


UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI PADOVA
DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE POLITICHE, GIURIDICHE E
STUDI INTERNAZIONALI
Corso di laurea Triennale in



Boots On the Ground: The Role of the European Union in Supporting
Small-Scale Fisheries in East and Southern Africa to Strengthen the
Resilience of Coastal Communities

Relatore: Prof. LUCIA COPPOLARO

Laureando: ALEXI SERANGELI

matricola N. 1235168

A.A. 2022/2023

Table of Contents

<u>LIST OF ACRONYMS</u>	<u>3</u>
<u>INTRODUCTION</u>	<u>6</u>
<u>CHAPTER I: “YOU KILLED FOR PRIDE AND BECAUSE YOU ARE A FISHERMAN.” - A COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEW OF ESA’S FISHERIES GOVERNANCE.</u>	<u>11</u>
OPEN ACCESS AND COMMONALITY OF ESA’S BLUE RESOURCES.	11
AN EXTENSIVE SURVEY OF ESA’S MARINE AND FRESHWATER ECOSYSTEMS.	16
THE CONTENTED FISHING GROUNDS OF ESA.	20
GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT OF ESA’S FISHERIES.	23
<u>CHAPTER II: “EUROFISH - A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN ENGAGEMENT IN ESA’S FISHERIES GOVERNANCE.”</u>	<u>27</u>
THE EUROPEAN ROLE IN ESA’S FISHERIES MANAGEMENT.	27
THE (IN)COHERENCE OF THE EUROPEAN DESIGN.	28
A SYSTEMIC OVERVIEW OF THE CFP’S EXTERNAL DIMENSION.	32
EUROPEAN DISTANT WATER FISHING NATIONS AND THE FIGHT AGAINST SUBSIDISATION.	35
A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE E€OFISH PROGRAMME.	39
<u>CHAPTER III: “AS FAR AS THE EYES CAN SEE – ILLEGAL, UNREGULATED AND UNREPORTED (IUU) FISHING, MONITORING CONTROL AND SURVEILLANCE (MCS) AND CO-MANAGEMENT GOVERNANCE IN ESA.”</u>	<u>45</u>
EMPOWERING COASTAL COMMUNITIES IN ESA.	45
WHAT IS IUU? AN OVERVIEW.	46
THE MCS COUNTEROFFENSIVE: ESA’S CASE.	49
ESA’S FISHERIES DISPUTES AND CONFLICTS.	53
THE SOMALI CASE.	54
THE GREAT LAKES: LAKE VICTORIA.	55
TANZANIAN COASTLINE.	56
MWAMBAO COASTAL COMMUNITY NETWORK.	58
THE OCTOPUS MARKET BACKGROUND.	59
THE TANZANIAN COMMUNITY-BASED FRAMEWORK.	60
MWAMBAO.	62
<u>CONCLUSIONS</u>	<u>65</u>
<u>BIBLIOGRAPHY</u>	<u>67</u>

PRIMARY SOURCES	67
SECONDARY SOURCES	68
MONOGRAPHS	68
EDITED BOOKS	68
REPORTS	69
SCIENTIFIC ARTICLES	74

List of Acronyms

AfDB	African Development Bank
AU-IBAR	African Union – InterAfrican Bureau for Animal Resources
BE	Blue Economy
CFP	Common Fishery Policy
CIFAA	Committee for Inland Fisheries and Aquaculture of Africa
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPA	Cotonou Partnership Agreement
CPRs	Common Pool Resources
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DG INTPA	Directorate-General International Partnerships
DG MARE	Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries
DMROs	Duly Mandated Regional Organisations
DWFNs	Distant Water Fishing Nations
DWFs	Distant Water Fishing
EA-SA-IO	East Africa – Southern Africa – Indian Ocean
EC	European Commission
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Commission
EEZs	Exclusive Economic Zone
EFI	External Financing Instrument
EPAs	European Partnership Agreements
ESA	East and Southern Africa
EUD	European Union Delegation
MUS	Mauritius
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FAs	Fisheries Agreements

FIFG	Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance
FPAs	Fisheries Partnership Agreements
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority for Development
IOC	Indian Ocean Commission
IOTC	Indian Ocean Tuna Commission
IPMU	Integrated Project Management Unit
IPOA-IUU	International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing
IUU	Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
LIFDCs	Low-income Food Deficit Countries
LSFs	Large Scale Fisheries
LTA	Lake Tanganyika Authority
LVFO	Lake Victoria Fisheries Organisation
MCCN	Mwambao Coastal Community Network
MCS	Monitor, Control and Surveillance
MFF	Multi-annual Financial Framework
MPAG	Multi-Annual Guidance Programmes
NDICI	Neighbourhood Development and International Cooperation Instrument
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSA	Non-State Actors
OACPS	Organisation for African, Caribbean and Pacific States
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PCD	Policy Coherence for Development
PFRS	Policy Framework and Reform Strategy for Fisheries and Aquaculture in Africa
PRSP	Regional Fisheries Surveillance Programme
PSMA	Port State Measures Agreement

R3 CFP	Result 3 Call for Proposals
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
RFABs	Regional Fisheries Advisory Bodies
RFBs	Regional Fisheries Bodies
RFMOs	Regional Fisheries Management Organisations
RIP	Regional Indicative Programme
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SCMs	Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SFCs	Sheisha Fishermen Committee
SFPAs	Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
SIF	Stop Illegal Fishing
SIOFA	South Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SWIO	Southwest Indian Ocean
SWIOFC	Southwest Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law Of the Seas
UNDESA	UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs
UNECA	UN Economic Commission for Africa
UNEP	UN Environmental Programme
UNFSA	UN Fish Stock Agreement
VGSSF	Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WIO	Western Indian Ocean
WPs	Work Plans

Introduction

One of the poorest regions worldwide, East and Southern Africa (ESA) stands out for its vast purview of water bodies. Its blue dimension is a crucial socio-economic space, and the availability of its natural resources affects the population's food security and livelihoods. These communities face mounting threats from climate change and biodiversity depletion, whilst overexploitation has compounded the pattern behind the allocation of commons, most of which are essential for emerging economies. Besides, rural peoples are the most affected by the severe lack of redistribution of wealth in the global pursuit of unconditional growth, requiring coherent aid to build resilience and assure equitable profits. The thesis examines the European Union's (EU) means to support ESA's coastal communities and preserve its biodiversity by implementing south-south cooperation projects whilst highlighting the small-scale fishers (SSF) sub-sector as a socio-economic matrix to secure an efficient food system resilience, create equitable livelihoods, and the implementation of sustainable practices. Hence, it strives to answer the query: By which means does the EU support the food system resilience of coastal communities in ESA, simultaneously ensuring equitable development and the sustainability of harvested environments?

Aquatic foods are highly valued as traded resources on the international market, with advanced nations being major importers and emerging countries serving as exporting counterparts. The EU's Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFNs) harvest a fair share of the catch, fishing into national Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) under fishing access agreements with associated countries, not rarely in developing regions. As the engagement of developing nations in trade certainly has a positive impact on their economies, it is questionable whether it is equally efficient in granting an equitable share of the wealth (Hammarlund & Andersson, 2019; Langan, 2012; Béné et al., 2010). The European market of aquatic resources is the single largest worldwide, and its Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) main driver is prioritising its primacy. Nonetheless, the commitment to achieve the

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) forces the EU to narrow the trade-offs between its economic targets while consistently considering its impact on developing countries. This conceptual duplicity often creates tangible complexities, especially concerning subsidising European fleets (Bretherton & Vogler, 2008). Furthermore, the EU adheres to the Blue Economy (BE) blueprint, which balances growth and natural exploitation. This concept is self-contradicting yet again, above all under the overshadowing context of climate change (Okafor-Yarwood et al., 2022; Morrisey, 2021; Garland et al., 2019; Cohen et al., 2019; Garland et al., 2019).

The SSF workforce, despite being the largest group dependent on marine resources, often faces political marginalisation and lacks representation (March & Failler, 2022; Andrew et al., 2007). Weak institutionalisation of management procedures leads to a disregard for conservation-based Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance (MCS) measures, contributing to Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, outbreaking an additional burden for coastal communities (Arthur, 2020; Witbooi et al., 2020; Acheson, 2006; Waters, 1991). In retaliation, cooperative management and community-based fisheries management tools have been used to enhance cohesion among actors in sub-regional contexts within the growing trend of decentralising governance (House et al., 2022; Evans et al., 2011; Pomeroy & Berkers, 1997). The thesis emphasises the importance of inclusive dialogue and increased participation to achieve sustainable development. Through comprehensive financial and structural aid for Africa-to-Africa regional cooperation projects, the EU fosters dialogue and collaboration among government authorities, civil society, and local communities, benefiting coastal communities.

The present work is divided into three chapters, organised in a consequential thread. The general outcome strives to depict a comprehensive picture before reaching its final assessment.

The first chapter establishes the geographical and sectorial context to address the focal question. As such, I draw attention to the structural dependence of coastal communities on the SSF sub-sector due to its crucial part in food security and workflow. The region's

longstanding food crisis, exacerbated by recent geopolitical and climatic events, emphasises the importance of seafood for food resilience and income generation. The overall projection of this leading outset supports the final statement by primarily defining deep-rooted socio-economic phenomena negatively affecting the coastal communities' means of sustenance.

In the second chapter, I explore the conceptual rationale behind the EU's external dimension of the CFP and the policies geared to implement it. It then considers case study no.1 as the European promotion of South-South cooperation through the Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) "E€OFISH" in East Africa, South Africa, and the Indian Ocean (EA-SA-IO). In overviewing the EU's financial mechanisms and management operations to increase regional integration in Africa, I identify the grounding bases to support local governance and reduce inequality.

In the third chapter, I evaluate an E€OFISH project in Tanzania: Case study no.2 highlights the NGO "Mwambao Coastal Community Network" (MCCN). By examining its lessons learned, I reflect on civil society's role in promoting coastal communities' representation through cooperative management, improving participatory MCS for marine conservation and tackling IUU fishing. Thus, I emphasise the importance of supporting participatory governance to address social equity and the sustainable development of ESA's coastal communities.

Methodology

The present study results from an "on-the-ground" experience gained while working as a field assistant for the Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE) team of the E€OFISH Programme during the second half of 2022. A preliminary desk-based study was followed up by on-site fieldwork from September 28 to October 27. The latter covered five of the thirteen contracting nations of the E€OFISH, namely Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar, Tanzania, and Mozambique. The mission's Terms of Reference included a set of evaluation questions

based on the Organization for Economic and Cooperation Development (OECD) - Development Assistance Committee criteria and supplemented by the Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Mauritius and the Republic of Seychelles (EUD MUS) impact assessment measures. The fieldwork was performed through methodical toolkits comprising face-to-face interviews, virtual meetings, Focus Group Discussions, and Key Informant Interviews conducted with persons of interest in the E€OFISH Programme. Due to confidentiality clauses in the contract agreements with the MTE team, any data collected during the mission could not be published. Nevertheless, the experience of working "on the ground" was crucial to establish the rationale of the thesis.

To achieve the conclusions of this study, research has been conducted by analysing material acquired by i) desk-based MTE, ii) fieldwork, and iii) ex-post research. I thereby rank different sources, each corresponding to the mentioned timeframes:

- i) A review of governmental, intergovernmental, and non-governmental reports and guidelines was made available to the MTE by the EUD MU and the E€OFISH's Integrated Programme Management Unit (IPMU).
- ii) Extensive documentation was obtained by consulting the open-access library of the E€OFISH Programme.
- iii) Comprehensive research was conducted on pertinent literature using peer-reviewed journals and analytical databases available to acquire secondary literature and institutional reports. Among others:
 - a. FAO, Duke University & WorldFish. 2023. *Illuminating Hidden Harvests – The contributions of small-scale fisheries to sustainable development.*
 - b. UNEP-Nairobi Convention & WIOMSA. (2015). *Regional State of the Coast Report Western Indian Ocean.*
 - c. Penas Lado, E. (2016). *The Common Fisheries Policy.*
 - d. Okafor-Yarwood, I., Kadagi, N. I., Belhabib, D., & Allison, E. H. (2022). *Survival of the Richest, not the Fittest: How attempts to improve governance impact African small-scale marine fisheries.*

Furthermore, to comprehensively explain the organisational structure of case study no.1, “E€OFISH Programme”, I leaned on Sweenarain, S., Ya, J., & Mashariki, A. (2020). *E€OFISH Technical Handbook: Enhancing equitable economic growth by promoting sustainable fisheries in the EA-SA-IO region* released by the IPMU. In case study no.2, “Mwambao Coastal Community Network”, the relevant information has been extrapolated from Slade, L. M., & Thani, A. K. (2014). *Assessment and priority setting for marine and coastal resource conservation in the Pemba Channel Region for FFI and the MCCN* (2018) *Strategic Plan 2018-2020*.

Conclusions

The deterioration of the environment acts as a stress multiplier, negatively affecting rural people's lives. In coastal regions, the small-scale sub-sector can ensure food resilience and promote surging livelihood for coastal communities when adequately aided and monitored. External aid bolsters the likelihood of success by enabling the improvement of joint management among diverse and somewhat conflicting parties. I argue that the EU’s engagement produces highly constructive impacts once its assets are appropriately channelled. Besides, the Mwambao project exemplifies the positive outcomes achieved through on-the-ground community-led approaches under the collective endeavours of governmental institutions and civil society. Ultimately, findings provide us with the rationale to tackle complex and widespread issues by nurturing active participation within local communities, whereby vertical actions seem to falter.

Chapter I: “You killed for pride and because you are a fisherman.”¹ - A comprehensive overview of ESA’s fisheries governance.

Open Access and Commonality of ESA’s Blue Resources.

Chapter I delves into the intricate socioeconomic and natural capital networks defining ESA's challenges and opportunities for sustainable development in coastal communities. A pillar among the ranks of the collective action theory, Garrett Hardin stated in the notorious *The Tragedy of the Commons* article published by Science (1968, p.1243) that in modern times, technical solutions cannot always be resolutive and need “an extension in morality”. He argues that the overpopulation predicament is naturally linked to the human perception of the finite. The author pictures an open pasture exploited by multiple herds in a context of social stability, where every individual is systematically compelled to maximise the number of their herd. The conclusion is that by failing to ascertain its scarcity, the world will grow into common misery due to the unjust distribution of a shrinking pool of shared natural resources.

Whilst not pastures, I consider fishing grounds in ESA and the viability of their biodiverse environs. Harnessing the aquatic resources’ potential is highly beneficial, especially to Low-income Food Deficit Countries (LIFDCs), but equally dangerous when exploited without measure. Whilst free riding on collective benefits, fishermen taper their access as much as others because the “simultaneous expansion of effort by all fishermen results in smaller populations of fish available for capture” (Waters, 1991, p.2). Notably, fish is also somewhat of a peculiar resource. Some are often migratory species and behave differently from sedentary ones, which thrive in balanced environments. They are threatened by their progressive decay, stressed by increasing climatic shocks and other anthropic stressors.

¹ Quote from E. Hemingway (1952) *The Old Man and The Sea*. Charles Scribner's Sons.

The spatial frame of this first chapter revolves around the blue spaces of ESA harnessed by coastal communities. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has the highest levels of hardship and undernourishment worldwide, making it an ideal case study for examining the importance of aquatic resources for coastal communities. The region is also facing logistical challenges, biodiversity depletion, and climate change, making it difficult to achieve sustainable development.

The governance of the Southwest Indian Ocean (SWIO) falters to meet the goals set by the UN SDGs, also due to the structural lack of scientific research and data collection necessary to inform policies (UNEP, 2015). The allocation of depleting resources is tethered to the ability of involved parties to manage informed collective action, the lack of which invariably damages the bottom of the pyramid the most, as its capabilities to react to disruptive events are often inadequate. Incorporating local communities into managing their vulnerabilities has proven integral to establishing a framework rooted in social justice (Morrissey, 2019). Whereas the latter is a concept usually ignored in policy development, I contend it to be pivotal in achieving a just transition toward equitable and sustainable development.

However, other variables tend to thicken the plot. The bounds of collective action throughout SSA are bolstered by the post-colonial asymmetry of economic and political patterns between the Global North and South, each contending the right to capitalise on unrestricted common pool resources (CPRs), portrayed as the “resource curse” theory, which “describe(s) the fact that developing countries with abundant natural resources [...] often appear to perform less well than their resource-poor counterparts” (Bené et al., 2009, p.946). Universally endorsed indicators such as GDP prioritise economic growth over wealth distribution, marginalising developing countries. The outdated belief in trickle-down economics compounds this stagnant system and often masks social inequality. Traditional economic strategies have failed to deliver on their promises, and the benefits of economic growth are concentrated in the hands of a few. Centralised institutions often grant allotments to international partners, bypassing the small producers who are most affected by the lack of infrastructure, as stated by Ostrom (1990, p.21): “Some participants do not have the autonomy to change their situational structures and are prevented from making

constructive changes by external authorities who are indifferent to the perversities of the commons dilemma or may even stand to gain from it.” The political agenda acknowledges the problem of open-access fishing grounds, but fishermen resist regulations, and local governments are reluctant to act, fearing political unrest (Waters, 1991). This predicament underlines the complex dialogue between governmental authorities and local communities in the region’s rural areas.

Each party’s revenue is bound to the efficient gathering and sharing of information as much as the latter is fundamental in enforcing a regulatory matrix. A poor rendition or acknowledgement of data can negatively affect collective actions, but above all, it produces normative grey areas that entitle different parties to exploit the same grounds. The free rider paradox now concerns whether one party is entitled to control what is virtually no man’s property. Schreiber, Chuenpagdee and Jentoft (2022, p.2) go as far as to describe the frequent political marginalisation of SSF in policy development as hermeneutical injustice: “With no access to social institutions and practices through which language is generated and disseminated (e.g., policy documents, programs, agendas and mandates of governance bodies, and articles in newspapers and academic journals), SSF people are hermeneutically marginalised”.

Interlinkages between overpopulation and resource overexploitation threaten everyone's access to necessities. However, it is only possible to understand the problem's relevance once one defines what the situation entails to each player: a rookie moves faster than any pawn.

The role of the SSF subsector in ESA is vital to the region’s food security as much as it is instrumental in achieving the equitable development of its rural population. The overlapping framework of ineffective governance, endemic poverty, and resource overexploitation appears somewhat exemplary to emphasise the importance of just allocation. To lay out a comprehensive overview of the topic, I must deconstruct the contextual features of SSF’s geographical and socio-economic environment.

1. The Path to Building Food Security in ESA.

Africa's eastern regions face significant rates of hunger and poverty despite being among the wealthiest lands on earth in terms of natural resources. Disclosures show that 579 million people live in conditions of multidimensional poverty in SSA, and at least 134.6 million were affected by hunger and malnutrition in ESA throughout 2022 (UNDP, 2022; FAO, 2023). These structural deprivations seriously hamper any ambitious design to capacitate the development of emerging countries. Moreover, the region's demographic fabric is slowly shifting while steadily growing, thus raising new predicaments. Sub-Saharan eastern regions are still overrepresented by rural populations, about 71 per cent of which suffer from some hardship (UNDESA, 2020). Despite the rest of the world going through a steady urbanisation process, at least 50 per cent of any country in ESA remains rural today. On the other hand, rapid urbanisation is leading to boosted inequalities and augmented exposure to climatic shocks. Today, some 4.5 billion people live in urban areas, consuming around 70 per cent of all food produced globally; the trend is bound to rise exponentially in SSA, eventually causing a shift in the logistics of its agri-food system (WFP, 2022a).

Mutual interactions between forecasted urban expansion and agricultural loss will undoubtedly come at a cost for its rural people. Projections suggest that millions of hectares will be lost due to urbanisation along the coastline (Bren d'Amour et al., 2016; UNDESA, 2018). Agriculture provides economic and dietary sustenance for 80 per cent of EA's population, whereas fish and other aquatic foods are believed to be somewhat of a "policy blind spot" regarding food security (Kurien & López Ríos, 2013; Obiero et al., 2019). The urbanisation process is complemented by forthcoming economic growth. The African Development Bank forecasts a steady surge in EA's growth rates from 5.1 to 5.8 per cent throughout 2024. The report recognises its merit in having avoided recession during the pandemic better than other continental neighbours, thanks to its diversified production structure. However, various external and internal variables have underpinned resilient fragility pockets, highlighted by rising commodity prices, climatic shocks in the Horn of Africa and recurring regional conflicts. Furthermore, the Africa Economic Outlook has suggested that: "tight monetary and fiscal policy to rein in inflation has also constrained domestic consumption, compounded by contractions in agriculture and manufacturing

activities, weak growth in credit to the private sector, and the rise in public debt.” (AfDB, 2023, p.34).

Besides being influenced by structural conditions of daunting hardship, ESA faces additional challenges from further escalating global events. Therefore, reciprocal linkages exacerbated structural flaws, representing essential drawbacks in the longstanding strategy for the region’s development.

Unforeseen consequences were caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, mainly exacerbating existing vulnerabilities and leaving a profound mark on every ESA country’s economy. The number of food-insecure people doubled compared to 2019’s rates by the end of 2022, and restriction measures scuttled resiliency, widening the unemployment basin. The pandemic hurt especially the informal sector, which is commonly practised by many in the region and lacks any safety net of essential labour benefits (WFP, 2023). In the SSF sub-sector, many people, both as fishermen and in processing, are employed part-time or perform seasonally, meaning they do not own fishing assets and gears. Instead, the informal microeconomy of the sector is grounded on a few hegemonic shadow owners, hiring and exploiting fishers unconditionally (Sweenaraian, 2021). The outbreak and the preemptive measures to tackle the virus further hindered the fight against IUU fishing due to restrictions aboard policing vessels.

On the other hand, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine greatly impacted the region’s food and energy prices. East Africans consume significant quantities of wheat and wheat-processed products, which account for 25 per cent of the region’s total cereal intake; 84 per cent of it is viable only thanks to importation, a great extent of which comes from Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Being at war, they both banned wheat export, drastically affecting ESA’s food security (WFP, 2022b). The conflict “triggered a cost-of-living crisis worldwide and pushed 15 million more Africans into extreme poverty, as real household income fell drastically, especially for net buyers.” (AfDB, 2023, p.37) and eventually resulted in some 400 events of social unrest throughout the continent. Albeit less than 1 per cent of these eventually escalated in violence, there is a high likelihood they will boost as inflation is estimated to increase during 2023 (AfDB, 2023).

In such a floundering state, aquatic resources must be acknowledged as integral to developing a resilience system to achieve regional food security. Tendall et al. (2015, p.2) define food system resilience as “capacity over time of a food system and its units at multiple levels, to provide sufficient, appropriate and accessible food to all, in the face of various and even unforeseen disturbances.” However, while I contend that strengthening the aquatic food market greatly benefits the resilience of the regional food system, it is essential to emphasise that increased attention towards seafood as a means to bolster food security is enforcing overexploiting practices in tropical countries. (Robinson et al., 2020). Furthermore, through infrastructure and capacity-building investments, local communities profit from a functioning value chain and reduce their financial vulnerability. Besides, most fishermen or processors in the artisanal and SSF subsectors, accounting for the lion’s share of the fisheries sector in ESA, do not usually have alternatives to fishing or processing, often due to poor education and lack of social mobility (Josupeit, 2022; March and Failler, 2022). Most of all, the concept of resilience in development is closely connected to the urgency of coping with uncertainty. Conflicts and price fluctuations exacerbate short and medium-term challenges, and erratic weather patterns attributed to climate change impede development efforts, especially in tropical countries. (IFPRI, 2014; Cooley et al., 2022).

An Extensive Survey of ESA’s Marine and Freshwater Ecosystems.

ESA’s demographic distribution gathers significantly around its freshwater bodies and increasingly in coastal urban centres. A complex intersection of 7 major marine currents and monsoon winds favours the upwelling of nutrients, enabling the economy to be sustained by exploiting a rich marine environment (UNEP, 2014). For instance, around 16 million people depend on natural resources from the Eastern African Coastal Current between Kenya and Tanzania. This number is expected to double by 2030 due to migratory trends, prospecting a logistical predicament as increasing pressure affects the region’s food security (Painter et al., 2022).

Its blue dimension provides a vast and resourceful socio-economic space, as the coastal purview, facing the Western Indian Ocean (WIO), stretches for 4.600 km from Somalia to

northern South Africa. Additionally, the region's hinterland comprises some of the most significant freshwater bodies in the world: the great African lakes and the Nile River basin, among others. Sure enough, ESA's aquatic resources are essential in securing nourishment and creating livelihoods for the estimated 60 million inhabitants of its coastal zones (within 100 km of the coast) as much as for the whole region.

ESA's blue spaces assume increased importance in the achievement of zero hunger and no poverty under the endorsement of prospective assessments: by 2030, SSA's fish supply will decline significantly (-5.6%) as it is bound to be outgrown by its vertical demographic growth (OECD, 2021). Such analysis is all the more critical when compared with former research, as Bené, Lawton and Allison (2009, p.937) have demonstrated that "the comparison of value with quantity reveals that, despite the huge revenues generated by the international fish export in a few individual sub-Saharan countries, this trade has failed to compensate for the increasing gap between fish demand and supply at the African level. When distinguishing between high-value and low-value fish, there is even greater cause for concern." In this context, the actual reinforcement of the sector is ever more urgent to secure food resilience and respond to the demand and supply transition in the foreseeable future (Obiero et al., 2019).

Whilst being a geographical interstice between clashing civilisations, these rich environments always provided a great basin of natural resources. As of today, unregulated human impact has undoubtedly left markings on the oceans. Primarily, anthropogenic drivers impact coastal ecosystems by altering natural habitats and further changing the species composition, which can cause their extinction (Lotze et al., 2006; Halpern et al., 2008). Coastal environments are provided with natural defences, such as coral reefs and mangrove forests, which are of particular importance for their ecological and economic value, as they provide environments heavily charged with marine life: "Coastal community development and individual well-being rely on the health of the environment, the abundance of resources and the intactness and productivity of habitats" (Bennett et al., 2015, p.63). Furthermore, they act as dissipators against wave energy, storm surges and other natural hazards to coastal communities (Taylor et al., 2003; Shroder et al., 2015). However, they both are significantly endangered by human degradation.

Mangroves spread throughout the East African coastline, gathering in Kenya, Tanzania, and Mozambique in high densities; forests also proliferate notably along the western coast of Madagascar and in the Seychelles atolls. Its wood is carved and employed extensively for canoes, traps, and nets by subsistence fisheries. Molluscs and crustaceans breeding represent significant sources of protein for many coastal environments in Mozambique: Sofala's shallow water shrimp fisheries account for a significant income generator for coastal populations and represent 3 to 5 per cent of the total national fisheries harvest and directly depend on the mangrove environments in the country (Nhantumbo & Gaile, 2020). It is also estimated that these habitats provide livelihoods for some 150,000 people throughout Tanzania. Currently, mangrove forests are subjected to increasingly affecting threats from deforestation to pollution, coastal urbanisation, and unsustainable aquaculture practices (Taylor et al., 2003).

Research states that at least half of the catch from tropical countries is achieved thanks to coral reefs (CORDIO, 2002). Increasingly vulnerable to global stressors such as climatic changes and ocean acidification, corals are also dangerously affected by local anthropogenic triggers, such as illegal fishing practices and oil spills. Obura et al. (2022) have compiled a descriptive study of the coral systems in the SWIO and listed seven ecoregions between "critically endangered" and "endangered" areas across the Eastern African isles and atolls and three "vulnerable" ecoregions in its continental counterpart (Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania). The complex ecosystems of coral reefs are precisely balanced thanks to the role played by their population structure. For this reason, corals are overtly vulnerable to external triggers, such as overfishing, which reduces the amount of biomass and eventually causes the death of corals and the collapse of the whole ecosystem (McClanahan, 2019; Ditzel et al., 2022).

In the WIO, historical rates of increasing overexploitation are showcased by the fact that stock fished within sustainable levels decreased from 90 per cent in the 1970s to 65.8 per cent in 2017 (Vikash, 2021). Further, FAO's 2019 assessments have shown that the latter decreased to 62.5 and that 37.5 per cent of stocks were fished at biologically unsustainable rates (FAO, 2022). Overexploitation, exacerbated by a lack of proper scientific evidence or prompt will to detect the ongoing depletion, has ubiquitously decreased catch per unit

efforts, causing increasingly lighter landings. It also changed trophic composition (food chain) in marine and inland waters due to the exhaustion of long-lived piscivorous species until fishers began to *fish down marine food webs* by targeting short-lived pelagic ones to counter stagnating or decreasing harvests.

Gradual decline in catch per unit effort rates in the northern hemisphere pushed advanced countries to access still prosperous areas in the southern one until the global fall in the 1980s, when new stocks could not compensate prior accessed areas, now on the verge of collapse. This trend affects poorly developing regions, which are financially compelled to export their resources to advanced economies to bolster development (Pauly et al., 2005). In the WIO region, fishers targeted species doubled from 85 in 1971 to 152 in 2000, and it is estimated that of 200 species, at least 35 per cent are in severe decline, and another 25 peaked at their maximum level of harvest (Van der Elst et al., 2005).

Robinson et al. (2020) conducted a thorough descriptive analysis of fisheries in Seychelles. They found that from the 1990s to 2016, the catch per unit effort of nine commonly targeted species declined by 65 per cent, whereas the overall fleet quadrupled. What is more, the authors assess that (Robinson, 2020, p.5) “offshore locations are more successfully targeted by larger vessels and, therefore, the shorter range and storage capacity of smaller vessels may limit poorer fishers to coastal fisheries that are more heavily exploited.”, where instead large foreign purse seiners target tuna banks offshore with high revenue, thanks to partnership agreements. Admittedly, global fishing fleets have been rising exponentially throughout the past century: from 1.7 in 1950 to 3.7 million in 2017; by 2015, 68 per cent of it was motorised, with only 5 per cent accounting for larger vessels, meaning that an increasingly large number of artisanal vessels are capable of reaching further fishing grounds and exploiting more. Without appropriate management, the fleet could grow to another million powered vessels throughout the next few decades (Rousseau et al., 2019).

The ensuing lack of natural supply falters in meeting insistent demand because of increased overexploitation of wild fish stocks, thus encouraging policy involvement in supporting aquaculture over capture. However, Africa is moving slowly toward that goal, with only 634 thousand people working in aquaculture whilst more than 20 million working in the

fisheries sector, which suggests that its production should increase twofold by 2050 to meet growing needs. Official estimations say that about 5 million people are employed in fisheries throughout the continent as of 2020 (FAO, 2022). Nevertheless, as comprehensively elucidated by the latest study conducted by FAO, Duke University and WorldFish (2023), it must be noted that extrapolating concrete information from the small-scale and artisanal sub-sector is bound to several constraints. Governments often lack the resources to prioritise monitoring and analysing SSFs, resulting in undifferentiated data between the latter and large-scale fisheries (LSFs). The dominant focus on natural science and stock assessment approaches to fisheries management further compounds the issue, as they tend to sideline data on social and economic aspects. Access to data beyond those for valuable and high-profile fisheries included in national data systems is often limited. This hampers assessments of the economic contributions of small-scale fisheries, as price and value information typically pertain to processed aquatic food products rather than the landed economic value. The heterogeneity of livelihoods in small-scale fishing makes it challenging to arrive at a single figure that accurately represents the diversity of part- and full-time employment and subsistence fishing. Data on the export of small-scale fisheries catch are also subject to limitations, as official trade statistics may not fully account for unrecorded cross-border trade. The overall aggregation of these constraints grounds a subdermal scenario of hidden harvest, helmed by the informal sector and the constitutional inability to measure its contributions, especially in developing economies (WB, 2012).

The Contended Fishing Grounds of ESA.

Jentoft and Chuenpagdee (2009) argue that fisheries and coastal management governance represent a wicked problem. Rittel and Webber (1973) defined wicked problems as typically lacking a clear-cut technical solution, making them difficult to tackle and having the propensity to blur the lines with other related issues, creating further complexity. The social perception of the problem considerably affects the quality of its definition, and collective constructs influence how these problems are understood and prioritised. This means that the nature and significance of wicked problems like those found in fisheries and

coastal governance are shaped by the values various stakeholders assign to them. The specific case of fisheries is challenging because it involves complex and often delicate trade-offs between equally significant goals that can contradict each other, especially when social values clash. Stakeholders have different interests, even if they share some values and principles, leading to competing interests between different actors. In ESA, the intrinsic value of seafood extends beyond its economic worth. It represents the promise of a healthy life, especially for a significant portion of the population otherwise vulnerable to famine. Nevertheless, this fundamental necessity is intertwined with the frenzy of the market's competitiveness, opposing subsistence fishing to large-scale foreign companies. Overall, Africa has the lowest consumption rate of aquatic resources compared to middle-income countries, with an average of 10.09 kg per capita. The eastern subregions fall at 5.49 kilograms per person. However, in the context of hunger and poverty outlined, fish meals have a much different and substantial value, as they are often the only means to secure nutrients in undernourished environments. Fish is regarded as nature's superfood, providing fatty acids, minerals, vitamins, and amino acids fundamental for physical and mental health, especially in the case of the child's development and to women undergoing pregnancy (FAO, 2017). Furthermore, integrating fish into poor dietary habits has been recognised as a positive influence in preventing hormonal and metabolic diseases widely encountered throughout the African Continent (Mendivil, 2021; Bowo-Ngandji et al., 2023).

The role of fish in East African diets, which primarily consist of cereals, legumes, and meat, faces a significant challenge due to the product's price fluctuations. This challenge is due to the affordability of fish, which is directly linked to its price variations. The latter represents an establishing factor of its affordability, especially when the consumer purchasing powers fall below the poverty line. In summary, food security strategies cannot disregard contextual inadequacies. The people's purchasing powers and infrastructural deficiencies, such as lack of essential utilities and sanitation, evidently confine their level of sustenance (Kurien & López Ríos, 2013). Hence, the qualitative and quantitative assessment of food security are directly affected by market shocks, ultimately impairing the cost of household health. As a perfect example, the COVID-19 pandemic painfully affected

pricing worldwide whilst restricting disposable income. Africa suffered a five-fold increase in sound diet expenses until 84.6 per cent of ESA could not afford it in 2021 (FAO, 2023).

ESA's food security is thus affected by the efficiency of its seafood market in supplying its population. Hence, it may suffer from a better-equipped competition where fish stocks are increasingly plummeting. Operated mainly by granted foreign vessels flying the national flag under partnership agreements, LSFs harvesting the high seas produce a global revenue of USD 7.6 billion, albeit reinforcing the asymmetrical relationship between external profit and local benefit (Sala et al., 2018). Mismanagement and misrepresentation within partnering agreements did not infrequently cause foreign fleets to take advantage of their fishing rights in African waters. Capacity-enhancing subsidies ensure the unequal pooling of these fishing grounds, contended by large and SSF fleets. Governmental subsidies can take many forms but are absorbed more significantly by LSF, bolstering their competitiveness at the expense of small-scale producers. Schuhbauer et al. (2017, p.117) found that this share amounted to roughly 90 per cent of the total subsidies. They also highlighted that despite accounting for only 2.5 per cent of global fisheries subsidies, Africa directed 33 per cent of its total subsidies towards SSF.

In contrast, Europe and Oceania allocated the lowest percentages to SSF, at 7 per cent and 4 per cent, respectively. Sala et al. (2018) noted that approximately \$4.2 billion in government subsidies artificially support high-seas fishing.

Between the late 1990s and 2005, approximately 46 per cent of the WIO fleet consisted of foreign vessels primarily targeting valuable pelagic species like tuna and deep-water orange roughly, as Van der Elst et al. (2005) reported. Recent assessments by WWF have revised this figure slightly to 44 per cent, emphasising that 78 per cent of tuna catches in the SWIO are attributed to DWFNs (WWF, 2023). Even if such high-remunerative and foreign markets do not necessarily affect African household's consumption, they absorb financial means and divert institutional efforts from the SSF framework (Bené et al., 2009). After all, the latter represents the strategic linchpin of the region's food security, employing communities in the labour market and creating livelihoods, as the catch is processed mainly by and for locals. Even so, regulatory actions still fail to define a universal standard of its

features: complex technicalities and different patterns are vaguely defined in reductionist categories and suffer from poor policy language translation, eventually affecting development strategies (March and Failler, 2022). Such ambiguity is but another symptom of the institutional weakness harnessing the region's governance, forcefully compelled by outsiders to apply foreign models to a very particular set of problems: "fishery regulation is one of those spheres of economic policy where what is the best thing to do depends on what can be done" (Turvey, 1964, p.1). In the end, the financial stakeholders often are the quickest to anticipate risks and sever their ties. This happens even as significant economic rent could be used wisely to invest in local communities' social infrastructures and services. However, this potential source of revenue is wasted on an annual basis. (Josupeit, 2022). The adjacent marginalisation of coastal communities leads to the loss of a significant percentage of their access benefits and, eventually, their trust in government-led policies. The UN Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Oliver De Schutter, expressed concern about the competitive access to marine resources between foreign vessels and local SSF in LIFDCs. He stated that short-term economic incentives and insufficient scientific information often combine and lead to inadequate compliance with the arts. 62 (2), 69 (2) and 70 (3) of the United Nations Convention on the Law Of the Seas (UNCLOS), which note that foreign vessels are only allowed to catch what is considered surplus fish (A/67/268, 2012). In the 2012 interim report to the UN General Assembly, it was observed that small-scale fishermen commonly encounter challenges such as competition from larger corporations and trade barriers, including tariffs and non-tariff measures, extending to meeting the stringent hygiene and sanitation standards required by importing countries. On the other hand, the report highlighted that the growth of export-oriented fisheries could result in job losses for those involved in fish processing within the small-scale sector, which serves local and regional markets.

Governance and Management of ESA's Fisheries.

UNCLOS dispositions regulate the oceans' international and domestic legal regimes. An additional set of multilateral agreements governs the regional dimension of fisheries

management, which is critical to monitoring and enforcing statutory dispositions. These Regional Fisheries Bodies (RFBs) are divided into Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) and Regional Fisheries Advisory Bodies (RFABs). Whilst the former has legally binding powers on conservation and management of their respective area of jurisdiction, RFABs mainly provide their members with advice based on scientific evidence (FAO, 2020). In EA, marine and freshwater bodies are regulated by 3 RFMOs and 3 RFABs: the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization (LVFO), the South Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA) and the Committee for Inland Fisheries and Aquaculture of Africa (CIFAA), Lake Tanganyika Authority (LTA), Southwest Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission (SWIOFC). For statistical purposes, FAO created Major Fishing Areas within the Coordinating Working Party on Fishery Statistics as distinct geographical zones, whose limits were established in collaboration with international fishery organisations based on several factors. East African inland waterbodies are catalogued under FAO Major Fishing Area 01. The SWIO region, on the other hand, is delimited and regulated as subareas 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Major Fishing Area 51, which roughly corresponds to the WIO.

The role played by FAO is of the utmost importance for the elaboration and operationalisation of common standard procedures developed on approved and up-to-date information. Since 1994, a comprehensive analysis of structural trends called the *State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture* has been published. The themes discussed inform the Committee on Fisheries, an inter-governmental organisation concerning the international management of fisheries and aquaculture meetings every two years (Pauly & Zeller, 2017). In 1995, the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF) was adopted. The document, quickly enacted worldwide, “provides a necessary framework for national and international efforts to ensure sustainable exploitation of aquatic living resources in harmony with the environment” (FAO, 1995, p. iv). Finally, on the conclusions reached at the 29th Session of the FAO Committee on Fisheries, The *Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication* (VGSSF) were agreed upon and adopted. The VGSSF (FAO, 2015, p. ix): “Provide complementary guidance concerning small-scale fisheries in support of the overall

principles and provisions of the Code. Accordingly, the Guidelines are intended to support the visibility, recognition, and enhancement of the already vital role of small-scale fisheries and contribute to global and national efforts towards eradicating hunger and poverty. The Guidelines support responsible fisheries and sustainable social and economic development for the benefit of current and future generations, emphasising small-scale fishers and fish workers and related activities and including vulnerable and marginalised people, promoting a human rights-based approach.”

The importance of ESA’s Blue World is tied to its cultural and socioeconomic values, certainly allowed by the proximity and pervasiveness of the former. Regional governance has historically overlooked its potential, leaving fishing grounds and other resources in decaying mismanagement, leading to overexploitation and increasing IUU fishing practices (NEPAD, 2014). Thanks to south-south cooperation, African countries have reached critical thresholds in the sector’s development. Guided by the African Union Commission, continental actors are now looking forward to a holistic implementation and strengthening of the sector under the Agenda 2063 framework.

Interregional cooperation has led to the *Policy Framework and Reform Strategy for Fisheries and Aquaculture in Africa* (PFRS), developed by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). The document is the product of at least ten years of multilateral dialogue. It is the ultimate effort to create a comprehensive strategy toward the regularisation of Africa’s fisheries as long as “a key challenge across the fisheries management spectrum is the lack of policy coherence and coordination in the management of the fisheries and aquaculture resources in the African Union countries.” (NEPAD, 2014, p. xiii). Thus, it acknowledges the structural limitations and hurdles of the “weak human and institutional capacity,” which “continues to be a key constraint for positive reform of the fisheries and aquaculture sector” (NEPAD, 2014, p. xiii).

Furthermore, the African continent has an increasing urgency to counter poverty and hunger proportionally to its demographic and economic growth rates while complying with the Agenda 2030 sustainability targets. To achieve such a challenging goal, African coastal countries advocate the Blue Economy concept, pioneered by Small Island Developing States (SIDS) within the international arena. The idea recognises blue resources' significant

role in human development and their potential once harnessed purposely. Under the banner of the Agenda 2063, the UN Economic Commission for Africa states that “the African Union call the Blue Economy the *New Frontier of African Renaissance*” (ECA, 2018, p. X). Such policies strengthen the narrative of ocean-based activities primarily as market-based on the false assumptions that Africa’s “natural resources have remained largely underexploited but are now being recognised for their potential contribution to inclusive and sustainable development.” (ECA, 2018, p. X; Cisneros-Montemayor et al., 2019). Instead, the scientific community has been ceaselessly reminded of the dangers entrenched in the market logic behind the BE, as articulated by Morrissey (2021, p.2): “The market logic of *blue growth* has driven unsustainable exploitation of marine resources, such as fisheries, despite numerous institutional attempts to tackle overfishing for instance. It is highly questionable how concepts such as blue growth or the blue economy are realisable in a context of rapid environmental change and climate crisis.”.

The BE concept is commonly known to be erratic and lacking a generally accepted definition, grounding the premises for ambiguous policy making. Its pursuance has too quickly gained momentum, often establishing models of growth without any contextual awareness, which once again benefitted more prominent stakeholders at the expenses of the small producer. Garland et al. (2019) argue that a just implementation of the BE should foremost regard the regional context in which it operates, considering especially heterogeneous levels of governance toward establishing inclusive management among the parts. The paper asserts that “the right scale for implementing BE [...] depends on the *locus* and the extent to which policies can be applied.” (Garland et al., 2019, p.16). Conversely, and keeping in mind that “environmental problems bear down disproportionately upon the poor.” (Agyeman et al., 2001, p.78), without considering the abovementioned factors, there is a high likelihood that the process will end up exacerbating unevenness among already skewed social structures as the product of unfair development policies (Cisneros-Montemayor et al., 2019).

Chapter II: “EUROFISH - A comprehensive analysis of the European engagement in ESA’s fisheries governance.”

The European Role in ESA’s Fisheries Management.

Chapter I elucidated the interconnections that enable foreign fleets to exploit the intricacies of ESA's fisheries governance. However, for a comprehensive understanding, it is imperative to delineate the boundaries of multilateral partnerships and cooperation strategies to fortify the region's policy development, as presented in Chapter II.

To achieve sustainable growth, Least Developed Countries (LDCs) must increase financial and social efforts to hinder shortcomings at a sped-up rate while supplied with inadequate aid. In this framework, the EU is one of Africa’s most significant economic partners and financial investors. The so-called “special privilege” collaboration has evolved through colonialism and neocolonialism, expanding and rearranging many times to represent one of the most important European trading partners in the Organisation of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific States (OACPS) framework. The present state of affairs allegedly represents a new chapter of cooperation between the EU and OACPS partners. As such, it favours the Union’s “painful duty,” as argued by Cosgrove (1969, p.77), to acknowledge the negative impacts caused by the European colonial past in Africa and the multitude of stumbling blocks in the path of the relationship’s evolution.

Nonetheless, it would be naïve to assume that the EU’s regional concerns would not include geopolitical targets. Ultimately, the EU represents an economic and political hatchery for merging diverse perspectives and interests through actively involving diverse policy actors in a good governance environment. In this regard, sustainable development becomes a critical device of the Union’s legitimacy both within and beyond, as underlined by Romano Prodi’s EC inception speech: “We must aim to become a global civil power at the service of sustainable global development. After all, only by ensuring sustainable global development can Europe guarantee its strategic security”. (Prodi, 2000, p.3) This moral

message was not new to the integration process, as evidenced in the Schuman Declaration: "Europe could, with more resources, fulfil a crucial duty: the development of Africa." (Schuman, 1950, p.12) Throughout this second chapter, I will analyse the Union's complex approach to the sustainable development of foreign partners in the fisheries department, characterised by recurring tensions between trade-oriented priorities and overarching poverty eradication goals as outlined in Artt. 208-211 of TFUE.

To provide a comprehensive overview, I will define the EU's priorities by examining the CFP and its external dimensions. I will then compare the moral motivations driving the Union's development efforts with the assessment of the EU's subsidies for Distant Water Fishing (DWFs) fleets in bilateral fishing agreements (FAs) with coastal developing states. This approach aims to pinpoint significant disparities within the Union's Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) concerning the development needs of LDCs and the Union's competitive market drivers. Finally, I will analyse the European-funded E€OFISH Programme as a reference for the Union's influence on the EA-SA-IO fisheries governance. Such assessment will come from dissecting the program's objectives, strategies, and outcomes to understand its role in promoting regional sustainability.

The (in)Coherence of the European Design.

In 2021, the EU-Africa partnership embarked on a fresh phase characterised by the implementation of two key instruments. The first entailed a comprehensive restructuring of the EU Strategy for Africa, notably recognising the intrinsic interdependence between the two entities. The second crucial development was encapsulated in the post-Cotonou Agreement, with a concerted effort to reinforce a concept of collaboration defined as a "partnership of equals." Within the post-Cotonou Agreement, the renovation of the multi-annual financial framework (MFF) 2021-2027 is notably complemented by the comprehensive merge of previous instruments into the Neighbourhood Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI - Global Europe Instrument). Prospectively, this reform benefits aid towards Africa as it coherently develops one fund for the whole region instead of offering a fragmented framework of different financial basins. Until the

renovation of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), any European project developed in cooperation with the OACPS has been financed through the European Development Fund (EDF) tool: an intergovernmental External Financing Instrument (EFI) consisting of EU members' voluntary contributions, which has been the most prominent geographical instrument outside the EU Budget (D'Alfonso, 2014). The 11th EDF, accounting for 30.5 billion EUR, was defined by Council Regulation (EU) No.2015/322 and managed by the EC Directorate General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA). Within the framework of the CPA, DG INTPA and the European External Action Service (EEAS) collaborated to design and execute an array of comprehensive policies across the African continent. Whilst the EEAS, driven by a strategic vision, seeks to promote interinstitutional cooperation, the mentioned Directorate manages the regional programming.

As the fourth pillar of the CPA, the concept of regionalisation assumed a notable role in effectuating both the Agenda for Change and, subsequently, the European Consensus on Development. These overarching policies were strategically launched to implement the EU's engagement toward the SDGs framework, while Art. 19 CPA included promoting local ownership and civil society cooperation. Coupled with the EDF 2014-2020 round, the OACPS obtained more than 24 billion EUR of the overall EDF budget for bilateral and regional cooperation projects as part of National and Regional Indicative Programmes. The Mid-Term Evaluation of the mentioned round, promoted by the EC, revealed that approximately 60% of the financial resources designated for regional cooperation were channelled into fostering regional economic integration. This allocation was distributed across five distinct RIPs spanning Western Africa, the EA-SA-IO region, Central Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. According to the same report, efforts to promote regional integration have been diligently pursued to integrate countries within the OACPS into the global economy. The CPA introduced the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) precisely to ensure compatibility with the World Trade Organization (WTO), grounding trade cooperation on reciprocity (Gomes, 2013). On the other hand, Stender et al. (2021) note that such Free Trade Agreements have yet to generate "win-win" outlooks for OACPS partners, and Langan (2012, p.261) highlights that "European companies are understood to take advantage of EPA trade liberalisation to 'crowd out' nascent ACP competitors and to

flood former colonies' markets with cheap European manufactures at the expense of fledgling indigenous small-scale entrepreneurs”.

Additionally, it must be noted that the attention devoted to fostering local ownership and involving civil society has been relatively limited. Supporting institutional allowances without precise accountability has strengthened unsustainable finance and resulted in an increased perception of a shallow “aid entitlement” culture. Additional constraints are found in weak governance and lack of streamlined management, which estranges the harmonisation of regional aims into national strategies. This also amplifies the gap between technical committees and the political leadership, resulting in a defecting dialogue to endeavour such targets.

The EU seeks to promote its principles and standards (Art.21 TUE) by implementing comprehensive cooperation networks. It fails to achieve its targets whenever the outcomes do not cope with the PCD principle formulated by Art.208 TFUE, which ultimately grounds its credibility and reliability as a partner. Policy Coherence was first introduced with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 and evolved accordingly to the Union's maturity (Núñez-Borja et al., 2018). However, the resolute application of the policy resulted from two distinct cases in West Africa: In 1994, European meat exports in the region were deemed disruptive for local markets, where the Union was simultaneously implementing cooperative projects to encourage meat production; in 1996, a similar case was regarded European FAs. The EU consistently lengthened any means to assess the situation due to lacking a comprehensive foreign policy framework. European NGOs under the Coalition of Fair Fisheries Agreements advocated these cases as highly problematic. In the FA case, the EU was “blamed for not having reduced the overcapacity of its fishing fleets, and for having simply exported the problem by concluding fisheries agreements.” (Hoebink, 2004a, p.45) The struggle to define PCD within the European apparatus has been critical to developing African FAs as they directly affect foreign economic and social environments (Hoebink, 2004b).

The European Union's international fisheries governance responsibilities and development cooperation goals are divided between the Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and

Fisheries (DG MARE) and the DG INTPA. Whereas DG MARE is often compelled to promote the primacy of a “business approach” to safeguard European interests, DG INTPA seeks to build consistency within the development targets laid out by partnership agreements. The juxtaposition of diverse jurisdictions often tends to bear incoherencies and conflictual relationships between European organisms, eventually reflecting on the effectiveness of partnership agreements with third parties (Acheampong, 1997). I contend that such inconsistencies shaping the EU’s external dimension are derivative of the moral role often erratically enacted by European officials in the Union’s claims. Manners (2002) depicts it as the normative power of the EU, which he defines as the ability to influence external partners through its perception of “normal” behaviour and argues it to be the “greatest power of all”. At the very least, this perception seems patronising and can be easily regarded as neocolonialist. For that matter, Langan (2012, p.245) asserts that normative power is “power no less [...] and is exercised, whether intentionally or not, in regular transgression of veiling moral norms.” The author shows how European policies in cooperation with the OACPS have protracted negative consequences for the region's most vulnerable citizens. Moreover, Holland (2002, p.29) contests that European normative powers have expressively favoured the subsidisation of European commercial investments “while failing to support indigenous small-scale enterprise in productive industrial sectors”, and corporate influences have gone as far as outweighing “development needs in the allocation of development aid” (Langan, 2012, p.257). Each round of reformed partnership with the ACP strived to revalidate the image of the European partner and repeatedly failed to achieve tangible progress in development policies by consistently overruling its ethical commitments. The “development” branding has been used to rationalise and condone Europe’s pursuit of interest throughout the evolution of European ties with African countries. Kadfak and Antonova (2021, p.4) argue that the EU actively promotes its “rules, norms and structures of meaning” by supplementing partnership and market pressures to “to change the other actors’ social practices and dispositions to finally adopt or internalise desired practices in their institution or legal system.” The European seafood market is the largest worldwide, creating robust premises to determine LDCs’ political dispositions. In the following sections, I will overhaul such estimations by cross-checking the CFP external

dimension with development channels aiming at estimating their ultimate impact on African recipients.

A Systemic Overview of the CFP's External Dimension.

European FAs with African countries matured over time, undergoing three rounds of structural reformation. From 1979 to the mid-1990s, agreements were poorly regulated as one-off payment transactions “to ensure continued access to fisheries resources as well as to secure employment opportunities for its citizens” (Witbooi, 2007, p.672). These redirected the overcapacity of the EEC fishing fleets toward then-conceived underexploited grounds. Such proclivity was pursued by the regulatory bases of the CFP, established by Council Regulations (EEC) No.2141/70 and 2142/70, promoting the notion of European auto-sufficiency (Seto, 2015). Regardless, FAs quickly showed their environmental and social impact as host parties had nearly no control over the harvest or efforts of DWFs. Between 1992 and 2000, the EU allocated approximately 270,000 ECUs annually to “re-deploy fishing fleets of the member-states into other nations’ waters mainly through international fisheries cooperation agreements with developing countries.” (Kaczynski & Fluharty, 2002, p.76) Meanwhile, from 1981 to 1997, European profits underwent a remarkable surge, escalating from 5 to a staggering 300 million EUR equivalent. This meteoric rise in profits was a direct result of a parallel expansion in the size of the European fishing fleet during the same period. (Failler & Binet, 2011). In the meantime, the owners of DWF vessels paid meagre fees to host governments whilst being handsomely subsidised by EU members. Such custom hindered the attempt of African fisheries to compete in this manipulated market as “Fishing subsidies can also introduce international seafood price distortions. [...] By reducing costs for the beneficiary fleets, subsidies increase activity and fish supply and therefore reduce prices [...] Lower prices tend to be detrimental for net exporters, which are generally developing countries.” (Merayo et al., 2019, p.9).

From Regulation No. 2908/83, multi-annual guidance programmes (MPAG) sought the EEC's standardisation of its fishing capacity to reduce its effort, ultimately failing in its

intent (Seto, 2015). On the other hand, reforming the external dimension of the European Union's CFP in 2002 introduced a more pronounced emphasis on sustainability due to the establishment of Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs), enacted by Regulation 2371/2002 and endeavouring the 2003 European Code of Sustainable and Responsible Fisheries Practices. These regulatory actions directed the European Commission (EC) to prioritise sustainability and conservation within agreements (Witbooi, 2007). Simultaneously with reforming the external dimension policy, the MPAGs were replaced by the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG). This transition aimed to streamline and fund the structural policies of the CFP, all the while addressing incoherencies caused by subsidisation policies (Witbooi, 2008). Assessments reveal that African nations incurred a substantial financial deficit of approximately 400 million USD due to inadequate fishing capacities compared to their DWF counterparts (FAO, 2014). This disparity is particularly pronounced in the downstream and post-harvest sectors: the European fishing industry is thus supplied with raw materials harvested in African waters at the lowest price. Conversely, African industries are often pulled back from the Common market due to their stringent hygiene standards and lack of funding to develop processing structures and Monitoring Control and Surveillance (MCS) systems. Structural displacement of development funds has been long exacerbated by European vessels conducting private joint ventures in African countries alongside FPAs (Seto, 2015; Occhiali, 2023). Such a trend strengthened the market's privatisation and assured multinational companies, such as Pescanova, Unilever and Resource Group Internationals, a safe linkage with corporate investors in coastal developing states (Kaczynski & Fluharty, 2002). On such grounds, Failler and Binet (2011, p.168) denounced the 2002 reformation as driven by “the illusion of a rational management of marine resources and the illusion of the effectiveness of state control.” FPAs allegedly allocated specific funds to host countries aiming to establish local and sustainable resource management while adopting a cooperative partnership approach to fisheries agreements. This empowered the EU to conduct joint evaluations with local management to assess coastal states' stock capacity as regulated by Art.62.2 UNCLOS (Witbooi, 2007). At the same time, as Slocum-Bradley and Bradley (2010, p.44) noted, various complaints emerged from civil society, non-state actors (NSA), and state authorities

regarding the EU-Seychelles FPA during its evaluation in 2008. A primary concern was the perceived lack of ownership granted to the Seychelles government concerning how they could utilise the remuneration provided by the EU under the Agreement, whilst EU vessels were believed to have repeatedly underreported their catch. Furthermore, in reviewing the Malagasy agreements, Le Manach et al. (2013) have shown how the absence of scientific data and incomplete knowledge had been exploited throughout its broking to advantage European DWFs. The study found a considerable decrease in the earning rates by the Malagasy government from 1986 (the agreement's inception year) to 2010: "The total annual financial contribution by the EU, in terms of real value, dropped by almost 90%". The country hosts the second most significant tuna processing industry in the region, which is French-owned and benefits "from EU duty-free status, thus entering European markets without any import duties being collected." (Le Manach et al., 2013, pp. 261-262) Finally, a critical evaluation by the Pew Environmental Group of the FIG I revealed that despite the EU's initiative to decommission approximately 6,000 vessels to align with sustainability objectives, it simultaneously subsidised the construction of 3,000 new boats and the upgrading of 8,000 others in support of the European fishing industry. (Capell et al., 2010) On such premises, Seto (2015, p.11) asserts that the external dimension "protects European producers and market prices by reducing imports and enables displacement of European fishing fleets to other coastal states EEZ's, rather than requiring an absolute reduction in capacity" (Seto, 2015, p.11) The 2009 Commission's Green Paper on Reform highlighted that FPAs failed to achieve their sustainability targets. By 2011, the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council released the Proposal for a Regulation of the CFP based on a comprehensive evaluation of its structural issues. Regulation (EU) No. 1380/2013 acted directly upon the external dimensions of the CFP, among other structural revisions. Most importantly, it endeavoured the Maximum Sustainable Yield and a landing obligation for bycatch, which is considerable given that by observing such regulations, the EU "considers itself bound by international legal requirements" (Salomon, 2014, p.83). The reform also replaces FPAs with Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements (SFPAs) in Art.31, stressing the sustainable use of resources as advised by UNCLOS and establishing that "Union fishing vessels shall not operate in the waters of third countries with which a

Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement is in force unless they have a fishing authorisation which has been issued in accordance with that agreement” (Regulation (EU) 1380/2013 Art.31.5) thereby halting commonality of joint ventures. Additionally, the article discourages European vessels from re-flagging under private agreements with other countries once they exhaust the quota established by an SFPA (Salomon, 2014; Seto, 2015). EU’s SFPAs are allegedly characterised by high levels of transparency while giving increased financial and know-how support to hosting partners. Accordingly, regulations set forth by the EU entail intricate negotiation processes. These complexities are compounded by the stringent levels of adherence demanded for food safety and quality control, a hallmark of the EU's standards. Such a combination of factors has progressively compelled African partners to gravitate toward swifter alternatives available through engagements with Asian counterparts (such as China, Taiwan, South Korea, and Indonesia, among others). These Asian partners typically follow a "pay, fish, and go" pattern, which often comes with significant drawbacks, including meagre financial compensations, a lack of transparency, instances of IUU fishing practices, and even human rights violations. As much as the Union’s normative power could often represent a double-edged sword, as described in previous segments, the implementation of international agreements within the boundaries of embedded human rights and democratic clauses pinpoints a stark divergence from other African partners.

European Distant Water Fishing Nations and the Fight against Subsidisation.

The European DWFs accounted for 1% of the EU fleet in 2011. Nonetheless, its landings constituted some 86 per cent of all landings in weight, with 15 per cent of gross income per year, and a great extent of the fleet has been supported through subsidisation (Antonova, 2016). Many coastal states and SIDS within the OACPS commonly rent fishing rights to DWFs through licensing to harvest in their respective EEZs to gain benefit from it. The prevailing theoretical rationale behind these collaborations is that considerable financial resources from these FAs will radiate positive impacts throughout the host nations' economies, eventually reaching the bottom of the pyramid due to trickle-down effects.

Gomes (2013, p.722) argues that EDF programmes find their theoretical grounds in neoliberalism, compelling African partners into a market economy far from being coherent with the prevailing paradigmatic situation of class polarisation in the region and often exacerbated by market drivers. Such theories are far from creating shared wealth, as profit remains agglutinated in foreign corporate pockets whilst host countries linger in the perception of short-term advantages, fundamental from the standpoint of the political class, forced to exhibit progress in the context of a “resource curse” environment. Such rent-seeking strategies have “isolated developing countries in the lowest levels of the value chain, where they capture far less overall wealth than would be possible if processing, wholesale and possibly even retailing was integrated into the national economy.” (Gagern and van den Bergh, 2013, p.384) The longstanding allocation of subsidies to the European DWF industry, especially regarding the Spanish fleet, has hampered the PCD framework within EU-OACPS relations. This predicament comes to the forefront in the study conducted by Sala et al. (2018, p.5), which highlighted that Spanish fleets absorb 14 per cent of all subsidies worldwide for high-sea fishing. Notably, many lucrative subsidies are allocated for tuna longlining fishing in the WIO region. The study underpins that these financial aids are by no means indispensable for sustaining the operations of Spanish DWFs. However, unlike their Taiwanese and Chinese counterparts operating in similar domains but with distinct economic outcomes, subsidies significantly influence the substantial profit these fleets generate. Moreover, European fleets were often caught disrupting UNCLOS regulations and actively participating in IUU activities. The Spanish DWF, for example, is often found at the centre of fishing access disputes from 1991 to 1995, both in Namibia and Morocco; more recently, Spanish MPs contested the broking of EU-Mauritania SFPAs on account of the absence of octopus quotas, even if the scientific community attested to their grave overexploitation rates (WRI, 2004; Salomon, 2014). On the other hand, French vessels were caught in 2011 underreporting tuna catches in Malagasy EEZs (Le Manach et al., 2013). Upon meticulous examination of four distinct national instances within SSA, the study conducted by Okafor-Yarwood et al. (2022) has showcased that IUU fishing has been primarily conducted by industrial vessels, far surpassing that observed within SSFs. The researchers postulate that African leadership's

grave lack of accountability paves the way for DWFs to engage in overfishing and unregulated practices, ultimately propelled by their urgency to amass foreign currency in the short term. In this complex landscape, the imperative for economic gain has effectively overshadowed concerns for sustainable resource management. Concurrently, institutions have tended to place undue blame on SSFs. Marginalised from political decision-making, the latter is often considered the source of IUU. For this reason, African governments are channelling substantial investments into MCS mechanisms, often overpowering fisherfolks and exacerbating the gap between coastal communities and central administrations. On June 17, 2022, a significant historical milestone was achieved as the WTO officially recognised the wide-ranging consequences of Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCMs). This acknowledgement comes after an extensive 21-year evaluation process initiated during the Doha Development Agenda 2001 and further advanced by the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in 2005. These pivotal agreements further solidified the foundation established by the unsuccessful SDG 14.6, which aimed to "end subsidies contributing to overfishing" by 2020. On the other hand, the Agreement on SCMs has faltered to trigger a variety of action parameters. The text excludes freshwater fishing activities as Art. 1 explicitly states that the agreement pertains to "marine wild capture fishing and fishing-related activities at sea." No significant threshold was reached regarding the special and differential treatment of LDCs, and technical assistance and capacity-building provisions are limited to implementing the Agreement, as stated in Art.7 (Tipping & Irschlinger, 2020; Occhiali, 2023). This is a crucial matter as a special and differential treatment approach to SCMs is argued to be beneficial to coastal communities when it guarantees some margin of wealth distribution towards marginalised fisherfolks. Once again, as contended by Merayo et al. (2019), such an issue is compounded by the mainstream narrative: policymakers tend to put together a wide variety of tools under the SCMs, some of which can be advantageous, whilst others are undoubtedly harmful. Squires et al. (2014, p.223) define "good" as Pigouvian subsidies matching "the number of external benefits [...] leading to the economic and ecological optimum production and investment," whilst "bad" SCMs are "considered to exacerbate the well-documented commons problem of overfishing, overfished resource stocks, excessive economic inputs allocated to the

sector, raising costs, lowering economic rents, and creating ecological damages, as well as distorting the price signals that allocate resources in a market economy”. The value of detrimental SCMs is much higher than that of its counterpart: “The value of harmful subsidies per tonne caught ranged from US\$945.8 to US\$59.2.” (Arthur et al., 2019, p.14). For this reason, the Agreement's shortcomings on the regulation of subsidies promoting overcapacity and overfishing bear grave unrest in the community, as stated by Lennan and Switzer (2023, p.): “Negotiators [...] traded a comprehensive agreement with disciplines on overcapacity and overfishing for an incomplete interim or ‘starter agreement’, with the promise to return to these more contentious issues in due course.” However, I argue that such strategies at the international level are hindered if not complemented by regional and national efforts to enforce international regulations and MCS as part of an inclusive and decentralised strategy. Due to the legal basis set by Artt. 29 to 31 of the CFP Regulation, the EU is compelled to bolster international fisheries governance by actively supporting and fostering cooperation with RFMOs and establishing “a legal, environmental, economic and social governance framework” to implement SFPAs. In the SWIO region, the EU is conducting bilateral agreements with Mauritius and Seychelles. The Indian Ocean represents a great basin of resources. Multiple actors have often exploited it because it racks up 16 per cent of the value of tuna fisheries worldwide, for some 6.5 billion EUR. Historically, French and Spanish DWFs exploited the lack of data management and governance control to amass a great deal of profit. This was until the IOTC was established to act firmly to implement MCS in the region through constant interactions between its 31 contracting parties, including the EU. However, the second Performance Review of the IOTC from 2016 (IOTC–2016–PRIOTC02–R[E]) underpinned the considerable lack of scientific data retrieval and a significant share of non-compliance among contracting parties in assisting such a process. To overcome such hindrances, the EU has placed substantial funds to drive regional cooperation and implement its capacity building by endeavouring extensive cooperation programmes through *ad hoc* funds agglutinated within the RIP of the EA-SA-IO region (Aranda et al. et al., 2019).

A Comprehensive Review of the E€OFISH Programme.

The E€OFISH Programme is a cross-regional initiative undertaken by an EU-IOC financing agreement and endeavoured by cultural and economic synergies of 13 States and 5 Duly Mandated Regional Organisations (DMROs) in the EA-SA-IO regions to strengthen the sustainable exploitation of their Blue resources by the implementation of the FAO Blue Growth Initiative. Such structure stresses the importance of subsidiarity and complementarity among diverse actors toward achieving the Programme's goals comprehensively within an enhanced attempt to strengthen regional integration. It is part of the EU's RIP strategy and financed through direct funding by the 11th EDF for a maximum EU contribution of EUR 28 million with an additional EUR 1 400 000 added by indirect management with ENABEL (Belgian Development Agency). It is set to develop over 72 months and has been extended. The broad, overarching aim of the program is to stimulate economic growth in a fair and just manner to guarantee its distribution throughout the value chain, with a particular concern for SSFs. This key clause is being further developed on the achievements of the Programme's predecessors, namely SmartFish I and II, established under the 10th EDF round. Besides other RIPs, the EA-SA-IO one includes the mentioned cross-regional envelope, subdivided into seven target needs not exclusively related to the regional DMROs mandate but still supported by the Union's Programme. These are peace and security in the Great Lakes region; migration; the maritime situation, security and safety; the implementation of the EU-East and Southern Africa interim Economic Partnership Agreement; transboundary water management; the contribution of sustainable fisheries to the blue economy; and wildlife conservation. However, Herrero and Gregersen (2016) have found the cross-regional envelope to better respond to EU priorities, strongly advocated by the EEAS' vision, rather than grounding the bases for regional actors' active integration.

Furthermore, it seeks to ensure the conservation and benefit of its marine and freshwater resources, grounding the premises for long-term development to attain enhanced employment, poverty reduction and food security. All the more, it intends to build resilience

against the incremental threat of Climate Change. The Programme propose to attain three main Results (R1 - R2 - R3 CFP):

- 1) Enhanced Regional Policies and institutional frameworks to secure more sustainable fisheries management and contribute to marine biodiversity and climate resilience.
- 2) Strengthened capacity to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing in the EA-SA-IO region.
 - a. The Programme revitalises the regional MCS management structure to seek the above, supplementing the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) Regional Fisheries Surveillance Programme (PRSP).
- 3) Concrete fisheries management and governance initiatives in small-scale inland and marine fisheries are supported with the possibilities of replication at the regional level.

The budget is divided into direct, semi-direct and indirect management procedures and is implemented by EUDs, DMROs and RFBs:

- DMROs: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), IOC, Southern African Development Community (SADC).
- RFMOs (marine): IOTC.
- RFMOs (inland): LVFO, LTA.
- RFBs: SWIOFC, SIOFA.
- Others: African Union Intergovernmental Bureau for Animal Resources - AU IBAR, FAO, UNEP.

The EUD MUS directly manages 52 per cent of the total budget, whereas indirect and semi-indirect management is divided between the IOC, LVFO and LTA. Due to lessons learned from EDF10 and conclusions from the European Court of Auditors 2009 report, the EU has increased the EUDs' capacities to manage competence areas by defining national and regional responsibilities in improved cooperation (Herrero & Gregersen, 2016).

The overall governance of this region is highly complex because, on average, each country in the area belongs to 2 to 3 DMROs. Additionally, ten countries in the region are not part

of any RFB because of their geographical location. Among the 10th EDF lessons learned, the EU agenda seeks to scale down DMROs' overlapping memberships and roles, as they often lead to resource duplication, potential miscommunication, and subtle rivalries (Herrero & Gregersen, 2016). The limited scientific knowledge of DMROs often hinders coordination within RFMO/RFB, whilst the prevailing regional cooperation approach sometimes results in policy endorsement without action due to differing interests. In such a distressed environment, the principle of direct access integrated into the 11th EDF has further exacerbated conflictual dialogues between the EU and regional DMROs, which foresaw this tool as a means to bypass their ownership as it enables other actors to access the same funding (Herrero & Gregersen, 2016). Soderbaum and Brodin (2016) assessed that direct access can favour a bottom-up approach, ultimately strengthening regional cooperation by implementing national strategies instead of classic top-down DMROs-driven merge of financial resources. Additionally, the focus on continental matters marginalises IO SIDS, worsened by the rejection of the IOC as an African Regional Economic Community (REC).

Embedded in the Programme's financial agreement, the EEOFISH is partitioned into 5 Work Plans (WPs) "to facilitate the strategic planning and operationalisation of the programme":

- 1) WP1 – LVFO: It receives a budget allocation of EUR 2 million, managed by the LVFO Secretariat under the financial oversight of the EUD of Uganda.
- 2) WP2 – LTA: The LTA receives a budget of 2 million EUR for its Work Plan, which the FAO will implement through a Contribution Agreement overseen by the EUD of Burundi.
- 3) WP3 – Marine Fisheries: has a budget of 9.8 million EUR, accounting for 34% of the total Programme's funding. It encompasses various critical actions within the Marine Fisheries domain:
 - a. Regional MCS Operations: These are led by IOC-PRSP and were initiated in 2007 with support from the EU DG MARE and SmartFish Programme. It

also received indirect backing from EU Fisheries Governance and the World Bank's SWIOFish I Project.

- b. Marine Small-Scale Fisheries: The IOC is responsible for the sustainable management of small-scale fisheries in the EA-SA-IO region across R1 – R2 – R3 CFP. This pertains to a maritime area comprising 12 countries, including 8 SWIO States and four coastal states in the Horn of Africa.
 - c. Cross-Regional Interventions: This encompasses various strategic tools and interventions to enhance the fisheries sector's regional institutional frameworks and political economy.
- 4) WP4 – Call for Proposals (R3 CFP): The collaborative efforts of DMROs and the technical assistance team ensure that the selected projects align with the program's objectives and guidelines, facilitating effective implementation. This WP is under the direct management of the EUD MUS. This plan has a financial allocation of EUR 8 million, distributed as follows: EUR 3 million for East Africa, EUR 3 million for Southern Africa, and EUR 2 million for the Indian Ocean. Each project within this plan falls within the grant range of EUR 500,000 to 1 million.
- 5) Technical Assistance: the technical assistance team and the Short-Term Expertise cut across the other WPs. They provide expert advice and strategic orientation to the LVFO, LTA and IOC.

The IOC implements the WP3 of the E€OFISH Programme, aimed at strengthening the operational capacities of relevant DMRO and RFB for sustainable, inclusive, and climate-smart marine fisheries in the EA-SA-IO region. R1 enhances regional and sub-regional policy and institutional environments to promote SSF as a growth driver. It integrates AU PFRS, addressing the impacts of overcapacity, overfishing, and climate change. The process begins with assessing the operational capacities of regional economic and fisheries organisations, leading to tailored strategies and a country-specific ten-year Action Plan. Furthermore, it involves developing fisheries databases for policymaking. IGAD and IOC work on tailored regional fisheries initiatives; meanwhile, coastal fisheries and conservation management are integrated, supporting projects in MPAs and Voluntary

Marine Conservation Management, whereas SADC partners with E€OFISH to promote Trans-Frontier Marine Conservation Areas in the Western Indian Ocean.

R2 focuses on MCS operations in marine fisheries, particularly addressing IUU fishing, fisheries-related crimes, and maritime insecurities in the region. Critical efforts centre on strengthening regional Fisheries Surveillance Operations, notably through the IOC PRSP. SADC is progressing toward establishing a significant MCS Coordination Centre in Maputo, supported by various organisations, including Stop Illegal Fishing/Fish I Africa, WWF, and others. Simultaneously, IGAD is working on establishing its regional MCS Coordination Centre in the Horn of Africa, aiming to share strategic information with recognised regional MCS Coordination Centers. IUU fishing challenges differ between small-scale artisanal fisheries and industrial sectors. The MCS sub-component should coordinate with R1 and R3 CFP projects, seeking to reform small-scale fisheries while safeguarding local communities.

R3 CFP aims to promote sustainable small-scale fisheries management innovations across the region by supporting the implementation of the FAO VGSSFs, among other soft power international tools. It has a budget of 8 million EUR allocated to EA-SA-IO. Several projects will be awarded, with the EUD MUS managing the component. These projects showcase the positive socio-ecological impacts of sustainable SSFs. Devolved governance structures supervise them through the Integrated Project Management Unit (IPMU), which combines external Technical Expertise from the technical assistance team with the project management and functional services of the IOC Secretariat. R3 CFP aims at reducing the overexploitation of blue resources whilst enhancing conservation and rehabilitation measures, establishing community-based management of SSF and participatory surveillance. Ultimately, Communication and Visibility will help disseminate lessons learned and best practices. SmartFish has already pursued such a strategy through the “Clean Fish. Better Life” campaign, consisting of a participatory video to “disseminate information around post-harvest hygiene and good practices from harvest to sale” in the SSFs subsector of the region.” This strategy aims to strengthen inclusivity in rural and coastal communities through community-led, relatively affordable means (March & Failler, 2022, p.7)

Gomes (2013, p.723) upheld the OACPS's growing importance in advocating policy changes for the CPA concerning development cooperation: "As a practitioner in managing development assistance, the ACP Secretariat possesses considerable institutional memory from its more than three decades of development cooperation with the EU." However, such a statement could be extended to several of the Union's creditable partners. Therefore, the EEOFISH Programme and other projects under the European umbrella of the RIPs possess the significant potential to integrate South-South management and cooperation into standardised aid channels. As portrayed in the Report of the Secretary-General to the United Nations General Assembly in June 2012 (UN, 2012, p.23): "Triangular cooperation maximises the comparative strengths of Northern funding and Southern expertise and is, therefore, more likely to fulfil programme countries' needs and priorities." A recent comprehensive evaluation of the SFPAs has showcased that such regional programmes tend to strengthen the efforts of bilateral agreements with African partners through synergistic interventions such as providing know-how "to encourage cooperation between coastal States [...] in support of the fight against IUU fishing" and, notably, support to the creation of community-led management and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), such as the *Fédération des Pêcheurs Artisans de l'Océan Indien* under SmartFish (EC, 2023, p.86)

Chapter III: “As Far As the Eyes Can See – Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) Fishing, Monitoring Control and Surveillance (MCS) and Co-Management Governance in ESA.”

Empowering Coastal Communities in ESA.

Chapter III considers the pervasive issue of IUU fishing, the challenges of implementing MCS management in the region, and the indispensable role of civil society organisations in advancing sustainable development and bolstering the resilience of ESA's coastal communities through local action. Implementing the direct access principle during the 11th EDF round inadvertently introduced a potential loophole that could bypass the jurisdiction of Duly Mandated Regional Organisations in managing the financial aspects of regional integration agendas. While this approach aimed to create a more robust management system and a multi-level course for aid action, it was met with immediate concern from OACPS partners. Senior officials from ESA's institutions argued that the EU had overlooked the region's political outlook, risking further undermining their authority (Herrero & Gregersen, 2016). The persistence of conflicting institutions across different decision-making levels impedes competent authorities from attaining development objectives, as the proliferation of complex governance structures often unfolds in bureaucratic stagnation, ultimately thwarting knowledge acquisition (Mason et al., 2021). This chapter highlights how the governance of SWIO fisheries has been significantly affected by a lack of data, impacting both economic and conservation management results, which altogether allows for thriving IUU rates. The deficiency of normative coherence and cooperative enforcement affects the MCS performance of each party, uncovering national and regional weaknesses, which minimises efforts against illegal fishing. A blurred concept of ownership, the juxtaposition of shifting jurisdictions and a severe lack of transparency result in conflicts that obstruct resource allocation and significantly impact the ground beneficiaries of aid strategies. These dynamics exacerbate existing social gaps between governmental authorities and local communities, compounding cross-cutting marginalisation (Josuepit, 2019; FiTI, 2017).

The comprehensive review of the E€OFISH Programme laid the benchmark to rationalise foreign aid conduits into the region. By reviewing the Programme's Result 3 Call For Proposals, I uphold the empowerment of non-state actors in executing grassroots governance initiatives, transcending a univocal top-down approach. I focus on the accomplishments of the NGO MCCN in the United Republic of Tanzania to showcase the effectiveness of civil society's support in overcoming the political and economic marginalisation hindering coastal communities' development. Through the case study, I thus explore the basis of cooperative management and participatory governance to overcome political misrepresentation and strengthen local decision-making faculties. Furthermore, the case study highlights their role in fostering sustainability and climate resilience knowledge, exemplifying bottom-up drivers of participatory MCS efforts to combat illegal fishing and encouraging regional replication.

What is IUU? An Overview.

The global surge in IUU fishing hampers the sustainable harnessing of marine and freshwater resources. Significant revenue losses for coastal countries, resulting in higher operational costs, have compelled national and supranational actors to include a counteroffensive framework in their governance agendas (UNEP, 2015). A survey conducted by Agnew et al. (2009), examining case studies from 54 countries and 15 high-seas regions, estimated that IUU fishing results in an annual global loss ranging from 10 to USD 23.5 billion. Additionally, an MRAG report (2005) has estimated that the value of illegal fishing, both in EEZs and high-seas of SSA, amounted to some USD 2.4 billion annually.

In the SWIO region, illegal fishing activities occur within EEZs and Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, involving Distant Water Fishing fleets and SSFs (Sweenaraian, 2021). The IOTC's establishment (1995) marked a decline in high-seas illegal fishing activities in the Indian Ocean, primarily concerning highly valued demersal species targeted by foreign fleets. Conversely, coastal populations often bear the brunt of high-seas fishing activities due to declining fish stocks, exacerbated by the high by-catch rate from Distant Water

Fishing Fleets and inadequate policing capabilities. It significantly stresses fisheries management in the short and long term and threatens the establishment of a resilient network that can safeguard regional food security. Moreover, illegal fishing is closely linked to other illicit activities, including human rights violations, trafficking, tax evasion, and smuggling.

Widjaja et al. (2020) argue that weak governance and insufficient enforcement create conditions where fishers are incentivised to flout regulations to pursue substantial economic gains. Often closely related to transnational organised crime, illegal fishing affects the achievement of Sustainable Goals, hindering the development of developing countries (Witabooi et al., 2020).

The FAO's categorisation of IUU fishing consists of several complex practices:

- a) Foremost, the transfer between vessels (transshipment) is widespread in the global fishing industry, whether at sea or in port. It quickens the product's motion, enabling vessels to continue operations without returning to shore. It ensures uninterrupted fishing and extends their time at sea, leading to continuous fishing efforts. In 2017, SkyTruth and Global Fishing Watch published a comprehensive report on global transshipment. Analysing data from the IOTC observers, it found that some 5,874 transshipments occurred between 2009 and 2015 in IO, not infrequently targeting Madagascar and Mauritius jurisdictions (SkyTruth, 2017). Transshipment often involves transporting fish far from their initial coastal catch locations and whitewashing it into the legitimate value chain. As such, it triggered local declines in SSF-targeted fish stocks (Belhabib et al., 2017; Lubchenco & Haugan, 2023). Ineffective monitoring allows unscrupulous actors to manipulate or obscure vital data about their fishing activities, distorting supply chains and undermining transparency efforts.
- b) Vessels can register under a flag state without a real connection to their owners or operators (flag of convenience), reducing regulatory supervision. From there, flags

and names can be changed (flag hopping), often fostering extensive labour abuses and inadequate safety protocols. RFMOs only regulate members, and some flag states have poor records of combating illegal fishing, granting "flags of non-compliance," allowing vessels to fish without subjecting them to MCS. Illegal fishing vessels use "ports of convenience", notably ports characterised by weak controls and inadequate capabilities. Such standard practices are facilitated by an extensive pattern of corruption safeguarding its features. In some regions, corruption evolved to be endemic to the system: ESA's fisheries are often controlled by "kingpins", political figures or high officials controlling networks through trickle-down sharing of profits or coercion (U4, 2021).

- c) Often, networks and individuals benefitting from IUU fishing are not targeted: analysing a series of 20 case studies in ESA, a paper from the non-governmental Stop Illegal Fishing (SIF) showed that often, MCS officers are too overwhelmed to move an IUU case to criminal charges due to the highly complicate features of the judiciary system. Moreover, "the fines for fishery offences may go into the funding of the fishery authority – essentially as income – which is likely to influence the authority's decision to follow a fishery rather than a criminal prosecution" (U4, 2021, p.5).
- d) Shell companies and joint-venture agreements are used to conceal ownership and facilitate channelling profits into tax heavens. Some joint ventures have also been linked to corruption intended to shield vessels and owners from prosecution and fines. Meanwhile, profit-sharing arrangements remain unclear and often pass through money laundering.

As Witbooi et al. (2020) stated, other than depriving coastal states of licensing fees and revenues, fraudulent practices can easily bypass hygiene regulations.

- e) While documentation should provide comprehensive information regarding the vessel and catch specifics, these are easily susceptible to falsification. Often inadequately furnished by operators who neglect safety standards and equipment for their crew, it is more likely that such vessels would operate in hazardous conditions and without safety certifications or necessary inspections. Frequently, crews are employed by being tricked through contractual falsifications or forced labour, often as a consequence of human trafficking with the intent to exploit them: “[...] allegedly a Seychelles recruitment agency, together with Norwegian port agents, facilitated the smuggling of migrant fishers from Indonesia to Norway.” (Witbooi et al., 2020, p.51)

The MCS Counteroffensive: ESA’s Case.

According to Witbooi et al. (2020), weak governance provides fertile grounds for the proliferation of IUU networks, aggravating developing countries' challenges. This is primarily due to a significant deficiency in fisheries governance’s transparency, which further compounds the problem (Lubchenco & Morgan, 2023). The High Seas Task Force's (2006) *Closing the Net* Report highlighted that such structural shortcomings obstruct meaningful engagement with international legal frameworks such as UNCLOS, while this hampers collaborative efforts to promote development. Similarly, the Global Ocean Commission's (2014) Report underscores the limited capacity of RFMOs to enforce regulations and apply sanctions for non-compliance. Adding another layer to this discussion, Luomba (2016) argues that top-down initiatives implemented unilaterally are prone to failure. Lastly, Josuepit (2019) underscored the crucial role of civil society organisations in consolidating the dispersed voices of local fishers and communities. Their involvement is instrumental in promoting participatory decision-making processes and ensuring that the concerns of these communities are adequately represented and their predicaments addressed.

Besides accounting for 8.1 per cent of the world's ocean surface, the WIO is estimated to generate only 4 per cent of global industrial catch, which is suspiciously low proportionally to its abundance. Indeed, in addition to the challenges posed by IUU fishing and historically high bycatch rates in large-scale fisheries, surveys have revealed a significant dearth of data regarding artisanal and subsistence fisheries landings. Unreported landings in this sector were found to be 1.4 times higher than the information reported by FAO. Van der Elst et al. (2005, p.282) note that "the main challenge facing marine biodiversity conservation and sustainable development of WIO fisheries is the application of good science and the implementation of management strategies with associated compliance mechanisms". Zeller and Pauli (2018) also highlight the issue of a "presentist bias" in gathering data from developing countries, stemming from efforts to enhance their catch-reporting systems without adequately addressing historical unmonitored datasets. This results in inconsistent historical baselines and creates a false impression of stable or increasing catch trends, even when actual declines occur. Fostering comprehensive networking of collaborating RFBs in the region is critical to bolstering the standardisation of the SWIO fisheries MCS systems and shared-knowledge platforms, and "the existence of international law in force is a necessary condition for good governance but certainly is not sufficient if and when implementation is poor" (Penas Lado, 2016, p.148). In 2001, the UN Fish Stock Agreement (UNFSA) entered into force to manage international cooperation of stocks inside and outside EEZs. The Agreement explicitly recognises RFMOs "as the appropriate institutional mechanism through which States must cooperate on management regimes and agree on problems of allocation and effort limitation in areas both within and beyond national jurisdiction." (GEOC, 2014, p.9) Accordingly, UNFSA suffered from non-compliance and lack of participation, necessary to allow RFMOs to perform. Alternatively, FAO has an extensive history of establishing sector-specific measures by implementing soft law regulations. It introduced two significant instruments in response to these challenges. The first is the 2001 International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU). This plan underscores the importance of shared information and cooperation among state and non-state actors, including civil society and NGOs. The second instrument is the 2009 Port State Measures Agreement,

which encourages port states to implement the provisions outlined in the IPOA-IUU, strengthening port controls and inspections to prevent illegally caught fish from entering international markets (Lubchenco & Haugan, 2023).

The EU has become a global leader in regulating and combating IUU fishing. Such capillary endorsement has stemmed mainly from persistent pressure from civil society organisations regarding the unsustainable and IUU-oriented fishing practices of European Distant Water Fishing Fleets in African waters, as extensively discussed in Chapter II. The EU's efforts to combat IUU fishing have been primarily managed through Regulation 1005/2008, which empowers the EC to impose trade restrictions on "non-cooperating" third-party countries and maintain a "blacklist" of IUU vessels, thereby blocking their access to European ports. To access the EU's markets, vessels must present a "catch certification," which places responsibility on the exporting country to verify the legal origins of the harvested fish. As Penas Lado (2016) pointed out, IUU regulation is not intended to replace the primary responsibility of flag states to discipline their vessels or coastal states' responsibility to control their waters. Instead, it intervenes when these two mechanisms fail.

Furthermore, the EU actively collaborates with African partners to strengthen MCS efforts. This is achieved by establishing Joint Deployment Plans, which involve intelligence-sharing, knowledge transfer, and capacity-building activities led by European Fisheries Control Agency inspectors. These initiatives enhance MCS capabilities in African waters and promote sustainable fishing practices. One such multilateral network passes through the E€OFISH Programme's Result 2, entailing capacity building expertise, intelligence and best practices. Besides, the EU has forged a consistent Regional Plan of Action to combat, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated under FAO's Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries in the EA-SA-IO region. DG MARE prompted the inception of the Regional Fisheries Surveillance Programme-IOC in 2007, which lasted until the expiration of SmartFish II in 2018 and took off again under E€OFISH.

In ESA, the non-governmental SIF created the FISH-i Africa Task Force in 2012 as a multilateral platform bundling shared efforts from Comoros, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, Somalia and Tanzania. The initiative aims to strengthen cooperation and information sharing “by uniting through regional centres of excellence, coordinated schemes for inspection shared intelligence and information, and the cooperative use of remote and physical inspection tools, robust regional protection is developed.” (SIF, 2021b, p.12; SIF, 2021b)

Technology is proving to be one suitable investment to strengthen MCS. NGOs like Global Fish Watch promote cooperation among enforcing authorities, supporting them to identify and act on illegal infractions by instilling tracking devices on board. Whilst these systems generally assist MCS, they stumble in giving an adequate picture of the SWIO fisheries. This is due to the presence of some 44 per cent of non-motorized vessels under 12 m, which usually do not have any monitoring devices, and secondly, because a broad segment of larger vessels commonly ignores the use of tracking systems. Foreign fleets operating in offshore Indian Ocean waters are ordinarily equipped with functioning tracking systems, the largest of which are Taiwanese, Chinese, and Spanish vessels. On the other hand, coastal fleets are overtly poor in the quality and quantity of tracking devices. Moreover, environmental watchdogs such as SkyTruth satellite mappings cannot be used as evidence in the courtroom due to the lack of legislative action (Murua et al., 2019).

Indeed, technological advancements would not go far without broad-based cooperation and systemic exchange of scientific research-based data storage between contracting parties within Regional Fisheries Bodies. One such project was initiated in 2008, and its goal was to “maximise partnerships and share responsibilities in the pursuit of researching key offshore fisheries resources.” (ORI, 2015, p.7). The Southwest Indian Ocean Fisheries Project, supported by the World Bank, linked nine participant countries in the SWIO region and acted as a collaboration of multiple stakeholders, critically reinforcing the role of the SWIOFC in the region after the Programme’s conclusion. The primary goal of the Programme, set to run for five years, was: “To promote the environmentally sustainable use

of fish resources through adoption by countries riparian to the Southwest Indian Ocean of a Large Marine Ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management in the Agulhas and Somali Large Marine Ecosystems that recognises the importance of preserving biodiversity.” (SWIOFP, 2008) The data was provided by 170 national components and was favoured by harmonising existing inventories, such as FAO, Fishbase and the Programme WIOFish. Additionally, significant assistance was given by the interactions among different management organisations and cooperation platforms, such as the IOTC, the SADC Fisheries Protocol and the UNDP’s *Nairobi Convention for the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Eastern African Region*. The scientific collection and assessment conducted through such comprehensive programmes are fundamental to directing and informing national and supranational governance (ORI, 2015; Van der Elst et al., 2009).

ESA’s Fisheries Disputes and Conflicts.

When a management body repeatedly fails to set up an effective MCS system, it neglects the needs of its users to exploit fishing grounds upon which they rely. In such a tense environment, profit-driven illegal means will ultimately thrive when conflictive relations are provoked without ensuring equitability. Eventually, governance institutions lose authority and collapse under the fragmented purview of scattered power dynamics heightened by increasing crime rates. Glaser et al. (2018) argue that because of a composite pattern of escalating events, fisheries conflicts are bound to increase in the foreseeable future. This estimate is backed up by Devlin et al. (2022) extensive survey conducted on fisheries disputes in EA from 1990 to 2017. The study identified a few heated geographical regions consistently affected by violent confrontation: waters shared by Somalia and Yemen, Kenyan and Tanzanian heavily exploited fishing waterfronts and throughout the Great Lakes, especially in Lake Victoria and Tanganyika. Conflictual relations can be triggered by IUU fishing, whose complex features are often linked to open-access fishing grounds endemic to SSA blue spaces. Accordingly, related crime organisations act as stress multipliers and pose undeniable threats to the livelihoods of coastal communities. A study

of the South African abalone (*Haliotis midae*) market discovered that “Organized criminal syndicates have taken advantage of this socio-political dynamic [...] to recruit poachers from local communities who feel disenfranchised by government policy and entitled to extract the easily harvested resource” (De Greef and Raemakers, 2014, p.iv). In the upcoming section, I review three cases in EA, each offering a contextual perspective on IUU fishing.

The Somali Case.

Throughout the 1990s and the first decades of the 2000s, SSA has been increasingly concerned with violent threats to maritime security. Concurrently, the Gulf of Aden to the West and the Horn of Africa to the East have been scourged by deleterious rates of piracy and IUU. These complex phenomena are often found to be related and can intertwine. The 1991 Somali Civil War and the subsequent fragmentation of national territories created instability in the fisheries sector throughout the country. This situation led to a strained relationship between Distant Water Fishing Fleets taking advantage of the political chaos and small-scale fishers. The unregulated and unmonitored presence of the former was exacerbated by the devastating tsunami of 2004, which pumped incentives to endorse piracy, causing many foreigners to withdraw gradually from Somali waters in the following years (Westberg, 2015).

The decline of piracy in 2014 led to the return of Distant Water Fishing fleet vessels to Somali waters. This disrupted the sense of ownership sought by artisanal fishing communities, who often turned to piracy to protect their fishing rights. However, this narrative overlooks that piracy in the region originated with prominent businessmen and politicians who used licensing foreign vessels as extortion. A study by Devlin et al. (2020) found that the narrative of the fisher/pirate fighting to protect its fishing entitlement against foreign invaders is a dangerous oversimplification that obscures the complex political and economic factors that drove piracy in Somalia. The return of Distant Water Fishing fleet vessels to Somali waters is a significant challenge for the country's artisanal fishing communities. Research by Sandkamp et al. (2022) highlights that the region has been the

world's second-most affected by piracy, with an average of 71 incidents per year from 2000 to 2006 and decreased significantly from 2015 to 2020. The evolution of the region's security issues prompted the UN Security Council to address it through Resolution 2316 (2016). With increased stability, Somalia has implemented regulations, enhanced cooperation with regional partners, and invested in its MCS capabilities to combat IUU fishing. The government has also worked to strengthen dialogue and co-management with SSF communities to build mutual trust and achieve better compliance.

The Great Lakes: Lake Victoria.

Pervasive rates of illegal fishing have thwarted the sustainable development of ESA's Great Lakes, and fisheries agencies have vastly underappreciated its consequences. Glaser et al. (2018) evidence that 129 fisheries dispute events occurred in Tanzania between 1990 and 2017. To contextualise, the Great Lakes region hosted several civil conflicts, from Uganda (1986-94), Burundi (1993-2005) and Rwanda (1990-94) to the First and Second Congo Wars (1996-97 and 1998-04). The proximity quickly enabled conflicts to spill onto Tanzanian and Kenyan jurisdictions, resulting in appalling rates of criminality and illegal fishing, the region's most common dispute drivers (Glaser et al., 2018). Lake Victoria's disputes have been progressively tied with Nile Perch's market, accounting for a multi-million dollar trade and involving the EU (Anderson, 2011). The significant dip in the health of its stocks has been inversely proportional to the substantial growth in its demand, ensuring unsustainable fishing efforts. In 1994, the Rwandan Civil War's devastation and lake poisoning plummeted fish demands.

Tanzanian markets saw fish prices plummet by more than 60 per cent, European importing agents ceased all shipments, and as a result, the EU imposed a ban on imports from Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda in May 1997, citing concerns about unsanitary standards. The ban was lifted in 1999, but the damage had been done. The foreign demand for Nile perch had grown exponentially throughout the 21st century while the stock grew thinner. The fishing gear cost had exceeded many fishers' budgets, resulting in several fishers turning to banditry. In 2003, Ugandan and Tanzanian authorities started acting against

illegal fishing practices by occasionally coordinating their efforts but more often stepping on each other's toes. A notable breaking point is exemplified in the 2009 case of Migingo Island. As argued by Glaser (2019, p.9), "the depressed Nile perch catches [...] led to increased competition for resources and distributive conflict." As such, the allegedly uninhabited Kenyan island was primarily targeted by Ugandan fishers. It quickly became disputed and embroiled in a direct conflict between police and military forces from both sides, escalating into a regional security threat to regional peace. It ended up in a silent dilemma as harassment and even homicide cases have continued upon its contention (Glaser, 2019). Overfishing, increasing motorised boats and smuggling fish into neighbouring countries still pose significant predicaments to the region's sustainable development. The efforts to establish multilateral control over the MCS of the lake led to the creation of the LVFO in 1994, which allowed for shared information management and transnational coordination.

Tanzanian Coastline.

Generally, IUU operates in a way that allows stocks to be exploited well beyond sustainable limits by concealing accurate assessments of the targeted ecosystem's capacity, which often masks the severity of their impact on marine environments, particularly in the case of small-scale and artisanal fishing operations. Among the most destructive practices is *blast* fishing, detonating cheap (TSH 15,000 or USD 8), homemade kerosene and fertiliser bombs underwater to stun or kill fish on reefs or shallow coastal shorelines (Slade & Kalangahe, 2015). Such a procedure makes them easier to catch, albeit killing more fish than harvested. The Tanzanian Government has extensively dealt with fisherfolks using such a technique since the 1960s. Wagner (2004) states that its extensive use reached "epidemic rates" until state joint operation "*pono*" between the Tanzanian Navy, Marine Police and local communities was established from 1997 to 2003. The consequences of blast fishing extend far beyond the immediate catch: When explosives are detonated in marine environments, they kill any marine organism within a radius of 10-30 m through

shockwaves and cause further long-term collateral damage to hard coral and the overall structure of the reef.

Furthermore, the debris from blast fishing settles on the seafloor, smothering benthic habitats and altering the composition of the substrate. This can have cascading effects throughout the food chain, as many species rely on healthy benthic communities for food and shelter (Fox & Caldwell, 2006). As authorities took a less active involvement in the pursuance and enforcement of the phenomenon, it quickly resurged to threaten the sustainable development of Tanzanian coastal communities.

In March and April 2015, the Wildlife Conservation Society promoted a large-scale vessel-based survey to analyse cetaceous life on the Tanzanian waterfront through acoustic recorders. The study incidentally led to the collecting of 231 hours of data and a confirmed 318 blasting episodes throughout the Tanzanian coastline. A multi-stakeholder consultation by the Tanzanian NGO MCCN in 2014 involved coastal villages from the southernmost region up to the Kenyan border has uncovered that blasting was encouraged in rural areas by “business individuals from Dar es Salaam who came with dynamite supplies and cool boxes for collecting fish” while exploiting manpower from coastal villages (Slade & Kalangahe, 2015, p.491). A comprehensive set of interviews conducted by Katikiro and Mahenge (2016), involving 180 random key-informant members of districts affected by blast fishing, yielded several noteworthy conclusions. It was observed that nearly half of the informants believe that enforcement efforts are closely tied to election campaigns, leading to scepticism about their effectiveness. This arises from the political implications of combating such a widely used fishing technique, representing a significant electoral base. Moreover, most surveyed respondents emphasised the importance of actively involving fishers in leadership roles within anti-dynamite activities. Conclusions further stress the need for meaningful participation of local people in designing and implementing anti-dynamite programs. Additionally, most interviewed individuals supported integration instead of engaging in univocal criminalisation narratives. Non-governmental initiatives were viewed as notably influential in this regard. Overall, the interviews highlighted the significant role of "trust" as a crucial factor in establishing an effective communication

channel between local communities and governmental agencies for addressing this commonly acknowledged issue.

Mwambao Coastal Community Network.

Under the comprehensive umbrella of the E€OFISH Programme's Work Plan 4 Result 3 – Call For Proposals, the EU allocated a significant financial investment of EUR 8 million to support small-scale inland and marine fisheries management, governance initiatives and fostering replication on a regional scale. The European Delegation to Mauritius led the direct management of these grants, with each grant set at a minimum size of EUR 500,000, whilst the Programme's technical assistance team is responsible for its monitoring.

Eligible recipients included entities such as public sector operators, local authorities, NSAs, business organisations, research institutes, or international organisations, as defined by Art. 43 of the Rules of Application of the EU Financial Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012, whilst beneficiaries were bound to manage and prepare the proposed actions.

As specified in the E€OFISH Programme's Financial Agreement (No RSO/FED/039-977, p.6), the overarching objective of these actions was to "raise awareness among fishing communities and other stakeholders about the need for sustainable management" while simultaneously "improving the livelihoods of fishing coastal communities." These strategic actions aimed to align with the goals of the FAO's Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries. They encompassed various activities, including efforts to reduce overfishing and overcapacity, particularly regarding fleet composition.

Additionally, the actions sought to bolster community-based management, incorporate participatory surveillance, and support conservation and rehabilitation measures.

Furthermore, they aimed to reduce food loss in the fisheries sector, enhance fish product safety from production to consumption, and support successful initiatives under the EDF10.

The Result 3 financial allocation was distributed among nine initiatives across the EA-SA-IO region, involving various stakeholders, with a significant representation of Civil society and international organisations. According to the Programme's Brief Progress Report (INCATEMA, 2023), as of February 2023, Result 3 – Call For Proposals initiatives were

reported to be "on course," implicating progression toward planned objectives. These projects are, as enucleated on the Programme's website (<https://ecofish-programme.org>) under the section "Progress Made With Regard to Activities": i) SOS Sahel Sudan; ii) IGAD; iii) KECHOFISH Project; iv) C3 Madagascar; v) ADPP Mozambique; vi) Action Aid International Zambia; vii) Namibia Nature Foundation Trust; viii) UNDP Mauritius; and finally ix) MCCN Tanzania - "From Octopus closures to sustainable marine resource management planning; promoting equitable governance of tenure (including women and youth) in small-scale fishing communities in Zanzibar and Tanzanian Coast through extending successful pilot initiatives."

Over this next segment, I will thoroughly review the MCCN case's specifics by engaging into a) The Octopus Market Background, b) The Tanzanian Community-Based Framework and c) Mwambao.

The Octopus Market Background.

Accounting for 6.8 per cent (USD 10.2 billion) of the total value of aquatic resources in 2020, the cephalopods market has grown increasingly in recent years (FAO, 2022).

Tanzania is one of the most productive SWIO exporters of octopus (*Octopus cyanea* and *O. vulgaris*). Mtonga et al. (2022) have shown that the national octopi catch increased from 438 to 5,687 tonnes from 1990 to 2019. Its marketing has grown strategically relevant since its peak in 2003, when its export rates surged dramatically toward the international and EU markets (specifically Italy, Portugal, France and Spain) (FAO, 2017). It kept its importance even if it underwent a decline until governmental authorities identified it as one of the top 10 national priority products in 2006 (Rockliff & Harris, 2016). On the mainland, octopi's fisheries are geared for international and national consumption; however, only 10 per cent is directed toward the latter.

Conversely, on Zanzibar islands, the tourist sector dominates the market, absorbing 90 per cent of the fishers' catch, whilst the remaining 10 per cent is sold to foreign markets (Pandur, 2014, as cited in Rockliffe and Harris, 2016). Furthermore, on the Island, octopus is often sold directly to hotels, creating a constant incentive to overfishing and an overreliance

issue for artisanal fishers, which vigorously affected the locals throughout the COVID-19 pandemic (Mtonga et al., 2022). Such an extensive and complex array of external factors requires establishing management based on informed scientific evidence to effectively exploit the species's life cycle without overindulging in its biological potential. Perry et al. (1999) identified three main factors orienting fisheries management, guided by the renovation of scientific information and the use of the precautionary approach: i) size and sex limitations, ii) regulations by total allowable catch and iii) control over the exploitation rates. Inadequate management is deleterious given that octopi's fisheries are mainly open access, and artisanal fishing practices do not necessarily regard size limitations nor acknowledge the increased effort compelled by the market (Sauer, 2020; Silas, 2021). In Tanzania, minimum size limitations are set at 500 g (Fisheries Regulations of 2009, G.N. No. 308), which is lower than the octopi's maturity, thus making temporal closures necessary to enable the octopus to mature (Raberinary & Benbow, 2012). A large segment of the scientific literature on the matter has consistently proven that establishing permanent or seasonal no-take zones, or closures, has benefitted the octopi's size and population growth and, consequently, the quality of the catch (Silas et al., 2022). In the SWIO region, several such initiatives have been endorsed through community-based fisheries management.

The Tanzanian Community-Based Framework.

Starting from the 1980s, a significant shift concerned the approach to resource management. Traditional state-led initiatives began to give way to more grassroots-oriented and participatory action frameworks (Neumann, 1998). This marked the emergence of collaborative management (co-management). As such, it opposed the traditional vertical decision-making processes where policy outputs are promoted by a central authority and implemented top-down. Instead, co-management emphasises collective and integrational approaches to resource management. It involves directly affected local communities in the decision-making processes of using and conserving natural resources. It aims to ensure sustainable development through local and multilateral cooperation, gaining community

support, and reinvesting conservation benefits in local communities for long-term program sustainability (Levine, 2006). It further ensures that local communities and stakeholder perspectives are considered, leading to more effective and equitable resource management practices. For as much as a segment of the scientific community has appraised co-management, Acheson (2006) argues that local-level management works only if matched by a robust social community, secure boundaries concerning resource exploitation and government efforts do not antagonise it.

Tanzania comprises the mainland and the semi-autonomous Zanzibar Islands of the Unguja and Pemba. Albeit areas within EEZs are accounted as a Union issue and engaged via collaboration, each jurisdiction deals autonomously in managing marine conservation in territorial seas. Its fisheries legislation creates a framework for collaborative management through which government agencies share natural resource conservation and responsibilities with local resource users. On the mainland, Marine Conservation Areas are managed by the Marine Parks and Reserves Unit (Act No.29 of 1994), while the Fisheries Act number 22 of 2003 promotes the creation of Beach Management Units as a community-based tool to enforce MCS at a village tier. In Zanzibar, the establishment of marine conservation areas is guided by the Fisheries Act No. 7 of 2010 and the Fisheries Policy (Draft, 2014) implemented by the Marine Conservation Unit under the supervision of the Department for Fisheries Development. Besides coordinating the marine conservation areas, the Marine Conservation Unit endorses collaboration among government agencies, civil society and local communities to manage demarcated closure programmes, or no-take zones, against harmful reef exploitation (Biofin, 2014). Hence, co-management practices have been historically convoluted, determined by the profound dependence of governmental agencies on external benefactors due to the inadequate means of the former (Levine, 2006). Cinner et al. (2012) argue that assimilating the donor's ideology enabled horizontal and democratic means of resource management to shape the management of the commons, strengthened by civil society organisation's reliance on village authorities to effectively implement co-management tools on the territory.

The marine conservation areas management entails complex interlinkages between the Marine Conservation Unit and adjacent coastal communities, coordinated by Shehia (Village) Fishermen Committees (SFCs) and a Fishermen Executive Committee for each controlled area (McLean et al., 2012). SFCs operate under the joint supervision of the village head (Sheha) and fisheries officers (Cinner et al., 2012). Since their establishment, SFCs have promptly expanded throughout coastal villages in Pemba and Unguja. They enforce MCS coordinatively with the Department of Fisheries Development and have the authority to create bylaws to regulate the use of marine resources. The establishment of SFCs aimed to shift some of the high costs associated with enforcing fisheries regulations to local communities and align with broader goals of improving livelihoods and reducing the use of destructive fishing gear. This initiative gained further support through a World Bank project in 2000, which provided the know-how, best practices and significant funds for community-based MCS.

Mwambao.

Mwambao stands as a leading actor in the purview of Tanzanian coastal development, with strong capabilities to exploit its genuine grassroots foundations in strengthening local governance through collective action and protecting the natural heritage by building awareness and concerted MCS. Throughout its existence, it was able to present itself as a trustworthy partner with both local actors and international stakeholders. Founded in 2010 with the financial support of the Sand County Foundation, the organisation sought to compel coastal communities to manage their marine resources actively, employing participatory tools to improve their visibility. After heading a study on Beach Management Units in Southern Kenya for the WTO, Mwambao quickly emerged with a leading role in research and information sharing. In partnership with the Fauna and Flora Foundation, it piloted its first octopus no-take zone project, funded under the SmartFish Programme, in 2014. In the following years, it supported creating the first village-level marine management plan, endorsing a strategic partnership with the conservation social enterprise Blue Ventures, propelling the organisation's reach to other villages. The MCCN's strategy

developed in a cascading pattern, spreading its coverage from the Unguja island to the Tanzanian mainland. Its goal is to support communities in Tanzania's coastal areas to develop robust local resource management, enhance livelihoods and sustain marine ecosystems through horizontal learning.

It plays a pivotal role in promoting marine conservation by facilitating mutual learning, best practices and know-how among communities across various coastal areas and neighbourhoods. This collaborative learning approach is essential to address the environmental issues caused by unsustainable fishing practices, such as blast fishing, while also advocating against the land grab pursued by the hotel industry and the rising oil and gas business. On the one hand, its efforts aim to foster a sense of shared responsibility and knowledge exchange among coastal communities, strengthening the capability to act upon their collective interest. Conversely, local communities are often estranged from the decision-making process of policies that may potentially impact their livelihoods or tenure entitlements. Accordingly, management documentation is written in a highly technical language (besides often neglecting the native Swahili) and is not accessible to a significant part of the population who is illiterate. Over time, locals have come to embrace the idea of a sustainable and well-preserved resource basin that they can tap into for their needs, all while ensuring its preservation for future generations.

MCCN recognises that developing countries, especially island communities, have reached a critical juncture in their ability to establish a resilient system against increasingly worsening external factors, such as climate change. It has actively supported the coastal communities by empowering SFCs to adopt binding bylaws and invest in micro-finance, as showcased by Hattam et al. (2020). In the Kuuu (Pemba) village, Mwambao has played a significant role in establishing a fisheries bank. This institution collects revenues from voluntary no-take zones and profits from octopi sales. These funds are then divided to support various initiatives, including endorsing SFCs, compensating fishermen for their work, and contributing to a community development fund. The latter, in turn, is exploited for infrastructural projects in the village, thereby contributing to the overall development and resilience of the community.

Conservation management through collective action often implies conflict, as frequently showcased by the literature (Neumann, 1998). In Zanzibar, local communities have been disputing closure entitlements with neighbouring villages or disregarding the Department of Fisheries Development authority on several occasions. Time and time again, Mwambao acted as a facilitator and, thanks to strong collaborations with government agencies and joined efforts from the Sheha, eased the shared acceptance of closure zones. The collaborative approach addresses various factors hindering community-based fisheries management, leading to conflicts and resource allocation problems. These include insufficient investment in public resources and corruption-related issues. The effectiveness of MCCN is that it rejects a “blanket model” to apply regardless of the issue specificity and instead opts for a thorough and informed resolution through on-the-ground involvement. As such, it strengthens the capacity of local institutions to tackle IUU and enhances their ability to enforce fishing laws effectively, benefiting local communities and governmental agencies by deploying data collection and storage systems.

Conclusions

Throughout this dissertation, I enquired about the EU's means to support the food system resilience of coastal communities in East and Southern Africa while ensuring their equitable development and the sustainability of harvested environments. The SSF sub-sector is pivotal in balancing the deterioration of ESA's marine and freshwater bodies affecting the lives of rural populations, as it promotes resilience and strengthens livelihoods when adequately supported and monitored. However, small-scale and artisanal trade is often informal and thus qualified by massive hidden data, ultimately affecting operational efforts to achieve sustainable development. External aid enhances the likelihood of success by facilitating improved joint management among diverse and sometimes conflicting parties. I argued that the EU's engagement produces highly constructive outcomes for partner least-developed countries when its assets are appropriately streamed for development endeavours. The Mwambao project is a notable example of the positive outcomes achieved through on-the-ground community-led approaches resulting from collaborative efforts between governmental institutions, civil society and local administration. These findings underscore the importance of nurturing active participation within local communities, where vertical actions often fall short in addressing complex and selective issues.

Chapter I showcased ESA's coastal communities' significant socioeconomic and environmental challenges, including extreme hardship, biodiversity depletion, climate change, and political marginalisation. Because of these, aquatic resources are increasingly vital for the region's food security and economy. Regional governance and cooperation are identified as essential for their sustainable management, where overfishing and unsustainable practices threaten the long-term viability of these resources. As such, a more just and inclusive implementation of the Blue Economy framework is advocated to foster the needs of the poor and marginalised.

Chapter II delved into the complexities of the EU's approach to the sustainable development of African partners in the fisheries sector. Recurring tensions between trade-

oriented priorities and poverty eradication goals were highlighted. Factors contributing to these tensions were identified, including the division of responsibilities between different EU bodies, perceptions of European normative power, complexities in the fisheries agreements, and the impact of distant water fishing industry subsidies on African coastal communities. Despite these challenges, it was recognised that regional Programmes, such as the E€OFISH, could foster South-South cooperation and collaborative management.

Chapter III concluded that addressing Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing requires transparent cooperation from governments, fishers, and stakeholders to implement Monitoring, Control and Surveillance. In this framework, civil society organisations were underscored as crucial players in advancing sustainable development and enhancing the resilience of coastal communities through localised initiatives.

Overall, the research emphasises the importance of several critical factors in fostering a just transition for coastal communities in ESA.

First, the North-South partnership is crucial in providing external support, addressing financial constraints and improving infrastructural standards. Conversely, South-South cooperation can facilitate the exchange of resourceful data and expertise, bolster enforcement measures, and enhance the accessibility of information and knowledge.

Second, addressing social disparities and rifts is crucial. This can be achieved by involving civil society organisations and bolstering localised community-based efforts, thus bridging gaps and promoting inclusivity.

Third, market equity is intrinsically tied to abrogating harmful subsidies while implementing and enforcing transparency measures in fisheries governance. These measures aim to combat pervasive unsustainability and IUU fishing activities and foster fair and ethical trade practices, providing a roadmap for achieving equitable development and environmental sustainability for inland and marine fisherfolks in ESA.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

1. AfDB. (2023). *African Economic Outlook 2023 Mobilizing Private Sector Financing for Climate and Green Growth in Africa*.
2. AfDB. (2023). *Performance And Outlook Macroeconomic*.
3. AUC-NEPAD. (2014). *Policy Framework And Reform Strategy For Fisheries And Aquaculture. In Africa, Creating a conducive and enabling environment for the fish sector to create equitable, social and economic development in Africa*.
4. FAO, (2015). *Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication*.
5. FAO, (2022) *The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2022. Towards Blue Transformation*. Rome, FAO. <https://doi.org/10.4060/cc0461en>
6. FAO, Duke University & WorldFish. (2023) *Illuminating Hidden Harvests – The contributions of small-scale fisheries to sustainable development*. Rome. <https://doi.org/10.4060/cc4576en>
7. FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, (2023) *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2023. Urbanization, agrifood systems transformation and healthy diets across the rural–urban continuum*. Rome, FAO. <https://doi.org/10.4060/cc3017en>
8. FAO. (1995). *Code Of Conduct For Responsible Fisheries*.
9. FAO. (2001). *International Plan Of Action To Prevent, Deter, And Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, And Unregulated Fishing*. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
10. FAO. (2016). *Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing*.
11. IFAD. (2022). *Annual Report*. IFAD, Rome. www.ifad.org.
12. UN ECA. (2018). *Africa's blue economy : a policy handbook*. ECA, Addis Ababa.

13. UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), OPHI (Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative). (2022) *2022 Global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI): Unpacking deprivation bundles to reduce multidimensional poverty*. New York.
14. *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea*, December 10, 1982.

Secondary Sources

Monographs

1. Ernesto Penas Lado. (2016). *The Common Fisheries Policy*. John Wiley & Sons.
2. Fan, S., Pandya-Lorch, R., & Yosef, S. (Eds.). (2014). *Resilience for food and nutrition security*. Intl Food Policy Res Inst.
3. Neumann, R. P. (1998). *Imposing wilderness: struggles over livelihood and nature preservation in Africa* (Vol. 4). Univ of California Press.
4. OECD (2017), *Marine Protected Areas: Economics, Management and Effective Policy Mixes*, OECD Publishing, Paris. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264276208-en>
5. Sunde, J., & Isaacs, M. (2008). *Marine conservation and coastal communities: who carries the costs?: a study of marine protected areas and their impact on traditional small-scale fishing communities in South Africa*, ICSF, Chennai. www.icsf.net
6. Taylor, M., Ravilious, C., & Green, E. P. (2003). *Mangroves of East Africa*, UNEP-WCMW, Cambridge. www.unep-wcmc.org

Edited Books

1. Barwell, L., Bosire, J., Bourjea, J., Schleyer, M. H., Celliers, L., & Paula, J. (Eds.) (2018). *Regional State of the Coast Report Western Indian Ocean. The United Nations Environment Programme/Nairobi Convention Secretariat*.
2. Cooley, S., D. Schoeman, L. Bopp, P. Boyd, S. Donner, D.Y. Ghebrehiwet, S.-I. Ito, W. Kiessling, P. Martinetto, E. Ojea, M.-F. Racault, B. Rost, and M. Skern-

Mauritzen, 2022: *Oceans and Coastal Ecosystems and Their Services*. In: *Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* [H.-O. Pörtner, D.C. Roberts, M. Tignor, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, A. Alegría, M. Craig, S. Langsdorf, S. Löschke, V. Möller, A. Okem, B. Rama (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA, pp. 379–550, doi:10.1017/9781009325844.005.

3. Hoebink, P. (Ed.) (2005). *The Treaty of Maastricht and Europe's development co-operation*. Aksant Academic Publishers.
4. Lindén, O., Souter, D., Wilhelmsson, D., & Obura, D. O. (Eds.) (2002). *Coral reef degradation in the Indian Ocean: status report 2002*.
5. Lubchenco, J., & Haugan, P. M. (Eds.) (2023). *The Blue Compendium From Knowledge to Action for a Sustainable Ocean Economy*.
6. Murua, H., Granado, I., Gee, J., Kroodsma, D., Miller, N. A., Taconet, M., Fernandes, J. A. (2019). *FAO Area 51 - AIS-based fishing activity in the Western Indian Ocean*. In Taconet, M., Kroodsma, D., Fernandes, J.A. (eds.) *Global Atlas of AIS-based fishing activity - Challenges and opportunities*. Rome, FAO.

Reports

1. Acheampong, A. (1997). *Coherence between EU fisheries agreements and EU development cooperation: The case of West Africa*. Maastricht, The Netherlands: European Centre for Development Policy Management.
2. Aranda, M., Ulrich, C., Le Gallic, B., Borges, L., Metz, S., Prellezo, R., Santurtún, M. (2019) *Research for PECH Committee — EU fisheries policy – latest developments and future challenges*, European Parliament, Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies, Brussels
3. Arthur, R, Heyworth, S, Pearce, J and Sharkey, W (2019) *The cost of harmful fishing subsidies*. IIED Working Paper. IIED, London.
<http://pubs.iied.org/16654IIED>

4. Béné, C. (2008-12-01), “*Global Change in African Fish Trade: Engine of Development or Threat to Local Food Security?*”, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No. 10, OECD Publishing, Paris.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/230215206300>
5. BIOFIN. (2022). *Policy And Institutional Review Zanzibar, Tanzania*. Zanzibar, [www. omkr.go.tz](http://www.omkr.go.tz)
6. Bossuyt, J. 2016. *The Political Economy of Regional Integration in Africa, The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Report*. Maastricht: ECDPM. <http://ecdpm.org/peria/ecowas>.
7. Bova, C., Sauer, W., & Higginson, L. (2023). *The Missing Millions From Shrimp And Tuna Fisheries In The South West Indian Ocean Improving Understanding Of Illegal, Unreported And Unregulated Fishing*. WWF, Brussels.
8. Braulik, G. T., Wittich, A., Macaulay, J., Kasuga, M., Gordon, J., Gillespie, D., Davenport, T. R. B. 2015. *Fishing with explosives in Tanzania: spatial distribution and hotspots*. Wildlife Conservation Society Tanzania Program, Zanzibar. 19 pages. Gill Braulik/ WCS Tanzania
9. Caillart, B., Cappell, R., Defaux, V., & Macfadyen, G. (2023). *European Commission Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Policy Unit B.3: Trade Negotiations and Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements*. EC, Bruselles. <https://doi.org/10.2771/52188>
10. Cappell, R., T. Huntington and G. Macfadyen (2010). ‘*FIFG 2000-2006 Shadow Evaluation*’. Report to the Pew Environment Group. 50 pp plus appendices. Poseidon Aquatic Resource Management Ltd, Windrush, Warborne Lane, Portmore, Lymington, Hampshire SO41 5RJ, UK
11. Chandra Bauljeewon, S. (2022). *Development Of A Formal Governance Framework For The Regional Fisheries Surveillance Plan (PRSP) Of The EEOFISH Project-Result 2, In The Context Of The Institutionalization Of The PRSP Consultant-Fisheries Development and Monitoring*. ECO 2022/ 55 EEOFISH IPMU, Ebène. www.ecofish-programme.org

12. D'Alfonso, Alessandro., & European Parliament. European Parliamentary Research Service. (2014). *European Development Fund. Joint development cooperation and the EU budget: out or in? In-depth analysis*. EPRS, Publications Office.
13. De Greef, K. and Raemaekers, S. (2014). South Africa's Illicit Abalone Trade: An Updated Overview And Knowledge Gap Analysis. TRAFFIC International, Cambridge, UK.
14. Devlin, C., Glaser, S. M., Villegas, C., & Poinatte, N. (2020). *Rough Seas: The Causes and Consequences of Fisheries Conflict in Somali Waters*, OEF, Broomfield. <https://doi.org/10.18289/OEF.2020.042>
15. EcoAfrica Environmental Consultants (2012) *An Assessment of Legal and Institutional Framework for Effective Management of Marine Managed Areas in Tanzania*. Mainland Tanzania Report. Marine Parks and Reserves Unit, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
16. EcoAfrica Environmental Consultants (2012) *An Assessment of Legal and Institutional Framework for Effective Management of Marine Managed Areas in Tanzania*. Mainland Tanzania Report. Marine Parks and Reserves Unit, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. PP 83.
17. European Court of Auditors. (2009). *Effectiveness of EDF Support For Regional Economic Cooperation In East Africa and West Africa, Special Report No 18//2009*. <https://doi.org/10.2865/96764>
18. Glaser, S., Devlin, C., Lambert, J., Villegas, C., & Poinatte, N. (2018). *Fish Wars: The Causes and Consequences of Fisheries Conflict in Tanzania*. OEF, Broomfield. <https://doi.org/10.18289/OEF.2018.033>
19. GOC. (2014). *From Decline to Recovery A Rescue Package for the Global Ocean*. GOC, Oxford. www.globaloceancommission.org
20. Herrero, A., & Gregersen, C. (2016). *European Centre for Development Policy Management Prospects for supporting regional integration effectively. An independent analysis of the European Union's approach to the 11th European Development Fund regional programming*, Maastricht: ECDPM.

21. INCATEMA. (2023). *Brief Progress Report As Of February 2023*. EEOFISH IPMU, Ebène.
22. Josupeit, H. (2022). *Actualizing The Definition, Characterization And Socio-Economic Profiling Of The Marine Small-Scale Fisheries In The Ea, Sa & Io Region*. ECO 2022/ 45, EEOFISH IPMU, Ebène. www.ecofish-programme.org
23. Kariuki, J. (2012). *Assessment Of Iuu Activities On Lake Victoria European Union*. REPORT/RAPPORT: SF/2011/12 SmartFish Programme, Indian Ocean Commission, Ebène.
24. Kurien, J., & Ríos, J. L. (2013). *Flavouring Fish Into Food Security*. REPORT/RAPPORT: SF-FAO/2013/14 SmartFish Programme, Indian Ocean Commission, Ebène.
25. Mackie, J., Ronceray, M., & Spierings, E. (2017). *Discussion Paper Policy coherence and the 2030 Agenda: Building on the PCD experience*, Maastricht: ECDPM. www.ecdpm.org/dp210
26. Merayo E., Porras I., Harper S., Steele P. and Mohammed E. (2019) Subsidy reform and distributive justice in fisheries. IIED Working Paper, IIED, London. <http://pubs.iied.org/16645IIED>
27. MRAG. (2005). *Review of Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing on Developing Countries Synthesis Report*. Marine Resources Assessment Group Ltd., London.
28. Mwambao Coastal Community Network. (2018). *Strategic Plan 2018-2020*. <https://mwambao.or.tz>
29. Nhantumbo E. and Gaile B. (2020) Shallow water shrimp fishery in Mozambique: who benefits from fiscal reform? IIED Working Paper, IIED, London. <http://pubs.iied.org/16670IIED>
30. Núñez-Borja, C., Baudalet, E., & Picarello, T. (2009). *External Evaluation of the European Union's Policy Coherence for Development*. EC, Bruxelles.
31. Roberts, P., Burroughs, L., & Mazurek, R. (2017). *An Exploration of Fisheries Management Agencies in Eastern Africa*. OEF, Broomfield.

32. Rocliffe, S., & Harris, A. (2016). *Blue Ventures Report: The status of octopus fisheries in the Western Indian Ocean*. 39-41 North Road, London N7 9DP, UK.
33. SIF. (2021). *Stop Illegal Fishing Annual Report 2021*.
34. SkyTruth, & GFW. (2017). *The Global View Of Transshipment: Revised Preliminary Findings*.
35. Slade, L. M., & Thani, A. K. (2014). *Assessment and priority setting for marine and coastal resource conservation in the Pemba Channel Region for FFI Pemba And Tanga, Tanzania-March 2014 Mwambao Coastal Community Network*.
www.mwambao.or.tz
36. Sophie Lemaître (2021). *By Stop Illegal Fishing Series editor: Sophie Lemaître Corruption as a facilitator of illegal fishing Insights from East Africa*. U4, CMI, Bergen. www.U4.no
37. Sweenarain, S. (2021). *The Potential Impacts Of The Covid-19 Pandemic On The Coastal Marine Fisheries Of The EA-SA-IO Region And The Ecofish Programme*. ECO 2021/ 23, EEOFISH IPMU, Ebène. www.ecofish-programme.org
38. Sweenarain, S., Ya, J., & Mashariki, A. (2020). *EEOFISH Technical Handbook Enhancing equitable economic growth by promoting sustainable fisheries in the EA-SA-IO region*, EEOFISH IPMU, Ebène.
39. Tipping, A., & Irschlinger, T. (2020). *WTO Negotiations on Fisheries Subsidies: What's the state of play? GSI Policy Brief International Institute for Sustainable Development The International Institute for Sustainable Development*. IISD, Canada. www.iisd.org/gsi
40. Vikash, G. (2021). *Regional Situational Analysis Fisheries of Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan and Tanzania*. ECO 2021/ 14, EEOFISH IPMU, Ebène. www.ecofish-programme.org
41. Visser, M. (2014). *Development and Cooperation EuropeAid International Cooperation and Development External Evaluation of the 11th European Development Fund (EDF) External Evaluation of the 11th European Development Fund This evaluation was commissioned by the Evaluation Unit of the Directorate-*

General for International Cooperation and Development (European Commission).
FWC COM 2015. EC, Brussels.

42. WFP. (2022). *Impact Of The Russia-Ukraine Conflict On WFP Operations In Eastern Africa*. WFP, Rome.
43. Woolfrey, S. (2016). *The Political Economy Of Regional Integration In Africa The Political Economy Of Regional Integration In Africa Common Market For Eastern And Southern Africa (Comesa)*, Maastricht: ECDPM.
44. WFP (2023). *The Lingering Impacts of COVID-19 on Food Security and Livelihoods across the Eastern Africa Region*. WFP, Rome.

Scientific Articles

1. Acheson, J. M. (2006). Institutional failure in resource management. In *Annual Review of Anthropology* (Vol. 35, pp. 117–134).
2. Adams J, MacKenzie MJ, Amegah AK, Ezeh A, Gadanya MA, Omigbodun A, Sarki AM, Thistle P, Ziraba AK, Stranges S, Silverman M. The Conundrum of Low COVID-19 Mortality Burden in sub-Saharan Africa: Myth or Reality? *Glob Health Sci Pract*. 2021 Sep 30;9(3):433-443. doi: 10.9745/GHSP-D-21-00172. PMID: 34593571; PMCID: PMC8514030.
3. Agnew, D. J., Pearce, J., Pramod, G., Peatman, T., Watson, R., Beddington, J. R., & Pitcher, T. J. (2009). Estimating the worldwide extent of illegal fishing. *PLOS ONE*, 4(2). <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0004570>
4. Aguión, A., Ojea, E., García-Flórez, L., Cruz, T., Garmendia, J. M., Davoult, D., Queiroga, H., Rivera, A., Acuña-Fernández, J. L., & Macho, G. (2022). Establishing a governance threshold in small-scale fisheries to achieve sustainability. *Ambio*, 51(3), 652–665. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-021-01606-x>

5. Agyeman, J., Bullard, R. D., & Evans, B. (2002). Exploring the Nexus: Bringing together sustainability, environmental justice and equity. *Space and Polity*, 6(1), 77–90. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13562570220137907>
6. Andrew, N. L., Béné, C., Hall, S. J., Allison, E. H., Heck, S., & Ratner, B. D. (2007). Diagnosis and management of small-scale fisheries in developing countries. *Fish and Fisheries*, 8(3), 227–240. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-2679.2007.00252.x>
7. Antonova, A. S. (2016). The rhetoric of “responsible fishing”: Notions of human rights and sustainability in the European Union’s bilateral fishing agreements with developing states. *Marine Policy*, 70, 77–84. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2016.04.008>
8. Arias Schreiber, M., Chuenpagdee, R., & Jentoft, S. (2022). Blue Justice and the co-production of hermeneutical resources for small-scale fisheries. *Marine Policy*, 137. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2022.104959>
9. Arthur, R. I. (2020). Small-scale fisheries management and the problem of open access. *Marine Policy*, 115. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2020.103867>
10. Badjeck, M. C., Allison, E. H., Halls, A. S., & Dulvy, N. K. (2010). Impacts of climate variability and change on fishery-based livelihoods. *Marine Policy*, 34(3), 375–383. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2009.08.007>
11. Baier, S. L., & Bergstrand, J. H. (2007). Do free trade agreements actually increase members’ international trade? *Journal of International Economics*, 71(1), 72–95.
12. Battista, W., Romero-Canyas, R., Smith, S. L., Fraire, J., Efron, M., Larson-Konar, D., & Fujita, R. (2018). Behavior change interventions to reduce illegal fishing. *Frontiers in Marine Science*, 5, 403. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2018.00403>
13. Bayramoglu, B., Copeland, B. R., & Jacques, J. F. (2018). Trade and fisheries subsidies. *Journal of International Economics*, 112, 13–32. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2018.01.009>
14. Belhabib, D., Greer, K., & Pauly, D. (2018). Trends in Industrial and Artisanal Catch Per Effort in West African Fisheries. In *Conservation Letters* (Vol. 11, Issue 1). Wiley-Blackwell. <https://doi.org/10.1111/conl.12360>

15. Béné, C., Lawton, R., & Allison, E. H. (2010). “Trade matters in the fight against poverty”: Narratives, perceptions, and (lack of) evidence in the case of fish trade in Africa. *World Development*, 38(7), 933–954.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2009.12.010>
16. Bennett, N. J., Villasante, S., Espinosa-Romero, M. J., Lopes, P. F. M., Selim, S. A., & Allison, E. H. (2022). Social sustainability and equity in the Blue Economy. In *One Earth* (Vol. 5, Issue 9, pp. 964–968). Cell Press.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2022.08.004>
17. Bowo-Ngandji, A., Kenmoe, S., Ebogo-Belobo, J. T., Kenfack-Momo, R., Takuissu, G. R., Kengne-Ndé, C., Mbagha, D. S., Tchatchouang, S., Kenfack-Zanguim, J., Lontuo Fogang, R., Zeuko’o Menkem, E., Ndzie Ondigui, J. L., Kame-Ngasse, G. I., Magoudjou-Pekam, J. N., Wandji Nguedjo, M., Assam Assam, J. P., Enyegue Mandob, D., & Ngondi, J. L. (2023). Prevalence of the metabolic syndrome in African populations: A systematic review and meta-analysis. *PloS One*, 18(7), e0289155. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0289155>
18. Bretherton, C., & Vogler, J. (2008). The European Union as a sustainable development actor: the case of external fisheries policy. *Journal of European Integration*, 30(3), 401–417. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07036330802142012>
19. Cinner, J. E., Daw, T. M., McClanahan, T. R., Muthiga, N., Abunge, C., Hamed, S., Mwaka, B., Rabearisoa, A., Wamukota, A., Fisher, E., & Jiddawi, N. (2012). Transitions toward co-management: The process of marine resource management devolution in three East African countries. *Global Environmental Change*, 22(3), 651–658. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2012.03.002>
20. Cinner, J. E., McClanahan, T. R., MacNeil, M. A., Graham, N. A. J., Daw, T. M., Mukminin, A., Feary, D. A., Rabearisoa, A. L., Wamukota, A., Jiddawi, N., Campbell, S. J., Baird, A. H., Januchowski-Hartley, F. A., Hamed, S., Lahari, R., Morove, T., & Kuange, J. (2012). Comanagement of coral reef social-ecological systems. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 109(14), 5219–5222. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1121215109>

21. Cisneros-Montemayor, A. M., Moreno-Báez, M., Voyer, M., Allison, E. H., Cheung, W. W. L., Hessing-Lewis, M., Oyinlola, M. A., Singh, G. G., Swartz, W., & Ota, Y. (2019). Social equity and benefits as the nexus of a transformative Blue Economy: A sectoral review of implications. *Marine Policy*, 109. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2019.103702>
22. Cohen, P. J., Allison, E. H., Andrew, N. L., Cinner, J., Evans, L. S., Fabinyi, M., Garces, L. R., Hall, S. J., Hicks, C. C., Hughes, T. P., Jentoft, S., Mills, D. J., Masu, R., Mbaru, E. K., & Ratner, B. D. (2019). Securing a just space for small-scale fisheries in the blue economy. *Frontiers in Marine Science*, 6(MAR). <https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2019.00171>
23. Cordón Lagares, E., & García Ordaz, F. (2015). Factors influencing the decision to leave a fishery and the effects of fishery subsidies: The case of the Spanish purse seine fishery. In *Ocean and Coastal Management* (Vol. 116, pp. 248–256). Elsevier Ltd. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2015.07.026>
24. Cosgrove, C. A. (1969). The Common Market and Its Colonial Heritage. *Journal of Contemporary History*, 4(1), 73–87. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/259792>
25. D'Amour, C. B., Reitsma, F., Baiocchi, G., Barthel, S., Güneralp, B., Erb, K. H., Haberl, H., Creutzig, F., & Seto, K. C. (2017). Future urban land expansion and implications for global croplands. In *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* (Vol. 114, Issue 34, pp. 8939–8944). National Academy of Sciences. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1606036114>
26. Devlin, C., Glaser, S. M., Lambert, J. E., & Villegas, C. (2022). The causes and consequences of fisheries conflict around the Horn of Africa. *Journal of Peace Research*, 59(6), 890–902. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433211038476>
27. Dolan, A. H., & Walker, I. J. (2006). Understanding vulnerability of coastal communities to climate change related risks. *Journal of Coastal research*, 1316-1323.
28. Ellis, J. T., & Sherman, D. J. (2015). Perspectives on Coastal and Marine Hazards and Disasters. In *Coastal and Marine Hazards, Risks, and Disasters* (pp. 1–13). Elsevier Inc.

29. Etiegni, C. A., Irvine, K., & Kooy, M. (2017). Playing by whose rules? Community norms and fisheries rules in selected beaches within Lake Victoria (Kenya) co-management. *Environment, Development and Sustainability*, 19(4), 1557–1575. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-016-9799-2>
30. Evans, L., Cherrett, N., & Pems, D. (2011). Assessing the impact of fisheries co-management interventions in developing countries: A meta-analysis. *Journal of Environmental Management*, 92(8), 1938–1949. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2011.03.010>
31. Fox, H. E., & Caldwell, R. L. (2006). Recovery from blast fishing on coral reefs: A tale of two scales. *Ecological Applications*, 16(5), 1631–1635.
32. Fuller, K., Kling, D., Kroetz, K., Ross, N., & Sanchirico, J. N. (2013). Economics and Ecology of Open-Access Fisheries. In *Encyclopedia of Energy, Natural Resource, and Environmental Economics* (Vols. 2–3, pp. 39–49). Elsevier Inc. <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-375067-9.00114-5>
33. Gagern, A., & van den Bergh, J. (2013). A critical review of fishing agreements with tropical developing countries. *Marine Policy*, 38, 375–386.
34. Garland, M., Axon, S., Graziano, M., Morrissey, J., & Heidkamp, C. P. (2019). The blue economy: Identifying geographic concepts and sensitivities. *Geography Compass*, 13(7). <https://doi.org/10.1111/gec3.12445>
35. Glaser, S. M., Hendrix, C. S., Franck, B., Wedig, K., & Kaufman, L. (2019). Armed conflict and fisheries in the Lake Victoria basin. *Ecology and Society*, 24(1).
36. Gomes, P. I. (2013). Reshaping an asymmetrical partnership: ACP-EU relations from an ACP perspective. *Journal of International Development*, 25(5), 714–726. <https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.2927>
37. Hammarlund, C., & Andersson, A. (2019). What's in it for Africa? European Union fishing access agreements and fishery exports from developing countries. *World Development*, 113, 172–185. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.09.010>
38. Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. In *Source: Science, New Series* (Vol. 162, Issue 3859).

39. Hattam, C., Evans, L., Morrissey, K., Hooper, T., Young, K., Khalid, F., Bryant, M., Thani, A., Slade, L., Perry, C., Turrall, S., Williamson, D., & Hughes, A. (2020). Building resilience in practice to support coral communities in the Western Indian Ocean. *Environmental Science and Policy*, *106*, 182–190. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2020.02.006>
40. Jentoft, S., & Chuenpagdee, R. (2009). Fisheries and coastal governance as a wicked problem. *Marine Policy*, *33*(4), 553–560. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2008.12.002>
41. Kaczynski, V. M., & Fluharty, D. L. (2002). European policies in West Africa: Who benefits from fisheries agreements? *Marine Policy*, *26*(2), 75–93. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0308-597X\(01\)00039-2](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0308-597X(01)00039-2)
42. Kadfak, A., & Antonova, A. (2021). Sustainable Networks: Modes of governance in the EU's external fisheries policy relations under the IUU Regulation in Thailand and the SFPA with Senegal. *Marine Policy*, *132*.
43. Katikiro, R. E., & Mahenge, J. J. (2016). Fishers' Perceptions of the Recurrence of Dynamite-Fishing Practices on the Coast of Tanzania. *Frontiers in Marine Science*, *3*, 233.
44. Lagares, E. C., & Ordaz, F. G. (2014). Fisheries structural policy in the European Union: A critical analysis of a subsidised sector. In *Ocean and Coastal Management* (Vol. 102, Issue PA, pp. 200–211). Elsevier Ltd. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2014.10.001>
45. Lancker, K., Fricke, L., & Schmidt, J. O. (2019). Assessing the contribution of artisanal fisheries to food security: A bio-economic modeling approach. *Food Policy*, *87*. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2019.101740>
46. Langan, M. (2012). Normative Power Europe and the Moral Economy of Africa-EU Ties: A Conceptual Reorientation of “Normative Power.” *New Political Economy*, *17*(3), 243–270. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2011.562975>
47. Lavenex, S., & Schimmelfennig, F. (2009). EU rules beyond EU borders: Theorizing external governance in European politics. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *16*(6), 791–812. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760903087696>

48. Le Manach F, Chaboud C, Copeland D, Cury P, Gascuel D, Kleisner KM, et al. (2013) European Union's Public Fishing Access Agreements in Developing Countries. PLoS ONE 8(11). <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0079899>
49. le Manach, F., Andriamahefazafy, M., Harper, S., Harris, A., Hosch, G., Lange, G. M., Zeller, D., & Sumaila, U. R. (2013). Who gets what? Developing a more equitable framework for EU fishing agreements. *Marine Policy*, 38, 257–266. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2012.06.001>
50. Lennan, M., & Switzer, S. (2023). Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies. The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 38(1), 161-177.
51. Levine, A. (2004). Local responses to marine conservation in Zanzibar, Tanzania. *Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy*, 7(3–4), 183–202. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13880290490883241>
52. Lotze, H. K., Lenihan, H. S., Bourque, B. J., Bradbury, R. H., Cooke, R. G., Kay, M. C., Kidwell, S. M., Kirby, M. X., Peterson, C. H., & Jackson, J. B. C. (2006). Depletion degradation, and recovery potential of estuaries and coastal seas. *Science*, 312(5781), 1806–1809.
53. Manners, I. (2002). Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms? *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(2), 235–258. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5965.00353>
54. March, A., & Failler, P. (2022). Small-scale fisheries development in Africa: Lessons learned and best practices for enhancing food security and livelihoods. *Marine Policy*, 136. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2021.104925>
55. Mason, J. G., Eurich, J. G., Lau, J. D., Battista, W., Free, C. M., Mills, K. E., Tokunaga, K., Zhao, L. Z., Dickey-Collas, M., Valle, M., Pecl, G. T., Cinner, J. E., McClanahan, T. R., Allison, E. H., Friedman, W. R., Silva, C., Yáñez, E., Barbieri, M., & Kleisner, K. M. (2022). Attributes of climate resilience in fisheries: From theory to practice. *Fish and Fisheries*, 23(3), 522–544. <https://doi.org/10.1111/faf.12630>
56. McClanahan, T. R. (2019). Coral reef fish communities, diversity, and their fisheries and biodiversity status in East Africa. *Marine Ecology Progress Series*, 632, 175–191. <https://doi.org/10.3354/meps13153>

57. Mendivil, C. O. (2021). Fish Consumption: A Review of Its Effects on Metabolic and Hormonal Health. In *Nutrition and Metabolic Insights* (Vol. 14). SAGE Publications Ltd. <https://doi.org/10.1177/11786388211022378>
58. Morrissey, J. (2023). Coastal communities, blue economy and the climate crisis: Framing just disruptions. *Geographical Journal*, 189(2), 283–299. <https://doi.org/10.1111/geoj.12419>
59. Mtonga, C., Jiddawi, N., & Benjamin, D. (2022). Recent rise in exploitation of Tanzanian octopuses: a policy and management challenge. *Western Indian Ocean Journal of Marine Science*, 2022(1), 107–118. <https://doi.org/10.4314/wiojms.si2022.1.8>
60. Murunga, M., Partelow, S., & Breckwoldt, A. (2021). Drivers of collective action and role of conflict in Kenyan fisheries co-management. *World Development*, 141. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105413>
61. Neethling, T. (2011). Piracy Around Africa's West And East Coasts: A Comparative Political Perspective. *Scientia Militaria - South African Journal of Military Studies*, 38(2). <https://doi.org/10.5787/38-2-91>
62. Nielsen, J. R., Degnbol, P., Viswanathan, K. K., Ahmed, M., Hara, M., & Abdullah, N. M. R. (2004). Fisheries co-management-an institutional innovation? Lessons from South East Asia and Southern Africa. *Marine Policy*, 28(2), 151–160.
63. Nunan, F. (2014). Wealth and welfare? Can fisheries management succeed in achieving multiple objectives? A case study of Lake Victoria, East Africa. *Fish and Fisheries*, 15(1), 134–150. <https://doi.org/10.1111/faf.12012>
64. Obiero, K., Meulenbroek, P., Drexler, S., Dagne, A., Akoll, P., Odong, R., Kaunda-Arara, B., & Waidbacher, H. (2019). The contribution of fish to food and nutrition security in Eastern Africa: Emerging trends and future outlooks. *Sustainability (Switzerland)*, 11(6). <https://doi.org/10.3390/su11061636>
65. Obura, D., Gudka, M., Samoilys, M., Osuka, K., Mbugua, J., Keith, D. A., Porter, S., Roche, R., van Hooidek, R., Ahamada, S., Araman, A., Karisa, J., Komakoma, J., Madi, M., Ravinia, I., Razafindrainibe, H., Yahya, S., & Zivane, F. (2022).

- Vulnerability to collapse of coral reef ecosystems in the Western Indian Ocean. *Nature Sustainability*, 5(2), 104–113. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-021-00817-0>
66. Occhiali, G. (2023). What's the Catch? A Review of the Fiscal Treatments of Fisheries in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Journal of Environment and Development*, 32(2), 192–217. <https://doi.org/10.1177/10704965231152827>
67. Okafor-Yarwood, I., Kadagi, N. I., Belhabib, D., & Allison, E. H. (2022). Survival of the Richest, not the Fittest: How attempts to improve governance impact African small-scale marine fisheries. *Marine Policy*, 135.
68. Painter, S. C., Popova, E., & Roberts, M. J. (2022). An introduction to East African Coastal Current ecosystems: At the frontier of climate change and food security. *Ocean and Coastal Management*, 216.
69. Pauly, D., & Zeller, D. (2017). Comments on FAOs State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture (SOFIA 2016). *Marine Policy*, 77, 176–181. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2017.01.006>
70. Pauly, D., Watson, R., & Alder, J. (2005). Global trends in world fisheries: Impacts on marine ecosystems and food security. In *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences* (Vol. 360, Issue 1453, pp. 5–12). Royal Society. <https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2004.1574>
71. Peer, N., Muhl, E. K., Janna, J., Brown, M., Zukulu, S., & Mbatha, P. (2022). Community and Marine Conservation in South Africa: Are We Still Missing the Mark? In *Frontiers in Marine Science* (Vol. 9). Frontiers Media S.A. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2022.884442>
72. Perry, R. I., Walters, C. J., & Boutillier, J. A. (1999). A framework for providing scientific advice for the management of new and developing invertebrate fisheries. *Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries*, 9(2), 125–150. <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008946522213>
73. Pomeroy, R. S., & Berkes, F. (1997). Two to tango: the role of government in fisheries co-management. In *Pergamon Marine Policy* (Vol. 21, Issue 5).
74. Pomeroy, R., Parks, J., Pollnac, R., Campson, T., Genio, E., Marlessy, C., Holle, E., Pido, M., Nissapa, A., Boromthanasarat, S., & Thu Hue, N. (2007). Fish wars:

- Conflict and collaboration in fisheries management in Southeast Asia. *Marine Policy*, 31(6), 645–656. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2007.03.012>
75. Raberinary, D., & Benbow, S. (2012). The reproductive cycle of *Octopus cyanea* in southwest Madagascar and implications for fisheries management. *Fisheries Research*, 125–126, 190–197. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fishres.2012.02.025>
76. Rittel, H. W. J., & Webber, M. M. (1973). Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning*. In *Policy Sciences* (Vol. 4).
77. Robinson, J. P. W., Robinson, J., Gerry, C., Govinden, R., Freshwater, C., & Graham, N. A. J. (2020). Diversification insulates fisher catch and revenue in heavily exploited tropical fisheries. In *Sci. Adv* (Vol. 6). <https://www.science.org>
78. Roscher, M. B., Allison, E. H., Mills, D. J., Eriksson, H., Hellebrandt, D., & Andrew, N. L. (2022). Sustainable development outcomes of livelihood diversification in small-scale fisheries. *Fish and Fisheries*, 23(4), 910–925. <https://doi.org/10.1111/faf.12662>
79. Rousseau, Y., Watson, R. A., Blanchard, J. L., & Fulton, E. A. (2019). Evolution of global marine fishing fleets and the response of fished resources. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 116(25), 12238–12243. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1820344116>
80. Sacko, J. L. C. (2020). Africa moves towards the blue economy through ecosystem-based assessment and management practices in African Large Marine Ecosystems. In *Environmental Development* (Vol. 36). Elsevier B.V.
81. Sadovy de Mitcheson, Y. J., Linardich, C., Barreiros, J. P., Ralph, G. M., Aguilar-Perera, A., Afonso, P., Erisman, B. E., Pollard, D. A., Fennessy, S. T., Bertoncini, A. A., Nair, R. J., Rhodes, K. L., Francour, P., Brulé, T., Samoily, M. A., Ferreira, B. P., & Craig, M. T. (2020). Valuable but vulnerable: Over-fishing and under-management continue to threaten groupers so what now? *Marine Policy*, 116. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2020.103909>
82. Sala, E., Mayorga, J., Costello, C., Kroodsma, D., Palomares, M. L., Pauly, D., ... & Zeller, D. (2018). The economics of fishing the high seas. *Science advances*, 4(6), eaat2504.

83. Salomon, M., Markus, T., & Dross, M. (2014). Masterstroke or paper tiger - The reform of the EU's Common Fisheries Policy. *Marine Policy*, 47, 76–84.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2014.02.001>
84. Sandkamp, A., Stamer, V., & Yang, S. (2022). Where has the rum gone? The impact of maritime piracy on trade and transport. *Review of World Economics*, 158(3), 751–778. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10290-021-00442-1>
85. Sauer, W. H. H., Gleadall, I. G., Downey-Breedt, N., Doubleday, Z., Gillespie, G., Haimovici, M., Ibáñez, C. M., Katugin, O. N., Leporati, S., Lipinski, M. R., Markaida, U., Ramos, J. E., Rosa, R., Villanueva, R., Arguelles, J., Briceño, F. A., Carrasco, S. A., Che, L. J., Chen, C. S., ... Pecl, G. (2021). World Octopus Fisheries. In *Reviews in Fisheries Science and Aquaculture* (Vol. 29, Issue 3, pp. 279–429). Bellwether Publishing, Ltd.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/23308249.2019.1680603>
86. Schuhbauer, A., Chuenpagdee, R., Cheung, W. W. L., Greer, K., & Sumaila, U. R. (2017). How subsidies affect the economic viability of small-scale fisheries. *Marine Policy*, 82, 114–121. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2017.05.013>
87. Sen, S., & Nielsen, J. R. (1996). Co-management: *a comparative analysis* (Vol. 20, Issue 5).
88. Seto, K. (2017). 2 West Africa & the New European Common Fisheries Policy: Impacts & Implications. In *Ocean Law and Policy* (pp. 68-100). Brill Nijhoff.
89. Silas, M. O., Kishe, M. A., Mgeleka, S. S., Kuboja, B. N., Ngatunga, B. P., & Matiku, P. (2022). The octopus fishing closures positively impact human wellbeing and management success; case of Tanzania. *Ocean and Coastal Management*, 217. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2021.106022>
90. Silas, M. O., Kishe, M. A., Mshana, J. G., Semba, M. L., Mgeleka, S. S., Kuboja, B. N., Ngatunga, B. P., Chande, M. A., & Matiku, P. (2021). Growth, mortality, exploitation rate and recruitment pattern of *Octopus cyanea* (Mollusca: Cephalopoda) in the WIO region: A case study from the Mafia Archipelago, Tanzania. *Western Indian Ocean Journal of Marine Science*, 20(1), 71–79. <https://doi.org/10.4314/wiojms.v20i1.7>

91. Slade, L. M., & Kalangahe, B. (2015). Dynamite fishing in Tanzania. *Marine Pollution Bulletin*, 101(2), 491–496.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpolbul.2015.08.025>
92. Slocum-Bradley, N., & Bradley, A. (2010). Is the EU’s governance “good”? An assessment of EU governance in its partnership with ACP states. *Third World Quarterly*, 31(1), 31–49.
93. Squires, D., Clarke, R., & Chan, V. (2014). Subsidies, public goods, and external benefits in fisheries. *Marine Policy*, 45, 222–227.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2013.11.002>
94. Staeger, U. (2016). Africa–EU relations and normative power Europe: A decolonial Pan-African critique. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 54(4), 981–998.
95. Stender, F., Berger, A., Brandi, C., & Schwab, J. (2021). The Trade Effects of the Economic Partnership Agreements between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States: Early Empirical Insights from Panel Data*. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 59(6), 1495–1515.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13201>
96. Tannous, I. (2013). The programming of EU’s external assistance and development aid and the fragile balance of power between EEAS and DG DEVCO. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 18(3).
97. Taylor, S. F. W., Aswani, S., Jiddawi, N., Coupland, J., James, P. A. S., Kelly, S., Kizenga, H., Roberts, M., & Popova, E. (2021). The complex relationship between asset wealth, adaptation, and diversification in tropical fisheries. *Ocean and Coastal Management*, 212. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2021.105808>
98. Tendall, D. M., Joerin, J., Kopainsky, B., Edwards, P., Shreck, A., Le, Q. B., Kruetli, P., Grant, M., & Six, J. (2015). Food system resilience: Defining the concept. In *Global Food Security* (Vol. 6, pp. 17–23). Elsevier B.V.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2015.08.001>
99. Turvey, R. (1964). *Optimization and Suboptimization in Fishery Regulation* (Vol. 54, Issue 2).

100. Van der Elst, R. P., Groeneveld, J. C., Baloi, A. P., Marsac, F., Katonda, K. I., Ruwa, R. K., & Lane, W. L. (2009). Nine nations, one ocean: A benchmark appraisal of the South Western Indian Ocean Fisheries Project (2008-2012). *Ocean and Coastal Management*, 52(5), 258–267.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2009.02.003>
101. Van der Elst, R., Everett, B., Jiddawi, N., Mwatha, G., Afonso, P. S., & Boulle, D. (2005). Fish, fishers and fisheries of the Western Indian Ocean: Their diversity and status. A preliminary assessment. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences*, 363(1826), 263–284. <https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2004.1492>
102. Wagner, G. M. (2004). Coral reefs and their management in Tanzania. *Western Indian Ocean Journal of Marine Science*, 3(2), 227-243.
103. Wanyonyi, I. N., Wamukota, A., Mesaki, S., Guissamulo, A. T., & Ochiwo, J. (2016). Artisanal fisher migration patterns in coastal East Africa. *Ocean and Coastal Management*, 119, 93–108.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2015.09.006>
104. Waters, J. R. (1991). Restricted access vs. open access methods of management: Toward more effective regulation of fishing effort. *Marine Fisheries Review*, 53(3), 1-10.
105. Westberg, A. B. (2015). The military, war and society: the need for critical sociological engagement. *Scientia Militaria - South African Journal of Military Studies*, 43(1). <https://doi.org/10.5787/43-1-1107>
106. Witbooi, E. (2008). The infusion of sustainability into bilateral fisheries agreements with developing countries: The European Union example. *Marine Policy*, 32(4), 669–679. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2007.11.008>
107. Witbooi, E., Ali, K. D., Santosa, M. A., Hurley, G., Husein, Y., Maharaj, S., Okafor-Yarwood, I., Quiroz, I. A., & Salas, O. (2020). Organized crime in the fisheries sector threatens a sustainable ocean economy. *Nature*, 588(7836), 48–56.
<https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-020-2913-5>

108. Zeller, D., & Pauly, D. (2018). The ‘presentist bias’ in time-series data: Implications for fisheries science and policy. *Marine Policy*, 90, 14–19.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2018.01.015>