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Three Essays on the Democratic Party

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THREE ESSAYS ON THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

A Dissertation
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Department of Political Science
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By

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ABSTRACT

In the United States today the two parties struggle to find common ground on anything, and strong partisan attachments lead many members of the public to follow the lead of their preferred party on nearly every political decision. However, the sorting of the public does not mean that the parties are monoliths. The Democratic Party in particular is composed of a wide range of groups which often do not easily come to consensus when there are decisions to be made. The occasional lack of consensus within the Democratic Party leads to questions about how the party as a whole is able to make decisions. During the party's primaries or when controversial policies become salient partisans are not able to rely on cues from their party as they normally would. In this dissertation I seek to determine what factors play into partisan's candidate and policy preferences when partisanship cannot. I first examine the impact of group sentiments on candidate preferences in primary elections, then I investigate whether partisan follow the lead of politicians on salient and controversial policy proposals or whether their preferences are driven by their core political values, and finally I seek to determine the relationship between group sentiments and core political values. I show that group sentiments not only shape candidate preferences in primaries, but also that core values shape policy preferences on controversial issues and those values that people hold are in turn influenced by group sentiments. I conclude that group sentiments have a pervasive impact over a great deal of intraparty dynamics and understanding this impact and the other factors that influence intraparty dynamics would help us more fully understand political behavior.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Unlike other democracies in which there are multiple parties to represent groups and

special interests, the United States political system tends to only have two major political parties.

These parties cannot specifically represent individual groups or interests and must try to build

coalitions to win electoral majorities. The coalition built by the Republican Party is narrower –

mainly comprised of white people and corporate interest – than that of the Democratic

Party(Grossmann and Hopkins 2016; Mason 2018a). As the majority of the country is white, and

with small amounts of support from other racial groups, the Republican Party is able to remain

competitive with a somewhat homogenous constituency (A. Abramowitz 2018; Achen and

Bartels 2016). On the other hand, the Democratic Party has a more ideologically and racially

diverse constituency (Grossmann and Hopkins 2016; Pew Research Center 2018). The diversity

of the party presents several challenges and questions that should be answered to more fully

understand how the Democratic Party operates in the United States.

First, the party must choose which candidate from the primary pool will run in a general

election contest. Presidential primaries display both the demographic and ideological diversity

that exists within the party. In the 2020 primary the Democratic field included candidates of

different races, genders, and policy preferences. This broad set of options presents a challenge

for voters to determine which candidate is best. Second, due to the breadth of ideologies that

exist at the elite level of the Democratic Party, there are times when different party elites espouse

different policy preferences (Cochrane 2021; Lacurci 2021). This raises the question of how

partisans, who normally take their cues from the party elites

(G. L. Cohen 2003; Freeder, Lenz, and Turney 2018), will form preferences on these controversial issues. Finally, the existence of intraparty disagreement on candidates and policies raises the question of whether members of the public have some underlying set of beliefs that structure their political thoughts and behaviors. Scholars often find a lack of an overarching stable belief system among Americans and instead find that partisan identity shapes nearly all political behaviors (Converse 1964; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017), but these findings do not explain the factors causing intraparty differences. In this dissertation, I investigate each of these questions to better understand the intraparty dynamics of the Democratic Party in the United States.

In the first chapter of this dissertation, I investigate the factors that shape how partisans choose a candidate in a primary election. As voting decisions in the United States are often contests between the two major parties, these types of competitions have been widely investigated by scholars. This research has found that one's partisanship is perhaps the most influential factor over the direction in which one votes in a general election (Campbell et al. 1960; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). In this case partisanship is functioning as a social identity, meaning that people's partisan preferences are based on a sense of self-identity rather than policy or ideological factors. Psychologists have found that individuals often derive their sense of self from the group to which they are attached and, as a result, show favoritism to others who are also members of that group (Tajfel 1979; Turner, Brown, and Tajfel 1979). The influence of partisanship as a social identity on elections will be important in an election in which a member of one's own party is competing with a member of another party. However, in an election contest where all competitors share one's partisanship, this social identity will not be

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as useful of a heuristic. I argue that instead of the social identity of partisanship, voters will rely on other underlying social identities to choose their preferred candidate.

Further scholarship on social identities has shown that various social identities can align with one another, strengthening identification with both groups (Roccas and Brewer 2002). This is increasingly the case with partisanship. Scholars have found that the sorting of members of different ideological, racial, and religious groups into political parties has strengthened attachments to each of these groups (Mason and Wronski 2018). I argue that the alignment and strengthening of these identities provides a potential cue for partisan voters to use in primary elections. These voters are not able to use their partisan identity to choose a candidate from their group, within the diverse Democratic Party, there are a variety of racial, gender, and other identities underlying partisanship. Therefore, when voters are faced with an intraparty contest, they will use their orientations towards the groups to which candidates belong to make their decision. For example, a Democratic voter who feels closer to the African American group will be more likely to prefer African American primary candidates. I test this argument using publicly available data from the 2018 ANES pilot study and data from an original survey constructed for this purpose. In these studies, voters are asked about their preferred candidate in the 2020 Democratic Presidential primaries to determine if those preferences are guided by sentiments towards the groups of which the candidates are members. The findings here suggest support for the argument that when faced with decisions that cannot be guided by partisan cues, partisans use cues from their other underlying group identities.

The next study in this dissertation also seeks to determine how partisans will make decisions without the benefit of a partisan cue. When considering the policy preferences of members of the mass public scholars have often found structure and consistency to be lacking

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(Converse 1964; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017). Furthermore, the preferences Americans do hold seem to be largely dictated by their party (Carsey and Layman 2006; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002) or the partisan candidate they are supporting in an election (Lenz 2012). In fact, the most stable opinions partisans hold are the ones which they know "go with" their partisan identity (Freeder, Lenz, and Turney 2018). However, in the two-party system of American politics there are not only policy disagreements between the parties; instead, there are also occasionally high-profile disagreements on important policy *within* political parties. This is especially the case in   ideologically broad Democratic Party, which is home to moderates like President Joe Biden and Speaker Nancy Pelosi as well as progressives such as Senator Elizabeth Warren and Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio Cortez (Cochrane 2021; Lacurci 2021). For example, in recent years many more "liberal" members of the party have expressed support for a single payer health care system while more moderate members have not (Diamond 2021; Nobles and Krieg 2019). In these situations, the cue received from partisanship is not as useful as it is when there is a clear position of the party on the issue. I suggest underlying core political values may help partisans form preferences in these complicated situations.

Core values are abstract beliefs about desirable end states or behaviors that transcend specific situations, guide evaluation and behavior, and can be rank-ordered in terms of relative importance (Kinder 1998; Schwartz 1992, 1994). One core value often found to be influential in political matters is equality or egalitarianism (Feldman 1988; Goren 2005). I argue that the strength with which partisans value equality will partially shape the opinions people hold on issues not settled within the party. For example, those who more strongly value equality will hold more favorable views toward redistributive policies like a wealth tax since this policy would be seen as promoting equality. Using a novel experimental approach, I test this core value

explanation along with a rival politician favorability explanation. Respondents in this experiment choose their preferences on a proposed wealth tax policy after seeing support for that policy from a politician from their party, but not from the whole party. The results here suggest that the leadership of politicians on these policies are less important than the core values held by the partisans forming their preferences.

The finding from this second study raises the question I seek to answer with the third chapter of this dissertation. Previous scholars searching for overarching belief systems that shape the ideology of members of the mass public have often found a lack of evidence for any such belief system (Converse 1964; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017). Even studies of core political values as a potential belief system shaping how people see the political world have found that these values are, in fact, shaped by partisan identity (Goren 2005; Goren, Federico, and Kittilson 2009), and therefore, not the factor shaping political thought. However, variation in core values within parties seems to influence the ideological positioning of partisans within their party. This leads to a question of whether the variation of core values within a party is structuring beliefs on issues that vary under partisanship or if there is some other factor that may be shaping policy preferences through core values. I suggest that core values are not a deeply held belief shaping variation within parties; instead, the variation on core values within a party is caused by varying group sentiments within that party.

Goren (2005) shows that core values are shaped by partisanship, a group identity. This shows the ability of these values to be shaped by group orientation, which I argue suggests variation on these values within the parties is caused by sentiments toward non-partisan groups. Similar to the first chapter of this dissertation, my argument is that when there are outcomes we know to be shaped by partisanship, candidate preference and core values, the variation in these

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outcomes within partisan groups will be shaped by sentiments toward groups underlying partisanship. The sorting of non-political group identities – such as race, gender, and religion – into political groups allows these group identities to influence political factors not fully shaped by the overarching political group identity (i.e., partisanship). To determine the relationship that exists between group sentiments within parties and core values I use data from the 2020 ANES. Testing how these factors relate to one another shows that warmer sentiments toward traditionally underrepresented or mistreated groups are related to holding equality values more strongly. Due to the nature of this test, I am not able to determine the direction of causality in this relationship, but I believe the theoretical basis for group sentiments to shape core values is stronger than that of the reverse direction.

In sum, in this dissertation I seek to examine some of the intraparty dynamics of the Democratic Party in the United States. The demographic and ideological diversity that exists within this party makes it an ideal location for testing how these dynamics function. I most closely examine how partisans choose primary candidates and form their positions on policy matters undecided within the party. Although I initially find core political values to be an important factor in policy preference formation, I suggest that these values are an effect rather than a cause. I argue that the factor shaping most intraparty dynamics is the same as the factor shaping a great deal of interparty dynamics: group sentiments. Partisan group sentiments are the overarching factor shaping the political world for individuals, and I argue that when these partisan group sentiments do not provide the cue necessary to form a political opinion, individuals will rely on their sentiments toward other underlying groups such as racial, gender, or religious groups. This dissertation argues that the impact of group orientations in politics cannot be overstated and pervades into spaces not previously considered.

CHAPTER 2: DIVISIONS IN THE BIG TENT:

GROUP SENTIMENTS AND CANDIDATE PREFERENCES WITHIN THE DEMOCRATIC

PARTY

The base of support for the Democratic Party has been described as a "big tent" that includes individuals of various races, genders, sexual orientations, and religions (Pew Research Center 2018). A simple look at the candidates in the Democratic 2020 Presidential primaries or the composition of Members of Congress (Pew Research Center, 2019) shows that this diversity extends to the elite level. Black individuals, Latinos, women, members of the LGBTQ community, and non-Christians comprise the Democratic field. The base of support as well as elites of the Democratic Party stand in stark contrast to the largely White and Christian base of support and elites of the Republican Party (Abramowitz, 2018; Mason, 2018). Research has shown identity-based sorting of these groups into the Republican and Democratic Parties over recent years (Achen and Bartels 2016). In this instance, sorting means that as individuals belong to and feel closer to groups aligned with their party, the strength of their partisan identification increases (Mason and Wronski 2018). These past studies examine the cumulative effects of party aligned group identities. The amount of diversity and the potential for cross pressures in the Democratic Party, however, permits an examination of whether group sentiments within the Democratic Party influence intraparty candidate preference.

The existing work on social identity in politics is extensive and offers a great deal of insight into how our group attachments influence our political behavior. This literature has

largely focused on partisanship, ideological identification, and participation, but is the impact of social group sorting limited to these factors? It is reasonable to think that the effects of sorting will be more muted in the Republican Party due to its homogeneity, but the heterogeneity of the Democratic Party may lead to additional group divisions beyond partisanship. This means that Republicans will tend to find that the Republicans around them look like them, hold similar religious beliefs, and sexual orientations. On the other hand, if an individual Democrat were to take a look around their "big tent," they may see members of other racial groups, people of varying gender identities, individuals with different sexual orientations than themselves, and people who do not share their religious beliefs. I aim to determine if the potential for varied group sentiments within the Democratic Party will result in voting within the party based on social group sentiment. The crowded 2020 Democratic presidential primary provides an excellent opportunity to test the impact of group sentiments.

Though we know that partisan identifiers are extremely likely to vote in line with their partisanship at the general election stage (Campbell et al. 1960; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002), this easily accessible cue is not available to voters in a primary election. Primary voters therefore must rely on something other than partisanship. Factors such as name recognition, endorsements, and electability undoubtedly play a role in the choice voters make in primary elections (Abramowitz, 1989; Cohen et al., 2008; Kam & Zechmeister, 2013; Koger et al., 2010; Masket, 2009; Mirhosseini, 2015; Rickershauser & Aldrich, 2007; Simas, 2017), but I argue that an individual's sub-partisan groups such as race, gender, and sexual orientation will also play a role in the decision-making process.

Using two distinct data sets that include individual group sentiments and 2020 Democratic primary candidate preference, the strongest effects I find come from gender group

sentiments, but racial and LGBTQ group sentiments are also significant factors in primary candidate selection among Democratic identifiers. I consistently show that individuals who feel more positively toward a gender, racial, or LGBTQ group are more likely to support a candidate from that group. Traditionally cross cutting identities tend to weaken partisanship and outgroup animosity (Brader, Tucker, and Therriault 2014; Mason 2015; Powell 1976), but here I show that identities within the Democratic Party impact voter preferences in the direction of one's identity whether that identity is cross-cutting or not. For example, male gender group sentiment is thought of as a trait predictive of support for Republicans (Kane, Mason, and Wronski 2021), but I find that Democrats who score more positively on male gender group sentiment are more likely to support male Democratic candidates. The effects for racial groups are somewhat weaker than the effect of gender groups, but this may be due to the makeup of the field of candidates (discussed in greater detail below). The evidence that LGBTQ group sentiments are predictive of candidate support leads to additional questions about how other not clearly visible groups, such as religion, may be influential over voting behavior within the party.

Overall, these results suggest that the importance of group sentiments extend beyond an individual's actual membership in a gender, racial, or LGBTQ group. The present study adds to the understanding of the pervasive impact of social identity by showing that within the Democratic Party different group sentiments lead to further voting behavior differences on the basis of group identification.

Primary Elections and Social Identities

Social Identity Theory argues that individuals derive their sense of self through the groups to which they are attached (Tajfel 1979). Group attachments lead people to show more favoritism toward members of their own groups, or in-groups, and hostility toward members of out-groups (Turner, Brown, and Tajfel 1979). These social group attachments can be aligned with one another and strengthen both group attachments and in-group favoritism/out-group hostility (Brewer and Pierce 2005; Roccas and Brewer 2002). Social Identity Theory has been applied to politics even before the identification of the theory itself. Early work in political science shows that partisanship functions as an identity for a large number of people (Campbell et al., 1960; Green et al., 2002). In this work, partisanship is a psychological attachment, not necessarily an agreement with the party on the issues. Partisan self-identification is often found to be an important factor in the decision-making process of voters, but in a contest between co-partisans this social identity is largely irrelevant.

Proponents of the importance of ideology argue that voters decide how to vote based on their broadly defined self-interests (Downs 1957; Fiorina 1978; Key and Cummings 1966; Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 2001) or based on some big picture issues that are important to them (Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder 2008). However, during a primary between co-partisans, when the ideological differences are typically subtler, it is more difficult to determine which candidate is more ideologically aligned with oneself. The lack of ideological constraint in the public makes it challenging for voters to make their decisions in primaries based on ideology (Converse 1964; Zaller 1992; Zaller and Feldman 1992). However, there are some situations in which ideology may be an important factor in primary candidate choice. Voters who, for example, choose Bernie Sanders over Joe Biden certainly may hold different ideologies, but the

difficulty in determining the nuanced differences between co-partisan candidates opens the door

for other factors, like group sentiment, to become important.

The existing literature on primaries largely focuses on the importance of the parties

themselves as well as expanded party networks. Scholars often focus on the ability of parties and

their expanded party networks to control the nomination process by their allocation of resources

like money, endorsements, and expert guidance to their preferred candidates (Cohen et al. 2008;

Hassell 2018; Koger, Masket, and Noel 2010; Masket 2009). However, some recent work shows

fractionalization within the parties (Bawn et al., 2012). This fractionalization exists mainly

between an establishment wing and an ideological wing in each party, and some argue that the

ability of the parties to control the nomination process has waned in recent years due to this

fractionalization (Cohen et al., 2016; Noel, 2016), but the eventual consolidation behind and

nomination of Joe Biden in 2020 suggests the power of the party to control the nomination

process is still substantial (Masket 2020). In this study I do not intend to weigh in on either side

of the discussion on the power of the parties to control nominations. Instead, I simply argue that

group sentiments within the party are an important contributing factor in the decision-making

process of primary voters, alongside many other factors that previous scholarship has identified.

Electability is often discussed as another major factor in primary elections. The actual

definition and components of electability are a source of disagreement, but for the purposes of

this study I define electability as the perceived chance of a candidate in a primary election going

on to win a general election. Evidence shows that voters from both parties take electability into

account when deciding how to vote in primary elections (Abramowitz, 1989; Rickershauser &

Aldrich, 2007). In fact, electability perceptions may be even more important than ideology in

these elections as voters are willing to stray from their own ideological beliefs if they believe that

the ideologically distant candidate has a better chance of winning in the general election (Mirhosseini 2015; Simas 2017).

There are also components that influence voting in general elections whose effect may carry over to primary elections. One powerful predictor of partisanship, and as a result voting behavior, is one's social group identity (Abramowitz, 2018; Mason, 2018; Mason & Wronski, 2018). There is reason to believe that these social group identities will be an important factor in primary voting decisions, especially within the Democratic Party as a result of its greater group diversity (Abramowitz, 2018; Mason, 2016). Recent research investigates how Social Identity Complexity (Brewer and Pierce 2005; Roccas and Brewer 2002) plays into the political realm, by examining how other social identities align with partisanship to strengthen the connections people feel toward both. This research refers to this alignment of other identities with partisanship as "sorting" (Abramowitz, 2018; Mason, 2016), and finds that this sorting is based on social identities (Mason 2018b); however, others have argued for the importance of policy differences (Fowler 2020; Orr and Huber 2019). Furthermore, recent work by Kane, Mason, and Wronski (2021) shows that feelings of closeness toward a group, regardless of membership in that group, have a strong association with partisanship. According to Social Identity Complexity Theory, those whose identities align with their partisan identities are more likely to hold all of these identities more strongly while those with unaligned, or cross cutting, identities hold weaker partisan attachments (Brewer and Pierce 2005; Mason and Wronski 2018; Powell 1976; Roccas and Brewer 2002) and may even choose not to vote (Campbell et al. 1960; Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015).

The prospect of cross cutting identities poses a unique puzzle. Cross cutting identities weaken partisanship, decrease the level of conflict between groups (Lipset 1960; Mason 2016),

and may even lead to defection from the party (Hillygus and Shields 2008). However, I only examine the candidate preferences of those who have identified themselves as Democratic partisans. Many of these individuals still do face cross pressures such as strong identification as White or Christian, identities often associated with the Republican Party. How will these voters respond to these cross pressures when deciding how to vote? I argue that these voters will seek to diminish feelings of cross pressure by supporting a candidate who fits in their own groups. This would lead a strong White identifying voter to support White candidates over candidates of other races. The ways in which singular group identities influence political behavior is an important building block for this chapter.

Fortunately, prior work examines the impact of specific group identities on candidate and policy preference. Jardina (2019) finds that Whites who are more conscious of their race are more likely to favor White centric policies, and others show that White voters prefer White candidates when they feel a sense of linked fate (Schildkraut 2015) or when there are non-White candidates (Petrow, Transue, and Vercellotti 2018). Furthermore, racial attitudes as a whole impact evaluations of candidates and policies (Enders 2019; Enders and Scott 2019; Tesler 2013), and having (lacking) descriptive representation among candidates increases (decreases) turnout among voters (Barreto, Segura, and Woods 2004; Gay 2001; Stokes-Brown and Dolan 2010).

Huddy and Carey (2009) conduct research very similar to the present study during the 2008 Democratic presidential primary and find results in line with my own expectations. They examine the impact of racial and gender solidarity and antipathy on the choice between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton. This work by Huddy and Carey differs from the present study, however, in two ways. First, the primary contest in 2020 was much more crowded with multiple

female candidates and candidates of color as well as an openly gay candidate. Second, the measure of racial/gender solidarity/antipathy used by Huddy and Carey asks whether voters considered race and gender important in their decision making, but the impact of racial and gender sentiments towards groups with which a voter does not identify are not considered. A more thorough investigation of the impact of group sentiments on voting behavior in the Democratic Party is possible by measuring group sentiments more directly and examining feelings towards groups voters do not self-identify with.

The preponderance of research shows that social group identity is a strong predictor of political behavior and often voting behavior. I argue that the heterogeneity of the Democratic Party will increase the impact of individuals' other, non-partisan, identities on their voting behavior in primaries. It is important to point out that a person does not have to belong to a group in order to identify closely with that group or for their feelings toward that group to impact their behavior (Kane, Mason, and Wronski 2021). I believe race, gender, and sexual orientation in the Democratic Party sufficiently vary to show that closer identification with a group will make an individual more likely to vote for a candidate from that group. The diversity on these dimensions extends to elites of the party, which allows for descriptive representation for voters regardless of the groups with which they identify. In sum, group favoritism will lead Democratic primary voters to choose candidates from the groups to which they feel closest.[1] These expectations can be outlined in the following hypotheses:

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[1] It is important to point out that I do not argue that group identities are the sole factor predicting vote choice in primary elections. For example, in a contest between Amy Klobuchar and Elizabeth Warren, two white women, sentiments toward gender and racial groups will likely not play a key role. Instead, I argue that group sentiments can be a contributing factor to choices the voters make in primary elections in the same way that other contributing factors like ideology and endorsements contribute to the voting decision.

Hypothesis 1: Attachment (or, closeness) to a racial group, regardless of respondent self-identification with that group, will increase the likelihood of choosing a candidate of that racial group.

> *Hypothesis 1a: Individuals will be more likely, all else equal, to choose a candidate of the same racial group as themselves as their attachment to their racial group increases.*

Hypothesis 2: Attachment (or, closeness) to a gender group, regardless of respondent self-identification with that group, will increase the likelihood of choosing a candidate of that gender group.

> *Hypothesis 2a: Individuals will be more likely, all else equal, to choose a candidate with the same gender as themselves as their attachment to their gender increases.*

Hypothesis 3: Attachment (or, closeness) to the LGBTQ group, regardless of respondent self-identification with that group, will increase the likelihood of choosing a candidate of the LGBTQ group.[2]

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[2] The small number of LGBTQ respondents in my 2020 Qualtircs survey (N=106) makes it difficult to test effects of group sentiment among only LGBTQ individuals. Hence, no Hypothesis 3A.

Data and Methods

To test my hypotheses, I rely on two distinct studies capturing candidate choice and group sentiment among voters. Complete question wording and coding details can be found in the Appendix.

The first survey was conducted in January of 2020 on 1000 registered Democratic voters using Qualtrics panels. The Demographics of this survey closely match those of the Democratic electorate.[3] Respondents were presented a series of candidate matchups, including pictures of the two candidates, in which they were asked to select their preferred candidate from the pair. An example matchup is shown in the appendix with the remainder of the Qualtrics survey.[4] These matchups were presented in a random order with the order in which the candidates appeared in each matchup also randomized. Showing pictures of the candidates made clear the race and gender of the candidates which, I argue, are important characteristics in the voter's decision-making process.

This survey included six of the best performing candidates according to polling averages at the time of the survey (Joe Biden, Pete Buttigieg, Amy Klobuchar, Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, and Andrew Yang), producing a total of fifteen candidate matchups.[5] This survey procedure provides me with two sets of dependent variables that will be used in this study. First,

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[3] This study was fielded January 24-31. Racial breakdown: 62% White, 17% Black, 13% Latinx. Gender breakdown: 58% female, 42% male. According to Pew, the Democratic electorate in 2019 was 59% White, 19% Black and 13% Latinx (Gramlich,2020), and according to Business Insider 57% of the Democratic electorate was female while 43% was male (Hickey 2019).

[4] Pictures of the candidates were taken from Politico's 2020 Voter's Guide for the Democratic Primary. This source was chosen as other sources of candidate images often use official photos for those candidates who are Members of Congress, which would likely give these candidates an advantage over candidates who do not hold office.

[5] According to Real Clear Politics polling averages, these were 6 of the 7 best performing candidates at the time of the survey. Michael Bloomberg was not included due to his late entry to the race and absence from the ballot in several states. Candidates like Kamala Harris could not feasibly be included here since they had dropped out prior to fielding the survey.

I create variables for each of the candidates indicating how many times that candidate was selected in their five matchups. Second, I construct a variable indicating the number of times a female candidate is chosen over a male candidate in the eight female vs. male matchups. One notable drawback of this survey is the lack of racial diversity of the candidates with Andrew Yang being the only non-white candidate. However, this survey also allows me to include a battery of controls by including factors like sexism that may also predict support for certain types of candidates.[6]

Throughout the analysis, following work by Kane, Mason, and Wronski (2021) I use group sentiment, which is feelings toward a group whether an individual is a member of that group or not, as my key independent variable. More specifically, I measure group sentiments by asking respondents: "Of the following groups how close do you feel towards them? By 'close' we mean people who are most like you in their ideas, interests, and feelings". This measure has been used previously in similar studies (Mason and Wronski 2018; Miller et al. 1981) and captures shared interests, which is an important part of group sentiments (Dawson 1994). The responses to this question are recoded to range from 0 to 1.[7] This survey also includes a candidate who is a member of the LGBTQ community, which provides an opportunity to test my

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[6] In models using data from the Qualtics 2020 survey the controls are: Benevolent sexism, hostile sexism, racial resentment, ideology, partisan strength, income, education, age, gender, and political knowledge. See the appendix for question wording and coding details.

[7] To ensure this group closeness measure is not simply capturing policy preferences and perceptions of ideological closeness to candidates, I conduct a test of the impact of gender group sentiment on perceived ideological closeness to candidates from male or female gender groups. Figure A2.1 shows that female group sentiment does not impact perceived ideological distance to any candidates, and higher male group sentiment leads to increased perceived ideological distance from both male and female candidates. This shows that the group closeness measure is likely capturing something other than perceptions of ideological closeness to a candidate or group of candidates.

third hypothesis.[8] However, no prominent Black candidates remained in the race at the time of this survey, which limits my ability to test my first hypothesis.

Figure 2.1 shows the average level of support each candidate receives from different groups in this survey. Joe Biden is the most popular candidate across all groups but there are some differences in the support other candidates receive depending on the group in question. One aspect of the figure that stands out is the second most popular spot, which varies based on the group being analyzed. For men and individuals who are not White, Bernie Sanders is the second most popular, but for women and Whites, Elizabeth Warren is the second most popular. Figure 2.1 gives us an initial look at the support each of the candidates in this survey receives, but the variables of interest will not only be self-reported gender or race, but also how respondents feel toward those groups.

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[8] Survey questions appear in the appendix in the order they appear in the survey. However, the appendix does not include all questions from this survey. Measures of closeness are separated from the candidate matchups in the survey by several other groups of questions (about 5 minutes of survey content) to help reduce the possibility of priming.

Figure 2.1: Candidate Support by Self-Reported Race and Gender of Respondents

The second survey is the 2018 American National Elections Studies (ANES) pilot study,

which was conducted in December of 2018 on 2,500 U.S. citizens over the age of 18 determined

to be representative of the United States population.[9] When using this dataset, I restrict my

analysis to the 1,243 respondents who said they planned to vote in the 2020 Democratic

primary.[10] These respondents were asked to select their preferred candidate given 11 choices

including both Black and White candidates and female and male candidates.[11] I use this question

to create dichotomous variables indicating whether respondents chose a Black or a White

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[9] The 2018 study was fielded December 6-19, 2018. This dataset was made publicly available online soon after the completion of the study.

[10] Racial breakdown: 68% White, 15% Black, Latinx: 11%. Gender breakdown: 61% female, 39% male. According to Pew, the Democratic electorate in 2019 was 59% White, 19% Black and 13% Latinx (Gramlich,2020), and according to Business Insider 57% of the Democratic electorate was female while 43% was male (Hickey 2019). Thus, this subset slightly oversamples Whites and women, but not to a degree that should raise major concern. The number of respondents included in each analysis varies due to nonresponse on some items of interest.

[11] The candidates included in this survey were: Joe Biden, Cory Booker, Kirsten Gillibrand, Kamala Harris, Eric Holder, Amy Klobuchar, Chris Murphy, Beto O'Rourke, Deval Patrick, Bernie Sanders, and Elizabeth Warren.

candidate and whether they chose a female or a male candidate. Because this survey does not include group closeness items, I proxy group sentiment using a series of feeling thermometers that measure how warm respondents feel toward a series of groups. Feeling thermometers have been shown to be an acceptable proxy for group closeness in previous studies (Achen and Bartels 2016; Giles and Evans 1985; Jardina 2019; Miller, Wlezien, and Hildreth 1991). This survey does not include a feeling thermometer for women as a group, so I use the feeling thermometer for the #MeToo movement to proxy female group sentiment.[12]

Results

I begin my analysis with the results from the 2020 Qualtrics survey. Figure 2.2 presents the results from a series of ordinary least squares regression models testing the impact of a number of factors on support for each of the candidates in the Qualtrics 2020 survey (full regression results presented in Appendix Table A2.1). The dependent variable in each of these models is the number of times a respondent selected a particular candidate out of the five opportunities they had to do so.[13]

There are several important findings depicted in Figure 2.2. First, five of the six candidates in this study are White, which leads me to expect White racial closeness to have no effect on the vote choice of the respondents in this study for five of the six candidates (Joe Biden, Pete Buttigieg, Amy Klobuchar, Bernie Sanders, and Elizabeth Warren). This expectation

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[12] Henderson-King and Stewart (1994) argue that sentiment toward feminists is more indicative of female group sentiment than sentiment toward women. Similarly, Kane, Mason, and Wronski 2021 identifies feminists as a group aligned with the Democratic Party, instead of women. Sentiment toward feminists was not asked on the ANES, so I use sentiment toward the #MeToo movement as a proxy.

[13] I use OLS for ease of interpretation. To test the robustness of this method, Figure A2.2 and Table A2.8 show results from the same tests using a Poisson count model. The results are substantively similar.

is met as White racial closeness does not reach statistical significance for any of the candidates. However, in the model for support of Andrew Yang, the only non-White candidate in the field, I find strong support for Hypothesis 1 as the coefficient for Asian group closeness is both substantively large (.919, indicating high Asian group sentiment predicts almost one more selection of Andrew Yang in his five matchups) and statistically significant ($p<0.01$). Both of these results lend support for my first hypothesis.

With respect to hypothesis 2, the gender closeness variables are statistically significant in the expected direction for four of the six candidates (Sanders and Yang being the exceptions). Gender self-identification is significant at the .05 level only once (Biden supporters are more likely to be female) and once at the .1 level (Sanders supporters are slightly more likely to be male). Thus, the sentiment an individual feels toward a gender group appears more influential over their candidate preference than the gender group to which that individual belongs.

Figure 2.2: Effects of Group Sentiment on Candidate Support

Note: GS = Group Sentiments.
Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. The dependent variable in these models is the number of times
a candidate was chosen in their 5 matchups (ranges from 0-5). N=982. See appendix Table A2.1 for regression outpu

Source: 2020 Qualtrics Survey.

Figure 2.2 also includes two necessary controls based on previous work on primary

voting. First, there is the question of candidate electability. Research shows that voters take their

perceptions of how well a candidate will do in a general election into account when voting in a

primary election (Abramowitz, 1989; Mirhosseini, 2015; Rickershauser & Aldrich, 2007; Simas,

2017). To account for this possibility, I include a control for the electability of each candidate.

The electability variable comes from a question which asked, "Which of the following

Democratic presidential candidates do you think is the most likely to defeat President Trump in

the general election?" Respondents choose the one candidate who they believed to be best

positioned to defeat President Trump. I then create dummy variables for each candidate coded 1

if they were chosen as the most likely to beat Trump and 0 otherwise. The results show that

electability is unquestionably important in voters' decisions.[14]

Another potentially important factor to primary voting decisions is ideology. Self-

reported ideology is often used in political science, but in this case the more important factor in

decision making may be the perceived ideological distance between a voter and the candidate. If

primary voters choose based on ideology, they will likely choose the candidate that they feel is

closest to them ideologically. In the 2020 Qualtrics survey respondents were asked to place each

of the candidates on the same 7-point ideological scale as they placed themselves on. To measure

perceived ideological distance, I recoded both perceived candidate and self-reported ideology to

0-1, subtracted candidate ideology from respondent ideology, and took the absolute value. Figure

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[14] As an alternative approach to accounting for electability, in appendix Figure A3 I subset my analysis to only those respondents who said they would never vote for President Trump regardless of who the Democratic nominee was, under the assumption that these individuals consider defeating President Trump, and therefore electability, a very important issue. The results reported there show slight decreases in statistical significance for some variables of interest, but this is likely attributed to the decrease in sample size (and therefore larger standard errors) when restricting to this subset of the data.

2.2 shows that it is the case that the further respondents perceive candidates to be from

themselves ideologically, the less likely they are to choose that candidate.

Nevertheless, even with the inclusion of these two controls the variables indicating racial,

gender, and LGBTQ group sentiment are statistically significant. Furthermore, with respect to

the importance of perceived electability and perceived ideological difference it is important to

point out that primary preference may drive these perceptions just as much as these perceptions

drive primary preferences (Abramowitz 1989; Granberg and Brent 1980), so it is difficult to

determine their actual impact on voter decision making.

To further understand the impact of gender group sentiment I conduct a more direct test

of hypothesis 2. Respondents in this survey were presented with eight matchups pitting a male

candidate against a female candidate. I use these matchups to create a variable ranging from 0-8

indicating the number of times a respondent selected a female candidate over a male candidate.

Figure 2.3 uses this variable as the dependent variable in the series of OLS regressions (see

Appendix Table A2.2 for full regression results).[15]

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[15] I use OLS for ease of interpretation. To test the robustness of this method, Figure A4 and Table A9 show results from the same tests using a Poisson count model. The results are substantively similar.

Figure 2.3: Effect of Group Sentiments on Choosing a Female Candidate

Note: Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. The dependent variable in these models indicates the number of times a female
candidate was chosen over a male candidate in the 8 female/male matchups (ranges from 0-8). All group closeness measures range from 0-1.
See appendix Table A2.2 for regression output.
Full Sample: N=948. Female Respondents: N=548. Male Respondents: N=400.

Source: 2020 Qualtrics Survey.

In Figure 2.3 each shape on the coefficient plot shows the same regression estimated on

different subsets of the data. The triangular points show that across the entire sample closeness to

both gender groups are statistically significant predictors of candidate choice in the hypothesized

direction (Female group sentiment: p<.01, Male group sentiment: p<.05). The effect sizes for

group sentiment here (Female group sentiment: .517, Male group sentiment: -.523) are larger

than either type of sexism (benevolent or hostile) or self-reported gender identification, and in

each case these effects indicate high levels of gender group sentiment led respondents to choose

a candidate of that gender at a rate of half a selection (i.e., about one-half of one time more), of

the eight matchups, higher than at the lowest level of the gender group sentiment. In the models

of the restricted samples the directions of the gender group closeness variables remain the same, and in the male sample statistical significance is retained ($p<.05$). However, in the female sample male group sentiment is only marginally statistically significant ($p<.10$) and female group sentiment is not statistically significant (see appendix Table A2.2 for full regression results). In sum, these results show strong support for hypothesis 2, but the support for hypothesis 2a is weaker.

In Figure 2.2 we also observe that closeness to the LGBTQ community is only significant ($p<0.05$) in the model for support of Pete Buttigieg, the only member of the LGBTQ community in the field. This provides preliminary support for hypothesis 3, but I examine this more closely below. Overall, in my examination of the results from the 2020 Qualtrics study I find some level of support for each of my three hypotheses.

Next, I move on to the results from the 2018 ANES. First, I more clearly examine the importance of racial group closeness. In the series of models shown in Figure 2.4 the dependent variable is always a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not a respondent chooses a White candidate.[16] The triangular points show that in the full sample the feeling thermometer ratings for both Whites and Blacks are statistically significant ($p<.05$) in the expected direction with higher ratings of Whites (Blacks) leading to higher likelihood of choosing a White (Black) candidate. The square points show that for White respondents the findings from the full sample largely hold with the only change being the statistical significance level of the feeling thermometer rating of Blacks falling to $p<.10$. However, when restricting the sample to Black respondents neither of the feeling thermometer ratings are statistically significant. These results

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[16] In this study there were only White and Black candidates, so a 0 on this variable indicates selecting a Black candidate.

provide more support for hypothesis 1, and somewhat weaker support for hypothesis 1a concerning the feelings of voters toward groups to which they belong (full regression results presented in Appendix Table A2.3).

Figure 2.4: Effect of Racial Sentiment on Choosing a White Candidate

Note: Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. The dependent variable in these models is a dichotomous variable indicating choosing a White candidate or a Black candidate (0 = Black, 1 = White). Both Black and White group sentiment are coded 0-1.
See appendix Table A2.3 for regression output.
Full Sample: N=844. Whites Respondents: N=592. Black Respondents: N=128.

Source: 2018 ANES Pilot.

I conduct a similar test for the effects of gender group sentiment on candidate preference using data from the 2018 ANES pilot survey. Figure 2.5 shows that whether the full sample

including men and women or the restricted sample including only women or only men is examined, the effect of the feeling thermometer rating for the female group is in the expected direction but not statistically significant. Based on these results, neither hypothesis 2 nor hypothesis 2a are supported. This finding conflicts with the finding of the importance of gender group sentiment in the Qualtrics survey in 2020 (shown in Figure 2.3). However, there may be an explanation for these divergent findings. Due to the construction and timing of the ANES 2018 pilot survey it is possible that respondents were not aware of the gender of the candidates for president. Respondents may have been able to infer the gender of candidates based on their names, but some names, like "Kamala", may be more ambiguous than others. I believe this possibility leads to an additional question regarding the knowledge of candidate group membership.

Figure 2.5: Effect of Gender Sentiment on Choosing a Female Candidate

△ Overall   □ Female   ◇ Male Respondents

Note: Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. The dependent variable in these models is a dichotomous variable indicating choosing a Female candidate or a Male candidate (0 = Male, 1 = Female). Female group sentiment is measured using a feeling thermometer for the #MeToo Movement as a proxy and coded 0-1. See appendix Table A2.4 for regression output.
Full Sample: N=831. Female Respondents: N=503. Male Respondents: N=328.

Source: 2018 ANES Pilot.

The disparate results between Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.5 provide an opportunity to explore a factor not yet accounted for – political knowledge. The ANES survey used in many of my tests to this point was conducted in early December of 2018, around a year and a half before the primary elections, when candidates were just beginning to explore the possibility of running, and at a time when respondents may not have been aware of the race or gender of the candidates given as options in this survey. If respondents are unaware of the groups to which a candidate

belongs, their own group sentiments could not influence their support for that candidate. To account for this shortcoming, I interact political knowledge[17] with group sentiments. Prior work shows that the ability to identify which groups align with which parties strengthens group identification (Kane, Mason, and Wronski 2021; Mason & Wronski 2018). The ability to place political candidates in the correct group(s) will likewise be important in allowing group sentiments to take effect. Individuals with higher levels of political knowledge should be more familiar with the candidates included in this survey, so their group sentiments will be able to influence their feelings toward the candidates. Furthermore, political knowledge may also be necessary for respondents to identify the invisible group identities of the candidates such as sexual orientation or religion. These identities are not visible in a photograph, so the procedure of my Qualtrics survey did not make respondents aware of Pete Buttigieg's sexual orientation. This allows me to test this argument in both surveys on both visible identities and invisible identities, and the inclusion of these tests helps to explain different findings based on the timing and method of the survey used. The possible interaction between knowledge and group sentiments produces a final hypothesis that will apply when respondents may not be aware of the characteristics of the candidates.

Hypothesis 4: Group attachments will be more likely to influence the candidate preference of individuals with higher levels of political knowledge compared to those with lower levels of political knowledge.

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[17] The political knowledge variable ranges from 0-1 and is measured using a battery of general knowledge questions about government regarding the party in control of each chamber of Congress, the length of a Senate term, the number of justices on the Supreme Court, and government spending. See Appendix for question wording and coding details.

Figure 2.6: Marginal Effects of Racial Group Sentiment on
Choosing a White Candidate by Respondent Political Knowledge

Note: Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. The dependent variable in these models is a dichotomous variable indicating choosing a White candidate or a Black candidate (0 = Black, 1 = White). Both Black and White group sentiment are coded 0-1. N=844.
See appendix Table A2.5 for regression output.

Source: 2018 ANES Pilot.

To begin testing this final hypothesis, I interact group sentiment variables from the ANES survey with political knowledge. In Figure 2.6, I show that those with higher levels of political knowledge are more influenced by racial sentiment when choosing a political candidate. At the highest levels of political knowledge, the White and Black racial sentiment variables result in 21 percentage point and 26 percentage point increases in the likelihood of choosing a White or Black candidate, respectively ($p<.05$) (full regression results presented in Appendix Table A2.5). Similarly, Figure 2.7 shows a nearly identical effect for the female gender sentiment variable from the ANES survey. Here we see a 29-percentage point increase in the effect of female gender sentiment on the likelihood of choosing a female candidate for those with the highest levels of political knowledge ($p<.05$) (full regression results presented in Appendix Table A2.6).

To ensure that political knowledge does not simply always lead to a greater effect of group sentiments I conduct a similar test interacting gender group sentiments with political knowledge using data from the Qualtrics survey. The pictures of the candidates in this survey made respondents aware of the gender and race of the candidates. Therefore, respondents at both high and low levels of political knowledge had this information. This means that political knowledge should not be an important factor here since there is no difference in whether respondents with high or low political knowledge knew to which groups candidates belong. As expected, this test (results depicted in Figure A2.5), shows that those with the highest level of political knowledge are not significantly differently influenced by gender group sentiment. This provides further support for the argument that effects from the ANES survey are dampened by those who are unaware of the groups to which candidates belong. When respondents are aware of the groups to which candidates belong—those from the Qualtrics survey (all of whom were shown candidate photos) and those with the highest levels of political knowledge in the ANES survey—their feelings toward racial or gender groups significantly impact their candidate preferences.

Figure 2.7: Marginal Effects of Female Group Sentiment on Choosing
a Female Candidate by Respondent Political Knowledge

Note: Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. The dependent variable in these models is a dichotomous variable indicating choosing a Female candidate or a Male candidate (0 = Male, 1 = Female). Female gender sentiment is coded 0-1. N=831.
See appendix Table A2.6 for regression output.
Source: 2018 ANES Pilot.

To further test the importance of knowledge of the groups to which a candidate belongs I examine a group that is not physically visible, sexual orientation. In Figure 2.2 I showed that LGBTQ group closeness was predictive of support for Pete Buttigieg, the only candidate who is a member of the LGBTQ community. However, it may be the case that those with lower levels of political knowledge were unaware of Buttigieg's sexual orientation. To determine whether or not this effect is driven by those with high levels of political knowledge, I interact political knowledge with an individual's feelings toward the LGBTQ group. Panel A of Figure 2.8 shows that sentiment toward a not clearly visible group is indeed only significantly predictive of candidate support for those with the highest level of political knowledge ($p<.05$). To provide a comparison point, Panel B of Figure 2.8 shows the same test conducted on support for Joe Biden, a white male candidate who is not a member of the LGBTQ community. Respondents' level of political knowledge does not moderate the effect of LGBTQ group sentiment on support for

Biden (see Appendix Table A2.7 for full regression results). This finding provides additional

support for both hypotheses 3 and 4.

Figure 2.8: Marginal Effects of LGBTQ Group Sentiment on
Support for Pete Buttigieg and Joe Biden by Respondent Political Knowledge

Note: Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. The dependent variable in these models is the number of times each candidate was chosen in their 5 matchups
(ranges from 0-5). LGBTQ group closeness ranges from 0-1. N=996.
See appendix Table A2.7 for regression output.
Source: 2020 Qualtrics Survey.

Discussion

In this study I argue that group sentiments are an important contributing factor in voting

behavior, not only when individuals are choosing between the parties, but also in within party

contests. This effect should be more pronounced among Democratic partisans due to the greater

level of group diversity within the party. Using two different survey methodologies at different

stages of the campaign I find substantively similar results. Consistent with recent work in the

field, I find that self-identified group membership is not necessary for group sentiments to

influence candidate preferences (Kane, Mason, and Wronski 2021). I also show that early on in

campaigns when not all voters are familiar with the groups to which a candidate belongs, or when a candidate's group memberships are invisible, like sexual orientation, only voters with higher levels of political knowledge are significantly influenced by their level of group sentiments. Overall, the findings from different surveys at different times provides legitimacy to the findings here and suggests that group sentiments are, in fact, an important factor in primary elections.

This study is not without its limitations, but these limitations offer opportunities for further research. Most importantly perhaps, there is an alternate explanation to the findings in this study based on previous work in low information elections. When voters have low levels of information in an election, they can at times rely on cues, or heuristics, in order to make their decisions. One important cue is the appearance of the candidate (Lau and Redlawsk 2001). Scholars find that voters will often choose candidates who are similar to themselves or candidates who are attractive when they have little information about the candidates and the election (Banducci et al. 2008; Olivola and Todorov 2010; Shephard and Johns 2008). The gender and race of a candidate also serves as important heuristics for voters making their decisions (D. C. King and Matland 2003; Matson and Fine 2006) as well as other appearance based cues such as age (Webster and Pierce 2019). It is possible that respondents in this study made decisions based on the appearance of the candidates, but I do not believe this possibility necessarily contradicts a group sentiments-based explanation in which the respondents' feelings about the groups to which a candidate belongs influences their decision making. Additionally, the consistent finding in this chapter that group *sentiments* were more strongly associated with candidate preference than group *membership* suggests that similarity to a candidate is not the main driving factor but rather how the respondent feels about the groups to which the candidate

belongs. The cues voters use when they have low information about an election are unquestionably important in their decision making, but the sentiments voters hold toward social groups also play a role in the voting decision and it is beyond the scope of this chapter to fully separate out these explanations.

An additional limitation is that the test of my first hypothesis with respect to racial groups was not ideal for a couple of reasons. First, the ANES 2018 pilot study measured group sentiment using only group feeling thermometers. While this measure can serve as a suitable proxy for feelings of group closeness, it is not the ideal measure. For gender groups tested here this is less of an issue due to the ability to conduct analysis on these groups from the Qualtrics survey, which included an explicit group closeness question. However, the rapid winnowing of the 2020 Democratic primary field did not allow for the inclusion of any Black candidates in the Qualtrics survey. It seems likely that the effect of racial group sentiment would hold had there been a Black candidate, but it is impossible to say for certain. The inability to test racial group sentiments more thoroughly is certainly a limitation, but the findings still shed light on the workings of group closeness within the parties and open additional avenues for future research. I also do not test for religious group sentiments, which are also likely to have an impact on candidate preference according to the partisan sorting literature (Abramowitz, 2018; Mason & Wronski, 2018). Individuals who feel connected to their religious group should be likely to select candidates from that religious group, but I argue this effect, like that of sexual orientation, would be contingent on respondent political knowledge as candidate religion is not always a well-known characteristic. Future research could help remedy the issues of this study by using a conjoint analysis in which the race, gender, sexual orientation, and religion are all randomly

varied for fictional candidates. Testing these effects with fictional candidates would also help eliminate the effects of hard to control for factors, like name recognition.

There is also a potential avenue for a test of the theory outlined in this chapter if the 2024 Republican Primary field is as large and diverse as it was in 2016. While the Republican Party base is not as diverse as that of the Democratic Party, strong group sentiments do exist and may contribute to primary voter preference. Specifically, since the Republican Party base is comprised largely of individuals with strong white and male group sentiments, we should expect white male candidates to have greater success in the Republican Primary process. This has, of course, been the case in the past, and if the 2024 presidential race provides a large and diverse field, future research could directly test the importance of group sentiments in the primary election process on the other side of the political aisle. Additionally, future research in this area could examine the lack of impact of some traditionally important factors like income or education on preferences within a party. Throughout the studies here these factors are not strongly associated with primary candidate preference, which is a bit unexpected given their importance elsewhere to understanding political behavior. This may be caused by the focus on the social groups of the candidates rather than their ideology. If candidates had been categorized as moderate or liberal, income and education may have had more of an impact.

In this chapter, building on previous work that shows that group sentiments are associated with an individual's partisanship, I show that group sentiments are also associated with voter's intraparty decision-making (i.e., in primary elections). Within the more heterogeneous Democratic Party, supporters of different candidates may be segmented by the groups who voters feel close to. This is especially true when individuals are most aware of the groups to which candidates belong. The impact of groups on political behavior is unquestionably a strong one,

and as work continues to be done in this area, we increasingly find evidence that these groups matter at each step of the political process.

CHAPTER 3: WHEN PARTIES DON'T LEAD:

HOW CORE VALUES SHAPE POLICY PREFERENCES DURING INTRAPARTY

DISAGREEMENTS

The political attitudes held by Americans are often thought of as unstable (Converse 1964; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017) and dictated by the party (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002) or the partisan candidate (Lenz 2012) with which one identifies. In fact, the most stable attitudes Americans hold are often those that they know "go with" their partisan identity (Freeder, Lenz, and Turney 2018). In line with this literature, when partisans are informed of the position of their preferred party they typically align their own attitudes with that position in spite of potential ideological incoherence (Cohen 2003). However, in the real-world, partisans at times are exposed to high profile disagreements *within* their own party. For instance, the contemporary Democratic Party is home to both notable moderates, like President Joe Biden and Speaker Nancy Pelosi, and high-profile progressives, like Senator Elizabeth Warren and Congresswomen Alexandria Ocasio Cortez (Cochrane 2021; Lacurci 2021). This ideological diversity, at times, leads to disagreement on salient policy issues between factions of the party. For example, in recent years many more "liberal" members of the party have expressed support for a single payer health care system while more moderate members have not (Diamond 2021; Nobles and Krieg 2019). When situations like these arise how do party identifiers choose which side of the issue they fall on?

Traditional influential factors like strength of party identification and leadership from politicians likely influence this decision calculus for partisan identifiers. When members of the public see a controversial policy matter being discussed in the news they can listen and ascertain where each party stands on the issue. With this knowledge partisans know where their party stands on an issue and their attachment to that party compels them to follow suit (Campbell et al. 1960; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015). Similarly, when faced with controversial issues during a political campaign, rather than voting based on their position on the issue, voters will change their position to match that of their preferred candidate (Lenz 2012). However, partisanship is not the only important factor in the formation of political opinions. I argue that other underlying factors like core political values also play an important part in this process. Core political values like equality, limited government, or traditional family values play a part in

Using a novel experimental approach I test the impact of politician favorability, policy leadership, and core values on the preferences of Democratic identifiers on a wealth tax policy. I find that Democratic identifiers largely do not take their policy cues from prominent politicians on unsettled issues within their party even when considering their feelings toward the politician providing the cue. Instead, the political values that individuals hold shape their preferences on these undecided policies. In particular, the strength with which respondents value equality has a strong predictive effect on their position on the wealth tax policy. This effect occurs while holding both ideology and strength of party identification constant. Furthermore, using ANES panel data I show that within the Democratic Party values of equality are not(Converse 1964; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017) and dictated by the party (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002) or

the partisan candidate (Lenz 2012) with which one identifies shaped by feelings toward politicians over time, and instead this relationship appears circular.

I argue that these results help to answer an important and under-researched question regarding policy factions within the Democratic Party. Furthermore, I show that core political values, despite being shaped by partisanship, are themselves an important area of study since they have the power to influence beliefs that partisanship does not. Overall, this research adds to our understanding of the formation of policy preferences as well and our understanding of variation within the parties.

Policy Preference Formation

The search for ideological structure to the beliefs of the mass public in America has consistently found that Americans are largely unaware of much of the political world and not able to base their political attitudes on an underlying ideology (Converse 1964; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017). The lack of a constraining set of ideological beliefs does not mean that the public does not have political attitudes. Scholars have investigated several factors which shape the attitudes that people do hold, and findings suggest attitudes are largely shaped by partisanship (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002) and only influence partisanship when they are highly salient (Carsey and Layman 2006; Mummolo, Peterson, and Westwood 2019). This means that on many political issues partisans will simply base their own opinions on the opinion presented to them by their party. In fact, scholars have shown that even overnight policy changes by a party are largely mirrored by its partisans (Slothuus and Bisgaard 2021). Further work has supported the idea that partisanship and leadership from partisan elites are the most important drivers of the

opinions held by members of the public. Through a process of motivated reasoning (Leeper and Slothuus 2014; Slothuus and de Vreese 2010) and following the lead of elites (Lenz 2012) partisans come to hold preferences that align with the position of their political party. This is shown in a great deal of clarity by Freeder, Lenz, and Turney (2018) who demonstrate that the most stable positions held by partisans are on issues which they know, and agree with, the position of their party. Although much of the scholarship on attitude formation concentrates on the impact of partisanship, which should be less important for the present study due to the intrapartisan nature of the conflict, this work does provide a potential answer to the question at hand.

Lenz (2012) shows that members of the public first choose a politician that they favor then shift their views of policy issues that become salient to match the positions held by their preferred politician. This provides a potential method by which partisans can form their opinions on salient issues that divide their party. Instead of basing their opinions on these issues on some deeply held ideological belief system, partisans will simply follow the lead of the politicians from their party that they like the most. Furthermore, preferences for politicians are not only developed between the parties. Factors like authoritarianism (Wronski et al. 2018) and group sentiments (King 2022) have been shown to shape preferences for different politicians within parties. Partisans should be able to follow the lead of their preferred politicians when undecided issues arise within their party. For example, those who prefer Joe Biden to Elizabeth Warren should side with Biden on issues like a wealth tax or single payer healthcare, which the two Democratic elites disagree on. The leadership of preferred politicians provides one potential answer to the central question of how partisans form their preferences on issues over which there

is intraparty disagreement, but there are other factors which vary within the parties that could also shape these policy preferences.

Core Political Values

One such factor is political values. Scholars argue that core values are relatively stable and shape attitudes and issue preferences (Feldman 1988; Jacoby 2006). Core values exist outside of politics and have five characteristics which differentiate them from other beliefs. These values are (1) abstract beliefs (2) about desirable end states or behaviors that (3) transcend specific situations, (4) guide evaluation and behavior, and (5) can be rank-ordered in terms of relative importance (Kinder 1998; Schwartz 1992, 1994). However, values may not be independent from the influence of other factors in the political world. Goren (2005) and Goren, Federico, and Kittilson (2009) show that these core values are largely shaped by partisanship.[18] This clearly presents an issue for the proposition that values can shape attitudes on issues that are partisan in nature, but does allow for the possibility that values impact preferences on issues not owned by the parties.

One study on such nonpartisan issues shows that, among political sophisticates, egalitarianism shapes preferences on "hard" issues such as nuclear power expansion (Elliott-Dorans 2020). These issues are not incredibly salient or clearly owned by one party or the other, which allows the politically knowledgeable to apply their core values. This finding lends support

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[18] Similar work in the UK has found the opposite, as core values seem to drive partisanship (Evans and Neundorf 2020), which the researchers suggest may simply be a function of weaker partisan attachments in the UK.

to the idea that values may also shape preferences on issues that are controversial within the parties, but I argue highly salient undecided issues provide an even more stringent test. Democratic identifiers have certainly heard more debate within their party over universal healthcare or a wealth tax in recent years than they have heard about the expansion of nuclear energy(Diamond 2021; Nobles and Krieg 2019; Stein 2019). The availability of cues from party leaders on issues of controversy within the party lead to the possibility for partisans to simply accept cues from their most preferred politicians when forming their opinions and should make it more difficult for the values an individual holds to be a key factor in shaping policy preferences. Therefore, I believe it is important to investigate the strength of core values and leadership from elites to not only shape preferences on hard, those that are difficult to understand, non-salient issues, but also controversial, those on which there is public disagreement within the party, salient ones.

The difficulty here for partisans in formation of preferences is not that the issues being considered are all that complex. In fact, issues that cause debate within a party are often relatively straightforward. For example, when considering the proposed wealth tax within the Democratic Party, partisans need to know whether they think it is a good idea for a tax to be levied on the net worth of extremely wealthy individuals. Most people understand what taxes are and understand that there are several exceptionally wealthy people in America. However, the issue arises from the lack of clear cues from the party. Democrats will hear prominent leaders in their party advocating both for and against this policy (Lacurci 2021; Stein 2019), which causes a dilemma over which cues to follow. I argue there are two possible ways in which partisans will respond to this situation. First, partisans will simply follow the cues from the party leader that they feel more favorable toward on the controversial issue. For example, if a Democrat has a

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very favorable feeling toward Elizabeth Warren and a less favorable feeling toward Joe Biden, they will be more likely to follow a cue from Warren than Biden. Second, if partisans are not just following the lead of a favored politician, they will base their positions on controversial issues on their core political values. In this example, those with preferences for greater equality will be more supportive of policies that redistribute wealth. These possibilities lead me to my two hypotheses for this study.

H1: When controversial policy issues arise within the Democratic Party, partisans will choose the side of the politician they are the most favorable toward.

H2: When controversial policy issues arise within the Democratic Party, partisans will base their preferences on their underlying core political values.

These hypotheses provide two solutions to the central question of this study, but they are not necessarily opposed to one another. It is possible that both core values and politician preference impact partisans' positions on controversial issues under different circumstances. Furthermore, it is possible that the effects of these factors are additive in some way and work together to form issue opinions. Whatever the case may be, there is no reason to believe that these hypotheses are exclusive, and in my analysis, I will assume that they can work concurrently.

Method and Data

To determine which factors shape the preferences of partisans when they are faced with an intraparty disagreement, I conducted a survey experiment. This survey experiment was

included on a survey that was administered through Lucid in March 2022 (N = 2,013).[19] For this

study, I obtained informed consent, basic demographics (e.g., gender, race, education, religious

affiliation, and religious attendance), and political characteristics (e.g., partisanship, voting

behavior, ideology) prior to implementing the experiment. My sample consisted of a fairly

representative racial composition including about 78% White, 9% Black, 5% Hispanic, 4%

Asian, and 4% other. The partisan make-up of my sample includes about 50% Democrats, 40%

Republicans, and 10% Independents. The demographics of this sample are similar to those of

widely used surveys such as the ANES as seen in Table A5. The survey included two attention

checks to ensure that respondents were giving their full attention to the questions being asked. Of

the 2,013 respondents seven (.3%) failed one or both of the attention checks and were not

included in the following analysis. Details about the attention checks can be found in the

appendix.

In this survey experiment respondents were randomly presented with one of three

vignettes describing a disagreement between a prominent member of their own party and the rest

of the party. In the control condition respondents read a vignette describing how some members

of the Democratic Party supported implementing a wealth tax while others did not[20]. In the two

treatment conditions support for the implementation of the policy was ascribed to either

President Joe Biden or Representative Alexandria Ocasio Cortez (D, NY) while respondents still

read that the party as a whole was not supportive of the policy. Along with this vignette

respondents were asked their own positions on the wealth tax policy followed by a question

about their perception of the positions of several Democratic politicians, including those

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[19] The responses were collected from March 9-12, 2022. Human subjects approval was obtained from the
IRB at the University of Mississippi (Protocol #22x-215).

[20] Full vignette texts can be found in the appendix.

mentioned in the vignette. All questions on support or opposition to the wealth tax policy were answered on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from strongly oppose to strongly support. I then recode this scale to range from 0-1. The question about the perceived position of the politicians on the issue serves as a manipulation check of the experimental treatment. If the experimental treatment worked as intended respondents reading a vignette naming a politician as a supporter of a policy should be more likely to perceive that politician as supportive of the policy of interest. Additionally, reading a vignette naming a politician should not necessarily impact the perceived positions of other politicians on that policy[21].

Figure 3.1 shows the impact of reading vignettes naming Biden or Ocasio-Cortez as supporters of a wealth tax policy on the perceived positions of seven prominent Democrats including Biden and Ocasio-Cortez compared to the control condition in which no politicians were named. For both Ocasio-Cortez and Biden reading the vignette naming the politician led to a large increase in perceived support for a wealth tax. Occasionally, reading a vignette moves the perceived position of a politician other than the politician mentioned in the vignette, for example reading the Biden vignette moves the average perceived position of Barack Obama on the wealth tax, but these changes never are as large as those for the named politician. Additionally, conducting t-tests comparing the perceived position of the politicians mentioned in the vignette of those who read the vignette naming a particular politician and those who did not shows that reading either vignette leads to a significant change in the perceived position of the named politician. Therefore, I conclude that the treatments had the intended effect.

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[21] Of course, it could be the case that changing the perceived position of a politician will also affect the perceived position of closely connected politicians. For example, changes to the perceived preferences of Joe Biden could lead to changes in the perceived preferences of Barack Obama due to their close connection.

Figure 3.1: Effect of Vignettes on Average Perceived Politician Position on the Wealth Tax Policy

Along with measures of the perceived positions of politicians on the wealth tax issue I ask respondents to rate the same politicians on a 0-100 feeling thermometer. This feeling thermometer rating is necessary as it allows me to determine which of the politicians each respondent is the most favorable toward. I expect that if respondents see a vignette mentioning a politician they like they will be more likely to support the policy, but if they are cold toward the politician mentioned in the vignette they should be less supportive of the policy. Using the preferences of respondents who see each vignette in conjunction with the feelings respondents hold toward the politician mentioned I will be able to determine if partisans are indeed following the lead of their preferred politician when faced with intraparty disagreement.

To determine whether the core political values held by respondents impacted their positions on the wealth tax policy, respondents were asked a battery of question about their

values prior to seeing the experimental treatments.[22] The set of core values related to politics has varied over time and between researchers. Feldman (1988) considers the core political values to be equality, economic individualism, and free enterprise while Goren (2005) and Goren, Federico, and Kittilson (2009) consider the core political values to be equality, size of government, traditionalism, and moral tolerance. A concern arises regarding which values to use comes from the difference in values examined by scholars; however, most of the influence found by both scholars, Feldman and Goren, as well as the influence of values found by later scholars (Elliott-Dorans 2020), comes from the equality value which all scholars measure using a very similar index. For the present study I choose to examine the set of values used by Goren, equality, size of government, traditionalism, and moral tolerance, since these values seem to cover a broader spectrum, but I do not believe either choice would be incorrect or lead to fundamentally different results. I create an index for each of the values measured here using between two and four questions for each value.[23] Each of these indexes is recoded to range from 0-1 for ease of interpretation.

Another concern regarding the values measured comes from the fact that all of my analyses are conducted within the parties rather than between them. Since prior work shows that partisanship colors values in the United States (Goren 2005) it is reasonable to think that the variation within the parties on the values will not be large enough to reasonably predict differences in policy preferences. To alleviate this concern, I use the equality value to compare variation that exists between parties to the variation that exists within the parties. I choose the equality value here since it has been shown to be the most influential by past researchers and

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[22] Questions about values were separated from the vignettes in the survey by several unrelated questions which took respondents around 5 minutes to complete. This separation helps eliminate potential contamination.
[23] The full questions used to create the index for each value can be found in the appendix.

because it uses the largest index comprised of four items. The four-item equality value measure is coded from 0-1. The average for all individuals is .61 (the median is .56) with standard deviation is .23. When the sample is restricted to only Democratic identifiers the average rises to .70 (median of .69) with a standard deviation of .20. As one would expect, there is less variation within the party than within the sample, but I argue there is an important amount of variation of core political values within the party that may help explain how partisan identifiers position themselves in intraparty disagreements. In addition to measures of policy preferences and values I include a standard battery of controls measuring respondent party identity, ideology, gender, race, income, and education.

Results

I begin my analysis of the factors shaping respondents' positions on the wealth tax policy with an examination of the impact of the vignettes on policy preferences. First, in Figure 3.2 I test whether simply reading the vignettes lead to changes in respondent positions on the wealth tax policy while taking into account only standard controls.[24] Figure 3.2 shows that simply reading a vignette has no significant impact on a respondent's position on the wealth tax policy. On its face this result is contrary to expectations that leadership from politicians will be the most important factor shaping policy preferences on controversial intrapartisan issues, but since this analysis does not yet take feelings toward these politicians into account, any real effects that may exist here could be masked by variations in feelings toward the mentioned politicians among the respondents.

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[24] Standard controls used in all analysis in this study are strength of partisanship, ideology, age, gender, race, income, and education.

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Figure 3.2: The Effect of Seeing Vignettes on
Wealth Tax Policy Preferences

Note: Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. Control variables omitted for readability.
See Table A3.1 for full results.

Next, I analyze whether the vignettes become important when accounting for the interaction of a politician's favorability with reading about them in a vignette. This analysis produces a much more direct test of my first hypothesis. If partisans are following the lead of their preferred Democratic leader on issues of controversy within the party, we should observe significant variation in the respondent's response to the vignette based on their feelings toward the politician mentioned. Specifically, I expect that those with a favorable view of the politician mentioned in the vignette will be more supportive of the wealth tax policy when they see the vignette than when they do not while those who dislike the mentioned politician will be less supportive of the policy than those who do not see the vignette. To test the potential for the experimental vignettes to be important when accounting for feelings toward politicians I interact feeling thermometers for the politicians named in the vignettes with an indicator for vignette assignment. Figure 3.3 shows the marginal effects of reading about one of the two politicians in a

vignette on respondent wealth tax policy preferences across levels of the feeling thermometer rating for the named politician. The effect of this interaction between politician feeling thermometer and their vignette being read is only significant once, at the lowest level of the feeling thermometer for Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. Those who felt the most negatively toward Ocasio-Cortez were significantly less likely to support the wealth tax when exposed to the vignette naming her as a proponent of the policy, but the wealth tax policy preferences of respondents at other levels of the feeling thermometer and respondents across all levels of the Biden feeling thermometer who saw the Biden vignette were not significantly influenced.

Figure 3.3: Marginal Effects of Seeing Vignettes on
Wealth Tax Policy By Politician Feeling Thermometers

Note: Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals.
See Table A3.2 for full results.

Given the findings to this point there is still is not an answer to the central question of this study: How do partisans form their policy preferences when there is disagreement on that policy within their party? To this point it seems that partisans are not simply following the lead of their favorite politicians from their party, which leads to the possibility that other underlying

factors may be influencing partisans' preferences. Next, I move on to test my second explanatory factor, core political values.

In Figure 3.4 the political values of egalitarianism, traditionalism, moral tolerance, and feelings on the size of government are added to the variables predicting respondent positions on the wealth tax policy. Each of the values predicts positions on the wealth tax policy at the .1 level, but equality and feelings about the size of government reach significance at the .05 level. As respondents move from the lowest level of the government size variable (lower levels indicate a preference for smaller government) to the highest level there is a .07 point increase in support for the wealth tax *(p=.02)*. This increase represents less than a tenth of the total scale, not a substantively large effect, but it does indicate a slightly stronger preference for a wealth tax among those who prefer a larger government.

Figure 3.4: Effects of Core Political Values on
Wealth Tax Policy Position

Note: Controls for age, gender, race, income, and education are included in this model but omitted from this figure for readabilit
See Table A3.3 for full results

In contrast, the effect of the egalitarianism value is substantively large; in fact, the largest

effect I find on preferences. Moving from valuing equality the least to valuing equality the most

results in a .27 point increase in support for a wealth tax while holding all else constant *(p=.001)*.

This increase represents more than a quarter of the total scale and can be thought of as moving

from neutral on the wealth tax policy to somewhere between "somewhat" and "strongly"

favoring the policy. As shown in previous work the core political value of equality seems to

strongly influence policy preferences (Elliott-Dorans 2020; Feldman 1988; Goren 2005; Goren,

Federico, and Kittilson 2009). This finding goes beyond previous scholarship to show that when

there is disagreement on a salient issue within a party, core political values are an important

factor in determining how partisans form their preferences on that issue.

However, it could still be the case that leadership from politicians is impacting these

policy preferences after all. In addition to the effects of equality Figure 3.4 shows a significant

impact of feeling thermometers towards both Alexandria Ocasio Cortez and Joe Biden with those who feel positively toward either politician being more likely to support a wealth tax. Given the results of this model the relationship between these factors and policy preferences is not yet clear. It is possible that favorability toward a politician, similarly to partisanship, shapes the values that individuals hold. If this is the case the finding here that equality is an important factor in shaping preferences toward a wealth tax may simply mean that those who like politicians supportive of a wealth tax shift their values about equality to be more in line with those of their preferred politician. To ensure that variation in core values that exist within the party are not simply a function of variation of feelings toward politicians I next conduct an additional analysis using another data source.

Additional Analysis: Politician Leadership on Values

The link between the equality and government size values and preferences on policy seems to indicate that the variation in values within a party, rather than leadership from preferred politicians, shape the public's policy preferences on issues over which there is intraparty disagreement. However, to this point I have been unable to determine whether these variations in values that exist within the parties are driven by favorability toward individual politicians. To test the link between values and politician evaluations I use ANES panel data from 1992-1996. The three survey waves conducted in this panel allow me to test the direction of the relationship between values and politician evaluations or the lack of a relationship between the two.

I measure the value of equality in the ANES panel using the same four item index for equality used in my original survey. Each of the four items is included in each of the three survey waves allowing for consistent measurement of values across waves. Here I choose to use the equality value since my own analysis along with previous scholarship (Elliott-Dorans 2020;

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Feldman 1988) shows it to be the most impactful core value. To measure feelings toward politicians I use feeling thermometer measures for former President Bill Clinton. As Clinton was the most recognizable Democrat over the time of this panel, I argue that if there is a relationship to be seen between values and politician evaluations it should show up here.

Following Goren's (2005) work, I first run a simultaneous equations model to measure the stability of both of my variables over time as well as their effects on one another over time. Table 3.1 shows the results from this model restricted to only Democratic respondents and including strength of partisan identity as a control. First, the stability coefficients show that both variables are stable. This part of the table can be interpreted as showing that both the equality value and Clinton feeling thermometer in 1992 are predictive of themselves in 1994 and the values in 1994 are predictive of the values in 1996. The stability of each factor seems similar indicating that it is not the case that one factor is highly stable while the other varies wildly.

Next, the structural coefficients show how each factor impacts the other across time. For example, the bottom rightmost box in the table shows the impact of the Clinton feeling thermometer in 1994 on equal opportunity values in 1996. This section of the table shows that in each instance of moving from time 1 to time 2 both of these factors significantly impact the other. Therefore, it is the case that preexisting feelings toward politicians are important in shaping core political values; however, it is also the case that preexisting values are important in shaping feelings toward politicians. These results indicate the relationship between core political values and feelings toward politicians is reciprocal unlike the relationship between core political values and partisanship(Goren 2005; Goren, Federico, and Kittilson 2009). I argue this reciprocal relationship indicates that there is some level of stability in core values underlying partisanship that is important in shaping policy preferences.

Table 3.1. Clinton Feeling Thermometer-Equality Cross-Lagged Structural Models

	3 Wave Estimates	
	1992–1994	*1994–1996*
Stability coefficients:		
Clinton Feeling Thermometer	0.516***	0.606***
Equal opportunity	0.396***	0.421***
Structural coefficients:		
Equal opportunity → Clinton Feeling Thermometer	0.112*	0.163**
Clinton Feeling Thermometer → Equal opportunity	0.179***	0.084**

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

N=281

Source: 1992–94–96 NES panel.

Figure 3.5: Effects of Changes in Politician Feelings and Strength of Party ID on Changes in Equal Oppurtunity Values

Note: Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals.
See Table A3.4 for full results.

To further test the relationship between these two variables to ensure that changes in politician favorability are not leading to changes in core values, I model the change in each variable over time. Figure 3.5 shows 3 models examining the effects of changes in party identity and changes in feeling thermometers toward Bill Clinton on changes in equal opportunity values across various waves in the ANES dataset among Democratic respondents. Regardless of the survey waves considered, among Democrats, neither changes in party identification strength nor changes in feeling thermometer ratings of Bill Clinton significantly predicted changes in equal opportunity values. This suggests that even though the value of equal opportunity varies within the Democratic Party, this variation is not caused by the strength of party identification or by feelings toward prominent members of the party. Therefore, the effects shown in Figure 3.4 do indicate that values themselves help to shape policy preferences when there is intraparty

disagreement on an issue and exhibit a reciprocal relationship with feelings toward politicians rather than just as a filter through which the leadership of politicians effects policy preferences.

Discussion

In this study I examine factors that influence the policy preferences of partisans when a disagreement arises within their party over a particular issue. I use a novel survey experiment as well as publicly available panel data to test two competing explanations. First, following scholarship on politician (Lenz 2012) and party (Carsey and Layman 2006; Freeder, Lenz, and Turney 2018) leadership on policy preferences, I argue that politician leadership can extend beyond partisan disagreement on policy to intrapartisan disagreements. For this theoretical explanation, I argue that in the same way members of the public have partisan attachments that lead their policy preferences, they also have more or less favorable views toward politicians within their own party. Having preferred politicians in one's own party then leads partisans to follow the policy lead of those politicians when policy disagreements arise within their party. I test this hypothesis using a survey experiment in which respondents are presented with a disagreement over policy within their own party where one of two politicians or "some politicians" are named as supporters of the policy while the remainder of the party is said to be opposed to the policy. Respondents were then asked where they stood on the policy. The expectation here was that seeing a politician the respondent preferred (measured using feeling thermometers) supporting a policy would make respondents also support the policy. However, I find that the support of a policy from politicians within their own party does not impact the level of support respondents exhibit toward the policy.

The second explanation tested here follows work on core political values, which argues that values like egalitarianism, size of government, moral tolerance, and traditionalism shape preferences on policy (Feldman 1988). Scholars have found these values are largely shaped by partisanship (Goren 2005), but can influence policies that are not partisan in nature (Elliott-Dorans 2020). Here I argue that when partisans are faced with a decision on which they do not receive a clear cue from their party they must rely on some other underlying factor to make their decision. Factors such as authoritarianism and group sentiments have been shown to work in this way and shape intrapartisan dynamics (King 2022; Wronski et al. 2018). Using respondent preferences, I test whether the core political values respondents hold shape preferences on the wealth tax issue. I find that both values of government size and equality significantly predict preferences, but the effect of the equality value is much more substantively significant. This finding meshes well with previous work showing that equality is the most impactful of the core values (Elliott-Dorans 2020; Feldman 1988; Goren 2005).

I then conduct additional analysis to ensure that my finding that values impact preferences is not masking a relationship in which favorability toward politicians shapes values which then shape preferences. Using panel data, I show that although there is a relationship between political values and feelings toward politicians over time, both factors are relatively stable and the relationship that does exist between them appears to be circular. I argue this test ensures that the finding of values influencing policy preferences is not simply due to an unobserved relationship.

Nevertheless, this study is not without its limitations. The first limitation comes from the experimental setup used to test policy leadership from politicians. Due to the nature of the question being asked here the policy used in the experimental treatment was a salient policy on

which respondents may well have already formed an opinion. This may not be a large problem since this preformed opinion may be based on preexisting political values, but the issue arises from the knowledge respondents may have of the positions of the politician used in the vignette on the policy. If respondents do not believe the text of the vignette and are instead following what they previously know about the positions of politicians on the policy the experimental treatment may not have had the intended effect. The measurement of the perceived positions of politicians after the vignette does seem to show that the vignette had the intended effect of changing the perceived positions of the politicians mentioned, but it is possible these effects weren't large enough to have the intended effect. A future analysis using a less salient policy may provide different results by.

The second limitation of this study comes from the lack of panel data measuring core political values. I test the relationship between politician favorability and core values over time using panel data from the ANES, but this data is nearly 30 years old (1992-1996). The political landscape has changed considerably in the interim with the parties becoming much more sorted (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Levendusky 2009; Mason and Wronski 2018). This change in the political landscape presents the possibility that the relationship between feelings toward politicians and core political values is fundamentally different now than it was in the 1990s. Remedying this issue would require new panel data including measures of core political values and feelings toward politicians, and unfortunately this depth of study is beyond the scope of the present study.

In spite of the limitations of this study, it also presents interesting questions for the future. The most interesting of these questions regards intrapartisan variation in values. This study has shown that, although values are shaped by partisanship, they vary considerably within political

parties. Additionally, core values shape preferences when there is intrapartisan disagreement over policy and do not seem to be led by feelings toward particular politicians in the party. This leads to a question of what does cause the intrapartisan variation in values. Are there other deeper underlying factors leading to this variation? Future research into the causes of intraparty value variation may help to explain and potentially resolve intraparty conflicts over policy.

In this chapter I build on previous work on preference formation and the importance of core political values to determine how partisans form their preferences when the elites in their party disagree on an issue. I find that core values, particularly the value of egalitarianism, are important in shaping the preferences of partisans when the party is divided. Additionally, I show that partisans are largely relying on their own underlying values rather than leadership from intraparty politicians on these unsettled policies. I argue this finding helps us understand intraparty dynamics, preference formation, and the importance of core political values.

CHAPTER 4: WHAT DO PARTISANS VALUE:

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORE VALUES AND GROUP SENTIMENTS

The values we hold and the way we feel about other people in society influence who we are as people. People often like to believe that they are above the fray when it comes to matters like partisan conflict, and many believe that they closely hold core values which they use to make their decisions (Cohen 2003; Davison 1983). In spite of these beliefs, even members of the public who style themselves as "independents," consistently fall on one side of the political aisle or the other (Keith et al. 1992; Petrocik 2009). A great deal of research shows that, in the political realm, humans are social animals following the lead of those who fit into their own partisan group (Campbell et al. 1960; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). Even the core values that people think they hold so closely are often influenced by the partisan group (Goren 2005). However, this influence of partisanship over core values is not absolute. Some level of variation on core values such as egalitarianism exists *within* the parties. Is this variation a reflection of the deeply held beliefs of members of the public, which shape their decisions on political matters? Or is this variation simply a further reflection of group sentiments toward groups in society. In this chapter I examine whether core political beliefs are an underlying factor shaping policy preferences or if these beliefs are just another effect of the feelings that people hold toward groups.

Core political values are considered abstract beliefs concerning some desirable outcome (Kinder 1998; Schwartz 1992, 1994). These beliefs should be divorced from any one particular situation but guide an individual's feelings in all aspects of political life. The most easily recognizable and understandable core political value discussed is equality. As a core political value, the importance an individual places on equality should not be constrained to one particular policy or candidate but should shape how they see all policies and candidates with those who value equality more strongly seeking to support candidates and policies that they feel will promote equality. However, if the level at which people hold core values like equality is controlled by partisanship (Goren 2005; Goren, Federico, and Kittilson 2009) any seeming effects of core values may simply be the result of partisan identity. Fortunately, the parties are not monoliths in terms of the values held by their members.

The variation that exists on core political values within the parties is considerable. Figure 4.1 shows the variation of one important value, equality, across the political spectrum and within each party.[25] Here equality is an index of four survey items rescaled to range from 0-1.[26] Among all Americans and among only Democrats, the distribution of the equality value is negatively skewed with more people falling on the upper half of the scale. In fact, for all Americans the mean value on the equality scale is .698 with a standard deviation of .235 while the mean and standard deviation for Democrats are .826 and .173, respectively. However, for Republicans the distribution is normal with a mean of .554 and standard deviation of .212. Of course, the distribution of the equality measure varies less within the parties than within the population, but

[25] For all analysis in this study leaners are included with partisans.
[26] These four items capture different aspects of an individual's beliefs about equality such as the importance of people having equal opportunities to succeed and the need for society to take action to become more equitable. Full question wording can be found in the appendix.

the standard deviation within the parties does remain near 20% of the entire scale, which I believe constitutes meaningful variation. Overall, I believe this figure shows that an amount of variation on the core value of equality worth examining does exist not only across, but also *within* the parties.

Figure 4.1: Distrubution of Equality Value Within and Across Parties

Source: 2020 ANES

Intraparty Dynamics

Intraparty dynamics are not often the focus of research on American politics. Instead, the focus often is on the effects of the two major parties. This research shows that partisanship is one of the major driving forces behind nearly every facet of political life. We know that Republicans are, on average, more authoritarian than Democrats (Federico and Tagar 2014; Hetherington and Weiler 2009). We know that members of the parties feel different toward certain groups of

people, mainly warmth toward groups associated with their party and animosity towards others (Kane, Mason, and Wronski 2021). Partisanship is a major driver of a wide range of political phenomenon ranging from policy attitudes (Carsey and Layman 2006; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002), to perceptions of the truth (Evans and Pickup 2010; Gerber and Huber 2010; Jones 2020; Nyhan and Reifler 2010), to voting (Bartels 2000; Campbell et al. 1960). However, in spite of the pervasive impact of partisanship in American politics, we cannot learn everything there is to know without examining the dynamics *within* the parties.

Intraparty dynamics determine who is nominated to represent a party in primaries, shape which policies are prioritized, and eventually what laws are passed. Without understanding intraparty dynamics, it is difficult to explain recent phenomena such as the rise of Donald Trump over more traditional Republicans or the emergence of a strong left flank in the Democratic Party. These important features of current American politics can only be understood with intraparty dynamics.

Some recent work shows that intraparty variation on factors like authoritarianism or group sentiments can help shape preferences for different politicians from one's party (King 2022; Wronski et al. 2018). Another factor that varies within the parties is core political values. Core values have been found to be an important factor in shaping the policy preferences held by members of the public (Elliott-Dorans 2020; Feldman 1988), and in fact Chapter 2 suggests that these values, particularly the value of equality, can influence partisan's preferences on a policy when there is intraparty disagreement.

A large amount of variation in core political values is due to party attachment (Goren 2005), but there may also be underlying factors explaining the variation that exists within the parties. To understand the potential factors causing variation on core values within the parties,

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we first should understand how and why partisanship leads to variation. Partisanship is a group identity (Campbell et al. 1960; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002) that shapes the way in which people see the world around them. One set of factors shaped by this group identity are the core political values that individuals hold (Goren 2005). Furthermore, this group orientation colors perceptions of other groups, such as racial, gender, or religious groups, in society (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Mason 2018a). It is possible that in the same way that the social group of partisanship accounts for the variation in core values between the parties, sentiments toward sub-partisan groups account for variation of core values within the party. Because group sentiments towards groups, like race, gender, or sexual orientation, vary within the parties, I believe that it is reasonable to think of the effects of group sentiments on core values as a spectrum in which orientations towards all social groups are a driving force behind the core political values that people hold. On this spectrum the most influential of these groups is partisanship, but other group orientations will also play an important part in shaping variation of core political values.

Using survey data from the ANES I examine how group sentiments are related to core political values. As previous research has found that the value of equality exhibits the largest effect on policy preferences (Feldman 1988), I focus my analysis on feelings on equality. I find that even when controlling for partisanship and ideology there is a strong relationship between the sentiments people feel toward minority groups and the strength with which they value equality. In particular, positive sentiments toward Black people as a group are associated with much larger values on the scale used to measure the core value of equality. This relationship also exists between equality and sentiments toward other minority groups and across parties. In this study I am not able to establish the causal direction of this relationship, but I do show that there

is a strong connection between the way people feel about groups in society and the core political values they hold.

Core Values

The belief systems of members of the public in the United States are usually considered unconstrained (Converse 1964; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017). This means that the average American does not have a structure of ideological thinking underlying all their political beliefs. Instead, in this understanding of belief systems the preferences people hold are a reflection of their attachment to a political party. However, some scholars have sought out factors that may underlie partisanship and provide some sense of shape to the belief systems of mass publics. For example, traits like personality have been examined as factors that may influence political attitudes (Gerber et al. 2010). Another factor that has been examined as a potential source of constraint in the belief systems of Americans has been core values (Feldman 1988). Core values are not simply shifting attitudes pertaining to certain situations one may face. Instead, Kinder (1998) and Schwartz (1992, 1994) argue that core values have five characteristics that separate them from other beliefs. These characteristics are (1) abstract beliefs (2) about desirable end states or behaviors that (3) transcend specific situations, (4) guide evaluation and behavior, and (5) can be rank-ordered in terms of relative importance. Scholars have also investigated what core values people may hold that influence their political thoughts and behaviors. Feldman (1988) considers three core political values, equality, free enterprise, and economic individualism, and finds that these values factor into policy positions held by members of the public on a number of salient issues such as welfare and education. He finds that equality values are important in determining how people feel about issues dealing with social spending.

Similarly, tests of the impact of the equality value on policy preferences on non-partisan, less salient policies have also shown that equality plays a major role in the formation of these attitudes (Elliott-Dorans 2020).

However, scholars have also found limits to the influence of core values. Goren (2005) tests whether partisanship is guided by one's core political values or vice versa and finds that partisan attachments are more stable than the core political values of equal opportunity, limited government, moral tolerance, and traditionalism. Indeed, Goren finds that attachment to a party may even shape an individual's core political values. Furthermore, when parties are cued in the minds of individuals, their feelings on these four political value scales become even more in line with the position of one's party. This is even more so the case when there is congruence between ideology and partisanship (Goren, Federico, and Kittilson 2009). Given that ideology is largely a symbolic identity (Conover and Feldman 1981; Devine 2015), it is logicial that sorting, the alignment of ideology with partisanship, would have an effect on values as it does on a variety of other political beleifs (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Mason and Wronski 2018). I believe this suggests that the alignment or disalignment of other group-based factors could further impact the variation of political values.

The ability of values to shape policy preferences may be an important feature of the belief systems of members of the American public, but if these values are simply a result of partisan identification their usefulness in expanding our understanding of American political behavior may be limited. Fortunately, this does not seem to be the case. Chapter 2 of this dissertation shows that values vary considerably within the parties, and this variation plays an important part in attitude formation when partisans are faced with a policy disagreement within their party (also see: Goren, Federico, and Kittilson 2009). This finding raises an important

question. Are core values within a party the basis for some level of constraint on belief systems or is there some other factor within the parties that further dictates value orientations? Since these values help to situate partisans in a lane within the party, and therefore help foster intraparty disagreements, it is important to understand all that we can about these values, particularly why they vary to such a degree within the parties. Chapter 1 of this dissertation shows that group sentiments impact some intraparty dynamics and other work finds that orientations toward partisan and ideological groups impact values (Goren, Federico, and Kittilson 2009); therefore, I argue that one potential source of the intraparty variation in values comes from orientations towards other groups in society.

Group Sentiments

Social identity theory argues that individuals derive their sense of self through the groups with which they identify (Tajfel 1979), and this identification leads to favoritism towards members of one's own groups and hostility toward members of other groups (Turner, Brown, and Tajfel 1979). Partisanship is one of these social groups and exerts a major influence over all aspects of political behavior in the United States (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). Identification with one of the parties not only makes you much more likely to vote for that party (Campbell et al. 1960), but also increases animus toward members of the other parties (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012).

Social identities, including partisanship, are not formed in a vacuum. Identities can at times align with one another resulting in a strengthening of both identities (Brewer and Pierce 2005; Roccas and Brewer 2002). Partisan sorting provides us with an excellent example of this;

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as individuals become more sorted into parties, their other social identities become more aligned with their partisanship. As a result, their attachment to their partisan identity, as well as their other aligned social identities, becomes stronger (Mason and Wronski 2018). However, more recent work has shown that membership in a group is not necessary for one's feelings toward that group to be an influential factor in one's political behavior. Instead, group sentiments, the closeness one feels towards a social group regardless of membership, have been shown to predict party attachment (Kane, Mason, and Wronski 2021) as well as primary candidate preferences (King 2022). Research on group identity provides an important piece of the puzzle for the present study. The sentiments people hold toward groups, whether those be attachment to a party or feelings of closeness to a racial, gender, or other group of which one is not a member, are an important determining factor in a wide variety of political phenomenon. Importantly, this range of political phenomenon has been shown to include not only *interpartisan* differences but also *intrapartisan* ones.

This suggests that variation within the American political parties is, at least in part, based on orientations towards the social groups that make up our society. Therefore, not only will those who, for example, feel closer to Black people as a group be more likely to be Democrats, and more likely to support Black candidates, they will also hold different core political values. Scholars show that how people feel toward groups, regardless of membership in that group, influences how they think that group should be treated (Sirin, Valentino, and Villalobos 2016, 2017). This work has shown that members of minority groups often feel a sense of empathy toward other minority groups, which leads to support for policies to help those groups. Similarly, I argue that people who feel close to groups that have been traditionally disadvantaged in the United States will hold different core values than those who feel distant from these groups.

However, as mentioned earlier, the variation in values within a party could be a reflection of deeply held beliefs in which case those who, for example, more strongly value equality would have more positive group sentiments toward traditionally underprivileged groups. Using only observational data these two possibilities are indistinguishable from one another.

Based on previous scholarship showing that equality is the strongest core value in predicting policy choices (Elliott-Dorans 2020; Feldman 1988), which I believe shows that this is the core political value that people find the most central to their beliefs, I expect that the most meaningful findings for this study will come from the core political value of equality. I argue this centrality helps members of the public connect their feelings to one another. In this case people can connect their sentiments toward different groups in society to how much they value equality. Those who hold feelings of closeness or warmth towards groups that suffer from inequality will place more importance on equality between groups. Therefore, as Chapter 2 shows that variation in the strength of equality values can influence policy preferences, in this chapter I argue that the variation in the strength of the equality value is shaped by group sentiments.

I believe this argument is in line with previous research on both core political values and group sentiments. Both core values and group sentiments vary within parties, and core values have previously been shown to be influenced by a group, partisanship, as well as the alignment of partisan and ideological groups. Furthermore, variation in group sentiment within parties is an important predictive force in other intraparty variation, such as choice of primary candidate. Therefore, group sentiments within a party, particularly feelings toward members of traditionally disadvantaged groups, should connect to the level to which one values equality. For example, a Democrat who feels very closely connected to members of the LGBTQ community will likely

value equality more than a Democrat who feels very distant from members of that group. This leads me to my hypothesis for this chapter.

Hypothesis 1: Feelings of closeness toward traditionally underprivileged groups will lead to increased values on the equality measure.

Method and Data

To determine the relationship between equality and group sentiments I use data from a publicly available set of survey data. The 2020 American National Election Study (ANES) was conducted in pre and post-election waves between August and December of 2020 on 8,280 U.S. Citizens over the age of 18 determined to be representative of the population of the United States. Respondents to this survey answered a series of questions regarding their feelings about equality as well as questions about their sentiments toward various groups. Following work from Feldman (1988) and Goren (2005) I create an index ranging from 0-1 for equality values using four survey questions.[27] This survey does not include traditional group closeness items, but I am able to proxy group sentiments for some traditionally underrepresented groups using feeling thermometers. While feeling thermometers are not a perfect measure they have been shown to be an acceptable proxy for group closeness in previous studies (Achen and Bartels 2016; Giles and Evans 1985; Jardina 2019; Miller, Wlezien, and Hildreth 1991). This survey includes feeling thermometers for many traditionally underrepresented groups such as Black people, Asian people, Hispanic people, LGBTQ people and Muslims. Using these data will help me to establish

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[27] Full question wording can be found in the appendix.

an association between equality and group sentiment. However, this data does not allow me to determine the causal direction of this relationship.

To test this relationship, I first split survey respondents into partisan groups. The distribution of the equality value in figure 4.1 shows that there is meaningful variation within each party and presents a more normal distribution among Republicans. Similarly, Figure 4.2 presents distributions of group sentiments toward several minority groups for each party. The distributions of these sentiments are similar to that of the equality value in that there is a more normal distribution among Republicans than Democrats, but again these sentiments do show considerable variability within each party. The intraparty variation on both variables of interest will allow me to analyze how sentiments toward groups are connected to the strength of the equality value.

Figure 4.2: Distrubution of Group Sentiments Within Parties

Source: 2020 ANES

Results

To begin the analysis of the effects of group sentiments on equality values, I examine the impact of sentiments towards various groups on the Equality value. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 plot the coefficients from separate regressions in which the dependent variable is the index measuring the equality value among Democrats and Republicans, respectively. Explanatory variables for sentiments toward several social groups are included. First, Figure 4.3 shows that among Democrats several factors are significantly related to the value of equality. As one may expect, moving from very conservative to very liberal ideology results in a significant ($p < .01$) decrease in the strength of the equality value. However, this effect is small, .03 on the 0-1 equality scale, when compared to the effects of sentiments toward either Black or White groups. Moving from the most negative to the most positive sentiments toward Black people is associated with a .23 increase ($p < .01$) in the strength of the equality value which represents a change of nearly a quarter of the scale. On the other hand, moving from the least to most positive sentiments toward White people results in a decrease of .14 on the equality scale ($p < .01$). Additionally, sentiments towards Asian people are significantly related to the strength of the equality value ($p < .05$).

Figure 4.3: Effects of Group Sentiments on Equality Values Among Democrats

Note: Controls for age, gender, race, income, and education are included in this model but omitted from this figure for readability.
Full regression results in appendix Table A4.1.
Source: 2020 ANES

Figure 4.4 tells a similar story about the relationship between group sentiments and the equality value within the Republican Party. The effect of moving across the ideological scale is slightly larger among Republicans, .05 (p < .01), but sentiments toward Black and White people retain their large effects, .12 and -.09 respectively, on the equality scale. However, among Republicans sentiments towards transgender people has a significant effect on the strength of the equality value while it did not among Democrats. This effect is large, .1 (p =. 01), rivaling the importance of racial group sentiments.

Figure 4.4: Effects of Group Sentiments on Equality Values Among Republicans

Note: Controls for age, gender, race, income, and education are included in this model but masked from this figure for readability.
Full regression results in appendix Table A4.2.
Source: 2020 ANES

These figures show that some group sentiments are undoubtedly significantly related to the strength with which partisans value equality even when considering factors like ideology, race, education, age, and income. I argue this suggests support for my hypothesized relationship between group sentiments and core values, and more broadly shows support for my argument that the importance of group sentiments extends beyond sorting people into parties to shaping their political thoughts and behaviors on intraparty matters.

These models show that group sentiments toward some groups of people are strongly associated with the value of equality, but the relationships between equality and sentiments toward other groups are shown to be insignificant. It is possible, however, that there is significant correlation between the different group sentiments which may be masking the relationships between some group sentiments and equality. To allow for the relationship between each group and equality to be analyzed, I estimate models for the effect of each on equality individually.

Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show that nearly all of the group sentiment variables, when considered individually, are strongly associated with equality in both parties. Interestingly the only group sentiment that does not seem to matter when considered individually is White group sentiment. This may suggest that feelings toward minority groups, particularly Black people, are the main driver of the association between group sentiments and the equality variable, and when this is not taken into account, negatively correlated factors, like White group sentiments, do not show an effect. Overall, these findings show strong associations between the sentiments people hold toward social groups and the strength with which they hold equality values.

Figure 4.5: Effects of Group Sentiments on Equality Values Among Democrats

Figure 4.6: Effects of Group Sentiments on Equality Values Among Republicans

Black Group Sentiment

Hispanic Group Sentiment

Asian Group Sentiment

LGB Group Sentiment

Transgender Group Sentiment

Muslim Group Sentiment

White Group Sentiment

To further examine how group sentiments are connected to core values I now briefly

examine two more core values: limited government/free enterprise and moral traditionalism.

Both Feldman (1988) and Goren 2005 examine a core value related to the size of government

that Feldman refers to as free enterprise and Goren limited government. These values are simply

different names for the same concept which regards how involved the government should be in

structuring society. Unfortunately, the 2020 ANES does not include all the items from either

Feldman's four item index or Goren's three item index. However, it does include two items[28] very similar to those previously examined, which I use to create and index for the limited government value. Goren also investigates two similar core value he refers to as traditionalism or traditional family values and moral tolerance, which concern the importance of adhering to traditional lifestyles and family dynamics and of accepting changes to societal morals over time. These values are each measured using two item indices. The 2020 ANES includes one question from each of these indices which I combine to form a measure of a value of moral tolerance and traditionalism.[29] The distributions for my limited government and moral traditionalism values can be seen in Figures A4.1 and A4.2, respectively. These figures show a much wider distribution on limited government among Republicans and a nearly normal distribution of moral traditionalism among Democrats. I expect wider distributions will allow for more effects of group sentiments on core values.

According to my argument, if these values are being shaped by group sentiments within the parties, we should see that alignment of these sentiments with one's partisan attachment results in changes in these values in the direction of changes caused by partisanship. For example, alignment of group sentiments with partisanship would mean more positive sentiments towards minority groups for Democrats. Then that alignment would be related to less support for limited government and moral traditionalism since Democratic partisanship causes changes in that direction.

Figure 7 shows very little support for this idea when it comes to the limited government value. No group sentiments are significantly related to this value for Democrats, and while three

[28] Full question wording in appendix.
[29] Full question wording in appendix.

group sentiments are for Republicans, two of these are in directions opposite of expectations. Instead of the alignment of positive White group sentiments with Republican partisanship increasing limited government values we see a significant decrease. Conversely, positive Asian group sentiments are associated with stronger limited government values. These findings are contrary to expectations.

Figure 4.7: Effects of Group Sentiments on Limited Government Values

Note: Controls for age, gender, race, income, and education are included in this model but masked from this figure for readability.
Full regression results in appendix Tables A4.3 & A4.4
Source: 2020 ANES

Figure 8 on the other hand does show results more in line with expectations. These results are not as clear as those for the equality value, but there is evidence that alignment (misalignment) of group sentiments and partisanship is associated with increased alignment of the moral traditionalism value and partisanship. Among Democrats, positive sentiments toward aligned groups, Hispanic people, LGB people and Transgender people, result in decreases in moral traditionalism, a Republican value, while positive sentiments toward White people increases moral traditionalism. Similarly for Republicans positive sentiments toward non-aligned

groups, LGB people and Transgender people, are associated with a decrease in the moral traditionalism value. Here we see more support for the argument of this study than when considering the limited government value, but less support than when considering the equality value.

Figure 4.8: Effects of Group Sentiments on Moral Traditionalism Values

Note: Controls for age, gender, race, income, and education are included in this model but masked from this figure for readability.
Full regression results in appendix Tables A4.5 & A4.6
Source: 2020 ANES

Discussion

In this chapter I have sought to investigate the source of variation in core political values within parties. Prior scholarship finds that these values are largely shaped by partisan identity with Democrats holding stronger equality values and Republicans holding values about limited government and traditional families (Goren 2005; Goren, Federico, and Kittilson 2009). However, here I show that there is meaningful variation on these values within the parties. Furthermore, it is important to understand this variation as previous work has shown that core political values are influential in shaping policy preferences on undecided issues within a party –

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such as a wealth tax policy among Democrats (see Chapter 2). I argue that the variation seen on core values within the parties is an extension of the effects of group sentiments. Group attachments to partisanship and ideology effect core political values (Goren, Federico, and Kittilson 2009), and group sentiments toward other groups, racial, gender, sexual orientation, have been shown to shape intraparty dynamics (J. B. King 2022). Therefore, the alignment of group sentiments under partisanship will lead to further changes to core political values in the direction caused by that partisan attachment.

I use data from the 2020 ANES to test this argument and find tentative support. For equality and moral traditionalism values I find that, for several groups, positive sentiments toward groups aligned with one's partisanship are associated with increases or decreases in core values in the direction dictated by partisanship. However, I do not find this to be the case for the value of limited government, which suggests there may be a different mechanism at work here. Rather than the alignment of group sentiments with partisanship causing changes to core values, the effects seen here may simply show a correlation without a clear causal direction between positive feelings toward traditionally disadvantaged groups and certain values concerning the place of those groups in society. It seems very possible that individuals who place more importance on the equality of all people or who do not value traditional family structures or traditional morality will feel more positive sentiments toward members of disadvantaged groups as a result of these values rather than vice versa.

With the data available for this study, it is not possible to determine a causal direction between my variables of interest. Either direction seems equally likely given the finding in this study, and a system of circular causation is also possible. Future work on this topic should utilize either panel or experimental data to determine if there is a clear direction in this relationship.

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One potential test would be to manipulate group sentiments through an experimental vignette and test to determine whether this manipulation resulted in a change to core political values. Scholarship has shown that intergroup contact can shift feelings towards social groups (Allport 1954; Dovidio et al. 2017; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006), and even just imagining that contact can lead to more positive group sentiments toward the group imagined (Crisp and Turner 2009; Miles and Crisp 2014). Therefore, I believe such an experiment would be able to determine whether group sentiments cause changes to core values.

Without additional analysis I am unable to conclude whether group sentiments shape the variations that exist on core political values within political parties. However, I do show that there are significant relationships between the way individuals feel about social groups and the core values they hold even when segmenting by party and controlling for ideology, the two factors previously shown to hold the most influence over these values. With the current state of strong partisan attachments and affective polarization in American politics, understanding intraparty dynamics is crucial to understanding candidates who will be nominated for office, policies that will be supported by politicians, and ultimately the direction of government, and I argue this study further shows the importance of group sentiments in helping us to understand intraparty dynamics.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

Throughout this dissertation I have investigated various aspects of intraparty dynamics within the Democratic Party in the United States. The Democratic Party is ideologically and demographically diverse (Grossmann and Hopkins 2016; Pew Research Center 2018), which leads to several questions regarding how this diverse coalition can coalesce, or fail to do so, behind leaders and policies. I began by investigating how Democratic partisans can select a candidate in primary election contests with diverse fields. In these elections voters cannot use partisan cues as they could in a general election, and unlike in Republican primary elections in which candidates, who often look the same, compete to show their conservative ideological purity (Grossmann and Hopkins 2016), Democratic primaries often include candidates of different races, genders, religions, and occasionally sexual orientations as well as a range of different ideological positions. In these complex contests voters must seek out any information available to them to aid in their decision-making process. Following work on general election contests showing partisan group identity as an easily accessible cue helping voters to choose a candidate (Bartels 2000; Campbell et al. 1960; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002), I suggest other group dynamics as a potential source of valuable information in the decision making process.

Though voters in primary elections cannot rely on their partisan group to choose a candidate, individuals hold a range of group identities and sentiments that shape how they see the world around them. Groups such as gender, race, sexual orientation, and others have already

been shown to be an important part of political identification and behavior (Kane, Mason, and Wronski 2021; Mason and Wronski 2018). I argue that sentiments toward these groups impact primary voting in the same way partisan group sentiments influence voting behavior in general elections. People are more likely to support those who they feel are members of their own groups or groups which they feel positively toward. I tested this argument using data on candidate preference in the 2020 Democratic primary from a publicly available data set and a novel survey.

I used the 2018 ANES pilot study to examine the relationship between sentiments toward social groups and preference for candidates who are members of those social groups. In this survey Democratic identifiers were asked to choose their preferred candidate from a list of potential 2020 Democratic presidential nominees. Additionally, respondents in this survey completed a series of feeling thermometers measuring orientations toward various groups in society. Using these feeling thermometers as a proxy for group sentiments I show that feelings toward Black and White racial groups are significantly related to support for candidates who are members of these groups. However, I do not find a relationship between feelings toward females and support for female candidates. To include more female candidates in my testing and establish a clearer relationship I next conducted an original survey. In this survey respondents were presented with head-to-head matchups between six of the top performing candidates at the time and asked to choose the candidate they would prefer to be the nominee from the pair.[30] Each candidate was presented as an option to each respondent five times allowing me to create a scale for the respondents' feelings toward each candidate instead of simply their one preferred candidate. The respondents also answered various questions about their feelings of warmth and

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[30] Respondents saw a total of 15 candidate matchups.

closeness to various social groups. The results from this survey show strong support for the argument that positive sentiments toward groups are significantly related to support for candidates who are members of that group for gender groups, but due to the lack of Black candidates in the survey I am not able to provide further support for this argument for racial groups.[31]

I further test my findings to determine if there is an interactive effect at work in this relationship. I hypothesize that the group sentiments of respondents in the first survey may not have been activated to influence their candidate preferences if respondents did not know which groups the candidates belong to – respondents in the second survey were shown photos of the candidates. I show that the more politically knowledgeable a respondent is the stronger the relationship between the group sentiments they hold and the candidates they prefer, but this relationship is only present in the first study for gender and racial groups. For respondents to the second survey, who saw the candidates, political knowledge did not affect the relationship between racial and gender groups and candidate preference. Furthermore, I show that political knowledge is also an important mediating factor in the relationship between sentiments toward not visible groups and candidate preference. Specifically, sentiments toward the LGBT group were only related to support for Pete Buttigieg among very politically knowledgeable respondents, those more likely to know he is a gay man. However, this study is not without its limitations. Unfortunately, as there were no Black candidates in the race at the time of the survey, I was unable to adequately test the impact of racial group sentiments on candidate preferences. Additionally, a test of sentiments toward religious groups would have further

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[31] At the time this survey was run all major Black candidates had dropped out of the 2020 Democratic presidential primary.

strengthened my argument that these candidate preferences can be influenced by sentiments that extend beyond visible groups like race and gender to nonvisible groups like sexual orientation and religion. I believe such further testing would support the findings here and would provide valuable information on the extent to which sentiments toward groups influence political life. Overall, the first chapter of this dissertation shows that, for intraparty candidate preferences, sentiments toward non-party groups function similar to how sentiments toward partisan groups function for interparty candidate preference.

This work on group sentiments and candidate preference shows that in situations when the partisan cue is not available partisans may use other information to help form their attitudes. Therefore, next I examined the intraparty functioning of another area in which partisanship is often seen as the controlling factor: policy attitudes. When scholars consider the policy attitudes of members of the American public they often show that these attitudes are unstable (Converse 1964; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017) and dictated by the party (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002) or the partisan candidate (Lenz 2012) with which one identifies. However, there are issues on which parties do not hold a unified position. In recent years this has especially been the case on several issues over which the "further left" and more "moderate" elites in the Democratic Party have disagreed. Issues like universal health care and a wealth tax were major points of contention in the 2016 and 2020 Democratic presidential primaries. When these issues arise, Democratic partisans do not have the benefit of leadership from their party and must instead find another way to form their policy preferences on these salient issues. In the second chapter of my dissertation, I searched for the factors other than partisanship that help to shape preferences in these circumstances.

I focused on two potential explanations for opinion formation on salient issues without clear partisan directions. First, following previous work showing that during elections preferences on issues are dictated by an individuals preferred candidate (Lenz 2012), I consider the possibility that partisans have a set of political elites from their own party that they prefer to other elites from their party and follow the lead of their preferred elites when faced with these controversial issues. Second, I propose that when partisans do not receive leadership from their party, they rely on their core political beliefs to help form their preferences. Here I specifically focus on core beliefs related to equality as previous work has shown these core beliefs to be most strongly related to policy preferences (Feldman 1988). I used a novel survey experimental approach along with the 1992-1996 ANES panel study to examine each of these possibilities.

The respondents to the survey experiment were presented with a vignette describing a policy disagreement for Democrats on a wealth tax policy between a prominent member of the party and the rest of the party. In these vignettes the named politician was always presented as supportive of new policy while the remainder of the party was presented as opposed. Following the vignette, I measured the position of respondents on the policy in question to determine whether support from different politicians would influence the positions of respondents. Additionally, prior to the experimental vignettes respondents were asked a battery of questions to determine their core political values, which allows me to test whether these preexisting values or the leadership of politicians from the vignettes has a larger effect on the policy preferences of the respondents. The results show that seeing a vignette had no significant effect on the policy preferences of respondents. Whether respondents loved or hated the named politician seeing the politician express support for a policy did not significantly influence the position of the respondent. On the other hand, the preexisting core political beliefs of the respondents were

significantly related to their position on the policy in question. Specifically, Democratic respondents who held stronger core beliefs on equality were more likely to support implementation of a wealth tax. This result makes sense on its face as those who have stronger preferences toward equality should favor redistributive policies that theoretically would help achieve an equitable society; however, the lack of connection between politician leadership and policy positions leads to further questions.

To ensure that the core value of equality is not simply a filter through which leadership from politicians influences policy preferences I made use of panel data. Results from the 1992-1996 ANES panel study show that feelings toward politicians are not directly causing core political beliefs like equality, but these core beliefs are also not directly shaping feelings toward politicians. Instead, this relationship is circular with previous feeling toward politicians influencing core political beliefs and vice versa. Overall, these findings show that core beliefs, particularly equality, seem to play a role in shaping policy preferences when cues from the party are not available. However, this chapter is not without its limitations. The most important of these limiting factors is the use of a salient policy in the survey experiment. As the intraparty disagreements that occur are often on salient issues, I chose to use such an issue in this experiment, but this also means that respondents were likely more aware of the issue, may have already formed some type of preference on the issue, and may know which politicians fall on which side of the issue. To remedy this a future study should use a hypothetical issue, but researchers should be careful to provide a clear description of the hypothetical issue to ensure that an individual could apply their core beliefs to their issue preference if core beliefs are indeed the factor shaping those preferences. The results from this study also raise another important question. If the core value of equality is an important factor in shaping preferences on

controversial issues, but is itself unstable as it varies with politician favorability, is there some other factor that shapes an individual's core political beliefs?

I concluded the empirical portion of the dissertation by further investigating core political beliefs to determine whether they function as some set of underlying beliefs or simply a filter through which some other factor is shaping opinions. Scholarship has consistently found that Americans are lacking in coherent and consistent ideological beliefs (Converse 1964; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017). However, the previous chapter of this dissertation suggests that on intrapartisan issues core beliefs may serve as some sort of overarching belief system structuring opinions. In this chapter I argue that this is not the case. Instead, core beliefs, like candidate preference, reflect group sentiments. Individuals who have positive sentiments toward traditionally disadvantaged groups will be more likely to hold values like equality more strongly. I do not suggest that core beliefs are unimportant, but that sentiments toward groups are the most important factor in shaping intraparty dynamics in the United States. To test the relationship between core values and group sentiments I used data from the 2020 ANES.

Unlike the prior chapters of this dissertation, in this chapter, I examined both Republicans and Democrats. The previous chapters focus on Democrats due to the greater group diversity in the Democratic Party and the greater prevalence of intraparty disagreements on salient issues. However, there is no reason to believe the relationship between core values and group sentiments would differ between the parties and I show that core values do vary within each party. Testing the relationship between core values and group sentiments shows there is a significant connection between the two. In particular, respondents who feel more positively toward the Black racial group are more likely to hold strong equality values. This relationship also exists between sentiments toward other traditionally disadvantaged groups and the equality value. I

also show a relationship between these group sentiments and values of moral traditionalism. While this study does support my hypothesized relationship between sentiments and core political values, I am not able to establish a causal relationship between these two variables. I argue that given evidence of group sentiments being a causal factor for political preferences, there is reason to expect that the same direction applies to the relationship between group sentiments and core values. Further examinations of this relationship should devise a method by which to determine a causal connection.

Throughout this dissertation I investigated several factors influencing intraparty dynamics in the United States, particularly within the Democratic Party. I argue that as the parties become more polarized from one another it is important to understand that there are still pieces of political behavior that cannot be explained by partisanship. Primary elections decide who will represent the party in general election contests. Issue preferences on matters not settled within the party may lead to different policies being enacted. I focus mainly on these two aspects of intraparty dynamics. I begin by showing a strong significant relationship between the sentiments a person holds toward social groups and the candidates a partisan prefers in a primary election. Next, I examine the issue preferences held by partisans and, contrary to what one may expect, find that these preferences do not seem to be formed by following the lead of the preferred party elite. Instead, the core values an individual holds are more strongly related to these positions. However, I follow up on this finding to show that these core values are not stable and seem to also be related to group sentiments.

In each chapter of this dissertation, I discuss limitations for that chapter, but there are limitations for this dissertation which cut across chapters. In chapters 2 and 4 group sentiments are discussed as individual sentiments toward social groups, but this is not actually the case. The

group sentiments an individual holds work together or be cross cutting (Kane, Mason, and Wronski 2021;Mason & Wronski, 2018) and the combination of these sentiments influence partisanship. Future examinations of the intraparty impact of group sentiments should be careful to consider the spectrum of sentiments working together rather than as individual factors. Another limitation relates to the treatment of partisan strength. Throughout this dissertation I have treated Democratic partisans as a monolith in terms of the effects of partisanship on political behavior, but this is not actually the case. The strength with which individuals identify with a party influences the importance of the partisan identity to their self. Future scholarship on intraparty dynamics should take differential effects of factors like group sentiments or core values on individuals with different levels of partisan attachment into account.

There are two main findings to take away from this dissertation. First, there is a tremendous amount of variation on several important political characteristics within the political parties in the United States, and this variation is worthy of more in-depth investigation by other scholars. Understanding why the parties change over time and how they may change in the future not only gives us a better understanding of the parties but will also help us to understand how those parties will interact with one another and how the country will be governed. Second, how we feel about groups of people is an extremely powerful force in politics that reaches beyond sorting and polarization of the parties. In the same way that group sentiments toward the parties dictates the side an individual will take in almost any political matter, sentiments toward other groups will take over and shape the choosing of a side when the cue from partisanship is not available. Future scholarship on any intraparty dynamics should always consider the importance of how an individual feels about groups of people in society.

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APPENDIX

2018 ANES PILOT STUDY SURVEY QUESTION WORDING

Primary voting and candidate choice:

Will you vote in a Democratic presidential primary in 2020, or not?

Options:
Will vote in a Democratic primary
Will not vote in a Democratic primary

In the 2020 Democratic primary for president, who will you vote for? Your best guess is fine.

Options:
Elizabeth Warren
Joe Biden
Kamala Harris
Cory Booker
Bernie Sanders
Kirsten Gillibrand
Deval Patrick
Eric Holder
Chris Murphy
Amy Klobuchar
Beto O'Rourke

Group sentiments:

We'd like to get your feelings toward some of our political leaders and other people who are in the news these days. We'll show the name of a person or group and we'd like you to rate that person or group using something we call the feeling thermometer.
Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the person. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the person and that you don't care too much for that person. You would rate the person at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the person.
If we come to a person whose name you don't recognize, you don't need to rate that person. Just click Next and we'll move on to the next one.

How would you rate blacks?
How would you rate whites?
How would you rate the #MeToo movement?

Coding Note: I recode the responses here to range from 0-1 where 0 indicates very cold and 1 indicates very warm. This variable is used as the key independent variable in the ANES tests.

Political knowledge:

What job or political office is now held by John Roberts?
[TEXT BOX 40 CHARACTERS]

What job or political office is now held by Angela Merkel?
[TEXT BOX 40 CHARACTERS]

For how many years is a United States Senator elected – that is, how many years are there in one full term of office for a U.S. Senator?
[NUMBER BOX, RANGE 1-99]

On which of the following does the U.S. federal government currently spend the least?

Options:
Foreign aid
Medicare
National defense
Social Security

Coding Note: To create the political knowledge variable I added together the number of these questions answered correctly by respondents and divided by the number of questions to produce a variable between 0-1. The ANES codes the Merkel question as correct if the respondent says she is a German politician or something to that effect. For the John Roberts question the ANES provides half credit if the respondent identifies him as a judge and full credit if he is identified as the chief justice.

2020 QUALTRICS STUDY SURVEY QUESTION WORDING

Candidate Selection:

Please select which candidate you would *prefer* as the 2020 Democratic Presidential candidate.

Put another way, if you had to choose between the following two Democratic presidential candidates, which *one* would you vote for?

| Bernie Sanders | Elizabeth Warren |

Coding Note: Each of the candidates was featured in 5 of these matchups with other candidates. I then use the number of times a candidate was selected in their matchups (a number ranging from 0-5) as the dependent variable indicating the level of support that candidate receives from a respondent.

Group Sentiments:

Of the following groups how close do <u>you</u> feel towards them? By "close" we mean people who are most like you in their ideas, interests, and feelings.
Rows:
1. Feminists

2. Whites

3. Blacks

4. Latinos

5. Asians

6. LGBTQ

Columns:
    A. Very closely

    B. Closely

    C. Somewhat closely

    D. Not closely at all

Coding Note: I recode the responses here to range from 0-1 where 0 indicates "not closely at all" and 1 indicates "very closely". This variable is used as the key independent variable in the Qualtrics tests.

Political Knowledge:

Which party has the majority in of seats in the U.S. House of Representatives?
    A. Republicans
    B. Democrats
    C. Neither
    D. Not sure

Which party has the majority in of seats in the U.S. Senate?
    A. Republicans
    B. Democrats
    C. Neither
    D. Not sure

How many justices are there on the U.S. Supreme Court?
    A. 12
    B. 7
    C. 9
    D. Not sure

Is the U.S. federal budget deficit – the amount by which the government's spending exceeds the amount of money it collects – now bigger, about the same, or smaller than it was during most of the 1990s?

> A. Bigger
> B. About the same
> C. Smaller

Coding Note: To create the political knowledge variable used I added together the number of these questions answered correctly by responded and divided by the number of questions to produce a variable between 0-1.

Electability:

Which of the following Democratic presidential candidates do you think is the _most likely_ to defeat President Trump in the general election.

Options:
Joe Biden
Bernie Sanders
Elizabeth Warren
Amy Klobuchar
Pete Buttigieg
Andrew Yang

Coding Note: An electability variable was created for each candidate and coded either 0 or 1 depending on whether or not the respondent found them the most electable.

Ideology

Ideologically speaking, do you think this candidate is a Liberal or a Conservative?
[Seven point scale ranging from extremely conservative (1) to extremely liberal (7)]

Coding Note: Respondents were asked this question about each candidate and they were asked the traditional 7 point liberal conservative self-identification question. I subtract candidate scores from respondent self-identifications to determine perceived ideological difference between the candidates and the respondents.

Sexism and Racism:

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

Rows:
1. Most women fail to appreciate
all that men do for them.

2. Women seek to gain power by
getting control over men.

3. Most women interpret innocent
remarks or acts as being sexist.

4. Women should be cherished and
protected by men.

5. Many women have a quality of
purity that few men possess.

6. A good woman ought to be set
on a pedestal by her man.

Columns:
        A. Strongly Disagree

        B. Somewhat Disagree

        C. Somewhat Agree

        D. Strongly Agree

Coding Note: The first three rows are added together to create the hostile sexism index and the last three rows are added together to make the benevolent sexism index.

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

Rows:
 1. Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.

 2. It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.

 3. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.

 4. Most blacks who don't get ahead should not blame the system; they only have themselves to blame.

Columns:
        A. Strongly Disagree

        B. Somewhat Disagree

        C. Somewhat Agree

        D. Strongly Agree

Coding Note: The responses here range from 0 (strongly disagree) to 1 (strongly agree). The respondents answers are added together and divided by the number of rows to create the racial resentment index (number 3 is reverse coded).

2020 ANES STUDY SURVEY QUESTION WORDING

Equality Index Items (All 5 point Strong Disagree-Strong Agree)
1. Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed.
2. This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are.
3. It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others.
4. If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems.

Limited Government Index Items
1. Which of the following statements comes closer to your view? One, the less government, the better; or Two, there are more things that government should be doing.
2. Would it be good for society to have more government regulation, about the same amount of regulation as there is now, or less government regulation?

Moral Traditionalism Index Items (Both 5 point Strong Disagree-Strong Agree)
1. The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes.
2. This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties.

SUPPLEMENTAL TABLES

VARIABLES	(1) Buttigieg	(2) Biden	(3) Warren	(4) Sanders	(5) Klobuchar	(6) Yang
Female Group Sentiment	0.0408	0.115	0.337*	-0.240	0.523***	-0.0833
	(0.173)	(0.182)	(0.172)	(0.187)	(0.168)	(0.176)
Male Group Sentiment	0.416**	0.491***	-0.448**	-0.0700	0.177	-0.143
	(0.178)	(0.187)	(0.177)	(0.192)	(0.172)	(0.181)
Black Group Sentiment	-0.352*	0.0362	0.418**	0.415**	-0.166	-0.319*
	(0.184)	(0.194)	(0.184)	(0.200)	(0.178)	(0.188)
White Group Sentiment	-0.00234	-0.173	0.0584	0.0238	-0.233	0.0372
	(0.171)	(0.179)	(0.170)	(0.185)	(0.165)	(0.174)
Asian Group Sentiment	-0.201	-0.0800	-0.397**	0.00554	-0.168	0.786***
	(0.177)	(0.187)	(0.177)	(0.192)	(0.171)	(0.181)
LGBTQ Group Sentiment	0.390**	-0.249	0.124	0.0703	-0.127	-0.0692
	(0.169)	(0.177)	(0.168)	(0.183)	(0.163)	(0.172)
Benevolent Sexism	-0.255	0.122	0.287	0.319	-0.349*	-0.522***
	(0.192)	(0.202)	(0.191)	(0.208)	(0.186)	(0.195)
Hostile Sexism	-0.0110	0.418**	-0.115	-0.241	-0.0402	0.175
	(0.195)	(0.204)	(0.194)	(0.211)	(0.188)	(0.198)
Racial Resentment	0.250	0.583***	-0.291	0.220	0.327	-0.481**
	(0.209)	(0.218)	(0.208)	(0.226)	(0.201)	(0.211)
Ideology	-0.274	-0.498**	-0.0886	0.101	-0.476**	-0.106
	(0.197)	(0.207)	(0.199)	(0.221)	(0.189)	(0.199)
Partisan Strength	0.0704	0.621***	0.484***	0.0621	0.121	-0.252
	(0.170)	(0.178)	(0.168)	(0.183)	(0.164)	(0.174)
Income	0.0738*	0.131***	-0.0385	-0.0956**	-0.00475	0.0295
	(0.0378)	(0.0400)	(0.0376)	(0.0412)	(0.0365)	(0.0384)
Education	0.0740**	-0.0326	0.0321	-0.00961	0.0757***	-0.0291
	(0.0289)	(0.0305)	(0.0290)	(0.0312)	(0.0279)	(0.0294)
Age	0.123***	0.0768**	-0.00976	-0.181***	0.0801***	-0.142***
	(0.0307)	(0.0329)	(0.0305)	(0.0340)	(0.0296)	(0.0313)
Female	-0.0693	0.230**	0.0439	-0.223**	0.142	-0.0302
	(0.102)	(0.107)	(0.101)	(0.110)	(0.0985)	(0.104)
Political Knowledge	0.164	0.0208	0.207	-0.322*	0.0277	0.313*
	(0.160)	(0.168)	(0.160)	(0.173)	(0.154)	(0.163)
African American	-0.207	0.174	0.00751	-0.105	0.114	0.168
	(0.157)	(0.165)	(0.156)	(0.170)	(0.151)	(0.159)
White	0.153	-0.0499	0.0379	-0.228*	0.140	0.0125
	(0.125)	(0.132)	(0.124)	(0.135)	(0.121)	(0.127)
Electability	2.128***	1.840***	1.757***	1.906***	2.684***	3.001***
	(0.185)	(0.0989)	(0.128)	(0.119)	(0.295)	(0.224)
Ideological Distance	-0.979***	-0.735***	-1.023***	-1.001***	-0.529***	-0.745***
	(0.204)	(0.215)	(0.215)	(0.238)	(0.204)	(0.209)
Constant	1.156***	1.032***	2.198***	3.769***	1.338***	2.923***
	(0.319)	(0.332)	(0.314)	(0.355)	(0.303)	(0.323)
Observations	982	982	982	982	982	982
R-squared	0.228	0.376	0.235	0.340	0.131	0.240

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: The dependent variable in these models is the number of times a candidate was chosen in their 5 matchups (ranges from 0-5). Source: 2020 Qualtrics Study

Table A2.2: Effect of Group Sentiments on Choosing a Female Candidate

VARIABLES	(1) All Respondents	(2) Female Respondents	(3) Male Respondents
Female Group Sentiment	0.517***	0.381	0.709**
	(0.183)	(0.248)	(0.276)
Male Group Sentiment	-0.523**	-0.464*	-0.617**
	(0.203)	(0.275)	(0.307)
Benevolent Sexism	0.0614	-0.0942	0.245
	(0.243)	(0.333)	(0.358)
Hostile Sexism	-0.146	-0.0876	-0.234
	(0.237)	(0.337)	(0.345)
Ideology	-0.104	-0.384	0.215
	(0.242)	(0.352)	(0.340)
Partisan Strength	0.403*	0.399	0.427
	(0.222)	(0.303)	(0.332)
Income	-0.0340	-0.0382	-0.0311
	(0.0488)	(0.0649)	(0.0773)
Education	0.0801**	0.0484	0.123**
	(0.0377)	(0.0502)	(0.0586)
Age	0.160***	0.136***	0.178***
	(0.0361)	(0.0471)	(0.0577)
Female	0.186		
	(0.130)		
Constant	2.070***	2.814***	1.486***
	(0.384)	(0.501)	(0.560)
Observations	948	548	400
R-squared	0.057	0.032	0.081

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: The dependent variable in these models indicates the number of times a female candidate was chosen over a male candidate in the 8 female/male matchups (ranges from 0-8). Source: 2020 Qualtrics Study.

Table A2.3: Effect of Racial Sentiment on Choosing a White Candidate

VARIABLES	(1) All Respondents	(2) White Respondents	(3) Black Respondents
White Group Sentiment	0.958**	1.162**	-0.283
	(0.409)	(0.514)	(1.045)
Black Group Sentiment	-1.201**	-1.147*	-1.053
	(0.562)	(0.668)	(1.792)
Ideology	-0.0771	0.00407	-0.461
	(0.117)	(0.144)	(0.282)
Partisan Strength	-0.521**	-0.564*	0.635
	(0.261)	(0.303)	(0.713)
Education	-0.166**	-0.110	-0.274
	(0.0749)	(0.0908)	(0.174)
Income	-0.0662**	-0.0763**	-0.0988
	(0.0298)	(0.0357)	(0.0781)
Marital Status	0.117	0.000656	0.466
	(0.223)	(0.250)	(0.746)
Church Attendance	0.00249	0.103	-0.0986
	(0.0615)	(0.0823)	(0.137)
Constant	3.508***	2.897***	4.170**
	(0.579)	(0.686)	(1.713)
Observations	844	592	128

Standard errors in parentheses
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note: The dependent variable in these models is a dichotomous variable indicating choosing a White candidate or a Black candidate (0 = Black, 1 = White). Source: 2018 ANES Pilot.

Table A2.4: Effect of Gender Sentiment on Choosing a Female Candidate

VARIABLES	(1) All Respondents	(2) Female Respondents	(3) Male Respondents
Female Group Sentiment	0.455	0.745	0.0857
	(0.408)	(0.592)	(0.603)
Ideology	0.407***	0.386***	0.472***
	(0.108)	(0.137)	(0.177)
Partisan Strength	-0.0141	-0.0976	0.139
	(0.215)	(0.280)	(0.342)
Education	0.196***	0.143*	0.289***
	(0.0656)	(0.0836)	(0.109)
Income	0.0668**	0.0695*	0.0629
	(0.0263)	(0.0359)	(0.0396)
Marital Status	0.235	0.272	0.153
	(0.191)	(0.247)	(0.302)
Church Attendance	-0.0542	-0.0969	0.00941
	(0.0550)	(0.0715)	(0.0876)
Constant	-3.033***	-2.887***	-3.456***
	(0.433)	(0.600)	(0.670)
Observations	831	503	328

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: The dependent variable in these models is a dichotomous variable indicating choosing a female candidate or a male candidate (0 = Male, 1 = Female). Source: 2018 ANES Pilot.

Table A2.5: Marginal Effects of Racial Group Sentiment on Choosing a White Candidate Across Political Knowledge

VARIABLES	(1) Voting for a White Candidate	(2) Voting for a White Candidate
White Group Sentiment	-0.278	
	(0.788)	
White * Political Knowledge	1.689	
	(1.123)	
Black Group Sentiment		0.271
		(0.877)
Black * Political Knowledge		-2.042
		(1.342)
Political Knowledge	-1.380*	1.377
	(0.793)	(1.131)
Ideology	-0.126	-0.115
	(0.115)	(0.117)
Partisan Strength	-0.589**	-0.509*
	(0.259)	(0.260)
Education	-0.151**	-0.161**
	(0.0769)	(0.0765)
Income	-0.0575*	-0.0561*
	(0.0309)	(0.0308)
Marital Status	0.120	0.132
	(0.223)	(0.224)
Church Attendance	-0.0184	0.00162
	(0.0619)	(0.0619)
Constant	3.521***	3.058***
	(0.651)	(0.765)
Observations	844	844

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The dependent variable in these models is a dichotomous variable indicating choosing a White candidate or a Black candidate (0 = Black, 1 = White). Source 2018 ANES Pilot.

Table A2.6: Effect of Female Group Sentiment on Choosing a Female Candidate Across Political Knowledge

VARIABLES	(1) Voting for a Female Candidate
Female Group Sentiment	-0.939
	(0.705)
Political Knowledge	-0.938
	(0.833)
Female * Political Knowledge	2.430**
	(1.051)
Ideology	0.360***
	(0.111)
Partisan Strength	-0.0401
	(0.217)
Education	0.155**
	(0.0681)
Income	0.0502*
	(0.0276)
Marital Status	0.246
	(0.193)
Church Attendance	-0.0367
	(0.0562)
Constant	-2.265***
	(0.592)
Observations	831

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The dependent variable in this model is a dichotomous variable indicating choosing a Female candidate or Male candidate (0 = Male, 1 = Female). Source: 2018 ANES Pilot.

Table A2.7: Effect of LGBTQ Group Sentiments on support for Buttigieg and Biden

VARIABLES	(1) Buttigieg	(2) Biden
LGBTQ Group Sentiment	0.0876	-0.392
	(0.279)	(0.320)
Political Knowledge	-0.0460	-0.107
	(0.237)	(0.273)
LGBTQ Sentiment * Political Knowledge	0.380	0.153
	(0.420)	(0.483)
Ideology	-0.244	-0.703***
	(0.201)	(0.231)
Partisan Strength	-0.177	0.856***
	(0.181)	(0.208)
Income	0.103**	0.223***
	(0.0402)	(0.0462)
Education	0.0744**	-0.108***
	(0.0309)	(0.0355)
Age	0.166***	0.222***
	(0.0317)	(0.0365)
Female	-0.120	0.0607
	(0.0980)	(0.113)
Constant	1.105***	1.872***
	(0.278)	(0.320)
Observations	996	996
R-squared	0.062	0.088

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: The dependent variable in these models is the number of times each candidate was chosen in their 5 matchups (ranges from 0-5). Source: 2020 Qualtrics Study.

Table A2.8: Effects of Group Sentiment on Candidate Support Using Poisson Models

VARIABLES	(1) Biden	(2) Buttigieg	(3) Klobuchar	(4) Sanders	(5) Warren	(6) Yang
Female Group Sentiment	0.0251	0.00795	0.308***	-0.115	0.150**	-0.106
	(0.0710)	(0.0854)	(0.0935)	(0.0757)	(0.0755)	(0.0965)
Male Group Sentiment	0.190***	0.212**	0.0565	-0.0262	-0.173**	-0.0625
	(0.0726)	(0.0892)	(0.0970)	(0.0765)	(0.0779)	(0.0983)
Black Group Sentiment	0.00801	-0.164*	-0.113	0.171**	0.143*	-0.278***
	(0.0750)	(0.0914)	(0.100)	(0.0802)	(0.0817)	(0.102)
White Group Sentiment	-0.0609	0.00613	-0.125	-0.00348	0.0222	0.0785
	(0.0697)	(0.0847)	(0.0921)	(0.0743)	(0.0746)	(0.0956)
Asian Group Sentiment	-0.0608	-0.0807	-0.0732	0.0272	-0.162**	0.512***
	(0.0724)	(0.0880)	(0.0973)	(0.0764)	(0.0783)	(0.0971)
LGBTQ Group Sentiment	-0.0896	0.177**	-0.0762	0.0488	0.0434	-0.0652
	(0.0690)	(0.0831)	(0.0919)	(0.0733)	(0.0739)	(0.0939)
Benevolent Sexism	0.0693	-0.173*	-0.150	0.151*	0.0857	-0.289***
	(0.0795)	(0.0946)	(0.104)	(0.0839)	(0.0835)	(0.107)
Hostile Sexism	0.0804	0.0347	-0.0567	-0.144*	-0.0311	0.165
	(0.0792)	(0.0962)	(0.106)	(0.0837)	(0.0861)	(0.108)
Racial Resentment	0.215**	0.202**	0.210*	-0.0139	-0.151	-0.330***
	(0.0843)	(0.102)	(0.112)	(0.0911)	(0.0920)	(0.117)
Ideology	-0.126	-0.0794	-0.163	0.131	0.0692	-0.0373
	(0.0774)	(0.0958)	(0.105)	(0.0842)	(0.0855)	(0.110)
Partisan Strength	0.244***	-0.0173	0.0632	0.00761	0.168**	-0.249***
	(0.0720)	(0.0830)	(0.0922)	(0.0736)	(0.0769)	(0.0900)
Income	0.0727***	0.0361*	0.00721	-0.0689***	-0.0140	0.0172
	(0.0153)	(0.0184)	(0.0203)	(0.0169)	(0.0165)	(0.0208)
Education	-0.0293**	0.0356**	0.0344**	-0.00983	0.0206*	-0.0210
	(0.0119)	(0.0138)	(0.0152)	(0.0130)	(0.0125)	(0.0163)
Age	0.0714***	0.0599***	0.0482***	-0.115***	0.00212	-0.107***
	(0.0125)	(0.0151)	(0.0164)	(0.0136)	(0.0133)	(0.0171)
Female	0.0844**	-0.0126	0.0535	-0.0830*	0.0125	-0.0282
	(0.0417)	(0.0500)	(0.0553)	(0.0442)	(0.0449)	(0.0563)
Political Knowledge	0.0928	0.0616	0.00658	-0.0910	0.00334	0.181**
	(0.0659)	(0.0798)	(0.0868)	(0.0693)	(0.0702)	(0.0899)
African American	0.0970	-0.0856	0.0958	-0.109*	0.0126	0.0640
	(0.0633)	(0.0838)	(0.0875)	(0.0654)	(0.0683)	(0.0854)
White	-0.0512	0.0937	0.110	-0.0746	0.0248	-0.0502
	(0.0517)	(0.0627)	(0.0692)	(0.0527)	(0.0552)	(0.0679)
Constant	0.331**	0.167	0.185	1.752***	0.751***	1.445***
	(0.131)	(0.156)	(0.171)	(0.132)	(0.138)	(0.167)
Observations	982	982	982	982	982	982

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Count models in which the dependent variable is the number of times a candidate was chosen in their 5 matchups (ranges from 0-5).
Source: 2020 Qualtrics Study.

Table A2.9: Effect of Group Sentiments on Choosing a Female Candidate Using Poisson Model

VARIABLES	(1) All Respondents	(2) Female Respondents	(3) Male Respondents
Female Group Sentiment	0.153***	0.106	0.228**
	(0.0563)	(0.0728)	(0.0900)
Male Group Sentiment	-0.156**	-0.132	-0.203**
	(0.0625)	(0.0816)	(0.0997)
Benevolent Sexism	0.0227	-0.0259	0.0868
	(0.0739)	(0.0975)	(0.114)
Hostile Sexism	-0.0436	-0.0256	-0.0717
	(0.0735)	(0.101)	(0.112)
Ideology	-0.0325	-0.109	0.0630
	(0.0744)	(0.103)	(0.110)
Partisan Strength	0.124*	0.116	0.142
	(0.0699)	(0.0910)	(0.110)
Income	-0.01000	-0.0106	-0.0100
	(0.0149)	(0.0192)	(0.0248)
Education	0.0233**	0.0135	0.0382**
	(0.0114)	(0.0146)	(0.0185)
Age	0.0471***	0.0381***	0.0557***
	(0.0109)	(0.0138)	(0.0185)
Female	0.0558		
	(0.0401)		
Constant	0.820***	1.055***	0.608***
	(0.119)	(0.149)	(0.184)
Observations	948	548	400

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Count models in which the dependent variable indicates the number of times a female candidate was chosen over a male candidate in the 8 female/male matchups (ranges from 0-8).
Source: 2020 Qualtrics Study.

Table A3.1: Effect of Vignettes on Wealth Tax Policy Preference

VARIABLES	Wealth Tax
AOC Vignette	0.00340
	(0.0200)
Biden Vignette	0.0156
	(0.0201)
Party Identity Strength	0.0271**
	(0.0114)
Ideology	0.0212***
	(0.00511)
Age	0.00175***
	(0.000476)
Gender (0 = Male , 1 = Female)	0.0307*
	(0.0173)
White	0.0247
	(0.0248)
Black	-0.0124
	(0.0314)
Income	0.00700**
	(0.00353)
Education	0.0125**
	(0.00629)
Constant	0.301***
	(0.0828)
Observations	1,021

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The dependent variables here is a five-point scale of respondent support for a wealth tax.

Table A3.2: Effect of Vignettes on Wealth Tax Policy Preference With Interaction

VARIABLES	Wealth Tax	Wealth Tax
Biden Vignette	0.0676	
	(0.0564)	
Biden Feeling Thermometer	0.176***	
	(0.0415)	
Vignette X Biden Feeling Thermometer	-0.0648	
	(0.0689)	
Party Identity Strength	0.00967	0.00952
	(0.0118)	(0.0111)
Ideology	0.0204***	0.0133***
	(0.00507)	(0.00501)
Age	0.00139***	0.00169***
	(0.000485)	(0.000460)
Gender (0 = Male , 1 = Female)	0.0345**	0.0505***
	(0.0171)	(0.0168)
White	0.0244	0.0287
	(0.0247)	(0.0243)
Black	-0.0154	-0.0128
	(0.0311)	(0.0306)
Income	0.00646*	0.00673**
	(0.00351)	(0.00342)
Education	0.0104*	0.00989
	(0.00624)	(0.00609)
AOC Vignette		-0.0974**
		(0.0413)
AOC Feeling Thermometer		0.201***
		(0.0360)
Vignette X AOC Feeling Thermometer		0.138**
		(0.0599)
Constant	0.309***	0.340***
	(0.0826)	(0.0807)
Observations	1,009	1,003

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The dependent variables here is a five-point scale of respondent support for a wealth tax.

Table A3.3: Effects of Core Political Values on Wealth Tax Policy Position

VARIABLES	Wealth Tax
AOC Vignette	0.0142
	(0.0192)
Biden Vignette	0.0279
	(0.0190)
AOC feeling thermometer	0.167***
	(0.0311)
Biden feeling thermometer	0.0751**
	(0.0355)
Egalitarianism	0.269***
	(0.0456)
Government Size	0.0696**
	(0.0288)
Traditionalism	0.0559*
	(0.0301)
Moral Tolerance	0.0671*
	(0.0367)
Party Identity Strength	0.00464
	(0.0115)
Ideology	0.00769
	(0.00512)
Age	0.00113**
	(0.000490)
Gender (0 = Male , 1 = Female)	0.0351**
	(0.0172)
White	0.0306
	(0.0239)
Black	-0.0213
	(0.0301)
Income	0.00664*
	(0.00340)
Education	0.0103*
	(0.00605)
Constant	0.0546
	(0.0879)
Observations	972

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The dependent variables here is a five-point scale of respondent support for a wealth tax.

Table A3.4: Effects of Changes in Politician Feelings and Strength of Party ID on Changes in Equal Opportunity Values

| | 1992-1996 | 1996-1994 | 1994-1992 |
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Strength of Party Identity	-0.087***	-0.032***	-0.067***
	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Clinton Feeling Thermometer	0.048	0.061	0.041
	(0.055)	(0.041)	(0.046)
Observations	280	550	367

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The dependent variables here are changes in the equality value.

Table A3.5: Summary Statistics

	Lucid 2022 Survey	ANES 2020
Age	51.7	49.0
Gender	55% Female	53.7% Female
Race	78.1% White 9.2% Black	72.1% White 8.8% Black

Table A4.1: Effects of Group Sentiments on Equality Values Among Democrats

VARIABLES	(1) Equality
Ideology	-0.0303***
	(0.00398)
Black GS	0.227***
	(0.0377)
Asian GS	0.0937**
	(0.0374)
Hispanic GS	-0.0449
	(0.0429)
LGB GS	0.0494
	(0.0334)
Muslim GS	0.00937
	(0.0249)
Trans GS	0.0521
	(0.0334)
White GS	-0.144***
	(0.0253)
Age	0.111***
	(0.0258)
Income	0.0297**
	(0.0142)
Education	0.0151
	(0.0176)
White	0.00138
	(0.00976)
Female	-0.00993
	(0.00870)
Constant	0.652***
	(0.0312)
Observations	1,288
R-squared	0.218

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: 2020 ANES

Table A4.2: Effects of Group Sentiments on Equality Values Among Republicans

VARIABLES	(1) Equality
Ideology	-0.0471***
	(0.00585)
Black GS	0.124**
	(0.0534)
Asian GS	0.0690
	(0.0572)
Hispanic GS	-0.0450
	(0.0647)
LGB GS	0.0166
	(0.0400)
Muslim GS	0.000676
	(0.0316)
Trans GS	0.103**
	(0.0399)
White GS	-0.0967**
	(0.0473)
Age	0.0639*
	(0.0378)
Income	-0.0594***
	(0.0209)
Education	0.000770
	(0.0243)
White	-0.00420
	(0.0176)
Female	-0.00812
	(0.0124)
Constant	0.724***
	(0.0485)
Observations	1,150
R-squared	0.118

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: 2020 ANES

Table A4.3: Effects of Group Sentiments on Limited Government Values Among Democrats

VARIABLES	(1) Limited Government
Ideology	0.0483***
	(0.00651)
Black GS	-0.0118
	(0.0616)
Asian GS	0.0298
	(0.0610)
Hispanic GS	0.0250
	(0.0700)
LGB GS	0.0496
	(0.0546)
Muslim GS	-0.0362
	(0.0406)
Trans GS	-0.0614
	(0.0545)
White GS	-0.0310
	(0.0413)
Age	-0.140***
	(0.0422)
Income	-0.0632***
	(0.0231)
Education	-0.0899***
	(0.0287)
White	0.0269*
	(0.0159)
Female	0.0196
	(0.0142)
Constant	0.297***
	(0.0509)
Observations	1,286
R-squared	0.087

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: 2020 ANES

Table A4.4: Effects of Group Sentiments on Limited Government Values Among Republicans

VARIABLES	(1) Limited Government
Ideology	0.0799***
	(0.00790)
Black GS	0.0717
	(0.0721)
Asian GS	0.182**
	(0.0772)
Hispanic GS	0.0162
	(0.0874)
LGB GS	0.0799
	(0.0541)
Muslim GS	-0.0217
	(0.0426)
Trans GS	-0.125**
	(0.0539)
White GS	-0.256***
	(0.0638)
Age	0.187***
	(0.0511)
Income	0.0586**
	(0.0282)
Education	0.114***
	(0.0329)
White	0.0331
	(0.0238)
Female	-0.0981***
	(0.0167)
Constant	0.137**
	(0.0655)
Observations	1,149
R-squared	0.177

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: 2020 ANES

Table A4.5: Effects of Group Sentiments on Moral Traditionalism Values Among Democrats

VARIABLES	(1) Moral Traditionalism
Ideology	0.0447***
	(0.00565)
Black GS	0.000330
	(0.0532)
Asian GS	0.0410
	(0.0529)
Hispanic GS	-0.159***
	(0.0606)
LGB GS	-0.196***
	(0.0473)
Muslim GS	0.0426
	(0.0353)
Trans GS	-0.0854*
	(0.0472)
White GS	0.191***
	(0.0356)
Age	0.393***
	(0.0365)
Income	-0.0519***
	(0.0200)
Education	-0.0131
	(0.0249)
White	-0.0147
	(0.0138)
Female	0.0203*
	(0.0123)
Constant	0.282***
	(0.0446)
Observations	1,283
R-squared	0.298

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: 2020 ANES

Table A4.6: Effects of Group Sentiments on Moral Traditionalism Values Among Republicans

VARIABLES	(1) Moral Traditionalism
Ideology	0.0662***
	(0.00561)
Black GS	0.0630
	(0.0512)
Asian GS	0.0540
	(0.0549)
Hispanic GS	-0.000903
	(0.0622)
LGB GS	-0.0994***
	(0.0385)
Muslim GS	-0.000229
	(0.0303)
Trans GS	-0.0848**
	(0.0384)
White GS	-0.00509
	(0.0454)
Age	0.329***
	(0.0363)
Income	0.0111
	(0.0200)
Education	0.0184
	(0.0233)
White	0.00341
	(0.0169)
Female	0.0200*
	(0.0119)
Constant	0.194***
	(0.0465)
Observations	1,150
R-squared	0.271

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: 2020 ANES

Figure A2.1: Effect of Group Sentiment on
Ideological Distance from Candidates by Gender

Note: Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Ideology for both the candidate and respondent are measured on a 7 point scale and rescaled 0-1.
Full Sample: N=948. Female Respondents: N=548. Male Respondents: N=400.

Source: 2020 Qualtrics Survey.

In Figure A1 I conduct additional data analysis that I believe supports the use of group closeness items as measures of group sentiment. I argue that if respondents are revealing their issue preferences through group closeness measures, then these measures should significantly impact perceived ideological difference. For example, using gender as a heuristic a respondent may assume candidates who are women will better represent women on gender issues. If this respondent cares strongly about women's issues, possibly revealed by group closeness items, they should perceive a smaller ideological distance between themselves and candidates who are women. Figure A1 shows that this is not the case. The figure reports that the average ideological distance between a respondent and a female or male candidate is not influenced by their score on the closeness to women measure. This average ideological distance is influenced by closeness to men, but this effect occurs for both male and female candidates. Respondents who report feeling closer to men report larger ideological distances between themselves and both male and female candidates. This suggests closeness to men leads respondents to perceive themselves as more ideologically distant than all Democrats not just women. Therefore, these group closeness measures are not simply capturing policy preferences, but rather actual sentiments toward groups as intended.

Figure A2.2: Effects of Group Sentiment on Candidate Support Using Poisson Model


Note: Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. The figures show Poisson models in which the dependent variable the number of times a candidate was chosen in their 5 matchups (ranges from 0-5). All group closeness measures ran from 0-1. N=982.

See appendix Table A2.8 for regression output.

Source: 2020 Qualtrics Survey.

Figure A2.3: Effects of Group Sentiment on Candidate Support Among Never Trump Voters

Note: Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. The dependent variable in these models is the number of times a candidate was chosen in their 5 matchups (ranges from 0-5). N=807.

Source: 2020 Qualtrics Survey.

Figure A2.4: Effect of Group Sentiments on Choosing a Female Candidate
Using Poisson Model

Note: Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. The figure shows a Poisson model in which the dependent variable indicates the number of times a female candidate was chosen over a male candidate in the 8 female/male matchups (ranges from 0-8). All group closeness measures range from 0-1.
See appendix Table A2.9 for regression output.
Full Sample: N=948. Female Respondents: N=548. Male Respondents: N=400.

Source: 2020 Qualtrics Survey.

Figure A2.5: Marginal Effects of Female Group Sentiment on Voting for a Female Candidate by Respondent Political Knowledge

Note: Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. The dependent variable in these models indicates the number of times a female candidate was chosen over a male candidate in the 8 female/male matchups (ranges from 0-8). N=948.

Source: 2020 Qualtrics Survey.

Figure A4.1: Distrubution of Limited Government Value Across Parties

Source: 2020 ANES

Figure A4.2: Distrubution of Moral Traditionalism Value Across Parties

Source: 2020 ANES

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University of Mississippi
- Ph.D. in Political Science, Expected 2023
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- PolsBC 3337: Reforming American Elections
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- Pol 251: Introduction to Political Science Methods
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    - Spring 2019
- Pol 363: War in World Politics
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PUBLISHED ARTICLES

- King, J. B. (2022). Divisions in the Big Tent: Group Sentiments and Candidate Preferences within the Democratic Party. *American Politics Research* 50(4), 488-502. https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X221081481

WORKING PAPERS/ PROJECTS IN PROGRESS

- "Partisan Policy Preferences on Controversial Intraparty Issues"
- "The Effects of Changing Party Composition Perception on Affective Polarization" with Conor Dowling and Austin Cutler.

CONFERENCE PAPERS

- King, Jonah (2020) "Divisions in the Big Tent: How Group Attachments Predict Primary Vote Choice in the Democratic Party." Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago, IL*.

- King, Jonah (2020) "Divisions in the Big Tent: How Group Attachments Predict Primary Vote Choice in the Democratic Party." Presented at the annual meeting of the International Society of Political Psychologist in Berlin, DE**.

- King, Jonah (2021) "The Effects of Changing Party Composition Perception on Affective Polarization" with Conor Dowling and Austin Cutler Presented virtually at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.

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