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FACULTY OF ECONOMIC AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCES

Contestation, Confusion and Change: Urban Governance and Service Delivery in Zimbabwe (2000-2012).



A Full thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master in Administration in the School of Government, Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences, University of the Western Cape.

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Key Words

Urban governance, Service delivery, Urban planning, Urban development, Politics, Contestation, Confusion, Change, Zimbabwe.



Abstract

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Master in Administration Full Thesis, School of Government, University of the Western Cape.

This study investigates how political dynamics impacted on service delivery in urban areas of Zimbabwe in general and, SPECIFICALLY, in the cities of Harare, Bulawayo, Masvingo and Mutare. The problematic of urban governance in these cities has been marked by contestation, confusion and change for a range of reason which would seem to be associated with issues of planning and management of urban areas, infrastructure such as provision and maintenance of roads, housing, public transport and water and sanitation. Consequently, these urban governance contestations almost led to the collapse of most if not all, urban functions and services in the aforementioned urban areas.


That Zimbabwe is suffering from a crisis of governance and public service delivery for decades is not in doubt. In this thesis, I argue that whilst much attention has been given to state governance, it is at the local governance level where the impacts of the crisis are more severe. Why at the local governance level? Local government is mandated to deliver directly or indirectly key human development services to citizens. Inevitably, urban governance is an important determinant of urban services delivery.

Urban governance takes place within a wider governance and political context. Post-independent urban Zimbabwe was dominated by the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF) until the turn of the millennium. When the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) began dominating urban local authorities, urban governance signaled an era marked by contestation, confusion and change. Subsequent urban governance political dynamics had profound impacts on service delivery.

Change manifested itself in the rise of the MDC and the subsequent consternation of Zanu-PF in the control of urban councils. Zanu-PF responded through a spirited and heterodox comeback resulting in widespread contestation with MDC led councils. The

local government ministry and central government continuously interfered and distorted the operations of urban governments. Urban councils became weak as service delivery was politicized with party structures more powerful than urban administration. Political contestation brought confusion as it became difficult to determine who was in control of urban affairs. Elected councillors and mayors were suspended or fired with central government taking over the delivery of some urban services.

The contest for control of the urban constituency between MDC and Zanu-PF has been sustained at the expense of service delivery. Considering the role of politics in urban governance, I conclude that the crisis of service delivery in urban Zimbabwe is a political crisis driven by the political impasse between the MDC and Zanu-PF.




Cape Town
August 2014.

Declaration

I declare that *Contestation, Confusion and Change: Urban Governance and Service Delivery in Zimbabwe (2002-2012)* is my own work, that it has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged as complete references.

Davison Muchadenyika

August 29, 2014.

Signed.....



Special Dedication

The song “*Makwarara akatengwa, vakatengwa naChombo kuti vauraye musangano.....Harare Mudzuri wakaenda, Chitungwiza Shoko wakaenda, Chegutu Dhalakama wakaenda, Kagurabadza maMutare, mamayor echinja akaenda, kukonzerwa nemunhu mumwechete*” triggered this intellectual analyze so as to ascertain with empirical evidence the interface between urban governance politics and service delivery.

In solidarity with all the urban residents striving to get urban services and functions at their door step!



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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAG	Affirmative Action Group
BCC	Bulawayo City Council
BMGF	Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
BPRA	Bulawayo Progressive Residents Association
CABS	Central African Building Society
CBD	Central Business District
CBOs	Community Based Organizations
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CHRA	Combine Harare Residents Association
CIO	Central Intelligence Office
CoH	City of Harare
CoM	City of Mutare
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DA	District Administrator
DHCS	Department of Housing and Community Services
DoS	Dialogue on Shelter
DPP	Department of Physical Planning
DUPS	Department of Urban Planning Services
ELB	Epworth Local Board
EMA	Environmental Management Agency
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
EU	European Union
FTLRP	Fast Track Land Reform Programme
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIS	Geographic Information Systems
GoZ	Government of Zimbabwe
HCD	Human Capital Director
HRT	Harare Residents Trust
ICTs	Information and Communication Technologies
IDAZIM	Institute for a Democratic Alternative for Zimbabwe
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LGB	Local Government Board
LGRUD PPC	Local Government Rural and Urban Development Parliamentary Portfolio Committee
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MLGRUD	Ministry of Local Government and Urban Development
MoNHTSA	Ministry of National Housing and Social Amenities
MoPW	Ministry of Public Works
MRA	Mutare Residents Association
MURA	Masvingo Residents Association
NHF	National Housing Fund
NPM	New Public Management

OG	Operation Garikai
OM/RO	Operation Murambatsvina / Restore Order
PA	Provincial Administrator
PSIPs	Public Sector Investments Projects
RBZ	Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
RDC	Rural District Councils
RTCPA	Regional Town and Country Planning Act
RTI	Research Triangle Institute International
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperative Agency
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SZ	Shelter Zimbabwe
UCAZ	Urban Councils Association of Zimbabwe
UN	United Nations
USD	United States Dollar
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHABITAT	United Nations Centre for Human Settlements
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Emergency Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
Zanu-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZBS	Zimbabwe Building Society
ZEC	Zimbabwe Election Commission
ZESA	Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority
ZIHOPFE	Zimbabwe Homeless Peoples' Federation
ZILGA	Zimbabwe Local Government Association
ZIMPOST	Zimbabwe Post and Telecommunications Corporations
ZimStat	Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency
ZINARA	Zimbabwe National Road Administration
ZINWA	Zimbabwe National Water Authority
ZIRUP	Zimbabwe Institute of Regional and Urban Planners
ZRP	Zimbabwe Republic Police
ZUPCO	Zimbabwe United Passenger Company

Table of Contents

Key Words	ii
Abstract.....	iii
Declaration.....	v
Special Dedication	vi
Acknowledgements.....	vii
Abbreviations and Acronyms	viii
Table of Contents.....	x
List of Tables	xiii
List of Figures.....	xiii
List of Boxes	xiii
CHAPTER ONE: REVITALIZING URBAN GOVERNANCE AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT: INTRODUCING THE STUDY.....	1
1.1 Introductory Remarks to Urban Governance and Urban Development.....	1
1.2 Contestation, Confusion and Change – Urban Governance in Zimbabwe.....	3
1.3 Problem Statement.....	4
1.4 Service Delivery Failure: Competing explanations.....	5
1.5 Zanu-PF and MDC ideologies on local government autonomy.....	7
1.6 Significance of the Study.....	8
1.7 Research Aim, Assumptions and Methodology.....	9
1.8 Thesis structure	10
1.9 Conclusion.....	11
CHAPTER TWO: CRITICAL REVIEW OF EXTANT LITERATURE ON URBANIZATION AND URBAN GOVERNANCE.....	12
2.1 Introductory Remarks to Urbanization.....	12
2.2 The General history of Urban Governance and Urban Planning.....	13
2.3 Urban Governance and Urban Development in Sub-Saharan Africa	14
2.4 Revisiting Urban Governance, Planning and Government (Politics)	17
2.5 Approaches to the study of Urban Politics and Urban Governance in extant theory.....	18
2.6 The Urban Political System: A Framework of Analysis.....	19
2.6.1 Decentralization, Democracy and Service Provision within Urban Governance	23
2.6.2 Local Political Leadership and Urban Governance	27
2.7 Some Concluding Remarks on Urban Governance in existing theory.....	28
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY TO INVESTIGATE URBAN PATTERNS IN ZIMBABWE.....	29
3.1 Delimitation of the Study.....	29
3.2 Sampling Procedure.....	30

3.3 Data Collection Methods	30
3.3.1 In-depth Interviews	31
3.3.2 Document Analysis	33
3.3.3 Participant Observation.....	33
3.3.4 Literature Review.....	33
3.4 Data processing methods	34
3.4.1 Data reduction.....	34
3.4.2 Data Display.....	35
3.4.3 Drawing Conclusions from Data.....	35
3.5 Ethics Statement.....	35
3.6 Research Limitations and Conclusion.....	36
CHAPTER FOUR: ZIMBABWE’S URBAN GOVERNANCE AND URBANIZATION CONTEXT.	37
4.1 Pre-Independence Local Government Context (1890-1980).	37
4.2 Periodization of Urbanization and Urban Governance in Post-Independent Zimbabwe	38
4.2.1 1980-1990 (Decentralization Period).....	39
4.2.2 1990-2000 (Urban Governance Reforms).....	40
4.2.3 2000-2008 (Change and Contestation Period).....	41
4.2.4 2008-2012 (Deepening Contestation and Confusion).....	43
4.3 Urban Governance and Planning Law: Powers and functions of local government.....	47
4.4 Current state of Urban Governance, Urbanization levels and Service Delivery.....	51
4.5 Concluding Remarks on Zimbabwe’s Urban Governance and Urbanization	54
CHAPTER FIVE: THE INTERFACE BETWEEN URBAN GOVERNANCE POLITICS, URBAN MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING SYSTEMS IN ZIMBABWE.....	55
5.1 Urban Management Systems	55
5.1.1 Role of councillors, central government and political parties in the appointment of urban council’s heads of departments	55
5.1.2 Relations between councillors and appointed officials	59
5.1.3 Appointed officials accountability channels	64
5.1.4 Attribution of council failure	67
5.2 The profession and practice of urban planning.....	70
5.2.1 Effects of centre-local relations to urban planners.....	70
5.2.2 Urban Planners in a turbulent political environment	73
5.2.3 Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order and the public image of the planning profession.....	75
5.2.4 Operation Garikai and Urban Planning.....	79
5.3 Conclusion	82

CHAPTER SIX: URBAN GOVERNANCE POLITICS AND SERVICE DELIVERY IN ZIMBABWE: SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE	83
6.1 Low cost housing	83
6.1.1 Allocation of land for housing	83
6.1.2 Developments in council-led housing	92
6.1.3 Low cost housing outside council	96
6.1.4 Comparison of council and outside council housing initiatives.....	100
6.2 Water and Sanitation	101
6.2.1 Rationale for shifting water and sanitation functions to ZINWA	101
6.2.2 Impacts of the shift (6.2.1) to the delivery of water and sanitation functions.....	103
6.2.3 Effects to residents of water and sanitation authority changes	106
6.3 Public Transport.....	108
6.3.1 Rank marshals and political players.....	108
6.3.2 Effects of public transport chaos to residents	110
6.3.3 Causes of public transport crises over the years	111
6.4 Road Infrastructure	113
6.4.1 Reasons for taking vehicle licensing from Urban Councils to ZINARA.....	113
6.4.2 Net effect of this shift (6.4.1) on road infrastructure maintenance and development.	117
6.4.3 Reasons for post 2000 Infrastructure dilapidation	118
6.4.4 Awarding of council road infrastructure tenders	119
6.5 Conclusion	120
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY DIRECTIONS FOR URBAN GOVERNANCE IN ZIMBABWE.....	121
7.1 Conclusions.....	121
7.2 Policy Directions.....	125
7.3 General recommendations	128
References.....	130
Annex I: Interview Guide	142
Annex II: Interview Schedule	145
Annex III: Corruption in land alienation process: Chiyangwa’s wealth List.....	147

List of Tables

Table 1: Zanu-PF's anti-devolution position during the Constitution making process.....	7
Table 2: Key Informants by category.....	32
Table 3: Interference of Central Government in Urban Councils During the Transition Period.....	45
Table 4: Comparison of local and central government powers.....	50
Table 5: Urbanization levels in Zimbabwe from 1950 – 2050 (in percentages).....	52
Table 6: Demographic Trends in Major Zimbabwean Towns and cities (1982-2012).....	52
Table 7: Zimbabwe's Economic Performance, 1980-2006.....	53
Table 8: CoH Summary of Excess staff as at 31 December 2012.....	68
Table 9: CoH DUPS Establishment as at 31 st December 2011.....	71
Table 10: CoH Housing partnership projects (2008-11).....	95
Table 11: Council-private sector partnerships in the cities of Mutare, Masvingo and Bulawayo.....	95
Table 12: Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle projects.....	96
Table 13: Housing delivery components and assigned institutions.....	97
Table 14: National Housing Loan Delivery Facility Joint Ventures.....	97
Table 15: Housing projects in the City of Mutare.....	99
Table 16: Shelter Zimbabwe's housing provision in Harare and Epworth.....	99
Table 17: Contribution of Water to Council Budgets.....	101
Table 18: City of Harare Planned termini facilities.....	112
Table 19: Incidental bus termini in the City of Harare.....	113

List of Figures

Fig. 1: A Systemic model of the Urban Political System	20
Fig 2: CoH Actual Revenue compared with Gross Wage Bill.....	68

List of Boxes

Box 1: The deterioration of local governance due to political contestations.....	42
Box 2: Contestations in Mutare City Council.....	46
Box 3: Rockview Park Water Supply sequence of event.....	107

CHAPTER ONE: REVITALIZING URBAN GOVERNANCE AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT: INTRODUCING THE STUDY.

This chapter emphasizes the importance of reviving urban governance as a precondition to urban services delivery. Chief among the reasons for the revival is the increase in the urban population and the resulting increased demand for urban services. The research problematique focuses on the rise of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in controlling urban areas leading to contestation, confusion and change in Zimbabwe's urban governance. Contestation, confusion and change within urban governance led to the deterioration of urban service provision. In principle, urban areas are engines of service delivery but in the Zimbabwean case they resemble sites of political struggles. The chapter provides the research problem, aim, assumptions, methodology, significance of the study, as well as the thesis structure. The ensuing section highlights urban services delivery as the primary reason for reviving urban governance and urban development.

1.1 Introductory Remarks to Urban Governance and Urban Development

Urban governance is practiced through planning, development and management of urban areas. Urban development is a function of urban governance systems. Urban governance systems refers to legislative, and institutional (both state and non-state) frameworks and actors that determine the production and delivery of urban functions and services. Urban socio-economic development relies on the functioning of urban governments.

Planning is at the heart of sustainable urbanization (UNHABITAT, 2010a: 5) and is the main conduit of urban governance. Urban challenges such as slums, urban sprawl, urban poverty and poor service provision are explained largely by present urban governance systems and urban planning approaches (UNHABITAT, 2009). Urban service delivery relies on the functioning of urban governance systems. Therefore, urban governance is a *sine qua non* for urban service delivery. Urban governance is a result of political processes, making it imperative to have credible and legitimate political systems. To that end, reviving urban governance systems through legitimate and credible political systems is an important step in addressing present urbanization challenges.

Urban planning is designed within a governance setting. The objective of urban governance institutions is to deliver functions and services to its constituency (urban community). The

urban community consists of many actors such as business, ordinary residents, pressure groups (civil society organizations, community based organizations, non-governmental organizations), political parties among others. Trends in urban governance have led to institutional fragmentation, multiplication of agencies, complex web of relationships, reconfiguration of networks, disparity of powers and responsibilities across different tiers and departments of governmental and non-governmental institutions, increasing role of market forces, and confusion over 'who does what' (Davoudi and Evans, 2005). The cosmopolitan urban community, if not properly managed within an urban political system, results in urban service provision decline as conflict and confusion take centre stage.

Addressing socio-economic needs of urbanites requires shifts in urban governance thinking and approaches. The challenges of economic, social and environmental sustainability require shared opportunities for public participation in cities (UNHABITAT, 2010b). The choices of citizens through elections and other forms of participation in urban governance are critical. Local government elections are a form of public participation (Williams, 2007) and service delivery programs can be linked to political party campaigning (Lijphart, 1985). In Zimbabwe; the election of the MDC to run urban councils resulted in tense political contestation with elected mayors and councillors dismissed. Residents' voices and choices through elections were suppressed. At the same time service delivery declined.

Zimbabwe is a unitary state with a centralized government. Local government is not constitutionalized¹ but rather a legislative creation. Local government is weak and subject to unrestrained interference from central government. Post-independent urban Zimbabwe was dominated by Zanu-PF until the turn of the millennium. Since 2000, MDC dominance grew in urban councils while the Ministry of Local Government Rural and Urban Development (MLGRUD) is headed by a Zanu-PF minister (RTI and IDAZIM, 2010). Political contradictions ensued; as efforts by the MDC to run urban local authorities seem to be systematically being frustrated by Zanu-PF through MLGRUD. Political struggles between Zanu-PF and MDC over the control of urban councils have turned more energy, focus and resources away from service delivery to political expediency.

Reasons for revitalizing urban governance include the undeniable fact that, more people are living in urban areas meaning an unprecedented demand for urban services (UNHABITAT,

¹ Local Government is enshrined in the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013.

2008). Urban services form the core of human development indicators. Housing, water and sanitation, health, education and transport have direct impacts on peoples' standards of living. Urban governance plays an important role in socio-economic development. Urban governments are the spring board of city, regional and national economies. Further, due to urbanization "the urban is shapeless, formless and apparently boundless, riven with new contradictions and tensions that make it hard to tell where borders reside and what's inside and what's outside" (Merrifield, 2012: 2). Service delivery contradictions and tensions within the urban political community threaten effective and efficient service delivery.

This thesis investigates how political dynamics in urban governance impacted on service delivery. This stems from the fact that urban governance in Zimbabwe has been marked by contestation, confusion and change. Contestation, confusion and change led to the collapse of urban functions and services as discussed in the next section.

1.2 Contestation, Confusion and Change – Urban Governance in Zimbabwe.

Due to MDC dominance in urban politics, the post-2000 era saw urban governance in Zimbabwe becoming hotly contested, resulting in confusion as to the direction of political change. Urban areas in principle are hives of service delivery but in the Zimbabwean case they are sites of political struggles. Sites of struggles as political parties wrestle for the control of cities. Political contestation relegates service delivery as political grip and survival are prioritized. The struggles intensified after the 2008 elections in which the MDC won and controlled 29 of the 30 urban centers with Zanu-PF controlling the remainder (ZEC, 2008). The result has seen political conflict including the removal of MDC mayors by the MLGRUD (headed by a Zanu-PF minister) (RTI and IDAZIM, 2010). The rise of MDC in urban governance meant increased political fortunes and spheres of influence for the party.

Realizing MDC electoral strength in urban areas, Zanu-PF launched a spirited and heterodox comeback aimed at regaining the control of local governance institutions (Kamete, 2006a). The comeback bid is advanced through the local government ministry which has a firm grip on the appointment of senior city managers, special interest councillors and suspension and dismissal of elected councillors. Councillors and mayors are decision makers, thus they have the political power. Administratively, council workers are the decision implementers and

urban managers. Conflicting political differences and allegiances between the council political and administrative wing was and is a standoff perturbing urban services delivery.

The rise of multiparty democracy and the efforts to retain political dominance in urban areas resulted in the recentralization of administrative authority and political power. Jonga (2012) argues that urban governance institutions in Zimbabwe are captured by political bandits who are serving their individualistic interests at the expense of service delivery demise. He further points out the MLGRUD, councillors and political administrative structures as active agents of political banditry. Contestation and political struggles in urban governance are a result of political intolerance and the attempt by Zanu-PF to reclaim lost support.

The crisis of governance and its ramifications in Zimbabwe has been a subject of long standing debate (Raftopoulos, 2006). This study argues that whilst much attention has been given to state governance, it is at the local governance level where the impacts of the crisis were more severe. Why at the local governance level? Local government is mandated to deliver directly or indirectly key human development services to citizens. Urban governance processes are heavily politicized struggles over the distribution of resources and quality of spaces (UNHABITAT, 2009). In urban Zimbabwe, when the MDC rose to political dominance, the impacts to service delivery were severe as stated in the problem statement in the succeeding section.

1.3 Problem Statement

There is currently a major urban crisis in Zimbabwe expressing itself in failures of water, electricity, medicines, transport, and housing provision (Ranger, 2007). The crisis is a governance problem. In Zimbabwe, the birth of multi-party democracy and the fight to retain political dominance resulted in the recentralization of administrative authority and power (Jonga, 2012). Due to the rise of MDC electoral strength in urban areas with Zanu-PF controlling the local government ministry, urban governance in Zimbabwe became ardently contested. Intense contestation marked central-local government relations leaving the electorate and residents confused about the direction of political change. Removing Zanu-PF from urban governance was a way to usher in a new urban governance regime centered on effective and efficient service delivery. However, one can argue that, for now, to some extent the new urban governance regime has shown unexpected results mainly due to intergovernmental and inter-party contestations. The period under study was marked by a

governance crisis at national level with contestable local governance institutions legitimacy (Kamete, 2009a).

The crisis of urban governance in Zimbabwe preceded the election of multi-party urban councils in 2000. In 2008, MDC controlled 29 out of 30 urban councils (ZEC, 2008). Zanu-PF controlled one urban council and the local government ministry, which ministry is responsible for the appointment of senior council officials, special interest councillors and suspension and dismissal of elected councillors. A palpable rift exists between appointed and elected officials, of which the former has been accused of following Zanu-PF diktats (Chirisa and Kawadza, 2008). This political reality has turned urban administration into a 'political battle front' rather than a locus of service delivery. Efforts by the MDC to manage urban councils seem to be systematically being frustrated by Zanu-PF through the MLGRUD.

Politicians are seemingly abusing their power to suit their selfish and corrupt agendas (Kamete, 2003), causing confusion in urban administration. Political contradictions and contestations have resulted into deteriorating urban services delivery. Urban governance contestations led to the suppression of citizens' choices (through elections) as elected mayors and councillors were either suspended or fired from office. Amidst contestation, service delivery declined to record levels. Service delivery levels question the feasibility of multi-party councils under an authoritarian regime. To that effect, the thesis shows and connects how urban governance political dynamics have impacted upon service delivery. In principle, urban governance forms the cornerstone of socio-economic and political development in any nation. The process of building sustainable human settlements aimed at providing urban services centers on how cities are governed.

Urban governance crisis led to service delivery failure (Ranger, 2007). The crisis took effect within a complex national socio-economic and political crisis. Urban local authorities form the core of public services management at the local level. The management of urban areas is a key component of local level democracy. Having stated the problem statement, the next section focuses on the competing explanations of service delivery failure.

1.4 Service Delivery Failure: Competing explanations

There are two competing explanations on service delivery failure in Zimbabwe. One is economic and the other is political. Zimbabwean cities have undergone an unprecedented

period of de-industrialization (Sachikonye, 2006; Kamete, 2006b) owing to economic challenges. De-industrialization affected local authorities' revenue base. Other scholars use both economic and political arguments to explain service delivery failure for instance Kamete (2006c: 67) argue that for cities like Harare, a combination of bad governance, unemployment, economic rises, poverty and rising crime contributed to urban blight. On the other hand, other scholars focus purely on the political explanation for example Chirisa (2013) attributes the poor state of service delivery to weak institutions, urban mismanagement, and the reluctance of central government to promote good urban governance. This same argument is also supported by Jonga and Chirisa (2009: 178) who points out "poor service delivery, weak administrative institutions, ineffective and inefficient councils and unaccountable and corrupt urban councils systems" as the result of central government interference in local authorities. At this stage, it is vital explain the state and MDC's views on the local government crisis and the subsequent service delivery failure.

The Government of Zimbabwe's (GoZ) through its economic blueprint, the Medium Term Plan (MTP) argues that "local authorities have weathered a turbulent economic period, and have emerged somewhat battered and bruised" (GoZ, 2011: 68). The position of the government in its economic blueprint raises the potency of the economy in explaining the local government crisis. In particular government identifies eight key challenges or constraints that affect the sound functioning of local authorities. These are financial non-viability, obsolete equipment, outdated billing systems and accounting packages, inadequate or non-available trunk services, ageing onsite infrastructure and non-complaint internal planning and monitoring systems (GoZ, 2011: 68-69).

However, the above stated government position needs to be looked at within a context. The MTP was crafted during the Inclusive Government comprising of MDC and Zanu-PF. Thus, the document falls short of being candid and attributing any failure to any of the two political parties. In fact, the document tried successfully to dissuade any blame to government coalition partners. In brief, it neutralizes the root causes of most development challenges it tries to address.

Contrary to the government's position, the MDC advances that the "local government system in Zimbabwe has suffered from extensive politicization and lack of or poor quality service delivery stemming from over-centralization of power by the local government minister"

(MDC, 2013a:25). Politicization and centralization are the two key drivers of poor service delivery, the MDC argues. This assumption of the MDC is important in this thesis, as the study intends to investigate the impacts of central government interference in local government. In addressing the service delivery impasse, the MDC proposed introducing a legislation outlining, the devolution of authority to local governments, introducing executive mayoral system, re-introducing strict city and town planning standards and guidelines, and prioritizing service delivery (MDC, 2013a: 25). To adequately explain the tension between Zanu-PF and MDC with regards to local government autonomy, the next section provides the local government ideologies of both parties.

1.5 Zanu-PF and MDC ideologies on local government autonomy

The position of the two parties (MDC and Zanu-PF) on local government autonomy in managing local affairs varies significantly. To illustrate this point, I will use the positions of both parties on local government during the constitution making process which ended in 2013. Zanu-PF was against the devolution of power and functions to local authorities, a position (devolution) strongly supported by the MDC. To put this argument into perspective, Zanu-PF made a raft of changes on devolution to the COPAC draft constitution of July 17, 2012 as shown on table 1.

Table 1: Zanu-PF's anti-devolution position during the Constitution making process

Section	COPAC's position based on Draft Constitution July 17, 2012.	Zanu-PF's position in response to COPAC Draft Constitution.
14.1	<i>Devolution</i> of governmental powers and responsibilities	<i>Decentralization</i> of governmental powers and responsibilities
14.1 (1)	'governmental powers and responsibilities must be <i>devolved to provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities</i> '	'governmental powers and responsibilities must be <i>decentralized to provincial councils</i> and local authorities
14.1 (2)	The objectives of the <i>devolution</i> of governmental powers and responsibilities to <i>provincial and metropolitan councils</i> and local authorities are-	The objectives of the <i>decentralization</i> of governmental powers and responsibilities to <i>provincial councils</i> and local authorities are -
14.2 (1)	<i>Provincial and metropolitan councils</i> and local authorities must, within their <i>spheres</i> -	<i>Provincial councils</i> and local authorities must, within their spheres <i>of jurisdiction</i> -
14.2 (c)	exercise their functions in a manner that does not encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of another <i>tier</i> of government;	exercise their functions in a manner that does not encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of another <i>structure</i> of government;
14.5 (1)	There is a provincial council for each province, <i>except the metropolitan provinces</i> , consisting of -	There is a provincial council for <i>each province</i> consisting of -
Sec 5	Tiers of government.	Structures of government.

Adapted from COPAC Draft Constitution of Zimbabwe, 17 July 2012; The Draft Constitution of Zimbabwe 18 July 2012 incorporating approved Zanu-PF Amendments; Herald 30 August, 2012.

Table 1 (page 7) shows the devolution struggle that characterized the Constitution making process. Zanu-PF saw devolution as threat to its hold on power and had a strong belief in centralization. This was in contrast to the push in favour of devolution by the MDC, to which the party reiterated its devolution stance by outlining its vision for local government as “to promote devolved local governance that is democratic, sustainable and delivers quality services equitably” (MDC, 2013b: 185).

Further to illustrate the divergence of views of Zanu-PF and the MDC on the running of local government affairs, I draw local government aspirations of both parties in the 2013 harmonized election manifestos. Zanu-PF’s 2013 election manifesto leaves out devolution in its list of ‘goals of the people’ the party defended during the COPAC constitution making process (Zanu-PF, 2013: 67-73). Not surprising, the 108 page Zanu-PF Manifesto does not even mention the word ‘devolution’ which shows the party’s total disregard of devolution. A big contrast, as the MDC Manifesto takes pride on devolution: “we fought for devolution and it is now a cardinal principle of the new Constitution and we are committed to making sure it works for the people” (MDC, 2013a: 6).

Form the abovementioned points; it is clear that Zanu-PF’s ideology is centered on control of local government structures using decentralization as a ‘façade’. One the other hand, the MDC believes in the devolution of power and functions in which local authorities are govern the right to govern in areas of their jurisdiction. This divergence of ideologies is at the core of this thesis as explained in Chapters 5 and 6 in which Zanu-PF continuously interferes in local government affairs. Building on the problem statement and local government ideologies of the MDC and Zanu-PF the next section justifies the importance of the study.

1.6 Significance of the Study

The study sheds light on:

- a) The role of urban governance in service delivery in Zimbabwe.

Beginning 2000, the Zimbabwean urban political landscape witnessed the emergence and ascendancy of MDC dominance over the running of urban affairs and the subsequent consternation of Zanu-PF (RTI and IDAZIM, 2010). Zanu-PF lost credibility and legitimacy as the main governing party in urban areas. Zanu-PF became ‘irrelevant’ in the management and administration of cities signaling a big political loss to Zanu-PF. It is therefore critical to

study and examine the role of the change from Zanu-PF to MDC on service delivery. This stems from the fact that local governments address critical issues of service delivery in the daily lives of the population (Kamete, 2003).

b) Understanding the politics of service delivery in Zimbabwe.

Local level democracy has resulted in multi-party councils presenting both opportunities and challenges to service delivery. MDC and Zanu-PF, two different political parties with two conflicting ideologies found themselves in council chambers with a common mandate of delivering services to citizens. For decisions to be agreed upon, parties have to debate and agree on courses of action. However, the polarization of the relationship between MDC controlled urban councils and central government (RTI and IDAZIM, 2010) led to the politicization of service delivery. Studying the politicization of urban service delivery helps to understand the functioning of urban governments in contested environs.

1.7 Research Aim, Assumptions and Methodology.

This section provides a synopsis of the research objectives, assumptions and methodology.

Research Aim and Objectives

The overall aim of this study is to investigate the impacts of urban governance political contestations on urban services delivery. The specific objectives are to:

1. Provide an overview of the historical and current perspectives on urban governance and urban development.
2. Provide an overview of the political, policy and legislative changes in Zimbabwe's urban governance.
3. Describe the impacts of urban governance political dynamics and conflicts on urban services delivery.
4. Recommend policy directions as to how urban services can be effectively and efficiently delivered in Zimbabwe's contested urban governance.

Research Assumption

This thesis suggests that contestation and confusion in urban governance politics led to the deterioration of service delivery. With a view to address this problematique, it is essential that governing authorities pay attention to issues such as contestation, confusion and change.

Research Methodology

The study is a qualitative assessment of what transpired during the period under study (2000-2012). The key focus of the study is not on measuring service delivery changes per se; rather it focuses on the nature and context of political contestations and how such contestations affected service delivery. Thus, in order to fully understand and explain such political contestations, a qualitative methodology is necessary. Information was gathered from a number of sources that include:

- a) Urban governance institutions involved in urban service delivery (planning, provision, management and administration) such as urban local authorities.
- b) Local government ministry responsible for overseeing urban services (MLGRUD).
- c) Analysis of international development agencies involved in human settlement planning and management (UNHabitat, SIDA, and Practical Action Southern Africa).
- d) Review of experiences of residents associations, advocacy groups, research Institutes, and professional planning bodies.²

The main data collection methods used includes:

- a) Key Informant Interviews with purposively selected individuals from organizations involved in urban governance work.
- b) Secondary literature review and analysis such as legal and policy instruments (by-laws, Acts of Parliament and policies governing urban planning and management) as well as reports (published and unpublished).
- c) Participant observation (as planner at IDAZIM³ responsible for the Local Governance Research and Policy program).

1.8 Thesis structure

The thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter provides the general overview and introduction to the thesis. A critical review of extant literature on urbanization and urban governance forms the second chapter. Chapter three explains the research methodology used to investigate urban patterns in Zimbabwe. The fourth chapter examines in detail the Zimbabwean urban governance and urbanization context. Presentation and discussion of research findings form the fifth and sixth chapters. The last chapter provides conclusions and

² These are the Zimbabwe Institute of Regional and Urban Planners, Dialogue On Shelter for the Homeless in Zimbabwe Trust, Zimbabwe Homeless Peoples Federation, Department of Rural and Urban Planning - University of Zimbabwe, and Harare Residents Trust.

³ Institute for a Democratic Alternative for Zimbabwe – Local Governance Centre of Excellence.

recommendations as to how urban services can be effectively delivered in Zimbabwe's contested urban governance.

1.9 Conclusion.

The chapter introduced the topic under study by outlining the main impetus to revitalize urban governance and urban development – increases in the demand for urban services. Further, the chapter explained the problem statement that is, due to the rise of MDC electoral strength in urban areas, urban governance in Zimbabwe became hotly contested, resulting in confusion as to the direction of political change. Subsequently, urban areas became sites of political struggles instead of engines of service delivery. Sites of struggles as political parties wrestle for the control of cities; in the process political grip and survival was prioritized, relegating service delivery. The research problem, assumptions, methodology, study significance and structure of the thesis conclude the first chapter. A critical review of extant literature on urbanization and urban governance is discussed in the successive chapter.



CHAPTER TWO: CRITICAL REVIEW OF EXTANT LITERATURE ON URBANIZATION AND URBAN GOVERNANCE.

In this chapter, I explain the relationship between urban planning, urban governance and urban development. Literature reviewed in this chapter demonstrates that in both developed and developing countries, urbanization occurs in the context of socio-economic development. This is also true in the Zimbabwean context as explained in chapter four. This chapter sets out the framework of urban governance as an important driver for urban planning and urban development. Furthermore, the chapter takes a closer look at the theoretical and historical perspectives of urban governance.

Urban governance, urban planning and urban development are interrelated and hence form the core of this chapter. Current debates (cf. UNHABITAT, 2009; Watson, 2009) about revisiting urban governance, planning and politics are analyzed. In addition, the chapter discusses the theoretical framework (Urban Political System) used as a foundation for the study. The basic premise of the Urban Political System rests on the response of local politics to environmental change as a way of addressing the urban question. A summary of the main urban governance arguments concludes the chapter. After outlining the chapter introduction, the next section explains the challenge of humanity - urbanization.

2.1 Introductory Remarks to Urbanization.

Urbanization and climate change are challenges confronting humankind (UNHABITAT, 2009; World Bank, 2010). Urban planning is seen as an important tool for addressing the challenges of urbanization and climate change. The complete urbanization of the society (Lefebvre, 1970) is a reality in progression, as urbanization levels reach new levels every single day. However, the geography of urbanization is more pronounced in Global South cities. In that respect, the World Urban Forum in Vancouver (June 2006) called for a major shift in global thinking about the future of Southern cities (Watson, 2009). A shift in thinking stems from the realization that for the first time in humankind history; in 2008 the majority of the world's population became city inhabitants (UNHABITAT, 2008). It is estimated that by 2030, about 4.9 billion, some 60% of the world's population will be living in cities (Merrifield, 2012). If the trend continues, it is projected that by 2050, about 75% of the planet earth will be urbanized (Burdett and Sudjic, 2007). The urbanization reality is occurring against a backdrop of mounting challenges such as the global financial crisis and its attendant

effects, climate change and resource depletion, increasing informality and poverty in urban settlements. Therefore, innovative, and inclusive urban governance is critical in addressing urbanization ills.

Urbanization brings to the fore the urban question. By definition, the urban question refers “to the organization of the means of collective consumption at the basis of daily life of all social groups: housing, education, health, culture, commerce, transport etc.” (Castells, 1978: 3). Why is the urban question so important? What is the role of urban governance politics in addressing the urban question? The urban question forms the essential levers of social organization and social change in any society. The urban question deals with services that make or break human lives. It is precisely the urban question that urban governance seeks to answer. In doing so, interactions between the state, urban politics, social movements and civil society are principal analytical arenas. Understanding urbanization requires a closer look at historical aspects of urban governance and urban planning which are explained in section 2.2.

2.2 The General history of Urban Governance and Urban Planning

Urban governance is practiced through the planning, development and management of urban areas. Contemporary urban planning dates back to the dawn of human civilization. Early forms of urban planning kept on changing and being modified to suit prevailing circumstances. Colonialism, international development agencies, and planning journals acted as conduits of transferring urban planning ideologies across the world. Industrial revolution in Western Europe largely influenced 19th century urban planning (UNHABITAT, 2009); in which planning was “described as a tool for attaining political and ideological goals of the state or ruling class” (Ibid: 49). Therefore, urban planning was a state function used to justify state actions and decide the distribution questions of who gets what, when and how.

The 20th century saw urban planning featured as “essentially a political, social, cultural, professional and technical response to a blend of circumstances which marked the years at the turn of the century” (Cherry, 1979: 306). Urban planning visions postulated by individual⁴ thought influenced urban planning practice. Physical, master, and layout planning are the main features of 20th century urban planning. Most urban planning ideologies developed in Western societies and diffused through different channels to the rest of the world.

⁴ For instance Ebenezer Howard, Le Corbusier, Walter Christaller, Patrick Geddes, Jane Jacobs, Lewis Mumford, Manuel Castells, Peter Hall among others .

Sager (2011) argues that, the modern era is dominated by neo-liberal urban planning approaches featured by a “shift from government to private strategies or a conversion from publicly planned solutions to competitive and market forces” (Ibid.: 148). Neo-liberalism relegates Keynesian welfare economics and is characterized by extended property rights, privatization, deregulation, erosion of the welfare state, devolution of central government, uneven economic development and increasing social polarization (Harvey, 2006). Neo-liberal urban planning includes urban economic development initiatives (for instance city marketing, competitive bidding); infrastructure provision (private sector involvement in financing and operating transport, and water procurement); housing and neighborhood renewal (housing market liberalization, private housing); and management of commercial areas (public space privatization). Though neo-liberal planning is consistent with New Public Management (NPM), it overrides citizens’ interests in favour of private interests and de-democratizes urban planning leading to severe distribution inequalities. Ultimately urban planning serves private and not public interests leaving the notion of public planning hanging.

New urban planning methods such as new forms of master planning, strategic spatial planning, Participatory Budgeting, Integrated Development Planning, and new urbanism are surfacing in urban planning theory and practice. Since establishment in 1978, UNHABITAT⁵ has been championing innovative approaches to urban planning in the whole world. UNHABITAT and other international development organizations⁶ have been promoting ‘good urban governance’ approaches in the whole world and their efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are instrumental. The intensity of urbanization in Sub-Saharan Africa is more pronounced compared to other regions; hence the study turns to the regions’ urban governance and urban development.

2.3 Urban Governance and Urban Development in Sub-Saharan Africa

Historically, urban planning in Sub-Saharan Africa was influenced by urban planning trends in colonial Europe. Planning methodologies, legislation and institutions were adopted and modeled from European countries. African cities were governed and controlled remotely by colonial municipal administrations from capital cities in the Global North, thus “playing a critical role in the process of colonial political domination and in the extraction of profit by

⁵ United Nations Centre for Human Settlements.

⁶ Most notable are United States Agency for International Development (USAID), European Union (EU), and World Bank.

colonial business enterprise” (Harrel-Bond et al., 1978: 309). Urban governance was a tool for supporting the status quo and repressing revolutionary movements. In modern times, little emphasis has been placed on local urban planning conditions in SSA when adopting urban planning methods. Urban planning continues to perpetuate social and economic segregation.

Sub-Saharan Africa is the least urbanized, but the most rapidly urbanizing region in the world (UNHABITAT, 2009: 25). A number of factors drive the magnitude and extent of urbanization in the region. Pre-colonial, post-colonial and prevailing socio-economic and political developments are imperative explanations. Urban development in SSA is influenced by both external and internal factors. Urban development aid from USAID⁷, World Bank and the European Union largely contributes to post-independence urban infrastructure design. The region’s rapid urbanization growth is accompanied by severe urban governance challenges which include reliance on central government controlled policies, legislation and finances. In some instances, this dependence renders urban governance weak and susceptible to manipulation by central governments.

Like other world’s developed cities, SSA cities require an independent governance and economic engine in order to make the transition from demographic to socio-economic growth. The rate of urbanization has not been tallying with urban socio-economic development. The State of African Cities Report (UNHABITAT, 2010b: ii) advances that “... as the urbanization of African poverty makes further progress, the prospects of a dignified and productive life continues to elude the poorest among Africans”. Rapid urbanization in the developing world is seriously outstripping the capacities of cities to adequately provide services to citizens (Cohen, 2006). Slum settlements, problems of congestion and urban sprawl make urban governance ‘too demanding’ in providing basic infrastructure and delivery of essential services.

Urban population in Sub-Saharan African cities is growing at an undoubtedly unprecedented rate. The compensatory effect in terms of urban development service provision is rather negative. Rapid urbanization is taking place against a backdrop of economic stagnation, poor agricultural performance, rising unemployment, financially weak municipalities incapable of

⁷ United States Agency for International Development.

providing basic services, poor governance, and the absence of a coherent urban planning policy (Cheru, 2005). Ultimately, service provision declines to record levels.

Urban planning practice has been ‘too technocratic’ rather than a socio-political process anchored on participatory approaches. Blue print urban planning approaches are inexistence. In addition, existing urban planning tools, such as master planning, zoning, building regulations and restrictive planning laws which have European origins continue to shape the region’s cities (Wekwete, 1995). Localization and ‘home growing’ of urban planning has been piecemeal at its best. Maintenance of high planning standards has been prioritized as compared to local socio-economic and political dynamics as key urban planning decision factors. In this case planning, therefore, was and still is, used as a tool for social segregation and exclusion in many territories (UNHABITAT, 2009). Numerous informal settlements in most SSA cities are testament to rigid urban planning methodologies.

Urban social movements in the form of residents associations, civil society organizations (CSOs), community based organizations (CBOs) have been viewed as detrimental and not key urban development stakeholders. Revision of planning laws has received limited response and attention. Radical revisions to the inherited legislative base for this technocratic blue print approach to planning have been rare, despite its failure to provide effective guidance for rapid urban growth (Attahi et al., 2008).

Moreover, Esser (2012) argues that the political impasse prevalent in African cities governed by opposition parties is a result of incomplete decentralization, in which the devolution of functions is not matched with a reallocation of resources. Ultimately urban governments fail to deliver sufficient urban services. Governing underfunded, rapidly urbanizing and politically contested sub-Saharan African cities raises questions about what kinds of urban governance arrangements are feasible under these circumstances.

Present day urban political realities are contested and service delivery is used as a source and resource for political agency. In the City Council of Lusaka, Zambia, Resnick (2011: 142-3) argues that city council struggles are a result of inter-party power politics, with the national party in power actively constrains the opposition-led city council in order to prevent it from developing successful initiatives and creating a springboard for future electoral victory at national level. Consequently, “cities are sites of contestation (marked by) deeply contested

politics” (Robinson, 2006: 166). An analysis of urban governance systems, existing urban development tools and the prevailing urbanization rates, and urban poverty indicate to a crisis in perpetuity. Subsequently, revisiting urban governance, planning and politics becomes a necessity, as explained in the following section.

2.4 Revisiting Urban Governance, Planning and Government (Politics)

Historically, in the 1980s the good governance mantra was popularized by the World Bank and UN agencies in packages like privatization, decentralization and democratization of the state. The rise and fall of the Washington Consensus in the 1990s left an imprint of ‘good governance’ slogan as a pre-requisite for development in the developing world. Urban planning is seen as an important vehicle to promote good governance. Interactions between urban governance and central government shape the nature and form of urban planning. To that end, “the purpose of planning and how it is undertaken are shaped by the wider context of governance” (UNHABITAT, 2009: 72). Present day urban areas have numerous actors of which urban governance institutions labour through and deliver services.

The United Nations agency responsible for human settlements, UNHABITAT (2002: 14); defines urban governance as:

The sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, plan and manage the common affairs of the city. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action can be taken. It includes formal institutions as well as informal arrangements and the social capital of citizens.

In practice, urban governance includes urban management and heavily politicized struggles over distribution of resources and quality of places (UNHABITAT, 2009: 74). Urban planning processes and outcomes are muddled by different actors with conflicting interests. In the context of urban governance, good governance has been defined “as an efficient and effective response to urban problems by accountable local governments working in partnership with civil society” (Ibid.: 74). Solving urban problems is a crucial function and responsibility of urban governance.

Urban governance shapes urban areas. The way in which cities are governed and organized both reflect and reinforce changes in the social, economic and spatial structure of urban areas

(Ibid.: 72). Consequently, urban governance is a key determinant of socio-economic and political development in cities. The World Bank, in its *1997 World Development Report* observes that the difference between the performance of cities and countries across the world can be partially explained by differences in governance. In Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, present day urban government institutions are an impediment and require significant changes to address contemporary urban challenges.

The governance equation in urban areas concerns the production and delivery of services. Service provision is when the organization or institution involved is responsible for the quality and quantity of the service and ensures its financing and execution (Davey, 1993). Good governance deals with the efficiency and effectiveness in which service production and provision is done. The demand for service delivery due to rapidly increasing urbanization makes urban governance an important sphere of state governance. However, the relationship between state and urban governance is defined by power and authority. Therefore, urban governance is essentially about power relations within and between political actors and institutions leading to power struggles (Harpham and Boateng, 1997).

In urban planning processes, actors are drawn from the private sector, state and civil society. It therefore requires considerable inclusivity and dynamism of urban governance in order to produce meaningful results. In most instances, these actors have antithetical rather than complimentary interests and objectives. Despite actor contradictions, the challenge of urban governance is to provide its constituency with urban services that are key to people's standards of living. Having discussed the need to revisit urban governance, the next section explains the various approaches to the study of urban politics and urban governance.

2.5 Approaches to the study of Urban Politics and Urban Governance in extant theory.

A number of theories to explain the interactions, relationships and contradictions between actors in urban affairs have been put forward by a range of authors as indicated here below.

The following five theories explain urban political and policy making processes:

- a) Institutional theory: existing institutional, constitutional and legal frameworks as key determinants of political processes.
- b) Community power theory: the main driving force explaining the revival of interest among political scientists in city government affairs (Dahl, 1961).

- c) Urban political system: what happens in a city is a response to changes in its environment (Easton, 1965).
- d) Theories that emphasize the role of individual and local political culture, ideology or values in explaining city political processes (Goldsmith, 1980: 28).
- e) Marxist city analysis associated with Manuel Castells (Castells, 1977).

The urban political system provides a near and proximate analogue of the context of Zimbabwe, hence applying it forms the conceptual foundation of the thesis as detailed in the subsequent section.

2.6 The Urban Political System: A Framework of Analysis

The basic premise of the urban political system rests on the response of local politics to environmental change as a way of addressing the urban question. By definition, the urban question refers “to the organization of the means of collective consumption at the basis of daily life of all social groups: housing, education, health, culture, commerce, transport etc.” (Castells, 1978: 3). Why is the urban question important? It forms the essential levers of social organization and social change in any society. The urban question deals with services that make or break human life. Traditional approaches sees politics, as based on performance, efficiency and management of technical solutions to agreed problems (Stone, 1987, 1989). In this study, politics is seen as conflict, the reconciliation of competing interests (Keating, 1991:5) and the ultimate delivery of urban services.

To visualize the urban political system, Fig. 1 (page 20) shows the interaction, relationships, inputs and outputs within urban politics.




Fig. 1: A Systemic model of the Urban Political System (Source: Goldsmith, 1980:37).

To explain Fig. 1, a local administration area (urban) is taken as a political system with the political community (residents) with political capacity, political authorities (formal and informal decision makers) and a regime (rules of the game) (ibid.: 35). Political parties, pressure groups and the media are key actors in the system due to their communication, advocacy and feedback comparative advantages. Citizens and decision makers are each placed at one end of the actor interaction continuum. Three actors (political parties, pressure groups and the media) act as a bridge between citizens and decision makers. In urban governments, elected and appointed officials are key decision makers. Actor interaction makes political conflicts especially electoral conflicts severe in urban decision making processes. In this case, contestation in the urban areas emanates from different urban development and ‘quality of life’ policies from different political players (Castells, 1978:1).

Exemplifying a French setting, Castells highlights the contradiction that exist when two different political parties have hold, one on local government and the other on central government. He noted “the ability to impose a political change at the local level prior to obtaining national power can be seen as an essential stage in consolidating a relationship to the population in the long term process of societal structures” (Castells, 1978: 1). This explains also the Zimbabwean setting; as the rise and ascendancy of the MDC in urban

government signifies a long term regime change strategy. Nonetheless, this development infuriated the ruling party (Zanu-PF), hence the contestation. Political conflicts continue to destabilize urban management.

The existence of social groups in the urban political system transacts to urban social movements that is “movements in which protests concerning the urban and ecology, organize and mobilize populations, transform relations of force between classes... and become one of the essential axes of social change” (Castells, 1978: 2). Social groups voice their concerns on a number of urban policy concerns such as allocation and use of land, supply and distribution of urban public services. The rise of urban social movements leads to social and political change coupled with the breakdown of one party statism in city politics. Changing inefficient urban regimes is a strategic objective of social movements within cities. In the Zimbabwean case, social movements like Harare Residents Trust (HRT), Combined Harare Residents Association (CHRA), Bulawayo Progressive Residents Association (BPRA), Masvingo Residents Association, and Mutare Residents Association (MRA) voice their concern in the production and delivery of urban services through residents’ demonstrations, petitions and other advocacy means.

The aforementioned residents associations foster active citizenship in urban areas. Residents groups play a significant role in the shaping of urban governance in Zimbabwe. Citizens, through different interactions with other actors within the urban sphere shape the nature of urban policy outputs and services. Active citizens are “democratic agents, empowering themselves through their challenges to the activities of institutions and organizations that shape their everyday lives” (Raco and Imrie, 2000: 2188). In the urban political system, citizens input demands and supports, act as actors and recipients of outputs and outcomes.

Popular citizen protests deepen the politics and urban crisis of service delivery. Urban political conflicts and contradictions provoke state intervention. Fulfilling the ‘social contract argument’ justifies and legitimatizes state intervention. In reality, state intervention is a convenient way to guarantee and favour state political interests. The internationalization of the contestation and political sensitivity of the urban question inflames a political crisis. The urban political arena is itself “an object of contest with social and political groups seeking a form of politics which contains competing demands” (Keating, 1991: 42); with each of the

two groups trying to maximize own interests at the expense of the other resulting in unending conflict.

From the abovementioned argument, the state becomes the actual manager of the urban system (urban services), of which intervention positively and negatively affects social groups and residents. Ultimately, “state intervention in the city, while attempting to overcome the contradictions resulting from the inability of producing the goods and services it urgently needs, in fact *politicizes* and *globalizes* urban conflicts by articulating directly the material conditions of daily life...” (Castells, 1978: 170). Once politicized and globalized, the crisis grows in stature and complexity. As a result, many actors claim to have solutions to the crisis and in the process deepening the crisis.

Decision makers constitute council elected and appointed officials. The logical flow of a decision moves from making to implementation. The implementation of decisions in urban affairs depends on the nature of decentralization regime in place (Section 2.6.1); nonetheless city bureaucrats form a critical component of this implementation. City bureaucracies are both a resource and a constraint to elected officials in the delivery of urban services. The two (bureaucracies and elected officials) need each other in solving the urban question. Non-synchronization of bureaucrats and elected officials’ goals, leads to unending conflict. In Zimbabwe, elected council officials do not have power and authority to hire and fire senior administrative staff. Mayors are ceremonial (Chirisa and Jonga, 2009) and town clerks are heads of council administrative staff and are appointed by the Local Government Board (appointed by the local government minister). Unending conflict ensued between council elected and appointed officials affecting service delivery.

The external system environments relates to the national, international economic environment, national social, physical and political environment that have a direct influence on the urban political system. UNHABITAT, SIDA and Practical Action Southern Africa are running programs and projects aimed at strengthening urban governance and service delivery in Zimbabwe. The political environment comprises intergovernmental relations between local and national governments, or other local authorities, and quasi-government organizations. Intra-system environments relates to the physical, social, economic and ideological characteristics prevailing in an urban setting. The urban political system faces a number of opportunities and constraints provided by the environment.

The results of decision makers are seen in policies, outputs and services. Outputs refer to decisions and non-decisions, policies, and service provision levels in the urban area (Goldsmith, 1980: 38). One can flag out urban problems on which action or inaction has been taken. Consequences of outputs; intended and unintended; form outcomes. Feedback results from the inclusion of outputs and outcomes back into the system. In principle, feedback is of essence in making sure that the system responds differently in future. The framework of analyze leads to decentralization and political leadership in the urban political system. First, I explain decentralization, democracy and service provision in the next section.

2.6.1 Decentralization, Democracy and Service Provision within Urban Governance

The relationship between local and central government is defined by two constructs which are centralization and decentralization. Centralization sees urban governance as local administration that is an extension and integral part of a sovereign state. This implies that the state has “an obligation to supervise local government to ensure that powers delegated to the subnational units are not overstepped” (Ismail et al., 1997:14). The decentralist approach sees urban governance as enshrined in constitutional arrangements thereby enjoying autonomy. The extent and magnitude of decentralization differs.

The currency of decentralization in the developing world is unpatrolled with 80% of all developing and transition countries undertaking some form of decentralization in the past two decades (Crawford and Hartmann, 2008: 7). African states have a long history of being centralized states in which centralized planning and administration was or is prevalent. With pressure from international development agencies and civil society organizations, most countries have implemented decentralization reforms at one stage.

A consensus of the need to ‘roll back the state to the frontiers of development planning’; in simpler terms reducing the role of the state in public service provision and development processes provided the impetus for decentralization. The World Bank (1989) in its report *‘Sub Saharan Africa – From crisis to sustainable growth’* argues that decentralization concerns the division of roles and responsibilities between central authority, local government and local communities with a view to reduce the number of tasks performed by central government and to decentralize the provision of public services. The debate about decentralization, brings to the fore the centrality of local governments in any state. The thrust

of decentralization lies in the perception that local government is more responsive to local needs and is inclusive of the majority poor (Crawford and Hartmann, 2008).

In defining decentralization, it is common to outline three different forms that emphasize one or other of these elements, as exemplified by Manor (1999: 5):

- i. *Devolution* (or democratic decentralization), i.e. transfer of power and resources to sub-national authorities that are both (relatively) independent of central government and democratically elected.
- ii. *Deconcentration* (or administrative decentralization), i.e. the transfer of authority to sub-national branches of the central state, often to line ministry officials based in local areas.
- iii. *Fiscal decentralization*, i.e. authority over budgets ceded to deconcentrated officials and/or unelected appointees or to elected politicians.

In Africa, south of the Sahara, the emphasis on decentralization has shifted from deconcentration to devolution and to some extent privatization. This is exemplified by the writing of new constitutions in Kenya and Zimbabwe which emphasized on devolution of power and functions. In addition, both countries were reacting to a ‘too much centralized state’ under authoritarian regimes. Political decentralization is the creation of local government through “devolution of powers to represent local councils, each with separate legal existence” (Tardoff, 1994). Devolution forms a complete form of decentralization as finances and functions are transferred

The World Bank in its *1999/2000 World Development Report* calls for a rethinking of the government in which decentralization allows local people “greater self-determination and influence in the decisions of their government” (World Bank, 1999: 107). It is important at this point to highlight the importance of proper planning and full implementation of decentralization programs so as to go beyond the political rhetoric. More often, decentralization programs are outlined as political gimmick in order to appease certain political constituencies but without full implementation. Decentralization reforms must spell out the sharing of roles, responsibilities and finances between central and local governments. This should be enshrined in the constitution and subsidiary legislation.

In Zimbabwe, since independence, the objectives and nature of the government's decentralization thrust has changed over time (Wekwete and de Valk, 1990; Gasper, 1997; Makumbe, 1998; Chakaipa, 2001; Conyers, 2003). The changes over time are explained in detail in Chapter 4 (Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2). Suffice to say, here I provide some views from literature on Zimbabwe's decentralization programme. Emerging issues on Zimbabwe's decentralization programme include the importance of capacity building and capacity of local institutions, political environment and viewing the process as a 'learning process' (Conyers, 2003).

Marumahoko (2011: 37) argues that in the Zimbabwean case, "efforts to capacitate urban councils through decentralization are futile if urban local government lacks the necessary financial means to fulfill its responsibilities". At the centre of this argument is that decentralization of finances and resources is critical for local government to perform its functions. It goes without saying that decentralization of functions only results in unfunded mandates. The period under study in this thesis was marked by decentralization of functions and not finances to local authorities. This presented challenges to the delivery of services. First, local authorities relied on central government grants (which were no longer provided) making the former subservient to the latter. In a harsh macro-economic environment, central government prioritized its functions neglecting local authorities. Thus, the GoZ has been accused of using decentralization "as a means of reducing the costs of providing public service" (MLGPH, 1999: 7). This denotes the wrong reasons of applying decentralization.

After making a review of decentralization and recentralization in Africa, James Wunsh argued that central government must relinquish authority to local government in the following areas. These are planning and capital investment, budgeting and fiscal management, personnel systems and management, and finance and revenue (Wunsh, 2001: 227). These areas of focus are articulated in Chapters 5 with a view to see how central government is interfering in urban planning and management systems of local authorities.

With regards to the provision of urban services, neo-liberal theorists have argued for privatization. The push for privatization has a long history dating to the 1980s and 1990s. Chief proponents of privatization are the World Bank and IMF, through the former's Washington consensus that outlined Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). However, a study carried out in 2000 found out the reluctance of Zimbabwe to commercialize or privatize

urban services (Pasipanodya et. al., 2000). Despite this, recently attempts have been made to commercialize or privatize some local authority functions. Examples include the attempt to commercialize Harare Water which is now a standalone entity and the preparation to privatize non-core activities by Bulawayo city council through the formation of strategic business units, leasing out properties and contracting out services (BCC, 2004: 15-16).

Most recently, MacDonald and Ruiters (2012) have called for alternatives to privatization. They defined alternatives as (i) “public” entities that are entirely state-owned and operated (such as a municipal water utility or a provincial electricity generator) and (ii) “non-state” organizations that operate independently of the state on a not-for-profit basis and are oriented to principles of equality and social citizenship (such as certain types of NGOs or community groups) (MacDonald and Ruiters, 2012: 3). For urban services delivery this approach is promising, but requires more scrutiny. First, this approach needs to be wary of the efficiency and effectiveness of wholly-owned state entities in public services delivery. In an environment where the state is weak and inefficient, this approach might not bring anticipated benefits. Second, for non-state actors to fully provide public services like water, electricity on a non-profit basis requires immense investment in capacity building of these entities.

In Zimbabwe, urban governance is an appendage of the central government. Centre-local relations are confrontational and contested due to divergences in local autonomy and central control. In this instance, local government becomes “a creature of statute subject to the vagaries and predilections of central political administrations” (Sullivan et al., 2004). The birth, growth and demise of urban governance lie in the hands of central government. The creation, redefinition and functional changes are detected by central government as it so desires (Kamete, 2006a: 256). Power, resources (financial, human and capital) and real jurisdiction lies in the central government and is transferred to urban authorities when central government so wishes.

Contradictions are worse and tense in multi-party councils, especially when central government power dynamics are not representative at local level. Kamete argues that it is unimaginable for a party in government to lack a presence at local government (Kamete, 2006a). Absence of central government representation at local level makes political players at central government level feel losing political support and on the road to political exit. The fear emanates from the perception of a rival in creation (Keating, 1995), and the “problem

ceases to be simply about the functions of local government” (Kamete, 2006a: 257), but political infighting and survival.

Kamete argues that “when city residents vote into council a political party other than the ruling party and central government appears to be harrying the opposition controlled council, residents may interpret this as an assault to their democratic choice...” (ibid.: 257). On the contrary, the state justifies its action as a guarantor of the social contract thus ensuring delivery of services to citizens by its agencies. Control from central government “often create more problems than they solve, including delays, frustrations, additional costs and perverse behavior” (Devas and Delay, 2007: 687). This resembles a prototype of the urban governance scenario in Zimbabwe after the ascendancy of MDC in urban governance, and the resultant central government interference. Service delivery deteriorated to record levels. Next, I discuss the importance of leaders (conceived by political parties) in the urban political system.

2.6.2 Local Political Leadership and Urban Governance

Political parties conceive urban local leadership. Therefore, the configuration, culture and thrust of political parties are largely endowed by its leadership at the local level. In view of this, Judd argues that “urban leaders have the ability to make choices, but within the parameters imposed both by local political arrangements and by external forces” (Judd, 2000: 959). The complex urban political environment makes leadership key in coordinating and rationalizing diverse interests. In this case, the main essence of leadership; “is the ability to inspire or persuade others to follow a course of action where there is at least some initial resistance to following” (Leach and Wilson, 2000: 11).

Leadership is crucial to the functioning and success of local governance (Borraz and John, 2004). Bochel and Bochel (2010: 726) argue that “strong leadership is a functional response to the institutional fragmentation prevalent in urban politics”. Strong local leadership emanates from the legitimate crisis and lack of political accountability at national level. Over the recent years, citizens have turned to local administration as a service delivery promising vehicle due to central government failures. Moreover, leadership is crucial for “resource mobilization, construction of governance arrangements, and transformation of local government institutions” (Haus and Sweating, 2006: 270). A number of stakeholders such as

business, non-state actors⁸ and central government are active in local governance making local leadership an expansive and important responsibility. Local leaders are stretched by the “urban polity complexity, with straddling jurisdictional boundaries and authority dispersion among multiple actors” (John and Cole, 1999: 98-9). Cooperation and coordination by urban leadership is essential, without which confusion and conflict takes effect.

2.7 Some Concluding Remarks on Urban Governance in existing theory

The chapter has emphasized that urban governance is an engine for urban service delivery. In essence, the delivery of urban functions and services is a product of the governance system in place. The internationalization of governance as a ‘pill’ for development through international development organizations influenced urban planning across the world. In addition, the chapter discussed the theoretical framework (Urban Political System) used to conduct the study. The basic premise of the Urban Political System rests on the response of local politics to environmental change as a way of addressing the urban question. Drawing from the urban political system as a framework of analysis, politics continue to shape and destabilize urban governance in Zimbabwe. Urban governance remains under threat from the central government – a phenomenon leading to urban contestation, and confusion. The next chapter focuses on the research methodology used to investigate urban patterns in Zimbabwe.

⁸ These include Community Based Organizations, Civil Society Organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations, and International Development Organizations.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY TO INVESTIGATE URBAN PATTERNS IN ZIMBABWE.

This chapter discusses the research methodology used to examine urban patterns in Zimbabwe. The chapter delimits the research within Zimbabwe's urban governance. Sampling procedure, data collection methods, and data processing methods are articulated. The chapter concludes by highlighting possible limitations and research gaps resulting from the chosen research methodologies. First, the next section delimits the study.

3.1 Delimitation of the Study

Urban areas in Zimbabwe are defined as local boards, towns and municipalities established and conferred functions through the Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29:15). Currently, there are 32 urban local authorities and the study key informants (elected and appointed officials) are drawn from four cities of Harare, Bulawayo, Masvingo and Mutare. These four cities have a combined population of 2 401 239⁹ out of a national population of 12 973 808 (ZimStat, 2012). Urbanization levels in Zimbabwe as of 2010 stood at 38, 25% (UNHABITAT, 2010) meaning that 4 962 481 Zimbabweans are living in cities. In principle the study covers half of the urban population. The four named cities provided key informants such as mayors, heads of council departments, and councillors. Reasons for delimiting the scholarship on the four said cities are based on the fact that the four cities had evident urban political contestations during study period. In addition, the four cities constitute the largest urban population centers in Zimbabwe.

The study on average retains a national coverage because other key informants are drawn from organizations with a national reach. Key informants were drawn from organizations involved in urban planning and urban governance on a city-wide and national scale. Time boundaries for the study stretch from 2000 to 2012. During this period, urban governance in Zimbabwe suffered from an “an authoritarian or guided democracy, which is basically a tyranny of the elite that borders on authoritarianism leaving the governed with only limited control over the government” (Kamete, 2009b). As a result, urban governance went through major political changes that were highly contested leading to severe implications to the functioning of urban local authorities.

⁹ Mutare (188 243), Bulawayo (655 675), Masvingo (88 554), Harare (1 468 767).

Politics is confined to formal and informal power relations between central government, political parties, non-state actors, and (inter and intra) urban local authorities. This includes elections, legislative changes, ministerial policies, Statutory Instruments and directives. Urban services under investigation are limited to low cost housing, water and sanitation, road infrastructure, management systems, the profession of urban planning, and public transport.

3.2 Sampling Procedure.

The study is a qualitative research as explained in section 3.3, and purposive sampling forms the core method of drawing and selecting respondents. Purposive sampling results in a purposive sample; that “provides a clear criterion or rationale for the selection of participants, or places to observe, or events that relates to the research questions” (Ezzy, 2002: 74). The following criteria were used to select 31 key informants:

- i. Key political figures in urban governance such as mayors and councillors,
- ii. Key administrative heads of urban councils departments,
- iii. Practicing planners within and outside government ministries and departments,
- iv. International development agencies running urban governance programs,
- v. Community based organizations involved in urban governance and urban planning,
- vi. Civil society organizations active in urban governance,
- vii. Political parties with representatives in urban local authorities,
- viii. Research Institutes training urban governance professionals.

Key informants were purposively selected based on the criteria mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Purposive samples facilitate the selection of few cases for intensive study (Bernard, 2002), which makes the researcher to get an in-depth understanding of the phenomena under study. Data from the mentioned sample is collected using the methods explained in the following section.

3.3 Data Collection Methods

The study consists of qualitative research. By definition, qualitative research is an “inquiry process of understanding based on distinct methodological traditions of inquiry that explore a social or human problem. The researcher builds a complex, holistic picture, analyzes words, reports detailed views of informants, and conduct the study in a natural setting” (Creswell, 1998: 15). Thus, qualitative research “is used to describe a set of non-statistical inquiry techniques and processes used to gather data about social phenomena” (McNabb, 2010: 225).

Collected data is called qualitative data. Qualitative data refers “to some collection of words, symbols, pictures, or other non-numeric records, materials, artifacts that are collected by the researcher and have relevance to the social group under study” (Ibid.:225). The aim of the researcher was to collect data from key informants, create understanding, interpret and analyze the data critically.

Devine (1995) argues that qualitative methods play an important role in political analysis emanating from the study of individual groups inside a formal political arena. This stems from two reasons. First, is that qualitative research allows researchers to record what they see and also interpret meanings they get from the study group. Second, qualitative research allows flexibility thus permitting the researcher to follow information leads of interest to the study. Qualitative methods benefits political analysis as it allows a comprehensive analysis of gathered data. To gather qualitative data, the researcher uses key informant interviews, document analysis, and literature review and participant observation. These methods are detailed in succeeding paragraphs.

3.3.1 In-depth Interviews

Thirty one (31) key informants were selected according to criteria set in section 3.2. The people interviewed are involved in mainstream urban governance work. The researcher anticipated that selected key informants possess a rich experience about the impacts of urban governance politics to service delivery during the period under study. It was envisaged that the key informants were ready and keen to share their experience and understanding about the topic under study. Bernard (2002: 189) argues that “good key informants are people to whom one can easily talk to, who understand the study information needs and who are glad to give information to the researcher”. In selecting the key informants the researcher looked at professional, academic and work experience of key informants.

The key informants were drawn from diverse sectors such as central government ministries, urban social movements, local authorities, NGOs and International Development Agencies Political Parties and Consultants, Practicing Planners and Research Institutes as shown on Table 2 (page 32).

Table 2: Key Informants by category

Category	Number
Central Government ministries	5
Urban Social Movements	5
Local authorities	6
NGOs and International Development Agencies	7
Political Parties	3
Consultants, Practicing Planners & Research Institutes	5
Total	31

Source: Author's Field Work, 2013.

Field research for this thesis was carried out between June 01 and September 01, 2013. The researcher booked appointments and permission for interviews two weeks before the proposed interview dates. This was done through emails attaching the letter of filed research from the School of Government and the interview guide. The topic was deemed politically sensitive by many interviewees. Other senior government officials declined to give the researcher an official interview, rather some preferred an informal discussion. The political sensitivity of the topic and the nature of Zimbabwean politics (violence, victimization of independent opinion and patronage) affected the researcher's repeated claims for interviewees to validate their opinions with concrete evidence. The researcher was often told that what he wanted to know further was 'deep waters'.

Key informant interviews were guided by an interview guide with open ended questions. Probing by the researcher provided a technique to follow up on information leads of particular interest. Devine (1995: 138) posits that "open ended questions are used to allow the interviewee to elaborate on what s/he has said". Intensive interviewing allowed the researcher to record interview nonverbal cues through observation; explore informants' subjective experiences, meanings and interpretation they attach to these experiences.

The researcher relied on field notes taken during the conducting of field research. McNabb (2010: 294) defines field notes as "notes, recordings, reminders, and other subjective reports that the researcher records while observing behaviors or interviewing respondents". Field notes are detailed and organized reports that the researcher produces from two senses of seeing and hearing. Field research is what is done when researchers want to know something about people, understand behaviors, or describe a group of people who interact in some way (Neuman, 2000). Written notes from the field work were treasured as they were a point of

reference at different stages of thesis compilation. Compilation of field notes was done on a daily basis so as to assess any information leads coming out.

3.3.2 Document Analysis

Published and unpublished documents covering urban politics and service delivery were used as data collection sources. These documents were accessed from organizations that house the key informants as well as the other organizations in general. In particular, the study drew information from documents produced by the Government of Zimbabwe, Cities of Harare, Bulawayo, Masvingo and Mutare, and other non-state actors.

3.3.3 Participant Observation

The researcher's experience as a practicing planner at Institute for a Democratic Alternative for Zimbabwe's (IDAZIM) Local Governance Centre of Excellence responsible for local government research and policy provided some reflections. The researcher's professional experience working with local authorities in Zimbabwe offered critical insights to the study. Moreover, the researcher's experiences as an urban resident in Zimbabwe for the past 15 years were also useful to the study.

3.3.4 Literature Review

Extant literature concerning urban governance and politics provides the study with major conceptual and theoretical foundations. Literature review shapes the direction of the study. The theoretical approach found in literature is used in conceptualizing and contextualizing the study. Literature concerning urban governance impacts to service delivery is used as data validation sources for research findings.

The meaning, process and context of the phenomena under study were captured by four data collection methods that are key informant interviews, document analysis, participant observation and literature review. The afore-mentioned methods provided the researcher with an understanding of political processes within urban local authorities and the attendant impacts to service delivery. The political events within the urban setting are analyzed in greater detail from the obtained data. The next logical step after data collection is data processing and analysis which is discussed in the ensuing section.

3.4 Data processing methods

Data collected using methods described in section 3.3 were analyzed, presented and interpreted in chapter five and six (Research findings). Data processing is disaggregated into two processes: data management and data analysis. Managing data began with organizing the data collection process. Pre-planning, securing entry and granting of permission by key informants were prioritized as a key data management process. The researcher kept a detailed record of all field work steps and processes. Collected data were stored in format befitting data qualities.

Interpretation is at the heart of qualitative research process. Data analysis is condensed into three interpretation processes which are (i) data reduction (ii) data display, and (iii) drawing conclusions from data (McNabb, 2010: 288). These three processes are explained in detail in the subsequent paragraphs.

3.4.1 Data reduction

Not all collected data finds its way in chapter five and six (Research Findings). The researcher organized collected data into six service delivery categories that are; low cost housing, water and sanitation, road infrastructure, management systems, the profession of urban planning, and public transport. This process is called conceptualization as it entails breaking down large data into workable and ordered bits of information. Conceptualization enabled the researcher to have data that is manageable with some degree of confidence. Contact summaries that are notes summarizing all questions from a key informant were prepared on a daily basis. Summaries around six defined service delivery themes were developed from contact summaries. The researcher checked for similarities and differences after clustering data in to six defined service delivery themes. This process is called comparative data analysis.

Comparative data analysis, according to Miles and Huberman (1994: 254) is a process of ‘drawing and verifying conclusions’ in qualitative data studies. In actual fact, comparative data analysis serves as an “analytical tool used to stimulate thinking about properties and dimensions of categories” (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 73). Comparison helped the researcher in asking further questions of particular interest to the study.

3.4.2 Data Display

Data are displayed in both descriptive and summary statistics such as direct and indirect quotations, profiles, narratives and graphic diagrams to show relationships, and interactions of urban governance politics and service delivery. Methods of data display are aimed at organizing and focusing information so as to allow the researcher to draw conclusions with ease. The explanations to be described and the type of data available determine how the data is displayed.

3.4.3 Drawing Conclusions from Data

The researcher prepares preliminary thematic summary reports (one per service delivery theme). Thematic summaries show vital information from collected data and thus can be incorporated partially or wholesale in the research findings chapters. Thematic summaries feed into major constructs or explanations. Combining constructs, themes and field notes with the researcher's analysis and synthesis forms the core of the research findings. This is a rather tedious and important process as it involves a number of activities such as

Assembling evidence, arguments, and conclusions into a report is always a crucial step; but more than in quantitative approaches, the careful crafting of evidence and explanation makes or breaks (qualitative) research. A researcher distils mountains of evidence into exposition and prepares extensive footnotes. She or he weaves together evidence and arguments to communicate a coherent, convincing picture to readers (Neuman, 2000: 395).

The researcher employs analytical research skills during the process distilling explanations and conclusions from collected data.

3.5 Ethics Statement

This study used primary data collected from key informants through in-depth interviews. Carrying out the research in a contested and polarized political environment raised some ethical concerns. The researcher was fully aware of the sensitivity and volatility of carrying out socio-political research at a time when Zimbabwe was heading for elections. Most key informants raised concerns about the political sensitivity of the subject under study and therefore the confidentiality of their views is an important aspect. However, there are key informants who were keen in divulging their confidentiality; hence they are quoted directly in the thesis. The primary responsibility of the researcher was to investigate and state the findings in an integral manner. Permission to interview senior city officials was granted in

writing from the city of Harare. The results will be made available to policy makers, research institutions, and research participants. The research was conducted in alignment with quality, integrity and ethical research standards.

3.6 Research Limitations and Conclusion

Qualitative methods are sometimes portrayed as unrepresentative and atypical, with its findings seen as impressionistic, piecemeal and idiosyncratic (Devine, 1995). In addition, qualitative research methodologies are often castigated as posing difficulties in replication and comparability making it not suitable for making generalizations. Despite these criticisms, the method remains critical in extracting and explaining people's views inside and outside political systems and the ontological and epistemological positions of defined practitioners.

The 2013 harmonized elections in Zimbabwe posed some challenges to this study. Several high ranking officials who had been targeted by this study (councillors, mayors, and cabinet ministers) kept on postponing interviews dates. Politicians were busy campaigning and the researcher had difficulties to arrange for interviews. Nonetheless, the researcher had to concentrate on key informants who were available.

The chapter discussed the research methodology used to examine urban patterns in Zimbabwe. Study delimitation, sampling procedure, data collection process, and data processing methods were explained. The chapter concluded by highlighting possible limitations and research gaps resulting from the chosen research methodologies. The study narrows down in the next chapter to explain Zimbabwe's urban governance and urbanization context.

CHAPTER FOUR: ZIMBABWE'S URBAN GOVERNANCE AND URBANIZATION CONTEXT.

This chapter outlines the context of Zimbabwe's urban governance system by looking at historical and recent trends in urban governance and urbanization. Since British conquest in 1890, local government in Zimbabwe kept on changing to suit the needs of the government in power. Post-independent Zimbabwe introduced some reforms, though largely central government retains control in local government matters. In both pre and post-independence Zimbabwe, local government is a political muscle that any ruling regime manipulates, associate with and advance certain political interests. First, I outline in brief Zimbabwe's pre-independence local government in the ensuing section.

4.1 Pre-Independence Local Government Context (1890-1980).

Like in most African states, the growth and emergence of local government was inextricably linked to colonialism. Local government in Zimbabwe was largely determined by the racial system of land apportionment between blacks and whites (Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1991). A two tier local government system existed that is; a more self-governing system for the white minority and a separate system for the indigenous majority. The system was designed to maintain peace and order within the black population, and to ensure continued black contribution to the settler economy. There were urban, rural and African Councils, with the first two covering 'white or European' areas. African councils were designated to 'African or black areas'. In the resultant paragraphs, I break down local government into rural and urban.

The 1923 'Responsible Government Constitution' marked the beginning of institutionalized rural local government as Native Councils were created for the first time in African areas. The Native Councils Act of 1937 led to the creation of formal Native Councils composed of chiefs, headman, and local black nominees. Thereafter, the 1957 African Councils Act broadened powers of African Councils to include making bye-laws, imposing rates, and exercising powers comparable to those of a town council. The 1966 Rural Councils Act was enacted and catered for commercial farmers and the formalization of existing road committees (Jordan, 1984). The 1980 District Councils Act replaced 220 'African Councils' with 55 District Councils, though fragmentation existed as Rural Councils were found in former 'European areas'.

Makumbe (1998) asserts that the Salisbury Sanitary Board of 1891 marked the beginning of urban local government. The Town Management Ordinance of 1894 established more sanitary boards in the main towns of Bulawayo, Mutare and Gweru (Matumbike and Muchadenyika, *forthcoming*). Afterwards, the Municipal Ordinance of 1897 granted municipal status to Salisbury (Harare) and Bulawayo, with wholly elected councils (Chakaipa, 2010). The Municipal Act (1930) and Urban Councils Act (1973) provided the legal framework for urban local authorities. Town planning services were categorized according to race, with African townships having limited services as compared to European areas. Most pre-independence changes (institutional and legislative) took place in rural than in urban areas mainly because the colonial government was trying to manage the 'African areas' which were increasingly becoming restless and revolutionary. In cities, African housing was tightly controlled and restricted to those formally employed. Rural-urban migration controls were a way of managing urban African population and matching it with the under provision of services in African areas.

Zimbabwe's urban development history is inextricably linked to colonialism. Colonialism brought a new socio-economic and political fabric in the form of the densification of the built environment in what became known as towns and cities. The aim here is not to detail pre-independence urban development but suffice to mention its importance in designing and shaping the form and structure of present day Zimbabwean cities. From pre-independence, the study details the post-independence urbanization and urban governance in the succeeding section.

4.2 Periodization of Urbanization and Urban Governance in Post-Independent Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe inherited a dichotomous and tripartite local government framework comprised of urban councils, 'white' rural councils and 'black' rural local authorities fragmented along racial lines (Masundu-Nyamayaro, 2008). Fragmentation in rural local government was eliminated in the 1988 Rural District Councils Act, which amalgamated 'white' rural councils and 'black' rural local authorities into rural district councils. At the national level, independent Zimbabwe inherited a highly centralized system of government, founded and built upon racial lines (Helmsing, 1991). In pursuit of the twin objectives of socio-economic development and the reduction of colonial disparities, local government changes through, legislation, directives, and policy pronouncements were made after independence.

Local government reforms of the 1980s, designed to achieve several development objectives such as rural, urban and regional development, are evident. The main purpose of urban local governments is to manage urbanization and its related processes. Post-independence urbanization and urban governance can be analyzed in four distinct phases. These are the decentralization period (1980-1990), urban governance reforms (1990-2000), change and contestation period (2000-2008) and deepening contestation and confusion (2008-2012). After setting out a brief introduction to Zimbabwe's post-independent local governance context, the study focuses on the decentralization period (1980-1990) in the next section.

4.2.1 1980-1990 (Decentralization Period).

Post-1980, urban development pursued a one city concept aimed at deracializing cities. Despite this attempt, Wekwete (1994) argues that the income and physical fabric of the built environment show potency to segregation. Initial attempts at local governance reforms were imbued in decentralization. Decentralization in Zimbabwe expended much rhetoric leading to a number of practical challenges as the government showed more romanticism than realism. As Rondinelli and Nellis, point out most decentralization policies are undertaken for primarily political reasons; and how the policy works out in practice will depend on similar struggles (Conyers, 1986). Objective wise; the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) achieved political as compared to urban and development planning benefits in the decentralization program.

The 1984 and 1985 Prime Minister's Directive¹⁰ outlined the new local government structures and introduced development committees at village, ward, district, provincial, and national levels with the aim of fostering bottom up planning. Roles of these committees included information supply, implementation, delegated and independent planning, and policy making and review (Gasper, 1991). Development priorities were identified and formulated at village level, channeled through the ward, district, and provincial levels to the national level. The basic premise was that contents of the national development plan should be development priorities discussed and prioritized at the village and ward level.

¹⁰ As enunciated in three government documents that is a) 'The Provincial Governors and Local Authorities in Zimbabwe: A Statement of Policy and directive by the Prime Minister' released in 1984, b) 'The Provincial Councils and Administration Act, 1985', c) 'Structure of Village Development Committees and Extension Services' released in 1985.

In practice, development planning agencies suffered time and budgetary constraints, lack of skilled personnel and central government interference in local decision making. As a result, created development planning agencies became insignificant and fruitless. By the end of the first decade of decentralization, it was clear that the process had failed to yield anticipated results as Brand (1991) likened the process to “centrally created decentralization”. It is evident that central government was not committed to the letter and spirit of making local government a distinct sphere. Gasper (1991:41) point out that:

Decentralization can never simply be instituted by a set of legal or administrative decrees. It required many measures of information dissemination, demonstration, incentives, training, discussion, mobilization, and ongoing informal coordination.

In addition, the 1980 Urban Councils Act introduced universal adult suffrage by repealing the 1973 Urban Councils Act which was premised on colonial property franchise. Oppressive migration laws were repealed and massive rural-urban migration ensued. Urban population growth ballooned as shown in table 3 section 4.4. The first decade did not yield expected reforms to foster improved local governance. Post-1990 reforms aimed at strengthening urban governance are explained in the following section.

4.2.2 1990-2000 (Urban Governance Reforms).

In the 1990s, the objective of the government’s decentralization programme shifted to promoting democracy and the focus of attention turned to elected local authorities (Conyers, 2003). Local governments play a pivotal role in the promotion of local participation and local level democracy. To that effect, it became necessary to democratize local governments in the post-1990 period. An important vehicle used in the democratization process is elections (Laakso, 1999) which started in 1993 in rural district councils and 1995 in urban councils. The introduction of local government elections was a landmark development as citizens became active agents of deciding who runs the local level.

The introduction of a directly elected executive mayor in 1995 marked a major change in urban governance. The move was aimed at strengthening representational democracy as urban residents were given the right to elect the political and administrative head of urban councils. Despite this development, the Zimbabwe Institute (2005: 17) argues that:

The Executive Mayor is a poor hybrid of the traditional British style Mayor and the American Strong Mayor.... Unlike the American strong Mayors who are executives with appointing and dismissing powers and veto powers, the Zimbabwe Executive Mayor is accountable to full council. In real terms, the Executive Mayor gained no executive authority. Attempts by Executive Mayors to assume executive functions have often led to clashes between the Mayor and Town Clerks.

Several practical challenges ensued in cases where the mayor was not from the ruling party (Zanu-PF). Such mayors were castigated by central government as pursuing parallel policies. The Executive mayoral system resulted in a tug of war between the Mayor and Town Clerk. Such conflicts were premised on overlapping and duplication of roles and responsibilities.

Furthermore, the World Bank's Urban I and II which started in the 1980s continued in the 1990s focusing "upon improving urban services and strengthening city governance...the project did make useful investments in sites and services, basic urban infrastructure and community health and education services in low income areas". Post-2000 exposed the intensity of the outcome of political decentralization as the MDC controlled urban councils. Central government reacted by heavily interfering in local government, defeating the whole purpose of decentralization. Government's attempts can be likened to re/centralization. In the subsequent section, I focus on urban political struggles between 2000 and 2008.

4.2.3 2000-2008 (Change and Contestation Period).

Politics became a central destabilizing factor to post-2000 urban governance. The autonomy and functioning of urban government institutions became more contested than in previous decades as central government tried to wrest control of MDC controlled local authorities. A 'cat and mouse' relationship ensued between central and local government. The rise and ascendancy of MDC in urban local government resulted in serious confrontations between state and local level. This was mainly because the ruling party had lost the control of most local authorities in elections and used any means possible to re/centralizes local government. Box 1 (page 42) shows the rapid deterioration of local governance due to political contestations.

Box 1: The deterioration of local governance due to political contestations.

Zimbabwe represents the example of a country that once had very robust institutions of local governance especially in the urban centers but the powers and resources of these institutions have systematically degraded over time as a result of political developments at the national level. A 1994 study by this author (Oluwu, Dele) found the Zimbabwean city of Harare and Kariba to manifest all the indicators of a sound local governance system at par with similar capital cities in South Africa (Cape Town and Durban), India (Bombay) and Canada (Toronto). In fact, in some important respects, the two sample Zimbabwean cities were better managed than some cities in India (Delhi and Hydebrad) and Nigeria (Lagos and Kano). Within a decade, most of these elements of good governance had been eroded as a result of the power struggle at the national center, one of whose elements is what I now understand to be major constitutional amendment on municipal government to neutralize the growing power of the opposition to the ruling party especially in the cities of Bulawayo and Harare.

Source: Oluwu, 2009: 117-18.

Ranger (2007) argues that, since 2000 the Zimbabwean state has radically intervened in urban local government. Ultimately, the sacking of opposition executive mayors¹¹ and their replacements with commissions loyal to Zanu-PF ensued. Terrence Ranger acutely puts it:

Elected executive mayors have been dismissed; whole municipal councils have been sacked; commissions appointed by the state have attempted to run cities. A whole series of new state authorities - governors for both Harare and Bulawayo; district administrators for the townships - have been inserted above and into the cities (Ranger, 2007).

For Harare city, after the sacking of the mayor and the subsequent resignation of a number of councillors in protest, the situation became worse as of December 2004, when there were not enough elected councillors remained to form a quorum (Kamete, 2009a). In accordance with the Urban Councils Act, the local government minister appointed commissioners to run city affairs. The commission's term must not exceed six months and it was scheduled to end in June 2005. Ironically, the local government minister re-appointed the commission again and extending the commission's term in violation of Section 80 (3) of the Urban Councils Act.

Chirisa and Jonga (2009) sum it as the 'defeat of democracy in council business'. At the height of central government interference in local authorities was the formers' instigation of the infamous Operation Murambatsvina / Restore Order in 2005. The GoZ embarked on an operation to 'clean filth' in cities on May 19, 2005 in contravention to eviction regulations stipulated under the country's Regional, Town and Country Planning Act (Part V, Section 35) and against the right to housing conferred in Article 25 (1) of the Universal Declaration of

¹¹ Mayors sacked and replaced by commissions: Harare (Mudzuri), Chitungwiza (Shoko), Chegutu (Dhlakama) and Mutare (Kagurabadza).

Human Rights. Operation Restore Order, a demolition and eviction campaign led by the military and police affected an estimated 700,000 people in cities across the country who lost homes, livelihood sources or both and indirectly affecting 2,4 million people (Tibaijuka, 2005). The Operation shows the authority and supremacy of political interference from central government cementing the relegation of urban councils political and administration authority.

The Minister of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development is not held accountable constitutionally for his actions because local government is not constitutionally empowered (RBZ, 2004). Chaos, contestation and confusion characterized Zimbabwe's local government system. Local government legislature that is; the Urban Councils Act, and Regional, Town and Country Planning Act give unrestricted powers to the minister who often (ab)use the office for political expediency. Hence, local authorities have been turned into political battlegrounds rather than avenues of service delivery. The resultant effect has been the poor delivery in key human development services such as water and sanitation, housing, education, energy and transport in local authority areas (Ranger, 2007).

The battle to control urban areas saw the GoZ empowering the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA), a government parastatal supreme to all water resources and related infrastructure. In June 2006, the GoZ issued a directive compelling all local authorities to transfer all water and sewer services to ZINWA. The shift was meant to weaken the sphere of influence of local authorities. Most urban councils lost substantially as water and sewer infrastructure were transferred at no cost. ZINWA presided over a cholera epidemic which claimed over 4,000 lives (ICG, 2009). Realizing the big mistake, GoZ shifted all water and sewer functions to local authorities in January 2009. The move attracted much resistance as ZINWA did not want to relinquish assets as well as the refusal by urban councils to take over a bloated and politically appointed workforce. The contestation and confusion deepened further after the 2008 elections as explained in the next section.

4.2.4 2008-2012 (Deepening Contestation and Confusion).

The executive mayoral system was abolished in 2008 and the ceremonial mayoral system was reintroduced (Chirisa and Jonga, 2009). The Urban Councils Act was amended to include (i) the abolishment of the executive mayoral system reintroducing the ceremonial mayoral system, and (ii) the appointment of special interests councilors as well as the appointment by

the local government minister of ceremonial mayors who did not have to be councillors. Reversion to the ceremonial mayoral system can be argued as an attempt to scuttle MDC controlled urban councils. Section 114 of the Urban Councils Act gives the Minister of local government the powers to suspend and dismiss elected councillors. Ministerial powers overshadow the will of citizens, destabilizing the functioning of a representative democracy. A political party in control of central government can (ab)use section 114 to frustrate citizens choices at local authority level (Musekiwa, 2012: 239).

Unfettered powers of the local government minister such as appointing special interest councillors, senior city management staff and setting conditions of service for councillors, and staff, suspending and dismissing councillors, further increases the contestations at urban governance level. The Urban Councils Act allows the local government minister to appoint special interest councillors though one can argue that, there is nothing special they bring to council chambers except Zanu-PF loyalty. In conformance to Statutory Instrument 94 of 2010, the Minister of Local Government appointed 86 special interest councillors to compliment the 389 elected councillors. Unexpectedly, “most appointed councillors in urban councils turned out to be Zanu-PF candidates who had lost elections” (Musekiwa, 2012: 245). Musekiwa argues that, special interest councillors are there to protect Zanu-PF interests and make MDC controlled urban councils ungovernable (Ibid.: 246). Therefore, the goal of central government through the local government ministry seems not to foster service delivery but rather to make MDC urban councils fail.

The March 2008 harmonized presidential, parliamentary and local government elections brought major changes to the governance of urban councils. All municipalities, town councils and town boards remained MDC strongholds, with the MDC winning the majority of Ward seats (EISA, 2008). Chakaipa (2010) notes that in the 2008 elections, MDC won 29 Urban Councils, and Zanu-PF 1 out of the 30 Urban Councils. Presidential elections were inconclusive heralding the inauguration of the Inclusive Government in January 2009 composed of two MDC formations and Zanu-PF. The election result sealed the total rejection of Zanu-PF by the urban electorate. At the same time, the result signaled the trust given to the MDC by urban residents. In practice, the election result ushered in another ‘urban governance war’ as Zanu-PF launched a spirited and heterodox comeback. In addition to contestation, the situation got worse as most of the elected councillors were mere party activists with limited or no experiences in public governance.

After 2008, Zimbabwe entered a difficult, tortuous and protracted transition (Masunungure and Shumba, 2012). It was expected that the transition ushers in transitional governance arrangements aimed at improving service delivery. Transitional governance is used here to refer to the systematic introduction of new forms of governance at local government level (Williams, 1999). Table 3 shows the firing and dismissal MDC elected councillors and mayors during the transitional period.

Table 3: Interference of Central Government in Urban Councils During the Transition Period.

Local Authority	No. of Councillors suspended	No. of Councillors dismissed.	No. of Councillors whose suspensions were lifted
Bindura Town Council	3	2	1
Chitungwiza Municipality	2	2	
Harare City Council	9	6	3
Rusape Town Council	7	5	2
Total	21	16	6

Source: Musekiwa, 2012: 239.

During the transition, most urban councils were marked by contestation and confusion as Zanu-PF tried to regain control of the urban constituency. Table 3 shows 21 suspended councillors with 16 of them totally dismissed by the minister of local government between September 2008 and January 2012. All suspended councillors are from the MDC, amply demonstrating the conflict laden with urban governance in Zimbabwe. Moreover, in May-June 2012, the local government minister suspended the mayor, deputy mayor and one councilor in Chinhoyi municipality (Muchadenyika, 2013).

To further show the deeper contestation in urban governance, I put into perspective political contradictions in Mutare city council. Mutare is the fourth largest city in Zimbabwe and is situated in the Eastern highlands providing a gateway to Mozambique. Over the past decade the population of the city has more than doubled to around 188 243. Between 2008 and 2013, the city was dominated by MDC councillors under the leadership of MDC Mayor Brian James. Despite significant progress by the local authority to improve service delivery, contestation resulted in the mayor being suspended and finally dismissed. Box 2 (page 46) portrays the unending central government desire to fire MDC councillors based on contested grounds. It can be argued that, the firing of MDC councillors is a Zanu-PF strategy to destabilize the functioning of local authorities. Ultimately, in Zimbabwe the efficacy of multi-party urban councils is queried.

The suspension and dismissal of Mutare City mayor came despite the fact that Mutare City council has won two Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce Cleanest City award (2010 and 2011) and Best Performing Urban Local Authority in Waste Management award at the 2013 Zimbabwe International Trade Fair. This demonstrates the ministers' spirited efforts to undermine the performance of MDC led councils as way of de-campaigning the MDC.

Box 2: Contestations in Mutare City Council

The minister of local government wrote a letter in March 2010 to Mayor Brian James titled Remedial Intervention 11. The minister mentioned with concern Mayor Brian James's refusal to accept directives from the ministry. The letter read *"Remember for avoidance of doubt, that section 313 as read with section 314 of the Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29:15) empowers me as the minister to: i. Give direction on matters of policy and ii. Reverse, suspend, rescind resolutions, decisions etc. of councils"*.

The letter noted the following:

- Dismissal of Councilor Mukorera from the office of deputy mayor which should have been a ministerial role.
- Refusal by the council to award exit packages to (Zanu-PF appointed) commissioners running the city prior to the current council.
- Refusal by the council to conclude land sales between Mr. Manyuchi, Mr. Chinjekure (top Zanu-PF officials) and the previous city administration (commission).
- The role distinction between administrative staff (led by the Town Clerk) and a ceremonial mayor.

In a letter dated 19th January 2012 the local government minister suspended Mutare Mayor Brian James citing *"...reports of misconduct continue to come to my office implying that you are unrepentant. This leaves me with no option other than to invoke section 114 of the Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29:15) to suspend you from being a councilor (Ward 12) for Mutare City, with immediate effect"*. The letter was not explicit on the basis of suspension except the word 'misconduct' which is vague. The mayor was evicted from his office by Zanu-PF youth under the supervision of Mr. Chinjekure (a Zanu-PF official in Mutare). Here, it raises questions as to the role and interests of Zanu-PF, a mere political party.

Afterwards, the local government minister appointed a 'partisan' five member team to ascertain the allegations leveled against the mayor. The investigation team's findings were never made public. It could be argued that by not providing clear allegations as contained in the minister's 2010 letter and that the mayors' eviction was supervised by Zanu-PF implies a grand plan to undermine MDC's support base. It can also be argued that the partisan investigation committee manufactured allegations in order to ratify the Ministers' decision. The mayor was finally dismissed by the local government minister in April 2013 citing cases of 'mismanagement, misconduct and insubordination'.

Sources: Mayor Brian James's Remedial Intervention 11 and suspension letter; News Agencies (News Day, Voice of America, The Herald, Financial Gazette).

The contradictions in urban local authorities are not only inter-party but also intra-party. In February 2010, the MDC fired all its 24 councillors in Chitungwiza municipality citing corruption, misdeeds and defiance to party directives. The MDC spokesman argued:

They (expelled councillors) are no longer MDC councillors. They have been fired for lack of good governance, accountability, failure to deliver and to live up to the mandate given them by the people. They have also been dismissed for defying the party. They have been fired for placing wrong priorities in the discharge of their duties – it's a whole litany of complaints from residents and the party that has necessitated their dismissal (Chipangura, 2010).

The MDC Chitungwiza mayor Israel Marange had been jailed for corruption and the councillors defied the party's directive on who should take over the post. However, the councillors remained in office as the local government minister refused to dismiss them.

In April, 2012 the MDC set up a probe team to investigate all MDC controlled councils in the country. The party argued that reasons for the probe were aimed at reclaiming 'Zimbabwe's self-respect, a climate of accountability, and pushing for zero tolerance on corruption and all evils' (MDC, 2012). Basing on the findings of the probe team, the MDC expelled 12 councillors¹² in August 2012 citing corruption and mismanagement of office. The local government minister did not suspend the councillors arguing that the MDC did not inform the parent ministry of the allegations. The councillors continued in office since according to the Urban Councils Act suspension, and dismissal powers are vested in the local government minister. The next section looks at the prevailing urban governance and planning law.

4.3 Urban Governance and Planning Law: Powers and functions of local government

During the period under study (2000-2012), local government in Zimbabwe was not constitutionalized¹³ (Olowu, 2010) but a legislative creation. Zimbabwe had a unitary system of government, where local government (sub national) entities exercise their powers by virtue of the *ultra vires* (beyond the powers) principle. Local government powers are specifically delegated by central government, which can override the formers' decisions. Central government supervises local government through the MLGRUD allowing the former to prevent the unlawful use of funds and other property of local authorities, prevent corruption, or improve the performance of local authorities (Machingauta, 2010).

¹² Harare (Deputy Mayor Emmanuel Chiroto, Peter Marange, Phumulani Musagwiza, and Xavier Vengesai), Gweru (Mayor Tedious Chimombe, Clemence Kwaru and Holly Dzuda), Bindura (Iveory Matanhire, Vengai Mudadi, Rickson Kaseke), Zvishavane (Alois Zhou) and Kwekwe (Johanees Ngozo).

¹³ The 2013 Constitution constitutionalizes local government.

Two main local government Acts¹⁴ provide the framework of urban governance in Zimbabwe. The management and administration of urban areas is governed by the Urban Councils Act (Chap 29:15). The Act:

provides for the establishment of municipalities and towns and the administration of municipalities and towns by local boards, municipal and town councils; to provide for the conferring of town and city status on growth points, municipalities and towns; to provide for the declaration of local government areas and the administration of local government areas by local boards; to confer functions and powers and impose duties upon municipal and town councils and local boards; to provide for the establishment of the Local Government Board and to provide for the functions thereof; and to provide for matters connected with or incidental to the foregoing.

In terms of urban planning the Regional, Town and Country Planning Act (Chap 29:12), Revised Edition of 1996 reign supreme. The Act provides:

for the planning of regions, districts and local areas with the object of conserving and improving the physical environment and in particular promoting health, safety, order, amenity, convenience and general welfare, as well as efficiency and economy in the process of development and the improvement of communications; to authorize the making of regional plans, master plans and local plans, whether urban or rural; to provide for the protection of urban and rural amenities and the preservation of buildings and trees and generally to regulate the appearance of the townscape and landscape; to provide for the acquisition of land; to provide for the control over development, including use, of land and buildings; to regulate the subdivision and the consolidation of pieces of land; and to provide for matters incidental to or connected with the foregoing.

A number of allied Acts aid the governance of urban local authorities and the urban development process. These include the Land Survey Act (Chap 20:12), Land Acquisition Act (Chap 20:10), Model Building Bye-Laws (1977), Environmental Management Act (Chap 20:27), Housing Control Act (Chap 29:08), Minerals and Mining Act (Chap 21:05), Public Health Act (Chap 15:09) among others. Gazing into the future, consolidating legislation pertaining to urban governance and planning are important overtures.

¹⁴ These are Regional Town and Country Planning Act (Chap 29:12), and Urban Councils Act (Chap 29:15).

Urban governments perform legislative and executive powers. Mandatory and permissive functions such as development, forward planning, financial, governance and regulatory (Mushamba, 2010) form the basis of local authority operations. These powers and functions are derived from the Urban Councils Act, and the Regional, Town and Country Planning Act. Local governments in Zimbabwe perform legislative and executive functions. Executive functions enable local authorities to:

- i. Make, adopt and implement policies,
- ii. Administer local government areas; and
- iii. Enforce local laws (by-laws) (Mushamba, 2010: 105).

Through the Urban Councils Act (Chap 29: 15), urban local authorities have power over immovable property, construction of sidewalks, hiring and firing of junior council employees, sewerage and drainage, water, parking, omnibuses and other transport services, valuation and assessment of property for rating, and finance and budgeting. Part XV, sections 198-222 of the Urban Councils Act outlines other powers of urban councils. These powers relate to 54 development functions outlined in the Second Schedule of the Urban Councils Act. These include but not limited to:

- i. General powers (flexible as the local authority or local government minister decides the interpretation and use of such powers),
- ii. Enforcement of conditions of title on property and buildings,
- iii. Fire brigade services,
- iv. Tendering (local government minister has powers to compile of contractors and determine contractor eligibility to contracting) and contracting,
- v. Procurement (local government minister has powers to make regulations that affect the operation of municipal procurement boards),
- vi. Construction, maintenance and working of railway service sidings,
- vii. Estate development (local government minister has powers to work on behalf of councils regarding estate development),
- viii. Numbering of houses and naming of roads (re-naming of roads require ministerial approval),
- ix. Prohibition and regulation of use of ramps or similar devices,
- x. Electricity,
- xi. Street lighting,
- xii. Refuse collection,

- xiii. Fixing tariffs and charges or deposits (lease agreements require ministerial approval),
- xiv. Right of entry to and use of land,
- xv. Undertaking income generating projects with written approval from the minister,
- xvi. Establishment of cooperatives with written approval of the minister.

However, it is important to highlight that central government has the powers to vary, redefine and reassign local government powers. A case in point is electricity, the Urban Councils Act mandates local authorities run, and operate electricity plants and generators. Despite this, the GoZ in 1987 took over ownership of Harare Thermal Power Station without compensation to the Harare City Council. Even today, the title deeds of the power station in question show the legitimate owner as Harare city council.

Planning related functions and powers of local governments are stipulated in the Regional Town and Country Planning Act. These include master and local planning, control of development, subdivisions and consolidations, and acquisition and disposal of land. To summarize the discussion on powers of local governments, I put a comparison of the main powers of local and central governments in Table 4.

Table 4: Comparison of local and central government powers

Local Government	Central Government
1. Plan and implement local development.	1. Establish, abolish or alter local government status.
2. Manage water and sanitation.	2. Fix the area of a local authority (number of wards and thus Councillors).
3. Provide and maintain roads.	3. Approve the getting or taking over of land by the local authority.
4. Manage education and health.	4. Carry out planning and estate development.
5. Manage refuse removal.	5. Appoint the Local Government Board.
6. Provide housing and serviced stands.	6. Appoint a Valuation Board.
7. Manage cemeteries.	7. Appoint auditors.
8. Carry out social welfare.	8. Appoint an investigating team where an inquiry is needed.
	9. Suspend or dismiss councillors who have committed serious offences.
	10. Appoint a commissioner to run the affairs of a Council when there are no councillors.
	11. Give general direction on policy.
	12. Authorize anything not covered by the Act.
	13. Publish model by-laws, direct Councils to adopt specific by-laws and approve Council developed by-laws.
	14. Suspend a Council resolution when it goes against the interests of residents.
	15. Correct any omissions.
	17. Regulate accounting and loans.
	18. Prescribe amounts beyond which Councils should seek tenders.
	19. Approve income generating projects and co-operatives.
	20. Direct Councils to pay their debts and reduce deficits.
	21. State what types of local charges can be raised without approval.

Source: ACPDT, 2002 and Chatiza, 2010.

The majority of central government functions stipulated in Table 4 are carried out by the local government minister. Table 4 summarizes the operating environments of local governments in Zimbabwe, in which central government wields more power in the running of local government affairs as compared to local government.

Unlike in other countries¹⁵ urban governance in Zimbabwe does not enjoy autonomy as it performs the functions conferred to it by central government. The functions, while defined in law are open to central government variation and re-assignment to other state agencies (Chatiza, 2010: 14). In this regard, central government determines the birth, growth and demise of local government compromising the functioning of the latter. Pre and post-independence policy and structural developments have sustained centre-local relations that undermine the emergence of sound local governance (Ibid, 2010). To fully appreciate Zimbabwe's urban governance and urbanization context, the study discusses the state of urbanization and service delivery in the following section.

4.4 Current state of Urban Governance, Urbanization levels and Service Delivery.

Urban governance is part of the broader local government system. Local government refers to the sub-national level of government (Mushamba, 2010). Appointees and democratically elected officials form the core of urban administration. Urban governance resembles a more decentralized and democratic system than in rural councils. The Urban Councils Act (Chap 29:15) governs the administration of urban areas. As of 2010 there were 7 city councils, 9 municipalities, 11 town councils and 4 local boards (Mushamba, 2010).

Urban local authorities have undergone and survived a turbulent political and economic period and have emerged severely battered and bruised (GoZ, 2009). Urbanization in Zimbabwe has not been associated with corresponding economic growth and 44% of Harare's population is composed of young people (5-25years) (UNHABITAT, 2010). As a result, the youth bulge puts a huge strain on urban services like housing, employment, education, infrastructure, and participatory governance. For comparative purposes table 5 looks at past, existing and projected levels of urbanization in Zimbabwe from 1950 to 2050.

¹⁵ Examples include South Africa, Uganda, and Tanzania.

Table 5: Urbanization levels in Zimbabwe from 1950 – 2050 (in percentages).

1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	2030	2040	2050
10,64	12,61	17,36	22,37	28,99	33,76	38,25	43,92	50,71	57,67	64,35

Source: UNHABITAT, 2010.

The growth of urbanization was accompanied by a tremendous increase in the urban population. Better economic and social service opportunities found in cities explain rural-urban migration. To disaggregate Table 5 into city specific population figures, I put into perspective population growth estimates in Zimbabwe's major cities from 1982 to 2012.

Table 6: Demographic Trends in Major Zimbabwean Towns and cities (1982-2012).

Name of urban centre	Year			
	1982	1992	2002 ¹⁶	2012 ¹⁷
Harare	656 000	1 184 169	1 435 784	1 468 767 ¹⁸
Bulawayo	414 000	621 742	676 650	655 675
Chitungwiza	172 000	274 035	323 260	354 472
Gweru	79 000	124 735	140 806	158 233
Mutare	70 000	131 367	170 466	188 243
Kwekwe	48 000	74 982	93 608	100 455
Kadoma	45 000	67 267	76 351	90 109
Masvingo	31 000	51 746	69 490	88 554
Chinhoyi	24 000	42 976	55 968	79 368
Redcliff	22 000	24 994	32 453	35 924
Marondera	20 000	39 384	51 871	62 120
Chegutu	20 000	30 122	43 424	49 832
Shurugwi	13 000	6 029	16 863	22 456
Kariba	12 000	21 039	23820	41 420
Victoria Falls	8 000	15 010	31 519	33 710

Source: Wekwete (1992:54); GoZ (1992/2002); ZimStat (2012).

Table 6 shows that the Zimbabwean urban population is on the rise since 1982. As a result, there is immense pressure on cities to deliver more services to an increasing urban population. Urbanization process in Zimbabwe has led to challenges of urban sprawl, urban poverty, inadequate housing for the urban poor, inadequate infrastructure and service provision including clean portable water, sewerage reticulation, power supply, garbage collection and disposal, and inadequate transportation at affordable levels (Munzwa and Jonga, 2010). The provision of urban goods and services has not been commensurate with urbanization levels. The mismanagement, corruption and contestation in urban councils results in cities failing to provide urban services such as water and sanitation, housing, public transport and refuse collection.

¹⁶ 2002 figures extracted by the author from 2002 Zimbabwe Census Report.

¹⁷ 2012 figures extracted by the author from 2012 Zimbabwe Census Preliminary Report.

¹⁸ Figures only for Harare Urban excluding Epworth and Harare rural.

Urbanization has not been matched with economic growth. To illustrate the mismatch, Table 7 shows the economic performance of Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe's GDP between 1998 and 2006 declined by -37 percent (UNDP, 2008).

Table 7: Zimbabwe's Economic Performance, 1980-2006.

Economic Indicators	1980-1990	1991-2000	2001-2006
Average annual GDP Growth (%)	4.30	0.90	-5.70
Employment Growth (%)	1.90	0.40	-7.50
Inflation in final year of period (%)	12	56	238
Exports as % of GDP in final year of period	23.00	43.00	24.00
Manufacturing as % of GDP	20.35	17.70	15.00
Agriculture as % of GDP	16.20	14.90	17.00
Mining as % of GDP	4.30	4.20	4.00
Budget deficit as % of GDP	-2.10	-6.30	-5.80

Source: GoZ, 2011:8.

The mismatch between urbanization and economic performance (Table 5, 6 and 7) meant that local authorities were confronted with increased demand on services with limited returns from a receding economy. As a result, Deborah Potts argues that the reality of urbanization in Zimbabwe resembles 'shattered dreams and hopes' (Potts, 2006) due to the deteriorating economy. The mismatch exposed urban councils as the main revenue sources (companies) either shut down or relocated to neighboring countries. Inflation, which according to official and conservative government figures exceeded 8,000% a year, with respected economists and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimating a figure in excess of 150,000% (Coltart, 2008) and the depreciation of the Zimbabwean dollar made urban development planning almost difficult in local authorities. Formal employment decline increased the informal housing and employment sectors of which most local authorities had not planned their cities with informality in consideration. The informal sector in many instances had a free ride on services as their administration and planning became politically contested rather than a town planning matter. Harsh macroeconomic environment made long term planning difficult resulting in local authorities preoccupying themselves with immediate concerns of survival.

Munzwa and Jonga (2010: 140) argue that the politico-economic breakdown of the principles of good governance between 2000 and 2008 led to "unemployment, environmental pollution and destruction, non-development and maintenance of infrastructure, shortages of urban transport, inadequate supply of water, etc." Urban goods and services are an important determinant of human development. However, the Zimbabwean urban governance case shows a reverse in civilization as shallow wells replace water taps, blocked storm drains lead

to ‘artificial and unnecessary’ flooding in streets, uncollected refuse produce stench smell and pot holed roads make ‘normal and straight’ driving impossible. The politics, governance and institutional behaviors in urban centers of Zimbabwe deteriorated severely calling for a reengineering of urban governance.

Here, it is vital to explore the divergent views of Potts (2006) and Munzwa and Jonga (2010). Whilst it is clear that, the economy had impacts on service delivery, it is my proposition that politics had far reaching and deep entrenched impacts on service delivery. It is this thesis’ assertion that the underlying cause in Zimbabwe’s service delivery failure is political but the economy became a convenient scape goat. There are some services that do not require much resources such as maintenance and repair of street lighting and traffic lights. Second, after the introduction of the multi-currency scheme (United States Dollars, South African Rands, and Botswana Pulla) in January 2009, local authorities began collecting tariffs in hard currencies but service delivery did not significantly improve as most people expected. What could be the reason? This substantiates my support for the assertion that the problems are more to do with politics than economics in Zimbabwe’s local government.

4.5 Concluding Remarks on Zimbabwe’s Urban Governance and Urbanization

The chapter discussed in detail the context of Zimbabwe’s urban governance system by looking at historical and recent trends in urban governance and urbanization. Since colonization in 1890, local government in Zimbabwe kept changing to suit the needs of governments in power. In both pre and post-independence Zimbabwe local government is a political muscle that ruling regimes manipulates, associate with and advance certain political interests. Politics continue to shape and destabilize the urban governance system in Zimbabwe as the system remains under threat from the central government. Centre-local contestations are leading to poor service delivery. The next chapter discusses empirical evidence from the field research focusing on the interface between urban governance politics and urban planning in Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE INTERFACE BETWEEN URBAN GOVERNANCE POLITICS, URBAN MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING SYSTEMS IN ZIMBABWE.

This chapter emphasizes the interface between urban governance politics, and urban management and planning in Zimbabwe. The study period was characterized by political polarization in Zimbabwe's local government. The MDC controlled most urban councils through its councillors and mayors with Zanu-PF controlling the local government ministry. On urban management, the chapter focuses on four aspects that are the appointment of council heads of departments, relations between councillors and appointed officials, appointed officials accountability channels, and the attribution of council failure. The primary emphasis is to analyze how central government through the MLGRUD influenced the administration and management of urban affairs. With regards to urban planning, I explain the effects of centre-local relations to urban planners, how urban planners executed their duties in a turbulent political environment, Operation Murambatsvina / Restore Order (OM/RO) and the public image of the planning profession, and Operation Garikai (OG) and Urban Planning. The ensuing section explains urban management systems.

5.1 Urban Management Systems

5.1.1 Role of councillors, central government and political parties in the appointment of urban council's heads of departments

The contest between the MDC and Zanu-PF over the control and administration of urban areas provides challenges over the management of urban affairs. Ten out of eleven council and government officials argued that the appointment of council heads of departments is influenced by political allegiance. Around mid-2000 most highly trained individuals such as planners and engineers left city councils for greener pastures. Zanu-PF had an opportunity to infiltrate the system, "as it was difficult for councillors to preside over the appointment of professionals".¹⁹ Thus, "urban councils are short of people appointed on merit".²⁰ Political appointments were based on patronage and clientelism.

¹⁹ Interview with Rejoice Ngwenya, 06 June 2013.

²⁰ Interview with Dale Dore, 03 June 2013.

The Urban Councils Act Part IX provides for the appointment of senior council staff. Councillors recommend their preferences to the Local Government Board (LGB), which body either approves or selects its preferred candidate. This relationship on one hand is a system of checks and balances and on the other it is an avenue for the MLGRUD to push its own agenda. Due to capacity and resource constraints, the LGB has been staffed by people seconded from the ministry of local government. Hence, people who constituted the LGB at the “pleasure of the local government minister often consulted the Minister before approving any position”.²¹ This demonstrates that as a legally constituted body, the autonomy of the local government board is compromised.

Notwithstanding the above mentioned point, the composition of the LGB (Section 116 of the Urban Councils Act) is to some extent representative (Urban Councils Association, Municipal Workers Union, Town Clerks, Public Service Commission representatives and two people with public administration experience). In principle, this representation is supposed to make it a fair and impartial body. However, questions arise as to the extent to which the body’s decisions are final and the role of the local government minister? A senior official in the local government ministry who declined a formal interview to the researcher argued that “I sit in the local government board but let me tell you this; we have been reduced to a rubber stamping body. The only views that matter are the Minister’s”.

The process of recruiting council senior officials through the LGB has been “soiled; resulting in the appointment of people with little or no local government knowledge and experience”.²² A case in point is the appointment of Dr. Tendai Mahachi as town clerk of Harare city without prior experience in local government. Dr. Mahachi is a Chemist by profession. Prior to his appointment to the city of Harare, he had been fired through industrial action at Unilever Zimbabwe. In addition, he was fired by the GoZ as chief executive officer of Air Zimbabwe in 2009 due to ‘generous disruption of the airline’s operations and services’. Local government is one of the powerful ministries as it is the ‘real government level’ that interfaces with citizens on a daily basis.

²¹ Interview with Christopher Matumbike, 14 June 2013.

²² Interview with Joseph Kamuzhanje, 12 June 2013.

Thus, Dr. Tendai Mahachi, the Harare Town Clerk “was appointed because of his strong allegiance and friendship to the local government minister”.²³ Subsequently, ministry of local government official argued that the Harare Town Clerk would ask the local government minister before implementing council decisions and resolutions. More so, “the local government minister has been accused for not considering legal and technical advice from the ministry’s legal adviser”.²⁴ From the foregoing argument, one can argue that, councillors do not have the power to run city affairs. In fact, the local government minister runs councils through appointed officials.

The LGB is used by the local government minister to give Zanu-PF loyalists positions in urban councils. For instance, the MLGRUD “imposed the Town Clerk to the city of Bulawayo against the wish of the council”.²⁵ To qualify this point further city of Bulawayo went for three years without a town clerk following the death of town clerk Stanly Donga in 2007. The LGB could not approve a candidate from the three forwarded by the city council. Instead, in contravention of the Urban Councils Act Section 137 (subsection 2) that mandates the chamber secretary to act as acting town clerk, the ministry of local government appointed Bulawayo provincial administrator Khonzani Ncube as acting town clerk.

There are indications of interference by the MLGRUD in appointing senior council officials as a way of bolstering corruption syndicates. This is evidenced by the City of Harare Special Investigations Committee’s Report on City of Harare’s Land Sales, Leases and Exchanges which found the appointment of senior council heads of departments by the MLGRUD as a vehicle for corruption and control in the city (CoH, 2010). These cases are:

- i. The firing of Harare City Engineering Director, who headed a department responsible for preparing land for sale. The Department was divided to create the Department of Urban Planning Services (DUPS) (now headed by an official seconded from the MLGRUD), Department of Engineering Services (now headed by the Minister’s brother-in-law). A City Planner was seconded by the MLGRUD to a section mainly responsible for preparatory stages of land alienation and was appointed on the eve of the installation of the 2008-13 council.

²³ Interview with Key Informant J.

²⁴ Interview with Key Informant J.

²⁵ Interview with Rejoice Ngwenya, 06 June 2013.

- ii. The firing of the Department of Housing and Community Services (DHCS) director by the Makwavarara Commission and replaced by a former MLGRUD official. The former Director appealed to court and won the case but the Local government minister threatened Harare City Councillors with dismissal if the Council agrees to reinstate him.
- iii. The Harare City Treasurer was suspended on contested circumstances and replaced by his deputy, even before the finalization of the case. The Report further alleges that the new City Treasurer was used to sign documents pertaining to the final sale of corrupt land deals. The suspended City Treasurer was later reinstated by the 2008-13 Council against the local government minister's wishes (CoH, 2010).

Central government through the MLGRUD plays a major role in terms of recruitment of senior council officials. The MLGRUD is supposed to build capacity both financial and human resources in urban councils. Where the MLGRUD tried to play that role for instance by seconding its ministry staff to local authorities facing challenges, it has been seen as interference. Nonetheless, it is the partisan nature of recruitment that raises questions as the local government minister would not approve the appointment of known MDC supporters to senior council positions. The MLGRUD is circulating people through seconding its personnel to urban councils resulting in very few new people getting into urban councils as senior managers.

There are cases where the local government ministry's decisions through the LGB are justified. For example, "in the case of Gwanda Municipality, the council conducted interviews for the chamber secretary position and recommended its preferred candidate to the LGB".²⁶ The LGB came out with its preferences justifying its position based on interview scripts it produced. It can be argued that these differences were politicized though this was purely a technical issue based on presented facts. Conflict ensued resulting in the firing of Gwanda Mayor. The municipality operated without a chamber secretary for some time. In that view "operating without a chamber secretary affects service delivery as key council decisions are not minuted".²⁷

²⁶ Interview with Key Informant D.

²⁷ Interview with Key Informant K.

Political parties have a major influence in the appointment of council heads of departments, especially Zanu-PF through the local government ministry. For example, “the Deputy Director for Estates and Valuations, Ministry of Public Works (MoPW), successfully won interviews for the housing director post for Chitungwiza municipality in 2012 but was denied to assume the position by the local government minister as he had no traceable Zanu-PF political record”.²⁸ It can therefore be argued that council heads of departments are politically oriented and appointed positions. This has made the local government minister to be labeled the ‘god father of all local authorities’; as he runs councils indirectly through partisan appointments.

In April 2002, through three quick directives, the local government minister nullified a council resolution to reverse recruitments and appointments made over the previous six months, gave himself powers to approve key council decisions on finance and human resources, and barred executive mayors from attending Cabinet Action Committee meetings unless invited by government (Kamete, 2006a). This summarizes how the local government minister exercises his powers to the detriment of coherent urban management. The Urban Councils Act through Section 313 gives the minister powers to give directions of a general character and policy in matters of public interest. Here, the law gives the minister full discretion in his/her interpretation what public interest means. However, difficulties emerge where there is no shared view between the minister and councils on what is in the public interest, particularly when councils and the minister are from different political persuasions (Machingauta, 2010).

5.1.2 Relations between councillors and appointed officials

Relations between councillors and appointed officials or executives were characterized by friction. Issues of roles and responsibilities especially on newly elected councillors comprised a “major source of conflict between councillors and appointed officials”.²⁹ In other instances, conflict of interests arose as councillors wanted certain things done but due to constraints, appointed officials would not implement. Moreover, councillors were communicating directly with appointed officials telling them “we are the owners of the council therefore do a,b,c,d”³⁰ by-passing the Town Clerk and Mayor. For example, in the City of Mutare (CoM);

²⁸ Interview with Key Informant A.

²⁹ Interview with Key Informant P.

³⁰ Interview with Key Informant A.

“councillors would tell executive staff that they (council executive staff) do not know that they were their employers”.³¹ Councillors threatened council staff even outside formal processes.

Trust between councillors and appointed staff was questionable as evidenced by the Mayor of Mutare’s fundraising initiative. In fact, the Mayor was “developing his own administration and mobilized funds were not channeled within the normal council system”.³² The City of Mutare had a separate executive called resource mobilization team headed by the Mayor. The resource mobilization team raised USD 45,000 and the “Mayor hired consultancies to draw the budget without any adjudication process except the Mayor”.³³ However, the budget was nullified after the “CoM Town Clerk told the Local government minister that the prepared budget did not follow proper council procedures”.³⁴ In this case, it can be argued that council executives felt that their roles were undermined by political contestations with the MDC running a parallel structure in the city.

When new MDC councillors came into power, “they found in place senior council staff already appointed and aligned to Zanu-PF”.³⁵ Over the years, urban local authorities have depended on the bureaucracy which has grown beyond its requirements. Council bureaucracy became serving its own interests. During the study period, “a self-serving bureaucracy was ready to mislead councillors at any point”.³⁶ A self-serving bureaucracy and councillors not knowing their roles provided immense challenges to the management and administration of city affairs. In 2008, newly elected councillors “lacked experience in dealing with city affairs leading to them being guided by council appointed officials”.³⁷ Instead of councillors being leaders in policy making, they were following council officials and in other cases were misled.

In addition, relations between councillors and appointed officials were fragmented along political party lines. In most instances, “elected officials belonged to the MDC with

³¹ Interview with Absolom Masendeke, 06 June 2013.

³² Interview with Key Informant D.

³³ Interview with Absolom Masendeke, 06 June 2013.

³⁴ Interview with Key Informant M.

³⁵ Interview with Christopher Matumbike, 14 June 2013.

³⁶ Interview with Andrew Mlalazi, 12 June 2013.

³⁷ Interview with Precious Shumba, 09 July 2013.

appointed officials inclined to Zanu-PF”.³⁸ Moreover, the MDC was dynamic and forward looking in terms of urban governance whilst those aligned to Zanu-PF were either sabotaging or opposed to MDC initiatives. As a result, a palpable rift exists between the appointed and the elected officials of which the former has been accused of following the diktats of Zanu-PF (Chirisa and Kawadza, 2011).

Relations were mostly based on suspicion. Councillors came in with a view to remove Zanu-PF aligned council personnel, creating animosity among senior council workers. However, appointed councillors (special interest councillors) lessened the knowledge gap and conflict between elected councillors and city managers. Due to suspicion between councillors and officials, decisions were interpreted politically. For example, in Mutare City Council, appointed staff proposed dismissing a significant number of workers as a cost cutting measure. Councillors did not support the proposal arguing that “the motive of the Town Clerk and the local government minister was political - making MDC councillors unpopular”.³⁹

Moreover, relations were strained, with technocrats accused of running the local government minister’s agenda. Technocrats were part of a Zanu-PF scheme “to make it difficult and strenuous for councillors to relate with appointed officials”.⁴⁰ On the other hand, MDC and its councillors came with their policies and agenda in urban councils. The MDC wanted “to appoint council officials loyal to party ideologies as they never believed that existing council officials could implement its policies impartially”.⁴¹ The MDC believed that existing council officials were an extension of the central government and Zanu-PF. Some council officials took advantage and further politicized strained relations. A senior city official pointed that “some council officials would advise councillors that s/he was not liked by certain heads of departments because of affiliation to councillors political party”.⁴² The strained relationship between councils and council executives resulted in corruption as people solicited help from councillors in order to get certain things done.

Appointed officials are responsible for service delivery through the implementation of council policies and resolutions. When councillors get into office, they will be under pressure

³⁸ Interview with Innocent Chirisa, 06 June 2013.

³⁹ Interview with Christopher Matumbike, 14 June 2013.

⁴⁰ Interview with Rejoice Ngwenya, 06 June 2013.

⁴¹ Interview with Key Informant R.

⁴² Interview with Key Informant R.

to make an impact. In the process, councillors aim to achieve quick win results which sometimes are against certain fundamentals. Due to long stay in council, “appointed officials were uncomfortable with being told what to do by new councillors”.⁴³ The refusal by appointed officials to get advice from new councillors is shown by Councillor Dore’s (CoH, 2002-03) attempt to have rubbish collected in his Ward by the city waste department. Councillor Dore visited the council department of waste management to raise the query and the official said, “*I have been here for 20 years and as a councillor you are powerless, so leave us alone. You are very new in council affairs*”.⁴⁴ Appointed officials had to “exude personal resistance to councillors for them to be seen as performing well by the local government ministry”.⁴⁵

Loyalties and rewards are key in Zimbabwean politics and subsequently in councils also. For example at one point, Harare city councillors decided to fire the Town Clerk. In a full council meeting, the Town Clerk asked councillors “*who dares fire me here*” and “only three councillors stood up”.⁴⁶ This shows the extent of the relationship between councillors and appointed officials. The Town Clerk’s loyalty and protection from the local government minister was the springboard of such courageous behavior.

Political violence and the protracted nature of entering political office resulted in the election of inexperienced councillors, a condition that widened the gap between councillors and executive officials. Incompetence of councillors made councillors to view appointed staff as a major deterrent to their plans. After councillor induction programs by NGOs and CSOs, “councillors became arrogant after learning about council business”.⁴⁷ Council administrative staff interpreted councillor induction programs as meant for challenging them. Council appointed staff thought “acquired knowledge by councillors was an affront to their existence”⁴⁸ and the consequential need to build resistance towards councillors. This background created unproductive and antagonistic relations between councillors and appointed staff.

⁴³ Interview with Key Informant O.

⁴⁴ Interview with Dale Dore, 03 June 2013.

⁴⁵ Interview with Dale Dore, 03 June 2013.

⁴⁶ Interview with Dale Dore, 03 June 2013.

⁴⁷ Interview with Key Informant M.

⁴⁸ Interview with Absolom Masendeke, 06 June 2013.

Most appointed officials concurred that the good relations between councillors and appointed staff had a positive impact when council wanted to carry out programs in residential areas as councillors would mobilize residents. Nevertheless, on council programs that had “a negative political connotation on the political constituency, councillors objected straining relations”.⁴⁹ During campaigning period, councillors would make politically motivated decisions that were not feasible to implement. As a result, the relationship was stressed as councillors sometimes disregarded technical and expert advice so as to further certain political interests.

The gradual MDC dominance in urban areas since 2000 was confronted by a human resources challenge. Most senior council officials by 2000 were sympathetic to Zanu-PF. If the senior official was not sympathetic to Zanu-PF, “the local government minister would delay or frustrate the recruitment process”.⁵⁰ A case in point is the delay by the ministry to appoint Bulawayo city town clerk for a period of three years as all the recommended people were considered not aligned to Zanu-PF. The shortlisted three were Gilbert Dube, Middleton Nyoni, and Gilbert Mlilo. Between 2000 and 2005, it was a confused situation as council officials were not too sure of supporting the MDC or working professionally. However, between 2005 and 2008, “council officials were bold enough to challenge councillors because they had protection from a Zanu-PF minister”.⁵¹ This disempowered the political wing of council.

The MDC was at its weakest especially in governing urban local authorities. This is because of a combination of factors that included “naïve, young and not informed caliber of MDC councillors, working with more knowledgeable and skilled appointed officials that were more likely to manipulate councillors”.⁵² The minister of local government appointed special interest councillors who were either an elite on their own or Zanu-PF candidates who had lost elections. Council appointed officials waited for councillors to blunder and then react. Zanu-PF used the formality of the local government system, as the local government minister waited for MDC councillors to blunder before taking action.

⁴⁹ Interview with Key Informant C.

⁵⁰ Interview with Key Informant H.

⁵¹ Interview with Key Informant B.

⁵² Interview with Beth Chitekwe-Biti, 20 June 2013.

The MDC argued that the problem was that “some council officials had been in those positions for long period of time with patronage related appointments”.⁵³ People whose blundering of city management affairs is legendary were still in council for political reasons. For instance in Mutare city council; Mayor Brian James was a “victim of an entrenched party political system that was running as a local authority in which the Town Clerk is the local government minister’s ‘blue eyed boy’”.⁵⁴ In the CoH, Mayor Masunda was concentrating on “trivial matters and not pushing an MDC agenda and subsequently failed to directly confront the local government minister”.⁵⁵ It means local authorities are battle grounds for party agendas. MDC pushes for its agenda through its councillors and Zanu-PF through special interest councillors and senior management executives. The result being tension and conflict.

A Harare city official went to Durban, South Africa with councillors and advised them that “Do you see how these people are organized, if you can also do the same, we can talk about progress”.⁵⁶ In 2009, when a researcher was doing a study and collecting data in council chambers, the research team gave “councillors pens, and councillors started stealing from each other”.⁵⁷ This form of behavior is least expected from councillors. This type of behavior shows that working with councillors was like “converting baboons and making them people”.⁵⁸ Thus, one can argue that conflict between councillors and appointed officials is also anchored on the latter’s expectation of minimum behavior from councillors.

Councillors and appointed officials were “not in a marriage though staying together”.⁵⁹ The relationship is by construct and design as despite losing local government elections, Zanu-PF retained control of urban councils through appointed officials. The uneasy and sour relationship between councillors and staff is one of the main reasons why service delivery remains poor in urban councils.

5.1.3 Appointed officials accountability channels

Appointed officials are accountable to councillors, and the Town Clerk. Section 136 of the Urban Councils Act provides functions of town clerk which include accounting to the Mayor

⁵³ Interview with Charles Mangongera, 19 June 2013.

⁵⁴ Interview with Charles Mangongera, 19 June 2013.

⁵⁵ Interview with Charles Mangongera, 19 June 2013.

⁵⁶ Interview with Key Informant F.

⁵⁷ Interview with Innocent Chirisa, 06 June 2013.

⁵⁸ Interview with Innocent Chirisa, 06 June 2013.

⁵⁹ Interview with Christopher Matumbike, 14 June 2013.

and, where necessary, to the council or the executive committee for the performance of any tasks entrusted through him to the employees of the council. The Town Clerk seats in full council and implements council decisions through heads of departments. The Town Clerk “furnishes the local government minister with updates of council affairs which presents a problem to many councillors”.⁶⁰ In terms of Section 309 of the Urban Councils Act, the local government minister has powers to compel local authorities to furnish him with reports. The provision reads:

The Minister may from time to time require a council to submit to him certified copies of records of its proceedings, statistics and other documents, and such other information as he may consider necessary for the effective discharge of his duties and responsibilities in terms of this Act or for any other purpose, and the council shall comply with any such requirement.

This provision allows the supervision of local government by central government from an informed point of view (in which government is aware of what is happening at the local level). The removing of executive mayors created ceremonial mayors which lack power and authority to run city affairs. The change made the office of Town Clerk powerful though the Town Clerk is not elected rendering participatory governance weak.

Councillors can pass a vote of no confidence in the Town Clerk but cannot hire or fire him/her. There is excessive protection of the “Town Clerk by the local government minister”.⁶¹ Interparty squabbles were common as the Minister of local government and his deputy often gave different and conflicting directives to the local level. Accountability of council staff is politicized as “one chief town planner after briefing the city mayor, the next day the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), were asking the chief town planner what he was discussing with the mayor”.⁶² Senior council heads of departments have difficulties in making independent decisions as one has to make sure that decisions are aligned to some political party members. Resultantly, decisions were either delayed or based on informal and outside council political consultations and accountability channels.

Accountability was affected by allegiance challenges emanating from appointment loyalties. Technocrats are meant to implement resolutions, and “any council resolutions were subject to

⁶⁰ Interview with Precious Shumba, 09 July 2013.

⁶¹ Interview with Absolom Masendeke, 06 June 2013.

⁶² Interview with Absolom Masendeke, 06 June 2013.

scrutiny by the local government minister”.⁶³ A number of budgetary resolutions were rescinded by the local government minister. The Minister has powers through Section 314 of the Urban Councils Act to reverse, suspend, rescind resolutions and decisions of councils on the basis that the minister views such decisions, and resolutions to be in a public interest.

The cumulative effect of the Minister’s powers to act on behalf of councils or to adopt by-laws or rescind council resolutions and decisions may undermine the council’s ability to provide local solutions to local problems (Machingauta, 2010: 145).

In practice, all senior city officials largely reported to the local government minister”⁶⁴ because that is where their protection came from⁶⁵ and the local government minister made them accountable to him.⁶⁶ Appointed staff knew the minister’ decisions superseded everything and everyone. For formality’s sake, city officials reported to council. The local government minister controls levers of power in the local government sector. By design the minister of local government “made it obvious that if an executive does not report to the ministry, the minister will have the official dismissed”.⁶⁷ Accounting to the local government minister directly by-passing councillors and mayors was however a source of conflict. Direct relationship with the minister made executive officials more powerful than councillors.

In Chinhoyi Municipality, where councillors tried to dismiss the town clerk, the Mayor ended up being dismissed by the local government minister. The council made serious allegations against the town clerk, “but when it was presented to the minister, the minister came with several allegations against the mayor”.⁶⁸ For standards, the MLGRUD vision for service delivery implies ministry supervision to local authorities. There is no system of public accountability in urban councils making accountability to the community weak.

In Harare, the local government minister managed to “protect corrupt MDC councillors, and in return the councillors ingratiated to the minister”.⁶⁹ This divided councillors. Corrupt councillors supported the direct accountability of appointed officials to the local government

⁶³ Interview with Rejoice Ngwenya, 06 June 2013.

⁶⁴ Interview with Key Informant E.

⁶⁵ Interview with Joseph Kamuzhanje, 12 June 2013.

⁶⁶ Interview with Beth Chitekwe-Biti, 20 June 2013.

⁶⁷ Interview with Christopher Matumbike, 14 June 2013.

⁶⁸ Interview with Christopher Matumbike, 14 June 2013.

⁶⁹ Interview with Charles Mangongera, 19 June 2013.

minister. MDC councillors “were riotous and the party lost control of its councillors”.⁷⁰ The reason is that councillors got filthy rich overnight. After being elected into office “an MDC councillor said she would allocate herself a flea market and a housing stand”⁷¹; an indication of being elected to accumulate personal wealth. Before being in council, some councillors had a pair of shoes and nothing else but ended up owning a fleet of vehicles. Ultimately, MDC councillors did not respect the party anymore as before and were no longer accountable to the party.

A government official pointed that, “*I was astonished 3 months ago in the Provincial Development Committee in one city to discover that even Town Clerks also report to District Administrators and Provincial Administrators who control development at district and provincial levels*”.⁷² Provincial administrators and governors were introduced in the two metropolitan provinces of Harare and Bulawayo as a way of fostering allegiance to Zanu-PF. In fact, it was a ploy by the local government ministry to dilute MDC power in local authorities.

5.1.4 Attribution of council failure

The first decade of the study period is unprecedented in the history of Zimbabwe’s socio-economic and political trajectory with the country’s isolation from the international community. The operating environment for councils was difficult. The economic meltdown made it difficult for council to raise revenue as people were unable to pay rates. This is evidenced by huge unpaid bills on water services. Zimbabwe had an economic crisis which culminated in sewage flowing in the streets between 2007 and 2008. Council failure to provide services became a blame game between councillors and appointed officials.

Councillors are political hence they “tried to avoid their misdeeds by apportioning blame to administrative officials”.⁷³ The goal of elected officials is politics of appeasement and political mileage, prompting council resolutions that are not practical resulting in failure to deliver such a planned service. Appointed officials know what works and what does not, though they fail council deliberately for instance giving themselves hefty packages at the expense of service delivery (i.e. Harare, Bulawayo and Mutare councils Town Clerks earning

⁷⁰ Interview with Charles Mangongera, 19 June 2013.

⁷¹ Interview with Charles Mangongera, 19 June 2013.

⁷² Interview with Key Informant A.

⁷³ Interview with Innocent Chirisa, 06 June 2013.

more than USD15 000).⁷⁴ For City of Mutare, there is gross financial mismanagement and incompetency within the council administrative staff. Documents availed to the researcher indicate that a loan of USD 600,000 in 2009 increased to USD 1,5million by August 2010. The loan facility was signed for by the Finance Director, the Town Clerk, and the finance manager without the Council Finance Committee’s authorization. Council failure can also be attributed to large workforce expenses as staff were appointed for political reasons. Excess staff in local authorities posed a financial burden (Table 8).

Table 8: CoH Summary of Excess staff as at 31 December 2012

Department	Total Excess	Redeployed	Total Remaining
Town Clerk	17	0	17
Chamber Secretary	8	0	8
Human Capital	40	0	40
City Treasurer	82	6	76
Urban Planning	59	0	59
Engineering Services	191	107	84
City Health	67	53	14
Housing & Community Services	189	98	91
Amenities	106	42	64
Harare Water	648	0	648
Total	1407	300	1107

Source: CoH HCD, 2013.

Table 8 analyzed with Fig 2 show a financially unsustainable situation for the City of Harare. The variance between actual revenue and the wage bill as shown on Fig 2 is very small, leaving the city council with limited financial resources for services investment.




Fig 2: CoH Actual Revenue compared with Gross Wage Bill (Source: CoH HCD, 2013).

⁷⁴ As exposed in the ‘Salarygate’, a salary scandal in Zimbabwe’s public sector in 2013.

Considering the revenue streams and expenditure on Fig 2, one can argue that most council failures were self-inflicted in council through failure to balance income and expenditure. To be a councillor, one needs to be a person of high socio-economic standing. However, councillors were elected on populist social standing making them vulnerable to corrupt behavior and manipulation. Councillors allocated themselves land because they were tenants and “the corruption permeated to the allocation of housing stands to residents”.⁷⁵ The executive were no longer acting professionally in the execution of their duties, as they became political. Appointed officials survived on political patronage of the ministry. Jonga and Munzwa (2009) argue that the failure of both politicians and administrators to observe the principles of urban good governance notably, transparency, accountability, the active involvement and respect of the citizenry, is pivotal to the current problems bedeviling the country’s urban management system.

The Local Government Rural and Urban Development Parliament Portfolio Committee (LGRUD PPC) Report on the state of service delivery in the municipalities of Harare, Chitungwiza and Norton revealed:

Perpetual challenges in all the three local authorities which can be explained by council negligence, inconsiderate private developers, systemic corruption, political and government interference in council business, abuse of office by council officials, inadequate funding etc.

The report noted with concern a crisis in perpetuity in Zimbabwe’s local authorities. In terms of state media (Herald, Chronicle, Zimbabwe Broadcasting Cooperation, and Sunday Mail) and Zanu-PF, council failure was attributed more to MDC councillors than appointed staff. This was a strategy to blackmail councillors and MDC as a majority party in urban councils. The MLGRUD was “leading the blackmailing and attack of MDC controlled councils, not even mentioning the dismal performance of its appointed officials in councils”.⁷⁶

The MLGRUD Permanent Secretary described the conduct of some Town Clerks as an “embarrassment” to the entire local government fraternity since Town Clerks were involved in council mismanagement and the “culture of looting” in urban local authorities (ZILGA, 2012a). It is ironic as the local government permanent secretary argued that “it is better for

⁷⁵ Interview with Rejoice Ngwenya, 06 June 2013.

⁷⁶ Interview with Dale Dore, 03 June 2013.

individuals who serve in the local government sector to retire with dignity rather than embarking on a self-enrichment crusade” (Ibid). Why would the local government ministry yearn for corrupt senior council officials to retire rather than dismissing them? Clearly this shows the extent of disservice by senior council officials and their protection from the parent ministry.

Councilors were accused of failing to guide and develop council goals that were pro-service delivery. This emanates from the fact that councilors make decisions on all council matters with appointed officials recommending advice to councilors. Attribution of council failure depended on the impression one wanted to create. Council failure was political with the failure of cities of Harare, Masvingo, Mutare and Bulawayo interpreted as the failure of the MDC. Nonetheless, councillors are not decision implementers, “though in terms of prioritization, one can apportion the blame on councillors”.⁷⁷

5.2 The profession and practice of urban planning

5.2.1 Effects of centre-local relations to urban planners

The Regional Town and Country Planning Act (RTCPA) gives the government authority to monitor planning standards and the overall urban development process. During the study period, town planning principles and foundations were in place but were defeated by politics. In fact, “Zanu-PF defeated town planning”.⁷⁸ The Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) encroached into peri-urban areas and it became very difficult to implement and monitor town planning as the planning profession was vilified by politicians.

Urban planning was affected in development control specifically in change of use as most open spaces were converted to private and commercial use. Change of use in urban areas “distorted the zoning system”.⁷⁹ Political players and their cronies exerted pressure for change of use on urban planners. Ultimately, most open spaces in Harare, Bulawayo, Mutare and Masvingo were converted into private built up spaces. This change led to the unpopularity of planning and its association with the wealthy and powerful (Kamete, 2011).

⁷⁷ Interview with Joseph Kamuzhanje, 12 June 2013.

⁷⁸ Interview with Rejoice Ngwenya, 06 June 2013.

⁷⁹ Interview with Andrew Mlalazi, 12 June 2013.

Housing cooperatives formed at the behest of political parties bypassed normal urban planning procedures. In terms of layout plans, most cooperatives have been complying with this requirement. Yet, it is when it comes to infrastructure that is severely lacking. Reasons to this are twofold: “one is financial constraints and the second is politicians allowing people to by-pass planning law thereby implying development precede infrastructure leading to distorted urban planning”.⁸⁰ The consequential impact on the health of the people is still unknown as even the cholera outbreak did not affect these areas.

The polarization and contestation between MDC and Zanu-PF posed severe problems to urban planning. Mistrust between central and local government made the work of planners difficult as each level of government pushed its own agenda. A senior urban planner argued that “contradictions in policy framework between central and local government made planning extremely difficult”.⁸¹ This is evidenced by the recruitment moratorium placed by MLGRUD on all major cities. Under the recruitment moratorium, “development control and development planning functions were negatively affected”.⁸² Effects of the recruitment moratorium on City of Harare Department of Urban Planning Services are shown on Table 9. The moratorium was aimed at preventing the MDC councillors from employing loyal supporters.

Table 9: CoH DUPS Establishment as at 31st December 2011.

Years	Approved Establishment		Strength		Vacancies		Excess Staff	
	2010	2011	2010	2011	2010	2011	2010	2011
Total	257	232	183	168	123	111	49	47

Source: CoH DUPS, 2012.

City urban planning departments have been constrained by human resources shortages to carry out development control functions. Subsequently, illegal developments sprouted in most urban centers as residents erected structures without plan approval.

When the MDC controlled urban governments, Zanu-PF did not accept the reality arguing that it was a regime change ploy. Zanu-PF was intolerable to the rise of the MDC in urban areas as local government is the ‘real government’. The rise of MDC was about people rejecting Zanu-PF leadership, and within 3 months of Mudzuri mayorship most roads had

⁸⁰ Interview with Andrew Mlalazi, 12 June 2013.

⁸¹ Interview with Key Informant R.

⁸² Interview with Key Informant R.

been repaired (he was fired after 1 year in office and replaced by a Zanu-PF appointed commission), “which showed a real grasp of urban issues”.⁸³ The local government minister cited poor service delivery performance by the mayor. Conversely, Machingauta (2010) argues that the impression created by the suspension and subsequent dismissal was that suspension and subsequent dismissal had nothing to do with service delivery but was meant to frustrate local councils controlled by the MDC. Zanu-PF could not allow progress in an MDC run council as the success of MDC would deter Zanu-PF political fortunes. During the leadership of government appointed Commissions planners interviewed argued they could not execute their professional duties according to the standards of town planning practice.⁸⁴ Appointed commissions made urban planners appendages of political party interests. This led to planners compromising on professional integrity.

The land reform programme brought tension in peri-urban areas affecting land and delivery of planning services (spatial planning). Cities were overtaken by a particular form of urban development driven by the informal urban structure of the economy within which planning is being practiced. In this instance, ‘planners had no role to play; they were the bonds (as in a chess game), the people sacrificed’.⁸⁵ The greyness of institutions also limited the capacity of planners to effectively manage informality in urban areas.

However, the presence of planners in both central and local government structures have somehow limited the negative impacts of the estranged centre-local relations to planners. Planners in central government represented by the Department of Physical Planning (DPP) and those in urban councils have spoken with a complimentary voice from a technical point of view and have assisted each other in digesting some of the undesirables of the political input without causing much friction with political players.

Because of corruption, planners were being forced to compromise planning principles in order to meet the requirements of either councillors or the local government minister. Approval of plans was influenced by politics as “planners were forced to approve plans quickly, compromising normal planning procedures”.⁸⁶ This is evidenced by a widespread number of mushrooming residential areas without proper urban planning services. These

⁸³ Interview with Innocent Chirisa, 06 June 2013.

⁸⁴ Interview with Elton Manjeya, 13 June 2013, Key informants B, D, M, F.

⁸⁵ Interview with Dale Dore, 03 June 2013.

⁸⁶ Interview with Christopher Matumbike, 14 June 2013.

include Ushehwokunze, Komboniyatswa, Whitecliff, Hopley, Madyirakumunda, Hatcliffe extension among others in the city of Harare. Planners might not have wanted the haphazard urban development that took effect but political pressure led to the compromise of planning regulations and standards

Due to political interference, planning rationale has been suspended weakening the planning profession. Evictions, due to flouting of planning regulations had tendencies to undermine the planner as the main defaulter. Nevertheless, “problems encountered in cities were far beyond the planners as there was disorder in cities”.⁸⁷ The planner was caught in-between vested interests - dealing with political players and trying to be impartial breeding a crippled planner.⁸⁸ Planners not confident to take decisions ended up stashing things for a long time.

5.2.2 Urban Planners in a turbulent political environment

Planning is in politics and cannot escape politics and the role of planners is highly political (Albrechts, 2003). The political environment to which the planner operated was contested and confusing. The consolidated voice of professionals at higher levels became critical. In this context, the image and integrity of planning needed strong defense from an effective and efficient professional association. The Zimbabwe Institute of Regional and Urban Planners (ZIRUP) failed to bring to the attention of the MLGRUD issues affecting the planner. The collective voice of planners in a more systematic way was weak complicating the planners' work.

Urban planning has two sides; forward planning and development control. Forward planning that is master and local planning suffered most due to insufficient resources. All statutory plans in use in Zimbabwe are out of time.⁸⁹ Development control activities such as enforcing regulations and approval of plans, vendor management suffered as the economy turned informal. It was not possible to enforce using planning regulations prepared in a normal economy. Planning became nearly impossible emphasizing on “ad hoc, and reactive as opposed to futuristic forward planning”.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Interview with Absolom Masendeke, 06 June 2013.

⁸⁸ Interview with Absolom Masendeke, 06 June 2013.

⁸⁹ Interview with Percy Toriro, 10 June 2013.

⁹⁰ Interview with Key Informant Q.

The caliber of mayors was a critical element determining how planners executed their duties in a turbulent political environment. For city of Harare, council officials interviewed applauded Mayor Masunda (2008-13) for being dynamic, apolitical, and his tremendous performance in assisting the work of urban planners. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) project in Harare strengthened and capacitated the CoH's urban planning department with Information Communication Technologies (ICTs), and geographic information systems (GIS). DUPS has been struggling to acquire GIS and CoH was having difficulties in funding the initial capital. Due to the BMGF project, DUPS is in a position to "produce accurate and up-to-date urban planning maps and data which informs decision making consequently helping in service delivery".⁹¹ The survey department under DUPS is in a position to contract out, "due to capitalization from the BMGF project, which compliments were attributed to the CoH mayor".⁹²

The division of labour between politicians and planners was blurred. Evidence suggests duplication of roles and responsibilities between planners and politicians. Kamete (2009b) quoting a planner notes that:

There were too many useless changes popping up in and around urban planning. These things . . . are not for serious professionals like us . . . There is need for local government to adhere to a strict division of labour. Things that have to do with mobilizing and mingling with residents . . . are not the work of serious planners. We leave that to . . . politicians . . . Planners deal with the serious technical stuff.

In addition, there were also struggles between planners and young people in cities. Young people with cover from political parties invaded most urban spaces. Political party youth wings occupied and used the open places illegally. Urban sites and spaces occupied by young people were featured by illegality, infractions galore, and tangible lawlessness evidenced by rampant non-compliance with trading, financial, health, labour, sanitation as well as building and planning codes and regulations (Kamete, 2004; 2009b).

⁹¹ Interview with Key Informant R.

⁹² Interview with Key Informant R.

Allegiance and patronage affected the recruitment of chief city planners. Chief planners were “purely political posts thus candidates were vetted over political affiliation”.⁹³ Planning is an intricate political process because it is about resource allocation. Resources are used for politics therefore one cannot separate processes of planning from politics. Inevitably, the profession of planning has not been devoid of political interference and meddling.

5.2.3 Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order and the public image of the planning profession

The image of the planning profession suffered significantly during the era of impunity between 2000 and 2008 which spilled into urban planning. Zanu-PF “forced councillors and councils to turn a blind eye into disorganized urban planning”.⁹⁴ Unplanned and informal settlements sprouted. The partisan political element affected town planning, with planners becoming powerless. The efficacy of planning as a profession was queried.

Disorganized urban planning resulted in the infamous Operation Murambatsvina / Restore Order (OM/RO) of 2005. OM/RO is a house demolition campaign launched by the Government of Zimbabwe in May 2005. OM/RO destroyed houses or structures which were considered illegal. The Operation left more than 700 000 households homeless and affected a further 2,4 million (Tibaijuka, 2005). Ironically, the local government minister officiated at Joshua M. Nkomo cooperative which was later destroyed during OM/RO. Upon the destruction of cooperative houses, the minister argued *‘ukandidaidza kumuchato wako ndinouya asi kuti ndizoziva kuti wakatora mukadzi wemunhu handizivi’* (if you invite me to your wedding I will come but I cannot know that you are wedding someone’s wife).⁹⁵

The preamble of the RTCPA states the objectives of town planning. Among them is protecting the physical environment, which was a key deliverable for OM/RO. Prior to OM/RO, destruction of the physical environment and unhealthy environment were extensive. A senior city planner argued that “the UN Special Envoy Tibaijuka was a ‘traitor’ as she appeased her paymasters instead of the welfare of the people – a challenge that planners face”.⁹⁶ Planners and other urban development professionals were constrained. Party politics resulted in the problem of overcrowding and informal settlements in cities.

⁹³ Interview with Beth Chitekwe-Biti, 20 June 2013.

⁹⁴ Interview with Rejoice Ngwenya, 06 June 2013.

⁹⁵ Interview with Key Informant N.

⁹⁶ Interview with Key Informant R.

The impact of OM/RO exposed planning as a profession. Planning had “failed to respond to challenges it was supposed to address”.⁹⁷ If planning served its purpose, it would have planned and handled OM/RO in a professional manner and there would be no need for another operation. Urban planning principles to address informality were superseded by politics. OM/RO resembles the failure of planning, one can argue. Government’s housing destruction during OM/RO emphasized the essence of planning, which can be understood as the supremacy of planning. Consequently a senior planner argued that “OM/RO was the best thing that happened to planners as all of a sudden planning was elevated though planners did not capitalize on the program”.⁹⁸ Unfortunately, gradually things reverted to pre-OM/RO, and planners became irrelevant.

Planning did not enforce OM/RO as a policy, but planning regulations were used. Planning was very insensitive and unreasonable to the public eye though Zimbabweans remember OM/RO not about planners, but the brutality of President Robert Mugabe. During OM/RO the violence was wanton, symbolic and punitive, signifying Zanu-PF's determination to maintain power and social control in the face of a population who (probably) did not provide a majority vote for it, with areas who voted for the opposition MDC the worst affected (Bracking, 2005). Zanu-PF thought that the “people who voted for MDC were mainly residing in unplanned settlements”.⁹⁹ The plan was to send MDC supporters to rural areas under the control of traditional chiefs who are loyal to Zanu-PF.

With time, it emerged that OM/RO political motivations were bigger than planning motivations. Bratton and Masunungure (2006: 21) posit that one of the aims of the operation was “to stifle independent ... political activity in the country’s urban areas.” GoZ further argued that the program was for security reasons as there was an immense urban concentration of opposition supporters. Therefore, the level of unemployment and infrastructure decay was anticipated as a trigger to mass uprisings.

Expensive housing structures were destroyed in the name of planning. This made planning to people not wholly a profession to assist but a “dictatorial, and demagogue profession to make

⁹⁷ Interview with George Masimba-Nyama, 20 June 2013.

⁹⁸ Interview with Joseph Kamuzhanje, 12 June 2013.

⁹⁹ Interview with Christopher Matumbike, 14 June 2013.

people's lives difficult".¹⁰⁰ Yet, that is not the intention of planning. Planning is viewed with skepticism in Zimbabwe, as a profession out to find and punish culprits. Even the Tibaijuka report did not exonerate planners but rather attacked planning law and regulations. Illegal settlements sprouted in the presence of urban planners and "only to turn against these settlements when Zanu-PF lost support in cities".¹⁰¹ This resulted in the public viewing planning as a disorganized profession.

Planning curricula deals with issues of regularization, and incremental planning which should be a reprieve to informality in cities. A government planner asked the following questions that further expose planning as a profession during and after Operation Murambatsvina:

- When did it become lawful in Zimbabwe to destroy someone's housing without compensation or providing an alternative?
- If Planners have a say, why did they remained silent watching the sprouting of illegal settlements and structures in towns?
- Who and whose Building Inspector was approving building construction?¹⁰²

These questions remain largely unanswered as there has not been a detailed inquiry on the part of government to find out the role of planning before, during and after OM/RO. Ultimately the public is confused about 'planners' and their role in the built environment.

As a result, planners are "not considered important by both the public and government".¹⁰³ The profession of planning has little merit in Zimbabwe. This is exacerbated by the dearth of a vibrant professional planning association (ZIRUP). The future of planning in the country rests on the country shifting from a predatory to a developmental state. The planning system has remained intact, "though corruption has deeply infiltrated"¹⁰⁴. Rent seeking behavior in the profession damaged the image of the profession. The process of plan preparation, application for planning permit and approval has institutionalized corruption.

Kamete (2007) argues that two issues implicated the planning profession in partisan agendas. One of these was the position of senior planners in government or government-backed

¹⁰⁰ Interview with Christopher Matumbike, 14 June 2013.

¹⁰¹ Interview with Key Informant A.

¹⁰² Interview with Key Informant A.

¹⁰³ Interview with Dale Dore, 03 June 2013.

¹⁰⁴ Interview with Absolom Masendeke, 06 June 2013.

institutions, such as urban councils and government ministries, in particular the local government ministry. The other issue had to do with the public utterances of some well-known planners. These include the then ZIRUP president speaking in his official capacity and therefore rightly seen as speaking for all planners. These utterances largely resonated with those of the state. These issues made it easy for critics to put ZIRUP in the same category as the Harare City Commission, the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) and other confirmed Zanu-PF foot soldiers.

In Bulawayo, Bulawayo city council (BCC) provided an ideal model by having 1000 un-serviced stands and 3 farms at any point in time up to 1995. The city tried to plan ahead of housing demand. However, BCC was caught up in socio-economic and political change. In 1995 Cowdry Park, a suburb in Bulawayo had “5000 planned stands waiting development of roads and sewer services”.¹⁰⁵ BCC’s general development and housing fund ran dry. When OM/RO came, government wanted space to resettle people, and “BCC directed government to Cowdry Park and overnight Cowdry Park became a slum”.¹⁰⁶ Urban areas have been distorted, in one way or the other with squatter proliferation without adequate services. Urban development in Zimbabwe changed because of a combination of politics and economics which acted both as causes and triggers.

Despite the impacts of OM/RO, one can argue that the planning profession had long lost credibility during the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) period (1990-95). During this period, planning was criticized by groups like the “Affirmative Action Group (AAG), Indigenous Groups, and national economic planning commission making spatial planning a nuisance”.¹⁰⁷ However, during OM/RO planning statutes became useful in 2005. One can argue that the damage to planning profession during OM/RO was minimal as compared to before (indigenization, land reform and affirmative action) which three resulted in an indirect acceptance of the informal sector.

OM/RO had substantial repercussions on urban planning as a profession. Quoting a Senior Planning Consultant, Kamete (2007: 159) writes:

¹⁰⁵ Interview with Andrew Mlalazi, 12 June 2013.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Andrew Mlalazi, 12 June 2013.

¹⁰⁷ Interview with Key Informant H.

What we as planners have demonstrated is an unacceptable degree of fear, incompetence and malice. I challenge those who disagree to prove me wrong when I say that the damn profession was totally cold-hearted, negligent and spineless during this operation. There are no two ways about it. We are the laughing stock of the cursed country. Until someone proves me wrong, I won't shut up.

Town planning standards have been castigated as 'very high, very elaborate, rigid and not amenable to physical and climatic conditions', irresponsible to end users with planners criticized for planning for themselves (GoZ, 2009). The UN Special Envoy Report castigated the 'outdated' Regional Town and Country Planning Act. Reluctant to discard the limiting cloak of scientism, and unwilling to look beyond the prescriptions of instrumental rationality, planners emerged out of the storm (Operation Murambatsvina) with a severely dented reputation (Kamete, 2007: 168).

5.2.4 Operation Garikai and Urban Planning

Operation Garikai was a government housing program spearheaded by the Army in the aftermath of the Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order. Government participation in actual land servicing and house construction was through the flagship Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle, which however has remained a modest contribution to addressing housing shortages in Zimbabwe (Chatiza and Mlalazi, 2009). Operation Garikai (OG) was initiated after a world outcry as OM/RO featured excessive and brutal use of military as capacity. The military is used to "mounting a barrack in 4 days for 3000 people and planned to replicate that for housing (15 000 units)".¹⁰⁸ The house building model failed, and the promise was left unfulfilled.

Operation Garikai was a political response to OM/RO. A response to world pressure, though government tried it ended up deceiving people. Pressure that came with Operation Garikai was from the Tibaijuka Report and government wanted to show the UN envoy that it can build houses in a limited space of time. From a political point of view, "Operation Garikai was needed though from a planning perspective, infrastructure services must have taken precedence".¹⁰⁹ Planning was defeated. As of 2013, no Operation Garikai housing schemes has running water, sewer and surfaced roads.

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Andrew Mlalazi, 12 June 2013.

¹⁰⁹ Interview with Joseph Kamuzhanje, 12 June 2013.

After the OM/RO UN Special Envoy Report, instead of reverting to urban planning law and principles as a way of reorganizing housing and urban development, government took a political route. Operation Garikai took effect and its shadows are still haunting all urban councils since the program gave people housing stands and ‘houses’ in un-serviced land. Operation Garikai was a hastily prepared package and there is enough evidence to suggest that if urban councils were adequately consulted, the program could have better achieved its objectives. Between 2005 and 2008 time was very short, and Zanu-PF wanted to work on its image before the 2008 harmonized elections. The party decided “to use land and a housing scheme to reward and lure supporters excluding town planning rationality and practices”.¹¹⁰

When Operation Garikai was launched, planning standards were abandoned. Stand sizes were reduced to 48m² and “local authorities were not fully involved in the planning stages”.¹¹¹ The housing projects were co-managed by the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and Ministry of Public Works (MoPW). The priority was on incremental housing development where by the government offered beneficiaries land and building materials to build houses for themselves. Due to lack of adequate funding, planning conflicts and political influence, the houses were handed over to beneficiaries at various stages of completion, such as completed units, window level, foundation level and site clearance level. Incremental development process is providing challenges to coherent and comprehensive urban development.

In some instances, urban planners prepared Operation Garikai layout plans “which raise questions as to why planners failed to point out that the program would not work”.¹¹² Planners were forced to succumb to naïve political visions explaining why most planners have left central and local government. The political culture in Zimbabwe’s urban governance is that “if one thinks differently, one has to leave or face subsequent victimization”.¹¹³

In 1982, when Queen Elizabeth was visiting Zimbabwe, people were relocated from Mbare to Churu Farm. When Ndabaningi Sithole took over Churu farm and wanted to house evicted people, “government relocated them to Porta farm and later moved to Hatcliffe, Caledonia

¹¹⁰ Interview with Rejoice Ngwenya, 06 June 2013.

¹¹¹ Interview with Key Informant E.

¹¹² Interview with Beth Chitekwe-Biti, 20 June 2013.

¹¹³ Interview with Beth Chitekwe-Biti, 20 June 2013.

and finally Hopely in 2005 during Operation Garikai”.¹¹⁴ Politicization of informal settlements makes it difficult to provide urban planning solutions. In addition, the government provided housing units instead of offsite infrastructure, against the advice of urban councils. The program was ‘dumped’ to urban councils. In the view of urban councils, “central government created problems with Operation Garikai and handed it over to cities”.¹¹⁵ In Harare, Operation Garikai houses were built in Whitecliff, a private land which the Constitutional Court ruled in favour of a private owner but government had already settled people.

Operation Garikai shows ad hoc planning, as it was not in the GoZ budget. Planning processes of land development (surveying, engineering designs, installation of service mains, planning permission) were never followed as land servicing only came after housing had been built. Completed housing is more visible than infrastructure, the political reason used to justify absence of infrastructure services during the program. Allocation of housing was political, as predominantly Zanu-PF supporters benefited. It is unusual to comprehend a housing project “driven by the Army with sergeant majors and brigadiers directing operations in the presence of housing and urban planning experts and authorities”.¹¹⁶

In Bulawayo, Operation Garikai is “riddled with political controversy between government and the city”.¹¹⁷ The council was forced to regularize the housing development as well as “providing water and sewer reticulation to the houses”¹¹⁸. However the city’s urban planning is facing serious challenges of integrating Operation Garikai into the city’s urban development plan. The political conflict emanated from double allocation of stands and housing units. The situation has been worsened by the involvement of the army in the project from construction to allocation. The housing trust in Bulawayo was chaired by Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) brigadier general “who was always in conflict with beneficiaries over double allocation.”¹¹⁹

The final allocation of Operation Garikai houses in Bulawayo by the housing trust led by army officials brought more confusion since it annulled decisions made by ministry of

¹¹⁴ Interview with Key Informant N.

¹¹⁵ Interview with Key Informant N.

¹¹⁶ Interview with Key Informant E.

¹¹⁷ Interview with Key Informant C.

¹¹⁸ Interview with Key Informant E.

¹¹⁹ Interview with Key Informant B.

national housing officials. The involvement of different actors resulted in multiple allocation of stands and houses to such an extent that there is no clear ownership of the project outputs. In the view of the Bulawayo city, “the council inherited a problem from government”.¹²⁰

During the handover ceremony of the houses from government to Bulawayo city council, the local government minister “warned the city authority not to reallocate the stands and houses and reiterated that no house built under Operation Garikai was supposed to be demolished on the grounds of inconsistency with the council bye-laws”.¹²¹ Bulawayo city council argues that, the government of Zimbabwe has “created a monster in the form of Operation Garikai and dumped the confusion to the city council”.¹²² The city is finding it difficult to integrate Operation Garikai housing scheme into the city’s urban development network due to a number of planning irregularities.

5.3 Conclusion

The chapter presented the interface between urban governance politics and urban management and planning systems in Zimbabwe. Politics within the urban governance realm compromise how cities are managed and planned. Key players in the urban governance politics include central government represented by the local government ministry, councillors, political parties and council administrative staff. The partisan nature and polarization within urban governance politics was evident and clear though acting to the detriment of proper urban planning and management. The next chapter presents the relationship between urban governance politics and service delivery.

¹²⁰ Interview with Key Informant E.

¹²¹ Interview with Key Informant A.

¹²² Interview with Key Informant D.

CHAPTER SIX: URBAN GOVERNANCE POLITICS AND SERVICE DELIVERY IN ZIMBABWE: SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

This chapter explains the state of service delivery in Zimbabwe as driven by urban governance politics. In particular, four service delivery areas of low cost housing, water and sanitation, public transport and road infrastructure are emphasized. With regards to low cost housing, I focus on allocation of land for housing, developments in council-led housing, low cost housing initiatives outside council, and a comparison of council and outside council housing initiatives. Reasons for shifting water and sanitation functions from urban councils to the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA), impacts of the shift to the delivery of water and sanitation functions, and the effects to residents of water and sanitation authority changes form the core of discussion on Water and Sanitation. For public transport, emphasis is placed on the seizure of bus termini by rank marshals and politicians, the subsequent effects of public transport chaos to residents and the causes of public transport crises over the study period. Finally, the chapter deliberates on road infrastructure focusing on the rationale for shifting vehicle licensing from Urban Councils to the Zimbabwe National Road Administration (ZINARA), effect of this shift on road infrastructure maintenance and development, reasons for post 2000 infrastructure dilapidation, and the awarding of council road infrastructure tenders. The ensuing section focuses on low cost housing.

6.1 Low cost housing

6.1.1 Allocation of land for housing

That there are considerable housing challenges in Zimbabwe's major cities is not in doubt. The housing challenge is constrained by supply and demand factors. The chief supply factor revolves around availability of suitable land for housing. There are problems 'associated with blockages to availability and actual delivery of land for low-cost and / or low income housing' (GoZ, 2009). This is despite the compulsory acquisition of land for urban expansion by the GoZ using the Land Acquisition Act (Chap 20:10). The Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement has gazetted 68 farms, (Harare – 44, Ruwa – 1, Chinhoyi – 1 and Bulawayo – 22), though due to legal challenges only four have been confirmed by the Administrative Court (GoZ, 2009). Land availability is a principal determining factor for housing delivery.

Urban councils and the state are the two principal allocators of housing land in cities. Land allocation and approval process is political. If one submits a land application proposal to any city council, if land is available and suitable for residential development, the city (executive staff) writes a report in response to the application. The report is discussed and a decision is taken by the council land committee. If the council land committee approves, the decision is taken to full council which takes a decision as advised by the land committee. However, “if council land committee is dominated by one party and full council dominated by another party, it complicates the process”.¹²³ Decisions are then interpreted in terms of politics.

The stipulated land allocation process was not followed as evidenced by post-2000 invasion of peri-urban farms and demolition of houses during OM/RO in 2005. Political parties capitalized on people invading land without following proper town planning procedures. A case in point is Zanu-PF which “saw mileage in Mbuya Nehanda Housing cooperative and facilitated the regularization and formalization of the housing cooperative”.¹²⁴ Post-2000 land allocations were inspired and driven by politics relegating normal procedures of land allocation. In some instances, after invading council, state or private land, land occupiers “facing evictions approach councillors to either seek reprieve or to be allocated land somewhere”.¹²⁵ People were using politics and political structures as a convenient way of accessing land.

State land is allocated by the stateland office (in the MLGRUD) “with provincial governors, and provincial administrators having great influence on who gets state land”.¹²⁶ Central government politicized the land allocation process and the effect spilled to local authorities. State land allocation is done through housing cooperatives, “most of which are Zanu-PF linked”.¹²⁷ Zanu-PF is in control of land, and party loyalists are the beneficiaries though not allocated according to housing waiting lists. In housing cooperatives like Hacliffe, Ushehokunze and Stoneridge farm, there are indications of contestation between CoH and the state as the former is ‘refusing’ to approve layout plans and connect water. These settlements

¹²³ Interview with George Masimba-Nyama, 20 June 2013.

¹²⁴ Interview with Key Informant E.

¹²⁵ Interview with Key Informant G.

¹²⁶ Interview with Key Informant E.

¹²⁷ Interview with Key Informant C.

are seen “as Zanu-PF projects spearheaded by the local government minister, evidence to a politicized and contested process”.¹²⁸

Council land is allocated by council. Council executive staff recommends what should be done to councillors. Previously, councillors had no business in land allocation. Councillors’ role was restricted to housing policy formulation and land allocation “was the executive’s role but councillors involved themselves because land is highly sought by people”.¹²⁹ Involvement in the land allocation process provides gateways for personal enrichment; explaining why the majority of MDC councillors are perceived to be corrupt. Councillors would sell land illegally and even the local government minister is sucked in corrupt land deals (CoH, 2010).

In general, land for low cost housing is lagging behind in terms of housing delivery. Shortage of land for low-cost housing in cities is evidenced by 37 slums in the city of Harare (DoS and CoH, 2012); as most local authorities lack legally developed land suitable for the development of low-cost housing (UNHABITAT, 2006). Local authorities are hamstrung to deliver the extent of housing need. Subsequently, occupation of land or farms around Harare for example Caledonia, and Whitecliff were necessitated by landless people in the name of political motivations. In the early 1990s, site and services programs supported by the World Bank and USAID enabled urban councils to deliver consistent housing programs.

Council has a prerogative to allocate land to councillors though “it is problematic as it escalates a culture of entitlement”.¹³⁰ In practice, councillors land entitlements covered high, low, and medium density, and industrial areas; a clear sign of primitive accumulation. Land accumulation by the local government minister shows massive corruption (as the minister owns houses and stand in 16 of the 92 local authorities).¹³¹ Councillors look up to the

¹²⁸ Interview with Key Informant D.

¹²⁹ Interview with Christopher Matumbike, 14 June 2013.

¹³⁰ Interview with Charles Mangongera, 19 June 2013.

¹³¹ 2 Glen View houses, 2 flats in Queensdale, A property in Katanga Township, Stand Number 1037 Mount Pleasant Heights, 4 Norton business stands, 3 Chinhoyi business stands, 4 Banket business stands, 1 commercial stand in Epworth, 2 residential stands in Chirundu, 4 commercial stands in Kariba, 1 stand in Ruwa, 1 stand in Chinhoyi, 2 stands in Mutare, 2 stands in Binga, 4 stands in Victoria Falls, 1 stand in Zvimba Rural, Chitungwiza (two residential and two commercial stands), Beitbridge (four stands), 20 stands in Crow Hill Borrowdale, 10 stands in Glen Lorne, 2 flats at Eastview Gardens (B319 and B320), 1 flat at San Sebastian Flats in the Avenues Harare, Number 79 West Road Avondale, Greendale house, Number 36 Cleveland Road Milton Park, Number 135 Port Road Norton, 2 Bulawayo houses, Number 18 Cuba Rd Mount Pleasant, Number 45 Basset Crescent Alexandra Park, 2 Chegutu houses, 1Glen Lorne house (Harare), 2 houses (Victoria Falls),

primitive accumulation exuded by the minister of local government, and think their participation in local government gives them entitlement.

Between 2000 and 2004 the mere change of faces and experience of benefits brought new dynamics to council decision making processes. Land allocation changed, as councillors “shared interests and mutual benefits when they got into office”.¹³² In terms of assets, “most MDC councillors had nothing, and thus prioritized amassing housing stands”.¹³³ Former MDC councillor argued that MDC councillors “were interested in housing stands and office and not service delivery”.¹³⁴ Here, the assumption that councillors are elected to improve service delivery is questionable.

Within councils, demand for housing land is initiated by the council department responsible for housing followed by urban planning processes and engineering designs. Land expropriation is done according to the Urban Councils Act Part X (Immovable Property). Section 152 of the Urban Councils Act (Chap 29:15) provides conditions for the alienation of council land. According to this Act, before selling, exchanging, leasing, donating any council land, council is obliged to publish its intention to do so in two newspapers, availing a copy of such notice to the public for 21 days and receive objections of such proposals within 21 days. The Urban Councils Act also mandates selling, exchanging, leasing, donating of land where there is a town planning scheme, with exceptions only possible with ministerial approval. This process was compromised and not followed.

The pricing of council land is done by councillors.¹³⁵ Land for housing is allocated by council to individuals using the Council Housing Waiting List Method on a first come first serve criteria. In Bulawayo City Council one has to pay a sum of USD 20 yearly to remain on the housing waiting list. Corruption has rendered this method useless as thousands have been on these lists for decades. There are “known cases of notable business people and politicians who bribe council officials to get housing stands overnight”.¹³⁶ Examples include a former

Stand along Simon Mazorodze Road, Norton (one stand), Avondale (two stands), 365 Beverly House (one stand), Bulawayo (three stands), Mica Point Kariba (one stand) (As published by state media (The Herald) in the minister’s divorce case.

¹³² Interview with Absolom Masendeke, 06 June 2013.

¹³³ Interview with Absolom Masendeke, 06 June 2013.

¹³⁴ Interview with Dale Dore, 03 June 2013.

¹³⁵ Interview with Key Informant G.

¹³⁶ Interview with Key Informant A.

Zanu-PF parliamentarian Phillip Chiyangwa (nephew to the President of Zimbabwe) who acquired a total of 109 properties (mostly land) (See Annex III for a full list of the properties) from councils through corrupt means. Such corrupt land acquisition as reported in the state media (Herald, November 29, 2013) came in the public view during the businessman's divorce with his wife.

The conventional method of land allocation on a first come first serve basis using the housing waiting list "have been compromised by corrupt councillors".¹³⁷ Councillors are of the view that "as long as land is in their Wards, they must have authority on land allocation". This facilitates corruption among councillors. Corruption severely affected the poor who depended on low cost housing. People own several housing stands while the "poor have limited access due bribes paid in accessing land".¹³⁸ The Special Investigations Committee's Report on city of Harare's land sales, leases and exchanges from the period October 2004 to December 2009 concluded the existence of rampant corruption in all council departments specifically with regards to land deals (CoH, 2010). Thus, the perception amongst home seekers is that "the land allocation process is corrupt and time consuming".¹³⁹

From a planning point of view, the process of acquiring a piece of land is very clear for instance compulsory acquisition or expansion of urban area through government proclamation. Nonetheless, "only in cases where Zanu-PF has no interest, law would apply".¹⁴⁰ Where the party had interests, law would not apply as evidenced by the (ab)use of youths to grab land in cities and forestall BMGF project in Mbare, Harare. Most open spaces in Harare have been invaded by Zanu-PF youth and supporters without council approval. In addition, the allocation of marketing stalls at Mupedzanhamo and Mbare Musika is controlled by Zanu-PF functionaries with little influence from Harare city council.

Central government through FTLRP acquired farms around cities which programme is Zanu-PF controlled with the MDC controlling urban councils. In the view of Zanu-PF, "giving land to MDC would entail promoting the MDC".¹⁴¹ This brought a dilemma in urban housing development as central government could not provide land to urban councils. Instead, Zanu-

¹³⁷ Interview with Christopher Matumbike, 14 June 2013.

¹³⁸ Interview with Christopher Matumbike, 14 June 2013.

¹³⁹ Interview with Beth Chitekwe-Biti, 20 June 2013.

¹⁴⁰ Interview with Key Informant H.

¹⁴¹ Interview with Key Informant N.

PF gave land to housing cooperatives without services resulting in the sprouting of unplanned settlements around cities. The idea of housing cooperatives is noble and beneficial but its politicization brings many challenges to coherent urban development. Within the CoH, “MDC councillors have created some housing cooperatives though they have not occupied land”.¹⁴²

Farms surrounding cities have been allocated to co-operatives, “with a view to create new constituencies that are loyal to Zanu-PF”.¹⁴³ The strategies worked well on a pilot project in Harare South where it is the only constituency retained by Zanu-PF over the past elections (2000-2012). Ownership through title deeds is deliberately delayed as a way to enforce loyalty. Occupants are threatened with repossession of stands if they are no longer visible in political gatherings. How long the strategy will work remains to be seen. Zanu-PF councillors who lost in urban councils continue to work in their Wards on parallel structures contending to represent people against the wish of the electorate.

Through the Urban Councils Act, local authorities have a role to allocate land for housing either for public or private development. Land allocation for housing is a highly political issue in Zimbabwe. First, councillors are involved in shady land deals by sprouting housing cooperatives mainly to guarantee support for re-election. Second, land allocation is done for self-enrichment by the councillors. In Zimbabwe, the role of a councillor is more of self-enrichment using public funds and resources than service. Third, the local government minister exercises too much powers to the detriment of the council. Through ministerial influence, “partisan housing cooperatives have been allocated land at under-valued prices”.¹⁴⁴ Most of these cooperatives have failed to deliver and in many cases, they have defrauded potential beneficiaries.

For most cities, available land for housing (in peri-urban farms) has been gazetted to become state land. As a result, acquiring urban land for expansion purposes and housing requires negotiation with the Ministry of Lands and Resettlement and MLGRUD. Urban councils found themselves with a need “to get land acquired under the FTLRP which counters the

¹⁴² Interview with Beth Chitekwe-Biti, 20 June 2013.

¹⁴³ Interview with Emmanuel Siraha, 30 July 2013.

¹⁴⁴ Interview with Elton Manjeya, 13 June 2013.

MDC programme for land distribution”.¹⁴⁵ Land for housing in councils relies on the benevolence of lands and local government ministers and “Zanu-PF thwarts this process so as to restrain the governance of MDC Councils”.¹⁴⁶ The introduction of Provincial Administrators and District Administrators made it more complex and bureaucratic for MDC to have control over land outside urban areas.

Through the Land Acquisition Act (Chap 20:10), Zanu-PF used the government compulsory land acquisition process as a conduit to get land access. Zanu-PF “mobilized and capitalized on landless people”.¹⁴⁷ Zanu-PF aligned housing cooperatives have “leadership that is political with cooperative names following liberation rhetoric”.¹⁴⁸ Zanu-PF rewarded FTLRP participants in urban areas with land and properties.¹⁴⁹ The party invaded peri-urban farms and “allocated stands to Zanu-PF supporters with the MLGRUD giving lease agreements”.¹⁵⁰ Many people in urban areas especially low income earners have “taken advantage of political allegiance to Zanu-PF to form cooperatives where they allocate themselves land and later push for the regularization of their housing schemes”.¹⁵¹ Politics became a convenient tool to land access.

In some cases, people occupying land in per-urban areas took over vacant land. Landlessness is a pure testimony of poor land delivery. Political structures came in after land occupation as “Zanu-PF took advantage of people benefitting through the FTLRP”.¹⁵² Despite political facilitation, one can argue that people had waited for a long time on the housing waiting list. This can be interpreted as a response to a complicated process of getting land in urban areas.

Housing cooperatives went beyond housing provision struggles to include land reclamation and challenging housing provision institutional arrangements (Masuko, 2008). The urban land question became critical than ever in Zimbabwean history, as social movements (CBOs and cooperatives) challenged the conventional way of housing provision. Most housing cooperatives were Zanu-PF aligned and most local authorities refused to accept these

¹⁴⁵ Interview with Rejoice Ngwenya, 06 June 2013.

¹⁴⁶ Interview with Rejoice Ngwenya, 06 June 2013.

¹⁴⁷ Interview with Beth Chitekwe-Biti, 20 June 2013.

¹⁴⁸ For example Herbert Chitepo, Sally Mugabe, Gushungo, and Face East.

¹⁴⁹ Interview with Andrew Mlalazi, 12 June 2013.

¹⁵⁰ Interview with Andrew Mlalazi, 12 June 2013.

¹⁵¹ Interview with Key Informant B.

¹⁵² Interview with Key Informant Q.

cooperatives as being “part of an illegal housing and urban planning system”.¹⁵³ Housing cooperatives are used as platforms for political membership mobilization.¹⁵⁴ Politically aligned housing cooperatives have easy access to housing land and are used as a way of gathering votes and rewarding those active in local politics.

Housing cooperatives have also posed serious consequences to ecologically fragile lands. For instance, in Mutare, Gimboki Housing Scheme is developing part of Dangamvura and Chikanga of which the areas are unsuitable for human settlements as the Dangamvura scheme is “on a mountain slope posing threats of inhabitants getting drowned in cases of slope failure due heavy and torrential rainfall”.¹⁵⁵ Hence, politics is over-riding issues of environmental integrity and preservation as well as planning principles.

Housing cooperatives are targets for political infiltration especially during elections. Some cooperatives such as Joshua M Nkomo (in Harare) “force members allocated stands to register four of their family members in that political constituency for voting purposes”. Housing linked voter registration and voting is an attempt to use cooperatives to garner more party supporters. The idea of housing cooperatives is political as it enabled managing the ordinary person’s political life to some extent.¹⁵⁶ In cities of Harare, Bulawayo, Masvingo and Mutare, it was evident that politicians would advise squatters to form cooperatives as a way to access housing stands. To join Zanu-PF linked housing cooperatives, prospective members would be asked to possess a Zanu-PF membership card even in MDC strongholds.

The issue of cooperatives is a socialist principle which is a Zanu-PF strategy which started before independence (for instance Cold Comfort in Harare). The MDC also realized that cooperatives “are the only way people can get quick access to land”.¹⁵⁷ Councillors gave preference to housing cooperatives quickening access to housing. However, there are cases where councils have been taken to court or councillors suspended on the basis that land was not properly exchanged.¹⁵⁸ Cooperatives have made significant progress in acquiring land from urban local authorities. For the year 2011, the CoH allocated 2954 residential stands to

¹⁵³ Interview with Beth Chitekwe-Biti, 20 June 2013.

¹⁵⁴ Interview with Precious Shumba, 09 July 2013.

¹⁵⁵ Interview with Key Informant A.

¹⁵⁶ Interview with Key Informant H.

¹⁵⁷ Interview with Key Informant G.

¹⁵⁸ In Kadoma Council chairperson fired, and Zvishavane, Council Chairperson and Director of Housing fired; Chitungwiza, Town Clerk arrested, convicted and fired, and MDC fire all its councillors).

76 housing cooperatives and 16 individuals on the housing waiting list (in excess of 500 000 home seekers) (CoH DCHS, 2011). During the same year, the city trained and registered 243 housing cooperatives with a total membership of 15, 311.

Allocation for housing land is characterized by confusion. One key informant bought land in Whitecliff, Harare from MoNHSA “though the land was being promised other prospective land seekers by some politicians”.¹⁵⁹ Moreover, the land in question here is at the centre of conflict between property owner (Pfungari Properties) and government. Land is a resource used to gain votes rather than a community development tool. A Zanu-PF official was allocating land in Hopely, a constituency that Zanu-PF has only managed to retain in all elections between 2000 and 2012. In Manyame, “politicians were allocating land without the knowledge of Chitungwiza municipality”. Another senior Zanu-PF official was allocating and selling housing stands nearer Harare International Airport “where people believed that the illegal housing scheme was a front for the local government minister”.¹⁶⁰ Land seekers are losing money in shoddy land deals spearheaded by politicians.

Council land is normally allocated to private developers, housing co-operatives and corporate consortium employer assisted schemes. Current strategies favour the allocation of un-serviced land to registered cooperatives; “as this is seen as a direct allocation to those in need of housing”.¹⁶¹ Co-operative members must meet certain conditions at council level, that is, they must be in the housing waiting list and not registered owners of a property within the greater Harare region which includes Chitungwiza and Norton. Housing cooperatives are being allocated infill stands and land close to existing suburbs so as to reduce the cost of off-site infrastructure. Land developers and employer consortiums’ are allocated farms that were recently incorporated into the new Harare boundaries “because they are better resourced to meet the huge infrastructural requirements of the periphery”.¹⁶²

During the inclusive government (2009-13), the ministries responsible for housing (MoNHSA) and land (MLGRUD) were controlled by two different political parties. The ministry responsible for land “allocated housing stands directly to beneficiaries”¹⁶³, usurping

¹⁵⁹ Interview with Key Informant L.

¹⁶⁰ Interview with Key Informant L.

¹⁶¹ Interview with Emmanuel Siraha, 30 July 2013.

¹⁶² Interview with Emmanuel Siraha, 30 July 2013.

¹⁶³ Interview with Key Informant I.

and circumventing the role of the MoNHSA. The effect has been the occupation of surveyed land without services giving problems to urban local authorities who do not have resources for off-site infrastructure. The MoNHSA has been forced to enter into partnership with land developers who possess land.¹⁶⁴ As a result, the MoNHSA with its finance partner Sunway City, a subsidiary of Industrial Development Cooperation which had land to deliver housing stands in Harare. The housing stands “were not affordable to low income earners and subsequently the housing waiting list could not be followed”.¹⁶⁵

In addition, the construction of Willowvale flats in Harare was financed through a loan of a USD25 million accessed from the World Bank in 2009. Loan repayment made housing units sold at higher price so as to pay back the principal and interest. It is clear that such schemes are not balancing housing provision and affordability as high income earners benefit from such schemes. The MoNHSA also runs its own housing projects for instance; the Ministry is developing and offering housing stands in White Cliff (Harare) and Lower Paradise Park (Marondera).

After 2010, land in general was no longer available in the four case study cities. Available small pieces of land, to some extent MDC tried to make its members benefit for example “in Willowvale flats, and Mufakose flats in Harare; and Kilan and Cowdry Park in Bulawayo city”.¹⁶⁶ The allocation of housing stands in Budiriro, Harare shows a significant role of political parties. Harare City Council “allocated 2000 housing stands in line with sympathetic MDC supporters”.¹⁶⁷ Zanu-PF quickly invaded the housing stands portraying contestation in land allocation. Existing land allocation methods are logically sound though political dimensions are worrisome. From a Zanu-PF political strategy, the infills are supposed to be allocated to its supporters “as a way to dilute the opposition constituency strongholds and narrow the gap as this becomes vital in national elections”.¹⁶⁸

6.1.2 Developments in council-led housing

The urban housing problematic in Zimbabwe is identical with critical shortages. The housing backlog is estimated to be at least 1 million, though there is a no comprehensive assessment

¹⁶⁴ Interview with Key Informant C.

¹⁶⁵ Interview with Key Informant I.

¹⁶⁶ Interview with Key Informant H.

¹⁶⁷ Interview with Key Informant H.

¹⁶⁸ Interview with Emmanuel Siraha, 30 July 2013.

to substantiate this figure (GoZ, 2012). By year 2000, most urban councils stopped housing projects aimed at giving completed housing units. Instead, councils provided land only with people providing infrastructure services themselves. High land servicing costs constrained development in council-led housing. Councils were even struggling to pay salaries for workers and the situation became worse after the dollarization period in January 2009. Central government is no longer providing Public Sector Investment Projects (PSIP) grants to local authorities, “necessitating a new local authority taxation mechanism”.¹⁶⁹ This development has led to the dominance of housing delivery by private players, CBOs, cooperatives and company assisted housing projects.

Up to 2000, local authorities benefitted from the National Housing Fund (NHF), PSIP, and partnerships with building societies in housing delivery. Local authorities had access to low interest bearing loans, both on open market and from government. This money was made possible because government had access to long term low interest loans from World Bank, African Development Bank (AfDB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) extended over periods of 25-30 years with a low interest rate (4-5%).¹⁷⁰ Zimbabwe failed to pay its debt to multilateral financial institutions (MFIs) resulting in the country only eligible to access costly loans of between 18-25% per annum outside MFIs.

A decline in housing finance resulted in a decline in housing delivery. For some time, “local authorities facilitated housing delivery through providing off-site infrastructure”.¹⁷¹ During the study period, loans from bilateral agencies such as USAID, and SIDA, that helped cities in providing off-site infrastructure could no longer be extended. Investing in off-site infrastructure is expensive because of high initial capital outlay. The city of Harare does not have the infrastructure capacity to support new housing developments. The sewerage treatment and water capacity, to support even an additional 100,000 housing units is not even sufficient. To that end, “the Iranian project aimed at building between 15, 000 and 20,000 housing units in Harare failed due to insufficient infrastructure”.¹⁷²

Urban planning is shaped around the British planning system of spacious stands, quality building materials, expensive and generous infrastructure. However, most urban councils

¹⁶⁹ Interview with Absolom Masendeke, 06 June 2013.

¹⁷⁰ Interview with Key Informant G.

¹⁷¹ Interview with Key Informant M.

¹⁷² Interview with Key Informant Q.

have accepted that the current housing delivery approach is untenable. The 2012 National Housing Policy reviewed the expensive conception of urban planning and housing delivery through allowing incremental development and emphasizing the importance of community based organizations (GoZ, 2012). In addition, cities have refocused internally, using different kinds of technology to make habitable houses as well as “reducing off-site infrastructure”.¹⁷³ For Cities of Harare, Bulawayo and Mutare the review of local development plans resulted in densification, reduction of building lines, stand sizes, roads, and creating semi-detached houses which in reality are an acceptance that there are no resources.¹⁷⁴ Cities are also allowing people to settle before infrastructure (incremental development) like sewer, water, and surfaced roads. Alternative methods of sanitation such as *ecosan* and boreholes are assisting low cost housing development.

Partnership arrangements which are not entirely council projects have increased in magnitude. Partnerships are that the Council provides the land and the developer provides the required infrastructure. Thus, council role is limited to land allocation and development control rather than ownership of housing projects. When housing provision is solely driven by a public sector institution, issues of affordability can be catered for. The City of Harare and Zimbabwe Building Society (ZBS) partnership housing stands “were unaffordable to low income households”.¹⁷⁵ The Old Mutual, Central African Building Society (CABS) and City of Harare housing project in Budiriro (Harare) aimed at delivering 5,000 stands is the largest post-independent housing initiative which is attributed to a networked and strong mayoral leadership.¹⁷⁶ However, the CABS-CoH partnership requires a “CABS bank account and a defined income bracket making it difficult for ultra-low income households to benefit.”¹⁷⁷ For low cost housing delivery, city council-partnerships with profit oriented organizations subvert issues of affordability. Urban councils in Zimbabwe are not able to provide housing alone due of capacity constraints. Table 10 (page 95) shows CoH partnership housing projects.

¹⁷³ Interview with Key Informant A.

¹⁷⁴ Interview with key Informants, A, B, F, M, K, O.

¹⁷⁵ Interview with George Masimba-Nyama, 20 June 2013.

¹⁷⁶ The project is attributed to the work of the City of Harare Mayor Muchadei Masunda (2008-13).

¹⁷⁷ Interview with George Masimba-Nyama, 20 June 2013.

Table 10: CoH Housing partnership projects (2008-11).

Name of project	Year Started	No. of housing units / residential stands
Slum Upgrading Project Dzivarasekwa	2011	480units
CABS Project in Budiriro	2009	5000 units
IDBZ	2008	72 units
CYBC (Mabvuku)	2007	42 stands
Shelter Zimbabwe (Chizhanje area, Mabvuku)	-	6-7000 stands
Pearl Properties	2010	Block of flats (132 units)
Glaudina Housing Development	2007	1351 stands

Source: CoH DHCS, 2012.

To put into perspective the other case study cities, Table 11 shows city-private sector partnership housing projects in Bulawayo, Masvingo and Mutare.

Table 11: Council-private sector partnerships in the cities of Mutare, Masvingo and Bulawayo.

Developer	No. of Stands Allocated	Completed Houses	Houses Under Construction
Mutare			
Aloe Enterprises	617	500	117
Pegasus	693	85	-
ZIMTA	1381	100	188
Aloe Enterprises	130	-	-
Dream House	333	-	-
Masvingo			
Treasure Consultants	500	16	21
KPM International	500	NIL	NIL
Mac Dowell	20	NIL	20
Steel Makers	7	6	1
NSSA	653	NIL	NIL
ZIMRE	437	NIL	NIL
Bulawayo			
Aggregate Properties	100	6	17
Glendinning	1004	244	204
Habek Deug	207	125	73
Bopse	381	197	205
ZIGEU	500	425	75
Standard Products	377	-	4
G G	116	-	-
Hardware	118	45	32
Glenkara Homes	1702	696	150

Source: Mapurisa, 2012: 57.

Table 10 and 11 demonstrates that local authorities are constrained to deliver housing projects without partnerships. Of the case study cities, the city of Harare is currently running an ultra-low income housing project financed by the BMGF. The project targets the provision of 480 housing stands together with infrastructure services. The project initially earmarked Mbare, the oldest suburb in Harare but “Zanu-PF claimed 51% of the housing units”¹⁷⁸, a clear

¹⁷⁸ Interview with Key Informants C, F, G, K, I.

indication of anti-developmental patrimonialism. Due to political contestation in Mbare, the project was subsequently moved to Dzivarasekwa extension, a move that can whittle down the expected project impacts.

Operation Garikai is the only Government of Zimbabwe directed universal project which has resulted in the provision of low cost housing in the cities of Bulawayo, Harare, Masvingo and Mutare between 2000 and 2012 as shown on Table 12.

Table 12: Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle projects

Mutare				
Garikai Phase I Chikanga 3	537 stands allocated		272 houses Completed	31 under construction
Garikai Phase II Chikanga 3	333 stands allocated to consortium		Servicing of the Stands completed	-
Bulawayo				
Cowdry Park	7 000 stands Allocated		200 houses Completed	718 under various Stages of construction
Masvingo				
Runyararo North Garikai I	340 stands allocated		100 houses Completed	240 are still to be developed

Source: Mapurisa, 2012: 56.

6.1.3 Low cost housing outside council

In terms of housing delivery, non-state actors provided more quantities as compared to local authorities. This can be attributed to capacity and changes in the housing delivery system. The Zimbabwe Homeless Peoples Federation technical partner argued that the state is not the best institution to housing delivery, “as government is not efficient in housing delivery”.¹⁷⁹ Therefore, the government should create enabling conditions such as housing finance and bye-laws. Urban social movements such as the Alliance of DoS and ZIHOPFE managed to deliver 15,000 tenured stands and 3,000 housing units to its members.¹⁸⁰

There are a number of institutions involved in housing delivery. Table 13 (page 97) presents the key institutions involved in housing delivery and their main functions.

¹⁷⁹ Interview with Beth Chitekwe-Biti, 20 June 2013.

¹⁸⁰ Interview with Beth Chitekwe-Biti, 20 June 2013.

Table 13: Housing delivery components and assigned institutions

Institutional category.	Main functions.
Central government.	Land allocation, land-use planning, land policy (tenure issues) and general regulation of standards (e.g. building materials, housing finance etc.) and provision of technical assistance where needed to Councils and other stakeholders. Under Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle Government also went as far as producing own materials.
Local authorities.	Land allocation (state land allocated to Councils), land use planning, on and offsite servicing, technical backstopping of community groups.
Private sector.	Land development and servicing (build-own-operate-transfer and other public-private partnership schemes), actual home construction (contractors and employing organizations), supporting employees' housing programmes.
Building material suppliers.	Production and distribution of relevant materials.
Financial institutions.	Provision of finance to home builders and land developers by local and international banks, building societies and private investors.
Construction sector.	Land servicing and home building.
Civil Society Organizations.	Savings mobilization, social mobilization of home seekers and capacity building, technical backstopping of such groups.

Source: Chatiza and Mlalazi, 2009.

Through the national housing loan development facility, central government explored joint ventures with the private sector and local authorities in delivering housing. The majority of these joint ventures however cater for medium and high income earners. Table 14 shows GoZ joint ventures in Harare, Bulawayo, Masvingo and Mutare in delivering high density housing.

Table 14: National Housing Loan Development Facility Joint Ventures

Location	Project	Status	%complete
Harare	Dzivarasekwa	800 high density stands 300mm diameter sewer line Roads, sewer and water reticulation services	30%
Bulawayo	Parklands Home Link	137 high density stands Roads, sewer and water reticulation services	70%
Masvingo	Nemanwa	300 stands Roads, sewer and water reticulation services	5%
Mutare	Chikanga	201 high density stands Roads, sewer and water reticulation services	100%

Source: MEPIP, 2012:127-128.

Cooperatives and savings groups played a significant role in terms of housing delivery for low income communities. In particular, “these developments were concentrated in peri-urban areas using incremental housing development though infrastructure services are poor”.¹⁸¹ This is largely due to the flexibility of these groups to survive in a hyperinflationary environment. Despite these attempts, “the challenge is how to increase the scale of these operations”.¹⁸² Scalability and changing the regulatory framework are key considerations in addressing low cost housing concerns. Urban housing co-operatives think and practice

¹⁸¹ Interview with Innocent Chirisa, 06 June 2013.

¹⁸² Interview with George Masimba-Nyama, 20 June 2013.

numbers (Kamete, 2006b: 985). Official government statistics reveal that cumulatively CBOs delivered over 10, 000 units (serviced stands and finished houses), while building societies delivered more than 40, 000 units, thus non-state actors kept some reasonable momentum in housing delivery (MoNHSA, 2013). Between 2000 and 2012 the City of Harare allocated 12,554 housing stands to 254 housing cooperatives with 2,301 housing units completed.¹⁸³

Housing cooperatives have been effective but in some cases cooperative management defrauded members for their own benefit without delivering agreed goals. At one stage, this prompted the local government minister to issue a directive compelling all cooperative members to stop paying contributions to cooperatives. In reality people were suffering, “as some cooperative leaders, known Zanu-PF functionaries continued forcing people to pay or risk losing housing stands”.¹⁸⁴ Most housing cooperatives are dominated by Zanu-PF in terms of membership and leadership making these housing schemes highly politicized.¹⁸⁵ Low cost housing projects have been hijacked by politics as a government planner observes:

I have attended several cooperatives including the one currently developing Hatcliffe Extension. Zanu-PF slogans are the norm before every member passes any message during cooperative meetings. This cooperative got that land through the local government minister despite several court contestations by the land owner.¹⁸⁶

The pace of development in cooperative housing schemes is very slow owing to the little monthly contributions (between USD 20-100). The contributed money caters for all administration and development activities such as water, sewer and road construction. Despite this observation, Table 15 (page 99) shows the expansion of low cost housing outside council in the City of Mutare.

¹⁸³ Statistics collated from the City of Harare Housing Cooperatives Register.

¹⁸⁴ Interview with Key Informant D.

¹⁸⁵ Interview with Key Informant B.

¹⁸⁶ Interview with Key Informant A

Table 15: Housing projects in the City of Mutare

Name of Project	Number of units	Project Status
Chikanga Infill Housing Scheme	166 stands	Being serviced with water sewer and roads.
Hobhouse III high density residential scheme	±1 432 stands	1 200 stands have water and sewer. Occupied already.
Greenside low density scheme	181stands.	Occupied since 2005. No roads.
Shangani (Murambi West) residential infill	32 stands	Stands allocated in 2003 and 2008. There are no services.
Birkley South	180 low density residential stands.	Allocated in 2008. No services
Dangamvura Golf Course	54 high density stands	Finalizing roads
Dreamhouse housing scheme	365 high density residential stands	Roads outstanding. Water and sewer partially completed
Beira Corridor Phase 1	320 low density residential stands	Roads and sewer on course
Gimboki South.	5 500 high density residential Scheme	Yet to start. Run by Gimboki Housing Consortium

Source: Adapted from CoM, 2010.

The period under focus (2000 – 2012) in terms of housing was hindered by the melting down of the economy. Despite the said challenges; Table 15 depicts the performance of Shelter Zimbabwe as a single entity. These projects have been completed and duly awarded certificates of compliance by the relevant local authorities.

Table 16: Shelter Zimbabwe's housing provision in Harare and Epworth

Period	Number of Stands Serviced	Location (Residential Area)	Socio Economic Status	Project Status
2000-2002	14	Hatfield	Medium density	Completed
2000-2002	20	Prospect	Medium Density	Completed
2000-2002	328	Railway reserve Phase 1 Glenview	High Density	Completed
2004-2005	371	Railway Reserve Phase 2 Glenview	High Density	Completed
2004-2005	122	Hopely	High Density	Completed
2007-2009	139	Rockview Park Phase 1A (ELB)	Medium Density	Completed
2010-2012	173	Rockview Park Phase 1B (ELB)	Medium Density	Nearing Completion

Adapted from Shelter Zimbabwe Company profile.

From the foregoing, low-cost housing is no longer spearheaded by local authorities but through housing cooperative schemes.¹⁸⁷ The role of the council has been limited to land allocation. Cumulatively, low cost housing schemes outside council have significantly contributed to housing delivery. The challenge is that housing cooperatives circumvent urban planning laws and in some cases the housing waiting list. Council urban services management is riddled with corruption, “as urban councils are taking money without making

¹⁸⁷ Interview with Elton Manjeya, 13 June 2013.

sure there is proper compliance to planned services”.¹⁸⁸ The situation is further aggravated by housing cooperatives in which people are refusing to pay for urban services arguing that they were not allocated land by councils.

6.1.4 Comparison of council and outside council housing initiatives

Because of the huge number of housing cooperatives in many urban centers and real estate companies which are into land development, housing initiatives outside council have contributed significantly to housing provision. Furthermore, central government’s Ministry of Housing and Social Amenities is contributing to housing provision using compulsorily acquired land for housing development (for example, Dzivarasekwa (Harare), Chikanga (Mutare), Parklands Home Link (Bulawayo) and Nemanwa (Masvingo) (MEPIP, 2012). Council is doing less in housing delivery “due bankruptcy, corruption and limited machinery to embark on housing projects”.¹⁸⁹

Council led housing schemes benefitted the middle income, such as civil servants and not low income individuals. A case in point is the Willowvale flats in Harare that were built as a low cost housing project but ended up benefitting high income groups.¹⁹⁰ Outside council housing initiatives specifically CBOs and cooperatives have contributed more to the delivery of low cost housing. Council partnerships with private firms mainly concentrate on medium and low density housing projects due to the profit motive of private capital.

Councils have redefined their role from a provider of housing to only a virgin land allocator and regulator of private and co-operative housing developments. There is not a single housing project wholly under taken by cities of Harare, Bulawayo, Masvingo and Mutare since 2000.¹⁹¹ At the same time, councils have allocated land to various co-operatives and private developers. Comparisons can however be made between the private sector and cooperative movement as these have significant housing development projects in urban areas.

Some of the land in peri-urban areas is owned by private companies and its use for council housing depends on councils’ ability to negotiate with private companies. Urban council’s success was much muted because of the financial crises. Councils could only provide un-

¹⁸⁸ Interview with Key Informant C.

¹⁸⁹ Interview with Key Informant A.

¹⁹⁰ Interview with Key Informants D, E, K, I, M.

¹⁹¹ Interview with Emmanuel Siraha, 30 July 2013.

serviced land. Housing waiting list ballooned with housing cooperatives providing a significant contribution to housing shortages. Housing cooperatives were associated with Zanu-PF politicking making cooperatives a tool for political expediency. Nonetheless, “if housing is only about a roof, outside council initiatives performed well, though infrastructure provision in these areas remains a big challenge”.¹⁹² The next section looks at the role of urban governance politics in the delivery of water and sanitation.

6.2 Water and Sanitation

6.2.1 Rationale for shifting water and sanitation functions to ZINWA

In June 2006, Cabinet of Zimbabwe issued a directive compelling all urban local authorities to transfer water and sanitation functions to the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA). The directive raised contestation between central and local government. At that time, water contributed the biggest percentage of council revenue making it a cash cow to local authorities. The Second report of the parliamentary portfolio committee on local government on the takeover of water and sanitation functions presented to the Senate on 11th April 2007 put the following figures as the percentage contribution of water to total council budget (Table 17).

Table 17: Contribution of water to council budgets

Local authority	% contribution of water account to total budget
Bulawayo	71
Harare	89
Mutare	55
Average	71,7

Source: PoZ, 2007.

Water and sewerage infrastructure constituted over 60% of urban assets (PoZ, 2007). The takeover made ZINWA a huge cash resource, “where Zanu-PF would occasionally take the revenue to finance the party”.¹⁹³ Following this argument, the shift of water and sanitation functions from local authorities to ZINWA “show political motivations rather than technical

¹⁹² Interview with Innocent Chirisa, 06 June 2013.

¹⁹³ Interview with Rejoice Ngwenya, 06 June 2013.

or economic”.¹⁹⁴ Central government thought of various ways of getting resources and a parastatal presented such opportunity.

The MLGRUD initiated the take-over of water and sanitation functions, “something that most local authorities were not expecting from the parent ministry”.¹⁹⁵ The city of Bulawayo refused to hand over functions to ZINWA and Harare, Mutare and Masvingo councils view the city as not having much problems compared to other cities.¹⁹⁶ The ZINWA board had strong characters that were “power hungry and wanted to take more than they can deliver”.¹⁹⁷ Central government did not realize inherent challenges such as deterioration of water and sanitation infrastructure. Government tried to find a solution to a problem it did not fully understand.

On the other hand, at the takeover by ZINWA, local authorities were struggling to deliver water. Despite political motivations, one can argue that central government might have thought of reducing overburdening local authorities. ZINWA was managing catchment areas, prior to the June 2006 directive. Water is managed as a cycle and therefore one can argue that it was a comprehensive water management attempt.

The takeover of water and sewerage functions was a power battle¹⁹⁸ evidenced by the fact that the transfer of assets from urban councils to ZINWA circumvented legal compliance issues like asset valuations. ZINWA was selling bulk water to CoH from a city of Harare dam. Politics of that time saw “water as a game changer”¹⁹⁹ with whoever controlling water seen as powerful. Any institutional changes within government “benefits Zanu-PF top officials with businesses or relatives in business”.²⁰⁰ Nonetheless, the Urban Councils Act did not change as it was only a policy directive from central government. In other words according to Sections 168²⁰¹ and 183²⁰² of the Urban Councils Act, urban councils were mandated to provide water and sanitation services in their areas of jurisdiction.

¹⁹⁴ Interview with Absolom Masendeke, 06 June 2013.

¹⁹⁵ Interview with Key Informant M.

¹⁹⁶ Interview with Key Informants A, D, F, M.

¹⁹⁷ Interview with Key Informant Q.

¹⁹⁸ Interview with Precious Shumba, 09 July 2013.

¹⁹⁹ Interview with Key Informant Q.

²⁰⁰ Interview with Dale Dore, 03 June 2013.

²⁰¹ Powers of council in regard to sewerage and drainage.

²⁰² Powers on council in relation to water supply.

The shifting of water and sanitation functions to ZINWA marked another step in government's re/centralization drive. The official government position was that "local authorities had failed to efficiently provide service" (PoZ, 2007). Water is a basic human right and "local authorities were labeled to be violating that human right."²⁰³ Government used the gimmick of human rights with an ulterior motive. Resultantly, local authorities were weakened further because of a depleted revenue resource. In 1986, CoH power stations were taken over by the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA), a central government controlled entity. Central government is determined to takeover and manages directly urban services.

The state thought it was "mighty and powerful and that it can do anything".²⁰⁴ Since 1995, local authorities were beginning to have less money and "we had a city like an ice block and suddenly started melting".²⁰⁵ Elements of the state wanted to take over and deliver services directly. Health, education and electricity were taken over from local authorities by the state. Government thought it had the budget and technical expertise to deliver but it failed to understand the implications of the take-over. The motive was to strip the powers of councils which were dominated by the MDC. Zanu-PF wanted better control by starving local authorities of revenue so as to make sure MDC run councils fail.

6.2.2 Impacts of the shift (6.2.1) to the delivery of water and sanitation functions

Central government failed to administer ZINWA. The supply of water in Harare became more erratic with the takeover as there was constant bursting of major water pipelines (Chirisa and Jonga, 2009). The services collapsed nationwide. Water treatment became difficult and water supply during ZINWA was a nightmare. Water cuts and persistent water shortages in all case study cities were frequent. Sewerage was overwhelmed due to lack of maintenance and sewer bursts became the order of the day.

Revenue collection was poor and not systematic as evidenced by huge unpaid water bills when local authorities took over. ZINWA lacked capacity to manage water and sanitation services. Under ZINWA, urban water became hazardous as evidenced by the 2008 cholera outbreak. ZINWA was inexperienced, under capacitated, too political and the delivery of safe

²⁰³ Interview with Key Informant S.

²⁰⁴ Interview with Andrew Mlalazi, 12 June 2013.

²⁰⁵ Interview with Andrew Mlalazi, 12 June 2013.

and clean water to residents was secondary.²⁰⁶ The shift was at the expense of urban residents who paid the price of suffering (water borne diseases and water rationing) with UNICEF drilling hand pump boreholes in most cities to rescue the situation. The formation of ZINWA was a “litmus test by Zanu-PF to have a stake in service delivery to urban residents”.²⁰⁷ However, ZINWA turned out to be a nightmare to Zanu-PF.

The shift from local authorities to ZINWA created more problems than which existed before prompting reversal to local authorities in January 2009. ZINWA performed worse than local authorities, the water crisis became more pronounced until the Parliament of Zimbabwe demanded water and sewer functions to be returned back to local authorities. ZINWA personnel were “poorly remunerated compared to when under local authorities negatively affecting personnel morale and performance”.²⁰⁸ To date, there is a personnel crisis which is still unresolved, as some urban councils refused to take back the politically appointed staff. In Gwanda, the council refused totally to take ZINWA personnel. ZINWA began charging Gwanda town council exorbitant rates for water, with the council passing the button to residents portraying contestation and confusion in water management.

Central government’s recentralization of water and sanitation was a retrogressive move. Government rushed decisions to contain something with very little research making the shift to ZINWA an ‘emotional decision’. After looting all the resources, government returned the ‘empty shell’ to local authorities. A senior Planning School lecturer noted: “*Kwakaenda mota kukadzoka vanhu*” (movable assets were taken to ZINWA but only workers were returned to urban councils).²⁰⁹ Massive looting featured the process. ZINWA was taking water pumps “from urban councils (i.e. Ruwa) and installing them on top Zanu-PF officials’ farms”.²¹⁰ Assets were given to ZINWA with more liabilities returned to urban councils.

To substantiate government’s rushed decision and the politicization of such decision; I cite the Auditor and Comptroller General’s 2007 report which shows the extent of ZINWA’s incapacity in delivering its mandate before even taking over from urban local authorities. The

²⁰⁶ Interview with Key Informant B, D, G, K, I M, N.

²⁰⁷ Interview with Key Informant A.

²⁰⁸ Interview with Christopher Matumbike, 14 June 2013.

²⁰⁹ Interview with Innocent Chirisa, 06 June 2013.

²¹⁰ Interview with Rejoice Ngwenya, 06 June 2013.

government ignored the findings and recommendations of the Auditor and Comptroller General. The Auditor and Comptroller General revealed that:

My audit revealed that ZINWA was failing to provide uninterrupted water supply and water of the right quality to its customers in small towns, growth points and institutional customers such as Prison Services, Zimbabwe Republic Police and the Defence Forces,...My visits to the water treatment stations in the catchment areas revealed that maintenance of plant and equipment was not being done according to standards set by management, and according to the manufacturer's specifications,...Based on the station inspections which I conducted in the catchment areas, I concluded that maintenance was not being taken as a priority by the authority. I observed that pumps and pipes were rusty and leaking and not all gate valves were working,...The tanks (reservoirs) were not cleaned at regular intervals. The walls of treatment tanks at most stations were almost falling apart due to cracks and leakages caused by lack of maintenance (Auditor and Comptroller General, 2007; cited in PoZ, 2007).

Residents started complaining about ZINWA's failure arguing that local authorities were better off than ZINWA and government backtracked. However, councils were in the weakest position to run water and sanitation services after taking over from ZINWA. City of Harare had no chemicals, and was "struggling to meet sanitary standards, which was a challenge in most urban local authorities".²¹¹ This is despite the fact that water and sanitation is a key human development service defining standards of living. To date, 31 urban local authorities have taken back water functions with the exception of one local authority (Plumtree).

When water and sanitation functions were returned to local authorities, government made sure that the function is delivered effectively using another parastatal, Environmental Management Agency (EMA). EMA concerns itself with water quality, emissions, sewerage disposal among other things and "if urban councils are not careful, water revenue goes back to government through EMA".²¹² EMA was put in place as the chief custodian of environmental preservation and stewardship. Most local authorities view EMA as a government strategy to siphon local government resources (ZILGA, 2012a). Zimbabwe's political system is corrupt, that it is very difficult to trust politicians and any system they put in place. The shift to ZINWA and back to urban councils created serious challenges in terms of water administration and billing. Local authorities had not willfully surrendered water and

²¹¹ Interview with Absolom Masendeke, 06 June 2013.

²¹² Interview with Key Informant G.

sanitation services, and “therefore were sabotaging ZINWA”.²¹³ The sabotage was evidenced by poor and inconsistent water billing by local authorities which resulted in sharp water revenue decline handed over to ZINWA.

6.2.3 Effects to residents of water and sanitation authority changes

ZINWA did not properly manage the available resources and it returned a deteriorated infrastructure. The ZINWA issue can be likened to “giving someone an intact water fetching gallon and one return it leaking”.²¹⁴ Non delivery bred distrust in residents. Water charges increased. Frequent bursting of water pipes was driven by lack of maintenance skills, knowledge and experience by the new authority. In many suburbs such as Corowborough, Glen Norah and Glen View (Harare) water become very scarce and used to be provided two days per week. Water standards were not closely monitored. Residents were supplied with dirty and un-purified water because the “contracts with companies which used to supply Harare City council with water chemicals were terminated with new found suppliers failing to meet the demand”.²¹⁵ Residents were the worst affected as a planner pointed out:

They are the ones who went for days, months, and years without running water. They are the ones who experienced raw sewage gushing out of sewer pipes. They are the ones who had to look for alternative sources of clean water.²¹⁶

This is in addition to paying exorbitant water bills and rates for a service not delivered. Residents succumbed to diseases out-break like cholera and typhoid. The cholera outbreak claimed 4000 lives (ICG, 2009). However, part VII, Section 100 of the Health Act compels Local Authorities to prevent or remedy danger to health arising from “any well or other source of water supply or any cistern or other receptacle of water, whether public or private, the water which is used or likely to be used by man for drinking or domestic purposes...”

In this case local authorities had no role to play in fulfilling this mandate.

Extracts (Box 3, page 107) from reports on Rockview Park, Shelter Zimbabwe’s (SZ) housing project in Epworth shows challenges faced by residents as a result of the collapse of ZINWA.

²¹³ Interview with Precious Shumba, 09 July 2013.

²¹⁴ Interview with Innocent Chirisa, 06 June 2013.

²¹⁵ Interview with Key Informant A.

²¹⁶ Interview with Elton Manjeya, 13 June 2013.

Box 3: Rockview Park Water Supply sequence of events.

A project feasibility study of Rockview Park in Epworth carried out in 2006 indicated that the underground water supplies of the area were not adequate to have the drilling of boreholes. As a result the same study recommended that the housing development be connected to Harare water through the existing 350mm Ventersburg - Ruwa main.

On 20 May 2008, SZ submitted an application to ZINWA for a water connection from the existing 350mm ZINWA Ventersburg - Ruwa main that runs parallel to Harare - Marondera railway line. On 09 September 2009, ZINWA approved the water connection of Rockview Park to the Ruwa main. In 2009 ZINWA handed over water supply services to Local Authorities. City of Harare and Ruwa refused to recognize the connection of the project to the Ruwa main arguing that ZINWA made an error it should have consulted the two councils prior to granting the connection. In a letter dated 24 January 2011 City of Harare advises SZ to negotiate with Ruwa Local Board because the line was financed by Ruwa and hence they own the line. In a response to SZ application to regularize the water connection on 27 February 2011, Ruwa Local Board advises that it cannot negotiate with a private developer but Epworth Local Board (ELB). Negotiations between the two Local Authorities continue to drag on at the expense of the developer and beneficiaries.

SZ had to look for an alternative by approaching another private developer Sunway City which is adjacent to Rockview, who have developed water reservoirs at Ventersburg and owns a separate water line running parallel to the Ruwa line into Sunway City. SZ sought connection of the development to the Sunway line. In a letter dated 10 October 2011, Sunway City advised SZ that the water infrastructure was adequate for their development only and it was not negotiable for other developments. SZ being a major competitor of Sunway City the decisions of Sunway City could have been motivated by out playing its competitor in terms of sales as they were marketing similar products.

Source: Various Shelter Zimbabwe Documents and letters.

Box 3 indicates that, the absence of a centralized water authority created by the handing over of water supply functions from ZINWA to local authorities created serious problems of co-ordination in sharing water resources between local authorities. There is essentially no integrated planning of water resource infrastructure between developments in proximity areas but under different local authority jurisdiction. For Harare metropolitan province, CoH, ELB and Ruwa Local Board have not developed a common infrastructure that would service Zimre Park, Sunway City, Rockview Park and other upcoming housing projects in Epworth, Ruwa and Harare. To have a Shelter Zimbabwe bulky water line crossing the Sunway City bulky water line and the two water lines getting supplies from the same source shows lack of integrated planning of off-site infrastructure by local authorities concerned.

When ZINWA took over water and sanitation functions, it employed local authorities to bill and collect water charges. Revenue collection system went down as local authorities were not collecting the charges properly, “as a way of sabotaging ZINWA”.²¹⁷ When water and sanitation services were handed to local authorities, local authorities revised the revenue

²¹⁷ Interview with Key Informants B, D, K, O, R.

collection system. As a result, bills increased and residents were unable to pay prompting central government interference discouraging local authorities from cutting water supplies. It affected the viability of local authorities as it “increased the number of people not willing to pay”.²¹⁸ The quality of services is dependent on the financing the service gets. By owing council large sums of money, residents were actually making councils unable to provide the service. Partially, this explains why suburbs were going for months without water as local authorities revenue shrank in addition to obsolete water and sanitation infrastructure.

6.3 Public Transport

6.3.1 Rank marshals and political players

Ranks marshals besieged and controlled bus termini in cities, which can be argued as the proliferation of the informal sector. Due to harsh macro-economic environment, people were doing anything for survival. Nonetheless, it became political as politicians recognized political mileage and capitalized. The process of bargaining followed, with “Zanu-PF protecting rank marshals on condition to attending party meetings”.²¹⁹ The underlying cause was economic in nature with politics riding on economic concerns. Politics superseded everything in the informal sector. Urban control was difficult because the “MDC risked losing support”.²²⁰ Inadvertently or intentionally, the MDC became a victim of political correctness.

The city of Harare has a traffic population of 160 000 (entering CBD per day during business hours), 800 000 registered vehicles, 7000 parking bays in the CBD and 16 000 licensed vehicles an average per year (CoH DUPS, 2012). Registered commuter omnibuses in Harare during year 2010 were 1,038 and 825 in 2011 (CoH DUPS, 2012). It is reported that there are more than 6, 000 unregistered commuter omnibuses in Harare.²²¹ Traffic in cities was uncoordinated with rank marshals being the only visible ‘regulator’. This was compounded by the fact that local authorities do not have control over commuter omnibus licensing contrary to discussions concluded in 1997 and a draft Statutory Instrument prepared to allow control of commuter omnibus licensing by local authorities (ZILGA, 2012a).

²¹⁸ Interview with Christopher Matumbike, 14 June 2013.

²¹⁹ Interview with Key Informant E.

²²⁰ Interview with Absolom Masendeke, 06 June 2013.

²²¹ Unofficial figures according to the City of Harare.

Zimbabwe lacks a broader plan in terms of public transportation system. Rank marshals were controlled by “individuals with money and political power”.²²² Ultimately, rank marshals had become a law unto themselves. The military intervened after rank marshals had beaten a soldier and the situation improved thereafter. Vigilante groups like Chipangano linked to rank marshals terrorized residents; a signal of lawlessness and a manifestation of powerless urban councils. Rank marshals disrespected the public to the extent of beating anyone who did not follow their instructions. With functional bye-laws and traffic police, “the victimization of passengers and residents by rank marshals could not have happened”.²²³

Harare Residents Trust, an urban social movement advocating for effective representation of Harare Metropolitan Province residents is of the view that, it was Zanu-PF’s economic tactic to sustain its youth wings through the creation of vigilante groups such as Chipangano and Upfumi Kuvadiki.²²⁴ Rank marshals were youth organized under Zanu-PF vigilante groups with state protection and access to state resources. Youths were collecting money on bus termini, setting fares with Zanu-PF protection, a clear and willful violation of the law. Zanu-PF extended its hands in the chaos that characterized urban central business districts. Rank marshals acted like “mafias extorting people with the blessing of state institutions like the Police”.²²⁵ More so, there was unending conflict between rank marshals and commuter omnibus drivers. These drivers had in many instances Zanu-PF bosses and were being quizzed by the public (who were not prepared to pay any fare hike), police and rank marshals.

On average each commuter omnibus paid to rank marshals USD6 per day with 5,000 commuters operating 364 days gives an annual income of USD10, 92 million. One would therefore be confronted with questions as to whether rank marshals were making money for themselves or a cartel. A senior Planning school lecture at the University of Zimbabwe argued that rank marshals were “working in partnership with Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) and political cronies making the process complex and intricate”.²²⁶ Rank marshals flourished at “bus termini remitting the bulk of their daily takings to a political syndicate aligned to Zanu-PF”.²²⁷ This explains why “rank marshals charged commuter

²²² Interview with Charles Mangongera, 19 June 2013.

²²³ Interview with Charles Mangongera, 19 June 2013.

²²⁴ Interview with Precious Shumba, 09 July 2013.

²²⁵ Interview with Dale Dore, 03 June 2013.

²²⁶ Interview with Innocent Chirisa, 06 June 2013.

²²⁷ Interview with Elton Manjeya, 13 June 2013.

operators using the language and regalia aligned to Zanu-PF”.²²⁸ The failure by the police to deal with rank marshals meant that there was an underhand propping rank marshals.

Of the case study cities, Harare was worst affected. A city official argued that, “Bulawayo City Council is run administratively and there is law and order with Harare being run politically and there is no law and order”.²²⁹ City of Harare was failing to even collect rates from flea markets “as the rentals were paid to Zanu-PF structures”.²³⁰ This view was verified and confirmed when the researcher visited flea markets pretending to be in need of having a flea market. Discussions with five individuals indicated Zanu-PF supremacy in handling flea markets rentals. This development makes Zanu-PF supreme to any authority.

6.3.2 Effects of public transport chaos to residents²³¹

The public transport chaos did not negatively affect residents per se though predictability and organization were poor. Zimbabwe in general was reacting from a crisis every time as there was little evidence of investment in preparedness planning. Residents benefitted more than they suffered. Due to transport chaos, congestion was rife though citizens had a choice, variety and access. The urban public transport sector was too crowded and over-traded resulting in the oversupply of public transport, reducing the transport cost. Public safety was crippled as “commuter drivers drove without driving licenses coupled with the proliferation of unroadworthy vehicles”.²³² Several accidents occurred with most commuter omnibuses uninsured. Safety and security were the biggest fatality. Most accidents which occurred in CBDs were also caused by commuter omnibuses that would either be running away from the ZRP or over speeding.

It became difficult to regulate omnibus fares and rank marshals increased fares at will. A practicing planner noted that:

In some instances, residents ended up paying more. They were also subjected to verbal and physical abuse by the rank marshals. There were also thieves amongst the rank marshals who

²²⁸ Interview with Key Informant A.

²²⁹ Interview with Key Informant N.

²³⁰ Interview with Key Informant N.

²³¹ This section also draws insights and experiences of the researcher as a resident of Harare and frequent visitor to Bulawayo, Masvingo and Mutare.

²³² Interviews with Key Informants A, C, J, L, R.

were stealing from the unsuspecting residents. The rank marshals also contributed to the pollution of the city by relieving themselves in service lanes and littering.²³³

Rank marshals emotionally and physically harassed the public as they competed to get passengers to load commuter omnibuses. Many old and young people “lost their belongings due to theft during the process of queuing to access public transport”.²³⁴ The public were also affected by fare hikes in areas furthest from city centers as there was no fare monitoring. Hence, uniformity and consistence in prices disappeared. Noise pollution characterized most CBDs as rank marshals touted all day soliciting for clients. Also related to this include drug abuse, quarrels and fights in CBDs by competing rank marshals.

A considerable number of senior Zimbabwe Republic Police officers own commuter omnibuses, retarding impartial law enforcement. Clampdown on rank marshals positively affected people as fares reduced from USD4 to USD2 to and from a journey. It was a blessing for people as sanity prevailed at ranks and transport became more efficient than before.

6.3.3 Causes of public transport crises over the years

The increase in population has not been matched by an equal increase in public transport infrastructure investments over the years. The decline of industrial activities in industrial areas also meant that most residents travel to the City centre on a daily basis where most activities are concentrated. The flow of traffic in Harare is not distributed along roads leading to industrial zones (e.g. Workington, Southerton, Willowvale and Msasa). Instead all traffic is directed towards the CBD because of “low industrial activity in the aforementioned areas”.²³⁵

The liberalization of public transport created numerous individual players who are not coordinated. Due to the absence of barriers to entry, the public transport business in cities is overtraded increasing the levels of competition. The unsustainable level of competition made commuter operators to do “anything to survive the competition and break even”.²³⁶ Increase in commuter omnibuses made traffic management challenging for city managers. Due to increase in private commuter omnibuses, termini facilities have failed to cope. To substantiate this, Table 18 shows the city of Harare planned termini facilities.

²³³ Interview with Elton Manjeya, 13 June 2013.

²³⁴ Interview with Key Informant A.

²³⁵ Interview with Key Informant M.

²³⁶ Interview with Key Informant C.

Table 18: City of Harare Planned termini facilities

Rank Location	Area Served	Minibuses	Buses	Rank Location
Fourth Street Bus Terminus	Hatcliffe, Domboshava, Tafara, Mabvuku, Epworth, Masasa Park, Highlands, Mandara, Ruwa, Chishawasha	279	4	Fourth Street Bus Terminus
Charge Office	Hatfield, Zengeza, Makoni, Sunningdale, Seke	232	–	Charge Office
Market Square	Budiriro, Glenview, Machipisa, Kambuzuma, Western Triangle, Mufakose, Glen Norah, Christon Park	330	–	Market Square

Source: City of Harare, 2010.

Planned termini facilities in the four case study cities are inadequate in terms of capacity and maintenance. Termini infrastructure is unable to absorb the increasing number of commuter omnibuses. Due to adjacent developments, “the physical expansion of the existing termini is not possible”.²³⁷ The transport section of the City of Harare indicated that there is need to increase efficiency and relevance of the existing planned termini infrastructure (Chakamba, 2010). Revamping existing termini to improve functionality, attractiveness and competitiveness so as to lure commuter omnibuses is important.

Incidental bus termini have developed as a coping mechanism. Incidental termini are informal commuter services area that lack basic amenities like toilets, shades and loading bays. These include former on-street parking provisions which have been converted and designated by the city council as commuter omnibus ranking facilities and unofficial areas dotted across city centre were commuter omnibuses load and drop off passengers (Chakamba, 2010). For city of Harare, Table 19 (page 113) shows a number of created incidental bus termini.

²³⁷ Interview with Key Informant B.

Table 19: Incidental bus termini in the City of Harare

Termini location	Area serviced	Minibuses	Buses
Western side of Mbuya Nehanda Street between Nelson Mandela and Kwame Nkrumah Avenue	Norton	25	-
South side of Kwame Nkrumah Avenue between Mbuya Nehanda Street and Harare Street	Belvedere	60	-
Eastern Side of Mbuya Nehanda Street between Jason Moyo Avenue and Nelson Mandela Avenue	Kuwadzana Extension	36	-
Southern side of Nelson Mandela Avenue between Mbuya Nehanda Street and Harare Street	Dzivarasekwa Extension	46	-
Northern side of Kwame Nkrumah Avenue between Chinhoyi Street and Mbuya Nehanda Street	Mt Pleasant	60	-
Western side of Jason Moyo Avenue between Mbuya Nehanda Street and Harare Street	Malbereign/ Westgate	70	-
Western side of Chinhoyi Street between Albion Street and Robert Mugabe Road	Westgate	41	-
Western side of Mbuya Nehanda Street between Jason Moyo Avenue and Speke Avenue	Malborough	45	-
Western side of Chinhoyi Street between Nelson Mandela Avenue and Kwame Nkrumah Avenue	Warren Park	140	-
Northern side of Nelson Mandela Avenue between Chinhoyi Street and Mbuya Nehanda Street	Dzivarasekwa	-	10
Western side of Chinhoyi Street between Speke Avenue and Albion Street	Southernton	35	-
Eastern Side of side of Seke road off Rail over bridge	Manyame Air Base	17	-
Rezende Street South	Epworth	53	-
Robson Manyika road opposite Charge Office	Seke	59	-
Northern side of Bank Street between Harare Street and Kaguvi	Chinhoyi and Bindura	118	-

Source: City of Harare, 2010.

Incidental bus termini as shown on Table 19 made traffic management difficult. This was compounded by limited resources at the disposal of municipal police.

6.4 Road Infrastructure

6.4.1 Reasons for taking vehicle licensing from Urban Councils to ZINARA

The Vehicle Registration and Licensing Act (Chap 13:14) provides local authorities as Roads authorities with the power to collect vehicle licensing revenue. The Vehicle Registration and Licensing Act Chapter 13:14 Section 31(1) reads:

Notwithstanding anything in any law but subject to section 38 and subsection (3), (5) and (6) a local authority may, in consultation with the Road Administration and by notice published by the Minister in statutory instrument in the prescribed form, fix a tariff of fees in respect of vehicles ordinarily kept at night within the area under control or administration of a local authority to be paid for licenses, temporary licenses, temporary identification cards ... and the issue of other documents by a local authority in respect of vehicles and such fees shall be

charged, levied and collected for the benefit of the Road Fund and the local authority may by like notice and amend or replace such tariff or fees.

The beneficiary of such fees is the road fund, which in terms of the Act means Zimbabwe National Road administration (ZINARA).

Furthermore, Section 31(2) of the Act provides that:

The proceeds of fees charged, levied and collected in terms of subsection (1) shall after deduction by the local authority of any administrative fees fixed by the Road Administration in terms of section 54, be held by the local authority on behalf of the Road Fund and be used by the local authority in a manner approved by the Road Administration.

The Act mandates local authorities to collect and administer vehicle license fees. It is recognized that local authorities in Zimbabwe had been collecting motor vehicle licenses with some degree of success.

ZINARA was created in 2001 through the Roads Act (Chap 13:18) with the main aim of road administration and the management of the Roads fund. In 2010, at the time when local authorities were placing orders for motor vehicle license books, they were surprised to learn that the license fees collection functions had been removed and placed into the hands of Zimbabwe Posts and Telecommunications (ZIMPOST) with no formal communication from ZINARA or the Ministry of Transport, Communication and Infrastructure Development (ZILGA, 2012b). Vehicle licensing functions were taken away from local authorities to ZINARA through a government directive. The Vehicle Registration and Licensing Act (Chap 13:14) did not change. Central government realized the fast deterioration of infrastructure and deteriorating central revenue funds and looked for an avenue to exploit. Taking vehicle licensing became “the easy way out”.²³⁸ Here, it can be argued that the centralization of vehicle licensing through ZINARA was aimed at coordinated infrastructure development.

The purpose of vehicle licensing fees is road infrastructure maintenance. However, very few local authorities were failing to account for the money due to misappropriation (i.e. paying for salaries at the expense of roads). The Minister of Transport used an excuse of one RDC

²³⁸ Interview with Key Informant K.

(Wedza) which misused vehicle licensing funds as the reason for withdrawing the function from local authorities (ZILGA, 2012b). Section 32(1) provides for circumstances where minister may collect fees on behalf of local authority:

If in the opinion of the Minister, a local authority fails or is unable to collect all or any part of the fees payable to it in terms of this Act, the Minister may undertake the collection of such fees on behalf of the local authority and recover from such local authority any costs incurred by him in that connection.

Due to poor accounting systems, “there were also fake road licenses depriving local authorities’ revenue”.²³⁹ In addition, the enforcement of vehicle licensing by the Municipal police was weak resulting in inefficient revenue collection. Based on these two reasons, one can argue that local authorities were responsible for the decision taken by the government. However, local authorities are of the view that each local authority “should have been advised of its shortcomings before such drastic actions were taken and that the current arrangement of distributing funds through ZINARA is unsustainable”.²⁴⁰

The idea of recentralization by the government was “premised on power, control and opportunities for rents”.²⁴¹ ZINARA is an attempt by government to centralize vehicle licensing and fees collection. Government had no money to build rural roads and decided to take the function from local authorities so as to spread the money across the country. ZINARA’s distribution of licensing fees has raised a lot of concerns and debate as the minister of transport skews allocation of vehicle licensing funds to Zanu-PF strongholds. ZINARA plays a redistribution role to all provinces irrespective of number of cars and road coverage; an indication of the folly of government’s recentralization drive. Allocation by ZINARA does not take into account the geographical concentration of license payers.

The ZINARA vehicle licensing takeover disconnected licensing to what the city can afford to manage (absorption levels). Decentralization of roles and responsibilities remained with revenue centralized. Cities were no longer in control of the supply side of urban transport. Central government interference in road management with ZINARA affected the ability of local authorities to repair and build roads through vehicle licensing of motorists.

²³⁹ Interview with Key Informant G.

²⁴⁰ Zimbabwe Local Government Association (ZILGA) position paper on Vehicle Licensing.

²⁴¹ Interview with Key Informant L.

Centralization through ZINARA raises questions of distribution efficiency and the City of Harare “showed displeasure with the revenue allocation process”.²⁴² Urban councils have no direct control of vehicle licensing putting local authorities in a weak position to perform road maintenance functions.

Urban councils are of the view that “where they are making some revenue, central government takes over the function”²⁴³. To that end, urban councils are victims of a difficult and complex political environment. Six council officials argued that central government had no reliable revenue streams therefore vehicle licensing was a remedy to government bankruptcy. The nature of politics in urban Zimbabwe is synonymous with MDC. Zanu-PF tried to take political life out of urban areas through “centralizing possible revenue streams for MDC run councils”.²⁴⁴ One can argue that ZINARA was an attempt to under-resource urban councils such that councils fail to get enough revenue to service urban areas so that failure is ascribed to MDC run councils. Urban areas have been battle fields by virtue of being run by the MDC; “every aspect of it, be it water treatment, pot holes, are contested and politicized”.²⁴⁵

Central government is committed to have direct control over local authorities’ potential revenue generating streams so as to under-resource MDC run councils. If the MDC had access to vehicle licensing revenue, “the party would make significant developments in infrastructure development and Zanu-PF would be seen as a failure”.²⁴⁶ Away from politics, two questions arise for interrogation. These are: previously when urban local authorities had vehicle licensing responsibility, what is that they achieved? How are the ZINARA funds accountable and used for road maintenance? These two questions could not be fully ascertained with data available to the researcher. Nonetheless, it is clear that ZINARA is “mechanism that ensures funds from vehicle licensing are used to benefit roads maintenance and not salaries of local authorities’ personnel”.²⁴⁷

²⁴² Interview with Key Informant M.

²⁴³ Interview with Key Informant B.

²⁴⁴ Interview with Key Informant E.

²⁴⁵ Interview with Key Informant E.

²⁴⁶ Interview with Key Informant B.

²⁴⁷ Interview with Precious Shumba, 09 July 2013.

Government realized the “collapse of ZIMPOST; a parastatal despite having huge infrastructure around the country”.²⁴⁸ It was essential to rescue ZIMPOST and therefore government took over the function from local authorities. It seems that the collapse of ZIMPOST was burdened to local authorities, as central government made sure that ZIMPOST collected ZINARA license fees. The Government of Zimbabwe has a long history of “taking over functions from local authorities with one reason that is access to funds”.²⁴⁹ ZINARA, ZESA, ZINWA, and ZUPCO allow central government to direct service delivery operations through parastatals. It also became easy to use service delivery commandeered through centralization to garner political support.

6.4.2 Net effect of this shift (6.4.1) on road infrastructure maintenance and development.

ZINARA is maintaining national roads only, though not comprehensively. Thus, ZINARA is looking at “one’s face and not the rest of your body”.²⁵⁰ Access roads in all case study cities are derelict and unattended signifying little or no improvement. When someone hits a pothole in cities, “one thinks of council and not ZINARA”.²⁵¹ In major cities like Harare and Bulawayo, people pay more traffic levies but when allocating ZINARA funds, equity issues are considered rather than the number of cars. Fund allocation criteria are wrong, since it suffocates largest contributing cities. One can argue that ZINARA is a wrong model to urban road infrastructure maintenance.

The allocation of ZINARA funds from both toll gates and vehicle licensing is questionable as some “local authorities in Zanu-PF strongholds (Mashonaland province (Bindura and Zvimba) have benefitted more than other big cities”.²⁵² Local people must have full control of their resources. However, this is not the case as revenue collected in major cities like Harare and Bulawayo is being taken to benefit people in other areas who might not have contributed. Moreover, revenue generated to benefit roads, “is channeled elsewhere by the government as ZINARA money was diverted to pay arrears to the World Bank”.²⁵³

²⁴⁸ Interview with Key Informant G.

²⁴⁹ Interview with Key Informant H.

²⁵⁰ Interview with Andrew Mlalazi, 12 June 2013.

²⁵¹ Interview with Key Informant K.

²⁵² Interview with Precious Shumba, 09 July 2013.

²⁵³ Interview with Key Informant S.

The net effect to road infrastructure maintenance is a “serious and negative one, the same effect with ZINWA and ZESA”.²⁵⁴ In the past Mutare, Kadoma, Harare, Gweru and Bulawayo generated their own electricity until 1986 when ZESA was created and people are still feeling that effect today. Instead of government focusing on power generation and network development, government through ZESA are focusing on distribution. That centralization which happened gradually between 1990 and 2005 destroyed service delivery. However, centralization in Zimbabwe goes back to a one party state where government tries to do everything for the people.

The association of rural district councils (RDCs) and Urban Councils argued to the local government ministry that the impact will be highly negative in that roads will not be maintained and more legal suits will arise and council will lose significant amounts of funds compensating the complainants. In addition, Zimbabwe Local Government Association (ZILGA) noted with concern the public outcry due to poor roads resulting in local authorities, and residents/stakeholders losing confidence in their local authorities (ZILGA, 2012b).

ZINARA has no accountability pressure, “since it does not have any constituency except being part of a central government ministry”.²⁵⁵ The researcher could not determine the efficiency, and corporate accountability of ZINARA. It was also difficult to ascertain the accountability mechanism for toll gates and vehicle licensing funds. In broadest sense, ZINARA revenue should support infrastructure development and capacity building of local authorities in infrastructure maintenance. It was also established that ZINARA is not too divorced from central government, making the entity prone to a “revenue generating vehicle for central government”.²⁵⁶ ZINARA funds are not properly accounted for as “USD 20million is reported to have vanished”.²⁵⁷

6.4.3 Reasons for post 2000 Infrastructure dilapidation

Road construction standards were severely compromised. This can be attributed to either absence of quality control or corruption in council construction works. Substandard products which are not durable, and temporal solutions provided by most local authorities explain the

²⁵⁴ Interview with Key Informant H.

²⁵⁵ Interview with Key Informant O.

²⁵⁶ Interview with Key Informant L.

²⁵⁷ Interview with Key Informant H.

sub-standard infrastructure in place.²⁵⁸ Private property developers were cheating home owners by using sub-standard road equipment materials which last for only 6-7years instead of 20-25 years.

Of all the case study cities, there are no infrastructure rehabilitation and development plans in excess of a 20 year planning period. Local authorities do not prioritize planning and “without benchmarks, city authorities cannot be assessed”.²⁵⁹ Plans with well-articulated indicators are crucial aspects to measure performance. Incompetence, poor planning, wrong priorities, and staff bloating affected the capacity of urban councils to maintain infrastructure. The MLGRUD introduced results based management framework, though at present it is still a grey area. Challenges of maintenance can also be attributed to central government which is no longer providing PSIP grants that can support road maintenance. A formula for sharing road maintenance between the state and urban councils seem dysfunctional and non-transparent. The operation of ZINARA resembles “ratepayers subsidizing the state rather than the reverse”.²⁶⁰

Some new suburbs have no roads at all. Before 2000, roads and sewer infrastructure were built first before house construction but post-2000; people were allowed to build without infrastructure. The situation is haphazard as councils no longer have enough money to put infrastructure before house construction. The state of infrastructure is dilapidated, “due to a combination of politicization of road infrastructure construction and maintenance, and economic instability”.²⁶¹

6.4.4 Awarding of council road infrastructure tenders

Tendering is opaque, “with no plans and time for councillors to devote to this process as councillors are preoccupied with taking decisions”.²⁶² The lack of transparency created chaos leaving everything to uncertainty and cloudiness. Corruption marked road infrastructure tenders, as corruption thrived on lack of transparency. In most tenders “as long as councillors were involved, there was evidence of corruption”.²⁶³ The tendering process is defrauding public funds because of overpricing due to the constructed process (paying councillors and

²⁵⁸ Interview with Key Informants D, H, M, R.

²⁵⁹ Interview with Absolom Masendeke, 06 June 2013.

²⁶⁰ Interview with Key Informant Q.

²⁶¹ Interview with Christopher Matumbike, 14 June 2013.

²⁶² Interview with Dale Dore, 03 June 2013.

²⁶³ Interview with Absolom Masendeke, 06 June 2013.

the service to be provided). As a result, councils suffered due public funds misappropriation. Corruption became a critical source of living to the detriment of residents.

The awarding of tenders is not clear, although the council advertises inviting tender bids. However the tender selection criteria are not public knowledge. Tendering is contested issue because most companies that “were awarded the tenders either belong to council officials or their political counterparts”.²⁶⁴ The researcher was denied by the four cities a roaster of all tenders awarded during the period under study. Tendering was also controlled by the local government ministry, with tenders given to Zanu-PF sympathizers. Umguza, Ruwa, and Harare councils were forced to pay in advance by the MLGRUD for tender services not yet provided.

6.5 Conclusion

The chapter presented how service delivery was affected by urban governance politics. Research findings indicate that service delivery suffered most due to contestations and confusion among political parties, city administration, city political wing and central government. It is also evident that politics of survival and appeasement were prioritized during the study period leading to the neglect of key service delivery considerations (water and sanitation, low-cost housing, public transport and road infrastructure).

²⁶⁴ Interview with Elton Manjeya, 13 June 2013.

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY DIRECTIONS FOR URBAN GOVERNANCE IN ZIMBABWE.

Key summaries and conclusions are based on the interface between urban governance politics and service delivery. Recommendations are developed based on the key conclusions and findings. In particular, I explain policy directions to improve service delivery in urban areas of Zimbabwe. The subsequent section presents key conclusions.

7.1 Conclusions

Considering the role of politics in urban governance, the crisis of service delivery in urban Zimbabwe is a political crisis driven by the political impasse between the MDC and Zanu-PF. That the urban governance system in Zimbabwe is a creation of a one party state is not in doubt. The rise of the Movement for Democratic Change heralded a period marked by contestation, confusion and change. Contestation emanated from the contest for control of the urban constituency between MDC and Zanu-PF. Change manifested itself in the rise of the MDC in controlling urban councils, with the decline of Zanu-PF support in urban areas. Confusion revealed itself through the actions of the local government ministry which relentlessly interfered and distorted the operations of urban councils. The local government minister became the ‘god father of all local authorities’ or the ‘defacto Mayor of Zimbabwe’. Urban councils became weak as service delivery was politicized with party structures more powerful than urban administration. Political contestation brought confusion as it became difficult to determine who was in control of urban affairs. Elected councillors and mayors were suspended or fired with central government taking over the delivery of some urban services.

Nonetheless, centre-local relations have been problematic for a long time, even when Zanu-PF was the only dominant party. In 1998, central government fired a Zanu-PF Mayor (Solomon Tawengwa) when the city of Harare went for days without water. During the period under study, at the centre of the problem between urban local authorities and central government relations is a legislation challenge. The Urban Councils Act (Chap 29:15) and its amendments had serious operational and political ramifications on the autonomy and management of urban affairs. Three important legal issues need to be underscored here. First, the Urban Councils Act gives excessive and unrestrained power to the local government minister. Second, the abolition of Executive Mayors undermined the importance of citizens’

voice as the Town Clerk became more powerful than elected councillors. Third, the provision allowing the Local Government Board to appoint senior council heads of departments has largely been manipulated by the local government ministry to effect partisan appointment of loyalists in key council posts.

Ministerial powers to suspend councillors, appoint commissioners, and reinstating expelled councillors ultimately affected service delivery as people elected in some cases have not been given the chance to serve and deliver. For instance, Mayor Elias Mudzuri was elected by Harare residents but due to excessive ministerial powers, the Mayor was fired despite positive and significant contributions he made in his short term in office (1 year). The subsequent Zanu-PF (Makwavarara) commission presided over intensive service delivery deterioration and massive corruption in land deals.

In February 2010, a new twist to urban governance contradictions emerged as the MDC fired the entire Chitungwiza Municipality councillors and the local government minister protected the fired councillors. The party's decision was premised on lack of good governance, accountability and failure to deliver amongst councillors. In some instances, the caliber of councillors from the MDC was poor and corrupt. People contesting to be councillors were not driven by desire to change people's lives but driven by bravado to challenge Zanu-PF, as well as earning a livelihood. The caliber of MDC councillors questions the qualities that should be exhibited by councillors such as professional experience, respected, and senior citizens of the society.

The relationship between central and local government is meant to strengthen the functioning of urban councils as defined within the law. The local government ministry plays supervisory and monitoring roles. Local authorities are supposed to furnish their operations to the ministry periodically. In principle, this relationship as defined by the Urban Councils Act is meant to enhance service delivery. However, the actions of the local government minister are perceived as anti-service delivery with supervision viewed as an impediment to service delivery. A case in point is the council budgeting process which the minister took longer to approve budgets with inflation taking effect. In accordance with the Urban Councils Act (Chap 29:15, Section 288b), local authorities submit the proposed budget for the minister's information, though the minister took it as permission seeking process. One can interpret this as over performing the supervisory role. Moreover, the local government minister interfered

in the setting of rates. Rates objections from the local government minister on behalf of government have often resulted in the incapacity of local authorities to deliver services.

Politics severely compromised the profession and practice of urban planning. It is evident that planners succumbed to politics of patronage at the expense of urban residents and town planning principles. In fact, the Zanu-PF regime defeated town planning. Urban planning law only applied where Zanu-PF had no interests. The failure of urban planning manifested in the infamous Operation Murambatsvina, which left an estimated 700, 000 people homeless. Central government used town planning laws and regulations to back a hasty and insincere Clean-up Operation. Urban planning was exposed, with the efficacy of the profession questioned. Planners interviewed indicated that, the profession of urban planning is weak and to some extent confused. Yet, some semblance of organized urban planning in Zimbabwe still exists.

The housing challenge in Zimbabwe is synonymous with enormous shortages and bottlenecks. The major challenge constraining housing is the availability and politicization of suitable land for housing. Beginning 2000, Zimbabwe embarked on the Fast Track Land Reform Programme, which program gave Zanu-PF access and control over peri-urban farms - a critical supply factor for urban development expansion. Zanu-PF had control over most peri-urban land and the MDC controlled cities. It was therefore difficult for the MDC to acquire peri-urban land for housing development, as this would mean direct confrontation with Zanu-PF. Land was or is a political resource used to canvass votes in urban areas.

Due to land shortages, it is clear that urban councils are failing to provide adequate land for housing. Despite this, housing cooperatives have sprouted, making the most significant contribution to low-cost housing post-2000. Housing cooperatives have challenged the conventional norms of urban planning and housing development. Inevitably, incremental planning is evident which has serious impacts on comprehensive urban infrastructure planning.

The Zimbabwean case depicts a central government which is not committed to local authorities' autonomy in running and managing urban affairs. This is substantiated by central government's continued re/centralization that resulted in the empowerment of government parastatals like ZINWA, ZINARA, and EMA to play a critical role in urban service delivery.

ZINWA shows an attempt by central government to directly connect with urban residents through service delivery commandeered by the state. There is evidence that the failure by government to run ZINWA further restrained the relations between government and urban residents. The reversion of water and sanitation functions to local authorities coincided with a vigilant Environmental Management Authority fining local authorities polluting the environment. Urban councils are of the view that, the approach by EMA is meant at siphoning council revenue to central government.

The introduction of ZINARA in collecting and managing vehicle licensing fees ahead of local authorities shows a clandestine approach by central government. The move exposed the MLGRUD as the ministry failed to defend local authorities. The ZINARA vehicle licensing takeover disconnected licensing to what the city can afford to manage (absorption levels). Decentralization of roles and responsibilities remained with revenue centralized. ZINARA is rehabilitating major national roads leaving city access roads unattended. Central government interference in road management with ZINARA affected the ability of local authorities to repair and construct roads through vehicle licensing of motorists. Centralization through ZINARA raises questions of distribution efficiency as major cities are uncomfortable with the new arrangement.

Politics of patronage and rents were more powerful than any urban administration. The control of bus termini by politically aligned youth is testament to this assertion. State institutions like the Zimbabwe Republic Police, could not reign in touts in central business districts of most cities. The public transport system was chaotic and dangerous to passengers. No state institution bothered. Lawlessness took effect, as politically aligned 'mafia' extorted and terrorized the public. There is evidence of a political cartel involving senior politicians protecting rank marshals and sharing the proceeds of extorted money. Where there is no law and order enforcement, cities are difficult to manage as city managers are weakened.

In summary, attributing the state of service delivery to economic collapse or political contestations poses a strong attribution challenge. For example, experiencing these political tensions in a normal economy, what would have been the impact? This question is difficult to answer with practical evidence, as the situation it provides is speculative. What is clear is that the political contestations seriously affected service delivery in cities. Having laid down key conclusions, the ensuing section explains some policy directions.

7.2 Policy Directions

Local Authority Capitalization

The state of infrastructure in Zimbabwean cities is dire and dilapidated. The provision of urban functions and services is reliant on urban infrastructure. The urban population has tremendously increased whilst there has been no major urban infrastructure expansion works undertaken over the past 13 years. In as much as urban councils are keen on providing services, they are constrained by limited existing infrastructure. Urban councils are losing a considerable percentage of revenue in repairing dilapidated infrastructure. It is therefore essential for urban councils to prioritize infrastructure investment planning. The capital expenditure budget for urban councils should significantly improve or be predetermined through law and policy.

Defined centre-local relations

Zimbabwe cannot sustain a situation where central and local governments always contest on matters of urban planning and management principles. Matters of principle should be executed as defined in law and policy and not left for politicians to decide as corruption and bickering takes effect. Relations between central and local government determine the latter's thrust in service delivery. Law and policy should be clear on the sharing of roles, responsibilities and revenues between central government and urban councils. A common and shared vision and commitment to govern together between central and local government is important in Zimbabwe's urban governance system.

Council reorientation

Councillors should stick to the mandate of overseeing services delivery to the public and desist from corruption. The gesture by the MDC to fire some of its councillors who were involved in corruption is exemplary. Political parties should ensure their councillors are delivering services to people. There is need to demonstrate proper governance with discernible results. Councils should invest in professionalism. Young, talented and dynamic individuals should be tapped into council administration to foster modern technologies and methods of city governance. In addition, there is need to select men and women of integrity to serve as councillors. Examples to emulate include Florence Chitauru and Dr. Timothy Stamps who started as councillors and ended up government cabinet ministers. The culture of

entitlement requires robust checks and balances so that councillors operate within a set and defined reward mechanism.

Support to urban governance institutions

State institutions are weak and the social fabric of the society is torn apart. Therefore, mending the society through institutional reform and capacity building is imperative. Bringing accountability and transparency in urban councils is crucial. There is need to put incentive mechanisms to foster performance and dissuade corruption amongst workers in councils. The present scenario where councillors have little authority over personnel performance affects service delivery. Councillors do not have power and resources to run urban councils, which two the local government ministry has.

Contracting out or out-sourcing

Urban councils must focus on core functions by looking at services and functions they possess a comparative advantage. According to the Urban Councils Act (Chap 29:15), urban councils are mandated with functions of sidewalk construction, sewerage and drainage, parking, omnibuses and other transport services, refuse collection, fire services, development control, making of by-laws and regulations, valuation and assessment of property for rating, property rating, among others. These functions are not proportionate to the capacity and size of an urban council. It is prudent for local authorities to streamline their functions through collaborating with the private sector and other non-state actors in the delivery of services. It means that some council services should be commercialized or privatized, and these services must not be monopolized but be exposed to the open market so as to allow fair competition.

If urban councils embrace contracting out, this calls for a change management program involving reaping stakeholder efforts and resources in service delivery through guiding coalitions. However, this is difficult in politically contested environments as political will should be tapped in. Stakeholders who matter should be part of the change process irrespective of them being political allies or adversaries.

Alignment of local government Acts to the New Constitution.

The New Constitution of Zimbabwe specifically Chapter 14 brings devolution of power in particular to provincial, metropolitan councils and local authorities. The new constitution provides a new dispensation for local governance in Zimbabwe. There is need to revamp the

local government system so that local authorities are given authority to run urban affairs. Local authorities should be empowered to generate own resources where it is feasible. The Executive mayoral system is effective for service delivery enhancement as evidenced during the term of Executive Mayors in Zimbabwe. Thus, an immediate return to executive mayoral system provides positive results to service delivery. The introduction of the Executive Mayor puts to an end the era in which the local government minister acts as the 'Mayor of Zimbabwe', as it allows elected officials to run urban councils.

Aligning local government statutes (Urban Councils Act, Rural District Councils Act, Regional Town and Country Planning Act) with the new constitution is an important milestone in making sure that local authorities are autonomous and accountable in providing services to people. After aligning local government statutes to the New Constitution, residents' awareness is critical. Community awareness should take the form of what type of central and local government existed before, and new relations and their impact to service delivery.

Prioritization

Though it is clear that politics and the macro-economic situation were key in affecting service delivery, urban councils were not innovative beyond this reality. Politics became a scapegoat for lack of imagination and innovation. Urban councils lack strategic thinking and planning that allows them to take advantage of the prevailing political and economic circumstances. Prioritization in urban councils is key as some Town Clerks are earning salaries of USD 15000 - a clear sign of wrong priorities. The employee benefits system for urban councils require revision as it must be in sync with collected revenue and services to be delivered.

Broadening Local Government Board Representation

The current LGB representation structure leaves other key local government stakeholders. The composition of the LGB (Section 116 of the Urban Councils Act) comprises of representative of the Urban Councils Association, Municipal Workers Union, Town Clerks, Public Service Commission and two people with public administration experience. In practice, the traditional and vocal UCAZ has been sidelined as Zanu-PF created the Zimbabwe Local Government Association (ZILGA) which is now taking over. The constituency of two experienced public administration officials is not defined. Two academic Local government training institutions that are the Department of Rural and Urban Planning,

University of Zimbabwe and Department of Local Governance, Midlands State University require representation on the LGB. It is envisaged that the two centers of local government teaching and training gives the academic input of enhancing systems of urban governance as well as in-cooperating recruitment needs to curricular. In addition, residents associations should be represented on the local government board.

Ministerial powers

First, the powers of the Minister of local government as enshrined in the Urban and Rural councils Acts should be revised and reduced to allow local authorities autonomy. There are sections which allow the minister to have unrestrained powers over the elected mayors and councillors. The fact that a minister can willfully dismiss and appoint Mayors and councillors indicates that councils cannot be entirely blamed for service delivery failure. This is further supported by senior appointed personnel by the minister who are in actual sense the ‘eyes and ears’ of the minister in council matters. Revising these Acts will enable smooth delivery of services in contested areas such as Harare, Bulawayo and other cities where residents elect the MDC to manage urban affairs though facing stiff resistance from central government.

7.3 General recommendations

Building public confidence in local authority systems.

During the study period (2000-2012), there existed a tendency of residents not paying rates as a response to poor and inadequate service delivery by urban councils. Convincing the public that rates paying is for a worthy cause becomes imperative. Therefore, there is need for public confidence building and recognition that biggest partners in city affairs are residents. Programming aiming at inculcating a sense of responsibility and ownership of urban services to the end users (residents) is critical. Residents’ movements in Zimbabwe are weak. Strengthening of grassroots residents associations fostering citizen agency and citizen demand for service delivery is a key strategic option. Civic awareness should result in residents beginning to ask service delivery issues from local authorities.

New Political Dispensation

Political governance systems must respect people’s right to make decisions that affects them at the very local level. Centralization and control are key overtures to an authoritarian government. Decentralization and empowerment are important tools of a democratic and

people-centered government. If a democratic government takes effect in Zimbabwe, it is clear that service delivery is going to improve significantly. The current governance arrangement in Zimbabwe is anti-service delivery and anti-developmental as the government keeps on centralizing and interfering in local authorities.

Modernizing revenue collection systems

The present rating and billing system in local authorities is outdated, and estimate based. This has presented challenges as residents are not willing to pay estimates they consider unrealistic in most circumstances. Inevitably, urban councils should modernize revenue collection systems and records. Proper billing and modern methods of revenue collection systems curb revenue loss through corruption and other means by city officials. Adoption of information technology based revenue system increases ratepayers' confidence in their accounts.

Staff Performance Appraisal

The appointment of most council officials has been soiled by political dynamics in the country. Evidence suggests that due to nepotism and patronage, a number of people were appointed without required qualifications and expertise. To that end, there is evidence that most council workers are either without requisite skills or are placed in departments outside their expertise and experience. The execution of urban services is highly a function of council administration officials. An overall and skills audit of council administrative officials is important so that all council departments are staffed with fully trained and competent professionals. Staff should be remunerated adequately based on clear performance criteria.

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
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7. Native Councils Act 1937.
8. Responsible Government Constitution 1923.
9. Rural Councils Act 1966.
10. Town Management Ordinance of 1894.



Annex I: Interview Guide

Contestation, Confusion and Change: Urban Governance and Service Delivery in Zimbabwe (2000-2012).

As indicated in my appointment communication (either through electronic mail or telephone), my name is Davison Muchadenyika, a student pursuing an Master in Administration degree at the School of Government (SOG) of the University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, South Africa. I am conducting a research on urban governance politics and Service delivery in Zimbabwe (2000-12). The purpose of the research is purely academic as it forms the requirements of my Masters by full thesis. Thank you very much for granting me permission to interview you in our prior communication. You are at liberty to refuse to answer any question or withdraw from the study at any time you wish. I assure you that your identity is anonymous unless you want it mentioned in the study. All the information you provide will strictly be treated as confidential and will only be used for the purpose of the master thesis. Please feel free to ask any questions before, during and after the interview if you wish. You may reach me at +263 712 525 180 or via email at muchadenyikad@gmail.com if you have questions later on relating to the study for clarification.

Do you want a copy of the final Master thesis?

Introduction to interview questions

Post-independent urban Zimbabwe was dominated by Zanu-PF until the rise of MDC dominance in urban governance. Post-2000 era saw urban governance in Zimbabwe becoming hotly contested, resulting in confusion as to the direction of political change. Political contradictions ensued; as efforts by the MDC to run urban local authorities seem to be systematically being frustrated by Zanu-PF through MLGRUD. Political struggles between the Zanu-PF and MDC over the control of urban councils have turned more energy, focus and resources away from service delivery to political expediency. It seems that political contestation relegates service delivery as political grip and survival are prioritized. Within this background, let's discuss the impacts of the highlighted political dynamics on the following:

Low cost housing

1. How is land for housing allocated? (Probe the role of political parties)
2. What have been the developments in council-led housing projects?
3. What have been the developments in low cost housing outside council programs?

4. Which housing initiatives (council-led vs. outside council) have contributed significantly to the delivery of low cost housing?

Management systems

1. How are council head of departments appointed? (Probe role of councillors, central government, political parties).
2. How were the relations between councillors and appointed council officials? (Probe cases of extraordinary relations i.e. due to politics)
3. What are the accountability channels used by appointed council staff? (Probe council, ministry of local government).
4. How is council failure attributed? (Councillors or Council staff).

The profession of urban planning

1. What are the effects of the fight between central government and urban councils to planners?
2. How have planners managed to carry out their duties in a turbulent political environment?
3. What is the image of the planning profession in the public eye after Operation Murambatsvina?
4. What have been the impacts of Operation Garikai on Urban Planning?

Water and sanitation

1. What were the reasons for shifting water and sanitation functions to ZINWA?
2. What are the impacts to water and sanitation services of the shift from urban councils to ZINWA and back to urban councils?
3. How residents were affected by the changes in water and sanitation authorities?

Public Transport

1. Rank marshals seem to have the blessing of some political players! What factors contributed to the management of bus termini and commuter omnibus in cities?
2. How are residents affected by the chaos that characterizes the public transport system?
3. What are the causes and sources of public transport crises witnessed over the years?

Road infrastructure

1. What were the reasons for shifting vehicle licensing function from local authorities to ZINARA?
2. What have been the effects of the shift (in 1 above) to road infrastructure maintenance and development?
3. Why is that most road infrastructure constructed after 2000 is old and derelict?
4. How are council road infrastructure tenders awarded?

What are your recommendations for councils to effectively and efficiently deliver services in contested political environments?

Thank You.



Annex II: Interview Schedule

No.	Name	Organization	Date and Time
1	Kudzai Chatiza	Local Governance Consultant	17-06-2013 1240-1330hrs
2	Peter Mutavati	Country Programs Manager, UNHABITAT	25-07-2013 0917-0935hrs
3	Christopher Matumbike	Senior Local Governance Fellow, IDAZIM ²⁶⁵	14-06-2013 0900-1030hrs
4	Nyasha Gumbo	Chief Planning and Research Officer, Dept. of Housing & Community Services, City of Harare	05-07-2013 1514-1545hrs
5	Levison Mutekede	Administrator, UCAZ ²⁶⁶	26-06-2013 1400-1500hrs
6	Mr. Marovanyanga	Committees Manager City of Harare	24-07-2013 0915-0945hrs
7	Beth Chitekwe-Biti	Executive Director – Dialogue on Shelter	20-06-2013 1017-1111hrs
8	George Masimba Nyama	Programs Coordinator – Dialogue on Shelter	20-06-2013 1119-1215hrs
9	Davious Muvindi	Coordinator, Zimbabwe Homeless Peoples' Federation	20-06-2013 1221-1241hrs
10	Mallon Mapika	Projects & Administration Officer, Peoples' Own Savings Bank	19-07-2013 1035-1115hrs
11	Tariro Kadzirange	Programs Officer, Practical Action Southern Africa	12-07-2013 0906-0956hrs
12	James Chiyangwa	Deputy Housing Director, City of Harare	25-06-2013 0941-1043hrs
13	Psychology Chiwanga	Dept. of Urban Planning Services Director, City of Harare	19-07-2013 0835-0915hrs
14	Joseph Kamuzhanje	ZIRUP ²⁶⁷	12-06-2013 1300-1400hrs
15	Thollet Mware	Monitoring & Evaluation Officer, Civic Forum on Housing	17-07-2013 1533-1606hrs
16	John Choto	Housing Officer, Ministry of National Housing and Social Amenities	19-07-2013 1145-1210hrs
17	Cosmas Murepa	Town Planner, Ministry of Local Government Rural & Urban Development	13-06-2013 1000-1045hrs
18	Percy Toriro	Programs Manager MDP-ESA ²⁶⁸	10-06-2013 0810-0945hrs
19	Andrew Mlalazi	Development Consultant/ Planner	17-06-2013 1500-1551hrs
20	Precious Shumba	Director, Harare Residents Trust	
21	Joel Chaeruka	Chairperson Department of Rural & Urban Planning, University of Zimbabwe	01-07-2013 1400-1450hrs
22	Innocent Chirisa	Senior Lecturer Department of Rural & Urban Planning, University of Zimbabwe	06-06-2013 1400-0330hrs
23	Ablsom Masendeke	Chief of Party RTI ²⁶⁹ & Civic Forum for Housing	06-06-2013 1010-1110hrs
24	Charles Mangongera	MDC	19-06-2013 1108-1143hrs

²⁶⁵ Institute for Democratic Alternative for Zimbabwe.

²⁶⁶ Urban Councils Association of Zimbabwe.

²⁶⁷ Zimbabwe Institute of Regional and Urban Planners

²⁶⁸ Municipal Development Partnership Eastern and Southern Africa.

²⁶⁹ Research Triangle Institute International.

25	Rejoice Ngwenya	Political Analyst	06-06-2013 0830-0940hrs
26	Blessing Kwambana	Planner, MoPW	05-07-2013 1400-1530hrs
27	Isaac Nyikayapera	Planner, MoPW	03-07-2013 1400-1530hrs
28	Emmanuel Siraha	Shelter Zimbabwe	10-07-2013 1400-1530hrs
29	Elton Manjeya	Practicing Planner	13-06-2013 1100-1150hrs
30	Shadrack Tondori	Coordinator, Zimbabwe Homeless Peoples' Federation	20-06-2013 1221-1241hrs.
31	Dale Dore	MDC Councillor CoH (2002-3)	03-06-2013 1100-1205hrs



Annex III: Corruption in land alienation process: Chiyangwa's wealth List

1. Stand 422 Quinington Township of Lot AD Quinington measuring 4128 square metres, Salisbury DT 8683/97, DT 7155/2002.
2. Stand 707 being remainder of Subdivision C of the Grange measuring 60, 6869 hectares held under DT8322/2005.
3. Stand 2453 Hatfield Township of Subdivision D of Subdivision B of Hatfield held under DT2686/2009 dated 22 May 2009.
4. Property held under DT 1001/2007.
5. Remainder of Stoneridge in Salisbury measuring 586, 7149 hectares held under DT 5428/2001.
6. Lot 1 of stand 223 of Quinington township of Lot 1A Quinington measuring 1, 6239 hectares held under DT 5929/1971, DT 3840/1988, DT 5418/2005 dated 23 June 2005.
7. Stand 19682 Harare Township of Stand 19675 Harare Township measuring 6, 1884 hectares held under DT 2037/59 dated 16 April 1959, DT 2688/09 dated 22 May 2009 and DT 5128/09.
8. Lot 1 of Lot 16A of Reitfontein measuring 4164 square metres held under DT 216/2013, DT 1614/58 and DT 1862/87 dated 26 March 1987.
9. Stand 65 Colne Valley Township 5 of Lot 7A Colne Valey measuring 7,5956 hectares held under DT 2037/59 and DT 2888/2009.
10. Stand 19682 Harare Township of Stand 19675 Harare Township measuring 6, 1884 hectares held under DT 2685/2009.
11. Stand 3789 Salisbury Township of stand 4450 Salisbury measuring 9959 square metres held under DT2685/2009.
12. Lot 3 of Delnadamph Estate measuring 5, 105 square metres held under DT 2683/09.
13. Stand 2453 Hatfield Township of Subdivision D of Hatfield measuring 2, 2876 hectares held under DT 2686/2009.
14. Stand 389 Derbyshire Township of Subdivision E of Derbyshire measuring 25, 8304 hectares held under DT8209/99.
15. Lot AD Quinington measuring 5, 4867 hectares.
16. Stand 426 Quinington Township of Lot AD Quinington measuring 4002 square metres held under DT3532/56, DT 2770/83 and DT 8687/97.
17. Stand 402 Quinington Township of Lot AD Quinington held under DT 3499/93, DT 2770/83 and DT 750/2002.
18. Stand 3701 Salisbury Township of stand 4450 Salisbury measuring 1190 square metres held under DT 3455/48 and DT 5525/2007.

19. Property known as 26 Fleetwood Road, Alexandra Park.
20. Stand 120 Quinington Township of Subdivision K of Quinington of Borrowdale Estate measuring 86223 square metres held under DT3248/48, DT 785/56 and DT 7831/87.
21. Stand 121 Quinington Township of subdivision K of Quinington Township of Borrowdale Estate measuring 8135 square metres held under DT 3248/48, DT 3993/78 and DT 6855/85.
22. Stand 311 Quinington township of lot 1A Quinington measuring 23632 hectares held under DT 5285/73, DT 5897/85 and DT 2658/2002.
23. Subdivision 1 of Wilbered in Zvimba District of Mashonaland West Province measuring 1331.20 hectares.
24. Remainder of Stoneridge measuring 586, 7149 hectares held under DT1465/75 and DT5428/01.
25. Subdivision A of Subdivision A of Stoneridge measuring 13, 4188 hectares held under DT 25369/30, DT 1465/75 nad DT 5428/01.
26. Subdivision A of Odar measuring 8, 2283 hectares held under DT 25703/30, DT 1465/75 and DT 5428/01.
27. Subdivision 1 OF Sinoia Citrus in Makonde District of Mashonaland West Province measuring 3477 hectares.
28. Lot 1 of Lot 1 of Fern Rock Block C of Hatfield Estate measuring 40952 sqm held under DT 391/58 and DT 392/58.
29. Stand 532 Derbyshire Township of Shortson measuring 7 544 square metres.
30. Piece of land in Salisbury Shortson measuring 72 3652 hectares held under DT 2685/94 and DT 6238/2004.
31. Property in Chinhoyi held under DT 1674/63.
32. Sinoia Drift Farm, Chinhoyi measuring 901, 05 hectares held under DT 5709/85.
33. Sangwe farm, Chinhoyi measuring 845,67 hectares held under DT109/29.
34. Olympus farm, Chinhoyi measuring 2812,86 hectares.
35. Old citrus farm, Chinhoyi measuring 1416, 124 hectares held under DT 1674/63.
36. Strathcona farm, Chinhoyi measuring 1416,124 hectares held under DT 3924/94.
37. North Umzari farm Chinhoyi measuring 600, 217 hectares.
38. Remainder of subdivision A of Stoneridge measuring 589,5874 hectares held under DT 1567/46, DT 3634/03, DT 5021/07 and DT 5631/07.
39. Remainder of subdivision A of Stoneridge measuring 586,8960 hectares held under DT 5021/07 in favour of Pinnacle Holdings (Pvt)Ltd.

40. Lot 11 of Lot AB Quinnington measuring 8902 square metres held under DT4011/2002.
41. Lot 1 of stand 223 of Quinnington township of Lot 1A Quinnington measuring 1, 6239 hectares held under DT 5418/05 and DT 1247/12.
42. Property held under DT 5021/2007.
43. Remainder of Thornicroft park of Galway Estate measuring 17, 3104 hectares held under DT1965/45, DT 1540/2010, DT 1539/10 and DT 2193/86.
44. Stand 424 Quinnington township of Lot AD Quinnington measuring 4002 square metres held under DT 8685/97 and DT 7158/2002.
45. Property otherwise known as No. 11 Crowhill Road, Borrowdale.
46. Stand 420 Quinnington of Lot AD measuring 4003 square metres held under DT 8681/97 and DT 7153/2002.
47. Stand 419 Quinnington of Lot AD measuring 4002 square metres held under DT 8680/97 and DT 7152/02.
48. Stand 427 Quinnington of Lot AD measuring 4002 square metres held under DT 8688/97 and DT 7161/02.
49. Stand 421 Quinnington of Lot AD measuring 5281 square metres held under DT8682/97 and DT 7154/02.
50. Stand 418 Quinnington measuring 4056 square metres held under DT 8679/97 and DT 7151/02.
51. Stand 423 Quinnington measuring 5933 square metres held under DT 8684/97 and DT 7157/02.
52. Stand 425 Quinnington measuring 4002 square metres held under DT 8686/97 and DT 7159/02.
53. Stand 426 Quinnington measuring 4002 square metres held under DT 2770/83, 8687/97 and DT 7160/02.
54. Stand 422 Quinnington measuring 4128 square metres held under DT 8683/97 and DT 7155/02.
55. Stand 428 Quinnington measuring 4048 square metres held under DT 8689/97 and DT 7156/02.
56. STAND 3052 Bluffhill Township of Lot 13 of Bluffhill measuring 3, 7919 hectares held under DT4940/2006.
57. Remainder of Lot H Borrowdale Estates situated in the district of Salisbury held under DT2844/90.

58. Remainder of stand 24 of Lot C of Borrowdale Estate measuring 1, 0959 hectares held under DT 11252/2003.
59. Remainder of Lot 1 of stand 24 of lot C Borrowdale estate measuring 4067 square metres held under DT 3212/2003.
60. Properties under Brighthouse Investment P/L.
61. Stand 3523 Chinhoyi Township measuring 850 square metres in district Lomagundi held under DT 6952/2006.
62. Stand 418 Quinington measuring 4056 square metres held under DT 8679/97 and DT 8656/05.
63. Property held under DT3840/1988.
64. Property held under DT 5418/2005.
65. Stand 7753 Salisbury Township of stand 4839 Salisbury Township measuring 2, 1194 hectares held under DT 9423/2000 and DT 1771/2003, Phillip Chiyangwa Trust.
66. Stand 625 Mandara Township 16 of Lot 7A Mandara measuring 6, 6867 hectares held under DT 1592/75 and DT 3432/2009. Pinnacle Property P/L.
67. Stand 2453 Hatfield Township of Subdivision B of Hatfield held under DT 2686/2009 and DT 2688/2009.
68. Stand 19682 Harare Township of stand 19675 measuring 6, 1184 hectares held under DT 2614/2009.
69. Stand 3789 Salisbury Township of stand 4450 Salisbury measuring 9959 square metres held under DT 2685/09.
70. Remainder of Lot 3 of Delnadamp Estate measuring 5105 square metres held under DT2683/2009.
71. Stand 65 Colne Valley Township 5 of Lot 7A Colne Valley measuring 7, 5956 hectares held under DT 2037/59.
72. STAND 19682 Harare Township of stand 19675 Harare Township measuring 6, 1884 hectares held under DT2614/2009.
73. Stand 3789 Salisbury township of stand 4450 Salisbury township measuring 9959 square metres held under DT 2685/2009.
74. Remainder of Lot 3 Delmadamp estate measuring 5105 square metres held under DT 2683/2009.
75. Stand 2453 Hatfield Township of subdivision b Hatfield measuring 2, 2876 hectares held under DT 2686/2009.

76. STAND 389 Derbyshire township of subdivision E of Derbyshire measuring 25 8304 hectares held under DT 8209/99.
77. Property held under DT 2888/2009.
78. Property held under DT 2688/2009.
79. Stand No. 7753 Salisbury Township of portion of stand 4839 Salisbury Township of Salisbury Township Lands held under DT 2246/47 and DT 9423/2000.
80. Lot 57 of Meyrick Park of Mabelreign in Salisbury measuring 1, 0553 hectares held under DT 2460/96 and DT 8442/90.
81. Stand 3507-3544 Chinhoyi township of Chinhoyi being residential Park medium density housing development of 38 units residential stands measuring 6, 0505 hectares valued at \$675 000.00 as at 31 May 2008.
82. Lot 11 of Bluffhill, corner Northolt Drive and Lavenham Drive , East Bluffhill. A cluster of 120 units of residential stands with water supply and sewer connected and borehole drilled measuring 1, 0065 hectares and valued at \$5 940 000.00 as at 31 May 2008.
83. Stand 3051 of Bluffhill, corner Northolt Drive and Lavenham Drive East Bluffhill being a cluster development of 57 units with water and sewer connected and borehole drilled measuring 1, 7385 hectares valued at \$10 260 000.00 as at 31 May 2008.
84. Stand 3052 of Bluffhill, corner Northolt Drive and Lavenham Drive East Bluffhill being a primary school built on a stand measuring 3, 7919 hectares and valued at \$6 300 000.00 as at 31 May 2008.
85. Remainder of Lot 13 Bluffhill, Corner Northolt drive and Lavenham Drive East, Bluffhill being a secondary school with 23 cluster houses and 36 Duplex Flats built on a stand measuring 7, 5291 hectares and valued at \$19 300 000.00 as at 31 May 2008.
86. Stand 3341 Kadoma Township (stand 2620-3340 Blue Ranges) Kadoma being a residential development with 693 stands/units measuring 20,7900 hectares and valued at \$1 600 000.00 as at 31 May 2008.
87. Stand 1-504 Eyecourt Township of Nyarungu estate being a development with a shopping centre, hotel/motel, and industrial stands measuring 46, 1270 hectares valued at \$7 320 000.00 as at 31 May 2008.
88. Stand 389 of Derbyshire Township being a development with a shopping centre and industrial site measuring 7,2287 hectares valued at \$1 210 000.00 as at 31 May 2008.
89. Stand 19345 harare township beong a development with residential stands measuring 10, 000 hectares and valued at \$5 000 000.00 as at 31 May 2008.

90. Stand 913 Mandara Township being a cluster development of 26 units measuring 3, 1634 hectares valued at \$7 840 000.00 as at 31 May 2008.
91. Subdivision C of The Grange (stands 566-712 the Grange Township) off Beeston avenue, a development with a five star hotel, 496 cluster homestead properties and 43 low density residential stands in total measuring 307, 957 hectares and valued at \$12 010 000.00 as at 31 May 2008.
92. The remainder of Stoneridge a mixed use development with a shopping centre, institutions and residential developments measuring 586,7145 hectares and valued at \$36 150 000.00 as at 31 May 2008.
93. Subdivision A of Stoneridge an agric-residential development measuring 8, 2283 hectares and valued at \$1 340 000.00 as at 31 May 2008.
94. Subdivision A of Arda an agri-residential development measuring 8, 2283 hectares and valued at \$820 000.00 as at 31 May 2008.
95. Stand 289 Willowvale Township, an industrial stand with 14 units measuring 0.9752 hectares and valued at \$200 000.00 as at 31 May 2008.
96. STAND 10050 Chinhoyi Township being a hotel site measuring 1.4430 hectares and valued at \$220 000.00 as at 31 May 2008.
97. Lot 8 of Hunyani, a hotel site IN Chinhoyi measuring 29.9077 hectares and valued at \$4 490 000.00 as at 31 May 2008.
98. Stand 7538 Gweru Township in Gweru, a hotel site measuring 4.9534 hectares and valued at \$920 000.00 as at 31 May 2008.
99. Stand 8432 Gweru Township in Gweru, a hotel site measuring 4.5934 hectares and valued at \$390 000.00 as at 31 May 2008.
100. The remainder of subdivision A of stoneridge a mixed use development with a shopping centre, instituions and residential developments measuring 586,8960 hectares and valued at \$63 480 000.00 AS AT 31 May 2008.
101. The remainder of Arda Farm being a mixed use development with a shopping centre, institutions and residential developments measuring 605,8092 hectares and valued at \$75 730 000.00 as at 31 May 2008.
102. The remainder of A of the rest being a mixed use development with a shopping centre, institutions and residential developments measuring 1456,1440 hectares and valued at \$36 400 000.00 AS AT 31 May 2008.

103. Stand 625 Mandara Township being a mixed use development with a shopping centre, institutions and residential developments measuring 6,6860 hectares and valued at \$3 340 000.00 as at 31 May 2008.

104. Stand 27406 Masvingo Township being a hotel on a stand measuring 1.9879 hectares and valued at \$280 000.00 as at 31 May 2008.

105. A mixed use development with a shopping centre, institutions and residential developments in Kasese Township of Kariba measuring 65, 5325 hectares and valued at \$7 910 000.00 as at 31 May 2008.

106. A lodge called Victoria Falls lodge in Victoria Falls built on a stand measuring 0.8000 hectares and valued at \$320 000.00 as at 31 May 2008.

107. Stands 418-428 Quinington Township of Lot AD Quinington Borrowdale, Harare a development with 12 units of residential stands serviced with 7 boreholes and 3 reservoirs of water

108. Stand 288 Willowvale Township an industrial property measuring 0.6792 hectares and valued at \$140 000.00 as at 31 May 2008.

109. Block D Avondale Township being an office complex in Broadlands with 1400 square metres with lettable office space on a stand measuring 0.1980 hectares and valued at \$2 800 000.00 as at 31 May 2008.