


A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ASSUMPTIONS, AIMS AND
METHODS IN SEWARD HILTNER'S APPROACH TO PASTORAL
COUNSELLING IN THE LIGHT OF THE MAJOR CHRISTIAN
TRADITIONS OF PASTORAL CARE.



Jonathan Cook

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by

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Supervisor: Professor J. Cumpsty

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SUMMARY

In this study Seward Hiltner's approach to pastoral counselling is analysed on the basis of a number of criteria derived from a survey of the history of pastoral care. On the assumption that any trend in pastoral care which gained enough support from a wide enough section of the Church for a long enough period of time to warrant attention from recognised historians of pastoral care qualifies as a significant aspect of the tradition, the criteria take the form of questions arising from these trends. The questions are grouped so as to qualify or balance each other. The themes covered are those of discipline in the Church as both restoring the individual and protecting the Church; the definition of sin varying with the social role of the Church and providing both a boundary around the group and a code for individual guidance, while also representing an inner attitude; good and evil in human nature and the need for both absolute demand (including the provision of an ideal with which to identify the ideal self) and unlimited acceptance; the extent to which the pastor may exercise authority over the client; the need for both lay and ordained ministries; the scope of pastoral care, including the functions of healing, facilitating spiritual growth, sustaining, guiding, discipline, restoration, and liberating from oppressive institutions and customs; the need to provide people with a clear logic of belonging to God; and appropriate openness to the Christian tradition, secular social sciences and the socio-political context of the Church. On these criteria Hiltner's approach was found to have been well matched to the particular

social context of America in the fifties, but to lack several aspects for the changed context of the present. These would either have to be accommodated in the counselling approach or be catered for in the pastoral context in which counselling should be offered. They include providing a demand both in the sense of a powerful ideal and a moral standard; integrating healing and sustaining in counselling with the other pastoral functions; reintroducing a sense of pastoral authority together with greater recognition of the role of lay ministry; providing a stronger and more explicit "logic of belonging"; and drawing more deeply on the pastoral traditions. Although there is overlap between the various criteria, it is suggested that they have proved useful in analysing Hiltner's approach and could be used to expose other approaches to the wisdom of the tradition. Suggestions are made for the development and use of the criteria in further research.

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My supervisor, Professor John Cumpsty not only provided much of the inspiration for this study, but also taught me a new way to think about religion and life. He was also endlessly patient! I shall continue to appreciate his contribution to the development of my thought long after the end of my work on this dissertation.

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Finally, most of my motivation for and insights into counselling (not to mention a large proportion of my library) originated from my father. I expect he will always remain for me the prototype pastoral counsellor.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE	INTRODUCTION	1
1.	Aim of the study	1
2.	Choice of Seward Hiltner	3
3.	Choice of McNeill (1951) and Clebsch and Jaekle (1964) as the major historians of pastoral care	4
4.	Choice of method for analysing the tradition	5
5.	Pastoral care and pastoral counselling	8
CHAPTER TWO	SEWARD HILTNER'S APPROACH TO PASTORAL COUNSELLING	10
1.	The shepherding perspective and pastoral counselling	10
2.	Theological method: Correlation of perspectives	13
3.	Counselling orientation: The eductive approach	26
CHAPTER THREE	THEMES FROM THE HISTORY OF PASTORAL CARE	35
	McNeill's stages in the history of the cure of souls	35
	Clebsch and Jaekle's four pastoral functions	58
CHAPTER FOUR	THE CRITERIA	70
	A note on method	70
	The criteria	73
1.	Discipline: Restoration of the sinner versus protection of the Church	73
2.	Sin: Group identity, individual guidance and inner attitude	75

3. Good and evil in human nature: The need for both absolute demand and unlimited acceptance	81
4. The extent and limitation of the authority of the pastor	90
5. Lay ministry and the priesthood	93
6. Functions of pastoral care	94
7. The logic of belonging	98
8. The influence of the Christian tradition, secular social sciences and the socio-economic context of the Church on the development of pastoral theology	101

CHAPTER FIVE THE CRITERIA APPLIED IN A CRITIQUE OF SEWARD HILTNER'S APPROACH TO PASTORAL COUNSELLING 104

1. Discipline: Restoration of the sinner versus protection of the Church	104
2. Sin: Group identity, individual guidance and inner attitude	115
3. Good and evil in human nature: The need for both absolute demand and unlimited acceptance	116
4. The extent and limitation of the authority of the pastor	118
5. Lay ministry and the priesthood	119
6. Functions of pastoral care	121
7. The logic of belonging	124
8. The influence of the Christian tradition, secular social sciences and the socio-economic context of the Church on the development of pastoral theology	125

CHAPTER SIX	CONCLUSION	129
NOTES		134
BIBLIOGRAPHY		144

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1. Aim of the study

In his frank review of his own pilgrimage through the fads and fashions of the past few decades in psychotherapy and pastoral counselling, Thomas Oden (1980) described how he came to the conclusion that there is an urgent need today to escape the awe of modernity and recover the "lost identity" of pastoral counselling within the wealth of the classical Christian tradition of pastoral care.

A major effort is needed today to rediscover and remine the classical models of Christian pastoral care, and to bring back into availability the key texts of that classical tradition following about fifty years of neglect, a neglect the depths of which are arguably unprecedented in any previous Christian century. (Oden, 1980, p.8)

These comments by Oden reflect a trend recognisable in the pastoral literature towards a more serious attempt to ground pastoral counselling in its historical roots within the Church.

What difference, if any, would be made to a typical approach to pastoral care if this call to return to its roots were heeded?

The aim of this study is to abstract from the Christian tradition those principles which emerge as important components of the tradition, and then to use these principles to criticise a representative contemporary approach to pastoral counselling - that of Seward Hiltner.

This task requires two areas of investigation. One of these is to understand Seward Hiltner's approach, and the other is to understand the Christian tradition well enough to be able to draw out the most important principles of Christian pastoral care. These two investigations are recorded in Chapters Two and Three respectively. In a limited study such as this these reviews cannot be exhaustive, but they do attempt to focus on the most significant aspects for our purpose.

It is in Chapters Four and Five that the heart of the study is reached. In Chapter Four the tradition described in Chapter Three is analysed in the form of several criteria which represent the essentials of the tradition. It is suggested that the criteria offer a way of placing any approach to pastoral care in the tradition and thus revealing areas in which the approach may need to be supplemented or corrected in order to be faithful to the wisdom of the tradition. In Chapter Five this will be illustrated by analysing Seward Hiltner's approach according to the criteria.

2. Choice of Seward Hiltner

Writing the editorial in a special issue of Pastoral Psychology in honour of Seward Hiltner, Mills (1980) noted that "since (Hiltner's) ordination . . . in 1935, no one has had more influence on the practice and understanding of pastoral care". Mills went on to list the extent of Hiltner's publications: he was author of ten books, co-author of three, editor of another three, and author of over 500 journal articles published in 75 different journals. In the same issue Pruyser (1980) pointed out that Hiltner's contribution went beyond pastoral theology to other disciplines, especially medicine and psychiatry. Hiltner was a champion of interdisciplinary cooperation.

Thus Hiltner was chosen for this study firstly because he is the most prominent author since the second world war in the mainstream of liberal Protestant pastoral care in America. American pastoral care is the stream which has moved furthest away from explicit reliance on the classical tradition of the cure of souls.

Secondly, Hiltner saw himself as a theologian, and his writings comprise a relatively complete and systematic exposition of pastoral theology. In Preface to Pastoral Theology (1958) in particular, Hiltner set out explicitly to construct a system of pastoral theology which would ground contemporary pastoral practice in Christian theology as a whole and connect it to the history of pastoral theology.

Hiltner's contribution spans the most vigorous era in American pastoral counselling, and has the advantage of extending from the forties to the eighties. He thus offers us about as recent a complete body of work as could be found.

3. Choice of McNeill (1951) and Clebsch and Jaekle (1964) as the major historians of pastoral care.

This is not an historical thesis, but a sound understanding of the history of pastoral care is clearly crucial to its success. It was therefore necessary to select the historians consulted carefully. They would need, of course, to have focussed on the history of pastoral care, rather than general ecclesiastical history, and they should have focussed on the mainstream of the Western Church - to have introduced a broader range of traditions than that would have made the study unmanageably large. It was also thought to be important that they should have approached the subject as historians rather than as pastoral theologians seeking to prove a particular point, otherwise their accounts would have reflected the bias of their purposes in addition to the inevitable bias of their backgrounds. If possible they should have attempted to demarcate significant periods and have identified the principle trends in those periods. Most important, they should have received wide recognition from the theological community as faithful recorders of the tradition. As it was not feasible to consult original documents throughout the history of the Church, it was important that the historians on which our historical judgement would be based should reflect the

process of consensus which will be described when we come to the discussion of how this study was approached.

On these criteria it was not difficult to select the two works used. McNeill (1951) and Clebsch and Jaekle (1964) were the references which appeared again and again (usually together) whenever the history of pastoral care was discussed. They both have systems of dividing up the history of pastoral care into periods and identifying the key aspects of each, and their systems differ quite substantially, enabling the reader to gain two distinct perspectives. A number of other authors have referred to the history of pastoral care, but none is cited as often, or is free of a particular motive for exploring the tradition. In this exercise it was thought to be more important to exclude reviews which might place an unnecessary slant on the analysis than to include a wide range of books which would give a broader coverage. The study required the distillation of a few very probably important themes rather than the listing of an exhaustive list of only possibly important subjects. The two works used satisfy all the criteria mentioned above and have the added advantage of having made their contribution during the period that Hiltner was making his.

4. Choice of method for analysing the tradition.

There are at least three different ways of approaching the central themes of a religious tradition (Cumpsty, unpublished lecture notes). Firstly, one can look for those aspects which have stood

the test of time within the community of believers. In Israel, for example, Jeremiah's words were incorporated into the tradition after his death because they fitted the experience of the community at that time, and as generations went by, they provided a better explanation of Israel's historical experience than some of the earlier beliefs - such as that of the restoration of Israel along the lines of David's kingdom. This could be called the community belief approach, in that it includes everything which has been believed in the community.

Secondly, one can go to the roots and look for those aspects which are consistent with what are considered to be the central teachings of the religion. In the case of Christianity, for example, one could look for whatever is consistent with the teachings and example of Jesus, and reject the rest. This could be called the basic root approach.

Thirdly, one could look for logical types and include whatever aspects fitted with a logical explanation of the type of religious tradition being examined, and reject whatever was foreign to that type. These types could be constructed on the basis of whatever criteria were useful for the purpose in question, and which fitted the evidence. This could be called the logical type approach.

Most writers of dissertations who have set out to criticise Hiltner have chosen the second way to find the criteria by which to criticise. The problem with this approach, however, is that the analysis is then subject to the researcher's own hermeneutical

assumptions. What the researcher chooses to deal with in the analysis may or may not therefore be of interest to the reader. Sanborn's (1979) analysis of the models of Boisen, Hiltner and Clinebell, for example, was described by the reviewer in Pastoral Psychology (32, 1984) as the "best detailed criticism I have seen of these figures", with his criticisms of Hiltner being seen as particularly informative and insightful. Yet, as will appear in a later chapter, it seemed to the author of the present study that the book revealed more about Sanborn's position than about Hiltner's. In other words, Sanborn had imposed a very definite structure on his analysis in which the questions he brought to the analysis prescribed his findings. Similarly, Hielema's (1975) exhaustive study of Hiltner and Jay Adams was written from a clearly conservative Reformed perspective which, although a valid perspective, tended to focus only on those matters of interest to those of a similar persuasion to Hielema, rather than to Hiltner or the broader theological community. Burger (1974), while offering a more balanced and probably fairer criticism, also speaks from a definite theological viewpoint. This is, of course, legitimate and even necessary if the hermeneutical approach is adopted. But as this had already been attempted several times, and as the results seemed so often to reflect the authors' views rather than Hiltner's, it was decided to attempt a different way.

At first an attempt was made to examine the history of pastoral care on the basis of logical types. The types which seemed to emerge most clearly in the history of pastoral care were those of the classical Catholic tradition, the Reformed Protestant

tradition, and one which combined aspects of both and could best be described as the Methodist tradition. No actual tradition fits a logical type exactly, of course, which is the major problem with this approach. When it came to the twentieth century, however, these types became somewhat mixed and unclear. Other factors seemed to be at work, and the analysis was in danger of again imposing on the criticism of Hiltner a straitjacket like that seen in the hermeneutical method. (Note 1)

So it was decided instead to use the community belief approach. The problem with this approach is that one has to find some way of defining who is in and who is not in the community. For the purposes of this study it was decided to include any contribution to the tradition recognised as valid by the historians referred to in the previous section. The method based on this approach which will be used in this study to derive the criteria for faithfulness to the tradition will be referred to as the method of successive corrections, to indicate that it rests on the assumption that each generation amends and adds to the tradition to improve the fit with their corporate experience. Those elements which endure or recur could be considered essential to the tradition. This will be discussed further in Chapter Four.

5. Pastoral care and pastoral counselling

If pastoral counselling is a specialised activity within pastoral care (Aden, 1968, p.164), then presumably the criteria for faithfulness to the tradition for the part (pastoral counselling)

will be the same as those for the whole (pastoral care). Aden draws attention to several different ways of defining pastoral counselling, but for our purposes it is not necessary to select one or the other, provided the assumption is granted that there is this basic correspondence between pastoral care and counselling as far as the criteria for faithfulness is concerned.

When deriving and discussing the dimensions we shall be concerned with pastoral care. When analysing Seward Hiltner's approach we shall be dealing with pastoral counselling - but doing so appropriately within the context of and subject to the broader concerns of pastoral care. Although pastoral care includes a much broader range of functions and activities than does pastoral counselling, it will be suggested that pastoral counselling needs to attend to its context in pastoral care, so that even those concerns not directly related to counselling itself are of interest to the counsellor, because they are relevant to the pastoral context in which pastoral counselling takes place.

CHAPTER TWO

SEWARD HILTNER'S APPROACH TO PASTORAL COUNSELLING

Any discussion on the method of pastoral theology must begin with Hiltner's Preface to Pastoral Theology. This statement is not prejudicial; it is factual.

With this statement MacDonald (1969) indicates the seminal importance of Hiltner's work for the discipline of pastoral theology.

In this chapter an attempt will be made to review those aspects of Hiltner's approach which are most relevant to a discussion of his place in the historical tradition of pastoral care. This will include his understanding of the shepherding perspective in relation to other theological and secular disciplines, his theological method of correlation of perspectives, and his educative approach to counselling.

1. The shepherding perspective and pastoral counselling

In trying to define the work of the pastor Hiltner went beyond the existing terms of pastoral care and pastoral counselling to the term "shepherding". This is a "perspective" which permeates all the pastor does, and yet is dominant in only some pastoral

activities (Hiltner, 1958, p.19). It includes the tasks of healing, sustaining and guiding, and stands alongside two other "operation-centred areas", communicating and organizing. The body of Christian theology is made up on the one hand of these three perspectives which arise from reflection on operations, and on the other hand several "logic-centred" fields such as biblical, historical, doctrinal, moral, psychological, aesthetical, and comparative theology (p.28). Hiltner preferred the term shepherding to pastoral care, because he considered the latter term to be identified with certain offices, whereas the concept he was trying to define was present in all pastoral work, even though dominant as we have said in only some situations (Hiltner, 1958, p.217). For our purposes we can regard the two terms as interchangeable, provided we bear in mind that Hiltner regards shepherding as what he calls a "perspective" rather than a particular set of activities.

Hiltner regarded shepherding as a legitimate theological discipline with a body of data (the healing, sustaining and guiding work of the pastor), a method (in which he drew on both theological reflection and the methods of the social sciences), and a contribution to make to the whole field of theology. Pastoral counselling is the major vehicle through which the shepherding perspective is expressed.

Hiltner insisted, however, that pastoral counselling forms an integral part of the broader scope of ministry. As such he suggested that the aims of pastoral counselling were in one sense the same as those of the Church itself,

- bringing people to Christ and the Christian fellowship, aiding them to acknowledge and repent of sin and to accept God's freely offered salvation, helping them to live with themselves and their fellow men in brotherhood and love, enabling them to act with faith and confidence instead of the previous doubt and anxiety, bringing peace where discord reigned before. (Hiltner, 1949, p.19)

Pastoral counselling also had special purposes, however, which Hiltner described broadly as

the attempt by a pastor to help people to help themselves through the process of gaining understanding of their inner conflicts. (Hiltner, 1949, p.19)

In this definition Hiltner gave a clue to three essential characteristics of his approach to counselling. Firstly, he regarded the pastoral counselling task as helping people to help themselves. This he described as eductive counselling, and is the aspect he emphasised more than any other. Secondly, he understood that the process of healing happens through insight, or self-understanding. Thirdly, his understanding of the source of emotional and spiritual problems was that they emerge from inner conflicts.

2. Theological method: Correlation of perspectives

What was significantly different about the age in which Hiltner made his contribution, according to Oglesby's (1969) introduction to a Festschrift in Hiltner's honour, was the emphasis on the methodology of reporting cases by means of verbatim accounts and using these to refine the practice of pastoral counselling and to train new pastors. Hiltner was a leader in the development of this methodology. Oglesby suggests that his greatest contribution, however, was to provide a theological treatment of the current approach to pastoral counselling. While Oglesby believed that Hiltner did not entirely escape the pitfall which characterised his generation of pastoral counsellors, that of making theology subservient to psychology, Hiltner "came closer than any other writer to dealing forthrightly with the theological implications of the empirical data" (Oglesby, 1969, p.14).

A key concept in Hiltner's development of his theory was that of correlation. The term comes from Tillich (Hiltner, 1958, p.222) and was used by Hiltner to refer especially to the relation between theology and psychology (or "culture" as he seems to have called the broader impact of the social and human sciences). He chose "correlation" after an extensive search which touched on words like "dialectic", "interconnect", "interpenetrating", "interrelated", "intervolve", "nexus", and even "amphidetic", while looking for a term which indicated the "full two-way street" which he believed was necessary to describe theological method. He believed that he differed from Tillich, however, in not being

satisfied with designating matters of ultimate concern to the realm of theology and matters of preliminary concern to other disciplines.

No one can say in advance when the emerging knowledge or insight is going to be ultimate or only preliminary. Nor does it seem sufficient to say that the sacred may erupt from the profane. Knowledge or insight of the utmost importance to theology may emerge at any time from a discipline that seems far removed from theology, and it hardly seems fair to say that that discipline has no claim to what it has discovered. (Hiltner, 1958, p.223)

The method of "correlation of perspectives" gave Hiltner the means for comparing theological and psychological concepts. Browning (1969) describes Hiltner's method as involving firstly a recognition that both psychology and theology are intellectual disciplines of reflection which are by nature thus one step removed from the data of human consciousness and of faith respectively. This process of abstraction relies on certain presuppositions arising from the perspectives of each discipline. If these perspectives and presuppositions could be recognised and bracketed, the remaining concepts could be compared, to the mutual correction and enrichment of each. Browning provides the following illustration of how correlation of perspectives might work.

It might be true that theology assumes that all healing

comes from God, while on the other hand, psychotherapeutic psychology studies a nontranscendent type of healing involving a psychotherapist and his relation to the patient. Yet it is possible to bracket presuppositions about the origins of healing and simply study and compare the structure and dynamics of the two types of healing. (Browning, 1969, p.132)

In this way the two disciplines can transfer concepts and data between them, allowing those of each to enrich and correct the other.

The method of correlation assumes, however, that the healing processes described in each of the two disciplines are similar, at least in some respects. It follows, then, that to the extent that they are comparable, they are not dependent on their presuppositions. It seems like a short step from there to the conclusion that the presupposition about healing is irrelevant to the method used to bring about healing. Hiltner does not make this claim, of course, or he could hardly continue to claim a special place for pastoral counselling in the range of counselling approaches. But it is necessary to face the question of the relation between presuppositions and process. If the presuppositions are as unimportant for understanding the process of healing as the method of correlation of perspectives would seem to imply, then the case for retaining separate disciplines of pastoral theology and psychology is weakened (Note 2). If, on the other hand, the theological perspective which recognises the

special contribution of religious faith and practice in healing is valid and important, then caution should be exercised in transplanting concepts between psychology and pastoral theology. Somewhere hidden within the concepts must be the presuppositions on which they were based.

Browning (1969) in fact concedes this, but only in respect of the "more rigid empirical psychologies", in which he suggests that the structure of the concepts would be limited by the "narrow selectivity and rigid thematization which went into" their development (p.132). Browning is perhaps a little unfair in singling out a certain approach to psychology, one of which he obviously disapproves. If his objection is valid in this case, then it is valid in general: the presuppositions or perspective of any discipline are certainly going to influence the concepts which emerge from that discipline, and even the nature and description of the raw data on which those concepts are based. Thus transfer of data may be possible, if risky; but transfer of concepts could probably only happen in an analogical fashion. It is when the transfer of a concept by analogy is misunderstood as a simple transplant of the concept as a whole that problems can arise. To illustrate, the problems of Freud's apparently literal use of the concept of energy as contained in Newtonian physics in his theory of libido caused considerable confusion in psychology. Hiltner did not appear to be aware that he was using concepts analogically and thus was perhaps guilty of not realising that some of the concepts he borrowed from psychology had roots attached to them which did not fit comfortably with the roots on which pastoral theology grows.

This description of the analogical use of concepts which are bound to their parent discipline and thus cannot be transferred except in the form of analogies, has some similarities to the distinction Fawcett (1970, cited in Sanborn, 1979) draws between "analogical" and "descriptive" models. Descriptive models replicate what they seek to describe, whereas analogical models only provide an illustration of certain properties of what they are being used to describe.

An analogical model . . . provides a way of thinking about something which is either impossible to observe or not clearly pictured by the mind as it would look if available for observation. Rather than attempting to provide a scale model of the actual thing, an analogical model attempts to communicate a correspondence with regard to certain structural properties or particular characteristics. (Sanborn, 1979, p.2)

An example of Hiltner's adoption of a psychological theory as an analogy for a theological matter can be seen in his use of Lewin's field theory as an analogy for how he understood the relation between theology and other disciplines.

Hiltner (1958) referred to field theory five times in Preface to Pastoral Theology. In the first he used it to explain the relation, in the communicating perspective, of the gospel to other forms of knowledge. The gospel represents the "ultimate" concerns, to use Tillich's phrase, which cluster at the focus,

around which other areas of knowledge occupy a field in which they may be under greater or lesser influence from the focus. He used this model in preference to a strict separation of the sacred and profane, in which important knowledge from disciplines other than theology are neglected, and in preference also to a minimizing of the difference between "saving" knowledge and "other" knowledge, in which the transcendence of God and the ultimate significance of Jesus Christ are forgotten.

In his second use of field theory (pp.99-101), Hiltner argued that as all healing occupies the same field, there can be no categorical distinction between secular and religious healing.

Any healing, brought about by whatever means, may have religious dimensions or move toward religious depth. It is its effect upon the production of functional wholeness that indicates the degree and kind of its religious dimension and depth. (Hiltner, 1958, p.100, his emphasis)

Thirdly, on pp.111-12, Hiltner applied field theory to a particular case reported by Spencer. Hiltner argued that had Spencer understood the relationship between the religious dimensions at the focus and the other dimensions in the field, he would have been more free to give attention to his parishioner's feelings, as the area where Hiltner believed healing would have been most effective, and "he would have given religious arguments less often and at somewhat different places".

The fourth occasion in which Hiltner used field theory (p.176) deals further with the communicating perspective (see the first use above).

Finally, on pp.211-12, Hiltner used field theory to argue for a concept of the Church as including all those who fall somewhere within its field of influence, rather than as a clearly demarcated sect including those who consciously choose to belong, and excluding everyone else. The former model allows for degrees in becoming a Christian, and promotes unconditional love because it does not depend on any evidence that the person has responded.

This use of field theory in several contexts has prompted commentators to state that field theory is the model on which Hiltner bases his method (e.g. MacDonald, 1969). As a useful illustration or analogy, field theory certainly suited Hiltner's purposes very well to explain the relation between several sets of concepts. But would be a mistake to consider field theory as an essential foundational concept required to understand Hiltner's work. In his first major work, Pastoral Counseling (1949), there is no reference to field theory at all, and only two passing references in footnotes with several other authors to its originator, Kurt Lewin. And in his latest major venture into theology, Theological Dynamics (1972), there are no references to either field theory or Kurt Lewin. Clearly Hiltner's approach can stand without reliance on Lewin. His use of field theory, then, appears to be analogic rather than literal. An examination of the five references to it listed above reveals that he used it for two

purposes. The one was to illuminate his belief that theology in general and pastoral theology in particular needed to be in dynamic contact with other disciplines. Psychology especially had a crucial contribution to make to pastoral theology, which in turn had the right and obligation to feed reflection based on this contribution into the wider body of theology. The other use was more directly concerned with the experience of people in a pastoral context, in that he used field theory to suggest that people needed to be approached as whole personalities, for whom help in what might previously have been dismissed as a secular domain could have profound consequences spiritually. In neither of these uses was the concept of an energy field essential for his explanation. It served more as an illustration, an analogy for the relationships he was trying to describe. He could have used another analogy to make his point. He did not wish boundaries to be drawn around pastoral theology so as to exclude the insights and methods of other disciplines, nor did he wish boundaries to be drawn around the religious aspects of human experience so as to exclude the rest of life. It would therefore seem to be incorrect to argue as MacDonald (1969) does that Hiltner based his pastoral theology on the model of field theory.

Sanborn (1979) suggested that field theory was Hiltner's "first model", and that it was superseded by his "second model", as contained in Hiltner's (1968b) later work. By the "second model" Sanborn meant the pyramid analogy Hiltner used to describe the hierarchy of values or goals which begins with health at the base and moves upward towards salvation at the apex.

The suggestion that this replaced Hiltner's use of the field model as his basic theoretical tool seems to be more Sanborn's creation than Hiltner's, however. Sanborn believed that by basing his "second model" on biblical theology, Hiltner resolved the contextual confusion between theology and psychology which Sanborn believed was present in the field theory model. He thought the second, pyramid model enabled Hiltner to base his thought clearly on theology. Sanborn's view relied, however, on a rigid separation of the concerns of psychology and theology, something which Hiltner, even in the pyramid, never allowed. Certainly Hiltner made no indication that his single reference to a pyramid in this article was intended to supercede his earlier use of field theory. In other words, because Sanborn's intention was apparently to defend the theological perspective against the perceived onslaught of the psychological perspective, he perceived Hiltner's analogies as models which belonged in either one camp or the other. This illustrates a point which will be made in Chapter Four, that to a large extent the perspective of the observer creates the nature of the observations. The importance to Hiltner's approach of these two models is created in this case by Sanborn's need to see Hiltner taking a position on a matter which was of importance to Sanborn rather than Hiltner.

What is interesting to us, however, in these two models, analogies though they may only be, is that Hiltner was prepared to go beyond a single model to describe his approach. In other words, his approach is greater than any single model with which he might wish to illustrate it in any particular context. Fawcett (1970)

distinguishes between the control model, which is the basis on which a person constructs theories and which is at least partially implicit, and limited-relevance models, which are used to make parts of the control model explicit. Using these terms, then, the two models to which Sanborn refers are at best limited-relevance models which Hiltner uses to illustrate aspects of his implicit control model.

What Hiltner may be implying in this is that the field model did not do justice to the importance within his control model of the value called salvation. Christian pastoral counselling, in other words, differs from other kinds of counselling in allowing for values which take precedence over physical health. This important insight need not clash with the important insights which were illustrated by the field model, however. In Chapter 4 a method will be proposed for accommodating different insights without being bound by the dualism which assumes that limited-relevance models which differ must therefore necessarily conflict.

While we have rejected Sanborn's criticism of Hiltner's field model as being both unfounded and a misunderstanding of what Hiltner was trying to do with the model, his criticism of Hiltner's alleged confusion between theology and psychology does find an echo in Lapsley's (1969) criticism that Hiltner's data may have been too second-hand, in the sense of being borrowed from psychology rather than arising directly from the exercise of the ministry. Given the dangers noted above of transferring even data from one discipline to another, this is a fair comment, and one

which suggests that Hiltner's approach should be examined to ensure that the experiences of pastors in pastoral work are given sufficient attention.

If field theory is not the foundation which some commentators have made it out to be, what then is the key to Hiltner's work? Hielema (1975) suggested that Whitehead's process theology, Tillich's correlational method, and Boisen's use of "living human documents" were the three most important influences on Hiltner. Hiltner himself recognised that Anton Boisen was an important influence. "The basic clue to the systematic construction of this author has come from Boisen." (Hiltner, 1958, p.51)

This indebtedness to Boisen is interesting, as it indicates clearly Hiltner's own preference for working within the realm of practical pastoral counselling, rather than academic theology. That he constructed the most systematic pastoral theology of his time arises not so much from the academic demand to tie up the loose ends of this branch of theology, as the need to provide the practice of pastoral counselling with a basis from which to develop. His concern is therefore always with the practical. Both Doniger (1969) and Oglesby (1969) refer to Hiltner's determination, particularly as editor of Pastoral Psychology, to write at a level suitable for the average parish minister, and to avoid specialisation at the expense of a unified understanding of the ministry in all its aspects. His use of philosophical, psychological and theological theories arose, therefore, from his attempt to understand the "human documents" which were his

concern, not necessarily from an intrinsic interest in these theories. Thus it is that he used Lewin's field theory in what we have called an analogical way.

In fact the impression may be gained from Hiltner's writing that the whole superstructure of theologizing is there to explain and support his primary commitment to his practical counselling method. In other words, his commitment to eductive counselling came first, and theological reasons for adopting this approach had then to be found to support this commitment. This is not the kind of assertion which can be proved beyond dispute, but it is consistent with what has been noted above. If it is true that Hiltner's commitment to the eductive approach preceded his theological explanation of it, then the place to look for the influences which led to his position is not in his theological work, but in his eductive approach. For this one probably needs to look no further than Carl Rogers - not so much as an influence on Hiltner (they developed their approaches at about the same time), but as another example of a product of the spirit of that age. The dominant cultural influence in America at that time tended towards an eductive or non-directive orientation.

In his chapter on the cultural-historical influences on the development of Rogers' thought, Van Belle (1980) noted the influence of the spirit of liberal Protestantism, which affirmed the basic goodness, rather than sinfulness, of human nature. He also pointed to the influence on Rogers of Dewey's Pragmatic philosophy.

The American nation was founded . . . in protest against external ecclesiastical control. This resulted in an emphasis on voluntary, free individual choice in matters of religion. This emphasis in time extended itself to other areas of American life as well. Finally, it became culturally established as the central motive of democratic equalitarianism, stressing individual decision in matters of private, and majority rule in matters of public concern.

It was Pragmatism's role in American history to free the individual from the control of tradition. (Van Belle, 1980, p.30)

But Rogers went further than this, Van Belle suggests, in calling for society to free the individual by respecting the individual's ideas and actions as they were, without reference to their acceptability in terms of majority opinions. In so doing Rogers "came closer to what moved the hearts of the American people than Dewey ever did" (Van Belle, 1980, p.32).

Hiltner was born just seven years after Rogers, and so too was part of this age which saw the "phenomenal public acceptance of (Rogers') non-directive principle" (Van Belle, 1980, p.32). He shared some important influences with Rogers such as being trained in a liberal Protestant seminary. Hiltner would therefore also have been directed by this American emphasis on the primacy of the individual. It was this respect for the wisdom and good judgement inherent in every person which above all informed his educative approach, the subject of the next section.

3. Counselling orientation: The eductive approach

Oglesby (1969) refers to the history of pastoral care as the swinging of a pendulum "from scourging to permissiveness and back again" (p.10). Indeed in the next chapter the issue of permissiveness versus control will emerge as a central theme in the history of pastoral care. For Hiltner too his eductive approach, in which he rejects all attempts at coercion in counselling, is fundamental to his whole system.

Hiltner regarded the underlying philosophy of his pastoral counselling (what he called his "approach") as more important than the techniques used (what he called "methodology"). The methods used should vary according to the needs of the case, but should never contradict the basic eductive approach. It is here that he considered that he might differ from Carl Rogers, who, it seemed to Hiltner (1949, p.255) at that stage, was more concerned with methods than approach. This did not later turn out to be such a difference, however, in that Rogers' later work indicated that he too regards his person-centred understanding of human relations as more an approach than a technique.

The eductive approach entails drawing the solution to a situation out of the creative potentialities of the person needing help (Hiltner, 1949, p.97). The parishioner has the right to decide whether or not he requires counselling, and then "how far he will go, where he wants to arrive, what he wants to talk about and what he does not" (Hiltner, 1949, p.148). It is the parishioner who

knows what he can and cannot do. Hiltner (1958, pp.151-54) did not deny that moral guidance of a directive or persuasive nature is sometimes called for; but he considered the pastor who becomes directive in a situation to have moved out of the shepherding perspective into the organising perspective. Counselling belongs in the shepherding perspective and thus has always only to do with the "internal" dimension of the welfare of the individual, as against the "external" concern for the welfare of the community.

This approach clearly has psychological and theological roots and consequences. Hiltner (1949) identified four theological poles which he observed in the late 1940's. For three of them he suggested that both sides of each pole held validity, and that the desired position would be somewhere in between in each case, moving from side to side as the situation demanded. They were optimism versus pessimism about human nature; naturalistic versus supernaturalistic religion, with regard to which he stated that "it would be unfortunate if the idea took hold that counselling, because it deals empirically and uses material gained empirically, had to have a naturalistic metaphysic to support it" (p.258); and preoccupation with the ultimate or theoretical versus preoccupation with the practical or operational. In each of these issues Hiltner's views seemed to have been neutral, almost detached - as long as the theologians did not become too fanatical, their views on these issues would not affect the discipline of pastoral counselling, and Hiltner would be prepared for them to believe what they thought appropriate. But when it came to the fourth issue, eductive versus coercive use of the

theology of human nature, Hiltner came down very strongly on the side of the eductive use.

Hiltner's approach was in fact independent of the theological position taken on issues which did not interfere with the eductive principle. In that sense Hiltner could be described as pragmatic - his concern was with what the counsellor did with his theological beliefs about human nature, rather than what they were, as the following passage illustrates.

The implication in pastoral counselling is that deciding upon our fundamental theological idea about human nature still leaves us the task of deciding upon our motivating interest in the enunciation and propagation of that particular idea. If the answer is of a coercive nature, involving fundamental distrust of God's ability to move in a transforming way within human character and human society, then it would seem that counselling is a hopeless enterprise. If, on the other hand, in far-reaching knowledge of the evil depths of human potentiality we can nevertheless emotionally affirm God's movement for positive transformation in human life, we are eductive, and counselling has point and meaning (Hiltner, 1949, p.259).

From this it can be seen that the most significant area in which Hiltner would have wanted to take issue with pastoral approaches down the ages would be on the need to impose some sort of

influence on the parishioner in order to guide the Christian away from evil ways into behaviour seen to be consistent with the ways of God. Hiltner did not see this as legitimate in the shepherding perspective. Our examination of the history of pastoral care in the next chapter will indicate that active guidance is a clear theme running through the centuries. Hiltner would suggest that this sort of guidance belongs to perspectives other than the shepherding perspective; but this raises two questions. Firstly, how is the pastor to move from one perspective to another without allowing the one to interfere with the other? If the pastor is to teach moral principles while working in the communicating perspective, will this not have an influence on his ability to be seen by the parishioner as wholly educative in counselling? And conversely, if he is educative in counselling, will this affect his impact as communicator? (Note 3)

Secondly, why should his argument for an educative approach not apply just as well in the other perspectives? If God can work in the person while the counsellor draws out from that person what wisdom lies within, why should this not be true also in other pastoral activities? One cannot really envisage Hiltner himself taking a directive stance in any of the perspectives. In fact his chapters on pastoral work as preparation for counselling (Hiltner, 1950) suggest that in practice Hiltner would want to apply the educative principle as a guiding rule in all pastoral work. To be true to his doctrine of human nature he would not accept anything approaching coercion.

If, conversely, guidance is needed in the other perspectives, then why should it not also be needed in a counselling context? It is valid to argue that technically it might be sound for the counsellor to bracket his/her belief system in order to counsel non-directively, but if the argument is a theological one to the effect that the eductive approach is necessary in order to affirm God's power to transform people and society, then this argument should be applied consistently, and it would seem to be at variance with the assumption which applied through most of the history of pastoral care. (Note 4)

In order to examine this question more fully, it is necessary to consider Hiltner's doctrine of human nature.

Hiltner (1949) wrote with approval of the "inner-release" view of human nature, the most advanced expression of which he attributed to Carl Rogers, but cautioned that it is not sufficient as a doctrine of human nature. While this view that the human personality has an almost unlimited capacity to discover and realise what is most helpful to its healthy development should be the "basic operating centre" of the counsellor's work in practice, Hiltner suggested that it needs to be used within the context of what he called the "objective-ethical view" (Hiltner, 1949, p.30). This refers to certain "minimum personality demands" which are common to people in all cultures. If these are denied,

the struggle for their release and expression cannot be understood merely in terms of the individual who is struggling, but must be viewed as the inexorable revolt of

human nature against that which has denied fulfillment of its most basic needs. (Hiltner, 1949, p.31)

He regarded these human needs as accessible in principle to empirical research. The objective-ethical view does not therefore require theological assumptions to support it. The Christian pastor will, however, understand that these needs are part of God's creation. This "Christian-theological view" of human nature provides the framework out of which the pastor can see that the objective-ethical view is necessary; it does not, however, appear in Hiltner's view to inform the content of the ethical position. It would appear that the counsellor who had arrived at the objective-ethical view from a theological perspective would not differ in practice from one who had arrived at it from some other perspective.

What is important to note in Hiltner's use of the term "ethical" here is that he was referring to conditions in the person's environment which prevent that person from fulfilling his or her personality needs, rather than to standards of personal behaviour. This will need to be explored further when it is considered whether Hiltner is within the stream of traditional pastoral theology in its concern for ethical instruction and correction. Hiltner was clear and emphatic that any kind of coercion, whether direct or indirect, whether in words or in attitude, is contrary to successful pastoral counselling. This presumably implies that it is not legitimate for the counsellor to enter an interview with any preconceived standards about what the client should or should not do in any situation.

What then was Hiltner's understanding of sin and evil? He did regard mental illness as involving some culpability on the part of the sufferer in that although mentally ill people begin their illnesses as victims,

the actual illness emerged not just from what had been done to the person but also from the perpetuation of the strategy he had devised to counter what had been done to him (Hiltner, 1963, p.15).

This, of course, is a passive sort of complicity in that it involves acquiescence in a state into which the sufferer has been forced, rather than an active choice of behaviour or attitude in disobedience to a given standard.

In a review of Christian descriptions of sin in Scripture and subsequent thought, Hiltner (1968a) recognised three principal ways of viewing sin: rebellion, alienation, and missing the mark. This last he divided into the temptation to miss the mark by trying to be perfect, and the temptation to acquiesce with the idea of oneself as a loser, in which the target is lost sight of through preoccupation with little things (this is what he claimed accidie meant). He suggested these could provide a differential diagnosis of human experiences. It is in his discussion of original sin, however, that his understanding comes out most clearly:

No individual person participates in sin by simple willfulness, atomistic individual action, and apart from

his culture, family, and heritage. No individual person is wholly to blame for the entire character of his predicament (Hiltner, 1968a, p.48).

Thus Hiltner appeared to argue that no one should be blamed entirely for the past which has led to his or her present situation, but equally no one can be let off the responsibility of participating in creating his or her future.

He was by no means necessarily accountable for what created his particular predicament. Yet no one but he can conceivably be responsible for what happens from this point onward (Hiltner, 1968a, p.49).

There seems to be a logical contradiction in this view, however useful it may be pastorally. If a person can be held responsible now for what he or she will become in the future, how can that responsibility not be admitted for those moments in the past when the seeds for the present were sown? It would also appear to be at variance with the understanding of human culpability which underlies the very strong Christian tradition of confession and restitution, a point which will be taken up, together with the psychologist Mowrer's (1961) call for a return to the therapeutic use of the confessional, in Chapter Five.

With regard to ethical principles, Hiltner suggested that the counsellor should hold faithfully to his or her own principles, but not allow differences between these and those of the client to interfere with the counselling relationship.

We can understand his view, maintain our own perspective, and utilize our perspective to help both him and the wider situation (Hiltner, 1950, p.184).

In practice this appears to mean a suspension or bracketing of the counsellor's ethical judgement while interacting with the client. The assumption is that by the eductive method of counselling, the client will free the client to make appropriate ethical decisions. The assumption about human nature which underlies this is clearly that freed of restrictions (what Carl Rogers called conditions of worth), people will tend to develop in healthy directions. This is the assumption which will need to be considered in the light of traditional approaches to human sinfulness.

CHAPTER THREE

THEMES FROM THE HISTORY OF PASTORAL CARE

The aim of this chapter is to describe in summary what the Christian tradition has to say about how the pastor helps people. To keep the study in manageable proportions, the survey will be limited to the history of pastoral care in the West. The survey will rely heavily on the histories written by McNeill (1951) and Clebsch and Jaekle (1964). The method used will be to select material which illustrates themes which recur in the history of pastoral care in order to use these themes in evaluating the extent to which Hiltner's approach is faithful to the tradition.

MCNEILL'S STAGES IN THE HISTORY OF THE CURE OF SOULS

After tracing its roots in Jewish pastoral guidance and Greek philosophical discourse, McNeill (1951) described several stages in the development of the Christian tradition of pastoral care. They are the New Testament period; the Age of the Church Fathers, characterised by discipline and consolation; the Celtic penitential system leading to the rise of the confessional as the dominant instrument of pastoral care; followed by a period of three centuries of "enrichment and deterioration" leading up to the Renaissance; and then several strands which emerged from or during the Reformation. His chapters covering this later period

deal separately with Lutheranism; the continental Reformed churches; Anglicanism; Presbyterianism and Puritanism; Congregationalism, the Baptist churches, Quakerism, and Methodism; and Roman Catholicism.

This survey clearly arises from a particular context and it could be argued that by devoting five chapters to various Protestant strands, as against one chapter to the Roman Catholic tradition since the Reformation, and three chapters to the entire tradition between the New Testament period and the Reformation, McNeill revealed his major interest and bias. His discussion did, however, suggest several important themes which will be useful when dealing with the development of pastoral care in this century. For this reason the periods McNeill dealt with will be discussed in the order he gave them, with a summary section dealing with some conclusions he drew from his survey.

1. The Guidance of Souls in the New Testament

McNeill pointed out that the Church must have had to meet the problem of discipline very early in its life, and that later themes in pastoral care can thus already be recognised in the New Testament. McNeill pointed to the commission given Peter in Matthew's Gospel to remit or retain sins (Matthew 16.16-19), and to the procedure for dealing with a member who is found to have sinned against another (Matthew 18.15-17). John's Gospel records a commission to the Apostles to forgive or retain sins (John 20.22-23). In the Book of Acts Luke records what McNeill

suggested was the earliest general regulation of behaviour in the Church, when the Council of Jerusalem prohibited certain foods and unchastity (Acts 15.29) - "the first Christian canonical list of grave sins" (McNeill, 1951, p.80). In his letters Paul also listed sins to be avoided, such as the "works of the flesh" listed in Galatians 5.19-21.

McNeill (p.81. Undated references below refer to McNeill, 1951) suggested that there are "two constant valid motives of the corrective discipline, restoration of the sinner and protection of the Church's purity". These are both illustrated by Paul in 1 Corinthians 5.4-6. Excommunication of the offending member may be resorted to "so that his spirit may be saved on the Day of the Lord", and the Corinthians are to be wary, because "a little leaven leavens all the dough". This strictness of discipline is balanced by forgiveness, as illustrated in 2 Corinthians 2.5-11, a passage possibly referring to the same case as dealt with before. Forgiveness and restoration to fellowship are again referred to in Galatians 6.1; but Hebrews 6.4-6 contains a far stricter message ruling out reconciliation for those who have committed apostasy. Although McNeill did not make this point explicitly, this seems to suggest that in the early Church's development of disciplinary procedures there came a time (probably under persecution) when the need to protect the Church's purity outweighed the value of the individual sinner's restoration, at least in certain circumstances. It may be that the writer to the Hebrews had a kind of apostasy in mind which differed from the type of sin Paul had in mind when he urged reconciliation. In that case, it would suggest

that the foundations were being laid for a system of categories of sins, with different disciplinary procedures applying for different categories.

Other elements McNeill (pp.82-86) noted in New Testament pastoral care include guidance of Christians in day-to-day living, including codes of Christian behaviour in most of the epistles; contemplation as a defence against passion and self-centred anxiety (e.g. Philippians 4.8); and mutual edification and fraternal correction (e.g. 1 Thessalonians 5.11,14, Hebrews 3.13, James 5.16). James in particular emphasised the role of the member in seeking out and recovering brothers who had strayed (James 5.19-20).

2. Discipline and Correction in the Age of the Fathers

During the second and third centuries the two functions of discipline noted above became the subject of dispute between those (like Tertullian and Origen) who sought the protection of the fellowship, and the more liberal leaders (such as Hermas and Clement of Alexandria) seeking the restoration of those who sinned. Probably the most significant development in this period (this is the author's rather than McNeill's description) was the gradual shift from a strict discontinuous distinction drawn between the Christian life on the one hand and the sinfulness of life without Christ on the other hand, to a continuous difference of degree in which people were seen usually to be neither perfectly "in" the fold of the redeemed, nor absolutely "out", but

rather to be more or less sinful, depending on the exercise of their will in prevailing against the "vast and frightful realm of sin" (McNeill, p.111). It was as if the ship of the Church which had previously been kept afloat and as dry as possible in the midst of the ocean of a sinful world, was now found to be filled with water itself, and the concern of the pilots was to keep that water as clean as possible.

McNeill pointed out that this was a period during which Christianity came to be "more often professed than inwardly embraced" (p.110), and that pastors therefore relied less on the life-giving experience of the early Church and more on enlisting the will. McNeill's point needs, however, to be taken a little further. It will be argued in the next few paragraphs that the meaning of sin and confession had changed radically by the end of this period and that this must surely have had to do with the changed political position of the Church from one in which, as a distinct and often persecuted minority, its boundaries were very clearly drawn, to one in which as the established religious institution of the society, its boundaries more or less embraced the whole population.

As regards the change in the understanding of sin, McNeill did point out that "the simple lists in the New Testament gave place to a detailed catalogue of sins which must be systematically checked and overcome" (p.111). But this was not just an increase in the number of sins to be considered. It seems to have been a change in the conception of sin from a betrayal of a person's

loyalty to Christ, something a Christian just would not commit, to any common lapse such as is characteristic of the imperfect human condition. Sin as it was originally understood was too significant a matter to be related in any way to the minor contraventions of the medieval system of sins which were later to come into being. And sins as defined in that system were generally far too petty to be associated with the awful consequences contingent on sin as it had been understood. The fundamental difference between the responses to sin of the early Church and the medieval Church can only be understood if their respective meanings attached to the word "sin" are considered to be different concepts. It would clarify much confusion if these two usages were represented by different words; and in this study a distinction will be drawn between "Sin", defined as the wilful turning away from Christ, and "sins", defined as conscious or accidental contraventions of a set of religious or moral precepts.

If the understanding of sin changed, so did the practice of confession. Where "Sin" is involved, of course, allowing for confession and reconciliation is a major matter, and the Church cannot afford to assume that the Sinner's return is automatic. But in the matter of "sins", every member is bound to be guilty. The community can be defined as a company of sinners seeking victory in their weakness. Thus, while only one repentance was permitted after baptism until as late as the end of the sixth century (McNeill, p.93), by medieval times confession had become a regular religious duty. As McNeill (p.93) put it,

One of the most remarkable transformations in the history of Church discipline is the gradual admission, leading ultimately to the requirement, of the frequent penance which had long been earnestly rejected.

There is thus little point in comparing as like phenomena the public exomolegisis of the early Church and the private rite of confession in the later Church. The one had to do with establishing the boundaries of the Church in a largely hostile society, while the other had to do with regulating behaviour in a society in which the Church functioned integrally as the vehicle for morality. The former was concerned with protecting the purity of the Church so that members would not weaken in their commitment; the latter had to do with regulating individual behaviour so that society would function smoothly. They are different phenomena with different functions.

It is of course not possible to predict how pastoral care would have developed had Constantine not been converted and the Church not subsequently been installed by Theodosius as the established religion in Rome, but it is not difficult to see a link between the changing political place of the Church and the changing demands placed on its pastors. Thus the impermeability of the Church's boundaries (i.e. the degree to which membership is exclusive and rigorously defined against a usually hostile majority in society) emerges as an important factor in determining what kind of pastoral care is likely to be exercised. This point will be returned to when developments in pastoral care are

considered in what is emerging as a possibly post-Christian era since the time Hiltner began to write.

3. The Celtic Penitential System and the Rise of the Confessional

This stage has by implication already been discussed in the previous section. The penitential discipline in the Celtic Church gradually evolved and spread until it led to confession becoming a regular, private transaction between parishioner and ordained priest. McNeill suggested that with this went a transformation of penance from a disciplinary to a sacramental role. In other words, it was the restoring aspect of reconciliation which was emphasised. In spite of the inadequacies and abuses of the penitential rites, McNeill suggested that "we cannot doubt that they were instrumental in the recovery and rehabilitation of many who had made shipwreck of life, and in elevating and stabilizing the morals of many more" (p.135).

What McNeill did not discuss is the function of the rites in regulating social behaviour from a sociological perspective. This is outside the scope of the present study, but it would be interesting to consider to what extent penance of this kind met the demand on the one hand for liberation as promised in the Gospel, and on the other hand the demand by society for conformity.

4. Three Centuries of Enrichment and Deterioration, from the Coming of the Friars to the Renaissance.

The spirit of secularism began to stir during the three centuries before the Reformation. This period saw the ascendancy of the friars as important practitioners of pastoral care. Literacy began to increase again among the laity and manuals (many dealing with Ars Moriendi, the art of dying) for self-improvement circulated. McNeill described the period as follows:

In the Art of Dying the Good Angel and the evil spirits are found contending for the soul of Moriens, the dying man. A comparable contest of good and evil forces was being waged for the soul of Europe. Devout and zealous men were doing what they could to avert disaster, and to guide the tempted and morally defeated to deliverance. The ecclesiastical life of the time shows a progressive deterioration, and this is illustrated in sacramental penance and its related practices (McNeill, 1951, p.160).

McNeill regarded the most regrettable aspect of this low point in the Church's history to be the approach adopted then to the problem of sin.

For long centuries the emphasis had been not on sin as a state of the soul from which repentance and divine grace would emancipate it, as upon sins in the plural that swarmed in great numbers and must be confessed in complete detail (McNeill, 1951, p.160).

This was associated with considerable abuse of the penitential system and the controversial introduction of indulgences. It should be noted that McNeill's distinction between sins and sin is not the same as that made earlier between "Sin" and "sins". "Sin" as encountered by the early Church was represented by a specific act or state of apostasy which marked out the sinner as outside the boundaries of the Church. It thus has nothing to do with the confessional as it developed later. As described by McNeill, however, sin is a "state of the soul" underlying sinful behaviour, and is the condition which ideally should be treated by the confessional when it operates at its best. It is the condition from which those within the boundary of the Church strive to be liberated.

We now have three uses of the word: "Sin" is the defining characteristic which excludes those who need to be excluded for the sake of preserving the integrity of the Church under threat; "sin" is the state of the soul from which Christians find emancipation through repentance and divine grace; and "sins" are the contraventions of moral codes, an over-emphasis on which can lead individually to scrupulosity and corporately to legalism and abuse of the mechanisms provided for effecting reconciliation.

5. The Cure of Souls in Lutheranism

McNeill pointed out that the Reformation had its inception in matters concerning the cure of souls. It was his objection to the abuses associated with the sale of indulgences that brought Luther

to the public statement of his theses. He did not object to the rite of confession itself, but argued that confession should be made primarily to God, that remission depends on the grace of God, not satisfying a formal ritual, that sacramental confession should be used to deal with the great offences, without worrying the person by attempting to deal with the large number of venial sins which are practically unavoidable, and that it is not necessary to confess all hidden sins, but only those committed intentionally against God's commandments (McNeill, p.166).

McNeill summarised the main characteristics of Lutheran pastoral practice in three generalisations (pp.189-191). Firstly Lutheranism freely revised medieval methods, making confession a voluntary disclosure of those sins of which the person was aware. This led on the one hand to neglect of the rite in some cases, and on the other hand to the possibility of its being a "searching and helpful personal conversation on the religious problems of the penitent". Secondly, pastoral visitation was encouraged, for "the healing of souls and the quickening of religious devotion". This was aided by the development of publishing and increase in literacy. Thirdly and potentially most importantly was the encouragement of the mutual care of souls by the laity. McNeill saw in the Lutherans' teaching of the corporate mutual priesthood of all believers "a highly significant reaffirmation of a neglected element in New Testament teaching", and noted that when it came to full recognition in the pietist period it was associated with a far-reaching revival.

So far in this survey of the history of pastoral care the emphasis has been quite clearly and overwhelmingly on sin and its treatment. This is the theme to which McNeill returned again and again throughout each period discussed. Major eras are demarcated by differences in approach to this single issue. Is this a fair reflection of how pastoral care evolved? McNeill's chapter on the Reformation, for example, opened with Luther's response to the abuses of indulgences, and then continued to deal almost exclusively with how pastors managed the problem of sin and confession. Yet he did point out that there were periods when confession fell into disuse. What were pastors doing then? Visitation is mentioned, but little attention given to it. Could it be that what occupied the pens of the leaders of the day and has thus come down to us as the major preoccupation of the age was only a small part of what occupied the time and attention of the ordinary pastors of that time? Hiltner (1967, p.15) argued that what McNeill recorded represented only the more controversial aspects of the cure of souls, and that the aspects which did not entail any conflict between the group and the individual were taken for granted. He went on to argue that it is these latter concerns which are in fact central to pastoral care. What Hiltner described as pastoral counselling and what McNeill described as the work of earlier pastors seem to have very little overlap at all. Hiltner did not bring any historical evidence to support his contention, and it could be argued that the historian's version is likely to be a fairer reflection of the true balance than the version of the pastoral theologian who needed to prove a point about his own emphasis. This issue will be returned to in Chapter

Five, however, when an attempt will be made to establish that recent trends in pastoral care and counselling help to indicate where the balance does lie.

6. The Cure of Souls in the Continental Reformed Churches

The impression is gained that the Reformers had pragmatic concerns uppermost in their minds when it came to pastoral matters. In the experiments with Christian government particularly, their concern was to regulate the behaviour of the population, at least as much as it was with the spiritual welfare of the individual. McNeill (p.209) described Calvin's pastoral work as follows:

He does not plot out ascetic or devotional exercises leading to a detached holiness, but asks for prompt, heroic devotion in a course beset with dangers, and seeks to fortify the souls of men for sacrifices and martyrdom.

Although McNeill did not make this point explicitly, it seems that the political tumult surrounding the Reformation and the often precarious position of both Lutheran and Reformed civic authorities introduced a new historical situation: it combined elements of the early years when the Church had been a threatened minority around which clear boundaries had to be drawn, with elements of the later established position in which its boundaries were the same as those of the secular community, and the ecclesiastical authorities exercised considerable influence over civic affairs. Now the Church still shared the boundaries with

the state, but it was a threatened state and a threatened Church which gave legitimacy to the state. Secular and religious morality and sanctions were therefore consciously brought together to serve the function of protecting the purity of the community (which is the same effect produced by the concern with boundaries noted in the Early Church). In this respect the major strand of the Reformation perpetuated the dominance of the community over the individual as the prime concern of pastoral care.

This control over the morals of the population was not new. For centuries bishops' courts and city councils had decreed rules which a later generation would think an intolerable tyranny over the liberty of the citizens. Calvin wanted to give this right and duty to the authorities of the Church, not of the State; and where the Church authorities delivered a sinner to the civil power, the civil power would punish him. (Chadwick, 1964, p.84)

Chadwick went on to enumerate some of the cases dealt with in the consistory of Geneva. They indicate in practice what this concern for protecting the purity and identity of the community meant:

A woman knelt upon the grave of her husband and cried Requiescat in pace; others saw her and started to copy her. A goldsmith made a chalice. Someone said that the arrival of the French refugees had put up the cost of living. A woman tried to cure her husband by tying round his neck a walnut containing a spider. Another danced.

Another possessed a copy of the lives of the saints, the Golden Legend. A woman of sixty-two married a man of twenty-five. A barber gave the tonsure to a priest. Another blamed Geneva for executing people for their religious opinions. (Chadwick, 1964, p.85)

Such concerns would clearly not have interested Hiltner. They indicate that the concern then was to regulate the behaviour of the community in order to establish and protect the model of Church and society which was evolving. A woman's cry of grief becomes a dangerous style threatening to take people back to the influence of Rome, from which they had been rescued. In this sense the people were seen to need protection against themselves.

7. The cure of souls in the Anglican communion

Much of McNeill's chapter has to do with the debate within Anglicanism concerning the place of private auricular confession. It thus just amplifies the points dealt with earlier and does not require study for our purposes.

8. Discipline and guidance in Presbyterianism and Puritanism

According to McNeill (p.268), both Puritan and Presbyterian writers have seen the purpose of ministry as "Persuasion to repentance and conversion, the relief of religious anxiety, and the awakening of conscience in the affairs of daily living". He claims, however that it was the establishment of the Church in

Scotland that led to its system of discipline becoming inflexible and institutionalised. Thus again the political position of the Church can be seen to have had an impact on its pastoral methods.

One feature of Presbyterianism which McNeill pointed out had and still has great value is the role offered to lay people in the office of elder.

9. The cure of souls in Congregationalism, the Baptist Churches, Quakerism and Methodism.

It is with this branch of Protestantism that the interests of the individual begin to overtake the interests of the community as the dominant concern of pastoral care. Referring to the impact of the Free Churches on the American frontier, McNeill (p.272) noted that "their primary object was rather to save and educate souls than to improve community life; but the rise of social morality was a valuable by-product of the discipline of souls". In a return to the spirit of the Early Church, the Church was again seen as a minority distinct from the wider society, and despite the emphasis on individual piety, the pursuit of holiness still led to the purity of the group of believers being a major concern. McNeill gained the impression, for example, that every Methodist in America in the early nineteenth century "was made aware of his participation in an order of life morally distinct from that of the society around him, and that his defection from the Methodist standards left him the alternatives of repentance or exclusion with the attendant disgrace" (p.283). The doctrine of the Church,

with particular reference to its composition and boundaries, thus again emerges as an important factor in determining the mood of pastoral care.

McNeill (p.284) offered the interesting suggestion that it is erroneous to interpret the characteristic of Protestantism as religious individualism. He argued that the mutual care of souls called for in the doctrine of the priesthood of all believers revived the spirit of the New Testament Church and caused people to care for others and in turn to benefit from their care. Whether or not Protestantism can be described as individualistic depends on the sense in which one uses the term, however. In one sense McNeill is correct; if the attention to the individual in the context of mutual care has led to care within the congregation, then indeed Protestantism has promoted community mindedness rather than individualism. But in another sense there is a very clear individualistic strand in Protestantism, in that it understands the primary end of pastoral care to be the salvation of the individual rather than the good of the community.

The line between disciplining the community for the sake of the individual and disciplining the individual for the sake of the community is so narrow, however, as to suggest that these are merely different approaches to the same end.

McNeill went on to indicate his own perspective by calling clearly for a return to discipline. Noting the "modern decline in importance of the forms of corrective discipline that were

formerly employed" (p.284), McNeill argued that before their decline during the nineteenth century, "there was established a pattern of behaviour in substantial accord with the externals at least of the older codes of discipline", and that these served the purpose of defining for society in general what a "respectable" person was. If his argument is true, then presumably we are living through a period during which the loss of that common agreement of the nature of respectability will make itself felt in radical social consequences. Browning (1976) in fact argues very strongly along just these lines, and calls for a return in the Church's pastoral ministry to the task of supplying the moral context for society.

The loss of discipline is partly a consequence of the greater difficulty in specifying acceptable behaviour in view of the greater complexibility of modern urban and industrial society.

But,

The difficulties of discipline have led to its too easy surrender by the Churches. No Church has ever ideally solved the problem of maintaining standards and correcting the shortcomings of its members without infringing the law of charity. But if discipline should disappear to the point at which the manner of life of Church people is not distinguishable from that of persons who make no religious profession, the Church would have lost her significance.

(McNeill, p.285)

McNeill has here identified a key dimension which seems to have been present throughout the history of Christian pastoral care: how to maintain standards and correct the shortcomings of members without infringing the law of charity, to use his words.

10. The cure of souls in Roman Catholicism

Much of this chapter has to do with the discussion of casuistry and the confessional. McNeill made a distinction between the spiritual director and the confessor, although the two functions are often combined. "Direction has to do with the pursuit of higher spiritual attainment rather than with the sacramental pardon of sins." (p.293). McNeill necessarily relied on the evidence of letters to illustrate the nature of spiritual direction, mainly from the great French guides, such as Francis de Sales, Pierre de Berulle, Vincent de Paul, Bossuet and Fenelon. But the reader is left with a question about how representative this is of Catholic cure of souls in the period from the Counter-Reformation to the twentieth century. To devote twelve out of eighteen pages in this chapter to the letters (addressed, as McNeill conceded, mainly to those under vows or of high social rank, and largely ignoring the common people) of French spiritual guides is surely to give a one-sided picture of a very rich and varied tradition of pastoral care.

On the subject of spiritual direction McNeill pointed out the basic dilemma: "The line between a healing and strengthening guidance and an unwholesome and debilitating domination is difficult to draw" (p.306).

McNeill began his concluding chapter with a statement that sums up the fundamental relation between the history of the cure of souls and modern helping professions:

The physicians of the soul whose work has concerned us in this book would be astonished if they could suddenly enter our world today. They would find themselves in an environment in which their assumptions are ignored by many earnest and highly trained men who undertake the reconstruction of personalities damaged in the stresses of life. (p.319)

In other words, practically speaking, there is little relation between the work of the pastoral theologians of earlier centuries and the work of modern psychologists. Taking this idea of McNeill's a bit further, we could say that pastoral care has been concerned predominantly with the health of the soul in the sense of its place within the sphere of God's grace and with the moral purity of the individual and the community. Pastors have thus also been interested in the mechanisms with which to help people appropriate the advantages of God's grace, and with which to control the behaviour of people to satisfy the existing codes of moral behaviour. Guidance and even compulsion took a leading part in pastoral care, alongside a greater or lesser emphasis on proclaiming the good news of peoples' acceptability to God. These two strands of demand and grace form the poles of a continuum along which pastoral approaches have oscillated throughout history.

The helping professions, on the other hand, are concerned with health principally in the sense of freedom from pathology. The nature of health is seldom explicitly defined, but generally has to do with the individual's experience of being well. The nearest therapists generally come to taking the community into account is in limiting their implicit definition of the health towards which they strive with their clients, to something which does not impinge on the right of others to enjoy a sense of well-being too. Guidance does not usually enter into it, because the therapist has no external authority on which to base such suggestions. It is the client who must supply the guidelines for "correct" behaviour. Neither does the proclamation of good news enter into the matter, as the therapist has nothing to offer beyond a belief in the client's intrinsic value and inner resources to deal with the problem.

While distinctions between the two traditions can be drawn in very many ways, it could be argued that the basis of most of these distinctions is the appeal in the pastoral tradition to the authority of God, both for moral direction and for healing power, as against psychology's appeal to the individual person, again for both moral direction and healing power. Both of these are modified and extended in various ways which approach that of the other: God's direction and healing are seen to be mediated by the community of believers, while the individual's experience can be illuminated and even confronted by reference to the wisdom accumulated in clinical experience with other individuals. But the starting point and assumptions remain basically distinct at this fundamental point.

An example can be seen in McNeill's reference to the psychoanalytic treatment of guilt: "It has not taken guilt itself but the feeling of guilt as the enemy to be destroyed" (p.320). This is not an academic distinction; he pointed out that moral values are therefore not at issue in psychoanalytic treatment of guilt, and the danger exists, as seen from the pastor's perspective, that by taking this approach the therapist might do away with the effect of conscience as "a not infallible but generally useful index" of the need for the remedies of repentance and forgiveness. This would carry the double danger of not truly helping the person to be freed from the torment of an injured conscience, while exposing him or her to the threat of a weakened conscience, with all the accompanying dangers of further immoral behaviour.

McNeill suggested that despite all the helpful advances made in the helping sciences, there remains an ultimate need in humanity which cannot be met by them:

But for the attainment of full health of personality, man must find a harmonious relationship in the realm of spiritual values. The primary obstacle to his entrance into this realm is what the Bible calls sin. When all has been done that science can do to relieve man's distresses, the pride that protects his other sins may withhold him from his true deliverance, leaving him to live out his days a defeated soul. Man is a child of God, strangely

prone to reject the divine Fatherhood; and in this aberration he finds himself frustrated and self-exiled from his true inheritance. (P.321)

It follows that there would be a difference in techniques as well. McNeill referred to the value of encouraging private prayer, intelligent self-examination, and resolute self-discipline, while the traditional means of grace have been the focus of the pastor-parishioner relationship down the centuries. None of these would usually find a place in modern counselling or psychotherapy.

If the criticism levelled against modern psychotherapy is that it disregards the reality of authority and resources beyond the individual and thus endangers the person's relation to God, the criticism that could be levelled against traditional pastoral care is that the concept of the authority of God can be co-opted to serve the personal power needs of the pastor, or to support the repressive demands of an unfree society. Thus an issue which has emerged often in the historical survey is that of the degree of authority which the guide should have over the guided. Associated with this is the degree of specificity of the code of behaviour expected of members and the rigor with which it is enforced. The degree of implicit control exercised by social instruments such as excommunication or disgrace should also be included.

McNeill summed up this ebb and flow of authoritarianism in the history of the cure of souls. As the aims and methods in the cure of souls have varied with the flow of history,

they have reflected the changing philosophies of the relation of the individual to the group (or Church). Where high interpretations of group authority prevail, the individual who breaks the pattern is subjected to an authoritative corrective discipline. The object sought is the subjection of the individual, and concern for the group interest rather than the interior recovery of the personality becomes the determining factor. Close attention is paid to specific acts, and there is a corresponding neglect of the more fundamental concept of personal character as a whole, of which acts are but symptoms and indices. "Sins" become more important than "sin", legal restraint than inner motivation" (p.viii-ix).

CLEBSCH AND JAEKLE'S FOUR PASTORAL FUNCTIONS

Clebsch and Jaekle (undated references in this section refer to Clebsch and Jaekle, 1964) described the history of pastoral care in terms of four pastoral functions: healing, sustaining, guiding, and reconciling.

Healing has to do with both restoring the person to health and moving from there to a higher level of spiritual integration. Means which the Church has used to achieve this have included anointing (recently returning to its earlier function as a sacrament of healing rather than extreme unction), prayers to saints and the use of relics, charismatic healers, exorcism, and

the use of the other sacraments. Clebsch and Jaekle suggested that a polarisation occurred in current pastoral healing between charismatic healers who have sought to recover the traditional healing ministry of the Church, and in so doing have in some cases repudiated medical healing, and those pastors who co-operate with the medical profession, and in so doing, tend to take their understanding of healing from extrapastoral sources.

Sustaining has been particularly evident in times of persecution and hardship. Clebsch and Jaekle suggested that sustaining includes preservation of the person to minimize loss; consolation of the person who has suffered loss, with a view to helping the person still to achieve his or her destiny under God; consolidation of the deprived person's remaining resources to enable him or her to face a deprived life; and redemption, in which the person is helped to embrace the loss and pursue fulfillment on a new basis.

Guiding is "that function of the ministry of the cure of souls which arrives at some wisdom concerning what one ought to do when he is faced with a difficult problem of choosing between various courses of thought or action" (p.49). Clebsch and Jaekle suggested that, the wisdom for guiding may come from within the individual himself, from the experience of the counsellor, from common cultural values, from a superior wisdom available to the counsellor, or a body of knowledge independent of both people.
(p.50)

Guiding includes casuistry and the disciplines advocated in schemes such as St Ignatius Loyola's Spiritual Exercises, "psychologically the most penetrating and pastorally the most effective scheme of spiritual transformation ever devised in the Christian tradition" (p.233).

Reconciling "means helping alienated persons to establish or renew proper and fruitful relationships with God and neighbour" (p.56). There are two interdependent "modes" of reconciling, forgiveness and discipline. This fourth function is particularly interesting for the purposes of our present study, because it is the one Clebsch and Jaekle added to the three suggested by Hiltner. It could therefore be assumed that Clebsch and Jaekle found in their historical survey that this was the element in the history of pastoral care which was missing in Hiltner's scheme. We have already seen that it is the dominant concern in McNeill's review.

Clebsch and Jaekle suggested that by the time of Origen and Tertullian four elements could be seen in reconciliation: preparation (spiritual counsel) to help the believer decide whether or not public confession was required; confession, which at that time generally was before the whole congregation; penance, also publicly before both the Church and the pagans; and reconciliation, which was then seen to be effected in relation both to God and the Church. It is curious that they omitted confrontation or correction which must, at least in some cases, have preceded preparation (cf Matthew 18.15-17).

Clebsch and Jaekle pointed out that in due course public exomologesis was replaced by private confession to a priest, and absolution became the most important part of the sequence. With the Reformation confession was made voluntary, and a regular general confession as part of congregational worship began to replace private confession to a priest. Lay people were brought into the reconciling process through fraternal correction and the expression of the priesthood of all believers emphasised in the Free Churches.

Clebsch and Jaekle suggested that in modern times reconciliation has been neglected. "There is no place in the structure and rhythm of the life of modern congregations where a serious discussion concerning the state of one's soul is expected". Presumably they had Protestant congregations in mind. Consequently the Church is virtually deprived of its ministry of pastoral reconciling "at a time when alienation is at the root of much human woe and anxiety" (p.66).

They found reasons for this in the tendency for discipline to become associated with the good of the Church rather than the good of the individual. It thus became associated with power and with punishment rather than redemption. In the Inquisition violent compulsion was justified on the grounds of correction.

Using the four pastoral functions, Clebsch and Jaekle then delineated eight epochs in the history of pastoral care.

In the era of Primitive Christianity (until about 180 A.D.) the Early Church was particularly concerned with sustaining, in the belief that the end of the world was imminent.

The following period up till 306 A.D. was one of persecution ("Under Oppression"). The great threat to the Church was that members might weaken and give in to the Emperor's demand that they conform to the state religion. Steps had therefore to be taken to minimize the temptation and maximize the penalty for weakening. As we have seen from McNeill's description, this was a hard period in the Church's life, when a stringent discipline was observed to keep up morale and prevent a loss of membership. It was the time of the debate over whether indeed a Christian could be allowed to confess and be absolved at all - should one guilty of apostasy be allowed back to contaminate the faithful? Thus when Clebsch and Jaekle suggest that the dominant function was "reconciling troubled persons to God and to the Church" (p.13-14), they seem to be giving a somewhat wide meaning to the term "reconciliation". The debate was about discipline; it could as well be called the epoch of excommunication as the epoch of reconciliation.

The basic question then was who should be allowed to be or remain a member of the Church. By including this in their use of the term reconciliation, Clebsch and Jaekle assumed that discipline was applied for what indeed should ultimately be the correct reason for it, namely to effect reconciliation. To allow for the reality that this link between discipline and reconciliation is not always maintained, however, without losing the link, we shall

regard the function of reconciling as comprising at least two sub-functions: discipline (maintaining a standard of behaviour which protects the identity of the group and assists the individual to resist temptation to fall away) and restoration (restoring alienated persons or groups to fellowship with God and others).

Also during this period, as Clebsch and Jaekle pointed out, pastors began the task of codifying sins and their appropriate penalties. While they described this period as being principally concerned with reconciliation, the task of drawing up codes of behaviour could just as easily have been described as guiding, indicating how difficult it is to characterise an era simply in terms of a single function.

The era of "Christian" Culture was the period when Christianity was legalised. This was characterised by guiding people to live according to the norms of the developing Christian culture.

During the Dark Ages in the West, Clebsch and Jaekle suggested that the encounter with the Teutonic peoples "quickly polarised soul care around inductive guidance", although they did not explain why that should have been so.

Medieval Christendom saw a return to healing as the dominant function, based on a well-defined sacramental system designed to cover every segment of the common life.

Clebsch and Jaekle then dealt with the Renaissance and the Reformation together (Renewal and Reform) as a period of rising

individualism, leading to a prominence "unknown before or since that era" being given to reconciliation. To explain this link they then make the extraordinary statement that "the Reformation's great upheaval in doctrine and in ecclesiology never generated a corollary revolution in the cure of souls". This perception appears to be so at variance with the general understanding of the very close relationship between pastoral matters and both the motivation for and nature of the Reformation, that it cannot pass unchallenged. If the great Reformation emphasis on grace had to do with anything, it had to do with pastoral care. And if the change in ecclesiology from a priestly dominated vehicle for the administration of sacraments to a lay-inclusive movement concerned with proclamation and edifying conversation had to do with anything, it surely had to do with pastoral matters. As McNeill (1951, p.166) pointed out, it was with pastoral matters that Luther was concerned when he nailed his theses to the door and launched the Reformation.

Clebsch and Jaekle called their seventh period the period of Enlightenment. During this era the emphasis was on "sustaining souls as they passed through the treacheries and pitfalls of a threateningly wicked world".

When it comes to modern times (The Post-Christendom Era), Clebsch and Jaekle have some interesting observations about pastoral care. They suggested that reconciling is "the most viable and the readiest of all pastoral ministrations in our age", and that there is no effective substitute for it in the other helping professions

(p.69). As we have noted above, however, they also stated that the aspect of reconciling covered by confession is inadequately provided for in modern Protestantism. Elsewhere they ventured some indications for the immediate future of pastoral care:

Sustaining seems the most widely practised of the pastoral functions. Guiding seems at present to engender a fascination disproportionate to its promise for the future. Reconciling seems to gain a prominence that might allow it to polarize the other functions. Healing seems capable of recrudescence under the sponsorship of reconciling. The tentativeness of these predictions is proportionate to their brevity. (p.80)

The interest in these observations from our point of view lies not so much in what Clebsch and Jaekle said in this forecast (it is difficult to determine whether they have in fact said anything which could possibly be disproved by actual developments; they seem thus to have failed the test of falsifiability), but in the light it sheds on the difficulty of separating these four functions and using them to characterise an age.

If it is difficult to isolate a single dominant theme in modern pastoral care, was this not also the case in earlier eras? Clebsch and Jaekle described the period of Renewal and Reform as one of reconciling, for example; yet at least in some Protestant strands, it could also be described as a period of guiding - particularly later as seen in the early Methodist movement, for example.

A major criticism of Clebsch and Jaekle's periodization, then, is that they have forced each period of history to fit into one or other of their four arbitrarily defined functions. This helps to portray a simple perspective, but a more helpful approach could be to recognise that these four functions run throughout the history of pastoral care, and then to examine any one point in time from the point of view of how adequately pastoral care at that time encompassed each of the four. This would do away with the need to describe a period in terms of one function only, and allow for a more gradual transition between eras than that suggested by a step-wise description of periods.

Three other observations Clebsch and Jaekle derived from their historical survey are firstly that ritual has played an important part in all four of the pastoral functions until before the present time. "Modern pastoral disregard for its ritual inheritance represents the sharpest discontinuity with the great tradition of pastoring" (p.68). Without expressing a judgement as to whether this is a helpful or harmful development, they suggested that one of the lessons of history is that pastoral authority wanes with loss of pastoral ritual.

Secondly, they suggested that the the edges of pastoral care have been blurred in respect of its distinction from other functions of the ministry, such as the pastor's sacerdotal, administrative, homiletic and educational functions (p.68), and also in respect of its distinction from various other helping professions. By falling back on these other disciplines for models of pastoral practice, pastors become amateurs or apprentices in someone else's field (p.68).

Thirdly Clebsch and Jaekle noted that pastoral care has always made use of current psychologies (p.69). They pointed out, however, that there have usually been two sources of the psychology used by pastoral theology (p.76). In addition to the academic psychology of the time, there has also been a popular idea of the human condition and its problems.

These unsophisticated notions of the origin, dynamic and cure of human woe always have paralleled, sometimes have lagged behind, and frequently have contradicted the regnant academic psychologies. (p.76)

Today is no exception in that pastoral theology still follows the dominant psychology of the time, while much pastoral practice occurs in accordance with the popular "psychologies" prevalent in the context in which the pastor is working.

Clebsch and Jaekle suggested that while there has been a proliferation of psychological theories this century, there is a common thread to them.

All have shared the assumptions advanced by such philosophers as Kant, Hegel, Feuerbach, and Nietzsche to the effect that the notion of the the soul's immortality is itself a psychological phenomenon not to be taken as metaphysical truth. Much Christian thinking since the Enlightenment has stubbornly resisted this modern psychological thought, not primarily because it is

inimical to Christian pastoral care, but because it attacks the traditional alliance between Christian doctrine (especially touching the soul's immortality) and the older faculty psychology. (p.77)

It would be beyond the scope of this study to do justice the questions of what modern psychological theories do and do not share in common, and whether it is on the question of the immortality of the soul that theology is most in conflict with the current theories. It would seem to the present writer that most secular psychological theories have not taken an explicit position on metaphysical matters, but have made the implicit assumption that the science of psychology may be pursued, or should be pursued, without reference to any spiritual dimension encompassing the relationship of people to God. The corollary of this is that people may be healed psychologically without reference to the spiritual dimension. This could be described as a theoretical agnosticism, in that the science of psychology is assumed to operate in a field which is independent of, and therefore need have no position on, the metaphysical concerns of religion, and a practical atheism in that it is assumed that healing should be considered independently of these metaphysical matters.

Far more striking than any supposed clinging to faculty psychology would seem to be pastoral theology's eagerness to appropriate this implicitly atheistic assumption about psychotherapy into its own assumptions about pastoral care. By its disregard of traditional pastoral approaches in preference for the techniques of modern

psychotherapy, modern pastoral care is apparently happy to work implicitly on the same atheistic assumption. It does so by using traditional pastoral vocabulary to describe psychological rather than spiritual matters. Thus prayer, for example, would be advocated as a valuable opportunity for recollection and meditation, rather than as an expression of a relatedness with the Spirit of God. Confession is healthy for its clear psychological benefit (see Mowrer, 1961), quite apart from its function of dealing with sin.

This brief survey of the history of pastoral care based on the two most widely recognised works on the subject will be used in the next chapter to draw up a checklist of elements which have been prominent in the practice of pastoral care down the centuries.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE CRITERIA

A Note on Method

In the Introduction the method chosen for understanding the tradition was referred to as the method of successive corrections. An alternative name considered for it was the "consensus" method, in that it is based on the "community belief" approach to the development of the tradition. It assumes that the proof that a certain belief or practice is consistent with a religious tradition lies in its survival through a process of testing against the criterion of life experience in the community. In this chapter we shall apply this rule and accept as valid any trend in pastoral care which gained enough support from a wide enough section of the Church for a long enough period to warrant attention from recognised historians as a major factor in the history of pastoral care. The trend need not survive till the present in its original form; it might even be corrected and reversed in a subsequent era. But if it is valid, we shall expect it to reappear later in some form or other to show that it represents a felt need within the Christian Church.

We saw in the previous chapter that Clebsch and Jaekle were somewhat arbitrary in assigning functions to their eight eras of

pastoral care, and that they gave insufficient weight to the Reformation in their analysis. McNeill, on the other hand, gave too much attention to the Reformation in that his main concern was to describe strands which emerged from the Reformation. He also focussed on pastoral approaches to sin, almost to the exclusion of other concerns. This illustrates the problem of perspective. No one really "knows" in any objective sense what happened over the past two thousand years. No one is really sure what is happening now. It is even a matter of opinion what pastoral care actually is. All we have are versions according to those who have been recognised by members in the discipline of pastoral theology as experts in the field. Their descriptions therefore represent an orthodoxy created by the approval of those who buy their books, cite their work in scholarly references, and invite them to conferences. (Note 5)

The approach adopted in this study in relation to understanding the history of pastoral care, then, is that we shall not use any particular version as our only guide to what pastoral care is or should be, but rather gather from several of the sources who have received the approval described above, a collage of the several aspects which appear to be central to the practice of pastoral care. Because our sources do not always agree, we shall expect to find that these aspects usually occur in polarities, such as law and grace, or the value of the individual and the importance of the group. Because in each case both ends of the polarity have been emphasised at one time or another by people who have been recognised by the pastoral theology corner of the community of

faith as sound, we shall assume that neither of the ends is wrong. The corollary of this is that neither of the ends is right on its own. In that sense we have a very permissive, uncritical approach to the history of pastoral care: there is validity in all positions which have received a considerable body of support from the Church. We shall not question the doctrinal base of a position as long as it appeared by its support to be meeting a felt need in the community.

Of course this is not meant to imply that the Church is always right. In a sense it is always wrong; that is why it needs continually to be correcting itself. But it is precisely in these corrections that we can rely on the Church to help us to begin to see principles emerging which can be used to do to current approaches what the course of history will in any event do to them in due course; and that is to correct some excesses or point out some deficiencies.

In his historical survey of the doctrine of the fall, Williams (1927, p.11) made use of the "Vincentian Canon" to the effect that true doctrine is that which has been believed everywhere, always and by all (*ubique, semper, ab omnibus*). Having recognised that disagreement is in fact a necessary process in maintaining the tradition, however, our own "canon" is somewhat modified from what St Vincent stated, although it may not be dissimilar from what he had in mind. Although lowering the standard to that which has been believed in some places, often, and by most, we then put the several resultant criteria together to qualify each other, and

thus arrive at a balance which recognises the beliefs contributed from everywhere in all times and by all.

THE CRITERIA

What follows is a series of groups of questions arising from the historical survey made in the previous chapter. These questions are the criteria which will be used in the next chapter to evaluate Hiltner's approach, but they are phrased in a general way so that they could be used to evaluate any approach to pastoral counselling or care. Each question in each group relates to the other questions in that group and needs to be taken together with them. For ease of reference later on, each group and each question is given a brief title. The questions are indented.

1. Discipline: Restoration of the sinner versus protection of the Church

We have seen that the issue which interested McNeill most in his historical survey was that of how the Church exercised corrective discipline and reconciliation. McNeill (1951, p.81) noted that corrective discipline was present from New Testament times. Both St Matthew and St Paul provided for the excommunication of the sinner to protect the Church's purity, and called for forgiveness and restoration of the sinner when appropriate. McNeill concluded that one of the two valid motives for corrective discipline is

restoration of the sinner, and the other is protection of the Church's purity.

We have already noted that these two have been in evidence as alternating poles in a continuum throughout the history of pastoral care. So we can simply list them as the first two questions in our list of criteria.

1.1 Restoration of the sinner: Does the approach to pastoral care or counselling being studied (referred to hereafter as "the approach") provide adequately for the restoration of those who have sinned? This should take account of the need to deal with "Sin", "sin", and "sins" as defined in the previous chapter. It would need also to allow for confession as called for by Clebsch and Jaekle.

1.2 Protection of the fellowship: Does the approach protect the Church's purity sufficiently by demanding high enough standards to prevent those within the fellowship from being influenced harmfully by others who do not satisfy minimum standards?

What does not arise from our historical survey is a consideration of sin as anything other than an individual phenomenon. This will be discussed further in the next chapter, when it will be noted that sin is also a social phenomenon, in which people are victims as well as sinners, and as such have a duty to extricate themselves from and oppose the sin.

2. Sin: Group identity, individual guidance and inner attitude

The protection of the fellowship requires that standards be set. What should these standards look like? The following discussion will suggest that the appropriate way for the Church to set standards depends in part on the position of the Church in society.

After the sharply drawn boundaries of the Early Church and the clear cut definition of what was and was not permissible in the Christian community, the Church moved to a more inclusive attitude, in which provision was made for human frailty in the task of maintaining behavioural standards. This entailed the shift from the concept of "Sin" as a fundamental attitude of rebellion, to "sins" as daily transgressions of a detailed moral code and an unavoidable consequence of being human. In the former situation the teaching of John is quite clear: although "if we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves" (1 John 1.8), because everyone shares in the human condition of sinfulness, yet it is also true that once within the fellowship, Christians do not commit sin (1 John 3.9) in the sense of transgressing the simple and straight-forward standard which identifies them as followers of Christ and separates them from those who oppose Christ. Once sin came to be used in the sense of "sins", however, it did not make sense to say that Christians do not commit sin. It was impossible not to transgress the detailed code of offences which evolved. But the aim had changed; it was no longer to define the boundaries of the Church, but to provide moral direction. That is

why, as we noted earlier when discussing McNeill's review of the history of pastoral care, the concept of "Sin" as used in the early Church is something quite different from the concept of "sins" used later.

It is true that moral influence was asserted in the former situation by defining the expectations of those within the Church very clearly, and then maintaining these strictly by the encouragement of group loyalty and the threat of exclusion. But that was not the main issue. In the Early Church a detailed code of behaviour was in any case already provided by the Jewish Law. In later times, however, the Church had no need to define its boundaries, but it was called on to influence behaviour over the whole spread of society, and without the aid of the Jewish code as the generally accepted standard of behaviour among its members. It thus had to adopt a different strategy. It did so by building up the ideal for behaviour to a standard which it accepted was impossible to satisfy (rather like the Law it replaced), thus putting everyone in the category of sinner, and then providing means for dispelling that guilt in a way which guided people towards the ideal.

This change seems to have arisen in response to the changed role of the Church from a voluntary minority group to the recognised source of moral standards for the whole of society. The principle involved seems therefore to be that to the extent that the Church has to play the role of moral arbiter in a society in which there is no other commonly recognised moral standard, to that extent it

needs to create mechanisms for influencing behaviour over which it only has partial control.

In this century the Church in the West is entering a new socio-political situation in which it is neither a persecuted minority in the context of an established rival religion, nor the dominant religion called on to provide the morality for the whole of society. In "Post-Christendom", as Clebsch and Jaekle call the modern age, Christianity is the most widely recognised religion in the West, but it is no longer recognised as the moral arbiter for society. There is no such established moral authority. In keeping with this ambiguous position, the boundaries of the Church are also defined ambiguously, with some denominations regarding themselves as clearly defined minorities on the model of the Early Church, and others seeing themselves inclusively as caring for and influencing any person or social institution falling within their geographical area, on the model of the medieval Church.

A modern example of the Church being called on to provide moral guidance for the whole of society in the absence of (or, as Browning suggests, in competition with) other commonly accepted standards of behaviour is the call by Browning (1976) for the Church to provide moral direction for society.

It is my argument that it is the function of religion in any society to create the highest levels of the symbolic meaning and value which governs society. (Browning, 1976, p.114)

His conclusion states his position clearly:

The goal of these chapters has been to sensitize us once again to the moral context of all care and especially the moral context of pastoral care. It has been my intention to swing the pendulum back in the direction of a moral concern, to argue for a rebirth of practical theology, and to plead for a heightened sensitivity to the implications for civilization of what we do in our care for one another. (Browning, 1976, p. 130)

Time will tell whether Browning's vision for a return to the role of the pastor as moral guide for society has taken into account the drastic changes in the socio-political position and role of the Church which the twentieth century has brought.

The earliest example of this call could be the considerable attention Paul gave to ethical instruction in his letters, presumably because he was already writing then to Christians who were not part of the Jewish moral community.

When, on the other hand, moral guidance is supplied by another social institution, and the Church is a possibly persecuted minority in which the cohesion of the group already provides an incentive for shared standards of behaviour, and the boundary of the Church becomes the crucial issue, then the details of daily behaviour dealt with in a catalogue of sins becomes less important. The emphasis falls instead on "Sin" as an indication

of whether a person is "in" or "out". A recent example of this end of the pole would be the Confessing Church in Germany, where a Christian's loyalty to the Church against the demands of Nazism became the all important question. It could be expected that the movement towards a confessing Church in South Africa would similarly make rejection of Apartheid the key issue, in comparison to which behaviour in, say, sexual matters would be given less importance.

A matter which belongs with this discussion is the degree to which pastors are interested in enlisting and strengthening the will, or creating an inner orientation towards what the Church defines as goodness.

In McNeill's survey we noted that he regretted the emphasis on external observances as against an emphasis on an internal "state of the soul" during the three centuries before the Reformation. He saw in this a deterioration in the Church's life at the time. The Church was preoccupied with "sins in the plural that swarmed in great numbers and must be confessed in complete detail" (McNeill, 1951, p.160), at the expense of a focus on the inner state of the soul. The Reformation was clearly in part a reaction against that, and an affirmation of the importance of the individual's direct relation to God as expressed by the basic inner attitude of faith, as against the outer observances of "works". This correction of the overemphasis on outer observances only is not only valid during a period when the Church is preoccupied with "sins", however. There is a startling indication in

the story of Ananias and Sapphira (Acts 5.1-11) that reference to this inner attitude was a necessary correction to insincere outer observance even during the earliest period of the Church's life, when the concern was still very much on "Sin" and boundaries.

But, in keeping with the way we have chosen to draw up the criteria, we shall not simply write off the preoccupation with "sins" as an error needing correction. It lasted too long and gained too much acceptance by the Church to be without substance. What important truth had the Church been moving towards with the emphasis on "sins", before the trend became too pronounced and required correction?

It seems that this has to do with the same need noted earlier: that the Church was required to supply a catalogue of behavioural guidelines for the whole of society. In other words, where Christianity is the dominant religious presence, it needs to supply a fairly detailed code of what is permissible behaviour.

If we can begin to integrate the evidence from the earlier period and from this period, then we have a three-way set of factors. When the Church is a minority concerned with "Sin" as defined above, then it needs to specify behaviourally what it is that distinguishes a Christian from everyone else. When it is in the majority and is pre-occupied with "sins", then it needs to provide a behavioural code. At all times the latter needs to be balanced by, and the former authenticated by, an inner attitude which validates the outer observances.

We can now write this as a three-part test:

2.1 Identity through behavioural boundaries: Does the approach provide an adequate sense of identity to members of the Church by defining "Sin" - i.e. that behaviour which defines clearly who does and who does not belong to the fellowship? The answer to this and the next question will depend partly on the social position of the Church at the time, and the social cohesion of society at large.

2.2 Guidance from a moral code: On the other hand, do pastors adopting the approach have a sufficiently inclusive vision for the whole of society to provide (if the Church is in a strong enough position to do so) a clear moral code for the guidance of society, and to enlist peoples' wills to follow the guide?

2.3 Inner attitude: Does the approach focus sufficiently on peoples' inner motives and attitudes to ensure that outer observances reflect a true inner state?

3. Good and evil in human nature: The need for both absolute demand and unlimited acceptance

If standards are to be set, how is the people's co-operation to be obtained in keeping to these standards?

An issue which is related to much that has already been discussed is that of individual freedom versus control. It is one way to describe what the Reformation was all about. The spirit of the age today tends very much towards the individual freedom pole. This has to do with the doctrine of human nature: optimistic views of human nature would encourage freedom for the person to develop naturally, while pessimistic views would lead to controls being imposed to curb unhealthy tendencies in the person. It is a debate which can be found in literature, philosophy, psychology, political theory and religion, and which emerges throughout the history of these and other disciplines.

In psychology Freud took a relatively pessimistic position, and so psychoanalysts look for ways to help their patients mobilize their defences against their turbulent ids. Rogers had a very optimistic view, and so encouraged his clients to trust their organismic valuing, by creating a therapeutic climate of unconditional positive regard. In theology these two positions may be represented (although this is, of course, only a resemblance, not a correspondence) by the doctrine of original sin (the pessimistic view of human nature) and the imago dei (the optimistic one). Pastorally they are represented by Law and Grace respectively. These two both reach their peak in Jesus, who took the Law far beyond its outer demands to a demand for inward obedience quite beyond the power of human goodness, and then demonstrated an acceptance of sinful people which did away with the barrier the Law had placed between God and His people. St Paul of course picks up both these emphases with his demand that

Christians be transformed in their minds (Romans 8.1), and his insistence that it is not by works, but by grace alone that we can be saved (e.g. Galatians 2.16).

Throughout the history of Christian theology till the present (with theologians like Tillich), the absolute demand and the unlimited acceptance of God have both been recognised and held together. When one has been emphasised at the expense of the other, a reaction has always ensued. This was already necessary in New Testament times, when St Paul, for example, had to warn that grace was no excuse for antinomianism (e.g. Romans 2.6).

These two sides to God's relation to humankind predate the New Testament, however. Cumpsty (1978) points out that the prophets were messengers of both the conditional Mosaic covenant of Exodus 24 and the unconditional covenant with Abraham, reaffirmed with David. They used the covenants to regulate the course of the people:

The prophets preached both covenants in their appropriate place, as it were, keeping man at a certain level, neither allowing him to rise into carelessness nor fall into despair. (Cumpsty, 1978, p.2)

On the face of it these are contradictory covenants. But they serve the same purposes and are complementary sides of the same coin of God's love.

If God were less demanding of Israel's perfection He would be less loving, for the perfection is not demanded from Israel but for Israel, the law is given for life and the demand that Israel should keep the law is the demand that she should have life. Any lesser demand would be less loving. (Cumpsty, 1978, p.3)

God's love is thus expressed in the combination of the two covenants. Attempts have been made throughout history to balance or moderate these two emphases. At times the emphasis has been on the demand more than on acceptance, and at other times the emphasis has been on acceptance more than on demand, a position taken up by most counsellors this century. At other times an attempt has been made to compromise between the two. The demand is then tempered by the assumption that God would not demand anything which is beyond the capabilities of the reasonable person, and that small infringements can be rectified by sacramental or other means. The acceptance is toned down by making it conditional on the satisfaction of these sacramental or behavioural requirements. That is characteristic of the great Roman Catholic tradition built up through the Middle Ages and is still probably the implicit understanding most people, Catholic or Protestant, hold to in practice. It is very effective in regulating peoples' hope and despair so that they are worried enough to conform, but reassured enough to live.

But Jesus insisted on the the radical expression of both these emphases. Jeremiah anticipated this in seeing that these two

covenants could not be satisfied unless they issued in a new covenant, "a covenant based firstly on forgiveness and secondly on the writing of the law within the heart" (Cumpsty, 1978, p.3). This is something God would need to effect.

One could then add a third element to these two emphases, which is the need for a divinely initiated process of forgiveness and sanctification, whereby the two covenants would be welded into the new covenant of unconditional participation in the grace of God and the transformation of the person's motivation towards holiness.

Cumpsty (1978, p.6) has pointed out that it is difficult for the individual to hold acceptance and unacceptability in the mind at once; we need therefore to give our minds to each in turn. Similarly pastoral care cannot be faithful to both in every moment, but it can be faithful to the whole understanding of God's love by emphasising each adequately when appropriate.

This section began with a consideration of how much freedom people should be allowed, and the pessimistic and optimistic views of human nature. The doctrine of original sin, its support clinically in the work of depth psychologists, and the demands of the Law all suggest that to allow people to be free to do what they wish is dangerous in the extreme. On the other hand, the picture of people made in the image of God, supported by the clinical experience of the humanistic psychotherapists and embodied in the doctrine of grace all suggest that to impose

restrictions on people is to damage and pervert them. The description of the apparently paradoxical but mutually necessary relation between demand and acceptance given above suggests that these two can be joined at the level of their both representing the love of God, eliciting a responsive love from us (John 14.15,23). Cumpsty (1978) uses the analogy of a child growing up. At first the child is restricted for its own safety. Then as it grows so the physical restrictions are replaced by verbal sanctions. But eventually the time comes when the child's development would be harmed if it were not set free to be responsible for his or her own behaviour, and the only sanction left to the wise parent is the one of love. Similarly in the history of Israel the understanding of God's dealings with his people has developed from one of punishment, through prophecy, then the Law, and finally the freedom of love.

In the history of Israel Cumpsty (1978) points out that the prophets tended to turn to whichever covenant balanced the political and religious situation of Israel at the time. When Israel was too comfortable and arrogant, the prophets reminded her of the conditions laid down in the Mosaic covenant. When Israel was threatened and fearful, the prophets could point to the promises in the Davidic covenant. A similar pattern of varying demand and acceptance could be traced through the history of the Church. An added dimension is that society also places a demand on people in the expectations placed on its members to conform to given cultural ideals. This demand varies according to the strength of goal-directedness current at any time. (Note 6)

This has consequences for how people regard themselves, and in particular for the formation of the ideal self. At any one time the pastor might have to deal with people who can identify well with the goals of society or alternatively who are alienated from them, and with a society which has strong or weak goal directedness, placing a relatively strong or weak demand on the person to achieve certain goals. This provides four logical types of relation to the ideals of society: identification with strong ideals, identification with weak ideals, alienation from weak ideals, and alienation from strong ideals.

The middle two types can be combined in the kind of human experience they create, which would be a relative lack of given direction, confused norms in society, and an individual searching for models from which to derive an ideal self. The type described as identification with strong goals would be experienced as a clear personal sense of identity in the form of a strong and demanding ideal self. The type described as being alienated from strong goals could lead to one of four possible responses, each representing a different way of defining the self, defining society, and defining the relation between the self and society: flight from society (as in the drug culture) being an attempt to lose the self and negate society; remaking the personality (as in psychotherapy) being the attempt to change the self to find a better fit with society; remaking the system (as in radical politics) being the attempt to change society to create a better fit with the self; or withdrawal into a position of isolation from and opposition to society (as in religious sects or utopian

communities) being the attempt to legitimate the rebellious self over and against an evil society.

The above types arise from an analysis of post-war American history. In the decade after the second world war there was an attempt to put the clock back and recover the confident values which had guided people through the first half of the century. The clear goals and considerable energy of this period was a period of high social demand in the form of the success ethic, and as far as the average individual was concerned, a clear given ideal self. But the goals did not carry through to the next generation - goals were either achieved (in the way of two cars in the garage and a pool), failed (world peace), found to be impossible, or discredited (cf Viet Nam). In the sixties those who could not adapt to the powerful demand of their parent's society turned to one or other of the four responses described in the previous paragraph. As the achieving society lost steam, goals lost their currency, and the seventies turned into a period of relatively low social demand and confused social norms.

Counselling in the period of confident goal-directedness emphasised affirmation of the actual self, as people buffeted and stretched by the demand created by their identification with the current ideals called for healing and sustaining. People needed to know they were accepted in spite of not satisfying the ideal of success. During the period of alienation from these powerful goals in the sixties, people still needed to know that they were accepted in spite of their rebellion, but they now also needed to

be helped to find an alternative model for their ideal selves. Hence the multiplicity of religious and secular utopias. When these alternative ideals also ran dry in the seventies, people still needed an ideal with which to identify, but now they also needed the demand to move them.

Of course these are logical rather than empirical types, and any counsellor would find any number of individuals in any period who would fit the description of the other periods. But the suggestion is that an approach developed in and appropriate to one period would not meet the needs of many people in other periods.

Returning to the need for both acceptance and demand, then, we could add that the demand should include the provision when necessary of an ideal with which the person could identify, and the acceptance should provide a respite from over-demand in the ideal self, or from the revolt against rejected ideals in society.

3.1 Demand: Does the approach communicate absolute demand for inner obedience to the perfect standards of Christ? Is the demand given direction in the form of an ideal with which people can identify in developing their ideal selves?

3.2 Acceptance: Does the approach communicate God's absolute acceptance of people in spite of their unacceptableness? Does it affirm the value of their actual selves?

3.3 The process of sanctification: Does the approach point people to the possibility of finding themselves forgiven at a level which initiates a process of inner transformation leading to a desire to be holy?

4. The extent and limitation of the authority of the pastor

What the above analysis does not answer is the extent to which each individual has to pass through the stages towards freedom and responsibility which we observed in the history of Israel. We have seen that Hiltner, for example, was emphatically against any form of coercion in pastoral counselling. Writing from a conservative evangelical position, on the other hand, Crabb (1977) complained that the modern emphasis on personal wholeness, human potential and the freedom to be oneself has diverted the attention of Christians away from "a burning concern for becoming more like the Lord" (p.20). Crabb thus wanted to focus on the person's will, and he advocated a directive approach to counselling. "In order to develop maturity . . . certain crucial parts of a client's belief system must be identified and directly changed" (p.28). Less extreme than this position is the call by McNeill (1951, p.321) that the spiritual dimension not be lost, but that the tested methods such as prayer, self-examination and self-discipline be used to help people attain full health of personality and spiritual harmony.

There has been a considerable increase in interest in spiritual direction recently (e.g. Leech, 1977; Kelsey, 1984). Cobb (1977,

p.2) notes, however, that the role of spiritual direction differs from what is usually understood to be the nature of pastoral counselling today, and even from that of pastoral care.

In many segments of our society those seeking religious direction are more likely to go to humanistic psychologists, Jungian analysts, or Indian gurus than to Christian ministers trained as pastoral counsellors.
(Cobb, 1977, p.2)

This modern exclusion of spiritual direction would certainly seem to be out of step with the history of pastoral care, and the renewed interest in it suggests that the tradition will correct its loss. According to the method with which we are drawing up the criteria, however, we also need to recognise that so widespread a trend excluding spiritual direction as has occurred this century must also represent a valid correction. Perhaps this correction was inspired by the rise of modern psychotherapy supplying a need for the personal therapeutic conversation absent in the pastoral care of the Victorian era.

This is a similar issue to that discussed in the previous section, except that it is expressed in terms of whether the counselling approach to the individual should be directive or permissive. At first glance this appears to be more a matter of counselling technique than theological principle; psychotherapy has by no means resolved this matter either, and recently there has been a resurgence of more directive approaches in the face of the

established permissive approaches. But behind the differences in technique is the theological question of pastoral authority. Can and should the pastor assume the authority to direct a parishioner if that seems appropriate? Again trends in history suggest that there are two complementary principles involved. There appears to be a need in the Church that pastors should possess and exercise pastoral authority, but this power needs to be balanced by respect for the person's liberty.

4.1 Pastoral authority: Does the approach recognise the authority and resources of a spiritual dimension beyond that of the client and counsellor; and does it allow this to be expressed by restrictions and explicit guidance when necessary? It is not necessary that this occur in pastoral counselling itself, but only that the approach not be incompatible with this occurring in the context in which counselling takes place.

4.2 Personal freedom: Does the approach avoid either implicit or explicit control by the pastor to satisfy his or her personal power needs?

A counsellor who prefers to be non-directive should as far as possible ensure that within the context in which the counselling occurs there are other opportunities if necessary for the client to be taught, disciplined and guided under the authority of the Church. The counsellor who prefers to be directive should ensure that this does not explicitly or implicitly obscure the acceptance offered by God, or limit the client's freedom to direct his or her own life.

5. Lay ministry and the priesthood

Christians in the Early Church were expected to exercise mutual responsibility in the form of mutual edification and fraternal correction. Later this was largely replaced by a professional priesthood, whose function included hearing confessions and, by exercising the sole authority to pronounce absolution, controlling access to the community. At intervals since then, and especially with the Reformation, there has been a revival of lay ministry, usually leading gradually to the return in practice if not in doctrine to a position in which the clergy hold a virtual monopoly on pastoral care.

We must conclude, therefore, that there is a validity in the call for the Priesthood of all Believers to be expressed in a pastorhood of every believer; and also in the apparent need for the Church to turn towards ordained pastors.

5.1 Mutual care of souls by the laity: Does the approach allow for and encourage the mutual care of souls among the laity?

5.2 Ordained pastors: Is the approach compatible with an order of pastors sufficiently recognised and trusted to provide parishioners with the opportunity for private spiritual conversation and authoritative guidance?

6. Functions of pastoral care

In our discussion of McNeill's survey we noted that he concentrated on matters of discipline, and we wondered what else pastors were doing which has not received such attention in the literature. We noted that today discipline has little if any place in the work of a pastoral counsellor. In that sense the four functions which Clebsch and Jaekle traced through the history of pastoral care are probably a fairer reflection of what actually absorbed the time of pastors. They have been discussed already, so they need just to be added to our list of questions. The four are expanded to six to include distinctions made earlier.

6.1 Healing: Does the approach allow for healing of the whole person in the sense of restoring him or her to health?

6.2 Facilitating spiritual growth: Does the approach lead to healing in the sense of helping the person to move to a higher level of spiritual integration?

6.3 Sustaining: Does the approach sustain people through periods of both personal and social hardship?

6.4 Guiding: Does the approach guide people by helping them to clarify their own wisdom and by providing access to wisdom which is beyond that of the client and the counsellor? This includes teaching the spiritual disciplines which lead to spiritual transformation.

6.5 Discipline: Is reconciliation provided for by the support of a discipline which confronts people and prepares them to seek to be reconciled?

6.6 Restoration: Is reconciliation then promoted by providing ways in which people who are estranged from themselves, the Church and God may have the barriers removed and their restoration openly recognised?

The questions on guiding, discipline and restoration have already been met in previous sections, but are included again here to complete the set dealing with the functions of pastoral care. Before moving off these functions, however, a recent movement should be dealt with in relation Sustaining (6.3). The political left of the Church has argued that pastoral care could be destructive if it blunted the determination of the people to seek their liberation. It then becomes the tool of the oppressor, as Marx suggested, by providing the "opiate" which comforts them and reconciles them to the existing order.

Alves (1977) was invited to write an essay for the journal Pastoral Psychology in which he was asked to describe how liberation theology could "both correct and transform" pastoral activity. In his response Alves argued that in practice the nature of pastoral care is determined by the institutional setting of the Church. This institution functions to perpetuate unliberated conditions in society. He implied therefore that pastoral care in the sense that it is commonly practised should be stopped.

This radical conclusion should be seen in the context of the North American audience to which it was addressed by a South American liberation theologian. Taken in the context of his other writings it would be hard to believe that Alves intended to do away with all pastoral care. It seems that he was stating his case somewhat strongly in order to expose what he saw as an ideologically blinded approach in the North American style of pastoral counselling. His arguments are worth noting, however, especially when considering the South African Church, which is the context in which this study is being made.

Alves found two hidden presuppositions in the task given him by the journal. Firstly he argued that pastoral care fulfils a function for the Christian community which serves to perpetuate it in its current form. Thus pastors will be concerned with disintegrating marriages and crises of faith, for example, because these threaten the existing order. Secondly, theology is evaluated by its effectiveness in supporting pastoral care in this function. Theology is thus not the foundation of pastoral care, but an ideology at the service of this function, serving the interests of the social group which holds the position of influence in the community.

A critique of his own presuppositions and the position which Alves proceeded to build up in the rest of the article would require a treatment on its own, and is beyond our scope at present. The question we do need to address, however, is, does this represent enough of a movement in the Church to warrant inclusion on the

basis of our way of selecting criteria? To do so, it should be a movement with a substantial body of support in the Church over a long enough period, however valid criticisms of it may subsequently turn out to be.

The particular movement we are considering is heavily dependent on Marxist social analysis, a tool which is relatively recent in the history of the Church. It cannot thus be traced in the history of pastoral care to help us decide whether or not this a well enough recognised reaction. If the specific social analysis is put aside, however, there is precedent for the Church to reject specific forms of pastoral care because they were seen to be supporting a political or religious establishment deemed to be oppressive. An example was given earlier when describing the offences brought before the consistory in Geneva during the Reformation period. The offences included using the words "Requiescat in pace" over the grave of a relative, for example. (Chadwick, 1964, p.85).

Without commenting on the content of the argument posed by Alves, we could therefore suggest that whenever the Church appears to be so captive to the dominant political or cultural order that its pastoral functions become oppressive, there is likely to be a reaction calling for liberation from that captivity. There are several cases to be seen this century, such as feminist theology, Black theology, and perhaps even the Black independent Church movement in South Africa.

We can now add a seventh question to the set in this section, to balance the call for sustaining:

6.7 Freedom from oppressive pastoral institutions: Does the approach resist pressures to restrict a justified movement towards cultural, political, economic or other liberation by perpetuating oppressive institutions and customs?

Restrictions could include the subtle one of only offering pastoral care to a particular class of people. Cobb (1977, p.2) points out that counselees are generally drawn from the middle class, and pastoral care needs to heed the call for the minister also to be identified with the poor, the disenfranchised and the oppressed. While the answers to all these questions will depend very much on the perspective of the one who answers, this one in particular is likely to elicit considerable disagreement, depending on the cultural assumptions of the people disagreeing. That is no reason, however, not to pose the question.

7. The logic of belonging

Cumpsty (1985a, p.8) suggests that religion is concerned with belonging - "the quest to belong cognitively and affectively to that which in the passing flux of experience is felt to be the ultimately real". He suggests that in Western religions (which he includes in what he calls the "secular world affirming paradigm")

there are a number of pathways whereby a person may relate to the Divine (Cumpsty, 1985b, pp.9-10). Protestant and pietistic Christianity has tended to emphasise a direct relationship between the person and God. Catholicism has emphasised belonging to God by belonging to a "bridging institution" which itself belongs to God. A third way to belong is to relate to the creation, "in a consuming desire to understand what is out there, to mould it ethically or to relate to it mystically". There is a fourth way of belonging which Cumpsty regards as a less satisfactory solution, which may be a last resort in times of massive sociocultural disturbance, and that is to belong to a tight-knit sect which distances itself from the rest of the world by using religious symbols which define itself as removed from and in opposition to the rest.

It is the first two of these modes of belonging which are most clearly discernible through the history of the institutional Church. Cumpsty refers to them as the individual and corporate modes respectively. The corporate mode of belonging is secure, tending to assure members that God holds on to them even when their own hold is tenuous, but there is also the danger that the power of the institution may be corrupted. The individual mode is direct and vigorous, but is brittle in the sense that one is either completely "in" or completely "out" of divine favour, and the individual has only his or her own personal emotional and spiritual resources on which to rely to determine this experience.

If this analysis is correct, we would expect to find in history an oscillation between corporate and individual belonging, with the

pendulum swinging away from corporate belonging when the power of the institution needed to be curbed, and back again when anxiety about belonging became too great. The Reformation and subsequent developments could be viewed in this way. Initially there was a reaction to the excessive power of the institution in the Reformation emphasis on direct relatedness to God and salvation by individual faith rather than corporate sacrament. But in due course the sermon and Scripture became almost sacramentalised in Reformed Churches as a way of linking people to the Church rather than direct to God.

The mode of belonging is expressed through ritual, this providing an affective component to the sense of belonging. Flowing from this too is an ethic (Cumpsty, 1985a, p11).

Cumpsty (1985b, p.11) suggests that while the best of both worlds may be enjoyed by blending both these paths in the way most mainline Churches do today, when social insecurity creates an increased need for the security of belonging, then it becomes important to achieve clarity of logic in choosing one or other of these paths. He illustrates anecdotally:

Among the Yorkshire and Lancashire parishes of the Church of England in the 1930s and 1940s . . ., only the middle class parishes seemed to be "liberal". The working class parishes of the industrial towns tended to be either firmly "tractarian" or firmly "evangelical", regarding each other with much suspicion.

What is important is that belonging should be experienced, not the way in which it is experienced.

There is little in the history of the Abrahamic family of religion to indicate that uniformity of emphasis on these pathways is either possible or desirable. Belonging may be experienced by any of them. (Cumpsty, 1985b, p.11)

The appropriate logic of belonging will depend on the person's situation. In times of social or individual insecurity, people are likely to need a very clear logic, following either the direct or corporate modes described above. But in times of security, the appropriate direction may be a blend of elements from each, providing richer symbols to embody the sense of belonging.

There needs, then to be only one question to cover this subject:

7.1 A logic of belonging: Does the approach provide an appropriate "logic of belonging" and embody it in ritual?

The ritual which provides people with a secure sense of belonging would include the sacraments.

8. The influence of the Christian tradition, secular social sciences and the socio-economic context of the Church on the development of pastoral theology

We noted earlier that McNeill seemed to concentrate on the way pastors have dealt with sin, at the expense of dealing with other pastoral matters. Clearly McNeill is not wrong to draw attention to this - his whole book contains the evidence in his support. But there have been other emphases. The Reformers emphasised salvation by faith. John Wesley emphasised holiness. The French spiritual guides in the tradition of Francis de Sales emphasised obedience. But just to attempt to capture in one word such rich and complex approaches as each of these is, reveals how limiting such an exercise is. So no attempt will be made to construct a typology of emphases. Instead their sources can be listed. Clearly the tradition of the Church including Scripture and ecclesiastical history is one such source. Another we have noted is the dominant psychology of the age. A third source which has been found to influence pastoral care is the socio-political position of the Church.

Because these influences are beyond the control of the Church of the time, this is one instance when it is impossible to unravel whether a movement in one direction has occurred with the support or against the opposition of the Church. The method of successive corrections therefore cannot apply, and the questions in this section cannot be phrased in a way which suggests that pastoral care ought to follow the lead given by, say, the sociological effect of its socio-political position. Instead we can only ask that it should take account of these influences, so as to respond suitably.

8.1 Faithfulness to the tradition: Does the approach take account of the Church's traditional wisdom, both in relation to doctrine and practice?

8.2 Openness to the secular social sciences: Is the approach sensitive to the contribution (helpful or otherwise) current psychology and the other social sciences are or could be making to the practice and theology of pastoral care?

8.3 Cogniscance of socio-political factors: Does the approach indicate an awareness of and an appropriate response to the Church's socio-political context?

By holding these three together we should allow for a balance between being too bound by tradition on the one hand, and being too influenced by the currents of modern secular thought on the other. The result, one would hope, would be to allow for a prophetic advance rooted in the tradition, but responsive to new situations and insights.

In the next chapter these the questions derived here will be applied to the approach of Seward Hitner.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE CRITERIA APPLIED IN A CRITIQUE OF SEWARD HILTNER'S APPROACH TO PASTORAL COUNSELLING

In this chapter the criteria developed in the previous chapter will be used to criticise Seward Hiltner's approach to pastoral counselling. The chapter will be organised according to the sections used in the previous chapter.

1. Discipline: Restoration of the individual versus protection of the Church

As we noted in Chapter Two, the very issue which has come down through the ages as the major issue in pastoral care, is the one which is almost defined out of the scope of pastoral counselling by its practitioners (Hiltner included) this century. Discipline does not enter the vocabulary of the main stream of pastoral counselling. As we noted in Chapter Three, Hiltner (1967, p.15) argued that McNeill's (1951) book is weighted in favour of the best documented material such as the penitentials, and that those aspects which represented no conflict between the individual and the group, such as ministry to the sick and bereaved, tended to be taken for granted. Hiltner may or may not be correct, but even if his argument is accepted, a place still needs to be made for correction and discipline, even if it is not as central as it appears.

As regards Restoration of the sinner (Question 1.1), then, Hiltner's pastoral counselling appears on the surface to provide no institutional way whereby the sinner may be restored to the fellowship of the Church. Furthermore Hiltner's field theory model of the Church precludes boundaries, so he would not want either to provide the standards seen as necessary for the Protection of the fellowship (Question 1.2).

The matter is not as simple as that, however. Taken out of the context of the institutional Church, Hiltner's eductive approach can be seen as being all about restoration, not of the sinner, but of the sick. Acceptance is a key experience for the client in eductive counselling, and this could be described as providing the means for the client's restoration to fellowship with humanity through his or her acceptance by the counsellor. Thus, while there is no ritual restoration and no symbolic re-entry to the defined body of the Church, there is a very real sense of being restored to human fellowship.

Seen this way, Hiltner's approach can be placed far over on the restoration end of a continuum formed by making two poles out of Restoration of the sinner (1.1) and Protection of the fellowship (1.2). Assuming that the historical trend captured in the second question will continue, we can therefore expect that this imbalance will begin to be corrected. Indeed, Southard (1984) discovered just such a trend incorporating several of the themes we would have predicted. He drew attention to "an almost universal call for more theology in Christian counselling after

forty years of psychological emphasis" (p.93) and noted a great shift in emphasis in the articles in Pastoral Psychology from 1950 to 1980 from the "pastoral counselling of the 1950's" towards what he calls "Christian counsel". He used this term to emphasise the contribution of Christian faith and principles to the counselling process, and because "counsel" is "the Biblical term for wisdom from God applied to the needs of an individual". He argued that Hiltner was mistaken in accommodating pastoral counselling to Carl Rogers' approach, in which the healing orientation had to be distinguished from the counsellor's own beliefs.

Southard went on to suggest three deficiencies in the pastoral psychology orientation (of which, we have noted, Hiltner was the most articulate spokesman) which could account for this swing away from it: Firstly the emphasis on self-realisation and the inhibition of the counsellor's own beliefs led to incipient humanism and the loss of the dimension of personal religious experience, as rooted in evangelism and personal piety. Secondly, individualism led to separation of the counselling task from the corporate worship, fellowship, instruction and discipline of the Church. Thirdly, pastoral counselling became separated from systematic theology, finding its theoretical base more in depth psychology.

Southard went further to give us a hint of the counsellor's private experience of imbalance which, in terms of the method of successive corrections, we would expect to underlie this sort of theological trend. He expressed his personal frustration at the

lack of a comprehensive system of practical theology that would provide me with authoritative guidelines of what the Church expected of its representatives in the care of individuals, the key points of doctrine that identify a personal experience as religious and a translation of revealed truths into statements that shed divine light upon a human dilemma. (Southard, 1984, p.102)

Apparently the pastoral counsellor following Hiltner's approach experiences an imbalance, and this has to do with a felt need for authority based on the Christian picture of truth, a need to incorporate into the counselling process those elements of human experience traditionally dealt with as spirituality, and a need to reintegrate pastoral counselling into the worship, fellowship, instruction and discipline of the Church.

Poling (1984) expressed what is probably his interpretation of this same experience of imbalance as regret at the almost total estrangement between pastoral care and ethics. He attributed this to the emergence of a pluralistic society in which a consensus on ethical norms no longer seemed possible, and the espousal of dynamic psychology as the dominant influence on the practice of counselling.

Donnelly (1984), also writing in Pastoral Psychology, described the New Testament model of forgiveness as "assertive, confrontative and direct in style, pastoral in application and reconciling in spirit" - hardly a combination of words one would

have expected had such an article been written, say, twenty years ago. He suggested that there are three concerns in this: concern for the victim, concern for the offender, and concern for the community, an analysis which would fit very well into our own description of discipline as working for the restoration of the sinner and the protection of the community.

We have already noted Browning's (1976) call for pastoral care to recover a moral role in society. Oglesby (1980) referred to this as "a positive corrective for the distorted emphasis on acceptance and forgiveness which deteriorated into a matter of condoning or obscuring the destructive dimension of human interaction", and traced its roots to the voice of Mowrer (e.g. 1961, 1967) in the sixties and Menninger (1973) in the seventies. Curran (1969) made an early call for the restoration of religious values in counselling. He suggested that conscience needs education, and that counselling can help the individual appropriate this education (p.139). Within this process there is a place for loving confrontation (p.140).

Hoffman (1979) regarded "ethical confrontation" as a therapeutic necessity, because clients need to be equipped to function in what is a world of moral choices (p.78). This should not, however, arise from a position of moralism, but should bring with it an equal emphasis on grace (justification) to balance the demand for growth (sanctification) (cf. our section 6 below). He drew on Tillich's concept of the transmoral conscience to reconcile these.

The psychologist Mowrer noticed this imbalance before most others and took a far more radical line against it - one which appears to place him on the other side of the scale, and therefore also out of balance. Mowrer (1961) charged the Freudian legacy, in which he included Carl Rogers, of leading Protestantism into a false understanding of the role of sin and guilt in psychopathology. Put simply, he argued that psychoanalysis, and pastoral counselling which has allowed itself to be influenced in this respect, have made the mistake of trying to deal with guilt by emphasising freedom from conscience instead of responsibility in obeying conscience. In his characteristically trenchant style Mowrer (1961, pp.181-82) put it this way:

The Calvinist doctrine of the grace of God (or what Tillich has called the Protestant Principle) has been a heresy which has produced despair, anger, and madness. Freud, with a great flourish of scientific objectivity and logic, pretended to deliver us by going all the way and taking from us responsibility both for our sins and our salvation. The result: moral collapse and chaos!

His opinion of the search for new solutions in the philosophies of the East is clear from his next sentence:

Now, feebly, in a sort of hebephrenic languor, we are toying with Asiatic abstractions that make as much sense as does modern abstractionist art.

Mowrer's solution lies in looking for principles to guide behaviour.

We have, it seems, a completely symmetrical choice between observing natural principles and prospering, on the one hand, and disregarding them and getting into trouble, on the other. (p.183)

From this perspective, Hiltner's approach would be deficient in not giving sufficient attention to helping people to inform and respond to conscience with responsible ethical behaviour, and in misleading people into believing that their guilt can be dealt with through coming to accept themselves without changing the behaviour which Mowrer believed led to their discomfort in the first place.

Mowrer came down very emphatically on the side of works as the vehicle for salvation. He argued that the Reformation doctrine of salvation by faith, this "ambiguous and bloody doctrine" (p.188), and the substitutionary doctrine of the atonement need to be dropped in favour of the Catholic retention of the importance of good behaviour. Substitutionary Atonement "is a doctrine which holds the deep natural wisdom of the Judeo-Christian ethic in contempt - and prevents us from coming to grips effectively with the most profound personal problem of our time, mental illness." (p.189)

Now it would not be consistent with the method of successive corrections to allow the whole experience of salvation by faith to

be written off like this. It represents far too strong a tradition and thus presumably contains an important ingredient of balanced pastoral care. Part of the problem here is probably that forgiveness means very different things in different moral contexts, as we noted in a previous chapter. The depth of forgiveness St Paul described only makes sense to a person brought up with the intense effort required by the Pharisaic Law. The kind of unmerited personal grace the Reformers described only makes sense to someone exposed to the ritualistic tyranny of the late medieval Church. But to come without qualification to such a doctrine of grace from today's typical normlessness is indeed cheap grace. Grace needs to be understood in the context of law. Where the demand is absolute, then grace can be absolute. Where demand has never been experienced, or is only partially perceived, then a doctrine of unmerited forgiveness and limitless grace threatens to be nothing other than licence or confusion. Where there is no demand, it is psychopathy; where there is only some demand it is confusion and the kind of abandonment of responsibility which is how Mowrer described mental illness.

Mowrer saw the answer as lying in the recovery of the confessional, and gathered a wide range of support (see, for example, Mowrer, 1967). But noting that Roman Catholics are not known for having a lesser incidence of mental illness than Protestants, suggested that the confessional needs to be a more significant experience than that offered in the Roman Catholic practice. Specifically, it should be more than an empty,

perfunctory formality. The penance assigned should be psychologically adequate (i.e. the penance should be more severe and should fit the crime); confession should become an adequate deterrent by being required to be made to significant others; and absolution and forgiveness, being largely ineffective, should be de-emphasised in favour of restitution and reform. (Mowrer, 1961, pp. 195-196)

This is consistent with the call described above for a return to pastoral counselling as moral discourse.

To return, then, to Hiltner's disagreement with McNeill concerning whether or not the recorded history of pastoral care is an accurate reflection of what actually happened, it appears that trends in this century confirm that both McNeill's emphasis on discipline and Hiltner's emphasis on acceptance reflect important aspects of the tradition. The historical record may thus be somewhat one-sided, but Hiltner too would be wrong to suggest that the matter of discipline and correction can simply be dismissed.

In summary so far, Hiltner's eductive approach places him on the restoration side of the continuum. This has led to a call to restore the balance, a call which could in turn become an imbalance on the side of the demand for moral purity if the importance of what Hiltner (with others down the centuries) stands for is lost (Oglesby, 1980, p.41). Hiltner could therefore be criticised not for being too permissive, but for being appropriately permissive without also providing the context of demand in which permissiveness leads to salvation. It is probably

a matter of therapeutic technique whether the counsellor would attempt to include the demand in some way in the counselling relationship, or whether it would be catered for by insisting that pastoral counselling take place within the context of the other functions of the Christian ministry, including instruction and discipline.

But the matter of context needs to be discussed further. We have said that Hiltner's approach appears on the restoration end of the continuum. But is it permissible to remove the function of restoration from the Church's ritual in the way Hiltner's approach requires? Presumably Hiltner and the other pastoral counsellors of his age were reacting against a too-strong ecclesiastical hold over the function of caring for those who might not regard themselves necessarily as being within the fold of the Church. But many of the imbalances we have noted and shall be noting in this chapter are associated with this separation of pastoral counselling from the other aspects of ministry and the life of the Church. Hiltner himself, as we noted at length in Chapter 2, was careful to emphasise the importance of the links between his shepherding perspective and other theological disciplines. In theory at least, then, this should not have been a problem. But whether the implicit consequence of his practice overpowered the explicit intention of his theory, or whether others in the field without Hiltner's sensitivity for the need to nurture those connections took over and effectively cut pastoral counselling off from the rest of the theological and ecclesiastical field, in reality pastoral counselling in recent decades has come to be

regarded as a discipline by itself, with pastoral counsellors practising in centres which might have very tenuous if any links to a congregation. We suggest that this distance has much to do with the imbalances discussed here.

But Hiltner's description of sin could contribute a third question to our list in this section, and thus exercise a critique on other approaches. We noted in Chapter Two that Hiltner saw sin as allowing oneself to continue in a state of sickness for which there could be a cure. A corollary of this would presumably be that the victim of another's sin could also be described as sinning if the victim does not exercise whatever freedom he or she has to bring that situation to an end. This is entirely consistent, of course with Rogers' description of the etiology of emotional disturbance in the conditions of worth placed on the person by significant others. If sin, then, is not just a personal affair, but also a social phenomenon in which people are victims as well as sinners, and as such have the responsibility to extricate themselves from and oppose this sin, then a third question could follow:

1.3 Does the approach enable the victims of the sins of others to extricate themselves where possible from participating in this way in the sins of others?

Given his own socio-economic and political situation, Hiltner was particularly interested in the operation of this principle in relationships between individuals, but it would apply as well to

the situation of an oppressed or discriminated against people. This definition of sin and its pastoral consequences may turn out to be a new contribution to the tradition arising from the experience of the Church in this century. (Note 7)

2. Sin: Group identity, individual guidance and inner attitude

Hiltner's understanding of sin has already been discussed, and need not be dealt with again here. In brief, Hiltner is not concerned with boundaries and so is not concerned with "Sin" as providing identity through establishing behavioural boundaries (2.1). Neither is he concerned with providing a moral code for the guidance of society, either explicitly or implicitly (2.2). Both of these fall outside Hiltner's definition of the shepherding perspective. Our conclusion, therefore, is that to the extent that Hiltner's approach is used as a model for pastoral care as a whole, or to the extent that he allows pastoral counselling to occur outside the context of balanced pastoral care, this constitutes an imbalance, and has evoked the kind of response we noted in section 1, particularly as regards the need for moral guidance - the matter of boundaries around the fellowship does not appear to be such an issue at present.

As regards Question 2.3 (Does the approach focus sufficiently on peoples' inner motives and attitudes to ensure that outer observances reflect a true inner state?), Hiltner does agree that when speaking of sin what is important is inner attitudes and

character rather than behaviour as such (Hiltner, 1972, p.98). In fact, Hiltner's conception of inner conflict as the source of disturbance and insight as the means to its resolution places him on the insight end of the continuum from insight to behaviour which has been the subject of so much debate in secular psychotherapy. Those who belong on the other end, both in psychotherapy and in behavioural pastoral counselling (e.g. Stone, 1980; and those who have picked up Mowrer's call, such as Glasser, 1965; Belgum, 1963), would therefore argue that Hiltner has neglected behaviour.

Another way of organising this section, then, would have been to collapse Questions 2.1 and 2.2 (Identity through behavioural boundaries and Guidance from a moral code) into one dealing with overt behaviour, and to balance it with another along the lines of 2.3 (Inner attitude). On this continuum, Hiltner would appear at the insight end and could be criticised for neglecting behaviour. In this instance, however, the theologically derived questions we already have seem to deal with more profound and pertinent issues than the now rather sterile secular debate between behaviour and insight.

3. Good and evil in human nature and the necessity for both absolute demand and unlimited acceptance

We noted in Chapter Two that one of the theological debates in which Hiltner was content not to take sides, provided the conclusion was not used coercively, was optimism versus pessimism

with regard to human nature. Yet it could hardly be denied that in practice Hiltner assumed an optimistic position, or else he could not afford to be entirely eductive. He thus came down very clearly on the acceptance side of the acceptance versus demand continuum. We have suggested, however, that the position which is faithful to the Christian tradition in this issue is not one or the other or a balance between the two, but a radical emphasis on both demand and acceptance. Hiltner clearly lacked the former, and this also prevented his approach satisfying Question 3.3. (the process of sanctification). Again it is the context in which the acceptance in Hiltner's approach occurs which needs attention - it needs to create the conditions in which people experience that love of God which impels them onwards towards greater wholeness.

This relates to the law aspect of demand. What is also lacking in Hiltner's approach, however, is an appreciation of the place of ideals in creating the sense of demand to which people need to respond; a vision of what the world might be and what they might be. Hiltner's approach belonged to the secure and goal-directed society of the fifties in America, in which there already existed a clear and impelling vision of the ideal society and the ideal citizen in it. The approach assumed, therefore, a strong given ideal which was readily incorporated into the individual's ideal self. In that context it could be appropriate to focus exclusively on acceptance. But in a context of rebellion, or of low social goal-directedness, Hiltner's approach lacked the strong alternative ideal with which people need to identify. (Note 8)

Hiltner's approach does, however, provide the strong affirmation of the actual self called for in Acceptance (3.2). This is a correct emphasis which could be endangered in the predicted swing towards demand. To devalue acceptance because it has not been balanced by demand would be to repeat again the mistake which has been made with each swing of the pendulum in the past.

4. The extent and limitation of the authority of the pastor

The issue at stake in this section is similar to that in the previous one, but takes it further to the role of the pastor and the understanding of Divine authority brought to the counselling context. Hiltner clearly satisfies the call for Personal freedom (4.2), but his approach does not provide the model of salvation which Pastoral authority (4.1) requires. In other words, if there is to be the demand called for in the previous section, then there needs to be a standard or a picture of optimal human health towards which to direct the demand. This implies a given ethical standard, not necessarily as a code, but at least as a set of principles or goals, and an image of the ideal - a description of the Kingdom of God. This the pastoral counsellor would bring with him or her to the interview as a given. Although this need not interfere with the therapeutic acceptance embodied in the educative approach, it would have a profound effect on the process if the client were aware that the context in which the counselling took place implied an expectation that people should grow towards an ideal. It is suggested that this would not lessen the impact

of acceptance (which Hiltner is right to emphasise), but in fact increase it, as it would be acceptance of the person in spite of and almost because of the very great expectations of that person in the light of the Gospel. Without it pastoral counselling cannot function to bring people closer to the Kingdom. It is here that the most crucial criticism of Hiltner must be made. He has done pastoral care a great service by so strongly supporting the acceptance part of this whole; but he needs to be corrected in that he has not seen the need also to allow clients to experience the Divine expectation of growth.

5. Lay ministry and the priesthood

To be fair to Hiltner, professionalism in pastoral counselling is one issue which he specifically listed in his own appraisal of his professional career as one in which he had not been heard accurately. Having discussed the establishment of the Clinical Pastoral Education movement, he went on to point out,

But from the start I also believed that pastoral counseling was inseparable from pastoral care, that pastors should have no preference for counseling in the study against bedside calls in the hospital . . . Perhaps unwittingly they tended to value formal counselling over the many less structured situations of pastoral care. (Hiltner, 1980. p.214-215).

So Hiltner was against establishing pastoral counselling as a profession separate from the ministry.

Nevertheless, while Hiltner did recognise the value of the mutual care of souls among lay people (see his acceptance of McNeill's argument in favour of this in Hiltner, 1959, p.141-143), his approach to pastoral counselling was still that it was something offered by the professional pastor (as distinct from the narrower concept of the professional pastoral counsellor, which we have seen he opposed). In so far as this has by intended or unintended implication led people to regard pastoral care as the exclusive preserve of the specialist, it has contributed to a loss of interest in the role of the laity in pastoral care.

It may be unfair to criticise Hiltner by pointing this out as an imbalance, as Hiltner's aim was not to provide a comprehensive approach to pastoral care, but to provide pastors with a theory to guide their counselling work. It is rather a criticism of the broader movement within the Church which has taken work such as that of Hiltner and used it as the norm for pastoral care in general. The correction of this imbalance can probably be seen in the strong small group movement throughout the Church, and aspects of the charismatic movement, where gifts of ministry are seen to be distributed arbitrarily by the Spirit rather than sacramentally by the Church. One would expect the next movement after that to be a swing back towards pastoral specialists again (not specialists in the sense of professional counsellors separate from the pastoral ministry in general, but ministers whose special

calling is pastoral care), probably with more pastoral authority than Hiltner envisaged (the authority of the pastoral counsellor in Hiltner's model is the implicit one provided by the respect in which professional and scientific expertise has been held. This does not appear to be as strong a claim to authority as it used to be).

6. Functions of pastoral care

Of all the seven functions represented by the seven criteria in this section, Hiltner really only did justice to the first, Healing, and perhaps the third, Sustaining. He included Guiding (6.4) in his description of the shepherding perspective, but it does not appear from his case studies how he would actually guide people, or from his theory what guidelines he could use without going against his eductive approach, which as we have seen is primary. He explicitly excluded discipline from the shepherding perspective (Hiltner, 1959, p.143).

This is a direct consequence of the contextual problem noted earlier. In his reliance on what is really a secular clinical model rather than the traditional pastoral model, Hiltner did perhaps make the mistake Alves suggested in the article discussed in the previous chapter, that is making theology subservient to the interests of pastoral practice. It could be argued that Hiltner's pastoral theology is merely a rationalisation for his decision to use a psychological model in a pastoral context.

It is not necessary to go back over each of the functions to reach our conclusion, which is the same one reached in the first section, that Hiltner's approach needs either to be modified to include the other pastoral functions, or it needs to be placed in a context in which it cannot operate without the client also being exposed to the other functions.

Hiltner in fact appeared to advocate exactly this in his (1961) book with Colston in which they looked at the context of pastoral counselling. They defined context as the "term for what differentiates the pastor's counseling from that of other counselors" (Hiltner and Colston, 1961, p.210). They suggested that the four dimensions which make the context of pastoral counselling different from that of secular counselling are the physical setting (e.g. in a Church building), the expectations of both the counsellor and client, the requirement that the counsellor shift from being pastor to being counsellor, together with the knowledge that he will need to shift back again, and the peculiar aims and limitations placed on the counsellor both by his task as pastor and by the limit his other duties place on the time he can devote to a single case.

That they thought that pastoral counselling should occur clearly within the context of pastoral care can be seen from the following passage,

The minister has several functions but only one task. His functions include preaching, counseling, teaching, evan-

gelizing, conducting worship, and leading the social outreach of church into world. His one central task, however, is bringing men into conscious acknowledgement of their dependence upon Jesus Christ as Lord and Savior and aiding them, in that faith, to live still imperfect but Christian lives. (Hiltner and Colston, 1961, p.7)

This would appear to satisfy our requirement. There are, however, two problems with this. Firstly, despite Hiltner's opposition to the separation between the professional identities of pastoral counsellors and ministers - he went so far as to call a private practice of pastoral counselling a contradiction in terms (Hiltner, 1964, cited in Hielema, 1974, p.86) - in practice this is exactly what his approach seemed to lead to. It is interesting to note that what Hiltner and Colston (1961) referred to in their research project as the context of pastoral counselling was in reality no more than a context created for the sake of pastoral counselling, not for the sake of pastoral care - Colston worked in a pastoral counselling centre for the purposes of this study. Thus although they suggested that clients would see the counsellor as also a pastor, there is no evidence that this did in fact happen. Burger (1974) similarly argued that there is a separation in practice between the communicating and shepherding perspectives.

The second and more basic problem is the one noted in Chapter Two, that Hiltner would have applied the educative principle not just to counselling, but also to the pastor's work as a whole. In other words, even his context would be characterised by acceptance without demand.

7. The logic of belonging

Hiltner does provide an implicit logic of belonging in his emphasis on acceptance. Clients experiencing his approach presumably experience strongly a sense of belonging to the human race through the acceptance given them by the counsellor. Although implicit, this could probably be articulated by clients, even in theological terms as mediating to them the love and grace of God. On Cumpsty's continuum from individual to corporate modes of belonging, this belongs very much on the individual end, because there are no symbols or rituals which tie it into the institution of the Church.

On the other hand, this sense of individual belonging to the human race does not seem as powerful a source of belonging as those described by Cumpsty, the very explicit logic of which would help people to withstand the chaos of social disruption. A sense of belonging to humanity based on one experience of acceptance by another person is far more open to being shaken by bitter experience with other people than is the powerfully supported and widely attested logic of belonging to a mysterious and distant but all powerful God.

A further dimension could therefore be added to Cumpsty's analysis, and that is the strength of the link which a particular logic of belonging affords. Either individual or corporate modes of belonging can be either weak or strong. Hiltner's approach affords a weak individual sense of belonging. This is adequate,

some might even argue preferable, in a situation of social stability such as was characteristic of America at the time Hiltner was writing. But it could be expected to serve less usefully in situations of social change or disruption, when a more powerful link would be needed. In such situations, Hiltner's approach would need to be changed or supplemented to provide people with the kind of logic which carries powerful support (e.g. Scripture) and/or the kind of ritual which powerfully cements them into a tangible body.

8. The influence of the Christian tradition, secular social sciences and the Church's socio-political context on the development of pastoral theology

It should be clear by now that Hiltner has not paid much attention to the Church's traditional wisdom in relation to the doctrine and practice of pastoral care (8.1), but has been very responsive to the contribution of psychology (8.2) - if somewhat less responsive to the other social sciences. A number of critics from more conservative theological schools (e.g. Hielema, 1975, Burger, 1974) have criticised Hiltner for not paying more attention to Scripture. It has also been argued by Oden (1980) and many others that the time has come for pastoral care (in Oden's words) to recover its lost identity in the key texts of the classical tradition.

It is revealing to observe here the note of caution Hiltner himself expressed at the conclusion of his thoughtful appraisal of

his own career (Hiltner, 1980). He seems to be wary of following too closely the fashions of the age when he expressed the fear that

I may, even though unintentionally, have contributed to the current preoccupation with the self-realization and self-development movements as one-sided forms of what Christopher Lasch calls narcissism. That has been far from my intent. Becoming one's self is a good thing unless it excludes the reality of relationships with others or denies the contankerousness in even the best of selves. But it is always an insufficient criterion of human relationships and commitments. (Hiltner, 1980, p.220)

The impression is gained here, as elsewhere, that Hiltner himself was in fact well in touch with his own roots in theology, Church history and the devotional heritage of the the Church (e.g. Hiltner, 1951), and therefore that he brought a balance and maturity to his own thinking. He was able to discern imbalance when it began to manifest itself. What he may not have anticipated was that those who would use and develop his work would not necessarily share the wealth of his own background, that rich context within which he had developed his approach as a correction to the imbalances which had preceded him.

Given that context, Hiltner's approach had great strength. Without it, however (and it has to be recognised that his approach

contributed to the ethos which devalued the tradition), it is lacking in the things we have discussed in this chapter. As such his approach did have the power to contribute to movements such as the narcissism alluded to above. Can Hiltner be blamed for this? It is almost inevitable that in responding appropriately to the situation out of which any thinker comes, that thought will miss the mark with the succeeding generation - the very one to which unfortunately the thought will be addressed. It is in recognition of the need therefore to place ones thought within the historical tradition in order to discern the imbalances, that this study has been made.

It is more difficult to decide whether Hiltner responded appropriately to his socio-economic position (8.3). As we have seen, his approach provided a very good match with the American society of his time, and in that sense it was appropriate. But, as Alves has pointed out, the Church has other political contexts as well, in which the dominant American model of pastoral care is not appropriate. It could be argued further that to provide too comfortable a match with the dominant socio-political ethos in any context is inappropriate because of the prophetic position the pastor should also adopt.

This brings us back once again to the issue of context. If pastoral care functions in a vacuum, then the approach offered by Hiltner would indeed be likely to serve the interests of the status quo - at least to the extent that the pastor would not wish to jeopardise the educative approach by adopting a prophetic

role. On the other hand, if all the pastoral functions were brought together into the counselling room, the pastor would quite clearly be lost under a welter of conflicting theological demands. The position suggested here is that pastoral counselling needs to occur in a context in which the fullness of pastoral care is also exercised, and in which all the facets of Christian ministry and mission are also present. It is in carefully relating to the context that the delicate balancing of apparent opposites required to be faithful to the Christian tradition can be achieved.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

The aim of this study has been to evaluate Seward Hiltner's approach to pastoral counselling on the basis of several criteria which embody the cumulative wisdom of the Christian tradition of pastoral care. By thus placing his approach in the perspective of the tradition, it was intended that the imbalances arising from its particular historical context would be revealed, and directions suggested whereby the approach could be amended or supplemented to reflect more faithfully the wisdom of the tradition, particularly in cultural contexts which differ from that in which Hiltner worked.

It is evident from Chapter Five that there is a considerable degree of overlap in the conclusions drawn from the various criteria in Chapter Four. Mostly this had to do with the separation which was found to exist between pastoral counselling as Hiltner understood it and the broader functions of pastoral care as handed down in the tradition. It was suggested that in America in the fifties this could have been appropriate, in that as a relatively stable society with strong ideals creating a powerful demand among its members, America was a community in which acceptance was an important need. Removed from that context, however, the approach is unable to respond to several

other needs in society. Acceptance in isolation then became an unbalanced ministry. It was recognised that an educative approach to counselling precluded introducing many of the functions suggested as missing in Hiltner's approach, but eductiveness could still be retained as a counselling orientation if counselling were offered clearly within the context of broader pastoral care. The problem lay, in other words, not in eductiveness per se, but in the separation of this from its context, or the adoption of eductiveness as a principle to guide the whole of pastoral care instead of just counselling, or the view that educative counselling alone could meet all the pastoral needs of the client. To be fair to Hiltner, he probably did not intend this to happen, but this is what appears to be the consequence of his approach.

Specifically, some of the elements which need to be considered as practically excluded from the Hiltner approach are, firstly, the provision of an ideal which is suitable for clients to adopt in their search for an ideal self, and the recognition of a moral standard to guide behaviour. Both of these serve to create the demand which was seen to be the necessary context in which acceptance could be effective.

Secondly, the healing and sustaining functions which were recognised as the important ingredients in Hiltner's counselling need to be integrated with the other pastoral functions (facilitating spiritual growth, sustaining, guiding, discipline, restoration, and liberating from oppressive institutions and customs) and other aspects of ministry.

Thirdly, it was suggested that there needs to be a sense of pastoral authority derived from beyond the counsellor him or herself, and expressed in the use of sacramental and other ritualistic or logical expressions of connectedness to God, providing for people a sense of belonging.

Fourthly, the role of the laity in mutual edification and correction needs recognition. Hiltner's approach probably led unintentionally to a devaluing of any but professional models of helping.

Finally, it is suggested that all of these have something to do with the break which occurred between modern American pastoral counselling and the tradition of pastoral care. The connection is being made again, and it is suggested that the criteria developed for this study could help to place any contemporary approach within the tradition and thus enable a critique to be made which is relatively (although obviously not entirely) free from the preoccupations of current pastoral theology.

Despite the overlap noted above, it is not recommended that the criteria be collapsed or reduced, as the same degree of overlap may not be found if the criteria are used to analyse another approach.

There are several directions for further research indicated by this study. As has already been suggested, the criteria could be used to analyse other approaches to test whether the criteria do

in fact offer a way of bringing the wisdom of the tradition to bear on any counselling approach. In particular it would be valuable to use the criteria to analyse a relatively new and incomplete approach, to assess whether predictions made on the basis of the analysis are confirmed. In other words, would the trends noted through the historical survey continue to manifest in the way predicted?

A second area of research would be to check, amend and add to the criteria by using other historical sources reviewed by an independent researcher. As was noted in Chapter Four, all we have is third hand information about pastoral practices in previous centuries, processed in turn through the particular assumptions and biases of the present researcher.

A third task which was not even attempted in this study would be to try to sift the historical trends in order to distinguish those which are validly part of the tradition from those which are aberrations or heresies. In other words, this would entail supplementing the "community belief" approach adopted here with a "basic root" approach or a "logical types" approach (see the note on method in Chapter One) to identify those trends which are foreign to the pure tradition in order to exclude them from the criteria. As our analysis stands, we have no criteria for identifying heresies which may gain enough support for long enough to gain entry into our set of questions. The advantage of using both the present method and a basic root or logical type approach together would be that on the one hand valid expressions of the

community's need which might otherwise have been rejected as outside the tradition on the basis of a basic root or logical type approach, could be recognised and accommodated, while on the other hand alien ways of accommodating them which might have been included by the community belief method, could be excluded.

Fourthly, the criteria could be tested empirically by designing and applying two questionnaires, one to assess the degree to which parishioners do experience the kinds of needs assumed to lie behind the trends out of which the criteria are derived, and the other to ascertain the extent to which the varieties of pastoral care and counselling offered by a sample of pastors do in fact respond to these needs.

Finally, further interdisciplinary work could be done involving pastoral theologians, psychologists, sociologists and historians to improve our understanding of what is happening in society at present and how this would emerge in the religious and emotional needs of the people, and what the appropriate responses might be in terms of the Christian religion. Instead of always having to rely on the pastoral models developed to meet the needs of the previous generation, pastors could then begin to design and offer counselling and pastoral care of a kind which relates to their parishioners' immediate experiences.

NOTES

1. It would not contribute to the main argument to include the work done in this direction in the text, but it may interest the reader to know something of the process which preceded the approach taken in this study. What appears in Chapter Four as a finished product is only the (current) end point of a long process. Space demands, of course, that the process only be sketched in outline.

At first an attempt was made to identify the key elements of Christian orthodoxy in order to draw up a series of statements which any approach to pastoral counselling (such as Seward Hiltner's) would need to satisfy. An extract from the author's research diary at that stage noted that his purpose was "to establish criteria by which to evaluate the goals and techniques of psychotherapy in terms of Christian teaching". This would not just be a set of negative conditions to be met, but also include positive statements of what the Christian tradition could add to counselling approaches, such as the picture of spiritual health (blessedness) contained in the Beatitudes - here is state of health which exists even in conditions (poverty of spirit, mourning, persecution, etc.) usually considered to be obstacles to mental health. To have such a set of statements would, of course, be very helpful in identifying which psychological theories and techniques could be admitted to pastoral practice, and how others would need to be amended in order to be prove acceptable. The motivation for this was the fear that implicit assumptions inimical to Christian belief were being imported into pastoral practice, and from there threatening to pervert theology. The "selfism" of the humanistic psychotherapists such as Carl Rogers would be an example of a subtle influence which could have far-reaching consequences for the tradition. After some frustrating effort trying to reconcile widely divergent theological traditions, each of which seemed to have a valid claim to being at least partly consistent with the tradition, however, it was realised that it would not be possible to draw up a list of statements which would be both widely accepted and also specific enough to be useful. One of the useful conclusions from this exercise was that any description of the principles of Christian pastoral care would have to be in dynamic rather than static terms - the tradition is by no means closed.

The next step was probably the most helpful of the stages in the process of coming to the present approach. The widely divergent traditions noted above were analysed according to positions taken on the issue which seemed to emerge again and again as a crucial one, and that is the relation between law and grace. A four-fold typology with respect to law and grace was drawn up (these are pure types and do not necessarily look like denominations as they occur in practice):

The first lays the emphasis on strict obedience to a given code. This could be called the "demand" type. At its worst it becomes legalism, in which the law becomes all-important and any sort of

coercion is condoned to achieve obedience. Fear is the chief motive. In better guises, this position emphasises God's sovereign love, with the law being given as an act of grace for life.

The second type emphasises the sovereign grace of God in giving actual righteousness to the elect, independently of anything they may do. The emphasis here is on freedom. At its worst this type leads to antinomianism and licentiousness. God's love is unconditional, therefore law (this position fails to distinguish law from the sanctions which enforce it) is contrary to love and must be dropped altogether. Whereas legalism assumes the worst about human nature, this position assumes the best. It could be called the "acceptance type".

The third type is a compromise between the first two. Demand and acceptance are balanced so that the individual feels sufficiently threatened to live at what is considered to be a satisfactory level of obedience, but also feels loved enough not to be crushed by the impossible expectations of perfectionism. God's love is partly conditional on human obedience, so sovereignty is de-emphasised in favour of an emphasis on human responsibility. This is a pragmatic or "moralist" position, and is usually where most systems of pastoral care come out.

The fourth type entails a radical intensification of both demand in the form of obedience to the spirit behind the law, and of acceptance in the form of the unconditional love of God. This could be called the "radical" position, and is the one which seems to be consistent with the teaching of Jesus.

Historically there has been no major era in the Christian tradition when the demand type was adopted in its pure form as described above, but the period which came closest to it was that just before the Reformation. Parts of the Protestant reaction to this legalism then looked very much like the acceptance type. But anxiety about election and the consequent desire to be seen to be on the right side of the visible Church began to turn what doctrinally verged on antinomianism into something in practice closer to legalism. The Methodist revival broke into this uncomfortable balance between antinomian words and legalist practice with the return for a while of something like the radical type, expressed in the preaching of justification by faith (acceptance) alongside an emphasis on holiness (demand).

These three historical periods therefore embody the three important types described above, leaving out the compromise position, which is not so much a type as an attempt to balance conflicting needs. They could be called the Roman Catholic type, the Protestant type, and the Methodist type, although it is admitted that would subject great traditions to caricature.

Some of the dimensions which were explored using this analysis were sanctification (growth) versus justification (conversion); this-worldly (secular) versus other-worldly (sacred) concerns; reasonable versus absolute demand; conditional versus unconditional acceptance; assurance versus doubt; human nature as good versus

human nature as bad; the human predicament as that of sickness versus sin; behaviour versus belief orientation; permissive (non-directive) versus coercive (directive) pastoral practice; fraternal versus paternal counselling; human effort versus divine gift; human free will versus determinism and the related question of divine sovereignty; and self-denial versus self-affirmation.

But as the list grew, and particularly when it was applied to this century, when the traditions seemed to become so intertwined, it began to be evident that applying a logical type analysis would not be adequate. An approach was needed which would take into account the progressive development of the tradition along a dialectical path which seemed to be marked by a number of polarities. These were often related to each other, but were also sufficiently different from each other not to want to fit into a single set of types. The tradition seemed to oscillate between these various poles, and it was very difficult or impossible to state that one end was more faithful to the tradition than the other. In fact the true tradition seemed to lie in the process itself of correcting any imbalance which occurred, either by leading pastoral practice back to some middle ground, or by bringing it to a radical paradoxical emphasis such as is called for in the demand/acceptance issue discussed above. So the idea emerged of using trends in the history of pastoral care to identify the most important dimensions on which the oscillations have occurred.

There was little in the literature to guide the work in this direction, as it differs from the method usually adopted.

2. It is precisely this that Hiltner (1980, in several places) regrets in the response others have made to his life work. He argues that theology has been neglected in Clinical Pastoral Education, in the interface with other professions, and in the training of pastoral counsellors in general. "I have an impression that at many places the field is freezing in a way that regards its theory to be some approach in psychology, or some combination of psychological approaches, rather at the expense of any serious work on theological bases" (Hiltner, 1980, p.216-217). On the face of it, then, one must blame the others in the field, not Hiltner for this relative eclipse of pastoral theology by other disciplines. A case could be made, however, for including Hiltner's approach within the general trend which gave such authority to psychology as a source for pastoral practice and even pastoral theology.

3. One fear about the eductive approach which we are not alluding to here, but which many might feel, is that if the pastor has a concern for regulating behaviour in some way, then his appearing to condone behaviour contrary to the direction he wishes people to move in may appear to him to weaken his influence in that direction. The implicit concept here seems to be that of a field of value vectors, in which the force of the pastor's influence and the power of the various religious sanctions which support him

operate as vectors on the individual in one direction, while the forces of temptation, personal weakness, bad company and so on act on the individual as vectors in the opposite direction. By being eductive, it could be argued, the pastor allows the vectors operating in the direction of sound behaviour to be weakened (because the person's fear of the pastor's and God's disapproval is reduced), thus exposing the person to the danger of sinful behaviour. This may well be a valid way of understanding how the behavioural equilibrium which constitutes moral standards in society is reached, and maybe the Church should be concerned with increasing the vectors in the direction of moral behaviour, but it is not an appropriate way of understanding the relation between pastor and parishioner. As is argued elsewhere, both demand and acceptance are absolute in the Christian ethic. The comments in the text, then are not intended to oppose counselling being eductive, but to point out that unless both demand and acceptance are considered together, the danger exists that one will be lost in the preoccupation with the other, or that a situation will be reached in which the pastor has a confused identity, being mostly demanding in one context and mostly accepting in another, but never absolutely both.

4. It will appear more clearly later that the argument here is not that counselling and pastoral care should not be eductive, but that they should not be eductive outside of the context of demand. The parishioner should know that the eductive counsellor also represents the absolute demand, and that the inductive pastor also represents the unconditional acceptance (see Chapters 4 and 5).

5. In coming to the method outlined below for deriving criteria an exploration was made into the current state of the philosophy of social science in order to search for a way of portraying the tradition of pastoral counselling in a way which was not so subject to one or other set of assumptions as to lose critical distance. This exploration was not included in the text because it is incidental to the main argument, but it may help the reader to outline in summary form in this footnote a few of the ideas which lie behind the approach eventually taken. The aim was to evolve a way of thinking which differed from what appeared to be limitations in the existing literature. Some of the ideas are fairly conjectural and are offered as beginnings rather than conclusions. To connect these thoughts with existing work in the field of pastoral counselling, they will be contrasted with the approach taken by Sanborn (1979), one of the few writers to pay attention to the question of research method in pastoral theology.

The purpose of Sanborn's study was to provide an analytical discussion of the major models of mental and spiritual health in order to bridge the gap which he perceived to exist between the theoretical studies of pastoral specialists and the general orientation of pastoral counsellors. His purpose in regard to examining current models is thus similar to our purpose in regard to examining models implicit in the history of pastoral care in the Christian tradition. Like Sanborn, we are interested in

analysing the concepts in various models of pastoral care in order to understand how these relate to the practice of pastoral counselling. But whereas Sanborn limited his analysis to what the models he was considering had to say about mental and spiritual health, we are also concerned with the other topics included in the subject, in particular with method in pastoral counselling. We are, furthermore, considering the models implicit in nearly two thousand years' of pastoral care, rather than three well-defined contemporary models. This must make our analysis far more selective in the range of material considered. Our exposition of the models of pastoral care has necessarily to be suggestive rather than definitive. To explain the methodological assumptions behind this study, however, it will be helpful to compare them with those of Sanborn.

Any discussion of pastoral counselling is by nature an interdisciplinary venture; one is faced immediately with two major disciplines: theology and psychology. That both need to be considered is probably beyond debate in most circles, but how each needs to be considered is by no means clear. Whereas once it seemed possible to divide pastoral care and counselling into two spheres of knowledge, the one being the preserve of theology and the other the preserve of psychology, (e.g. Sanborn's reference to mental health as being the concern of psychology and spiritual health the concern of theology), this is no longer possible. Each of these disciplines is evolving, and particularly in psychology, there is such a methodological ferment currently in progress that any dividing line which might once have been drawn between the two disciplines is rapidly being blurred. To illustrate this, we can take Sanborn's (1979) use of Fawcett's (1970) approach to the distinction between the models of science and religion, as an example of an approach which is no longer tenable.

As presented by Sanborn (1979, pp.2-4), Fawcett (1970) differentiates between models in three ways. Firstly he differentiates between descriptive and analogical models. Descriptive models correspond in all respects except size to what is being described. Analogical models illustrate correspondence on certain (but not all) structural properties, thus illuminating what would otherwise be inaccessible to verbal description. While religion has always operated with analogical models, Fawcett suggests that science is only recently beginning to recognise their value.

Secondly he differentiates between limited-relevance and control models. Control models define "a fundamental interpretive approach for grasping reality" (Sanborn, 1979, p.2), whereas limited-relevance models explain a limited facet of the whole, or some specific thing, and require a control model as universal foundation. Fawcett recognises that a control model is only one possible way to describe reality and is thus never exhaustive.

Thirdly, Fawcett distinguishes the control models of science and religion. Scientific models are observer models which "objectify", while religious models are participator models which "subjectify".

Observer models are shaped to explain, represent and predict observed phenomena, while participator models are shaped to enable man to view the universe and his personal being as related in a way that is existentially or subjectively creative and meaningful. (Sanborn, 1979, p.3)

An examination of the state of scientific endeavour in the social sciences, and psychology in particular, will show how rapidly these categories have lost their usefulness.

Polkinghorne's (1983) survey of the recent history of the philosophy of science as it refers to the human sciences provides a useful background to the current state of psychology. He traces five stages in the evolution of modern thought from logical empiricism to mature relativism today. Gone is the attempt to establish "true" laws by evolving theories to mirror reality and then testing them by the established principles of empiricism. The construction of theory has become instead the selection of explanations of phenomena on the basis of their value, as consciously assessed by the researcher. Similarly, Gergen (1985) discussed "social constructivism" as by no means a universal position adopted in psychology, but as a significant contemporary movement challenging established views and offering a way of resolving some of the perennial research method problems in the social sciences. The central thesis of social constructivism is that it views discourse about the world "not as a reflection or map of the world but as an artifact of communal interchange" (Gergen, p.266)

This development is parallel to what has been happening in other disciplines. Physics has led the field in bringing in what is almost a metaphysical element at the level of quantum mechanics. When physicists, the princes of "hard science", began proclaiming that at the level of subatomic particles the observer appears to create the phenomenon he observes by the act of observing, and that empirical findings can therefore be regarded as a function of the observer's method, the impact had to be enormous. As far as psychology is concerned, the model of hard science to which the majority of psychologists had for so long aspired had done a somersault, becoming in the process far more ready to consider alternative philosophies of science than had the psychologists. Commentators such as Capra (1983) and Zukov (1979) have pointed out this paradox, and Zukov (1979) in particular has pointed out the similarities between the "new physics" and Eastern religions. The whole prestigious edifice of scientific method as practised by the physical sciences is disappearing, to the frustration of psychology, which has just spent a century preparing the ground for its own mansion to be built to the same plan.

Meanwhile similar considerations, together with the cybernetic revolution, have been bringing about a similar revolution of thinking in biology.

In psychology interest in applying general systems theory found a home principally among family therapists, who were looking for a

model to explain the relations between family members. The systems movement has gained a dynamic of its own, however, and theoreticians are claiming now that this is a new epistemology with implications far beyond that of family therapy. One of the major consequences of this has been to call into question the usefulness of the concept of objectivity in understanding human behaviour. The suggestion is that there are as many versions of reality as there are observers.

The result of this epistemological upheaval has been a plethora of articles and books all either describing the ferment, or searching for the next Kuhnian paradigmatic shift which everyone seems to expect is imminent. The foundations of the old empiricism are clearly at least under siege, if not already undermined. The new methodology will need to take account of the inaccessibility of "reality" (if that concept is to survive at all), the inseparability of the observer from the observed, and it could be argued, the end of disciplinary isolation.

We need now to return to Sanborn's (1979) use of Fawcett's discussion of models. Firstly it is clear that the preceding discussion of what has been happening this century in the human sciences would hit at the bases of Fawcett's first and third distinctions. At a time when the "hard" sciences are themselves moving towards the analogical use of models, the vain attempt made by some human scientists to construct what Fawcett has called descriptive models can surely be put to rest. At least until the next revolution in scientific thought, the only appropriate use of models of human behaviour would appear to be analogical. The distinction is thus unnecessary.

Similarly, the distinction between the objective observer model of science and the subjective participant model of religion must fall away, as science moves increasingly into a participatory understanding of observation, and scientific knowledge loses its objective tag. In this respect science has moved in the direction of religion. This leaves the distinction between control and limited-relevance models. This appears still to be a useful distinction. It could be argued that religion seeks to provide the control model for the various limited-relevance models of science, but that would not take account of the very serious search in science for their own control models.

Sanborn draws a distinction between "the" theological control model and "the" scientific control model. He argues that Hiltner tried to operate from the basis of this theological control model, while using various scientific limited-relevance models to deal with particular issues. He suggests, however, that Hiltner in fact failed to recognise that the implications of his "theological assumption" undermined his intentions by being more in line with the scientific control model (Sanborn, 1979, p.46). This part of Sanborn's analysis is particularly confusing because he does not define clearly either of the control models or defend the implication that there is one theological control model and one scientific control model. This assumption is so at odds with what is evident from reading either theology or "science" (a somewhat

broad term) as to render his analysis meaningless. So while the distinction Fawcett draws between control and limited-relevance models could be helpful, Sanborn's use of it is not. More useful would have been a description of what Hiltner's implicit control model actually was, how this compares with other theological and other models, what his limited-relevance models were, and the extent to which they were consistent with his own control model and that of others. Such a distinction would help to keep limited-relevance models (such as Hiltner's use of field theory) in perspective and avoid the confusion that arises when they are given controlling status.

Applying the argument followed above to the question of how to approach our present study, a fundamental assumption underlying the analysis is that the description of pastoral care on which we shall base our analysis must be regarded as the creation of the writer and those on whom he relied for his sources, based on particular cultural and philosophical foundations. As such it could differ fundamentally from a description based on different foundations. The concern of the analysis is thus not to prepare a description of objective truth which could be regarded merely as a particular interpretation of reality, but rather to look for a truthfulness which is provided by religious values. The question is, what can we learn about what it means to be faithful to the religious tradition we are looking at? This has to do with meaning, interpretations and values. We thus retain the concept of Truth but do not tie it to a particular version of history. (While this distinction between religious Truth referring to a dimension which transcends the observer and has much to do with values, and "truth" thought of as an objective description of some physical reality existing independently of the observer is not pursued further here, it is an important one. It seems to the author that the new thinkers in psychology are not aware of this distinction and are in danger of denying any standard beyond the individual.)

Leaving aside as unnecessary for our purposes the consideration of whether or not a description of an objective reality is possible in principle, it needs to be noted that the data for our analysis do not even pretend to be objective, but are created descriptions of interpretations. Our data are thus at least two stages removed from what could be described as the basic data of phenomenological observations. The first step away is that the people who have described pastoral care down the ages have interpreted their and their parishioners' experiences through the lenses of their own vantage points. The second step is on the one hand the chance filter of what was written down and survived, and on the other hand the intentional filter through which that material was selected which was considered worth preserving for posterity and inclusion in the sort of sources which we would consult in order to understand the history of pastoral care. We then put this data through a third process by organising it in a particular fashion in order to meet the demands of this study. At each step of the way the data has been filtered, interpreted, selected and organised according to the assumptions and intentions of those through whose hands it has passed. We can therefore hardly be

confident that what we have to deal with represents some "true" account of how pastoral care has actually been exercised over the centuries. To illustrate the point, if there is so much debate among Biblical scholars over a text which has discrete dimensions and a very well researched genesis, how much less confident can we be about a practically infinite body of data which is represented (we do not know how faithfully) by a body of literature of very varied origin and unspecified boundaries.

Can we then be said to have any data to work with at all? In answering this question in the affirmative we need to go beyond the concept of data as it would usually be understood in the human sciences, to an understanding of the material of our analysis as being the evidence of the development of the tradition. This we approach through the body of literature about pastoral care. In other words, we are interested in examining representative documents to see what the development of thinking has been, because that represents the general consensus which has emerged at each stage of the process, and that consensus represents the best explanation which theologians at the time could offer to match belief with the experience of people of that time. We have thus attempted to focus on a few of the more representative documents (e.g. the two books used in the historical survey) rather than covering a wider range of more esoteric contributions, and tried to deal with the more representative concerns of pastoral care rather than the minutiae of pastoral activities which have been followed at one time or another down the ages.

Although it is impossible to exercise a critique on any theory without introducing arbitrary categories, the approach in this study, then is as far as possible to avoid allowing these categories to exclude important information from the tradition.

6. The following analysis is based on a conversation with Professor John Cumpsty, 16 April 1986.

7. Two observations need to accompany this suggestion. Firstly, of course, this cannot be seen as Hiltner's own contribution - he was merely in step with what may turn out to be an important trend in contemporary theology. Secondly, this illustrates that the pastoral tradition should not be regarded as closed. Looking for successive corrections in the Community Belief method may appear to be entirely backward-looking, seeking confirmation for present approaches only in whether or not they satisfy the strict criterion of having precedent in the past; but this need not and should not be so. A strong enough movement by a large enough part of the Church today should be as good an indication of an important principle as any such movement at any other time in the Church's history.

8. One could speculate that South Africa today has many similarities to America in the turbulent sixties, but there is at least one important difference. Instead of the one powerful ideal

of material success against which the younger generation were rebelling in America, South Africa offers several competing powerful ideals (e.g. violent liberationist, pacifist, successful capitalist, defender of Western civilization, etc.). These are powerful ideals, so South Africa does not fit into the American seventies model of many competing weak ideals, but neither does it fit the American sixties model of one powerful ideal. It represents a separate type. One of the dismal failures of the Church has been its inability to come to terms with these powerful competing ideals and offer people a transcending ideal which would give them a sense of belonging and a sense of meaningful direction. Those who have meaningful direction by adopting one or other of the competing ideals face alienation from the rest of society and probably from the Church and God, in that the Church as a whole cannot be said to have identified itself with any one of them. Those who value belonging above direction experience torn or lost ideal selves, resulting in confusion, depression and paralysis. Whites and many middle class Blacks are entering a period of mass alienation from their selves as they seek to avoid alienation from their fellows and from God. In the struggle to belong they cannot afford to define their ideals in terms of one or other of the competing models on offer. The ideals with which they had identified have been hijacked, discredited, destroyed, or have simply evaporated. This is true for the first time too of Afrikaners, whose guiding direction has turned into a nightmare cul de sac.

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