**University of Cape Town**
Faculty of Humanities

The Effectiveness of United Nations Multifunctional Peace-support – Comparing Conflict Transformation in Angola and Mozambique

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Abstract

This study evaluates the effectiveness of United Nations multifunctional peace-support in facilitating the transformation of the Angolan and the Mozambican internal wars into non-violent conflicts which are managed within the framework of a newly created polity. The comparison between the Angolan case, a failure, and the Mozambican case, a success, aims to contribute towards an answer to the question of under which conditions the concept of United Nations multifunctional peace-support fails and under which conditions it is successful. Since both the conflict situations in Angola and Mozambique and the kinds of United Nations intervention (in both cases multifunctional peace-support operations) were similar in many respects, the research format of this comparison is a most-similar-systems design.

Similarities and differences of multifunctional peace-support operations as well as of the Angolan and the Mozambican conflict situations are outlined. The argument of this study is that a few significant differences between the Angolan case and the Mozambican case explain the fundamentally different outcomes of the two conflict transformation processes. The Angolan parties concluded a peace agreement due to a combination of two main causes: strong external pressure and military stalemate. External pressure, however, decreased after the peace agreement was concluded, and, equally important, the implementation of the accord created a new military situation. The United Nations, restricted by a lack of resources and a very limited mandate, was incapable of countering this threat. The party which perceived itself as loser of the conflict transformation process went back to war. The Mozambican parties, by contrast, agreed upon a conflict transformation process due to a combination of three main causes: external pressure, military stalemate and complete economic exhaustion. The beginning of the conflict transformation process along with the United Nations intervention altered the military situation as it had in Angola, but external pressure and the state of complete economic exhaustion persisted. The United Nations, having a comprehensive mandate and sufficient resources, repeatedly proved to be capable of putting the conflict transformation process back on track when it was stalled. Most importantly, it was highly effective in facilitating political solutions to problems arising from the implementation of the peace accord by offering financial resources to the exhausted conflict parties.

The failure of multifunctional peace-support in Angola and the success of the concept in Mozambique suggest four conditions necessary for the success of this kind of United Nations intervention: first, external pressure must not stop once negotiations for a peace agreement have been successfully concluded, but must persist throughout the entire conflict transformation process. Second, the conflict parties must perceive conflict transformation as gain. Third, multifunctional peace-support operations need a comprehensive mandate. Fourth, multifunctional peace-support operations need sufficient resources.

Table of Contents

List of Acronyms

ANC	African National Congress
CCF	Cease-fire Commission
CCFA	Joint Commission for the Formation of the Angolan Armed Forces
CCFADM	Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force
CCPM	Joint Political-Military Commission
CMVF	Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission
CNA	National Commission on State Administration
CNE	National Elections Commission
COMPOL	National Police Affairs Commission
CORE	Reintegration Commission
COREMO	Comité Revolucionario de Moçambique
CSC	Supervisory and Monitoring Commission
EU	European Union
FAA	Angolan Armed Forces
FADM	Armed Forces for the Defence of Mozambique
FNLA	Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola
Frelimo	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique
FUNIPAMO	Frente Unida Anti-Imperialista Popular de Moçambique
GE	Grupo Especial
GEP	Grupo Especial Paraquedista
GNP	Gross National Product
GPA	General Peace Agreement
GRAE	Governo Revolucionario de Angola no Exilio
MANU	Mozambique African National Union
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola
MPLA-PT	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola - Partido do Trabalho
NEC	National Elections Commission
NESAM	Núcleo dos Estudantes Africanos Secundários de Mozambique
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
ONUCA	United Nations Observer Group in Central America
ONUMOZ	United Nations Mission in Mozambique
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
PAPOMO	Frente Unida de Moçambique

PAT	Auxiliary Transitional Police
PCA	Partido Communista de Angola
PDA	Partido Democratico de Angola
PLUA	Partido da Luta dos Africanos de Angola
Renamo	Resistência Nacional Mocambicana
SADF	South African Defence Force
SWAPO	South West African People's Army
UDENAMO	União Nacional Democrátia de Mocambique
UN	United Nations
UNAMI	União Africana de Mocambique Independente
UNAMIC	United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNAR	União Nacionalista Africana de Rombézia
UNAVEM	United Nations Angolan Verification Mission
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAG	United Nations Transitional Assistance Group
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation
UPA	União des Populacoes de Angola
UPNA	União des Populacoes do Norte de Angola
US	United States
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union

List of Tables and Figures

Tables

Figures

Political Map of Angola

(source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/Libs/PCL/Map_collection/Africa/Angola.GIF)

Political Map of Mozambique

"War, it seems to me, (...) may well be ceasing to commend itself to human beings as a desirable or productive, let alone rational, means of reconciling their discontents. This is not mere idealism. Mankind does have the capacity, over time, to correlate the costs and benefits of large and universal undertakings."

John Keegan: A History of Warfare

INTRODUCTION

This study evaluates the effectiveness of United Nations multifunctional peace-support in facilitating the ending of the Angolan and the Mozambican internal wars.

The study is to be seen in the context of the wider question of which conditions contribute to the success of multifunctional peace-support and under which conditions the concept fails. The cases of Angola and Mozambique are chosen, because a comparison between the two cases is well suited to contribute to an answer: the concept of multifunctional peace-support was applied in both countries, but the outcome was diametrically opposed. Angola went back to full-scale internal war, whereas the war in Mozambique ended.

The purpose of this introduction is twofold: first, the main concepts used in this study will be defined and their crucial characteristics will be described. Second, the analytical framework will be outlined. Thus, the introduction is organised into seven brief sections: section (a) will discuss the significance of internal war; section (b) will define the term internal war and outline its most important characteristics; section (c) will describe how the United Nations have dealt with internal war and will introduce the concept of multifunctional peace-support; section (d) will give a literature overview on studies on the effectiveness of this kind of intervention; section (e) will outline the comparative design of this study: section (f) will discuss concepts of war ending and introduce the concept of conflict transformation; finally, section (g) will give an overview of the organisation of this study.

a) The Significance of Internal War

Since the end of the Second World War, the majority of wars, among them the most destructive ones, have not been inter-state, but internal wars:

> "The requirement of statehood for both parties to a war significantly reduces the actual incidents of armed combat in the post-1945 world – and coincidentally minimizes the numbers of casualties and the amount of physical destruction. Of the approximately 22 million casualties of armed action since 1945, about 8 million were the victims of combat between the organized armies of two or more states. The remainder resulted from wars of national liberation and internationalized civil wars."[1]

These findings are reinforced by a study by Dan Smith covering the five-year time period from 1990 to 1995. Of a total of 84 wars, only 8 were fought between states: Armenia and Azerbaijan, Ecuador and Peru, India and Pakistan, Iraq and Kuwait, Iraq and the United Nations, Mauritania and Senegal, Slovenia and Yugoslavia, Croatia and Yugoslavia. The remaining 76 wars were not inter-state wars, but - in Smith's terminology - civil wars, regional civil wars, or wars of liberation.[2]

Not only did the latter occur significantly more often than wars between states, but the degree of destructiveness, as measured by the death toll from 1990 to 1995, was also significantly higher. Of 7 wars with more than 100,000 casualties, 6 wars were civil wars or regional civil wars: Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burma, Indonesia, Lebanon and Somalia. The only inter-state war in this category was the war between Iraq and the United Nations. All six wars claiming more than 1,000,000 lives, were civil wars or regional civil wars: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda and the Sudan.[3]

b) Defining Internal War

This study will avoid highly specific terminology such as Dan Smith's terms of civil war, regional civil war and war of liberation, and use the generic term of internal war, which covers all forms of extensive violence within a state. There are two reasons for this:

First, specific concepts of large-scale violence occurring within states are often difficult to distinguish. Where, for example, is the thin line between Dan Smith's concepts of civil war and regional civil war? A civil war is hardly imaginable without any kind of intervention by foreign actors. More specifically, why does he classify wars such as in Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Congo, Mozambique or Rwanda as civil wars, although foreign intervention was a vital element in all of these wars?

Second, narrowly defined concepts such as the ones used by Dan Smith lead to omission and neglect of phenomena of extensive violence within states. In defining war, *inter alia*, as an armed conflict about power and territory, Dan Smith omits many phenomena of extensive violence

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[1] K.J. Holsti 1992, p. 41
[2] Dan Smith 1997, pp. 90-95; he defines war as "an open armed conflict about power or territory involving centrally organized fighters and fighting with continuity between clashes."

within states from his analysis already by his definition of war.[4] This may lead to an incomplete analysis of an armed conflict, or to its complete omission from analysis. The war in Somalia, for example, was partly about power, but this was not the predominant purpose which made people fight and use means of extensive violence. The most important feature of the war in Somalia was that it was not always clear whether the armed factions had any interest or intent in gaining political power and responsibility at all.[5] Extensive violence such as in the South African Province of KwaZulu-Natal in 1993 and 1994, where almost 3,000 people were killed, is completely omitted from analysis, because it does not meet Dan Smith's criteria of war.[6]

Given the problems of distinction and omission, this study will mainly use the generic term of internal war, covering all forms of extensive violence within states. Only in a few cases where types of internal war can be unambiguously determined, more specific terminology will be used. A definition of internal war has to fulfil two conditions: it has to be general enough to cover all phenomena of extensive violence, and specific enough to enable the analyst to determine clearly what an internal war is and what it is not.[7]

I will use the following definition as working definition for this study: an internal war is an armed conflict which causes more than 1,000 fatalities a year, and which is mainly or exclusively fought within the territory of a sovereign state and by conflict parties from within this state. Hence, internal war is defined by three characteristics:

First, it is an armed conflict in which there are more than 1,000 casualties a year. Internal war aims at covering large-scale violence occurring within a state. The threshold of 1,000 casualties is somewhat arbitrary, but it offers a clear criterion of large-scale violence. The figure of 1,000 fatalities was introduced by Melvin Small and David Singer for both inter-state and internal war and has become an accepted definition in social science.[8]

Second, internal war is mainly or exclusively fought within the boundaries of a sovereign state. The term 'internal' already suggests that it is fought within certain boundaries. In the Westphalian system, these boundaries are borders of a sovereign state. In principle, internal wars take place within states, yet there are exceptions to this principle. Armed factions often seek refuge in neighbouring countries, establish military bases, set up training centres etc., with or without approval by the host-country. Counterinsurgency often targets these camps, thereby expanding the *locus belli* to a neighbouring country. The *locus belli* is also extended by the internationalisation of internal war as outlined under the third characteristicon. The support by external actors can

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[3] ibid., pp. 24, 25

[4] Many further omissions follow from his definitions of civil war, regional civil war and war of liberation.

[5] Donald Snow 1996

[6] South African Survey 1996/97. Johannesburg (South African Institute of Race Relations) 1997, pp. 601-606; 1,489 people were killed in 1993, 1,464 in 1994.

[7] Both Ted Gurr's and Harry Eckstein's definition do not meet these criteria. Ted Gurr's definition is too narrow (Ted Gurr 1970, p. 11), Harry Eckstein, who invented the term, defines it not unambiguously enough (Harry Eckstein 1964, p. 38).

[8] Melvin Small/David Singer 1982

provoke military strikes against this external actor by the party which is disadvantaged by this support.

Third, internal war is mainly or exclusively fought by parties from within the state in which the fighting takes place. Governments, insurgents and other armed groups can be internal conflict parties.[9] Yet, internal war is usually not fought without the involvement of external actors. Most internal wars have an international dimension in addition to the domestic one.[10] States, international governmental and non-governmental organisations intervene in internal wars by providing financial support, by delivering weaponry, and sometimes even by sending troops, in order to influence the outcome of the war in their favour. They are invited to do so by internal conflict parties, seeking to get as much external support as possible, in order to increase their capabilities relative to their foes.[11]

c) The United Nations and Internal War

The United Nations was founded to preserve world peace by protecting the territorial integrity of its sovereign member states. With its Charter largely drafted before the German and Japanese surrender, requiring sovereign statehood and, originally, declaration of war on axis powers for membership, the United Nations originates as a reaction of states to a catastrophe humankind could not even imagine six years before. Never again should Nazi-like aggression be possible; never again should aggression against other states destroy world peace.[12] This is very apparent in the first words of the Preamble of the Charter:

> "We the Peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind (...) have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations."[13]

Before the end of the Cold War, the United Nations, or more precisely the Security Council defined in principle its main purpose of the maintenance of international peace and security, (Article 1 of the Charter) as the prevention and management of inter-state war.[14] There were only a few notable exceptions to this principle: a United Nations field mission, designed to act as an

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[9] Political science analysis of internal wars focuses almost exclusively on wars between government and insurgents, thereby neglecting that large-scale violence also occurs between insurgent groups such as in pre-independent Angola, or armed groups, which can hardly be called insurgents due to the virtual lack of interest in gaining political power, such as the different clans in Somalia.

[10] see for example: Karl Deutsch 1964, Martha Cottam 1986, Stephan Walt 1996

[11] External intervention develops a dynamic on its own: If internal actor A brings in external actor α, internal actor B has to counterbalance the change in capabilities by seeking assistance from external actor β etc. If external actor α improves or tries to improve his position relative to the one of other states in the international system by assisting internal actor A, external actor β has to counterbalance and intervene itself by assisting internal actor B (Stephan Walt 1996).

[12] see, for example, Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference by the Chairman of the United States Delegation, the Secretary of State (June 1945), pp. 88-92

[13] Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations

[14] The Security Council is the organ with by far the most competencies in the field of maintenance of peace and security. The role of other organs will be briefly discussed in the first chapter.

impartial buffer between Belgian and Congolese government troops, became involved in the internal war in Congo in 1960, and the Security Council imposed economic sanctions on the apartheid regimes in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa in 1966 and 1977, respectively.[15]

Since the end of the Cold War, however, the United Nations has extended the scope of its activities in the peace and security sector and has attempted to manage and help end several internal wars. Two causes for this change need to be emphasised: first, an organisation aiming at maintaining international peace and security cannot neglect internal wars. The fact that most wars since the end of the Second World War have been internal wars and that internal wars have been more destructive than inter-state wars makes it clear that international peace and security cannot be maintained by protecting state boundaries only. Second, the new co-operation between the permanent members of the Security Council emerging in the late 1980s led to new approaches for old problems. As part of a new thinking, Mikhail Gorbachev called for new kinds of conflict management and for United Nations initiatives to facilitate the ending of internal wars.[16]

Since the late 1980's, all of the three main tools used by the Security Council to maintain international peace and security have been applied to inter-state and internal wars: the non-coercive measures for the "Pacific Settlement of Disputes" as outlined in Chapter VI of the UN Charter; the coercive measures as outlined in Chapter VII, entitled "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression"; and peace-support operations which are not provided for in the United Nations Charter.

In applying the concept of peace-support in situations of internal war, it was developed a crucial step further and the concept of multifunctional peace-support emerged. This new concept is no longer confined to the deployment of a lightly armed interposition force as was traditional peace-support. The degree of intervention has deepened and the scope has widened. Multifunctional peace-support has the following four characteristics: first, the rival parties have agreed to the mandate of the operation. Second, the deployment of the operation takes place after a comprehensive settlement agreement between the rival parties has entered into force. Free and fair elections have been the most important common feature of these agreements so far. Third, the purpose of the operation is to facilitate the implementation of the settlement agreement. Fourth, the operation is not confined to a military mandate, but has police and other functions to fulfil as well.

Given these four features, I define a United Nations multifunctional peace-support operation as a field mission consisting of military, civilian and police personnel, deployed with the consent of the parties concerned, organised and directed by the United Nations, and aimed at facilitating the implementation of a comprehensive settlement agreement including the provisions for the conduct of free and fair elections by monitoring, supervising and/or controlling the

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[15] Gregory Fox 1994, pp. 638, 639; the measures against Apartheid states are in accordance with Article 73 of the Charter, outlining that the interests of the inhabitants of non-self governing territories are paramount. The General Assembly also followed this principle when it recognised the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) as the sole representative of the Namibian People.

[16] Mikhail Gorbachev 1988

compliance with the agreement in the military, the police, and other civilian fields of implementation.

d) Evaluations of Multifunctional Peace-support Operations

This study will evaluate the effectiveness of multifunctional peace-support operations by scrutinising both the specific kind of intervention of a particular multifunctional peace-support operation, and the specific conflict situation in which this field mission intervened.

Five multifunctional peace-support operations have been launched so far: the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), the United Nations Transition Group (UNTAG) in Namibia, the United Nations Angolan Verification Mission (UNAVEM II), the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and the United Nations Mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ).[17]

The current literature agrees on the overall assessment of these cases: ONUSAL, UNTAG and ONUMOZ are regarded as success stories. [18] UNTAC used to be included in this list, but the coup d'état by Hun Sen in July 1997 called for a re-assessment of the case. The only case assessed as a clear failure is UNAVEM II, for Angola lapsed into full-scale internal war again before the operation was completed.

There is disagreement, however, on what caused effectiveness or ineffectiveness. The literature tends to downplay the significance of the conflict situation. Tendai Msengezi, for example, completely neglects the Angolan conflict situation and argues that the collapse of the peace process was caused by the failures of UNAVEM II only.[19] Horace Campbell, Phyllis Johnson, Thania Pfaffenholz and Joseph Hanlon argue in a similar way.[20] Victoria Brittain and Fernando Goncalves also focus very much on UNAVEM II in their attempt to explain the renewed fighting between the Angolan parties, but include one factor specific to the Angolan conflict situation: the role of the United States.[21] The significance of both conflict situation and United Nations intervention has been emphasised, to different extents, by Richard Snyge, Gabriele Strom, Alex Vines, Christopher Alden, Margaret Anstee, Janet Heininger and Ian Johnstone. [22]

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[17] The following missions resembling multifunctional peace-support operations are not included in this list: the United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of Elections in Nicaragua (ONUVEN) was only an electoral assistance mission combined with a small military observer component provided by the United Nations Observer Mission in Central America (ONUCA); the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was not primarily a UN mission, but a multinational force led by the United States; UNAVEM III and the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), both successor missions of UNAVEM II, are not included in this list, because, although designed as multifunctional operations, they were never able to carry out their civilian mandates.

[18] Most of the literature assesses success or failure of mulifunctional peace-support operations. Few authors exclusively concentrate on the functions of certain components of multifunctional peace-support operations. Michael Doyle, for example, analysed in depth the civilian mandate of UNTAC (Michael Doyle 1995), and Ali Mahmoud the police component of ONUMOZ (Ali Mahmoud 1996).

[19] Tendai Msengezi 1992

[20] Horace Campbell 1993, Phyllis Johnson 1993, Thania Paffenholz 1995, Joseph Hanlon 1994

[21] Victoria Brittain 1993, Fernando Goncalves 1993

[22] Richard Snyge 1997, Gabriele Strom 1992, Alex Vines 1995, Christopher Alden 1995, Margaret Anstee

e) A Design for Comparison

This study will comparatively evaluate the effectiveness of United Nations multifunctional peace-support in Angola and in Mozambique. A comparison of these cases - the one a failure, the other a success - is particularly well suited to contribute to analysing the conditions under which multifunctional peace-support is successful.

Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune outline two kinds of comparative research designs: most-similar systems design and most-different systems design. Most-similar systems design studies put under scrutiny a number of similar systems. It is observed that these similar systems generate different behaviour. The different behaviour is explained by the small differences between these similar systems.[23] Since such an analysis requires an in-depth analysis of the systems, the number of cases is usually very limited.[24]

Most-different systems designs, on the contrary, compare very different systems. The purpose of the study is again to explain different behaviour by outlining the differences between the systems, but since the number of differences is so high, studies concentrate on certain parts of the system.[25] The purpose cannot be achieved by one analysis, but by the combination of many studies of a particular topic. Most of the studies collect statistical data, therefore the research design is also called statistical method.[26]

This study will adopt the format of a most-similar systems design because it aims at evaluating the fundamentally different outcome of United Nations multifunctional peace-support by comprehensively comparing two similar cases. Angola and Mozambique are situated in Southern Africa, they were Portuguese colonies before 1975, the internal wars were fought between a Marxist-Leninist government and an insurgency movement claiming to fight for democracy and free market economy, both countries experienced Apartheid-South African destabilisation policy, negotiations led to comprehensive peace agreements in the early 1990s, and the United Nations tried to facilitate the implementation of these accords.

f) A Concept for War Ending

Four concepts are relevant for the ending of wars: negative peace, positive peace, conflict resolution and conflict transformation:

First, negative peace is defined as the absence of mass organised violence.[27] The advantage

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1996, Janet Heininger 1994, Ian Johnstone 1995

[23] Adam Przeworski/Henry Teune 1970, pp. 31-46

[24] Frank Aarebrot/Pal Bakka 1991, pp. 52-55

[25] Adam Przeworski/Henry Teune 1970, pp. 31-46

[26] Frank Aarebrot/Pal Bakka 1991, pp. 52-55

[27] for an overview about the concept of negative peace see: Robert Pickus 1992, p. 232; Karl Bracher 1969, p. 110. Analysts of negative peace assume that war is not inevitable, but they also assume that humankind is imperfectable. Therefore, peace defined as absence of mass organised violence is possible, peace defined as universal love and harmony is impossible. It remains an ultimate overall aim, one ever to be sought, but very unlikely to be attained. What is now called negative peace was the prevalent conception of peace after the Second World War.

of the negative peace concept is its relatively clear definition, i.e. the absence of mass organised violence, and the fact that this feature is relatively unproblematic to operationalise in an empirical study. However, the concept is not adequate for this study, because it does not go beyond a temporary picture of the battlefield. The absence of fighting may be just a momentary phenomenon, e.g. the result of a strategy that waits for an opportunity to continue fighting. Flavius Renatus Venegetius puts this strategy very boldly: "qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum."[28]

Second, analysts on positive peace agree that the absence of violence alone does not constitute peace and argue that peace has to be defined much more comprehensively. Yet the concept is not adequate for empirical analysis due to the absolute lack of an agreed definition and the impossibility to operationalise such a comprehensive concept. The agreement upon the term positive peace ends with the consensus that peace is more than negative peace. The differences between the definitions are tremendous, although peace is often regarded as a certain kind of social justice.[29] Yet, a concept which is defined so comprehensively is virtually impossible to operationalise in an empirical study.

Third, conflict resolution focuses, as the term already implies, on a specific conflict and its resolution. A conflict is seen as resolved when the causes of the conflict are resolved.[30] This definition, however, is also very comprehensive and generates similar problems for empirical study as positive peace.

Fourth, the concept of conflict transformation is defined as:

> "build systems of conflict management to contain the conflicts, avoid their escalation into violence, and transform them into the healthy non-violent conflicts of multi-ethnic plural societies."[31]

This study will use the concept of conflict transformation. The effectiveness of the United Nations intervention will be assessed in terms of its ability to facilitate conflict transformation. The object of a conflict transformation approach is not the solution of conflict, but the process of moving a violent mode of conflict to a non-violent mode. It is highly unlikely that war is followed by a situation of entire harmony. The conflict transformation approach offers the advantage that it allows a war to be ended without the resolution of all underlying sources of conflict. Certain dimensions of conflict might be resolved, others might not. These remaining dimensions are carried out within a new set of rules not allowing for political violence.

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[28] "those who want peace prepare for war" Flavius Renatus Venegetius: Epitoma Rei Militaris, book 3, prologue; quoted in Edward Luttwak 1992, p. 3

[29] e.g, Johan Galtung 1972, Saul Mendlovitz 1975, Ernst Czempiel 1986

[30] Hugh Miall 1992

[31] William Ury, quoted in: David Wendt 1994, p. 165

g) The Organisation of this Study

This study will be organised into three parts. The first part will describe the evolution and concept of United Nations multifunctional peace-support. The second part will outline similarities and differences of the Angolan and the Mozambican pre-intervention situation. Drawing from the two previous parts, the third part will evaluate the effectiveness of multifunctional peace-support in Angola and Mozambique. The conclusion will summarise the findings and suggest conditions conducive for the success of multifunctional peace-support.

PART I

UNITED NATIONS MULTIFUNCTIONAL PEACE-SUPPORT

This part will identify the concept of United Nations multifunctional peace-support. The introduction to this part will briefly define the generic term *peace-support operation*. Three chapters will follow: the first chapter will describe the legal framework applying to peace-support in general and to peace-support in situations of internal war in particular. The second chapter will outline the crucial features of multifunctional peace-support by contrasting the concept with the other main types of peace-support. The third chapter will outline differences between multifunctional peace-support operations. The synposis will summarise the findings of this part of the study.

Multifunctional peace-support is a type of peace-support. Before giving an overview about the organisation of the chapter, the generic term *peace-support* needs to be clarified:

Peace-support is not peace-enforcement. There are three important distinguishing features: first, a peace-support operation is deployed only with the consent of the rival parties. Conversely, the *raison d'être* of a peace enforcement operation consists in the fact that no such consent is present, and the intervention aims at forcing uncooperative parties in settling their dispute by military means. Second, a peace-support operation is launched after a cease-fire has been established or before armed conflict has broken out, whereas a peace enforcement operation fights for the establishment of a cease-fire. Third, the military personnel of a peace-support operation consists of unarmed, or lightly armed soldiers. Peace enforcement troops, in contrast, are heavily armed due to the task they have to fulfil.

Thus, I define a United Nations peace-support operation as a field mission consisting of military, frequently also civilian and police personnel, deployed with the consent of the parties concerned, organised and directed by the United Nations, and aimed at the prevention, containment, moderation and/or termination of hostilities between or within states.[1]

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[1] I will use the term peace-support as a generic term instead of peace-keeping. The latter term is misleading, because it tends to be used both as highly specific concept and as generic term in the current literature.

1 Peace-support in the Charter System

This chapter aims to describe the legal framework applying to peace-support operations. The first section will embed peace-support in the context of the Charter. Particular emphasis will be put on the emergence of a new interpretation of the Charter which has enabled the United Nations to intervene in internal war. The second section will deal with the central problem of this new interpretation for peace-support operations: the legality of intervention in a sovereign state.

1.1 Peace-support as Means for Maintenance of Peace and Security

The main purpose of the United Nations is the maintenance of international peace and security:

> "The Purposes of the United Nations are:
> 1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace (...)"[2]

The organisation has three sets of means to accomplish this end: Chapter VI measures, Chapter VII measures and peace-support operations.

Chapter VI of the UN Charter provides the means for "Pacific Settlement of Disputes". The measures provided for in this Chapter are non-coercive. Acting under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the Security Council, by far most competent UN organ for the maintenance of international peace and security[3], is responsible for the investigation of every situation that threatens the maintenance of peace and security (Article 34 of the UN Charter). If it comes to the conclusion that this is the case, it may act as a mediator or arbiter (Article 33 (2), and Article 34, and Article 37 of the UN Charter). Since the fulfilment of this function is an intervention in the victim state, the latter has to agree with the measures taken.[4].

Chapter VII was supposed to provide the "teeth of the United Nations"[5]. The Security Council, after having determined that there is a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression", may take coercive action against the aggressor.[6] In a first step, the Security Council

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[2] Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations
[3] The General Assembly may only make recommendations except the Security Council does not fulfil its responsibilities assigned to it by the Charter (Article 10, 11, 14 of the UN Charter and Uniting for Peace Resolution)
[4] The relevant article for an action according to Chapter VI of the UN Charter is not Art. 2 (7), because this paragraph only applies for enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, but Art. 2 (4).
[5] Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference by the Chairman of the United States Delegation, the Secretary of State (June 1945), p. 88
[6] Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations

calls upon the parties to comply with provisional measures outlined by the Council.[7] If the parties do not comply, the Security Council may decide upon non-military sanctions.[8] If these sanctions prove to be ineffective, military sanctions may be imposed.[9] However, it is dubious whether Chapter VII became the "teeth of the United Nations". Since member states have anxiously protected their sovereignty, the collective security mechanism never became fully operational.[10]

Peace-support operations are not provided for in the Charter, but have become an important means for the maintenance of peace and security. Instead of a full operationalisation of Chapter VII, the General Assembly and the Security Council developed the concept of peace-support in order to fulfil the primary purpose of the United Nations.[11] Peace-support operations are not mentioned in the UN Charter and are not defined by other official UN documents. They have developed *de lege ferenda* as "a technique (...) to help control and resolve armed conflicts"[12] The competence of UN organs for peace-support operations under the Charter is unclear and disputed. It is certain that Articles 97 to 99 do not provide the Secretary-General with the mandate to independently establish peace-support operations. The mandate of the Secretary-General is to initiate actions to be taken by the Security Council or the General Assembly and to execute their decisions.[13] The overwhelming majority of peace-support operations, however, has been authorised by the Security Council, but the Uniting for Peace Resolution provides a legal basis for an authorisation by the General Assembly as well. The First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), for example, was authorised by the General Assembly.[14]

During the Cold War, the Security Council, in principle, interpreted international peace and security as the absence of inter-state war. Therefore, the three sets of means, as described above, were applied almost exclusively to inter-state conflict. The interpretation of maintenance of international peace and security as absence of inter-state war originates with the drafters of the Charter, who saw the main purpose of the United Nations in the prevention of large-scale cross border invasions such as in the First and Second World War.[15] Breaches of the peace other than

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[7] Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations

[8] Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations

[9] Article 42 of the Charter of the United Nations

[10] Richard Falk 1969, pp. 43-55

[11] Karin Rudolph 1995, p. 961

[12] Marrack Goulding 1993, p. 452

[13] The Secretary-General can be very powerful in this executing function, for example Dag Hammerskjoeld during the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) and the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC).

[14] During the Korea crisis the Security Council was capable of acting promptly and efficiently due to the USSR's abstention of the Security Council (a response to the non-recognition of the People's Republic of China as the representative of China to the UN). After the crisis, however, the USSR returned and blocked every draft resolution with regard to Korea. Therefore, Western states (under the leadership of the USA) proposed a draft proposal named the Uniting for Peace Resolution, which was adopted by the General Assembly on 3 November 1950 (GA Resolution 377/V). In the first of three individual resolutions it is stated that the General Assembly shall immediately consider matters of peace and security and make recommendations to the UN members for collective measures, when the Security Council fails to fulfil its primary responsibility of maintaining peace and security due to lack of unanimity.

[15] Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference by the Chairman of the United

violations of the non-interference principle laid down in Article 2 (4) of the Charter, were virtually *per definitionem* excluded.

The fact, however, that the majority of wars after 1945 has been fought within states has generated a dilemma for the United Nations: the organisation is designed to protect peace between sovereign states by a collective security mechanism consisting of sovereign member states, but the main threat for peace comes from within these sovereign states, a no-go area for the United Nations.[16] Article 73 of the Charter made this dilemma even more complex. It stipulates that the interests of the inhabitants of non-self governing territories "are paramount" and that political aspirations of these peoples have to be taken in account, and lists as one of the purposes of the administration of these territories "to develop self-government". Although Article 73 of the Charter virtually encourages internal war in cases where these rights are not granted by the colonial power, however, the Charter does not offer any explicit provisions for the settlement of intra-state conflict.

Since the end of the Cold War, this dilemma has been partly resolved by a newly emerging interpretation of the term 'threat of international peace and security', which incorporates internal war. During the Cold War, this interpretation was a rare exception, applied only in exceptional cases. Most prominently the Security Council, explicitly referring to Chapter VII, imposed an embargo on the Apartheid regimes in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa in 1966 and 1977, respectively.[17] After 1989, the emergence of the new interpretation has gained momentum. As a consequence, the Security Council, explicitly or implicitly referring to a threat to international peace and security, has authorised more peace-support operations aimed at managing internal war than aimed at managing inter-state war. In the course of the adaptation of the peace-support doctrine on internal war, the concept of multifunctional peace-support emerged.[18]

1.2 Legality of Intervention

Peace-support operations which intervene in sovereign states fulfil a variety of functions. Many of these functions are performed in highly sensitive areas of state sovereignty. This applies in particular to governmental functions such as those performed by the multifunctional peace-support operations UNTAG in Namibia, UNTAC in Cambodia and ONUMOZ in Mozambique. It has been argued, in particular by UN member states in the General Assembly, that multifunctional peace-support is not in accordance with the principle of sovereignty and the principle of non-interference.

Since peace-support operations are not mentioned *expressis verbis* in the Charter or in any other official UN documents, this section will analyse the general question of the legality of UN

States Delegation, the Secretary of State (June 1945), pp. 88-92

[16] Article 2 (7) of the Charter of the United Nations

[17] Gregory Fox 1994, pp. 638, 639

[18] This evolution will be discussed in detail in the second section of this chapter.

intervention and outline the implications of this legality for peace-support operations.

The United Nations Charter states in the first of its principles in Article 2: "The organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members."[19] Bodin was the first theorist who formulated the doctrine of sovereignty in 1577[20]:

> "It is necessary that those who are sovereigns should not be subject to commands emanating from any other and that they should be able to give laws to their subjects, and nullify and quash disadvantageous laws for the purpose of substituting others (...)"[21]

A prerequisite for sovereign rule is the absence of interference in internal affairs of a (since 1648) territorial defined sovereign. Bodin states that sovereign decision "cannot be done by one who is subject to the laws or to those who have the right of command over him."[22]

Friedrich Kratochwil argues that the principle of sovereignty is derived from Roman private law. A property holder of a piece of land had the right of *dominium*.[23] This right had two main features: first, it was an exclusive right. No others could have this right *ab inferis usque ad coelum*.[24] Second, in principle, the owner was allowed to use his property freely, without any restrictions. There were only a few exceptions to this principle, like the principle *sic utere tuo*, i.e. the restriction that the use of the property must not harm the rights of *dominium* of another holder.

These two main features of *dominium* are also the main features of sovereignty in world politics: first, the state, as right-holder of sovereignty, has the exclusive right of jurisdiction within its territory. The territory is defined by borders demarcating *ab inferis usque ad coelum*. Second, sovereignty is the most important feature of the state regardless how the state treats its *proprietas*. In principle, the state is not bound by moral considerations of right and wrong. From the principle of sovereignty derives the principle of non-intervention: in principle, having the right of sovereignty means being allowed to do the wrong thing. It does not matter whether the regime is dictatorial or democratic, whether human rights are violated or not. It does not matter whether there is internal war or humanitarian catastrophe.

Lloyd George, British Prime Minister, emphasised the principle of non-intervention very clearly after the October Revolution in Russia:

> "Whether Russia is Menshevik or Bolshevik, whether it is revolutionary or reactionary and whether it follows one set of men or another, that is a matter of the Russian people themselves."[25]

However, the principle of non-interference has never been absolute; there have always been exceptions. In the UN Charter, there are two norms of non-interference: Article 2 (4) treats the relations among states, whereas Article 2 (7) covers the relations between the United Nations and

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[19] Article 2 (1), Charter of the United Nations
[20] F. H. Hinsley 1969, p. 278
[21] Jean Bodin 1577, bk. I, chapt. VIII, quoted in: Friedrich Kratochwil 1995, p. 98
[22] ibid.
[23] Friedrich Kratochwil 1995
[24] literally translated: from hell to heaven
[25] Lloyd George during a debate in the House of Commons 1918, quoted in: Stanley Hoffmann 1984, p. 25

its member states.[26] For the task at hand, the analysis of the legality of UN intervention, Article 2 (7), has to be interpreted. The article reads:

> "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII."[27]

Whereas any intervention is prohibited in the relations among states, the UN is only prohibited from intervening "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction"[28]. In theory, this threshold is lower than the one which applies to the relations among states. It is also lower than the one which applied to the relations between the League of Nations and its members. In the Covenant of the League of Nations the word "solely" was used instead of "essentially".[29] In UN practice, however, this distinction plays no significant role because the threshold is interpreted very strictly.[30]

There is only one exception from the non-intervention norm which is explicitly mentioned in Art. 2 (7) of the UN Charter, and that is in cases, where the Security Council applies enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. In addition to the explicit exception, there is an implicit one which is not mentioned in the Charter *expressis verbis*: United Nations intervention is legal in cases where the victim state has explicitly consented to the action taken by the United Nations. This exception logically derives from the principle of sovereignty. The analogy with the *dominium* is helpful: the property holder has the right of *suprema decisio* (sovereign decision) over his *dominium*. This encompasses also the fundamental decisions, whether he wants to exercise this right, or whether he wants to exercise it, temporarily or indefinitely, only in certain domains, or whether he does not want to exercise it at all.

The explicit exception is not applicable to peace-support operations because peace-support is not peace enforcement. It is the implicit exception which applies: the legal precondition for the deployment of a multifunctional peace-support operation is the consent of the government to all functions performed by the mission. Peace-support operations are in accordance with the principle of sovereignty and the principle of non-interference, regardless of the functions they perform, provided that the government of the victim state has agreed upon all the actions taken by the United Nations.

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[26] Anton Schloegel 1995, Michael Mattler 1994
[27] Article 2 (7) of the United Nations Charter
[28] ibid.
[29] Article 15 (8) of the Covenant of the League of Nations
[30] Anton Schloegel 1995, p. 811

1.3 Summary

Peace-support is one of three sets of means to maintain international peace and security. Peace-support, in contrast to the two other sets of means, pacific settlement of disputes and enforcement measures, is not mentioned in the Charter. It has developed *de lege ferenda*, mainly because the Security Council failed to fully operationalise Chapter VII of the Charter.

Since the interpretation of the term *maintenance of international peace and security* has changed, peace-support operations increasingly aim to manage internal war. During the Cold War, peace-support operations have aimed, in principle, at managing inter-state conflict, because the purpose of the United Nations, i.e. maintenance of international peace and security, was interpreted, except for a few exceptions, as absence of inter-state war. Since the end of the Cold War the concept of maintenance of international peace and security is in the process of being re-defined. According to the evolving new definition, an internal war can also be a threat to international peace and security.

Due to this new interpretation, many peace-support operations have become involved in efforts to manage internal war. This has led, however, to what Eva Bertram refers to as "sovereignty dilemma"[31]. Although the *raison d'être* of the United Nations was to protect state sovereignty, it has to interfere in this sacrosanct of the Charter in order to maintain international peace and security.

Using Friedrich Kratochwil's analogy of sovereignty with the *dominium* in Roman Private Law, I have argued that United Nations intervention other than enforcement is legal in cases where the sovereign explicitly consents to all the functions performed by the United Nations.

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[31] Eva Bertram 1995, pp. 390-393

2 From Traditional Peace-support to Multifunctional Peace-support

This chapter will outline the three main types of peace-support as they have evolved in United Nations practice: traditional, preventive and multifunctional peace-support.[32] The purpose of this typology is, first, to describe the crucial differences between multifunctional peace-support on the one hand and traditional and preventive peace-support on the other hand, and, second, to identify the critical features of multifunctional peace-support. Emphasis will be put on the issue why multifunctional peace-support emerged.

2.1 Traditional Peace-support Operation

2.1.1 The Concept

Traditional peace-support operations are launched after rival parties have established a cease-fire, but before the conflict has been settled. The purpose of the operation is to facilitate the maintenance of the cease-fire with the consent of the parties concerned, and thereby to contribute to the creation of an atmosphere in which conflict settlement negotiations between the parties can proceed.

Traditional peace-support operations perform nearly exclusively military functions. The maintenance of the cease-fire is facilitated by either the observance of troop movements and actions taken by the military organisations of the rival parties only, or by adding to it the function of an interposition force. An interposition force consists of lightly armed soldiers, whereas military observers are unarmed.

Given these characteristics, a United Nations traditional peace-support operation may be defined as a field mission, consisting of lightly armed and/or unarmed soldiers, deployed with the consent of the parties concerned, organised and directed by the United Nations, and aimed at facilitating the maintenance of a cease-fire by creating a buffer between the rival parties and/or observing troop movements.

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[32] It is very difficult to typologise United Nations peace-support operations, because each operation is to a certain extent unique and the number of operations is bewildering. Since this typology is not an end in itself, but a means to unambiguously describe what multifunctional peace-support is and what it is not, this typology is confined to these three main types only. Most of United Nations peace-support operations can be sub-summarised under one of those types, many, however, cannot. The latter are, in most of the cases, similar to one of these main types. For a comprehensive typology see Marrack Goulding 1993.

2.1.2 An Example: UNTSO in the Middle East

The United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) is a good example to clarify the concept further. UNTSO was the first traditional peace-support operation.[33] In November 1947 the General Assembly recommended a partition of Palestine into two states to the Jewish and Arab communities, after Britain, the mandatory power, had turned to the UN. However, efforts of peace-making failed. On the 14th of May 1948, the Jewish Community declared the independence of Israel, which was immediately recognised by important powers such as the USA and the USSR. Egypt, Saudi-Arabia, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon declared war on the new state one day later.[34] On 29 May 1948, the Security Council called for a four-week cease-fire. After the cease-fire had entered into force, it set up a commission for the supervision of the cease-fire, to which military observers were added.[35] The observers were deployed along the Lebanese-Israeli and Syrian-Israeli border. The mission has been a failure and a success at the same time. It failed to create an environment for negotiations settling the dispute, but it prevented the resort to force. The mission is still deployed, its mandate has been adjusted several times, and the number of soldiers is declining.[36]

2.1.3 Traditional Peace-support in Situations of Internal War

Since the first peace-support operation was launched, traditional peace-support has become a common feature in world politics. Missions have been deployed in a variety of cases, for example, between Egypt and Israel, Syria and Israel, Lebanon and Israel, Saudi-Arabia and Yemen, India and Pakistan, the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, or Lybia and Chad.

Traditional peace-support has always aimed at facilitating the end of inter-state dispute.[37] There is only one exception to this rule: the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC). ONUC was originally designed to manage inter-state conflict. Congo became an independent state on 30 June 1960. After a mutiny, Belgium intervened without the consent of the Congo government. The latter protested against this action at the Security Council, claiming that Belgium had violated the principle of non-interference. The Security Council adopted a resolution calling for Belgian withdrawal and authorised the Secretary General to provide necessary military assistance.[38]

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[33] In 1947, similar missions were already authorised by the UN in the Balkans (authorised by the General Assembly) and in Indonesia (authorised by the Security Council); however, these missions remained under national command and, thus, cannot be regarded as UN peace-support operations.

[34] for a detailed analysis of the UN engagement in Palestine during the 1940s see: Harry Sacher 1952, pp. 76-153

[35] under Security Council Resolution 54 (1948)

[36] United Nations 1996, pp. 15-32

[37] or quasi inter-state disputes such as in the case of Cyprus

[38] Security Council Resolution 143 (1960)

A few days later, ONUC was launched. After the dismissal of Prime Minister Lumumba, however, the Congo lapsed into war. Confronted with this new situation, the Security Council adopted the famous Security Council Resolution 4741 on 21 February 1961, authorising ONUC to use force as a last resort to prevent internal war. This resolution marks the change from peace-support to peace enforcement. Since the necessary preconditions for peace-support - absence of fighting and consent of the parties - were lacking, ONUC had to be transferred into a peace enforcement operation.[39] The operation was a success in the sense that fighting could be brought to an end, but the cost, both in terms of human life and material resources was enormous.[40] It would take more than 30 years until a United Nations field mission would again become involved in efforts to end internal war, but then with a reformed concept of peace-support.

2.2 Preventive Peace-support

2.2.1 The Concept

Preventive peace-support differs from traditional peace-support primarily in its purpose: it aims at preventing the spill over of conflict from an adjacent state. The field mission is launched before armed conflict has broken out, not afterwards such as the traditional peace-support operation.

Preventive peace-support performs essentially the same functions as traditional peace-support. The focus of the operation is almost exclusively on military aspects: it acts as an interposition force between the conflict state and the host state, and observes the border between these states. The operation is deployed on the territory of the victim state and with the consent of the victim state.[41]

Hence, United Nations preventive peace-support may be defined as a field operation consisting of lightly armed troops and military observers, deployed on the territory of a potential victim state with its consent, organised and directed by the United Nations, and aimed at preventing the spill over of conflict from a neighbour state or neighbour states into a potential victim state by creating an interposition force between the potential victim state and this neighbour or these neighbours and by observing the border or the borders between them.

The only operation launched so far has been the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia, but more operations of this type are likely to be deployed.

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[39] United Nations 1996, p. 709

[40] One of the consequences of the operation was a major financial crisis for the UN; for a discussion of . ONUC, see: Marrack Goulding 1993, pp. 452, 453; Agostino Zacarias 1996, pp. 42-46; Paul Diehl 1993, pp. 49-53

[41] United Nations 1996, pp. 564-566

2.2.2 An Example: UNPREDEP in Macedonia

The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was deployed in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia at the beginning of 1992. In March 1995, UNPROFOR was replaced by three peace-support operations, one of which was UNPREDEP. The purpose and functions of United Nations intervention remained the same. The war in the Balkans had shown how easily war spills over from one country to another. First, Slovenia, then Croatia, then Bosnia and Herzegovina. Macedonia was one of the potential next victims. In order to prevent the spill-over of war to Macedonia, therefore, the United Nations deployed a substantial part of its UNPROFOR personnel in the newly independent country, which was later replaced by UNPREDEP. The main function of the deployment was to act as an interposition force at Macedonia's borders to Albania and to the newly established Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and to observe troop movements at these borders. The operation is still deployed. It has been able to achieve its objective so far: neither the conflict in Albania, nor the war in Kosovo spilled over into Macedonia.[42]

2.3 Multifunctional Peace-support

2.3.1 Multifunctional Peace-support as Specific Type of Peace-support

Following the new interpretation of international peace and security by the Security Council (as described above), the concept of peace-support was adopted to the conditions of internal war. ONUC, in particular, had dramatically shown that the concept of traditional peace-support cannot be applied in situations of internal war. The concept of multifunctional peace-support has emerged as a consequence. Multifunctional peace-support requires, as all forms of peace-support, the agreement of the parties concerned. However, there are three crucial differences between multifunctional peace-support and other kinds of peace-support: time of deployment, purpose and functions.

Traditional peace-support operations are deployed after rival parties have agreed upon a cease-fire and stopped the actual fighting, but before negotiations have taken place to transform the conflict. Preventive peace-support operations are deployed in a much earlier phase of conflict, when a conflict in a neighbouring state threatens to spill over into another state. Multifunctional peace-support is again deployed at another stage of conflict. A cease-fire has been established and a comprehensive settlement agreement has entered into force which defines in detail future non-violent interaction between the conflict parties.

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[42] ibid.

The purpose of traditional peace-support operations is to facilitate the maintenance of a cease-fire and, in this way contributing to an atmosphere in which negotiations can take place. Preventive peace-support aims at preventing the spill-over of conflict from one state into an adjacent state, before actual fighting has broken out. Multifunctional peace-support aims to facilitate the implementation of a comprehensive settlement agreement, and, thereby, to make a crucial contribution to successful conflict transformation.

Different ends call for different means. Traditional peace-support and preventive-peace support operations fulfil almost exclusively military functions because their purpose is militarily defined. Multifunctional peace-support operations, on the contrary, have a much broader scope because they are aimed at facilitating the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements, which are by no means confined to military aspects. The most crucial element of these peace agreements have been provisions for free and fair elections. The typical mandate of a multifunctional peace-support operation encompasses three comprehensive components: military, civilian and police. The functions performed are, to a large part, observation responsibilities. Due to mutual mistrust, the conflict parties set up observation mechanisms which are aimed at ensuring that each party implements the provisions of the agreement. Part of these mechanisms is multifunctional peace-support.

2.3.2 The Four Features of Multifunctional Peace-support

Multifunctional peace-support, therefore, has the following four features: first, the rival parties have agreed to the mandate of the operation. The mandate of a multifunctional peace-support operation, as the mandate of any peace-support operation, is based on the agreement of the rival parties.

Second, the deployment follows a comprehensive settlement agreement. These agreements always envisage a highly specific concept of conflict transformation. War is to be ended by democracy. Fighting on the battlefield is to be replaced by the compromise between democratic institutions. The holding of free and fair elections is the core of these comprehensive settlement agreements.

Third, the purpose of the operation is to facilitate the implementation of this settlement agreement. Parties who fought each other for years, sometimes even decades, distrust each other deeply. The United Nations aims at helping to overcome this problem by observing the implementation of crucial aspects of the agreement, sometimes even by autonomously conducting certain tasks. United Nations intervention is a means for the parties to ensure that the other party or parties comply with the agreements and that no party takes advantage by violating the newly established rules.

Fourth, the operation is not confined to a military mandate, but has civilian and police functions to fulfil as well. Typical military subject areas have been the maintenance of a cease-fire, cantonment and demobilisation, and withdrawal of foreign forces. Civilian components have always included participation in political commissions and functions regarding voter registration and elections. Typical police subject areas are the performance of the local police and the re-organisation of the local police.[43]

2.3.3 The Five Multifunctional Peace-support Operations

Five multifunctional peace-support operations have been launched so far: UNTAG, UNAVEM II, ONUSAL, UNTAC and ONUMOZ. In briefly describing each operation, the four features of multifunctional peace-support will become apparent:

• UNTAG, launched in Namibia in April 1989, was the first United Nations multifunctional peace-support operation. The deployment followed the signature of the Brazzaville Protocol by Angola, Cuba and South Africa, stipulating that Namibia would become a fully sovereign country and that free and fair elections for a constituent assembly would be held. The mandate of UNTAG was threefold, as is typical for a multifunctional peace-support operation: first, the main military tasks consisted of verifying the withdrawal of foreign forces, verifying of the cease-fire and monitoring of the cantonment. Second, the civilian mandate contained three main elements: the establishment of regional and district offices for explanation and assistance of internal reconciliation, the supervision of the civil administration reform process, and, most importantly, organisation and supervision of the electoral process. Third, the police component of the mandate consisted of the supervision of the local police.[44] UNTAG was withdrawn in March 1990 after having completed its mandate and is regarded as one of the greatest successes of UN conflict transformation.

UNAVEM II was established in Angola in May 1991, after the President of Angola, José Eduardo dos Santos, and the President of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), Jonas Savimbi, had signed the General Peace Agreement for Angola in Lisbon. In accordance with this accord, the mandate of UNAVEM II had three components: military, civilian and police. The military component consisted of the verification of the cease-fire and the monitoring of the assembly areas of the rival parties' armies. The decisive task of the civilian component was the monitoring and verification of the elections. Finally, the police component had the task of monitoring the Angolan Police. The mission turned out to be a failure: Although the United Nations verified the elections as free and fair, UNITA rejected the results and Angola went

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[43] Scope and depth of functions varies from operation to operation. These differences will be subject of the next section.

[44] For a comprehensive analysis of UNTAG see Gabrielle Strom 1992

back to full-scale war. UNAVEM II's mandate was adjusted and a new diplomatic peace-making process, *inter alia* involving the UN, began. In November 1994, the Angolan government and UNITA signed the Lusaka Protocol and three months later the Security Council set up a new field mission, UNAVEM III, to monitor and verify the implementation of the newly signed Protocol. However, UNAVEM III failed to facilitate the implementation of the Protocol as did its successor, the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA). Both missions were designed as multifunctional peacekeeping operations, but could never fulfil its civilian functions due to the lack of co-operation by the conflict parties. These two operations, therefore, will be not regarded as multifunctional peace-support in this study.

ONUSAL was launched in El Salvador, two months after UNAVEM II had been authorised. Its mandate was to monitor and promote the implementation of all political aspects of the Peace Agreement of Mexico City of 27 April 1991. After all divisions were deployed, the observer mission had four components: first, a human rights division was deployed in May 1991, consisting of 30 human rights observers and legal advisors. The mission is said to be the most extensive human rights verification operation ever undertaken in the history of United Nations. Second, the military division was added in July 1991. Its mandate was the verification of the cease-fire and the separation of forces. At the beginning, this division consisted of only 15 military observers. By January 1992, it rose to a maximum strength of 380 military observers and eventually dwindled to only 3 at the end. In February 1992, the police division was deployed as the third division consisting of 16 police observers. Their mandate was the supervision of the Auxiliary Transitory Police (PAT) and the evaluation of the performance of the new police. Eventually, the electoral division, consisting of approximately 900 electoral observers, was added in September 1993. Its mandate was to supervise the electoral process before, during and after the elections.[45] ONUSAL was withdrawn in April 1995 and is regarded as great success of UN conflict transformation.

UNTAC was deployed in Cambodia in March 1992. The deployment followed the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict signed in Paris on 23 October 1991 which requested the Security Council to create UNTAC. The mandate of the operation was again threefold: the main functions of the military component were the verification of the withdrawal and non-return of all categories of foreign forces, the supervision of the cease-fire, and the verification of cantonment of the rival parties' forces. The civilian element consisted of human rights monitoring, authority in some crucial governmental areas, and, most importantly, the conduct of free and fair elections. Finally, the main task of the civilian police component was to monitor the performance of the local police. [46] United Nations intervention in Cambodia was regarded as a great success until the loser of the elections, Hun Sen, ousted the winner, Prince Norodom Ranarriddh at the beginning of July 1997.

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[45] United Nations 1996, pp. 427-435

Mozambique's ONUMOZ has been the latest multifunctional peace-support operation launched so far. It was established to facilitate the implementation of the General Peace Agreement, signed on 4 October 1992 in Rome by the President of the Republic of Mozambique and the President of the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo). Again, the mandate was threefold: the military mandate consisted primarily of monitoring the cease-fire, the cantonment of the forces, and their demobilisation. The most important tasks of the civilian component were the monitoring of the entire electoral process and the co-ordination of humanitarian assistance. The police unit supervised the performance of the local police. After free and fair presidential and legislative elections in October 1994, and the installation of Mozambique's new Parliament and the inauguration of the President of Mozambique in early December, ONUMOZ was withdrawn at the end of January 1995. The operation is seen as great success of United Nations facilitated conflict transformation.

2.4 Summary

There are three main types of United Nations peace-support: traditional, preventive, and multifunctional. These three types share one crucial feature in common: peace-support operations are launched and operate with the consent of the parties concerned; they do not have the capabilities to enforce. However, there are three crucial differences between multifunctional peace-support on the one hand, and traditional and preventive peace-support on the other hand: time of deployment, purpose and means.

A traditional peace-support operation is deployed after a cease-fire has come into effect, but before rival parties have agreed upon a settlement of their dispute. The United Nations presence is aimed at helping to implement the cease-fire regulations and at facilitating negotiations between the parties in this way. The operations are either confined to observing the cease-fire, or the function of an interposition force in added. The former task is performed by unarmed military observers, the latter by lightly armed soldiers.

A preventive peace-support operation is launched before fighting has taken place in order to prevent the spill-over of war from one state into another. In order to achieve this goal, preventive peace-support operations observe the border between the potential victim state and the conflict state. This military function calls for military personnel. There are hardly any civilians involved in preventive peace-support.

A multifunctional peace-support operation is launched after a cease-fire has entered into force and after a comprehensive settlement agreement has been concluded. The most crucial feature of these settlement agreements is the provision for free and fair elections. The purpose of the

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[46] Janet Heininger 1994, pp. 31-46

operation is to facilitate the implementation of this settlement agreement. United Nations intervention is not confined to military aspects but covers civilian and police aspects as well. The United Nations gets involved in all crucial areas of the conflict transformation process.

Given these similarities and differences, United Nations multifunctional peace-support has four crucial features: first, the rival parties have agreed upon the actions taken by the United Nations. Second, the deployment follows a comprehensive settlement agreement, including provisions for free and fair elections. Third, the purpose of the field mission is to facilitate the implementation of this agreement. Fourth, the operation consists of a military, a civilian and a police contingent. The next section will outline in detail the functions these contingents perform.

3 Differences among Multifunctional Peace-support Operations

This chapter outlines the differences among multifunctional peace-support operations. Multifunctional peace-support operations are not all the same; they differ significantly. Although all multifunctional peace-support operations have the same aim and they all have a military, a civilian and a police contingent, there are significant differences concerning the scope and depth of their mandate, as well as the resources available to implement that mandate.

3.1 Scope of Mandate

The scope of multifunctional peace-support is the result of negotiations and by no means unilaterally determined by the United Nations. Since multifunctional peace-support is based on the consent of the parties, the parties have to agree that a certain area is subject to intervention. United Nations intervention in most subject areas is already requested in a comprehensive settlement agreement. Few areas are added afterwards and only at the request of the parties. The negotiation processes and requests so far have yielded no significant differences of military subject areas. Significant differences, however, are found in the civilian and the police component.

The military component consists of three subject areas which are significant for conflict transformation: cease-fire, cantonment and demobilisation, withdrawal of foreign forces. Every operation so far has performed these three tasks.[47]

The civilian subject areas which are significant for the conflict transformation process are governmental administration, political commissions, voter registration, presidential and parliamentary elections, and elections for a constituent assembly. None of the multifunctional peace-support operations so far has performed functions in all of these fields. UNTAG's and UNTAC's mandate covered functions in the field of government administration, political commissions, voter registration and elections for a constituent assembly. UNAVEM II, ONUSAL and ONUMOZ performed tasks in the fields of political commissions, voter registration, and presidential and parliamentary elections.

The police subject areas are the performance of local police and the re-organisation of local police. Both functions were only performed by UNTAG and ONUSAL. The police components of UNAVEM II, UNTAC and ONUMOZ, on the contrary, were unifunctional. These operations had only a mandate in the subject field of local police performance.

In sum, the scope of multifunctional peace-support operations differs. There are no differences concerning the military component, but the differences of the civilian and the police

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[47] The United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) observed the withdrawal of foreign

mandates are significant. UNTAG and UNTAC had a larger civilian mandate than the others. UNTAG and ONUSAL the widest police mandate.

3.2 Depth of Mandate

The depth of the mandate is also a result of the outcome of a negotiation process and founded on the consent of the rival parties. Five different extents of intervention can be distinguished: technical assistance, monitor and verify, supervision, control and conduct.

First, technical assistance means that the United Nations provides logistical support at the request of the parties. Second, monitoring and verification means that the UN observes a situation and confirms whether the behaviour of the conflict parties is in accordance with the arrangements agreed upon for this particular situation, without, however, having the legal ground to influence the parties directly.[48] Third, supervision means monitoring and verification, including the right to request changes of the actor's behaviour, without, however, having the legal grounds to give orders to the actors to change their behaviour. Four, control means that the UN has direct control over the actors and the right to give them orders. Five, conduct means that the UN has the mandate to perform certain tasks autonomously, with or without the consent or the assistance of local authorities.[49]

Using these terms, the depth of the functions performed in the military, civilian and police subject areas outlined above can be described. Significant differences of civilian functions become apparent.

Military functions are very similar. Except for UNTAC, all operations monitored and verified the cease-fire, cantonment and demobilisation, and the withdrawal of foreign troops. UNTAC also monitored and verified cantonment and demobilisation, as well as the withdrawal of foreign troops, but, in contrast to all other operations, supervised the cease-fire. Table 1 shows the similarities of military functions.

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forces for ONUSAL, UNAVEM I for UNAVEM II.

[48] The parties can be influenced only indirectly, for example by the preparation of a report.

[49] The five different degrees of intervention are partly taken from Steven Ratner 1997, p. 42

Table 1: Military functions of multifunctional peace-support operations[50]

military area	operation	UNTAG	UNAVEM II	ONUSAL	UNTAC	ONUMOZ
cease-fire		monitor and verify	monitor and verify	monitor and verify	supervise	monitor and verify
cantonment and demobilisation		monitor and verify	monitor and verify	monitor and verify	monitor and verify	monitor and verify
withdrawal of foreign forces		monitor and verify	monitor and verify (UNAVEM I)	monitor and verify (ONUCA)	monitor and verify	monitor and verify

Civilian functions vary significantly. Government administration was supervised by UNTAG, whereas UNTAC assumed governmental authority in areas which were crucial for the implementation of the peace agreement. Political commissions featured the United Nations as a member except for UNAVEM II, where its role was confined to the one of invited guest. Voter registration was conducted by UNTAC, controlled by UNTAG, and monitored and verified by UNAVEM II, ONUSAL and ONUMOZ. Elections for a constituent assembly were conducted by UNTAC, whereas UNTAG only controlled them.[51] Presidential and parliamentary elections were monitored and verified by UNAVEM II, ONUSAL and ONUMOZ. Table 2 highlights these differences.

Table 2: Civilian functions of multifunctional peace-support operations[52]

civilian area	operation	UNTAG	UNAVEM II	ONUSAL	UNTAC	ONUMOZ
governmental administration		super-vision	--	--	authority	--
political commissions		member	guest	member	member	member
voter registration		control	monitor and verify	monitor and verify	conduct	monitor and verify
elections for a constituent assembly to write a constitution*		control	--	--	conduct	--
presidential and parliamentary elections		--	monitor and verify	monitor and verify	--	monitor and verify

* constituent assembly transferred itself into parliament

Police functions differ only slightly. UNTAG, UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ monitored and verified the performance of the local police. ONUSAL monitored and verified as well, but in addition to this, it supervised the Auxiliary Transitory Police (PAT), a particular branch of the local

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[50] The functions of the operations are taken from: United Nations 1996 (UNTAG: pp. 203-229; UNAVEM II: pp. 238-244, ONUSAL: pp. 425-442; UNTAC: 458-471; ONUMOZ: pp. 321-338)

[51] After having written the constitution the constituent assemblies transferred themselves into parliaments. •

[52] The functions of the operations are taken from: United Nations 1996 (UNTAG: pp. 203-229; UNAVEM II:

police. UNTAC supervised the performance of the entire police. UNTAG and ONUSAL monitored and verified the re-organisation of the local police.

Table 3: Police functions of multifunctional peace-support operations[53]

police area	operation	UNTAG	UNAVEM II	ONUSAL	UNTAC	ONUMOZ
performance of local police		monitor and verify	monitor and verify	monitor or supervise (PAT)	supervision	monitor and verify
reorganisation of local police		monitor and verify	--	monitor and verify	--	

In sum, whereas the military components of multifunctional peace-support operations perform similar tasks, the extent of intervention of the civilian and the police component differs significantly. The extent of the intervention of UNTAC, and to a lesser degree UNTAG, was much higher than the one of UNAVEM, ONUSAL and ONUMOZ.

3.3 Resources for Intervention

The allocation of resources for a multifunctional peace-support operation is shaped by the scope and depth of its mandate to a considerable degree. A certain task calls for certain resources. Conducting elections, for example, requires more United Nations electoral personnel than monitoring elections. Nevertheless, even a clearly circumscribed task is not a *roma locuta causa finita*. In allocating the resources, the United Nations - or more precisely, its most influential member states - still has a considerable degree of autonomy.

The allocation of resources varied enormously. The total expenses of ONUSAL in El Salvador amounted to US $107,003,650;[54] UNAVEM II in Angola was significantly more expensive with US $175,802,600;[55] the expenses of US $368,584,324 for UNTAG in Namibia were more than ONUSAL and UNAVEM II combined; the costs of ONUMOZ in Mozambique, US $510,252,500, were higher than the ones of UNTAG and UNAVEM II combined; finally, UNTAC's operation in Cambodia amounted to a cost of US $1,620,963,300, clearly more than all other operations combined.[56]

The difference in available resources is also apparent by the military, civilian and police personnel deployed:

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pp. 238-244, ONUSAL: pp. 425-442; UNTAC: 458-471; ONUMOZ: pp. 321-338)
[53] ibid.
[54] United Nations 1996, p. 737
[55] ibid., p. 714
[56] ibid., p. 741; included in this figure are the expenses of a small observer mission, the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), which prepared the deployment of UNTAC.

The size of the military components differed immensely, although the scope and depth of the military mandate were very similar: UNAVEM II's military component consisted of only 350 unarmed military observers, ONUSAL's of 380. UNTAG's military component, on the contrary, was 4,493 troops strong, whereas ONUMOZ's consisted of 6,625 troops and 354 military observers. UNTAC was a large-scale military intervention with 15,547 troops and 354 military observers.

The number of civilian personnel also varied greatly. UNAVEM II had 642 civilian staff, ONUSAL 1,220, ONUMOZ 1,761, and UNTAG 2,000. UNTAC had again by far the greatest civilian component with 15,444 civilian staff.[57]

The size of the police components again varied significantly, but less greatly than the military and the civilian component. The police component of UNAVEM II and ONUSAL was very small with 126 and 315 police officers. ONUMOZ had 1,087 police personnel, UNTAG 1,500, and the largest contingent was again the one of UNTAC with 3,359.

Hence, there are great differences in the resources available for multifunctional peace-support operations. Military and civilian components are primarily affected by these differences, but the police components also significantly differ in the amount of resources available. UNTAC was a large-scale military and civilian intervention. ONUMOZ and UNTAG followed in terms of allocation of resources. The resources of ONUSAL and UNAVEM, on the contrary, were very limited.

3.4 Summary

There are differences in scope and depth of mandate, and in the resources the operations have to fulfil these mandates.

There are only a few significant differences concerning the scope of the mandate. A small number of significant differences is found in the civilian and the police mandate. The military subject areas have not varied so far at all.

In contrast, there are several significant differences as far as the depth of the mandate is concerned. The military components of multifunctional peace-support operations perform the same tasks, but the extent of intervention of the civilian and the police component differs significantly.

The resources available for multifunctional peace-support operations vary enormously. Military and civilian components are primarily affected by these differences, but the police components also differ significantly in the amount of resources available.

In terms of the scope and depth, as well as resources for intervention, UNTAC was a large-scale intervention. UNTAG followed in terms of the mandate, ONUMOZ in terms of resources.

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[57] ibid.; maximum deployment during the elections

UNAVEM II and ONUSAL, although they had similar mandates to the one ONUMOZ, had very limited resources.

4 Synopsis

This chapter has outlined the concept of multifunctional peace-support in three steps: the first section embedded peace-support in the context of the United Nations Charter. The second section delineated multifunctional peace-support from traditional and preventive peace-support and also outlined the four crucial features of the concept. The third section discussed differences between multifunctional peace-support operations.

The prerequisite for the emergence of multifunctional peace-support was a new interpretation of the Charter. The latter, drafted before the end of the Second World War, originally aimed at preventing inter-state war. The primary purpose of the United Nations, the maintenance of international peace and security, was, apart from very few exceptions, interpreted as absence of inter-state war. During the Cold War, this interpretation remained unchanged, although internal wars occurred much more frequently and were much more destructive than inter-state wars. The new co-operation of world powers from the mid-1980s onwards gave rise to the emergence of a new interpretation of the maintenance of international peace and security. In a number of cases, internal wars have been interpreted as a threat to international peace and security, and the United Nations has taken action to counter this threat.

Internal war cannot be managed by the same means as inter-state war. Traditional peace-support became involved in internal war once which dramatically showed the limits of the concept. Multifunctional peace-support emerged as a new type of peace-support designed to help end internal war. The concept has four critical features: first, the rival parties have agreed upon the actions taken by the United Nations. Second, the deployment follows a comprehensive settlement agreement including provisions for free and fair elections. Third, the purpose of the field mission is to facilitate the implementation of this agreement. Fourth, the operation consists of a military, a civilian and a police contingent.

Although all multifunctional peace-support operations share these four features in common, there are significant differences between them in terms of the scope and depth of mandate and resources. There are only a few differences concerning the scope of the mandate. Yet, there are several significant differences as far as the depth of the mandate is concerned and the allocation of resources varied greatly from operation to operation.

PART II

INTERNAL WAR IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE

This part compares the Angolan and the Mozambican conflict situations before the United Nations intervention. Success and failure of multifunctional peace-support cannot be explained without an understanding of the particularity of a certain conflict situation. Different conflict situations are as much potential factors for different outcomes of multifunctional peace-support facilitated conflict transformation as differences between multifunctional peace-support operations, outlined in the previous part.

In this study, the conflict situations will be described by outlining the main causes why fighting in Angola and Mozambique ceased and why the conflict parties embarked on a conflict transformation process after decades of war. I will argue that conflict transformation in Angola began via the combination of a military stalemate with strong external pressure. In Mozambique, by contrast, the persistence of a military stalemate, combined with significantly lower external pressure than there was in Angola, and a state of complete economic exhaustion, a condition which was absent in Angola, made the conflict parties embark on a conflict transformation process.

This part is organised into nine comparative chapters: Portuguese colonial rule, formation of insurgency movements, internal and external dimension of the pre-independence internal war, internal and external dimension of the post-independence internal war before 1985, internal and external dimension of the post-independence internal war after 1985, and, finally, the negotiations for conflict transformation. The findings are summarised in the synopsis of this part.

5 Portuguese Colonial Rule

The legacy of Portuguese colonial rule has been omnipresent in both independent Angola and independent Mozambique, and has had a significant impact on the wars in both countries.

5.1 Portugal as Power in Decline

Portugal reached the height of its power due to its overseas empire between the mid-16th and the mid-17th century.[1] In Africa, Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe became Portuguese colonies. In South America, Brazil became part of the Portuguese overseas empire. In Asia, Goa, Damao and Diu (now part of India), Macao (to be returned to China) and East Timor (now part of Indonesia) were colonised.

The history of Portuguese colonialism in Africa south of the Equator began in 1483, when Diogo Cão landed in the Congo River estuary.[2] In 1575, the Portuguese founded Luanda, other settlements followed along the coast. Contact with Monomopata, now Mozambique, was established due to the Portuguese efforts to sail to India. In 1497, Vasco da Gama crossed the Cape of Good Hope and dropped anchor at Inhamgane. Portuguese settlement began at the beginning of the 16th century on the coast in accordance with the function da Gama had formulated for Mozambique: the bridge to India.[3]

In the 17th century the Portuguese discovered gold in Brazil. At the same time, trade in the Far East flourished. Portugal's colonies in Asia, therefore, became of prime importance for Portuguese economic interests in the Indian Ocean. Compared to the riches of Brazil and the Portuguese colonies in Asia, Angola and Mozambique had little to offer. Their function was defined by the Portuguese success in Brazil in the Atlantic and Goa, Damao, Diu and Macao in the Indian Ocean. The flourishing colonies needed slaves. Angola provided slaves for Brazil, Mozambique for Portuguese India.[4]

From the 2nd half of the 17th century onwards, however, Portugal was a power in decline. A balance-of-payment crisis marked the beginning of the decline. Export of sugar, tobacco, wine, fruit and salt were insufficient to pay for the necessary imports of cereals and manufactured goods. The crisis could only be averted by a new trade relationship with England which was codified into law in the Methuen Commercial Treaty of 1703. The accord assured preferential duties for Portuguese wine in exchange for British woollens to Portugal. In the short run, the treaty boosted Portugal's wine industry. In the long run, however, England established a significant degree of

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[1] Ronald Chilcote 1967, pp. 10, 11
[2] John Marcum 1969, p. 1
[3] Antonio Da Silva Rego 1972, pp. 158-160

control over the Portuguese economy.[5]

The immediate crisis was averted at the cost of increasing economic dependence on England, but the dramatic decline continued. In 1807, France overran Portugal without encountering any significant resistance. A historian commented on the Portuguese defeat: "There is certainly no example in history of a kingdom conquered in so few days and with such small trouble as was Portugal in 1807."[6]

In 1822, Brazil declared its independence. Three years later, Portugal recognised Brazil's sovereignty. The loss of Brazil was an economic catastrophe for Portugal. Its total foreign trade fell from 50 million milréis in 1796 to 18 million milréis in 1842.[7] In 1910 the Portuguese monarchy abdicated, leaving the new Republic with a debt burden of £163 million. The Republic failed to halt the decay. The economic and political situation deteriorated further. In the 25 years of Republican rule from 1910 to 1925, the country had 8 presidents, 44 cabinets, 24 uprisings and 150 general strikes. The cost of living increased 25-fold.[8]

Given the degree of decay in the metropolis, the colonies were neglected, and very little development took place. Yet, at the same time, they were esteemed as the means to preserve Portugal's status as a major power and to prevent marginalisation as an impoverished nation at the edge of Europe:

> "Only the colonies can give us in Europe the influence and position which otherwise would be denied to us so justifiably because of the narrow boundaries of the Metropolis and its situation in the peninsula."[9]

5.2 Portugal's Attempt to Revive Past Glory

A radical re-orientation of Portuguese politics occurred after António Salazar seized power following a *coup d'état* in 1925. Salazar banned all opposition, established a one-party dictatorship and set up the *Estado Novo* (New State). Salazar was determined to halt the decay and lead Portugal back to its past glory. The colonies were considered to be the economic and political key for this enterprise.

The colonies were the tool to prop Portugal's own backward economy. Salazar closed the backward Portuguese economy off from the world economy and concentrated on the trade with the colonies. Exploitation in the colonies became more efficient due to increasingly labour-repressive policies. This applied in particular to cotton production. In 1926, one year after the take-over of Salazar, only 0.7 per cent of the cotton Portugal imported came from its colonies. 20 years later,

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[4] Ronald Chilcote 1967, pp. 6-9
[5] David Abshire 1969, p. 50
[6] Charles Oman, quoted in: R. J. Hammond 1966, p. 12
[7] R.J. Hammond 1966, p. 13
[8] Barry Munslow 1983, pp. 8, 9

the colonies were providing 96 per cent of the total import of cotton.[10]

The colonies were the means to preserve Portugal's status as major power. Even in the 1960s and 1970s, after the United Nations had enshrined the principle of self- determination in its Charter, and other European powers had finally understood that there was no alternative to the dissolution of their overseas empires, Portugal went the opposite way. It incorporated its overseas territories as integral parts of the Portuguese state and increased its oppression mechanisms against any kind of opposition.[11]

5.3 Consequences of the *Estado Novo* on Angola and Mozambique

The *Estado Novo*'s attempt to revive Portugal's past glory had two important effects on Portuguese colonial rule in Angola and Mozambique: Portuguese settlement was expanded, and limited development based on exploitation of natural resources and forced labour took place.

5.3.1 The Expansion of Portuguese Settlement

Before Salazar's take over, Portuguese settlement had been limited to the coast and a few fertile inland valleys. During the *Estado Novo* settlement expanded, but still remained geographically limited.

At the height of Portuguese power, the function of Angola and Mozambique was the supply of slaves. This required Portuguese presence at the coast from where the slaves were shipped to Brazil and India, to a limited extent also to Europe and North America, and a few fortresses in the interior from where the Africans were abducted.[12]

The Berlin Conference in 1884/85, establishing the principle of effective authority over a given territory as precondition for its allocation to a colonial power, did change Portuguese military presence, but not the areas of white settlement and economic development. Military control, finally established all over Mozambique in 1920, in Angola in 1930, was secured by military outposts, and not followed by a significant expansion of white settlement and development of the hinterland.[13]

It was only the *Estado Novo* which finally expanded Portuguese settlement in the interior. The most famous example of this policy was the building of the Cahora Bassa Dam in central Tete

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[9] Manuel Ferreira Ribeiro, quoted in: David Abshire 1969, p. 54
[10] Barry Munslow 1983, p. 11
[11] John Marcum 1969, p. 5
[12] James Duffy 1959, pp. 170-173
[13] for Mozambique: Thomas H. Henriksen 1978, pp. 75-98; for Angola: Jeffray Paige 1975, p 220

district in the west of central Mozambique, a region which had been completely neglected throughout Portuguese colonialism. However, Cahora Bassa - construction began in 1969 - was built in the dying days of Portuguese colonialism and did not change the marginalisation of Tete district. [14]

Portugal failed to expand into the most remote areas such as Tete district, but expanded from the coastal areas towards the interior. By the beginning of the 1960s, Angola and Mozambique were divided into two halves: a neglected one in which Portuguese presence was confined to military outposts, and one in which the Portuguese had settled and developed agriculture and - to a limited degree - industry. In Angola, Portuguese agriculture and industry concentrated on the western half of the country, west of Malanje, Silva Porto and Cassinga, and neglected the rough and sparsely populated territory of the east, still known as *Terras do Fim Mundo* (The Lands at the End of the World).[15] In Mozambique, Portuguese settlement and economic activities were largely confined to central and southern Mozambique. Apart from settlements along the coast and along the Rio Rovuma at the border to Tanganyika, Portuguese presence in east-central and northern Mozambique remained confined to military outposts.[16]

The colonial administration of the *Estado Novo* exemplified the division into two halves: only in areas with a strong white settler population was the system of direct rule applied. These areas were, from the governor to the secretary, administered exclusively by white people. Non-assimilated Africans as well as - despite their education - *assimilados* (assimilated Africans) and *metiços* (*mulattos*) were subjects of Portuguese rule. In rural areas, apart from white settler population, on the contrary, a system of indirect rule was applied. These areas often had a considerable degree of autonomy. Indirect rule did often not interfere with traditional social structures defined by family, lineage and tribe. African officials were indispensable for the weak rural administration of the Portuguese: an African police force was formed; the *regulos* (African chiefs) maintained public order and assisted in the collection of taxes; and the village head men executed the instructions of the *regulos*.[17]

5.3.2 Limited Economic Development

Portugal, a power in decline and itself an underdeveloped country in Europe, lacked the resources to develop its colonies. However, some limited development, much more successful in Angola than in Mozambique, took place during the *Estado Novo,* in order to prop Portugal's own backward economy.

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[14] Malyn Newitt 1995, p. 527-529
[15] Margaret Anstee 1993, p. 54
[16] Allen Isaacman/Barbara Isaacman 1983, pp. 39-53

As already mentioned above, the function of Angola and Mozambique originally consisted in the supply of slaves. This required coastal settlements from where slaves were shipped to America and Asia, as well as few fortresses in the interior from were the Africans were abducted. Economic development was not necessary. When the slave trade finally died around 1850, Portugal had itself become an underdeveloped country, lacking the necessary resources to develop Angola and Mozambique and assign new functions to them. Little effort was directed at exploiting mineral resources, developing the agricultural sector, or establishing industry in the colonies. The two colonies became little more than "two bankrupt settlements."[18]

Angola still enjoyed more Portuguese attention than Mozambique. The Portuguese had found mineral resources in Angola, in particular diamonds, which fuelled hopes for a new Brazil. Moreover, conditions for agriculture were more favourable than they were in Mozambique. When the metropolis had the resources to develop its colonies, therefore, Angola was the recipient.[19] Mozambique, on the contrary, lacking mineral resources and unable even to produce enough food to feed its population, was virtually completely neglected. The colony's most important resource remained manpower. Contract labour replaced slavery. South Africa recruited workers south of the Rio Save, Rhodesia north of it.[20]

The *Estado Novo* stopped the neglect of the colonies and limited development took place in areas of Portuguese settlement, based on dramatically increased exploitation of natural resources and forced labour. This kind of development was much more successful in Angola than in Mozambique.

Angola offered mineral resources, favourable agricultural conditions and revenues from international transport. Portugal exploited Angola's mineral riches such as diamonds, copper, zinc, tin, wolfram, sulphur, nickel, high-grade iron, gold, silver, oil, tar and asphalt. Traditional crops such as manioc, beans and maize were replaced by coffee, cotton, sugar cane, sisal etc. The Benguela Railway from Lobito to Zaire and Zambia served as the principal outlet for the mining regions of both countries. Mineral resources, agriculture and international transport caused an economic boom with annual growth rates of up to 13 per cent.[21] As a consequence of the enormous economic growth 500,000 new immigrants arrived in the 1960s.[22]

Mozambique, on the contrary, offered fewer resources to exploit than Angola. The country lacked mineral resources and agricultural conditions were less favourable than in Angola, but it was also an important outlet for international transport. Portugal's limited development, therefore,

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[17] Bruno da Ponte 1974, pp. 36, 37

[18] Henry Wilson 1977, p. 34

[19] Irene van Dongen 1969, David M. Abshire 1969; Angola had by far the biggest share of Portugal's total trade with the empire. 61 per cent of the trade was transacted with Angola, only 3 per cent with Mozambique in 1855. Thirty years later the figures had remained virtually unchanged: 61 per cent for Angola, Mozambique's per centage had even decreased to 1 per cent (Gervase Clarence-Smith 1985, p. 65).

[20] Malyn Newitt 1995, pp. 296, 297

[21] George Wright 1997, pp. 14, 15

was focussed on the transport networks connecting South Africa, Rhodesia and Malawi to the sea, and on agriculture where possible. Cotton, sugar cane, cashew nuts, copra, sisal, irrigated rice and, from the 1960s onwards, tea became Mozambique's main agricultural export products. Agriculture, however, caused a huge deficit in the trade balance, which could only be covered by revenues from South Africa, Rhodesia and, to a less considerable extent, by Malawi. The Mozambican harbours of Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) and Beira served as principal outlets to the sea for the Transvaal, South Africa's industrial heartland, as well as for land-locked Rhodesia and Malawi. Repatriated wages of migrant workers in Rhodesia and South Africa also played a crucial role in covering the deficit in the trade balance.[23]

5.4 Summary

The Portuguese empire was at the height of its power between the mid-16th and the mid-17th century. It had expanded over three continents, gold had been discovered in Brazil and trade with the Far East flourished. Angola and Mozambique served Portugal's rich colonies by providing slaves. Portuguese presence and development in Mozambique and Angola, therefore, was confined to coastal settlements, from where slaves were shipped to America and Asia, and to few fortresses in the interior, from where slaves Africans were abducted.

From the mid-17th century onwards, however, Portugal was a power in decline. Angola and Mozambique were almost completely neglected and when the slave trade finally died around 1850, they were virtually bankrupt. Lisbon had become an underdeveloped country itself and lacked the resources to assign new functions to its colonies. Portuguese settlement remained limited to coastal cities and a few fertile valleys in the interior. Virtually no development took place.

Salazar was determined to lead Portugal back to its past glory. The colonies played a key role in this vision. They provided the means to support Portugal's own backward economy and they prevented Portugal's marginalisation in world politics. Salazar's *Estado Novo* had two major effects on Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mozambique: Portuguese settlement was expanded and limited economic development took place:

Portuguese settlement expanded from the coast inland, but remained geographically limited. In Angola, the coastal settlements were expanded, but settlement remained confined to the western part of the country. There were still virtually no settlements in the east, beyond Malanje, Silvo Porto and Cassinga. In Mozambique, the coastal settlements were expanded to the south and the centre of the colony, but the east and north remained neglected.

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[22] ibid.

Limited development, based on increased exploitation of forced labour, took place. It was much more successful in Angola than in Mozambique. Angola offered plentiful mineral resources, favourable conditions for agriculture and revenues from international transport. In Mozambique, on the contrary, virtually no mineral resources were found and conditions for agriculture were less auspicious. Despite the development of the agricultural sector, the Mozambican economy was highly dependent on revenues from international transport and repatriated wages from migrant workers, both from Rhodesia and South Africa.

[23] Allen Isaacman/Barbara Isaacman 1983, pp. 39-53

6 The Formation of Insurgency Movements

It is in the very nature of a one party dictatorship not to tolerate any opposition and this applies in particular to opposition against the core of its ideology. Colonialism laid at the very core of Salazar's ideology, the restoration of Portugal's past glory. Although the expansion of Portuguese settlement and the increasing exploitation of labour caused serious grievances and disruptions of traditional social structures among the African population in Angola and Mozambique, it was only from the beginning of the 1950s onwards, when, with the advent of a new generation of leaders and the beginning of decolonisation in Africa, potent insurgency movements began to emerge.

6.1 Angola: Split in Three Insurgency Movements

Three insurgency movements emerged in Angola. All attempts to unify against the common enemy, the Portuguese, failed.

6.1.1 The Emergence of MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA

From the 1950s political protest radicalised and three influential insurgency movements emerged: the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA) based in Luanda, the *Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola* (FNLA) based in the north and the *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA), based in central and south Angola. Each of the insurgency movements grew out of specific regional situations.

Political protest in Luanda had had a long tradition among the *assimilado* and *mestiço* population, stuck in between the non-assimilated Africans and the Portuguese. The Luanda press, in particular, was a vehicle of protest. For example, José de Fontes Pereira, writing in the latter half of the 19th century, attacked the corruption of the Portuguese administration, forced labour, prison brutality, educational neglect of the African population. He also was a protagonist in advocating for Angolan independence. Protest groups such as the *Grêmio Africano, Liga Nacional Africana*, or the *Associação Regional dos Naturais de Angola* were formed at the beginning of the 20th century.[24]

After Salazar had tightened control in the colonies, banned protest groups, and censored the press, protest became more radical. In 1955 the *Partido Communista de Angola* (PCA) was

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[24] John Marcum 1969, p. 20-27

founded. Its early members were *assimilados* and *mestiços* aiming at mass mobilisation against colonial imperialism. A few months later, at the beginning of 1956, another important *assimilado-mestiço* movement with similar aims, the nationalist movement *Partido da Luta dos Africanos de Angola* (PLUA) was born. In December 1956 both parties merged and formed the MPLA.[25] Agostinho Neto, educated in Portugal, became leader of the party, but along with two other important party figures, Illidio Machado and Viriato da Cruz, was arrested by the Portuguese in Luanda. After the three MPLA leaders were freed by an MPLA-led uprising in Luanda, the leadership went into exile first to Leopoldville (now Kinshasa), then to Brazzaville.[26]

Protest was not confined to Luanda. Two other influential insurgency movements were founded in the inland: the *Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola* (FNLA) and the *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA).

The FNLA had its roots in the Bakongo populated rural areas of the north, where the Portuguese indirect rule had left enough autonomy for Africans to conduct local political affairs largely by themselves. The traditional social structure defined by family, lineage and tribe had not been significantly interrupted. However, the situation for the Bakongo people changed dramatically with the beginning of the coffee boom in the 1950s. Portuguese demands for land and cheap labour rapidly undermined the traditional social structure. The threat to the traditional social structure caused protest.[27]

The *Uniao des Populacoes do Norte de Angola* (UPNA) was founded in July 1957, when the Portuguese tried to interfere in the succession disputes of the Bakongo-Dynasty. A year later, UPNA's leader, Holden Roberto, while attending the First All-African Peoples Conference, dropped the word *norte* in the name, thereby suggesting the abandonment of the idea of Bakongo independence and its replacement with the idea of Angolan nationalism: *Uniao des Populacoes de Angola* (UPA).[28] In March 1962 the movement merged with the *Partido Democratico de Angola* (PDA), also a Bakongo based party, and formed the FNLA. In April the party formed a government in exile, named *Governo Revolucionario de Angola no Exilio* (GRAE). The body was first located in the Congo, later in Ghana.[29]

UNITA had its roots in the rural areas of central Angola. The Ovimbundus in the centre of Angola were deeply affected by the Portuguese agrarian policy, as were the Bakongos in the north. The favourable climate attracted thousands of Portuguese farmers and traders, who settled in farms and towns along the Benguela Railway from Lobito to Benguela.[30] These settlements exploited

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[25]ibid., p. 28

[26] Martin James 1992, pp. 46-49

[27] Jeffray Paige 1975, pp. 256, 257

[28] Bakongo nationalism posed a threat to Congo-Brazzaville and then-Congo-Leopoldville because the old Bakongo Empire included all areas of Kikongo speaking peoples, therefore an area covering parts of Angola, Congo-Brazzaville and Congo-Leopoldville.

[29] Martin James 1992, p. 43

[30] Due to the flow of European settlers Nova Lisboa, the second largest city of Angola, grew by 73 per cent

African labour and severely disrupted traditional social structures. Initial protest was religious, e.g. a religious cult which prophesied that great rains would wash the whites out of the country. More important were circles formed in catholic and protestant schools: from mid-1950 the catholic *Juventude Cristã de Angola* organised a programme of religious and political education among youths in Nova Lisboa. The protestant *Organização Cultural dos Angolanos* organised discussions on the problems of tradition versus modernisation in African society. The most active organisation, not linked to a religious community, was the *União dos Naturais de Angola*. However, the organisation collapsed in 1958 because of massive Portuguese counter-insurgency measures.[31]

In September 1958, catholic and protestant missions sent an initial group of Ovimbundu students to Portugal for advanced studies. It is these students, among them Jonas Savimbi, who eventually established UNITA as the powerful insurgency movement of centre and south Angola.[32] Jonas Savimbi was initially a member of the FNLA and GRAE. In July 1964, however, accusing Holden Roberto of tribalism and corruption, Jonas Savimbi resigned. In March 1966 he launched his own liberation movement and founded UNITA. Originally, his leadership was one in exile as was that of FNLA and MPLA. However, after the Zambian government forced UNITA to close its head office in Lusaka, UNITA was the only insurgency whose leadership was permanently within Angola.[33]

6.1.2 Failed Attempts of Unification

MPLA, FNLA and UNITA remained divided throughout their anti-colonial struggle. External pressure to establish a common front concentrated on MPLA and FNLA, because these two movements were initially significantly stronger than UNITA, which, as the youngest movement, was compelled to concentrate more on establishing a support base than on actual anti-colonial struggle.

The pressure resulted in numerous attempts to unify MPLA and FNLA. As early as 1960 representatives of both parties signed the *Declaração de Compromiso*, which, however, had no effect on the interaction between the parties. In 1966, the OAU again managed to facilitate negotiations between MPLA and FNLA and a declaration was signed in Dar es Salaam. However, Holden Roberto declared the compromise null and void, claiming that the FNLA delegation did not have the authority to sign the document. In 1971, the OAU again succeeded in bringing the two parties to the negotiating table, even including their leaders, Agostino Neto and Holden Roberto. One year later, an agreement for the establishment of a common front was signed, but, once more,

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and Lobito, third largest city, by 75 per cent (John Marcum 1969, p. 104).

[31] John Marcum 1969, pp. 104-112

[32] ibid., p. 112

not implemented.[34]

UNITA concentrated its efforts on establishing a common front with the FNLA. Since Jonas Savimbi persistently failed to persuade Holden Roberto to unify the two movements, he attempted to advocate his idea of a UNITA-FNLA alliance via external actors. Yet his attempts to exert pressure via Zambia, Zaire, and Congo-Brazzaville proved futile.[35] The FNLA offered to include UNITA members in its ranks, but refused to merge with UNITA as a party, a pre-condition for co-operation emphasised by Jonas Savimbi.[36]

Remarkably, there were never any serious attempts to build an MPLA-UNITA alliance.[37] This can be party explained by the different support bases MPLA and UNITA have had: the MPLA as the urban-intellectual party with its support base in and around Luanda, a strong *assimilado* and *mestiço* influence, and a multiracial ideology; conversely, UNITA, the rural based movement, drawing its support heavily from the Ovimbundu, and emphasising ethno-regional differences.[38]

6.2 Mozambique: Unification in One Insurgency Movement

In sharp contrast to Angola, only one effective insurgency movement was founded in Mozambique. This unity, however, was persistently threatened by schisms and defections.

6.2.1 The Emergence of Frelimo

In sharp contrast to Angola, only one influential insurgency movement emerged in Mozambique, although this unity was persistently threatened by schisms and defections: the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (Frelimo). The united front against Portuguese rule was founded as a merger between exile organisations.

Before Salazar's take over, protest was articulated both inside and outside of Mozambique. Inside Mozambique, labour and regional associations addressed specific grievances caused by Portuguese colonial rule, without, however, agitating against the existence of this rule. Labour associations such as the *Associação des Carpinteiros* or the *Associação does Alfaiates* aimed at

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[33] Fred Bridgland 1986, p. 66

[34] John Marcum 1969, pp. 206-209

[35] ibid., p. 208

[36] Martin James 1992, p. 45

[37] John Marcum 1969, pp. 206-210

[38] However, this can be only part of an explanation. Despite similar differences, MPLA and FNLA had at least tried to form a common front, and, although, according to these dimensions, FNLA and UNITA were similar movements, no alliance was created during the anti-colonial struggle.

improving working conditions. Regional associations such as the *Associação dos Inhambaneses* and the *Associação dos Muchopes* addressed specific regional grievances. Outside Mozambique, the scope of protest was wider, but did not challenge Portuguese rule as such either. The most important among these organisations, formed to defend the rights of Mozambique's black and mestiço population, was the *Liga Africana*, founded in Lisbon in 1920.[39]

The *Estado Novo* provoked new forms of protest and invented new mechanisms to suppress them.[40] Inside Mozambique, the *Associação Africana*, an *assimilado* and *mestiço* organisation, emerged as the most important protest organisation. It demanded guarantees for African lands and called for an end to discriminatory labour practices. Due to Salazar's suppression mechanisms, however, the organisation publicly confined itself to non-political activities after the late 1930s.[41] Student protest started to become an important political factor after the Second World War. The most important among the early student movements was the *Núcleo dos Estudantes Africanos Secundários de Mozambique* (NESAM), founded in 1949 and banned by the Portuguese in 1964. One of the founders of NESAM was Eduardo Mondlane, who would later become Frelimo's first leader. As many future leaders of insurgency movements against Portuguese rule did, he left Africa in the 1950s to study in Europe and the United States.[42]

Due to the consequent Portuguese oppression of any opposition, Mozambique's influential protest movements emerged among exiles, especially among *assimilados* and *metiços*. These exiles, exposed to the beginning of the decolonisation wave, confined their protest no longer to specific aspects of Portuguese rule, but targeted the existence of Portuguese colonialism as such. Mozambican nationalism was born.

Three important exile movements were established in the early 1960s. In October 1960, the *União Nacional Democrátia de Mocambique* (UDENAMO) was founded in Bulawayo. Most members were migrant workers from central and southern Mozambique. In February 1961, the *Mozambique African National Union* (MANU) was established in Mombasa. MANU was a Makonde based organisation which had grown out of the *Tanganyika Mozambique Makonde Union*, founded in 1954 in Tanganyika by exiled Makonde tribesmen from the north of Mozambique. Finally, a few months after the establishment of MANU, the *União Africana de Mocambique Independente* (UNAMI) was formed in Blantyre. It drew its membership heavily from exiles from Tete district in the east of Mozambique.[43]

Soon after their establishment, the three movements merged to form Frelimo. After Tanzania's independence UNDENAMO, MANU and UNAMI opened offices in Dar es Salaam.

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[39] Walter Opello 1973, pp. 190-198

[40] The oppression is symbolised by the Muedo massacre in June 1961, when the Portuguese police opened the fire against a peaceful demonstration and killed 600 people (Allen Isaacman/Barbara Isaacman 1983, p. 80).

[41] Thomas Henriksen 1978, p. 159

[42] ibid., pp. 164-166

[43] Walter Opello 1973, p. 198, Barry Munslow 1983, p. 79

Strongly pressured by Julius Nyerere and Kwame Nkrumah the parties merged and established Frelimo at a conference in Dar es Salaam at the end of June 1962. Eduardo Mondlane, a university teacher in the United States, who was not affiliated with any of the three precursor organisations, became Frelimo's first leader.[44]

6.2.2 Schisms and Defections

The price for unity, however, was high. The early history of Frelimo was a history of conflict, expulsion, revolts and assassinations. The following list contains only the most important disputes in Frelimo's Central Committee in the 1960s:

Matthew Mmole and Lawrence Millinga, both northerners and leading figures of MANU, were expelled from the committee. This led to serious tensions between northerners and southerners. The election of Marcelino dos Santos, a *mestiço*, to committee member led to tensions between black and *mestiço* members. Leo Milas was beaten up after being appointed to the committee.[45] Consequently, three committee members, allegedly involved in the beating, were expelled. Filipe Magaia, northerner and Frelimo's secretary of defence, was killed and replaced by the southerner Samora Machel, giving rise to suspicions that Magaia was killed by members of his own party to strengthen the influence of the southern faction.[46]

The tensions reached its peak after Eduardo Mondlane's death, when the committee tried to decide on a successor.[47] Incapable of fulfilling its task, it finally appointed a troika consisting of Uria Simango, Marcelino dos Santos and Samora Machel. Yet, it took only a few months before Simanga accused dos Santos and Machel of planning to murder him. Frelimo relieved Simango of his post.[48]

The power struggles within Frelimo led to defections and the establishment of new splinter groups such as the *Frente Unida Anti-Imperialista Popular de Moçambique* (FUNIPAMO), the *Comité Revolucionario de Moçambique* (COREMO), the *Frente Unida de Moçambique* (PAPOMO) and the *União Nacionalista Africana de Rombézia* (UNAR). However, most of these movements were little more than paper organisations and none of these organisations significantly influenced the course of Mozambique's pre-independence internal war.[49]

Therefore, the anti-colonial struggle effectively remained confined to Frelimo. No other insurgency movement played a significant role in the war against the Portuguese. Yet the seeds for

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[44] Thomas Henriksen 1978, pp. 168-170

[45] Some members alleged that Milas worked for the CIA, an allegation which later proved true.

[46] Walter Opello 1975, pp. 71-81

[47] Mondlane's murder was never identified. Frelimo accused Portugal, Portugal pointed to Frelimo dissidents. Yet, there is not sufficient evidence to determine the responsiblity.

[48] Richard Gibson 1972, pp. 277-286

future conflict in Mozambique had already been sowed by the defections from Frelimo.

6.3 Summary

Portuguese colonial rule was both a cause of, and a hindrance to insurgency. It was a cause because exploitation of labour generated grievances against Portuguese colonial rule, and it was a hindrance due to Portugal's highly effective oppression mechanisms.

Beginning in the mid-1950s, however, effective insurgency movements were established, most of them by exiles who were exposed to the beginning of the decolonisation wave in Africa.

Here, however, end most of the similarities between the Angolan and Mozambican formation of insurgency movements. In Angola, three groups emerged: the urban based MPLA and the rural based FNLA and UNITA. In Mozambique, by contrast, effective insurgency was confined to one movement, although this achievement was persistently threatened by schisms and defections.

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[49] ibid.

7 Pre-independence Internal War -
External Dimension[50]

War broke out in Angola in 1961, in Mozambique in 1964. The liberation movements tried to accumulate as much foreign assistance as possible in their struggle against the Portuguese, and, in Angola in addition to this, in their struggle against each other. Similarly, Portugal tried to increase its capabilities to defeat the insurgents with the help of external assistance.

7.1 External Assistance for Portugal

Portugal was the last power to fiercely defend its colonial empire at a time when all other colonial powers had already dissolved their empires. Therefore, its wars, blatant violations of the principle of self-determination, were extremely unpopular. This seriously hampered efforts to get external support.

Support was confined to few countries with specific interests at stake either in Europe or in Africa. Portugal was an important NATO member due to its Azores Islands in the mid-Atlantic, a strategically important link between Western Europe and the Middle East. Therefore, NATO members, in particular the United States, provided some financial assistance and military aid. The scale of this support, however, was rather small.[51]

Within Africa, Apartheid-South Africa and Rhodesia were allied with the Portuguese in their defence of white minority rule in Southern Africa. Rhodesia undertook regular cross border raids against Frelimo in Tete province at the border to Rhodesia probably as soon as from the beginning of the 1970s onwards. When Frelimo started to sabotage and attack the Umtali-Beira railway, Rhodesia's vital connection to the sea, Salisbury's involvement increased.[52]

South Africa acted very cautiously in regard to Mozambique, where the war did not reach its border. Its assistance was confined to providing equipment and financial support for Portugal. In Angola, on the contrary, South Africa's rule in South-West Africa (now the sovereign state Namibia) was threatened by guerrillas of the South West African People's Army (SWAPO), trying to infiltrate the country from southern Angola. This prompted Pretoria to similar cross border raids deep into Angolan territory as Rhodesia in Mozambique.[53]

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[50] It is beyond the scope and purpose of this study to list the whole array of external state and non-state actors involved in the Angolan and the Mozambican war. The analysis of the external dimension of both internal wars will be confined to those actors which played a significant role throughout the war and in particular during the war ending process before and during the United Nations intervention.

[51] Thomas Henriksen 1983, pp. 173-179

[52] ibid., pp. 179-181

7.2 External Assistance for MPLA, FNLA and UNITA

For Angola's insurgency movements, foreign aid was the principal tool with which to increase their capabilities against the Portuguese, and equally importantly, against their rival insurgents. As a consequence, the Angolan pre-independence internal war became firmly embedded in the East-West rivalry, the Sino-Soviet split and regional conflicts.

From the outset, the MPLA took its place in the Cold War on the side of the Soviet Union. The MPLA was backed by the Soviet Union from as early as 1961 onwards.[54] Soviet assistance was crucial in terms of arms deliveries: Simonov automatic rifles, AK-47s, 82mm mortars and 75mm cannons was the early equipment delivered. The second major ally of the MPLA was Cuba. The latter's assistance went one step further than Soviet support. After a meeting between Agosthino Neto, leader of the MPLA, and Che Guevara in 1965, the Cubans started to provide a corps of military instructors and soon afterwards combat troops. In the regional context, Zambia proved to be the most important ally because it provided a sanctuary for MPLA guerrillas directly on Angola's border. Moreover, all supply routes went through Zambia. [55]

The FNLA took its place on the other side of the East-West antagonism. The United States, perceiving a threat to its position in Southern Africa, began funding the FNLA in 1961.[56] Less significant aid came from Britain and France. Yet Western aid followed the logic of a fallback strategy. It was aimed at strengthening the position of the FNLA *vis à vis* the MPLA, in order to prevent the MPLA from coming to power in case Portugal would withdraw from Angola. At the same time Portugal was indirectly supported by NATO members. Apart from support from the West, the FNLA had important regional allies. Both Congo-Brazzaville and - with a brief interruption in the early 1960s - Congo-Leopoldville (Zaire) provided assistance and a sanctuary for guerrillas. In 1961 a military base in Kinkuzu, Congo-Leopoldville, was established, which was an ideal base for the infiltration of guerrilla troops in the north of Angola.[57]

The Sino-Soviet split after Stalin made possible a liaison between UNITA and China. From the very beginning UNITA was supported by China, although this support, compared to the superpower's support for FNLA and MPLA was rather marginal and soon to be terminated.[58]

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[53] Paul Moorcraft 1994, p. 76

[54] The Soviet Union supported MPLA during its entire struggle except for a short period in 1973 and 1974 because of an internal split in the MPLA (Paul Moorcraft 1994, p. 82)

[55] Paul Moorcraft 1994, pp. 68-71

[56] William Minter 1994, p. 143; due to Portuguese pressure official support ceased already one year later, covert aid, however, continued.

[57] Martin James 1992, p. 44; after having sent a goodwill mission, the OAU decided to exclusively recognise and assist GRAE as the legitimate government of Angola in 1963. This policy, however, gradually changed in favour of the MPLA. Between 1966 and 1972 the OAU extended preferential aid to the MPLA. Already in 1968 the aid for FNLA was cut off, in 1971 the exclusive recognition of GRAE withdrawn (John Marcum: 1978, p. 227).

[58] Bruce Larkin 1971, p. 190; China had initially supported the FNLA, but had withdrawn because of FNLA's Washington connection.

Compared to the vital foreign assistance for MPLA and FNLA external aid for UNITA was much less forthcoming. Most importantly, UNITA lacked a regional ally. Soon after its foundation, it was expelled from Zambia and, from then on, compelled to work within Angola only. As the youngest and weakest movement, UNITA offered less opportunities for external actors, seeking to manipulate the outcome of internal war in their favour, than MPLA and FNLA.[59] Therefore, there is truth in Fred Bridgland's romanticising notion of UNITA as a self-sustaining and independent Maoist guerrilla movement in the 1960s and early 1970s.[60]

7.3 External Assistance for Frelimo

Frelimo failed to attract support by Western countries. Its external aid was confined to Warshaw Pact members, China and regional allies.

The United Nations recognised Frelimo as the sole representative of the Mozambican people and granted the organisation observer status in New York. Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions, citing the principle of self-determination, condemned Portuguese colonialism.[61]

However, the legal recognition did not pay off as far as western aid was concerned. There were two main hindrances to meaningful support for Frelimo: first, Frelimo's use of Marxist language in its national and international campaign, such as the praise of the Vietnamese for "their heroic struggle against American imperialism"[62], suggested that Frelimo had already chosen its place in the East-West antagonism. Second, Portugal had only recently become a new, geo-strategically important NATO member, which reacted very sensitively to policies directed against its activities in Africa.[63]

Foreign aid was confined to Warshaw Pact members, China and a few African states, but even their assistance, compared with their involvement in Angola, was rather marginal. Guerrillas were trained in Algeria, Egypt and especially Tanzania. China, *inter alia*, provided training instructors and delivered weaponry. Other weapon supplies came from Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. The latter provided, in addition to military support, financial assistance.[64]

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[59] An indicator for this weakness is that it was recognised by the OAU no sooner than in 1974 as the last Angolan insurgency movement (Martin James 1992, p. 45).

[60] Fred Bridgland 1986, p. 66

[61] Thomas Henriksen 1983, p. 183

[62] Frelimo Bulletin, quoted in: Thomas Henriksen 1983, p. 183

[63] Thomas Henriksen 1983, pp. 173-175

[64] Paul Moorcraft 1994, pp. 114-118

7.4 Summary

External assistance was an important tool for all parties involved to increase their capabilities towards their rivals. Consequently, the Angolan and Mozambican war became embedded in international conflicts from the very beginning. Intervention in Angola, however, was larger in scale than in Mozambique.

In Angola, the split in three insurgency movements and their attempts to accumulate external aid led to large-scale international intervention. The MPLA-FNLA rivalry became embedded in the East-West antagonism, the struggle between UNITA and MPLA in the Sino-Soviet split and the war between Portugal and the insurgency movements in the conflict over white minority rule in Southern Africa involving Apartheid-South Africa.

In Mozambique, external intervention played a crucial role, but was not as large in scale as in Angola. Frelimo's war against Portugal also became entrenched in the regional conflict over white minority rule, but this time predominantly involving Rhodesia. East-West rivalry played only a minor role because western aid for Portugal was limited and no alliance with a rival insurgency movement existed as in Angola. The unity of significant Mozambican insurgency prevented further internationalisation of the war.

8 Pre-independence Internal War -
Internal Dimension

In both Angola and Mozambique, the insurgents inflicted heavy costs on Portugal, but were incapable of militarily defeating the colonial power, as the latter failed to eliminate the insurgents. The significant difference between the two wars is again the number of insurgency movements and their interaction. The schisms between the Angolan insurgency movements could not even be overcome by a common enemy. Drawing from their forthcoming external support, they fought each other as fiercely as they fought the Portuguese. In Mozambique, on the contrary, Frelimo was the only significant force in the war against Portugal.

8.1 Angola: War of Independence and Civil War

Angola's pre-independence internal war was a war of independence and a civil war at the same time. The insurgent movements did not only target the colonial power, but also fought themselves.

8.1.1 The War of Liberation

Portugal was incapable of militarily eliminating the insurgency movements. The latter were far away from military victory, but succeeded in continuously putting pressure on Portugal's colonial regime.

Portugal was caught completely off-guard when Angola's war began in 1961 in Uige district in the north and marauding bands of Africans, loosely organised by the UPA (late FNLA), attacked isolated white settlements and plantations in Uige region. Portugal had only 3,000 troops in the whole of Angola, none of them in the north. However, the *Estado Novo* was determined to fight for its colonies. The uprising was brought to an end by 17,000 troops already by the end of the year. [65]

After the uprising, Portuguese counter-insurgency concentrated on the protection of the economic centres and mineral resources in western Angola along with the diamond fields in the north-east of Lunda district.[66] Incursions in the north and the east were difficult and costly, because

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[65] Paul Moorcraft 1994, pp. 66; according to Moorcraft 50,000 Africans were killed during the uprising.

[66] Portugal took not only military measures: local autonomy was expanded, forced labour abolished and the education system dramatically improved, in order to address grievances among the population. Moreover, approximately one million Angolans were resettled in so called *aldeamentos*, villages which allowed for Portuguese control of the rural population (Basil Davidson 1972, pp. 298-314).

the environment suited the guerrilla tactics of the insurgents. The FNLA operated along a frontier of swamp, mountains and jungle in Zaire and Uige districts in the north of Angola, MPLA and UNITA on the scarcely populated plateau of savannah and forest in Moxico and Cuanda Cubango districts in east-central Angola.[67]

As long as Portugal did not perceive an immediate threat to its assets in the west and the north-east, the war was essentially small in scale. MPLA, FNLA and UNITA could infiltrate the eastern districts of Moxico and Cuanda Cubango without effective Portuguese resistance.[68]

This only changed at the beginning of the 1970s, when the FNLA advanced from its northern stronghold into Cuanza Norte and threatened Luanda, and the MPLA expanded its front in the east towards the west into Bié, Huambo, Huila and Malanje districts. In 1970, Portuguese troops started an offensive against the FNLA in the north. The operation was regarded as successful, the FNLA headquarters was overrun, but it could not eliminate the insurgency movement. The Portuguese estimated a number of 300 guerrillas after the assault. In the same year, Portugal started its assault on the MPLA. The operation dramatically weakened the MPLA. According to Portuguese sources, it had lost 2,000 guerrillas. After the operation, MPLA's presence was confined to narrow strips of land on the Zambian border in Moxico district. Yet again the movement was not eliminated.[69]

Remarkably, clashes between Portuguese troops and UNITA guerrillas rarely occurred. Most notably, Portuguese troops did not target UNITA during its assault on the MPLA in Bié, Cuanda Cubango and Moxico, although UNITA operated in these districts as well.[70]

8.1.2 The Civil War

The civil war was primarily a war between FNLA and MPLA in the north, and between MPLA and UNITA in the east. Whereas the FNLA attacks proved effective in decisively weakening the MPLA in the north, neither MPLA nor UNITA could eliminate the other from the east.

The hostility between FNLA and MPLA originated with the uprising in Uige district in 1961. Marauding bands of UPA affiliates, most of them poorly armed or not armed at all, murdered everybody they connected with the colonial rule: Europeans, *assimilados* and *mestiços*, men, women and children. The few MPLA guerrillas in the north were a particular target. Marcos

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[67] Paul Moorcraft 1994, p. 69

[68] Basil Davidson 1972, pp. 219-230

[69] Willem van der Waals 1993, pp. 141-154, 210

[70] ibid., pp. 174, 175; this gave rise to allegations that both parties co-operated during the war. In 1972, documents were published accusing UNITA of planning a joint operation with Portuguese forces against FNLA and MPLA.

Kassanga, UPA's defected chief of staff alleged that 8,000 Angolans had been "savagely massacred" by UPA elements. He also reported the "case of Commander Tomas Ferreira and his squad of 21 men sent into the interior by the MPLA (...), captured by the UPA militants and barbarously hanged."[71] A Portuguese war correspondent described the situation in the north: "The UPA has undertaken the job of eliminating them (...). Effectively, the UPA gives the MPLA here in the north one hell of a life."[72] As a consequence of these attacks, the FNLA was virtually the only active insurgency movement in the northern districts of Zaire and Uige. The MPLA could not establish itself.

The east of Angola was the battle field of MPLA and UNITA. Taking advantage of the Portuguese neglect of the east, both succeeded in getting popular support and setting up their own administrations in 'liberated areas', something that existed only in the most rudimentary form in the FNLA's stronghold in the north.[73] Yet UNITA was an easy target for the MPLA in its attempt to weaken the rivalry movement. Because of insufficient foreign assistance, UNITA guerrillas were under-equipped and decisively disadvantaged against the well-armed MPLA. UNITA continuously suffered heavy losses in clashes with the MPLA. Encouraged by its successes against UNITA, the MPLA Central Committee drew up a plan to eliminate the rival group in 1971. However, the Portuguese assault on the MPLA left the plan unimplemented.[74]

8.2 Mozambique: War of Independence

The Mozambican pre-independence war was a war of independence only, fought between Frelimo and the Portuguese. No other insurgency movement played a considerable role in the war.[75] Frelimo was as far away from a military victory against the Portuguese as the Angolan insurgents, but the Portuguese failed in militarily ending the costly war in Mozambique as they did in Angola.

Frelimo began to infiltrate the north of Mozambique from Tanzania in 1964. The attack on the Portuguese base at Chai in Cabo Delgado district in the north of Mozambique on 25 September 1964 marked the starting point of Frelimo's guerrilla war. The first year of guerrilla warfare was a great success for Frelimo. The guerrillas used unconventional warfare tactics such as ambush,

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[71] Marcos Kassanga 1962, quoted in: Basil Davidson 1972, p. 211

[72] Fernando Ferinha 1967, quoted in: Basil Davidson 1972, p. 220

[73] Basil Davidson 1972, pp. 220, 221; the FNLA failed to establish itself in the east. The movement persistently failed to expand beyond its Bakongo stronghold in the north at the border to Congo-Leopoldville/Zaire, because its military activities were not accompanied by a political campaign inside Angola generating needed popular support for the movement.

[74] Willem van der Waals 1993, pp. 153, 173

[75] COREMO was the only other insurgency which tried to establish itself in Mozambique to fight the Portuguese. The organisation failed, however, to achieve this objective. Except for rare incursions into Tete district from its base in Zambia, COREMO played no role in the war at all (Thomas Henriksen 1978, p. 189).

sabotage, and hit and run attacks. Popular support in the north was forthcoming and soon the movement succeeded in establishing itself in Cabo Delgado and Niassa districts, both bordering to Tanzania. It succeeded in establishing 'liberated zones' in Cabo Delgado and Niassa and, as MPLA and UNITA had done in Angola, set up its own administration [76]

Portugal concentrated on containment rather than roll back. The north of Mozambique was like the east of Angola: sparsely populated, rough terrain, very few Portuguese settlers and not of economic significance. Therefore, Portugal concentrated on the protection of central and south Mozambique. The intensity of the war in the north was low. Conversely, Frelimo's attempts to expand and move beyond their northern stronghold were forcefully countered by the Portuguese. In 1964, Frelimo was driven out of the south after PIDE had arrested 1,500 Frelimo activists. In 1965, its attempts to expand from its northern stronghold into the central provinces of Zambézia and Tete were blocked by direct military encounter and pressure on Malawi which cut Frelimo's supply routes. [77]

In 1968 Frelimo tried again to expand into Tete, this time with success. This time the expansion was carefully prepared by Frelimo mobilisers who persuaded the population of their cause before the guerrillas entered the territory. Once the guerrillas had infiltrated via Zambia, popular support was forthcoming and Frelimo succeeded in establishing itself in the district. Tete posed a serious logistical problem to Frelimo because of the poverty of the area, exacerbated by Portuguese napalm attacks, precluded self-sustenance. Supplies had to be carried by an army of porters via Zambia.[78] Yet Tete was strategically important because it was Frelimo's first step towards the fertile Beira corridor, an important agricultural area in the centre of Mozambique and an important transport route between Rhodesia and Mozambique.[79]

Faced with the expansion of Frelimo, Portugal decided on large-scale military action against the movement. In May 1970, Portugal launched Operation Gordian Knot allocating 35,000 troops, backed by 100 helicopters and other aircraft, in the northern strongholds of Frelimo. By September, the Portuguese troops had already restored control over Cabo Delgado and Niassa, and had inflicted heavy losses on Frelimo. Many guerrillas were killed, virtually all its bases were destroyed and equipment seized.[80]

Frelimo did not defend its stronghold in the north, but withdrew and transferred its guerrilla forces through Malawi to Tete district. This reinforcement of the combatants in Tete enabled Frelimo both to increase its activities in Tete and to continue its expansion to the south. Both were crucial events in the course of the war: Frelimo, co-operating with the *Zimbabwe*

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[76] Allen Isaacman/Barbara Isaacman 1983, pp. 85, 86

[77] Thomas Henriksen 1978, pp.187-190

[78] Thomas Henriksen 1983, p. 147

[79] Paul Moorcraft 1994, p. 115

[80] Malyn Newitt 1995, pp. 528-538; popular support for Frelimo was forthcoming. Remarkably, when Renamo began its struggle, it established its headquarters exactly in this region and was supported by the

African National Union (ZANU), began to establish a significant presence at the Rhodesian border. This brought Rhodesian troops into Mozambique's war. Determined both to support Portugal's colonial war and to fight its own insurgency, Rhodesia launched cross border raids against Frelimo and ZANU. The southwards expansion to the Beira corridor threatened, for the first time in the war, the white settler communities and Mozambique's economy which was dependent on central Mozambique's agricultural production. Moreover, Frelimo, sabotaging the Umtali-Beira railway, threatened Rhodesia's access to the harbour of Beira.[81]

Portugal - and Rhodesia at the western border - countered the attacks. According to Portuguese sources, 70,000 troops were fighting in Mozambique for Portugal's colonial empire by 1974. Most notably, 60 per cent of these soldiers were Africans. Among the three elite units, the figure was as high as 90 per cent: *Grupo Especial* (GE), *Grupo Especial Paraquedista* (GEP) and *flechas*. The African troops were volunteers, many of them Frelimo defectors, who were trained at Dondo Base, near Beira. Portugal's massive military presence hindered Frelimo to infiltrate into the south, or to rebuild its northern stronghold. Frelimo, however, could not be expelled from the Beira corridor and Tete. Portuguese control in the towns was strong, in the rural areas it was weak.[82]

8.3 Summary

The course of the Angolan and Mozambican internal war before the Lisbon *coup d'état* in 1974 shows both a significant similarity and a significant difference.

The similarity consists in the ability of the Angolan insurgency movements and Frelimo to inflict costly wars on the Portuguese and in Lisbon's inability to militarily end the wars. Portugal concentrated on defending the economic heartlands of its colonies: the west of Angola, and the south and centre of Mozambique. As long as insurgency was confined to the difficult access areas of the east in Angola and the north in Mozambique, Portuguese counter-insurgency did not act decisively. As soon as the insurgency movements threatened to advance to Portuguese settlements and economic centres, however, the response was forceful. Large-scale attacks on the expanding insurgency movements followed, which severely weakened MPLA, FNLA and Frelimo. Although its strongholds in the north were overrun, Frelimo was the only movement which succeeded in maintaining its presence in Portuguese settler areas.

The significant difference consists in the fact that the Angolan war was a war of independence and a civil war at the same time, whereas the Mozambican war was a war of

population.
[81] Thomas Henriksen 1978, pp. 198-202
[82] ibid.

independence only. In Mozambique, Frelimo was the only insurgency movement of significance. In Angola, on the contrary, MPLA, FNLA and UNITA could not even form a common front against the Portuguese. MPLA and FNLA as well as MPLA and UNITA fought each other as they fought the Portuguese. For UNITA the MPLA was even the main foe because encounters with the Portuguese very seldom occurred.

9 Post-independence Internal War before 1985 - External Dimension

Portuguese withdrawal from Angola and Mozambique was not the result of military defeat, but of the *coup d'état* of the Armed Forces Movement in Lisbon on 25 April 1974. It ousted Lisbon's discredited leadership and sent it into exile. Portuguese counter-insurgency in Angola and Mozambique collapsed and, already soon after the *coup d'état*, *de facto* unconditional surrenders were signed between Portugal and the three Angolan insurgency movements, and between Portugal and Frelimo.[83]

9.1 Angolan Alliances

Although African heads of state brokered a power sharing agreement between MPLA, FNLA and UNITA, the Angolan parties prepared for the decisive battle. They strengthened their existing alliances and formed new ones. The United States extended its assistance to UNITA and South Africa began supporting UNITA and FNLA.

African heads of state tried to mediate between the three factions. Invited by Kenya's President, Jomo Kenyatta, MPLA, FNLA and UNITA signed the Mombasa Agreement on 5 January 1975. A cease-fire and the beginning of negotiations, to take place in the Portuguese town of Alvor, were agreed upon. 10 days later, the Alvor Agreement was signed. The four most important provisions of the agreement were as follows: first, armed hostilities were to cease immediately. Second, the three armed forces were to be merged into one national army comprised of 8,000 men from the MPLA, 8,000 from the FNLA and 8,000 from UNITA. Third, general elections were to be held within nine months. Fourthly, the day of independence was set for 31 October 1975.[84]

Parallel to these negotiations, however, foreign assistance for the war machinery of the three parties increased dramatically. The MPLA's two principal allies were the Soviet Union and Cuba. The Soviet Union, determined to prevent the coming to power of a United States backed party in Angola, poured arms about US $100 million worth in the MPLA during the 12 months before independence.[85] Cuba, in accordance with its perceived internationalist mission to promote socialism, sent troops. In 1975, Havana publicly admitted for the first time the presence of a substantial presence of troops in Angola.[86] The number of combat troops at this time is estimated

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[83] Douglas Porch 1977, pp. 115-121
[84] Martin James 1992, pp. 55,56
[85] Jeremy Harding 1994, p.37
[86] Martin James 1992, p. 62

at about 12,000.[87]

Large-scale military aid for the MPLA forced FNLA and UNITA to counterbalance. They formed an alliance against the strongest of the insurgency movements and drew support from the same external sources. FNLA's Washington connection was extended to UNITA. In 1975, the CIA disbursed more than US $30 million to FNLA and UNITA.[88] Equally importantly, South Africa joined the array of external supports for the insurgents. South Africa had previously intervened in the Angolan war in order to prevent the infiltration of SWAPO guerrillas into Namibia. Now, Pretoria was determined to hinder the coming to power of the Soviet and Cuban backed MPLA and to install a co-operative government. South Africa sent military aid and troops for the battle for Luanda.[89]

International aid favoured the MPLA. Cuba sent considerably more troops than South Africa and Soviet aid outweighed United States support. Largely as a consequence of this advantage, the MPLA won the battle for Luanda in 1975 and effectively eliminated the FNLA. UNITA was weakened, but not defeated. International recognition for the MPLA as Angola's legitimate government was forthcoming with only a few exceptions, most notably, of course, the United States and South Africa. UNITA continued its guerrilla struggle in eastern Angola and established a provisional capital in the south-east.

International alliances did not change during UNITA's guerrilla struggle against MPLA, but the extent of aid changed again in favour of the MPLA. Encouraged by the final blow to the FNLA and the succession of the Portuguese by the MPLA, the Soviet Union and Cuba aimed at eliminating UNITA and increased their support. By the end of 1985, the Soviet Union had pumped military equipment nearly US $2 billion worth in the MPLA.[90] In addition to this, it had provided the MPLA with US $560 million of economic aid.[91] Cuban troop strength had reached 35,000 by 1986.[92]

United States assistance, on the contrary, was curbed by the Clark Amendment in 1975, which - in legal terms - put an end to covert CIA aid for UNITA. It is unlikely that aid was completely cut off, but at least the extent of aid decreased dramatically.[93] In addition to the likelihood of forms of covert aid, funding by Saudi Arabia and other sources in the Gulf, reaching

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[87] ibid., 1992, p. 71; I concentrate on the allies which had significant impact both on the war between MPLA and UNITA and which played a critical role to bring about negotiations between the two Angolan foes. Other allies such as East Germany are omitted from analysis.

[88] for a comparison: in January 1975 the CIA agreed to provide FNLA with US $300,000 and rejected a US $100,000 annuity for UNITA (Martin James 1992, p. 61); as a consequence of US funding for UNITA, China withdrew (Martin James 1992, p. 66)

[89] clear-cut violation of Article 2, para. 4 of the UN Charter

[90] Daniel Kempton 1989, p. 72

[91] ibid., p. 73

[92] Martin James, p. 212

[93] ibid., pp. 212, 213;

US $60-70 million a year seems to have been encouraged by the United States.[94]

Pretoria reconsidered the purpose of its involvement in Angola. On the one hand, due to massive Soviet and Cuban intervention, a new effort to help UNITA conquer the country would have been very costly both financially and in terms of white casualties. On the other hand, ANC and SWAPO guerrilla camps in Angola posed a threat to South Africa. Therefore, South Africa continued its involvement, but changed its strategy. Instead of aiming at facilitating UNITA's coming to power in Luanda, it aimed at preventing the infiltration of SWAPO troops into Namibia. Part of this strategy was to assist UNITA, particularly in maintaining the insurgency's state within a state in the south-east of Angola. In the south-west, where UNITA presence was weak, South Africa launched cross border raids against SWAPO and MPLA troops.

9.2 Mozambican Alliances

Frelimo's alliance with the Soviet Union remained as unchanged as its enmity with Rhodesia. With Rhodesian help, Frelimo dissidents and ex-*flechas* founded the Resistência Nacional Mocambicana (Renamo). After white-minority rule in Rhodesia finally came to an end, Pretoria took over the patronage from Salisbury.

As had the MPLA, Frelimo inherited its Moscow connection from its independence struggle. Yet assistance for Frelimo was much less forthcoming than it was for the MPLA. Moscow provided mainly military assistance. It is estimated that the Soviet Union had provided 24 fighter aircraft, 195 tanks, 200 armoured cars, 300 armoured troop carriers and 128 medium artillery by 1982.[95] However, the Soviet Union persistently failed to contribute substantially to the strengthening of Mozambique's crippled economy. Between 1978 and 1982, for example, it provided only US $175 million in economic assistance.[96]

Frelimo's other inheritance was the enmity with Rhodesia's white minority rule. In 1974 Frelimo endorsed the formation of a front-line states alliance, consisting of Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana and Mozambique, committed to helping ZANU, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the African National Congress (ANC) to abolish white minority rule in Rhodesia and South Africa, respectively, and SWAPO in its fight for Namibian independence from South Africa. Consequently, Frelimo targeted Rhodesia's Ian Smith regime: ZANU and ZAPU were invited to establish military bases along the border to Rhodesia, and Mozambican soldiers even operated inside Rhodesia as *reconnaisance* forces. Furthermore, Mozambique supported the United Nations boycott against Rhodesia and closed its borders, thereby inflicting heavy damage on both Rhodesia

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[94] John Marcum 1988, p. 6

[95] Peter Vanneman/Martin James 1982, p. 9; for comparison: the MPLA received 41 fighter aircrafts, 264 tanks, 300 armoured cars, 412 armoured troop carriers and 550 medium artillery.

and itself. The act cut off land-locked Rhodesia from the Mozambican port of Beira, its outlet to the sea, but cost Mozambique approximately US $500 million in lost rail and transit fees.[97]

Since Mozambique could not sustain such a battle on two fronts economically, it was much more cautious in its actions towards South Africa, with which no fighting had occurred during Frelimo's independence struggle. The opening of the southern front would have meant US $100 million a year in lost port revenues and the loss of income for thousands of Mozambicans working in the mines of South Africa's Transvaal. Reluctantly, Frelimo allowed the ANC to open offices in Maputo.[98]

Salisbury's response to Frelimo's actions against white-minority rule in Rhodesia caused a new internal war in Mozambique. After Mozambican independence, Frelimo dissidents and *flechas* had fled to Rhodesia. Rhodesian intelligence formed, out of this nucleus of Frelimo opponents a "clandestine pseudo-terrorist movement."[99] Plans for such a movement had existed since 1974. In 1977, they were realised and Renamo was founded in Salisbury.[100] Having escaped from Frelimo detention, André Matsangaissa became the first leader of Renamo. Alfonso Dhlakama, a Frelimo defector, became his deputy.[101]

During its early existence, Renamo was entirely dependent on its Rhodesian patron. Virtually all necessary equipment was delivered by Rhodesia. Many of Renamo's operations were joint operations with Rhodesian forces against ZANU and ZAPU guerrilla camps inside Mozambique and economic sabotage aimed at weakening Frelimo's rule.[102] Because of the high degree of dependence on its patron, Renamo was about to collapse when the Lancaster House Agreement put an end to white minority rule in what was soon renamed Zimbabwe in 1979.

This was, however, prevented by South Africa. In 1978, P.W. Botha had come to power and from then on his notion of a Total Onslaught of communism against South Africa shaped Pretoria's foreign policies.[103] South Africa began supplying Renamo with arms from mid-1979 onwards. After the Lancaster House Agreement, Renamo equipment, armaments and rebels were

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[96] Kurt Campbell 1987, p. 19

[97] Allen Isaacman/Barbara Isaacman 1983, p. 173; for an in-depth analysis of the origins and dynamics of the conflict between Rhodesia and Mozambique see: Ken Flower 1987

[98] ibid., p. 174

[99] Margaret Hall/Tom Young 1997, p. 117

[100] ibid., p. 118; Ian Smith admits that he knew from the creation of Renamo. Asked about the creation of Renamo, he even puts it, as if he had personally created it, when he says nearly 20 years afterwards: "I acted correctly. I am not repentant. I would do the same thing again." (Ian Smith in an interview with Diario de Noticias, 21 December 1992, quoted in: AIM, no.1, 27 January 1993)

[101] Paul Moorcraft 1994, pp. 256, 257

[102] ibid., p. 258, 259

[103] Total Onslaught was Botha's explanation of the withdrawal of Portugal from Angola and Mozambique and the collapse of Ian Smith's regime in Rhodesia, and the succession of white minority rule by Soviet sponsored liberation movements. South Africa was perceived as the next potential victim of this onslaught. For a detailed analysis of South African destablisation policy towards Angola and Mozambique see Deòn Geldenhuys 1982.

transferred by air from Rhodesia to South Africa.[104] Renamo was provided with two military bases in the northern Transvaal from where Renamo guerrillas were airlifted to central Mozambique.[105] In addition to the patronage for Renamo, South Africa undertook minor-scale, but deadly cross border raids, and cut off the majority of its economic ties with Mozambique. The latter is exemplified most clearly by South African trade through Maputo harbour, before Botha's destablisation policy the Transvaal's outlet to the sea. In 1983, South African trade was down to 16 per cent of its level in 1973.[106]

Renamo's successful expansion in Mozambique's central provinces and its attacks on the Beira railway and oil pipeline, both vital transport links for land-locked Zimbabwe, along with the long-standing ties between Frelimo on the one hand and ZANU and ZAPU on the other, prompted Zimbabwe to intervene in the Mozambican war. [107] Originally, the task of Zimbabwean troops was confined to the protection of the Beira corridor, but from the mid-1980s onwards, they ceased to perform only defensive functions and mounted attacks on Renamo in central Mozambique.[108]

Zimbabwean involvement, however, could not counterbalance mighty South Africa. Pretoria-backed Renamo could not be effectively countered militarily and the cutting off of economic ties exacerbated Mozambique's precarious economic situation. As a last resort, Mozambique, the Front Line State, embarked on negotiations with South Africa, the Apartheid state, in order to end the internal war. In Maputo's logic, the internal war was not authentic, but simply a war by proxy. It was caused by a foreign power and the same foreign power had the key to the solution. Renamo was seen as a mere puppet of Pretoria. Mozambican Security Minister Sergio put this view in his own words, when he asked: "why talk to the corporal, when you can go to the general?"[109] In March 1984, P.W. Botha and Samora Machel signed the Nkomati Accord. The important passage of the Pact on Good Neighbourliness and Non-aggression is laid down in Article 3:

> "The High Contracting Parties shall not allow their respective territories, territorial waters or air space to be used as a base, thoroughfare or in any other way by another state, government, foreign military forces, organisations or individuals which plan or prepare to commit acts of violence against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other or may threaten the security of its inhabitants."[110]

In brief, South Africa and Mozambique agreed to cut off any assistance for Renamo and the ANC, respectively. Samora Machel celebrated Nkomati as a great diplomatic success: "what Nkomati means for the bandits is that the spring where the water rises has run dry. It leaves the

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[104] Alex Vines 1991, p. 18

[105] Margaret Hall, Tom Young 1997, p. 135

[106] Paul Moorcraft 1994, p. 270

[107] The deployment of Tanzanian and Malawian troops had no effect on the course of the war, and, therefore, are excluded from analysis.

[108] David Hoile 1994, p. 7

[109] quoted in: Abiodun Alao 1994, p. 58

[110] Nkomati-Accord of 16 March 1984, Article 3, as quoted in: David Hoile 1994, p. 55

water that was already pumped up here to evaporate."[111]

However, this assessment proved fundamentally wrong. Renamo could not be eliminated by Nkomati, partly because South Africa did not fully comply with the accord, partly because Renamo had ceased to be a mere proxy warrior.[112]

Immediately after Nkomati, numerous negotiations on economic issues took place between Mozambique and South Africa. During 1984, these high-level meetings dealt with trade credits, labour matters including Mozambican migrant workers in the Transvaal, tourism, fishing rights and Maputo harbour. However, as soon as it became apparent that Nkomati had failed, and war continued to ravage the country, these attempts to initiate new economic co-operation terminated.[113]

9.3 Summary

International intervention in Angola, already large in scale before the Lisbon coup, increased even further, whereas intervention in Mozambique continued to be smaller in scale, but also of decisive importance.

In Angola, foreign intervention became even larger in scale, after Portuguese counter-insurgency had collapsed and Lisbon had began to withdraw from its colonies. South Africa emerged as a powerful ally of UNITA and FNLA, Soviet assistance for the MPLA as well as US American financial aid for FNLA and UNITA peaked, and Cuba sent more and more combat troops. After the MPLA, due to massive Cuban and Soviet support, had seized power in Luanda, and international recognition was forthcoming, Soviet and Cuban assistance was primarily aimed at eliminating UNITA. The United States, curbed by the Clark Amendment, could not effectively support UNITA, but South Africa, trying to create a buffer between MPLA ruled Angola and Namibia, remained a powerful ally of UNITA.

In Mozambique, where the transfer of power to Frelimo was undisputed after the Lisbon coup, foreign intervention remained smaller in scale, but not less decisive. The Frelimo government had inherited both its ties with Moscow, and, even more importantly, its enmity with Rhodesia. The Apartheid state responded to Mozambique's enforcement of the United Nations economic embargo and to its co-operation with ZANU and ZAPU with facilitating the creation of Renamo. After Rhodesia's Apartheid regime had come to an end, South Africa, perceiving a Total Onslaught on white-minority rule in Southern Africa, became Renamo's patron.

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[111] Samora Machel, quoted in: Abiodun Alao 1994, p. 62
[112] South Africa continued to provide covert assistance for Renamo (Margaret Hall/Tom Young 1997, p. 147).
[113] Margaret Hall/Tom Young 1997, pp. 154, 155

10 Post-independence Internal War before 1985 –
Internal Dimension

After the Lisbon coup, the war in Mozambique was over, whereas the fighting between MPLA, FNLA and UNITA escalated. The FNLA was defeated, UNITA weakened, the MPLA took over power in Luanda, and the war between MPLA and UNITA continued. In Mozambique, on the contrary, Renamo, with the vital assistance of Rhodesia, waged a new war.

10.1 Angola: The Continuation of War

After the MPLA had taken over power in Luanda, UNITA withdrew in the east, continuing its guerrilla struggle against the MPLA. The new government initially neglected UNITA's activities in the east, and, facilitated by forthcoming popular support and South African assistance, UNITA soon began to spread in virtually every province. UNITA, however, failed its objective to destabilise the MPLA government by inflicting a maximum of economic damage, because, based in the east, it failed to threaten the government's core economic assets in the west and the government could compensate the damage caused by UNITA by increasing Cabinda's oil production.

Despite the reconciliation efforts of the OAU, MPLA, FNLA and UNITA prepared for the decisive battle. In June fighting broke out in Luanda between FNLA and MPLA. UNITA, still the weakest organisation withdrew from Luanda and declared war on the MPLA in August 1974 after being attacked in Silva Porto.[114] In August 1975, South Africa intervened militarily in southern Angola, ostensibly to protect the Cunene hydroelectric project. One month later, the scope of the intervention was widened when the South African Defence Force (SADF) launched a search and destroy mission against SWAPO deeper in Angola. In October, South African and UNITA troops began the drive from the Namibian border towards Luanda (Operation Zulu). At the same time FNLA and Zairian forces advanced to the capital from the north. However, South African and Zairean troops along with United States funding could not counterbalance Cuban troops and Soviet military aid. Cuban troops, operating Soviet rocket launchers, eliminated the northern column in November, and halted the drive of the southern column. The FNLA was defeated, UNITA only weakened.[115]

Having defended Luanda, the MPLA proclaimed the People's Republic of Angola on 10 November 1974. One day later, UNITA proclaimed the Democratic People's Republic of Angola in Huambo (former Nova Lisboa). The MPLA, with the help of 12,000 Cuban combat troops

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[114] ibid., pp. 53-57

continued to advance on all fronts. For South Africa, the participation in armed combat became too costly. The government in Pretoria could not justify the great number of casualties and was under pressure of world opinion because of massive violation of international law.[116] South Africa announced its withdrawal in January 1976. UNITA abandoned its capital Huambo along with other cities and withdrew to the east of the country, where it continued to wage its guerrilla war.[117]

Angola continued to be divided into two parts: the MPLA inherited the developed west from the Portuguese, including the Cabinda oil fields, UNITA the difficult access areas of the east, including diamond fields in south-east and central-east Angola, from the anti-colonial insurgency. Since disruptions in the east did not have direct effects on the west, the MPLA adopted a similar strategy as the Portuguese had done during the pre-independence internal war. The MPLA neglected UNITA's low-level guerrilla war and its hearts and minds campaign in the east.

Instead of fighting UNITA, the MPLA fully concentrated on the realisation of its vision of an independent and free Angola which had evolved among the leadership in the years of exile. By the end of 1978, some Cuban soldiers had been sent home, most of the remaining combat soldiers had assumed guard and training functions.[118] In October 1976, the MPLA decided to transform itself into a Leninist party. The following year was declared the 'Year of Founding of the Party and of Production for Socialism'. At the end of the year the MPLA was renamed Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola - Partido do Trabalho (MPLA-PT).[119] In accordance with its ideological framework, the MPLA outlawed political opposition, embarked on economic centralisation and agricultural collectivisation, imposed restrictions on religious freedom and discarded issues related to ethnicity, such as the equal representation of ethnic groups in positions of political influence. Many of these measures led to alienation of large segments of the population, who again experienced disruptions of their social structures; this time not caused by the Portuguese, however, but by a Luanda-centred, former exile *mestiço-assimilado* elite which showed little understanding for the actual socio-economic situation in Angola. Failed economic policies could be economically compensated for by Cabinda oil, but they caused dangerous resentment among the population which UNITA exploited in its political campaign.[120]

UNITA started again where it had begun. It launched its political campaign in the east focussing on the south-east, from where South African supplies came, but this time without rival insurgency movements and with external assistance. Because popular support was forthcoming, UNITA succeeded in building a state-within-a state in south-east Angola and in exerting control over much of east-central Angola. The agricultural programme succeeded in providing enough

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[115] Martin James 1992, pp. 61-78
[116] clear-cut violation of Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter
[117] Martin James 1992, pp. 61-78
[118] Paul Moorcraft 1994, p. 185
[119] Partido do Trabalho means literally translated Party of Labour.
[120] John Marcum 1988, p. 6

food and fibre for the population and the guerrillas. Peasants had to work one day a week on communal fields, the rest of the week they could cultivate their own crops. In exchange for the work on the communal field, they were allowed to use the tractors and oxen of the communal farm. The exploitation of diamond fields in south and central-east Angola, exported via Zaire to Europe, completed UNITA's economic success. UNITA also established educational and agricultural programmes. In 1981, its state-within-a state was so safe from MPLA attacks that UNITA built Jamba, the provisional capital of "Free Angola". Jamba is described as a fully functioning city with a population of around 10,000 people, running hot and cold water, electricity, entertainment facilities, primary and secondary schools etc.[121]

Having secured its base, and profiting from its alliance with South Africa, UNITA increased its guerrilla activities throughout the country with the objective of inflicting a maximum of economic damage on the MPLA regime. In 1980 the SADF launched Operation Sceptic. 2,000 troops attacked SWAPO bases and Angolan government troops more than 100 miles inside Angola. UNITA, co-operating with the SADF, occupied new sections of Cuando Cubango province including the towns Cuangar, Luengue and Mavinga. One year later, South Africa launched Operation Protea, a conventional invasion of Cunene province with more than 10,000 troops. Again one year later, South Africa, still occupying Cunene, launched attacks further north. It took until 1983 for the Angolan government and Cuban troops to respond firmly to these attacks, but they were still not able to effectively counter the attacks.[122]

UNITA spread in almost every province, but it failed in its objective of decisively weakening the MPLA by inflicting a maximum of economic damage on the regime. By 1984, as a result of the co-operation between South Africa and UNITA, the latter was present in every province except for Namibe in the south-west. UNITA inflicted damage on the economy, in particular it disrupted the agriculture in central Angola. However, UNITA's stronghold remained the east and its ability to wage a war of economic destruction against the government's economic core assets, which were all situated in the western half of Angola, was very limited. Moreover, the MPLA could compensate for the damage caused by UNITA by increasing the oil production, especially in the Cabinda enclave. Between 1979 and 1983, revenues of crude oil export increased from US $986 million to US $1,494,9 million. This trend continued. Three large new oil fields were opened in 1984.[123]

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[121] Martin James 1992, p. 97-100
[122] William Minter 1994, pp. 30-44
[123] African Contemporary Record, vol. XVII (1984/85), pp. B 612-B 625

10.2 Mozambique: A New War

Soon after Frelimo had taken over power from the Portuguese, Renamo, founded after independence, began its war against the new government. The new insurgency failed to attract sufficient popular support, but, due to first Rhodesian and then South African patronage, it succeeded in destroying Mozambique's economy by targeting agricultural and industrial centres in central and southern Mozambique.

After Frelimo had come to power, it faced an enormous task: first, the Mozambican economy has always been vulnerable. Not only did it lack mineral resources, but also Angola's favourable conditions for agriculture. Mozambique's economy was dependent on migrant labour to Rhodesia and South Africa, and on earnings from transport and harbour traffic, most of it from Rhodesia and South Africa. Second, the economic function of Mozambique during colonialism was to serve Portugal's underdeveloped economy. Mozambique was largely isolated from external relations with other countries except for South Africa and Rhodesia. Third, the sudden exodus of the Portuguese had inflicted heavy damage on the economy. In many cases, the settlers took everything with them which they could possibly carry, in other cases they destroyed their factory and farm buildings outright. Fourth, Frelimo lacked the expertise to find solutions for the urgent economic problems.[124] Paul Moorcraft writes about Frelimo's take over of power:

> Frelimo might have inherited the political kingdom at independence in 1975, but unfortunately the departing whites took nearly all the keys of that kingdom: the money, the expertise and, in some cases, even the machinery.[125]

Frelimo tried to address Mozambique's problems within a clearly circumscribed ideological framework. As had the MPLA in Angola, Frelimo came to power with a vision for an independent Mozambique which had evolved among the leadership in exile:

> "When it took power in 1975, Frelimo was already armed with a range of policies and an analysis of the task to be done which reflected the revolutionary ideologies of the 1960s, of Cuba and Vietnam as well as those of Cabral and PAIGC."[126]

At the heart of this vision of independence lay a comprehensive programme of large-scale social engineering. Important components of this programme were literacy programmes, the emphasis of a single nation and the discouragement of expressions of ethnicity, democratic structures in the workplace and community, loss of the chiefs' power, and communal villages. A major vehicle of this modernisation was the resettlement of peasants in communal villages. In short, a planned modernisation was to liberate the people of traditional oppression mechanisms, in particular lineage, and was to build a single Mozambican nation.[127]

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[124] Peter Meyns 1982
[125] Paul Moorcraft 1994, p. 253
[126] Malyn Newitt 1995, p. 542
[127] ibid., p. 548

Only two years after the take over from the Portuguese, an insurgency movement, soon to be called Renamo, began to challenge Frelimo's one-party rule and vision of independence. The group, based in Rhodesia, launched its first military operation in the Gorongosa mountains in February 1977. The operation was aimed, as were many of Renamo's early campaigns, at freeing inmates from re-education camps. These inmates were then recruited by Renamo.[128] In other early operations, Renamo served its patron Rhodesia and its purpose of destabilising Mozambique directly and targeted the few important transport links in the underdeveloped country. Renamo repeatedly attacked the road linking Maputo and Beira, the only connection between the largest and the second-largest city, and the road between Tete and Chimoio, thereby threatening to cut off the connection between Tete province and the rest of Mozambique.[129]

By the end of 1977, Renamo had already succeeded in establishing a permanent camp in the Gorongosa game reserve, a difficult access area close to the Beira corridor in northern Sofala province. The Rhodesian airforce supplied the camp with the necessary equipment. Renamo also succeeded in establishing a social base in Gorongosa. During the drought in 1979, when Frelimo failed to alleviate a precarious economic situation in central Mozambique, Renamo stepped in and provided clothes and food for the population.[130] Most of the supplies came from Rhodesia, but Renamo also shot game in Gorongosa and distributed it among the population.[131]

By the end of 1979, however, Renamo faced severe problems. In October 1979, Frelimo troops overran Renamo's main base in the Gorongosa mountains and killed its leader André Matsangaissa. Fighting for Renamo's leadership broke out within the organisation. In addition to this, the Lancaster House Agreement of December 1979 provided the basis for a majority government in what soon would be renamed Zimbabwe, and Renamo lost its only potent foreign patron, which it was completely dependent on. In Maputo's point of view the problem of "armed banditry", how Frelimo referred to Renamo, was resolved by the collapse of white minority rule in Rhodesia. The patron was gone and, seemingly, with it the threat. This perception was reinforced by the capture of Sitatonga base, Renamo's last concentration area inside Mozambique, in June 1980.[132]

Yet the re-emergence of Renamo proved Frelimo's assessment wrong. Renamo soon solved its problems: Afonso Dhlakama emerged as the new leader of Renamo after his supporters had won a shoot-out at Chisumbanje in southern Zimbabwe in June 1980, and South Africa replaced Rhodesia as patron. By 1981 there were already 6,000 to 7,000 rebels in Mozambique, much more than there had been under Rhodesian guidance, and the insurgency movement rapidly spread from central Mozambique to other regions, especially to the south, closer to South African

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[128] Renamo's first leader, André Matsangaissa, for example, was a former inmate, imprisoned by Frelimo.
[129] Margaret Hall/Tom Young 1997, p. 119
[130] ibid.
[131] Rachel Waterhouse 1991
[132] Paul Moorcraft 1994, pp. 260, 261

supplies. By the end of 1981 only Cabo Delgado province in the north remained unaffected. Attempts by Frelimo, from 1982 onwards also by Zimbabwe, to effectively counter Renamo, failed.[133]

Renamo's greatest hindrance to advancing throughout the country was not Frelimo or Zimbabwean military, but its failure to gain sufficient popular support. One indication of this is that Renamo always lacked the appeals to make a considerable number of men volunteer. Renamo always relied heavily on forced recruitment, which included even children throughout the war.[134] Renamo succeeded in creating a social base in certain areas of Sofala, Manica, Tete, Zambézia and Moçambique provinces, largely by exploiting grievances caused by Frelimo's villagisation. The resettlement was alien to the peasant population and, in many cases, was imposed on them without regard for its wishes and cultural traditions.[135] However, apart from these areas, Renamo could not neutralise the legitimacy Frelimo had won during its struggle for Mozambican independence. In the rest of the country, where it failed to get popular support, it destroyed. Robert Gershony summarises the conduct of war against civilians in areas where popular support was not forthcoming as follows:

> "As in normal guerrilla warfare, some civilians are killed in crossfire between the two opposing forces, although this tends in the view of the refugees to account for only a minority of the deaths. A larger number of civilians in these attacks and other contexts were reported to be victims of purposeful shooting deaths and executions, or axing, knifing, bayoneting, burning to death, forced drowning and asphyxiation, and other forms of murder where no meaningful resistance or defence is present. Eyewitness accounts indicate that when civilians are killed in these indiscriminate attacks, whether against defended or undefended villages, children, often together with mothers and elderly people, are also killed."[136]

Renamo's warfare was an indication of weak popular support, but it was highly effective in destroying the economy. Renamo's sabotage and terror targeted in particular the country's core agrarian and industrial areas in the south and in the centre, causing large-scale disruption and devastation. At the same time, the failure of Frelimo's economic policies became dramatically apparent. Most notably, the villagisation was a dismal failure. Between 1979 and 1981, the

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[133] Alex Vines 1991, p. 20; parallel to the military success Renamo launched its political campaign. It formed a National Council and its president, Afonso Dhlakama, travelled to West Germany, France and Portugal, where Renamo opened an office headed by Evo Fernandes. On the first party congress in Walmerstad, South Africa, in May 1982, Renamo announced its political objectives, the most important of which were multiparty democracy and mixed economy (Margaret Hall/Tom Young 1997, p. 135)

[134] William Minter concludes from 32 interviews with Renamo ex-participants that at least 90% were recruited by force (William Minter 1989)

[135] Christian Geffray 1990

[136] Robert Gershony 1988, p. 32; based on 196 interviews with refugees and displaced persons, Gershony identified three types of areas: tax areas, control areas, destruction areas. The extent of violence was least in tax areas, where peasants had their own land and Renamo combatants visited the farmers regularly to demand contributions such as food and clothing. Compared to tax areas the level of violence was significantly higher in control areas, where people were forced to work on Renamo farms and plantations under extremely harsh conditions. Punishment included murder. The level of violence was highest in destruction areas. These areas were subject to military attack; if no government soldiers were present, the attack was conducted against unarmed civilians.

production on collective fields fell by almost 50 per cent.[137] The result of both Renamo's policy of devastation and failed Frelimo policies became dramatically apparent in 1983, when 600,000 to 700,000 people died in the southern provinces of Gaza and Inhambane during a drought.[138]

10.3 Summary

War followed the independence of Angola and Mozambique. In Angola, the war between MPLA and UNITA continued. In Mozambique, a new war broke out between Frelimo and Renamo. None of the parties had the military capabilities to win over their enemies. Renamo was, due to the lack of sufficient popular support, much weaker than UNITA, which even succeeded in establishing a fully functioning state-within-a state. Renamo, however, was more successful in putting pressure on the government by devastating the economy.

In Angola, the MPLA won the battle for Luanda and defeated the FNLA. It did not, however, defeat UNITA. Savimbi withdrew to the east of Angola, where both MPLA and UNITA had begun their struggle against the Portuguese and against each other. Again, UNITA was successful in mobilising the masses and in winning popular support. UNITA built a state-within-a state in the south-east and re-emerged forcefully at the beginning of the 1980s due to its strong popular support, its diamond mines in the north-east and South African assistance. Guerrilla war spread in every province. However, not only was UNITA far away from militarily defeating the MPLA, it also was incapable of putting sufficient pressure on the MPLA's economic system. There were two reasons for this failure: first, the MPLA's economic core assets were situated in the west, UNITA's strongholds, however, were in the east, which seriously hampered UNITA's efforts to disrupt the Angolan economy. Second, the MPLA could compensate the damage UNITA caused by increasing its oil production.

In Mozambique, the internal war seemed to be over with the departure of the Portuguese. However, the seeds of conflict, which had already been sown by schisms in Frelimo during the independence struggle and by Frelimo's hostility towards Rhodesia, soon began to sprout. Renamo was founded among exiles in Rhodesia and began its war against the Frelimo government. Throughout the war, popular support for Renamo remained weak. It could only win popular support in certain areas in central Mozambique. Despite this weakness, however, Renamo waged a highly effective war of destruction, targeting the country's core agricultural and industrial areas in central and southern Mozambique. Renamo was far away from defeating Frelimo, but its large-scale terror tactics, along with Frelimo's failed economic policies, pushed the country to the brink of economic disaster.

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[137] Allen Isaacman 1988, p. 20

11 Post-independence Internal War after 1985 -
External Dimension

In 1985, Michail Gorbatchev took office in the Kremlin and soon began to withdraw from Africa. This had a major impact on both MPLA and Frelimo. At the same time, the Clark Amendment was abolished and the United States returned as a powerful ally of UNITA.

11.1 Angola: Superpower Pressure to End the War

External intervention continued to be large in scale. In addition to the actors which were already involved, the United States returned as a powerful ally of UNITA. However, in sharp contrast to the war before 1985, both superpowers put pressure on MPLA and UNITA to end the war.

In 1985, the United States returned to Angola as a powerful ally of UNITA. The United States Congress abolished the Clark Amendment and the United States resumed its support for UNITA.[139] Christopher Pycroft estimates that UNITA was supported with US $10 million in 1986, with an annual US $30 million during the remaining years of the Reagan administration and with US $80 million under President George Bush.[140]

At a time when United States aid for UNITA increased, Soviet aid for the MPLA decreased, but remained considerably larger in scale than United States support for UNITA throughout the 1980s. From 1982 to 1984 the MPLA was assisted with US $2 billion, from 1986 to 1987 the figure had decreased to US $1 billion, although the war in Angola had escalated.[141] In March 1988, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Anatolii Adamishin arrived in Luanda and announced that Moscow was no longer willing to pay the bill for an unwinnable war.[142]

Both superpowers put pressure on the MPLA and UNITA to end their war. Soviet initiatives to end the war date back to 1974, when Moscow, expecting a protracted, unwinnable war, urged the MPLA to negotiate. Soviet pressure, however, decreased as South African involvement increased. After Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union, the pressure on MPLA-PT to negotiate resumed. This was in line with Gorbatchev's view that the Soviet Union, facing its own precarious economic situation, could no longer afford to confront the United States anywhere in the world. On the Twenty-seventh Party Congress in March 1986, spokesmen

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[138] Margaret Hall/Tom Young 1997, p. 151

[139] Peter Koerner 1996, p. 7

[140] Christopher Pycroft 1994, p. 245

[141] Peter Vanneman 1990, p. 47

[142] Martin James 1992, p. 227

reported that the Soviet Union was in favour of political settlements of regional conflicts.[143]

Determined efforts of the United States to negotiate an end to the Angolan war originate with the Reagan administration. Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker began his diplomatic efforts in 1981. Crocker's strategy for peace in Angola was to make South Africa withdraw from Namibia and Cuba from Angola, a solution which came to be known as linkage. Namibia would finally become independent and elections would legitimise the new rule. Angola would be led by a government of national reconciliation.[144]

The coming to power of Michail Gorbachev and the new co-operation of the superpowers greatly facilitated Crocker's mediation efforts. South Africa had agreed with the linkage from the beginning on and, by mid-1987, the MPLA's and Cuba's resistance, both countries highly dependent on Soviet aid, began to slip. Formal negotiations between Angola, Cuba, the United States and South Africa began in London in May 1988. From then on, the Four Party Peace Talks became a regular forum. The international dimension of the conflict was finally resolved by the Brazzaville Protocol signed by South Africa, Angola and the United States. South Africa agreed to withdraw from Namibia by 1 November 1989 according to UN Resolution 435. In turn, Cuba agreed to withdraw its troops from Angola. The period of the withdrawal was specified in an agreement with the MPLA-PT government in New York on 22 December 1988. Within 27 months the Cubans would have completely withdrawn from Angola.[145]

The agreement prepared Namibia's independence and resolved the external dimension of the war involving South Africa, Cuba, Angola, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Crocker's initiative, however, was more ambitious than this. The remaining task was to make MPLA and UNITA negotiate and to end the Angolan war. In order to achieve this goal, the United States put direct pressure on UNITA and indirect pressure on the MPLA.

UNITA's military successes of the early 1980s were reversed. The MPLA advanced on all fronts and even threatened UNITA's stronghold in the south east. In 1989, government forces planned the final assault on Jamba. The beleaguered UNITA could only escape military defeat due to military and financial aid from the United States. This dependency required that UNITA listened to its master.

The MPLA was faced with dramatically dwindling Soviet support. Moscow had lost interest in Angola, a phenomenon that was highlighted by the Soviet absence from the Four Party Peace Talks. In addition to this, Cuban assistance was negotiated away. United States support for UNITA, on the contrary was increasing.[146] The MPLA was clearly in a stronger military position,

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[143] ibid., pp. 227-229

[144] Chester Crocker 1992, pp. 40-43

[145] Martin James, pp. 232-240

[146] The MPLA tried to re-define its position in the international system, in order to compensate for the loss of Soviet financial assistance. Apart from gaining membership in IMF and World Bank in September 1989 - against initial resistance by the United States, however, these efforts did not yield the needed success (Peter

but, largely due to United States aid for UNITA, could not win the war. The longer the war would take, the weaker the MPLA and the stronger UNITA would become.

11.2 Frelimo's Turn and Renamo's Loss

Renamo's very existence was threatened when it had seemingly finally lost South Africa as ally. Military assistance for Frelimo decreased significantly, because the Soviet Union drastically cut its aid and Zimbabwe became weary of a war which could not be won. Frelimo succeeded in redefining its position in the international system and won significant western support, but this support was limited to economic, mostly emergency aid to cope with the disastrous economic situation, and not military assistance.

Zimbabwe increased its operations against Renamo in 1985, but soon became weary of a war in which Frelimo and Zimabawean troops persistently failed to defeat the enemy. In 1985 Zimbabwe decided to deploy 10,000 combat troops to fight Renamo. However, although some Zimbabwean operations against Renamo's strongholds proved highly effective, the insurgency movement could not be defeated and even failed to prevent Renamo from attacking the Umtali-Beira railway, Zimbabwe's outlet to the sea. The Zimbabwean National Army (ZNA) blamed Frelimo for the lack of progress:

> Frelimo troops were considered more of a hindrance than a help. ZNA senior officers made it clear that they wanted to place all local Frelimo units under their command, restrict them to base or disarm them. The ZNA was convinced of Renamo penetration of Frelimo at all levels, and therefore tended to mount operations without informing Frelimo.[147]

Gorbatchev's withdrawal from Africa did not only have an impact on Angola, but also on Mozambique. Compared to the forthcoming assistance for MPLA, Soviet aid for Frelimo was always small in scale. When Moscow cut its support by two thirds in 1986, Frelimo, fighting Renamo and facing a catastrophic economic situation in the country, was obliged to search for other external financial sources. Mozambique found economic support, but not military aid, when it began to redefine its position in the international system and approached Western donor countries. In 1986 the United States provided over £40 million worth of food and economic assistance.[148] In 1987, it joined the Bretton Woods Institutions.[149]

Donor pressure shaped Frelimo's policies. In January 1987 the Programme of Economic Rehabilitation (PRE) was launched. The currency was devaluated, price controls were lifted, the state budget deficit was reduced and economic management was decentralised. In the same year,

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Koerner 1996, p. 8).
[147] Paul Moorcraft 1994, p. 291
[148] ibid., p. 285
[149] Cameron Hume 1994, p. 19

Frelimo began to return previously confiscated church property. In 1988, the African Charter on Human Rights was ratified, and consultations with religious groups for a new religious freedom law began. At its 5th Party Congress in July 1989 Frelimo carefully removed all references to Marxism-Leninism and the Soviet bloc. In September 1989 the People's Assembly decided to dismantle the one party state and to replace it with a democratic political system.[150]

Co-operation with the West and the abolishment of the one-party state provided a bridge for new negotiations with South Africa. In 1988, the same year in which the Four Party Talks between Angola, Cuba, South Africa and the United States were concluded successfully, Joaquim Chissano and P.W. Botha decided to revive Nkomati. South Africa delivered £15 million-worth of equipment for the defence of the Cahora Bassa dam and assisted in repairing its 520 sabotaged pylons, trade through Maputo harbour began to increase again, and, most importantly, aid for Renamo ceased.[151] The crucial improvement of relations between South Africa and Mozambique was highlighted by the two visits of the new South African president de Klerk to Mozambique in 1989.[152]

The belated implementation of Nkomati was a severe blow for Renamo. The latter's popular support base inside Mozambique remained very weak. It was never able to effectively counter the legitimacy Frelimo had gained during its liberation struggle. Because of this weakness, Renamo was still dependent on external assistance to a very considerable degree and this assistance was virtually confined to South Africa only. Renamo had tried to attract other patrons - it had opened offices in Portugal, West Germany and the United States, for example - but its conduct of war persistently blocked the formation of new alliances with potent external actors. [153] The international community regarded Renamo as a terror organisation, but not as a liberation movement. In particular Robert Gershony's Report to United States Assistant Secretary of African Affairs, Chester Crocker, outlining Renamo's flagrant violations of *ius in bello* principles, proved devastating for Renamo.[154]

11.3 Summary

From 1985 onwards, external involvement no longer supported the escalation of war in Angola and Mozambique, but pressured for de-escalation. This pressure was strong in Angola, where external intervention had been a large-scale phenomenon from the very beginning on, and considerably weaker in Mozambique, where external intervention had been significantly smaller in scale.

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[150] Margaret Hall/Tom Young 1997, pp. 202-209
[151] Paul Moorcraft 1994, p. 290
[152] Alex Vines 1991, p. 29
[153] Apart from South Africa's large-scale support, low-scale assistance came from Germany, Portugal, the Middle East and United States right-wing non-governmental organisations.

In Angola, both the Soviet Union and the United States pressured for negotiations and a power-sharing agreement between MPLA and UNITA. This pressure was facilitated by the agreement of South Africa and Cuba to withdraw from Namibia and Angola, respectively. UNITA was exposed to United States pressure because it was beleaguered by the MPLA and, with the South Africans withdrawn from Angola, could escape the government's final assault only with Washington's aid. The MPLA was exposed to United States pressure, because Soviet support was dwindling and the more and the longer the government would fight, the worse the gap between its external assistance and UNITA's would become.

In Mozambique, pressure was less strong. The government lost important resources for fighting Renamo, because of drastically decreasing Soviet aid and the war weary Zimbabwe. Maputo succeeded in approaching western donor countries, but this aid was aimed at alleviating the catastrophic economic situation and at preventing mass starvation, not at waging war. Renamo had seemingly finally lost its only potent ally, South Africa. This did not necessarily mean the end of the insurgency movement, because Renamo had succeeded in getting some popular support within Mozambique after the Lancaster House Agreement, but it was nevertheless a severe blow for the movement.

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[154] Robert Gershony 1988; see above for further details.

12 Post-independence Internal War after 1985 -
Internal Dimension

After 1985, large-scale government offensives proved effective in weakening the insurgency movements, but failed to militarily decide the outcome of the war.

12.1 Angola: Military Stalemate

Between 1980 and 1984, government and Cuban troops had acted defensively, and UNITA - with South African help - expanded throughout the whole country. From 1985 onwards, however, MPLA and Cuban troops not only stopped UNITA's expansion, but even threatened UNITA's stronghold in the south-east. Yet, although UNITA's situation was precarious, government troops did not succeed in taking Jamba.

The 1985 government offensive against UNITA proved effective. By July 1985, government forces had encircled the region around Jamba and threatened UNITA's main logistic base at Mavinga. South Africa tried to come to rescue. It launched Operation Wallpaper providing the fire of a multiple rocket launcher, troop and air strikes by SAAF Mirages and Impalas along the Lomba River.[155] As a result of the South African intervention, the three government brigades finally withdrew to Cuito Cuanavale in October 1985.[156]

UNITA remained under siege in 1986 and 1987. The government troops launched again a full-scale attack on UNITA's heartland in south-east Angola from Cuito Cuanavale in December 1985 and in June 1986.[157] Although the immediate military situation was less threatening than in mid-1985, future prospects for UNITA suffered a severe setback in mid-1987, when negotiations on Namibian independence between Angola, Cuba, South Africa and the United States reached a virtual breakthrough. A hostile SWAPO government in Windhoek, replacing the rule of the South African patron, had become a possibility which had to be calculated with. UNITA reacted quickly to this threat and began to move towards the north, in order to establish a new stronghold at the border to Mobutu's Zaire.[158]

Suddenly Cuito Cuanavale had a new significance. It was not only Mavinga which could be attacked by MPLA-PT/Cuban forces from Cuito Cuanavale, but it was also the base from where UNITA's drive towards the north could be stopped. Therefore, UNITA and 6,000 South African combat troops attacked the government-held strategic air-strip from 25 February to 23 March 1988.[159] Cuito Cuanavale, however, did not fall. In May 1988 Cuban troops succeeded in breaking

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[155] It is disputed whether South Africa supplied troops as well.
[156] Peter Koerner 1996, p. 7
[157] Helmoed-Roemer Heitman 1990, pp. 13-19
[158] Annette Seegers 1996, pp. 252-256
[159] ibid., p. 256

through the South African artillery barrage, reached Cuito Cuanavale from the north and lay a protective minefield around the south.[160] MPLA-PT and Cuba interpreted this as outright victory. For the first time, they cheered, the seemingly invulnerable South African war machinery was defeated. The facts suggest a more complex outcome: South Africa did not take Cuito Cuanavale, but protected UNITA's drive towards the north. While MPLA-PT and Cuban forces were engaged in Cuito Cuanavale they could not challenge UNITA.[161]

After Cuito Cuanavale the international community's pressure on MPLA and UNITA to negotiate reached its height. As a result, a cease-fire, to come into effect on 24 June 1989, was agreed upon. However, in August UNITA, alleging cease-fire violations by MPLA-PT, announced that it would not abide by the cease-fire agreement any more.

The war was not over yet. Now, after the foreign powers had left, a new conflict constellation could lead to new outcomes. At the end of 1989, MPLA-PT prepared for the final battle. Its forces attacked Mavinga again. The government troops succeeded in crossing the Cuito and Lomba rivers, but they were thrown back before Mavinga. UNITA had again successfully reverted to guerrilla tactics of ambush, harassment and deception.[162] UNITA was no longer assisted by South Africa, but the re-involvement of the United States compensated for the loss. Mavinga showed a military stalemate among the internal factions at a particular period of time. MPLA-PT was clearly stronger than UNITA in military terms - in the very contrast to UNITA it could even threaten UNITA's stronghold in the south-east - but the government could not militarily eliminate the insurgency movement.

12.2 Mozambique: Complete Exhaustion and Military Stalemate

The Mozambican government launched one large-scale attack after the other on insurgency strongholds, as the MPLA had done in Angola. In contrast to UNITA, Renamo proved to be too weak to defend its strongholds and lost control over much of central Mozambique. However, this did not defeat Renamo. It continued its war of destruction and finally pushed the country over the brink into economic catastrophe. Yet insurgency-held and government-held areas were equally affected by severe food shortages and mass starvation. Both parties had fought each other to the point of complete exhaustion.

The Mozambican government dramatically increased its military activity against Renamo. A wave of government offensives started in mid-1985, after Julius Nyerere, Robert Mugabe and Samora Machel had met at a crisis summit in Harare and decided to increase Zimbabwean operations against Renamo in Mozambique. By July, the Zimbabwean troops had established their

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[160] David Birmingham 1992, pp. 105-109
[161] Annette Seegers 1996, pp. 256-258
[162] ibid., pp. 242-247

principal base in Chimoio in central Mozambique and started their military campaign in Renamo's strongholds in Manica and Sofala provinces.[163]

By 1992, the joint government-Zimbabwean offensives had succeeded in destroying much of Renamo's control over central Mozambique. Already in August 1985, Zimbabwean troops overran *casa banana*, Renamo's headquarters in the Gorongosa mountains. Half a year later, Renamo retook its former headquarters, then ineffectively guarded by government soldiers. Zimbabwean troops, however, seized control again in April 1986. In the same year, the offensive against Renamo in Zambézia began. Renamo guerrillas were pushed towards the coast where they lost a major battle for the small port of Pebane. By the end of 1987, Renamo had managed to maintain a strong presence in the province, which was its former stronghold, only in the difficult access areas of Upper Zambézia. Zimbabwe did not participate in the government's unsuccessful 1988 offensive, but rejoined the government forces again from 1989 onwards. After the successful offensive in Zambézia, government and Zimbabwean troops launched large-scale operations in the two provinces where Renamo's presence had remained to be strong: Manica and Sofala in central Mozambique. Renamo's new headquarters at Marangue was taken and the communication centre of the insurgents was destroyed. By 1990, Renamo no longer held a single town and its control of a "Free Mozambique" was confined to a few small and isolated difficult access areas in central Mozambique.[164]

The advance against Renamo-controlled areas, however, did not defeat Renamo. On the contrary, the insurgents increased their acts of large-scale terror and sabotage, targeting the agricultural and industrial centres in central and southern Mozambique. They dynamited the sugar refinery in Luabo, and destroyed Mozambique's most modern sugar refinery in the town of Morromeu, both in Zambézia. Renamo's operations in Zambézia in 1985 caused massive disruption of agricultural production in the province. Renamo launched hit and run raids on factories in the western industrial suburbs of Maputo and planted mines and bombs in the city. It raided town after town in the south, for example Xinavane, Macia and Manjacaze. Atrocities against civilians in the south increased. The sabotage of railway lines affected every line. Ambushes on road traffic were frequent.[165]

As a consequence of Renamo's large-scale terror and sabotage, and the government's concentration of resources on the military - around 40 per cent of the annual budget was spent on the war against Renamo - the economic situation in Mozambique, already on the brink of catastrophe before 1985, dramatically deteriorated further. The Gross National Product (GNP) per capita, which adequately describes "the choices available to people in shaping their communal and

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[163] African Contemporary Record, vol. XVIII , pp. B 677-B 682 (1985/86); vol. XIX (1986/87), pp. B 686-B 689; vol. XXI (1988/89), pp. B 611-B 614; vol. XXII (1989/90), pp. B 538-B 540; vol. XIII (1990-92), pp. 609, 610
[164] ibid.
[165] ibid.

individual lives",[166] illustrated this development. The GNP per capita had dropped dramatically from US \$270 in 1985 to US \$170 in 1986. Another landslide drop occurred between 1986 and 1987, when it further decreased to US \$80. After a slight increase in 1988, it dropped again to US \$80 in 1988, remained approximately the same in 1989, increased slightly in 1990, and then, due to a new drought, fell to a dramatic low of US \$65 in 1992. Figure 1 describes this development:

Figure 1: Mozambican GNP per capita in US\$ from 1985 to 1992[167]

Food production, in particular, decreased dramatically. The Ministry of Trade released a report in 1986, saying:

> "The best producing areas of northern Tete, Upper Zambézia, Niassa and Nampula are under constant attack. The populations of these zones have fled from their traditional producing land, seeking security in other areas less suitable for production, or in urban areas."[168]

Mozambique was dependent on donors in order to avert mass starvation. The government repeatedly appealed for aid. The United Nations recognised the emergency. Before 1990, at least a major catastrophe was averted due to donor support. During the severe drought from 1990 to 1992, however, Mozambique's situation grew even more desperate. Mass starvation in Nampula, Zambézia, Manica, Sofala, Gaza and Inhambane could no longer be averted. Both government and Renamo-held areas were affected. Because the country was in a state of complete exhaustion the fighting between the two parties became a low-intensity affair. The foes even reached agreement about food supplies to Renamo areas. [169]

12.3 Summary

The Angolan and Mozambican internal wars after 1985 were similar and different at the same time. The governments of both countries launched major offensives against the insurgents

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[166] William Ryrie 1995, p. 219
[167] source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook, vol. 50 (1993), p. 163
[168] quoted in: African Contemporary Record, vol. XIX (1986/87), p. B 697
[169] Richard Snyge 1997, pp. 15-23

without being capable of defeating them. Yet it was only in Mozambique that continuous war destroyed the economy and led to a state of complete exhaustion.

In Angola, government and Cuban troops threatened to overrun UNITA's provisional capital Jamba. UNITA, stopping its expansion and concentrating on the defence of its stronghold, escaped the final assault only narrowly, and again only with South African help. In 1988, the conflict constellation changed, because Cuba and South Africa stopped intervening in the war between MPLA and UNITA. This new constellation opened up the possibility of new outcomes. Both parties, pressured by their patrons, agreed upon a cease-fire, but soon went back to war. The MPLA, even without Cuban troops, threatened to overrun Jamba once more, but UNITA again averted the attack. This highlighted the military stalemate between MPLA and UNITA. Although the MPLA was stronger than UNITA and the latter had to concentrate all its resources on defending its stronghold in the south-east, the government could not defeat the insurgency. In contrast to Mozambique, the Angolan military stalemate was not accompanied by economic exhaustion. After 1985, the bulk of the fighting had taken place in the east of Angola, where UNITA could not effectively sabotage the Angolan economy. A further increase in Cabinda's oil production even led to economic growth.[170]

In Mozambique, government and Zimbabwean troops launched large-scale attacks against Renamo's strongholds in central Mozambique. In contrast to UNITA, Renamo was too weak to defend its strongholds and lost control over much of its 'liberated territory' in central Mozambique. Its headquarters was overrun three times. However, the assault on Renamo's strongholds did not defeat the insurgency. Renamo continued its large-scale terror against agricultural and industrial centres in central and southern Mozambique, and finally pushed the country over the brink into economic catastrophe. Yet Renamo itself was just as affected by the economic disaster as Frelimo was. Not only government-held, but also Renamo-held areas were affected by severe food shortages and mass starvation. Renamo even negotiated with Frelimo to deliver food into its areas. Both parties had fought each other until complete exhaustion.

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[170] The GNP per capita continuously increased except for a small decrease from 1985 to 1986. In 1991, it was US $958 per capita, much more than Mozambique's US $70 in the same year (United Nations Statistical Yearbook, vol. 50 (1993), p. 163)

13 Negotiating Conflict Transformation

The Angolan and the Mozambican parties agreed upon very similar conflict transformation processes, but the causes for these agreements were different.

13.1 Angola: Strong External Pressure and Military Stalemate

In Angola, the combination of strong external pressure and the inability of either party to win the war led to the conclusion of the General Peace Agreement on Angola, also known as the Bicesse Accords on 31 May 1991.

The African and the Portuguese mediation initiatives failed. The African initiative began in January 1989 and symbolically culminated in the handshake of the MPLA leader, José Eduardo dos Santos and UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi at a summit meeting of African heads of state in Gbadolite in December 1990. UNITA and MPLA claimed to have reached agreement on the cessation of armed hostilities and a government of national reconciliation consisting of MPLA and UNITA members. However, neither of these agreements was implemented. After the African initiative had failed, MPLA and UNITA agreed upon Portugal as a new mediator. The Portuguese initiative, however, also failed to yield substantial progress.[171]

The Soviet-American initiative, starting in December 1990, brought the negotiations to an end within half a year.[172] The two superpowers pressured for a conflict transformation model similar to the one in Namibia. At the core of conflict transformation would be free and fair elections. In changing the Angolan constitution and providing for multiparty democracy one month before the end of the negotiations, the MPLA prepared the way for free and fair elections.[173] The main problem during the negotiations was disagreement between MPLA and UNITA on the election date. UNITA insisted on a 12-month period between cessation of armed hostilities and elections, while the MPLA first suggested a three-year period, and later indicated its willingness to accept a two year period. This issue highlighted a particular problem between MPLA and UNITA. The outcome of the elections was likely to be very close. UNITA and western observers expected UNITA to win because of its support by the Ovimbundu forming half of the Angolan electorate.

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[171] Donald Rothchild/Caroline Hartzell 1995, p. 194

[172] Chester Crocker 1992, p. 487; of particular importance was a meeting between MPLA and UNITA in Washington, co-sponsored by the Soviet Union and the United States, in which the Angolan parties agreed upon a concrete framework for the negotiations.

[173] This fundamental ideological re-orientation of the MPLA was primarily a result of external pressure during the negotiation process, facilitated by the fundamental change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. The second ordinary Party Congress in 1985 made no ideological changes whatsoever, in 1988 two cabinet members, who were in favour of reconciliation with UNITA were replaced by hardliners (most significantly Kundi Paihama became Minister of State Security). One year after the negotiations had begun, however, the Central Committee transferred the one-party state into a multi-party system, thereby creating the precondition for a peaceful settlement of the war with UNITA. The third ordinary Party Congress abandoned

The MPLA wanted time to change the situation in its favour. To the surprise of many observers, however, all outstanding issues were resolved by May 1991. The General Peace Agreement on Angola was signed by José Eduardo dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi in Lisbon on 31 May 1991.[174]

MPLA and UNITA agreed on the following conflict transformation process: armed hostilities would cease by 15 May 1991. All troops would be assembled in cantonment areas by 1 August 1991. Demobilisation and establishment of a new integrated army would be completed before the elections. Free and fair elections would take place between 1 September and 30 November 1992.[175]

13.2 Mozambique: Exhaustion, Military Stalemate and External Pressure

In Mozambique, the combination of external pressure and the inability of both parties to win the war played a significant role in bringing about negotiations. The most important factor, however, absent in Angola, was complete economic exhaustion. Neither the government, nor Renamo had the resources to fight any more.

Negotiations between Frelimo and Renamo began in July 1990 and proceeded - in contrast to Angola - without major setbacks. They were concluded in March 1992, although external pressure was considerably lower than in Angola. The most important mediators were the Roman Catholic Church and Zimbabwe. Superpower involvement was confined to a non-formal role in the case of the United States. Cameron Hume distinguishes five phases of the negotiation process: first, no substantial agreements were achieved in 1990, but the dialogue between Frelimo and Renamo had begun. Second, the two parties identified the most important issues and reached agreement upon the procedure to be followed in their negotiations between January 1991 and October 1991. Third, between November 1991 and March 1992, political questions were discussed and agreement was already reached on the holding of free and fair elections.[176] Fourth, Frelimo and Renamo addressed humanitarian issues, stemming from the state of exhaustion, and began to discuss military issues between March and June 1992. Finally, agreement was reached on military issues from August to October 1992. The General Peace Agreement for Mozambique was signed in Rome on 4 October 1992.[177]

The conflict transformation process agreed upon by the Mozambican parties was very

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the MPLA's Marxist-Leninist ideology and transferred the MPLA in a party of democratic socialism.

[174] Donald Rothchild/Caroline Hartzell 1995, p. 195

[175] United Nations 1996, pp. 238, 239

[176] Frelimo had prepared the way for multi-party elections already three years earlier. As outlined above, the disastrous economic situation and the lack of Soviet support forced the party to approach western donors. The donor pressure shaped Frelimo's policies. Most importantly, after having joined the IMF and the World Bank in 1987, and after having ratified the African Charter on Human Rights in 1988, Frelimo abandoned its Marxist-Leninist ideology and dismantled the one-party state in mid-1989.

similar to the Angolan one: armed hostilities would cease on coming into force of the peace treaty. The cantonment of troops would be completed 30 days later. Demobilisation and establishment of a new integrated army would be completed 180 days after the peace agreement had come into force. Finally, free and fair elections would take place one year after the peace treaty had come into effect.[178]

13.3 Summary

In Angola, conflict transformation was caused by strong external pressure and a military stalemate. In Mozambique it was caused by complete exhaustion, military stalemate and a certain degree of external pressure.

In Angola, the fact that neither party could win the war was not sufficient to make the parties embark on the conflict transformation process. The African and Portuguese mediation initiatives, not supported by sufficient external pressure on MPLA and UNITA, failed. In contrast, the Soviet-American initiative succeeded within half a year.

In Mozambique, the parties were not only unable to defeat each other, but they also lacked the resources to continue fighting. External pressure was lower than in Mozambique than it was in Angola. Mediation was carried out mainly by the Roman Catholic Church and Zimbabwe. The negotiations were concluded within two years without major setbacks.

Despite these differences, the Angolan and Mozambican parties embarked on a very similar conflict transformation process. Both processes were based on the cessation of armed hostilities, cantonment of forces, demobilisation and the establishment of a new, integrated defence force, and free and fair elections. Table 4 shows the time schedule for these four crucial steps:

Table 4: time schedule for conflict transformation in Angola and Mozambique

steps to be completed	Angola	Mozambique
cease-fire	15 May 1991	when peace treaty enters into force (E-Day)
cantonment of troops	1 Aug. 1991	30 days after E-Day
demobilisation/new defence force	before elections	180 days after E-Day
elections	1 Sept-30 Nov. 1992	one year after E-Day

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[177] Cameron Hume 1994

14 Synposis

This part of the study was aimed at outlining the pre-United Nations intervention in Angola and Mozambique by scrutinising the main causes why the conflict parties stopped fighting and embarked on a conflict transformation process after decades of war.

I have outlined a combination of two causes for the beginning of conflict transformation in Angola: strong external pressure and a military stalemate. In the Mozambican case, I have identified a combination of three causes: external pressure, a military stalemate and a state of complete economic exhaustion.

External Pressure

External pressure was a cause of cessation of fighting in both Angola and Mozambique, but the extent of pressure was different.

The Angolan war was highly internationalised from the very beginning. During the pre-independence war each of the three insurgency movements tried to accumulate as much external assistance as possible, in order to win the war against the Portuguese and against the rival insurgents. The high level of foreign intervention, involving superpower involvement as well as South African and Cuban troops continued. From 1985 onwards, however, the superpowers changed the aim of their involvement. Their goal was no longer to help a party militarily win the war, but to facilitate the ending of war. Since both MPLA and UNITA were highly dependent on Soviet and United States support, respectively, the superpowers had the means to exert strong pressure on the Angolan parties. Once the Soviet Union and the United States had assumed forceful leadership in the negotiations, the latter were concluded within half a year.

In Mozambique, on the contrary, external intervention played a significant role from the very beginning, but was always smaller in scale than in Angola. Most notably, superpower confrontation was absent. As in Angola, the internationalisation of the war changed from 1985 onwards. Soviet aid for Frelimo dwindled and Zimbabwe became weary of a war against Renamo which could not be won. Renamo, on its part, had lost South Africa, its only significant patron. This did not pose the same threat to the existence of the insurgency movement as it had in 1979, when its lost Rhodesia as its patron, because it had, by this time, succeeded in establishing a certain degree of popular support within the country. In sharp contrast to UNITA, however, this popular support base was very weak and the loss of South Africa was a severe blow. The negotiations to end the war were concluded without strong external interference. Mediation was mainly confined to the Roman Catholic Church and the Zimbabwean government.

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[178] United Nations 1995, pp. 105-125

Military Stalemate

The persistence of a military stalemate was a cause of the beginning of conflict transformation in both Angola and Mozambique. No party was able to defeat the other.

In Angola, MPLA and UNITA fought each other for more than 20 years. Fighting between the two parties began in east-central Angola, where both operated during the pre-independence internal war. UNITA was the younger and the weaker movement, but could not be defeated. The lost battle for Luanda weakened UNITA, but, in contrast to the FNLA, did not eliminate it as a potent force in Angola. UNITA recovered from the defeat and, with forthcoming popular support and massive South African assistance, the insurgency spread from the east towards the west. This expansion, however, was stopped after 1985 largely due to forceful intervention of Cuban troops. Large-scale government attacks, first joined by Cuban troops, then by MPLA troops only, threatened UNITA's stronghold in the south, but UNITA successfully defended its provisional capital Jamba. The insurgency movement could not be defeated on the battlefield.

In Mozambique, Frelimo and Renamo fought each other for almost 15 years, but as in Angola, neither party could defeat the other. Renamo, continuously extended its operations in central and southern Mozambique from 1977 to 1984 with a short interruption after losing Rhodesia as a patron. The government – with the support of Zimbabwean troops – began a string of large-scale offensives against the insurgency's strongholds in central Mozambique in 1985. In contrast to UNITA, Renamo was incapable of defending its strongholds and, by the end of the 1980's, Renamo-held areas were confined to a few isolated strips of land in difficult access areas in central Mozambique. However, this did not defeat the insurgency. Large-scale terror continued to put pressure on the Frelimo government.

Economic Exhaustion

Economic exhaustion was the most important cause of the beginning of conflict transformation in Mozambique, but it did not play a role in Angola.

In Angola, the insurgency movement was clearly less successful in sabotaging the economy than Frelimo in Mozambique. UNITA operated mainly in the east of Angola, but the economic centres were situated in the west, a legacy of Portuguese colonialism. Except for the early 1980s, UNITA proved incapable of seriously threatening Angola's economic heartlands and even then, disruptions were mainly confined to agriculture in central Angola. Equally importantly, MPLA and UNITA could afford to fight a war. The MPLA financed its war, including Cuban troops, largely with Cabinda's expanding oil production. UNITA financed its war to a considerable degree with its diamond fields in the east of the country.

Mozambique, on the contrary, could not afford a war and Renamo was much more effective in destroying the country's economy. Frelimo inherited an underdeveloped country and economic dependency on Rhodesia and South Africa. Already the confrontation with Rhodesia

seriously weakened the economy and the antagonistic relations with South Africa in the 1980s further exacerbated the situation. Renamo's war of destruction finally pushed the country over the brink into economic disaster by systematically targeting the economic heartlands in central and southern Mozambique. Although Frelimo's rapprochement with the west yielded limited donor assistance to alleviate the economic situation, severe food shortages and mass starvation could not be prevented. However, not only government-held territories were hit by starvation, but also Renamo-held areas. Both parties had fought each other until complete economic exhaustion.

PART III

THE INTERVENTIONS OF UNAVEM II AND ONUMOZ

This part evaluates the effectiveness of UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ in facilitating conflict transformation in Angola and Mozambique.

The effectiveness will be evaluated by analysing the ability of the two multifunctional peace-support operations to facilitate the implementation of the provisions of the General Peace Agreements (GPAs) on Angola and Mozambique. The effectiveness in the seven subject areas which potentially had an impact on the conflict transformation process will be analysed: cease-fire, cantonment and demobilisation, withdrawal of foreign forces, political commissions, voter registration, presidential and parliamentary elections, and, finally, performance of local police. Particular emphasis will be put on an attempt to explain the fundamentally different outcomes of UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ: crucial parts of the GPA on Angola were not implemented and the country lapsed back into full-scale internal war after the elections. The decisive parts of the GPA on Mozambique, on the contrary, were implemented and the conflict was successfully transformed.

This part is organised into three sections: first, the similar effectiveness of multifunctional peace-support in Angola and in Mozambique in the subject area of withdrawal of foreign forces will be analysed. Second, the ineffectiveness of UNAVEM II and the effectiveness of ONUMOZ in the subject areas of cease-fire, cantonment and demobilisation, political commissions, and, finally, presidential and parliamentary elections will be evaluated. Third, the common problems of effectiveness of UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ in regard to performance of local police and voter registration will be examined.

15 Common Effectiveness of UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ

Withdrawal of foreign forces was the only subject area in which both UNAVEM and ONUMOZ were successful. The external actors had the political will to withdraw. This enabled the United Nations to effectively fulfil its mandate.

15.1 Withdrawal of Foreign Forces

UNAVEM I, the precursor of UNAVEM II, and ONUMOZ were able to facilitate the complete withdrawal of foreign troops because the former external conflict parties co-operated with the United Nations. Despite the same outcome, a crucial difference existed concerning the means to this end. Whereas United Nations involvement in this subject area was confined to military observers in Angola, the United Nations introduced troops (blue helmets) in Mozambique.

15.1.1 Angola: Withdrawal of Cuban Forces[1]

The process of Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola was completed successfully. The process was completed even earlier than scheduled. The United Nations facilitated the withdrawal by monitoring and verifying the troop movements. Due to the co-operation of the Cuban government with the United Nations, UNAVEM I proved effective in fulfilling this task.

Cuba had the political will to withdraw from Angola. The war had been very unpopular in Cuba, the Soviet Union pressured Havana to cease its involvement, and, perhaps most importantly, Cuba was able to perceive itself as winner: South Africa had not only ceased its cross-border raids into Angola, but had also agreed finally to grant independence to Namibia. On 13 July 1988 Angola, Cuba and South Africa agreed upon the "Principles for a Peaceful Settlement in South-West Africa". One of the twelve principles addressed Angola: after having re-deployed its troops to the north, Cuba would completely withdraw its troops.[2]

The "Agreement between the Governments of the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba for the Termination of the Internationalist Mission of the Cuban Military Contingent" (often referred to as "Bilateral Agreement"), signed between Angola and Cuba on 22 December 1988, provided substance to this principle. Cuba would withdraw its troops in seven phases: prior to 1 April 1989, 3,000 men would be withdrawn. The remaining 50,000 troops would be re-deployed to the north of the 15th parallel by 1 August 1989 and to the north of the 13th

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[1] Monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of Cuban forces was performed by the immediate precursor mission of UNAVEM II, UNAVEM I.

[2] Point C of the Principles for a Peaceful Settlement in South-West Africa

parallel by 31 October 1989. Half of the remaining troops (25,000) would be withdrawn by 1 November 1989, two thirds (33,000) by 1 April 1990, and three fourths (38,000) by 1 October 1990. By July 1991, the process would be completed and the 50,000 Cuban troops would have left Angola.[3]

The treaty requested the United Nations to monitor and verify this process:

"The Parties, through the Secretary-General of the UN, hereby request that the Security Council verify the redeployment and phased and total withdrawal of Cuban troops form the territory of the People's Republic of Angola (...)."[4]

Already two days before the agreement was signed, the Security Council created UNAVEM I to monitor and verify the withdrawal of Cuban troops as envisaged in the Bilateral Agreement.[5] On 3 January 1989, an advance party of 18 military observers arrived in Angola. The mission became operational seven days later.[6] By April 1989, the maximum strength of 70 military observers arrived.[7]

Cuba withdrew its troops as scheduled throughout 1989. By the beginning of April 1989, the first phase of the withdrawal process was completed successfully. 4,624 troops had left Angola, even 1,624 more than envisaged in the GPA.[8] The second phase was completed as successfully by 1 November 1989. The United Nations verified that 25,510 troops had returned to Cuba, 510 more than envisaged; the remaining troops had withdrawn north of the 15th parallel by August, and north of the 13th parallel by 31 October.[9]

At the beginning of 1990, however, the Cuban withdrawal came to a halt. On 7 February 1990, the Angolan and the Cuban government announced a temporary suspension of their withdrawal due to UNITA attacks on Cuban troops. During an attack on a camp of Cuban soldiers in Benguela Province, UNITA had killed four Cuban troops. After South Africa and the United States had announced that they would exert their influence on UNITA to make the insurgency movement stop its attacks, Cuba resumed troop withdrawal on 25 February.[10]

Although UNITA's attacks did not completely cease, Cuba continued its withdrawal. Despite the suspension of troop withdrawal in February, the April deadline was nearly met. Of the 33,000 troops which were supposed to withdraw, 32,381 had in fact been withdrawn.[11] From October onwards, the withdrawal was ahead of schedule again. By 1 October, 38,643 troops, 643

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[3] Article 1 of the Agreement between the Governments of the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba for the Termination of the Internationalist Mission of the Cuban Military Contingent (Bilateral Agreement)

[4] Article 3 of the Agreement between the Governments of the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba for the Termination of the Internationalist Mission of the Cuban Military Contingent (Bilateral Agreement)

[5] Security Council Resolution 626 (1988)

[6] Virginia Fortna 1993, p. 382

[7] United Nations 1996, p.713

[8] Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 10 May 1989 (S/20625), para. 9

[9] Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 9 November 1989 (S/20955), para. 4

[10] Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 12 May 1989 (S/21246)

[11] ibid., p. 7

more than provided for in the Bilateral Agreement, had been withdrawn.[12] The entire process was successfully completed by 25 May. The United Nations had verified the withdrawal of 50,000 troops and the absence of any other Cuban troops on Angolan territory.[13]

Throughout the process, the Cuban and the Angolan government co-operated fully with the United Nations, thereby enabling it to carry out its mandate fully. The following became a *leitmotiv* in Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council:

> "As with all peacekeeping operations, an essential condition for UNAVEM ability to fulfil its mandate is that is should receive the full co-operation of the parties concerned, especially as regards the freedom of movement and other facilities which it requires to carry out its duties."[14]

Table 5: the scheduled and actual process of Cuban withdrawal from Angola

Phases	Envisaged number of withdrawn troops	Actual number of withdrawn troops
1st: 1 January – 1 April 1989	3,000	4,624
2nd: 2 April – 1 November 1989	25,000	25,510
3rd: 2 November – 1 April 1990	33,000	32,381
4th: 2 April – 1 October 1990	38,000	38,643
5th: 2 October – 1 July 1991	50,000	50,000 (already on 25 May 1991)

15.1.2 Mozambique: Replacing Zimbabwean and Malawi Forces with UN Troops

ONUMOZ monitored and verified the complete withdrawal of foreign forces as it did in Angola. In contrast to Angola, however, the United Nations introduced troops in order to facilitate the Zimbabwean and Malawi troop withdrawal against resistance from the Mozambican government.

According to the GPA, the government would undertake to negotiate the complete withdrawal of all foreign troops from Mozambican territory. Following the coming into effect of the cease-fire, the withdrawal was to be initiated.[15] No particular deadline for the withdrawal was specified, only that the "modalities and time-frame for the withdrawal shall not contravene any provision of the Cease-fire Agreement or the General Peace Agreement."[16]

The withdrawal was to be verified by the CCF; a verification by a foreign actor was not provided for in the GPA. Nevertheless, Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote in his Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on ONMOZ on 3 December 1992 that, according to the GPA, it

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[12] Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 10 October 1990 (S/21860), para. 7
[13] ibid.
[14] Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 7 August 1989 (S/20783), para. 12
[15] Protocol IV, section III (1) of the GPA; the Mozambican parties would decide which foreign forces would be permitted on Mozambican territory (Protocol V, section III (7) of the GPA)
[16] Protocol IV, section II (1) of the GPA

would be part of ONUMOZ's mandate to monitor and verify the complete withdrawal of foreign forces.[17] The Security Council authorised ONUMOZ on 16 December in Security Council resolution 797 (1992) with all functions suggested in this report, including the one quoted above.

The verification of the withdrawal of armed forces could have been accomplished by an enlarged military observer contingent. Another function became intertwined with the verification, however, which could not have been fulfilled without armed soldiers. The Mozambican war had posed severe problems for the economies of landlocked Zimbabwe and Malawi because they were dependent on transport corridors through Mozambique which linked both countries to the sea. Renamo's systematic attacks on traffic in these corridors had been the main cause for the interventions of Zimbabwe and Malawi. War ending in Mozambique was in the very interest of these two countries – Zimbabwe had even played an important role as mediator – but they demanded security guarantees for these strategically important transport corridors during the conflict transformation process.[18] Renamo also demanded an enlarged peace-support operation, comprising troops, as a security guarantee. It linked the beginning of the cantonment of its forces to a reinforced United Nations presence.[19] The United Nations indicated that it was prepared to compensate for the withdrawal by deploying a contingent of peace-support troops (blue helmets).[20]

Concerned about Mozambique's sovereignty, the government had resisted plans for the deployment of United Nations troops for a long time. The two neighbour states, Malawi and Zimbabwe, and Renamo finally generated enough pressure on the government, however, to make the latter consent reluctantly. Due to the government's reluctance, it was only between March and May 1993 that the United Nations troops arrived. Each of the five infantry battalions was allocated along a strategically important corridor: the Nacala-Malawi railway, the Tete corridor between Malawi and Zimbabwe, the Beira corridor between Beira and Zimbabwe, the south-north highway from Maputo to Beira and the Limpopo railway line from Maputo to Zimbabwe.[21] The number of blue helmets totalled 7,500 troops after completion of deployment.[22] The troop contingent was withdrawn one month after the October elections in November 1994.[23]

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[17] Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 3 December 1992 (S/24892), para. 17; this function, however, was not mentioned in the Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 9 October 1992 (S/24642) where the mandate of the United Nations as outlined in the GPA is interpreted.
[18] Chris Alden 1995, p. 106; by the time the GPA was to be implemented, Tanzania had already withdrawn. One of the main incentives of her intervention, the control of the flux of refugees into Tanzania, had ceased to exist. Still concerned about their access to the sea, Malawi and Zimbabwe remained as the only foreign powers. Both countries had agreed to begin withdrawing their forces on E-Day (15 October), but let pass the deadline and did not start withdrawal until the United Nations troops arrived.
[19] Boutros Boutros-Ghali 1995, p. 27
[20] The Report of the Secretary-General, 3 December 1992 (S/24892) does not list this function under the mandate as outlined in section III, but under "basic assumptions" in section II: "With the implementation of the agreement's provisions on the assembly and demoblization of the two sides' forces, ONUMOZ will have to assume transitional responsibility for the security of the corridors."
[21] ibid., p. 29
[22] Chris Alden 1995, p. 106
[23] Richard Snyge 1997, p. 42

The concerns of the government about state sovereignty had not been resolved when the peace-support troops arrived. Initially, the government's non-co-operation severely hampered the UN's ability to verify the withdrawal of the Malawian and Zimbabwean troops, and to guard the corridors. Most importantly, the negotiations between the UN and the government for a status-of-forces agreement, allowing UN troops free movement all over the country without previous approval by the government, could not be concluded before May 1993.[24]

By the time the status-of-forces agreement was signed, the Zimbabwean troops had already left.[25] The United Nations verified the complete withdrawal and replaced the Zimbabwean troops by an Italian blue helmet contingent. The Malawi forces withdrew by mid-May. The withdrawal was monitored and verified by a blue helmet contingent from Bangladesh. The latter replaced the Malawi forces after their withdrawal in the Nacala corridor.[26]

After the withdrawal was monitored and verified, the United Nations troops began to concentrate on their task to protect the corridors. During the entire period of their deployment, only minor incidents limited to acts of banditry occurred. Neither government nor Renamo forces violated the GPA and operated in these corridors. Acts of banditry occurred mostly in the Beira corridor and increased during the first months of the deployment of the Italian contingent, when the latter focussed exclusively on protecting the corridors against government or Renamo operations and did not try to intervene to prevent attacks of banditry on road traffic. The number of attacks decreased as soon as the interpretation of the mandate was widened to include the protection of the corridor against any kind of interruption.[27]

It is questionable whether the UN could have coped with more serious incidents. Many battalions were very ill-prepared for their tasks. The Uruguayan battalion, for example, initially set up its camp at a site which was 40 kilometres away from the corridor it was supposed to patrol.[28] The Zambian battalion arrived virtually without equipment.[29]

15.2 Summary

The withdrawal of foreign forces was completed successfully because the external actors involved had the political will to withdraw. UNAVEM I and ONUMOZ, therefore, successfully facilitated the withdrawal of foreign troops. Yet different means were used to accomplish this end: whereas verification in Angola was confined to military observers, the United Nations introduced troops in Mozambique in order to facilitate the withdrawal of foreign troops.

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[24] ibid., pp. 38, 39
[25] Zimbabwean troops completed their withdrawal by 15 April.
[26] Boutros Boutros-Ghali 1995, p. 31
[27] Richard Snyge 1997, p. 44
[28] ibid., pp. 42, 43; moreover, the first supply with food and water for the troops arrived no sooner than after two days.

Peace-support is not peace enforcement. United Nations multifunctional peace-support can only be effective when the conflict parties have the political will to implement a certain agreement and when they co-operate with the United Nations. Both was the case in Angola and in Mozambique. Cuba withdrew from Angola because it was able to withdraw as a winner from an unpopular war. Soviet pressure further facilitated the withdrawal. Despite attacks from UNITA, Cuba withdrew its troop contingent before scheduled. Zimbabwe and Malawi had intervened in Mozambique to protect important transport corridors which linked both countries to the sea. Given their dependence on their outlets to the sea, ending the Mozambican war was in the very interest of both countries. Zimbabwe was one of the most important mediators during the GPA negotiations between Frelimo and Renamo. Zimbabwe and Malawi, however, linked their withdrawal to security guarantees for the corridors they protected. A United Nations troop contingent stepped in. It politically facilitated the withdrawal at least as much as through monitoring and verification.

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[29] Pamela Reed 1997, p. 292

16 Ineffectiveness of UNAVEM II, Effectiveness of ONUMOZ

The effectiveness of UNAVEM II and the one of ONUMOZ were diametrically opposed in the decisive four subject fields of work in political commissions, cantonment and demobilisation, elections, and cease-fire. UNAVEM II failed to facilitate the implementation of GPA provisions in these four subject areas, whereas ONUMOZ succeeded. The ineffectiveness of UNAVEM II and the effectiveness of ONUMOZ were a product of both the different conflict situations in Angola and Mozambique and the different kinds of intervention by UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ.

16.1 Political Commissions

In both Angola and Mozambique, serious tensions arose in the political commissions during the conflict transformation process, yet the ability to resolve the tensions and to find solutions to urgent problems was very different. In Angola the political commissions failed to find solutions for the most critical problems of the GPA implementation; in Mozambique, on the contrary, they succeeded.

16.1.1 Angola: Lack of Co-operation

The Angolan parties failed persistently to find consensus about crucial aspects of the GPA implementation because of the absence of economic pressure to transform the conflict and insufficient external pressure. The United Nations, weakened by a very limited political mandate and scarce resources, was unable to compensate for these two factors.

According to the GPA, crucial executive authority would be exerted not by the government alone, but by joint government-UNITA commissions. The highest decision-making organ during the conflict transformation process would be the Joint Political-Military Commission (CCPM). It would oversee the entire GPA implementation process.[30] The Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission (CMVF) and the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Angolan Armed Forces (CCFA) would assist the CCPM in the specific fields of cease-fire, cantonment and demobilisation, and formation of the new Angolan Armed Forces, respectively. The commissions would be constituted at the time of the signature of the GPA. The mandate of CMVF and the CCFA would end on the date of the elections;[31] the mandate of the CCPM would end on the day an elected government took office.[32]

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[30] Attachment IV, section II (1) of the GPA

[31] for the CMVF: Attachment I, section V of the GPA; for the CCFA: Attachment I, Annex II of the GPA

[32] Attachment IV, section II (8) of the GPA

Given the conflict transformation process outlined in the GPA, the joint government-UNITA political commissions would be the key to failure or success: first, principles concretely outlined in the GPA would have to be implemented exactly in the way as described in the treaty. There were only a few provisions which were formulated so concretely, most of them covering military issues such as the establishment of verification mechanisms. Second, principles abstractly outlined in the GPA would have to be filled with substance. This applied to the majority of the provisions, in particular civilian issues. The principle of free and fair elections, for example, could only be implemented by adopting the means necessary for the conduct of free and fair elections.

The political commissions, however, persistently failed both to directly implement the concrete provisions and to fill the abstract ones with substance. Two main factors caused this ineffectiveness:

First, conflict transformation in Angola was less obligatory than in Mozambique because neither MPLA nor UNITA were exhausted conflict parties. On the contrary, they had much to lose in case the other party would win the elections at the end of the process: the MPLA, internationally recognised as the Angolan government, exerted control over western Angola, including all its industrial centres. Of particular importance were the off-shore oil fields in the north of Angola and in the Cabinda enclave, which pumped 500,000 barrels annually.[33] UNITA was not an exhausted insurgency movement such as Renamo in Mozambique. It controlled a fully functioning state-within-a state and the mineral riches of UNITA's territory provided the party with plentiful revenues. From December 1992 to January 1993, for example, UNITA shipped diamonds worth more than US $100 million to Europe and Israel.[34]

Second, the Soviet Union and the United States failed to exert sufficient pressure on MPLA and UNITA, respectively.[35] Strong superpower pressure had been one of the main causes for the conclusion of a GPA. Soviet and United States pressure during the conflict transformation process, however, proved insufficient. The Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991 and Moscow was compelled to concentrate on its domestic chaos instead of attempting to continue its superpower role in world politics.[36] The United States continued their involvement in Angola but failed to compel UNITA to abide by the GPA. Assistance by the United States Congress was ideologically motivated to such a degree that it continued even after UNITA had begun to wage a new war.[37] United States recognition for the elected MPLA government took 8 months.[38]

Overcoming these two problems would have been an extremely difficult, perhaps impossible task for any multifunctional peace-support operation, but in particular for UNAVEM II. UNAVEM's political role was severely hampered because it did not have the financial resources to

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[33] James Ciment 1997, p. 212
[34] ibid., p. 211
[35] Victoria Brittain 1993, Fernando Goncalves1993
[36] Margaret Anstee 1996, p. 533
[37] Inge Tvedten 1997, p. 66
[38] ibid., p. 42

offer financial incentives and because its political mandate was very limited. The United Nations could not solve political problems by offering financial incentives as it did so successfully in Mozambique because of the conflict parties' access and its own lack of resources. In sharp contrast to Mozambique, UNAVEM II did not establish particular trust funds for facilitating the GPA implementation process. The overall budget of UNAVEM II was US $175,802,600.[39] This was less than the diamond revenues for UNITA in four months. Moreover, the GPA defined the political mandate of the United Nations very narrowly. CCPM and CMVF would be composed of representatives from the government, UNITA, Portugal, the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Nations. The foreign representatives, except for the one from the United Nations, would act as observers, decisions would be taken by consensus between government and UNITA after having heard the observers.[40] The United Nations would not have observer status, but would act only "in the capacity of invited guest".[41] The United Nations was regularly invited to attend meetings of the CMVF and, after initial exclusion, of the CCPM, but its impact was severely limited due to its role as invited guest.[42]

Given the MPLA's and UNITA's resources to continue war, the absence of sufficient external pressure and the weak role of the United Nations, crucial steps of the conflict transformation process remained uncompleted. The commissions' discussions focussed on five subjects: cease fire, cantonment and demobilisation, prisoners of war, extension of public administration, the electoral process and police monitoring. Critical failures to reach political solutions were evident in all of these fields:

The closer the date of the elections approached, the less CCPM and CMVF were capable of resolving the small violations of the cease-fire which occurred during the conflict transformation process. In 1991 all incidents could be resolved except for one. A UNITA soldier had been ambushed and killed at Malanje on 30 September and the incident remained a smouldering issue.[43] In 1992, three incidents could not be resolved: four British tourists had been killed in January 1992, and the government and UNITA accused each other; in April 1992, a UNITA soldier had been killed by a government policeman;[44] finally, one of the sporadic clashes between government and UNITA supporters in Malanje escalated and shooting broke out between the two factions.[45]

CCPM and CMVF failed to avert the demobilisation crisis. Cantonment began alarmingly slow. The failure to meet the deadline for cantonment of 1 August did not cause any political problems and a new deadline was set for 15 September 1991. Only when it became obvious that the

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[39] United Nations 1996, p. 715
[40] CCPM: Attachment II, Annex (2) of the GPA; CMVF: Attachment I, Annex I, section A (2, 4) of the GPA
[41] Attachment IV, section II (5) of the GPA as applying to the CCPM; similar formulation in regard to the CMVP: "A representative of the United Nations shall also be invited to participate in the meetings of the CMVF." (Attachment I, section II (6) of the GPA)
[42] see, for example, Margaret Anstee 1996, pp. 127-157
[43] Margaret Anstee 1996, p. 49
[44] Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 24 June 1992 (S/24145), para. 34
[45] Africa Research Bulletin (Political Series), vol. 29, no. 8 (August 1992)

new deadline would again not be met by both parties, did serious tensions arise. Instead of attempting to resolve the problem, however, UNITA boycotted CCPM and CMVF for 10 days, thereby putting cantonment further behind schedule.[46] After the September deadline had passed, the lack of substantial progress in cantonment and demobilisation became a matter of great concern for the international community but it did not prompt government and UNITA to take action. Cantonment and demobilisation remained uncompleted.[47]

The release of political prisoners remained as incomplete as cantonment and demobilisation. The GPA stipulated that all "civilian and military prisoners" would be released.[48] However, the issue "occupied long hours of often fruitless debate."[49] The release of political prisoners remained an unfinished task. By June 1991, the government had released 950 suspected UNITA supporters and claimed that no prisoners of war and political prisoners were left in its prisons. UNITA had released 272 prisoners in Jamba, but only 60 of them had left UNITA's provisional capital. UNITA claimed they would remain voluntarily in Jamba.[50] By December, more political prisoners were released, 700 by the government and 1,000 by UNITA. The latter claimed that 600 of the released prisoners wanted to stay in Jamba.[51] In June 1992, the release of political prisoners suffered a severe setback when the government detained 40 people, most of them UNITA supporters, during the visit of the pope in June.[52]

The issue of public administration remained unresolved because UNITA did not give up control over its strongholds. According to the GPA, the government would extend its public administration to areas which laid beyond its control at the time the GPA was signed.[53] The provision was never fully implemented. The issue became, as Margaret Anstee put it, "the most monumental time waster."[54] The CCPM set a deadline of 20 June 1992 for the completion of the process. The government threatened that voter registration and elections could not take place wherever public administration was not established. On 20 June, the government said it had been able to extend its administration to all but one of Angola's 165 municipalities and to all but 90 of the approximately 600 communities.[55] The numbers, however, fluctuated each week. Sometimes government officials had to withdraw due to hostile reception and, predictably, the issue of Jamba remained unresolved. Remarkably, the government often failed to provide its administrative personnel with necessary logistics, such as adequate accommodation or food, thereby hampering its own administrative network.[56]

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[46] Fen Hampson 1996, p. 110
[47] This will be dealt with in detail under the section on cantonment and demobilisation.
[48] Attachment I, Annex II of the GPA
[49] Margaret Anstee 1996, p. 134
[50] amnesty international report 1992, p. 56
[51] ibid.; UNITA claimed again that 600 of those who were released wanted to stay in Jamba.
[52] amnesty international report 1993, p. 53
[53] Attachment IV, section V of the GPA
[54] Margaret Anstee 1996, p. 134
[55] Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 24 June 1992 (S/24156), para. 26
[56] Margaret Anstee 1996, pp. 134-136

The delays in the preparation of the electoral process threatened the entire conflict transformation process. The electoral process was dealt with very briefly in the GPA; only the abstract principles were given. However, preparations to fill these principles with substance did not begin before May 1992. This prompted two United States non-governmental organisations to issue the following statement: "(...) the prospects for conducting meaningful elections as scheduled for September, 29-30, 1992 are dubious."[57]

Only in May 1992 was the National Elections Commission (NEC) established and the electoral process began.[58] Little time was left for the preparations of the voter registration process which exacerbated the logistical problems. Likewise, preparation for the actual electoral process remained very poor and could not have been conducted without large-scale logistical assistance by UNAVEM. When the results of the elections were rejected by UNITA, neither CCPM nor NEC were able to resolve the issue or at least de-escalate the spiral of violence.[59]

GPA provisions concerning the monitoring of police activities were never fully implemented. Joint government-UNITA police monitoring teams became operational in all provinces no sooner than at the end of June 1992,[60] but their effectiveness remained severely hampered by a lack of co-operation between government and UNITA.[61] Human rights abuses continued and UNITA's allegation that the government integrated its best troops into the so called "anti-riot police", thereby creating a parallel army, could not be investigated.[62]

16.1.2 Mozambique: Resolving Crises

The Mozambican conflict transformation process threatened to collapse as often in the political commissions as the Angolan one. In sharp contrast to Mozambique, however, solutions to urgent problems could be agreed upon and the conflict transformation process, when stalled, could be put back on track. The state of exhaustion did not allow for another viable option than to continue the internationally sponsored conflict transformation process. The United Nations, having a much more comprehensive political mandate and much more resources than in Angola, played an important role in facilitating the dialogue between the parties.

According to the GPA, crucial components of the implementation of the GPA would be overseen by commissions composed of both Frelimo and Renamo delegates in order to guarantee impartiality. The Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC) would "supervise and monitor compliance" with the GPA.[63] It would be assisted by 6 subsidiary commissions dealing with

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[57] Joint Statement of the Natinoal Democratic Institute for International Affairs and the International Republican Institute, March 1992, quoted in: Marina Ottaway 1997, p. 7
[58] The United Nations were not invited to the NEC.
[59] This will be dealt with in detail under the section on the presidential and parliamentary elections.
[60] Virginia Fortna 1993, p. 399
[61] Margaret Anstee 1996, p. 69
[62] This will be dealt with in detail under the section on the performance of the local police.
[63] Protocol I (5) of the GPA

specific aspects of the GPA implementation process: the Cease-fire Commission (CCF) would plan, verify and guarantee the cessation of armed conflict including demobilisation;[64] the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force (CCFADM) would oversee the integration of government and Renamo forces in a new defence force;[65] the Reintegration Commission (CORE) would conduct the reintegration of soldiers in society;[66] the National Elections Commission (CNE) would conduct the electoral process;[67] the National Police Affairs Commission (COMPOL) would monitor and verify the performance of the police;[68] the National Commission for State Administration (CNA) would conduct the relationship between government and Renamo-held areas.[69]

In sharp contrast to Angola, the United Nations played a crucial role in facilitating the solution of political problems. Three factors caused the effectiveness of the United Nations:

First, as outlined in detail in the previous part, ending the war was an economic necessity in Mozambique. Renamo's war of devastation had caused economic disaster. Neither Frelimo nor Renamo could afford to continue the war.

Second, the state of exhaustion in Mozambique and sufficient resources from New York enabled the United Nations to facilitate political solutions to urgent problems. Due to the state of exhaustion, Frelimo and Renamo were highly susceptible to financial incentives. The United Nations could always facilitate the solution of urgent political problems by offering financial incentives, whenever the conflict transformation process was stalled. This tactic was extremely expensive. ONUMOZ became one of the most expensive United Nations field missions ever undertaken. The costs for the operation amounted to more than US $510 million. In addition to this, member states made voluntary contributions, enabling the United Nations to establish a Trust Fund for the Implementation of the Peace Process in Mozambique of nearly US $18 million and a Trust Fund for Assistance to Registered Political Parties in Mozambique of more than US $3 million.[70] This is an overall amount of more than US $530 million, approximately three times the expenses of UNAVEM II.

Third, the United Nations had a much more comprehensive political mandate than in Angola. Under the terms of the GPA, the United Nations was requested to participate and assume chairpersonship in three commissions: CSC, CCF and CORE. In June 1993, government and Renamo requested the UN to assume chairpersonship of the CCFADM as well.[71]

The entire GPA implementation process was behind schedule from the very beginning, because the CSC was established more than two weeks late. In order to supervise the entire GPA

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[64] Protocol VI, section I (1) of the GPA
[65] Protocol IV, section I (iii) of the GPA
[66] Protocol IV, section VI (ii) of the GPA
[67] Protocol III, section V (3) of the GPA
[68] Protocol IV, section V of the GPA
[69] Protocol V, section III (9) of the GPA
[70] United Nations 1996, pp. 725, 727
[71] Richard Snyge 1997, p. 24

implementation process, the CSC was to be established on E-Day, 15 October 1992. However, Renamo had not sent a delegation to Maputo yet. It demanded logistical support by the government such as appropriate housing, transport and communication facilities.[72]

Renamo sent a delegation as soon as a compromise was reached with the government about the logistical demands. The decisive negotiations between the government and Renamo on 29 October 1992 had been mediated by Aldo Ajello, the Special Representative of the United Nations in Mozambique. The members of the CSC were appointed on 4 November and held their first meeting the same day.[73] Aldo Ajello assumed chairpersonship on behalf of the United Nations. On its first meeting, the CSC established the three subsidiary commissions dealing with military matters: CCF, CORE, CCFADM.[74]

However, progress in the CSC and these three subsidiary commissions was very slow and all commission work came to a complete standstill from March to June 1993. The Renamo delegation left Maputo on 9 March, alleging that it would not receive enough logistical support from the government. The United Nations succeeded in overcoming this deadlock by increasing international financial support. On 10 May 1993, the UN established a Trust Fund for the GPA implementation, which was designed, *inter alia*, to provide the necessary resources for Renamo's transformation into a political party. Italy alone contributed nearly US $6 million to the fund.[75]

On 3 June, Renamo's delegation came back to Maputo and resumed its work in the commissions.[76] After Renamo's boycott, the implementation process was seriously behind schedule. Demobilisation and the creation of a new defence force should have been completed by January 1993 and elections were to take place in three months time, in September 1993. Faced with these delays, both government and Renamo tried to speed up the implementation process. The UN facilitated these efforts.

Government and Renamo requested the United Nations to chair the CCFADM. The UN assumed chairpersonship in July 1993 and substantial progress in the integration of the two armies into a new defence force could be achieved. In one of its first sessions, the commission decided to begin the training of instructors for the new FADM and sent 50 officers from the government and 50 from Renamo to Nyanga, Zimbabwe, where the United Kingdom ran a training facility.[77]

The United Nations succeeded again in improving Renamo's co-operation by financial incentives. From September onwards, Alfonso Dhlakama was paid US $300,000 a month, finally accumulating to US $3.9 million by October 1994. Reacting to the disputes in the CCF about public administration, Aldo Ajello formulated a set of rules to guide the commission in its

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[72] Boutros Boutros-Ghali 1995, p. 24, 25

[73] ibid.; in addition to government, Renamo and the United Nations, the following external actors were member of the CSC: France, Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States and the OAU (Germany joined later).

[74] ibid.

[75] ibid., pp. 31, 32

[76] ibid.

[77] ibid., pp. 32-37

verification of the cease-fire. The rules distinguished between military and logistical aspects of troop movements on the one hand, and aspects relating to state administration on the other. A cease-fire violation was re-defined more narrowly than in the GPA as troop movement aimed at gaining new positions. The highly sensitive issue of public administration, therefore, dropped out of the definition and was no longer to be covered by the CCF, but by the CNA. The guidelines were approved in September 1994, following Boutros Boutros-Ghali's visit to Mozambique. Moreover, Chissano and Dhlakama found solutions regarding the contested issues of public administration, as well as the composition of National Commission on Administration (CNA) and the National Police Affairs Commission (COMPOL).[78]

Boutros Boutros-Ghali visited Maputo from 17 to 20 October 1993, one year after the GPA had entered into force in order to negotiate a new time table and to help to overcome outstanding issues. He used US $1,2 billion in promised grants and loans as means of pressure and emphasised that these funds would be held until government and Renamo had achieved progress in the conflict transformation process. The visit was highly successful. A new time schedule was agreed upon, consent was achieved in the outstanding issues of cease-fire guidelines, the draft electoral law was approved, and the National Elections Commission (CNE) as well as the chairpersons of the National Police Affairs Commission (COMPOL) and the National Commission for State Administration (CNA) were appointed.[79]

The CSC approved the new time table on 22 October 1993: concentration of forces would begin in November 1993 and demobilisation in January 1994. Demobilisation would be completed by the end of May 1994, and the new FADM would be fully operational by September 1994. Voter registration would take place between April and June, the electoral campaign would occur in September and October, and elections would be held by the end of October.[80]

Richard Snyge describes the CSC after the October negotiations as the "cockpit of the peace process".[81] In 1994, the CSC was almost in constant session and meetings were held every day. Most of the outstanding issues could be solved in the CSC without consulting the UN Secretariat or the Security Council. Aldo Ajello said later that New York was informed about a problem after it was already resolved and the gathering of France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States made a direct involvement of the Security Council unnecessary in most of the cases.[82]

Not only had the CSC become an effective instrument after the October negotiations, but the subsidiary commissions except for CORE as well.[83] The CCF succeeded in solving a total of 95

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[78] ibid.

[79] ibid.

[80] ibid.

[81] Richard Snyge 1997, p. 92

[82] ibid., pp. 153, 154

[83] The only exception was CORE. It remained of minor importance throughout the GPA implementation process. The United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC), which chaired the commission, as well as government and Renamo had reached a compromise about a re-integration

cease-fire complaints and hundreds of incidents in the assembly areas. After the October negotiations, no major cease-fire violation occurred any more. The demobilisation process had to be re-scheduled, but was concluded before the elections.[84]

The CCFADM managed to overcome the problem that the envisaged troop strength of the new FADM would not reach 30,000. The figure of 30,000 was originally a precondition for the holding of elections because this strength was seen as adequate to deal with possible civil unrest following the elections and ONUMOZ withdrawal. By the end of the demobilisation process in mid-August 1994, only 5,961 soldiers were registered for the FADM, but Aldo Ajello's suggestion that further recruitment could take place later was accepted.[85]

16.2 Cantonment and Demobilisation

Lacking political consensus and the will to co-operate, the Angolan parties did not implement the GPA provisions on cantonment and demobilisation. In Mozambique, on the contrary, the demobilisation crisis was politically resolved as were all other critical GPA implementation crises by financial incentives from the United Nations.

16.2.1 Angola: Keeping the Military Option

The most critical consequence of the Angolan parties' failure to reach political solutions was the uncompleted cantonment and demobilisation process. UNAVEM's monitoring and verification mechanism was ineffective because it was highly dependent on the uncooperative conflict parties. Lacking the political will to find compromises and to implement the GPA, the conflict parties failed to complete cantonment and demobilisation. MPLA and UNITA kept the military option by avoiding cantonment and demobilisation, respectively. The international community, including the United Nations, failed to take decisive action as it did during the entire conflict transformation process.

According to the GPA the demobilisation process would consist of two steps: first, all government and UNITA soldiers would be assembled in cantonment areas. The government would establish 27 assembly points, UNITA would establish 23.[86] During their cantonment, the troops would have to abide by the following rules of conduct: directives and orders from the CCPM and

formula, but the donor countries ignored the proposal and, bypassing CORE, agreed upon their own formula in January 1994. The delays in the demobilisation process further weakened CORE.

[84] Richard Snyge 1997, pp. 154, 155
[85] ibid., pp. 103-106 and pp. 155, 156

the CMVP were to be observed,[87] armaments and ammunition were to be controlled,[88] and nobody would be allowed to leave the assembly areas unless authorised by the monitoring bodies.[89]

Second, following cantonment and demobilisation, the assembled troops would be either demobilised or integrated into the new Angolan Armed Forces.[90] The new defence force would consist of 50,000 troops. The army, with a strength of 40,000 soldiers, would consist of 20,000 from the government and 20,000 from UNITA.[91] All remaining soldiers were to be demobilised. Armament and munitions were either to be moved to the training centres for the new Angolan Armed Forces or delivered to warehouses. No demobilised soldier would be allowed to take any military equipment with him.[92]

The Secretary-General recommended the United Nations mandate in regard to cantonment and demobilisation to the Security Council on 20 May 1991. The observers contingent, which would consist of a maximum of 350 unarmed soldiers would monitor the demobilisation process, in addition to its task to monitor the cease-fire.[93] Initially, however, the United Nations undermined its ability to effectively monitor cantonment and demobilisation by infighting in New York. UNAVEM II had to wait for the approval of its budget until mid-August 1991. In the meantime it was lacking the necessary manpower and equipment to fulfil its mandate. The Secretary-General noted in his Report to the Security Council dating 31 October 1991:

> "The delay in the approval of the Mission's budget, which did not take place until two-and-a-half months after the Security Council's decision to establish UNAVEM II, and the consequent shortfalls in logistics support for it, (...) made it practically impossible to occupy all the assembly areas simultaneously."[94]

Following the approval of its budget in September, UNAVEM II's military observer contingent finally reached its maximal strength, almost one month after cantonment was scheduled to be completed.[95]

However, the eventual deployment of the authorised UNAVEM observer contingent did not solve the problems of monitoring and verification because the United Nations was dependent on the co-operation of the two conflict parties in two respects: first, UNAVEM's mandate was confined to monitoring joint government-UNITA monitoring teams of the CMVF. Second, the Angolan parties had to provide figures about their troop strengths and armament.

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[86] Attachment I, Annex I, Appendix 2 of the GPA; these were to be situated away from major population centres and surrounded by security zones. At least 100 combatants would have to be assembled at one cantonment area. The approximate locations were listed in Appendix 2.
[87] Attachment I, Annex I, Appendix 4 (1b) of the GPA
[88] ibid.
[89] Attachment I, Annex I, Appendix 4 (3c) of the GPA
[90] Attachment I, Annex I, Appendix 4 (7a) of the GPA
[91] Attachment III, section VI (B) of the GPA
[92] Attachment I, Annex I, Appendix 4 (7b) of the GPA
[93] Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 20 May 1991 (S/22627), para. 6
[94] Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 31 October 1991 (S/23191), para. 16
[95] ibid., para. 17

First, the role of the United Nations was confined to the verification of the setting up and the performance of the monitoring teams established by the CMVF. According to the GPA, the CMVF would create joint government-UNITA monitoring groups for the verification of the cease-fire as well as cantonment and demobilisation.[96] The United Nations would verify whether these monitoring groups assumed their responsibilities, but it would not monitor the process independently from them.[97]

MPLA and UNITA, however, lacking the political will, failed to fully implement this mechanism. No monitoring teams were sent by the Angolan parties before CCPM and CMVF had begun their work on 17 June, more than two weeks late.[98] The establishment of CCPM and CMVF was no breakthrough for the setting up of the verification mechanism. The Angolan parties were slow in establishing the monitoring teams and in deploying them at the assembly points. At some assembly points, no government-UNITA joint monitoring teams arrived at all during the entire demobilisation process.[99]

Second, effective verification was further undermined by the absence of a reliable estimation of troop strengths of government and UNITA forces: "Facts were, however, a very scarce commodity."[100] According to the GPA, the Angolan parties had to regularly provide the United Nations with complete inventories of their troops and armaments.[101] This was an important precondition for effective monitoring and verification, without which the progress of cantonment and demobilisation could not be adequately assessed.

However, both conflict parties persistently failed to provide the United Nations with these figures. They remained a contested issue throughout the GPA implementation process. The expected number of both government and UNITA forces was corrected twice in the course of the cantonment process. At the time of the signature of the GPA, it was estimated that there was a total of 200,000 government soldiers and 50,000 UNITA soldiers. The first correction massively reduced the estimated number of government soldiers to 115,640, while the expected number of UNITA troops remained with 49,800 approximately on the same level. The second correction slightly reduced the figure of expected government troops to 114,600, whereas the one of UNITA was significantly corrected downwards to 37,330.[102]

The dependence on uncooperative conflict parties and the unavailability of reliable estimations of troop numbers seriously undermined the monitoring of the demobilisation process. This was dramatically highlighted when the government accused UNITA of massively understating its troop strength and of hiding a 20,000-strong army in the bush. An investigation team composed

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[96] Attachment I, Section IV (3) of the GPA
[97] Attachment I, section III (5) of the GPA
[98] Virginia Fortna 1993, p. 398
[99] Fen Hampson 1996, p. 110
[100] Margaret Anstee 1996, p. 53
[101] Attachment I, Annex I, Appendix 4 (1) of the GPA
[102] Margaret Anstee 1996, pp. 18, 19; Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 31 October 1991 (S/23191), para. 24

of government, UNITA and UN representatives was sent, but reported only approximately 300 "logistical units" which were not accounted for. However, Margaret Anstee discards the reliability of these findings:

> "Let us not forget that this wild and remote region of south-eastern Angola was known in Portuguese times as Terras do Fim Mundo, 'The Lands at the End of the World'. Moreover a man who is an armed guerrilla at one moment may be a peasant in civilian clothes peacefully going about his farm the next, and who knows the difference?"[103]

The lack of consensus and will to co-operate of the Angolan parties not only undermined the monitoring and verification mechanism, it also made cantonment and demobilisation impossible. Throughout the demobilisation process, MPLA and UNITA justified the delays by citing logistical problems, in particular shortages of food, clothing and transport. The CMVF never took action to resolve these problems. When it had become evident that the original deadline of 1 August 1991 for the completion of cantonment could not be met, the deadline was merely postponed to 15 September 1991, without preparing a plan as to how the shortcomings in the demobilisation process could be resolved. When it became obvious that this new deadline would not be met either, MPLA and UNITA accused each other and UNITA boycotted any work in the commissions for 10 days. Solutions for the problems of demobilisation and cantonment, however, were again not found.[104]

Based on unreliable estimations, the United Nations assessed the progress of the alarmingly slow cantonment process. UNITA assembled significantly faster than the government. At the end of October 1991, two months after cantonment was scheduled to be completed, only 68,666 government and 26,968 UNITA soldiers had assembled, or 59 per cent in the case of the government and 54 per cent in the case of UNITA.[105]

By February 1992, the number of government soldiers had decreased to 61,884 troops, or 54 per cent.[106] A sudden exodus had occurred around Christmas caused by the bad conditions in the assembly areas (lack of food, medicine, work etc.) as well as the low morale of government soldiers. UNITA soldiers were confronted with similar conditions, but they were more used to the hard life in the bush.[107] While the rate of assembled government soldiers decreased by five per cent, the rate of UNITA soldiers increased by almost 40 per cent to 93 per cent, or 34,717 soldiers.[108]

This wide gap between government and UNITA was not closed any more during the GPA implementation period. According to the last published count of assembled troops, 42,600 government and 31,700 UNITA troops were present in cantonment areas at the end of June.[109] Adding the number of troops who had already been demobilised by June (demobilisation began on

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[103] Margaret Anstee 1996, p. 54
[104] Fen Hampson 1996, p. 110
[105] Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 31 October 1991 (S/23191), para. 24
[106] Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 3 March 1992 (S/23671), para. 11
[107] Margaret Anstee 1996, pp. 18, 19
[108] Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 3 March 1992 (S/23671), para. 11
[109] Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 24 June 1992 (S/24145), para. 16

1 April) and therefore terminated their stay at assembly points, 60,936 government and 33,193 UNITA soldiers were either registered in a cantonment area or already demobilised. This is a rate of 53 per cent for the government and 89 per cent for UNITA three months before the elections.[110]

Figure 2: progress of cantonment of government and UNITA troops[111]

Progress in demobilisation was as alarmingly slow as cantonment. Yet, whereas the government's record on cantonment was clearly worse than the one of UNITA, the former demobilised faster.

Demobilisation began on 1 April. At the end of the month, the government had demobilised 9,994 troops, or 9 per cent of its estimated troop strength. UNITA, on the other hand, had demobilised only 180 soldiers, only half of one per cent.[112] Demobilisation continued at this slow pace. By the end of June the gap between government and UNITA had remained almost the same. 18,336 or 16 per cent had been demobilised by the government, and 1,493 or 4 per cent by UNITA.[113] By the end of August, the revised deadline for the completion of the demobilisation process, only 45 per cent of government and 24 per cent of UNITA soldiers had been demobilised.[114] In other words, more than half of the government soldiers and more than four fifths of UNITA's soldiers were still in arms, after the deadline for completion of demobilisation had passed and one month before the elections were scheduled to take place.[115]

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[110] figures for demobilised soldiers: Margaret Anstee 1996, pp. 56-59
[111] percentage of at assembly points present plus already demobilised troops in relation to estimated troop numbers from October 1991 to June 1992; sources in chronological order (one source per monthly data except for two sources for June 1992): Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 31 October 1991 (S/23191), para. 24; 3 March 1992 (S/23671), para. 11; 24 June 1992 (S/24145), para. 16/Margaret Anstee 1996, pp. 18, 19; estimated number of troops: Margaret Anstee 1996, pp. 18, 19 and Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 31 October 1991 (S/23191), para. 24
[112] Margaret Anstee 1996, p. 51
[113] ibid., p. 56
[114] ibid., p. 60
[115] These figures were the last ones to be published before the elections.

Figure 3: progress of demobilisation of government and UNITA troops[116]

The more evident the failure of the Angolan parties to assemble and demobilise their troops became, the more the concerns in the international community arose. In sharp contrast to Mozambique, however, it failed to take decisive action as it had during the entire conflict transformation process. To give only two examples: first, there were severe shortages of food at the assembly areas, in particular at the ones of the government, but international funding proved insufficient to resolve the problem. Concerned about possible raiding for food by soldiers, the United States provided assembly points with 450,000 Meals-Ready-to-Eat, and the United Nations launched a US $27.5 million special relief program. Shortages of food, however, remained a severe problem during the entire cantonment and demobilisation process. [117] Second, donors did not react to the appeals of the government and Renamo to provide attractive demobilisation packages. When government and UNITA emphasised that more resources were needed for demobilisation, a donor meeting was held on 30 April 1992. The Angolan parties announced that further external funding of US $447 million was needed for the social reintegration of demobilised soldiers. In sharp contrast to Mozambique, however, none of the donors reacted.[118]

Given the alarming figures about cantonment and demobilisation, the United Nations attempted to speed up the process. Reacting to constant complaints of the government and UNITA about the lack of logistics, Margaret Anstee authorised the use of UNAVEM planes and helicopters, and the United States provided C130 aircraft in order to transport troops to assembly areas and weaponry to storehouses. Due to donor fatigue and the small budget of UNAVEM II, however, support other than logistical was impossible.[119]

The parties kept delaying the cantonment process. On 9 September, three weeks before the elections, Margaret Anstee reported to New York that

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[116] percentage of demobilised troops in relation to estimated troop strength from April 1992 to August 1992; sources in chronological order (one source per monthly data): Margaret Anstee 1996, p. 51, p. 56, p. 60; estimated number of troops: Margaret Anstee 1996, p. pp. 18, 19; Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 31
[117] Virginia Fortna 1993, p. 399
[118] Margaret Anstee 1996, pp. 54, 55

"only 41 per cent of Government and UNITA troops had been demobilised: 24 per cent were still in the assembly areas with their weapons stored near at hand; and 32.5 per cent of total Government and UNITA troops had been verified."[120]

The Security Council tried to exert influence on the Angolan parties by issuing a Statement of the President:

"It (the Security Council, M.K.) strongly appeals to the Government and UNITA to overcome rapidly the delays and inadequacies (...), and increase the momentum of progress on the issues of confinement of troops and weapons, demobilisation and the formation of the new armed forces and police."[121]

The Secretary-General wrote letters to José, Eduardo dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi and made suggestions as to how to complete cantonment, demobilisation and disarmament.[122] The United Nations, however, failed to take action other than words. In the first three weeks of September, it seemed as if the government and UNITA would finally try to bring the cantonment and demobilisation process back on track. Dos Santos and Savimbi met twice, the CCPM met frequently, and announcements were made that a complete demobilisation by 27 September 1992 was envisaged, two days before the elections were to take place. Yet, on 23 September, dos Santos acknowledged that the completion of the demobilisation process would not be possible by this deadline.[123]

Although cantonment and demobilisation were uncompleted, the new Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) were established on 27 September and the government and UNITA forces formally ceased to exist. However, it was evident that the formation of the FAA and the abolishment of the government and UNITA forces were merely symbolic and that the new FAA was a far cry from an effective military organisation. Only 19 per cent of the new armed forces had been formed by the beginning of September.[124]

In addition to uncompleted cantonment and demobilisation, as well as the ineffectiveness of the FAA, disarmament remained uncompleted. The soldiers who arrived at assembly points brought almost exclusively weapons of very poor quality. UNITA handed over not one heavy weapon such as Stinger Sam missiles or semi-automatic M-79 grenade launchers. UNAVEM II had suspicions about the places where weapons were hidden, but it had neither the mandate nor the resources to verify these suspicions.[125]

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[119] ibid., pp. 56-59

[120] ibid., p. 59

[121] Statement of the President of the Security Council, 18 September 1992 (S/24249)

[122] Margaret Anstee 1996, p. 63

[123] ibid., pp. 62, 63

[124] Yvonne Lodico 1997, p. 118

[125] Vladimir Krska 1997, p. 88

16.2.2 Mozambique: Giving Away the Military Option

In contrast to Angola, the United Nations succeeded in setting up an effective monitoring and verification mechanism. However, this alone proved insufficient for facilitating cantonment and demobilisation. Only when the United Nations increased funding enormously for Frelimo and Renamo, did the two exhausted parties complete cantonment and demobilisation 16 months after schedule, and without implementing the GPA provisions on disarmament.

According to the GPA, all government and Renamo troops which would not to be integrated in the FADM (Armed Forces for the Defence of Mozambique) were to be demobilised. A demobilised soldier was defined as an ex-member of government or Renamo forces who handed over his weapons, ammunition, equipment, uniform and documentation, as well as has been registered and received the demobilisation certificate. 60 days after the GPA entered into force (E-Day), 20 per cent of the total troops would be demobilised; 90 days after E-Day, 40 per cent; 120 days after E-Day, 60 per cent; 150 days after E-Day, 80 per cent; and 180 days after E-Day, the demobilisation process would be completed.[126]

Assembly and demobilisation would be monitored and verified by the United Nations.[127] In contrast to Angola, the United Nations would monitor and verify cantonment and demobilisation independently from monitoring mechanisms of the two conflict parties. The effectiveness of United Nations verification, therefore, would not completely depend on whether or not the conflict parties set up their verification mechanism. Government and Renamo would provide the United Nations with the necessary data for its monitoring task and would supply the organisation with "complete inventories of their troop strength, arms, ammunition, mines and other explosives on E-Day - 6, E-Day, E-Day + 6, E-Day + 30 and, thereafter, every 15 days."[128]

As in Angola, however, the parties failed to abide by this GPA provision. In order to compensate for the parties' failure to provide complete inventories of their troop strengths and weaponry, the United Nations determined a figure of the estimated troop strengths of the government and Renamo.[129] Using the figures given by both parties during the negotiation process in 1992, the strength of government troops was estimated at 76,405 and the one of Renamo's strength was estimated at 22,637.[130] Both parties accepted these figures. However, the problem was only partly resolved. Estimations of troop strengths of the government and Renamo remained a source of considerable uncertainty and controversy during the entire demobilisation process. In

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[126] Protocol IV, section VI (I) of the GPA

[127] The United Nations had initially no mandate concerning the creation of the FADM. In June, government and Renamo decided to request Aldo Ajello to assume chairpersonship of the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force (CCFADM). The United Nations mandate concerning the FADM remained confined to this political role.

[128] Protocol VI, section I (10a) of the GPA

[129] Government and Renamo provided new lists of men and weaponry at the end of July. But these lists soon proved unreliable (Richard Snyge 1997, p. 62).

April 1994, for example, these figures provoked a serious confrontation between the government and Renamo in the CCFs when the government announced a new figure which was significantly lower than the one presented in 1992. The new number declared was 64,110, almost 13,000 troops less than in 1992, and made Renamo highly suspicious. After a massive protest by Renamo, the government revised the figure slightly upward to 64,466.[131]

The reliability of the troop number estimations remained a problem, but, nevertheless, the United Nations succeeded in establishing the necessary preconditions for cantonment and demobilisation due to two reasons:

First, in sharp contrast to Angola, ONUMOZ's monitoring was independent from monitoring teams of the government and Renamo. Therefore, the conflict parties could not obstruct the monitoring process. When the two conflict parties failed to monitor and verify the process, United Nations observation was not affected.

Second, the United Nations crucially increased the depth and scope of ONUMOZ from January 1993 onwards, which enabled the United Nations both to monitor more effectively and to provide security guarantees for the demobilising and demobilised parties. The number of military observers increased steadily and five battalions of United Nations troops were deployed in March and May 1993.[132] At the end of May, the number of UN troops totalled 5,300, and the number of military observers totalled 247. At the end of June, 6,222 troops and 294 observers were deployed.[133] In mid-September the United Nations sent a small UNCIVPOL survey team in accordance to Security Council resolution 863 (1993) to Mozambique. On 5 November, the Security Council authorised the immediate deployment of 128 police observers in resolution 882 (1993).[134]

The issue of the enlargement of ONUMOZ was a cause for delay of the entire demobilisation process. In a letter to the Secretary-General dating 7 January 1993, Renamo raised its concern about its security during and after demobilisation, and formulated the deployment of United Nations troops and UNCIVPOL as a pre-condition to start cantonment and demobilisation. The government, however, did not reluctantly agree with this plan before March 1993 and even then waited to sign a status-of-forces agreement for the United Nations troops until May 1993.[135] Other problems causing delay were the absence of Renamo from the political commissions before October 1992 and between March and June 1993 as outlined above, as well as the fact that most initially designated assembly points were unsuitable.[136]

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[130] government figures: Boutros Boutros-Ghali 1995, p. 40; Renamo figures: Mozambican News Agency (AIM), no. 39 (August 1993), p. 4

[131] Boutros Boutros-Ghali 1995, p. 40

[132] ibid., p. 29

[133] Richard Snyge 1997, p. 42

[134] Boutros Boutros-Ghali 1995, p.34, 35

[135] Richard Snyge 1997, pp. 38, 39

[136] United Nations military observers requested relocations of many assembly areas. The GPA had provided for 29 government and 20 Renamo areas. By late April 1993 ONUMOZ had inspected 19 assembly points

By the time all these problems were resolved in September 1993, the whole demobilisation process was badly behind schedule. Eleven months had passed, cantonment should have been completed ten months ago, and demobilisation eight months ago. According to schedule, there were only four weeks left for the elections. On 24 September, the government declared its readiness to begin the cantonment of its troops as soon as Renamo would do the same.[137] Renamo declared one day later that it would be prepared to start cantonment and demobilisation, but could not finish the process before the elections.[138]

This declaration reminded the international community of the Angolan disaster and international pressure to complete demobilisation reached its heights. Boutros Boutros-Ghali points out:

> "Although a return to war was not contemplated, the RENAMO leadership was reluctant to give up its military option, while still seeking to gain what it perceived as political concessions.(...) With the situation in Angola offering clear evidence of the dangers of this approach, my Special Representative reasserted ONUMOZ's determination to hold elections only after full demobilisation had taken place."[139]

A similar development in Mozambique was to be prevented at virtually any cost. A pre-condition for this was a new time schedule which would leave enough time to complete the demobilisation process before the elections.[140] Boutros Boutros-Ghali visited Maputo from 17 to 20 October 1993 to urge the parties to agree upon a new time table for the entire transformation process. All outstanding issues hindering the beginning of cantonment and demobilisation were resolved. Boutros Boutros-Ghali calls the breakthrough "an impressive show of political will by both parties."[141] The new time table agreed upon read as follows: cantonment would begin in November 1993, demobilisation would start in January 1994, and it would be completed in May 1994. Elections would take place in October 1994, exactly one year later than originally envisaged.[142]

This breakthrough was facilitated by financial incentives. US $1,2 billion in promised grants and loans were held until the government and Renamo had achieved progress in the transformation process.[143] In addition to this, demobilisation was made more attractive by a new demobilisation package. In January 1994, Aldo Ajello announced a demobilisation package which

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and had approved only 13 of them, 9 government and 4 Renamo sits. By November 1993 ONUMOZ had inspected all assembly points, but had approved only 35 of them. A high number of Renamo sites proved unsuitable. 11 out of 20 points were rejected, whereas only 3 out of 29 government sites were considered inadequate. The rejected assembly points were chosen for mere strategic reasons. Some had no access to water, others could only be reached by roads which were known to be mined. By June ONUMOZ could finally open the first six assembly areas, one for each party in the south, the centre, and the north of Angola.

[137] Letter from the Mozambican Government to the United Nations, 24 September 1993

[138] Boutros Boutros-Ghali 1995, p. 35

[139] ibid.

[140] Chris Alden 1995, p. 106

[141] Boutros Boutros-Ghali 1995, p. 36

[142] Richard Snyge 1997, pp. 57, 58

[143] ibid., p. 58

"could hardly fail to persuade a soldier to choose demobilization rather than continued service."[144] The package for each demobilised soldier consisted of six components: six months' salary; transfer with family to any part of Mozambique; provision with food for three months; a kit of tools and vegetable seeds; additional 18 months' salary based on former rank; occupational training; and a provincial fund to support ex-soldiers' activities in their communities.[145]

With forthcoming financial support, cantonment and demobilisation could be successfully completed. Figure 4 quantitatively shows the progress of cantonment as measured by the registration of troops at assembly areas. At the end of December, 9,895 of the expected number of 49,638 government troops had been registered in an assembly point; Renamo had assembled 6,714 of 19,140 expected combatants.[146] This is a rate of 20 per cent for the government and 35 per cent for Renamo. By the end of February, 59 per cent of expected government and Renamo troops had been registered in assembly areas. The figure of government soldiers had doubled to 29,082 government soldiers. The number of registered Renamo troops had increased, but not as fast as the government forces, and totalled 11,221.[147] By the end of April, there was again a gap between the government and Renamo, with 70 per cent of the government forces and 82 per cent of Renamo soldiers assembled in cantonment areas. 34,922 government and 15,852 Renamo troops had passed the first step of the demobilisation process.[148] By the end of June, the gap had become smaller, but remained significant with a percentage of 84 versus 91. 41,645 of 49,638 expected government troops had registered in an assembly area.[149] When the assembly areas officially closed its doors for new arrivals on 15 August, 43,297 government troops and 22,790 Renamo troops had been registered at one of the assembly points. In other words, only 87 per cent of the expected number of government soldiers had come to the assembly points, but 120 per cent of the expected number of Renamo troops.

At the end of the cantonment process, the inconclusive nature of these figures could be explained by two factors: first, as mentioned above, both parties did not provide the UN with detailed and updated figures of the number of their troops and weaponry. The estimations were very unlikely to be absolutely correct. They could have been too high, but - and there was no certainty about that either - they could have been too low as well. Second, the numbers of government and Renamo troops registered *in situ* corrected the problematic cantonment figures to a considerable degree. Including the troops registered *in situ*, 64,130 of an expected total number of

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[144] ibid., p. 66

[145] ibid.

[146] figures for December: Pamela Reed 1997, p. 294; figures of expected number of soldiers to be cantoned: Mozambique News Agency (AIM), no. 28 (March 1993), p. 2; the figures of 49,638 for the government and 19,140 for Renamo are the expected numbers of soldiers to be cantoned in assembly areas. The figures of the overall numbers were 64,466 and 22,637 for government and Renamo, respectively, as mentioned above. Soldiers not to be cantoned were to be demobilised *in situ*.

[147] Mozambique News Agency (AIM), no. 28 (March 1993), p. 2

[148] Mozambique News Agency (AIM), no. 33 (May 1993), p. 2

[149] Mozambique News Agency (AIM), no. 36 (June 1993), pp. 2, 3

64,466 government soldiers, and 23,640 of Renamo troops had been registered.[150] This is almost 100 per cent in the case of the government. The figure for Renamo still exceeds 100 per cent because the estimation of its troops was too low.[151]

Figure 4: progress of cantonment of government and Renamo troops[152]

(number of cantoned soldiers in relation to expected troop strength in per cent)

Figure 5 quantitatively shows the progress of demobilisation of the government and Renamo troops as measured by the number of soldiers having received a demobilisation certificate. By the end of April, the demobilisation had gained momentum. 14,240 government soldiers out of an estimated number of 64,466 government troops overall had been demobilised.[153] This is a rate of 22 per cent. Renamo, on the contrary, had demobilised significantly more slowly. Only 1,585 troops of its estimated number of 22,637 overall troops, or seven per cent, had received a demobilisation certificate.[154] By the end of June, this gap had become slightly closer but remained significant: 22,832 government and 5,138 Renamo soldiers had been demobilised.[155] This is a rate of 55 per cent for the government and 30 per cent for Renamo. Only by the end of August, when the post-demobilisation verification had begun, did the gap was close. 52,108 government soldiers and 18,227 Renamo soldiers had been demobilised, which is a rate of 81 per cent in both cases.[156] Most of the remaining 19 per cent were incorporated in the FADM in accordance to the GPA: by 15 August, 7,375 government and 3,241 Renamo soldiers had entered the new defence force. The

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[150] Mozambique News Agency (AIM), no. 39 (August 1993), p. 4

[151] After cantonment was officially concluded on 15 August, small numbers of soldiers kept arriving at assembly points. By the end of November, 67,042 government and 24,649 Renamo troops had been registered (Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 23 December 1994, para. 10)

[152] percentage of at assembly areas registered troops in relation to estimated number of arrivals at assembly points from December 1993 to August 1994, sources in chronological order (one source per monthly data): Mozambique News Agency (AIM), no. 28 (March 1993), no. 33 (May 1993), no. 36 (June 1993), no. 39 (August 1993); source for estimated number of arrivals: Mozambique News Agency (AIM), no. 28 (March 1993), p. 2

[153] Mozambique News Agency (AIM), no. 33 (May 1993), p. 2

[154] ibid.

[155] Pamela Reed 1997, p. 294

[156] Mozambique News Agency (AIM), no. 40 (September 1993), p. 1

small remaining figure is the result of the uncertainty about the actual troop strengths of government and Renamo as mentioned above.

Figure 5: progress of demobilisation of government and Renamo troops[157]
(number of demobilised soldiers in relation to expected troop strength in per cent)

These figures show that the demobilisation process was completed successfully. The number of assembled and demobilised troops had steadily increased during the entire process. The difference between the government and Renamo was that Renamo assembled significantly faster and demobilised significantly slower than the government. Yet, in August, when the demobilisation process was completed, this difference lost its significance. Both cantonment and demobilisation rates came close to the expected number. Divergences from the estimated figure could be explained without alleging a hidden army on either side.

This quantitative analysis, however, remains silent about the three serious problems which occurred once demobilisation had began to proceed.

First, the time table was violated again. Cantonment began in November as scheduled, but demobilisation, which was supposed to start in January, did begin before March.[158] The main reason for the delays in the demobilisation process was the reluctance of both parties to assemble and demobilise their most important forces. The government, for example, held the "Red Berets", nine elite brigades, in the barracks as long as possible.[159] In addition to these strategic considerations of the leaders, soldiers refused to be demobilised in a number of cases because they protested about arrears in their pay or asked for substantially higher demobilisation benefits than scheduled.[160] Concerned about the delays, the Security Council adopted resolution 916 (1994) and

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[157] percentage of demobilised troops in relation to estimated troop strength from end of March to end of August 1994; sources for number of demobilised troops in chronological order (one source per monthly data): Mozambique News Agency (AIM), no. 33 (May 1994); Pamela Reed 1997, p. 294; Mozambique News Agency (AIM), no. 40 (September 1994); source for estimated troop strengths: Mozambique News Agency (AIM), no. 33 (May 1993), p. 2

[158] Pamela Reed 1997, p. 293

[159] Richard Snyge 1997, p. 64

[160] Boutros Boutros-Ghali 1995, p. 40

urged the parties to complete the assembly of forces on 1 June and the demobilisation on 15 July. Harshly criticising the performance of ONUMOZ and questioning its impartiality, the government responded that it could not meet these deadlines and announced it would complete assembly by 1 July and demobilisation by 15 August. However, the government did not meet its own July deadline. The Security Council answered to this new delay by issuing a Statement of the President which did not mention a deadline for assembly any more, but emphasised that 15 August was the deadline for demobilisation.[161] Actually, the official closing date for assembly was 15 August, the one for demobilisation 30 August.

Second, riots in the assembly areas became a common feature of the demobilisation process. This was partly a consequence of the demobilisation package, and partly caused by the soldiers' prolonged stay at the assembly points. The demobilisation package was so attractive that only very few combatants volunteered for the FADM. Government and Renamo therefore obliged troops to join the new military organisation. This provoked rioting in the assembly points and desertions from the FADM. The prolonged cantonment caused frustration among soldiers. In a number of cases they even took their commanding officers hostage to press their demands for rapid demobilisation.[162]

Third, the United Nations failed to effectively monitor and verify disarmament. The GPA had defined a demobilised soldier, *inter alia*, as "an individual who (...) was demobilized at the decision of the relevant command, and handed over the weapons, ammunition, equipment, uniform and documentation in his possession."[163]

Hence ONUMOZ's mandate of monitoring and verifying demobilisation included a disarmament component. Both parties, however, kept their best weapons and hid them outside assembly areas. As a main part of the post-demobilisation verification, teams of UN military observers visited hundreds of arms caches before ONUMOZ's mandate expired, but the process could not be concluded. By the time the UN left, it had registered 46,193 of various arms, 2,703,733 of various types of ammunition, 19,047 of various types of mines, 5,687 kilograms of explosives, 4,997 individual grenades and 220 intact boxes. Due to the delays in the demobilisation process, the United Nations could not complete the post-demobilisation verification and failed to effectively monitor and verify disarmament.[164]

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[161] Statement of the President of the Security Council (August 1994)
[162] Boutros Boutros-Ghali 1995, p. 41
[163] Protocol IV, section VI (ii) of the GPA
[164] Alex Vines 1998, p. 193

16.3 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections

The United Nations proved effective in facilitating the conduct of the elections in Angola and in Mozambique. It could not, however, prevent the rejection of the results by UNITA. Angola's elections were the prelude to war, whereas the Mozambican conflict was successfully transformed.

16.3 1 Angola: Prelude to War

Without the implementation of crucial aspects of the GPA, such as demobilisation, the conflict transformation process was easily reversible. There was evidence already during the preparations of the elections that neither MPLA nor UNITA would accept electoral defeat. Both parties tried to undermine the credibility of the electoral process by accusing the United Nations of acting partially. As soon as UNITA's electoral defeat transpired, the organisation rejected the electoral process and alleged fraud. Instead of accepting electoral defeat, UNITA aimed at exploiting a favourable military situation. UNAVEM's technical assistance proved to be vital for the conduct of the elections. Its election monitoring, however, was mainly cursory due to lack of resources, which weakened the argumentation against UNITA' allegations.

Only the major electoral principles were outlined in the GPA. These principles would be further filled with substance by the Angolan political parties:

> "The Angolan Government will hold discussions with all political forces in order to survey their opinions concerning proposed changes in the Constitution. The Angolan Government will then work with all the parties to draft the laws that will regulate the electoral process."[165]

The major principles laid down in the GPA are the following: Elections would take place to choose the President of the Republic and the National Assembly.[166] The elections would be "free and fair."[167] In order to guarantee the latter principle, the elections would be supervised by international electoral observers whose task it would be to certify that the elections had been free and fair.[168] The President would be elected through an absolute majority system. If no candidate got 50 per cent of the vote or more in the first round, a second round would be held.[169] Members of the National Assembly would be elected through a proportional electoral system.[170] Both elections would be held - whether simultaneously or not - between 1 September and 30 November 1992.[171]

Until March 1992, no steps were taken to fill these abstract provisions for the electoral process with substance. It was only in March that the government began bilateral negotiations with

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[165] Attachment III, section 2 of the GPA

[166] Attachment IV, section I (1) of the GPA

[167] Attachment III, section 6 of the GPA

[168] ibid.

[169] Attachment IV, section I (2) of the GPA

[170] Attachment IV, section I (3) of the GPA

opposition parties and organised a multiparty conference in order to discuss matters such as a draft electoral law, a draft party law, and an exact date for elections.[172] The main outcomes of these late initiatives were the creation of the National Elections Commission (NEC), the announcement of the election date of 29 and 30 September 1992, and the request to the United Nations for technical assistance for and observation of the electoral process.[173] The Security Council accepted the twofold mandate and authorised the deployment of 98 electoral observers during the registration and campaign periods and the deployment of 400 observers for the actual polling.[174]

The government, responsible for the initiation of the electoral process, had waited until six months before the elections to start preparations. Therefore, technical assistance was the part of the UN's mandate which posed the immediate challenge. In fulfilling its technical mandate, UNAVEM performed two main functions. Voter education was one area of prime importance. Civic educational courses and trial voting exercises were provided to provincial officials, who, in turn, taught those who fanned out to the surrounding countryside. UNAVEM personnel provided advice, as well as land and air transport for these activities.[175] The other area of prime importance was the preparation of the logistics for the polling itself. Again, as in the case of voter registration, air support was the logistical crux. Given the vast territory of Angola, airlifts were indispensable for both the conduct and the verification of the elections. Due to donor support, UNAVEM succeeded in assembling the needed miniature air force. The 54 helicopters and 12 fixed wing planes constituted the largest air operation ever assembled for electoral assistance.[176]

An official electoral campaign, beginning at the end of August, preceded the actual voting.[177] Savimbi's and dos Santos' rhetoric was often very aggressive. Tensions grew as the election date came nearer. Reports of intimidation and provocation by both government and UNITA supporters became more frequent, and a meeting between dos Santos and Savimbi was postponed.[178]

In addition to rising tensions between the government and UNITA, accusations of the Angolan parties started, alleging that UNAVEM acted partially. The government began with these accusations. Without citing specific incidents, accusations against UNAVEM became a common feature of MPLA rallies.[179] Representatives from several countries explained these sudden accusations as part of a strategy:

> "The interpretation among many was that the Government wanted to manipulate UNAVEM as part of a Government/MPLA strategy to control the election process, and prepare for possible defeat. If it lost, it could say that UNAVEM was partly to blame and its verification faulty."[180]

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[171] Attachment IV, section I (9) of the GPA
[172] Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 3 March 1992 (S/23671), para. 16
[173] Margaret Anstee 1996, pp. 87-98
[174] Security Council Resolution 747 (1992)
[175] Margaret Anstee 1996, p. 122
[176] ibid., p. 188
[177] Keith Somerville 1993, p. 64
[178] Margaret Anstee 1996, p. 125
[179] ibid., p. 142
[180] ibid., p. 143

The Security Council reacted to these allegations and the high tensions between the government and UNITA by issuing a Statement of the President expressing concern about the security situation and urging both parties to continue its co-operation with UNAVEM.[181]

The situation in Angola exacerbated further, tensions rose again higher, but the cease-fire still held. In Cuito, UNAVEM intervened when UNITA personnel beat up presidential guards, which prompted UNITA to accuse the United Nations of acting partially.[182] Although never unambiguously clarified, a series of UN helicopter accidents strongly suggested sabotage: on the Saturdays of three consecutive weeks, United Nations helicopters, starting from the same airport, crashed.[183]

Although cantonment and demobilisation had not been completed, and despite the tense security situation in the country including the targeting of UNAVEM II, the elections were held as scheduled on 29 and 30 September 1992. Again UNAVEM's technical assistance proved crucial. Most of the electoral personnel - approximately 25,000 people - were airlifted to the voting stations along with all required materials. In contrast with the pre-election situation, the situation during the elections was calm. The turnout was impressive. People often walked for hours to get to their polling station and queued for hours to cast their vote.[184]

Only a few minor incidents were reported, most of which were caused by the late arrival of voting materials or election officials. Only two more serious incidents occurred: UNITA soldiers surrounded a polling station in Luanda, but the situation was brought to a peaceful end by a government-UNITA joint police monitoring unit and UNAVEM police. UNITA was involved in another incident as well. Guards of Jonas Savimbi had stormed the neighbouring house of Savimbi's residence in Luanda and killed one government policemen, alleging that the house was used to plot an attack on Savimbi's life.[185]

Counting the ballots began as soon as the polling stations had closed in the evening of 30 September. From there, the ballots were brought to provincial offices, where they were counted again. Parallel to the counting by the Angolan authorities, monitored by UNAVEM, the UN mission carried out a Quick Count analysis of the presidential election. The same system had already been used in Namibia, Nicaragua and Haiti. Based on a quick analysis of the results in a carefully selected sample of polling stations, the final result was estimated. The forecast would serve as a secondary check for the freedom and fairness of the elections.[186]

In contrast to its effective technical support, UNAVEM's observation capacity was limited due to a lack of resources. These limitations applied to monitoring the voting and counting the

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[181] Statement by the President of the Security Council, 18 September 1992 (S/24573)

[182] Margaret Anstee 1996, p. 150

[183] ibid., pp. 188, 189; the air strip was located in a UNITA-held area.

[184] ibid., pp. 193-198

[185] ibid., p. 198

[186] ibid., p. 192

votes. Lacking an adequate number of observers and necessary transport, only two-thirds of Angola's 6,000 polling stations could be covered. Even at those 4,000 covered polling stations, monitoring was cursory. The observers spent an average of 20 minutes at the stations, enough time to observe approximately four voters completing and casting their ballot. There were similar problems with the monitoring of the counting of votes. However, in this case, UNAVEM could use its Quick Count as a means to alleviate the problem of cursory observation.[187]

The Quick Count was completed by 5 October. The prognosis suggested a clear victory for dos Santos in the presidential race. He had won 49.2 per cent, 0.8 per cent less than necessary for absolute majority and the presidency in the first election round. Savimbi had only received 38.2 per cent of the vote. Apart from outlining a high probability for a dos Santos victory, the prognosis issued a rather ambiguous assessment for the success of voter education. 12.6 per cent of the votes were spoiled. Of course, the result of the Quick Count was not published.[188]

The actual counting took much longer than anticipated. The more votes that were counted and the more evidence that was accumulated that the MPLA would win the elections, the more aggressive UNITA's behaviour became. On 2 October, UNITA congratulated the United Nations for having done a "very good job."[189] One day later, Jonas Savimbi issued the following alarmingly warlike statement:

> "It is a pity for me to tell you that the MPLA wants to cling to power illegally, tooth and nail, by stealing ballot boxes, beating up and deviating polling list delegates and distorting facts and numbers through its radio and television network. I appeal to all the Angolan people to remain serene. I appeal to all UNITA militants to remain vigilant as in the past. *At the right time, we will give an adequate response to the MPLA manoeuvre* (emphasis by MK)."[190]

UNITA was not willing to accept electoral defeat, because, first, it would have been a severe loss for the party to hand over its territories; second, UNITA had avoided demobilisation and still had the military resources to go back to war; and, third, the conditions for renewed military confrontation were favourable for UNITA.

First, UNITA was not an exhausted conflict party, but a movement which controlled vast terrain in eastern Angola, including a fully functioning state-within-a state. Popular support in these areas was forthcoming and the economic conditions were very favourable due to the diamond fields. UNITA had persistently failed to hand over its territories to the government as envisaged in the GPA. Accepting electoral defeat, however, would have left UNITA with little other choice.

Second, UNITA still had soldiers in arms. It had never embarked on an irreversible conflict transformation process as envisaged in the GPA. Critical provisions were left unimplemented, in particular the ones on cantonment and demobilisation. The military option was still present.

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[187] Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 25 November 1992 (S/24858), para. 10, 11
[188] Margaret Anstee 1996, p. 205
[189] Salupeto Pena, as quoted in: Margaret Anstee 1996, p. 200
[190] Jonas Savimbi, as quoted in: Margaret Anstee 1996, p. 201

Third, as will be discussed at length in the following section on the cease-fire, military conditions for the defence of its territories and even for an advance against government-held areas were favourable. UNITA had successfully defended itself against MPLA attacks for nearly 30 years. The government had not succeeded in taking south-east Angola even at the height of Cuban involvement with 50,000 troops. Meanwhile, these troops had withdrawn which crucially improved UNITA's military situation. Moreover, the cease-fire had removed pressure from UNITA. It was no longer the threatened insurgency movement fighting for its very survival.

Two days after Savimbi's warlike speech, UNITA underlined its preparedness to go back to war. All senior FAA members left the newly integrated armed forces.[191] Tensions between government and UNITA rose higher. On 10 October, the NEC agreed to carry out investigations in every provincial capital concerning the polling records, the left-over electoral material, the supplementary polling booths and on specific allegations. NEC assessed the findings and unanimously issued a statement that no major irregularities were found, and that only minor irregularities had been discovered. This assessment, however, was refuted by UNITA, although the party's representatives in NEC agreed with it.[192]

On 17 October, the official results were announced. The MPLA had won 53.74 per cent of the votes in the parliamentary elections, UNITA had received only 34.10 per cent. The result of the presidential elections largely verified the prognosis of the Quick Count. Dos Santos had won 49.57 per cent of the votes, Savimbi only 40.07 per cent.[193] However, since none of the candidates had received the majority of the votes, a second round was necessary. As John Marcum outlines, the non-core areas of MPLA and UNITA had determined the electoral outcome. Outside its core provinces, UNITA had failed to attract votes,[194] winning only in Huambo, Cuanda Cubango, Bié and Benguela. The rest of the provinces, except for one, was won by the MPLA.[195]

Margaret Anstee issued a public statement on the day that the results of the elections were announced, declaring that the elections had been free and fair:

> "The United Nations considers that while there were certainly some irregularities in the electoral process, these appear to have been mainly due to human error and inexperience. There was no conclusive evidence of major, systematic or widespread fraud, or that the irregularities were of a magnitude to have a significant effect on the results officially announced on 17 October. Nor, in view of their random nature, could it be determined that such irregularities had penalized or benefited only one party or set of parties. I therefore have the honour (...) to certify that, with all deficiencies taken into account, the elections held on 29 and 30 September can be considered to have been generally free and fair."[196]

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[191] Vladimir Krska 1997, p. 89

[192] Margaret Anstee 1996, pp. 233-235

[193] Africa Research Bulletin (Political Series), vol. 29, no. 10 (October 1992), pp. 10740-10743

[194] John Marcum 1993, p. 220

[195] Africa Research Bulletin (Political Series), vol. 29, no. 10 (October 1992), pp. 10740-10743; Zaire was won by the FNLA and Holden Roberto, who had returned from exile.

[196] Margaret Anstee, quoted in: Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 25 November 1992 (S/24858), para. 20

UNITA, however, continued to reject the results. MPLA and UNITA prepared for war again.

16.3.2 Mozambique: Conflict Transformation

The Mozambican conflict was successfully transformed after the elections had taken place. Although some irregularities occurred despite United Nations monitoring, the two parties accepted the electoral results. Frelimo won both the presidential and the parliamentary elections, Renamo had gained excess in the polity and to its resources with an electoral result which was higher than expected. The United Nations proved effective in providing technical support, and, supported by the international community, in facilitating talks between the two parties when Renamo threatened to boycott the elections.

Protocol III of the GPA prescribes "Principles of the electoral act": first, parliamentary and presidential elections would be held simultaneously one year after the signing of the Peace Accord.[197] This period could be extended if the necessary preconditions for general elections were absent.[198] Second, freedom of press and media access, association, expression and political activity would be guaranteed.[199] Third, the electoral system to be created would have to be based on the principle of absolute majority vote for the election to Presidency, and on the principle of proportional representation for election to the Assembly.[200] Fourth, a National Elections Commission (CNE) would be established. It would organise, conduct and monitor the electoral process as well as announce the results.[201]

In accordance with Protocol I and III, the UN's mandate in the subject field of presidential and parliamentary elections consisted of two functions: technical assistance, and monitoring and verification.[202] Technical assistance, provided for by UNDP, consisted of management, co-ordination and monitoring a US$ 64.5 million budget. UNDP trained 2,600 electoral officials, 8,000 census agents, 1,600 civic education agents and 52,000 polling officers, and also provided backup support and technical advice. Teams allocated to difficult-access areas were ferried to their destination. The monitoring and verification activities encompassed civic education of the electorate and impartiality of media, polling, vote counting and vote tabulation.[203] On the eve of the elections, the approximately 900 UN electoral observers were reinforced by observers from the

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[197] Protocol III, section V (1b) of the GPA (the treaty was signed on 7 August 1992)

[198] ibid.; these conditions are not specified in the GPA.

[199] Protocol III, section I, II of the GPA

[200] Protocol III, section V (5, 6) of the GPA

[201] Protocol III, section V (3) of the GPA

[202] External support for the electoral process is explicitly mentioned trice in the GPA: Protocol I states that the government would request technical and material support from the UN and the OAU as soon as the GPA is signed. Protocol III stipulates that government and Renamo would invite external observers, *inter alia* from the UN, in order to ensure the highest possible degree of impartiality. Finally, Protocol V outlines that government and Renamo would agree upon the external observers to be invited 60 days after E-Day.

[203] Boutros Boutros-Ghali 1995, pp. 56, 57

European Union and the Organisation of African Unity.[204] The overall number of international observers totalled more than 2,300.[205]

The time table for the electoral process as outlined in the GPA had become obsolete early in the transformation process, mainly due to the 16 months of delay in the cantonment and demobilisation process. The CNE had to re-schedule the electoral campaign period and the actual elections: the electoral campaign would take place between 10 September and 24 October, and the elections would be held simultaneously on 27 and 28 October 1994.[206]

Frelimo and Renamo held rallies throughout the country.[207] The campaign period began calmly, but the longer it took, the more serious violent incidents became. Several rallies of Frelimo and Renamo were disrupted by clashes between their supporters. Rhetoric became fiercer. Alfonso Dhlakama began to warn against the possibility of electoral fraud by Frelimo. This culminated in a speech in Nampula province where he reportedly said: "I have already won. Only by electoral fraud can Frelimo and Chissano win the elections."[208]

Boutros Boutros-Ghali formulated the dangers of these developments in his Report of the Secretary-General dating 21 October 1994, but did not consider the incidents serious enough to threaten the entire electoral process:

> "ONUMOZ (...) nevertheless believes that these incidents, despite their gravity, have not so far posed a serious threat to the democratic nature and fairness of the electoral process. Some public pronouncements made by certain candidates, however, could cast doubt on their commitment to accept the results of the elections. This is unfortunate and worrying."[209]

The situation exacerbated even more. On 25 October, two days before the elections were to take place, the Front Line States leaders met in Harare for discussions on Mozambique. Joaquim Chissano and Alfonso Dhlakama attended the meeting. The final statement stipulated that the fundamental conditions for free elections existed, but also warned that the region was not prepared to accept another cycle of war in Mozambique and that the Front Line States would take "appropriate and timely action" to keep peace in Mozambique after the elections.[210]

Alfonso Dhlakama felt humiliated and returned to Beira. From there, he alleged one day before the elections that Frelimo prepared for massive fraud and announced that Renamo would boycott the elections. The cause he cited for this boycott was the surplus of voter registration cards. Only 81 per cent of the estimated electorate was registered and had received a voter registration card. Therefore, there was a surplus of voter registration cards of approximately one million.

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[204] United Nations 1996, p. 725

[205] Boutros Boutros-Ghali 1995, p. 61

[206] The delays will be dealt with in more detail under the section on voter registration.

[207] Boutros Boutros-Ghali 1995, p. 60

[208] Alfonso Dhlakama, October 1994, as quoted in: Richard Snyge 1997, p. 127 (it is not evident whether this quote refers to the expected electoral results in Nampula province or in the entire country.)

[209] Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 21 October 1994 (S/1994/1196)

[210] Richard Snyge 1997, pp. 130, 131

Renamo had already demanded to destroy these surplus cards, but had received no response from the CNE, and now alleged that Frelimo would plan to distribute the cards to unregistered voters.[211]

The CNE refuted this complaint and pointed out that, according to the Electoral Law, a party had to withdraw from polling 15 days before the elections, a presidential candidate 72 hours beforehand. In the view of the CNE, therefore, Renamo and Dhlakama were still standing in the elections.[212] Despite Renamo's boycott, the electorate was proceeding to vote on the first day of the elections. Even the electoral monitors appointed by Renamo remained on duty. The announcement of the boycott came too late; Renamo could not reach the public quickly enough.[213]

Attempts of the international community to persuade Alfonso Dhlakama to come back into the game were enormous. The United States, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Portugal and the United Nations were at the forefront of these attempts. Boutros Boutros-Ghali issued a Statement of the Secretary-General and the Security Council a Message from the President, urging Renamo to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the elections.[214] Aldo Ajello spoke to Dhlakama on the telephone on the morning of 27 October and urged him to come to Maputo to participate in negotiations. The Renamo leader came to Maputo the same afternoon. Negotiations took the whole night and were finally successfully concluded in the morning of 28 October, the second election day. CSC and CNE reassured Dhlakama that the surplus voter cards would be destroyed in the presence of Frelimo and Renamo officials. At 11.20 A.M. Dhlakama announced on Radio Mozambique that Renamo would return to the elections. According to Ajello, the diplomatic efforts of Zimbabwe's Mugabe, South Africa's Mandela, Portugal's Soares and the White House played a crucial role in persuading Dhlakama to return to the elections.[215]

Due to Renamo's boycott on the first day, the elections were extended to 29 October. In many stations, more than 60 per cent of the registered voters had already turned out on 27 October, the first election day. The second day was much calmer and the third day almost unnecessary. At the end of the third day, the electoral observers counted the votes in front of the polling staff and immediately announced the results at each polling station. Escorted by safeguards, the ballots were taken to the provincial election offices for counting within seven days, and then to Maputo for the national count, scheduled to take another seven days.[216]

On 2 November, Aldo Ajello issued a preliminary statement saying

"the UN's observation would not support any possible claim of fraud or intimidation, or any other patterns of incidents that could have affected the credibility of the elections."[217]

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[211] Pamela Reed 1997, pp. 299, 300
[212] Boutros Boutros-Ghali 1995, p. 62
[213] ibid.
[214] Statement of the Secretary-General, 27 October 1994 (SG/SM75456); Message from the President of the Security Council, 27 October 1994 (SC/5922)
[215] Richard Snyge 1997, pp. 133, 134
[216] ibid., p. 135

The CNE gave a first indication of the final results on 7 November: Frelimo was leading with 52.17 per cent of the legislative votes against Renamo's 30.27 per cent and 62.61 per cent of the presidential vote against 26.52 per cent.[218] The final results were supposed to be announced on 14 November, but the deadline could not be met. Nevertheless, Alfonso Dhlakama telephoned to Boutros Boutros-Ghali saying that he would recognise the results though there had been major irregularities. On 19 November, five days after scheduled, the CNE announced the official results. 5,402,940 people had cast their vote, representing 87,9 per cent of the registered voters. Frelimo's candidate, Joaquim Chissano, had won the presidential elections with an absolute majority; no second ballot was necessary. Chissano had received 53.30 per cent and Dhlakama 33.73 per cent. Frelimo had won the parliamentary elections as well with 44.33 per cent versus Renamo's 37.78 per cent.[219]

Renamo lost the presidential and the parliamentary elections, but its result, especially in the parliamentary elections, was much better than expected by most observers. The party won five out of eleven provinces: Sofala, Manica, Tete, Zambézia and Nampula. Frelimo won the remaining six provinces: Maputo City, Maputo Province, Gaza, Inhambane, Niassa and Cabo Delgado.

Table 5: Distribution of seats in the National Assembly of Mozambique[220]

Province	Total Seats	Frelimo	Renamo	UD
Maputo City	18	17	1	0
Maputo Province	13	12	1	0
Gaza	16	15	0	1
Inhambane	18	13	3	2
Sofala	21	3	18	0
Manica	13	4	9	0
Tete	15	5	9	1
Zambézia	49	18	29	2
Nampula	54	20	32	2
Niassa	11	7	4	0
Cabo Delgado	22	15	6	1
Total	250	129	112	9

There were irregularities during the electoral process. Most worrying was the fact that there was a gap of more than 200,000 between the number of 6,363,311 registered voters given at the end of the voter registration process and the figure of 6,148,842 given as registered in the final table of results.[221]

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[217] Aldo Ajello, quoted in: Mozambique News Agency (AIM), no. 45 (November 1994). The speech is summarised in: Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, 9 November 1994 (S/1994/1282)

[218] Richard Snyge 1997, p. 64

[219] Boutros Boutros-Ghali 1995, p. 64; the União Democràtica (UD) also succeeded in entering Parliament. It won 5.15 per cent and obtained 9 seats.

[220] The table is taken from: Boutros Boutros-Ghali 1995, p. 64

[221] Richard Snyge 1997, p. 140

Nevertheless, the same day that the CNE announced the results of the elections, Aldo Ajello declared the elections free and fair:

> "Problems have occurred, irregularities were recorded and disruptions did take place. However, throughout the entire process there has been no event or series of events which could affect the overall credibility of the elections. (...) On behalf of the United Nations, I therefore declare that the elections held in Mozambique from 27 to 29 October 1994 were free and fair. The outcome of the Presidential elections and the composition of the new Assembly reflect the will of the Mozambican voters."[222]

Joaquim Chissano and Alfonso Dhlakama announced that they would abide by the results. Chissano congratulated the Mozambican people and the CNE, and acknowledged the roles played by external actors, including the United Nations. Dhlakama alleged that the elections had not been free and fair because Renamo had been discriminated against, but he emphasised that he and Renamo would respect the electoral results.[223]

Renamo, in contrast to UNITA in Angola, had gained by its electoral result, although executive power remained with Frelimo. It had gained access in the polity and to its resources, and had ceased to be an insurgency movement constantly struggling for its economic survival. Moreover, options other than acceptance of the electoral results were limited. Renamo had embarked on a conflict transformation process which was difficult to reverse. In particular, Renamo had given away its military option by having demobilised its troops.[224]

16.4 Cease-fire

The conflict transformation process provided a military advantage to both UNITA and Renamo. Gone was the heavy military pressure of MPLA and Frelimo. Moreover, Cuban and Zimbabwean troops had withdrawn from Angola and Mozambique, respectively. Having the resources to go back to war and having lost the elections, UNITA used the military advantage and waged a new war. For Renamo, however, conflict transformation was the means to overcome exhaustion, and it had given away its military option by implementing the GPA provisions on cantonment and demobilisation. Renamo accepted Frelimo's electoral victory. Armed hostilities ceased in Mozambique.

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[222] Statement by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, 19 November 1994 (SG/SM/5488)
[223] Richard Snyge 1997, p. 140
[224] for an elaboration on the significance of demobilisation see: Tendai Msengezi 1992

16.4.1 Angola: Return to War

The cease-fire was threatened from the moment it entered into force, because the withdrawal of Cuban troops and the elimination of the military stalemate of Mavinga provided a military advantage to UNITA. As soon as UNITA's electoral defeat transpired, it used these advantages and went back to war.

The conflict transformation process crucially improved UNITA's military situation due to two reasons:

First, Cuban troops had already withdrawn even before MPLA and UNITA began the GPA implementation process. At the height of its involvement, Cuba had deployed 50,000 troops on Angolan territory. Cuban intervention had been decisive in bringing the MPLA to power, to help it stay in power, and to counter UNITA. The withdrawal of the Cuban troop contingent meant a severe military weakening for the MPLA and a critical military strengthening for UNITA.

Second, the cease-fire eliminated the military stalemate of Mavinga which had made the conflict parties embark on a conflict transformation process. According to the GPA, all armed air, land or sea attacks, all offensive movements of troops, all attempts to occupy new positions without prior agreement between the parties, all new installations of weapons (including land mines), all patrol activities outside assembly areas, all violence against civilians, all hostile propaganda, and all receipt of lethal material would have to cease.[225] The "free circulation of persons and goods" would be guaranteed.[226] The cease-fire took away the military pressure from UNITA. As described in detail in the previous part of this study, MPLA and UNITA had agreed upon a conflict transformation process after the government's final assault on UNITA's headquarters had failed. The MPLA could not militarily defeat UNITA. The insurgency had been threatened in its very existence, but could narrowly escape the government offensive. The elimination of the military stalemate of Mavinga put an end to UNITA's precarious situation. UNITA ceased to be a beleaguered insurgency movement fighting for its very survival.[227]

However, as long as both parties hoped for electoral victory, the cease-fire held. Yet a series of incidents occurred already before. The United Nations was again hindered in playing a more effective role because of its weak mandate and resources. In accordance with the GPA, the role of the United Nations was confined to verifying and monitoring the establishment and the performance of joint government-UNITA cease-fire verification mechanisms, and did not encompass independent observation. Virginia Fortna adequately describes this role as "watch the watchers". The watchers, however, never completely established the verification mechanism.[228]

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[225] Attachment I, section II (6) of the GPA
[226] Attachment I, section I (5) of the GPA
[227] Moreover, UNITA suddenly had the opportunity to expand its non-military activities freely throughout the country. After 15 years UNITA again opened an office in Luanda and in its former provisional capital Huambo. In many parts of the country UNITA started a meaningful political campaign for the first time.
[228] Virginia Fortna 1993, p. 393

The resources allocated for this task were very limited. The Security Council, following a recommendation of the Secretary-General, authorised not more than a maximum number of 350 military observers for both the verification of the cease-fire and the demobilisation.[229] UNAVEM II's entire budget for 1991 was only US $52 million.[230]

Cease-fire violations occurred during the entire GPA implementation process. Initially, the violations did not pose a threat to the conflict transformation process. In his first report on the work of UNAVEM II, the Secretary-General listed the following incidents: on 7 August, UNITA stopped the governor of Malanje province outside the town of Malanje and forced him to return to the town. Two days later, a similar incident happened to a UNITA colonel who was stopped on his way to Menongue and forced to return to Cuito Cuanavale on 9 August.[231] On 13 September, the airport of Lucapa, held by UNITA, was targeted by small arms fire. On 21 September, approximately 200 UNITA supporters occupied the residential house of the Police Department. On 30 September, a UNITA colonel was ambushed and killed at Malanje.[232] At the beginning of January 1992, a party of seven British tourists were ambushed and four of them killed close to the town of Quilenges in a UNITA stronghold. The government and UNITA accused each other.[233]

The closer the elections came, the more the security situation was exacerbated. The most serious incident occurred in Benguela province. At the beginning of April 1992, a UNITA soldier had been killed by a government policeman in the town of Chongoroi. Approximately 40 heavily armed UNITA soldiers attacked government buildings in the town in reaction to this incident, took weapons from the police armoury, and burned down houses. The UNITA troops withdrew, taking five policemen hostage.[234] In mid-August, only six weeks before the elections, one of the sporadic clashes between MPLA and UNITA supporters - reported in many towns - escalated in Malanje. Shooting broke out; the United Nations evacuated its personnel from Malanje. The death toll was reported to be several times higher than the number of registered soldiers in the area.[235]

The deteriorating security situation is well documented in the wording of the Reports of the Secretary-General. On 31 October 1991, he wrote: "It is a great pleasure to be able to report to the Security Council that the cease-fire in Angola has now held for over five months. This is a result on which both sides are to be congratulated."[236] On 24 June 1992, in contrast, he worded: "(...) it is

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[229] Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 20 May 1991 (S/22627), para. 6, 16
[230] This was not approved before mid-August 1991. Initially, therefore, the expenses of UNAVEM II had to be covered by the budget of UNAVEM I. As a consequence, UNAVEM II had to be set up in stages, and took much longer to become operational than envisaged. By the beginning of June, only an advance party of 61 military observers were deployed. In October, after the monitoring of the demobilisation process was added to the observers' tasks, the contingent reached its maximum strength of 350.
[231] Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 31 October 1991 (S/23191), para. 22, 23
[232] ibid.
[233] Margaret Anstee 1996, p. 49
[234] Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 24 June 1992 (S/24145), para. 14
[235] Africa Research Bulletin (Political Series), vol. 29, no. 8 (August 1992)
[236] Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 31 October 1991 (S/23191), para. 30

also a matter of concern that the political and security atmosphere throughout Angola remains tense and could yet derail the process if not contained."[237]

The elections finally threw the country back into full-scale war because UNITA did not accept its defeat. On 2 October, two days after the elections, UNITA congratulated the United Nations to its performance during the elections.[238] One day later, however, after UNITA's electoral defeat had become evident, Jonas Savimbi alleged massive electoral fraud by the government and made the following warlike statement in his "Message to the Angolan Nation": "(...) the duty of us freedom fighters, those who through their blood and sweat brought about democracy to this country, to tell you that the MPLA is not winning the war and cannot win."[239]

The MPLA reacted virulently to the allegations in this statement, and accused UNITA of aiming to come to power as in 1975 after the Lisbon *coup*. More specifically, the government alleged movements of UNITA troops in the provinces of Bié, Moxico, Uige and Malanje. As had happened with a number of alleged cease-fire violations beforehand, the matter could not be investigated due to a lack of co-operation between the government and UNITA.[240]

On 5 October, UNITA officially announced that it would categorically reject the electoral process. The same day, all senior UNITA generals abandoned the newly formed Angolan Armed Forces (FAA). Despite all these major setbacks, a considerable diplomatic success was achieved on 10 October, when the National Electoral Council (NEC) agreed on how to investigate UNITA's complaints of electoral fraud. Although UNITA delayed the deployment of special NEC representatives to investigate alleged irregularities and failed to send the number of representatives agreed upon in NEC, at least an investigation could begin.[241]

During the time the investigations took place, the security situation deteriorated further. Two particularly serious incidents occurred: first, a bomb exploded under a car parked outside a hotel frequented by UNITA personnel and their families. Shooting took place between the government and UNITA and the latter took 10 antiriot policemen hostage. The government and UNITA accused each other of having planted the bomb. Second, an ammunition dump just outside the UNAVEM II headquarters exploded. It could not be determined whether it was an accident or sabotage.[242]

On 16 October, in an atmosphere of mutual accusation about cease-fire violations, the results of the investigation were officially announced: all investigators, including UNITA's representatives, had agreed that no major irregularities had occurred. UNITA, however, refuted the result of the investigations and stated it had known the outcome of the investigation from the outset. On 17 October, the electoral results were officially announced. The MPLA had won the

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[237] Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 24 June 1992 (S/24145), para. 43
[238] Margaret Anstee 1996, p. 200
[239] Jonas Savimbi, quoted in: Margaret Anstee 1996, p. 200
[240] Margaret Anstee 1996, p. 201
[241] ibid., pp. 206-218
[242] ibid., pp. 219, 229

parliamentary elections, but there was no winner of the presidential elections although dos Santos had come close to the 50 per cent threshold. The United Nations declared the elections free and fair that same day.[243]

However, both parties prepared for war: the many cantoned government and UNITA troops which were still not demobilised left their assembly points and joined the troops who never arrived at a cantonment area. The government began to prepare the defence of strategically important targets in the west of Angola. Priority was given to the defence of Luanda. UNITA forced government administrators to leave throughout the country. Fighting broke out in Huambo, Lobito, M'Banza Congo, Luanda Norte and Malanje. At the end of October, the war had reached Luanda.[244]

Given the withdrawal of the Cuban troops and the elimination of the military stalemate, UNITA made rapid gains throughout the country. By the end of 1993, it was reported that the insurgency movement held half of the country.[245] Huambo, Angola's second largest city, was in UNITA's hands. It took until 1994 before the government could stop UNITA's advance on all fronts.[246] The 350 military observers of UNAVEM II did not play any significant role in controlling the new war. The same applied to the 7,500 blue helmets of UNAVEM III, deployed on 8 February 1995.[247]

16.4.2 Mozambique: Cessation of Armed Hostilities

The specific military stalemate leading to the General Peace Agreement on Mozambique was eliminated at the beginning of the conflict transformation process as it was in Angola. This provided Renamo with an advantage as did the withdrawal of Zimbabwean troops. However, the internationally sponsored conflict transformation process was the only means to overcome the state of exhaustion.

The beginning of the cease-fire provided a military advantage to Renamo as it had to UNITA:

First, entering into force on 15 October 1992, the cease-fire eliminated the specific military stalemate which had made the parties embark on conflict transformation. The cease-fire was negatively defined so as not to

> "carry out any kind of attack by land, sea, or air; organize patrols or offensive manoeuvres; occupy new positions; lay mines and prevent mine-clearing operations; interfere with military communications; carry out any kind of reconnaissance operations; carry out acts of sabotage and terrorism; acquire or receive lethal equipment; carry out acts of violence against the civilian population; restrict or prevent without justification the free movement of persons and

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[243] ibid. p. 235
[244] ibid., p. 263-327
[245] SIPRI Yearbook 1993, p. 115
[246] James Ciment 1997, p. 213
[247] United Nations 1996, p. 716

property; carry out any other military activity which, in the opinion of the CCF and the United Nations, might jeopardize the cease-fire."[248]

This removed any military pressure from Renamo. The government stopped its large-scale offensives in central Mozambique and Renamo returned to its strongholds. The headquarters was again established in the Gorongosa mountains.

Second, the Zimbabwean troops withdrew during the conflict transformation process. Government offensives had always been successful when government soldiers were joined by Zimbabwean troops. Most remarkably, Zimbabwean troops twice succeeded in taking Renamo's headquarters casa banana. The 5,300 United Nations troops were no compensation for this. In sharp contrast to the Zimbabwean troops, they were lightly armed soldiers, having the capability of acting as passive interpostion force but not as combat troops.[249]

However, as outlined above, the international community provided enough incentives for Renamo to stay in the conflict transformation process and to relinquish its military option. The cease-fire held; only isolated incidents occurred.

The United Nations had the mandate to monitor and verify the cease-fire. The Security Council approved the deployment of 25 military observers in resolution 782 (1992) on 13 October. Two days after the GPA entered into force, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Mozambique, Aldo Ajello, and 21 military observers arrived in Mozambique. On 20 October, the military observers were deployed in Nampula and Beira.[250]

At the very beginning of the cease-fire implementation, the government and Renamo accused each other of cease-fire violations. Renamo alleged troop movements of government forces violating Protocol VI, section I (5b) of the GPA in Nampula, Zambézia and Tete. The government alleged attacks of Renamo troops on the towns of Angoche and Memba in Nampula, as well as on Maganja de Costa and Lugela in Zambézia.[251]

Initially, these allegations could not be investigated due to two reasons: first, the small contingent proved ineffective to investigate cease-fire violations. As Boutros Boutros-Ghali notes, "major violations reported in the days following the cease-fire could not be effectively investigated."[252]

Second, the CCF could not take action because it had not yet been established. Renamo was still absent from Maputo and communication was difficult. Expressing his concern about the development, Boutros Boutros-Ghali officially informed the Security Council about these issues in a letter to the Security Council on 23 October 1992. Four days later, the Security Council worded a

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[248] Protocol VI, section I (5b) of the GPA

[249] The blue helmets were primarily of psychological importance. The 5,300 troops gave ONUMOZ a visible military presence in Mozambique. Whether the lightly armed troops, many of them ill-equipped and ill-trained, had been able to militarily counter a serious threat of the cease-fire, is highly doubtful.

[250] Boutros Boutros-Ghali 1995, p. 24

[251] Letter of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 23 October 1992

[252] Boutros Boutros-Ghali 1995, p. 24

Presidential Statement emphasising that the implementation of the cease-fire was the necessary precondition for the presence of ONUMOZ.[253]

It took a long time before these problems were resolved. The Security Council approved the establishment of ONUMOZ in Security Council Resolution 797 (1992) on 16 December 1992, and thereby created the legal basis for a crucial enlargement of the operation. Yet no sooner than in February 1993 did new military observers arrive in Mozambique. By mid-March 1993, 154 observers had been deployed, primarily in Maputo, Beira, Matola and Nampula.[254]

On 4 November, the most important obstacle for the verification of the cease-fire seemed to be removed. Renamo sent a delegation to Maputo and the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC) was appointed which agreed upon the composition of the CCF and other commissions on its first meeting. The United Nations assumed its chairpersonship as provided for in the GPA. However, the verification mechanism was obstructed again from March to June 1993 because Renamo's delegation had left Maputo. Claiming a violation of Protocol III, section V, para. 7/b,c of the GPA, Renamo alleged that the government would not provide enough logistical support and that the international community would fail to provide the necessary resources for Renamo's transformation into a political party.[255]

In June, Renamo returned to Maputo and the CCF could resume its work. The commission immediately began to investigate the 40 alleged cease-fire violations. After investigation by UN observers, Renamo was condemned because of the occupation of Salamanga, Maputo Province, and for the detention of 27 people in June and July 1993 at the same place. Renamo had occupied Salamanga after E-Day and detained the people, alleging that they had hunted in a Renamo-controlled area without permission from Renamo.[256] The government was condemned because of its occupation of villages in Tete and in Gaza in June 1993.[257]

The government had reacted to the cease-fire violation of Renamo by an own cease-fire violation. Aldo Ajello strongly condemned this retaliation:

> "I am very concerned by the attitude of some high-ranking government authorities who think they have the right to counterattack when Renamo occupies an area illegally. That's a dangerous philosophy. It would make the UN useless here and could lead to renewed conflict."[258]

Apart from these two major incidents at the beginning of the GPA implementation process, only minor violations of the cease-fire occurred which did not have the potential to threaten the

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[253] Statement of the President of the Security Council, 27 October 1992
[254] Boutros Boutros-Ghali 1995, p. 28, the maximum strength of the military observer contingent was 354 in mid-1994.
[255] ibid., p. 29
[256] The latter part of the violation of the GPA highlighted a particular problem of the conflict transformation process for the first time: public administration. Renamo was very reluctant of giving up control in its strongholds in central Mozambique.
[257] Boutros Boutros-Ghali 1995, p. 33
[258] Aldo Ajello, quoted in: Mozambican Peace Process Bulletin, no. 5 (August 1993), pp. 5, 6

transformation process. Most of these violations were linked to the issue of public administration, dealt with in Protocol V, section III (9a) of the GPA :

> "The Parties recognize that the public administration in the Republic of Mozambique during the period between the entry into force of the cease-fire and the time when the new Government takes office will continue to obey the law in force and to be conducted through the institutions provided for by law."[259]

Renamo, however, continued to implement its own law. Renamo's detention of hunters in Salamanga was already mentioned above. Two similar incidents occurred: in March 1993, Renamo detained 23 people in Zambézia, 21 of whom were policemen. The justification given by Renamo was that the persons were heavily armed.[260] In June, nine persons were detained on alleged grounds of illegal hunting in Zitundo, near to the border of the South African province of Kwazulu-Natal.[261] The cases were investigated, but the CCF did not condemn the detentions. Boutros Boutros-Ghali mentioned the incidents in several of his Reports to the Security Council, but the Security Council did not take action.[262]

16.5 Summary

UNAVEM II failed to facilitate the implementation of critical GPA provisions in the subject areas of political commissions, cantonment and demobilisation, presidential and parliamentary elections and cease-fire. ONUMOZ, on the contrary, succeeded in doing so. Failure and success in these four subject areas proved decisive for the entire conflict transformation process. Angola lapsed back into full-scale internal war, whereas the Mozambican conflict was successfully transformed.

The political commissions were the key to success and failure of conflict transformation. The conflict parties had to create the necessary preconditions for the implementation of GPA provisions and had to find solutions for problems arising from this process. The Angolan parties failed, whereas the Mozambican ones succeeded. This fundamentally different outcome was caused both by different conflict situations and by the different depth and scope of the United Nations political mandate. Conflict transformation in Angola was much more difficult than in Mozambique from the outset because the Angolan parties still had the resources to continue their war. In Mozambique, on the contrary, the conflict parties were exhausted and this exhaustion could only be overcome by a kind of interaction other than war. Prospects for ending the Angolan war further deteriorated during the conflict transformation process. The Soviet Union collapsed and its pressure on the MPLA ceased. The United States, inheriting its partial role from a decades-old alliance with

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[259] Protocol V, section III (9a) of the GPA
[260] Mozambique News Agency (AIM), no. 6 (April 1993), p. 3
[261] Mozambique News Agency (AIM), no. 12 (July 1993), p. 1
[262] These incidents are mentioned explicitly or implicitly in the Report of the Secretary-General to the Security-Council of 10 September 1993, 1 November 1993 and 28 January 1994

UNITA, failed to compel UNITA. In Mozambique, on the contrary, Frelimo remained and Renamo became dependent on donor aid. Assistance was distributed through the United Nations, which connected support to substantial progress in the conflict transformation process. The United Nations ability to offer financial incentives to overcome exhaustion, combined with its comprehensive political mandate, enabled ONUMOZ to facilitate solutions to urgent political problems. In Angola, on the contrary, the United Nations failed to facilitate political solutions. Given the Angolan conflict situation, it would have been difficult, perhaps impossible, for any multifunctional peace-support operation to positively influence the political dialogue between the conflict parties. Yet UNAVEM II, given its lack of resources and a very limited political mandate, never had the capability at least to attempt to give the conflict transformation process new impulses.

Failure and success in the subject area of cantonment and demobilisation was a direct consequence of the work in the political commissions. Cantonment and demobilisation were among the most important and most disputed issues in the commissions. Lacking external and economical pressure to transform conflict, MPLA and UNITA failed to implement the GPA provisions in this subject area. The United Nations, lacking resources and an adequate mandate, failed to facilitate the actual cantonment and demobilisation as well as the setting up of an effective monitoring and verification mechanism. ONUMOZ, on the contrary, succeeded in setting up an effective monitoring and verification due to sufficient resources and an adequate mandate. It further succeeded in facilitating the actual cantonment and demobilisation by offering financial incentives for the exhausted conflict parties.

The electoral process in Angola was threatened from the very beginning by the outstanding solution of urgent political problems, particularly uncompleted cantonment and demobilisation. The fact that the Angolan conflict transformation process was easily reversible offered the loser of the elections the option to continue the war. In Mozambique, however, the conflict transformation process had gained momentum and the solution of the most important political issues, in particular the completion of demobilisation, made it considerably more difficult to resort back to armed struggle. The United Nations played an important role during the conduct of the elections. Its technical assistance proved indispensable. Monitoring and verification was more effective in Mozambique than in Angola, but still sufficient in the latter case. This was the necessary precondition for the successful conclusion of the Mozambican conflict transformation process, but insufficient to facilitate the successful conclusion of the one in Angola. Renamo was more than a loser in the elections. The electoral results for Renamo were better than expected. In addition to this, the former insurgency movement had gained access into the polity and its resources, and had stopped to constantly struggle for its economic survival as an insurgency movement with weak popular support and with virtually no external support. Moreover, the opposition party had embarked on a conflict transformation process which was difficult to reverse. Most importantly, the

demobilisation had ruled out the military option. The loser of the Angolan elections reacted very differently. UNITA, instead of handing over its areas of control in eastern Angola, including its fully functioning state-within-a state and its diamond mines, took the military option. The conflict transformation process was easily reversible because crucial GPA provisions, particularly in regard to cantonment and demobilisation, had not been implemented. Moreover, a new military situation caused by the conflict transformation process favoured UNITA militarily.

The cease-fire was threatened by a new military situation, which was created by the conflict transformation process and which favoured the insurgency movements: first, the foreign troops which had decisively strengthened the government forces withdrew before the GPA entered into force in Angola, and withdrew during the GPA implementation process in Mozambique. Second, the cease-fire removed the heavy pressure of the governments against the insurgency movements. Before the elections, the cease-fire held. The United Nations monitoring and verification activities played an important role in resolving incidents. Again, ONUMOZ was more effective in performing this task than UNAVEM II due to a more comprehensive mandate and more resources. After the elections, however, the cease-fire collapsed in Angola, whereas armed hostilities had finally come to an end in Mozambique. Having lost the elections, UNITA took advantage of the new military situation. Due to the Cuban withdrawal and the removal of government pressure on Jamba, UNITA's military prospects to not only defend its strongholds, but to also advance throughout the country had never been better. The insurgency movement made rapid gains in the entire country. The 350 military observers of UNAVEM II failed to control the renewed hostilities as did the 7,500 blue helmets which were later deployed. This highlights again the fact that peace-support is no means for coercion, but dependent on the political will of the conflict parties involved. Renamo was similarly advantaged as UNITA by the new military situation, although the involvement of Zimbabwean troops was far less significant than the one of the Cuban troop contingent. However, Renamo did not take advantage of this situation. It had embarked on an internationally sponsored conflict transformation process to overcome its state of exhaustion, which was difficult to reverse. Moreover, the electoral defeat had been a gain for Renamo. An electoral result which was better than expected provided Renamo entry into the polity and access to its resources. Its struggle for economic survival ceased.

17 Similar Problems of Effectiveness of UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ

UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ had similar problems to facilitate the implementation of GPA provisions in the subject areas of performance of local police and voter registration. None of these problems, however, proved decisive for success or failure of the entire conflict transformation process.

17.1 Monitoring and Verification of Performance of Local Police

The Angolan and the Mozambican conflict transformation process show how unlikely it is that police forces suddenly begin to abide by the rule of law and allow for transparency of their activities once a peace agreement enters into force after decades of internal war. Two specific problems could not be solved: first, serious human rights violations could not be prevented; second, allegations made by the insurgency movements that the governments would build a new army in disguise of elite police contingents could not be adequately investigated. United Nations observers proved ineffective in overcoming these problems because the conflict parties undermined the monitoring mechanism.

17.1.1 Human Rights Violations and Avoidance of Demobilisation in Angola

Monitoring and verification of the police was another question which remained unresolved in the political commissions. In failing to fully implement the monitoring and verification mechanism as outlined in the GPA, the government and UNITA decisively undermined the ability of United Nations civilian police (UNCIVPOL) to effectively monitor the police. Serious human rights violations could not be prevented and UNITA's allegation that the government would establish a parallel army by incorporating demobilised soldiers in the anti-riot police could not be adequately investigated.

According to the GPA, the police would continue to perform its functions under the responsibility of the government. Yet, in order to ensure its impartiality, the police would be monitored by teams of observers composed of the government, UNITA, and one representative of the United Nations.[263] There would be no restrictions of movement for the monitoring teams throughout the entire Angolan territory.[264] The mandate of the monitoring teams was explicitly

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[263] Attachment III, section II (2) of the GPA
[264] Attachment III, section III (3, 4) of the GPA

outlined in the GPA: visitation of police facilities, examination of police activities, and investigation of possible human rights violations committed by the police.[265]

The Secretary-General included monitoring and verification of police activities in UNAVEM's mandate as authorised by the Security Council on 30 May 1991.[266] UNCIVPOL was deployed in late August and during September.[267] By October, deployment was completed. Teams of three or four CIVPOL officers were in place in all 18 provincial capitals.[268]

However, the government and UNITA showed little interest in police monitoring activities. CIVPOL could not begin carrying out its mandate, because the government-UNITA joint monitoring teams were not yet established. These monitoring groups were established no sooner than January 1992 and became operational in all provinces as late as in mid-June 1992.[269] Yet, this did not solve all problems. The joint verification mechanism outlined in the GPA was never completely implemented by the government and UNITA. Both sides gave logistical reasons for the lack of implementation, such as lack of transport, office space or communications, even though the United Nations provided logistical support.[270]

Since the verification mechanism was not completely implemented, an effective monitoring of police activities did not take place. Two particular problems arose:

First, alleged human rights violations could not be investigated. UNITA accused the government of having killed nine of its members between June and August 1991. Two UNITA defectors reported that two former high-ranking UNITA officials and their families had been killed in Jamba in August 1991 on order of Jonas Savimbi. UNITA was further accused of having killed four government air-force officers, two of whom had been buried alive.[271] Amnesty international reported that 40 people, most of them UNITA supporters, were detained in Luanda during the visit of Pope John-Paul II and subsequently released uncharged in June 1992. During the elections, the government reportedly detained at least twelve UNITA members who were also released uncharged when the elections were over. Reports about maltreatment of prisoners remained a feature of the government's human rights record. According to reports of amnesty international, beatings and other forms of ill-treatment of political detainees and criminal suspects were common practice, and torture was used during interrogation.[272]

Second, the government could establish its "anti-riot" police without being effectively monitored. In April 1992 UNITA protested vehemently in the CCPM against an assignment of

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[265] ibid.

[266] Security Council Resolution 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991

[267] Virginia Fortna 1993, p. 399

[268] Margaret Anstee 1993, p. 69

[269] Virginia Fortna 1993, p. 399

[270] Margaret Anstee 1993, p. 69; the entire monitoring system was almost completely dependent on UNAVEM's transport and communications facilities.

[271] amnesty international report 1992, pp. 4-7

[272] amnesty international report 1993, p. 53; similar sources on the situation in UNITA's prisons are not available.

[273] Margaret Anstee 1993, p. 72

equipment for the police, including lethal items, arriving at the port of Lobito.[273] Although designed for the police, this was a breach of the GPA, defining the cessation of armed hostilities as, *inter alia*, the stop of all receipt of lethal material by the government and UNITA.[274] Political tensions between government and UNITA further escalated when the addressee of the equipment became known. The government was in the process of establishing an "anti-riot" police force. UNITA alleged that the government was integrating its best troops into the anti-riot police, thereby creating a new elite unit of government forces, and claimed that 30,000 former government troops had been already transferred into the anti-riot police by 15 August 1992. The government, on the contrary, held that this police unit numbered only 1,030, and that is would attain its projected total of 1,516, by December 1992. Due to insufficient monitoring, no facts could be determined and UNITA kept alleging with vehemence that the anti-riot police was a parallel army.[275]

17.1.2 Human Rights Violations and Avoidance of Demobilisation in Mozambique

UNCIVPOL in Mozambique failed to fulfil its mandate as it did in Angola because the conflict parties did not co-operate with the United Nations monitors and the United Nations concentrated its pressure and financial incentives on other issues to facilitate conflict transformation. Serious human rights violations could not be prevented and the government's "Quick Reaction Police" was not observed at all.

According to the GPA, the police would continue to perform its functions under the responsibility of the government. Three guarantees were outlined: impartiality,[276] human and citizen rights,[277] and compliance with the GPA.[278] The compliance with these principles would be verified by a National Police Affairs Commission (COMPOL).[279]

The GPA did not contain any provisions for a role to be played by an external actor. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, however, emphasised previously in his operational plan the desirability of a police component:

> "While the agreement does not provide a specific role for United Nations civilian police in monitoring the neutrality of the Mozambican police, experience elsewhere suggests that this could be desirable in order to inspire confidence that violations of civil liberties, human rights and political freedom will be avoided."[280]

Renamo also called for a UNCIVPOL contingent in ONUMOZ. Almost from the beginning of the implementation period onwards, Renamo had expressed its concern over the role

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[274] Attachment I, section II (6) of the GPA
[275] Margaret Anstee 1993, pp. 71-77
[276] as general principle: Protocol IV, section V (1) of the GPA; in regard to political parties: Protocol IV, section V (1) of the GPA
[277] Protocol IV, section V (1) of the GPA
[278] ibid.
[279] Protocol IV, section V (7) of the GPA

of the police and alleged that the government would incorporate demobilised soldiers into police ranks. Renamo called for a monitoring and verification mechanism to be performed by a UNCIVPOL contingent in order to reassure that the government would abide by the GPA. It announced early in 1993 that it would not start demobilisation before such a UN police contingent had arrived.[281] In early September 1993, Joaquim Chissano and Alfonso Dhlakama finally agreed to request an UNCIVPOL contingent.[282]

On 13 September, the Secretary-General sent a small survey team to Mozambique.[283] On 5 November the Security Council authorised the immediate deployment of 128 police observers.[284] 125 observers arrived in Maputo and in provincial capitals in November 1993. On 23 February 1994, the Security Council crucially enlarged the number of authorised police observers from 128 to 1,144 as previously suggested by the Secretary-General.[285] The monitors were deployed at UNCIVPOL's headquarters in Maputo, 10 regional and provincial headquarters, and 83 posts were established throughout the country, 15 of them in Renamo controlled areas.[286]

Although the number of UNCIVPOL officers in ONUMOZ was significantly greater than in UNAVEM II, police monitoring proved to be as ineffective in Mozambique as in Angola: it failed to prevent serious human rights violations and it failed to monitor the government's Quick Reaction Police.

Serious human rights violations could not be prevented because the conflict parties persistently failed to react to UNCIVPOL reports. UNCIVPOL had the mandate to independently investigate the performance of the PRM (Police of the Republic of Mozambique) and the Renamo "police". Five sets of serious human rights violations were observed: detention of persons without legal reason, detention of accused persons for more than the legal period, use of excessive force, torture and even killing detainees.[287] These gross human rights violations were reported to the National Police Affairs Commission (COMPOL), but this commission persistently failed to take action. Referring to the police of the government police, Ali Mahmoud comments: "In the absence of any authority to take action against the PRM the entire efforts of CIVPOL in dealing with complaints regarding abuse of power and violation of human rights became futile."[288]

The Quick Reaction police was not monitored at all during the entire conflict transformation process. Monitoring and verification of human rights was not the primary reason

[280] ibid.
[281] Boutros Boutros-Ghali 1995, pp. 34, 35
[282] Letter of President Chissano and Mr. Dhlakama to the United Nations from 8 September 1993 (S/26432)
[283] Boutros Boutros-Ghali 1995, pp. 34, 35
[284] Security Council Resolution 882 (1993)
[285] Security Council Resolution 898 (1994) and Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council of 28 January 1994, Addendum 1 (S/1994/89)
[286] Richard Snyge 1997, pp. 119-121
[287] In addition to this, Renamo persistently failed to account for people detained before the GPA entered into force. Renamo, on contrast to the government, did not free one political prisoner and maintained that those, it had captured before the GPA came into effect, were living freely in Renamo-held areas (amnesty international report 1993, p. 215 and 1994 p. 221).
[288] Ali Mahmoud 1996, p. 47

why Renamo had insisted on a CIVPOL element. Renamo's primary incentive was to prevent the government from incorporating demobilised soldiers into the Quick Reaction Police, and thereby creating an elite troop contingent under the disguise of the police. The government, however, completely failed to comply with PRM verification procedures in the case of the Quick Reaction Police.[289]

17.2 Voter Registration

In both Angola and Mozambique little time was left for the voter registration process and preparations focussed already very much on the elections itself. This resulted in a lack of resources which caused serious logistical difficulties for the registration of eligible voters and for monitoring the process in both Angola and Mozambique. The United Nations played a vital role in overcoming logistical difficulties, but could not prevent the exclusion of certain difficult access areas from voter registration and/or monitoring.

17.2.1 Geographical Limits of Voter Registration in Angola

The United Nations, supported by funds from member states, could resolve only the most urgent logistical problems. After a dispute between Pretoria and Luanda put an end to South African air support, difficult access areas could not be reached any more by voter registration teams. These logistical difficulties also had negative repercussions on the monitoring and verification mechanism.

On 10 November 1991, the Angolan government announced that the elections would be held in September 1992.[290] One month later, it requested the United Nations to provide technical assistance for voter registration and to monitor and verify the process.[291] A project on technical assistance for the electoral process by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was signed in January 1992. A small team of international and national consultants on electoral organisation, logistics and communications would be created, and, in addition to this, UNDP would seek to co-ordinate bilateral foreign assistance.[292] Also in January 1992, 98 UNAVEM observers arrived in Angola to monitor and verify the voter registration process. It was clear from the outset

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[289] ibid., p. 45; apart from its core function, monitoring and verification of local police, UNCIVPOL assisted in the electoral process. It guarded voter registration teams in Renamo controlled areas, provided transport, its communication system played a crucial role in the management of the elections and transmissions of results, and it contributed 550 officers to the electoral observer contingent.
[290] Fen Hampson 1996, p. 111
[291] Vladimir Krska 1997, p. 85
[292] Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 3 March 1992 (S/23671), para. 4

however, that monitoring and verification would be confined to sample observation, given the vast territory of the country and the small number of observers.[293]

Voter registration did not begin before May 1992. Government and UNITA had agreed at the beginning of the conflict transformation process that a National Electoral Council (NEC), not provided for in the GPA, would be established and that this commission would announce the time period in which voter registration was to take place. This announcement was to be made 30 days in advance. However, the establishment of NEC was postponed again and again, and when it finally took place on 9 May 1992, NEC was under pressure to proceed as fast as possible to meet the deadline of September for the elections. On its second meeting, it scheduled voter registration from 20 May to 31 July 1992.[294]

Little time was left for necessary preparations. External support helped overcome the most urgent logistical problems. The particularly urgent issue of air support was resolved by South Africa. Given the vast territory of the country, neither voter registration nor the monitoring of this process would be possible without adequate air support. South Africa had offered to provide air support and Angola's government, after mediation by the United Nations, had agreed to the assistance of its former arch enemy before NEC was even established.[295]

After NEC had announced the beginning and deadline of voter registration, three donor meetings were held before the beginning of registration. The United States pledged to provide US $1.5 million to the UNDP technical assistance project, US $1 million for seminars, and US $2.8 million for air support; Portugal pledged to provide 40 additional vehicles; the United Kingdom provided 20 Land Rovers and a metal bridge; the European Community offered ECU 2 million for air support, and Italy contributed ECU 1 million for air support.[296]

This support, however, solved only the most urgent logistical problems. Most importantly, air support was completely dependent on South Africa, a contribution which was persistently threatened by the history of war between Luanda and Pretoria. At the time when donors pledged their scarce support for the voter registration process, they already focussed on the preparation of the actual elections. Preparations for funding began which later enabled the United Nations to assemble the largest air operation ever undertaken for electoral assistance during the elections. 54 helicopters and 12 fixed wing planes constituted a miniature air force.[297]

Voter registration began as scheduled on 20 May 1992. Given a registration period of 10 weeks and an estimated 5,3 million eligible voters, progress was initially alarmingly slow. After four weeks, only about 500 of the planned 1,400 joint government-UNITA registration teams had

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[293] ibid., para. 25, 31
[294] Margaret Anstee 1993, p. 98
[295] ibid., pp. 94-96
[296] ibid., pp. 99-102
[297] Margaret Anstee 1993, p. 188

been established.[298] By 2 June 100,000 voters were registered, by 16 June, four weeks after the beginning, 370,000 were registered.[299]

Voter registration proceeded faster when the South African air support became fully operational. After six weeks, by 30 June, 750,000 voters were registered; by 11 July, 2,600,000 were registered. However, when the deadline was reached on 31 July only 4,303,266 million voters or 81 per cent of the NEC's estimation of 5.3 million were registered. Given this significant gap of nearly 20 per cent, NEC announced an extension of the voter registration process until 10 August.[300]

Meanwhile, however, tensions between Luanda and Pretoria had escalated once more. The Angolan government put an end to South Africa's air support on 6 August and asked the South Africans to withdraw forthwith. Precipitant for the new conflict between Luanda and Pretoria was the entrance of a South African military supply-cum-hospital ship into the port of Luanda, which allegedly was not clarified with the Angolan government beforehand.[301]

The loss of South African air support was a serious blow for the voter registration process which could not be compensated. In particular, difficult access areas in the east, largely held by UNITA, could not be reached any more. By 10 August, 4,860,000 voters had been registered, 92 per cent of the estimated number of eligible voters.[302] However, it was all too obvious that voter registration had missed its aim to register all eligible voters by more than 8 per cent.

First, the estimated number of eligible voters had proven to be unreliable. In some provinces more than 100 per cent of the estimated number had been registered, in others only 60 per cent.[303] Therefore, the conclusion of NEC that 92 per cent of eligible voters had been registered was not supported by reliable evidence.

Second, repercussions on the field to the ending of voter registration strongly suggested that the process had not been completed. In remote UNITA-held areas, unregistered potential voters demonstrated, threatened register teams, and took hostages. Cuando Cubango, Moxico and Uige were particularly affected. Similar incidents did not occur in government-held areas.[304]

The logistical problems also seriously affected the monitoring and verification mechanism. In many areas, NEC was unable to verify that only those persons had been registered who fulfilled age and citizen requirements. Verification proved to be particularly difficult in UNITA-held areas.[305] The small number of United Nations observers was unable to alleviate this problem.

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[298] Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 24 June 1992 (S/24145), para. 33
[299] Margaret Anstee 1993, pp. 103-108
[300] ibid.
[301] ibid., pp. 108-111; part of the agreement between Luanda and Pretoria had been that the Angolan government provided accommodation for the South African soldiers. The former never kept the promise and the South African soldiers had to camp in abysmal conditions. The ship was aimed to improve these conditions.
[302] Keith Somerville 1993, p. 63
[303] Marina Ottaway 1997, p. 8
[304] Margaret Anstee 1993, pp. 117-119
[305] Keith Somerville 1993, p. 63

Numerous attempts of the United Nations to convince NEC to extend the period of voter registration failed.[306] Although there was evidence that the voter registration process was disadvantageous to UNITA, Jonas Savimbi agreed with the result. He merely emphasised that such difficulties should not occur in the actual voting process.[307]

17.2.2 Geographical Limits of Voter Registration in Mozambique

The United Nations played a crucial role in coping with the logistical problems of the voter registration process. However, not all problems could be resolved, which had negative repercussions on the registration of voters and on monitoring the process in difficult access areas, particularly in central Mozambique, Renamo's stronghold.

Although elections were originally envisaged to be held on 15 October 1993, voter registration did not begin before 1 June 1994. Delays in the demobilisation process had put the entire conflict transformation process badly behind schedule. Moreover, the government and Renamo agreed upon the electoral law and the composition of the National Elections Commission (CNE), which was to initiate voter registration no sooner than in November 1993.[308]

The United Nations performed three tasks in the subject area of voter registration: technical assistance, provision of security for registration teams, and monitoring and verification.[309] The first function, technical assistance, was performed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The most important technical assistance was transport. After the CNE had established 1,600 five-person brigades throughout the country, UNDP helped to ferry them to all parts of the country, and provided them with camping equipment and food.[310] The second function, provision of security for the registration teams, was performed by the UNCIVPOL contingent. It was added to ONUMOZ's functions because registration teams were hesitant to enter Renamo areas without protection.[311] The third function, monitoring and verification, was performed by 148 officers of ONUMOZ's electoral division who were stationed throughout the country and carried out investigations independently from the CNE.[312]

Despite crucial technical support by UNDP, not all logistical problems could be resolved. The preparations for the actual elections had already begun and absorbed more attention than the voter registration process. During the elections UNDP was able to recruit 2,600 electoral officers,

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[306] ibid., p. 117; NEC's decision on this matter was taken with a large majority. Therefore, at least some UNITA representatives must have agreed with this decision.

[307] ibid.

[308] The delays and their causes will be outlined in detail in the section on the political commissions.

[309] Only the first and the third function were explicitly mentioned in ONUMOZ's mandate as approved by the Security Council in Resolution 797 (1992). The second one was added because the registration teams perceived it as too dangerous to enter Renamo areas without protection.

[310] Richard Snyge 1997, p. 122

[311] Michael Turner 1997, p. 7

800 census agents and 52,000 polling officers due to forthcoming external support. Voter registration, on the contrary, was performed by only 8,000 registration agents.[313] The difference in the number of monitoring personnel was similarly large: only 148 United Nations officers monitored the voter registration, whereas 2,300 observers from the European Union, the Organisation of African Unity, and the United Nations monitored the actual elections.[314]

The registration process started well in the north and in the south of the country, but was initially very slow in the difficult access areas of central Mozambique. By providing security for the registration teams, UNCIVPOL succeeded in speeding up voter registration in Renamo territories to a considerable degree. Logistical difficulties to enter difficult access areas in central Mozambique, however, could never be completely overcome. The only practical means to reach these areas were helicopters, and maintaining supplies for the registration teams was a constant logistical challenge. Due to these difficulties, some Renamo areas remained excluded from voter registration during the entire process.[315]

The estimated number of eligible voters in Mozambique was 7,894,850.[316] On 15 August, the envisaged last day of registration, 5,636,000 voters had been registered. Due to the problems of getting into Renamo areas, and the high number of demobilised soldiers and refugees returning to their home areas, registration remained incomplete.[317]

Therefore, the National Assembly twice decided to extend the registration process. By 20 August 1994, 6,034,066 voters had been registered. By 2 September, the final deadline, 6,363,311 had been registered. Although only 81 per cent of the estimated number of eligible voters had registered, the process was regarded as completed.[318] Voter registration was disadvantageous to Renamo. It was in the difficult access areas of central Mozambique, Renamo's stronghold, where voter registration could not completely overcome logistical difficulties. However, Renamo did not formally protest against the result of the registration process.[319]

Logistical difficulties, caused by insufficient resources, also affected the ability of the United Nations to monitor and verify the process. Observation concentrated on the north and south of Mozambique and was significantly less present in Sofala and Zambézia. Allegations that forms, registration books and voter cards were filled in improperly, or that minors and foreigners were registered, resulted in complaints and investigations during the registration process. ONUMOZ

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[312] Boutros Boutros-Ghali 1995, p. 57
[313] Richard Snyge 1997, pp. 121, 129
[314] Boutros Boutros-Ghali 1995, pp. 57, 61
[315] Richard Snyge 1997, p. 120
[316] Boutros Boutros-Ghali 1995, p. 57
[317] Michael Turner 1997, p. 7
[318] Boutros Boutros-Ghali 1995, p. 58
[319] Richard Snyge 1997, p. 120; certain Renamo areas remained closed during the entire conflict transformation process.

received 83 complaints of irregularities, of which 34 were submitted to the CNE after investigation. Most of these 34 complaints concerned the improper filling in of forms.[320]

Despite these difficulties, the voter registration process was regarded as completed. Boutros Boutros-Ghali reported without enthusiasm to the Security Council: "(...) voter registration has concluded in an orderly manner."[321]

17.3 Summary

UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ could not prevent GPA implementation deficits in two subject areas: performance of local police and voter registration. The problems in these subject areas, however, did not prove decisive for success or failure of the entire conflict transformation process.

UNCIVPOL was ineffective in Angola and in Mozambique; because the conflict parties did not co-operate with the United Nations monitors. In Mozambique, where the United Nations had proven to be able to overcome a lack of co-operation, ONUMOZ concentrated on other issues which were more decisive for success and failure of the entire operation. During the Angolan and the Mozambican war, MPLA and Frelimo, respectively, used the police force as an instrument against the insurgency movements. Likewise, UNITA's and Renamo's "police" were highly partial tools for the maintenance of power in "liberated" areas and for the fight against the governments. The GPAs, however, required a sudden and fundamental change of policing after decades of war: partiality was to be replaced by impartiality and the rule of law, secrecy by transparency. This envisaged shift materialised neither in Angola nor in Mozambique.

The conflict parties failed to set up an effective monitoring and verification mechanism and they failed to take action when UNCIVPOL reported violations of the GPA. Due to the lack of co-operation, two problems could not be overcome: first, serious human rights violations continued. Given the aim of the conflict transformation process of holding free and fair elections, this was a critical failure of the GPA implementation. Second, the governments' elite police forces were not observed at all during the entire conflict transformation process. Allegations made by the insurgency movements that the governments would create a parallel army by integrating demobilised soldiers into their elite police contingents could not be investigated.

The voter registration process was weakened by the focus of donor countries, the United Nations and conflict parties on the actual elections. In contrast to the actual polling, resources for the voter registration process were scarce. Two examples illustrate this problem: in Angola, a total of 400 electoral observers were authorised to monitor the poll itself, whereas only 98 observers

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[320] Pamela Reed 1997, pp. 299, 300
[321] Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council of 21 October 1994 (S/199/1196), para. 4

were authorised for the verification of the voter registration process.[322] In Mozambique, 52,000 polling station officers were recruited, but only 8,000 people as registration agents.[323]

Exacerbated by the war-ravaged infrastructure in both countries, the tendency to neglect voter registration caused enormous logistical difficulties to register eligible voters, and to monitor and verify the voter registration process. These difficulties were overcome to a considerable degree but not completely resolved. Some difficult access areas, most of them held by the insurgency movements, were excluded from voter registration and/or monitoring and verification. The United Nations played a vital role in overcoming logistical difficulties and in monitoring the process, but could not prevent the exclusion of certain areas.

None of these problems in implementing GPA provisions, however, threatened the entire conflict transformation process. Performance of police and voter registration were regarded as the "soft issues". The conflict parties focussed on other, more decisive steps of the GPA implementation: cease-fire, demobilisation and elections. This is most clearly illustrated by Jonas Savimbi's reaction to the uncompleted voter registration process which disadvantaged UNITA. The problem did not become an explosive issue. Instead he merely emphasised that such difficulties should not occur in the actual voting process.

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[322] Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 3 March 1992 (S/23671), para. 4
[323] Richard Snyge 1997, pp. 121, 129

This part of the study was aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ in facilitating conflict transformation in Angola and Mozambique, respectively. The effectiveness was evaluated by analysing the ability of the two multifunctional peace-support operations to facilitate the implementation of the provisions of the Angolan and the Mozambican GPAs in the subject areas, in which UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ were involved, and which were potentially significant for the conflict transformation process. Particular emphasis was given to examining why multifunctional peace-support failed in Angola but succeeded in Mozambique.

The argument of this part was that the failure in Angola and the success in Mozambique was caused by different conflict situations as well as by different scopes and depths of United Nations multifunctional peace-support.

Conflict Situation

In Angola, the two causes which had made the conflict parties sign a peace agreement were eliminated during the GPA implementation process. In Mozambique, on the contrary, pressure to transform the conflict continued.

Two main factors had made the MPLA and UNITA embark on a conflict transformation process: the military stalemate of Mavinga and strong external pressure. The MPLA had put enormous pressure on UNITA, but had been incapable of eliminating the insurgency movement militarily. UNITA had been in a precarious military situation but succeeded in defending its stronghold. Parallel to this military stalemate, the Soviet Union and the United States had put pressure on their allies to end the war.

Both main causes, however, were eliminated during the conflict transformation process. The beginning of the cease-fire put an end to the government's military pressure against UNITA's strongholds in eastern Angola. Second, superpower pressure decreased. The Soviet Union collapsed at the beginning of the GPA implementation process, and was compelled to deal with its domestic chaos instead of continuing an interventionist role in world politics. The United States remained as the only power able to exert pressure on one conflict party, but failed to effectively sanction UNITA's performance during the conflict transformation process.

In Mozambique, on the contrary, three main factors had made Frelimo and Renamo embark on a conflict transformation process: a specific military stalemate, external pressure and economic exhaustion. Frelimo forces, supported by Zimbabwean troops, had overran the rebels' strongholds, but had not been able to defeat Renamo militarily. The insurgents continued their war of destruction. Frelimo, losing Soviet support, had become increasingly dependent on donor countries which pressured for an end to the war. Moreover, Zimbabwe, whose troop contingent had proven decisive for the military advance against Renamo in central Mozambique, became weary of a war

which could not be won. Renamo, on its part, had lost its only meaningful patron. Given its weak popular support and the scarce resources in the areas under its control, this loss had been an existential threat for Renamo. Finally, Frelimo and Renamo had fought each other to the point of complete exhaustion. The country had lapsed into economic catastrophe.

The specific military stalemate was eliminated by the beginning of the cease-fire as it was in Angola. The military pressure of the government on Renamo ceased, and the insurgency movement was able to return to its strongholds in central Mozambique. External pressure, however, continued and was very effective because the exhausted conflict parties were highly susceptible to financial incentives. Frelimo remained dependent on donor countries, and Renamo, having lost South Africa as patron, became dependent on donor aid. During the conflict transformation process, most donor aid was distributed through the United Nations.

UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ

UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ significantly differed in mandate and resources. As a consequence, the scale of United Nations intervention in Angola was much smaller than the one in Mozambique.

The Mozambican GPA requested by far a more comprehensive mandate for ONUMOZ than the Angolan one for UNAVEM II. Both multifunctional peace-support operations monitored and verified the cease-fire, cantonment and demobilisation, and the performance of the local police, but whereas this function was confined to monitoring joint government-UNITA verification teams in Angola, ONUMOZ monitored independently from monitoring teams of the conflict parties. UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ performed roles in the political commissions, but whereas the mandate in Angola was confined to the role of an invited guest, ONUMOZ representatives chaired the most important commissions. Only in the subject areas of withdrawal of foreign forces, voter registration and elections did UNAVEM and ONUMOZ have the same mandate. The withdrawal of foreign forces, voter registration and the actual polling was monitored without dependence on monitoring teams of the conflict parties. Moreover, the United Nations provided technical assistance for the voter registration process and the actual polling.

The differences in the resources for UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ were even more significant. The expenditures of UNAVEM II amounted to no more than US $175,802,600. ONUMOZ, on the other hand, spent an overall sum of more than US $530 million: US $510,252,500 for the actual United Nations field mission, US $17,710,806 for the Trust Fund for the Implementation of the Peace Process in Mozambique, and US $3,050,000 for the Trust Fund for Assistance to Registered Political Parties in Mozambique. The instrument of trust funds was not used at all in Angola. Differences between the strengths of UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ were similarly significant. The Security Council authorised a maximum of only 350 unarmed military observers for UNAVEM II's military contingent, whereas 6,222 lightly armed troops and 294

military observers were deployed in Mozambique. The United Nations sent 400 electoral observers to Angola, but 900 to Mozambique. The UNCIVPOL contingent in UNAVEM II consisted of 126 officers. In Mozambique, on the contrary, 1,087 officers were deployed.[324]

Outcome

It is doubtful whether any multifunctional peace-support operation would have been able to cope with the Angolan conflict situation. UNAVEM II, ill-funded and hampered by a limited mandate, lacked any capabilities to give the conflict transformation process necessary impulses. Conflict transformation in Mozambique was less complicated than in Angola, because external pressure and the state of exhaustion persisted. ONUMOZ, having sufficient resources and a more comprehensive mandate than UNAVEM II, succeeded in facilitating the transformation of the Mozambican conflict.

UNAVEM was only successful in facilitating the withdrawal of Cuban forces. The Cuban troop withdrawal, monitored and verified by the United Nations, was completed ahead of schedule, because Cuba had the political will to end its intervention in Angola. UNAVEM II, however, proved ineffective in all other subject areas. Without external pressure and the economic necessity to change interaction, the Angolan parties persistently failed to find political solutions to urgent problems stemming from the conflict transformation process. Given the Angolan conflict situation and its limited role, the United Nations was incapable of contributing to the solution of political problems. As a consequence, many GPA provisions, such as the ones dealing with the police or the voter registration, were not implemented or were not completely implemented. Even the most critical issues remained unresolved such as cantonment and demobilisation. When the elections took place, the conflict transformation process was easily reversible. Having lost the elections, UNITA exploited a favourable military situation caused by the cease-fire and the withdrawal of the Cuban forces, and advanced militarily against the government instead of handing over its areas to the MPLA. The United Nations unarmed military observers proved incapable of preventing the collapse of the cease-fire.

ONUMOZ was successful in the most crucial subject areas. The key to its success was its ability in overcoming severe problems in the political commissions and helping to turn these commissions from the drag to the engine of the conflict transformation process. The United Nations repeatedly succeeded in putting the conflict transformation process back on track by offering the exhausted conflict parties financial incentives. Less vital issues such as the performance of the local police and voter registration remained neglected, but the most important issues, in particular cantonment and demobilisation, were resolved. By the time the elections took place, the conflict transformation process had gained momentum and was difficult to reverse. Renamo accepted its electoral defeat, because it had given away its military option and because the

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[324] United Nations 1996, pp. 714, 725

exhausted former insurgency movement profited from the electoral result by gaining access into the polity and its resources.

CONCLUSION

This study was aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ in order to contribute to an answer to the question under which conditions United Nations multifunctional peace-support is successful. This conclusion will briefly summarise the findings of the three parts of this study and, in a second step, suggest conditions necessary for the success of United Nations multifunctional peace-support operations.

a) Summarising the Findings of this Study

The study was organised into three parts: an outline of the concept of multifunctional peace-support, a comparison of the Angolan and the Mozambican conflict situation, and, finally, an evaluation of UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ.

Part I outlined the concept of United Nations multifunctional peace-support. Four distinct features were identified:

- The rival parties agree upon the action taken by the United Nations. Multifunctional peace-support, as any form of peace-support, lacks the means for coercion. It depends on the consent of the conflict parties.

- The deployment follows a comprehensive settlement agreement between the conflict parties. At the core of the conflict transformation process formulated in these agreements are fair and free elections.

- The purpose of multifunctional peace-support is to facilitate the implementation of this peace accord.

- Every multifunctional peace-support operation has a military, a civilian and a police contingent.

Part I also emphasised that multifunctional peace-support operations do not only share crucial features in common, but also differ in scope and depth of mandate as well as in resources. Few differences exist in regard to the scope of the mandate. The subject areas, in which multifunctional peace-support operations get involved, are similar. Differences concerning the depth of the mandate are more significant. Different roles are performed in order to facilitate GPA implementation in similar subject areas. The resources allocated to multifunctional peace-support operations vary greatly.

Part II compared the Angolan and the Mozambican pre-United Nations intervention conflict situation by scrutinising the causes for the conflict parties' embarking on conflict transformation. It was argued that a set of two main causes made the conflict parties embark on conflict transformation in Angola: strong external pressure and a military stalemate. Three main causes were identified in the case of Mozambique: external pressure, military stalemate and economic exhaustion. Therefore, the critical difference between the Angolan and the Mozambican conflict situation was the access to resources: the Angolan parties had the economic means to fight a war, whereas the Mozambican parties had fought each other until complete exhaustion.

Part III analysed in detail how effective United Nations multifunctional peace-support was in facilitating the transformation of the Angolan and the Mozambican conflict. It was argued that differences in the conflict situations and in United Nations multifunctional peace-support caused the failure in Angola and the success in Mozambique.

In Angola, where the conflict parties still had the resources to continue their war, the two causes which had made the parties negotiate and sign a GPA were eliminated during the conflict transformation process: external pressure decreased and the GPA, calling for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of foreign forces, created a new military situation very different from the specific military stalemate which had made the conflict parties embark on conflict transformation. While this conflict situation would have probably been intractable for any form of non-coercive United Nations intervention, UNAVEM II, restricted by the lack of resources and a very limited mandate, proved ineffective in facilitating conflict transformation. In particular, it failed to give necessary political impulses. Having lost the elections, UNITA, favoured by the new military situation, returned to war instead of handing over its territories in eastern Angola to the government.

In Mozambique, the GPA eliminated the specific military stalemate which had been a cause for conflict transformation as it did in Angola. However, external pressure and the state of exhaustion persisted. Given this conflict situation, ONUMOZ, equipped with sufficient resources and a comprehensive mandate, succeeded in facilitating conflict transformation. In particular, it had the capability to facilitate political solutions to problems arising from the conflict transformation process and repeatedly succeeded in putting conflict transformation back on track by offering financial resources to the exhausted conflict parties.

b) Four Necessary Conditions for Successful Multifunctional Peace-support

The failure of UNAVEM II and the success of ONUMOZ suggest four necessary conditions for successful multifunctional peace-support:

- External pressure must not stop once negotiations for a GPA have been successfully concluded, but it has to persist during the entire conflict transformation process.

Margaret Anstee entitled her book on the conflict transformation process in Angola "Orphan of the Cold War." The metaphor captures well one of the central problems of the Angolan conflict transformation process. Angola had been a highly internationalised internal war from the very beginning. The dynamics of the war were crucially shaped by external involvement. A peace agreement was concluded due to massive superpower pressure on the two conflict parties. However, after UNAVEM II was deployed for a few months, the Soviet Union collapsed and the United States alone were incapable of making the parties comply by the GPA. In Mozambique, on the contrary, the pressure persisted and donors enabled the United Nations to give financial incentives for compliance with the GPA.

Janet Heininger draws a similar lesson from the success of UNTAC in Cambodia:

"The United Nations should be realistic in appraising the level of external support it can count on before embarking on a mission. Lack of such support can doom a mission, while firm commitments can help overcome obstacles that could cause it to fail."[1]

- The conflict parties must perceive conflict transformation as a gain.

It is highly unlikely that, after years, often decades of war, conflict parties embark on conflict transformation because of their genuine desire for peace. Instead they seek to improve their position. Three out of four successful multifunctional peace-support operations helped the conflict parties to overcome a state of exhaustion: UNTAC, ONUSAL and ONUMOZ.[2] Embarking on conflict transformation was the means to overcome exhaustion.

The exhaustion gave ONUMOZ the opportunity to give the conflict transformation process new impulses by offering financial incentives, whenever it was stalled. The exhausted conflict parties were highly susceptible to financial support. Exhaustion also made possible a win-win situation after the elections. The government won the elections and remained in power. Renamo lost the elections, but gained access into the polity and its resources. It ceased to struggle for its economic and military survival in the bush.

- Multifunctional peace-support operations need a comprehensive mandate.

The ability of conflict parties to implement GPA provisions after years of war is limited. Distrust and lack of political will often have to be overcome. In order to be able to solve problems and to prevent others from arising, the United Nations needs a comprehensive mandate.

Of particular importance is a strong political mandate. The key to the Angolan failure and the Mozambican success were the political commissions. ONUMOZ, chairing the most important commissions, had the necessary channels to influence the parties. Conversely, UNAVEM II, depending on the will of the conflict parties to be invited to the political commissions, lacked the procedural preconditions to influence the conflict parties.

Of similar importance is a strong monitoring and verification mandate. Sufficient monitoring and verification is a *conditio sine qua non* for the success of multifunctional peace-support. It is, for example, only rational for a party to complete demobilisation if it can make sure that the other party does the same. In Angola, however, monitoring and verification was a political problem which was never resolved. United Nations monitoring in the subject areas of cease-fire and cantonment and demobilisation was confined to verify the establishment of the joint government-UNITA monitoring teams. This mechanism, however, was never fully implemented. ONUMOZ, on the contrary, had the mandate to independently monitor and verify. The monitoring mechanism was effective and did not cause severe problems such as in Angola.

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[1] Janet Heininger 1994, ,p. 134; similar arguments have been made in regard to UNTAG and ONUSAL: Theo-Ben Gurirab 1994, Saul Landau 1993

[2] for UNTAC: Janet Heininger 1994, p. 117; for ONUSAL: Saul Landau 1993, p. 210

- Multifunctional peace-support operations need sufficient resources.

Severely restricting the resources for a multifunctional peace-support operation means, as Margaret Anstee puts it in the case of UNAVEM II, "making bricks without straw."[3] Multifunctional peace-support aims at facilitating conflict transformation by taking over responsibilities in crucial areas of the GPA implementation. Due to its large scope, these missions are extremely expensive. Multifunctional peace-support cannot be cheap.

Scarce resources affect all areas of involvement. Effective monitoring of a cease-fire, of a cantonment and demobilisation process, and of voter registration and elections is not possible without a certain number of personnel. Moreover, the enormous logistical difficulties to overcome in a war-ravaged country can only be solved by the necessary equipment. Air support, in particular, is of crucial importance.

Even more important, sufficient resources are needed to be able to offer incentives to the conflict parties. The Mozambican conflict transformation process was badly stalled several times, but the United Nations always succeeded in helping to overcome problems by offering financial incentives for compliance with the GPA.

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[3] Margaret Anstee 1993, p. 30

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