



## UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository)

### Where to draw the line? Climate change-conflict-migration-terrorism causal relations and a contested politics of implication

Telford, A.

**DOI**

[10.1016/j.envsci.2023.01.001](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2023.01.001)

**Publication date**

2023

**Document Version**

Final published version

**Published in**

Environmental Science & Policy

**License**

CC BY

[Link to publication](#)

**Citation for published version (APA):**

Telford, A. (2023). Where to draw the line? Climate change-conflict-migration-terrorism causal relations and a contested politics of implication. *Environmental Science & Policy*, (141), 138-145. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2023.01.001>

**General rights**

It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

**Disclaimer/Complaints regulations**

If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: <https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact>, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.

*UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam (<https://dare.uva.nl>)*



Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

# Environmental Science and Policy

journal homepage: [www.elsevier.com/locate/envsci](http://www.elsevier.com/locate/envsci)

## Where to draw the line? Climate change-conflict-migration-terrorism causal relations and a contested politics of implication

Andrew Telford

University of Amsterdam, Bushuis, Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam, the Netherlands

### ARTICLE INFO

#### Keywords:

Climate change  
Causality  
Terrorism  
Implicature  
Migration

### ABSTRACT

This paper explores the politics of epistemological claims which link climate change, conflict, migration and terrorism in causal relationships. The paper contends that attempts to establish such causal relationships in conditions of empirical complexity are characterised by a contested politics of implication. Drawing on a critical discourse analysis of a UN Security Council debate on climate security (December 9, 2021), and the concept of linguistic implicature (referring to the non-explicit, inferential meanings which can follow from language use), the paper traces two logics which could suggest a politics of racial implication in climate security discourses: first, a compulsive climatic determinism which roots risks of terrorist violence in climate-affected populations; and second, a logic of proxy geographies in which dehumanisation could be implicated through natural world metaphors. Overall, this paper seeks to provide an understanding of how the inferential meanings associated with claims linking climate change, migration, conflict and terrorism could constitute potentially unequal outcomes in climate security politics and policymaking.

### 1. Introduction

On November 4th, 2021, as world leaders gathered for the United Nations (UN) Conference of Parties (COP) in Glasgow, a new collaboration was announced between the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (NASTART), Pool RE Solutions (a reinsurance company specialising in terrorism risk), and the International Forum for Terrorism Risk Reinsurance Pools (IFTRIP). Based at the University of Maryland, this consortium conducts research on the links between climate change and terrorism (NASTART, 2021). These debates are not new, and a growing literature documents the potential causal relationships between climate change, migration, conflict, and terrorism (Adelphi, 2017; Asaka, 2021; Renard, 2008; Siddiqi, 2014; Silke and Morrison, 2022; Spadaro, 2020). This paper argues that claims about the causal relationships between these phenomena could, through the non-explicit meanings suggested by these statements, reproduce racialised power dynamics in climate security politics.

To make this argument, I draw on the concept of political implicature: an idea used to describe the inferential meanings implied by particular uses of language (e.g. metaphors or analogies), but which are not necessarily explicitly stated, the more implicit, subtextual or 'implicated' meanings conveyed in language use. I argue that two different linguistic devices – modal verbs and natural world metaphors –

could implicate racialised meaning in two different, yet interrelated, ways: 1) a *compulsive determinism* in which climate-affected populations have little choice but to resort to terrorism, and 2) *proxy geographies* which dehumanise climate-affected communities through the use of natural world metaphors ('breeding grounds' and 'fertile grounds').

To unpack this argument, the paper first provides an overview of climate security literatures, with a focus on debates on causality in this field. Second, it introduces the theoretical framework of pragmatics, specifically the concept of political implicature, followed by a methodological account of a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of a recent UN Security Council (UNSC) debate (December 9, 2021) on climate change and terrorism. Third, the paper documents two logics – a compulsive climatic determinism and proxy geographies – which could suggest a contested politics of racial implication in climate security debates. Finally, the paper reflects on the policy dimensions of a politics of racial implication, arguing that alongside epistemological debates about the empirical connections between climate change, conflict, migration and terrorism, it is important to examine the context-dependent implicatures which could follow from these epistemological claims.

### 2. Climate security and complex causation

Speaking at the UN Security Council on the security implications of

E-mail address: [a.j.telford@uva.nl](mailto:a.j.telford@uva.nl).

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2023.01.001>

Received 28 February 2022; Received in revised form 31 October 2022; Accepted 2 January 2023

Available online 24 January 2023

1462-9011/© 2023 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>).

climate change (Dec 9, 2021), Secretary-General António Guterres stated that ‘the climate emergency is the vital issue of our time’. Highlighting a range of issues exacerbated by the effects of climate change, including conflict, displacement, terrorism and food insecurity, Guterres noted that ‘all of this undermines global peace, security and prosperity’. Guterres’ arguments are not new, and speak to an increasingly prevalent conversation about the security implications of climate change. A wide range of political actors, from national security and defence institutions (Schwartz and Randall, 2003; US Department of Defense, 2021), to think tanks (Centre for Naval Analyses, 2014) and NGOs (Christian Aid, 2021), are in broad agreement that climate change impacts threaten the security of human societies and ecosystems.

Climate insecurity can be defined as ‘the conditions under which the effects of climate variability and/or change are represented as threatening to a group of threatened actors’ (Mason, 2014, p. 807). A significant body of critical scholarship has also developed on climate security discourses (Boyce et al., 2019; Detraz and Betsill, 2009; Dupont, 2019; Gilbert, 2012; Oels, 2013; Von Lucke et al., 2014). Climate security is characterised by epistemological difficulties in establishing causality between different factors, including, amongst other factors, rainfall variation, temperature changes, food insecurity, displacement, and violent conflict (Mach et al., 2019; Nordås and Gleditsch, 2007; Salehyan, 2014; Selby, 2014).

One of the most visible examples of these difficulties relates to the Syrian Conflict. An oft-repeated argument suggests that a drought in the late 2000s in Syria led to rural-urban migration to Syrian cities, that this increased frustration with the Assad government’s economic and agricultural policies, and that this backdrop contributed to the grievances behind the 2011 demonstrations and outbreak of war (Gleick, 2014; Kelley et al., 2015). However, these claims are highly contested (De Châtel, 2014; Fröhlich, 2016; Selby, 2019). Selby et al. (2017) argue that there is no substantive evidence to conclude that climate change was a causal factor in the outbreak of conflict in Syria. Other factors, including political economic inequalities linked to ineffective agricultural management and liberalisation of fuel subsidies, and poor governance reinforced by Ba’athist ideology, compounded vulnerability to environmental variability in Syria (Feitelson and Tubi, 2017; Daoudy, 2021). Ide (2018) argues that evidence for the different stages which link climate change to the conflict remains uncertain, with a majority of studies supporting the claim of rural-urban migration and clear evidence of an unusually strong drought, but uncertainty as to the extent to which this can be linked to climate change. There is general agreement that the Assad regime’s violent response to the 2011 demonstrations is the primary cause of the conflict (Ide, 2018).

A related literature has also explored the implications of climate change for individual and communal political violence (Fjelde and von Uexkull, 2012; Vestby, 2014). Salehyan and Hendrix (2014) postulate two causal pathways between climate change and participation in political violence. First is a neo-Malthusian model which suggests that resource scarcities could generate competition and communal violence over resources. Second is an opportunity costs model in which a decline in economic prosperity as a consequence of climate change impacts increases the likelihood of individuals participating in political violence. In a study of two typhoons in the Philippines (Bopha in 2012 and Haiyan in 2013), Walch (2018) argues that exposure to natural hazards could decrease recruitment to armed rebel groups, not only through disruption to such groups’ logistical operations, but also because increased government assistance and the presence of international humanitarian actors can make recruitment a riskier process. Exploring the links between climate change impacts and non-state armed groups (NSAGs), Adelphi (2017) argue that climate change can exacerbate conflict-affected environments (through a weakening of state authority over national territories and provision of alternative livelihood opportunities) which allow NSAGs to operate.

Mass et al. (2013) argue that large-scale environmental terrorism is unlikely to develop in the future, but note two pathways through which

this could take place: ‘evolution’, in which environmental resources are utilised by existing terrorist groups; and ‘emergence’, in which new organisations with novel ideologies and tactics emerge. Chalecki (2001, p. 3, original emphasis) defines environmental terrorism as ‘the unlawful use of force against in situ resources as to deprive populations of their benefit(s) and/or destroy other property’. In an in-depth study with 100 asylum seekers from 17 countries (including conflict-affected and drought-stressed regions), Kohler et al. (2019) argue that perpetrators used environmental terrorism in a variety of different ways, including contamination of water and reducing supplies of key resources, e.g. electricity infrastructure.

Reflecting on her ethnographic study with Islamist group *Jamaat-ud-Dawa* in the response to the 2010 floods in the Sindh region of Pakistan, Siddiqi (2014, p. 887) contends that while such groups did influence the post-disaster response, ‘the relationship between climatic disasters and such radical politics is not linear and requires a far more complex analysis’. In his evaluation of the literature on climate change-terrorism nexus, Asaka (2021) highlights that such linkages always involve complex feedback loops. As such, causal politics in climate security debates can involve a contested dynamic of attribution, locating responsibilities for complex, multi-causal phenomena with some actors and obscuring the culpability of others (Telford, 2020). Adopting an epidemiological framework for the related concept of climate-induced migration (CIM), Nicholson (2014) argues that the concept is characterised by a series of ‘symptoms’ or logical fallacies. These include a tendency to acknowledge the ontological complexity of climate change whilst simultaneously promoting the ‘climate migrant’ as a relatively stable ontological category, and also a tendency towards equivocation, for instance claims that ‘more dialogue’ is needed in the field (Nicholson, 2014). Instead of a focus on the causal dynamics of climate change and migration, Nicholson (2014) argues that policymakers should focus on rights violations against migrants in a more holistic sense. Nicholson’s (2014) arguments could also be extended to debates on climate change, conflict and terrorism, with a tendency towards equivocation and uncertain empirical conclusions in the field and the promotion of concepts, e.g. ‘climate conflict’, as relatively stable ‘ontological categories’ despite the presence of causal complexity and uncertainty.

Causal claims can also exacerbate unequal relations of power, including in climate security debates (Kurki and Suganami, 2012). For example, in the context of securitised CIM discourses, Baldwin (2013) argues that CIM is racialised in three respects: first, that migrants are naturalised using nature idioms (e.g. the assertion that migrants move due to natural forces); second, that with a ‘loss of status’ migrants are represented as excessive to a territorialised international order; and third, a state of ‘ambiguity’ in which migration is indeterminate, the product of incalculable, indefinable dynamics. In this context, fears for ‘our’ security are framed by a phenomenon of White affect (Baldwin, 2016): a social relation grounded in an affective fear of the climate-induced migrant as an emergent threat in a world of constant transformation. The climate-induced migrant, constructed as a figure that is *yet-to-come*, exists *in excess of* White, imperial, humanist and (neo) liberal norms, an *unknowable* entity (Baldwin, 2017). Bettini (2014, p. 191) argues that security discourses of climate migration create an image of dangerous migrants engaged in ‘bad circulation’, whilst Methmann and Rothe (2014) identify racialised, gendered imagery in an analysis of 140 EU and US climate security documents. This work is supplemented by the concept of a ‘climate terrorism assemblage’, in which Telford (2020) argues that causal claims about climate change and terrorism produce a contested politics of attribution and racialised, gendered subjectivities in contexts of climate insecurity (particularly of a frustrated, young masculine figure drawn towards terrorism). This paper further explores these ambiguities in causality, focusing on the ‘excesses’ of meaning which can follow from claims about causal relationships between climate change, conflict, migration and terrorism, what in this paper are called ‘implicatures’.

### 3. Climate security and racial implicature

In order to explore the possible racialised implicatures of climate security discourses, the paper draws upon pragmatics and the concept of linguistic implicature. Cameron (1998, p. 443) defines pragmatics as ‘the study of utterance interpretation’. Focusing on the inferential meanings which ‘go beyond’ the immediate semantic content of utterances, pragmatic devices, for example allusions, metaphors, presuppositions and implicatures, are central to political rhetoric (Wodak, 2007). Critical discourse analysis (CDA) accepts the indeterminacy of linguistic meaning, the openness to multiple interpretations of texts in their contexts (Flowerdew, 1999). This is not to claim that some interpretations may be more accurate or normatively preferable according to a particular set of criteria, but to state that inferences from texts, the implicatures that can derive from utterances, are not ‘fixed’ or waiting to be ‘discovered’ or ‘decoded’.

The concepts of ‘code words’ and ‘dogwhistles’ are key to the pragmatics of racialised discourses. Omi and Winant (1994, p. 123) define code words as ‘phrases and symbols which refer indirectly to racial themes, but do not directly challenge popular democratic or egalitarian ideals’. As Omi and Winant (1994) document, beginning with George Wallace’s presidential bid in 1968, code words, for example ‘inner city’ or ‘welfare queen’, have been a core part of American politics, carrying an implicit racist subtext without appearing to challenge democratic norms directly (Mendelberg, 2001). Khoo (2017) contends that the racial effects of code words are not essential to their semantic meaning, but rather a function of the pre-existing stereotypes and pragmatic inferences of audiences who hear or read these words. Haney-López, p. IX (2014) defines ‘dogwhistle politics’ as ‘coded racial appeals that carefully manipulate hostility towards nonwhites’. The politics of racial dogwhistling can involve three steps: first, using the dogwhistle with veiled references to the threat of nonwhites; second, denying racism by claiming that the dogwhistle makes no direct reference to particular groups; and third, alleging victimisation on the basis of no evidence (being identified as a racist) (Haney-López, 2014). Together, code words and racial dogwhistling explain how racist discourses can perpetuate through coded, subtle appeals as well as overtly discriminatory language.

This paper draws on the related concept of ‘implicature’. Van Dijk (2005, p. 65–6) defines political implicatures as ‘the specific political inferences that participants in the communicative situation ... may make on the basis of this speech and its context’. Focusing on Spanish parliamentary debate, van Dijk (2005) argues that political implicatures draw from three contextual sources: participants’ representations of discourse structure and its meanings (e.g. their representations of particular political issues), participants’ models (understanding) of the current communicative context (a debate, etc.), and participants’ general knowledge of the political context. As a concept, conversational implicatures are violations of one or more of Grice’s (1975) four maxims for effective communication: the quantity maxim (to not provide more or less information than is required), the quality maxim (to speak the truth), the relation maxim (to speak that which is relevant), and the manner maxim (to be clear in communication). Where meanings violate these principles of communicative efficiency (Grice’s ‘cooperative principle’), meanings are ‘implicated’. As Mustafa (2010) notes, implicature is an important means of cultural transfer and is common in devices such as irony, euphemism, and metaphor.

Key to understanding the politics of causal claims which connect climate change, conflict, migration and terrorism are the political implicatures which can follow from these epistemological claims, what in this paper is termed a politics of racial implication. This politics is comprised of two, interlocking aspects: first, attempts to draw causal ‘lines’ in the empirical complexity of these causal dynamics; and second, the indeterminate, potentially racialising, implicatures which may be constituted through these discursive practices. Unlike some accounts of code words or dogwhistles which assume a knowing audience that

surreptitiously interprets messages from an intentional communicator, a politics of racial implication does not make such assumptions of a fixed ‘audience’ or a singular ‘speaker’. Indeed, in writing about racial implicatures, this paper accepts ‘race’ as a floating signifier, a relational concept which is perpetually re-signified (Hall, 1996a). As Goldberg (1992) (p. 53) notes, ‘race’ is a ‘fluid, transforming, historically specific concept parasitic on social and theoretic discourses for the meaning it assumes at given historic moments’. ‘Race’ espouses context-specific meanings (e.g. biological assumptions based on skin colour, or cultural traits based on religious affiliation or cultural practices) and naturalises these to particular populations. Populations are therefore not inherently prone to climate-induced political violence, but are socially constructed as such: they are not ‘grounded in nature, but producing nature as a sort of guarantee of its truth’ (Hall, 1996b, p. 141).

In light of these clarifications, I argue that, although implicatures in climate security discourses are by definition indeterminate, racial implicatures are, to an extent, delimited by their *naturalising* implication. It is not necessarily the case that specific populations are naturalised with particular racist characteristics (e.g. African populations with a tendency towards terrorist violence), but rather that, because an utterance draws on a naturalising assumption, this could carry the implication of racialising a particular population when applied in that context. Such claims, when grounded in racialised discourses about climate-affected populations in Global South contexts, could justify racist policy outcomes, for example exclusionary border practices grounded colonial histories of subjugation and containment (Pallister-Wilkins, 2022). This paper explores the empirical context of the UN Security Council, focusing on racialising implicatures which could be suggested in utterances about the causal relationships between climate change, conflict, migration and terrorism.

### 4. Methods

Climate security was first debated in the UNSC in April 2007 at the behest of the then UK Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett; this was followed by a second debate in June 2011 instigated by Germany, after which a cautious presidential statement on the security implications of climate change was adopted (Landgren et al., 2021). From 2018 onwards, UNSC engagement with climate security has intensified, with six debates on this theme. My primary focus is the English transcription of a UNSC debate on ‘security in the context of terrorism and climate change’ (December 9th (UNSC, 2021a and, 2021b)), the first debate in this forum which addresses as its central concern the relationships between climate change and terrorism. The meeting was initiated by the Nigerien Presidency of the UNSC, and addressed by UN Secretary-General António Guterres, African Union Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat, and Mamman Nuhu, Executive Secretary of the Lake Chad Basin Commission and Head of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) (Security Council Report, 2021). In addition to the Nigerien Presidency, the debate was also addressed by fourteen national representatives and a European Union spokesperson. The meeting addressed the contested relationships between climate-related factors and political violence in the Lake Chad region (Ani and Uwizeyimana, 2020; Daoust and Selby, 2022), but was more broadly a general discussion of the relationships between climate change and terrorism. I also draw on two other UN-related utterances from political figures (Boris Johnson and Patricia Espinosa) on climate security and terrorism.

The December 9th debate (and related utterances) were selected as they are the first in the UNSC to specifically address the links between climate change and terrorism. I only draw on one debate to allow for an ingrained, in-depth analysis of the particular linguistic and pragmatic features of this exchange. The CDA consisted of two stages: a textual and then contextual stage. The textual stage involved two readings. The first reading involved highlighted any sections from the debate where claims are made about the causal relationships between climate change, conflict, migration and terrorism. The second reading focused in on these



highlighted sections of text to examine the specific linguistic devices employed. The specific linguistic devices I focused on draw on Wodak's (2007) and van Dijk's (2005) analyses for linguistic devices which are commonly associated with pragmatic (subtextual) meaning in political discourses. These include metaphors, analogies, pronoun usage, specific phrases or words (e.g. racial code words such as 'inner city'), and particular grammatical and stylistic features (for instance verb tense and particular uses of punctuation). As part of this second reading, I found that, in cases where the causal relationships between climate change, conflict, migration and terrorism are discussed, modal verbs and natural world metaphors were commonly utilised. Modal verbs are a kind of auxiliary verb associated with properties of possibility or necessity (for example verbs denoting what *may*, *will*, *could*, or *would* happen in different scenarios). Natural world metaphors make reference to phenomena associated with 'nature' or the 'natural world', for example the idea that terrorism could 'seed' in particular contexts, or representations of terrorists as 'parasites' or 'animals'.

As van Dijk (2005) notes, the political context is fundamental for the implicatures suggested by linguistic utterances. As such, in drawing out interpretations about the implicatures which could potentially follow from these linguistic devices, I drew on a range of secondary sources about the political context (including texts about climate security in the UNSC (Landgren et al., 2021), and texts about how linguistic devices, e.g. natural world metaphors (Hampl, 2019), are used in discourses about climate change and terrorism). From this two-stage analysis, I focused on two trends identified as part of the CDA: 1) a compulsive climatic determinism grounded in the use of modal verbs, and 2) proxy geographies suggested through natural world metaphors.

##### 5. A compulsive climatic determinism?

The first trend is that of a compulsive climatic determinism (implied through modal verbs) whereby climate-insecure populations are *assumed to be* (though this is not always *explicitly stated as such*) vulnerable towards acts of terrorist violence: that they exhibit an inevitable *compulsion* towards terrorist violence in conditions of climate insecurity. I argue that in discourses of present and future scenarios of climate insecurity, instead of adopting a range of adaptive strategies to respond to these circumstances (for example cooperative resource allocation, conflict resolution, improved education or livelihood diversification), climate-insecure populations *will* or are *likely to be* compelled towards and vulnerable to acts of (political) violence. To provide two examples from the UNSC December 9th debate, the first from Krzysztof Szczerski, Poland's Permanent Representative to the UN:

The nexus between climate change, poverty and terrorism is particularly visible in developing countries with fragile State institutions. Climate change ... will increasingly exacerbate conflicts over natural resources. That in turn opens the way for the infiltration of the vulnerable populations by terrorist organizations.

And second from Alar Karis, President of Estonia:

Climate change, as well as other forms of environmental degradation, prepare the ground for social instability, conflicts, terrorism and extremism ... We see conflicts for natural resources within and among States. We also see people who have become desperate due to the loss of their livelihoods, homes, loved ones or hope for a better future. That ... creates conditions for terrorist organizations to take advantage of the unstable situation and desperation of people. That is what we are also currently witnessing, for example, at the European borders.

In another example, Patricia Espinosa, the former executive secretary of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, interviewed by Fiona Harvey of *The Observer* ahead of COP26 (October 24th, 2021) (Harvey, 2018), states:

The catastrophic scenario would indicate that we have massive flows of displaced people ... It would mean less food, so probably a crisis in food security. It would leave a lot more people vulnerable to terrible situations, terrorist groups and violent groups. It would mean a lot of sources of instability.

In each of these examples, speakers assert relationships between climate change, resource scarcities, and vulnerability to terrorism. Karis argues that this is already happening, stating that climate changes 'prepare the ground' for 'conflicts, terrorism and extremism'. Karis' assertion that these causal relationships are evident in actually existing cases may be linked to the topic of the UNSC debate: on climate change and security in the Lake Chad region. Szczerski's comments assert a 'visible' connection between 'climate change, poverty, and terrorism', but are otherwise future-oriented: 'it will exacerbate conflicts over natural resources'. Espinosa's comments also draw upon future possibilities. Referring to a 'catastrophic scenario', she states that 'it would indicate that we have massive flows of displaced people' and 'it would leave a lot more people vulnerable to ... terrorist groups and violent groups'. Both Szczerski and Espinosa use modal verbs to construct their causal arguments: 'will' in the case of the former, and 'would' in the case of the latter. This choice could suggest a deterministic relationship whereby, in conditions of resource scarcity, populations rendered climate-insecure 'will' or 'would' be vulnerable to terrorist activity. 'Will' or 'would' leave little room for alternative forms of adaptive capacity and suggest a necessary vulnerability to, a compulsion towards, terrorist violence. In another example, this time from former UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson in an earlier UNSC debate on climate security (February 23rd, Johnson, 2021), he states:

Think of the young man forced onto the road when his home becomes a desert ... He goes to some camp, he becomes prey for violent extremists, people who radicalise him and the effects of that radicalisation are felt around the world.

All four speakers use language which indicates vulnerability among populations susceptible to terrorism: 'desperate' and 'desperation' from Karis, 'vulnerable' from Szczerski, and 'people vulnerable to terrible situations' from Espinosa. Johnson states that a young man would be 'prey' for 'violent extremists'. In all of these cases, vulnerability could imply a lack of agency on the part of 'vulnerable populations', that they will have little choice but to resort to violence in the face of these inevitable causal dynamics. Szczerski suggests that these populations will be susceptible to 'infiltration' from terrorist actors, implying little to no resistance or alternative. The causal factors which link climate change to terrorism vary in each of these examples, but they invariably involve conflict over resources, livelihood insecurity, and displacement. In arguing that modal verbs could implicate a deterministic logic, the meaning of these verbs does not explicitly denote that particular populations are more inevitably prone to terrorism than others. In terms of their explicit semantic content, 'will' and 'would' are simply verbs to signify future possibilities. However, when they are utilised in the context of climate insecurity and terrorism, they could implicate that particular climate-affected populations have little choice but to react with terroristic violence, that their actions are drawn inevitably towards these outcomes. As such, determinism is not explicit in the meaning of the modal verbs; rather it could be implicated in the racialisation of climate-affected populations through the use of such verbs in this context.

Karis, Szczerski and Johnson all draw on language pointing to fragile states in Global South contexts. Szczerski references 'developing states with fragile State institutions', and Karis refers to the situation currently being witnessed at 'European borders'. Johnson also implies a Global South context, referring to desertification, poverty and refugee encampments (drawing on racialised, gendered imagery of radicalised males in 'some camp' (Santos et al., 2018)). As Bettini (2015) notes, environmental discourse "has always been haunted by a fear of

dangerous, unruly populations in the “Global South.” ... This leads to apocalyptic talk, usually with a strong racial undercurrent, of hordes of refugees threatening “our” security” (Bettini, 2015). Building on critiques of racialised narratives of climate-induced migration from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region to Europe (Methmann and Rothe, 2014; Telford, 2018), Chaturvedi and Doyle (2015, p. 135) identify the figure of the ‘climate terrorist’ threatening the Global North in neo-Malthusian climate security discourses. Hartmann (2010) contends that environmental degradation has supplemented demographic anxiety in climate security discourses – the primary argument being a deterministic one: that climate changes increase food and water scarcities, that this generates resource competition and disputes, and that ‘climate refugees’ and ‘climate conflicts’ are the offspring of these impacts.

As Meierding (2016) notes, deterministic narratives of ‘climate conflict’ can localise responsibility for climate insecurities away from the climate injustices of western elites. Livingstone and b) (2015a) also warns against the *climate reductionism* of contemporary climate security debates. Climate reductionism reduces the causes of conflict to climate change, arguing for direct or near-direct causal relationships between climatic factors and the outbreak of political violence (Livingstone, 2015b). Attaching an overly deterministic role to the climate does not account for the complex socioeconomic and political causes of conflict and risks conclusions which negate human agency in these circumstances (Livingstone, 2015b). These conclusions, as Livingstone (2015b) warns, bear resemblance to theories of environmental determinism in early twentieth-century geography. Scholars such as Ellsworth Huntington argued that human beings living in temperate regions, with a more variable climate, have a more adaptable, productive work ethic than those who lived in tropical regions, who were characterised by a more idle, unproductive attitude towards labour (Keighren, 2015). Livingstone (2015b) argues that these conclusions, whether applied in a historical or contemporary context, risk what is essentially “racism under the guise of science”: a deterministic, naturalising discourse which attributes the superiority of some human beings over others to the geographic determinants of climate change.

I would not argue that the examples from the UNSC debate perpetuate a “racism under the guise of science”. However, if, when applied in this context, modal verbs could implicate that particular populations (almost always centred in non-Euroamerican, Global South contexts) are more likely to be associated with terrorism, this could naturalise this trait and hence racialise such populations. In doing so, the implicature would not only draw on a racist assumption about certain groups of people (sometimes named as ‘African’ or ‘Muslim’ migrants, for example) being particularly susceptible to terrorism, but also needs to be situated within broader histories of climatic determinism and neo-Malthusianism.

It is important to note that not all participants make deterministic claims in the debate. Ronaldo Costa Filho, the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the UN, states that ‘terrorism is not directly linked to climate change, and climate change cannot be seen through the security lens, disassociated from the systemic elements that cause it’. China and Russia have also long been skeptical of debate on climate change in the UNSC (on the basis that it is a sustainable development issue better addressed by other UN organs (Brown, 2021)). In a study of how Indian government officials view climate security discourse, Boas (2014) finds that a dominant perspective is of climate security as a Western strategy that locates climate insecurity in the Global South and detracts away from the mitigation obligations of Global North countries. The UNSC failed to reach agreement on a draft resolution after the December 9th debate (on integrating climate security into the UN’s conflict-prevention strategies); 12 voted in favour, 2 voted against (India and Russia), with one abstention (China) (UNSC Meetings Coverage, 2021). Other representatives from the December debate acknowledged that such causal links may exist, but are more hesitant to draw such inevitable connections. To take two examples, first Juan Ramón de la Fuente Ramírez, Mexico’s

Permanent Representative to the UN, and then from George Edokpa, Nigeria’s Deputy Permanent Representative:

We need to better understand the scientifically based contexts in which the effects of climate change may exacerbate the underlying causes that lead to the radicalization of individuals or groups and may even encourage the perpetration of terrorist act.

The adverse effects of climate change on communities, including the loss of livelihoods, hunger, poverty, inequality and migration, can often prompt clashes over resources that can create an enabling environment for terrorist groups.

Ramírez states that climate change ‘may exacerbate’ underlying causes which lead to ‘radicalization of individuals or groups’ and ‘may even’ encourage ‘terrorist acts’. ‘May’ suggests a lower degree of likelihood, openness to a wider set of adaptive possibilities in these causal relations. Edokpa states that effects of climate change on communities ‘can often’ prompt resource-based conflict, and ‘can create’ an enabling environment for ‘terrorist groups’. His use of ‘can’ as a modal verb could suggest a less deterministic relation, albeit one conditioned with the adverb ‘often’ which limits the range of possibilities in conditions of climate insecurity. ‘Can’ could also continue to suggest a deterministic relationship, but because the verb is less determined than ‘will’ or ‘would’ it still leaves space open for Edokpa to take a less defined position, to ‘hedge his bets’ so to speak.

Other speakers from Global South contexts, for example Thilmeeza Hussain, Permanent Representative to the UN from the Republic of Maldives, use more deterministic language. Hussain states that ‘we will face a future of increasing violence and the possible breakdown of societies ... resource contention, mass migrations and other consequences of our climate breakdown drive radicalization’. In drawing such connections, Hussain is echoing a longer history of Small Island States securitizing climate change in the UN Security Council (Brown, 2021). As opposed to a Global South context of violence and extremism impinging on the Global North, Hussain refers to the breakdown of societies in general. However, even if Hussain’s securitization of the existential demands of climate change is understandable, and she does not directly name particular populations, the deterministic causal relationship drawn between affected communities, violence and radicalization does still risk reinforcing the naturalizing assumptions of a politics of racial implication in the UNSC debate. What this analysis suggests for climate security policymakers is that not only are the empirical foundations of these causal claims important, but also the potential discursive implicatures that follow from them. Alongside modal verbs, I also argue that natural world metaphors referring to particular geographical spaces, for example ‘breeding grounds’ or ‘fertile grounds’, could act as racialising implicatures in climate security debates.

## 6. Natural world metaphors as proxy geographies

As Hampl (2019) notes, natural world metaphors are a prominent feature of terrorism discourses. These include references to terrorist actors as dangerous animals attacking populations, as ‘seeds’, ‘cancers’ or ‘plants’ which grow and need to be ‘weeded out’, and as ‘parasites’ which can spread and ‘infect’ vulnerable actors (Umar et al., 2020). Kruglanski et al. (2007) argue that epidemiological metaphors are regularly utilised in counterterrorism policies; here, the ‘agent’ refers to ideologies terrorists utilise, ‘hosts’ are populations ‘at-risk’ from radicalisation, and the ‘environment’ refers to broader conditions producing vulnerabilities in populations. Natural metaphors can ascribe terrorism a power which extends beyond human control, that it takes place ‘naturally’ in the absence of human intervention (Cameron, 2010). This analysis draws on two examples from the UNSC debate, first from Geraldine Byrne Nason, the Republic of Ireland’s Permanent Representative

to the UN, and second from Maurizio Massari, Italy's Permanent Representative to the UN:

We are seeing that the lack of adequate Government responses to increasingly frequent and extreme weather events can also weaken the social contract between citizens and the State ... In turn, situations of conflict exacerbated by climate change provide breeding grounds for such terrorist groups.

Climate change often exacerbates internal conflicts and induces part of the population to migrate. Those phenomena, even when they are not directly linked to international terrorism, contribute to creating fertile ground for violent extremism.

'Breeding grounds' and 'fertile ground' suggest a soil or earth that provides a substrate, the appropriate nutrients and environment to enable the living threat of terrorism to 'grow' and 'spread' (Hampl, 2019). In one respect, such metaphors could imply (implicate) a process of dehumanisation, both of the depersonified terrorist actors reduced to growing or breeding organisms (Umar et al., 2020), and of the human populations vulnerable to recruitment and influence from terrorist actors, lacking agency to resist such 'infection' or 'infiltration'. Boris Johnson's reference to 'young men' as 'prey' also draws on this kind of natural world metaphor. The notion of 'young men' as 'prey' suggests that they are vulnerable to being 'hunted', lacking the agency to resist recruitment by terrorist groups (Hampl, 2019). In these senses, dehumanisation echoes what Goldberg (2015, p. 48–9) calls "thingification", a context in which human beings are reduced to useable 'things': they are rendered "objects of pure control rather than the interlocutors of (sometimes contentious) relation". To an extent, the dehumanising effects of natural world metaphors in debates about climate change and terrorism echo the Orientalising of Global South contexts in the climate conflict literature more broadly (Siddiqi, 2022). As Siddiqi (2022) notes, part of the effect of (some) 'climate conflict' scholarship is to construct climate-affected communities as 'victims' who lack agency to respond to these dynamics, an approach which depersonifies subaltern actors and does not centre their lived experiences and knowledges of natural hazards in conditions of climate insecurity.

Part of the pragmatic (non-explicit, inferential) meaning of natural world metaphors lies in the fact that communities affected by the risk of terrorism, and the terrorist groups themselves, are not explicitly named. Nason identifies 'terrorist groups' and Massari 'international terrorism' and 'violent extremism', but specific terrorist actors are not named. As Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah (2005) argue, naming is an exercise of power: an exercise in assignation about what can be contingently known about a subject. In the natural world metaphors employed by Nason and Massari, 'breeding ground' and 'fertile ground', it is types of geographical space referred to, particular geographies characterised by their 'fertile' potential for the 'breeding' of terrorist groups and activities. Such metaphors are what in this paper I term 'proxy geographies': specific imagined geographies which racialise, but do not explicitly name the groups that are racialised as an effect of this geographical metaphor. The geographical space in this context, the 'breeding ground' or 'fertile ground', acts as a proxy for the specific population (communities in Global South contexts) that is racialised. As Said, 2003 contends, geographical spaces ('imagined geography') can be discursively constructed to house essentialised cultural differences and demarcate 'Us' from 'Them'. Geographical demarcations, e.g. 'West' and 'East', can reproduce notions of cultural superiority, including racist assumptions about populations and cultures as more 'violent', 'primitive', or 'backwards'. Places can be constituted as markers of racist violence (e.g. prisons and plantations): geographical spaces are imbued with racial meaning, co-constructed as sites of racial difference (McKittrick, 2011). In the case of natural world metaphors which are imagined geographies, it is the notion of *breeding* grounds, of *fertile* ground, which connotes the racialising, dehumanising potential of this implicature.

In the context of Africa, neo-Malthusian narratives of overpopulation can be traced to nineteenth-century European imperialism and settler colonialism, grounded in four specific suppositions (Verhoeven, 2011). First is the notion that African environments are overwhelmingly significant in defining human behaviours, acquiring a moral significance. A prominent example of this trend is the 'Heart of Darkness' metaphor: the notion of mysterious, deep-seated environments hidden in the interior of Africa which are difficult for Europeans to penetrate and colonise. The second supposition is that 'African' communities are poor environmental stewards, incapable of managing natural environments. Third is that mismanagement of natural environments and resources will inevitably lead to competition over scarce resources. Finally, Verhoeven (2011) traces the ways in which 'the environment' is classified as a 'neutral', 'apolitical' category in imperialist debates about colonisation in Africa, thus evading the fundamental violences of environmental degradation, poverty and resource appropriation by political elites. Each of these suppositions reinforces a colonial imaginary of Africa as a 'passive' space over which broader geopolitical conflicts are played out (Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen, 2018), an imaginary which corresponds with the metaphor of climate-affected communities and political contexts as a 'ground', 'soil' or 'garden' over which terrorism can 'grow' and 'spread'.

In the context of British colonialism, Davenport (1995) argues that the figure of the maternal body, epitomised in Queen Victoria, is crucial for understanding 19th century imperial expansion. Set against social inequality and narratives of urban crowding in Victorian Britain, colonies become a site of externalisation of reproduction, a feminised, fertile space for the cultivation of the Empire's imperial 'children' (Davenport, 1995). Malthusian discourses in this period conjured notions of the fertile 'land' or 'soil', of colonies as spaces which can be 'cultivated' as 'gardens' (Davenport, 1995). A concern about environmental degradation, fertility and overpopulation is also echoed in contemporary neo-Malthusian discourses (Sasser, 2018). As Hendrixson and Hartmann (2019) argue, concerns about high rates of fertility in the Global South combined with anxiety about an ageing population in the Global North justify social policy (e.g. family planning) interventions. When this populationist (Bhatia et al., 2020) logic is interpreted in the context of climate change, resource competition, and an excessive 'youth bulge' of frustrated males vulnerable to terrorist recruitment, neo-Malthusian logics could also justify repressive, militarised border and security policies (Ojeda et al., 2020). Set against these neo-Malthusian discourses, the proxy geography of a 'breeding ground' or 'fertile ground' implicates a gendered, racialised form of dehumanisation. On the one hand, communities and political contexts in Global South contexts are a fertile, fragile (feminised) substrate which is vulnerable to 'infiltration' by terrorist groups, and on the other hand terrorist groups are represented as aggressive (masculine) parasites taking advantage of and exploiting these passive communities.

Such implicatures, the pragmatic meanings which could be inferred from the metaphor as a linguistic device, are themselves grounded in neo-Malthusian histories (and presents) of racism, colonialism, and climate injustice. Another implication of such metaphors, as imagined geographies which work as racial proxies, is that the actors which are primarily responsible for climate change impacts, polluters in Global North contexts, are not explicitly named in climate security discourses (as is also the case in deterministic discourses). As such, investigating the potential implicatures in these utterances is not only about situating implicatures in their gendered and racialised contexts and understanding the racist policy outcomes which could follow from these implicatures, but also about naming the unequal political dynamics which produce securitised climate change responses in the first instance.

## 7. Policy implications

This paper has argued that the causal politics of climate change, conflict, migration and terrorism interconnections can also be



characterised as a contested politics of racial implication. Drawing on UN climate security discourses, the paper documents two logics: first, a *compulsive climatic determinism* suggested by implicatures linked to linguistic modality; and second, a logic of *proxy geographies* which, through natural world metaphors, implicates dehumanised populations that lack agency. In terms of the policy implications that this paper's analysis suggests, I argue that two, neither of which are novel in climate change politics, are of particular importance. The first relates to the performative effects of causal claims in climate security discourses. As McDonald (2013, p. 49, original emphasis) states: "discourses of climate security matter. They serve to define who is in need of protection from the threat posed by climate change; who is capable of providing this protection; and (crucially), what forms of responses to these threats might take". Importantly, not only do climate security discourses delimit conditions of possibility for effective policymaking in response to climate insecurities: they could also suggest context-specific implicatures, meanings implicated beyond the semantic content of political utterances, which inscribe unjust, racist systems of inequality in climate change politics. As such, policymaking responses, when reflecting on political utterances about the connections between climate change, conflict, migration and terrorism, should not only focus on the more explicit performative effects of these utterances, but also the more subtle, inferred and pragmatic implicatures that they may also signify. In the specific case of climatic determinism in UNSC debates, this means that 'we should be extremely cautious before assuming a straight-line progression from scarcity to conflict will ensue across Africa' (Brown et al., 2007, p. 1148–9, original emphasis).

Secondly, I echo other authors in exercising caution over causal analysis in climate security policymaking. Whether this involves jettisoning causal identification in the context of climate change-conflict-migration-terrorism relationships (Nicholson, 2014), or whether it involves careful, nuanced 'tracing' of context-specific causal relationships (production of careful, historicised causal narratives) (Suganami, 2008), such analyses should be conducted with caution. Indeed, in conditions of empirical complexity which reject causal explanations grounded in universal laws, as is almost always the case in world politics (Suganami, 2013), there are risks of causal demarcations which produce teleological 'origins' and obscure, behind an epistemological language of 'causation', the social and political contingencies of climate insecurity.

The contribution of this paper is to add the need for pragmatic analysis to this political exercise: discursive causal claims could reproduce a range of implicatures, including determinism and dehumanisation, which carry exclusionary and racist policy connotations. These could relate to policy decisions based on neo-determinist assumptions about the 'inevitability' of violence in particular populations (Judkins et al., 2008; Sluyter, 2003), or solutions which focus on security risks 'caused' by 'Global South' populations instead of on the primary responsibility for, and structural injustices which underpin, anthropogenic climate breakdown in 'Global North' contexts. In order to promote a climate security politics (and climate security policymaking) grounded in climate justice, it is therefore crucial to engage further with the contested politics of implication that underpins epistemological debates on climate insecurity.

#### Declaration of Competing Interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

#### Data Availability

All of the data drawn upon in the article are available in the reference list and the quotations used in the paper.

#### References

- Adelphi. (2017). Insurgency, Terrorism, and Organised Crime in a Warming Climate: Analysing the Links Between Climate Change and Non-state Armed Groups. (<https://climate-diplomacy.org/magazine/conflict/insurgency-terrorism-and-organised-crime-warming-climate-summary>).
- Ani, K.J., Uwizeyimana, D.E., 2020. Climate change and changing environmental insecurity in the Lake Chad Region. *J. Afr. Union Stud.* 9 (2), 65–88.
- Christian Aid. (2021). Climate change the world's greatest security threat says Christian Aid ahead of UN Security Council. *Mediacentre Christian Aid*. (<https://mediacentre.christianaid.org.uk/climate-change-the-worlds-greatest-security-threat-says-christian-aid-ahead-of-un-security-council/>).
- Asaka, J.O., 2021. Climate change – terrorism nexus? A preliminary review/analysis of the literature. *Perspect. Terror.* 15 (1), 81–92.
- Baldwin, W.A., 2013. Racialisation and the figure of the climate-change migrant. *Environ. Plan. A: Econ. Space* 45 (6), 1471–1490.
- Baldwin, W.A., 2016. Premeditation and white affect: climate change and migration in critical perspective. *Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr.* 41 (1), 78–90.
- Baldwin, W.A., 2017. Postcolonial futures: climate, race, and the yet-to-come. *Interdiscip. Stud. Lit. Environ.* 24 (2), 292–305.
- Bettini, G., 2014. Climate migration as an adaptation strategy: de-securitizing climate-induced migration or making the unruly governable? *Crit. Stud. Secur.* 2 (2), 180–195.
- Bettini, G. (2015, December 17). 'Climate migration' proved too political for the Paris agreement – and rightly so. *The Conversation*. (<https://theconversation.com/climate-migration-proved-too-political-for-the-paris-agreement-and-rightly-so-52133>).
- Bhatia, R., Sasser, J.S., Ojeda, D., Hendrixson, A., Nadimpally, S., Foley, E.E., 2020. A feminist exploration of 'populationism': engaging contemporary forms of population control. *Gender. Place Cult.* 27 (3), 333–350.
- Boas, I., 2014. Where is the South in security discourse on climate change? An analysis of India. *Crit. Stud. Secur.* 2 (2), 148–161.
- Boyce, G.A., Launius, S., Williams, J., Miller, T., 2019. Alter-geopolitics and the feminist challenge to the securitization of climate policy. *Gender. Place Cult.* 27 (3), 394–411.
- Brown, O. (2021, February 27). Episode 1: The UNSC's role in addressing climate related security risks. *Climate Diplomacy Podcast*. (<https://climate-diplomacy.org/magazine/cooperation/climate-diplomacy-podcast>).
- Brown, O., Hammill, A., McLeman, R., 2007. Climate change as the 'new' security threat: implications for Africa. *Int. Aff.* 83 (6), 1141–1154.
- Cameron, D., 1998. "Is there any Ketchup, Vera?" Gender, power, and pragmatics. *Discourse Soc.* 9 (4), 437–455.
- Cameron, L., 2010. Responding to the risk of terrorism: the contribution of metaphor. *DELTA* 26, 587–614.
- Centre for Naval Analyses Military Advisory Board. (2014). *National Security and the Accelerating Risks of Climate Change*. ([https://www.cna.org/cna\\_files/pdf/MAB\\_5-8-14.pdf](https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/MAB_5-8-14.pdf)).
- Chalecki, E.L. (2001). *A New Vigilance: Identifying and Reducing the Risks of Environmental Terrorism*. (<https://pacinst.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/21/2013/02/environmental-terrorism-final.pdf>).
- Chaturvedi, S., Doyle, T., 2015. Climate Terror: A Critical Geopolitics of Climate Change. Palgrave.
- Daoudy, M., 2021. Rethinking the climate-conflict nexus: a human-environmental-climate security approach. *Glob. Environ. Polit.* 21 (3), 4–25.
- Daoust, G., Selby, J., 2022. Understanding the politics of climate security policy discourse: the case of the Lake Chad Basin. *Geopolit. Adv.* <https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2021.2014821>.
- Davenport, R., 1995. Thomas Malthus and maternal bodies politic: gender, race, and empire. *Women's Hist. Rev.* 4 (4), 415–439.
- De Châtel, F., 2014. The role of drought and climate change in the Syria uprising: untangling the triggers of the revolution. *Middle East. Stud.* 50 (4), 521–535.
- Detraz, N., Betsill, M.M., 2009. Climate change and environmental security: for whom the discourse shifts? *Int. Stud. Perspect.* 19 (3), 461–476.
- Dupont, C., 2019. The EU's collective securitisation of climate change. *West Eur. Polit.* 42 (2), 369–390.
- Eriksson Baaz, M., Verweijen, J., 2018. Confronting the colonial: the (re)production of 'African' exceptionalism in critical security and military studies. *Secur. Dialogue* 49 (1–2), 57–69.
- Feitelson, E., Tubi, A., 2017. A main driver or an intermediate variable? Climate change, water and security in the Middle East. *Glob. Environ. Polit.* 44, 39–48.
- Fjelde, H., von Uexkull, N., 2012. Climate triggers: rainfall anomalies, vulnerability and communal conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Political Geogr.* 31 (7), 444–453.
- Flowerdew, J., 1999. Description and interpretation in critical discourse analysis. *J. Pragmat.* 31 (8), 1089–1099.
- Fröhlich, C.J., 2016. Climate migrants as protestors? Disspelling misconceptions about global environmental change in pre-revolutionary Syria. *Contemp. Levant.* 1 (1), 38–50.
- Gilbert, E., 2012. The militarization of climate change. *ACME: Int. E-J. Crit. Geogr.* 11 (1), 1–14.
- Gleick, P., 2014. Water, drought, climate change and conflict in Syria. *Weather Clim. Soc.* 6 (3), 331–340.
- Goldberg, D.T., 1992. The semantics of race. *Ethn. Racial Stud.* 15 (4), 543–569.
- Goldberg, D.T., 2015. Are We All Postracial Yet? Polity Press.
- Grice, H.P., 1975. Logic and conversation. In: Cole, P., Morgan, J.L. (Eds.), *Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech Acts*. Academic Press, pp. 41–58.
- Hall, S. (1996a). Race, the Floating Signifier. Media Education Foundation Interview. (<https://www.mediaed.org/transcripts/Stuart-Hall-Race-the-Floating-Signifier-Transcript.pdf>).



- Hall, S., 1996b. The rediscovery of ideology: return of the oppressed in media studies. In: Story, J. (Ed.), *Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: A Reader*. Routledge, pp. 124–155.
- Hampfl, M., 2019. Now is the time to root out evil”: the role of natural world metaphors in the construction of the “Us” and “Them” dichotomy. *Brno Stud. Engl.* 45 (1), 57–74.
- Haney-López, I., 2014. *Dog Whistle Politics: Strategic Racism, Fake Populism, and the Dividing of America*. Oxford University Press.
- Hartmann, B., 2010. Rethinking climate refugees and climate conflict: rhetoric, reality and the politics of policy discourse. *J. Int. Dev.* 22 (2), 233–246.
- Harvey, F. (2018, October 24). Cop26: ‘World conflict and chaos’ could be the result of summit failure. *The Observer*. (<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/oct/24/world-conflict-and-chaos-could-be-the-result-of-a-summit-failure>).
- Hendrixson, A., Hartmann, B., 2019. Threats and burdens: challenging scarcity-drive narratives of “over-population”. *Geoforum* 101, 250–259.
- Ide, T., 2018. Climate war in the middle east? Drought, the Syrian civil war and the state of climate-conflict research. *Curr. Clim. Change Rep.* 4, 347–354.
- Johnson, B. (2021). PM Boris Johnson’s address to the UN Security Council on Climate and Security: 23 February 2021. (<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-boris-johnsons-address-to-the-un-security-council-on-climate-and-security-23-february-2021>).
- Judkins, G., Smith, M., Keys, E., 2008. Determinism within human–environment research and the rediscovery of environmental causation. *Geogr. J.* 174 (1), 17–29.
- Keighren, I., 2015. Environmental determinism. In: Wright, J.D. (Ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*. Elsevier, pp. 720–725.
- Kelley, C.P., Mohtadi, S., Cane, M.A., Seagar, R., Kushnir, Y., 2015. Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian drought. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.* 112 (11), 3241–3246.
- Kho, B., 2017. Code words in political discourse. *Philos. Top.* 45 (2), 33–64.
- Kohler, C., dos Santos, C.D., Bursztyn, M., 2019. Understanding environmental terrorism in times of climate change: Implications for asylum seekers in Germany (Article). *Res. Glob.* 1, 100006. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resglo.2019.100006>.
- Kruglanski, A.W., Crenshaw, M., Post, J.M., Victoroff, J., 2007. What should this fight be called? Metaphors of counterterrorism and their implications. *Psychol. Sci. Public Interest* 8 (3), 97–133.
- Kurki, M., Suganami, H., 2012. Towards the politics of causal explanation: a reply to the critics of causal enquiries. *Int. Theory* 4 (3), 400–429.
- Landgren, K., Thompson, S.K., Romita, P., Entelis, A., Woldegerima, D.Y., Sesar, V., Waisse, A., Jenkins, T., Knutson, L., Blainey, M., Schupp, R., Villanti, B., Haven, A., Saad, R., & Salloum, S. (2021). *The UN Security Council and Climate Change*. Security Council Report. ([https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/climate\\_security\\_2021.pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/climate_security_2021.pdf)).
- Livingstone, D.N. (2015a, December 4). Stop Saying Climate Change Causes War. *Foreign Policy Magazine*. (<https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/04/stop-saying-climate-change-causes-war-paris-cop-21-bernie-sanders/>).
- Livingstone, D.N., 2015b. The climate of war: climate, warfare, and climatic reductionism. *Wiley Interdiscip. Rev.: Clim. Change* 6 (5), 437–444.
- Mach, K.J., Kraan, C.M., Adger, W.N., Buhaug, H., Burke, M., Fearon, J.D., Field, C.B., Hendrix, C.X., Maystadt, J., O’Loughlin, J., Roessler, P., Scheffran, J., Schultz, K.A., von Uexkull, N., 2019. Climate as a risk factor for armed conflict. *Nature* 571, 193–197.
- Mason, M., 2014. Climate insecurity in (Post)Conflict areas: the biopolitics of United Nations vulnerability assessments. *Geopolitics* 19 (4), 806–828.
- Mass, A., Comardicea, I., Bodó, B., 2013. Environmental terrorism – a new security challenge? In: Mass, A., Bodó, B., Burnley, C., Comardicea, I., Roffey, R. (Eds.), *Global Environmental Change: New Drivers for Resistance, Crime and Terrorism?* Nomos.
- McDonald, M., 2013. Discourses of climate security. *Political Geogr.* 33, 42–51.
- McKittrick, K., 2011. On plantations, prisons, and a black sense of place. *Soc. Cult. Geogr.* 12 (8), 947–963.
- Meierding, E., 2016. Disconnecting climate change from conflict: a methodological proposal. In: Dalby, S., O’Leary, S. (Eds.), *Reframing Climate Change: Constructing Ecological Geopolitics*. Routledge.
- Mendelberg, T., 2001. *The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the Norm of Equality*. Princeton University Press.
- Methmann, C., Rothe, D., 2014. Tracing the spectre that haunts Europe: the visual construction of climate-induced migration in the MENA region. *Crit. Stud. Secur.* 2 (2), 162–179.
- Mustafa, M.S., 2010. The Interpretation of Implicature: A Comparative Study between Implicature in Linguistics and Implicature in Journalism. *J. Lang. Teach. Res.* 1 (1), 35–43.
- Nadarajah, S., Sriskandarajah, D., 2005. Liberation Struggle or Terrorism? The Politics of Naming the LTTE. *Third World Q.* 26 (1), 87–100.
- National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. (2021). Climate change: Fuelling terror and extremism. (<https://www.start.umd.edu/news/climate-change-fueling-terror-and-extremism>).
- Nicholson, C.T.M., 2014. Climate change and the politics of causal reasoning: the case of climate change and migration. *Geogr. J.* 180 (2), 151–160.
- Nordås, R., Gleditsch, N.P., 2007. Climate change and conflict. *Political Geogr.* 26 (6), 627–638.
- Oels, A., 2013. Rendering climate change governable by risk: From probability to contingency. *Geoforum* 45, 17–29.
- Ojeda, D., Sasser, J.S., Lunstrum, E., 2020. Malthus’s spectre and the Anthropocene. *Gender. Place Cult.* 27 (3), 316–332.
- Omi, M., Winant, H., 1994. *Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to 1990s*. Routledge.
- Pallister-Wilkins, P., 2022. *Humanitarian Borders: Unequal Mobility and Saving Lives*. Verso.
- Renard, P.R., 2008. Heated terror: exploration of the possible impacts of climate change on the causes and the targets of terrorism. *Les. Cah. du RMES* 5 (1), 15–53.
- Said, E., 2003. *Orientalism* [1978]. Penguin.
- Salehyan, I., 2014. Climate change and conflict: making sense of disparate findings. *Political Geogr.* 43, 1–5.
- Salehyan, I., Hendrix, C.S., 2014. Climate shocks and political violence. *Glob. Environ. Change* 28, 239–250.
- Santos, R., Roque, S., Santos, S.J., 2018. De-securitising ‘the South in the North’? Gendered narratives on the refugee flows in the European mediascape. *Contexto Int.* 40 (3), 453–477.
- Sasser, J.S., 2018. *On Infertile Ground: Population Control and Women’s Rights in the Era of Climate Change*. New York University Press.
- Schwartz, P., & Randall, D. (2003). *An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and its Implications for United States National Security*. US Department of Defense. (<http://www.gbn.com/articles/pdfs/Abrupt%20Climat%20Change%20February%202004.pdf>).
- Security Council Report. (2021, December 8). Climate Change and Terrorism: High-level Open Debate. What’s in Blue. (<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2021/12/climate-change-and-terrorism-high-level-open-debate.php>).
- Selby, J., 2014. Positivist climate conflict research: a critique. *Geopolitics* 19 (4), 829–856.
- Selby, J., 2019. Climate change and the Syrian civil war, part II: the Jazira’s agrarian crisis. *Geoforum* 101, 260–274.
- Selby, J., Dahi, O.S., Fröhlich, C., Hulme, M., 2017. Climate change and the Syrian civil war revisited. *Polit. Geogr.* 60, 253–255.
- Siddiqi, A., 2014. Climatic disasters and radical politics in Southern Pakistan: the non-linear connection. *Geopolitics* 19 (4), 885–910.
- Siddiqi, A., 2022. The missing subject: enabling a postcolonial future for climate conflict research. *Geogr. Compass* 16 (5), e12622.
- Silke, A., Morrison, J., 2022. Gathering storm: an introduction to the special issue on climate change and terrorism. *Terror. Polit. Violence* 34 (5), 883–893.
- Sluyter, A., 2003. Neo-environmental determinism, intellectual damage control, and nature/society science. *Antipode* 35, 813–817.
- Spadaro, P.A., 2020. Climate change, environmental terrorism, eco-terrorism and emerging threats. *J. Strateg. Secur.* 13 (4), 58–80.
- Suganami, H., 2008. Narrative explanation and international relations: back to basics. *Millenn.: J. Int. Relat.* 37 (2), 327–356.
- Suganami, H., 2013. Causation-in-the-world: a contribution to meta-theory of IR. *Millenn.: J. Int. Relat.* 41 (3), 623–643.
- Telford, A., 2018. A threat to climate-secure European futures? Exploring racial logics and climate-induced migration in US and EU climate security discourses. *Geoforum* 96, 268–277.
- Telford, A., 2020. A climate terrorism assemblage? Exploring the politics of climate change-terrorism-radicalisation relations (Article). *Political Geogr.* 79, 102150. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2020.102150>.
- Umar, L., Rasul, S., Kamran, U., 2020. Metaphors of terrorism in political discourse in Pakistan. *J. Soc. Sci. Humanit.* 28 (1), 143–159.
- United Nations Security Council (2021a). 8923rd meeting Thursday, 9 December 2021, 10 a.m. (<https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/meetings/2021>).
- United Nations Security Council (2021b). 8923rd meeting Thursday, 9 December 2021, 3 p.m. (<https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/meetings/2021>).
- United Nations Security Council Meetings Coverage. (2021, December 13). Security Council Fails to Adopt Resolution Integrating Climate-Related Security Risk into Conflict-Prevention Strategies. Meetings Coverage. (<https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14732.doc.htm>).
- United States Department of Defense (2021). Climate Risk Analysis. (<https://media.defense.gov/2021/Oct/21/2002877353/-1/-1/0/DOD-CLIMATE-RISK-ANALYSIS-FINAL.PDF>).
- Van Dijk, T.A., 2005. War rhetoric of a little ally: political implicatures and Aznar’s legitimization of the war in Iraq. *J. Lang. Polit.* 4 (1), 65–91.
- Verhoeven, H., 2011. Climate change, conflict and development in Sudan: global neo-malthusian narratives and local power struggles. *Dev. Change* 42 (3), 679–707.
- Vestby, J., 2014. Climate variability and individual motivations for participating in political violence. *Glob. Environ. Change* 56, 114–123.
- Von Lucke, F., Diez, T., Wellmann, Z., 2014. What’s at stake in securitising climate change? Towards a differentiated approach. *Geopolitics* 19 (4), 857–884.
- Walch, C., 2018. Weakened by the storm: rebel group recruitment in the wake of natural disasters in the Philippines. *J. Peace Res.* 55 (3), 336–350.
- Wodak, R., 2007. Pragmatics and critical discourse analysis: a cross-disciplinary inquiry. *Pragmat. Cogn.* 15 (1), 203–225.