



THE UNIVERSITY *of* EDINBURGH

Edinburgh Research Explorer

Layout considerations on compound survival shelters for blast mitigation: A finite-element approach

Citation for published version:

Caçoilo, A, Mourão, R, Lecompte, D & Teixeira-Dias, F 2023, 'Layout considerations on compound survival shelters for blast mitigation: A finite-element approach', *International Journal of Protective Structures*, pp. 1-19. <https://doi.org/10.1177/20414196231197701>

Digital Object Identifier (DOI):

[10.1177/20414196231197701](https://doi.org/10.1177/20414196231197701)

Link:

[Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer](#)

Document Version:

Peer reviewed version

Published In:

International Journal of Protective Structures

General rights

Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

Take down policy

The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.



Layout considerations on compound survival shelters for blast mitigation: a finite-element approach

International Journal of Protective Structures

XX(X):2–20

©The Author(s) 2022

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/ToBeAssigned

journals.sagepub.com/home/prs



Andreia Caçoiló¹, Rodrigo Mourão², David Lecompte³, Filipe Teixeira-Dias⁴

Abstract

The safety of both military personnel and equipment in unstable regions has for a long time been a major issue and concern. Protective shelters with multiple configurations have been widely used to meet safety requirements. Since military compounds are subjected to different types of threats, such as the detonation of improvised explosive devices (IED), a good understanding of the response of such shielding structures to blast waves is critical. A three-dimensional finite element (FE) model of a corner-entry ISO 20 ft container HESCO-Bastion survival shelter is developed, validated and tested under the external detonation of explosive charges. The FE model is validated against experimental data and used to investigate the protective performance of the shelter by considering several design-related parameters, such as charge location, roof extension, interior corridor dimensions, and the effect of venting and its location. Results are discussed in terms of peak overpressure and maximum impulse at discrete locations around the container, and it is found that the shelter is the least efficient in mitigating the blast load propagation when the explosive material is at an angle of 45° to the entrance. Also, while the protective roof at the entrance plays a significant role in protecting the container from air-borne threats, it is observed that it contributes to higher pressure and impulse data within the shelter, for detonations at ground level, with impulse amplifications as high as 94% when fully covering the entrance area. Contrarily, varying the distance between the container and the HESCO-Bastions is found to have minimal impact on the impulse, while naturally decreasing the peak pressure for increasing distances. Venting (through openings) can lead to up to 95% reduction in the peak pressure, whilst not affecting the impulse.

Keywords

Blast loading, survival shelter, HESCO-Bastion, finite element analysis, wave propagation

1 Introduction

2 Military operations in conflict regions are often at risk of being targeted by explosive threats,
3 putting personnel and equipment safety under high risk. Soil-filled prefabricated galvanised steel
4 weld-mesh units lined with non-woven polypropylene geotextile, such as the HESCO Bastion
5 (HB) concertainers, have long been used by the military to build rapid field deployable blast
6 walls to mitigate potential damage arising from such threats. Although these units can also be
7 found in several civilian applications, their compactness and folding ability are most important
8 for military expeditionary use, as this facilitates transportation prior to assembly (1).

9 The use of HB barrier walls to mitigate the effects of blast waves has been extensively
10 investigated over the past years. Dirlewanger *et al.* (2) conducted an experimental program
11 aiming to understand the structural response of HB walls under far-field explosive threats and
12 expand the available data set to further improve modelling techniques. These authors identified
13 the response mode to be tipping and sliding, and concluded that the overturning resistance
14 of a HB barrier against blast loading is dependent on the moisture content of the base layer
15 of contained soil. Scherbatiuk *et al.* (3) developed an analytical formulation that can be used
16 to obtain the P-I diagram for a free-standing HB wall, with its rotation defined as the failure
17 criteria. The authors showed that the required impulse to rotate the wall to 75% of the complete
18 overturning angle and the required impulse to completely overturn the wall were very close.
19 This indicates that the maximum rotation of the wall becomes increasingly sensitive to the
20 impulse as the critical impulse required to completely overturn the wall is approached. Similarly,
21 Scherbatiuk *et al.* (4) proposed an analytical model to calculate the vertical and horizontal
22 displacement-time history responses of a free-standing soil-filled HB concertainer wall subjected
23 to blast loading. Their model was developed based on experimental observations and delivers a

¹Department of Mechanical Engineering, Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, NJ, USA

²Stone Security Engineering, New York City, NY, USA

³Laboratory for Energetic Materials and Blasting Engineering, Royal Military Academy, Brussels, Belgium

⁴Institute for Infrastructure and Environment, School of Engineering, The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh EH9 3FG, UK

Corresponding author:

Andreia Caçoilo, Department of Mechanical Engineering, Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, NJ, USA
Email: acacoilo@stevens.edu

24 good agreement with experimental data, for the early time histories, specially before the wall
25 overturns, from when additional mechanisms come into play.

26 These studies have primarily been focused on the structural response of HB walls to blast
27 loading and, to date, the attenuation effects on blast waves attributed to the HB have been
28 minimally investigated, particularly for large TNT-equivalent explosions. The exception may be
29 the work of Xu *et al.* (5), who conducted one of the few experimental test series on HB barriers
30 aiming to record the overpressure at key locations around the HB wall. Their findings indicate
31 that peak overpressure is minimally affected by the blast wall thickness, whereas the height of the
32 wall and proximity of the measurement location to the back face are the controlling parameters
33 for the blast wave attenuation, allowing for the derivation of an empirical formulation for the
34 back wall overpressure of a HB.

35 In addition to general defensive barriers, HB units are typically used to form protective
36 structures, where units are stacked or placed adjacent to each other, fully encapsulating sensitive
37 equipment or creating safe areas for personnel. Smaller units can also be used to form roof
38 covers, provided beam-like supporting elements and decking sheets are also used. Examples of
39 such structures are generic protective shelter compounds, where standard ISO 20 ft shipping
40 containers are confined by HB units. Such structures, however, may induce high levels of
41 confinement and increase the magnitude of the blast waves propagating in its interior, due
42 to multiple reflections and spurious effects.

43 Although confined explosions have been studied in different settings, such as urban
44 environments (6; 7; 8; 9; 10), tunnels (11; 12; 13) and small-size closed compartments and
45 rooms (8; 14; 15; 16; 17), where the flow of blast waves is constrained by obstacles and non-
46 straight narrow paths, very limited research on blast wave propagation within survival shelters
47 is available. In one of the few available studies, Lecompte *et al.* (18) conducted a series of
48 experimental blast tests on a laboratory-scale survival shelter using a modular building system
49 (e.g., commercially available plastic building blocks). These authors aimed to record internal
50 pressure and impulse data using different shelter layouts — corner-entry and flow through —
51 and developed a finite element (FE) model of the system. Although the authors identified the
52 detachment of the inter-brick connections as a limitation of their small-scale model, results were
53 still considered acceptable and their approach a reasonably quick tool to obtain preliminary
54 estimates of the magnitude of the blast wave propagating within the protective shelter. Aiming
55 to improve this methodology and to conduct a thorough study on the blast wave propagation
56 within protective shelters, Caçoilo *et al.* (19) developed a 1:10 scale model of a corner-entry
57 survival shelter made of steel protected wood panels. Contrarily to the model presented by
58 Lecompte *et al.* (18), this improved version was developed so that the assumption of rigid walls

59 remain valid and pressure data could be accurately measured. The authors also developed a
60 three-dimensional finite element model of the experimental set-up that was used to assess the
61 blast propagation within the shelter over time, rather than just obtaining pressure and impulse
62 data at discrete locations.

63 It is clear from the studies presented above that shock waves propagate in confined spaces,
64 such as protective shelters, in complex ways, as a multitude of reflections, diffractions, and
65 superpositions can occur, resulting in atypical pressure measurements and unexpected structural
66 responses. Over the last two decades, several studies have examined the influence of load shape
67 on structural response of systems. In the work of Huang *et al.* (20), the effect of pulse shape
68 on underground structures subjected to internal blast loads was studied, indicating that pulse
69 shape was critical in the damage analysis of buried structures. Tan *et al.* (21) conducted a
70 numerical study to evaluate pulse shape effects on the ultimate blast capacity of steel beams.
71 It was found that their blast resistance gradually decreased with exponential, triangular, and
72 rectangular loading profiles. Moreover, Sauvan *et al.* (? , sauvan2012) performed an experimental
73 study to evaluate the variation of blast parameters in confined spaces, including overpressure,
74 impulse, and arrival time, by progressively increasing the confinement level of the testing setting.
75 According to the authors, in semi-confined environments, damage levels caused by the negative
76 phase of the blast wave can be greater than the damage caused by the positive phase alone. In
77 a similar study, Kang *et al.* (22) have found that negative pressures should be included in blast
78 analyses to obtain accurate structural responses. More recently, Cacoilo *et al.* (23) presented
79 an extensive numerical work on evaluating the influence of several wave-related parameters on
80 the structural response of corrugated metal plates, i.e. impulse trains, complex pressure profiles,
81 and signal simplifications. The authors reported that correctly defining the negative impulse
82 train in the pressure-time history is one of the main factors leading to accurate modelling of
83 the mechanical response of the structure, highlighting the need to fully understand the effects
84 of confinement on pressure measurements.

85 HESCO-based protective shelters are highly flexible in design, allowing separate modules
86 to be attached in a number of different layouts. Such layout modifications can lead to major
87 implications with regards to the load acting on the container, which can drastically influence its
88 structural performance and, consequently, the safety of its occupants. Such design adjustments,
89 sometimes introduced due to operational constraints in remote field operations, require designers
90 and engineers to make informed decisions. Within the above framework, this paper proposes a
91 finite element model of a standard ISO 20 ft steel container survival shelter subjected to the
92 detonation of explosive charges. The model is validated against experimental data and used to
93 investigate the influence of the shelter design on the overall blast wave propagation, maximum

94 overpressure and specific impulse, considering different design-related parameters, such as charge
95 location, roof extension, interior corridor dimensions, and the effect of venting and its location.

96 **Experimental results**

97 Caçoilo *et al.* (19) presented a laboratory-scale experimental study on the blast wave propagation
98 inside a HESCO-Bastion compound (HBC) survival shelter. The authors conducted a series of
99 blast tests with explosive charges located at 0.5 and 1 m from the entrance, with an angle of
100 incidence of 45° . The test set-up, shown in Figure 1, was scaled down with a reduction factor
101 $\lambda = 10$ and entirely built out of plywood. It features the representative HESCO wall barriers
102 and container, as well as the ground and protective roof. To represent a hemispherical explosion,
103 typical from those occurring from the detonation of air-borne threats after reaching the ground,
104 the explosive charges were placed at the entrance of the compound model and in contact with
105 the structure's ground. Foam was used to hold the explosive charges and detonator in place (see
106 Figure 1(c)). Although the experimental tests were conducted with a fixed mass of explosive,
107 part of the blast wave propagated through the opening where the foam was inserted, reducing
108 the intensity of the effective blast wave impinging the HBC. The energy fraction that is lost
109 underneath the base plate was identified based on external pressure measurements coupled with
110 the Kingery-Bulmash empirical equations. The blast pressure acting on the structure is estimated
111 to be equivalent to 3.3 g of TNT. The blast wave propagation within the HBC was monitored
112 through the use of pressure transducers fixed to each face of the container. A full description of
113 the experimental details can be found in Caçoilo *et al.* (19).

114 **Numerical framework**

115 *Model description*

116 The numerical framework presented in this paper was developed using the commercially available
117 general-purpose finite element code LS-DYNA. An overall view of the model developed to
118 describe the small-scale experimental work is shown in Figure 2. The air domain inside
119 the shelter was discretised with reduced integration eight-node hexahedral elements using an
120 ALE formulation. The model is based on a coupled framework, combining the Multi-Material
121 Arbitrary Lagrangian-Eulerian (MM-ALE) and the Load Blast Enhanced approaches (24). The
122 coupling method avoids modelling the high-explosive and its detonation explicitly by allowing a
123 pressure-time history to be applied on a single layer of elements of the ALE mesh instead, based
124 on the Kingery-Bulmash empirical equations (25). This is referred to as the *ambient layer*, which




Figure 1. Experimental set-up: (a) top view (with roof removed); (b) overall view; (c) detonator holding system; and (d) schematics of the high explosive support system. Reprinted with permission of Springer Nature, from Caçoiló *et al.* (19); permission conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center.

125 makes the exterior surface of the air domain act as a receptor of the blast wave parameters and
 126 convert them into thermodynamic state data, which are subsequently applied as a source onto
 127 the adjoining ALE finite elements (26). The assumption of rigid shelter and container surfaces
 128 was modelled by restraining the boundary nodes of the air domain to behave as fully reflective
 129 surfaces. While this is expected to lead to a slight overestimation of pressure and impulse, it is
 130 not expected to influence the wave reflection profile along the confined space. Pressure data is
 131 obtained by setting a number of tracer points — the numerical equivalent to pressure gauges — at




Figure 2. HESCO-Bastion compound (HBC) survival shelter: (a) overall view of 3D model with air domain (shown in blue); and (b) wireframe view of ISO container and pressure tracer locations: S1 - front face, S2 - right face, S3 - left face, S4 - back face and S5 - top face. While the specific charge location depends on the analysis conducted, it typically faces the entrance corner (adapted from Cacoilo *et al.* (19)).

132 the centre of all five faces of the container, coinciding with the locations where the pressure data
 133 was experimentally recorded. While additional locations on each face of the container could have
 134 been used to predict pressure data, Cacoilo *et al.* (27) demonstrated that very little variation in
 135 pressure data across multiple locations on each face of the container is observed. Consequently,
 136 only the centre of each face (S1, S2, S3, S4 and S5) were used for pressure measurements in this
 137 study. Spurious zero energy (hourglass) modes, typical of under-integrated formulations (28; 29),
 138 are controlled with a viscous hourglass algorithm. This approach is in line with research that
 139 suggests the viscous form to be more suitable for high-strain rate events, such as blast and shock
 140 waves, than the stiffness form (30; 31).

141 *Material modelling*

142 The air domain is widely considered an ideal gas for the study of several aerodynamic problems,
 143 satisfying the ideal gas law (32). As such, the material type MAT_NULL is used to define the
 144 evolution of the density of air, while the pressure is defined by a linear-polynomial equation of
 145 state, given by

$$P = C_0 + C_1\mu + C_2\mu^2 + C_3\mu^3 + (C_4 + C_5\mu + C_6\mu^2) E, \quad (1)$$

146 where C_i (with $i = 0, \dots, 6$) are material constants, E is the specific internal energy and μ is the
 147 compression factor

$$\mu = \frac{\rho}{\rho_0} - 1, \quad (2)$$

148 where ρ/ρ_0 is the ratio of the current density to the reference density. For an ideal gas, such as
 149 air, the linear-polynomial in equation 1 can be reduced to

$$P = (\gamma - 1) \frac{\rho}{\rho_0} E_0, \quad (3)$$

150 with $\gamma = 1.4$ for small overpressures (33). This reduction is achieved by setting $C_0 = C_1 = C_2 =$
 151 $C_3 = C_6 = 0$ and $C_4 = C_5 = \gamma - 1$, where γ is the ratio of specific heat at constant pressure and
 152 volume ($\gamma = c_p/c_v$). All material properties are listed in Table 1.

Table 1. Material and equation of state properties and constants for air (34).

Material	Parameter	Value
Air	Density, ρ	1.225 kg/m ³
	$C_0 = C_1 = C_2 = C_3 = C_6$	0
	$C_4 = C_5$	0.4
	Specific internal energy, E	2.5×10^{-4} kJ/kg


153 Conservation of mass, momentum and internal energy in the advection process is enforced
 154 with the van Leer and Half-Index-Shift formulation (35), which is known to accurately capture
 155 overpressure peaks and is recommended when detonation products are omitted (19). Advection
 156 methods are described in detail by Young (36) and Benson (37).

157 *Model validation*


158 The ability of the proposed FE model to accurately replicate and predict pressure and impulse
 159 data is verified against experimental results by Caçoilo *et al.* (19). The model was used to
 160 replicate the test conducted by these authors at a distance of 1 m from the entrance, and an
 161 angle of incidence of 45°. Figure 3 shows a comparison between the predicted and experimental
 162 pressure and specific impulse time-histories, measured at the centre of each face of the container,
 163 as outlined in Figure 2(b).

164 Overall, pressure data is well captured by the numerical model, more critically the first positive
 165 overpressure peak. Although the numerical model slightly overpredicts pressure data after the
 166 first positive peak (leading to an overprediction on cumulative impulse), most probably due the
 167 assumption of rigid boundary conditions, it is able to accurately predict the overall pressure
 168 trend and localised reflection induced peaks on all faces of the container.


169 Overall, relative errors of the computed maximum overpressure range from 0.2 to 29.8%, while
 170 differences in specific impulses range from 4.7 to 48.9%. Although differences in the specific




(a)




(b)




(c)



(d)



(e)



(f)




Figure 3. Comparison between numerical and experimental overpressure and impulse time-histories, for a charge located at 1 m from the entrance, at an angle of 45° : (a-b) sensor S1, (c-d) sensor S2, (e-f) sensor S3, (g-h) sensor S4 and (i-j) sensor S5.

171 impulse are bigger than those for pressure, they can be explained by the cumulative nature of
 172 the specific impulse, which is amplified by a continuous overestimation of pressure. Overall, such
 173 results indicate a good match with the experimental results, highlighting the strength of the
 174 proposed model and the corresponding numerical predictions.

175 **Results and discussion**

176 This section presents the results of the analyses that were done with the developed model,
177 regarding operational aspects of the construction and position of the HBC within military
178 expedition compounds. This is highly relevant as such factors play a key role in minimising
179 the loads acting on the interior container. Conditions used for validating the FE model (i.e.
180 explosive charge located at 1 m from the entrance, at an angle of incidence of 45° relative to the
181 entrance) will be used as a baseline for further studies.

182 *Charge location*

183 The entrance of the shelter naturally represents its most vulnerable location when considering
184 the detonation of a high-explosive (HE) charge. It is nonetheless important to determine the
185 most critical angle with respect to the survival shelter’s entrance. Three different positions of
186 the charge were considered, with increasing angles angles of incidence: 0°, 45° and 90° between
187 the entrance axis and the location (position vector) of the HE charge, as shown in Figure 4.




Figure 4. Top view of the shelter and locations of the charge for the reference layout (adapted from Cacoilo *et al.* (19)).

188 Figures 5(a) and 5(b) show that a charge located at 45° yields the highest values of peak
189 overpressure and specific impulses on the different faces of the container. Although the minimum
190 overpressure is recorded for an angle of 0°, differences to an angle of 90° are minimal, with
191 an overpressure variation ranging from 1.2 to 5.7 kPa, for sensors S2 and S1, respectively.
192 A similar trend is observed for specific impulses, where such variation ranges from 2.9 to
193 3.6 kPa.ms, for sensors S3 and S4, respectively. The maximum overpressure and specific impulse
194 differences were observed for sensor S4, corresponding to 12.5 kPa and 10.3 kPa.ms, respectively.

195 Overall, significant sensitivity on the results with respect to the charge location is observed,
 196 with a maximum difference of 42% and 80% for maximum overpressure and specific impulse,
 197 respectively.




Figure 5. Comparison of (a) maximum overpressure and (b) specific impulse for different charge locations.

198 *Protective roof*

199 Protection against direct air-borne threats, such as mortars, can be efficiently achieved by
 200 increasing the extension of the protective roof, which is a key element in providing additional
 201 stand-off distance. The propagation of the blast wave within the shelter may, however, result
 202 in higher pressures and loads on the container due to the consequent increased confinement
 203 level. The influence of such geometric considerations is assessed by considering three different
 204 layouts for the protective roof: Ref (typical entrance); R2 (non-protected entrance) and R3 (fully
 205 protected entrance). Schematic representations of the different layouts are shown in Figures 6(a)
 206 to 6(c). The analysis is conducted with explosive charges located at 0°, 45° and 90°, for a constant
 207 stand-off distance of 1 m.

208 The most critical charge location for the three roof layouts corresponds to a 45° angle, as shown
 209 by the results in Figure 7. Layout R2, when compared to the reference layout, delivers a general
 210 decrease in peak overpressure and specific impulse. Reductions of 15% and 100% are achieved
 211 for peak overpressure and specific impulse, respectively, as listed in Table 2. Nevertheless,
 212 when comparing layout R3 to the reference layout, the maximum relative differences are 21%
 213 for overpressure and 94% for specific impulse. This is generally explained by the increased




Figure 6. Geometric considerations for the protective roof: (a) Reference, (b) R2 and (c) R3.

Table 2. Relative differences on the maximum overpressure and specific impulse for the different layouts of the protective roof, comparing with the reference layout for sensor S4, where (+) indicates an increase and (−) a decrease of the absolute value of maximum overpressure and specific impulse.

Charge location	R2		R3	
	ΔP_{\max} (%)	Δi_s (%)	ΔP_{\max} (%)	Δi_s (%)
0°	−15	−100	+19	+94
45°	−13	−28	+21	+47
90°	−14	−49	+15	+66

214 confinement level provided by layout R3. While layout R2 allows the blast wave to propagate
 215 upwards and escape the shelter, reducing the intensity of the blast wave in the inner area, layout
 216 R3 provides additional blast wave superposition due to the added roofing area. As such, layout
 217 R2 proves to be more efficient in protecting the container from the detonation of charges located
 218 in close proximity to the entrance. This layout, however, increases the risk of air-borne threats
 219 detonating in the non-protected entrance corridor, which may result in significantly higher loads
 220 acting on the container due to the reduced stand-off distance.

221 *Corridor dimensions*

222 Due to the highly modular nature of HB construction, the gap between the ISO container and
 223 the HB walls, typically referred to as internal corridors, can be easily set-up and modified on
 224 site to fulfil operational needs. Similar to the propagation of blast waves in urban scenarios,
 225 where different path widths result in significantly different peak pressure and impulse (38),
 226 varying the gap widths in a survival shelter may considerably affect its protective performance,
 227 by amplifying/reducing the load acting on the steel container. The influence of different gap
 228 widths on the blast wave propagation is thus evaluated by considering three different layouts.
 229 Results are compared against the reference layout, with the charge facing the entrance at 45°, as

230 shown in Figure 8(a). Layouts C1 and C2 provide wider lateral and rear corridors, respectively,
231 as shown in Figures 8(b) and 8(c). Layout C3 provides the combined geometry of layouts C1
232 and C2 (see Figure 8(d)).

233 Overpressure and specific impulse data is shown in Figures 9(a) and 9(b), respectively.
234 As expected, layouts C1 and C3, with enlarged lateral corridors, attenuate the maximum
235 overpressure recorded in all sensors, when compared to the reference layout. This reduction
236 is, however, more evident for sensor S3, where the maximum overpressure is approximately 62%
237 lower than the reference layout. Additionally, peak overpressure in sensors S1 and S5 is observed
238 to have the smallest decrease, at 11 and 9%, respectively. This might be explained by the fact
239 that those sensors (front and top) are located in regions that have the same gap as the reference
240 layout. Considering layout C2, it is clear that by independently increasing the gap at the rear
241 of the compound only affects the peak overpressure recorded in sensor S4, located in that same
242 region.

243 Figure 9(b) shows very little differences in the specific impulse recorded for layouts C1, C2
244 or C3, relative to the reference layout, with differences ranging from 0.1% to 17%, for sensors
245 S3 and S4, respectively. From this set of results, it is clear that none of the proposed layouts
246 deliver a consistent impulse decrease in all sensors, contrarily to what happens in terms of peak
247 overpressure. According to previous research on the response of corrugated plates under blast
248 loading, the structural response under dynamic loading is dominated by the specific impulse (23).
249 The minimal impulse variations observed across the different layouts translates into minimal
250 variation of the ISO container response when considering the different gap widths between the
251 container and HB walls. Although such geometry modifications might not show a clear advantage
252 from a performance point of view, they can be considered from an operational perspective, as
253 the protective capacity of the shelter is not compromised.

254 *Effects of venting*

255 Previous results indicate that the rear of the container is in most cases the face subjected to
256 higher loads, mostly due to the superposition of shock waves travelling on both sides of the
257 container. As such, the effect of including openings in the vicinity of this location, intending to
258 reduce the maximum overpressure, should be analysed. Figure 10 shows the venting locations
259 addressed in this study. All venting conditions are based on the reference layout, with the HE
260 charge located at 45° with respect to the entrance and a stand-off distance of 1 m.

261 Maximum overpressure and specific impulse for the different venting configurations are shown
262 in Figures 11(a) and 11(b). As should be expected, only sensor S4 presents variations in the

263 calculated maximum overpressure, as the shock front propagates similarly through the lateral
264 corridors when compared to the absence of venting. While this is true for the maximum
265 overpressure, as it is typically obtained in the first passage of the wave, the total specific
266 impulse, however, varies from the reference case for all sensors. This is due to the fact that
267 after reaching the opening, the blast wave propagates backwards with a new set of reflections
268 and superpositions, leading to a different pressure-time history and, consequently, a different
269 total specific impulse. Comparing to the absence of venting openings, a reduction of 14% on
270 maximum overpressure in sensor S4 is observed for layouts BO and LO, while layout RO leads
271 to a decrease of approximately 35%. With a general decrease of the maximum specific impulse for
272 all venting options, significant reductions of about 95%, 94% and 86% are observed for layouts
273 BO, LO and RO, respectively.

274 *Entrance confinement*

275 The effectiveness of alternative entrance layouts in attenuating the intensity of the shock wave
276 propagating within the HB shelter is evaluated with two different layouts with additional entrance
277 barriers and one layout with a simplified entrance, as shown in Figure 12. It aims to understand
278 how an increased stand-off distance provided by longer entrance corridors compares with smaller
279 and less confined entrance areas. All layouts are evaluated with a charge located at 1 m from the
280 entrance and increasing angles of incidence. Results are compared against the reference layout
281 (see Figure 4).

282 On the one hand, it is clear that different confinement levels at the entrance of the shelter
283 have minimal effect on the peak overpressure, as shown by the results in Figure 13. On the other
284 hand, the specific impulse is found to be highly sensitive, with a maximum difference of nearly
285 72%, for a charge positioned at 45° , across the different layouts.

286 Charges located at 45° , as shown in Figures 13(a) and 13(b), are found to induce the higher
287 impulse variations across the different layouts. While the long entrance corridors of layouts E1
288 and E2 play a key role in increasing the impulse recorded in all sensors, when compared to the
289 reference layout, the low confinement and reduced channelling effects at the entrance of layout
290 E3 leads to a generalised decrease of the impulse for all sensors. Overall, layouts E1 and E2 drive
291 a maximum increase in the impulse of 56% and 211%, respectively, while layout E3 is able to
292 reduce the impulse recorded in the reference layout by a maximum of 43%.

293 Charges located in the vicinity of the shelter entrance with an angle of incidence of 0° induce
294 the lowest peak overpressure and impulse across all different layouts, as demonstrated by the
295 results in Figure 13(c) and 13(d). This can be explained by the fact that the charge is not facing

296 the entrance directly, which contributes to reducing the amount of energy actively entering the
297 shelter. Specifically, layout E3 is the one to offer best performance in reducing the maximum
298 impulse, as most sensors register negative maximum impulses values. This is a good indicator of
299 better structural performance under both dynamic and impulsive regimes, when compared with
300 a positive maximum impulse (23).

301 Considering the charge located at an angle of 90° , while the maximum impulse recorded in
302 layout E1, E2 and E3 is similarly across all sensors, the reference layout leads to lower maximum
303 impulse, with differences ranging from 40% to 77% for sensors S1 and S3, respectively. Layout
304 E3, however, shows the highest differences in peak overpressure, specifically in the front (sensor
305 S1), rear (sensor S4) and top (sensor S5) faces, when compared to the remaining layouts, which
306 present very similar peak overpressure. These observations can be explained by the fact that the
307 detonation of a charge at 90° occurs directly in front of the entrance of Layout E3, which results
308 in a higher intensity shock wave around the container.

309 **Concluding remarks**

310 This paper presents a comprehensive study on the protective performance of an ISO 20ft steel
311 container HESCO-Bastion survival shelter subjected to the exterior detonation of explosive
312 charges, aiming to provide design recommendations at the shelter level, for a better protection
313 of military personnel in operational conditions. A three-dimensional finite element model is
314 developed and validated against experimental data and used to investigate the influence of
315 key design and construction parameters to which designers and engineers may need to pay
316 special attention. These parameters include the location of the high-explosive charge, the
317 extension/configuration of the protective roof, the dimension of the gap between the HESCO-
318 Bastion barriers and the ISO container, the effect of venting and the entrance confinement.
319 While this study focuses on peak overpressure and maximum impulse, rather than the structural
320 response of the container, the significance of the findings is discussed throughout the paper. From
321 the obtained results it can be concluded that:

- 322 • While it is difficult to estimate the magnitude of blast waves propagating through complex
323 environments, such as the interior of a ISO container survival shelter, using conventional
324 analytical methods, three-dimensional FE modelling has been proven to be a valuable tool
325 for investigating such scenarios. Additionally, the proposed FE model of the survival shelter
326 is found to deliver accurate results when compared to experimental data.

- 327 ● The exact location of the high-explosive charge plays a critical role on the peak overpressure
328 and impulse recorded at the faces of the container, with an angle of incidence of 45° leading
329 to the highest overpressure and impulse.
- 330 ● The configuration and extension of the protective roof over the entrance of the shelter is a
331 major design parameter when the maximum impulse is considered. The absence of a roof
332 over the entrance can lead to a maximum impulse reduction of nearly of 100%, compared
333 to a configuration with 50% of the entrance covered. Contrarily, fully covering the entrance
334 increases the maximum impulse to by approximately 94%.
- 335 ● An increased gap between the HESCO-Bastion walls and the container is found to have
336 minimal influence on the maximum impulse. It is, however, observed that it can lead to
337 reduced peak overpressure, most critically at the enlarged corridors.
- 338 ● The inclusion of venting on the shelter, specifically at the rear, where the propagating shock
339 waves meet and superimpose, has minimal influence on the peak overpressure. Nonetheless,
340 it has a major impact on the maximum impulse, with reductions of up to 95% when
341 comparing to the shelter layout with no openings.
- 342 ● Increasing the confinement level of the entrance by extending the entrance corridors
343 typically induces higher maximum impulses but no significant variation of the peak
344 overpressure. It should be noted that by removing the entrance corridor and having a
345 direct entrance to the shelter can actively mitigate the maximum impulse observed in the
346 container, the exception being the case where the charge is located directly in front of the
347 entrance.
- 348 ● Although some of the investigated layouts might not have a clear advantage from a
349 protection performance point of view, they may be considered from an operational
350 perspective. While the magnitude of the blast wave propagating within the shelter might
351 be of great concern, design modifications can also lead to vulnerable situations where the
352 container might end up being exposed to other direct threats. As such, the presented
353 findings should be used with active judgement, considering the particularities of the
354 scenario and the full threat vector to which the shelter might be exposed to.

355 **Declaration of conflicting interests**

356 The Authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.

357 References

- 358 [1] Smith P. Blast walls for structural protection against high explosive threats: A review. *International*
359 *Journal of Protective Structures* 2010; 1(1): 67–84. DOI:10.1260/2041-4196.1.1.67.
- 360 [2] Dirlewanger H, Pope D, Russel D et al. Enhancement of hesco bastion wall models to better predict
361 magnitudes of response under far-field loading conditions. In *17th International Symposium on the*
362 *Interaction of the Effects of Munitions with Structures*. Germany.
- 363 [3] Scherbatiuk K, Rattanawangcharoen N, Pope D et al. Generation of a pressure–impulse diagram
364 for a temporary soil wall using an analytical rigid-body rotation model. *International Journal of*
365 *Impact Engineering* 2008; 35(6): 530–539. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijimpeng.2007.04.006.
- 366 [4] Scherbatiuk K and Rattanawangcharoen N. A hybrid rigid body rotation model for predicting a
367 response of a temporary soil-filled wall subjected to blast loading. *International Journal of Impact*
368 *Engineering* 2010; 37(1): 11–26. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijimpeng.2009.06.014.
- 369 [5] Xu R, Chen L, Fang Q et al. Protective effects of gabion wall against blast waves from large tnt-
370 equivalent explosions. *Engineering Structures* 2021; 249: 113389. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
371 engstruct.2021.113389.
- 372 [6] Kinney G and Graham K. *Explosive Shocks in Air*. 2nd edition ed. New York: Springer, 1985.
373 ISBN 978-3-642-86682-1.
- 374 [7] Baker W, Cox P, Westine P et al. *Explosion Hazards and Evaluation*. Fundamental Studies in
375 Engineering, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B. V., 1983. ISBN 978-0-444-42094-7.
- 376 [8] Julien B, Sochet I and Vaillant T. Impact of the volume of rooms on shock wave propagation within
377 a multi-chamber system. *Shock Waves* 2016; 26: 87–108. DOI:10.1007/s00193-015-0603-2.
- 378 [9] Smith P, Whalen G, Feng L et al. Blast loading on buildings from explosions in city streets. In
379 *Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers Structures & Buildings*, volume 146. pp. 47–55.
380 DOI:10.1680/stbu.2001.146.1.47.
- 381 [10] Fouchier C, Laboureur D, Youinou L et al. Experimental investigation of blast wave propagation
382 in an urban environment. *Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries* 2017; 49: 248–265.
383 DOI:10.1016/j.jlp.2017.06.021.
- 384 [11] Skews B and Law W. The propagation of shock waves in a complex tunnel system. *Journal of the*
385 *Southern African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy* 1991; 91: 137–144.
- 386 [12] Smith P, Mays G, Rose T et al. Small scale models of complex geometry for blast overpressure
387 assessment. *International Journal of Impact Engineering* 1992; 12: 345–360. DOI:10.1016/
388 0734-743X(92)90112-7.

- 389 [13] Rigas F and Sklavounos S. Experimentally validated 3-D simulation of shock waves generated by
390 dense explosives in confined complex geometries. *Journal of Hazardous Materials* 2005; 121: 23–30.
391 DOI:10.1016/j.jhazmat.2005.01.031.
- 392 [14] Anthistle T, Fletcher D and Tyas A. Characterisation of blast loading in complex, confined
393 geometries using quarter symmetry experimental methods. *Shock Waves* 2016; 26: 749–757. DOI:
394 10.1007/s00193-016-0621-8.
- 395 [15] Geretto C, Chung Kim Yuen S and Nurick G. An experimental study of the effects of degrees of
396 confinement on the response of square mild steel plates subjected to blast loading. *International*
397 *Journal of Impact Engineering* 2015; 79: 32–44. DOI:10.1016/j.ijimpeng.2014.08.002.
- 398 [16] Salvado F, Tavares A, Teixeira-Dias F et al. Confined explosions: The effect of compartment
399 geometry. *Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries* 2017; 48: 126–144. DOI:
400 10.1016/j.jlp.2017.04.013.
- 401 [17] Sauvan P, Sochet I and Trélat S. Analysis of reflected blast wave pressure profiles in a confined
402 room. *Shock Waves* 2012; 22: 253–264. DOI:10.1007/s00193-012-0363-1.
- 403 [18] Lecompte D, De Schepper R, Belkassam B et al. A modular building-block system for lab-scale
404 explosive testing of urban type configurations. In *23rd Military Aspects of Blast and Shock*. Oxford,
405 p. 16.
- 406 [19] Caçoilo A, Teixeira-Dias F, Mourão R et al. Blast wave propagation in survival shelters:
407 Experimental analysis and numerical modelling. *Shock Waves* 2018; 28(6): 1169–1183. DOI:
408 10.1007/s00193-018-0858-5.
- 409 [20] Huang X, He L and Ma GW. Soil-structure interaction and pulse shape effect on structural element
410 damage to blast load. *Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities* 2011; 25(5): 400–410. DOI:
411 10.1061/(ASCE)CF.1943-5509.0000229.
- 412 [21] Tan Y, Xi F, Li S et al. Pulse shape effects on the dynamic response of a steel beam under combined
413 action of fire and explosion loads. *Journal of Constructional Steel Research* 2017; 139: 484–492.
414 DOI:10.1016/j.jcsr.2017.10.001.
- 415 [22] Kang KY, Choi KH, Choi JW et al. An influence of gas explosions on dynamic responses of a single
416 degree of freedom model. *Shock and Vibration* 2016; 2016: 1–13. DOI:10.1155/2016/9582702.
- 417 [23] Caçoilo A, Mourão R, Teixeira-Dias F et al. Structural response of corrugated plates under
418 blast loading: The influence of the pressure-time history. *Structures* 2021; 30: 531–545. DOI:
419 10.1016/j.istruc.2021.01.025.
- 420 [24] Slavik T. A coupling of empirical explosive blast loads to ALE air domains in LS-DYNA. *IOP*
421 *Conference Series: Materials Science and Engineering* 2010; 10. DOI:10.1088/1757-899X/10/1/
422 012146.

- 423 [25] Kingery C and Bulmash G. Air- blast parameters from TNT spherical air burst and hemispherical
424 surface burst. Technical Report ARBRL (TR-02555), Ballistic Research Laboratory, Maryland,
425 1984.
- 426 [26] Shuaib M and Daoud O. Numerical analysis of RC slab under blast loads using the coupling of
427 LBE and ALE method in LS-DYNA. In *Fib Symposium*. Cape Town.
- 428 [27] Caçoilo A, Mourão, Belkassem B et al. Blast wave assessment in a compound survival container:
429 Small-scale testing. *Proceedings* 2018; 2(8). DOI:10.3390/ICEM18-05459.
- 430 [28] Consolazio G, Chung J and Gurley K. Impact simulation and full scale crash testing of a
431 low profile concrete work zone barrier. *Computers & Structures* 2003; 81: 1359–1374. DOI:
432 10.1016/S0045-7949(03)00058-0.
- 433 [29] LSTC. LS-DYNA Theory manual, 2006.
- 434 [30] Alia A and Souli M. High explosive simulation using multi-material formulations. *Applied Thermal*
435 *Engineering* 2006; 26: 1032–1042. DOI:10.1016/j.applthermaleng.2005.10.018.
- 436 [31] Flanagan D and Belytschko T. A uniform strain hexahedron and quadrilateral with orthogonal
437 hourglass control. *International Journal for Numerical Methods in Engineering* 1981; 17: 679–706.
438 DOI:10.1002/nme.1620170504.
- 439 [32] Vallerani E. An “ideal equivalent gas method” for the study of shock waves in supersonic real gas
440 flows. *Meccanica* 1969; 4(3): 234–249. DOI:10.1007/BF02133438.
- 441 [33] Dobrociński S and Flis L. Numerical simulations of blast loads from near-field ground explosions
442 in air. *Studia Geotechnica et Mechanica* 2015; 37(4): 11–18. DOI:10.1515/sgem-2015-0040.
- 443 [34] Ousji H, Belkassem B, Louar M et al. Parametric study of an explosive-driven shock tube as blast
444 loading tool. *Experimental Techniques* 2016; 40: 1307–1325. DOI:10.1111/ext.12179.
- 445 [35] Van Leer B. Towards the ultimate conservative difference scheme. IV. A new approach to numerical
446 convection. *Journal of Computational Physics* 1977; 23: 276–299. DOI:10.1016/0021-9991(77)
447 90095-X.
- 448 [36] Youngs D. Time-dependent multi-material flow with large fluid distortion. *Numerical Methods for*
449 *Fluid Dynamics* 1982; 24: 273–285.
- 450 [37] Benson D. Momentum advection on a staggered mesh. *Journal of Computational Physics* 1992;
451 100: 143–162. DOI:10.1016/0021-9991(92)90316-Q.
- 452 [38] Morris E BT Lusk and Hoffman JM. Influence of street intersections on last channelling diffraction
453 effects. In *Proceedings of the Annual Conferences on Explosives and Blasting Technique*. Nashville,
454 Tennessee, pp. 12–15.




Figure 7. Maximum overpressure and specific impulse for different roof extensions with charges located at (a-b) 45°, (c-d) 0° and (e-f) 90°.




Figure 8. Corridor dimension layouts: (a) Reference, (b) C1, (c) C2 and (d) C3.




Figure 9. Comparison of (a) maximum overpressure and (b) specific impulse for different corridor widths.




Figure 10. Venting locations on the reference HBC: opening at the (a) rear (BO), (b) left side (LO) and (c) right side (RO).




Figure 11. Influence of venting openings on the maximum (a) overpressure and (b) specific impulse.




Figure 12. Modified entrance layouts: (a) Entrance 1 (E1), (b) Entrance 2 (E2) and (c) Entrance 3 (E3).




Figure 13. Maximum overpressure and specific impulse for different entrance layouts. The explosive charge is located at a stand-off distance of 1 m and at an angle of incidence of: (a-b) 45°; (c-d) 0° and (e-f) 90°.