance with feminist values.

In 1986 a group of Rape Crisis members lead by Rozeena Maart broke away to form WAR (Women Against Rape). This group was more radical and focused on direct action such as picketing offenders and spraying graffiti on their homes and workplaces. There are references to this group between 1986 and 1989 in the newsletter and relations between the groups appear to have been quite tense, with Rape Crisis feeling WAR misrepresented it and WAR arguing that Rape Crisis did not take enough direct action. This appears to be the only example of factions splitting in order to found their own group.

Some liberal and radical feminists left in 1986 because Rape Crisis was becoming too political. Liberal and radical feminists within the context refer to those who believed reform was possible within the current system<sup>131</sup>. In 1987 some more radical feminists left because Rape Crisis was seen to be compromising itself in its efforts to join in the anti-apartheid struggle and too many members were focusing on instead UWCO and FEDSAW<sup>132</sup>. However, many radicals remained within the organisation because they supported the anti-apartheid work.

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<sup>130</sup> McCarthy and Zald 'Resource Mobilisation and Social Movements' p. 134

<sup>131</sup> Rape Crisis, 'The Radical Position in Rape Crisis,' in *Rape Crisis Newsletter* (np: 1985) July

<sup>132</sup> Carol Bower, 'Resignation Letter,' in *Rape Crisis Newsletter* (np, December 1987)

Another tension present within most feminist organisations is whether empowerment is an internal process or an output. In 1981 it defined the organisation's aims in terms of supporting rape survivors, changing public attitudes and improving services. Thus defining its purpose as empowering clients and producing measurable outputs in the form of public education work. It did not define empowering its members as an organisational aim and yet this became a central part of the organisation's work after 1983. If empowering Rape Crisis's members was perceived to be detrimental to empowering Rape Crisis's clients, there was potential for conflict. Indeed, the decision to appoint shelter workers for two years because it would provide greater continuity for residents demonstrates that the organisation recognised that empowering members and empowering clients was not always compatible.

McCarthy and Zald suggest that organisations like Rape Crisis that wish to promote personal transformation as well as social change are likely to adopt leadership styles that can increase tension in the organisation. In organisations with a unified leadership, the tension is reduced because the same individual or group implements the two leadership styles and they can work to reduce the tension. In Rape Crisis, with no formal leadership, the two styles were represented by different groups of members. 'Mobilising leadership', that focuses on reaffirming goals and values, strengthening constituent's commitment to the organisation, and stressing the unique nature of the organisation was promoted by members who wanted to emphasise what was particular about Rape Crisis's message and work. They resented the 'watering down' of the message necessary in order to work with other organisations. Those who favoured linking up with the anti-apartheid struggle promoted 'Articulate leadership' that focused on the links between Rape Crisis and other SMOs and the connection between gender-based violence and other social issues.

There was a kind of feeling... that you can't delink these things (*gender-based violence*) from the broader struggle in South Africa and we can't sit on the side lines and we need to get involved and there was then an initiative at the time to set up... FEDSAW ... spearheaded by UWCO the United Women's Congress and there were a lot of debates within the organisation about whether we should join that or not. And there were some people who argued that that would dilute our focus, erm and that the broader struggle didn't take account of women issues in a particularly feminist way and there were other people who argued very strongly that we have to be part of this movement.... Rape Crisis did join FEDSAW but its participation then rested on very few people...<sup>133</sup>

## Emotional work

Another issue that fed into division over joining the anti-apartheid struggle was the type of work that the organisation engaged in. Counselling rape victims is emotionally draining work and Rape Crisis had constant problems meeting its counselling commitment. There were

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<sup>133</sup> Participant M

enough members to do the counselling, but many members did not do their requisite duty, and did not follow up on cases if they did. An obligatory duty was to attend the Counselling meeting if you had a case, both in order to share the information, as well as to receive support because the issues we dealt with were traumatic. People who did not attend the meetings did not have a 'safety valve' for possible emotions arising out of counselling sessions. Awareness of the organisation's inability to deal with its own work load led to an understandable reluctance among many members to take on further work outside the organisation, particularly when this might involve them in additional emotional work. Hercus's<sup>134</sup> study of Australian feminists found that feminists had to engage in a high degree of emotional work<sup>135</sup> when they worked outside of feminist settings. This was because adopting feminism involved a dramatic change of perception that impacted on the emotional responses of feminists. Anger was a very central emotion to the feminists Hercus studied and it helped to keep them motivated and committed to their work. However, as anger is often construed as a deviant emotion for women, they often had to disguise it when they worked outside feminist circles or risk being labelled man-haters or other derogatory terms.

Rape Crisis was accused of being a man-hating organisation. It is clear from the tone of their newsletters that there was a great deal of anger and indignation directed at the police and judiciary. Anger was also directed at the perceived hypocrisy of the anti-apartheid struggle that claimed to be concerned with equality but dismissed women's issues. Working with groups that are the target of anger often involves managing that emotion to avoid alienating the other group, but this is not pleasant. Rape Crisis had to work with the police, but it is not surprising that many members balked at the thought of engaging in yet more internal censorship in order to work with other unsympathetic organisations.

The objections to involvement in the battered women's shelter were based primarily on the organisation's inability to cope with its own workload rather than opposition to working with the other groups involved. The shelter issue was described as divisive and alienating in the August 1985 newsletter. The shelter was opened in 1986 and the building and the staff members employed within it seem to have been funded by donors, particularly Botlida, the Lutheran Church and the City Council. However, Rape Crisis provided the counsellors and the referral service and this meant the organisation had to retrain its counsellors and set up referral systems. It was entirely set up and run by RC.

Counselling took a lot of Rape Crisis members' time and energy. A constant theme over this period was how to reduce the counselling workload. One of the earliest suggestions was that Rape Crisis should only offer phone counselling and stop house calls. This was rejected because it would exclude poor women. In early 1983 there was such a shortage of counsellors that a counselling workshop set up to discuss the issue suggested that Rape Crisis stop offering counselling. This suggestion was also rejected because the experiential

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<sup>134</sup> Cheryl Hercus 'Identity, Emotion and Feminist Collective Action' *Gender and Society* Vol. 13 no.1 1999 p.39

<sup>135</sup> Emotional work is defined as work to deal with deviant emotions.

knowledge of rape was from counselling. By May 1983 a workable policy emerged when Rape Crisis decided to focus on training service providers to provide counselling. Walters's report indicates that between 1981 and 1984 67 out of 115 talks and workshops were delivered to community service organisations or to hospitals and related institutions. In the latter part of the decade the policy was adapted to focus on other SMOs and then community groups in black areas.

The decision to maintain counselling was, from a resource mobilisation position, a rational one: the organisation gained a good deal of funding precisely because it did provide a service to rape survivors. Further, as the organisation itself realised, being in regular contact with survivors gave credibility to the other areas of their work. Yet, based on the newsletters and on interviews from the 1980s, public education was viewed as equally important and more likely to achieve Rape Crisis's aim of reducing the incidence of rape.

## Burnout

Rape Crisis was a very demanding organisation, requiring a lot from members in terms of providing services and organisational maintenance. It is not surprising that it suffered from high levels of burnout. One of the key responses to this problem by the organisation was an attempt to increase social contact between members. In the May 1982 newsletter the editorial notes that by way of response to discussion about burnout at the conference, supper has been added to sub group meetings, a social to the end of the general meeting and a drinks evening to the end of the training course. In the January 1986 newsletter one of the aims of the year is described as increasing social contact between members. Rape Crisis sought to increase members' participation in organisational activities and to reduce the numbers leaving the organisation by increasing social linkages between the members.

Again, from a resource mobilisation perspective, fostering social links between members can be in the organisation's best interests because it increases the importance of the organisation and its goals to those members. Thus, it helps create "solidary" incentives for members and these, according to the theory, can help organisations survive problems such as failing to achieve goals, or enable organisations to erect new goals if the current ones are attained. The nature of Rape Crisis's work could also have promoted the forming of "solidary"<sup>136</sup> incentives. Washkansky argues that the reason Rape Crisis members placed a high value on group cohesion is that it insulates them against the feelings of loneliness felt by the survivors they counsel. Thus, the nature of Rape Crisis's work made the fostering of "solidary" incentives more likely.

(F)eelings of loneliness, isolation, and alienation are common amongst Rape Survivors. It is possible, through the experience of projective identification, this experience is

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<sup>136</sup> This term comes from Mayer N Zald and Roberta Ash Garner 'Social Movement Organisations: Growth, Decay and Change'. In Zald and McCarthy (eds) *Social Movements in an Organisational Society*. It is never defined but appears to refer to social benefits such as a sense of community and solidarity.

transmitted onto counsellors, and into the organisation as a whole. If this is the case, it could be that one of the ways in which members defend against or avoid these painful feelings is to emphasize the togetherness of the group, thereby reinforcing group cohesion.<sup>137</sup>

“Solidary” incentives are portrayed as necessary in organisations that attempt to foster personal change because they help motivate that change<sup>138</sup>. Yet fostering “solidary” links can increase division within the organisation because, under some circumstances, they can encourage people to form homogenous sub groups. One of these circumstances is clearly relevant to Rape Crisis:

The less the short run chances of attaining the goals, the more solidary incentives act to separate the organisation into homogenous sub groups – ethnic, class and generational. As a corollary, the extent that a becalmed or failing MO [movement organisation] is heterogeneous and must rely heavily on “solidary” incentives, the more likely it is to be beset by factionalism.<sup>139</sup>

Neither Rape Crisis’s long term goal of changing the social conditions that promoted rape nor the shorter-term goal of improving services to rape survivors were achievable in the short run given the antagonistic attitude of the relevant authorities. Therefore resource mobilisation theory suggests that Rape Crisis would become divided into homogenous sub groups. There is some evidence for this: groups emerged around liberal, socialist, and radical feminism as well as around ascriptive differences such as sexuality, and groups based on racial difference began to emerge at the end of the period.

## Lesbianism

In the 1980s and early 1990s there were few organisational or social spaces where lesbians could be open about their sexuality so Rape Crisis became an important social space for lesbians. This created a situation where lesbian members tended to become much more involved in the organisation than heterosexual members and thus began to accumulate more experience, which led to them leading projects or becoming paid workers. ‘Though “out” lesbians were consistently in the minority in... organizational membership, they did dominate in the organizational hierarchy as they generally put in the most hours, and it was a safe space.<sup>140</sup>’ References to the appeal of Rape Crisis as a safe space for lesbians span from the 1983 conference report in the newsletter in which three of the six delegates to the conference mentioned fellowship with other lesbians as an important part of their conference, to the 1992 Sexuality Workshop. The issue was also raised in several participants’ interviews<sup>141</sup>.

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<sup>137</sup> Denise Washkansky, *Helping the Helper: A Psychodynamic Exploration into the Experience of Working in a Organisation Dealing with Rape* Psychology Honours Project, University of Cape Town (Cape Town: NP, 1996)

<sup>138</sup> Zald and Garner ‘Social Movement Organisations’

<sup>139</sup> Zald and Garner ‘Social Movement Organisations’

<sup>140</sup> Participant I- written response to interview schedule.

<sup>141</sup> Participants A, F, M, I

Participant F recalled that Rape Crisis was known among other NGOs as a lesbian organisation in the late 1980s.

Originally the controversy around allowing women to be openly lesbian within the organisation was based on fears about the reaction of people outside the organisation. Opponents argued that allowing lesbians to be open about their sexuality in the organisation would deter some clients, potential new members, and donors and potentially lead to Rape Crisis being marginalized. Indeed in 1983 CMH expressed reservations about the references to lesbianism in the organisation's newsletter, but these criticisms were dismissed.

Tension between heterosexual and homosexual members emerged early on. The 1984 National Conference held a workshop on the issue that concluded that the tension was misplaced. The problem appears to have abated during the mid 1980s but resurfaced in the late 1980s, in the August 1989 newsletter an article appeared entitled 'Political Lesbianism: what heterosexuality is and why it must be abandoned'. Although the article was criticised by the editors of the following newsletter they did accept the basic point that there were less heterosexual members in the organisation than before. By 1992 the divisions were so serious that a sexuality workshop was held to address the problem. The group consisted of four groups, lesbian, bisexuals, heterosexual and any of the above. The heterosexual group claimed that 'If you are not a lesbian you feel cut off which limits your participation.' The group also noted that non-lesbians still left the group over the issue. This observation is confirmed by participant M who noted that women who were not comfortable working with open lesbians left.

In effect, by providing a safe social space for lesbians it seems that Rape Crisis created an additional "solidary" incentive to that group that attracted them to the organisation and kept them there. However, in the process the organisation created a tension between heterosexual and lesbian members.

### Location and access

The Rape Crisis newsletter indicates that there was an ongoing interest in becoming more representative. It was recognised that a vital part of this involved making the organisation accessible to members<sup>142</sup>. As meetings were held in the evening, attendance required the use of a car and this excluded many potential members from areas like Mitchell's Plain because they lacked transport. In the early 1980s and in 1987 Rape Crisis debated moving to an area that was closer to its client base and potential members, however in both cases fears over safety prevented the move.

Both staff and clients of Rape Crisis benefited from having the office located in a fairly secure area. Participant F recalled that in the late 1980s the Lavender Hill group affiliated to Rape Crisis were having problems with territorial gangs who obliged women to get 'permission' to

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<sup>142</sup> Rape Crisis, 'Editorial', in *Rape Crisis Newsletter* (np: 1990) March



go to the group's office. Observatory was accessible by taxi and bus to clients from a wide range of areas. It also meant the clients could keep their counselling secret.

However, being based in Observatory created an ongoing problem for members from outlying areas. There is no mention in the newsletter of transport rosters to facilitate participation in the general meeting. Participant F argued that there was no transport roster for general meetings because members could not say in advance whether they would attend. If members from outlying areas did attend the meeting then the organisation tried to provide a lift home.

In 1992 a serious dispute arose over the issue of transport and participation in Rape Crisis. The issue was raised at a general meeting in the form of a letter signed by most of the black members and objecting to the marginalization of members without transport in the organisation because they could not get to meetings. The letter also noted that several black members had already resigned over the issue of transport and yet the problem had not been addressed

Also raised was the question of this issue being deeper: of racism and non-feminism are evident in the organisation around other issues. If we have a policy we must live up to it, it is no good having principles without practice.<sup>143</sup>

Transport had been an issue for several years. Participant F feels that it came to a head in 1992 because several members who had regularly provided lifts left the organisation and no one emerged to replace them. This meant that members from outlying areas had to repeatedly raise the issue of transport in general meetings and negotiate with other members. At smaller focus group meetings members from outlying areas ran the risk that no one would have a car.

One of the solutions to the problem suggested by members with transport to the problem was that those members without transport join a satellite branch closer to their home. This move would mean they lost all decision making power in the organisation. The response to this suggestion and to the general reluctance of other members to help with transport was anger. A temporary solution was found by appointing transport representatives for each sub group who had to arrange transport. The long-term solution of a minibus was suggested but given the very serious financial trouble Rape Crisis was in by this stage this solution must have seemed highly unlikely.

The transport debate is the first incident recorded in the Rape Crisis newsletter of the feeling by non-white members that they had to be 'white in certain ways in Rape Crisis.'<sup>144</sup> This sentiment continued to mark debate within the organisation for several months. This sentiment also illustrates the decisive influence that "solidary" incentives and the fostering of an organisational culture can have when a reasonably homogenous organisation becomes

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<sup>143</sup> Rape Crisis 'General Meeting Minutes', in Rape Crisis *Newsletter* (np: 1992) June

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid*

more heterogeneous. Participant I stated that there was a sizeable group of coloured members at this point many of whom many were lesbian and therefore felt comfortable 'because of the 'strong lesbian sub-culture'. It is interesting that common sexuality did not prevent some feelings of alienation.

#### Rape Crisis and Resource Mobilisation Theory: conclusion

Resource mobilisation theory predictions based on the environment in which Rape Crisis operated seem to be fairly accurate. However, a key question remains as to whether or not they fit because the members of Rape Crisis were performing a 'rational' cost benefit analysis of the situation and then adjusting the actions of the organisation accordingly, as the theory suggests they should.

Some aspects of Rape Crisis's behaviour do suggest a calculated response designed to preserve the organisation, for example, the 1988 request for members to refrain from giving out information on illegal abortion. However, the decision to join the anti-apartheid struggle is a decision less clearly based on organisational preservation and growth. From conversations with participants it seems clear that the decision to join the anti-apartheid struggle was based on moral considerations rather than calculations of the benefits involved. In other words, the participants of Rape Crisis that were interviewed for this study do not remember the decision to join the anti-apartheid movement as based on 'rational' analysis of costs and benefits. Likewise, many of the objections to working with the anti-apartheid groups were based on values of these groups as well as practical consideration such as the increasing level of repression directed at anti apartheid groups.

Resource mobilisation theory's prediction about the infrastructure and resources were also reasonably accurate. Zald and McCarthy's observation about the potential role of heterogeneity and doctrine in generating internal division seem to be borne out by Rape Crisis's experience. Over this period Rape Crisis did lose a couple of small groups of members.

The presence of contrasting leadership styles that Zald and McCarthy predict would be present in an organisation, were present and seemed to help explain some of the division over tactics, specifically whether to focus on strengthening the internal organisation. However, resource mobilisation theory neglects factors, such as the nature of Rape Crisis's work that could help explain divisions over tactics. Instead it focuses on the structure of SMO and the social composition of the membership for explanations of organisational behaviour.

The most useful insight that comes from resource mobilisation concerns the potential dangers in using "solidary" incentives: they may help to retain members but they can also lay the groundwork for future division. The key division of this period was probably the division between heterosexual and homosexual members but emerging at this period was the tension between coloured and white members.

## **Rape Crisis and Political Process Theory**

According to the political process model, the key difference between the emergence phase of a social movement and the development phase is that the social movement is assumed to have some influence over the environmental factors that influence its success. The social movement is supposed to have influence over its organisational strength, particularly once it has established a dedicated organisation to carry the movement. Control over organisational strength enables the movement to influence the level of insurgency and through the level of insurgency the collective attribution of the social section it is targeting for mobilisation. A strong organisation is also assumed to directly affect the collective attributions of the targets for mobilisation regardless of the level of insurgency. Conversely, a high level of confidence will also help in building a stronger organisation. Through the movement's choice of tactics it is also supposed to be able to affect the level of social control by making the organisation seem more, or less, threatening. Increasing the level of insurgency is also supposed to enable the organisation to affect the political opportunities open to it by prompting opposing actors to come to terms.

The broad socio-economic conditions in the country, McAdam suggests, remain completely beyond the control of the organisation. This does not seem accurate in the case of South Africa, where the lobbying of the ANC helped to bring about the international sanctions that did affect the broad socio economic conditions. Political opportunities are also and claimed to remain mainly outside of the movement's control. This does seem to be true of smaller movements and SMOs, such as Rape Crisis, that lack the numerical strength or powerful allies to prompt counter movements to come to terms. However, like any SMO, Rape Crisis was responsible for interpreting events as opportunities and choosing how to try to exploit them. The SMO's ability to influence the social control response of authorities is also argued to be limited, even the adoption of non-threatening institutional tactics can make the movement appear weak and encourage repression.

### **Political opportunities in South Africa**

In South Africa over this period the major changes in political opportunity affected the interaction between the state and the anti-apartheid movements and these changes have been the focus of most scholarship on the subject. Some of the changes in the interaction between the state and anti-apartheid actors affected Rape Crisis's political opportunities and these are briefly reviewed below. Chief among them is the creation of an elite-in-waiting for Rape Crisis to target and the creation of a reform program that increased Rape Crisis's access to institutions.

The early 1980s was a period of disappointment for Rape Crisis. Despite a promising start to the decade with the initial meeting with the Western Cape Attorney General and provisional chief of CID, by the middle of the decade the organisation's relationship with the judiciary was

extremely strained, as was the relationship with the police. Compounding the unresponsive attitude of these institutions was the pressure from within Rape Crisis to limit contact with the representatives of the apartheid state<sup>145</sup>. Rape Crisis was not able to cultivate any powerful allies within the institutions it dealt with. In the health sector things were slightly better, with Rape Crisis helping to train social workers, nurses and doctors at Tygerberg and Groote Schuur hospitals where services were established for rape survivors<sup>146</sup>. However, Rape Crisis did not work with these centres consistently and seems to have been primarily reactive in its provision of training, indicating it did not have sufficient influence with hospital management to be consultants or even junior partners on the projects.

Throughout the late 1980s it became increasingly clear to Rape Crisis and other SMOs that apartheid was ending, although what form this ending would take was not clear<sup>147</sup>, and that the ANC were likely to play a central role in the new dispensation.

This provided Rape Crisis with an elite-in-waiting to target and attempt to secure allies and serious treatment of their issue. Through UWCO Rape Crisis already had a tentative link to the ANC because UWCO was connected to the ANC Women's League (ANCWL). UWCO was the 'underground' of the ANCWL, and disbanded in 1990 after the ANC was unbanned. Most women who had been in UWCO formed the new branches of the ANCWL. In January 1987 the newsletter reprinted interviews with ANC Women's League leaders in which they discussed the ANC's attitude to women in leadership positions and their own reservations about western feminism. Later in 1987 Rape Crisis greatly increased its contact with UWCO and involvement in the anti-apartheid movement by helping to re-establish FEDSAW. Because Rape Crisis had not been badly affected by the state of emergency its members were able to play a key role in this.

The September 1989 newsletter indicates that Rape Crisis had three members on the FEDSAW executive. However, this does not seem to have given the organisation direct access to the national anti-apartheid membership because the newsletter indicates that UWCO was being pushed to put the issue of sexual violence on the national agenda. In the report of the general meeting and assessment workshop of April<sup>148</sup> that year, the future directions section indicates that Rape Crisis wanted to increase its lobbying ability. It planned to do this by building alliances and helping to form a pressure group and focusing its lobbying on the ANC. The section also discusses plans to help develop a national model for service providers to victims of sexual abuse, presumably for presentation in the event of reform to the services involved.

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<sup>145</sup> By 1986 business leaders had joined student leaders and trade unionists in visiting the ANC in Lusaka<sup>145</sup>. KwaNdebele refused to accept independence: effectively ending the Bantustan policy and increasing the chances of a unitary South Africa.

<sup>146</sup> Rape Crisis 'Training', in *Rape Crisis Annual Report* (np: 1982), (np: 1983), (np: 1984), (np: 1985)

<sup>147</sup> Writing in 1987 Frankel described the situation as 'in which the inability of dissidents to overthrow the state is countered by the incapability of the state to eliminate dissidence completely.' Philip Frankel 'Beyond apartheid: pathways for transition'. In Philip Frankel, Nicholas Pines and Mark Swilling (eds) *State resistance and change in South Africa*. (Johannesburg: Southern Books, 1988)

<sup>148</sup> Rape Crisis 'Assessment Workshop Minutes' *Rape Crisis Newsletter* (np: 1990) May

After the ANCWL had been unbanned and had re-entered South Africa UWCO dissolved itself into their Western Cape arm. However FEDSAW continued until November of 1991 when the ANCWL suggested that it be converted into the Women's Alliance<sup>149</sup> and form the Western Cape section of the Women's National Coalition (WNC).

Once the transition negotiations had begun between the various political parties, various commissions to consider the reform of institutions also emerged. Although Rape Crisis appears to have helped to create pressure for a women's commission, the July 1990 newsletter indicates that it decided to send members to the health and law commissions instead. In late 1990 it prepared a joint submission with NICRO to the Booysen Commission on violent sexual offenders. The May 1990 newsletter mentions that the organisation is co-operating informally with child protection services to improve the response to children from violent homes and victims of sexual offences. In 1991 it was approached by the Department of Health for information about the needs of survivors of sexual violence. Rape Crisis's financial problems in 1992 disrupted its work with the commissions that emerged in the early part of the transition. In the mid 1990s, however, it was able to resume exploiting the greater receptivity of institutions to advice from outside bodies.

Although political violence continued throughout the transition period, there was a great deal less harassment of organisations by the state. The change in attitude toward demonstrations and organisations was apparent soon after De Klerk took control of the Presidency in 1989. The Mass Democratic Movement was able to stage a coordinated civil disobedience campaign and demonstration protesting at the excessive powers of the security forces without being severely harassed by the police or army. This very public change of attitude signalled to organisations like Rape Crisis that it was much safer to become openly involved in politics.

The success of the anti-apartheid movement not only changed Rape Crisis's political opportunities, it also increased the confidence of Rape Crisis members. Participant M remembers the change in goals as the organisation increased its involvement in the anti-apartheid struggle: 'from lets inject a feminist analysis and provide a home for like thinking women and provide a service to survivors to lets overthrow the state.' A sign of Rape Crisis's increased confidence was the decision in 1990 to form a lobbying group aimed at national level policy. Rape Crisis's increased confidence probably also resulted from contact with UWCO and subsequently the ANCWL. This contact may not have convinced all Rape Crisis members that they were dealing with fellow feminists but it did show them that the ANC were likely to be more receptive to their programme than the National Party had been. Like their counterparts in North America, the majority of the 1980s had seemed pretty bleak to feminist in South Africa. However, they were able to enter the 1990s with growing confidence in their ability to secure their aims.

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<sup>149</sup> The idea was to create an organisation that could attract a wide range of women's organisations and push issues on to the transition agenda and secure women a place in negotiations.

Until its financial collapse in 1992, Rape Crisis was able to significantly strengthen its organisation by attracting more members, increasing the number of projects and increasing the level of funding. It benefited from the strengthening of other organisations such as the Women's Movement in UCT and the other feminist centres because this provided allies to work with. The growth of other feminist groups eased Rape Crisis's recruitment process by allowing them to recruit large numbers of members in one place. However, Rape Crisis remained a difficult organisation to get involved in for those who were not at university

There was an ongoing debate throughout this period about whether association with anti-apartheid women's groups such as UWCO and FEDSAW strengthened Rape Crisis or weakened it. Involvement granted Rape Crisis a greater visibility and access to women it would previously have struggled to target for membership, but some members left Rape Crisis to concentrate on UWCO. Participant M moved from Rape Crisis to UWCO because she wanted to work on broader women's issues.

### Potential problems

Exploiting political opportunities can weaken organisations in the long run, according to McAdam. The opportunities have to be recognised and quickly seized in order to be exploited 'Even as insurgents exploit the opportunities that this confluence of factors affords them, the movement sets in motion processes that over time are likely to place contradictory demands destructive of insurgency.'<sup>150</sup> He emphasises two key groups of processes, those related to the establishment of a formal organisation and those related to repression.

Rape Crisis's political opportunities over this period don't seem to be characterised by short term opportunities – the option of building alliances with anti-apartheid groups was available most of the period. The opening up of institutions was a little more time bound as commissions tended to have start dates and then a series of deadlines; however, commissions tend to last a couple of years and there were often series of them keeping the access to institutions open. The reduction in the state's propensity for repression was not a short-term opportunity, nor was Rape Crisis directly involved in generating it. However, Rape Crisis did work to minimise its own exposure to repression by attempting to strengthen itself by securing independent funds and avoiding direct confrontation with the state over issues like abortion.

Rape Crisis does not seem to have fallen prey to two of the processes that McAdam indicates are linked to the foundation of a formal organisation: oligarchization and cooption. Like Zald and McCarthy, McAdam does not believe oligarchization is an inevitable result of formalising a movement. Oligarchization refers to the process through which the maintenance of the organisation supersedes the original goals of the movement as the main goal of the SMO. Once an organisation provides permanent employment for leadership the continuation of the

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<sup>150</sup> McAdam *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency* p.52

organisation may become their primary concern. Rape Crisis's practice in the early 1980s of rotating posts every year, and every two years for shelter workers, seem to have been designed to prevent this as well as preventing the concentration of power in a few members' hands and thus creating a traditional oligarchy.

Cooptation becomes a danger if the organisation begins to look outside its base for support. The danger is that the organisation will accept support from organisations whose interests do not coincide with its own. If the SMO becomes dependent on these outside forms of funding it is in danger of being co-opted and having its goals altered to suit its patron. Rape Crisis became very aware of this possibility after the Law Commission suggested that the organisation be subsumed into state services. It responded by trying to secure a diverse base of independent donors that would allow the organisation to remain independent. Although Botilda, the Swedish women's group that began to fund Rape Crisis heavily in the mid 1980s, did not try to influence the goals of the organisation they did demonstrate to the organisation the danger of becoming too dependent on one major donor. When Botilda announced it would have to withdraw its funding in 1991 Rape Crisis was unable to find a replacement and this was the main reason the organisation had to shed all its paid staff and shut the shelter in 1992.

The third process that McAdam identifies is related to the two previous processes. Either oligarchization or cooptation can lead to an SMO losing its indigenous support base because the goals of the movement move away from those of its supporters and the leadership become unresponsive. An organisation without an indigenous support base is very vulnerable if it loses its donors because it will not be able to use the organisational structures from its former support base or its former sympathisers to raise money. It will also face problems of legitimacy if it is claiming to speak for a group that it no longer represents.

Rape Crisis was neither co-opted nor did it succumb to oligarchy in the sense that its goals were displaced, but its relationship with its support base did change as a result of the changing political opportunities it had. The lack of political opportunities that characterised the first half of this period prompted Rape Crisis to focus on service provision rather than campaigning. The blossoming of opportunities in the later period made it clear to Rape Crisis that it would need to diversify into areas like lobbying and that other areas such as campaigning would need to be extended, creating demand for much greater volunteer involvement or more workers. The need to expand the organisation increased existing tension over issue like professionalization and decision-making in the organisation.

A review of the newsletters in the late 1980s and early 1990s suggests that the solution would have to be more workers because of the falling level of volunteer involvement and the difficulty in holding volunteers accountable. In 1986 accountability meetings were introduced to try to hold members to commitments they had made. In the July 1987 newsletter the write up of the accountability meeting focuses on the implications for workers of low volunteer responsibility, such as making it difficult for workers to plan their time. In July 1989 the

workers created their own worker support group to discuss issues because they felt there was a general apathy among the membership. They noted that as soon as a worker was appointed to a section, in this case resources, volunteer efforts fell dramatically. By 1990 the need for more accountability had led to the creation of a disciplinary system for members and workers who failed to meet their responsibilities. The 1990 change would have had the greatest impact on volunteers because workers were already held accountable to the membership: they had to provide monthly accounts of their actions and attend accountability and maintenance meetings, and in 1992 a formal review process was added to all staff contracts.

An issue closely related to the problem of volunteer accountability was that of the professionalization of staff. As the 1980s progressed and workers increasingly assumed responsibility for Rape Crisis, they began to want the ability to stay in their role for more than a year in order to be able to pursue longer-term projects. In 1987 the staff began to increase their control by being granted permission to make everyday decisions about the running of the organisation. However, the issue of professionalization remained. Workers attached to the shelter were allowed to stay two years, not to run projects but because it was seen as better for residents. Increasingly, pressure emerged from the other workers for longer appointments.

The issue reached a crisis point in 1990 when a workshop was held with staff and volunteers to try to debate and resolve the issue. Many of the older volunteers favoured returning to the system of one-year appointments because it evened power distribution in the organisation and helped share skills, which was a key internal empowerment aim. Those promoting permanency saw it as the best way of creating long-term policies for Rape Crisis, promoting long term stable funding, and moving the organisation from the fringes into the mainstream. The September 1990 newsletter announced that Rape Crisis was in crisis because worker/volunteer division had crystallised over the issue of permanency. However, the two groups do seem to have compromised on this issue because Participant I was allowed to renew her contract later that year.

Tied to the issue of professionalization was the issue of research. This became a contentious issue before the issue of professionalization, but for similar reasons. Many members were deeply uncomfortable with the idea of individuals promoting their own career using information from the organisation. In the early 1980s, Rape Crisis was reluctant to let non-members conduct research, Shirley Walters who wanted to research democracy in the organisation had to become a member first. By the mid 1980s there was opposition to research even by members if it was for 'personal gain', for example, for a degree. Participant M described the debate over researchers as a 'blow up' invoking strong emotions on both sides.

(M)y perception is that the issue of professionalization arose in the late eighties already; it was also linked to anti-academicism / anti-research feelings. For instance, I had to jump



through hundreds of hoops to get Rape Crisis to approve two research projects I wanted to do on gbv [gender-based violence]. By the nineties, that seemed to have gone<sup>151</sup>.

The loss of all paid staff members at the end of 1992 temporarily stopped the professionalization/permanency debate. However, once funding had recovered sufficiently for the organisation to begin to employ people again the issue re-emerged

Another change prompted by the organisation's desire to exploit the political opportunities available to it in the 1990s was an increased awareness of its image. The January 1990 newsletter notes that the posters inside the office had been 'toned down' because it is increasingly a public space. The editorial of this newsletter shows renewed concern that Rape Crisis was perceived as anti-male.

(L)ater on [after the late 1980s] we became more professional and needed to be accepted as professional organisation amongst institutions, ...at different sorts of levels, parliament government level and sort of, I think then Rape Crisis became more careful about its public image. Part of that was a good thing, part of that was natural of being professional and wanting to be seen as professional and to be but also it had spin offs in terms of the way we dressed Rape Crisis didn't really care before that... I just think Rape Crisis became more conscious of the image they are presenting outside...<sup>152</sup>

One of the key results of this increased awareness of public image was an increased sensitivity to the issue of lesbians in the organisation.

In the late 1980s among other NGOs ... some of them Rape Crisis was known as a lesbian organisation... and what Rape Crisis said about that was there were probably just as many in their organisation... later on when we had to work with institutions ... Rape Crisis became more careful about its image.

Thus, in attempting to conform to the image that it felt was necessary to fully exploit the institutional opportunities emerging in the 1980s the organisation made several changes that could alienate sections of the membership. Specifically, it seemed to become a less hospitable space for lesbians, less tolerant of open displays of strong feminist rhetoric, and it began to promote things such as taking care with personal presentation that had been condemned in earlier periods. Participant I recalled that, in the late 1980s, a member was told she was too fat to do public education work.

Debates in Rape Crisis prompted by the desire to pursue new political opportunities alienated some sections of its membership. However, the alienation was not the result of cooption or goal displacement (oligarchy in McAdam's terminology), but because the organisation needed to do more work and this brought the existing issues of volunteer responsibility and the role of workers to a head. The opening of institutions prompted some in Rape Crisis to reconsider its

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<sup>151</sup> Participant I

<sup>152</sup> Participant F

image and to try to appear more mainstream in order to enhance its effectiveness in institutional forums and this alienated some sections of the membership, who felt less welcomed. However, the issues over which this debate emerged: the level of feminism in the organisation, and the visibility of lesbians, were not new. Another key difference is that Rape Crisis was at this stage a very different type of organisation to those that McAdam seems to be describing because the support base (the membership) were formally equal, with the paid workers because they had equal decision making power.

McAdam's theory is heavily slanted toward SMOs' external environment, and the role of SMOs in interpreting these changes in the environment and reacting is neglected. Organisations seem to be distinguished only in terms of being weaker or stronger and having varying levels of cooption, oligarchization or alienation from their indigenous support base. Rape Crisis's internal democracy changed the way it reacted to changes in opportunity because responses had to be negotiated and there was no core set of decision makers steering the organisation.

Rape Crisis was often divided on issues and this led to mixed responses, for example, it took several years before the organisation built up significant alliances in the anti-apartheid movement and even when it was part of such an alliance in the late 1980s and 1990s there were still voices of dissent and many members chose not to participate. The workers were not able to impose professionalization on a reluctant membership despite their importance to the organisation, nor could the membership dictate to the workers. They had to settle for a second best option that left neither party satisfied.

### **Rape Crisis and Political Process Theory: conclusion**

The factors that McAdam argues help shape the development of a social movement did have a great effect on Rape Crisis during this period. The changing of the political opportunity structure that accompanied the negotiated transition created political opportunities for Rape Crisis. As noted above a drop in the level of repression helped strengthen the organisation and make the membership of Rape Crisis more positive.

Political process theory over-emphasises the importance of external environment in explaining the behaviour of organisations. Although the changes in the political structure created opportunities that Rape Crisis could react to they did not determine how it would react. McAdam neglects the impact of the structure of the organisation, particularly its decision-making processes, on Rape Crisis's reaction to opportunities. Another result of political process theory's assumption that organisations are hierarchal is that it overlooks factors other than oligarchization and cooption that can lead to an SMO becoming distanced from its indigenous support base. In this regard resource mobilisation theory is more credible. Despite these shortfalls, McAdam's acknowledgment that exploiting political opportunities can create contradictory demands on SMOs is an important one.

## **Rape Crisis and Generational Theory**

Generational theory is more focused on the individuals within a movement than either resource mobilisation theory or political process theory. Although the external environment of the movement is considered important this is mainly considered because it impacts upon the development of the collective identity that links individuals to a movement. In Whittier's generational theory the interaction between the external environment and the early activities of activists shapes the collective identity of activists and group them into micro cohorts. Snow and McAdam complicate Whittier's theory by suggesting that pre-existing identities and frames held by the individual will influence how a collective identity is generated and assimilated. It is thus necessary to consider the background of members before they joined – particularly other social movements or causes they were involved in.

Whittier's theory indicates a belief that all early activities are equally important in the formation of a collective identity. McAdam and Snow, however, argue that framing activities are more important in its formation than other activities. Thus, when examining the early activities of Rape Crisis members, it is necessary both to consider the type of activity and what impact it appears to have had on the members. Differences between micro cohorts are likely to have emerged over tactics and internal issues such as democracy, so an examination of the major debates of this period is needed before it is possible to determine whether group positions emerged over them.

The external environment has been extensively discussed in the previous sections, so a brief synopsis will do here. Whittier suggests that a hostile external environment, such as that faced by American feminists during the Reagan administration, encourages activists who join during that period to focus on sustaining the movement rather than trying to make extensive policy gains. Thus, in the 1980s Whittier notes there was a tendency for new feminists to focus on self-development, spirituality and cultural events rather than political goals. The 1980s were also a fairly hostile time for feminists in South Africa, but there does not seem to have been a withdrawal by new members from political goals, possibly because South African feminists were not confronting a worsening situation. In fact tolerance toward feminism increased slightly in the 1980s. Instead, for most of the period the membership of Rape Crisis was divided between outward orientated members who sought to forge links with the anti-apartheid movement, despite that movement's hostility to feminism, and members who focused on the internal health of the organisation<sup>153</sup>.

### **Collective identity and the training course**

Whittier suggests that the early activities engaged in by activists have a great impact on the formation of a collective identity. For new activists joining Rape Crisis the first activity was participation in the mandatory training course. The training course varied in length between

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<sup>153</sup> This view expressed by Participant M and I

one or two months depending on the number of sessions per week. Participant A stated that the training course was preceded by selection that helped to ensure that applicants had similar values to those of the organisation: 'when people were screened they were told we have a feminist analysis of rape which means we believe this and this are myths about rape... and checking whether somebody did feel comfortable and that made sense to them...' However, by 1987 Participant M claimed there was a self-selection process and all applicants were admitted to the training course.

Whittier argues that boundaries are an important part of collective identities<sup>154</sup> and the mandatory training course provided a clear barrier between members and non-members. Unfortunately, because the training dossiers were composed by breaking down the previous years' dossiers and updating material it is not possible to trace the development of the training course during the 1980s, but the outlines and trainer notes for the early 1990s training courses are still on file. The trainers' notes from the 1980s were also destroyed but some notes and evaluations from the early 1990s are on file. This makes it difficult to create predictions for cohorts' behaviour based on their training course.

However, based on other sources it is possible to suggest general trends in the training course over the period. Participant A, who had a degree in psychology, completed the training course in 1978 and recalls that quite a large proportion of the time was dedicated to building counselling skills and understanding of trauma. By the time Participant B, who was studying psychology, did the course in 1992 only 4 sessions out of 16 were dedicated to building counselling skills. The sessions focused respectively on rape survivors, battered women, survivors of childhood sexual abuse, and counselling small groups<sup>155</sup>. Participant M indicated that by the time she was providing counselling, hard skills were considered less important: 'we are an activist group of women and by the pure fact of the perspective that we bring we will help women.'

The content of the training course probably became more political following the decision to identify the organisation as feminist because this created a need to give potential members an understanding of what feminism meant, rather than just using the sections of feminist theory that dealt with rape. For example, the growth of radical feminism in the organisation in the early 1980s leads to concern that the organisation's structure and internal procedures should reflect feminist organisational values of non-hierarchy and participation. In the 1990 training course 4 out of 16 sessions were dedicated to Rape Crisis as an organisation, its alliances with anti-apartheid groups, feminism and democracy and the behaviour necessary to support democracy.

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<sup>154</sup> Verta Taylor and Nancy Whittier 'Collective Identity in Social Movement Communities: Lesbian Feminist Mobilisation,' in Morris And McClurg (eds), *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory* p.125

<sup>155</sup> Sharon Stanton and Ruth Anthony 'Rape Crisis Training Course 1991', in *Training Course 1990-1993* folder (np, 1994)

Following the opening of the battered women's shelter in 1986 the training course also had to accommodate information about the needs of battered women. The July 1984 newsletter indicates that a discussion of racism was going to be added to the training course. However, in 1991 there were complaints that racism was not sufficiently addressed in the training course. The course plan indicates that there were no sessions dedicated to racism in the 1991 training course, nor was it specifically mentioned in the notes for the session on 'Women as Oppressors'.

The widening of the spectrum of issues covered by the training course over this period suggests that members who joined later in the decade would have considered broader range of issues important than those who joined and completed the training course while it focused on rape. In particular, those who joined in the early 1980s, during the period when the constitution was being revised to make Rape Crisis more democratic are likely to have felt this was an important issue. However, for most of this period it appears that a wide range of issues was covered during training and that no one issue predominated. This suggests that even if it were possible to examine the material used in each training course this would not lead to a clear understanding of the issues that each year considered important.

### Collective identity and trauma

Regardless of the issues addressed in the training course the form of it was likely to have prompted the development of strong bonds among members because it was based on small groups that shared personal experiences. Those members that decided to continue after the training course usually became involved in counselling, and by the mid 1980s this was compulsory. Those participants from this period who compared public speaking and counselling<sup>156</sup> noted that public speaking was preferred because it involved a much greater sense of accomplishment than counselling. Many of the accounts of counselling in the newsletter and from the participants indicate that it could be an overwhelming experience. 'I remember my one volunteer... she said will you please stop giving me incest cases I just can't cope... we did have support structures for people to debrief themselves, but still it was very tough... a lot of people burnt out.'<sup>157</sup>

Participants could become involved in a range of activities including creating and collating resources, running workshops and engaging in public speaking. These activities all involve the framing of issues much more explicitly than counselling and McAdam and Snow suggest that this would give them a greater impact upon the formation of the collective identity that members developed. However, it is the experience of counselling that is most prominent in participants' recollections about their service work at Rape Crisis. Participant B feels that working with trauma profoundly affected the way that members interacted with each other:

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<sup>156</sup> Participant A, F and M

<sup>157</sup> Participant M

In an organisation dealing with trauma people feel that they have to pull together, so if you disagree with something you don't want to say that because it causes friction and if you're dealing with trauma you need to make sure you all hold together so you can deal with the trauma.<sup>158</sup>

It seems possible that dealing with traumatised women introduced an element of secondary trauma into Rape Crisis's collective identity because most members came into prolonged contact (over a year) with traumatised women<sup>159</sup>. Participant C noted in her interview that, in the mid 1990s, Rape Crisis has a problem with the low levels of trust among staff. Low levels of trust and intimacy<sup>160</sup> are characteristic of secondary traumatic stress disorder. Thus, although counselling does not involve framing, its emotional impact makes the claim that it has less impact on collective identity than public speaking or running workshops seem unlikely.

### Decision making

Rape Crisis's decision-making structure necessitated a large number of meetings and these were often lengthy affairs. All members had to attend some meetings but although general meetings were compulsory attendance was poor. General meetings are likely to have had a great impact on members because they involved debates about all the decisions affecting the organisation. The June 1992 newsletter carries a Worker's report that dwells on the change in style of Rape Crisis's debates over the period; she claims they move from impassioned shouting and yelling followed by reconciliatory drinks to a more muted style where criticism wasn't vocalised. Although some members were dominant in the organisation, the general meeting still provided space for everyone to participate in decisions and block decision they could not abide with.

It [the dominant members] shifted all the time but in the beginning it was Anne Levett, Anne Mayne, Ray Davis and Ayesha Mohammed.... After it was Beatie and Ingrid... quite a lot of people, it was a matter of experience and sheer strength of character to make things go the way we wanted to go in terms of that decision to become part of the broader anti-apartheid movement.<sup>161</sup>

Participation in meetings often meant participation in the social afterwards and exposure to this aspect of Rape Crisis helped to strengthen members bonds with the organisation. As noted in the previous sections the social side of Rape Crisis became particularly important to lesbian members. Participation in meetings seems to have led both to support for the system and to opposition to it as too time consuming. The latter view seems to have been particularly common among members who held paid posts because they were frustrated by the delays to

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<sup>158</sup> Participant B

<sup>159</sup> McCann, I.L., and Pearlman, L.A. 'Vicarious traumatization: A framework for understanding the psychological effects of working with victims'. *Journal of Traumatic Stress*, 3 (1990) pp.131 - 149.

<sup>160</sup> McCann, and Pearlman, 'Vicarious traumatization'

<sup>161</sup> Participant A, my italics

their work. Whether participation resulted in support for the system or not, members who participated regularly in meetings seem much more likely to have bonded with the organisation.

### Collective identity and personal identities

Snow and McAdam suggest that their pre-existing identities and interests affect the manner in which a collective identity is adopted and create variations in collective identity. All the participants had previously been involved in feminism to varying degrees, Participant I was an academic feminist, Participant M was in a feminist reading group as well as UCT's Women's Movement, and participants B and F had both been interested in feminism and women's issues, but had not previously joined groups. Pre-existing interest in feminism suggests that these members would be supportive of the feminist element of Rape Crisis's identity. However, how it would translate into support for issues is more difficult to predict. Feminism is diverse and the type of feminism that prevailed in the organisation changed over the period, moving from liberal feminism in the early 1980s to a more radical or socialist position in the late 1980s.

Participants F and B had been involved in anti-apartheid groups before they joined. Predictably, Participant F supported Rape Crisis's involvement in anti-apartheid work. However by the time Participant B joined Rape Crisis the transition was under way and the anti-apartheid movement was changing form. Participant A, M and I supported involvement in anti-apartheid movement even though they had not been involved in anti-apartheid work before. Participants B, M and I joined or continued to be members other organisations after Rape Crisis. Participant B and I worked in gay rights organisations, Jewish organisations, and another counselling service. Participant M joined UWCO. Participant B and I both stated that they had had mixed experiences at Rape Crisis with some aspects being very negative. Participant I stated that she was wary of joining all women organisations. Interestingly, both participants had supported reform of the organisation, specifically a greater professionalism.

The influence of the collective identity that members developed during their time in the organisation is a function of its salience<sup>162</sup>. All the participants indicated that while they had been in Rape Crisis it had been very important to them. Both Participant B and I indicated that while they were members the organisation was central to them: 'Rape Crisis became everything to me at that point...'<sup>163</sup> Participants F, M and A indicated that their development had been profoundly affected by the organisation: 'Joining Rape Crisis changed my life'<sup>164</sup>. These accounts support Whittier's claim that collective identities endure after the activist has left the movement that nurtured them.

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<sup>162</sup> Salience is composed of the frequency with which the identity is used and its importance to the holder.

<sup>163</sup> Participant B

<sup>164</sup> Participant M

Rape Crisis was important to its lesbian members because it provided one of the few safe organisational spaces for them to express their sexuality. Four of the five participants were lesbian at the time of their membership in the organisation, with one participant not mentioning her sexuality. However, all socialised with fellow members of Rape Crisis and according to Stryker this should have both increased the frequency with which the identity was used and increased its importance to members because it was associated with their social group.

### Micro cohorts

There is strong evidence that the collective identity developed by Rape Crisis members was highly salient and some of the accounts from the participants indicate that Rape Crisis affected their perspective permanently. Rape Crisis's recruitment process with the mandatory training course seems ideal for the cultivation of micro cohorts. However, when the participants were asked about groups that formed within the organisation, none mentioned a shared years of entry or training course as a factor. Participant M felt the key division while she was a member was between those who focused on the internal health of the organisation and members like herself who wanted to be more politically involved. Participant I agreed with Participant M and claimed there were also groups based on area of specialisation within Rape Crisis (education, counselling, or battered women), as well as social groups, people in partnerships, and some lesbian groups.

Again it's evident that the practice of mixing new and experienced members prevented the development of temporally based micro cohorts. Further, lesbian relationships that emerged within the organisation often developed between members who joined at different times. In Whittier's study the organisations involved seem to have kept clearer boundaries between micro cohorts<sup>165</sup>. In Rape Crisis, once the training course was complete, members were expected to become involved in all aspects of organisation and to play an equal role. Although older members did have more experience, this did not prevent new members running projects or taking up prominent roles.

Whittier suggests that the variations in collective identity led to different perceptions and decisions. To some extent the evidence from Rape Crisis supports this. For example, the maintenance-orientated group supported internal strengthening of the organisation over involvement in the anti-apartheid movement. They believed the best way to promote Rape Crisis's work was to maintain a strong independent organisation that could put forward Rape Crisis's views. Those in favour of alliances argued that gender-based violence was linked to violence in general and the best way to promote Rape Crisis's views was to link up with anti-apartheid. The two groups also perceived the anti-apartheid groups differently. Those opposed to forging alliances argued that these groups were not feminist. Those supporting

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<sup>165</sup> For example, the 'founder' micro cohort of 1972-3 referred to the 'joiner' micro cohort who joined the organisations they founded as 'baby feminists'.



the alliance argued there were feminists in the anti-apartheid movement, especially among the women's organisations: 'I think there was in the broad struggle a feminist strand, then the exiles came back with quite strong feminist views.'<sup>166</sup> However, on other issues, such as professionalism within the organisation, membership in these groups did not predict position.

There were divisions within micro cohorts over tactics, but it is important not to overstate the importance of these. Individuals remained free to decide whether to focus on Rape Crisis or to work with anti-apartheid organisations. The only debate that would have affected all members was the professionalization and decision-making debate that emerged at the end of the period. An important question for the next period is whether this debate was characterised by divisions based on length of membership because this would support Whittier's micro cohort thesis, and whether it is possible to identify changes in the internal or external conditions that helped to prompt a change in perspective.

### **Rape Crisis and Generational Theory: conclusion**

A collective identity has to have clear boundaries to be effective and the training course provided this for Rape Crisis. The training course also provided the basis of the collective identity developed by Rape Crisis members. The content of the course changed over this period, becoming more focused on feminist theory and organisational issues. This suggests that members who joined after these changes would be inclined to view issues such as internal democracy as of similar importance to providing services to clients.

Although public speaking and training were identified as the most enjoyable aspects of Rape Crisis's work, it seems that the counselling work had a greater impact on members. This contradicts McAdam and Snow's claim that framing activities are the most important in the formation of collective identity. Although framing activities did provide women with a new perspective – participant M referred to "light bulbs going on" over women's heads during the training course – the emotional impact of counselling was much greater. Snow and McAdam neglect the importance of emotion in their work on identity and framing, focusing instead on cognitive elements. This leads to an underestimation of the importance of emotion in forming a collective identity.

The salience of Rape Crisis's collective identity was affected by the presence of networks to reinforce it. All the participants interviewed from this period were single and childless during their time at Rape Crisis; the majority were lesbian; they all had pre-existing ties to feminism and they all socialised with fellow Rape Crisis members. This implies that their pre-existing beliefs, social network, and in many cases their personal relationships, supported their collective identity as a Rape Crisis member and helped it to become highly salient. The participants then may represent the section of Rape Crisis membership that held the strongest collective identity. However, they did not indicate in their interviews that either their

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<sup>166</sup> Participant M

background or level of involvement was unusual. Instead they indicated that many members were heavily involved in the organisation, suggesting that Rape Crisis's members often had a very strong collective identity.

Whittier's theory should not be dismissed, but there do not appear to be micro cohorts in Rape Crisis in the form she suggests. This could be because organisational practices such as involving all volunteers as quickly and deeply as possible helped to submerge the micro cohort identity by integrating cohorts. McAdam and Snow's observation about the impact of pre-existing identities and interests on the way in which a collective identity is adopted suggests another reason that cohort identity might not be clear-cut.

Although micro cohorts did not predict position on issues, there was a link between perspective and decision making, indicating that collective identity played a role. Both those supporting and opposing alliances had contact with members of anti-apartheid groups, but their perceptions of them were very different. Yet these two groups of perceptions, that suggest the existence of a collective identity, did not result in constant group behaviour.

The conditions for the emergence of a new generation of activists were present in the early 1990s. The external conditions had shifted dramatically, creating new political opportunities for the organisation and exploiting these opportunities changed the demands on the organisation. The internal situation also changed with a financial crisis depriving the organisation of workers and leaving a small group to maintain the organisation. If a new generation with a distinct collective identity emerged then an important part of Whittier's theory will have been vindicated

## **Chapter Four**

### **Rape Crisis 1993 – 2000: Expansion**

Rape Crisis changed dramatically over this period from volunteer controlled non-hierarchical organisation to an organisation that is controlled by a board of trustees and director. It became a hierarchical organisation in which volunteers play an important but limited role. The first director resigned from the organisation in March of 2000 and this event marks the end of the period covered in this thesis. Despite the financial crisis at the start of the period, by 1995 Rape Crisis had as many paid staff as it had in 1990 and by 1997 it had 14 paid staff spread across three offices. It was able to buy two properties to act as offices, one in Observatory and another in Khayelitsha.

The early 1990s was a period of dramatic change across South Africa. The changes in the external environment around Rape Crisis would prompt all three of the theories discussed here to predict that the organisation itself would change. Resource mobilisation theory and political process theory argue that organisations and the activists that control them perceive change and respond in a similar manner to it because they are 'rational'. However, in generational theory this process is mediated. The dramatic external change leads to the creation of a new collective identity among activists joining the movement and this results in the new activists perceiving the situation differently and advocating different responses. At the beginning of 1993 Rape Crisis was reduced to 10 active members, creating great scope for new members with a different perspective to enter and influence the organisation.

#### **Overview**

The table below summarises the situation over this period. The actors Rape Crisis was dealing with changed greatly over this period. There was an increase in the openness of state institutions during the transition period and after. The anti-apartheid movement and the ANC shifted from being an opposition movement to being political leaders. Civil society changed as organisations that had focused on apartheid changed focus or joined political groupings. Large numbers of skilled people left the SMS and civil society and moved into government and state institutions. Apartheid ceased to be the dominant issue, creating greater space for other issues in the SMS. The issue of gender-based violence and gender equality became more prominent.

The changes in Rape Crisis's internal structure seem to have been partly prompted by the external changes, however the desire to create a more professional counselling service was evident in the 1980s. Rape Crisis was able to become a 'mainstream' organisation, but this required an upgrading of its counselling service and this in turn required professional staff to deliver training. The organisation also had greater advocacy opportunities and exploiting them required increasing organisational capacity and reliability. However, none of the external

changes dictated the form of internal reforms. Rape Crisis could have become a modified collective investing increased power in steering committee or staff, but retaining members' voting power on key decisions.

<b>1992 – 2000</b>	
<b>External</b>	
Relations with authorities.	Fair
Ability to influence relevant institutions (medical, police, judicial).	Fair
Relations with mixed sex anti-apartheid organisations.	Reasonable
Relations with women only anti-apartheid organisations.	Fair
<b>Internal</b>	
Organisational structure	Hierarchy with structured participation
Maximum number of paid posts.	14 (1997)
Key debates	Structure, racism and professionalization.

### **Sources**

The information used in this section is drawn from interviews with women who were members during this period and documents created at the time both by members of the organisation and by external sources. The newsletter ended in 1993 and was replaced for a couple of years by workers' reports and minutes that were sent out to members to keep them abreast of the organisation's work. The workers' reports do not provide the insight into the volunteers that the newsletter did because there is no space for volunteers to contribute articles or write letters to the organisation. Unfortunately, the minutes from the general meeting, steering committee and sub groups for the first 3 years of this period do not appear to have been well archived, there are minutes from June 1993–July 1994 but none from 1995 or 1996. From 1997 the amount of documentary evidence increases, with minute books and a variety of internally created reports on workshops, services, and alliances available. The archives have also been divided recently because the directorship moved to the Heideveld office and the director needed some of the archives to be based there for consultation. It is also possible that some archives have been destroyed to create more storage space in workers' offices.

Letter	Role(s) in Rape Crisis	Period of involvement
B	Volunteer, counselling coordinator	1992-1995
C	Training and Public Awareness coordinator, volunteer, board member	1994-1996 1997-1998 2001 -
E	Volunteer, Training and Public Awareness coordinator	1998 -
F	Volunteer, Chair of Steering Committee	1988-2001
H	Volunteer, change management team member, Advocacy coordinator	1996-1998 1999 -
K	Volunteer; director	1982-87, 1996-2000
L	Volunteer, Secretary and Chair of Steering Committee	1993-1996
N	Researcher at University of Cape Town.	

## **Rape Crisis and Resource Mobilisation Theory**

Over this period South Africa's SMS began operating under what Zald considers normal circumstances: a capitalist system with a rational legal bureaucratic state that is separate from civil society<sup>167</sup>. However, the majority of organisations in South Africa had emerged under unusual circumstances and the skills, tactics and structures that had developed to operate under the apartheid regime's oppression were not suitable to the new era<sup>168</sup>. Rape Crisis had also functioned for most of its history during a period of social unrest when the state was preoccupied with suppressing dissidents. Despite this, Rape Crisis had been subject to relatively little repression and could be expected to make the transition to a post-apartheid era better than many organisations that had focused on the anti-apartheid struggle.

### **Environment**

At the beginning of this period it was unclear what role civil society, especially those sections of civil society associated with the anti-apartheid struggle, would play. South African civil society was bloated with people and organisations that under less repressive circumstances would have chosen to situate themselves in the political arena rather than civil society<sup>169</sup>. It also contained many organisations that performed functions that the state would normally perform, such as people's courts for settling disputes<sup>170</sup>. Whether civil society would continue

<sup>167</sup> Mayer N. Zald and Roberta Ash Garner, 'The Political Economy of Social Movement Sectors,' in Zald and McCarthy, *Social Movements in a Organisational Society*

<sup>168</sup> Khehla Shubane, 'Whither civil society formations?' *Civil Society After Apartheid – proceedings of conference convened by the Centre for Policy Studies on the role and status of civil society in post apartheid South Africa* (eds) Richard Humphrey and Maxine Reitzes 1996

<sup>169</sup> Ran Greenstein, Volkhart Heinrich, and Kumi Naido, 'The state of civil society in South Africa: past legacies, present realities and future prospects' Researched for South African national NGO Coalition by Community Agency for Social Enquiry ([Johannesburg]: CASE, 1998) p.6

<sup>170</sup> Tom Lodge, *Politics in South Africa: from Mandela to Mbeki* (Cape Town: David Philips, 2002) p.205.

to have a key role in national politics, or continue to provide services traditionally associated with the state, was unclear.

Some civil society actors such as UWCO did enter the political arena by merging into returning political parties. However, the emergence of South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) signalled that many organisations that had been affiliated to the UDF wished to remain in civil society and to contribute to the transition from there. Civil society, including SMS personnel, played a key role in helping the ANC to develop policy during the transition period<sup>171</sup>, particularly the Reconstruction and Development Plan. The RDP seemed to guarantee a large role for civil society (including social movements) in future policy making and implementation<sup>172</sup> and the ANC seemed supportive of this role<sup>173</sup>. However, following the election SANCO suffered a loss of skilled personnel, and was excluded from the ANC's alliance post 1995. Its role was formally curtailed in 1996 when the ANC unveiled the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) plan to replace RDP.

The failure of the SANCO to entrench a role for itself did not affect Rape Crisis greatly. Participant F commented that; 'We had the WNC, the Attorney General's Task Group on Rape and the ability to organize in the VAW sector.'

The demands that international donors made of South African organisations changed in the post 1994 period. Financial transparency was demanded from organisations and clear lines of accountability. Activists lacked the skills necessary to implement these changes and many of the most competent activists had moved into state or government posts<sup>174</sup>. International donors began to focus their funding on state initiatives. Where funding did continue to NGOs it was often for specific projects and this meant organisation had to be capable of generating long term plans.

### The gender based-violence social movement industry in the 1990s

In contrast to the uncertain future faced by many struggle organisations, those focusing on gender-based violence benefited from the change of donor priorities. Donors like the Ford Foundation, ICCO and Community Heart began to focus on gender-based violence. However, Rape Crisis, like the rest of the SMS in South Africa was subject to pressure for donors to increase accountability and to adjust to a funding environment that was project driven. These demands helped to shape its internal reforms.

The issue of gender-based violence also became much more prominent domestically in the 90s. Improved community-police relationships and attempts by the SAPS to set up specialised units probably increased reporting levels. The reported rape rate rose from 29,399

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<sup>171</sup> Greenstein, Heinrich, and Naido, 'The state of civil society in South Africa' p.21

<sup>172</sup> 'Taken together, these waves of human personnel and skill leaving the ranks of civil society have had a destabilising effect on the work and structure of many organisations.' Greenstein, Heinrich, and Naido, 'The state of civil society in South Africa' p.25

<sup>173</sup> ANC 'A New Style of Government,' in *1994 Election Manifesto of the African National Congress*. (np, 1994)

<sup>174</sup> Greenstein, Heinrich, and Naido, 'The state of civil society in South Africa' p.36

in 1994 to 37,905 in 1997. Rape Crisis's Director commented in 1997 that gender issues were receiving more attention in the political arena than ever before<sup>175</sup>.

This increase in funding, combined with a rise in interest in the subject, led to a predictable increase in the number of SMOs in the gender-based violence SMI. Some entrants were new organisations like Ilitha Labantu, others were former anti-apartheid organisations that changed their focus, such as the Black Sash. This fits with resource mobilisation theory's predictions that a rise in funding will prompt new SMOs to enter an SMI. In 1995 CAB (Coordinated Action for Battered Women), the organisation that had been involved in the foundation of Rape Crisis's shelter changed its name to Network Empowering Women Against Violence (NEWAVE), and became the Western Cape arm of a national network of organisations involved in the gender-based violence field. Its first director was a former Rape Crisis member. When NEWAVE held its first regional conference over 100 organisations were represented<sup>176</sup>.

Resource mobilisation suggests that competition is normal in most SMIs, rather than co-operation. In previous chapters it was suggested that Rape Crisis co-operated with other organisations because they were not in direct competition. The organisations were operating in different areas to Rape Crisis or had different specialisations. The emergence of 100 organisations in the same industry and the same region, vying for similar donors, changed this situation. Yet there is no indication in the workers' reports or meeting minutes that Rape Crisis felt threatened by this development.

Resource mobilisation theory can explain this odd reaction. It suggests that older, established SMOs tend to fare better than new arrivals because of the superior skills base they have developed in fundraising and managing followers. Established organisations are more likely to be perceived as legitimate by other actors.<sup>177</sup> Rape Crisis appears to have gained legitimacy among many people who were now in government because of its work promoting the gender-based violence issue among progressive organisations. 'RCs former political profile definitely paid off as we were now seen by state institutions as the most credible stake holders on issues of sexual assault.'<sup>178</sup>

This legitimacy helped Rape Crisis form alliances with other prominent organisations in order to make joint submission to enquiries, commissions and the like. By 1997 the Director was able to note in her 'Vision'<sup>179</sup> document that Rape Crisis was perceived by donors as being able to affect government policy and was therefore attracting funds from donors to lobby. Thus, Rape Crisis did not mind new organisations emerging in its SMI because they did not

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<sup>175</sup> Carol Bower, 'Vision Document for Presentation at the May Planning Weekend,' in *Rape Crisis Internal Report* (np: 1997)

<sup>175</sup> Participant M

<sup>176</sup> Bronwyn Pithey 'Workers Report'. *Rape Crisis Workers' Reports* (np, 1995) October

<sup>177</sup> McCarthy and Zald 'Resource mobilisation and social movements' p.34

<sup>178</sup> Participant F, written addition to her interview.

<sup>179</sup> Bower, 'Vision Document for Presentation at the May Planning Weekend,'

enjoy the same profile or reputation as it did and it benefited from the increasing importance of the sector.

Another danger faced by organisations in expanding SMIs is that the goals and tactics of the new members will prove more appealing to supporters and this will force other SMOs in the industry to adjust their tactics and goals. This does not seem to have happened to Rape Crisis. Although it did adjust its tactics over this period there is nothing to suggest that this was in response to the success of other SMOs.

## Gains and Problems

At a policy level, Rape Crisis experienced great gains<sup>180</sup> and the director's comments in her 1998/1999 annual report seem justified:

Rape Crisis Cape Town's credibility, and thus its influence with regard to the development of legislation, policy and procedure around rape and sexual assault issues, has reached significant heights, both nationally and internationally.

All these opportunities allowed it to influence the development of policy and guidelines that related to the treatment of rape complainants and accused rapists. 'Post apartheid there is essentially a Rape Crisis understanding of violence against women reigns... it hasn't necessarily percolated throughout society... Rape Crisis's agenda became the state agenda.'<sup>181</sup> Rape Crisis succeeded in influencing the content of policy and saw some legislation passed that promoted its views.

There was no clearly defined counter movement to Rape Crisis during this period, yet policies have often not been implemented. For example, the legislation concerning the granting of bail has been amended to prevent rape suspects being released unless there are pressing reasons why this will aid the cause of justice: in practice, bail has been granted in most cases. Convincing Magistrates to implement guidelines has remained a problem for Rape Crisis.

It has become pretty apparent that many of the problems we are experiencing with the court system lie with the magistrates who are fairly untouchable group. We are currently looking at our available avenues of recourse to challenge them.<sup>182</sup>

Even prosecutors and magistrates at the sexual offences court in Wynberg that Rape Crisis helped establish, often deviate from national policy for the handling of rape complainants<sup>183</sup>.

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<sup>180</sup> At a provincial level it was part of the Attorney General's research and monitoring project (1994), the Attorney General's Forum (1995), the Attorney General's symposium on Rape (1996). It extended its program of police training and tried to extend the program to prosecutors (1996, prosecutors in Mitchell's Plain were trained). At a national level, Rape Crisis made a joint submission with Pregs Govender (Chair of the Portfolio Committee on the Quality of Life and Status of Women) for amendments to the law on sexual offences. Rape Crisis was part of a group commissioned to write a discussion document on the legal aspects of rape for the Deputy Minister Of Justice. It was represented on the South African Law Commission's project committee rewriting the sexual offences bill and helped rewrite the sentencing and bail guidelines. It helped create the Domestic Violence Act (1999). At an international level Rape Crisis contributed an 'invited expert' to help draft recommendations to the UN for reducing gender-based violence (1998).

<sup>181</sup> Participant M

<sup>182</sup> Bronwyn Pithey, 'Workers Report'. *Rape Crisis's Workers' Reports* (np: 1995) July



Rape Crisis did manage to increase its access to the police, employing a full time police trainer on a six-month contract in 1998. However, the pilot scheme was not made permanent and in 2000 a directive was issued suspending the involvement of NGOs in police training.

The opposition that Rape Crisis faced, from the late 1990s on, was no longer based in formal institutional resistance to change. The organisation had to adapt its tactics to focus on resistance by individuals within key institutions such as the police and judiciary. The tactic it adopted was the creation of the Advocacy (1996) and Criminal Justice Liaison posts (1999). These workers were tasked with conducting advocacy with service providers and providing training for them. In addition, the organisation tried to strengthen the Independent Complaints Commission.

### Infrastructure and resources

Rape Crisis's infrastructure changed radically during this period. The initial changes were planned by 7 of the 10 active members left in the organisation at the beginning of 1993. Of this group only 2 had been members prior to 1991. This group decided to reintroduce the Steering Committee to act as a management group and ensure accountability and efficiency in the organisation. The Steering Committee was officially responsible to the General Meeting, but its re-introduction ended the flat organisational structure. Members of the group also suggested a radical reduction in the number and importance of general meetings, confining them exclusively to decisions regarding principles and holding them only once every two months. All other decisions were to be referred to the relevant focus group<sup>184</sup>. This suggestion was rejected

The seven decided to change the organisation's policy by allowing non-members to apply for positions within the organisation. They employed a non-member as the administrator and fundraiser. They decided that Rape Crisis would focus exclusively on rape rather than duplicating services available elsewhere. The affiliation to CMH was ended to give the organisation greater control over its finances. However, the most dramatic decision to emerge from the weekend was the decision to split Rape Crisis into two autonomous organisations. Rape Crisis Observatory to provide counselling and Rape Crisis Cape Town to provide public education, training and advocacy.

The aim of this restructuring was to allow the organisation to expand: the minutes of the meeting refer to a Peninsula wide network of centres<sup>185</sup>. The idea was that the counselling organisation would appeal to a broader range of women than it did currently if it was separated from Rape Crisis's activist image. Likewise, the activist organisation would benefit

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<sup>183</sup> Sharon Stanton, Margot Lochrenberg, Veronica Mukasa, 'Improved Justice For Survivors Of Sexual Violence? Adult Survivors Experience of the Wynberg Sexual Offences Court and Associated Services'. ([Cape Town]: Rape Crisis, 1997)

Kelley Mout 'The Court Doors May Be Open But Lies Beyond Those Doors? An Observation of the Workings of The Wynberg Sexual Offences Court', University of Cape Town Honours Thesis ([Cape Town]: unpublished, 2000)

<sup>184</sup> Rape Crisis 'Rape Crisis Weekend Away: Greyton 2<sup>nd</sup> to 4th July' (np: 1993)

<sup>185</sup> Rape Crisis 'Rape Crisis Weekend Away: Greyton 2<sup>nd</sup> to 4th July'

because it would not have to provide labour for the counselling service<sup>186</sup>. This proposal was rational from a resource perspective because it would allow the service organisation to exploit the growth in the sentiment pool<sup>187</sup> opposing gender-based violence. Meanwhile, those members who wanted to continue to promote Rape Crisis's often controversial message were free to do so. The division also made sense from a financial standpoint: counselling's funds came predominantly from local donors whereas international groups often financed education work. The split did not happen because the counselling coordinator employed after the decision and the new volunteers who joined in 1993 rejected it.

## Structural change and internal tension

In 1994 a dispute between longer-term volunteers in the organisation and the staff and steering committee forced more structural change. The staff were eventually granted formal power over the volunteers (1995), this resulted in longer-term volunteers leaving. The transition proved very difficult. Initially, in 1994, staff were given responsibility for day to day decisions and were reminded that they were not allowed to order volunteers around. This did not satisfy the older volunteers. At the end of 1994 Rape Crisis employed CDRA to help manage the conflict. CDRA did succeed in getting an open discussion of the problems within the organisation but did not manage to formulate a solution. Eventually in 1995 a former member, who was a change consultant, was employed. Following her recommendations the decision was taken to appoint a director and create a hierarchal organisation.

The practical reasons for these decisions were that donors were demanding a more accountable structure and the greater workload of Rape Crisis required a more efficient decision making system. Further, if the organisation wanted to expand it needed to be more efficient and able to make credible commitment to carrying out long-term projects.

The decision was traumatic and some members left the organisation. Washkansky's research indicated that there was ambivalence to the introduction of a formal hierarchy among many members.

A hierarchal management structure with different levels of authority is associated with principles of business, which in turn is associated with patriarchy, and male domination. The need firstly to distance themselves from these associations and secondly, to maintain group cohesion can be seen to contribute to ambivalent feelings toward authorities.

Rape Crisis's work helped to create the need for cohesion and "solidary" incentives. This in turn helped create opposition to the creation of a hierarchy. According to participant F the change consultant made a similar point during her work at Rape Crisis. She argued that because members had been supported and nurtured by Rape Crisis they felt betrayed and angry when the organisation stopped providing this support.

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<sup>186</sup> Rape Crisis 'Steering Committee minutes' 14/01/1994 (np: 1993)

<sup>187</sup> This term refers to the number of people who felt that the SMO's goals accord with their own, McCarthy and Zald 'Resource mobilisation and social movements' p.32

Rape Crisis's work also impacted deeply upon attitudes towards power in the organisation. Washkansky argued that members of Rape Crisis identified strongly with the survivors rather than the rapists. In some ways the counsellors share the experience of the victim especially their powerlessness.

Power becomes associated with the power of abuse, and thus taking on any form of power might threaten the identification with the victim and align the members of the organisation with the perpetrator.<sup>188</sup>

Thus members of Rape Crisis often had an ambivalent attitude toward decision-makers in the organisation. This is reflected in Washkansky's reports by the hostility directed at the Steering Committee by members. Despite the reservations about hierarchy and inequalities of power within the organisation, Washkansky discovered recognition that a hierarchical structure was needed

Members were describing (not by name) a hierarchical structure as something that was needed in the organisation. When it was pointed out that they were describing a 'hierarchy' members attempted to find alternative solutions in avoidance of accepting patriarchal ideology they perceive to be lying behind the concept.<sup>189</sup>

The implementation of the plan was delayed until 1996 when sufficient funding was raised to employ a director. A director was appointed at the end of 1996. Initially she was responsible to the Steering Committee and the General Meeting. This created a circular management structure as members and staff were accountable to the director and holding the director accountable. A Board of Trustees was appointed in 1998 to help resolve this problem. Unsurprisingly, there was unrest after the appointment of the director and the staff adopted an antagonistic stance towards the director. The staff were also used to a high degree of autonomy and had to adjust to the creation of management structure above them. In response to the unease a change management team was established in 1997 to 'co-ordinate and facilitate a process of transformation'<sup>190</sup>.

### Conforming to resource mobilisation's predictions?

Under what Zald and McCarthy describe as normal circumstances, the pressures on Rape Crisis prompted it to adopt a form that is similar to that they describe in their essays. Rape Crisis also began to express ambitions that accorded with those that resource mobilisation predicts. For example, focusing on expansion instead of goals such as internal democracy and empowering members.

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<sup>188</sup> Denise Washkansky *Helping the Helper: A Psychodynamic Exploration into the Experience of working in an Organisation Dealing with Rape*, Psychology Honours Project, University of Cape Town (Cape Town: NP, 1996) p.29

<sup>189</sup> *Ibid* p.31

<sup>190</sup> Rape Crisis 'CMT Report May 1997' (np: 1997) May

The director displayed an articulate leadership style, focusing on targeting new donors and forming alliances that would help Rape Crisis achieve its aims. She also spent a lot of time resolving organisational issues. She recruited a board of trustees and put in place a deed of trust. However, this work was necessary administration rather than mobilising leadership focusing on the uniqueness of Rape Crisis. The planning documents from this period indicate that Rape Crisis began to act in an entrepreneurial fashion. The organisation held workshops to try to assess the external environment and to spot opportunities. This again suggests that part of the reason that Rape Crisis's behaviour in early periods does not match that predicted by resource mobilisation theory was because the organisation was working in an environment that differed significantly from the environment in which resource mobilisation theory was generated

The director resigned from Rape Crisis in March 2000 because of a lack of trust between herself and the board. As the director had not had any voting power on the board it was possible for them to override her decisions in the event of a dispute. 'The board and I found it difficult to work together ... what was needed at Rape Crisis was there be a director in place who had been appointed by the board, so I resigned'<sup>191</sup>

### Becoming diverse

Rape Crisis succeeded in opening two offices over this period. The first, in Khayelitsha, offered both a counselling and a public education service and was opened in 1994. The second office (Heideveld) opened in 1996 and provided a public education service while referring counselling cases to Observatory. The two offices were first referred to as 'satellite' offices and later as branch offices. They appear to have been perceived as subordinate to the main office. They had inferior resources in terms of office equipment. Although the workers from the offices were formally allowed to join management structures poor transport and the timetabling of these meetings effectively excluded them.

Khayelitsha faced the most pressing problems. According to Participant F Rape Crisis realised that its counselling model was not wholly appropriate for Khayelitsha. It had tried to identify an alternative model either from among the township based anti-rape organisations or internationally. The exercise failed so the Khayelitsha worker was given six months to canvass local organisations and find out whether they felt a counselling service was needed. This exercise produced a positive response and so a counselling program was set up based on Observatory's. However, it took a long time for the service to attract significant numbers of clients and some workers in Observatory felt the Khayelitsha worker was shirking her responsibilities.

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<sup>191</sup> Participant K

(A) lot of the programs that had been implemented from the historical model... and the historical model was that Observatory office was the most long standing and ... the Khayelitsha office's were simply duplicates of that.<sup>192</sup>

Further, the Khayelitsha office was initially situated in a building shared by several NGOs and had a problem with theft that raised the suspicion of some staff at the Observatory office<sup>193</sup>. The office equipment was often in use by other organisations so the worker's reports and other correspondence were often late. This increased the perception in the Observatory office that the worker in Khayelitsha was shirking her responsibilities.

Two successive workers in the Observatory offices were asked to take on responsibility of helping their colleague in Khayelitsha to manage the Khayelitsha project. Both indicated that many of the problems stemmed from the lack of contact between Observatory and Khayelitsha. Very few people from Observatory went to Khayelitsha, and were unaware of the situation. Participant C felt she was asked to liase between Observatory and Khayelitsha because she was black and the organisation was trying to protect itself from charges of racism.

I was horrified with the way [the Khayelitsha worker] was dealt with when I was employed I was asked to sort of manage [the Khayelitsha worker], now how can you bring in a new person who's on the same level as, as a colleague of hers and ask her to manage that colleague ... and the reason asking me was that I'm also black, so let's bring in another black person to manage a black person ... and then we can't be charged with racism...<sup>194</sup>

The office in Heideveld was less problematic than the Khayelitsha office possibly because the worker who founded it was already well known to most people in Rape Crisis. It was the Heideveld worker who objected to the branch offices exclusion from the Change Management Team<sup>195</sup>. The response from the team was that Heideveld and Khayelitsha were responsible for failing to apply to the team when it was founded. They conceded the team should make greater efforts to keep Heideveld and Khayelitsha informed of decisions.

### The danger of "solidary" incentives

The tension experienced by the staff indicates the presence of tensions that Zald and McCarthy argue stem from a heterogeneous support base and membership. They comment that organisations that unite 'beneficiary' and 'conscience' constituents in a federated chapter structure are often subject to tension<sup>196</sup>. Referring back to Zald and McCarthy's definitions we find the 'conscience' constituents are assumed to be part of the resource rich elite and

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<sup>192</sup> Participant J

<sup>193</sup> Participant H

<sup>194</sup> My italics

<sup>195</sup> Rape Crisis, 'Minutes of the Change Management Team Meeting of Rape Crisis, Cape Town Held at 23 Trill Road on 21 August 1997 at 18h00' (np: 1997) p.1

<sup>196</sup> McCarthy and Zald, 'Resource mobilisation and social movement', p.33

'beneficiary' constituents are assumed to be based in the 'mass' resource poor group<sup>197</sup>. The groups are also assumed to come from different communities and this is supposed to promote the development of cliques.

The lack of understanding between members based at Observatory and the branch offices is similar to what the pair describe as marking the interaction of predominantly white middle class participants of the civil rights movement and the mixed class black members. Reviewing the members of the steering committee and the change management team it also becomes apparent that the management of Rape Crisis was overwhelmingly elected from the Observatory office and was predominantly white. The problem that emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s with the dominance of lesbians in the staff positions and unofficial positions of leadership was rehashed. This time with 'insider' status was seemingly based on racial identity and office membership as well.

It ties directly into the issues of race and culture... lesbian feminist white women would be the ones who were committing the time doing more of the talking were opening or closing the doors to other people to reach that level... in any place in the world that you go the power is held by very small groups of people...<sup>198</sup>

The issue of organisational culture also re-emerged as the volunteer body became more representative. The branch offices drew a wider range of women into the organisation. All these women were entitled to attend the general meeting, and transport was provided. While the general meeting continued this helped to make the general meetings more mixed. Further, the organisation introduced payments for volunteers who remained over six months and this removed the financial barrier that prevented many women from devoting time to the organisation. The memberships of the Observatory branch also became more mixed. The change in the membership of the organisation prompted changes in the organisational culture. In 1998 there were a series of staff workshops to confront racism in the organisation.

From '97/'98 ... the organisation had to start to look at what the hell is going on ... what the impact of ... the expectation that this our culture and people fit into it... problems which is typically related to apartheid which is the assumption made by the white minority that my reality is their reality... we'd opened the Khayelitsha office...and Heideveld in '97 so there was also this move of opening new offices that started to really challenge the culture of the organisation, firstly the assumption that Observatory was the place where everything happened, which was the initial thinking ...so really starting to challenge the supremacy of this one geographical space that held most of the resources and decision makers.<sup>199</sup>

The challenge extended beyond the make-up and behaviour of the leadership to the membership. Towards the end of this period there seems to have been a reduction in the level of socialising between members, particularly in the Observatory office. The bar-based

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<sup>197</sup> Ibid p.24

<sup>198</sup> Participant H

<sup>199</sup> Participant J

socialising of the previous periods was perceived as unsuitable because it fostered division in the membership, but nothing has emerged to take its place<sup>200</sup>. The dangers of basing a socially diverse organisation on “solidary” incentives became clear. Another factor that supported a shift away from “solidary” incentives was the progress made during this period toward many of Rape Crisis’s goals. McCarthy and Zald suggest that an SMO that is achieving its targets has less need for “solidary” incentives.

The volunteers joining Rape Crisis in this period changed not only in terms of the communities that were represented but also in terms of the academic backgrounds. From 1994 onward a greater proportion of the applicants were drawn from social work and psychology backgrounds because experience at Rape Crisis was perceived as a good way to help secure entrance into a master’s programme<sup>201</sup>. The acceptance of these graduates into the organisation demonstrates that attitudes towards gaining personal benefit from the work had shifted dramatically since the early 80s.

Rape Crisis also sought to increase its legitimacy in the eyes of other role players by promoting a professional image. Concern about Rape Crisis’s image as a lesbian organisation led to an attempt to replace it with one of an efficient and credible service provider<sup>202</sup>. This transformation upset many members who felt that the organisation was sacrificing the communal atmosphere it had developed:

There was a lot of stuff that I found difficult when I came in the organisation was very unstructured, it was kind of laissez faire and it was a homely loving place for many people, I think a lot of people sought social stimulation there and I was there wanting to do the work more so I felt quite strongly that the organisation needed more structure and needed to be professionalized a bit more ... there were people who shared it but there were a lot of people who resisted quite strongly ... at some point the volunteers kind of had what we called the revolution, and sort of got very angry with the staff because.. we were moving in the professional direction and the volunteers wanted to hold onto the warm safe atmosphere that had been there before.<sup>203</sup>

From a resource mobilisation perspective the loss of ‘communal spirit’ in return for greater legitimacy seems an acceptable trade off. The organisation replaced the members it lost over the issue and arguably increased its ability to function.

## Donors and funding

Although gender-based violence did become a priority item for many donors Rape Crisis still faced several challenges. The administrator repeatedly warned the organisation that they were too dependent on foreign donors and needed to diversify their funding base. In 1997,

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<sup>200</sup> Participant H

<sup>201</sup> Confirmed by Participants B and L

<sup>202</sup> See participant F’s comments in previous chapter.

<sup>203</sup> Participant B

most foreign donors announced that they would no longer fund counselling because it was felt that the South African government should provide this service<sup>204</sup>. Many donors also announced they were scaling down their presence in South Africa. This forced Rape Crisis to try to increase its domestic funding base to fill the immediate shortfall and to begin looking for long-term domestic donors. Advocacy and professional training were both very popular with donors and Rape Crisis tried to maximise its activities in these areas in order to attract more funding. Rape Crisis also increased the revenues it generated from its own work by charging consultancy fees when state actors approached it for advice. It created a contingency fund to cover organisational costs in the event of a funding crisis.

McAdam accuses Zald and McCarthy of being too generous in their view of elite sponsors. He suggests that the pair view elite sponsors, like donor organisations, too benignly because donors will always seek to promote their own interests. However, Rape Crisis's problems with international donors did not lie in sinister alternative agendas being promoted by the donors. Instead, the problems Rape Crisis experienced resemble some of the problems McCarthy and Zald indicate are associated with conscience constituents. The international donors were involved in multiple issues and in multiple countries and this impacted on their commitment to fighting gender-based violence in South Africa, making Rape Crisis much more vulnerable to a shift in priorities.

### **Rape Crisis and Resource Mobilisation: conclusion**

This period marks the normalisation of civil society in South Africa and demonstrates that once the apartheid issue was resolved, rape and gender-based violence emerged as key issues. As resource mobilisation suggests, as donors began to prioritise the gender-based violence SMI it attracted new entrants. Further, Rape Crisis's status as an established SMO in its sector helped it to flourish despite the emergence of numerous other SMOs. It had to adapt to dealing with dispersed resistance to implementing reform, rather than an identifiable counter movement. It did this through a mixture of advocacy, training and attempting to strengthen watchdog bodies like the independent complaints commission.

The restructuring of Rape Crisis took place between 1993 and 1998 and was the result of several change processes. It led to the creation of a hierarchy within the organisation. The motivation for these changes appears to have been a desire to expand and to become more efficient in service provision. The infrastructure of Rape Crisis became more output focused and less concerned with promoting internal democracy. These changes indicate the leadership of the organisation had begun to behave in a manner that resembled the entrepreneurial leadership style described by Zald and McCarthy.

The treatment of members, specifically the introduction of payments and the tolerance of members who wanted to improve their career prospects by volunteering, could indicate that

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<sup>204</sup> Bower, 'Vision Document for Presentation at the May Planning Weekend,'



the organisation felt its volunteers were cost sensitive. These changes also reflect the recognition by the organisation that if it wanted to recruit and retain volunteers in previously disadvantaged communities it had to compensate them.

As the membership of the organisation became more diverse the power of the Observatory office was challenged, as were organisational practices that had placed members from the branches at a disadvantage. The organisational culture was also challenged as it was seen as encouraging cliques. The use in previous time periods of "solidary" incentives thus proved problematic in this period.

This chapter has noted that, under what Zald and McCarthy describe as 'normal' circumstances, the organisation began to resemble much more closely the structure of organisations they describe. The goals pursued by the movement also moved closer to ones they would predict. However, if the post 1994 period had been characterised by the neglect of gender-based violence as much as the pre 1994 period had, would Rape Crisis have changed in this manner? Even if international donors had been keen to fund its programmes if its access to institutions had been limited, it arguably would not have expanded as much as it did or have diversified. Further, it would have been possible to meet donors' demand for accountability by improving record keeping within the organisation – it did not require the level of restructuring undertaken. So Rape Crisis's change may not have resulted from the creation of a 'normal' civil society environment, it had been relatively unaffected by repression anyway, but from the increased political opportunities it had over this period.

### **Rape Crisis and Political Process Theory**

From a political process perspective Rape Crisis was in a stronger position in this period than any previous. The apartheid issue was receding allowing other issues such as gender-based violence to move to the fore. This meant that if Rape Crisis was able to create a strong organisation it could help ensure gender-based violence became a major issue and exploit any political opportunities that resulted from the issue's greater status. If it succeeded it would be able to build on the confidence that had emerged in the previous period. Thus, Rape Crisis potentially had more control over the level of insurgency and the collective attributions of its members than in earlier times.

#### **Political opportunity and organisational strain**

Exploiting the increasing political opportunities in the late 1980s and early 1990s began to place strain on the organisation and brought existing issues to a head. The issue of power within the organisation re-emerged in 1994. Several older volunteers, who had returned to the organisation, objected to the power of the steering committee and the staff. This controversy led to the creation of a formal hierarchy that gave staff power over volunteers. This development increased the possibility of the organisation succumbing either to cooption or

oligarchy. It eroded the membership's control over decision-making and made it easier for management to make unpopular decisions.

There are no obvious examples of oligarchization, where organisational maintenance supplants other goals, over this period. However, what does emerge is that the management structures created were capable of making decision that alienated sections of the staff and volunteers. The handling of the problems with the Khayelitsha worker prompted her to write in her worker's report that, 'Rape Crisis consist of individuals who have got the prejudice and attitudes and it will take that individual to change. This is a new dispensation.'<sup>205</sup> The absence of the staff from the Heideveld and Khayelitsha offices from management structures until the late 1990s indicates that it was possible to unintentionally alienate staff.

The general meeting would not have counter-balanced the dominance of Observatory in management. The number of volunteers from the two branch offices remained small until after the board of trustees replaced the general meeting in 1998. In 1997 Khayelitsha had 10 volunteers and Heideveld 10<sup>206</sup>. The changes in structure almost certainly increased the chance of goal displacement in the long run.

### Cooption and alienation

Cooption refers to the replacement or alteration of organisational goals in response to the needs of a sponsor. The change in donor funding towards specified grants for proscribed projects did force Rape Crisis to change the way it worked but not its goals. A more insidious change was prompted by the organisation's desire to be accepted by state institutions. In previous periods annoying the authorities had been seen as positive, the emphasis in this period switched to co-operation. 'If you pissed off the authorities so much the better in a sense, you were doing something right, we were seen as militant but we took it as a compliment, we weren't ashamed of being feminist, we were quite vocally feminist.'<sup>207</sup>

Obviously the change in tactics was not itself bad; the organisation was working in a different context that required a different approach. However, the subsequent changes can be seen as displacing some of the goals of the organisation. After a long period of promoting the feminist view that experience rather than expertise is important, the organisation implemented a recruiting policy that stressed the importance of suitable formal qualifications. This arguably undercut some of the empowerment aims, for example, encouraging women to speak for themselves and not defer to 'experts'. The recruitment policy also reduced the chances for volunteer members to move into paid positions once they had accumulated enough experience. There was also a drive for members to appear more conventional, which manifested itself in concerns over dress<sup>208</sup>, literature and posters displayed in the office<sup>209</sup> and

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<sup>205</sup> Workers Report (np, 1996) June

<sup>206</sup> Tanya Goldman 'Rape Crisis Cape Town Impact Evaluation', (Cape Town: Community Agency for Social Enquiry, 2001) p.26.

<sup>207</sup> Participant F

<sup>208</sup> Participant F

the desire to overcome the image of the organisation as lesbian dominated<sup>210</sup>. These changes seem to undermine one of the goals of Rape Crisis, and other feminist organisations, of providing an alternative cultural space where women are freed from mainstream cultural expectations.

However, labelling this process as cooption is complicated by the recognition that the impetus for all these reforms existed within the organisation and pre-dated 1990s. As mentioned in previous chapters, Rape Crisis's constitution presented the organisation's aims as helping survivors both directly and by improving the services they received. The internal empowerment aims emerged later and were perceived by some members to override the survivors' interests in some cases: 'Possibly not always the best decisions were made in the interest of the client, sometimes decisions were made, you'd go with the group ... rather than standing up for what you believe in.'<sup>211</sup> It is possible that members of Rape Crisis who felt that clients were suffering as a result of the internal empowerment goals used the external changes in the 1990s to further their argument. These changes were not forced on the general membership. They took place before the general meeting was abolished, so members who objected had space to do so. Thus labelling these changes as cooption is, perhaps, misleading.

Further, it is worth noting that the 'cooption' described above did not involve Rape Crisis falling under the influence of the state bodies. In fact the reverse seems to be true: Rape Crisis's views became influential in these bodies. This confirms Schmitt's thesis that 'insider' movements are generally much more successful than 'outsider' movements<sup>212</sup>. The tactics used by Rape Crisis, assisting officials and writing legislation, are identical to the 'occupy and indoctrinate' tactics described by Schmitt as both typical of insider movements and much more successful than outsider tactics. Therefore some of the changes that can be seen as cooption of Rape Crisis by the mainstream were also tactics to help Rape Crisis win influence.

Deciding whether or not the changes in Rape Crisis alienated it from its indigenous support base is also very difficult, partly because the meaning of the term is not clear in this situation. McAdam's work suggests that the indigenous support base refers to members of organisations that originally supported the movement, in his example African Americans in the southern states of the United States who were members of groups that supported the movement<sup>213</sup>. Rape Crisis does not have obvious organisational origins, although it did later

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<sup>209</sup> Rape Crisis, 'Editorial', in *Rape Crisis Newsletter* (np: 1990) January

<sup>210</sup> Several of staff members commented that Rape Crisis losing its image as a lesbian dominated organisation had positive impact on the organisation. Goldman 'Rape Crisis Cape Town Impact Evaluation' p.6

<sup>211</sup> Participant B

<sup>212</sup> Insider movements are described as movements that seek to work with institutions to improve service delivery.

These organisations are typically 'institutional' meaning that they have persisted for several years, regularly interact with mainstream organisations, and use unobtrusive mobilising to influence institutions. Outsider movements do not work with institutions to improve service delivery; they may provide alternative service centres. They focus on pressuring institutions to change by raising public awareness of the issue and underlining institutional failure. Schmitt 'Unobtrusive Mobilisation by an institutionalised Rape Crisis Centre

<sup>213</sup> Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*. p.98-104

draw heavily on UCT's women's movement. Instead, Rape Crisis seems to have drawn support from numerous groups over its existence: feminists, lesbians, service providers, rape survivors, and women interested in community service. It seems better to use the resource mobilisation term of sentiment pool, that is, the number of people who feel the organisation's goals are in harmony with their own.

The composition of Rape Crisis membership shifted over this period. It became more racially diverse with less emphasis on feminism or lesbianism among the membership. The last two changes stem partly from the increasing diversity of members. Many members from Khayelitsha and Heideveld came from communities where hostility to homosexuality was fairly common and feminism was associated with white middle class women<sup>214</sup>. Also, a number of organisational practices that had marginalized many black members of the organisation were reformed: the emphasis on after hours socialising, the lack of transport to meetings and the issue of the low level of representation of black women in management structures. These changes helped the membership become more diverse, but did so by drawing from groups that had supported Rape Crisis's work previously.

### Impact of the reforms

Given the dangers associated with the creation of a hierarchy, it is worth considering whether these reforms strengthened Rape Crisis. McAdam's theory implies that they would have done so because they helped to create a centralised and coordinated organisation<sup>215</sup>. It was capable of sustaining pressure on institutions to reform, and carrying out programs to support this. It helped to coordinate the actions of other SMOs in the field by giving a great deal of support to NEWAVE and actively seeking co-operative partnerships itself. It was also able to survive the lack of trust between the first director and staff, and weather the director's departure.

### External problems

Rape Crisis's ability to access and influence policymakers helped to keep its membership and staff positive over this period. The increased public interest in their issue also helped assure members that their work was important and socially valued

The high levels of poverty within South Africa and in particular among women, obliged Rape Crisis to provide payments for volunteers if it wanted to be able to recruit and retain members from disadvantaged communities. By 2000/1 training, supervision and sessional payments for volunteers accounted for 29% of Rape Crisis's budget<sup>216</sup>. The need to remunerate volunteers reduced the funding available for other programmes.

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<sup>214</sup> Goldman 'Impact Evaluation' p.7

<sup>215</sup> McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency* p.179

<sup>216</sup> Goldman 'Impact Evaluation' p.25

## Political opportunities and allies

Political opportunities in this period were similar to those experienced at the close of the last period. Opportunities to help develop policy and legislation continued to be present and were exploited by the advocacy worker. The presence of a strong advocacy worker, Bronwyn Pithey, allowed Rape Crisis to build its influence over the period increasingly. Rather than making submissions in open forums it was asked to contribute by stakeholders<sup>217</sup>. Rape Crisis was also able to influence the agenda of institutions. For example, in 1999 survivors started to ask their counsellors about accessing antiretroviral drugs. Within a month of the first request the advocacy department submitted a paper on the issue to the Minister of Health.

Although the ANCWL did produce a position paper on gender-based violence in 1998<sup>218</sup> it focused on party politics over this period. Thus Rape Crisis could not rely on the ANCWL to champion its cause. Rape Crisis did have high profile partners from academe, civil society and among prominent politicians. However, it seems that many of these partnerships were based on personal relationships between Pithey and members of those organisations:

Initially for the first four years [1996 – 2000] I had very good communication [with Rape Crisis] they had very strong advocacy department ... Bronwyn Pithey was part of that ... because of her involvement we did a lot of submissions to parliament together... when Bron left there was a bit of a lull in their advocacy work.<sup>219</sup>

Some of Rape Crisis's partnerships lapsed when Pithey left. The situation was not helped by the one-year delay in appointing a replacement. The new advocacy worker has built up her own partnership network.

### **Rape Crisis and Political Process Theory: conclusion**

Rape Crisis's most successful period was characterised by the presence of factors that McAdam indicates lead to success. First, Rape Crisis managed to create an organisation capable of coordinating its diverse work and sustaining a long campaign to improve the policy environment and challenge attitudes. The strength came partly from building successful alliances with other organisations working in the field. Secondly, it benefited from the public and policy makers' perception that violence against women was an important issue and the widespread opportunities for reform that accompanied the new dispensation. Thirdly, it benefited from international donors prioritising violence against women. Finally, it benefited from the optimism created in members by its success in influencing policy and making substantive gains towards some of its goals.

However, the concepts that McAdam offers to analyse the organisation's problems proved to be problematic again. There is no evidence of oligarchization in the current period. However,

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<sup>217</sup> For example, she contributed to the reform of legislation about bail (1997) and sentencing guidelines (2000).

<sup>218</sup> African National Congress Women's League Executive Committee 'Gender Violence Policy' (np, 1998)

<sup>219</sup> Participant N

the reforms did create more workers who were dependent upon the organisation for their livelihood. It also gave workers greater control over decision making in the organisation, which increased the chance of oligarchization. There may have been some cooption as the organisation changed aspects of its behaviour to appeal to state institutions. However, the organisation adjusted its behaviour to increase its appeal to state institutions, not in response to pressure from these institutions. Instead, members of the organisation promoted the changes based on what they thought would make the organisation most effective. McAdam's concept of indigenous support base is not easily applicable as Rape Crisis drew from a range of groups over its history. So, changes in the groups it drew from do not necessarily represent alienation of the indigenous support base.

It was suggested earlier that the reforms undertaken by Rape Crisis were largely caused by the expansion of its political opportunities. If the organisation wanted to expand and open new branches as well as diversifying into research and advocacy, it needed to develop a management structure capable of coordinating its activities. However, this restructuring took place at the cost of other goals such as nurturing a participatory democracy, and the objections from members reveal that these sacrifices were recognised at the time. What this suggests is that the restructuring of Rape Crisis was not an automatic response to increased political opportunities, but the result of decision to sacrifice some goals in order to pursue emerging opportunities. If members who prioritised democracy and other internal goals had predominated the organisation might have chosen to preserve internal aims of the organisation at the expense of some external opportunities.

### **Rape Crisis and Generation Theory**

At the start of this period Rape Crisis was reduced to 10 active members and was struggling to maintain a skeleton service to survivors. Just 7 of these planned the organisation's re-emergence and only 2 of the planners had been in the organisation before 1991. The external conditions also changed over this period as South Africa moved from a tense political climate with fairly high levels of violence to a stable democracy focused on rebuilding itself. Crime rates were high over this period and the number of reported rapes rose steadily until 1997 and then declined slightly. This period was one of ongoing change with conditions inside and outside Rape Crisis changing dramatically, especially in the first half of the period.

#### **New members**

The training course held in 1993 was abridged because the organisation was desperate for counsellors. The sessions on democracy and the organisation's structure were cut. However, the sessions dealing with Rape Crisis's organisational understanding of the causes and consequences of rape were left in. Interestingly, the 1993 training course was co-ordinated by Participant F, who was one of the supporters of making general meetings quarterly and increasing the decision-making power of focus groups.

Participant L remembers the training course as being traumatic. There had been no prior selection and of the 40 women who did it, many left before joining the organisation.

They ran a training course that was in retrospect was very disorganised, emotionally overwhelming for everybody, not very containing, I think quite a freak-out ... they were as usual desperate looking for membership... nobody had been screened and I remember the first small group session we did was when we had felt powerless in our lives ... if you think of that professionally its outrageous some girls were talking about their rape experiences and others were talking about it in a relatively mundane environment... so it either scared you aware or sucked you in.<sup>220</sup>

At this stage Rape Crisis was still an important social space for lesbians and a safe space for women to experiment with their sexuality. As the organisation was desperate for counsellors, everyone had to counsel. Participant L highlighted how important the strong social bonds between members were for helping them to cope with the counselling: 'it became very much a social group for me at that stage... my sustenance from the organisation was far more emotional and social... it was very exciting...'

New volunteers were expected to quickly get involved in all aspects of the organisation: participant L joined the Steering Committee (also called the management committee) after 8 months. The highly stressful working environment highlighted the need for change to volunteers. Participant L commented that she felt strongly that the training had to be made more professional to reduce the high level of attrition of volunteers. Participant L was well placed to identify the reasons for volunteers leaving because for a year over 1994-5 she ran a project to investigate the reasons for volunteers leaving and seek ways to reduce it.

Collective identity, the training course and a changing membership

Previous chapters have argued that the training course played a vital role in the development of Rape Crisis's collective identity. Therefore, changing the training course should have an effect on the collective identity of new members. It seems likely that the new members who joined in 1993 would place less value on Rape Crisis's internal empowerment aims than previous generations. The training course no longer explained the reasons behind Rape Crisis structure. Participant F feels that the lack of older members in the organisation also helped to create a change in attitude.

I think that the example set by long-term members was much more important [than the training course]. Once there were only two of us with that sort of understanding and experience, trying to retain those processes and associated values insofar as they could be, within a changed system of priorities, was like fighting a rearguard action.<sup>221</sup>

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<sup>220</sup> Participant L

<sup>221</sup> Participant F, written communication, 18/07/2004. My italics

The training course was reformed in 1994 when participant B took over the training and added a 14-day course of counselling skills in addition to the original course. A course dedicated to public education and training skills was also devised:

We started hiring more staff and the staff tended to be more professional, which meant the training courses became more professional. I hope more containing less focused on the warm and fuzzy sexuality stuff and more focused on can you actually do the work...<sup>222</sup>

The focus of the specialised counselling training course on developing the skills to deliver a service made the training course much more orientated toward clients than toward personal development. However, the sections on democracy and the history of Rape Crisis were returned to the main training course. Professionalism seems to have led to a focus on the outputs of the organisation rather than the process. The training course also began to attract psychology and social work students who wanted to improve their curriculum vitae before applying for masters programs<sup>223</sup>. These volunteers were focusing on building up their counselling experience rather than on the organisation.

If members were more focused on clients they would be more inclined to query practices that were perceived as detracting from service provision. This point is supported by comments from both participants B and L that although they did succeed in creating a more professional training course it did not satisfy them: they felt wider reform was needed to improve service to clients. Participant B mentioned that older volunteers were disturbed by the loss of 'warm and fuzzy' organisational space that provided space for self-development and for debating important issues such as sexuality and feminism. New members were more inclined to worry about issues such as 'who are we helping, them [clients] or us?'<sup>224</sup> For newer members, management and staff, these debates appeared as time consuming and often unproductive.

Thus the proportion of members who held a collective identity that supported the internal goals of Rape Crisis declined over this period. The collective identity that began to emerge over this period was one that placed a greater emphasis on skills development and client service. This is surely a crucial factor in explaining why the debate over professionalism and decision making power was settled in favour of professionalism and management control in this period.

### Collective identity and structure

The other significant decision that led to the creation of a different collective identity in the organisation was the decision during 1993 to focus on growth and activism (public education, training and advocacy)<sup>225</sup>. Thomas's study<sup>226</sup> found that feminist healthcare organisations that

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<sup>222</sup> Participant L

<sup>223</sup> Confirmed by participant L and H

<sup>224</sup> Participant L my italics

<sup>225</sup> Rape Crisis 'Rape Crisis Weekend Away: Greyton 2<sup>nd</sup> to 4th July'

<sup>226</sup> Jan Thomas 'Everything about US is feminist: the significance of ideology in organisational change'. *Gender and Society* 13:1 Spring (Feb 1999)



emphasised the activist element of feminism and identified expansion as a goal changed from collective structures to feminist bureaucracies<sup>227</sup> or feminist participatory democracies. In contrast, organisations that remained non-hierarchical and collective emphasised internal democracy, empowering members, and survival rather than growth.

The collectivist democratic organisations viewed hierarchy as ideologically inconsistent with feminism. Leaders of these organisations framed feminist organisations primarily in terms of process - what happened inside an organisation.<sup>228</sup>

In 1993 it was not clear what form the organisation would take. The principal proposal of splitting counselling and education was rejected, and it was another year before Rape Crisis decided it needed to introduce more layers of management in addition to the steering committee. The organisational form that Rape Crisis eventually adopted resembles Thomas's feminist participatory democracy:

Members of participatory bureaucracies framed feminist organisations as one focusing on process as well as outcomes. Ideological shifts away from collectivity were legitimised by the incorporation of formalised routes for staff input. Keeping power relatively distributed empowering workers through their participation in decision making were significant defining features of participatory bureaucratic centres and set them apart from feminist bureaucracies.<sup>229</sup>

### Collective identity and collective action frames

The link between collective action frames, becomes clear here. Rape Crisis created a new collective action frame that emphasised growth and activism. This created a need for an action orientated organisation capable of managing work in many areas. This led to the recognition of the need to reform the organisation's decision-making processes, and therefore a reduction in the emphasis given to decision-making and related topics in the training course. So new members entered an organisation that wanted to grow and pursue an activist agenda, where the decision-making processes were under review, and the staff were becoming more influential. The addition of skills-focused training to the training course helped to focus volunteers on their work with clients and led to a more externally orientated outlook. However, these changes do not represent a departure from feminism but a change in the aspects of feminism that the organisation emphasised. Goldman found that except for one staff member and two volunteers all the Rape Crisis members she questioned identified themselves as feminists: 'Their interpretations varied. But the common theme was that feminism was about empowering women.'<sup>230</sup>

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<sup>227</sup> A feminist bureaucracy is described as authority being vested with individuals on the basis of their role, at least four levels of hierarchy in the organisation with the director responsible only for administration. Work is segregated on manual and administrative lines, and the office is segregated

<sup>228</sup> Thomas 'Everything about US is feminist' p.116

<sup>229</sup> *Ibid* p.113

<sup>230</sup> Goldman *Impact Evaluation* p.6

It is important to note that external forces did not directly create the change in the organisation's collective identity. The decisions that led to the change were predominantly internal. The decision to reintroduce the steering committee, to cut down the training course in 1993, to admit members who were seeking to improve their curriculum vitae with counselling experience and to add skills based training in 1994.

### Collective identity and diversity

In the late 1990s the organisation's collective identity was altered again by the growing diversity of the volunteer base and its changing role. Khayelitsha held its first training course in 1996 for 10 volunteers, but only 5 elected to work for the organisation after they had completed it. The training course run in Khayelitsha was based on that run in Observatory, giving all volunteers a common base. However, the Khayelitsha volunteers appear to have experienced more problems with their families and social groups than the Observatory based volunteers did. 'Volunteers in Khayelitsha said it is often difficult for women who have been empowered through RCCT training to gain acceptance in their family and community, especially among men.'<sup>231</sup> The following year Khayelitsha increased the number of volunteers by 6. These volunteers did have decision-making power within the organisation and they were provided with transport to get to general meetings. In 1997 10 volunteers from Heideveld joined them. The Heideveld volunteers only did training and public awareness work (TPA) as their centre did not offer counselling.

The addition to Rape Crisis of significant numbers of members from black communities forced the organisation to try to confront racism within itself. Participant H recalled that up to the mid 1990s the dominant members of the organisation were demographically similar to previous periods<sup>232</sup>. Black members perceived this dominance as a problem: 'Zuleiga – Problems [racial] aren't resolved. The fact that Rape Crisis is in Observatory has a major problem concerning transport, but no-one gave heed. Is it that the older members have more authority?'<sup>233</sup> This comment was followed by objections that this issue was not connected to feminism. Participant C claimed that up to the mid 1990s feminism was used to avoid confronting racial problems:

Parallels between race oppression and women's oppression were never drawn, the idea was that we are all women and we are all oppressed. There was no recognition that racism was inherent in many people's background. Feminism was pushed to avoid looking at racism, not consciously, but that is how it worked out.

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<sup>231</sup> *Ibid* p.7

<sup>232</sup> See participant H comments earlier in chapter

<sup>233</sup> Rape Crisis 'Feminism' 7/12/97 my italics (np: 1993)

Rape Crisis was not unique among feminist organisations in this. Salo notes in her critical essay on South African feminism<sup>234</sup> that many feminists in South Africa have an a priori definition of feminism based on the idea that the private sphere was the principle site of oppression. This belief led some feminists<sup>235</sup> to argue that women engaged in the national liberation struggle were not feminist as they were not challenging the patriarchy or trying to change the private sphere. Salo argues that the idea of sisterhood and that all women are victims of the patriarchy obscures the role of women in perpetuating other forms of discrimination such as race and class<sup>236</sup>. Meintjes also supports this argument:

In the United States African American women were the first to challenge the Euro centrism of the concerns and debates of feminists, pointing out that the notion of the private sphere as the central locus of oppression was to ignore the nature of systemic oppression in other spheres... But it is only recently, in the nineties, since the demise of formal apartheid that the debate has begun to probe more searchingly the implications of race in the construction of a South African feminist politics.<sup>237</sup>

The importance of group cohesion as a coping mechanism and the related importance of "solidary" incentives have been examined previously. Washkansky noted in her research paper on Rape Crisis that one way of maintaining group cohesion seemed to be to downplay differences between members<sup>238</sup>. As the membership became more diverse this became more difficult. The Observatory office's culture, particularly the emphasis on after work drinking and socialising was questioned:

There is far less out of work socialising... that certainly was the culture and ... that was a normative thing in a white single women space to go and drink beer and play pool was what you did ... bring Moslem women into that mix, bring Xhosa black women into that mix bring mothers into that mix and it starts to shift what the norm is ... it also means that people begin to split according to those things, things you understand, things you enjoy  
...<sup>239</sup>

What had been accepted as Rape Crisis's culture began to be perceived as a white liberal culture. As the Observatory branch itself became more mixed the pattern of interacting changed, becoming more based on service area. Accordingly the role of cohesion and "solidary" incentives as mechanisms for coping with trauma inside the organisation was reduced. Debriefing and better training and vetting of counsellors became more important as mechanism of coping with trauma in the organisation. However, cohesion within focus groups remained important.

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<sup>234</sup> Elaine Salo, *South African Feminism: Whose struggles, Whose Agenda?* Institute for Historical Research and the Department of History, University of The Western Cape, *South African Contemporary History Seminar*, ([Bellville]: np, 1994) Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> April 1994 2pm

<sup>235</sup> Salo names Shireem Hassim and Cheryl Walker in her essay.

<sup>236</sup> Salo, *South African Feminism* p. 20

<sup>237</sup> Dr Sheila Meintjes, *A Critical Perspective on Women and Feminism in South Africa*, Conference Paper, University of the Western Cape, ([Bellville]: np, 1997) 31 March - 2 April p.2

<sup>238</sup> Washkansky, *Helping the Helper*, p.21

<sup>239</sup> Participant H

At the same time as Rape Crisis was addressing the problem with race, the role of volunteers within the organisation was being reduced. Management was taken over by the staff and steering committee, the director and then the board of trustees. Volunteers took part in focus groups (TPA or counselling) where they could make suggestions that would be forwarded to management. They also had quarterly volunteer forums where they met with all the other volunteers to discuss problems and elect a representative to the board of trustees.

Stryker's theory suggests that reducing the link between a collective identity and a social group would weaken the collective identity by reducing its importance to the holder and reducing the frequency it is used. It is quite difficult to measure this. There has definitely been a marked reduction in intra Rape Crisis socialising since the late 90s, especially in the Observatory branch. However, volunteers who joined after this period<sup>240</sup> still claim that their time at Rape Crisis has had an enormous impact on them and their perspective.

### **Rape Crisis and Generational Theory: conclusion**

The dramatic changes in Rape Crisis's internal structure over this period do not appear to have flowed directly from the change in external environment as political process theory and resource mobilisation theory would suggest. Instead, the process was mediated by collective identities and framing. The 7 members who planned Rape Crisis's re-emergence had a collective identity that emphasised the importance of activism and made them anxious to expand Rape Crisis and exploit the opportunities available. Had these women been members who in the previous period had emphasised the importance of creating an alternative to hierarchy they could have decided to try to preserve the organisation's structure as much as possible and exploit only those opportunities they could currently handle.

The collective identity 'activist-feminist' led to the creation of a collective action frame that stressed the importance of expansion and activism. This collective action frame led to changes in the internal running of the organisation and training course that helped to create a new collective identity. By the late 1990s the collective identity of Rape Crisis members had changed to a sufficient extent to warrant the label of a new generation. They were not involved directly in the running of the organisation; they were more racially and economically diverse; they were more aware of racial issues, and had completed their training in an organisation that placed a stronger emphasis on client service. Thus, Whittier's predictions regarding the conditions that prompt a change in generation appear to have been borne out. However, Snow and McAdam rather than Whittier described the mechanisms that achieved this.

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<sup>240</sup> Participants G, D, and E

## Conclusion

The social movement theories used in this thesis were developed in the USA and Europe. They all had shortfalls in their utility for analysing Rape Crisis Cape Town. These shortfalls were not because the theories were not suitable for describing an organisation operating under apartheid or in post apartheid South Africa. The problems lay in the neglect of the impact of internal factors, such as the decision-making mechanisms, and the type of work the organisation was involved in. Despite the problems, the analyses suggested by the theories had considerable merit.

One of the key questions highlighted at the start of this essay was Rape Crisis's unusual structural development. Feminist centres that were founded as collectives typically modified their structures fairly quickly. Rape Crisis began as a modified collective with the founders controlling a good deal of the discussion within the organisation, vetting new members and allocating roles. It then became a collective in which all members had equal decision-making rights and where, outside of the constraint of having to counsel, members were free to choose their focus. The collective structure led to problems with accountability, service delivery and strategic planning. Yet the structure persisted for over a decade before changing rapidly in the 1990s. Generation theory (including frame theory), resource mobilisation theory and political process theory all provided credible explanations for this phenomenon.

Frame theory highlighted the importance of frames in shaping organisational structure. Rape Crisis's growing commitment to feminism initially drove its commitment to fostering non-hierarchical forms of organisation. This frame led to the inclusion in the training course of sections on democracy and collectivism; it also meant that democracy was treated within the organisation as a key issue. These developments helped ensure that new members entering the organisation felt that collectivity and democracy were important, thus they helped to preserve it. However, in 1992 the organisation went through a financial crisis that saw it lose many of its original members. Just 7 members plotted the re-emergence of Rape Crisis and only 2 of them had been in the organisation before 1991. This group created a new collective action frame that emphasised activism. They also delivered a training course that did not contain the session on organisational democracy and history. This helped to create a new generation of activists in the organisation who were less concerned with internal democracy and more with focused on output. Thus, when the collective structure was perceived as hampering client services and activists goals it was much more vulnerable to reform than in the previous period.

Resource mobilisation theory and political process theory both suggest that it is important for an organisation to have achievable goals. For much of Rape Crisis's history the attitude of authorities hampered its progress toward its activist goals. Thus goals related to internal democracy represented achievable aims. Once activist goals were achievable these began to supplant the internal democracy goals and this led to a change in structure.

The explanations of the cultural changes in Rape Crisis are related to the explanation of structural changes. For generation theory the change in the composition of the training course in the 1990s and the loss of older members are key factors in explaining the change in culture, as is the change in the external political environment.

For resource mobilisation theory the growing diversity of Rape Crisis helps explain the cultural shift. The theory suggests that once Rape Crisis became a diverse organisation its tradition of using "solidary" incentives became a liability rather than an asset. As the "solidary" incentives were reduced, its importance as a safe social space for lesbians and feminists also declined changing the organisational culture.

Resource mobilisation theory's differentiation between members on the basis on economic profile, and beneficiary and non-beneficiary identity, proved to be adaptable to the South African situation. It provided a theoretical basis for analysing the impact on Rape Crisis of diversifying its membership.

Resource mobilisation theory and political process theory are most commonly used to examine organisations that aim at national level politics. However, they did provide insight into Rape Crisis's provincial and local level work.

All the theories examined here struggled to explain the emergence of Rape Crisis: The importance of being based in an organisationally rich section of the population for SMO emergence has been over estimated

None of the theories adequately addressed the impact of collective decision making on organisational behaviour. Rape Crisis's consensual decision-making process did favour more eloquent or more stubborn members, but it still prevented the imposition of unpopular decisions. Thus, it affected the internal dynamics of the organisation by making it impossible for groups to ignore each other's wishes. It also meant that the organisation often took a long time to form a position on issues and this slowed down its reaction to external events.

Consensual decision-making helped ensure that McAdam's concepts of oligarchization and cooption were irrelevant for much of the period. Resource mobilisation's assumption that there are leaders who direct decisions leads it to focus too heavily on leadership styles as predictors of organisational problems and organisational focus. Whittier's theory emphasises that organisational change occurs as a new generation or micro cohort becomes dominant in an organisation. She neglects the impact the decision-making process can have by preventing even numerically superior groups dominating.

All the theories have problems with their basic assumptions about human nature. The 'economic-rationality' that resource mobilisation theory and political process theory suggest guide decisions by members of an organisation did not fit explanations of decisions given by participants. Whittier's theory over-emphasises the stability of collective identities. Changes in an organisation are not just the result of the emergence of a new micro cohort or generation.

If the external situation changes the elements of the collective identity that are emphasised can shift.

The most important shortfall of all three theories was their failure to examine the impact of the work that SMOs do, on their structure and culture. Rape Crisis's work counselling rape survivors led to members identifying with the survivors and their experiences of powerlessness. This helped to create opposition to the creation of a hierarchy that would give some members power over others. The culture of Rape Crisis was influenced by the trauma associated with its work. Rape survivors often feel isolated by their experience and some of these feelings appear to have been transferred, during counselling, to Rape Crisis members. In addition many members of Rape Crisis were already isolated to a degree by their identification as feminists or lesbians. To counter these feelings of isolation the organisation began to emphasise group cohesion. This led the organisation to try to foster social links between members, to downplay differences between members, and to identify common enemies: the rapists and the patriarchy. This emphasis on women's common identities as victims of patriarchy made it difficult to address issues of racism within the organisation.

### **Future Directions**

Despite the problems described above, a synthesis between these three approaches seems the most appropriate way forward. The breadth of factors resource mobilisation considers is a key positive feature. It makes a greater attempt than the other theories to examine the impact of different organisational structures and diverse membership bases. Political process theory's emphasis upon political opportunities as the most salient feature of the external environment seems justified and indicates the factors of the external environment that can be expected to prompt change. Generational theory highlights the importance of considering who decision makers are and how their background may prompt them to act. Framing theory not only explains how collective identities are established, it also highlights how collective identities and ideology are adjusted to take account of changing circumstances.

The addition of considerations of the impact of an organisation's work on culture and structure is possible without drastically changing the theories. Generation theory already considers the impact of the initial activities that members engage in on their collective identity. This can be expanded to include sensitivity to the potential effects of ongoing engagement in traumatic work. Resource mobilisation theory examines issues that influence the interaction of members, such as differences in economic and interest background. This can be expanded to include a consideration of the impact of the work that members are asked to perform by the SMO.

The effect of collective decision making structures can be examined through resource mobilisation theory. It already examines the impact of different organisational and leadership structures on organisations. The addition of collective decision making as a form of leadership broadens, without fundamentally changing, the scope of the analysis.

Whittier's generation theory can be adapted to acknowledge that external changes can change the priority given to aspects of an identity without losing its central insight that feminists, like other political radicals, do not become conservatives as they age. The addition of a more nuanced idea of rationality can be added to resource mobilisation theory without destroying it. McAdam, in recent work, has adjusted his ideas on rationality to allow for the effect of identity.

The synthesis developed from resource mobilisation theory, political process theory and generation theory could be used to examine other Rape Crisis centres in South Africa. This would help to provide insight on the effect different organisational structures and different trauma-coping mechanisms on organisational behaviour. Examining SMOs that work with others forms of trauma would help expose whether working with rape trauma has distinct implications for organisations. This synthesis could be extended to examine the impact of emotion on SMOs that do not deal with trauma.



## Appendix 1: Rape in South Africa

Interpol figures indicate that South Africa has the highest reported rape rate in the world<sup>241</sup>. However, there are good reasons to believe the statistics significantly underestimate the problem. Women may be reluctant to report the incident for a variety of reasons<sup>242</sup>. Many women fail to identify their experience as rape because it took place within some form of relationship<sup>243</sup> and therefore do not report it. Even when rapes are reported to the police the officer may decide not to record them, therefore they will not be reflected in the crime statistics<sup>244</sup>. Those rapes that are recorded may not make it into the crime statistics because of police incompetence<sup>245</sup>. Before 1994 poor community-police relations reduced reporting of rapes even further. The uneven provision of police services under apartheid left many women without access to a police station at which to report.

Over the period examined in this thesis, South Africa had a restricted definition of rape. Rape was limited to penetration of a vagina by a penis; other sexual crimes such as sodomy or oral sexual assault were excluded from the rape statistics.

Dealing with the survivors and perpetrators of sexual assaults places a great deal of strain on the South African Police Service (SAPS), district surgeons, healthcare facilities, and courts. The research available on the performance of these service providers indicates that most of them can, according to the 'National Policy Guidelines for Victims of Sexual Offences'<sup>246</sup>, be described as failing<sup>247</sup>. The failure of state service providers to adequately address the

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<sup>241</sup> INTERPOL, 'South Africa,' (1999) [Online]. Available: <http://www.interpol.int/Public/Statistics/ICS/1999/SouthAfrica1999.pdf> [2004-May-09]

<sup>242</sup> For a summary of these reasons please refer to:

Heidi Becker and Pamela Claasen, 'Violence Against Women And Children: Community Attitudes And Practice' *Report Prepared For The Women And Law Committee Revised Draft 7.11.1996* (NP, 1996) p.30.

Sharon Lewis, 'Dealing With Rape,' Centre For The Study Of Violence And Reconciliation. (Johannesburg: Sachel Books, 1994) p.30.

<sup>243</sup> Neil Anderson *Beyond Victims And Villains: The Culture Of Sexual Violence In South Johannesburg*, (2002) p.4 [Online]. Available: [www.ciet.org](http://www.ciet.org) [2004, July, 07]

Sandra Bollen, Lillian Artz, Lisa Vetten, and Antoinette Louw 'Was The Abuse Considered A Crime,' in *Violence Against Women In Metropolitan South Africa: A Study On Impact And Service Delivery* (Pretoria: Institute For Security Studies, 1998) Monograph No.41 September

<sup>244</sup> Anderson 'Beyond Victims And Villains' p.5.

<sup>245</sup> Antoinette Louw, 'The Problem With Police Statistics'. (Pretoria: Institute Of Security Studies and Nedcor Crime Index, 1998) No.3

<sup>246</sup> Ministry of Justice 1997

<sup>247</sup> Louw et al, *Violence Against Women: A National Survey*.

Additional information on problems with the SAPS:

Neil Andersson, 'How To Police Sexual Violence,' in *Crime And Conflict*, Autumn 1999

Lillian Artz 'Violence Against Women In Rural Southern Cape: Exploring Access To Justice Within A Feminist Jurisprudence Framework,' unpublished research paper. ([Cape Town]: Institute Of Criminology, University of Cape Town, 1999)

Additional information on problems with district surgeons and healthcare providers:

Karen Robinson, 'Secondary Victimization and District Surgeons'. Research paper, (np: Independent Project Trust, 1999)

Tina Jacobs, Malinda Steenkamp and Suzanne Marais 'Domestic Violence: A Close Look At Intimate Partner Violence' In *Trauma Review* August 1998

Additional information on the problem with courts:

Sharon Stanton, Margot Lochrenberg, Veronica Mukasa, 'Improved Justice For Survivors Of Sexual Violence? Adult Survivors Experience of the Wynberg Sexual Offences Court and Associated Services,' Research Report unpublished, Rape Crisis Cape Town, African Gender Institute, Human Rights Commission (1997)

Kelley Mout, 'The Court Doors May Be Open But What Lies Beyond Those Doors? An Observation of the Workings of The Wynberg Sexual Offences Court'. Honours Thesis UCT unpublished (2000)

problems caused by rape indicates that social movements like Rape Crisis still have a vital role to play in tackling South Africa's rape problem.

The interaction between rape and other forms of gender-based violence and the other important issues facing South Africa are not well researched, but the initial findings are suggestive. The established links between the HIV epidemic and rape include the practice of raping young girls or older women to 'cure' oneself of infection, the greater vulnerability of HIV transmission during rape because of the increased probability of trauma to the vagina and the reduced chance of condom usage<sup>248</sup>. The links between development issues and rape are more tentative. However, gender-based violence, including rape, has been identified as a factor that intensifies poverty<sup>249</sup>. The presence of gender-based violence in communities increases the need for psychosocial support services and conflict resolution<sup>250</sup>. Finally, rape and the fear of rape prevent women enjoying constitutionally guaranteed rights such as the right to substantial equality, the right to freedom from violence and the right to dignity<sup>251</sup>.

Attempts to reduce the number of rapes have to confront the complexity of causal factors. Socio-cultural, economic, institutional and political factors all affect women's vulnerability. The lower the social status accorded to women the greater their vulnerability<sup>252</sup>. Research suggests that if the masculinities that are prominent in a woman's community promote male sexual initiation and domination there will be higher levels of rape than in communities where masculinities do not promote this, *ceteris paribus*<sup>253</sup>. Communities with high levels of rape myth acceptance and of sexist beliefs about women are rape-enabling environments<sup>254</sup>. Lower economic status is associated with greater vulnerability to rape<sup>255</sup>. Research suggests that male dominated institutions deal less effectively with rape than institutions that are not male dominated. The presence of laws that discriminate against rape complainants also promote rape, and societies with low levels of female representation in their legislators are more likely to have such laws<sup>256</sup>. The myriad of factors that affect vulnerability to rape indicate the need for organisations to focus on the issue and develop expertise and understandings that can be used to help tackle the problem.

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<sup>248</sup> Cynthia A Gomez, 'Gender, Culture, and Power: Barriers to HIV prevention,' in *Journal Of Social Research* 33:4 (1996)

Rachel Jewkes and Katherine Wood 'Dangerous Love' Reflections on the Causes of Violence in Xhosa Township Youth,' in Robert Morrell (eds) *Changing Men in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Zed Books, 2002)

<sup>249</sup> SANGOCO, 'Poverty and Health,' in *The People's Voices: National Speak Out on Poverty Hearing* (np: SANGOCO Publications: 1998)

<sup>250</sup> Alcinda Honwana, 'The Collective Body,' in *Track Two*, 8: 1 July 1999

<sup>251</sup> Bronwyn Pithey et al 'Legal Aspects Of Rape In South Africa' Discussion Document Commissioned By The Deputy Minister Of Justice (Pretoria: Ministry of Justice, 1997) p.6

<sup>252</sup> Lloyd Vogelman, *The Sexual Face Of Violence*. (Johannesburg: Sached Books, 1990) p.65

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<sup>255</sup> Antoinette Louw and Michael Shaw, 'Stolen Opportunities: The Impact of Crime on South Africa's Poor'. (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 1997) Monograph 14

<sup>256</sup> Vogelman, *The Sexual Face Of Violence* p.190

**Appendix 2: Table summarising key changes: 1976 to 2000**

	1976 – 1981	1981-1992	1992 – 2000
<b>Internal</b>			
Organisational structure	Modified collective	Collective	Modified collective (1992-96)  Hierarchy with structured participation (1996 –2000)
Maximum number of paid posts.	0	5 (1989)	14 (1997)
Key debates	Feminist identity and role in anti-apartheid struggle.	Internal democracy, role in anti-apartheid struggle, dominance of lesbians in the organisation and transport.	Structure, racism and professionalization.
<b>External</b>			
Relations with authorities	Poor	Poor	Reasonable (1992 –1994)  Fair (1994 – 2000)
Ability to influence relevant institutions (medical, police, judicial)	Poor	Poor	Fair
Relations with mixed sex anti-apartheid organisations	Poor	Reasonable	Reasonable
Relations with women only anti-apartheid organisations	N/A	Good	Fair

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