

Operationalizing Human Rights-Based-Approaches
Experiences of civil society organizations advocating for
the rights of men who have sex with men in Zimbabwe

Travor Murai

© Travor Murai 2023

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission by the author.

ISBN 978-90-6490-170-6

Operationalizing Human Rights-Based-Approaches: Experiences of civil society organizations advocating for the rights of men who have sex with men in Zimbabwe

Op mensenrechten gebaseerde benaderingen operationaliseren:

Ervaringen van maatschappelijke organisaties die opkomen voor de rechten van mannen die seks hebben met mannen in Zimbabwe

Thesis

**to obtain the degree of Doctor from the
Erasmus University Rotterdam
by command of the
Rector Magnificus**

Prof.dr. A.L. Bredenoord

and in accordance with the decision of the Doctorate Board
The public defence shall be held on

Wednesday, 22 November 2023 at 15.00 hrs

by

Travor Murai
born in Mutare, Republic of Zimbabwe

**International
Institute of
Social Studies**

Doctoral Committee

Doctoral dissertation supervisor

Prof. W. Harcourt

Other members

Prof. F. Viljoen, Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria

Prof. R.B. Gaidzanwa, University of Zimbabwe

Prof. D.J.M. Hilhorst

Co-supervisors

Dr S.I. Bergh

Dr S. Heumann

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am deeply grateful to my promotor, Professor Wendy Harcourt, for providing me with the opportunity to grow academically under her guidance and direction. I also extend my thanks to her for chairing the Full Draft Dissertation Committee and Seminar. I would like to express my appreciation to my co-supervisor, Professor Silke Heumann, for her exceptional and insightful critical feedback, as well as her cutting-edge ideas on sexuality. A special and heartfelt thanks goes to Professor Sylvia Bergh, whom I first met in 2009 while pursuing a Post-Graduate Diploma at ISS. Professor Bergh has been exceptionally supportive as my 'day-to-day' supervisor since the beginning of this journey. Your guidance and unwavering support mean the world to me. I extend my gratitude to all of you for your incisive comments, unwavering commitment, patience, and meticulous attention to detail throughout this process.

Professor Irene van Staveren, I am thankful for accepting me as your PhD student during the early stages of the thesis proposal writing. I owe a debt of gratitude to my External Senior Discussant, Professor Marc Epprecht of Queen's University, Canada, my Internal Senior Discussant, Professor Karin Astrid Siegmann at ISS, and my Peer Discussant, Chitrakshi Vashisht at ISS, for their critical examination of the first full draft of my thesis, the insightful reports they provided, and their constructive input during my Full Draft Seminar (FDS).

I also want to acknowledge the members of the assessment committee: Professor Frans Viljoen from the Centre for Human Rights at the University of Pretoria, Professor Rudo Gaidzanwa from the University of Zimbabwe, and Professor Thea Hilhorst at ISS. Special thanks to JoAnn van Seventer, the copy editor of my thesis, for her valuable contributions.

I express my gratitude to colleagues from NUST, KU Leuven, SAIH, SRC, GALZ, and the collectives for reading preliminary drafts of this PhD, participating in my PhD monitoring seminars, and offering various forms of support at different stages of my journey. To my family and loved ones, this success story is as much yours as it is mine, and there are many more successes to come. Thank you for your unwavering support and love.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ACT 3D	Advocacy and other Community Tactics - Delayed Dignity is a right Denied
ARMZ	Advocacy and Research for Men in Zimbabwe
ART	Antiretroviral Therapy
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women
CISR	Consensus Instruments on Sexual Rights
COPAC	Constitutional Parliamentary Select Committee
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
EPMs	Enhanced Peer Mobilizers
EU	European Union
EUR	Erasmus University Rotterdam
FR-GoZ	'First' Republic Government of Zimbabwe
GALZ	Association of LGBTI People in Zimbabwe
HRBA	Human Rights-based Approach
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IAZ	Intersex Advocate [sic] Trust Zimbabwe
IDAHOT	International Day against Homophobia, Transphobia, and Biphobia
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organizations
ISS	International Institute of Social Studies of EUR
LILO	Looking in, Looking Out
LBQ	Lesbians, Bisexuals, and Queer persons
LGBTI	Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals, Transgender and Intersex persons
LGBTQ+	Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals, Transgender and Queer plus
NAC	National AIDS Council
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NUST	National University of Science and Technology
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MoAs	Memorandum of Agreements
MoHCC	Ministry of Health and Child Care
MSM	Men who have Sex with Men
OHCHR	Office of the Higher Commissioner for Human Rights
PPT	Political Process Theory
PRIDE	Promoting Rights, Inclusion, Diversity, and Empowerment in Education
PSI	Population Services International Zimbabwe, changed to Population Solutions for Health
RMT	Resource Mobilization Theory
SAIH	Norwegian Students and Academics' International Assistance Fund
SAfAIDS	Southern Africa HIV and AIDS Information Dissemination Service
SHRL	Stockholm Human Rights Lab
SR-GoZ	'Second' Republic Government of Zimbabwe

SMOs	Social Movement Organizations
SOGIE	Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity and Expression
SOGIESC	Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Expression, and Sex Characteristics
SRC	Sexual Rights Centre
SR-MSM	Sexual Rights of Gay People
SRH	Sexual and Reproductive Health
SRHR	Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
UPR	Universal Periodic Review
WHO	World Health Organization
WSW	Women who sleep with other women
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
ZIMAHA	Zimbabwe Men against HIV and AIDS
ZNASP	Zimbabwe National HIV and AIDS Strategic Plan

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	v
LIST OF ACRONYMS	vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS	viii
LIST OF TABLES	xi
LIST OF FIGURES	xii
LIST OF PICTURES	xiii
ABSTRACT	xiv
SAMENVATTING	xv
1 CHAPTER ONE	1
THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING	1
1.1 Introduction	1
1.2 Knowledge Gap	4
1.3 About the Targeted CSOs	6
1.4 Note on Terminology	8
1.5 Statement of the Problem	10
1.6 Purpose of the Study	10
1.7 Scope of the Study	12
1.8 Societal Relevance of the Study	13
1.9 Structure of the Thesis	15
1.10 Conclusion	17
2 CHAPTER TWO	18
THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVES	18
2.1 Introduction	18
2.2 Theoretical Framework	18
2.3 Conceptual Framework	25
2.4 Conclusion	43
3 CHAPTER THREE	44
SEXUAL RIGHTS OF MSM AND HRBAS	44
3.1 Introduction	44
3.2 Sexual Rights of MSM	44

3.3	Human Rights-Based Approaches and SR-MSM	45
3.4	Conclusion	49
4	CHAPTER FOUR	50
	RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	50
4.1	Introduction	50
4.2	Epistemological Position	50
4.3	Population	51
4.4	Sampling Frame	51
4.5	Sampling	51
4.6	Research Context	53
4.7	Endogenous Ethnographer	55
4.8	Data Collection Techniques	61
4.9	Fieldwork	64
4.10	Ethical Considerations	65
4.11	Data Management	67
4.12	Data Analysis	67
4.13	Data Presentation	68
4.14	Limitations of the Study	68
4.15	Conclusion	70
5	CHAPTER FIVE	71
	THE NATIONAL POLITICAL CONTEXT	71
5.1	Introduction	71
5.2	The Influence of Perceptions on non-Indigeneity	71
5.3	Influence of Political Harassment of Activists	82
5.4	The Influence of ‘Culture’ on HRBAs	94
5.5	The Influence of Religion on HRBAs	103
5.6	Conclusion	110
6	CHAPTER SIX	112
	THE INTERNATIONAL FUNDING CONTEXT	112
6.1	Introduction	112
6.2	Queer Imperialism	112
6.3	Intermediary Partnerships	126
6.4	Donors Prioritizing MSM	131
6.5	Conclusion	138
7	CHAPTER SEVEN	139

INTERNAL CAPACITIES and CONSTRAINTS	139	
7.1 Introduction	139	
7.2 CSO Capacities	139	
7.3 Internal Constraints	149	
7.4 Conclusion	159	
8 CHAPTER EIGHT	161	
OPERATIONALIZING LIGHT VERSIONS OF ‘FORMAL’ HRBAs	161	
8.1 Introduction	161	
8.2 Different HRBAs in Project Implementation	161	
8.3 Beyond ‘Formal’ and ‘Light’ HRBAs	182	
8.4 Conclusion	187	
9 CHAPTER NINE	189	
CONCLUSION AND REFLECTIONS	189	
9.1 Introduction	189	
9.2 Implications of Findings on Social Movement Theories	196	
9.3 Reflections on Findings	199	
9.4 Suggestions for Future Studies	201	
9.5 Conclusion	202	
REFERENCES	203	
BIOGRAPHY	234	
APPENDIX 1: PROFILES OF THE TARGETED CSOs	236	
APPENDIX 2: ACTIVITIES ENGAGED IN FOR PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION		237
APPENDIX 3: PRIMARY DATA: DOCUMENT LIST	239	

LIST OF TABLES

<i>Table 1: Collectives and their Statuses</i>	54
<i>Table 2: Tools, Guides, and Respondents per Guide</i>	61
<i>Table 3: GALZ Services and Activities</i>	120
<i>Table 4: Funding Focus – HIV/AIDS</i>	134
<i>Table 5: Funding Chain</i>	165

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Typical 'Imperialist' HRBAs to SR-MSM32
Figure 2: Conceptual Framework42
Figure 3: Typical HRBAs 'preferred' by INGOs.113
Figure 4: Typical Local CSO HRBAs125
Figure 5: Comparison of Donor INGO and Local CSO HRBAs128

LIST OF PICTURES

Picture 1: Art Products at the SRC8
Picture 2: A look-alike of the 20 Litter Bins the SRC donated.84
Picture 3: Research Product and a Support Group Meeting.....148
Picture 4: A Tool on Obligations of Duty-bearers.....173

ABSTRACT

In this thesis, I explore the operationalization of Human Rights-based Approaches (HRBAs). The thesis uses the case of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) advocating for the Sexual Rights of Men who have Sex with Men (SR-MSM) in Zimbabwe. I explore how the political context within which donor-funded MSM projects are implemented, global funding rules, conditionalities, dependencies, capacities and constraints internal to CSOs, influence the nature and extent to which the CSOs operationalize HRBAs. I employ two social movement theories - political process theory (PPT) and resource mobilization theory (RMT). PPT emphasizes the influence of relevant political opportunities, while RMT emphasizes the influence of resource-dependent capacities. I use ethnographic methods to gather data from fieldwork over two years in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. My other research methods include participant observation, document review, key informant interviews and online interviews with representatives of donors. I show that the Mugabe government mobilized homophobic tropes and tightened sodomy laws as a ploy to promote a homophobic national agenda and set the tone for cultural and religious debates regarding SR-MSM, all in the name of regime self-preservation. This had a significant adverse impact on the potential for HRBA operationalization. Despite these tropes, dissenting voices from some key figures such as traditional and religious leaders, as well as key institutions like the courts offered a glimmer of hope for HRBA in relation to the SR-MSM. While the Mnangagwa government has yet to establish an agenda and tone of tolerance for SR-MSM, it has acknowledged and challenged activists and allies to canvass for the repeal of sodomy laws and to ensure national development that is inclusive of all people. I also illustrate that the intermediary partnership model, in which donor INGOs receive funding from back-donors and convey the funds to local CSOs, plays a pivotal role in influencing HRBA operationalization within the international funding context. This model has several advantages over the direct recipient model. One key advantage is that intermediaries have a better understanding of both the back-donor and recipient CSOs, making them more effective in countering notions of queer imperialism and supporting context-sensitive operationalization of HRBAs. Furthermore, I demonstrate that CSOs possess sufficient internal capacity to operationalize normative or 'formal' HRBAs as described in the literature, enabling them to deliver their full potential. Notwithstanding this sufficient internal capacity, these CSOs faced significant constraints related to a limiting political context, insufficient NGOization and scarcity of resources. These challenges lead to their operationalization of toned-down versions of HRBAs. I reveal that 'formal' HRBAs often prove impractical on the ground due to the aforementioned factors, prompting local CSOs, with the support of their donors, to operationalizing 'light' versions of HRBAs. I emphasize the importance of CSO activists using approaches or components thereof that are most suitable for each unique context.

Keywords: HRBAs, CSOs, sexual rights, gay men, men who have sex with men, MSM projects, Zimbabwe

SAMENVATTING

Dit proefschrift beschrijft onderzoek naar het operationaliseren van op mensenrechten gebaseerde benaderingen (Human Rights-based Approaches of HRBAs). Daarbij is gebruikgemaakt van de casus van maatschappelijke organisaties die opkomen voor de seksuele rechten van mannen die seks hebben met mannen (SR-MSM) in Zimbabwe. In het onderzoek is gekeken naar de invloed van een aantal factoren op de manier waarop en de mate waarin de maatschappelijke organisaties HRBAs operationaliseren. Het gaat om de volgende factoren: de politieke context waarbinnen door donoren gefinancierde MSM-projecten worden uitgevoerd, wereldwijde financieringsregels, voorwaardelijkheden, afhankelijkheden, en mogelijkheden en beperkingen binnen maatschappelijke organisaties. Er wordt uitgegaan van twee theorieën over sociale bewegingen: de politieke processtheorie (PPT) en de mobilisatietheorie (resource mobilization theory; RMT). In de PPT wordt de invloed van relevante politieke kansen benadrukt, terwijl in de RMT de nadruk ligt op mogelijkheden die hulpbronnen bieden. In ruim twee jaar veldonderzoek in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, zijn data verzameld met etnografische methoden. De andere gehanteerde onderzoeksmethoden zijn participerende observatie, literatuuronderzoek, interviews met sleutelfiguren en online interviews met vertegenwoordigers van donoren. Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat de regering Mugabe homofobe taal hanteerde en wetgeving op het gebied van anale seks aanscherpte. Zo werd een homofob klimaat geschapen en de toon gezet in het cultureel en religieus debat over SR-MSM. Dit alles was bedoeld om het regime in stand te houden en had een zeer negatief effect op de mogelijkheden voor het operationaliseren van HRBAs. Ondanks dit homofobe klimaat waren er tegengeluiden van enkele sleutelfiguren zoals traditionele en religieuze leiders, en ook belangrijke instellingen zoals de rechtbanken, wat een sprankje hoop bood voor HRBAs op het gebied van SR-MSM. Hoewel de regering Mnangagwa de agenda en toon nog moet bepalen op het gebied van tolerantie voor SR-MSM, heeft zij activisten en medestanders erkend en hen aangemoedigd om campagne te voeren voor de intrekking van de wetgeving op het gebied van anale seks en voor een binnenlands beleid waarin alle mensen erbij horen. Uit het onderzoek blijkt ook dat het intermediary partnership-model, waarin internationale ngo's bedragen ontvangen van achterliggende donoren en die doorsluizen naar lokale maatschappelijke organisaties, van cruciaal belang is voor het operationaliseren van HRBAs in de internationale financieringscontext. Dit model heeft verschillende voordelen ten opzichte van het model van de directe ontvanger. Een belangrijk voordeel is dat intermediairs beter bekend zijn met zowel de achterliggende donor als de ontvangende maatschappelijke organisatie, en daarom beter in staat zijn om weerstand te bieden aan 'homo-imperialisme' en om een op de context afgestemde operationalisatie van HRBAs te ondersteunen. Verder blijkt uit het onderzoek dat maatschappelijke organisaties voldoende toegerust zijn voor het operationaliseren van normatieve of 'formele' HRBAs zoals beschreven in de literatuur, zodat ze optimaal kunnen functioneren. Desondanks hadden deze maatschappelijke organisaties te kampen met ernstige beperkingen die te maken hadden met de politieke context, onvoldoende ngo'isering en schaarse hulpbronnen. Door deze uitdagingen operationaliseerden ze afgezwakte versies van HRBAs. De onderzoeksresultaten wijzen erop dat 'formele' HRBAs in de praktijk vaak niet goed werken vanwege bovengenoemde factoren. Hierdoor zijn lokale maatschappelijke organisaties, gesteund door hun donoren, genoodzaakt om 'light' versies van HRBAs te operationaliseren. Het is van belang dat activisten in maatschappelijke organisaties benaderingen of onderdelen daarvan gebruiken die het meest geschikt zijn in de unieke context.

Trefwoorden: HRBAs, maatschappelijke organisaties, seksuele rechten, homoseksuele mannen, mannen die seks hebben met mannen, MSM-projecten, Zimbabwe

“[Same-sex sexualities are] unnatural and there is no question ever of allowing these people to behave worse than dogs and pigs¹”.

His Excellence, R.G. Mugabe
Former President of Zimbabwe 1995

“Those people who want [same-sex right to marriage] are the people who should canvass for [it ...]. [It is] not my duty to campaign for [it]. In our constitution, [it is] banned. [... I must] obey my constitution²”.

His Excellence, E.D. Mnangagwa
President of Zimbabwe 2018 (at the time of this study)

“If we had not used HRBA, I [do not think our] movement would have survived the Mugabe era. We are coming from there. We have had people who have been able to stand up, voice, challenge, and defend their rights in this era that we live in [second republic]. We are seeing small organizations popping up and growing. Some say [...] we want to be able to do research for LGBTI. [Others say we] are interested in training media personnel [or] we are a blogging group [...]. We are witnessing all these small groups and small collectives coming up. It shows that the voice is growing, and there is deep participation. It also shows that people believe in our work, and for them to believe in it, I think [it is] the approach we use in designing and implementing our projects”.

Sexual Rights Centre Staff 2,
In a Key Informant Interview on 28 March 2019.

¹ *The Herald*, August 12, 1995.

² *Newsday*, January 31, 2018.

1 CHAPTER ONE

THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING

1.1 Introduction

My ethnographic study is about the experiences of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Queer plus (LGBTQ+) Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) advocating for the Sexual Rights of Men who have sex with Men (SR-MSM) in Zimbabwe through the operationalizing of Human Rights-Based Approaches (HRBAs). In essence, my study primarily centers on MSM, which I employ as an inclusive term encompassing gay men and other MSM who do not identify as gay men. Beginning in the 1990s, and gaining momentum after 2005, global and local civil society human rights activism has framed the discourse on SR-MSM within HRBAs, shifting it away, but not disconnecting it from, public health and needs-based approaches (Epprecht 2012, Chemhuru 2012, Muparamoto 2020 and Evans & Mawere 2021). Subsequently, several CSOs in Zimbabwe have been using HRBAs to fight *inter-alia* for the SR-MSM (Shoko & Phiri 2017, Hunt Bristowe and Chidyamatare & Harding 2017 and Mandipa 2017). However, human rights activism in relation to SR-MSM has not been linear, with differing stakeholders holding varying perspectives on whether these rights can be classified as human rights (Evans & Mawere 2021).

Available evidence suggests that factors such as: 1) the national political context, 2) global funding rules, conditionalities, and dependencies, and 3) the capacities and constraints of CSOs do not support the operationalization of HRBAs regarding the sensitive topic of SR-MSM (Dunton & Palmberg 1996, Schafer & Range 2014, Shoko & Phiri 2017, Chiminige & Makamure 2017). I located my study in Bulawayo, the second capital city of Zimbabwe. Bulawayo offers a setting where more community-based CSOs are operationalizing the HRBAs. I also targeted donors, the Nordic International Non-Governmental Organizations³ (INGOs), as my study is about projects funded by these organizations.

As a human rights activist, I first encountered the surge in the number of CSOs and their reliance on HRBA as a champion of zero-tolerance toward homophobia for the Southern Africa HIV and AIDS Information Dissemination Service (SAfAIDS) in Harare between 2012 and 2014. I participated in a SAfAIDS project that solicited and strengthened the capacity of influential traditional, political and religious leaders, given

³ Norwegian Students and Academics' International Assistance Fund (SAIH) and COC Netherlands. The major projects are SAIH's Promoting Rights, Inclusivity and Diversity in Education (PRIDE) and COC Netherlands' Bridging the Gaps.

that their influence is instrumental in shaping public and individual habits infringing on SR-MSM, and in building pluralistic communities.

Based on the SAfAIDS model, we hoped to facilitate social and behavior change that influences individuals, communities and society toward alternative habits, engenders a recognition of SR-MSM, and dislodges dogmatic habits that violate the dignity of LGBTQ+ people. After that, firmly believing that diversity can nurture the inclusion of LGBTQ+ people, I participated in activities of Bulawayo-based LGBTQ+ organizations, both as a resource person and as chair of the Board of Trustees of the SRC from 2020. I have thus witnessed the growth of LGBTQ+ CSOs as part of civil society and their continued reliance on HRBAs. I consider myself to have deep first-hand knowledge of the lived realities of MSM communities, the strengths and weaknesses of the LGBTQ+ movement, the issues related to SR-MSM, and the politics surrounding the obligations of duty bearers.

This chapter discusses the ‘story behind the story’ in the national political context, the international funding context, and the internal capacities and constraints intrinsic to LGBTQ+ CSOs as essential factors in determining HRBA operationalization. I draw my purpose and research questions from the above factors. In this chapter I explain the scope of my study, highlighting its focus on HRBA operationalization by CSOs in Bulawayo, and their donors in Norway and the Netherlands. I show that the findings of my study are essential for aiding CSO programming, policy, public action, research, and teaching. I then give a synopsis of the thesis in the form of chapter summaries before rounding off the chapter with a conclusion.

Evidence abounds that the above three factors do not specifically support HRBA operationalization on the sensitive topic of SR-MSM. In August 2012, following GALZ’s⁴ local and international advocacy achievements, the Zimbabwe Republic police under the government’s Ministry of Home Affairs, without a warrant, raided the GALZ office; confiscated documents, computers and advocacy material; arrested and physically assaulted 42 LGBTQ+ people and activists; detained them overnight and profiled them at a local police station (GALZ 2015). GALZ, together with other LGBTQ+ CSOs, had, for example, at the February 2012 session of the Committee on CEDAW⁵, submitted a broader shadow report describing how governmental attitudes had facilitated violations of SR-MSM (ibid, see GALZ 2012a).

⁴ The Association of Lesbian, Gays, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) People in Zimbabwe (GALZ).

In 2014, police arrested GALZ activists for wearing T-shirts inscribed with the message ‘same love’. In December 2015, the police disrupted a march by the Sexual Rights Centre (SRC). The SRC took the police to court after they had stopped the march to observe the International Day to End Violence against Sex Workers. The High Court of Zimbabwe ruled in favor of the police, and the SRC appealed to the Supreme Court. Two years later, in November 2017, the Supreme Court quashed the decision of the High Court of Zimbabwe that had upheld the police’s violation of the right of the SRC to hold a peaceful demonstration (The Southern Africa Litigation Center 28 November 2017). The first epigraph of this thesis sums up the political context during the Mugabe era; the second sums it up during the Mnangagwa era; and the third illustrates the utility of HRBAs for LGBTQ+ activism in the two eras.

In addition to an unsupportive political context for HRBA operationalization on the sensitive topic of SR-MSM, notions of ‘queer imperialism’ related to global funding rules, conditionalities and dependencies have resulted in some governmental human rights bodies refusing to engage in donor-funded LGBTQ+ CSO projects underpinned by the HRBA (Miller 2017). Furthermore, national governments in countries like Zimbabwe are generally reluctant to provide adequate support for these projects aimed at assisting MSM. As a result, the little funding support available for LGBTQ+ CSO projects comes almost entirely from external international donors. Hart (2016) notes that over the years, compared to other projects, MSM projects have received little funding from Global North governments, international foundations, agencies and other mainstream institutions. The few donors supporting LGBTQ+ work in the Global South perceive their modes of operation as grounded on neutrality. However, local politicians perceive MSM projects in their countries as heavily resourced, and the donors as promoting notions of ‘civilizing mission’, ‘white savior complex⁶’, ‘white gaze⁷’, structural racism⁸ and queer imperialism, all with roots in colonialism; they, therefore, see a need for the decolonization of aid (Sarpong 2012 and Awondo et al. 2012).

Not only have former British Prime Minister David Cameron and former American President Barack Obama threatened to cut bilateral aid, but INGOs have also threatened to cut multilateral aid over violations of the sexual rights of LGBTQ+ people in Africa (Sarpong 2012 and Awondo et al. 2012). Former President

⁶ White saviour complex “refers to a complex where a white person provides help to non-white people in a self-serving manner” (Peace Direct 2021: 42).

⁷ ‘White gaze’ is the “process by which people and societies are viewed through the lens of White ethnocentrism, which assumes that Whiteness is the only referent of progress. This ‘gaze’ means that institutions, White people, and even other people of colour may engage with non-White people, practices and institutions based on their perceived inferiority to White institutions and norms” (Peace Direct 2021: 16).

⁸ “Structural (or systemic) racism refers to the normalisation and legitimatisation of an array of dynamics – historical, cultural, institutional and interpersonal – that routinely advantage White people, while producing chronic outcomes for people of colour worldwide” (Peace Direct 2021: 12).

Mugabe considered respect for sexual rights of LGBTQ+ people, as a bilateral and multilateral aid conditionality, to be ‘satanic’ (Sarpong 2012). Thus, aid evokes notions of dependencies, relative power and powerlessness in INGOs and local partner relationships, notions which tend to influence HRBA operationalization. McNamara (2014) framed Malawi’s relatively high level of donor dependence as a possible reason for the country to pardon a same-sex couple for violating sodomy laws after pressure from international aid-giving countries and a visit by then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. According to the literature, Zimbabwe CSOs suffer many capacity deficits. Several scholars have highlighted capacity issues in broader civil society (Moyo, Makumbe & Raftopoulos 2000; McCandless & Pajibo 2003); capacity development issues continue to attract increasing attention from civil society academics and practitioners (Brown & Korten 1991).

1.2 Knowledge Gap

The above evidence on the three factors motivates my interest, given that they have received less attention in the literature regarding their influence on HRBA operationalization on the sensitive topic of SR-MSM. Studies point to the challenging national operational context for CSOs in Zimbabwe, marked by a poor human rights situation, lawlessness and impunity, and difficulties in mobilizing capacities (Dunton & Palmberg 1996, Moyo 2004, Schafer & Range 2014, Masunungure 2011). These studies do not, however, explore the influence of the above factors on HRBA operationalization. Few studies focus on HRBA operationalization by CSOs in Zimbabwe, particularly by LGBTQ+ CSOs concerning sexual rights. The literature on this subject is scant and seems to take a homophobic stance (Chimininge & Makamure 2017).

Scholars are generally reluctant to explore same-sex sexualities, as they perceive this to be risky (see Taruvinga & Mushayamunda 2018). Despite the questionable empirical merits of a study by Chimininge and Makamure (2017), as the authors seem to take a homophobic standpoint, the authors focus on HRBA operationalization by GALZ. They observe that political and traditional leaders have failed to accept the rights discourse. They have reservations about GALZ embracing the HRBA without considering the *Ubuntu* philosophy. However, they involved neither GALZ staff as primary data sources, nor various secondary data sources of the organization, in a significant way. Engaging GALZ leaders would have allowed them to better portray the dynamics around the operationalization of HRBAs on same-sex development work. A fair engagement of primary and secondary data sources informs my analysis of HRBA operationalization related to SR-MSM.

Since the UN conferences of the mid-1990s, a handful of studies have linked HRBA or its tenets to the topic of sexuality and sexual rights (Logie 2021, Izugbara et al. 2020, Miller et al. 2015, Ndashe 2010 and

Schafer & Range 2014). A few are worth reviewing here. These studies have documented various challenges faced by development actors in operationalizing HRBA in Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) projects: challenges such as transforming institutions, changing norms and attitudes, addressing the lack of accountability and lack of capacity among health practitioners and policymakers, as well as insufficient funding. Logie (2021:1) observed that the “[d]iscourse of sexual rights is missing in SDGs ‘that purport to leave no one behind’” and says it is tantamount to the “erasure” of LGBTQ+ people in SDGs. Izugbara et al. (2020) analyzed the HRBA tenet of human rights instruments. They identified several of these instruments adopted by the African Union (AU) or, before that, by the Organization of African Unity that inherently forbade the exclusion of LGBTQ+ people based on SOGIESC adopted between 1981 and 2018.

Particularly relevant to my study is a study by Ndashe (2010), aimed at providing an overview of the battle for recognition of the sexual rights of LGBTQ+ people as human rights at the Southern Africa regional level, focusing on the opportunities and challenges at the AU and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. This study highlights the key issues confronting the nascent LGBTQ+ movement as it organizes activities on sexual rights, at both country and regional levels. The study findings reveal that visibility remains challenging for activists, as they operate underground in many countries. The study also points to disagreements over priorities and strategies by activists and indicates that building an LGBTQ+ movement is one of the most significant challenges.

Another relevant study at the continental level is by Currier (2012b), who explores strategies of visibility and invisibility used by CSO activists in Namibia and South Africa when organizing activities to claim sexual rights as human rights. The findings of this study show that LGBTQ+ activists do not always desire public visibility as an organizing strategy. Instead, these movements strategically pursue visibility and invisibility at different junctures, depending on politics and other considerations. In my analysis chapters, I engage with the theme of visibility, highlighting how activists wish to handle their visibility. Building LGBTQ+ movements is also a relevant aspect of my study, given that the movement consists of the MSM and I examine the role of older CSOs in mentoring social movement groups.

As shown above, most studies do not examine the influence of factors like the national political context, the international funding context, and the internal capacities and constraints of CSOs in operationalizing HRBAs. Most studies by researchers elsewhere have focused on the operationalization of HRBAs on projects implemented in politically stable environments with relatively adequate funding, and in

organizations that have adequate capacity; studies have often focused on less sensitive development topics than SR-MSM (Miller 2017, Morten & Hans-Otto 2018), the case of my thesis. There is a gap in these studies regarding the influence of the national political context, international funding context, and internal capacities and constraints on the operationalization of HRBAs on the sensitive topic of SR-MSM (see Green & Guijt 2019) in the politically fragile and volatile case of Zimbabwe, a gap which my ethnographic study seeks to fill.

1.3 About the Targeted CSOs

GALZ led the first CSO advocacy initiatives on the SR-MSM and those of LGBTQ+ individuals, using the HRBAs in Zimbabwe in the 1990s before the Yogyakarta principles (I discuss these below), although (and because) the constitution outlaws same-sex marriages. The CSOs came in to fill *inter-alia*, a service provision gap emanating from the criminalization of sodomy and inadvertently, other sexual practices in same-sex marriages by the Criminal Law (Reform and Codification) Act. This criminalization resulted in the absence of state services for LGBTQ+ persons. The SRC, Transgender Research and Advocacy Trust (TREAT), Advocacy and Research for Men in Zimbabwe (ARMZ), NeoteriQ and Zimbabwe Men against HIV and AIDS (ZIMAHA) -- organizations that I also target through this study, in addition to GALZ -- are some of the CSOs that are part of the surge (see Appendix 1 for the basic profiles of the CSOs). This sheer proliferation occurred after the 'First' Republic Government of Zimbabwe (FR-GoZ) banned GALZ from participating in the 1995 and 1996 ZIBF exhibitions (Dunton & Palmberg 1996). A shift in civil society's focus from HIV and health, during the inception years of these CSOs, to the SR-MSM and LGBTQ+ individuals boosted the increase in the number of CSOs working on the latter.

GALZ and the SRC are among the largest CSOs in the country. According to Goddard (2004) and the organization's webpage, GALZ was formed in 1990 and operates as a *universitas*. In its early years, the organization's primary goal shifted from providing social activities to championing the human rights of LGBTQ+ people in Zimbabwe. The activism of GALZ has been expressed, among others, through public exhibitions, campaigns, counseling, media work, analysis of Zimbabwe policies and laws, and facilitation of legal representation. Goddard (2004) notes that after independence, 'gay' people engaged in self-organizing in social spaces such as gay fashion shops, gay 'night' clubs, and gay parties. This organizing led the LGBTQ+ people to realize the need for a 'gay' organization, hence the formation of GALZ in Harare. However, it is unclear in the literature whether these examples of self-organizing apply to all identities under the LGBTQ+ acronym.

At the time of GALZ's formation, there was no widespread overt discrimination and bashing of gay people in Zimbabwe. The organization found it difficult to reach out to LGBTQ+ people. It had around 70 members in 1992, and 349 in 1999, and since then its membership has been growing steadily. The organization does not include statistics on its current membership on its webpage. This membership initially consisted of a few elite coloreds⁹, white men, and women, mostly with telephones¹⁰, and therefore easy to contact, who identified as LGBTQ+ people. For example, the founding members were dominantly white. Over the years, it has grown to include black people. For a long time after its formation up to 2002, the organization drew the majority of its membership and carried out most of its work in Harare, Chitungwiza, and other Northern parts of the country; it later opened a satellite office in Bulawayo.

Initially, the activities of GALZ focused on making a psychosocial and edutainment space available for LGBTQ+ people, including safer sex workshops and counseling. Some members protested when around 1992-3 the organization started to pursue political goals. In 1993, before GALZ was banned from participating in the Book Fair activities of 1995 and 1996, 'authorities' had stopped radio stations from offering phone-in slots for GALZ representatives after a couple of such slots. There were other incidents involving print media houses, the then Minister of Home Affairs Dumiso Dabengwa and former President Mugabe, which helped to put 'homosexuality' on the national agenda before the Book Fair ban of GALZ.

A group of White and Black people who identified as members or allies of the LGBTQ+ community founded the SRC (see Appendix 1). As the name suggests, the SRC is a sexual rights CSO¹¹, founded in 2007 and legally established in 2010 after registering its 'constitution' with the Deeds office. According to the SRC 'Constitution' (2010:1), the initial goals of the organization included advancing:

[...] the sexual rights of vulnerable and marginalized women, children and men; [challenging] behavior and attitudes [...] that prevent vulnerable and marginalized groups from exercising their rights; [addressing] stigma and discrimination; [providing] psychosocial support [...] and capacitating] vulnerable and marginalized women, children and men to advocate for change in national policies and legislation.

The organization sought to achieve these initial goals "through participatory learning tools" (interactive workshops, theatre, music, dance, and art [see art products below]) (SRC Constitution 2010:1).

⁹ "In Southern Africa, the term 'coloured' has a specialised meaning in that it denotes a person of mixed racial ancestry rather than one who is black, as it does in most other parts of the world" (Adhikari 2013: iix).

¹⁰ The telephones aided easy organizing.

¹¹ See section 2.3.7 for the conceptualization of the term CSO.



Picture 1: Art Products at the SRC

Source: SRC 2019 Annual Report, 2021-2021 Strategic Plan

The SRC’s operational areas are mainly in Bulawayo and other parts of the Southern region of Zimbabwe. Given the absence of a Bulawayo-based LGBTQ+ CSO since Zimbabwe’s independence, as GALZ had headquarters and worked mainly in Harare, Chitungwiza, and other Northern parts of the country, and after ten years of existence, SRC had fine-tuned its goals by 2017 also to focus more on LGBTQ+ people as well as sex workers (SRC Strategic Plan 2017). It also relied less on theatre, art, and dance, and instead favored workshops and meetings. The organization both houses and strengthens the capacity of nascent LGBTQ+ and sex-worker CSOs, known as collectives.

1.4 Note on Terminology

I intentionally use the broad term ‘LGBTQ+ ’instead of ‘MSM CSOs’ when referring to organizations advocating for SR-MSM. These CSOs define themselves broadly as LGBTI/Q+ CSOs, and although my study primarily focuses on MSM, these organizations work with various LGBTQ+ groups and other communities, such as sex workers. I acknowledge that beyond gay men and other MSM, the LGBTQ+¹²

¹² I adopt SAfAIDS (2014) definitions of the acronym: Lesbian- a female sexual identity or orientation, which is an attraction between two or more females at various levels (emotionally, physically, intellectually, spiritually, and sexually). Gays- Primarily male same-sex identity, orientation, or attraction between two or more males, again, at various levels, but it can also be used more broadly to include all people attracted to the same sex. Bisexual- Attraction at various levels towards both males and

acronym encompasses individuals who do not conform to heteronormative norms, including gender non-conforming people, and that there are distinct phobias¹³ directed at these groups, even though I often refer to homophobia¹⁴ (See Smith et al. 2017).

I opted for 'MSM projects' instead of 'LGBTQ+ projects' because the primary projects I examined and the experiences detailed in my study are more closely related to MSM. However, these CSOs often view their projects as inclusive of various categories within the LGBTQ+ spectrum, although much of their donor funding is specifically designated for MSM projects, and the inclusion of other categories is often indirect. One significant limitation of this study, which I will discuss further in the methodology chapter, is its non-inclusiveness of the other categories under the broad LGBTQ+ acronym.

I use the term 'SR-MSM,' rather than 'MSM rights,' to emphasize that the sexual rights of MSM are human rights. Furthermore, it underscores that all individuals, including MSM, have the right to express their sexuality responsibly without harming others (Goddard 2004). I employ 'INGOs' to signify Northern-funded organizations and 'CSOs' to denote local community-based organizations. I use 'formal HRBA' in line with the works of Miller and Redhead (2019) to highlight the normative nature of these approaches as framed in literature and conceptualized by United Nations (UN) agencies and other major international development agencies.

The term 'activists' refers to LGBTQ+ activists unless otherwise specified. I use the term 'insufficient NGOization' to describe a lack of organizational development related to the professionalization, bureaucratization, and institutionalization of CSOs. Donors often prefer to entrust their funds to

females. Transgender- refers to individuals whose gender identity does not align with the sex they were assigned at birth. Transgender is about gender identity and is distinct from sexual orientation. Queer or Questioning: "Queer" once considered a derogatory term has been reclaimed as an umbrella term for non-heterosexual orientations and gender identities. "Questioning" is used for individuals who are exploring their own sexual orientation or gender identity. The "+" encompass other identities and orientations that are not explicitly represented by the letters in the acronym LGBTQ, including identities like asexual (lack of sexual attraction), pansexual (attraction to people regardless of gender), genderqueer (gender identity that doesn't fit within the binary of male/female), and many others.

I am not naïve to assume in my study that all these different groups of people and the organizations that advocate for rights of these specific groups have similar experiences in operationalizing HRBAs. I use the term LGBTQ+, recognizing that the groups have similar experiences brought about by the effects of different phobias mobilized against all of them; nevertheless, I still recognize that these communities are not a homogeneous group. I am alive to this in the presentation of my findings and hence I deploy the concept of intersectionality, as it relates to both marginalization and privilege.

¹³ Such as transphobia directed against transgender people and biphobia directed against bisexual people.

¹⁴ I use the term homophobia in the broader sense of its conceptualization, beyond that it is about fear and hatred of LGBTQ+ people, to refer to the strategic use of negative feelings associated with beliefs in the inherent superiority of heteronormativity and inherent inferiority of same-sex sexualities (van Klinken & Chitanda 2016, Currier 2010).

professional and institutionalized CSOs, as they consider these aspects crucial for ensuring accountability to them.

1.5 Statement of the Problem

The social problem of my study relates to violations of SR-MSM, with their far-reaching social and economic consequences. As aforementioned, CSOs try to address these violations using HRBAs. Consequences of the violations of SR-MSM include:

[...] lower productivity, incomes, and rates of accumulation of human and social capital. [The violations] promote poor SRH, poverty, and economic disadvantage by stalling [MSM's] access to services [...]. [Violation] denies them voice, recognition, and engagement, [...] compromises their dignity and self-worth. [It leads to] exclusion or ostracism by the family [...] injuries, visits to health personnel, disabilities, and deaths [...], erodes their confidence and mental health, hindering their productivity and participation in development activities. [It] affects families and communities, saps household resources, strains family ties, and depresses family members. [Furthermore, it often leads to] poor health outcomes; forced displacement; low educational attainment; high unemployment rates; poor access to quality livelihoods, housing, health, and financial services; exposure to violence including arrests, detention, beatings, ill-treatment, and sexual assault (Izugbara, Bakare, Sebany, Ushie, Wekesah & Njagi 2020:101-102).

My research focuses on a problematic national political context, a challenging international funding context, and limited internal capacities of CSOs as factors affecting the operationalization of HRBAs. In my study, the national political context features more prominently and takes more space (see Chapter 5, and Section 9.2.1) than the other two factors, given that it provides a broad framework for how these other factors play out.

1.6 Purpose of the Study

In light of the social and research problems in 1.5 above, in line with Nyamu-Musembi and Cornwall (2004), I believe that it is essential for ethnographic studies to look more closely at the factors that influence HRBA operationalization on sexuality¹⁵, particularly in SR-MSM, as the numbers of CSOs operationalizing the approach, and the scope of the CSO projects underpinned by HRBAs, have progressively increased since the 1990s. Anthropologists must consider the national political context, looking at the impact of political regimes; religious, cultural and institutional arrangements; the

¹⁵ I use the term sexuality as an object of study that sums up practices, experiences, and knowledge centered around the nature of gender identities, expressions, attractions and roles, sexual acts, sex characteristics, and reproduction that are contingent upon defined political, religious, cultural, ethical, legal, biological, psychological, social, economic, and historical context (Cornwall, Correa and Jolly 2008, Rubin 1984). Sexuality is a dynamic concept that serves as a site of, and mirrors, particular outcomes derived from power struggles and relations. This aspect of the concept is less visible, given that its relevance to politics is seldom at the fore (ibid).

international funding context; as well as the capacity and constraints of the implementing organizations, determined by the interests of different stakeholders, including the state, donors, and project staff.

My study, as is the norm in anthropology, questions the idea of ‘normative/formal’ HRBAs and makes use of an evidential basis on the efficacy of ‘formal’ HRBAs, a basis relied on by an increasing number of CSOs in their development work. I employed two social movement theories: the political process theory (PPT), (also used by Chua (2012) and Noonan (1995)), and the resource mobilization theory (RMT) as useful theoretical lenses for understanding the influence of the repressive political context, the international funding context, and that of resource-dependent CSO capacities and constraints. Without in-depth comprehension of the experiences of CSOs in politically fragile and volatile contexts, ethnographic studies lack an evidential basis to support the adoption, adaptation, or discarding of HRBAs by these CSOs in such contexts

I look at the suitability of ‘formal’ HRBAs, that is, the praxis of a 'step-by-step' process of mainstreaming tenets such as human rights instruments, principles, entitlements of rights holders, obligations of duty-bearers, and rights protection mechanisms concerning MSM projects, given the complex political context of Zimbabwe. One cannot understand the national political context in isolation from the religious and cultural structures in which it is embedded – or without reference not only to political leaders but also to traditional and religious leaders, who give it its form. Therefore, my first research sub-question is about the role of these leaders.

Main Research Question

How does the national political context in which CSOs implement MSM projects, their interactions with donors, and internal capacities and constraints, influence the implementation of HRBAs within these projects in Zimbabwe?

Sub-questions

- a) Why and how do MSM projects grounded in HRBAs become subject to politicization and instrumentalization by local political, traditional, and religious leaders?
- b) How do Nordic donor INGOs interpret and translate ‘formal’ HRBAs to SR-MSM into concrete projects?
- c) What are the capacities and constraints internal to local CSOs implementing rights-based MSM projects?
- d) How do local CSOs operationalize ‘formal’ HRBAs in MSM projects?

1.7 Scope of the Study

The section discusses two aspects that determine the scope of the study, namely its geographic delimitation and timeframe. The location of Bulawayo, some 439km from the capital city, where donors are headquartered and most networks are found, potentially provides a setting that generates specific nuances about HRBA operationalization that have not been established. A genocide known in Zimbabwe as *Gukurahundi* occurred among the people of Bulawayo and inhabitants of the two Matabeleland provinces and some parts of the Midlands where people of the Ndebele ethnic group reside (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009).

The term *Gukurahundi* (rain that washes the dirty) refers to the ethnic cleansing of the mostly Ndebele ethnic group and the opposition PF ZAPU¹⁶ party, which was the undeclared purpose of the genocide between 1982 and 1986, two years after Zimbabwe attained colonial independence (Muzondidya 2009, Campbell 2003, Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009). The government sent the army to reinforce police units deployed to quell unrest. The army engaged in the wanton killing of Ndebele-speaking civilians (Meredith 2002, Muzondidya 2009). Conservative estimates put the figure of those who perished in the genocide at around 20,000 people (Campbell 2003). It is against this history of state-sponsored political persecution that one can explain why the people of Bulawayo are characterized as more tolerant than people in other parts of the country toward LGBTQ+ people, and less compliant to the state's pressure to be homophobic (see Home Office 2014). People whose mother tongue is the Ndebele language constitute around 17% of the country's population; those whose mother tongue is Shona, around 75%, and those whose mother tongues are other languages, about 8% (UNICEF 2017).

Most studies have used the case of CSOs based in Harare and, in particular of GALZ (see Muparamoto 2018, Chimininge and Makamure 2017, Goddard 2004, Campbell 2002, Epprecht 2004, Murray & Roscoe

¹⁶ PF ZAPU, Patriotic Front - Zimbabwe African People's Union is a liberation movement whose leadership during the armed struggle and at independence was composed of some of the founding cadre-ship of the liberation struggle and whose army waged the war of liberation alongside the army of Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) that came to rule Zimbabwe after the elections at independence ZANU-PF (Campbell 2003). The PF ZAPU combatants and Ndebele people felt neglected and ostracised while they witnessed the privileging of fellow ex-combatants from the ZANU PF and the Shona people leading to unrests (Muzondidya 2009). This marked the beginning of a heavily doctored 'patriotic history' of erasing the role of PF ZAPU and its army, Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) and by extension, the Ndebele people in waging the armed struggle against colonialism and the role of Britain's mediation of cease fire and ultimately independence agreement in 1980. ZANU PF propagates a fictitious and self-serving narrative that ZANU PF, its ZANLA army and by extension, the Shona people won the war on the battlefield and by so doing the identity of 'patriots' and the right to rule and to wield control and manage public institutions including in Ndebele people areas such as Bulawayo. In reality, ZANLA did not initiate the armed struggle but joined ZIPRA and it did not win independence on the battlefield, as it was an outcome of a negotiated ceasefire and independence agreement (Compagnon 2011). This may partly explain why the people of Bulawayo, whom the majority are Ndebele – although a significant population of the Shona people have moved in since after the Gukurahundi genocide, are not gullible to politicised narrative of homophobia given that they have been projected as docile and at worst sell-outs and villains in another politicised narrative of the 'patriotic history' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Willems 2009 and Compagnon 2011).

1998), and researchers have focused less on the case of CSOs based in Bulawayo, such as SRC. Bulawayo offers a unique setting for investigating CSOs away from the capital cities, such as Harare, where most CSOs, donors, embassies, and government offices have their headquarters. In the big cities, funding support and networks are relatively more accessible. In addition, surveillance of CSO work is more widespread in big cities. The number of fully established and viable CSOs in other cities in Zimbabwe, such as Gweru, Mutare, and Masvingo, is limited, hence the choice of Bulawayo. My study targeted two INGOs, one in the Netherlands and the other in Norway. Of interest was not the physical location in the Global North, but their partnerships with CSOs based in Zimbabwe.

I write this thesis at a time when the national political context in Zimbabwe, global funding rules, conditionalities, dependencies, and CSO capacities and constraints provide an intriguing environment for the operationalization of HRBAs. The thesis covers the period from 2010 to 2020. The selected period has allowed for the periodization of the eras before and after the removal of the President of the FR-GoZ, Robert Gabriel Mugabe.

1.8 Societal Relevance of the Study

The study's findings and conclusions are of evidential and practical value for CSO researchers, practitioners, and society. The findings draw attention to the centrality of the topic of sexuality in shaping political power struggles and relationships, highlighting how political actors often politicize homophobia. The relevance of my study is that it links bodies of knowledge around civil society, sexuality, ideas and action, and SR-MSM. It draws attention to the topic of HRBA operationalization in CSOs, regarding which, despite its neglect in the research, there is increasing evidence for practitioners and researchers to engage on the topic.

While before 1999, all countries of the world did not recognize same-sex marriage as a right, in 2015 as many as twenty did so (Velasco 2018). Within international law, various frameworks have entrenched SR-MSM as an international norm. The urgency around fast-tracking initiatives to end the AIDS pandemic as a threat to public health by 2030 has seen increased attention for SR-MSM at a global level. Zimbabwe has joined in these initiatives. For example, as my findings show, the Ministry of Health and Child Care (MoHCC) and the Parastatal National AIDS Council (NAC) have led various initiatives that recognize most of the SR-MSM. These include critical population-related policies, and strategies such as the Zimbabwe National HIV/AIDS Strategy IV, 2021-2025 (ZNASP IV) and the Zimbabwe National Key Populations HIV/AIDS Implementation Plan, 2019-2020. Others are the Comprehensive National HIV Communications Strategy for Zimbabwe, 2019-2025, and the Zimbabwe Legal Environment Assessment for HIV, Tuberculosis, Sexual and Reproductive Health & Rights 2019, among many others. Therefore, it

is logical to note that the government of Zimbabwe is increasingly discussing some, though not all, SR-MSM more transparently; this underlines the relevance of my study.

My study also provides methodological suggestions for 'native' ethnographers in researching sensitive topics in a politically volatile context. These suggestions include the need for interlocutors to find skillful ways to gain entry and acceptance. They also include the need to avoid being a 'fly-on-the-wall' researcher, but rather one who takes up various roles and positions related to the research context while simultaneously abiding by ethics. Such roles and responsibilities allow entry into platforms in which one would otherwise not have participated.

With Zimbabwe facing economic and political upheavals and volatility, my study experiments with a plausible theoretical framework of social movement theories, which researchers and activists have not widely used, to investigate the local context. Studies on the success and failures of CSOs and social movements in Zimbabwe have relied on theoretical frameworks other than social movement theories: Gramsci's theory of hegemony (Chipato, Ncube, and Dorman 2020, Chikoto-Schultz and Uzochukwu 2016, Ncube 2010), political economy theories (Moyo 2014b, Masunungure 2014), and social capital framework (Tarusarira 2013), among others.

Activists and researchers can emulate my use of the social movement theories in understanding and interrogating the potential power that has 'made' activists and allies, and cognitively liberated¹⁷ people (including those in rural areas¹⁸), wield their collective influence to articulate their protests. The use of the theories is essential, given that social movements provide possibilities of change beyond what litigation in highly compromised courts of law can bring about. Using the case of the 2018 elections, Moyo (2019) shows that in an authoritarian state such as Zimbabwe, authorities, including the judiciary, have little respect for rules when carrying out rule-bound national processes. Such lack of respect renders litigation, a hallmark activity for opposition politics, futile, making it merely a smokescreen to appease disgruntled citizens. The loss of hope in such actions as litigation calls for alternative actions, which activists can find within the broad array of activities prescribed through the social movement theories (see section 2.2).

¹⁷Cognitive liberation refers to the ability of people to realize the strength they wield collectively, and the opportunities for political action as they arise (McAdam 1996).

¹⁸ Such factors as limited telecommunications infrastructure, low numbers of internet users, limited media reach, and limited presence of CSOs have seen reduced participation of rural people in progressive political activism (Manganga 2012).

My findings are also relevant for academic instruction and research and contribute to the existing body of knowledge. These findings may also inform HRBA training manuals for CSOs, and university course outlines for relevant modules and student dissertation topics. The findings can inform a broader curriculum development of relevant university courses.

1.9 Structure of the Thesis

The thesis has nine chapters: the present chapter on the problem and its settings, a chapter reviewing the literature on HRBAs and SR-MSM, a chapter presenting my theoretical framework and conceptual perspectives, a chapter on the methodology used, four chapters presenting and discussing empirical findings, and a chapter on conclusions and theoretical implications. The first chapter presents the introduction, explaining the study's various aspects; revealing Bulawayo, in Zimbabwe, as the research setting; and introducing critical terms used in the study, such as MSM, sexual rights, CSOs, INGOs, and HRBAs.

In Chapter 2 I have reviewed literature on sexual rights and HRBAs. I state that the sexual rights as they relate to MSM include the right to life, liberty, privacy, autonomy, security, non-discrimination, equality, protection from epidemic diseases, freedom from violence, sexual intercourse, pleasure, marriage, privacy, and having a family. I highlight that HRBAs are an approach advanced by the UN in the 1990s to fulfill human rights. I argue that HRBAs have been widely operationalized in international development cooperation, but only limited literature examines how they extend to projects in SR-MSM. I reveal that various international frameworks, including the Yogyakarta principles, have been formulated to delineate sexual rights as human rights.

Chapter 3 presents the theoretical and conceptual frameworks, and reviewed literature on various features of HRBA. The chapter focuses on social movement theories, the PPT and RMT. I show that the PPT is relevant for explaining how a political context with its accompanying political opportunities can influence social movements and CSO processes such as HRBA operationalization. The RMT explains how an international funding context, and internal capacities and constraints, influence HRBA operationalization.

Chapter 4 presents the methodology. I discuss my epistemological position, the population, sampling techniques, design, data collection tools, approach to data analysis, ethical issues, and limitations. The chapter justifies the rationale for adopting ethnography as the primary research method since it allows for an in-depth process of knowledge creation. The method includes using a qualitative research approach and data-gathering tools such as Key informant interviews (KIIs), participant observation, and document

review. It proved very useful in eliciting in-depth and detailed lived experiences in the operationalization of HRBA by CSOs in Bulawayo. I also reflect on my positionality vis-à-vis my previous relations and interactions with the CSOs I study, and how this helped me to gain entry into the field and to decide which data to exclude from my thesis.

Chapter 5 is the first findings chapter. The chapter addresses the research question on the influence of the political context, i.e., 'Why and how do HRBA MSM projects become politicized and instrumentalized by local political, traditional, and religious leaders?' Data collection primarily involved conducting Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with CSO activists, members of parliament, chiefs, and religious leaders to inform the findings. My findings show that while the Mnangagwa government has yet to set an agenda and tone for tolerance of SR-MSM, certain key figures, including Mnangagwa himself, some chiefs, and religious leaders, have acknowledged and engaged with SR-MSM activists and their allies regarding their role in canvassing for the repeal of sodomy laws. Furthermore, the courts in Zimbabwe have played, and continue to play, a pivotal role in supporting MSM and other LGBTQ+ activists and their allies. They act as impartial arbiters, free from partisan political influence and manipulation. This role includes affirming the legal standing of CSOs and protecting them against raids and attacks.

Chapter 6 addresses the research question on INGO interpretation and translation of 'formal' HRBAs into concrete projects. Data collected from Nordic donor INGOs, SAIH, and COC Netherlands through online KIIs and local CSOs inform the findings. These INGOs are intermediaries that receive funding from their respective governments and private institutions in the Global North and convey the funds to organizations in the Global South. The intermediary partnership model has various advantages over the direct recipient model, in that the intermediary INGOs better understand both the back-donors and the recipient local CSOs, making them more effective.

Chapter 7 addresses the research question on the influence of internal capacities and constraints. I primarily drew data that addressed the question from participant observation, document review, and KIIs with staff members of CSOs. The targeted local CSOs were developing human resources with the capacity to operationalize the HRBAs from their very formation. Contrary to notions in literature (Plipat 2005), the activists had adequate capacity, or ability, to operationalize HRBAs. They demonstrated this capacity in many instances. They successfully used strategic litigation to assert, *inter-alia*, the legal existence of GALZ and the right to identity of transgender people. They successfully utilized international human rights

frameworks such as the UPR process. However, they faced significant constraints related to insufficient NGOization and scarcity of resources.

Chapter 8 focuses on the operationalization of HRBA by local CSOs. I drew data mostly from participant observation, document review, and KIIs with staff members of CSOs. I show that the CSOs use mainly three established HRBA discourses: HRBA as a key guiding principle, HRBA as rhetoric, and HRBA as a toolkit.

Chapter 9 presents the conclusion and theoretical implications. It pulls together the central answers to the four sub-research questions to present the main conclusions. It also explores the study's contribution to the body of knowledge and practice. I highlight the importance of courageous activists who can mobilize critical masses against tendencies of the government and of political, religious, and traditional leaders who mobilize homophobia to gain political, electoral, and opportunistic mileage.

1.10 Conclusion

This chapter has introduced the main messages of the thesis and presented its background, as well as its research questions, scope, societal relevance, and structure. In terms of the knowledge gap, only very few studies have investigated how CSOs operationalize HRBAs. I have underlined that the purpose of my study is to explore how the political context, funding modalities, and internal capacities and constraints, influence the operationalization of HRBAs. My study aims to inform CSO programming, LGBTQ+ policies, research, and academic instruction. The next chapter presents a review of the literature relevant to my study.

2 CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVES

2.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the theoretical and conceptual position of my study. The chapter justifies using the PPT and the RMT as lenses to examine the political and funding contexts, and resource-dependent capacities and constraints internal to the CSOs, which influence the nature and extent of HRBA operationalization. The PPT helps to understand the influence of the political context. The RMT enhances understanding of the influence of the international funding context and resource-dependent capacities intrinsic to the CSOs. The Western queer theory is the predominant framework for studies engaging LGBTQ+ communities (Clarke 2013). However, I found it not relevant to my study. Queer theory questions the dominant power that privileges, legitimizes, and normalizes heteronormativity and concerns itself with the diversity and complexity of LGBTQ+ categories and the broader SOGIESC (Portwood-Stacer 2010, Clarke 2013). My study focuses on human rights as interpreted by the CSOs, and as someone involved in the scene, I respect how the activists in these CSOs frame their work. I am therefore not theorizing sexuality as such, but rather how CSOs operationalize HRBAs, and the different factors (political opportunities, internal constraints and capacities, donor resources) that determine their success or failure, making the PPT and RMT relevant, and hence do not use queer theory. I engage with the concept of queer imperialism only for examining the imposition of donor agendas such as HRBAs in framing the work of the CSOs -- again, to indicate how I focus on how organizations operationalize HRBAs, rather than looking at sexuality itself.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

A theoretical framework is a 'lens' to view a study that connects issues and debates relevant to the study, and pre-existing theories that fit into the study of the researcher (Adom & Hussein 2018). I use the theoretical framework as a 'lens' that enables me to look at the operationalization of HRBA within political and funding contexts, and at CSO internal resources as determining factors. I adapted the PPT and the RMT because of their conceptual capacity, as proven in the literature, to analyze the influence of authoritarian, non-democratic, and repressive contexts on such processes as HRBA operationalization. Noonan (1995) used the PPT to analyze an authoritarian context in Chile and found that proper framing of ideology and themes provides opportunities for protest, notwithstanding the authoritarian context. Chua (2012) used the PPT to analyze an authoritarian context in Singapore and concluded that LGBTQ+ collective action remains afloat, despite repression, thanks to strategic adaptation and pragmatic resistance that entailed avoiding

confrontation. The activists avoided situations where authorities could perceive them as threats to the status quo. I have adapted the RMT and the PPT as my theoretical framework because, taken together; they highlight the external political and funding contexts and internal organizational resource-dependent capacities and constraints as essential factors influencing the nature and extent to which CSOs can operationalize HRBAs on SR-MSM projects in Zimbabwe.

2.2.1 Political Process Theory

The PPT, also known as the 'political opportunity theory', has a long-standing history as a theoretical framework dating back to its use by Eisinger (1973), who propounded it to interrogate the factors influencing the effectiveness of protests. It emerged in the United States in the 1970s and 80s as an analytical framework in response to social agitation over civil rights and wars, and following student protests (McAdam 1982). The theory has evolved over the years, but the problem of the influence that political processes have on social movement actions has continued to feature in subsequent elaborations (Tilly 1978, McAdam 1982, Tarrow 1983, Tarrow 1994). The problem of the influence of political processes is at the center of my study, where the focus is on the influence of Zimbabwe's volatile and fragile political context on HRBA operationalizing in MSM projects.

The PPT is critical of the RMT (discussed in the next section) for placing resources to determine collective action. For McAdam (1982:21), in revealing the deficiency of the RMT, "resources do not dictate their use; people do". In my thesis, I combine the RMT and the PPT, following McAdam's (1982) thinking that RMT explains some collective actions but not all. The PPT posits that activists' actions, such as HRBA operationalization, depend on the availability or lack of relevant political opportunities (Meyer 2004).

According to Meyer (2004), the theory has five key components: mobilizing structures, political opportunities, framing processes, contentious repertoires and protest cycles. For Wang and Soule (2016), the other components are tactical innovation and adaptation. I discuss below only the mobilizing structures, political opportunities and tactical innovation and adaptation, as these have direct relevance to my study. Mobilizing structures are political and non-political organizations that advocate for change in a particular context (McAdam, McCarthy & Zald 1996). In the case of my study, these organizations are the collectives, SRC and GALZ. The theory states that the mobilizing structures, SRC and GALZ for the case of my study, serve the purpose of rallying together a social movement by providing spaces, mentorship, solidarity, leadership, membership, capacity development, information, knowledge, skills, communication channels, networks, partnerships, and collaborations for the social movement (ibid).

Another fundamental component of the PPT is the political opportunities, the exogenous political situations of a particular context with its unique legal and policy environment, human rights situation, protection mechanisms, and legitimacy questions of an incumbent government or system (see McAdam 1996). These opportunities collectively provide a framework and a boundary "for collective action, with chances and risks attached to them, which depend on factors outside" (Koopmans 2004: 65). For the case of my study, the political opportunities provide the framework and a boundary for HRBA operationalization by the mobilizing structures, that is, GALZ, SRC, and the collectives, and provide the chances for successful operationalization and the risks. The PPT envisages that political opportunities for instigating action have to be in place before organizations can achieve their goals (see McAdam 1996) -- HRBA operationalization in the case of my study. The organizations then attempt to take action, like HRBA operationalization within the boundaries of available political opportunities and processes (ibid).

The PPT states that risks exist as long as the government or the system is going through a challenging experience leading to its vulnerability (Chua 2012). For the PPT, while a government or system can experience vulnerabilities for many reasons, the causes invariably revolve around the legitimacy question, whereby the majority of citizens are not supportive of the heavy-handed manner and complex economic, political, legal, and social conditions of their particular government (ibid).

According to McAdam (1996:27), four main significant dimensions of political opportunity affect actions like the operationalization of HRBA, namely:

[...] degree of openness or closure of the political structure. [T]he extent of stability or instability of elite alignments that typically underpin a polity. [T]he availability of elite allies and the state's capacity and proclivity for repression.

The theory states that opportunities for change are an outcome of expanding political enfranchisement to include those previously or historically excluded (the MSM for the case of my study) and diverging views of leaders (Chua 2012). They also result from increased diversity and tolerance within political institutions. In addition, they are an outcome of loosening repressive techniques and structures that previously did not allow people to demand their entitlements and hold duty-bearers accountable for their obligations (McAdam et al. 1996).

The explanation above is vital for my study, given that it explores HRBA operationalization during a quasi 'changing' period from a repressive Mugabe regime to a Mnangagwa regime that has kept some of the repressive techniques and let others go. The relevance of the 'transitional period', despite the persistence of

a homophobic culture, relates to how lifting some of the repressive techniques, such as office raids and homophobic rhetoric, has influenced the experiences of activists in operationalizing HRBA. In Zimbabwe, the exogenous challenges faced by CSOs have been partly the result of a repressive national context. This context is an outcome of measures by a ruling political party doing everything it takes to retain power in response to pressure from mainly human rights CSOs, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) opposition political party, the rebelling business sector, and civil unrest (see Masunungure 2011). In Zimbabwe and elsewhere in the developing world, the double impact of neo-liberalism and authoritarianism has imposed a complex external operating environment for democracy, good governance, and human rights CSOs (Helliker 2012).

Opportunity is too broad a concept. In the case of HRBA operationalization in SR-MSM projects, it is difficult to determine which aspects of exogenous factors contribute to its success. For Gamson and Meyer (1996: 275), "the concept of political opportunity structure is in trouble, in danger of becoming the sponge that soaks up virtually every aspect of the social movement environment". I noted in Chapter Two that what the HRBA is operationalized "in relation to also matters a great deal for the implications of an HRBA" (Yamin & Cantor 2014:460). The degree of openness or restraint of Zimbabwe's political structure regarding the recognition of SR-MSM influences the extent of HRBA operationalization concerning SR-MSM. CSOs' access to legal registration, protection, and other human rights protection mechanisms also influences HRBA operationalization (see Beyeler & Rucht 2010). Given that opportunity is too broad a concept, my study focuses on the exogenous structures and the human rights situation that affect activists.

Tactical innovation is about devising techniques that enable Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) to further their objectives. For McAdam (1983), tactical innovations are essential, given that activists have limited institutionalized power. Innovation, therefore, offsets the powerlessness of the activists. It also increases their bargaining power. Tactical adaptation is the countering of tactical innovation techniques by the opponents (see Morris 2000). Often, innovative tactics, over time, face counter-tactics. The interaction of tactical innovation and adaptation influences collective action, such as HRBA operationalization in SR-MSM projects. Tactical innovations may include using various internet platforms, including social media, and unfamiliar platforms like homes, neighborhoods, and social events, in pushing for particular social action (ibid). Tactical innovation is relevant to my study.

Tactical adaptations may include using the police or the military (Earl 2003), harassment of activists, impeding mobilization and meetings, stigmatization, discrimination, ostracism, assault, imprisonment,

arrest, or killing of activists (Ferree 2004). Activists tend to assess the state's handling of public expressions of discontent, its vulnerability, and the availability of political opportunities for activism (Shriver & Adams 2010). The component of tactical adaptations is, however, not relevant to my analysis.

Before PPT emerged, society deemed political activists engaging in social agitation irrational and deranged (McAdam 1996). It viewed them as deviants rather than political actors. The PPT has overturned this view, exposing it as elitist, racist, and fundamentally patriarchal (Chua 2012, Noonan 1995, McAdam et al. 1996). The PPT offers my study a framework to understand that activists (and their allies in civil society and public and private sectors) are neither irrational nor deranged. It also explains the external political opportunities that construct boundaries for SR-MSM activism (Chua 2012).

The PPT helps to understand the dynamics of HRBA operationalization -- that operationalization involves a social movement that goes beyond mobilizing structures (organizations) and exogenous opportunities. Focusing on the exogenous political processes of societies, and disregarding the internal capacities and capacity constraints of CSOs, is but a limited way to explore failure or success in HRBA operationalization. Hence, my thesis is also concerned with the internal resource-dependent capacities and constraints of the CSOs. RMT helps to understand capacities and constraints, as well as the influence of the funding context or donors.

2.2.2 Resource Mobilization Theory

My study also employs the RMT. It emphasizes the centrality of resources (Zald & McCarthy 2002). According to McCarthy and Zald (1977:1217-18), resource mobilization is "a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society". The theory rose to prominence in the United States in the 1970s to explain the emergence and rise of social movements (see Jenkins 1983; Edwards & McCarthy 2004). The RMT posits that collective action is continuous, covers a wide range of social activities such as lobbying, awareness raising, and advocacy, and takes place in diverse settings such as the workplace, sports arenas, or at home; hence the depiction in my study of HRBA operationalization by CSOs as collective action (Corte 2013, Cress & Snow 1996).

According to the RMT, as expounded by McCarthy and Zald (1977), foundations, INGOs, and businesses (donors) contribute to SMOs. Representatives of these donors may also volunteer in these organizations; other stakeholders such as activists, leaders at various levels, and beneficiaries of the SMOs are seldom donors (ibid). The theory formulates a critical role for donors, which helps to explain the influence of the

international funding context. The staff members in these organizations are professionals (ibid). The organizations aim to keep themselves going (ibid). They are accountable more to the donors than to the beneficiaries. They use various means to manipulate the perceptions of donors and political decision-makers (ibid).

The RMT attempts to explain why social action occurs, focusing on society's inherent social bonds and structural conditions (Edwards & McCarthy 2004). It seeks to explain how social bonding and divisions change over time. The RMT posits that in any particular historical epoch, there is a need to outline the combinations of activists ready to embark on collective action (ibid). The RMT is critical of the emphasis of theories, like the social breakdown and relative deprivation theories (Curti 2008), that have identified discontent with the modes of dominance and deprivation used by a presiding government as a condition for collective action (McCarthy & Zald 1977). For the RMT, discontent is perhaps a necessary condition, but in itself not a sufficient one (ibid). The RMT posits that organizations must mobilize discontent so that dissatisfied activists can see the need for cooperation and come together to collaborate (see Edwards & McCarthy 2004).

The RMT, like the PPT, is critical of assumptions in theories like the mass society theory, which depicts collective action as spontaneous outbursts based on uncontrolled 'social contagion', and individuals who engage in collective action as crazed, alienated, irrational, atomized and highly gullible to the incitation of opposition leaders and ideologies (McCarthy & Zald 1977). The RMT sees activists engaging in collective action as goal-oriented, primarily rational, and practical. While McCarthy and Zald (1977) used the language of rational actors who weigh costs and benefits, Klandermans (1984) adds that actors use not the actual costs and benefits, but perceived and expected costs and benefits to make decisions.

HRBA operationalization is a resource-dependent collective action. The theory asserts that an organization's ability to acquire and use resources influences collective action, such as the operationalization of HRBA (Edwards & McCarthy 2004). Activists exercise agency and perform collective action within boundaries provided through a gamut of resources at an organization's disposal. Herein lies the weakness of the RMT, which assumes that collective action is a process of free choice of agentive activists bound only by the availability of resources, yet whose agency is also bound by political structures.

The RMT states that activists mobilize collective action to transform uncoordinated modes of working into strategies or frameworks (Edwards & McCarthy 2004). Unless activists mobilize uncoordinated working modes into such frameworks as the HRBA, an organization with resources may be unable to realize the full

potential of those resources (see Jenkins 1983). Organizations with limited resources and brave and committed activists who can efficiently use the few resources towards collective action can achieve more or less the same in operationalizing frameworks as those that are adequately resourced (Kendall 2006). The mere availability of brave and committed activists, on the one hand, or resources alone, on the other hand, is not sufficient for HRBA operationalization.

Coordination is required to enable brave and committed activists to process available resources into collective action (Corte 2013). In addition, efficiency in resource utilization more often compensates for other missing resources (ibid). In general, activists enhance the prospects of meaningful and effective collective action through the availability of resources (McCarthy & Zald 1977). The theory posits that access to resources depends on relations and networks built by an organization over time and, therefore, varies significantly between organizations (ibid).

According to Edwards and McCarthy (2004), there are five kinds or categories of resources. The first category is moral resources. These include sympathetic support, solidarity, and legitimacy. External actors tend to be the ones who grant or retract these resources (Cress & Snow 1996). They are less accessible to organizations (Corte 2013). The second category is cultural resources. These include artifacts and cultural products encompassing tools/instruments, knowledge of them, and other related processes and issues (Cress & Snow 1996, Corte 2013). They also include knowledge of operationalizing such frameworks as the HRBA, or collective action 'know-how' (ibid). Moreover, they include the prior experience of staff members in the organizations and their ability to understand and use organizational policies, strategic plans, websites, social media, and other templates, and external resources such as literature, media, and other relevant productions (ibid). Unlike moral resources, cultural resources are more accessible to organizations for independent use and are less proprietary (ibid). They enhance membership expansion and orientation and keep them mobilized and capacitated for collective action (ibid).

The third category is the social-organizational resources, divided into three general forms: infrastructures, social networks, and organizations (McCarthy 1996). Infrastructures include communication and technological infrastructure, including the website, internet, transportation, and sanitation (McCarthy 1987). Social networks include the collaborative platforms and spaces available to an organization. Organizations encompass collaborative partner organizations, public institutions, and donors (ibid). These resources are relevant for my study, as it delves into the role of partnerships between CSOs on one hand, and donors, collectives, universities, and health facilities on the other, in the operationalization of HRBAs.

The fourth category is human resources. They include the skill sets and expertise of the staff members of the organizations (Edwards & McCarthy 2004). These resources are relevant for my study in explaining capacities and internal constraints in HRBA operationalization. The last category is material resources, which refer to physical and financial capital. They include monetary resources, workstation equipment, space, and supplies (ibid). In the next section, I will discuss the conceptual framework.

2.3 Conceptual Framework

A conceptual framework identifies and explains variables of the study, how these variables connect in an integrated way to examine the problem under study and denote the researcher's guide in carrying out the study, or a structure that a researcher believes can best explain the phenomena under study (Patrick 2015). Adom and Hussein (2018) define a conceptual framework as a way of bringing together several related concepts and variables to explain or predict a given event. It is the researcher's explanation of how he/she explores the research problem (ibid). I conceptualize the political context and its various aspects, capacities and constraints; CSOs; the international funding context and its various aspects; and 'formal' HRBA operationalization as variables in this section.

Variables such as the political context, international funding context, capacities, and constraints are inspired and aligned to the theoretical framework discussed in section 2.2. In discussing the RMT, de Waal and Ibreck (2013) highlight the importance of the political context as a structural condition in influencing opportunities for collective action, like HRBA operationalization. An open or democratic political context would allow for HRBA operationalization more meaningfully than a closed or repressive political context (Meyer 2004). Therefore, the political context becomes a relevant variable for my study. Engels and Müller (2019), in highlighting the relevance of the RMT to contexts like Zimbabwe, note that social movements in the South lack such resources as funding, and have limited opportunities in the South to generate the funding, hence the need for international donors. In line with this thinking, the international funding context is a conceptual variable of my study. Engels and Müller (2019) further note that financial resources alone are insufficient; this highlights the importance of other resources, such as cultural resources. However, the extent of utilization of these resources depends on the capacities and constraints of the CSOs. Capacities and constraints, therefore, become relevant conceptual variables in my study.

2.3.1 Political Context

The term context has been conceptualized in various fields of study and is often prefixed with such adjectives as cultural, social, economic, historical, or national, to mention a few. There is a need to define the term, particularly when prefixed by the adjective 'political'. For my study, a context has:

[...] a supplementary role: It [brings in and adds to] the understanding of a phenomenon—the focal object—that would not have been adequately understood had it been considered in isolation. A context thus completes the conditions for understanding the focal object [...] context is not a neutral layout of things or properties near the focal object, nor is it a set of circumstances or an indefinite "background". It is ordered and organized by its relations to the focal object, which co-determines what properties of the surroundings are relevant and thus part of the context [...] The context both determines and is [...] determined by the object (Dohn, Hansen & Klausen 2018:4-5).

The adjective 'political' prefixing the term 'context' reveals the focus in my study on those aspects of the term that are related to activities, affairs, and relations related to gaining authority in social institutions such as the state, CSOs, and the church (Flinders 2018). Political context also depicts political opportunities available for CSOs, which either enhance or inhibit prospects for HRBA operationalization. CSOs can operationalize HRBA if sufficient exogenous opportunities are available in the political context in which they operate (Hooghe 2005).

2.3.1.1 Political Context – Indigeneity of Sexual Rights/Struggles

I must conceptualize the indigeneity of same-sex sexualities because my findings chapters engage with them. My position, anchored in my analysis of the works of Epprecht (1998), Evans-Pritchard (1973), Dlamini (2006), Chitando and Mateveke (2017), and Bertolt (2019), among others, is that same-sex sexualities are autochthonous to Africa and not a 'western pervasion'. Epprecht (1998) has revisited archival evidence, such as rock paintings, that show same-sex sexualities. Also, a respected ethnographer on indigenous Africa, Evans-Pritchard (1973), notwithstanding the near absence of same-sex sexualities in his work, provided evidence that same-sex sexualities are indigenous to Africa in a journal in 1957 (Dlamini 2006).

Empirical evidence has persuaded many scholars (Epprecht 1998, 1999, 2004, Goddard 2004, Phillips 2011, Han & O'Mahoney 2014, Campbell 2002, Dunton & Palmberg 1996) to conclude that same-sex sexualities existed in Africa before contact with Europeans and that it was the colonial project that besmirched same-sex sexualities as abhorrent. The colonial project enabled the construction of heterosexuality as a superior sexuality, which European settlers had to safeguard through legislation enabling colonial domination (ibid). I note the likes of Chimininge and Makamure (2017), Chemhuru (2012), Shoko (2010), Muyembe and Muyembe (2001), and Gelfand (1985) who tend to rely more on functionalism than on empirical evidence in arguing for non-tolerance of MSM and SR-MSM, and for the exclusive existence of procreation-oriented heterosexual practices and behaviors in African 'culture'. I also acknowledge the silence about the existence of same-sex sexualities in the works of most "anthropologists who visited Africa during the first half of the twentieth century", then commentators on African societies (Essien & Aderinto 2009:123), and in the 13th

Century Manden Charter¹⁹, but I still hold the position that same-sex sexualities are indigenous to Africa and Zimbabwe.

Scholars Oloruntoba-Oju (2011) and Dlamini (2006) agree that there is very little dispute that same-sex sexualities existed in Africa before contact with Europeans and that there was great tolerance -- not necessarily in words – but in practice. They argue that the besmirching of same-sex sexualities by colonial authorities marked the emergence of its condemnation, that is, homophobia, which was not prevalent in pre-colonial Africa. While other scholars have argued that same-sex sexualities are not indigenous to Africa (Mabvurira & Matsika 2013), it appears from various scholarly accounts that it is, in fact, the Western gay identity and homophobia that are alien to indigenous Africa and that these were instigated and reinforced through the colonial project, primarily through missionary activities (Swidler 1993, Parrinder 1980).

What is evident from the foregoing is the ‘invention of African tradition’, which is circulated on various platforms as opposed to same-sex practices. Also evident is the ‘invention of gay identity in Africa’, that is, a name depicting a distinct category called ‘gay’ or ‘homosexual’, whereas the type of same-sex practices commonly referred to as ‘gay’ or ‘homosexual’ has always been present in pre-colonial Africa (Dlamini 2006). In addition, Dlamini (2006) has noted that the categorization of people in Africa has always been central to the success of the colonial project.

Same-sex sexualities and sexual rights were not central only to colonial rule; independent Africa also inherited notions about same-sex sexualities as having Western origins. Bertolt (2019) refutes assertions that homophobia is indigenous to Africa, and argues that it is a co-construction phenomenon invented during colonial rule and maintained by African agency in post-colonial Africa. Nationalists and African leaders such as Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Arap Moi of Kenya, Chiluba of Zambia, Museveni of Uganda, and Bingu Wa Mutharika of Malawi recanted toleration of same-sex practices. They recast the ‘invented African tradition’ that denoted such practices as opposed to African norms and values (Nyanzi 2013). While Dlamini (2006) highlighted that the dichotomy, such as ‘gay/straight, was a product of colonial orientalist categorizations, these terms have continued in independent Africa, and politicians often employ them in homocritical utterances.

¹⁹ It is one of the oldest constitutions in the world. It was the oral declaration of rights for people under the newly established Mali Empire created in 1300. It contained various human rights such as right to life, physical integrity, and right to education for children, the right to fair treatment for women, respect for marriage among others (see Achour 2021).

Decolonization, the HIV/AIDS crisis, and specific forms of conservative religiosity and neo-populism, however, necessitated increased attention to SR-MSM and a surge in the mobilization of resources by INGOs in the North to assist CSOs in the Global South. For Wright (2000:107), “the AIDS epidemic fostered the sudden foundation of gay organizations in unlikely places”. A significant chunk of the resources has been directed towards LGBTQ+ activism that is recasting sexual rights as human rights in African settings, marking the beginning of a push for a U-turn towards tolerating same-sex sexualities in Africa, but not as it existed in pre-colonial times. The push is toward tolerating Western gay identity by projecting SR-MSM as human rights, using such approaches as the HRBA. The push is, however, facing resistance from some pockets of conservative religious circles and populist nationalists. As a result, homophobia has increased in many countries in the South, in part as a backlash to LGBTQ+ activism, connected to the growth of particular forms of conservative religiosity and the rise of neo-populism (Gosine 2005, Armas 2005, and Jolly & Corrêa 2006).

Under the FR-GoZ, i.e., from colonial independence in 1980 to 2017, when Mugabe was disposed of, the authorities used repression techniques such as homophobic rhetoric, office raids, and threats through legal or quasi-legal, legislative, policy, and administrative interventions (Chakawarika 2011). Dionne, Dulani, and Chunga (2014) reveal that 94.7% of the population in Zimbabwe viewed SR-MSM as not enforceable by law. While the LGBTQ+ community is not homogenous, and is affected differently by the criminalization of same-sex marriages, “they share experiences of structural, institutional and individual discrimination and marginalization based on their sexual orientation and gender identity” (Meer et al. 2017:6).

2.3.1.2 Political Context - Harassment of Activists

Political harassment of LGBTQ+ activists also marks Zimbabwe’s national political context. Two studies, the first by Dunton and Palmberg (1996) and the second by Schafer and Range (2014), highlight the political harassment of activists, where assailants murdered David Kato, leader of a CSO called Sexual Minorities Uganda, on 26 January 2011. GALZ faced homophobic rhetoric and threats, search and seizure of property, intimidation, and labeling of its activists as regime change agents, or agents of foreign cultures in Zimbabwe (ibid, Dunton & Palmberg 1996). My analysis chapters further deal with the persecution of GALZ activists, adding how such persecution adversely affected HRBA operationalization.

2.3.1.3 Political Context – Culture

The conceptually elusive term ‘culture’ also forms a crucial analytical frame for my findings related to the influence of the political context on the operationalization of HRBAs, in that the politics of SR-MSM often

draw heavily from culture. A seminal definition of culture portrays it as a “complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, arts, morals, laws, customs, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” (Taylor 1871:1). Geertz (2000:14) is of the view that culture is “best seen not as complexes of concrete behavior patterns – customs, usages, traditions, habit clusters”, but “as a set of control mechanisms – plans, recipes, rules, instructions for the governing of behavior” (Geertz 2000: 44). The above conceptualization helps to assert the relationship between politics and culture in that politics, as seminal works on the subject have suggested, is about governing behavior (Oppenheim 1956). Macionis (2012: 54) defines culture as “ways of thinking, [...] acting, and the material objects that together form a people’s way of life”. I adopt Geertz’s (2000) conceptualization of culture as a set of control mechanisms for governing behavior, given its proximity to the PPT’s component of bounded opportunities, which explains that practice happens as controlled by a context. Moreover, this conceptualization is of relevance in explaining my findings.

I heed the warning of Phillips (2006:7) against exaggerating the influence of ‘culture’ as the basis for violations of the rights of women, and see the warning as relevant against overrating the influence of ‘culture’ in justifying violations of SR-MSM:

[...] for we know that the cultural brokers who take on the role of interpretation [of ‘culture’] may be a narrowly unrepresentative elite, employing what they claim to be the unbreakable traditions of their culture to reinforce the subordination of [SR-MSM for the case of my study]. We also know – from the other side – that it can be problematic simply to invoke the rights of [MSM] against the claims of cultural groups. This can leave [MSM] with an unhappy choice between their rights or their culture and seems to ignore the inequalities between majority and minority groups that first gave the impetus to debates on multiculturalism. In representing some cultures as more [homophobic] than others, it can also give a perverse legitimacy to [homophobic] and racist attacks.

Therefore, in my analysis, I bear in mind the tendency to interpret the assumptions of influential, and often elite, traditional leaders as to what constitutes ‘culture’ as representative of what culture is, and as being more significant than what less powerful non-custodians of culture perceive as culture.

The concept of *Ubuntu* features prominently in discussions about Zimbabwean ‘culture’. *Ubuntu* is a philosophy shared among Africans at home and in their diaspora. Khomba (2011) has found derivatives of the term in major Nguni languages spoken by most Bantu people in Africa. Morphologically, the term depicts personhood or humanness, and “consists of the augment prefix, u-, the abstract noun prefix bu- and the noun stem –ntu, meaning person” in Nguni languages (Kamwangamalu 2016:25). Various African thought leaders have made attempts to explain the term, building either on the morphological translation of the term or on their lived experiences. For Desmond Tutu, *Ubuntu* entails:

A person is a person through other persons. None of us comes into the world fully formed. We would not know how to think, walk, speak, or behave as human beings unless we learned it from other human beings. We need other human beings to be human (Tutu 2004:25).

In practice, the *Ubuntu* philosophy is enforced through the idiom ‘*Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu*’; this idiom evades accurate translation to the English language. However, an attempt to translate this idiom yielded the following: “a person is a person because of or through others” and “I am because we are” (Tutu 2004:25-26, Moloketi 2009:243). To synthesize the various ways literature conceptualizes the term: *Ubuntu* is a Bantu people's cultural philosophy, which denotes behaviors and practices adhering to communality, solidarity, reciprocity, mutuality, interdependence, compassion, responsibility, and dignity (Nussbaum 2003, Moloketi 2009).

2.3.1.4 Political Context – Religion

Scholars have had a long-standing history of grappling with various ways in which they conceptualize the term ‘religion’ in seminal literature from which other later definitions sprung. For Müller (1873) and Tylor (1891), it is the universal belief in a supernatural being. Frazer (1927) states that religion involves the appeasing of supernatural beings. Durkheim (1915) defines it as a standard system of social behaviors, practices, and beliefs in a moral community. For Otto (1950), religion is about the sanctuary and extraordinary presence that generates feelings of mystery, fascination, and fear. Geertz (1971) sees religion as a system of symbols denoting a cosmological perception, and shaping a way of life concerning human relations, the world, and individuals. Drawing from the above definitions, and for this study, religion is a standard system of practices and behaviors anchored in a belief in supernatural beings and the need to continuously pacify them, thereby shaping, organizing, and defining the moral environment of a community or communities.

My interest in the ambiguous concept of religion is in how I deploy it as an analytic-conceptual tool in my analysis to understand its influence on HRBA operationalization: that is, how aspects of religion help to prohibit or abate religious stigma, discrimination, and persecution of activists and protect freedom of religion for the activists. The absence of, in particular, legal definitions of the concept of religion in most human rights instruments, international law, and national constitutions attests to the difficulty of defining the concept (Gunn 2016). However, authorities often require individuals, such as refugees (Gunn 2016) and activists, for the case of my study, to appear before such institutions as courts.

The authorities expect adjudicators and judges to make judgments and rulings based on assumptions ‘common’ to them about the concept. In reality, there is no common understanding of religion among the

lawyers or academics, and those appearing before such institutions as the courts. This lack of understanding leaves the concept of religion open to manipulation and, in the case of my study, open to instrumentalization and weaponization by authorities against activists. The ‘lack’ of a legal definition also renders activists unreligious, given that authorities, the general public, legal practitioners, the LGBTQ+ people, and other religious actors could perceive their social and sexual practices and behaviors as inconsistent with the doctrines of their religion.

2.3.2 International Funding Context – Queer Imperialism

I also conceptualize international funding within the context of queer imperialism. In my study, I critically engage with assumptions of ‘queer imperialism’. Queer imperialism refers to the heavy-handed manner in which, mostly governments and, to an extent, other development actors in the Global North, enforce rights on governments in the South using their position of power and resources (Meer, Lunau, Oberth, Daskilewicz, & Müller 2017). It is about heavy-handed 'imposition' of SR-MSM from outside the country resulting in an ethnocentric, 'one size fits all' model of 'sexual rights empowerment', without considering how people experience and perceive sexuality in different local contexts (Meer et al. 2017). As explained by Chimininge and Makamure (2017:83-84):

The pressure [...] exerted by the international donors requiring stricter adherence [...] to human rights has intensified incidences of unethical practices [...] in Africa, hence an ethical crisis. [B]ecause of donor pressure, Africa is supposed to receive whatever the West has imposed upon her. [Among other ideologies] Africa has to consume from the West is the rights-based approach to development.

Such queer imperialism relies on donors' mobilized power and resources in the Global North to impose foreign views on countries in the South. According to Meer et al. (2017:6), there is a “widespread perception that the human rights discourse is a not-so-subtle form of Western donor ‘queer’ imperialism” (see also Epprecht 2012:228).

My thesis explores how aid donors and recipients understand, interpret, and translate HRBAs in the context of debates on queer imperialism, and what capacities and constraints affect CSOs in implementing projects that draw on HRBAs. While some challenges with HRBA operationalization emanate from inhibitive national political and international funding contexts, others are internal to the CSOs.




Figure 1: Typical ‘Imperialist’ HRBAs to SR-MSM

Source: Created by the Author.

Above, I have rejected the argument that non-heteronormative practices are a Western import, and argued that homophobia is a result of Western colonization. While some Western aid is used to fight homophobia, other funding from politically and religiously conservative and far-right groups, particularly from the USA, provides financial and material incentives to religious or political leaders and institutions in African countries that promote homophobia (Dreier, Long & Winkler 2020). This situation reflects north-south power relations, and structural racism, as captured in the colonial ideologies of ‘civilizing mission’ and ‘white saviors’, which problematizes development interventions to advance sexual rights.

It is, therefore, critical to recognize the impact of anti-gay rhetoric (Patil 2017) in determining the activities of CSOs. Debates on the impact of queer imperialism on support for African CSOs are heated. Carrier (2012b) believes that foreign funding can sometimes deradicalize activists and lead to an NGOization of gender and sexuality social movements (see section 2.3.7) created by systems of donor funding dependency affecting the work of CSOs. He notes that there is mixed evidence of “queer imperialism” regarding the support given to CSOs by such INGOs as Hivos. Donors like Hivos seem cautious and work in consultation with African activists to avoid imposing Western gay agendas on recipient CSOs (ibid).

Nevertheless, politicians continue to consider CSOs as part of regime change politics. They do so because politicians foster regime change through aid conditionality, and the use of CSOs to portray a poor human

rights record for LGBTQ+ people, to give the West a basis to impose sanctions (see Owen 2010). The assumption is that the ultimate goals of regime change politics border on exerting pressure that will replace governments and other institutions with puppets (Reiter 2017). Politicians perceive HRBAs to SR-MSM as a strategy of agents in favor of regime change of deliberately contriving to have the country fail to protect these rights. Politicians cannot canvass or protect the SR-MSM out of fear of losing political and electoral relevance as these rights are not recognized by the ‘majority’. For the politicians in government, their failure to protect SR-MSM creates a basis for the imposition of sanctions. The sanctions create economic and social hardships that lead to the ‘majority’ opting for regime change. Therefore, CSOs and their donors have faced resistance in their operationalization of HRBAs to SR-MSM.

2.3.3 International Funding Context – Partnerships

For over two decades, 'partnerships' has been an important topic in relation to development. A partnership is a formal alliance of actors working toward a common purpose (WHO 2003). WHO (2003) defines a partner as a stakeholder participating in a partnership on an equal footing with the other/s. I consider the ‘partnerships’ as a central concept in the international funding context partly because, among other things, it purports to downplay power dynamics, one-way flow of capacity to the South, and aid conditionalities, thereby projecting INGOs and the local CSOs as equal partners. Nevertheless, they are not equal partners (Bailey & Dolan 2011).

Yamin and Cantor (2014:474) highlight that the term ‘partners’ “[...] tends to erase the inherent asymmetry of power between donors and recipients [where donors] often determine what [...] programs to support”. Failure to toe the line of the donors often leads to the collapse of the partnership, which may mean a loss of funding to recipient CSOs (Meer et al. 2017). Elliott (1987: 65) expresses similar sentiments:

[...] this is a dialogue of the unequal, and however many claims are made for transparency or mutuality, the reality is - and is seen to be - that the donor can do to the recipient what the recipient cannot do to the donor, [depicting an] asymmetry of power that no amount of well-intentioned dialogue can remove.

Lister (2000) underlines that literature also criticizes North-South partnerships as a Northern-imposed idea designed to legitimize Northern donors for their interference in the South, and to dissipate notions of queer imperialism. Lewis (1998) sees the use of the term ‘partnerships’ as a strategy for donors playing an intermediary role in promoting their institutional survival in the face of stiff competition for resources, rather than as a means to level power relations or shift power to the South. Dichter (1989) sees the concept as masking the reality that partnerships are often alliances between individuals and not organizations, and that successful partnerships are based on strong personal relationships.

Including partnerships as a conceptual framework allows for analysis of the power dynamics within the partnerships of donors and the local CSOs. The levels of violations of SR-MSM have prompted funding support by governments in the Global North, and other private foundations, towards local initiatives to address those rights (Lister 2000). Given their shortcomings related to a lack of context-specific knowledge about SR-MSM and experience in local initiatives, these governments and foundations have engaged INGO intermediaries to distribute this funding support more effectively on their behalf.

Most donor INGOs have their headquarters and raise funds from their governments and other back-donors in developed countries, have global operations and influence, and work through ‘partnerships’ with local CSOs in the Global South (Velasco 2018). The roles of INGOs in these ‘partnerships’ include providing various resources, but mainly funding, capacity strengthening of the CSOs through training, and advocacy on behalf of the CSOs on global platforms (ibid). In my thesis, and in line with the RMT, I conceptualize INGOs as intermediaries linked to the mobilization of resources for local CSOs through North-South partnerships. Lister (2000) notes that the literature tends to project North-South partnerships as enabling efficient use of scarce resources, contributing to project sustainability, and improving targeted communities' participation in development cooperation.

2.3.4 CSO Capacities

To understand constraints, one needs first to explore the meaning of capacity. Among the many concepts in development that elude a universally accepted meaning is the concept of capacity (Morgan 2006). Nevertheless, scholars have mapped the central ideas that accompany the concept of capacity: capacity as exclusively a human resource issue, capacity as training, and capacity as the ability to deliver (Brinkerhoff & Morgan 2010, Morgan 2006). I use the term capacity to refer to the ability of CSOs to create public value, that is, the ability to achieve a desired collective contribution to public life (Morgan 2006, Brinkerhoff & Morgan 2010). As Morgan (2006:6-7) states:

Capacity is about [...] collective ability, [...] involving a complex combination of attitudes, resources, strategies, and skills, both tangible and intangible [...]. Capacity is a potential state. It is elusive and transient. It is about latent as opposed to kinetic energy [...]. Given this latent quality, capacity is dependent to a large degree on intangibles. It is thus hard to induce, manage and measure. As a state or condition, it can disappear quickly, particularly in smaller, more vulnerable structures. This potential state may require the use of different approaches to its development, management, assessment, and monitoring (Morgan 2006:6-7).

Brinkerhoff and Morgan (2010:3) sum up the preceding by looking at capacity as referring to five core capabilities: to "carry out technical, service delivery and logistical tasks", to commit and engage, to relate and attract support, to adapt and self-renew, and lastly to "balance diversity and coherence".

Morgan (2006) uses the concept of capacities to highlight what an organization can be or do. The concept refers to the confluence of opportunities and abilities that arise from the availability of internal resources to overcome external constraints toward achieving goals. My study adapts the concept to reflect on the quality of viability of the CSOs. To get a sense of the viability of CSOs as actors, my study focuses on the internal opportunities, including resources and collective staff knowledge commanded by these organizations and available towards HRBA operationalization. Constraints relate to conditions and factors that threaten and impede these abilities.

2.3.5 CSO Constraints

I use the term constraints to refer to various internal challenges encountered by CSOs. These constraints relate to compromised foundations, scarcity of material and financial resources, and fragmentation. Others include a lack of internal democracy, amateurism, and lack of strategy (Moyo, Makumbe & Raftopoulos, 2000; McCandless & Pajibo 2003). Compromised foundations entail weak structures and wayward motivations at formative stages. For example, from their very formative stages, some CSOs are not anchored in their domestic constituencies (Masunungure 2011). The primary motivation for establishing CSOs often hinges more on getting donor funding and less on assisting constituencies; this results in little accountability and transparency (Sachikonye 2007). For Sachikonye (2007), these organizations have suffered from the founder-member syndrome, a tendency of founder members to perceive organizations as their own.

Another key defining feature in my conceptualization of the term constraints relates to the RMT, particularly the scarcity of financial and material resources. Since activists have founded some CSOs on the back of donor funds (Zeilig & Ansell 2008), they have no alternative sources of financial and material support. Brown and Kalegaonkar (2002) have observed that CSO viability requires financial and material support from sources other than donors for their independence. Fragmentation, as a critical variable in understanding constraints, is about the lack of collaborative initiatives among CSOs. Saki and Katema (2011) assert that Zimbabwe's civil society has remained fragmented along political, ideological, and tribal lines in competing for funding, affecting its viability. Mohan (2002) opines that it is foolhardy to assume that individual organizations in civil society coalitions within a given country are working towards common objectives, and notes among coalitions a tendency of authoritarian forms of leadership and god-father/mother syndrome. This has led to some CSOs working in isolation.

Activists have focused these fights foremost on the competition for funding, whereby coalitions turn into new organizations or abuse their coalition status, credibility, and profile, using the latter as a competitive

advantage when competing with their member CSOs for donor funding (Zigomo 2012). Internal elections for leadership positions in these coalitions and networks; organizational culture and procedures; ideological positions; participation in particular processes; and underrepresentation of particular groups or constituencies have all caused disputes and divisions (ibid). Beyond fights in coalitions and networks, animosity between individual organizations has also arisen over niche or focus areas. Alluding to turf wars, Masunungure (2011) calls this ‘organizational sovereignty’, which militates against effective and sustained collaboration.

Masunungure (2011) admonishes CSOs to conceive of the struggle for democratization at two levels: internally within the organizations, and externally, meaning democratization as it relates to state and national politics. Brown and Kalegaonkar (2002) echo the same sentiments, stating that practitioners should conceive the effectiveness of the broader struggle for democratization internally, by dint of the effectiveness of internal democracy in relation to corporate governance.

Brown and Kalegaonkar (2002) have identified amateurism as one of the internal constraints faced by civil society. Zimbabwe Institute (2008) notes that amateurism and poor strategy have compelled CSOs to operate on short-term projects, characterized by spontaneity and militancy. As much as this earns the CSOs much-needed publicity for fundraising purposes (Zigomo 2012), the transient impetus quickly dissipates until the next activity. Amateurism and poor strategy also relate to a dilemma of organizational growth: voluntarism and activism on the one hand, and careerism and professionalism on the other (Zimbabwe Institute 2008).

2.3.6 ‘Formal’ HRBAs: Conceptualization

As with many other development concepts, the term HRBA eludes a universally accepted definition. There are arguments that HRBA as a catchall notion mirrors the “complexity of the development issues and challenges facing institutions such as NGOs” (Mitlin & Hickey 2009: 9). Furthermore, attempts at conceptualizing HRBAs within the field of SR-MSM seem to be limited, with Chimininge and Makamure (2017) stating that the approach is of less significance in SR-MSM. My analysis in Chapter 8 explores how donors and activists understood and applied HRBAs to SR-MSM on the ground.

HRBA has come to mean several things, to a point where it makes more sense, and it becomes more accurate to talk of Human Rights-based Approaches (HRBAs) in the plural. However, for my study, and based on a review of the works of Ghanem (2022), Miller (2017), OHCHR (2006), and Boesen and Martin (2007), the term includes several dimensions. It is a conceptual framework, developed from Locke’s doctrine of a God-

given natural law (Ghanem 2022) that merges human rights and human development. It achieves this merging by giving equal importance to process and results (Miller 2017). In guiding human development, this approach consciously and systematically integrates human rights, international human rights instruments, standards, normative elements, and principles (Boesen & Martin 2007). For my study, this means that it integrates sexual rights with instruments like the consensus instruments on sexual rights (CISR), which include the Yogyakarta principles, and principles like non-discrimination of LGBTQ+ people. It relies on local, national, regional, and international human rights protection mechanisms in all phases and stages of programming, policy formulation, or other development processes (OHCHR 2013). For my study, this entails relying on courts and international platforms, such as the UN Universal Periodic Review process.

2.3.7 Civil Society Organizations

The term CSOs is derived from the concept of civil society. Civil society has a long-standing history in Western philosophy (Keane 2009). Since the late 1980s, the concept has been a buzz or catchphrase in contemporary development, and scholars regard organizations drawn from civil society as crucial development actors (Keane 1998, Laine 2014, Putnam 1995, Kumar 1993). The conceptualization of the term ‘civil society’ has been at the core of debates on civil society, with scholars criticizing the various emerging definitions for their lack of empirical rigor (Foley & Hodgkinson 2003). The literature views civil society first, in line with the writings of Locke, as a constitutional state; second according to Hegel, as a system of needs; third, in line with de Tocqueville, as associational life; and fourthly in line with Marx, as a realm of conflict (Locke 1965, Hegel 2003 [1821], de Tocqueville 2003 [1848], Gramsci, Hoare & Smith 1971). The changing perspectives on civil society, all of which develop into contemporary debates (Laine 2014), reflect the changing pedestal from which different thinkers in different historical epochs have conceived the relationship between the family/society, market/economy, state, and lately, global institutions such as the Bretton Woods.

In contemporary debates, scholars understand civil society in terms of the space it occupies and its function. Understanding civil society as a space denotes a descriptive concept, pointing out that it is a distinct space outside the state, family, and market (Chandhoke 2007). The understanding of civil society as a function denotes it as a normative concept in outlining what utopian ideal civil society ought to be and to do, and that is the understanding that activities of civil society are non-partisan, and promote human rights, governance, and democracy (Fukuyama 2001, Seligman 1992).

For my thesis, I use CSOs as an umbrella term for the various non-governmental, non-partisan, and not-for-profit networks, donor organizations, INGOs, SMOs, and community groups. Although these are normatively outside the state, market, and family, they interconnect with all these spaces. They “enable all citizens to ensure a degree of government accountability” (Schwedler 1995:5), yet critics view them as promoting the personal and private interests of careerist staff, in particular management, and as more accountable to donors than to their constituencies (Lang 2013), Choud & Kapoor 2013). Idealists say that CSOs are institutionalizing “the [organizational] and public [interests] as a medium of democratic self-reflection” (Merkel 2004:47) through playing oversight/watchdog, advocacy, capacity development, and service provision roles (Cooper 2018).

In addition, I conceptualize CSOs as linked, first, to social capital through "social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them" (Putnam 1995:19). Compared to the state, they also have the upper hand in external development aid mobilization, as the North has primarily redirected away from the state to CSOs' traditional flow of development aid (Kitschelt 1986, McCarthy & Zald 1987). The oversight/watchdog role signifies the involvement of CSOs in monitoring the actions of duty-bearers, including the state, towards increasing transparency and accountability by raising the alarm in instances when accountability and transparency are lacking (Moyo 2014b).

The advocacy role involves various initiatives, including campaigns, lobbying, litigation, networking, research, and education (Rapaport, Manthorpe, Moriarty, and Hussein & Collins 2005). The capacity development role is about developing rights holders' abilities and skill sets through training, mentorship, and other initiatives (Clayton, Oakley & Taylor 2000). The service provision role entails affording various health, education, and social amenities services through the initiatives of CSOs, notwithstanding that the primary duty bearer for these services is the state (Lewis & Khanji 2009). These roles, taken together, are in theory pivotal in fighting corruption, documenting and reporting human rights violations, and bridging gaps left behind by the Zimbabwe state as it rolls back from its obligations under the yoke of neo-liberalism and mismanagement of governance (Moyo 2014b).

I also explore the term CSOs within an ongoing debate on the process of 'NGOization', meaning the transformation from loosely organized social movements to vertically structured and formal funding-dependent organizations that aim to bring about social changes (Lang 2013, Choud & Kapoor 2013). The preceding is vital, given that my study is also targeting community-mobilizing movements known as collectives that are somewhat in the process of NGOization through mentorship by the SRC. NGOization

entails professionalization, institutionalization, bureaucratization, depoliticization, and demobilization of social movements. These variables are not mutually exclusive, given that one variable influences others.

Based on a synthesis of the works of Lang (2013) and Choud and Kapoor (2013), the variables are about the following. Professionalization is a process whereby SMOs move beyond relying predominantly on the often voluntary action of passionate activists, towards increasingly engaging employees and resource people with qualifications, expertise, and management skills. These people are often careerists, engaged primarily for pay. As a means of livelihood and by means of their expertise, they can carry out tasks in line with institutional norms, core values, structures, best practices, and appropriate language. In institutionalization, SMOs progressively develop and adhere to the dictates of foundational and governance documents, rules, procedure manuals, and policies in their day-to-day operations and interactions. Bureaucratization refers to a process whereby SMOs increasingly perform their actions under the control, guidance, and direction of complicated structures, regulations, and formalities, often at the expense of timely action. Depoliticization relates to the detachment of SMOs from social action, issues, and affairs related to actors gaining, retaining, or losing authority or power. Demobilization refers to a process where interest in the radical engagement of duty-bearers dissipates in favor of conformism. NGOization and, in particular, depoliticization and demobilization, detach the SMOs from their constituencies, affecting these communities' broader struggle for rights.

Collectives/SMOs targeted through my study are the community mobilizing movements undergoing the process of NGOization. They include ARMZ, NeoteriQ, ZIMAHA, and Intersex Advocate (sic) Trust Zimbabwe (IAZ). Each of these organizations focuses on a specific sub-population-group within the broader LGBTQ+ community. ARMZ focuses on gay and bisexual men and other MSM; IAZ focuses on intersex people; NeoteriQ focuses on lesbian and bisexual women; and ZIMAHA focuses on gay men and other MSM who predominantly live positively with HIV, meaning they are HIV positive and at the same time optimistic about being HIV positive.

The SRC houses and mentors these SMOs toward professionalization and institutionalization. NGOization often occurs as qualified professionals seek to base their careers as activists on the need to access resources available to registered organizations, be visible to various stakeholders, and formalize collaborations and networks with other institutions (Lang 2013). Finances remain the subject of debate in the literature: in as much as financial resources are central to collective action, NGOization results in financial dependency on donors; fixation on vertical accountability to donors at the expense of inward accountability to staff

members, board and registered members; horizontal accountability to ‘partner’ CSOs; and downward accountability to communities (Choud & Kapoor 2013).

At the core of this debate is the question of agenda setting, whereby the donors, and not the communities, define the agenda, yet the CSOs represent the rights of community members (Reinsborough 2004). Agenda setting results in these organizations gradually detaching and distancing themselves from their social base, and deviating from initially set strategic goals. A further subject of debate is that NGOization, with its push for professionalization and bureaucratization, increases the power of 'experts' and management, reduces that of activists, demobilizes activists, and depoliticizes the work of organizations as they get overwhelmed by the demands of management and bureaucratic processes and tools (Choudry & Kapoor 2013, Edwards 2014).

Furthermore, I explore the concept of civil society within debates around the accountability of CSOs. The concept of accountability has two internal and external dimensions, the latter referring to the processes by which stakeholders hold people, groups, or organizations accountable for their actions or the resources they use, and how they report to a recognized authority about actions and resources used (see Broberg & Sano 2017, Naidoo 2003). Regarding the internal component, the idea is to take ownership of the ambitions articulated through the mission, vision, and organizational objectives/goals of CSOs. Due to highly publicized incidents that have caused people to lose trust in CSOs, accountability in CSOs has taken up more discursive space since the 1990s (Kaldor 2003).

Naidoo (2003) importantly emphasizes that the age of ‘blind faith’ in such institutions as CSOs, which have the mandate to demand that the state be accountable, is over. Blind faith has been replaced by accountability, whereby CSOs are also accountable to their stakeholders. Civil society’s demand for state accountability makes sense when the CSOs are also accountable (Fox 2000). For CSOs, four dimensions of accountability have been established: vertical, 'upward' accountability, often to donors; 'inward' accountability to staff, board, volunteers, and registered members of an organization; 'downward' accountability to local communities or beneficiaries; and 'horizontal' accountability to ‘partner’ CSOs and other collaborative stakeholders (see Naidoo 2003). Some CSOs are obsessed with vertical accountability at the expense of downward and horizontal dimensions of accountability (Slim 2002). Five fundamental accountability mechanisms used by CSOs in practice are: reports and disclosure statements, performance assessments and evaluations, participation, self-regulation, and social audits (Ebrahim 2003:813).

Sachikonye (2007) observed that in Zimbabwe, while a civil society 'industry' was booming post-2000, thanks to donor funding, there was little accountability and transparency, especially concerning the downward dimension. Citizens had 'blind faith' in CSOs and the MDC opposition political party (Munemo 2014, Court & Amy 2005, Bratton & Masunungure 2011). From the 1990s to post-2000, a rolling back state and a liberalized economy, coupled with international isolation of the country because of global sanctions, made citizens suffer (see *ibid*). This suffering led to resentment of the ZANU PF ruling political party and affinity to the opposition MDC political party, and to 'blind faith' in CSOs as an escape from suffering (*ibid*).

Most human rights CSOs also distanced themselves from accountability to the ZANU PF government; this fueled mutual distrust between the government and the CSOs, often resulting in hostile relations characterized by office raids, confiscation of CSO equipment and materials, and assaults by the police (Court & Amy 2005). The First Republic Government of Zimbabwe (FR-GoZ) depicted CSOs as conniving with the West to be foot soldiers of a regime change agenda in the country (Ncube 2010, Bratton & Masunungure 2011).

The ZANU PF government sees and treats CSOs as threats to its continued role as a party of power (Munemo 2014, Court & Amy 2005, Bratton & Masunungure 2011). Common phenomena are surveillance, spying, scrutiny, and censoring of CSOs, often using party and government officials and state resources and institutions to protect ZANU PF interests (*ibid*). The literature reports that harmonious relations between CSOs and governments exist as long as CSOs require from the governments little more than the freedom to exist, without seeking to influence development in ways that are incompatible with the interests of the government (see Kaldor 2003). The operational context often compels the CSOs targeted through my study to fit into this category. These debates on CSOs about NGOization and accountability are relevant in light of the organizations and context of my study.

2.3.8 Interrelationship between Variables

The diagram below depicts the interrelationship between the variables, political context, capacities and constraints, HRBAs and CSOs.




Figure 2: Conceptual Framework
Source: Constructed by Author.

The arrows joining these rectangles depict that these various aspects of the political environment are interrelated and have an intertwined bearing on CSOs (represented in the diagram by the large circle) as they operationalize the HRBA. The space inside the circle represents the organizational context. The rectangles inside the large circle denote the capacities and constraints internal to the CSOs, hence their location. The grey arrows show that these internal capacities and constraints affect HRBA operationalization.

Two rectangles that cut the circle at the bottom on the left and the right represent the international funding context. As I show in the diagram, the rectangle on the left depicts debates around queer imperialism as characterizing the international funding context. The rectangle on the right depicts debates around partnerships and the characterizing of the international funding context. These two rectangles illustrate views that characterize the international funding context as a continuum. On one end of the continuum is queer imperialism; on the other is the concept of partnerships, which characterizes relationships between donors and CSOs. African countries accuse INGOs of fostering queer imperialism, yet INGOs say they work through partnerships (see sections 2.3.4 and Appendix 1).

The overlap of various components of the diagram, the linkage made by arrows, and the placement of particular components inside others represent the interrelationships between the variables. The diagram shows that my study looks at three levels of interrelationship: the national political context, the international funding context, and the internal capacities and constraints as factors that influence HRBA operationalization by CSOs. HRBA is the dependent variable, and the national political context, the international funding context, and the internal capacities and constraints are the independent variables.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter has presented the theoretical and conceptual location of the study. The terms conceptualized include political context, international funding context, CSO capacities and constraints, HRBAs and CSOs. The chapter explains the use of the PPT and the RMT as the lens to examine how political processes in a particular political context in which activists implement MSM projects, and resource-dependent capacities and constraints internal to CSOs, influence the nature and extent of HRBA operationalization, politicization, and instrumentalization. The PPT helps to clarify the influence of the political context, and the RMT elucidates the influence of resource-dependent capacities internal to the CSOs. The next chapter discusses the HRBA's key components, characteristics, and operationalization.

3 CHAPTER THREE

SEXUAL RIGHTS OF MSM AND HRBAS

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I review the literature on SR-MSM and HRBAs. I reveal the lack of consensus regarding the meaning of the term ‘sexual rights’ and show that they are included within existing human rights. I discuss the SR-MSM and show that they include, among other rights, the right to non-discrimination, sexual intercourse, pleasure, marriage, privacy, and having a family. I examine the conception and history of HRBAs and reveal the role of the UN in advancing these approaches in the 1990s. I illustrate various international instruments and frameworks relevant to HRBAs and how these have been widely operationalized in international development cooperation. However, limited literature looks at how HRBAs extend to projects in SR-MSM. I reveal recent international frameworks relevant for HRBAs to projects on SR-MSM; these include the Yogyakarta principles.

3.2 Sexual Rights of MSM

Sexual rights encompass certain existing human rights which “if properly applied, protect certain forms of sexual activity and expression” against some harmful norms related to SOGIESC (Miller 2000:76). There is no consensus on the meaning of the term ‘sexual rights’. This term, primarily as used in heteronormative contexts, has gained extensive discursive space over the past three decades, especially during the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the context of Western-led scare tactics of ‘what not to do’ (Miller 2000). The debates on sexuality have also been sparked, as argues Armas (2007), by the tendency to treat sexuality and sexual rights as an afterthought in development, whereby sexual rights are projected as secondary to ‘more critical rights’ such as rights to health, education, and work, and yet human rights are interdependent, interrelated and indivisible. Armas (2006) argues that sexual rights are not secondary to rights to health, work, or education but that sexual rights are all of these rights, and Gosine (2005) reveals how sex has always been a vital aspect of development since the 1950s.

The SR-MSM include, but are not limited to: the right to life, liberty, privacy, autonomy and security of persons; the right to non-discrimination and equality; the right to protection from epidemic diseases; freedom from violence; the right to sexual intercourse; the freedom to choose a sexual partner/s of one’s choice; and the rights to pleasure, marriage, privacy, and having a family. However, some countries and

actors reject SR-MSM, hence also what these rights require them to do under international law (Gosine 2005, Armas 2006, 2007, Miller, Kismodi, Cottingham & Gruskin 2015 and Ali, Kowalski & Silva 2015).

3.3 Human Rights-Based Approaches and SR-MSM

Practitioners have widely operationalized HRBA in both politically stable and unstable contexts (see Dang 2018, Morten & Hans-Otto 2018). However, Yamin & Cantor (2014:460) importantly observed that what CSOs operationalize HRBA “in relation to also matters a great deal for the implications of an HRBA”. For the case of my study, the interest is on how CSOs operationalize these approaches to SR-MSM, a sensitive matter in and beyond Zimbabwe (Hunt et al. 2017, Mandipa 2017).

3.3.1 Tenets of HRBAs and Traditional Approaches

While scholars agree that although HRBA is a recent addition to the so-called traditional approaches, many of its components have a long-standing history anchored in culture, philosophy, religion, history, law, and other fields of study (Nyamu-Musembi & Cornwall 2004, Nyamu-Musembi 2002); the SR-MSM are a recent addition. From time immemorial, the broad concept of human rights, the principles, standards, instruments, the human rights protection systems, and other components of HRBA have existed in many societies (Nyamu-Musembi & Cornwall 2004), but not the SR-MSM such as the right of MSM to marry and to have a family. My analysis in chapters five to eight focuses on these excluded SR-MSM. HRBA predecessors, the ‘traditional approaches’, have come about from development emerging as an ‘industry’ in the 1940s immediately after the world wars (Laine 2014, Kumar 1993). In addition to the basic human needs approach, these predecessors include charity and economy-centered approaches (UNICEF 2015).

Scholars claim that HRBA was the most comprehensive effort to move from notions of charity to the obligation to fulfill, respect, and protect human rights during development activities and processes (see Dang 2018, Broberg & Sano 2017). However, these obligations did not extend to SR-MSM, hence the focus of my study on the same. In many respects, the HRBA is distinct from its predecessors, though deriving some of its tenets from them. Practitioners use the HRBA together with, or as an alternative to, these approaches to underpin various development projects, including poverty, climate change, health, education, and sexual and reproductive health, among others (Miller & Redhead 2019, Bergesen, and Parmann & Thommessen 2019).

However, less is known about how practitioners use HRBA in the field of SR-MSM beyond the strategy of infusing the approach in public health (Epprecht 2012, Phillips 2004) and beyond sexual and reproductive health as they relate to HIV and AIDS (Gosine 2005, Armas 2007), especially in the fragile and volatile

political context of Zimbabwe²⁰ (Nyamu-Musembi & Cornwall 2004). In the 1990s the approach's focus was more on women's social, civil, economic, and cultural rights and, later on, the sexual rights of women (Miller & Redhead 2019). Practitioners did not emphasize SR-MSM as part of the HRBA when the latter first emerged in the early 1990s (Gosine 2005, Armas 2007). For the case of Zimbabwe, Makamure and Chimininge (2017) shed light on the 'insufficiency' of HRBAs as used by GALZ in the Zimbabwe context, which favors *Ubuntu* philosophy. Phillips (2011) holds that the majority of Zimbabweans reject the tendency of practitioners to use human rights discourse to push for LGBTQ+ rights. My analysis also focuses on these issues.

3.3.2 'Formal' HRBAs: Operationalization

HRBAs emerged in the 1990s, with recipient partners toeing the line of understanding and interpreting donors (Gruskin, Bogecho & Ferguson 2010). Conventional operationalization follows a 'step-by-step' process of mainstreaming the tenets of human rights (Dang 2018). The first step involves context analysis in human rights terms. Broberg and Sano (2017:676) observed that:

Contextual analysis, insights about institutional constraints, and sensitivities are all-important dimensions that [actors] must [take] into account. Sensitivities may direct actors to nudging forms of advocacy rather than strongly formulated demands. The latter is especially relevant when international donors or international NGOs are involved. Across different types of actors involved in [HRBAs], knowledge about the vulnerable groups that [they] target seems to be very important. Generally, these contextual factors and their inherent sensitivities, institutions, and path-dependent patterns are crucial in determining the success of [HRBAs]. However, they also make the quest for mainstreaming [HRBAs] in all areas of development work a challenging one.

In operationalizing HRBAs, the first, and vital, step is to recognize that the interests of political actors, including retention of political power, play an essential role (Broberg and Sano 2018). The second step is to identify rights holders and duty-bearers. The third step involves capacity analysis (including that of rights-holders and duty-bearers). There are situations where there is no explicit duty bearer to hold accountable, or where the duty bearer is too weak to be expected to uphold certain human rights (Destrooper & Mbambi 2017). The fourth step focuses on identifying results and indicators. The last step is to identify entry-level frames. In recent years, the entry-level frame in sexuality programming has been the HIV/AIDS framework, however not without challenges (see Solomon & Hove 2017).

In projects other than those concerning SR-MSM, practitioners have operationalized HRBAs, first as a set of normative principles, secondly as a set of instruments, thirdly as a component for CSOs to integrate into

²⁰ There are a few exceptions to this (see Mandipa 2017)

programming, and fourthly as the underlying justification for interventions aimed at strengthening institutions (see D'Hollander et al., 2013). My analysis maps the different ways in which activists operationalize the HRBA in SR-MSM projects. Actual operationalization in projects and activities requires the application of human rights principles, international policy, legal instruments, and other HRBA elements in all stages of the project's life cycle. However, regarding the operationalization of HRBAs in SR-MSM projects, some governments perceive sexuality programming as dominated by Western-oriented elite groups of activists connected to the Western gay identity.

3.3.3 HRBAs: Vital, but not a Magic Bullet

HRBAs to sexuality are indispensable yet insufficient, according to Corrêa, Petchesky & Parker (2008). The HRBAs provide a holistic view, considering all stakeholder categories, social and corporate institutions, and relations, facilitate a participatory process, ensure transparency and accountability, allow monitoring, and foster sustained results (UNFPA 2010, UNRISD 2016, and OHCHR 2006). However, its use of international legal and policy instruments that benchmark best practices is problematic regarding explicit recognition of sexual rights (Izugbara et al. 2020). HRBAs require attention to both process and outcome, and the individual has rights, and must demand these rights, from those who have duties and obligations to meet them. In practice, situations also occur where, even for HRBAs, there are no clear duty-bearers, and even if they exist, they cannot meet their obligations with regard to rights. This thesis explores how HRBA focuses on process and outcome, and how rights holders exercise their entitlements. HRBAs promote individual rights to non-discrimination and non-violence, respect for the rule of law, and the reform of laws that infringe upon human rights.

3.3.4 Insufficiency of HRBAs

HRBAs have been criticized for being rooted in a human rights discourse with Western origins (Uvin 2004). They are accused of propping up cultural imperialism due to their disregard for indigenous knowledge systems (Bell 2004). Practitioners criticize HRBAs for presenting problems and, at times, negative consequences in their operationalization, and for a lack of empirical evidence to support their efficacy; they are thus skeptical about their added value (Seppänen 2005). Katsui (2008) describes the downside of HRBAs under three categories: bourgeois Western origins, problems with operationalization, and negative consequences. Corrêa, Petchesky & Parker (2008) add four categories: individualism, attempt to impose a false standard of universality, hypocritical political use by governments, and racist and neo-colonial uses to inferiorize 'other' cultures and societies.

Practitioners and researchers have highlighted the approach's priority-making as a weakness (Katsui 2008, Uvin 2004). However, considerable literature also counters these criticisms of HRBA. Schafer and Range (2014) refute the criticism of HRBA as having Western origins by arguing that human rights, such as rights to life, food, shelter, etcetera, are not alien to Africa. In support, Tamale (2011:24) states, "... the controversial foundations of sexual rights have their roots in traditional African values".

The myriad uses and interpretations of HRBAs have led to challenges regarding standardized ways of assessing their impact. Some argue that it is difficult to measure their success -- their levels of participation, accountability, indivisibility, and interdependence (UNFPA 2010). However, a growing body of literature addresses this challenge (Nordic Trust Fund 2013, Thomas et al. 2017). The literature considers the myriad uses, interpretations, and complexity of HRBAs in mapping frameworks to conduct impact assessments. Broberg & Sano (2017:673) argue that HRBA "is not suitable for all types of development and not for all recipient communities".

Miller (2017) notes that while some CSOs embrace HRBAs, others reject them, and some faith-based CSOs have formulated "alternative engagement[s] with a human rights discourse and practice" (Miller 2017: 69). These alternative engagements include faith-based teachings, which place more importance on human 'dignity' than human 'rights', and the reframing of Biblical concepts within 'modern' and 'secular' rights language to enable wide accessibility beyond religious circles.

3.3.5 HRBAs to SR-MSMs

HRBAs emerged in the 1990s, concerned with entwining human rights and development (Leilani 2015). Cold War tensions led to the late entry of human rights into development cooperation (Broberg and Sano 2017). After the end of the Cold War, HRBAs were motivated in fields other than SR-MSM, such as the Declaration on the Right to Development in 1986, and the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, among other significant historical events (Miller 2017). In Africa, colonial administrators viewed SR-MSM as a 'wild', deviant and abhorrent sexual practice, inferior to heterosexuality (Moore & Wekker 2011). In the Zimbabwe context, INGOs and CSOs engage with Western notions of gender and sexuality in HRBA operationalization, homophobia as a result of Western colonization, and debates around indigeneity and tolerance of same-sex sexualities.

Leilani (2015) observed that human rights were limited to the political and civil rights, and to the social, economic, and cultural rights that prompted the development of HRBAs, and that human rights did not extend to SR-MSM. HRBAs initiated legal human rights frameworks, such as the International Bill of

Rights. Globally, after the 1990s, the focus on the HRBA increased, due to the influence of UN agencies and INGOs (Dang 2018). Various documents compiled to delineate sexual rights as human rights include what I term consensus instruments on sexual rights (CISR). The CISR include the “International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) compilation of cases and laws on sexual orientation and gender identity”, the World Association for Sexual Health (WAS) Declaration on Sexual Rights, the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF)’s Sexual Rights, the WHO Sexual health, human rights and the law’ report, the Yogyakarta Principles of 2006, and the UN SOGI resolution (Miller et al. 2015:17).

Given space constraints, I briefly discuss only the Yogyakarta principles. These are an articulation of relevant provisions drawn from international legal and policy instruments on human rights as applied to LGBTQ+ individuals. They affirm the primary obligation of states to implement SR-MSM, and provide detailed recommendations to states. The Yogyakarta Principles plus 10 supplements the original 2006 principles and are an authoritative statement on the "exposition of international human rights law as it currently applies to the grounds of SOGIESC" (Yogyakarta Principles plus ten, 2017:4). The Yogyakarta principles are a comprehensive and authoritative statement on the SR-MSM. Zimbabwe is one of the countries contesting the SR-MSM, due to discrimination and homophobia. Human rights protection mechanisms through 'formal' HRBAs are themselves at times the perpetrators of violations of SR-MSM.

3.4 Conclusion

I have reviewed the literature on SR-MSM and HRBAs. I have given examples of SR-MSM, and these include, among others, the right to privacy, autonomy, equality, protection from epidemic diseases, sexual intercourse, pleasure, marriage, privacy, and having a family. I have examined the HRBAs and linked them to SR-MSM. To link the HRBAs to SR-MSM I have used the CISR that include the Yogyakarta principles.

4 CHAPTER FOUR

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss the epistemological position, the population, sampling techniques, design, data collection tools, approach to data analysis, ethical issues, and limitations. The thesis has been guided by exploratory research, as this approach, unlike confirmatory research, is suited to address the particular variables of the study highlighted in the conceptual framework, taking into consideration that I am the main research instrument, and must therefore include myself and address my situatedness, limitations, partiality, and biases (Reiter 2017). The study has an ethnographical research design, is qualitative in approach, and uses participant observation, document analysis, and key informant interviews (KIIs) as primary data collection instruments. I have utilized the thematic analysis approach to analyze data. I have used a qualitative approach where the purpose was to understand HRBA operationalization in SR-MSM projects. The goal was to identify and explain behavior, attitudes, beliefs, or actions regarding HRBA operationalization in SR-MSM projects.

4.2 Epistemological Position

Epistemology is about generating knowledge, what constitutes acceptable knowledge, and the relationship between the researcher and the participants in research (Scotland 2012, Crotty 1998). According to Saunders et al. (2009), positivist epistemology entails various aspects, including that there is one social reality, and that objectively observable social reality is the basis for knowledge. It also postulates that researchers can study the social world scientifically and that it is appropriate to apply the methods of natural science to social science research. Further, it postulates that social science researchers can study social phenomena just as natural scientists study non-humans and that research leads to lawlike generalizations derived from observable causal relationships and regularities.

Social Constructivism, conversely, states that knowledge is about subjective meanings, and research leads to details of specific cases (Saunders et al. 2009). Constructivism posits that, while cultural and social processes influence meaning, individuals interpret the same phenomena differently (Crotty 1998). Concerning epistemology, social constructivism underpins my study. This is because the study holds that such factors as national political and international funding contexts and organizational capacities and constraints determine the actual operationalization of HRBAs. I attempt to understand the above factors,

and the more popular interpretations of interlocutors regarding HRBA operationalization, hence the grounding of my study in social constructivism.

Concerning my approach, I have chosen to use exploratory research, as mentioned above. My situatedness, interest, and positionality in interpreting empirical evidence, and hence the subjectivity of my findings, have influenced this choice. Reiter (2017: 142-3) notes that:

Instead of advancing arguments that make exclusive claims about truth, exploratory research offers more or less plausible and [...] fruitful ways to examine and explain a limited segment of reality. [Exploratory research] sets out to explain limited segments of reality by suggesting a causal order and sequence of events. It does not claim that this order is inherent in reality but instead remains skeptical about the —true nature of causality in the world and only suggests a useful and helpful way to explain it by putting it into causal order.

Training in ethnographic methods at the Catholic University of Leuven during the design stage of this thesis, and before the commencement of fieldwork, prepared me to pay attention to the influence of my positionality on epistemology.

4.3 Population

The population (set of all possible measurements) consisted of the staff members in the targeted local CSOs advocating for the SR-MSM in Bulawayo and INGOs in Norway and the Netherlands. It also included media practitioners, MPs, councilors, and religious and traditional leaders residing in Bulawayo. I have detailed my justification for selecting Bulawayo as a research location in section 1.8.

4.4 Sampling Frame

I have drawn the sampling frame based on the data type needed to address the research questions. To address the first research question, the sampling frame consisted of CSO staff members, councilors, MPs, traditional leaders, religious leaders, and media personnel. To address the second and third research questions, the sampling frame consisted of staff members in INGOs and local CSOs. The sampling frame also consisted of local CSO and INGO staff to address the last research question. However, I did not use a sampling frame in the conventional (probabilistic) way.

4.5 Sampling

The thesis employed a non-probability sampling design and used a purposive sampling method, particularly mixed purposeful sampling. I triangulated intensity sampling, opportunistic sampling, and critical case sampling. Intensity sampling provides for “information-rich cases that manifest the phenomenon intensely” (Patton 1990: 182). Opportunistic sampling allows for flexibility, whereby the researcher can follow new

leads during fieldwork. Critical case sampling allows for “logical generalizations and maximum application of information to other cases because if it's true of this one case, it's likely to be true of all other cases” (Patton 1990: 183).

Following intensity sampling, I purposively selected interlocutors from the two main CSOs in Bulawayo: SRC and GALZ. These two organizations are information-rich cases that intensely manifest the HRBA operationalization phenomenon. Using opportunistic sampling, I also included staff members from LGBTQ+ collectives housed at the SRC as they appear in the SRC's organogram. The collectives included ARMZ, IAZ, ZIMAHA, TREAT, and NeoteriQ. Appendix 1 gives the detailed profiles of these organizations.

Regarding staffing, collectives relied mainly on volunteers, while SRC and GALZ had a fully-fledged staff complement. The collectives had, on average, three volunteers. I employed intensity sampling to purposively select one participant from each of the four collectives. SRC had twenty full-time employees. Relying on intensity sampling, I purposively selected for KIIs only the ten working directly on MSM projects. GALZ had around four full-time employees at its satellite office in Bulawayo. Using critical case sampling, I purposively selected one of them for KIIs. When I requested more interviews, the focal person at the Bulawayo office referred me to staff members at the Harare office. In line with the criterion sampling, the Harare office lay outside the inclusion criteria, as my study focused on organizations in Bulawayo. Using opportunistic and intensity sampling, I purposively selected two representatives from the two INGOs -- one from each -- those whose work portfolios covered Zimbabwe. Based on intensity sampling, I also selected five chiefs, five MPs, five media personnel and five councilors for KIIs.

GALZ had 16 out of 17 projects underpinned by the HRBA. The only project not underpinned by the HRBA was based on the Public Health Approach. The GALZ Bulawayo satellite office had fewer activities than its Harare office, because of its position as mainly a satellite office. The Harare office implemented the bulk of the activities and led the implementation of some of the activities carried out in the Bulawayo office. There were limited opportunities to interact with diverse LGBTQ+ communities at the GALZ Bulawayo satellite office through project activities. I had to carry out participant observation at the SRC offices, which was always a beehive of activities that brought in various LGBTQ+ groups from the collectives. I then decided to focus mainly on activities by the SRC, and the collectives for participant observation, and to include GALZ by means of document review and one key informant interview. I selected documents mainly from SRC and GALZ according to their relevance to my study.

As almost all projects of the SRC and the collectives had a rights component, they were underpinned by the HRBA. There were 12 projects upon commencement of the fieldwork. The organization, on its website and in various documents, states that HRBA underpins all its projects. However, the website and these documents did not conceptualize the term. Not all projects by the SRC were MSM projects. The SRC, as an LGBTQ+ and sex worker organization, had some other projects that dealt with issues of sex workers. While seven of the twelve projects directly focused on MSM projects, the remaining five were primarily on sex work, and also mainstreamed crosscutting issues for both the LGBTQ+ and the sex workers.

In addition, some rights holders also doubled as sex workers and LGBTQ+ persons; hence, the five other projects targeted both stakeholders. SRC also had sex worker collectives, which I did not target through my study. The collectives that I targeted dealt exclusively with LGBTQ+ issues. Each project had between one and eight activities. I purposively selected activities from the seven projects that I had, for various reasons, targeted for participant observation and document review. These reasons included questioning whether their sensitivity or confidential nature could allow me to observe them, and being keener on following those expressly linked to human rights discourse.

I also purposively selected five MPs based in Bulawayo who had participated in the various activities of the targeted CSOs. I also purposively selected five local councilors. I selected five chiefs, based on their availability. I selected five media practitioners: two from state media, two from independent media, and one from freelance journalists. I selected five religious leaders, based on their availability. These are pivotal in instrumentalizing and politicizing MSM projects underpinned by HRBAs. This instrumentalization affects the operationalization of HRBA by CSOs, hence their inclusion in my study.

4.6 Research Context

I conducted fieldwork in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, between July 2018 and March 2020, with online interviews with representatives of selected organizations in Norway and the Netherlands in 2021. I filled in other missing data by conducting a review of documents between March 2020 and April 2021. For the INGOs, I targeted SAIH headquartered in Norway and COC Netherlands. Detailed profiles of these INGOs are in Appendix 1.

As mentioned above, the collectives did their projects mostly in collaboration with the SRC, and vice versa, notwithstanding that SRC had in its portfolio several projects that it carried out independently. Upon the commencement of fieldwork, the collectives were at varying levels regarding NGOization. Among the collectives I targeted, only TREAT was registered. The role of SRC was to nurture these organizations into

viable CSOs. The collectives had their finances handled by the SRC for accountability, as they were still putting their finance and accounting systems in place. The SRC assisted with legal registration for those not yet registered.

Table 1: Collectives and their Statuses

Collective	Established:	Status of legal registration and focus areas
IAZ	2016	Not registered (at the time of fieldwork); aims to lobby and advocate for the rights of intersex persons in Zimbabwe.
Pow Wow	2015	Registered in 2018; works to advocate for universal access to health services, including primary healthcare and health rights for sex workers in their diversity.
ARMZ	2018	Registered in 2020; aims to empower the self-reliant and socially involved MSM community to make prudent and responsible sexual reproductive health decisions.
ZIMAHA	2014	Not registered (at the time of fieldwork); aims to ensure that all gay and bisexual men and other MSM fully enjoy their fundamental rights.
NeoteriQ	2018	Not yet registered; aims to promote equity and equality of opportunities for lesbians, bisexuals, and trans diverse community through activism, advocacy, movement building and solidarity, research, capacity and skills development, health, and wellness.

Source: Adapted from SRC Strategic Plan 2021-2025

The organizations mentioned earlier are running various projects. Some projects focus on counseling, legal, and other psychosocial care and support services for men and women facing challenges with their SOGIESC. These organizations also engage in policy reviews and legal reforms, provide rapid response services to those in distress, and run awareness-raising and capacity-strengthening projects targeted at gatekeepers in religious, political, and traditional settings, among many others. Organizations carry out some of these projects as consortiums (see SIDA 2014b).

I had mutual working relations with the targeted groups, and they all received me well. Some participants were former college mates, former comrades in opposition politics, former colleagues in CSOs, and former and current students that I taught at a local university, and others were CSO colleagues whom I had interacted with for over fifteen years. I had over seven years of working relationships with one of the donors. This did not compromise ethical issues and the rights of the participants in my study but meant that I did

not need much time to familiarize myself with the interlocutors and context. Of course, I had to familiarize myself with specific issues, such as individual preferences on what gender participants preferred.

During fieldwork, I visited SRC offices to observe the implementation of projects as and when the organization carried them out and when it was appropriate, in terms of the project nature and logistical arrangements, for me to participate. In one week, I would, on average, visit the SRC to participate in its projects more than three times. I would spend long hours per visit to the SRC offices. In addition, I would meet staff members of the various organizations outside office space and get a ‘post-mortem’ kind of analysis of how they implemented the projects.

4.7 Endogenous Ethnographer

I recognized the significance of my positionality and self-reflexivity in ensuring the quality of my study and in providing transparency regarding my limitations and biases. I am not doing this research “from nowhere, without a specific interest, while seeing everything,” nor do I believe that methodology “provides no solution to this situation” of influence of my normative interest on the study (Reiter 2017:130). My journey into this research topic was prompted by my activist career, which naturally drew me to the subject of rights. I had previously attempted to promote human rights without explicitly framing them as HRBAs in various organizations. My ‘situated’ normative commitments to HRBAs stemmed from my enthusiasm for their potential to address rights violations effectively.

I was initially motivated to explore HRBAs for my doctoral thesis by what the PPT describes as ‘insurgent consciousness’²¹. For the benefit of the CSOs and scholarship, I aimed to explore the evidential basis for the perceived insufficiency of needs-based, public health, charity-model and faith-based approaches with their emphasis on quantification, disease and biomedical-based interventions, reliance on moral duty, and obsession with anachronistic religious scriptures, respectively. I thus set out to explore the severe psychosocial effects of LGBTQ+ activism when the political context impacts the individual, and hence the bravery of the activists’ engagement (see Theron, McAllister & Armisen 2016). In addition, I wished to explore whether HRBAs are a suitable approach for CSOs in their advocacy for SR-MSM in Zimbabwe’s homophobic political context. Moreover, I wanted to find out whether, despite challenges, the activists and CSOs have adequate capacity; and whether the international donors are justified in promoting the adaptation of HRBAs. With this aforesaid forthrightness about my subjectivity and strong self-reflexivity and the

²¹ The PPT’s insurgent consciousness posits that unfair treatment of certain members of society is why activists engage in particular actions (Cragun & Cragun 2000).

methods set out in this chapter to ensure reliability, I hoped to limit and counterbalance the impact of potential biases and partiality emanating from the above-described normative commitments.

These motivations were fueled by personal experiences of rights violations, as well as stories of abuse and discrimination faced by college students, friends, and colleagues. These experiences stirred a sense of anger and responsibility toward both the LGBTQ+ movement and academia, despite my apprehensions about potential criticism, backlash, and negative labeling. A year before embarking on my PhD studies, these motivations led me to play a key role in establishing the SRHR Institute, where I became the first Director. The institute's core objectives centered around SRHR, gender, social and behavior change, as well as safeguarding and protection programs, all anchored in HRBAs.

The persistent and widespread violations of the sexual rights of LGBTQ+ individuals at a macro-level further solidified my determination to study HRBAs for my doctorate. I undertook this study fully aware of the personal costs it might entail, firmly believing that these sacrifices were justified for the betterment of the LGBTQ+ and human rights movements. In my view, this same rationale, not recklessness, motivates the bravery and resilience of activists.

As I described in the introductory chapter of this thesis, I had observed that despite the proliferation of CSOs and the expansion of their work, little progress had been made in advancing the SR-MSM (see also Theron, McAllister & Armisen 2016). The authorities intransigently continued to use repression techniques and there was a glaring absence of a clear legal and policy framework for MSM rights promotion and protection (Chakawarika 2011). Court & Amy (2005), EU²² (2017), and Musser (2014) also contend that the FR-GoZ put in place an expanded legal and policy framework designed to contain and control CSO advocacy work. These factors, coupled with the reported adoption of HRBAs by CSOs, intensified my normative commitment to scrutinize the effectiveness of HRBAs.

I acknowledge that my standpoint and strong self-reflexivity could influence the research questions, methods, interpretation of data, and the inclination to accept corroborating evidence, as recognized by feminist scholars (Haraway 1988, Harding 1991). In addition, for Cook and Schwartz (2002:3), a thesis is not just the bearer of empirical evidence; it is “also a reflection of the needs and desires of its creator”. However, I have implemented strategies to mitigate these potential biases and ensure a balanced perspective.

²² European Union

Throughout my research, I remained conscious that even the process of choosing which data to collect, include, and interpret is an exercise of power. My awareness of this dynamic allowed me to maintain a vigilant approach, seeking findings that extended beyond my normative commitments. In my findings chapters, I also compare and contrast my normative commitments with my empirical data, envisioning how my findings challenge and destabilize these commitments.

From around 2010, I was in contact with senior staff members from SAIH, SRC, and some junior staff members at the GALZ Harare office. I did not know staff from the GALZ Bulawayo office nor senior management at their Harare office, and some of the known junior colleagues at the Harare office had since left the organization. The contact, especially with SRC and SAIH, facilitated these organizations' acceptance of me as a researcher. Fieldwork at the SRC further confirmed my subsequent engagement with the organization, and as a result, I now serve on its advisory board.

My proximity to the SRC did not gain me much favor at GALZ, given the competition (healthy most of the time) between these two organizations for donors and constituencies. I need to explain how people at GALZ and other CSOs perceived me as a researcher, given that this has a bearing on “what sort of information might be out of our reach, or maybe even withheld from us, due to who we are and how we are perceived” (Reiter 2017: 133). I first learned about the new collectives during my first weeks of fieldwork; however, I already knew some of their members. A significant number of not only MSM but also other stakeholders who frequent the targeted CSO spaces were familiar to me from past encounters before I commenced fieldwork. I knew the councilors targeted through my study, most of the MPs, some of the chiefs, media personnel and most of the religious leaders.

This context and experience influenced my worldview. I recognized sexual rights as human rights and MSM as inherently endowed with human rights. I was aware that my subjectivity, anchored in my ‘world-view’ (that is, where I stand as a researcher *vis-a-vis* the study and how this stance has a bearing on data collection and analysis), and the reactivity of interlocutors underpinned by their ‘world-views’, could either enrich or compromise the quality of the findings. I was satisfied that my worldview is expansive enough for use as a framework for interrogating HRBA operationalization using the ethnographic design.

During the design stage, I resolved to use ethnography, which stems from anthropology and uses a phenomenological approach involving observation of patterns of human behavior. I made this choice after discarding alternative designs, such as those with a positivist leaning, which I deemed unsuitable for my study. Ethnography “is the study of social interactions, behaviors, and perceptions within groups, teams,

organizations, and communities” (Reeves, Kuper & Hodges 2008:512). The design allows one to gather data using tools such as participant observation, interviews, document review, and analysis (see Genzuk 2003). Genzuk (2003) further argues that ethnography provides a detailed account of human experiences over extended periods. Therefore, I found this design suitable given that my study focused on studying the operationalization of HRBA by CSOs over a period of two years.

I relied on participant observation as the trademark of the anthropological gaze but departed from the traditional hallmark of ethnography of studying ‘others’. I moved from an ethnography of studying autochthonous ‘others’, and the ‘fly-on-the-wall’ or ‘helicopter’ view participant observation approach and decided to use a contemporary ‘observant participant’ endogenous ethnographic design (see Roschenthaler 2010). This is due to profound changes in how societies are organized and how researchers conduct ethnography. In Malinowski’s era, societies were ‘primitive and immobile’ and often studied by ethnographers from abroad. In contemporary societies, studying ‘ourselves’ is a reality, and local researchers can follow interlocutors, ideas, and material under study at local sites. I conducted the study as an endogenous ethnographer, meaning I did ethnographic fieldwork at home rather than abroad or in ‘exotic’ contexts. I consolidated existing working and personal relations with some interlocutors.

This insider position had both advantages and challenges. It was easy for me to access the field. Outsiders often make initial access to the field through third parties who act as their intermediaries to gain entry. Another advantage was my mastery of the two vernacular languages, *IsiNdebele*, and *ChiShona*, used by participants. In addition, law enforcement agencies could not disrupt the study. Government authorities tend to be suspicious of a foreign or white anthropologist studying such a sensitive subject bordering on SR-MSM. In addition, doing fieldwork at home meant that the expenses related to fieldwork were minimal, and therefore I could be in the field for a more extended period. My study was, therefore, genuinely longitudinal, an essential characteristic of ethnography. Another advantage of my insider position is that participants rarely felt the effect of the presence of a participant observer in my research context. The insider position gave the study credibility. It also facilitated trusting connections between myself and the interlocutors throughout the fieldwork.

Various participants in my research network were able to relate easily to my ethnicity, class, age, education, languages I spoke, sexual orientation, and personality. In handling issues of relationship status, I instinctively realized that I should not be judgmental about my interlocutors’ relationship statuses, and they were not judgmental about mine. Most of my interlocutors from the CSOs already knew my sexual

orientation and sexual relationship status, and I knew theirs. I choose not to reveal the sexual orientation of my interlocutors from the CSOs, media, and traditional, religious, and political leadership in this thesis given the susceptibility of anonymity, although I have guaranteed it in this study. ‘Outing’, that is, visibilization of sexual orientation of individual interlocutors and of myself could involve risks of stigma and discrimination for my interlocutors and me at community, workplace and other levels as the case of the St. Joseph teacher has shown.²³ The only identity I reveal is that, like myself, the majority are activists, and this identity has no bearing on sexual orientation.

As Mbaye and Epprecht (2022) also observe, LGBTQ+ people more often choose:

[...] to pass as heterosexual mostly to protect their families from stigma and their roles in the church, which they valued very highly. This is an important distinction. The identity to which they gave priority was not rooted in sexuality, as SOGIE rights advocates tend to promote, but in the collectivities of kin and congregation.

In addition to the above, and by inference, heterosexual allies and researchers in LGBTQ+ circles may choose not to always disclose their SOGIESC positions openly to ‘jelly-in’, gain acceptance and protect their social relations in the LGBTQ+ movement. As a human rights activist, I have often found sexual orientation to be a dividing and alienating topic. It tends to pit ‘us’ against ‘them’. This happens not only in pitting heterosexual people against ‘homosexuals’ but also in pitting different groups within the LGBTQ+ communities against each other. I therefore decided that self-reflexivity about my sexual orientation, and disclosure of the sexual orientation of my interview participants, CSO activists, has less priority in this thesis -- in line with the above strategies of LGBTQ+ people passing as heterosexuals, or of heterosexual allies not disclosing their SOGIESC positions to protect social, work and LGBTQ+ community engagement relations.

All participants were thus relaxed during participant observation and interviews. I believe this enhanced the quality of information that I gathered. The SRC and the collectives allowed me into sensitive meetings and gave me office space to work from, access to the internet, access to project documents, and access to donors

²³ I illustrate this in section 5.2, using the case of the white teacher at St. John’s College who resigned after media publicity of his sexual orientation, accusations from parents that he was ‘recruiting’ students into being gay, and following threats of prosecution for violating sodomy laws, as well as of physical violence and death. Prior to his ‘coming out’, i.e., being transparent about his sexual orientation, he did not face this stigma and discrimination. From this case, it is notable that silence and strategic ambiguity, rather than transparency about one’s sexual orientation at such places as the workplace, guarantees non-discrimination and avoidance of the other risks described above. However, this ambiguity has its own limitations in a study such as mine: it denies readers a clear understanding of the researcher’s positionality, biases and strengths related to the relationship between the researcher’s own sexual orientation and the topic of study.

during their visits. They allowed me to use the organization's equipment and gadgets, among many other things. I had access to almost everything that could be accessible to staff members. I had fair access to SRC's premises, organizational policies, and sensitive information from grant agreements and correspondence between the CSOs and the INGOs. Being an insider also offered access to various formal and informal stakeholders' platforms of these CSOs, and opportunities for informal gatherings. I also, without a notebook, frequented various places of leisure and entertainment where stakeholders spent their free time. These instances facilitated my acceptance as part of these CSOs on various formal platforms.

I was, however, aware of some shortcomings of native ethnographers, one being that "fieldwork in a cultural context of which you already have first-hand experience seems to be more difficult than fieldwork which is approached from the naïve viewpoint of a total stranger" (Leach 1982:24). There were instances when I felt that my insider position interfered with the observation of familiar phenomena, such as mundane routines in project implementation. For example, I realized that the operationalization of HRBAs as rights rhetoric would be a sub-theme in my analysis and my data presentation at the later stages of data collection. I was familiar with the rights language and had used it with the interlocutors since 2014 when I first had contact with them. In addition, my insider position presented ethical challenges for my study, requiring me to be skillful and conscious of my research position.

I knew that my presence as a researcher could alter the research context. I carried out the study as an insider or a native researcher; thus, the activists did not interpret my presence as an intrusion into the CSOs. I was also aware of past confrontational relations between LGBTQ+ organizations and the state, and about repressive laws, and politicization and instrumentalization of HRBA operationalization in SR-MSM projects. I was able to link up with past and new contacts in carrying out this research. I knew the CSO jargon, as well as various practices and sensitivities among the LGBTQ+ community.

I portrayed myself as a non-competitor for funding, now that I was in academia as a PhD researcher, full-time lecturer, and no longer a CSO employee. Some participants would ask for expert knowledge or guidance for activities and university studies. I agreed to assist only in those activities that did not directly affect the study, and politely turned down those that could have influenced the findings of my study. This positionality helped me as a researcher to aim for honesty and openness in carrying out my study in an epistemologically accepted way.

I adopted a transparent approach with my participants, sending them interview transcripts for validation and sharing preliminary findings with CSOs, taking their feedback into account. This approach helped confirm

the relevance of my study and addressed aspects that participants preferred not to publish. In summary, my research journey has been marked by self-awareness, a commitment to transparency, and a continuous effort to balance my normative commitments with rigorous research practices. My insider position, while advantageous, also came with challenges, which I have strived to manage throughout the study.

4.8 Data Collection Techniques

My study employed three complementary data collection techniques, identified according to the type of data needed to address the research questions, and in light of the characteristics of the interlocutors in various categories of data sources. They were complementary in that the idea was to have these different techniques create a bigger picture, and not necessarily validate one truth through triangulation (see Table below).

Table 2: Tools, Guides, and Respondents per Guide

Tool	Relevant Guides	Total number of respondents per guide/activities/documents
KIIs	KII guide for staff members in CSOs (10 from SRC, one from GALZ, and one from each of the four collectives)	- 15
	KII guide for INGOs (1 from SAIH, 1 COC Netherlands)	- 2
	KII guide for local councilors (5), MPs (5), media personnel (5), religious leaders (5), chiefs (5)	- 25
Participant observation	A guide for participant observation (27 activities)	- 27
Document review	A guide for reviewing project files, Organizational files, 25documents	- 43
Document review	A guide for reviewing media reports	- 57

Source: Created by the Author.

The three data collection techniques were KIIs, document review, and participant observation. I used these techniques simultaneously during fieldwork. I conducted KIIs to get participants' undocumented but significant individual experiences in HRBA operationalization, and to clarify complexity. I reviewed documents characterized by low reactivity to examine the normative nature of HRBA, its operationalization, politicization, and instrumentalization. Participant observation facilitated my participation in the operationalization of HRBAs.

4.8.1 Key Informant Interviews

I also made use of KIIs to gather data. According to Barrett & Twycross (2018), KIIs are qualitative interviews with a wide range of people, including professionals and community leaders knowledgeable about the phenomena researched. I found the KIIs ideal because I was able to target knowledgeable informants concerning HRBA operationalization, instrumentalization, and politicization. I selected for KIIs 10 SRC staff members, one GALZ staff member, two representatives of the INGOs, five MPs, five chiefs, five counselors, five religious leaders, five media personnel, and four staff members from the collectives. I justify this selection of interlocutors in section 4.4 above. Each interview session lasted between 30 to 60 minutes. I conducted most of the interviews with staff members of the CSOs in their offices. I interviewed the other interlocutors in various venues, including at their offices, my office, SRC offices, and participants' residences. I used online KIIs for representatives of INGOs. I held these interviews privately.

The purpose of interviewing all these groups was to get different views on the subject matter. The KIIs with CSO staff members provided information mainly on how they implement HRBA on the ground; representatives of INGOs provided information on the interpretation and translation of HRBA by donors; and the other stakeholders provided information on the influence of the political context. However, Steber (2018) notes that KIIs are often not truly representative of a population. They are knowledgeable, but that knowledge may not be realistic (Steber 2018). To offset this shortcoming, I also performed participant observation.

4.8.2 Participant Observation

I participated in selected activities openly as a researcher, although the extent of my involvement in the activities went beyond being a 'fly on the wall', where one just observed without participating. I was involved in the processes of various activities, including assisting with mobilizing participants, contributing during discussions, presenting particular topics/sessions, and formulating programming tools (see Appendix 2 for a list of all activities I engaged in as part of participant observation). I also made suggestions for enhancing the visibility of the organization. For example, the SRC had been reluctant to have a website, given past experiences in which unknown elements had hacked its website. I discussed this with the management and suggested more secure options that would make hacking more difficult. I then participated in the initial stages of the website development (see Appendix 2: Activity 1). I suggested website development because I found it difficult to access certain information about the SRC, especially during the design stage of my thesis while doing coursework in Europe. The website could potentially have provided such information.

I also participated in the social activities of the activists, including those on social media, and I frequented other social spaces where activists hang out. I did not record in a notebook the data collected through participant observation in conversations and discussions, to avoid having ‘data extraction’ interfere with the natural flow of conversations. I later recorded this kind of data in a notebook. However, I did record data during workshops, meetings, and activities where other participants were also taking notes. I observed 27 activities, although not always from start to finish, for various reasons (see Table 3 above, Appendix 2). Some of the reasons included that the CSOs carried out some activities simultaneously; in other activities, stakeholders were comfortable with me observing some, but not all aspects, of activities. For example, I did not attend one-on-one HIV/AIDS testing and counseling sessions, family or individual counseling sessions, or specific confidential meetings.

4.8.3 Document Review

Documentary review is a technique whereby one interprets documents to give voice and meaning to data. I searched and collected the documents following the parameters established by the document guide. I gathered most documents about GALZ from its websites. The staff of the SRC and its collectives gave me most documents at the beginning of the fieldwork period, as those organizations did not yet have a website. The SRC later added most of these documents to its public webpage.

Following the document guide for webpage documents, I searched for the appropriate documents using combinations of the following entries: ‘human rights’; ‘sexual rights’, ‘LGBTI/Q+ rights’, ‘MSM’, and ‘HRBA/human rights-based approach/es’ for the cases of GALZ, SRC, and the collectives. For the case of the targeted INGOs, I searched relevant documents using entries that included ‘SAIH HRBA’, ‘SAIH and SOGIESC/sexual rights of MSM’, ‘COC Netherlands HRBA’, ‘COC Netherlands SOGIESC/sexual rights of MSM’, and ‘rights-based approaches’. Entries used to gather media reports, government reports, and published INGO and CSOs reports included ‘HRBA and sexual rights of MSM’ ‘Key populations and HRBA’, ‘HIV/AIDS, and MSM’, ‘human/sexual rights of MSM’, SOGIESC, and LGBTQ+ rights. I identified various documents in this way, including various media documents.

I selected 35 documents, presented in Appendix 3, and 57 media reports as primary data. The documents were all in English; most ranged from 20 to 60 pages and were available online. Documents, unlike research participants, do not react to the influence of the researcher. However, I questioned their neutrality, and I took them as demonstrating intention. I gathered and extensively reviewed primary data such as CSO project files, other CSO files, and media archives. The advantages of the document review technique are

that it helps to gather background information, allows one to study projects carried out by CSOs in the past, and helps with triangulating information obtained from other sources.

I reviewed a diverse collection of documents from 2011 to 2021. Project documents included strategic planning documents, annual operational plans, project proposals, grant agreements, research reports, narrative reports, baseline reports, project evaluation reports, and booklets. The other documents reviewed included training manuals, human resource policies, and Memorandum of Agreements (MOAs) to establish how the CSOs shared and applied HRBAs in internal programs and implemented them through consortiums.

4.9 Fieldwork

I began fieldwork by pre-testing the data collection tools and collecting data from local CSOs, MSM; traditional, religious, and political leaders; and media practitioners. I pilot-tested all data collection tools in Bulawayo but used other projects not targeted in the final study. The pilot study assisted in adapting the use of language/terms to that preferred by interlocutors. For example, I revised the tools to include daily words, such as ‘collectives’, about the SMOs mentored by and housed at the SRC. The pilot study did not involve the organizations or participants included in the final study, so as not to sensitize them in advance. The aim was to determine flaws, limitations, or other weaknesses in the design of tools and the wording of questions.

As Turner (2010) suggests, I conducted a pretest of data collection tools with subjects whose interests resembled those of the eventual participants in my study. I pretested all data collection tools for reliability and validity. Reliability and validity have a positivist epistemology and probabilistic sampling undertone. I use the term validity to refer to ‘credibility’ or ‘transferability’ and reliability to refer to my study’s ‘confirmability’ or ‘dependability’ (Chowdhury 2015). To all research participants, I emphasized the voluntary nature of their participation in the study, recognizing the dual roles I held – one as a PhD student and the other as a colleague. This approach aimed to prevent them from feeling pressured to participate due to the latter relationship.

During this period, I also collected relevant documents. This gave me all the relevant knowledge about the CSOs, which was useful during interview probes. I did forty-two KIIs, each lasting between thirty minutes and one hour. I held the KIIs at places and times convenient for both myself and the participants (see Davies 2008). For the KIIs, I told participants from the onset that I expected them to respond only to questions they felt comfortable answering. I held interviews regularly with the participants, and conducted follow-ups later to clarify particular issues. Concerning participant observation, I did not disrupt participants’ daily routines,

but rather observed. This did not mean that I was a ‘fly on the wall’; to the contrary, I fully participated in various activities that allowed me to collect data (Melhus, Mitchell & Wulf 2010).

4.10 Ethical Considerations

I sought and was granted permission to carry out the study by the CSOs, Bulawayo City Council²⁴, and participants, and in the process, I gave them relevant information about my study and myself as a researcher, the rights of interlocutors, issues of informed consent, research ethics, and the use of incentives. A challenge with the realities of fieldwork is that researchers do not give participants ample time to study the consent forms. Often, they come already printed, thus rigid and beyond negotiation, and often leaving participants without duplicates of the signed copies (Hart & Bond 1995). Given this, I sent out the consent forms in advance to allow for alterations or additions. I also verbally explained the contents of the consent forms before data collection. Where applicable, well-informed potential participants signed a consent form that explained my study's general purpose, methods, and possible outcomes, to ensure an informed decision to participate. Those who consented to participate in the KIIs also allowed me to record the KIIs.

The consent forms signed by participants granted them the right to withdraw from the study at any time during the data collection session or after the session, but before the publication of the research report, and to skip answering questions they were uncomfortable answering. When it was impossible to use written consent forms, I obtained verbal consent during impromptu participant observation in public spaces. In addition, the consent form explained to participants that my study had no immediate remuneration except modest reimbursements for costs related to the study (such as transportation costs). I identified the figures involved before the data collection sessions, and used other non-monetary incentives, such as snacks and refreshments, to motivate participants. From the onset, I was clear about the duration of the data collection sessions. I gave participants information about grievance procedures and the right to appeal against publication of the results. In case they needed additional information about myself or the study, I gave details of contact persons and names of supervisors.

Often with ethnographic research, because of the long periods that researchers spend in the field, participants tend to forget the researcher/participant relationship and start to regard researchers as members of their communities and families (see Bell 2004, Hesse-Biber & Leavy 2010). Due to my intimate

²⁴ The city council needed to clear the counsellors I targeted for them to participate in the study. While Zimbabwe criminalizes same-sex sexualities, the city council operates in a way semi-autonomous from the central government. In addition, I had personal relations with the leadership of the council and several councillors. This enabled me to seek permission without great anxiety for my own security and for that of research participants from the council.

knowledge of the research context and its sensitivities, and my close connections and interactions with interlocutors, I had access to information that could potentially violate the ‘do no harm’ ethical consideration. I had information that could antagonize participants' relations and present some individuals in a bad light. I therefore did not include in the analysis and the report sensitive or harmful information that could potentially embarrass or endanger the participants or their CSOs, information that participants often passed to me because they had come to perceive me as a friend, colleague, ‘brother’ or stakeholder, and not merely a researcher (see Hesse-Biber & Leavy 2010).

I was also aware that maintaining confidentiality may not allow for the analysis and publishing of specific data that would facilitate the identification of participants who had contributed, though the CSOs could use the same findings to improve their plight (see Hesse-Biber & Leavy 2010). Some participants prefer to have researchers identify and link them to their views in the research reports (ibid), and my study included such participants. In such cases, I stuck to confidentiality and anonymity as a protection against possible future litigation in case things were to turn out wrong for the participants in the future, and to protect the rights of participants’ significant others, who may not want readers of my thesis to know their identities (ibid). Moreover, consent-seeking was applied continuously during the fieldwork.

In data collection sessions involving the electronic recording of the proceedings, the participants retained the right to start and stop the recording at any time. In addition, I paused or stopped KIIs or recording when participants seemed uncomfortable, and asked permission to proceed after they had cooled off. This required constant ontological alertness and a sharp eye to read the ‘researcher’/participant’s relational dynamics, including any signs of discomfort, and the ability to handle that. I was mindful that failure to handle discomfort and other ethical issues, such as using incentives and images in data collection, could result in acrimonious relations between researcher/s and interlocutors and threaten the continuation of fieldwork.

I used the collected material, including electronic recordings, only for academic purposes. I processed the material using an encrypted computer; the initial plan was to store the material in the Erasmus University of Rotterdam’s (EUR) vault, but this was not possible, as I explain in section 4.11. I will destroy such records after five years. In compliance with the new EU privacy regulations, I present the findings of my study in a manner that does not link or expose individual respondents. In short, these issues allowed for optimum informed consent of participants and agreements about data analysis, reporting/dissemination of findings, use of findings, and observing of agreements (see Blaxter, Hughes & Tight 2001).

Targeted CSO staff members worked with LGBTQ+, arguably the most non-tolerated minority group in Zimbabwe. These staff members and the LGBTQ+ people sometimes prefer invisibility as a strategy in their work (see Currier 2012b), given the perceived and actual consequences of having the nature of their work exposed, or having the sexual orientations of this group known. In line with the do-no-harm principle, I maintained the invisibility of CSO staff members and I was silent about their sexual orientations, given activists use this as a strategy for their work and to avoid ‘outing’, that is, exposing the sexual orientations of the LGBTQ+ people who work with the targeted organizations. I allowed participants to choose the interview locations so that they could feel free and safe. It is standard practice that competent committees conduct an ethical review of research protocols before research. My research protocols were reviewed during the ISS Dissertation Design Seminar for this thesis, by the NUST IDS Board as well as the office of the Bulawayo Mayor.

4.11 Data Management

During fieldwork, I quickly imported data from a voice recorder, and from the phone collected audio, and stored them safely in a password-protected personal laptop and a password-protected memory stick for backup purposes. I immediately deleted the original recordings from the voice recorder once I had confirmed that I had saved the documents correctly -- this was because the audios were not password protected. The initial plan was to store all data in the EUR document vault; however, incessant power cuts, as well as poor internet connectivity and speed, prevented this. I kept hard copies of documents in a locked cabinet in my office at NUST.

4.12 Data Analysis

The analysis was qualitative and interpretive, and based on thematic analysis, a systematic process aimed at sifting qualitative information gained from various data sources to identify key emerging themes (Creswell 2014). Creswell (2014) defines data analysis as using specific procedures to work through collected data. This process involved categorizing and classifying collected data, and synthesizing it to extract useful information to answer the research questions. I achieved this through coding, which I employed to arrange data into categories to easily identify similar data. This involved a two-way process of selecting relevant data and categorizing them under relevant themes.

The themes were those used by participants, and were related to the questions I had asked during data collection. I began transcription of audio and recorded data during fieldwork. I coded words and phrases with similar meanings from the transcribed audio data, notes compiled from participatory observation, and other written documents into sub-themes to reduce the responses to units that are easy to manage. This

process was followed by intensive reading of the raw data under each theme, to elucidate the main ideas. In the initial stages, I developed themes as they emerged in each data source. Regarding sequence, I analyzed various data sources concurrently and iteratively, from the early stages of fieldwork until the writing of the thesis.

The intensive reading process led to fine-tuning of themes across data sources; these were next prepared and organized for analysis, and then coded, using NVivo qualitative software. The following process involved the connection of the data to show how one concept may influence another; corroboration/legitimization by evaluating alternative explanations; disconfirming evidence; and searching for negative cases. I also used comparisons and contrasts for qualitative analysis. In this method, I compared answers between participants (IPDET 2007). I identified reasons for the differences (see TDR 2014). As a qualitative data analysis method, I also searched for missing information -- what respondents deliberately omitted; silence also has meaning. Upon discovering missing information, I revisited the field to find the information, as it could affect findings. I used analysis to aggregate the collected data.

4.13 Data Presentation

In data presentation, I use specific terms, words, and ways of presenting data based on how the participants used them during fieldwork and best practices. I use the term ‘collective/s’ in the same manner used by interlocutors. I have also adopted LGBTQ+-affirming words, terms, and language in the data presentation, and have avoided using derogatory ones. For example, I replaced LGBTQ+ derogative vernacular words such as ‘*ngochani*’, ‘*stabani*’, and ‘*ncukubili*’ when used to denote people of same-sex sexualities and diverse gender identities and expressions. My presentation of findings also follows standard academic practice in using quotation marks for shorter direct quotes, indented paragraphs for longer direct quotes, square brackets for added words, and ellipses for omitted words or sentences.

4.14 Limitations of the Study

The LGBTQ+ movement comprises diverse groups, often representing people with different sexual orientations, gender identities, expressions, and other sex characteristics (SOGIESC). In identifying as *inter-alia* LGBTQ+ and sex worker CSOs, the leading organizations I targeted, although they work with different SOGIESC, e.g., through SOGIESC collectives, tend primarily to homogenize the experiences of different SOGIESC ‘activists’ in HRBA operationalization. The preceding motivated me to delimit my study in a different way from how the CSOs view themselves and to narrow the study to focus on the MSM,

indicating a central blind spot of my study – the non-inclusiveness of other SOGIESC groups²⁵. I acknowledge that most of the literature on the history of LGBTQ+ organizing (see, for example, Goddard 2004 and Epprecht’s 2008 *Heterosexual Africa*) heavily focuses on ‘gay’ organizing, and while this may be coherent, the absence of literature regarding the organizing of LBQ women is troubling, especially for LBQ women activists.

I targeted largely MSM projects, although the CSOs also deal with other projects, such as those for sex workers and allies of these groups. Therefore, while the CSOs directly and indirectly work with different groups, I set out to consider the experiences of MSM and they are the more dominant group. My findings do not reflect the realities of all the other diverse categories. I thus acknowledge that the specific nuanced and varied experiences of the ‘LBTI’ groups in operationalizing HRBAs are beyond the purview of my current study. As I explain in the conclusions, these experiences are a potential area for other scholars to explore. Only a few nascent CSOs in Bulawayo at the time of my fieldwork focused exclusively on individual categories of the broad LGBTQ+ identity. These few nascent organizations also had a few projects of their own. My findings do not account for how the other groups self-organized themselves and, if they were part of the gay and other MSM, then why they associated themselves with “gay” organizations.

Another limitation of my study was that I could not carry out my initial plan to conduct the second leg of fieldwork at the INGOs in Norway and the Netherlands. Funding challenges led to delays, and it ultimately became impossible because of the COVID-19 restrictions in February 2020. I decided to offset this drawback by relying on project documents from the targeted INGOs. I had one face-to-face KII with a representative of one of the INGOs, who visited Zimbabwe. I did two online interviews, one with a representative of SAIH and another from COC Netherlands. I gathered data through field observations when representatives of the INGOs had compliance visits to partner CSOs. I also used the perspectives of representatives of CSO staff regarding INGOs, and information available from the websites of these INGOs. The gathered data were adequate to paint a picture of how these INGOs interpreted and translated HRBA discourses into concrete projects.

Regarding data collection, I decided to collect the bulk of the data from the majority of activities of one organization, the SRC. The SRC implemented most of these activities in collaboration with the collectives it mentored; hence, following SRC activities meant following the collectives and vice versa. This choice of

²⁵ See Awuor (2021) regarding the underrepresentation and marginalization of LBQ persons in the LGBTQ+ movement in the case of Kenya.

SRC and its collectives was because the other large, targeted organization, GALZ, had a satellite office with fewer activities, and the other organizations were still in the process of institutionalizing, and also had fewer project activities. This limited the richness of KIIs with representatives of these organizations. As I mentioned above, I offset this by relying on the various documents of GALZ published through the main office in Harare, and everyday informal conversations with representatives of the collectives.

4.15 Conclusion

This chapter has presented the methodology of my study. I have explained the appropriateness of the population, sampling techniques, design, fieldwork, data collection tools, approach to data analysis, and data presentation style. I have also addressed ethical considerations, the validation process, and the limitations of my study. The chapter explains the use of exploratory research to guide the thesis. It also explains my use of a qualitative approach. Consistent and constant awareness of my positionality characterized my fieldwork experience. In this chapter, I have outlined the justification for my decisions regarding methods. The following four chapters present the findings resulting from these decisions.

5 CHAPTER FIVE

THE NATIONAL POLITICAL CONTEXT

5.1 Introduction

This is the first of the chapters on empirical findings. I here indicate how the national political context influences the nature and extent to which CSOs apply ‘formal’ HRBAs. In doing so, I draw from the PPT, given its inherent concern with the problem of how political processes influence social movement actions (Tilly 1978, McAdam 1982, Tarrow 1983, Tarrow 1994), and its theoretical capacity to explain the influence of the political context on the operationalization of HRBAs. The findings have been taken from two somewhat similar types of Zimbabwe republics between 2010 and 2020. The First Republic Government of Zimbabwe (FR-GoZ) was under former President Mugabe before 2017, and the Second Republic Government of Zimbabwe (SR-GoZ) was under President Mnangagwa from 2017 until the conclusion of my data collection in 2021.

5.2 The Influence of Perceptions on non-Indigeneity

This section illustrates the lingering effects of perceptions regarding the non-indigeneity of same-sex sexualities on the experiences of activists in operationalizing HRBAs. The popular perception in most societies is that there are two binary sexes – male and female, two binary genders -- masculinity and femininity, and only one sexual orientation, i.e., heterosexuality, and that anything else is foreign (Edmondson 2019, Tamale 2011). While Evans and Mawere (2022) correctly point out that the debate on the indigeneity of same-sex sexualities in Zimbabwe has been exhausted because of extensive supportive empirical evidence, the documents I have reviewed reveal intense intolerance of MSM and SR-MSM, implying that both are not indigenous to Zimbabwe. These perceptions from findings require further engagement. For example,²⁶ former president Mugabe declared that SR-MSM are unnatural, unconstitutional, a sign of moral decadence, a threat to human dignity, a ‘white disease’, ‘part of the culture

²⁶ Many examples of homocritical speeches exist regarding the indigeneity of heteronormativity, and purport to symbolically define ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘patriots’ and ‘sell-outs’, ‘pigs/dogs’ and ‘humans’, and ‘whites and blacks’. These speeches include: ‘worse than pigs and dogs/male pig[s] know the female one[s]’, ‘we are not gays’, ‘Blair, keep your England and I keep my Zimbabwe’ among many others (Engelke 1999, Dunton & Palmberg 1996, Schafer & Range 2014, Shoko & Phiri 2017). See: *The Washington Post*, “Mugabe Says of Obama’s Gay Rights Push, ‘We Ask, Was He Born out of Homosexuality?’,” <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/07/25/mugabe-says-of-obamas-gay-rights-push-we-ask-was-he-born-out-of-homosexuality/> July 25, 2013.

of Europeans²⁷, and a ‘scourge white people planted on a pure continent²⁸’ (see *The Sunday Mail* 18-24 July 2010).

If one is to accept Mugabe’s argument, white people first settled in Zimbabwe for a long enough period to plant a ‘scourge’ or ‘transmit the white disease’ of ‘same-sex sexualities’ through colonialism. In other words, Mugabe’s statements insinuate that colonialism brought same-sex sexualities to Zimbabwe and Africa. Mugabe was not alone in holding negative views about MSM that affected the operationalization of HRBAs in CSOs. For example, former Minister of Education, Arts, Sports, and Culture, Anias Chigwedere, described the LGBTQ+ community as a finger whose festering can spread to the whole body and, therefore, must be cut off (GALZ 1999).

The media reviewed (*The Sunday Mail*, 18-24 July 2010; *The Herald*, 15 September 2010) show that the government rallied citizens to adopt a hostile stance toward the West and local activists promoting the SR-MSM. It achieved this by associating the West’s so-called ‘imposition’ of SR-MSM with the imposition of Western sanctions, regime change politics, and imperialism. It also projected activists operationalizing HRBAs on SR-MSM as unpatriotic and ‘sellouts’ (see *The Herald* 15 September 2010). The reviewed documents also reveal that homophobic rhetoric on the foreignness of same-sex sexualities worsened during national processes that mobilize people, such as constitution-making²⁹ and elections, given that actors such as politicians use homophobic rhetoric as a rallying point in mobilization (*The Herald* 3 September 2010). From the above findings emerge four politicized narratives that affected HRBA operationalization: 1) white people, through colonialism, brought same-sex sexualities to pristine Africa; 2) Same-sex sexualities are a filthy practice; 3) The white race is diseased in practicing same-sex sexualities and, therefore, on a moral level ‘inferior’ to the pristine and ‘superior’ black race; 4) Westernization and imperialism sustain the imposition of same-sex sexualities in Africa.

It is crucial to note dissenting minority voices, as the quote below reveals:

The [MSM] are [minority indigenes of] Zimbabwe. Their sexual practice[s can] cause cultural shock to individuals witnessing [them] for the first time in a closed society like ours. This is a fact they must acknowledge and that [this shock can] cause some temporary [negative] feelings [about

²⁷ *The World*, “Robert Mugabe: 25-Years of Gay-Bashing,” <https://theworld.org/stories/2012-05-30/robert-mugabe-25-years-gay-bashing>, May 30, 2012.

²⁸ Quoted in BBC news, “Homosexual and Hatred in Zimbabwe,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/events/crossing_continents/top_features/143169.stm. 12 August 1998.

²⁹ Authorities accused GALZ of promoting foreign values on same-sex marriages after the organization made its submission on SR-MSM to the thematic committees charged with facilitating the formulation of the constitution in 2012-2013. A couple of weeks after the submission, authorities raided the GALZ offices.

them] among [heterosexual people]. [Heterosexual people] *must acknowledge that* [as the] majority, *their sexual practices are pervasive and* [even acknowledged by] *homosexuals and, therefore, accepted.* [This will] *help avoid the insensitivity to* [heterosexuals] *around homosexuals displaying intimate affection in public* [and] *the insensitivity of* [heterosexuals] *wanting to police consensual intimacy that happens in private between homosexuals [...]. I believe many heterosexual people go through* [a cultural] *shock* [when first exposed to sexual practices of MSM], *a process they will get over [...]. Our younger generations [...]* *are already socialized into urban societies that have open homosexuals [...]. My main point is that let's be sincere about homosexuality and heterosexuality and be sensitive and respectful* (KII with Chief 2 – 12 June 2019).

The quote importantly confirms dissenting views from the four politicized narratives above, and against tendencies in the literature to generalize empirical findings such as “[a]ll the respondents indicated that homosexuality was brought by whites who are trying to influence the cultures of African countries” (Mabvurira & Matsika 2013: 9). Alternatively, that where it existed, it was a practice of witches or abnormal people (ibid). In line with the PPT, it illustrates imagined opportunities for HRBA operationalization, discriminatory nevertheless, such as that activists can promote the narrative that MSM can enjoy SR-MSM in ‘private’ and not promote the display of their public affection in public, as this can cause cultural shock.

However, attributing homophobia in the above quote to cultural shock is debatable. In the literature I reviewed, there were no instances of homophobia being conceptually linked to culture shock. Using the works of van Klinken & Chitando (2016) and Currier (2010), I defined homophobia as, going beyond popular reference to hatred and fear of LGBTQ+ people, to mean the strategic use of negative feelings associated with beliefs in the inherent superiority of heteronormativity and inherent inferiority of same-sex sexualities.

The above quote elicits an additional level of defining homophobia -- as often transient and seldom permanent negative feelings associated with cultural shock for people socialized in heteronormativity upon learning about and interfacing with same-sex sexual practices. This way of understanding homophobia offers hope for activists operationalizing HRBAs in a world where closed heteronormative societies face increasing globalization³⁰ and modernity, where conservatives are bound to learn and interface with same-

³⁰ Globally, as of December 2022, 68 countries criminalized same-sex relationships between consenting adults out of a possible 195, in mid-2000s 76, and in the 1990s over a hundred, indicating a gradual global move toward acceptance of SR-MSM (see Valenza 2015). (See also Statista Research Department 2022), Number of countries that criminalize homosexuality as of 2022, Available from: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1227390/number-of-countries-that-criminalize-homosexuality/>. In Africa, “as of 2017, 33 countries criminalize male same-sex practices, 29 of which also criminalize homosexuality among women. In Southern Africa, Zimbabwe’s neighbours South Africa, Botswana and Mozambique have decriminalized same-sex relationships. Six countries (Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, and South Africa) protect gay individuals from employment discrimination, but only South Africa offers constitutional protections to sexual minorities and same-sex marriage recognition” (Dreier, Long and Winkler 2020: 297).

sex sexualities, and where the revival of an imagined ‘pristine’ heterosexuality as the only form of sexuality is no longer possible:

One can no longer have the privilege of wishing for [the] realities and impact of [...] modernity, globalization, and other factors on the shaping and development of the African mode of being [along] Ubuntu. It is hardly an exaggeration to advance the view that being African does not mean the same thing to all Africans – even indigenes of sub-Saharan Africa (Matolino & Kwindigwi 2013: 201).

The above is true for Zimbabwe, as shown by the quote from Chief 2 above; being Zimbabwean does not mean identifying with heteronormativity for all Zimbabweans, including indigenes of the country. *Ubuntu* is not and has never been the dominant value system in modern and open urban societies. For Chief 2, this is true especially “for our younger generations, [who are already] socialized into urban societies that have open homosexuals” (KII with Chief 2 – 12 June 2019). These findings echo those of the Afrobarometer (2020: 3), which confirms that “[t]olerance levels [...] are somewhat higher in cities than in rural areas [...] and increase modestly with respondents’ education level”. A study by Tinarwo and Pasura (2014) to examine tolerance levels of the Zimbabwean diaspora living in ‘open’ communities in British cities presents similar findings. The preceding confirms Tamale’s (2014: 155) assertions that “sexuality is not exclusively driven by biology [and by extension, indigeneity]; a very significant part of it is socially constructed through legal, cultural and religious forces driven by a politico-economic agenda”.

The chief’s perception that younger generations are more tolerant contradicts findings from the Afrobarometer (2020), which observed similar tolerance levels with adults in Africa. The Afrobarometer (2020) calculated these tolerance levels for the continent using mean averages, and included Central and East African regions less tolerant than Southern Africa, hence the disparity. From a PPT theoretical standpoint, political opportunities for the revival of ‘pristine’ heterosexuality and a return to ‘pristine’ *Ubuntu* no longer exist, as I mentioned above. Matolino and Kwindigwi (2013: 202) also note:

The success of Ubuntu largely depends on undifferentiated, small, and tight-knit communities that are relatively undeveloped. Through mutual recognition and interdependence, members of these communities foster the necessary feelings of solidarity that enable the spirit of Ubuntu to flourish [...]. Without [...] such communities, the notion of Ubuntu becomes only but an appendage to the political desires, wills, and manipulations of the elite in the attempt to coerce society towards [political gain].

From a PPT’s perspective, and as the above quote shows, the degree of openness or closure of communities determines the success of *Ubuntu*. *Ubuntu* succeeds in closed communities. The Gukurahundi genocide (see section 1.8) ripped open to other cultures and people communities in Bulawayo, and so has

globalization, availing political opportunities for tolerance of activists operationalizing SR-MSM. The quote above and the PPT imply, therefore, that globalization expands socialization agents on sexuality as global media houses, Western education, and diaspora-based parenting add to ‘local’ socialization agents. Riding on PPT, Zimbabwe is bound to become more tolerant as it inevitably opens itself to the outside world's influence on sexuality, and as young people embody ‘cosmopolitan culture’.

Mugabe’s declaration that SR-MSM are an unconstitutional foreign practice reveals the strategy to use national laws to illegalize SR-MSM for political gain and regime self-preservation, dating back to the colonial administration and stretching to the post-Mugabe era, in which President Mnangagwa also defended his neutral or ambivalent stance as based on the constitution³¹. The colonial project marooned black men from the affection of their female partners and families through residential enclosures and colonial urban centers meant primarily for bachelors, based on racist perceptions that primitive blacks, as they imagined to be the case with primates, were exclusively heterosexual (Taru & Basure 2014). The administrators deemed that time spent on reciprocal affection with female partners would interfere with the labor of men from colonial industries, mines, and settler farms (Han & O’Mahoney 2014). The administrators put in racist sodomy laws targeting primarily the racial ‘other’, to enforce exclusive heterosexuality of men for reasons of consolidating colonialism, as the quote below reveals:

When white people came, sex on the thighs and even anal sex, probably after they had practiced it as herd boys, was a [...] pastime for black people in [colonial] mines and [settler] farms here in Zimbabwe and in [South Africa]. Then, we didn’t have [organizations] like we now do that existed solely to defend in colonial courts the blacks against colonial [sodomy] laws [illegalizing] sexual practices like sex on the thighs or anal sex. As a chief, I am not opposed to pastime sex on the thighs or anal sex when men find themselves in male-only confinements or when it is their preference even after marrying women (KII with Chief 1 - 9 June 2019).

The isolated acknowledgment of the existence of CSOs now, unlike in the era of colonialism, where the illegalization of same-sex sexualities went unchallenged, is a positive development for HRBA operationalization. The acknowledgment is gaining traction.

Mnangagwa in Davos³² also stated that it is not his duty to canvass for SR-MSM, in other words, to shape public and national opinion on SR-MSM. He seems to undermine his power in shaping public and national opinion, but his neutral or ambivalent position partly shapes public and national opinion on SR-MSM. He

³¹ See the second epigraph of this thesis.

³² *Newsday* 31 January 2018 Mnangagwa won’t campaign for gays (Online) Available from: <https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/01/mnangagwa-wont-campaign-gays/>

suggested the existence of those whose it is their duty [CSOs and activists] to do so, and that while the constitution forbids same-sex marriages, it allows them to canvass for popular support toward amending the constitution. As I shall show below, Mugabe and others did not acknowledge, and saw no reason for, the existence of MSM, their rights, and CSOs.

Mnangagwa has also amplified the mantra of ‘leaving no one behind’. He added to it, ‘leaving no one and no place behind’. Various government strategic documents now also carry the mantra (MoHCC 2020). Unlike Mugabe, who stripped MSM of humanness, depicting them as pigs and dogs, Mnangagwa sees them as human beings with rights, for which, while he cannot advocate, others can. Therefore, in leaving no one and no place behind, the assumption is that he includes MSM in all places in Zimbabwe because he sees MSM as human beings.

Epprecht (2022) has compiled various court cases involving black men whom the colonial administration accused of practicing non-heterosexual behaviors and practices. These court cases help to prove, against notions in the above findings of SR-MSM as a ‘white disease’, ‘European culture’, ‘a scourge on a pristine continent’, and a ‘festering finger’, the indigeneity of non-heterosexual practices among blacks. Makofane (2013), in engaging Epprecht (2012), notes that narratives in the above quote, such as that same-sex sexualities were a “favorite pastime for black people in [colonial] mines and [settler] farms”, reinforce notions that male same-sex sexual practices are an aberration that only happens in settings without women and, therefore, are counterfeit sexuality compared to heterosexuality.

At independence, the post-colonial administration inherited³³ the same colonial sodomy laws³⁴ for political gain and regime preservation (Han & O'Mahoney 2014). This obsession with regime preservation explains an ideological irony in that while Mugabe's politics were anti-colonialist, at the same time, the very same politics maintained and promoted pro-colonial sodomy laws after formal political independence. In 2013, Zimbabwe adopted a new constitution that does not necessarily outlaw ‘sodomy’, notwithstanding that the

³³ GALZ and SHRL (2022) report that in 2019 alone the authorities charged five men in different parts of the country with “sodomy”. The police raided a gay couple’s home without a warrant and assaulted the couple prior to arresting and bringing them before a magistrate, who remanded them into custody. The court released the couples after a state witness did not appear for criminal trial (GALZ 2020).

³⁴ Section 73 of the Criminal Law (Reform and Codification) Act outlaws sodomy. It states: “(1) [a]ny male person who, with the consent of another male person, knowingly performs with that other person anal sexual intercourse, or any act involving physical contact other than anal sexual intercourse that would be regarded by a reasonable person to be an indecent act, shall be guilty of sodomy”. The world over, most former colonial powers have repealed sodomy laws and replaced them with laws that promote SOGIESC inclusion and equality. The Act also states that: (2) “subject to subsection (3), both parties to the performance of an act referred to in subsection (1) may be charged with and convicted of sodomy”.

Criminal Law (Reform and Codification) Act does. The adopted constitution prohibits same-sex marriage, specifically, under the heading ‘marriage rights’, as follows: “Persons of the same sex are prohibited from marrying each other.” In this light, the SR-MSM yearn for decolonization from the post-colonial politics of neo-colonialism of the elite, and for the attention of decolonial scholarship. Decolonizing SR-MSM will entail repealing the colonial sodomy laws without which, as decolonial thinkers Fanon et al. (2004) warn, and as I justify below (section 5.4), attempts to return to a ‘pristine’ past are bound to fail.

The compiled cases above mean that, despite the hyped tropes of Mugabe and others on same-sex sexualities as a fruit of colonialism, the empirical evidence above shows this position to be false. I have proved false the assertion in the above findings that white people first introduced same-sex sexualities in Zimbabwe. In Chapter 6, I engage empirical evidence to prove that similar tropes about discourses such as imperialism, Westernization, and globalization sustain same-sex sexualities that impede HRBA operationalization as false. In conceptualizing the indigeneity of sexual rights (section 2.3.1.1), using the works of Swidler (1993) and Parrinder (1980), I illustrated that it is the Western gay identity and homophobia that are alien to indigenous Africa.

The PPT’s political opportunity component helps to explain how Mugabe, by making SR-MSM unconstitutional ‘white disease’, provides a framework and a boundary for HRBA operationalization and the perceived risks for activists in not obeying the constitution (see Koopmans 2004). Because of the perceived risks of violating sodomy laws and promoting a relic evil of colonialism and a ‘white disease’, the targeted CSOs were not promoting the right to marriage for gay people. The risks are real, given that in neighboring Malawi, a gay couple faced charges of up to 14 years in prison in 2010 for violating similar sodomy laws (Han & O’Mahoney 2014).

That both SR-MSM and LGBTQ+ activism are rooted in Zimbabwe is not only a matter of my positionality (see section 4.7) but, as I illustrated in section 2.3.1.1, autochthonous to Africa and not a ‘Western pervasion’ (Epprecht 1998, 1999, 2004). A chief also highlighted the indigeneity of tolerance of same-sex practices alongside such practices as casual sex among young people and masturbation:

[Oral tradition] tell[s] us that before white people came to our lands, sex on the thighs and masturbation was a common pastime among boys and became visible among herd boys while herding cattle. In other words, these practices are part of our culture before their contact with white people. The elders: older siblings, parents, relatives, and village heads knew about these practices as much as they knew about casual sex between male and female teenagers, [for example] when they met fetching firewood or water. They would even talk about these practices: sex on the thighs, masturbation, and casual sex as common adolescent practices that go against Ubuntu. Upon

graduation to manhood, these herd boys would, however, marry a woman or women, and some continued [while in heterosexual marriages] to engage in masturbation [or to have sexual relations with people of the same sex through] sex on the thighs and anal sex (KII with Chief 1 - 9 June 2019).

The colonial project instigated and reinforced laws against same-sex practices through missionary activities in addition to laws, as the quote below shows. The Mugabe government's projection in the above findings of activists operationalizing HRBAs in promoting SR-MSM as Western-oriented, unpatriotic, and sellouts is misplaced. These notions are similar to those in mass society theories that deemed activists irrational and deranged before the emergence of social movement theories (McAdam 1996). The RMT and PPT are critical of this manner of projection of activists in such theories as mass society theory. Observing through the same critical lenses of these social movement theories, one can understand the circumstances, such as when governments face legitimacy questions, or the projection of activists as unpatriotic and sellouts, or as gullibly accepting the cultural values of the West (McCarthy & Zald 1973, 1977). The same chief stated:

The [CSO] activists and straight young people will tell you that culture is dynamic. They will tell you that returning to [pristine] African culture before the arrival of the white [people] is a dream. True. They say, in its dynamism, our culture has taken abode influences from colonialism, Westernization, and globalization. Again, true. They will tell you [MSM] are [indigenes] of Zimbabwe. Of course, that is true. [For me, the] colonial project [attempted] to erase the diversity of African sexualities from our culture. [It tried] to impose heteronormativity through laws and missionary activities. [...] Due to the inherent evolutionary character of culture, we are, again, as a people edging toward a state of tolerance of diversity similar to the state before the coming of white [people. A state] of tolerance of diversity in Zimbabwean sexualities, although nothing is [pristine] about this state given [it's] an outcome in independent Zimbabwe of the effects of Westernization and globalization in addition to natural causes, and not an outcome of the teachings from the custodians of the [pristine] African culture (KII with Chief 2 – 12 June 2019).

It is worth noting that in the above findings, Mugabe, and others, from a moral plank, associate the non-indigeneity and filthiness of SR-MSM ('pigs, and dogs, unnatural³⁵, a scourge on a pristine continent, a festering finger and moral decadence') with racial identity ('white disease and European culture). I argue, using the works of de Saugy (2022: 603), that the perceived origins of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in 'contaminated black gay' communities in America, its dismissal as a white man's disease, and "the disproportionate visibility of white gay men, particularly in South Africa" continue to contribute to the image in Zimbabwe of "homosexuality as white, foreign, [...] distant" and filthy.

³⁵ The quote reads, "It degrades human dignity. [It is] unnatural and there is no question ever of allowing these people to behave worse than dogs and pigs... What we are being persuaded to accept is sub-animal behaviour and we will never allow it here" (see Dunton & Palmberg 1996: 18).

Evans and Mawere (2022) have indicated this association of ‘gay’ identity with racial identity with the use of empirical evidence. The mobilization of racism utilizing politicized homophobia as a moral tenet in projecting blacks as “pristine” and superior, and whites as diseased and inferior, is what my study also underlines, in addition to the association mentioned above. In their study, Evans and Mawere (2022) examined how some Zimbabweans active on Twitter associated with racial identity, the disclosure of gay identity by a white teacher at St John’s College³⁶ in 2018. They perceived the disclosure:

[N]ot as a matter of one expressing their sexual orientation but a concealed attempt to recruit (woo) and molest ‘innocent boys’. This positions him as foreign and a pollutant, which, following Zimbabwe’s nation-craft, is buttressed by his racial identity (whiteness and gay), and its link with reinvented foreignness and colonialism (Evans and Mawere 2021: 10).

Considering that white activists formed and once held positions of leadership at the secretarial level in both GALZ and the SRC during their formative years³⁷, the findings mentioned above and observations by Evans and Mawere are crucial for the context of my study (see section 1.4 about the targeted CSOs). This means that for Mugabe, and others, these organizations promoting ‘filthy’ practices are a fruit of a ‘diseased inferior’ white race and an imposition on a ‘pristine’ and superior black race. For me, the racialization of SR-MSM activism as an occupation of ‘diseased’ white people partly explains the decrease over the years of white activists involved in CSOs. Unlike at their inception, during my fieldwork period, the staff establishment of SRC, GALZ, and collectives consisted exclusively of blacks.

Nyanzi (2014) observes that notions similar to the above fuel the accusations that black activists, who correspond to ‘White’ ideas of human rights and gay identity, take the lead in LGBTQ+ activism using HRBAs in African countries. These activists are often depicted as either Western-oriented middle/upper-class activists, or local male elites connected to cosmopolitan/elite spaces that correspond with neo-imperialism agendas (ibid). While, at one point, such accusations found credence in the eyes of those who equated leadership of GALZ and SRC by white people with championing Western agendas, there is no ‘basis’ for saying that the current indigenous activists in these CSOs are Western-oriented, unpatriotic or

³⁶ Some of the parents/guardians of pupils at the college hired a law firm to prosecute the teacher, as they perceived his disclosure of his gay sexual orientation as “ancillary to sodomy”, in breach of the sodomy laws in section 73 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act. Threats of prosecution, physical violence and death prompted the teacher to resign. Such treatment of LGBTQ+ people after ‘coming out’, with no protection from the state, explains why many choose to lead closeted lives (See *BBC News*, “Gay Zimbabwe teacher resigns after death threats”, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45665906> 27 September 2018). GALZ (2020) reports similar extensive use of blackmail for extortion by third parties and the police, leading many LGBTQ+ people to choose to lead closeted lives. In 2019, a gay man fled the country after a police officer friend connived with another man to expose his sexual orientation and demanded a bribe under threats of prosecution (ibid).

sellouts. The majority are born, bred, educated in, and indigenous to, Zimbabwe. My observations during fieldwork were that these activists appreciate and respect the positive communal values of *Ubuntu*³⁸.

Scholars have observed in other similar contexts (see Tamale 2009, Luirink 2008, Rubin 1984) the use of powerful tropes against the indigeneity of SR-MSM and LGBTQ+ individuals as a ploy to distract attention from authoritarianism and dictatorship. I agree with these scholars, and argue that Mugabe and his government officials used the anti-indigeneity tropes that projected SR-MSM as Western, and local activists as unpatriotic and sellouts, from the years of the Book Fair saga and beyond toward a similar end. They used the tropes described in my findings above³⁹ as a ploy to mobilize widespread public negative feelings about MSM, and instrumentalize them to distract attention from the legitimacy question as well as the dire material conditions of the majority emanating as adverse effects of dictatorship. Therefore, the SR-MSM activists became natural enemies and targets of vitriol in that they were fighting back against such politicization of homophobia.

I argue that this way of politicizing homophobia has been possible in light of findings of a public opinion survey in which most Zimbabweans reported their dislike for LGBTQ+ people, with 83% saying that they would strongly dislike having LGBTQ+ persons as neighbors⁴⁰ (Kokera & Ndoma 2016). By associating the so-called ‘imposition’ of SR-MSM by the West, and their local black ‘comprador’ activists, with, for instance, hunger, unemployment, and poverty blamed on Western sanctions, the government rallied the widespread ‘dislike’ of LGBTQ+ people by most Zimbabweans, prompting them to adopt a hostile stance toward the West, and toward local activists for promoting SR-MSM with the use of HRBAs. In this way, argues de Saugy (2022), it shifted the blame for economic and social hardships away from itself to woo voters, wield control of the police, army, and war veterans, and unite a party increasingly rocked by factions,

³⁸ See section 5.4 for the discussion on positive values of *Ubuntu*.

³⁹ Such as ‘white disease, European culture, a scourge on a pristine continent and a festering finger’.

⁴⁰ The statistics of 83% of Zimbabweans saying they would ‘dislike’ having LGBTQ+ people is important in that it serves to demonstrate what homophobia or the instrumentalization of negative feelings about LGBTQ+ people has achieved. I argue that the 83% does not necessarily mean hatred or fear of LGBTQ+ people but fear of being neighbours of LGBTQ+ people whom such laws as section 73 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act, criminalize. In addition, it is fear of associating with LGBTQ+ people who for decades, the political leadership of the country and other influencers have denigrated. Prior to the emergence of politicization of homophobia in the mid-1990s, Epprecht (1998:633) reports that most Zimbabweans were “baffled by the ‘antihomo’ campaign of 1995”. I am not inclined to accept that such statistics reflects the successful imposition of the government’s ‘antihomo’ stance in shaping public attitudes as many of the opinion surveys typically project. However, this could be a personal bias, anchored in my positionality as an activist (see also Afrobarometer 2016, Dionne, Dulani and Chunga 2014).

and thus as a tactic for regime self-preservation. As I will show in the sections below, it also shifted the blame to rally the support of cultural and religious leaders for government officials.

The government did not point out to citizens that, as I highlighted in the background sections, the same West was also dealing with particular tendencies that were contributing to social and economic hardship. These tendencies included those related to corruption, poor governance, electoral fraud, property rights violations, and violation of the right to life. These tendencies intensified during violent and chaotic invasions of commercial farms (Report on Cartel Power 2021, Willems 2013, and Moyo 2004). The government isolated particular issues, such as the so-called ‘imposition’ of SR-MSM by the West, and sanctions, with the potential to mobilize public antagonism toward the West and local activist partners. It made more noise about them, blaming them for almost all economic and social ills bedeviling the country (Report on Cartel Power 2021) seemingly, and as Tamale (2009) has noted for other similar contexts, to drown the concerns of the West about its increasing corruption, dictatorship, and authoritarianism.

However, this once powerful strategy of regime-self-preservation by sanctions, and by shifting blame to Whites and the West, or labeling political enemies ‘gays’ conspiring with imperialists to impose ‘gay’ rights (GALZ & SHRL⁴¹ 2022), reached the limits of its potency by 2015 amid political implosions in Mugabe’s ruling party⁴², and failed to save him in November 2017. The dismal failure of his strategy became visible after the infamous “We are not gays” speech at the United Nations General Assembly in 2015. The speech failed to galvanize support among Mugabe’s supporters in the way that such powerful tropes had achieved in the past. The supporters blamed social and economic woes not on the West, Whites, sanctions, ‘gay’ local enemies, or LGBTQ+ people, but squarely on Mugabe’s politics (de Saugy 2022).

For the PPT, and as explained in the theoretical section (2.2), the major cause for a government or system to experience vulnerabilities revolves around the legitimacy question, whereby most citizens no longer support the heavy-handed manner and complex economic and social hardships that they experience under their government (McAdam 1996). No strategy can perpetually protect a government from these vulnerabilities if most citizens are facing hardship. This, together with the posturing for international re-engagement, partly explains why the SR-GoZ has abandoned this failing strategy of blame-shifting for

⁴¹ Stockholm Human Rights Lab

⁴² Concerns about the West imposing SR-MSM, intended to unite the rival factions and rally popular support, were in part overtaken by dire material conditions and infighting that culminated in the dismissal of Joice Mujuru, former Vice President, and the transient rise of President Mugabe’s wife, Grace Mugabe, as his successor (de Saugy 2022, Gaidzanwa 2015).

regime self-preservation in the post-Mugabe era, at least as it relates to the SR-MSM discourse, and not so much as it relates to sanctions.

The above portrayal of SR-MSM as Western negatively influenced HRBA operationalization. A participant (KII with SRC staff 2 - 28 March 2019) stated that politicians and other gatekeepers in public spaces dismiss SR-MSM and HRBA as Western in orientation. Authorities also criticize staff members in CSOs operationalizing HRBA in MSM projects for being inclined to promote Western values to please their donors. On the one hand, politicians dismiss SR-MSM, and issue homophobic statements in homophobic networks, only to admit in 'private' spaces that MSM have rights. On the other hand, CSO staff operationalizing HRBAs are mindful that using the HRBA to address the effects of homophobic statements leads to authorities dismissing them as comprador objects of Western donors, whereas they welcome the approach in 'private' spaces. I discuss in the next section the political harassment of activists.

5.3 Influence of Political Harassment of Activists

In this section, I explore the empirical data that show the effects of political harassment of activists on their operationalization of HRBAs in the FR-GoZ. I developed political harassment as an essential analytical tool in my conceptual framework (section 2.3.1.1) to understand my findings on the same. The government used threats and homophobic rhetoric against activists. Former Zimbabwe Prosecutor-General, Johannes Tomana, and former President Mugabe threatened that the government would 'deal' with the GALZ for its advocacy work on SR-MSM and, by extension, any CSOs and activists operationalizing HRBAs (Bulawayo24 5 March 2014). Johannes Tomana weighed in. He complained that Zimbabwe's law was weak in dealing with the rights-based activism used by GALZ to advocate for SR-MSM. He further noted that just because the government has not outlawed GALZ does not mean its existence and lobbying efforts are legal (*The Herald* 30 October 2014, 09 May 2015, 15 May 2015, *Bulawayo24* 5 March 2014).

The government's use of political harassment to suppress HRBA activism for the SR-MSM is not limited to my study period, but dates back to the mid-1990s. Mugabe said then about his government's position on CSOs working on SR-MSM using HRBAs:

Is any sane government, which [protects] society's moral values [...] to countenance their accessions? I find it extremely outrageous and repugnant to my human conscience that such immoral and repulsive organizations, like those of homosexuals who offend both against the law of nature, and the morals of religious beliefs espoused by our society, should have any advocate in our midst, and even elsewhere in the world [...]. The association of sodomites and sexual perverts [argues that] we accept homosexuality as a right. [Then] what moral fiber [shall] our society ... ever have to deny organized drug addicts or even those given to bestiality, the rights they may claim, and

allege to possess under the rubrics of individual freedom, and human rights (Dunton, and Palmberg, 1996: 14, and Engelke 1999:299).

For Mugabe, LGBTQ+ CSOs were ‘immoral and repulsive’ organizations, activists ‘sodomites and sexual perverts’, and HRBA activism for the SR-MSM was tantamount to the promotion of criminal activities and sexual activities between humans and animals. The visibility of HRBA activism for the SR-MSM was not well-received in Zimbabwe. The above statement projects Zimbabwe under Mugabe as a typical PPT-closed society without political opportunities for HRBA operationalization in SR-MSM advocacy. The activists had no illusions about the dangers of opposing the President; according to Epprecht (2012), such homophobia has made SR-MSM advocacy risky for activists.

I argue in line with de Saugy (2022), Epprecht (2013a), and Manyonganise (2015) that Former Zimbabwean President Mugabe⁴³ displayed no negative public feelings toward LGBTQ+ people until the 1990s. At that time, he escalated homophobic rhetoric when faced with questions of accountability for economic troubles, and for the legitimacy question after allegations of rigging successive elections since the 1980s (see also Moyo 2019). In 1995 at the Book Fair saga⁴⁴, Mugabe escalated the homophobic rhetoric while facing massive protests from labor and student movements over adverse consequences of the structural adjustments program happening close to the launch of the Presidential elections (Campbell 2003).

In the 2000s, Mugabe escalated the instrumentalization of politicized homophobia following the expropriation, without compensation, of land from white farmers to 'indigenous' black 'farmers' through the highly chaotic fast-track land reform program characterized by vast human rights violations. Waves of homophobic rhetoric seem to be products of the self-preservation tactics of the regime when citizens take it to account for the bad political economy and its extended stay in power. As Rubin (1984) observed, in times of political upheavals, sexuality becomes an easy target and sexual scapegoating an attractive strategy.

Mugabe’s explicit refusal to accept SR-MSM in the mid-1990s set not only what the PPT terms a boundary for HRBA operationalization in SR-MSM advocacy, permeating all social structures and institutions, but also an enduring agenda for years to come for other actors affiliated with his ruling political party, such as the youth wing. In the mid-1990s, political, traditional, and religious leaders, some sections of civil society,

⁴³ Yet Mugabe had known about the existence of gay people at least since the 1980s, and he knew from around the 1980s that the first black President of Zimbabwe, Canaan Banana, was gay (de Saugy 2022).

⁴⁴ GALZ in the mid-1990s had also grown to be a leading critical voice against the government -- with assertions of individual freedoms, a new kind of critical activism not seen before, and with potential to set a ‘dangerous’ precedent for civil society which the government needed to halt before it could be emulated (de Saugy 2022).

and some student leaders of the University of Zimbabwe supported Mugabe's ZIBF homophobic stance (Muparamoto 2018). My findings show that more than a decade and a half after Mugabe's initial vitriol discussed above, the youth played a crucial role in the political harassment of activists working on SR-MSM using HRBAs, dating back to their role in the days of the Book Fair saga. At the Book Fair, youth descended on the fair and tore down notices of protest which GALZ had planned to carry out when Mugabe addressed the fair. In January 2012, people who claimed to be the ruling ZANU PF party youths vandalized litter bins that the SRC had donated to the Bulawayo City Council in 2011 (*The Chronicle* 06 December 2011). The media quoted the perpetrators stating that they:

[D]ecided to stop [the city council's] promotion of gay activities [...]. Placing those bins around the city with the inscription that [the SRC donated them] was a way by the council [to endorse] gay activities in the city. It is a well-known fact that Zanu PF — from the Presidency to the last person on the ground — is against gay activities in the country. We were not going to stand aside and watch the council celebrating gay activities in the city (Newsday 24 January 2012).



Picture 2: A look-alike of the 20 Litter Bins the SRC donated.
Source: *IPS News*⁴⁵ (Online)

In January 2014, the former President of the Zimbabwe Congress of Student Union, a student union body aligned to ZANU PF youth league, Farai Mteliso, 'reported' Ricky Nathanson to the police for pretending to be a female by wearing female clothes and using a female toilet, leading to her arrest⁴⁶. Ricky is a transgender women activist who then worked with the SRC in leading the collective TREAT, once housed at the SRC premises. The police charged her with "criminal nuisance" and detained her in a holding cell.

⁴⁵ *IPS News*, Surviving Zimbabwe's Anti-Gay Laws, 11 February 2014, (online), <https://www.ipsnews.net/2014/02/surviving-zimbabwes-anti-homosexuals-laws/>

⁴⁶ *The Chronicle*, Minister ordered to pay transgender activist \$400k, <https://www.chronicle.co.zw/minister-ordered-to-pay-transgender-activist-400k/> 19 November 2019. Zimbabwe Legal Information Institute, Nathanson v Mteliso & Ors. (HB 176 of 2019, HC 1873 of 2014) [2019]

They forced Ricky to strip naked so that police officers could examine her biological anatomy to verify her gender, and took her to a medical doctor for a physical examination for the same purpose.

In December 2014, following the postponement during that year of the annual Pride Week, due to security concerns and the jointly held event of Pride Week and Miss Diversity, a group of about 12 assailants suspected to be ruling party cadres attacked activists of SR-MSM and participants with *inter-alia* clubs, logs, bottles, and clenched fists (GALZ 2015). The activists and participants suffered various injuries, and some were taken for medical care (KII with GALZ staff - 12 March 2019). The participants highlighted that while they had recourse to bring political harassment to the courts, the process was exhausting and time-consuming, and often required resources they did not always have (KII with SRC staff 2 - 28 March 2019).

Literature shows that activists have scored important legal victories against political harassment in some instances in which they brought such harassment to the courts⁴⁷ (Long 2003). In 1996, the High Court of Zimbabwe set aside a government order banning GALZ from participating in the Zimbabwe International Book Fairs (*ibid*). In 2014, Magistrate Ndebele acquitted Ricky Nathanson, arrested on charges of ‘criminal nuisance laws’. In 2019, the High Court awarded delictual damages to Ricky⁴⁸. In February 2014, the High Court ruled that GALZ was operating legally after authorities arrested its co-chair of the Board of Trustees for running an ‘unregistered’ organization⁴⁹. In January 2014 the High Court had also ordered that the police return GALZ property seized during a police raid⁵⁰.

Based on the rulings above, the courts have set a precedent for the legal existence of LGBTQ+ CSOs, and protection against discrimination on the grounds of SOGIESC. Effectively in Zimbabwe, operations of CSOs within the confines of the laws, particularly sodomy laws, are legal, and discrimination based on SOGIESC stands prohibited. From 2016 to the time of the writing of this thesis in 2022, the courts had made no convictions based on SOGIESC⁵¹. The courts seem less gullible than the chiefs and religious

⁴⁷ Before and after the conviction of former President Canaan Banana for sodomy, a case in which LGBTQ+ activists felt the court lent itself to political use. However, the case needs nuances. One must note that sodomy laws are in the constitution, and complainants presented ‘credible’ evidence of ‘forced sex’, bordering on abuse of office power. Nevertheless, political rivals could have ‘pushed’ complainants to report the case after more than a decade to score political points.

⁴⁸ The judge was of the view that “This case raises issues regarding minority rights in this country, and one hopes this judgment in a way will help spark a frank national conversation of these issues which we appear to have been shy or less enthusiastic to openly discuss”. See *Nathanson v Mteliso & Ors. (HB 176/19, HC 1873/14) [2019] ZWBHC 135 (14 November 2019)*. <https://africanlii.org/article/20191128/zim-judge-gives-stunning-human-rights-decision-transgender-case>.

⁴⁹ *Huffington Post* 28 February 2014. Zimbabwe's gay community wins a landmark court victory.

⁵⁰

⁵¹ <https://www.humandignitytrust.org/country-profile/zimbabwe/>, <https://zimlii.org/home>

leaders (see sections 5.4 and 5.5, respectively) to political manipulation, and remain an essential recourse for activists to turn to in protecting SR-MSM. In other countries, such as Swaziland, such recourse is unavailable for activists (Kennedy et al. 2013).

The preceding avails opportunities for CSOs working on SR-MSM using HRBAs to turn to the courts as a vital duty bearer and alert the activists to the need for continued sensitization and capacity strengthening of judicial officers on the SR-MSM. However, sodomy laws, as the Banana case has shown, impede the effectiveness of the courts, and activists, to borrow from President Mnangagwa's word, have to 'canvass' for the repeal of sodomy laws, and for the reform of other restrictive laws. A lost opportunity for activists to turn to the courts to advance SR-MSM was, arguably, the case of the white teacher at St. John's College, who resigned after threats of prosecution, physical violence, and death (see section 5.2 above). In the US, activists see similar legal victories as drivers of changes in public opinion toward greater protection of SR-MSM (Gloppen and Rakner 2019). The converse of this is when the public perceives court decisions as too far removed from public opinion, creating scope for backlash (ibid).

Other opinion leaders and non-government institutions have contributed to the harassment of activists of SR-MSM. These have included churches, employers, families, the Constitutional Parliamentary Select Committee (COPAC⁵²), and agents of regime preservation such as chiefs⁵³. Opposition political leaders have at various junctures spoken out against supporting SR-MSM. Examples include former MDC⁵⁴ President and former Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai⁵⁵. They also include the current President of the main opposition, Nelson Chamisa, who says he does not support SR-MSM, unlike Mnangagwa, who is either neutral or ambivalent⁵⁶, and Tsvangirai, who would flip-flop depending on the audience. The media has captured these in such headlines as '[w]e [do not] support gay rights: Chamisa⁵⁷' and 'Tsvangirai denounces homosexuality⁵⁸'. Others who have contributed to the harassment of activists of SR-MSM

⁵² COPAC "was established in April 2009 as enjoined by Article VI of the Global Political Agreement" to ensure a people-driven constitution making process (COPAC 2013:2).

⁵³ *The Sunday News* 7-13 February 2010, *The Herald* 3 September 2010, 15 September 2010, 6 March 2012, 21 May 2012, 31 March 2015, 23 July 2015, *The Sunday Mail* 12-18 September 2010, *Newsday* 17 February 2012, *Kubatana.net* 24 August 2012.

⁵⁴ Movement for Democratic Change

⁵⁵ In 2011, former Prime Minister and founding President of MDC opposition political party retracted his pledge to protect 'gay' rights that he made while on a tour of European capitals in 2009. The BBC, Zimbabwe's PM Morgan Tsvangirai in gay rights U-turn, 24 October 2011, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15431142>

⁵⁶ In the famous interview in Davos - *Newsday* 31 January 2018 Mnangagwa won't campaign for gays (Online) Available from: <https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/01/mnangagwa-wont-campaign-gays/>.

⁵⁷ *The Zimbabwe Mail* - 4 March 2012.

⁵⁸ *The Herald* - 6 March 2013.

include members of parliament (MPs), local councilors, musicians, religious leaders, traditional leaders⁵⁹, and ordinary bigots⁶⁰. Moreover, the 2012-13 constitution-making process subjected LGBTQ+ communities to homophobic rhetoric and attacks by various opinion leaders⁶¹.

GALZ and SHRL (2022) capture other forms of political harassment of activists⁶². These include:

[...] torture, assaults, and violence, rape based on their sexual orientation, arbitrary arrest and unlawful [detention], extortion of valuables in exchange for non-disclosure of their gender identity or sexual orientation [...], arbitrary monitoring, and surveillance, disruption of organized events, and [...] raids (GALZ, and SRHL 2022:7⁶³).

Some of the above forms of violence, such as torture, arbitrary arrests, unlawful detention (as in the case of Ricky Nathanson), rape based on sexual orientation, extortion of valuables in exchange for non-disclosure of their gender identity or sexual orientation, and disruption of organized events, and conducting raids were not prevalent in Bulawayo, at least during my fieldwork, and not in the case of the organizations I targeted between the period 2018 through 2021 in the SR-GoZ. A recent study in state-run universities also provides empirical evidence that the above forms of harassment against LGBTQ+ people are no longer widespread (GALZ 2019a). The evidence from this study shows that the nature of harassment faced by students included gossip, name-calling, insults, outings, invasions of privacy, and cyberbullying. The same study identifies fellow students as the foremost perpetrators of harassment of LGBTQ+ students.

The documents I reviewed also revealed the above forms as mainly experienced by activists of SR-MSM from GALZ, mostly in Harare under FR-GoZ. In section 1.8, I explained how Bulawayo is more tolerant than Harare regarding SR-MSM, and this, together with the softening of Mnangagwa's stance on SR-MSM, could be the explanation for a lower prevalence of the above forms of violence in Bulawayo. This is important to note, given that the PPT posits that opportunities for such actions as HRBA operationalization

⁵⁹ See *The Sunday Mail* 21-27 February 2010, 14-21 March 2010, 28 March -3 April 2010, 11-17 April 2010, 18-25 April 2010, *The Sunday News* 7-13 February 2010, *Advocate.com* 22 June 2010, *The Herald* 3 September 2010, 15 May 2015, 09 May 2015, 23 July 2015, *The Chronicle* 06 December 2011, *Newsday* 24 January 2012, GALZ 2015, GALZ 2017.

⁶⁰ GALZ (2020) highlights a case where in 2019 a man entrapped a gay man in Beitbridge, Zimbabwe after conspiring with the police to ambush him while in a compromising position. They blackmailed and extorted from him ZAR 1, 000.00.

⁶¹ See *The Sunday News* 7-13 February 2010, 5 March 2012, *The Sunday Mail* 14-21 March 2010, 18-24 July 2010, 26 February 2012, *Advocate.com* 22 June 2010, *The Herald* 15 September 2010, 22 November 2011, *Newsday* 11 January 2012. President Mugabe, Minister Jonathan Moyo castigated the COPAC for attempting to incorporate SR-MSM into the 2013 Constitution (Epprecht 2012).

⁶² GALZ and SRHL (2022). 'Universal Periodic Review of Zimbabwe 40th Session of the Working Group January 2022 - February 2022, Situation of Human Rights for LGBT Person, Joint submission by GALZ and SRHL.

⁶³ Ibid.

are an outcome, among other things, of tolerance within social institutions and structures (McAdam et al. 1996).

It may not be surprising that, while in Bulawayo it is possible to operationalize light versions of HRBAs for the case of Bulawayo-based CSOs such as SRC, the same may not be possible for Harare-based CSOs. In such places, as the PPT postulate, due to the combined effects of public intolerance and the capacity and propensity for repression, excluded groups such as LGBTQ+ for the case of my study, and their activists, experience enormous difficulties in engaging in such initiatives as HRBA operationalization (McAdam 2010). HRBA operationalization is difficult, if not impossible, in countries like Russia, Algeria, Nigeria, and Lithuania, which have passed laws prohibiting HRBA-based activism on SR-MSM by prohibiting ‘homosexual propaganda’ (see Hart 2016).

The PPT envisions that, for organizations to successfully operationalize HRBAs, for the case of study, certain political opportunities, such as government tolerance for CSOs to undertake HRBA operationalization, must be in place (see McAdam 1996). In the section on my positionality (Section 4.7), I reflected on my motivation for conducting this study, which was partly driven by reports of violations like the above-named forms of harassment of activists. However, during the time of my activism at the SRC and elsewhere, I did not personally encounter the above forms of harassment; hence also my inclination to think of Bulawayo as more accommodating and tolerant of SR-MSM than places like Harare.

In framing political harassment as an analytical tool for my findings in section 2.3.1.2, I highlighted that this harassment often included murder and various forms of physical abuse. It is worth noting that, unlike in Uganda and elsewhere in Africa, assailants in Zimbabwe have not murdered activists of SR-MSM. In Uganda, assailants murdered activist David Kato (see section 2.3.1.2, Schafer & Range 2014). For instance, the 12 assailants in Zimbabwe who violently disrupted and injured activists and participants at the jointly held event of Pride Week and Miss Diversity did not commit murder. However, I argue that profiling by the police, police visits at places of residence, and subsequent outings, and as discussed in the above findings, Mugabe’s threats to deal with CSOs, Tsvangirai’s denunciation of LGBTQ+, Chamisa’s refusal to support SR-MSM, and vandalism of donations tend to maroon activists from their families, organizations, and service providers. As the PPT postulates, these actions and their impact, including alienation and working in fear, deprive activists of SR-MSM opportunities toward HRBA operationalization.

Political harassment, coupled with agents of regime preservation characterizing activists of SR-MSM as agents of regime change, sellouts or puppets; and a rights approach as a Western imposition (section 5.2),

create what the PPT terms difficult exogenous political situations (see McAdam 1996) for such actions as HRBA operationalization. Alienation and fear as outcomes of political harassment avail, as the PPT posits, a framework and a boundary for such actions as HRBA operationalization “with chances, and risks attached to them” (Koopmans 2004: 65), as I highlight, using the findings below. Thus, in line with the PPT, the organizations I targeted could attempt to operationalize HRBA only within the boundaries of the impact of alienation and fear created by political harassment (McAdam 1996).

Such boundaries restricted opportunities for prospects of HRBA operationalization by CSOs. When asked how attacks by ruling party youths and assailants suspected to be ruling party cadres had affected their efforts as activists toward the operationalization of the HRBA, a research participant said this:

In our efforts to bring in the communities to participate actively, [to operationalize] the principle around participation, [or] empower [ment] people shy away. [Therefore], that affects key principles of a human rights-based approach [...]. They [do not] want to be associated with you because of [the] hostile environment [...]. They know if they are seen walking through [...], everyone who sees them automatically assumes [it is] either they are gay or lesbian. They are afraid of attacks when they leave the [organization. [This has] got us to think about best strategies around how do we remain relevant and safe, and how do we [...] utilize this very good concept of human rights-based approach [...]. We find alternative venues that are not our everyday spaces [...]. We [...] ensur[e] accountability to them and our safety (KII with SRC staff 2 - 28 March 2019).

Harassment of activists meant that CSOs could not operationalize the HRBA tenet of entitlement of rights holders. An SRC staff member highlighted that the government’s political harassment of activists, through the President, adversely affected their work, as explained below:

I would talk about, for example, the operational environment, the hostility of the environment where we operate[d]. There [was] so much backlash for the LGBTI community as much as [donors] want to push and help our communities to be visible, visibility also attracts some backlash. We have had some stages where the head of state [and government] equated gays and lesbians as worse than pigs and dogs. That demeans someone [who has come out of the closet in] a society [where] already the head of state [and government] says that [...]. It means [these remarks compromise] their welfare or well-being in [the] space where they live. We have had an operational environment that has always been very difficult (KII with SRC staff 2 - 28 March 2019).

The quote below reveals that some of the LGBTQ+ people blamed GALZ staff for the police raids:

[Rights holders...] fail to access basic services they are entitled to. The raids, in particular, have alienated GALZ staff members from the communities they seek to serve [...]. Some members [...] then blame GALZ staff for the raids (GALZ 2015:4).

Moreover, service providers became reluctant to engage activists even when they sought services on behalf of their organization:

[Because of the] raids, the organization now had limited safe spaces to hold events. This significantly affected the organization's programming [...], as finding safe spaces for their members to congregate was no longer simple. Even some of the spaces that we perceived to be safe [were] raided [by authorities]. Thus, finding venues for any activity was now a constant worry on the part of the staff [...]. They [battled] with concerns about the safety, and security of members. Even in smaller towns such as Mutare, Masvingo, and Chinhoyi, where GALZ used to have vibrant affinity groups, people can no longer meet freely as they used to do because of fear of raids (GALZ 2015: 21-22)

The outing of activists and enforced visibilization of CSOs through the raids have had an adverse effect on a personal level for the activists and the organizational level for the CSOs, as GALZ could not easily secure venues for its activities. In line with the PPT's component of tactical innovation, the CSOs came up with their own safe spaces, such as drop-in centers, given that the raids and the attitude of service providers explained in the above quote meant the organizations could not have safe spaces.

For Spade (2015), coming out of the closet is a marker of liberation. While overcoming internalized homophobia⁶⁴ helps to give LGBTQ+ activism real people's faces⁶⁵, there are adverse effects for individual activists in doing so⁶⁶. These adverse effects incline them toward acting straight (Payne 2007) and render them reluctant to come out or to attend activities that could subject them to outing or forced visibilization of their CSOs (see also Mbaye & Epprecht 2022). This means that the closet remains a safer space for activists. Some interviewed staff members expressed that donors felt that the CSOs, for instance, could do more towards advocacy as it relates to lobbying of government, conducting campaigns, and mobilizing various stakeholders.

Such advocacy activities would subject activists to outing and the visibilization of their CSOs, and could mean that activists would come out of the closet (KII with SRC staff 6 – March 2019, and KII with SRC staff 3- March 2019). While donors have expressed these sentiments regarding the need for more advocacy, based on a particular rationale informed by their 'Western' understanding of sexual oppression, activists are not always ready. LGBTQ+ people and activists do not want to be visible in their communities, as visibility has had devastating effects in homophobic contexts like Zimbabwe. In addition, political harassment of activists by multiple government and non-government actors has had a negative bearing on the prospects of HRBA operationalization in that it created an environment of impunity and lack of legal

⁶⁴ I use the term 'internalized homophobia' here, following Ryan, Legate, Weinstein, & Rahman (2017), to describe a reluctance to come out, or self-disgust in terms of one's SOGIESC status.

⁶⁵ Against notions that in their local settings, LGBTQ+ activists are voiceless, faceless; often white people advocate on their behalf in the Global North (see Koyama 2010).

⁶⁶ As I also illustrated with the case of the white teacher at St. John's College who resigned after threats of prosecution, physical violence, and death (see section 5.2 above).

protection for LGBTQ+ people, and affected the capacity and ability of LGBTQ+ rights holders to hold the state to account, as shown below:

We have had very few people [...] com [ing] up, no matter how much [authorities violate their human rights] - those who want to take up cases of litigation against duty-bearers. LGBTI people were beaten and violated by the police, and when you thought you had empowered them enough to be able to stand and demand their rights, they tell you no, I would rather let go. I [do not] want the media to broadcast this case. I do not want the community where I live to know this is what happened to me. I do not want my family to know. [Therefore], sometimes we feel like as much as we have empowered the communities using HRBA, making them understand that they have the right to demand the rights, to demand justice when [authorities violate their rights], the environment is disempowering the community automatically. It seems we are taking two steps forward, and our environment pulls people three steps back, so there is that back-and-forth kind of engagement (KII with SRC staff 2 - 28 March 2019).

In other words, lack of protection affects LGBTQ+ people's access to justice. As a result, reviewed media material reveals that:

Most gays and lesbians in Zimbabwe have to hide their sexual identity. Discrimination, exclusion, and violent attacks against them cause permanent fear and loneliness. Many suffer from poor mental health [...]. Many [...] come with signs of depression, suicidal tendencies, paranoia, anxiety, and other related challenges. [GALZ] provides help, but ultimately policy must change. [Estimates are that] ten percent of Zimbabwe's population is gay or lesbian – they are simply born like this. However, only a few dare to disclose their sexual orientation. [Society largely rejects homosexuality and considers it taboo. Society misunderstands it] as a form of psychiatric problem. Negative attitudes towards people of the LGBTI [...] community are highly prevalent (GALZ staff 2⁶⁷, Dandc.eu 01 August 2019).

Although the lack of protection has also adversely affected the work of the CSOs, they have had brave and resilient activists who have defied attempts to repress them, and who continued to persevere in the face of persecution and labeling, as revealed in the quote below:

However, despite the volatile operational environment, the organization has continued to thrive and has been innovative about serving its members. Some members have distanced themselves due to the fear instilled by the attacks. Others have soldiered on. [They] are determined to claim their space in society [...]. Notwithstanding the challenging operational environment, the organization has soldiered on and hopes for a better future (GALZ 2015: 4-5).

A Member of Parliament stated that while activists have to be brave and resilient in fighting for their rights, they also need to be cautious:

⁶⁷ See media report by GALZ staff under Grace Badza (2019) titled 'I have no place in society' (online) Available at <https://www.dandc.eu/en/article/homophobia-zimbabwe-hurts-mental-health-lgbti-people> (Retrieved 11 January 2021).

They need to worry about doing so at the risk of losing their lives or [disappearing] like Itai Dzamara and others, or [authorities throwing them] into lengthy jail terms, as has happened to some opposition activists. We [do not] want a situation where we lose brave activists to oppression (KII with MP 3 – 15 July 2019).

This caution by the Member of Parliament highlights the risks of enforced disappearance and prosecution for violating sodomy laws. However, it has the unfortunate and probably unintended effect of projecting activists as reckless. Such projection of activists as reckless evokes similar notions in mass society theory, which depicts activists as crazed, irrational, or highly gullible regarding Western values on the SR-MSM (see McCarthy & Zald 1973, 1977). It also suggests that uncontrolled 'social contagion' motivates activism for SR-MSM (see *ibid*). The PPT and RMT are critical of the above notions and the unfortunate, unintended projection in the quote above of activists as reckless. Therefore, that these brave and resilient activists who are defying attempts to repress them are goal-oriented, primarily rational, and practical, as opposed to being reckless or victims of the contagion of Western values on SR-MSM is not solely a matter of my positionality (see section 4.7). The RMT supports the preceding (section 2.2, McCarthy, and Zald 1977). The RMT, however, emphasizes that the mere availability of brave and committed activists is insufficient for HRBA operationalization, and that coordination is required to enable these activists to engage in collective action (see McCarthy 1996).

While using HRBAs exposes activists to danger and risk, it simultaneously rejuvenates their resilience, bravery, innovation, and resourcefulness. Literature also reveals a similar trend of bravery and resilience the world over. In support, Hart (2016: 5-6) observes that:

In the [...] the 21st century, [many] countries [...] have repealed sodomy laws, decriminalized homosexuality, allow same-sex marriage, [or have] passed laws making it easier for [transgender] people to change legal documents in recognition of their self-determined gender identity. [The UN introduced a] declaration on LGBTI rights [and later passed it]. In every corner of the world, LGBTI activists and allies have worked to resist persecution and to advance the recognition of the rights, and dignity of all people, regardless of sexual orientation and gender identity. These activists have organized themselves in [...] CSOs], networks, and informal groups [...]. Many have already developed strategies for continuing to operate effectively, even in the most repressive of contexts. Driven by dedicated volunteers, and courageous activists, they can mobilize people and provide vital community services through informal networks and innovative mechanisms.

The PPT's insurgent consciousness component helps to explain the bravery and resilience of activists and allies. According to insurgent consciousness, the unfair treatment of LGBTQ+ people and activists prompts bravery and resilience, and not recklessness (see Cragun & Cragun 2000).

Because of the above, mainly during the First Republic Government of Zimbabwe (FR-GoZ), the CSOs avoided public spaces and the media when purposefully targeting various actors in terms of HRBA sensitization when it comes to MSM projects, using innovative strategies as shown below:

It depends [...] if it is parliamentarians, you target a specific committee. If it is political leaders, sometimes we target them individually. We ask for an audience with them in their capacity as individuals, even as traditional leaders (KII with GALZ staff - 12 March 2019).

During fieldwork, the CSOs would also invite these individual politicians and religious and traditional leaders to ‘private’ spaces during their various activities, such as International Day against Homophobia, Transphobia, and Biphobia (IDAHOT) commemorations (see Appendix 2 –Activity 13), religious, and traditional leaders’ conferences (Appendix 2 – Activity 10), and the proud to serve campaigns (Appendix 2 – Activity 2). The avoidance of the media and public spaces for LGBTQ+ activities, and the invitation to politicians, religious, and traditional leaders to ‘private’ places, are examples of how, in line with the PPT’s component of tactical innovation, activists devised innovative techniques to offset their powerlessness, increase their bargaining power, and further their objectives (see McAdam 1983).

During the processes around mobilizing political, religious, and traditional leaders for activities such as those mentioned above, I observed that some would ask how much money they would be getting up front as transport and meal allowances. In one activity, a religious leader complained that as ‘men of God’, organizers could not give them the same amounts as other LGBTQ+ participants. A collective leader stated that with one of the religious leaders, they had to negotiate and settle on his ‘participation fee’ beforehand (KII with Collective staff 3 - 17 March 2019). These leaders also believed that CSOs have massive funding (see also section 6.2). An MP who has worked with CSOs for a long time said that perhaps the ‘participation fee’ initially motivated some politicians and traditional religious leaders. However, the same MP noted that, with time, by participating in many of these activities and becoming sensitized, they started to embrace the SR-MSM and champion these on various platforms (KII with an MP 2 – July 2019). Most of the interviewed CSO representatives shared the above sentiment.

Some CSOs are reluctant not only to do advocacy work around SR-MSM but also to use the HRBA. A participant in the interview stated:

In Zimbabwe, [authorities consider HRBAs as] a tool by opposition political parties and political CSOs. Non-partisan CSOs fear using the approach as this could result in losing their non-partisan image, which is crucial if they want to engage regularly with the government or its institutions. There is, therefore, a need to cleanse the human rights approach of its partisan baggage. [This can be realized] by avoiding involvement in partisan activities by these CSOs and by individuals in these

CSOs, even at a personal level. Doing so threatens the prospects of engaging the government and even the continued existence of these CSOs (KII with an MP 5 – July 2019).

The findings above demonstrate the relevance of the PPT in explaining the influence of political opportunities on HRBA operationalization.

In this section, I have demonstrated the adverse effects of political harassment of activists on their operationalization of HRBAs in FR-GoZ. I demonstrated that during the Mugabe era, the government of Zimbabwe had, as expounded by the PPT, sufficient capacity and propensity for repression, achieved through the use, by its multiple institutions and officials, of political harassment of activists of SR-MSM and MSM. I revealed how this harassment created an adverse operational environment for HRBA operationalization by CSOs. I have shown that brave and resilient activists are motivated by the mistreatment of LGBTQ+ people, and are keen to operationalize HRBAs in their advocacy for SR-MSM. I have also shown that engaging an emerging willing crop of leaders away from homophobic networks in evading political harassment is an essential step toward the acceptance of HRBA in SR-MSM advocacy by local CSOs.

5.4 The Influence of ‘Culture’ on HRBAs

This section explores the influence of ‘culture’ on the operationalization of HRBAs by CSOs in Zimbabwe, focusing on the period of the FR-GoZ. Findings from interviews with chiefs, as shown in the quotes below, have revealed the huge significance of the currency and influence of the cultural philosophy of *Ubuntu* in trying to operationalize the HRBAs in Zimbabwe (see also Chiminige & Makamure 2017). A chief stated that:

It is difficult for us to accept that [LGBTQ+] as human beings have human rights without asking ourselves [...] what our culture has to say about being human. Our Ubuntu says ‘umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu’, meaning you are human because of other human beings. An individual being is a mirror of human beings. Umuntu’s rights or an individual’s rights are subordinate to the rights of abantu or humans/people. Umuntu’s rights are never human rights unless abantu-humans recognize them as human/abantu’s rights and unless they recognize them as mirroring their humanness and values. If you say homosexual rights are human rights or abantu’s rights, in other words, [you mean] they mirror our collective understanding and recognition of what it is to be a human being. Then which humans are you talking about – certainly not the majority of humans in Zimbabwe who see this practice as not part of our sexuality. Maybe you are talking about the majority of human beings in Britain and America. As the President has said, it is not our duty as custodians of culture and Ubuntu to make the majority in Zimbabwe recognize homosexual rights as human rights. [It is] the duty of the homosexual organizations and the other like-minded (KII with Chief 3 - 17 June 2019).

This chief echoes the deep-seated sentiments of former President Mugabe, who, in politicizing homophobia, refused for more than 20 years to acknowledge that MSM have rights, saying in 1995, “We don’t believe they [MSM] have any rights at all” (Goddard 2004: 93), and defining in 2015 the SR-MSM as ‘new rights’ contrary to *Ubuntu*⁶⁸. Departing from Mugabe’s stance of outright refusal to acknowledge SR-MSM, and of yearning for a return to a ‘pristine’ culture, the chief echoes President Mnangagwa’s sentiments, that while the revival of a ‘pristine’ culture is no longer possible, it is not the duty of custodians of ‘culture’ to canvass for the SR-MSM. While President Mnangagwa did not say whose duty it is, the chief clearly stated that it is the duty of the CSOs, activists, and allies.

In addition, the chief in the above quote emphasizes that the notion of ‘*Umntu ngumuntu ngabantu*’, which is a defining feature of *Ubuntu*, means that an individual has no authority over their body, voice, and agency or what they can do with these, and that such authority rests with society, and even more so on matters of sexuality. In PPT’s terms, the notion facilitates the closure of the society for opportunities to operationalize the HRBAs. The HRBAs emphasize the opposite, that individuals have rights by virtue of being born human. These rights are inalienable. Third parties cannot take them away, nor can individuals voluntarily surrender them. The preceding understanding of *Ubuntu*, which differs from the understanding of the concept in my conceptual framework section (section 2.3.1.3), where the term refers to an individual’s compassion for the greater good of humanity, creates problems for activists operationalizing HRBAs.

The statement “certainly not the majority of humans in Zimbabwe who see this practice as not part of our sexuality” makes *Ubuntu* an ‘othering’ philosophy. The import of the quote, which is aligned to Mugabe’s rhetoric⁶⁹, is that *Ubuntu* applies to us, ‘the majority indigenes of Zimbabwe’, and not to ‘other’ people such as colonial settlers or their descendants, who are Zimbabweans and other non-Africans. Given such notions accompanying *Ubuntu*, van Binsbergen (2001) has criticized it for denying non-autochthonous individuals their humanity. I dare add, based on the way ‘gay’ identity has been associated with racial identity (section 5.2) and citizenship (above quote), that *Ubuntu* not only denies non-autochthonous individuals their humanity but, equally devastating, their national identity, citizenship, and human rights. The statement about the ‘majority of us’ further passes, as Matolino and Kwindigwi (2013: 202) observe,

⁶⁸ Vox: “Why Robert Mugabe Just Shouted ‘We Are Not Gays’ in His UN Speech,” <https://www.vox.com/2015/9/28/9411391/why-robert-mugabe-just-shouted-we-are-not-gays-in-his-un-speech>. September 28, 2015.

⁶⁹ Mugabe’s quote sums up this kind of rhetoric: “Let the Americans keep their sodomy, bestiality, stupid and foolish ways to themselves, out of Zimbabwe. Let them be gay in US, Europe and elsewhere [...]. They shall be sad people here” (see Dunton and Palmberg, 1996: 19).

for “an erroneous notwithstanding salient belief that [*Ubuntu*] is easily understood by everyone, and everyone will have the natural desire to [behave, and act] in accord with its dictates”.

The chief above views the function of *Ubuntu* as similar to that of the broader culture, as I conceptualized the latter's function as a mechanism of control (see 2.3.1.3). The literature I reviewed underemphasizes the view of *Ubuntu* as fostering control. The emphasis is more on the positive aspects of the meaning of the term than on the control that society imposes on an individual whereby the individual has no power. The positive aspects were communality, solidarity, reciprocity, mutuality, interdependence, compassion, responsibility, and dignity (Mandela 2006, Tutu 1999, 2004, Nussbaum 2003, Moloketi 2009). Marx (2002) has criticized *Ubuntu* for its tendencies of fostering conformity and control, noting that the philosophy is not ideal for nation-building, given that the latter requires both the positive aspects emphasized in *Ubuntu* as well as simultaneous tension, for example, for purposes of fostering creativity and innovation. Implicit in the above positive aspects of *Ubuntu* is a false narrative that Africans are predisposed toward these qualities. On the contrary, as Matolino and Kwindigwi (2013) note, such positivity is a social creature of particular contexts, and often an outcome of specific motivations, and not an inherent and apparent character of Africans or other people, for that matter.

Another chief similarly projected *Ubuntu*, relating it to ‘control’ as did the above chief, and as Marx (2002) argues, it is about behaviors and practices approved by society, and not necessarily those that are common to a particular society:

I am yet to come to terms with the role of organizations that are making noise about a pastime for boys and private and often embarrassing sexual practices for men, given the vast nature of other serious livelihood problems we are facing [which problems these organizations can focus on]. Which organizations are making as much noise about masturbation, about anal or oral sex in [heterosexual] relationships between girls and boys, or men and women, or about women rubbing themselves on edges of corners of various objects for sexual pleasure? We know all these practices are old-time [and long-standing] common practices for boys, girls, men, and women. As I said, they are part of our culture but not of Ubuntu. We know everyone knows that the majority of people engage in some [...] of these practices beyond just being a pastime, and even after [they engage in heterosexual] marriage[s]. We also know [they are] private, intimate, and often embarrassing practices if they leak out to the public. We know that they are part of our culture. As in part of how we do things or live our sexual lives as a people but not part of Ubuntu as in Ubuntu is not only about common behaviors and practices, we all or the majority do in a community, such as masturbation but about those that are approved or seen in a good light by the majority such as heterosexual marriage. [The practices are part of our culture, although not part of Ubuntu], and what is not part of our culture about these practices is the noise about the private, the intimate, and often the embarrassing (KII with Chief 1 - 9 June 2019).

The chief's sentiments above reveal quiet acceptance of same-sex sexual practices and, by extension, of SR-MSM. These sentiments of Chief 1 are in accord with Epprecht's (2012, 1998) narratives of 'unspoken facts' and 'don't ask, don't tell'; a *de facto* culture of tolerance or indifference to same-sex practices and identities that often translates to freedom from discrimination in some cases. The findings of my study, as shown above, present a disjuncture from the preceding, that is, loud politicization of homophobia, which the CSOs' activism counters through what the Chief perceives as 'noisy' activism. Yet, *Ubuntu* prefers in line with Epprecht's (2012, 1998) narratives 'silence', or ignoring what Chief 1 refers to as 'the private, the intimate, and often the embarrassing' matters around sexuality. For Chief 1, the practice of same-sex relations often visibilizes their existence, but *Ubuntu* invisibilizes their recognition. For Makofane (2013), the practice of referring to same-sex sexualities and identities as "unspoken facts" is a form of erasure, and has contributed to the exclusion of these practices and identities, for instance, in SRHR initiatives.

Despite the widely discreet and covert nature of recognition of multiple sexes, gender identities, and sexual orientations (Epprecht 2012), sex and gender binaries and broader heteronormativity continue to structure social practices and politics (Hunt et al. 2017). As I revealed in the previous two sections, agents of regime preservation are already making 'noise' about the indigeneity of same-sex identities and sexual practices. Zimbabwean politicians and public service providers mainly regard same-sex identities and practices, in particular, as 'Western gay identities' that emphasize bodily autonomy and integrity, liberation, pride, and individualism, as outside the accepted norms (Hunt et al. 2017, Mandipa 2017). Opposition to Western gay identities results from their defining features that are diametrically against the African imperatives of *Ubuntu*, communality, community, and Christianity.

As I observed in my motivation for this study (see section 1.1), the 'noise' has prompted a surge in the number of CSOs working on SR-MSM. For these CSOs, and as covertly, discreetly, and yet widely recognized in Zimbabwe, as overtly set out in the Yogyakarta principles, and as researchers have proven in various studies:

Not everyone feels attracted to another sex or prefers another sex partner. Not everyone feels comfortable with the sex assigned at birth or with the expected gender role behavior for men and women in their society. Not everyone is born with bodily sex characteristics that are [in their entirety] wholly female or male, according to the norms in society (van Lisdonk, Schelfhout, Bilajbegovic & Bakker 2018:3).

In addition, the HIV and AIDS burden among MSM has drawn attention to what the above chief refers to as the 'private, intimate, and often embarrassing'. Furthermore, despite the merits of a discreet and covert

position⁷⁰ and the inescapable challenge to its sustainability in the context of an increasingly globalizing world⁷¹, the failure of Zimbabwean politicians and service providers to openly recognize the above means that individuals who fall outside heteronormativity are not granted their full sexual rights (McEwen 2020, Hartal 2018, Epprecht 2012). Neglecting these sexual rights leads to protective homophobia which is “rooted in the lay association of homosexuality with AIDS, pedophilia, immorality, and irreligiosity” (Izugbara et al. 2020:99). Such rights violations of rights result in the denial of rights to SOGIESC (Chikura-Mtwazi 2018).

Nevertheless, these sentiments help to clarify the perception of chiefs on CSOs working for SR-MSM using HRBAs. The CSOs are ‘noise makers’, meaning they are an unwelcome irritation. The HRBA emphasizes the right to information even about the private and intimate, meaning it promotes the ‘noise’ on the ‘private, intimate, and embarrassing’. The short message from the quote is that the chiefs, and by extension politicians and service providers, have not understood the role of these CSOs; hence the need for the CSOs to target them. It is imperative to target them because the forms and implications of SOGIESC-related rights violations “are far-reaching, extending beyond people’s SRH⁷², to encompass their overall wellbeing, the welfare of their households and communities, and even the economic and social fabric of societies” (Izugbara et al. 2020:101). Badgett, Waldwick and Rodgers (2019:1) argue that violations of the rights of LGBTQ+ workers, for example, undermine the economic development of a country as they contribute to “[...] lost labor time, lost productivity, underinvestment in human capital and inefficient allocation of resources”. Rights violations also impede the effectiveness of development work, given that development interventions often produce and enforce sexual rights discrimination (Logie 2021, Marumo & Chakale 2019, and McEwen 2020).

The quote above also illustrates another dimension about *Ubuntu* and culture not found in the literature I reviewed, the notion that while these two terms are related, in that *Ubuntu* is an aspect of culture, there is an essential distinction between the two. The chief implies that both terms are about ‘the common practices and behaviors’ found in a particular community, but to pass the test of being aligned to the philosophy of *Ubuntu*, they must be approved by the same community. In other words, the majority of members may engage in particular practices and behaviors individually and as a collective, and these practices and behaviors may become part of the culture of that community without members necessarily perceiving them

⁷⁰ Having an overt position places LGBTQ+ people on a confrontational path with custodians of Ubuntu.

⁷¹ The term describes how societies are not only structured around territory and stasis, but also along the lines of mobilities (Bastos, Novoa, & Salazar 2021).

⁷² Sexual and Reproductive Health

as corresponding with *Ubuntu*. This way of understanding *Ubuntu* depicts it not necessarily as a utopia, but as being about the ideal. Another participant noted the following regarding the importance of culture:

The influence of culture is huge in our context; if you are an NGO implementing HRBA [you are] projected as [being] against culture. For me, human rights are not necessarily or always against culture [...]. This is [my position], and probably [that of] a few others in the Council. NGOs cannot afford to pretend that culture is not important. In our context, the culture of Ubuntu is important and not that of human rights. The interesting point for me is that the culture of Ubuntu is not opposed to human rights, and some of the Ubuntu values and principles, such as respect for human dignity, are similar to those of human rights. Therefore, there is an opportunity for NGOs to demonstrate that Ubuntu and human rights are mutually reinforcing and to address the unfortunate projection of human rights as against culture for them to use the HRBA in our context successfully (KII with a Councilor 1 – 6 June 2019).

The observation in the above quote, that *Ubuntu* is not in binary opposition with human rights, proffers a riposte to Chimininge and Makamure (2017), who view GALZ's use of HRBAs on LGBTQ+ initiatives as inappropriate, and resonates with Tamales (2008) observations. Tamale (2008) notes that while the opposition of 'culture' and rights is not uncommon in feminist and legal discourses, the potential benefits for sexuality activists brought about by the conceptual closeness of the two concepts have not been fully explored. Unlike Chimininge, and Makamure (2017), Bongmba (2016) makes a case for *Ubuntu* in SR-MSM without slandering MSM or HRBAs, and Petchesky and Parker (2008) note the insufficiency of HRBAs, without dismissing them as dispensable in LGBTQ+ initiatives.

Richardson (2008) argues against using *Ubuntu*, as Chimininge and Makamure (2017) suggested, in a universalized and decontextualized sense, stating that it leads to the manipulation of *Ubuntu*. The latter bemoaned GALZ for using HRBAs, and not *Ubuntu*, when in fact, the politicization of *Ubuntu* and the sensitive context of SR-MSM as foreign render the politicized philosophy of *Ubuntu* inapplicable. Their rejection of HRBAs, in any case, and as I indicated in the methodology section, lacks plausibility given that Chimininge and Makamure (2017) used methodologies that did not include CSOs as research participants.

An MP expressed frustration about the universalized and decontextualized use of HRBA and the *Ubuntu* philosophy, as shown below:

The tedious zero-sum debates on human rights and Ubuntu [are nauseating]. We are, in most cases, expected to support such positions as 'all about human rights is good', 'all about human rights is bad', and 'all about Ubuntu is good' or 'all about Ubuntu is bad' without room for a middle way (KII with MP 3 – 15 July 2019).

The foregoing raises the question of whether *Ubuntu* is a fruitful concept, given its origins in unwritten tradition, which partly accounts for its fuzziness and polysemy. Critics of the HRBA who say it is against the value base of *Ubuntu*, such as Chiminingo, and Makamure (2017), overlook that there is no agreed definition of the concept of *Ubuntu*, and they do not attempt to formulate one. The same MP noted, “[i]n our context, when politicians say a social practice upholds *Ubuntu*, it is almost tantamount to romanticizing it, and when they say it is against it, it is tantamount to demonizing it, and for political mileage in both instances”. In line with Matolino and Kwindigwi's (2013) arguments, the MP further noted that explicit political aims around retaining political power for those ruling, and gaining it for the opposition, inform the political obsession with reviving *Ubuntu* philosophy. This means that *Ubuntu*, as political rhetoric, is never intended to improve the material condition of the ordinary people, but rather for the political gain of the elite. Matolino and Kwindigwi (2013: 203) also support this view:

[W]e can ask a further question on how the political philosophy of Ubuntu either has been of service to the common aspirations of ordinary and impoverished citizens or has been an authentic expression of their stations and needs. Our position is that Ubuntu has been neither. It has failed to capture the citizens' wishes, and it has failed to articulate the wishes of ordinary citizens. These citizens are here and now, and a narrative of return does not help them.

I have demonstrated above the conceptual closeness of *Ubuntu* and human rights, meaning that activists can use *Ubuntu*, when not politicized, to defend SR-MSM. Ultimately, the protagonists of every kind of social practice can claim that it upholds *Ubuntu*. In such a scenario, there is likely to be fear that the protagonists of different social practices may have to stop relying on the concept if it is tied to a particular conceptualization, or anyone's meaning. I argue that the critics of *Ubuntu*, who say it is against HRBA as it relates to SR-MSM, use it in a consciously dishonest way. They have their private definition of the nebulous concept, and want to impose this definition in defense of their values and beliefs.

Just as in my conceptual chapter where I defined culture as a mechanism for control, another chief also noted how culture is primarily a tool of control:

First, and foremost, culture is a political tool of control. It is not just anyone's tool. It is a tool of the ruling and the powerful. Cultural norms, values, and beliefs are nothing but norms, values, and beliefs of the ruling, the rich, and the powerful. These norms work to consolidate these groups' wealth, reign, and power. The weak and vulnerable have no culture. Homosexuals have neither culture nor religion. The different norms, beliefs, and value systems that inhere in them are a threat to the wealth, reign, and power of these dominant groups, and in one word – they are uncultural. Culture finds itself deployed by the dominant groups as a convenient and popular weapon, even among ordinary bystanders against rights (KII with Chief 5 – 21 June 2019).

The chief in the above quote acknowledges that various traditional and political actors have deployed culture as one of the main instruments (in addition to national laws) against SR-MSM, given that various violations of these rights are carried out in the name of observing cultural beliefs, or *Ubuntu*, and norms hinged on heteronormativity.

The President of the Traditional Chiefs' Council, Chief Charumbira, has said that SR-MSM are taboo and unacceptable and that they anger the ancestors, and upholding them will result in the punishment by the ancestors not only of MSM but of the community as well (see *The Sunday News* 21-27 February 2010, *The Herald* 23 July 2015). A chief noted these conversations as progress:

We now talk about homosexuality as chiefs. If you ask me, [just talking about it] is progress. Our colleagues who have been Chiefs for a little longer will tell you that this was a taboo, often a quickly dismissed subject among chiefs in the 1990s. It was a subject of politics. Bar the negativity that dominates our conversations about homosexuality. There is consensus that homosexuals are human beings and that we need to introspect on the cultural norms that justify the violation of the Ubuntu [humanness] inherent in a homosexual individual. We have done the same concerning forced child marriages, polygamy in the advent of HIV/ AIDS, and female genital mutilation (KII with Chief 4 – 20 June 2019).

When the SRC began engaging with public institutions such as Mpilo hospitals, state universities, United Bulawayo Hospitals, various city health clinics, the NAC, the Ministry of Health, Bulawayo City Council, and the parliament of Zimbabwe, there was considerable mistrust. The NAC and the Ministry of Health were among the first to accept that the SRC was using the HRBAs in its advocacy for SR-MSM, and it took longer for the hospitals, city health clinics, and Bulawayo City Council to work with the organization on HRBAs to SR-MSM projects.

The CSOs and donors have registered significant milestones through their activism. In 2015, the NAC, for the first time, procured sex commodities that MSM use, such as lubricants and other health products⁷³. The ZNASP (2015-2020) prioritizes LGBTQ+ persons as part of its key targeted population, and advocates for law reforms (ibid). The Zimbabwe National Key Populations HIV and AIDS Implementation Plan (2019-2020) recognizes gay men, other MSM, transgender, and intersex persons as key populations (ibid). These milestones have come about after CSOs like SRC have invested several years of work toward showing that the spirit and intent of HRBA advocacy for SR-MSM were not entirely against the values of culture and *Ubuntu*.

⁷³ National Health Strategy (2021- 2025). Ministry of Health and Child Care, (2021). National Health Strategy for Zimbabwe (2021-2025). Zimbabwe National Key Populations HIV and AIDS Implementation Plan (2019-2020).

The HRBA poses a threat against galvanized homophobia, for instance, because it is against stigma and discrimination; for this reason, bigoted actors have clutched at various arguments to dismiss and undermine it. These arguments include that the HRBA is culturally insensitive, is against morality (see the quote below), and that human rights are far from universal. They also claim that the HRBA is a form of cultural imperialism, and that the approach promotes the values of Eurocentric and Western civilization while demeaning and altering the values of other civilizations (KII with Chief 1 - 9 June 2019, KII with Chief 2 – 12 June 2019). In addition, they claim that the approach fails the test of contextualization and adaptation in the Global South due to its Western origin (KII with Chief 1 - 9 June 2019). The quote below reveals how traditional leaders have often deployed culture to violate SR-MSM:

Some [...] traditional leaders [...] speak mostly around the principle of morality or moralization of issues. That [the] principle of morality conflicts with the HRBA [...]. They tell you it is not cultural for a man to fall in love or have sexual relations with a man [That is] morality versus us who are coming with HRBA (KII with SRC staff 2 - 28 March 2019).

These views align with Gauri and Gloppen (2012) and Magnarella (2003), who note that politicians could interpret some aspects of the HRBA as attempts to undermine traditional and cultural practices if practitioners fail to frame these aspects properly. Tamale (2008) also questions the human rights discourse because of its claim to universality and denial of its own culture, namely, Western culture. For Tamale (2008), this leads to a false opposition between ‘culture’ and ‘rights’.

Gauri, and Gloppen (2012), describing the challenges with HRBA operationalization in Malawi, note that it was common even for educated Malawians to maintain that culture is of paramount consideration, even when it means overriding the universalistic character of human rights. Some staff members reported in interviews that in operationalizing the HRBA, they encountered all these sentiments and notions about the HRBAs (KII with SRC Staff 4 - 27 March 2019, KII with SRC staff 5 - 27 March 2019, and KII with SRC staff 7 - 28 March 2019). Many times, they find it difficult to dispel them. They fail due to the volatility of the situations in which targeted participants express these sentiments, and their limited knowledge about the approach and activity implementation arrangements that may not allow room for them to do so. As a result, they reported that they ended up abandoning aspects of HRBAs that aroused animosity. They also end up operationalizing those aspects welcomed by the targeted participants in any activity. In some instances, they use approaches inimical to the HRBA, such as charity and need-based models. The findings above imply that CSO activists are in a conundrum. The cultural context constrains their ability and capacity to fully operationalize ‘formal’ HRBAs related to SR-MSM advocacy. In Chapter 8 I discuss these ‘light’

HRBAs that arise, and the abandonment of HRBAs in favor of other approaches due to limitations of context, capacities, and resources.

This section has examined the influence of ‘culture’ on the operationalization of HRBAs by CSOs in Zimbabwe. I have shown how the effects of the instrumentalization of culture and the related practice of *Ubuntu* render ‘formal’ HRBAs unattainable, and ‘light’ HRBAs practical, on the grounds of the case of advocacy for SR-MSM by CSOs. I have shown that this instrumentalization of culture plays out through the misuse of culture or *Ubuntu* as being opposed to an HRBA to SR-MSM. Related to the foregoing, I will in the next section discuss the influence of religion on HRBA operationalization.

5.5 The Influence of Religion on HRBAs

While from the 1990s, after the Book Fair saga, religious homophobia and other forms of homophobia became ingrained in Zimbabwe’s society, since 2000, vocal and popular charismatic and fundamentalist religious leaders have emerged on many occasions, siding with politicians and traditional leaders in speaking with one voice against activism on SR-MSM. As he had done for traditional leaders in the 1990s (see previous section), Mugabe set the tone for religious leaders, urging them to oppose SR-MSM and its rights-based activism, stating:

[H]omosexuals [...] offend [...] against [...] religious beliefs espoused by our society [and SR-MSM] should [not] have any advocate in our midst, and even elsewhere in the world. [We should not] accept homosexuality as a right (Dunton and Palmberg, 1996: 14, and Engelke 1999:299).

Mugabe was referring to the dominant Christian religion when he said, ‘religious beliefs espoused by our society’. It was ironic for him to call a colonial religion a religion of ‘our society’, given he espoused anti-colonialism ideals. Regime-self-preservation partly explains this irony, along with the fact that he was Christian by socialization.

A striking case of religious leaders adhering to Mugabe's tone is that of the United Family International Church leader, Emmanuel Makandiwa. He described MSM as “mentally sick” (see *The Sunday Mail* 30 March 2014 & *The Herald* 31 March 2015). This description also infers that activists promoting SR-MSM are promoting mental illness, implying that they are themselves diseased, and their organizations are made up of mentally ill people. Walter Magaya, leader of the Healing and Deliverance Ministries, made a similar projection of MSM, and by extension, activists, as diseased. On television and radio, he conducted healing sessions for persons with same-sex sexuality.

The religious projection of same-sex sexuality as a disease resonates with political and cultural stereotypes against activism for SR-MSM: it resonates with Mugabe's political stereotypes projecting same-sex sexuality as a 'white disease planted in a pristine continent' and that of former Minister Chigwedere as a 'festering finger on the whole body' (see section 5.2). It also resonates with that of Chief Charumbira as a 'taboo with the potential to cause ancestors to punish the whole society' (see section 5.4). I have already discussed in the previous sections how the PPT explains the unfortunate projection of activists as mentally sick, crazed, or gullible to external incitation.

Makandiwa has said, based on the exegesis of Romans 1 verses 26-28, that homosexuality is a result of a reprobate mind and that God never thought anyone could be a homosexual (*The Sunday Mail* 30 March 2014). In this instance, Makandiwa paraphrases Mugabe's famous quote (above) about gays being perverts. Mugabe, as I indicated above, has labeled MSM as "sexual perverts", similar to accusing them of having 'reprobate minds', and has inferred that "our society" – or 'God' in the case of Makandiwa -- cannot accord [...] "the rights they may claim, and allege to possess under the rubrics of individual freedom, and human rights" (Dunton, and Palmberg, 1996: 14, and Engelke 1999:299). The same Makandiwa once officiated at the ZANU PF anti-sanctions campaign launch and signed a petition against travel bans imposed on President Mugabe⁷⁴. The above instances, although not related, reveal Makandiwa as bent on siding with former President Mugabe's politics.

Makandiwa's siding with Mugabe's politics illustrates an apparent conflation and symbiosis of religion and politics, creating an adverse political context for operationalizing HRBAs concerning SR-MSM. This takes place particularly for purposes of political expedience and personality branding. It plays out because the electoral benefits toward aiding regime preservation are bound to accrue to politicians and their parties by associating with dominant churches with voter mobilizing capacity. It also plays out because benefits are bound to accrue to Christianity and its leaders through political support. Two cases illustrate this. The first is 'Pastor' Chamisa, who has not relented from his position that he opposes gay rights (see section 5.3). The second is the case of Bishop Nolbert Kunonga of the Harare Diocese of the Anglican Church Province of Central Africa, which reveals that both political and religious leaders in these conflated and symbiotic relations instrumentalize homophobia (*The Chronicle* 30 September 2011, and *The Telegraph* 08 September 2011).

⁷⁴ See Religion in Zimbabwe website, story titled "Emmanuel Makandiwa" (online) Available from <http://relzim.org/resources/religious-leaders-zimbabwe/prophet-makandiwa/> [Accessed April 22, 2014].

From the time he toyed with ambitions of becoming president of Zimbabwe, Chamisa has built an image of himself as a devout Christian to the extent of becoming a Pastor. For me, and because of my personal experiences working for a Christian organization (see section 4.7), this leaves him in a quandary. On the one hand, he needs to espouse human rights and the democratic disposition that he espouses as a ‘democrat’ or ‘change champion’, which requires him to support diversity, including SR-MSM, and on the other hand he must maintain the Christian disposition that requires him to echo religious homophobia whenever pressed for his position on SR-MSM. He cannot be both without hoodwinking one or both camps. The ‘democrat’ or ‘change champion’ identity is critical for financial and technical support conflation from the side of civil society and the international community conflation. And the ‘Christian’ or ‘pastor’ identity is critical for enticing the huge Christian camp in Zimbabwe to vote for him on the ballot. On this matter, he has chosen to side with the voters, anticipating that civil society and the international community will understand the expediency of his reasons for his choice and, thus, be sympathetic and lenient.

Ellis and Ter Haar (2004) state that religion is instrumental in influencing the political behavior of individuals in Africa, and seemingly for Chamisa, in shaping the choices of the majority of Christians in Zimbabwe to vote for one of their own, a ‘Christian, and a pastor – (discount the democrat in him)’. It seems that anti-gay religious perspectives have cost SR-MSM activism an influential voice from the leader of the largest opposition political party. Vincent and Howell (2014) also support these notions, arguing that in South Africa, the church also shapes attitudes and ethics for individuals.

In withdrawing from the Harare Diocese of the Anglican Church Province of Central Africa, Kunonga gave the following reasons:

The big decision is that we want to abide by our conscience and our faith. We do not intend to deviate in any way from the scriptures. To do so is to go against the rule of God if not His will, and I would urge Zimbabweans and Anglicans throughout the country that we cannot accept homosexuality⁷⁵.

However, the main reason for his withdrawal from the Harare Diocese was that it had become apparent that the church was likely to replace him. This followed reports of abuse of his power in the church and his support for the chaotic land reform program, which was a violation of human rights, and as a result of which he had gained a farm. Stakeholders had also accused him of mistreating priests who spoke out against human rights violations and other governance crises in the country.

⁷⁵ Nehanda Radio, Bishop Kunonga interview with The Herald, 17/09/2007

He responded by mobilizing homophobia, an issue that had been at the periphery of Harare Diocese church politics. He instrumentalized it as the main reason he was pulling out, to gain support from the congregants and the Zimbabwe government, including the courts, which were bound to become the final arbiter on the case. The Bishop opportunistically took advantage of the polarization of the church congregants and the broader Anglican Communion beyond Zimbabwe over same-sex sexualities by strategically dividing the Church into conservative and liberal factions. Upon his expulsion, he retained a significant segment of the church, to the point where the church had two bishops.

The instances of Makandiwa, Magaya, Chamisa, and Kunonga denigrating SR-MSM and activists dominate media attention because Makandiwa and Magaya draw huge crowds of over 50,000 in their weekly services at their Harare venues, Chamisa is the leader of the main opposition political party, and Kunonga's case dragged on for some time. Similar anti-gay postures and teachings in smaller churches in different parts of the country are likely to go unreported in the media.

Tamale (2014) and Gunda (2017) argue that in countries like Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Uganda, the dissemination of anti-gay teachings, which align with political and cultural anti-gay stereotypes, is the result of several years of indoctrination of African pastors. The indoctrination occurs through workshops and training organized by the US Christian right movement. However, during my interviews with pastors and interactions in various SRC activities, such as IDAHOT and the Traditional and Religious Leaders *Indaba*⁷⁶, none of them admitted to ever attending such workshops and training. Interestingly, one of the pastors mentioned their participation in activities organized by the Other Sheep, which advocates for the SR-MSM. This raises the possibility that pastors who do attend anti-gay training and teachings may be reluctant to make themselves available for interviews with an LGBTQ+ researcher or to participate in activities organized by CSOs.

The combined political, cultural, and religious toll on activists, whom many identify as Christians, is bound to affect their operationalization of HRBAs toward SR-MSM. Epprecht (2010) believes that religious teachings opposed to SR-MSM are based on that God through his word⁷⁷, more so through the King James translation of it than in the ancient Greek and Hebrew texts, incontrovertibly condemns same-sex sexual relationships as a sin. One activist related a popular anti-gay teaching in many of these churches regularly

⁷⁶ The vernacular term *indaba* is commonly used to refer to a council at which traditional leaders and other elders meet to discuss important matters.

⁷⁷ John 1:1 equates the Bible to the word of God, as do Leviticus 18:22, 20:13; Romans 1:18-32; 1 Corinthians 6:9-11; 1st Timothy 1:10-11; Mark 10:6-9; Genesis 19:1-11; Judges 19:16-24 and Deuteronomy 23:17.

frequented by activists: that MSM are the “reason why the Biblical towns [of] Sodom, and Gomorrah were destroyed [and, therefore, they are] an abomination with no acceptance in the Christian religion” (GALZ staff 2⁷⁸ – 01 August 2019, *Dandc.eu* 01 August 2019). However, activists challenged this narrative, as the quote reveals:

Not everyone in the two Biblical communities [of Sodom and Gomorrah] practiced same-sex relations. Why single out same-sex relations as the reason for the destruction? What about incest? What about inhospitality to visitors? What about all the other sins? Lot escaped death not because he was ‘straight’ but because he was hospitable to visitors. Lot’s wife failed to escape death, turning into a pillar of salt, not because she was a lesbian but because she failed to listen and obey. We need to sift through and read other verses⁷⁹ other than those in Genesis to situate the interpretations of the reasons behind the destruction. Those preaching about marriage as facilitating procreation and not companionship are more in marriages and sexual relations of companionship than procreation as they use various contraceptive methods. Why deny LGBTI people companionship through marriage or sexual relations if the major purpose of marriage is companionship? (KII with SRC staff 7 – 28 March 2019).

Unfortunately, activists cannot give a riposte in the church due to church protocol during sermons. In addition, such teachings tend to influence some less empowered activists, negatively affecting their commitment toward rights-based activism for SR-MSM. The above participant stated that these teachings influenced most church members to have a negative attitude, and that these teachings drained the energy, self-esteem, and self-confidence of activists in CSOs to engage in their work for SR-MSM. I went through such experiences at the Zimbabwe Christian Alliance after implementing SAfAIDS-supported sensitizations and undergoing the backlash (see section 4.7).

While Makandiwa, Magaya, Chamisa, and Kunonga hogged the limelight for not supporting SR-MSM, less popular religious leaders whose rare positive voices supported SR-MSM were not hosted in mainstream media. An example is Gracious Light Ministries’ Pastor Anyway Humbe, who supports sexually abused LGBTQ+ individuals⁸⁰, and pastors who attend CSO activities like the SRC’s Religious and Traditional leaders’ indaba and IDAHOT commemorations (see Appendix 2 – Activities 10 & 13). All five church leaders whom I interviewed reported that the members of their churches included LGBTQ+ people and activists. They said most church members had a tolerant attitude toward LGBTQ+ people. They also stated

⁷⁸ See media report by GALZ staff: Grace Badza (2019) titled ‘I have no place in society’ (online) Available at <https://www.dandc.eu/en/article/homophobia-zimbabwe-hurts-mental-health-lgbti-people> (Retried 11 January 2021).

⁷⁹ Some other relevant verses found by the author and relevant in explaining the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah are Ezekiel 16:49-50, Jeremiah 23:14 and Zephaniah 2:9; see also Germond & de Gruchy (1997:215).

⁸⁰ *Taboo Media*, 22 November 2016, ‘Zimbabwe ministry offers counsel to abused sexual minorities’ (online) <https://taboomedia.com/2016/11/22/zimbabwe-ministry-offers-counsel-to-abused-sexual-minorities/> (Retried 08 June 2021).

that they support the LGBTQ+ people in their personal lives and often participate in CSO activities. A relative of one church leader worked as a staff member in one of the CSOs. Upon further probing, this relative revealed that the church leader was aware of their employment at an LGBTQ+ organization, and was supportive and open-minded about it:

He is supportive. He is one of the church leaders. He has even seconded some reverends from our church [...] to come to the space. They have come and are constantly asking me when the next meeting is. They are quite open-minded, but I am not sure if their open-mindedness will continue [...] or if they are hoping that one day maybe [these LGBTQ+ people] will be converted into [heterosexuality] (KII with SRC Staff 4 – 27 March 2019).

This participant and others who attended churches that do not discriminate against LGBTQ+ people reported that their churches give them confidence, inspiration, and motivation to continue with their activism for SR-MSM, without suggesting that in doing so, they are sinning. In Swaziland, LGBTQ+ people, including HIV-positive MSM, enjoyed similar church support (Kennedy et al. 2013). Religion and human rights, in some instances, share a different value base. ‘Formal’ HRBAs often criticize religion for practices and religious texts that depict same-sex sexual practices as a sin. They emphasize, against the value base of Christianity that depicts a human body as the temple of God, that individuals have autonomy over their bodies. Nevertheless, LGBTQ+ people tend to be loyal to such a religion. ‘Formal’ HRBAs, which negate the need for nuanced interpretations of religious practices to MSM and instead take a dismissive approach to religion based on its treatment of SR-MSM, can alienate MSM and activists.

In my conceptual framework, I highlighted that religion shapes, organizes and defines the moral environment of a community or communities, and I have demonstrated above how it shapes the moral environment for HRBA operationalization in advocacy for SR-MSM. In the operationalization of HRBAs, attempts of CSOs such as SRC and GALZ are pitted, the world over (see Corrêa 2006), against the bounded context of the rise in fundamentalism. Popular charismatic religious leaders with many followers have been in the limelight for their homocritical utterances, especially during the FR-GoZ, creating difficult political situations for HRBA operationalization. Fundamentalism as a context, and the homocritical stance of church leaders, create obstacles to the operationalization of HRBAs and illustrate the relevance of the PPT.

The difference in churches of treatment of SR-MSM, on the one hand, by Makandiwa, Magaya, Kunonga, and Chamisa, which tends to promote exclusion, and on the other hand by Anyway Humbe and SRC pastors, who promote inclusion, reveals the diversity of positions toward inclusion and exclusion in the Zimbabwean Christian churches. A participant noted the following about this diversity:

To include or exclude homosexuals is not exclusively a matter of doctrine. It often links to the politics of the day. We hear that because Zimbabwe is a Christian nation, the automatic position of the Christian body is exclusion. No. Mugabe wanted to align the Zimbabwe church's position to that of politics and culture on homosexuals. He coerced the Christian churches and individuals to take an exclusionary position [...]. [W]e knew as the church's leadership that we could not oppose the President and the government and not face personal consequences such as the dreaded CIOs⁸¹ paying us night visits. Pius Ncube once opposed Mugabe. The CIOs set him up for a sex scandal that sadly got him expelled from his church. He died a lonely man, probably regretting his bravery in ever opposing Mugabe. Again, at the church level, if, as a leader, you condone homosexuality, your rivals for the leadership position use that against you in internal church politics. They politicize your tolerance for homosexuals and use it to mobilize the church to oust you from leadership. Even where there are no rivals, if you appear to condone homosexuals, people flee from your church to other churches. Politicians have historically coerced religion to support slavery, racism, colonialism, and apartheid for [political gain]. Mugabe has manipulated it to support homophobia also for [political gain]. We knew, but we [did not] oppose him [as] Pius did, out of fear, but we never officially excluded homosexuals. I doubt if most ordinary churches did that, except those who did want political favor. We [did not] have to. We remained inclusive of homosexuals in silence (KII with Pastor 1- 27 June 2019).

In section 6.4 above, I discussed how traditional leaders prefer 'silence' about the existence of MSM and same-sex practices to avoid discrimination. Similarly, the quote above reveals an untapped constituency of religious leaders who prefer 'anonymity' and 'silence' as an inclusion strategy for LGBTQ+ people in their churches. These findings align with Van Klinken and Gunda's (2012) observations, who note that silence and acceptance exist alongside the exclusion of LGBTQ+ people in African religious traditions. The quote above shows that anonymity and silence arise out of fear of victimization, possible at three levels. First, persecution from the government. Second, persecution from rivals in internal church politics. Thirdly, congregants fleeing from the church.

The quote above also reveals the drawback of Mnangagwa's stance of neutrality or ambivalence. While the neutrality or ambivalence at the level of the President of the republic discourages the likes of Makandiwa, Magaya, Kunonga, and Chamisa from openly denigrating SR-MSM, it does not encourage or create a context where people like Anyway Humbe, the SRC pastors, and Pastor 1 above to openly support SR-MSM. Mugabe manipulated religion, causing a context of fear and silence and attracting gullible Makandiwas, Magayas, Kunonga, and Chamisas to side with him. Encouragement and facilitation would create a context of open support for SR-MSM, not neutrality or ambivalence. The quote above shows that the Zimbabwe Christian body is ripe for a doctrine of inclusion of LGBTQ+ people because it never was for their exclusion.

⁸¹ Central Intelligence Organization officers.

Another pastor narrated how their local branches have remained behind while branches of the same churches have evolved in other African countries, Europe, and America to openly support SR-MSM (KII with Pastor 5- 30 June 2019). The case of the Anglican Church helps to illustrate Pastor 5's sentiments. In 1996, the then Anglican Bishop Jonathan Siyachitema openly denigrated SR-MSM as ungodly and alien. In 2011, Rowan Williams, the then Anglican Archbishop of Canterbury, met former President Mugabe and emphasized respect for SR-MSM, notwithstanding that they are a thorny issue in the church (Shoko and Phiri 2017).

According to the PPT, opportunities for change of attitudes and behaviors become more available as societies open up for diverse views. I, therefore, predict a context characterized by more inclusion and tolerance of MSM and activists if religious leaders stop denigrating SR-MSM as they have done during the FR-GoZ, and if they promote SR-MSM openly. I expect citizens and congregants whom Makandiwa and others have conditioned to be homophobic to update their attitudes in interacting with either neutrals on the subject, typified by President Mnangagwa, or promoters of SR-MSM, exemplified by Anyway Humbe and the SRC pastors.

Suppose Mnangagwa would not only encourage advocacy for SR-MSM, as he did in Davos, but also facilitate it and promote the realization of these rights. In that case, I contend that the religious context for HRBA operationalization will greatly improve, given that churches govern activists' attitudes in their activism. GALZ, after Makandiwa denigrated SR-MSM, stated that some of its members attended his church. Almost all activists stated that they are devout Christians. This means that Christianity is pivotal to activists' day-to-day workplace activities and lives. In agreement, Helmke and Levitsky (2004) argue that religion remarkably influences daily social practices.

5.6 Conclusion

I have shown above how notions on the foreignness of SR-MSM, political harassment of activists, culture, and religion contribute to a political context that is not supportive of the operationalization of 'formal' HRBAs in advocacy work for SR-MSM. The notion of the foreignness of SR-MSM was perpetuated through tropes about SR-MSM as a 'white disease', 'a European culture', 'a scourge on a pristine continent, and a 'festering finger'. Various actors drawn from the government, political parties, and the public engaged in political harassment of activists. A *de facto* culture of tolerance or indifference to same-sex practices and identities, while allowing for freedom from discrimination, nevertheless contributed to the erasure of SR-MSM and advocacy. Religious leaders who prefer 'anonymity' and 'silence' as a strategy for including MSM in their churches, deny activists support, motivation, and inspiration in their advocacy of SR-MSM.

I have shown the development of a political context in Zimbabwe that allowed various actors to instrumentalize ‘anti-gay’ sentiments for personal and political gain. Nevertheless, while impeding the operationalization of ‘formal’ HRBAs in advocacy for SR-MSM, such a political context simultaneously breeds a crop of brave activists who can work, in line with the PPT, and RMT, within the limited available political opportunities and resources. In the next chapter, I discuss how the international funding context influences HRBA advocacy for SR-MSM, using the case of Nordic INGOs.

6 CHAPTER SIX

THE INTERNATIONAL FUNDING CONTEXT

6.1 Introduction

This Chapter explores how the international funding context influences the operationalization of ‘formal’ HRBAs to SR-MSM. I use the case of Nordic INGOs, SAIH, and COC Netherlands, intermediaries of funding from Global North governments to local Global South CSOs. I grapple in the next sections with the notions of ‘queer imperialism’ and ‘partnerships’ in examining how Nordic donors assert human rights as a priority for the partners they support and, at the same time, acknowledge the unattainability of ‘formal’ HRBAs, and practicability of ‘light’ HRBAs. I look at the HRBA frameworks that these INGOs ‘preferred’ during Zimbabwe’s first and second republics. I explore how different or similar these frameworks were from those ‘preferred’ by the local CSOs. I also examine how local CSOs/activists translated these frameworks, through what kinds of rights claims and what kinds of activities and services. I explore the available room for local CSOs to adapt INGO/donor- ‘preferred’ frameworks in their operationalization. I discuss the influence that INGO priority funding of mainly gay and other MSM HIV/AIDS projects has had on the experiences of activists in operationalizing HRBAs in their advocacy for SR-MSM.

6.2 Queer Imperialism

In this section, I present findings on how queer imperialism, i.e., the influence of ‘imposition’ of donor- ‘preferred’ HRBAs as an aspect of the international funding context, influences HRBA operationalization. The RMT is limited in explaining imposition and non-imposition of donor approaches and practices in that it curves a neutral role for donors; it sees donors as neutral partners, playing the funding role and often volunteering in the activities of social movements, hence my employment of the queer imperialism conceptual framework (see section 2.2.2). I could not rely solely on the RMT because it masks the power dynamics that often characterize relationships involving the exchange of resources.

I use the case of SAIH to ‘map out’ the typical HRBAs that INGOs ‘prefer’ for local CSOs. I draw the diagram below from SAIH’s Strategy for Development Cooperation 2008-2012, 2012 – 2017, 2018-2022 and 2022-2026 versions, and its 2022 – 2026 funding application template for partners. The INGOs in the FR-GoZ and SR-GoZ have prioritized HRBAs of local CSOs, with no country-specific strategic plans or HRBA frameworks. They also acknowledge that the local implementing CSOs determine the interpretation and operationalization of HRBAs. In section 2.3.2, I described the characteristics of ‘imperialist’ HRBAs

to SR-MSM as consisting of imposition of the Western ‘gay’/gender identity, as well as the civilizing mission, cutting off aid, sanctions, structural racism, and regime change for countries violating SR-MSM, NGOization of social movements, and donor dependency.




Figure 3: Typical HRBAs ‘preferred’ by INGOs.
Source: Created by the Author

The figure above highlights donor HRBA tenets such as human rights instruments, non-discrimination, participation and inclusion, and focus on vulnerable groups (see boxes on the left of the Figure above). The 2022-2026 SAIH funding application template focuses on the principle of participation and inclusion of historically oppressed groups (depicted in Figure 3 above), with four outcomes: “strengthened indigenous and intercultural higher education institutions, [...] increased access to mechanisms that ensure their protection”, strengthened CSOs, and HEIs⁸², and more effective advocacy “for the rights of students, teachers, and academics” (SAIH Funding Application Template 2022-2026, p.5). I have included these aspects in the figure.

In line with the HRBAs depicted in Figure 3, the theory of change in the funding application template recognizes that “higher education has largely failed to include the diversity of our societies, and [...] academic freedoms are under continuous attack” (SAIH 2021c:14). Therefore, the vision for SAIH is “that

⁸² Higher Education Institutions

context-relevant, inclusive higher education is accessible to all ...”. The vision is achieved through an “inclusive higher education sector” (p.14), meaning strengthening intercultural higher education institutions, preventing discrimination of all groups within these institutions, promoting independent research, and strengthening capacities in civil society organizations and organizations for students, and academics (SAIH 2021c).

For local CSOs, templates for donor HRBAs are suggested in the format of instruction terms/questions that the applying or reporting organization will have to provide answers for, and normally, each answer has a word limit. Most participants found these templates to be flexible and user-friendly, as shown by a typical answer below:

[The proposal templates are] quite user-friendly and simple. They [do not] require too much work. They also give space for adaptability to our national context. They are easy to interpret. With reporting templates, they are okay, but [it is] just that they sort of change [...] as the year goes, [because] for [INGOs it is] quite a learning process [...]. The reporting templates I use now differ from those used in 2016 (KII with SRC Staff 4 – 27 March 2019).

The quote above also shows that INGOs are increasingly attentive to the context and realities of changing political opportunities that may necessitate changing both the proposal and reporting templates. It reveals that these donors are also listening to the local CSOs in the South.

A representative of COC Netherlands stated that their “partners can work on [pathways/HRBAs they are focusing on as an INGO], and then they will include them in their work plan, and they will, of course, include them in their report” (KII with COC Representative – 26 April 2021). When I asked the representative of COC Netherlands about their ‘ideal/preferred’ HRBAs to local CSOs, they answered that they should be user-friendly or simple, but ideally contain elements that would enable the INGOs to report to their back donors, as explained in the quote below:

We do have [specific templates]. It depends on the program. The templates are similar to the [ones for] two programs we did in the last five years. We tried to make them as simple as possible but also contain the elements that we need to be able to report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, our back donor. We also try to [consider] the time it takes for the organizations to fill the templates and the effort (KII with COC Representative – 26 April 2021).

The quote also reveals that the INGO— would not want to have their partner CSOs spend too much time filling out the templates. The coming of the second republic meant changing political opportunities, with a bearing on HRBAs that CSOs could implement on the ground. The INGOs did not prescribe any approaches, including HRBA, even after the coming of the Second Republic, as illustrated below:

I am comfortable with any approach they want to take [in the second republic]. They are leading. They know what is necessary. Some organizations [are] in some countries where human rights are very sensitive because politicians use [them] in an abusive, negative manner. They [would not] want to use the term [human rights]. At the same time, they would work based on human rights; even if [it is] not officially mentioned, [that is] still the approach they would want to take in practice. It is important to realize [...] that human rights have different connotations in different cultures. Recent developments with the UN and other international and regional mechanisms have questioned human rights universality, and people [have started to talk] about cultural human rights. The [...] debate has made it more complicated (KII with COC Representative – 26 April 2021).

Notwithstanding that COC Netherlands, for instance, does not prescribe any HRBA, what seems apparent from the representative of the KII is that they are inclined to work with partners that use the approach in some manner – in other words, those that apply ‘light versions’ of HRBAs as their context allows, as revealed in the two quotes below:

The organizations that we work with are truly committed to improving the lives of community members; they are human rights-based, and they are based on the rights that everybody has, including the LGBTI persons, and how to uphold these rights, and how to hold government, and other stakeholders accountable (KII with COC Representative – 26 April 2021).

However, this inclination is not the official position of COC Netherlands, as explained in the quote below:

My personal view, and this is not [...] the official standpoint of COC, [...] is that the underlying approach is always human rights because human rights are based on universality. Everybody has equal rights in the face of the law, but that depends on the context. On what is happening at the political level [...]. Organizations adapt because they want [...] to continue with their work without being obstruct[ed] or law enforcement [arresting them]. Organizations and groups also have their [...] ways of doing their work and framing it or coming up with narratives [...] to make [it] easier for them to work above ground and not [be] forced underground (KII with COC Representative – 26 April 2021).

The quote above also illustrates that the funding INGO understands the importance of ‘soft’ entry-level frames/narratives for local CSOs, making it easier for these organizations to work ‘above ground’. Unlike COC Netherlands, the representative confirmed that SAIH recommends (but does not demand) that their partner organizations consider using the HRBAs, and that the back donor expects SAIH to promote human rights through its partners in different countries. When I posed the question of whether SAIH recommends an HRBA, the representative had this to say:

Yes. Absolutely [...] NORAD is our main donor [...], and they have a human rights approach... That underpins everything that they support. Interestingly now [...] NORAD is [...] streamlining its support toward sustainable development goals, which are also built on human rights. The SDGs are increasingly becoming more important to our funders, which we also reflect in the reports [...] we give to our partners (KII with SAIH Representative – 11 June 2021).

However, the representative stated that actual ways of operationalization are up to the partners, as organizations and as implementing staff, to decide. SAIH and COC Netherlands appreciate the need to adapt and contextualize HRBAs in their implementation by partner CSOs to suit Zimbabwe's changing political context. The INGOs have adopted this position in translating and interpreting 'formal' HRBAs, appreciating that there is no universal agreement on the exact scope and implementation arrangements of an HRBA due to context-specific internal and external factors. The factors they appreciate lead to different ways of operationalizing HRBAs among their partner CSOs, and to different projects and activities by the different implementing staff within these CSOs.

The KII, with the COC Netherlands representatives, corroborated the above notion. The representative highlighted that most of the organizations they have worked with are operationalizing the HRBA even if they do not call it such:

I have not [seen] an organization [...], let me think, [that does not use HRBA]. Organizations and groups that we are working with, in my experience, the groups or organizations that we want to work with, that we establish [...] a long-term relationship with, and that we want to continue working with, [...] all have a human rights-based approach even if they [do not] call it a human rights-based approach. Even the very small groups, far away from the capital. [They could be] like three leaders, 3 LGBTI persons who want to do something for the community members. They [would be having] a little bit of extra money, or they happen to have office space, or they have organized film, evening ones and want to continue. They want the lives of community members, their brothers, sisters and siblings to improve. They feel they have the right to improve their lives because they have the same rights as everybody else. Even if [they do not have] human rights ingrained in their mission, vision and constitution, their approach is based on human rights (KII with COC Representative – 26 April 2021).

This flexibility in the interpretation of the operationalization of HRBAs by the INGOs and their back donors is in line with Epprecht's (2013) observations that there is no evidence of queer imperialism in the support given by donors to local CSOs. This means that 'queer imperialism' more specifically relates to 'human rights as a priority area' and not to the INGO interpretation and translation of HRBA into concrete projects. These findings confirm what scholars have already noted in the literature (see Kokera & Ndoma 2016, Piron & Sano 2016 and Piron & Watkins 2004). SAIH and COC Netherlands are not the only donors that do not prescribe particular approaches for their CSO partners in the Global South. Even for those INGOs that do publish guidelines, these are non-rigid and flexible. Some INGOs, such as SIDA and the EU, publish programming guidelines for CSOs to follow when developing their interventions. These guidelines clearly state that the HRBA should be used in the interventions, but they do not prescribe how it should be done. They leave this to the discretion of the implementing partners (ibid).

While SAIH and COC Netherlands do not have specific HRBA guidelines or preferences for interpreting and translating HRBA into concrete projects, none of the organizations with particular guidelines give funds to the CSOs in my study. Therefore, donors could not have directly influenced the use of the HRBAs by the CSOs targeted through my study. The representative of COC Netherlands noted that the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, their main back donor, does not explicitly require them to ask their partners to use the HRBA, as shown below:

If I talk about the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, our main donor [...], they are very flexible and understand [what is] on the ground. They are supportive of the approach that we are taking. In most countries, we work with different organizations and [...] some groups would only want to focus on small-scale community events because they feel that is like their strength, and that is what they want to do, and that is what the community needs. Other organizations are already involved in national human rights work; they are ready to engage internationally. It very much depends overall. I feel that the Ministry understands that even if you want to focus on the empowerment of the individual or community building, these are like the basic elements, the fundamentals that need to be in place before you engage in proper if you may want to call it that, human rights work. You [cannot] focus on human rights work while completely ignoring the other elements of community organizing, building self-esteem and all these very important elements. The Ministry understands that very well (KII with COC Representative – 26 April 2021).

I have shown that the INGOs acknowledge the unattainability of ‘formal’ HRBAs and expect the local CSOs to adapt the approach. However, a less widely shared thought among some participants was that failure to adhere to the human rights-related demands of these donor templates would affect the chances of writing successful proposals or presenting satisfactory narrative reports, thereby jeopardizing donors’ funding prospects. This relates to the ideas mentioned in the conceptual framework (section 2.3.3) that these are interactions between unequal parties. Regardless of how sincere a donor may be in opposing the imposition of their approaches and practices, the asymmetries of power will cause the recipient to do what the donor expects rather than what the circumstances on the ground require (see Elliott 1987).

The two INGOs, COC Netherlands and SAIH, did not use the adoption of their ‘HRBAs⁸³’ as a condition for funding. The literature has indicated the drawbacks of using SR-MSM as a conditionality for bilateral and multilateral aid in Africa to create a political environment that supports CSOs in their HRBA operationalization in relation to SR-MSM (Biruk 2014, Meer et al. 2017, Wroe 2012, Mwakasungula 2013, and Currier 2012b). The CSOs indicate that they do not support conditional aid, as it reinforces notions like queer imperialism, and suggests that SR-MSM are a Western construct and non-indigenous; these notions,

⁸³ The INGOs did not have documents specifically describing their HRBAs. I however sketched a typical HRBA for the INGOs, using available primary data for the case of SAIH.

as illustrated in the Malawi case, create a disempowering political environment for their HRBA advocacy work (Chanika, Lwanda & Muula 2013, Oberth 2014, and Currier 2012b). Chanika, Lwanda and Muula (2013) reveal that politicians in Malawi employed the narrative of queer imperialism to galvanize political opposition, even from women's groups to HRBA advocacy for SR-MSM.

Politicians employed the queer imperialism narrative after former President Bingu Wa Mutharika had at the behest of international donors, pardoned two gay men whom the courts had sentenced to 14 years in jail for attempting a gay marriage (Biruk 2014). Meer et al. (2017:28) state that as “donors began to halt or cancel their financial aid commitments to Malawi, the debate became increasingly about the West exerting financial muscle over Malawi to force them to accept ‘Western’ gay rights”. The sheer exertion of pressure on Malawi, including the visit of the then UN Secretary-General, evokes narratives that key actors presiding over the selection of recipients of aid are themselves ‘gays’, and that people who engage in same-sex sexual practices only engage or claim same-sex identities to obtain money from these donors (Currier 2012b). Currier (2012b) notes that some literature refers to this as a ‘gay for-pay’ notion.

Currier (2012a) notes the heavy dependence of CSOs in Southern Africa on international funding, and argues that such dependence perpetuates the myth of same-sex sexualities as “un-African”. The Global North's attempts to push for recognition of SR-MSM by authorities in countries in the South by using development aid or queer imperialism has also fueled the above myth (Sarpong 2012). African politicians and governments have reacted to queer imperialism with indignation and defiance, deeming threats of withholding aid to countries in the South as interference in local affairs and infringement on their sovereignty (Awondo et al., 2012; Sarpong 2012). Within these countries, the threats have fueled homophobia and anti-LGBTQ+ political rhetoric. Homophobia has a definite bearing on HRBA operationalization.

Former Prime Minister of Britain David Cameron stated at the 2011 Commonwealth meeting in Australia that his government was considering cutting aid to countries with legislation that infringed on SR-MSM (Sarpong 2012) (see Figure 3 below). In addition, when Uganda submitted the Anti-Homosexuality Bill in October 2009, Western countries such as the USA, the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Denmark threatened to cut bilateral aid to the country (Nyanzi & Karamagi 2015). In Ghana, President John Mills stated that the British leader could not dictate Ghana's reform agenda, especially because such reform conflicts with the country's moral fabric. The President's office in Uganda dismissed the threats as driven by a ‘bullying mentality’. Zimbabwe's former President Mugabe described the suggested reforms as a push

for ‘new rights’ that are ‘satanic’ and contrary to the African tradition (Sarpong 2012). Governments perceive resources provided through Global North development partners as promoting queer imperialism in the South, and thus do not register much impact.

I argue that the two Nordic INGOs I targeted present a different perspective on the above canonic dogmas regarding aid conditionality. For example, SAIH perceives the grounds for these dogmas and alerts its partners to be aware that the colonial era has privileged white gaze and white epistemologies, as shown in the quote below:

Higher education remains accessible only for the few and less for historically oppressed groups such as women and ethnic, racial, and sexual minorities. Education [...] continues to be, used to colonize and control groups of society. The knowledge, systems of knowledge production, worldviews, languages, and cultures of indigenous people and ethnic minorities have [...] been the victim of destruction and oppression by colonization and the dominance of Western definitions of knowledge (SAIH 2021c:14).

The two INGOs did not have documents that outline and clarify specific HRBAs that they adhere to, and the web pages did not contain any specific HRBA manuals. However, in separate KIIs, the two representatives insisted that what their INGOs meant by HRBAs should remain amenable and responsive to multiple interpretations by local CSOs, corresponding with the different contexts in which they “work and live”, as “human rights have different connotations in different cultures” (KII with COC Representative – 26 April 2021).

Traditions of rigor, together with growing economic and political imperatives in the field of development, tend to compel donors and local CSOs toward clarity, conciseness, and exactitude around the impact of approaches like HRBAs (see Merry 2016, Eyben 2007). The most ‘seductive’ manner used by development actors to provide evidence of impact is ‘quantification’, which is “the use of numbers to describe social phenomena in countable and commensurable terms” (Merry 2016:1). Back donors expect INGOs to give them quantitative reports on the impact of HRBAs, but this is not always possible given that the impact is often qualitative and takes time.

6.2.1 Non-Imposition of ‘Imperialist’ HRBAs

According to a key informant, from its inception, GALZ has been using the human rights discourse, and it did so more systematically starting in 1995 after the book fair issue (KII with GALZ staff – 12 March 2019). The organization has no written guidelines or templates on HRBA, but does have strategic plans and work plans that take into account the elements of HRBAs. Not all donors directly impose HRBAs, as most funders

respect GALZ as a community organization. In one instance, when funding from a particular donor came with operationalization frameworks that would pose a risk to the communities and activists, it was turned down (ibid).

GALZ projects focus on LGBTQ+ issues, including economic and political empowerment. Activities include public exhibitions, campaigns, counseling, media work, policy analysis, legal service/referrals, social safety net activity, and legal services that provide human rights literacy, crisis management, health, information and provision of safety nets and safe spaces. Other services and activities include crisis management, health, information and the provision of safety nets and safe spaces.

Table 3: GALZ Services and Activities

Legal Services	Crisis Management	Health Services	Information	Safety Net	Safe Spaces
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “Training/capacity building -Safety and security/risk reduction -Human rights literacy -Legal advice on sexual orientation, violations based on sexuality, and gender identity, harassment, gender identity, and the law -Asylum support -Legal support -Domestic unions -Cases in relation to sexual orientation -Legal referrals -Documentation -Information” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “Family re-integration -Health cases -Eviction (based on sexual orientation) -Disownment -Arrest -Violence and harassment -Case follow-up -Relocation -Identification - Discrimination” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “Information and health awareness -Treatment Literacy and Treatment - Comprehensive sex education -Peer support -Counseling -General wellbeing -Gay-friendly service providers -Support -Protective barriers -Referrals -Psychosocial support and groups -Counselling”. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> “IEC material -Legal (ABCs of arrest, the law) - SRHR/Health (STIs, HIV, Mental health, General well-being) -Asylum -Books -Site referrals (online and offline) -Promotional material -T-shirts -Caps/ hats -Flash sticks -Water bottles -Tents” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “Social and economic empowerment” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “Resource centers -Library -Wellness sessions”

Source: Adapted from the GALZ webpage⁸⁴

⁸⁴ GALZ (n.d) Services (online) available from <https://galz.org/about/services/> Retrieved 6 October 2022.

When I asked an SRC staff member if the organization had started using HRBA at its inception in 2007, the staff member had this to say:

Yes, [that is] how our work was fundamentally built. As the organization grew [...], more [donors] came to us. [They wanted] us to interrogate what we understood about the HRBA. We needed to make sure that as staff who are implementing the work, we [...] familiarized ourselves with this approach and [...] make sure that we do not only [read about] it on paper [but] that [...] we are using it [...] in our everyday work (KII with SRC staff 2 – 28 March 2019).

As with GALZ, an SRC staff member explained that the HRBA was the organization's initiative. They had researched the approach, and other staff members had already had hands-on experience with it from their previous work. The founding secretariat understood the added value of the approach and its historical and conceptual foundations:

I would like to believe [the international community coined HRBA] after such key documents like UDHR. HRBA speaks on what to do [guided by these] key documents [...]. I am not sure, but I believe [they] founded [them] based on those key documents that still guide our work (KII with SRC staff 2 – 28 March 2019).

When asked how they first, at the inception of the organization, came to know about HRBA and its potential use in MSM projects, a staff member had this to say:

When we designed the workaround programming for LGBTI, it was [...] vital for us to look at the world's best practices and what principles could guide the work we intended to do. The HRBA was the best approach to guide us in this work. We helped ourselves [understand] what it meant. [We used it to design] our programming, our response, and how we carry out our activities (KII with SRC staff 2 - 28 March 2019).

As was the case with GALZ, SRC did not have HRBA-specific templates or written guidelines recommended or imposed by the donors. The organization would refer to the HRBAs in correspondence, and on the various project documents shared with donors. Observed examples include project proposals, narratives and financial reports, research reports, evaluation reports and one-on-one meetings with donors. Staff members were required to use the HRBAs:

Yes, [it is] a requirement by the organization, but it is also within us because [it is] now part of our work. [It is] an important aspect of our work that we need to be rights-based. It could have started as a requirement, but [it is] now embedded within us because of the nature of our work (KII with SRC staff 5 - 27 March 2019).

In addition, I observed that some of the collectives started experimenting with HRBAs before they were involved in any funding partnerships. This means that HRBAs may also be operationalized when no donor is involved.

A participant was of the view that instead of being a tool for imposition of donor agendas, the HRBAs were a tool for claiming autonomy from donor agendas for the local CSOs, as shown below:

We have used the HRBA to claim autonomy in programming. Autonomy from donors. Sometimes, donors may want you to do certain things in a particular way. If these ways of donors do not go well with us, we write back to them and [tell] them your suggested ways conflict with HRBA, which we believe in as an organization. All our donors know we use HRBA as our standard of operation. We make it a point that even potential donors know beforehand that we use the HRBA. The HRBA is an important shield for us against intrusive and pushy tendencies by donors (KII with SRC staff 7 – 28 March 2019).

This quotation shows that, to withstand possible ‘queer imperialism’, local CSOs communicate a consistent political position on the approaches and practices they use. During fieldwork, I observed that when in writing back to donors, local activists stood firm regarding their practices (not related to HRBA), the donors would then request written statements regarding organizational policies to justify their insistence on particular practices. I argue, therefore, that local CSOs need written policies regarding the approaches and practices they use; these can serve as a bulwark in resisting donor imposition of approaches and practices.

CSOs operationalize HRBAs in this way to ensure the willingness of donors to fund HRBA processes like participation and downward accountability. Therefore, CSOs embrace HRBAs for their utility, but without intending to be compradors, championing only the interests of donors. Donors must modify their funding to correspond with their preferred HRBAs. Interviewed representatives of donors stated that they were aware of the myriad uses of HRBAs by their partners, but had no preference regarding the ways they were used. The SAIH’s acknowledgment that its funding could support activities and results of CSOs that may not fit into its frameworks reflects this lack of rigidity. The quote below reveals this:

However, be aware that not all the activities you do that SAIH supports, and all the results you achieve, will be reflected in the global results framework. [The framework helps] to monitor and summarize only the core results of all projects across all partner countries. SAIH works with different types of partners [...]. As you can see in the template, not all outcomes are relevant for all types of partners and their work [...]. Hence, only include in your results framework the outcomes and outputs [...] relevant to you (SAIH 2021c:23).

In practice, programming and donor priorities interlock to produce a mutually accepted HRBA. This contrasts with widespread notions of ‘queer imperialism’, which are said to influence governments to reject

SR-MSM projects underpinned by the HRBAs (see Chimininge & Makamure 2017). In line with the above, Kemp and Vanclay (2013) argue that HRBAs also serve as an opportunity to reflect broadly on the power dynamics inherent in the practice of international development. The PPT and RMT are critical of assumptions that activists are passive and hapless beneficiaries of resources of donors, who are in turn highly gullible to the incitation and contagions of Western ideologies (see section 2.2). The PPT and the RMT help to clarify the conscious mobilization of resources, embedded in possibilities provided by political opportunities, where social actors act rationally.

Non-imposition of HRBA guidelines by INGOs like SAIH and COC Netherlands created an enabling environment for partner CSOs to adapt and contextualize ‘formal’ HRBAs, deriving from them ‘light versions’ of the approach suitable to the Zimbabwean context in which they operate (see Chapter 8). My findings indicate that donor-imposed HRBAs would affect the viability of an organization as a whole, given that policies and operational plans (see Appendix 2, documents 2 & 3) would have to comply with the contents of these guidelines, as argued below:

Donor imposed [...]. What [would happen] if a donor imposes a pro-advocacy guideline? [A guideline] that says we should not hand out sex commodities such as condoms and lubricants to our LGBTI communities and instead empower the communities to claim those from the state. This I say because some HRBAs push for the state to be the primary duty bearer when it comes to service provision and that we play an advocacy role as CSOs. We know the laws, the stigma, discrimination and the broader homophobic situation in Zimbabwe better than the donors do. The government is not necessarily keen on providing lubricants, dental dams, finger coats and other services we extend to the LGBTI community. Advocacy may take a long time to yield results; hence, we combine the HRBA with the needs-based approach in those scenarios. In such instances, we look at the needs of our communities and cover them. If a donor says, “stick to a particular HRBA guideline”, we may be unable to cover these needs. [Therefore], if all our donors were to impose HRBA or other operational guidelines, this would affect our effectiveness in assisting our communities and formulating organizational policies and operational plans (KII with SRC staff 7 – 28 March 2019).

The quote above demonstrates that it is challenging to implement strict HRBAs in resource-poor countries such as Zimbabwe, and that it is necessary to combine the HRBA with the needs-based approach. The quote also demonstrates that selecting suitable components from different approaches enables CSOs to empower rights holders to claim their rights, and to hold the government accountable when meeting their needs through the provision of essential goods and services.

I have shown above that local CSOs formulate their HRBAs, whereby INGO and CSO priorities in human rights interlock to produce mutually accepted approaches. However, Dawson (1996) warns that such interlocking of priorities does not always mean an absence of donor power, and that situations of

interlocking priorities may appear to be free from the exercise of donor power only because power differences are very deeply ingrained. In light of this warning, my position as a Board Chair of SRC, interacting with donors regularly, and as a long-time participant in SAIH activities from around 2004, may have influenced my data collection, analysis, and findings that point to interlocking priorities instead of imposition of HRBAs. Nevertheless, although my positionality, my perception of HRBAs as reflexive approaches for local CSOs, may color my assessment of the influence of donors – according to me, such influence did not translate to imposition.

In some of the literature, the imposition of approaches in partnerships is an outcome of power dynamics, where, according to Dahl’s seminal works on power (1957: 2002-3), “A has power over B to the extent to which he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do”. The logic behind queer imperialism rests in Dahl’s (1957) *base* of power, which is resources. This *base* is one of his four components in analyzing power dynamics; it stipulates that the power that comes with “the resources that A can use to influence B’s behavior” facilitates the imposition of such approaches as HRBAs (ibid). In studies that apply this framework, the prominent resources are financial, and these resources are projected as having a unidirectional flow from donors to recipient local CSOs (see Hudock 1995, Hoksbergen 2005, Lister 2000). Such notions of queer imperialism thus underemphasize non-financial resources like those explained in the RMT, such as social-organizational, moral, and cultural resources (see section 2.2.2). These other resources explained in the RMT depict local CSOs as not dependent entirely on donors for all types of resources, and show the reality of interdependence, hence downplaying the idea of unilateral and unidirectional queer imperialism that facilitates imposition. I discuss below the HRBAs preferred by local CSOs.

6.2.2 Local CSO ‘Preferred’ HRBAs in FR-GoZ and SR-GoZ

I have used the SRC PRIDE⁸⁵ project, Rapid Response Learning Paper 2020, and various best-practice documents and learning papers to create a representative diagram of typical HRBAs ‘preferred’ by local CSOs. These HRBAs address violated rights through services and activities that target vulnerable communities and strengthen individuals.

⁸⁵ Promoting Rights, Inclusion, Diversity, and Empowerment in Education




Figure 4: Typical Local CSO HRBAs

Source: Adapted from SRC Rapid Response Learning Paper 2020:6

Figure 7 above shows that typical HRBAs for local CSOs involve addressing the violated right/s through services and activities as a first stage. According to the SRC, these activities “target vulnerable communities and aim to strengthen people through a human rights-based approach premised on the fundamental principles of equality, dignity, and respect for all ” (SRC Rapid Response Learning Paper 2020:6). The systematic gathering of evidence of violated right/s then follows this stage. The next step is to track compliance by state and policymakers with human rights standards, instruments, and international law. Underpinning these processes is an analysis of trends in human rights violations and the compiling of various reports regarding the latter, followed by advocacy initiatives to redress these violations. Chapter 8 discusses how these HRBAs are operationalized on the ground.

The above findings align with observations in literature that depart from the logic of NGOization and imperialism to show that local CSO dependence on financial support does not always suppress their preferred approaches (Anyidoho and Crawford 2014). In line with the findings of this study, Anyidoho and Crawford (2014) show that consistent communication about an organization's approach enables local social movements to maintain their independence. The SRC has consistently stated in various documents that HRBAs underpin its work. For Banse (2015), differences in the implementation of approaches among local recipient organizations, HRBAs in the case of my study, are not the result of queer imperialism or partnerships, but of the political context, and differences related to organizational capacities and constraints.

In the next section, I discuss the influence of the funding context, using the conceptual framework of partnerships.

6.3 Intermediary Partnerships

The INGOs targeted in this study, SAIH and COC Netherlands, are, as I conceptualized the term partnerships (see section 2.3.3), intermediaries, that, as conceived by RMT, receive funding from their respective governments and private institutions in the Global North and convey the funds to organizations in the Global South, which governments and private institutions cannot fund directly. SAIH receives funding from *inter-alia*, NORAD, and students in universities in Norway, and conveys these funds to GALZ, SRC, and other organizations in Zimbabwe and other countries in the Global South. COC Netherlands receives funding from *inter-alia*, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and conveys these funds to similar organizations, including SRC. However, intermediary partnerships are not the only partnership framework, as some government donors in the Global North have effectively ‘partnered’ directly with Global South CSOs (Cook and Vieira 2016). For example, the Swedish government has ‘partnered’ directly with the Coalition of African Lesbians. In addition, some Global South CSOs want to ‘partner’ directly with Global North governments, allowing them to directly influence policies that determine funding priorities (Cook and Vieira 2016).

The case of SAIH and COC Netherlands reveals that working through intermediaries is more beneficial than the direct recipient model for LGBTQ+ CSOs in the context of Zimbabwe. These INGOs have over five years of specific experience of working with the CSOs, and expertise regarding the SR-MSM, as their webpage shows they have focused on the same for over ten years. Moreover, they have relationships and networks in the Global South, with SAIH having been in Zimbabwe for over 15 years, and working with over a dozen diverse partners. According to Cook and Vieira (2016), intermediaries are also more suited and experienced than governments in the Global North for managing and administering small- to medium-sized grants. The INGOs also actively strive to better understand the politics, debates and arguments on the subject of LGBTQ+⁸⁶, and to use their years of experience in international advocacy⁸⁷ to make them more suitable for directly distributing the funds. These INGOs distribute the funds through partnerships involving *inter-alia* regranting, strengthening of field-based financial and programmatic capacity, development of

⁸⁶ SAIH, for example, commissioned a study on anti-gender: McEwen, H. (2020). Un/Knowing and Un/Doing Sexuality and Gender Diversity: The Global Anti-Gender Movements against SOGIE Rights and Academic Freedom. Johannesburg: A Report Written for the Norwegian Students` and Academics` International Assistance Fund.

⁸⁷ COC Netherlands made a joint submission with GALZ and SRC to the UPR process in 2016: The United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), ‘Universal Periodic Review of Zimbabwe 26th Session October 2016 Joint submission by: Sexual Rights Centre, GALZ and COC Netherlands’ October 2016, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRZWStakeholdersInfoS26.aspx>.

relevant infrastructure, development of financial and programmatic tools, and engaging in joint advocacy with the local organizations in the Global South.

For Cook and Vieira (2016), intermediary partnerships with local CSOs are effective when they share common approaches to their work. While the RMT explains the role of donors as fund providers, and as contributing to augmenting capacity by participating in projects of local movements, it does not delineate the differing partnership frameworks with their advantages and disadvantages (see section 2.2.2). My study, in addition to considering the RMT, draws distinctions between donors who are intermediaries and donors who are direct funders. It goes on to highlight the above-mentioned advantages of working through intermediaries. My study, however, has not sufficiently dealt with the shortcomings of intermediary partnerships, a gap that other studies can fill. Intermediary INGO and local CSO HRBAs have some features in common that allow for smooth operationalization to the extent that the context allows. In Figure 8, the systematic gathering of data/evidence of human rights violations (SRC HRBAs) and of new research (SAIH HRBAs) are both about generating new knowledge.




Figure 5: Comparison of Donor INGO and Local CSO HRBAs
 Source: Created by the Author

Both HRBAs have advocacy as an integral component, and rely on human rights instruments, standards and international law. They also focus on the discriminated and the excluded (SAIH HRBAs) or those whose rights have been violated (e.g., rights like non-discrimination – SRC HRBAs). The discernable difference is that the INGO HRBAs tend to focus more on strengthening the capacity of local CSOs. In literature, for processes like HRBA operationalization, both donors and recipient local CSOs must be familiar with the thematic focus of each of the parties, and the strategies and approaches used to achieve their goals (Cook and Vieira 2016). Partnerships in which either the donor INGO or the recipient local CSO falls behind, will need one partner to bring the other up to speed with the priorities and approaches used.

The interviewed representatives of the INGOs indicated that they are closely watching and following the human rights situation in Zimbabwe. Various documents have aptly tried to capture the context, reflecting their hands-on understanding of LGBTQ+ rights situations in these countries. The quote below, from SAIH's paper regarding their position on SOGIESC, sums up various aspects of this context, as discussed in Chapter 1:

LGBT+ people experience discrimination or violence based on their [...] SOGIE. Such violence is [a type] of gender-based violence driven by a desire to punish those seen as defying gender norms. Like discrimination and violence against women and girls, root causes [manifest] in discriminatory, patriarchal structures and rigid norms related to gender roles, identity and sexuality. Violence and discrimination based on SOGIE constitute gross violations of the human rights of LGBT+ people. When this [occurs] in [an educational] setting, it poses a significant threat to the universal right to education. It also diminishes the potential role of the education sector as an arena for inclusion and increased tolerance, and [the] exclusion of marginalized groups makes education institutions less representative of the society in which they are situated. Hence, it contributes to a less fair and democratic society (SAIH 2021b: 1).

The above findings illustrate that INGOs, as intermediaries, know the discourses and praxis regarding SR-MSM in the South, have long-standing relations with local CSOs who know and appreciate the context, and bring to the table their years of experience. The evidence in global and local media and literature that MSM in different parts of the world, and particularly in the Global South, face violations of their SR-MSM has prompted various governments and foundations in the Global North to fund initiatives aimed at addressing these violated rights (see 1.1, 1.1.2 and 2.3.3). However, Cook and Vieira (2016) highlight that foundations and governments in the Global North often lack the knowledge and experience of working directly with local CSOs, have less appreciation of the nuances of the SR-MSM in the South, and lack experience in managing small grants often given to CSOs in the South. The findings above show that intermediaries, on the contrary, have an advanced appreciation of the context.

While INGOs have a relatively advanced appreciation of the context, a representative of COC Netherlands stated that they encourage CSOs, given their even better knowledge of the context, to work from an ‘inside-out’. With such awareness, INGOs can enable their partner organizations to enjoy autonomy in choosing the desired approach, as shown in the quote below:

We work [based on] an ‘inside-out’ [approach], which means that we support, facilitate and fund while [...] making sure that the communities are in the driver’s seat. The organizations we are working with, with few exceptions, are LGBTI organizations. They work [and] live in a context. They know much better than we do what is needed to meet the [rights] of the community members. This is the fundamental value of collaboration with partners in Zimbabwe and other countries (KII with COC Representative - 26 April 2021).

An equivalent of the ‘inside-out’ approach is, for SAIH, the ‘locally anchored partnership model⁸⁸’. Notions like those in the quote above are also expressed in SAIH’s Strategy for Development Cooperation 2022-2026 (SAIH 2021a), which states: “we work in collaboration with our partners who have the experience, expertise and local anchoring to change their situations and contribute to more just and fair societies” (p.2). These approaches, which recognize not only the ‘deficit’ but also the agency of local CSOs, and which purport to ‘shift the power’ from donors to local CSOs, are welcome against a backdrop of tendencies of operational frameworks to maintain the status quo in partnerships.

Peace Direct (2021) observes these tendencies, and states that attempts to ‘shift the power’ towards partners in the Global South and foster ‘locally-led approaches’ have been inconsistent, and have largely failed. For these INGOs, local CSOs, as I have noted above, know their HRBAs, including “framing [them] or coming up with [their] narratives [...] to make [it] easier for them to work above ground, and not [be] forced underground” (KII with COC Representative - 26 April 2021). In PPT parlance, they know the political context and the limited political opportunities arising from their context.

My interlocutors had feared (as I show in section 6.3.1) that, had donors imposed any HRBAs, those contesting the donor-‘preferred’ approach would be dismissed as ‘unrealistic’/ ‘un-strategic’ to the politics of securing donor funding (KII with SRC staff 7 – 28 March 2019). Therefore, I argue that avoiding donors to outline and clarify specific HRBAs to represent any particular rights discourse is the key to maintaining the non-imposition of ‘formal’ HRBAs that may prove incompatible with particular contexts and has facilitated local CSO operationalization of only ‘light’ versions of HRBAs (see Chapter 8).

⁸⁸ See SAIH’s Strategy for international cooperation 2022-2026 p.2 (SAIH 2021a).

Local CSOs in the Zimbabwe context have less knowledge and appreciation of back donors of funding INGOs as well as the capacity to work with them directly. My interlocutors stated that they stand fewer chances in applying for and winning big grants if they have to apply directly to back donors like NORAD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, because the CSOs of my interlocutors lack the internal capacity to administer huge grants (KII with SRC staff 7 – 28 March 2019, KII with SRC staff 2 - 28 March 2019). They acknowledged that the INGOs, as intermediaries, and due to their proximity, know the donor better than they do, and therefore, they have “better power” than they do to justify to the back donors the ‘light’ versions of HRBAs that they apply on the ground (KII with SRC staff 7 – 28 March 2019). Cook and Vieira (2016) also observe that partnering with intermediaries like SAIH and COC Netherlands, as in the case of my study, allows local CSOs to access from back donors resources, which they could not have accessed on their own, given the challenges of compliance with accountability requirements⁸⁹ of back donor funding, and the burdensome requirements of reporting.

I adopt the concepts of the ‘inside-out’ approach and ‘locally-anchored partnership’ as a counter-narrative to the queer imperialist imposition of HRBAs, given that the PPT and the RMT theories in themselves do not counter the narrative. The RMT mentions donors only in highlighting that they provide funding and that their representatives may also volunteer in SMOs but are seldom full-time employees of these organizations (McCarthy and Zald 1977). It fails to explain queer imperialism, or the ‘inside-out or locally anchored partnership’ approaches. The PPT does not delineate the role of donors, and bundles them together with implementing CSOs as mobilizing structures (see section 2.2.1). It is preoccupied with explaining political context, openness, and degree of closure as boundaries for activism.

6.4 Donors Prioritizing MSM

I use the case of the SRC to illustrate that most funding by donors to local CSOs was to fight HIV/AIDS (see Table 4). In 2019 the SRC ran 12 projects, which provided annual funding of US\$ 747,292. Nearly all projects mainstreamed HIV/AIDS in targeting either gay men, other MSM or sex workers but not in purposefully targeting LBQ women. A total of US\$ 470,337, or 62.9%, of the annual funding was specifically for HIV/AIDS projects. These projects included the Elton John Foundation-funded Advocacy and other Community Tactics (ACT) to challenge barriers to HIV services among gay men in Zimbabwe – Delayed Dignity is a right Denied (3D), also known as ACT 3D project (US\$ 124,963), the COC Netherlands-funded Bridging the Gap project (US\$ 33,868), and the Global Fund/UNFPA-funded MSM

⁸⁹ Including financial, monitoring and evaluation requirements.

project (US\$ 135,385). They also include the PSI Zimbabwe-funded Going the Last Mile project (US\$ 44,898) and the Aidsfonds-funded Bridging the Gap project (US\$ 131,218).

Most stakeholders, particularly donors, perceive AIDS prevalence to be high among gay men and very low among LBQ women⁹⁰. Therefore, they have directed most HIV/AIDS funding to programs targeting gay men and the other MSM. More than a third of the US\$ 470,337 specifically allocated for HIV/AIDS, as mentioned above, was almost exclusively allocated for gay men and other MSM. The other 61.67% of that amount was mainly for sex worker projects dominated by cisgender female sex workers (see Table 4). In addition, the ViiV Healthcare-funded Social and Economic Empowerment project was almost exclusively for MSM and transgender communities. As a result, the SRC piggybacked NeoteriQ, an LBQ women's collective, in its projects; the same was true for other collectives without adequate funding, such as IAZ, the collective of intersex people. I further observed that, while GALZ is an association of all diverse constituencies of people of same-sex sexualities, most people outside LGBTQ+ circles perceived it as an organization for gay men and other MSM, given that a big chunk of its funding was from HIV/AIDS donor funds that prioritized gay men and other MSM.

The funding focus in the table below shows that the international funding context does not support HRBA operationalization related to lesbian, bisexual and queer (LBQ) women, but gives preference to MSM. International funding has come in to support public health-inclined approaches and MSM in the fight against HIV and AIDS. This support follows the universalizing of Western epidemiological and epistemological classifications of MSM as being a high-risk group because they engage in penile sexual relations, and LBQ women as being a low-risk group because they do not practice penile sex, despite skimpy evidential basis for these classifications in African contexts (Awuor 2021).

Contrary to the above, often suppressed empirical evidence, such as from a survey done in Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia and Botswana, indicates that approximately a third of LBQ women report forced penile sex, which renders them a high-risk group⁹¹ (see Sandfort et al. 2013). Over 18% of LBQ women in the same survey also report engaging in transactional sex, including penile sex (ibid). In another study, most self-identifying lesbians surveyed in Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe had current or former male

⁹⁰ Providing epidemiological evidence to confirm this perception in the Zimbabwean context went beyond my intention, which was to discuss how the perception affected experiences of diverse LGBTQ+ groups with HRBA operationalization. Suffice it to note that the perception reflects a bias related to the North American cultural context; however, contradictory evidence has come from other African contexts (see Awuor 2021).

⁹¹ However, important to note is that perpetrators of forced sex for LBQ women also include other women, although men are the majority perpetrators (Sandfort et al. 2013).

sexual partners (Matebeni et al. 2013). Poteat et al. (2014) reported similar findings in the case of Lesotho. Tamale (2014) also notes abundant instances of ‘corrective rape’⁹² on LBQ women (see also Ndondo, Maseko & Ndlovu 2013, Brown 2012 and Sigamoney & Epprecht 2013).

⁹² Corrective rape describes notions that often justify the use of rape to change or ‘cure’ LBQ women, hence its other designation as ‘curative rape’. It suggests that LBQ women have a ‘wrong’ sexual orientation that needs correcting (see Tamale 2014).

Table 4: Funding Focus – HIV/AIDS

SRC Project Title:	Reach	Target Groups	Brief Description Project Focus	Funding Partner	Budget for 2019
1. Hands Off	25	Sex workers in their diversity, including those who identify as LGBTQ+.	The project's focus was on justice for sex workers.	Aidsfonds	\$38 561
2. PRIDE	260	Students in tertiary education institutions, support staff and lecturers.	The goal was to "make the university a free space for LGBTQ+ students and allies".	SAIH	\$57 249
3. Bridging the Gaps	2691	Sex workers in their diversity, including those who identify as LGBTQ+.	The long-term goal is "to end the HIV epidemic among key populations".	Aidsfonds	\$131 218
4. Going the Last Mile for HIV Control	671	MSM community.	It sought to "mobilize the MSM community for the uptake of clinical HIV-related services".	PSI Zimbabwe ⁹³	\$44 898
5. Partnership to Inspire, Transform and Connect the HIV Response (PITCH)	1200	Sex workers in their diversity, including those who identify as LGBTQ+.	It addressed "self-stigma, enhanced capacity to capture evidence, agenda setting for advocacy and intensified engagement amongst stakeholders, connecting local and national groups to regional and global bodies and enabled legal and policy frameworks".	Aidsfonds	\$144 344
6. Sisonke, We Together	50	LGBTQ+ within the family and religious settings, Religious Leaders, Parents and Friends of LGBTQ+ Persons.	It sought to "create an enabling environment for LGBTQ+ persons within the family and religious settings by fostering a culture of inclusion and tolerance for diversity through creating strong family values, support systems and spaces for meaningful dialogue on rights of target groups".	Other Foundation	\$5 246
7. Sustaining and Expanding the Rapid Response and Agency for LGBTQ+ and Sex Worker Communities in Bulawayo	146	LGBTQ+ and Sex Worker communities.	It sought to "offer community members a sustainable rapid response mechanism that reacted swiftly to distress calls, documented human rights violations and offered health and legal support where needed".	British Embassy	\$18 000

⁹³ Now known as Population Solutions for Health.

8. Global Fund MSM	3362	Primarily MSM community.	The overall objective of the Global Fund MSM Project “was the provision of an environment for enhanced psycho-social support and increased knowledge on SRHR including HIV services”.	Global Fund UNFPA	\$135 385
9. Bridging the Gap	335	LGBTQ+ community.	It sought to “address HIV-related stigma within the LGBTQ+ communities in Bulawayo”.	COC Netherlands	\$33 868
10. Social and Economic Empowerment (SEE)	250	MSM and Transgender Community.	It sought “to build the capacity using the Income, Savings and Lending model, to advance SRH education and to tackle social cohesion with the MSM and Transgender communities”.	ViiV Healthcare	\$29 760
11. “Advocacy and Other Community Tactics to Challenge Barriers to HIV Services Among Gay Men in Zimbabwe (ACT)- Delayed Dignity is a Right Denied (3D)- ACT 3D.”	650	Healthcare service providers, LGBTQ+ persons and sex workers.	It sought “[...] increased awareness, sensitivity and tolerance for sexual diversity in Zimbabwe and reducing stigma and discrimination against target groups by society. Furthermore, it sought to improve the delivery of healthcare services by healthcare service providers in three healthcare facilities targeted at gay men and other MSM. Finally, the ACT 3D project sought to increase the uptake of healthcare services by target groups in select communities of Zimbabwe”.	Elton John Foundation MPACT	\$124 963

Source: Adapted from SRC Annual Report (2019:20-39).

As a consequence of the above, my observations were that the majority of LBQ activists were excluded as office- and field implementers of HIV/AIDS projects due to the perception that they were ‘unaffected’, and against a backdrop of ready availability and accessibility of HIV/AIDS funds for CSOs. As a result, in the operationalization of HRBA, gay men and other MSM experiences dominate, while in the CSOs I targeted, lesbians, bi-sexual women and transgender people's experiences are underrepresented. During fieldwork I came across activists of other identities, such as intersex people and transgenders, identifying as gay and bisexual men and other MSM to participate in gay men/other MSM HIV projects.

I also came across instances where MSM activists engaged in gatekeeping to prevent non-MSM groups from participating in gay/other MSM HIV/AIDS initiatives. Participation of these activists in MSM HIV/AIDS initiatives meant employment, per-diems, T-shirts, caps, refreshments/meals and modest reimbursements for transport, meals and other incidentals -- in other words, a source of livelihood in a country characterized by high unemployment, poverty and hunger. Nyirabikali (2016) also confirms that activists in poor countries often conceive participation in civil society activities and partisan politics as alternatives to holding a formal job, as the value of monthly monetary reimbursements and other benefits for regular participants is like a salary in some sectors. A conviction to advance the group's interests is not always the main driver of such participation (ibid).

The RMT, as discussed in Chapter 3, contends that SMOs are dependent on various types of resources, including funding, for their operations -- and for the case of SMOs in the Global South, funding from the international INGOs, given limited organizational and in-country opportunities (Engels and Müller 2019, Ellis and van Kessel 2009). The bias in funding portrayed in Table 4 above is not unique to the case of my study. Cornwall (2006) has commented on how the consensus on the urgency of the HIV/AIDS crisis as a public health threat brought about a shift, directing international funding⁹⁴ of CSO projects in the Global South towards gay men and other MSM, often at the expense of projects for LBQ women and intersex people. In light of the above, I argue that HIV/AIDS funding for CSOs has not only transformed these CSOs to be gay/other MSM-dominated, but has also not afforded opportunities for groups like LBQ women to openly operationalize the HRBA as it relates to their unique situations. I argue, therefore, that an international funding context dominated by readily available HIV/AIDS funding for CSOs has had the

⁹⁴ This shift in focus is also related to broader public health research, and other similar initiatives, which need international funding (Awuor 2021).

effect of homogenizing the experiences of diverse activists in the operationalization of HRBAs. This context has also aggravated the effects of intersectionality for LBQ women.

While a significant number of activists are females, which is more visible in the case of SRC and the collectives, I have observed that while there is a significant representation of female activists, LBQ women's voices often have less influence in the LGBTQ+ social movement due to intersectionality as it relates to marginalization. This intersectionality hinges on gender, low education and lack of international exposure. An example is the case of NeoteriQ, the lesbian and bi-sexual collective, on which donors bestow a lower priority for HIV/AIDS funding (KII with Collective staff 1- 17 March 2019).

Oberth (2014) highlights the public health 'soft' entry-level approach to HIV/AIDS as an innovative tactical 'interim' strategy for HRBAs. As the PPT's tactical innovation component makes clear, this strategy offsets powerlessness and allows activists to further their objectives. The benefits of the strategy are that toning down on HRBAs and foregrounding public health tends to make service providers willing to extend services to LGBTQ+ communities. However, Oberth (2014) has also highlighted that using a public health approach to HIV/AIDS as a 'soft' entry-level frame strategy has led to actors conventionally viewing SR-MSM as a health issue, whereby sex is viewed negatively as a source of danger and disease. I argue that the public health approach to HIV/AIDS as a 'soft' entry-level frame to SR-MSM has served to reveal the elitist domination of this group by generalizations of pro-gay men and other MSM activists, and their exaggeration of solidarity within the diverse LGBTQ+ community. This frame has also served to expose the tendencies of pro-gay men and other MSM intellectuals and activists to pose as qualified to be the voice of the entire LGBTQ+ movement, including LBQ women, while ignoring the intersecting privileges that come with being recipients of HIV/AIDS funding, males and highly educated.

Epprecht (2012) has made observations similar to my findings on the use of the public health approach as a better strategy than the HRBAs, 'gay rights' and go-slow/ 'low profile' approaches to advance human rights. I have gone a step further above to show the effectiveness of this strategy in operationalizing human rights. I have shown that the strategy brings duty bearers on board. It also contributes to the recognition of the right to health for MSM. To a significant extent, the strategy has facilitated the operationalization of HRBA tenets of entitlement of MSM as rights holders, the obligations of duty bearers in availing healthcare for MSM, and the principles of indivisibility of human rights, inclusion and non-discrimination. Nevertheless, while the strategy has been effective, I highlight the shortcomings around the intersectionality of privilege, and marginalization. Due to how the international context prioritizes HIV and AIDS funding,

I have found that the experiences of the LGBTQ+ movement with HRBA operationalization have been mainly experiences of gay men and other MSM.

6.5 Conclusion

In this Chapter, I have discussed the influence of the international funding context, revealing how ‘formal’ HRBAs regarding SR-MSM are interpreted and translated into concrete projects by Nordic INGOs. Using the case of SAIH, COC Netherlands, frameworks of queer imperialism, and partnerships, I have shown that local CSOs embrace HRBAs without overt imposition by donors using their position of power. The INGOs follow the human rights situation in Zimbabwe and therefore have a fair appreciation of the context. I have demonstrated that the notion of human rights is a high priority for local CSOs, INGOs, and their back donors, given the poor human rights record of the country. I have revealed that the INGOs anchor their interpretation and translation of human rights into concrete projects on the level of local CSOs. Beyond ‘queer imperialism’, I have shown different approaches for the Nordic INGOs, that include the ‘inside-out’ approach and the ‘locally anchored partnership’ approach. Both approaches emphasize the Nordic INGOs’ recognition that they know less than the activists in local CSOs do about their contexts, and the HRBA approaches that suit those contexts. In the next chapter, I look at how internal capacities and constraints facilitate the attainability of ‘formal’ HRBAs on the ground in the case of CSOs in the Zimbabwean context.

7 CHAPTER SEVEN

INTERNAL CAPACITIES and CONSTRAINTS

7.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I explore how capacities and constraints internal to local CSOs affect the implementation of MSM projects that draw on ‘formal’ HRBAs. In Chapter 5, I looked at how external factors affect HRBA operationalization. Zinyemba (2013) has argued that organizations in Zimbabwe face internal and external capacity challenges, which militate against their effectiveness in development work. External and internal factors mutually intertwine. External factors such as the influence of culture and religion shape the capacities and constraints internal to these organizations. Kenyon (2019) notes that internal factors such as organizational structure, levels of understanding of rights by staff members, perceptions of human rights discourse by stakeholders, and in particular those of the leader, can either facilitate or impede the adoption and operationalization of HRBA. Therefore, for adequate assessment of HRBA operationalization, researchers need to consider the various capacities of an organization because they all have a bearing on HRBAs. In exploring the influence of capacities and constraints, I use as conceptual frameworks capacity as human resources and training, and capacity as the ability to deliver (operationalize HRBAs), as well as insufficient NGOization constraints and resource constraints.

7.2 CSO Capacities

I formulated the concept of CSO capacities as part of my analytical tools (section 2.3.4) to understand my findings on how these capacities influence HRBA operationalization. I noted in that section that scholars have mapped the central ideas that accompany the concept of capacity: capacity as exclusively a human resource issue, capacity as training, and capacity as the ability to deliver (Brinkerhoff & Morgan 2010, Morgan 2006). I use these ideas to structure the discussion of my findings on how capacities influence HRBA operationalization. Although inadequate, the organizations I targeted had some of the resources needed for HRBA operationalization. The RMT, in its criticism of the social breakdown and relative deprivation theories, states that discontent alone, while necessary, is an insufficient condition for processes like HRBA operationalization (McCarthy & Zald 1973, 1977). The theory sees resources as an important cog in transforming discontent into action. However, having resources alone does not ensure HRBA operationalization. The capacity to use these resources determines the extent to which activists can operationalize the HRBAs, hence my use of the concept of capacities as an analytical tool.

7.2.1 Capacity as Human Resources and Training in HRBAs

All of the 10 interviewed SRC staff members working on MSM projects had participated in numerous 1–3 day training workshops and weeklong refresher courses on human rights. Of the 10, three senior staff members had also participated in a university master’s course on rights-based programming. I lectured the course, and all three were my students. The effort by the SRC toward developing human resources with the capacity to operationalize the approach was ongoing, as was also the case with GALZ, which had been refining the approach from the early 1990s, as shown below:

I think I have done [in an ongoing and continuous manner] almost everything, a certificate in human rights with the University of Pretoria, [a] weeklong training and [...] several workshops with our partners on human rights (KII with GALZ staff - 12 March 2019).

The SRC also deliberately trained its staff in HRBA and seconded some staff members for training at conferences and other institutions, such as universities. A staff member said:

We do [training] as part of our staff development. We constantly interrogate how we program [to be sure] if we are still in line with the HRBA. [We follow] some courses that are [already] designed. We also second [staff members] to conferences where topical issues are discussed. In addition, we encourage each other to read [...] new [and] interesting information that can help us understand more and improve on this approach (KII with SRC staff 2 - 28 March 2019).

When I further probed the staff about this training, it became clear that the SRC was making various systematic strides for its staff complement to familiarize itself with HRBA. I asked a staff member who had been with the organization since its inception how much training they had followed, and how many people had, as a result, come to appreciate the organization’s commitment to getting to know about HRBAs, and they stated this below:

I would speak [on my behalf] and generally for other staff members who have benefited. Of course, the staff complement has grown recently, and we have new staff members, but I think about seven of us [out of 20 staff members at the time of fieldwork] have been seconded to key training. Some even go on for a month [and these] discuss key aspects of HRBA and how you link that into or integrate the approach into your day-to-day running of the organization. [A] Swedish organization called RFS [ran such a training]. I know three of us attended that one-month-long training and [another] three-week course offered by the University of Toronto. [The courses looked at] integrating the human rights approach into civil society programming. [The organization also] seconded [some of us] to attend short courses offered by a department at the University of Pretoria, [the] Center for Human Rights. It has courses that speak about integrating HRBA into your programming. [Therefore], we have had great opportunities, and most of the time, when [the organization seconds] an officer [...] to attend such a course, [...] the organization [requires them] to come back and share learning with the rest of the team. [Therefore], you will find that even if I were the one going, I would come back then organize whether [in] a day or two where we stop, close shop and share the learning. This helps

us to [stay] updated and [to] see how much we can impart to the LGBTI community we serve (KII with SRC staff 2 - 28 March 2019).

In addition, the GALZ staff member at the Bulawayo office reported that staff members attend regular courses on HRBAs, and on human rights in general. The courses they attended covered various aspects of HRBAs, as revealed below:

They covered the origins of human rights, the different instruments, what they are, what they mean, what ratification means, the difference between some of the elements, some of the components like the declarations and the treaties and what is the meaning of domestication when it comes to domesticating those, what is law (KII with GALZ staff – 12 March 2019).

When I probed these participants on their view of the efficacy of these training programs, whether they thought the training had helped them, and whether they thought they could have gained some of the information about HRBAs on their own, they had this to say:

I [do not] think I would have gained it alone. I think these are important. For instance, [I come] from a background that is not social sciences per se. I [did not] know much about some elements [which are) covered within the social sciences spectrum of study. I assume that those who have done social sciences at least have more coverage of issues concerning human rights [...] than me from a public health background [...]. [Public health has] little on human rights as a component. Those training[s] then become an addition to what [I] already know. For instance, when coming from a public health approach, you depend on the scientific thing. You hardly pay attention to the issues of human rights. I have gone through [...] a short course. [It is] standard that all new staff undergo human rights training (KII with GALZ staff - 12 March 2019).

The orientation of new staff members in HRBAs also took place at the SRC and the collectives. However, I observed that most training on HRBAs was at an introductory level. The training did not explore in detail the challenges related to operationalization, and to assessing the evidence of the impact of the approach on the ground.

At GALZ Bulawayo offices, the CSO displays various SR-MSM posters pasted on the office walls. The perimeter walls of the SRC's Drop-in Center also have such posters, as do the walls of the SRC's main office. Most of these posters were made by LGBTQ+ communities themselves. The use of these posters (see picture collage below) has made many stakeholders visiting these spaces aware of SR-MSM.



The portrayal of the sexual rights of LGBTQ+ people at GALZ

Source: Author

The GALZ Bulawayo offices also had a huge billboard inscribed with the rights in the UDHR document (see picture below). However, during interviews activists did not mention the consensus instruments on sexual rights (CISR), such as the Yogyakarta Principles, as being linked to HRBAs. This was surprising given that elsewhere, LGBTQ+ NGOs have adopted, and increasingly rely on, CISR, although the governments have neither signed nor ratified these (Karlsson 2015). Some senior management seemed aware of the instruments but mentioned them only in informal conversations, and not in relation to HRBA operationalization. The above findings reveal a fair level of training and awareness regarding UN Assembly-endorsed instruments, and limited regarding CISR. This awareness is sufficient for the staff members to draw on rights instruments when operationalizing HRBAs, even if they fail to cite the particular clauses on standards, or the CISR.



Rights Contained in the UDHR

Source: Author

My conclusion is that participants perhaps preferred to rely on instruments recognized not only universally, but also by the Zimbabwean government. In legal systems characterized by impunity, such as Zimbabwe, the international instruments recognized by the government are a more reliable basis upon which activists may claim their rights. Some activists perceive using CISR as coming with certain risks. The RMT posits that perception of potential benefits and risks determines the choice of particular ways of operationalizing the HRBA in a particular context or activity; the theory shows activists as rational and, therefore, weighing the costs of social action (McCarthy & Zald 1977).

However, the RMT notes that activists do not decide these benefits and risks in isolation, as they are socially constructed (Gamson 2004). I argue that social construction allows CSOs to sensitize these activists to consider relying on CISR in their activism. I also argue that reservations about using the CISR, in favor of using only those endorsed through the UN General Assembly, are misplaced. The CISR, as provided through the RMT, are an important cultural resource in the dynamics of activism (see McCarthy & Zald 1977). Although the General Assembly had not endorsed them (at the time of my fieldwork), and many states resisted them, the CISR are an expression of the ideal without which there is little basis for sexual

rights claims. They may only be an expression, like many other progressive instruments. However, without written expressions, there is nothing on which to base rights claims. As explained by the RMT, the translation of these progressive expressions, including other widely accepted human rights protection mechanisms, depends on the active mobilization of grievances (Gamson 2004).

The staff members of the CSOs demonstrated adequate levels of appreciation for the efficacy of ‘formal’ HRBAs, and capacities related to training regarding the latter; thus, any failure to deliver the full potential of HRBAs could not be necessarily pinned on their limited exposure to ‘formal’ HRBAs. The quote below summarizes the appreciation of the efficacy of the HRBAs:

If we were not using HRBA, I [do not] know what our argument for working with the LGBTI community would be. I [do not] know what we would use to defend or to argue why we feel [it is] important to work with the LGBTI community. The HRBA, a good foundation for our work, is a holistic approach to seeing every human being as a decent human being who deserves [equal and fair treatment] by all [...]. HRBA has also helped us to strengthen our thinking around how we [...] design proper programs that are very responsive to the rights of communities [...]. If we were not using the HRBA, we would come in here and design these very nice programs on paper, but they [would] not be responding to the rights of the communities. Involving the communities in designing the programs [ensures that] we are designing programs that respond to their rights. With HRBA, we have seen the growth of the LGBTI movement in Zimbabwe. If we had not used HRBA, I [do not think our] movement would have survived the Mugabe era. We are coming from there. We have had people who have been able to stand up, voice, challenge and defend their rights in this era that we live in [second republic]. We are seeing small organizations popping up and growing. Some say [...] we want to be able to do research for LGBTI. [Others say we] are interested in training media personnel [or] we are a blogging group [...]. We are witnessing all these small groups and small collectives coming up. It shows that the voice is growing; there is deep participation. It also shows that people believe in our work, and for them to believe in it, I think [it is] the approach we use in designing and implementing our projects (KII with SRC staff 2 - 28 March 2019).

When I asked a participant what they thought was the ‘added value’ of HRBA at each stage of the project, this was the answer:

It ensures we live our talk and improve the design, project delivery and output. Achieving our results also ensures that every stage feeds into the next. Our [organizational] theory of change link[s] somehow [...] with the [HRBA]. [It helps us to] realize what we want to achieve as an institution, which rights are we riding on, and how do we ensure that at every stage these elements are not lost (KII with GALZ staff - 12 March 2019).

I asked why the emphasis was on rights, and not on needs. In responding, they said the HRBA assists in making an impact beyond areas of their operation:

With rights, there is more sustainability. With needs, if you meet the need today, you start again tomorrow, but with rights, you make sure that your community is empowered enough not to depend

entirely on the institution. If the institution close[s] today, having used the rights approach, you are sure there is continuity because our community is empowered in one way or the other through a rights-based approach. Some other partners we would 'partner' with are also familiar with these elements. So [it is] an issue of sustainability. Along the process, we address the needs [...]. We look at our strategic plan; we are shifting from direct service delivery to advocacy [...]. I spoke about someone who is in Tsholotsho [a rural area]. There is no [GALZ] office in Tsholotsho, but if we incorporate the human rights-based approach, we may even go to the levels of advocacy. If we have policy changes across the country, we can have someone who has never heard of GALZ benefiting in the [end] as opposed to addressing needs. We address the needs of particular constituencies we have access to, that have access to us, and that we meet their needs. For us, as an institution, our vision is broader. It is to see the full realization of human rights and see LGBTI people as equal citizens in Zimbabwe. Our rights-based approach [guides us on] how we then act, how we then approach, and what are the [rights] within our constituencies basically for the sake of sustainability, and to increase the people who are impacted upon (KII with GALZ staff - 12 March 2019).

The quote below shows the understanding of the efficacy of the HRBA and its advantages when juxtaposed with the public health approach:

[Suppose] you look at the public health approach closely, [it is] more about figures. It [does not] care more about the human aspect. [It is] more about reaching people who are HIV positive, [...] even if [you might be doing so in an] unethical [way]. In terms of the public health approach to some extent, there is [...] some manipulation [...] because they want to get numbers [...]. It conflicts [with the HRBA) because it [does not] give the person time to process. [It is] more medical. [It is] more about controlling the disease without considering the effects it will have on the individual concerned. If we are to test you today, we treat you. There is no time to let you process it [and decide if you want to be treated]. In the human rights-based approach, we want to let you get as much information as possible. With public health, we will coerce you to be concerned [about the] disease [so that] you [do not] take long [to be treated]. [If I am the] individual who has already been shocked [I will] not [be] too sure probably because I want to live as well, I might [...] admit to being treated straight away without taking into account what it will mean (KII with GALZ staff - 12 March 2019).

As shown in the quote below, the representative of COC Netherlands in a KII also noted a tendency to focus more on targets when CSOs use a health-focused approach:

Organizations that work in HIV/AIDS [tend to have a] very specific health focus. Often the problem with [these] organizations that are coming from that sector [is that donors have told them to focus] on service delivery or other specific aspects of the work. [Yet] they feel that is not necessarily the best way to meet the needs of their communities. [They feel that their work] should also be rights-based, [...] about empowerment, training community members on human rights, SOGIESC issues, and the basics of gender identity, expression and sexual orientation. Because donors are so [...] focused on [...] getting them to achieve the targets- so many condoms, lubricants, and service delivery in related areas, because they need the money, I think one of the many consequences has been that [donors have coerced them] to shift focus into solely prioritizing service delivery and related services (KII with COC Representative - 26 April 2021).

Plipat (2005) observed that CSOs benefit from a sense of being on high moral ground when claiming to use HRBAs. However, an essential factor that inhibits CSOs “from delivering the full potential of the [‘formal’ HRBA is] the organization’s limited knowledge of human rights and the human rights approach” (Plipat 2005:165). According to Plipat (2005:6), the full potential of ‘formal’ HRBAs is reduced because CSOs “interpret the [‘formal’ HRBA] in ways that fit their organizational [...] expertise, rather than interpreting the full spectrum of [formal HRBA] concepts”, and thereby giving the approach its full meaning. The above findings reveal that capacity does exist in the form of knowledgeable and well-trained human personnel. Therefore, ‘limited knowledge’ is not a significant factor impeding ‘the full potential of the formal HRBAs’. The findings also confirm the perspectives in the RMT that collective action, such as HRBA operationalization, is neither spontaneous nor based on uncontrolled ‘social contagion’. The quotations above indicate, as explained under the RMT, that staff in these CSOs are professionals who are neither irrational nor highly gullible to the incitation of imperialism or other ideologies, as is assumed by theories like the mass action theory.

7.2.2 Capacity as the Ability to Operationalize HRBAs

Morgan (2006) and Brinkerhoff & Morgan (2010) conceive capacity as the ability to deliver, or in the case of my study, the ability to operationalize HRBAs. In Chapter 8 I discuss particular ways by which CSOs have operationalized HRBAs. Below I discuss outcomes linked to this ability to deliver, or to operationalize HRBAs, and use them to illustrate this capacity. Various outcomes registered by GALZ and SRC, by anchoring their projects in HRBAs, elicited reactions from authorities like the banning or disruption of some of their activities. As an example, a deliverable anchored in HRBAs is that SRC in 2019 “made successful use of strategic litigation to clarify the application of the loitering law to [sex workers]” leading to a ‘massive’ reduction in arbitrary arrests of sex workers in Bulawayo -- LGBTQ+ sex workers included (SRC Strategic Plan 2019:10).

Another outcome of the ability to operationalize HRBAs is that in 2016 GALZ, together with SRC and COC Netherlands, made a joint submission to the United Nations Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review (UPR) on Zimbabwe to call attention to the challenges facing LGBTQ+ people and sex workers in Zimbabwe. As mentioned, GALZ and the Stockholm Human Rights Lab (SHRL) made another joint submission to the UPR in 2022 (GALZ & SHRL 2022). In upholding the HRBA tenets of holding duty bearers accountable, these organizations pointed out that various actors, including government officials and the police, subject LGBTQ+ people to cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment, detention and torture, often

carried out after arbitrary arrests⁹⁵. Activists, anchoring their work in HRBAs, have used various human rights protection mechanisms available at international, national and local levels, as summarized in the quote below:

The constitution is our key reference point, but we also use the existing policies within the different ministries, like the gender policy within the Ministry of Gender and the patients' charter [within the Ministry of Health. These] are some of the instruments we have studied closely [...]. We have made use of the human rights commission itself. [Therefore], [...] the human rights and gender commissions are the key local instruments that we have used. We also used the courts to seek redress for some of the issues, like when [we faced] the issues of our ['operating without'] registration and [that] of the raids,⁹⁶ we made use of the courts, and we got favorable outcomes⁹⁷ from them [...]. Internationally, we have tried to make use of the UPR process. We have always used a shadow report for each period of the UPR. We have also lobbied with the African Commission and the AU. We have lobbied SADC⁹⁸. We also try to use some of these entry points as part of the full realization of our rights within the context of Zimbabwe. [Therefore], we have tried to go to the AU to make sure that the AU is aware of the prevailing environment for the LGBTI people and maybe to try to discuss it at that level so that we could have change within the country (KII with GALZ staff - 12 March 2019).

The quote above shows that in Zimbabwe, CSOs rely on both local and international human rights protection bodies. In contexts that are less receptive to HRBA activism concerning SR-MSM, such as Swaziland, CSOs primarily rely on international human rights bodies (Kennedy et al. 2013). However, this reliance poses several issues due to its various shortcomings. I discuss these shortcomings in section 8.2.1.

The SRC also extensively used photography and video in the 'Our Voices' campaign, an outcome of its HRBA-anchored work to get LGBTQ+ and sex worker communities heard. It also provided mentorship and basic resources for newly formed LGBTQ+ and sex-worker CSOs that it housed, thus capacitating these collectives as duty-bearers. The SRC, through its various projects, like the SAIH's Promoting Rights, Inclusion, Diversity and Empowerment in Education (PRIDE⁹⁹) and COC Netherlands' Bridging the Gaps

⁹⁵ The United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), 'Universal Periodic Review of Zimbabwe 26th Session October 2016 Joint submission by: Sexual Rights Centre, GALZ and COC Netherlands' October 2016, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRZWStakeholdersInfoS26.aspx>.

⁹⁶ Findings show that "GALZ has over the years experienced unjustified raids from the Zimbabwe Republic Police and other armed but unidentified individuals... The police have on different occasions raided offices of GALZ and events hosted by the organization" (GALZ 2015: 6). In December 2014, a group of about twelve unidentified men 'gate crashed' into the offices during an event and assaulted members and robbed them of their personal belongings. The Zimbabwe Republic police raided GALZ offices twice in two weeks in 2012. During the raids some GALZ members were harassed, assaulted, and arrested. The police also raided offices in May 2010 and confiscated work equipment and materials (GALZ 2015).

⁹⁷ GALZ have many times approached the courts and won their cases; for example, after a lengthy court case the police returned the GALZ equipment and materials taken during the May 2010 raids (GALZ 2015).

⁹⁸ Southern African Development Community

⁹⁹ See Appendix 2 for a description of the PRIDE project.

programs, among others, promotes and contributes to the fulfillment and enjoyment of SR-MSM and human rights of sex-worker communities.

The PRIDE project had various activities, including support for university students researching SR-MSM, guest lectures in universities on SR-MSM, and material and equipment support for universities hosting SR-MSM researchers. Activities under the COC's Bridging the Gaps program included the U=U Campaign: (undetectable HIV in the body equals untransmittable HIV to other persons), support group meetings for HIV-positive LGBTQ+ persons, research (see picture below), quarterly 'buddy' support meetings, and the IDAHOT commemorations¹⁰⁰. The above initiatives brought the attention of the primary duty bearer, the Zimbabwe government, to the organization and the accompanying backlash.



Picture 3: Research Product and a Support Group Meeting

Source: Cover page of the same report, Picture – SRC COC 2019 Mid-year narrative report

CSOs have also imparted knowledge of HRBA in such a way that the served communities are also aware of their rights:

The community we serve is now aware of their rights and is [aware of] how they can seek redress and protection using different instruments or elements within this country. It means these empowered individuals can also stand their ground. [It] also means their lives [have] improved because [the authorities do not subject them] to unwarranted searches [and] because they can now speak for themselves. Neither can [authorities subject them] to anxiety [...]. They are empowered enough to know what is right regarding the Constitution and what is not. Some people may fail to interpret the

¹⁰⁰ See Appendix 2 for a description of these projects.

law or the constitution, but they have been empowered enough [...]. Through the rights-based approach, they can now stand and defend their ground (KII with GALZ staff – 12 March 2019).

The concept of capacity is relevant to the RMT's emphasis on the centrality of resources in analyzing such collective action as HRBA operationalization (see Edwards & McCarthy 2004). The RMT rightly states that processes like HRBA operationalization are resource-dependent collective actions. The theory asserts that an organization's ability to acquire and use resources influences collective action (see Jenkins 1983; Edwards & McCarthy 2004, McCarthy & Zald 1977). The concept of capacity explains this 'ability to use' the resources. The RMT stops at highlighting the need for resources. The concept of capacity as formulated by Morgan (2006) and Brinkerhoff & Morgan (2010) picks up from where the RMT stops, to explain this 'ability to use resources' as capacity, i.e., as a potential condition. This means that concepts like capacity as human resources, training, and the ability to deliver easily fit into a revamped RMT. In the next section, I discuss the influence of internal constraints on HRBA operationalization.

7.3 Internal Constraints

In this section, I discuss findings on the influence of internal constraints on HRBA operationalization in advocacy for SR-MSM. I also discuss insufficient NGOization-related constraints and resource-related constraints.

7.3.1 Insufficient NGOization Constraints

In the discussion below, I rely mostly on the role of the SRC in mentoring collectives, that is, nascent social movement organizations. My conceptual framework on NGOization as a component of CSOs aids the analysis in this chapter (see section 2.3.7). As the GALZ Bulawayo chapter did not play such a role during my fieldwork, I could not include it in the analysis below. Zinyemba and Zinyemba (2013) argue that organizational development, i.e., for the case of my study, organizational professionalization, bureaucratization and institutionalization, is one of the major internal challenges facing many CSOs. Some reasons for the above are: the founder member syndrome, whereby founders of CSOs claim perpetual entitlements to proceeds from the CSOs; a bureaucracy that does not allow for quick decision-making; and poor corporate governance. Observations made during fieldwork corresponded with these views regarding the case of collectives coming to the SRC for mentorship and the hosting of funds - read NGOization for the case of my study.

I observed that donors were reluctant to entrust funds directly to collectives still undergoing NGOization, i.e., institutionalization, professionalization and bureaucratization, as they believed their financial and accountability systems needed further strengthening. The above aligns with Szántó's (2016) observation

that NGOization facilitates a form of ‘governing from afar’ due to the push for upward accountability to donors whom the NGOs depend on for survival and legitimacy. NGOization -- particularly professionalization, bureaucratization and institutionalization -- although it attracts funding, which is critical for HRBA operationalization in funded donor projects, makes CSOs less accountable to their constituencies, thereby affecting these communities’ broader struggle for rights (ibid). Currier (2012b) argues that such funding has tendencies to deradicalize, co-opt CSOs and create systems of donor dependency. James and Malunga (2006) put it differently, stating that donor funding strengthens the secretariat, thereby weakening members.

During fieldwork, I observed that the SRC carefully and, with relative success, dealt with the NGOization process, including the drawbacks of insufficient NGOization. NGOization frees the organization from the constraint of the founder-member syndrome, a phenomenon arising out of the informal organization of work and operations, which obliges an organization to extend continuous benefits to founder members of an organization. As I explained in section 2.3.5, Sachikonye (2007) highlights the founder-member syndrome as a constraint. Most founder members had exited the organization without claiming permanent entitlement to proceeds from the organization.

The SRC had two other heads of secretariat who had served the organization at different intervals during the study period. There were also changes at the senior management levels and within the staff complement. Most founding board members had also stepped down from the Board of Trustees. In my day-to-day visits to the SRC and later in formal engagements as a board member, I never encountered a scenario where founder members, either at the secretariat level or at the board level, would pester the organization for continued benefits after they stepped out of the organization. Such milking of the organization would potentially remove resources meant for HRBA advocacy for SR-MSM.

Before NGOization, some collectives operated through informal coordination, with little or no oversight. Amateurs led them. In interviews, and contrary to notions in literature (see Masunungure 2011, Sachikonye 2007), they indicated that their lived experiences, and those of their friends and partners with violations of their SR-MSM motivated their desire to come together and establish the collectives (KII with Collective staff 1- 17 March 2019, KII with Collective staff 3 - 17 March 2019, KII with Collective staff 4- 17 March 2019). According to Masunungure (2011) and Sachikonye (2007), such nascent organizations do not anchor their existence in their domestic constituencies at formative stages. The primary motivation is to get donor funding, not the passion and interest to fight for their SR-MSM (see section 2.3.5).

In line with Sachikonye (2007) and Masunungure (2011), I identified amateurism as one of the internal challenges faced by collectives. During fieldwork, I observed that these amateurs were passion-driven visionaries, good at initiating the formation of these organizations and networking for this purpose, but less experienced in resource mobilization, and in organizing and managing the collectives so that they could grow past the point of informal coordination. They had limited experience in handling the NGOization process, including professionalizing various financial, managerial and organizational functions. These functions cannot find root in informally coordinated CSOs.

For Bromideh (2011), this is common in nascent NGOizing organizations, and the lack of experience of passionate founding individuals often leads to a lack of vision and strategic planning. In such transitioning grassroots organizations, and some older CSOs, activities and decisions are person-centered, focused on founder member/s or the domineering head of the secretariat or manager/s, and often ad hoc (ibid). In agreement, James and Malunga (2006: 52-3) state:

In any [CSO] in its early years of life, it is difficult to disassociate organizational performance from the performance of the leader. As such, the performance of the [leader reflects] the performance of the [CSO]. Most of the CSO networks have appointed young, dynamic activists as coordinators, often in the initial stages [...]. This 'youth policy' has been good from the perspective of raising the profile and visibility of the advocacy networks [...]. Once a secretariat is established, the performance of the [CSO] will depend strongly on its leadership, more than [on] the members. The leadership in CSO networks is still highly dependent on a small number of key individuals [...].

The other staff members and stakeholders who expect fair, respectful, or equal treatment get frustrated due to the preferred work culture, leadership/management style, and the tone at the top, which they see as 'toxic' (Bromideh 2011).

NGOization has many advantages that enhance various prospects of HRBA operationalization, such as the participation of MSM in national processes. The state prefers to work with NGOized CSOs such as those registered by law. I observed that this aspect of NGOization, together with the convergence of various actors on HIV/AIDS, has led to closer proximity and collaboration between CSOs and state institutions. These state institutions include NAC¹⁰¹, state universities, public hospitals and line ministries, with CSOs having a strategic opportunity to contribute to the official decision-making process. However, my observations during fieldwork were that this has been focused on efforts toward ending HIV/AIDS as a public health threat. NGOized CSOs such as GALZ and SRC take part in NAC-coordinated activities, including the key population forum, and contribute to the formulation of various national policies on HIV/AIDS. I argue that

¹⁰¹ National AIDS Council

this proximity to the state has the danger of political co-option and control of CSOs, resulting in their lack of independence, conformism, depoliticization of issues and toned-down militancy (see section 2.3.7).

The NGOization dilemma posits voluntarism and activism on the one hand, and careerism and professionalism on the other (Zimbabwe Institute 2008). As I observed during fieldwork, the dilemma is that, upon their formation and in their early years, collectives often rely on the passion and motivation of volunteers who may not possess professional qualifications and are inclined towards activism. However, as the collectives register significant growth, they tend to require ‘qualified’ staff, particularly at the management level. Career growth, and not passion, drives these ‘qualified’ staff members. They become more technical and bureaucratic in managing the organizations. This often results in a scenario where the collectives that transform themselves into CSOs through NGOization are sequestered from the issues and the people they claim to represent.

These ‘qualified’ staff members, except for those founding members who take it upon themselves to further their education, are often not members of the LGBTQ+ communities, although they claim to be allies. Their primary motivation is benefits, and not lived realities with SR-MSM violations or those of close friends or acquaintances. They are the first to leave the organization when funding for staff benefits dwindles, and if they stay, they are likely to engage in ‘creative accounting’ to cushion themselves. They are reluctant to embrace downward reviews of such benefits as salaries, and often threaten to take the litigation route when aggrieved on matters of personal benefits. The litigation route poses an existential threat to the CSOs in that if courts award damages to the activists, authorities will raid the bank accounts or attach the property of the CSOs to offset the damages.

The SRC has transformed itself into an NGO and countered the drawbacks of lack of organic linkages to the communities they serve by housing the collectives, which, ironically, were themselves in the process of NGOization through mentorship by the SRC. While the SRC model of playing an NGOization role works and has various advantages that include prospects for HRBA operationalization, I argue for an alternative model that allows for NGOs to remain embedded in the issues and the people they claim to represent after these collectives gain autonomy, through having membership-based grassroots structures. This will also enhance downward accountability to, and authentic representation of, rights holders. During fieldwork, I observed that in models where one organization exercises mentorship over the other, the mentored collectives risk having their governance and management roles seized by the mentoring organization and ending up with limited power, voice and agency.

Some coordinators of collectives also believed that the mentorship model did not always foster complementarity. They said the mentorship model favors the mentoring organization. According to these coordinators, the model allows the mentoring organization to outcompete mentored collectives in bids for funding, and to implement if it deems necessary, or win bids on activities similar to those of the collective, but without the participation of the collective. Another drawback was confusion about the duties and responsibilities of project team members and those of the mentor organization. I observed that some representatives of the collectives often became frustrated. They complained that some of their mentors at the SRC did not always provide adequate advance information about expectations and requirements in the implementation of projects. These representatives then got the blame for inadequate adherence to sound corporate governance or programming, monitoring and evaluation requirements. I argue that while, on the one hand, sufficient NGOization in general, and SRC's NGOization role in particular, facilitates prospects of HRBA operationalization, on the other hand, it leads to the hegemony of the management, hierarchy and red tape, which then stifle the realization of SR-MSM by means of HRBA activism.

In playing out their NGOization role, the SRC identified some gaps in the collectives, and they engaged donors to strengthen corporate governance among them. The donors, however, were slow to respond to the collectives' capacity gaps related to corporate governance. As a result, some of the collectives still had to kick-start various processes towards NGOization, including the induction of the board of trustees, the formulation of organizational policies, and the strengthening of internal financial and accountability systems. This adversely affected their operationalization of HRBA; the lack of standard operating procedures and other policies resulted in inconsistencies in applying HRBA tenets like participation and accountability.

In line with the PPT and the RMT, the findings above contradict the stereotyped portrayal of social movement activists as being consumed by fanaticism or erratic behavior. These findings reveal that activists who exhibit cognitive liberation often undergo a transformative process, facilitated, for instance, through mentorship, as exemplified by the role played by the SRC in NGOization. Consistent with the principles of the PPT and RMT, I contend that engagement, rather than fanaticism, serves as the driving force behind the formation of a pro-SR-MSM movement and the development of activists, allies, and cognitive liberation. I mentioned how NGOization facilitates support for the LGBTQ+ movement from state entities like the NAC, public hospitals, and universities. The implications of NGOization for the operationalization of HRBA have been delineated above. I now turn to the implications arising from resource constraints.

7.3.2 Resource Constraints in HRBA Operationalization

In this section, I rely only on my observations as the major source of the empirical findings presented below, and often generalize my findings to all the CSOs. This is deliberate, in line with the do-no-harm principle, as some constraints are sensitive and reflect weaknesses in individual CSOs or staff members. I include specific sources of data and specific CSOs only where I believe they will not infringe on the do-no-harm ethical consideration (see section 4.10). I ground my analysis on the RMT's conceptual frameworks on constraints (section 2.3.5) and CSOs (section 2.3.7).

The RMT highlights the significance of resources, like funding and personnel, for collective action like HRBA operationalization. In line with the RMT, HRBA operationalization in advocacy of SR-MSM succeeds when CSOs and activists with grievances can mobilize enough resources. The RMT importantly places resources at the center of such processes as HRBA operationalization; hence the relevance of its analysis of how resource constraints affect HRBA operationalization. I also highlighted the scarcity of resources, particularly funding, as an aspect of the conceptual frame of CSO constraints (section 2.3.5). GALZ and the SRC had relatively better funding than did the collectives. However, according to Hart (2016), CSOs, in general, have received little funding from Global North governments, international foundations, agencies and other mainstream institutions, compared to CSOs in other sectors, such as those supported through humanitarian aid. This also has a bearing on benefits to individual activists:

Nevertheless, social justice activism in Africa, particularly around sexual and gender rights, is not an obvious route to personal success [...]. At the same time, the financial rewards are usually much less than equivalent positions in either government or the private sector (Theron, McAllister & Armisen 2016: 2)

My interlocutors acknowledged the lack of resources as a constraint towards HRBA operationalization, as illustrated below:

The HRBA [...] is helpful, but you know an institution [also has] limited resources [and as a result] limited reach to people. [This] means [that] only a few people ... can have access [vis-à-vis] the overall population of the LGBTI. It means [it is] only a drop in the ocean. It means a number of them are not benefiting because they cannot have access to us (KII with GALZ staff - 12 March 2019).

As I observed during fieldwork, the reality is that these CSOs often are unable to meet their annual budget for activities to carry out their strategic plans. And for collectives, the funding situation, as I mentioned above, is even worse. During the fieldwork period, collectives like NeoteriQ, IAZ and ARMZ would operate for significant periods with passion, using personal and community resources rather than being driven by

budgets derived from donor funds. Because fewer donors were willing to fund LGBTQ+ activities, which led to stiff competition, activists invested too much of their ‘free’ time in searching for resources and compiling proposals, often working very late hours and spending time at the office on weekends. Not all staff members shared a willingness to work outside office hours; some argued that such choices often strained their social lives. However, they had little choice, as employment contracts depend in most cases on acquired grants. In addition, as James and Malunga (2006) note, the scarcity of donors and inter- and intra-competition in formulating grant-winning proposals gives too much power and authority to those individuals whose proposals win the grants. This means it weakens those individuals who are not winning grants.

While there is clearly a lack of resources for LGBTQ+ CSOs, the irony is, as I observed, that the yet-to-be-sensitized providers of services to these CSOs -- resource persons, some rights holders, and local politicians -- perceive LGBTQ+ CSOs as heavily resourced. Perceptions like ‘black people are poor - white people are rich’, ‘the Global South is poor - the Global North is rich’, and ‘living conditions for the ordinary people in the post-colonial era have deteriorated to colonial era levels or worse’ promote the irony. People who believe LGBTQ+ CSOs are well-funded do so because they believe their activities are connected to the Global North and wealthy white people.

I observed that the CSOs lacked longer-term multi-year grants, whereas most donors preferred short-term grants, most less than or equal to one year and very few going for up to three years. Zimbabwe Institute (2008) noted that amateurism and poor strategy compelled some CSOs to operate on short-term projects characterized by spontaneity and militancy. Although this earns CSOs much-needed publicity for fundraising purposes (Zigomo 2012), the transient impetus quickly dissipates until the next activity.

The World Bank (2005) explains that, due to most CSOs’ weak internal capacity, and tendencies of corporate governance malfeasance, most donors are reluctant to finance long-term and very large projects implemented by any one organization. Theron, McAllister and Armisen (2016) also report “stories of mismanagement, favoritism and outright corruption” in the LGBTQ+ CSOs. Donors emphasize efficiency in using the few resources provided through short-term grants. This is important, given that the RMT notes that efficiency in resource utilization compensates for other missing resources (McCarthy 1996).

For James and Malunga (2006), the donor preference for short-term quick results grants to HRBAs has led local CSOs to develop mostly survival-oriented short-term projects, focused on service provision, rather than projects on advocacy, whose sustainability and impact are difficult to demonstrate to donors. I also

observed apprehension about the uncertainty associated with ongoing grants, as well as disenchantment and demotivation among staff of LGBTQ+ CSOs' after 'legitimate' expectations of grant renewals were not fulfilled.

This tends to compromise the sustainability of the impact and viability of the CSOs. In most cases, funding lapses before changes in structures, institutions, attitudes, behaviors and practices have taken root in the communities served by the CSOs, which continue on their own without funding; this affects the sustainability of their impact. Because the CSOs have to lay off staff they have recruited for particular grants, due to a lapse in funding, they lose their viability. I observed huge financial gaps arising when donors did not renew grants after they had lapsed; or when they did renew, they reduced the size of the grants and delayed disbursement of the funds. Victoria (2019) made similar observations regarding CSOs in Nigeria. Huge financial gaps, disenchantment and demotivation affected the prospects of HRBA operationalization and led to the operationalization of 'light' versions (see Chapter 8).

I mentioned in section 6.3 that CSOs rely mostly on funding from intermediary INGOs. My observation, later augmented by my board membership, was that most of the funding by intermediary INGOs involves very small grants, a little above US\$ 100,000. These small grants have the same effect as short grants on the sustainability and viability of CSOs as described above. Funding from the Zimbabwe government, for example through NAC, is insignificant, and very few corporate firms are willing to extend any funding to the CSOs. James and Malunga (2006) state that it is difficult to obtain significant government funding for local CSO projects, let alone to influence policy, given that the work of CSOs demands government accountability regarding (unmet) human rights.

For Akindele, Ayoola and Ameen (2017), government funding of local CSO projects is not a healthy phenomenon, as it breeds loyalty of CSOs to the government. If Global South government funding breeds loyalty of local CSOs to their governments, it follows that Global North government funding of Global South local CSOs, directly or through intermediaries, also breeds Global South CSO loyalty to Global North governments. The RMT also sees these actors as more accountable to their donors than to other stakeholders (McCarthy & Zald 1977). This has led Boadi (1996) to argue that local CSOs in countries like Nigeria are proxies of the interests either of their local governments or those of Global North donors, and have more in common with political than with civil interests. Hence, in my conceptual framework (see section 2.3.7) I problematized notions of conceiving of CSOs as being independent of either the state or politics.

During fieldwork, I also found many donors reluctant to fund core and operational costs, preferring to confine their funding to project activities. Few donors were willing to fund identified capacity gaps in the CSOs – gaps related to costs of: formulating organizational policies; acquiring organizational tools like cloud-based monitoring systems and financial management systems; organizational assets like self-owned office premises; and support of monitoring and corporate governance activities such as board processes. Contrary to their roles as explained in the RMT, in some CSOs, board members of these organizations also often become sponsors. They do pro-bono consultancy services, meet costs related to their stay in the town while doing organizational work (if they come from outside), and fund their participation in various board processes like meetings, strategic planning workshops, and annual operational reviews, among others. The RMT exclusively ascribes the role of financing CSOs to donors.

The CSOs often exclude core costs, like supporting board processes in budgets of proposed projects to donors, and if they do, these are often the first to be cut out of these budgets when the donor asks CSOs to revise the budgets downwards. In other words, while lack of funding contributes to the implementation of ‘light’ versions of HRBAs, poor budgeting on all facets by the CSOs also contributes to difficulties in operationalizing the ‘formal’ HRBAs. In line with this, James and Malunga (2006) note that poor budgeting results from hurried proposals, and from budgets made without consulting the relevant stakeholders, such as board members. Poor budgeting, as it relates to exclusion in budgets of costs of board processes, could also result from a calculated intention to cripple the effectiveness of the board or its oversight role on the management. This often happens when management wants to derive undue personal benefits from the organization at the expense of other stakeholders. The CSOs are also reluctant to justify the core costs or take a stand when donors refuse to fund these costs.

Another resource constraint faced by local CSOs concerning HRBA operationalization is a lack of personal capacity, especially among the collectives. The collectives themselves acknowledged that they had limited personal capacity. I observed that the collectives found it difficult to attract and retain qualified personnel, particularly staff members with postgraduate degrees; they also found it hard to provide comprehensive career development training opportunities to develop the competencies of staff members, due mainly to funding constraints. I made observations, similar to those of Bromideh (2011), that increasingly in local LGBTQ+ CSOs, the presence of ‘volunteer’ workers who get only per-diems or allowances, but still work as fully employed staff, causes tension between volunteers and other staff.

Funding constraints also often translate to low salaries, or their absence. As a result, the level of qualifications, competencies and capacities in these organizations is deficient, and there is a glaring mismatch between job roles and the qualifications of the individuals performing those roles. Some staff members of collectives found it challenging to perform mundane tasks related to their jobs, like writing proposals and reports. In addition, some staff members, having attained qualifications through career development support from these organizations, went on to greener pastures. The World Bank (2005) supported the above findings, noting that smaller organizations are not able to compete with the salary levels of larger CSOs, intermediary INGOs, UN agencies and international development agencies; hence qualified staff, while working for the smaller organizations, are on the lookout for vacancies in the well-resources entities. In other words, donors who should be capacitating local CSOs by providing adequate funding for salaries are draining personnel capacity.

I have observed that high turnover among staff and board members is a challenge that occasionally threatens organizations, and results from a lack of funding for staff remuneration and support of board processes. I have, in the section above, emphasized the importance of passion as the primary motivating factor for activists. However, passion and loyalty alone do not determine the willpower to stay in an organization; it is necessary to pay staff according to the value of their positions, qualifications and skills. The CSOs had difficulties retaining, in the medium to long-term, professional and skilled staff members. The little or no funding support to board members, either because few donors are reluctant to fund board processes or due to poor budgeting by the secretariat as described above, strains relationships -- on the one hand between donors and board members, as donors insist on boards playing their oversight role, and on the other, between staff and board members, as staff members get frustrated in trying to get cooperation, on non-dispensable board roles, from incapacitated boards. James and Malunga (2006) observe that because CSOs fail to retain experienced and qualified board members, they can neither respond to nor engage with issues that become too technical and complex, often leaving them to secretariat staff.

There was a time when the SRC faced a bleak future and high staff turnover at the management level of the organization, as described in the quote below:

In 2017-18, there was a time when we lost three senior managers from the organization[:] the Director, the Programs manager and the Financial Manager. At the same time, [...] those are the key people who guide and make sure that our everyday programming is [underpinned by] HRBA, and as a [fundamental] principle that should guide our work. If you lose those [occasionally], you have lost an immediate supervisor who can say this is how we should be doing things. We have managed as an organization because we have constantly held these conversations as a team and not allowed the conversations to remain with management. We managed to pull through, and I think

from where we are now, we [do not] even remember that we had staff turnover because programs have managed to run smoothly and continuously without any breaks (KII with SRC staff 2 - 28 March 2019).

The SRC was also dealing with a similarly bleak future at the time of the conclusion of my fieldwork, when several board members had to leave before the end of their terms, partly due to a lack of resources for supporting board processes. Some board members, out of frustration, felt that the management at the SRC was weaponizing the support of board processes, withdrawing it to cripple oversight so that management would have no checks and balances. These board members saw developments around lack of support for board processes as bound to lead to corporate governance irregularities that could soil their names, and hence they either resigned, or stopped participating without resigning. Incapacitation of boards due to lack of support for board governance processes often led to slippages in governance and management functions; as a result, the secretariat came to lead and dominate governance processes, like formulating strategic plans and organizational policies.

In literature, and as I observed in the case of collectives, small CSOs struggle with hiring skilled staff for tasks that require technical fundraising, legal consultations, accounting experts and communication matters (FRA 2018). In the Zimbabwean case, this also applies to large, older CSOs. GALZ holds HRBA refresher courses “twice yearly because of staff turnover issues” (KII with GALZ staff - 12 March 2019). Later as a board member, I witnessed high attrition at the board level. I have seen CSOs drastically reduce the size of their staff, and some may likely shut down or exist only as briefcase organizations due to lack of funding. The foregoing observations imply that at both board and secretariat levels, most of the CSOs have individuals who lack the requisite qualifications to effectively perform the duties and responsibilities that come with their positions. This compromises HRBA operationalization as it relates to SR-MSM and service delivery to marginalized rights holders. For the donors, it means inefficiency in utilizing millions in taxpayer money from Global North countries conveyed as donor funds to CSOs in the Global South.

7.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I examined how capacities and constraints internal to local CSOs implementing MSM projects affect HRBA operationalization. I have shown that CSOs have relatively inadequate resources and relatively adequate capacity regarding the operationalization of ‘formal’ HRBAs. I have argued that limited capacities do not lead to the implementation of ‘light’ versions of HRBAs, nor of ‘formal’ HRBAs; however, constraints do. I reveal these constraints as related to insufficient NGOization and lack of resources. The findings in the chapters above have underlined the impracticality of ‘formal’ HRBAs for

projects of CSOs in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. In the following chapter, I discuss my findings regarding ‘light’ HRBAs operationalized by local CSOs.

8 CHAPTER EIGHT

OPERATIONALIZING LIGHT VERSIONS OF ‘FORMAL’ HRBAs

8.1 Introduction

In the above chapters on empirical findings, I have described the volatile political context, difficult international funding context, and challenging internal capacities and constraints as factors that make the operationalization of ‘formal’ HRBAs impractical on the ground, thus leading to the operationalization of ‘light’ versions. In this chapter, I present findings on how local CSOs operationalize these ‘light’ versions of HRBAs in MSM projects in two regimes. In the first and second republics, there are no discernable differences in how local CSOs operationalize HRBAs. This is partly because the uncertainty, fragility, volatility and unpredictability of the Second Republic Government of Zimbabwe (SR-GoZ) have more often made the operational environment of local CSOs similar to that of the First Republic Government of Zimbabwe (FR-GoZ).

I base my analysis on assessing how CSOs apply different and evolving tenets of ‘formal’ HRBAs. My analysis focuses on HRBA operationalization processes, and on the resultant strands of HRBAs that emerge from these processes. This is important, given the tendency in the literature to focus on the policy-level application of HRBAs, and to emphasize theoretical arguments about outcomes of ‘formal’ HRBA operationalization without paying much attention to field-level operationalization, and how the process differs from context to context (Piron & Sano 2016). My analysis helps to shift attention from theoretical arguments about outcomes by demonstrating three ways the approach is usable on the ground. On the ground, the process shapes the outcomes. Above I have mentioned other approaches that activists use alongside the ‘light’ HRBAs. These include the public health approach and *Ubuntu*. Epprecht (2012) and Oberth (2012), as mentioned above, see the public health approach as an “interim” approach to HRBAs.

8.2 Different HRBAs in Project Implementation

In this section, I present findings on how ‘light’ HRBA discourses in implementing projects that advocate SR-MSM, differ from ‘formal’ HRBAs. I found no universally accepted consensus on the operationalization of HRBAs. All these three ways below, i.e., HRBA as the key guiding principle, HRBA as rights rhetoric and HRBA as a toolkit, fall outside and beyond ‘formal’ HRBA discourses as framed in literature.

8.2.1 HRBA as Key Guiding Principle

The CSOs operationalize the HRBA as a key guiding principle, philosophy or reflexive approach that shapes organizational culture, norms and values, but not necessarily through mainstreaming its various tenets. The reflexive approach means that HRBAs arise within these organizations, and activists operationalize them without apparent external imposition. This is against the backdrop that human rights are a priority for the local CSOs, intermediary INGOs, back-donor governments, foundations and private institutions.

The notion of rights as a high-priority goal is implicit in local CSO policies and documents, and in the donor-guiding proposals and reporting templates. The nomenclature of SRC, as Sexual Rights Centre, illustrates its prioritization of human rights, particularly sexual rights, from its inception. The INGOs advertise calls for proposals already tailored to address various tenets of HRBAs, implicitly or explicitly. A participant, whom I asked whether donors request that CSOs use the HRBAs, said the following, revealing the implicit nature of how INGOs achieve the translation of HRBAs into concrete projects:

In responding to the questions in those templates, we state that HRBA will guide us, and in activities, you see that they prioritize human rights, but they [do not] spell it out specifically that you have to follow HRBA or whatever approach (KII with SRC staff 5 - 27 March 2019).

A representative of COC Netherlands had this to say when I asked whether their funding of partner CSOs is only on condition that they uphold human rights:

[We integrate] the human rights-specific elements [...] into the different aspects of theories of change of the [...] programs. In the current program that we are doing, you could say that human rights [are linked] to lobbying and advocacy. One of the pathways is influencing laws and policies [...]. We do not force them to work on influencing laws and policies because one organization may want to focus more on community work, community organizing and empowerment events. [Nevertheless], other organizations are much better and more [able] to do the typical human rights work with lobbying and advocacy. It depends on the organization or group and their mandate, [...] experience and [record of accomplishment] (KII with COC Representative - 26 April 2021).

The representative of COC Netherlands also revealed that their back donor, while having expectations regarding fulfillment of certain human rights indicators, understands that these could be addressed using ways of working other than those laid down in HRBA frameworks, as explained below:

Of course, [there are several] human rights indicators [...] we need to fill in. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs framework we are working on is a lobby and advocacy framework. It is very much advocacy-driven. We are thankful that the Ministry understands that lobbying and advocacy are much more than traditional human rights work (KII with COC Representative - 26 April 2021).

Early in 2021, SAIH sent out its 2022 – 2026 funding proposal application template, referred to in the above chapters; CSOs had to return this by June 1, 2021 (see SAIH 2021c). This template presented the inclusion and recognition of LGBTQ+ people in academic positions as a priority. This followed a baseline survey (see McEwen 2020) and numerous reports by CSOs and the media, highlighting the exclusion of LGBTQ+ people in academic functions.

I asked a participant in KIIs if they purposely integrate HRBA tenets when performing their activities, and in other phases of the ‘project life cycle’, and they replied as follows:

No, we [do not. It is] there at the back of our minds. We have learned about it, but when implementing, we [do not] necessarily say we met the HRBA. I [would not] say we do that deliberately (KII with SRC staff 5 - 27 March 2019).

Another participant used words like ‘guide’ and ‘frame’ to denote their operationalization of HRBAs as a guiding philosophy, as shown in the quote below:

I think maybe from a simple point, my understanding of HRBA is that it is a guide or [...] frame around the use of the rights within our programming or in formulating interventions that relate to the constituency we serve (KII with GALZ staff - 12 March 2019).

This quote aligns with notions in the literature that some individuals consider the integration of HRBA tenets as a process, but not an ultimate objective of their programs (see D’Hollander et al. 2013).

Based on my observations during fieldwork, HRBA as a key guiding principle means that CSOs frame organizational goals and objectives, and not necessarily systematic implementation arrangements, in compliance with HRBA principles and international human rights standards, among other HRBA norms (see Bussoti & Maia 2017, D’Hollander et al. 2013 and Yasmin 2009). I observed that CSOs apply HRBAs to guide programming processes in which international human rights frameworks, standards, instruments and human rights protection bodies are key features.

Almost all the targeted CSOs were at least using the HRBA in this manner, and some also use HRBAs in other ways explained below, depending on context. I observed that the CSOs draw the values of HRBA as a guiding philosophy from the UN General Assembly endorsed resolutions, as discussed in section 7.2.2. In that section, I observed how in closed contexts such as Swaziland, CSOs rely mostly on international human rights bodies (Kennedy et al. 2013).

The disadvantages of relying on international human rights bodies include that these bodies are not easily accessible to activists on the ground due to various constraints, including funding, as I highlighted (Katsui

2008). In addition, appealing to the standards of distant international human rights protection mechanisms presents challenges, given that people in some contexts have limited access to international human rights bodies (ibid). The interface between different legal systems governing access to entitlements also complicates the recognition and claiming of human rights. Furthermore, reference to international frameworks becomes an end in itself, and not a means, when the aim is not engagement, but reference to a declaration. Moreover, showing the impact of international frameworks in local settings is difficult (ibid). Nyamu-Musembi and Musyoki (2004) and Hickey and Mitlin (2009) note that scholarly literature criticizes HRBAs for being elitist, given their reliance on the international human rights framework, and on professional and legal knowledge. However, Kabeer (2002) maintains that this way of operationalizing HRBAs, which stipulates an internationally agreed set of norms derived from international standards and backed by international law, provides a stronger basis for citizens to make claims on duty-bearers, and hold them accountable to enhance their access to human rights.

8.2.2 HRBA as Rights Rhetoric

The use of rights language is the second way of HRBA operationalization, and CSOs that adopt this way of using HRBAs strategically use rights language in their work. Thiel (2019) defines such an approach as rights-framed, and not an HRBA, because such an approach does not implement actual HRBA components. Most participants believed that the rights language used in templates automatically suggests human rights as a priority area for the targeted intermediary INGOs. CSOs use HRBAs to address the donor's priority interest in human rights whether or not they explicitly state that they are doing so (KII with SRC staff 7 - 28 March 2019). For the participant below, other approaches automatically disqualify the proposal:

For me, the rights language in templates specifically requires one to use the HRBA. You will rarely find a proposal drawing from a faith-based approach in responding to the template questions being successful or a charity approach [...]. [Some] faith-based approaches label LGBTI people as sinners as a core value, promoting stigma and discrimination against LGBTI people. Most proposal templates will have questions on addressing stigma and how you do this from a faith-based approach. (KII with SRC staff 7 - 28 March 2019).

The participant stated that CSOs' use of HRBA tenets is influenced by the frequent use of human rights principles, protection mechanisms, instruments and rights language and donors' rights consciousness, as expressed in the language of proposal and reporting templates.

My analysis above demonstrated the centrality of the human rights narrative in the 2022 – 2026 template of SAIH. The language of the template emphasizes that proposal frameworks must contain elements (among

these, human rights tenets) that the INGO needs to report to back donors. This shows that back donors also prioritize human rights:

SAIH is developing a global theory of change. [The INGO], as part of the application to NORAD, [will] formulate a specific, contextual problem analysis for each country [...]. SAIH has developed an outline of a global results framework for [...] 2022-2026. For this, SAIH is accountable to our back donor, NORAD. Together with our overall theory of change for the program, it is the main tool used to develop annual reports for our donors. The global results framework outlines key expected results for the entire program (in seven countries) and must have a logical connection to all partner results frameworks. As such, each partner's results framework must be designed with a clear link to the impact, outcome and outputs of the global results framework so that your key results can be brought from your framework and to the global level (SAIH 2021c:13).

Findings from reviewed documents show that the main funder of SAIH is the Norwegian government, through NORAD. The other funders are the Norwegian students in higher and tertiary learning institutions, through the National Union of Students in Norway (McEwen 2020). This is in line with notions discussed in the literature review section that Global North governments promote development through their international development agencies (Yamin & Cantor 2014); in the case of Norway, this is NORAD. These agencies then, in some instances, work with their sub-grantees such as the INGO SAIH (in the case of NORAD). The table below details the funding chain and the accountability dynamics for the INGOs, and their back donors.

Table 5: Funding Chain

INGO	Back Donor	Back-back Donor	Accountability Chain
SAIH	NORAD	Government of Norway, Norwegian students in tertiary education students	Local CSOs report to SAIH. SAIH reports to NORAD. Accountability mechanisms include periodic narrative and financial reports, audits and external evaluations
COC Netherlands	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Government of The Netherlands	Local CSOs report to COC Netherlands. COC Netherlands reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accountability mechanisms include periodic narrative and financial reports, audits and external evaluations

Source: Created by the Author.

While the back donors and the INGOs do not insist on particular rigid ways of operationalizing HRBA, they still have a keen interest in ensuring that local CSOs are accountable, and that they are accountable to their back-back donors. I capture this in the quote below:

The partners report to us. We report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. If partners need [more] than a certain amount, they [must] do an audit [...]. We need to do audits for the programs that we do. The accountability is through reporting and auditing. We have strategic dialogues with the Ministry every six months approximately. We talk about the program's progress, the challenges and all that (KII with COC Representative - 26 April 2021).

The quote below also corroborates this:

We do very comprehensive financial and narrative reports, [reporting] on our partners' frameworks and on the additional gains or victories that our partners have achieved. We also have to report on human rights issues when we apply for funding, which we do every four or five years. In addition, we do organizational assessments, [...] meant to assess the organization's capacity and where we can support if needed. We do country partner visits with NORAD now and then (KII with SAIH Representative – 11 June 2021).

Some literature projects a counter-narrative, not supported in my findings, of structural and cultural racism, residues of colonialism and imperialism, subtly implanted in donor project documents (see Peace Direct 2021). This literature regards the human rights narrative in donor project documents as a racist imposition, making use of the power that comes with ownership of the resources. For Peace Direct (2021), language is one of the principal areas through which structural racism is manifested.

Language creates for donors and recipients perceptions that the projects are neutral, and that local communities need a ‘savior’, or that donors are ‘experts’ in human rights; hence the need for the placement of ‘field experts’ in the South, or regular donor compliance visits (Peace Direct 2021). The thinking is that these ‘experts’ lack knowledge of the local context but have the donors' trust. Notwithstanding these notions from the literature, my analysis above reveals that human rights are a priority for local CSOs. The INGOs neither had country offices in Zimbabwe nor placed their ‘experts’ to mentor local CSOs in human rights, but, even in their compliance visits, appreciated that local CSOs knew the context better.

I participated in some events (workshops, meetings, training and conferences) that would have allowed activists to mainstream different HRBA principles, but I saw the implementers concentrating on HRBAs only as rights rhetoric. This, in some instances, was due to the type of audience present. In general, activists in activities that involved traditional, religious and political leaders thrived on merely rhetorical use of an HRBA. In these activities, activists would use rights language without using the other HRBA tenets as their

reference point. In some activities, the implementers used rights talk to set the tone, and depending on the audience's receptiveness, the two HRBA discourses discussed in this section were in line with rights talk. In some instances, and when the audience was not receptive, implementers premised the entire activity exclusively on rights talk, which was important, given that language matters.

However, I observed a growing trend to combine and alternate these various approaches in activities, based on the sensitivity of the issue at hand, the knowledge of the implementers on a particular issue, and the perceived dangers and risks to implementers in using one approach over the other and the attitudes of the audience. While rights talk was the natural fallback approach for these CSOs as human rights organizations, in some instances the implementers abandoned all HRBA discourses, including HRBAs as rights rhetoric, in favor of public health and needs-based approaches.

A participant stated that gatekeepers themselves, in some instances, deprive them of the opportunity to rely on rights rhetoric when they at “times ironically deploy the language of rights to also claim the rights of heterosexual people” to heterosexuality and heteronormativity (KII with SRC staff 5 - 27 March 2019). In section 2.3.6, I discussed HRBAs and sexuality as always quintessentially linked toward promoting SR-MSM. However, the finding above shows that, in some cases, gatekeepers also employ HRBAs, particularly rights rhetoric, to push back and oppose SR-MSM activism. This shows that when stakeholders link sexuality and HRBAs, it is not always for the purpose of promoting SR-MSM, as is suggested in the literature (see section 2.3.6).

I observed that HRBA as rights rhetoric often turns every activity, project and program that targets the LGBTQ+ into a rights initiative. This also borders on loose usage of the term ‘rights’, without pointing to strategies and mechanisms in other HRBA discourses that have the potential to address deeply entrenched issues faced by the LGBTQ+. In this way, although HRBA as rights rhetoric presents itself as the magic fix to these deeply entrenched issues, as a vague notion without reference to the other discourses, it holds little potential and remains a dream.

In much of the literature, the normative justification for using human rights language is that it places values and politics at the heart of development practice (Hausermann 1998). However, I argue that this is also the weakness of using human rights language. In a context like that of Zimbabwe, reference to internationally agreed norms and international law is an admission of working towards promoting foreign SR-MSM (see section 5.2), which have been projected to be related to regime change and Western values, as argued below:

It is not only politicians but also ordinary people as well whom [the] Mugabe government's stance has [succeeded in convincing] that human rights are Western. Therefore, you [are] viewed as promoting Western agendas the minute you start to use human rights language. While comparatively [it is] a very powerful approach because it includes [many] aspects, I think a combination of approaches would work depending on the context and the participants in that activity because things differ from context to context. For example, in our Zimbabwean context, there are [huge] animosities at the political level where a development practitioner needs to adapt to suit the situation so that the beneficiaries [sic] ultimately get services. Sometimes, we have to let go of the HRBA and give alms, that is, the charity model, or meet the needs, such as handing out food and non-food items, which is a needs model (KII with SRC staff 8 - March 2019).

More particularly, human rights language as it relates to MSM is itself projected as unconstitutional and, therefore, illegal, as depicted below:

When you start using the human rights language, most people think you are challenging some of the laws within Zimbabwe. You [are] challenging the constitution. Human rights are not challenging the constitution. They are there to enforce it, but the challenge comes when interpreting the Constitution. They interpret it differently from the HRBA¹⁰², [it is] all about interpretation. For instance, during the parliamentary visit [under the ‘Meet the KP’ parliamentary program¹⁰³] we had on Saturday, some of the parliamentarians walked out when they were doing their debrief sessions because they felt that the issues that were being highlighted went against them and the constitution (KII with SRC Staff 4 - 27 March 2019).

Another notable strength of using human rights language in literature is that such use leads to the re-politicization of development discourses (Chabal 2012, Hamm 2001 and Manji 1998). In the Zimbabwean context, this is at times the greatest cause of failure to realize rights for MSM, as captured in the quote below:

In the Mugabe era, it was better to say to clinicians ‘that this individual is presenting with this kind of health problem; therefore, he/she needs medical attention; than to say: ‘This individual is presenting with this kind of health problem because of how they have sex, he is gay, or she is lesbian, and therefore it is his/her right to receive medical attention’. With the first approach, he/she will get medical attention, which is the most important thing, whereas, with the second approach, [they will tell you] that “President Mugabe and other leaders have said LGBTI people have no right. We will get in trouble if we concede that LGBTI people have rights”. Therefore, the second approach becomes useless in ensuring that this LGBTI person has received medical attention [...]. The first approach results in the right to health for the individual realized. The second approach, ironically, the rights-based approach, results in the [denial of the right to the] individual (KII with SRC staff 7 – 28 March 2019).

These findings align with observations made in the literature that human rights language risks being misunderstood as pushing political and partisan interests, or as promoting interests of political organizations

¹⁰² This arises, perhaps, in that the constitution of Zimbabwe criminalizes LGBTQ+ related rights like same sex marriage, yet HRBA provides for the protection of such rights.

¹⁰³ Parliamentarians who are champions of KP inclusion were pivotal in organizing and facilitating this program.

disguised as CSOs (Manji 1998), and as attaching political goals to development programming (Chabal 2012, Hamm 2001). Given the finding above, Jayasuriya (2012) concedes that many societies support tenets used in other non-HRBA discourses, such tenets as needs, compassion and alms – derived from needs-based, *Ubuntu* and charity models respectively. In sensitive contexts, by using the actual HRBA tenets such as that individuals have an inalienable entitlement to rights, and by disregarding the use of tenets like needs and compassion from other non-HRBA discourses as a proxy for HRBAs, implementers could cause negative reactions, as shown in the quote above.

According to Broberg and Sano (2018), the HRBA should ideally lead to the empowerment of socially disadvantaged groups, but the finding above shows that the re-politicization of development, by implementers using politically charged rights language, seems to do the opposite. The quote reveals that not only human rights language, but also the use of particular terms that denote same-sex sexualities, could lead to denial of services to MSM. Stakeholders, like chiefs and councilors collaborating with the CSOs, were also not able to rely on HRBAs as rights rhetoric.

One chief noted that the use of human rights language leads to controversies, which in turn result in labeling and removal from positions of power:

In Zimbabwe, we have, over the years, realized that politicians consider human rights and development [...] as having no relationship. [They label you] the moment you want to tell them; these two have a mutually reinforcing relationship. [Labelling is] followed by [removal] from being a chief and losing all the benefits of being a chief. For them [the politicians], human rights are about confronting the ruling government on a regime change agenda. Development is about complementing government efforts, mostly in humanitarian crises. Many times, most of us chiefs, and I am sure others [as well], find it better to avoid the human rights language if we want to push through our issues in government (KII with Chief 3- 17 June 2019).

The above-quoted chief, who is in his 50s, presides over a rural district with over 25,000 people where his homestead is located. However, he frequented Bulawayo weekly, and I had the opportunity to have informal conversations with him, and other chiefs in their mid-30s to late 60s, who shared similar sentiments on various social platforms. The quote also reveals that the interface between development and human rights language has not yet gained traction in Zimbabwe.

The consequences are worse for those linking SR-MSM with national development, as authorities consider these rights to be in the realm of politics, as one councilor remarked. This councilor was a member of the local Bulawayo city council, and as is the case with most councilors at the time of fieldwork, belonged to an opposition political party. He had this to say:

For most of us in politics, the moment you use the rights language when talking about the LGBTI people, you are speaking politics, not development. You are speaking politics in the sense that the human rights language, when used in relation to LGBTI people, is viewed as more a subset of politics than it is of development, given that politicians have said LGBTI do not have [particular] rights (KII with Councilor 3 – 23 June 2019).

These findings align with observations by Broberg and Sano (2018) that in certain contexts, to talk about human rights is to talk about politics, power, obligations of duty bearers and entitlements of rights holders. The workshop with traditional and religious leaders revealed that the politically laden word ‘rights’ could potentially alienate allies because of its association with regime change politics in Zimbabwe, unlike words derived from other discourses: needs, compassion, alms -- among others. This becomes more obvious in cases where potential allies are, in fact, not willing to meet the human rights of LGBTQ+ communities.

Given the limitations associated with the political rights language in HRBAs, some participants reported that they end up using other approaches without even knowing it:

We do, but we [will not] be aware that we are now combining [different approaches]. In our work, our value is our client; as I said earlier, some of the HRBA aspects, we talk [about them but] we might not be practicing them. From time to time, we sit down and ask ourselves if we are serving the clients from a human rights base (KII with SRC staff 5 - 27 March 2019).

Drawing from the above findings, I argue that human rights rhetoric has become a paradox: on the one hand, it gives CSOs the first steps in talking about tenets found in other HRBA discourses. On the other hand, the continued use of such rhetoric is less effective given its association with regime change politics in the Zimbabwean context. Demands for rights-related entitlements, and pressure on the government to meet its obligations, are not what politicians want to hear from CSOs. I argue that this has meant that CSOs in contexts like Zimbabwe must focus on the health and reproductive health rights of LGBTQ+ communities, and refrain from emphasis on citizenship and political rights. It has also meant that when it comes to addressing SR-MSM that go beyond health and reproductive health rights, CSOs have used HRBAs as a guiding principle and as a toolkit (discussed below) without foregrounding them in human rights language, and without calling them HRBAs.

8.2.3 HRBA as a Toolkit

A third way to operationalize HRBAs is to use them as a toolkit from which to pick various components (tenets) and use them as best practices in various stages of project life cycles, as organizations and implementing staff see fit, in line with their capacities and with the political context. These HRBA tenets include *inter-alia* principles, instruments, standards, obligations of duty-bearers, entitlements of rights

holders, normative elements of inclusion, and rights protection mechanisms. These HRBA principles, or tenets, are the key tenets operationalized by CSOs, as shown below:

When it comes to components of HRBA, [their] principles have been fundamental to what we do as an organization. Because we are an LGBTI community-led organization, we can identify the LGBTI community members, bring them into the space and teach them about their rights so they can claim them, and [that is] the principle of participation. [We also help them] to build [an] understanding of what it means not to claim their rights [...]. We have empowered them [: that is] empowerment now, and that is another principle of a human rights-based approach. We have empowered the community to claim those rights, speak for themselves and defend them and the principle of non-discrimination and equality. So as a community, we speak around these principles so that when they go out there and claim their rights, they understand that no one deserves to be discriminated [and] everyone is equal before the law (KII with SRC staff 2 - 28 March 2019).

The sentiments in this section demonstrate that CSOs and activists appreciate and embrace the normative values of HRBA discourses -- even though politicization, instrumentalization and political opportunities diminish the full potential of the discourses as framed in literature. In the subsections below I discuss how the SRC and the collectives, depending on the context, allow for mainstreaming some of the HRBA tenets in programming. On the tenets presented below, I was able to gather adequate data by means of participant observation in the projects and activities I followed. While my interlocutors could easily have taken components from the HRBA toolkit, they did not agree on what combination of these components was adequate to constitute an HRBA, in their operational context.

8.2.3.1 Mainstreaming Entitlements of Rights Holders

The SRC and the collectives had various activities within various projects (see Appendix 2, Activity 3, 5, 6 and 7), providing opportunities for mainstreaming entitlements of rights holders. According to the literature, entitlements allow rights holders to have rights, claim rights, and hold the duty bearer accountable, but also oblige them to respect the rights of others (Boesen 2007). The SRC and the collectives also developed tools to mainstream rights holders' entitlements, including the checklist (Appendix 2, Activity 6) and the pocket guide for the health worker. Activists used the client checklist to check which rights service providers met, and which they violated, in healthcare facilities like city health clinics, Mpilo Hospital and United Bulawayo Hospitals.

The checklist also assessed client satisfaction with healthcare services. The CSOs used it to hold these duty-bearers accountable during monthly feedback meetings at the SRC. Given that the foregoing is important if the HRBA is to have an effect, through its focal persons at the respective institutions the SRC managed to persuade service providers to attend the meetings. The organization had in each hospital a focal person,

who served as a health practitioner. This focal person assisted in mobilizing the other healthcare service providers for monthly feedback meetings. The healthcare service providers and representatives of collectives reviewed the anonymously completed checklists. In monthly feedback meetings, the SRC proposed actions to address areas in need of attention.

Various interview respondents also attested that they were mainstreaming the entitlements of rights holders in various stages of the project life cycle:

When we do our planning or at any stage, be it at initiation, implementation, or even at the design stage, we make sure that [...] we are taking into cognizance [...] human rights. How [the project] will respond to entitlements of our constituency. At every stage of the project, we check if that stage responds to the entitlements of our communities (KII with GALZ staff - 12 March 2019).


Furthermore, analysis of various SRC publications and project documents reveals that they specify various entitlements of rights holders, affirming that LGBTQ+ people are entitled to rights, to claim their rights, and to hold duty-bearers accountable (SRC Best Practices 2019). These documents serve as a data source for proposals for future funding, and as baseline data for other research projects. As I discussed in Chapter 5, while the context under the FR-GoZ made it difficult to mainstream entitlements, this situation greatly improved during the SR-GoZ.

8.2.3.2 Mainstreaming Obligations of Duty-bearers

The SRC and the collectives had various activities related to various projects, allowing for mainstreaming of duty-bearers' obligations (see Appendix 2, Activity 6, 7). These targeted the government as a duty bearer, and also the SRC and the other CSOs as duty-bearers. I observed that GALZ, the SRC and the collectives performed extremely well as duty-bearers with regard to all three obligations: protecting, fulfilling, and respecting human rights. Concerning meeting the obligation to fulfill, findings from reviewed documents show that under the ACT 3D project, MSM clients had to know about the various health services provided by healthcare centers through the SRC and the Enhanced Peer Mobilizers (EPMs). The SRC selected these EPMs from collectives (SRC Best Practices 2019).

Other obligations, given the challenges around stigma and discrimination, included: 1) imparting to LGBTQ+ people information, knowledge, and skills about access to health in ways that are not stigmatizing and discriminating; and 2) influencing other duty-bearers to observe their obligations through changing their practices, behaviors and attitudes. The foregoing was achieved through sensitization workshops for government hospitals (see Appendix 2, activity 11), city health clinics, and government department representatives, and through focal persons (SRC champions) working in these institutions to persuade

members to participate in the workshops. In addition, the SRC offered reference pocket guides for healthcare service providers, describing their obligations; see picture below.



Picture 4: A Tool on Obligations of Duty-bearers
Source: Author

I observed that mainstreaming these obligations was made possible in the fragile and volatile political context of Zimbabwe by the SRC's use of the national response to HIV/AIDS as an entry-level frame for rights-based discussions around SR-MSM (as discussed in section 6.4). In addition, it was facilitated by their non-partisan and non-confrontational approach, and by developing good working relationships with various duty-bearers. In developing these good relationships, the SRC rides on its own other national and local programs and platforms.

In reaction to the national response to HIV/AIDS programs and platforms, the CSOs demonstrate their good intentions in SR-MSM advocacy work by complementing efforts that address goals shared in the fight against HIV/AIDS by various stakeholders, government entities such as NAC, representatives of line ministries, state universities and public hospitals. In these platforms, the SRC and the collectives sometimes use self-reported stories of MSM to demonstrate their lived realities and expand stakeholders' thinking regarding sexual rights and sexuality. For example, members of LGBTQ+ collectives shared their own lived realities when parliamentarians, under their 'Meet the KP program', visited the SRC offices in March 2019, and during meetings of religious and traditional leaders in 2020, as well as in various meetings with health service providers. This has also worked towards evaluating the language used by stakeholders who tend to

regulate and stigmatize MSM already largely discriminated against. Often, the same stakeholders promote such language, and the shared platforms where lived stories are shared help to check derogatory language and introduce alternative, affirming language.

Cornwall, Corrêa and Jolly (2008) also observed the usefulness of breaking the silence on sexual rights. They stated that activists can achieve this by opening more spaces and using positive language. They can also achieve the above by fostering alliances that take those working in sexuality beyond the restrictions posed by different stakeholders' views on issues like identity politics, and by re-modeling existing platforms and institutions to suit local realities. What is important is that, notwithstanding the volatile context and its limitations on rights-based approaches used by CSOs to push various duty-bearers to meet their obligations, how the SRC and the collectives addressed these obligations contributed to the overall objective of reducing stigma and discrimination within healthcare settings against MSM. They adapted their approaches toward the obligations of duty-bearers, suiting them to what was possible within the volatile context of Zimbabwe.

8.2.3.3 Mainstreaming Principles

In the literature, and as discussed in preceding chapters, common HRBA principles include participation, inclusion, accountability, the rule of law, indivisibility, equality, non-discrimination, interdependence, interrelatedness, universality and inalienability (Bussoti & Maia 2017, Dang 2018). Interviews with staff reveal that the CSOs consider mainstreaming these HRBA principles, to the extent made possible by available funding and political opportunities, as one of the most effective ways of operationalizing the HRBAs. For some participants (SRC staff 2 – 28 March 2019, staff 4, collective staff 2 and collective staff 3), HRBA operationalizing meant operationalizing the principles. The quote below sums up the views of various interviewees regarding the operationalization of HRBA principles in all the stages of the project life cycle:

When talking about the project planning stage, we [...] sit down and think about what principles we can use. We do not exclude the voice of the LGBTI [people]. They are already involved [; that is] a principle of Human rights, in all the stages, be it review or when we are implementing. When we come just to sit and reflect on [...] the program in the monitoring stage, the voices of the LGBTI are also there [...]. Accountability [...] as a key principle [also entails] how the programs are running financially. We speak [to the LGBTQ+ communities] about how much funds we received for this project to run, and this is how we intend to divide the money. We do have that. We hold annual planning meetings every year, and the annual meeting[s do not] only speak of the activities; we also speak about the budget lines attached to those activities[,] and community members are represented; they are included in those meetings, and [that is] accountability to me (KII with SRC staff 2 - 28 March 2019).

These principles are complementary, although they can be applied separately (Dang 2018). The thesis uses two of the six principles to demonstrate how they are operationalized. These two, discussed in detail below, are participation and accountability. I have selected these two because, in many instances, the CSOs received relatively adequate funding to operationalize them, and the national HIV/AIDS response facilitated political opportunities for their operationalization.

Participation and Inclusion

That the principle of participation and inclusion is operationalized in the project identification stage of projects with specific funding for such, is well established. Regarding the project identification stage, ACT 3D project documents, for example, reveal that the SRC, working with the collectives, conducted meetings involving open dialogue with healthcare workers, as captured in the extract below from a research report:

During these conversations, the SRC was picking the challenges they faced, including attitudes and beliefs that healthcare workers held and limited knowledge in understanding LGBTI health issues or unmet human rights [...]. The dialogues helped in designing a sensitized curriculum for them. Participation in project identification as a best practice was also revealed in that both MSM clients (rights holders) and the Healthcare service providers (duty-bearers) actively participated in the crafting of objectives (SRC Best Practices 2019:11).

The CSOs operationalized the principle of participation beyond the ACT 3D project, as shown below:

We do allow [...] participation in all projects. We usually hold coffee morning [meetings] where we receive feedback on any activity we have implemented and where [we share] ideas for future projects. Participants [in the coffee morning meetings] are inclusive of sex workers and members of the LGBTI community. We have mini-group sections where people talk. [It is] more like a catch-up session for them. From then, we build on the conversations we hear daily [...] when we convene as [an] organization (KII with SRC Staff 4 - 27 March 2019).

Other participants also confirmed this. For example, a participant stated that they formulate project ideas in consultation with rights holders:

When generating ideas for the project, we consult our target [rights holders]. We find out from them what they want and then infuse those ideas within the concept note or the project proposal. So, one of the first things that the HRBA has assisted us with is the participation of the LGBTI community. [Therefore], we are saying it has helped us build their critical consciousness in understanding [their identity] and rights (KII with SRC staff 5 - 27 March 2019).

The same participant stated that rights holders, who are the primary stakeholders, are involved practically in all stages of the project life cycle:

At concept note, we involve them, and in the implementation, we involve them. Even when we do evaluations, we involve them. We have representatives of the target [rights holders whom we involve, and] not everyone [...]. Their evaluation feeds into the next round of project calls or proposals we make (KII with SRC staff 5 - 27 March 2019).

The above findings regarding the SRC and the collectives contradict assertions by Cornwall and Pratt (2010) that vulnerable and marginalized people simply rubber stamp pre-approved decisions in the name of participation; these findings point to the active involvement of the LGBTQ+ people in project formulation. The principle of participation and inclusion was also pivotal in the project design stage. Using the example of the SRC's ACT 3D project, findings from reviewed literature reveal that:

The major HRBA best practice identified at this stage [project design stage] was the participation of both MSM clients and the Healthcare service providers [...]. This [...] included facilitating clients' participation in coming up with activities that match/address the identified needs;[and] facilitating the participation of clinicians and other [healthcare service providers] in coming up with activities that match/address the identified needs (SRC Best Practices 2019: 11).

The collectives play a pivotal role for the SRC in operationalizing the principle of participation and inclusion. An SRC staff member stated that “the space here is creative; we strive on creativity, on project writing we sit together as a team, and throw in ideas as the whole organization including the collectives” (KII with SRC Staff 4 - 27 March 2019). In an interview, a staff member of one of the collectives also appreciated the role played by the SRC in providing a space for them and their communities:

We would meet in social spaces as LB¹⁰⁴ women. We always discussed the need for an organization that specifically looks at issues of LB women. We had no idea what we should do to form an organization. We approached various people and organizations to help us. We went to [name of organization withheld for ethical purposes], but we felt we were not getting the support we were looking for, and it became complicated when some of our members felt that the environment was not LB-friendly. [Therefore], after the new Director at SRC, we approached the organization. We felt at home here. We have received support in many areas, including registering and fundraising. We have not registered the organization yet but hope to register it this year or next year (KII with Collective staff 4- 17 March 2019).

In March 2019, although they were the link between the SRC and the communities, the majority of staff members in the collectives did not yet have funding and, thus, steady salaries. They were thus operationalizing the principle of participation and inclusion voluntarily, by only receiving out-of-pocket allowances, as shown below:

¹⁰⁴ Lesbian Bisexual

The collectives are the voices of the community members. We are supporting [the collectives] with technical [knowledge. They are not on the salary payroll]. These are just community members who decided to start their own thing (KII with SRC Staff 4 - 27 March 2019).

While in the literature, facilitating participation and inclusion in various stages of the project life cycle is important for strengthening the most vulnerable, the hard-to-reach, and the excluded (see Destrooper 2016), my findings show that it is also important for CSOs if they are to remain relevant and viable as organizations:

The principles are fundamental to our work, guide our work and are the pillar of our work. The minute [we] as an organization live out community involvement, which is the participation of our communities, we have lost it. The minute we even forget [participation], we take power away from them, and eventually, our voice speaks for the community instead of the community speaking for themselves. Those who support our work are interested in our voices and the voices of the communities. [Therefore], this is a core principle that guides our work and issues with accountability. As an organization, we want to remain accountable to our communities (KII with SRC staff 2 - 28 March 2019).

Findings from reviewed documents show that operationalization of participation was a prerequisite for achieving the objectives of various projects. For example, the first sub-objective of the ACT 3D project was to increase awareness, sensitivity and tolerance for sexual diversity in Zimbabwe, and reduce social stigma and discrimination against rights holders by the end of December 2019 (SRC Best Practices 2019). In another study by the SRC, participants were of the view that:

The problem of MSM stigma and discrimination is multi-faceted because it has many drivers. These drivers, findings point out, range from myths about the MSM and the broader LGBTI community, lack of information, lack of political will to end the rights [violations] at stake, and lack of support and interest from the community and national leaders, among others ... This multi-faceted problem of stigma and discrimination would require multi-sectorial approaches in addressing it (SRC Best Practices 2019: 16).

The CSOs thus operationalized the principle of participation and inclusion by means of multi-sectorial approaches. The reviewed documents and the KIIs reveal that the SRC, working with the collectives, targeted various stakeholders to address the abovementioned multi-faceted problem through multi-sectoral approaches. These stakeholders included healthcare service providers, as well as funding and collaborative partners. Various activities and platforms were utilized to engage these stakeholders from multiple sectors toward a multi-sectorial approach in addressing the abovementioned multi-faceted problem. These activities and platforms included quarterly multi-stakeholder feedback meetings, various policy-making platforms focused on access to health for MSM: such as the National Key Populations Forum, and other activities that provided various stakeholders with information, education and communication materials.

For some of the projects, [let us] say for equality among LGBTI people [,] we have in terms of participation as in whom we invite to the space if there is an event; [let us] say the upcoming one: the International Day against Homophobia and Transphobia. We ensure that a certain portion of the number, for example, if we are inviting 300 participants, we ensure that we invite an equal number [from] all the different groups in the LGBTI community (KII with SRC Staff 4 - 27 March 2019).

According to Kemp and Vanclay (2013), participation and inclusion should be meaningful, free and active; and activists should make it a priority for everyone to have the right to participate in decisions that affect their human rights. During fieldwork, I observed that CSOs have managed to live up to these notions of participation and inclusion, as expressed in the literature. I also observed that participation could be fruitful if the implementing organizations were able to do away with bureaucracy and centralized systems.

The above findings focused on how CSOs have ensured the participation of LGBTQ+ communities in their organizational processes and in seeking reproductive health and rights. This is primarily because fieldwork did not provide many opportunities for data collection regarding the participation of LGBTQ+ communities in political processes like political campaigns, as well as various trending hashtag movements against corruption, economic meltdown, public demonstrations, unrest and elections, among many other such processes. All the CSOs and almost all the MSM that interfaced with me refrained from such political processes. Not only did they avoid talking about these processes on behalf of their CSOs but also, they avoided talking about the same in their capacities. My findings show that for MSM, participation in political processes and freedom of association with political movements is not a right most can enjoy. In line with the PPT, the political context did not allow opportunities for MSM to engage in these rights. This could be among the lingering effects of homophobic rhetoric by politicians in both opposition and ruling political parties, and entrenched homophobia in some of these movements. Mashininga (2021) asserts that the homophobia of Mugabe's era still haunts LGBTQ+ individuals.

Accountability and Rule of Law

Since around 2013, concerns about accountability in CSOs have increased in Zimbabwe, partly due to corporate governance failures that have led to the closing of some CSOs (NANGO 2013). For my discussion of the findings related to this principle, I draw on Slim (Slim 2002). I examine how the CSOs operationalized performance accountability -- accounting for outcome, impact and attribution. I also look at voice accountability -- accounting for the veracity (can it be proved?) of what they said, and accountability as it relates to the authority (from where you derive your power to speak -- do CSOs speak *as* the LGBTQ+, *with* the LGBTQ+, *for* the LGBTQ+ or *about* the LGBTQ+?) behind their words.

The reviewed documents reveal that in operationalizing performance accountability, initiatives included researching the SR-MSM that are susceptible to violations. They also included identifying corresponding rights holders and duty-bearers, and rolling out the most relevant projects that address these violations, simultaneously targeting both rights holders and duty-bearers. SRC Best Practice (2019) reveals that CSOs used tools like the problem/objective tree analysis in mapping the rights susceptible to violations, and most of these rights are linked to stigma and discrimination.

Findings from KIIs reveal that the mystery client tool (Appendix 2, Activity 7) was an innovative tool designed by CSOs to ensure accountability. It also allowed CSOs to relay feedback to healthcare champions, who would then act on identified issues:

Using the mystery client scenario, we also developed tools to measure whether our sensitization training created positive results. We would send some EPMs posing as clients into these [health] facilities [...] They [would be] on a mission to assess, and they would present as gays, lesbians and transgender with various health conditions to assess the quality of service and then give us feedback, which we would share through a group that we called Healthcare Service Provider Champions. [We selected] the champions [...] from all these [health] centers of excellence we had trained. We would then share the feedback of the mystery clients with these champions with the hope that they would then give back the feedback to the facilities for improvement of services (KII with an SRC staff 2: 28 March 2019).

The use of the champions proved to be an effective strategy. While the quote above refers only to champions in healthcare centers, the CSOs extended the strategy to institutions like universities with which SRC collaborated.

During feedback meetings, champions would share notes on how they could improve service delivery to clients. They would also report to colleagues at their workstations about areas needing improvement concerning service delivery. In a feedback meeting, one of the champions reported having discussed some of these recommendations with the management of their institution, and that the latter had adopted these suggestions to enrich their nurse training programs. I observed that EPMs are always readily available to offer prompt and appropriate support, like accompanying clients to healthcare institutions (see Appendix 2, Activity 5). Their response to instances where clients needed post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) was quite rapid: they were able to give all the necessary support to clients within the 72 hours prescribed for PEP.

Borrowing from Slim's (2002) insights on voice accountability of CSOs, I observed that in all targeted CSOs, most stakeholders self-identify as LGBTQ+, and hence I regard them as *speaking as*. In organizations such as GALZ, the Bulawayo office, and the SRC, I observed that around 75% of staff

members self-identify as LGBTQ+. All staff members of the collectives self-identify as LGBTQ+. Almost all primary stakeholders of GALZ and the collectives self-identify as LGBTQ+. SRC has almost equal representation of primary stakeholders who self-identify as LGBTQ+ and those who self-identify as sex workers. Many of those who self-identify as sex workers also concurrently identify as LGBTQ+. Professionals who self-identify as LGBTQ+, sex workers, people living with HIV/AIDS, or allies of these groups dominate the boards of all the targeted CSOs.

The SRC, although it was operationalizing speaking as a form of voice accountability in its own right, is also working very closely with collectives that represent lesbians, bisexual women, WSW, gays, other MSM, transgenders, gender non-conforming individuals, and Intersex people as separate and unique groups, and thus speaks with their consent, as shown below:

When it comes to mobilizing or coming together as a team to develop a proposal, we get insights from [LGBTQ+ collectives]. They are more in touch with the communities they serve because SRC serves sex workers and the LGBTI community, but ARMZ, ZIMAHA, NEOTERIQ, and TREAT each have a specific constituency that they serve (KII with SRC Staff 4 - 27 March 2019).

In this manner, SRC is operationalizing speaking with voice accountability, and the ‘speaking as’ form of accountability. This has been important for the SRC, given that some of these separate and unique groups do not have adequate representation at the staff level, due to staff turnover and balancing of skill sets in CSOs where certain skills are not easy to find among the LGBTQ+. All targeted CSOs were operationalizing the ‘speaking as’ and the ‘speaking with’ forms of accountability, and none operationalized the ‘speaking for’ form of voice accountability.

I observed that the ‘speaking for’ form of voice accountability has issues regarding legitimacy in the eyes of various stakeholders. The MSM I interacted with dismissed most CSOs (which I did not target in my study) that rely on this form of voice accountability as masquerading to get donor funding. This partly explains the lack of donor-, and other stakeholders’, support for programming in these CSOs, as the majority can only lay claim to ‘speaking for’ or ‘on behalf of LGBTQ+’. This also explains why GALZ, SRC and the collectives (and others that I did not target) have been able to attract many of the LGBTQ+ funders, as they are regarded to have more legitimacy in engaging in LGBTQ+ programming by dint of being able to speak as and with the LGBTQ+. The authority aspect of accountability found expression in that the majority of staffers in CSOs were LGBTQ+ and had openly come out as LGBTQ+. The experience of most staffers with LGBTQ+ issues was direct.

Based on my observations, operationalizing accountability as a principle also meant holding other duty-bearers, particularly the government, accountable for their actions. I also observed that CSOs devised various tools and processes to operationalize the principle of accountability as it relates to various government institutions, particularly public health institutions. In this way, the principle helps to address individual and community grievances, contributes toward good governance and the fight against corruption, and provides an image of transparency at both CSO and community levels (see United Nations 2017). However, one participant noted the limitations of CSOs in operationalizing the principle of accountability, and others, as shown below:

As an institution, and maybe with our partners, we try to ensure these are fully integrated. [However] as you know, when we implement our activities, we [do not] implement them in isolation, and our members do not live on an island. We may be integrating but within our small space. Our constituency and our stakeholders have lives beyond our activities. We may have these principles, but the game changes when they step out or return to their families. When they go back to their workplaces, the game also changes. We realize that for the realization to be meaningful or for these principles to be real, you find that, to an extent, they are not as real as we want them to be real. We are just a CSO [...] with little influence on policies within the country, but we try to relate to those principles (KII with GALZ staff – 12 March 2019).

A participant observed that, while in essence, they integrate principles into the projects, there are no standardized ways of doing so (KII with GALZ staff – 12 March 2019). I observed potential in the standardized application of the abovementioned principles, and others. Using the principle of non-discrimination and equality as an example – and as much as differences in Zimbabwe’s political systems, cultural settings, and contexts limit the operationalization of this principle, leading to a scenario where MSM are often marginalized – interlocutors expressed that it was possible to apply the principle systematically. This could be through deliberate and systematic reference by CSO project staff to the implications of the principle in all instances when authorities discriminate against LGBTQ+ persons. For example, activists can apply the principle when they explain what it entails in instances of deliberate and systematic exclusion of LGBTQ+ persons from access to medical care. While this is achievable, sometimes such deliberate and systematic use of HRBA tenets results in backlash, or as already noted above, the denial of services to MSM; hence activists assess opportunities, and use as proxy, tenets from other non-HRBA discourses in sensitive contexts.

When opportunities allow, activists can achieve the standardized application of actual HRBA tenets whenever LGBTQ+ persons are disregarded in organizational, community and national processes. They can also achieve it by empowering LGBTQ+ persons to participate effectively in decision-making so that

they recognize their capacity to effect change. I observed that the potential for standardized ways of operationalizing these principles was diminished, as explained further in the section below, by various factors: fear, risks to the safety of the implementing staff, and lack of due diligence, bordering on lack of capacity.

8.3 Beyond ‘Formal’ and ‘Light’ HRBAs

In Chapter 7, I revealed that CSOs appreciate and embrace the normative value of ‘formal’ HRBAs as framed in the literature. In this section, I argue that assessing risks and benefits bound by the political context and internal capacities renders the translation of ‘formal’ HRBAs a matter of theoretical possibilities rather than praxis.

The context and capacities diminish the full potential of the ‘formal’ HRBAs, as shown in the quote below:

As much as [HRBA] is very good on paper, it is very good within a particular protective context. We also [don’t live] on an island. When you are to take [HRBA] outside your set space, you consider the Zimbabwean context regarding human rights broadly, how they are [...] violated within the country. [Now] then specifying [human rights] to be LGBTI issues [is often tantamount to] inviting a fire to yourself. [In some contexts], you [may not] want to be too aware of their rights [...] because there is a failure to understand human rights within the spaces we visit. As a country, our human rights situation is not the best. Therefore, it [is] even worse for sexual minority groups such as LGBTI. [However,] the approach is ok, but [it is] not [always] user friendly in the sense that the environment or the [country] itself is [...] not the best. [The state does not] respect human rights [and is] the perpetrator of violations [...] Therefore], to an extent, you have to compromise. You have to let go of what you know is wrong [from an HRBA perspective], sometimes for your safety (KII with GALZ staff – 12 March 2019).

The quote above is instrumental in revealing the poverty of ‘formal’ HRBAs in volatile contexts. It shows that the Zimbabwean context makes it impossible to implement various HRBA tenets, such as instruments, standards, normative elements of inclusion, rights holders’ entitlements and duty-bearers’ obligations. For example, when it comes to obligations, the quote portrays the state as a violator instead of a duty bearer, yet ‘formal’ HRBAs project the state as the primary duty bearer.

Destrooper and Mbambi (2017) observed that in a volatile context like the Democratic Republic of Congo, ‘formal’ HRBAs, in which the State is the primary duty bearer, could not work. They argue for moving beyond ‘formal’ HRBAs, which see the state as the primary duty bearer, toward other HRBAs that recognize a multiplicity of duty-bearers; in such cases where non-State actors like CSOs and INGOs cease to be ancillary duty-bearers, but become primary duty-bearers in their own right. This is, however, problematic for these actors in the Zimbabwean context, due to the long-standing association of SR-MSM with regime change and imposition of Western values, which authorities say infringe on the country’s

sovereignty and non-interference. Therefore, I argue that in HRBAs, the State should remain the primary duty bearer.

The quote above also shows an assessment of potential and perceived benefits and risks that determine the choice of a particular way of operationalizing the HRBA in a particular context or activity. The carrying out of an assessment by activists is in line with the RMT, which posits that activists are rational, and weigh the costs of social action (Edwards & McCarthy 2004, McCarthy & Zald 1973, 1977). As already mentioned in the previous chapter, the benefits and risks are socially constructed, and activists do not decide them in isolation; this provides room for the leadership of CSOs to sensitize activists in favor of particular approach/es (McCarthy & Zald 1973, 1977). In the literature, applying HRBA for some INGOs involves developing rigid HRBA guidelines for CSOs. However, this way of operationalizing the approach may assume linearity, or a systematic process of application of the HRBAs. The quote above, in line with assertions by both the PPT and the RMT, demonstrates that issues of context and resource-dependent capacities do not allow for systematic application of a wholesome approach (Edwards & McCarthy 2004, McAdam 1982).

The quote above also shows that the PPT's political processes alone, or the RMT's resource-dependent capacities alone, would not guarantee the effective operationalization of HRBAs. Considering these together, however, can lead to successful operationalization of the approach. These findings support observations made by Brett (2017:24) that “there is not a one size fits all approach in the fulfillment of human rights” as contexts differ in various aspects – cultural, social, economic and political – leading to different ways of operationalizing human rights concepts. While McAdam (1982:21) importantly observed that “resources do not dictate their use, people do”, I argue in the same vein that resources do not dictate their use; people and political opportunities do.

HRBA operationalization is thus dependent on the availability of relevant political opportunities and resource-dependent capacities, particularly in fragile, economically unstable and politically volatile contexts such as Zimbabwe. One participant described the Zimbabwean context as messy:

Zimbabwe is a messy and ambiguous context to operationalize HRBA or any other approach or tool. There is a need to be always adapting rather than adopting because not all tenets of the HRBA are possible to be translated at all given times because of the limiting political context and unpredictability at all fronts- economic, political and social environments (KII with SRC staff 7 – 28 March 2019).

Costa (2017) agrees, stating that in fragile and volatile contexts, the prevailing political, social, cultural and economic factors characterizing the targeted context and people largely determined the operationalization of HRBAs.

One participant stated that external (read: political opportunities) and internal (read: resources and capacities) contexts are different. Conditions for applying HRBAs may be available at particular moments in particular CSOs. However, they may not be available in other CSOs due to divergent experiences with external and internal contexts (KII with SRC staff 7 – 28 March 2019). Relatively large organizations (in terms of annual budget, staff complement and office space) like GALZ and the SRC have had a long history of applying HRBAs: as early as the 1990s for GALZ (KII with GALZ staff – 12 March 2019) and 2007 for SRC (KII with SRC staff 2 – 28 March 2019). These two organizations have also had several projects for which they could apply HRBAs (see Appendix 2). They have also developed a wide base of resources, described under the RMT, that allow them to navigate the consequences of applying HRBAs. This has not been the case with collectives, most of which started using HRBAs around 2015, and some as recently as 2019. These groups are newer, and some have not yet had projects to which to apply HRBAs.

A participant stated that holistic integration of all HRBA tenets, while overlooking factors characterizing the targeted context for programming as well as various internal elements, could render the approach futile (KII with GALZ staff – 12 March 2019). A few staff members stated that when they first tried to operationalize the HRBA, they were obsessed with operationalizing all of its tenets (KII with SRC staff 6 – March 2019, KII with SRC Staff 7 – 28 March 2019 and KII with SRC staff 3- March 2019), which they had read in the literature. The tenets included that human rights are indivisible and inseparable. They thought this meant they should simultaneously emphasize fulfilling all rights in each activity. They also thought that failure to encompass the fundamental components of human rights and all the widely cited six principles of HRBA in programming would mean failure to operationalize the HRBAs:

During preparation for interviews for this job here at SRC, I read a lot about HRBA. I read an online profile of SRC, and I think from the Oxfam website that the SRC uses the HRBA. I had not used this approach myself before. So, I read about it, such things as that there is no hierarchy of human rights, and about the six principles. When I got the job, others thought we should integrate everything we had read in the literature about the approach. We faced several challenges while trying to do this. We then took what could work for us at any given point and henceforth appreciated the need to domesticate HRBA to suit the context. You know Zimbabwe has a difficult government regarding human rights [...]. Applying almost everything about HRBA in programming is possible in less difficult countries or democratic societies. In Zimbabwe, there are laws, politics and fear on our part that impede the application of HRBA (KII with SRC staff 7 – 28 March 2019).

The SRC, GALZ and the collectives have carefully analyzed the political context of Zimbabwe and mapped a good assessment of it to avoid creating dangers for staff members and the LGBTQ+ communities they serve, while at the same time achieving their goals, as shown in the quote below:

As [a collective], we try to talk about human rights, but [we are] mindful not to sound like we are blaming the government for rights violations. We fear [...] speaking like opposition political parties or [creating perceptions that] we support them as a collective. We do not want a situation where the ruling ZANU (PF) government does not tolerate us because we speak about human rights as the opposition does. [Therefore], we rarely speak about such rights as the right to vote, to join a political party of your choice, to seek political office, to campaign for politicians, etc. We stick to such rights as the right to health, [freedom from discrimination and stigmatization], the right to have a sexual partner of your choice, the right to have a family, etc. We are even diplomatic and calculative when discussing the right to marriage for LGBTI people because that is illegal in Zimbabwe. We [do not] want to be seen as promoting illegality, although we want that overturned, but we do it bearing in mind that we should not be seen to be saying to our communities 'break the law'. [Therefore], I can say that by being mindful of which human rights to place more emphasis on, especially for now, and which ones to shelve, and how to talk about the right to marriage for LGBTI people, we have coined our HRBA. [We have coined it] in a way that is in line with Zimbabwe laws while promoting participation and inclusion of LGBTI people as citizens in a calculated way, which with time will cascade to them realizing other rights that we are currently not majoring in (KII with collective representative – 14 June 2019).

'Formal' HRBAs emphasize the entitlements of rights holders, whereby they may claim/demand rights and hold the state accountable for violations of their rights; however, the quote above shows that this is not always practicable. For the above participant, holding the state accountable would make them seem to be 'bad people' running a 'bad organization', thus shutting down any possibilities of engagement with the government. In support, Kehl (2018) observed that for rights holders to claim their rights, the state must perceive them as legitimate citizens making legitimate claims. The quote above shows that LGBTQ+ people and their sexual rights claims are illegitimate in Zimbabwe. I observed the foregoing approach, explained in the above quote, in various other activities by collectives and the SRC, where the HRBA became a product of contextualization.

A participant highlighted that contextual factors make them reluctant to promote rights like self-identity:

The fact that politics is a factor in the realization [...] of human rights then brings several [issues] if you talk of the right to identify. [If] a male [...] identifies as a woman and dresses as a woman when they get to the airport with the passport, it also brings in some issues of stigma, discrimination and criminalization as you are thought of as disguising yourself as someone else. [The authorities then subject them] to unwarranted searches (KII with GALZ staff – 12 March 2019).

Another participant believed that the contextual challenges result not only in contextualization, but also in abandoning HRBAs, no matter how modified, in favor of the public health approach:

In Zimbabwe, when we talk about programming for LGBTI communities, one would argue that they would want to use the public health approach. In terms of arguing why it is important for programs for LGBTI communities, [the] public health approach [does] not speak to all the fundamentals of human rights of the community. It speaks to the right to health and those few rights related to health and addresses them, while HRBA gives an overview of all the rights. It does not select a few that seem acceptable at a given time. So, one could put on a scale [the] HRBA versus the public health approach where the public health approach can go silent on other key rights and be biased towards particular rights for an individual (KII with SRC staff 2 – 28 March 2019).

In the literature, thinking focused on wholesome integration of all aspects of HRBA, without careful consideration of preconditions. This has led many to think that the approach has fundamental weaknesses of rigidity, being too prescriptive, or too linear to fit fragile and volatile contexts like that of Zimbabwe (Costa 2017 and Henkin 2019). These preconditions include local realities, experiences and contexts. To counter this negative idea, scholars have demonstrated the myriad uses of HRBAs, with emphasis on selected rights or particular principles (see Broberg & Sano 2017 and Henkin 2019).

In dealing with the complexity of the context, CSOs have adapted the HRBA, using it as it suits the moment, and choosing to emphasize tenets that suit the audience. In addition, findings show that CSOs go to the extent of alternating or even combining the HRBA with the public health, *Ubuntu*, charity and needs-based approaches to suit the context, as shown below:

I [do not] know if [it is] written; there is also the principle of Ubuntu. That principle also contributes a lot to spell[ing] out what the HRBA is to us. The principle [is about] knowing somebody as a human being, seeing them as a human being, and addressing them as a human being. [The] documents that we have already mentioned [may not spell out Ubuntu], but it is one of our reference points when we are talking about the HRBA (KII with SRC staff 2 - 28 March 2019).

This quote shows that the *Ubuntu* philosophy is not opposed to HRBA, and reveals an important characteristic of HRBAs: amenability. Linking *Ubuntu* and HRBAs, needs-based approaches and HRBAs, as suggested by participants, shows that CSOs can manipulate HRBAs; making them complexity-informed, non-prescriptive, non-linear and context-flexible. It is important to contextualize HRBA to suit complexity, but CSOs must do this systematically.

A participant stated that operationalizing a complexity-informed and context-flexible approach may be a challenge for the CSOs under study: it will require additional resources in the formulation of the approach; willing, knowledgeable and motivated staff; and changes in the modes of project identification, design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. Under the foregoing conditions, the HRBA would be the

best fit in complex contexts, and would offer opportunities for learning by doing (KII with SRC staff 7- 28 March 2019).

In Chapter 6, I showed how representatives of SAIH and COC Netherlands indicated that their INGOs enable local CSOs to contextualize and adapt the approach. I argue that by using contextualization and adaptation, CSOs in the South can develop a more grounded approach, and Northern donors can develop appropriate outcomes and expectations. This is in line with observations in literature that the HRBAs are dynamic -- open to changes and the influence of local contexts, as well as the human agency of various stakeholders, including donors. That contextualized operationalization of the approach guarantees chances to strengthen the realization of human rights in complex and volatile environments (Costa 2017).

Based on the foregoing discussion, it makes more sense for development practitioners to move beyond preoccupation with the adoption and adaptation of ‘formal’ HRBAs in development processes. They need to start to regard them as one of many alternative approaches, to use alongside other approaches, where the choice of approach follows the assessment of the best fit for a given context and time. Noh (2015) argued that HRBAs must not be normative, but context-sensitive, so that development practitioners can operationalize them through adaptation in volatile states like Bangladesh. My study has demonstrated the ineluctability of adaptation, but I would go even further to state that certain contexts, as highlighted in the foregoing discussion, do not allow even for adapted, ‘light’ versions of HRBAs; therefore, activists may have to discard them entirely, in favor of other approaches. Such approaches, as mentioned above, include the public health approach, the *Ubuntu* model, the charity approach, and the basic needs approach.

8.4 Conclusion

This chapter has examined how local CSOs implement projects underpinned by ‘formal’ HRBAs. It has shown that CSOs adapt ‘formal’ HRBAs on the ground, and operationalize ‘light’ versions in three ways: HRBAs as a key guiding principle, HRBAs as rights rhetoric, and HRBAs as a toolkit. My findings indicate that CSOs appreciate and embrace the normative values of ‘formal’ HRBAs, even though the political context, internal resources, and capacities may diminish their full potential. Political and organizational contexts are constantly shifting and unpredictable. Conditions for applying some aspects of ‘formal’ HRBAs may be available at particular moments, and CSOs may not be available at others. This chapter reveals that even in a difficult context such as Zimbabwe, internal initiatives and willingness to embrace HRBAs exist among local CSOs, but not always in the ways outlined in ‘formal’ HRBAs. These findings are important, given the need to understand the utility of HRBAs in volatile political contexts, making them a helpful tool in praxis rather than in theory. Lastly, I argue for development practitioners to move beyond

preoccupation with both 'formal' and 'light' versions of HRBAs toward operationalization of the pertinent elements from a combination of different approaches.

9 CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSION AND REFLECTIONS

9.1 Introduction

The last four chapters have explored the political and funding contexts, capacities, and constraints internal to CSOs, and how activists operationalize ‘formal’ HRBAs. I have pointed to context-specific limitations like political harassment of activists, the instrumentalization of culture and religion, organizational capacities, and how the political context, organizational resources, capacities, and constraints have converged and interacted, leading CSO operationalization of HRBAs in various ways not stipulated in international guidelines. These factors render ‘formal’ HRBAs unattainable on the ground, and alert development practitioners to consider ‘light’ versions of HRBAs.

Regarding social movement theories, the above-mentioned factors demonstrate the relevance of the PPT and the RMT in investigating political context issues on the one hand, and organizational resources and capacities on the other. The empirical chapters have focused on demonstrating the relevance of these two theories, when taken together: these theories seek to break down the divide between internal organizational resources and the external political context as the only factors influencing organizational processes. Separately, neither exogenous factors nor resources are more fundamental: they influence HRBA operationalization collectively. In this chapter, I summarize my major findings, conclusions, theoretical implications, and suggestions for future research.

My study has investigated the extent to which CSOs can operationalize ‘formal’ HRBAs, and my findings reveal that the political context is not supportive of ‘formal’ HRBAs. Due to limited political opportunities, internal capacities and constraints, CSOs can operationalize only ‘light’ versions of HRBAs. In the sections below I summarize the main findings regarding my sub-research questions.

9.1.1 The Influence of the National Political Context

My study reveals that the political context is a major factor determining the need for CSOs to implement ‘light’ versions of HRBAs. Mugabe, government officials, and the state media have mobilized intense intolerance toward MSM and HRBA advocacy on SR-MSM; they have done this for political gain and regime preservation, using homophobic tropes (see Section 5.2). Several politicized tropes that affected HRBA operationalization are reflected in four themes: 1) white people, through colonialism, brought same-

sex sexualities to pristine Africa; 2) same-sex sexualities are a filthy practice; 3) the white race is diseased in practicing same-sex sexualities, and therefore morally inferior to the pristine and superior black race; 4) Westernization and imperialism sustain the imposition of same-sex sexualities in Africa. These tropes have projected SR-MSM as Western, and local activists as unpatriotic sellouts who side with Western countries in punishing Zimbabwe. The Mugabe regime also projected the international community-imposed sanctions against Zimbabwe as, *inter alia*, a punishment for preserving its ‘pristine heterosexuality’. As a ploy, until 2017 the Mugabe government used this strategy and the abovementioned tropes with relative success: to set an agenda, and the tone for cultural and religious debates on SR-MSM; to wield control over the positions of government officials, opposition, religious and cultural leaders; and to rally the support of voters facing dire material conditions – i.e., all for regime self-preservation.

Despite these tropes, dissenting voices from some chiefs offer a glimmer of hope for HRBA advocacy of SR-MSM. For these chiefs, being Zimbabwean does not mean that heteronormativity is required for all Zimbabweans. I have detected an increase in higher tolerance levels toward MSM and HRBA advocacy on SR-MSM. However, tolerance was higher in cities than in rural areas, among the ‘educated’ than the ‘uneducated’, among those exposed to modernity and globalization, and among younger generations. In post-colonial Zimbabwe, while espousing anti-imperialist tendencies, Mugabe's government inherited and tightened pro-colonial sodomy laws to illegalize rights-based LGBTQ+ activism on SR-MSM, again for the sake of regime self-preservation. However, in the second republic, some chiefs and President Mnangagwa seem to be acknowledging activists and allies in their canvassing for the repeal of the sodomy laws, and to be promoting national development that is inclusive of the historically neglected MSM, through the mantra, ‘leaving no one, and no place behind’.

In the FR-GoZ, government officials, the ruling party, opposition political cadres and leaders, multiple opinion leaders, the media, and religious groups were all instrumental in creating an environment conducive to harassment of activists (see Section 5.3). For example, officials issued threats to CSOs. ZANU PF party cadres vandalized property that promoted the visibility of SR-MSM rights, such as the SRC donated litter bins in Bulawayo. A youth affiliated with ZANU PF violated a transgender woman’s right to self-identity by reporting her to the police over her gender expression. Former MDC President Tsvangirai flip-flopped on committing to protect SR-MSM, and a key figure of his opposition party, Chamisa, refused to support SR-MSM. Assailants suspected of being members of ZANU PF physically attacked GALZ members during GALZ events.

These findings align with observations in the literature that CSOs in Africa often carry out SR-MSM projects in unpredictable and unsupportive environments in which activists are at risk, including death (Kretz 2013 and Musaala 2014). Violations of civil and political rights of MSM in Zimbabwe, while widely publicized, vary within the country and are not as widespread as in other countries where assailants have murdered LGBTQ+ people on the grounds of their SOGIESC, or regularly subjected them to torture or to ‘curative’ rape. This suggests that some political opportunities do exist for HRBA operationalization in Zimbabwe.

The courts in Zimbabwe have played an important and unbiased role, free from partisan political influence and manipulation, in asserting the legal existence of LGBTQ+ CSOs and their right to protection against raids and attacks, and against stigmatization and discrimination of individuals on the grounds of their SOGIESC. The courts have been an important source for activists to turn to in ensuring that HRBAs protect SR-MSM. As President Mnangagwa and some chiefs have intimated, activists and allies have to ‘canvass’ to repeal sodomy laws for executives, the courts, and other duty-bearers to be effective in protecting SR-MSM. Nevertheless, in reality, an adverse political environment leading to the harassment of activists has meant that LGBTQ+ CSOs have been able to operationalize only ‘light’ versions of HRBAs. Some LGBTQ+ members have blamed the CSOs for the police raids. Some service providers are refusing to provide services to the LGBTQ+ CSOs. The political environment has also caused activists to prefer the closet, and LGBTQ+ CSOs to prefer invisibility. Nevertheless, LGBTQ+ CSOs have been able to count on brave and resilient members, activists, and allies who have defied the attempts to repress them, and who continue to persevere by being innovative and resourceful. For instance, they have chosen to avoid public spaces and the media for their activities, instead targeting political leaders individually, negotiating demands for a ‘participation fee’ from ‘men of God’, and avoiding partisanship.

I have demonstrated the influence of ‘culture’ on the operationalization of HRBAs by LGBTQ+ CSOs in Zimbabwe, focusing on the period of the FR-GoZ (section 5.4). This plays out through the misemployment of culture and *Ubuntu* as being against SR-MSM and HRBAs. For example, some traditional leaders conceived the notion of *Ubuntu* as meaning that individuals in a society have no authority, voice, or agency over their sexuality, yet HRBAs state the opposite. Agents of regime preservation also use *Ubuntu* as an ‘othering’ philosophy that applies exclusively to the majority indigenes of Zimbabwe/Africa, thereby denying ‘others’ their humanity, national identity, citizenship, and human rights. They also use *Ubuntu* as a tool for fostering control and conformity, against popular notions that it is about the compassion of individuals in a society for the greater good of the society or humanity. Other neutral custodians of culture,

free from political manipulation in their understanding of SR-MSM, prefer, contrary to the dictates of HRBAs, quiet acceptance or indifference to same-sex sexual practices and, by extension, to SR-MSM. The drawback is that such a stance contributes to excluding these practices and identities in development initiatives. However, LGBTQ+ CSOs have registered milestones in demonstrating the proximity of some cultural values to HRBA advocacy of SR-MSM.

Mugabe, as with cultural homophobia, set the tone for religious homophobia in the 1990s when he claimed that SR-MSM offended religious beliefs. Popular religious leaders continue to echo political and cultural tropes in perceiving MSM as diseased. For example, ‘prophet’ Makandiwa’s ‘God is against the reprobate mind’ speech paraphrases Mugabe’s ‘society is against sexual perverts’ speech. While the conflation and symbiosis of religion and politics create a political context opposed to the operationalization of HRBAs concerning SR-MSM, they provide political gain and expedience for the actors involved. ‘Pastor’ Chamisa stood to gain electoral mileage in his ambition to be the next President of Zimbabwe. Bishop Kunonga, ‘prophet’ Makandiwa, and ‘prophet’ Magaya hoped for the support and blessing of the country's political leadership. Church teachings, such as ‘LGBTQ+ people were the reason for God’s destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah’, tend to haunt activists who attend those churches and affect the extent to which they can advocate for SR-MSM using HRBAs. The opposite is true for those activists who attend the few churches whose leaders support SR-MSM. These activists reported that their churches give them the needed support to continue their HRBA work without feeling they are sinning.

Other church leaders preferred anonymity, as did some traditional leaders: using silence and/or indifference as a strategy for including LGBTQ+ people in their churches. They feared backlash from the government, rivals for their leadership positions, and ordinary church members were they to support SR-MSM openly.

9.1.2 The Influence of the International Funding Context

The second research question was about how Nordic INGOs could support the application of ‘formal’ HRBAs to SR-MSM in their concrete projects. In their HRBAs, the targeted donors pay attention to HRBA tenets like human rights instruments, the principle of non-discrimination, the principle of participation and inclusion, and the focus on the most vulnerable groups. I found that donors did not use ‘queer imperialism’, or adoption of their HRBAs by funded local partners, as a conditionality for funding. The donors use concepts like ‘inside-out’ and ‘locally anchored partnerships’ to acknowledge that local CSOs best know the contexts, and therefore the best application of HRBAs to those contexts. I argue that donors should remain amenable and responsive to local CSOs’ flexible interpretations of the term, in line with the different contexts in which they work and live, reflecting their different cultures. For local CSOs, the non-imposition

of interpretation allows activists to consider alternative ways of HRBA operationalization, the ‘light’ or toned-down ways.

The targeted local CSOs started operationalizing HRBAs upon inception, some even before receiving any funding from international donors. However, these organizations did not have HRBA templates or written guidelines, and the donors did not impose any. They used a range of activities and services to operationalize HRBAs. These mainly included: training, sensitization, and capacity strengthening activities; local and international advocacy activities; psychosocial support counseling, provision of safe spaces, incomes, savings, and landing activities; media work; legal, medical, and social safety net referrals; and rapid response to activists facing persecution. Using consistent communication, via various documents and correspondence about ‘light’ HRBAs, enabled local CSOs to maintain their independence, notwithstanding their dependence on financial support from donors.

While some donor governments and recipient local CSOs prefer the direct recipient model, the intermediary partnership model has various advantages, which were utilized by the targeted organizations in my study. Intermediary donor INGOs have experience working with local CSOs and managing small grants; expertise and knowledge regarding LGBTQ+, SR-MSM and HRBA discourses; and have networks in the Global South that donor governments often do not have. They also have experience and expertise in managing, administering, monitoring, and reporting on funding from donor governments that local CSOs often do not have. Therefore, they know both the donors and the recipient local CSOs. Their intermediary partnerships with local CSOs are effective for the operationalization of suitable approaches, such as ‘light’ versions of HRBAs. However, because most donors perceive prevalence to be high among gay men and other MSM and very low among LBQ women – resulting in biased funding for gay men and other MSM -- experiences in the operationalization of HRBAs have been largely related to the experiences of MSM activists.

9.1.3 Influence of Internal Capacities and Constraints

The third research question of my study explored the influence of capacities and constraints intrinsic to local CSOs in implementing MSM projects based on the HRBA. From their very formation, the targeted local CSOs were developing human resources with the capacity to operationalize HRBAs. These initiatives were either part of staff development, project activities, or an initiative of individual staff members. The initiatives for developing this capacity varied, including one-day training workshops, weeklong training/refreshers courses, and secondments to tertiary-level degrees. All SRC staff members working on MSM projects had attended workshops or courses, or attained a degree related to HRBAs. For GALZ, orientation on human rights was part of the onboarding process for new members. The organizations had

also developed promotional materials on HRBAs that were easily accessible and visible to activists, such as banners and posters.

The content of these training programs and courses varied, and included *inter-alia* ‘formal’ HRBA tenets such as standards, principles, obligations of duty bearers, entitlements of rights holders, and human rights protection mechanisms. The training programs and their content were sufficient to enable activists to operationalize ‘formal’ HRBAs. Contrary to notions in literature (Plipat 2005), the activists had adequate capacity or ability to operationalize HRBAs. They demonstrated this capacity in many instances: CSOs and activists successfully used strategic litigation to assert the *inter-alia* legal existence of GALZ after the arrest of its co-chair on allegations of running an unregistered organization; in addition, to defend the right of transgender people to identity after the arrest of Ricky Nathanson for using a female toilet. They also utilized international human rights frameworks, such as the UPR process.

Activists, however, faced significant constraints related to insufficient NGOization and scarcity of resources. Donors were reluctant to entrust funds directly to collectives still undergoing NGOization. As a component of insufficient NGOization, amateurism was a challenge faced by nascent CSOs. The amateurs were passion-driven but less experienced regarding the administration of grants. The CSOs have received less funding than CSOs in other sectors, such as those supported through humanitarian aid. This is contrary to the notions of politicians that CSOs have received a lot of funding. They lacked longer-term multi-year grants because most donors preferred short-term grants; this led to apprehension, disenchantment, and demotivation. In addition, some donors supporting short-term grants are reluctant to fund core and operational costs, and want to confine their funding to project activities; this limits the extent to which activists can operationalize ‘formal’ HRBAs.

9.1.4 Operationalizing ‘Light’ Versions of ‘Formal’ HRBAs

My last research question examined how local CSOs operationalize ‘formal’ HRBAs in MSM projects. My findings reveal that ‘formal’ HRBAs prove unsuitable for many contexts, and for some public authorities or duty bearers. I have shown that in operationalizing HRBAs, local CSOs, with the support and understanding of their donors (see section 6.3), make choices as to which aspects of ‘formal’ HRBAs they can implement on the ground. This has led local CSOs to contextualize HRBAs, in practice only operationalizing ‘light versions’ of ‘formal’ HRBAs. Local CSOs operationalize HRBAs mainly in three established ways: 1. HRBA as a key guiding principle, 2. HRBA as rhetoric, and 3. HRBA as a toolkit.

HRBAs as a key guiding principle means that the values derived from its tenets shape organizational culture, norms, and values, and does not necessarily entail the systematic mainstreaming of these tenets. The actual values of HRBA as a guiding philosophy are drawn from the international human rights framework and understanding of sexual rights. This is problematic, as the international human rights framework operates with a particular understanding of its efficacy, and of its accessibility to activists in the Global South, as informed by ‘Western’ understandings of these frameworks.

The second way in which CSOs have operationalized HRBAs is the use of HRBAs as rights rhetoric. Implementers of projects would use rights language as their point of reference, without using the other HRBA tenets. My study demonstrated that operationalizing HRBA in this way turned each MSM activity, project, and program into a rights initiative. The term ‘rights’ was used without harnessing strategies and mechanisms, present in other HRBA discourses, that could address deeply entrenched issues faced by MSM. I argued that HRBAs, as rights rhetoric, are highly problematic because, in Zimbabwe, human rights language related to MSM is projected as unconstitutional and, therefore, illegal.

I have shown that the primary main way in which CSOs operationalize HRBAs is as a toolkit, from which activists select and use various components as best practices in various stages of projects, depending on the context. In my study, the tenets mainstreamed in CSO programming included rights holders' entitlements; duty-bearers' obligations; principles; normative elements; and human rights protection mechanisms.

My findings point to the need to adapt rather than adopt the ‘formal’ HRBAs, due to the political context and the unpredictability of economic, cultural, and social environments. My study has shown that external and internal contexts differ according to time and space: it may be possible to apply HRBAs in particular ways in particular contexts, moments, and CSOs, and not in others.

A participant in a key informant interview demonstrated how human rights language became a tinderbox during the FR-GoZ, when clinicians would grant a gay or lesbian individual the right to health if they presented themselves as an ordinary patient, without stating their sexual and gender identity. The clinicians denied the same individual that right once they stated they were lesbian or gay. This informant explained that health officials might deny the service to conform to the homophobic stance of politicians.

In Chapter 6, however, I highlighted how the national response to HIV/AIDS had opened opportunities for SR-MSM. In the context of the national response to HIV/AIDS, health officials began to encourage gay and lesbian individuals to be open about how they have sex, and thus to reveal their gender and sexual

identities, allowing officials to diagnose a health condition correctly. Therefore, whether the rights language is a tinderbox depends on the political context. A contentious political context leads to poor health diagnoses, arbitrary arrests, harassment, threats, discrimination, denied opportunities, wide use of derogative terms, and continued reference to homophobic laws in operationalizing HRBAs.

9.2 Implications of Findings on Social Movement Theories

The PPT and the RMT emerged primarily to explain social movement processes, origins, maintenance, and outcomes. I have successfully adapted their components to explain an aspect of maintenance, and outcomes, of HRBA operationalization by CSOs. Adapting PPT in this way was appropriate because it tackles the problem of how political processes influence social movement actions. My findings also illustrate how Zimbabwe's volatile and fragile political context affects the CSO process of HRBA operationalization of MSM projects. My adaptation of RMT was successful because of its emphasis on the centrality of resources in achieving collective action, such as the process of HRBA operationalization. The adapted components, as explained in section 2.2, are mobilizing structures, political opportunities and tactical innovation. Below I explain the usefulness of these theories, and their components, for grounding my study findings in theory. I then discuss the implications of my findings for revamping the theoretical framework. This revamping includes amending the theories to better explain reality, and the use of alternative theories to explain HRBA operationalization.

As discussed in section 2.2.1, the PPT's mobilizing structures are political and non-political organizations in a particular context advocating for change (McAdam et al. 1996). To demonstrate the suitability of the PPT concerning this component, my findings reveal SRC, GALZ, and collectives as mobilizing structures. I found that the context in which these organizations exist, characterized by various actors mobilizing homophobia in multiple ways for political expedience and opportunistic reasons, creates a difficult context for HRBA operationalization.

According to the PPT, mobilizing structures provide spaces, mentorship, solidarity, leadership, membership, capacity development, information, knowledge, skills, communication channels, networks, partnerships, and collaborations to the social movement (McAdam et al. 1996). My findings reveal that CSOs play this critical role. GALZ, the oldest LGBTQ+ organization, provided all of these aspects to most of the existing CSOs in Zimbabwe; moreover, the SRC has provided its office as a safe space for collectives and LGBTQ+ people. I discussed how the SRC has also provided mentorship to collectives by acting as the fiscal hosts of the funds of these grassroots CSOs, and by collaborating in programming. Therefore, the

component of mobilizing structures is quite relevant for explaining the reality on the ground portrayed by my study.

My findings also indicate the relevance of the PPT's component of political opportunities in explaining reality as it relates to HRBA operationalization. In the first of my chapters on findings, I reveal how the exogenous political situation in Zimbabwe affected HRBA operationalization through roles played by the government, ruling party cadres, opinion leaders, and the media in mobilizing homophobia. As postulated in the PPT component regarding political opportunities, a context collectively avails a framework and a boundary for collective action like HRBA operationalization, and as I show, the Zimbabwe context renders operationalization of 'formal' HRBAs impractical. The relevance of this component becomes clear, as is also shown by my findings, in that risks of repression by a government (such as political harassment of activists) increase when it faces the legitimacy question.

Another aspect of PPT, as shown in my findings, is its relevance for tactical innovation. Tactical innovation involves devising techniques that enable activists to further their objectives. These include avoidance of the media and public spaces for LGBTQ+ activities; inviting politicians, religious, and traditional leaders to 'private' places for sensitizations; and using HIV/AIDS as a 'soft' entry-level frame into the SR-MSM discourse. However, the HIV/AIDS as a 'soft' entry-level frame helps to reveal that tactical innovations at times come with drawbacks, given the challenges of negativity associated with HIV/AIDS, and the emerging complexities linked to HIV/AIDS funding and intersectionality.

Other innovative tactics include the use of safe spaces for LGBTQ+ people, and the use of alternative approaches like the 'needs-based' approach and the *Ubuntu* when pushing for protection of SR-MSM. Adopting a politically charged HRBA development discourse to address a sensitive issue like SR-MSM is bound to elicit a heavy-handed response from heteronormative institutions, leading to continued repression of CSO activists or denial of services to MSM. This justifies the need for toned-down, adapted, and contextualized versions of HRBAs. 'Tactical innovation' thus involves the need for CSO activists and other service providers to adapt and contextualize HRBAs, and to consider alternative discourses, like public health approaches, to promote SR-MSM.

The component of tactical adaptations was not relevant in my analysis. While the FR-GoZ regularly perfected its repression techniques against activists, these perfected techniques were not in response to tactical innovative techniques on the part of activists. For example, activists have not used innovative

tactical techniques to challenge sodomy laws. Nevertheless, through the 2013 constitution, the government further tightened laws against same-sex marriages.

I mentioned above that the success of adapting RMT lies in its emphasis on the centrality of financial and human resources. My findings point to the relevance of moral resources in explaining reality as it relates to HRBA operationalization. I discussed how moral resources like support; collaborations with state institutions like universities and public hospitals; solidarity; understanding of the difficult context in which the CSOs operate; and legitimacy derived from legal registration, can facilitate the operationalization of HRBAs. I demonstrated, as is postulated by the RMT, that moral resources are often not accessible to CSOs; I showed, for example, how external actors like the state, grant or retract legitimacy as a moral resource through cumbersome registration processes and illegalization of CSOs and their activities.

Regarding cultural resources, my findings reveal the importance of resources like the CISR, other UN declarations and conventions, and various proposal writing templates, in addition to knowledge of various HRBA tenets: principles, standards, entitlements of rights holders, and obligations of duty-bearers. In line with the RMT, my findings demonstrate that, compared to cultural resources, these resources are more accessible to organizations for independent use, and are less proprietary. Regarding social-organizational resources, my findings indicate the relevance of infrastructures, social networks, and organizations for HRBA operationalization.

I have shown the importance of collaborations with state institutions, as facilitated through MoAs and donors, in enabling HRBA operationalization. Regarding human resources, my findings have revealed the important role of the skills and expertise of staff members of the organizations towards HRBA operationalization. I have discussed how younger organizations, with less qualified and experienced personnel, lack adequate capacity for HRBA operationalization. My findings have also demonstrated the relevance of material resources. I have shown how crucial material resources like finances and office space are for collectives.

While I have demonstrated above that the PPT and RMT are, by and large, relevant for reality interpretation related to HRBA operationalization, where these two theories were lacking, I have had to borrow from other concepts to explain reality. I have relied on the concepts of the ‘inside-out’ approach and ‘locally anchored partnership’ as counter-narratives to queer imperialism. I have also relied on concepts like NGOization and queer imperialism, which are not included in the components of the PPT and the RMT.

I borrowed the concepts of inside-out and locally anchored approaches from the Nordic donors, who used them to show that they avoid queer imperialism in their engagements with local CSOs. I argue that the RMT lacks nuances in explaining the role of donors in social movement processes like queer imperialism, and the ‘locally anchored partnership approach’ as a counter to queer imperialism. The RMT treats donors narrowly as donors and volunteers (McCarthy and Zald 1977) without problematizing their subtle roles. Therefore, based on my findings, I make a case for including queer imperialism, and its counter-narrative the ‘locally anchored partnership approach’, in theorizing social movement processes using the RMT.

I employed the concept of NGOization to analyze the process whereby SMOs transform into NGOs. The PPT and RMT explain the emergence of SMOs, their maintenance and outcomes, but do not explain how they transform into NGOs, and how this transformation affects outcomes. I relied on the concept of intersectionality to explain the disadvantages of using HIV/AIDS as a ‘soft’ entry-level frame; this frame tended to aggravate the effects of intersectionality for LBQ women, as interventions were focused primarily on MSM. Regarding theory building, my findings argue for including the above concepts as components of social movement theories.

I also believe that the PPT employs a reductionist approach in theorizing about mobilizing structures; it identifies these structures exclusively with SMOs as advocating for change (McAdam et al. 1996) and excludes mobilizing structures that are in favor of the *status quo*. My findings reveal agents of regime preservation: the dense pro-*status quo* mobilizing structures that include politicians, traditional and religious institutions (see section 5.4-5); law enforcement agencies such as the police; and ruling-party structures such as the youth league and the state media (see section 5.3). I, therefore, argue to amend the PPT’s component of ‘mobilizing structures’ to be read as ‘pro- and anti-*status quo* mobilizing structures’. In this case, the PPT’s component of tactical adaptation explains the counter-strategies used by pro- and anti-*status quo* mobilizing structures, not the pro-*status quo* structures themselves.

9.3 Reflections on Findings

I suggest that there is a need for enhanced organizational capacity development, an enhanced spirit of unpaid participation, and greater attention to the process. The main consideration is that the successful operationalization of HRBAs in the advocacy of SR-MSM requires transforming the political context, including aspects related to culture and religion. The country's president, government officials, opposition politicians, and religious and traditional leaders must take bold steps toward creating an environment of tolerance of the SR-MSM. A potential first step toward bettering the condition of LGBTQ+ persons would

be the formal acknowledgment of SR-MSM, and the provision of legal protection of sexual rights, particularly the right to sexual autonomy.

I suggest that activists must use any approaches/components of these approaches, depending on which one/s are the best fit in a given context. Activists can adapt a particular approach, and/or select pertinent components from that approach or from a combination of approaches, like HRBAs, *Ubuntu*, public health, or the charity or basic-needs models. This will require operationalizing these approaches, or some of their components, to 'work with the grain' in specific situations and contexts, rather than imposing specific components of a single approach. Operationalizing the more pertinent elements can contribute to positive outcomes, but assessing the final impact can be challenging. Activists need prior training in different approaches like *Ubuntu*, public health, needs-based, and HRBA. Additionally, there is a risk of fatigue among activists who must systematically consider which approach or components of an approach are the best fit.

My study has shown that, because the bulk of funding for CSOs is for HIV/AIDS, gay men and other MSM whom donors perceive to be at greatest risk, have come to dominate the LGBTQ+ movement. Therefore, experiences of HRBA operationalization concerning the SR-MSM are predominantly experiences of gay men and other MSM. Gender bias, low levels of education, and social capital have disproportionately affected the equitable representation of LBQ and transgender women. Donors and CSOs must mobilize funding that deliberately includes these groups, given emerging data that indicate that they are also at elevated risk (Awuor 2021).

CSOs must 'make' more brave and resilient activists and allies in support of SR-MSM. They must seek out people from different strata of Zimbabwean society and mobilize them to protest whenever authorities, groups, and individuals violate SR-MSM. Although the voices of the few have already had some effect, they register less impact due to mobilized homophobia. This study has shown the need for brave and vocal CSO activists to demand SR-MSM in a difficult, volatile, and fragile political context. Mass mobilization is a promising strategy to combat oppression, as it is often led by those living on the cutting edge of multiple systems of control. No group must be left behind, as every oppressed individual is one more addition toward forming a critical mass against all forms of oppression. The CSOs need to recognize that some officials in state institutions are tolerant of SR-MSM and willing to work with them. They must also seek out public influencers to push for acceptance and tolerance.

The Nordic donor INGOs explored in this study endorse sexual rights as a priority. Donors should support the promotion of sexual rights as human rights, recognize that human rights and development are increasingly converging, take stock of how they have delivered and managed aid, and share lessons learned in delivering and managing aid. The current intermediary partnership model has been critical for the operationalization of the HRBA, and there is a need for continued reliance on this model. A suggested addition would be an explicit promotion of flexibility in approaches used by CSOs, specifically as they relate to sexual rights.

I have shown in this study the stigmatization of MSM arising from the perceptions around non-indigeneity of same-sex sexualities, the influence of poor understanding of aspects of culture and religion and the influence of donor funding modalities that tend to associate MSM primarily with HIV and AIDS. While playing out in culture, religion and donor funding modalities, this stigmatization is linked to misconceptions about social and biological dimensions of LGBTQ+ issues. In relation to social dimensions, these issues include inter-alia, discrimination, intersectionality, health disparities, support systems and harassment. In relation to biological dimensions, they include misconceptions about sexual orientation and gender identity. The other human rights NGOs in Zimbabwe should complement the efforts of LGBTQ+ CSOs. This can be achieved by incorporating awareness-raising and education on the biological and social aspects of LGBTQ+ issues into their broader projects. This approach aims to dispel misconceptions and foster empathy within the public.

The government needs to facilitate operational policy and legal frameworks that enable civil society to play development roles without being hindered. This includes keeping modest and non-deterrent registration fees for CSOs that want to register as trusts. The government should also amend the Private Voluntary Organizations Act to allow for quick registration, and less state interference and surveillance of CSO activities, and should decriminalize and recognize SR-MSM as contained in various international instruments. This will create an environment conducive to HRBA operationalization by CSOs, and benefit the government by depicting it, to actors on domestic and global stages, as dedicated to respecting human rights.

9.4 Suggestions for Future Studies

On the whole, the operationalization of HRBAs has been the work of non-governmental development actors like UN agencies, INGOs and local CSOs. Consequently, most studies and literature on HRBAs relate to the work undertaken by these actors. However, government institutions like NAC, public hospitals and city

health clinics have also started to embrace the approach. A potential area for future studies could be the extent and manner of operationalization of HRBA by these government institutions.

Although this study has focused on the experiences of CSOs in the operationalization of HRBAs, it has not examined their experiences in assessing the impact of HRBAs; a potential area of future study could therefore focus on how different actors (donors, INGOs or local CSOs) assess evidence regarding the impact of HRBAs.

Researchers also need to engage with the intersecting constructs of gender bias as expressed in sexism, culturalism, classism, ableism and ageism, revealing how these contribute to within-group stigma, discrimination, and other violations of SR-MSM. There is also a need for studies focused on strategies to shift the attention of CSOs toward the realization of political and economic rights for LGBTQ+ people.

9.5 Conclusion

My research has explored the operationalization of HRBA, using the case of CSOs in Zimbabwe. It has examined how the political context, international donor-funding context, and capacities and constraints intrinsic to the CSOs, influence the nature and extent to which HRBAs are operationalized in their advocacy of SR-MSM. My study has highlighted the importance of brave CSO activists, who can work around difficult, volatile and fragile political contexts to operationalize ‘light’ versions of HRBAs. It has also pointed to the importance of non-rigidity in donor interpretation, and the translation of ‘formal’ HRBAs into concrete projects. My research has described ‘light’ versions of the ‘formal’ HRBAs -- using the HRBA as a key guiding principle, HRBA as rights rhetoric, and HRBA as a toolkit. Furthermore, my study has both revealed the existence of relative capacity in CSOs, and indicated various resource and NGOization constraints. Stakeholders can use these findings to improve CSO HRBA operationalization, donor strategies, and funding models.

REFERENCES

- Achour, Y.B. (2021). 'What is a Democratic Revolution?' *Athena*, 1 (1)124-152.
- Adhikari, M. (2013). *Burdened by race: Coloured identities in Southern Africa*. Cape Town, UCT Press.
- Adom, D., and Hussein, E.K. (2018). 'Theoretical and Conceptual Framework: Mandatory Ingredients'. *International Journal of Scientific Research*, 7 (1): 438-441.
- Advocate.com: No Room for Gay rights in the New Constitution, <https://www.advocate.com/news/daily-news/2010/06/22/official-no-room-gay-rights-zimbabwes-constitution>, 22 June 2010.
- Afrobarometer (2020). 'All in this together': Africans Tolerant on Ethnic, Religious, National, but not Sexual Differences. Round 7, Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 362 | Brian Howard.
- Afrobarometer (2016). *Merged Data, Round 6*. <http://afrobarometer.org/>. Accessed 23 March 2020.
- Akindele, T., D.O. Ayoola, and A. Ameen (2017). 'Challenges of Civil Society Organizations (CSOS) in Influencing Democratic Governance in Nigeria'. *African Journal of Management*, 2 (2): 51-64.
- Ali, S., Kowalski, S, and P. Silva (2015). 'Advocating for Sexual Rights at the UN: The Unfinished Business of Global Development'. *Reproductive Health Matters*, 23 (46): 31-37.
- Anyidoho, N.A., and G. Crawford (2014). Leveraging National and Global Links for Local Rights Advocacy: WACAM's challenge to the power of transnational gold mining in Ghana. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*, 35 (4): 483-502.
- ARC International and ILGA (2016). Compilation of the Adoption of the 2016 SOGI Resolution (Online) Available from: <http://arc-international.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/SOGI-Resolution-Vote-compilation-FINAL.pdf>. Accessed 3.03.23.
- Armas, H. (2007). *Whose Sexualities Count: Poverty Participation, and Sexual Rights*, IDS Working Paper 294, Brighton: IDS.
- Armas, H. (2006). 'Exploring Linkages between Sexuality and the Rights to Tackle Poverty'. *IDS Bulletin*, 37 (5): 21-26.
- Armas, H. (2005). *Whose Sexuality Counts? Politic Visions of the Poor, and their Sexualities. The Possibilities of Rights-Based Approaches, and Participation* (Spanish), BRIDGE.
- Awondo, P., P. Geschiere, and G. Reid (2012). 'Homophobic Africa? Toward a More Nuanced View'. *African Studies Review*, 55 (3): 145 – 168.
- Awuor, O.D.C. (2021). *Neglected or unaffected! Investigating the Exclusions and Silences Around Lesbians, Bisexuals, and Queer (LBQ) Women, and HIV in Kisumu, Kenya*. A Research Paper presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for obtaining the degree of Master of Arts in Development Studies, International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam.

- Badgett, M., V. Waldwick, and Y. Rodgers (2019). *The Relationship Between LGBTI Inclusion, and Economic Development: Macro Level Evidence*. Elsevier.
- Bailey, F. and A. Dolan (2011). 'The Meaning of Partnership in Development: Lessons in Development Education', Policy and Practice'. *A Development Education Review*, 13: 30-48.
- Barclay, P. and S. Bernard (2013). 'Who Cries Wolf, and When? Manipulation of Perceived Threats to Preserve Rank in Cooperative Groups'. *PLoS ONE*, 8 (9): e73863.
- Barrett, D. and A. Twycross (2018). 'Data Collection in Qualitative Research'. *Evidence-Based Nursing*, 21(3): 63–64.
- Bastos, C., A. Novoa and N.B. Salazar (2021). 'Mobile Labour: An Introduction'. *Mobilities*, 16 (2): 155-163.
- Bell, D. (2004). 'The Ethical Dilemmas of International Human Rights, and Humanitarian NGOs: Reflections on a Dialogue between Practitioners and Theorists'. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 26 (2): 300-329.
- Bergesen, H.O., G. Parmann and O.B. Thommessen (2019). *United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). Yearbook of International Cooperation on Environment and Development*, 227–227.
- Bertolt, B. (2019). 'The Invention of Homophobia in Africa'. *Journal of Advances in Social Sciences and Humanities*, 5 (3): 655-659.
- Beyeler, M. and D. Rucht (2010). Political Opportunity Structures and Progressive Movement Sectors. In S. Walgrave, and D. Rucht (Eds.) *The World Says No to War: Demonstrations against War to Iraq* (pp. 20–42). Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press.
- Biruk, C. (2014). 'Aid for Gays': The Moral and the Material in 'African Homophobia' in Post-2009 Malawi'. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 52 (3): 447 - 473.
- Blaxter, L., C. Hughes and M. Tight (2001). *How to Research*, 2nd Ed. Buckingham, Open University Press.
- Boadi, E.G. (1996). 'Civil Society in Africa'. *Journal of Democracy*, 7 (3): 118-132.
- Boesen, J.K. and T. Martin (2007). *Applying a Rights-Based Approach: An Inspirational Guide for Civil Society*, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for Human Rights.
- Bongmba, E.K. (2016). 'Homosexuality, Ubuntu and Otherness in the African Church'. *Religion and Violence in Africa*, 4 (1): 15-38.
- Bratton, M. and E. Masunungure (2011). *The Anatomy of Political Predation: Leaders, Elites and Coalitions in Zimbabwe, 1980-2010*, Developmental Leadership Program and Research Paper No. 9.
- Brett, R. (2017). *Non-Governmental Actors in the Field of Human Rights: An Introduction to the International Protection of Human Rights*. Abo. Akademi University.

- Brinkerhoff, D.W. and P.J. Morgan (2010). 'Capacity and Capacity Development: Coping with Complexity'. *Public Administration and Development*, (30): 2-10.
- Broberg, M. and H. Sano (2018). 'Strengths and Weaknesses in a Human Rights-Based Approach to International Development: An Analysis of a Rights-Based Approach to Development Assistance Based on Practical Experiences'. *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 22 (5): 664-680.
- Bromideh, A.A. (2011). 'The Widespread Challenges of NGOs in Developing Countries: Case Studies from Iran'. *International NGO Journal*, 6 (9): 197-202.
- Broodryk, J. (2005). *Ubuntu Management Philosophy: Exporting Ancient African Wisdom into the Global World*. Johannesburg: Knowles.
- Brown, L.D. (1996) 'Participation, Social Capital and Intersectoral Problem Solving: African and Asian Cases'. *World Development*, 24 (9): 1467-1479.
- Brown, L.D. and A. Kalegaonkar (2002). 'Support Organizations and the Evolution of the NGO Sector'. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 31 (2): 231-258.
- Brown, L.D. and D. Korten (1991). Working More Effectively with Non-Governmental Organizations. *Non-Governmental Organizations and the World Bank*, Eds. Paul Samuel and Arturo Israel. Washington: World Bank.
- Brown, R. (2012). 'Corrective Rape in South Africa: A Continuing Plight Despite an International Human Rights Response'. *Annual Survey of International and Comparative Law*, 18, 45.
- Burnett, M. (2012). *Curtailling Criticism. Intimidation and Obstruction of Civil Society in Uganda*. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- Bussoti, L. and R. Maia (2017). Managing the Risk of Violating Human Rights under Industrial Resettlement Programs. *Managing the Risk of Violating Human Rights under Industrial Resettlement Programs*, (2): 90-93.
- Campbell, H. (2003). *Reclaiming Zimbabwe: The Exhaustion of the Patriarchal Model of Liberation*. Philip: Claremont.
- Campbell, H. (2002). 'Homophobia in Zimbabwe or the Politics of Intolerance', Occasional Paper Series Pretoria. *African Association of Political Science*, 6 (3): 44.
- Chabal, P. (2012). *The End of Conceit: Western Rationality after Post-Colonialism*. New York: Zed Books.
- Chandhoke, N. (2007). 'Civil Society'. *Development in Practice*, 17 (4): 607-614.
- Chanika, E., J.L. Lwanda and A.S. Muula (2013). 'Gender, Gays and Gain: The Sexualized Politics of Donor Aid in Malawi'. *Africa Spectrum*, 48 (1): 89-105.
- Chakawarika, B. (2011). *Challenges Faced by NGOs in the Political Harsh Climate of Zimbabwe: Analyzing the Effects on Sustainability and Promotion of Human Rights*. University of Gothenburg.

- Chemhuru, M. (2012). 'Rethinking the Legality of Homosexuality in Zimbabwe: A Philosophical Perspective'. *International Journal of Politics and Good Governance*, 3 (3.3).
- Chikura-Mtwazi, C. (2018). *Zimbabwe's LGBT Community: Why Civil Rights and Health Issues Go Hand In Hand*: <https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-lgbt-community-why-civil-rights-and-health-issues-go-hand-in-hand-90546>. [Accessed 11 March 2019].
- Chikoto-Schultz, G., and K. Uzochukwu (2016). 'Governing Civil Society in Nigeria and Zimbabwe: A Question of Policy Process and Non-State Actors' Involvement'. *Non-profit Policy Forum*, 7 (2): 137-170.
- Chimininge, V. and C, Makamure (2017). 'Ethics and Crisis in Africa: A Critique of the Rights-Based Approach to Homosexuality in Zimbabwe'. *Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies*, 1(1): 77-107.
- Chipato, F., C. Ncube and S.R. Dorman (2020). *The Politics of Civil Society in Zimbabwe*. In *The Oxford Handbook of Zimbabwean Politics*. Oxford University Press.
- Chitando, E. and P. Mateveke (2017). 'Africanizing the Discourse on Homosexuality: Challenges and Prospects'. *Critical African Studies*, 9 (1): 124-140.
- Choudry, A. and D. Kapoor (2013). Introduction: NGOization: Complicity, Contradictions and Prospects. In Choudry, A. and D. Kapoor (Eds.) (2013). *NGOization: Complicity, Contradictions and Prospects*, pp.1-23. London: Zed Books.
- Chowdhury, I. A. (2015). 'Issue of quality in Qualitative Research: An overview'. *Innovative Issues and Approaches in Social Sciences*, 8 (1):141-162.
- Chua, L.J. (2012). 'Pragmatic Resistance, Law and Social Movements in the Authoritarian States: The Case of Gay Collective Action in Singapore'. *Law and Society Review*, 46 (4): 713–748.
- Clarke, D. (2013). Twice removed: African invisibility in Western Queer Theory. In: Ekine, S. & Abbas, H. (eds.) *Queer African Reader*, pp. 173-185. Nairobi: Pambazuka Press.
- Clayton, A., P. Oakley and J. Taylor (2000). *Civil Society Organizations and Service Provision, Civil Society and Social Movements Program Paper*. Number 2, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.
- Compagnon, D. (2011). *A Predictable Tragedy: Robert Mugabe and the Collapse of Zimbabwe*. Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.20) Act 2013.
- Cook, T. and J.M. Schwartz (2002). 'Archives, records and power: The making of modern memory'. *Archival Science*, 2, 1-19.
- Cook, B. and B. Vieira (2016). *The Road to Successful Partnerships: How Governments in the Global North can effectively Partner with Intermediary Organizations to Support LGBTI Communities in the Global South and East*, New York, Global Philanthropy Project.
- Cooper, R. (2018). *What is Civil Society? How is the Term Used and what is Seen to be its Role and*

Value? (Internationally) in 2018? K4D Helpdesk Report, Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.

COPAC (2013). *The Final Draft Constitution of Zimbabwe*, Constitution Select Committee, Harare.

Cornwall, A. (2006). 'Development's Marginalization of Sexuality: Report of an IDS Workshop'. *Gender and Development*, 14 (2): 273-289.

Cornwall, A., S. Corrêa and S. Jolly (2008). *Development with a Body: Sexuality, Human Rights and Development*, (Eds) London: Zed Books.

Cornwall, A. and G. Pratt (2010). The Use and Abuse of Participatory Rural Appraisal. *Reflections from Practice: Agriculture and Human Values*, 28 (2): 263-272.

Corrêa, S., Petchesky, R. and R. Parker (2008). *Sexuality, Health and Human Rights*, London and New York: Routledge.

Corte, U. (2013). 'A Refinement of Collaborative Circles Theory: Resource Mobilization and Innovation in an Emerging Sport'. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 76 (1): 25–51.

Costa, M.G. (2017). *The Humanitarian-Development Nexus in South-Central Somalia and Yemen*. INTERSOS.

Court, J. and P. Amy (2005). *How Civil Society Organizations Use Evidence to Influence Policy Processes. A Literature Review*. London. Overseas Development Institute.

Cragun, R., Cragun, D. (2000) *Introduction to Sociology*, Black Sleet River.

Crawford, S. and A. Würth (2007). *Training on Human Rights-Based Approaches to Development: Experiences and Materials*, Report as part of GTZ Cross-Sectoral Project: Realizing Rights in Development Cooperation.

Cress, D.M. and D.A. Snow (1996). 'Mobilization at the Margins: Resources, Benefactors and the Viability of Homeless Social Movement Organizations'. *American Sociological Review*, 61 (6): 1089–109.

Creswell, J.W. (2014). *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. Sage Publications.

Crotty, M. (1998). *The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process*. St Leonards: Allen and Unwin.

Currier, A. (2012a). 'The Aftermath of Decolonization: Gender and Sexual Dissidence in Post-Independence Namibia'. *Signs*, 37(2), 441-467.

Currier, A. (2012b). *Out in Africa: LGBT Organizing in Namibia and South Africa*. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press.

Currier, A. (2010). 'Political Homophobia in Postcolonial Namibia'. *Gender & Society*, 24 (1): 110–29.

- Curti, G.H. (2008). 'From a Wall of Bodies to a Body of Walls'. *Emotion, Space and Society*, 1 (2): 106 – 118.
- Dahl, R. (1957). 'The Concept of Power'. *Behavioral Science*, 2, 201-215.
- Daily News: Mugabe Slams Homosexuality Again,
<https://dailynews.co.zw/?s=Mugabe+slams+homosexuality+again> 17 February 2012.
- Dandc.eu: I have no Place in Society,
<https://www.dandc.eu/en/article/homophobia-zimbabwe-hurts-mental-health-lgbti-people>, 01 August 2019.
- Dang, T.N. (2018). 'The Impact of Political Culture on the Human Rights-based Approach to Development in the Central Highlands of Vietnam'. *Journal of Sustainable Development*, 11 (1): 101-110.
- Davies, C.A. (2008). *Reflexive Ethnography: A Guide to Researching Selves and Others*, the ASA Research Methods, Routledge.
- Dawson, S. (1996). *Analysing Organizations*, London: Macmillan.
- de Saugy, Y.F. (2022). "'We Are Not Gays": Regime Preservation and the Politicization of Identity in Mugabe's Zimbabwe'. *African Studies Review*, 65 (3): 591-614.
- de Tocqueville, A. (2003 [1848]). Democracy in America. In V. Hodgkinson and M. Foley, *the Civil Society Reader* 113-153.
- de Waal, A. and R.I. Ibreck (2013). 'Hybrid Social Movements in Africa'. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 31 (2): 303–324.
- Destrooper, T. (2016). 'Linking Discourse and Practice: The Human Rights-Based Approach to Development in the Village Assaini Program in the Congo Central'. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 38 (3): 787-813.
- Destrooper, T. and P.S. Mbambi (2017). 'A Praxis-Based Understanding of New Duty-bearers: Examining Contextual Realities in the DRC'. *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 21 (2): 142-166.
- D'Hollander, D., I. Pollet and L. Beke (2013). *Promoting a Human Rights-based Approach (HRBA) Within the Development Effectiveness Agenda*, a Briefing Paper Prepared for the CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness (CPDE) Working Group on HRBA, KU Leuven, Research Institute for Work and Society.
- DiDiRi (2013). *DiDiRi Collective Literature Review: LGBTI Rights and Health*. Compiled By Hivos South Africa.
- Dionne, K.Y., B. Dulani and J. Chunga (2014). *Research Note: Attitudes toward Homosexuality in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1982-2012*. Unpublished Manuscript.

- Dichter, T. (1989). 'Issues Critical to a Shift in Responsibilities between U.S. PVOs and Southern NGOs' *Paper to the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid, the DONOR* December 6.
- Dlamini, B. (2006). 'Homosexuality in the African Context'. *Agenda*, 20:67, 128-136.
- Dohn, N.B., S.B. Hansen and S.H. Klausen (2018). 'On the Concept of Context'. *Education Sciences*, 8 (11): 1-17.
- Dreier, S.K., J.D. Long and S.J. Winkler (2020). 'African, Religious and Tolerant? How Religious Diversity Shapes Attitudes toward Sexual Minorities in Africa'. *Politics and Religion*, 13: 273–303.
- Dunton, C. and M. Palmberg (1996). *Human Rights and Homosexuality in Southern Africa*, 2ndeds, Current African Issues 19, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.
- Durkheim, E. (1915). *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, Glencoe: The Free Press, George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
- Earl, J. (2003). 'Tanks, Tear Gas and Taxes: Toward a Theory of Movement Repression'. *Sociological Theory*, 21 (1):44–68.
- Ebrahim, A. (2003). 'Accountability in Practice: Mechanisms for NGOs'. *World Development*, 31 (5): 813-829.
- Edmondson, L. (2019). 'Anti-Homosexual Acts on Trial: The Poetics of Justice in Uganda'. *TDR/The Drama Review*, 63 (2): 6-33.
- Edwards, M. (2014). *Civil Society*. 3rd Ed. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Edwards, B. and J.D. McCarthy (2004). 'Resources and Social Movement Mobilization' In Snow, D.A. S.A. Soule, and H. Kriesi (eds) *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*. Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing.
- Eisinger, P.K. (1973). 'The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities'. *American Political Science Review*, 67: 11-28.
- Elliott, C. (1987). 'Some Aspects of Relations between the North and South in the NGO Sector'. *World Development*, 15 (Supplement) 57-68.
- Ellis, S. and G. Ter Haar (2004). *Worlds of Power: Religious Thought and Political Practice in Africa*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Engelke, M. (1999). 'We Wondered What Human Rights He Was Talking About' Human Rights, Homosexuality and the Zimbabwe International Book Fair'. *Critique of Anthropology*, 19 (3): 289-314.
- Engels, B. and M. Müller (2019). 'Northern theories, Southern movements? Contentious politics in Africa through the lens of social movement theory'. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 37 (1) 72-92.
- Essien, K. and S. Aderinto (2009). "Cutting the Head of the Roaring Monster": Homosexuality and

- Repression in Africa'. *African Study Monographs*, 30 (3): 121-135.
- Escobar, M., L. Cubillos and R. Lunes (2015). 'Looking for Evidence of the Impact of Introducing a Human Rights-Based Approach in Health: The SaluDerecho Experience'. *Health and Human Rights* 17 (2) E57-E70.
- Epprecht, M. (1998). 'The 'Unsayings' of Indigenous Homosexualities in Zimbabwe: Mapping a Blind Spot in an African Masculinity'. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 24 (4): 631-651.
- Epprecht, M. (2004). *Hungochani: The History of Dissident Sexuality in Southern Africa*. Montreal and Kingston: McGill- Queen's University Press.
- Epprecht, M. (2008). *Unspoken Facts: A History of Homosexualities in Africa*, Harare, Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ).
- Epprecht, M. (2010). 'Understanding Homophobia in Africa Today'. *Perspectives*, Cape Town, 4 (10): 1-15.
- Epprecht, M. (2012). 'Sexual Minorities, Human Rights and Public Health Strategies in Africa'. *African Affairs*, 111 (443): 223-243.
- Epprecht, M. (2013a). *Sexuality and Social Justice in Africa: Rethinking Homophobia and Forging Resistance*. London: Zed Books.
- Epprecht, M. (2013b). 'Homosexual Tropes and LGBTI Strategies of Visibility in South Africa and the Dream of Love to Come: Queer Sexuality and the Struggle for Freedom'. *The Journal of African History*, 54 (2): 298-300.
- Epprecht M. (2022). *Sex in the Archives: A Guide to The Major Documentary Source on the Early Modern History of Male-Male Sexuality in Zimbabwe*, Gay and Lesbian Memory in Action (online) Available from: <https://gala.co.za/sex-in-the-archives-marc-epprecht/> (Accessed 08 March 2023).
- Evans, H.S. and T. Mawere (2021). "'Even God Gave up on them": A Deconstruction of Homosexuality Discourses in Zimbabwe's Online Locales'. *Journal of Homosexuality*, 69 (7):1-24.
- Evans-Pritchard E. (1937). *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Zande*, Oxford: Oxford University.
- Eyben, R. (2007). 'Labelling People for Aid', In J. Moncrieffe and R. Eyben (Eds), *The Power of Labeling: How People are Categorized and Why It Matters*, Routledge.
- Fanon, F., H.K. Bhabha and J.P Sartre (2004). *The Wretched of the Earth*. Translated by Richard Philcox. New York, NY: Grove Press, 2004.
- FAO (2001). *Project Cycle Management*, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations *Technical Guide: Socio-Economic and Gender Analysis Program*. <http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/ak211e/ak211e00.pdf> [Accessed 10 May 2015].
- Ferree, M.M. (2004). 'Soft Repression: Ridicule, Stigma and Silencing in Gender-Based Movements'. pp. 85–101 in *Authority in Contention*. Emerald Group Publishing Limited.

- Flinders, M. (2018). 'Nexus Politics: Conceptualizing Everyday Political Engagement'. *Democratic Theory*, 5 (2): 56-81.
- FRA (2018). *Challenges Facing CSOs Working in Human Rights in the EU*. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2017.
- Frazer, J. (1927). *Man, God and Immortality Thoughts on Human Progress*, New York: Macmillan.
- Friedman, J. (2007). 'Beyond the Post-Structural Impasse in the Anthropology of Development'. *Dialectical Anthropology*, 30: 201-225.
- Foley, M. and V. Hodgkinson (2003). 'Introduction'. In V. Hodgkinson and M. Foley, *The Civil Society Reader*. Lebanon: University Press of New England.
- Fox, J. (2000). *Civil Society and Political Accountability: Propositions for Discussion*, Chair, Latin American and Latino Studies Program, University of California, Santa Cruz.
- Fukuyama, F. (2001). 'Social Capital, Civil Society and Development'. *Third World Quarterly*, 22 (1): 7-20.
- Gaidzanwa, R.B. (2015). 'Grappling with Mugabe's Masculinist Politics in Zimbabwe: A Gender Perspective'. In *Mugabeism? History, Politics and Power in Zimbabwe*, edited by S.J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 157-79. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- GALZ (2019a). *Experiences of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex and Queer (LGBTIQ) Students on Campus and Perceptions of Campus Climate and Student Outcomes in Zimbabwe*, Harare, GALZ.
- GALZ (2019b). *Actus Reus: An Analysis of Human Rights Violations against LGBTI Persons in Zimbabwe*, Harare: GALZ.
- GALZ (2017). *An analysis of the state of human rights violations against LGBTI persons in Zimbabwe (2011-2017)*.
- GALZ (2015). *An Assessment of the Impact of State-Sanctioned and Unsanctioned Raids on GALZ Premises and Gatherings*. Harare: GALZ.
- GALZ (2012a). *Report on Discrimination against Women in Zimbabwe Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Submitted to the Committee on the Elimination Discrimination against Women on 6 January 2012 for the 51st Session, Held in Geneva*. CEDAW Shadow Report. <http://sodraafrica.se/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/CEDAW-Shadowreport-GALZ.pds>.
- GALZ (2012b). *GALZ Violations Report 2012*. Harare: GALZ.
- GALZ (2011). *GALZ violations Report 2011*. Harare: GALZ.
- GALZ (2008). *Unspoken facts: A history of homosexualities in Africa*. Harare: GALZ and Ann Arbor: Africa Books Collective.
- GALZ (1999). *Sexual Orientation and Zimbabwe's Constitution: A Case for Inclusion*. Harare: GALZ.

- GALZ and SRHL (2022). 'Universal Periodic Review of Zimbabwe 40th Session of the Working Group January 2022 - February 2022, *Situation of Human Rights for LGBT Person*, Joint submission by GALZ and SRHL.
- Gamson, W.A. (2004). 'Bystanders, Public Opinion and the Media' In David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hans-Peter Kriesi (Eds) *Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* 246-261, Maiden, MA: Blackwell.
- Gamson, W. and D. Meyer (1996). Framing Political Opportunity. In McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. and M. Zald (Eds.), *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (275–90).
- Gauri, V. and Gloppen, S. (2012). 'Human Rights-Based Approaches to Development: Concepts, Evidence and Policy'. *Deepening Democracy*, 44 (4): 485-503.
- Geertz, C. (2000). *Available Light: Anthropological Reflections on Philosophical Topics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Geertz, C. (1971). *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
- Gedro, J. and R.C. Mizzi (2014). Feminist Theory and Queer Theory: Implications for HRD Research, and Practice, *Advances in Developing Human Resources*, 16(4): 445–456.
- Gelfand, M. (1985). 'Apparent Absence of Homosexuality and Lesbianism in Traditional Zimbabweans',
- Genzok, M. (2003). *A Synthesis of Ethnographic Research, Occasional Papers Series*, Center for Multilingual, Multicultural Research (Eds), Center for Multilingual, Multicultural Research, Rossier School of Education, University of Southern California. Los Angeles.
- Germond, P. and S. De Gruchy (1997). *Aliens in the Household of God: Homosexuality and Christian Faith in South Africa*, (Eds), Cape Town: David Philip.
- Ghanem, R. (2022). 'Human Rights between the Philosophy of Natural Law and Legal Positivism'. *SIDM*, 1: 283-298.
- Gloppen, S. and L. Rakner (2019). *The perfect enemy: From migrants to sexual minorities*, CMI BRIEF 5.
- Goddard, K. (2004). 'A Fair Representation'. *Journal of Gay and Lesbian Social Services*, 16 (1): 75-98.
- Goffman, E. (1974). *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. New York, NY: Harper.
- Gosine, A. (2005). *Sex for Pleasure, Rights to Participation and Alternatives to AIDS: Placing Sexual Minorities and/or Dissidents in Development*. Brighton, IDS Working Paper 228.
- Gunda, R.M. (2017). *Silent No Longer: Narratives of Engagement between LGBTI Groups and the Churches in Southern Africa*, Johannesburg, The Other Foundation.

- Gunn, T.J. (2016). 'The complexity of religion and the definition of "religion" in international law'. *Human Rights Journal*, 16: 189-215.
- Gramsci, A., Q. Hoare and G. Smith (1971). *Selections from the Prisons Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*. New York: International Publishers.
- Green, D. and I. Guijt (2019). *Adaptive Programming in Fragile, Conflict and Violence-Affected Settings-What Works and Under What Conditions? The Case of Institutions for Inclusive Development, Tanzania*, Action for Empowerment and Accountability Research Program (A4EA).
- Gruskin, S., D. Bogecho and L. Ferguson. (2010). 'Rights-Based Approaches to Health Policies and Programs: Articulations, Ambiguities and Assessment'. *Journal of Public Health Policy*, 31 (2): 129 – 45.
- Hamm, B. I. (2001). 'A Human Rights Approach to Development'. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 23 (4), 1005–1031.
- Han, E. and J. O'Mahoney (2014). 'British colonialism and the criminalization of homosexuality'. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 27 (2): 268-288.
- Haraway, D. (1988). 'Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective'. *Feminist Studies*, 14 (3): 575-599.
- Harding, S. (1991). *Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking from Women's Lives*, Cornell University Press.
- Hart, E. and M. Bond (1995). *Action Research for Health and Social Care*, Buckingham, Open University.
- Hart, M. (2016). *Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex Issues in Civil Society*. Global Philanthropy Project and Ben Francisco Maulbeck.
- Hartal, G. (2018). 'Fragile Subjectivities: Constructing Queer Safe Spaces'. *Social and Cultural Geography*, 19 (8): 1053-1072.
- Hausermann, J. (1998). *A Human Rights Approach to Development*, London: Rights and Humanity.
- Hegel, G. (2003) [1821]). *Philosophy of Right*, In V. Hodgkinson and M. Foley, *the Civil Society Reader* (pp. 76-95). London: University Press of New England.
- Helliker, K.D. (2012). *Debunking Civil Society. Zimbabwe and Most of the World*. Critical Studies Seminar Report. Rhodes University.
- Helmke, G. and S. Levitsky (2004). 'Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda'. *Perspectives on Politics*, 2 (4): 725–740.
- Henkin, L. (2019). *The Rights of Man Today*. Routledge.

- Hesse-Biber, S. and P. Leavy (2010). *The Ethics of Social Research*, Qualitative Practice, Sage.
- Hickey, S. and D. Mitlin (Eds.) (2009). *Rights-based Approaches to Development: Exploring the Potentials and the Pitfalls*, Sterling, USA: Kumarian Press.
- Hoksbergen, R. (2005). 'Building Civil Society through Partnership: Lessons from a Case Study of the Christian Reformed World Relief Committee'. *Development in Practice*, 15 (1): 16-27.
- Home Office (2019). Country Policy and Information Note Zimbabwe: Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity and Expression, Version 4.0. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/775001/cpin-zim-sogie_v4.0e_jan_2019.pdf [Accessed 22 August 2021].
- Home Office (2014) Country Information and Guidance - Zimbabwe: Sexual orientation and gender Identity (Online) https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1145752/1226_1413377874_cig-zimbabwe-lgbt-v1-0.pdf [Accessed 23 July 2019].
- Hooghe, M. (2005). 'Ethnic Organizations and Social Movement Theory: The Political Opportunity Structure for Ethnic Mobilization in Flanders'. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 31 (5): 975-990.
- Hudock, A. (1995). 'Sustaining Southern NGOs in Resource-Dependent Environments'. *Journal of International Development*, 7 (4): 653-667.
- Huffington Post. Zimbabwe's Gay Community Wins a Landmark Court Victory. 28 February 2014. https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/dan-littauer/zimbabwes-gay-community-w_b_4872270.html.
- Hunt, J., K. Bristowe, S. Chidyamatara and R. Harding (2017). 'They Will Be Afraid to Touch You': LGBTI People and Sex Workers' Experiences of Accessing Healthcare in Zimbabwe an In-Depth Qualitative Study'. *BMJ Global Health*, 2 (2): 1-8.
- Hunt, P., A.E., Yamin and F. Bustreo (2015). 'Making the Case: What is the Evidence of Impact of Applying Human Rights-Based Approaches to Health?' *Health and Human Rights*, 10; 17 (2): 1-10.
- Human Rights Watch (2012). Curtailing Criticism, Intimidation and Obstruction of Civil Society in Rwanda, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/08/21/curtailing-criticism/intimidation-and-obstruction-civil-society-uganda> [Accessed 22 June 2019].
- Izugbara, C., S. Bakare, M. Sebany, B. Ushie, F. Wekesah and J. Njagi (2020). 'Regional Legal and Policy Instruments for Addressing LGBT Exclusion in Africa'. *Sexual and Reproductive Health Matters*, 28 (1): 99- 111.
- James, R. and C. Malunga (2006). 'Organizational challenges facing civil society networks in Malawi'. *KM4D Journal*, 2 (2): 48-63.
- Jayasuriya, S. (2012). 'Post Tsunami Recovery: Issues and Challenges in Sri Lanka'. *Tourism Concern*, (5): 74-76.

- Jenkins, J.C. (1983). 'Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements'. *Annual Review of Sociology*, (9): 527–53.
- Jolly, S. (2000). "'Queering" Development: Exploring the Links between Same-Sex Sexualities, Gender and Development'. *Gender and Development* 8 (1): 78-88.
- Jolly, S. (2006). *Not So Strange Bedfellows: Sexual Rights and International Development*, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Jolly, S. (2008). 'Rethinking Sexuality and Policy'. *Insights*, 75, Brighton: IDS.
- Jolly, S. and S. Corrêa (2006). 'Sexuality, Development and Human Rights' *Expert Group on Development Issues*, Department for International Development Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden.
- Kabeer, N. (2002). *Citizenship and the Boundaries of the Acknowledged Community: Identity, Affiliation and Exclusion*. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.
- Kaldor, M. (2003). 'Civil Society and Accountability'. *Journal of Human Development*, 4:1, 5-27.
- Kamwangamalu, N.M. (2016). 'Ubuntu in South Africa: A Sociolinguistic Perspective to a Pan-African Concept'. *Critical Arts*, 13 (2): 24–41.
- Karlsson, R. (2015). *LGBT and the Universal Enjoyment of Human Rights*. Thesis in Public International Law. Faculty of Law Stockholm University.
- Katsui, H. (2008). *Negotiating the Human Rights-Based Approach and the Charity-Based Approach In Development Cooperation Activities: Experiences of Deaf Women in Uganda*. In T. Veintie and P. Virtanen (Eds.) *Local and Global Encounters: Norms, Identities and Representations in Formation*. Renvall Institute Publications 25, Helsinki P.9-28.
- Keane, J. (2009). *Civil Society: Definitions and Approaches*. Springer Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
- Kehl, K. (2018). 'In Sweden, Girls are Allowed to Kiss Girls and Boys are Allowed to Kiss Boys: Pride Jarva and the Inclusion of the LGBT other in Swedish Nationalist Discourse'. *Sexualities*, 21 (4): 674-91.
- Kemp D. and F. Vanclay (2013). 'Human Rights and Impact Assessment: Clarifying the Connections in Practice, in'. *Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal*, 31(2): 86-96.
- Kennedy, C. E., Baral, S. D., Fielding-Miller, R., Adams, D., Dlodlu, P., Sithole, B. (2013). "'They are Human Beings, they are Swazi": Intersecting Stigmas and the Positive Health, Dignity and Prevention Needs of HIV Positive Men Who Have Sex with Men in Swaziland'. *Journal of the International AIDS Society*, 16 (4Suppl 3).
- Kenyon, K.H. (2019). 'Health Advocacy on the Margins: Human Rights as a Tool for HIV Prevention among LGBTI Communities in Botswana'. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 37 (2): 257-273.

- Khomba, J.K. (2011). *Redesigning the Balanced Scorecard Model: An African Perspective*. Ph.D. Dissertation, Pretoria, University of Pretoria.
- Kitschelt, H.B. (1986). 'Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements In Four Democracies'. *British Journal of Political Science*, (16): 57-85.
- Kokera, R. and S. Ndoma (2016). *In Zimbabwe, Tolerance Crosses Ethnic, Religious, National-But Not Sexual-Lines*, Afrobarometer. http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno124_tolerance_in_zimbabwe.pdf [Accessed 20 June 2020].
- Koopmans, R. (2004). 'Political Opportunity Structure: Some Splitting to Balance the Lumping'. In Goodwin, J. and J. Jasper (Eds.), *Rethinking Social Movements*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield (61-73).
- Koyama, E. (2010). 'The Uganda Controversy: Solidarity vs. Imperialism in LGBT Organizing'. *Tikkun*, 25 (4): 59 Duke University Press.
- Kretz, A.J. (2013). 'From "Kill the Gays" to Kill the Gay Rights Movement". The Future of Homosexuality Legislation in Africa'. *Journal of International Human Rights*, 11 (3): 208-244.
- Kubatana.net: GALZ co-Chairperson charged, 24 August 2012.
- Kumar, K. (1993). 'Civil Society: An Inquiry into the Usefulness of a Historical Term'. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 44 (3): 375-395.
- Laine, J. (2014). 'Debating Civil Society: Contested Conceptualizations and Development Trajectories'. *International Journal of Not-For-Profit Law*, 16 (1): 59-77.
- Landoni, P. and B. Corti (2011). 'The Management of International Development Projects: Moving Toward a Standard Approach or Differentiation'. *Project Management Journal*, 42 (3): 45-61.
- Lang, S. (2013). *NGOs, Civil Society and the Public Sphere*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Leach, E. (1982). *Social Anthropology*. London: Fontana Paperbacks.
- Leilani, E. (2015). 'How Do Institutions Engage with the Idea of a Human Rights-Based Approach to Matters Involving Children?' A Case Study of UNICEF and the World Bank, Thesis Submitted in Total Fulfillment of The Doctor of Philosophy Degree to the Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne.
- Lewis, D. (1998). 'Partnership as Process: Building an Institutional Ethnography of an Inter-Agency Aquaculture Project in Bangladesh' In Mosse, D., Farrington, J., & Rew, A. (Eds) (1998) *Development as Process: Concepts and Methods for Working with Complexity* London: Routledge.
- Lewis, D. and N. Khanji (2009). *Non-Governmental Organizations and Development*. Abingdon. UK: Routledge.
- Lind, A. (2009). 'Governing Intimacy, Struggling for Sexual Rights: Challenging Heteronormativity in

- the Global Development Industry'. *Sexuality and Development, Development*, 52 (1): 34–42.
- Lister, S. (2000). 'Power in Partnership? An Analysis of an NGO's Relationship with its Partners'. *Journal of International Development*, 12 (2): 227-239.
- Locke, J. (1965). 'Second Treaties of Government'. In J. Locke, *Two Treaties of Government*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Logie, C.H. (2021). 'Sexual Rights and Sexual Pleasure: Sustainable Development Goals and the Omitted Dimensions of Leave No One Behind Sexual Health Agenda'. *Global Public Health*, 1-12.
- Long, S. (2003). *More Than a Name: State-Sponsored Homophobia and its Consequences in Southern Africa*: Human Rights Watch, International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission. New York: HRW.
- Luirink, B. (2008). *Behind the Mask*. In Dube, Ireen and Hielkema André (ed.) (2008), *Urgency Required: Gay and Lesbian Rights are Human Rights*, Hivos.
- Mabvurira, V. and A.B. Matsika (2013). 'An Analysis of the Response of Traditional Cultural Leaders to the Appearance of Homosexuality as a Public Topic in Zimbabwe'. *International Journal of Politics and Good Governance*, 4 (4.3) Quarter III.
- Macionis. J.J. (2012). *Sociology*. Boston: Pearson.
- Makofane, K. (2013). 'Unspoken Facts: A History of Homosexualities in Africa'. *Culture, Health and Sexuality*, 15 (Sup1):114-116.
- Matebeni, Z., V. Reddy, T. Sandfort and I. Southey-Swartz (2013). "I Thought We Are Safe": Southern African Lesbians' Experiences of Living with HIV'. *Culture, Health and Sexuality*, 15 (sup1): 34-47.
- Mandela, N. (2006). 'Foreword'. In R. J. Khoza (Ed.), *Let Africa Lead: African Transformational Leadership for 21st Century Business*. Johannesburg: Vezubuntu.
- Mandipa, E. (2017). 'The Suppression of Sexual Minority Rights: A Case Study of Zimbabwe', In *Protecting the Human Rights of Sexual Minorities in Contemporary Africa*, Namwase and S. and Jouko, A. (Eds) pp.151-158.
- Manganga, K. (2012). 'The Internet as Public Sphere: A Zimbabwean Case Study 1999-2008'. *Africa Development*, XXXVII (1): 103 – 118.
- Manji, F. (1998). The Depoliticization of Poverty, In D. Eade (Ed.), *Development and Rights*, Oxford: Oxfam GB, 12-33.
- Manyonganise, M. (2015). 'Oppressive and Liberative: A Zimbabwean Woman's Reflections on Ubuntu'. *VERBUM et Ecclesia*, 2 (33): 3-10.
- Marumo, P.O. and M. Chakale (2019). 'Philosophical Evaluation of South African Strategy in Confronting Homophobia', *African Renaissance: (Special Issue, September 2019)*:9-25.

- Marx, C. (2002). 'Ubu and Ubuntu: on the Dialectics of Apartheid and Nation Building'. *Politikon*, 29 (1): 49–69.
- Mason, C.L. (2018). *Queering Development Planning from: Routledge, Handbook of Queer Development Studies*, Routledge.
- Mashininga, K. (2021). 'Mugabe's Homophobia Still Haunts LGBTIQ Community', *University World News*, 22 April 2021. P.1.
- Masunungure, E.V. (2014). *The Changing Role of Civil Society in Zimbabwe's Democratic Processes: 2014 and Beyond*, Working Paper, Bonn, and Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- Masunungure, E.V. (2011). *Zimbabwe at the Crossroads: Challenges for Civil Society*. Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa.
- Matolino, B. and W. Kwindigwi (2013). 'The end of Ubuntu, South African'. *Journal of Philosophy*, 32 (2): 197-205.
- Mbaye, A.C and M. Epprecht (2022). 'New Studies of Sexual Orientation, Gender Identities and Expression in Africa South of the Sahara: Complicating the Narrative'. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, DOI: 10.1080/00083968.2022.2142253.
- Mbiti, J. (1969). *African Religions and Philosophy*. Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers.
- McAdam, D. (1982). *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency: 1930-1970*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- McAdam, D. (1996). 'Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions'. In Doug McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. and M. Zald (Eds.), *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (23–40).
- McAdam, D., J.D. McCarthy and M.N. Zald (Eds.) (1996). *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- McCandless, E. and E. Pajibo (2003). *Between Perception and Reality: Are NGOs Really Making a Difference?* Harare: A Report for MWENGO.
- McCarthy, J.D. (1987). 'Pro-Life and Pro-Choice Mobilization: Infrastructure Deficits and New Technologies', In M.N. Zald and J.D. McCarthy (Eds), *Social Movements in an Organizational Society*, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press, pp. 49–66.
- McCarthy, J.D. (1996). 'Mobilizing Structures: Constraints and Opportunities in Adopting, Adapting and Inventing', In D. McAdam, J.D. McCarthy and M.N. Zald (Eds), *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, New York: Cambridge University Press, Pp. 141–51.
- McCarthy, J.D., Zald, M.N. (1977). 'Resource Mobilization and Social Movements'. *Am. J. Sociol*, 82 (12): 12-41.

- McCarthy J.D. and M.N. Zald (1987). 'Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory' In Buechler Steven M. and F. Kurt Cylke (Eds.), *Social Movements: Perspectives and Issues* Mountain View, Mayfield Publishing, pp. 149-172.
- McEwen, H. (2020). *Un/Knowing and Un/Doing Sexuality and Gender Diversity: The Global Anti-Gender Movements against SOGIE Rights and Academic Freedom*. Johannesburg: A Report Written for the Norwegian Students` and Academics` International Assistance Fund.
- McKinnon, I., A. Lor and D.P. Evans (2019). 'An Assessment of Human Rights-Based Approaches to Health Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices Among Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Locally Employed Staff'. *Health and Human Rights Journal*, 21 (1): 33–44.
- McNamara, T. (2014). 'Not the Malawi of our Parents: Attitudes toward Homosexuality and Perceived Westernization in Northern Malawi'. *African Studies*, 73 (1): 84-106.
- Meer, T. Lunau, M. Oberth, G. Daskilewicz, K. and A. Müller (2017). *Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex Human Rights in Southern Africa: A Contemporary Literature Review 2012-2016*. Johannesburg: Hivos.
- Meredith, M. (2002). *Robert Mugabe: Power, Plunder and Tyranny in Zimbabwe*. Jeppes Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers Ltd.
- Merry, S.E. (2016). *The Seductions of Quantification: Measuring Human Rights, Gender Violence and Sex Trafficking*. The University of Chicago Press.
- Messer, E. (1993). 'Anthropology and Human Rights'. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 22, 221-249.
- Melhus, M., J.P. Mitchell and H. Wulf (2010). *Ethnographic Practice in the Present*. Berghahn Books.
- Merkel, W. (2004). 'Embedded and Defective Democracies'. *Democratization*, 11 (5): 33-58.
- Meyer, D.S. (2004). 'Protest and Political Opportunities'. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 30, 125-145.
- Miller, A.M. (2000). 'Sexual but not Reproductive: Exploring the Junction and Disjunction of Sexual and Reproductive Rights'. *Health and Human Rights- Reproductive and Sexual Rights*, 4 (2): 68-109.
- Miller, A.M., E. Kismödi, J. Cottingham and S. Gruskin (2015). 'Sexual Rights as Human Rights: A Guide to Authoritative Sources and Principles for Applying Human Rights to Sexuality and Sexual Health'. *Reproductive Health Matters*, 23 (46): 16-30.
- Miller, H. (2017). 'Rejecting 'Rights-Based Approaches' to Development: Alternative Engagements With Human Rights'. *Journal of Human Rights*, 16 (1): 61-78.
- Miller, H. and R. Redhead (2019). 'Beyond 'Rights-Based Approaches'? Employing a Process and Outcomes Framework'. *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 23 (5): 699-718.
- Mitlin, D. and Hickey, S. (2009). The Rise of Rights-Based Approaches to Development. In *Rights-Based*

Approaches to Development: Exploring the Potential and Pitfalls, Hickey, S., and D. Mitlin (Eds.) (Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press).

- Mohan, S. (2002). 'Role and Relevance of Civil Society Organizations'. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, 63 (2/3): 193-211.
- MoHCC (2020). *Zimbabwe National HIV and AIDS Strategic Plan 2021 – 2025*, AIDS & TB Program, Harare: Ministry of Health and Child Care.
- Mokhobo, S. (1989). 'AIDS and the Mining Industry', In *Chamber of Mines Newsletter*. August/October.
- Moloketi, G.R. (2009). 'Towards A Common Understanding of Corruption in Africa'. *Public Policy and Administration*, 24 (3): 331-338.
- Moore, H. and G. Wekker (2011). 'Intimate Truths about Subjectivity and Sexuality: A Psychoanalytical and a Postcolonial Approach'. In *Feminist Studies: A Guide to Intersectional Theory, Methodology and Writing*, Edited by Nina Lykke. New York: Taylor and Francis.
- Morgan, P. (2006). *The Concept of Capacity*, European Center for Development Policy Management.
- Morris, A. (2000). 'Reflections on Social Movement Theory: Criticisms and Proposals'. *Contemporary Sociology*, 29 (3): 445–454.
- Morten, B. and S. Hans-Otto (2018). 'Strengths and Weaknesses in a Human Rights-based Approach to International Development. An Analysis of a Rights-Based Approach to Development Assistance Based on Practical Experiences'. *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 2 (5): 664-680.
- Moyo, J.N. (2019). *How Zimbabwe's 2018 Presidential Election Was Stolen*, Harare, SAPES Books.
- Moyo, S. (2004). *The Overall Impact of the Fast Track Land Reform Program*, AIAS Books.
- Moyo, S. (2014a). 'Regime Survival Strategies in Zimbabwe after Independence'. *Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy*, 2 (1): 103-114.
- Moyo, S. (2014b). *Corruption in Zimbabwe: An Examination of the Roles of the State and Civil Society in Combating Corruption*, A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment for the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, University of Central Lancashire.
- Moyo, S., J. Makumbe and B. Raftopoulos (2000). *NGOs, the State and Politics in Zimbabwe*. Harare, SAPES Books.
- Msibi, T. (2014). *Is Current Theorizing on Same-sex Sexuality Relevant to the African Context? The need for more African Voices on Theorizing Same-sex Desire in Africa*: Available from <http://www.pambazuka.org/governance/current-theorising-same-sex-sexuality-relevant-african-context> [Accessed 23/11/2018].
- Munemo, D. (2014). *A Comparative Study of the Nexus between Modes of Liberation and Regime Survival: The Case of Zambia and Zimbabwe*. Gweru: Midlands State University.
- Muparamoto, N. (2020). 'LGBT Individuals and the Struggle against Robert Mugabe's Extirpation in

Zimbabwe'. *Africa Review*, 13 (2): 1-16.

- Murray, S.O. and W. Roscoe (1998). *Boy-Wives and Female Husbands: Studies of African Homosexualities*, New York: Palgrave.
- Musaala, A. (2014). *Challenges to the Rights of Sexual Minorities in Africa*, London: UK.
- Musser, R. (2014). *The Two Main Challenges Facing African Civil Society Organizations*, CIPE.
- Muzondidya, J. (2009). "From Buoyancy to Crisis 1980-1997." In Raftopoulos, B. and Mlambo, A.M. (Eds) *Becoming Zimbabwe: A history from the pre-colonial period to 2008*. Harare: Weaver Press, 167-200.
- Mwakasungula, U. (2013). *The LGBT Situation in Malawi: An Activist Perspective*. In Lennox, C., Waits, M. (Ed.), *Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in the Commonwealth: Struggle for Decriminalization and Change* (pp. 359-380). London: Institute of Commonwealth Studies.
- Naidoo, K. (2003). *Civil Society Accountability: "Who Guards the Guardians?"* World Alliance for Citizen Participation, UN Headquarters, New York: CIVICUS.
- NANGO (2013). *NGO Audit Report*, Harare: National Association of Non-Governmental Organizations-NANGO.
- Ndondo, H., S. Maseko and S. Ndlovu (2013). "“You can ignore us, but we won't go away”": A Qualitative Study to Explore Sexual Experiences and Vulnerability to HIV Infection among Lesbian, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex Women in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe'. *Sexually Transmitted Infections*, 89 (Supplement 1): A304-A304.
- Nussbaum, B. (2003). 'Ubuntu: Reflections of a South African on our Common Humanity'. *Reflections*, 4 (4): 21-26.
- Ncube, C. (2010). *Contesting Hegemony: Civil Society and the Struggle for Social Change in Zimbabwe, 2000 – 2008*, A Thesis Submitted to the University of Birmingham for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, International Development Department School of Government and Society, The University of Birmingham.
- Ndashe, S. (2010). *The Battle for the Recognition of LGBTI Rights as Human Rights*, In Heinrich Böll Stiftung (Ed) *Struggle for Equality: Sexual Orientation, Gender and Human Rights in Africa, Perspectives- Political Analysis and Commentary from Africa* <http://www.za.boell.org/downloads/perspectives_4-10.pdf> [Accessed 9 February 2014].
- Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J. (2009). *The Ndebele nation: Reflections on hegemony, memory and historiography*. Pretoria: UNISA Press.
- Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J. and W. Willems (2009). 'Making Sense of Cultural Nationalism and the Politics of Commemoration under the Third Chimurenga in Zimbabwe'. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 35 (4): 945–65.
- New Zimbabwe: ED [Emerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa] Courts Gay Vote as Zanu PF in a Surprise

Meeting with LGBT Reps, 22 June 2018.

- Newsday: Mugabe Ups Wars against Gays, <https://www.newsday.co.zw/2011/12/2011-12-19-mugabe-ups-war-against-gays/>, 19 December 2011.
- No Gay Rights in New Charter, <https://www.newsday.co.zw/2012/01/2012-01-11-no-gay-rights-in-new-charter/>, 11 January 2012.
 - Litter Bins Furore Takes New Twist, <https://www.newsday.co.zw/2012/01/2012-01-24-litter-bins-furore-takes-new-twist/>, 24 January 2012.
 - Devotion: Homosexuality has no Place in Africa, <https://www.newsday.co.zw/2012/02/2012-02-17-devotion-homosexuality-has-no-place-in-africa/>, 17 February 2012.
 - Gold ‘Rains’ at Makandiwa Service, <https://www.newsday.co.zw/2013/01/gold-rains-at-makandiwa-service/>, 21 January 2013.
 - Makandiwa’s Miracle Money’ Backfires, <https://www.newsday.co.zw/2016/10/makandiwas-miracle-money-backfires/>, 13 October 2016.
 - Homosexuality and Criminality, <https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/09/homosexuality-and-criminality/>, 30 September 2018.

Noonan, R.K. (1995). ‘Women against the State: Political Opportunities and Collective Action Frames In Chile’s Transition to Democracy’. *Sociological Forum*, (10): 81–111.

Nordic Trust Fund (2013). *Study on Human Rights Impact Assessments: A Review of the Literature, Differences with Other Forms of Assessments and Relevance for Development*. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/projects/resources/40940-1331068268558/hria_web.pdf - [Accessed 14 June 2018].

Nyamu-Musembi, C. and A. Cornwall (2004). *What is the ‘Rights-Based Approach’ All About? Perspectives from the International Development Agencies*, IDS Working Paper No. 234, Brighton: Institute for Development Studies.

Nyamu-Musembi, C. and S. Musyoki (2004). *Kenyan Civil Society Perspectives on Rights, Rights-Based Approaches to Development and Participation*, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.

Nyanzi, S. (2013). ‘Dismantling Reified African Culture Through Localized Homosexualities in Uganda’. *Culture, Health and Sexuality*, 15 (8): 952-967.

Nyanzi, S. (2014). *The Paradoxical Geopolitics of Recriminalizing Homosexuality in Uganda: One of Three Ugly Sisters*. Article Newsletter N.14 – Stella. Sexuality Policy Watch <http://www.sxpolitics.org/?p=9386>, [Accessed 08 December 2020].

Nyanzi, S. and A. Karamagi (2015). ‘The Social-Political Dynamics of the Anti-Homosexuality Legislation in Uganda’. *Agenda*, 29 (1): 24-38.

- Nyasani, J.M. (1980). 'The Ontological Significance of 'I' and 'We' in African Philosophy'. In *I, We and Body: First Joint Symposium of Philosophers from Africa and from the Netherlands*, ed. Heinze Kimmerle. Amsterdam: B.R. Grüner. OECD (2015). *Integrating Human Rights into Development a Synthesis of Donor Approaches and Experiences*. Prepared for the OECD DAC Network on Governance (GOVNET). Overseas Development Institute.
- Nyirabikali, G. (2016). *Opportunities and Challenges for Civil Society Contributions to Peacebuilding in Mali*, Solna, Stockholm International Research Institute.
- Oberth, G. (2014). *Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) Human Rights in Southern Africa: A Contemporary Literature Review*, Johannesburg: Hivos Southern African Sexual Diversity Rights Programme.
- Oberth, G. (2012). *Who is really affecting the Global Fund Decision-Making Process? A Community Consultation Report*. Cape Town, South Africa: AIDS Accountability International.
- OHCHR (2016). *Summary Reflection Guide on a Human Rights-Based Approach to Health: Application to Sexual and Reproductive Health, Maternal Health and Under -5 Child Health*, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights <https://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/women/wrgs/health/healthworkers.pdf> [Accessed 30 March 2020].
- OHCHR (2013). *Human Rights-based Approaches: A Tool for Sustainable Development in Developing Countries*. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations.
- OHCHR (2006). *Frequently Asked Questions on a Human Rights-based Approach to Development Cooperation*. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), New York, <http://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/faqen.pdf> [Accessed 4 December 2018].
- Oloruntoba-Oju, T. (2011). 'Sexuality Indices in Yoruba Language and Culture'. *Sexuality in Africa Monographs* 7 (2): 14-20.
- Oppenheim, F.E. (1956). 'An Analysis of Political Control: Actual and Potential'. *The Journal of Politics*, 20: 515 – 534.
- Otto, R. (1950). *The Idea of the Holy*, John W. Harvey trans, Oxford University Press 2d ed.
- Owen, J.M. (2010). *The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Network, States and Regime Change*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Oxfam (2001). *Challenges and Opportunities of Implementing a Rights-Based Approach to Development: An Oxfam America Perspective*. Oxford: Balliol College.
- Oxfam (2012). *Sexual Diversity and Gender Identity Rights Politics*, https://wwwcdn.oxfam.org/s3fpublic/file_attachments/story/sexual_diversity_and_gender_identity_rights_policy.pdf [Accessed 12 October 2020].
- Parrinder, E.G. (1980). *Sex in the World's Religions*, London: Sheldon.
- Patil, V. (2017). 'Sex, Gender and Sexuality in Colonial Modernity: Towards a Sociology of Webbed

Connectivities' In J. Go and Lawson, G. *Global Historical Sociology* Cambridge University Press, pg. 142-159.

- Patrick, R. (2015). *Conceptual Framework: A Step-by-Step Guide on How to Make One*.
<https://simplyeducate.me/2015/01/05/conceptual-framework-guide/> [Accessed 6 June 2020].
- Patton, M. (1990). *Qualitative evaluation and research methods* (pp. 169-186). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Payne, R. (2007). 'Str8acting'. *Social Semiotics*, 17(4): 525–538.
- Peace Direct (2021). *Time to Decolonize Aid: Insights and Lessons from a Global Consultation*. Lead Author: Shannon Paige. Peace Direct.
- Petchesky, R.P. (2009). 'The Language of "Sexual Minorities" and the Politics of Identity: A Position Paper'. *Reproductive Health Matters*, 17 (33): 105-110.
- Phillips, O. (2011). Blackmail in Zimbabwe: Troubling Narratives of Sexuality and Human Rights In Thoreson, R. and S. Cook (2011) *Nowhere to Turn: Blackmail and Extortion of LGBT People in Sub-Saharan Africa*, New York: International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission.
- Phillips, O. (2004). 'The Invisible Presence of Homosexuality: Implications for HIV/AIDS and Rights in Southern Africa,' in Alipeni A. et al. (ed.) *HIV and AIDS in Africa: Beyond Epidemiology*. Oxford: Blackwell, 155-166.
- Piron, L. and H. Sano (2016). *Lessons Learned on the Danish Human Rights-Based Approach 2016 Evaluation Study*. The Danish Institute for Human Rights.
- Piron, L. and F. Watkins (2004). *DFID Human Rights Review a Review of How DFID Has Integrated Human Rights into Its Work*, London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Plan (2010). *Rights-based Approach to Development and Child Right Programming*, a Handbook for Plan Vietnam, Plan Vietnam, Hanoi, Luck House.
- Plipat, S. (2005). *Developmentizing Human Rights: How Development NGOs Interpret and Implement a Human Rights-Based Approach to Development Policy*. Doctoral Dissertation, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh.
- Political Research Associates (2012). *Colonizing African Values: How the U.S. Christian Right Is Transforming Sexual Politics in Africa*. <<http://www.politicalresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/10/colonizing-african-values.pdf> [Accessed 22 April 2016].
- Portwood-Stacer, L. (2010). 'Constructing Anarchist Sexuality: Queer Identity, Culture and Politics in the Anarchist Movement'. *Sexualities*, 13 (4), 479–493.
- Poteat, T., Logie, C., Adams, D., Lebona, J., Letsie, P., Beyrer, C. (2014). 'Sexual Practices, Identities and Health among Women who have Sex with Women in Lesotho—A Mixed-Methods Study'. *Culture, Health & Sexuality*, 16 (2): 120-135.
- Pratt, N. (2004). 'Bringing Politics Back In: Examining the Link between Globalization and

- Democratization'. *Review of International Political Economy*, 11(2): 331-336.
- Putnam, R. (1995). 'Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital'. *Journal of Democracy*, 6 (1): 65-78.
- Ramose, M.B. (1999). *African Philosophy through 'Ubuntu'*, Harare: Mond Books.
- Rapaport, J., J. Manthorpe, J. Moriarty, S. Hussein and J. Collins (2005). 'Advocacy for People with Learning Disabilities in the UK: How Can Local Funders Find Value for Money?' *Journal of Intellectual Disabilities*, 9 (4): 299–319.
- Reeves, S., A. Kuper and B.D. Hodges (2008). Qualitative Research Methodologies: Ethnography. *BMJ*, 337.
- Reinsborough, P. (2004). Post-Issue Activism – Decolonizing the Revolutionary Imagination: Values Crisis, the Politics of Reality and Why There's Going to be a Common-Sense Revolution in this Generation. In Solnit, D. (Ed.) *Globalize Liberation: How to Uproot the System and Build a Better World*, pp.161-211. San Francisco, CA: City Lights Books. Reiter, D. (2017). *Foreign- Imposed Regime Change, Governance, Political Change and World Politics*.
- Reiter, B. (2017). 'Theory and Methodology of Exploratory Social Science Research'. *International Journal of Science and Research Methodology*, 5 (4): 129-150.
- Report On Cartel Power (2021). *Report on Power Cartel Dynamics in Zimbabwe*. Malverick Citizen, <https://www.pindula.co.zw/images/c/ce/cartel-power-dynamics-02-feb-2021-optimized.pdf> [Accessed 22 February 2021].
- Richardson, R.N. (2008). 'Reflections on Reconciliation and Ubuntu', in: Nicholson, R. (ed.). *Persons in Community: African Ethics in a Global Culture*. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, pp. 65–83.
- Rosenthaler, U. (2010). *An Ethnography of Associations?* Translocal Research in the Cross River.
- Rubin, G. (1984). 'Thinking Sex: Notes for A Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality', In C. Vance (Ed.) *Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality*, Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Ryan, W. S., N. Legate, N. Weinstein and Q. Rahman (2017). 'Autonomy Support Fosters Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Identity Disclosure and Wellness, especially for those with Internalized Homophobia'. *Journal of Social Issues*, 73 (2): 289-306.
- Sachikonye, L. (2005). 'The Land is the Economy: Revisiting the Land Question'. *African Security Review*, 14 (3): 31-44.
- Sachikonye, L. (2007). *Consolidating Democracy and Governance in Southern Africa: Zimbabwe*, <www.eisa.org.za> [Accessed 15 October 2016].
- SAIH (2021a). SAIH's *Strategy for Development Cooperation 2022-2026* SAIH, Oslo, Unpublished.
- SAIH (2021b). *Position Paper on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Expression (SOGIE)*, Oslo,

Unpublished.

SAIH (2021c). *SAIH's 2022 – 2026 Funding Proposal Application Template*, Oslo, Unpublished.

Saki, O. and W. Katema (2011). 'Voices from Civil Society'. In: Murithi, T. and Mawadza, A. (eds.) 2011. *Zimbabwe in transition: A view within*. South Africa: The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. pp. 44-76.

Sandfort, T.G., L.R. Baumann, Z. Matebeni, V. Reddy and I. Southey-Swartz (2013). 'Forced Sexual Experiences as a Risk Factor for Self-Reported HIV Infection among Southern African Lesbian and Bisexual Women'. *PloS One*, 8 (1): e53552.

Sarpong, S. (2012). 'The Reach and Boundaries of Moral Concerns: Which Way for British Aid in Africa?' *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 0 (0): 1–16.

Saunders, M., P. Lewis and A. Thornhill (2009). *Research Methods for Business Students*, 5thed, Harlow, Prentice Hall.

Schafer, R. and E. Range (2014). *The Political Use of Homophobia: Human Rights and Persecution of LGBTI Activists in Africa*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, International Policy Analysis, <<http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/10610.pdf>> [Accessed 30 June 2016].

Schwedler, J. (1995). 'Introduction' In Schwedler, J. (Ed.) *Toward Civil Society in the Middle East: A Primer*; Lynne Rienner, Boulder CO.

Scotland, J. (2012). *Exploring the Philosophical Underpinnings of Research: Relating Ontology and Epistemology to the Methodology and Methods of the Scientific, Interpretive and Critical Research Paradigms*, Canadian Center of Science and Education Accessed <<http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/elt/article/viewfile/19183/12667>> [Accessed 15 July 2015].

Seligman, A.B. (1992). *The Idea of Civil Society*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Seppänen, S. (2005). *Possibilities and Challenges of the Human Rights-Based Approach to Development*, Helsinki, Hakapaino Oy.

Shoko, T. (2010). "'Worse Than Dogs and Pigs" Attitudes towards Homosexual Practice in Zimbabwe'. *Journal of Homosexuality*, 57 (5): 634-649.

Shoko, T. and D. Phiri (2017). *Canaries in the Coal Mines: An Analysis of Spaces for LGBTI Activism in Zimbabwe: Country Report*. Johannesburg: Other Foundation.

Shriver, T.E. and A.E. Adams (2010). 'Cycles of Repression and Tactical Innovation: The Evolution of Environmental Dissidence in Communist Czechoslovakia'. *The Sociological Quarterly* 51 (2): 329–354.

SIDA (2014a). Human Rights-based Approach at SIDA Compilation of Briefs on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) Persons (<<https://www.sida.se/contentassets/89da6ee09a8547a7b876ce8c02e49aee/18254.pdf>> [Accessed 2 June 2018]).

- SIDA (2014b). *The Rights of LGBT People in Zimbabwe*
<https://www.sida.se/globalassets/sida/eng/partner/human-rights-based-approach//lgbti/rights-of-lgbt-persons-zimbabwe.pdf> [Accessed On 30 March 2019].
- SIDA (2008). *Integrating the Rights Perspective in Programming: Lessons Learnt from Swedish-Kenyan Development Cooperation*, Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation SADEV Report 2008:2, Karlstad.
- Sigamoney, V. and M. Epprecht (2013). ‘Meanings of Homosexuality, Same-Sex Sexuality and Africanness in Two South African Townships: An Evidence-Based Approach for Rethinking Same-Sex Prejudice’. *African Studies Review*, 56 (2): 83–107.
- Slim, H. (2002). *By What Authority? The Legitimacy and Accountability of Non-Governmental Organizations, International Meeting on Global Trends and Human Rights — Before and after September 11*, International Council on Human Rights Policy, Geneva: Oxford Brookes University.
- Slim, H. (2002). ‘Not Philanthropy but Rights: The Proper Politicization of Humanitarian Philosophy’. *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 6 (2): 1–22.
- Smith, B.A., Z. Murib, M. Motta, T.H. Callaghan and M. Theys (2017). “‘Gay’ or ‘Homosexual’? The Implications of Social Category Labels for the Structure of Mass Attitudes.” *American Politics Research*. 1–37.
- Solomon, M. and M. Hove (2017). *Gay Zimbabweans Fight Stigma, Harsh Laws*.
<https://www.voanews.com/a/zimbabwe-gay-rights-lgbt/3673999.html> [Accessed 23 March 2017].
- Spade, D. (2015). *Normal Life: Administrative Violence, Critical Trans Politics and the Limits of the Law*, 2nd ed. Duke University Press.
- Steber, C. (2018). *What’s The Difference Between Key Informant Interviews and In-Depth Interviews?* Market Research Blog. <https://www.cfrinc.net/cfrblog/key-informant-versus-in-depth-interviews> [Accessed 1 May 2019].
- Swidler, A. (1993) *Homosexuality and World Religions*, Pennsylvania: Trinity.
- Szántó, D. (2016). ‘The NGOization of Civil Society in Sierra Leone: A Thin Line between Empowerment Disempowerment’. In: Mustapha, M., Bangura, J.J. (Eds) *Democratization and Human Security in Postwar Sierra Leone*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, pp 133–161.
- Tamale, S. (2008). ‘The Right to Culture and the Culture of Rights: A Critical Perspective on Women’s Sexual Rights in Africa’. *Feminist Legal Studies*, 16 (1): 47-69.
- Tamale, S. (2009). *A Human Rights Impact Assessment of the Anti-Homosexuality Bill*, Public Dialogue November 18, 2009, Makerere University.
- Tamale, S. (2011). *African Sexualities: A Reader*, (Eds) Oxford: Pambazuka Press.
- Tamale, S. (2014). ‘Exploring the Contours of African Sexualities: Religion, Law and Power’. *African Human Rights Law Journal*, 14 (1): 150-177.

- Taru, J. and H.S. Basure (2014). 'Rethinking the Illegality of Homosexuality in Zimbabwe: A Riposte To Chemhuru'. *International Journal of Politics and Good Governance*, (5): (5.1).
- Tarusarira, J. (2013). 'Civil society and generation of trust in Zimbabwe'. *The African Review: A Journal of African Politics, Development, and International Affairs*, 40 (2): 140-161.
- Taruvinga, M. and M. Mushayamunda (2018). 'Homosexuality as a Silent Insider: A Call for Social Work Discourse among Lesbians, Gays and Bisexual (LGB) in Zimbabwe'. *Mgbakoigba, Journal of African Studies*, 7 (2): 23-38.
- Tarrow, S. (1994). *Power in Movement*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tarrow, S. (1983). *Struggling to Reform: Social Movements and Policy Change During Cycles of Protest*. Western Societies Program Occasional Paper No.15. Ithaca, N.Y: New York Center for International Studies, Cornell University.
- Taylor, E.B. (1871). *Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language, Art and Custom*, 2nd ed. London: John Murray
- TDR (2014). *Data Analysis and Presentation*, Special Program for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases (TDR), World Health Organization.
- The Chronicle: I'm not a ZANU-PF Puppet — Kunonga, <https://www.chronicle.co.zw/im-not-a-zanu-pf-puppet-kunonga/>, 30 September 2011.
- Outrage in Bulawayo as Homo Pressure Group Donates to Mayor, <https://www.chronicle.co.zw/outrage-in-bulawayo-as-homo-pressure-group-donates-to-mayor/>, 06 December 2011.
- The Herald: AFM Lashes Out on Homosexuality, 3 September 2010.
- Divisions Rock COPAC: Guard against Gay Rights, ZANU-PF Supporters Urged 15 September 2010.
 - Outlaw Homosexuality, Zimbabweans Tell COPAC, <https://www.herald.co.zw/outlaw-homosexuality-zimbabweans-tell-copac/>, 22 November 2011.
 - Gays Will Be Severely Punished, Says President, <https://www.herald.co.zw/gays-will-be-severely-punished-says-president/>, 24 November 2011.
 - Scottish Catholic Leader Condemns Homosexuality, <https://www.herald.co.zw/scottish-catholic-leader-condemns-homosexuality/>, 6 March 2012.
 - Homosexuality Illegal, Says Chinamasa, <https://www.herald.co.zw/homosexuality-illegal-says-chinamasa/>, 21 May 2012.

- Chihuri Slams False Prophets, Homosexuals, <https://www.herald.co.zw/chihuri-slams-false-prophets-homosexuals/>, 11 June 2012.
- Tsvangirai Denounces Homosexuality, <https://www.herald.co.zw/tsvangirai-denounces-homosexuality/>, 6 March 2013.
- President Saluted for Stance against Homosexuality, <https://www.herald.co.zw/president-saluted-for-stance-against-homosexuality/>, 24 May 2013.
- 2013: The Curious Case of Miracle Money, <https://www.herald.co.zw/2013-the-curious-case-of-miracle-money/>, 27 December 2013.
- US Hypocrisy on Homosexuality Exposed, <https://www.herald.co.zw/us-hypocrisy-on-homosexuality-exposed/>, 5 March 2014.
- Homosexuality as Collateral for ‘Dead Aid’, <https://www.herald.co.zw/homosexuality-as-collateral-for-dead-aid/>, 10 March 2014.
- Zim[babwe] Dancehall Raps Homosexuality, <https://www.herald.co.zw/zim-dancehall-raps-homosexuality/>, 25 March 2014.
- Recolonization by Homosexualization: Plan to Diminish Africans? <https://www.herald.co.zw/recolonization-by-homosexualization-plan-to-diminish-africans/>, 08 April 2014.
- Homosexual Rights: Africa in the Dock, <https://www.herald.co.zw/homosexual-rights-africa-in-the-dock/>, 10 April 2014.
- President Uncompromising on ‘Fronts’, Gays, <https://www.herald.co.zw/president-uncompromising-on-fronts-gays/>, 30 October 2014.
- Gays, Lesbians Need Deliverance, <https://www.herald.co.zw/gays-lesbians-need-deliverance/>, 31 March 2015.
- EU Envoy Rapped over Gays, <https://www.herald.co.zw/eu-envoy-rapped-over-gays/>, 09 May 2015.
- Let’s Resist Recolonization by Homosexualization, <https://www.herald.co.zw/lets-resist-recolonization-by-homosexualization/>, 15 May 2015.
- Mozambique Decriminalized Homosexuality, <https://www.herald.co.zw/mozambique-decriminalises-homosexuality/>, 30 June 2015.
- Traditional Leaders in Zimbabwe Undermine the Democratic Process, 23 July 2015.

- Pope Calls for Respect for Gays, <https://www.herald.co.zw/pope-calls-for-respect-for-gays/>, 09 April 2016.
- Daily News, Gays Face Off, <https://www.herald.co.zw/daily-news-gays-face-off/>, 29 November 2016.

The Southern Africa Litigation Center: Supreme Court of Zimbabwe Sets Aside High Court Decision To Refuse Peaceful Demonstration by Sexual Rights Centre, <https://www.southernafricalitigationcenter.org/2017/11/28/news-release-supreme-court-of-zimbabwe-sets-aside-high-court-decision-to-refuse-peaceful-demonstration-by-sexual-rights-center/>, 28 November 2017.

The Sunday Mail: Homosexuality Destroys, Curses a Nation, 21-27 February 2010.

- Gay Rights Furore: ZANU-PF, MDC-T on Collision Course, 14-21 March 2010.
- Sodomy A Disgrace to Zim[babwe] Society, 28 March-3 April 2010.
- Shun Homosexuality: President, 11-17 April 2010.
- No Room for Gays in Zim[babwe], 18-25 April 2010.
- No Gay Rights in the Constitution, 18-24 July 2010.
- Parents Disown Gay Son, 12-18 September 2010.
- Gay Rights Out of Constitution, 26 February 2012.
- Gays, Lesbians Mentally Sick: Makandiwa, <https://www.sundaymail.co.zw/gays-lesbians-mentally-sick-makandiwa> , 30 March 2014.

The Sunday News: New Constitution's Stance on Gays Mirrors a Morally Upright Zimbabwe, 5 March 2012.

- Chiefs Say Gays Have No Place in the New Constitution of Zimbabwe 7-13 February 2010.

The Telegraph: Archbishop of Canterbury 'To Meet' Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/08/archbishop-canterbury-robert-mugabe>, 08 September 2011.

The Zimbabwean: GALZ Employees Claim Torture by Police, 30 May 2010.

The Zimbabwe Mail: We [Do Not] Support Gays Rights: Chamisa, 4 March 2012.

- Mugabe Attacks Gays Yet His Journalist is One, 24 November 2011.

Theron, L., J. McAllister and M. Armisen (2016). A Call for Critical Reflection on Queer/LGBTIA+ Activism in Africa. Sexuality Policy Watch (Online). Available from: <https://sxpolitics.org/a-call-for-critical-reflection-on-queerlgbtia-activism-in-africa/14803>. Accessed 12 February 2022.

- Thiel, M. (2019). Theorizing the EU's International Promotion of LGBTI Rights Policies in the Global South. In *EU Development Policies*. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.
- Thomas, R., Kuruvilla, S., Hinton, R., Jensen, L.B.S., Magar, V. and F. Bustreo (2017). 'Assessing the Impact of a Human Rights-Based Approach Across a Spectrum of Change for Women's, Children's, and Adolescents' Health'. *Health and Human Rights Journal*, 17 (2): 11-20.
- Tilly, C. (1978). *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, Mass: Addison Wesley.
- Tinarwo, M.T. and D. Pasura (2014). 'Negotiating and Contesting Gendered and Sexual Identities in the Zimbabwean Diaspora'. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 40 (3): 521-538.
- Turner, D.W. (2010). 'Qualitative Interview Design: A Practical Guide for Novice Investigators'. *The Qualitative Report*, 15 (3): 754-760.
- Tutu, D.M. (2004). *God has a dream: A vision of hope for our time*. Cape Town: Africa: Image Books/Doubleday.
- Tutu, D.M. (1999). *No Future without Forgiveness*. London: Rider.
- UNDG (2003). *The Human Rights-based Approach to Development Cooperation: Towards a Common Understanding among UN Agencies* Stamford Interagency Workshop on A Human Rights-Based Approach in the Context of UN Reform.
- UNDP (2016). *Marginalized Minorities in Development Planning*, www.undp.org/governance [Accessed 16 March 2017].
- UNDP (2006). *Applying a Human Rights-based Approach to Development Cooperation and Programming*, UNDP Capacity Development Resource, Capacity Development Group, Bureau for Development Policy, United Nations Development Program http://waterwiki.net/images/e/ee/applying_hrba_to_development_programming.pdf [Accessed 16 March 2017].
- UNICEF (2017). *Zimbabwe – The Impact of Language Policy and Practice on Children's Learning: Evidence from Eastern and Southern Africa 2017*, UNICEF Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office (ESARO), Basic Education and Gender Equality (BEGE) Section.
- UNICEF (2016). 'A Human Rights Approach to UNICEF Programming for Children and Women: What it is and some Changes it will bring'. http://coe-dmha.org/unicef/hpt_introreading01.htm [10 May 2020].
- UNICEF (2015). *Introduction to the Human Rights-based Approach: A Guide to Finnish NGOs and Other Partners*, Finnish Committee for UNICEF. http://hrbaportal.org/wp-content/files/hrba_manuaali_final_pdf_small2.pdf [Accessed 16 November 2019].
- United Nations (2017) *Brief Explanation of a Human Rights-Based Approach (HRBA)*, UN Viet Nam.
- United Nations (2015). *Summary Reflection Guide on a Human Rights-Based Approach to Health*

Application to Sexual and Reproductive Health, Maternal Health and Under-5 Child Health, United Nations,

UNFPA (2010). *A Human Rights-Based Approach to Programming, Practical Implementation Manual and Training Materials*, Gender, Human Rights and Culture Branch of UNFPA Technical Division (GHRCB) and the Program of International Health and Human Rights, Harvard School of Public Health Program of International Health and Human Rights.

UNRISD (2016). *The Human Rights-based Approach to Social Protection*, United Nations Research Institute of Social Development Issue Brief 02. <[http://www.unrisd.org/80256b3c005bccf9/\(httpauxpages\)/1e57fc1e56010c2cc125801b004b0d10/\\$file/ib2%20-%20human%20rights%20based%20approach.pdf](http://www.unrisd.org/80256b3c005bccf9/(httpauxpages)/1e57fc1e56010c2cc125801b004b0d10/$file/ib2%20-%20human%20rights%20based%20approach.pdf)> [Accessed 16 March 2017].

Uvin, P. (2004). *Human Rights and Development*, Bloomfield, Kumarian Press.

van Adriaan, K., and E. Chitando (2016). Introduction: Christianity and the Politics of Homosexuality in Africa, In Ezra Chitando and Adriaan Van Klinken (Eds.), *Christianity and Controversies Over Homosexuality in Contemporary Africa*, London and New York: Routledge, 1-17.

van Klinken, A. and E. Chitando (2016). *Public Religion and the Politics of Homosexuality in Africa*, eds. London: Routledge.

van Klinken, A. S. and M.R. Gunda (2012). 'Taking up the Cudgels against Gay Rights? Trends and Trajectories in African Christian Theologies on Homosexuality'. *Journal of Homosexuality*, 59 (1): 114-138.

van Lisdonk, J., J. Schelfhout, A. Bilajbegovic and B. Bakker (2018). *Sexual and Gender Diversity in SRHR: Towards Inclusive Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights Through Mainstreaming*, Utrecht, Rutgers.

Vincent, L. and S. Howell (2014). "'Unnatural', 'Un-African' and 'Ungodly': Homophobic Discourse in Democratic South Africa". *Sexualities*, 17 (4): 472-483.

Willems, W. (2013). 'Zimbabwe Will Never Be a Colony Again: Changing Celebratory Styles and Meanings of Independence'. *Anthropology Southern Africa*, 36 (1-2): 22-33.

Wright, T. (2000). 'Gay Organizations, NGOs and the Globalization of Sexual Identity: The Case of Bolivia'. *Journal of Latin American Anthropology*, 5 (2): 89-111.

Yamin, A.E and R. Cantor (2014). 'Between Insurrectional Discourse and Technical Guidance: Challenges and Dilemmas in Operationalizing Human Rights-Based Approaches in Relation to Sexual and Reproductive Health'. *Journal of Human Rights Practice*, 6 (3): 451-485.

Yasmin, R. (2009). *Conceptualizing the Rights-based Approach to Development. Theoretical Perspectives and Practices in Civil Society Organizations*. The University of Melbourne.

Yogyakarta Principles Plus 10 (2017). *Additional Principles and State Obligations on the Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, Gender Expression and Sex Characteristics to Complement the Yogyakarta Principles*, Geneva.

- Yogyakarta Principles (2006). *Yogyakarta Principles. Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity*, Geneva.
- Velasco, K. (2018). 'HRINGOs, LINGOs and LGBT Policy Diffusion Human Rights INGOs, LGBT INGOs and LGBT Policy Diffusion, 1991–2015'. *Social Forces*, 97 (1): 377–404.
- Victoria, N. (2019). 'The Challenges of Civil Society Organizations in Democratic Sustenance in Nigeria'. *Global Journal of Political Science and Administration*, 7 (5): 22-42.
- WHO (2003). *The Power of Partnership*, Geneva, Global Partnership to Stop TB.
- World Bank (2005). 'Engaging Civil Society Organizations in Conflict-Affected and Fragile States: Three African Country Case Studies', Social Development Department, Washington, World Bank.
- Wroe, D. (2012). 'Briefing: Donors, Dependency and Political Crisis in Malawi'. *African Affairs*, 111: 135–144.
- ZHRC (2018). *Rights and Responsibilities: A Case of Zimbabwe* <https://www.zhrc.rights/responsibility/zimbabwe-htl/2187> [Accessed 23 May 2019].
- Zald, M.N. and J.D. McCarthy (2002). 'The Resource Mobilization Research Program: Progress, Challenges and Transformation', In J. Berger and M. Zelditch (Eds), *New Directions in Contemporary Sociological Theory*, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 147–71.
- Zeilig L. and N. Ansell (2008). 'Spaces and Scales of African Student Activism: Senegalese, and Zimbabwean University Students at the Intersection of Campus, Nation, and Globe'. *Antipode*, 40 (1): 31-54.
- Zigomo, K. (2012). *A Community-Based Approach to Sustainable Development: The Role of Civil Society in Rebuilding Zimbabwe*. Zimbabwe Institute of Research.
- Zimbabwe Institute (2008). *The State of Civics in Zimbabwe*. Harare: Zimbabwe Institute.
- Zinyemba, A.Z. (2013). 'The Challenges of Recruitment and Selection of Employees in Zimbabwean Companies'. *International Journal of Science and Research*, 2310-7064.
- Zinyemba A. and R. Zinyemba (2013). 'Service Delivery of Non-Governmental Organizations in Zimbabwe: Challenges and Strategies', *University of Zimbabwe, Business Review*, 1 (1): 22 -31.

BIOGRAPHY

I am a passionate advocate, educator, and researcher dedicated to the fields of rights-based approaches, civil society, gender, sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR), safeguarding, and social and behavior change (SBC). My journey has taken me from the 'trenches' of civil society activism in Zimbabwe to academic institutions, where I continue to contribute significantly through research and as a resource person to civil society and community development. Born and raised in Zimbabwe, my academic journey began with a Bachelor of Science Honors degree in Sociology from the University of Zimbabwe in 2007. This marked the beginning of my academic pursuit in the field of social sciences, where I would later delve into the intricacies of development studies, anthropology, and governance. My dedication to knowledge acquisition led me to pursue a Post Graduate Diploma in Governance, Democratization, and Public Policy at the Institute of Social Studies in the Netherlands in 2009. This experience allowed me to explore the role of civil society organizations in democratization efforts in my home country, Zimbabwe.

In 2013, I furthered my studies by obtaining a Master of Science in Development Studies from the National University of Science and Technology (NUST) in Zimbabwe. My research for this degree focused on the role of corporate governance and monitoring and evaluation in student and youth civil society organizations in Harare. This academic foundation laid the groundwork for my future career in academia and civil society leadership. My commitment to addressing critical issues in society, especially in the realm of social and behaviour change and safeguarding, led me to pursue a Master of Arts in Cultural Anthropology and Development Studies at KU Leuven in Belgium in 2018. During this time, my research explored the intersection of culture, development, and political economy, providing fresh insights into the cultural and behaviour change challenges and opportunities facing marginalized communities. Continuing my educational journey, I am currently a Ph.D. candidate at Erasmus University Rotterdam in the Netherlands. My doctoral research revolves around the operationalization of a human rights-based approach in civil society organizations advocating for the rights of men who have sex with men in Zimbabwe. This groundbreaking work tackles sensitive and critical issues in a challenging context, highlighting my unwavering commitment to social justice.

My academic pursuits have been accompanied by a rich tapestry of professional experiences. My career in academia began in earnest in 2013 when I assumed the role of a part-time lecturer at IDS NUST Zimbabwe. Here, I taught a course in Emergency Information Management Systems as part of the Post Graduate Diploma in Disaster and Development Management. In 2016, I was appointed as a full-time lecturer at IDS NUST Zimbabwe, a position I hold to this day. In this capacity, I have been instrumental in imparting knowledge to MSc in Development Studies students in courses such as Civil Society and Development, Rights-Based Programming, and Research Methods. My dedication to nurturing the next generation of development professionals extends beyond the classroom, as I supervise students' dissertations and actively engage in independent research on topics that include SRHR, SBC, HRBA, gender, safeguarding, civil society, NFP corporate governance and sexuality.

My influence reaches far beyond the lecture halls of academia. I have taken on leadership roles in various civil society organizations and institutions. From 2015 to 2016, I served as the Founder and Former Executive Director of the Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights Institute, where I oversaw strategic planning, fundraising, and program management. My tenure witnessed the Institute's foundation and institutionalization. In 2019, I assumed the role of Chair of the Board of Trustees of the Sexual Rights Centre, demonstrating my ongoing commitment to the SRHR cause. My involvement in organizations such

as CONTACT Family Counselling Centre and the Zimbabwe Christian Alliance has allowed me to champion various causes, from child protection to governance.

My extensive experience also extends to the field of monitoring and evaluation, where I worked as the Monitoring and Evaluation Coordinator for Grassroots Soccer Zimbabwe in 2014-2015. My expertise in data collection, analysis, and reporting played a crucial role in ensuring program effectiveness. Throughout my career, I have authored numerous publications, providing valuable insights into critical issues. My research papers and reports have covered topics ranging from sexual and gender-based violence in higher education institutions to the documentation of community best practices in healthcare service delivery for key populations. My academic contributions continue to shape the discourse in SRHR, advocacy, and development.

In addition to my academic and professional achievements, I am deeply committed to community service. I have, for instance, facilitated community-based participatory planning under the World Food Programme-NUST collaboration, contributing to community development in Zimbabwe. My accomplishments have not gone unnoticed. I have received various awards and recognitions throughout my career, including the NUST Book Prize and the Leadership is Protecting All award. These accolades reflect my unwavering dedication to creating positive change in society.

As a lifelong learner, I have continuously sought opportunities for further education and training. I have participated in courses and workshops on topics such as academic writing, student assessment, documentation of human rights violations, corporate governance and leadership, ethnography, and data management, strengthening my research and teaching skills. In addition to my academic pursuits and professional achievements, I am known for my active involvement in conferences and presentations. I have shared my research findings and insights at various conferences, contributing to the dissemination of knowledge and the promotion of critical discussions. My life and career epitomize a profound commitment to social justice, gender equality, and human rights. Through my academic endeavors, research contributions, and leadership roles, I have become a driving force for positive change in Zimbabwe and beyond. My journey continues to inspire future generations of scholars, advocates, and development professionals as I strive to make the world a more equitable and just place for all.

Selected Publications

1. Nyirenda, D. and Murai, T. (2022) The Nature of sexual and gender-based violence in institutions of higher learning. Cases from the National University of Science and Technology and Lupane State University. Paper written for UNESCO Our Rights Our Lives, Our Future Conference.
2. Murai, T. (2020) Compendium of best practices: Operationalization of Key Population Drop-In Centres. UNFPA and Sexual Rights Centre.
3. Murai, T. (2019) Documentation of community best practice model and centers of excellence in health care service delivery for key populations: A case of Mpilo hospital and Bambanani New Start Centre in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, Sexual Rights Centre.
5. Murai, T. and Maphosa, M. (2019) The Factors that affect adherence and treatment effectiveness and efficacy, Sexual Rights Centre.

APPENDIX 1: PROFILES OF THE TARGETED CSOs

About the targeted CSOs¹⁰⁵

Name of Organization	Year of Established	Brief Profile/Activities	Objectives	Target Constituency
1. SAIH	1961	As stated on its website, SAIH supports through North-South partnerships CSO projects in several countries, including Zimbabwe.	Focuses on education in development cooperation. It supports projects that promote equality, inclusion, diversity, human rights, non-violence and education.	Local CSOs, Students and Academics, LGBTQ+ youth.
2. COC Netherlands	1946	COC strives to decriminalize sexual orientation, gender identity, equal rights, emancipation and social acceptance of LGBTs in the Netherlands and worldwide (DiDiRi 2013).	The INGO works in a way that can be defined as inside-out as it supports coalitions of LGBTQ+s and straight people and empowers them to make changes from within their community or organization.	Local CSOs, lesbians, gay men, bisexuals and transgender people.
5. ARMZ	2018	Community engagement, advocacy, research, behavior change and mental health.	Financial literacy and career guidance	MSM and male sex workers
1. ZIMAHA	2014	Counseling training, support groups for MSM, skills training, rainbow solidarity circles, commemorations, mentorship, financial literacy workshops and documentation.	- Equitable access to effective HIV prevention and care treatment services, health and human rights, - Eradication of stigma and discrimination, - Participation of MSM in policy formulation and implementation.	MSM, gay men, bisexual men and, more particularly, those living positively with HIV.
2. TREAT	2015	Sensitization workshops, solidarity circles, networking and training.	- Advocating for trans-diverse persons' constitutional and legal rights in Zimbabwe, - enhancing access to gender-affirming healthcare services.	Trans-diverse populations, trans-women, trans-men and gender non-conforming individuals.
3. NEOTERIC	2018	Health and wellness activities, movement building, solidarity and capacity development.	- Fostering growth and development - Facilitating participation	Lesbians, bisexual women and trans-women people.

Source: Created by the Author.

¹⁰⁵ About GALZ and SRC see Sections 1.3 and 6.2.2

APPENDIX 2: ACTIVITIES ENGAGED IN FOR PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION

Name of Activity (Most of these activities took place in Bulawayo unless otherwise stated).	Organization	Brief Description	Time Frame/Date
1. Website development	SRC	- Content gathering and creation for the website.	May 2019-July 2020
2. Proud to Serve Campaigns	SRC with collectives	- Provided a platform for interaction between service and MSM.	October-November 2018
3. LILO training	SRC with collectives	- Training on sexual orientation and gender identity-related issues.	June -July- 2018 & September -October 2018
4. MSM & Transgender People Training of Trainers on ISALS	SRC with collectives	- Strengthening target groups on social cohesion, solidarity and economic empowerment.	July- August 2019
5. Reaching and retaining MSM in HIV care	SRC with ARMZ & ZIMAHA	- Community outreach mobilization, basic psychosocial care, support, referrals and physical accompaniment of clients to access healthcare services.	January 2018- June 2019
6. Advocacy and community Tactics	SRC with collectives	- Understanding HIV-related stigma and discrimination against gay men, bisexual men and MSM.	February- July 2019
7. Mystery client	SRC with collectives	- Monitoring tool to assess the reduction in stigma, discriminatory attitudes and practices by healthcare workers.	March 2019, June 2019, and September 2019 (Quarterly)
8. Interactive spaces on lived experiences of LGBTQ+	SRC with collectives	- Sensitizes family members of LGBTQ+ people about the lived experiences of LGBTQ+ people.	November 2018, December 2018 and May 2019
9. Dialogues for LGBTQ+ persons, family members and religious leaders on topical issues	SRC with collectives	- Interactive dialogues through group sharing and presentations.	July 2018-June 2019
10. Religious and Traditional Leaders, conference, Indaba, national dialogues	SRC with collectives	- Discussed the need for leaders to embrace the LGBTQ+.	May 2019, July 2019 and October 2019
11. Healthcare Worker Sensitizations	SRC with collectives	- Discussed provision of stigma and discrimination-free services.	September-November 2018; April-June 2019
12. U=U Campaign: Undetectable = Un-transmittable Campaign.	SRC with collectives	- Increased treatment literacy and promoted adherence, suppressing the viral load to undetectable levels, thus ensuring treatment efficacy.	Quarterly in 2019- March, June and September 2019
13. IDAHOT Commemoration	SRC with collectives	- Advocated for upholding key populations' human rights and social inclusion.	May 2019
14. Support Group Meetings	SRC with collectives	- Facilitated safe spaces for learning and sharing amongst positive LGBTQ+ persons.	Monthly 2018-2019
15. Buddy Support Meetings	SRC with collectives	- Aimed to enhance adherence to treatment for HIV-positive LGBTQ+ people.	Quarterly in 2019

16. Research on factors that affect adherence to HIV and AIDS treatment among LGBTQ+	SRC with collectives	- Contributed to the knowledge of how best treatment efficacy can be achieved within the LGBTQ+ communities.	July 2019
17. PRIDE project	SRC	- Supported students in conducting research for their dissertations on LGBTQ+ rights and sex work topics.	June-September 2019
18. Guest lectures	SRC with collectives	- Lectures covering topics on the SRHR needs of sexual and gender-diverse persons.	Quarterly in 2018 and 2019
19. Queer forums	SRC with collectives	- Dialogues targeted at students within institutions of higher learning.	Quarterly in 2018 and 2019
20. Policy engagement meetings	SRC with collectives	- Held with the Ministry of Health, other CSOs and MPs to discuss LGBTQ+ communities' health policies.	November 2018, April 2019 and June 2019
21. Development of IEC material	SRC with collectives	- Communicate and educate regarding key messages.	Throughout the year 2018-2019
22. Group and individual therapy	SRC with collectives	- Quarterly support group therapy, psychosocial care and support sessions	Quarterly in 2018 and 2019
23. Family Fun Days	SRC with collectives	- Foster relationship-building and solidarity among LGBT persons, their family members and religious leaders	Quarterly in 2018 and 2019
24. Community dialogues on SRHR & Substance Abuse	SRC with collectives	- Linked MSM with community members and institutions.	Quarterly in 2018 and 2019
25. Human Rights Literacy Dialogues	SRC with collectives	- Educated MSM on the different international human rights instruments that affirm their human rights.	Quarterly in 2018 and 2019
26. Safety and Security training	SRC with collectives	- Empowered MSM to identify specific security risks that affect them.	Quarterly in 2018 and 2019
27. Symposium for Key Populations and Support Structures	SRC with collectives	- Provided a platform for service providers working with MSM community members to interact with MSM.	September 2019
28. Documentation of cases of human rights violations	SRC with collectives	- Documented cases of human rights violations	On a case-to-case basis throughout the year 2018-2019
29. Registration of collectives	Collectives	- The attempts at registration by the four collectives: ZIMAHA, ARMZ, NeoteriQ and IAZ.	April- June 2019

Source: Created by the Author

APPENDIX 3: PRIMARY DATA: DOCUMENT LIST

Title	Organization /Source	Year
1. Un/knowing & un/doing sexuality & gender diversity: The global anti-gender movement against SOGIE rights and academic freedom	SAIH	2020
2. SAIH's Strategy for Development Cooperation 2022-2026	SAIH	2021a
3. Position paper on sexual orientation, gender identity and expression (SOGIE)	SAIH	2021b
4. SAIH's 2022 – 2026 funding proposal application template	SRC	2021c
5. SRC-SAIH Audited Project Financial Statements	SRC	2021
1. Sexual Rights Centre Operational Plan 2019	SRC	2019
2. Sexual Rights Centre Operational Plan 2020	SRC	2020
3. Sexual Rights Centre Annual Report 2019	SRC	2020
4. Inclusion and Safer Spaces Policy	SRC	2020
5. Letter of agreement between COC Netherlands and Sexual Rights Centre on collaboration in the DiDiRi program	COC Netherlands	n.d.
6. The law in Zimbabwe, and the LGBTI Community: A study to explore the possibility of reforms in line with the new constitution	GALZ	2016
7. Politics of Sexuality and Gender in Zimbabwe: Emerging Discourses of Sex Work	SRC	2019
8. Understanding human rights recognition and integration: The essential guide for policymakers	GALZ	2017
9. Annual Report 2019: Progress toward promoting and contributing to the fulfillment and enjoyment of human and sexual rights of marginalized groups and key populations in Zimbabwe	SRC	2020
10. Factors that affect adherence, treatment effectiveness and efficacy among LGBTI communities in Bulawayo	SRC	2019
11. Report on Discrimination against Women in Zimbabwe based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Submitted to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on 6 January 2012 for the 51st session, held in Geneva. CEDAW Shadow Report. http://sodraafrica.se/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/CEDAW-Shadowreport-GALZ.pdf .	GALZ	2012
12. Our Voices: A collection of real-lived experiences of being LGBTI and HIV-positive LGBTI people and sex workers	SRC	2018
13. End of Term Impact Evaluation of the PSI/PEPFAR supported SRC: Reaching and Retaining Men Who Have Sex with Men (MSM) in HIV care in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe project	SRC	2018
14. Sexual Rights Centre Strategy 2017-2021: Changing Lives strengthening relationships,	SRC	2017

15. SRC Best Practices (2019). Documentation of community best practice model and centers of excellence in healthcare service delivery for key populations: A case of Mpilo Central Hospital and Population Services International Bambanani New Start Center in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, Bulawayo, Sexual Rights Centre.	SRC	2019
16. SRC Strategy: 2017-2021; Changing Lives, Strengthening Relationships and Transforming Systems	SRC	2021
17. Understanding human rights recognition and integration: The essential guide for policymakers, Gays and Lesbian Association of Zimbabwe, Harare.	GALZ	2017
18. SRC Notarial Deed of Trust (2020). Notarial Deed of Trust of Sexual Rights Centre, Bulawayo, Sexual Rights Centre	SRC	2020
19. SRC TORs (2019). Operational research on adherence, treatment effectiveness and efficacy among LGBTI communities in Bulawayo. Sexual Rights Centre, Bulawayo.	SRC	2019
20. Rapid Assessment: HIV-related stigma and discrimination against gay, bisexual men and MSM in health settings	SRC	2018
21. Various funding proposals, grant agreements and narrative reports (These cannot all be mentioned by name given their nature of confidentiality)	SRC, ARMZ, NEOTERIQ, TREAT	2018-2019
22. MSM pocket guide for healthcare workers	SRC	2018
23. ZNASP I, II, III	NAC	
24. MoHCC Professional Training Manual	MoHCC	
25. Zimbabwe Sexual Minorities Report	NAC	2013
26. Zimbabwe HIV Prevention Shadow Report	International HIV/AIDS Alliance	2018
27. Understanding Human Sexuality and Gender Unspoken Facts	GALZ	2008
28. GALZ violations report	GALZ	2011
29. GALZ violations report	GALZ	2012
30. Responding to the Safety and Security Needs of LGBTI Communities and Organizations: A situational analysis of Malawi, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe	Hivos	2013
31. Home Office Report Country Information and Guidance Zimbabwe: Sexual Orientation and gender identity	Home Office	2014
32. Compendium of best practices: Operationalization of Key Population Drop-In Centers	SRC	2012
33. Sexual Orientation and Zimbabwe's Constitution: A Case for Inclusion	GALZ	1999
34. An Assessment of the impact of state-sanctioned and unsanctioned raids on GALZ premises and gatherings.	GALZ	2015
35. An analysis of the state of human rights violations against LGBTI persons in Zimbabwe (2011-2017)	GALZ	2017

Source: Created by the Author.