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THE TANDEM ARTS OF SPEAKING AND UNDERSTANDING: INFLUENCES OF PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS ON RESEARCH IN SPEECH COMMUNICATION

William L. Nothstine

"There would be no speaker and no art of speaking," writes Gadamer, "if understanding and consent were not in question, were not underlying elements; there would be no hermeneutical task if there were no mutual understanding that has been disturbed and that those involved in a conversation must search for and find again together."[1] It is this interpenetration of the two arts speaking and interpretation — which I will address in this paper. My aim is to point to areas in which hermeneutic phenomenology, as conceptualized by Heidegger in *Being and Time*, and developed as a basis for philosophical hermeneutics by Gadamer in *Truth and Method* and later writings, is making its mark in the field of speech communication.[2] My primary purpose for doing so is to offer a report of the impact of philosophical hermeneutics upon one field. But I admit a second purpose: the three areas discussed below are each represented by scholars of speech communication, many of whom see their relation to the other areas as primarily an institutionally-contrived one. Implicit in the paper is the argument that these areas have more to talk about with one another than they often suppose.[3]

I

Within the field of speech communication, the last two decades have seen a burgeoning interest in the relation of rhetoric and knowledge. The issue is one with ancient and venerable beginnings, but the terms by which it finds expression are distinctly modern. The continued erosion of our once-unquestioned faith in scientific knowledge has brought communication scholars the opportunity to re-think the importance of rhetoric to knowledge — scientific or otherwise. Writings in the field on this subject began to appear in the late '60's and early 70's, and some of the early essays took as their starting point Toulmin's 1958 discussion of argument, with its attendant notions of analytic vs. substantive argument, and of field-dependent logics.[4] These essays are characterized by the assumptions that knowledge is essentially knowledge of reality; that such knowledge is an ideal, and that in practical affairs we must settle for less than this ideal — for "proofs of the unprovable," as it were; that rhetoric is the art which provides this knowledge which, while imperfect, is still the closest thing to truth available.

A second line of argument on the issue begins with the assumption that knowledge is grounded in socially-shared symbols. Writings from this camp draw their assumptions from a broad range of sources, including Blumer's symbolic interactionism, and the critical writings of Kenneth Burke.[5] Here, the arguments point to the relativity of all knowledge, owing to its symbolic nature, and claims often resort to an "ontological definition of man" as the "symbol-using animal."[6] Gone is the analytic ideal of truth, and in its place is the subjective truth of symbolicity.

A third camp within this issue argues that knowledge is grounded, not in "objective reality,"

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nor in "subjective symbology" but rather what itself is the method, be it critical judgment of arguments or invention of universal arguments.[7] In this position, knowledge is that which survives the test of critique from the widest range of differing positions through debate, or that which is the product of an invention system which produces lines of argument capable of translation from one ideological system to another, without preference for either system. These three groups (for convenience's sake, they might be called the analytics, the symbolists, and the methodologists) are contributing to an evolving debate, and they recognize one another by the shibboleth "knowledge is rhetorical."

Scholars of speech who have affiliated themselves with hermeneutic phenomenology have entered the fray by pointing to Heidegger's claim that the phenomenon of Being-in is more fundamental than and not wholly explained by knowing. These writers object that, while we have labored over how we are to understand "knowledge" and "rhetorical," we have devoted precious little reflection to that word "is" by which we link the two; we have ignored the ontological issue in favor of the epistemological one, leaving the relation of Being to rhetoric and to knowing unexamined. The emergent critique by scholars of the hermeneutic position includes the following themes:

First, human knowledge is derived from understanding. While common usage leaves the two terms synonymous, phenomenological investigation presents the difference between them. "Understanding," writes Gadamer, "is the original form of the realization of There-being, which is Being-in-the-world;" it is "the primarily realization of existence."[8] Understanding is thus a fundamental structure of human existence. It is understanding of the possibilities of our world for us. This world is not accounted for by the sum of the entities within it, nor as something apart from self. Rather, world is what is presupposed in every act of knowing, and which precedes the dichotomy of subject and object. It is a functioning context of possibilities in which we ourselves *are*. Language offers as the ability to bring things to light in their living context, not removed and isolated by thematization. Thus, the hermeneutic response to the analytics would echo Heidegger's conclusions regarding the platonic "myth of the cave:" the "cave myth" held the opportunity for us to regard truth as unconcealedness, but this chance was lost to the advantage of the position that truth is correctness, or correspondence with reality, which comes from reason.[9] Where the analytics view rhetorical knowledge as an imperfect approximation of reality, the hermeneutic contribution to rhetoric is the reminder that it is language itself which permits us to see things as they *are*. Similarly, the symbolist position's "ontological" definition of man still presupposes the very notion of Being in this definition. While the symbolist literature is seldom at violent odds with hermeneutic scholarship, at its roots it must ground all in the operation of the symbol, and leave existence assumed but unexamined.[10]

Rhetoric, then, is an art of language which, Scott argues, must be seen "as a human potentiality to understand the human condition."[11] This is the ontological grounding of rhetoric as an art of language. For language is the articulation or interpretation of Being as understood. Following this path, Hyde and Smith argue that "rhetoric shows itself in and through the various ways understanding is interpreted and made-known."[12] Further, they argue, this making-known of understanding — rhetoric — is at work for the individual as a "practical mastery of understanding" *before* communication lets this understanding be shared between people.[13] Rhetoric is thus an art which produces practical knowledge primarily, and theoretical knowledge only secondarily.[14]

Knowledge is thus revealed to be rhetorical insofar as it is situated in a context and a tradition. Campbell draws our attention to the value of this knowledge when he discusses the problem which faces the teacher of rhetoric: maxims, rules-of-thumb, and so on, have their use in the

early training of the speaker or writer, but true excellence is distinguishable from simple mechanical competence by a different kind of knowledge.

> Let us say that we enter the classroom at that point in the course when the canons of rhetoric have been covered (with appropriate illustrations) and the importance of pathos, ethos, and logos duly noted. Our topic for today is the higher mysteries of the art: timing and a sense of the appropriate.

> Now anyone who has attended to public speaking, let alone anyone who has taught it, knows that the person who has timing and a sense of the appropriate really knows something. Indeed a single quip fired at the right time would be more than sufficient to quell all doubts about the reality, let alone the power of this knowledge. Yet how difficult — and I speak from experience to people who have had similar experience — it is to convey precisely what this absolutely indispensable knowledge is and how it is to be learned.

> ...Surely, if ever there were truly and radically human knowledge, something that no conceivable computer could ever predict or duplicate, this is it. Yet what sort of knowledge is this? This is practical knowledge, and it cannot even be arrived at by way of distinguishing between the true and the probable. It is not a matter of applying a general principle to a given circumstance.... The only universal element in this form of knowledge is that it must grasp the circumstances in their infinite variety. [15]

I will return to the importance of this theme below; for now I want only to make the point that the knowledge which is rhetorical is practical, immersed knowledge.

Here, then, is the foundation of the hermeneutic response to the methodologist position. A general sort of goal of this methodologist position is the formation of lines of argument through methods which will "not predetermine the properties subsequently found in diverse subject matter." [16] This goal, however, is one which has an arguable presupposition: that strict adherence to method leads to creativity. Ther hermeneutic position is the opposite: that reliance upon method makes one a helpless prisoner, since it precludes the openness to experience upon which knowledge is based and leaves one subject to unfounded (and unexamined) presuppositions. [17] The "objective" knowledge which method produces in knowledge which, by definition, is of things from which the historically-situated individual has been almost surgically removed. [18] By contrast, as Kockelmans points out, hermeneutics offers knowledge grounded in "the things themselves" without resorting to objectification, and a knowledge which is intersubjectivity valid without resorting to transcendental subjectivism. [19] It is this knowledge with which rhetoric is associated.

II

Several parts of this "knowledge" debate also address a second issue which has equally-long roots: the debate over the nature and status of the enthymeme. The history of its study has gone first one way and then another in the search for the answer to the riddle of what Aristotle called "the substance of rhetorical persuasion." Aristotle claimed that it was a syllogism whose premises are for the most part true (rather than necessarily true), and added that in actual use it might often be the case that this rhetorical syllogism will not have both premises and the

conclusion explicitly given in the discourse.[20] Later scholars focused upon this second part and claimed that the defining feature of the enthymeme was its truncated form. Left with the problem of explaining why some rhetorical arguments do appear in their full, untruncated form (to say nothing of the problem of having ignored the main half of Aristotle's definition), scholars declared this full form to be the epicheireme; "enthymeme" would refer to its streamlined form. While the epicheireme / enthymeme dilemma occurs comparatively seldom in contemporary speech communication literature, at least in those terms, the enthymeme continues to be of concern to these scholars. Attempts to address the nature of the enthymeme have resorted alternatively to the relation of validity in rhetorical argument to that in scientific demonstration, to premises tacitly provided by audiences, to mental leaps from data to claim, or to the turn-taking devices which regulate ordinary conversation.[21]

Dockhorn's conception of the enthymeme is developed in an essay which extends Gadamer's ideas on rhetoric, and which Gadamer himself cites with approval.[22] Dockhorn characterized the enthymeme as a "universally valid consideration, which does not have to anticipate opposition."[23] Let us examine this characterization in two parts, and consider its importance in framing some of the issues just mentioned.

As a "universally valid consideration," the enthymeme is seen by Dockhorn as acting from and through the humanistic concepts of *Bildung* (cultural learning), *sensus communis*, judgment, and taste. "It rests," writes Dockhorn, "upon a kind of general culture of the 'common man.'"[24] Contained in this general culture is an openness to learning and experience by which a consideration may be raised to the level of universality. Now this "universality" is not a universality of concept, nor that of tautology, but rather that of communality. This communality — or a kind of dialectical transcendence — is that of which Kockelmans writes, "All genuinely human experiences in science, art, social praxis, morality, religion, philosophy are characterized by the operative presence of two components: there is always an element coming from the tradition of the society to which each man belongs, and there is a creative element in which that which is handed down is overcome or transcended."[25]

Referring to the sophists' claim that the study of rhetoric would produce good citizenship as well as good oratory, Aristotle notes that these earlier rhetoricians had held rhetoric to be the ethical branch of politics.[26] In this connection, despite Aristotle's insistence that the study of rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic, not of politics, it is significant that he chides his predecessors for neglecting the enthymeme. Dockhorn argues that the enthymeme itself, with its grounding in our common sensibilities, is the act in which tradition is embraced, renewed, transmitted. Hence the enthymeme is universally valid in the sense that it is grounded in our shared tradition.

This helps to show, in turn, why the consideration contained in the enthymeme "does not have to anticipate opposition," since it argues from generally accepted notions. It is in this regard that Aristotle advises us, when arguing from common knowledge to obvious conclusions, to avoid being too eliptical in our reasoning, yet equally important, to avoid being so detailed that our audience will feel we belabor the obvious.[27]

Enthymemes have their effect by resonating with common sense, and in this way we can see how the enthymeme makes rhetoric a means of reaffirming the place of both rhetor and audience in tradition. Dockhorn makes this argument succinctly:

> If it is a general sign of *Bildung* 'to be open to what is other and to other points of view,' 'to be capable of being raised above oneself to universality,' and if this universality is by no means universality of

concept or of the understanding, then the source for such a culture of *humanitas* can only be rhetoric.[28]

We can take this further, and consider the "incompleteness" which seems to characterize enthymemes. If we take this incompleteness to include both the absence of certain formal parts as well as the resistance of the enthymeme to logical analysis, we can see hermeneutic investigation revealing the inadequacy of the geometric method in addressing knowledge of human affairs. Further, we can see that this incompleteness reflects the incompleteness of all understanding. There is no legitimate sense in which understanding can be "once-and-for-all." Understanding is understanding of possibilities within a living tradition; its interpretation as language and its making known as rhetoric reman within and constitute afresh that tradition.[29] Hence the incompleteness is revealed as the circularity of understanding itself. Those discussions which ground the enthymeme in subjectivity, in claims tacitly provided by the audience, for example, are (from the hermeneutic point of view) near the mark yet always missing the point that enthymemes accomplish what they do because they build from a tradition which speaker and audience share, resonate with the pre-judgments of each, and represent an interweaving of horizons — speaker's and audience's — "which only *putatively* are assumed to exist by themselves."[30]

The themes of incompleteness and not anticipating opposition also characterize an interesting line of research which rounds out this discussion (and provides a bridge to the final section of this paper). Jackson and Jacobs give an interesting account of the "pragmatic bases of the enthymeme" by bringing the tools of descriptive conversational analysis to bear upon instances of informal, conversational argument.[31] Jackson and Jacobs argue that conversations in general are cooperative ventures, with both sides assuming that the other will make contributions which are appropriate and timely.[32] One way in which we expect this cooperation to be demonstrated is in the quantity of a conversant's remarks: we expect others to say enough to be clear, but not to say more than is required at the moment. When the latter expectation is unmet, the results tend to be irreparable; once said, a thing cannot be "unsaid." However, if a person's utterance seems to say *less* than it might, the other may ask a question, repeat a previous question, or indicate the deficiency. When no further information is requested by one's listener, the "quantity maxim" is satisfied (and so, presumably, is the listener). Thus a person may make an argument which is, by formal standards, incomplete, and yet satisfy an interlocutor. Using language which is strikingly close to Dockhorn's, Jackson and Jacobs say that their position is thus similar to the "tacit premises" explanation[33] except that, in their view, "agreement is reached not because the audience 'supplies' the unstated premises for a claim, but because the audience doesn't object to a claim."[34]

III

The work on enthymemes by Jackson and Jacobs serves as a nice transition to the topic of this final section, conversation analysis, "the analysis of discourse in all of its natural settings, including speeches and formal presentations, but also including informal meetings and everyday talk."[35] The varieties of conversational analytic approaches are several, and it is beyond my present task to distinguish among them all. Instead, I propose to discuss the general features these approaches seem to share, and relate them to the interests of this paper.

First, conversational analysis begins with and always returns to talk itself — what situated people actually say. In this way they study communication itself, "rather than as an indicator of something else, such as attitudes, cognitive balance mechanisms, group cohesiveness, or communication apprehension."[36] Second, the general aim of conversational analysis is to examine how discourse at once constitutes and interprets the social world of the people who

create it. Third, the analysts of conversation show a marked aversion to theoretical generalizations, arguing that description and interpretation come first.[37] Fourth, conversational analysis is concerned with the informal practical "logics" by which we make sense out of our communicative world.[38]

The similarities between the philosophical hermeneutic view of communication and the views just outlined should not be surprising. In a very real sense, hermeneutics *is* conversation. It is conversation with a text, and makes no claims about the inner life of the author of that text, being more concerned with what the text itself says and is. Deetz puts the matter clearly when he writes that "understanding fundamentally is a problem of understanding messages rather than people." In this way, "the desire to understand a speaker can be seen as different and secondary to understanding what is spoken."[39] The tradition from which a person speaks is constituted in the language he uses, and this language "has its real being only in the fact that the world is represented in it."[40] The "logic" which hermeneutics utilizes is the logic of conversation itself — of question-and-answer. The product of hermeneutic understanding is practical knowledge of situated affairs, and it is worth remembering in this regard that one who has acquired practical understanding of something is said to be conversant with this area. Thus, the practical concern, the preference for text over psychologizing, the concern for descriptive interpretation over theoretical generalizations — all of these point to similarities between the hermeneutic attitude toward conversation and other approaches to the analysis of conversation.

Indeed, at this level of analysis one must examine research reports very closely to determine whether the researchers themselves regard their own work as hermeneutic, naturalistic, ethnomethodological, or of some other variant. The hermeneutical approach, however, is distinguishable by three other concerns:

First, hermeneutic research remains concerned that the question of Being does not get buried. This is more than eschewing epistemological questions in favor of ontological ones; it is recognition that epistemological claims (regarding prejudgment or the fore-structure of understanding) are to be grounded in tradition, in our temporality and existentiality, in Being-in-the-world.[41]

Second, the hermeneutic research sees part of its task as a "perpetually reflexive critique of presupposition. Such a self-reflexive critical mode interrogates the layers of common-sense, taken-for-granted everyday assumptions that pass as the practical world. If one's ontological interest is in this practical world and how it is communicatively constituted, one ought to work from a perspective which enables one to make problematic for study that which everyone else presupposes."[42] This critique of presuppositions may occur at two levels: It may be at the level of the assumptions embedded in ordinary conversation (as Hawes demonstrates), or it may be at the level of theoretical concepts, such as empathy or the self, in their use by researchers (as Deetz shows). Significantly, the reflexive critique itself is the same at either level, since both naive participant and scholarly researcher are in much the same business of making sense out of their world.[43]

Third, the hermeneutic approach to conversation is keenly aware that conversation is more than just competency; it is art. Conversation involves an openness and immersion which is the necessary precondition for the "art" of conversing, with another, or with a text.[44] Such an art involves giving direction to conversation, while retaining the freedom and creativity necessary for creative outcomes. There is no recipe for this: "it is not an art in the sense that the Greeks speak of techne," writes Gadamer, "not a craft that can be taught and by which we would master the knowledge of the truth."[45] Here again we find the twin themes of timing and appropriateness. These two, tracing their lineage back to the theory of invention and style of Gorgias,[46]

based on *to kairon* (the opportune) and *to prepon* (the fitting), have continually reoccurred in this paper, as a part of the knowledge which is rhetorical (Campbell), as a reason why the form of an enthymeme is important to its power to prove (Jackson and Jacobs), and not as a measure of the art of conversation (and, to a large extent, I suspect, of the art of conversational analysis as well).

These three areas — knowledge and rhetoric, enthymeme, and conversation analysis — are not the only areas in which hermeneutics has contributions to make to speech communication, nor are these three as distinct from one another as the ease of labelling them might suggest. My attempt has been to show that the contributions are possible, potentially valuable, and already beginning.

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NOTES

1 Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, tr. and ed. David E. Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 25. This paper benefitted from several conversations between the author and Robert T. Craig, Temple University, and Nola J. Heidlebaugh, SUNY-Oswego.

2 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962); Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, tr. John Cummings and Garret Barden (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975), and Gadamer (1976).

3 Given the nature of this meeting, I have chosen not to present elaborate documentation of the various arguments and claims which characterize the various issues. Instead, the issues themselves will be sketched in rather broad strokes, and more detailed description is reserved for the influence of hermeneutics in each area. In the elaboration of these points of influence, of course, I hope that these brief sketches will, in turn, take on more detail.

4 Stephen Toulmin, *The Uses of Argument* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958); See: Robert L. Scott, "On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic," *Central States Speech Journal* Vol. 18 (Feb. 1967), pp. 9-17 (Scott's revision of his view will be mentioned shortly; see n. 11); Richard Cherwitz, "Rhetoric as 'A Way of Knowing': An Attenuation of the Epistemological Claims of the 'New Rhetoric'," *Southern Speech Communication Journal*, Vol. 42 (1977), pp. 207-219.

5 Herbert Blumer, *Symbolic Interactionism* (Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1969); Kenneth Burke, *Permanence and Change* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965); Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); Kenneth Burke, *Language as Symbolic Action* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966); See, for example, Barry Brummett, " 'Process' or 'Inter-subjectivity': Postmodern Rhetoric," *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, Vol. 9 (1976), pp. 21-51; Karlyn K. Campbell, "The Ontological Foundations of Rhetorical Theory," *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, Vol. 3 (1970), pp. 97-109.

6 See: Burke, (1966), 3; Campbell (1970), p. 103.

7 See: Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., "Rationality in Rhetoric and Philosophy," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, Vol. 59 (1973), pp. 381-389; Walter B. Weimer, "Science as a Rhetorical Transaction: Toward a Non-justificationist Conception of Rhetoric," *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, Vol. 10 (1977), pp. 1-29; Richard McKeon, "Discourse, Demonstration, Verification, and Justification," *Logique et Analyse*, Vol. 11 (1968), pp. 37-94; Richard McKeon, "The Methods of Rhetoric and Philosophy: Invention and Judgment," in *The Classical Tradition*, ed. Luitpold Wallach (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 365-373; Donald P. Cushman and Phillip K. Tompkins, "A Theory of Rhetoric for Contemporary Society," *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, Vol. 13 (1980), pp. 43-67.

8 The first rendering is the translation by Barden and Cummings (1975), 230; the second is Brown's: Klaus Dockhorn, "Hans-Georg Gadamer's *Truth and Method*, tr. and ed. Marvin Brown, *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, Vol. 13 (1980), pp. 160-180.

9 Martin Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth," tr. John Barlow, in *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, Vol. III*, ed. William Barrett and Henry D. Aiken (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 251-270; see also: Richard E. Palmer, *Hermeneutics* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), pp. 143-144.

10 See: Heidegger (1962), p. 206; Michael J. Hyde and Craig R. Smith, "Rhetoric and Hermeneutics: A Seen But Unobserved Relationship," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, Vol. 65 (1979), p. 348.

11 Robert L. Scott, "On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic: Ten Years Later," *Central States Speech Journal*, Vol. 27 (1976), p. 266.

12 Hyde and Smith (1979), p. 354. Italicized in the original.

13 *Ibid.*, pp. 354-5.

14 Gadamer (1976), p. 21; Hyde and Smith (1979), p. 350.

15 John Angus Campbell, "Hans-Georg Gadamer's *Truth and Method*," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, Vol. 64 (1978), p. 103.

16 Cushman and Tompkins (1980), p. 57.

17 Gadamer (1975), p. 324.

18 See: Stanley Deetz, "Conceptualizing Human Understanding: Gadamer's Hermeneutic and American Communication Studies," *Communication Studies*, Vol. 26 (1978), p. 18; Leonard C. Hawes, "Toward a Hermeneutic Phenomenology of Communication," *Communication Quarterly*, Vol. 25 (1977), p. 33.

19 Joseph J. Kockelmans, "Toward an Interpretive or Hermeneutic Social Science," *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal*, Vol. 5 (1975), pp. 75-77.

20 *Rhetoric*, Bk. I, Ch. 1.

21 See, for example: Lloyd F. Bitzer, "Aristotle's Enthymeme Revisited," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, Vol. 45 (1959), pp. 399-408; Wayne Brockreide, "Where is Argument?" *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, Vol. 11 (1975), pp. 179-182; Bower T. Aly, "Enthymemes: The Story of a Light-Hearted Search," *Speech Teacher*, Vol. 14 (1965), pp. 265-275; Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs, "Structure of Conversational Argument: Pragmatic Bases of the Enthymeme," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, Vol. 63 (1980), pp. 251-65.

22 Dockhorn (1980); Gadamer (1976), p. 40, n. 3.

23 Dockhorn (1980), p. 161.

24 *Ibid.*

25 Kockelmans (1975), p. 74.

26 *Rhetoric*, Bk. I, Ch. 2.

27 *Ibid.*, Bk. II, Ch. 22.

28 Dockhorn (1980), p. 161; See also: Gadamer (1975), p. 17.

29 Kockelmans (1975), p. 74.

30 *Ibid.*, p. 77.

31 Jackson and Jacobs (1980); the ideas of Jackson and Jacob's piece which are of principle interest here are also discussed in H.P. Grice, "Logic and Conversation," in *Syntax and Semantics, Vol. III: Speech Acts*, ed. P. Cole and J. Morgan (New York: Academic Press, 1975), pp. 41-58; J.R. Searle, "Indirect Speech Acts," in Cole and Morgan (1975), pp. 59-82; R. Nofsinger, Jr., "Some Rules in the Grammar of Doing Conversation," *Human Communication Research* (1976), pp. 172-181; R. Nofsinger, Jr., "A Peek at Conversational Analysis," *Communication Quarterly*, Vol. 25 (1977), pp. 12-20.

32 See: Grice (1975), pp. 44-47.

33 See: Bitzer (1979).

34 Jackson and Jacobs (1980), p. 262.

35 Nofsinger (1977), p. 13.

36 *Ibid.*, p. 12.

37 See, for example: Nofsinger (1977), pp. 13-14; Hawes (1977), pp. 37-38.

38 Compare Hawes (1977), 38 with Nofsigner (1977), 12; these continued similarities between the two positions — even though they consider themselves to be different — are instructive and, I believe, support my characterization of the features mentioned as being generally displayed.

39 Deetz (1978), 18.

40 Gadamer (1975), 401; see: Leonard Hawes, "How Writing is Used in Talk: A Study of Communicative Logic-in-Use," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, Vol. 62 (1976), 350-360.

41 Deetz (1978), 22-23; Hawes (1977), 37ff; Stanley Deetz, "Interpretative Research in Communication: A Hermeneutic Foundation," *Journal of Communication Inquiry* (1977), 65-67.

42 Hawes (1977), 32.

43 See: Daniel J. O'Keefe, "Ethnomethodology," *Journal of the Theory of Social Behavior*, Vol. 9 (1979), 196-197.

44 Gadamer (1975), 325-328.

45 Gadamer (1975), 329.

46 See: George Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton, 1963), 66-68.