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## **From Eidetics to Hermeneutics: Notes on the Philosophical Method of Paul Ricoeur**

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From Eidetics to Hermeneutics

Notes on  
the Philosophical Method of

Paul Ricoeur

by

William A. Hyatt

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Master's Essay

Theology

Fall, 1972

The value lies in the faithful following, through darkness, of a light by which we have been guided and which is no longer visible to us directly; indeed, it can be said that it is because there is a darkness, an eclipse, that there can be testimony — attestation.

Gabriel Marcel

## PRESCRIPT

The most important aspect of this paper, it must be confessed, is a certain, if indefinable, mental transposition that occurred in the writer over the several weeks and months of preparation. The following text, burdened by all of the usual limitations of a short presentation, bears the marks of an expanding appreciation of the intensity and scope of Ricoeur's philosophical project. But the reflective method of that project speaks more directly to the student who engages it. And the words it speaks are a call to participate in courage and humility: courage to open oneself, humility to recognize limits. It seems impossible to appreciate Ricoeur's approach to self-understanding without identifying these polarities as the tension of my participation in Being.

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## INTRODUCTION

In the midst of the contemporary crisis of culture appears the monumental philosophical project of Paul Ricoeur. This crisis is characterized not only by a radical shift in the notion of science,<sup>1</sup> and by the emergence of historical consciousness,<sup>2</sup> but also by a deeply felt conflict emerging from and challenging the future of man's explanation of man, his world and his destiny. If Thales asked a metaphysical question concerning the ultimate causes of the many things he observed around him, and Descartes, transposing the ground of all such questions, asked, "How do I know any answer is true?"--the modern question (possibly beginning with Kierkegaard) is, "So what?" "Is there, after all, any value to all that is and to all that man knows?" This is the reflective question--for the possible answers are "Yes" and "No" and it is a question for interiority--for man is forced to look to himself and his works for an answer. But what is the answer? Contemporary man is left to struggle with radically opposing styles of interpretation; On one extreme there is interpretation which would cut down and destroy the illusions<sup>3</sup> and, at another pole, one which would find man's ultimate destiny in a postcritical faith, a recollection or restoration of meaning.<sup>4</sup> It is to the dialectical resolution of these opposing hermeneutics that Ricoeur's work is ultimately addressed, especially in his latest published work, Freud and Philosophy.<sup>5</sup>

Yet Freud and Philosophy is something of a detour in Ricoeur's overall development. Prior to this book he published the first two of three projected parts of his Philosophy of the Will. These parts consist

of the two books, Fallible Man<sup>6</sup> and The Symbolism of Evil.<sup>7</sup> Attention is given to these two books in the present paper in the hope that such a study will provide an ascesis to Ricoeur's later work and also because the precise meaning of Ricoeur's "hermeneutic turn,"<sup>8</sup> and consequently the distinctive method of all his work to date, appears for the first time in these two books.

We intend to analyze Ricoeur's method first by locating it within the development of phenomenology (Part I--Description, pp. 3-11ff) and then by demonstrating how Ricoeur applies his method in Fallible Man and in The Symbolism of Evil (Part II--Application, pp. 12-52ff).

PART I: METHOD -- DESCRIPTION

A. THE SOCRATIC/PHENOMENOLOGICAL TRADITION

Ricoeur's philosophical project may be variously described as a concrete attempt to study man himself,<sup>9</sup> as a philosophical anthropology,<sup>10</sup> or as a search for authentic subjectivity, i.e., an authentic act of self-consciousness.<sup>11</sup> For this reason one may assign Ricoeur a place in the Socratic tradition of philosophy. For Socrates turned philosophic reflection<sup>12</sup> along a new path. Instead of inquiring into the stuff of which the universe is made, he sought to glean from man's works, history, and expression an authentic understanding of self.<sup>13</sup> Socrates' dictum, "Know yourself," pointed to a new path for the pursuit of wisdom.<sup>14</sup> The history of this path, however, as traversed by different philosophers, witnesses to the possibility of many different methods and many different views of man.

Among those philosophers whose views of man have significantly influenced Ricoeur we may list Plato<sup>15</sup> and Gabriel Marcel.<sup>16</sup> Other aspects of Ricoeur's philosophical project<sup>17</sup> are affected by the philosophical methods associated with the names of Descartes,<sup>18</sup> Kant,<sup>19</sup> and Hegel.<sup>20</sup> The most important influence of all, however, comes from the phenomenological method of Edmund Husserl. For it is this "method of eidetic reduction"<sup>21</sup> which places Ricoeur in the properly-so-called phenomenologist tradition.<sup>22</sup> The weight of the eidetic approach can be felt even after Ricoeur finds it necessary to



distinguish "with considerable force" between the method Husserl practiced and the philosophical interpretation of this method which he developed.<sup>23</sup>

In at least two instances of importance to this paper, Ricoeur fruitfully unites the method of one philosopher with the philosophic doctrine of another. Fallible Man is the first example. The method is Kantian<sup>24</sup> while in the Platonic myths Ricoeur finds the beginnings of a philosophical meditation on the fallible condition of man.<sup>25</sup> The second example is the union of the phenomenological method of Husserl and the existentialism of Gabriel Marcel. Ricoeur had published books on both.<sup>26</sup> Yet he advanced over the thought of each philosopher when, in The Symbolism of Evil, he confronted Marcel's respect for human finitude<sup>27</sup> with the rigor of Husserl's method.

Because Ricoeur's philosophical work is concerned with authentic subjectivity, i.e., correct self-understanding, we have located him within the broad tradition of philosophers whose study is man. Because of the influence of Husserl's method on Fallible Man and on The Symbolism of Evil, we have further placed him within the phenomenological tradition. Yet, because of the influence of existentialism, we will see that he brings the phenomenological tradition to a distinctive, new focus.

#### B. FROM EIDETICS TO HERMENEUTICS

Ricoeur spans three periods of phenomenology. Beginning with Descartes and his concern with the thinking subject, phenomenology reached a first high point in the "transcendental idealism" of Husserl. His methods were later adapted by existentialists (e.g., Marcel, M. Merleau-

Ponty) whose main interests were directed to the whole of concrete human existence. In both the Husserlian form (which finds essence given in perception) and the existentialist form, primacy is given to perception. By raising the question of language, Ricoeur moves phenomenology away from perception (experience) toward expression and the task of deciphering expression. There has emerged a third kind of phenomenology, hermeneutic phenomenology.<sup>28</sup>

Yet, as we have noted, Ricoeur is critical of phenomenological method as non-self-limiting. The search for "limit concepts"--compatible with the aim of a truly reflective philosophy--marks the emergence of Ricoeur's own method. The "limit concept" is necessary to preserve philosophy from self-destruction. For the inner telos of philosophy is a drive for unity, and that very drive occasions premature (and false) synthesis. Herein lies the temptation to a philosophical hubris. On the other extreme, the claims of multiple--and irreducible--philosophies provide a temptation to skepticism, giving up all hope that "all philosophies are ultimately within the same truth of being."<sup>29</sup> To retain hope; to avoid premature synthesis: these are the conditions of possibility for philosophy. And they are exigencies which are met by "limit concepts."

The "limit concept" arises by opposing two sides of a polarity. Philosophy is internally a tension between clarity and depth;<sup>30</sup> externally, it is set over against its own source, prephilosophy.<sup>31</sup> Phenomenology accuses "objectivist" empiricism of overlooking the heart of the human subject's experience--yet objectivist methods can reveal a corresponding naïveté in phenomenology itself.<sup>32</sup> Only through Kant are the limits and ground of Husserl exposed, while through Husserl, an implicit phenomenology is revealed in Kant.<sup>33</sup> Kant is to be understood through Augustine--and

Augustine through Kant.<sup>34</sup> Psychoanalysis is not phenomenology, but phenomenology can reveal, hidden within the overt hermeneutics of suspicion, the seeds of a hermeneutics of recovery.<sup>35</sup> "The Adam symbol is protected against all moralizing reduction by the mass of the other myths...."<sup>36</sup> This dialectic of opposites--leading to a "limit concept"--is the general strategy of Ricoeur's method.

Under the sign of reflective philosophy, however, Ricoeur will further specify a series of methods which become segments of the over-all method of transcendental deduction. The first of these (which corresponds to the structural phenomenology period of his project, i.e., FN and FM) is the method of eidetics or eidetic analysis. This method, which consists in the suspension or bracketing of the empirical, factual description of man's situation as involved in particular historical circumstances, frees the philosopher to analyze the essential structures of human reality. The structures are revealed as the a priori possibilities of man's actual activities. They are the conditions or principles of intelligibility logically prior to any empirical study of man. Within the eidetics, for example, the human fundamental structures of willing are described as decision, movement and consent.<sup>37</sup>

In Ricoeur's project, the eidetics serves to postpone the examination of the concrete, historical existence of man, i.e., his condition in relation to Fault and Transcendence. However, that examination is the clear, if implicit, developmental aim of the project from the beginning. FM, still eidetic, brings the project to the verge of the empirical. For the last time<sup>38</sup> Ricoeur examines the structures which make it possible for man to be fallible, in theoretical, practical and affective dimensions of his existence.<sup>39</sup>

And then comes the "turn" — or more dramatically, the "leap" to hermeneutics. From concern for conditions of possible experience, Ricoeur moves to actuality, to human existence, to what he calls an empirics. The eidetic brackets, under which the structures which would allow Fault to emerge were discovered,<sup>40</sup> are now removed.<sup>41</sup> From structural (essential) phenomenology we move to existential phenomenology --- or do we? Certainly the new turn of the theme is to man in the fullness of his existence. But the method is not, as with the existential phenomenologists, an examination of man's experience. Rather, it is an examination of the expression of Fault in symbol and myth. It is this turn to expression, at the very moment when his phenomenology would become existential, that constitutes the specific difference of Ricoeur's method.

Ricoeur finds in both the essentialist and existentialist treatment of Fault an instance of premature synthesis. Speaking of the "later" Husserlian phenomenologists he says:

That school of phenomenologists has sought inspiration in the theory of the Lebenswelt for a description which is too quickly synthetic for my liking. In dealing with a problem, if we go straight to the 'existential project,' to the 'movement of existence' to which all authentically human conduct leads, then we risk missing the special character of the problem and blurring the outline of different functions within a sort of indistinct existential monism...<sup>42</sup>

The existentialists have compounded the problem by locating alienation, error, Fault and guilt ontologically in finitude.

Philosophy tends to reduce the event of guilt to a structure homogenous with other structures....In this respect the philosophies of existence, which have done so much to reintroduce error into philosophical reflection, proceed no differently than Plotinus and Spinoza: for them also finitude is the ultimate philosophical alibi for guilt, a temptation which seems inherent in a philosophical treatment of the notion of guilt.<sup>43</sup>

But an ultimate account of the reason for the move to hermeneutics cannot rest with the notion of premature synthesis. The final exigence for the move is suggested above in Ricoeur's criticism of the existentialists. Fault<sup>44</sup> is not a reality open to structural or existential analysis. It does not appear purely as a datum of human experience.

The fault is not an element of fundamental ontology homogeneous with other factors discovered by pure description, like motives, powers, conditions, and limits. It can be conceived only as an accident, an interruption, a fall. It does not constitute a part of a system....Rather, the fault remains an alien body in the essential structure of man. There is no principle of intelligibility of such disruption....The fault is absurd.<sup>45</sup>

If Fault is not a structural characteristic of human existence, it cannot be examined directly in experience. The actuality of Fault cannot be circumscribed by a method modeled on "system" or dedicated to exposing essential structures. Instead, the meaning of Fault must be approached indirectly, by an examination of the rich expression of Fault given in symbols and myths. For these express — and attempt to account for — human evil and suffering. Yet they do so obliquely; they suggest rather than say, they hide as well as disclose. The language of myth is both rich and dense. Such language calls for interpretation. Philosophical reflection must turn to hermeneutics.

### C. UNLIMITED GOAL, LIMITED ACHIEVEMENT

We have postponed an examination of the basic presuppositions of Ricoeur's transcendental method as a whole in order to preserve the integrity of the specifically different but developing segments. Before we go on to elaborate further implications of the last segment, the turn to hermeneutics (as evidenced in SE), we will now consider the philosophic basis which confers

unity on all of Ricoeur's developing project.<sup>46</sup>

The basic problem of philosophical methodology is that of reconciling philosophy's traditional goal of rational universality and objectivity with the complex limitation placed on this goal by man's total existential involvement as entailing both a basic human and singularly individual finitude.<sup>47</sup>

There is a tension in philosophy between source and method. For the source, whether one considers the history of ancient Greece or a particular tradition, or a given philosopher is always limited. Yet, Ricoeur maintains, the aim of any genuine philosophical method is complete explanation. This is a particularly urgent tension for a philosophy which takes as its field of inquiry the prereflective. Nor is the tension lessened by moving attention from experience to expression. For one there encounters symbols, the birthplace and fullness of language, and symbols are opaque. In Ricoeur's philosophy, and especially in its hermeneutic moment, one encounters a drive toward pure rational articulation (the pure language goal) together with its polar extreme, symbol (the dense prereflective language origin).<sup>48</sup> In contrast to more naïve brands of philosophy, however, Ricoeur's philosophy immediately abandons any claim to being "presuppositionless." "It wants to be thought, not presuppositionless, but in and with all its presuppositions. Its first problem is not how to get started, but, from the midst of speech, to recollect itself."<sup>49</sup> In one stroke Ricoeur's philosophy thereby abandons the hubris of self-sufficiency and invites dialectic to strengthen its thrust toward explanation.

In the same stroke it restricts the notion of reflection itself. And this in two ways: 1) reflection is a task; it must not be confused with consciousness, or self-consciousness or awareness as given. 2) since it

is not directly given in the conscious field, it cannot be a starting point for philosophy. To think so is to mistake the starting point for the goal: one begins with an unclear, vague self-awareness and advances, through a meditation on the acts that objectify that awareness, to a new, mediated, self-awareness. "Reflection is the appropriation of our effort to exist and of our desire to be, through the works which bear witness to that effort and desire."<sup>50</sup>

If reflection is a task of self-recovery to be performed in the midst of language, it must find in language the essential structures of human existence which make language possible. Thus the reflective task moves beyond the epistemological, beyond the Kantian discovery of the synthetic a priori principles of knowledge (or moral obligation). Reflection addresses itself to the larger effort of discovering the essential structures of human existence. Reflection thus becomes interpretation. "Reflection must become interpretation because I cannot grasp the act of existing except in signs scattered in the world."<sup>51</sup>

Thus hermeneutic phenomenology, as the highest moment of reflective philosophy, continues to maintain philosophy's goal of rational universality. (And this preserves the unity of Ricoeur's developing project). At the same time it shifts the emphasis of traditional transcendental method<sup>52</sup> and admits the impossibility of a complete realization of that goal. By admitting its presuppositions, its origins within language, it directs attention to the radical limitation of philosophy. For language is a non-philosophical presupposition — a fullness which no explanation will ever equal. Language "has already taken place...everything in a certain sense has already been said."<sup>53</sup> "This limit [of total philosophical comprehension] is never attained

because in man's precomprehension of himself there is a wealth of meaning which reflection is unable to equal."<sup>54</sup>

Even though a philosophy which reflects on man never achieves its goal, some advance is made in understanding man by reflection's recognition of its own limitation. For it is man himself who is reflecting, who is speaking his finitude, and by this act is in some sense breaking through it. Finitude expresses itself. Reflection must take this, too, into account. "The complete discourse on finitude is a discourse on the finitude and the infinitude of man."<sup>55</sup>



PART II: METHOD -- APPLICATION

We have attempted to locate Ricoeur within a broad historical perspective, to identify his methods within the tradition of phenomenology and to indicate the contribution he makes to that tradition in his turn to hermeneutics. We asserted a methodological continuity, together with a change of perspective, in the move from eidetics to empirics. It is the purpose of Part II of this exposition to support that assertion by turning to the themes of Fallible Man and The Symbolism of Evil. Section one (1.) of the following will attempt to find, at the limit of the structural analysis, a border with the world of symbol and myth. Section two (2.) will consider Ricoeur's first attempt to apply the empirical method — to explicate sympathetically existential significations through expressions, specifically through the symbols of evil.

Section one (on Fallible Man) is further divided into three parts: A. The Transcendental Synthesis, B. The Practical Synthesis, and C. The Affective Synthesis. The movement is from the abstract toward the concrete.

In the final section (2.) we will consider the Symbolism of Evil under the titles: A. The Hermeneutical Standpoint, B. The Field of Symbol and C. Myths.

1. FALLIBLE MAN: FROM FALLIBLE TO FAULT

The structure of human reality is originally dialectical. Man is limit and unlimited, finite and infinite. This is the originating disproportion of man within himself which makes man fallible.<sup>56</sup> Fallibility, nevertheless, remains a structural concept.<sup>57</sup> As the "possibility of evil" it is prior to the experience of evil. Fallible Man intends and remains within the structural account allowed by eidetic method. Still, the structural model comes, progressively, to border on the ontological by a gradual removal of the brackets. This is effected in three cycles: that of knowing, willing and feeling.<sup>58</sup>

Each of these cycles begins with the finite pole prior to moving to an implied infinitude. Nevertheless, Ricoeur is not totally neutral. His method involves not only a set of polarities leading to a "limit concept" but also a weighted focus. Just as in FP he weighs phenomenology against the counter-focus of psychoanalysis, so in this eidetic, the pole of man's infinitude is weighted (or favored) against its counter pole, man's finitude.

Also, in Ricoeur's approach, phenomenology must begin by a move away from immediacy.<sup>59</sup> This is effected in Fallible Man by applying Kantian limits to intentionality itself. In effect this is a reduction of existence to knowing. An analysis of knowing becomes the model of the later, more concrete totality of will and feeling which is viewed as ideal limit. By setting immediacy off-center, the idea of the total (authentic) grasp becomes a task. The demand for such a grasp is there, but it is not to be fulfilled directly.<sup>60</sup> As a limit-idea, the understanding of the total being-world is an intention which is never thoroughly fulfilled.

## A. THE TRANSCENDENTAL SYNTHESIS

To grasp the significance of this first, and model, analysis is akin to witnessing the marriage of Husserlian phenomenology to Kantian epistemology.<sup>61</sup> Kant provides the limits; Husserl, the method. The goal is a critique of knowledge, but it is to be reached via the object as it appears. "What is first displayed, what appears, is things, living beings, persons in the world."<sup>62</sup> Yet, when reflection begins, that simple presence is broken. Do things is as sensitively presented? as received? Or do they is as determined by understanding, by the act which dominates presence by determining its meaning?<sup>63</sup> Two separate analyses of that appearance — one as the finitude of knowing, and the other as the infinitude of knowing, are demanded.

The finite pole emerges in a description of perspective. For the object appears only in a series of profiles, "the perspectival limitation of perception" which reflectively establishes the subject as a "point of view." "It causes every view of... to be a point of view on.... But this characteristic of the point of view, inherent in every viewing, is not directly noticed by me but realized reflectively."<sup>64</sup>

Reflection on the object as perceived thus reveals the limitation of the viewer, as one with a "point of view." In the limit, analysis points to the body as the condition for perspective. For perspective can be understood 1) as the opening of the body onto... 2) the here from which the object is perceived and 3) the originating motion which allows objects to appear from different sides. I do not first see the finitude of the body — but its openness;<sup>65</sup> yet as I reflect I realize that "I never perceive more than one side at any given time, and the object is never more than the presumed unity of the flux of these silhouettes....The

intentional analysis of this inadequacy makes me turn back from the object to myself as the finite center of perspective....The point of view [identified with perspective and the finitude proper to receptivity<sup>66</sup>] is the ineluctable initial narrowness of my openness to the world."<sup>67</sup> The body therefore becomes one pole of the reflective movement.

Yet there is an infinity presupposed by all perspectives — an infinity which transcends all perspectives. For it is man who recognizes perspective as finite and this recognition already presupposes a different quality of experience.

The very act of declaring man finite discloses a fundamental feature of this finitude: it is finite man himself who speaks of his own finitude....Thus it is of the nature of human finitude that it can experience itself only on the condition that there be a "view on" finitude, a dominating look which has already begun to transgress this finitude.<sup>68</sup>

This transgression (transcendence or originating affirmation) is precisely that which is limited by bodily perspective. Yet transcendence itself must be reflected through the object as perceived. Even though an object is always seen from a point of view, — it is the whole object which is meant or signified. Thus the object itself discloses the transcendence of finite perspective. The object as signified has as its reflective pole the intention to signify. "This transgression is the intention to signify. Through it I bring myself before a sense which will never be perceived anywhere by anyone, which is not a superior point of view, which is not, in fact, a point of view at all but an inversion into the universal of all point of view."<sup>69</sup>

Further, the intention to signify, i.e., human transcendence itself, "is nothing else than speech as the possibility of expressing, and of expressing the point of view itself."<sup>70</sup> I am a being who intends and

expresses as an intentional transgression. "I speak of things in their absence and in terms of their non-perceived sides."<sup>71</sup>

It is precisely this "authority" or weight or transcendence of the power of speaking over perspective (of signification over perception) that makes "reflection on point of view as such possible; I am not immersed in the world to such an extent that I lose the aloofness of signifying, of intending, aloofness that is the principle of speech."<sup>72</sup>

Those are the two poles — the finite of the body and the infinite of intending speech. A further step will indicate their relation. As counter poles neither can be totally subsumed into the other. The dialectic remains. Finitude is always transcended. Yet finitude always prevents the full realization of what is intended in speech. It is the intention to signify which is the transcendence of man and it is this intention which is not fulfilled. For to intend is always to speak of things in their absence. (The whole is always that which is intended, yet it is precisely the whole which is never present to a point of view). When pressed, it must be admitted that this argument respects a certain fullness of value which attends those expressions which are least fulfilled. "Without being paradoxical we may say that the least fulfilled expressions are the most instructive...and that the height of signification is that of the one which in principle cannot be fulfilled, the absurd signification. I am the power of absurd significations."<sup>73</sup> Thus I am not exhausted in intending presence. Rather, I am a twofold intentionality: I signify emptily (I am a power to speak of in absence) and I am "an openness to receiving and a power of seeing in the presence of the this-here."<sup>74</sup>

We have seen that perspective is the finitude of knowing while the

power of signification is the infinitude. These co-intentionalities (which meet in the object) define the finite/infinite disproportion of transcendental consciousness. But all this occurs by reflection, by problematizing the original appearance of the object. And that object, prior to reflection, appeared as a unitary whole. The concluding synthesis, then, (of perspective and power of signification) was given before it was problematized, given in the object which is "by no means 'in' consciousness."<sup>75</sup>

What is the thing? It is the unity which is already realized in a correlate of speech and point of view; it is the synthesis as effected outside. That synthesis, inasmuch as it is in a correlate, bears the name of objectivity. Indeed, objectivity is nothing other than the indivisible unity of an appearance and an ability to express; the thing shows itself and can be expressed.<sup>76</sup>

Such is the thing's mode of being.

The objectivity of the thing served as a guide to reflection—to the coming to awareness of the subjective synthesis itself. And this reveals a limitation of this reflection. For the final moment, the conscious synthesis, remains limited to an intention which projects objectivity. It is an intention without fulfillment. As such it does not extend to self-consciousness or existence. The synthesis "is consciousness" but not "self-consciousness." "The consciousness philosophy speaks of in its transcendental stage only constitutes its own unity outside of itself, on the object."<sup>77</sup>

Yet much has been gained. For a pattern, a model has been set. And the conditions of possibility for further syntheses have been established. Perhaps even more importantly, the "I" of the "I think" has been revealed as "merely the form of a world for anyone and everyone.

It is consciousness in general, that is, a pure and simple project of the object."<sup>78</sup> But the "I" of the "I think" does not extend to being. It does not bring man to existence or to a grasp of his own relation to being. Rather it reveals man as a tension between the finite and infinite and suggests his intermediate (or intermediating) place between the finite and the infinite in things.

#### B. THE PRACTICAL SYNTHESIS

In the following study we begin from the model of knowing consciousness established above and are led to recognize self-consciousness as itself intentional. "Roughly speaking, it is a passage from a theory of knowledge to a theory of the will...."<sup>79</sup> It is a move toward a greater totality than was revealed in the abstract transcendental reflection--a reflection which started from the thing and merely elaborated the conditions of possibility of the objectivity of the thing. We now move from the universe of things to our life-world (of which knowing consciousness was merely the abstract framework). Yet we remain philosophic. There is no question of proceeding straightway toward the totality. "That explains why our method will consist rather in taking the idea of totality as a task...."<sup>80</sup> Nor will the task be completed with this reading. We are moving toward the concrete.<sup>81</sup>

Following the framework established for knowing, the new, "practical" reading of finitude will pattern the notion of character on that of perspective (the finite), happiness on that of expression/meaning (the infinite) and respect on that of the transcendental imagination projected into the object (the mediator). For the present analysis, however, the guiding object is no longer the "thing" but the "person."

The notion of character is to be approached in two steps. During the pre-reflective stage of naïveté one is given over entirely to what he is doing. He does not notice the narrowness of his affective perspective. He desires the project. Yet reflectively he discovers desire to be finite. In the first moment desire was openness to the project. As such it did not yet disclose its finitude. But desire, like the zero origin of all successive views in perspective, shows itself, on further analysis, to be a lack of, a drive toward. It is oriented and elective. Yet desire does not operate purely or independently. Rather, it operates within the field of a pre-given state of feeling or mood in which one finds oneself; a mood which desires nothing. And this feeling, the "here" of one's body "shows that my body is still something besides the letting-in of the world or the letting be of all things. The body is not pure mediation; it is still immediate for itself and in this way seals up its intentional openness."<sup>82</sup>

Along with this affective closing we discover the feeling of the primal difference between the I and all others; to find oneself in a certain mood is to feel one's individuality as inexpressible and incommunicable.<sup>83</sup>

Thus reflection on desire, or better, on the conditions in which desire emerges, reveals the affective finitude of each man, an affective solipsism which Ricoeur terms "primal self-dilection."

The second step in an approach to the notion of character is to turn to the practical perspective. As merely conscious the body is an organ of (possibly infinite) action. Only when it meets resistance does it become self-reflective. It is then that there is revealed a practical finitude.

Habits illustrate this practical finitude. They admit a double interpretation. By acquiring a habit one is liberated from giving full attention. Yet "every habit is the start of an alienation which is inscribed in the very structure of habit, in the relation between learning



and contracting."<sup>84</sup> What is contracted, made routine, is fixed. Our tastes and aptitudes become regulated and our field of availability shrinks. We succumb to inertia.

"These various aspects of finitude— perspective, primal self-dilection, perseverance and inertia— come together in the notion of character."<sup>85</sup> Character adds to the collection the notion of a totality, the finite totality of my existence. Yet the finitude of character does not consist in the popular notion that character is that which affords others the possibility of sketching one's "portrait." (This lends itself to thinking of character as a closed figure, drawn up by combining simple components such as emotivity, activity, etc.).

Rather, character is to be interpreted after the model of perspective which originally was linked to the idea of openness. From the exterior portrait we must turn back to the person. And we see that in each act of the person the whole soul is represented, is reflected. A totality of the person is revealed. This totality "could be called the total field of motivation."<sup>86</sup> The finitude of character, then, is seen to consist in a limited openness — the limited openness of our field of motivation taken as a whole.

My openness is my radical accessibility to all values of all men, the whole range of the human. Yet my character is that whole seen from somewhere. It is the way in which I exercise my freedom as a man. In this sense it is a narrowness (or narrowing) of humanity, of openness.

Moreover, character is immutable. It is unlike perspective which can change, can move. "There is no movement by which I could change the zero origin of my total field of motivation."<sup>87</sup> It is immutable. I can neither choose nor repudiate its perspective. It is the fact of my

existence. For, as long as I can remember, I was already this openness onto humanity. Thus does character become the finite pole of will.

In the next section we intend to establish happiness (the aim of humanity, all possible human motivations) as the infinite pole. It is, however, not only a particular form of human transcendence "but the total aim of all the facets of transgression."<sup>88</sup> Happiness is not a sum of pleasure, the lasting agreeableness of life, but a whole, a termination of destiny. The demand for this totality (not content with mere 'sum of pleasure') is in me as the project of reason. It is a demand for a totality of meaning. Again, it is a demand for complete volition.

"The idea of a complete volition and the destination of reason hollow an infinite depth in my desire, making it the desire for happiness and not merely the desire for pleasure."<sup>89</sup> Yet besides the demand of reason for totality, there are feelings of direction occasionally given. "I receive signs of my destination to happiness. These are privileged experiences, precious moments in which I receive the assurance that I am on the right path."<sup>90</sup> Although happiness is not given in any single experience, feeling, within some experiences, anticipates its realization and confirms the demand of reason for totality. Even as character is the zero point within the total field of human motivation, happiness is its infinite end.

In the previous discussion on knowledge the duality of finite and infinite was mediated in the project of objectivity. In the present discussion on will the finite (character) and the infinite (happiness as the ideal limit of all possible human motivations) is mediated in the project of the person. It is in the person that one discovers the synthesis of character and happiness.<sup>91</sup> With the person is introduced the notion of self which was lacking at the end of the study on knowledge.

Yet the following synthesis will not go beyond an intentional self-consciousness. It will not give the immediacy of self to self.

The person is still a projected synthesis which seizes itself in the representation of a task, of an ideal of what the person should be. The self is aimed at rather than experienced. Indeed, the person is not yet conscious of Self for Self; it is only conscious of self in the representation of the ideal of the Self. There is no experience of the person in itself and for itself.<sup>91</sup>

The condition of reflection is to again set aside immediacy. Here, the person becomes a project, the project of humanity, i.e., the human quality of man. We are in search of that mode of being on which every individual (empirical) instance of what we call a human being should be patterned.

What is this humanity? Its limits may be set by character and happiness but how are they formed to make man? What do I think when I think man? "I intend a synthesis....that of an end of my action which would be, at the same time, an existence. An end, consequently a goal to which all the means and calculations of means are subordinate; or in other words, an end in itself, that is, one whose value is not subordinated to anything else, and at the same time an existence that one apprehends, or to be more precise, a presence with which one enters into relations of mutual understanding, exchange, work, sociality."<sup>92</sup>

Thus man exists as an end in himself and is not to be used by this or that will. In positing man (and each instance of man patterned on that model) as an existent end, consciousness becomes self-consciousness. The self is still a projected self and so the self-consciousness remains intentional. But the intention, no longer theoretical, becomes practical. "The person is an 'is to be,' and the only way to achieve it is to 'make it be.'"<sup>93</sup> Humanity is neither you nor I, but the practical ideal

of the "Self" in each. In relation to humanity as the ideal, each person becomes a finite actualization expressing that humanity through the narrowness of character. Finally, since character is always a limitation, the intentionality of the will is revealed<sup>as</sup> destined to a lack of fulfillment. The person as unfulfilled intention remains a task, but this implies that the totality itself must remain unachieved.<sup>94</sup>

### THE AFFECTIVE SYNTHESIS

The final cycle, that of affectivity or feeling (Gemüt), brings the structural account of fallibility to the border line of actual evil, the experience of fault. Affectivity remains modeled on the analysis of knowing, but goes beyond consciousness (constituted in the project of the object), and beyond self-consciousness (determined in the project of the person) to reveal a new sense of human disproportion. "In other words, what is at stake in a philosophy of feeling is the very gap between the purely transcendental exegesis of 'disproportion' and the lived experience of 'misery.'"<sup>95</sup>

Feeling is the other side of knowing. Feeling and knowing are mutually explanatory. "Indeed, the significance of feeling appears in the reciprocal genesis of knowing and feeling."<sup>96</sup> If we disregard, for the moment, different levels of feeling, we immediately note a dual reference implied in feeling. For feeling is at once intentional (it is a feeling of something — the loveable, the fearful) and it also reveals the way in which the self is inwardly affected. "An intention and an affection coincide in the same experience, a transcending aim and the revelation of an inwardness."<sup>97</sup> Its aim overflows itself into

an affective "correlate" that then constitutes the possibility of expressed feeling. "Our 'affections' are read on the world they develop, which reflects their kinds and nuances."<sup>98</sup>

If we were to void the intentional moment (love of some thing), we would at the same time void the affective moment of the self (I am loving). Yet we also hesitate to call the thing as loved, an object. For loved is a quality founded on the perceived and known object. The peculiarity or the intentionality of feeling is that it cannot be separated from the representative moment of the thing. The intentional correlate of feeling lacks autonomy. "It is the perceived and known object which endows them [i.e., feelings] with a center of significance, a pole of objectivity and, one might say, the substantive of reality....The moment of exteriority does not belong to them: it belongs to the percept as such."<sup>99</sup>

Moreover, "it is the property of perception to signify a thing which is, a 'being,' [Etant, perhaps be-ing] by means of sensorial qualities--colors, sounds...."<sup>100</sup> Feeling does not posit any being and for this reason it refers back, it manifests the way in which I am affected. It is my love, my hate. Feeling therefore designates a thing-quality and, through the presence of this "object," it also reveals the inwardness of an I.

To explain how this is possible we must look to the reciprocity of feeling and knowing. Knowing sets up a fundamental cleavage between "the object" and the subject because it exteriorizes its object in being. The object is "over against" the I. "In short, knowing constitutes the duality of subject and object."<sup>101</sup> Feeling, on the other hand, by its

dual intentionality, manifests a profound unity with the world. For affectivity, together with knowing, looks toward the object; yet immediately, and in the same act, it shows a reflexive reference of the subject.

However, there is no clear way to express this double-directed intentionality. And the reason for this difficulty is that the object-subject duality of knowing has influenced language.

Since the whole of our language has been worked out in the dimension of objectivity, in which the subject and object are distinct and opposed, feeling can only be described paradoxically as the unity of an intention and an affection, of an intention toward the world and an affection of the self. This paradox, however, is only the sign pointing toward the mystery of feeling, namely, the undivided connection of my existence with beings and being through desire and love.<sup>102</sup>

The language difficulty, however, can be overcome indirectly by a display of the dual reference of feeling in a specific case.<sup>103</sup> We shall take the case of possession.

As in every case above, the discussion begins on the pattern set by knowing, the appearance of the object. However, the function of feeling is to interiorize. Therefore, the final moment of this study will show the interiorization of disproportion.

The investigation of authentic human affectivity, therefore, must be guided by the progress of objectivity. If feeling reveals my adherence to and my inherence in aspects of the world that I no longer set over against myself as objects, it is necessary to show the new aspects of objectivity which are interiorized in the feelings of having....<sup>104</sup>

Objects viewed by a subject are usually "charged" economically. They appear as desirable or undesirable, valuable or not. The object in the fully human, cultural world is more than the bare object of perception. Moreover, the economic object is not a simple need (as in

the animal kingdom). It is an available good. "Whereas the simple need is only an oriented lack, the desire for the economic object is relative to the object's availability for me."<sup>105</sup> It is precisely availability that creates that whole cycle of feelings relative to acquisition, possession and preservation. The dual direction of feeling comes into play. The external economic object is internalized as "having" or as "mine." The I is affected by having.

Through this feeling I experience both control and dependence. If I can avail myself of the object I have control over it; yet I am dependent on it as a thing which can escape from me, or be taken away. "The possibility of no-longer-having is inherent in the tendency to avail oneself [sic] [oneself] of....The otherness of the mine, which is the breach between the I and the mine, is made up of the threat of losing what I have...."<sup>106</sup>

Possession is thus revealed as two-dimensional; it is to view objects a certain way and it is to constitute the subject in a certain way. Possession informs the "I." Yet what is mine excludes you. "Mine and yours, by mutually excluding each other, differentiate the I and the you through their spheres of belonging."<sup>107</sup> The mutual exclusion, begun by the separated spatiality of the body, is continued by the character formed by possessing.<sup>108</sup>

This does not mean that any innocence in having is unimaginable, (that having is originally guilty and human communication is possible only by all deprivation of having). It does mean that "I cannot imagine a suspension of having that would be so radical as to deprive the I of any anchorage in the 'mine'....I cannot imagine the I without the mine or man without having."<sup>109</sup>

We have thus reached a "limit idea" in the notion of possession. The essential structure of human existence is unimaginable apart from possession. As an affect, possession is at once intentional and interiorizing. Affectivity, then, has the function of totalizing what knowledge separates.

The universal function of feeling is to bind together. It connects what knowledge divides; it binds me to things, to beings, to being. Whereas the whole movement of objectification tends to set a world over against me, feeling unites the intentionality, which throws me out of myself, to the affection through which I feel myself existing. Consequently, it is always shy of or beyond the duality of subject and object.<sup>110</sup>

Yet this very function of "binding together," of uniting the self and the world, reveals a new alienation of the self from the self. For it points up the duality of sensibility which reaches for instantaneous pleasure, and reason — which aspires to totality, to the perfection of happiness. This "reaching for" and "aspiring to" are one ultimate affect directed toward irreducible (finite/infinite) goals. As reflected in the self, this affect, this indefinite affective quest, evidences the fragility of the human being. "Conflict is a function of man's most primordial constitution."<sup>111</sup>



2. THE SYMBOLISM OF EVIL:

MAN—ORIGINATOR AND VICTIM OF EVIL ..

A. THE HERMENEUTICAL STANDPOINT

The Symbolism of Evil represents Ricoeur's first extended exercise in hermeneutic. The (eidetic) field of structures is replaced by the (empiric) field of expression. Because of this dramatic shift, the continuity of Fallible Man and The Symbolism of Evil may be obscured.<sup>112</sup> It seems, however, that continuity is preserved by both the general methodological concern with the object and by thematic development. FM was phenomenological because of its concern with the object of knowledge as model for investigation of will and affect. SE remains phenomenological by its interest in "the object," but becomes hermeneutic because expression is now considered to be that object. In FM the thematic development moved from abstract to concrete in three cycles. In the first, the structure of man (what man would be like) was revealed as a tension between the finite and infinite, as an intermediate between the finite and infinite in things. (Cf. p. 18 above.) The second cycle indicated that man would be an unfulfilled existent (Cf. p. 23 above.) and the third cycle interiorized the finite/infinite tension as conflict which was man's constitution — and thus said what made man fallible.

However, these remain structural characteristics. Fallibility is the possibility (perhaps likelihood) of Fault. But it does not indicate the experience (ontology) of evil. At this border point Ricoeur could have moved to a direct examination of the experience of Fault. But he opts to begin, again indirectly, by exploring the expressions of evil.

We must not overstate the above case for continuity. For Ricoeur's option to investigate symbol and myth remains, ultimately, a wager.<sup>113</sup> Moreover, for a philosophy with presuppositions, at a critical point in history, and at a developed moment of philosophical reflection, such a wager seems necessary.<sup>114</sup> This is so precisely because philosophical reflection is a matter of thinking, and thinking does not occur in a vacuum but within a historical, culturally conditioned context. Our context is, as a matter of fact, critical.

We have recognized that the "explanations" offered by myth are inadequate, i.e., not compatible with history according to the historical method.<sup>115</sup> And this demythologization "is the irreversible gain of truthfulness, intellectual honesty, objectivity."<sup>116</sup> On the other hand, this very advance carries with it the possibility of a human impoverishment. For it is the symbols and myths that situated man in being, that revealed his relation to the transcendent (evil and sacred), that therefore revealed his own transcendence; that therefore enabled him to progressively transcend himself in history, that brought him to the present moment of criticism. It is these symbols and myths which are now being destroyed. The possibility looms large that when destroyed, those symbols which gave rise to thought will mark the end of thought.

This, then, is the modern context within which Ricoeur returns to symbols. The movement is through myth. As explanatory, myth is already an interpretation. By dissolving myth as explanation, we can uncover the symbol which gave rise to that explanation. By criticism we can hear again. Yet modern man will not hear "unless he lives in the aura of the meaning he is inquiring after."<sup>117</sup> He must believe in order to understand, just as he must understand in order to believe. We enter the "circle of hermeneutics" by the narrow door of the wager.

Once the wager is made we can enter the field of expression by means of interpretation. Beginning from the symbols<sup>118</sup> we first presuppose that the symbol or expression has something to say. We believe in the symbols. This belief, however, is not the immediate belief of a "first naïveté." For "we must believe in order to understand...."<sup>119</sup> Hermeneutic belief is not at all the same as natural belief. "The philosopher adopts provisionally the motivations and intentions of the believing soul. He does not 'feel' them in their first naïveté; he 're-feels' them in a neutralized mode, in the mode of 'as if.' It is in this sense that phenomenology is a re-enactment in sympathetic imagination."<sup>120</sup> This lack, or loss, of immediacy, problematizes the symbolic field from the beginning.<sup>121</sup> As re-enacted in sympathetic imagination, the hermeneutic belief will be a "second naïveté." Yet, because the symbolic expressions Ricoeur examines are archaic, their original intentionality must be recovered.

Therefore, the tools of modern scientific and historical criticism are accepted.<sup>122</sup> To accept such criticism is to accept demythologization understood as the reduction of the explanatory power of myth.<sup>123</sup> The strength of Ricoeur's whole approach seems, to the present writer, to lie in the next step. Granted the elimination of the etiological function, we must continue to look to myth to discover its symbolic — or existential — function.<sup>124</sup> For it is only then that the symbol will speak, only then that the myth will reveal its exploratory significance to modern thought.

In losing its explanatory pretensions the myth reveals its exploratory significance and its contribution to understanding, which we shall later call its symbolic function -- that is to say, its power of discovering and revealing the bond between man and what he considers sacred. Paradoxical as it may seem, the myth, when it is thus demythologized through contact with scientific history and elevated to the dignity of a symbol, is a dimension of modern thought.<sup>125</sup>

Thus demythologization becomes a moment of recovery. By wagering on symbols and by accepting criticism, Ricoeur hopes "to elaborate existential concepts — that is to say, not only structures of reflection but structures of existence insofar as existence is the being of man."<sup>126</sup>

## B. THE FIELD OF SYMBOL

Ricoeur's theory of symbolic expression develops in two complementary stages. We will divide the first stage (on symbols) into three sections: The first section (The Definition of Symbol) attempts to outline the formal dimensions and structures of the symbol and to identify its double intentionality. Section two (The Development of Symbols) will indicate three types of symbols. Finally, section three (Relations) is a short note on the relations of the symbols among themselves and their relation, as a whole, to the concept of the servile will. Ricoeur's second stage (C. Myths) will be taken up later under titles which suggest his emphases: The Analytic of Myth and The Dialectic of Myths.

### 1. The Definition of Symbol

Symbol is primitive while myth is a first order spontaneous hermeneutics. Symbols are recognized as such by their power to disclose analogical meanings which are "spontaneously formed and immediately significant, such as defilement, analogue of stain; sin, analogue of deviation; guilt, analogue of accusation."<sup>127</sup> Myth retains the analogical structure of symbol, but adds a temporal and character dimension of narration. "I shall regard myths as a species of symbols, as symbols developed in the form of narrations and articulated in a

time and space that cannot be co-ordinated with the time and space of history and geography according to the critical method."<sup>128</sup> For example, exile is a symbol of human alienation. But such alienation creates for itself a fanciful history, the exile from the Garden of Eden. As history, it happened "at that time." The story of the expulsion is a myth.

In both myth and symbol we discover a double intentionality. "The symbol of evil is constituted by starting from something which has a first-level meaning and is borrowed from the experience of nature — man's contact and orientation in space."<sup>129</sup> This literal intentionality (a conventional sign) is given in words — stain, deviation — which do not resemble the thing signified. Hence it truly intends the thing. However, a second intentionality of the symbol arises in and from this first-level meaning. Through the stain or deviation there is intended a certain situation of man in the sacred. "This situation, aimed at through the first meaning, is precisely stained, sinful, guilty being. The literal and obvious meaning, therefore, points beyond itself to something which is like a stain, like a deviation...."<sup>130</sup> This second intentionality, unlike conventional signs which are purely arbitrary, is intimately related to the first intentionality. And this constitutes both the power and the opaqueness of the symbol. "The first, literal, patent meaning analogously intends a second meaning which is not given otherwise than in the first. This opaqueness is the symbol's very profundity, an inexhaustible depth."<sup>131</sup>

In addition to this non-arbitrary quality, the structure of the relation between the two intentionalities shows a second quality: the

relation cannot be dominated intellectually. I can advance to the latent meaning only by the power of the primary meaning which assimilates.

In the symbol I cannot objectivize the analogous relation that binds the second meaning to the first. By living in the first meaning I am drawn by it beyond itself: the symbolic meaning is constituted in and through the literal meaning, which brings about the analogy by giving the analogue. Unlike a comparison that we look at from the outside, symbol is the very movement of the primary meaning that makes us share in the latent meaning and thereby assimilates us to the symbolized, without our being able intellectually to dominate the similarity. This is the sense in which symbol "gives"; it gives because it is a primary intentionality that gives the second meaning.<sup>132</sup>

It is this double aspect (non-arbitrary and non-reducible) that accounts for the fullness of the symbol and places it at the origin of language. Because the symbol is bound to its content — and, through its primary content, to its secondary content (which points beyond itself to the sacred), i.e., because the second content remains intentional, the symbol is "inexhaustible."<sup>133</sup>

Reflection reveals the "inexhaustible" symbol to be undifferentiated. The originating symbol can be differentiated — on the cosmos, in man's affects or feelings (psychic or oneiric) and in images which dramatize these understandings.<sup>134</sup> This last is the poetic dimension of the symbol. Thus "man first reads the sacred on the world, on some elements or aspects of the world...,"<sup>135</sup> e.g., the sun, the moon. This cosmic aspect is accompanied by its psychic response. The dream (or fantasy) may also signify the sacred. Because the symbol remains undifferentiated at this primitive moment, "to manifest the 'sacred' on the 'cosmos' and to manifest it in the 'psyche' are the same thing."<sup>136</sup> The poetic image brings the analogues of the symbol together. It expresses the intention-

ality of the symbol. Thus the poetic is the origin of language which allows the further development of the symbol.<sup>137</sup>

We have described a structural complexity and an undifferentiated quality of symbols. Taken together these are the qualities that make symbols the origin and fullness of language which is the basis for all of Ricoeur's further hermeneutics.

## 2. The Development of Symbols

After so defining symbol, in SE Ricoeur chooses to limit his investigation only to those symbols which fall within the broad history of the West. Moreover, there is both an historical and phenomenological development of these symbols. The exposition traces the movement of evil from exteriority to interiority, from the 'objective' to the 'subjective.' This evolution of the symbol is isomorphic with the history of the subject. The history of consciousness is like the history of the symbol.

Within that developing history we can identify three types of symbols. There are symbols of defilement, symbols of sin, and symbols of guilt. They are intentionally distinct but remain linked by reason of historical development.

The most archaic symbols show the analogue of evil as defilement or stain.<sup>138</sup> The symbols are undifferentiated. "The ethical order of doing ill has not been distinguished from the cosmo-biological order of faking ill...."<sup>139</sup> The intentions of the agent are not so important as 'happenings in the world.' In its cosmological moment evil is incurred by proximity. Its psychic moment is a pre-ethical fear.<sup>140</sup> Man attempts to flee contact with defilement. Finally, in its poetic moment, defilement is revealed in word and ritual. Its power lies precisely in

its ambiguity. Defilement is not literally a stain, impurity never literally dirtiness. This is shown by the rituals. "The representation of defilement dwells in the half-light of a quasi-physical infection that points toward a quasi-moral unworthiness....One can catch sight of it in the acts of purification and go back from the act which suppresses to the 'thing' suppressed. It is the rite that exhibits the symbolism of defilement; and just as the rite suppresses symbolically, defilement infects symbolically."<sup>141</sup>

At this point, however, the poetic intention is exhausted in its object. It is not yet self-conscious. Further movement is possible because the analogue (of defilement) is repeatable in ever varying elaborations.

The passage from defilement to ethics occurs when the fear is expressed in words. The symbol has insinuated itself into the experience and becomes the instrument by which the defiled self becomes self-conscious. "It is through the word that dread acquires its ethical quality....Man asks himself: since I experience this failure, this sickness, this evil, what sin have I committed? Suspicion is born, the appearance of acts is called in question...."<sup>142</sup> The language of confession is like the magical procedures of elimination. It is supposed to operate by an efficacy comparable to that of spitting out. But besides the verbal ejection, language is the beginning of appropriation. "Dread expressed in words is no longer simply a cry, but an avowal. In short, it is by being refracted in words that dread reveals an ethical rather than a physical aim."<sup>143</sup> By reason of the transcendence of the language intention, the total immediacy between man and his situation of suffering evil is broken.



The transition from defilement to sin occurs, phenomenologically and not historically, in the consciousness of a polar space or personal separation from god.<sup>144</sup> One passes from the pure to the holy, from defilement to sin. "Polarly opposed to the god before whom he stands, the penitent becomes conscious of his sin as a dimension of his existence, and no longer only as a reality that haunts him...."<sup>145</sup> The reflection on his situation has revealed it to be one in which the initiative was taken by someone else,<sup>146</sup> "who...is essentially turned toward man; a god in the image of a man...but above all a god concerned about man; a god who is anthropropic..."<sup>147</sup> Evil, as sin, becomes personalized. A contract — the Israelite covenant — is made and broken. Sin is the breaking of the contract. Yet the cosmic moment of sin symbolism retains a reference to position. Man is for God or against Him. Evil comes from God's wrath, a punishment for being against God.

The psychic moment raises "fear" to "fear of God."<sup>148</sup> Sin anthropomorphizes fear, and makes it ethical. Yet even in this ethical context, the language of defilement continues to appear. The penitent speaks of being "cleansed of sin," although cleansing now means a change in existence (and not simply an escape from a quasi-physical evil). Such cleansing becomes a sign of good faith. For one will no longer simply suffer evil, but evil will come if one breaks the contract. Thus evil is no longer a positive, impersonal force, but the result of a person's turning away from God. Sin begins to subjectivize evil.

The symbols of guilt complete this subjectivization of the experience of evil.<sup>149</sup> "Sin designates the real situation of man before

God....Guilt is the awareness of this real situation."<sup>150</sup> Whereas sin emphasized the "before God," the feeling of guilt emphasizes the "It is I who....". The individual conscience now becomes the measure of evil.<sup>151</sup>

"The second conquest, contemporary with the individualization of fault, is the idea that guilt has degrees. Whereas sin is a qualitative situation — it is or it is not, — guilt designates an intensive quantity, capable of more and less."<sup>152</sup> The subject thus becomes the conscious instigator of evil. He is 'reflexively' responsible — guilty — for evil to the degree of his conscious involvement. Yet, if guilt has degrees, "it also has extremes that are designated by the two polar figures of the 'wicked' and the 'just'."<sup>153</sup> And man can be totally guilty, — responsible in the highest degree, — for evil. Thus it is within guilt that we reach the experience limit for the three cycles of primary symbols.

### 3. Relations

What began as a reading of evil 'on the world' has been progressively interiorized to become a reading of evil in the subject in terms of an ethical 'idealism.'<sup>1</sup> The movement may also be viewed as a progressive 'demythologization' in which each subsequent symbol reinterprets former symbols. Or, to reverse the emphasis, we may say that the first lend the power of symbolization to the last.<sup>154</sup> Guilt, for example, expresses itself only in the indirect language of the two prior stages. The former symbols are thus transposed 'inward' "to express a freedom that enslaves itself, affects itself, and infects itself by its own choice."<sup>155</sup> Conversely, the symbolic character of defilement and sin becomes quite clear only when these are used to show a dimension

of freedom. "Then and only then do we know that they are symbols, when they reveal a situation that is centered in the relation of oneself to oneself."<sup>156</sup> It is then that the whole movement of the symbols suggests a concept,-- the concept of the servile will.<sup>157</sup>

It is from the paradoxical concept of the servile will that we can, looking back, appreciate its recourse to the prior symbolism. For the concept of a freedom which is bound is not directly accessible. The idea of will can only mean free choice. This is not directly compatible with the idea of servitude,-- the unavailability of freedom to itself. "That is why the concept of the servile will must remain an indirect concept, which gets all its meaning from the symbolism that we have run through and which tries to raise that symbolism to the level of speculation."<sup>158</sup> "The power of the symbol is to have thought the concept indirectly."<sup>159</sup>

### C. MYTHS

The second—and complementary—stage of Ricoeur's theory of symbolic expression turns to the spontaneous hermeneutics of symbols which he calls 'myths.' We may at once give some general characteristics of myths before entering the analytic and dialectic development of SE.

Even though myths are a first-order interpretation of symbols they remain short of philosophical discourse. Their language is expressive, but indirect. By reason of being more articulate than symbols, however, myths "leave room for the dimension of narrative with its fabled characters, places, and times, and tell the Beginning and End of the experience of which the primary symbols are the avowal."<sup>160</sup>

The specificity of myths can be indicated by their threefold, irreducible function. 1) An exemplary man, an Anthropos, an Adam becomes the sign for the whole of mankind. He symbolically stands for the concrete universal of human experience. 2) Myths unfold their story from a beginning to an end. They thus introduce an historical tension into human experience. 3) They explore the fault, or cleavage, in human reality represented by a passage or leap from innocence to guilt. "That is why myth can exercise its symbolic function only through the specific means of narrative: What it wants to say is already drama."<sup>161</sup>

Despite the unity displayed by this threefold function, however, there is, de facto, a multiplicity, an endless diversity of myths. Even when we choose to limit the consideration to 'myths of evil,' the multiplicity must be overcome by imposing upon them a typology that permits thought to become orientated. But this typology must not remain a static classification. For "myths have never stopped battling one

another; every myth is iconoclast towards others....<sup>162</sup> For a fuller understanding of myth, then, we must place them in oppositions, in a dialectic which will reveal their mutual affinities and limits.<sup>163</sup>

The following two sections are, therefore, dictated by this double exigency. In the first we will follow Ricoeur's outline as he establishes a typology: The second will take up the dialectic of myths.<sup>164</sup>

#### 1. The Analytic

Myth introduces what might be called "the drama of symbol." And with this drama there appear characters (gods and men) who move through a plot (which depicts an origin of evil and indicates an elimination or amelioration of evil in a fantasy history). Through the characters and plot, which stand for universal, concrete man, there is portrayed man's understanding of himself vis-à-vis Fault.

Ricoeur divides the Western myths of evil into four basic types. These he calls 1) the drama of creation, 2) the tragic myths, 3) the "philosophic myth" of the exiled soul and 4) the Adamic myth. The first three of these are grouped by reason of the fact that they locate the origin of evil in a state or situation prior to man. The last, the biblical myth of Adam, Ricoeur calls anthropological in that it originates evil with man through an act of man's conscious will. In conformity to his habitual method, Ricoeur wagers on one element in the discussion, in this case, on the Adamic myth.

3) The drama of creation myth<sup>165</sup> begins without characters. The plot proceeds by telling of the final victory of order over chaos. Thus the primordial state is chaos. Then the gods come into being. The genesis of the divine precedes the genesis of the world. "The birth of the present

world order and the appearance of man, such as he exists now, are the last act of a drama that concerns the generation of the gods."<sup>166</sup> The first intention of the myth, which must be recaptured, is its theogony. The gods come into being. But this implies that chaos is anterior to the gods. "The principle of evil is primordial, coextensive with the generation of the divine."<sup>167</sup>

Thus man is not the origin of evil. "Man finds evil and continues it....Evil is as old as the oldest of beings....evil is the past of being."<sup>168</sup> Moreover, the creative act is an act of violence. In the Babylonian form of the myth, the present order is brought into being through the slaying of the oldest gods. "Thus the creative act, which distinguishes, separates, measures, and puts in order, is inseparable from the criminal act that puts an end to the life of the oldest gods, inseparable from a deicide inherent in the divine."<sup>169</sup> There is a basic ambiguity between good and evil in this myth.

2) In the tragic myths, the characters are already present as gods and men. But they stand in opposition to one another. As the drama reaches a climax, there arises the idea of an impersonal god — or fate. "It may be said that divine malevolence has two poles, an impersonal one in Μοίρα and a personal one in the will of Zeus."<sup>170</sup> The theology of the tragic myths (which Ricoeur regards as "unthinkable") carries the previous ambiguity between good and evil to an extreme by shifting the ambiguity toward the diabolical. "The non-distinction between the divine and the diabolical is the implicit theme of the tragic theology and anthropology."<sup>171</sup> Because the gods intend evil toward man, the tragic myths also originate evil prior to man.

But what makes tragedy tragic? The tragic element proper appears when the theme of man beset by the divine/diabolical comes up against the theme of heroic greatness. "Fate must first feel the resistance of freedom, rebound (so to speak) from the hardness of the hero, and finally crush him, before the pre-eminently tragic emotion - φόβος - can be born."<sup>172</sup> The drama of tragedy occurs in the time during which fate -- the force of the impersonal divine/diabolical -- struggles<sup>with</sup>, and eventually, overcomes, the freedom of man. Because he is overcome, man is victim. Yet because he is heroic, man is to be admired.

There remains, however, a certain ambiguity about the innocence of man. The tragic myths echo this ambiguity in the dramas of creation. For example, the central character in Prometheus Bound is a guilty-innocent. "Prometheus is the benefactor of mankind; he is the humanity of man; he suffers because he has loved the human race too much. Even if his autonomy is also his fault...."<sup>173</sup> First the drama shows his generosity and innocence; then there is discovered in his "history" -- his past, an element which shows an initial guilt. "The tragedy of Prometheus begins with unjust suffering. Nevertheless, by a retrograde motion, it makes contact with the original germ of the drama: the theft was a benefaction, but the benefaction was a theft. Prometheus was initially a guilty innocent."<sup>174</sup> As with the drama of creation myths, there is to be discovered here an account of an initial chaos -- or evil -- which is overcome by an act of violence. The 'tragic myth' adds a note on man's current state of limited freedom. Prometheus is powerless, crucified on his rock -- but he has the power of word and a hardness of will that withholds consent. "The freedom of Prometheus is a freedom of defiance and not of participation."<sup>175</sup> His grandeur lies in rebellion.

Tragic drama may be resolved in two ways. The first, noted in the tragic tradition itself, is a drift away from the tragic. Since man is doomed, the resolution seems inevitable. Unless the fates themselves change their attitude toward man! This is what happens in this first way of resolution. The gods change with time, "which wears out the claws and teeth of the wrath of gods and men."<sup>176.1</sup> Redemption is possible by time. We are again cast back to the god who is becoming of the drama of creation myth. Such a resolution, however, destroys the tragic dialectic itself.

A more authentic resolution of tragedy remains within the drama itself. This resolution is by way of aesthetic deliverance. "It seems to me that the tragic vision, when it remains true to its 'type,' excludes any other deliverance than 'sympathy,' than tragic pity' --that is to say, an impotent emotion of participation in the misfortunes of the hero, a sort of weeping with him and purifying the tears by the beauty of the song."<sup>176.2</sup> This sort of deliverance speaks to the attitude -- rather than the existence of the participant. "This is the meaning of the tragic φρονέειν, of that 'suffering for the sake of understanding'....--that is tragic wisdom, that is 'tragic knowledge'...."<sup>177</sup>

3) The third type of myth is that of "the exiled soul and salvation through knowledge."<sup>178</sup> This type is distinguished from all the others in that it divides man into "soul" and "body." Man becomes the same as his soul and other than his body. This myth "tells how the 'soul,' divine in its origin, became human -- how the 'body,' a stranger to the soul and bad in many ways, falls to the lot of the soul -- how the mixture of the soul and the body is the event that inaugurates the humanity of man and makes man the place of forgetting, the place where



the primordial difference between soul and body is abolished. Divine as to his soul, earthly as to his body, man is the forgetting of the difference; and the myth tells how that happened."<sup>179</sup> This is the only myth that radically divides man into two realities, — even though the other myths speak of a rupture.

It is the ancient discourse of Orphism that invented 'soul' and 'body.' In the drama, developed and modified endless times in later philosophic treatment, the 'body' is understood in opposition to the soul. Because it encloses the soul 'in the likeness of a prison,' it takes on a penal character; it alienates the soul. The body is a place of exile. Man (the soul) has fallen into the earthly. The soul is being punished. Yet, even though man in his present existence does not even know he is divided—so bound is he to his 'ether,' i.e., the body—still he (the soul) is being educated, i.e., 'led out.' The soul maintains a certain conflict with the passions of the body and seeks an eternal repose united again with its divine origins.

As the theme turns from the miserable present toward deliverance, we find that "the myth of the exiled soul is par excellence the principle and promise of 'knowledge,' of 'gnosis.'"<sup>180</sup> By knowledge man makes himself the same as his soul and other than his body. Man is delivered through knowledge. A love of wisdom, a philosophy is a reunion of the soul with itself. Know thyself.

This myth retains a certain affinity to the first two. For by positing a 'soul in exile in the body,' it places evil as prior to the reflection on his situation made by any free and responsible man. It is man's situation—rather than his origin—that is the first intention of this myth. "The Orphic myth is a situational myth which clearly seems to have been later projected into an origin myth."<sup>181</sup>

4) The Adamic or anthropological myth, introduces a radical, new intentionality. Whereas the other three types speculate on the origin of evil as being in a state or situation prior to man, this myth originates evil with man through an act of his will.<sup>182</sup> For this reason the Adamic myth stands sui generis against the others. It is anthropological because it relates the origin of evil to an ancestor of the human race. Moreover, this ancestor is truly human. "All the speculations on the supernatural perfection of Adam before the fall are adventitious contrivances which profoundly alter the original naïve, brute meaning; they tend to make Adam superior and hence a stranger to our condition...."<sup>183</sup> Adam was not superhuman. Hence, he did not "fall" into humanity. "We shall see that the Adamic myth is a myth of 'deviation,' or 'going astray,' rather than a myth of the 'fall.'"<sup>184</sup>

The deviation occurs by the act of a single man.<sup>185</sup> It is an event. "On the other hand, the myth spreads out the event in a 'drama,' which takes time....In being extended in time....the drama gets a turbid ambiguity which contrasts with the frank rupture of the evil event."<sup>186</sup> Evil becomes an historical event—as over against the other accounts which indicated a structure of existence.

This man-centered account of evil introduces the concept of bad will, and with it, what Ricoeur calls "the ethical vision of the world in radical form." While God remains innocent, man, through his bad will, corrupts the world. Yet that corruption is not absolute. For the whole account is a "retrospective symbol closely bound up with a whole historical experience turned toward the future."<sup>187</sup> In its biblical setting the symbols which correspond to this Adamic, "retrospective symbol" will emphasize the future. They will be eschatological. They will

see deliverance as the restoration of a deviant freedom to its prior state. They are given, in the biblical account, through a number of figures, e.g., Abraham; all of which promise restoration through a Messiah or the Son of Man.

## 2. The Dialectic

We have found that the Adamic myth alone locates its account of evil in an act of the will. The other three myths refer evil to a horizon prior to man — in a state or category of being. There is at once, then, a tension between the Adamic and the other myths. Ricoeur's method is 1) to weigh or adopt one myth (the Adamic) in order to 2) appropriate all. The appropriation is achieved in a series of movements in which the Adamic myth (considered "subjective") is set against its counterfoci — the other myths which locate evil "objectively," outside or prior to man. A reciprocity of evil as state and as act underlies the whole dialectic. Because of this reciprocity the speculative myths will provide a limit for the reflective myth.

1) The drama of creation myth began without characters. Chaos reigned, and then the gods came into being through violence. The Adamic myth is iconoclastic toward this myth. It begins with God, who is clearly good, who is so powerful that he has no need to struggle with chaos. He creates by fiat. He speaks — and it is so. Thus there is no violence involved in creation. And creation itself participates in the essential goodness of the Creator.

Does this, then, imply that the Adamic myth is a complete 'conquest' over the creation myth? If not, how does the creation myth influence — or insert itself into the Adamic myth? Ricoeur finds the answer in the figure

of the serpent. For it is the serpent which first introduces evil in the Adamic myth. True, the primary intention of the myth is to give an account of the deviation of man—but evil was presented by the serpent. The serpent who tempts is reminiscent of the monsters of chaos. "The Yahwist appears to have kept the serpent intentionally; the only monster who survived from the theogonic myths....has not been demythologized."<sup>188</sup> The serpent, however, is not a god, but also a creature. And this saves the man-centered, ethical intention of the myth's account of evil.

If the primary intention of the Adamic myth is ethical—to locate evil in an act of will, the introduction of the serpent adds a secondary note: evil is already there. Evil cannot be totally reduced to human will if another evil has preceded it. The evil of the serpent is present before man initiates evil. The primary intention of the Adamic myth is thus limited by contact with the myth of creation.

2) In dialectic with the tragic myths, the irreducibility of non-human evil within the Adamic myth is even more sharply affirmed. "The Adamic myth is anti-tragic; that is clear."<sup>189</sup> A personal God is opposed to impersonal fate; God intends good, not evil toward man; man is "lord of the earth" rather than victim; his past is that of an innocent creature, rather than a guilty/innocent. The responsibility for evil is human, rather than a prehuman, exterior fate.

Yet there are several "tragic" aspects in the Adamic myth. One, as we have seen, is the serpent figure. For he is a prehuman "fate." In a previous section (pp. 14-18) we noted a structural limit of man to be perspective or orientation. This structural limitation manifests itself

actually in the Adamic myth: man turns toward the serpent. This turn signifies the deviation of man from the originally good destiny of finitude.<sup>190</sup>

The very quality of the freedom posited as human in the Adamic myth implies, -- rather than opposes, -- fate. Man experiences his freedom as fault. For an action, (by which he intends a development of his existence (you will become like god), brings forth evil.. In this sense fault is not merely ethical, not merely the transgression of the moral law, but it is existential: "to become oneself is to fail to realize wholeness, which nevertheless remains the end, the dream, the horizon, and that which the Idea of happiness points to. Because fate belongs to freedom as the non-chosen portion of all our choices, it must be experienced as fault."<sup>191</sup> Thus the tragic myths, found within the Adamic myth, reveal the reverse side of the ethical (primary) intention of the myth."<sup>192</sup>

Tragedy shows, makes visible (without, however, making it thinkable) the wickedness of man as a "second degree evil." It is always in second place to an originating Evil that man presents evil. "Thus, the tragic representation continues to express not only the reverse side of all confession of sins, but the other pole of human evil; the evil for which I assume responsibility makes manifest a source of evil for which I cannot assume responsibility, but which I participate in every time that through me evil enters into the world as if for the first time. It might be said that the avowal of evil as human calls forth a second-degree avowal, that of evil as non-human."<sup>193</sup>

Further, this non-human, first degree, "other" evil, is and remains

opaque. It can be represented, not thought. It therefore becomes a limit function. As tragedy appears in the Adamic myth it limits that myth's first intention which was to make man responsible for evil. And, by setting limits, it saves the Adamic myth. For if the primary intention were to go unchecked, man would be totally responsible for evil. And, since evil is a transcendental, man would then be a god. To so regard man would be idolatry. This idolatry, the temptation of the ethical point of view, is limited by the tragic view which continues to reaffirm the unchosen dimension of freedom. Since man cannot be responsible for the unchosen, he cannot be totally condemned. Compassion, introduced by the "tragic" limits and thus saves the otherwise excessive moralism of the Adamic myth.

3) The myth of the exiled soul, intermingled with the Adamic myth, perhaps more than any other such union, has formed the Western mind. Yet, initially, as types, the two myths are significantly distant one from the other. The dualism of soul and body (which makes evil a mixture) is sharply contrasted with the "anthropological monism of the Adamic myth, to which corresponds the conception of evil as a deviation from a primordial state."<sup>194</sup>

A series of historical transpositions, however, brought the two myths together. These transpositions were possible, Ricoeur finds, because of "a play of underground affinities" between the two myths. Chief among these affinities is the theme of the externality of evil.

This externality is clear in the Adamic myth. It is the serpent who seduces the human. In the myth of the exiled soul, it is the body which is understood as external, the source of a seduction to evil.

"The Orphic myth develops the aspect of the apparent externality of the seduction and tries to make it coincide with the 'body,' understood as the unique root of all that is involuntary."<sup>195</sup> The seduction, however, is at first quite different. In the Adamic myth its source is the non-human creature. ~~Serpent-~~ Seduction is external. The exiled soul takes the body to itself and thereby becomes evil. The evil is the mixture.

To account for the eventual intermingling of the myths, Ricoeur transposes the discussion in a reverse direction. We move from the myths back to the primary symbolism which gave rise to the myths. In Hebrew literature we find the captivity in Egypt and the departure from Egypt, the Exodus. This symbolism has its mythical expression "in the theme of banishment, inseparable from the story of the fall.... It cannot be said, then, that the theme of exile is alien to the theme of the fall; it is attached to it as a 'curse'."<sup>196</sup> Man is captive, banished, fallen in the Biblical account; even as the soul is banished, and captivated in the body, according to the Orphic account.

In its basic symbolism, the Orphic account credits the soul (man) for waging conflict with the body. But as we move through the development of the symbols from defilement to sin to guilt, the 'body' becomes more and more itself a symbol. "The body itself is not only the literal body, so to speak, but also a symbolic body. It is the seat of everything that happens in me without my doing."<sup>197</sup> As the body is symbolized it becomes less external. It is no longer quite true to identify "man" with "soul." The conflict has been internalized. It is man (totally) over against those forces (symbolized, for example, by the involuntary motions of the body) which limit his freedom. And this account — man over against evil — is not so distant from the Biblical account of man over against the serpent.

To return to the Biblical account — as it develops the Adamic myth, we note a gradual shift from sin symbolism to guilt symbolism, a progressive internalization of deviation.<sup>198</sup> But this sets in motion a certain dualism: Man, the sinner, is against God. In the final moments of this progression (in the late Hebrew and early Christian era) the full body-soul language appears. Paul, especially, treats of sin and law in the language of 'spirit' and 'flesh.' This adds a strength to the Adamic myth — but also fundamentally changes its meaning.

Adam will be less and less the symbol of the humanity of man; his innocence will become a fantastic innocence, accompanied by knowledge, bliss, and immortality, whether by nature or as superadded gift; at the same time, his fault, instead of being a case of 'going astray' will become truly a 'fall,' an existential downgrading, a descent from the height of a superior and actually super-human status; consequently, Adam's fall will no longer be very different from the fall of the souls in Plato's Phaedrus, where the soul, already incarnate, falls into an earthly body.<sup>199</sup>

In summary, then, we can detect a two-way movement as the two myths draw closer. The original dualism (soul against body) of the Orphic myth, when internalized, regards the body not as a thing in which "I am" but merely as a symbol of limitation. In fact, as Plato uses the myth, there is "an inflection of the Symbolism of the 'evil body' in the direction of the theme of 'evil choice'...."<sup>200</sup> On the other hand, there gradually emerges an interpretation of the Adamic myth which inserts a dualism into man. Adam falls from an original state of innocence, and because of the fall the existential condition of man is self-division.

The myths again appear to be co-limiting. The intermingling of "body-soul" and "Adam," for all its history in Christianity, was never totally coherent. For the myths themselves arrive at a limit in which



must be recognized a final irreducibility: evil is both initiated and discovered. The speculative myths of chaos, tragedy and exile "

reveal the hyper-ethical dimension of the myth of the fall and so indicate the limitations of any philosophy of the will<sup>o</sup> which tries to remain an ethical vision of the world. The myth of the fall needs those other myths, so that the ethical God it presupposes may continue to be a Deus Absconditus and so that the guilty man it denounces may also appear as the victim of a mystery of iniquity which makes him deserving of Pity and well as of Wrath.<sup>201</sup>

CONCLUDING NOTE

The reader, as well as the writer, may feel at this juncture a vague sort of inconclusiveness. And, it might well be expected that a concluding summary would address itself to the resolution of the attending tension. Yet, I believe, such a summary is not possible without doing violence to the work we have attempted to reflect. For Ricoeur's own work continues--to Freud and Philosophy and to his yet unpublished Poetics of the Will. Nor is there any evidence presented in the already published works to suggest that he will try to offer a definitive statement in his forthcoming work. Perhaps he would agree that to so attempt would be tantamount to turning the whole into an idol.

A more faithful, and more fruitful, effort might take up Ricoeur's method itself to place his thought in dialectic with another approach. We can do no more than suggest the contours of such a dialectic in this concluding note. We may, however, raise the possibility of a dialectic between Ricoeur and Bernard J.F. Lonergan. That set of counterfoci, according to Ricoeur's method, might lead to limit concepts which would not only reveal strengths and weaknesses in each--but, if entirely successful, might well save each from the hubris of self-sufficiency; a hubris overlooked by anyone tempted to idolize either.

For example, how would Ricoeur's penetrating analysis of symbol and myth affect Lonergan's continuing assertion that myth is simply pre-metaphysics? In this respect Lonergan exercises a suspicious attitude toward myth. If we were to apply Ricoeur's method we should attempt to discover, within this suspicious attitude, the seeds of its own reversal.

In other words a sharper understanding of myth might at once reveal the validity of the suspicion and the limits to which that validity extends. Ricoeur seems to have done this by distinguishing the etiological and exploratory function of myth. As etiological, i.e., explanatory myth is prior to science and metaphysics. As exploratory, however, myth is simply further data to be understood.

To reverse the emphasis: On at least one crucial issue Ricoeur, it seems, would be limited by Lonergan. That issue is objectivity. Lonergan has insisted that a grasp of the dynamic structure of knowing is "essential to a grasp of the objectivity of our knowing." (Collection, p. 231). Ricoeur seems to have passed over crucial aspects of the total dynamic structure. For example, a distinction between insight and concept, reflection and judgment. By locating the (Kantian) analysis of knowing within the eidetic brackets he systematically (we wonder if perhaps irrevocably) breaks with the factual. Does the move to expression really allow a complete removal of the brackets, does an examination of expression allow existential assertion?

From the apparent deficiencies in cognitional analysis, there results a limitation on the notion of objectivity. For Ricoeur, objectivity is two-pronged: it is the "indivisible unity of an appearance and an ability to express." (See p. 17 of this paper). That locates objectivity as a correlate of experience (perception) and language (concept). It also separates the subject and object, whether that object be a thing, or an expression. "In short, knowing constitutes the duality of subject and object." (See p. 24 of this paper). Ricoeur must turn to affectivity to reunite man and his world. (See p. 27 of this paper).

For Lonergan objectivity is three-pronged, the intrinsic relation of knowing to being. (See Collection, p. 228). It is a triple cord which includes an experiential component, a normative component, and an absolute component "that is reached when reflective understanding combines the normative and the experiential elements into a virtually unconditioned, i.e., a conditioned whose conditions are fulfilled." (Collection, p. 230). A fact is the content of an act of judgment.

When Lonergan's analysis of knowing and objectivity is applied to Ricoeur, there is revealed not only the inadequacy of Ricoeur's account of knowing and objectivity, but also an inconsistency between what Ricoeur says and what he does. For although fact is bracketed in theory, Ricoeur makes judgments. Yet Lonergan's analysis may also justify Ricoeur's insight into symbol and myth. For it seems that there is genuine insight which is often cast in terms that Lonergan would identify as "counter-position." A better formulation may better reveal the genuine strength of Ricoeur's insight and judgment. Thus the symbol is not "over there," already with meaning which is to be given in an act of auditory perception. Yet, as data, symbol does give rise to thought. If the necessary distinctions are introduced, this statement can be accepted.

A final example is Ricoeur's notion of the "overdetermination of symbols." Take any usual "beep, beep" sound. On a first level of knowing this is simply an auditory experience. It is not until some understanding occurs that the "beep, beep" becomes a symbol. For a symbol is symbol inasmuch as the "beep, beep" is meaningful, and meaning is a function of understanding. Yet with this understanding there can occur a second understanding, the content of which is "not all is understood." This may be a

sense of Ricoeur's phrase "the overdetermination of symbols." If so, the insight is genuine. However, if Ricoeur were to accept this sense, he would be forced to recognize its further implication. For if all symbols are overdetermined, and overdetermination consists in understanding that "not all is understood," then understanding is more fundamental than symbol.

## FOOTNOTES

1. There is a remarkable difference between what may be termed the classical (Greek or medieval) and the modern (or contemporary) conception of science. Nor does this difference lie only in the fact that modern science understands a greater number of things much better; rather, the primary difference is in the conception of science itself. As formulated by Aristotle in his Posterior Analytics, science is concerned with necessary, eternal truth known through (the four) causes. (Cf. Aristotle, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York, 1941), pp. 110-186. Specifically, Cf., "Analytica Posteriora": Book I, 4, 21, and 6, 5 (on necessary truth); Book I, 8, 21 (eternal); Book II, 11, 20 (on the four causes). Because it deals with "that which is necessary and cannot be otherwise" and because it deals with "that which is universal and true in all cases" it differs from opinion and cannot be known in the act of perception. (Cf. Ibid., Book I, 33, 30 and Book I, 31, 27.) Yet the Greeks were not unaware of the particular, the contingent, the many. There results a "double universe" and a double awareness. That which is science (i.e., the necessary and eternal) can be known but cannot be controlled or influenced by man. That which is particular and contingent likewise can be known — but only through opinion — and this only is the proper area of man's influence.

The modern conception of science is altogether different. It is concerned, not with that which cannot possibly be otherwise, but with what in fact is so. It is not a body of eternal truths, but is only on the way towards truth. Again, it is not at all opposed to opinion; in fact "the latest scientific opinion," is often the best science. Modern science is empirical in that it not only begins with experience but, in its very act of verification, it returns to see if things are, in fact, as the thematization (i.e., hypothesis) suggested. Modern science is restless, for it aims at the complete explanation of all phenomena; yet the modern mind need not be split between the eternal and the contingent, knowledge and opinion, for all the universe can be known. Opinion is simply a stage on the way to complete knowledge. The most dramatic consequence of this shift in the meaning of the word science is modern man's increasing awareness that it is he who is responsible for what he is to become. Realizing that the "eternal truths" were themselves formulated, and re-formulated in history; and realizing equally that doctrines and authorities are also historical entities, interpreted now this way, now that, the individual is confronted by three general alternatives: a) to deny the new scientific ideal and return to the sometimes comfortable but no longer fruitful classical ideal, b) to succumb to the often attractive obscurantism of a modern romanticism or c) to take a stand in his own historically conscious culture and devote his energies to working out complete solutions. There can be no doubt that Ricoeur's work gives evidence that he has chosen this last alternative.

2. See W. Taylor Stevenson, History as Myth (New York: The Seabury Press, 1969), p. 1. "It has become increasingly clearer within Western civilization as a whole that the understanding of the historical nature of reality is the distinguishing characteristic of our time."

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<sup>3</sup>See Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 32-36. (Henceforward this book will be designated FP).

<sup>4</sup>FP, pp. 28-32.

<sup>5</sup>"There is no general hermeneutics, no universal canon for exegesis, but only disparate and opposed theories concerning the rules of interpretation. The hermeneutic field...is internally at variance with itself." FP, pp. 26-27.

<sup>6</sup>Paul Ricoeur, Fallible Man, trans. Charles Kalbley (Chicago: Regnery, 1965). (Henceforward this book will be designated FM).

<sup>7</sup>Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans. Emerson Buchanan (Boston: Beacon, 1969). (Henceforward this book will be designated SE).

<sup>8</sup>The "hermeneutic turn" is discussed at length below (See pp. 4-8, 28-31). Essentially it is a turn to the reading of experience through expression.

<sup>9</sup>See Stuart C. Hackett, "Philosophical Objectivity and Existential Involvement in the Methodology of Paul Ricoeur," International Philosophical Quarterly, IX (1969), p. 11. "If the proper study of mankind is man himself, then the total impact of Paul Ricoeur's philosophical work is an exemplary paradigm...." (Henceforward this article will be designated, Hackett).

<sup>10</sup>FM, p. 26

<sup>11</sup>See Paul Ricoeur, History and Truth, trans. Charles A. Kelbley (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1965), p. 32. (Henceforward this book will be designated HT).

<sup>12</sup>As the term "reflection" is used by Ricoeur it does not mean to argue or to draw conclusion (by induction or deduction); nor does it mean "introspection" which is "suspect." "An introspective psychology does not hold up in face of the Freudian or Jungian hermeneutics; whereas a reflective approach...not only holds up but opens a true debate...." See Paul Ricoeur, "The Hermeneutics of Symbols and Philosophical Reflection," International Philosophical Quarterly, II (1962), p. 195. (Henceforward this article will be designated HSPR). Rather, reflection "states the conditions of possibility whereby empirical consciousness can be made equal to thetic consciousness." FP, p. 53. By a series of intellectual operations man thematizes his experience (awareness, perception) of the world. This is direct. At a sophisticated moment in his development, however, a man may turn his attention on his own performance (especially, on his intellectual operations and his expressions). What were the a priori conditions of possibility for such to have occurred? This is the beginning of reflection. We shall see that Ricoeur's use of reflection is closely connected with his preference for expression over experience and with the "hermeneutic conflict."

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Ricoeur explicitly locates himself in the Western tradition of rational philosophy. "I vowed...to continue, by means of the philosophical exegesis of symbols and myths, the tradition of rationality of philosophy, of our Western philosophy." FP, p. 38. And again, "For my part, I do not in the least abandon the tradition of rationality that has animated philosophy since the Greeks." HSPR, p. 200. And again, "The most self-taught philosopher cannot pass over Socrates, Plato, Descartes, or Kant." HT, p. 41.

<sup>13</sup>"According to Plato, in order to be understood, the individual must be studied first on a larger scale in terms of the State or Community. Likewise, we may better understand self-consciousness in terms of the larger scale of the history of philosophy." HT, p. 66. For Ricoeur, however, understanding man moves beyond understanding man's understanding; reflection transcends its origins; for its goal is not to elaborate the structures of reflection, but to elaborate "existential concepts," i.e., the structures of existence, insofar as existence is the being of man." See Ricoeur, SE, pp. 356-357. This latter consideration, that reflection must extend beyond the conscious thematization of the operations of the conscious subject, 1) is in harmony with Ricoeur's challenge to Kantian epistemology, 2) justifies the excursion into Freud of a philosophical project concerned with the will, and 3) accounts for the recourse of reflection to symbol and expression--and hence to hermeneutics. "Reflection is the effort to recapture the Ego of the Ego Cogite in the mirror of its objects, its works, its acts." FP, p. 43.

<sup>14</sup>SE, p. 356.

<sup>15</sup>Plato conceived of man as the intermediate (το μεταξύ) between reason and desire. Ricoeur follows this tradition which he also sees exemplified in Descartes, Pascal, and Kierkegaard. See FM, pp. 3-25.

<sup>16</sup>With his teacher, Marcel, Ricoeur shares an appreciation of the mystery of being as well as a respect for human finitude, the condition of an incarnate existence or personal body. See Don Ihde, Hermeneutic Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1971, p. 8). Ihde describes three lasting influences on Ricoeur: 1) Marcel's respect for the mystery of being, 2) Marcel's teaching concerning incarnate existence and 3) the conviction that philosophy is recuperative and unifying in its aim. Ricoeur also credits Marcel's influence for generating a deep respect for his own experience as a basis for philosophizing. Ihde's book offers an excellent bibliography on Ricoeur--pp. 185-190. (Henceforward this book will be designated Ihde). In the introduction to FN--at the beginning of his philosophical project--Ricoeur notes, "Meditation on Gabriel Marcel's work lies at the basis of the analyses in this book." See p. 15.

<sup>17</sup>By Ricoeur's "philosophical project" is meant the overall development of a philosophy of the will which begins with the publication of Le Volontaire et l'involontaire in 1950. (Translated by Erazim V. Kohák as Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966). (Henceforward this book will be



N

designated FN). The first two (of the three projected) parts of volume two were originally published in 1960. They are, by and large, the basis of this paper. The first is Fallible Man and the second, The Symbolism of Evil. The method of pure description of FN, referred to by Ricoeur as "an eidetics" of the will, reveals the fundamental possibilities of man. It abstracts from, or brackets, the symbolic, the empirical and the poetic. Hence, it omits the concrete aspects of fault and transcendence. FM begins the movement from eidetics to empirics, from structural possibility to actual condition. Yet FM remains abstract: it is a study of that in man which permits fault to occur, i.e., fallibility. SE moves to the hermeneutics of symbols as a method of considering the concrete manifestation of fault. (We will see that it is precisely this move to the concrete that demands a shift in method.) Part three of volume two, when published, will deal with the other, bracketed, concrete aspect, i.e., transcendence. The Poetics of the Will is the anticipated third volume of the project.

Freud and Philosophy (Ricoeur's most recently published book) further demonstrates the importance of the methodological shift to hermeneutics and opens the entire project to a phenomenology of language which has been Ricoeur's more recent interest. (See Erazim Kohák, "Translator's Introduction" to FN, pp. xi-xxxviii and Charles Kelbley's "Translator's Introduction" to FM, pp. ix-xv).

<sup>18</sup>For Descartes, all things are to be doubted except consciousness itself. "Descartes knows that things are doubtful, that they are not such as they appear; but he does not doubt that consciousness is such as it appears to itself." FP, p. 33. Ricoeur, however, does not trust the "so called evidence of immediate consciousness." FP, p. 43. "The home of meaning is not consciousness but something other than consciousness." FP, p. 55. We shall see the central importance of this shift away from immediate consciousness in part II of this paper.

<sup>19</sup>For Kant, man was to be explained by means of the method of transcendental deduction. This term "transcendental deduction" has suffered multiple transformations of meaning. In Kant, its meaning is quite clear: begin with some basic aspect of man's knowledge or experience and then trace that aspect back to the essential conditions of its possibility. These conditions can then be considered a priori constituents of the basic structure of man. Thus there is a sharp distinction between "transcendent" which means "transcending the limits of experience" and "transcendental" which means "lying at the basis of experience." (See Lewis White Beck, "Introduction" to Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950), p. xviii. Again Kant says "The word 'transcendental'...does not signify something passing beyond all experience but something that indeed precedes it a priori, but that is intended simply to make knowledge of experience possible." Prolegomena, pp. 122-23.

<sup>20</sup>Hegel attempted to unite Greek ontology with Kantian psychology by discovering the essential structures of human reality as spirit. (See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Reason in History, trans. by Robert S. Hartman (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1953), pp. 13-14 et passim.) Ricoeur finds in Hegel an approach that sets the evidence of immediate consciousness

off-center and a system which "finally reaffirms immediate consciousness, but in the light of the complete process of mediation." FP, p. 463. Yet because of his fear of a premature synthesis, and because he affirms the impossibility of total reflection, Ricoeur must reject the Hegelian claim to rational objectivity and absolute knowledge. (See FP, p. 378 and p. 388).

<sup>21</sup>The term "eidetic" demands clarification. In contemporary philosophical usage (although this does not apply to current American psychological usage) the term refers to an intentional, methodological bracketing. The tactic originates with Husserl, who used the Greek word Eidos to mean pure essence. He said that fact and essence are different and defined fact as "accidental." It is therefore fact that must be "bracketed out" of an investigation of essences. Husserl argued that all contingent things, all "objects" of direct experience are correlative to a necessity. The character of necessity belongs to each thing in its essence. Yet direct experience yields, not necessities, but only particular elements. Therefore, there is within every sense perception an essential insight, the object of which is the necessary, non-temporal, non-spacial pure essence or Eidos. This is the intimate selfhood of an individual object apprehended within the perception itself. Thus in addition to the particular elements, apprehension contains concept or insight. Eidos becomes the object correlate of concept or insight. See E. Paul Welch, The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl (New York: Octagon Books, 1965), pp. 164-165. Husserl seems to have thought that the eidetic method--the immediate disposition of or bracketing of fact--was a tactic necessarily employed in order to clarify the concept and its pure essence correlate. From Ricoeur's remarks, it seems that Husserl, by this method of de-ontologization of the object, was led to a crisis in his own philosophy which "he himself calls transcendental solipsism." Paul Ricoeur, "Kant and Husserl," Philosophy Today, X (1966), p. 148. (Henceforward this article will be referred to as KH).

<sup>22</sup>FN, Introduction, pp. 3-34, et passim. Also, see Ihde, p. 9.

<sup>23</sup>See KH, p. 148. For Husserl's interpretation errs by a kind of hubris; it is not self-limiting and therefore does not know its own limits. KH, passim. Husserl reduces all evidence to present experience and by so doing he "totally identifies phenomenology with an egology without ontology." (KH, p. 162). Thus, in Husserl, there is "the total triumph of interiority over exteriority, of the transcendental over the transcendent." (p. 163). This "paradox of transcendental solipsism" itself gives evidence, under Ricoeur's hand, of the limitation of an essential (or eidetic or Husserlian) phenomenology. That limitation (of the phenomenology as elaborated) consists in the absence of a self-limit. The method Husserl practiced, however, retains respect. We will see that it is by applying a Kantian "phenomenology of judgment" to the Husserlian "phenomenology of perception" that Ricoeur discovers the limits and ground of Husserl's phenomenology. The limit for Husserl comes from a source outside Husserl.

<sup>24</sup>See FM, pp. 9-10.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 12ff.

<sup>26</sup>Ricoeur's first individually published book was Gabriel Marcel et Karl Jaspers: Philosophie du Mystère et Philosophie du Paradoxe (Éditions du Temps Présent, Paris, 1947). In 1950 he presented a translation and commentary of Husserl's Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie under the title of Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie. (Paris: Gallimard, 1950). See fn 42 of this paper.

<sup>27</sup>See Hackett, p. 14.

<sup>28</sup>The above distinction of three "levels" may not be so clear as indicated. For Ricoeur finds in the later Husserl a "change of accent [which] marks the passage to existential phenomenology" (FM, p. xii) and an argument could be advanced placing Heidegger, rather than Ricoeur, at the head of hermeneutic phenomenology. (See Ihde, p. 4).

<sup>29</sup>HT, p. 6.

<sup>30</sup>Ricoeur refers to "the entire work" of FN as "an exercise in method in which two requirements of philosophical thought--clarity and depth, a sense for distinctions and a sense for covert bonds--must constantly confront each other." FN, p. 15.

<sup>31</sup>"Here philosophy seems to be well guarded against itself by nonphilosophy." "It seems that in order to be independent in the elaboration of its problems, methods, and statements, philosophy must be dependent with respect to its sources and its profound motivation. This fact cannot fail to be disquieting." HT, p. 14.

<sup>32</sup>Ihde, p. 17.

<sup>33</sup>KH, p. 147.

<sup>34</sup>"I propose that we try to understand them through each other." HSPR, p. 207.

<sup>35</sup>FP, Book III

36.<sup>2</sup> "That is why the myths of evil have to be taken all together; it is their very dialectic that is instructive." HSPR, p. 213.

37. FN, pp. 6-7.

38. This phrase should be qualified. For eidetic analysis appears in both SE and FP. In SE eidetics provide a formal analysis of the structure of symbol and myth. Symbol and myth themselves, however, reveal a level of understanding that goes beyond an eidetics. (See SE, pp. 14f.). In FP, "a basically Husserlian analysis is used as a counter to psychoanalysis." Ihde, p. 14.

39. FM, passim.

40. FN, pp. 20-28.

41. The other bracketed dimension of human existence, Transcendence, will be treated in Ricoeur's long promised Poetics of the Will.

42. Paul Ricoeur, Husserl: An Analysis of his Phenomenology, trans. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1967), pp. 214-215. (See fn 26 of this paper for original title). (Henceforward this book will be designated Husserl.)

43. Husserl, p. 230.

44. By the term Fault (La faute) Ricoeur refers to a basic, radical disruption marking all existence. (See Translator's Introduction to FN, pp. xxxiv-xxxv.)

45. FN, p. 24

46. That there is both an "evident change in perspective" and an "underlying continuity" is amply demonstrated by Ihde (See his Chapter 4) and admitted by Ricoeur in his Foreward to Ihde's book (Cf. p. xiii).

47. Hackett, p. 12.

48. HSPR, pp. 191-193.

49. Ibid., p. 192.

50. FP, p. 46.

51. Idem.

52. From an attempt to trace some domain of human experience to the a priori conditions of its possibility to an attempt to elaborate man's relation to being (his act of existing) by reflection on symbols which speak that act.

53. HSPR, p. 192.

54. FM, p. 11.

55. FM, p. 38.

56. "This global disposition consists in a certain non-coincidence of man with himself: this 'disproportion' of self to self would be the ratio of fallibility." FM, p. 4.

57. "In maintaining that fallibility is a concept, I am presupposing at the outset that pure reflection, that is, a way of understanding and being understood which does not come through image, symbol or myth, can reach a certain threshold of intelligibility where the possibility of evil appears inscribed in the innermost structure of human reality." FM, p. 3.

58. "The theory of fallibility represents a broadening of the anthropological perspective of the first work [Le Volontaire et l' involontaire] which was more closely centered on the structure of the will. The elaboration of the concept of fallibility has provided an opportunity for a much more extensive study of the structures of human reality. The duality of the voluntary and the involuntary is brought back into a much vaster dialectic dominated by the ideas of man's disproportion, the polarity within him of the finite and the infinite, and his activity of intermediation or mediation. Man's specific weakness, and his essential fallibility are ultimately sought within this structure of mediation between the pole of his finitude and the pole of his infinitude." FM, p. xx.

59. "Phenomenology becomes strict when the status of the appearing of things (in the broadest sense of the term) becomes problematical.... How do the 'regions' of reality (thing, animal, man, etc.) relate to the subjective processes of consciousness (perceiving, imagining, positing an abstraction, judging, etc.)? In this strict sense the question of being, the ontological question, is excluded in advance from phenomenology, either provisionally or definitely." Husserl, p. 202.

60. See FM, p. 75.

61. The present writer feels like a foreign guest at this wedding inasmuch as he is only marginally familiar with either 'partner.'

62. FM, p. 29.

63. See FM, pp. 29-30.

64. FM, p. 32.

65. "In other words, the world is not primarily the boundary of my existence, but its correlate...." FM, p. 31.

66. FM, p. 35.

67. FM, p. 36.

68. FM, p. 38. According to Ihde, Ricoeur uses the word transgression "in a way similar to uses of transcendence by other existential phenomenologists" (See Ihde, fn. 9, p. 68). A translator's note (of FM, See p. 38) indicates a root meaning of "stepping over or breaking through" without the overtone of moral or legal violation.

69. FM, p. 41.

70. FM, p. 41f.

71. Idem., Note that at this point Ricoeur touches on what is to become the principal theme of his later phenomenology: man is language. When I signify in absence the signification becomes a sign and "In the sign dwells the transcendence of the λόγος of man." (FM, p. 43).

72. FM, p. 48.

73. FM, p. 43.

74. FM, p. 44.

75. FM, p. 59. This is in opposition to Kant who located the a priori synthesis in conscious judgments.

76. Ibid., p. 58.

77. Ibid., p. 70.

78. Idem.

79. Ibid., p. 72.

80. Ibid., p. 75.

81. "Taken as a totality, human reality will appear to us as a progressively richer and more complete dialectic between more and more concrete poles and in mediations which become progressively closer to life." FM, p. 76.

82. Ibid., p. 84.

83. Ibid., p. 85. It would be informative to apply this point of Ricoeur's theory to the reported experiences of users of "heavy" drugs. It does not lead to the inter-personal.

84. Ibid., p. 87.

85. Ibid., p. 89.

86. Ibid., p. 92.
87. Ibid., p. 95.
88. Ibid., pp. 98-99.
89. Ibid., p. 103.
90. Ibid., p. 104.
91. Ibid., pp. 105-106.
92. Ibid., p. 109.
93. Ibid., p. 110.
94. See Ihde, pp. 74-75.
95. FM, p. 125.
96. Ibid., p. 126.
97. Ibid., p. 127.
98. Ibid., p. 127.
99. Ibid., p. 128.
100. Idem.
101. Ibid., p. 129.
102. Ibid., p. 134.
103. In Fallible Man Ricoeur considers three cases, i.e., possession, domination, and honor. We treat only the first of these in this paper.
104. FM, p. 171.
105. Ibid., pp. 173-174.
106. Ibid., p. 174.
107. Idem.
108. "Being established and settled completes incarnation and transforms it through and through." FM, p. 175.
109. Ibid., pp. 175-176.
110. Ibid., pp. 200-201.

111. Idem., p. 201.

112. "The hiatus between pure reflection on 'fallibility' and the confession of 'sins' is patent." SE, p. 347.

113. "I wager that I shall have a better understanding of man and of the bond between the being of man and the being of all beings if I follow the indication of symbolic thought." SE, p. 355.

114. SE, p. 348.

115. "For us, moderns, a myth is only a myth because we can no longer connect that time with the time of history as we write it, employing the critical method, nor can we connect mythical places with our geographical space." SE, p. 5.

116. Ibid., p. 350.

117. Ibid., p. 351.

118. "I am convinced we must think not behind the symbols, but starting from the symbols according to the symbols." HSPR, p. 203.

119. SE, p. 351 (emphasis added).

120. Ibid., p. 19.

121. "In every way, something has been lost, irremediably lost: immediacy of belief." Ibid., p. 351.

122. "What is peculiar to modern hermeneutics is that it remains in line with critical thought." Ibid., p. 350.

123. "The myth can no longer be an explanation; to exclude its etiological function is the theme of all necessary demythologization." Ibid., p. 5.

124. "This 'crisis,' this decision, after which myth and history are dissociated, may signify the loss of the mythical dimension: because mythical time can no longer be co-ordinated with the time of events that are 'historical' in the sense required by historical method and historical criticism, because mythical space can no longer be co-ordinated with the places of our geography, we are tempted to give ourselves up to a radical demythization of all our thinking. But another possibility offers itself to us: precisely because we are living and thinking after the separation of myth and history, the demythization of our history can become the other side of an understanding of myth as myth, and the conquest for the first time in the history of culture of the mythical dimension. That is why we never speak here of demythization, but strictly of demythologization, it being well understood that what is lost is the pseudo-knowledge, the false logos of the myth, such as we find expressed, for example, in the



etiological function of myths. But when we lose the myth as immediate logos, we rediscover it as myth. Only at the price and by the roundabout way of philosophical exegesis and understanding, can the myth create a new peripeteia of the logos." Ibid., pp. 161-162.

125. Ibid., p. 5.

126. Ibid., pp. 356-357.

127. Ibid., p. 18.

128. Idem.

129. HSPR, pp. 193-194.

130. Idem.

131. Idem. Also, see SE, p. 15.

132. Idem. Also, see Se, pp. 15 and 16.

133. See SE, pp. 15-18.

134. These three dimensions of symbolism -- cosmic, oneiric, and poetic -- are present in every authentic symbol. Ibid., p. 10.

135. Ibid., p. 10.

136. Ibid., p. 12.

137. "The poetic symbol shows us expressivity in its nascent state. In poetry the symbol is caught at the moment when it is a welling up of language...." Ibid., pp. 13-14.

138. Ibid., pp. 25-26.

139. Ibid., p. 27.

140. "The world of defilement is a world anterior to the division between the ethical and the physical. Ethics is mingled with the physics of suffering, while suffering is surcharged with ethical meanings." Ibid., p. 31.

141. Ibid., p. 35.

142. Ibid., p. 41.

143. Ibid., p. 42.

144. "It is already the personal relation to a god that determines the spiritual space where sin is distinguished from defilement; the penitent experiences the assault of demons as the counter part of the absence of the god...." Ibid., p. 48.

145. Ibid., p. 48.

146. "The category that dominates the notion of sin is the category of 'before' God." Ibid., p. 50.

147. Ibid., p. 51.

148. "In rising from the consciousness of defilement to the consciousness of sin, fear and anguish did not disappear; rather, they changed their quality." Ibid., p. 63.

149. "It can be said, in very general terms, that guilt designates the subjective moment in fault as sin is its ontological moment." Ibid., p. 101. "Guilt...is the complete internalization of sin." Ibid., p. 143.

150. Ibid., p. 101. "with guilt, 'conscience' is born..." Ibid., p. 143.

151. "According to the schema of sin, evil is a situation 'in which' mankind is caught as a single collective; according to the schema of guilt, evil is an act that each individual 'begins.'" Ibid., p. 107. "But with the factor of 'conscience' man the measure likewise comes into being." Ibid., p. 143.

152. Ibid., p. 107.

153. Idem.

154. "Thus there is a circular relation among all the symbols: the last bring out the meaning of the preceding ones, but the first lend to the last all their power of symbolization." Ibid., p. 152.

155. Ibid., p. 152.

156. Idem.

157. Ibid., p. 151.

158. Idem.

159. Idem., p. 113.

160. HSPR, p. 194.

161. Ibid., p. 197.

162. Ibid., p. 198.

163. It is this dialectic of myths which will finally establish the limits for Ricoeur's understanding of Fault.

164. The following discussions, however, will be a rather severely limited reflection of Ricoeur's thought. We are necessarily forced to omit discussion of many of the transitional myths and many of the dialectical cross currents. This has the effect of excluding the subtlety while it brings into relief the main progress of his thought.

165. See SE, pp 175-210.

166. Ibid., p. 176.

167. Ibid., p. 177.

168. Ibid., p. 178.

169. Ibid., p. 180.

170. Ibid., p. 217.

171. Ibid., p. 214. Ricoeur also suggests that, because this ~~non~~ distinction could not be thought through, it caused the downfall of tragedy and its vehement condemnation by Plato.

172. Ibid., p. 218.

173. Ibid., p. 223.

174. Ibid., p. 225.

175. Ibid., p. 224.

176. Ibid., p. 227.

176<sup>2</sup> Idem.

177. Ibid., p. 229.

178. With Ricoeur we will attempt only a heuristic description of this myth type. A full understanding of 'the exiled soul' —its origins and development would result only as the term of a dialectic between the type and the history of Archaic Orphism.

179. Ibid., p. 280.

180. Ibid., p. 300.

181. HSPR, p. 198.

182. "The etiological myth of Adam is the most extreme attempt to separate the origin of evil from the origin of the good; its intention is

to set up a radical origin of evil distinct from the more primordial origin of the goodness of things." Ibid., p. 233.

183. Ibid., p. 233.

184. Idem.

185. The myth "tends to concentrate all the evil of history in a single man, in a single act -- in short, in a unique event." SE, p. 243.

186. Idem.

187. Ibid., p. 260.

188. Ibid., p. 255.

189. Ibid., p. 311.

190. "The soul of the serpent's question is the 'evil infinity,' which simultaneously perverts the meaning of the limit by which freedom was oriented and the meaning of the finiteness of the freedom thus oriented by the limit." Ibid., p. 253.

191. Ibid., pp. 312-313.

192. "It is not possible to absorb all the meanings revealed through that figure [i.e., the serpent] into the avowal of a purely human origin of evil. The serpent is more than the transcendence of sin over sins...it is the Other, it is the Adversary, the pole of counter-participation, of a counter-likeness, about which one can say nothing except that the evil act, in positing itself, lets itself be seduced by the counter-positing of a source of iniquity represented by the Evil One, the Diabolical." Ibid., p. 313.

193. Ibid., pp. 313-314.

194. Ibid., p. 330.

195. Ibid., p. 331.

196. Ibid., p. 331.

197. Ibid. , p. 332.

198. "Step by step, the Biblical theme of sin tends toward a quasi dualism, accredited by the inner experience of cleavage and alienation." Ibid., p. 333.

199. Ibid., pp. 334-5.

200. Ibid., pp. 334-5.

201. Ibid., p. 346.

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