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Kipnis: Professional Responsibility and the Responsibility of Professions

Professional Responsibility and the Responsibility of Professions

Kenneth Kipnis

If one studies the statements emerging from those organizations which undertake to speak for professions, one is struck by the codes of ethics and canons of professional responsibility which appear so frequently as to make them seem almost the hallmark of professionalism itself.¹ These codes appear to be based on the assumption that some actions can merit one assessment if undertaken by a certain professional, but another assessment if undertaken by some other person. For a philosopher, perhaps the most interesting thing about professions is their suggestion that there somehow exist certain special justifiable standards for the conduct of a certain class of persons.² At least two questions are raised. First, one wonders what might be the justification for these special standards?³ And second, one wants to know how it is possible to delineate the proper dimensions of these special standards and to assess the magnitude of the claim that they have upon professionals. These are, I submit, the two most important philosophical issues that arise in the field of professional ethics. It is the aim here to map an approach to them.

The argument here presented is an attempt to show how distinctive responsibilities of the individual professional can be understood in terms of the responsibility of his or her profession, taken as a whole. In the first section, I will be developing a concept of responsibility that is fundamental in this context. In the second, I will show how professions can come to have such responsibilities. Finally, I will sketch the relationship between the responsibilities of professions and the responsibilities of professionals.

I

A place to begin is with the idea of having a responsibility.⁴ A married couple can have the responsibility for the welfare of their child. A philosophy instructor can have the responsibility for a particular course. A member of a mountaineering expedition can have the responsibility for the maps. The sanitation company can have the responsibility for the proper collection and disposal of a community's garbage. In these cases and others, what one has responsibility *for* is always a matter of some concern. One would have to tell a story to explain how it is that someone has responsibility for a pebble; why, for example, it is a pebble of considerable importance; a crucial piece of evidence in a criminal case. In general, the more important the matter of concern, the greater the responsibility.

Those who have responsibility for matters of concern are expected (in the evaluative -- not the predictive -- sense of "expected") to give these matters all the attention they are due. They are expected to be able to provide -- and can generally be called upon to provide -- an account of how they are insuring that due care and attention are being given to the matters of concern for which they have responsibility. When we talk about a responsibility that an agent has, we are referring to a sphere of concern for which the agent is accountable. If a preventable mishap occurs within the sphere, there is a strong presumption that the agent is blameworthy. This concept of a responsibility -- a sphere of concern for which an agent is accountable -- is the concept I am taking to be fundamental here. To distinguish it from two derivative concepts of responsibility to be sketched shortly I will refer to it as "substantive responsibility."

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Not every agent has substantive responsibilities. A derivative concept of responsibility -- what I will call "virtue responsibility" -- is applied to persons who are, in a particular way, well suited to assume important substantive responsibilities. Of the responsible person Graham Haydon has written:

He will . . . be aware that he stands in, or has the opportunity of entering into, certain relationships with certain others in such a way that he in particular can be called to give an account of what happens in certain specified spheres. But in recognizing that he can be called to account for the nature and outcome of his actions, he is recognizing . . . the importance of so acting as to be able to give a good account.⁵

Thus the responsible person will be one who takes seriously the act of assuming a substantive responsibility and, having assumed it, is predisposed to give that responsibility the care and attention it is due.

Conversely, the person who is irresponsible is one who is predisposed to carelessness and/or inattention as regards responsibilities. It is not difficult to understand why irresponsibility should be regarded as a vice. Many of our activities are undertaken within the contexts of relationships and organizations requiring a high degree of mutual reliance. The settling of responsibilities within the relationship or organization is often necessary if the actions of the participants are to make sense. Consider two pilots flying a large aircraft over the sea. If each does her part, attending to the need for coordination, progress can be made in safety. But either can, through inattention, frustrate the good-faith efforts of the other, endanger others, and in general, erode the trust that makes cooperation possible in the first place. If we have determined that someone is irresponsible, we typically relieve that person of important responsibilities and refrain from delegating new ones.

A second derivative sense of responsibility should be noted. If the child suffers from the neglect of its parents, if the philosophy course serves only to convince students of the pointlessness of the discipline, if the maps for the mountaineering expedition are damaged or misplaced, we may hold certain persons to have responsibility for these mishaps. What I would like to call "mishap responsibility" can occur in two ways: when someone acts so as to bring the mishap about and when someone with substantive responsibility for a matter of concern neglects to give due care or attention and, as a result, the mishap occurs. When mishaps occur, those with substantive responsibility for relevant matters of concern are typically called upon to provide accounts of themselves.

It appears to be a fact of contemporary life that concerns about irresponsibility will generally be related to whether or not a mishap has occurred and, in addition, to the scale of the mishap. The first major nuclear accident will provoke a most penetrating interest. However where the irresponsibility is clear and the risk of serious loss high then, even if no mishap results, concern may well be great. If a flight crew throws a drunken party while aloft in a loaded aircraft, interested persons may well take a hard look at the personnel and the procedures of the airline in question.

A word needs to be said about the way in which one comes to have responsibilities. In the clearest cases responsibilities are more or less explicitly settled by the parties themselves or by authorized representatives.⁶ There are matters of concern which must receive attention and there is a collection of persons who create or maintain a system of relationships -- an organization or organized activity -- such that the responsibilities and the means of meeting them are allocated in a reasonable manner. The process of settling

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responsibilities is an ongoing political process. There are often questions about the privileges, rights, resources, immunities, and status accorded to those with responsibilities. These concomitant benefits can be a significant incentive to assume important responsibilities and can be forfeited upon being relieved of responsibilities. Accordingly, disagreement about the best way to attend to matters of common concern may mask conflict about whose special interests will receive the most abundant satisfaction. Beyond the issue of benefits, there are questions about the standards to be met in attending to responsibilities and, moreover, questions about the quality of past performance. Finally, there are questions about how responsibilities ought to be delegated; whether, for example, those who have it ought to be relieved of it.

Consider, for example, the responsibility that parents have for their children. It is profoundly important that children be cared for and the institution of the family is the prevailing means by which this care is expressed. The legal and social context of parenthood accords privileges, rights, resources, immunities, and status to persons who are parents in the expectation that in that manner the welfare of children can be insured.⁷ As things now stand it is up to parents, first of all, to insure that their children can mature into adults in a wholesome way. A failure here may well be a moral failure, a failure to meet one's responsibilities in a context where significant social values are at stake. In cases of such failure, where parents are shown to be unfit for the task of childrearing, they are relieved of their responsibilities by the courts.

Consider the member of the mountaineering expedition with responsibility for the maps. Just as others rely upon him to attend to that important matter, he can rely upon the others to attend to a broad range of other important concerns. If, however, it turns out that he cannot be relied upon, prudence requires that he be relieved of responsibilities in this context. Here, as with parenthood, responsibilities are more or less explicitly delegated. There is a reliance upon the person with responsibility, a granting of benefits in recognition of that responsibility, and the option of relieving the agent of that responsibility in the event that the arrangement proves unsatisfactory.

If one thinks of substantive responsibility in this general way, organizations as well as persons may have responsibilities. The sanitation company can, through authorized representatives, enter into an agreement with an authorized representative of a second organization, an incorporated township. If the agreement provides that the sanitation company shall have the *exclusive* right to pick up and dispose of the garbage, and that the township shall provide consideration in return for these services, then it seems unproblematic that the company has the responsibility for picking up all of the garbage in the township.

But now suppose that the garbage does not get picked up -- let us say the company discovers that it does not have the resources to meet its responsibilities under the terms of the agreement. Can we make sense out of the suggestion that the company itself -- as opposed to particular persons working within it -- might be "irresponsible"?⁸ I believe we can. To be sure, there clearly are cases where the failure of an organization to meet its responsibilities is a consequence of the failure of some person within the organization to meet his or her responsibilities. But the matter cannot rest here. For an organization is more than a collection of persons: it is a system of positions and associated procedures. Thus, if an irresponsible person occupies a position and, as a consequence, a mishap occurs, it may be that the *procedures* which select persons to occupy positions of responsibility *are themselves defective* in some way. Moreover, it may be that in some cases each person

within the organization can meet his or her responsibilities and yet, *because the structure of the organization itself is faulty, its responsibility is not met.*⁹ Perhaps the structure impedes the flow of certain types of information. Perhaps there are important matters that are not assigned as anyone's responsibilities. Perhaps the organization trains its personnel to attend only to some aspects of a problem, neglecting others; or only takes on persons who do; or singles them out for promotion, eventually discarding the others. One can reply that in these cases the charge of irresponsibility should lie with those persons who have designed the structure of the organization. But organizations rarely have such architects. Rather, they are generally aggregations of positions and procedures that have accumulated gradually over the years. (Such structures can lack coherent justifications. We can only explain them as the products of historical processes.) And even where a defect-ridden organization can point to its architect, one should still ask how the responsibility for design happened to settle on a person like that.

While we may not be comfortable talking about organizations as "irresponsible," there can be no doubt that some of them are predisposed to carelessness and inattention as regards the responsibilities they have assumed. Social institutions are artifacts, instruments that people have fashioned to realize human values. As with any artifact, they can be fashioned with the care and skill they require or they can be object lessons in negligence, irresponsibility, or even viciousness. If one is concerned with the propensity of a particular organization to fail to meet its responsibilities one cannot be blind to the structural aspects of the problem. In a society which routinely delegates to many organizations responsibility for a broad range of matters of public concern, close attention should be given to the manner in which persons within those organizations are selected, trained, promoted to positions of authority, and constrained to so organize themselves as to give due attention and care to our concerns. In the following section I will show how it is the delegation of such responsibility which creates a profession.

II

The development of an occupation into a profession is a lengthy process.¹⁰ Occupations may be located at virtually any point along a continuum with day laborers at one end and doctors and lawyers at the other. Nevertheless, three distinct but related features characteristically emerge as professionalism progresses.

1. In the first place, organized practitioners within an occupation begin to make a *claim to maximal competence*. Through representatives, one begins to hear that a certain discrete class of persons, through intense and thorough intellectual training and practical experience, exceeds in skill all other persons in some area of endeavor. Two conditions must be satisfied before such a claim can be made. First, there must be some organization of practitioners within the favored class. The organization need not include all of them but must include enough to warrant a claim to speak on behalf of the whole class. Second, there must be some criterion for deciding who belongs to the class of favored practitioners and who does not. (In the end, this evolves into an elaborate gatekeeping procedure involving education, accreditation of schools, and certification of new members.) The esoteric nature of the knowledge and skill possessed by this select class of practitioners begins to make it look as if persons outside the favored class simply lack the standing to make sound judgments about the performance of those specialists. As the claim to maximal competence comes to be accepted, it begins to seem more and more reasonable to let the select class of practitioners certify and evaluate itself. The organization of favored practitioners stands ready to assume this responsibility.

2. The special competence possessed by members of a profession is of a sort that can be applied to some matter of public concern. For reasons that will become clear, the process of professionalization requires that the profession make a public *commitment to devote itself to the realization of some significant social value*,¹¹ to give due attention to the distinctive matter of social concern to which its skills and knowledge can be directed. Typically one finds explicit reference to these values in the preambles to the codes of ethics which emerge from professional organizations. Thus, the American Bar Association's *Code of Professional Responsibility* begins with the following:

The continued existence of a free and democratic society depends upon recognition of the concept that justice is based upon the rule of law grounded in respect for the dignity of the individual and his capacity through reason for enlightened self-government. Law so grounded makes justice possible, for only through such law does the dignity of the individual attain respect and protection. Without it, individual rights become subject to unrestrained power, respect for law is destroyed, and rational self-government is impossible.

Lawyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of the relationship with and functions in our legal system. A consequent obligation of lawyers is to maintain the highest standards of ethical conduct.¹²

The same type of self-identification can be seen in official statements from professions of less lofty pretension. Consider these words from the preamble to the *Code of Ethics* of the National Association of Real Estate Boards:

Under all is the land. Upon its wise utilization and widely allocated ownership depend the survival and growth of free institutions and of our civilization. The Realtor is the instrumentality through which the land resource of the nation reaches its highest use and through which land ownership attains its widest distribution. He is the creator of homes, a builder of cities, a developer of industries and productive farms.

Such functions impose obligations beyond those of ordinary commerce. They impose grave social responsibilities to which the Realtor should dedicate himself. The Realtor, therefore, is zealous to maintain and improve the standards of his calling and shares with his fellow-Realtors a common responsibility for its integrity and honor.¹³

These examples can be multiplied. It is only rarely, however, that professional associations precisely delimit the social values to which their skills are characteristically to be directed and to which they pledge to commit their energies. Nonetheless, what is clear is that professions typically endeavor to represent themselves as dedicated to an ideal of social service.¹⁴

3. Neither the competence nor the commitment is sufficient to change a discrete organized occupational activity into a profession. What is needed is social recognition of and reliance upon the organized profession as the means by which certain skills are to be applied and certain matters of public concern given the attention they are due. This last feature is built upon the preceding two. For if there is confidence that the members of a profession possess maximal competence in a particular area and if there is trust that these practitioners are deeply committed to the responsible application of their distinctive skills,

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then there will be no need to designate nonprofessionals as overseers of professional practice. No one is competent to do the job and we don't need to have it done in the first place.

As this view becomes more plausible, as the profession earns or otherwise secures its trust and confidence, it gradually obtains autonomy at both the institutional and individual levels. Institutional autonomy is secured when the organization obtains recognition as representing the profession. It is invited to speak on behalf of the profession. It takes control over membership: the selection and training of candidates, the accreditation of professional schools and programs, the certification of new members, the promulgation and enforcement of standards of professional practice. In the clearest cases of professionalization, the profession becomes, in essence, an unregulated legal monopoly with respect to a certain service, unauthorized practice being a criminal offense. Individual autonomy is secured when the profession obtains a substantial measure of control over the conditions and content of its work. It lays claim to, and is granted, the latitude it says it needs in order to do its best job. Autonomy for the individuals in a profession can take several forms. The tradition of academic freedom is probably the best known mechanism but others can be seen in the governance structures of hospitals¹⁵ and in the operation of Disciplinary Rule 3 of the ABA code which effectively prevents lawyers from working for non-lawyers in corporations that sell legal services. Substantial control over the conditions and content of work is, in each context, secured by members of the affected profession.

In the end, of course, it is we who, through our representatives, delegate responsibility to professions or relieve them of it. With respect to professions as a whole and the communities they serve, responsibilities are settled, in the clearest cases, in committees of state legislatures. These committees typically meet with the representatives of professional organizations in efforts to hammer out satisfactory arrangements. I have not been convinced that the delegation of such responsibility is always unwise.¹⁶ Much, it seems, depends upon the political dimensions of the institutional and individual autonomy that is granted, the soundness of the profession's claim to competence (the scope of that competence relative to the epistemic legitimacy of the knowledge-claims upon which it is based), and the degree to which the profession is genuinely committed to an ideal of public service. A complete justification of a profession would have to take account of all of these matters. Here, however, what is of most interest is the commitment. For it assures us that the privileges that have been granted will not be abused or otherwise exercised irresponsibly. If the profession plainly has organized itself in such a way as to insure that its distinctive matter of social concern receives from the profession the attention it is due, then it may well be reasonable for us to choose to maintain a system of professional practice. But how might one assess the manner in which a profession meets or fails to meet this condition?

III

A place to begin is with the code of ethics of the profession. These codes embody a theory about the relationship between the profession and the community it serves: lawyers, it will be remembered, are "guardians of the law." The codes indicate in their preambles the significant social values that the professions take to be their primary concerns. While there is often a pressing need for a precision that philosophical skills could provide, the central intent is clear: to register, on the part of the profession, an official recognition of the sphere of responsibility to which the profession owes due attention.

But how is this reciprocal of social privilege -- to be acted upon by the organized profession? One way is through the institutionalization of a code of ethics, a set of principles defining the conditions under which professional skills are to be applied. Naturally, before we were through, we would want to consider the mechanisms by which a profession could insure that its members were adhering to its principles. These might or might not be enforcement procedures of some kind but, in any case, we would want to know that they were adequate to provide substantial adherence to the code of ethics under the existing conditions of professional practice. For a justifiable professional code consists of principles that would, if substantially adhered to, insure that the substantive responsibility of the profession receives the attention it is due. The rationality of the delegation of responsibility to professions can thus turn on the soundness of those principles.

Consider, for example, the duties that arise when someone makes it clear that he is committing a serious wrongdoing that is punishable by law. Assume that this takes place in a situation where one is expected not to divulge the information. Should one let the proper authorities know? In non-professional contexts one can envision the arguments going either way. But if it had been a doctor who received the information while acting in a professional capacity, then the following argument would have application. The principle of doctor-patient confidentiality is one of the best-known and most firmly established principles in medical ethics. It is a part of the Hippocratic oath and its special claims upon the medical profession are recognized in legal privilege.¹⁷ The justification for this principle is reasonably clear. As things stand, the medical profession has a special responsibility for the health of the community it serves. Persons who are not medical professionals usually lack the skill and confidence that doctors have and, even if they were competent, they are barred by law from putting their knowledge and skill into practice. The granting of special privileges to the medical profession would lack point in the absence of a reasonable expectation that the members of the profession were undertaking to use those privileges to serve (rather than to exploit) the public. Doctors have indeed been quite successful in their efforts to encourage the public to rely exclusively upon their profession in attending to certain concerns. For the medical profession to meet its responsibility, the public must be willing to see doctors when the need arises and to supply information that doctors need if they are to do their best work. It is reasonable to suppose that if doctors -- even a very small number of doctors -- are willing to use that information to the detriment of the patients who supply it, the public will be less willing to cooperate with doctors. A betrayal of confidence by a medical professional can erode public trust and poison the environment in which medical practice flourishes. On the other hand, adherence to the principle of doctor-patient confidentiality can help to create an environment in which the medical profession can do its best job.

Construed in this general way, the special responsibilities of individual professionals are based upon the responsibilities that their professions have assumed in the political process of professionalization. And, if this account is apposite, the principles of professional ethics -- some of them at least -- can be justified as sets of rules, substantial adherence to which will conduce to the creation of an environment in which due care and attention are best given to the distinctive matters of concern for which professions can be maintained.

It is important to note here that small changes in the articulated commitment of the profession can produce great changes in the code of ethics. Thus some disputes about what appear to be ethical issues may mirror deep differences concerning what the commitment of the profession ought to be. Consider, for example, the obligations that arise when a doctor believes that the small boy she is treating has been battered by the parent who

brought him in University of Dayton Review, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1981), Art. 10
further harm by notifying the proper authorities, if the doctor does this, other child abusers will hesitate before taking their injured children to doctors, with consequent fatal results for these other children. Still other parents will hesitate out of a fear that they will be wrongly identified as child abusers upon bringing their injured children to the doctor. Now on one account, the doctor ought to be the champion of her patient. The medical profession should assert its overriding obligation to the patients that are delivered into its hands. Nothing can be more important than the suffering patient that is before the doctor and the interest that that patient has in securing what it can of physical well-being. Yet on another account, the medical profession is the means by which we express our concern for our physical well-being. The medical profession that does the best job is the one that best secures the health of the community it serves. Thus, although, at the outset, some children may be better helped by notifying the authorities, in the long run a medical profession that routinely betrays these parents will lose the trust it needs if it is to do its best work. Nothing can be more important to a doctor than being worthy of trust. On the one account the medical profession is primarily concerned with the health of the patients that are brought to it. On the other account the concern is with the general physical well-being of the community. A resolution of the ambiguities in the present codes may press hard choices upon the professions and their membership and upon those who delegate responsibilities to them.

Although there are other matters to be considered, it is the codes that merit the closest attention in the philosophical study of professional ethics. They delineate the public interest that the profession exists to serve. They can set out principles which, if substantially adhered to, will insure that that public interest will receive from the profession the care and attention it is due. The claim that sound principles have upon the practitioner has its basis in the claim that the profession has to the trust of the public. A responsible profession, one might say, is one which does not merely profess its dedication to the public interest in its code but, rather, expresses that dedication in its very constitution.

From the point of view of the individual professional, the theory here presented calls attention to the political role that the practitioner can properly play within the profession itself. As a member of a profession, as one who can participate in its governance, he or she shares responsibility for the quality of its structure. If that structure merely serves to create the illusion of concerned attention, if it serves values that are quite different from -- or even at odds with -- the values the profession claims to serve, then the need is great for effective political action within the profession.¹⁸

From the point of view of the citizen, the theory here presented calls attention to the power to delegate responsibility to professional associations and the power to relieve them of responsibility. Deprofessionalization, the process of relieving professions of their responsibilities (and concomitant privileges and benefits), has been urged by some critics.¹⁹ At a minimum, prudence requires that one refrain from leaving important matters to organizations that are predisposed to inattention as regards the responsibilities they have assumed. The code of ethics of a profession is a guarantee that the practice of individual professionals will conform to principles that display due regard for the profession's sphere of responsibility. Given the extent of our reliance upon the professions, it would not be unreasonable to subject these guarantees to the most rigorous philosophical scrutiny.²⁰

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- ¹Most of these are to be found in Jane Clapp's *Professional Ethics and Insignia* (Metuchen: Scarecrow Press, 1974).
- ²Allison Jagger has considered philosophy itself as a profession in "Philosophy as a Profession," *Metaphilosophy*, 6 (1975), p. 100.
- ³At least one commentator has denied that there are such special standards. See Robert M. Veatch, "Medical Ethics: Professional or Universal," *Harvard Theological Review*, 65 (1972), p. 558. Veatch's main argument has been criticized in Kenneth Kipnis's "Professional Ethics," *Business and Professional Ethics*, 2 (1978), p. 2. Recently Veatch has modified his views in "Professional Medical Ethics: The Grounding of Its Principles," *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy*, 1 (1979), p. 1.
- ⁴The discussion here builds upon H. L. A. Hart's analysis of "role responsibility" developed in Chapter IX of his *Punishment and Responsibility* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968).
- ⁵Graham Haydon, "On Being Responsible," *Philosophical Quarterly*, 28 (1978), p. 56.
- ⁶There is another view in which responsibility is generated where the serious need for attention encounters the capacity to meet that need. Thus, on this account, if someone should discover that a serious mishap can be averted through attention that only he or she can provide, then, even in the absence of any explicit delegation or assumption of responsibility, that person can have a substantive responsibility for the matter of concern involving the imminent mishap. Some of the dimensions of this theory are brought out in Kenneth Kipnis, *Philosophical Issues in Law: Cases and Materials* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977), pp. 99-158. See also the bibliographical references on pages 328-330. While I am in some sympathy with those who advance this view, I have not been convinced by the arguments that have been brought forward in defense of it.
- ⁷Note that even if this expectation were unfounded, even if it were conclusively shown that other means were better suited to the task of rearing children, even if it were demonstrated that parents should not have the special rights and responsibilities that they presently have, parents would still have those rights and responsibilities, both legal and moral. They are, I would say, built into the present social structure and cannot be altered until that structure is changed.
- ⁸The issues surrounding organizational irresponsibility are helpfully represented in Christopher D. Stone's *Where the Law Ends* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975).
- ⁹The general issue of collective, non-distributive responsibility is treated in Peter A. French, ed., *Individual and Collective Responsibility* (Cambridge: Schenkman, 1972). See especially the articles by R. S. Downie and David Cooper.
- ¹⁰See Harold Wilensky, "The Professionalization of Everyone," *The American Journal of Sociology*, 70 (1964), p. 137.
- ¹¹See Talcott Parsons, "Professions," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* 12 (1968), p. 536.

- ¹²Quoted in Maynard E. Pirsig, ed., *Cases and Materials on Professional Responsibility* (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1970), p. 337.
- ¹³Quoted in Stephen J. Martin, ed., *Commentaries on the Code of Ethics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), p. v. I am grateful to Mary Carson Smith for calling this material to my attention.
- ¹⁴In the end this produces a distinctive type of transaction in the payment of fees to professionals. They are paid, not for their work, but, rather, in order that they may do their work. Lawrence Haworth develops this point in his *Decadence and Objectivity* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), p. 112.
- ¹⁵I am grateful to Andrew Jameton for calling the matter of hospital governance to my attention.
- ¹⁶Milton Friedman presents a strong case in "Occupational Licensure" in *Capitalism and Freedom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).
- ¹⁷See, for example, Rule 27 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence.
- ¹⁸There may be substantial obstacles in the way of effective political action within the profession itself. The structure of many professions precludes significant participation by large and distinct segments of its membership: the AAUP and non-tenured professors, the American Bar Association and sole practitioners, the various engineering professional associations and working (non-managerial) engineers.
- ¹⁹See, for example, the writings of Ivan Illich: *Deschooling Society* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972); *Tools for Conviviality* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973); and *Medical Nemesis* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976).
- ²⁰Versions of this paper have been read at Lake Forest College; at the Colloquium on Collective Responsibility in the Professions at the University of Dayton; at the University of Michigan as part of the NEH Journalism Program; at the organizational meeting of the Society for the Study of Professional Ethics at the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Convention in Washington D.C.; and at the Hastings Center Workshop on Ethics at Princeton University. The paper was written in part during the NEH-sponsored National Project on Philosophy and Engineering Ethics at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. I am indebted to Sara Lyn Smith, Andrew Jameton, Haskell Fain, Michael Martin, Albert Flores, Lisa Newton, and Robert F. Ladenson for helpful comments and suggestions.