

The London School of Economics and Political Science

Weaving Webs of Insecurity:
Fear, Weakness and Power in the Post-Soviet South
Caucasus

Kevork Oskanian

A thesis submitted to the Department of International
Relations of the London School of Economics and Political
Science, London, September 2010

In Memory of Djanik Oskanian (1927-2007)

DECLARATION

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work.

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without the prior written consent of the author.

I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.

ABSTRACT

This thesis' central aim is the application of a Wendtian-constructivist expansion of Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) on a specific case study: the South Caucasus. To that effect, three concepts of RSCT – amity/enmity, state incoherence, and great power penetration – are expanded and developed within the broader above-mentioned ontological-epistemological framework. Amity-enmity is elaborated into an integrated spectrum founded on varying ideational patterns of securitisation alongside objective characteristics, and encompassing conflict formations, security regimes and security communities. States are conceptualised as ideational-institutional-material 'providers of security'; their incoherence is characterised over three tiers and two dimensions, leading to a distinction between vertical and horizontal inherent weakness, ostensible instability and failure. Great power penetration is dissected into its objective, subjective and intersubjective elements, resulting in a 1+3+1 typology of its recurring patterns: unipolar, multipolar-cooperative and multipolar-competitive, bounded by hegemony and disengagement. After the specification of a methodology incorporating both objective macro- and interpretive micro-perspectives, two working hypotheses are specified. Firstly, that state incoherence engenders high levels of regional enmity, and, secondly, that patterns of great power penetration primarily affect transitions of regional amity/enmity between conflict formations and security regimes. The framework is subsequently used to triangulate these hypotheses through an application of the theoretical framework on the post-Soviet Southern Caucasus. An initial macro-overview is subsequently provided of the Southern Caucasus as a regional security complex; the three expanded concepts are consequently investigated, in turn, from the discursive micro-perspective. The South Caucasus is categorised into a 'revisionist conflict formation', the nature of its states' incoherence is characterised, and existing patterns of great power penetration are identified as competitive-multipolar. In the final chapter, the hypotheses are largely confirmed, and various scenarios as to the possible emergence of a regional security regime are investigated.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work would not have been possible without the counsel and cooperation of scores of individuals who contributed their knowledge, constructive criticism, practical aid or emotional support to this endeavour. I would first of all like to thank my supervisors, Dr. Roy Allison and Prof. Barry Buzan, and my panellists, Dr. Jürgen Haacke and Prof. Chris Hughes for providing me with the irreplaceable empirical and theoretical directions on the long road towards completion. My appreciation also goes out to all those who assisted me during my fieldwork in Yerevan, Tbilisi and Sukhumi: Levon Chaushyan and Gohar Shahazizyan, Levon Ouzounian, Janna Davtyan, Melsida Akopyan and Artavazd Saretsian.

I would also like to express my indebtedness to the faculty at the International Relations Department of the London School of Economics, who were indispensable in driving my intellectual growth during four crucial years of my life: in particular Prof. Mick Cox and Prof. Margot Light, for their role in leading the so-productive IR509 Research Design seminars; Prof. Kimberly Hutchings, Dr. George Lawson and Dr. Kirsten Ainley for their part in convening the always-inspirational IR502 Theory seminars; and Mr. Mark Hoffman for organising the ever-informative IR512 International Security workshops. I would also like to convey my appreciation for the irreplaceable work done by Mrs. Hilary Parker, without whom the day-to-day functioning of the LSE IR department would be, to put it mildly, far less straightforward. That same department is also owed appreciation for the funding provided towards the realisation of this project.

As for my fellow travellers, especially those of the 2006 intake: the countless remarks in the methodology and theory seminars, the empirically significant lunch-time discussions on the 7th floor of Clement House, the friendly but theoretically profound chats at the post-seminar drinking sessions in The George IV will not be forgotten. My gratitude goes out to Manuel Almeida, Ana Alves, Adel Altorai, Gregorio Bettiza, Alexis Crow, Alex Edwards, Rebekka Friedman, Jasmine Gani, Ben Holland, Joe Hoover, Zeynep Kaya, Jorge Lasmar, Candice Moore, Ramon “Moncho” Pacheco-Pardo, Vassilis Paipais, Chris Phillips, Marco Pinfari, Henry Radice, Jeff Reeves, Meera Sabaratnam, Laust Schouenborg and Ee-Long Toh.

FRONT MATTER

Geopolitical Map of the Caucasus



Peter Fitzgerald, 'Caucasus regions map', 2008 via Wikitravel, Creative Commons Attribution Share-Alike license 1.0, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, http://wikitravel.org/shared/Image:Caucasus_regions_map.png

Timeline of Events in the South Caucasus 1988-2009

February 1988: Demonstrations demanding the Autonomous Region's reattachment to Armenia take place in Stepanakert, Nagorno-Karabakh and Yerevan, Armenia; deadly anti-Armenian pogroms follow in Sumgait, Azerbaijan.

June 1988: An open letter from sixty members of the Abkhaz intelligentsia accuses Georgia of a long-term policy of forcible assimilation

June 1988: The harassment and expulsion of Azeris from Armenia escalates.

April 1989: A massacre of pro-independence demonstrators by Red Army troops takes place in Tbilisi, Georgia.

July 1989: Deadly clashes erupt in Sukhumi between ethnic Georgians and Abkhaz in reaction to a Georgian government decision to convert the Georgian-language section of Sukhumi State University into a branch of Tbilisi State University

September 1989: 'Ademon Nykhas', the South Ossetian nationalist movement, demands the reunification of the Autonomous Region with the North Ossetian Autonomous Republic, located in Russia.

November 1989: The Supreme Soviet of South Ossetia demands that the Autonomous Region's status be upgraded to that of Autonomous Republic. The Supreme Soviet of the Georgian SSR affirms its right to secede from the USSR. Zviad Gamsakhurdia's 'March on Tskinali' results in armed clashes between Georgians and Ossetians.

December 1989: The Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR includes Nagorno-Karabakh in its yearly budget, effectively annexing the territory.

January 1990 ('Black January'): Anti-Armenian pogroms and anti-Soviet demonstrations take place in Baku and are followed by a violent military crackdown.

August 1990: A declaration of sovereignty is adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR.

September 1990: The Supreme Soviet of South Ossetia declares the region a fully sovereign union republic of the USSR, in effect seceding from Georgia.

October 1990: Parliamentary elections in Georgia -boycotted by most Abkhaz and Ossetians.- are won by Gamsakhurdia's Round Table-Free Georgia pro-independence bloc.

December 1990: The Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR adopts a declaration of sovereignty.

January 1991: Georgian interior ministry troops enter Tskhinvali; armed conflict erupts in South Ossetia.

March 1991: The all-union referendum on the preservation of a reformed USSR is boycotted by Armenia and Georgia. Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Azerbaijan participate and overwhelmingly vote in favour of the union.

April 1991: Georgia declares independence.

May 1991: Zviad Gamsakhurdia is elected President of Georgia.

May 1991: 'Operation Ring', involving Soviet and Azeri Interior Ministry troops, attempts to disarm Armenian militias in and around Nagorno-Karabakh; ethnic Armenian villagers from the neighbouring Shahumyan district are forcibly displaced.

September 1991: Armenia declares independence.

September 1991: Ayaz Mutalibov is elected President of Azerbaijan.

October 1991: Levon Ter-Petrosyan is elected President of Armenia.

October 1991: Azerbaijan declares independence.

December 1991: Nagorno-Karabakh declares independence following a referendum among its ethnic Armenian inhabitants.

December 1991: The USSR is formally dissolved.

December 1991: Zviad Gamsakhurdia is ousted as president of Georgia, in a bloody military uprising.

February 1992: Hundreds of Azeri civilians are massacred in the village of Khojali, within Nagorno-Karabakh, during an advance by Armenian troops.

February 1992: The Georgian parliament abolishes the Soviet-era constitution in favour of the 1921 Georgian Democratic Republic's, provoking disquiet in Abkhazia.

March 1992: Eduard Shevardnadze is appointed Acting Chairman of the Georgian State Council.

May 1992: Sushu – Nagorno-Karabakh largest Azeri-inhabited town – falls to ethnic Armenian forces; the Lachin corridor between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia is created; following a military rebellion, Ayaz Mutalibov is succeeded as president of Azerbaijan by the Popular Front's Abufaz Elchibey; Azeri-Armenian armed clashes on the Nakhichevan border elicit threats and counter-threats in Ankara and Moscow; Armenia signs the Collective Security Treaty of the CIS.

June 1992: The 'Sochi Agreement' establishes a cease-fire between Georgia and South Ossetia; a joint Russian-Georgian-Ossetian peacekeeping force is set up under Russian command.

July 1992: Abkhazia declares independence.

August 1992: Georgian armed military and paramilitary units try to reassert control over Abkhazia; the first Georgian-Abkhaz war erupts; Georgian troops book early successes.

October 1992: The Azeri parliament fails to ratify CIS membership.

December 1992: Following a successful counter-offensive, Sukhumi is besieged by Abkhaz and North Caucasian forces, amid reports of unidentified aircraft – strongly suspected to be Russian – aiding separatist forces.

April-October 1993: Several Azeri districts around Nagorno-Karabakh fall to Armenian forces; in response, Turkey closes its borders with Armenia.

June 1993: A military coup removes Elchibey and his Popular Front party from power in Azerbaijan; Heidar Aliyev is elected acting president by parliament.

September 1993: Azerbaijan rejoins the CIS, including its Collective Security Treaty.

September 1993: Sukhumi falls to Abkhaz forces; Shevardnadze flees the city; ethnic Georgians are expelled from most of Abkhazia.

September-November 1993: The return of Gamsakhurdia to Samegrelo (in Western Georgia) is followed by an armed insurrection centred on the region.

October 1993: Heidar Aliyev is elected president of Azerbaijan.

December 1993: Georgia joins the CIS, including its Collective Security Treaty.

December 1993: Zviad Gamsakhurdia commits apparent suicide in Western Georgia, under still-unclear circumstances.

May 1994: A Russian-brokered cease-fire halts fighting in and around Nagorno-Karabakh.

May 1994: The Moscow Agreement (brokered by Russia) establishes a cease-fire between Abkhazia and Georgia and provides for the formation of a Russian-led CIS peacekeeping force and UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG).

September 1994: Azerbaijan and a consortium of mostly Western oil corporations sign the 'Contract of the Century', regarding the future exploitation of Caspian oil and gas fields.

December 1994: France, Russia and the United States are appointed as co-chairs of the OSCE 'Minsk Group' (tasked with finding a negotiated solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict) during the organisation's Budapest summit.

March 1995: A military coup against Heidar Aliyev ends in failure.

August 1995: An assassination attempt against Eduard Shevardnadze fails.

November 1995: Eduard Shevardnadze is elected President of Georgia.

April 1996: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia sign Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the European Union.

February 1998: Another assassination attempt against Eduard Shevardnadze falters.

February 1998: Levon-Ter Petrosyan is forced to relinquish power following a 'palace coup' led by Prime Minister Robert Kocharyan

March 1998: Robert Kocharyan is elected President of Armenia.

April 1999: Georgia and Azerbaijan leave the CIS Collective Security Treaty; Georgia joins the Council of Europe.

October 1999: Several MPs and government officials – including the speaker, Karen Demirchyan, and the prime minister, Vazgen Sargsyan – are shot to death in an armed attack in the Armenian parliament.

January 2001: Armenia and Azerbaijan join the Council of Europe.

April 2001: Negotiations between Robert Kocharyan and Heidar Aliyev in Key West reportedly come close to resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

October 2001: A group of Georgian (and, according to Russian claims, Chechen) fighters enters Abkhaz-controlled territory, but is repelled after skirmishes reportedly killing 40.

November 2001: Georgia accuses Russia of bombing sites in the Pankisi gorge, while Moscow voices counter-charges of Chechen terrorist activity from Georgian territory.

February-May 2002: US Special Forces advisors are stationed in Georgia; the Georgia Train and Equip Programme (GTEP) is instituted.

October 2002: Armenia signs the founding charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation.

October 2003: Ilham Aliyev is elected as President of Azerbaijan in polls deemed neither free nor fair by the international community; a crackdown against opposition protestors follows.

November 2003: The Rose Revolution removes Eduard Shevardnadze from power in Georgia, in reaction to his perceived rigging of preceding parliamentary elections.

January 2004: Mikheil Saakashvili is elected President of Georgia.

May 2004: Aslan Abashidze, post-Soviet strongman in the Ajaria region of Georgia, is ousted following mass protests encouraged by the central authorities in Tbilisi.

June 2004: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are included in the EU European Neighbourhood Policy

October 2004: Presidential elections in Abkhazia result in a tense stand-off between Sergei Bagapsh and Raul Khadjimba, widely seen as Russia's preferred candidate.

January 2005: A re-run of the presidential elections in Abkhazia results in the election of Sergei Bagapsh as president and Raul Khajimba as vice-president.

May 2005: The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline is inaugurated.

June-August 2005: The closure of the Eregneti market, in South Ossetia, by authorities in Tbilisi is followed by armed skirmishes in the region.

July 2006: Georgian forces reassert control over the Kodori gorge, in Upper Abkhazia.

September 2006: The 'Government of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia', recognised by Tbilisi as the legal government-in-exile of the territory, is moved to Upper Abkhazia.

October 2006: Russia initiates a trade embargo against Georgia.

May 2007: Following his defection from the separatist camp, Dimitri Sanakoyev is appointed by the President of Georgia as the 'Head of the South Ossetian Provisional Administrative Entity'.

November 2007: The last Russian military base in Georgia (excluding Abkhazia and South Ossetia) is closed.

November 2007: Opposition demonstrations in Georgia are violently suppressed; Mikheil Saakashvili calls pre-term presidential elections.

January 2008: Saakashvili is re-elected President of Georgia, whose population overwhelmingly votes in favour of NATO membership in a non-binding referendum, with 77% approving.

February 2008: The contested win of the Armenian presidential election by Serj Sargsyan, the government candidate, is followed by opposition mass demonstrations in Yerevan.

March 2008: Armenian security forces crack down on opposition demonstrators in Armenia with lethal force; numerous opposition figures are subsequently arrested.

April 2008: Georgia fails to obtain a NATO Membership Action Plan during the organisation's Bucharest summit.

June-July 2008: Clashes erupt in South Ossetia between Georgian and South Ossetian forces.

August 2008: War erupts between Georgia and Russia.

September 2008: The independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is officially recognised by the Russian Federation.

A Note on Transliteration and Toponymy

I have attempted to phonetically transliterate the many languages of the South Caucasus as consistently as possible, usually according to previously existing transliterations in the regionalist literature. In particular, I have avoided using the russified first and family names of individuals, as was often the case in the Soviet past, romanising as much as possible from the original Armenian, Azeri, Georgian, Abkhaz and Ossetian: '*Heidar* (Aliyev)' will thus be preferred over '*Gaidar*', '*Mikheil* (Saakashvili)' over '*Mikhail*'. As a rule, in view of the contested nature of many of the region's localities, and in the absence of any proper English-language variants, the use of place-names will be determined by the predominant usage in the media and literature *outside* the region proper. Akhazia's capital will thus be called 'Sukhumi' (instead of the more infrequently used Abkhaz Sukhum), Nagorno-Karabakh's 'Stepanakert' (instead of the Azeri Khankendi), among others. Many of these place-names have moreover been modified in the post-Soviet period, and unless otherwise indicated, this post-Soviet toponymy will be applied throughout the thesis.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AIOC: Azerbaijan International Operating Company

ANM: Armenian Pan-National Movement

ARFD: Armenian Revolutionary Federation - Dashnaktsutyun

BTC: Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan

CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States

CoE: Council of Europe

CSTO: Collective Security Treaty Organisation

EBRD: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

ENP: European Neighbourhood Policy

EU: European Union

FDI: Foreign Direct Investment

FSU: Former Soviet Union

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GPP: Great Power Penetration

GTEP: Georgia Train and Equip Program

GU(U)AM: Georgia Ukraine (Uzbekistan) Azerbaijan Moldova

ICG: International Crisis Group

IPAP: Individual Partnership Action Plan (NATO)

IFC: International Finance Corporation

INOGATE: Interstate Oil and Gas Transportation to Europe

KLO: Karabakh Liberation Organisation

MAP: (NATO) Membership Action Plan

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NSC: National Security Concept

NSS: National Security Strategy

ODIHR: (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

OSCE: Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PACE: Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

PAP-T: Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (NATO)

PARP: Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (NATO)

PfP: Partnership for Peace

RF: Russian Federation

RPA: Republican Party of Armenia

RSC: Regional Security Complex

RSCT: Regional Security Complex Theory

RSSC: Regional Security Sub-Complex

RSFSR: Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic

SSR: Soviet Socialist Republic

TACIS: Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States

TRACECA: Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION.....	3
ABSTRACT	4
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	5
FRONT MATTER.....	6
<i>Geopolitical Map of the Caucasus.....</i>	<i>6</i>
<i>Timeline of Events in the South Caucasus 1988-2009.....</i>	<i>7</i>
<i>A Note on Transliteration and Toponymy</i>	<i>12</i>
<i>Acronyms and Abbreviations</i>	<i>13</i>
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	15
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	18
<i>A Genealogy of Regional Security Complex Theory</i>	<i>18</i>
<i>Applying the Framework: The Southern Caucasus.....</i>	<i>24</i>
<i>Guiding Questions</i>	<i>29</i>
<i>The Mechanics of Research.....</i>	<i>31</i>
<i>Chapter Outline</i>	<i>35</i>
CHAPTER 2: AMITY AND ENMITY IN ITS REGIONAL CONTEXT.....	39
<i>A Meta-theoretical Excursion.....</i>	<i>39</i>
<i>Securitisation and the State in an RSCT Context.....</i>	<i>44</i>
<i>Conceptualising a Spectrum of Amity and Enmity.....</i>	<i>47</i>
Revisionist and Status-Quo Conflict Formations	50
Thin and Thick Security Regimes	51
Loose and Tight Security Communities	52
The Amity/Enmity Variable as a Spectrum.....	54
<i>Change and the Amity/Enmity Spectrum.....</i>	<i>55</i>
<i>Conclusion</i>	<i>59</i>
CHAPTER 3: STATE INCOHERENCE AS WEAKNESS, INSTABILITY AND FAILURE.....	60
<i>Conceptualising State Incoherence in an RSCT Context.....</i>	<i>63</i>
<i>A Three-Tiered View of State (In)Coherence: Legitimacy, Force and Sovereignty.....</i>	<i>66</i>
Legitimacy and Inherent Strength/Weakness	66
Force and Ostensible (In)Stability.....	69
Effective Sovereignty and State Failure	72
<i>State Incoherence, Securitisation and RSCT.....</i>	<i>77</i>
<i>Conclusion</i>	<i>80</i>

CHAPTER 4: GREAT POWERS AND THEIR REGIONAL ENTANGLEMENTS	82
<i>Defining Great Powers</i>	82
<i>The Objective, Subjective and Intersubjective Aspects of Individual Great Power Penetrations</i>	87
<i>Categorising Aggregate Patterns of Great Power Penetration</i>	94
<i>Conclusion</i>	100
CHAPTER 5: PUTTING THE FRAMEWORK INTO PRACTICE	102
<i>Amity/Enmity, and the Convergence/Divergence of Inter-State Discourse</i>	104
<i>State Weakness, Legitimacy, and the Convergence/Divergence of Intra-State Discourse</i>	109
<i>Great Power Penetration and the Dependence/Independence of Regional Security Discourse</i>	113
<i>Change and the Stability of Discourse</i>	117
<i>Conclusion</i>	122
CHAPTER 6: A MACRO-VIEW OF THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS	124
<i>Units</i>	124
<i>Polarity</i>	127
<i>Boundaries</i>	132
<i>Amity and Enmity: A Macro-View</i>	134
<i>State Incoherence in the Southern Caucasus</i>	138
<i>Great Power Penetration</i>	142
<i>Conclusion</i>	149
CHAPTER 7: DISCOURSES OF CONFLICT IN THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS.....	150
<i>Introduction</i>	150
<i>Armenia's Insecurities: Karabakh and the Ghosts of 1915</i>	151
<i>Azerbaijan's Oil, and the Call of Karabakh</i>	158
<i>Georgia: An Uneasy Partner to Two Enemies</i>	166
<i>Conclusion: The South Caucasus RSC as a Revisionist Conflict Formation</i>	172
CHAPTER 8: STATE INCOHERENCE IN SOUTHERN CAUCASIA	175
<i>Armenia, and the Blessings (?) of Homogeneity</i>	176
<i>Azerbaijan: Tolerator or Assimilator?</i>	180
<i>Georgia: Between Fragmentation and Weakness</i>	187
CHAPTER 9: THE GREAT POWERS AND THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS	199
<i>Russia: Of Geopolitics and Empire</i>	199

<i>The Caucasus and the West: Oil, Gas, Pipelines...and a Bit of Democracy</i>	206
The United States	206
The European Union	208
<i>Turkey, Iran and the Weight of History</i>	211
Turkey	211
Iran	213
<i>The Fears and Hopes of Small States</i>	214
Armenia	215
Georgia	217
Azerbaijan	219
<i>Conclusion: Patterns of Penetration in the Southern Caucasus</i>	221
CHAPTER 10: THE SOUTH CAUCASUS REGIONAL INSECURITY COMPLEX.....	224
<i>The Southern Caucasus as a Web of Fear, Weakness and Power</i>	224
<i>Enmity and the Vertical and Horizontal Incoherence of States</i>	227
<i>Great Power Penetration and Amity/Enmity</i>	231
<i>Evaluating the Hypotheses</i>	236
<i>Towards a Security Regime?</i>	243
<i>Conclusion</i>	249
APPENDIX	254
1. <i>National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia (2007)</i>	254
2. <i>National Security Concept of the Republic of Azerbaijan (2007)</i>	272
3. <i>National Security Concept of the Republic of Georgia (2005)</i>	293
4. <i>Maps</i>	310
Ethno-Linguistic Groups in the Caucasus	310
Ethno-Linguistic Groups in Azerbaijan	311
Ethno-Linguistic Groups in Georgia	312
5. <i>Notable Personalities in the South Caucasus 1988-2009</i>	313
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES.....	316
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	319

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) is something of an awkward stepchild in the family tree of International Relations and International Security, embraced by neither orthodox neo-realists nor constructivists, yet claiming the parentage of both. Its ontological pluralism and epistemological eclecticism has combined with lack of detailed theorisation to leave it exposed to charges of state-centredness (Hoogensen, 2005) and incoherence (Acharya, 2007, p. 636; Taureck, 2005). Left in between two important paradigms of International Relations and International Security, it has nevertheless often been applied almost off the cuff: its prima-facie utility to regionalists is quite obvious, despite the deficiencies pointed out by its detractors, deficiencies which are often filled-in 'on-the-go', as empiricists work out ad-hoc methods of application that are not really based on thorough conceptual analysis, but rather, on a wide range of intuitive assumptions and intellectual leaps of logic.

The main aim of this thesis is to provide an additional theoretical underpinning to RSCT by expanding three of its central concepts: Amity/Enmity, 'State Weakness' and 'Great Power Penetration', concepts which up to now have most often than not been used *intuitively*, without much further systematic reflection on their actual internal workings within the wider theoretical framework. It will do so through both theorisation and empirical application, through abstract deconstruction/reconstruction and the deployment of the resulting conceptualisations on a case study: the Southern Caucasus. The thesis will, as a consequence, have two distinct halves, one theoretical, the other empirical. One could, of course, ask whether a case study is at all necessary, but the counter-argument would be swift and convincing: perhaps more than other theories, RSCT aspires to empirical relevance, and limiting oneself to ethereal thought experiments without demonstrating their applicability would therefore leave this job half-finished.

A Genealogy of Regional Security Complex Theory

Before moving on to dwell on these central theoretical and subsidiary empirical aims, however, it is perhaps best to start with a genealogy of the theory itself. What is RSCT, where does it come from? The short answer would be to point to the first brief mention of its very central concept – the [Regional] Security Complex (RSC) – in the first edition of Barry Buzan's "People, State and Fear", the work that introduces a systematically sector based approach to International Security (Buzan, 1983, pp. 105-115). There, a 'security complex' is defined as "a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be

considered apart from one another.” (p. 106), and the brief section continues with a short sketch of several such security complexes in the then Cold-War world.

RSCT proper was left undeveloped for a relatively long period after its initial introduction: the Cold War did not really lend itself to regional theories of (in)security, as IR and IS were mostly conceptualised in systemic terms and regions very much remained the purview of ‘area studies’ and those scholars concentrating on integrative processes. On the demand side, bipolarity and globalisation diverted theorists’ attention towards the systemic, away from the regional. Regions were, as a rule, arbitrarily defined – if they were at all looked at – and theories focusing on regional interaction were virtually nonexistent. As Buzan himself described the situation immediately following the end of ‘bipolarity’, “there is also an important set of security dynamics at the regional level, and this often gets lost or discounted. At that middle level, one finds only the hazy notions of regional balances of power and subsystems, or crude media references that use region to describe whatever location currently contains a newsworthy level of political turbulence” (Buzan, 1991, p. 187).

The new post-Cold War world order presented itself as far more complex and regionalised than before, calling for theories that could grasp this new, clearly discernible reality, operating somewhere between the systemic and the domestic. Thus, in *People, States and Fear’s* second edition, Buzan (1991, pp. 186-229) expands this novel idea of RSCs further in a new, dedicated chapter on ‘regional security’, where ‘region-level subsystems’ are seen, first and foremost, as constituted by the increased security interaction and security interdependence that results from geographic proximity. The idea of *securitisation* is absent at this point, but Buzan does introduce the *ideational* ‘patterns of amity and enmity’ as the principal element that must be added to power relations in conceptualising of these sub-systems. At this stage, the definition of a ‘RSC’ is identical to the one provided in 1983 (p. 190). The thrust of the argument aims to paint clear contours for this hybrid ideational/material structure within an ontology that retains a strong Waltzian neo-realist bias¹, while introducing cultural/historical factors into the argument. Central concepts of the theory – overlay, higher/lower-level complexes (forerunners of great power complexes), internal and external transformations – are, among many others, also introduced.

At first, RSCT then goes through something of a bifurcation. David Lake and Patrick Morgan (1997) present a mainly material-positivist version of the theory in “Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World”. They advocate a comparative, multi-variate

¹ In fact, RSCs are described as ‘process formations’ within the Waltzian international system (p.209).

approach going beyond 'security' per se, with a strong *positivist-materialist* bias, apparent in their definition of RSCs, which, while echoing Buzan, eliminates the *interpretivist-ideational* element of "security concerns": "a set of states continually affected by one or more security externalities that emanate from a distinct geographic area." (p.12). Lake and Morgan's version of RSCT also blurs the boundaries between the systemic and regional levels, and the RSCs themselves – important in Buzan's version – by allowing for overlaps in membership between both. States and great powers can thus simultaneously be members of several RSCs (sometimes quite distant ones in the case of great powers). The authors also replace the ideational 'amity/enmity' variable of 'Buzanian' RSCT with the considerably more positivist 'dominant patterns of security management'.

In the end, this version of the theory has proved something of a dead end, partly because of lacunae pointed out by Buzan and Wæver (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 78-82), lacunae that seemingly prevented it from having a major impact on empirical practice: among others, a diversion of focus away from security towards the political and the lack of clear delimitation between and within levels. On the other hand, theoretical developments opened up the possibility for the development of the ideational aspects of the theory as initially proposed by Buzan: on the supply side, constructivist frameworks that were very much geared towards idealism and interpretivism had completed their migration from sociology into IR. The emergence of the 'Copenhagen School' and the idea of 'securitisation' in preliminary works like 'Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe' (Wæver, Kelstrup, & Lemaitre, 1993) ultimately led to the first attempts at an explicitly ideational revision of RSCT provided in 'Security: A New Framework for Analysis' (Buzan, Wæver, & De Wilde, 1998).

In this monograph – widely regarded as the Copenhagen School's foundational text – Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde provide the foundation for the theory as we know it today, developing its securitisation-based ideational half, and briefly outlining a '*revised*' (as opposed to '*classical*') version of the theory in the introduction (pp. 1-20). There, a distinction is introduced between *homogenous* and *heterogenous* security complexes, according to whether one considers securitisations occurring within one or multiple sectors. Secondly, it is suggested that an explicitly social constructivist approach would also be one way of moving beyond *Classical* Security Complex Theory, expanding the ideational aspects of the theory beyond the rather indefinite and macro-perspective notions of amity/enmity or security interdependence towards the very specific, explicitly discursive phenomenon of *securitisation*: "*an instance where an issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and*

justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (pp. 23-24). Significantly, the introduction explicitly links RSCT to the rest of the volume, in effect making it an integral part of Securitisation Theory, as confirmed in the conclusion (pp. 195-213).

The contemporary, materially/ideationally hybrid RSCT received its first *detailed*, monographical formulation in Buzan and Wæver’s ‘Regions and Powers’ (2003). In it, the authors place the theory within the existing literature and present an outline of the theory’s main constitutive concepts – the analytical tools that give the theory its shape – before applying them to create a comprehensive, system-wide outline of contemporary regional security. Regionalist theories of security like RSCT are seen as complementary to the globalist and neo-realist views that had dominated the field up to that point, providing them with an ability to conceptualise a regional level between the unit- and system-levels. After presenting a differentiated view of system-level polarity (by setting apart superpowers, great powers and regional powers), the authors proceed to offer an outline of RSCs’ main typologies and features based on a critical evaluation of the hitherto scattered work using the concept, aiming to “...integrate the lessons from existing and new case studies, fill in remaining gaps in the theory, produce an operational formulation of the theory, and empirically apply it to all regions of the world” (p.42).

Buzan and Wæver conceptualise RSCs (as in the 1998 volume) as “*a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, de-securitisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another.*” (p. 44). They subsequently differentiate between ‘descriptive’, ‘predictive’ and ‘revised’ RSCT. The first uses RSCs in a descriptive exercise, reconceptualising the configuration of the international system in terms of these RSCs, whose essential structure consists of their boundaries, anarchic structure, polarity and “social construction, which covers the patterns of amity and enmity between the units.” (p. 53). Possible changes in these variables lead to ‘internal’ and ‘external’ transformations, the former based on modifications in their polarity, structure of anarchy or amity/enmity, the latter referring to shifts in their boundaries through their merging or splitting. Several types of RSC are subsequently identified, including standard, centred, great power, supercomplexes, pre- and proto-complexes. *Predictive* RSCT is introduced as a scenario-building tool, plotting possible ‘external’ and ‘internal’ transformations of RSCs, providing a more fine-tuned and diverse method than its power-focused intellectual ancestor, structural neo-realism. Finally, *revised* RSCT emphasises the constructivist aspects of the theory by stressing RSCs as constituted by clusters of

securitisation on different levels and within/across different sectors (as elaborated in the 1998 volume).

For the most part, the discussion remains an outline, a rough sketch of the dense terminology used within the approach. Overlay, centred RSCs, insulators, patterns of amity/enmity, state weakness, great power penetration: the finer inner workings of these concepts so central to the theory are left undeveloped, or, alternatively, left for others to expand. And developing the latter three aforementioned terms is precisely one of this thesis' central concerns. As their operationalisation remains at the level of a general introduction and a preliminary discussion, there is indeed much to be expanded. For instance, how exactly does one conceptualise the amity/enmity variable? Buzan and Wæver refer to it as a "socially constructed dimension of structure" (p. 50), and suggest that "[t]hose of a Wendtian disposition can see that this social theory can easily be applied as a useful constructivist elaboration of the amity-enmity variable in RSCT" (ibid.). These patterns could thus, the authors continue, be conceived of in terms of Wendt's social structures of anarchy (Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian), based on what kind of roles (friend/enemy) actors internalise, but no systematic and explicit elaboration is offered in that direction.

Similarly, much of the theoretical and practical side is left open regarding the concept of weak and strong states, briefly introduced in the first chapter (p.22) as a spectrum of 'stateness' or 'empirical sovereignty', and applied extensively but rather intuitively in the chapter on sub-Saharan Africa (pp. 224-229). How exactly the spectrum is to be employed in a consistent and easily replicable way is also left open for further theorisation. One final, under-explored issue are the precise and finer points of the interaction between the systemic and regional levels, that is, great powers or superpowers and the RSCs themselves. Apart from overlay and the differentiation between ordinary and 'centred' or 'great power' RSCs, and their roles in interregional linkages and external transformations, the phenomenon of 'great power penetration' is again, only gently alluded to, and applied rather intuitively in the empirical section of the monograph (pp. 46-47, 49, 53-61).

To some extent, these omissions are understandable, a result of the lack of space in presenting a comprehensive review of global security in the post-9/11 world. But they call out for expansion in two ways. First, they are central to the interaction between the regional, domestic and systemic levels, an interaction that must be properly conceptualised if RSCT is to expand its applicability even further. More than ever, RSCs are at the nexus of the domestic and the systemic, rather than being, simply, a set of self-contained security relationships. The need for a systematised 'toolbox'

describing these level-to-level interactions has become a necessity within RSCT. As Buzan and Wæver (2003, pp. 16-20) themselves point out, the involvement of great powers in RSCs has become more multi-faceted and complex in the post-Cold War environment. Moreover, in today's context, the emergence of 'weak' states has implications that go far beyond the regions containing them, helping generate securitisations that affect the system as a whole. Integrating the domestic and systemic into a continuous whole centred on the regional level will therefore be one of the aims of the theoretical expansion.

This continuous whole will be structured around the notion of 'securitisation', by expanding the amity/enmity, state incoherence and great power penetration variables in terms of the networks/clusters of securitisation by which RSCs have come to be defined. The amity/enmity concept so central to RSCT deserves development beyond the hitherto vaguely delineated categories provided by Wendt (1999, pp. 246-312), whose rump materialist framework does seem singularly placed to provide such an elaboration because of its ontological similarities to RSCT. How one conceptualises the Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian structures of anarchy in an ideational world defined by securitisations and de-securitisations would be essential in devising a readily generaliseable version of this theory. Considering RSCT's hybrid outlook, it is also clear that securitisations and security discourse could play a fruitful role in a conceptualisation of both state incoherence and great power penetration. Characterising and integrating these three variables by providing a discursive *micro-perspective* approach in addition to RSCT's currently more dominant and more material-positivist *macro-perspective* will be another goal of this theoretical development.

Part of the risk of such an expansion lies in the inherent complexity of RSCT – its inherent hybridity, its multiple levels, and the sectors that are part of its Copenhagen School heritage, especially within the 'revised' version; it could be argued that, rather than developing concepts in finer detail, intuition and improvisation are often part of the large body of thought and practice in IR that does not aspire to scientific-methodological dogma, providing practitioners with flexibility and contextual adaptability. But then the question arises why such improvised and ad-hoc approaches should remain based on implicit assumptions that cannot be formulated in the coherent abstract. Surely, making logical linkages within and between concepts explicit would, if successful, add to the value of any theory, while limiting the risk of centrifugal tendencies within it. As in any case, there will be some trade-off between detail and clarity; this does not mean, however, that one cannot push towards a Pareto optimum involving *both*.

In the end, however, the ultimate test of any resulting theory will lie in its applicability. A case study will thus have to demonstrate that the resulting framework can be applied to produce empirical knowledge rather than remaining an ivory-tower exercise performed for its own sake. The framework derived from the theoretical expansion will have to be put into operation in a region that displays strong interactions between the domestic, regional and systemic levels. The area I have chosen in this case is commonly known as the Southern Caucasus (and, less commonly, the Transcaucasus), comprising Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, including the still overwhelmingly unrecognised republics of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh².

At this point, I shall not address Buzan and Wæver's characterisation of this area as a regional security sub-complex of the Former Soviet RSC, or their suggestion that it might at some point turn into a freestanding mini-complex. These questions will be handled in the empirical chapter providing a macro-perspective view (chapter 6) as I attend to one of the concept's constitutive variables – its boundaries – and argue, in depth, that it has indeed become, or at the very least could be treated, as freestanding. My focus, for now, will be on the area's suitability for an application of the expanded theoretical framework I intend to develop, through an overview of its modern history. Does it suggest an ability to generate the questions that, in turn, could provide viable hypotheses regarding linkages between amity/enmity, 'state weakness', and great power penetration in an RSCT context?

Applying the Framework: The Southern Caucasus

The Southern Caucasus seems a promising site for my empirical section, for a number of reasons: first of all, its complex and conflictual nature. It has seen several violent intra-state and inter-state conflagrations since the early 20th century, especially during periods without Russian overlay, underscoring the deeply inimical relations within the region. It has historically functioned as a meeting point of empires, with Russia hegemonically dominant for most of the past two centuries, and other great powers

² Most of the literature approaches the Southern Caucasus from issue- or actor-specific angles, often in combination with the Northern Caucasus, Central Asia, the Black Sea or the 'Caspian Basin', social-scientific monographs and edited volumes have concentrated on secessionism/nationalism and state weakness (Chervonnaia, 1994; Closson, 2007; Coppieters, 1996b; D. Lynch, 2004; Matveeva, 2002), bilateral inter-unit relations (Croissant, 1998), the regional role of single great powers (particularly Russia) (Baev, 1997; Menon, Fedorov, & Nodia, 1999), or have limited their view to single issue-areas: geopolitics/military-strategic matters (Gadzhiev, 2001; Matveeva & Hiscock, 2003), or the one issue that elicits real interest in Western policy circles: energy security (Ebel & Menon, 2000; Karagiannis, 2002; Van der Leeuw, 1999). Very few have tried to take a comprehensive and theoretically systematic view of security in the Southern Caucasus as the regional interplay of multiple phenomena emanating from both material and ideational factors; an in-depth RSCT analysis could therefore be a welcome addition to the existing literature.

regularly challenging its dominance, as during the 19th-century 'Great Game' (Hopkirk, 2001), immediately following WWI (D. Kelly, 2000), and in the post-Soviet period. Finally, during the modern-day periods outside of Russian or Soviet imperial control – in 1918-1920 and after 1991 – its main constituent states have always been unstable. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were riven by violent intra-state conflict in 1918-1920, much as they are now; it seems, in other words, to be populated by 'weak' or, as I shall call them, '*incoherent*' states. The region's modern history suggests it is rife with precisely those questions that my theoretical framework aims to clarify.

The Southern Caucasus' three recognised states emerged in their modern forms following the fall of the Czarist Empire, in 1917, after a failed attempt by the three largest ethnic groups of the Southern Caucasus (Armenians, Azeris, Georgians) to create a unified state, the short-lived Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (TDFR) (Hovannisian, 1997, pp. 289-299; Swietochowski, 2004, pp. 105-128). Its brief and fractious history illustrates the extent to which regional elites had, by that time, taken on the specific identities and interests of different 'imagined communities' (B. Anderson, 2006), identities that would only be reinforced in 1918-1921 with the emergence of the three 'Democratic Republics' of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Marked by wars and massacres – an inevitable outcome of dramatically overlapping territorial claims and hopelessly mixed populations – this short period of history outside of direct Russian imperial rule now occupies pride of place in the nationalist narratives of *all* peoples of the Southern Caucasus as a focus of grievance and identity.

It is all too easy to claim, as much of Western reporting has done, that '*ancient hatreds*' that had remained bottled up during the decades of Soviet rule effortlessly rose again in 1989. And, to be fair, much of the antagonism within the region is also constructed as 'ancient' by nationalists on all sides in the region. But if one goes back only slightly further in time, towards the middle of the 19th century, one finds a dramatically different picture of the area, one that reveals the contingent and far from inevitable nature of regional ethnic antagonisms. Early imperial Russian Transcaucasia was an area of the empire where centuries of Byzantine, Persian, Turkish influence, and Russian overlay had created what one could conceivably call a unified socio-cultural space, where different ethnicities lived side by side in *relative* peace under a 'pax Russica' without the added territorially exclusive complications of modern nationalism. At the same time, this era of imperial control set the stage for what would happen in the early and late 20th centuries: the strife in 1918-1921 (and following 1989) was not based on anything 'ancient'; it was the combined, socially constructed product of the processes

of modernity *and* Russian imperialism that had affected the Southern Caucasus during the 19th century³.

Ethnic nationalism only emerged in the second half of the 19th century, when it touched first the Armenians and Georgians, and subsequently the Azeris (Goldenberg, 1996, pp. 23-30). The Russian imperial authorities had been instrumental in its emergence by privileging different ethnic groups at various times during their rule, the only constant being their discriminatory attitude towards the their *Muslim* subjects. The combination of resulting socio-economic patterns, internal and external migrations, and modernisation created a potent, volatile situation in which nationalism could readily take root. In Georgia, Marxism mixed with Georgian antagonism against the local Armenian bourgeoisie to create a “national liberation movement based on class war”, centred on the local Mensheviks (Suny, 1996, p. 140). The long-simmering antagonisms between Armenians and Azeris broke out in the open in 1905 (Swietochowski, 1996, pp. 214-215), in spite of efforts by communal leaders to contain the violence, and, after the fact, encourage reconciliation (Altstadt, 1992, pp. 39-43), and set the stage for the brutal ethnic cleansings that would mark the Caucasus following the Cold War. It must be stressed, however, that 1905 was the first instance of large-scale ethnic conflict in the region: a distinctly *modern* date.

While these hatreds were, perhaps, not *ancient*, they have nevertheless demonstrated a remarkable persistence and resilience over time. The decades of Soviet propaganda that followed the Bolshevik takeover of the region – defining the three main ethnicities as ‘brotherly nations’ and celebrating Southern Caucasian brotherhood of nations under Russian-Soviet tutelage – showed itself entirely ineffective. Quite on the contrary: several authors argue that the Soviet ‘titular nation’ system, combined with rigid, primordialist historiography to reinforce rather than weaken ethnic allegiances within the USSR, and create ethnic consciousness where, previously, there was little, as, arguably, in Abkhazia and Ossetia (Cornell, 2001; Suny, 2001). In the Southern Caucasus, the situation was complicated by territorial changes and upgrades/downgrades in the status of various territories – including Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh – especially during the Stalinist period, which has led to not-too-unfounded charges of them having been deliberately designed to foment ethnic strife.

³ Well into that century, the absolute majority of Tbilisi’s population was ethnic Armenian: mostly traders and artisans brought there by subsequent Georgian kings aiming to complement their largely agrarian co-ethnics with an urban population (Suny, 1994, pp. 86-95, 116-117). The co-habitation of Armenians and Azeris (then called ‘Caucasian Tatars’) in Baku, Shushi, Yerevan, and throughout the territories that now make up Armenia and Azerbaijan, where both groups were substantially intermingled, was relatively peaceful until 1905 (Altstadt, 1992, pp. 28-33; Bournoutian, 1996).

What is noteworthy about the earlier, very brief period of independence in 1918-1921 is the similarity between the regional flashpoints at that time, and the sites of conflict seven decades later, in the post-Cold War period: wars and massacres between Armenians and Azeris (inside and beyond Nagorno-Karabakh), pro-Bolshevik uprisings by the Abkhaz and the Ossetians, a war between Georgia and Armenia over the contested provinces of Javakheti and Lori. When Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan attained their independence after seventy years of Soviet rule, the patterns of strife took on a familiar form, generating both inter- and intra-state conflicts and tensions centred around these same territories. Baku and Yerevan were already involved in a de-facto civil war *before* the formal implosion of the USSR, with Armenian fighters confronting Azeri troops in Karabakh from the autumn of 1991, although skirmishing and armed unrest had begun long beforehand (De Waal, 2003; Rieff, 1997); independence 'upgraded' the conflict to a full-fledged international conflagration. Abkhazia and South Ossetia were at the same time moving beyond Tbilisi's control, in the run-up to open armed conflict and extensive ethnic cleansing in 1991-93 (Chervonnaia, 1994; Human Rights Watch, 1992; Potier, 2001). The end result has been a series of 'frozen conflicts' that have marked the region ever since the 'hot' phase of these conflagrations came to an end, pitting Armenia/Karabakh against Azerbaijan and Abkhazia/South Ossetia against Georgia (with the latter becoming 'unfrozen' in 2008).

The Southern Caucasus has thus been a site for both inter- and intra-state conflict at different stages in its modern history outside of imperial domination. Apart from persistently fractious inter-state enmities that provide ample opportunity for the exploration of RSCT's 'amity/enmity' variable, its modern nationalisms seem to also have produced states that can all be described as weak and unstable. The intra-state troubles of the 1918-1920 and post-1991 period were noted above; today, *two* of the recognised regional states – Azerbaijan, Georgia – have fragmented through the latter era's separatist conflicts. All three states have moreover seen their share of political instability and strife in the post-Soviet years. None of them has had a peaceful transition of power between government and opposition, with both Georgia and Azerbaijan going through civil wars during their early post-Soviet history. In other words, the Southern Caucasus appears to also provide ample opportunity to apply the rehashed concept of state incoherence this thesis aims to develop.

Apart from pointing to persistent – if not altogether ancient – forms of enmity and state incoherence, modern history also illustrates how great powers have shaped the antagonisms within this region, time and again, through either direct domination or simple interaction. As has already been pointed out, the hegemonic role of Russia

and the Soviet Union played a crucial role in forming its various contemporary ethno-nationalisms. In the absence of Russian hegemony, the different constituent nations (and, later, states) of Transcaucasia looked towards outside powers for protection, in 1918-1921, as in the post-Cold War era. The Transcaucasian Federative Democratic Republic fell prey, among others, to the competing and incompatible great power preferences of the Georgians (Germany), Azeris (the Ottoman Empire), and Armenians (the Russians, the Allies, and later, the United States). From 1918 to 1920, the three 'Democratic Republics' also strove to enhance their relative positions through alliances with outside powers, with the British in particular often acting as an arbiter in disputes. As today, the interests of these outside powers were primarily focused on the oilfields in Baku.

Following the Cold War, the Southern Caucasus has similarly seen an ever-increasing involvement of great powers in its processes since the end of Soviet empire in 1991, and commensurately divergent alignments by the three constituent states, in addition to the unrecognised statelets. Moscow has always had a prominent presence (Baev, 1997), with military bases inherited from the USSR and, as is credibly alleged, involvement in the separatist conflicts that marked the region's states in their first years of independence. Its economic involvement is considerable as well, in the strategic sectors of especially Armenia, and less straightforwardly, Georgia. With the 2008 war, it has to some extent also assured itself a position within the region through its de-facto protectorates in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The United States and the EU ('Europe') have, meanwhile greatly increased their regional presence, starting with the 'Contract of the Century' signed with Azerbaijan in 1994 (MacFarlane, 1999). Much of their involvement has centred on energy transportation routes for hydrocarbon reserves (like the already functional BTC oil pipeline and the proposed Nabucco gas pipeline). The United States has, however, expanded into the military and political sectors by actively pushing for Georgia's NATO membership, at least during the G.W. Bush presidency (D. Lynch, 2006, pp. 51-54). The EU's regional involvement has gone from benign neglect of the region's states to their inclusion within the ENP and Eastern Partnership programme, with the possibility of Association Agreements being signed in the near future (European Commission, 2009d; MacFarlane, 2004). Turkey and Iran have also played roles shaping the region, if only as adjacent regional powers with important historical ties to it. Again, as regards great power penetration, the Southern Caucasus seems fertile and complex ground for a practical application of RSCT.

Guiding Questions

Modern history certainly directs attention towards this region as a potentially fruitful site for a trial run of an expanded version of RSCT, based around the variables of amity/enmity, state incoherence, and great power penetration. The need for such an application is made all the more urgent because of the continued impermeability of the region's enmities to change: in all its societies, the impact of programmes by well-meaning peace-promoting NGOs has been minimal. There are no large-scale self-sustained movements rejecting conflict-engendering nationalisms, no notable indigenous peace groups comparable to Israel's 'Peace Now'. Moreover, on an inter-governmental level, *none* of the frozen conflicts have been resolved. This remains a highly fractured region, its many impervious, blockaded borders accentuating its unresolved – and seemingly irresolvable – antagonisms.

RSCT – with its multi-level and structural view of security – would suggest the futility of trying to untie a Gordian knot by plucking at a few minor strings within it: if expanded appropriately, it would allow the complex networks of securitisations and counter-securitisations that drive regional insecurity to be exposed. If, as Wæver (2002) suggests, these securitisations are 'sedimented' – that is, of varying 'immutability' – the agency of individuals or smaller 'enlightened' groups would bump up against the overarching ideational structures created by these securitisations, deep-seated 'logics of appropriateness' that risk marginalising anyone stepping outside of the ideological, nationalist mainstream. Moreover, addressing one level of securitisation – domestic (state incoherence), regional (amity/enmity) or systemic (great power penetration) – would not be sufficient to break through the complex spider's web of securitisations that drives regional insecurity. Finally, the addition of material factors (made possible by the hybrid nature of RSCT, its macro-perspective) would add yet another dimension of complexity. Seeing this region as a complex, interdependent, ideational-material cluster – as RSCT does – could just help us understand the persistence of its hostile relations, and the possibility of them transforming.

In particular, I shall look into whether a stable security regime can emerge from the conflictual situation that now marks the Southern Caucasus RSC. I shall do this by evaluating what I call the '*stability*' of prevailing discourses, and identifying possible pathways and obstacles in the way towards a transformation of the fractious Southern Caucasus from *conflict formation* to *security regime*. To some extent, this will be a highly hypothetical exercise, involving building alternative scenarios and considering the likelihoods of their occurring, as described by Buzan and Wæver (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 65-70) in their section on 'predictive' RSCT. How would the security discourses in the region have to change to engender more stability, both within and

between the various regional units? How would a change in the way great powers penetrate the region affect the prospects for the emergence of such a stable, less conflictual region? How would changes in the material context affect these prospects? These are the types of questions that will conclude my case study.

Two underlying questions emerge from the line of questioning presented above: one on the interplay between the three variables expanded in the theoretical section, and another on the consequences of the particular configurations found within an RSC for the region's transformative potential. My attention will be focused, firstly, on evaluating the past and present interplay between state incoherence, great power penetration and amity/enmity within the region, and, secondly, on a scenario-building exercise aimed at evaluating the RSC's transformative potential, touching on an issue that has always been central to the study of international security: the quest for peace, or at the very least, stability. The first line of questioning – *interplay* – will lead me towards positing several hypotheses regarding the links between state incoherence and patterns of great power penetration on the one hand, and amity/enmity on the other, within the discourses of security that shape the region's culture of anarchy: what I shall call the 'micro-perspective' of RSCT. Looking at the structure of this prevalent discourse, does state incoherence engender enmity, as suggested by Miller (2007) from a more historical perspective; and if so, how? Moreover, how does the way the region is penetrated by great powers – the structure of great power penetration – affect actors' discourses of (in)security? Does it skew the regional culture of anarchy towards enmity? Answering these two questions from the novel, hybrid, material-ideational point of view provided by RSCT will pave the way for my main line of inquiry: exploring the region's transformative potential.

The impression is that the peoples of the region are caught in a spider's web of self-sustaining conflict, with their leaders and elites lacking the agency required to tear this web to shreds. What is needed is a holistic understanding of this spider's web, integrating all its interconnected levels (domestic, regional and systemic), and both its ideational and material threads towards answering the crucial question as to the possibility of an emergent, conflict-mitigating security regime. To this end, this dissertation will answer queries as to the future persistence of the insecurities that have plagued the Southern Caucasus for so long, by looking at conditions within the region from the dying years of the Soviet Union to the August 2008 Russo-Georgian war, two crucial dates in its recent history.

At this point, some will accuse me of pessimism for referring to the images of a spider's web or Gordian knot. Others will fault me for optimism for believing in the capacity of an

apparently doomed and hopelessly fractious region to change; but for all their complexity and the strength of their fibres, spider's webs are liable to destruction and Gordian knots can be hacked through, if one musters the agency and intelligence to do so. Personally, I shall approach my subject with a degree of detachment and reflexion that tries to avoid either extreme. My goal is not to turn this region into what Adler and Barnett (1998b), following Deutsch (1957), call a 'security community'. I have no such illusions, and considering conditions in the region today, such a leap of faith would be daring indeed. As the empirical chapters will show, the days when Azeri and Armenian elites could jointly call for calm in Baku (as in 1905), or when Georgians, Armenians and Azeris could even consider a confederal state (as in 1918) have long been displaced in the at times vitriolic nationalist narratives that now mark this region. So have the days of Sayat Nova, the effortlessly secular and cosmopolitan Armenian troubadour who in the 18th century sang his songs in Georgian and Azeri alongside his native Armenian (Dowsett, 1997). Much less ambitiously, one of my lines of questioning will centre on whether the states within the region would be able to manage their conflicting security interests through formal mechanisms designed to minimise the occurrence of war and armed conflict, giving their populations at least a glimmer of hope at a life of 'normalcy'. That in itself is already a daunting task, in a region marked by ongoing strife since before its units even attained formal independence.

The Mechanics of Research

The methods employed in answering these research questions and hypotheses were largely structured around an intertextual analysis of the basic security discourses in evidence within the different societies of the region, supplemented by semi-structured interviews and ethnographic observation carried out during two separate periods of fieldwork, in July-September 2008 and August 2009. My main aim was to capture the region's narratives on security, while granting material factors some measure of independent causality, conforming to the overall metatheoretical point of view adopted in this Wendtian-constructivist expansion of RSCT.

The *material* factors were mapped in what I shall call a 'macro-perspective', largely through Western secondary sources, mostly think-tank reports by well-established entities like the Economist Intelligence Unit, Freedom House, and Transparency International. Considering the 'birds-eye' nature of this 'macro-perspective', the level of detail afforded by their publications was usually more than sufficient for the purposes of my thesis. The 'micro' or discursive perspective required a more detailed intertextual analysis of the basic security discourses prevalent within the South Caucasus RSC's three recognised states, and three unrecognised polities; here, a wide variety of

sources and a combination of methods provided for both data- and method-triangulation (Denzin, 2009, pp. 260-313)⁴. Documents used in this intertextual analysis included both primary and secondary sources, although the stress remained, as much as possible, on the former.

In terms of the research matrix provided by Hansen (2006, pp. 74-82), I aimed to capture securitisations, and the multiple, often clashing identities and values driving these over a historical time-period going from the decline and fall of the USSR in the 1980s to the August 2008 Georgia war. The focus was, firstly, on official discourse, and, secondly, on the intra-societal debates that surrounded these official discourses, and the historical securitising moves/acts underlying them: with the 'stability' of established official security discourses (i.e. the extent of their contestation) a major factor in my research, investigating the existence of alternative narratives and understandings of security formed a major part of my analysis, leading to the measured inclusion of even marginal political discourses – like those of Ashot Bleyan in Armenia, or the OI! Youth Group in Azerbaijan – for the sake of completeness.

National Security Concepts acted as a starting point for the analyses of official security discourses in the recognised South Caucasus states. While these could generally be seen to be authoritative statements in their own right, their status as a repository of successful securitisations was not taken for granted: in all three (Armenian, Azeri and Georgian) cases, the evolution of official security discourse was traced back through presidential statements and interviews gathered from official presidential websites, supplemented by interview transcripts from local and Western news and monitoring agencies, as well as policy statements by government entities. These official discourses were then put into the broader context of intra-societal debate in order to gauge their 'stability' or lack of contestation: diverging statements by opposition politicians, conflicting opinions and reports in the local media were also part of the primary source material on the regional security discourse. Where possible, these local outlets were directly accessed through their internet archives; monitoring by

⁴ Regional sources were confined to documents and reports in Russian, Armenian and English, in order of preference. This might raise some issues regarding the potential distortive effects of not relying on the language of origin in, for instance, Georgia and Azerbaijan, with the ever-present risk of the discourse being 'adapted' to the particular target audience at hand. Whether your readers or listeners are co-nationals or Western outsiders will matter, if only because both governments and oppositionists will skew their rhetoric to the specific requirements of propaganda and PR. Two elements are of importance here, however, in minimising such distortions. Firstly, this effect is less pronounced in the case of the Russian (as opposed to the English-language) versions of particular articles; in fact, quite often, material that might seem offensive to Western ears was simply not translated into English, while it was into Russian (still the *lingua franca* of much of the region's elite in the time period under consideration). Secondly, any such distortions should have been minimised by the multi-faceted and cross-cutting nature of my (multiply triangulated) analysis, with its combination of primary and secondary sources, supplemented by interviews and ethnographic, immersive research and drawn from a wide variety of outlets in a range of different languages.

Eastview and the BBC (as accessed through Lexis Nexis) also provided a steady stream of data, as did reports by Western media focused on the region, like Radio Free Europe and Eurasianet.

In the absence of formal National Security Concepts, and in light of the less accessible nature of local source material, the security discourses of the non-recognised entities – Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia – relied to a greater extent on authoritative statements by the local elites, in primary sources where available, and in secondary sources where necessary. Tracing back the underlying securitisations did not pose much of a problem as the origins of these conflicts have been well-documented. The main securitising moves and acts, contained in resolutions by the local supreme soviets, or statements by the various nationalist mass movements and personalities were readily available, either directly on the entities' internet resources or indirectly in secondary sources dealing with the conflicts' origins. The Russian press or, in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenian press also provided a steady stream of information regarding these entities' elite perceptions. The most important challenges to these dominant discourses could also be detected in secondary material reporting intra-elite discord: the conflicts surrounding Samvel Babayan in Karabakh, Dmitry Sanakoyev in South Ossetia are a case in point, as is the recent Abkhaz unease at Russian economic dominance (see chapters 7 and 8).

As everywhere in the FSU, the limits to media freedom in the South Caucasus had to be taken into account when mapping some of the opposition discourses in the region's less free states. While the electronic media (television) are subject to informal state control in Yerevan, Baku and Tbilisi, there is some measure of freedom for the printed press, and critical articles do appear in opposition and independent newspapers in all three recognised South Caucasus states despite of pressure and harassment by their governments. While these independent publications are often in the local language (except for Russian-language publications like *Golos Armenii* in Armenia and *Zerkalo* in Azerbaijan), they are often picked up on and translated by well-respected monitoring services like Eastview and the BBC. Opposition viewpoints are also freely reported on by Western media with a regional focus (Radio Free Europe, or the BBC Russian and Azeri services), apart from being readily accessible in the regional 'blogosphere'. One Yerevan-based organisation, Caucasus Journalists' Network, also provided large numbers of raw transcripts of online interviews carried out co-operatively by journalists from all three South Caucasus states, with political figures of various political backgrounds. More broadly, prevalent attitudes in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia had been the subject of large-scale opinion surveys (see chapter 6) whose result also provided valuable insights into the attitudes prevalent within the different societies, with

the important caveats usually accompanying such surveys in more or less authoritarian societies.

Two separate bouts of fieldwork in the region supplemented the formal inter-textual research outlined above: one in July-September 2008 (Armenia and Georgia), and the other during August 2009 (Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia). The aim of these visits was, firstly, to obtain interviews from various individuals of interest, and, secondly, to immerse myself in local socio-cultural conditions to a maximum extent by adding an ethnographic element to my research. Except in Nagorno-Karabakh, I was extensively aided in my endeavours by local contacts, who also allowed me to interact to a maximum extent possible with ordinary Armenians, Georgians, and Abkhazians. To some extent, the insights gained through such everyday interaction were valuable correctives to the information gained through the simple reading of texts: directly observing and interacting with anti-government demonstrators in Yerevan, reading the mostly English-language placards held by Georgians in protest at the August 2008 war, or talking to ordinary Abkhazians about the importance of Apsuara, their 'code of honour', gave me valuable insights into at least a small sample of the day-to-day interaction that I would not have received in the comfort of a research library or newspaper archive. It also opened up discourses that did not necessarily feature in the mainstream public narratives of these societies: for instance, among religious cult members, feminists and ultra-liberal activists on the political fringes of society.

My formal, semi-structured interviews concentrated mostly on members of the local political elites and counter-elites: policymakers, first and foremost, and opposition leaders and activists. Journalists, intellectuals, artists, NGO campaigners and foreign diplomats were also included, alongside, in a less formal setting, 'ordinary' citizens who couldn't be described as part of a local 'elite'. Again, these were not central but, rather, complementary to my inter-textual approach, aimed mostly triangulating impressions inductively arrived at through the latter, asking questions pertaining to the interviewees' perceptions of regional security, statehood, great power involvement, and prospects for change. The openness and accessibility of my interviewees varied with the extent of authoritarianism within a given society: I found respondents in Abkhazia and Georgia most ready to speak, while it did take more effort to 'open up' some of the interviewees in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh⁵. Such open reluctance was, however, rare: most

⁵ In one particularly memorable instance, I was refused an interview by a prominent pro-government intellectual in Nagorno-Karabakh after revealing my country of citizenship (Belgian) and the topic of conversation (regional security), with the friendly advice that only the local foreign ministry would have the authority to comment on such sensitive matters.

interviewees were frank and openly critical of their governments, even if it required more 'prodding' in some settings than in others.

One source of regret was my inability to carry out fieldwork in Azerbaijan. Although this did seem remotely possible at the beginning of my project (in 2005-06), as time progressed and optimism as to a resolution of the Karabakh conflict regressed, my ethnic origins precluded me from visiting Baku, as Azerbaijan routinely denied visas to foreign nationals of Armenian descent at the time. I compensated by, firstly, establishing contacts with members of the expatriate Azeri community in London, including diplomats and opposition supporters, and by, secondly, delving disproportionately into the numerous Azeri sources available from abroad. Official discourses – presidential statements, communiqués and policy papers by various ministries – were readily accessible. Baku is also host to a large number of well-archived bi- or tri-lingual, or monolingual Russian-language publications which provided a wealth of material. Newspapers like *Zerkalo*, and news sites like *trend.az*, *day.az* and *apa.az*, in addition to the monitoring by Eastview and the BBC provided a wide selection of source data. All in all, the information obtained was sufficient to insert insights on Azerbaijan's security discourse into this thesis.

Another unfortunate limitation on this thesis was my inability to explicitly engage with the Copenhagen School's sectoral view (Buzan, et al., 1998, pp. 27-29), although the political and societal sectors do feature in my treatment of state incoherence in particular. A decision *not* to present the analysis of the regional security discourse sector-by-sector was made about mid-way through the project, as it became apparent that the 100,000-word limit would prevent me from doing justice to the possible wealth of material that could emerge by looking at interactions between the military, political, societal, economic and environmental sectors. The problem lay partly in my focus on *both* the material and the ideational, and on the nature of my research questions and hypotheses, which deals with the general interaction between the three broadly defined and expanded variables, from the *structural* perspective that RSCCT provides. Future research could introduce sector-specific approaches to the framework presented below, refining it further: in this respect, this framework will remain a work in progress, hopefully providing interesting pathways to an ever-increasing understanding of the workings of regional security.

Chapter Outline

This thesis will take on the following shape. Following this introduction, chapters 2-5 will centre on the first aim enumerated above: conceptual expansion. Chapter 2 will focus mainly on the opening out of amity/enmity into a spectrum encompassing six

different categories, ranging from revisionist conflict formations to tight security communities, defined from a macro- (material/epiphenomenal) and micro- (ideational/discursive) perspective. Within this framework, a distinction will be made between the *instrumental* and *argumentative* aspects of security discourse, the former determining the referent objects that are to be protected, the latter driven by a determination to employ the techno-scientific knowledge present within a given society towards their protection. These different aspects of discourse will converge and diverge in varying ways to reflect different 'cultures of anarchy'; changes in instrumental or argumentative security discourse at the official level will thus lead to different regional configurations/networks of securitisations, and, hence, changes in regional patterns of amity/enmity. Such changes in official, state-level security discourse are linked to a lack of 'discursive stability', or the deficient 'groundedness' of official instrumental and argumentative narratives in surrounding material circumstances and the underlying society's security discourses.

The second concept, state (in)coherence, will be expanded in chapter 3 by distinguishing between three different components and two distinct dimensions: the inherent strength/weakness, ostensible stability/instability, and the effective sovereignty of states, on the one hand, and their horizontal or vertical (in)coherence on the other. Applying a macro- and micro-perspective, the chapter will address the complex relationship between the three tiers of state weakness, distinguishing between inherently weak, ostensibly unstable and failed states, and making an additional division between collapsed and fragmented variants of state failure based on the horizontal/vertical distinction.

The third expanded concept, great power penetration, will be discussed in chapter 4 and will again include both macro- and micro-, material and discursive elements. Objective, subjective and intersubjective elements within the concept will be differentiated through the physical presence and interests of the penetrating powers, in addition to the 'discursive dependence' of local security dynamics on great power involvement. Taken together, these material and ideational factors will allow me to classify region-specific patterns of great power penetration into a range of categories ranging from unipolar, through multipolar/competitive to multipolar/cooperative (bounded by the related notions of hegemony and disengagement) in preparation for an empirical analysis of the interaction between such patterns and the amity/enmity within a given region.

The goal of chapter 5 will be two-fold: firstly, the elaboration of the hypotheses that will guide the empirical application of the previously expanded concepts, and, secondly, the

development of a methodology suited to the thesis' aims. As indicated above, these hypotheses will relate to the links between state (in)coherence, great power penetration and amity/enmity, as well as the possibility of the RSC 'transforming internally' into a security regime. More practical, methodological sections will relate to the mechanics of the empirical employment of amity/enmity, state (in)coherence and great power penetration in subsequent chapters.

These empirical chapters (6, 7, 8 and 9) will place regional phenomena within the previously elaborated concepts. Chapter 6 will provide a comprehensive macro-perspective view of the 'security constellation' surrounding the Southern Caucasus through the constitutive variables of the RSC proper (units/polarity/boundaries/amity-enmity) and two additional expanded factors (state coherence, great power penetration). Chapter 7 will describe how security discourses imbued with divergent nationalist narratives on their *argumentative* side, and marked by the acceptance of war as an suitable tool of policy on their *instrumental* side fashion the South Caucasus RSC into a 'revisionist conflict formation'. Chapter 8 will dissect the material and ideational aspects of 'state incoherence' by looking at the inability of the region's 'horizontally fragmented' states (Georgia, Azerbaijan) to shape the 'collective strategies of survival' that would be required for re-integration, because of fundamentally diverging identities and narratives of history. The states' 'vertical incoherence' – their lack of legitimacy and limited ability to compensate for that lack through projections of state power into society – will also be looked at. Chapter 9 will characterise the nature of great power involvement in the region by considering the subjective interests shaping their material entanglements, and the applying the typology previously expounded in chapter 4 to the resulting patterns of great power penetration; in conclusion, the 'discursive dependence' of the states' security discourses on these patterns will be considered.

Chapter 10 will finally 'pull everything together' and answer the main research questions by detailing how the expanded concepts of amity/enmity, state (in)coherence and great power penetration feed into each other from the micro- as well as macro-perspectives. The hypotheses will seem to have been largely confirmed: in other words, state incoherence indeed drives this region towards greater enmity, while generally competitive, multipolar patterns of great power penetration distort the calculations and discourses of regional states to maintain the current conflict formation. Nevertheless, elements within the counter-narratives of the different regional sub-state societies will be deemed to reveal a potential for change and the 'destabilisation' of dominant discourses of security. The thesis will conclude with scenarios for the future, specifically elaborating on the chances for the emergence of a security regime in the

Southern Caucasus and offering a critical-prescriptive assessment of policy implications for both regional and extra-regional actors concerned with improved regional stability.

CHAPTER 2: AMITY AND ENMITY IN ITS REGIONAL CONTEXT

This chapter will attempt to further develop one of the central concepts in RSCT: the amity/enmity variable co-defining the character of RSCs alongside their boundaries, polarity and anarchy. Buzan and Wæver (2003, pp. 45-51) describe patterns of amity/enmity as “taking the form of subglobal, geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence”. They furthermore roughly outline a typology of such patterns – conflict formation, security regime, and security community – and suggest a possible Wendtian approach to this issue (Buzan, 1991, p. 218; Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 50-55; Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 12; Wæver, 1989). Apart from this vague sketch, the concept has as yet not been given the development warranted by its central importance in the overall theory; and this conceptual expansion and refinement is one of the primary tasks of this part of my inquiry.

Accordingly, in the first part of this chapter, I shall argue in favour of using Wendt’s ‘soft constructivist’ theoretical framework as the broader theoretical underpinning of the concept’s expansion within RSCT’s specifically hybrid context. A second part will consequently expand on the nature of corporate state agency within RSCT by linking *securitisation* with state behaviour. A third section will elaborate a typology of amity/enmity in terms of this theoretical background, as a six-category spectrum of amity/enmity ranging from ‘revisionist conflict formations’ to ‘thick security regimes’. The fourth and final part will then look at *permissive* factors behind *changes* in these patterns: what allows for the ‘internal transformation’ of RSCs? In concrete terms: which factors – or, ‘facilitating conditions’ (Buzan, et al., 1998, pp. 31-33) – *allow for* alterations in patterns of amity/enmity from one category to the other (or, alternatively, shifts on the amity/enmity continuum)?

A Meta-theoretical Excursion

As pointed out in the introductory chapter, Regional Security Complex Theory (Buzan, 1991, pp. 186-229; 1993a; Buzan & Wæver, 2003; Buzan, et al., 1998, pp. 10-20; Lake & Morgan, 1998) is one of the ‘middle roads’ to have emerged in recent years in response to the centrifugal forces that have plagued IR and Security Studies since the onset of the Third Great Debate within the discipline. Standing at the nexus of structural neo-realism and constructivism, it has come to display hybrid characteristics that stem from its complex intellectual pedigree, particularly in the ‘revised’ version developed by Buzan and Wæver (Buzan & Wæver, 2003; Buzan, et al., 1998, pp. 1-20). Its ontology is inherently crossbred: its central concept’s essential structure is both materially and ideationally delimited. Regional Security Complexes (RSCs) are defined

by *anarchy* and *polarity* (largely materially conceptualised *facts*), but both their *boundaries* and patterns of amity or enmity are socially constituted by inherently discursive *securitisations*.

RSCT's bias is certainly *structural*: most of the aforementioned concepts imply a measure of constancy and immutability. But *securitisations*, as Austinian *speech acts* that generate a given society's intersubjective definitions of (in)security, also introduce an element of *process* and, consequently, an underexplored potential to conceptualise *change*. The uneasy combination of the material and the ideational, structure and process within its ontology is mirrored in the cohabitation of 'erklären' and 'verstehen' within the theory's epistemological outlook (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 83-87). This hybridity, raises the question of how to balance its various, diversely grounded theoretical elements (material and ideational, explanation and understanding, causal and constitutive, structure and process) when deepening and widening its central concepts. And this applies just as strongly to any expansion of the amity/enmity variable; how can one develop it in a way that keeps intact the inherent hybridity of the theory, so as to link it with its material elements, provide it with structure without disregarding process, tie it to explanatory as well as interpretive theory?

In the 'revised' version of RSCT, amity/enmity is clearly situated on the ideational/interpretive side of RSCT: 'security interdependence' is seen as being co-constituted by *securitisation*, and the variable is thus part of RSCT's *constructivist* heritage (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 70-76). This suggests a constructivist approach would be most adequate as the theoretical scaffold around which to build an expansion of the concept. The question is, however, exactly which form of constructivism? As has been pointed out by many, there are a great variety of constructivisms within the intellectual landscape of contemporary IR; and the distinction goes beyond the simple dichotomy between the 'soft' and 'hard' variants. In fact, constructivisms exist on a wide spectrum between the extremes of positivism and post-structuralism, separated from the former by a belief in an intersubjectively constructed social reality, and from the latter by a continuing adherence to *some* measure of objective knowledge. Within that spectrum, varieties abound: Zehfuss (2002, pp. 1-32), for instance, distinguishes three variants: Wendtian, Kratochwilian and Onufian. Adler (1997), on the other hand, has made a more complex distinction between the approach's 'modernist', 'modernist linguistic', 'critical' and 'radical' forms. The different varieties diverge on a number of aspects, *inter alia*: the extent to which they essentialise and objectify social kinds; the extent to which they are structure- or process-oriented; their digressing willingness to endow the material world with independent causal qualities; their anti-foundationalism

or scientific realism; the absence or presence of an emancipatory agenda; their degree of state-centredness.

The problem of where to place the Copenhagen School in this spectrum is compounded by the ambiguities within the concept of *securitisation*. In its foundational text – *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Buzan, et al., 1998) – (in)security is seen as heavily discursive, and ‘revised’ RSCT seems to be introduced more as a possible add-on to this process-oriented approach than an indivisible part. But – to considerable criticism from the ‘harder’ constructivist range of the spectrum – Buzan and Wæver do refer to the ‘sedimentation’ of discourses into fairly static identities (Buzan & Wæver, 1997, p. 244); and their view of society similarly does lean towards the structural and moderately static (Wæver, et al., 1993, p. 39). Moreover, integrated into RSCT, securitisation becomes part of a more unambiguously structural whole. RSCT’s ontological scope goes beyond the strictly discursive; and both the *material* and the *ideational* are part and parcel of its reality. In fact, Securitisation Theory has generally been criticised for *exactly* the ‘faults’ found in ‘soft’ versions of constructivisms by those operating from a more post-structuralist or critical vein: for reifying and objectifying fluid social realities, a lack of critical engagement, state- and Western-centredness, scientific realism, scientific-philosophical incoherence (Hansen, 2000; McSweeney, 1996, 1998; Wilkinson, 2007)⁶. These criticisms sound familiar, in that they resemble those levelled against one of the grand theorists of constructivism, Alexander Wendt (Guzzini & Leander, 2006; Kratochwil, 2000; S. Smith, 2000; Suganami, 2002), *precariously* suggesting a possible compatibility between his ‘rump materialism’ and RSCT.

Perhaps the clearest, most explicit and most important compatibility between Wendt’s and Buzan and Wæver’s *ontologies* lies in their conceptualisation of *security*: in the way it is clearly demarcated from universalist and largely constant assumptions that govern the rationalist theorisations of the concept, and at the same time differentiated from the entirely fluid and contingent notions of ‘hard’ constructivists and post-structuralists. Virtually all theories of IR agree on the centrality of *survival* as the primary interest of all states, although they differ sharply on the exact implications

⁶ Taking this ‘soft constructivist’ position will no doubt make this thesis vulnerable to precisely these critiques. While some measure of objectification is to be expected, the framework will illustrate the diversity of opinion present within these societies by *not* taking existing securitisations for granted, instead extensively problematising them by also accounting for their ‘discursive stability’, i.e. the extent to which they are (or are not) contested within the societies by alternative discourses. Looking at the inner workings of societies will also address the ever-present risk of state-centrism: again, the securitisations driving regional actors are *not* taken at face value, always seen as contingent on continuous processes of social construction and contestation. These processes will be laid out in later chapters through, for instance, the post-Cold War conflicts between ethnic and civic conceptualisations of nationhood in Armenia and Georgia. See also chapters 1, 3 and 5.

thereof. Rationalists of different colours varyingly *assume* states will adopt security-, power- or utility-maximising behaviour in safeguarding this primary objective: the security-as-survival of the state. 'Hard' constructivists don't assume anything, except to view 'security' as contextual, indeterminate and inherently reflexive, unable to escape its 'essentially contested' nature.

On the one hand, Wendt (1999, pp. 224-245) separates himself from orthodox rationalists by pointing out that security is 'multiply realisable': except in particularly acute, life-threatening situations – his proverbial 'hotel fire' (Ibid., p. 122 & 157) – 'security' can be interpreted in multiple ways. States must thus give meaning to 'security' in their day-to-day interaction, and actively interpret this very vague concept in terms of more concrete interests and policy goals, without which the concept would remain an empty shell. Rather than seeing the notion as an undifferentiated, material given which can or cannot be modified under the influence of causal factors, security thus becomes a largely socio-cultural construct around a small, material core: the imperative of *physical* survival. And this is no different in the case of RSCT's materially embedded securitisations, which are inevitably culturally specific and subjectivist, in contrast to more rationalist notions of security.

On the other hand, both RSCT and Wendt's rump materialism are separated from 'harder' versions of constructivism by this existence of the material alongside the ideational, the hybridity that offers so much potential and flexibility but adds to the theories' complexity. In both approaches, discourse – or, if you will, the ideational realm – does not exist in a material void (Wendt, 1999, pp. 110-113): hence, the above-mentioned accusations of excessive structuralism and state-centredness levelled at Wendt and Buzan/Wæver. This explicit presence of the *material* also means that notions of *rationality and rational choice* – problematised in the 'harder' parts of the constructivist tradition – retain their relevance. For Wendt (1999, pp. 114-138), rationality may be culturally embedded, but it is still *rationality*, giving scholars insights to the pressures that push actors towards reacting to material realities in predictable ways within a relatively fixed context.

RSCT is more implicit in that regard, but it is clear that the material variables and the theory's neo-realist pedigree imply some measure of rationalism there as well. In the scenario-building, 'predictive' version of RSCT, states react to their environment (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 45-46, 67-70), be it to exogenous shocks or endogenous regional factors like, for instance, the *polarity* of a given RSC, or its *geography*, or the material possibilities of *technology*. In both RSCT and Wendtian constructivism, interests and security are constructed around culturally specific ends and values, while

instrumental action is still influenced by a material reality, upholding the potential relevance of adequately contextualised structural-rationalist models of behaviour. As will be apparent below, the insights of various rationalist theories of IR and International Security – offensive and defensive varieties of realism, regime theory – will retain some validity in the differing cultures of anarchy that constitute the amity/enmity variable, providing a predictive element of state behaviour within that particular context⁷.

Finally, both Wendt and Buzan/Wæver see combined objectivist and subjectivist *epistemologies* and methodological pluralism as a fitting complement to their hybrid *ontologies*. While RSCT clearly takes a less rigid approach than Wendt in that regard – the latter arguably advocates a more strictly delineated ‘social-science’ angle in International Relations research – the framework is sufficiently adaptive to accommodate varying combinations of positivism and interpretivism. This is all the more necessary because of the potentially rich insights that could be provided by not disregarding either the objective/material or the subjective/ideational in RSCT. In the following theoretical expansion and case-study, this combined objectivist-subjectivist epistemology will thus be translated into a dualist methodology, with a macro-perspective grasping the *objectively observable* characteristics (behaviour and brute material givens) of security interaction from the top down, and a micro-perspective looking at the *subjective security discourse*, the networks of securitisation underlying these objectively gathered ‘facts’.

All of the above can be illustrated by a brief look at the one structure so central to both approaches: the state. For Wendt, states encompass a material base with super-imposed identities and notions of (in)security that are in large part *culturally* and *socially* constituted (Wendt, 1999, pp. 193-245). In RSCT’s most recent versions, the notion of the state seems underdeveloped beyond the differentiation between pre-modern, modern and post-modern (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 20-26); but an earlier conceptualisation of the state by Buzan clearly includes both ideational and material elements, and a measure of corporate agency. While it has remained in the

⁷ The Liberals’ bottom-up approach, for instance, sees unit-level characteristics – reflective of internally generated beliefs and interests and mostly explained through the democratic or non-democratic character of domestic regimes – as a causal factor of cooperation or conflict (Doyle, 1986; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Gaubatz, 1996; Moravcsik, 1997). On the other hand, those working from a systemic-structuralist perspective have constructed top-down models that seek to explain emphases on relative or absolute gains in terms of the structure of anarchy itself (Waltz, 1979) system-level, externally generated variables (Grieco, 1988a, 1988b) or iterated, multi-player game-theoretical configurations (Snidal, 1991): relations are competitive or cooperative because of particular configurations of the system, given functionally identical units displaying a similar preference for either absolute or relative gains (Axelrod, 1984; Grieco, 1988a, 1988b; Keohane, 1982; Oye, 1985; Snidal, 1985a, 1985b, 1991). RSCT’s multi-perspectival aspect makes the integration of these theories’ insights into RSCT a possibility – by looking at ways particular configurations of material reality ‘push’ state action into certain, ‘rationally mandated’ directions – within the culturally determined teleological context provided by securitisation theory.

background, this version of statehood is clearly compatible with both Wendt's and contemporary RSCT approaches. The next section will concentrate on reintegrating this material-ideational form of corporate statehood into modern-day, 'revised' RSCT by linking it to the latter's central notion of 'securitisation' through a double move: firstly, by distinguishing *argumentative* and *instrumental* aspects within the processes of securitisation and security discourse more generally, and, secondly, by linking these two aspects to a tri-partite (material/institutional/ideational) view of the state. In so doing, it will also turn the supra-state and sub-state levels into a unified field, integrated by discourses of security that cut across and interact, opening up state discourses to contestation and destabilisation from both above and below.

Securitisation and the State in an RSCT Context

In *People, States and Fear*, Buzan (1991, pp. 57-111) sees the state as being composed of three fundamental building blocs: its *physical base* (territory and population), its *institutions* (administrative-bureaucratic apparatus and laws), and its *ideas* (a state's ideology, and the underlying society's socio-cultural values); this tri-partite definition of the state is, clearly, part material, part ideational. On the material side, one has the physical base or pure *matter*, on the ideational side, (*almost*) pure *ideas*. The institutions of a state form an intermediate category between these two where, in effect, ideology and matter meet to create the legal and organisational expression of statehood, formed on the state's physical base according to the ideas of statehood prevalent within a given society. Within the context of security, these three components are the main referent objects of state action: protecting the survival of its physical base, the stability of its institutions and the continuity of its values form a three-pronged set of priorities for any state. How does securitisation – a society's discursive definition of an issue as an existential threat requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the bounds of political procedure (Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 24) – relate to this setup, and how can the state be conceptualised as it is within RSCT – a 'unit' – when so much of regional securitisation takes place at the domestic, sub-state level?

Securitisation is about the identification of issues as existential threats requiring emergency measures. The identification of 'existential threats' is, on the one hand, predicated on collective assumptions and beliefs as to *what exactly* is worthy of being protected from harm, the choice by a given society of its 'referent objects' for security (Buzan, et al., 1998, pp. 36-40). On the other hand, the protection of these values and identities is dependent on techno-scientific knowledge, or assumptions on the workings of the outside world that underlie a 'logic of threats and vulnerabilities' (Buzan, et al., 1998, pp. 57-61, 79-84, 103-109, 124-126, 150-154). Securitisation in the *broad* sense

thus includes two intertwined but distinctive discursive processes that logically⁸ precede and follow the identification proper of a threat. I shall call these discursive processes *instrumental* and *argumentative*. The argumentative element concerns the construction of the values and the interpretation of identities that are to be protected. Instrumental discourse, on the other hand, is determined by the techno-scientific knowledge within a given society: its assumptions on the workings of the outside world that play a central role both in the identification of (potential) threats, or the choice of extraordinary means to remedy these threats⁹.

The argumentative constituent of securitisation emerges from the requirement that referent objects be defined and interpreted *before* they can be designated as being under existential threat. It is called *argumentative* precisely because it encompasses *arguments* about the ultimate goals of state action, the highest-order referent objects that are constitutive of national identity and its associated ideological values; it is therefore intricately bound with a state's self-view, and thus, the third, ideational part of the tri-partite physical base-institutions-ideology complex, connected to how society views its state as it is and as it ought to be. *Instrumental* discursive processes, on the other hand, deal with the *means of achieving security* for the state, and consequently involve the application of a society's techno-scientific knowledge and physical base to the protection of the identities and values generated above. States and their underlying societies will have to answer two central questions based on their assumptions on the workings of the outside world. Firstly, they will have to identify threats to the values pre-determined in the argumentative discursive process. Whether or not something is seen as a threat depends, after all, not only on the values one holds dear, but also on the knowledge one has regarding what, in the outside world, might threaten them. Secondly, they will have to determine the exact manner in which to employ the assets contained within their physical base, potentially resulting dramatically different culturally determined strategies towards identical ends (Desch, 1998; Johnston, 1995).

⁸ Note that this does not imply the *chronological* precedence of the argumentative identification of values as referent objects. As Huysmans (1998, p. 494) and Wilkinson (2007, p. 11) have argued, values and identities are often constituted during the securitizing act/move proper. Nevertheless, from a *logical* perspective, a successful securitisation can, as a rule, not take place without the referent object being identified as the premise, the starting point of the speech act calling for 'extraordinary measures'. One takes measures in order to safeguard an object of value; an object does not become of value *only* because one has taken certain measures to preserve it.

⁹ To some extent, this notion of 'argumentative' and 'instrumental' discourse ties in with Wæver's (2002) three-layered view of 'sedimentation' of discourse. In the deep, first layer, one finds relatively immutable and constant discourses on identity. The slightly more variable middle layer concerns itself with the formulation of interests based on the identities formulated in the first. The relatively changeable top layer deals with the formulation of policy. The immutable, bottom 'identities' layer clearly correlates with the argumentative aspects of security discourse discussed here, while the top, policy-layer corresponds to its instrumental facets, with the middle layer of interests representing an intermediate category between these two poles.

It must be stressed these two types of discourse are ideal-types, seldom, if ever, occurring in pure form. In a way, they could be seen as an interlocked continuum, with argumentative discourses largely ideational and value-based, and the instrumental extreme plugged into material reality to a greater degree. Those of a post-structuralist slant may consequently argue that it is impossible to disentangle the instrumental and argumentative, that identities and values stand in an inseparable, mutually constitutive relationship with techno-scientific, 'Zwecksrationalität'/logic-of-consequences knowledge (March & Olsen, 1989). Just as argumentative discourses shaping state identity cannot contain the purely ideational, instrumental discourses cannot be devoid of elements of state identity and its specific value-set. On the argumentative side, if the state is or ought to be anything, it should, first and foremost, *survive physically*. The survival of the physical base and its institutions is a prime ideational value in and of itself, and its practical material exigencies (one has to feed a population and defend a territory) can consequently form part and parcel of this value-set contained in the ideational part of the tri-partite state¹⁰. On the instrumental pole, unless a society's moral outlook is entirely consequentialist (the ends justifying the means), most extraordinary measures required by securitisations would involve a significant element of moral reflection, and this is where values and identity also come into play. Particularly in the middle of this continuum – in between the argumentative and instrumental – one finds definitions of vital interest that can seem both referent objects in and of themselves, but are just as well instrumental in their subordination to higher-level values and identities¹¹.

¹⁰ While the state as an objective referent object is indeed composed of these three distinct material and ideational elements, rationalists often see only the material requirements of state survival as ultimately underlying state action. However, here, the identity of the state is, ultimately, a complex of values and interpretations, and outside of particularly acute situations (wars), immutable, purely material considerations (feeding a population, defending a territory) will form an important but certainly not exclusive part of a state's value-set. The state's 'material rump' and its requirements will be enveloped by 'national values' and subject to interpretation as to what exactly it is that must survive, and what survival entails. The state is, after all, a social construct, not an independently existing individual with a well-defined physical boundary, and self-definition will naturally play a greater role in defining its survival. This ties in with Wendt's idea of identity comprising a rump material component, overlain with an idea of 'self' constructed through social interaction (Wendt, 1999, pp. 224-245). More specifically, Wendt distinguishes 4 types of identity: personal/corporate, type, role and collective. Personal or corporate identities consist of the "self-organising, homeostatic structures that make actors distinct entities" (Wendt, 1999, pp. 224-225). Type identities refer to social categories or labels "applied to persons who share (or are thought to share) some characteristic or characteristics" (Ibid., p. 225). In contrast, role identities are not based on characteristics intrinsic to the individual or collective concerned, but "exist solely in relations to Others" (as in the case of master and slave, teacher and pupil) (Ibid., p. 227). Finally, collective identities take the relationship between Self and Other "...to its logical conclusion, identification...in which the Self-Other distinction becomes blurred and at the limit transcended altogether...with the causal power to induce actors to define the welfare of the Other as part of that of the Self, to be altruistic" (Ibid., p. 229). The rump material core is situated in the first of these types.

¹¹ One example is the relationship between the state and the military: is the military a means towards security, or is it a value in and of itself? As Huntington (Huntington, 2000, pp. 80-97) has pointed out, the answer depends on the ideological outlook of a given society.

All of the above raises the question of where exactly to put the distinction between argumentative and instrumental. Is it sufficient to state that argumentative discourse refers to the highest-order referent objects, those that are directly constitutive of collective state- and nation-hood, mostly values in and of themselves? Even the most argumentative, value-directed discourses can be seen as instrumentally serving the extreme goal of state survival, and the situation becomes particularly blurry in the case of the 'vital interests' mentioned in the previous paragraphs. To some degree, then, the distinction between argumentative and instrumental becomes a matter of interpretation and contextualisation. When referring to the argumentative aspects of the security discourse, this text will imply a discursive reality that is situated relative to its instrumental counterpart, most closely and explicitly generating notions of state- and nationhood through values and identities that, to their greatest extent, define rather than serve the goal of survival.

Finally, within any given society, countless contradictory securitisations and security discourses will inevitably present a confusing picture to anyone attempting to engage in shameless state-centrism by conceptualising the state as a coherent corporate actor. Within the framework presented here, the solution lies in acknowledging these contradictions through the notion of *discursive stability* (encapsulating the security discourses variegated and often contested nature, and outlined below), combined with a focus on the highest institutional discourses of the state. Within Buzan's tri-partite structure of the state (matter/institutions/ideas), institutions do indeed play a central role: they are, in effect, where a society combines matter with ideas to produce the institutional expression of statehood. From an IR standpoint, they are also the primary locus of state agency: a state acts within international society primarily through its institutions – its government, its armed forces, its diplomatic corps, its bureaucratic machinery. The discourse prevalent within a state's institutions thus becomes of primary importance when assessing the self-definition and practical policymaking of a given state: it is indicative of what 'a state' as a collective entity 'thinks', how it justifies its existence, and its actions (Wendt, 1999, p. 222). These above-mentioned processes of securitisation existing within society are filtered and crystallise into official discourse, in both their argumentative and instrumental aspects. Thus conceptualised, and properly contrasted with any alternative discourses that might exist within society, security discourses at the *official, institutional* level can thus be taken to reflect that corporate agency within the theoretical expansion that I will outline below.

Conceptualising a Spectrum of Amity and Enmity

Buzan and Wæver explicitly (and fleetingly) mention the possibility of conceptualising amity and enmity in terms similar to Wendt's 'cultures of anarchy', more specifically

mentioning the categories of 'conflict formations', 'security regimes' and 'security communities', roughly (but as we shall see below not entirely) commensurate with Wendt's Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian anarchies governed by relationships of 'enmity', 'rivalry' and 'friendship' (Buzan, 1991; Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 50-55). In effect, basing myself on the hybrid nature of RSC and its similarities and parallels to Wendtian constructivism, I shall now elaborate criteria that would allow us to place RSCs into one of the ideal-type categories suggested by Buzan and Wæver. The one and only modification to their suggested typology will be the inclusion of two subdivisions within each category, to add additional nuance. Thus, conflict formations will be sub-divided into '*revisionist*' and '*status-quo*', security regimes into '*thin*' and '*thick*', and security regimes – following Adler and Barnett (1998a) – into '*loosely coupled*' and '*tightly coupled*' sub-types.

In keeping with the preceding meta-theoretical discussion, these criteria will have a dualist character, combining both objective and subjective characteristics in their definition of amity/enmity within a given RSC. On the one hand, different types of amity and enmity will be differentiated through overt, objectively discernible state behaviour: do states in a region display co-operative or competitive behaviour in their security interactions? Typically, do they form a balance of power system or a collective security system? On the other hand, this question will be approached from a subjectivist, discursive point of view: what are states' predispositions vis-a-vis their regional counterparts, as seen in their institutional discourses on security, their securitisations? Do they perceive each other in amicable or inimical terms? The former, objective macro-perspective view would relate to the general structure of interaction within the RSC: the complex of *overt, objectively observable state behaviour*, norms, institutions. The latter subjective micro-perspective aspect would refer to the unit-level *discourse* informing and interpreting these objective elements, more specifically the nature of unit-level securitisation.

The macro-perspective is clear enough: it consists in analysing the epiphenomenal aspects of unit-to-unit, interregional and systemic interaction within and around a given RSC. The presence or absence of armed conflict, the relevance or irrelevance of conflict-minimising normative legal instruments and institutions can give an indication as to where to situate the region in this spectrum. These epiphenomenal elements are, in themselves, far from sufficient, however. The micro-perspective analysis provides the crucial '*Verstehen*' element in my approach by dissecting the security discourse behind the security interaction. This combination of a macro- with a discursive micro-approach is, ultimately, what allows one to detect factors like the difference between status-quo and revisionist units, the internalisation of norms, and, the presence or

absence of collective identities within an RSC. Crucially, it adds to the understanding of a region in ways that purely behavioural or game-theoretical approaches would leave out, quite apart from creating a better fit with the holistic approach chosen in this instance.

The discursive, micro-perspective approach will be crucial in complementing the insights of the objective criteria employed from the macro-perspective, revealing the narratives underlying hostile or friendly regional security interaction and anarchical culture through what I shall call their *discursive convergence* or *divergence*. Argumentative discourses may thus reflect *identities* and *values* that are mutually compatible or incompatible. Whether or not states end up as 'enemies' or 'friends' may depend, for example on the way they define their territory or the ideologies they define themselves by: states with conflicting territorial claims, for instance, will often have inimical relationships that are clearly reflected in their argumentative discourses (Forsberg, 1996). Instrumental discourses, on the other hand, can lead to conflicting security-enhancing strategies or identifications of threat that – even if identities are not inimical *per se* – result in an adversarial relationship: for example, when states are forced to compete for limited resources – e.g. water (Postel & Wolf, 2001) – or when regional security dilemmas are exacerbated through the blurring of the distinction between offence and defence (Jervis, 1978, pp. 186-206).

The result will be a unified spectrum of amity and enmity¹² whose categories typically overlap in practice, even if, in the discussion below, they are presented as disconnected, qualitatively separate ideal-types. On different points of this spectrum, macro (interactional) and micro (discursive) patterns will have varying degrees of compatibility. On the one hand, the superficial macro-interaction between states will be inimical or amicable based on objective criteria. On the other hand, their deeper mutual *discourses* will reflect amity or enmity, partly through patterns of mutual securitisation/desecuritisation¹³, through the *convergence* or *divergence* of states' argumentative values and identities (their *logics of appropriateness*), or through the convergence or divergence of instrumental, rational security-enhancing action by states

¹² Grieco (1988a) provides an interesting positivist approach to the question of amity and enmity through his $U=V-k(W-V)$ formula, where U stands for the utility an actor gains from cooperation, V for its absolute gains, W for its relative gains, and k for its sensitivity to relative (as opposed to absolute) gains: in other words, its level of distrust. In a security community, trust will be complete, k will be close to 0 and actors will be sensitive mainly to absolute gains from co-operation ($U=V$). Conversely in a conflictual situation, k will approximate 1, distrust will predominate, and parties will solely be sensitive to relative gains ($U=W$). The problem of how to quantify the ideational 'k'-variable in a socially constructed environment does seem an intractable one, however.

¹³ 'Patterns' or 'networks' of securitization will henceforth refer to these major interlinked processes of securitization and/or de-securitisation (both institutionalized and ad-hoc) that, constituting the theory's amity/enmity variable, form part of the very definition of a Regional Security Complex (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 44; Buzan, et al., 1998, pp. 28-31).

(their *logics of consequences*). Accordingly, in the discussion that follows, each of the different categories will be specified according to both macro-perspective, objective criteria and micro-perspective, discursive criteria, the latter differentiated along argumentative and instrumental lines.

Revisionist and Status-Quo Conflict Formations

In conflict formations (Senghaas, 1973; Väyrynen, 1984), the regional culture of anarchy will be power-based: the dominant determinant of state security will be relationships of *power*. From an objective, macro-perspective, security interaction between states will be regulated by a bare minimum of norms that are *not* aimed at systematically excluding risks of armed conflict. The basic tenets of realism – first and foremost, balancing behaviour and political interaction as a zero-sum game – will be valid throughout the region, and, manifest themselves through readily observable state behaviour, for instance, arms races and ad hoc alliances. Within this category, a distinction can be made between ‘revisionist’ and ‘status-quo’ conflict formations, based mainly on the predominance of revisionist or status-quo states within it, and the dynamics within these two sub-types will also differ slightly.

These differences will to some extent mirror the distinctions between power-maximising, offensive realism and security-maximising, defensive realism. In revisionist conflict formations, most states will want to challenge the status quo according to their own views, resulting in highly fluid RSCs lacking mutual recognition among constituent units. In status-quo conflict formations, relations between states will still be marked by fundamental distrust and competitive behaviour (e.g. over scarce goods). These different logics of anarchy will sometimes produce similar conduct. On the one hand, a region composed of status-quo units in a relationship of fundamental distrust could still see security dilemmas ‘accidentally’ escalating interaction into arms races and armed conflict without any of the units actually desiring such an outcome (Jervis, 1976, pp. 62-76). On the other hand, a region composed of revisionist states could end up in an uneasy balance of power, with none of the units prepared to actually realise their challenge to the status-quo.

However, this potentially confusing similarity would not rid the status-quo/revisionist conflict formation distinction of its validity, and its relevance. Firstly, because the distinction can still be found, more or less clearly, at the discursive level: whether or not states are revisionist can clearly be read from their security discourse (Cortell, 2000). Secondly, because most RSCs – being composed of both status-quo and revisionist units – will be situated in the grey area between revisionism and status-quo, only *tending* towards one of these two ideal-types. Finally, because whether or not states

accept each others' legitimacy and right to exist can be crucial in assessing the potential of RSC transformations from conflict formation to security regime.

Turning to this category's subjective, micro-level characteristics, both types of conflict formation will be marked by the presence of *war* as an acceptable tool of security and foreign policy within the instrumental security discourse of regional units. The reasoning for this adherence to armed conflict as an instrument of policy will vary in the two sub-categories: in revisionist conflict formations, divergent argumentative discourses will, in effect, be reflective of the mismatched identities that, in turn, lie at the root of unbridled enmity. States with overlapping territorial identities and contradictory ideological values, for instance, will usually clearly identify these overlaps and contradictions as the reason for their revisionism and resulting inimical relationships (Forsberg, 1996). In status-quo conflictual regional political cultures, the grounds for enmity and conflict will have to be sought in rather less value-laden techno-scientific assumptions of instrumental security discourse, resulting in mutually incompatible security-enhancing strategies, even if the states' identities or fundamental values are not contradictory in themselves (as in the above-mentioned examples, in competition over scarce resources or enmity emanating from security dilemmas).

Thin and Thick Security Regimes

In security regimes (Jervis, 1982), states will have developed, to paraphrase Krasner (1983, p. 2), "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge" regarding security interaction, and it is the existence of these norms mitigating the logic of power that differentiates this category from conflictual, balance of power RSCs. Security interaction will be governed by mutually agreed, permanent co-operative rules and norms that stipulate codes of conduct for participants aimed at minimising the risk of armed conflict. Depending on the nature and prevalence of these rules, I shall distinguish between 'thin' and 'thick' security regimes¹⁴. In 'thin' security regimes, norms and rules governing security interaction will be entirely technical in nature, and concerned mostly with the military issue-area. Thick regimes, by contrast, will imply active cooperation on the part of the participants towards commonly defined goals. The areas of cooperation will be multiple in nature, and also exist in non-traditional areas of security (transnational crime, environment), usually supported by a permanent regional organisation.

¹⁴ For a more complex typology addressing the varying scope and intensity of regimes, see Donnelly (1986).

From an objective point of view, thin regimes will thus consist mostly of 'ad-hoc' agreements within a given issue-area (for instance, arms-control, confidence-building, hotlines), regulated through periodic intergovernmental summits and meetings. Rather than mutual co-operation, they will include mechanisms for mutual verification, either by the parties themselves, or by an outside party, indicating a lack of mutual trust. In most cases they will not be accompanied with large-scale, permanent regional organisations. Within the regional security discourse, such 'thin' regimes will not imply any kind of desecuritisation, rather, they will lead to forms of 'regulated (in)security' between the parties. The instrumental nature of these thin security regimes will be apparent by a 'logic of consequences' within this discourse; rather than common, internalised value-systems – which are typical of *thick* security regimes – the participants will see these regimes as conducive to the security of their own, specific referent objects.

Thick regimes, by contrast, will include wide-ranging formal agreements covering a range of security issue-areas (comprehensive peace treaties for instance), often resulting in the setting up of permanent regional organisations. Most importantly, these arrangements will not be purely instrumental in nature: participating states will spend considerable effort at maintaining them as values in and of themselves, having internalised their norms to some degree¹⁵. This internalisation will also be visible within regional discourses of security: these thick security regimes' effectiveness will rely to some extent on a 'logic of appropriateness' and an implicit trust between the parties, leading to the at least partial desecuritisation of some previously contentious issues. The argumentative part of the regional web of securitisations and counter-securitisation will thus include certain commonly held values associated with these regimes.

Loose and Tight Security Communities

The absence or presence of *collective identities* is what distinguishes 'thick' security regimes from the final category in the spectrum, the 'security community'. This final

¹⁵ One of the most common problems of regime theory is the precise conceptualisation of the term 'regime' (Hasenclever, Mayer, & Rittberger, 1997, pp. 8-22; Keohane, 1993; Kratochwil, 1993). One first question is whether it refers to formal agreements between states (e.g. treaties), or 'norms' and 'institutions' in the broader, constructivist sense? A second point that requires clarification is the choice between seeing regimes as mainly constituted by these norms in themselves or in terms of compliant behaviour. In fact, I shall give a combined answer to both these questions, in suggesting that the concept of 'regime' be limited to norms contained in explicit, formal agreements between the units within a given RSC, *insofar as they are also complied with by the parties*. These formal agreements do not have to be region-wide: they can take the form of bilateral agreements between individual units that ultimately form a 'web' constituting a region-wide security regime. These norms can moreover be generated by formal instruments operating at a higher level: if the states within a region are all signatories of a higher-level agreement regulating security interaction and they start obeying these norms, a regional security regime will come into existence. The a priori requirement of compliance also explains my terminology. I do not refer to 'strong' or 'weak' regimes: compliance is already presumed. The 'thinness' or 'thickness' of a security regime here refers to the extent, in scope and in depth, of the norms within the regime: the number of issue-areas it tackles and the degree to which its norms are internalised within the state actors' value-systems.

category in the range of regional anarchies has been extensively described by Adler and Barnett (1998b), whose expansive description can be followed here. It is also the category where subjective factors become extremely important in themselves. The concept of a 'pluralistic security community' was introduced by Karl Deutsch et alia (1957) to describe regions consisting of several states where increasing interdependencies had come to create, dependable expectations of peaceful change among actors. In terms of RSCT, these RSCs can be said to have been completely (or at the very least largely) desecuritized internally. Armed conflict between the regional units is seen as so unlikely that security is in effect defined collectively: while states maintain a distinct independence, their identities are so interlinked that the processes of securitisation become, in effect, synchronised and bundled, accordingly resulting in collective security policies towards commonly perceived threats.

Adler and Barnett (1998a, pp. 55-57) make a distinction between 'loosely' and 'tightly coupled' security communities based on several factors, with loosely coupled security communities described as displaying "a high degree of trust, a shared identity and future, low or no probability that conflicts will lead to military encounters, and a differentiation of those within from those outside the security community". Tightly coupled security communities, by contrast, have thoroughly internalised mechanisms of mutual aid, which become an inherent part of the national identity. Both can be differentiated using specific criteria: multilateralism, unfortified borders, changes in military planning, common definition of threats and discourses and languages of the community in the case of loosely coupled ones, and, additionally, co-operative and collective security, military integration, policy coordination against internal threats, free movements of populations, internationalisation of authority and a multiperspectival polity for the tightly coupled ones.

The epiphenomenal nature of many of the above characteristics of loose and tight security communities must be stressed here: what actually constitutes such 'Kantian' cultures of anarchy is the existence of a *collective identity*, a collective definition of 'self' that is clearly visible in the regional security discourse. Crucially, the existence of such a collective identity does *not* imply the disappearance of national, unit-level identities (Adler & Barnett, 1998a, pp. 29-36). Individual states continue to exist (this is why Deutsch referred to *pluralistic* security communities in the first place), but with identities that are inextricably combined, amalgamated with a supra-national sense of 'we-ness', and national interests that are defined in terms of the higher-level collective interests. At the 'tightly coupled' end of security communities, units can transfer considerable aspects of sovereignty to supra-national institutions, and RSCs will only continue to exist as long as this transfer of sovereignty is not complete. But, at least in theory, it

follows that security communities can lead to the end of anarchy within a given region, in effect terminating the existence of the RSC as a separate regional structure, and transforming it into a unit in and of itself (Buzan, 1991, pp. 218-219; Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 66-67).

The Amity/Enmity Variable as a Spectrum

From the above, it is clear that the method for characterising the structures of enmity and amity within a given RSC will be multi-faceted, relying on objective indicators on the one hand, and the subjective, ideational discourse of unit-level actors on the other. And amity and enmity will thus not simply be characterised as the aggregate of bilateral inter-state relations within a given RSC; rather, it will be evaluated as an integrated *whole*, a holistic, Wendtian ‘culture of anarchy’. Rather than a seamless continuum, the result is a succession of overlapping categories that form a spectrum of amity and enmity bounded by chaos (in the absence of even the minimal norms sustaining a revisionist balance of power culture of anarchy) and hierarchy (in the absence of anarchy). This spectrum can be summarised in the following figure:




Figure 1: The Amity/Enmity Spectrum

It is important to note the graduated and relatively indefinite nature of the above-mentioned categories. There is considerable overlap between the border areas of conflict formations, regimes and security communities: thin regimes are often difficult to distinguish from status-quo conflictual sub-systems, thick regimes often resemble loose security communities. While clear borders can be defined on paper, and in theory, applying them will to some extent be a matter of interpretation and debate. In my view, there is no foolproof natural-scientific way to quantitatively and positively measure the compliance of units with the norms of an incipient, thin security regime, or the reality of an embryonic collective identity. The above-mentioned categories are therefore ideal-types against which to assess and estimate, not measure. It is therefore of the utmost importance to keep in mind the qualitative nature of my endeavour, and its inherent ‘fuzziness’. This intrinsic overlap between the categories is further complicated by the multiple realisability of these ideal-type regional cultures of anarchy. Each of these

categories can manifest itself in a wide variety of forms, with regional specificities surrounding their core characteristics: there are no prototypical conflict formations, security regimes or security communities. The minimal requirements of each category will usually be translated into practice in regionally specific ways.

I have expanded the amity/enmity variable in terms of a 'spectrum' of different, regional 'cultures of anarchy'. These 'cultures of anarchy' can be analysed from two perspectives: the macro – in terms of overt patterns of behaviour – and the micro – in terms of discourse, including security discourse. On different points of this spectrum, these macro (interactional) and micro (discursive) patterns will have varying degrees of compatibility. On the one hand, the superficial macro-interaction between states will be inimical or amicable. On the other hand, their deeper mutual discourses will reflect amity or enmity, partly through patterns of mutual securitisation/desecuritisation. These patterns of securitisation/desecuritisation will depend, in large part, on the convergence or divergence of both types of discourse outlined above. The logical conclusion is that changes in security discourse would enable RSCs to transform in terms of amity/enmity, in other words, to move from one category within this spectrum to another. The question thus becomes how these *discourses* could change; and it is to this question that I now turn in this chapter's final section.

Change and the Amity/Enmity Spectrum

As laid out earlier, this thesis will also address the possible transformation of conflictual patterns of amity/enmity towards security regimes. This requires conceptualising the internal transformation of RSCs from one culture of anarchy to another; at first sight, however, the predominantly static nature of RSCT would seemingly pose a problem in that regard. For while its structure is indeed to some degree constituted by process¹⁶ (especially in the case of the *boundaries* of RSCs), and the theory allows for internal and external transformations of RSCs (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 53), it does not address the mechanisms behind such transformations. It is, admittedly, not my intention here to turn RSCT from a static into a dynamic theory; rather, my focus will be on the presence or possible emergence of permissive and efficient factors that would allow for such transformations. In short, my goal will be to formulate a method of identifying the obstacles to and potentialities for the emergence of alternative cultures

¹⁶ The balance between structure and process is one of the most contentious debates within IR, and, especially, its Constructivist tradition. 'Wendtian' constructivism, (Wendt, 1987, 1992, 1995, 1998, 1999) allows for a greater role for structure in comparison to its 'harder' counterparts elaborated by, among others, Onuf (1994), Kratochwil (2000) and Ruggie (1993). It moreover allows for the independent role of a material 'rump', unlike those versions of constructivism tending to a more post-structuralist, purely interpretive-discursive outlook. My choice is for the former version precisely because it to some extent mirrors the hybrid material/ideational ontology of RSCT.

of anarchy from a given structural (material and ideational) situation: which factors in a given RSC stand in the way of or allow for its transformation into a regime or a security community, its figurative evolution from point A to point B on the spectrum? How that transformation would occur is in itself not my object of study; rather, I shall be concentrating on what could increase the probability of the RSC transforming.

A wide range of *rationalist* IR theories can explain the emergence of regimes (and security communities), and thus, the transition from one type of regional anarchy to another (Hasenclever, et al., 1997). Power-based theories concentrate on the role played by hegemonies and powerful states as self-interested facilitators and creators of regimes whose norms can, over time, become self-sustaining (Gilpin, 1982; Kindleberger, 1974; Mearsheimer, 1994). Interest-based theories see transitions from one type of anarchic culture to another as emanating from the rational utility-maximisation by relevant actors (Keohane, 1982, 1984). Knowledge-based rationalist theories concentrate on learning (simple and complex) to explain ways in which actors adapt their instrumental action, or even the interests to be pursued themselves in reaction to new technical or social information (Haas, 1980, 1989; Kydd, 2000; J. S. Nye, Jr., 1987). All three types of theory often work on the basis of rational-actor models (although the latter, knowledge-based theories sometimes do turn ‘interest’ from an independent into a dependent variable, and often do come close to constructivism in their implications).

One way of conceptualising change in RSCs could thus be to simply adapt all or some of these theories to the RSCT framework, empirically draw out relevant variables, and come to a conclusion as to the feasibility of internal, cultural RSC transformation. And if my goal was to simply explain instead of to understand, this would be more than sufficient. But it isn’t: I want to ‘*verstehen*’, as well as ‘*erklären*’. Because I view regional cultures of anarchy as ‘ideas *almost* all the way down’ – in a Wendtian sense – I should be able to take a closer look at the constitution of the ideas themselves informing these cultures of anarchy, rather than the behaviour *caused* by these ideas that the purely rationalist theories capture. These rationalist theories will to some extent be able to explain and evaluate these ideas, but they will not give us any indication as to their nature. And it is their *nature* that is central to my discussion.

A previous section elaborated on the link between security discourse and the state as a corporate actor, within the Wendtian grand-theoretical context I had adopted earlier. In it, a state’s official, institutional discourses on security – in both their argumentative and instrumental aspects – could be seen as the crystallisation, the end result of intra-societal debates occurring at the sub-unit level, at least in non-totalitarian states. But

processes of securitisation – securitising moves, securitising acts – take place constantly within more-or-less open societies; many of the debates touching on existential issues remain ongoing, even if state institutions themselves have adopted a position and issues have become fully securitised. In most societies, established securitisations and discourses on security are regularly challenged, both in their argumentative and instrumental aspects, and it is the presence of such challenges that offers the key to identifying possibilities for change. Within the material-ideational environment offered by RSCT, the question comes to centre on whether and how alternative approaches could cause changes akin to a Kuhnian ‘paradigm shift’ (Kuhn, 1996), albeit in the *secular* area of security discourse rather than scientific theory, sometimes aided by changing material circumstances that undercut the coherence of dominant discursive paradigms.

In the case of argumentative aspects of security discourse, intra-society debates will often touch on questions of identity, the interpretation of the precise meaning of statehood, and thus, the values and interests that must ultimately be defended as referent objects of security (Jepperson, Wendt, & Katzenstein, 1996, pp. 58-62). These debates can sometimes ‘dethrone’ or modify the dominant discourse, and it thus becomes important to assess how contested or not this value/identity discourse really is (Wendt, 1999, p. 188). Is there an agreement on what exactly is to be secured when one refers to ‘the state’, or are there significant challenges, alternative values informed by differing interpretations of identity? Such challenges can find their origin on both the domestic and international levels. In the former case, internal social, political, and cultural changes can conspire to produce divergent views of *statehood*. In the latter case, discursive encounters with significant others can either reinforce or weaken existing identities, which, after all, are not simply self-contained, but also encompass views of a state’s role in the wider world (Wendt, 1994; 1999, pp. 326-336). Challenges originating in both the domestic and international levels will be reflected within intra-society ideological debates. And the intensity and nature of such debates will give us an indication on whether identities and values can survive as they stand, or whether they could be replaced by versions more amenable to a different regional ‘culture of anarchy’, through the internalisation of new norms or the merging of identities, for example.

In case of instrumental discourse, intra-society debates can question the definition of threats as *threats* and the strategies used to attain security. There may be no agreement as to the existentially threatening nature of a perceived menace, and security discourse in broader society may identify more than one way of remedying a given threat. Such debates are much more common, and they are often amplified by

either modifications in material circumstances or changes in the technical knowledge informing such instrumental action (Goldman, 2001). Material circumstances can change on the domestic or international levels: the resources contained in the state's physical base may alter, as can the regional or higher-level balances of power, affecting the power of the state relative to other regional units and influencing the coherence and consistency of certain policy options over others. On the other hand, technological knowledge may be modified domestically, or propagate downwards from the international level: for instance, through the proliferation of new military doctrines, or the insights of global epistemic communities. In both cases, prevailing instrumental discourses may shift under the weight of contestation, adjusting the balance between cooperative and competitive behaviour in terms of their *usefulness* towards fixed goals (rather than their *appropriateness* in terms of shifted values), and in the end affecting the patterns of amity and enmity. Assessing the stability of security discourses will consequently also necessitate identifying the material and ideational factors that might at some point cause shifts in their instrumental logic, in addition to their argumentative aspect.

A state's dominant security discourse, as expounded by its institutions, is thus liable to destabilisation because of the debates that usually mark societies that allow for at least some measure of contestation. As is clear from the previous paragraphs, the discursive stability of both argumentative and instrumental discourses is influenced by both ideational and material factors at both the sub- and supra-state levels. A narrative must be firmly rooted in both domestic and international/regional value-systems to successfully ward off challenges to its dominance of a state's institutions. It must also remain consistent with the external, domestic and international material realities to which it refers and by which it is sustained. Shifts in either societal values and material circumstances can lead to changes in the viability of a given discourse, and, insofar as security discourses and patterns of amity and enmity are co-constitutive, the resulting discursive changes will have an effect on these patterns of amity and enmity.

Perhaps the best parallel to this notion of 'discursive stability' would be Kuhn's scientific-philosophical concept of a 'paradigm shift'. Although applicable to scientific theory, it could be argued that the fundamental truths held by societies in general – including those governing their perceptions of security, and attendant pathways towards it – are liable to transformation by alternative takes on reality that displace established ideologies undercut by growing inconsistency and incoherence. For lack of time and space, this particular thesis will not go into these actual processes of transformation, but the issue would no doubt be interesting material for further exploration. The empirical portions of this text – particularly the final chapter – will

concentrate on identifying either the alternative discourses or the material changes that might, at some point, *permit* such changes to occur, potentially rendering existing security discourses obsolete.

Conclusion

This chapter's main objective was the expansion of the concept of amity and enmity, central to RSCT and to the hypotheses being scrutinised in this thesis. This expansion started off with a short meta-theoretical excursion, an evaluation of the different grand theoretical frameworks that might be applied to the flexible conceptual framework of RSCT. In the end, the choice was in favour of a (broadly defined) Wendtian-constructivist approach, positing an ideational reality constructed around a materialist rump, and thus approximating the ontology implicit in RSCT. Within the processes of securitisation that stand at its centre, an additional differentiation was made between *argumentative* and *instrumental* discourses, the former linked to the identities and values that constitute the *ends* of state action, the latter bound to instrumental *action* geared towards securing these goals. Accordingly, the amity/enmity variable was expanded into a spectrum made up of 'cultures of anarchy' – conflict formations, security regimes, security communities – that differ not only in their epiphenomenally conflictual or cooperative natures, but also in terms of their units' underlying discursive beliefs, norms and identities. Transformations in these cultures of anarchy were elaborated in terms of the stability or instability of underlying official, institutional security discourses, and their 'groundedness' within their respective sub-state societies and the surrounding material environment, in both their argumentative and instrumental aspects.

The multi-level nature of RSCT will pose the impetus for my two subsequent chapters, consecutively dealing with the *domestic* and *systemic* levels of security interaction. As will be shown, a thorough consideration of the former is quite necessary in assessing the possibilities of regime emergence in regions with particularly weak and fragile states, apart from being called for from a purely deductive-theoretical point of view. The final theoretical chapter, on the systemic level, will subsequently place the effects of great power involvement on RSCs within the overall theoretical framework chosen here. First, however, the discussion turns to the domestic, sub-state level, and, more specifically, on how to conceive of what is currently (and somewhat confusingly) known as 'state weakness' in an RSCT context.

CHAPTER 3: STATE INCOHERENCE AS WEAKNESS, INSTABILITY AND FAILURE

In the previous chapter, the notion of '*discursive stability*' introduced the sub-state level into the discussion of amity and enmity in a Wendtian RSCT context, something made possible by the complex, multi-level nature of the theory. RSCT certainly remains state-centred, but the theory does allow for more flexibility in including sub-state processes and non-state actors in its analyses of international security than its 'black-box' rationalist predecessor, structural neo-realism. While this may lead to less *elegant* and streamlined theorising, it broadens the theory's scope by including factors that are crucial in understanding and explaining international phenomena outside the purview of IR's dominant paradigm. And one of the obvious advantages of opening that black box of statehood is the possibility of factoring in what is commonly called '*state weakness*' and '*state failure*' into integrated accounts of international and regional systems. This *crucial* element was, for much of the history of IR, simply obscured from view as a subject of 'political science', an omission that came to haunt the discipline when it became one of the defining features of regional (and, in the post-911 world, even systemic) instability in the post-Cold War World¹⁷.

One obvious but very important distinction should be made from the outset, between *weakness* and *powerlessness*, *weak states* and *weak powers*, *cohesion* and *capability* (Buzan, 1991, pp. 112-114). In the broader literature, the *weakness* of states generally *doesn't* refer to an absence of *power* in the neo-realist sense, in other words, to low aggregate military or economic capabilities; rather, it usually points to the cohesiveness of states, to their effective *empirical* statehood. To clearly distinguish between these two quite different understandings and do away with a confusing situation that regularly re-emerges throughout IR literature on the subject, I shall use the terms '*state*

¹⁷ Different theories of International Relations conceptualised the state in varying ways well before that; Realist, Liberal and Marxian IR scholars all employed their particular view of 'stateness', but the coherent nature of the state was in most cases *assumed* in their theorisations of the international (Hobson, 2000). Debates on the character of the international system's primary constituent emerged relatively late in IR's conceptual development, and were, mostly, held on the fringes of the discipline. There was Skocpol and others' (1985) attempt to 'bring the state back in', during the 1980s, when the relative autonomy of the state both from its domestic society and international structures was stressed. Within historical sociology, much work was done in terms of the genesis of modern statehood as a phenomenon in international affairs. Scholars like Michael Mann (1984) and Charles Tilly (1975, 1985, 1990) attempted to reconceptualise the state and its underlying society as inseparable state-society complexes or, essentially, war-waging entities. Wallerstein's World Systems Theory and the Dependencistas saw the state's role as shaped by its position in a global capitalist economy (Wallerstein, 1984, pp. 27-96). But for most IR scholars, the state remained a subject for political science, not international relations; no wonder then, that most debates on the phenomenon took place (and are still taking place) at the intersect between history, sociology and IR. Much of the work on statehood within the discipline was theoretical and historical, aimed mostly at the de-reification of the established, fossilised assumptions of the state within existing IR theories rather than the development of practically applicable notions of state incoherence.

incoherence’ or *coherence*’ in reference to the latter understanding (lack of cohesion) and *powerlessness*’ to encompass deficient material capabilities throughout this chapter and thesis.

Much of the literature on state incoherence characterises the phenomenon in functionalist or institutionalist terms, with the state’s primary purpose defined in terms of ‘governance’, as the provision of various public goods (Fukuyama, 2004a; Krasner, 1988, 2004; Rotberg, 2002b, 2003, 2004), the most important of which is *security*, along with public services like health, education, communications and transportation infrastructure, or even political freedom and socio-economic security. State incoherence occurs when the provision of these public goods becomes markedly deficient because of inefficiencies inherent to the state as a bureaucratic construct. Others, including Jackson (1982, 1990) describe the state in Weberian terms: as an organisational structure with the monopoly of the legitimate use of force over a given territory and population. State incoherence can be seen in that context as the fraying of this monopoly. Still others writing within this neo-Weberian tradition see state weakness mostly in terms of deficient state legitimacy, defining state strength as the “...capacity of the state to command loyalty – the right to rule – to extract the resources necessary to rule and to provide services, to maintain that essential element of sovereignty, a monopoly over the legitimate use of force...” (Holsti, 1996, p. 82). In a variation on that theme, Migdal (1988, pp. 32-33) defines state coherence in terms of *social control*, with legitimacy as the strongest form thereof. None of the definitions on offer readily fit into the RSCCT context; finding one that does will, consequently, be the aim of this chapter’s first half.

RSCCT needs a well-integrated and expanded concept of state incoherence. From an inductive standpoint, much of *regional* insecurity in today’s world emerges from ‘weak’, ‘failed’ and ‘collapsed’ states (Milliken & Krause, 2002): different gradations of the same phenomenon. Such incoherent states result in what Holsti (1996, pp. 123-149) calls “wars of the third kind” -civil wars- that affect regional security either through overspill or through the intervention of neighbouring states. From a more systemic viewpoint, so-called ‘weak’ and ‘failed’ states provide fertile staging grounds for transnational terrorist groups (Rotberg, 2002a); the increasing frequency of state collapse has also been tied to the general decline of the state with the rise of globalisation (Clapham, 2002; Yannis, 1999, pp. 820-821). Remaining blind to these issues by not accounting for state incoherence would be a major omission, and a theory aimed at providing a universally applicable, reasonably broad conceptual framework for regional international politics it would thus have to take this occurrence into account.

But on a purely deductive-theoretical level as well, RSCT is in need of a reasonably worked-out concept of state (in)coherence. Firstly, RSCs depend to a large degree on inter-state security interaction, which, in turn, presupposes a reasonable degree of both state cohesion and state power within the region, or, at the very least, the presence of state-like units, recognised or otherwise. It is difficult to imagine a functioning RSC composed solely of juridical states, with legally recognised governments whose writ does not extend beyond their respective capitals, outside of which chaos rules. Second (*and, importantly, to a certain extent qualifying the previous point*), the fragmentation of incoherent states into secessionist, recognised or unrecognised state-like units could lead to a de-facto internal transformation of RSCs through the addition of units and a potential change in polarity (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 66-67). Finally, beyond the most extreme revisionist conflict formations, the amity/enmity spectrum elaborated in the previous chapter assumes the presence of reasonably cohesive and stable states (or state-like units), the lack of which would preclude the emergence of regional anarchic cultures. 'Reasonable expectations' of norms-ruled behaviour or peaceful change could not emerge in an environment marked by unstable units and resultant potential power-vacuums.

This chapter will then expand this general, over-arching notion of state incoherence as follows. In a first move, the provision of security through a monopoly of legitimate force will be identified as the essentially defining feature of the state in International Relations. State incoherence will subsequently be disaggregated into three distinct tiers based on the three components of the Weberian definition of the state: ideational *legitimacy*, material *force*, and institutional *monopoly*. The first tier of *inherent weakness* will be defined in terms of the legitimacy of a state's given constitutional framework as a collective strategy of survival. The second tier of *ostensible stability* will be delineated in terms of the ability of the state to compensate for deficiencies within its constitutional framework's legitimacy through the application of state force. The third tier of *effective sovereignty* will be made contingent upon its capacity to maintain its institutional monopoly of legitimate force through a '*force-legitimacy equilibrium*': its ability to address the security concerns of its underlying society without itself being securitised as a threat. Based on the above framework, as well as Holsti's differentiation between *horizontal* and *vertical* incoherence, a final typological distinction will emerge between *inherently weak*, *ostensibly unstable* and *collapsed/fragmented* states, before being placed in the overall 'Wendtian' framework of RSCT outlined in the previous chapter.

Conceptualising State Incoherence in an RSCT Context

How would one best integrate *state weakness* in a Wendtian-constructivist version of RSCT, based on notions of embedded rationality and rump materialism? The three-tier view of state structure presented in the previous chapter provides a useful starting point. The state is composed of material, institutional and ideational elements, with institutions as the primary source of agency, at the crossroads between ideas and matter, society and the state itself. This material/institutional/ideational structure stands in a complex relationship of *exchange* with society. On the one hand, as implied above in the mainstream literature, its purpose is the provision of public goods – above all, security – to groups within its underlying society. On the other hand, this underlying society – part of the state’s physical base – is instrumentalised to a certain degree (through, among others, the extraction of resources) in order to provide this security. The provision of public goods is, thus, not a one-way street: resources are extracted from society by the state in return for its services.

For the purposes of this discussion, aimed at conceptualising state weakness in RSCT terms, I shall put forward two initial, preparatory arguments. Firstly, that state incoherence can in fact be described in terms of *only the provision of security through a monopoly of legitimate force*, which, in the context of RSCT, and in a wider context as well, is the only public good provided by the state directly relevant to its cohesion and continued existence as a state, and hence, wider, region-level security. The provision of other public goods is either not essential to statehood per se, or ancillary to the central aim of providing security. An important consequence is that state incoherence could be conceptualised in terms of securitisation, of unstable and incompatible, dissensual security discourses within state and society, which leads me to my second point. A state performs its essential purpose of providing security through institutions that hold *a monopoly of legitimate force over a given territory and population*. This latter characteristic – the monopoly of legitimate violence – is what makes a state a *state* and differentiates it from other arrangements that social groups may use to enhance their survival. *The* strength/weakness, (in)stability, collapse or fragmentation of states will depend on a complex relationship between that monopoly, these components of legitimacy and force, and the ability of the state to provide security, a relationship visible in the patterns of securitisation that pervade underlying society.

According to the authors writing from a functionalist perspective (Fukuyama, 2004b; Rotberg, 2004), the state exists to provide a variety of public goods to its citizenry. All agree on the centrality of *security*, both from external and internal threats. Most add the provision of socio-economic goods: transportation, communications, education, healthcare, et cetera. Some extend the state’s function to the provision of political

freedoms as well. However, the fundamental purpose of sovereign statehood can be seen as residing *only* in the provision of *security at an individual or sub-state group level through a monopoly of legitimate violence*. In theory at least, states could exist as *states* without providing socio-economic goods or without being remotely democratic: it is, admittedly, to stretch the imagination, but in the ideal-type, libertarian night-watchman state, a situation could be envisaged where many of the above-mentioned functions are carried out entirely by the private sector¹⁸. The thoroughly Westphalian states of early modern Europe in fact did *not* provide many of the socio-economic functions attributed to contemporary statehood (Birnbau, 1981; Van Creveld, 1999); their involvement in society was truly minimal by today's standards, and freedom and democracy were certainly not seen as their 'raison d'être'. In Fukuyama's (2004a, pp. 22-26) terms, their 'scope' was extremely limited. This did not diminish their status as *states*.

Sovereign states are ultimately endowed with a monopoly of legitimate force precisely in order to provide security for groups within their underlying societies; at core, they can still be seen as contemporary expressions of Hobbes' Leviathan and Locke's social contract, remedies against the insecurities of anarchy. The fact that they have taken on a multitude of functions that *apparently* go beyond this fundamental purpose is based on a shift in the interpretation of what security exactly entails. Whereas prototypical 18th and 19th century states were concerned almost exclusively with the provision of military and political security – often to a narrowly defined elite – this concept has now been expanded to include the economic, environmental and societal issue-areas (Thomas & Meyer, 1984, pp. 467-469). 'Security' is not constructed as simply entailing merely security of life and limb for the limited number of people who matter ('society' in the restrictive, 18th-century sense of the word), it encompasses all individual citizens of the state, and implies much more than mere physical survival. And while it may involve the provision of a raft of public goods, it is clear that many, if not most of these goods are in fact directly linked to the primary purpose of providing *security* at a collective and individual level.

To a certain extent, this echoes the Wendtian notion of state survival encompassing more than the mere existential continuity of institutions, territory and population; as the state is composed of both matter and ideas, defining its 'survival' goes beyond the purely material (Wendt, 1999, pp. 233-238). In almost analogous fashion, the socialised individual defines his 'survival' in terms that go beyond the merely *physical*

¹⁸ Nozick's "Anarchy, State and Utopia" (1974) was one notable attempt to construct just such a minimal, night-watchman state.

(Wendt, 1999, pp. 130-138). Man cannot be content with simple survival in a physical sense, but also craves, indeed necessitates, social and cultural continuity, the stable existence of the reference-points that give meaning to the world around him: he defines his personal well-being in terms of socially constructed expectations that form part and parcel of the sense of self that is to be safeguarded from harm. Security, for the individual like the state, consists of a physical rump surrounded by socially constructed outer cultural and civilisational layers. Thus, when one says that the state must safeguard the security of its citizens or subjects, this goes beyond their mere corporeal integrity – the latter is merely the hard core of a complex concept – whose complexity and ‘layeredness’ increases in tandem with society’s as the latter modernises and raises individuals’ expectations to ever-higher levels in a world of increasing ‘disembeddedness’ and ‘time-space distantiation’ (Giddens, 1990). The provision by the state of a greater number of public goods to societies therefore to some extent masks its continued focus on an albeit much-expanded notion of *security*, which makes *securitisation* particularly relevant in discussions of state weakness, a point that will be amplified below¹⁹.

If security is taken to be a complex, socially and intersubjectively defined concept, and this fundamental exchange between the state and its underlying society – resources for security, broadly defined – is seen as the core, irreducible purpose of statehood, how can one conceptualise state survival or failure? The obvious functionalist or institutionalist reply would place it in the states’ inability, or ineffectiveness, in performing their central task: providing security²⁰. That is, however, a very superficial answer. States are but one in a plethora of alternative institutions capable of providing security to groups: empires, tribes, clans, feudal relationships. The objective here is to describe the incoherence and failure of states *as states*, to describe *state* failure and incoherence, not the general inability of societies to maintain their security through social ‘institutions’, broadly defined. The one substantial characteristic that makes

¹⁹ This relates to the Copenhagen School’s *sectorised* view of securitisation (Buzan, et al., 1998, pp. 27-31). Indeed, from historical political sociology, it would appear securitisations in the *military* and *political* sectors were the driving force behind the complex relationships of exchange that created the modern state. While every society will include a differing set of expectations as to the role (and legitimacy) of state action in each of the Copenhagen School’s sectors, it does appear the military and political are of particular importance, directly linked as they are to the survival of the core physical, institutional and ideological aspects of statehood (Buzan, 1991, pp. 116-134). The linkages between the state and the societal, environmental and economic sectors, on the other hand, are more indirect and also quite recent, resulting from the expansion of state functions already mentioned above. The provision of security by the modern state in the *societal* sector, and the complexities attendant thereto, are of particular importance in view of the role of modern *state nationalism* in incorporating the state within the identities of its citizenry; securitisations occurring in this sector will therefore be of particular importance in states where competing, alternative identities – ethnic, religious – are securitized by the state as *political* threats, and state ideology is securitized as a *societal* threat by sub-state groups.

²⁰ Lake (1996, p. 2) even uses the metaphor of the state as a security-producing firm, while Tilly’s conception of state formation is largely based on its role in war-making, with the latter at one point comparing the state to a protection racket (Tilly, 1985, 1990).

states *states* and differentiates them from other security-enhancing institutional arrangements must thus be brought into play: Weber's (1984, p. 37) 'monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force'.

The answer to the question as to why states *fail* is contained in this very term: the continuity of states is determined by three distinct variables contained within this concept, *monopoly*, *legitimacy* and *force*. Each of these elements relates, to some extent, to one of the three components of 'statehood' posited by Buzan. *Force* can be tied relatively easily to the state's physical base, while *legitimacy* is related to its ideational-ideological foundation. The sovereign *monopoly*, meanwhile, is a key qualitative attribute of the state's institutional-administrative features. Viewed from this angle, Buzan's approach seems to tightly link into Weber's definition of statehood, for while many authors tend to prioritise one of the elements by emphasising state capacity, institutional effectiveness or legitimacy, this particular approach most clearly acknowledges the complexities underlying Weber's definition.

Three questions must be asked when approaching the overall coherence of states: do they retain a monopoly of legitimate force by exercising effective sovereignty over their territories and populations? Are they capable of efficiently applying force to their respective societies? And, finally, in how far is this force accepted as legitimate by these underlying societies? The overall cohesiveness of states depends on, and can be conceptualised according to the complex relationship between these three elements of legitimacy, force and monopoly. Furthermore, the deficiencies and imbalances within and between these elements will be clearly visible within the patterns of securitisation that pervade a state's underlying society. In societies where the state does not carry out its core function – providing security – efficiently, securitisations will inform protective measures that circumvent the state; conversely, where a state lacks legitimacy, it will be securitised as a *threat* as its attempts at imposing or enforcing its authority collide with the disobedient mistrust of ordinary citizens.

A Three-Tiered View of State (In)Coherence: Legitimacy, Force and Sovereignty

Legitimacy and Inherent Strength/Weakness

The first of these three elements, *legitimacy*, is best comprehended by seeing the state as, in Migdal's (1988, p. 27) terms, a collective 'strategy of survival', amalgamated and coordinated from the various strategies of survival of sub-state groups and actors. As such, it is directly related to the ideational portion of Buzan's tri-partite state. In an ideal-type coherent state, collective political identities and values are shared by constituent elements, and an overarching, sovereign authority is provided with the

resources required to protect these collectivities from external (and internal) threat. States act as a consensual framework – a social contract, a grand bargain – by bundling these strategies of survival of groups and individuals in sub-state society. The result is an arrangement whereby the state is endowed with a monopoly of legitimate violence and provided with commensurate resources, in return for security for a collective identity and value-set²¹.

But what exactly are these collective identities and values, and how are they going to be secured? As argued in the previous chapter, the exact mechanisms and methods employed by the state, and the nature of the collective values and identities it pursues is, more often than not, the subject of vigorous debates in many societies. To paraphrase Migdal, the various ‘strategies of survival’ within society will not necessarily be harmonious and compatible: some values of groups and individuals will necessarily clash. The important question, in terms of state cohesion, is how such clashes are resolved: through the state, or outside the state? This makes the patterns of securitisation that pervade society so important when it comes to state (in)coherence, and legitimacy in particular. Do sub-state groups see the state as the principal method for resolving their securitisations, and in how far do these sub-state groups identify with the collective identities and values espoused by the state, internalising these value-sets and identities as their own referent objects of securitisation?

A state’s legitimacy – here referring to the extent to which the state’s collective strategies of survival and their underlying values and identities are accepted as authoritative and are integrated into the security discourses and practices of society – lies at the core of state strength and survival, of state coherence. Returning to the notion of ‘civilised’ man seeing his security socially constructed around a physical core, this basically refers to the extent to which the state has become part of that social envelope as a value in and of itself. In cases where it has done so successfully, groups and individuals will automatically rely on the collective strategies of survival offered by the state, and the state will be what I call ‘inherently strong’.

This internalisation of the state, and its collective values and identities as the legitimate source of security will, however, seldom be perfect; in any society, alternative

²¹ The above does not imply all groups and individuals will be treated equally by all states, in other words, that the state will evenly provide security to all its citizens, without distinction. Contemporary liberal-democratic states – the normative benchmark in the current international system – strive to do that in the political (although not the socio-economic) sense. Other forms of statehood may primarily provide security to a more or less small, dominant elite, yet still retain their legitimacy based on notions of divine right, or ideological necessity; or they may, on the contrary, insist on providing socio-economic rather than legal-political equality. The crux of the matter is, however, whether the arrangement – egalitarian or not – is accepted as legitimate by most groups in society, whether the state’s collective values and identities are internalised as a quasi-natural fact of life.

strategies of survival will continue to exist alongside those provided by the state. It is important here to remember that the state is but one among a range of such strategies that may or may not be adopted by groups or individuals, some of whom will continue to reject the state in favour of such alternative strategies. Inherent strength will not preclude the possibility of certain criminal and subversive groups placing themselves outside the 'grand bargain' of state and society: all states, however egalitarian and inclusive, securitise sections of their sub-state society that do not perceive them as legitimate and do not accept their authority at face value. But the passive acceptance of the state by the great majority of society will ensure the state's continuity in the face of its challengers, at least as long as the state can muster the force required to control the latter, as shall be argued below.

In inherently weak incoherent states, clashing alternative strategies continue to exist in *broader* sections of society because of two specific deficiencies in this internalisation of the state's ideological base. First, the consensual, collective 'strategy of survival' incorporated into the state may be generally ill-defined and badly internalised: societies as a whole, for a variety of reasons, could fail to achieve and maintain the collective values and identities necessary to produce and sustain sovereign statehood. In terms of the *tri-partite* state, the *ideational* portion of statehood, the collective 'idea of the state' could lack in definition and clarity, or be poorly integrated into the discourse and practices of the state's citizenry. In the worst cases, the absence of a collective idea of the state's purpose and function, values and identity, the state will in effect become a hollow shell, subject to the arbitrary, narrow interests of whoever controls its institutions, leading to a general distrust of the state by society, its reliance on alternative strategies of survival, in turn resulting in lawlessness and corruption²².

Secondly, the collective state identities and values could indeed be clearly defined and well internalised by specific parts of society, but could, simultaneously, be rejected by significant, territorially and ethno-religiously distinctive groups harbouring equally well-defined, but divergent identities and value-sets. In this case, there will be a clear distinction between in-groups, which have internalised the values and identities associated with state-centred strategies of survival, and out-groups, which haven't: the latter will securitise the state as a threat, continuing to advocate aberrant strategies of survival that often lead to *secessionist* tendencies, sometimes intensified by an *intra-state* security dilemma (Buzan, 1993b).

²² For a detailed study of the link between legitimacy and corruption, see Anderson and Tverdova (2003).

This ties in with Holsti's (1996, pp. 91-97) distinction between the 'vertical' and 'horizontal' legitimacy of states. 'Vertical legitimacy' applies to the degree in which a state is seen as legitimate by its underlying society *as a whole*; a deficit in this particular type of legitimacy will lead to endemic corruption, political disorder and criminality, and a disregard for state authority as sub-state groups and individuals try to ensure their security *despite* the state. Here, state legitimacy can be said to be lacking in *depth*: collective values and identities are badly defined, and weakly internalised in society as a whole, and the state's ideology and institutions are ill-defined and contested in a territorially non-descript manner. 'Horizontal' legitimacy, on the other hand, refers to the extent to which the state is evenly accepted as legitimate across different sections of society; states lacking in such legitimacy will have underlying societies that are fractured along ethno-religious, sectarian lines. State legitimacy, in other words, is lacking in *breadth*: collective values and identities are defined only in terms of one particular (often ethno-religious) section of society, their internalisation is unevenly spread. This vertical/horizontal distinction is, it must be remarked, one of ideal-types: most state-society complexes will incorporate divisions of both types, in varying proportions. Distinguishing between the two is nevertheless important as they underlie a crucial distinction between two types of state failure, collapse and fragmentation, introduced below²³.

Force and Ostensible (In)Stability

But is state incoherence solely about legitimacy? Most of the existing literature doesn't make a distinction between *instability* and *weakness*: these two terms are seemingly interchangeable. Yet, a quick glance at contemporary international society reveals a qualitative difference in the type of incoherence one observes in various states: Lebanon (Rotberg, 2002a, p. 134) and North Korea (Eizenstat, Porter, & Weinstein, 2005, p. 136) have all at some point been described as 'weak', yet the internal dynamics of these two states differ widely. With Lebanon apparently in a constant state of organised chaos, and North Korea remaining one of the most tightly controlled societies in history, nevertheless teetering on the brink of collapse for much of the post-Cold War period, would describing both states as 'weak' adequately capture the

²³ Vertical and horizontal weakness would also result in diverging interactions between the Copenhagen School's various sectors of security. In the case of vertical weakness, one would expect a complex interplay between the state's ideological-institutional makeup (the political sector's main referent object) and a variety of other sectors in which the contemporary state is assumed, but fails to provide security (military, economic, societal, environmental): whether the state, in its current institutional form and with its current ideological outlook, is an adequate 'collective strategy of survival' in all these sectors comes under question, resulting in generalised, territorially non-distinct challenges to the state. By contrast, in cases of horizontal weakness, securitisations would be centred more strongly on the political and societal sectors. The state's ideological and institutional makeup would be seen as a societal threat to the values and identities of out-groups, whose identities and values are, in turn, seen as incompatible with the state's, either because the state is subservient to identities of a dominant ethnos (as in the case of pure nation-states), or because they do not fit into state as a political project (as in the case of homogenising, centralised states).

essentially differing nature of their internal incoherence? Differentiating between *inherent weakness* and *ostensible instability* – as I do here – might introduce some clarity to the situation. Because, whereas the inherent weakness of states is linked to their legitimacy within sub-state society, the question of whether such lapses actually destabilise the state and lead to ostensible instability is directly related to the second element of ‘stateness’: force.

Both vertical and horizontal *legitimacy gaps* (Eizenstat, et al., 2005, p. 136; J. M. Weinstein, Porter, & Eizenstat, 2004) – deficiencies in the ideational fabric of legitimacy undergirding the state – must, in the end, be filled through the exercise of material power, or the application of force, broadly defined: the more inherently weak the incoherent state, the more hard power the state will have to employ in order to compensate for its deficient legitimacy, suppress these divergent strategies and ensure its ostensible stability. Because legitimacy is based on internalised norms and values, it is, to some extent, a self-regulating mechanism not requiring direct intervention from the state; the exercise of force to compensate for deficiencies in legitimacy exerts the state to a far greater degree, as a conscious effort requiring resources and organisation (Gallarotti, 1989). This makes inherently weak states much more dependent on their physical and techno-scientific resource base for their stability, because they must compensate for their weakness through a costly combination of coercion and cooptation. One example here are *rentier states*, of highly deficient legitimacy, whose regimes nevertheless often manage to maintain their relative stability thanks to, among others, their oil wealth – as argued in a quantitative study by Smith (2004). This distinction between inherent weakness and ostensible stability is of special importance in unmasking the well-documented instances where an authoritarian state masks its subservience to the security of a small elite or specific ethnic group through the application of such hard power into society, an issue not foreign to the Former Soviet Union.

An ostensibly unstable state will, firstly, be confronted with strategies of survival that include an element of *political violence*, and, secondly, be unable to offset and suppress these strategies through the application of force on its part. It will not be able to exercise effective and constant political control over its whole territory and population, and this ineffectiveness will risk pushing it into a powerful downward spiral towards failure, collapse or fragmentation, instances where the state not only loses substantial *control*, but that core attribute of statehood, its monopoly of legitimate force. Two issues are of importance here: firstly, as in the case of inherent strength or weakness, this ostensible stability of the state is never perfect: just as a state’s legitimacy cannot be all-encompassing, its ability to make up for these ideational

lacunae by suppressing every single criminal and dissident group will be limited: some level of violence will exist in every sub-state society. The difference between stability and instability lies in the nature of the violence: does it have a political aspect, specifically aiming to modify the existing state order, as opposed to limiting itself to financial gain as in the case of criminality? Secondly, this violence must be of a nature as to negatively affect the very core of state survival – the monopoly itself of legitimate force or its '*effective and exclusive sovereignty*' – albeit in a partial and transitory manner. In other words, it must be concentrated around alternative foci of legitimate violence that present themselves as alternatives to the state or advocate alternative forms of statehood, use political violence to assert themselves as such, yet do not succeed in irrevocably and permanently limiting the state's sovereignty over its territory and population.

The very same vertical/horizontal distinction introduced above matters in ostensibly unstable states, producing different dynamics according to the fissures and deficiencies that affect the legitimacy of the state. A horizontally weak state will most likely also destabilise horizontally: what would simply be secessionist *tendencies* in an inherently weak state would turn into ongoing armed separatist movements that actively contest the state's constitutional status-quo and try (but fail) to establish permanent control over a given territory and population. Accordingly, ostensible instability in vertically weak states would also express itself vertically, with corruption and lawlessness becoming blatantly visible as the state is unable to repress alternative strategies of survival: open politically (rather than ethnically) inspired armed rebellions, and widespread terrorist activity are indicative of this kind of instability. Again, as the vertical/horizontal differentiation is an ideal-type, instability in many, if not most states will display different combinations of both variants, with one or the other providing the dominant dynamic of instability.

The distinction between inherent strength/weakness and ostensible (in)stability is nevertheless crucial in approaching overall state incoherence efficiently in a regional context. The inherent weakness of states – linked directly to their deficient legitimacies – allows one to identify states whose stability is dependent on the exercise, by the state and its elites, of considerable repressive force, the thin veneer that often covers over the fissures of illegitimacy and inherent state weakness, and that can disappear as soon as material circumstances change. The then resulting ostensible instability often degenerates into permanent state failure, with its profound regional security implications; keeping a tab on such potentialities – Iraq 2003 springs to mind – would consequently prove useful in any regional analysis.

Effective Sovereignty and State Failure

The difference between mere *instability* and wholesale *failure* is ultimately determined by the third element of 'stateness', based on an ability to maintain a *monopoly* of legitimate force over the longer term. The discussion now turns to this, the most crucial, and most complex of the three elements. At the core of state survival lies *effective sovereignty*: the extent to which the state can cling on to its monopoly of legitimate force over its territory and population. While defects in the two other elements do not necessarily lead to state failure, inherent weakness and ostensible instability can, over the longer term, involve vicious downward cycles that ultimately lead to the loss, by the state, of its ability to maintain its exclusive legitimate authority, standing at the very core of its survival. It is important here to understand the way legitimacy and force interact in producing these vicious cycles leading to state failure. State survival, ostensible stability and inherent strength (or their opposites) form one integrated whole, and their respective constituent elements – sovereignty/monopoly, force, legitimacy – are inextricably interlinked, and mutually constitutive.




Figure 2: The Three Tiers of State (In)Coherence²⁴

²⁴ At the base of state coherence stand the two tiers of legitimacy and force, with legitimacy determining the weakness or strength of a state, and force complementing it to form ostensible stability, supporting the third tier ('monopoly'). If this base shrinks (i.e. if the state becomes less legitimate, or weaker, without an expansion in the application of force to compensate), the state becomes ostensibly unstable. At some point, the state could become so unstable as to affect the monopoly of legitimate force standing atop this shrinking base, toppling it, and making the state *failed*.

The link between legitimacy and force is, as was implied above, one of complementarity, with force having to compensate for a state's inherent weakness in order to ensure its *stability*. There are, however, additional linkages between legitimacy and force on the one hand, and *monopoly* on the other: over the longer term, a state's monopoly of legitimate force requires a careful balancing of its legitimacy and the application of force to its society. An inability to achieve such a balance not only leads to *instability*, but also to a possible vicious cycle resulting to the loss of effective sovereignty – or state *failure*. Long-term instability negatively affects the legitimacy of the state as the preferred 'strategy of survival' for sub-state groups and individuals: if a state is unable to guarantee the security of large swathes of its population because it is unable to muster the force necessary to maintain stability, these groups and individuals are increasingly bound to consider alternative ways of enhancing their security (Dupont, Grabosky, & Shearing, 2003; Musah, 1999). More and more force will subsequently be needed to compensate for this decline in legitimacy, exacerbating the situation if such force cannot or will not be mustered by the state. The vicious nature of this downward spiral is clear: unless the failing state can restore stability by restoring its legitimacy (through, for instance, a renegotiation of its grand bargain) or by mustering the force required to reassert its authority (perhaps through outside help), the result can be a slide into fully-fledged state failure as the gap between legitimacy and inadequate repressive violence inexorably grows wider, ultimately eliminating the state's monopoly of legitimate force.

Neither of the options that offer a way out of this downward spiral, driven by instability, towards state failure – a renegotiated grand bargain or increased application of force by the state – are straightforward. In vertically weak states, the absence of an adequately defined and internalised idea of the state within society would pose a catch-22 problem for anyone attempting to re-establish legitimacy: the renegotiated state-society bargain that would create new, consensual collective values and identities itself requires some level of political culture, of commonality of values and identities, that are often themselves absent. In horizontally weak states, a renegotiated bargain would depend on the extent to which the well-defined, clashing values and identities that are behind the fissures in sub-state society could be reconciled within a reconstructed notion of unified statehood, and that is in itself far from uncomplicated. On the other hand, what Holsti has called the '*state-legitimacy dilemma*' (Holsti, 1996, pp. 91-122) often makes an increase in the level of force applied to society for the sake of enhanced stability detrimental to legitimacy: weak and unstable states that try to augment their control over society by applying forceful, authoritarian methods often end up *losing* their legitimacy in the process by alienating large sections of society. In the

end, with their legitimacy reduced, they often find control more elusive than initially was the case, quite apart from eventually risking a fall into the vicious cycle of reduced legitimacy and inadequate force described above.

The third element at the core of state survival, effective sovereignty, thus requires a careful, long-term balance between state legitimacy and force: the level of force applicable by a state to its society is, over the longer term, bounded by a minimum required to assert authority and maintain security, as well as a maximum level acceptable to society. Maintaining this *force-legitimacy equilibrium* helps avoid the vicious circle of instability, decreased legitimacy, and ultimate state failure described above. This equilibrium can be disturbed by exogenous factors affecting both sides of the force-legitimacy equation. A state can lose its ability to exercise effective control because of extraneous economic failures. It can lose its legitimacy because of social or cultural changes. There is also a definite role for human agency in provoking failures in this equilibrium: for instance, overly authoritarian or incompetent leaders, or fractious competing elites. Many states have been unable to ever achieve this balance between legitimacy and force for lack of an adequate economic and/or ideological base from the very onset of independence, leading either to in-born ostensible instability, or to an increasingly illegitimate state order whose stability is reliant on increasing repression, exposing the state to the ever-present danger of downward vicious cycles.

The end point of these vicious cycles is often complete state *failure*, deemed to occur when the state *definitively* loses its sovereign monopoly of legitimate force – its effective sovereignty – to sub-state groups. It is important here to make clear distinctions, firstly between *ostensible instability* and *state failure*, and secondly between two variants of *state failure* based respectively on the vertical/horizontal distinction discussed above, *state collapse* and *state fragmentation*. In both ostensibly unstable and failed states, the monopoly of legitimate force is affected to some extent; the main difference is, however, the inability of the *failed* state to *reassert* its control and restore that monopoly through the mobilisation of power.

In ostensibly unstable states, the alternative foci of legitimacy that exist in *every* state (even the strongest states contain organised criminal groups or political extremists at the margins of their societies) will violently challenge that monopoly without, however, succeeding in *permanently* removing significant portions of its territory and population from state control. Their challenges to the state will be fluid and transitory, and the state, while not in total control, will remain the dominant actor over its territory and population, able to muster the force to confront and suppress these partial and impermanent challenges. In *failed* states, by contrast, sub-state groups will have

succeeded in establishing themselves over the longer term in significant areas and over larger groups in society, with the state unable to muster the force required to regain control and re-establish its exclusive monopoly over prolonged periods of time. The state will in effect have lost out to other strategies of survival incorporating an element of violence.

Within failed states, the differentiation between vertical and horizontal incoherence results in a corresponding distinction between state *collapse* and state *fragmentation*, previously suggested in a different theoretical context by Vinci (2008). The main difference will consist in the nature of the sub-state groups that manage to break the state's exclusive hold on power, more specifically, whether or not they aspire to separate statehood. In *fragmented* states, sovereignty will have *fragmented* as well. The juridical state will have split into several fragments that, in themselves, display all the features of empirical statehood: a stable territory, more or less effective control through state-like institutions, a unifying ideology. In *collapsed* states, by contrast, state sovereignty will have wilted into irrelevance, in favour of sub-state actors (factions, warlords) that do not in themselves lay claim to separate statehood, against whom the state remains powerless. While these actors might in themselves not exercise a monopoly of legitimate force over a stable territory or population, collectively, they deny the state from exercising its own positive sovereignty over its territory and population, which is consequently left in a Hobbesian state of chaos. Again, fragmented and collapsed states are ideal-types: many states display characteristics of both. Often, states that originally collapse vertically end up partially fragmented as well, as sub-state groups organised in ad-hoc state-like units organise themselves to at least partly fill the void left by the collapsed state²⁵.

In a regional context, the immediate consequences of these two different forms of state failure – collapse and fragmentation – differ considerably. Collapse, as the term itself implies, is far more indeterminate than fragmentation, which, in contrast to the former variant, can still leave clear foci of legitimacy and empirical sovereignty in place. In the context of RSCT, fragmentation can be said to result directly in the de-facto internal transformation of an RSC through the *addition* of state-like units. Collapse poses a different problem altogether: one of a political vacuum within the RSC, in effect an internal transformation of the RSC in the *opposite* direction, through *disappearance* of a unit and the opening of a regional political no-mans land. Both variants similarly

²⁵ The unrecognised states of Somaliland and Puntland, in collapsed Somalia, are a good example (Shinn, 2002).

introduce an unwelcome source of instability and uncertainty within any given complex because of the risks of regional (and sometimes even global) overspill.

Above all, however, the failure of states creates a tension between the resultant absence/fragmentation of empirical sovereignty, and the relatively immutable, juridical understanding of sovereignty under International Law. The concept of state survival provided above has mainly embraced a Weberian, empirical understanding of statehood, one based on positive rather than negative sovereignty (Jackson, 1990, pp. 26-31). Yet, both sovereignty and statehood can be conceptualised in the *legal* rather than empirical, terms of the 1933 Montevideo convention, which refers, more specifically, to the capacity of states to enter into relations with other states (Art. 1): in other words, to their necessary recognition as states by their peers. These two notional sides of statehood operate on different, separate spheres of reality – one empirical, the other legal – but nevertheless interact to produce concrete consequences for anyone studying a given region.

Firstly, the juridical aspect of statehood works in favour of state survival and the status-quo by setting a clear limit to the legal recognition of state failure. In the case of fragmented states, resultant *unrecognised* state-like units do not enjoy the full legal protection accorded to their juridical counterparts by international society (Jackson, 1982). Unrecognised, devoid of international legal legitimacy, they cannot become the subjects of permanent international regimes, or acquire the reasonable expectations of peaceful change that are the security community's defining feature (Nathan, 2004). In the case of collapse, the legal continuity of the juridical state in effect masks its factual disappearance as an autonomous actor within the RSC; the question of whether or how to fill the void thus created more often than not leads to the involvement of 'interested parties' in a part of the region that in effect falls outside the normal parameters of the international system of sovereign states.

Consequently, one is faced with an awkward choice between empirical and juridical statehood when approaching RSCs with failed (fragmented and collapsed) states. A first question concerns the state-like units that emerge from state fragmentation: does one treat unrecognised statelets as 'units', or see them as sub-state actors? My – albeit qualified – choice is in favour of the former: RSCT is, after all, a theory of IR, not International Law, and it is the *empirical* rather than *legal* status of states that should matter in assessing whether they count as units. That having been said, however, an element of caution must be retained when approaching these state-like units, by acknowledging the power of legal norms in favour of the status-quo, and the complicating aspect of their unrecognised status in the emergence of stable, long-term,

non-conflictual cultures of anarchy: durable regional security regimes and communities will require a solution to the problem posed by fragmented states.

A second issue concerns the treatment of *collapsed* states: does it make sense to treat them as actors/units, or must their territory be seen as falling outside the 'normal' parameters of RSCT? Again, I will favour the second, empirical view: in the absence of empirical statehood, the territory and population of a collapsed state shall be deemed more a passive *object* rather than an autonomous subject of the international system. The chaotic nature of state collapse militates against the inclusion of its internal turmoil in structural theories like RSCT. However, firstly, to the extent that sub-state actors in these collapsed states assume state-like properties (in the event of combined collapse and fragmentation, as described above), they can themselves be treated as state-like units in their own right. Secondly, this does not mean that groups *not* displaying empirical characteristics of statehood will be ignored: such sub-state groups (including those in weak or unstable states) are the object of micro-perspective analysis through their participation in the region's securitisations, even if they cannot be seen as 'unit-level actors' in the RSCT sense of the word. Thirdly, neither does this imply the minimisation of the effects of state collapse on the *other* units within the given RSC, and beyond; in fact, their reactions (among others in terms of patterns of securitisation) could prove vital in understanding the broader implications of state failure.

State Incoherence, Securitisation and RSCT

How can one fit this three-tiered conceptualisation of state incoherence into the Wendtian framework of RSCT sketched out in the previous chapter? The three tiers of state survival – inherent strength, ostensible stability, effective sovereignty – contain both material and ideational aspects, which an analysis of state coherence would thus have to include. This invites a combination of the macro- and micro-perspectives introduced in the previous chapter when operationalising this approach in terms of the overall theoretical framework employed here. To recap, the former concerns itself with the objective, epiphenomenal aspects of security interaction, the latter with the security discourse underlying these epiphenomena. Deficiencies at the core of this structure of 'stateness', effective sovereignty, are most obviously present in the security *interaction* both within the state concerned and in the wider region, and thus lend themselves readily to the macro-perspective: the *symptoms* of outright state failure (collapse or fragmentation) are easily discernable in a sub-state and wider regional context. The same goes for the features of ostensible instability. Identifying the lapses in the state's legitimacy that underlie these failures and instabilities, or differentiating between inherently weak or inherently strong (but stable) states would, however, require a

discursive, micro-approach that identifies diverging values/identities and strategies of survival/definitions of threat.

Any analysis would thus have to combine a macro and micro-perspective to be entirely effective. The macro-perspective would examine the integrity of the state's existential core, its effective sovereignty, in effect preliminarily characterising the state as failed (collapsed and/or fragmented), unstable or stable; in addition, it would look at the more obvious indications of inherent weakness: corruption, a repressive or rentier state. The micro-perspective would shift one's attention to the outer ideational layer of legitimacy by evaluating the inherent strength or weakness of the state through existing patterns of securitisation; its goal would consist in identifying the deficiencies and fissures within the ideational structures that either help explain existing failures and instabilities, or could – in *ostensibly stable* but *inherently weak* states – form the basis of future destabilisation. Combined, the insights of these objective and interpretive approaches would allow for an assessment of the ability or inability of the state to maintain its force-legitimacy equilibrium by effectively filling the legitimacy gaps identified.

A macro-perspective could objectively assess the effective sovereignty of a given state: does the state have an effective monopoly of legitimate force over its territory and population, and to what extent is this monopoly compromised? The presence of unrecognised state-like units on the territory of a state, the inability of a state to exercise such exclusive control are all symptoms of state fragmentation and collapse that are obvious from this objective viewpoint. So are the symptoms of ostensible instability: if there still is a monopoly of legitimate force, it will be occasionally and partially corroded through violent political unrest of various kinds, or armed secessionist movements. The macro-perspective can thus set the scene for a subsequent micro-analysis by characterising the state as collapsed, fragmented, ostensibly unstable or stable. Apart from this, it can identify the extent to which states are engaged in repression or cooptation, and the pervasiveness of corruption: all possible indicators of inherent weakness, regardless of the state's ostensible stability.

The exact pathways for a discursive micro-perspective analysis depend on the characterisation of the state as failed, unstable or stable from an objective, macro-viewpoint. If the state has been classified as ostensibly stable, an additional differentiation can be made between inherent weakness or strength: the examination of the state's legitimacy will concentrate on vertical and horizontal fissures that *could* lead to collapse, fragmentation or instability in the future. If, on the other hand, the state has been classified as failed or ostensibly unstable, the guiding question will be which

lacunae in the state's legitimacy have contributed to state failure or instability; the state's inherent weakness can be safely assumed.

This approach would rely on the patterns of securitisation observed within and around the examined state. Within the framework of state (in)coherence outlined above, there is a clear relationship between these patterns and state weakness (or lack of legitimacy). One has to remember that the provision of *security* is the state's ultimate *raison d'être* and source of legitimacy: the state is, in effect, an overarching, collective strategy of survival aimed at protecting collective values and identities. The conformity of sub-state securitisations with this collective strategy can be analysed from the points of view of argumentative and instrumental discourse introduced in the previous chapter: values and identities that diverge from the collective, state-centred benchmark will be visible within the argumentative portion of intra-state securitisations. On the other hand, perceptions of threat and strategies of survival that do not conform to the perceptions and methods implicit in the state's collective strategy for survival could be found in the instrumental aspects of the security discourse.

Analysing diverging patterns of securitisation from these argumentative and instrumental perspectives will make it possible to distinguish between the vertical and horizontal weakness of states through what could be termed *mutual auto-securitisation*, which occurs when the state is securitised as a *threat* (rather than valued as a guarantor of security) by significant sections of society, which are, in turn, securitised as threats by the state. In horizontally weak states, such mutual auto-securitisation will involve territorially and culturally specific out-groups that reject the state's collective identities/values in their argumentative security discourse, identify the state as a threat to their aberrant values and thus advocate deviant strategies of survival in their instrumental discourse. The centrifugal dynamics thus created will usually favour the emergence of aspirant-states or secessionist movements: unless these de-legitimising tendencies are suppressed and marginalised through force or cooptation, they risk degenerating into instability and fragmentation.

In *vertically* weak states, the deficient internalisation of values and identities throughout society and the consequent presence of aberrant strategies of survival will be visible from the micro-perspective in the low level of public trust in state institutions, seen as threats to the values prevalent within society rather than means towards greater security. Even in the most stable inherently weak states, the continued presence of non-state institutions as providers of security (the family, the clan, the tribe, informal networks) in a society's everyday security discourse could be seen as indicating state

weakness, especially if they circumvent and contradict state-sanctioned procedures and strategies.

Once the extent to which state legitimacy has been compromised in society is known through the micro-perspective, the insights of the macro- and micro-approaches can be combined to answer questions as to the past, present or future ability of the state to compensate for these legitimacy gaps through the exercise of force (through either cooptation or repression). In the case of inherently weak states, forward-looking scenarios could be developed wherein the fissures observed can no longer be remedied by the state, leading to ostensible instability, or, in extreme cases, possible downward spirals towards state failure. In ostensibly unstable states, the inquiry could focus on the present inability of the state to compensate for deficient legitimacies, and the possible future emergence of vicious cycles leading from instability to failure. In failed states, the inquiry could take on an explanatory form, looking back at the reasons for state failure. Of course, in all three cases, the situation will also have to be analysed from a more positive, constructive point of view: could circumstances improve rather than deteriorate? In short, the micro- and macro-perspectives can be combined to analyse the past, present or future interplay of legitimacy, force and monopoly, and their relationship with state coherence. As conceptualised into the three-tiered schema above, the coherence of states is dependent on an often precarious institutionalised equilibrium between ideational and material factors, and any adequate approach would thus have to blend in both these perspectives.

Conclusion

This chapter aimed at developing the notion of state *incoherence* within the previously introduced, over-arching Wendtian framework of RSCT. After reducing the central function of the state to the provision of *security*, and linking Weber's definition of statehood to Buzan's tri-partite view, it disaggregated the phenomenon into a state's *inherent weakness*, *ostensible instability* and *effective sovereignty*, all three related, respectively to the ideational, material and institutional aspects of the state. Inherent strength/weakness was said to depend on a state's legitimacy (or lack thereof) within society; ostensible (in)stability on that state's ability to compensate for legitimacy gaps by projecting force into that society; and, finally, effective sovereignty on its resulting capacity to maintain an effectual monopoly of such legitimate force. A further distinction was introduced between the vertical and horizontal dimensions of state incoherence, resulting in a complex typology including: horizontally and vertically inherently weak/strong states, horizontally and vertically ostensible stable/unstable states and failed – collapsed or fragmented – states. The chapter subsequently delved

into ways of applying the previously elaborated objective macro-perspectives and discursive micro-perspectives of RSCT to this set-up.

Throughout the framework outlined above, the multi-level nature of RSCT will have to be kept in mind; after all, the framework of this analysis – RSCT – is a multi-level theory, and any examination of intra-unit occurrences would thus have to take into account their broader, regional and systemic interactions. In evaluating the effects of the above-mentioned phenomena on the surrounding RSC and higher-level, great power interaction, as well as, conversely, the effect of regional and systemic security dynamics on state weakness, instability or failure will have to be included. From a macro perspective, one has the ostensible effects of failure and instability in terms of regional (and sometimes even systemic) overspill, or the demonstrable involvement of external forces in the internal affairs of failed, unstable or weak states. From a micro-perspective, on the other hand, the failure or instability of states may be securitised as a regional or systemic threat, or legitimacy gaps can be manipulated by external powers to their strategic advantage: patterns of securitisation that cross state boundaries will fall well within the purview of this inquiry. The many possible theoretical-empirical viewpoints made possible by RSCT – macro/micro, ideational/material, domestic/regional/systemic – will have to be used to the full in order to provide a detailed understanding of one of the most important phenomena in the post-Cold War world. Accordingly, the next chapter will move from the sub-state to the systemic level of RSCT by grappling with the issue of great power penetration (GPP) into RSCs.

CHAPTER 4: GREAT POWERS AND THEIR REGIONAL ENTANGLEMENTS

The previous chapter, focusing on state incoherence, already dealt with one non-regional level of RSCT. While this opening of the black box of domestic politics may seem outside the purview of IR and International Security Studies to those adhering to more orthodox and parsimonious views of the discipline, within the context of inherently multi-level RSCT it was both a *possibility* and a *necessity*: the presence of domestically stable, recognised units is one of the prerequisites for the emergence of security regimes and communities, and thus directly impinges upon the patterns of amity and enmity observed on the regional, inter-state level. This chapter switches attention to the more conventional *systemic* level of RSCT, and its interaction with variables at the regional level: more specifically, the effect of great power penetration (GPP) on the security dynamic of RSCs.

The chapter's central question revolves around the involvement (or more pejoratively, interference) of great powers in regional affairs, and its effect on the security interactions and discourses within an RSC. For while at the lower, domestic level, constancy may prove crucial to the formation of distinctly regional, and relatively stable security relationships, at the higher, systemic level as well, the configurations of great power interaction, and their penetration into the regional level make an essential contribution to these security dynamics. The following sections will expand on the interaction of the systemic and the regional within RSCT in the following way. First, a definition of great power status compatible with the overall Wendtian framework will be devised. The subsequent section will build a material, subjective and intersubjective view of regional great power involvement. The aggregation of these individual involvements in the final section will lead a 1+3+1 typology of GPP, based on their varying polarity and amity/enmity: unipolar, cooperative-multipolar and competitive-multipolar, bounded by hegemony and disengagement on either side.

Defining Great Powers

Before trying to conceptualise GPP in terms of this inquiry's overarching framework, however, a clear, theoretically compatible definition of 'great power status' would have to be elaborated. If the systemic level is primarily about the interaction between great powers, and penetration is about systemic-regional interaction, how are the units operating at the higher level defined and differentiated from lower-level *regional* powers and other states/units? What is a great power? The term itself is one of those fundamentally contested concepts that litter the social sciences – and, accordingly, definitions of great power status abound – with most of these definitions corresponding

to appropriately materialist or ideational conceptions of 'power' that exist within the discipline²⁶.

Waltz (1979, pp. 129-131) refers to seven material elements that determine 'capability', and distinguishes great and 'secondary' powers through their relative ranking within a hierarchy of material power. Mearsheimer (2001, p. 5) – basing himself on a similarly orthodox materialist view of power – defines great powers in terms of their dominant economic-military capabilities: more specifically, as commanding the military assets needed to “put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war against the most powerful state in the world”, including a nuclear deterrent. Others, including Bull (1977, pp. 200-229) introduce elements of subjectivity and intersubjectivity into this exclusively material view of great power status, by adding factors such as a perceived 'social status' and the social recognition of concomitant rights and duties to military power. Keohane (1969, p. 296) sees a great power as a state “whose leaders consider that it can, alone, exercise a large, perhaps decisive, impact on the international system”. Clark (1989, p. 2) points to their 'managerial' role in the “decision making of the society of states”, while Simpson (2004) emphasises their role in the generation and maintenance of norms of international law. Martin Wight (1995, p. 50) distinguishes great powers through their “general interests”, as opposed to the “limited interests” of other states. Hopf (1998, pp. 172-173), on the other hand, emphasises the socially constructed nature of great power status.

Within the context of RSCT, Buzan and Wæver (Buzan, 2004; Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 30-37) make a distinction between superpowers, great powers and regional powers, implicitly combining material and ideational elements. In their view, superpowers are characterised materially by “broad spectrum capabilities exercised throughout the system” (2003, p. 34), referring to 'objective' material military and economic factors. Moreover, superpowers both see themselves and are seen by

²⁶ As suggested by the concept itself, 'great power status' is primarily about power, and how one defines a 'great power' is closely linked to how one defines 'power' and 'polarity' in general. Conceptions of power in IR vary from neo-realism's extreme materialism to post-structuralism's extreme ideational position. Structural neo-realists like Waltz (1979) and Mearsheimer, (2001) conceive of power in almost entirely material terms, as military and/or economic 'capabilities'. At the other extreme are, among others, 'hard' constructivists like Ashley (1984), who see power intersubjectively and largely unintentionally constituted through perception and discourse. Between these two positions lie a number of intermediate, hybrid material/ideational views of power. While they do strongly tend towards materialism, classical realists – Morgenthau (1985), among others – speak of 'perceptions of the balance of power' as a factor to be reckoned with, while within the English School, Hedley Bull (1977) differentiates 'subjective' and 'objective' balances of power. From a more liberal standpoint, Joseph Nye (1990) developed the ideational notion of 'soft power' acting alongside the more traditional forms of 'hard power'. The approach taken by Wendt (1999) lies within the middle ground between materialist and ideationalist notions of power: he sees the distribution of power as implying a core material element, and, additionally, as closely correlated with the distribution of interests within the system. Without delving further into the debates surrounding power in IR (which would necessitate a thesis in and of themselves), my conception of 'great power status' will implicitly utilise this Wendtian conception of 'power'.

others as such; they also act as "fountainheads of universal values" (2003, p. 35) that underpin international society, clearly adding subjective and intersubjective elements to the definition. Great powers, while not enjoying quite the same broad-spectrum, system-wide capabilities as superpowers, are seen as still capable of projecting power outside their respective RSCs, a capability recognised by themselves, and by third states in their calculations of system-level polarity. Regional powers, in contrast, are merely able to influence (albeit decisively) the internal polarity of 'their' RSC.

The approach taken in this thesis will be based on these latter definitions, explicitly combining objective material criteria on the one hand, and the ideational subjective and intersubjective (self)-understandings of the states involved on the other hand. Great powers will be defined as *states whose ability and willingness to project their power beyond the boundaries of their respective RSCs is recognised by states and actors throughout the international system*. In other words, in order to be great powers, states must conform to three different sets of criteria: objective, subjective and intersubjective.

- *Objectively*, they must possess the ability to *independently and effectively* project power beyond their RSC, in a number of sectors, particularly the military, political and/or economic.

- *Subjectively*, they must be willing to use this ability in pursuit of extra-regional interest as part of a great power identity²⁷.

- *Intersubjectively*, states outside their RSC – and, especially, fellow great powers – must recognise this ability and willingness, and base their strategic calculations on this recognition.

Any claim to great power status would thus not stand on its own: it would both have to be grounded in the objective capabilities of the state concerned and its subjective self-perception, and be accepted as valid by the international community of states and a 'peer group' of fellow great powers, implicitly if not explicitly. *Superpowers* would be a special case within the wider category of 'great powers', with a recognised ability and willingness to project power independently, effectively and *permanently, throughout the international system* rather than simply *beyond their RSC*.

Great powers' objective ability to *independently and effectively* project their power beyond their RSC in the first place refers to an ability – grounded in raw military and economic capabilities – to achieve 'results' and affect the behaviour of other states

²⁷ Russia's adherence to *derzhavnost'* – great power status – as part of its national identity is one such example, discussed in chapter 8.

over the longer term, and in a systematic fashion. Subjectively and intersubjectively, great power status denotes a particular social interpretation of 'power', placing a particular state in the higher reaches of the hierarchy of international society. Great power status results from a subtle interplay between capability, self-perception and the perceptions of 'significant others', of 'society' at large (Levy, 1982, p. 282). This is no different from what occurs domestically, within states: in this context, the idea of 'great powers' should be seen as the international equivalent of intra-state elites, based on a similar interpretation of 'power' in the context of – an albeit *anarchical* – hierarchy. This elite status also implies – again, similarly to the intra-state context – a leading role in the creation and maintenance of the norms of international society, one that flows logically from, among others, the interactions of the law-making mechanisms of the international legal order with perceived preponderance in international affairs (Simpson, 2004; Suzuki, 2008)²⁸.

The next natural question would concern the actual application of this definition to the current international system: which states or units qualify? Considering the wide range of definitions existing in IR, it is not surprising that the precise enumeration of 'great powers' will differ from author to author (Kennedy, 1988; Krauthammer, 1990; Layne, 1993; Mearsheimer, 2001, pp. 360-384; Waltz, 1993), with significant disagreements over states that lie on the regional/great power border. Even the objective/subjective/intersubjective definition offered above can lead to differing interpretations. Buzan and Wæver (2003, pp. 37-39), using their particular approach, talk of a 1+4 system, with the United States seen as the only superpower, and 'Europe', Russia, China and Japan acting as great powers; these classifications could certainly be contested, even within the same theoretical framework.

One possible solution that could diminish differences in interpretation lies in operationalising the concept from a specifically regional perspective by applying this definition of great power status only to units that are active, security-wise, within a particular security constellation. A comprehensive, system-wide identification of *all*

²⁸ The relative importance of material, subjective and intersubjective factors in determining great power status inevitably varies, and, as a result, states' identities lag behind their capacities and vice-versa, with important implications for their systemic and regional behaviour in times of transition and change. A great power or superpower that perceives itself and is perceived by others as such may lose its material capacity to uphold its status before it itself realises this to have occurred: such was the case with the United Kingdom following World War Two (arguably up to the rude awakening of 1956) (Boyce, 1999, pp. 163-178), and, it could be argued, of Russia following the end of the Cold War. Conversely, a state with the requisite material capabilities for great power status may fail to define itself as one over a considerable period of time: the United States during the interbellum may serve as one such example (Ruggie, 1997). If, in the future, the United States withdraws from the international community, the subjective may in fact again precede the material and intersubjective. Closely monitoring the interplay of these three components of great-power status is thus not only necessary from a purely deductive-theoretical point of view; it is empirically valuable in accounting for change and the possibilities/consequences thereof.

great powers becomes unnecessary: only great powers that impinge on the security dynamics of the region that is targeted for study would need to be identified as such. From this viewpoint, the search for great powers would concentrate on those units that penetrate a given RSC, and conform to the definition mooted above, implying a generally perceived ability and willingness to independently project power at the systemic level.

How does one conceptualise systemic-regional projections of power, based on the three-tiered definition of great power status provided above? If systemic-regional projections of power are conceived of as the region-level application of power by a state of a certain capability, with particular self-perceptions and a high, intersubjectively constructed social status, 'projections' will inevitably involve objective, subjective and intersubjective elements. How does material capability interact with the material aspects of a given RSC? What role does subjective perception play in the operationalisation of these material capabilities? And, finally, how do great powers, their regional entanglements and international society shape each other at the regional and systemic levels? The conceptualisation of regional projections of power presented below will necessarily include three tiers that to some extent echo this theme of objectivity, subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Firstly, a single great power's regional entanglements have a distinct objective component in the power's material presence in the security dynamics of the RSC. Secondly, subjective motives behind regional projections of power stem from the place of the RSC within the great power's overall matrix of subjective perceptions. Thirdly, projections of power will have to be placed within the general context of a region as part of 'international society', by referring to the ways in which such projections are perceived and assimilated into the region's security dynamic.

Over time, such projections of power add up to great power penetration, defined here as *the longer-term projection of power by a great power into a RSC, justified through long-standing patterns of securitisation between the power and the region, substantially affecting the enduring structures of a region's internal security dynamic*. This implies rather more than just episodic involvement, entailing a measure of constancy and durability. In simple terms, a great power is deemed to penetrate a region when it is physically present there over a longer period (militarily, politically, economically...), when it rationalises its presence in terms of its long-term security, and when it substantially affects the security behaviour/discourse of regional units. Penetration by great powers that are 'indigenous' to a centred or 'great power' RSC will logically have an element of automaticity about it; they will be deemed to be both members and penetrators of 'their' respective regions. One obvious question that follows is as to the

exact meaning of 'permanence' in the case of extra-regional penetrating powers: how long-standing and durable must these projections of power be? The answer lies in the intersubjective aspects of great power penetration: simply put, regional great power involvement must be of such a nature as to shape long-standing patterns of securitisation within the region, beyond the concrete instances of involvement themselves. Episodic involvement like, for instance, military evacuation missions, cannot count in themselves unless they affect strategic calculations and discourse of regional actors long after they have ceased.

The link between this objective/subjective/intersubjective approach and the macro- and micro-approaches discussed in previous chapters is clear: analysing the objective aspect of GPP would involve investigating the superficial, macro signs of power projection – formal alliances or the application of force into the RSC, the presence of military bases, and trade, aid and investment flows with its constituent units – specifically in light of potentially distortive effects on the indigenous polarity of the RSC. An interpretive micro-approach could subsequently elucidate both the subjective and intersubjective aspects of such projections by firstly tracing back the patterns of securitisation that link the said region to a great power through its definition of interest or perhaps even identity, focusing on both the instrumental and argumentative aspects of security discourse within the great power concerned. Secondly – also on the micro-level – one would have to look at the intersubjective effects of great power penetration on the security discourses of the regional units themselves. Such individual great power penetrations could then be aggregated into distinct categories, developed within the context of region-system interaction and RSCT. The subsequent two sections will follow this approach, the first tackling *individual* great power penetrations, in their macro/objective and micro/subjective and intersubjective aspects, the second aggregating these into 'patterns of penetration', categorised according to the variables of polarity and amity/enmity.

The Objective, Subjective and Intersubjective Aspects of Individual Great Power Penetrations

Firstly, at the most general level, the objective aspects of individual GPP refer to the superficial, macro-perspective elements of one single great power's interactions with a given region, based mostly on observable and material state behaviour, specifically the allocation of resources by each power to interaction with the RSC in the form of a military intervention or presence, financial or humanitarian aid, alliance commitments, trade and investment flows and the like. These material commitments form a

preliminary 'map' of the projection of power into a given region²⁹. What are the flows of aid from the great power to the region's units? Does the power have a military presence – permanent or temporary – in the region, and if so, where, and in what capacity? Does it have formal alliances, or does it serve as a guarantor or peacekeeper in the context of a security regime, or does it entertain considerable commercial interests? On their own, however, these macro-perspective 'objective' elements of penetration can only provide a partial picture of the phenomenon. As explained above, the projection of power has both subjective and intersubjective aspects, which brings us to the central role of discourse in understanding the phenomenon.

The second, subjective tier of regional power projection concerns the great power's perception of the RSC, as detected in its discursive rationales for regional involvement. The central question revolves around the ways in which the region is represented in the power's security discourse, and the distinction made in chapter 2 between argumentative and instrumental aspects of securitisation is, once again, important here. On the argumentative side, a region can play a role in defining a great power's identity, its value-set, its sense of self. On the instrumental side, a region may offer an opportunistic means of upholding a great power's values and safeguarding crucial referent objects of security (Ayoob, 1999, pp. 251-253). The central question in both cases concerns the relationship between the region and the great power's values and referent objects: where exactly do these linkages lead? At one extreme, a region may become so closely interwoven with a power's identity that it in effect becomes inseparable from its sense of self and its perception of security, becoming a referent object in itself. At the other extreme, regional involvement may simply be a means to safeguarding values and referent objects that are entirely extraneous to and disconnected from the region itself. In between, there can be a number of other intermediate possibilities and pathways through which a great power can connect a region to its sense of security (Desch, 1993; Miller, 1998).

Four of these pathways will be distinguished here by differentiating between *shared identity*, *material interest*, *systemic strategies* and *universalised values* as drivers of GPP; each of these drivers plays a role in the power's discourse by justifying regional involvement in terms of different arguments that indicate an increasingly detached relationship between the RSC and the great power. The first driver, *shared identity*,

²⁹ The objective criteria for GPP concentrate only on these three sectors (military, political, economic), because they refer to the active formulation and application of policies by the power within the region. This does not preclude the relevance of other sectors (environmental, societal) in the subjective and intersubjective aspects of great power involvement.

refers to the above-mentioned extreme where a great power's sense of self interweaves with a region to such an extent that it has become an inseparable referent object of security for the power in question, part of its very identity: region and power are in effect almost indissoluble, and intervention becomes reified in discourse. In justifications referring to *material interest*, independently existing, innate features of a region are defined as essential to the power's security: interventions here are not based on an expanded, imperial sense of identity, but an instrumental evaluation of the region as an indispensable tool for national security. Considerations of *systemic strategies*, on the other hand, cause the logic of the power's security discourse to wander towards the systemic level: intervention occurs not because of intrinsic, 'objectivised' material regional interests, but because higher-level security dilemmas push powers towards engagement. Finally, involvement rationalised through *universalised values* will be either humanitarian or universally ideological in nature. In each of these cases, the discursive linkages between the power and the region become more indirect and tenuous, and regional penetration therefore more unstable and ephemeral.

In arguments based on *shared identity*, regional great power involvement is steered by the perception of the region (or parts thereof) as an inseparable referent object, almost an extension of the great power's sense of self. GPP often becomes so matter-of-fact, so reified, that the region, in whole or in part, almost turns into an extension of the great power's territorial identity, a 'natural' sphere of influence, where involvement is seen not only as essential to security, but also self-evident, part of the norms that govern interaction in the RSC, a value in and of itself for the great power in question. Often, such intervention will be based on cultural or ideological affinities and shared values and norms. One good example can be found in the Cold War: American involvement in Western Europe through NATO was often justified as being in defence of the 'Free World', and has been described as being based on shared identities and values (Hemmer & Katzenstein, 2002). Meanwhile, the Soviet Union dominated and subsidised its Eastern European neighbours in the name of 'socialist internationalism' (Jamgotch, 1975, pp. 407-412), sometimes arguably at great cost (Marrese & Vaños, 1988). In both cases there were identities and values creating bonds between regions and powers that went beyond mere material interest. Another example could be found in the way in which the European colonial states continued their involvement in far-flung regions regardless of whether they had become a liability, in the name of upholding an imperial identity, as in the historical case of Britain and the Indian subcontinent, or Portugal and its colonies (Mahajan, 2001, pp. 199-204).

In justifications based on *material interest*, independently existing 'objective' features of the relevant region are either instrumentalised as essential to the power's higher-value referent objects of security, or securitised as threats to these referent objects. Two elements are important here: firstly, the fact that these features are instrumentalised or securitised means that these characteristics, rather than being referent objects in their own right, have a significance that is always relative to other referent objects; rather than having an intrinsic value as part of the power's identity or innate value-set, their importance lies in their usefulness for or threat to the great power's higher-level security objectives. This distinction is important in distinguishing this type of discourse from the previously discussed identity-based variant. A second defining characteristic of such discourse is that regional interest be based on *material* features whose relevance is independent from interactions at the systemic level; in other words, features that would be either useful or threatening to the great power regardless of the behaviour of its peers³⁰.

The justification of regional involvement through the security imperatives emanating from the systemic level, on the other hand, brings us to the third element in the discourse underlying system-region projections of power: *systemic strategies*. Here, the value of a region lies not in its identification with the great power, or in its innate and materially threatening or useful nature, but in its significance to interaction at the systemic level (Taliaferro, 2004). The great power may not perceive any 'objective' interests within a region, yet, higher-level strategic considerations may force it to be involved; a systemic security dilemma may drive great powers towards regional entanglements in the periphery, by default, lest the others 'get there first'. Again, the superpower rivalry during the Cold War provides many examples of regional involvements by the United States and the USSR in the absence of 'objective' interests, simply predicated on the possibility of exerting "indirect influence" (Scott, 1982, pp. 177-197) on the adversary. The crucial element here is the absence of 'objective', material interests: that the region concerned be neither intrinsically threatening nor useful for the power in question save for its role in the broader context of systemic great power competition. As a result, regional commitments are not

³⁰ This discourse underlies regional great power behaviour that is predicated on clearly defined geopolitical objectives centred on the region in question. In cases where features are *instrumentalised* this may, for example, refer to 'resource wars' aimed at ensuring the supply of strategic commodities (Broad, 1980; Klare, 2001), or interventions in favour of economic interests (Frieden, 1989). In cases where such characteristics are *securitised*, this could include interventions designed to prevent the proliferation of WMD, or involvements aimed at suppressing terrorist activity directed at the great power. In all these cases, regional involvement would usually be subject to a favourable cost/benefit analysis mainly taking account of variables *within the region proper*. To some extent, it also underlies grand strategies based on 'selective engagement' (Art, 1998; Posen & Ross, 1996, pp. 17-24), whereby great powers only involve themselves in regions where 'vital interests' are at stake (although the next factor may also be at play there).

justified through a cost-benefit calculus based on the region proper; in fact, the costs of such involvement may very well exceed the benefits if one evaluates them separately from the overall systemic context. The rationale only becomes apparent when *systemic* factors, such as the overall balance of power and concomitant issues of credibility and prestige are taken into consideration.

Finally, some justifications of regional intervention centre around *universalised*³¹ *values*, to some extent bringing the classification full circle as the argument returns, once again, to ideas and shared identities, albeit of a cosmopolitan/solidarist rather than communitarian/pluralist kind (Wheeler, 2002). While such global values imply a form of identification (with mankind as a whole), they are quite distant from the great power's particularist domestic values and identities that formed the first motivating element explored here in great power interventions. There thus is a great difference between regional involvement based on *shared* values/identities and interventions based on *global* values/identities, like, for instance, the 'responsibility to protect' (ICISS, 2001); the first refer to confluences of a particular set of specifically communitarian values, whereas the latter refer to universalist values and identities, deemed common to humanity as a whole. Securitisation in the latter case is quite distant and abstract: at stake are not identities and values that are specific to the great power, but the common identities and values of humanity, a general concern with the welfare and survival of the species. Needless to say, such discourse is the main driver behind humanitarian interventions based not on existential fear but on altruism, and as such is the weakest and, as some would argue, least straightforwardly credible (Chandler, 2004) of all four discourses in driving regional great power intervention, at least in contemporary international society.

Great power discourse on regional intervention includes elements of all four above-mentioned ideal-types, and clearly differentiating between them will add considerable value to any analysis. The different motivations/calculations behind regional great power involvement are important in determining the extent to which the power will go in order to maintain its presence there. Two discursive elements are important here. Firstly, clearly distinguishing between the argumentative and instrumental aspects of securitisation gives the researcher an edge in understanding the phenomenon by separating values and means in the drivers of intervention – shared identities, material interests, systemic strategies and universal values – and judging the extent to which involvement is a strategic aim in itself or a mere opportunistic tactic in the overall

³¹ Note the deliberate use of 'universalised' instead of 'universal' here, aimed at avoiding western-centrism and cultural absolutism: while the values referred to are *claimed* to be universal by the given great power, their *actual* universal nature remains open to question.

interaction between great powers, or something in between. Each of these discursive ideal-types implies different configurations of ends and means, different pathways linking the region to the great power as either a value or a means in terms of security. Secondly, and more importantly, the concept of *discursive stability* introduced in chapter 2 could again serve to denote the permanence of a great power's presence in a region; the extent to which discourse of regional intervention is well-rooted, both materially and ideationally, indicates the lengths to which a power is prepared or able to go in order to prolong its involvement. To what extent such involvement is contested, or under danger from changing material circumstances, are central questions to ask when looking at the subjective perceptions of regions by the great power.

Moreover, this subjective aspect of great power involvement relates directly to the notion of socially constructed 'interest' alongside material 'capabilities' as mutually constitutive parts of a hybrid, Wendtian conceptualisation of 'power' (Wendt, 1999, pp. 96-109), if one sees the relationship between the distribution of capabilities and interests throughout the system in regional terms. If, as Wendt (1999, p. 109) says, "the distribution of interests must have an independent role in constituting the meaning of anarchy and the distribution of power", great powers' regional interests – as outlined above in terms of 'subjective' discourse – could be argued to determine the allocation of resources to particular regional involvements. In fact, this conforms to what one sees in terms of actual state behaviour: the 'distribution of capabilities' through the system will to some extent be *regionally* defined, and powers will be more willing to apply their capabilities in some regions than in others. In other words, as a result, the distribution of these capabilities will be directly related to the distribution of *interest* within the regionally differentiated system.

The final, intersubjective tier of penetration refers to the effects of an individual great power's regional involvement on the security dynamics of a region. The presence of a great power in regional patterns of securitisation – or the '*discursive dependence*' of an RSC – is the last, and crucial, intersubjective building block in regional projections of power; without it, neither the material nor subjective tiers of penetration would be relevant. A region can only be deemed penetrated by a great power if its component units actually react to this penetration. Seen in such discursive terms, the question thus becomes how a given power is integrated into the region's security discourse: *how* and *how intensely* region-level units react to and perceive its power, and its interests within regional 'discourses of penetration'. This 'discursive dependence/independence' can be seen as encompassing the following elements, among others: firstly, the prominence (or absence) of the great power in the region's security discourse.

Secondly, the alignments of regional actors with or against the penetrating power: in terms of securitisation, whether the great power is securitised as a threat or whether it is seen as a potential means towards greater security. And, thirdly, perceptions by regional states of the penetrating power's capabilities relative to its counterparts, and of its effects on regional polarity.

Through its effect on the instrumental and argumentative security discourses of regional actors, great power penetration directly or indirectly influences these units' security-enhancing *strategies* (R. E. Kelly, 2007) and collective values/identities. On the one hand, regional actors react *directly* to regional GPP, by either securitising regional involvement by the great power as a threat (in their instrumental security discourses), by aligning themselves (bandwagoning) with the great power as a security-enhancing strategy (again, in their instrumental security discourses) or, more rarely, by identifying with the great power through shared identities and values (in their argumentative security discourses). On the other hand, GPPs can also have an important *indirect* effect on regional patterns of securitisation by influencing the strategic calculations and broadening or narrowing the range of options available to the units in their relations to their regional counterparts. Through the resulting effects on the convergence or divergence of regional security discourses, great power penetration thus has a considerable effect on regional patterns of amity and enmity, a link that will be of great importance in the later chapters connecting these two concepts.

These objective, subjective and intersubjective aspects of great power involvement cannot be seen as separate from their effects on the wider systemic security dynamic. Ultimately, they must be placed within the network of perceptions and counter-perceptions, action and counteraction that constitute 'international politics' in general. The material actions and subjective perceptions of other intervening great powers, of the regional units themselves, and of 'significant others' are, in the end, collectively instrumental in shaping the material and subjective/intersubjective aspects of a particular intervention; objective reality, subjective self-perception and intersubjective interaction thus stand in a relationship of constant mutual constitution. Placing separate, objective-subjective-intersubjective regional penetrations within the wider security dynamic thus becomes the final part of the puzzle of great power involvement. At this point, our discussion somewhat returns to RSCT – whose structural variables provide a means of capturing the complexities of an intersubjective universe of security – concentrating on building a typology of aggregate 'patterns of great power penetration'.

Categorising Aggregate Patterns of Great Power Penetration

In the end, the individual projections of power into a region described in the previous section can be aggregated into what I shall call a 'regional pattern of penetration', the systemic-regional portion of the security constellation surrounding a given RSC. Their structure and characterisation depends largely on the interaction between the different powers penetrating the region, including those powers that may be indigenous to the latter. Such a regional 'pattern of GPP' serves as an intermediate category between the region and the system; with its own polarity and patterns of amity/enmity, and a membership that combines both extra-regional and 'indigenous' powers, it captures the how system-level polarities and patterns of amity and enmity are 'focused' in regionally specific ways through the interaction of the capabilities and interests of powers.

As was implied above, the projection of power by great powers is determined by both their capabilities and their interests, with the latter determining the distribution of projections of power throughout the system. As a consequence, it would be wrong to *directly* link the systemic and the regional: the former must be mediated, focused through a region-specific lens, constituted by interests, in order to become relevant in a particular RSC. Rather than conceptualising the systemic level and linking it directly with the regional, one would have to construct it from the unique perspective of the RSC that is the object of study (Miller, 1995). Empirically, this is supported by the significant 'disconnects' one often encounters between regional penetrations and the systemic distributions of power and patterns of amity/enmity. Powers do not penetrate the various regions within the system equally; their presence is more pronounced in some RSCs than others, and their patterns of amity/enmity will sometimes (but more rarely) be at variance with specific configurations of cooperation or competition, from region to region. Some participants at the systemic level might be indifferent to a particular region and thus be irrelevant, as great powers, to the polarity of systemic-regional penetration there. Differences in interest may amplify the capabilities of some great powers in certain regions, and temper them in others. Alternatively, great powers with an overall cooperative relationship may be more competitive at a specific regional level. Thus, what is relevant to the regional level is *not* the overall structure of the systemic level, but how this structure is ultimately transferred onto the regional level through interventions by great powers as the polarity and amity/enmity of region-specific patterns of GPP.

As far as system-level penetration goes, Russia and Japan – if one takes them as system-level great powers – are hardly relevant to the security dynamics of African RSCs. China is, as it has clearly decided to project its power into the region (mostly through no-strings-attached aid) in pursuit of raw materials (Alden, 2005). An analysis

of system-region interaction could thus reasonably omit Japan and Russia. The above also explains to a great extent why great powers sometimes accept defeat in far-flung regions in spite of their overwhelming system-level superiority. The enormous military prowess of the United States was ultimately inconsequential in Vietnam (Betts, 1980) precisely because a lack of interest limited its willingness to use its capabilities to the full; the extreme military unipolarity of today's international system would arguably be far more relevant in case of interventions in regions of high interest, like Europe or East Asia. Similarly, there have been (admittedly rare) historical cases of cooperation or competition between great powers that diverged from the overall systemic pattern of amity or enmity. This could be argued to be the case between the US, the UK and France in contemporary Africa (regionally competitive, systemically cooperative) (Alden, 2000), or, conversely, between the otherwise fractious Western great powers in East Asia – especially China – during and after the Boxer rebellion (Otte, 2007).

Thus, each region will have a unique group of great powers interacting within its pattern of GPP. Apart from those powers penetrating the region from above and outside, they will also include indigenous great powers³², which both *penetrate* and *are part of* the region.

These aggregate patterns of GPP will be classified along two dimensions:

Firstly, their 'polarity': the sum of great powers penetrating the region as described in the previous section, and the distribution of power between them. As stated above, such penetrations would necessitate three distinct components: a physical presence on the macro-level, subjective great power 'discourses of penetration', and at least some 'discursive dependence' of the RSC on the penetrating great power.

And, secondly, their 'amity/enmity', based, from a macro-perspective, on their overt cooperative or competitive behaviour, and, from a micro-perspective, on the convergence or divergence of their subjective 'discourses of penetration', or, in other words, the compatibility/incompatibility of subjective motivations for regional involvement. This runs entirely in parallel with the idea of discursive convergence/divergence underlying amity/enmity within the region proper, as described in chapter 2.

³² One could argue that indigenous regional powers would have to be included as well, insofar as they are able to challenge penetrating great powers. If power is taken to be constituted by capability and interest, their power could become comparable, from a region-specific perspective, to that of their great power counterparts.

Keeping this in mind, it now becomes possible to establish a typology of GPP based on these two, material and ideational variables of polarity and discursive convergence/divergence. To this effect, the concepts of polarity and amity/enmity will be operationalised somewhat less complicatedly than in the case of RSCs. Where polarity is concerned, a simple distinction shall be made between unipolar and multipolar³³. As regards amity/enmity, there will be a straightforward differentiation between competition and cooperation, rather than the necessarily more complicated conflict formation/security regime/security community differentiation in chapter 2. The result will be the 1+3+1 typology of GPP seen in table 1: *unipolarity* (where amity/enmity is irrelevant as a variable), *cooperative multipolarity* and *competitive multipolarity* at the centre, bounded on either side by two related concepts – *hegemony* and *disengagement* – that fall outside the definition of penetration proper, the former because it implies the effective overlay of regional security dynamics (and consequently, the absence of a functioning RSC), the latter because it refers to an *absence of GPP*. I shall now discuss these different categories one by one, applying the objective/subjective/intersubjective framework as necessary³⁴.

Table 1: 1+3+1 Typology of Regional Great Power Penetration

Great Power Penetration				
Disengagement	Competitive-Multipolar	Cooperative-Multipolar	Unipolar	Hegemony
0 Great Powers	n Competing Great Powers	n Cooperating Great Powers	1 Great Power	1 Great Power
Perfect Anarchy / Discursive Independence	Partial Discursive Dependence			No Anarchy / Discursive Dependence

Hegemony in effect means the *overlay* of regional security dynamics by a single great power, and its complete military, economic and/or political domination of the RSC. From the objective, macro-perspective, hegemony thus entails an overriding presence by one great power within the RSC: the existence of a formal alliance with most units of the RSC, the stationing of troops throughout the RSC, its economic/commercial predominance within the region, leading to a significant impairment of regional anarchic conditions. From the micro-perspective, the crucial factor is the absence of autonomous patterns of securitisation. The security of regional units is entirely,

³³ An additional, structurally significant differentiation is possible between multi-polar and bi-polar: there is, indeed, an important difference between the dynamics of 2-player and n-player games from a purely rationalist point of view, and this is bound to reflect upon the security dynamics of a given region. I have steered clear of an explicit differentiation in this text, mostly for purposes of simplicity and clarity (to avoid an exceedingly complex 1+5+1 typology), preferring to treat bi-polarity as a special form of multi-polarity.

³⁴ The scheme presented here is, in effect, based on the adaptation of a mainly materialist/macro-perspective framework suggested by Benjamin Miller (2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2007; Miller & Kagan, 1997; Miller & Resnick, 2003).

willingly or unwillingly, attuned, subordinated to the interests of the hegemon, instrumentally and often argumentatively as well. In other words, subordinated states take care to adjust their security-seeking discourse and behaviour to the hegemon's, and often end up pursuing similar values or even sharing an identity with their hegemonic overlord; the Gramscian (Cox, 1983) slant in this ideational part of the concept is evident. Failure to do so usually results in 'corrective' punitive measures by the latter.

Disengagement implies the exact opposite: the irrelevance of *any* great power to a region's security dynamic. The question is how to establish whether a great power is relevant to the region's security; after all, in today's globalised world, great powers (and lesser states, for that matter) do tend to have a presence of sort in regions around the world, without necessarily being relevant to regional patterns of securitisation. The three-tiered conceptualisation of individual GPPs can serve as a guide. Objectively, a disengaged great power's relations with the region in question will be minimal, and generally imply that the power in question is unwilling to bear significant material costs in order to (directly or indirectly) maintain a regional presence, either through the support of proxies or through a substantial presence of its own. Subjectively, the great power must perceive the region to be of no or only marginal interest to the maintenance of its security: in other words, the region must not feature in its network of securitisations. Intersubjectively, the region's security dynamic must not be affected by the great power's above-mentioned minimal, objective presence. Neither the great powers' peers, nor the RSC units must include whatever limited presence the great power may have within the region in the instrumental and argumentative aspects of their mutual securitisations. This does *not* mean that the units don't take account of the presence of these great powers on the systemic level; it does mean, however, that the activities of great powers within the RSC remain too insignificant to affect relationships of security between the RSC units. Disengagement thus amounts to the *material absence, subjective indifference and intersubjective irrelevance* of great powers vis-à-vis a given RSC.

The unipolar/multipolar, competitive/cooperative forms of GPP are situated between these two extremes of hegemony and complete disengagement. It is important here to make a clear distinction between hegemony on the one hand, and the unipolar penetration of an RSC on the other. The latter simply refers to the penetration of an RSC by one single power, with other units retaining their ability to pursue autonomous foreign and security policies. While the region's security dynamic is affected, in whole, by one single external, or internal 'centring' power, regional units preserve some independence in determining their external relations according to autonomous patterns

of securitisation. In case of hegemony, however, the RSC in effect ceases to function because of the severe impairment of regional anarchy: endogenous patterns of amity and enmity and polarity are overridden by a common *submission* to the hegemon by all or part of the units, giving it the role of final arbiter in intra-regional disputes. Units still formally survive as sovereign entities, but over the longer term, their foreign and security policies are determined (willingly or otherwise) by the dominant great power's interests; deviations from this norm are usually localised and by and large temporary³⁵.

While the difference between unipolarity and multipolarity is fairly straightforward, and based on the number of powers (indigenous or external) penetrating the region, the variable of amity/enmity, as defined through cooperation and competition deserves some wider discussion. On a macro-level, the *co-operative* involvement of several great powers within a region can become apparent through their presence in joint peacekeeping or peacemaking operations, the presence of formal or informal decision-making and coordination mechanisms regarding the region. The co-ordinated and compatible nature of the powers' micro-level discourse is crucial in determining the stability and longevity of these co-operative arrangements; whether they co-operate on opportunistic strategic considerations that happen to coincide, common material interests or genuinely shared values makes a difference in terms of discursive stability, and, hence, the continuity of co-operative behaviour. A competitive relationship between different great powers involved in a region, on the other hand, manifests itself on the macro-level through the existence of opposing alliances (of varying formality) between units within the RSC and their respective great power sponsors, or frequent, intra-regional proxy wars, as well as divergent coercive and incentivising policies aimed at either forcing or persuading units at bandwagoning with one or the other power, or combinations of powers. From a micro-perspective, such competition will be the result of conflicting and incompatible subjective discourses of interest by the great powers, and the exact nature of these incompatibilities, and their interaction with the regional security dynamic will be crucial in determining the effect of GPP on regional security.

The importance of these patterns of GPP lies in their varying influence on the security dynamics of penetrated regions; in effect, different types of penetration impose different structural constraints on the discourse and behaviour of units (Miller, 2000, 2007; Miller

³⁵ The USSR's role in Eastern Europe – if one takes it as a region separate from Western Europe – during the Cold War could certainly be described as falling under hegemony, thus defined. The security interests of the socialist bloc were very much subordinated to those of the USSR, certainly during the earlier years (Rubin, 1982). Decision-making was very much centralised in Moscow; the Brezhnev doctrine later saw to it that deviations from the norms concocted in the Kremlin were punished (Jones, 1977).

& Resnick, 2003). As argued in previous chapters, the rump materialist and structural theoretical approach applied here not only opens discourse to the explicitly acknowledged influence of the physical, material world; it more generally allows for the limiting influence of *structures* (both ideational and material) on the agency of individual actors. Patterns of penetration are such constraining structures, bending discourse towards certain outcomes without, however, any kind of determinism or automatism. As such, they influence the four constitutive variables of RSCs – boundaries, anarchy, polarity and amity/enmity – by creating inter-regional interaction centred on penetrating powers, by distorting the polarity of a given RSC, by mitigating its anarchy and by exacerbating or dampening existing patterns of amity and enmity.

Patterns of penetration can also be linked to what Buzan and Wæver have called the 'external transformation' of RSCs, either through their combination into 'supercomplexes' – groups of RSCs whose still-distinct security dynamics display a high measure of interdependence through their joint penetration by one or several great powers – or through their outright merger or division (Buzan, 1991, p. 219; Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 53-61). Two or more otherwise disparate regions might 'transform externally' into a supercomplex through their common penetration by one single, or several, interacting great powers, as in the case of the Northeast Asian and Southeast Asian RSCs and China (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 155-156). Conversely, a RSC where penetration is geographically disparate – with different great powers penetrating or even overlaying different sub-complexes – might fall apart, as arguably happened in Europe after the Cold War (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 346-351).

In addition, the indigenous polarity of a given region may become practically irrelevant if it is heavily penetrated by extra-regional powers; the balance of power in a given region may be determined not so much by internal factors – the capabilities of units themselves – as by alignments and alliances with sponsoring powers. The intensity of penetration, its polarity and its unipolar/cooperative or competitive nature would be crucial in determining by how much such intra-regional factors would lose their relevance, with increased penetrative multipolarity and competitiveness adding to the complexity of analysis.

GPP also qualifies the anarchic nature of a given RSC, with the hegemonic, unipolar, multipolar-cooperative, multipolar-competitive and disengaged categories very much acting as a continuum allowing increasing anarchy within a given RSC³⁶. Thus,

³⁶ Several authors working within the English School also broached the subject of international systems with varying levels of anarchy, albeit outside an explicitly regionalist framework. Wight (1977, pp. 21-29) thus distinguished between sovereign state-systems and suzerain, hierarchical systems. Watson (2007,

unipolar or co-operative multipolar involvements will limit the margins of manoeuvre of regional units in counteracting the objectives of those powers; the systemic level will dampen the autonomous and anarchic regional security dynamic to a considerable degree as the powers are able to impose themselves more efficiently onto the region, and interactions at the systemic-regional level will thus be of disproportionate importance in understanding region-level security. The contrary is true for competitive multipolar penetrations: here, regional units will often see their options multiply through the possible bandwagoning with different powers vying for influence. Anarchic conditions will unmitigatedly prevail. As I shall hypothesise in the following chapter, such patterns of penetration have a significant influence on the amity/enmity variable through their effects on the presence and/or structure of regional anarchy. GPP is thus one of the structures pressuring discourse and behaviour in certain directions through its effects on the security dynamic of a given region; and the effects of such varying patterns of penetration on patterns of amity and enmity the Southern Caucasus will figure among the subjects of the subsequent chapters of this thesis.

Conclusion

This chapter has formulated the third, and final, conceptual building block to this expanded, 'Wendtian' version of RSCT, by developing the notion of great power penetration alongside the already refined concepts of amity/enmity and state (in)coherence. After defining great power status, it turned its attention to individual great power involvements and their material-objective, subjective and intersubjective manifestations. The *objective* aspects referred to a great power's physical presence in and interaction with the given RSC; the subjective tier developed the region's role within the great power's *subjective* security discourse through four ideal-types: shared identity, material interest, systemic strategies and universalised values; *intersubjectively*, GPP was also expounded in terms of the discursive (in)dependence of regional units vis-à-vis the great power. The result was a 1+3+1 typology based on the polarity and amity/enmity of aggregated great power involvements with a given RSC: *unipolar*, *cooperative-multipolar* and *competitive-multipolar* patterns of GPP, all bounded by *hegemony* on one side and *disengagement* on the other.

But as explained before, this thesis will not be a solely theoretical exercise; it will aim to demonstrate that such a hybrid, multi-dimensional framework could be used for the

pp. 19-22) similarly elaborated a more detailed spectrum of anarchy and hierarchy (independence, hegemony, dominion, empire). Although they run parallel to the framework presented here, a crucial difference is their sole concern with the undifferentiated quantitative level of anarchy versus hierarchy, as opposed to the qualitative and multi-dimensional pattern of great power involvement as differentiated according to polarity and amity/enmity, which is the object of discussion here. The above-mentioned variance in the level of anarchy emerges from my primary concern with these patterns.

generation and ordering of practically useful and understandable *empirical knowledge* that also adequately captures the inherently complex interactions that lie at the heart of regional security. Subsequent chapters will endeavour to prove just that, by utilising the concepts to a number of mutually complementary ends, including the testing of several hypotheses, and the concurrent mapping of the Southern Caucasus' security dynamic. In preparation, the next chapter will act as a methodological 'hinge' between the thesis' theoretical and empirical parts, by outlining a practical application of what hitherto has been a rather abstract conceptual exercise.

CHAPTER 5: PUTTING THE FRAMEWORK INTO PRACTICE

Ultimately, the appeal of any given theoretical framework lies in its applicability to the real world, and its ability to provide added analytical value; the central aim of this methodological chapter will therefore consist of outlining a systematic practical operationalisation of concepts previously elaborated in the abstract. The first, introductory chapter already identified the case study that will serve as a testing ground for this expanded conceptual framework of RSCT: the Southern Caucasus. As promised in that chapter, I shall specify a number of hypotheses on the linkages between state incoherence, great power penetration and amity/enmity, and a number of research questions regarding their effects on the possible transformation/evolution of patterns of amity/enmity. Subsequently, using the case study and the research questions and hypotheses as a mental ‘anchor’, I shall proceed to elaborate a methodology geared towards falsifying/confirming these hypotheses, using the as-yet abstract concepts introduced in previous chapters. In the case of amity/enmity, state incoherence and great power penetration, I shall set out approaches to the macro- and micro-perspectives alluded to in previous chapters, by specifying clear, systematic criteria from the macro-perspective for the different categories introduced, and by elaborating on the micro-perspective study of discourse in each case through concepts like ‘discursive convergence/divergence’ and ‘(in)dependence’. This chapter’s final part will particularly dwell on the identification of potential *change* in the regional security dynamic through the ‘stability’ of instrumental and argumentative official discourses.

As laid out in the first chapter, the latter half of this thesis will concentrate on assessing the amity/enmity, state incoherence, and great power penetration variables within a small, but disproportionately complex area of the Former Soviet Union – the Southern Caucasus – using the previously expanded theoretical framework. The ultimate aim will be to weigh the possibilities for the emergence of a security regime within the region by employing the previously expanded RSCT framework with its hybrid, material-ideational view. I shall assess the possibilities of the emergence of a security regime in the region by evaluating the ‘stability’ of prevailing discourses. The methodology employed – involving the mapping of the convergence, independence and stability of security discourse in the region – should also provide a detailed view of the opportunities and pitfalls, discursive pathways, bottlenecks and obstacles that stand in the way of a transformation of the fractious South Caucasus from conflict formation to security regime.

This line of questioning opens up a range of issues, and within the previously expanded framework of RSCT, it in particular points to the possible effects of state incoherence and great power penetration on amity/enmity. How do these two variables affect amity/enmity in terms of providing opportunities and pitfalls, bottlenecks and obstacles for or against the emergence of a security regime? Previous work by Miller³⁷ (2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2007; 2003) has implied that horizontal state incoherence and competitive patterns of GPP skew the culture of anarchy within an RSC towards greater enmity, and complicate transitions from revisionist conflict formations to security regimes by acting as structural impediments. More empirically, commentators within and outside the region have often referred to the new 'great game' between the powers as an impediment to peace, and have pointed to the presence of ethnic minorities as a source for international conflict (Cheterian, 2008, pp. 373-379; Cornell, 2001; De Waal, 2010). Would an analysis of material conditions *and* security discourse in the South Caucasus similarly confirm these negative links made either from a different theoretical perspective, or more empirical standpoints? Looking at the way the incoherence of their counterparts and the presence of the great powers affects the security policies of the region's units thus becomes a pertinent preparatory line of inquiry to the final scenario-building exercise.

Whether and how, state incoherence affects enmity in the Southern Caucasus RSC, and whether and how GPP affects these patterns of amity/enmity become this thesis' two main foci of inquiry, to be analysed from a combined macro- and micro-perspective. The two corresponding hypotheses are, firstly, that state incoherence has negatively affected amity and enmity in the Southern Caucasus since independence, and, secondly, that the competitive nature of great power penetration has played an essential role in maintaining the revisionist conflict formation there. By the end of this endeavour, both hypotheses should have been examined from this hybrid, material-ideational point of view, allowing me to more effectively gauge the potential for an emergent security regime in the RSC, But what exactly does a methodology combining macro- and micro-perspectives. and ideational and material factors entail? And how

³⁷ Employing a largely materialist outlook and a historical methodology, Miller describes state incoherence and territorial revisionism (he refers to the phenomena jointly as *state-nation imbalance*) as the main independent variable affecting the war-proneness of regions, which he visualises in terms of a spectrum ranging from 'hot war', through 'cold war', 'cold peace', and 'normal peace' to 'warm peace' (2007, pp. 41-81). Apart from the state-nation imbalance, Miller also sees patterns of GPP as co-determinants of regional 'war-proneness'; in the case of both variables, he clearly retains a macro-view and avoids looking at discourse. His basic claim is that these patterns mainly facilitate the emergence of 'cold war' and 'cold peace', with co-operative patterns of penetration favouring the latter outcome. Transitions to 'hot wars' and 'warm peace', on the other hand, are mainly determined by the interests and calculations of the regional actors themselves (as the costs and risks involved in both are disproportionately more significant) (2007, pp. 13-20).

does one operationalise the three variables in terms of discursive convergence, independence and stability?

Amity/Enmity, and the Convergence/Divergence of Inter-State Discourse

In chapter two, I already conceptualised amity/enmity in terms of a spectrum, based on both macro- and micro-criteria. I also briefly introduced the notion of '*discursive convergence*' to describe the ways in which micro-perspective security discourse comes together or diverges within a given RSC. Placing a given region within this spectrum will thus entail applying criteria from *both* the macro- and micro-perspectives. From the macro-perspective, a RSC will display a number of objective, readily observable characteristics where amity and enmity are concerned. The most obvious is the presence or absence of conflicts, their regularity, and the extent to which they are resolved. These structural macro-characteristics will be reflected at the level of discourse; zones of conflict, regimes and zones of peace observed from the macro-viewpoint will be 'grounded' in processes of securitisation and desecuritisation observed in a given region.

Security discourse will converge to differing degrees, and display varying characteristics, in different cultures of anarchy, in both its instrumental and argumentative aspects. Conflict formations could be based on deep-rooted argumentative mutual securitisations of values and identities; on the other hand, they could be the result of conflicting instrumental strategies aimed at securing identities and values that are *not* a priori conflictual. Security regimes could be seen entirely instrumentally, as utility-maximising means, or they could become values in and of themselves. Security communities might be based on merged collective values and identities of differing intensity. From the point of view of methodology the question arises: how exactly does one place a region in this spectrum? To properly characterise a given region, one would need two sets of criteria: epiphenomenal, macro-perspective ones, acting as a first indication of a region's nature, and micro-viewpoint counterparts that require a thorough analysis of the discourse in a region. Let us now turn to these formal macro-characteristics of amity/enmity, before moving on to the micro-perspective.

Conflict formations are thus characterised – from a macro-perspective – by military competition (detectable through arms races, aggressive military postures and/or the presence/regularity of armed conflict) and a lack of formal security regimes aimed at resolving such military competition. 'Armed conflict', in this sense, will be defined as any unresolved military confrontation involving at least one *state-like* unit, having caused 1000 or more battle-related combatant or civilian deaths, loosely following the

criteria specified for 'war' in the PRIO and Uppsala University DPCR datasets (Strand, Wilhelmsen, & Gledits, 2003, pp. 3-4). "Two or more parties perceiving themselves to be in an adversary relationship, who are increasing or improving their armaments at a rapid rate and structuring their respective military postures with a general attention to the past, current, and anticipated military and political behavior of the other parties" (Gray, 1971, p. 40) will be seen as being involved in an *arms race*. The lack of an effective security regime will be interpreted as the absence of effective binding agreements under international law specifically aimed at mitigating military competition, either by solving the underlying issues behind direct military conflict, or by providing for arms control mechanisms. Ad-hoc cease-fire agreements and third-party monitoring regimes will not count as such: the defining criterion will be the emergence of a political agreement addressing the underlying causes of the conflict, not *suspending* the military confrontation itself. The difference between revisionist and status-quo conflict formations will mainly lie in the *lack of formal legal recognition* that underlies conflict in the former, as in the case of Israel and some Arab states and Iran, Taiwan and the PRC, and, indeed, the de-facto statelets in the Southern Caucasus.

Moving on, the next category of 'security regimes' is characterised by the presence of formal conflict-minimising norms, or, in other words, the binding security accords whose absence was typical of conflict formations. From a macro-perspective, conflicts within *thin* security regimes have been resolved through *ad-hoc* agreements that still imply a degree of distrust, and thus often require either mutual verification mechanisms or third-party security guarantees), and include a weak degree of institutionalisation. Thick security regimes, by contrast, will be based on agreements that are strongly institutionalised, and imply a high degree of trust between the parties³⁸. The 'density' of such agreements will also matter: in 'thick' security regimes, units will have developed mechanisms for cooperation and coordination at different levels and in different sectors of security. The differing underlying dynamics of these two types of security regime are somewhat similar, respectively, to those of common or cooperative security arrangements (in the case of thin security regimes), and comprehensive security frameworks (in the case of thick security regimes), with the latter implying a greater degree of institutionalisation and a broader range of (non-traditional) issue-areas (Dewitt, 1994; Emmers, 2003, pp. 4-5).

³⁸ For an appropriate conceptualisation of 'trust' in International Relations, see Hoffman (2002); he defines trust in terms of the degree of discretion granted to actors, and the limited nature of oversight as visible in both practice and formal normative frameworks. Intergovernmental security institutions providing for limited exchanges of sensitive information and intelligence, for instance, imply a high degree of trust, thus defined.

Table 2: Categories of Amity/Enmity and their macro- and micro-perspective criteria

	Macro-Perspective Characteristics	Instrumental convergence/divergence (means and threats)	Argumentative convergence/divergence (identities and values)
Revisionist Conflict formation	Military Competition / Lack of mutual recognition / Lack of formal security regimes	War as means / hypersecuritisations ³⁹	Incompatible Identities and values
Status-Quo Conflict Formation	Military Competition / Mutual Recognition / Lack of formal security regimes	War as means / securitisations based on security dilemmas, conflicting 'national interests'	Distinct but compatible identities and values
Thin Security Regime	Conflicts resolved through ad-hoc security regimes often based on verification / 3d-party guarantees	Security cooperation as means / securitisations based on security dilemmas	Distinct but compatible identities and values
Thick Security Regime	Conflicts minimised through Institutionalised mechanisms based on trust	Partial desecuritisation / Regime as value	Security cooperation/institutions as part of collective values / distinct identities
Loose Security Community	Absence of conflict / integrated security institutions	Exclusion of war as means / de- or meta-securitisation	Security cooperation/institutions as part of collective values / Emergence of collective identities
Tight Security Community	Absence of conflict / supranational security institutions	Exclusion of war as means / de- or meta-securitisation	Security cooperation/institutions based on collective identities

Higher up the ladder of amity, in *loose* – or, in Adler and Barnett's (1998b, pp. 55-57) terms, 'loosely coupled' – security communities, conflicts will be 'unthinkable' partly because the structure of international law providing for permanent security institutions will to some extent have been *integrated* rather than simply providing for co-ordination or co-operation. Joint military planning (as, for instance, in the case of NORAD), the absence of fortified borders and multilateralism will be the most visible macro-level symptoms of wide-scale desecuritisation at the micro-level⁴⁰. In *tight* security

³⁹ Hypersecuritisation denotes "a tendency both to exaggerate threats and to resort to excessive counter-measures" (Buzan, 2004, p. 172); this usually occurs in an acute way, over several sectors, to the detriment of other referent objects that might actually be threatened by the counter-measures themselves. Ultra-nationalist conspiracy theories may be a good indication of such hyper-securitisation.

⁴⁰ De-securitisation is, in effect, the reverse of 'securitisation': a referent object is deemed to be no longer under existential threat, and any extra-ordinary measures taken to safeguard it are rolled back. Its urgency diminished, the issue (re-)enters the political realm and becomes an object of everyday, routine politics. Within the context of the South Caucasus' regional conflicts, this would refer to more than the simple

communities, finally, units will have ceded part of their traditional sovereign powers to *supra-national* frameworks for dealing with collectively defined security concerns; while states will remain in existence, aspects of their core security-providing functions will have been taken over by these institutions which will have become political actors in their own right. Such regions would be one step away from an internal transformation into a single political entity.

By itself, this macro-perspective characterisation tells only part of the story of amity/enmity. Especially within the categories related to higher levels of amity, the formal security agreements and mechanisms by which these are defined are based on the convergence of discourse around collective values and identities that can only be micro-analysed discursively. Collective identities are essential to pluralist security communities, and part of the 'thickness' of 'thicker' security regimes lies in the fact that their security mechanisms have become values in and of themselves. The lack of recognition and persistence of conflict in revisionist conflict formations is based on the incompatible identities and values of the units involved. Accordingly, the macro-criteria enumerated above will have to be complemented by a set of micro-counterparts – discursive 'markers' – referring to particular patterns of securitisation; RSCs will also have to be placed within the spectrum through the peculiarities of their security discourse linked to readily observable phenomena from a macro-perspective.

This link starts at the level of *official* discourse, which will, more often than not, reflect objectively observable security conditions. Logically enough, if the region is a revisionist conflict formation, governmental discourse at the unit level will see armed conflict as a constant possibility, and treat 'war' as a legitimate means of policy, as well as intensely securitising other units within the region as acute existential threats. On the argumentative side of discourse, the unwillingness to recognise 'the other' will be based on identities and values that are mutually exclusive: for instance, conflicting long-term territorial claims (with territory as an essential part of state identity) or opposing political ideologies (Diehl, 1999; Walt, 1996, pp. 33-45). The discourse typical of status-quo conflict formations will differ specifically on this argumentative

normalisation of relations between recognised states and their secessionist entities following the implementation of formal agreements: such agreements (especially when accompanied through international guarantees) would still be aimed at *managing* a security issue rather than turning it into something everyday political, they would form the basis of security regimes. Full de-securitisation might over the longer term produce the situation of 'a-security' typical of security communities as the identities and values of the belligerents themselves become more compatible, resulting in a trust and self-identification that would make such formal agreements self-sustaining, or even superfluous. Roe (2004) has pointed out that full de-securitisation and the dissolution it entails of the Schmittian friend-enemy distinction (Huysmans, 1998) is particularly difficult to achieve in the societal sector, as this would entail the denial of identity of the minority in question. He argues that a 'management' of these minority issues within the security realm would be more feasible than their complete removal towards the political.

side. The mutual recognition of units will be based on compatible identities and values, with conflict mostly founded on divergences on the instrumental side: conflicting definitions of threat – often based on a security dilemma (Jervis, 1976) – and clashing *interests* rather than *identities*, with war still seen as a distinct possibility.

How the normative mechanisms provided for in security regimes are incorporated into patterns of securitisation is also essential in distinguishing between thin and thick versions of the category. Official discourse will deal with such mechanisms either instrumentally – as, purely, a technical means of securing stability and avoiding conflict – or, in the case of thick regimes, values in and of themselves. Crucially, in contrast to thin regimes, the high degree of inherent trust and comprehensive nature of ‘thick’ security regimes will imply a partial degree of mutual desecuritisation. One step further along the amity/enmity continuum, in pluralist security communities, desecuritisation becomes near-complete, with units excluding the possibility of war among themselves, no longer seeing each other as potential threats, and defining and addressing threats *collectively*⁴¹. The tight security community represents the ‘high point’ on this spectrum, with units conceding increasing portions of their sovereignty to supra-national institutions legitimised through collective identities that are readily detectable in the argumentative portion of security discourse. Beyond this lies the end of anarchy.

As argued in previous chapters, however, an exclusively *regional* view of amity/enmity would tell us only part of a complicated story. The friendliness or hostility of intra-regional relations cannot be decoupled from either the domestic or global levels of security interaction. Unit-level patterns of securitisation are after all the result of sub-unit processes; securitising moves, their acceptance or rejection by the audience, the contestation of prevailing security discourse et cetera (Buzan, et al., 1998). But more specifically, in incoherent states, failure to adhere to collective strategies of survival (on the instrumental side) or to generate (*relatively*) stable collective values and identities (on the argumentative side) leads to state weakness and instability. As argued below, in certain cases the lack of identifiably constant collective identities or strategies can spill over onto the regional level, particularly when some of the alternative identities challenging those of the state overlap with others in the wider region, or when separatist intra-state strategies are instrumentally abused by outside states. Moreover, the penetration of great powers into the region inevitably influences the nature of amity and enmity as well: the instrumental and argumentative aspects of security discourse are dependent or independent from such penetration in varying degrees. Several methodological questions spring from this interconnected theoretical framework.

⁴¹ A situation referred to by Wæver as “*asecurity*” (Wæver, 1998).

Firstly: how does one approach the question of state weakness (lack of legitimacy, vertical and horizontal) and its linkages with the regional level? In other words, how does one identify 'alternative identities' and 'strategies of survival', and their 'overspill' onto the regional level? And, secondly, how does one evaluate the dependence or independence of regional security discourse from penetrating great powers?

State Weakness, Legitimacy, and the Convergence/Divergence of Intra-State Discourse

Chapter 3 made a number of clear theoretical-conceptual distinctions regarding different elements of state (in)coherence. Most generally, there was the differentiation between the phenomenon's two dimensions, vertical and horizontal (Holsti, 1996, pp. 91-97). Also, three tiers of state incoherence were identified: inherent weakness, ostensible instability, and state failure (collapse or fragmentation). The inherent strength and weakness of states was linked to their legitimacy as strategies of survival, a quite ideational element implying a necessary micro-analysis of societal discourse. Ostensible stability/instability, on the other hand, was made dependent on the ability or inability of the state to exercise material power over a given society in order to suppress any imperfections in its legitimacy, something more easily discernable from a macro-perspective. Finally, state failure was linked to the inability of the state to maintain an institutional monopoly its effective sovereignty in the face of challenges to its power and authority. These three tiers and two dimensions also allowed for a typological differentiation between inherently weak, ostensibly unstable and fragmented/collapsed states.

Table 3: Macro-characteristics of inherently weak, ostensibly stable and failed states

	Horizontal	Vertical
Inherently Weak (but Ostensibly Stable) States	Secessionist tendencies suppressed through state repression	Generalised political dissent suppressed through state repression, Corruption
Ostensibly Unstable States (Inherently Weak by default)	Presence of armed/violent secessionist movements	Political instability, extra-constitutional transitions of power
Failed States (Inherently Weak by default)	"Fragmented" state: division of state into territorially distinct and stable secessionist units with <i>empirical</i> statehood	"Collapsed" state: complete absence of empirical statehood

As in the case of amity/enmity, the assessment of a state's strength/stability will have to be approached from both macro- and micro- perspectives. The method employed in this case will oscillate between these two viewpoints: firstly, a number of objective criteria will distinguish between (horizontally/vertically) failed, unstable/stable,

weak/strong states. Secondly, a deep analysis of the discourse will help to discern the underlying patterns in the legitimacy of the state, and thus, provide a clear understanding of the element at the core of state coherence. Only a combination of these two perspectives will present a full picture state coherence, one that can be subsequently linked to amity and enmity at the regional level.

Looking at the issue from a macro-perspective, the differences between the collapse, fragmentation and continued survival of a given state are relatively discernable. A vertically failed, collapsed state is characterised by the absence of an effective government, with authority diluted among numerous political factions battling over control of one state, without, however, themselves laying claim to *separate* statehood. A *horizontally failed fragmented* state has divided into a number of entities that display most, if not all qualities of empirical statehood (Jackson, 1982), recognised or not. Ostensibly unstable states are likewise easily identifiable from a macro-perspective. The presence or absence of armed secessionist movements is the main, and quite obvious criterion pointing to *horizontal* instability. *Vertically*, a society's adherence to the constitutional legal-political framework is empirically assessable over time; whether or not internal political processes remain peaceful, and whether or not transitions of power occur according to the constitutional order provided for by the state is historically more or less evident. In the case of longer-term unstable states, the inherent weakness of a state can moreover be safely assumed.

The distinction between inherent strength and weakness is trickier to discern from the macro-perspective in the case of *ostensibly stable* states, and would necessarily have to be complemented by micro-perspective discursive analysis to be entirely effective. It is nevertheless preliminarily possible by looking at the level of political repression applied by a given state onto its society, and the corruption that indicates a lack of internalisation of a state's institutional norms. Simply put: an ostensibly stable state with a relatively high degree of authoritarianism will likely be inherently weak, and one where minimal repression is required for the effective functioning of state institutions, inherently strong; similarly in the case of relatively elevated levels of corruption (Buzan, 1991, pp. 57-111). The indices of political and press freedom provided by Freedom House (2007) can point to such repression, and, hence, to the inherent weakness of states deemed 'partly free' or 'not free' under its classification system, even in the absence of overt instability. Quantitative measures like Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (Lambsdorff, 2007; Sampford, Shacklock, Connors, & Galtung, 2006) can also give an indication as to the level of corruption in a given society, suggesting the existence of the 'legitimacy gaps' that constitute inherent weakness.

But as mentioned above, accurately assessing and understanding a state's inherent strength or weakness inevitably involves a foray into the micro-perspective. Here, the starting point is Migdal's (1988, pp. 27-29) view of the state as a 'collective strategy of survival', introduced in Chapter 3. Seen this way, a state's legitimacy (the factor underlying inherent weakness or strength) can be assessed from the discursive micro-viewpoint, in both the argumentative and instrumental aspects of a society's security discourse. Argumentatively, state weakness manifests itself through a deficient internalisation of the collective values and identities propagated by the state, in either a generalised manner (in the case of vertical weakness), or in an ethno-territorially distinct way (in the case of horizontal weakness).

In the former, vertical case, ethnically and territorially diffuse alternative values and allegiances – 'primordial sentiments', in Geertz' (1963) words – continue to exist within society to the detriment of the effective functioning of the state. In the latter, horizontal case, these alternative values, identities and allegiances have a distinct, ethnic and territorial focus, leading to the threat of separatism. Within the instrumental portion of the sub-state security discourse (dealing with the identification of threats and choice of means), the failure to internalise the state as a 'collective strategy of survival' is apparent in a tendency to recognise the state as a *threat* to security rather than a *means* towards it (again, maintaining the distinction between horizontal and vertical weakness through the element of ethno-territoriality), as happens so often in cases of societal securitisation, when clearly discernible, territorially distinct out-groups view the state as a societal threat to their identities, while they are viewed, in turn, as political threats to the territorial integrity of the state.

From a practical point of view, assessing a state's vertical strength is indeed more problematic: it is relatively easier to analyse ethno-territorially distinct competing identity discourses rather than the deficient 'internalisation' of one state identity or ideology in society at large. The latter will often be cloaked by the ostentatious state-centred discourse of elites and counter-elites, who will often describe their actions as in defence of the collective values, identities and strategies of survival espoused by the state. This presents considerable difficulties from a purely discursive point of view, as those in control often use the rhetoric of statehood, issue pompous declarations in support of the state while instrumentalising that very state for their narrow interests and carefully covering up the corruption that is inherent to vertical state weakness.

The key to solving this problem lies in the consideration of the *praxis* of securitisation along with the security discourses in wider society. First, the macro-perspective will already have answered the question as to the ostensible instability or failure of a given

state; in the case of unstable states, their political volatility will in itself be a clear indication of inherent weakness, more obviously so in the case of failed states. Second, even if political instability has been averted through repressive or cooptative state force – as in the case of rentier states – that repressive and cooptative force, as observed from the macro-perspective, may in itself be seen as an indication of inherent weakness, as argued above. A vertically ostensibly stable *and inherently strong* state will not have to rely on a large inward-looking security apparatus or widespread patron-client networks to remain stable. Third, discourse remains relevant: even the mendacious rhetoric of elites has its value as an indication of the identities and values that a given society strives for. And, unless a society is totalitarian, the deficient legitimacy of a state and the consequent presence of aberrant strategies of survival will be visible from the micro-perspective in the low level of public trust in state institutions, often described by ordinary citizens as *threats* to the values prevalent within society rather than *means* towards greater security; the continued presence of non-state institutions as providers of security (the family, the clan, the tribe, informal networks) in a society's everyday security discourse will point to aberrant 'strategies of survival'.

The main focus of this thesis will be horizontal weakness, because horizontal legitimacy ties mostly into the divergence and convergence of the security discourses of distinct sub-state groups with those of the state, rather niftily relating to the juxtaposition of divergent/convergent security discourses seen at the regional level in the case of amity/enmity. My micro-analysis of horizontal state weakness will, basically, seek out such ethnically/territorially specific discourses of security within states, assessing the extent to which their inherent collective identities are compatible with the state's (argumentative), as well as the extent to which they designate the state as a *threat* rather than a *provider of security* (instrumental). In fragmented or ostensibly unstable states, the aim will be to evaluate the impact of the alternative discourses of separatist state-like units or secessionist sub-state ethnic groups on regional amity/enmity. And even in ostensibly stable but inherently weak states, suppressed societal securitisations of ethnic minorities could point to the emergence of future conflict, and a possible deterioration in the regional level of amity/enmity. But how exactly are these alternative, ethnically distinct discourses of security linked in with this variable?

At the beginning of this chapter, I hypothesised that state incoherence would have a significant effect on the level of hostility within a region. I shall now refine this statement into two working hypotheses that might explain this outcome. Firstly (and most obviously), the level of enmity within the region might be affected directly, with the central state trying to reassert its authority and effective sovereignty by suppressing or

aiming to suppress the alternative identities of unrecognised statelets (in fragmented states) and secessionist movements (in unstable states). If one takes the de-facto statelets as regional units (as I decided to do in chapter three), the absolutely incompatible nature of their identities with those of the central state's skews amity/enmity in a region towards the revisionist conflict formation part of the spectrum. Secondly, amity/enmity might be impacted upon indirectly, because of the overlap of such secessionist identities with those of or within (recognised) neighbouring units, or the instrumental exploitation of such separatisms by these very neighbours. This could even happen in the face of ostensible stability – that is, in the absence of overt separatist moves by a minority – if that minority's subservience to the central state is based on active and successful repression by the latter.

State incoherence in the Southern Caucasus (Coppieters, 2001; Malek, 2006; Matveeva, 2002) will thus be analysed according to the above framework: first a macro-perspective view of the effective sovereignty, ostensible stability and inherent strength or weakness of the three states, and, subsequently, a micro-analysis of domestic security discourse, with the specific aim of assessing the horizontal fractures within underlying societies and their links to amity/enmity, in particular within the political and societal sectors. The changing narratives and definitions of statehood prevalent within the different states will be considered in detail, as well as the basic discourses within secessionist units, while the security discourses of ethnic minorities that the macro-perspective might have identified as candidates for future unrest (the Armenians, Azeris and Ajars in Georgia, the Lezghin and Talysh in Azerbaijan) will be touched upon. Of crucial interest will be the ways in which these competing alternative identities behind state weakness feed into regional patterns of amity and enmity, as hypothesised above. In fragmented states like Georgia and Azerbaijan, secessionist identities could do so by underpinning unrecognised state-like units that push the RSC towards increased enmity, because of the de-facto revisionism implied by the central government's imperative aim of rolling back the factually existing status quo. Enmity between established states could also increase through the repression (real or perceived) of alternative collective identities associated with identities of neighbouring recognised units, leading them to turn revisionist, as in the case of Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh in 1990-1992.

Great Power Penetration and the Dependence/Independence of Regional Security Discourse

The final element of this thesis is great power penetration; again, the methodology employed here will switch between assessing its macro-elements and performing a deep analysis of security discourses connected to the phenomenon. Based on the

combination of these macro- and micro-perspectives, I will classify patterns of GPP into the different categories laid out theoretically in the previous chapter: hegemony, unipolar penetration, cooperative multipolar penetration, competitive multipolar penetration and disengagement. To recap, hegemony will entail the near complete dominance of the security dynamic by one single great power: regional patterns of securitisation (at the official level at least) will be determined by *its* interests and regional units will be left with little autonomy in setting the security agenda. On the other end of the spectrum (disengagement), the region will be free from great power interventions; security discourse of units will barely mention great powers within a regional context (although systemic references will naturally always be possible). In regions that are subject to cooperative multipolar GPP, the security dynamic will be influenced (but not determined) by *several* great powers acting more or less in unison. Finally, competitive multipolar penetration will, self-evidently, involve a number of great powers pursuing *incompatible* objectives, as apparent in their macro-perspective behaviour and official security discourses. Any approach would thus have to assess GPP along three lines of inquiry. Firstly, it would have to account for the number of great powers penetrating the region. Secondly, if there are several, it would have to assess the nature of the relationship between these great powers (cooperative or competitive), and, thirdly, it would have to weigh up the impact of their involvement on the regional security dynamic. As in the case of the other variables discussed in this chapter, this would have to be done through a macro- and micro-perspective.

From a macro-perspective, I loosely follow Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997, p. 755) by assessing the *presence* of great powers penetrating a region through three types of regional involvement: 1) political/economic (trade and investments, non-military aid), 2) semi-military (military aid, arms supplies, advisors, covert operations), 3) direct military (presence of troops, alliance commitments). Both the magnitude of this material involvement, and its particular nature could give an early, macro-perspective indication of the cooperative or competitive nature of regional great power penetration, or the effects it might have on the security dynamic of regional actors. A micro-viewpoint will then look at two different kinds of *discourse*: firstly, it will gauge the *discursive convergence/divergence* of the penetrating great powers in order to more deeply assess their *competitive* or *cooperative* relationship. Secondly, it will look at the *discursive dependence* or *independence* of the intra-regional official security discourses from external, system level influence: in other words, how the presence of great power affects the regional units' security discourse in both its instrumental and argumentative aspects. It is precisely this link into security discourse that provides the

bridge between patterns of GPP and regional patterns of amity and enmity, one of the objects of my inquiry.

The simplest category of penetration – disengagement – entails the absence of great powers, materially from the region proper, and ideationally from the official security discourse of the units. In other words, the regional presence or activities of great powers are sufficiently small so as not to become an element in the patterns of securitisation of regional units, and the region's security is entirely *discursively independent*. Conversely, hegemony implies an end to anarchy in the RSC: material involvement is so extensive that regional security discourse has become entirely *dependent* on the great power. Regional units in effect lose the autonomous ability to generate policy in a situation of 'overlay' and subordinate their preferences to those of the sole penetrating power. In the case of disengagement, penetration is irrelevant; in case of hegemony the RSC effectively ceases to exist because of the de-facto (though not de-jure) suspension of anarchy. This leaves the more conventional forms of GPP, lying somewhere between complete dependence and independence, as more interesting bases of analysis.

In case the RSC is penetrated (but not *dominated* as in the case of hegemony) by one single great power – in other words, when there is a degree of discursive dependence in light of the presence of this sole power – the pattern of GPP can be deemed to be unipolar without further ado. In the case of *multipolar* penetration, or the material and discursive presence of several great powers, a distinction will have to be made between *cooperative* and *competitive* variants: the notion of discursive convergence – mentioned above in the context of regional amity/enmity – can also be applied to making this distinction. Apart from the appearances gathered from the macro-perspective, such an analysis of 'discourses of regional penetration' of great powers, and their compatibility/incompatibility can reveal the underlying motivations of these powers vis-a-vis the region. In this particular case, the study of the official discourses of great powers will be guided by the different types of interest elaborated in the previous chapter: shared identity, material interest, systemic strategies and universalised values. Each of these motivations will normally be reflected in either the instrumental or argumentative aspects of these powers' official security discourse; taken together, these 'narratives of GPP' explaining and justifying regional involvement can illustrate the superficially co-operative or competitive behaviours observed from the macro-perspective, confirming the characterisation of a regional pattern of GPP as 'cooperative' or 'competitive'.

Subsequently, an assessment must be made of the *impact* of these patterns of GPP on the patterns of amity/enmity within the region. Situated between the extremes of hegemony (complete dependence) and disengagement (complete independence), the security dynamic of most regions is at least partially *dependent* on outside influence. The next stage of the analysis dealing with regional patterns of GPP will thus consist of mapping this influence by looking at the role played by great powers in shaping the security discourses of regional units. Three interrelated factors will be considered: firstly, the prominence of great powers in the discourse, secondly, the alignments of regional units with or against the penetrating powers, and, thirdly, the effects of these penetrations and alignments on the units' intra-regional security calculations, either through their instrumental discourse, by affecting their perceptions of threats and choice of *means*, or through argumentative discourse, by influencing the values and identities of these units.

The goal of this discursive analysis will not only be establishing the role of *individual* great powers in the regional security dynamic; my aim will also be to reveal the intersubjective *impact* of particular patterns of GPP on the discourse of these regional units, taking the argument back to my hypothesis on the links between such patterns and the amity/enmity variable. Consequently, in a final phase of the analysis, I shall have to take a step back and look at GPP and its discursive effects in a holistic, all-encompassing manner, specifically querying the direction into which a particular intersubjective set-up has pushed the region, by either limiting or expanding the options open to its regional units.

I specifically posited that within the Caucasus *competitive* penetration has contributed to maintaining the region as a conflict formation, diminishing the chances for the emergence of a security regime. I shall now further hypothesise that the particular link between great power penetration and this outcome mainly lies in the effect of the former on *instrumental rather than argumentative* aspects of security discourse, especially in the short- and medium-term: while great power penetration affects the instrumental calculations of the regional units and actors, it has relatively little effect on their identities and values. Any effect of any changes in the patterns of GPP on an emergent security regime would thus be limited, with positive changes to these instrumental calculations encumbered by the mainly *regional* dynamics underlying definitions of identities and value-sets. The micro-analysis of discourse will concentrate on identifying these effects of great power penetration on the security discourse of regional units, in both its instrumental and argumentative aspects.

On the face of it, the Southern Caucasus is quite heavily penetrated as an RSC (Baev, 1997; Cornell, 1999; Menon, et al., 1999; Perovic, 2005). It was, of course, part of the Soviet Union, and Russia quickly reasserted its authority over the area in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse, undermining the openly hostile regimes of Gamsakhurdia in Georgia and Elchibey in Azerbaijan, supporting (according to many non-Russian observers) secessionist movements in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Ajaria, and aiding Armenia in its conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. The situation has, however, become more fluid and complex over the past decade-and-a-half; other great and regional powers (the United States, the European Union, Turkey, Iran) have become engaged in the region, mostly through their involvement in the transportation- and energy corridors linking the Caspian basin to the West (Baran, 2002; Karagiannis, 2002). In trying to assess the changing nature of regional GPP, and its effects on patterns of amity/enmity, I shall concentrate mostly on this changing relationship between the 'traditional' hegemon, and these newly engaged powers, and the regional units, which is commonly held to be competitive despite outwards appearances in mediation mechanisms like the OSCE Minsk group, centred on the Karabakh conflict. The presence of these diverse powers does seem to *strongly* affect the official and societal discourse of most of the regional units; interestingly, perhaps not only in terms of strategic calculation (instrumental discourse) but also in terms of norms and values (argumentative discourse), especially in the EU's case.

Change and the Stability of Discourse

This brings me to the question of how to assess *change* within the framework outlined above. As was earlier mentioned, this thesis' central questions concern the security situation in the Southern Caucasus from the period immediately following the fall of the USSR to 2008, and as shall be shown in the empirical chapters, this was a period of (varyingly successful) consolidation for the regional units, and of transition from hegemony to more complex forms of GPP. Whether these two elements feed into the patterns of amity and enmity in the region in the manner previously hypothesised will be one of the main areas of attention in the subsequent empirical chapters. More generally, however, this thesis is about the possible future transition of the Southern Caucasus from conflict formation to security regime in light of existing patterns of penetration and state incoherence. This implies that, apart from being able to identify the connections between the different variables, my methodology should also be able to account for *potential change*. On the theoretical level, this was done through what was termed the *stability* or *instability* of the security discourse in previous chapters. But how does one assess *discursive stability* in practice?

The idea behind *discursive stability/instability* is simple. Security discourses and securitisations are always the result of an intra-societal debate; issues are put forward as existential, in securitising moves, by securitising actors. Whether or not the move succeeds and becomes a securitising act depends on the ability of these actors to convince a relevant audience in the face of veto actors opposing those moves (Buzan, et al., 1998). The discursive micro-perspective elements of this framework are thus the result of a complex give-and-take, constant debate and contestation, and it is precisely through contestations, and the introduction of alternative frameworks of securitisation that change occurs (Wendt, 1999, p. 188). In this particular framework, security discourse does not stand alone; it is loosely 'wrapped' around a material rump that informs it and plays a role in actively shaping and changing it. Neither is it entirely homogenous: security discourse has argumentative and instrumental aspects. The former refers to a society's choice of values and identities as referent objects based on its normative assumptions, the latter to that society's identification of threats and choice of remedial means on its techno-scientific knowledge of the material world. As such, security discourse can become destabilised through a change in either one of three constituents – shifting material conditions, evolving techno-scientific knowledge, and successfully contested normative assumptions – leading to the unravelling of existing securitisations and the emergence of alternative ones.

These three components are influenced by a multiplicity of factors, (not least of which are state incoherence and great power penetration). Assessing the prospects for change would start at the level of official discourse, as expressed by policymakers in statements or official documents. At the very top of such discourse are the securitisations included in the national security strategies of states, blueprints of the most fundamental security concerns of a given polity. Logically enough, these documents include frequent references to surrounding regional units and more or less accurately reflect regional patterns of amity and enmity. They also include argumentative aspects in the form of fundamental referent objects – values, and more implicitly, identities – and instrumental aspects in terms of identified threats and remedial strategies. They are no less determined by the material conditions that inform the unit's security discourse. Official security discourses, and their patterns of securitisation are grounded in the complex interaction of material conditions, techno-scientific knowledge and normative assumptions both shaping and shaped by underlying societies, including, most directly, the state institutions that actively generate policy.

How does one then practically assess the effect of these three building blocks on the stability of such official discourses of securitisation? Let us start with the normative

assumptions that inform them. These elements underlying the argumentative aspect of security discourse are both product and result of societal discussion on values and identities, the most fundamental referent objects. The extent of contestation surrounding these values and identities as included within official security discourse will be the major determinant of the 'discursive stability' of its argumentative aspects, challenged through the presence of alternative values and identities and diverging discourses of securitisation, often carried by opposition groups, generating discussion in the media and potentially 'dethroning' existing official discourse. Returning to the categories of amity and enmity, it becomes clear that the emergence of such alternative argumentative discourses can affect changes in discursive convergence on the regional level.

To illustrate with an example in the South Caucasus: Armenia's current identity is based on an ethnic form of nationalism, based on 'pan-Armenianism', stressing the need for Armenia to secure not just the security of its own population, but also the continued survival, as an independent state, of the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh and world-wide recognition of the 1915 Genocide. As explained in the following chapter, there exists a different narrative of identity (carried mostly by the more liberal followers of the state's first president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan) stressing a *civic* form of nationalism ('Armenians as citizens of the Republic of Armenia') and reducing the prominence of the aforementioned elements of ethnic nationalism in the general hierarchy of referent objects, and thus, the potential 'compatibility' of Armenian security discourse with that of surrounding states.

The instrumental aspects of securitisation refer to the identification of threats and the choice of means based on a society's techno-scientific knowledge of the material world, in the broadest sense of the word: that is, the socially constructed assumptions held by society on the workings of its physical environment. Based on these assumptions, policymakers are able to identify threats and securitise them successfully, as well as choosing the particular means to address these threats. As I argued in chapter 2, the identification of threats in international relations is *not* as materially pre-determined and constant as one would expect from a pure rational-choice perspective; it is in large part a matter of *subjective perception and intersubjectivity*, and this, in turn, is largely a function of the prevailing domestic and regional cultures. The same goes for the choice of means towards greater security: whether one chooses co-operation or military competition both determines and is determined by perceptions of the surrounding security environment. However, *perceptions* within societies can diverge: what some see as a threat may well be seen as harmless by others, what others see as an efficient means towards security, may

come to be seen as counterproductive by some. Again, in the same way, counter-elites, divergent bureaucratic factions, and epistemic communities underlying the top of the decision-making pyramid may come to challenge securitisations in terms of their choices regarding threats and means as expressed in the national security strategies of the polities concerned.

The link to change in the amity/enmity spectrum is clear here as well: the identification of neighbouring units as threats (rather than potential partners for cooperation) underlies many of the more hostile 'cultures of anarchy'. And the choice of war as a realistic option in one's relationship with these neighbours is also tightly linked with the level of distrust and conflict within a given region. The potential for change is precisely predicated on societal challenges to these inimical instrumental discourses carried by policymakers. In the Caucasus, for instance, one could pose the question in how far the Georgian government's stated commitment to a peaceful solution of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the re-integration of these territories through the granting of the 'highest level of autonomy' was rooted in wider Georgian societal discourse during the years preceding the 2008 war: was this strategy, aimed at securing the referent object of Georgian statehood widely accepted, and therefore well-grounded and *stable*? It is, among others, through an analysis of societal discourses and narratives that one can find out.

The contested perceptions and assumptions of instrumental discourse, however, are only part of the picture of its stability; staying true to the Wendtian, rump materialist approach chosen in this theoretical framework, *material conditions* must be seen as having some causal value of their own (Wendt, 1999, pp. 130-138). Physical reality after all feeds into instrumental discourse and shapes it; instrumental discourse can change both because *techno-scientific knowledge* changes, through these processes of contestation, or because existing discourses *are changed by shifting material conditions*. The difference between these two variants is simple. In the first case, dominant, official discourses of threats and means are challenged from below and overthrown, as argued in the previous paragraphs. In the second case, these dominant discourses are affected by changes in their material environment: instead of societal contestation, they are modified by an obligation to acknowledge and react to changing physical realities.

A first, basic example could serve as an illustration. If two states quarrel over an economically essential natural resource, two things can happen in relation to material conditions and techno-scientific knowledge. First, techno-scientific knowledge within these states can change internally: in other words, alternative technologies may

emerge within their societies that make the natural resource useless, changing the perceptions of both states, and their instrumental discourses. Second, material conditions can change: the natural resource may run out completely, making it logically irrelevant in the belligerents' eyes, almost mechanically modifying instrumental discourse. The second variant is not a matter of assumption or contestation, but one of a simple, logical reaction of existing discourse to material reality, giving material conditions an independent explanatory value. My analysis will thus also try to identify such changes in the purely *material* regional context that might affect the stability of existing instrumental discourses in the Southern Caucasus.

Discursive stability can both be enhanced and diminished through changes in the state's material environment, as they strengthen or invalidate assumptions held within these states; identifying such potential transformations would help one assess the stability of discourse to a greater degree. For instance, entirely hypothetically, if Azerbaijan's recent belligerent rhetoric (International Crisis Group, 2007, p. 15) is based on projections of oil-fuelled economic growth, what could happen if the oil runs out, or if the 'resource-curse' invalidates these predictions? How would this feed into the existing discourse? If Armenia's uncompromising security discourse is partly predicated on ten years of uninterrupted economic growth despite economic blockades, what could a sudden economic crisis do to the stability of this discourse? Such a disinterested, critical look at the constancy of the material conditions that inform instrumental security discourse would certainly give valuable additional information as to its potential transformation. This makes an interpretive element directed at extracting the socially constructed views of 'objective reality' within a given intersubjective situation especially important, as argued by Pouliot (2007) in his attempt to marry the material and the ideational into a 'subjectivist' constructivist methodology. Interpretively understanding the place of material factors within these regional security discourses makes it possible to engage in scenario-building exercises aimed at exploring the potential effects of material changes on these discourses, and, hence, on regional cultures of anarchy, especially if these cultures are adequately historicised rather than reified as immutable givens.

Of course, 'discursive stability' cannot be seen separately from its intersubjective context. Inter-state interaction *shapes* intra-societal security discourse as much as it *is shaped* by it: neither techno-scientific knowledge, nor normative assumptions are 'closed boxes', free from external influences. And it is through, for instance, the effects of state incoherence and patterns of GPP on this discursive stability of that one can construct potentialities in the amity/enmity of a region, asking oneself how changes in regional states' social environment would affect the chances of a region 'migrating'

from one category of amity/enmity to another through their effects on units' security discourse. In this way, discursive stability will become a recurring theme throughout the empirical chapters of the thesis. At different stages, questions will be asked as to the stability of the set-ups described, with the aim, at the very end, of assessing the potential for the emergence of a security regime, and constructing plausible scenarios for the Southern Caucasus future development. In so doing, the three central aims of this endeavour, set out in chapter 1, will have been accomplished: (1) an expansion of several concepts RSCT, (2) a critical examination of several hypotheses through the said expanded theoretical framework, and (3) the construction of a comprehensive map of security in the Southern Caucasus, focusing in particular on the potential transformation of the region into a security regime.

Conclusion

In the subsequent, empirical chapters, the above framework will be applied to link the three central concepts of this thesis: amity/enmity, state weakness, and great power penetration. The next chapter will present a comprehensive macro-view of the RSC, tackling, in turn, the four constitutive elements of the region (units, polarity, boundaries and amity/enmity), in addition to the two expanded variables of state incoherence and GPP. The three subsequent chapters will engage with the three expanded concepts by dealing with their informing micro-level discourses, both instrumental and argumentative. In combination with the macro-perspective, these three chapters will also try to place the RSC and its security constellation as accurately as possible within the numerous categories elaborated previously. These 'discursive' sections will have to identify intertextual, official and alternative 'basic discourses' (Hansen, 2006) on both the argumentative and instrumental sides of the equation from the specific point of view of this thesis' theoretical framework. At this point, it would perhaps be useful to prophylactically remark on the *subjective* nature of the discourses that will be laid out imminently: the – at times extreme – opinions and inconsistent historiographies they contain will be entirely those of the regional actors, unless explicitly stated otherwise. And their reproduction will obviously in no way entail the endorsement of one historical view over another.

The assumption is that the societies in the region are indeed sufficiently open to provide the data necessary for such an enterprise; and indeed, while all Southern Caucasian states do have (at times serious) problems in terms of democracy and transparency, suitably vigorous debates take place within the written press on most issues of importance (Freedom House, 2008d). With several months of culturally immersive fieldwork in the region – in 2008 and 2009 – providing an anthropological context, the study of *official* discourse in the chapters that follow will be anchored in the

recently elaborated National Security Strategies of the Southern Caucasian states (Republic of Armenia, 2007b; Republic of Azerbaijan, 2007; Republic of Georgia, 2005), supplemented by official documents, semi-structured interviews with relevant policymakers, and media reports. Alternative societal narratives will be analysed, again, through media discourse, and semi-structured interviews with members of opposition and civil society groups concerning the period in question (1988-2008), with the particular aim of gauging the effects of these alternative societal discourses on 'discursive stability' (alongside material, macro-perspective factors).

Once a clear 'web' of security interaction in the Southern Caucasus is arrived at, discussion will move towards explicitly evaluating the hypotheses on the relationship between these three concepts, in the final, tenth chapter. As outlined above, the first proposition would assert that horizontal state incoherence has driven the Southern Caucasian RSC towards greater enmity since independence. I further hypothesised that this was due, from a micro-perspective, to both direct and indirect discursive mechanisms: *directly*, the region is driven towards the highly inimical 'revisionist conflict formation' category through the existence of de-facto states of dubious legitimacy. *Indirectly*, enmity in the region is increased through the identification of regional units with secessionist minorities in neighbouring states, or through their instrumentalisation of such minorities for higher-level strategic aims.

The second proposition ties amity/enmity to patterns of great power penetration. In this case, the corresponding working hypothesis will be that the competitive nature of GPP has played an essential role in maintaining the region as a revisionist conflict formation through its effects on instrumental security discourses. Changing patterns of penetration would thus have a limited effect on any moves towards the more amicable parts of the amity/enmity spectrum because of their circumscribed influence on the argumentative portions of the security discourse. After offering its conclusions regarding the validity or falsity of these hypotheses, the thesis will close with an evaluation of the possible emergence of a regional security regime and scenarios for the future – based on 'discursive stability' – in this highly problematic region.

CHAPTER 6: A MACRO-VIEW OF THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS

The previous chapter set out the basic methodological approach to be employed in my case study: the Southern Caucasus. As argued in the introductory chapter, the choice of this region is not accidental: despite its relative smallness (both in terms of surface area and population), it is a region of surprising complexity, a complexity that would allow me to test the applicability of this expanded version of RSCT to its limits. In terms of the principal aim of my study – establishing the link between state incoherence, great power penetration and amity/enmity – the area between the Black and Caspian seas is nothing less than a treasure-trove. As the next chapters will show, relations *between* and *within* its recognised states, marked by a complex web of compatible and incompatible interests and identities, are far from straightforward. Since 1991, the region has increasingly been a bone of contention between a number of great powers (Russia, the United States and ‘Europe’), culminating in the Russo-Georgian war of 2008. In terms of state incoherence, the picture is further complicated through the presence of endemic political instability and corruption, as well as the existence of three secessionist entities that are strongly enmeshed in the great power politics of the region.

As stated in the preceding methodology chapter, the approach employed here will encompass two distinct perspectives: one macro, concentrating on the ‘superficial’, readily observable and mostly material characteristics of the region, and one micro, concentrating on ideational patterns of securitisation and counter-securitisation. This chapter deals with the former. In approaching this macro-view, I shall proceed as follows: an introductory section will give a general overview of the region in terms of the four ‘traditional’ constituent variables of RSCT: units, polarity, boundaries and, finally, amity/enmity. While the first three will largely be dealt with in a cursory manner, the macro-aspects of the expanded notion of amity/enmity expounded in chapter 2 will be applied in a longer, separate section. The next two sections will similarly deal with the expanded variables of state incoherence and great power penetration, in preparation for the complex task of establishing networks of securitisation for the three expanded variables in the subsequent chapters.

Units

The Southern Caucasus contains three recognised states: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. All three came into existence in 1991, after the fall of the Soviet Union. Of the three, Georgia has the longest historical track record as an independent state, with the last Georgian kingdom, Imeretia, losing its statehood after having been subjugated

by the Russian empire, in 1804 (Suny, 1994, pp. 63-64). By contrast, the last independent Armenian state on the territory of today's Republic of Armenia disappeared almost one millennium ago; after centuries of subsequent Georgian, Turkish and Persian rule, the area around Yerevan was incorporated into the Russian empire in 1828, through the Russo-Persian treaty of Turkmenchai (Hovannisian, 1997). And while Turkic-Muslim khanates and sultanates had existed on Azerbaijan's territory for centuries, the very concept of a unified Azeri nation-state only came into being at the beginning of the 20th century, when the southern Caucasian 'Tatars' (as its Turkic inhabitants were called at the time) started developing a national identity (Swietochowski, 2004). While all three states did enjoy a brief period of independence after the Russian revolution, by 1923, they had swiftly been incorporated into the Soviet Union. After being forcefully united within the so-called Transcaucasian Soviet Socialist Federative Republic, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan became Union Republics in their own right in 1936, maintaining that status until the end of the Soviet empire turned all constituent republics into independent states under international law.

This historical picture is complicated by the existence of three (overwhelmingly) unrecognised statelets in the region: Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. All three used to be either autonomous republics or autonomous oblasts (regions), subordinated to union republics in Soviet times (Potier, 2001, pp. 1-20). Abkhazia did have an intermittent history of (semi-)independent statehood, often as a vassal or ally of larger neighbouring Georgian kingdoms, before its gradual incorporation into the Russian empire in the 19th century (Zverev, 1996, pp. 37-39). It enjoyed limited autonomy within the Georgian Democratic Republic (1918-1922), and was a full union republic of the USSR (associated with the Georgian SSR) up to 1931, after which it was attached to the Georgia as an autonomous republic. Neither South Ossetia nor Nagorno-Karabakh had had a long-standing history of sovereign statehood, although the latter did enjoy wide-ranging autonomy as a collection of Armenian-ruled fiefdoms within larger Muslim polities before the 19th century (Murinson, 2004, pp. 13-14). Both were largely Soviet creations: Nagorno-Karabakh was assigned to Baku in 1921, and granted the status of an autonomous oblast in 1923 after having been a bone of contention between the independent Azeri and Armenian Democratic Republics in the brief preceding period of independence. The Soviet authorities granted a similar status within the Georgian SSR to South Ossetia, in 1922, after pro-Bolshevik insurrections during the previous years of Georgian independence.

The path taken by these three entities towards de-facto statehood differed considerably. In the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the movements towards independent statehood started around 1990, largely in reaction to Georgian moves

towards independence from the USSR (Nodia, 1996, pp. 81-85; Zverev, 1996, pp. 37-47). There had been tension in the past between the Abkhaz and the Georgians, springing from the fact that the Abkhaz constituted only about 17% of the nominal population of 'their' autonomous republic (Hewitt, 1999, p. 463), where they enjoyed cultural and political predominance as the 'titular nation'. Relations between the Ossetians and the Georgians, however, had been relatively harmonious up to 1990: in fact, intermarriage rates between the two ethnic groups had been quite high in Soviet times, and, according to the 1989 census, more ethnic Ossetians lived in Georgia proper than in the autonomous oblast of South Ossetia (Kolstø & Blakkisrud, 2008, p. 487). Nevertheless, both territories decidedly moved towards secession from Georgia once it became clear the Soviet Union would not survive. By contrast, Nagorno-Karabakh's challenge to the authorities in Baku began in earnest several years before the final collapse of the Soviet Union, with the local Armenian majority demanding the region's transfer from Azerbaijan to Armenia as early as in 1987 (Zverev, 1996, pp. 17-29). By 1991, both union republics were entangled in a civil war over the region, and the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh only came into being when it became clear that outright annexation by Armenia would not be acceptable to the wider international community. Today, while Abkhazia and South Ossetia enjoy official international recognition by Russia and a handful of other states, Nagorno-Karabakh is not even recognised by its 'protector', Armenia.

The question emerges whether to treat these entities as fully-fledged regional units, or analytically subordinate them to either their de-jure metropolitan states, or their protectors, Russia in the cases of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Armenia in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh. This problem is inextricably tied to their ability to develop policies independently from their factual sponsors, Armenia and Russia. In fact, the composition of their leadership and their policies over the past two decades would indicate these entities' near-complete dependence on their respective supporters in Yerevan and Moscow. In the case of South Ossetia, and to a lesser extent in Abkhazia, there are close links between both entities' leaderships and the Russian state bureaucracy (Nichol, 2008, p. 1), amplified by the distribution of Russian citizenship to the majority of their populations during the past decade (Cornell & Starr, 2006, pp. 55-56). Their factual behaviour has been one of near-complete obedience to the aims of the Russian Federation in the Southern Caucasus, with their very survival as de-facto 'states' depending on economic, political and military support from Moscow, especially following their formal recognition by the latter, in September 2008. The same goes for the "Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh)": although the region's leadership does at times verbally assert its independence, in terms of actual policy its

relationship to Yerevan has been one of subordination. It has never been included in peace negotiations as a fully-fledged party, and, ironically, its 'obedience' has been facilitated by the concentration of power in Armenia proper in the hands of the Karabakhi elite, following the 1998 constitutional coup and the 1999 parliament massacre⁴² (Panossian, 2002).

It would, therefore, seem analytically feasible *not* to treat the de-facto statelets of the Southern Caucasus as units in their own right. They appear incapable of formulating policies that diverge, in essence, from those of their political masters, and thus would appear to have much difficulty in independently projecting significant power without prior approval from Moscow or Yerevan. That is, however, tempered by one important consideration: while these entities cannot for the most part develop policies – particularly *security* policies - on their own, they *are* involved in the networks of securitisation that define the Southern Caucasus. As we shall see below and in later chapters, both Georgia and Azerbaijan are *fragmented* states; and it is the mutual securitisations between them and their secessionist entities that throw light on that situation. Therefore, while I shall certainly take full account of the fact that these entities are more accurately described as 'protectorates' than fully-fledged states, I will continue treating them as separate units in terms of the *securitisations* that underlie their status as parts of 'fragmented' states (see chapter 3, and below).

Polarity

Turning to the region's polarity, between the three recognised states, the picture is one of increased imbalance, both in economic and military terms. Economically, in terms of absolute figures, Azerbaijan has undoubtedly become the regional frontrunner, almost entirely due to its enormous oil and gas reserves⁴³. With a GDP of 31.2 Billion USD in 2007 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007, p. 5), it easily overshadows both of its neighbours. Moreover, its oil-fuelled growth rates have been nothing less than spectacular in recent years: 22% on average from 2003 to 2007. That has left its principal political rival, Armenia, far behind: whereas Yerevan could hope for some semblance of parity - at least in terms of GDP per capita – in the late 1990s and early 2000s, today, it has certainly lost considerable relative economic clout. The only consolation for policy-makers in Armenia could be the distorted and oil-dependent

³² Tellingly, both Armenian presidents since 1998 have been natives of Nagorno-Karabakh. Robert Kocharyan, president from 1998 to 2008, was a former president of the de-facto statelet, while the current president, Serj Sargsyan, is a former defence minister.

⁴³ Azerbaijan's oil and gas reserves are estimated by the United States Energy Information Administration (2008) at respectively 7 billion barrels and 30 trillion cubic feet.

nature of Azerbaijan's economy, that is, if Armenia's economy hadn't been as isolated and vulnerable as it is today.




Figure 3: Real GDP (USD Billions), 2000 & 2005-2007 (The World Bank Group, 2008)

In the case of Azerbaijan, the economy is still almost entirely centred on oil, which makes up an extraordinarily high proportion of national income (70% in 2006) and exports (84% in 2006) (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007), consequently exposing Baku to the vagaries of the international oil market, although steps are being taken to reduce this one-sided dependence. The creation of an oil fund looking to manage Azerbaijan's new-found wealth on a long-term basis (SOFAZ) has only partially allayed fears about the emergence of an inefficient 'rentier state', as is so often the case in societies that suffer from the 'resource curse' (O'Lear, 2007). Another issue is the dependence of the oil sector on pipelines through Russia and, more precariously, Georgia, for export. Since the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, the strategic advantage of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline transporting Azeri oil outside of Russian territory has diminished considerably (The Economist, 2008a).

Armenia, on the other hand, is almost entirely devoid of natural resources, save for limited gold, copper and molybdenum deposits in the North and South of the country (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008a; Levine & Wallace, 2007). Worse still, most of its international borders have been closed to trade for the better part of the past two decades: Azerbaijan's since before the fall of the Soviet Union, Turkey's since April 1993. Apart from being circumvented by almost all major regional infrastructure projects, the country is dependent on costly Georgian transportation routes for 70% of its external trade (with Iran and air routes accounting for the remaining 30%), a

situation which hampers the development of export-based industries and artificially inflates import prices (Freinkman, Polyakov, & Revenco, 2004; Polyakov, 2001). In spite of the fact that Armenia generally has scored highly in surveys of economic freedom (Holmes, Feulner, & O'Grady, 2008, pp. 85-86), its economy is dominated by government-connected cartels that further increase the inefficiencies and deformations in the economy. The fact that Yerevan could boast growth rates in the double digits for every year since 2000 was in no small part due to the dramatic growth in remittances sent home by the quite numerous Armenian diaspora, amounting to an estimated 1.3 billion dollars in 2007 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008d, p. 28)⁴⁴.

For many years, Georgia's economy was the regional laggard in terms of GDP per capita. Since the Rose Revolution, it has been able to register a significant rise in economic growth, among others thanks to extensive Western economic assistance (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008c). The country's main strength (or, alternatively, its geo-strategic curse) is its position between Europe and the oil and gas reserves of the Caspian basin: thanks to its friendly relations with both its Southern Caucasian neighbours, it has been able to transform itself into a strategically indispensable transportation hub for both Azerbaijan and Armenia. As was stated above, the latter especially depends on Georgia for access to the outside world. It is, moreover, the chosen route for the already operational Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC), Baku-Supsa and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipelines, in addition to being the corridor of choice for the proposed Nabucco gas pipeline and the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railroad, both linking the Caspian basin directly to Europe (Baran, 2007, pp. 138-139; Ismayilov, 2007). Nevertheless, Tbilisi's conflicts with Moscow have inflicted serious damage on some (largely export-oriented and agricultural) sectors of the economy: trade links with Moscow have been virtually non-existent since 2006, when the Kremlin banned the importation of Georgian produce, expelled Georgian citizens and closed the border with its southern neighbour (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008e, p. 8)⁴⁵. And, of course, the continuing conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia – culminating in the 2008 Russo-Georgian war – have been a constant brake on development and a drain on the state's resources, although a substantial (4.5 Billion USD) aid package promised by Western donors in October 2008 should mitigate the most immediate consequences of the conflict in the years to come (European Commission, 2008).

⁴⁴ The above figure is based on the amount of cash transfers registered by the Central Bank of Armenia; but as pointed out by Banaian and Roberts (2004), according to whom remittances may account for up to 30% of Armenia's GDP, unofficial estimates can exceed official ones considerably. For a statistical survey on the importance of remittances to Armenian society, see Gevorkyan (2007).

⁴⁵ At the time of writing (September 2010) the trade embargo was still in force, while the Upper Lars border crossing between Russia and Georgia had reopened on 1 March 2010. Flights between Moscow and Tbilisi (suspended in 2006) resumed later that year (Patsuria, 2010; RIA Novosti, 2010).




Figure 4: Gross National Income Per Capita (ppp, USD) (The World Bank Group, 2008)

In terms of military capabilities, there has been a noticeable regional power shift, at least in terms of defence expenditure and military hardware, in favour of Azerbaijan. Whereas in the mid-late 1990s, immediately following their victories in the Karabakh conflict, the Armenian armed forces could be acknowledged as the best-equipped and -organised in the Southern Caucasus (thanks largely to Russian assistance), recent years have seen a dramatic increase in the defence expenditures of both Baku and Tbilisi (IISS, 2008, pp. 165-168, 176-177; SIPRI, 2008, pp. 185-190). In Georgia, the budget increased quite dramatically following the Rose Revolution, from 51.7 million USD in 1998 to 592 million USD in 2007, that is, from 1.1% to 5.2% of GDP; the bulk of these increases had gone to preparing the armed forces for entry into NATO through the implementation of a thorough Strategic Defence Review, heavily based on IPAP standards of interoperability. Troop levels stood at 36,000 just before the 2008 conflict erupted, but while the level and quality of armaments had improved, and military ‘software’ had been brought closer to NATO standards through American advice, training and direct aid (Tselyuko, 2008), the conflict revealed serious deficiencies in Georgia’s armed forces (Giragosian, 2008). During the August war, these deficiencies exacerbated the significant losses inflicted on Georgia’s military capability by Russia’s armed forces, which, despite their own technical and operational inefficiencies, succeeded in dismantling the Georgian military-industrial complex through overwhelming force (Barabanov, 2008a; Barabanov, Lavrov, & Tselyuko, 2009; Lavrov, 2009; McDermott, 2009).




Figure 5: Military Expenditure in the Southern Caucasus 1998-2008 (Million USD)
(Source: SIPRI)

Azerbaijan's growth as a regional military power has been very impressive, although, according to a recent International Crisis Group report (2008b), serious problems remain. Azerbaijan's army is a far cry from what existed in June-October 1993, when Armenian forces were able to overrun several Azeri districts without much resistance, Baku called in the aid of Mujahideen mercenaries from Chechnya and Afghanistan, and warlords were instrumental in changing regimes in the capital (De Waal, 2003, pp. 181, 211-216, 236). Baku has implemented NATO norms, participating in a variety of programmes with various acronyms (PfP, IPAP, PAPP, PAP-T) and receiving bilateral assistance from the US, UK and, especially, Turkey, even if it has avoided specifying NATO membership as an explicit policy objective. Moreover, the recent spectacular growth in oil revenues has allowed the Aliyev regime to increase defence expenditures to 2 Billion dollars in 2008 – equal to the *whole* state budget of arch-foe Armenia – allowing Azerbaijan to upgrade its military capabilities both quantitatively and qualitatively in quite dramatic ways. However, as pointed out by the International Crisis Group (2008b, pp. 12-15), the Azeri power ministries' lack of transparency and accountability may seriously hamper any gains through inefficiency and mismanagement, besides the fact that money never equates to combat capability so simply.

Relatively speaking, Armenia had become the regional slacker in military terms by August of 2008, before the destruction of much of Georgia's military capability: its military budget was only a fraction of both its neighbours', both in absolute terms and as a proportion of GDP. Nevertheless, from a regional perspective, its armed forces

retain several advantages, admittedly depending on the continued regional presence and goodwill of the Russian Federation, whose strategic partnership is explicitly stressed in Yerevan's National Security Strategy and Military Doctrine (Republic of Armenia, 2007a, 2007b). Armenia's 'external'⁴⁶ borders are still guarded by Russian troops, and, save for the strategically important radar station at Gabala, Azerbaijan, Armenia is the only (recognised) state in the region hosting Russian military bases, more specifically, the 102nd base at Gyumri. Armenia has an explicit mutual defence agreement with Russia, and continues to receive Russian arms supplies at preferential terms (H. Melkumian & Zakarian, 2003; Tamrazian, 1997). Finally, as a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, Yerevan cooperates with other former Soviet Republics in a number of military issues (Malysheva, 2001), representing the centre of the organisation's so-called Caucasus axis of military operations and the focal point of its regional air defence component. Nevertheless, there is little doubt the country has increasing difficulty in keeping up with its main strategic adversary in terms of raw manpower and level of armaments (Barabanov, 2008b).

Boundaries

Where are the boundaries of the Southern Caucasus RSC? Is it, in fact, an RSC, or, as argued by Buzan and Wæver (2003, p. 419), a sub-complex within the wider FSU RSC? The security linkages between the three Southern Caucasian states are far denser than those with the Central Asian and other surrounding states, partly because of their geographic proximity and the relatively well-delimited nature of the Southern Caucasian land mass, bordered to the West and the East by respectively the Black and Caspian seas, as well as the formidable, relatively impenetrable Caucasus mountains to the north. Although a fully grounded reply to the question of 'boundaries' would require a diversion into a micro-analysis of security discourse, even from the macro-viewpoint of material reality and ostensible state behaviour, there are strong indications that these three units can be analysed meaningfully as a separate whole.

Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia are bound by transportation links that create a significant interdependence between them: Baku's oil industry is largely dependent on technical supplies transported through Georgia for its expansion, while Armenia's economy relies on Georgia as an import/export corridor to the outside world. In themselves, these economic links open up quite a few security concerns in all three capitals of the Southern Caucasus. In terms of macro-perspective military interaction, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been locked in open conflict since independence. There

⁴⁶ I.e. with states outside the FSU – Turkey and Iran.

are significant Armenian and Azeri minorities in Georgia, creating potential problems between all three states. And, most importantly, as will become clear in the following chapters, these states define their security first and foremost in terms of *each other*. Describing the region as a separate RSC or RSSC – as I shall do in this case study – would therefore be far from unjustified.

Nevertheless, seeing the region as a separate entity is not as straightforwardly accepted as one might think. Many – if not most – authors treat the Armenia-Azerbaijan-Georgia triad as part of the wider Former Soviet Union, often linking it closely to Central Asia. A minority see the three countries as part of the ‘Black Sea Region’ (Pavliuk & Klympush-Tsintsadze, 2004; Sezer, 1997, Herd, 2000 #333), or, more questionably, the ‘Caspian Basin’ (Alam, 2002) or ‘West Asia’ (Peimani, 1999). But as Buzan (2003) and Lake and Morgan (1998) point out, expanding the geographic scope of ‘regionness’ often goes at the expense of analytical depth, and, especially in the case of the quite expansive ‘West Asian’ and ‘Black Sea’ cases, apart from a few specific issue areas (terrorism, the environment, trade), it is quite unclear what including the Balkans or countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan would contribute to the analysis that will be carried out in the following chapters.

The security linkages between the Caucasus and the outlying areas of West Asia, the Caspian Basin or the Black Sea simply do not reach the scope and critical mass required to justify their meaningful inclusion in a comprehensive analysis of security in the Southern Caucasus (except perhaps if limited to the narrow but admittedly important issue-area of energy). There is, however, a stronger case for viewing the Southern Caucasus as part of the Former Soviet Union, or linking it to Central Asia. Many of the security dynamics one observes between Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan are tied to wider interactions in these areas. GUAM and the CSTO include members throughout the FSU. The Southern Caucasus is strategically located between the vast Central Asian energy reserves and an energy-hungry Europe increasingly concerned at its dependency on Russia. As former Soviet republics, all three states are faced with similar problems of transition to their counterparts in other parts of the demised superpower. And, crucially, states in both the Caucasus and Central Asia define their security largely in relation to their northern ‘big brother’, the Russian Federation.

In many issue-areas, mostly centred on the workings of the CIS and the CSTO, Russia acts as a crucial pivot point between the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. More importantly, there is considerable overspill on quite fundamental security issues between Russia’s Northern Caucasus region and the three states to the south:

examples include the links between Abkhazia and related Northern Caucasian ethnic groups (Hewitt, 1999), especially apparent during the Abkhaz-Georgian war of 1992-1994, the close relations between South and North Ossetia, the activities of Chechen militias in Georgia's Pankisi gorge in the early 2000s (German, 2004), ties between North Caucasian and Azeri Salafist radicals (Valiyev, 2005), and the occasional restlessness of Azerbaijan's Lezgin, Avar, and Tsakhur minorities, ethnic groups with a presence in Russian Dagestan (Melikishvili, 2008; RFE-RL, 2008).

It is quite clear Russia cannot be treated as an 'ordinary' penetrating great power because of its geographic proximity and its intense, direct involvement in the region, predicated in no small part on the linkages between the north and the south of the great mountain chain. Provided this is always kept in mind, whether to define the Southern Caucasus in one way or the other – as a complex or sub-complex – is a minor question of terminology and analytical choice. In this case, I shall follow Coppieters (1996a), Rondeli (1998) and Derghoukassian (2006) in analysing it as a RSC:. It can indeed easily be deemed to represent a sufficiently self-contained "set of units whose major processes of securitisation, de-securitisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another" as defined by Buzan and Wæver (2003, p. 44). However, rather than seeing the Southern Caucasus RSC as unipolar and centred on Russia, I shall treat it as internally tri-polar and self-contained, while at the same time acknowledging Russia's strong regional presence *as an external actor and great power*, that is as a state whose behaviour is not simply predicated on its interactions with other regional units, but also, or even more so, on its interactions with what it rightly or wrongly sees as its systemic peers.

Amity and Enmity: A Macro-View

Turning to the fourth traditional variable of RSCT, amity/enmity, previous chapters provide a detailed roadmap for its operationalisation. The central question here is where to situate Southern Caucasia within the typologies first suggested in chapter 2 and methodologically elaborated in chapter 5. To recap, these ideal-types were linked to a number of macro- and micro- characteristics, included in table 2 (p. 106). So how can one characterise this region in terms of amity/enmity's macro-perspective aspects, thus defined? As foreshadowed by the gloomy modern historical overview of chapter 1, from a macro-viewpoint at least, it would make sense to classify the Southern Caucasus as a *revisionist conflict formation*. In terms of military competition, there is a raft of unresolved (frozen) armed conflicts throughout the region, all of which erupted in

the immediate aftermath of the dissolution of the USSR⁴⁷. The situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which violently broke away from Georgia in a series of conflagrations between 1991 and 1994, 'thawed' towards open warfare as recently as in August 2008, resulting in their becoming de-facto protectorates of Russia. Armenia and Azerbaijan fought one of the bloodiest conflicts in the Former Soviet Union in 1991-1994, causing over 20,000 deaths on both sides and well over a million refugees and IDPs (De Waal, 2003, p. 285). While peace talks have been ongoing under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group, a final settlement seems particularly elusive, and, as is clear from the preceding discussion on polarity, all sides in the region are apparently locked in a particularly intense and costly arms race.

Crucially, the conflicts in the Southern Caucasus are not ordinary conflicts over competing interests; they are the result of the mutual non-recognition of several regional units – an essential characteristic of a revisionist conflict formation – grounded in fundamentally incompatible interpretations of history. Georgia (along with *almost* all states except Russia) naturally doesn't recognise either Abkhazia or South Ossetia, while these Russian protectorates do not in any way accept the legitimacy of Georgia's claims over their territory. Armenia's government does not recognise the inclusion of Nagorno-Karabakh into Azerbaijan; in fact, since 1991, it has carefully avoided any legal act that could be interpreted as even an implicit recognition of its Eastern neighbour's territorial integrity (Potier, 2001, p. 84). As shall be seen in later, discursive chapters, the mutual non-recognition of units is well-grounded in nationalist ideas that pervade all societies in the region, and that, in different ways, imply the illegitimacy of 'significant others', sometimes in quite extreme ways.

Until the beginning of the 20th century, populations in the Southern Caucasus were quite intermingled; the region can certainly be compared to the Balkans in that respect. Today's borders were demarcated in the 1920s, and solutions were often imposed by the authorities in Moscow, who routinely ignored ethnic composition or demography as a decisive factor in their 'adjudications' in an effort to facilitate control over the region's nationalities (S. T. Hunter, 2006, p. 112). Thus, the disputed territories of Nakhichevan and Nagorno-Karabakh – the latter populated by an Armenian majority of 94.4% according to the 1926 Soviet census (Yamskov, 1991, p. 344) – were awarded to Azerbaijan in 1921, while the area of Zangezur was assigned to Armenia, under circumstances that remain contested by both parties (Potier, 2001, pp. 2-5). All these territories had been the site of fierce fighting, ethnic cleansing and massacres in the short period of independence immediately following WWI, and neither Armenians nor

⁴⁷ See also map in Front Matter.

Azeris were to accept these decisions as final. Similar problems had existed in South Ossetia and Abkhazia during the brief period of Georgian independence; Soviet nationalities' policy served to further construct primordialist and highly territorialised national identities for these 'titular' ethnic groups, laying the groundwork for today's disputes (Cornell, 2002a; Suny, 2001).

On the Armenian side, there was continued bitterness over the inclusion of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, long before the Azeri-Armenian conflict became internationalised in the 1990s. Disputes over Nagorno-Karabakh (and Nakhichevan) emerged within the Soviet Union as early as in the 1960s, when the Karabakh Armenians protested Azeri rule through a petition to Nikita Khrushchev, and the communist leadership of the Armenian S.S.R. was extensively purged for having allowed nationalist demonstrations in the streets of Yerevan (Croissant, 1998, p. 20; Dekmejian, 1968, pp. 512-520; Potier, 2001, pp. 5-6). The conflict finally (re-)erupted in earnest in 1988, when the Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabakh, supported by massive demonstrations of their ethnic kin in Armenia, made use of Gorbachev's policy of Glasnost to demand the attachment of the autonomous oblast to Armenia. After anti-Armenian pogroms in Azerbaijan and the expulsion of the Azeri minority from the Republic of Armenia, the situation soon spun out of Moscow's control, and when 'overlay' was removed and both republics gained independence, in 1991, what had been a low-level internal conflict became an intense and particularly cruel, zero-sum international war between two parties with radically differing interpretations of history (De Waal, 2003; Rieff, 1997).

The situation was somewhat different in Georgia, whose territorial integrity *is* recognised by both its de jure Southern Caucasian neighbours. Although the country has a minor border issue with Azerbaijan, centred on the cave monastery of David Gareji (Abbasov & Akhvlediani, 2007), it does seem to be well on its way towards resolution, and is largely overshadowed by the two countries' broader strategic relationship. Relations with Armenia are less straightforward, but only slightly so. In 1919, independent Georgia had fought a short border war with Armenia over the disputed provinces of Lori and Javakheti (Hovannisian, 2005, pp. 104-105). The Soviets drew the current border between the two republics in 1921, awarding Lori to Armenia and Javakheti (still 90% Armenian-populated) to Georgia, a situation that is accepted by both sides today on an intergovernmental level. Mindful of their dependence on Georgia as a transit route, successive governments in Yerevan have worked to lessen the frequent tensions between Tbilisi and its Armenian minority,

despite irredentist claims by nationalist groups in Armenia (Wheatley, 2004, pp. 30-31). Notwithstanding the region's economic and cultural isolation⁴⁸ within Georgia, demands for autonomy and federalism by some groups within Javakheti do not enjoy official support across the border (Minasian, 2006).

While Georgia has – relatively speaking at least – good relations with both its *recognised* Southern Caucasian neighbours, it is nevertheless entangled in highly conflictual relations with the two breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This ties into Georgia's predicament as a fragmented state, and the close entanglement of Russia in its interactions with these separatist entities and de facto Russian protectorates, which will be discussed in greater detail below, in the sections dealing with state incoherence and GPP. For now, relating to the present subject of amity/enmity, suffice it to say that the fundamental relationship between these entities and their de-jure metropolitan state is one of non-recognition, de-legitimation, and open conflict, complementing the macro-perspective characterisation of the Southern Caucasus as a revisionist conflict formation.

Despite limited and as yet largely unrealised plans for security co-operation between Georgia and Azerbaijan (within the context of GUAM⁴⁹) (Allison, 2004), and various vague and as yet improbable proposals by Western scholars and regional leaders for a Caucasian stability pact (Celac, Emerson, & Tocci, 2000; Emerson & Tocci, 2001; The Economist, 2008b), the dominant relationships within the region remain fundamentally distrustful and lack any formal security regime. Macro-level interactions are characterised by intense military competition – at times culminating in open conflict – and by the lack of mutual recognition between several of its constituent elements. This characterisation of the Southern Caucasus as a revisionist conflict formation will be reinforced at the micro-level through the complex web of mutual securitisations that pervade the Southern Caucasus. Before moving on, however, two more factors would have to be dealt with from a macro-perspective: state incoherence and great power penetration. It is to the former of these two that I now turn.

⁴⁸ Javakheti remains one of Georgia's poorest and most isolated regions (Wheatley, 2004). Until its closure in 2007, a Russian military base was the area's largest employer; locals moreover preferred using the Armenian or Russian currencies over the Georgian Lari. Javakheti's Armenians are also overwhelmingly Russian speakers, adding to suspicions of pro-Russian sympathies, and isolating them further from Georgian mainstream society. Since the 2003 Rose Revolution, there have been attempts to address these issues, with limited success.

⁴⁹ A regional grouping of four former Soviet states (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, set up in 1997 in an as yet unsuccessful attempt to balance the Russian Federation (Allison, 2004, pp. 475-477).

State Incoherence in the Southern Caucasus

Chapter 5 set out a number of macro-perspective characteristics for each of the different types of state incoherence elaborated previously. To recap, the typology elaborated in chapter three included a horizontal and vertical dimension, referring to types of incoherence associated with secessionism and generalised instability, respectively. In addition, distinctions were made between inherent weakness, ostensible instability and failure – collapse and fragmentation – (see table 3, p. 109), each with corresponding macro- and micro-characteristics. From the macro-perspective employed here, all states in the Southern Caucasus do have readily visible, serious internal deficiencies. Obviously, with de-facto states existing on their de-jure territories, Georgia and Azerbaijan are both fragmented, while Armenia, lacking any minorities, is horizontally strong. According to the indicators of vertical weakness and instability suggested in chapter 5, all three regional units are inherently weak and display occasional signs of ostensible instability. All three states are rated either partly free or not free by Freedom House, and score badly on Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (both macro-level indicators of illegitimacy and hence, inherent weakness); and a history of political unrest exposes all regional units' ostensible instability, or their inability to maintain themselves as their societies' preferred 'strategy of survival' among large parts of their populations.

In terms of political freedoms and civil liberties, Freedom House (2008c) awarded Georgia the highest regional score, 4⁵⁰, which was a slight deterioration from previous years, mostly due to the heavy-handed repression of anti-government demonstrations in November 2007 by the Sahakashvili government. While Freedom House does describe Georgia as an 'electoral democracy', that evaluation was only partially confirmed by parliamentary and presidential elections in 2008: serious challenges were identified by the OSCE-CoE observer mission, which simultaneously judged both elections to have in essence conformed to Georgia's international commitments (OSCE/ODIHR, 2008a, 2008b). Other organisations point to continuing limits on the freedom of electronic media, as critical television stations and reporters have been systematically taken over by pro-government interests in recent years (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2007). But while the country's divided opposition – now including important elements of the forces behind the 'Rose Revolution' of 2003 – continues accusing the government of authoritarian tendencies, it is nevertheless safe to say that

⁵⁰ Freedom House grades states' political rights and civil liberties according to an inverted scale from 1 to 7, with 1 denoting perfect freedom/protection of rights, and 7 a complete absence of freedom/protection of rights. For a complete methodology, see Freedom House (2007).

'rump Georgia'⁵¹ remains the *relatively least autocratic* state in the region. At 67th place in Transparency International's 2008 corruption perceptions index (Lambsdorff, 2008), it also remains the Southern Caucasus' least corrupt country, in no small measure thanks to extensive reforms following the 2003 Rose Revolution. Vertically at least, it seems to be the inherently strongest in its region, in contrast to its extreme horizontal fragmentation into de-facto states and its potential problems with other minorities, notably the Armenians of Javakheti, discussed previously in the context of Armenian-Georgian relations.

Armenia, like Georgia, was ranked 'partly free' in the 2008 Freedom House report (2008a); it scored slightly lower than Georgia in terms of both civil liberties (4) and political rights (5); this may, however, present an exceedingly positive picture in light of recent developments. Tellingly, the FH report explicitly states that Armenia is *not* an electoral democracy, every election since independence having been marred by irregularities and fraud. The report furthermore refers to rampant nepotism, restrictions on press freedoms (especially in the case of electronic media), limited academic freedom, arrests and harassment of opposition members. Events surrounding the presidential elections in 2008, when at least 11 citizens were killed during demonstrations against presidential elections judged flawed by international observers (OSCE/ODIHR, 2008c), have further pushed Armenia in an authoritarian direction (International Crisis Group, 2008a). Dozens of opposition supporters remain in jail, and the failure of Armenian authorities to free what are described as 'political prisoners' has opened the possibility of the country losing its voting rights within the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE, 2008). At 109th place in Transparency International's index, Armenia scores considerably lower than its northern neighbour Georgia in terms of corruption. Within the preceding typology, it can be said these macro-perspective criteria suggest an Armenian polity suffering from considerable vertical inherent weaknesses; conversely, in the absence of any sizeable, territorially distinct ethno-religious group, Armenia remains horizontally inherently strong.

Azerbaijan is the only recognised country to have been judged 'not free' in the 2008 Freedom House report, achieving scores of 6 and 5 on, respectively, its respect for political rights and its protection of civil liberties (Freedom House, 2008b). The report states that "elections since the early 1990s have been considered neither free nor fair by international observers." It points to extensive corruption, limits on press freedom (again, particularly in the case of electronic media), the jailing of opposition journalists, and some restrictions on academic freedom as problems weighing on the country's

⁵¹ I.e. Georgia, minus the two secessionist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

claimed liberal-democratic credentials. Despite a boycott by the fragmented opposition and continuing serious deficiencies in the electoral process, international observers did judge the October 2008 elections to be an improvement over previous ones (International Election Observation Mission, 2008). And, for the moment at least, it does seem as if the Aliyev regime has been able to maintain the country's stability through a combination of repression and cooptation, although it remains to be seen whether its oil wealth will be able to maintain the country's stability over the longer term. ICG in particular has pointed to the potentially destabilising effects of an inevitable drop in oil revenues on Azerbaijan and the whole region (International Crisis Group, 2007). Apart from that, the final macro-indicator of inherent weakness, corruption, puts Azerbaijan, at 158th place in Transparency International's 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index table, easily outscoring both Georgia and archrival Armenia in that dubious category.

In terms of ostensible instability, all units in the Southern Caucasus are prone to political unrest; and, apart from the scarcity of free and fair elections, none of the regional units have experienced constitutional transitions of power to successors that were not pre-approved by the incumbent. In Azerbaijan, there were two transitions of power between 1991 and 1993, both of them extra-constitutional government overthrows. In the first, the Azeri popular front removed Azerbaijan's last Soviet-era leader, Ayaz Mutalibov, after the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenian forces in 1992. His fervently anti-Russian successor, Abufaz Elchibey, was ousted in a bizarre coup by an Azeri businessman-turned-warlord following defeats at the front in 1993. Heidar Aliyev, general secretary of the Azeri Communist party from 1969 to 1982, and a former politburo member came to power as a result. Despite another attempted coup in 1995, and some violent opposition demonstrations, the Aliyev dynasty (Heidar was succeeded by his son, Ilham, in 2003) has been able to maintain stability within Azerbaijan ever since, through a combination of co-optation and repression (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008b, pp. 5-6; Nichol).

With a recent history littered with political violence, Armenia remains an ostensibly unstable state. Armenia's first president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, was forced out of office through a bloodless constitutional coup in 1998, after having clung on to power by sending tanks onto the streets of Yerevan following forged elections in 1996 (Astourian, 2000). On 27 October 1999, little more than a year later, gunmen perpetrated a massacre in the Armenian parliament, killing six parliament members along with the speaker, Karen Demirchyan, and the prime minister, Vazgen Sargsyan, leading to a six-month power-struggle between two factions within the group that had come to power in 1998 (Bravo, 2006, pp. 503-506). The current president, Serj Sargsyan, was

the approved successor of his predecessor (and the winner of that power struggle), Robert Kocharyan, who had to proclaim a state of emergency following bloody clashes between demonstrators and security personnel in March 2008 (International Crisis Group, 2008a). While Armenia is horizontally strong and stable – thanks to its ethnic homogeneity – it continues to be vertically weak and unstable, with its authorities regularly losing control over a society suffering from an absence of the rule of law in both the political and economic spheres.

Georgia's recent history similarly doesn't bode well for its continuing stability. Its first president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, was ousted in an armed revolt (Way & Levitsky, 2006, pp. 397-400), and subsequently died in an apparent suicide. His successor, Eduard Shevardnadze, survived several assassination attempts – alleged to have been masterminded by Russia (Geyer, 2000, p. 61) – only to be overthrown in the Rose Revolution of 2003. While Saakashvili did command considerable popularity in subsequent years, his democratic credentials were shaken in November 2007, when opposition demonstrations were violently suppressed by his security forces. To its credit, the Georgian government did regain some legitimacy by organising generally free and fair elections in 2008; but an apparent determination in Moscow to realise regime change in the country continues to put Georgia at risk of destabilisation in the future (International Crisis Group, 2008d). Crucially, the country has not yet had a constitutional transfer of power from incumbent to opposition, the ultimate test of long-term vertical stability; and, in its absence, for all its purported democratic credentials, any stability it may exhibit would have to be taken with a grain of salt. What's more, minorities within rump Georgia (the aforementioned Javakheti Armenians) might present a challenge to its horizontal stability in the future.

The three unrecognised entities in the Southern Caucasus will be dealt with cursorily in this section, partly because of the lack of data, partly because the extensive involvement of external actors (Russia, Armenia) makes it difficult to gauge their self-supporting strength and stability. The main conclusion one could make from political developments in 1993-2008 is on the *relative* vertical strength of both Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, both of whom seem to have more-or-less independently functioning and reasonably (by Caucasian standards) stable political systems, as opposed to the fractious and highly dependent South Ossetia (Kolstø & Blakkisrud, 2008). South Ossetia seems to be the vertically weakest entity in this sense, having suffered from a serious split in its political elite with the defection of Dimitri Sanakoyev to the Georgian side in 2006, detailed in chapter 8: neither Nagorno-Karabakh nor Abkhazia ever saw the emergence of a similar political force seriously advocating reunification with the metropolitan state.

The other two de-facto states display characteristics of state weakness that are not unlike those seen in the region's 'legally established' units, especially during elections (Caspersen, 2008). Abkhazia in particular seems to have a vibrant political culture that does at times display both independence from Russian control, and the periodic instability associated with elections throughout the region, as indicated by the turmoil surrounding the 2004 presidential ballot. The outcome of the October 2004 polls in favour of Sergei Bagapsh, the candidate *not* initially favoured by either Moscow or the incumbent, was overturned and not recognised by either Russia or the pro-government candidate. After forceful Russian 'mediation', Bagapsh was eventually allowed to take power after a re-run – on a joint ticket with his opponent – early the following year (Fuller, 2004; Peuch, 2004b, 2005). Following the 1999 parliamentary murders in Armenia and the subsequent tensions within Armenia's elites, Nagorno-Karabakh's political stability did suffer from infighting that pitted factions led by Robert Kocharyan and Serj Sargsyan against those of one-time local strongman and former defence minister, Samvel Babayan. But the issue was resolved by the comprehensive removal from power and imprisonment of the latter, and the de-facto republic has remained stable ever since, holding relatively peaceful elections that regularly draw the condemnation of both Baku and the outside world (ANN-Groong, 2004).

Great Power Penetration

Georgia's and South Ossetia's predicaments take the discussion to a macro-perspective analysis of the final factor in the Southern Caucasian security puzzle, great power penetration. Chapter 5 set out its macro-characteristics: the presence of great powers penetrating a region can be assessed through three types of regional involvement: 1) political/economic (trade and investments, non-military aid), 2) semi-military (military aid, arms supplies, advisors, covert operations), 3) direct military (presence of troops, alliance commitments). Both the magnitude of this material involvement, and its particular nature give an early, macro-level indication of the cooperative or competitive nature and the polarity of regional great power penetration, or the effects it might have on the security dynamic of regional actors, to be complemented at the micro-level by the discourse of both regional actors and penetrating powers.

Of course, as the region's old imperial master, Russia penetrates the region almost by inertia: it inherited several military bases from Soviet times, in all three former Soviet republics, although its direct military presence had been shrinking before the 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict (Lachowski, 2007, pp. 43-68). In rump Georgia, its last military base, at Akhalkalaki, in the Armenian-populated Javakheti region, was closed in 2007 (Socor, 2007). In Azerbaijan, Russia's 'Military Space Forces' maintain a

strategically important radar station at Gabala (Aliev, 2004; Podvig, 2002), close to Baku, whose lease is due to run out in 2012, and which was the subject of a possible deal regarding strategic missile defence between Washington and Moscow. Russia's military position seems safe and relatively uncontested in Armenia, where its border troops guard the border with Turkey, and ground and air forces maintain bases in Gyumri and at Erebuni, near Yerevan. Moreover, after the withdrawal of Georgia and Azerbaijan in 1999, Armenia remains the only regional member of the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) (A. Weinstein, 2007).

Russia's role in the Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia must also be mentioned here. From 1994 to August 2008, about two thousand Russian servicemen were stationed in Abkhazia, and around one thousand in South Ossetia, their official, *nominally* neutral (MacFarlane, 1997) status as 'peacekeepers' always put into question by subsequent Georgian administrations (Nichol, 2008, pp. 11-14). The 2008 five-day war has considerably increased the level of Russia's military presence in both entities, apart from reinforcing Russia's commitment to the breakaway regions through their official recognition on 26 August 2008, and cooperation and defence agreements signed the following month (Reuters, 2008; RIA Novosti, 2008b). Most non-Russian observers, including the ICG (2008d, p. 2) consider Russia not to have abided by the agreements brokered by the French EU presidency at the end of the conflict. As a result, what was previously a 'peacekeeping' presence seems to have been upgraded by Moscow to a full-fledged military commitment to recognised independent statelets: Russian troop levels have increased to 3,800 in Abkhazia and a similar number in South Ossetia, and Sukhumi has already declared its readiness to host a permanent naval base to the Russia's Black Sea fleet on its territory, at the former Soviet submarine base at Ochamchira (Allison, 2008, p. 1163; UPI, 2008). Even if Russia's position in its traditional naval base at Sevastopol now seems secure, this could at some point offer an – albeit imperfect – alternative or supplement (apart from the purely geopolitical element of adding several hundred kilometres to the Black Sea coastline under de-facto Russian control).

Russia's economic presence in the Southern Caucasus remains considerable as well. It is Armenia's main trading partner and source for foreign direct investment, with Russian companies controlling strategically important sectors of the economy: with the exception of one mobile operator, Russian firms own all of Armenia's telecommunications network, virtually the whole energy sector (including the nuclear power plant at Medzamor), its rail network, and the local remnants of the Soviet-era

defence industries, most of these acquired during the presidency of Robert Kocharyan (1998-2008) in exchange for debt relief or subsidised energy supplies⁵². Armenia's economic dependence on Russia as its main trading partner is amplified by the remittances sent home from an important diaspora spread throughout the territory of its former imperial master, where a large part of the estimated 1.5 million economic migrants fleeing Armenia in the decade immediately following independence ended up.

Tbilisi's economic relations with Russia have been strained since the Rose Revolution, and Georgia has suffered particularly since 2006 from a trade and transportation embargo by what used to be the largest export market for its products. An attempt by Gazprom in 2006 to increase prices for the provision of natural gas accelerated Georgia's decision to purchase supplies from Azerbaijan even before the 2008 war, lessening its energy dependence on its northern neighbour (Nichol, 2007, p. 21). Despite the fraught relationship, Russian-based firms have continued to be active in the country, controlling its electricity network, a major bank, mines, and a mobile telecoms operator (Indans, 2007, pp. 136-137; The Financial, 2008), although this has not translated into any kind of leverage over the current government in bilateral political relations. Simultaneously, despite frequent protestations by Tbilisi, Russian corporations and private individuals have been operating for years in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, especially in the tourism and telecoms sectors (Civil Georgia, 2007).

In that strategic sense, Azerbaijan is perhaps least economically penetrated by Russia of all three Southern Caucasian states. Although Russian companies were involved in the 'contract of the century', regulating the exploitation of Azerbaijan's substantial Caspian oil reserves through AIOC⁵³, they have largely withdrawn their interest, leaving the oil sector – accounting for 90% of the country's FDI – to mostly Western operators (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008b, pp. 38-39; Muradov, 2003). Azerbaijan is largely self-sufficient where energy is concerned, and, in the absence of substantial FDI outside the oil sector, its remaining strategic sectors are either domestically owned, or penetrated by a diffuse mix of foreign companies. However, Russia's influence over the Azeri economy is to some extent maintained by its continuing direct control of important export routes (like the Baku-Novorossiisk oil pipeline) and, much more indirectly, its (now clearly demonstrated) ability and willingness to project power into Georgia, potentially threatening the crucial BTC pipeline, as well as Azerbaijan's main

⁵² Perhaps surprisingly, Armenia has chosen to stay outside of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), and has so far failed to enter a customs union with the Russian Federation, instead preferring integration into the WTO.

⁵³ The 'Azerbaijan International Operating Company'

overland transportation routes to the ports of Poti and Batumi. In recent years, the growing realisation of this fact in Baku may have contributed to a further deepening of the rapprochement between Azerbaijan and Russia, after the signing of a Declaration of Friendship and Strategic Partnership in July 2008 (Khachatrian, 2008b).

Russia's *exclusive* presence in the Southern Caucasus has been declining since the fall of the Soviet Union, at least in Azerbaijan and Georgia. While Armenia adopted a pro-Russian line from the very beginning, in the early days of independence at least, governments in power in both these states had an unmitigated pro-Western slant (Alieva, 2000, pp. 17-26); the nationalist regimes of both Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Abulfaz Elchibey openly challenged Moscow's predominance of the region in 1991-1993. These brash, direct challenges remained short-lived: both Gamsakhurdia and Elchibey had been removed from power by 1993. In both cases, these anti-Soviet political leaders were replaced by high-ranking members of the former Communist bureaucracy, Shevardnadze in Georgia's case, Heidar Aliev in Azerbaijan's. While both states became more cautious in their challenges of their former imperial master, they did more subtly continue a rapprochement with the West, allowing both the United States and the European Union to establish a more or less firm foothold in the region (Alieva, 2000, pp. 17-25). Georgia remained the most pro-Western state in the RSC, and this was dramatically amplified by the coming to power in 2003 of an unabashedly pro-Western administration in Tbilisi, openly advocating NATO and EU membership and challenging Russian regional hegemony.

The first significant Western presence in the Southern Caucasus was economic, however, and centred on Baku. With the signing of the multi-billion 'contract of the century', large oil multinationals, including BP and Exxon-Mobil, reinforced Western interest in Azerbaijan and the Caspian in general as a new, 21st-century source of oil and gas. Azerbaijan also quickly developed close economic ties to NATO member Turkey, with the clear approval of subsequent American administrations (Croissant, 1997, p. 354). The building of the BTC-pipeline and its putting into operation in 2005 reinforced its role as a major alternative source of energy to petro-power Russia and the ever-unstable Middle East, as well as increasing Western involvement in the region. The State Department's part in pushing this intensely political project – funded by the US Exim Bank, along with the EBRD, the IFC and a private consortium led by BP – was notable (EBRD, 2003; Hill, 2004). The pipeline was, for a long time, the largest Western venture in Georgia, which has benefited in recent years from increased attention from international investors outside the oil sector as well. Armenia, blockaded and circumvented by almost all major regional transportation projects, has not been able to benefit to the same extent from Western FDI.

Since independence, Western states – especially the United States – have also been able to penetrate the Southern Caucasus *militarily* (Nichol, 2007). US military aid to Azerbaijan was seriously constrained until 2002 because of legislative limitations, which, as a result of Armenian lobbying in Washington, prohibited any military aid to the country by the US government (Cornell, 2005, pp. 111-115), to the annoyance of subsequent US administrations. After its lifting, such security-related aid rose to a modest 26.71 million in 2007 (Nichol, 2007, p. 33), concentrating mostly on counter-terrorism training and energy security. Meanwhile, Armenia – a firm ally of Russia’s with nevertheless good relations with the West – has also received modest amounts of military aid in the form of training and know-how from the United States government (11.89 Million USD in 2007)⁵⁴. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan participate actively in NATO’s PfP and iPAP programmes, and both countries have, like Georgia, contributed modestly to NATO- or US-led missions abroad, including Iraq (Armenia), Afghanistan (Azerbaijan), and Kosovo (Armenia); but while Armenia has expressly excluded the possibility of it ever joining NATO, Azerbaijan’s attitude towards alliance membership has been only slightly more ambivalent.

U.S. and NATO military involvement in Georgia, however, has been quite open and on a larger scale; a commitment to eventual NATO alliance and E.U. membership is among the central planks of the country’s security and foreign policies, as clearly stated in its National Security Concept (Republic of Georgia, 2005), and Tbilisi is by far the largest recipient of U.S. military aid in the region, a cumulative 379 Million USD between 1992 and 2005. Although Georgia started its move towards the Atlantic alliance in the Shevardnadze era, its pro-Western orientation turned into something more than a ‘tilt’ following the 2003 Rose revolution. American advisors had already arrived in the country in 2002, ostensibly to help Georgian troops clear Chechen fighters from the remote Pankisi gorge, in the Caucasus, following threats of cross-border intervention by the Russians. That same year, the United States initiated GTEP, a ‘train and equip’ programme aimed at improving standards in the Georgian military, while a security treaty was signed between the two countries in 2003, reportedly much to Russia’s ire (Blagov, 2003).

After the coming to power of Mikheil Saakashvili, Tbilisi’s NATO membership became one of the Bush administration’s most important regional priorities. GTEP was followed by a similar American programme (SSOP) in 2004, with the intention of encouraging Georgia to upgrade its armed forces to NATO standards within a minimal amount of

⁵⁴ Between 1992 and 2008, the United States also provided 4.761 Billion USD in (non-military) foreign aid to all three South Caucasus states: 1.821 Billion USD to Armenia, 832 Million USD to Azerbaijan and 2.108 Billion USD to Georgia (Nichol, 2011, p. 46).

time, even though this did not prevent the humiliating defeat at the hands of the overwhelmingly more numerous forces of the Russian 58th army in August 2008 (Barabanov, 2008a). NATO accession had already been delayed by the NATO council's refusal to grant it a Membership Action Plan (MAP) during the Bucharest summit, in April 2008, and the perceived imprudence by Tbilisi's leadership during the Summer war of that year further increased the resistance to near-term membership among some of the states in Donald Rumsfeld's 'Old Europe' (Allison, 2008, p. 1165)⁵⁵. Georgia's commitment to NATO membership nevertheless remained a matter of consensus within society during the period under review, as shall be seen in subsequent chapters.

As is often the case, regional involvement by the European Union⁵⁶ rests mostly on financial assistance and the subtle attraction of 'soft power'. Although actual EU membership is still a very distant prospect, all recognised regional units have on various occasions revealed an interest in joining the European bloc as fully-fledged members. All three de-jure states were recipients of aid in the context of the TACIS, TRACECA, INOGATE and a host of other EU-sponsored programmes during the previous fifteen years, together receiving a more than 1.200 Billion EUR in aid between 1991 and 2006; in 2004, they were included in the EU ENP (European Neighbourhood Policy), an integrated, long-term approach to building security and sustainable development in regions adjoining the organisation (European Commission, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d; Trenin, 2005). The EU was active in the past financing rehabilitation projects in the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflict zones, and European Union observers have also been acting as observers in the aftermath of the 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict (European Union, s.d.). Collectively, the EU is actually the largest trade partner for Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, with turnover in 2007 amounting to 1.575 Billion, 993 million and 8.3 billion EUR respectively (European Union, 2008a). In the absence of 'hard', military power, however, it remains to be seen to what extent this largely civilian involvement has an effect on the security behaviour of the regional actors; precisely because of the ideational nature of 'soft power' and the conditionalities

⁵⁵ Whether or not the recently signed US-Georgian Strategic Charter (United States Department of State, 2009) is anything more than declarative remains to be seen .

⁵⁶ Involvement by individual member states is negligible. In Shevardnadze's time, Germany and Georgia did have a particularly close relationship, with Berlin aiding the former Soviet Republic both through its influence on EU institutions and through direct aid. France and Armenia seem to have a cordial relationship, mostly based on the presence of a sizeable French-Armenian diaspora, although this does *not* translate into tangible French penetration in the region. Britain's presence in Azerbaijan, mostly through BP's investments in the energy sector, is also notable, as is Italy's through ENI. Individually, however, these involvements are not sufficient to substantially and permanently affect the strategic calculations and security behaviours of the three Transcaucasian states (see following sections).

associated with EU aid, the true significance of regional penetration by the EU will be captured through the subsequent micro-, discursive perspective.

Two other external actors are worth mentioning in the Southern Caucasus, although, not being great powers, their interactions occur on an exclusively interregional level rather than having an additional systemic aspect: Turkey, and Iran. During the first years following the fall of the Soviet Union, there were high expectations (and concerns) regarding their roles in the newly independent, mostly Muslim and Turkic-speaking states of Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus, most of which have not been realised. The main Western fear was that these countries would come under the influence of Iranian-style political Islam; this discounted the fact that, except for Shiite Azerbaijan, most of the newly independent states were traditionally Sunni, and that the populations of these states had been thoroughly secularised in Soviet times. In the Southern Caucasus, as in the rest of the FSU, direct Iranian political influence has remained quite muted, and much of Islamist radicalism in the region has a Sunni-Salafist rather than Shiite character. Security interaction between Tehran and the region remains mainly limited to issues concerning the Caspian sea, counter-proliferation, the potentially nefarious influence of Azerbaijan on Iran's Azeri-populated north, and Iran's role as an alternative energy and transportation corridor for Armenia. In general, Tehran takes a pragmatic and low-profile approach in its policies towards the region, one based more on national interest than ideological imperative (S. Hunter, 2003, pp. 142-143; Oliker, 2003, pp. 208-213; Tarock, 1997b; Vartanian, 2004).

Turkey was, for a while, seen as an appropriate model for the former Soviet states, and during the early 1990s, focused much of its attention on the FSU (De Pauw, 1996); it soon became clear the expectations of a Turkish-dominated region stretching from the Mediterranean to the Altai Mountains would not materialise (S. A. Jones, 2000, pp. 63-65). Most of the Central Asian states remained firmly in the grip of their Soviet-era leaders, most of whom ultimately – after some vacillation – have chosen accommodation with Moscow. Ankara's influence in today's Southern Caucasus lies mostly in its position on the current and potential energy and transportation routes out of the region, and its role as a major trade and investment partner for both Georgia and Azerbaijan, with whom relations remain particularly close. Moreover, its historic enmity with Armenia has combined with its ethnic kinship with Azerbaijan to keep Yerevan firmly in Moscow's orbit. The August 2008 events have prompted Turkey to increase its diplomatic activity in the region, redoubling efforts at normalising relations with Armenia, and putting much emphasis on a so far vaguely-defined 'Caucasus Stability and Co-Operation Platform', but overall, its independent influence has so far still been limited compared to the penetrating great powers'.

From a macro-perspective, the Southern Caucasus remains strongly penetrated by Russia, and although its regional hegemony appears to have diminished in recent years, as events in Georgia have shown, it is still very able to decisively influence events in the region. Relations between Russia and the United States are undoubtedly competitive, with – as shall be seen in the relevant discursive chapter – Moscow taking an increasingly hard-line stance on NATO expansion into a region it still sees as part of its Southern ‘soft underbelly’, its rightful sphere of influence. In addition, while EU involvement is largely commercial or ideational in nature and lacks a ‘hard power’ military aspect, Moscow still views Brussels’ activities in the region with a certain degree of suspicion. Russia’s distrust of the West is amplified further by American-led efforts to construct energy routes from the Caspian basin circumventing its territory. The one issue where these great powers do co-operate – Nagorno-Karabakh – remains an exception to the otherwise competitive rule.

Conclusion

According to the macro-perspective provided in this chapter, the Southern Caucasus remains a RSC defined by weak and unstable states, penetrated by competing great powers and plagued by revisionist-conflictual patterns of amity and enmity. In terms of their horizontal coherence, both Georgia and Azerbaijan can be described as ‘fragmented’ in light of the existence of “territorially distinct and stable secessionist units with empirical statehood” within their recognised borders (see table 3, p. 109). Several extra-constitutional transfers of power and recurring political instability also suggest these states are moreover ostensibly unstable from a vertical point of view. Furthermore, Russia, the United States and the European Union all penetrate this RSC, alongside regional players Turkey and Iran, making for a competitive-multipolar pattern of great power penetration (see table 1, p. 96). Finally, the RSC can also be described as a ‘revisionist conflict formation’, in light of intense military competition (including armed conflict), combined with the absence of the mutual recognition of several units and a formal security regime (see table 2, p. 106). While this is already clearly visible from the macro-perspective laid out above, the intricate interactions between these phenomena truly come to the fore from the micro, discursive viewpoint, the main focus of the next three chapters. How do state incoherence, GPP and revisionist-conflictual relations appear in the regional security discourse, the patterns of securitisation that pervade this RSC? It is to these questions that we now turn, before providing an answer to this thesis’ main research questions by focusing our attention on the relationship between these phenomena.

CHAPTER 7: DISCOURSES OF CONFLICT IN THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS

Introduction

In chapter 2, the amity/enmity variable of RSCT was elaborated at a micro, discursive level in terms of regional networks of securitisation, differentiated as to their argumentative (values-centred) and instrumental (means/threats-centred) aspects. The result was a spectrum of amity/enmity, ranging from the revisionist conflict formation at the conflictual extreme, to the tight security regime at the amicable end. Above, I already touched upon the fundamentally inimical, conflictual relations that appear in the Southern Caucasus from a macro-viewpoint; these are also reflected at the deeper, discursive level, where the argumentative and instrumental patterns of securitisation reveal a region that is still very much in the revisionist conflict formation part of the spectrum. This is an RSC where all three recognised units define themselves – their values and identities – in fundamentally conflicting terms, as apparent in their official security discourses. The presence of units that are overwhelmingly unrecognised under international law exacerbates this situation by adding a legal-normative element to the conflictual nature of these identities. This is also a region where all units see the use of force as a legitimate means towards solving their clashing self-views, apparent not only in the frequency of armed conflict and a regional arms-race at the macro level, but within the units' national security strategies – supplemented by official pronouncements of their respective leaderships – from the micro-, discursive perspective. More depressingly perhaps for those of a more peaceful disposition is the relative stability of these conflictual discourses of security: values and identities rooted in aggressive and essentialist nationalism are seen as relatively legitimate, while the military is still seen as the most effective way to maintain security by both governments and oppositions, especially in Azerbaijan and Armenia.

The national security strategies of the three Southern Caucasian states (see appendix) were adopted in 2006-2008, and all deal comprehensively with a wide range of issue-areas, from the military to the environmental. In effect, they can be seen as 'crystallisations' onto the state level of the numerous securitisations and securitising acts that have pervaded their respective state institutions and societies since independence. Throughout, they contain numerous explicit and implicit definitions of identity and values – argumentative aspects of securitisation – that often lie at the core of fundamentally compatible and incompatible regional relationships. These fundamental normative assumptions are generally grounded in a wider discursive context; all three states have formulated their security concepts in a way that is largely

reflective and constitutive of the historically generated and unique fears and concerns that permeate their societies.

Armenia and Azerbaijan's argumentative construction of identity/values clash directly, and quite dramatically, through the uncompromising centrality of Nagorno-Karabakh in their conceptions of national security; the conflict over this territory is but a small part of fundamentally incompatible definitions of statehood, history and territoriality prevalent within both societies. Georgia's National Security Concept, meanwhile, is predicated in no small part on the securitisation of its northern neighbour, the Russian Federation, as a particularly acute existential threat to the central value of unified and independent statehood. While Tbilisi does not *directly* securitise its Southern Caucasian neighbours – indeed, its relations with Azerbaijan are almost unequivocally friendly – the relative fragility of its relationship with Armenia and the existence of unrecognised statelets that constantly and intensely question its territorial identity still warrant describing the region as 'revisionist-conflictual'.

The security concepts also expound the core principles of the security policies that make up the instrumental facet of securitisation, referring to methods for achieving security, for addressing these fears and existential concerns; all of them give considerable importance to the state's military development, which, in conjunction with policy statements and actual implementation, leave open the constant possibility of armed conflict. These discourses also relate to fundamentally different foreign policies and great-power alignments that create additional tensions between the three units, with Georgia and, to a far lesser extent, Azerbaijan tending towards the West, and Armenia firmly remaining within the Russian orbit, earning the latter latent distrust in Tbilisi and open contempt in Baku. In the next few sections, I shall analyse each of these units' security concepts as to their effects on the patterns of amity/enmity within the Southern Caucasus RSC proper, and as to their groundedness in the wider security discourses within their state institutions and societies, in both their argumentative and instrumental aspects, before moving on to their implications for state (in)coherence and regional great power involvement in subsequent chapters.

Armenia's Insecurities: Karabakh and the Ghosts of 1915

Armenia's formulation of its security concept (Republic of Armenia, 2007b) (see also appendix p. 253) starts with a standard enumeration of values: independence, protection of state and population, peace/international cooperation, preservation of national identity and economic prosperity, each further amplified in the document through the specification of a range of fundamental interests. The document is candid in its subsequent characterisation of the Republic's security relations with various

neighbours. Both Azerbaijan and Turkey are included in its subsequent itemisation of direct threats to fundamental values and interests. More specifically, “Azerbaijan’s aggressive policy of military posturing” is seen as “threatening the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Mountainous Karabakh” [emphasis added]. “Turkey, a strategic partner of Azerbaijan, may also pose an additional threat”, the concept continues, adding that the trade and transport blockade imposed by both countries is equivalent to the use of force. Armenia’s isolation from regional projects (pipelines, transportation links) is likewise posed as a threat attributable to Azerbaijan.

In terms of policies, the document is equally unambiguous: under a separate sub-heading, it states that “the just and peaceful resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict is a key issue for the national security strategy of the Republic of Armenia, which is the guarantor of the safety and security of the population of the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh (Artsakh)”. The concept nevertheless advocates a normalisation of relations with both Azerbaijan and Turkey, arguing against Baku’s policy of regional exclusion that “bilateral and regional cooperation could build confidence.” Meanwhile, the establishment of diplomatic relations, the recognition of the 1915 genocide and the lifting of the blockade are identified as key policy goals in bilateral relations with Turkey. Georgia – with whom relations are relatively friendly – is seen mostly in terms of its importance as a stable transportation corridor, although the troubled Armenian-inhabited region of Javakheti is referred to as necessitating co-operation between the two states.

The explicit and largely unqualified identification of Azerbaijan and Turkey as threats, and Nagorno Karabakh’s population as a referent object of security in addition to Armenia’s, are what stand out in this document. Armenia’s concern at the survival of an entity that *de jure* falls outside the bounds of its political responsibility lies at the core of its fundamentally revisionist and dysfunctional relationship with Azerbaijan, and, by extension, Turkey. Since before the inception of independence, the one constant in Armenian security discourse – both official and societal – has been the inclusion of Karabakh’s security into the remit of the Armenian state⁵⁷. And – save for a brief vacillation in the final months of Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s presidency, discussed below – security for Karabakh’s population and its Armenian identity has, in general, meant a

⁵⁷ Armenia’s parliament has never rescinded a law passed by its Soviet-era predecessor, the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR, in effect annexing the territory, in December 1989 (Croissant, 1998, p. 146); in fact, that law is expressly mentioned in the Republic’s 1991 declaration of independence (Republic of Armenia, 1990). Armenia’s independence movement emerged from the so-called ‘Karabakh Committee’, set up in 1988 precisely to achieve the reunification of the then autonomous region to the Armenian SSR. The successor to that committee, the Armenian Pan-National Movement, came to power after parliamentary elections in 1990 on a platform that was centred on the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. The Karabakh issue and Armenia’s independence movement were thus inextricably intertwined.

commitment to the territory's right to self-determination, including independence. This line has been consistently repeated by Armenian officialdom in various fora when addressing the subject, at least since the coming to power of Robert Kocharian in 1998 (see Noyan Tapan, 2001; Oskanian, 1998, 2005; Public Television of Armenia, 2004; Regnum, 2008), and is moreover clearly visible in the foreign ministry's legal arguments regarding Nagorno-Karabakh's status under international law (see ACNIS, 1997; Avakian, 2005).

This adherence to Karabakh's security and independence has to be seen in the wider context of the foundational discourse that still influences many of the pronouncements of high-ranking policymakers and ideologues in the Republic, one that is both reflective and constitutive of a deeply felt sense of deprivation stemming from events in the early 20th Century. In this discourse, Armenian statehood is seen as the realisation of a long-standing aspiration of the Armenian ethnos, one that must prevent a repeat of the 1915 Genocide, and the loss of the "Western Armenian" homelands that ensued, an aspiration included in the Republic's declaration of independence (1990). Tellingly, Armenia's National Security Strategy lists the preservation of (an ethnically defined) Armenian national identity, "within Armenia and throughout its diaspora", as one of the Republic's fundamental values, also warning against the dangers of an "inadequate intellectual and national education", more specifically resulting in a "an insufficient awareness of national ideals, respect towards the state and its institutions, and individual morality, including healthy living, the traditional role of the family, and the misinterpretation of the national identity."⁵⁸ Karabakh, with its Armenian population, is seen as part and parcel of this broader referent object of Armenian identity.

This official view of Karabakh, and 'Armenian identity' in general as fundamental values to be secured by the Armenian state is deeply grounded in broader societal discourse. Armenian historiography unswervingly refers to the disputed territory as a heartland of Armenian culture, often citing its central role in the Christianisation of Armenia and the development of the written Armenian language in the 4th and 5th centuries; the tenuous Armenian identity of this heartland under Azeri domination is then often juxtaposed with the disappearance of Armenians from their historic homelands in Eastern Anatolia at

⁵⁸ Although political parties in the Soviet Union are generally (and rightly) seen as ideologically vacuous, the dominant member of the current coalition, the Republican Party of Armenia, describes its fundamental values as 'Tseghakron' (Lalayan, 2002a, 2002b; Republican Party of Armenia, 2009): literally, 'race-worship', a fundamentally racist ideology developed in the 1930s by Garegin Njdeh, an erstwhile guerrilla commander and Nazi collaborator. The RPA's former junior coalition partner, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation – also known as the Dashnak party – meanwhile still officially includes the realisation of a 'free, united and independent Armenia' – usually interpreted as including territories in Georgia and Turkey, in addition to Nagorno-Karabakh – among its official goals (ARFD, 2009), although this now seems to be more of a declaration of intent rather than a matter of practical policy, in Georgia's case at least (Stepanyan, 2009).

the hands of the Ottoman Turks, and from Nakhichevan and the areas around Nagorno-Karabakh at the hands of the (Turkic) Azeris, in what is seen as the culmination of one millennium of Turkic encroachment (G. A. Galoian & Khudaverdian, 1988; Kotanjian, 1997; Manassian, 1997; S. A. Melkumian, 1990). This narrative of dispossession is present throughout Armenian society, and the grievances stemming from it are usually subsumed under the term “Hay Dat” (the ‘Armenian Cause’), or, alternatively, “azgayin qaghaparakhosutyun” (‘national ideology’). Much of Armenian everyday discourse fails to distinguish between Azeris and Turks (both colloquially referred to as “Turqer” in Armenian), and, as in the Balkans, this ethnonym does carry with it a strong stereotypical connotation of innate barbarism and cruelty⁵⁹, recently amplified by the 1988 Sumgait pogroms and the subsequent ethnic cleansing of Armenians from Azerbaijan, and their attempted removal from Karabakh proper in 1990-1992 (BBC Monitoring, 2005a; Hakopyan, 1997). Added to this is a latent fear that ‘the Turks’ still harbour the goal of eliminating Armenia as an obstacle to pan-Turanist goals as long as it does not acknowledge and atone for the 1915 Genocide, and of Karabakh as a ‘bastion’ against such designs. In such an atmosphere of hypersecuritisation, any suggested concessions, including on the return of territories occupied by Armenia but falling outside of Karabakh proper, are heavily criticised by large sections of the Armenian public and intellectual elite (Ayvazian, 2007; Marina Grigoryan, 2009; Mikaelyan, 2006; Panorama.am, 2008; Sarkisyan, 2009).

This territorial-ethnic view of Armenian identity is, to a more limited extent, replicated in societal attitudes towards Georgia. Within Armenian society at large, feelings towards Georgia are ambiguous, partly because of its recent alignment with Turkey and close cooperation with Azerbaijan, partly because of some relatively limited historical antagonisms between the two sides, based, again, on diverging territorial identities. Many ordinary (and not-so-ordinary) Armenians see Javakhq/Javakheti as a part of historical Armenia; perceived neglect or oppression of the Armenian identity in this Armenian-populated region (see chapter 8), and long-running disputes over Armenian cultural monuments throughout Georgia aggravate the situation by amplifying the existential fears among some regarding Armenian identity in the neighbouring state (Martirosyan, 2008, Stepanyan, 2009 #589; Novosti-Armenia, 2008). Nevertheless, as is clear from the National Security Concept, these existential fears have not found their way into state policy, undoubtedly because of Armenia’s dependence on Georgia as its only viable outlet to the outside world, leading to frequent criticism of Armenian state

⁵⁹ For examples of such discourse, see Ararat Center (2009) and opinion surveys by ACNIS (2006b, pp. 616, 623). For a mainstream Armenian view of the Karabakh issue, see De Facto (2009). For a detailed survey on Armenian public and expert attitudes on the Karabakh issue, see ACNIS (2006d).

policy in the media. Subsequent governments have consistently described Georgia as a friendly country, although this was sorely tested by events in August 2008, when Yerevan had to navigate between its strategic relationship with Russia in the military issue-area and its dependence on Georgia in the economic sphere (see also below).

Against this backdrop, Karabakh's centrality in Armenia's National Security Strategy becomes more understandable, firmly founded, as it is, in broader security discourses pervading society. Much of Armenian state and societal discourse defines the republic in ethnic rather than civic terms: Armenia is the state of the transnational Armenian ethnos, and, the territorial identity of that ethnos clearly supersedes the boundaries of the recognised state. In both official and broader public discourse, the idea that the Republic of Armenia must include Armenians outside its borders as referent objects of security is widespread indeed. This is further complicated by a widely held incongruence between the territories of today's Armenia, and the historical homelands 'lost' in 1915-1923: this narrative of territorial loss increases the perception of threat to the Armenian identity among ordinary Armenians. Independent statehood, whether in Armenia or in Karabakh, is seen as the only proven method for securing Armenian identity and, at the very least, the remnants of this historical homeland in view of the 'ethnic incompatibility' – to paraphrase former president Robert Kocharyan – of Armenians and Azeri Turks (as quoted in Teryan, 2003). As Kocharyan's predecessor, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, found out to the cost of his presidency, it makes it very difficult for anyone to present an alternative view that at least partially de-securitises Azerbaijan and Turkey, limits the republic's referent objects to its territory and population, and weakens its "pan-Armenian" commitment.

There is, indeed, an alternative discourse to the narrative expounded above, one that defines the state's referent object of security rather differently. As was already briefly mentioned above, public state discourse on Karabakh only became ambiguous for a brief period during Levon Ter-Petroyan's ill-fated second term as president. In fact, there had already been a noticeable evolution in the discourse of the ANM and its leader, Ter-Petrosyan, between 1989 and 1997: Armenia's first president gradually became more cautious as internationally sponsored peace negotiations around the enclave progressed after the 1994 cease-fire⁶⁰, increasingly laying bare previously existing fissures within the Armenian government (2003). These tensions finally erupted into the open when in November 1997, he published a crucial article entitled

⁶⁰ In hindsight, Ter-Petrosyan's differing attitudes towards Karabakh can be readily detected when comparing his speeches – especially in the later years – with those of his successors, Kocharyan and Sargsyan (see Armenian Radio, 1994; Armenpress, 1998; Arminfo, 2002; Public Television of Armenia, 2005, 2006, 2008; Ter-Petrosyan, 1994).

“War or Peace? A Time for Seriousness”, followed by a press conference, where he openly questioned the possibility of Armenia ever achieving recognition of Karabakh’s independence without risking renewed war and international isolation (SNARK New Agency, 1997; Ter-Petrosyan, 1997). The result was an outcry in the Armenian press, the mobilisation of the remnants of the country’s intelligentsia, accusations of defeatism (Noyan Tapan, 1998), and, finally, the palace coup of February 1998. Since that date, Armenian official (and mainstream opposition) discourse has *never* deviated from the prime necessity of having Karabakh’s independence recognised; only a number of fringe liberal parties, personalities and media outlets dare advocate any alternatives (for examples see Bleyan, 2006; Ghazinyan, 2007).

Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s conciliatory attitude regarding Nagorno-Karabakh was partly based on instrumental calculations: accommodation was seen as the best way of ensuring Armenia’s survival in the longer term. According to Ter-Petrosyan and his most influential foreign-policy advisor, Jirair Libaridian (1999, 2004), the difficult nature of Armenia’s region necessitated a pragmatic attitude excluding the Armenian Cause – demands for recognition and restitution for the 1915 Genocide – from official state policy. Much of the liberals’ argument for concessions on the Karabakh issue also emanated from an understanding that Armenia, as a small state, would have to make the most of its policy options by adopting a maximally pragmatic attitude. Security for Armenia would have to be achieved through normal relations with its neighbours rather than the realisation of the ‘Armenian Cause’. The republic’s first foreign minister, Raffi Hovanissian, was thus promptly dismissed after raising the genocide issue in Istanbul in 1992; plans were even made in the early years of independence of developing the Turkish port of Trabzon as the main western outlet for Armenian trade, although the escalation of the Karabakh conflict in 92-93 and the ensuing blockade by Turkey put an end to these designs (Libaridian, 2004, p. 277).

But, quite apart from instrumental calculations, these conciliatory discourses towards two Turkic neighbours were also based on a fundamentally different world-view, one that diverged dramatically in terms of its values and identities from the *ethnic* Armenian nationalism that permeates official and societal discourse today, thus defining the security remit of the Republic of Armenia in radically different terms (Libaridian, 1999, pp. 69-96). Along with a small number of politicians at the core of the then-ruling ANM, Ter-Petrosyan saw the project around the Armenian state primarily in *civic* rather than *ethnic* terms; Armenia’s statehood did not stand at the service of a pan-ethnic ideal, but at the service of its – and only its – citizens. The Levon Ter-Petrosyan

administration thus took a cool and ambiguous approach to the Armenian diaspora, even going so far as to securitise it at times⁶¹. Much of the focus during the Ter-Petrosyan presidency, in 1991-97, was on creating a “petakan qaghbarakhosutyun” – *state* ideology – as opposed to the “azgayin qaghbarakhosutyun” (*ethno-national* ideology) that had dominated much of Armenian political thought, discourse and culture till then⁶²: the Republic of Armenia existed, first and foremost, to safeguard *its citizens*. Statehood, not nationhood was the primary ideal to be secured. In combination with the above-mentioned instrumental considerations, this led to fundamentally differing attitudes towards territoriality, Karabakh, and relations with Armenia’s two Turkic neighbours.

On an official level, such discourse has by now been largely overshadowed by an ethnic, pan-Armenian view of the state, and, within the Armenian political landscape, it remains rather marginalised. Although Ter-Petrosyan has recently returned to the political scene as the leader of the country’s main opposition coalition (including ultra-nationalist elements), he is very careful to show himself committed to the recognition of Karabakh’s right to self-determination, and does regularly criticise the government from a nationalist angle, particularly where Turkish-Armenian relations are concerned (Ter-Petrosyan, 2009a, 2009b). There are, however, still clear indications of Ter-Petrosyan fundamentally liberal views on Armenia’s security, and fundamental purpose: frequent admonitions that the current government is moving the country towards war, his suspension of opposition activities during the Turkish president’s visit to Armenia in the summer of 2008, and his continued commitment to normalising relations with all of the country’s neighbours. Most tellingly, Ter-Petrosyan (2007a) has tried to securitise Armenia’s current regime as one of foreign occupation, clearly going against the fundamental tenets of pan-Armenian ‘national ideology’ by, in effect, implying the ‘foreignness’ of Karabakhi Armenians. Any major shift in Armenia’s security perceptions would require a departure from some of its fundamental assumptions, and it is so far unclear to what extent Ter-Petrosyan will be able to ‘destabilise’ this dominant discourse in the future.

⁶¹ Thus, the Armenian government at the time refused to grant diaspora Armenians citizenship, and passed a law prohibiting Armenian citizens from holding dual nationality, arguing that this would pose a security threat that could possibly be manipulated by third powers (A. V. Gevorkyan & AIPRG, 2006). The Dashnaks – mostly funded by the diaspora – were promptly banned and expelled as threats to national security in 1995 (the ban was lifted in 1998) (Ter-Petrosyan, 1995).

⁶² Ter-Petrosyan thus explicitly rejected the very notion of a ‘national ideology’ in one particularly controversial interview (see Astourian, 2000, p. 34).

Azerbaijan's Oil, and the Call of Karabakh

Azerbaijan's National Security Concept (Republic of Azerbaijan, 2007) (see also appendix, p. 271), adopted in 2007, starts with a general outline of a general context marked by both challenges and opportunities. The by far most important challenges, according to the document, are the refugee flows, "crimes against humanity", "genocide", and "illegal activities by criminal groups in the occupied territories, including international terrorist groups", brought about by "Armenian aggression". Among the contextual opportunities enumerated are "transportation corridors for Azerbaijan's natural resources"; Georgia's role as a link between Baku and Turkey is mentioned, and the western neighbour is described as a "strategic partner" with whom cooperation will continue to develop "in the framework of common interests of both countries, implementation of the regional energy and transportation projects and other areas of mutual interest."

While Georgia is mentioned only twice – as a strategically important transportation corridor and a fellow member of GUAM – Yerevan is expressly securitised as a threat throughout the document in a broad range of issue-areas: Azerbaijan's environment (through pollution of the river Arax and the Metsamor nuclear power plant), as a hindrance to Azerbaijan's democratisation, as an impediment to border security and a source of transnational crime (through Nagorno-Karabakh), and an obstacle to regional economic cooperation, which, in the absence of an agreement on the enclave remains "unacceptable" to Baku. Foremost among the state's interests are its independence and territorial integrity, to which Armenia is identified as the principal threat, even beyond an eventual resolution of the Karabakh issue:

"Regardless of the outcome of the conflict resolution process, persistence of the ideology of mono-ethnic statehood, ethnic cleansing practices and territorial expansionism of the Armenian state policy will inevitably continue to affect negative relations between the two states also in the future"

Against this, the concept advocates a foreign policy aimed at restoring the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan using "all means laid down in international law". It declares Azerbaijan "committed to a peaceful settlement" of the Karabakh dispute, on the following basis:

- Withdrawal of Armenian troops
- Restoration of sovereign rights
- Return of forcibly displaced Azeris
- High degree of self-rule for Karabakh
- Restoration of communication

Overall, the impression is that Armenia is hyper-securitised by Azerbaijan in its security concept, in an arguably more explicit and overarching way than Turkey and Azerbaijan are in Armenia's considering its ubiquitous presence within the document as a threat to a wide range of referent objects. In addition to this difference in degree – most probably due to Azerbaijan's position as the defeated party in the current status-quo – Armenia and Azerbaijan's world views seem to clash dramatically, and in terms of both fundamental values and identity on the one hand, and interests and policy on the other. From the point of view of argumentative securitisation, apart from the obvious, historically conditioned divergence in territoriality around Karabakh, Armenia's mono-ethnic nature is contrasted with an idealised view of Azerbaijan as an age-old "example of peaceful coexistence". Added to this incompatibility in identities is a stress on a clash in interests and policies: in all the issue-areas above, Armenia's policies are seen as impeding the development of Azerbaijan's. As shall be seen below, Baku has increasingly come to see military action in Karabakh as a viable and justified option: in the wider official discourse, war is now presented as a legitimate policy tool in the face of Armenian "aggression". Azerbaijan's oil wealth should therefore be put at the service of its military, in order to – one way or the other – turn the country into the Southern Caucasus' dominant power and pressure its enemy into concessions.

Azerbaijan's state discourse on security has been fairly constant since the coming to power of the current president's predecessor – and father – Heidar Aliyev, in 1993. On its argumentative side – defining the state's values – Karabakh, and Azerbaijan's territorial integrity have always been clearly discernable, over-arching referent objects of security, whose perceived violation by Yerevan has now come to dominate almost all issue-areas. Since the 1994 cease-fire, and following successive Azerbaijani defeats on the battlefield, this requirement has received added urgency because of considerable refugee and IDP flows within Azerbaijan, with six districts outside of Nagorno-Karabakh proper under Armenian occupation. The Azeri state has been unvarying in its assurances to these IDPs of their return to these territories; it has, also, been quite consistent in its single-minded insistence on the principle of territorial integrity, and the need for re-integrating Karabakh into Azerbaijan. For successive Azeri governments, the Karabakh issue has, moreover, been seen as mostly territorial: both internationally and domestically, this conflict is usually presented as an old-fashioned land-grab by Armenia rather than as a minority issue. Moreover, post-independence government discourse almost invariably blames the Armenian diaspora and "double-faced" and "traitor" foreign politicians (I. Aliyev, 2006b) for the West's perceived indifference at the plight of the Azeris over the years.

Nevertheless, there has been a distinct evolution in Azeri official discourse over the past decade-and-a-half. While neither Heidar nor Ilham Aliyev ever departed from the stated objective of securing the restoration of Azeri control over its lost territories (including Nagorno-Karabakh), the senior Aliyev put much more emphasis on a peaceful resolution on the conflict than is the case today, perhaps reflecting a greater concern, at that time, for the rebuilding of the basic foundations of the Azeri state – economic, bureaucratic, military – after the turmoil of 1991-1993. While Armenians and Armenia were certainly securitised, the intensity of their securitisation at the very top of the government was, in public at least, far less intense than in recent years. Aliyev, the elder statesman, preferred to couch his arguments on Karabakh in terms of inter-state (rather than inter-ethnic) politics, framing his language in the terminology of *international norms*: Armenia had been condemned by the United Nations Security Council, it had committed aggression and ethnic cleansing, and Azerbaijan was entitled to restore its territorial integrity and the rights of its displaced citizens under international law.

This has somewhat changed since the coming of power of Ilham Aliyev, in 2003. In contrast to his father, the younger Aliyev does not shy away from supplementing the securitisation of the Republic of Armenia as an ‘aggressor state’, with an image of the Armenians as a fundamentally alien and hostile ethnic group by frequent references to orthodox Azeri historiography. His publicly and frequently professed belief that Armenians are new arrivals who mostly appeared in Karabakh following the treaty of Turkmenchai in 1828 is one that is broadly held and propagated in Azerbaijan. Contrary to his more pragmatic-sounding predecessor, the younger Aliyev often refers to the contentious territorial history between Azeris and Republic of Armenia proper, at one time even implying that an indefinite postponing of a solution to the Karabakh problem might entail the resuscitation of Azeri territorial claims on Armenian territory at some time in the future (see I. Aliyev, 2006e) (see also 2006a; I. Aliyev, 2006c, 2006g).

Allusions to a possible military solution had never disappeared entirely from the instrumental portion of official Azeri security discourse after the 1994 cease-fire. But during the latter years of the first Aliyev presidency, and certainly with the coming to power of Azerbaijan’s current president, they have certainly intensified in both frequency and quality. Ilham makes the link between Azerbaijan’s oil wealth, its exponentially increasing military budget and a possible military solution to the conflict much more often than his father⁶³, regularly reminding his interlocutors of the limits of

⁶³ The elder Aliyev’s speeches can readily be compared to his successor’s discourse, indicating gradually more sceptical attitude to the peace process led by the Minsk Group, and a greater readiness to engage in

the Azeri people's patience, or of Azerbaijan's intention to use 'all means' to achieve Karabakh's reintegration. The image of Azerbaijan as a rising regional power with a truly independent foreign policy is then contrasted with the dependence of Armenia on Russia, and its much smaller military expenditure, to support the idea that time is on Azerbaijan's side. This could, of course, be dismissed as simple domestic propaganda, or as bluster designed to maximise positions in the long-running Minsk Group negotiations. Considering the centrality of Karabakh in Azeri official and societal discourse, however, there is a clear, inherent danger in this divergence of perception in both capitals: after having staked so much on the issue, Baku could at some point feel able and willing, perhaps even obliged to make good on its frequent, public, and clear-cut commitment to restore the country's territorial integrity.

The younger Aliyev's discourse is indeed much more grounded in the broader narrative on Nagorno-Karabakh and relations with Armenia. On an immediate, policy level, there seems to be a well-established consolidation within society around the so-called 'Charter of Four', a 2001 document described as "establish[ing] a sort of 'maximum tolerance level' of compromise for Azerbaijan, and [firing] a warning shot across the bows of the ruling elite that passing this level would elicit wide and consolidated social protest" (Musabekov, 2005). The charter, written by four former officials close to the Aliyev regime, described a phased solution to the Karabakh conflict, with the ultimate aim of bringing the territory under renewed Azeri control, either through peaceful means, or, if necessary, through renewed military action (BBC Monitoring, 2001a). It enjoyed the support of a wide range of both pro- and anti-government organisations, and seems to be reflected quite closely in current government discourse and policy, defining Karabakh as a fundamental value, and the use of force as an acceptable means of securing it. The numerous nefarious consequences that could result, in particular international condemnation, the interruption of energy transit routes, and renewed military defeat, are usually omitted from the discourse.

On a more profound level, the observed hyper-securitisation of Armenia is amplified by an official historiography – widely replicated in societal discourse – centring on perceived Armenian encroachment and intrigue on age-old Azeri land from ancient times. This narrative became established in Azerbaijan during the Soviet period, when Azeri historians like Ziya Bunyatov, a former chairman of the Academy of Sciences,

sabre-rattling. The elder Aliyev stressed development, stability and a negotiated solution (H. Aliyev, 1998b, 2000, 2001); gradually, however, his rhetoric on the use of force became more ambiguous, with an AFP report in October 2001 already claiming Aliyev senior had threatened war explicitly thrice during that year (AFP, 2001). Today, under Ilham Aliyev's presidency, the state's military build-up is often directly linked to an armed solution to the conflict (see 2003, 2004b, 2004c; I. Aliyev, 2005c, 2007b, 2009).

engaged in endless polemics with their Armenian counterparts, mostly centred on the role of the Caucasian Albanians in the region. Orthodox Soviet Azeri historiography presents the Azeris as the direct descendants of, among others, this ancient – now almost entirely extinct – Caucasian ethno-linguistic group. One of the most important controversies thus surrounds the identity of the Karabakh Armenians, often presented either as immigrants, or as forcibly Armenianised Albanians, and, therefore, in the essentialised historiography of the Caucasus, Azeris; but the line of argument goes further, presenting today's Republic of Armenia as historically *Albanian* territory, and pointing to its Muslim majority in the early 19th century as evidence in support of rightful Azeri claims to the territory⁶⁴. According to official historiography, that majority was subsequently diluted through large-scale Armenian immigration from the Ottoman and Persian Empires encouraged by the imperial Russian authorities in a deliberate policy of colonisation, leading to an artificial Armenian presence on Azeri soil (Alijarly, 1996; Bunyatov, 1987, 1990; Day.az, 2006; De Waal, 2003; F. Mamedova, s.d.; Tabrizli, 1989).

This narrative of encroachment is complemented by a history of massacre and 'genocide' at various points during the 20th century, and the creation of an illegitimate, artificial Armenian state, with Russian help, on the territory of the former 'Erivan khanate', ceded to Armenia in 1918. Historically, the 1918 Baku Commune and the surrounding ethnic violence during the 'March Days', as well as the Dashnaks' massacre of Armenia's Azeri population in 1918-1920 are perceived as an essential part of this historical Armenian enmity towards Azerbaijan, rather than as a Bolshevik attempt to take power in post-revolutionary Azerbaijan. The expulsion of Azeris from the Armenian SSR in 1946-47 and 1988-89, from Nagorno-Karabakh in 1991-92 and the surrounding regions in 1992-94 is simply seen as the continuation of earlier, centuries-old Armenian encroachment and victimisation aimed at creating a 'Greater Armenia'. The Khojali tragedy in particular – during which hundreds of Azeri civilians were killed during an advance by ethnic Armenian troops – functions as a rallying cry during commemorations of these various events, which take place yearly on the 31st of March, the 'Day of Azerbaijani Genocide', Baku's answer to the 24th of April commemoration of the 1915 Genocide in Armenia⁶⁵ (H. Aliyev, 1998a; I. Aliyev, 2008; Hasanli, 2009; Hasanov, 2008; K. Mamedova, 2004; Suleymanov, 2006).

⁶⁴ For a most comprehensive review of clashing Armenian and Azeri historical narratives, see Shnirelman (2001, pp. 17-197)

⁶⁵ The image of the 'barbarian Turk' evident in Armenia is mirrored in Azerbaijan through innumerable overtly racist statements and publications expounding on the supposedly devious and terroristic character of Armenians. The Ministry of National Security thus lists a number of such publications on its website (Republic of Azerbaijan, 2008b), including a particularly notorious racist diatribe by one V.L. Velichko,

Karabakh is central in this narrative of dispossession, and, more generally, in Azeri historical definitions of territoriality, and, hence, identity: it is described as an age-old cradle of Azeri culture: several important Azeri poets were born in the region's pre-Soviet capital, Shushi/Shusha, and the Karabakh Khanate is seen as one of the most important Muslim predecessor states of modern Azerbaijan. The Karabakh issue is thus presented as but one new episode in a long history of Armenian oppression, intrigue and "terrorism", deftly covered up by what is sometimes referred to in Azeri as "dünya ermənilər" and in Russian as the "mirovoye armenstvo", best translated as 'world Armenianry' (Gasnov, 2007; Kocharli, 2004). The creation of a second Armenian state on Azeri soil by what are seen as recent immigrants is then presented as a step too far. Both the Azeri president and the Azeri media routinely compare the Armenian community in the region to other diasporan Armenian communities in France and Russia: immigrants, new arrivals, and therefore unable to claim legitimate statehood on ancient Azeri land (I. Aliyev, 2004a, 2004c, 2005a).

As argued by the ICG (2007) and others, the threat of war over Nagorno-Karabakh should be taken seriously indeed. Regardless of their conformity with actual historical fact, official and societal Armenian and Azeri narratives on the region mirror each other almost perfectly: both describe the other as 'intrusive', almost eternally encroaching on what are seen as historically Armenian or Azeri lands. Both present the other's identity as a fundamental, existential threat to themselves: in terms of one millennium of Turkic oppression on the Armenian side, and almost two centuries (more if one counts discourse on the perceived plight of the Caucasian Albanians) of Armenian aggression on the Azeri side, resulting in large swathes of actually and potentially disputed territory. Both include narratives of massacres and genocide that block out the others' suffering and necessarily define security in zero-sum terms. And, at an official and societal level, decision-makers on both sides see the use of force – including ethnic cleansing⁶⁶ – as an entirely legitimate means of solving their problems. As I shall argue in a subsequent chapter, it is this full-frontal clash of identities, coupled with a

originally published in 1904 (Velichko, 1990, p. 2). Armenian attempts at gaining recognition for the 1915 Genocide are thus also summarily dismissed as part of intrigues aimed at material and territorial gain (Gasnov, 2007). This discourse of dispossession and perennial enmity is amplified by an identification of Azerbaijan with its larger Turkic neighbour, the Republic of Turkey. The term 'one nation, two states' is used at an official level to describe the relationship between the two states and peoples. Moreover, Azeri politics and society sees common cause with Ankara in its attempts to counter-act efforts by Armenians towards international recognition of the 1915 Genocide. In fact, while, in recent years, some debate has opened up within Turkish society on the 1915 events, the dominant interpretations in Baku are almost uniformly orthodox in their unconditional acceptance of official Turkish nationalist historiography.

⁶⁶ Armenian elites tend to designate the buffer zone around Karabakh as 'liberated' territories, and often link the return of Azeri refugees to Karabakh and these surrounding areas to the unlikely return of Armenian refugees to Azerbaijan, while Azeri nationalists – including former presidential advisor Vafa Quluzade – argue that the Karabakh Armenians should move to Armenia if they want to achieve their self-determination (Day.az, 2009b; Grigoryan, 2008; Movsesyan, 2007)

continued belief in the legitimacy of raw military force, and Russia's view of the Caucasus as an inalienable part of its identity, that lies at the core of the Caucasus' predicament today; in combination with the Russia factor, the Karabakh problem is *the* Gordian knot preventing the transformation of this region from a revisionist conflict formation into at the very least a thin security regime.

Azerbaijan's relations with Georgia, on the other hand, form a stark contrast to the dysfunctional discursive 'shouting match' between Baku and Yerevan. Georgia is unequivocally seen as a 'strategic partner' of Azerbaijan in the official discourse, almost always within the context of transportation corridors and pipelines, of economic cooperation, and a shared interest in territorial integrity⁶⁷, a mutually beneficial partnership sometimes contrasted with Armenia's exclusion and isolation from regional projects (I. Aliyev, 2004c). Again, while there are potential problems emanating from Azeri minorities in Georgia and Georgian-populated regions within Azerbaijan, as in the case of the Armenian-Georgian relationship, these are usually either omitted, or interpreted as an opportunity to deepen cooperation between the two states. Similarly, within broader discourse, the narrative concentrates mainly on the confluence of economic or strategic interests of two sovereign states rather than a common or collective Caucasian identity (Rustamov, 2008); if that is, at all, referred to, it is mostly in the context of common oppression by the Russian and Soviet Empires⁶⁸. As I shall argue in a later chapter, the differing attitude towards Russia displayed in official pronouncements and broader discourse is striking in Azerbaijan, with mainstream media and even former high-ranking officials (like Vafa Guluzade) now taking a much more openly anti-Russian line than the Azeri government, putting the latter in a rather awkward position during the August 2008 events. Then, in contrast to the Armenian public discourse, Azerbaijan's was far more sympathetic to Georgia: similarly to Armenia, the Azeri leadership had to balance a tightrope between two states it described as 'strategic partners', with its society clearly choosing sides.

The absence of alternative discourses of national/state identity are quite noticeable in Azerbaijan: this is, no doubt, due to the long hold on power of the Aliyev clan – since

⁶⁷ As is clearly visible in the discourse of both Ilham and Heidar Aliyev, throughout both their presidencies, and of Azerbaijan's diplomatic service (e.g. H. Aliyev, 1994; I. Aliyev, 2005b, 2006b; Republic of Azerbaijan, 2008a).

⁶⁸ Most of the problems regarding Georgia's Azeri minority centre on their underprivileged status within the Kvemo-Kartli region (the Borchalu region in Azeri) adjoining Tbilisi. In fact, there were disturbances involving its Azeri inhabitants in 1989, and the minority does regularly complain of the region's socio-economic underdevelopment, perceived cultural neglect and under-representation in state structures (Day.az, 2008b, 2009a; Ibragimov, 2009; Valiyev & Valiyev, 2005). Occasionally, sharper criticism of Georgia, including ominous accusations of 'Armenian-style' territorial ambitions (Teymurkhanliy, 2009), can be heard within Azeri society at large, but that kind of discourse remains firmly in the minority. For a fuller assessment of Georgian-Azeri relations, see below.

1993 – and the relatively repressive nature of the Azeri regime. While there was a difference in terms of pragmatism and geopolitical orientation between Elchibey's Popular Front and Aliyev Sr. and Jr. (the former being much more pro-Western, with significant pan-Turkist elements), there has been a general constancy and consensus in the official line propounded regarding Azeri national identity, a peculiar mix of Turkic nationalism, belief in a secular Islam, and Caucasian indigenosity. Crucially, there is little divergence on the place of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh in this identity. The 2001 'Charter of Four' seems to have been widely accepted as a blueprint for a nationally consolidated policy, and not one single mainstream political party or politician in Azerbaijan advocates, or has ever advocated the recognition of Karabakh's independence; even the possibility of a referendum on independence limited to the population of Nagorno-Karabakh proper is overwhelmingly rejected (Eurasianet.org, 2006). A split as observed around 1997 in neighbouring Armenia has never materialised, although according some Aliyev did accept the possibility of Karabakh establishing a non-hierarchical relationship with Azerbaijan during the 2001 Key West negotiations, only to renege on the commitment on his return to Baku⁶⁹.

Most of the alternative discourses concerning Azerbaijan's attitudes towards Armenia are instrumental in nature, questioning the government's policies in attaining the return of Karabakh to Azerbaijan, rather than the goal itself of regaining control of the territory. On the extreme side, there are groups like the Karabakh Liberation Organisation – uniting refugees and IDPs from within and around Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as members of the Azerbaijani 'intelligentsia' – who advocate an immediate suspension of the Minsk Group negotiations and an instant resumption of hostilities with Armenia. More mainstream opposition parties also insist on a restoration of Azeri control over the territory, with all maintaining the possibility of military action, albeit with differing degrees of urgency (Ismailzade, 2008).

For instance, in the run-up to the 2003 presidential elections, some, like Isa Gambar and the Yeni Musavat parliamentary opposition, stressed armed force only as a last resort, while Ali Kerimli of Elchibey's Popular Front party emphasised United Nations resolutions and the efforts of the Azeri diaspora. Others – like the National Independence Party of Etibar Mammadov – took views more reminiscent of the KLO's rash stance (BBC Monitoring, 2003c). On the other, liberal extreme, most of the

⁶⁹ While such claims should be approached with considerable scepticism, Aliyev's pragmatic background, and his general public discourse, suggest such a scenario would at least have been possible. Aliyev's longtime advisor appears to have admitted as much in an interview published by the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, by suggesting the elder statesman was prepared to exchange territory with Armenia and agree to the Minsk Group proposals on such a 'common state' before finally backing off (Azerbaijan in the World, 2008, p. 2). See also De Waal (2003) and BBC Monitoring (2002).

discourse emanates either from smaller NGOs, or from the active Azeri 'blogosphere', where more liberal elements concentrate more on the democratic failings of the Aliyev regime, and maintain a discourse that, rather than emphasising the ethnic narratives of massacre and dispossession, concentrates on the democratic credentials of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic (1918-1920) as a pioneering model for the Muslim world, a kind of discourse that can also be found within the most moderate arm of the Azeri executive, the foreign ministry and its Diplomatic Academy⁷⁰.

Georgia: An Uneasy Partner to Two Enemies

Georgia's National Security Concept (Republic of Georgia, 2005) (see also appendix, p. 292) does not pull any punches: from the very beginning, it makes clear the country's wish to achieve full membership of both NATO and the European Union, defining Georgia as "an integral part of the European political, cultural and political area". It continues with an enumeration of the country's national values: independence, freedom, democracy and the rule of law, prosperity and security. These values are then operationalised in terms of national interests, including:

1. Ensuring territorial integrity
2. Ensuring national unity and civil accord
3. Regional stability
4. Strengthening Freedom and Democracy in Neighbouring States
5. Strengthening the State's Transit Function and Energy Security
6. Environmental Security of the Country and the Region
7. Preserving National and Cultural Uniqueness

Two things stand out in the remainder of the document, when concentrating on threats and policies: first, Georgia's fear of disintegration and internal unrest, and, second, its interrelated, intense and absolutely explicit securitisation of its northern neighbour, Russia. Both of these issues will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters dealing with state cohesion and regional great power penetration: with Georgia looking primarily northwards (at threats) and westwards (at solutions to these threats), it does seem its immediate neighbours – Armenia and, to a far lesser extent, Azerbaijan – play only a subordinate, instrumental role in its security policies. Georgia's main

⁷⁰ One alternative youth group in particular, "OI!" ("Be!") seems to be popular among the well-educated, pro-Western elite in Azerbaijan. Although tiny and politically marginal, it is very well-organised and technically literate, aiming to instil a spirit of "non-violence, tolerance and modernity" in its adherents, explicitly using the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic as a role model (see www.ol-az.org). It, and similar groups, very much remain the exception in a country where 'civil society' as such remains underdeveloped.

securitisations are directed elsewhere, and relations with its Southern Caucasian partners seem to be mostly subsidiary to these principal security perceptions⁷¹.

The concept does make a distinction between the two neighbours, in spite of trying to maintain a balance by including both under the common sub-heading “Partnership with Armenia and Azerbaijan”: in the body of the text Baku is designated a “strategic partner”, while relations with Yerevan are described merely as a “close partnership”. In the case of Azerbaijan, collaboration in the fields of transportation and energy naturally features prominently, as does cooperation “in the political and security spheres, as well as in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration.” The document continues: “Partnership of Georgia and Azerbaijan in GUAM and participation in the EU's ENP and NATO's PfP program contribute to harmonization of security interests and elaboration of common positions on various strategic issues.” The section on Armenia is more reserved, concentrating on Georgia's role as a transit country for Armenian trade and stating Tbilisi's support for Armenia's involvement in the EU's ENP and NATO, more distant than the common path towards Euro-Atlantic integration described in the paragraph on Azerbaijan. The section also identifies the Karabakh conflict as a major threat to the stability of all states in the region, and calls for the emergence of a common economic space and a single market.

This pattern – whereby good relations with both Azerbaijan and Armenia are valued, with a thinly disguised preference for Azerbaijan – is well-grounded in the broader official security discourses that have emanated from the Georgian state since independence. Tbilisi's development of its ‘strategic partnership’ with Azerbaijan started under Gamsakhurdia, and came to full fruition with the building of the BTC pipeline in 2001-2003. Naturally, and as can be inferred from the NSC, one obvious instrumental reason is the immense opportunity Georgia's geographic position offers as an alternative transit route for Caspian hydrocarbon reserves, and much of the cooperation occurs within the issue-areas of energy and transportation⁷². Collaboration

⁷¹ This does not invalidate my characterisation of the South Caucasus as a separate RSC, provided these securitisations of Russia are seen as interactions between the regional and systemic levels of analysis. As I already mentioned in chapter 6, this characterisation is to some extent an analytical choice, dependent upon the view of Russia as a great power penetrating the RSC rather than an inseparable part of the RSC. Moreover, considering the history of the region since the fall of the Soviet Union, it would be counter-productive to reify the Russian presence in this RSC by including it in the regional level; its withdrawal from the region would at least have to be seen as a possibility, a point somewhat reinforced by the Georgian NSC, many of whose policies and assumptions are precisely predicated on a diminished Russian role in the South Caucasus.

⁷² A short overview of the bilateral agreements between Georgia and Azerbaijan would confirm this impression. There are, of course, the major agreements on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railroad, but these are supplemented by a whole slew of other treaties dealing with transportation, trade and communications. There is some co-operation in security matters (mostly dealing with pipeline security), and cultural issues (concerning ethnic minorities on each others' territory), but compared to the ‘Great Silk Road’ project, these remain quite limited in nature (MFA Georgia, 2009).

with Azerbaijan is often defined as part of a common move towards the Euro-Atlantic area, a way of addressing the one securitisation that disproportionately drives much of Georgian foreign and security policy: of the Russian Federation as a threat to Georgian statehood and identity⁷³. The relationship between Georgia and Azerbaijan is further reinforced by a common interest (together with Moldova) in restoring their territorial integrity: obviously, an important referent object in the official security discourse of successive Georgian governments. Within the post-Soviet sphere, both countries are on the same side of that issue, in principle at least. While Tbilisi remains prudent in not linking its particular problems to the Karabakh issue too directly (see below), it does support Azerbaijan's territorial integrity in international fora (for instance, voting for a 2008 UNGA resolution reaffirming the same) (UNGA, 2008), all the while avoiding any explicit, direct statements prejudicing the negotiations process between its two neighbours one way or the other.

The Georgian press, electronic media, and political pundits, similarly tend to emphasise their country's role as an important transit hub for both neighbours, while also displaying a perhaps more visibly pro-Azerbaijani tilt in their discourse: the 'strategic partnership' with Baku thus seems to be well-grounded within more widely held societal attitudes⁷⁴. These discourses remain mostly at an instrumental level, however: cooperation is justified mostly in terms of confluences of interests and policies rather than common identities or values. While there are formalistic references to a common Caucasian home and Georgian-Azerbaijani brotherhood (BBC Monitoring, 2004b), these remain on the margins (or are, at best, event-driven); the nationalist exclusivism that seems to be typical of the Caucasus does rear its head on occasion, even in Georgian-Azeri relations, but seldom manages to creep up the list of priorities. Tensions regarding alleged discrimination of the ethnic Georgian minority in Azerbaijan's Kakhi, Belakani and Zakatala regions (Kikacheishvili, 2008; RFE-RL, 2003) and the territorial dispute surrounding the David Gareji monastic complex, while

⁷³ Gamsakhurdia signed a partnership agreement with Azerbaijan in December 1990, one full year before the formal dissolution of the USSR. Shevardnadze, meanwhile, saw the construction of pipelines from Azerbaijan over Georgian territory as crucial to the country's development (BBC Monitoring, 2003a), while Saakashvili clearly accorded the project a political, emancipatory role vis-à-vis Russia, as a means towards both political and economic security (Imedi TV, 2005; Saakashvili, 2005b, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d).

⁷⁴ Thus, several of the interviewees questioned by the author expressed a commonly held view in Azerbaijan of the Karabakh conflict as an unnecessary complication thwarting co-operation (and the expulsion of Russia) within the Southern Caucasus, also revealing an irritation at Armenia's strong pro-Russian/anti-Turkish stance.

as a rule not affecting core official discourse, do at times surface in both state's presses and media⁷⁵.

Georgia's relationship with Armenia, by contrast, seems to be more problematic (Shirinyan, 2008), not so much on an inter-state, as at an inter-societal level. Armenians played a major role as a significant other in the formation of Georgian national consciousness in the 19th century (Suny, 1994); their compact presence in the Georgian region of Javakheti has moreover been viewed with distrust by Georgian nationalists because of Armenians' perceived pro-Russian stance, and Armenian nationalists' territorial claims (see also following chapter). There is a significant amount of suspicion in the societies of both sides of the border: accusations of cultural misappropriation, forced assimilation and forcible demographic change in Armenia and Javakheti are echoed by talk of Russian-inspired unrest and separatism in Georgia (BBC Monitoring, 2007c, 2008c). On an inter-state level, both governments take great care to control the situation, defining it largely as a socio-economic issue, and as Georgia's internal affair (MFA Georgia, 2006); at least in public, their discourses largely coincide, with the Georgian and Armenian governments pushing for the greater integration of the Armenian minority into wider Georgian society and, as mentioned above, even the Armenian president calling on the local Armenians to work for integration by learning the Georgian language (Armenpress, 2007; BBC Monitoring, 2004c, 2007a). That having been said, there is a significant amount of distrust in the societies of both sides of the border: talk of Russian-inspired unrest in Georgia (BBC Monitoring, 2007c, 2008c) and – in an alarming echo of the earlier stages of the Karabakh conflict – of cultural misappropriation, forced assimilation and forcible demographic change in both Javakheti and Armenia (See also following chapter).

Fundamentally differing views on the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination are a second element of potential friction between these two neighbours. Although both states try to stress the 'uniqueness' and specificity of their respective situations (BBC Monitoring, 2004a), as a rule avoiding any statements or acts which could be interpreted as manifestly going against their neighbour's interests, it is nevertheless clear that in places such as Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and

⁷⁵ The dispute over the David Gareji monastic complex was a particularly sensitive moment in Georgian-Azeri relations. Of considerable historical-cultural value to Georgia and situated in Azerbaijan according to borders drawn in Soviet times, its transfer to Tbilisi's control was demanded by the leadership of Georgia's orthodox church; the Georgian government, for its part, proposed territorial swap, which was firmly refused by the Azeri side. Soviet-era historiography also came into play when Azeri historians insisted – to the Georgians' dismay – that the monuments on their side of the border were, in fact, Albanian (Edilashvili, 2007; Roks, 2007; Rustavi-2, 2007). Not to be outdone, one newspaper in Yerevan has implied that inscriptions in the monastery are, in fact, Armenian (Golos Armenii, 2009). Saakashvili and Aliyev finally decided to resolve the issue discreetly, through an intergovernmental commission (Saakashvili, 2007b).

Abkhazia, these interests conflict directly: Armenia and Georgia have fundamentally differing views on the balance between these fundamental principles of international law. The Georgian government actively condemned the recognition of Kosovo's independence by Western states as an assault on the principle of territorial integrity, and was followed in its condemnation by the overwhelming majority of political groups (Civil Georgia, 2008; Mze TV, 2008; The Messenger, 2008a, 2008b). On the Armenian side, meanwhile, views on the recognition were almost uniformly positive. The government performed a cautious balancing act, on the one hand welcoming the application of the principle of self-determination in the Kosovar case, while, on the other hand, maintaining the rhetoric of 'uniqueness' (Oskanian, 1999, 2007). The press, meanwhile, was more unequivocally enthusiastic, along with the self-styled government of Nagorno-Karabakh proper (MFA Mountainous Karabakh, 2008b). On this societal level, the principle of territorial integrity has been noticeably paramount in Georgian (and Azeri) public thought, with self-determination dominating Armenian international political discourse.

Third, the fundamental 'vectors' of Armenian and Georgian foreign and security policy clash quite radically, with Armenia following an explicitly pro-Russian course, while Georgia gravitates strongly towards NATO, and, by implication, Turkey. These divergent grand strategies are usually tolerated in official circles and much of the media: the line adopted by both governments is that third parties should not influence their mutual relationship. There is a strong realisation on both sides of an interdependence between the two states: Armenia needs Georgia for transportation links to the outside world, Georgia needs Armenia in order to counteract separatist tendencies in Javakheti, and both sides have so far been able and willing to largely resist pressure from allies to go directly against each other's interests. Azerbaijan has not been able to coax Georgia into joining its blockade of Armenia, although it did obtain Georgia's assurance that Azeri cargo would not be transported to Armenia; and Armenia has so far tried to maintain a cautious, but potentially costly neutrality in Georgia's troubled relationship with Russia. The question is, of course, whether both sides can maintain this position in light of potential demands from their strategic partners, and more strongly diverging discourses in both their societies, with distinctly 'unfriendly' articles regularly appearing in both countries' media.

Tellingly, both the Georgian and Armenian governments refrained from taking actions or making statements that might be construed as being aimed against the other during the August 2008 war: the Armenian president maintained an almost-eerie silence throughout most of the conflict, probably for fear of offending either his state's main conduit to the outside world (Georgia), or his strategic partner, Russia, and eventually

expressed condolences and offers of humanitarian help for both sides (Abrahamyan, 2008; E. Danielyan, 2008b), while still participating in the collective condemnation of Georgia during the CSTO summit later that year (Russia & CIS General Newswire, 2008a, 2008b). Armenia also refrained from recognising Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence, despite the obvious implications for Mountainous Karabakh, and only criticised Georgia mutedly or indirectly in the following weeks (Black Sea Press, 2008; E. Danielyan, 2008a). The contrast between the two country's media, however, was dramatic. Armenian pro-government publications and broadcasters took a very explicit pro-Russian stance (taking over the rhetoric on 'genocide' being committed in Ossetia), and the leader of the main opposition group, Ter-Petrosyan, harshly criticised Tbilisi's actions in an interview (A1Plus, 2008a, 2008b; Khachatryan, 2008a). Meanwhile, there were media reports in Tbilisi – originating from Azeri sources, according to one interviewee – of Russian planes using Armenian bases to bomb targets within Georgia (Gruziya Online, 2008); many ordinary Georgians also saw the Armenian efforts at repairing the Poti-Tbilisi railroad during the conflict as entirely self-interested, rather than a show of solidarity (personal observations).

Overall, the impression one gets from an analysis of Georgian security discourse on Armenia confirms what is already indicated within Tbilisi's National Security Concept: that relations with Yerevan, while friendly, are less close than those with Baku. Again, these friendly relations are largely based on instrumental considerations: there is very little, if any talk of shared values or a shared identity in the Georgian-Armenian case. Both in terms of values and policies there are a few potential "stress-points" (Javakheti, strategic FP vectors, views on international norms) that could misalign interests in the future, although the realisation that both nations are 'doomed' to enjoy good-neighbourly relations tempers this risk to some extent⁷⁶. The relative precariousness of Georgian-Armenian relations is then reflected in the broader discourse within Georgia, and the lack of 'groundedness' of official Georgian (and Armenian) pronouncements of 'friendship' and 'cooperation' in wider societal discourse, where distrust of each others' intentions is at times clearly visible. Combined with a deeper-seated anti-Armenian element in traditional Georgian ethnic nationalism, the potential for securitisations of the southern neighbour crystallising into state policy remain somewhat more pronounced than in the case of Georgian-Azeri relations.

⁷⁶ As one Georgian newspaper commentary puts it: "Historically speaking Georgia and Armenia are 'doomed' to enjoy good-neighbourly relations and this has been and should be the precondition of stability in the Caucasus, in particular the South Caucasus region. Much could therefore be achieved, if only these two countries were left to get on with it." (The Messenger, 2009). See also Jgharkava (2009).

Conclusion: The South Caucasus RSC as a Revisionist Conflict Formation

How would one then characterise the amity/enmity variable within the Southern Caucasian RSC? From a macro-perspective, material conditions and the visible behaviour of different units – as expressed through their government policies – have already strongly indicated the region's status as a revisionist conflict formation. These regional 'surface features' are indeed confirmed from the micro-perspective of regional security discourse. To recap, revisionist conflict formations, situated at the conflictual extreme of the amity/enmity spectrum, are defined by mutually exclusive values and identities on the argumentative side of security discourse, and an acceptance of armed force as a legitimate policy tool on the instrumental side. The units within such RSCs securitise each other as threats to their fundamental values and identities, and see 'war' as a natural extension of regional politics. The intensity and entrenched nature of conflict within such regions far exceeds that of 'status-quo conflict formations', where disagreements are based on conflicting material interests rather than incompatible identities.

As the preceding discussion makes abundantly clear, at least two of the three units within the RSC in question do have such fundamentally divergent self- and world-views. Armenia and Azerbaijan have perceptions of history and territoriality that cannot but be a source of constant conflict, unless both governments and their underlying societies fundamentally redefine the very essence of their collective being. Their differing discourses over the conflict over Karabakh at the official level are radically mutually exclusive: just as one can't be 'a little bit pregnant', Karabakh falls under *either* Armenian *or* Azeri sovereignty. The Armenian leadership's steadfast insistence (post-1998) not to allow the territory to fall within Azerbaijan's jurisdiction, and the Azeri government's correspondingly unwavering promise to restore control have become a major factor in both regimes' (highly deficient) legitimacies. Moreover, this particular aspect of their discourse is firmly rooted in the ideational realities that pervade both their societies: in both states, governments *have* fallen over the Karabakh issue, which is rooted in the broader narratives of history and territorial and normative definitions of state- and nationhood.

On the Armenian side, there is a palpable fear of allowing a repetition of 1915, seen among others in terms of territorial loss, amplified by the Turkic identity of the 'other'. Azeri identity presents a curious mirror image: defined, as it is, by a perception of Russian-sponsored Armenian encroachment of traditional Azeri lands, including Karabakh. Both states' and societies' dominant historiographies are fundamentally incompatible: the historical territories of 'Greater Armenia' and 'Greater Azerbaijan' overlap in dramatic fashion, adding mutually exclusive definitions of territoriality to

incompatible constructions of identity as drivers of conflict. Alternative discourses that could destabilise these self-definitions have been sidelined in both states: Ter-Petrosyan's idea of 'civic' rather than 'ethnic' nationalism, rejecting expansive notions of territoriality, has largely remained on the margins of Armenian politics since his fall from power in 1998, while much of Armenian society clearly views the militarily obtained status-quo as an entirely legitimate solution to the issue. Meanwhile, as the aggrieved party, the Azeri political landscape almost entirely lacks politicians rejecting military force as a policy option in the confrontation (quite on the contrary, the sabre-rattling element remains an important aspect within the discourse); those elements of civil society that do, and maintain a correspondingly less virulently anti-Armenian self-view, can almost exclusively be found in the blogosphere and around specific organisations aimed at fostering co-operation (Conciliation Resources, Caucasus Journalists' Network, and others....).

Admittedly, the Georgian government's relationship to its two neighbours is somewhat different, marked, as it is, by mutual recognition. At least on an official level, Georgia's identity (its territoriality) is, *in toto*, not seen as being endangered by either Armenia or Azerbaijan, both of whose governments explicitly recognise their neighbour within its internationally still overwhelmingly recognised borders, including Abkhazia and South Ossetia. More than that, some of the co-operation between Azerbaijan and Georgia (especially regarding transportation routes and energy security) could be seen as taking on characteristics of a security regime: witness both governments cooperation within GUAM, their co-ordination of pipeline and energy security, amplified by frequent references to shared interests and a strategic partnership. This does not, however, diminish the overall nature of the Southern Caucasus as revisionist-conflictual.

Firstly, Georgia's good relations with Azerbaijan have not led to a broad-based, deep type of cooperation: clearly, both countries' collaboration is mostly limited to one-two issue-areas (mostly economic), and there are no broader permanently institutionalised frameworks of cooperation, especially in light of the recent ineffectiveness of the GUAM grouping. There is, moreover, a fundamental difference between Georgia's explicit pro-Western stance and Azerbaijan's 'balanced' policy that, crucially, has started describing Russia as a 'strategic partner' to the oil-producing state. Secondly, Georgia *does* have threats to its fundamental identity from de-facto statelets in the Southern Caucasus and the main external player within the region, Russia, again creating intra-regional security relationships that are based on fundamental non-recognition and incompatibilities (albeit from the point of view of state incoherence and great power penetration – see following chapters). Thirdly, its good official relationship with Armenia is still fragile, as it lacks 'grounding' in the discourse of society-at-large.

Ethno-nationalist groups in Armenia clearly and unequivocally regard Javakheti as 'historical Armenian lands' that were left to Georgia by a quirk of history, and are now subjected to misrule by Tbilisi; and the Georgian view of Armenia(ns) as a potential Russian 'fifth column' within the Caucasus is still quite widespread. To some extent, government policy in both states thus goes against the nationalist reflexes prevalent within both societies.

As is clear from the previous paragraphs, amity/enmity in the Southern Caucasus is indelibly entwined with developments at the levels above and below the regional. Its revisionist-conflictual nature is firmly interlinked with the weakness of at least two of its recognised units – Georgia and Azerbaijan – whose fragmentation has resulted in the emergence of three de-facto statelets. The significance of the involvement, from the systemic level, of great powers in regional security interaction was also hinted at above, primarily through Russia's effects on amity/enmity. Accordingly, the next two chapters will try to map the effects of state weakness and great power penetration on discursive regional security interaction, in preparation for a 'grand finale', where interactions between the levels (regional/sub-state/systemic) will be explored, and the prospects for change – through the 'stability' of the existing discourses – will be assessed.

CHAPTER 8: STATE INCOHERENCE IN SOUTHERN CAUCASIA

From the distant vantage point of the macro-perspective, the Southern Caucasus is clearly plagued by state incoherence, in both its horizontal and its vertical forms. Two of its constituent states – Georgia and Azerbaijan – have fragmented, spawning three secessionist statelets. What's more, the level of corruption and political instability in all three recognised states strongly indicates their vertical inherent weakness: within all societies in the region, there seems to be a lack of consensus on whether and how their respective states can act as the exclusive providers of security through legitimate force, a lack of consensus that comes to the fore whenever the state fails to, however temporarily, muster the force to paper over such differences. The question is whether this deep structure of state incoherence is borne out in the subjective discourses on (in)security that pervade these different states and societies: why and how are the states securitised as threats, either by well-defined ethnic groups, or by their societies as an indeterminate whole? The next few sections will try to answer these questions by, in turn, looking at these discourses within the recognised states, their unrecognised 'offspring', distinct ethnic minorities that have *not* broken away, and their societies in their totality, so as to form a clear micro-perspective picture of the webs of securitisation underlying both horizontal and vertical state incoherence.

As in the previous chapter, I shall be using the different states' national security concepts as my analytical starting-points, and subsequently delve into the underlying discourses of the societies concerned. In Armenia, the effort will almost entirely centre on identifying *vertical* weaknesses in the relationship between state and society; in the cases of Azerbaijan and Georgia, the chapter will have to deal with horizontal weaknesses as well, looking at the official discourse, but also at the diverging narratives that split the underlying societies and drive the various secessionisms in the region. As this deals with the issue of *divergence*, this will necessarily involve contrasting the discourses in the metropolises with those in the secessionist units; and much of the analysis will take place in the Copenhagen School's political and societal sectors, the former concerned with the safeguarding of a state's ideology and institutions, the latter centred on securing minorities' identities and values. Here, it serves to remind oneself of the fundamentally dissonant historical and political narratives that exist throughout the Southern Caucasus: this is a region where very few periods, monuments, territories remain beyond contention. The narratives presented here will therefore be *intensely* subjective, and, unless specifically stated otherwise, the

historical claims and contradictory accusations will be those of regional actors alone, presented in the context of securitisation and counter-securitisation.

Armenia, and the Blessings (?) of Homogeneity

The Republic of Armenia stands out in the region in terms of its homogeneity. Over 95% of its population is ethnic Armenian (Republic of Armenia, 2001), and the spectre of disintegration along ethnic lines is therefore comfortably absent from its definition of national security objectives and threats. Minority problems are, not surprisingly, hardly mentioned in its NS concept, especially because, as discussed in the previous chapter, the one minority that Armenians *did* traditionally securitise – the Turkic Azeris – had been expelled before the attainment of independence. Among the enumeration of interests and policies, one finds a cursory reference to “fully integrating and protecting all ethnic and national minorities residing in Armenia” as part of the requirements of maintaining the state’s independence. In the construction of a new quality of life and morale in the Republic, the document moreover declares an aspiration towards “protect[ing] the historic, spiritual, cultural heritage and the ethnic identity of the national minorities living in Armenia”. There is little, if any, securitisation of ethnic minorities in this respect, either within Armenia’s elite or within its broader population, reflective of the fact that the country’s largest ethnic minority – the Yezidis – make up a territorially indistinct and well-integrated group of at most 1.5% of the population (Asatryan & Arakelova, 2002)⁷⁷.

This allows the security concept to concentrate almost exclusively on other domestic problems that might be seen as potentially weakening the state. Apart from the above-mentioned requirement of integrating national minorities, the interest in maintaining the independence of the republic thus also requires effective governance, democracy and civil liberties, and human rights. Within the section on internal threats, the dangers faced by Armenia in terms of these goals are enumerated: among others, a “deterioration in the system of public administration and declining trust in the judiciary”, insufficiencies within the political system and deficient democratic consolidation, and polarisation are all seen as potentially endangering the stability of the republic. In

⁷⁷ Relations with Armenia’s other ethnic minorities – Assyrians, Greeks, Molokan Russians, and others – have traditionally been good as well. The relationship between the Armenian state and *religious* minorities has, however, been problematic: non-traditional denominations, especially Jehovah’s witnesses, gained a foothold in Armenia during the 1990s, and were securitised both as threats to Armenia’s national church, and to the combat-readiness of the armed forces (as members are not allowed to engage in any military activity whatsoever). These concerns have ebbed away in recent years, with the sect’s registration and the adoption – under severe European pressure – of a stringent law on alternative service (Amnesty International, 2008; E. Danielyan, 2006). In the highly patriarchal societies of the South Caucasus, and with homosexuality widely perceived as an affliction or disease, sexual minorities also remain a target for harassment, blackmail and discrimination (United States Department of State, 2011a, pp. 59-61; 2011b, pp. 45-46; 2011c, pp. 78-79).

response, the document continues, the domestic security strategy should aim for efficient public administration (in turn necessitating increased levels of state governance, a solid political system, democratic values and civil society), the rebuilding of the armed forces, the liberalisation of the economy and the promotion of a “new quality of life and morale”.

As would be expected, official Armenian discourse does at least pay lip service to the principles of good governance, human rights and democratisation. All presidents since independence – Ter-Petrosyan, Kocharyan, Sargsyan – have clearly stated their intention of building a democratic state under the rule of law, and, as a member of the Council of Europe since 2001, Armenia has taken on specific commitments to that effect (Council of Europe, 2009; RFE-RL, 2001). The instability of the Armenian political system (detailed in chapter 6) clearly indicates their successive failures to construct a state recognised by all (or, at the very least, *almost* all) Armenians as the guarantor of their security through the monopoly of legitimate force. Armenian officials of all political persuasions have, when necessary, explained the democratic deficiencies in Armenia since at least 1995 in terms of either the difficulty of introducing structural changes in times of crisis (Ter-Petrosyan, 1996), or the specificities of the “Armenian mentality” (E. Danielyan, 2003), or in terms of foreign conspiracies trying to manipulate the Armenian political scene (Zakarian, 2002). The fact, however, remains that Armenian society remains plagued by a dangerous split in its discourse on the state and its role in providing the ultimate public good: *security*.

Large swathes of the Armenian public do not trust state structures to be either effective, or representative of their values and interests, clearly disbelieving the government’s rhetoric on democracy, and good governance. Pro- and anti-government groups, including the press, appear to live in parallel universes where perceptions of the state are concerned. The audiovisual broadcast media (almost all of them government-controlled) and the pro-establishment written press, for instance, hardly ever broach the sensitive subject of *high-level* corruption, while the narrative encountered among supporters of the opposition is that of the state being entirely subservient to and controlled by clan interests. As revealed in several opinion polls, trust in the judiciary and official law-enforcement – so important in upholding law and order, and, as a consequence, security in any society – is extremely low⁷⁸. Conversations with ordinary Armenians and independent analysts often reveal a deep

⁷⁸ In this respect, the opinion polls carried out by the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC Data Initiative Team, 2007a) indicate consistently low levels of trust in the ability of state institutions – the police, public prosecutors, human rights ombudsmen – as providers of security, certainly when compared to interpersonal relationships (family, friends, neighbours).

distrust of the state as an opaque, repressive threat to normal life; ‘security’ is seldom associated with Armenia’s official structures, with whom it seems better to avoid interaction to the maximum extent possible. Quite on the contrary, many Armenians I encountered expressed the opinion that ‘this could not go on for much longer’, that it would ‘erupt’ at some point, and laid bare their disillusionment with a system that is perceived to be the product of corrupt officialdom and organised crime, with one specific layer of the population seen to stand well above the law⁷⁹.

The inability of Armenian society to agree on the ‘rules of the game’ governing the state is made particularly obvious in periods leading up to and following elections. In this sense, the 2008 presidential ballot was particularly traumatic. The securitisation of the state as a *threat* rather than a *means towards security* by a significant part of society translated into significant support for Ter-Petrosyan, with the latter’s open equation of the Karabakhi-Armenian leadership as a foreign (Tatar-Mongol) occupation regime and “banditocracy” (“*avazakapetut’yun*”) providing the clearest expression of these perceptions (Ter-Petrosyan, 2007b, 2008). While the pro-government media have, almost invariably, towed the official line blaming the opposition for the deadly March 2008 clashes, the plight of dozens of activists arrested during and after the disturbances – and described as ‘political prisoners’ by their sympathisers – were the focus of opposition discourse until their release in a nation-wide amnesty in mid-2009 (Marianna Grigoryan, 2009; G. Mkrтчyan, 2008). Armenian society and its elites and counter-elites remain deeply split in their perceptions of the state, depriving that state of its stabilising function as the ‘collective strategy of survival’ mentioned in chapter 3, and necessitating regular projections of brute force into society by the state.

To be fair, this is not particular to the regime in power at any given time. All post-independence governments of the Republic of Armenia have been distrusted by their population as corrupt and self-serving, of turning *state* security into *regime* security, as is so often the case in incoherent states. Levon Ter-Petrosyan lost his popularity soon after his overwhelming 83% win in the 1990 presidential elections, to date, the only ones with more or less unquestioned legitimacy (Ishkanian, 2008). The economic collapse that followed, including a near-famine in 1992-1993, the accompanying poverty and corruption, and his generally distant and aloof style soon alienated him

⁷⁹ Interviews, personal observations. During one opposition demonstration observed by myself in July 2008, one former prime minister described in detail how a small number of government-connected oligarchs skim the remittances of their compatriots through illegal cartels controlling the importation of basic necessities: a recurring narrative in broader society. The Armenian press often speculates on the reason why these prominent and wealthy figures – who are also often members of parliament with underworld nicknames – end up in relatively low places on the lists of the country’s biggest taxpayers, published yearly by the finance ministry (A. Galoian, 2006; M. Mkrтчyan, 2009).

from the population (Bremmer & Welt, 1997), many of whom still associate him with the cold, dark winters without electricity or heating during much of his presidency⁸⁰. The rigged 1995 constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections, and the falsified 1996 presidential elections also destroyed his democratic legitimacy, and, over the longer term, severely damaged many Armenians' faith in the representative nature of their state, a distrust that continued in the Kocharyan years, despite an improvement in the economic situation (IFES, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004). Most Armenian citizens outside the structures of state power see a republic incapable almost from the very inception of instituting democratic rule and providing security at the most basic level, irrespective of the particular regime in power at a given time. The distrust between rulers and ruled is so intense that ordinary Armenians seldom, if ever, believe their government to act in the state interest (rather than for private gain)⁸¹.

The Republic of Armenia's vertical weakness is, very much, a *structural* matter of long-term *state* legitimacy, rather than a short-term one of *regime* legitimacy per se. The state, along with its political elites, has shown itself unable to create mechanisms that offer a consensual way of resolving the many debates and disputes on security. One of the most significant consequences of this situation is the political instability that accompanies any attempt by a government to solve the most important of all security issues confronting the state: the Karabakh conflict. As regimes tend to be seen as illegitimate and self-serving, and the political process is perceived as manipulated and unrepresentative, a plethora of groups – representing 'intellectuals', war veterans, oppositionists – can act as an alternative centre of legitimacy and challenge the government, securitise it as a threat to national security. This is what happened in 1998, when the Yerkrpah – a union of Karabakh war veterans – played a crucial role in dislodging Ter-Petrosyan from the presidency (see previous chapter). Under current circumstances, any government prepared to compromise on the matter would therefore be faced with a choice between endowing its efforts with a democratic seal of approval (thus risking its fall from power) or forcing through a settlement. Both choices would certainly seem unpalatable to any regime in Yerevan.

⁸⁰ A fact used, rather crudely, by the pro-government Kocharyan/Sargsyan camp in pre-election propaganda in 2007-2008. Establishment newspapers duly reminded the population of how bad things were in 1991-1995 in articles and interviews (Respublika Armeniya, 2008; Vardanyan, 2007); the extent of distrust between state and citizenry is such, however, that local power outages in the 2008 pre-election period were also interpreted by some as part of this campaign (personal observation).

⁸¹ The extent of the public's distrust and disillusionment is revealed in public opinion polls (ACNIS, 2006a, 2006c; CRRIC Data Initiative Team, 2007a).

Azerbaijan: Tolerator or Assimilator?

Armenia's eastern neighbour and political arch-rival, Azerbaijan, was horizontally fragmented even before it became an independent state, in 1991: in contrast to Armenia, Baku is confronted with a geographically concentrated ethnic minority that has securitised the centre sufficiently to choose an alternative 'strategy of survival', in the form of the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh. To treat the conflict around that enclave as purely *territorial* and *inter-state* – as was the case in the preceding chapter – would simply obscure the reality that, to this day, the inhabitants of the enclave itself define it first and foremost as a successful attempt at decolonisation and self-preservation from Azerbaijan. A thorough understanding of the Armenian-Azeri conflict would therefore also require an examination of the sub-state security dynamics between the Karabakh Armenians and Baku in the context of Azerbaijan's coherence, which might also be affected by relations between the centre and its numerous other minorities. Vertically as well, the micro-perspective confirms what is suggested at the material, macro-level: the Republic of Azerbaijan is inherently weak, its ostensible stability upheld, in no small part, through a combination of repression and cooptation, depending in part on the possibilities offered by its oil riches.

The pervasiveness of the Karabakh issue in Azerbaijan's security concept (2007) was already amply discussed in the previous chapter's section on Azeri-Armenian relations. From that document, it is clear that Baku defines the conflict over the area mostly as a territorial one between two states, generally ignoring the role of the Karabakh Armenians themselves in collectively rejecting rule by Azerbaijan in the years leading up to and following the demise of the Soviet Union. There is also an oblique securitisation of *other* potential ethnic or religious groups that might become the target of "attempts by certain extremist elements to instigate ethnic and religion-based tension" in Azerbaijan. "Separatism, ethnic and religious extremism in all their manifestations are capable to undermine the foundations of the State and society and constitute a potential source of serious threat to country's national security," the concept continues within the section identifying 'threats'. In response, the section on domestic security policy describes the "preservation and promotion of the environment of ethnic and religious tolerance in the country" as one of the key tasks of Azerbaijan's government. The concept also declares its adherence to liberal-democratic norms of good governance, stating that "the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and achieving social justice will provide valuable support in combating attempts against the performance of the State functions and the realization of the national interests."

Azerbaijan's constitution provides minorities and their native tongues with a special status⁸², although there have been expressions of concern by the Council of Europe (2004) at the perceived circumscription of these rights in the 2002 law on the state language. Azeri leaders, in particular, do their best to strengthen the (self-)image of their country as a multi-ethnic, pluralist and democratic state. Ilham Aliyev regularly reinforces these credentials through visits to minority villages and cultural centres throughout the country (I. Aliyev, 2004b, 2005f, 2005g). The peaceful co-habitation of Muslims, Christians and Jews is often referred to by opinion leaders, and in this respect, Azerbaijan, and Azeris are constructed as an example to the world (e.g. I. Aliyev, 2005d; Orudzhev, 2003). Armenian-Azeri relations are, of course, a *glaring* exception to this image of peaceful cohabitation, with intense mutual securitisation not only generating the enmity between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but also underlies Azerbaijan's current fragmentation. And while relations between the Azeri state and most of its non-Armenian minorities appear to be comparatively placid, they do not remain without pitfalls: there are latent potential problems with the country's Avar, Lezgin and Talysh minorities that, in conjunction with Islamic radicalisation, have elicited some concern in official circles in Baku (Kotecha, 2006).

The deep and widespread mutual securitisations of Armenians and Azeris were already referred to in the previous chapter, in the context of Armenian-Azeri inter-state relations. But this focus on inter-state relations did not address the *internal* dynamics that led to the fragmentation of the Republic of Azerbaijan. In fact, the Karabakh conflict is as much about the mutual distrust between an *ethnic minority* and its metropolis as the intense mutual fear between two *nations* due to incompatible historiographies or territorial identities. Nowadays, many Azeri leaders and commentators place the Karabakh conflict within a broader narrative, defining it primarily as one between Armenia or 'the Armenians' as a worldwide group, and Azerbaijan, *over a piece of land*. Even at the highest levels of government, the Karabakh Armenians' specific agency is overshadowed by the wider narrative context of a supposed age-old Armenian attempt to create a 'Greater Armenia' through the territorial conquest of Azeri territories (see H. Aliyev, 2003).

This amalgamation of Karabakh Armenian separatism with Greater Armenian "chauvinism" serves to obscure the specific and local securitisations of Azerbaijan by the Karabakh Armenians, securitisations that uncomfortably contradict the dominant

⁸² Article 21 of that constitution – on the official state language – "...ensures free use and development of other languages spoken by the people". Article 45 guarantees everyone's right to "use his/her mother tongue. Everyone has the right to be educated, carry out creative activity in any language, as desired" (Republic of Azerbaijan, 2002).

Azeri narrative of tolerance and multi-ethnic harmony. While at least partially motivated by pan-Armenian nationalism, specific local grievances do play a part in the Karabakh Armenians' insistence on secession from Azerbaijan, and in their societal securitisation of Baku as a fundamentally hostile, colonial, even "*genocidal*" power (Kaufman, 2001, pp. 52-55). Quite simply, if this is a conflict over territory, it is one where a large majority of the population within that territory bears virtually no trust towards one of the sides in the dispute, and sees independent statehood as the only guarantee for cultural, and even *physical* survival.

The Karabakh Armenians' fears emerged from their perceived persecution, colonialism and discrimination by the authorities in Baku, from pre-Soviet times till the end of the Karabakh conflict. The fierce clashes in the 1905-1906 Armeno-Tatar War are remembered to this day, as is the massacre and expulsion of the Armenian population from the region's old capital, Shushi/Shusha by Azeri forces, in 1919. When reminiscing about Soviet Azeri rule, Karabakh Armenians also refer to such issues as a biased, anti-Armenian judiciary, the exploitation of Karabakh's natural resources, lack of capital investment, encouragement of Azeri immigration (and Armenian emigration) through surreptitious administrative and economic pressures, and the largely fictitious nature of the Nagorno-Karabakh Oblast's cultural autonomy to justify their demands for independence from Baku⁸³. From the February 1988 mass demonstrations (Malkasian, 1996, p. 5) to the October 1991 referendum (MFA Mountainous Karabakh, 1991), over events like Sumgait, Black January, Operation Ring, to the ethnic cleansing of much of Nagorno-Karabakh's Armenian population by Azeri forces in 1992, the securitisation of Azerbaijan has only hardened in the Karabakh Armenians' collective mindset, becoming ever-more institutionalised⁸⁴.

These charges of discrimination during Soviet times are rejected outright by the Azeri side, by pointing to official Soviet statistics indicating a high standard of living within the region relative to other parts of the Azerbaijan SSR (Azimov, 2009, pp. 261-263; MFA Azerbaijan, s.d.-b). Of course, the Azeri narrative of the modern-day conflict also denies or minimises the Karabakh Armenians' allegations of anti-Armenian pogroms

⁸³ Many such complaints were already apparent in an appeal sent by Karabakh Armenians to Nikita Khrushchev, in 1964 (MFA Armenia, 2009).

⁸⁴ 'Black January' refers to events in Azerbaijan's capital in January 1990, when widespread pogroms of the remaining Armenian population were followed by a mass evacuation, and a bloody intervention by the Red Army. 'Operation ring' denotes the expulsion and deportation, in the spring of 1990, of the Armenian villagers living just north of the Mountainous Karabakh border. The actions by Azeri and central Soviet troops were widely viewed in the territory as a precursor to a similar campaign within its boundaries. By the autumn of 1992, Azeri armed forces had moreover conquered, and ethnically cleansed, most of the territory, and were only a few miles away from the capital, Stepanakert, before the tide turned definitively in the Armenians' favour (De Waal, 2003, pp. 87-95, 113-118, 194-211). For a comprehensive Karabakh Armenian view of the conflict timeline, see MFA Mountainous Karabakh (2008a), Agadjanian et al. (2007) and the Office of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic (s.d.).

and ethnic cleansing from 1988 to 1991, mirroring the Armenian narrative by pointing to the sufferings of Armenia's and Nagorno-Karabakh's Azeri populations, and even alleging an *Armenian* hand behind anti-Armenian pogroms in Azerbaijan at the beginning of the conflict (Agayeva, 2010; Azimov, 2009, p. 264; MFA Azerbaijan, s.d.-a). The granting of the "highest degree of self-government" to Nagorno-Karabakh's population is already presented as a major concession on Azerbaijan's part, in conjunction with the return of *all* IDPs, the direct control by Azerbaijan of today's 'buffer zone', and the acceptance by Nagorno-Karabakh of Azeri sovereignty (H. Aliyev, 1996a, 1996b, 2001; I. Aliyev, 2004c, 2005a, 2009). The Karabakh Armenians are usually ignored as political actors in their own right, as apparent in Baku's adamant refusal to negotiate with the 'separatists' as long as they do not accept Azeri rule; in this, Azerbaijan's approach contrast sharply with Georgia's, where subsequent governments *have* negotiated directly with the secessionists and the Saakashvili government actively engaged the populations of the breakaway territories through public diplomacy (see next section).

With independent statehood seen as an established – if unrecognised – fact, these offers of the 'greatest degree of autonomy' in conjunction with 'security guarantees' are rejected out of hand in Stepanakert. Karabakh's Armenian population simply does not subscribe to the official Azeri self-view of itself as a harmonious multi-ethnic society (as opposed to mono-ethnic Armenia). Instead, Baku is seen as a great 'assimilator' of indigenous, 'really Caucasian' peoples, and, thus, a real and present danger to Karabakh's Armenian identity (Interviews, August 2009. See also Kotenyok, 2006; Melik-Shakhnazaryan & Khachatrian, 2007; Panarmenian.net, 2008; Zargaryan, 2009). If anything, Karabakhi discourse is less flexible on issues such as the return of conquered ("liberated") territories around the enclave, or the return of Azeri refugees to these territories or Mountainous Karabakh proper. Apart from demanding the Stepanakert's direct participation in the Minsk Group talks, both official and broader discourse is very reluctant to even consider these possibilities, viewing them as a loss of a vital buffer zone against potential Azeri aggression or a possible introduction of a 'fifth column' into or around Karabakh (Interviews, August 2009; Asbarez, 2009; Balayan, 2007; A. Danielyan, 2009). What Job (1992) has called the 'insecurity dilemma' – pushing minorities towards a rejection of the metropolis because of the existential fears associated with the loss of a claim to sovereignty – is, clearly, in full operation here.

While Mountainous Karabakh's fragmentation from Azerbaijan is, indeed, the latter's most clearly visible and complex horizontal fissure, there are other potential pressure-points in which ethnic issues might come to play a centrifugal role, in particular among

non-Armenian minorities, portions of which have been securitising the central authorities for some time. The main problem seems to come from overspill between Russia's restless Caucasus region and Azerbaijan's northern districts, home to sizeable Lezgin, Tsakhur and Avar minorities who stand in close contact with their ethnic kin in Dagestan, and who, on occasion, display nationalistic stirrings. Quite recently, in 2008, there was a rather disquieting episode when a number of organisations purportedly representing these ethnic groups published an appeal to 'all people of good will' accusing the Azeri government of discrimination; on another occasion, an organisation claiming to speak for the ethnic Avars within Azerbaijan accused Baku of "genocide" in a plea to the president of Dagestan. Around that same period, a conference was organised in Moscow on Lezgin history during which pamphlets were distributed accusing the Azeri authorities of 'ethnocide'. 'Sadval', a Lezgin nationalist organisation has been active in northern Azerbaijan since the early 1990s, when there was considerable tension between Lezgins and other minorities, among others connected to the drafting of soldiers for the Nagorno-Karabakh war and difficulties in maintaining cross-border contacts with ethnic kin in Dagestan. It has toned down its demands considerably (from outright independence to greater autonomy within Azerbaijan), and appears to have little support among the broader Lezgin population despite lingering fears among some of perceived assimilatory policies (Fuller, 2008a, 2008b; Kavkaskii Uzel, 2008; Matveeva & McCartney, 1998; Rossia3.ru, 2008).

In Southern Azerbaijan – the site of a short-lived self-proclaimed republic in 1993 – there are occasional and relatively isolated expressions of discontent among the ethnic Talysh, at times leading to repressive measures on the part of the authorities. A 'Talysh-Mugan' Republic was set up by Alikram Gumbatov, an ethnic Talysh officer, during the chaos surrounding the collapse of the Karabakh front in 1993, but was, according to observers, as shallowly rooted as it was short-lived: Talysh nationalism does not appear to be a potent force, because of either fear or disinterest (Kotecha, 2006, pp. 33-36). The Azeri government is occasionally still accused of hard-handed methods in the region: in one recent episode, Novruzali Mamedov, the editor of a Talysh-language newspaper, died in prison after having been sentenced to a long prison term on charges that the Committee to Protect Journalists has called "fabricated" (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2009; RFE-RL, 2009). But all in all, unrest among the Talysh, and other ethnic groups that could pose problems has remained within comfortably manageable levels. Azerbaijan's remaining minorities are either too geographically indistinct or small to pose a potential threat to the coherence

of the state⁸⁵; there always remains, however, a *latent* potential for unrest that could not be plausibly ignored by Baku, in addition to the ever-present fear that minority tensions might be manipulated by Armenia, Russia or Iran (see following chapter).

In terms of its vertical (i.e. ethno-territorially indistinct) coherence, the macro-perspective chapter suggested that Azerbaijan *has* remained largely ostensibly stable since the violent repression of anti-government protests following the 2003 presidential election. However, there were clear indications of the Azeri state's highly deficient legitimacy, and, hence, its inherent weakness: Azerbaijan has consistently been included among the most corrupt states of the Former Soviet Union following independence, and in terms of fundamental freedoms and respect for human rights, the country's score is the lowest in the Southern Caucasus. The problem from a micro-perspective, however, is precisely that discourse contradicts the 'birds-eye view' of Azeri society: the limited body of survey data would suggest Azerbaijan is actually *more*, not *less* legitimate than its two Western neighbours, Armenia and Georgia⁸⁶, and Azerbaijan's media, both printed and electronic, retain an overwhelmingly pro-government stance, although knowledgeable outside observers attribute this to informal mechanisms of government control, based on an "elaborate web" of patronage and corruption (Walker, 2008, p. 6).

This apparent contradiction between the macro- and micro-perspectives is not surprising: correctly identifying securitisations within authoritarian societies is known to be challenging (Wilkinson, 2007, p. 12), and the macro-perspective certainly suggests one should tread carefully where discourse within Azerbaijan is concerned. The crucial question to be posed here, therefore, is whether this ostensible stability and the *prima-facie* legitimacy of Azerbaijan's state institutions are a result of the application of force by the state aimed at disguising legitimacy gaps (by restricting free speech and contestation), rather than the result of more deeply held attitudes within society. I shall argue the former, for the following reasons: first, the combination of co-optation and repression shown to be applied by the Aliyev regime in the macro-perspective chapter

⁸⁵ The country's tiny Udi minority, estimated at about ten thousand and centred around the town of Nij, deserves special mention here. The Udi are widely seen as the direct descendants of the Caucasian Albanians, speaking a modern version of the latter's language and, remarkably, adhering to the Armenian Apostolic faith. Because of their religion, and the similarity of their names to Armenian ones (ending in –yan), they have been subject to various pressures, prompting some to emigrate to Russia (Clifton, Clifton, Kirk, & Ljøkjell, 2005).

⁸⁶ The CRRRC survey on Azerbaijan finds Azeris have a surprisingly high level of confidence in their state: 52.8% of respondents trust parliament, as opposed to 21.1% in Georgia, which is widely acknowledged to be the most democratic/least authoritarian state in the region). The discrepancies in perceptions of the legal system (44.1 vs. 19.5%) prosecutor's office (65.7% vs. 34.7%) and government (52.3% vs. 21.9%) are, similarly, inexplicably large (CRRRC Data Initiative Team, 2007b, 2007c). But, as some commentators on the region have convincingly pointed out, such surveys regularly underreport the depth of distrust and discontent prevalent within authoritarian post-Soviet societies (Coalson, 2009).

itself indicates that stability and regime legitimacy are not as spontaneous as it may seem: a legitimate state does not need de-facto censorship, physical repression and direct economic co-optation to maintain control over its society. Second, the institutionalised corruption also apparent from the macro-perspective is in itself an indication of a rejection of the state as a collective strategy of survival in practice, if not in discourse: if the state is legitimate, most of its citizens will willingly respect the norms and rules that form part of its institutional arrangements. And third, returning to the discursive, micro-perspective, elite and counter-elite discourses, *where they are visible*, still exhibit the kind of fundamental rifts and mutual auto-securitisations that are typical of inherently weak states⁸⁷.

Opposition politicians regularly describe the legal system as a threat to ordinary, upstanding Azeri citizens rather than a tool against criminality (Caucasus Journalists' Network, 2004), something typical of other Southern Caucasian states as well. Others lament the current hereditary Azeri "dictatorship's" inability to live up to the democratic ideals of Rasulzadeh's Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918-1920), a point of reference for many opposition supporters (Asgarov, 2009). Accusations and counter-accusations of subservience to foreign interests similarly figure in the discourse of anti- and pro-government groups (BBC Monitoring, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d, 2005e; Morning Star, 2002). The electoral process – so central to an aspiring democracy's status as a 'shared strategy' – is seen as hopelessly skewed, and therefore subjected to frequent boycotts (or threats thereof) over the years (BBC Monitoring, 2009a; Fuller, 2008f). There is also a micro-regional element in the confrontation between government and opposition (albeit one which is less prominent than in Armenia), with Aliyev seen as the leader of the 'Nakhichevani' clan (Sidikov, 2004)⁸⁸.

It is certainly justified to ask oneself whether the Azeri state and regime would be able to maintain their ostensible stability in the absence of large-scale co-optation and repression. In Baku, stability could very well be argued to be more the result of a targeted application of state resources than that of a smooth functioning of an

⁸⁷ For an excellent source of Azeri English-language articles from an opposition perspective, see <http://azerireport.com/>.

⁸⁸ On a final note, while Azerbaijan remains a thoroughly secular society, observers have in recent years also seen a growth in the number of 'independent' Islamic and more radical Salafi Islamist groups, with the perceived corruption of established religious and secular authorities a major driver in their growth. While still well-contained, marginal, and mostly peaceful, the intersection of this religious dissent with ethnically specific grievances in border regions, especially in the north, has led to acts of violence, notably in the 2008 events surrounding the Abu Bakr mosque, in Baku. Regions bordering Dagestan are especially vulnerable because of their cross-border contacts with one of Russia's most restive republics, where the Sharia Jamaat, a group aiming to create a pan-Caucasian emirate, remains active, and the danger of ethnic and religious grievances 'cross-pollinating' remains. However, while the state does remain vigilant as to the activities of such independent groups, seasoned observers of Azerbaijan do not believe Islamism to pose an imminent systemic threat (Fuller, 2008c; Fuller & Bakir, 2007; International Crisis Group, 2008c, p. 11; Jamestown Foundation, 2008; Sattarov, 2004; Wilhelmssen, 2009).

elite/counter-elite consensus on the legitimacy of state institutions as arbiters and guarantors of security. It is reasonable to argue that Azerbaijan's stability could become seriously challenged in the absence of such legitimate institutional mechanisms, once the state is faced with intra-elite rifts that remain insoluble in the face of insufficiently legitimate institutions, or if it loses its ability to co-opt and repress. Combined with the country's fragmentation into a rump Azerbaijan and a Republic of Mountainous Karabakh, this means the Southern Caucasus' largest and most populous state can safely be described as horizontally fragmented, and vertically ostensibly stable but inherently at least as weak as, and perhaps weaker than, both of its neighbours, as evidenced by the totality of macro- and micro-perspective factors enumerated previously.

Georgia: Between Fragmentation and Weakness

Moving westward, the Georgian National Security Concept (Republic of Georgia, 2005) is certainly reflective of the Georgian state's recent efforts at developing an inclusive identity, one that could provide the basis for a shared 'strategy of survival' for Georgia's multi-cultural society. As in Azerbaijan, the restoration and maintenance of the country's territorial integrity and the return of (mostly Georgian) IDPs and refugees feature prominently in the document; in two ways, however, the document's discourse differs fundamentally from that of its Azeri counterpart's. First, it is not so much the separatist groups/nations, as an ethnically unrelated third party – *Russia* – that is intensely securitised as an outside manipulator and instigator, something I shall return to in the next chapter. Second, there is an – albeit reluctant – acceptance of the de-facto authorities within the separatist regions as interlocutors towards a solution, which, in Georgia's eyes, should include broad autonomy under its sovereignty. Apart from the securitisation of "aggressive separatist movements inspired from abroad", the security concept specifically provides for "negotiations with the de-facto authorities", albeit on a status based on broad autonomy and a respect for Georgia's territorial integrity. In the case of South Ossetia, the concept advocates offering broad autonomy and a commitment to the non-use of force; in the case of Abkhazia, it proposes working within the UN-based 'Group of Friends' process. Such direct references to dialogue with separatist entities would be unthinkable in neighbouring Azerbaijan⁸⁹.

⁸⁹ Apart from those parts of the NSC referring to the need for national re-integration, Georgia has also adopted an extensive 'National Concept on Tolerance and Civic Integration', detailing a raft of minority rights (Republic of Georgia, 2009). But while certainly relevant to relations with minorities in 'rump' Georgia, its adoption *following* the 'August War' (and recognition by Russia of both breakaway territories) makes it at best a theoretical exercise in relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Broader government discourse also differs dramatically from Azerbaijan's, constantly engaging with all minorities in the country, including those that have broken away, through intense public diplomacy. These conflicts are *not* reduced to territorial disputes or age-old, almost Manichean struggles between competing nations: the narrative on the Georgian side is, rather, one of great power infringement and manipulation, in the absence of which these 'brotherly' minorities would be inevitably drawn towards prosperous and democratic Georgia (rather than corrupt and authoritarian Russia), over the objections even of their de-facto authorities. Especially following the 'Rose Revolution', there was a clear effort at directly engaging the populations of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, over the heads of their 'de-facto' administrations (see below). 'Public diplomacy' was made an explicit part of the remit of the Office of the State Minister for Reintegration (Republic of Georgia, s.d.), and Saakashvili regularly addressed the publics of both separatist entities, with offers of economic development, good governance and generous political autonomy, interspersed with the occasional sentence in the minority language (see Saakashvili, 2004a, 2004b; Saakashvili, 2008).

Saakashvili's approach differs considerably from that of his predecessors. The country's first post-Soviet president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, routinely described Georgia's ethnic minorities as unreliable 'guests', resident at the pleasure of their Georgian hosts, to be expelled at the slightest hint of treasonous (read 'pro-Russian') behaviour. Gamsakhurdia is described by several authors as "messianic" and "paranoid" (Cohen, 2004; Kaufman, 2001, p. 115), and one of his major speeches as leader of the anti-Communist opposition – a 1990 lecture entitled "The Spiritual Mission of Georgia" – excels in its combination of religious mysticism and nationalist exceptionalism (Gamsakhurdia, 1990). Throughout the period between 1989 and 1993, Georgian discourse was dominated by a virulent populism that securitised minorities as an alien imposition and an imminent threat to the country's survival, resulting in ethno-centric discriminatory policies (English, 2008; S. Jones, 1994; Kaufman, 2001, p. 110; Nodia, 1996). All Georgian (and non-Georgian) individuals interviewed by the author firmly rejected this approach, and the so-called 'Zviadists' today represent only a very small proportion of the country's political landscape.

After the collapse of the Gamsakhurdia presidency and the consolidation of his rule, Shevardnadze certainly tempered the official narrative, and at least *formally* acknowledged the need for an inclusive, civic understanding of Georgian citizenship; to little avail, however. Shevardnadze's tenuous hold on power in during his first years in power complicated the elaboration of a consistent policy towards the separatist entities, and early attempts to forcibly reintegrate Abkhazia in 1992-93 served to discredit any claims he might have had to greater 'tolerance' and 'cosmopolitanism' as Gorbachev's

former foreign minister, at least in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali (Akaba, 2000, pp. 80-81). Shevardnadze also tended to see the Ossetian and Abkhazian problems as issues of elite inter-state 'high politics', to be resolved through patient and discreet high-level diplomacy rather than emotional appeals to the local populations, intense public diplomacy, or active policies at promoting their integration into public life, an approach criticised by one prominent Georgian scholar (Nodia, 2005a, pp. 47-48). And indeed, comparing Shevardnadze's and Saakashvili's discourses, the latter's emphasis on Georgia's ethnic diversity, the need for a civic (rather than ethnic) understanding of citizenship, and for direct public diplomacy towards minorities is far more explicit – and flowery – than in the case of his predecessor: Shevardnadze, true to his past as a Soviet elder statesman, concentrated mostly on the technicalities of constitutional reform or high-level, inter-elite negotiations, all the while avoiding Gamsakhurdia's ethno-nationalism, and Saakashvili's emotionalism (By way of contrast, see BBC Monitoring, 1994; Saakashvili, 2005a).

In the end, neither Shevardnadze nor Saakashvili have succeeded in reuniting Georgia. The former's increasingly visible frustration at the inability of the 'international community' and, notably, Russia to provide for reunification with either South Ossetia or Abkhazia led to a marked deterioration in Georgian-Russian relations towards the end of his presidency, discussed in the following chapter. Saakashvili's forceful public diplomacy also didn't succeed in tackling the entrenched securitisations in either Abkhazia or South Ossetia before the policy was, in effect, brought to nought by the August War. The re-assertion of central authority over Ajaria in 2004 through the expulsion of the pro-Russian Abashidze clan served as an early sign of encouragement for the Saakashvili administration (see Saakashvili, 2005a), followed by only limited successes in the remaining breakaway regions, first among them the defection of Dimitri Sanakoyev, a former South Ossetian prime minister to Tbilisi's side (Peuch, 2007)⁹⁰. But the crucial difference between Ajaria on the one hand, and South Ossetia/Abkhazia on the other was the absence of an *ethnic factor* in the former. The province's main ethnic minority, the Ajarians, are *Muslim* Georgians who had not developed an ethnic identity distinct from their brethren in 'rump Georgia' during the Soviet and post-Soviet periods (Cornell, 2002b, pp. 273-274; International Crisis Group, 2004b). And, as elsewhere in the Caucasus, the historically generated and

⁹⁰ In Abkhazia, the picture was somewhat different: although significant numbers of Georgian-Megrelian refugees had gradually been allowed back into the southern Gal(i) district of the breakaway entity, and Georgian troops took control of the Kodori gorge until 2008, the self-proclaimed authorities in the area held uniformly fast onto their claims to independence (Fuller, 2007; Interfax, 2006; Kucera, 2007). The election of Sergei Bagapsh in 2004, apparently against Moscow's wishes, did give some in Tbilisi cautious (but vain) hope that fear of Russia would drive the Abkhaz back 'into the fold'. (Anjaparidze, 2004; Blagov, 2004; Peuch, 2004a).

ethnically driven societal securitisations outlined below were essential to any understanding of the breakdown of relations between Georgia and its breakaway regions; and in spite of these initial successes, these securitisations remained intact in both Sukhumi and Tskhinvali.

In Abkhazia, existential fears were based on a deeply, historically rooted fear and distrust of Tbilisi, found in the extensive narratives on Georgian aggression and encroachment since at least the early 20th century: within Abkhazia, Georgia was, and still is very much perceived as a colonial power aiming at the demographic dilution and assimilation of Abkhaz culture, in continuation of policies started by the Georgian Democratic Republic of 1918-1921, intensified in the wake of Stalin's decision to subordinate the territory to the Georgian SSR, in 1931. The Georgian wars against the Abkhazian People's Soviet in 1918-1921, the importation of thousands of Mingrelian-Georgian⁹¹ immigrants, and the general persecution of Abkhaz culture in the final years of Stalin's rule are remembered to this day as part of a long-standing policy of *Georgianisation* (Akaba, 1996; Khodzhaa, 2007; Kvarchelia, 1998; Lakoba, 1999). While these repressions decreased in intensity in the post-Stalin era, Abkhazians charge that the authorities in Tbilisi always continued applying various pressures to lessen the position of the titular ethnic group in favour the Georgian Mingrelians, perceived discriminations that led to periodic demonstrations and petitions demanding the (re)attachment of the autonomous republic to the Russian Federative Soviet Socialist Republic, or a restoration of its pre-1931 status as a full union republic in its own right⁹².

Most of these Soviet-era Abkhaz appeals were "given short shrift" by the authorities in Moscow (Fowkes, 2002, p. 77); but 'perestroika' and 'glasnost' opened another opportunity to openly voice such grievances, and thus, Abkhazian demands for full union republic status resurfaced in June of 1988, when sixty intellectuals signed the so-called "Abkhazian letter" (Kotlyarov, 1994) to the central authorities in Moscow. One of the central securitising acts on Abkhazia's road to independence, it accuses Georgian nationalists – from the early Mensheviks, through Joseph Stalin, to the contemporary Georgian Communist Party – of a decades-old attempt at 'Georgianising' Abkhazian culture through cultural repression, administrative tricks, demographic manipulation, and historical falsification. The document caused an outcry in Tbilisi, where the

⁹¹ The Mingrelians (or Megrelians) are a distinct Georgian sub-ethnos numbering about 500,000. In everyday life, they speak an unwritten South Caucasian language, related to but distinct and unintelligible from standard Georgian, and mainly inhabit the country's western province of Samegrelo.

⁹² A comprehensive collection of such Soviet-era petitions and letters from Abkhazia can be found in Kotlyarov (1994)

Writers' Union quickly tasked a number of intellectuals with drafting a response (Miminoshvili & Pandzhikidze, 1990), which, rather predictably, in turn accuses the Abkhaz authors of falsifying history, trying to sow discord between the Abkhaz and Georgian peoples who had lived together since centuries, if not millennia, in successive politically and culturally *Georgian* Abkhaz states.

As in the Armenian-Azeri case, the diverging interpretations of history⁹³ apparent in these conflicting documents are co-constitutive of fundamentally incompatible identities, essentially divergent views of what 'Abkhazia' and 'Georgia' represent, and, finally, incompatible 'national projects' (Coppieters, 2002; Nodia, 1998). To many Georgians, Abkhazia is Georgian by virtue of the *Georgian* 'high culture' of its historical elites, and an uninterrupted Georgian presence since antiquity. To the Abkhaz – in the words of one separatist leader – "Abkhazia is Abkhazia", with a distinct ethnic identity, to be preserved and defended against its "mini-empire" adversary, Georgia (Lakoba, 1995). Additionally, as elsewhere in the region, past history serves as a guide to the present and a harbinger of the future: "It seems that history truly moves in a circle", writes one Abkhaz author before comparing 1992-93 with the Abkhaz experience during the Menshevik-Georgian repressions of 1917-1920 (Akaba, 1996, p. 11). With such radically divergent perceptions of history forming the longer-term backdrop, a series of concrete occurrences in the Soviet and immediate post-Soviet periods has served to entrench fear and distrust within both populations. From the creation of Aidylara (the Abkhaz national movement), over events surrounding the Abkhaz State University in Sukhumi in 1989 to the short but intense war in 1992-93 (ironically, under the 'moderate' Shevardnadze), subsequent events 'proved' to both sides that the other desires Abkhazia without themselves, through ethnic cleansing and "genocide", if necessary (Anchabadze, 1999; Nadareishvili, 2007; Zhorzholiani, Lekishvili, Toidze, et al., 1995, pp. 83-96).

Since 1993, both in the discourse of political elites and in discussions between Abkhaz and Georgian scholars, no-one has been able to resolve the fundamental contradiction between the Georgians' wish for reunification (and corresponding fear of disintegration), and the Abkhazians' fear of subordinating themselves to a hostile entity – and their resulting insistence on secession – for many years at the cost of near-total

⁹³ As elsewhere in the Southern Caucasus, the convoluted nature of local history allowed, and still allows both sides to stick to entirely contradictory narratives. The Abkhaz argue for an uninterrupted – and largely exclusive – presence of their ethnic group in Abkhazia since at least antiquity, disturbed by the influx of Georgians or the forcible 'Georgianisation' of Abkhazians since the 19th century (Achugba, 2006; Akaba, 1996). The Georgians arguments vary, although all end up stressing the Georgian nature of Abkhazia (see Gamakhariya & Gogiya, 1997; Hewitt, 1993, pp. 274-275; Khoshtariya-Brosse, 1996; Nodia, 1998, pp. 25-26; Zhorzholiani, Lekishvili, Toidze, & Khoshtaria-Brosset, 1995).

economic isolation (Coppieters, Nodia, & Anchabadze, 1998a, p. 177). According to one Abkhazian deputy foreign minister, in 1999, the Abkhazian side saw Tbilisi refusal to contemplate a confederal 'common state' solution as proof that Georgia would never accept anything less than the province's legal subordination, and concluded, therefore, talks would be pretty much useless (Interviews, August 2009): two attempts by Abkhaz and Georgian scholars to discuss possible constitutional solutions to the conflict (Coppieters, Darchiashvili, & Akaba, 2000; Coppieters, Nodia, & Anchabadze, 1998b) exposed the diverging perspectives between the sides: Georgians stressed *federal* solutions implying subordination to a centre, while to the Abkhaz, *equality* and *recognition* stayed a top priority (see Adzhindzhal, 2007; Akaba, 2000, p. 88; Chirikba, 2009; Kvarchelia, 1999).

These fundamental contradictions are exacerbated by the Abkhazians' firm realisation that they constituted a mere 18% of the territories pre-1993, and their resulting resistance to the return of Georgian refugees and IDPs, most of whom are characterised as 'combatants', and consequently beyond the scope of any right of return (Achukba, 2006)⁹⁴. Abkhazia's recognition by the Russian Federation has moreover clearly removed any doubts the Abkhaz elites might have had as to their de-facto state's viability. In fact, following this recognition, other issues and potential securitisations have emerged: Russia's potentially overwhelming dominance of the local economy, or demands by those (relatively substantial) non-Abkhaz ethnic groups (Armenians, Russians) that have remained in the country, and still outnumber the Abkhaz themselves. In interviews, officials thus expressed concern that the Armenians would be demanding equal funding for the preservation of *their* culture, something that could pose a potential problem. During my visit to the region (August 2009), there was also ongoing wrangling over Abkhazia's citizenship law, and the nature (ethnic or civic) of the state's national ideology (Goble, 2009). After recognition by Russia, the Abkhaz opposition has also grown increasingly apprehensive at the threat of cultural assimilation, and perceived Russian economic encroachment into the country (BBC Monitoring, 2009b; Regnum, 2009; Simonyan, 2009).

There are parallels and differences between the situations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. There is a long pre-modern history of interaction between Georgians and Ossetians both within and beyond the areas that now comprise the self-declared

⁹⁴ Some Mingrelian refugees have actually returned since 1993, notably to the southern Gali district. This was explained by officials in Sukhumi by the fact that the Georgian population in that area had not participated in hostilities during the war; in other places, Georgians had made themselves complicit in crimes against the Abkhaz state and population, and could therefore not be designated as 'refugees' under international law (Interviews, August 2009).

republic, but, while definitely conflicting (Shnirelman, 2001, pp. 350-380), historiographies on both sides don't appear not quite as convoluted and contradictory as in the Georgian-Abkhaz and Armenian-Azeri cases⁹⁵. And as elsewhere in the Southern Caucasus, contemporary narratives of enmity are greatly influenced by experiences at the start and the end of the 20th century, but in the South Ossetian case, grievances seem to have emerged much more recently than in either Sukhumi or Stepanakert. In Soviet times, South Ossetia's titular nation did not display the existential fears observed in Abkhazia and Karabakh through the regular appeals to the centre observed elsewhere, and the region remained mostly tranquil, certainly compared to restless Abkhazia. One prominent Russian analyst has thus suggested that the South Ossetians became separatists "against their will", due to Gamsakhurdia's counterproductive policies rather than any long-standing grievances (Markedonov, 2008). And indeed, looking at the official discourse during the 'war of laws' that preceded the breakdown of the Soviet Union, when Tbilisi and Tskhinvali (and Sukhumi) were engaged in tit-for-tat legislation aimed at enhancing or safeguarding their perceived constitutional rights, the picture one gets is one of gradually escalating securitisation between Georgians and Ossetians. The referent object of security for Ossetians is, initially, their economic and cultural welfare, to be ensured through an upgrading of the territory's autonomous status; gradually, it becomes their physical survival, to be safeguarded through outright secession (Volkhonskii, Zakharov, & Silayev, 2008, pp. 177-244).

Eventually, in 1991-92, this complex cycle of securitisations and counter-securitisations escalates into open warfare, during which both sides stand accused of major violations of international humanitarian law (Human Rights Watch, 1992); in Ossetian discourse, a link is quickly made with the Menshevik atrocities of 1920, when Georgian troops went on the rampage in the region, allegedly killing about five thousand Ossetians and displacing tens of thousands (Zasseyeva, 2007)⁹⁶. Ossetian historical grievances were arguably not as intense as in Abkhazia to begin with; the securitisations contained

⁹⁵ The main divergence centres on the exact period of the Ossetians' settlement in the Southern Caucasus, with South Ossetians stressing the local presence of their presumed Alan, Sarmatian and Scythian forefathers since ancient times (Bliyev, 2006, pp. 15-32; Dzugayev, 2007), and Georgians arguing the case for large-scale immigration since the 12th-13th centuries, and, especially, during the last two-three centuries of Russian and Soviet domination (Topchishvili, 2005; Zhorzholiani, Lekishvili, Mataradze, Toidze, & Khoshtaria-Brosset, 1995). The South Ossetians' claim to ancient local statehood also does seem to be less prominent and clear-cut than their Abkhazian or Karabakhi Armenian counterparts' (see Presidentrso.ru, 2008).

⁹⁶ In fact, the South Ossetian parliament's 1991 appeal to Russia's legislative body asking for reunification with North Ossetia within the Russian Federation explicitly refers to the two "*genocides*" inflicted by Georgia, "*in 1920 and from 1989 onwards*" (Volkhonskii, et al., 2008, p. 202). That ultimate marker of existential fear becomes established within the South Ossetian narrative from that time, as argued by a local author (Pukhayev, 2006). Both North and South Ossetia demanded the recognition of these "*genocides*" by the international community in 2006 (Kavkazskii Uzel, 2006; Ossetia.ru, 2006), while many Ossetian websites have entire sections dedicated to them (see osinform.ru, osgenocide.ru).

within the “Abkhazian letter” occurred much earlier (in 1988) and were, arguably, more forceful, using words like ‘assimilation’ and ‘dissolution’ from the very start. Nevertheless, as in Abkhazia, the negotiations process was unable to square the circle between the Ossetians’ insistence on secession and Georgia’s unbending commitment to its territorial integrity; on the contrary, in 2004, the region seemed on the brink of renewed armed conflict (International Crisis Group, 2004a). But significantly – and unlike what happened in other South Caucasian separatist entities – serious fissures did emerge within the South Ossetian elite, in 2006. After a power struggle between rival factions, one group led by a former separatist Prime Minister, Dimitri Sanakoyev could clearly envisage living within the reformed Georgia of Saakashvili, agreeing to co-operate with the central authorities in a ‘provisional administration’ for the province, and eliciting furious denunciations from Tskhinvali (BBC Monitoring, 2006, 2007b; Corso & Owen, 2006). The extensive inducements aimed at luring Ossetians away from the separatist regime – including the Russian-language ‘Alania’ TV station, monetary compensation for defectors and, rather more bizarrely, a concert by the 1970s disco group, Boney M., of ‘Rasputin’ fame – could ultimately not prevent the overwhelming majority of ordinary Ossetians from describing him as a traitor; Sanakoyev’s influence did not go much beyond becoming a serious irritant for the Tskhinvali regime (as he himself recently admitted), before his complete sidelining in the aftermath of the 2008 war (Barry, 2008; Corso, 2008).

That conflict has brought to nought all of Tbilisi’s past efforts at luring the secessionist regions back into the fold; the war itself has reinforced the perception in both separatist regions of Tbilisi as an existential threat, while recognition by Moscow has dramatically increased the viability of separation as a strategy of survival. With the expulsion of almost all Georgians from Ossetia, and of all Georgian forces from Abkhazia – including the Kodori gorge – both Tskhinvali and Sukhumi, now safely under Moscow’s protection, reject the possibility of any kind of reunification with Georgia. In fact, the secessionists use the contrast between Saakashvili’s rhetoric of ‘peace’ and ‘tolerance’ and his “aggression” in August 2008 to underscore Tbilisi’s unchanging fundamentally malicious intentions (Interfax, 2009; s.n., 2009a, 2009c). South Ossetia is moreover certainly more comfortable with Russian protection than Abkhazia: its government had already called for reunification with North Ossetia within the Russian Federation on several occasions before the war (Interfax, 2008b; Khairullin, Pavlikova, Dzhanayev, & Yeremjan, 2006), while the matter had not been under serious consideration in Sukhumi. Quite on the contrary, while the Abkhaz remained wary of excessive Russian influence (see above), Moscow had to pressure Kokoity into a rather humiliating about-turn after his calls for the territory’s inclusion into the Russian

Federation, in September 2008 (Barry & Cowell, 2008); he was still suggesting the creation of a 'union state' with Russia in 2009 (Prime-Tass, 2009). In both entities, however, a return to *Georgian* sovereignty is deemed out of the question.

Georgia's horizontal weakness does not end in its fragmentation into a rump and two separatist entities. While the tensions following the downfall of Gamsakhurdia between the Mingrelians and other Georgians have largely dissipated⁹⁷, the Armenian and Azeri minorities in, respectively, Javakheti and Kvemo-Kartli continue to look unfavourably at a number of policies instituted by the Tbilisi government, most importantly, the requirement that all holders of government office master the Georgian language. The lack of knowledge of the state language among rural Armenians and Azeris has led to their under-representation in the country's political structures, leading to charges of discrimination. These minorities regularly interpret socio-economic problems as the result of wilful negligence by the central authorities, and both ethnic groups remain wary of perceived attempts by these authorities to change the ethnic make-up of their regions. Lohm (2007), and Wheatley (2004), for instance, report that disputes in Javakheti centre on, among others, history, the ownership of architectural monuments, continued fears of demographic change and ethno-linguistic assimilation, a constant perception of discrimination, coupled with a deficient political culture, provocative reporting by the media, and Georgian fears of disintegration⁹⁸. All of these factors were amplified by the economic dependence of Javakheti's population on the Russian military base at Akhalkalaki, a major bone of contention between Tbilisi and Moscow until its closure in 2006: a large proportion of the servicemen stationed there were local ethnic Armenians, and the bases provided both civilian employment and custom for agricultural supplies, apart from being seen, in the traditional Armenian vein, as 'protection' from Turkey (Gusep, 2005).

Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have so far worked to ease tensions among 'their' ethnic groups, and official Tbilisi is trying to allay the concerns of both Armenians and Azeris through a comprehensive strategy aimed at improving their socio-economic situation and Georgian language skills (Interviews, August 2008). But the securitisation of

⁹⁷ The downfall of Gamsakhurdia, a Mingrelian, led to several armed insurrections in the province during the early 1990s, followed by bloody reprisals by pro-Shevardnadze forces (MacFarlane, Minear, & Shenfield, 1996, p. 12; Rotar, 1998), and lingering fears of secessionism (RFE-RL, 2000). Tensions between the Mingrelians and other Georgians seem to have dissipated for now, with the overwhelming majority of the group continuing to identify themselves as *Georgian* (International Crisis Group, 2008d, p. 8).

⁹⁸ The Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railroad passing through the region is also seen as a potential threat, with local Armenian fears of a Turkish influx seemingly amplified by the closure of local Russian bases and a possible return of the Meskhetian Turks, who had been deported from the area following World War Two (Pentikäinen & Trier, 2004, pp. 17-19). For a moderate Armenian argument in favour of autonomy, see Minasyan (2006, 2007).

Russia and the fear of disintegration tends to limit the central government's policy options by turning any demand by these ethnic minorities for cultural rights (i.e. recognition of Armenian or Azeri as a regional language) or regional autonomy into a potential starting-point for the emergence of Russian-inspired separatism. A recent report lauds the Georgian government for its efforts to overcome the relative isolation of both the Armenian- and Azeri- inhabited regions of Georgia, while at the same time faulting it for not addressing "the predominantly authoritarian dynamic" that defines local state-society relations, thus leaving ethnic divisions vulnerable to exploitation by Russia (Wheatley, 2009, p. 55). Considering the lingering tensions between Georgia and its former imperial master, the incomplete nature of the regions' democratisation and Georgia's perennial fears of disintegration indeed provide fertile ground for future destabilisation, and further horizontal fragmentation.

In terms of its vertical strength and stability, Georgia's record is, at best, mixed. Although the violent implosion of the early 1990s remains a distant, but cautionary memory, the country's political system has never been able to produce an ordered transition of power since independence. The Shevardnadze era that followed the chaos of Gamsakhurdia's presidency did provide a measure of stability, albeit one based precariously on the typical mixture of authoritarianism, co-optation of criminalised elites, widespread corruption and forged elections still seen in Armenia and Azerbaijan; at its core, Georgia's political-constitutional system remained unequivocally weak (Wheatley, 2005, pp. 103-170). The Rose Revolution seemed to herald a new start: immediately following the ouster of Shevardnadze, a new technocratic elite seemed to unite Georgia's population behind a major state-building project based on European values and civic responsibility that was well-funded by the West. As Saakashvili boasted in 2005, Georgia was "a beacon of freedom for the whole world"; this was, he continued, its "spiritual mission", its "special role in its relation to humanity" (Saakashvili, 2005a), in a possible oblique corrective reference to the well-known 'spiritual mission' speech by his hapless predecessor, Gamsakhurdia (see above). More moderate variations on this theme became a mainstay of Georgian official discourse after the Revolution.

The initial post-revolutionary euphoria and unity have, in recent years, given way to ever-increasing contestation: the revolutionary leadership has gradually fragmented, with the dissenters' accusations of corruption and authoritarianism echoing the language heard in Baku and Yerevan. The first splinters appeared in the broad coalition soon after 2003, and observers of Georgian politics sounded their concerns on the authoritarian potential of Saakashvili's administration only a few years into his first term (Fuller, 2005; Nodia, 2005b). By 2008, sharp criticism of the Georgian

government was no longer the exclusive purview of a few divided minor opposition parties or of isolated individuals who had publicly fallen out of favour (like former defence minister Irakli Okruashvili and oligarch Badri Patarkatsishvili)⁹⁹: opposition figures included a former foreign minister (Salome Zourabichvili), Saakashvili's former Human Rights ombudsman (Sozar Subari), and, most prominent of all, Nino Burjanadze, the erstwhile speaker of parliament and, together with Saakashvili and the late Zurab Zhvania, member of the triumvirate considered the driving force behind the Rose Revolution¹⁰⁰.

While Saakashvili and his party did win the 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections, an increasingly prominent element within the elite no longer sees the political-electoral process as legitimate, and increasingly sees the street as the legitimate road towards regime change. Burjanadze thus accuses the current administration of abusing the war for propagandistic purposes and instituting an authoritarian state in one open letter (Burjanadze, 2008), while charging Saakashvili of establishing "a Soviet-style regime", before deploring the naïve tendency of outsiders to dismiss the Georgian opposition as 'radicals' (Burjanadze, 2009). Former ombudsman Subari, on his part, speaks of a death squad operating within Georgia's interior ministry, and of the violent anti-opposition crackdown of November 2007 in justifying his move towards the opposition (Fuller, 2008d). Zourabichvili, for her part, accuses the U.S. State Department's Matthew Bryza of stealing the opposition's victory in the January 2008 elections by prematurely recognising an allegedly fraudulent election (Zourabichvili, 2009, p. 8). In terms of state legitimacy, Georgia's discourse is now moving closer to that of its two neighbours; after a period of elite consensus on the state-as-common-strategy, Georgia seems to be weakening vertically, increasing the potential for future destabilisation in spite of continued opposition fragmentation and popular apathy (Fuller, 2008e; Whitmore, 2009).

Georgia is, without a doubt, the most fragmented and horizontally weak of the three recognised Southern Caucasian states, something clearly visible from the material, macro-perspective, but also glaringly obvious when one looks at the deeper discourses pervading its, and its fragments', societies, since the fall of the Soviet Union and

⁹⁹ Accused by the authorities of plotting a coup in the run-up to the 2008 presidential elections, Patarkatsishvili *officially* gained little over 7% of the vote running under the slogan "*Georgia without Saakashvili is a Georgia without Terror!*" (Asatiani, 2007; Corso, 2007; s.n., 2008a). The opposition has consistently rejected the results of both elections held in 2008 as fraudulent.

¹⁰⁰ Oppositionists (and ordinary Georgians) interviewed in August of that year admitted to the success of the Saakashvili government in improving administrative efficiency, and reducing *petty* (though certainly not high-level) corruption. But the government was also accused of abusing administrative resources during elections, stifling the freedom of the electronic media and interfering in the judicial system by several prominent former allies, who also compared the Georgian regime explicitly to Vladimir Putin's (a particularly insulting comparison in the Georgian context at that time).

before. Their persistent divergence comes despite recent efforts on the part of the Georgian government to overcome the securitisation of the centre in minority-inhabited regions of the country, efforts whose mixed results were almost entirely neutralised by the 2008 Russo-Georgian war. And while Georgia seemed to be the most promising state in terms of vertical strength in the aftermath of the 2003 Revolution, recently, it has started displaying all of the markers of illegitimacy and vertical weakness visible within its neighbours, through the sharply divergent discourses of its elites that increasingly view the regime as a threat, and the political process as superfluous. All of this cannot, however, be seen in isolation from the role that the great powers in general, and Russia in particular, play within the region: Georgia has been the place where many of their conflicting interests have collided. It is to this issue, of great power penetration, that I shall turn in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 9: THE GREAT POWERS AND THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS

This final empirical chapter will examine great power penetration in the Southern Caucasus from the micro-perspective, as outlined in the theoretical and methodological chapters. First organized according to individual great powers, this chapter's first sections will focus on the subjective factors driving the different powers' presences in the region, looking at the motivations undergirding these involvements. A subsequent section will then investigate the dependence of the regional units' discourses on these involvements: the attitudes of regional states towards the great powers. In combination with the macro-perspective provided in chapter 6, I shall then be able to classify the Southern Caucasus' patterns of GPP into one of the different categories laid out theoretically in chapter 4: hegemony; unipolar, cooperative multipolar or competitive multipolar penetration; and disengagement. By then, this chapter will have provided a detailed, multi-faceted, material, subjective and intersubjective map of great power presence in the Southern Caucasus.

Russia: Of Geopolitics and Empire

As shown in the macro-perspective chapter, Russia's material involvement in the Southern Caucasus is both long-standing and intense. While its military involvement has been reduced in rump Georgia – much against its will – it has strengthened its military presence in the country's two breakaway regions, while maintaining its strong defence ties with Armenia. Regardless of differences within the sphere of 'high politics', Russia still has important levers over the economies of all former Soviet republics within the RSC, either through direct investments, or through the control of strategic export routes. The Russian Federation therefore remains a major *material* player in this RSC.

The *subjective* motivations driving this presence of Russia's in the Southern Caucasus are correspondingly deep-seated; after all, as the former imperial power (in the guise of the Soviet Union and, before that, Tsarist Russia), its relationship with the region would rightly be assumed to be more elaborately developed and historically grounded than in the case of the more distant United States and the EU. Naturally, there are the cold considerations of national interest stemming from the region's inherent characteristics as motivators of regional penetration. But Russia's connection to the Caucasus might also be argued to be more profound, with the region forming part of its identity and self-view as, quintessentially, a Eurasian great power.

This self-view is tied to a particularly geopolitically coloured strain of strategic thought that has permeated Russian (and Soviet) state and society – with varying intensity – for the past two centuries. Most contemporary authors dismiss the traditional distinction between ‘Slavophiles’ and ‘Europhiles’ in Russian political thinking as outdated. Instead, they often identify three or four such intellectual strands in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Empire: the pro-Western liberalism of the ‘*Zapadniki*’ (Westernisers), the moderate nationalism of Russia’s post-Soviet bureaucratic-industrial establishment, and Dugin’s (2000) radical neo-Eurasianism at the extreme left and right of the country’s political spectrum (and, sometimes, other, minor strains, like the mystical Russian national-liberalism of isolated intellectuals like Solzhenitsyn).

These paradigms of Russian strategic thought each have different assumptions of Russia’s place in the world, as a *Western* or *Eurasian* state, part of Western civilisation or a civilisation in and of itself. Shared by all, however, is a conviction that this place is *in the top tier*, as a great power or ‘*velikaya derzhava*’: the vast majority of Russia’s political and intellectual elite advocates the maintenance of Russia’s position as a great power as a matter of overwhelming importance, whether through the adoption of Western norms, or through the maintenance of a Eurasian geopolitical or civilisational specificity¹⁰¹. Also typical of Russian foreign policy thinking is a strong geopolitical slant: in contrast to the West, mainstream, non-Westernising Russian policymakers and commentators tend to have a far more territorial and realist, zero-sum view of international politics. (Clover, 1999; Ingram, 2001; Kerr, 1995; Legvold, 2007; Light, 1996; Richter, 1996; G. Smith, 1999; Tuminez, 1996).

The *Zapadniki* and their pro-Western liberalism enjoyed only a brief and tenuous spell as the dominant mode of thought during the first years following the collapse of the USSR, before being eclipsed by a more moderate-nationalist policy, especially after statements by Boris Yeltsin and his entourage in February 1993, widely identified as a crucial turning point in post-Cold War Russian strategic thinking¹⁰². During that month, Russia’s then president famously declared the Former Soviet Union – including, naturally, the Southern Caucasus – a space of exclusive Russian responsibility; and, starting from that date, the Russian Federation pushed for the United Nations to

¹⁰¹ Tsygankov (1997; 2003) provides some of the more nuanced – and particularly interesting – distinctions within Russian strategic thought, among others distinguishing between Westernisers and 4 different variants of Eurasianism, of differing intensity: expansionist, civilizationist, stabilisers, and geo-economists..

¹⁰² In effect, Moscow was asking for a blanket authorisation to organise peacekeeping missions according to its own will. Such authorisation was never granted; nevertheless, in all Foreign Policy and National Security Concepts (since the first FPC was devised in 1993), the CIS has played an important role as Russia’s ‘zone of special responsibility’, and it is clear from policy practice (if not explicit discourse) that Moscow perceives the region as its rightful exclusive zone of influence. (Light, 1996; A. C. Lynch, 2001; Richter, 1996, pp. 88-89; Shearman, 1997, pp. 10-12; Tuminez, 1996, p. 59)

formally recognise its right to maintain stability within that zone, through military intervention if necessary. The 1993 Foreign Policy Concept, adopted later that year is, in fact, quite explicit on the matter of using military force within the CIS as a means of keeping the states of the “near-abroad” in line (Trofimenko, 1999, pp. 80-81). It also presages the arguments used by Moscow during the August 2008 war: “The outcome of this process will largely be determined by our ability to firmly assert the principles of international law, including respect for minority rights, and to establish good-neighbourly relations through persuasion or even – in extreme cases – by using power methods.” (Russian Federation, 2005a, pp. 28-29).

As argued by Mankoff (2009, pp. 11-51), these most basic tenets of Russian foreign policy have remained quite stable ever since – especially in the former Soviet space – despite considerable vacillation and inconsistency in the specifics of broader policymaking during the 1990s (MacFarlane, 2006, pp. 44-46). As liberalism waned – even before the removal of Kozyrev in 1996 – Russian foreign and security policies took a decisively nationalist turn under the foreign- and prime-ministerhips of Yevgeni Primakov (1996-1999), very much a product of the Soviet foreign policy bureaucracy, and, arguably, the Kremlin’s most Eurasianist-inspired post-Cold War senior policymaker to date (Clover, 1999, p. 10; Thorun, 2009, pp. 34-35). With the advent of Putin in 1999, the idea of *Derzhavnost* gradually became more exclusively prominent and entrenched (along with its domestic equivalent, *Gosudarstvennost*, the idea of a strong, paternalistic state); but now, it was combined with a particular emphasis on Russia’s natural resources as a source of power, and the stated need to integrate the Federation into the world economy. Often referred to as the *economisation* of Russia’s security and foreign policies, and, according to Balzer (2005), presaged by Putin’s doctoral thesis, this seems to have become virtually unassailable as the Kremlin’s worldview (Lo, 2003)¹⁰³.

Even if the actual rhetoric has recently been somewhat ‘modernised’ to fit Moscow’s claim to contemporary, ‘normal’ great power status, the underlying message remains the same, particularly where the CIS is concerned. The 2000 National Security Concept (Russian Federation, 2005c; s.n., 2000) specifies “Russia’s national interests consist in ensuring the sovereignty and enhancement of Russia’s position as a great

¹⁰³ One crucial text setting the tone for this resurgence of great power politics as part of Russia’s national ideology and strategic thought was Putin’s ‘Millennium Manifesto’, in which he attempted to define the elusive ‘Russian idea’: in effect, the state ideology of the Russian Federation (see particularly Putin, 2005, pp. 227-228). Thorun (2009) has argued that, under Putin’s presidency, Russian geostrategic thinking underwent a shift from what he calls ‘pragmatic geoeconomic realism’ during the early years, to ‘cultural geostrategic realism’ in the later period, the latter stressing the notion of the CIS as a distinct cultural ‘pole’ dominated by an independent great power.

power.” (p. 131) NATO expansion and a “decline of integration processes” within the CIS are identified as “main threats in the international sphere” (p. 134). The Foreign Policy concept of that same year (Russian Federation, 2005b) also puts emphasis on Russia’s role in establishing a multipolar world (with Russia as one of the poles). Furthermore, “to form a belt of good-neighbourliness along the perimeter of Russia’s borders” is one of the policy’s priorities (p. 90). “Practical relations with each of them should be developed with due consideration of their respective openness to cooperation and readiness to acknowledge, in due manner, the interests of the Russian Federation, and in particular to guarantee the rights of Russian compatriots.”(pp. 97-98). These themes are broadly repeated in the 2009 National Security and 2008 Foreign Policy Concepts, the latter of which, according to Mankoff (2009, p. 13), has retained 80% of its predecessor’s content “verbatim” (Russian Federation, 2008, 2009). They are also echoed in the five principles of Russian foreign policy¹⁰⁴ enunciated by President Medvedev in 2008.

Against this backdrop, three of the four motives enumerated in chapter 4 drive Russia’s involvement in the Southern Caucasus: its inherent characteristics (material interest), its role as a part of Russia’s great power identity (shared identity), and, on the margins, ‘universalised values’ (or, at least, *Russian* interpretations thereof). The Southern Caucasus is valuable to Russia by virtue of its geostrategic location, as a buffer to its vulnerable south, but also as an important lever in maintaining a ‘*zone of privileged interests*’ (Trenin, 2002, 2009) within the CIS – particularly Central Asia – through the control of energy reserves and transportation routes. It is significant in upholding a self-view as a great power because of the dense historical and cultural links that tie the Russian federation to it, and because of the damage any challenge to Russian dominance would be seen as doing to Russia’s great power status. Finally – rhetorically at least – Russia’s presence in the Southern Caucasus is portrayed as the continuation of a centuries-old ‘mission civilisatrice’, as part of the great-power responsibility to uphold universal values in an exclusive zone of influence where stability and legality are seen as dependent on its own good-will. This translates into a range of political, military and economic imperatives that have marked Russian policy towards the region since the mid-1990s, clearly visible in the material aspects of its regional involvement: maintaining a military presence, and a political predominance within the region.

¹⁰⁴ Respect for international law, insistence on multipolarity, avoidance of isolation, protection of Russian citizens and regions of ‘special interest’ (Reynolds, 2008; Russia & CIS Presidential Bulletin, 2008b).

The Southern Caucasus as a whole is strategically important to Russia by virtue of the most important inherent material characteristic that drives the former imperial power's political involvement: its location in the immediate proximity to its territory. First, the Southern Caucasus is seen in Moscow as inextricably tied to the survival of the Federation itself, both as a coherent state and as a great power, through its extensive political and cultural links to the fractious republics to the north of the mountain range. The border between north and south is blurred at best, and highly permeable, and the sight of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan free from Russian domination may set an attractive precedent for the northern autonomous republics that periodically gravitate towards secessionism (Baev, pp. 246-252; Markedonov, 2007; Nalbandov, 2009, pp. 30-31)¹⁰⁵. A degree of political influence over southern Caucasia is thus seen as important to the Russian federation for its physical survival, allowing it to manage security in the ever-restless North Caucasus.

Furthermore, in terms of military geography, the geopolitically sensitive Russian elite views losing the South Caucasus to NATO as the loss of a vital territorial buffer. In terms of military geography, the South Caucasus – and Georgia in particular – is important in its position on the Black Sea littoral, as pointed out as early as in 1993 by Russia's then defence minister, Pavel Grachev (BBC Monitoring, 1993); while Russia's presumed 'search for warm waters' has at times lapsed into cliché (Caldwell, 2007, p. 281; Rieber, 2007), in combination with Ukrainian independence and the Orange revolution, Russia's hold on the Black sea littoral has become precarious indeed. Rather than being simply a matter of losing Sevastopol without the possible backup of Ochamchira (now largely addressed through the recent extension of Russian basing rights in the Crimea), Russian analysts have expressed fears of being encircled by NATO within the CIS proper (Herd, 2005; Makarychev, 2009, pp. 42-49). This, in addition to the political logic discussed above, drives Russia's insistence on a military presence and political preponderance within the region (Alexandrova-Arbatova, 2008; Black, 2000, pp. 221-242; Williams & Neumann, 2000, pp. 374-387).

However, the 'refined', economised version of Derzhavnost seen in Russia today goes beyond the overt military and political spheres: it defines economic levers – and control over energy resources and transportation routes in particular – as crucial instruments

¹⁰⁵ The involvement of the Federation of Mountain Peoples in the war in Abkhazia, the presence of North and South Ossetia, the activity of Chechen rebels in Georgia's Pankisi gorge and the interaction between jihadists on both sides of the Russian-Azeri border attest to its permeability. Russia's reluctance in recognizing Abkhazia's and South Ossetia's independence likewise originated in concerns for the Northern Caucasus; no doubt outweighed by the knowledge that both entities would remain utterly dependent on Moscow's goodwill. Russia's concern at Georgia's plans to use a Russian-language channel (First Caucasus) to broadcast across 'its' Caucasian republics apparently led to the suspension of broadcasts by Eutelsat in 2010, reportedly under pressure from Gazprom (RFE-RL, 2010).

of policy, both domestically and abroad. The 'Energy Strategy of Russia Until 2020', adopted by the government in 2003, thus specifically states: "Russia controls considerable reserves of energy resources, as well as a powerful fuel and energy industry, which forms a base for its economic development and an instrument for its domestic and foreign policies. The role of the country in global energy markets largely determines its geopolitical influence" (Russian Federation, 2003, p. 4). Russian policymakers are acutely aware that the region's position between Europe and Central Asia gives Russia the opportunity to control energy routes out of its 'near abroad', towards the West. And considering Russia's reliance on energy and raw materials for its future economic development and strategic reach, this latter factor should not be underestimated (Baev, 2001, pp. 1-9). Control over Caspian energy resources is central to Russia's motivations in the Caucasus, and recent Russian policy has clearly been aware of the strategic value of exclusive control over energy routes in bolstering Russian power and influence in both its 'near' and 'far' abroad (Myers Jaffe & Manning, 2001; Perovic, 2005; Yazdani, 2006). Simply put, for much of the post-independence period, Russia has been concerned at the possible loss of Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus to the West through their decreased dependency on its goodwill for their hydrocarbon exports, quite apart from resenting the resulting reduction of leverage at the systemic level¹⁰⁶.

All above-mentioned factors are mainly based on an instrumental logic of material interest, aimed at maintaining the position of a great power so central to Russian national identity (see chapter 4). But the value of the Southern Caucasus to Moscow could be described as something marginally more than a geographic buffer, transit space or springboard by virtue of coldly calculated interest. In fact, the significance of this region to the *derzhava* could be argued to go beyond the purely instrumental, with this region becoming essential to the great power identity of the Russian Federation, in effect forming part of the values and identities to be safeguarded, of the referent object of security itself. The Southern Caucasus might be seen as not only being important to Russia's survival because of an 'objective', material characteristic inherent to the region – hydrocarbon reserves, proximity, strategic location – but also because of its symbolic value to Russia's self-view of great power status and territoriality. The *derzhava* must have a territorially definite sphere of influence, a civilisational area underlying a shared identity (Mankoff, 2009, p. 12), of which Armenia, Azerbaijan and

¹⁰⁶ Russia's active promotion of pipeline routes that cross its territory – like South Stream, North Stream, and Blue Stream – in opposition to ones that avoid it – like the Nabucco and Trans-Caspian pipelines in particular – fit into this strategy of maintaining a gas *monopsony* in Central Asia and a gas *monopoly* in Europe (Ericson, 2009; Mangott & Westphal, 2008). For a selection of essays by Russian policymakers and commentators on policies in the Caucasus, see also Niedermaier (2008, pp. 423-562).

Georgia have become an inextricable part over two almost uninterrupted centuries of domination. Without these territories of the 'near abroad', Russia's claim to great power influence is deficient, at least in the highly territorialised and geopolitical approach that permeates Russian foreign policymaking (Mark, 1996, pp. 144-146; Suny, 2007)¹⁰⁷.

In addition, Russian analysts, commentators and policymakers often combine this particularist form of self-identification with reference to universalised values, at least rhetorically. The universalist civilising mission (Tishkov, 2005) of imperial Russia's Christian Orthodoxy or the Soviet Union's Communist Internationalism seems to have transformed itself into one of 'peacekeeping' and upholding universal norms within Russia's civilisational area and sphere of special responsibility. Official discourse stresses Russia's role in maintaining stability and tackling conflict throughout the CIS: Russian 'peacekeeping' after the first Ossetian and Abkhaz conflicts is a case in point. Military intervention during the 2008 war with Georgia was also extensively justified through references to various international norms, including international humanitarian law. The recognitions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were likewise defended through extensive references to certain interpretations of international legal norms, with Russia cast in the role of their protector. This a stance that certainly contradicts Moscow's general insistence on pluralist norms, non-interference and sovereignty on the systemic level, and therefore could be argued to be almost entirely instrumental (Allison, 2009), but it nevertheless forms integral part of Russia's security discourse.

To recap, Russia's involvement in the Southern Caucasus is driven by three of the four major motivating factors behind great power penetration enumerated in chapter 4: material interest, shared identity, and, to a lesser extent, universalised values. The region is valuable to Moscow by virtue of its geostrategic location; it is significant in maintaining its great power identity because of the dense historical and cultural links that tie the Russian federation to it, and because of the damage any challenge to Russian dominance would be seen as doing to Russia's great power status. Finally, Russia's presence in the Southern Caucasus is often presented as the continuation of a historical civilising mission in contemporary guise. The links between the Russian Federation and its southern neighbours run deep; but since the fall of the Soviet Union,

¹⁰⁷ The 2008 Georgia war could therefore also be seen as an assertion of Russia's great power status, even in light of its dubious strategic success. The relative ease with which Russia distributes Russian citizenship to the residents of Georgia's breakaway regions, and, in fact, the recognised Southern Caucasian republics could be argued to indicate an element of mutual identification (Littlefield, 2009), although there clearly was an element of instrumental expediency as well. Consider, moreover, references to the "*historical and spiritual heritage*" of a "*common civilization area*" by foreign minister Lavrov (States News Service, 2008).

Russian power in its perceived back yard has been challenged from the West, the subject of the following section.

The Caucasus and the West: Oil, Gas, Pipelines....and a Bit of Democracy.

The West's material involvement in the Southern Caucasus was extensively documented in the macro-perspective chapter. On the part of the United States, it encompassed its active involvement in the region's pipeline politics, the provision of development aid to all the recognised states of the region (and, indeed, Nagorno-Karabakh), and – at least during the G.W. Bush presidency and following the Rose Revolution – growing military links with Georgia, a key ally and, for Washington at least, a potential NATO member. In the European Union's case, the Southern Caucasus now forms part of its European Neighbourhood Policy, after previously having received financial assistance through programmes like TACIS; the EU is moreover active in the promotion of alternative transportation corridors within the regions through TRACECA and a number of existing and planned fossil-fuel pipelines. These objective involvements are driven by the largely *material* subjective motivations of both Western entities in the RSC.

The United States

Washington's engagement with the Caucasus has been predicated on the region's value in terms of cold calculations of material interest and systemic strategies, combined with some universalist elements (democracy-promotion) within the discourse justifying engagement. In contrast to Russia, the United States does not have extensive historical ties to the region that could be said to tie it to its own self-perceptions of identity. Save for the near-assumption of a mandate over Armenia immediately following World War One, the 'world's only superpower' has been a newcomer to the South Caucasus. Subsequent post-Cold War National Security Strategies have clearly indicated the importance of *energy security*, and both policymakers and analysts have plainly identified the Caspian basin, including Azerbaijan, as a strategically significant source of hydrocarbons in the 21st century¹⁰⁸. Another material factor driving US involvement is the region's strategic geopolitical location, in close proximity to Iran and on crucial supply routes to Afghanistan. A further – systemically driven – motivation has been the United States' general concern with the emergence of a reconstructed Soviet empire, addressed through the strengthening of

¹⁰⁸ Both the 1998 and 2002 National Security Strategies (NSS) explicitly identify the Caspian basin's hydrocarbon reserves as a means of enhancing the United States' energy security (USA, 1998, p. 32; 2002, p. 20), while the 2006 NSS welcomes the Rose Revolution as bringing "new hope for freedom across the Eurasian landmass" (USA, 2006, p. 2).

the sovereignty and statehood of states throughout the CIS, usually combined with a universalist effort towards their democratic transformation and liberalisation.

A material interest in the Caspian's hydrocarbon reserves has driven much of United States policy towards both Azerbaijan and Georgia during the past two decades, with both countries, but Georgia in particular, gradually moving up in prominence on the list of American foreign policy priorities. As early as during the administration of George Bush Sr., policymakers and strategists were aware of the historical and potential significance of the Caspian as a source for carbon fuels¹⁰⁹; as, in subsequent years, offshore oil prospecting confirmed Soviet-era projections of large oilfields off the coast of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, securing American participation in their exploration became an important priority. Georgia's value as an increasingly realistic alternative to Russian export routes out of the Caspian basin was acknowledged throughout the 1990s¹¹⁰, but with the construction of the BTC pipeline, the country's status as an indispensable export route of Azeri and Central Asian hydrocarbon reserves became sealed, leading in turn to its upgrading to what Sergei Lavrov has somewhat denigratingly called a 'pet project' of the Bush administration (De Borchgrave, 2008). Also, in terms of its inherent material value, apart from its status as a transit corridor and repository for oil and gas, the Southern Caucasus has also been seen in terms of its location on supply routes to the theatre of operations in Afghanistan (Banusiewicz, 2010), and its proximity to aspiring nuclear power Iran, although Azerbaijan has repeatedly excluded the possibility of any participation in military action against the Islamic Republic (AFP, 2006, 2007).

The United States' involvement has also emerged from a system-level concern to counter-act the potential re-emergence of a reinvented Soviet empire – especially in the 1990s – often combined with a universalist drive towards democratisation and liberalisation. Statements by policymakers during Congressional hearings confirm that subsequent US administrations defined the region not only in terms of its role in providing a transit corridor for Caspian energy resources, but also as a crucial barrier against the reconstruction of a resurrected Soviet Union, through the formation of strong, sovereign and democratic states firmly integrated into the global economic system (see various congressional hearings from 2000 to 2008, in particular Federal

¹⁰⁹ As Secretary of State under G.H.W. Bush, James Baker visited Kazakhstan even before the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union, in September 1991, leading to allegations (and strenuous denials of) conflicts of interest for both himself and the then-ambassador to Moscow, Robert Strauss; both Texans had previously been deeply involved in the oil industry (Heilbronner, 1991).

¹¹⁰ As apparent in statements of various senior administration officials before Congressional committees and sub-committees during the period (Federal News Service, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1998a, 1998b).

News Service, 2008). The later push towards Georgian NATO membership was also rhetorically justified in terms of democratisation and Georgia's sovereign prerogative, among others during a high-profile state visit by G.W. Bush (see BBC, 2005). Although direct confrontation with Russia was always downplayed, clearly, there was an element of geopolitical thinking at the centre of this democracy-promoting attitude: as a member of NATO, a democratised, stable (and, although that was of secondary importance, reunified) Georgia would provide the much sought-after corridor between the West and the hydrocarbon riches of the Caspian basin, apart from countering the possibility of Russian neo-imperial temptations¹¹¹.

The mainly material, and partially systemic and universalist nature of United States interest in Georgia and Azerbaijan seems clear-cut; there is, however, an added complexity to Washington's perceptions of interest in the Caucasus affecting links with the region's most openly pro-Russian state, Armenia. Despite the country's excellent relations with Moscow (and Tehran), the presence of a powerful Armenian diaspora lobby in Congress has led all US administrations to maintain good relations with Yerevan. Armenian-American relations have invariably been described as 'friendly' in spite of Yerevan's clear strategic orientation towards Moscow. As one US diplomat stationed in Yerevan explained, Washington understands Armenia's historically conditioned perceptions of insecurity, and its inability to break its relations with both Russia and Iran¹¹². Action by diaspora groups in Congress – which contains a large and influential Armenian caucus – ensured Armenia remained the largest per-capita recipient of foreign aid in the world, after Israel, for much of the 1990s¹¹³. Domestic considerations *are* a factor in US policy to the region; quite plausibly, Armenia would *not* be receiving the kind of attention it is receiving today on Capitol Hill, and, to a lesser extent, in Foggy Bottom and on Pennsylvania Avenue, in the absence of the Armenian-American community.

The European Union

This region is important to Brussels in two ways: similar to the United States, it sees the Southern Caucasus in terms of strategic *material interests*, as a source of and

¹¹¹ A 1997 Foreign Affairs article by Zbigniew Brzezinski arguing for NATO expansion into the FSU and support for states like the Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan in the face of an unreformed Russia's imperial temptations fits well into the subsequent US policies in the region. It produced an outcry in Russia (Black, 2000, p. 234; Brzezinski, 1997).

¹¹² Interview with a US diplomat in Yerevan, August 2008.

¹¹³ Although not quite as powerful as their pro-Israel counterpart, AIPAC, or, in fact, the large and influential oil lobby, the ANCA and Armenian Assembly have for many years been able to limit aid to Azerbaijan (against the express wishes of successive administrations), and have, annually, substantially increased the proposed allocations in the foreign aid budgets for both Armenia and Mountainous Karabakh. This influence is largely based on ethnic Armenian populations in electorally significant states, like California, New Jersey and Michigan (King & Pomper, 2004; Newhouse, 2009, pp. 88-90; Paul, 2000).

transit corridor for Caspian hydrocarbons (European Union, 2008b, p. 5). Secondly, quite separately from this fact, while expansion into Turkey and the Former Soviet Union remains a contentious issue, there has nevertheless been a realisation in Brussels that the European Union may expand towards the immediate proximity of the Southern Caucasus, creating a steadily increasing interest in promoting its stability through the diffusion of 'European' values. Energy and stability (through good governance and conflict-resolution) are thus the themes governing EU motivations in the region¹¹⁴. The 2007 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instruments accordingly list a wide range of explicit objectives, centred on promoting good governance, democratisation, regional cooperation and conflict-resolution in all three states, in addition to energy collaboration in the specific case of Azerbaijan (European Commission, 2007b, pp. 16-23; 2007c, pp. 19-27; 2007d, pp. 19-27).

While the BTC pipeline itself was mostly promoted by the United States, Europe has committed itself to some degree to other transportation and communications networks that are aimed primarily at diminishing its energy dependence (Baran, 2007) on Russia. Thus, both TRACECA and INOGATE have been defined in Brussels as projects of high strategic importance, with the former building overland transportation/communications links to Central Asia (the official website talks of the 'restoration of the historical Silk Road' (TRACECA, 2010)), the latter aimed at integrating energy production and transportation networks in the Caspian and Black Sea basins and Europe (INOGATE, 2010). Gas pipelines connecting the Caspian hydrocarbon reserves to Europe over Turkey have been identified as 'priority projects' in legislation passed by the European Parliament and Council in 2006 directed at, among others, ensuring energy security (European Union, 2006a). While not explicitly mentioned in official documents, the clear *implicit* objective is to diversify sources away from Russia over Turkey and Georgia, among others through the Nabucco pipeline, running from the Caspian to Austria, tapping, among others, into the vast Shah Deniz field and Turkmenistan's natural gas reserves¹¹⁵.

Meanwhile, the variety of post-Cold War programmes that tried to implement Europe's declared commitment to bringing standards of governance in the Southern Caucasus to European levels gained in coherence with the inclusion of the three recognised regional states in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). As often revealed in the

¹¹⁴ As noted by the European Union's 2003 Security Strategy (European Commission, 2004, pp. 10-11). And another ENP policy paper (European Commission, 2007a, p. 7).

¹¹⁵ The 2009 report of the co-ordinator of 'Project of European Interest NG3' –Nabucco – contains thinly veiled references to Russia and Gazprom (Van Aartsen, 2009, pp. 4-5), and most official pronouncements tend to follow this discreet pattern.

various documents governing relations with these states, the European efforts are seen in tandem with criteria and conditionalities set forward by the Council of Europe and the OSCE, and fit into an ENP that sees its principal priorities – conflict-resolution, democratization, good governance, legislative harmonisation, regional integration and economic development – first and foremost in terms of its beneficial effects in creating a zone of stability around the Union (European Commission, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c; European Union, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d). Some have noted the rather limited practical impact of these various, mostly technical programmes (MacFarlane, 2004; Nuriyev, 2007). Europe nevertheless maintains significant ‘soft power’ over the region’s elites and counter-elites, who seldom fail to *rhetorically* underline their commitment to ‘European values’, which the projects centred on TACIS and its successor, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), aim to instil (see below).

Europe’s motivations resemble the United States’ – material interests centred on energy security, and universal liberal-democratic (“*European*”) values, with the added dimension of geographic proximity¹¹⁶ – but in the absence of hard, military power, much of its leverage remains limited to the pressures of the conditionalities related to the ENP and its considerable soft power. There is an additional Mars/Venus moment in its co-ordination with American policies, in that there is far less consensus within the Union on the extent to which Russia’s regional interests should be challenged directly, among others through NATO expansion, disagreements that came to the fore in the run-up to the August 2008 war in the discussions surrounding the initiation of a Membership Action Plan with Georgia during the Bucharest summit earlier that year (Gardiner, 2008; Wild, 2008). But apart from these disagreements in *means*, the overall strategic *aims* of the EU and the US coincide to a great extent, making references to ‘the West’ as a common denominator for these two powers quite appropriate. And, partly as a consequence, despite the largely economic and ‘soft power’ aspects of Europe’s regional involvement, its various programmes throughout the CIS have elicited distrust among ruling circles in Moscow, who, true to form, tend to view these entanglements in geo-political and geo-economic terms (Costea, 2010; Lobjakas, 2009; Sopinska, 2009).

¹¹⁶ Shared identity seems to play little part in Europe’s attitudes towards the Southern Caucasus. The EU remains *at best* ambivalent regarding the *theoretical* possibility of expansion in the distant future, and one-sided references to possible EU accession are more frequent in the Southern Caucasian states themselves, especially Georgia, which explicitly puts EU membership alongside its NATO aspirations (see below). The expansion of the ENP to the region does not point towards such a possibility, considering the inclusion therein of incontrovertibly non-European states like Morocco and Tunisia; in fact, the ENP has been described as aiming to create a stable ‘semi-periphery’ between Europe proper *and the outside world* rather than prepare states for future membership (Marchetti, 2006; Palmer, 2006).

Turkey, Iran and the Weight of History

Turkey

Turkey and Iran were the two final external actors in the Southern Caucasus mentioned in the macro-perspective chapter; the former's strategic location as the natural transit point for Central Asian carbon reserves remains one of the main drivers of its policies towards the Southern Caucasus, while Iran's material involvement has been limited to interregional trade, and some energy cooperation with Armenia. Turning its territory into a major transit and transportation hub at the crossroads of a north-south and east-west axis has figured among Ankara's most important regional *material interests* since at least the mid-1990s (Aydin, 2003, pp. 150-155; Robbins, 2003, pp. 302-310; Winrow, 2004). This has produced two distinct (and apparently contradictory) vectors in Turkey's policies: on the one hand, co-ordination with the West in securing the Caucasus as an alternative transit route for Caspian hydrocarbons, within the wider context of Turkey's EU candidacy and NATO membership; on the other hand, increased trade and co-operation with Russia, among others in developing north-south pipelines ensuring its own energy needs. While the emphasis was mostly on the former during much of the 1990s, the coming to power of the AK-party in 2003 has meant a major shift towards rapprochement with Russia in the Southern Caucasus, particularly after the transition towards a 'neo-Ottomanist' foreign policy under the influence of the current foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu.

This recent Neo-Ottomanist turn – with its active re-engagement with formerly Ottoman dominions in the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus – is very much seen as a departure from the non-interventionism of 'orthodox' Kemalist foreign policy (encapsulated in the maxim 'Peace at home, peace in the world'). First advocated in post-Cold War Turkey by the late prime minister, Turgut Özal, its objective is not so much dominance as the creation of a zone of stability (or of 'zero problems') in Turkey's immediate neighbourhood through the addition of 'strategic depth', required for the maintenance of regional power status and possible because of Turkey's historical and cultural legacy and geopolitical position between the West and the Muslim world. This redefinition of Turkey's strategic identity has brought about a pragmatic improvement in Russian-Turkish relations, which were marked by a mixture of competition and cooperation since the end of the Cold War; their cooperative aspects have definitely become dominant in recent years¹¹⁷ (Murinson, 2006; Torbakov & Ojanen, 2009).

¹¹⁷ Turko-Russian ties in the Southern Caucasus have come a long way since May 1992, when Ankara threatened Armenia with military action in response to Armenian advances into the Azeri exclave of

Shifting threat perceptions between Russia and Turkey have been ‘permissive factors’ in the development of close relations, with Moscow no longer concerned about Ankara as a threat to its interests in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia after the dissipation of the great ambitions of the early 1990s, and Turkey no longer fearing Russian ambitions outside the former Soviet space with the disappearance of the USSR. Russia now is Turkey’s largest individual trading partner (Gül, 2009), both states have been irritated by unilateralist American policies in their respective neighbourhoods (Iraq, the ‘Near Abroad’), and both increasingly define themselves as being ‘between’ West and East, especially with the coming to power of the AKP and Turkish disillusionment with the EU accession process (Hill, 2003; Hill & Taspinar, 2006; Torbakov, 2007; Winrow, 2009). These factors have gradually superseded the many differences that existed between the countries in the 1990s, including Chechnya, the status of the PKK, and the Bosphorus straits (Sezer, 2000, pp. 63-68). Within the Southern Caucasus, they have led to a shared interest in the maintenance of stability, resulting in Turkey’s famed (but now moribund) ‘Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform’ initiative, first mooted by Demirel in 2000, then by Prime Minister Erdogan in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 war (Fotiou, 2009; Gultekin Punsmann, 2009).

Turkish foreign and security policies towards the FSU have been largely based on hard-nosed material interest; but the Neo-Ottomanist turn mentioned above already points to the importance of shared identity as an additional, broader driver of policy. Specifically relative to the Southern Caucasus, however, there are three additional, tightly interconnected ways in which this region plays a role as part of Turkish identity, generating securitisations that are argumentative rather than purely instrumental, i.e. securitisations that drive the objectives of policy rather than their means. First, a large part of Turkey’s population originates from the South and North Caucasus, and their diasporas – notably of Abkhazians and Azeris – contribute to shaping Turkish discourse and policy towards the region¹¹⁸. Second, close ethno-linguistic affinities have combined with Turkey’s national identity, ‘Pan-Turkism’ and a shared historical enmity towards Armenia to create a close, culturally driven political bond between

Nakhichevan (whose international legal status is subject to a Turkish guarantee), provoking dire Russian warnings of a possible escalation towards “*World War Three*” (International Crisis Group, 2009, pp. 18-19; Sezer, 2000, p. 65).

¹¹⁸ The presence of a large and vocal Abkhaz diaspora creates close ties between Turkey and the largely unrecognised republic and regularly disturbs the otherwise good relations between Tbilisi and Ankara, despite a long-standing Turkish preference for the principle of territorial integrity. While it is difficult to estimate exact numbers, the number of Turks of Northern Caucasian extraction (including the Abkhaz and the ethno-linguistically related Circassians) is estimated at 2-3 million (Çelikpala, 2006, pp. 431-436&441; Kaya, 2004, p. 224). And quite apart from ethnic sympathies between two Turkic nations, the “*organised and self-conscious*” Azeri community in Turkey does play a role in maintaining the close relationship between Baku and Ankara (Robins, 1993, p. 597). The political role of the predominantly Muslim *Laz*, who live on both sides of the Georgian-Turkish border and speak a language related to Mingrelian, has been rather limited in comparison (Naegele, 1998).

Ankara and Baku, encapsulated in the dictum 'One Nation, Two States' (see chapter 7 and below). Third, Turkey's troubled relationship with Armenia is directly connected to the deep-seated insecurities that have plagued Turkish society since the establishment of the Republic known as the 'Sèvres syndrome', a pervasive, irrational fear within Turkish society of dismemberment by other great powers and regional rivals (Göçek, 2008; Guida, 2008). Combined, these factors have both shaped and restricted the policies of subsequent governments in Ankara, especially concerning relations with Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

The overrunning of territories surrounding the enclave by Armenian forces in 1993 led to the closing of the border between Turkey and Armenia. Subsequent Turkish governments have consistently put forwards three distinct conditions for a re-opening: first, the withdrawal of Armenian forces from Azerbaijan, second, the recognition by Armenia of the current interstate borders through a re-affirmation of the treaties of Kars and Moscow and, third, an end to the world-wide Armenian campaign for recognition of the Armenian Genocide. Attempts to normalize relations usually elicit a broad nationalist backlash, and fierce resistance on the part of Azerbaijan, which has grown adept at influencing Turkish public opinion in the matter (International Crisis Group, 2009). On the other hand, as Cornell (1998b, pp. 63-67) points out, a variety of factors (including its EU aspirations and both Western and Russian reactions) mitigated Turkey's ability and willingness to lend Azerbaijan unconditional support during the 'hot' phase of the Karabakh conflict.

Iran

In the Southern Caucasus, as in the rest of the FSU, Iranian political influence has remained insignificant in comparison to other external actors – hence the shortness of this section – despite initial expectations of a post-Cold War Turkish-Iranian regional rivalry. The Caucasus does feature in Tehran's matrix of security perceptions and interests, mainly through the existence of an independent Azerbaijan, which is very much seen as a *threat* to Iran's territorial integrity through its possible influence on the Islamic Republic's large ethnic Azeri minority, concentrated in the Northwestern parts of the country (Cornell, 1998a, pp. 55-59; Shaffer; Tarock, 1997b, pp. 188-190) ¹¹⁹.

¹¹⁹ In the early years of independence, fears of separatism were intensified by Elchibey's open ideological commitment to a unified Azerbaijan (Cornell, 2010, p. 70), subsiding somewhat with a mellowing of such rhetoric under the more pragmatic Aliyevs. The Iranian authorities thus made a point of quickly resettling refugees from the Karabakh conflict on the Azeri side of the border (lest they encourage irredentism on the Iranian side) (Cornell, 1998a, p. 56), and it took many years for Tehran to agree to the opening of an Azeri consulate in the Azeri-populated city of Tabriz, in 2005, after much prodding from Baku. Although relations have improved significantly in recent years, Iranian sensitivities are still regularly piqued by often open calls for unification in the independent and opposition press, and Tehran continues to view interactions across the border with a weary eye, especially in light of Azerbaijan's military and intelligence cooperation with Israel (Bourtman, 2006). Iran also actively trades with Azerbaijan, and has some *very* limited religious

Iran thus tilted towards Christian Armenia during the Karabakh war, and remains a major alternative supplier of energy – and, more generally, a trading partner and transportation corridor – for the blockaded country.

Tehran also interacts with the region on matters related to the Caspian, and shares with Moscow a common distrust of Western penetration in the region. Russia and Iran have moreover co-operated on a host of issues, ranging from the status of the Caspian, over bilateral trade, to arms exports and the development of Iran's nuclear programme, specifically in the construction of the nuclear power plant at Bushehr (Freedman, 2000; Tarock, 1997a; Vakil, 2006, pp. 56-59). While some have referred to the early emergence of a 'Russian-Armenian-Iranian axis', its own limited resources and the sensitivity of the larger powers to Iranian influence have largely kept it out of direct and effective regional involvement.

Turkey and Iran penetrate the South Caucasus by virtue of their historical and ethnic links to the region, and their geographic proximity. Ankara's views of the region are conditioned by its material interest in positioning itself as an energy gateway at an important crossroads of the Eurasian landmass, and its close identification with the ethnically similar Azeris, amplified by the recent activist foreign policy in its geopolitical neighbourhood; these links are, conversely, weighed down by a problematic relationship with Armenia, and a cautious deference for Russian strategic interests. Iran's concerns are more limited, and focused mostly on the societal threat posed by Azerbaijan to its territorial integrity. But great power penetration is not simply a one-way street: the states within an RSC react to the involvements detailed in the previous sections. Accordingly, the next section will look at how these great power involvements affect the security discourses of the regional actors themselves.

The Fears and Hopes of Small States

As indicated in chapter 4, the 'discursive dependence' of these units on the penetrating great powers is one final element in the picture of great power penetration. How do the three main units of the Southern Caucasus perceive the presence of the great powers in the region? Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia each have displayed quite distinctive approaches to Russia, the United States, EU, Turkey and Iran. Since their independence, Yerevan has been seen as consistently pro-Russian, defining the former imperial power as an indispensable protector, a strategic partner in all issue-areas, from military to economic. After the short rule of the pro-Western – and some

influence various Shi'ite Islamic foundations that very much form the subject of suspicion on the part of Baku. Relations with Georgia remain minimal (Sadegh-Zadeh, 2008).

say pan-Turkic – Abufaz Elchibey (Hyman, 1997, p. 351; Ismailzade, 2004, p. 2), Azerbaijan has generally kept its options open by pursuing a balanced policy, developing relations with the West, especially in the field of energy and transportation, while maintaining quite close economic and, increasingly, military and political ties with Moscow. And save for an interlude during the early Shevardnadze years, when the former Soviet foreign minister tried to establish a *modus vivendi* with Moscow, Georgia's orientation has been clearly pro-Western, culminating in the unabashed NATO aspirations of Mikheil Saakashvili. The relative prominence of the great powers, the alignments of the different units, and the effects of great power penetration on perceptions of distributions of power will be the particular focal points of this final discussion.

Armenia

Historically, Armenians' relations with Russia run deep. In fact, Russia's role as a self-proclaimed 'protector' of the Christians of the Ottoman Empire (combined with occasional periods of cultural repression, as in the late 19th-early 20th centuries) played an important role in the emergence of modern Armenian nationalism (Suny, 1993, pp. 31-51). Soviet-era propaganda presented the Soviet takeover of the independent Republic of Armenia in 1920 as having saved Armenia from certain annihilation at the hands of Turkey's Kemalist forces while conveniently forgetting that these forces were at that time allied with the Bolsheviks (Hovannisian, 1973; Mason, 2005), a narrative that is still widespread today. And in spite of a short hiatus in the few years that preceded Armenia's formal independence – when Moscow's role in preserving Karabakh's status *within* the Azerbaijan SSR came to the fore – this view of Russia as an underwriter of Armenia's survival still holds: a strategic alliance with Russia is seen as an essential cornerstone of Yerevan's national security, an indispensable guarantee in an otherwise hostile regional environment (Mirzoyan, 2007, pp. 34-90; Papazian, 2006, p. 239).

As the Armenian National Security Strategy clearly states, Russia, together with the CSTO, is the "main pillar of the Armenian Security System [...]. The Russian military presence in the Caucasus is an important factor for Armenia's security." In the country's Military Doctrine, bilateral military relations with Moscow are described as a "strategic partnership", and provision is made for the creation of 'permanently combined forces'¹²⁰. The discourse and policies of subsequent Armenian presidents,

¹²⁰ Relations are undergirded by a raft of agreements stipulating co-operation in issues ranging from air-defence to the operation of the Medzamor nuclear plant, so strategically crucial to the republic's economic, and indeed, physical survival (Daly, 2009). Tellingly, Armenia's borders with non-FSU states are today still guarded by Russian border troops (ARKA News Agency, 2009), and the status of Russia's bases in the

from Levon Ter-Petrosyan to Serj Sargsyan, has been adamantly pro-Russian. With very few exceptions, Armenia's clear strategic orientation has received very little criticism from opposition circles, with the current leader Ter-Petrosyan careful to solidify his pro-Moscow credentials through criticism of Western hypocrisy regarding Armenia's democratisation and clearly pro-Russian pronouncements on regional security matters¹²¹.

Armenian state and society therefore seem to have no problem with Russia's view – expounded above – of the Southern Caucasus as its 'back yard'; with an alliance with Turkey out of the question, and with Karabakh at the top of Yerevan's security agenda, Armenia's policies are seemingly irremediably skewed towards Moscow because of limits imposed by issues of identity, the argumentative aspects of securitisation. Yerevan has to toe Moscow's line, even if the great ally maintains 'strategic' relations with archrival Azerbaijan and has itself pointedly refrained from openly taking sides in the dispute after the end of overt hostilities in 2008¹²². Providing another divergence of interest between Armenia and the Kremlin, as seen in the previous chapters, Yerevan is also reluctant to see Georgia destabilised, but save for some leverage over its neighbour's Armenian minority, its ability to influence events and counteract Russia is limited indeed.

Yerevan's staunch pro-Russian stance has not, however, been seen as antithetical to the maintenance of good relations with the West by subsequent Armenian governments. The current National Security Strategy talks of co-operation with NATO, and describes the development of relations with the EU as a 'priority direction' for Armenia through the ENP. Again, all presidents since independence have been careful to maintain good relations with both the United States and the EU, a policy that was

country – whose presence was initially confirmed for 25 years through a wide-ranging Russo-Armenian Treaty of Friendship, Collaboration and Mutual Aid signed in 1997 (Russian Federation, 1998) – has never been in doubt. Very few mainstream voices have moreover expressed concerns over the fact that, under Kocharyan, much of Armenia's strategic industries – including the telecoms, energy and military sectors – have come under Russian control (Socor, 2006). Serj Sargsyan is equally seen as staunchly pro-Russian, closely co-ordinating his moves towards Turkey with Moscow.

¹²¹ This was clearly visible in the series of interviews conducted by the author in the summer of 2008. Very few of the Armenian interviewees, whether pro- or anti-government, questioned Armenia's pro-Russian strategic orientation, in marked contrast to Georgia, where Russia is *intensely* securitised across a broad spectrum of the political and intellectual class. The same could be observed during Armenian opposition rallies in July-September 2008, where speakers and ordinary participants were uniformly pro-Russian, especially in their reactions to the Russo-Georgian war (see also chapter 7).

¹²² President Medvedev called Azerbaijan a 'strategic partner' during a visit to the country in 2008, during which a Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation – including *military* cooperation – was signed (Assa-Irada, 2008b). The line taken by Foreign Minister Lavrov on the Karabakh conflict has been one of diplomatic ambiguity, at best. When asked, the head of Russia's diplomatic corps has quite consistently argued that territorial integrity and national self-determination are equivalent principles in international law; however, after the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the specificity of Georgia's breakaway regions as opposed to Azerbaijan's and Moldova's was stressed, together with a thinly veiled warning that this was dependent on the continued non-use of military force (Arminfo, 2005; BBC Monitoring, 2010; Russia & CIS General Newswire, 2008c).

subsumed in 1999 by then foreign minister Vardan Oskanian under the term 'complementarity': Armenia's relations with various regional players would develop according to issue-specific convergences of interest, in a complementary rather than mutually exclusive way (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1999, 2000, 2002; M. A. Weinstein, 2004). Thus, Armenia could have a strategic military relationship with Russia, growing economic integration with the European Union and still receive considerable development assistance from the United States under the Millennium Challenge programme, while relying on Iran for some of its energy and transportation needs (Mikaelian, 2009). Its leadership therefore saw no contradiction between its close relations with Russia on the one hand, and its support for U.S.-led operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, or the NATO peacekeeping effort in Kosovo (E. Danielyan, 2010). But recent developments – including an extension of Russia's base rights till 2044, and the expansion of the Russian military's role in Armenia's defence have elicited rare expressions of concern in broader society – and put in question the sustainability and credibility of Yerevan's 'complementary' foreign policy (Giragosian, 2010; Krikorian, 2010).

Georgia

In stark contrast to Armenia's reliance on Moscow as a guarantor of its security, one of the most important threads running through Georgia's National Security Concept (Republic of Georgia, 2005) is the securitisation of Russia as a threat to its survival. In the section on threats, the document speaks of "aggressive separatist movements, inspired and supported from outside Georgia", in an only thinly veiled reference to the former imperial hegemon. It identifies the extension of Russian citizenship to the residents of breakaway regions as a potential pretext for intervention. The Russian military bases are no longer a direct threat to Georgia's sovereignty, it claims in 2005, but pose a risk to the country's national security until their final withdrawal (completed in 2007, at least in 'rump' Georgia, with new bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia now posing a renewed threat). Not surprisingly, since the Rose Revolution, Georgia's relationship to the great powers has shifted towards the West in the most dramatic way possible. "The Concept underlines the aspiration of the people of Georgia to achieve full-fledged integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), and to contribute to the security of the Black Sea region as a constituent part of the Euro-Atlantic security system.", it reads in its introduction. In the section on policies, it calls Georgia a "geographic, political and cultural part of Europe", and welcomes both NATO and EU enlargement into the former Soviet space.

No other state in the Southern Caucasus securitises the Russian Federation and aspires to membership within the 'Euro-Atlantic community' with quite the intensity

apparent in these formulations: these two elements form the centre-piece of Tbilisi's security and foreign policies. And they enjoy the overwhelming support of both the elites and the population at large: if anything, the opposition to Saakashvili has been even more pro-Western than himself (despite criticising the president of mismanaging relations with Moscow), and opinion polls general find a comfortable majority of ordinary Georgians in favour of integration with the West¹²³. Attitudes towards Russia are marked by fundamental and deep-seated perceptions of *threat*: the dominant Georgian narrative on its northern neighbour is one based on a history of imperial domination, centred on traumatic events like the forcible incorporation of the Democratic Republic of Georgia into the Soviet Union in 1921, the lethal dispersal of the April 1989 independence demonstrations and the subsequent Russian support for separatist South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which are, in any case, seen as artificial *Soviet* creations¹²⁴. Russia is often depicted as an essentially imperialistic and authoritarian entity, which is unable to countenance the possibility of Georgian unified, independent and democratic statehood.

Moscow's perceived role in prolonging the separatist conflicts in Georgia – after, in Georgian eyes, having instigated them in the first place – has played a crucial role in the re-intensification of this deep-seated mistrust. Shevardnadze certainly attempted to 'correct' the destructively virulent anti-Russian stance of his short-lived predecessor, Gamsakhurdia, but this correction was also based on an oft-expressed hope that this would lead Russia into pressing for reintegration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The return and strengthening of Georgia's westward tilt during the years preceding the Rose Revolution was therefore accompanied by claims that Russia was, at best, showing disinterest in a solution to these frozen conflicts as Tbilisi seemingly lost hope

¹²³ Opinion surveys carried out in 2008 show the difference in popular attitudes towards NATO in the three recognised states of the Southern Caucasus. Asked as to their opinion of their country's membership in the alliance, a full 87% of Georgians polled said they 'fully' or 'somewhat' supported that option in 2008 (72.5% expressed their support during a referendum earlier that year). By contrast, the corresponding figure was only 48% in Azerbaijan, and a mere 27% in Armenia (RIA Novosti, 2008a; s.n., 2009b). None of the analysts, policymakers and opposition leaders interviewed during 2008 opposed Georgia's membership of NATO, although one – a former foreign minister – criticised Saakashvili for 'mismanaging' relations with Moscow. Other opposition leaders – including Khaindrava, Zurabishvili and Alasania – have repeatedly stated their pro-Western line (Akhmeteli, 2008; Interfax, 2008a; Vignansky, 2007). The government regularly uses accusations of pro-Russian activity as a de-legitimising argument in its interactions with the opposition, as in the immediate aftermath of the November 2007 clashes (Saakashvili, 2007a).

¹²⁴ References to 1921 occur regularly in Saakashvili's presidential speeches and statements, especially between 2006 and 2008. The overall impression among both policymakers and analysts interviewed in August that year was that Russia was fundamentally opposed to Georgia's very existence as an independent state, and was in effect operating a modern version of the 'Brezhnev doctrine' by opposing democratisation. Many interviewees depicted Russia in very unflattering terms, with one newspaper editor describing it as a 'wild beast' running amuck, to be caged as quickly as possible. Discourses in Tbilisi contrasted dramatically with those in pro-Russian Yerevan, where most interviewees (including opposition members) did not see a contradiction between democratisation and a pro-Russian strategic orientation.

on co-operation with Russia as a means of restoring its territorial integrity (see BBC Monitoring, 2000), its prime security concern since the early 1990s. Shevardnadze started Georgia's westward turn, but, as seen in the previous chapter, with the Rose Revolution, state policy and discourse have become much more unambiguous. Georgia hoped that a combination of NATO membership, democratisation and economic development – among others, as a transit corridor for Caspian hydrocarbons – would cause the breakaway regions to gravitate towards Tbilisi, guaranteeing the state's independence and territorial integrity¹²⁵. In light of Moscow's above-mentioned regional perceptions and priorities, the deterioration in Russian-Georgian relations – from about 1999, when Moscow started accusing Tbilisi of aiding Chechen rebels (Geyer, 2000, p. 65) – could not be described as surprising.

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan, finally, sits somewhere between Armenia and Georgia in its attitudes towards the great powers, although it seems to have greatly improved its relations with its former imperial master during the past decade, particularly after the August 2008 events. The National Security Concept refers to the need to develop mutually beneficial relations with other countries, but “overdependence” is very much seen as a threat, perhaps in a thinly veiled reference to the Russian Federation. Relations with Turkey, Russia and the United States are all described as ‘strategic partnerships’. “Integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic political, security, economic and other institutions constitutes the strategic goal of the Republic of Azerbaijan,” it states, but as is clear from the text this refers to individual programmes for non-members rather than outright membership: EAPC, PfP in the case of NATO, the TACIS, the ENP and TRACECA in the case of the EU. The concept refers to the 2006 memorandum of understanding on “Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy” between the European Union as undergirding mutually beneficial co-operation in that field, particularly in “ensuring the diversification of [...] energy sources and transportation routes”.

This multi-vector approach – walking a tightrope between good relations with Russia and expanding ties with the West – has guided Azeri foreign policy since the advent to power of the Aliyev clan in 1993 after the ouster of the unabashedly pro-Western and anti-Russian Abufaz Elchibey. Azeri policymakers are clearly very conscious of the

¹²⁵ Although Shevardnadze was more cautious than Saakashvili in expressing his views on NATO membership, seeing it as a longer-term aspiration rather than an immediate goal, he was already pushing for the expansion of military links to the United States under the Train and Equip Programme, and threatening not to renew the mandate of Russian peacekeeping troops in the breakaway territories, in addition to demanding the closure of Russian military bases, over which agreement in principle was actually reached as early as in 2000. By mid-2003 he was already unambiguously referring to NATO integration as guaranteeing Georgia's independence (BBC Monitoring, 2003b; Interfax, 2003). Saakashvili's style might have been less nuanced, the logic of his policies could just as well be described by these statements.

foreign policy options opened by their carbohydrate resources, and an ‘independent foreign policy’ which refuses to clearly choose sides, and exploits these options to the full has been a priority for a long time. Thus, while the energy industry and BTC pipeline certainly increased co-operation with the West, during the past decade, relations with Moscow have improved markedly as policymakers in Baku correctly perceived the increased insistence of the Kremlin on deference for its ‘special interests’ in the FSU, even while its self-confidence was amplified by growing oil revenues (Midgalovitz, 2003)¹²⁶. Russia’s continuing close relations with Armenia, and its crucial military aid to the arch-enemy during the 1991-1994 Karabakh war were rather pragmatically ‘forgotten’, a fact helped by Moscow’s continued official recognition of the territory as part of Azerbaijan, which was seemingly also able to allay Russian fears of an excessive westward lurch (Mite, 2006; Parsons, 2006)¹²⁷.

That having been said, Azeri society at large displays far more distrust and criticism of Russia than its policymaking elite¹²⁸. While ‘raison d’état’ has certainly led Baku to fine-tune its relationship with Moscow, this stance is certainly not grounded in the prevalent societal discourse, whose anti-Russian tendencies certainly came to the fore during the 2008 August War: reminded of the strategic vulnerability of its export routes, Baku was exceedingly cautious in its attempts not to antagonize Russia, but most of the local press coverage was unabashedly pro-Georgian¹²⁹. There is, however, a crucial difference with the situation in Georgia, in that Russia is not involved *directly* in the Karabakh conflict, as is the case in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and negotiations are held in a multilateral format, through the OSCE Minsk Group, jointly chaired by a

¹²⁶ Figures perceived as anti-Russian, like Vafa Quluzade, a prominent former presidential advisor with strong pro-Western tendencies, had already been removed from formal positions of influence (BBC Monitoring, 1999), and towards the second half of the decade, anticipating the language in the 2007 National Security Concept, the Azeri head of state increasingly referred to his country’s relationship with *both* the United States and Russia as ‘strategic’ while also using the term for its energy cooperation with the EU (I. Aliyev, 2004b, 2005b, 2005e, 2006b, 2006d, 2006f, 2007a, 2007c). Azerbaijan further downgraded its already vague EU and NATO aspirations, both in discourse and in practice, following the August 2008 war, which served as a stark reminder to Azerbaijan of the importance of Russia’s goodwill in its ability to export oil (Eurasia Insight, 2009; s.n., 2008b).

¹²⁷ This evolution of Azeri-Russian relations was rather accurately described by Ilham Aliyev (2004c) himself during an address at Chatham House.

¹²⁸ The historical narrative regularly describes Czarist Russia and the Soviet Union as fundamentally hostile imperial powers, based on a litany of perceived injustices and infractions, including: large-scale immigration of Armenians into Azeri lands in the 19th century; the March “*genocide*” of 1918: the creation of Mountainous Karabakh as an autonomous region; ‘Black January’; the participation of the 366th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the Red Army in the Karabakh War; and the alleged 1 Billion dollars in arms transfers to Armenia at that time.

¹²⁹ Among others, see Today.az (2008a), Teymurkhanliy (2008), Day.az (2008a) and Mirkadyrov (2008a, 2008b). The opposition moreover initially decried the government’s muted and delayed reaction to the crisis (BBC Monitoring, 2008a), although this was tempered later on by a more pragmatic acceptance of the regime’s cautious stance, at least by a number of opposition figures (BBC Monitoring, 2008b). The government, for its part, issued a simple statement recognising Georgia’s territorial integrity at the very start of the crisis (Assa-Irada, 2008a), reverted to silence (Defence and Security, 2008), then limited itself to vague calls for reconciliation between the two belligerents, and a return to normalcy (Russia & CIS Presidential Bulletin, 2008a).

relatively efficiently cooperating USA, France, and Russia, all three disinterested in a thawing of this frozen conflict. As a consequence, it is *Armenia* that is securitised much more heavily as the external aggressor, and much of the Azeri side's frustration at the slow progress of talks is directed at the Minsk Group chairs *collectively* rather than Moscow on its own, especially in the discourse of *official* Baku (BBC Monitoring, 2001b; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1997; Ismayilov, 2008; Presse, 2001); accusations that a fundamentally hostile Moscow is behind the prolongation of the conflict are still heard in society at large, but the discourse there is far more ambivalent than in neighbouring Georgia.

Two additional aspects of Azerbaijan's foreign and security discourse are its very close identification with Turkey, and its problematic links with Iran. Relations with Ankara are guided by the regularly recurring rhetorical principle of 'one nation, two states', and based on linguistic and cultural affinities between these two Turkic countries. Apart from its role as a major trading partner and crucial transit corridor, Turkey's blockade of the Armenian border and almost-unquestioning support is seen as crucial in Baku as part of the effort at isolating archenemy Armenia¹³⁰. Relations with Iran are problematic, to say the least. Elchibey's fierce anti-Iranian stance contributed to Iran's support to Armenia during the Karabakh war, and although official Baku generally refrains from stoking Iranian fears of Azeri separatism, society at large does display affinity with the ethnic brethren to 'Southern' – Iranian – Azerbaijan, leading to continuing Iranian apprehensions (Priego, 2009; Shaffer, pp. 155-204).

Conclusion: Patterns of Penetration in the Southern Caucasus

How would one characterize the patterns of GPP in the Caucasus in terms of the typology elaborated in chapter 4? The typology in question operated along two dimensions – polarity and amity/enmity – and thus generated a spectrum of possibilities ranging from hegemony, through unipolar, multipolar/co-operative and multipolar/competitive, to disengagement. It is quite clear from the above that Russia, while certainly influential, has lost its position of hegemony over the past decade-and-a-half, as the US and EU have successfully encroached on what was Russia's undoubted 'home turf'. These three external actors feature to varying extents in the

¹³⁰ Accordingly, when Ankara moved to normalise relations with Yerevan after years of negotiations within the context of its 'zero-problems' policy, in the summer of 2008, ties came under considerable strain, with alarmed Azeri commentators and politicians accusing their Western neighbour of betrayal (Mamedkhanov, 2008; Today.az, 2008b). Yet even there, Azerbaijan has been able to show an ability to independently influence events: Baku's priority has been to ensure the linkage of this normalisation with a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, something it has so far been able to accomplish with the aid of a Turkish domestic public opinion very much skewed in its favour (Kardas, 2009).

security calculations of the individual units and strongly shape the securitisations within the region, with Turkey, and, to a much lesser extent, Iran, playing a supporting role.

Penetration in the region is, without a doubt, multi-polar and competitive, and it became so soon after the fall of the Soviet Union. While Russian policies in the early 1990s were clearly incoherent, they did aim, however crudely, for the retention of the region within Moscow's zone of influence. The West, wary of provoking Russia, did involve itself economically in the Caucasus, but, crucially, political or military encroachments were rather limited, almost non-existent in fact. In a way, the West's shared motivation – access to energy resources and their export through alternative routes – was still very much aspirational in the 1990s: Western economic involvement in Caspian oilfields did *not* necessarily affect Russia's fundamental interest in retaining control, as all main transportation links were still guarded by Moscow. The degree of competitiveness increased considerably following the coming to power of Putin and George W. Bush in Moscow and Washington, respectively, and the decision to push for Georgian NATO membership after the building of the BTC pipeline. Just as Russia's foreign and security policies shifted towards a geo-political/geo-economic view of *Derzhavnost*, and put energy resources at centre-stage, Moscow saw both the United States and 'Europe' encroaching on 'its' back yard, economically, politically and militarily, *without* the prior co-ordination and deference seen during the 1990s. American troops were deployed in Georgia (unthinkable in the 1990s), the BTC pipeline became reality, and Georgia went through a regime change *not* sanctioned in Moscow.

The competitive nature of great power relations is based on the clash between Russia's and the West's strategic priorities. Geo-politically, the Caucasus is part of Moscow's perceived zone of 'special interest', a buffer essential to the security of its vulnerable south, one that is to be subjected to 'geo-economic' control of, among others, energy transportation routes. It is, moreover to some extent part of a highly territorialised 'great power' identity. To the United States the Caucasus has been a barrier to a Russian imperial revival, and a geopolitically significant corridor for actual and potential military operations in Eurasia. To 'the West' in general, it has been perceived as the location of and transit corridor for ever-scarcer hydrocarbon reserves, with the added, marginal element of the universal liberal 'civilising mission' shared by both these two Western powers. Georgia – the one regional actor daring to go directly against the *Derzhava's* regional priorities – is where this clash of interests and identities came to a head in the years preceding the August 2008 war. The picture is more nuanced in Armenia and Azerbaijan – the extra-regional actors have been able to co-ordinate quite effectively within the OSCE Minsk Group – but in the final analysis,

this is a region where, at least up to 2008, the overall pattern of GPP was one of multipolarity and competition. The question of how these patterns of penetration interact with the relationships of amity/enmity between and the incoherence of regional states will be the central question of the next, concluding chapter.

CHAPTER 10: THE SOUTH CAUCASUS REGIONAL INSECURITY COMPLEX

The previous three chapters have, in turn, *individually* applied the three concepts that previously were the subject of a theoretical expansion within RSCT: amity/enmity, state coherence, and great power penetration. Yet, as pointed out in chapter 5, the central aim of this thesis is to explore – using the Southern Caucasus as an example – how these three concepts interrelate; looking at these interactions is the goal of this concluding chapter. The aim is to identify a ‘web’ of co-constitution that links the three expanded variables, before attempting to evaluate the hypotheses proposed in chapter 5 on the relationship between these three concepts, and, finally, weighing up the chances of this revisionist conflict formation evolving into a security regime. This chapter is structured as follows. Its first section will construct this network of interrelations between great power penetration, state incoherence and amity/enmity. The second will move towards evaluating the two hypotheses on the effects of state incoherence and great power penetration on amity/enmity. The third, finally, will deal with the region’s transformative potential, based on the notion of ‘discursive stability’ introduced in chapter 2.

The Southern Caucasus as a Web of Fear, Weakness and Power

As was shown in the corresponding second chapter, the Southern Caucasus is a revisionist conflict formation. From a macro-perspective, it is a region populated by units that often do not recognise each other’s legitimacy, creating a slew of unresolved ‘frozen’ conflicts. From a micro-perspective, the security dynamic within the region is marked by security discourses that, on their argumentative side, constitute identities and values that are fundamentally incompatible, and on their instrumental side, include armed conflict as a legitimate means of securing these values and identities. As I shall argue below, both these identities and values, and the idea of war as an acceptable instrument of politics, are also shaped by, on the one hand, the incoherence of the region’s states, and, on the other, the role of great powers in the RSC. The states’ internal incoherence intertwines with and intensifies a wide variety of inter-state securitisations; the great powers, on the other hand, ‘distort’ regional securitisations through their interactions with actors’ identities or their effect on their instrumental calculations as to the utility of war. States fear and distrust each other precisely because their historically constituted imagined territorialities overlap, while regional units’ perceptions of external powers as potential allies or threats are strongly influenced by historical narratives underlying their identities, alongside the more conventional instrumental considerations of utility. Together, these different

components of the security dynamic constitute a type of enmity that, because of its convoluted nature, will be difficult to resolve any time soon.

The Southern Caucasus RSC is revisionist-conflictual precisely because of a lack of recognition between its constituent units: the associated securitisations constitute actors' mutual perceptions in ways that dramatically intensify regional security dilemmas. One of the legally established states – Armenia – does *not* accept the legitimacy of another's – Azerbaijan's – borders, officially and explicitly. In return, Azeri officials often reinforce the narrative within their society of Armenia as 'Western Azerbaijan', an unjust quirk of history artificially created by the descendents of 19th-century Armenian immigrants alien to the Caucasus. Naturally, neither Georgia nor Azerbaijan accepts the right to exist of the RSC's unrecognised statelets – Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia – as legitimate sovereign states. These non-recognitions are not merely a matter of diverging technical legal interpretations or political expediency; they are based on the fundamentally diverging values and identities of the actors involved, clearly visible in their official discourses that are, in turn, constituted by the reified, essentialist narratives of history permeating all societies in the region.

Armenian society perceives both Turkey and Azerbaijan – the 'barbarian Turks' – as fundamentally hostile to its very existence; while the blunter expressions of this point of view have certainly been 'sublimated' among its elite, its influence – among others clearly visible within the National Security Strategy and Armenia's historically informed strategic orientation – is undeniable. Azeri society is deeply permeated by a conspiratorial historiography that expounds its relationship with Armenia and Armenians in terms of perennial intrigue and encroachment on Azeri lands. Georgia is clearly very conscious of its fragility, and intensely securitises *Russia* as the primary driver behind its post-Cold War disintegration, while trying to maintain friendly relations with two neighbours that remain at each other's throats. Needless to say, the three secessionist entities – Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia – define themselves and their legally precarious existences first and foremost in opposition to their metropolitan states. In a word, in this RSC, incompatible identities and historical narratives are a breeding ground for the fears and securitisations that provide the teleological logic, that explain the goals of international political behaviour. The argumentative aspects of securitisation in the Southern Caucasus are fundamentally dissonant and diverging.

On the *Zwecksrationalität*-governed instrumental side of security discourse, *war* is clearly seen as a legitimate means towards the national goals of regional actors

conditioned by these above-mentioned identities. Discourse in Armenian society centres on safeguarding the advantages won through victories on the battlefield in 1990-1994, including, for most nationalists and the Karabakh elite, the ethnically cleansed Azeri-inhabited villages in the region proper and the 'buffer zone', lest they become a springboard for a renewed 1915. Azerbaijan backs up its enormous military budget with increasingly frequent, ominous reminders of its readiness to use force to overturn the de-facto status-quo; as in Armenia, the discourse of current and former officials sometimes even degenerates into advocating ethnic cleansing. However contested the circumstances, Georgia did show its readiness to go to war to resolve conflict in August of 2008, admittedly after heavy provocations by the similarly militarily inclined South Ossetian side. As in 1991-1994, the force of arms remains an always-present tool of security policy for *all* actors in the region, notwithstanding their rhetorical adherence to 'European values' in the appropriate fora.

Furthermore, regional actors are quite willing to expend considerable limited means towards the attainment of their respective goals, be it secession for the unrecognised units (and their allies), or territorial reintegration for the recognised ones. Armenians have endured decades of closed borders and exclusion from potentially lucrative regional energy and transportation projects for the sake of their ethnic brethren in Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan has spent billions of dollars of its oil wealth in a bid to make its threats to retake the region by force in response to a failed peace process more credible. Georgia has suffered economically from its extremely strained relationship with Russia, formerly its most important trading partner (although this was to some extent offset by Western aid). And for most of the past twenty years, the populations of all three unrecognised units have patiently endured international isolation and stunted development in the name of self-determination. To an outside – Western – observer, used to thinking in terms of economic utility-maximisation, much of this behaviour seems 'irrational'. Why, instead of wasting so much time and resources on trivial national projects, don't these states see the point of co-operation and integration, with the not-so-far away European Union as a shining example?

It is the normative acceptance of war as a legitimate means of resolving regional differences, together with the above-mentioned incompatibility of identities that ultimately leads to the characterisation of the region as a revisionist conflict formation. From the capitals of 'civilised' and pacified Europe, the Southern Caucasus is often perceived as a miniature version of the Balkans, peopled with irrational nations unable or unwilling to see the light of cooperation and integration as opposed to competition and conflict. The central insight of RSCT is, however, is of amity/enmity as a *variable*: the cultures of anarchy vary from one RSC to another, and with them, the *rationalities*

that govern security interaction within. Armenians, Azeris, Georgians, Abkhaz and Ossets are not *irrational*; their rationality functions towards ends that are differently defined, within a political-cultural context that is distinctly constituted and regionally specific.

It is all too easy to forget that it took Europe two World Wars, a Cold War, and the loss of Empire to generate the norms and identities that rule its contemporary patterns of de-securitisation (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 352-356). On the argumentative side, a complex *European* security identity has emerged, based in no small part on 'meta-securitisation', a securitisation of the past; in the Southern Caucasus, such collective identities are almost entirely lacking. In terms of the distinction between the argumentative and instrumental aspects of securitisation, the supposedly 'irrational' behaviour of local actors becomes exceedingly understandable. Their allocation of resources, their 'rationality' is subservient to fundamentally incompatible national identities, fundamentally incompatible because, as in pre-World War Two Europe, they are primarily defined in opposition to each other, with overlapping territorialities and inherently conflictual historical narratives. The self-definition of Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and the other unrecognised statelets doesn't fit: it occurs at the expense of the 'other', and this fundamental incompatibility is what then governs instrumentality, what is seen as expedient and inexpedient in the region's societies and governments.

Moreover, because conflict in the Southern Caucasus is largely based on the argumentative side of the securitisation spectrum, it will be intractable and unresponsive to changes in the material context, as argued in chapter two of this thesis. If instrumental rationality is based on societies techno-scientific matching of means and ends, and the *ends* are fundamentally incompatible, traditional methods of conflict-resolution that are based on utility-maximising game-theoretical models (see Rapoport, 1974) will be limited in their effectiveness. Conflict-resolution would not only involve appropriately matching actors' preferences; it would, in effect, involve actively changing these preferences at a quite fundamental, existential level. And such fundamental ('sedimented' in Wæver's terminology) value-systems are in their nature less susceptible to change through material pressures than issues that involve the identification of threats and means. They structure the region and limit the agency of individual units and actors through their normative de-limiting of behaviour in ways largely impervious to material incentive or economic-utilitarian rationality.

Enmity and the Vertical and Horizontal Incoherence of States

This particular variant of culturally embedded rationality is moreover reinforced, both from above – the systemic level – and from below – the sub-state level. The

securitisation by both Georgia and Azerbaijan of threats to their national securities emanating from separatist groups feeds directly into the regional patterns of amity/enmity, first and foremost, of course, because of the fragmented nature of these states, and their *non-recognition* of the secessionist statelets, which ipso-facto turns the region into a revisionist conflict formation. But clearly, these securitisations also affect the relations between the three *recognised* states, quite visibly in the case of Azerbaijan (its 'separatist groups' and Armenia are virtually inseparable), less so in the case of Georgia (its separatist-linked securitisations are primarily directed at Russia; but there is, no doubt, a wary distrust towards Armenia's links to Javakheti operating in the background as well). More subtly, the *vertical* weakness of states in the region makes appeals to the fears and aspirations embedded in these incompatible nationalist narratives an ever-present temptation for dubiously legitimate governments seeking to prolong their stay in power.

The 'bundle' of securitisations related to horizontal state incoherence dominates security discourse in both of the region's fragmented states, Georgia and Azerbaijan, and is, again directly related to diverging discourses which have littered this region with territorial identities that overlap and historical narratives that make the emergence of shared state allegiances extremely difficult. While Azerbaijan views itself as a model multi-national republic and Armenians as intruders and disturbers of that model, Nagorno-Karabakh's Armenians view the Azeri state as a great assimilator of subordinate peoples, a perennial massacerer of Armenians (in 1905, 1918-1920, 1988), even while the anti-Armenian discourses in Azerbaijan reinforce these perceptions. It is difficult to see how these two positions could be reconciled to form the 'collective strategy of survival' necessary for the functioning of a single sovereign state. The idea that, for instance, Armenians would accept Azeri sovereignty in exchange for the promise of economic advantages from Baku – posited by a number of Azeri analysts – was the subject of downright ridicule for my interviewees in Stepanakert.

The same divergence of identities and narratives can be seen in Georgia: Tbilisi, Tskhinvali and Sukhumi have dramatically diverging views of history that underlie much of their intractable conflict. Some Georgians – including, crucially, the first post-Soviet president – go so far as to consider the Abkhaz and the Ossets an alien factor, an intrusion into the Southern Caucasus from the north. Early twentieth-century history – specifically, the Bolshevik-sponsored uprisings during the Georgian Democratic Republic – has moreover reinforced the perception of both these minorities as pro-Russian elements. In return, the Abkhaz and Ossets' view of recent history – including Soviet history – is a narrative of Georgian attempts at forcible assimilation and, especially in the Abkhaz case, colonisation. Alignment with Russia is seen as a natural

protective measure by these ‘endangered’ minorities against what has been called a ‘mini-empire’. Both sides of these discourses are in turn reinforced by the conflicts of the early 1990s: the ethnic cleansing and the resulting refugee flows (creating an added imperative for reunification), and the meddling by Russia (reinforcing the perception of threat emanating from Moscow and of the minorities as a ‘fifth column’).

Horizontal state incoherence ultimately feeds into and is reinforced by mutual perceptions between Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, the region’s three de-jure units. Much of the tension emanates from the presence of Armenian minorities in Georgia and, of course, the Karabakh conflict itself. The latter is indelibly enmeshed in the Azeri-Armenian inter-state relationship: for Armenian policymakers – who, have come to define ‘Armenians’ in *ethnic* rather than *civic* terms – it is difficult to ignore the plight of their co-ethnics without seeming to endanger a crucial referent object in Armenia’s security discourse. In broader society, issues like Nagorno-Karabakh and Javakheti are very much seen in terms of ‘stemming a historical tide’ of depopulation and Genocide, with 1915 naturally featuring prominently in the discourse. Armenian narratives clearly present the limited territory of today’s Republics of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh as a result of centuries of injustice and oppression, and substantial Armenian minorities outside of its territory add a pressing contemporary element to this theme.

Meanwhile, Azeri discourse makes virtually no distinction between its Armenian minority and the Republic of Armenia – preferring to view the Karabakh conflict in inter-state terms, as the occupation of its territory by a neighbouring state – and pointedly refusing to initiate direct negotiations with Stepanakert. Azerbaijan’s historiography very much looks like a mirror image of Armenia’s. Again, the issue is one of ‘stemming a historical tide’, this time of Armenian encroachment and massacre in Albanian and Azeri lands: losing Karabakh – spoken of in almost-mythical terms in the historical discourse, as a cradle of Azeri culture – would be giving up one part of one’s country to an ever-growing enemy. This historical attachment to Karabakh is deeply entrenched: witness Aliyev’s (alleged) retreat during the Key West negotiations in 2001, when the possibility of ceding control over Karabakh was abandoned by the veteran leader on his return to Baku (alluded to in chapter 7).

In Georgia, attempts by Saakashvili to make Georgia’s national ideology and state identity more accommodative to minorities by stressing civic rather than ethnic notions of nationalism have had little effect in relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, partly because conflicting historical narratives and competing identities are so entrenched, going beyond the immediate effects of 1991-93. In any case, following the 2008 war,

the question of whether the Abkhazian and South Ossetian populations would have traded their independence for some kind of association with a liberal and democratic Georgia remains – for lack of a better word – *academic*. The presence of geographically concentrated Azeri and, especially, Armenian minorities has also always been a cause for concern to authorities in Tbilisi, especially in the case of the Armenians because of, again, their long-time dependence on Russian bases for economic survival, reinforced by the historical perception of Armenians as a pro-Russian element and potential fifth column. In the case of the Javakheti Armenians, the risk of this sub-state level phenomenon encroaching on amity/enmity at the regional level by negatively affecting Georgian-Armenian relations is always present; but Yerevan – keenly aware of its dependence on Georgian transportation links to the outside world – has so far been able to maintain a pragmatic attitude to its ethnic brethren across the border.

All three recognised units are, moreover, *vertically* inherently weak: corrupt and unstable from a macro-perspective, highly dysfunctional from a discursive, micro-perspective, through the absence of consensus on the state, and its political mechanisms as a ‘shared strategy of survival’. Any stability is, by and large, not the result of state legitimacy: in all three states, governing elites have to repress and marginalise oppositionist counter-elites that as a rule see the street as a valid form of political interaction, with most of the general population viewing the state and its institutions with distrust. The extent of legitimacy, and the ability of the states to use repression/cooptation to compensate for a lack thereof varies from state to state and over time – with Azerbaijan’s hydrocarbon reserves in particular giving the Aliyev regime a powerful tool for patronage – but the overall picture of vertical weakness, of legitimacy gaps camouflaged by state force remains in place.

What’s more, the vertical inherent weakness of states inevitably relates to both the amity/enmity and GPP variables. In the absence of a liberal-democratic ‘collective strategy of survival’, regional regimes must build their narratives of legitimacy not so much on the rule of law, but on their ability to realise the nationalist-mythological objectives they have set themselves. The aim of reunification is always at the top of any government’s agenda in both Georgia and Azerbaijan, and no Armenian presidential candidate (including the ‘liberal’ Levon Ter-Petrosyan) would consider not including the self-determination of Karabakh in their programmes. Reintegration and/or reunification are thus not only relevant in terms of their effect on diverging strategies of survival that underlie vertical incoherence: they feed into patterns of amity/enmity by making diverging identities the basis for regime survival as well, in a region plagued by a lack of legitimate political process.

Moreover, the deficit of viable political mechanisms that would forge a legitimate consensus on matters of national security makes it difficult for governments to claim a mandate for compromise solutions that go beyond the requirements of narrow nationalism. In both Armenia and Azerbaijan, the democratic legitimacy of governments has been highly suspect for most of the post-Soviet period, and leaders can therefore not unambiguously argue they have the authority to bargain on behalf of their populations, something that has been seized upon by the opposition in Armenia and Azerbaijan especially. And, because of the high level of securitisation that underlies the territorial conflicts, again, both elites and counter-elites employ the latter as highly effective means of mobilisation.

As seen in the empirical chapters, the narratives that underlie both horizontal and vertical state incoherence also interact with the security discourses on GPP. Georgian views of the break-up of their state in the early 1990s are infused with the narrative of Russian imperialism; their National Security Concept refers to this Russian role in fostering secessionism in only slightly oblique terms. Accusations of pro-Russian sympathies are moreover often employed by the authorities in Tbilisi against opposition forces (most notably in the turbulent 2007/08 pre-election period). While Azerbaijan's foreign and security policies are clearly based on a refusal to be bound by one particular alliance, a refusal to choose between the West and Russia, the idea that the Karabakh conflict was instigated by Russia and that Armenian victories were largely due to Russian support pervades the discourse of policymakers, analysts and the broader public (although it now diminishes the higher one climbs in the policymaking hierarchy). The perception that Armenia is a Russian puppet without, in effect, the ability to make independent policy is common currency throughout Baku. Meanwhile, elites and counter-elites in Armenia often interpret criticism of Armenia's human rights record and electoral process as being motivated by an intention to either pressure or reward Yerevan for concessions regarding Nagorno-Karabakh.

Great Power Penetration and Amity/Enmity

GPP interacts with the regional security dynamic in three ways. Firstly, the particular pattern of GPP prevalent within the region – competitive multipolar – shapes the systemic structural context within which regional actors make their policy choices, or rather, translates this systemic context onto the regional level in region-specific form. Second, structural conditions within the RSC co-determine the specific policy choices made by the great powers, in light of the particular definitions of interest that underlie this pattern of GPP. Third, the great powers' individual policy choices in turn shape both the calculations and perceptions of regional actors, through their links to the regional balance of power and their perceptions of interest and threat. The result is a

complexly structured security constellation where securitisations at different levels intertwine and conspire to constantly recreate and sustain a revisionist-conflictual security complex whose enmities are reinforced from below and above, from both the sub-state and systemic levels.

That GPP into the Southern Caucasus is multipolar and competitive was demonstrated in the previous chapter. The Russian Federation has perhaps the most complex and long-standing links to the region, with economic and military-strategic assets, and a definition of interest that goes to the very core of its historically constructed identity as a great power, with the region forming part of its increasingly geo-economically defined 'sphere of privileged interest'. This goes against the enduring aim of Western powers – the USA and EU – to tap and transport Caspian hydrocarbon resources over routes beyond Moscow's control. Neighbouring regional powers – Turkey, Iran – play a role as well, the former as a NATO member, a transit corridor for hydrocarbons and, increasingly, an assertive regional player in its own right, the latter through its securitisations of Azerbaijan as a potential threat to its territorial integrity.

This generally competitive picture must be somewhat nuanced: the great powers do share an interest in avoiding the type of long-term, large-scale conflagration that could endanger energy flows or create wider regional instability, apart from potentially feeding into higher-level interests operating at the systemic level through potential policy linkages with, for instance, strategic arms control or joint counter-terrorism efforts. Despite its drama, the 2008 war was still a relatively contained and short-lived affair, with Moscow clearly wary of letting the instability in its soft southern underbelly affect the northern Caucasus, and Washington concerned with the potential interruption of the BTC pipeline so central to its regional interests. Turkey also has an interest in longer-term regional stability, because of its physical proximity and its excellent bilateral relations with Russia. But save for these important caveats, it is fair to state the general thrust, the inherent logic of great power interaction in the South Caucasus to be one of multipolar competition.

That competition is largely – but not entirely – based on *material interest*, that is, characteristics inherent to the region that are relevant to the powers' definitions of security. The great powers' motivations in the region are, on the whole, based on its *instrumental, material* value towards strategic objectives: the provision/control of energy supplies, transit to theatres of war in West Asia, stability in one's periphery are all aimed at bolstering the economic and societal securities of the powers involved. There is, however, an element of identity at play in their involvement as well: for Russia in particular, the Southern Caucasus is more than just a region, it is part of its self-view

as a great power, of value as the derzhava's sphere of privileged interest. Combined with a particularly geo-economic techno-scientific knowledge governing its instrumental rationality – based increasingly on *economic* control within this sphere of interest – this creates a particularly strong tie to the region.

The fact that several great powers are involved in the Southern Caucasus, and that their overall relationship has been competitive, certainly affects the range of options open to both the recognised and unrecognised units within the region. Azerbaijan is, clearly, a major beneficiary of this situation: its National Security Concept clearly outlines a refusal to 'take sides', and its post-1994 foreign and security policies can be described as a non-committal and multi-vectoral balancing act, tilting towards either the West or (as was increasingly the case in the 2000s) Russia as conditions change. One important material factor – its coveted oil and gas reserves – gives it the opportunity to play one of the sides off against the other as needed: apart from the competition over proposed hydrocarbon export routes, Baku is far less dependent on foreign aid for its political and military security – as defined in the NSC and reinforced in the discourse – than either Armenia or Georgia.

In this multipolar-competitive GPP context, Armenia has allied itself firmly with Russia, mainly due to its strong securitisation of NATO member Turkey as an existential threat. Consequently, its options to vacillate and play off are far more limited: excluded from the major regional energy and transportation projects, and lacking any natural resources or industries that might be of interest to the other great powers, strategic sectors of its economy have, over the years, gone into Russian ownership, creating a dependency that leaves little room for manoeuvre. Nevertheless, Yerevan's 'complementary' foreign policy, introduces a very limited element of nuance and, at the very least, *potential* alternatives into the equation, perhaps a function of its large Western diasporas and a desire to keep its options open in case Russia is forced out of the region.

Georgia, meanwhile, has used this multipolar competition to clearly side with 'the West' in the hope of protection by NATO and eventual reunification. Its major asset – or, depending on how one views it, liability – has been its position as an alternative to Russia for the transit of Caspian hydrocarbons from both Azerbaijan and, potentially at a later stage, Central Asia. Its strained relationship and very strong securitisation of Russia as a threat to its territorial integrity and sovereignty limit its options in re-adjusting its policies: its discursive dependence on the West is considerable, and a re-adjustment of regional GPP towards Russia – following, for instance, a loss of interest

by the West – would put the central thrust of its foreign and security policies under considerable strain, in effect requiring a paradigm shift in Georgian strategic thinking.

The multipolar-competitive nature of GPP opens up and closes a variety of possibilities for regional units; the other side of the equation consists of the way in which great powers make specific policy choices based on *regional* structural constraints when shaping the specific ways in which they engage. As alluded to above, these constraints take the form of the intra-regional patterns of securitisation that permeate it and shape its political culture and patterns of amity/enmity. In cases where these securitisations are directed at the great powers themselves (Georgia-Russia/Armenia-Turkey), these constrictions are obvious. But intra-regional patterns of securitisation are relevant here as well: both on the regional and sub-state level, they consist of the fundamentally divergent discourses of identity that underlie the RSC's status as revisionist-conflictual, and to any power desiring some measure of control over the region, these provide a perfect opportunity to maintain a level of influence through a policy of 'divide and rule'.

In this region's patterns of securitisation, Armenia's intense rivalry with Azerbaijan provides a central point of division: quite simply, it is the main reason why any meaningful tri-lateral cooperation between the region's three recognised units remains out of the question. And, as long as it remains frozen, the conflict does grant Moscow a significant structural advantage in its stated aims of maintaining the Southern Caucasus RSC within its sphere of privileged interest. Armenia cannot provide an alternative route for Caspian hydrocarbons and remains locked in its strategic relationship with Moscow, while Baku's oil exports are routed either through Russia proper or unstable and easily manipulable Georgia. If there were successful cooperation between the three states *outside of Russian control*, the increased bargaining power stemming from co-ordinated policies would give regional actors a degree of independence that would seem unwelcome in Moscow.

Russia's attitude towards the Karabakh conflict has therefore always been ambiguous. As a member of the Minsk Group, it has indeed ostensibly strived for a resolution of the conflict as an impartial mediator for the better part of two decades. Although it supported Armenia during its war against Azerbaijan with generous supplies of weaponry, it now has excellent relations with both sides. Commentators and analysts in both Tbilisi and Baku have alleged that it is fundamentally interested in a non-resolution of the conflict as it provides it with leverage over both belligerent parties. And looking at the structural advantages gained by Moscow from that frozen conflict – in terms of an ability to maintain an influence over two fundamentally conflicted parties

and within a deeply divided region – the allegation that it is not interested in a resolution *unless it occurs under its guidance and reinforces its regional position* (through, for instance, the insertion of Russian peacekeepers or legal guarantees) doesn't seem that far-fetched.

The multiple sub-state securitisations that fragment Georgia similarly provide ample opportunity for a continued Russian presence. Georgian political leaders (including Shevardnadze and Saakashvili) have in the past accused Moscow of not being interested in the resolution of conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (see chapter 9). Again, the structural advantages of these conflicts are clear: for almost 20 years, they provided Russia with a guaranteed foothold in the South Caucasus, and a means of harassing the authorities in Tbilisi through the actions of proxies whose links with the FSB are only thinly veiled. Especially in South Ossetia, and to a lesser extent in Abkhazia, the separatists would have very little freedom of manoeuvre indeed in the absence of Russia's tolerance or aid, depending on how one views Russia's role up to 2008. After the war, with the recognition of both entities, this de-facto situation has simply burst into the open.

The mirror image of those structural side-constraints on policy operate for the West; Georgia's historically rooted securitisation of Russia makes it an obvious candidate as both an ally and a point of transit. On their own, the material benefits of its position cannot account for that fact. On the other hand, Armenia's securitisation of Turkey and its intense enmity towards Azerbaijan preclude the West from establishing extensive strategic ties with the land-locked country; provided, of course, that such ties would be desired in light of the probable irritation such a policy would cause in Baku, whose hydrocarbon reserves, after all, remain the West's primary point of interest in the region. Here, behaviour by the Western powers and Russia seem to, increasingly, mirror each other as they respond to Azerbaijan's multi-vectoral policies with a similarly delicate balancing act, trying hard to curry favour in Baku without losing sight of other, competing regional interests: the ability to maintain an effective regional strategic presence for Moscow, and the avoidance of major regional conflict for both Russia and the West.

The multipolar-competitive configuration of GPP sets up the systemic-regional structural context within which units make their choices, generally subservient to the identities and values that are their referent objects of securitisation. The actual policies they then formulate towards the great powers are a joint product of this regional-systemic structural context, and their perception how the individual great powers relate to these referent objects. In the Southern Caucasus, regional units align themselves

with great powers based not so much on shared values, as on the basis of practical considerations of how such alignments affect the superior goals of national grand strategy; their prime consideration is the value of these alignments as counter-measures against perceived, mostly regionally generated threats. The fact that Moscow and the West are, to a large extent, in opposition within the Southern Caucasus, gives local entities a theoretical opportunity to bandwagon with the 'camp' that enhances their regional position and secures their referent objects most effectively; the nature of their referent objects and the existing securitisations surrounding them act as side-constraints to the units' agency, pushing them in the direction of one particular side.

GPP thus clearly helps shape the RSC's polarity by aiding entities that arguably would not be able to hold their own in the absence of great power penetration. Armenia could not resist Azerbaijan and Turkey if it were left exposed by Russia. Georgia could not possibly defy Russia's aims in the absence of the Western alternative; conversely, both the South Ossetian and Abkhaz authorities are acutely aware of their dependence on Russian goodwill, as clearly demonstrated in August 2008. This regional bandwagoning has reinforced the 'frozen' nature of the conflicts in the region: it distorts the region's polarity, reducing incentives to compromise for different actors hiding behind 'their' benefactors which are arguably not interested in resolving many of the regional conflicts in ways outside their control, at least, arguably, in the case of Moscow.

Evaluating the Hypotheses

What does this mean for the hypotheses proposed in chapter 5? The first proposition, asserted that horizontal state incoherence and overlapping territorial claims based on national minorities adjacent to but outside their nation-states have driven the South Caucasian RSC towards greater enmity since independence. I hypothesised that this was due, from a micro-perspective, to both direct and indirect discursive processes: *directly*, the region is driven towards the highly inimical 'revisionist conflict formation' category through the existence of de-facto states of dubious legitimacy, as a result of a failure of the fragmented recognised states to produce collective strategies of survival. *Indirectly*, enmity in the region is increased through the identification of regional units with secessionist minorities in neighbouring states, or through the instrumentalisation of such minorities for higher-level strategic aims; among others, by penetrating great powers. Both factors strengthen the element of revisionism within the RSC, and hence, its status as a revisionist conflict formation.

Again, as discussed in chapter 5, the second hypothesis tied amity/enmity to patterns of GPP, proposing that the competitive nature of great power penetration has played an essential role in maintaining the 'frozen' version of the revisionist conflict formation that has existed for most of the period under study in the Caucasus, through its effects on the *instrumental* security discourses in the region. Any move of the RSC towards a security regime would only partially be facilitated by changes in these patterns of penetration, as these patterns of penetration have only limited effect on the region's clashing values and identities, as visible in the argumentative aspects of the security discourse.

The first hypothesis – that the direct and indirect discursive processes behind horizontal state incoherence push the region towards enmity – has been proved correct beyond reasonable doubt. The very absence of collective strategies of survival in the fragmented states, and the resulting fragmentation creates de-facto statelets which, lacking international recognition, turn the region into a revisionist conflict formation almost as a matter of tautology. But more indirectly, the overlapping territorialities based on historical narratives also push the units' identities, and hence, their perceptions of security, towards conflict. Armenia's ethno-nationalist (as opposed to civic-nationalist) definition of identity, and its strong identification with Armenian minorities in Nagorno-Karabakh and Javakheti are one example of how these territorialities create lasting tension and conflict, based not so much on *material interests* as on *fundamental values and identities* held by the different states and societies.

Moreover, value/identity conflicts seem to provide ample opportunity for meddling by outside actors, as witnessed by the *instrumentalisation* by Moscow of Georgia's internal incoherence, and, arguably, the Armenian-Azeri conflict. The previous section already discussed how the frozen conflicts in the region were maintained by Russia to secure a strategic advantage; while not directly increasing enmity in the Southern Caucasus RSC, these identity/value-centred securitisations further maintain the possibility of conflict precisely by opening up opportunities for outside interference, for their instrumental use by interested parties, making any decrease in the region's revisionist-conflictual nature even more unlikely. Horizontal state incoherence is indeed one of the underlying causes of enmity in the Southern Caucasus, as hypothesised.

The broader issue of how *GPP* affects amity/enmity within the South Caucasus RSC is more complex, and requires a few clarifications. Importantly, the question here is not only the direct involvement of individual great powers acting as an efficient factor in

shaping patterns of amity/enmity. Rather, the hypothesis refers to the *patterns* of GPP as passive, *permissive* shapers of regional conditions, setting the general context, the background within which argumentative and instrumental securitisations occur. Second, I need to be clear about the modifications that would be necessary to shift between the 'conflict formation' and 'thin security regime' categories of the amity/enmity spectrum, as opposed to jumping from 'thick security regimes' to 'security communities'. Chapter 2 clearly set out the characteristics of revisionist/status-quo conflict formations, thin/thick security regimes and loose/tight security communities. To recap, in 'thin security regimes', narrow, formal agreements aim to minimise the chances of war between units that, while recognising each other's legitimacy, remain fundamentally distrustful of each other. In thick security regimes, these agreements take on a larger array of issue-areas, become values in and of themselves, while security communities see the emergence of collective identities and near-complete mutual desecuritisation.

Transitions within this spectrum necessitate changes in the units' instrumental and argumentative security discourses. Thus, a transformation from revisionist to status-quo conflict formation requires the emergence of compatible identities, while a transition across the border between status-quo conflict formations and thin security regimes is mainly affected by changes in the *instrumental* aspects of securitisation (as to the acceptance of war as a means towards security). Transitions to 'warmer' forms of peace (thick security regimes, security communities) additionally require alterations in the security discourses' argumentative aspects (the inclusion of regimes in the units' value-sets, the emergence of collective identities). The question thus becomes how patterns of GPP affect the *instrumental* as opposed to the argumentative aspects of a region's security discourses. If variations in these patterns can be shown to influence transitions between the status-quo conflict formation and thin security regime categories, the hypothesis would be proven correct.

In the discursively dependent southern Caucasus RSC, great powers are mostly seen as either *means* or *threats* to established values and identities. Their immediate effects on the security discourses of the regional units seem to be clearly situated on the *instrumental* side. The particular configuration of GPP co-determines the choices open to regional units in combination with their perceptions of threat, and any great powers not perceived as such will be potential means towards greater security. The presence of several competing great powers – as is the case in the Southern Caucasus – allows regional units to augment their capabilities through alliances and bandwagoning, albeit subject to considerable structural side-constraints: in particular, the security exigencies of their identities and values.

Turkey and Russia are securitised as *threats* by, respectively, Armenia and Georgia. Russia and the United States/NATO are, by contrast, seen as *means* towards greater security by these same states. In the absence of strong securitisations of either Russia or Western states, Baku has been able to pursue a more balanced policy, remaining non-committal to both 'sides'. The main effect of Russia's alliance with Armenia has been to offset Baku's growing military power, and the perceived threats emanating from Turkey, in effect granting Yerevan an existential guarantee in the absence of which its position within the RSC would have been precarious, to say the least. Russia's involvement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia similarly guarantees the continued existence of these statelets. Georgia, meanwhile, clearly sees its growing association with NATO as, again, an existential guarantee, with the one difference that, not having attained full membership, it did *not* enjoy article V protection in August 2008. With an independent source of power – hydrocarbons – Azerbaijan is much less dependent on exclusive Western or Russian help in enhancing its regional position. Certainly, at the level of state discourse, the main emphasis seems to be on *instrumental* alliances with this or that power in function of the augmentation of relative power that it provides, subject to the fundamental values-as-referent-objects underlying the state.

GPP thus distorts the polarity within a given RSC through these alliances and associations, and so indirectly shapes the views of different states on the practical utility of war as an instrument of policy. Again, because GPP is competitive and multipolar in the Southern Caucasus, great power interventions lack fundamental coordination (although there are clearly delimited areas of cooperation as, for instance, in the Minsk Group), allowing different regional units some leeway in their alignments. True, the existing securitisations of great powers as threat put considerable limits on this agency; but there is little doubt that the regional units would be far more constrained in their instrumental strategic choices under conditions of, say, unipolar penetration or multipolar-cooperative GPP.

The picture becomes clear when one attempts a counterfactual exercise: given the security discourses existing in the region, and their discursive dependence on individual great powers and the particular pattern of penetration that shapes the regional environment, what would happen if, say, the region were penetrated by one single great power, or through a multipolar-cooperative pattern? The extent to which such forms would constrain the options open to the different regional actors would merely depend on the willingness of the great power(s) to impose its (their) uniform solution on the different actors. While it would certainly not guarantee outcomes, it would undoubtedly end up limiting the variety of options open to regional actors today, hampering the logic of Azerbaijan's multi-vectoral policy, and putting all regional states

before the choice of either *resisting* the one or collective great power(s) – at high cost – or complying.

The main point is that the effects of such co-ordinated GPP would largely be limited to the instrumental portion of the regional security discourse, to the units' perceptions of relative power that ultimately underlie their view of war as a rational policy tool. Co-ordinated action imposing or facilitating a peace in Nagorno-Karabakh or North Ossetia and Abkhazia would substantially increase the relative costs of continued armed conflict, especially for those units with strong dependencies on an outside power. Resisting a solution imposed by Russia, or the great powers acting in concert would be well-near impossible for the Abkhaz and the South Ossetians, and similarly so for the Armenians, who would no longer be able to turn to alternatives to bolster their positions, while Azerbaijan would no longer enjoy the possibility of vacillation. Hard choices would have to be made by all regional units. Even in the absence of direct coercion, unipolar or cooperative-multipolar patterns of GPP would facilitate the provision of great power guarantees underpinning any thin security regime, again skewing units' instrumental discourses in the direction of compliance.

Then does the systemic level have no or little effect on the units' argumentative discourses, their values and identities? It is admittedly difficult to see how whether a region is penetrated by one or several co-operating great powers would make a difference as to the identities and values of regional units, at least in the short term. In this case-study, it is clear that the most fundamental identities and values relating to national and state identity – and, ultimately, conflict – are largely *internally* generated, based as they are on nationalist narratives that emerged in the early 20th century, and were very imperfectly suppressed in Soviet times, only to re-emerge after the end of the Cold War. The extent to which outright Soviet domination *failed* in deliberately supplanting these national identities with the artificially constructed *Homo Sovieticus* ideal is remarkable in that respect: in fact, for all the talk of brotherhood of nations, competing national identities were unwittingly *reinforced* in a dramatically essentialised form with all the unintended consequences that entailed (see also chapter 1).

Patterns of GPP thus mainly affect the instrumental discourses of the regional units: their acceptance of war as a means towards security. Does that confirm my second hypothesis? Thin security regimes do not suppose trust between the parties: they simply imply the abrogation of war as a policy tool for practical, rational reasons, the relevant security regime being only shallowly internalised, and supplemented by verification procedures. But what the Southern Caucasus shows is the continuing relevance of *incompatible, divergent identities* to the possible emergence of such

regimes; in the absence of the mutual recognition, a thin security regime upheld from the systemic level would be far from self-sustaining and complete. A security arrangement between adversaries that still don't trust each other, but accept each others' right to exist (and not much more) would be different from one where surviving incompatible identities would drive potential belligerents at each other's throats at the slightest lessening of great power coercion.

So while patterns of GPP definitely do play a relatively important role in the transitions between conflict formations and thin security regimes, their effect must be put in the proper perspective: the stability of resulting regimes will *also* be shaped by the *compatibility* of *identities*, and that is mainly a regional-domestic affair. What is also clear is that the role of global factors culminates in the 'colder' ranges of the amity/enmity spectrum, with 'warmer' forms of peace – thick security regimes, security communities – being constituted to a much greater extent by profound changes in the argumentative sections of the security discourses, over which patterns of penetration have little effect. So, while patterns of GPP do have a *comparatively* more important effect on the emergence of thin security regimes through their influence on instrumental discourses, the regional and domestic levels remain an important factor there, as in warmer forms of amity, through their role in shaping the argumentative aspects of security discourse.

There is, however, one point of nuance. While *patterns* of GPP may not have an effect on argumentative security discourses, the *individual* regional involvements of great powers do (albeit in a longer-term and indeterminate manner). As seen in chapter 8, the *rhetoric* (though not the *practice*) of 'democracy', 'good governance' and 'human rights' has certainly permeated the region since its release from the Soviet Union in 1991, highlighting the role of 'European' or 'Western' values in shaping the identity of elites and counter-elites in the region, beyond the lip-service paid to them by various leaders. The conditionalities of OSCE and Council of Europe membership do seem to have some constraining effect on the discourse (and, to a *much* lesser extent, practice) of governments, who try to bolster their rickety internal and external legitimacies by at least some measure of demonstrative compliance. Meanwhile, 'European values' infuse the narratives of opposition movements and counter-elites in all three recognised states, and even unrecognised units like Abkhazia. The notion that integrating with Europe would make the region a more 'civilised' place does feature in the less nationalist portions of all regional societies' narratives, apart from being implicit in their *official* discourses, as evidenced through their place in all three NSCs.

The one regional unit identifying most with these values in its official discourse is Georgia; talk of democracy and human rights has a slightly hollow ring to it in rather more clearly authoritarian Armenia and Azerbaijan. More relevant to the construction of new, compatible identities, Saakashvili in particular tried to introduce a more liberal, civic form of nationalism along with his pro-Western orientation. It must be said that there were some successes in reshaping ethno-centric thinking in Georgia, judging by comparisons between local surveys and popular attitudes in Yerevan and Baku. But even in Tbilisi, the move towards this form of nationalism, and the desire to conform to NATO standards and conditionalities regarding democratisation was *instrumental*, still subject to the over-archingly vital identity of Georgia as a unified state that includes Abkhazia and South Ossetia, *come what may*. The imperative of unification remained intact, and acted as one important driver of the August 2008 war, which nullified any integrating effect such civic nationalism might have had, quite apart from severely discrediting Tbilisi's stated adherence to 'Western' norms.

More broadly, there are clearly elements within the elites and counter-elites of all Southern Caucasus units that ascribe to the idea(s) of the European Union and the Council of Europe, and 'the West' in general, as a potential remedy for the region's woes. The notion that the conflicts within the region could be resolved through growing co-operation and interdependence between the existing units – even in the absence of formal peace agreements – is one that recurs regularly, especially (and not accidentally) in entities (like Armenia) contented with the status-quo¹³¹. Such interdependence and trade would, the argument goes, make the borders between states or the formal sovereignty of unrecognised regions much less relevant to their interaction (similar to what happened in Eastern Europe following EU expansion). This logic also drives the importance given – especially by Western-funded NGOs – to track-two diplomacy in the region. The underlying idea is to foster interaction between parts of the different units' civil societies. Prominent examples include programmes fostering social and cultural exchanges between Azeris and Armenians, and Abkhaz and Georgians by Conciliation Resources (www.c-r.org) and International Alert (www.international-alert.org), bilateral initiatives including visits by delegations of diplomats and intellectuals in Baku, Yerevan and Stepanakert (Broers, 2010), and 'Social Innovation Camps' organised around participants in the region's emerging 'blogosphere' (sic-caucasus.net) .

¹³¹ Interviews, Yerevan, Tbilisi (2008) and Sukhumi (2009). The goal of a 'common market' in the Southern Caucasus is also explicitly mentioned in Georgia's National Security Concept (see chapter 7).

It must be stressed, however, that these initiatives are quite limited in their effects. Any participants are mostly drawn either from officialdom, or from a highly select, usually westernised stratum of a civil society that is quite weak in all units of the RSC. Any desecuritisations that might occur through these interpersonal contacts would still have to be seen in terms of drops in an ocean of mutual fear and suspicion. There are no broad-based peace groups in any of the South Caucasian societies, no meaningfully pervasive counter-discourses to the narrow nationalisms that pervade the region, except, as argued above, in the highly dubious case of Georgia. And this brings us back to my hypothesis on the relationship between the systemic level and the level of enmity within RSCs.

If the great powers and the system-level have effects on the values and identities that drive conflict and are, in their common and collective forms, essential for the 'warm peace' of thick security regimes and security communities, that link is distant and extremely indeterminate, certainly in comparison to the instrumental threats/means discourses that are much more linked to identifiable material conditions and an instrumental form of rationality. The point is not so much that the systemic level, and great powers with 'soft power' are *irrelevant*; rather, the processes that underlie changes in values and identity are to a far greater extent dependent on intra-regional and domestic factors; in view of the complexity of identity- and value-formation, systemic factors therefore prove far less *directly* relevant to the choice of ultimate *ends* than the identification of *threats and means*, and thus, the emergence of 'warmer' forms of amity.

Towards a Security Regime?

The Southern Caucasus RSC is revisionist-conflictual. In other words, on their argumentative side, divergent security discourses of its units tend to dismiss the existing status quo through their non-recognition of other units' legitimacy. On their instrumental side, equally divergent discourses continue to view war and armed conflict as a legitimate and practically relevant means of securing states' referent objects. The final question I put myself at the start of this thesis was the possibility of this RSC moving from the 'revisionist conflict formation' part of the amity/enmity spectrum to 'security regime', thin or thick. For that to occur, the units within it would have to, first, recognise each other's legitimacy, and, secondly, war would have to be subject to long-term restrictive regional normative mechanisms. Are there any prospects of this occurring? In terms of the general framework employed here, the question to ask is whether and how the state discourses underlying the status of the region as revisionist-conflictual could be destabilised, either from below, from within the states' societies, or above, through pressures emanating from the systemic level of the great powers.

In the following paragraphs, I shall broach this question by looking at the stability of the regional security discourse, at *rigidities* reinforcing the conditions of extreme enmity, and *instabilities* potentially transforming these into something more amicable. What has shaped the state discourses on security in this revisionist-conflictual way? The first, most obvious rigidity can be found within the societies themselves. As seen throughout the thesis, the divergent discourses of enmity are firmly rooted in all societies in the region, which are imbued with an ethnic nationalism marked by essentialist and mutually exclusive identities, one that sees war as a logical way of enhancing state policy. As pointed out above, there is no tradition whatsoever of large-scale pacifist movements (similar to 'Peace Now' in Israel); external efforts to promote such movements remain marginal at best. There is no major pan-Caucasian movement advocating regional integration, based either on economic expediency or a shared 'Caucasian' identity. Any talk of region-wide co-operation stumbles on the deep-rooted enmity between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and even Georgian-Azeri cooperation remains largely at a superficial, rhetorical level, confined in practice to the issue-areas of transportation and energy.

The necessary conditions for the emergence of a security regime 'from below' through the destabilisation of dominant narratives are thus lacking; all the more so because of the continued *incoherence* of the states in the region, which, as I argued in the previous sections, is a major impediment to amity, both in its horizontal and vertical forms. With the divergent 'strategies of survival' underlying the fragmentation of both Georgia and Azerbaijan so deeply rooted in the societies of the breakaway states, there is truly minimal hope of pressures from below facilitating re-unification. And, as was pointed out above, the democratic deficit that underlies the vertical legitimacy of all units in the region, again, diminishes incentives for governments to reconsider their adherence to incompatible, essentialist identities and war as a continuation of policy by other means. Nationalist rhetoric acts as an 'Ersatz'-legitimacy, and the weakness of civil societies further diminishes the chances of internally generated change.

Could such compatible identities or normative limitations on war be imposed from above, from the systemic level? As argued in the previous sections and chapters, the competitive-multipolar pattern of GPP provides a backdrop where regional units can bolster their relative power through alliances with great power 'sponsors', and, at least in theory, a change in these patterns would have a limiting effect on the options open to them, at least in their *instrumental* policies towards incompatibly defined ends. The link between GPP and value-based *argumentative* discourses is far more convoluted and tenuous than that between these penetrations and *instrumental* discourses. How would a change in the patterns of GPP affect the chances of a security regime in the

RSC, through the dominance of the region by one single great power, or co-operation between these great powers, or in other words, the emergence of hegemony, unipolar and multipolar-cooperative forms of GPP?

Of course, outright *hegemony* by any great power would supersede and suppress the 'native' securitisations in the Southern Caucasus RSC, by definition. If Moscow managed to restore a situation of 'overlay', this would remove much of the current usefulness – for Moscow at least – of maintaining frozen conflicts; in fact, a resolution would be seen as a priority for any power obtaining such comprehensive control over the region. Such a re-imposition of Russian hegemony – one that supersedes and suppresses all local patterns of securitisation – remains extremely unlikely. First, it is clear that Russia does not currently aim for such an eventuality; while it certainly has a 'geo-economic' view of its 'sphere of special responsibility', its foreign policy clearly does not seek at the kind of total control that marked the Soviet Union's relationship to Eastern Europe during the Cold War. While it certainly aims for the economic re-integration of the former Soviet space, and for the maintenance of friendly, pro-Russian regimes in 'its' region, that does not imply the kind of influence that would entail *overlay*. In any event, it would be difficult to see how the traditionally more anti-Russian societies in Georgia and Azerbaijan could ever accept such an eventuality; it would require considerable repressive force on Moscow's part, aside from the necessity of overcoming the very real material interests of the West within the region. A return to the past thus seems implausible.

The opposite extreme would consist of the West gaining an exclusive and comprehensive foothold, through NATO and EU expansion, and either a transformation of Russian priorities away from the current geo-economic, moderately Eurasianist world-view and/or an implosion in Moscow's power. But this eventuality seems even less probable than that of a restoration of Russian hegemony. The Southern Caucasus' importance to Russia – both in terms of *identity* and *interest* – was extensively pointed to in Chapter 9; it would take some kind of calamity resembling the situation in the early 1990s for Russia to give up its pretensions to a region with which it has maintained so complex a relationship for so long. Its interests in the region are clearly greater and deeper than the West's, and simple geographic proximity amplifies its ability to project power into it. Besides, Western interests in the region, while significant, would most probably not justify the effort such an exercise in overlay would require.

Hegemony is a very extreme form of great power involvement, one that in effect severely limits the anarchy of a given RSC. Less extreme, unipolar or multipolar-

cooperative forms of GPP would not involve the suppression of regional patterns of securitisation, thus not addressing the problem of divergent argumentative discourses. But an assertion of unipolar penetration by either the West or Russia, or comprehensively co-operative penetration by the Western powers and Russia might at some point impose certain intermediate solutions on belligerents in the region by making war a normatively still acceptable but *practically irrational* choice. Such changes in patterns of GPP would limit the array of options open to the countries within the region: with Georgia dependent on the West, Armenia dependent on Russia, and Azerbaijan dependent on its ability to play off West against East in their striving for its oil reserves, at least some of the recognised powers would see the costs of counter-acting one single or several co-operating powers rise exponentially in the case of unipolar or multipolar-cooperative GPP.

Unipolar outcomes in the patterns of GPP are only marginally less unlikely than hegemony for reasons parallel to the ones brought against the possibility of *hegemonic* dominance by one single power: in the absence of unforeseeable 'events', none of the powers currently penetrating the region would seem to be in any way willing to withdraw from it *completely*, considering their firmly grounded interests. The possibility of co-operative multipolar penetration as a possibly facilitating factor for the emergence of an imperfect security regime would require either a change in the well-grounded contradictory fundamental interests driving these powers, or some sort of mutual accommodation (based on linkages with higher-level, systemic interests, for instance). It would also necessitate a readiness of these great powers to co-ordinate their policies in the region across a wide variety of issue-areas, expending considerable resources in an effort to counter-act the strong intra-regional dynamics that ultimately sustain the various conflicts there, conflicts that, as we have seen, are not the result of 'rational' calculations, but of *clashing identities and values*.

Even in the unlikely event of unipolar or co-operative-multipolar GPP, these identities and values would thus continue to diverge in any foreseeable timeframe: any resulting security regime would be *extremely* imperfect and heavily dependent on long-term outside involvement. It is difficult to see how *any* kind of great power intervention could consciously '*manufacture*' the required compatibility in identities, as argued in the previous section. In any case, such an attempt would require an extremely long-term commitment on the part of a great power (as the recent experience in the Balkans has shown), and co-ordinated action by a group of fundamentally inimical great powers over such a long period seems far-fetched and laced with uncertainties. Both the divergent identities governing the behaviours of recognised states would have to be

addressed, as well as the inability of fragmented units to generate the collective strategies of survival required for coherent statehood: a tall order indeed.

The two remaining sources of potential change would be *material* factors and, if you will, the 'joker in the pack': *human agency*. Could the one material variable that RSCT does recognise – polarity – be a driver for the emergence of a security regime? In the narrow case of Georgia and the secessionist units, it is difficult to see how a change in power relations could *ever* bring back Abkhazia and South Ossetia under Tbilisi's control without enormous costs in terms of Moscow's credibility. But the one major indigenous variable affecting the broader polarity of the South Caucasus is the presence of hydrocarbons, oil and gas; and one could extrapolate as to its effects, boldly assuming the absence of 'corrective' great power intervention. Its main effect has been on the changing balance of power between the region's two largest belligerents – Armenia and Azerbaijan – and the one inter-state conflict impeding trilateral co-operation between the region's recognised units. One of the possibilities might thus be identified in the changing indigenous balance of power between Armenia/Karabakh and Azerbaijan. This would involve either the Armenian side desisting from separation in reaction to Azerbaijan's ominous threats, conscious of its inability to win any future war. Or, conversely, it could consist of Azerbaijan, over the longer term, losing the perceived advantage emanating from its hydrocarbon reserves, thus grudgingly accepting the existing status quo.

Yet, Armenia's armed forces and polity more generally seem confident of their ability to win any future conflict because of the perceived corruption within the Azeri army and the powerful advantage granted Armenian forces through their defensive position in notoriously difficult terrain. Added to that comes its construction of Azeris as aiming to eradicate the Armenian presence in Karabakh over the longer term, if given any type of control: rationally, war is therefore a preferable bet over this perceived certainty. As the ICG (2007) has pointed out, combined with growing Azeri confidence, and the dependence of Azerbaijan's political stability on oil-funded co-optation, with Azerbaijan's oil production scheduled to peak in 2012, this might actually push Baku towards military action *before* its oil advantage runs out, rather than seeking accommodation with Yerevan.

All of the above indicates to what extent political-cultural change in the Caucasus is impeded, by attitudes within societies, the structure of GPP, and the material realities within the region. Especially in the absence of full mutual recognition, the most likely outcome in the short term will thus be a continuation of the region's revisionist conflictuality. Under such circumstances, a limited form of great power management

based on the one shared interest of all great powers in the avoidance of large-scale conflict would probably be the best hope for at least some modicum of stability. Such a region- and issue-specific concert of the great powers would maintain a light-touch approach to maintaining stability and avoiding a thawing of the conflicts in the region through intelligent balancing, and threats and inducements. The region would remain conflictual, war would still be seen as a legitimate method of conducting inter-state politics in the absence of formal security-enhancing mechanisms, but targeted interventions by the great powers might at the very least make it more *impracticable* for all sides, Armenia and Azerbaijan in particular. Even today, a flare-up around Nagorno-Karabakh in particular would probably be met by intense diplomatic efforts aimed ending hostilities as soon as possible, considering the undoubted effects such an armed conflict would have on the interests of *all* great powers involved if allowed to occur or continue unchecked.

However, structural theories like RSCT – and IR generally – tend to under-estimate the role of *human agency* as it is, by definition, unquantifiable and unpredictable. But admittedly, the structure of the Southern Caucasus militates massively against positive change in its culture of anarchy; bringing about such change would indeed be quite a difficult task. A ‘Schuman/Adenauer moment’ would require unprecedented vision, alongside reciprocation and co-ordination from the most important actors within the region; it would not be sufficient for one statesperson or group with the required vision to remould underlying societal attitudes to take power in one republic, it would have to be a co-ordinated occurrence to work. Any such person or group – even if they succeeded in taking power – would have to contend with the fossilised attitudes and securitisations marking their respective states and societies. And his or her chances for success would be greatly increased if these dominant ideologies and value-systems had been comprehensively discredited through ‘events’, like a comprehensive defeat in war, or economic collapse/stagnation, and if structural conditions at the very least moved towards something more conducive to change, through, for instance, a change in the patterns of GPP towards benign unipolarity or co-operative multipolarity.

It took Germany two defeats, and the providence of the allies who did *not* transform it into Morgenthau’s agricultural economy, to generate the generally pacifist and Europeanist identity that marks its political culture today. Could something similar to the combination of military defeat, the Soviet menace, American aid, and French and German statesmanship create similar shifts in the patterns of securitisation in Armenia, Azerbaijan or Georgia? The shift in values/identities (argumentative discourse) and legitimate means (instrumental discourse) required for a transformation towards a self-sustaining security *regime* rather than security *community* would be less profound than

those seen in post-War Europe. It would simply require an acceptance of each other's legitimacy rather than a collective identity, and a *management* of the regional securitisations rather than full-scale de-securitisation (the latter being a characteristic of the more demanding, and regionally even more implausible, security community).

The seeds for such mutual recognition are certainly there. As pointed out in the introduction, there *have* been previous attempts within this region to create an integrated political-economic space. Even if they were short-lived and doomed to failure, they could, one day, act as important precedents. Looking into the past, there are the long periods when the predecessors to the entities that today make up the Southern Caucasus formed a more or less integrated cultural space; looking into the future, regional cooperation and integration can be amply justified by the enormous economic advantages that would result. While these positive arguments from a pre-nationalist past and a potential post-nationalist future have been largely marginalised in the narratives that exist in the region today, they do lay dormant in groups that operate at the fringes of regional civil society, and could, at some point, provide the basis for the construction of alternative identities that create a better regional 'fit', helped along by expedient events and the courage of visionary regional statespersons that is today so very much lacking.

Conclusion

This thesis started out as a theoretical exercise aimed at an expansion of RSCT, and its subsequent application to two issues: first, the micro-perspective workings of several hypotheses regarding the relationship between state incoherence and the patterns of GPP and the level of conflict within a region; second, the potential for the emergence of a security regime within the Southern Caucasus RSC. The preceding nine chapters have, hopefully, provided a sufficient answer to all the questions posed at the beginning of this endeavour, even if, as in most social-science exercises, many questions remain.

RSCT's amity/enmity variable was expanded as a spectrum encompassing six distinct types, based on macro- and micro-perspective criteria. Whether or not an RSC was classified as a revisionist or status-quo conflict formation, a thin or thick security regime, or a loose or tight security community depended on certain epiphenomenal elements – like the presence of armed conflict, of treaties, of supra-national institutions – and discursive components within the patterns of securitisation: the convergence or divergence of discourses in either their argumentative (identities/values) aspects, and/or their instrumental aspects (techno-scientific knowledge). The chapter also

introduced the notion of *discursive stability*: whether or not the dominant narratives of security within a given society were contested by powerful counter-narratives with the potential of superseding them, giving some indication as to the possible movements across the spectrum of a given RSC.

State (in)coherence was elaborated upon in the same objective/intersubjective vein, through an initial distinction between its vertical and horizontal variants, as well as ostensible stability and inherent weakness. The significance of both state power and legitimacy, and the complex interactions between them both in constituting the stability and weakness of such states was also pointed out: while inherent weakness was connected to a low level of legitimacy, it was argued that ostensible instability resulted from an inability of a given state and society to maintain the *force-legitimacy equilibrium*: a fine-tuned balance between the force required to repress alternative 'strategies of survival' and the ability of a given society to accept these applications of state power as legitimate. The resulting typology of state incoherence included weak, unstable and collapsed/fragmented states, with the final two (differentiated according to vertical and horizontal weakness respectively) the result of the permanent inability of a state to apply legitimate force.

Great power penetration, finally, was expanded through a re-articulation of the notion of 'great power status' in its objective, subjective and intersubjective elements, with great power status emerging from a material ability to project power beyond one's own RSC, a subjective definition of interest that substantially reaches beyond that region, and an intersubjective acceptance as a great power by one's peers. The interaction between the systemic and regional levels was similarly conceptualised as comprising objective, subjective and intersubjective aspects: the physical presence of a great power in an RSC, subjective definitions of interest linking a great power to the RSC, and the intersubjective 'patterns of GPP' that result in the aggregate. These patterns could be classified along a spectrum situated between hegemony and complete disengagement: from unipolar through cooperative-multipolar to competitive-multipolar, with both the individual great power involvements and the patterns themselves affecting the logic of anarchy governing a region.

The above discussion shows how these expanded concepts were subsequently employed to answer the several question asked at the beginning of this thesis. First, by providing an intricate, combined micro-perspective and macro-perspective view on state incoherence, great power involvement and regional conflict-proneness. Secondly, by providing a clear overview of conditions within the Southern Caucasus RSC. Thirdly, by extrapolating the present towards possible future scenarios,

indicating that, rather than an abstract exercise for its own sake, RSCT, properly conceptualised, can provide myriad insights into the regionally specific functioning of International Relations, while at the same time contributing new, potentially fertile theoretical and methodological viewpoints to the field of Area Studies.

But what are the broader implications of this expansion? Two important insights come to mind: firstly, the overwhelming importance of regionalised diversified paradigms of international relations and international security. Despite tremendous progress in that direction in the past two decades, IR and IS are both still too dominated by models and approaches that remain stubbornly systemic. But if there is one central insight that constructivist and other post-positivist approaches have provided in this period, it is that there is no such thing as *rationality*, only *rationalities*, subject to differing 'logics of anarchy'. In the absence of proper contextualisation, the allegedly universal insights provided by 'elegant' rationalist theories of IR remain an empty box that must be filled with the regionally specific identities and values to which rationality is always subservient in real-world politics.

A second important – and related – insight is the extent to which applied and applicable theories and methodologies of IR must necessarily be *eclectic* and *pluralist* to be of any practical value to real-world policymaking and scenario-building. The era where parsimony and quantification could provide practically valuable insights to the study of the discipline is well and truly over. This is obviously the case for purely ideational phenomena like amity/enmity, but also for more complex realities, like state incoherence or great power penetration. The interpretation of ideas, of how states make anarchy what it is in their environs, must find its proper place at the very pinnacle of the discipline; simplistic law-like statements that treat the subject-matter of IR as dead, reactive matter distinct from its social environment can no longer stand unchallenged in their dominance, especially in the policymaking communities across the Atlantic, in the one still remaining superpower. On the other hand, maintaining the other extreme by limiting oneself to an ever-flowing and assumedly self-standing discourse can only give a partial view of reality, disconnected from the material forces and realities and their real-world effects.

The arrogance of the universal and systemic was perhaps best illustrated in the failure of the regional strategies and state-building exercises of that superpower in the Middle East and beyond. It shows how, without the proper contextualisation, inflexible and narrow scholarship generating universal claims can have real detrimental effects on the real world; on the other hand, the humility that comes with the rejection of absolutes and a readiness to puncture rigid boundaries between different approaches leads to an

acceptance of the fundamental complexity that the social realm of International Relations ultimately represents. In combining neo-realism with securitisation theory and introducing a regional tier between units and system, RSCT has gone a long way in both directions, providing the possible spine for the construction of region-specific theories that capture peculiarity while still grounding themselves in a measure of universal truth.

Different 'rules of the game' prevail in conflict formations, security regimes, and security communities. Human behaviour has been 'captured' in each of these categories through universalist rationalist theories – like structural neo-realism and institutional neo-liberalism – that do give an insight into the workings of international politics and international security: but instead of being mechanically transposed from the universal realm, they must be inserted into the cultures of anarchy constituted by the prevailing discourses and narratives of a particular region. A deeper awareness of regional cultural specificities – one that would perhaps be closer to the frame of mind of an anthropologist than an economist or quantitative political scientist – would do away with the Western-centric notion of generic 'man' acting according to equally generic 'reason'. Regions function according to their specific rationality, and which universal theory applies in a particular case depends on the extent to which regional instrumental and argumentative discourses conform to the assumptions that a particular theory makes on the drivers of human action.

The one perspective that the previous one hundred thousand words have largely left out has been an explicitly *critical* one. Perhaps understandably so, as speaking truth to power is not RSCT's primary objective. Yet, responsible scholarship always requires a critical, reflective eye that, in the best traditions of E.H. Carr, disassembles the realities of power behind existing narratives and tentatively projects visions of a better world. In trying to objectively answer the question as to the potential transformation of the Southern Caucasus RSC, the version of RSCT presented here may not have directly pursued a transformative or emancipatory agenda, but has at least attempted to lay bare those bottlenecks and complications that make this region as conflictual as it is today. And, in the unlikely event that its conclusions ever reached the region's political, economic and intellectual elites – who, for far too long, have adhered to ideas and notions that can only be described as retrograde and self-destructive – they would no doubt, not make comfortable reading.

While, indeed, their agency in this matter is limited due to the complicated and interconnected nature of the RSC's material and ideational realities, there is no such thing as *determination*, even within the complex truths presented here. There is still

space and time for Adenauers and Schumans to emerge in a region whose problems and promise are equally immense, to build upon the kernels of counter-discourse that reject the coarse, essentialist and at times absurd nationalist dogma that permeates its historical-ideological narratives. De-securitisation is possible, however difficult it may be.

During my fieldwork in the region, and my conversations with local actors, there were those who accepted established narratives without doubt; crucially, there were also those who looked upon their region with a sense of questioning and criticism. All too often, the intellectually bankrupt ideas of the former have been taken into account by Western scholars and practitioners in misplaced deference for 'local sensitivities'. If we can draw one lesson from the previous body of theory and empirics, it is that these narratives do not deserve such deference: they are the equivalents of the bigotry that kept Europe in perennial conflict up to 1945, and deserve nothing less than the systematic ridicule and relentless criticism that '*truth to power*' requires in this case.

APPENDIX

1. National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia (2007)

Appendix
of RA President Decree NH-37-N
of February 7, 2007

REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

(approved at the session of National Security Council at the RA President office on January 26, 2007)

INTRODUCTION: DEFINITION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia is a system of state policy aimed to guarantee state, public, and individual security, sustainable development and the maintenance of the Armenian identity. It is implemented through the development and execution of a unified state policy based on an all-inclusive system of democratic values for all spheres of life.

The National Security Strategy is subject to further amendment in order to better address the domestic and international situation and to address the changing security threats and challenges, as well as to reflect the needs related to the effective implementation of the aims of this document.

The main guarantees for the implementation of the National Security Strategy are:

- an efficient system of governance;
- the rule of law;
- a consolidation of democratic values;
- an independent and impartial judiciary;
- combatability of the armed forces;
- efficient security and law-enforcement structures;
- foreign policy ensuring effective international engagement;
- and,
- comprehensive social justice.

I. FUNDAMENTAL VALUES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA, FACTORS AND POLICIES OF SECURITY GUARANTEE, THREATS AGAINST IT

1. FUNDAMENTAL VALUES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

The fundamental values of the National Security of the Republic of Armenia are:

INDEPENDENCE. The Republic of Armenia is a sovereign, democratic state, based on the principles of social justice and the rule of law;

PROTECTION OF THE STATE AND ITS POPULATION. The Republic of Armenia guarantees the territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of the state, and ensures the physical safety of its population;

PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. The Republic of Armenia aspires to expand and develop its level of international engagement, and to promote peace and security in both the regional and global context;

PRESERVATION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY. The Republic of Armenia strives to preserve and develop the identity of the Armenian nation, within both Armenia and throughout its Diaspora;

PROSPERITY. The Republic of Armenia aims to secure a higher quality of life for all of its population through sustainable development.

2. FACTORS AND POLICIES OF NATIONAL SECURITY GUARANTEE

The factors and policies serving the fundamental values of national security include:

INDEPENDENCE

- consolidating efficient governance supported by a stable constitutional order, through efficient and transparent state institutions and public administration;
- enhancing and protecting democracy and civil liberties;
- safeguarding all human rights and fundamental freedoms;
- fully integrating and protecting all ethnic and national minorities residing in Armenia;
- strengthening and consolidating all elements of a market economy, while promoting science-based, innovative, export-oriented industries;
- and,
- ensuring the reliability, security and safety of energy, transport and communication infrastructure.

SECURITY OF THE STATE AND POPULATION

- maintaining modern and professional armed forces and an efficient security and law-enforcement structure;
- engaging in the global effort to combat transnational threats such as international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their related components, organized crime, human trafficking and the illegal drugs trade, and production and import of low-quality food products;
- forming favorable environment for the present and future generations;
- maintaining an efficient utilization of natural resources, with comprehensive environmental regulation and protection; and,
- integrating into international structures for the monitoring and prevention of natural and man-made disasters, adopting a reliable early-warning alert system to preempt and prevent natural and man-made disasters, and to ensure urban security and public safety.

PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

- consolidating Armenia's international standing and credibility, pursuing lasting peace and security in the region, and a deeper engagement in international security, including participation in international peacekeeping operations.

PRESERVATION OF THE NATIONAL IDENTITY

- developing and implementing a comprehensive concept of Armenia-Diaspora relations, with a broader mobilization of the potential of the Armenian Diaspora;

- promoting and fostering Armenian studies language, literature, history and culture as factors ensuring continuity of national spiritual heritage and symbolizing national identity;
- and,
- enhancing the Armenian national culture along with preserving the elements of its distinguishing national features, aware of universal cultural values and developments, including the promotion of Armenian cultural heritage abroad.

PROSPERITY

- eradicating poverty;
- implementing a social policy aimed at protecting the vulnerable segments of the Armenian population;
- developing and implementing competitive and efficient science and education policies, with a special focus on developing innovative technologies;
- providing more inclusive and effective healthcare meeting highest international standards;
- and,
- ensuring conditions for the development of spiritual and cultural potential of the individual and society.

3. THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY

Threats to national security are defined as events, actions, or the absence thereof, that may threaten the existence of the Armenian state, society, family or individual. Such threats may emanate from domestic (internal threats) or foreign (external threats) sources.

The key issue of the National Security of the Republic of Armenia is the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.

Since attaining independence at the end of the 20th century, Armenia has been engaged in a difficult process of transition which is the source of its main domestic threats.

The National Security of the Republic of Armenia has also been faced with the emergence of several new inter- and intra-regional threats. Inter-regional threats stem mainly from unresolved ethnic and armed conflicts in neighboring states, whereas intra-regional threats are rooted in a clash of interests of the main powers in the region.

EXTERNAL THREATS

USE OF FORCE. The Republic of Azerbaijan continues to pursue an aggressive policy of militant posturing that explicitly threatens the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh. Despite numerous factors preventing such development, openly militant statements articulated at the highest level, cause to consider them as direct threats. In light of the heightened threat environment, there is an additional danger that the Republic of Turkey, a strategic partner of Azerbaijan, may also pose an additional threat. Taking into consideration the universally known provisions of international law, the Republic of Armenia considers the trade and transport blockade imposed by Turkey and Azerbaijan as a use of force against the Republic of Armenia;

ETHNIC CONFLICTS, INTERNAL UNREST AND MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN NEIGHBORING STATES. Such destabilizing developments may create a more diverse set of security threats for Armenia, from the disruption and disintegration of transit infrastructures to the spillover of ongoing military actions from neighboring states;

DISRUPTION OF TRANSIT THROUGH NEIGHBORING STATES. The disruption of both the TbilisiSukhumi railway and the road from Georgia into Russia has posed a significantly negative impact on Armenia. The imposition of broad international economic sanctions on Iran would also directly threaten the National Security of the Republic of Armenia;

WEAKENING OR INEFFICIENCY OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCES. It is the understanding of the Republic of Armenia that membership in a strategic alliance necessitates that all alliance members are inherently prohibited against adopting any action that violates the interests of the other alliance members. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) should, therefore, clarify the regulations regarding its involvement in the cases of military aggression directed against a member state;

TERRORISM AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME. International terrorism in all its forms, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and narcotics, money laundering, and human trafficking, each constitute a direct threat to the Republic of Armenia;

ENERGY DEPENDENCE. Armenia, with a scarcity of natural resources, is dependent on external energy supplies. Recent reforms, however, have led to more efficient energy relations both domestically and with Armenias main energy supplier, the Russian Federation, thereby easing Armenias energy dependence;

ARMENIAS ISOLATION FROM REGIONAL PROJECTS. Armenian participation in regional infrastructure projects is of a great significance and, in this respect Armenia highly values the regional TRASSECA and INOGATE programs of the European Union (EU). Armenia also sees Azerbaijan's effort to isolate Armenia from such regional development programs as a direct threat;

DECLINE OF NATIONAL AND CULTURAL IDENTITY IN THE ARMENIAN DIASPORA. The Republic of Armenia attaches a great importance to the preservation of the national identity in the Armenian Diaspora. Well-organized and efficiently integrated Diasporan communities are important contributions to the overall increase in Armenias international involvement. Any weakening of the Armenia-Diaspora ties and the absence of mutually enriching contacts may threaten the fundamental values of the National Security of the Republic of Armenia;

EPIDEMICS AND NATURAL DISASTERS. The outbreak and spread of life-threatening epidemics globally and in neighboring regions, as well as natural or man-made disasters, may threaten the National Security of the Republic of Armenia.

INTERNAL THREATS

DETERIORATION IN THE EFFICACY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE DECLINE IN TRUST IN THE JUDICIARY. The Republic of Armenia is engaged in a transitional process of an active reform. Any deterioration in the efficacy of public administration and any decrease in the speed or scope of its reform effort are seen as potential threats to national security. The effectiveness, impartiality and independence of the judiciary are crucial for Armenia and, along with the efficacy of public administration, are essential considerations to sustain public trust;

INSUFFICIENCY OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM. The current state of inadequacy among the political parties threatens the national security and the internal democratization and development of political parties is a key prerequisite for the consolidation of democracy in the country;

INSUFFICIENT LEVEL OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION. Continuity and effectiveness of democratic systems of governance are at risk in all of the countries in

transition. Direct threats in this regard include an inadequate protection of human rights, shortcomings in electoral procedures and performance, and insufficient inclusion and engagement of civil society;

POLARIZATION. The inadequate and incomplete provision of social security, significant levels of poverty, insufficient or unequal access to all aspects of professional training, health and social services, and emerging intolerance, comprise traditional challenges for all states in transition. Despite Armenia's demonstrable progress in addressing these challenges, they remain significant risk factors for overall national security;

URBANIZATION. The level of urbanization in Armenia was already quite significant during the Soviet period and has only continued since independence. This increase in urbanization stems mainly from a combination of inconsistencies in the labor market and a rural-urban division in access to education and living conditions, most notable in the capital. The continuation of this trend of urbanization constitutes a threat to the national security, as it results in a pattern of overly compact inhabitation and settlement in the areas prone to seismic activity, a deterioration of the demographic balance in rural areas, and a depopulation of border villages;

CHALLENGES FROM THE MARKET ECONOMY AND FINANCIAL-BUDGET MANAGEMENT. An insufficiently competitive economic environment, an inadequate regulation of natural monopolies, and an underground or shadow economy and large cash flows, each pose a serious risk factor for the country. The Republic of Armenia strives to maintain consistent rates of high economic growth and, to foster liberalized trade, seeks to develop small and medium enterprises and attraction and safeguard foreign investment;

INADEQUATE INFRASTRUCTURE. The Republic of Armenia faces a daunting challenge to construct and extend additional road links, provide reliable and safe water, and develop telecommunications networks and other related infrastructure;

LOW LEVEL OF SCIENCE AND EDUCATION. Education is a traditionally important priority for Armenia. Inefficient administration in the science and education sectors, inadequate levels of international engagement and collaboration, and insufficient access to professional education are threats to national security;

INADEQUATE INTELLECTUAL AND NATIONAL EDUCATION. The education of national morals and tenets of patriotism should start at home and continue through all levels of formal education. An insufficient awareness of national ideals, respect towards the state and its institutions, and individual morality, including healthy living, the traditional role of the family, and the misinterpretation of the national identity, threaten national security;

NEGATIVE DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS. The Republic of Armenia sees a low national birthrate, disappointing indexes of health, mortality, life expectancy and the quality of life, unregulated and illegal migration, especially among the educational, scientific and cultural workforce, as demographic threats to national security;

ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES. The Republic of Armenia recognizes the importance of increasing the efficient use and protection of the country's mineral and natural resources, especially its water and forest resources. The preservation of Lake Sevan and the properly regulated utilization of its natural resources are priority elements of the environmental policy of Armenia;

EPIDEMICS AND DISASTERS. The outbreak of epidemics, devastating earthquakes and other natural and man-made disasters pose potential security risk factors.

The National Security Strategy serves as the basis for any policies that the Republic of Armenia may develop and implement to prevent and overcome threats and risks to national security, and provides a guide to guarantee the sustainable development of the Armenian state and the society.

II. DOMESTIC SECURITY STRATEGY

The sustainable and secure development of the Republic of Armenia calls for greater efficiency in governance, establishment of democratic values and continued economic growth. In recognition of the above, Armenia has undertaken a comprehensive reform process. The implementation of these reform programs is supported by the preservation of the Armenian national identity, through a full utilization of national potential and is supported by and based on international best practices. Thus, any failure or delay in the reform effort is a direct threat to the National Security of the Republic of Armenia.

The implementation of these reforms is ensured through an integrated national policy and is reflected by the Armenian Constitution, its obligations under international treaties, legislation, presidential decrees and regulations, and all governmental decisions and supporting sub-legislation.

1. EFFICIENT PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Goals: an increased level of state governance, with a solid system of the political system, the establishment of security and the protection of democratic values, first and foremost all human and civil rights, and the development of a civil society.

Institutional reforms are aimed at the strengthening of a democratic state, the effective functioning of the bodies of public administration, the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, a consolidation of the system of local self-government, the wider inclusion of civil society in the decision-making and monitoring processes, and an intensification of the fight against corruption, especially bribery. In this respect, Armenia has initiated a number of long-term state programs, most notably an anti-corruption strategy, sound administrative justice and innovative e-governance projects.

One of the national security-related priority programs is the creation of an efficient disaster management system.

The Republic of Armenia considers a strategic reform of judiciary as one of the key priorities for the establishment of a durable constitutional order, the rule of law, and for the effective functioning of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. These reforms are further aimed at the protection of human and civil rights, and the protection of the state, society and individual against illegal actions.

2. BUILDING THE ARMED FORCES

Goals: the creation of a military capability able to defend and resist any aggression or incursion, to guarantee the physical safety, sovereignty and independence of the people of the Republic of Armenia, and to safeguard the territorial integrity of the state.

Efficient and modern Armenian Armed Forces must always be prepared to repulse any threat and guarantee the military security of the Republic of Armenia. The priorities and goals of the defense of the Republic of Armenia are to be established and formulated in

a separate document on military doctrine. A defense strategy is the basis of the activities of the Armenian Armed Forces.

The Republic of Armenia consistently adheres to the principles of civilian control and democratic planning within the defense budget process.

The Republic of Armenia recognizes the inability of an individual state to address the modern challenges alone, and aspires to engage in active military-political cooperation with both the states of and beyond the region. The Armenian military holds an important place as a contributor and partner in international peace and security efforts.

All defense reforms and cooperation serve the interests of the Republic of Armenia and are not aimed against any third party or country.

3. LIBERALIZING THE ECONOMY

Goals: sustainable economic growth, the development of small and medium enterprises, energy independence, and the creation of an open and attractive business environment.

The respect and protection of private property and entrepreneurship are long-held facets of the traditional Armenian culture, and have been reflected in reform policies aimed at creating favorable conditions for rapid economic growth.

Armenia has focused on promoting the development of small and medium enterprises, in recognition of their invaluable role in the establishment of a democratic society and the preservation of traditional family ties.

The key priorities in fostering sustainable economic growth include:

- promoting market economic relations;
 - consolidating competition;
 - achieving macroeconomic and financial stability, developing financial system;
 - enhancing financial intermediation;
 - improving a competitive business environment, with a significant decrease in the shadow economy and the dollarization;
 - preventing monopolization within sectors of the economy, including the efficient administration and supervision of natural monopolies;
 - implementing a long-term program of investment promotion;
 - introducing more balanced territorial and sectoral social and economic development, with an effective administration of infrastructure;
 - promoting technology-oriented and environmentally sound industries;
- and,
- promoting exports.

The Republic of Armenia identifies the need to implement reforms focused on individual branches of industry and sets the following priorities:

- to pursue greater energy independence through a diversification of energy supplies and production, the creation of new sources of energy, including nuclear energy, and to develop a stable and reliable export-oriented energy system;
- to promote the sustainable development of transport, through the integration of Armenia in regional transit routes and networks, while striving to effectively lift the blockade of Armenia;
- to introduce sound environmental practices, with the proper and prudent utilization of all natural resources, including water, to preserve Lake Sevan and its surroundings, to restore and preserve forests, ensure the safe use of nuclear power, supervise the storage of hazardous chemicals, radioactive material and waste, and to introduce an early-warning alert rapid-reaction and disaster management system for natural and man-made disasters, including the raising of disaster awareness and public preparedness; and,
- to ensure biological safety and food security, including an increase in agricultural production and food processing capacity, the improvement of the import-export balance in agricultural trade, compliance with international food safety standards, the implementation of new, inclusive regional development projects, with a special focus on the border and highland areas, and an increase in agricultural efficiency through the introduction of new modern technologies.

4. NEW QUALITY OF LIFE AND MORALE

Goals: poverty eradication, higher living standards over the long-term, the consolidation of social justice and an elimination of societal polarization, the modernization of education and science, with greater access to education, and continued cultural and intellectual development.

The policy priorities in the fields of social security, education, intellectual and cultural developments include:

- consolidating the state based on social justice;
- establishing and promoting public accord;
- addressing the social needs of the population, with greater access to social services;
- improving social standards through the creation of new jobs and the establishment of a social insurance system;
- improving the system of pensions, raising the minimal pension to internationally accepted standards;
- addressing the negative demographic situation;
- regenerating the professional community, especially in the fields of science and education, as a prerequisite for sustainable economic and public development.

Therefore, the Republic of Armenia aspires to:

- implement a long-term state policy aimed at empowering the countrys scientific potential, restructuring educational system to comply with European standards and to meet the social and economic needs of the state, introducing modern education technologies;

- translate the body of academic knowledge for the use in Armenia, engage academia in all areas, including defense, in order to achieve more efficient modernization;
- prevent the brain-drain;
- increase the role of the Armenian as a language of the national identity and of the state language;
- effectively protect intellectual property;
- create a favorable environment for the preservation and reproduction of universal and national values, national traditions, and standards of cultural and intellectual heritage;
- ensure increased access to cultural values;
- support the spiritual, moral, social and cultural activities of the Armenian Apostolic Church;
- prevent any threat to the cultural and intellectual identity and moral values of the Armenian people;
- engage in greater cooperation with other states in order to preserve Armenian cultural, spiritual and historic monuments located within their territory;
- protect the historic, spiritual, cultural heritage and the ethnic identity of the national minorities living in Armenia;
- integrate into the international information area, to ensure professional promotion of Armenia and the Armenians, and to counter disinformation and propaganda;
- promote relevant information about Armenia and all branches of Armenian studies through the Internet, with the creation of relevant Armenian websites;
- promote sustainable and balanced urban development, including creation of harmonious biosphere and fostering of proportionate territorial density of population, and incorporating considerations of seismic vulnerability, especially in Yerevan;
- create a more efficient healthcare system, through the promotion of healthy living, the regulation and monitoring of medication and related medicinal supplies, the prevention of diseases, especially radiation sickness, biological terrorism and substance abuse, and the early diagnosis of disease and their treatment, with a focus on the protection of mothers and infants and pre-natal care.

III. THE REPUBLIC OF NAGORNO KARABAKH

The just and peaceful resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict is a key issue for the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia, which is the guarantor of the safety and security of the population of the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh (Artsakh).

The parties to the conflict have each assented to the mediation by the Organization for Security and Cooperations (OSCE) Minsk Group and continue to support the Minsk Group co-chairing states (France, the Russian Federation, and the United States) in their effort to support a negotiated resolution to the Karabakh conflict. The Republic of Armenia appreciates the high level of expertise of those involved in the negotiations and does not deem it necessary to consider or accept declarations made by other international organizations or their possible involvement.

The Republic of Armenia advocates a peaceful and compromise-based solution to the conflict.

The legal aspects for the foundation of the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh are sound and not in question. The position of the Republic of Armenia is based on the principle that any final solution or final document should be approved by the Karabakh side and Armenia is ready to accept only a resolution which would affirm the irreversible reality of the existence of the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh.

Nagorno Karabakh should have a geographic link to Armenia and its security should be guaranteed.

Azerbaijans militant policy vis-à-vis Nagorno Karabakh and its readiness to opt for the military solution of the problem are direct threats to the security of Armenia. Under such circumstances, Armenia needs to have an army with increased defense capability to guarantee its security. The main priority of the army is to safeguard the inviolability of the borders of the Republic of Armenia and to be the guarantor of the physical safety of the peoples of the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh.

IV. EXTERNAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Armenia implements an external security strategy based on the following basic principles:

COMPLEMENTARITY

The foreign policy of Armenia is based on a partnership approach that seeks to simultaneously develop relations with all states in the region and with states with interests in the region. Such a policy is aimed at maintaining an overall balance in the region. The positive trends in the dialogue and cooperation among the major powers and the consolidation of the international community to combat terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are conducive to Armenias pursuit of its foreign policy of complementarity.

ENGAGEMENT

Armenia is actively involved in both regional and international integration and regards itself as an equal partner in such processes. Armenia sees its engagement and participation in these international developments as being in conformity with Armenian interests. Armenias strategic partnership with Russia, its adoption of a European model of development, mutually beneficial cooperation with Iran and the United States, membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and its intensification of the cooperation with the NATO alliance, all contribute to the consolidation of the potential of Armenias policy of complementarity.

There are three layers of Armenias external security strategy: the international, regional and pan-Armenian.

1. INTERNATIONAL

In order to keep pace with international developments, and to better address their positive and negative trends, the Republic of Armenia has adopted a strategy of promoting its national interests through international integration and active engagement. Such a strategy demands active participation in current international developments and intensive multilateral, multi-layer and bilateral policy.

The main directions of the strategy of integration/engagement are:

- participating in global security efforts, particularly, fight against terrorism and peacekeeping operations;
- participating in international arms control regimes;
- active engaging in major international organizations;
- developing relations with global centers of power and countries with interests in the region;
and,
- participating in European and post-Soviet integration.

1.1. MILITARY-POLITICAL COMPONENTS OF THE EXTERNAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Armenias military cooperation with individual states and membership in international and regional security structures, and its active participation in their programs, are aimed only at consolidating the security of the country. The main components of military-political security include:

- bilateral relations with Russia, with defense and technical military cooperation, through a strategic partnership between the two states;
- participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization;
- bilateral military cooperation, particularly with the United States and Greece;
- cooperation with the NATO alliance;
and,
- engagement in activities of international security organizations, such as the OSCE, which guarantee open and transparent arms control regimes.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY ORGANIZATION (CSTO)

Armenia is a founding member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The aim of the CSTO is to collectively prevent and, if necessary, repulse a military threat against any of its participating states.

Armenia views its participation in this organization as a component of its security, which is exercised through various levels of ties between its member states. The military component of the CSTO provides privileged conditions for the supply of the military equipment to CSTO member-states, which is a key priority for Armenia.

The intensification of the military component of the CSTO is aimed at the establishment of mechanisms for military cooperation and for an effective way to exchange information and address international threats, such as terrorism and trafficking in arms and drugs.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

Armenia strives to establish intensive relations with NATO through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.

Armenias active participation in the PfP is important both in terms of the necessity for a significant level of relations with European security structure NATO and for the development of bilateral relations with the United States and other allies, but also for Armenias policy of European integration.

Armenia is intensifying its political dialogue with NATO, and is establishing compatible military units, such as the current peacekeeping battalion, capable of participating in NATO peacekeeping operations. Armenia is also a part of NATO's Planning and Review process.

The successful implementation of the PfP Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) will foster the greater modernization and efficiency of the Armenian defense system and will bring it in closer conformity with the defense systems of advanced states, including their armed forces.

1.2. MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

UNITED NATIONS

Since acquiring UN membership in 1992, Armenia has fully adhered to the universal values of the United Nations, such as the protection of human rights, democracy and rule of law as an integral constituent of the state ideology, and has both actively participated in various activities of the organization and cooperated with many bodies, subsidiary organs and structures of the United Nations organization.

Through its continued participation and practical contribution to the international fight against terrorism and to several UN peacekeeping efforts, Armenia will assist international security and stability efforts.

While Armenia attributes great importance to the leading role of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security, it also believes that the new geopolitical realities of today demand a reform of the organization in order to better address new challenges.

EUROPEAN STRUCTURES

a. EUROPEAN UNION (EU)

The development and consolidation of Armenia's relations with the European structures, and with the European Union (EU) above all, is a priority direction for the country's foreign policy.

The further intensification of the country's diverse cooperation with the EU will promote the consolidation of democracy, strengthen the rule of law, and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms.

In addition, the development of relations with the EU, as a major global economic and political power, broadens Armenia's trade and economic links and supports the country's economic development.

Through its regional initiatives, the EU promotes a favorable environment for the establishment of lasting stability and cooperation in the South Caucasus region. Armenia's inclusion in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) is a major step forward toward European integration.

Establishment of close relations with the EU serves Armenia's long-term interests.

b. COUNCIL OF EUROPE

Membership in the Council of Europe affirmed Armenia's place in the European family and its commitment to develop itself as a country in adherence to European political, legal, cultural, and human rights standards.

Armenia highly values the readiness of the Council of Europe to promote the inter-state and civil society contacts in the South Caucasus and considers it an important factor for the fostering of regional cooperation, conflict resolution and regional security.

c. ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (OSCE)

Armenias participation in the OSCE is important for the promotion of peace and security, and for the expansion of the principles of democracy and rule of law.

The role of the OSCE, and its Minsk Group, the mediating body engaged in the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, makes the OSCE an especially important organization for Armenia.

Armenias active involvement in the three main dimensions of the OSCE, the politico-military, the economic and environmental, and the human, are important factors for the security and stability of the country.

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS)

Armenia is a founding member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and is an active contributor to the development and implementation of its cooperation programs. Such a policy serves the economic, humanitarian, political, military and other interests of the country.

The CIS promotes the economic, social and humanitarian ties between its members and is making an effort to establish greater cooperation in various domains in the politico-military arena, the security of external borders, in combating international terrorism and in fighting organized crime, drug trafficking and illegal migration.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS

Armenia is greatly interested in its further integration into international economic organizations and more active participation in their economic activities. The countrys membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) is a major step in this direction.

The continued close and successful cooperation between Armenia and the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and their sizable assistance to Armenia, have been a significant contribution to the efficiency of reforms in Armenia.

Armenia also participates in the activities of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC).

1.3. BILATERAL DIMENSIONS OF EXTERNAL SECURITY

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Although Russia includes a part of the Caucasus, Armenian-Russian relations go far beyond the regional level. The importance of Russias role for the security of Armenia, the traditional friendly links between the two nations, the level of trade and economic relations, Russias role in the Nagorno Karabakh mediation effort, as well as the presence of a significant Armenian community in Russia, all contribute to a strategic partnership.

The foundation for this strategic partnership was established through a Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance and the Declaration on the

Collaboration towards the 21st Century. Both these agreements and a bilateral agreement on defense cooperation, including within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), serve as the main pillars of the Armenian security system.

The Russian military presence in Caucasus is an important factor for Armenia's security and for the preservation of the political and military balance in the region. The Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation jointly guard the Armenian borders and cooperate in air defense.

Armenia attributes a great importance to its cooperation with Russia in the areas of defense, military-technical relations, energy, transportation, regional stability and security, and in the improvement of the legal status of the large number of Armenians residing in Russia.

THE UNITED STATES

The relationship between Armenia and the United States is continuing to develop dynamically, both because of the important U.S. role in regional and global military-political and economic processes and international relations and due to the diverse U.S. assistance provided to Armenia.

Armenia and the United States closely cooperate in the implementation of democratic reforms in Armenia. Bilateral economic cooperation and commercial ties continue to expand and the U.S. holds an increasingly significant share in foreign investment in Armenia.

The U.S. is a co-chair of the OSCE's Minsk Group and contributes to seeking a mediated resolution to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Armenia also values the efforts of the United States in establishing greater stability and security in our region and to promote regional cooperation.

Armenia has also partnered with the U.S. in the fight against international terrorism, peacekeeping operations, as well as in the confronting the challenges of proliferation and other global security related issues.

The Armenian Diaspora, through its various organizations and centers in the United States, has contributed to the development of bilateral relations between Armenia and the United States.

EUROPEAN STATES

Armenia's bilateral relations with the European states are part of its overall process toward European integration. Economic and social development, European integration, resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, regional stability and development of regional cooperation are each high on Armenia's bilateral agenda. Implementation of this agenda would only promote the intensification of the trade links, facilitate access to the European market, and encourage foreign investment in Armenia.

Armenia is interested in the diversified development of relations with its European partners, and has specifically identified the consolidation of bilateral political and economic ties as a priority. Cooperation in international organizations and the existence and positive potential of significant Armenian communities in some European states serve as additional contributions to the promotion of mutually beneficial cooperation.

Armenia also values the lessons from the Eastern European countries' experience and its consideration in its reform processes.

MIDDLE EAST

Relations with the countries of the Middle East are important for Armenia given both the regions proximity and the impact of developments in the Middle East on broader international politics.

Reflecting Armenias centuries-old links to the countries of the Middle East, there are still numerous Armenian communities throughout the region, that have long contributed to the social, political, economic and cultural development of the region and its constituent states.

Armenia will continue to develop its relations and cooperation with its traditional partner states in the Middle East and will strive to give new impetus to developing trade and economic relations with the Arabic countries of the Gulf and the Mediterranean regions.

ASIA AND PACIFIC

Armenia has intensified and broadened its relations with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region in general, and with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states in particular. In terms of developing both a bilateral and multilateral framework, Armenia has identified the increasing international role of major ASEAN countries, particularly China, India and Japan, their economic potential and progress, as well as opportunities for cooperating with these countries within international organizations.

2. REGIONAL

Both Armenias relations with its neighbors and developments in the region serve as basic factors for the Armenian security.

Armenia continues to advocate regional cooperation, seeks the creation of regional security system, and advocates the promotion of constructive relations among all neighboring states. Armenia also notes the challenges posed by the unresolved conflicts and disputes between the states of the region, and the absence of common and unified mechanisms for security, stability and communication.

In this way, the key to resolving the conflicts in the region, to solving the disputes and overcome historic difficulties, and to preventing the emergence of dividing lines in the region and their negative consequences, is through dialogue and cooperation.

The regional directions of the Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia include:

- consolidating regional stability, establishing, restoring and developing mutually beneficial bilateral and multilateral regional cooperation;
 - further developing neighborly relations by implementing diversified programs of cooperation with Iran and Georgia;
 - resolving the Nagorno Karabakh conflict and normalizing relations with Azerbaijan;
 - seeking a normalization of relations with Turkey;
 - consolidating democracy throughout the region;
- and,
- engaging in international economic projects focusing on the region.

2.1. BILATERAL DIMENSIONS OF EXTERNAL SECURITY

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

The development of traditional neighborly relations between Armenia and Iran is based on a number of shared realities: shared borders, historic and cultural ties, and mutual economic interests.

Armenias main southern transit route passes through Iran as does Armenias strategic access to Asia and Middle East, a reality only exacerbated by the blockade of Armenia imposed by its two neighboring states.

The two countries have significant interests in energy cooperation and are currently implementing several joint projects aimed at providing Armenia with important alternative sources of energy.

Armenia appreciates the balanced position which Iran, as a major actor both in the region and within the Islamic world, has adopted regarding the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.

Armenia seeks to continue to develop its cooperation with Iran in the energy sector, and is pursuing policies designed to expand bilateral trade, establish new communications, and to effectively utilize the existing potential.

Armenia also values Irans engagement in various processes in the South Caucasus region and regards it a factor contributing to maintaining balance and stability in the region.

GEORGIA

Armenia has traditionally enjoyed friendly relations with Georgia which have contributed to the maintenance of overall stability in the region.

Georgia is an important regional partner for Armenia and is seen as a partner for Armenia, with the expansion of the existing high-level bilateral cooperation rooted in the long-term strategic interests of both countries.

Armenia is mostly interested in the stable and secure development of Georgia and would welcome a lasting peaceful resolution of existing conflicts in Georgia. Such a resolution would allow Armenia to benefit from the vital transit links through Georgia and would promote the restoration of the Tbilisi-Sukhumi railway, a consideration with particular significance for both Armenia and the region as a whole.

The existence of a large, well-established Armenian community in Georgia brings added importance to relations between two countries. The two governments have engaged in fostering cooperation aimed at improving the social and economic situation of the Armenian population of Georgia, including the Armenian community of the southern Georgian region of Javakhk.

THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

There are no diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey. The establishment of normal diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey is hampered by preconditions set forth by the Turkish side.

Armenia has long advocated the establishment of diplomatic relations without any precondition and will continue its efforts to surmount the obstacles and improve the bilateral relations between Armenia and Turkey.

Armenia aspires for the universal recognition and condemnation, including by Turkey, of the Armenian Genocide, and sees it both as a restoration of an historical justice and

as a way to improve the overall situation in the region, while also preventing similar crimes in the future.

The unnatural character of bilateral relations and the closed border by Turkey threaten the Armenian security and hamper its lasting development. The absence of normalized relations adversely affects the stability of the region as a whole and impedes the development of regional cooperation.

The normalization of ArmenianTurkish relations would decrease the risk of new dividing lines emerging in the region and would help to create a more conducive environment for the final settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.

Armenia closely follows Turkey's accession negotiations with the European Union and hopes that the process will avoid any application of double standards. Armenia stresses that the lifting of the Turkish blockade of Armenia, which has acquired special importance in view of Armenia's inclusion in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), will be an important condition in the negotiations between Turkey and the EU.

AZERBAIJANI REPUBLIC

Diplomatic relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have not been established due to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Azerbaijan has adopted a policy aimed at the exclusion of Armenia from all projects of regional cooperation.

Azerbaijan continuously refuses to open its communication routes with Armenia and denies all Armenian and international initiatives to engage in bilateral cooperation in an attempt to exert pressure on Armenia regarding the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.

Armenia believes that the bilateral and regional cooperation could build confidence and have a serious positive impact on the overall situation. Armenia will continue its confidence building efforts and to this end will encourage cooperation, contacts and visits on every level.

3. ARMENIA DIASPORA RELATIONS

The wide range of issues comprising ArmeniaDiaspora relations presents a significant component of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia. In sheer numbers, the Armenian Diaspora exceeds the overall population of Armenia; it is geographically diverse and stems largely from the exodus of Armenians to safety during the Genocide and related forced deportations. The Armenian Diaspora is well integrated within their host countries of residence and is active in many areas of political, economic and social affairs of those countries. The largest Diasporan communities are presently located in the Russian Federation, the United States, France, Iran, Georgia and in some Arab countries. Majority of the Diasporan Armenians are non-Armenian citizens.

In order to consolidate relations with its Diaspora, the Republic of Armenia focuses its efforts on preventing the assimilation and loss of lingual and cultural identity among the Armenians living abroad. Additionally, Armenia embraces all systemic demonstrations of Diaspora involvement in the solution of vital problems facing Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh.

The integration of the Armenian nation offers a serious degree of economic and cultural potential, especially as a means to promote trade, tourism, preservation, development and publicizing of the cultural heritage.

The preservation and intensification of ties with the Diaspora also creates a unique bridge between Armenia and the international community, as Armenian community

organizations worldwide support the development of bilateral ties with different countries, and foster Armenia's global integration and consolidation of democracy.

The Armenian Apostolic Church, through its capacity as the national church, also has an important mission in the integration of the Armenians and the development of the nation.

CONCLUDING PROVISIONS

The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia serves as a guideline for the determination of the main directions, challenges and priorities of the country's domestic and foreign policy. Further revisions of the National Security Strategy should address the changing nature of dynamic internal, regional and global developments, altered situation and political priorities.

Any declarations made on behalf of the Republic of Armenia and by its state officials should preserve the wording, intent and the spirit of the National Security Strategy.

In order to ensure the overall consistency of the decisions adopted by the state and administrative authorities of the Republic of Armenia, such decisions should be in accordance with the provisions of the National Security Strategy.

The provisions of the National Security Strategy are exercised on the basis of the development of guidelines and action plans in the areas of foreign policy, defense, economy, food security, energy, environment protection, the safety of communications and information, demography, science and education, and intellectual and cultural developments. These guidelines are elaborated by the Government of the Republic of Armenia in accordance with the provisions of Articles 85, 86, and 89 of the RA Constitution.

CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE RA PRESIDENT A. GEVORKYAN

2. National Security Concept of the Republic of Azerbaijan (2007)

Approved by Instruction No. 2198 of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan
on 23 May 2007

INTRODUCTION

Azerbaijan has a centuries-long history of statehood and established the first ever democratic Republic in the East in 1918. Azerbaijan lost its state independence in 1920 only to restore it in 1991 in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The people of Azerbaijan benefiting from the opportunity to foster greater democratic values have chosen the path of building a modern democratic State based on its national statehood traditions, historical and cultural heritage.

In the early years of its independence the young Republic faced the military aggression of Armenia, internal instability, hardships of a transition period and other serious challenges. Nevertheless, the Republic of Azerbaijan under the leadership of its national leader Heydar Aliyev overcame all the difficulties and, having succeeded in identifying and following a consistent approach to strategic development, is now transforming into an economically and politically dynamic modern State and consolidating its global and regional position. In this latter regard, Azerbaijan is becoming an important and in many cases a decisive country to cooperate with in the Caspian-Caucasus region, and plays an indispensable role in the realization of the regional energy and transportation projects. The ultimate goal of this overall strategy is to ensure the prosperity, sustainable development and well-being of the Republic of Azerbaijan and to contribute to maintaining security and stability in the whole region.

The National Security Concept (hereinafter the "Concept") is a set of goals, principles and approaches to the policies and measures, which underline the independence, territorial integrity and democratic development of the country, integration into the Euro-Atlantic area as the strategic choice, and multidimensional and balanced foreign policy, as well as are directed at the protection of the individuals, society and State in the Republic of Azerbaijan against internal and external threats.

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The security environment of the Republic of Azerbaijan is derived from a set of factors which affects the protection of the State sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, national interests, and ensuring sustainable development, values of the people and their prosperity.

Geographically located at the crossroads of the West and East, the Republic of Azerbaijan has embraced the positive elements of various civilizations. The Republic of Azerbaijan shares the European values and as an inalienable component of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture contributes to the security of this area. At the same time, the Republic of Azerbaijan, as part of the Islamic world, shares the progressive heritage and spiritual values of the Islamic civilization.

The currently unstable region where the Republic of Azerbaijan is located has vast potential and opportunities, which can be used effectively for development in a friendly and cooperative manner with regional and wider international partners. The rich natural resources of the Republic of Azerbaijan open perspectives for the country's prosperity and national welfare and transform the country into an important energy source and a crucial integral part of the international energy supply system. The development of international transportation and communication corridors, including the construction of

oil and gas pipelines, already contribute to the development of the economy of the Republic of Azerbaijan and of its partners, and is a salient example of regional cooperation.

This geographic location provides important advantages, but is also a source of a number of the security challenges facing the country. The most important and vivid example of such challenges is the aggression committed by neighbouring Armenia against the Republic of Azerbaijan, as a result of which a considerable portion of the country was occupied and approximately one million Azerbaijanis were displaced or became refugees. The aggression was accompanied by serious crimes against peace and humanity, including genocide and terrorist acts against the citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan, whilst the occupied territories provide fertile ground for illegal activities pursued by transnational organized criminals, including international terrorist groups. Azerbaijani historical, cultural and archeological monuments on the territory of the present-day Armenia and in the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan were massively destroyed, its natural resources were plundered and the environment was damaged. The aggression against the Republic of Azerbaijan is a major determinant of the country's security environment and is a key factor in the formulation of the National Security Policy.

At the same time, the existence of such threats in the security environment of the Republic of Azerbaijan as international terrorism, illegal migration, trans-national organized crime, human and drug trafficking and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction set certain tasks for the country.

2. THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN

The national interests of the Republic of Azerbaijan consist of a set of fundamental values and goals of the people of Azerbaijan, as well as the political, economic, social and other needs necessary for the prosperity of the individuals, society and State. They are identified as follows:

- Protection of the State's independence and territorial integrity, ensuring inviolability of its internationally recognized borders;
- Preservation of the unity of the people of Azerbaijan, and promotion of the national consciousness;
- Establishment of the civil society, ensuring respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms;
- Strengthening the performance of State institutions and ensuring security of the people through developing democratic and civil society institutions, and by maintaining the rule of law and public order;
- Fulfilling international obligations and contributing to global and regional security and stability through development of cooperation aimed at integration into the value-shared international organizations;
- Creating favourable conditions for attracting foreign and domestic investment to develop a market economy, improve its legal basis and ensure economic stability;
- Ensuring the future development of the people of Azerbaijan, providing decent living standards and well-being for the population through efficient use of natural resources, sustainable economic development, environmental protection, and increasing educational, scientific and technological potential;

- Consolidating solidarity and national identity based upon the values shared by the Azerbaijanis around the world;
- Preservation of the cultural-historical heritage and spiritual values of the people of Azerbaijan and their enrichment through universal values, development of the language, national consciousness, patriotism, national dignity and the intellectual potential.

3. THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN

Elimination or containment of threats to the national security are among the major tasks of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

The threats to national security of the Republic of Azerbaijan are as follows:

3.1. Attempts against the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order of the Republic of Azerbaijan

Every State has the right, according to international law, to protect itself against open and covert activities aimed at undermining its independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order. The aggressive policy of Armenia against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan is a vivid example of such threats.

Despite reforms in the rapidly developing economy, and other important accomplishments, the aggression of Armenia against the Republic of Azerbaijan continues to create serious social and political impediments. This problem, with trans-regional implications, represents a major threat to the national interests of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Regardless of the outcome of the conflict resolution process, persistence of the ideology of mono-ethnic statehood, ethnic cleansing practices and territorial expansionism of the Armenian State policy will inevitably continue to affect negatively relations between the two States also in the future.

In addition, attempts by certain extremist elements to instigate ethnic and religion-based tensions in the Republic of Azerbaijan cannot be disregarded.

3.2. Actions undermining the ability of the State to ensure the rule of law, maintenance of public order and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms

In the early 1990s the Republic of Azerbaijan faced a number of aspects of this threat. Attempts by certain domestic and foreign circles, striving to undermine the democratic system in the Republic of Azerbaijan, to hinder the performance of State functions remain among the possible actions threatening national security.

3.3. Separatism, ethnic, political and religious extremism

Separatism, ethnic and religious extremism in all their manifestations are capable to undermine the foundations of the State and society and constitute a potential source of serious threat to country's national security.

3.4. Terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

Proximity to the regions harboring major terrorist groups and proliferation problems are potential security threats. Possibility of acquisition of weapons of mass destruction or their production technologies for terrorist activities may exacerbate these threats.

3.5. Regional conflicts and transnational organized crime

The "uncontrolled" areas, which emerged as a result of continuing occupation of a part of the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan by Armenia, and the unresolved conflicts in neighbouring countries provide fertile ground for trans-national organized crime and other illegal activities. They are considered among major threats to the security of the country and of the region as a whole.

Outbreak of conflicts in the regional countries represents also a threat to the Republic of Azerbaijan. Regional conflicts may seriously harm the external economic relations of the Republic of Azerbaijan and cause large-scale influx of refugees as well as increase transnational criminal activities such as the illegal arms trade, human and drug trafficking and other illegal activities.

3.6. Actions against energy infrastructure of the Republic of Azerbaijan

Revenues generated from the development and transportation of the energy resources constitutes a valuable asset for the economy of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Therefore, attempts to undermine this sector of the industry through political means or by inflicting physical damage to the related infrastructure are among potential threats.

3.7. External political, military or economic dependence

In tune with the present trend in the international environment for more integration and cooperation, the Republic of Azerbaijan is interested in establishing mutually beneficial relations with other countries. Political, military or economic overdependence of the Republic of Azerbaijan in international relations, however, is among the threat factors which may potentially impede realization of its national interests.

3.8. Economic destabilization

As a result of the challenges associated with the armed aggression, transition to market economy and integration into global economic system during the first years of independence, the Republic of Azerbaijan went through severe economic crisis in the first half of the 1990s. Despite these odds, the Republic of Azerbaijan persisted in transitioning to the market economy, created favourable conditions for foreign investment and achieved considerable accomplishments, particularly in the energy sector. It is at the same time aware of the risks of overdependence on the fast growing oil and gas revenues which may disrupt macro-economic stability and subsequently leave the country vulnerable to the impact of the global and regional economic crises.

3.9. Inadequate professional human resources

As a result of socio-economic hardships during the first years of independence, the education sector experienced serious difficulties, such as insufficient funding and structural problems. The negative consequences of this setback are felt even today. Failure to developing and effectively managing a modern education system capable of ensuring education and training at all levels necessary for the development of the national professional workforce and of the governing sector may have negative consequences for the overall development of the Republic of Azerbaijan in a long-term perspective.

3.10. Regional militarization

The excessive accumulation of armaments and weapon systems in the region undermines regional stability and may distort the military balance between the regional countries. A military build-up exceeding reasonable national security purposes, including the foreign military bases lacking effective control mechanisms, may create concerns about intentions and result in a regional arms race. Another aspect is that such increased military build-up may drain the limited economic resources to be allocated for socio-economic development and undermine mutual confidence between the regional countries.

3.11. Environmental challenges

The environmental problems in the Republic of Azerbaijan are a result of the decades-long old-fashioned oil production methods mainly in the Absheron Peninsula and in the Caspian Sea in order to meet the Soviet Union's energy needs in disregard of environmental consequences.

Furthermore, mass destruction of the flora and fauna in the territories of Azerbaijan occupied by Armenia, including the wide-scale fires on these lands, has become one of the acute environmental challenges for the country.

A considerable portion of the sources of drinking water supply of Azerbaijan is situated in neighbouring countries and their exposure to intensive pollution by chemical, radioactive and other harmful substances in the territories of these creates problems in drinking water supply for the population. Furthermore, the technologically obsolete Metsamor nuclear energy station located in the seismic zone in Armenia is a source of a threat for the whole region.

Environmental pollution, degradation of the agricultural soils, irrational use of natural resources, lack of proper recycling of industrial and household wastes are sources of serious problems.

The environmental problems negatively affect economic and social life, threaten the public health and prosperity of the nation and create a burden for the governmental institutions.

4. MAIN DIRECTIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN

As a sovereign State, the Republic of Azerbaijan formulates and implements a National Security Policy which aims at the containment and elimination of threats in the current security environment and at the realization of the national interests of the country by making use of domestic and foreign policy means.

The National Security Policy takes into account the multidimensional character of threats, which tend to blur the dividing line between external and internal security and require adequate multifunctional measures.

4.1. Promotion of security by foreign policy means

4.1.1. Restoration of territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan

The territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan shall be united, inviolable and indivisible. Restoration of its territorial integrity by making use of all means laid down in international law is a key objective of the National Security Policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Occupation of territories and ethnic cleansing practices are contrary to universal and European values, as well as to the principles and ideals of peace, democracy, stability and regional cooperation.

Efforts of the Republic of Azerbaijan aimed at the settlement of the conflict with Armenia are not confined only to reaching political agreement between the two States, but as soon as such an agreement is achieved they will be directed at establishing lasting peace and mutual understanding between the two peoples.

The Republic of Azerbaijan is committed to the peaceful settlement of the conflict in the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group with a view to eliminating the consequences of the aggression against it and ending the occupation of a part of its territory.

The legal and political grounds for the settlement of the conflict are based upon the norms and principles of international law as reflected in the United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions 822, 853, 874 and 884 adopted in 1993, as well as the appropriate documents and decisions of the OSCE and the Council of Europe. These documents reaffirmed the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of the internationally recognized borders of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

The settlement should be on the following basis:

- Withdrawal of the armed forces of Armenia from all the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan;
- Restoration of the sovereign rights of the Republic of Azerbaijan in these territories;
- Return of the forcibly displaced Azerbaijanis to their native lands;
- Elaboration within the framework of a lawful and democratic process of the legal status, which would ensure peaceful coexistence of the Azerbaijani and Armenian communities of the Nagorno-Karabakh region and its high level self-rule within the Republic of Azerbaijan;
- Establishment of conditions for restoring the communications and socio-economic growth of this region in the framework of the overall economic development of the country and of the regional integration processes.

Issues related to violation of the norms and principles of international law in the territories occupied by Armenia as well as the illegal activities in these territories are under the constant attention of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The Republic of Azerbaijan will continue to use available political and legal means to investigate and appraise the facts concerning the destruction of the cultural and historic heritage and distorting original features of the Azerbaijani settlements in the regions of Armenia, which used to be inhabited by the Azerbaijanis and in the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan. In this context, unlawful settlement, exploitation and misappropriation of the natural resources in the occupied territories will receive particular attention.

Integrated activities and consistent measures shall be undertaken with a view to coordinating, both domestically and in the international arena, the activities and efforts of governmental structures and civil society related to the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan; prosecuting the genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed against the Azerbaijanis during the aggression against the Republic of Azerbaijan and occupation of a part of its territory; conducting comprehensive and thorough study of the "Armenian question"; revealing the truth and bringing it to the attention of the international community; and ensuring international legal appraisal of the conflict.

4.1.2. Integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures

Integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic political, security, economic and other institutions constitutes the strategic goal of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The Republic of Azerbaijan views its partnership with the Euro-Atlantic structures as a means for contributing to security, economic prosperity and democracy in the whole Euro-Atlantic area.

The Republic of Azerbaijan works together with NATO to eliminate instability, conflicts and threats in European and the Euro-Atlantic area and, proceeding from the principle of the indivisibility of security, is determined to share the burden of building a common security system in Europe and in its own region without discrimination on geographic or political grounds.

The Republic of Azerbaijan fully utilizes available partnership mechanisms with NATO within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and NATO's "Partnership for Peace" programme. In this regard, the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) is an important instrument for strengthening cooperation with NATO in short and medium-term perspectives. IPAP will be further used as a mechanism for reforming security sector of the Republic of Azerbaijan to meet NATO standards, as well as for developing political dialogue.

Proceeding from the recognition of necessity to deepen its integration into the European area, the Republic of Azerbaijan has established a multi-faceted relationship with the European Union. Cooperation between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the European Union is carried out within the "Technical Assistance for CIS" (TACIS), "Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia" (TRACECA) and some other programmes. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the European Union, which is effective since 1999 provides a favourable framework for political dialogue, support for development of democracy, economic cooperation as well as encouraging of investments.

Inclusion of the Republic of Azerbaijan into the "New Neighbourhood Policy" of the European Union and within this policy framework implementation of the Azerbaijan-European Union Action Plan adopted in 2006 strengthens political dialogue, develops cooperation in the sphere of political, economic and institutional reforms and creates a basis for raising cooperation to a qualitatively new level.

The Memorandum of Understanding on "Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy" signed in 2006 between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the European Union will contribute to ensuring the diversification of the energy sources and transportation routes of the member-states of the European Union, development and modernization of the energy infrastructure, efficient use of energy resources and development of the renewable energy sources in the Republic of Azerbaijan. Close cooperation of the Republic of Azerbaijan with the European Union will contribute to the stability in the Caucasus and will promote the European values in the region.

4.1.3. Contribution to international security

The Republic of Azerbaijan is making sustained efforts to contribute to international and regional security by participating in joint efforts aimed at maintaining of international peace and stability.

After the 11 September 2001 attacks the fight against terrorism became one of the most important issues of the international agenda. The Republic of Azerbaijan fully supports the struggle of the international community against terrorism and undertook a number of significant steps against the terrorist activities, disregarding whatever pretexts under which they were carried out. The Republic of Azerbaijan has made its airspace and airfields available in support of the international fight against international

terrorist organizations. The Republic of Azerbaijan also became a party to all conventions on combating terrorism at global and regional levels.

The Republic of Azerbaijan makes efforts to stabilize the sensitive regions of the world. The Azerbaijani peacekeepers contribute to security by participating in the peacekeeping operation in the Serbian Kosovo province, in NATO-led operations in Afghanistan, and in Iraq as a part of the international coalition.

The Republic of Azerbaijan, as a party to the relevant international arms control and non-proliferation treaties, fully supports the efforts to maintain international security. The Republic of Azerbaijan is seriously concerned about the weakening of the international non-proliferation regime and will continue to cooperate with the international community and the relevant organizations for the imposition of adequate controls.

The Republic of Azerbaijan is concerned by the fact that the arms control mechanism is not effective in its territories occupied by Armenia. Accumulation of a great number of armaments and ammunitions in these territories, which are beyond the international control, poses serious threats to regional peace.

4.1.4. Cooperation with international organizations

Active participation in the work of international organizations is of great importance for the security and foreign policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Irrespective of their size and influence, the universal and regional international organizations increasingly play a more important role in addressing the new global threats. Thus, along with their contribution to the elimination and prevention of these threats, international organizations create opportunities for defending the national interests of the Republic of Azerbaijan in global politics. At the same time, the international organizations provide a suitable forum for attracting the attention of the partner countries to the security problems facing the Republic of Azerbaijan.

From this perspective, the existence, development and adaptation to changes in the contemporary world of the universal and regional international organizations is important for the Republic of Azerbaijan.

The Republic of Azerbaijan acknowledges the indispensable role of the UN, which it joined in 1992, in maintaining the international peace and security, and in promoting sustainable development and democracy.

The interest of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the UN is not limited to the settlement of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Republic of Azerbaijan shares the common values with the UN and expands its cooperation with this organization in the framework of human rights, economic and social development programmes. The Republic of Azerbaijan contributes to the struggle of the international community against terrorism in the framework of the UN and other organizations.

The Republic of Azerbaijan supports the reforms within the UN aimed at increasing its operational capabilities, including strengthening the international law system and enforcing the adopted decisions with a view to responding more effectively to the challenges and threats of the 21st century.

The OSCE, which the Republic of Azerbaijan joined in 1992, is the unique regional organization that embraces all the countries of the European Continent and determines the norms and principles regulating the relations between the countries and maintaining common security. The Helsinki Final Act and other documents of the OSCE constitute a principled political basis for ensuring regional peace and security.

From the viewpoint of the role the OSCE is playing in the resolution of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, cooperation with this organization takes a prominent place in the foreign policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The Republic of Azerbaijan is also cooperating with the OSCE in other areas.

In view of the growing importance of the OSCE in the new political environment, the Republic of Azerbaijan is interested in increasing its role by undertaking appropriate reforms through active participation and with the good faith of all its members to raise the effectiveness of this organization, in particular with regard to respect for its principles.

The cooperation of the Republic of Azerbaijan with the Council of Europe pursues the goal of integration into the European family of nations and of benefiting from the European standards and values. The Republic of Azerbaijan joined the Council of Europe in 2001 and in the framework of cooperation with this organization adapts its national legislation to the European standards. Azerbaijan signed and ratified the key document of the Council of Europe, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its protocols, on 25 January 2001 and 25 December 2001 respectively.

As a part of the Islamic world the Republic of Azerbaijan attaches particular importance to its activities within the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). After joining the OIC in 1991, the Republic of Azerbaijan became an active participant in this organization. The OIC is a first international organization which recognized and condemned Armenia as an aggressor. The unequivocal and just position of the OIC on this vital issue created favourable conditions for promoting relations of the Republic of Azerbaijan with this organization. The Republic of Azerbaijan plays the role of the bridge between the civilizations and benefiting of both Eastern and Western cultures will continue to contribute to the dialogue among States and nations.

The Republic of Azerbaijan is interested in maintaining cooperation within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and developing economic, political, legal and humanitarian relations with the CIS member-states on a bilateral basis.

The organization "For democracy and economic development - GUAM" comprising Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine was founded in 1997 and was transformed into an international regional organization in 2006. GUAM unites the partner countries on the basis of common interests in the spheres of democracy, development and security.

The Republic of Azerbaijan attaches special importance to joining efforts and developing a common approach of GUAM member-states towards the issues of vital importance for them, particularly in regard of resolution of the existing conflicts in their territories and combating aggressive separatism.

The geographic area of the GUAM member-states, their current geopolitical and geo-economic position plays an important role in Eurasia in particular in terms of the energy issues and transportation corridors.

Implementation of the democratic and economic development concept of GUAM will positively effect the development of the member-states and their role in the international system.

Cooperation with the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC) is one of the foreign policy priorities of the Republic of Azerbaijan. BSEC was established in 1992 in the format of Black Sea Economic Cooperation and in 1998 was transformed

into a regional organization with a view to promoting regional and sub-regional integration processes and economic cooperation in the area embracing the Black Sea, Caspian Sea and Mediterranean Sea.

4.1.5. Regional cooperation and bilateral relations

The Republic of Azerbaijan pursues a multidimensional, balanced foreign policy and seeks to establish friendly relations with all countries on the basis of universally accepted norms and principles of international law, such as respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, inviolability of borders and non-interference in internal affairs. The Republic of Azerbaijan has established such relations with almost all countries of the world and is continuing to develop them.

The Republic of Azerbaijan participates in joint efforts in addressing regional and global issues. Regional security, combating terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ensuring energy security are among the priority areas.

The Republic of Azerbaijan considers it important to take a number of steps for achieving peace and stability in the region. Foremost, the region should be free from weapons of mass destruction. Development of the regional relations in line with the nuclear non-proliferation norms of international law is a precondition for ensuring and strengthening stability at the regional and global level.

Absence of foreign military forces in the region would contribute to the regional security. Regional security should be achieved through mutual recognition of and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the regional countries and by abandoning militarist and aggressive policies.

The Republic of Azerbaijan will continue its efforts to ensure human rights and fundamental freedoms of Azerbaijanis living abroad, as well as to promote their national identity and values in conformity with the generally-accepted norms and principles of international law, international treaties to which the Republic of Azerbaijan is a party, and with national legislation, whilst taking into account the legislation of foreign countries concerned.

4.1.5.1. Cooperation with regional countries

The Republic of Azerbaijan attaches great importance to the development of comprehensive relations with neighbouring countries. The Republic of Azerbaijan is committed to finding solutions to outstanding problems in bilateral relations in a mutually acceptable fashion and in conformity with international law. The Republic of Azerbaijan is interested in an early finalization of the talks on the delimitation and demarcation of the borders with neighbouring countries.

Development of harmonious relations with other countries, especially those adjoining the Republic of Azerbaijan, is of great importance also for eliminating threats emanating from separatism, ethnic, political and religious extremism.

The Republic of Azerbaijan views regional cooperation as an indispensable factor for maintaining peace and stability in the region. At the same time, the aggressive policy of Armenia is a major obstacle to comprehensive regional cooperation in the South Caucasus. It is unacceptable for the Republic of Azerbaijan to cooperate with Armenia until it abandons this policy.

On the other hand, a trilateral strategic partnership and deepening cooperation between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey has developed into a factor of stability in the region. This cooperation, resulting in successful implementation of infrastructure projects such as Baku-Supsa, Heydar Aliyev Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan export oil pipelines

and South Caucasus gas pipeline (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum), has increased the importance of the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions, contributed to the European and global energy security and laid the foundations for the new vital and secure energy source for Europe.

Implementation of the geo-strategically important "Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway link" project is an important step in fostering and expanding regional cooperation and at the same time creates new global opportunities.

Comprehensive relations with Turkey, which was the first country to recognize the independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and which plays a special role in ensuring peace and stability in the region, is of particular importance. Bilateral relations between the two countries sharing ethnic, cultural and linguistic affinity are further expanding and deepening at the level of strategic partnership. The contributions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and Turkey in implementing trans-regional economic projects and the efforts of Turkey directed at settlement of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan indicate the coincidence of positions of the two countries and the advanced level of their cooperation.

Promotion of comprehensive cooperation and partnership with Georgia is of great importance for the Republic of Azerbaijan. The Republic of Azerbaijan closely cooperates with Georgia in the framework of common interests of both countries, implementation of the regional energy and transportation projects and other areas of mutual interest, and will continue further developing bilateral strategic cooperation.

Partnership of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine within the organization "For democracy and economic development - GUAM" is another example of regional cooperation.

Partnership with Ukraine and Moldova is not confined only to the GUAM framework, but at the same time is developing on a bilateral basis in political, economic, humanitarian and other spheres.

Relations between Azerbaijan and Russia constitute an important factor for regional stability and development. The Republic of Azerbaijan engages in a strategic partnership and cooperation with the Russian Federation both on a bilateral basis and in multilateral frameworks of European regional organizations, and in particular within the CIS in the political, economic, humanitarian, security fields, in combating organized crime and other areas.

The Republic of Azerbaijan is interested in peaceful and good neighbourly relations with Caspian littoral countries and in joint participation in regional projects. The Republic of Azerbaijan enjoys close neighborly relations with the Caspian littoral States of Russia and Kazakhstan. Currently, one of the routes for transportation of the Azerbaijani oil from the Caspian Sea to the European markets via the Black Sea is the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline. In 2006 the Republic of Azerbaijan signed an agreement with Kazakhstan supporting and providing conditions for transportation of Kazakhstan oil from the Caspian Sea to the world markets through the "Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan" system through the territory of Azerbaijan.

These three Caspian littoral States have already reached agreement over division of the Caspian Sea bed. The Republic of Azerbaijan believes in reaching a similar agreement with its close neighbours of Iran and Turkmenistan, defining of the legal status of the Caspian Sea in the foreseeable future and using the Caspian Sea only for the peaceful purposes and for the prosperity of the littoral countries.

The Republic of Azerbaijan attaches great importance to its relations with neighboring Iran. The relationship between the two countries, which share a common rich historical

and cultural heritage, is one of the important objectives of the country's foreign policy. The Republic of Azerbaijan is interested in promoting mutually beneficial relations with Iran in political, economic, cultural and other areas.

4.1.5.2. Cooperation with non-regional countries

The Republic of Azerbaijan is also interested in cooperation with other countries beyond the region. Foremost, the Republic of Azerbaijan cooperates with its strategic partner the USA in the framework of the UN and Euro-Atlantic structures, in the anti-terror coalition, in combating global challenges and threats such as international terrorism, separatism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, trans-national organized crime, illegal drug, arms and human trafficking, corruption and on a bilateral basis in political, military, economic, energy security spheres and in promoting democratic reforms.

The Republic of Azerbaijan builds its cooperation with the European countries on a bilateral and multilateral basis and is interested in deepening integration into European economic and legal space and in implementing joint regional economic projects. It is important for the Republic of Azerbaijan to expand economic and political cooperation, in particular with the Baltic, East and South-East European States. Azerbaijan contributes to the policy of diversification of energy supplies and ensuring energy security in Europe and took a number of important steps in this regard.

Relations with the Central Asian countries also constitute an important objective of the foreign policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Further development of bilateral relations with the countries of this region is of particular importance.

The Republic of Azerbaijan is interested in mutually beneficial cooperation with such leading countries of the Far East and South-East Asia as China, Republic of Korea and Japan. Active participation of these countries in the economic projects in the Republic of Azerbaijan, such as realization of the "Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia" (TRACECA) project, has laid solid foundations for the development of the potential of the bilateral relations.

The emergence of new economic and political power centers in South-East and South Asia has expanded the foreign policy interests of the Republic of Azerbaijan into these regions.

The relations of the Republic of Azerbaijan with Middle Eastern countries have big potential and the efforts aimed at developing bilateral relations with these countries will be continued.

4.2. Strengthening of defense capability

The defense capability of the Republic of Azerbaijan is one of the major assets for promoting national interests of the country.

The defense policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan is aimed at developing and maintaining a democratically accountable defense capability based upon its national resources and appropriate to the current security situation. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan constitute the basis of the country's defense capability.

The national defense policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan is based upon the following premises:

- Peaceful coexistence with all countries;

- Respecting the sovereignty and independence of other countries, and non-interference in their internal affairs;
- Recognising the integrity and inviolability of international borders.
- Strengthening international security;
- Supporting a concept of defense sufficiency that takes into account the correlation of all relevant military postures.

The main goals of the national defense policy pursued by the Republic of Azerbaijan, which takes into account the country's historical past, the security situation, the major objectives of democratic State building and the fact of the occupation of a part of its territory by Armenia are identified as follows:

- Protecting the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Azerbaijan, restoring its territorial integrity and ensuring control over its territory;
 - Maintaining the capability of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan to mobilize and to conduct military operations for the purpose of preventing and repulsing foreign armed aggression;
 - Continuing to participate in the relevant mechanisms of the NATO's "Partnership for Peace" programme, promoting mutually beneficial military cooperation with NATO member-states and other partners on a bilateral and multilateral level;
 - Fulfilling the international legal obligations of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the defense field;
 - Contributing to international security through appropriate policies and arrangements.
- The national defense policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan is based upon the following principles:
- Unity of command and control of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan and other armed units as envisaged by the national legislation and ensuring democratic oversight over all security forces;
 - Timely identification and assessment of military threats against the security of the Republic of Azerbaijan;
 - Sufficiency of forces, including reserves, means and other capabilities, together with adequate planning to ensure national security by military means.

Practical activities to ensure national security by military means consist of an evaluation of basic military tasks, characteristics and objectives of likely wars and armed conflicts as well as identification of the dimensions of the potential threat, the situation of military and political forces and other factors threatening the military security of the country. These activities require also the elaboration of organizational principles of the Armed Forces and identification of ways to ensure their preparedness in preventing possible aggression.

Another important element of the national defense policy is establishing the optimal correlation between the economy and defense and developing the national defense industry.

Comprehensive development of international military-political and military-technical relations and cooperation is of particular importance in the process of strengthening the defense capability of the country. Integration into the Euro-Atlantic security system,

establishment of operational forces interoperable with those of NATO member-states, and participation in peacekeeping and crisis-response operations under the mandate of the appropriate international organizations are among the main objectives of the defense policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Comprehensive defense of the territory and the citizens of the country is a requirement of the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan and should be ensured by all means. To this end, the Armed Forces and other armed units envisaged by the national legislation have each capability to fulfill their specific missions.

The Armed Forces and other armed units of the State exercise the rights and carry out tasks and responsibilities stipulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan, national laws, other normative-legal acts, as well as in international treaties on international humanitarian law to which Azerbaijan is a party.

4.3. Promotion of security by domestic policy means

4.3.1. Strengthening of democracy

The Republic of Azerbaijan has chosen the path of development of democratic governance and civil society as the only viable means to guarantee the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The Republic of Azerbaijan managed to carry out important reforms in its legislative and economic systems despite the negative effects of the occupation by Armenia of a part of its territory continuing since the re-gaining of State independence. The citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan enjoy the right of applying to the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Azerbaijan, to the European Court of Human Rights and to the UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies. With a view to protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, the Ombudsman institution was established and the independence of the courts was ensured. The legislation protecting the freedom of expression and eliminating the State control over the media and abolishing the censorship was adopted.

In the framework of ongoing democratic reform process, the Government focuses on further development of the election practices, improvement of the law enforcement mechanisms, ensuring transparency of the public agencies and of the recruitment process in these bodies, clarifying the competences of the self-governing municipal bodies and increasing their role in addressing local problems, as well as strengthening of the material-technical basis of the media and of the non-governmental organizations.

The Government will continue its efforts to increase the democratic and civil control over all security structures, ensuring transparency of their activities, fighting effectively against corruption, further strengthening the accountability of public officials, whose duty is to serve the people, and providing members of the Milli Meclis with information about the activities of those officials in their spheres of competence and facilitating access of the broad public to this information through the media.

Upholding the fundamental values of a democratic State, such as the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and achieving social justice will provide valuable support in combating attempts against the performance of the State functions and the realization of the national interests.

4.3.2. Preservation of the environment of ethnic and religious tolerance

The Republic of Azerbaijan has always been an example of the peaceful coexistence of different peoples and religions. The State of Azerbaijan considers that a rational

national policy derived from the interests of the whole society, religious tolerance, ensuring the equality of all citizens before the law, the democratic rights and freedoms for the people and the opportunity to freely exercise their rights provide the best environment to prevent transformation of the risks into real threats and for their elimination.

Preservation and promotion of the environment of ethnic and religious tolerance in the country is among the key tasks of the Government. The national policy of the State of Azerbaijan is based upon one of the main provisions of the Constitution, which stipulates that the Republic of Azerbaijan is a united and indivisible homeland for all citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

4.3.3. Scientific, educational and cultural policy and preservation of moral foundations

The policy of preservation of the science, education and moral foundations of the people of Azerbaijan aims at the protection of the cultural heritage, material and moral values, means of satisfying cultural needs and scientific-technological potential against internal and external threats and at benefiting from progressive domestic and international developments.

The Republic of Azerbaijan preserves the national cultural identity without overlooking the present trends of globalization of the world culture and creates opportunities to benefit from the global cultural heritage for the progress of its own national culture.

The Republic of Azerbaijan, in line with its international obligations, preserves the historical and cultural monuments on its territory.

Sustainable development of the country requires adequate well educated and trained professional human resources, as well as scientific-technological progress. For this purpose, the Republic of Azerbaijan is expanding cooperation with the developed countries, and benefits from international experience with a view to raising science and education to international standards and to introducing new technologies. The Republic of Azerbaijan designs and implements the long-term programmes of State policy on protection and development of the scientific potential.

4.3.4. Economic and social development

Ensuring sustainability of the economic development is a core principle of the Government's economic policy. This is a complex issue, which requires consideration of both the economic and social dimensions on an equal footing. To that end, the Republic of Azerbaijan intends to prepare and implement simultaneous and coordinated programs in both directions.

It has been possible to keep moderate inflation rates, create a stable and predictable monetary market as well as to substantially increase the strategic monetary reserves of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Structural reforms in the public administration system have been implemented and most of the enterprises have managed to increase their efficiency by realigning their manufacturing to market demand.

In order to prevent the threat of economic destabilization resulting from an overdependence on the fast growing oil and gas revenues, the need for an economic policy capable to ensure diversification has been recognized.

Entrepreneurship has experienced noticeable development and progress has been achieved in the liberalization of the economy. Economic growth should be sustained through practical measures aimed at improving the living standards of the population, undertaking structural-technological modernization and realization of the competition

advantages of the country. Attainment of new achievements in socio-economic development also requires adherence to an integrated approach in carrying out the reforms, ensuring transparency in the privatization process, modernization of the economy and encouraging social change.

The main goal of the regional economic policy within the country is to achieve the development of the non-oil sectors of the economy by efficient use of the potential of the regions, expansion of the production of manufacturing enterprises, stimulation of export-oriented goods production, further improvement of the living standards of the population through the development of the local entrepreneurship, increasing the employment rate, particularly through the creation of jobs for young people, and ensuring vibrant economic development of the country.

Attraction of inward investment plays a vital role in the long-term sustainable and balanced development of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The required quantity and quality of inward investments can primarily be assured through support of private investments. In this regard creating a favourable investment climate is one of the key tasks. For this purpose attention will be devoted to the protection of private property rights, improving corporate management, creation of conditions for fair competition for all investors regardless of the forms of the property, further improvement of the normative and legal basis regulating investment activities, stimulation of the inflow of investments into the non-oil sector and the development of the regions. At the same time, operation of the Azerbaijani companies in foreign countries and their participation in international projects will be encouraged.

Furthermore, particular attention will be devoted to strengthening the transit capabilities of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the East-West and North-South transportation corridors, to bringing modern technologies to the country and to the development of the information-communication systems.

4.3.5. Enhancing internal security

Ensuring internal security is one of the key tasks of the State. This also enhances the State capabilities to respond to international risks and threats.

Reliable internal security can only be achieved in an environment of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, development of civil society and of social well-being. Ensuring internal security by preserving public order and fighting against crime and corruption are among the main responsibilities of the relevant governmental structures. Legislation, institutional reforms and practical measures are underway with a view to increasing the efficiency of the law enforcement agencies in addressing these issues.

Intelligence and counterintelligence, being one of the crucial elements of the national security, will continue to play a significant role in ensuring the security of the State and its citizens.

4.3.6. Reinforcing border security

The sensitive geographic location of the Republic of Azerbaijan makes it vulnerable to such trans-border threats as international terrorism, illegal immigration, transnational organized crime, human and drug trafficking, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

As a result of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan 132 km of the international border with Islamic Republic of Iran and 733 km of the border with Armenia were seized by the latter. Lack of control over these borders creates fertile grounds for above mentioned crimes.

Existence of trans-border threats requires devoting particular attention to the border security of the country. A specific central governmental agency, the State Border Service, has been established to carry out effective border security policy. In the framework of the democratic State building process and in particular of the security sector reforms, the border security concept is being revised and the radical structural reforms aimed at transformation of the State Border Service from a militarized structure into a law enforcement agency are underway. A more effective border control system, established as a result of the reforms carried out in cooperation with NATO and other foreign partners, contributes to improving the mechanisms coordinating the possible supporting role and activities of the Armed Forces and other security structures in the border security.

Border security becomes an increasingly important component of security of the oil and gas deposits and transport corridors.

With a view to increasing the effectiveness of border security, normative legal acts are being adjusted to international standards, public administration is being improved and transparent budgeting system is being established.

The Republic of Azerbaijan is expanding its cooperation in the sphere of border security in the framework of NATO, the European Union, the International Organization for Migration, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Conference on Border Management and other international organizations, as well as with other countries on a bilateral and multilateral level.

In order to advance reforms in this sphere the air and maritime control, search and rescue, and rapid response capabilities are being upgraded, the training system is being improved, land borders and control posts are being provided with modern equipment and transformation of the personnel into a professional corps is being accelerated.

The reform and construction processes envisage inclusion of the currently uncontrolled portion of the borders into the common border security system after the resolution of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and undertaking of the appropriate security measures on these territories.

4.3.7. Migration policy

Analysis of recent trends indicates that the rapid socio-economic development of Azerbaijan, the expansion of the international energy and transportation communications and the geopolitical position of the country have accelerated the migration processes. This requires adaptation of migration policy and improvement of the management of migration processes to take into account the national interests aimed at development of the country and ensuring its security.

A State Migration Policy for 2006-2008 has been approved for the purposes of:

- Implementing State policy in the field of migration;
- Improving the national legislation to meet international norms and up-to-date standards;
- Ensuring national security and sustainable socio-economic, demographic development;

- Making effective use of the workforce and even distribution of the population throughout the country;
- Benefiting from the intellectual and labor potential of the immigrants;
- Eliminating the negative consequences of an unregulated immigration flow and preventing illegal migration, including human trafficking.

The State Migration Service of the Republic of Azerbaijan was established with a view to implementing the State Migration Policy, developing a management system to forecast and regulate migration processes, and to ensure coherence between the activities of relevant governmental agencies.

Improvement of the mechanisms for regulating migration processes in the country requires formulation of effective immigration policy, strengthening the international cooperation, controlling emigration processes and creating of unified information database.

4.3.8. Energy security policy

Among the key activities aimed at ensuring the national security of the Republic of Azerbaijan are:

- Development and exploitation of the existing and prospective oil and gas reserves in the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea;
- Construction and installation of modern oil and gas platforms;
- Identification and assessment of the threats to the main oil and gas pipelines and terminals and taking appropriate countermeasures.

Also among the key tasks of the national security of the Republic of Azerbaijan are ensuring the security of energy transportation between the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea via the Heydar Aliyev Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan main export oil pipeline and the South Caucasus gas pipeline, as well as of the crucial facilities which ensure the geo-strategic and economic interests of the Caspian littoral States, and to this end managing and diminishing the growing risks.

With the Heydar Aliyev Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan main export pipeline becoming operational in 2006, the Azerbaijani oil became an important factor in the world market. The geography of the pipelines delivering the Azerbaijani oil to the Turkish port of Ceyhan and the gas to the Turkish Erzurum gas terminal creates certain security risks.

The Republic of Azerbaijan implements integrated measures to prevent constructed and used energy production and transportation infrastructure from exposure to natural disasters, human induced technological accidents and sabotage.

Due to the anticipated global energy supply crisis in the 21st century it was decided to develop alternative energy sources in the Republic of Azerbaijan. Given that Azerbaijan has a favourable number of sunny and windy days annually, energy needs of the country can be partially met by making use of power stations generating energy from wind, sun, biomass, lower mountain waters and by hydroelectric power stations.

4.3.9. Transportation security policy

While stimulating steadfast and rapid economic growth, the rich energy resources of the Republic of Azerbaijan have turned into one of the major factors that determine the interests of various countries in the region and generate frictions in their relations.

After gaining independence the Republic of Azerbaijan further developed its energy sector and created various transportation networks. Ensuring security of these transportation networks is one of the main tasks for the country.

In order to ensure security of the international transport corridors and the pipelines the Republic of Azerbaijan pursues the following objectives:

- Ensuring transport and transportation security;
- Providing mobilization capabilities of the transportation system;
- Strengthening security measures with a view to increase effective functioning and competitiveness of the Europe-Caucasus-Asia and North-South international transportation corridors;
- Ensuring the reliability of the transport infrastructures protection system;
- Identifying and eliminating external threats to the security of the transportation infrastructures;
- Banning or controlling the circulation of the devices, which can be used in terrorist attacks against the transportation means and the infrastructure, including pipelines;
- Preventing damage to the social and ecological environment during the construction and exploitation of the transportation facilities.

These objectives should be reflected in the activities of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan, other security structures as well as relevant governmental bodies and necessary conditions for their implementation should be established.

4.3.10. Emergency management and protection of environment and public safety

Environment-related natural disasters and human induced technological accidents may endanger internal security through harming the well-being and property of the population. These hazards should therefore be considered within the broader security context.

The Republic of Azerbaijan has established a special Ministry for Emergency Situations, responsible for formulation and coordination of measures for early warning of the emergency situations and for dealing with their consequences.

The Republic of Azerbaijan cooperates on a bilateral basis with a number of countries for sharing of experience and exchange of information on the crisis management and prevention of emergency situations. Multilateral cooperation in this area is carried out through NATO mechanisms and the Republic of Azerbaijan will continue to make effective use of these opportunities.

The Republic of Azerbaijan takes seriously the ecological problems and is aware of the emerging and potentially harmful threats, risks and challenges. Readiness against natural, human induced technological disasters and crisis situations and their prevention is among the key issues for the State.

The Republic of Azerbaijan implements active measures to prevent contamination of the population and its territory by radioactive, bacteriological and chemical substances and to avert their negative impact on the economy of the country.

Protection of the strategic State facilities, including oil and gas production and refining enterprises, terminals, major pipelines, fresh water supplies, electric power stations and hydro-technical installations against natural and human induced technological disasters as well as terror threats is one of the key tasks for the State.

Taking into account the diverse geographical and geological environment, the protection of the country's territory against natural emergency situations which may potentially cause destruction, such as earthquakes, mud slides, floods, avalanches, and hazards caused by mud volcanoes, as well as ways to handle their consequences, are all under constant attention.

Safeguarding the rich flora and fauna in the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan, which has several climatic zones, is of utmost importance.

Particular attention is devoted to eliminating the sources of environmental pollution, to tackling the ecological problems of the Caspian Sea, to the preservation and rehabilitation of its biodiversity, and to other relevant issues.

Control over the usage of plant protection means (pesticides and biological agents) and timely quarantine inspections for early pest identification and treatments are key issues in ensuring food security.

For the purpose of protecting public safety it is important to strengthen the medication quality control mechanisms and struggle against counterfeit medications.

4.3.11. Information security policy

Ensuring the national security policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the information sphere requires integrated measures to protect the State, public and individual information resources, as well as protection of national interests in information sphere.

A national system and information infrastructure for the protection of the information and the State information resources in the country is being developed and strengthened for the purpose of ensuring the national security of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the information sphere. Credible and important data are being collected to ensure informed decisions by governmental structures and public officials.

Key issues of this dimension of national security are increasing the coherence and effectiveness of the intelligence and counter-intelligence capabilities and ensuring coordination in protecting classified information. The Republic of Azerbaijan will develop its national intelligence and counter-intelligence capabilities and will continue improving its activities aimed at protecting classified information.

Information security is regulated through improvement of the legal mechanisms for safeguarding State secrets and for ensuring a free flow of open information. Legal and administrative mechanisms will ensure individual rights and the democratic oversight over the activities of the governmental structures.

FINAL PROVISIONS

Due to its strategic location, the Republic of Azerbaijan plays a significant role in the political and economic processes of the Euro-Atlantic area, as it is manifested in realization of the energy and transportation projects in the region.

The security environment of the Republic of Azerbaijan is characterized also by the existence of such threats as armed conflicts, international terrorism, trans-national organized crime, illegal migration, human and drug trafficking, proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction, all of which are potential sources of a number of security challenges facing the country.

The present Concept lays the basis for the national security policies of the Republic of Azerbaijan, sets the tasks for the governmental structures and requires their coherent efforts for the protection of national interests.

The Concept assesses the dynamic security environment of the country, the national interests of the Republic of Azerbaijan and indicates the main objectives of the national security policies.

The Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan will take the appropriate measures to ensure implementation of the tasks identified in the Concept.

The Concept will be regularly reviewed and updated in order to ensure more effectively the national security of the country through the internal and foreign policies of the State.

The Concept sets forth also a basis for elaborating the military doctrine, foreign policy strategy, defense review, economic concept, culture, science, education, health, transportation strategies and other policy documents related to different areas of State's activities.

The other conceptual documents in security field to be elaborated subsequently should reflect consensus across the society, be realistic and, together with this Concept, be capable to contribute to the strengthening of democracy, establishing the rule of law, developing the civil society, creating an effective and democratically controlled security sector and assist achievement of sustainable economic development and social progress.

3. National Security Concept of the Republic of Georgia (2005)

“Georgia's citizens' firm will is to establish a democratic social order, economic freedom, a Rule of Law based social state, to secure universally recognized human rights and freedoms, to enhance the state independence and peaceful relations with other peoples.”

Preamble to the Constitution of Georgia

Introduction

Georgia is at an important stage in its centuries-old history. Georgia regained its independence in 1991, after seven decades of occupation. Since then, it has undergone a period characterized by internal conflicts supported from outside of Georgia, and by political and economic instability. Nevertheless, the people of Georgia have made an unequivocal decision to build a democratic and free state that ensures the rule of law, human rights, security, prosperity of its citizens and a free market economy.

The Rose Revolution of November 2003 once again demonstrated that democracy and liberty are part of the Georgian traditional values that are of vital necessity to the people of Georgia. Georgia, as an integral part of the European political, economic and cultural area, whose fundamental national values are rooted in European values and traditions, aspires to achieve full-fledged integration into Europe's political, economic and security systems. Georgia aspires to return to its European tradition and remain an integral part of Europe.

The National Security Concept of Georgia is the keystone document that presents a vision of secure development of the state and of fundamental national values and interests. It describes threats, risks and challenges to national security and sets major directions of national security policy. The Concept underlines the aspiration of the people of Georgia to achieve full-fledged integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), and to contribute to the security of the Black Sea region as a constituent part of the Euro-Atlantic security system.

The Government of Georgia shall implement the National Security Concept through relevant long-term measures that will safeguard fundamental national values and national interests by adequately addressing security threats, risks and challenges to national security.

The National Security Concept shall serve as the basis for all strategies and plans. Along with any revision of the Concept, relevant strategies and plans should be updated as well.

2. Fundamental National Values of Georgia

Georgia's fundamental national values are the foundation of Georgian Statehood. Protection of fundamental national values is of ultimate importance to the very existence and security of Georgia, and to the security and prosperity of its citizens. Georgia will protect its fundamental national values by all available lawful means. The fundamental national values of Georgia are:

2.1 Independence: Georgia is a sovereign, independent state that respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states and expects the same from them. Georgia rejects the interference of any state in its domestic affairs.

2.2. Freedom: The rights and freedoms envisaged in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms are fundamental national values of Georgia. Georgia guarantees the protection of universally recognized human rights and freedoms of all individuals and groups residing on its territory, respects their freedom of choice, and creates favorable conditions for the realization of every individual's opportunity.

2.3. Democracy and Rule of Law: Georgia adheres to universal democratic values and principles, based on which it is establishing a democratic system of governance. In this system, state authority is defined by law and separated among three branches of government. The Georgian political system guarantees a strong and independent judiciary. Georgia promotes the development of civil society and ensures freedom of the media.

2.4. Prosperity: Georgia secures sustainable economic development based on democratically established and transparent rules. Through these rules, Georgia ensures the implementation of an effective social policy aimed at increasing the welfare of, and creating decent living conditions for, all citizens. Georgia fosters the development of a free market economy and creates favorable conditions for entrepreneurship, enhancement of foreign trade, and attraction of investments.

2.5. Peace: Georgia aims at establishing good relations with every state based on the norms of international law. Development of friendly relations with neighboring states is of particular importance for Georgia. Georgia resolves all disputes by peaceful means, based on the norms of international law. A free, independent, united, prosperous, and peaceful Georgia will significantly contribute to strengthening regional security and stability.

2.6. Security: Georgia aspires to guarantee security of the state, its institutions and citizens, within its internationally recognized state borders. While safeguarding security, Georgia adheres to the norms of international law.

3. National Interests of Georgia

The national interests of Georgia derive from the contemporary international and domestic setting. National interests are based on fundamental national values. The realization of national interests will ensure the stability and development of the state, as well as the prosperity, security and protection of rights and freedoms of the citizens of Georgia. Failure to protect national interests will endanger Georgia's fundamental national values. The national interests of Georgia are:

3.1. Ensuring Territorial Integrity: Georgia is dedicated to restoring and maintaining its territorial integrity and ensuring the non-violability of its internationally recognized borders. Georgia will employ all available lawful means to resolve peacefully and justly all issues that might arise in the process of restoring the constitutional order on the territory of Georgia.

3.2. Ensuring National Unity and Civil Accord: Georgia ensures protection of the interests, rights and freedoms of all ethnic and religious groups residing in the country. For this purpose, Georgia is building a society based on the principles of pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity and non-discrimination. Georgia strives to foster respect for the Constitution among its citizens and to ensure their self-identification as citizens of Georgia.

3.3 Regional Stability: Processes taking place in Europe are the foremost determinants of Georgia's security environment, although processes in the Middle East and Central Asia also have serious influence. Georgia attaches particular importance to developments within the Black Sea basin, the Caucasus and Russia. Maintenance of peace and security in this area, as well as peaceful resolution of existing disputes, is of vital importance to Georgia. Georgia contributes to the strengthening of the regional security system through cooperation in bilateral and multilateral formats.

3.4. Strengthening Freedom and Democracy in Neighboring States and Regions: Georgia welcomes and contributes to the strengthening of democracy, free markets and civil society in neighboring states and regions, and considers them as important preconditions for ensuring regional stability and security.

3.5. Strengthening the State's Transit Function and Energy Security: Georgia attributes special importance to strengthening its transit and energy corridor functions.

Therefore, it actively participates in international energy, transportation and communications projects. Ensuring alternative energy and strategic resource supplies, as well as development of strategically important regional infrastructure, are connected to the maintenance of stability, economic growth and prosperity in Georgia.

3.6. Environmental Security of the Country and the Region: The quality of environmental protection and the rational use of natural resources are closely related to public security and health. Taking into consideration Georgia's biodiversity and its role as a transit country, special importance is attributed to the ecological safety of large international and local projects.

3.7. Preserving National and Cultural Uniqueness: Georgia, as a state with a centuries-old history and rich cultural heritage, considers the preservation of cultural diversity and national identity as a necessary element for ensuring national security.

4. Threats, Risks and Challenges to National Security

4.1. Infringement of Georgia's Territorial Integrity: Aggressive separatist movements, inspired and supported from outside of Georgia, led to armed conflicts in the country that resulted in de facto separation of Abkhazia and the former Autonomous District of South Ossetia from Georgia, and loss of control over these territories by the Georgian authorities. This infringement of Georgia's territorial integrity is a major national security threat.

Infringed territorial integrity is the main source of a number of other problems that undermine the political, economic and social stability of the country: up to three hundred thousand Georgian citizens were forced to leave their legitimate residences; Georgia's state borders remain undefined; uncontrolled territories host illegal militant groups, create conditions favorable to a variety of terrorist groups and provide fertile ground for contraband and transnational organized crime; and separatist regimes systematically violate human rights.

Consequently, the infringement of territorial integrity, if not addressed in a timely and efficient manner, may endanger the existence of Georgia as a viable state.

4.2. Spillover of Conflicts from Neighboring States: The potential spillover of conflicts represents a serious threat to Georgia's national security because it could destabilize the country. These conflicts may elicit provocations from other state and non-state actors, as has happened on a number of occasions over the Pankisi Gorge. The spillover of conflicts from neighboring states may also cause a large-scale influx of refugees into Georgia and create favorable conditions for transnational criminal activities and contraband.

Lack of control over the state border of Georgia with the Russian Federation along the perimeters of Abkhazia and the former Autonomous District of South Ossetia exacerbates the above mentioned threat and creates further obstacles to deal efficiently with the problem. Prolonged, unresolved conflicts in neighboring states, and possible deterioration of stability in Russia, particularly in the North Caucasus, could drag Georgia into conflict. In addition, the Russian Federation's military presence on the territory of Georgia would be a risk factor to the stability of the country in certain circumstances.

4.3. Military Intervention: While the likelihood of open military aggression against Georgia is low, cross-border incursions by state and non-state actors are real, and they threaten the security of the country. Georgia has faced infringement of its sovereignty and territorial integrity on numerous occasions in the form of systematic violation of Georgia's land, air and maritime space, and by sporadic military attacks.

Illegal military and paramilitary formations in territories uncontrolled by the Georgian government and near the borders of the country considerably raise the possibility of renewed armed conflict and destabilization in Georgia. In this context, the ongoing process of granting Russian citizenship to residents of the breakaway regions of

Georgia is a potential threat because, in certain circumstances, it could be used as a pretext for intervention in Georgia's internal affairs.

4.4. International Terrorism: International terrorism is a considerable threat to the national security of Georgia, especially in view of Georgia's proximity to terrorist havens in neighboring regions.

As an active participant in the international anti-terrorist coalition, Georgia may become a target of international terrorist attacks. These may be directed against strategic infrastructure such as international oil and gas pipelines and other states' assets located in Georgia.

4.5. Contraband and Transnational Organized Crime: Unsettled conflicts in neighboring states, lawlessness in Georgia's separatist regions of the former Autonomous District of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and poor control of the state borders, add up to opportunities for contraband and transnational organized crime that seriously damage the national security and economy. These threats hinder establishment of law and order in the country, jeopardizing the stability of Georgia and the entire region. The possibility that Georgia's natural transit location could be misused in the commission of transnational crimes is also a tangible threat to Georgian security.

4.6. The Russian Federation's Military Bases: Military bases of the Russian Federation located in Georgia are no longer a direct threat to Georgia's sovereignty. However, until their final withdrawal, they remain a risk to national security, and still negatively affect the security environment in Georgia.

Georgia welcomes the transition of the Russian Federation's military bases to the "withdrawal regime" and believes that irreversible realization of the Joint Declaration of the Foreign Ministers of Georgia and the Russian Federation of May 30, 2005 will facilitate normalization of bilateral relations and strengthening of mutual confidence.

4.7 Corruption and Inefficient Public Administration System: Lack of a democratic tradition of governance and mechanisms of checks and balances has led to an increase in corruption. During recent years, corruption has penetrated the public sector and become so systemic and dramatic that it jeopardizes the security of the state by draining its resources, undermining people's confidence in democratic values and institutions and hampering economic development, thus negatively affecting civic cohesion and social balance. Georgia's recent experience shows that corruption and inefficient state governance, if not tackled systematically and diligently, may become a threat to national security.

4.8. Economic and Social Challenges: Without sustainable economic development, competitiveness of the national economy remains low. This underdeveloped economy is a serious challenge to the national security of Georgia.

Backwardness of the national economy has brought about a decline in living standards, degradation of healthcare and education, deterioration of the demographic situation, increased unemployment and increase in those living under the poverty line. In turn, these conditions have resulted in the engagement of individuals in unlawful activities.

Uneven social and economic development and the absence of a strong middle class widen the gap in living standards between different social groups. Moreover, social and economic disparities between the capital and the regions of Georgia further aggravate the situation. This could trigger social tension and political extremism that may endanger sustainable development of the state, stability and national security.

4.9. Energy Related Challenges: Dependence on energy imports from mainly one country, where free market and property rights are not secured, as well as underdevelopment of local energy sources, unstable energy supply and poor technical conditions of energy infrastructure render Georgia vulnerable and create conditions for foreign leverage. Energy related challenges, if not addressed in a timely and efficient

manner, may endanger not only economic development, but also the national security of Georgia.

4.10. Information Related Challenges: Georgian national security may be put at risk because of the absence of a cohesive national information policy, weakness of infrastructure implementing such policy, and public administration based on insufficient and incredible information. In addition, the existence of an unsatisfactory classified information protection system, the possibility of illegal access to state information systems with the purpose of acquiring or destroying information, and a likelihood of conducting large scale information attacks on Georgia from outside countries represent serious challenges to national security.

4.11. Environmental challenges: Deterioration of Georgia's natural environment, including natural and man-made hazards, could eventually endanger its natural environment, the well being of its citizens and its biodiversity. Georgia's location in a seismically active area increases its vulnerability to natural disasters. Terrorist attacks against the energy infrastructure could also cause serious environmental damage in Georgia. Finally, the damage of major industrial assets in neighboring countries could cause significant environmental harm and other negative consequences in Georgia.

5. Main Directions of Georgia's National Security Policy

The goals of Georgia's national security policy are to defend Georgia's national interests that are based on fundamental national values, to respond to national security threats, and to prevent risks and challenges from developing into threats or exacerbating existing threats.

5.1. Strengthening of Public Administration and Consolidation of Democratic Institutions

It is the firm will of the citizens of Georgia to build a free, democratic society and to create a transparent and accountable system of governance based on the rule of law and the equality of every citizen before the law. This system will become the guarantor of the rights and freedoms of all citizens without distinction, and will serve as a substantial basis for the further development of the country.

The Constitution of Georgia provides for separation of powers among the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, which is the basis for the democratic system of governance. In parallel to reforming and optimizing the functioning of the government's legislative and executive structures, the judiciary and law-enforcement agencies are also undergoing profound reforms. The Governmental Commission on Reforms in Public Administration is responsible for ensuring effective implementation of functional and structural reforms in public administration. The Strategy of Good Governance is being elaborated, aimed at perfecting the public administration system, increasing transparency of the public sector, increasing public involvement, establishing the rule of law, and securing the independence of each of the three branches of government.

Georgia attributes special importance to the establishment of an efficient system of local governance and self-governance. In order to carry out reforms in this field and decentralize the state governance system, the State Commission on Good Governance and Reforms in Territorial Administration has been established.

Georgia guarantees the conditions for the development of the non-governmental sector and the mass media. This will contribute to the establishment of a strong and vibrant civil society and will increase the government's accountability to society.

Establishing a democratic system of governance is impossible without minimizing corruption in the public sector. Increasing the government's transparency and accountability and creation of a strong civil service with respective social guarantees will significantly downscale corruption. A number of significant institutional and legislative changes have already been implemented to strengthen mechanisms that

prevent corruption. The National Anti-corruption Strategy, which sets forth relevant anti-corruption measures, has been elaborated and approved. Based on this strategy, the government will develop and implement an action plan that sets forth necessary measures, a timetable for their implementation and the agencies responsible.

5.2. Strengthening State Defense

Georgia is enhancing its state defense by strengthening its Armed Forces, reinforcing mechanisms of civilian defense, cooperating with the international community to promote world peace and security, and developing crisis management mechanisms.

Georgia is carrying out large-scale defense reforms aimed at developing modern, efficient and sustainable armed forces in line with NATO standards. The reformed Georgian Armed Forces will have increased defense capabilities to counter military threats to national security and to participate in international anti-terrorist and peace support operations. They must also be prepared to assist civilian authorities in post-crisis rehabilitation and management, maintaining law and order, and providing security for Georgian citizens. Defense reforms envisage not only structural changes, but also the modernization of armaments, equipment and infrastructure, and optimization of the number of troops required for particular missions. In the process of building the armed forces, Georgia attributes high importance to enhancing bilateral relations and the assistance provided by partner countries.

The Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO and the ongoing Strategic Defense Review are fundamental for the implementation and sustainability of these reforms.

Establishment of effective democratic civilian control over the military is one of the central elements of the defense reforms. The Ministry of Defense has been transformed into a civilian agency headed by a civilian Minister. Functions and responsibilities are being divided between the Ministry and the General Staff. Public accountability of the defense system is guaranteed by the Parliament through its power to define state defense policy, approve the defense budget, monitor defense expenditures, adopt laws in the defense sphere, and carry out control over their implementation.

The Georgian authorities consider it necessary to develop efficient reserve and mobilization systems to enhance Georgia's defense capability. At the same time, it is important to create a civil defense system to provide security for the Georgian people. Civil defense must serve as a supportive mechanism to the state defense system in case of a serious threat or crisis. It will prepare the civil population for defense and ensure the protection of material and cultural values by minimizing or eliminating consequences of crises or emergencies.

By participating in multinational anti-terrorist, peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, Georgia acquires valuable experience, but more importantly, contributes to Euro-Atlantic security. Georgia, as a member of the international anti-terrorist coalition, contributes to the establishment of peace and stability in different parts of the world. Georgian troops participated in the NATO led operations in Afghanistan; currently they are involved in NATO's operations in Kosovo, as well as in the stabilization mission in Iraq.

Georgia is creating a crisis management system that will be able to prevent and respond to crises, manage post-crisis situations in a timely and efficient manner, and ensure prompt decision-making and implementation. The crisis management system will provide for coordinated actions of state agencies, as well as precise delineation of functions and responsibilities of the governmental, non-governmental, international and humanitarian organizations involved in the crisis management process. The creation of the unified and centralized crisis management system is underway at the National Security Council of Georgia.

5.3. Restoration of the Territorial Integrity of Georgia

Infringed territorial integrity, that is, the existence of uncontrolled territories within Georgian borders, hampers Georgia's transformation into a full democracy. Therefore, reintegration of the state and restoration of the rule of law on the whole territory of Georgia is one of the top priorities of the national security policy. The state reintegration policy envisages participation of Abkhazia and the former Autonomous District of South Ossetia in developing the constitutional order of Georgia.

The Georgian Government is committed to take timely and efficient measures aimed at peaceful settlement of the conflicts, based on the principles of international law, and is ready to ensure protection of civil, political, economic, social, religious and cultural rights of all ethnic groups residing on its territory.

Georgia has given impetus to political dialogue with the de facto authorities of Abkhazia and the former Autonomous District of South Ossetia on the political status of breakaway regions and separation of powers between the national and regional governments, based on the principles of Georgian territorial integrity and broad regional autonomy.

Regarding the former Autonomous District of South Ossetia, the new proposal of the President of Georgia - Initiative of the Georgian Government with Respect to the Peaceful Resolution of the Conflict in South Ossetia - represents a solid foundation for confidence building and settling of existing disputes between the two sides. This initiative offers autonomous status to the former Autonomous District of South Ossetia and calls for renunciation of force. It is based on the principles of self-determination of nations, cultural identity, minority rights, human rights, and freedom and equality of citizens as stipulated by the Constitution of Georgia.

Regarding Abkhazia, the document drafted by the former Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations to Georgia, Dieter Boden, under the UN auspices with the participation of Secretary General's Group of Friends (France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States)-Document on Basic Principles for the Distribution of Competencies between Tbilisi and Sokhumi-creates a framework to guarantee a special status for Abkhazia, broad powers for its government, and the rights and interests of Abkhazia's multinational population. The activities of the Secretary General's Group of Friends and continuation of the Georgian-Abkhazian peace negotiations within the Geneva framework are of high importance for resolution of the Abkhazian conflict.

Returning internally displaced persons and refugees to their legitimate places of residence with full security guarantees should be ensured in accordance with the principles of justice, equality, human rights and freedoms, and the international law.

In order to ensure successful settlement of these conflicts in accordance with the peace initiatives set forth by Georgia, more active involvement of the international community is required. This will end the monopolization of the peace process by one particular actor. Georgia welcomes any proposal and initiative aimed at peaceful and fair resolution of the existing conflicts on its territory.

5.4. Integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union

Georgia, as a Black Sea and South-Eastern European state, has historically been a geographic, political and cultural part of Europe. Therefore, integration into European and Euro-Atlantic political, economic and security systems is the firm will of Georgian people. Georgia welcomes NATO and EU enlargement and believes that integration of the Black Sea states into NATO and the EU will significantly reinforce the security of the Black Sea region as the South-Eastern border of Europe. Integration to NATO and the EU represents a top priority of Georgian foreign and security policy.

5.4.1. Membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Georgia views NATO as an organization of collective defense that is the central mechanism for providing security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. Georgia's

cooperation with NATO contributes to strengthening of democratic values in the country, accomplishment of democratic reforms, especially in the field of defense, as well as establishment of a secure and stable environment. Membership of NATO would not only endow Georgia with an unprecedented degree of military and political security, but would allow it to contribute to strengthening the security of Europe, particularly the Black Sea region. Georgia has already proved its readiness to share the responsibility of the collective security by sending its troops to Kosovo and Afghanistan.

On October 29, 2004, NATO approved Georgia's Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). Implementation of IPAP is essential for NATO membership. IPAP encompasses complex reforms in political, defense, security, economic and other fields, which are necessary to develop Georgia into a stable democracy and a reliable partner for NATO.

Georgia is implementing an action plan that outlines concrete measures for fulfilling IPAP. In order to facilitate the NATO integration process, various institutional reforms are underway. Georgia is fully committed to the irreversible implementation of the IPAP provisions, which are essential to Georgia's quest for a NATO Membership Action Plan.

Georgia actively cooperates with NATO members and other aspirant states within the scope of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Georgia attributes special importance to bilateral and multilateral cooperation with NATO member states in the political, security and defense fields.

5.4.2 Integration into the European Union

Georgia views the EU as a community of nations that ensures the peace and prosperity in Europe. Georgia's cooperation with EU contributes to the implementation of democratic reforms and to strengthening the market economy and security of the country. Values and objectives shared by the EU are common to Georgia, which considers EU membership an important guarantee for its economic and political development. Georgia's accession to the EU will strengthen Europe by restoring the Black Sea region as a European trade and stability zone.

The current legal framework for the relationship between Georgia and the EU is the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). Objectives of the partnership include strengthening of political dialogue, market economy, democracy, trade, investment and harmonious economic relations, and providing bases for legislative, economic, social, financial, scientific, technological and cultural cooperation. Implementation of the National Program of Harmonization of Georgian Legislation with EU Legislation is underway within the framework of the PCA.

In June 2004, Georgia was included in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which represents an important mechanism for further movement with the European Union. The ENP provides opportunities to ensure the "four freedoms" of movement (goods, services, capital and persons), to increase efficiency of state institutions, and enhance scientific-educational cooperation with the EU. Moreover, there is an opportunity for cooperation in the fields of political dialogue, border protection, crisis management and the rule of law.

Georgia attributes great importance to the elaboration and successful implementation of the action plan within the ENP in order to exploit fully all opportunities offered by the EU. After achieving tangible progress in socio-economic, institutional, legal and political spheres, Georgia intends to develop a format ensuring a higher level of integration with the EU until full membership becomes possible. Legal and institutional reforms are underway in Georgia according to EU standards.

Georgia fully subscribes to the European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World, and is ready to take part in its implementation.

The assistance of the EU to Georgia through various projects under the Technical Assistance to the CIS (TACIS) program and EU Rule of Law Mission to Georgia

(EUJUST THEMIS) has been instrumental in fostering Georgia's reforms in a variety of spheres.

5.5. Strengthening Foreign Relations

Foreign policy is one of the main directions of Georgia's national security policy, aimed at establishing a favorable international security environment for Georgia. In order to achieve this goal, Georgia cooperates with the international community in bilateral and multilateral formats.

5.5.1. Strategic Partnership with the United States of America

Georgia continues to develop its strategic partnership with the United States of America. From the very day Georgia declared independence, the United States has strongly supported development and strengthening of Georgia's statehood, democracy, defense capabilities and economy. The United States' continued support to Georgia through various forms of cooperation and assistance plans is instrumental to Georgia's pledge to become a full democracy with a viable market economy, and to its aspirations to move toward European and Euro-Atlantic integration. US administered educational programs play important role for Georgia since they are instrumental in increasing the level of education and qualification of Georgian students.

Georgia's defense capabilities have significantly increased as a result of assistance programs conducted by the United States. The Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) initiated by the US has proved to be a major success in the process of building the modern Georgian Armed Forces. The new Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (SSOP) is advancing Georgia's defense capabilities to a higher level. Units trained under these programs constitute the core of the Georgian Army.

Georgia actively provides political and military support to the anti-terrorist coalition led by the US. Units trained under US assistance programs successfully fulfill their missions in anti-terrorist and peace support operations in and outside Georgia. Currently, Georgia has deployed up to 850 troops to support the US led stabilization mission in Iraq.

5.5.2. Strategic Partnership with Ukraine

The Rose Revolution of Georgia and the Orange Revolution of Ukraine, as confirmations of the belief in common values of democracy and freedom, opened a new era in the relations between the two nations.

The strategic partnership between Georgia and Ukraine is rooted in historically established friendly and good neighborly relations between the two nations. After the two countries regained independence, relations between them were institutionalized by the unprecedented 1993 Agreement between the Republic of Georgia and the Republic of Ukraine on Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. Georgia and Ukraine have established a partnership in different fields such as free trade, industrial cooperation, and military education and assistance. Georgia and Ukraine are dedicated to exploit fully the opportunities of the strategic partnership to the optimal mutual benefit.

Georgia and Ukraine cooperate in the fields of foreign and national security policy, not only in bilateral format, but also in multilateral fora, such as the United Nations, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova), Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) and others.

Georgia would welcome Ukraine's possible participation in Secretary General's Group of Friends.

Partnership with Ukraine on the way to NATO and EU integration is indispensable to Georgia. Georgia welcomes Ukraine's "Intensified Dialogue" with NATO and action plan within the EU ENP. Coordinated efforts in foreign and security policy between

Georgia and Ukraine will be mutually beneficial to both countries' bid for NATO and EU membership.

5.5.3. Strategic Partnership with Turkey

Turkey is a leading regional partner of Georgia that supports Georgia in its efforts to develop stable economic, political and military institutions.

Since Georgia's independence, Turkey has been an important trade and economic partner for Georgia. Further enhancement of economic relations and successful implementation of joint regional transportation and energy projects, such as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipelines are of strategic importance for Georgia and Turkey. It is also important to deepen cooperation with Turkey within the context of the Black Sea region.

Turkey has been a valuable military partner for Georgia. Turkish assistance in training of Georgian troops, improving technical and logistical capabilities, and in modernizing military infrastructure has significantly contributed to the strengthening of Georgian Armed Forces. Turkey has also played an important role in educating military personnel by contributing to the development of Georgia's National Defense Academy and conducting various military educational programs.

5.5.4. Partnership with Armenia and Azerbaijan

Historically established traditional good neighborly relations connect Georgia to Armenia and Azerbaijan. Georgia believes that it is of utmost importance to elaborate joint approaches about the future of the region. Deepening regional cooperation and establishment of a common economic space and single market would contribute significantly to the stability and prosperity of the region.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict endangers stability of all states in the region. Georgia would welcome peaceful resolution of this conflict and more active involvement of international community in the peace process. This would strengthen and facilitate regional security and cooperation.

Georgia aspires to deepen its partnership with Armenia and Azerbaijan on the basis of cooperation in spheres of mutual interest. Realization of large-scale economic projects also has the function of strengthening regional security by promoting cooperation and strong, long lasting business relationships.

Georgia's relationship with Azerbaijan has developed into a strategic partnership. Joint energy, transportation and communications projects significantly contribute to the stability and prosperity of the two countries. Two major regional energy projects - the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline - not only have economic importance but also play a stabilizing role in the region. Once these projects become operational, alternative energy resources will be delivered to the world market. For this purpose, Georgia maintains close cooperation with Azerbaijan in the field of pipeline security.

Georgia cooperates closely with Azerbaijan in the political and security spheres, as well as in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration. Partnership of Georgia and Azerbaijan in GUAM and participation in the EU's ENP and NATO's PfP program contribute to harmonization of security interests and elaboration of common positions on various strategic issues.

Georgia enjoys a close partnership with Armenia in all spheres of bilateral interest. Georgia believes that strengthening good neighborly relations and mutually beneficial cooperation with Armenia is in the national interest of both countries, and it contributes to strengthening traditional friendship, economic prosperity and political stability between the two states.

Both countries should reap the benefits from the realization of joint economic, energy and transportation projects. Georgia believes that Armenia should benefit from

Georgia's transit location by transporting Armenian goods through its territory. Georgia and Armenia actively cooperate in BSEC. Georgia supports Armenia's involvement in EU's ENP and welcomes its stronger cooperation with NATO.

5.5.5. Partnership with the Russian Federation

Georgia aspires to build cooperation with Russia upon the principles of good neighborly relations, equality and mutual respect. Georgia would welcome transition of Russia into a stable democratic state with a functioning market economy and respect for European values. Democratization and foreign policy predictability of the Russian Federation would positively influence Georgia's and the regional security environment.

Georgia expresses its readiness to intensify political dialogue, deepen trade, economic and socio-cultural relations, cooperate in solving regional conflicts, and to fight against terrorism and transnational crime with the Russian Federation. Georgia believes that conclusion of the framework agreement on friendship and cooperation will create favorable conditions for the improvement of relations between the two states. Georgia reiterates its commitment to sign the framework agreement without delay.

The Russian Federation must fulfill the obligations undertaken at the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit regarding the withdrawal of its military bases from Georgian territory within the agreed timeframe. This will undoubtedly improve the relations between Georgia and the Russian Federation.

5.5.6. Regional Cooperation within the Black Sea Region

The Black Sea region is an integral part of Europe. The new European security system based on transformed European and Euro-Atlantic organizations cannot develop fully without establishing a reliable Black Sea Security system as an essential element of the whole Euro-Atlantic security. This is a unique opportunity for NATO and the EU to work together to assist Black Sea nations to secure sustainable regional stability and security.

The security policy of Georgia is based on the principle that security in the Euro-Atlantic area is indivisible, and that Georgia, as a Black Sea country, is an integral part of it. Georgia welcomes ongoing integration of the Black Sea countries into NATO and the EU, and firmly believes that Georgia's future lies with the more secure and stable Black Sea region and, consequently, with NATO and the EU. Membership of Georgia and other Black Sea states would secure what has become NATO's and EU's important southern flank.

Georgia welcomes NATO's active participation in Black Sea security cooperation. Georgia attributes high importance to the involvement of NATO in the fight against illegal trade of weapons and drugs, trafficking in human beings, terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on the Black Sea.

Strengthening cooperation with the Black Sea states is of utmost importance for Georgia. In this respect, Georgia attributes special importance to the cooperation in the following regional initiatives:

5.5.6.1 GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova): Georgia regards GUAM as a regional organization of the partner states that are united on the basis of mutual interest in democracy, prosperity and security. Transformation of GUAM into a full-fledged organization promoting economic and social development and democratic stability and security is of vital interest for Georgia. Implementation of specific projects under the US-GUAM framework program, such as Trade and Transport Facilitation and the Virtual Law Enforcement Center, contributes to enhancing cooperation between the member states in such fields as trade, transportation, law-enforcement, fight against international terrorism and organized crime, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

5.5.6.2 Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC): Georgia views BSEC as an organization providing considerable security and economic impact on the

region because of its serious economic potential and geopolitical importance. Georgia seeks to enhance cooperation within BSEC in such fields as trade, energy, communications, information technologies, transportation, and tourism and infrastructure development.

5.5.6.3 By participating in the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) and cooperating within the Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) on the Black Sea (so-called "Ukraine Initiative"), initiatives aimed at enhancing peace and stability in the Black Sea area and increasing regional maritime cooperation, Georgia contributes to the security of the Black Sea region and to confidence building between the regional states. Georgia welcomes cooperation of BLACKSEAFOR with other partner states and international organizations that would contribute to strengthening stability and security in the Black Sea region.

5.5.7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Georgia actively cooperates with the Baltic Sea states on a wide range of issues. It is especially important for Georgia to share the Baltic experience of European and Euro-Atlantic integration. The Baltic States' support for Georgia's aspiration to integrate into NATO and the EU is instrumental for the harmonization of national legislation and institutions, as well as for reform of the defense sector and other spheres of public policy.

Georgia considers it very important to deepen political and economic cooperation with the states of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, and to secure their support for the reforms proceeding in Georgia. The participation of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Poland in the New Friends of Georgia group of countries contributes to Georgia's European aspirations.

Georgia, as a natural link between West and East, pays a great deal of attention to the development of a close relationship with Central Asian states. The main goal of cooperation with these countries is to promote the free flow and exchange of energy resources, goods and information between West and East.

5.5.8. Forum for Multilateral cooperation:

Cooperation with the international community in multilateral fora is an important priority of Georgian foreign and security policy.

5.5.8.1. Georgia believes that the United Nations should have the leading role in the process of establishing and maintaining global peace and just resolution of conflicts around the world. For this purpose, it is necessary to enhance effectiveness of the UN via comprehensive reform of its activities. Georgia also supports the UN's role in the elimination of social inequality and poverty, and in the amelioration of the effects of natural and ecological disasters.

5.5.8.2. Georgia regards the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as an important collective security organization that plays a significant role in promoting stability in Europe. The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty remains the cornerstone for providing security in Europe. Georgia attributes special importance to the timely and irreversible fulfillment of the decisions of the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit. The Government of Georgia attributes particular importance to the assistance rendered by the OSCE in the process of strengthening democratic institutions and ensuring stability in Georgia. The Georgian government welcomes more active involvement of OSCE in the process of conflict resolution in the country. The now defunct Border Monitoring Operation had played an important role in ensuring stability at the Georgian borders. The OSCE has launched a new Border Guard training program, which Georgia considers very important, however, the border monitoring issue still remains problematic. Georgia cooperates closely with the international community to find a solution to this problem.

5.5.8.3. Membership of the Council of Europe is a good opportunity for furthering European values and norms in political, legal, cultural and social spheres. Georgia adheres to the standards of the Council of Europe, which provide for the establishment of a democratic state with western values and norms. Georgia is dedicated to implementing the recommendations of the Council of Europe aimed at strengthening local and regional democracies, improving protection mechanisms for human and minority rights, and strengthening the rule of law in the country.

Georgia attaches great importance to the participation of its members of Parliament in the Assemblies of the Council of Europe and OSCE, which it considers essential for consensus building at a political level.

5.6 Fight against International Terrorism, Contraband and Transnational Organized Crime

Georgia opposes any form of terrorism and acknowledges the growing threat of international terrorism and its new forms. The national anti-terrorist policy of Georgia aims at providing security for Georgian citizens and state and non-state institutions.

To achieve this goal, Georgia is developing capabilities for fighting terrorism, including strengthening of special units of the armed forces and law enforcement agencies. In order to avoid the misuse of the Georgian territory for transit functions by international terrorists, the Government of Georgia is strengthening border protection and cooperating closely with neighboring countries in anti-terrorist activities. Other actions for fighting terrorism should include establishment of clearly defined procedures for investigation of terrorist acts, reinforcing the capabilities of anti-terrorist intelligence and counterintelligence, and identification of individuals involved in ordering and executing terrorist acts.

By participating in multinational anti-terrorist operations, Georgia is acquiring valuable experience, but more importantly, contributing to the efforts of the anti-terrorist coalition.

Particular importance is attributed to the protection of transport and energy infrastructure, particularly oil and gas pipelines. Georgia actively cooperates with other countries for effective accomplishment of this task.

Georgia attributes high priority to taking specific robust measures in the fight against smuggling, illegal arms and drug trade, trafficking in human beings and other transnational organized crimes. Tackling these problems successfully requires political will, consolidated efforts, and reform of the relevant agencies.

Since the 2003 Rose Revolution, the Georgian leadership has demonstrated strong will to deal with these problems. Contraband and transnational organized crime have diminished significantly as a result of targeted state policy. This has been reflected in a drastic decline of the shadow economy, improvement of economic situation and growth of government revenues.

In order to ensure the sustainability of this process, it is necessary to conduct specific reforms and adjust the legal framework more explicitly to the requirements of countering contraband, transnational organized crime and terrorism. It is important to streamline law enforcement institutions, decentralize law enforcement services and ensure coordinated activities of the relevant state institutions. However, without the restoration of constitutional order on the whole territory of Georgia and establishment of lasting peace in its neighborhood, addressing these threats and challenges will consume huge resources and efforts without eliminating Georgia's vulnerability to them.

During the reform process, the Interior and Security Ministries have been modernized and united under the Ministry of Interior, thus eliminating duplication of functions, overlapping, and the lack of coordination between the two previously independent agencies. Intelligence services have also been streamlined, bringing counter-

intelligence under the Ministry of Interior, while subordinating the Foreign Intelligence Department to the President of Georgia. Transformation of the State Border Protection Department from a militarized security force into a civilian border police service is also underway. Further reforms have to be undertaken, backed by external assistance programs to complete a setup of the institutional system of law enforcement that will guarantee implementation of the rule of law.

5.7. Economic Security Policy

The economic security policy of Georgia aims at providing the necessary economic conditions for ensuring Georgia's development and strengthening its national security. The ongoing process of economic recovery is a result of governmental policy aimed at achieving long-term sustainable economic growth based on free market principles.

The priorities of Georgia's economic security policy are:

- strengthening macro-economic stability through improvement of the tax collection system, implementation of effective monetary policy, introduction of a medium term expenditure policy and efficient state debt management;
- development of the private sector and job creation through deregulation of the economy, stimulation of small and medium size enterprises, improvement of the investment climate and protection of private property rights;
- improvement of the investment climate in the agriculture sector and development of an agricultural land market;
- creation of a favorable business environment for development of traditional and innovative industry sectors;
- development of tourism and full exploitation of Georgia's capacities in this field;
- implementation of a regional policy aimed at reducing social and economic disparities between the capital city and the regions, provision of equal opportunities for regional development, including implementation of target programs aimed at the development of mountainous regions;
- development of basic infrastructure, modernizing Georgia's road infrastructure and realization of Georgia's comparative advantages - its transit, transport and communication potential;
- active participation in international economic projects, which would facilitate Georgia's integration into the global economy;
- development of Georgia's export potential;
- creation of conditions for fair competition and equal opportunities in business by prohibiting exclusive rights that might limit fair competition, especially in the communication and energy sectors.

Since the Rose Revolution, significant progress has been visible in the economic sphere. The level of the shadow economy and corruption has declined, state budget revenues have significantly increased, a robust privatization process has started, salaries have been raised, and the process of infrastructure rehabilitation has started. Georgia is implementing these reforms based on the Government's Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Program.

5.8. Social Security Policy

In order to ensure social security and social cohesion of the Georgian population, Georgia is implementing a social security policy.

The priorities of Georgia's social security policy are:

- eradicating extreme poverty and social exclusion, reducing poverty, improving living standards and facilitating the development of a strong middle class;

- curtailing high unemployment, providing opportunities for employment, especially in regions, and increasing labor mobility;
- establishing a modern education system, ensuring primary and secondary education for every citizen of Georgia, improving the quality of higher education through its alignment with the requirements of the national and global labor market and conforming with international science and education systems;
- reforming pension and social protection systems, developing targeted social assistance programs, gradually covering arrears in pensions and other debts;
- reforming the healthcare system so that availability of high quality health care is guaranteed, developing an effective insurance market and promoting healthy lifestyles and environment;
- preventing socially dangerous diseases such as tuberculosis, AIDS and drug-addiction.

The Georgian Government has been pursuing an active social security policy. Important changes have already taken place: the education system is undergoing intensive and robust reforms, a significant portion of accumulated pension debts has been paid and social assistance programs are proceeding unimpeded.

5.9. Energy Security Policy

Georgia is a part of the East-West and North-South energy corridors, which is important for political independence and economic development of the country. The Georgian government realizes the role that Georgia plays as a component of the supply corridor of energy resources from Caspian and Central Asian regions to the rest of the world. The Baku-Supsa and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipelines are already functioning, whereas the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline will be operational in 2006. The Georgian government is committed to ensure efficient functioning of these projects.

In order to ensure energy security and independence Georgia should conduct a policy aimed at diversification of energy generation and import sources, greater energy efficiency and creation of an energy crisis prevention and management system. For these purposes, Georgia should create favorable conditions for attracting foreign investments, enhance international cooperation in the energy sector, and actively participate in European and Western energy projects.

The Georgian government has already started reforms in the energy sector. The short-term priorities are:

- eradication of the energy deficiency;
- rehabilitation of energy infrastructure;
- liberalization of the energy sector and improvement of its financial conditions;
- privatization of the energy distribution system and certain hydropower stations.

5.10. Information Security Policy

Georgia realizes that effective public administration can only be ensured if the state information policy is cohesive and the decisions are based on credible information. Coherent and persuasive presentation of state positions, both internally and internationally, is an essential element of any state's national security. Georgia attributes considerable importance to the protection of classified information, legal regulation of security of information technologies, and protection of the critical information systems of the state. Moreover, secure flow of credible information before and during crises is a necessary precondition for successful crisis prevention and resolution.

In this respect, the Georgian Government is developing the legislative basis and infrastructure necessary for the improvement of the information technologies and secure flow of information. A Special Communications and Information Agency under the oversight of the National Security Council has been established. The establishment of the crisis management center with a situation room is underway at the National Security Council to facilitate unimpeded flow of information during the crises, inter-agency coordination and coordinated management of crisis or emergency.

5.11. Environmental Security Policy

Georgia's environmental security policy is aimed at the protection of individuals and the environment through measures preventing substantial depletion of natural resources and environmental pollution and minimizing the consequences of man made and natural disasters. Special importance is attributed to large-scale industrial accidents and natural disasters, such as floods, landslides, avalanches and earthquakes. Regular risk assessments and public awareness campaigns must be carried out, and an efficient crisis prevention and post-crisis management system developed.

The priorities of environmental security policy are:

- control over the sources of air pollution, prevention of pollution and degradation of agricultural soils, and radioactive waste and rocket fuel cleanup;
- food security;
- harmonization of Georgian legislation with United Nations and European environmental protection standards.

The Government of Georgia acknowledges that provision of environmental security requires close regional and international cooperation. Successful cooperation among Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the field of environmental protection contributes to strengthening the ecological security of the region.

5.12. Preservation of Cultural Heritage

The Government of Georgia acknowledges that development in the cultural sphere is a necessary precondition for the nation's sustainable development and security.

Georgia seeks to maintain and develop the nation's unique cultural heritage, which enriches the world's cultural heritage. In this respect, an active policy of preserving national cultural heritage, promoting modern and traditional Georgian arts, and protecting architectural and natural values is a must. Georgia is creating favorable conditions and guarantees for the preservation of the cultural heritage of national minorities residing on its territory.

Georgia promotes and protects its state language and seeks to ensure respect for the Georgian language throughout the country.

Conclusion

Georgia puts forward its National Security Concept for the first time since its independence. By this document, Georgia demonstrates to its people, and to the world, the very direction it will follow to build a strong society and state. The people of Georgia have made a firm decision to join the community of democratic nations that respect human rights and freedoms and the rule of law.

For these purposes, each ministry and agency of Georgia will elaborate a strategy within its field of competence and take immediate steps for its implementation according to specific plans. Only through such commitment and endeavour can the fundamental national values and interests set forth in this document be secured.

This document describes some steps Georgia is already taking and lays out an ambitious but necessary path ahead that derives from the aspirations of the Georgian

people. Georgia fully recognizes that following this path will take time, dedication and courage. However, in addition to the many challenges to overcome, there are opportunities from which to benefit. Through the commitment of the Georgian Government and people, and with the assistance of friendly countries, Georgia will be able to build a state that inspires pride in its citizens, is guided by the principles of peace and democratic values, and that will occupy a respectable place in the community of nations.


4. Maps

Ethno-Linguistic Groups in the Caucasus



Pmx, 'Map of the ethno-linguistic groups in the Caucasus region (English version)', 2007 via Wikipedia, Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Caucasus-ethnic_en.svg

Ethno-Linguistic Groups in Azerbaijan



'Languages of Azerbaijan' in Lewis, M. Paul (ed.), 2009. Ethnologue: Languages of the World, Sixteenth edition. Dallas, Tex.: SIL International. Online version: <http://www.ethnologue.com/>

5. Notable Personalities in the South Caucasus 1988-2009

ARMENIA:

Levon Ter-Petrosyan (1945-): Founding member of 'Karabakh Committee', 1st President of the Republic of Armenia (1991-1998) [Overthrown]

Jirair Libaridian (1945-): Advisor to President Levon Ter-Petrosyan (1991-1997)

Raffi Hovannisian (1959-): Foreign Minister of the Republic of Armenia (1992), Founder of Opposition 'Heritage Party' and ACNIS Think-Tank.

Vazgen Sargsyan (1959-1999): Defence Minister and Minister of State for Defence of the Republic of Armenia (1992-1998), Leader of 'Yerkrapah' Paramilitary Organisation, Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (1999) [Assassinated]

Karen Demirchyan (1932-1999): Speaker of Parliament of the Republic of Armenia (1999) [Assassinated]

Robert Kocharyan (1954-): 2nd President of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (1994-1997), 2nd President of the Republic of Armenia (1998-2008)

Serj Sargsyan (1954-): 3^d President of the Republic of Armenia (2008-)

Vardan Oskanian (1955-): Foreign Minister of the Republic of Armenia (1998-2008)

AZERBAIJAN:

Ayaz Mutalibov (1938-): 1st President of the Republic of Azerbaijan (1991-1992) [Overthrown, In Exile]

Isa Gambar (1957-): Acting President of the Republic of Azerbaijan (1992), Opposition Leader, Musavat Party

Abufaz Elchibey (1938-2000): 2nd President of the Republic of Azerbaijan (1992-1993) [Overthrown]

Heidar Aliyev (1923-2003): 3^d President of the Republic of Azerbaijan (1993-2003)

Ilham Aliyev (1961-): 4th President of the Republic of Azerbaijan (2003-)

Surat Huseynov (1959-): Warlord, Leader of Attempted 1994 Coup

Vafa Quluzade (1940-): Foreign Policy Advisor of the President of Azerbaijan (1990-1999)

Novruzali Mamedov (1940-2009): Ethnic Talysh Activist [Died in captivity]

Ali Kerimli (1965-): Leader of the (Opposition) Azeri Popular Front Party

Alikram Gumbatov (1948-) : President of the (de-facto) Talysh-Mughan Republic (1993)

Etibar Mammedov (1955-): Leader of the (Opposition) National Independence Party

GEORGIA:

Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1939-1993): 1st President of the Republic of Georgia (1991-1992) [Overthrown]

Eduard Shevardnadze (1928-): Acting Chairman of the State Council of the Republic of Georgia (1992-1995), 2nd President of the Republic of Georgia (1995-2003) [Overthrown]

Jaba Ioseliani (1926-2003): Warlord, Leader of 'Mkhedrioni' paramilitary organisation

Mikheil Saakashvili (1967-): 3^d President of the Republic of Georgia (2003-)

Nino Burjanadze (1964-): Speaker of Parliament of the Republic of Georgia (2001-2008), Opposition Leader (2008-)

Zurab Zhvania (1963-2005): Speaker of Parliament of the Republic of Georgia (1993-2001), Prime Minister of the Republic of Georgia (2004-2005)

Arkadi 'Badri' Patarkatsishvili (1955-2008): Oligarch, Opposition Presidential Candidate (2007-2008)

Aslan Abashidze (1938-): Leader of the Autonomous Republic of Ajaria (1991-2004) [Deposed]

Salome Zurbishvili (1952-): Foreign Minister of the Republic of Georgia (2004-2005), Founder of the (Opposition) Georgia's Way party.

Sozar Subari (1964-): Human Rights Ombudsman of the Republic of Georgia (2004-2009), Opposition politician

Irakli Alasania (1973-): UN Ambassador of the Republic of Georgia (2006-2008), Founder of (Opposition) Our Georgia-Free Democrats Party

ABKHAZIA:

Vladislav Ardzhinba (1945-2010): 1st President of the (de-facto) Republic of Abkhazia (1994-2005)

Sergei Bagapsh (1949-): 2nd President of the (de-facto) Republic of Abkhazia (2005-)

Sergei Shamba (1951-): Foreign Minister of the (de-facto) Republic of Abkhazia (1997-2010), Prime Minister of the Republic of Abkhazia (2010-)

Raul Khadjimba (1958-): Vice President of the (de-facto) Republic of Abkhazia (2005-2009), Opposition leader

SOUTH OSSETIA:

Eduard Kokoity (1964-): 2nd President of the (de-facto) Republic of South Ossetia (2001-)

Dimitri Sanakoyev (1969-): Head of the Provisional Administrative Entity of South Ossetia (2007-)

NAGORNO-KARABAKH (See also ARMENIA):

Arkadi Ghukasian (1957-): President of the (de-facto) Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (1997-2007)

Samvel Babayan (1965-): Commander of the Armed Forces of the (de-facto) Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (1994-2000) [Arrested]

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

ARMENIA

Larisa Alaverdian, MP, Member of the Committee on European Integration/ Former Human Rights Ombudsperson

Laura Bagdassarian, Director, “Region” Center, Caucasus Journalists’ Network

Gideon Dewhirst, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of the United Kingdom, Yerevan

Richard Giragosian, Director, Armenian Center for National and International Studies (ACNIS)

Stepan Grigoryan, Chairman, Analytical Center on Globalization and Regional Cooperation

Tony Halpin, Editor, Armenianow.com / Moscow Correspondent, The Times

Alexander Iskandaryan, Director, Caucasus Institute

Hovsep Khurshudian, Spokesperson, Heritage Party

Sergey Minasyan, Analyst, Caucasus Institute

Tigran Mkrtchyan, Researcher, Armenian International Policy Research Group

Vardan Oskanian, Chairman, Civilitas Foundation / Former Foreign Minister (1998-2008)

David Petrosyan, Analyst, Noyan Tapan News Agency

Manvel Sargsyan, Senior Analyst, Armenian Center for National and International Studies (ACNIS)

“A Western Diplomat”

GEORGIA

Revaz Adamia, Former Chairman of Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security, Former UN Ambassador

Melsida Akopyan, Black Sea Press News, Georgia

Armen Bayandurian, MP

David Darchiashvili, MP, Chairman, Committee on European Integration

Karen Elchian, President, Armenian Cooperation Center of Georgia

Zaza Gachechiladze, Editor, The Messenger

David Gamkrelidze, Chairman, New Rights Party

Kornely Kakachia, Dean of the Department of Politics and IR, University of Georgia

Zurab Khamashuridze, Head of Division of the Department for Relations with International Organisations, Office of the State Minister of Georgia for Reintegration

Suzanna Khachatryan, Editor, Georgian Public Television

Nodar Ladaria, Columnist, 24 Saati

Levon, Armenian Businessman, Tbilisi

Vazgen Mirzakhanyan, Primate of the Armenian Apostolic Church

Yura Poghossian, Deputy Editor, Vrastan (Armenian) Weekly

Alexander Rusetsky, Coordinator, South Caucasus Institute for Regional Security

Giorgi Sordia, Programme Director, European Centre for Minority Issues (Georgia)

Arnold Stepanian, Public Movement "Multinational Georgia"

Guram Svanidze, Expert, Parliamentary Commission on Human Rights and Re-Integration

Levan Tsutskiridze, Rector, Zurab Zhvania Institute of Public Affairs

Giovanni Vepkhvadze, Painter

Salome Zurabishvili, Former Foreign Minister

NAGORNO-KARABAKH

Karen Avetisyan, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh in Yerevan

Arayik Harutunyan, Chairman, Free Fatherland Party

Marcel Petrosyan, Official Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

ABKHAZIA

Stanislav Chirikba, Foreign Policy Advisor to the President of the Republic of Abkhazia

Maxim Gunjia, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Republic of Abkhazia

George Hewitt, Honorary Consul of the Republic of Abkhazia

Azniv Kehian, Director of Tumanian Armenian School, Sukhumi

Diana Kerselian, Member of Sukhumi City Council

Suren Kerselian, Chairman of the Armenian Community of Sukhumi

Liana Kvarchelia, NGO Coordinator

Artavazd Saretsian, Editor, "Hamshen" Magazine

Aram, Village Head

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- A1Plus. (2008a, 21 August). "Esli Biy Pomoshch Rossii Zapozdala". Retrieved 15 December, 2008, from <http://www.a1plus.am/ru/politics/2008/08/21/7514>
- A1Plus. (2008b, 24 August). "Russia Saved the People of South Ossetia from Genocide". Retrieved 25 October, 2008, from <http://www.a1plus.am/en/print/politics/2008/08/24/7517>
- Abbasov, I., & Akhvlediani, D. (2007). Monastery Divides Georgia and Azerbaijan. *Institute of War and Peace Reporting - Caucasus Reporting Service*, (385). Retrieved from http://www.iwpr.net/?p=crs&s=f&o=334484&apc_state=henpcrs
- Abrahamyan, G. (2008, 10 September). In Wake of Georgia War, Armenia Faces Hobson's Choice. *Eurasia Insight*. Retrieved from Nexis UK
- Acharya, A. (2007). The Emerging Regional Architecture of World Politics. *World Politics*, 59(4), 629-652.
- Achugba, T. (2006). *O Problemakh Natsionalnovo Samosoznaniya Naseleniya Yugo-Vostochnoi Abkhazii (Istoriko-Etnograficheskii Ocherk)*. Sukhum: Dom Pechati.
- Achukba, T. A. (2006). *K Obosnovaniyu Statusa "Gruzinskikh Bezhentsev"*. Sukhum: Akademiya Nauk Abkhazii.
- ACNIS. (1997, March). Nagorno Karabakh: A White Paper. Retrieved 5 July, 2008, from http://www.armeniaforeignministry.com/fr/nk/white_paper.html - Karabagh%20Position
- ACNIS. (2006a). Armenia's Thirteen-Year-Old Independence and Sovereignty. In G. Lalayan (Ed.), *Armenia in a Transforming World* (pp. 435-464). Yerevan: Armenian Center for National and International Studies.
- ACNIS. (2006b). The Armenian Genocide: 90 Years and Waiting. In G. Lalayan (Ed.), *Armenia in a Transforming World* (pp. 601-631). Yerevan: Armenian Center for National and International Studies.
- ACNIS. (2006c). Corruption in Armenia. In G. Lalayan (Ed.), *Armenia in a Transforming World* (pp. 421-434). Yerevan: Armenian Center for National and International Studies.
- ACNIS. (2006d). The Karabakh Story: 17 Years in Progress. In G. Lalayan (Ed.), *Armenia in a Transforming World* (pp. 563-600). Yerevan: Armenian Center for National and International Studies.
- Adler, E. (1997). Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics. *European Journal of International Relations*, 3(3), 319-363.
- Adler, E., & Barnett, M. (1998a). A framework for the study of security communities. In E. Adler & M. Barnett (Eds.), *Security Communities* (pp. 29-66). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Adler, E., & Barnett, M. (Eds.). (1998b). *Security Communities*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Adzhindzhal, E. K. (2007). *Abkhazia's Liberation and International Law*. Sukhum: Paradigm.
- AFP. (2001, 17 October). Azeri President: We are Ready to Go to War to Win Back Karabakh. from Nexis UK
- AFP. (2006, 26 April). Azerbaijan Rules Out Help for US Military Action Against Iran. Retrieved 23 June, 2009, from Nexis UK
- AFP. (2007, 1 April). Azerbaijan Cannot Be Used to Attack Neighbours: Ministry. Retrieved 23 June, 2009, from Nexis UK
- Agadjanian, M., Asatryan, E., & Minasyan, S. (2007). *Azerbaijan against the People of Karabakh: Politico-Legal Consequences of Aggression and the Influence of those Consequences on the Prospects of Regional Security*. Yerevan: Nairi.
- Agayeva, S. (2010, 29 March). Azerbaijan Permanent Representative to UN Accuses Armenian Representative of Lie. *Trend News*. Retrieved from <http://en.trend.az/news/politics/foreign/1659994.html>
- Akaba, N. (1996). *Abkhaziya: Mezhdru Lyubovyu i Nenavistyuu*. Sukhum: Maaan.
- Akaba, N. (2000). The Swiss Experience and Prospects for a Peaceful Abkhazian-Georgian Peace Settlement. In B. Coppieters, D. Darchiashvili & N. Akaba (Eds.), *Federal Practice: Exploring Alternatives for Georgia and Abkhazia* (pp. 75-90). Brussels: VUB Brussels University Press.
- Akhmeteli, N. (2008, 18 January). Georgia: Opposition's Criticism of the West Goes Only So Far. *Eurasianet*. Retrieved from http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav011808b_pr.shtm
- Alam, S. (2002). Pipeline Politics in the Caspian Sea Basin. *Strategic Analysis*, 26(1), 5-26.
- Alden, C. (2000). From Neglect to 'Virtual Engagement': The United States and Its New Paradigm for Africa. *African Affairs*, 99, 355-371.
- Alden, C. (2005). China in Africa. *Survival*, 47(3), 147-164.
- Alexandrova-Arbatova, N. (2008). Troubled Strategic Partnership: The Black Sea Dimension of Russia's Relations with the West. In D. Hamilton & G. Mangott (Eds.), *The Wider Black Sea Region in the 21st Century: Strategic, Economic and Energy Perspectives* (pp. 293-318). Washington: Center for Transatlantic Relations.
- Aliiev, F. (2004). Russia-Azerbaijan: Back to the Beginning? *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, (19). Retrieved from http://www.ca-c.org/online/2004/journal_eng/cac-03/19.alieng.shtml
- Alieva, L. (2000). *Reshaping Eurasia: Foreign Policy Strategies and Leadership Assets in Post-Soviet Caucasus*. Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley.
- Alijarly, S. (1996). The Republic of Azerbaijan: Notes on State Borders in the Past and the Present. In J. F. R. Wright, S. Goldenberg & R. Schofield (Eds.), *Transcaucasian Boundaries* (pp. 113-133). London: UCL Press.
- Aliyev, H. (1994). Speech of the Azerbaijan President Heydar Aliyev at the Meeting with the Russian Army Commander in Transcaucasia - General Fedor Reut - January

- 6, 1994. Retrieved 4 March, 2009, from <http://library.aliyev-heritage.org/print.php?lang=en&page=1899511>
- Aliyev, H. (1996a). Speech of the Azerbaijan President Heydar Aliyev at the Lisbon Summit of OSCE. Lisbon, December 2, 1996. Retrieved 4 August, 2010, from <http://library.aliyev-heritage.org/print.php?lang=en&page=2293922>
- Aliyev, H. (1996b). The Statement of the President of Azerbaijan Republic Heydar Aliyev for Representatives of Mass Media of Azerbaijan and Foreign Countries - December 6, 1996. Retrieved 4 August, 2010, from <http://library.aliyev-heritage.org/print.php?lang=en&page=5860739>
- Aliyev, H. (1998a). Decree of President of Republic of Azerbaijan about genocide of Azerbaijani People. Retrieved 3 March, 2009, from <http://www.human.gov.az/?sehife=etrafli&sid=MTMyMjMzMTA4MTMyNjE1Mw==&dil=en>
- Aliyev, H. (1998b). Inaugural Address. Retrieved 17 March, 2009, from <http://library.aliyev-heritage.org/print.php?lang=en&page=7958721>
- Aliyev, H. (2000). New Year's Address. Retrieved 17 March, 2009, from <http://library.aliyev-heritage.org/print.php?lang=en&page=2541517>
- Aliyev, H. (2001). Annex to the letter dated 4 April 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. New York: United Nations General Assembly Security Council.
- Aliyev, H. (2003). Address of the President of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev to the Azerbaijani People on the Occasion of the Genocide Committed against the Azerbaijanis on March 31. Retrieved 17 March, 2009, from <http://library.aliyev-heritage.org/print.php?lang=en&page=9159202>
- Aliyev, I. (2003). Speech in the inauguration ceremony by Ilham Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Retrieved 17 March, 2009, from <http://library.aliyev-heritage.org/print.php?lang=en&page=2773818>
- Aliyev, I. (2004a). Interview of President of Azerbaijan Republic Ilham Aliyev for "Reuter" Agency. Retrieved 30 March, 2009, from http://www.president.az/articles.php?item_id=20070810053350496&sec_id=14
- Aliyev, I. (2004b). Speech of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev at meeting at the Columbia University in New York. Retrieved 20 March, 2009, from http://www.president.az/articles.php?item_id=20070813060710459&sec_id=11
- Aliyev, I. (2004c). Speech of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev at meeting in club "Chatham House". Retrieved 20 March, 2009, from http://www.president.az/articles.php?item_id=20070814111242124&sec_id=11
- Aliyev, I. (2005a). Interview of Azeri President Ilham Aliyev to Turkish Journalists. Retrieved 20 March, 2009, from http://www.president.az/articles.php?item_id=20070810070009204&sec_id=14
- Aliyev, I. (2005b). Interview of President Ilham Aliyev to Reporter of Newspaper "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" Victoria Panifilova. Retrieved 20 March, 2009, from http://www.president.az/articles.php?item_id=20070810055508440&sec_id=14

- Aliyev, I. (2005c). Interview of President Ilham Aliyev to reporter of newspaper "Nezavisimaya gazeta" Victoria Panifilova. Retrieved 28 March, 2009, from http://www.president.az/articles.php?item_id=20070810055508440&sec_id=14
- Aliyev, I. (2005d). Official reception on behalf of President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev on the occasion of 28 May - Republican Day. Retrieved 10 March, 2009, from http://www.president.az/articles.php?item_id=20070813063208583&sec_id=11
- Aliyev, I. (2005e). Speech of President Ilham Aliyev at the Meeting with Participants of ITAR-TASS Days in Azerbaijan. Retrieved 20 March, 2009, from http://www.president.az/articles.php?item_id=20070813035128669&sec_id=11
- Aliyev, I. (2005f). Speech of President of Azerbaijan Republic Ilham Aliyev at the Meeting of Nij Settlement. Retrieved 20 March, 2009, from http://www.president.az/articles.php?item_id=20070814110030455&sec_id=11
- Aliyev, I. (2005g). Speech of President of Azerbaijan Republic Ilham Aliyev. Retrieved 20 March, 2009, from http://www.president.az/articles.php?item_id=20070814103116081&sec_id=11
- Aliyev, I. (2006a). 10th Congress of Friendship, Brotherhood, Cooperation Congress of Turkish-Speaking Countries and Communities. Retrieved 18 March, 2009, from http://www.president.az/articles.php?item_id=20070813052414953&sec_id=11
- Aliyev, I. (2006b). Interview of President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev to Employees of Moscow Office of Al-Jazeera TV Broadcast Corporation of Qatar. Retrieved 26 March, 2009, from http://www.president.az/articles.php?item_id=20070810073943378&sec_id=14
- Aliyev, I. (2006c). Interview of President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev to the reporter of the Turkish newspaper Retrieved 26 March, 2009, from http://www.president.az/articles.php?item_id=20070810072907218&sec_id=14
- Aliyev, I. (2006d). Official Reception in Honor of President Ilham Aliyev in Washington. Retrieved 19 March, 2009, from http://www.president.az/articles.php?item_id=20070813061935592&sec_id=11
- Aliyev, I. (2006e). Political briefing at Royal International Relations Institute. Retrieved 18 March, 2009, from http://www.president.az/print.php?item_id=20070813042642743&sec_id=11
- Aliyev, I. (2006f). Solemn Opening Ceremony of the Year of Russia in Azerbaijan at Heydar Ailyev Palace. Retrieved 19 March, 2009, from http://www.president.az/articles.php?item_id=20070813052319846&sec_id=11
- Aliyev, I. (2006g). Speech of President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev at the second sitting of heads of diplomatic service bodies of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Retrieved 2009, from http://www.president.az/articles.php?item_id=20070813053413030&sec_id=11
- Aliyev, I. (2007a). Intervyu Prezidenta Azerbaidzhana Ilkhama Aliyeva Korrespondenty Yaponskoi Gazety "Nikkei". Retrieved 24 March, 2009, from http://www.president.az/articles.php?item_id=20070810044230402&sec_id=14
- Aliyev, I. (2007b). Meeting with representatives of country. Retrieved 18 March, 2009, from http://www.president.az/print.php?item_id=20070814110344290&sec_id=11

- Aliyev, I. (2007c). President Ilkham Ailyev Dal Intervyu Televideniyyu Moldovy. Retrieved 24 March, 2009, from http://president.az/articles.php?item_id=20071219072657411&sec_id=14
- Aliyev, I. (2008). Obrashchenie k Azerbaidzhanskomu Narodu v Svyazi s 31 Marta - Dnem Genotsida Azerbaidzhantsev. Retrieved 2 March, 2009, from <http://www.azembassy.msk.ru/events/2008/prez31.html>
- Aliyev, I. (2009). Interview of President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev to Deutsche Welle TV and Radio Channel of Germany. Retrieved 24 March, 2009, from http://president.az/articles.php?item_id=20070811101736150&sec_id=14
- Allison, R. (2004). Regionalism, Regional Structures and Security Management in Central Asia. *International Affairs*, 80(3), 463-483.
- Allison, R. (2008). Russia Resurgent? Moscow's Campaign to 'Coerce Georgia to Peace'. *International Affairs*, 84(6), 1145-1171.
- Allison, R. (2009). The Russian Case for Military Intervention in Georgia: International Law, Norms and Political Calculation. *European Security*, 18(2), 173-200.
- Altstadt, A. (1992). *The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.
- Amnesty International. (2008). Armenia: Fear of the Freedom of Conscience and Religion: Violations of the Rights of Jehovah's Witnesses. Retrieved 9 June, 2008, from <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR54/001/2008>
- Anchabadze, J. (1999). History: The Modern Period. In G. Hewitt (Ed.), *The Abkhazians: A Handbook* (pp. 132-146). Richmond: Curzon Press.
- Anderson, B. (2006). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Anderson, C. J., & Tverdova, Y. V. (2003). Corruption, Political Allegiances, and Attitudes towards Government in Contemporary Societies. *American Journal of Political Science*, 47(1), 91-109.
- Anjaparidze, Z. (2004). Abkhaz Presidential Election Already Sparking Protests. *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 1(99). Retrieved from http://jamestown.nvmservers.com/124/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=26944
- ANN-Groong. (2004, 6 October). The Rise and Fall of Samvel Babayan. *Review and Outlook*. Retrieved from <http://groong.usc.edu/ro/ro-20041006.html>
- Ararat Center. (2009). Activities of Ararat Center: Media Coverage. Retrieved 21 January, 2010, from <http://blog.ararat-center.org/?p=215> - n15
- ARFD. (2009). Hay Heghapokhakan Dashnatsutyune. Retrieved 2 June, 2009, from <http://www.arfd.am/arm/index.php?c=1&sc=1&id=2&p=0>
- ARKA News Agency. (2009, 5 December). President Serzh Sargsyan Speaks Highly of Strengthening Strategic Armenian-Russian Cooperation. Retrieved 18 December, 2009
- Armenian Radio. (1994, 11 January). President Ter-Petrosyan's New Year Message. *BBC Monitoring*. Retrieved from Nexis UK

- Armenpress. (1998, 12 January). President Ter-Petrosyan Optimistic about Prospects for 1998. *BBC Monitoring*. Retrieved from Nexis UK
- Armenpress. (2007, 1 May). Armenia: Kocharian Urges Armenians in Georgia to Learn Georgian. *Caucaz.com*. Retrieved from http://www.caucaz.com/home_eng/depeches_detail_imprim.php?idp=1643
- Arminfo. (2002, 27 May). Armenian President Outlines How Far Prepared to Compromise on Karabakh. *BBC Monitoring*. Retrieved from Nexis UK
- Arminfo. (2005, 2 February). Russian FM: "We Should Not Oppose Principles of Territorial Integrity or Right of Nations to Self-Determination to Each Other". Retrieved 25 March, 2008, from Nexis UK
- Art, R. J. (1998). Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement. *International Security*, 23(3), 79-113.
- Asatiani, S. (2007, 27 September). Georgia: The Ally Who Turned On Saakashvili. *RFE/RL*. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1078815.html>
- Asatryan, G., & Arakelova, V. (2002). *The Ethnic Minorities of Armenia*. Yerevan: Civil Society Institute.
- Asbarez. (2009, 11 May). Karabakh Defense Minister Opposes Ceding of Liberated Territories. *Asbarez*. Retrieved from <http://www.asbarez.com/2009/05/11/karabakh-defense-minister-opposes-ceding-of-liberated-territories/>
- Asgarov, G. (2009). Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. We Had It Once... *Azeri Report*. Retrieved from http://azerireport.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1327&Itemid=48
- Ashley, R. K. (1984). The Poverty of Neo-Realism. *International Organization*, 38(2), 225-286.
- Assa-Irada. (2008a, 4 August). Baku Backs Tbilisi amid Tension in Separatist Regions. Retrieved 5 June, 2009, from Nexis UK
- Assa-Irada. (2008b, 3 July). Medvedev Calls Azerbaijan Strategic Partner. Retrieved 9 March, 2009, from Nexis UK
- Astourian, S. H. (2000). *From Ter-Petrosian to Kocharian: Leadership Change in Armenia*. Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley.
- Avakian, S. (2005). Nagorno-Karabagh: Legal Aspects Available from http://www.armeniaforeignministry.com/fr/nk/legalaspects/legalaspect_text.pdf
- Axelrod, R. (1984). *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books.
- Aydin, M. (2003). Between Euphoria and *Realpolitik*: Turkish Policy toward Central Asia and the Caucasus. In T. Y. Ismael & M. Aydin (Eds.), *Turkey's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: A Changing Role in World Politics* (pp. 139-160). Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Ayoob, M. (1999). From Regional System to Regional Society: Variables in the Construction of Regional Order. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 53(3), 247-260.

Ayvazian, A. (2007). The Fundamentals of Armenian Identity or Who is an Armenian? Retrieved 2 May, 2009, from http://www.ararat-center.org/upload/files/Who_is_Armenian__English_AZG,_01%5B1%5D.12.2007.doc

Azerbaijan in the World. (2008). A Conversation with Vafa Guluzade on Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy. *Azerbaijan in the World*, 1(5), 1-5.

Azimov, A. (2009). Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Historical Background, Legal Aspects and Negotiations Process. In A. Petersen & F. Ismailzade (Eds.), *Azerbaijan in Global Politics: Crafting Foreign Policy*. Baku: Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy.

Baev, P. (1997). *Russia's Policies in the Caucasus*. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Baev, P. (2000). Russia in the Caucasus: Sovereignty, Intervention and Retreat. In M. H. Crutcher (Ed.), *Russian Forces at the Dawn of the Millennium* (pp. 189-257). Carlisle Barracks: Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College.

Baev, P. (2001). *Russia Refocuses Its Policies in the Southern Caucasus*. Cambridge: Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government Caspian Studies Program.

Balayan, Z. (2007). Beregite Status-Kvo Kak Istinu. In A. Ayvazian (Ed.), *Razmavarutyun yev Anvtangutyun Hartser* (pp. 193-201). Yerevan: Ararat Center for Strategic Research.

Balzer, H. (2005). The Putin Thesis. *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 21(3), 210-225.

Banaian, K., & Roberts, B. W. (2004). *Remittances in Armenia: Size, Impacts, and Measures to Enhance their Contribution to Development*. Yerevan: USAid Armenia.

Banusiewicz, J. D. (2010, 6 June). Azerbaijan Visit Highlights Afghanistan Contributions. *States News Service*. Retrieved from Nexis UK

Barabanov, M. (2008a). The August War between Russia and Georgia. *Moscow Defence Brief*, (14). Retrieved from <http://www.mdb.cast.ru/mdb/3-2008/item3/article1/?form=print>

Barabanov, M. (2008b). Nagorno-Karabakh: Shift in the Military Balance. *Moscow Defence Brief*, (14). Retrieved from <http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/2-2008/item2/article2/>

Barabanov, M., Lavrov, A., & Tselyuko, V. (Eds.). (2009). *Tanki Avgusta: Sbornik Statei*. Moskva: Tsentr Analiza Strategii i Tekhnologii.

Baran, Z. (2002). The Caucasus: Ten Years After Independence. *The Washington Quarterly*, 25(1), 221-234.

Baran, Z. (2007). EU Energy Security: Time to End Russian Leverage. *The Washington Quarterly*, 30(4), 131-144.

Barry, E. (2008, 1 November). Georgia's Public, and Battered, Face in a Separatist Republic. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from Nexis UK

Barry, E., & Cowell, A. (2008, 12 September). South Ossetia Sends Russia Mixed Signals. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from Nexis UK

BBC. (2005). Text: Bush's Speech in Georgia. Retrieved 15 March, 2008, from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4534267.stm>

BBC Monitoring. (1993). Grachev on the Problems and Prospects of the Armed Forces. Retrieved 5 March, 2009, from Nexis UK

BBC Monitoring. (1994). Shevardnadze Sets Out Stabilization Programme at Citizens' Union Congress. Retrieved 3 September, 2009, from Nexis UK

BBC Monitoring. (1999, 9 October). Azeri State Foreign Policy Adviser Explains Reasons for Resignation. Retrieved 29 March, 2009, from Nexis UK

BBC Monitoring. (2000, 31 January). Georgian President Deems Russia's Stand Towards Caucasus Security Significant. Retrieved 20 January, 2008, from Nexis UK

BBC Monitoring. (2001a). Authors Say Karabakh Settlement Charter Reflects Will of Azeri People. Retrieved 30 March, 2009, from Nexis UK

BBC Monitoring. (2001b, 24 October). Azeri Leadership Realizes War Only Way to Liberate Karabakh - Radio. Retrieved 5 March, 2008, from Nexis UK

BBC Monitoring. (2002). Former Azeri Official Confirms Territorial Swap Plan on Agenda for Long Time. Retrieved 30 March, 2009, from Nexis UK

BBC Monitoring. (2003a). East-West Links Can Promote Stability, Georgian President Tells EBRD. Retrieved 4 April, 2009, from Nexis UK

BBC Monitoring. (2003b, 10 May). Georgian President's Speech at US-trained Battalion Graduation Ceremony. Retrieved 22 June, 2008, from Nexis UK

BBC Monitoring. (2003c). Guide to the Azerbaijani Presidential Election. Retrieved 30 March, 2009, from Nexis UK

BBC Monitoring. (2004a). Armenian, Georgian Presidents Say No Parallels Between Regional Conflicts. Retrieved 5 December, 2008, from Nexis UK

BBC Monitoring. (2004b). Azeri, Georgian Leaders Want to Build Common South Caucasus Home. Retrieved 2 December, 2008, from Nexis UK

BBC Monitoring. (2004c). Presidents Discuss Problems of Georgia's Armenian Community. Retrieved 5 December, 2008, from Nexis UK

BBC Monitoring. (2005a, 27 February). Armenian Leader Says Karabakh Talks "More Intense". Retrieved 24 March, 2008, from Nexis UK

BBC Monitoring. (2005b, 29 September). Azeri Election: Candidate Appeals to President for Democratic Polls. Retrieved 9 September, 2008, from Nexis UK

BBC Monitoring. (2005c, 30 September). Azeri Election: Government Accused of Failure to Tackle Problems. Retrieved 3 September, 2008, from Nexis UK

BBC Monitoring. (2005d, 14 June). Azeri Party Sees Authorities' Anti-Opposition Campaign as "Terror". Retrieved 9 September, 2008, from Nexis UK

BBC Monitoring. (2005e, 18 March). Three Major Azeri Opposition Parties Join in Bloc for Parliamentary Polls. Retrieved 9 September, 2008, from Nexis UK

BBC Monitoring. (2006, 8 November). Georgia: South Ossetian Separatists Label Parallel Poll Frontrunner as "Traitor". Retrieved 13 October, 2009, from Nexis UK

- BBC Monitoring. (2007a, 27 April). Armenian President Says Javakheti Armenians Should Speak Georgian. Retrieved 5 December, 2008, from Nexis UK
- BBC Monitoring. (2007b, 30 April). Leader of Breakaway Region Condemns "Fascist Regime" in Georgia. Retrieved 13 October, 2009, from Nexis UK
- BBC Monitoring. (2007c, 5 May). "Uprising" in Georgia's Armenian-Populated Region Said Unlikely. Retrieved 5 December, 2008, from Nexis UK
- BBC Monitoring. (2008a, 14 August). Azeri Opposition Criticize President for Not Responding to Crisis. Retrieved 5 June, 2009, from Nexis UK
- BBC Monitoring. (2008b, 28 August). Experts Welcome Azeri President's Handling of Russia-Georgia Crisis. Retrieved 5 June, 2009, from Nexis UK
- BBC Monitoring. (2008c, 24 July). Georgian Pundit Says Attacks against Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway Possible. Retrieved 5 December, 2008, from Nexis UK
- BBC Monitoring. (2009a, 23 March). Azeri Referendum to Deepen Stagnation, Stifle Democracy - Agency. Retrieved 3 September, 2009, from Nexis UK
- BBC Monitoring. (2009b). Paper Notes "Rise in Anti-Russian Sentiments" in Georgia's Breakaway Abkhazia. Retrieved 30 September, 2009, from Nexis UK
- BBC Monitoring. (2010, 27 January). Russian Foreign Minister Sums Up Outcomes of 2009. Retrieved 5 April, 2010, from Nexis UK
- BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. (1997, 8 December). Azerbaijani President Aliyev Criticizes Slow Work of OSCE Mediators. Retrieved 5 March, 2008, from Nexis UK
- BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. (1999, 15 December). Foreign Minister Oskanyan Reaffirms "Balanced" Policy with West, Russia, Iran. Retrieved 22 January, 2008, from Nexis UK
- BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. (2000, 7 April). Armenia Will Establish Equal Relations with East and West. Retrieved 22 January, 2008, from Nexis UK
- BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. (2002, 1 October). Armenian Foreign Minister Says US Military Ties Boost "Complementarity Policy". Retrieved 22 January, 2008, from Nexis UK
- Betts, R. K. (1980). Comments on Mueller - Interests, Burdens and Persistence: Asymmetries between Washington and Hanoi. *International Studies Quarterly*, 24(4), 520-524.
- Birnbaum, P. (1981). State, Centre and Bureaucracy. *Government and Opposition*, 16(1), 58-77.
- Black, J. L. (2000). *Russia Faces NATO Expansion: Bearing Gifts or Bearing Arms?* Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Black Sea Press. (2008, 13 September). Armenia Does Not Intend to Recognize Independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. *Arminfo*. Retrieved from Nexis UK
- Blagov, S. (2003, 16 April). US-Georgian Security Cooperation Agreement Provokes Outcry in Russia. *Eurasia Insight*. Retrieved from http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav041603a_pr.shtml

- Blagov, S. (2004, 6 December). Presidential Candidates Strike Deal in Abkhazia. *Eurasianet*. Retrieved from Nexis UK
- Bleyan, A. (2006, 4 July). "Yete Tsankutyunnere Dzier Lineyn, Aghkatnere Votgov Man Cheyin Ga". *Zhamanak Daily*. Retrieved from <http://www.zhamanak.com/article/3372/>
- Bliyev, M. (2006). *Yuzhnaya Osetiya v Kolliziyakh Rossiisko-Gruzinskikh Otnoshenii*. Moskva: Izdatelstvo "Evropa".
- Bournoutian, G. A. (1996). The Ethnic Composition and the Socio-Economic Condition of Eastern Armenia in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century. In R. G. Suny (Ed.), *Transcaucasia, Nationalism and Social Change: Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia* (pp. 69-86). Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Bourtman, I. (2006). Israel and Azerbaijan's Furtive Embrace. *Middle East Quarterly*, XIII(3), 47-57.
- Boyce, G. (1999). *Decolonisation and the British Empire*. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press.
- Bravo, K. E. (2006). Smoke, Mirrors, and the Joker in the Pack: On Transitioning to Democracy and the Rule of Law in Post-Soviet Armenia. *Houston Journal of International Law*, 29(3), 489-582.
- Brecher, M., & Wilkenfeld, J. (1997). *A Study of Crisis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Bremmer, I., & Welt, C. (1997). Armenia's New Autocrats. *Journal of Democracy*, 8(3), 77-91.
- Broad, W. J. (1980). Resource Wars: The Lure of South Africa. *Science*, 210(4474), 1099-1100.
- Broers, L. (2010). Opening Borders, Preserving Walls: Opportunities to Support the Karabakh Peace Process. *Journal of Conflict Transformation: Caucasus Edition*, 3(1). Retrieved from http://caucasusedition.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/Laurence-Broers_Final_approved_June-1-issue.pdf
- Brzezinski, Z. (1997). A Geostategy for Eurasia. *Foreign Affairs*, 76(5), 50-64.
- Bull, H. (1977). *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Bunyatov, Z. M. (Ed.). (1987). *Istoricheskaia Geografiya Azerbaidzhana*. Baku: Elm.
- Bunyatov, Z. M. (Ed.). (1990). *Istoria Azerbaidzhana Po Dokumentam i Publikatsiyam*. Baku: Elm / Akademia Nauk Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR.
- Burjanadze, N. (2008, 24 October). Nino Burjanadze's Open Letter to Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. *Civil Georgia*. Retrieved from http://www.civil.ge/eng/_print.php?id=19825
- Burjanadze, N. (2009, 2 June 2009). Support Georgia, Not Saakashvili. *The National Interest*. Retrieved from <http://www.nationalinterest.org/PrinterFriendly.aspx?id=21546>
- Buzan, B. (1983). *People States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books.

- Buzan, B. (1991). *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Buzan, B. (1993a). From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School. *International Organization*, 47(3), 327-352.
- Buzan, B. (1993b). Societal Security, State Security, and Internationalisation. In Ø. Wæver, M. Kelstrup & P. Lemaitre (Eds.), *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (pp. 41-58). London: Pinter.
- Buzan, B. (2004). *The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Buzan, B., & Wæver, Ø. (1997). Slippery? contradictory? sociologically untenable? The Copenhagen school replies. *Review of International Studies*, 23, 241-250.
- Buzan, B., & Wæver, Ø. (2003). *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Buzan, B., Wæver, Ø., & De Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner.
- Caldwell, L. T. (2007). Russian Concepts of National Security. In R. Legvold (Ed.), *Russian Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century and the Shadow of the Past* (pp. 279-342). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Caspersen, N. (2008). Separatism and Democracy in the Caucasus. *Survival*, 50(4), 113-136.
- Caucasus Journalists' Network. (2004, 16 February). Onlain Interviu - Mamedov Etibar, Azerbaidzhan. Retrieved 17 October, 2008, from <http://www.caucasusjournalists.net/interview.asp?idinterview=37>
- Celac, S., Emerson, M., & Tocci, N. (2000). *A Stability Pact for the Caucasus: A Consultative Document of the CEPS Task Force on the Caucasus*. Brussels: CEPS.
- Çelikpala, M. (2006). From Immigrants to Diaspora: Influence of the North Caucasian Diaspora in Turkey. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 42(3), 423-446.
- Chandler, D. (2004). The Responsibility to Protect? Imposing the 'Liberal Peace'. *International Peacekeeping*, 11(1), 59-81.
- Chervonnaia, S. M. (1994). *Conflict in the Caucasus: Georgia, Abkhazia and the Russian Shadow*. Glastonbury: Gothic Image.
- Cheterian, V. (2008). *War and Peace in the Caucasus: Ethnic Conflict and the New Geopolitics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Chirikba, V. A. (2009). *The International Legal Status of the Republic of Abkhazia in Light of International Law*. Paper presented at the 'Independence of Abkhazia and Prospects for the Caucasus' Conference.
- Civil Georgia. (2007). Moscow Mayor Pledges More Investment in Abkhazia. *Civil Georgia*. Retrieved from <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=15404>
- Civil Georgia. (2008, 18 February). Saakashvli Warns Against Kosovo Precedent. *Civil Georgia*. Retrieved from http://www.civil.ge/eng/_print.php?id=17143

- Clapham, C. (2002). The Challenge to the State in a Globalised World. *Development and Change*, 33(5), 775-795.
- Clark, I. (1989). *The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Clifton, J. M., Clifton, D. A., Kirk, P., & Ljøkjell, R. (2005). The Sociolinguistic Situation of the Udi in Azerbaijan. Retrieved from <http://gamma.sil.org/silesr/2005/silesr2005-014.pdf>
- Closson, S. R. (2007). *State Weakness in Perspective: Trans-Territorial Energy Networks in Georgia, 1992-2003*. London School of Economics and Political Science, London.
- Clover, C. (1999). Dreams of Eurasian Heartland. *Foreign Affairs*, 78, 9-13.
- Coalson, R. (2009, 31 July). Gallup's Index of Fear. Retrieved August 4, 2009, from <http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1790063.html>
- Cohen, J. (2004). Georgia: Changing the Guard. Retrieved 21 April, 2009, from <http://www.c-r.org/resources/occasional-papers/georgia-changing-the-guard.php>
- Committee to Protect Journalists. (2007). Attacks on the Press 2006: Georgia. Retrieved from <http://cpj.org/2007/02/attacks-on-the-press-2006-georgia.php>
- Committee to Protect Journalists. (2009). Journalists Killed in 2009. Retrieved 15 September, 2009, from <http://www.cpj.org/deadly/2009.php>
- Coppieters, B. (1996a). Conclusions: The Caucasus as a Security Complex. In B. Coppieters (Ed.), *Contested Borders in the Caucasus* (pp. 193-204). Brussels: VUB Press.
- Coppieters, B. (2001). The Politicisation and Securitisation of Ethnicity: The Case of the Southern Caucasus. *Civil Wars*, 4(4), 73-94.
- Coppieters, B. (2002). In Defence of the Homeland: Intellectuals and the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict. In B. Coppieters & M. Huyseune (Eds.), *Secession, History and the Social Sciences* (pp. 89-116). Brussels: VUB Brussels University Press.
- Coppieters, B. (Ed.). (1996b). *Contested Borders in the Caucasus*. Brussels: VUBPress.
- Coppieters, B., Darchiashvili, D., & Akaba, N. (Eds.). (2000). *Federal Practice: Exploring Alternatives for Georgia and Abkhazia*. Brussels: VUB Brussels University Press.
- Coppieters, B., Nodia, G., & Anchabadze, Y. (1998a). Conclusions by the Editors. In B. Coppieters, G. Nodia & Y. Anchabadze (Eds.), *Georgians and Abkhazians: The Search for a Peace Settlement* (pp. 173-183). Köln: Bundesinstitut für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien.
- Coppieters, B., Nodia, G., & Anchabadze, Y. (Eds.). (1998b). *Georgians and Abkhazians: The Search for a Peace Settlement*. Köln: Bundesinstitut für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien.
- Cornell, S. (1998a). Iran and the Caucasus. *Middle East Policy*, V(4), 51-67.

- Cornell, S. (1998b). Turkey and the Conflict in Nagorno Karabakh: A Delicate Balance. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 34(1), 51-72.
- Cornell, S. (1999). Geopolitics and Strategic Alignments in the Caucasus and Central Asia. *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, 4(2). Retrieved from <http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume4/June-August1999/cornell.pdf>
- Cornell, S. (2001). *Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus*. Richmond: Curzon.
- Cornell, S. (2002a). *Autonomy and Conflict: Ethnoterritoriality and Separatism in the South Caucasus - Cases in Georgia*. Uppsala University, Uppsala.
- Cornell, S. (2002b). Autonomy as a Source of Conflict: Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Perspective. *World Politics*, 54(2), 245-276.
- Cornell, S. (2005). U.S. Engagement in the Caucasus: Changing Gears. *Helsinki Monitor*, 16(2), 111-119.
- Cornell, S. (2010). *Azerbaijan Since Independence*. Armonk: E.M. Sharpe.
- Cornell, S., & Starr, F. S. (2006). *The Caucasus: A Challenge for Europe*. Uppsala: The Silk Road Studies Program.
- Corso, M. (2007, 6 November 2007). Georgia: Ex-Defense Minister Returns to Political Fray. *Eurasianet*. Retrieved from http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav110607aa_pr.shtml
- Corso, M. (2008, 11 November). Georgia: Unclear Future for South Ossetia's Pro-Tbilisi Leader. *Eurasia Insight*. Retrieved from Nexis UK
- Corso, M., & Owen, E. (2006). Georgia's South Ossetia: One Unrecognized State, Two Unrecognized Governments. *Eurasia Insight*. Retrieved from http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav111306_pr.shtml
- Cortell, A. P. (2000). Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda. *International Studies Review*, 2(1), 65-87.
- Costea, S. (2010, 6 May). The Profound Causes of Russia's Hostility Towards the Eastern Partnership. *World Security Network*. Retrieved from http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/printArticle3.cfm?article_id=18281
- Council of Europe. (2004). *Resolution ResCMN(2004)8 on the Implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in Azerbaijan*. Retrieved from <https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=761919&BackColorInternet=9999CC&BackColorIntranet=&BackColorLogged=FDC864>.
- Council of Europe. (2009). General Overview: Armenia's Membership in the Council of Europe. Retrieved 5 December, 2008, from http://www.coe.am/index.php?cat_id=35
- Cox, R. W. (1983). Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay on Method. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 12(2), 162-175.
- Croissant, M. P. (1997). U.S. Interest in the Caspian Basin. *Comparative Strategy*, 16(4), 353-367.

- Croissant, M. P. (1998). *The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications*. London: Praeger.
- CRRC Data Initiative Team. (2007a). CRRC Data Initiative Survey - Armenia. Retrieved 3 July 2009, from Caucasus Research Resource Centers: <http://www.crrccenters.org/index.php/en/11>
- CRRC Data Initiative Team. (2007b). CRRC Data Initiative Survey - Azerbaijan. Retrieved 3 July 2009, from Caucasus Research Resource Centers: <http://www.crrccenters.org/index.php/en/11>
- CRRC Data Initiative Team. (2007c). CRRC Data Initiative Survey - Georgia. Retrieved 3 July 2009, from Caucasus Research Resource Centers: <http://www.crrccenters.org/index.php/en/11>
- Daly, J. C. K. (2009, 27 March). Analysis: Armenia's Nuclear Power Plant. *UPI Energy*. Retrieved from Nexis UK
- Danielyan, A. (2009, 16 July). NKR Political Parties Issue Joint Statement on "Flawed" Talks. *Hetq.am*. Retrieved from <http://hetq.am/en/karabakh/artsakh-31/>
- Danielyan, E. (2003, 7 March). Armenia Poll Sparks Domestic Outcry, Western Criticism. *Eurasianet.org*. Retrieved from http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/eav030703_pr.shtml
- Danielyan, E. (2006, 3 October). New Alternative Service Falls Flat in Armenia. *Eurasianet.org*. Retrieved from http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/eav031006_pr.shtml
- Danielyan, E. (2008a, 2 September). Sarkisian Discusses Georgia Crisis With Russian Leader. *RFE-RL Armenia Report*. Retrieved from <http://www.azatutyun.am/content/article/1597117.html>
- Danielyan, E. (2008b, 14 August). Yerevan Hopes for Quick End to Georgia Fighting. *RFE-RL Armenia Report*. Retrieved from <http://www.azatutyun.am/content/article/1596833.html>
- Danielyan, E. (2010). Armenia Plans Troop Deployment in Afghanistan. *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 7(8).
- Day.az. (2006, 6 January). Farida Mamedova: "Razrushiv Zakhronenie Agadede, Armyane v ocherednoy raz piytayutsia posyagnut na istoriyu Azerbaidzhana. *Day.az*. Retrieved from <http://www.day.az/print/news/armenia/38422.html>
- Day.az. (2008a, 18 August). Eldar Dzhakhangirov: "Bolshe Vsevo Menya Udivil Rossiiskii Agitprop, Kotoryi Pervoklassnye po Urovnyu SMI Prevratil v Isterichnye Boevye Listki Vremen Gebbelsa.". Retrieved 5 June, 2009, from <http://www.day.az/print/news/politics/127839.html>
- Day.az. (2008b, 1 May). Posol Azerbaidzhana v Gruzii: "Dumayu, chto vlasti Gruzii prekrasno osoznayut, chto Gruzinskie Azerbaidzhantsiy yavlyayutsya bogatstvom straniy.". *Day.az*. Retrieved from <http://www.day.az/news/politics/116533.html>
- Day.az. (2009a, 27 May). Ganira Pashayeva - "Nashi Sootechestvenniki, Kompaktno Prozhivayushchie v Gruzii, Igrayut Ogromnyu Rol v Rasvitii Otnoshenii Mezhdou Nashimi Stranami". Retrieved from <http://www.day.az/news/politics/158833.html>

- Day.az. (2009b, 18 May). Political scientist: If Karabakh Armenians want to live together with the main part of their people, let them get out of our territory and return to Armenia where they have already gained independence. Retrieved from <http://www.today.az/news/politics/52244.html>
- De Borchgrave, A. (2008, 2 September). Commentary: Israel of the Caucasus. *UPI*. Retrieved from Nexis UK
- De Facto. (2009). Politiko-Pravovyye Faktyi i Argumentyi (Minimalnaya Papka). Retrieved 29 March, 2009, from <http://defacto.am/index.php?name=news&op=printe&id=164>
- De Pauw, F. (1996). Turkey's Policies in Transcaucasia. In B. Coppieters (Ed.), *Contested Borders in the Caucasus* (pp. 179-191). Brussels: VUB Press.
- De Waal, T. (2003). *Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War*. New York: New York University Press.
- De Waal, T. (2010, 13 September). Call off the Great Game. *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/09/13/call_off_the_great_game
- Defence and Security. (2008, 22 August). Silence of the Commonwealth. Retrieved 5 June, 2009, from Nexis UK
- Dekmejian, R. H. (1968). Soviet-Turkish Relations and Politics in the Armenian SSR. *Soviet Studies*, 19(4), 510-525.
- Denzin, N. K. (2009). *The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods*. Piscataway: AldineTransaction.
- Derghoukassian, K. (2006). Balance of Power, Democracy and Development: Armenia in the South Caucasian Security Complex. (Working Paper No. 06/10). Retrieved from http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00003503/01/balance_of_power.pdf
- Desch, M. C. (1993). *When the Third World Matters: Latin America and United States Grand Strategy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Desch, M. C. (1998). Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies. *International Security*, 23(1), 141-170.
- Deutsch, K. W., Burrell, S. A., & Kann, R. A. (1957). *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Dewitt, D. (1994). Common, Comprehensive and Cooperative Security. *Pacific Review*, 7(1), 1-15.
- Diehl, P. F. (Ed.). (1999). *A Road Map to War: Territorial Dimensions of International Conflict*. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.
- Donnelly, J. (1986). International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis. *International Organization*, 40(3), 599-642.
- Dowsett, C. (1997). *Sayat-Nova: An 18th-Century Troubadour*. Leuven: Peeters.
- Doyle, M. W. (1986). Liberalism and World Politics. *The American Political Science Review*, 80(4), 1151-1169.

- Dugin, A. (2000). *Osnovy Geopolitiki* Available from <http://www.arctogaia.com/public/osnovygeo/geopol0.htm>
- Dupont, B., Grabosky, P., & Shearing, C. (2003). The Governance of Security in Weak and Failing States. *Criminal Justice*, 3(4), 331-349.
- Dzugayev, K. (2007). *Respublika Yuzhnaya Osetiya: Istoriya i Sovremennost*. Retrieved 2 October, 2009, from <http://cominf.org/node/1166475840>
- Ebel, R., & Menon, R. (Eds.). (2000). *Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus*. Lanham: Roman and Littlefield Publishers.
- EBRD. (2003). *Project Summary Document*. Retrieved from <http://www.ebrd.com/projects/psd/psd2003/18806.htm>.
- Economist Intelligence Unit. (2007). *Country Report 2007 - Azerbaijan*. London: Economist Intelligence Unit.
- Economist Intelligence Unit. (2008a). *Country Profile 2008 - Armenia*. London: Economist Intelligence Unit.
- Economist Intelligence Unit. (2008b). *Country Profile 2008 - Azerbaijan*. London: Economist Intelligence Unit.
- Economist Intelligence Unit. (2008c). *Country Profile 2008 - Georgia*. London: Economist Intelligence Unit.
- Economist Intelligence Unit. (2008d). *Country Report 2008 - Armenia*. London: Economist Intelligence Unit.
- Economist Intelligence Unit. (2008e). *Country Report 2008 - Georgia*. London: Economist Intelligence Unit.
- Edilashvili, N. (2007, 4 December). Border Dispute Breaks Harmony between Azerbaijan and Georgia. *The Georgian Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.geotimes.ge/print.php?print=3887&m=news>
- Eizenstat, S. E., Porter, J. E., & Weinstein, J. M. (2005). Rebuilding Weak States. *Foreign Affairs*, 85, 134-146.
- Emerson, M., & Tocci, N. (2001). A Stability Pact for the Caucasus in Theory and Practice - A Supplementary Note. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 1(3), 115-147.
- Emmers, R. (2003). *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF*. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
- Energy Information Administration. (2008, 17 October). World Crude Oil and Natural Gas Reserves, January 1, 2007. *International Energy Annual 2006*, from <http://www.eia.doe.gov/iea/res.html>
- English, R. (2008). Georgia: The Ignored History. *New York Review of Books*, 55(17). Retrieved from <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/22011>
- Ericson, R. E. (2009). Eurasian Natural Gas Pipelines: The Political Economy of Network Interdependence. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 50(1), 28-57.

Eurasia Insight. (2009, 9 April). Azerbaijan: Russian 2008 Blitz against Georgia Eroded Ardor for NATO and EU in Baku - Expert. Retrieved 4 March, 2010, from http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav040909a_pr.shtml

Eurasianet.org. (2006, 12 July). Azerbaijani Hopes for Peace Dwindle with Karabakh Disclosure. Retrieved 10 October, 2009, from <http://www.eurasianet.org/print/56530>

European Commission. (2004). *Communication From the Commission: European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper*.

European Commission. (2007a). *Communication from the Commission: A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy*.

European Commission. (2007b). *European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument - Armenia - Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013*. Brussels: European Union.

European Commission. (2007c). *European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument - Azerbaijan - Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013*. Brussels: European Union.

European Commission. (2007d). *European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument - Georgia - Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013*. Brussels: European Union.

European Commission. (2008). *Georgia Donors' Conference, Brussels, October 22, 2008*. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/georgia/conference/donor_usd_en.pdf.

European Commission. (2009a). *Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2008: Progress Report Armenia*. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2009/sec09_511_en.pdf.

European Commission. (2009b). *Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2008: Progress Report Azerbaijan*. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2009/sec09_512_en.pdf.

European Commission. (2009c). *Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2008: Progress Report Georgia*. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2009/sec09_513_en.pdf.

European Commission. (2009d, 1 July). South Caucasus. Retrieved 1 August, 2010, from <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/regions/south-caucasus/>

European Union. (2006a). *Decision Nr. 1364/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 Laying Down Guidelines for Trans-European Energy Networks and Repealing Decision 96/391/EC and Decision 1229/2003/EC*.

European Union. (2006b). *EU/Armenia Action Plan*. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/armenia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf.

European Union. (2006c). *EU/Azerbaijan Action Plan*. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/azerbaijan_enp_ap_final_en.pdf.

European Union. (2006d). *EU/Georgia Action Plan*. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/georgia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf.

European Union. (2008a). *European Union and its Main Trading Partners: Economic and Trade Indicators*. Retrieved 2 January 2009, from European Union: <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/data.htm>

European Union. (2008b). *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World*.

European Union. (s.d.). EUMM Georgia. Retrieved 30 April, 2011, from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1512&lang=en>

Federal News Service. (1994, 24 May). Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Hearing. Retrieved 5 March, 2008, from Nexis UK

Federal News Service. (1995, 14 November). Prepared Statement of James F. Collins. Retrieved 5 March, 2008, from Nexis UK

Federal News Service. (1996, 30 July). Prepared Statement by John E. Herbst. Retrieved 5 March, 2008, from Nexis UK

Federal News Service. (1997a, 23 October). Hearing of the International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Retrieved 5 March, 2008, from Nexis UK

Federal News Service. (1997b, 22 July). Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Retrieved 5 March, 2008, from Nexis UK

Federal News Service. (1998a, 31 March). Prepared Statement of Strobe Talbott. Retrieved 5 March, 2008, from Nexis UK

Federal News Service. (1998b, 8 July). Senate Foreign Relations Committee International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion Subcommittee Hearing Regarding Caspian Sea Oil Exports. Retrieved 5 March, 2008, from Nexis UK

Federal News Service. (2008, 10 September). Hearing of the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission). Retrieved 15 March, 2009, from Nexis UK

Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. *International Organization*, 52(4), 887-917.

Forsberg, T. (1996). Explaining Territorial Disputes: From Power Politics to Normative Reasons. *Journal of Peace Research*, 33(4), 433-449.

Fotiou, E. (2009). *"Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform": What is at Stake for Regional Cooperation?* Athens: International Centre for Black Sea Studies.

Fowkes, B. (2002). The National Question in the Soviet Union under Leonid Brezhnev: Policy and Response. In E. Bacon & M. Sandle (Eds.), *Brezhnev Reconsidered* (pp. 90-109). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Freedman, R. O. (2000). Russian-Iranian Relations in the 1990s. *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 4(2). Retrieved from <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2000/issue2/jv4n2a5.html>

Freedom House. (2007). Methodology. Retrieved 28 April 2008, from http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=333&year=2007

Freedom House. (2008a). *Freedom in the World: Armenia*. Washington: Freedom House.

Freedom House. (2008b). *Freedom in the World: Azerbaijan*. Washington: Freedom House.

- Freedom House. (2008c). *Freedom in the World: Georgia*. Washington: Freedom House.
- Freedom House. (2008d). Freedom of the Press (2007). Retrieved 21 April, 2008, from <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=16&year=2007>
- Freinkman, L., Polyakov, E., & Revenco, C. (2004). Armenia's Trade Performance in 1995-2002 and the Effect of Closed Borders: A Cross-Country Study. *Armenian Journal of Public Policy*, 1(2), 185-212.
- Frieden, J. A. (1989). The Economics of Intervention: American Overseas Investment and Relations with Underdeveloped Areas, 1890-1950. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 31(1), 55-80.
- Fukuyama, F. (2004a). The Imperative of State-Building. *Journal of Democracy*, 15(2), 17-31.
- Fukuyama, F. (2004b). *State-building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Fuller, L. (2004, 18 November). Analysis: New Solution Proposed for Abkhaz Election Deadlock. *RFE-RL*. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1055943.html>
- Fuller, L. (2005, 29 June). Georgia: Is the Country Becoming Progressively Less Democratic? *RFE/RL*. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1059570.html>
- Fuller, L. (2007, 31 January). Caucasus: Are Georgia, Abkhazia Pursuing Diverging Agendas? Retrieved 21 September, 2009, from <http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1051034.html>
- Fuller, L. (2008a, 26 June). Analysis: Do Azerbaijan's Ethnic Minorities Face Forced Assimilation? *RFE/RL Caucasus Report*. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1347830.html>
- Fuller, L. (2008b, 15 May). Analysis: Does Azerbaijan Face a New Irredentist Threat? Retrieved 30 June, 2008, from <http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1117493.html>
- Fuller, L. (2008c, 5 September). Daghestan Militants Blamed for Baku Mosque Blast. Retrieved 12 September, 2008, from <http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1196666.html>
- Fuller, L. (2008d, 1 October). Ombudsman Slams 'Authoritarian Rule' in Georgia, Founds New Movement. *RFE/RL*. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1293020.html>
- Fuller, L. (2008e, 7 November). One Year After Crackdown, Georgian Opposition Remains Angry - But Weak. *RFE/RL*. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1339405.html>
- Fuller, L. (2008f, 27 September). Opposition in Belarus, Azerbaijan Differ over Election Boycotts. Retrieved 8 December, 2008, from <http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1292046.html>
- Fuller, L., & Bakir, B. (2007, 10 August). Azerbaijan: Why Is 'Alternative Islam' Gaining Strength? Retrieved 9 September, 2008, from <http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1078075.html>
- Gadzhiev, K. S. (2001). *Geopolitika Kavkaza*. Moskva: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia.

- Gallarotti, G. M. (1989). Legitimacy as a Capital Asset of the State. *Public Choice*, 63, 43-61.
- Galoian, A. (2006, 30 June). 300 Nalogykh Spartantsev. *168 Zham*. Retrieved from <http://www.168.am/ru/articles/2160>
- Galoian, G. A., & Khudaverdian, K. S. (Eds.). (1988). *Nagorniyi Karabakh: Istoricheskaya Pravka*. Yerevan: Izdatelstvo Akademiya Nauk Armianskoi SSR.
- Gamakhariya, D., & Gogiya, B. (1997). *Abkhaziya - Istoricheskaya Oblast Gruzii: Istoriofografiya, Dokumenty i Materialy, Kommentarii*. Tbilisi: Agdgoma.
- Gamsakhurdia, Z. (1990). The Spiritual Mission of Georgia: A Lecture Delivered at the Idriart Festival in Tbilisi Philharmonic Hall, 2 May 1990. Retrieved 20 September, 2009, from <http://iberiana.iatp.ge/smg.htm>
- Gardiner, N. (2008, 1 April). A Two-Tier Alliance: Germany and France Undermine NATO. *The Daily Standard*. Retrieved from Nexis UK
- Gasnov, A. (2007, 27 October). Karabakh, Nakhchevan, Dalee Vezde, Ili Kaka Protivostoyat Mirovomu Armyanstvu? *Day.az*. Retrieved from <http://www.day.az/print/news/politics/96141.html>
- Gaubatz, K. T. (1996). Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations. *International Organization*, 50(1), 109-139.
- Geertz, C. (1963). The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States. In C. Geertz (Ed.), *Old Societies and New States* (pp. 105-157). New York: The Free Press.
- German, T. C. (2004). The Pankisi Gorge: Georgia's Achilles' Heel in its Relations with Russia? *Central Asian Survey*, 23(1), 27-39.
- Gevorkyan, A. V., & AIPRG. (2006). Dual Citizenship in Armenia: Nature of the Debate since Independence. *Armenian Journal of Public Policy*, 9-22.
- Gevorkyan, G. (2007). *Labour Migration in Armenia: The Results of a Pilot Sample Survey*. Yerevan: National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia.
- Geyer, G. A. (2000). Conversations with Eduard Shevardnadze. *The Washington Quarterly*, 23(2), 55-66.
- Ghazinyan, A. (2007, 7 September). Politics of Provocation? PM's Visit to Bleyan Sparks Speculations. *Armenianow.com*. Retrieved from <http://www.armenianow.com/?action=printable&IID=1150&AID=2469&CID=2455&lng=eng>
- Giddens, A. (1990). *The Consequences of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Gilpin, R. (1982). *War and Change in International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Giragosian, R. (2008, 15 August). Georgian Planning Flaws Led to Campaign Failure. *Jane's Defense Weekly*.
- Giragosian, R. (2010, 3 September). Is Armenia Russia's Partner or Pawn? *RFE-RL*. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/2147689.html>

- Goble, P. (2009, 13 August). Abkhazia Caught Between Ethnic and Civic Nationhood. *Georgian Daily*. Retrieved from http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14065&Itemid=130
- Göçek, F. M. (2008). Through a Glass Darkly: Consequences of a Politicized Past in Contemporary Turkey. *Annals of the American Association of Political and Social Science*(617), 88-106.
- Goldenberg, S. (1996). *Pride of Small Nations: the Caucasus and Post-Soviet Disorder*. London: Zed Books.
- Goldman, E. R. (2001). New Threats, New Identities and New Ways of War: The Sources of Change in National Security Doctrine. *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 24(2), 43-76.
- Golos Armenii. (2009). Armenian Commentary Takes Critical Look at Ties with Georgia. *BBC Monitoring*.
- Gray, C. S. (1971). The Arms Race Phenomenon. *World Politics*, 24(1), 39-79.
- Grieco, J. M. (1988a). Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism. *International Organization*, 42(3), 485-507.
- Grieco, J. M. (1988b). Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation: Analysis with an Amended Prisoners' Dilemma. *The Journal of Politics*, 50(3), 600-624.
- Grigoryan, M. (2008, 7 October). Armyanskie Bezhentsiy. *Golos Armenii*. Retrieved from http://www.golos.am/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=35829&Itemid=37
- Grigoryan, M. (2009, 24 June). Armenia: Amnesty Does Little to Deflect Opposition Ire. *Eurasianet*. Retrieved from <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav062309a.shtml>
- Grigoryan, M. (2009, 14 July). Artsakh Vnov - Ediniyi Bastion Armyanstva. *Golos Armenii*. Retrieved from http://www.golos.am/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=47985
- Gruziya Online. (2008, 8 August). Samolet, Bombivshii Bazy Vaziani, Zaletel so Storonu Armenii. Retrieved 12 August, 2008, from <http://www.apsny.ge/news/1218235586.php>
- Guida, M. (2008). The Sèvres Syndrome and "Komplo" Theories in the Islamist and Secular Press. *Turkish Studies*, 9(1), 37-52.
- Gül, A. (2009, 11 February). Russia Has Become Turkey's Biggest Trade Partner. *Today's Zaman*. Retrieved from <http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=166571&bolum=109>
- Gultekin Punsman, B. (2009). *The Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform: An Attempt to Foster Regional Accountability*. Athens: International Centre for Black Sea Studies.
- Gusep, T. (2005, 4 July). "The Russian Military Base Protects Us. From Unemployment and from Turkey.". *Caucaz Europeanews*. Retrieved from http://www.caucaz.com/home_eng/breve_contenu.php?id=170

- Guzzini, S., & Leander, A. (Eds.). (2006). *Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and His Critics*. Oxford: Routledge.
- Haas, E. B. (1980). Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes. *World Politics*, 32(3), 357-405.
- Haas, E. B. (1989). *When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Relations*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Hakopyan, H. V. (1997). Adrbeidzhanum Hayeri 1988-1990 Tvakanneri Tseghasbannutyune Mijazgayin Iravunqi Tesaketits *Gharabagh: Hakamartutyun - Hamadzaynutyun* (pp. 22-31). Yerevan: Haikakan Banak.
- Hansen, L. (2000). The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 29(2), 285-306.
- Hansen, L. (2006). *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*. New York: Routledge.
- Hasanli, J. (2009, 11, 18, 25 April and 2, 9 May). Tragicheskaya Vesna 1918 Goda. *Zerkalo*. Retrieved from <http://www.zerkalo.az/?sec=readarchive&id=41750>
- Hasanov, A. (2008). Historical Roots of the IDP Crisis in Azerbaijan. *ADA Biweelky*, 1(11). Retrieved from http://ada.edu.az/bwprint.php?item_id=20090327033315544&sec_id=151
- Hasenclever, A., Mayer, P., & Rittberger, V. (1997). *Theories of International Regimes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Heilbrunner, S. (1991, 15 September). Baker Makes Symbolic Visit to Kazakhstan. *United Press International*. Retrieved from Nexis UK
- Hemmer, C. J., & Katzenstein, P. (2002). Why Is There No Nato in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism. *International Organization*, 56, 575-607.
- Herd, G. P. (2005). Colorful Revolutions and the CIS. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 52(2), 3-18.
- Hewitt, G. (1993). Abkhazia: A Problem of Identity and Ownership. *Central Asian Survey*, 12(3), 267-323.
- Hewitt, G. (1999). Abkhazia, Georgia and the Circassians (NW Caucasus). *Central Asian Survey*, 18(4), 463-499.
- Hill, F. (2003). Seismic Shifts in Eurasia: The Changing Relationship between Turkey and Russia and its Implications for the South Caucasus. *Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 3(3), 55-75.
- Hill, F. (2004). Pipelines in the Caspian - Catalyst or Cure-All? *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, 5(2), 17-26.
- Hill, F., & Taspinar, O. (2006). *Russia and Turkey in the Caucasus: Moving Together to Preserve the Status Quo?* Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales.
- Hobson, J. M. (2000). *The State and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Hoffman, A. M. (2002). A Conceptualisation of Trust in International Relations. *European Journal of International Relations*, 8(3), 375-401.
- Holmes, K. R., Feulner, E. J., & O'Grady, M. A. (2008). *2008 Index of Economic Freedom*. Washington: The Heritage Foundation.
- Holsti, K. J. (1996). *The State, War and the State of War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hoogensen, G. (2005). Bottoms Up! A Toast to Regional Security? *International Studies Review*, 7(2), 269-274.
- Hopf, T. (1998). The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory. *International Security*, 23(1), 171-200.
- Hopkirk, P. (2001). *The Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hovannisian, R. G. (1973). Armenia and the Caucasus in the Genesis of the Soviet-Turkish Entente. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 4, 129-147.
- Hovannisian, R. G. (1997). *The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times* (Vol. 2). Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Hovannisian, R. G. (2005). Genocide and Independence. In E. Herzig & M. Kurkchian (Eds.), *The Armenians: Past and Present in the Making of National Identity* (pp. 89-112). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Human Rights Watch. (1992). *Bloodshed in the Caucasus: Violations of Humanitarian Law and Human Rights in the Georgia-South Ossetia Conflict*. London: Human Rights Watch.
- Hunter, S. (2003). Iran's Pragmatic Regional Policy. *Journal of International Affairs*, 56(2), 133-147.
- Hunter, S. T. (2006). Borders, Conflict and Security in the Caucasus: The Legacy of the Past. *SAIS Review*, 26(1), 111-125.
- Huntington, S. P. (2000). *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Huysmans, J. (1998). Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Agenda in Europe. *European Journal of International Relations*, 4(2), 479-505.
- Hyman, A. (1997). Turkestan and pan-Turkism Revisited. *Central Asian Survey*, 16(3), 339-351.
- Ibragimov, N. (2009, April). Moment Istoricheskoi Otvetstvennosti. *Echo*. Retrieved from http://www.echo.az/archive/2005_09/1160/tochka01.shtml
- ICISS. (2001). *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre.
- IFES. (2001). *Citizens' Awareness and Participation in Armenia*. Washington: IFES.
- IFES. (2002). *Citizens' Awareness and Participation in Armenia*. Washington: IFES.

- IFES. (2003). *Citizens' Awareness and Participation in Armenia*. Washington: IFES.
- IFES. (2004). *Citizens' Awareness and Participation in Armenia*. Washington: IFES.
- IISS. (2008). *The Military Balance 2008*. London: Routledge.
- Imedi TV. (2005, 12 October). Georgian President Stresses Caspian Pipeline's "Political" Importance. *BBC Monitoring*. Retrieved from Nexis UK
- Indans, I. (2007). Relations of Russia and Georgia: Developments and Future Prospects. *Baltic Security and Defence Review*, 9, 131-149.
- Ingram, A. (2001). Alexander Dugin: Geopolitics and Neo-Fascism in Post-Soviet Russia. *Political Geography*, 20, 1029-1051.
- INOGATE. (2010). Energy Portal: EU, the Littoral States of the Black and Caspian Seas and their Neighbouring Countries. Retrieved 20 March, 2010, from <http://www.inogate.org/>
- Interfax. (2003, 28 July). Shevardnadze Says NATO Membership Will Guarantee Georgia's Independence. *World News Connection*. Retrieved from Nexis UK
- Interfax. (2006, 27 September). Saakashvili Opens Administrative Center for Abkhaz Government in Exile in Kodori. *Russia & CIS Presidential Bulletin*. Retrieved from Nexis UK
- Interfax. (2008a, 5 December). Burjanadze Blames Georgian Authorities for Dim NATO Membership Prospects. *Russia & CIS Military Weekly*. Retrieved from Nexis UK
- Interfax. (2008b, 6 March). No Alternative to Unification of Ossetian People - North Ossetian Leader. *Russia & CIS General Newswire*. Retrieved from Nexis UK
- Interfax. (2009, 11 August). One Year on from Conflict, Uneasy Peace Prevails in the South. *Central Asia & Caucasus Business Weekly*. Retrieved from Nexis UK
- International Crisis Group. (2004a). *Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia*. Brussels: International Crisis Group.
- International Crisis Group. (2004b). *Saakashvili's Ajara Success: Repeatable Elsewhere in Georgia?* Brussels: International Crisis Group.
- International Crisis Group. (2007). *Nagorno-Karabakh: Risking War*. Brussels: International Crisis Group.
- International Crisis Group. (2008a). *Armenia: Picking Up the Pieces*. Yerevan/Tbilisi/Brussels: International Crisis Group.
- International Crisis Group. (2008b). *Azerbaijan: Defence Sector Management and Reform*. Brussels: International Crisis Group.
- International Crisis Group. (2008c). *Azerbaijan: Independent Islam and the State*. Brussels: International Crisis Group.
- International Crisis Group. (2008d). *Georgia: The Risks of Winter*. Tbilisi/Brussels: International Crisis Group.
- International Crisis Group. (2009). *Turkey and Armenia: Opening Minds, Opening Borders*. Brussels: International Crisis Group.

- International Election Observation Mission. (2008). *Republic of Azerbaijan - Presidential Election, 15 October 2008: Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions*. Baku: OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.
- Ishkanian, A. (2008, 4 March). Democracy Contested: Armenia's Fifth Presidential Elections. *OpenDemocracy*. Retrieved from <http://www.opendemocracy.net/node/35948/pdf>
- Ismailzade, F. (2004). *Azerbaijan's Tough Foreign Policy Choices*.
- Ismailzade, F. (2008). *Who's Who in the Azerbaijani Opposition*. Washington: The Jamestown Foundation.
- Ismayilov, R. (2007). Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey: Building a Transportation Triumvirate? *Eurasianet*. Retrieved from <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav020707.shtml>
- Ismayilov, R. (2008, 16 April). Azerbaijan: It's Back to the Drawing Board for Karabakh Talks. *Eurasianet*. Retrieved from Nexis UK
- Jackson, R. H. (1982). Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood. *World Politics*, 35(1), 1-24.
- Jackson, R. H. (1990). *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jamestown Foundation. (2008). Briefs: Roundup of Azerbaijan's "Forest Brothers" Follows Attack on Baku Mosque. *Terrorism Focus*, 5(32).
- Jamgotch, N., Jr. (1975). Alliance Management in Eastern Europe (The New Type of International Relations). *World Politics*, 27(3), 405-429.
- Jepperson, R. L., Wendt, A., & Katzenstein, P. J. (1996). Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security. In P. J. Katzenstein (Ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (pp. 33-75). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Jervis, R. (1976). *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. *World Politics*, 30(2), 167-214.
- Jervis, R. (1982). Security Regimes. *International Organization*, 36(2), 357-378.
- Jgharkava, Z. (2009, 24 April). Russian Cards. *Georgia Today*. Retrieved from http://www.georgiatoday.ge/print_version.php?id=6647&version=456
- Job, B. L. (1992). The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World. In B. L. Job (Ed.), *The insecurity dilemma : national security of Third World states*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Johnston, A. I. (1995). Thinking about Strategic Culture. *International Security*, 19(4), 32-64.
- Jones, S. (1994). Populism in Georgia: The Gamsakhurdia Phenomenon *Nationalism and History: The Politics of Nation Building in Post-Soviet Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia* (pp. 127-149). Toronto: University of Toronto - Centre for Russian and East European Studies.

- Jones, S. A. (2000). Turkish Strategic Interests in the Transcaucasus. In G. K. Bertsch, C. B. Craft, S. A. Jones & M. Beck (Eds.), *Crossroads and Conflict: Security and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia* (pp. 55-65). London: Routledge.
- Karagiannis, E. (2002). *Energy and Security in the Caucasus*. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
- Kardas, S. (2009). Turkey and Azerbaijan: "One Nation-Two States?". *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 6(193). Retrieved from http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35630
- Kaufman, S. J. (2001). *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Kavkazskii Uzel. (2008, 18 June). Avartsy Azerbaidzhana Prosyat Prezidenta Dagestana Zashchitit Ikh Ot "Azerbaidzhanizatsii". Retrieved 15 September, 2009, from <http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/138095?print=true>
- Kavkazskii Uzel. (2006). O Genotside Yuzhnykh Osetin v 1989-1992 gg. Retrieved 13 October, 2009, from <http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/96430/?print=true>
- Kaya, A. (2004). Political Participation Strategies of the Circassian Diaspora in Turkey. *Mediterranean Politics*, 9(2), 221-239.
- Kelly, D. (2000). End of the Great Game: British Intervention in Russia's Southern Borderlands and the Soviet Response. *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 13(4), 84-100.
- Kelly, R. E. (2007). Security Theory in the "New Regionalism". *International Studies Review*, 9(2), 197-229.
- Kennedy, P. M. (1988). *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*. London: Unwin Hyman.
- Keohane, R. O. (1969). Lilliputian's Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics. *International Organization*, 23(2), 291-310.
- Keohane, R. O. (1982). The Demand for International Regimes. *International Organization*, 36(2), 325-355.
- Keohane, R. O. (1984). *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Keohane, R. O. (1993). The Analysis of International Regimes: Towards a European-American Research Programme. In V. Rittberger & P. Mayer (Eds.), *Regime Theory and International Relations* (pp. 23-45). Oxford: Clarendon.
- Kerr, D. (1995). The New Eurasianism: The Rise of Geopolitics in Russian Foreign Policy. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 47(6), 977-988.
- Khachatrian, H. (2008a, 9 March). Armenian Society Shares Common Views on Georgian-Russian War and Its Consequences. *Central Asia Caucasus Institute Analyst*. Retrieved from <http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4934/print>
- Khachatrian, H. (2008b). Russia Makes a Bid to Enhance its Influence in the Caucasus Using Economic Leverage. *Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst*. Retrieved from <http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4914>

- Khairullin, M., Pavlikova, O., Dzhanayev, D., & Yeremjan, A. (2006, 23 March). South Ossetia Claims to be Part of Russia. *Gazeta*. Retrieved from Nexis UK
- Khodzhaa, R. (2007). *Abkhazskii Narodnii Sovyet 1917-1920*. Sukhum: Fond Pervovo Prezidenta Respubliki Abkhaziya.
- Khoshtariya-Brosse, E. V. (1996). *Istoriya i Sovremennost: Abkhazskaya Problema v Konfliktologicheskoi Aspekto*. Tbilisi: Samshoblo.
- Kikacheishvili, T. (2008, 13 June). Saingilo Notebook: Georgia Officials Work to Organize Diaspora. *Georgian Daily*. Retrieved from http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3087&Itemid=134
- Kindleberger, C. (1974). *The World in Depression*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- King, D., & Pomper, M. (2004). The U.S. Congress and the Contingent Influence of Diaspora Lobbies: Lessons from U.S. Policy towards Armenia and Azerbaijan. *Journal of Armenian Studies*, VIII(1).
- Klare, M. T. (2001). *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Kocharli, T. (2004). *Armenian Deception (Historical Information)*. Baku: M-Dizayn.
- Kolstø, P., & Blakkisrud, H. (2008). Living with Non-recognition: State- and Nation-building in South Caucasian Quasi-states. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 60(3), 483-509.
- Kotanjian, H. S. (1997). Gharabaghian Hakamartutyun Lutsman Arandznahatkutyunnere *Gharabagh: Hakamartutyun - Hamadzaynutyun* (pp. 5-11). Yerevan: Haykakan Banak.
- Kotecha, H. (2006). *Islamic and Ethnic Identities in Azerbaijan: Emerging Trends and Tensions*. Baku: OSCE Office in Baku.
- Kotenyok, Y. (2006, 4 July). Nagorni Karabakh Gotov k Dialogu. *Utro.ru*. Retrieved from <http://utro.ru/articles/2006/07/04/562296.shtml>
- Kotlyarov, V. N. (Ed.). (1994). *Abkhazskie Pisma: Sbornik Dokumentov*. Sukhum: El-Fa.
- Krasner, S. D. (1983). Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables. In S. D. Krasner (Ed.), *International Regimes* (pp. 1-22). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Krasner, S. D. (1988). Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective. *Comparative Political Studies Quarterly*, 21(1), 66-94.
- Krasner, S. D. (2004). Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States. *International Security*, 29(2), 85-120.
- Kratochwil, F. (1993). Contract and Regimes: Do Issue Specificity and Variations of Formality Matter? In V. Rittberger & P. Mayer (Eds.), *Regime Theory and International Relations* (pp. 73-93). Oxford: Clarendon.

- Kratochwil, F. (2000). Constructing a New Orthodoxy? Wendt's 'Social Theory of International Politics' and the Constructivist Challenge. *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, 29(1), 73-101.
- Krauthammer, C. (1990). The Unipolar Moment. *Foreign Affairs*, 70(1), 23-33.
- Krikorian, O. (2010, 3 September). Concerns Raised over Extension of Russian Military Presence in Armenia. *Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso*. Retrieved from <http://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/All-news/Concerns-raised-over-extension-of-Russian-military-presence-in-Armenia>
- Kucera, J. (2007, 14 June). Abkhazia: Bracing for More Trouble. *Eurasianet*. Retrieved from Nexis UK
- Kuhn, T. S. (1996). *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kvarchelia, L. (1998). Georgia-Abkhazia Conflict: View from Abkhazia. *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*, 6(1), 17-27.
- Kvarchelia, L. (1999, September). An Abkhaz Perspective. Retrieved 5 September, 2009, from <http://www.abkhazworld.com/articles/conflict/27-an-abkhaz-perspective.html>
- Kydd, A. (2000). Trust, Reassurance and Cooperation. *International Organization*, 54(2), 325-357.
- Lachowski, Z. (2007). *Foreign Military Bases in Eurasia*. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
- Lake, D. A. (1996). Anarchy, Hierarchy and the Variety of International Relations. *International Organization*, 50(1), 1-33.
- Lake, D. A., & Morgan, P. M. (Eds.). (1997). *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*. University Park: Pennsylvania University Press.
- Lake, D. A., & Morgan, P. M. (Eds.). (1998). *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Lakoba, S. (1995). Abkhazia is Abkhazia. *Central Asian Survey*, 14(1), 97-105.
- Lakoba, S. (1999). History: 1917-1989. In G. Hewitt (Ed.), *The Abkhazians: A Handbook* (pp. 89-101). Richmond: Curzon Press.
- Lalayan, M. (2002a). *Garegin Njdeh: Kensagrakan Aknark*. Yerevan: Republican Party of Armenia.
- Lalayan, M. (2002b). *Tseghakron Sharjume: Patmutyun yev Qaghaparakhosutyun*. Yerevan: Republican Party of Armenia.
- Lambsdorff, J. (2007). The Methodology of the Corruption Perceptions Index Available from <http://www.transparency.org/content/download/23695/358196>
- Lambsdorff, J. (2008). Corruption Perception Index 2008. Retrieved 2 January 2009, from Transparency International: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2008

- Lavrov, A. (2009). Sostoyanie Gruzinskoj Armii k Zaverzheniyu Boyevikh Deistvii i ee Poteri. In M. Barabanov, A. Lavrov & V. Tselyuko (Eds.), *Tanki Avgusta: Sbornik Statei* (Vol. 119-126). Moskva: Tsentr Analiza Strategii i Tekhnologii.
- Layne, C. (1993). The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise. *International Security*, 17(4), 5-51.
- Legvold, R. (2007). Russian Foreign Policy during State Transformation. In R. Legvold (Ed.), *Russian Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century and the Shadow of the Past* (pp. 77-143). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Levine, R. M., & Wallace, G. J. (2007). *2005 Minerals Yearbook: Commonwealth of Independent States*. Washington: United States Geological Survey.
- Levy, J. S. (1982). Historical Trends in Great Power War. *International Studies Quarterly*, 26(2), 278-300.
- Libaridian, G. J. (1999). *The Challenge of Statehood: Armenian Political Thinking Since Independence*. Watertown: Blue Crane Books.
- Libaridian, G. J. (2004). *Modern Armenia: People, Nation, State*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Light, M. (1996). Foreign Policy Thinking. In N. Malcolm, A. Pravda, R. Allison & M. Light (Eds.), *Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy* (pp. 33-100). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Littlefield, S. (2009). Citizenship, Identity and Foreign Policy: Contradictions and Consequences of Russia's Passport Distribution in the Separatist Regions of Georgia. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 61(8), 1461-1482.
- Lo, B. (2003). The Securitization of Russian Foreign Policy under Putin. In G. Gorodetsky (Ed.), *Russia Between East and West: Russian Foreign Policy under Putin* (pp. 11-26). London: Frank Cass.
- Lobjakas, A. (2009, 6 May). Eastern Partnership - The EU's Accidental Sphere of Influence. *RFE-RL*. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1622923.html>
- Lohm, H. (2007). *Javakheti after the Rose Revolution*. Flensburg: European Centre for Minority Issues.
- Lynch, A. C. (2001). The Realism of Russia's Foreign Policy. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 53(1), 7-31.
- Lynch, D. (2004). *Engaging Eurasia's Separatist States*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Lynch, D. (2006). *Why Georgia Matters*. Paris: Institute for Security Studies.
- MacFarlane, S. N. (1997). On the Front Lines in the Near Abroad: The CIS and the OSCE in Georgia's Civil Wars. *Third World Quarterly*, 18(3), 509-528.
- MacFarlane, S. N. (1999). *Western Engagement in the Caucasus and Central Asia*. London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs.
- MacFarlane, S. N. (2004). The Caucasus and Central Asia: Towards a Non-Strategy. In R. Dannreuther (Ed.), *European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy* (pp. 118-134). London: Routledge.

- MacFarlane, S. N. (2006). The 'R' in BRICs: Is Russia an Emerging Power? *International Affairs*, 82(1), 41-57.
- MacFarlane, S. N., Minear, L., & Shenfield, S. D. (1996). *Armed Conflict in Georgia: A Case Study in Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping*. Providence: The Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies.
- Mahajan, S. (2001). *British Foreign Policy 1874-1914: The Role of India*. London: Routledge.
- Makarychev, A. (2009). Russia, NATO and the "Color Revolutions": Discursive Traps. *Russian Politics and Law*, 47(40-51).
- Malek, M. (2006). State Failure in the South Caucasus: Proposals for an Analytical Framework *Transition Studies Review*, 13(2), 441-460.
- Malkasian, M. (1996). *"Gha-Ra-Bagh": The Emergence of the National Democratic Movement in Armenia*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
- Malysheva, D. (2001). Security Problems in the Caucasus. *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, (7). Retrieved from http://www.ca-c.org/online/2001/journal_eng/cac-01/05.malyshe.shtml
- Mamedkhanov, A. (2008, 3 September). About the Visit of Abdullah Gul to Yerevan. *Today.az*. Retrieved from <http://www.today.az/print/news/politics/47369.html>
- Mamedova, F. (s.d.). Istina o Karabakhskoi Probleme. Retrieved 2 March, 2009, from <http://karabakh-doc.azerall.info/ru/articles/artc014.htm>
- Mamedova, K. (2004). *Khodzhaliy - Shekhidiy i Shakhidiy*. Baku.
- Manassian, A. S. (1997). Gharabaghian Hakamartutyune Patmaqaghaqakan yev Irvakan Tesankyunnerits, *Gharabagh: Hakamartutyun - Hamadzaynutyun*. Yerevan: Haykakan Banak.
- Mangott, G., & Westphal, K. (2008). The Relevance of the Wider Black Sea Region to EU and Russian Energy Issues. In D. Hamilton & G. Mangott (Eds.), *The Wider Black Sea Region in the 21st Century: Strategic, Economic and Energy Perspectives* (pp. 147-176). Washington: Center for Transatlantic Relations.
- Mankoff, J. (2009). *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics*. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Mann, M. (1984). The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results. *Archives Européennes de Sociologie*, 25, 185-213.
- March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1989). *Rediscovering Institutions*. New York: Free Press.
- Marchetti, A. (2006). Widening Without Enlarging: The European Neighbourhood and the South Caucasus. *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 5(2), 1-9.
- Mark, D. E. (1996). Eurasia Letter: Russia and the New Transcaucasus. *Foreign Policy*, 105, 141-159.
- Markedonov, S. (2007). The Paradoxes of Russia's Georgia Policy. *Russia in Global Affairs*, (2). Retrieved from <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/19/1116.html>

- Markedonov, S. (2008, 21 September). Konets Proyekta "Gruzinskoe Natsionalnoe Gosudarstvo". Retrieved 20 October, 2009, from <http://www.fondsk.ru/article.php?id=1629>
- Marrese, M., & Vaňous, J. (1988). The Content and Controversy of Soviet Trade Relations with Eastern Europe, 1970-1984. In J. C. Brada, E. A. Hewett & T. A. Wolf (Eds.), *Economic Adjustment and Reform in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union: Essays in Honor of Franklyn D. Holzman* (pp. 185-217). Durham: Duke University Press.
- Martirosyan, S. (2008) Javakhetia Issues in Mass Media. *Vol. 3. South Caucasus Monthly Analytical Magazine*.
- Mason, J. W. (2005). Living the Lie: The Armenian Intelligentsia in the Soviet Union. *Oral History*, 33(2), 57-68.
- Matveeva, A. (2002). *The South Caucasus: Nationalism, Conflict and Minorities*. London: Minority Rights Group International.
- Matveeva, A., & Hiscock, D. (Eds.). (2003). *The Caucasus: Armed and Divided - Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation and Humanitarian Consequences in the Caucasus*. London: Saferworld.
- Matveeva, A., & McCartney, C. (1998). Policy Responses to an Ethnic Community Division: Lezgins in Azerbaijan. *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights*, 5, 213-252.
- McDermott, R. N. (2009). Russia's Conventional Armed Forces and the Georgian War. *Parameters*, 39(1), 65-80.
- McSweeney, B. (1996). Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School. *Review of International Studies*, 22, 81-93.
- McSweeney, B. (1998). Durkheim and the Copenhagen School. *Review of International Studies*, 24(1), 137-140.
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (1994). The False Promise of International Institutions. *International Security*, 19(3), 5-49.
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Melik-Shakhnazaryan, L., & Khachatrian, A. (2007). *Etnopolitika Azerbaidzhana*. Yerevan: De Facto.
- Melikishvili, A. (2008). Russia Resurrects the Lezgin Issue in Azerbaijan at Moscow Conference. *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 5(135). Retrieved from http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=33805
- Melkumian, H., & Zakarian, A. (2003, 11 November). Russia to Continue Arms Supplies to Armenia. *RFE-RL*. Retrieved from <http://www.armenialiberty.org/articleprintview/1572576.html>
- Melkumian, S. A. (1990). *Lernayin Gharabagh*. Yerevan: Luys.
- Menon, R., Fedorov, Y. E., & Nodia, G. (Eds.). (1999). *Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia: the 21st Century Security Environment*. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.

- MFA Armenia. (2009). Petition from the Armenians of Mountainous Karabakh to Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev - 19 May 1964. Retrieved 15 September, 2009, from http://www.armeniaforeignministry.com/fr/nk/nk_file/article/27.html
- MFA Azerbaijan. (s.d.-a). Beginning of the Contemporary Phase of the Conflict. Retrieved 31 July, 2009, from http://mfa.gov.az/eng/khojaly_en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=24&Itemid=38
- MFA Azerbaijan. (s.d.-b). The Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of the Azerbaijan SSR. Retrieved 15 September, 2009, from http://mfa.gov.az/eng/khojaly_en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=23&Itemid=37
- MFA Georgia. (2006). Joint Press-Conference of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia. Retrieved 17 July, 2009, from http://www.mfa.gov.ge/print.php?gg=1&sec_id=461&info_id=1673&lang_id=ENG
- MFA Georgia. (2009). Relations Between Georgia and the Republic of Azerbaijan. Retrieved 5 April, 2009, from http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?sec_id=265&lang_id=ENG
- MFA Mountainous Karabakh. (1991). Akt O Rezultatakh Referenduma O Nezavisimosti Nagorno-Karabakhskoi Respubliki. Retrieved 15 September, 2009, from <http://www.nkr.am/ru/document/42/>
- MFA Mountainous Karabakh. (2008a). Crimes Without Punishment. Retrieved 21 December, 2008, from [http://www.nkr.am/Crimes without punishment/Prestuplenie_bez_nakazanie_files/frame.htm](http://www.nkr.am/Crimes%20without%20punishment/Prestuplenie_bez_nakazanie_files/frame.htm)
- MFA Mountainous Karabakh. (2008b). Georgii Petrosyan: "Priznanie Kosovo Stanet Eshe Odnim Faktorom, Usilivayushchim Pozitsii Stepanakerta". Retrieved 5 December, 2008, from <http://www.nkr.am/ru/statement/44/>
- Midgalovitz, C. (2003). *Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict*. Washington: Congressional Research Service.
- Migdal, J. S. (1988). *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and Stable Capabilities in the Third World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Mikaelian, H. (2009). Armenian Foreign Policy: Coordinating the Interests of the US, the EU and Russia. *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, (57). Retrieved from http://www.ca-c.org/online/2009/journal_eng/cac-03/10.shtml
- Mikaelyan, L. (2006, 12 December). Vrag i Evo Obraz Tam i Zdes. *Golos Armenii*. Retrieved from http://www.golos.am/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1577
- Miller, B. (1995). *When Opponents Cooperate: Great Power Conflict and Collaboration in World Politics*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Miller, B. (1998). The Logic of US Military Interventions in the Post-Cold War Era. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 19(3), 72-109.
- Miller, B. (2000). Explaining Variations in Regional Peace: Three Strategies for Peacemaking. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 35(2), 155-192.

- Miller, B. (2001a). Between War and Peace: Systemic Effects and Regional Transitions from the Cold War to the Post-Cold War. *Security Studies*, 11(1), 1-52.
- Miller, B. (2001b). The Global Sources of Regional Transitions from War to Peace. *Journal of Peace Research*, 38(2), 199-225.
- Miller, B. (2001c). Hot War, Cold Peace: International-Regional Synthesis. In Z. Maoz & A. Gat (Eds.), *War in a Changing World*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Miller, B. (2007). *States, Nations and the Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Miller, B., & Kagan, K. (1997). The Great Powers and Regional Conflicts: Eastern Europe and the Balkans from the Post-Napoleonic Era to the Post-Cold War Era. *International Studies Quarterly*, 41, 51-85.
- Miller, B., & Resnick, U. (2003). Conflict in the Balkans (1830-1913): Combining Levels of Analysis. *International Politics*, 40, 365-407.
- Milliken, J., & Krause, K. (2002). State Failure, State Collapse and State Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons and Strategies. *Development and Change*, 33(5), 753-774.
- Miminoshvili, R., & Pandzhikidze, G. (1990). *Pravda Ob Abkhazii*. Tbilisi: Merani.
- Minasian, S. (2006). Samtskhe-Javakhetia: What Will Happen after Russia Withdraws its Military Bases from Russia. *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, (38). Retrieved from http://www.ca-c.org/online/2006/journal_eng/cac-01/09.mineng.shtml
- Minasyan, S. (2006). *Vrasdani Etnikakan Poqramasnutyunner*. Yerevan: Caucasus Media Institute.
- Minasyan, S. (2007). *From Political Rallies to Conventions: Political and Legal Aspects of Protecting the Rights of the Armenian Ethnic Minority in Georgia as Exemplified by the Samtskhe-Javakheti Region*. Yerevan: Caucasus Media Institute.
- Mirkadyrov, R. (2008a, 29 August). Medvedev Postayanno Vret. *Zerkalo*. Retrieved from <http://old.zerkalo.az/print.php?id=35544>
- Mirkadyrov, R. (2008b, 16 August). Rossiya, Genotsid i Ethnicheskije Chistki - Eti Ponyatna Stanovyatsya Sinonimami. *Zerkalo*. Retrieved from <http://old.zerkalo.az/print.php?id=35236>
- Mirzoyan, A. (2007). *Armenia's Foreign Policy, 1991-2004: Between History and Geopolitics*. Florida International University, Miami.
- Mite, V. (2006, 9 November). Azerbaijan: President Aliyev Walks Tightrope between Russia, West. Retrieved 15 March, 2009, from <http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1072630.html>
- Mkrtchyan, G. (2008, 10 December). Protesting for Prisoners: Armenian Opposition Marks Human Rights Day with a Series of Events. *Armenianow*. Retrieved from <http://armenianow.com/?action=viewArticle&AID=3439&CID=3296&IID=1212&lng=eng>
- Mkrtchyan, M. (2009, 23 May). Vremya Myagkikh Mer Proshlo. *Golos Armenii*. Retrieved from http://www.golos.am/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=46093&Itemid=37

- Moravcsik, A. (1997). Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. *International Organization*, 51(4), 513-553.
- Morgenthau, H. J. (1985). *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: Knopf.
- Morning Star. (2002, 16 September). Azeri Rally Demands President's Resignation. Retrieved 3 September, 2008, from Nexis UK
- Movsesyan, G. (2007, 9 February). Territorialniye Pretenzii Azerbaidzhana Neobosnovaniy. *Respublika Armeniya*. Retrieved from <http://www.ra.am/?num=2007020907>
- Muradov, A. (2003). Azerbaijan's Oil Supplies: Current State and Future Prospects. *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, (22). Retrieved from http://www.cac.org/online/2003/journal_eng/cac-04/12.mureng.shtml
- Murinson, A. (2004). The Secessions of Abkhazia and Nagorny Karabagh. The Roots and Patterns of Development in Post-Soviet Micro-Secessions in Transcaucasia. *Central Asian Survey*, 23(1), 5-26.
- Murinson, A. (2006). The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 42(6), 945-964.
- Musabekov, R. (2005). The Karabakh Conflict and Democratisation in Azerbaijan. Retrieved from <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/nagorny-karabakh/conflict-democratization-azerbaijan.php>
- Musah, A.-F. (1999). Privatization of Security, Arms Proliferation and the Process of State Collapse in Africa. *Development and Change*, 33(5), 911-933.
- Myers Jaffe, A., & Manning, R. A. (2001). Russia, Energy and the West. *Survival*, 43(2), 133-152.
- Mze TV. (2008). Opposition Advises Georgian Authorities on Kosovo's Independence. *BBC Monitoring*. Retrieved from Nexis UK
- Nadareishvili, T. (2007). *Genocide in Abkhazia*. Tbilisi: Samoshoblo.
- Naegele, J. (1998, 29 June). Turkey: Laz Minority Passive in Face of Assimilation. *RFE-RL*. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1088963.html>
- Nalbandov, R. (2009). Battle of Two Logics: Appropriateness and Consequentiality in Russian Interventions in Georgia. *Caucasian Review of International Affairs*, 3(1), 20-36.
- Nathan, L. (2004). Security Communities and the Problem of Domestic Instability. (55). Retrieved from <http://www.research4development.info/PDF/Outputs/CrisisStates/wp55.pdf>
- Newhouse, J. (2009). Diplomacy, Inc.: The Influence of Lobbies on U.S. Foreign Policy. *Foreign Affairs*, 88, 73-92.
- Nichol, J. Azerbaijan. In G. E. Curtis (Ed.), *Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies* (pp. 79-148). Washington: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.
- Nichol, J. (2007). *Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia: Security Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests*. Washington: Congressional Research Service.

- Nichol, J. (2008). *Russia-Georgia Conflict in South Ossetia: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests*. Washington: Congressional Research Service.
- Nichol, J. (2011). *Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests*. Washington: Congressional Research Service.
- Niedermaier, A. K. (2008). *Countdown to War in Georgia: Russia's Foreign Policy and Media Coverage of the Conflict in South Ossetia and Abkhazia*. Minneapolis: Eastview Press.
- Nodia, G. (1996). Political Turmoil in Georgia and the Ethnic Policies of Zviad Gamsakhurdia. In B. Coppieters (Ed.), *Contested Borders in the Caucasus* (pp. 73-89). Brussels: VUB Press.
- Nodia, G. (1998). The Conflict in Abkhazia: National Projects and Political Circumstances. In B. Coppieters, G. Nodia & Y. Anchabadze (Eds.), *Georgians and Abkhazians: The Search for a Peace Settlement* (pp. 15-50). Köln: Bundesinstitut für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien.
- Nodia, G. (2005a). Georgia: Dimensions of Insecurity. In B. Coppieters & R. Legvold (Eds.), *Statehood and Security: Georgia after the Rose Revolution* (pp. 39-81). Cambridge: American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
- Nodia, G. (2005b, 8 September). Georgia: Heading for a New Revolution? *RFE/RL*. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1061260.html>
- Novosti-Armenia. (2008, 28 November). V Gruzii Osushchestvlyayetsya Genotsid Armyanskovo Kulturnovo Naslediya. *Respublika Armeniya*. Retrieved from <http://www.ra.am/?num=2008112805 - 2008112805>
- Noyan Tapan. (1998, 30 January). Crisis Due to Ter-Petrosyan's "Defeatist" Policy, Intellectuals Say. *BBC Monitoring*. Retrieved from Nexis UK
- Noyan Tapan. (2001). Full text of Armenian president's Independence Day Address. Retrieved 16 June, 2009, from Nexis UK
- Nozick, R. (1974). *Anarchy, State and Utopia*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Nuriyev, E. (2007). *EU Policy in the South Caucasus: A View from Azerbaijan*. Brussels: CEPS.
- Nye, J. S. (1990). Soft Power. *Foreign Policy*(80), 153-171.
- Nye, J. S., Jr. (1987). Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes. *International Organization*, 41(3), 371-402.
- O'Lear, S. (2007). Azerbaijan's Resource Wealth: Political Legitimacy and Public Opinion. *The Geographical Journal*, 173(3), 207-223.
- Office of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic. (s.d.). Nagorno Karabakh Conflict. Retrieved 24 June, 2008, from http://www.nkrusa.org/nk_conflict/index.shtml
- Oliker, O. (2003). Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Implications of Foreign Interests and Involvement. In O. Oliker & T. S. Szayna (Eds.), *Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Implications for the U.S. Army* (pp. 185-240). Santa Monica: Rand Corporation.

- Onuf, N. (1994). The Constitution of International Society. *European Journal of International Law*, 5, 1-19.
- Orudzhev, G. (2003). Azerbaijan's National Minorities Today. *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, (22). Retrieved from http://www.ca-c.org/online/2003/journal_eng/cac-04/18.orueng.shtml
- OSCE/ODIHR. (2008a). *Georgia Extraordinary Presidential Election 5 January 2008: OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report*. Warsaw: OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.
- OSCE/ODIHR. (2008b). *Georgia Parliamentary Elections 21 May 2008: OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report*. Warsaw: OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.
- OSCE/ODIHR. (2008c). *Republic of Armenia Presidential Election 19 February 2008: OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission*. Warsaw: OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.
- Oskanian, V. (1998, 8 October). Address by Vartan Oskanian, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, to the Permanent Council Meeting of the OSCE. Retrieved 4 April, 2008, from http://www.armeniaforeignministry.com/speeches/981008osce_vienna.html
- Oskanian, V. (1999). Statement by H.E. Vartan Oskanian, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, at the EAPC Meeting, Brussels, 16 December 1999. Retrieved 5 December, 2008, from http://www.armeniaforeignministry.com/htms/speeches/st_eapc_brussels.html
- Oskanian, V. (2005). Statement by Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian in Armenian National Assembly hearings on resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Retrieved 3 April, 2009, from http://www.armeniaforeignministry.com/speeches/050329_vo_ana_nk.html
- Oskanian, V. (2007). Statement by H.E. Vartan Oskanian at the 62nd Session of the UN General Assembly. Retrieved 5 December, 2008, from http://armeniaforeignministry.com/speeches/071003_osk_un.html
- Ossetia.ru. (2006, 12 October). Severnaya i Yuzhnaya Osetiya Potrebuyut Priznat Genotsid Osetin. Retrieved 13 October, 2009, from <http://www.ossetia.ru/news/prizn-genoz>
- Otte, T. G. (2007). The Boxer Uprising and British Foreign Policy: The End of Isolation. In R. Bickers & R. G. Tiedemann (Eds.), *The Boxers, China and the World* (pp. 157-178). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Oye, K. A. (1985). Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies. *World Politics*, 38(1), 1-24.
- PACE. (2008). *The Implementation by Armenia of Assembly Resolutions 1609 (2008) and 1620 (2008)*. Retrieved from <http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/APFeaturesManager/defaultArtSiteView.asp?ID=831>.
- Palmer, J. (2006, 24 June). Toward a European Commonwealth: Beyond Enlargement. *The International Herald Tribune*. Retrieved from Nexis UK

Panarmenian.net. (2008, 27 November). Azeri President Actually Denounced Moscow Declaration. *Panarmenian.net*. Retrieved from <http://www.panarmenian.net/news/eng/?nid=27832>

Panorama.am. (2008, 23 April). Ucheniyi: Armyanskii Vopros - Eto Vopros Bezopastnosti. Retrieved 5 May, 2008, from <http://www.panorama.am/ru/politics/2008/04/23/ayvazyan2/?sw>

Panossian, R. (2002). The Irony of Nagorno-Karabakh: Formal Institutions versus Informal Politics. In J. Hughes & G. Sasse (Eds.), *Ethnicity and Territory in the Former Soviet Union: Regions in Conflict* (pp. 143-164). Oxford: Frank Cass.

Papazian, T. (2006). From Ter-Petrosian to Kocharian: Explaining Continuity in Armenian Foreign Policy. *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*, 14(2), 235-251.

Parsons, R. (2006, 21 February). Analysis: Putin Seeks to Draw Azerbaijan Back Into Russian Orbit. Retrieved 26 March, 2009, from <http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1066011.html>

Patsuria, N. (2010, 17 May). Can Georgia Find the Backdoor for Exports to Russia. *Eurasianet.org*. Retrieved from <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61079>

Paul, R. A. (2000). Grassroots Mobilization and Diaspora Politics: Armenian Interest Groups and the Role of Collective Memory. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 6(1), 24-47.

Pavliuk, O., & Klympush-Tsintsadze, I. (Eds.). (2004). *The Black Sea Region: Cooperation and Security Building*. London: M.E. Sharpe.

Peimani, H. (1999). *Iran and the United States: The Rise of the West Asian Regional Grouping*. Westport: Praeger Publishers.

Pentikäinen, O., & Trier, T. (2004). *Between Integration and Resettlement: The Meskhetian Turks*. Flensburg: European Centre for Minority Issues.

Perovic, J. (2005). From Disengagement to Active Economic Competition: Russia's Return to the South Caucasus and Central Asia. *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*, 13(1), 61-86.

Peuch, J.-C. (2004a). Analysis: Separatist Region Goes to the Polls in Georgia. Retrieved 22 September, 2009, from <http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1055127.html>

Peuch, J.-C. (2004b, 4 November). Georgia: Failure of Abkhaz Mediation Talks Deepen Moscow's Quandary. *RFE-RL*. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1055701.html>

Peuch, J.-C. (2005, 13 January). Bagapsh Set for Landslide Victory in Abkhazia. *RFE-RL*. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1056830.html>

Peuch, J.-C. (2007, 14 November). Caught Between Russia and Georgia, South Ossetia Rift Widens. Retrieved 12 September, 2009, from <http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1079132.html>

Podvig, P. (2002). History and the Current Status of the Russian Early-Warning System. *Science and Global Security*, 10, 21-60.

- Polyakov, E. (2001). *Changing Trade Patterns after Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus*. Washington: World Bank.
- Posen, B. R., & Ross, A. L. (1996). Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy. *International Security*, 21(3), 5-53.
- Postel, S. L., & Wolf, A. T. (2001). Dehydrating Conflict. *Foreign Policy*, 126, 60-67.
- Potier, T. (2001). *Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia: A Legal Appraisal*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- Pouliot, V. (2007). "Subjectivism": Towards a Constructivist Methodology. *International Studies Quarterly*, 51, 359-384.
- Presidentrso.ru. (2008). Kratkie Svedeniya iz Istorii Yuzhnykh Osetin. Retrieved 23 September, 2009, from <http://www.presidentrso.ru/republic/history.php>
- Presse, A. F. (2001). Azerbaijani President Criticizes Mediators in Talks with Armenia. Retrieved 5 March, 2008, from Nexis UK
- Priego, A. (2009). The Southern Azerbaijan Question and Its Implications for Iranian National Identity. *Azerbaijan in the World*, II(7). Retrieved from <http://ada.edu.az/biweekly/issues/vol2no7/20090406025632009.html>
- Prime-Tass. (2009, 31 August). President: South Ossetia wants to Create Union State with Russia. Retrieved 3 October, 2009, from Nexis UK
- Public Television of Armenia. (2004, 28 June). I am Proud to Have Fought for Karabakh, Armenian President Says. *BBC Monitoring*. Retrieved from Nexis UK
- Public Television of Armenia. (2005, 25 November). President Kocharyan Says Armenia May Recognize Karabakh. *BBC Monitoring*. Retrieved from Nexis UK
- Public Television of Armenia. (2006). Armenian President Urges Karabakh's Integration into World Community. *BBC Monitoring*. Retrieved from Nexis UK
- Public Television of Armenia. (2008, 1 April). Armenian Leader Threatens to Recognise Breakaway Azeri Region. *BBC Monitoring*. Retrieved from Nexis UK
- Pukhayev, K. (2006, 1 November 2006). K Voprosu o Genotside. *Yuzhnaya Osetiya*. Retrieved from <http://ugo-osetia.ru/6.97/6.97-5.html>
- Putin, V. (2005). Russia at the Turn of the Millennium. In A. Melville & T. Shakleina (Eds.), *Russian Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and Realities* (pp. 221-234). New York: Central European University Press.
- Rapoport, A. (Ed.). (1974). *Game Theory as a Theory of Conflict Resolution*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
- Regnum. (2008, 11 April). Recognition of Nagorno Karabakh Independence by Armenia Looks Logical and Justified: Interview with Hayk Kotanjian. Retrieved 5 July, 2008, from <http://www.regnum.ru/english/983635.html>
- Regnum. (2009, 22 May). V Abkhazii Nablyudetsya Tendentsya Rosta Antirossiiskikh Nastroenii: Intervyu Lidera Partii ERA Beslana Butby. Retrieved 29 June, 2009, from <http://www.regnum.ru/news/1166546.html>

- Republic of Armenia. (1990). *Declaration of Independence*. Retrieved from <http://www.armeniaforeignministry.com/htms/doi.html>.
- Republic of Armenia. (2001). *Results of Census of Republic of Armenia 2001*. Retrieved from <http://docs.armstat.am/census/pdfs/52.pdf>.
- Republic of Armenia. (2007a). *The Military Doctrine of the Republic of Armenia*. Retrieved from <http://www.mil.am/eng/index.php?page=104>.
- Republic of Armenia. (2007b). *Republic of Armenia National Security Strategy*. Retrieved from <http://www.mil.am/eng/index.php?page=49>.
- Republic of Azerbaijan. (2002). *The Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan*. Retrieved from http://www.president.az/print.php?item_id=&sec_id=52.
- Republic of Azerbaijan. (2007). *National Security Concept of the Republic of Azerbaijan*. Retrieved from <http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Azerbaijan2007.pdf>.
- Republic of Azerbaijan. (2008a). *Azerbaijan-Georgia Relations*. Retrieved from <http://mfa.gov.az/eng/downloads/bilateral/Georgia.pdf>.
- Republic of Azerbaijan. (2008b). Bibliotheka. Retrieved 5 March, 2009, from http://www.mns.gov.az/publications_ru.html
- Republic of Georgia. (2005). *National Security Concept of Georgia*. Retrieved from http://www.mfa.gov.ge/print.php?gg=1&sec_id=24&info_id=37&lang_id=ENG.
- Republic of Georgia. (2009). *National Concept for Tolerance and Civic Integration*. Retrieved from http://www.diversity.ge/files/files/National_Concept_Eng_ADOPTED.pdf.
- Republic of Georgia. (s.d.). Office of the State Minister for Reintegration: Mission Statement. Retrieved 6 September, 2009, from http://www.smr.gov.ge/en/about_ministry
- Republican Party of Armenia. (2009). Kusaktsutyun Patmutyunits. Retrieved 2 June, 2009, from http://www.hhk.am/arm/index.php?page=history_hhk
- Respublika Armeniya. (2008, 15 February). Vazhneishee Dostizhenie Poslednikh Let - Vosstanovleniye Doveriya. *Respublika Armeniya*. Retrieved from <http://www.ra.am/?num=2008021318>
- Reuters. (2008, 17 September). Russia Signs Treaty to Defend Georgia Separatists. *RFE-RL*. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1200807.html>
- Reynolds, P. (2008, 1 September). New Russian World Order: The Five Principles. Retrieved 25 March, 2009, from <http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/759161>
- RFE-RL. (2000, 13 July). How Unstable is Western Georgia. *Caucasus Report*. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1341951.html>
- RFE-RL. (2001, 25 January). Caucasus: Armenia and Azerbaijan Join Council of Europe. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1095594.html>
- RFE-RL. (2003, 2 June). Labor Leader Urges Support for Georgian Minority in Azerbaijan. *RFE-RL Newslines*. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1142927.html>

RFE-RL. (2008, 26 June). Do Azerbaijan's Ethnic Minorities Face Forced Assimilation? *RFE-RL Commentary*. Retrieved from http://www.rferl.org/content/Azerbaijan_Ethnic_Minorities_Forced_Assimilation/1145552.html

RFE-RL. (2009, 18 August). Journalist, Rights Activist Dies in Azerbaijani Jail. Retrieved 15 September, 2009, from <http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1802552.html>

RFE-RL. (2010, 1 February 2010). Georgia Satellite Channel Claims Kremlin Pressure Took It Off the Air. Retrieved 5 February 2010, from http://www.rferl.org/content/Georgia_Satellite_Channel_Claims_Kremlin_Pressure_Took_It_Off_The_Air/1945639.html

RIA Novosti. (2008a, 11 January). Georgians Back NATO Membership in Referendum. Retrieved 20 January, 2009, from <http://en.rian.ru/world/20080111/96285713.html>

RIA Novosti. (2008b, 26 August). Russia Recognizes Georgia's Breakaway Republics. Retrieved 30 July, 2009

RIA Novosti. (2010, 26 July 2010). Majority of Georgians Disapprove of Country's Policy towards Russia - Poll. Retrieved 31 July, 2010, from <http://en.rian.ru/world/20100726/159958499.html>

Richter, J. (1996). Russian Foreign Policy and the Politics of National Identity. In C. A. Wallander (Ed.), *The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War* (pp. 69-93). Oxford: Westview Press.

Rieber, A. J. (2007). How Persistent Are Persistent Factors? In R. Legvold (Ed.), *Russian Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century and the Shadow of the Past* (pp. 205-278). New York: Columbia University Press.

Rieff, D. (1997). Nagorno-Karabakh: Case Study in Ethnic Strife. *Foreign Affairs*, 76(2), 118-133.

Robbins, P. (2003). *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War*. London: Hurst & Co.

Robins, P. (1993). Between Sentiment and Self-Interest: Turkey's Policy toward Azerbaijan and the Central Asian States. *Middle East Journal*, 47(4), 593-610.

Roe, P. (2004). Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization. *Security Dialogue*, 35(3), 279-294.

Roks, Y. (2007, 22 May). Monastirskii Konflikt. *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, p. 6.

Rondeli, A. (1998). Security Threats in the Caucasus: Georgia's View. *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, 3(2). Retrieved from <http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume3/June-August1998/SECURITYTHREATSINTHECAUCASUS.PDF>

Rossia3.ru. (2008). Glas Kavkaza: Obrashchenie Lezginskovo i Avarskovo Narodov Protiv Gosudarstvennovo Azerbaidzhanskovo Fashizma. Retrieved 15 September, 2009, from <http://www.rossia3.ru/politics/foreign/lezgin>

Rotar, I. (1998). Mingrelia: Georgia's New "Hot Spot"? *Prism*, 4(8).

Rotberg, R. I. (2002a). Failed States in a World of Terror. *Foreign Affairs*, 81, 127-140.

- Rotberg, R. I. (2002b). The New Nature of Nation-State Failure. *The Washington Quarterly*, 25(3), 85-96.
- Rotberg, R. I. (2003). Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators. In R. I. Rotberg (Ed.), *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror* (pp. 1-24). Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
- Rotberg, R. I. (Ed.). (2004). *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Ruggie, J. G. (1993). Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations. *International Organization*, 47(1), 139-174.
- Ruggie, J. G. (1997). The Past as Prologue?: Interests, Identity, and American Foreign Policy. *International Security*, 21(4), 89-125.
- Russia & CIS General Newswire. (2008a, 5 September). CSTO Slams Georgia over S. Ossetia Operation. Retrieved 31 March, 2009, from Nexis UK
- Russia & CIS General Newswire. (2008b, 5 September). CSTO Slams Georgia over S. Ossetia Operation - Part 2. Retrieved 31 March, 2009, from Nexis UK
- Russia & CIS General Newswire. (2008c, 18 September). S. Ossetia, Abkhazia not Precedents for Settling Transdnistria, Karabakh Conflicts - Lavrov. Retrieved 9 December, 2008
- Russia & CIS Presidential Bulletin. (2008a, 21 August). Aliyev Calls for Normalisation of Situation in Georgia. Retrieved 5 June, 2009, from Nexis UK
- Russia & CIS Presidential Bulletin. (2008b, 1 September). Medvedev Names Russia's Five Key Foreign Policy Principles. Retrieved 5 March, 2009, from Nexis UK
- Russian Federation. (1998, 10 November). Handout for Foreign Ministry Press Briefing. *Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast*. Retrieved from Nexis UK
- Russian Federation. (2003). *Energeticheskaya Strategiya Rossii na Period do 2020 Goda*. Retrieved from <http://www.energystrategy.ru/projects/es-2020.htm>.
- Russian Federation. (2005a). Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (1993). In A. Melville & T. Shakleina (Eds.), *Russian Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and Realities* (pp. 27-64). New York: Central European University Press.
- Russian Federation. (2005b). Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (2000). In A. Melville & T. Shakleina (Eds.), *Russian Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and Realities* (pp. 89-103). New York: Central European University Press.
- Russian Federation. (2005c). National Security Concept of the Russian Federation (2000). In A. Melville & T. Shakleina (Eds.), *Russian Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and Realities* (pp. 129-146). New York: Central European University Press.
- Russian Federation. (2008, 12 July 2008). The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. Retrieved 5 March, 2009, from <http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml>
- Russian Federation. (2009). *Strategiya Natsionalnoi Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii Do 2020 Goda*. Retrieved 11 November, 2009, from <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html>

Rustamov, R. (2008). Gruzija Prodolzhaet Ostabat'sya Dlya Azerbaidzhana "Oknom b Mir". *Yuzhniyi Kavkaz: Regionalniy Analiticheskii Zhurnal*, 6(29). Retrieved from <http://www.caucasusjournalists.net/number.asp?idnumber=35>

Rustavi-2. (2007, 15 October). Georgian Orthodox Church Locked in Azerbaijan. *The Georgian Times*. Retrieved from <http://geotimes.ge/print.php?print=7270&m=news>

s.n. (2000, 14 March). Remarks by Security Council Secretary Sergei Ivanov Regarding Russia's National Security Concept at the Moscow State University of International Relations. *Official Kremlin International News Broadcast*. Retrieved from Nexis UK

s.n. (2008a, 14 February). Badri Patarkatsishvili. *The Telegraph*. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1578596/Badri-Patarkatsishvili.html>

s.n. (2008b, October). The Georgia Effect. *Defense & Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy* Retrieved 15 March, 2009, from Nexis UK

s.n. (2009a, 7 August). Abkhazia, S. Ossetia Will Never Be Part of Georgia. *Russia & CIS Military Weekly*. Retrieved from Nexis UK

s.n. (2009b). Opinion Poll: Extent of Popular Support for NATO Membership in the South Caucasus. *Caucasus Analytical Digest*(5).

s.n. (2009c, 7 August). S. Ossetia Will Never Abandon Independence - Kokoity. *Russia & CIS Military Weekly*. Retrieved from Nexis UK

Saakashvili, M. (2004a). Speech Delivered by President Mikheil Saakashvili at the Parade Dedicated to the Independence Day of Georgia Retrieved 21 April, 2009, from <http://www.president.gov.ge/?l=E&m=0&sm=3&st=190&id=151>

Saakashvili, M. (2004b). Speech delivered by the President Saakashvili at the meeting with members of Supreme Council of Abkhazia Retrieved 21 April, 2009, from <http://www.president.gov.ge/?l=E&m=0&sm=3&st=190&id=152>

Saakashvili, M. (2005a). Address by President Saakashvili at Independence Day Parade. Retrieved 21 April, 2009, from <http://www.president.gov.ge/?l=E&m=0&sm=3&st=170&id=145>

Saakashvili, M. (2005b). President Saakashvili Opens Georgian Section of BTC Pipeline. Retrieved 4 April, 2009, from <http://www.president.gov.ge/?l=E&m=0&sm=3&st=150&id=844>

Saakashvili, M. (2006a). Emergency Statement by President Saakashvili. Retrieved 4 April, 2009, from <http://www.president.gov.ge/?l=E&m=0&sm=3&st=130&id=1365>

Saakashvili, M. (2006b). President Saakashvili's Comments on Pipeline Explosion to BBC News. Retrieved 4 April, 2009, from <http://www.president.gov.ge/?l=E&m=0&sm=3&st=150&id=844>

Saakashvili, M. (2006c). Public Appearance of the President of Georgia Michael Saakashvili at the Presentation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceykhan Oil Pipeline. Retrieved 4 April, 2009, from <http://www.president.gov.ge/?l=E&m=0&sm=3&st=100&id=1967>

Saakashvili, M. (2006d). Remarks by President Saakashvili at the Security Council Meeting. Retrieved 4 April, 2009, from <http://www.president.gov.ge/?l=E&m=0&sm=3&st=150&id=844>

- Saakashvili, M. (2007a). President Saakashvili Addresses Nation During State of Emergency, Proposes Snap Presidential Election for 5 January 2008. Retrieved 11 April, 2009, from <http://www.president.gov.ge/?l=E&m=0&sm=3&st=50&id=2394>
- Saakashvili, M. (2007b). President Saakashvili announces agreement with Azerbaijan on Davit Gareji monastery complex. Retrieved 5 December, 2008, from http://www.president.gov.ge:80/print_txt.php?id=2220&l=E
- Saakashvili, M. (2008). The President of Georgia Addressed Abkhazian and Ossetian Population with Peace Initiative. Retrieved 10 April, 2009, from <http://www.president.gov.ge/?l=E&m=0&sm=3&st=30&id=2597>
- Sadegh-Zadeh, K. (2008). Iran's Strategy in the South Caucasus. *Caucasian Review of International Affairs*, 2(1), 35-41.
- Sampford, C., Shacklock, A., Connors, C., & Galtung, F. (Eds.). (2006). *Measuring Corruption*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Sarkisyan, A. (2009, 8 July). Logika Karabakhskovo "Uregulirovaniya". 7 Or. Retrieved from <http://www.7or.am/?p=print&lang=ru&pp=newsview&newsid=4320>
- Sattarov, R. (2004). Islam as a Political Factor in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan. *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, (28). Retrieved from http://www.ca-c.org/online/2004/journal_eng/cac-04/01.sateng.shtml
- Scott, A. M. (1982). *The Revolution in Statecraft: Intervention in an Age of Interdependence*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Senghaas, D. (1973). Conflict Formations in Contemporary International Society. *Journal of Peace Research*, 10(3), 163-184.
- Sezer, D. B. (1997). From Hegemony to Pluralism: The Changing Politics of the Black Sea. *SAIS Review*, 17(1), 1-30.
- Sezer, D. B. (2000). Turkish-Russian Relations: The Challenge of Reconciling Geopolitical Competition with Economic Partnership. *Turkish Studies*, 1(1), 59-82.
- Shaffer, B. (2002). *Borders and Brethren: Iran and the Challenge of Azerbaijani Identity*. Cambridge: The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
- Shearman, P. (1997). Defining the National Interest: Russian Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics. In R. E. Kanet & A. V. Kozhemiakin (Eds.), *The Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation* (pp. 1-27). Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Shinn, D. H. (2002). *Somaliland: The Little Country that Could*. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies.
- Shirinyan, A. (2008). Armenia and Georgia - Mediated Neighborhood. *South Caucasus Monthly Analytical Magazine*, 3(26). Retrieved from <http://www.caucasusjournalists.net/ENG/item.asp?id=231>
- Shnirelman, V. A. (2001). *The Value of the Past: Myths, Identity and Politics in Transcaucasia*. Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology.
- Sidikov, B. (2004). New or Traditional? "Clans", Regional Groupings and State in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan. *Berliner Osteuropa Info*(21), 68-74.

- Simonyan, Y. (2009, 22 May). Abkhzskaya Oppozitsiya Opasaetsya Assimilatsii. *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*. Retrieved from <http://www.ng.ru/printed/226498>
- Simpson, G. (2004). *Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- SIPRI. (2008). *SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Skocpol, T. (1985). Bringing the State Back In: Current Research. In P. B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer & T. Skocpol (Eds.), *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, B. (2004). Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World. *American Journal of Political Science*, 48(2), 232-246.
- Smith, G. (1999). The Masks of Proteus: Russia, Geopolitical Shift and the New Eurasianism. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series*, 24(4), 481-494.
- Smith, S. (2000). Wendt's World. *Review of International Studies*, 26, 151-163.
- SNARK New Agency. (1997, 29 September). Armenian President Says Independence for Karabakh "Unrealistic". *BBC Monitoring*. Retrieved from Nexis UK
- Snidal, D. (1985a). Coordination versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes. *The American Political Science Review*, 79(4), 923-942.
- Snidal, D. (1985b). The Game Theory of International Politics. *World Politics*, 38(1), 25-57.
- Snidal, D. (1991). Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation. *The American Political Science Review*, 85(3), 701-726.
- Socor, V. (2006). Armenia Selling More Infrastructure, Industry to Russia. *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 3(206).
- Socor, V. (2007). Georgian Flag Raised over Akhalkalaki. *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 4(128). Retrieved from http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=32841
- Sopinska, J. (2009). Eastern Partnership: Moscow Accuses EU of Expanding Sphere of Influence. *Europolitics New Neighbours*.
- States News Service. (2008, 29 December). Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov's Article "Russian Foreign Policy and a New Quality of Geopolitical Situation" for Diplomatic Yearbook 2008. Retrieved 5 June, 2009, from Nexis UK
- Stepanyan, D. (2009, 19 June). Having Forced Armenians from Javakhk, Georgia Will Lose this Region. *Arminfo*. Retrieved from <http://www.arminfo.info/index.php?show=article&id=16482>
- Strand, H., Wilhelmsen, L., & Gledits, N. P. (2003). *Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook*. Oslo: PRIO.
- Suganami, H. (2002). On Wendt's Philosophy: A Critique. *Review of International Studies*, 28, 23-37.

- Suleymanov, E. (2006). *Khojaly Genocide (in documents, facts and foreign press)*. Baku: A&ZS.
- Suny, R. G. (1993). *Looking toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History*. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- Suny, R. G. (1994). *The Making of the Georgian Nation*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Suny, R. G. (1996). The Emergence of Political Society in Georgia. In R. G. Suny (Ed.), *Transcaucasia, Nationalism, and Social Change: Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia* (pp. 109-140). Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Suny, R. G. (2001). Constructing Primordialism: Old Histories for New Nations. *Journal of Modern History*, 73(4), 862-896.
- Suny, R. G. (2007). Living in the Hood. In R. Legvold (Ed.), *Russian Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century and the Shadow of the Past* (pp. 35-76). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Suzuki, S. (2008). Seeking 'Legitimate' Great Power Status in Post-Cold War International Society: China's and Japan's Participation in UNPKO. *International Relations*, 22(1), 45-63.
- Swietochowski, T. (1996). National Consciousness and Political Orientations in Azerbaijan, 1905-1920. In R. G. Suny (Ed.), *Transcaucasia, Nationalism, and Social Change: Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia* (pp. 211-234). Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Swietochowski, T. (2004). *Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920: The Shaping of a National Identity in a Muslim Community*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tabrizli, A. (1989). *Histoire du Daglig (Haut-) Gharabagh A La Lumière de Documents Historiques*. Strasbourg: Association Culturelle Azerbaïdjanaise.
- Taliaferro, J. W. (2004). *Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Tamrazian, H. (1997, 29 August). Armenia/Russia: Landmark Treaty Includes Provision for Mutual Defense. *RFE-RL*. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1086156.html>
- Tarock, A. (1997a). Iran and Russia in 'Strategic Alliance'. *Third World Quarterly*, 18(2), 207-223.
- Tarock, A. (1997b). Iran's Policy in Central Asia. *Central Asian Survey*, 16(2), 185-200.
- Taureck, R. (2005). Book Review: Barry Buzan and Øle Wæver, *Regions and Powers*. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 34(1), 283-285.
- Ter-Petrosyan, L. (1994, 21 September). Khosq Hayasdani Ankakhutyan 3-rt Taredartsin Nvirvats Entunelutyan Zhamanak. Retrieved 5 July, 2008, from <http://www.levonforpresident.am/?catID=41&contID=101>
- Ter-Petrosyan, L. (1995). Decree by the Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrossian. Retrieved 3 April, 2008, from <http://www.arf.am/English/history/004history.htm>

- Ter-Petrosyan, L. (1996). Yeluyt Nakhentrakan Hanrahavaq Handipmane Hanrepetutyán Hraparakum. Retrieved 5 December, 2008, from <http://www.levonforpresident.am/?catID=41&contID=95>
- Ter-Petrosyan, L. (1997). Paterazm, te Khaghaghutyun? Lrjanalu Pahe. Retrieved 16 April, 2009, from <http://www.levonforpresident.am/?catID=41&contID=90>
- Ter-Petrosyan, L. (2007a, 8 December). History, Ideology, Typology: An Address by Levon Ter-Petrosian at the December 8, 2007 Rally in Freedom Square, Yerevan. Retrieved 5 July, 2008, from <http://www.levonforpresident.am/?catID=39&contID=85>
- Ter-Petrosyan, L. (2007b). A Time for Plain Speaking and Calling to Account. Retrieved 15 May, 2009, from <http://www.levonforpresident.am/?lang=eng>
- Ter-Petrosyan, L. (2008). Levon Ter-Petrosyani Yeluyte Hay Azgayin Kongresi Arajin Hamajoghovum. Retrieved 15 May, 2009, from <http://www.levonforpresident.am/?catID=20&contID=409>
- Ter-Petrosyan, L. (2009a, 1 May). Critical Juncture: The Speech of Levon Ter-Petrosian at the Rally of 1 May, 2009. Retrieved 5 July, 2009, from <http://www.levonforpresident.am/?lang=eng>
- Ter-Petrosyan, L. (2009b, 29 May). Levon Ter-Petrosian's Speech at the Rally on May 29, 2009. Retrieved 1 July, 2009, from <http://www.levonforpresident.am/?lang=eng>
- Teryan, A. (2003). Armenian President Says Armenians, Azerbaijanis 'Ethnically Incompatible'. *RFE-RL Caucasus Report*. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/content/Article/1341802.html>
- Teymurkhanliy, F. (2008, 15 August). Stanet Li Gruzinskii Primer Zarazitelnyum? *Zerkalo*. Retrieved from <http://old.zerkalo.az/print.php?id=35164>
- Teymurkhanliy, F. (2009, 7 May). I Gruzuya Idet Po Stopam Armenii? *Zerkalo*. Retrieved from <http://www.zerkalo.az/?sec=readarchive&id=41659>
- The Economist. (2008a, 16 August). The Dangers of the Safe Route. *The Economist*, 388, 25.
- The Economist. (2008b). Waiting and Watching. *The Economist*, 388(8594), 46.
- The Financial. (2008). Russian Owned Madneuli Plans New Investments in Georgia. *The Financial*. Retrieved from http://www.finchannel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=18978&Itemid=18
- The Messenger. (2008a, 8 April). Prime Minister under Fire for Kosovo Remarks. *The Messenger*. Retrieved from http://www.messenger.com.ge/issues/1583_april_8_2008/1583_gurgenidze.html
- The Messenger. (2008b, 19 February). Saakashvili Warns against 'Provocations' after Kosovo. *The Messenger*. Retrieved from http://www.messenger.com.ge/issues/1549_february_19_2008/1549_kosovo.html
- The Messenger. (2009, 26 June). Georgian-Armenian Relations Should Develop without Third-Party Involvement. *The Messenger*. Retrieved from http://www.messenger.com.ge/issues/1884_june_26_2009/1884_edit.html

- The World Bank Group. (2008). World Development Indicators Database. Retrieved 29 December 2008, from The World Bank Group:
- Thomas, G. M., & Meyer, J. W. (1984). The Expansion of the State. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 10, 461-482.
- Thorun, C. (2009). *Explaining Change in Russian Foreign Policy: The Role of Ideas in Post-Soviet Russia's Conduct towards the West*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Tilly, C. (1975). Reflections on the History of European State-Making. In C. Tilly (Ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (pp. 3-83). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Tilly, C. (1985). War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. In P. B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer & T. Skocpol (Eds.), *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tilly, C. (1990). *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD990-1990*. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell.
- Tishkov, V. (2005). Russia as a European Nation and Its Eurasian Mission. *Russia in Global Affairs*, 3(4), 84-100.
- Today.az. (2008a, 27 August). Lala Shovket: "Independence and Sovereignty of Azerbaijan Means Nothing to the Kremlin Leaders, Who Are Ready to Come with Arms in Their Hands to Our Houses, Like They Did in Georgia.". Retrieved 6 June, 2009, from <http://www.today.az/print/news/politics/47240.html>
- Today.az. (2008b, 4 September). Mubariz Ahmedoglu: "Turkey's Current Steps Remind of Iran's Actions in 1992, Which Rescued Armenia". Retrieved 5 June, 2009, from <http://www.today.az/print/news/politics/47395.html>
- Topchishvili, R. (2005). *Ob Osetinskoi Mifologeme Istorii: Otzyv na Knigu "Osetiya i Osetiny"*. Tbilisi: Ena Da Kultura.
- Torbakov, I. (2007). *Making Sense of the Current Phase of Turkish-Russian Relations*. Washington: The Jamestown Foundation.
- Torbakov, I., & Ojanen, H. (2009). *Looking for a New Strategic Identity: Is Turkey Emerging as an Independent Regional Power*. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs.
- TRACECA. (2010). Traceca Today. Retrieved 20 March, 2010, from <http://www.traceca-org.org/default.php?l=en>
- Trenin, D. (2002). *The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border between Geopolitics and Globalization*. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Trenin, D. (2005). Russia, the EU and the Common Neighbourhood. *Centre for European Reform Essays*. Retrieved from http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/essay_russia_trenin_sept05.pdf
- Trenin, D. (2009). Russia Spheres of Interest, not Influence. *The Washington Quarterly*, 32(4), 3-22.
- Trofimenko, H. (1999). *Russian National Interests and the Current Crisis in Russia*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

- Tselyuko, V. (2008). Force Development and Armed Forces of Georgia under Saakashvili. *Moscow Defence Brief*, (3). Retrieved from <http://www.mdb.cast.ru/mdb/3-2008/item3/article2/?form=print>
- Tsygankov, A. P. (1997). From International Institutionalism to Revolutionary Expansionism: The Foreign Policy Discourse of Contemporary Russia. *Mershon International Studies Review*, 41(2), 247-268.
- Tsygankov, A. P. (2003). Mastering space in Eurasia: Russia's Geopolitical Thinking after the Soviet Break-up. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 36, 101-127.
- Tuminez, A. S. (1996). Russian Nationalism and the National Interest in Russian Foreign Policy. In C. A. Wallander (Ed.), *The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War* (pp. 41-68). Oxford: Westview Press.
- UNGA. (2008). *General Assembly Adopts Resolution Reaffirming Territorial Integrity of Azerbaijan, Demanding Withdrawal of All Armenian Forces*. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/ga10693.doc.htm>.
- United States Department of State. (2009). *United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership*. Retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/113762.htm>.
- United States Department of State. (2011a). 2010 Human Rights Report: Armenia Available from <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160447.pdf>
- United States Department of State. (2011b). 2010 Human Rights Report: Azerbaijan Available from <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160448.pdf>
- United States Department of State. (2011c). 2010 Human Rights Report: Georgia Available from <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160457.pdf>
- UPI. (2008). Russia, Abkhazia in Talks over Naval Base. Retrieved from http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2008/11/13/Russia_Abkhazia_in_talks_over_naval_base/UPI-93291226613035/
- USA. (1998). *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*.
- USA. (2002). *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*.
- USA. (2006). *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*.
- Vakil, S. (2006). Iran: Balancing East against West. *The Washington Quarterly*, 29(4), 51-65.
- Valiyev, A. (2005). Azerbaijan: Islam in a Post-Soviet Republic. *The Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 9(4). Retrieved from <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2005/issue4/jv9no4a1.html>
- Valiyev, A., & Valiyev, Y. (2005). Azerbaijan-Georgia Relations Put to the Test. *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, 6(2), 3-4.
- Van Aartsen, J. (2009). *Activity Report September 2007 - February 2009: European Coordinator, Project of European Interest Nr. NG3*. Brussels: European Union.
- Van Creveld, M. L. (1999). *The Rise and Decline of the State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Van der Leeuw, C. (1999). *Oil and Gas in the Caucasus: A History*. Richmond: Curzon.

- Vardanyan, A. (2007, 11 September). U Nas Opyat Yest Chto Razrushat? *Golos Armenii*. Retrieved from http://www.golos.am/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13745&Itemid=54
- Vartanian, A. (2004). On the Evolution of Iranian Policies in the Southern Caucasus. *Central Asia and the Caucasus*(25), 133-135.
- Väyrynen, R. (1984). Regional Conflict Formations: An Intractable Problem of International Relations. *Journal of Peace Research*, 21(4), 337-359.
- Velichko, V. L. (1990). *Russkoe Delo i Mezhduplemennyie Voprosyi* (Vol. 1). Baku: Elm.
- Vignansky, M. (2007, 8 November). The Opposition in Georgia Could Be Even More Pro-Western. *What The Papers Say Part A (Russia)*. Retrieved from Nexis UK
- Vinci, A. (2008). Anarchy, Failed States and Armed Groups: Reconsidering Conventional Analysis. *International Studies Quarterly*, 52, 295-314.
- Volkhonskii, M. A., Zakharov, V. A., & Silayev, I. Y. (2008). *Konflikty v Abkhazii i Yuzhnoi Osetii: Dokumenty 1989-2006 gg.* Moscow: Russkaya Panorama.
- Wæver, Ø. (1989). Conflicts of Vision: Visions of Conflict. In Ø. Wæver, P. Lemaitre & E. Tromer (Eds.), *European Polyphony: Perspectives Beyond East-West Confrontation* (pp. 186-224). London: Macmillan.
- Wæver, Ø. (1998). Insecurity, Security and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community. In E. Adler & M. Barnett (Eds.), *Security Communities* (pp. 69-118). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wæver, Ø. (2002). Identity, Communities and Foreign Policy. In L. Hansen & Ø. Wæver (Eds.), *European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States*. London: Routledge.
- Wæver, Ø., Kelstrup, M., & Lemaitre, P. (Eds.). (1993). *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*. London: Pinter Publishers.
- Walker, C. (2008). Azerbaijan's Growing Contradictions between Economic and Democratic Development: Testimony Prepared for Delivery, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Available from <http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/CSCETestimony072908.pdf>
- Wallerstein, I. (1984). *The Politics of the World-Economy: The States, the Movements, and the Civilizations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Walt, S. M. (1996). *Revolution and War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Reading: Addison-Wesley.
- Waltz, K. N. (1993). The Emerging Structure of International Politics. *International Security*, 18(2), 44-79.
- Watson, A. (2007). *Hegemony and History*. London: Routledge.
- Way, L. A., & Levitsky, S. (2006). The Dynamics of Autocratic Coercion after the Cold War. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 39, 387-410.

- Weber, M. (1984). Legitimacy, Politics and the State: Politics as a Vocation. In W. Conolly (Ed.), *Legitimacy and the State* (pp. 32-62). Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publisher Ltd.
- Weinstein, A. (2007). Russian Phoenix: The Collective Security Treaty Organization. *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, 8(1), 167-180.
- Weinstein, J. M., Porter, J. E., & Eizenstat, S. E. (2004). *On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. National Security*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development.
- Weinstein, M. A. (2004, 29 September). Armenia: The Dream of Complementarity and the Reality of Dependency. *Eurasia Insight*. Retrieved from http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp092904_pr.shtml
- Wendt, A. (1987). The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory. *International Organization*, 41(3), 335-370.
- Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics. *International Organization*, 46(2), 391-425.
- Wendt, A. (1994). Collective Identity Formation and the International State. *The American Political Science Review*, 88(2), 384-396.
- Wendt, A. (1995). Constructing International Politics. *International Security*, 20(1), 71-81.
- Wendt, A. (1998). On Constitution and Causation in International Relations. *Review of International Studies*, 24, 101-118.
- Wendt, A. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wheatley, J. (2004). *Obstacles Impeding the Regional Integration of the Javakheti Region of Georgia*. Tbilisi: European Centre for Minority Issues.
- Wheatley, J. (2005). *Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution: Delayed Transition in the Former Soviet Union*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Wheatley, J. (2009). *The Integration of National Minorities in the Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli Provinces of Georgia: Five Years into the Presidency of Mikheil Saakashvili*. Flensburg: European Centre for Minority Issues.
- Wheeler, N. J. (2002). *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Whitmore, B. (2009, 3 August). Faded Rose: Can Georgia's Democratic Dream Be Revived? *RFE/RL*. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1791536.html>
- Wight, M. (1977). *Systems of States*. Leicester: Leicester University Press.
- Wight, M. (1995). *Power Politics*. New York: Leicester University Press.
- Wild, D. B. (2008, 2 April). NATO: Secretary General Takes Action to Defuse MAP Flap. *Eurasia Insight*. Retrieved from Nexis UK
- Wilhelmsen, J. (2009). Islamism in Azerbaijan: How Potent? *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 32(8), 726-742.

- Wilkinson, C. (2007). The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitisation Theory Useable Outside Europe? *Security Dialogue*, 38(1), 5-25.
- Williams, M. C., & Neumann, I. B. (2000). From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia and the Power of Identity. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 29(2), 357-387.
- Winrow, G. (2004). Turkey and the East-West Gas Transportation Corridor. *Turkish Studies*, 5(2), 23-42.
- Winrow, G. (2009). *Turkey, Russia and the Caucasus: Common and Diverging Interests*. London: Chatham House.
- Yamakov, A. N. (1991). Ethnic Conflict in the Transcaucasus: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh. *Theory and Society*, 20(5), 631-660.
- Yannis, A. (1999). State Collapse and its Implications for Peace-Building and Reconstruction. *Development and Change*, 33(5), 817-835.
- Yazdani, E. (2006). Competition over the Caspian Oil Routes: Oilers and Gamers Perspective. *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, 5(1 & 2), 51-64.
- Zakarian, A. (2002). Majority Leader Blames 'External Forces' For Parliament Turmoil. Retrieved 5 December, 2008, from <http://www.armenialiberty.org/content/article/1567913.html>
- Zargaryan, R. (2009, 28 August). Paradoxes of Bakinskoi Politiki. *Defacto.am*. Retrieved from <http://defacto.am/index.php?name=news&op=view&id=660>
- Zassejeva, E. (2007). Genotsid Osetin 1920-go Goda v Istorii Moyei Semi. Retrieved 3 October, 2009, from http://osinform.ru/1707-genotsid_osein_1920-go_goda_v_istorii_moej_semji.html
- Zehfuss, M. (2002). *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Zhorzholiani, G., Lekishvili, S., Mataradze, L., Toidze, L., & Khoshtaria-Brosset, E. (1995). *Historic, Political and Legal Aspects of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict*. Tbilisi: Samshoblo.
- Zhorzholiani, G., Lekishvili, S., Toidze, L., & Khoshtaria-Brosset, E. (1995). *Historic, Political and Legal Aspects of the Conflict in Abkhazia*. Tbilisi: Georgian Academy of Sciences.
- Zourabichvili, S. (2009, 21 January). *Chatham House Roundtable Summary: The Georgian Challenge and the New US Administration, Europe and Russia*, London.
- Zverev, A. (1996). Ethnic Conflicts in the Caucasus 1988-1994. In B. Coppieters (Ed.), *Contested Borders in the Caucasus* (pp. 13-72). Brussels: VUB Press.
-