

THE RECRUITMENT AND TRANSPORTATION
OF ELIZABETHAN TROOPS AND THEIR
SERVICE IN IRELAND, 1594 - 1603

Thesis submitted in accordance with
the requirements of the University of
Liverpool for the degree of Doctor in
Philosophy by

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October 1982

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The subject of the thesis followed as a natural progression from previous interest in sixteenth century lieutenancy, and a continuing concern with Irish history. My earliest debts for encouragement are to Professors A.G. Dickens, J. Hurstfield and G.A. Hayes McCoy, the last two sadly deceased. My greatest debt of thanks must be given Dr. Michael Power of the University of Liverpool for his painstaking supervision, patience and sound advice at every stage of the work.

For references and encouragement to persevere with the work my list of debts to other historians is a long one: Professor D.B. Quinn, Professor R. Dudley Edwards, Professor N. Canny were helpful on the Irish aspect of the thesis, and Dr. David Palliser, Dr. Roger Schofield, Dr. B. Harris, and Nicholas Allridge of the University of Liverpool gave good advice on some of the English aspects.

To archivists and librarians my list is necessarily longer; in Liverpool to the staffs of the Sydney Jones University Library, the City's Central Libraries and to Miss Frances Wilson of Christ's Notre Dame library for inter-library facilities. In London, my thanks are due to the librarians and archivists at the Public Record Office, The British Library, Lambeth Palace Library, The Institute of Historical Research and the College of Arms. In Oxford, my thanks are due to the librarians who helped me in the Bodleian. The archivists at the Chester City Record Office, Lancashire County Record Office, Kent County Record Office and the Staffordshire Record Office were always helpful on visits and in prompt answers by letter. To Miss Close at the Bristol Archives Office my thanks are due for help with mayoral papers. To the librarians at Hatfield House, the William Salt Library, Stafford, and the Folger Shakespearean Library, Washington, U.S.A. I am grateful for photocopies of manuscripts. And although my search for sixteenth century military records did not prove fruitful I am grateful for prompt replies from Gwynedd, Clwyd, Pembroke, Flintshire, Derbyshire and the City of Southampton Record Offices. In Dublin my thanks are due to the librarians of the National Library, Trinity College Library, the Royal Irish Academy Library, and to the Deputy Keeper, Public Record Office, Belfast for photocopies.

Finally, the work would not have been completed without a term's leave from the Liverpool Institute of Higher Education, or, indeed, without the support of my wife and family.

ABBREVIATIONS

<u>AFM</u>	<u>Annals of the kingdom of Ireland by the Four Masters</u> , edited and translated by J. O'Donovan (7 vols., Dublin, 1851).
<u>APC</u>	<u>Acts of the privy council of England</u> , edited by J.R. Dasent (32 vols., London 1890-1907).
<u>Arch.Cant.</u>	<u>Archaeologia Cantiana</u> , Kent Archaeology Society.
B.L.	The British Library.
Bodleian	Bodleian Library, Oxford.
BAO	Bristol Archives Office.
<u>BIHR</u>	<u>Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research</u> .
<u>Cal.Carew MSS</u>	<u>Calendar of the Carew Papers</u> in the Lambeth Palace Library.
<u>CPR</u>	<u>Calendar of the Patent Rolls, Ireland</u> .
CRO	Cheshire County Record Office.
CCR	Chester City Record Office.
<u>CSPI</u>	<u>Calendar of State Papers, Ireland</u> .
<u>CSPD</u>	<u>Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, England</u> .
<u>DNB</u>	<u>Dictionary of National Biography</u> .
<u>EHR</u>	<u>English Historical Review</u> .
<u>Econ.H.R.</u>	<u>Economic History Review</u> .
<u>HMC</u>	<u>Historical Manuscripts Commission</u> .
<u>IMC</u>	<u>Irish Manuscripts Commission</u> .
<u>IER</u>	<u>Irish Ecclesiastical Record</u> .
<u>IHS</u>	<u>Irish Historical Studies</u> .
<u>Irish Sword</u>	<u>Irish Sword: The Journal of the Military History Society of Ireland</u> (Dublin, 1949--).
KCA	Kent County Archives (Maidstone).
LRO	Lancashire Record Office (Preston).
Lambeth MSS	Lambeth Palace Library Manuscripts (London).
<u>Narration</u>	<u>Sir Henry Docwra's Narration of the services done by the army ymployed to Lough Foyle in Celtic Society Miscellany</u> , (Dublin 1849).
<u>Itinerary</u>	Fynes Moryson, <u>An Itinerary</u> (4 vols., MacLehose, Glasgow, 1907-1908).
<u>OED</u>	<u>Oxford English Dictionary</u>
PRO	Public Record Office of England, Chancery Lane.
p.c.	Privy council.
RIA	Royal Irish Academy.
SRO	Staffordshire Record Office, Stafford.
SP	State Papers.

.../cont.

TRHS Transactions of the Royal Historical Society.
TLCAS Transactions of the Lancashire and Cheshire
 Antiquarian Society.
THSLC Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire
 and Cheshire.
TCD Trinity College, Dublin.
UJA Ulster Journal of Archaeology.
VCH Victoria County History.

ABSTRACT

The Recruitment and transportation of Elizabethan troops and their service in Ireland, 1594 - 1603

John James Noel McGurk

The thesis begins with a survey of Ireland's condition in the sixteenth century. In a consideration of contemporary war aims on both sides the historiography of the subject is incorporated in the introduction. Recruitment, deployment, and the composition of the forces fighting in Ireland in the 1590s are examined in an overall view of demands on the English and Welsh shires to maintain those forces in field armies and garrisons. The difference between what the government ideally wished for from the military resources of the shires and what they provided in practice can be discerned.

Infantry and cavalry levies sent out of Kent, a shire remote from the Irish theatre of warfare are studied in detail for every year of the war. Similar levies to Ireland from the midlands of Northamptonshire and Derbyshire, and from the maritime counties of Lancashire and Cheshire, nearer Ireland are studied to provide a contrast in local military administration to those sent from Kent. The six chapters of Part One of the thesis shows how in recruiting Irish levies the Elizabethan state exercised increased control over the localities, and in this respect makes a comment on the character and workings of the Elizabethan state in time of war. Part One proves the general unpopularity of the Irish war in giving evidence of reluctance to bear the burdens of government demands, and of war weariness in the shires.

In Part Two the billeting and transportation of the troops levied are considered by concentrating on the three main military ports of Chester, Bristol and Barnstaple, but to complete this aspect, levies sent to other and less important ports for the war are also studied. Part Two sharply exposed the practical problems in the ports, and of how local and central government overcame them to successfully assemble and ship enough levies of recruits and re-inforcements as well as the habillements of war to supply the commanders in Ireland over a period of almost nine years.

In Part Three the enquiry is extended into Ireland by emphasizing the life and conditions of the Elizabethan soldier there by considering the problems of maintaining an army in late sixteenth century Ireland, as well as the strategies, tactics, arms and armour used in the war. Welfare measures taken for the sick and wounded in Ireland as well as relief measures on their return to England completes the thesis. Part Three may be said to ^{establish} ~~prove~~ the hard and cheerless life of the Elizabethan soldier in Ireland. The thesis as a whole demonstrates the determination of the Elizabethan government to regain sovereignty over Ireland by means of a military conquest.

INTRODUCTION

But if the Plaines of Cresy, like a Booke
 Containe in Characters their heavie doome
 If Bullen, Turney, Poictiers, pale do looke,
 To think what hath, or may here after come;
 If they be witnesses how ill we brooke
 Disembling lips, when Trueth the goale hath won,
 Treading on falsehood: Why not then Terone? (1)

Background to the Nine Years War:

The condition of Ireland was one of the many difficulties facing Queen Elizabeth at her accession; the mention of rebellion in Ireland made the queen "sick and ill".⁽²⁾ The country was rarely free from rebellion throughout the forty-five years of Elizabeth's reign; as late in the reign as May 1596 the queen reminded the Irish council she would reform the disordered state of Ireland with the sword to the obstinate and with justice to the oppressed.⁽³⁾ Ireland was perhaps the most complex and intractable problem of Elizabethan England, a most "unwelcome inheritance from Henry VIII".⁽⁴⁾

One major feature of Irish life throughout the sixteenth century, which affected the whole history of Anglo-Irish relations lay in the different cultural groups among Ireland's population. Four chief groups may be distinguished: the native Gaelic Irish, the old English of the Pale and of the towns, the Scots, and the new English, officials of church and state in Dublin and new adventurers who planted the subdued parts of Munster, Leinster and

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1. England's Hope against Irish Hate (1600) un-paginated pamphlet in Lambeth Palace Library, endorsed "Thomas Heyes, his cobby".
 2. J.Morrin (ed.) Cal. Patent Rolls, Ireland, ii (1862) p.lxiii.
 3. Calendar of State Papers, Ireland (hereafter CSPI).
 4. N.P.Canny, The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland: A Pattern Established, 1565-1576 (Harvester, 1976) ll.

Connaught. The native Gaelic Irish, the majority of the population, were represented by sixty or more Gaelic lords or chiefs. Their system of society, traditions, laws and language were so different from the English system that two different nations lived in Ireland. In Ulster the Gaelic population predominated led by the chiefs of the O'Neills', O'Donnells', Maguires', MacMahons', O'Reillys' and O'Rourkes' to name only the more notable. In Connaught Burkes, O'Malleys, O'Connors and O'Kellys represented the more Gaelic families of the west. To the south and west the O'Sullivans, O'Briens, and MacCarthys were the most prominent Gaelic lords or chiefs, and while Leinster had been the most Anglicized of the four provinces of Ireland, O'Connors, O'Moore's and O'Byrnes headed notable Gaelic family groups, outside the English Pale and the towns.⁽¹⁾

(See Map 1) Among the old English many had adopted the Gaelic way of life through inter-marriage with native Gaelic stock, and had thrown off their English allegiance. Such were the Fitzgeralds, the Roches, the Barrys, the Powers, Butlers, Dillons, Tyrells and Savages. Contemporary Englishmen referred to them as "English rebels" and "Irish enemies". Of the third group, the Gaelic Scots, strongest perhaps in the north-east of Ulster the most representative were the Mac Donnells of Antrim.⁽²⁾ The 'new' English had been going to Ireland throughout the Tudor period as leaders of expeditions, would-be colonizers and officials in the Dublin administration in state, church and army; their names are celebrated in Elizabethan history, Sidney, Perrott, Raleigh, Gilbert, Spenser, Bagenall, Norris, Russell, Essex and Mountjoy. Many of the lesser known names of those

1. G.A.Hayes-McCoy, "Gaelic society in the late sixteenth century" in Historical Studies, iv (1963), 45-61

2. G.Hill, An historical account of the MacDonnells of Antrim (Belfast, 1873).

who went into Ireland as captains of levies and who stayed as planters will be found throughout this thesis.⁽¹⁾

To understand the background of the Elizabethan re-conquest two important consequences of earlier attempts to subdue Ireland need to be emphasised; firstly, after the Anglo-Norman twelfth century invasion, kings of England claimed to be lords of Ireland; secondly, at the same time the association of kingship with land ownership emerged and stood in sharp contrast to native Gaelic tradition in which a king or chief was the elected leader of his people with no hereditary rights to land or office. The effective owners of the land were the families who occupied and tilled them. Historians agree that this was to be changed by the Irish policy of Henry VIII. No kingdom of Ireland existed in legal fact until an Irish parliament of 1541 recognised Henry VIII, not as lord of Ireland, but as king of Ireland.⁽²⁾ Henry's intention was to bring about a revolution; the "sundry sorts" of people who made up the Irish population were all to be anglicized and treated henceforth as the king's subjects. The Gaelic lords were directed to hold lands as fiefs of the crown of England with the result that the crown would recover its de facto power over the land of Ireland. The policy became known as "Surrender and Re-grant", and the king's deputy in Ireland, Anthony St. Leger (1540-1551) carried out the long process of negotiation with the Irish or Gaelic lords.⁽³⁾ By King Henry VIII's death in 1547 forty of the principal Gaelic and Old English lords had made their peace and had undertaken to obey English

1. See Appendix 2

2. 33 Henry VIII c.1 in the Irish Statutes (1786 ed.), I, 176

3. W.F. Butler, "The policy of surrender and re-grant" in the Journal of the Royal Soc. of Antiquaries, Ireland, xliii (1913)

laws. In return the king gave them English titles, earldoms to Con O'Neill in Ulster, MadWilliam Burke in Connaught and to Murrough O'Brien in Thomond, seats in parliament, and permission to receive confiscated church lands within their own territories. As part of the anglicization programme Henry VIII introduced the new reformed religion into Ireland, though ultimately the reformation had little success in Ireland.⁽¹⁾

There was a basic weakness in the Henrician scheme of conciliation with the Gaelic lords. In sixteenth century Ireland the family communities were the traditional holders of the lands so that by negotiating with the lords the crown ignored the majority of the families whose Brehon laws and customs recognised no association of landownership and tenure of public offices. In other words, the English crown assumed in a feudal sense the absolute ownership of all Irish land, and confused the office of Gaelic chieftanship, an elective one, with land ownership. The agreements then made with individual Gaelic chiefs who would not bind their successors under Brehon law to keep these covenants with the English crown, became recipes for future troubles. Endemic domestic intrigues between Irish families exacerbated the confusion.⁽²⁾ For their part many chiefs were willing enough to convert unstable land interests into firm feudal tenures, but they could not change overnight the traditions of their peoples.⁽³⁾ It was a situation soon appreciated by the government when rebellion broke out against the royal policy, anglicization and reformation. Two generations of violent reaction would follow before the final downfall of the

1. B. Bradshaw, The Dissolution of the Religious Orders in Ireland under Henry VIII (Cambridge, 1974), Appendix 1, Tables of property redistribution, pp. 231-247.

2. W.F. Butler, art. cit., pp. 161-162

3. 28 Henry VIII c.15 in Irish Statutes, I (1786 ed.), 119-127

Gaelic system.⁽¹⁾

Elizabeth's policy towards Ireland in the 1560s was a continuation of her father's, reform not conquest. The Irish parliament of 1560, representing only the anglicised part of Ireland, tried to make Ireland protestant by legislation, but the religious conservatism of the old English and Gaelic Irish, and the association of the reformed religion with an alien government made catholicism a force which cemented Irish unity and resistance to England. Although English determination to control Ireland increased under Elizabeth the hope of achieving it was by negotiation; negotiation was economical, force cost money.⁽²⁾ Even as late as 1570 the old Henrician policy was being pursued. By the act of parliament, 12 Eliz., c.4 Gaelic chiefs surrendered their lands, and received them back by patents under the crown to descend in hereditary succession in accord with the laws of England. Checks were placed on the traditional exactions from their peoples whence they raised military forces. In lieu of these customary dues the chiefs were to receive money rents.⁽³⁾ It was not universally successful for the Gaelic chiefs had ever regarded themselves as military leaders and began to resent the diminution of their powers, especially after the shiring of the provinces in the 1570s and 1580s when, (with the exception of the greater part Ulster) sheriffs were introduced into their areas, and with them the full administrative machinery of English law.⁽⁴⁾ In theory, it appeared that progress had been made in the Anglicization of Ireland,

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1. R.Dudley Edwards, Ireland in the Age of the Tudors (1977), chs. 4-8
 2. N.Canny, Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland (Harvester, 1976), ch. 3
 3. For traditional Gaelic exactions such as "bonnaght" or the billeting of soldiers see J.Dymmock, "A Treatise of Ireland, 1600" in Irish Archaeological Tracts (Dublin, 1842), 8 - 10
 4. CSPI., (1588-1592), 267

and the towns, none of which was of native origin, gave active support to the servants of the crown.⁽¹⁾

But the growing resentment of many Gaelic lords soon became armed hostility. In the late 1580s in the province of Connaught the leading family of the Burkes rose in rebellion saying that they would have a MacWilliam Burke, not an English earl, and if not, they would go to Spain for one and that they would "tolerate no sheriff nor any of them or their people answer at any court of assize or sessions of the peace".⁽²⁾ Outside the English Pale (See Map 1) rebellious attitudes became widespread. Yet the aim of voluntarily securing the individual loyalty of the dynastic chiefs was never completely abandoned, especially if this could be achieved by exploiting feuds between hibernicised families like the Butlers and the Geraldines.⁽³⁾

In the complex series of attempts to govern Ireland in the 1570s and 1580s some general trends can be discerned: efforts at conciliation and the gradual introduction of English administration and laws were followed by outbreaks of rebellion, which led to the confiscation of lands, which in turn was followed by attempts at plantation and piecemeal colonization. Events in the province of Munster in the 1570s and 1580s provide an example of trends in English policy.

The rich, fertile and accessible province of Munster became a magnet for the land hungry adventurers from the west of England.⁽⁴⁾ The province was on the sea route to Spain, the Azores, and significantly for those with long term colonizing objectives, such

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1. R.Dudley Edwards, Ireland in the Age of the Tudors (1977), 92-103
 2. CSPI., (1586-1588), 68, 98; ibid., (1588-1592), 173, 506
 3. G.A.Hayes-McCoy, "Conciliation and coercion, and the Protestant Reformation 1547-1571 in A New History of Ireland; Early Modern Ireland 1534-1691 (Oxford, 1976), iii, 88-92.
 4. N.Canny, op.cit., p.72

as Humphrey Gilbert, Munster could be considered a trial run to the Americas.⁽¹⁾ In Munster the feuds between the Butlers and Fitzgeralds provided opportunities for English interference by land hungry younger sons. Munster was in a state of rebellion from 1569 to 1573 led by Sir James Fitzmaurice Fitzgerald. Well established Anglo-Irish lords like MacCarthy, the Earl of Clancarty, joined the rebellion because of harassment by Sir Peter Carew and Humphrey Gilbert. Carew and Gilbert, both Devonshiremen, helped Sir John Perrott and the Earl of Ormond to crush the insurrection. Fitzmaurice escaped to the courts of Europe, collected an invading force of Spaniards and Italians and made a landing in Kerry in July 1579. But this second Desmond rebellion, was put down with severity; by November 1583 the province was quiet.⁽²⁾ The way was cleared for the confiscation of the Desmond estates. Every petition for letters patent for these Munster estates stressed the benefits which would accrue from a settled plantation of these fertile lands.⁽³⁾ Between 1585 and 1598 Gaelic Irish rebellious landowners were gradually dispossessed and replaced in their holdings by loyal English colonists, perhaps 12,000 of them. But the Munster plantation was not destined to last. In the last Gaelic resurgence of the queen's reign which began with the Ulster Gaelic lords, Maguire, O'Donnell and O'Neill, rebellion spread throughout Ireland and brought disaster to the Munster colony in 1598. Many of the colonists returned to England in a hurry like Edmund Spenser; many were killed, and some may have joined the Irish.⁽⁴⁾

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1. D.B.Quinn, "Renaissance influences in English Colonization" in TRHS., 5th ser. vol. 26 (1976), 84-86
 2. G.A.Hayes McCoy, art. cit., in New History of Ireland (short title), 105-106.
 3. N.Canny, op.cit., 81-82
 4. D.B.Quinn, "The Plantation of Munster, problems and opportunities" in Journal of Cork Historical and Archaeological Society, lxxxi (1966), 19-40

In Connaught, which lies west of the River Shannon, the government aimed at destroying local Gaelic independence, as elsewhere, through a settlement negotiated with the local Gaelic lords known as "The Composition of Connaught" which confirmed them in their estates and introduced money rents instead of services and contributions in kind. The composition was one of the most important achievements of Sir John Perrott as Lord Deputy (1584-1588).⁽¹⁾ However, the harsh methods of the military governor, Sir Richard Bingham, towards the peasantry of northern Connaught drew their hostility,⁽²⁾ and in this they were aided by the O'Donnells of Tyrconnell, modern Donegal, who had lands and influence in many parts of northern Connaught. Under the leadership of the able and energetic Red Hugh O'Donnell (c. 1574-1604) the Gaelic forces incursions into Connaught kept that province unsettled.⁽³⁾ And when O'Donnell joined O'Neill and other Ulster lords such as Maguire their confederacy headed the greatest Gaelic resistance the Elizabethan government had encountered in Ireland. (See Map 1.)


Of the four provinces of Ireland, Ulster proved the most intractable to conquest and anglicization. Mountainous and much afforested all its southern approaches were through wood, bog and lough and it must have presented the appearance of an impenetrable fortress. The most inaccessible part lay around the Sperrin Mountains and the great forest of Glenconkein, the homeland of the O'Neills, ancestral lords of much of the entire province. A veritable water barrier, the sea, the Foyle, the Erne, the Blackwater, Lough Neagh and the Bann rivers formed an almost continuous water

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1. James Perrott, The Chronicle of Ireland, 1584-1608 edited by H.Wood, Irish Manuscripts Commission (hereafter I.M.C.), Dublin, 1933.
 2. D.N.B., s.v., Bingham, Sir Richard. Sir Henry Docwra served as a captain under Bingham in Connaught and wrote his experience in "A Relation of Service done in Ireland" in Celtic Miscellany edited by J.O'Donovan (Dublin, 1849)
 3. P.Walsh (ed.) O'Clery's Life of Red Hugh O'Donnell, i, ii (Dublin, 1948, 1957).

Map 1.

Ireland, 1594-1603

▲ Garrisons, forts, 1600-1602
 ● General places of Garrisons
 ✂ Estates
 ■ Trench Landings
 The Pale c. 1540
 - - - - - The Pale c. 1596



defence. (See Map 2.)

However, the main passages into sixteenth century Ulster were from the south west where Ulster and Connaught are divided by the river and series of loughs collectively called the Erne. At Ballyshannon where the Erne flows into the Atlantic, and at south Donegal, the area of O'Donnell's ancestral lands, were the best entrances into Ulster because naval support could effectively be given to an invading force. Enniskillen on the isthmus between Upper and Lower Lough Erne became a natural position for a garrison to control the passage into south-west Ulster.⁽¹⁾ To the south-east there was the historic Gap of the North, the gorge in the hills between Dundalk and Newry known in the period as the Moyry Pass, a traditional gateway into Ulster from the south. (See Map 3) And, at Armagh, not far from the river Blackwater, and barely fifteen mile from O'Neill's chief seat, Dungannon, English commanders kept a precarious foothold on this passage into Tyrone. (See Map 2)


On Ulster's coastlines the only English footholds by 1594 were small garrisons at Enniskillen, Carrickfergus, Olderfleet, and Carlingford. Belfast was then unimportant, but Captain Thomas Lee advocated fortifying Belfast rather than Carrickfergus to command the area south to Carlingford.⁽²⁾ The difficult terrain of south-east Ulster is clearly illustrated in Map 3, a portion of a map attributed to Richard Bartlett, military map-maker with Mountjoy's forces.⁽³⁾ Sir John Davies considered Ulster to be "a very wilderness the

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1. G.A.Hayes-McCoy, Ulster and other Irish Maps, c.1600 (Irish Manuscripts Commission, Dublin, 1964).
 2. British Library (hereafter B.L.), Add.Ms., 33, 743, f.89, "Discoverie, Recoverie and Apology".
 3. PRO.M.P.F./36, and for Bartlett's map or description of the Blackwater, PRO.N.I., T2125/2/4. Bartlett was beheaded by Gaelic Irish in 1603 before he finished mapping Donegal.

Map 3

SOUTH EAST ULSTER, 1602

This portion of Bartlett's larger map shows the difficulty of the terrain between Dundalk and northward into the Moyry Pass, the historical Gap of the North, a defile in the mountains (Bottom right-hand corner, highlighted)



1. The original is in the PRO.MPF/36. This reproduction is from Seanchas Ard Mhacha, volume 7, no.1 (1973), p.24 by kind permission of His Eminence, Cardinal Archbishop of Armagh and Primate of All Ireland, Tomás Ó Fiaich.

inhabitants having for the most part no certain habitation in any towns or villages".⁽¹⁾ Apart from "plotte" and "plans" of forts and garrisons made by military map-makers such as Richard Bartlett, John Thomas and Robert Ashby of the fringes of Ulster, the interior of the province remained uncharted until the plantation surveys of the early seventeenth century.⁽²⁾ The Irish are not known to have used maps except those they captured or stole to send on to Spain.⁽³⁾ There were general descriptions of the province in the many "Discourses" and "Discoveries" dealing with Ireland at large, and at least one particular description by Sir Henry Bagenal written in 1586.⁽⁴⁾

The major figure in the Ulster rebellion of the 1590s was Hugh O'Neill, 2nd Earl of Tyrone (1540-1616). At home in both worlds, English and Gaelic, he was a subtle politician, organizer of genius, outstanding leader and soldier with rare gifts of patience and ability to inspire loyalty. It is almost impossible to say when he first decided to be the champion of Gaelic separatism. He had himself inaugurated as "The O'Neill" on the ancestral stone chair at Tullahogue, near Dungannon in 1593. Did he then calculate that he had more to gain by furthering his ambitions as the Gaelic O'Neill than he had as the English Earl of Tyrone?⁽⁵⁾ Hugh Maguire of Fermanagh had already rebelled in July 1593, Hugh or Red Hugh O'Donnell a year later, but Hugh O'Neill waited, prepared

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1. Sir John Davies "A Discovery of the true causes why Ireland was never entirely subdued" in H. Morley (ed.), Ireland under Elizabeth and James (1890), 340-341
 2. For an example of John Thomas' maps see Map 5 in Chapter Eleven below; some of Ashby's work in the series of military maps in PRO.N.I., T2125/1-5
 3. CSPI., (1601-1603), 529, deposition of Jordan Roche before Sir George Carew in Cork, 19 November 1602.
 4. Sir Henry Bagenal's "Description of Ulster, 1586" in Ulster Journal of Archaeology, ii (1854), 137-160
 5. For O'Neill's earliest hostilities, CSPI., (1592-1596), 179, 215, 384-386, 393

his forces and came out in full and open rebellion in the spring of 1595.⁽¹⁾

According to Fynes Moryson many Englishmen regarded the frequent occurrence of rebellion in Ireland lightly "thinking them rather profitable to exercise the English in arms than dangerous to disturb the State".⁽²⁾ At the beginning of the rebellion this seemed to be the attitude. Sir William Fitzwilliam (1588-1594) had made Munster and Connaught generally quiet in his efforts to establish recognition of the queen's sovereignty over rebellious Irish and Old English lords alike. The Dublin administration was of the opinion that the reduction of Gaelic Ulster would follow the pattern set in Connaught, and that the rebellion stirring in the north would hardly be more difficult to quell than Shane O'Neill's had been.⁽³⁾

Such attitudes underestimated the strength of Gaelic Ulster. From 1594 to 1599 O'Neill and O'Donnell were largely successful in keeping the English out of Ulster; Clontibret (1595) and the Yellow Ford (1598) were their best known victories. They were then able to unite most elements of opposition to the crown in almost every part of Ireland by presenting their cause, not as an Ulster one of defence, but as an Irish one of freedom from England and, with the aid of Spain, they hoped to shake off English sovereignty and restore traditional catholicism.⁽⁴⁾

Though the Irish fought a defensive war with courage, and, at times with uncharacteristic unity of purpose under O'Neill's leadership, they and their allies the Spanish, when they landed in 1601, were defeated by the greater resources of the English state.

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1. G.A.Hayes-McCoy, "Strategy and tactics in Irish warfare, 1595-1601" in Irish Historical Studies, ii, (1941), 256.
 2. C.L.Falkiner, Illustrations of Irish history and topography (1904) 287
 3. Sir William Fitzwilliam was lord deputy first in (1571-1575), for this first term of office see N.P.Canny, op.cit., pp.132, 139, 157-159, and again lord deputy (1588-1594), see D.N.B., s.v., Fitzwilliam, Sir William.
 4. See chapter one, under Irish war aims.

English command of the seas checked further foreign help to the Irish, the English army and garrisons were kept victualled and supplied, and the last Elizabethan Lord Deputy, Mountjoy, conquered Ireland for Queen Elizabeth. The queen succeeded where her predecessors had failed. For the first time in Ireland's history all its inhabitants became the subjects of one authority. The military victory ensured that that authority would be English. But though Ireland was managed and controlled, it was permanently hardly pacified. ←

The recent historiographical revolution in sixteenth century Irish history, mainly represented in the work of D.B.Quinn, R.Dudley Edwards, G.A.Hayes McCoy, N.P.Canny and B.Bradshaw, has greatly altered the picture of Elizabethan activity in Ireland since the pioneering work of R.Bagwell.⁽¹⁾ And though there is not as yet a full scale study of the Nine Years War or a definitive biography of Hugh O'Neill, the specialist articles of the authors mentioned have unbound the subject from a purely nationalistic interpretation. Ten years ago when I asked Professor G.A.Hayes McCoy if there was anything more to be said on the O'Neill war he firmly replied there was everything to do from the point of view of the Elizabethan military effort.

The most important secondary work with a bearing on some of the themes of the following thesis is C.G.Cruickshank's, Elizabeth's Army (2nd edition, Oxford 1966) but the emphasis of Cruickshank's book is on the army at home. Dr. L.Boynton's The Elizabethan

1. See the bibliography under the authors listed.

Militia (1967) was an important guide to musters and trained bands, but, for home defences in England; he has only three references to the war in Ireland. And, though nothing to do with the Nine Years War, A.Howell Lloyd's, The Rouen Campaign, 1590-1592 (Oxford, 1973) and G.Parker's The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659 (1972) show what could be done with reports and dispatches from other sixteenth century theatres of warfare. Apart from Cruickshank's and Boynton's works the only two other books with a bearing on military organization in Elizabethan England are A.L.Rowse's chapter ix in his The Expansion of Elizabethan England (1955) which does not reach the 1590s and his chapters on Ireland are marred by a chauvinistic approach; C.Falls' Elizabeth's Irish Wars (1950) covers all the rebellions in Ireland under Elizabeth by relying on the pioneering work of R.W.Bagwell, Ireland under the Tudors in three volumes (1885-1890). Both Rowse and Falls deal but sketchily on the system of raising men for the Irish levies. G.A.Hayes McCoy's later work in Irish Battles (1969) and his last contribution to the New History of Ireland, III, Early Modern Ireland, 1534-1691 (Oxford, 1976) emphasize the Gaelic resistance to anglicization and conquest and not so much the English effort to conquer. N.Canny's Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland: a pattern established, 1565-1576 (Harvester, 1976) while not reaching the 1590s showed the formation of new harsh attitudes on the part of the English to the Irish to justify conquest and colonization. D.B.Quinn's work on Ireland first showed that there was aim and method in Elizabethan plantations, and that since the discovery of the New World the strategic importance of Ireland to England had increased. (1)

1. For a fuller listing of these authors' contributions see the bibliography. All have helped directly or indirectly as background to the thesis.

This thesis is not a complete history of the war from the English side, but seeks to explore that effort. The recruitment, transportation and conditions of service of Elizabethan military levies in Ireland in the Nine Years War has not attracted any major study, and is therefore a gap which this thesis hopes to fill. Part One attempts to find out why the war was fought and demonstrates the demands made on the shires for manpower resources to conduct the war on the part of the late Elizabethan government, an area not formerly studied by other historians. Part One also shows some of the effects of the Irish war on the late Elizabethan state especially the way in which that war helped to bring about a unitary military organization, but not necessarily an efficient one. Again, this aspect is more mentioned than studied in the standard histories of Elizabethan England where the effects of the Irish war on the English state are generally treated in the broader context of the war with Spain, Ireland being ambiguously regarded now as domestic policy, and with Spanish intervention there in 1601, as foreign policy.⁽¹⁾ To my knowledge there is no secondary work on the embarkation and transportation of troops from England to Ireland in the 1590s. Part Two of this thesis hopes to fill this gap by setting out to account for every levy ordered to the ports of Chester, Bristol, Barnstaple and others; Chester proved to be the most important port in this respect. Part Three, by focussing on the impact of the war on the common soldier, hopes to fill a gap on the service and welfare conditions of the soldier in field and garrison and by considering the relief measures taken for the sick and wounded in Ireland and on their return to England.

1. For examples, The New Cambridge Modern History, iii (1968); J.B.Black, The Reign of Elizabeth (Oxford, 2nd edition, 1959) ch.xii.

In Part One of the thesis the reasons for selecting Kent, Northamptonshire, Derbyshire, Lancashire and Cheshire to focus on raising levies was primarily determined by the availability of lieutenancy records, such as the Sir John Leveson collection for Kent,⁽¹⁾ and secondarily to provide a contrast between the demands on inland and maritime shires as well as a contrast in organization between counties under lords lieutenant, like Kent, and those under commissioners for musters like Lancashire. Throughout Part One it was necessary to fill the gaps in local sources by collating them with the state papers, domestic and Ireland, and the privy council's registers.⁽²⁾ The letters and papers of Sir Robert Cecil, chiefly responsible with the queen for war policy, were also extensively used. While central government records are necessarily one-sided emphasising the state's policy, occasionally, letters and papers at local level, and especially quarter session records show a reluctance to and evasion of the demands on the shires, which, whenever possible to prove, was brought out.

In Part Two for the embarkation and transportation of troops to Ireland the most helpful major sources were the mayors' military papers, great letter books, and mayors' files in Chester City Record Office as well as the City of Chester's quarter sessions files. Unfortunately for the ports of Bristol, Barnstaple and other western ports there was a scarcity of local material dealing with troops to

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1. The Leveson collection, Staffordshire Record Office, D.593/S/4 were an important source for my "Lieutenancy in Kent, 1580-1620" M.Phil., thesis, University of London, 1971. The items dealing with troops to Ireland were deliberately excluded in that work for the purposes of the present thesis.
 2. In a great many instances when using the state papers Ireland it was necessary to consult the originals in the P.R.O., hence the two styles in referencing: page references for the calendars, for example, CSPI., (1598-1599), 245, but when the original was used, for example, PRO., SP.63/194/no.21

Ireland, but a picture of that activity emerged from a wider range of sources in print, the most useful proving to be J.Latimer's edition of the Annals of Bristol in the Sixteenth Century (1900) and J.R.Chanter & T.Wainwright editors of the Barnstaple Records (1900). And for the large levy assembled at Rochester in October 1601 the Leveson lieutenancy letters and papers for Kent once again proved to be a very useful major source for the final chapter of Part Two.

In Part Three contemporary English letters, accounts and dispatches particularly from those who were participants in the war were much used. Many of these are to be found extensively transcribed in the seven volumes of the calendars of the Irish state papers. Fynes Moryson's Itinerary while the most important single source for Mountjoy's management of the war is also important for insights into the life of the soldier in Ireland. And for some of the grim realities of a brutal war William Farmer's Chronicle of Ireland 1594-1613 views the war from his position as a surgeon with Mountjoy's forces, but more often than not he described the wounds of officers, and not the hurts of the common soldier. Petitions in the privy council registers, state papers and local sessions records helped to build up a picture of the provision made for the maimed soldiery on their return to England. Irish records with a bearing on the war and used mainly in Part Three are represented by the Annals of the Four Masters, and O'Clery's Life of Red Hugh O'Donnell which in P.Walsh's two volume translation (Dublin, 1948, 1957) provided valuable Irish attitudes to the hostilities. O'Sullivan Beare's History of Catholic Ireland (Lisbon, 1621) used in the translation and edition of M.Byrne entitled Ireland under Elizabeth (1903) was also valuable for the same purpose especially since the author's father and uncles were participants in the war.

The four appendices of the thesis: ships in the service of the Irish war; an~~α~~ alphabetical list of captains active in Ireland; a list of garrisons; and a register of relief awarded disabled and aged soldiers have been compiled from a wide variety of local and central government records.

CHAPTER ONE

War aims and justifications

"The Queen's meaning towards Ireland was nothing but good; she detested persecution, she was scrupulously anxious, like her father, to protect the Irish owners in the possession of their estates; yet she pursued a policy the most fertile in disaster that the most malignant ingenuity could have devised." (1)

Before the present revolution in the writing of Anglo-Irish history those who wrote of sixteenth century Ireland at best uncritically repeated contemporary and justificatory comments or, at worst, foisted on to sixteenth century conditions romantic notions of nationalism thereby interpreting the record of Anglo-Irish relations as a long drawn out and consistent conflict of Gael and Gall. In contrast, modern historical research, with a clearer understanding of both English and Irish societies in the sixteenth century, presents a picture of a conflict between an emergent renaissance state and an ancient Gaelic civilization with its own cross pattern of internal warfare, complicated by a bewildering series of alliances and counter alliances, with treachery and tragedy, and with motives noble and ignoble on both sides. The modern historiography of the subject is still far from being settled. Recent writers differ in their interpretations of government policy, on the interpretation of propaganda, and, as one might expect, on the personal motivation of the protagonists. The psychology of war aims can be a dangerous subject for the historian, but is it not virtually

1. J.A.Froude, The English in Ireland (1901) 52.

axiomatic of war history that the victorious always have a vested interest in the bad state of the country they hoped to rule and colonize?⁽¹⁾

(i) English aims:

The sixteenth century re-conquest was probably the first time since the twelfth century Anglo-Norman conquest that large numbers of Englishmen came into direct contact with the Gaelic Irish in their native habitat. Ireland had never been fully united in a political sense either by Gaelic kings or Anglo-Irish lords so that it can be argued that with the establishment of a strong centralized government in Tudor England it was almost inevitable that an attempt would be made to bring Ireland under more effective English control. In sixteenth century Ireland there were but few political institutions surviving from pre-Norman conquest times; those that did were local, not national, and therefore promoted division rather than unity, inevitably inviting interference from England.

Political institutions to govern Ireland were imported, as it were, from England and run by English settlers whose steady influx brought about a sharply divided population between old English settlers and new arrivals, and between them both and the native Gaelic Irish. The superstructure of institutions - a central authority in Dublin, a system of law administered by royal justices, the attempts to impose shires and sheriffs - were all in Professor J.C.Beckett's words "like a clock whose face was in Ireland while the works were in England".⁽²⁾ Strictly that 'clock face' was in the Pale, an area

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1. Representative authors of the new writing on the subject are listed under Quinn, D.B., Hayes McCoy, G.A., Canny N., Bradshaw, B., Moody, T.W., Edwards, D.R., McCurtain, M., and Clarke, A., in the bibliography.
 2. J.C.Beckett, 'The study of Irish history' in Confrontations: studies in Irish History (1972), 18.

extending about thirty miles round Dublin at the beginning of the sixteenth century but, which later extended north to Newry and Dundalk and west to Mullingar. Outside the Pale Gaelic chiefs and Anglo-Irish feudal overlords held sway. In overall charge were the Viceroy's, often called lords deputy, English or Anglo-Irish noblemen sent to head English administration; there were no less than seventy-six of them throughout the sixteenth century and they had varying success in governing Ireland.⁽¹⁾

It was certainly an overall Elizabethan aim to make the lord deputy's nominal government under the Crown more effective over the whole country, and this aim was given greater or less emphasis depending on the urgency and seriousness of rebellion in Ireland and on resources in England.⁽²⁾ Within that overall context a variety of English concerns can be discerned: the fear of Spanish intervention in Ireland, the queen's interest in Ireland, and the religious dimension of the struggle. Lastly, the opinions and comments of contemporary writers on Ireland, many of them little more than propagandists for the conquest, give an insight into English attitudes to the Irish.

Ireland in the sixteenth century could have easily become to England what the Netherlands were to Spain, 'a postern gate' through which the enemies of England were sure of a welcome. This provided what the Elizabethans called 'strong practical reasons' for pursuing a vigorous policy in Ireland. When Spanish aid was daily expected from about 1594 to aid O'Neill's growing rebellion in Ulster which threatened to unite all opposition to English attempts at rule, then

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1. Calendar of the Patent Rolls, Ireland, edited by J.Morrin (1861), i, preface, xvii, xviii, lii.
 2. The English presence in Ireland was naturally dependent on sea power to supply it; every lord deputy recognised "the commodity of the sea" as Lord Mountjoy put it. F.Moryson, Itinerary, ii, 392.

reasons of strategy dictated to queen and privy council a policy of repression in Ireland that hardly needed a justifying ideology. The aim of the war then became nothing less than England's own defence. This pragmatic approach so often seen in commissions and communiques was also enshrined in the terms of the lord deputy's oath of office:

"Ye shall defend her majesty's castells,
garizons, dominions, people ... and
represe her rebels and enemies ...
and all other thinges for the preservacion
of this her majesty's peace among the
people and execuccion of justice" (1)

In the parliament of 1597/8 Francis Bacon underlined the dangers to the realm by pointing to four main events which had increased those dangers: the king of France had turned catholic; Calais had fallen to the Spanish, thereby "knocking at our doors"; furthermore "that ulcer of Ireland ... hath run and raged more, and must attract the attentions of Spain", and, finally "the last two sea exploits, Cadiz and the Islands' Voyage must surely spur the King of Spain on to take his revenge".⁽²⁾ By the 1601 November parliament Bacon's prophecy of Spanish involvement had come to pass, a Spanish force of 23 ships and some 4,500 soldiers had landed at Kinsale on 23 September 1601. Sir Robert Cecil's opening speech dwelt on the Spanish presence in Munster: there, he said, the intention was "to tear Her Majesty's subjects from her ... We have there an army and nothing but an army, fed, even out of England". He added: "it is time to open our coffers". The chief purpose in calling the parliament was the queen's need of £300,000 before Easter. Nor did Cecil think anyone so foolish as to suppose an end to the danger even if the Spanish

1. Cal. of Patent Rolls, Ireland, ii (1862), 29.

2. J.E.Neale, Elizabeth I and her Parliaments, ii (1957), 360

were expelled from Ireland.

"If we had been of that mind, when he
(the king of Spain) had that great
overthrow of his Invincible Navy in
anno 1588 we had been destined to
perdition". (1)

There were those who thought it good policy to make peace with Spain so that the queen could concentrate on "reducing Ireland to quietness" and so save the excessive charges of treasure, victuals, munitions and men levied and sent out of England. Lord Burghley reflected on the advantages of peace with Spain during the last year of his life,⁽²⁾ and from Ireland, Sir George Carew, president of Munster, counselled such a peace in his 'Discourse of Ireland' (1598) which he sent to Sir Robert Cecil.⁽³⁾

Sir George Carew had no doubt that the forces in Ireland would be able to expel the Spaniards and suppress the rebellion though he feared that it would cost England a greater price than Ireland was worth. Peace was not possible with Spain by 1601 and he suggested that the surest way to effect the pacification of Ireland was by means of a 'sharp prosecution'. Carew was aware that those who had inheritances in Ireland "and such as live by the wars" wanted a final solution, 'by the sword'. None of them would heed the loss of men and money 'that must be consumed in finishing the work'.⁽⁴⁾ The lord deputy, Mountjoy, sounded just as determined a note when he heard that the Spaniards had landed at Kinsale; he said to Cecil:

"I cannot dissemble how confident I am,
to beate these Spanish Dons, as well
as ever I did our Irish Macks and Oes,
and to make a perfect conclusion of the
warre of Ireland ...". (5)

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1. J.E.Neale, Elizabeth I and her Parliaments, ii (1957) pp.411, 413
 2. PRO.SP. 12/266/3 - 2nd January 1598.
 3. Cal. Carew MSS., iv, 168-171. Carew may have known that the English-Spanish peace-talks at Boulogne in 1600 had proved to be premature.
 4. Cal.Carew MSS., iv, 168-171, 'Discourse of Ireland' to Cecil, 1601.
 5. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, ii, (J.Machehose ed. Glasgow 1907), ii, 461.

From the highest level of policy it was seen that unless Ireland was brought to submission she would prove a safe haven for England's enemies. The truth of the old saying:

"He who would England win
With Ireland must begin" (1)

must have been self-evident in October 1601. The queen and council in England determined to oppose with all the military potential possible an Irish rebellion which aimed at the elimination of English sovereignty in Ireland. In asking the clergy to provide horses that October the queen wrote to Archbishop Whitgift:

"... the kinge of Spayne and the pope having long succored by underhande meanes our Rebels in Ireland have nowe of late discovered their malice in more open manner by sending into that kingdome a Navie and an Armie of men who are landed in oure province of Monster pretendinge both to restore there the superstitions of Rome and to reduce that Realme under Spanishe tyranie .. (2)

The queen also stressed the seriousness of the situation in her letters to the lords lieutenant pointing out that not only was the king of Spain aiding "our rebels" but that he wished "to make himself owner of that kingdome".⁽³⁾ The nationalistic tone common in English government pronouncements against Spain since 1588 hardened with the Spanish intervention in Ireland. The Elizabethan government did not under-estimate the military task ahead. When the English fought at Kinsale in 1601 they did so as much to repel a Spanish invasion as to put down an Irish revolt. In that sense the war in Ireland assumed an international dimension which it had lacked since the Desmond rebellions of 1579 to 1583. Whether the Elizabethan government was right to be so worried by Spanish forces is perhaps doubtful. Modern historical opinion on Spanish strength in the later sixteenth

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1. Cited in PRO.SP.12/284/28, 29 by Richard Hawkins to the p.c. 10 June 1602.
 2. Lambeth Ms., 2009, f.141
 3. PRO.SP.12/282/33.

century seems to indicate that England over-estimated its military power; G.Parker calculated that plague wiped out 8 per cent of the Iberian population between 1598 and 1602 with the result that captains failed to fill their bands of soldiers and the Spanish army was not quite the formidable power that it seemed.⁽¹⁾

It is generally correct to identify English policy with the queen's in all foreign and military affairs; Ireland was ever considered by her "our realm of Ireland" or "our kingdom of Ireland"; Munster was "our province" and even rebels were called "our rebels of Ireland".⁽²⁾ Privy councillors might propose policies, but generally it was the queen who gave orders, Elizabeth often called her councillors together about Ireland and strengthened them with her wisdom in advising how to suppress the rebellion.⁽³⁾ Elizabeth disliked the human and financial costs of warfare and favoured instead moderate and indirect rule as long as possible, inefficient as it was in the hands of the Dublin administration. As long as the Irish situation was not especially urgent the queen did not want to spend more than was necessary on Ireland. However, Elizabeth had the ruthless determination of the Tudors. Sir Robert Cecil who knew the queen's will better than most wrote of her to Sir George Carew in Munster:

"I speake it to you confidently, that
(but myself) I know not one man in this
kyngdome that will bestow six woords of
argument to repleye if she denye it ..."⁽⁴⁾

In proclamations, and through privy council orders she repeatedly

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1. G.Parker, The Army of Flanders (Cambridge, 1972), 43
 2. Lambeth Ms., 2009, f.141 and PRO.SP.12/282/33
 3. R.Dudley Edwards, 'Ireland, Elizabeth and the Counter-Reformation' in Elizabethan Government and Society edited by S.T.Bindoff, J.Hurstfield, and C.H.Williams (1961). And for the queen's relationship with the Butlers of Ormond, ibid.
 4. J.Maclean (ed.) The Letters of Sir Robert Cecil to Sir George Carew Camden Society, old series, lxxxviii (1864), 139.

made it clear that it was her wish to keep Ireland "in perfect obedience".⁽¹⁾ And the compromising and moderate programmes of the 1570s and 1580s of trying to increase crown revenue in Ireland without harassment, of punishing without driving the rebellious to desperation, of rewarding the loyal without cost to the crown, and of reducing the army without impairing its effectiveness became unrealistic in the Ireland of the 1590s. It is of interest that pronouncements about moderation in Ireland seem to appear after bouts of severe repression, for example, when Sir John Perrott, lord deputy (1584-1588) hoped to heal the wounds inflicted by Lord Grey in quelling the Desmond rebellion (1579-1583).⁽²⁾ Lord Mountjoy, also, after his own 'definitive' conquest speaks of 'politic proceedings', proemis rather than poena and of 'appeasement'.⁽³⁾ Sir Arthur Chichester advocated educating the Irish to civility "by gentle persuasion and force of example" at the end of a very forceful military career devastating ^{at} north-east Ulster from his base at Carrickfergus.⁽⁴⁾

It is not possible to find a consistent policy in the many letters of the queen to her servants in Ireland, nor is it realistic to expect one in the changing circumstances and with the different personalities in the last years of the war. It had been spread abroad that the queen "intendeth the utter extirpation of the Irish" according to a privy council letter of November 1595 to Sir William Russell, lord deputy, but the council wanted to assure the lord deputy that the queen had no such intention nor had she ever made such a declaration. Instead, the queen wanted it known in Ireland that:

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1. PRO.SP.12/282/33, 34 for example, and APC., xxix-xxxii, passim
 2. W.L.Renwick, (ed.) Spenser's View of the Present State of Ireland (Oxford, 1970), 109.
 3. HMC., Salisbury, xiv, 241
 4. CSPI., (1606-1608), 276

"no subject of hers shall be oppressed by any, if they live in obedience, but if any think of tyrannizing over others to fashion themselves any greatness, no formal submission shall preserve them from the rod of her justice (1)

From the royal point of view the Irish were to be regarded as the common subjects of the crown. Rebels, whether in England or in Ireland, were simply traitors. But if there is a constant note in the queen's letters to Ireland it is her hesitancy to give approval to expensive schemes of conquest. Sir Robert Cecil wrote to Sir George Carew that the queen was "apter to approve facta than facienda."⁽²⁾

When times were propitious Elizabeth favoured conciliation; all the lord deputies of Ireland had her authority to pass pardons; the Earl of Essex, for example, had her permission to treat with O'Neill but only on his capitulation:

"take him in upon such conditions as you shall find good and necessary for our honour and the safety of the kingdom ... grant him our pardon only for his life." (3)

In her answers to the petitions of O'Neill, O'Donnell, Maguire and McMahon in March 1596 she made clear that if they were sincere in their submission, "giving proof thereof", their lands were to be restored, the garrisons removed and their lives pardoned.⁽⁴⁾ But in July 1596 O'Neill was dominant over the province of Ulster and over a confederacy of the northern chiefs; in Connaught he was known as "The Lord O'Neill": in view of his dominance he was emboldened to disregard the queen's proffered pardon, and to rebel.

The theoretical claims of the crown of England to O'Neill's lands, for the most part the ancient Anglo-Norman earldom of Ulster, were

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1. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 121. Russell was lord deputy from June 1594 to May 1597. His Irish journal is in B.L.Add.Ms., 4728 and summarised in Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 220-260
 2. Cal.Carew MSS., iv, 362
 3. Cal.Carew MSS., iv, 98, Cecil to Carew, 29 June 1601 enclosing a draft of the queen's letter giving the lord deputy authority to pardon.
 4. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 168-170.

periodically raised and, set out clearly in 1569 in the Act of Attainder of Shane O'Neill.⁽¹⁾ When Sir Thomas Smith was given title to Ulster lands in his abortive attempt at establishing a colony in 1572 he was told to hold them "from the crown as heir to the earldom of Ulster".⁽²⁾ But with the repeated reversals of English military fortunes up to 1599 the only parts of Ulster that were effectively under the crown were the eastern seaboard^a of the present county Down, the town and fortress of Carrickfergus, and a sporadic garrison presence in the towns of Newry and Armagh.

In 1598 the rebellion spread from Ulster to Connaught and into Munster and absorbed two-thirds of all Ireland. What had initially been a provincial revolt became an all-out war on the part of the Irish to eliminate English rule with the help of the Spaniards. Faced with this threat the queen and council were forced to adopt a new policy, a plan of conquest, and the Earl of Essex with an army of 16,000 foot and 1,300 horse was dispatched in 1599. Essex's failure, despite his exceptionally wide powers as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and unprecedented military resources, is well known.⁽³⁾ He wrote to his cousin Fulk Grenville that 'Ireland was the hardest task that ever any gentleman set about';⁽⁴⁾ and though he wanted that task he cursed Ireland as "that most rotten country".⁽⁵⁾ The queen's anger at the abandonment of his army to come to the Court is well know^a, but not her outburst to him

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1. 11 Eliz., s.3, c.1 in Irish Statutes (1786), I, 322
 2. Cal. Patent Rolls, Ireland, i (1861), 553, and in a grant of Ulster lands to the elder Earl of Essex in 1574 Ulster is referred to as a "Province or Earldom", *ibid.*, p.556.
 3. L.W.Henry defends Essex's action in Ireland in 'The Earl of Essex and Ireland' BIHR., xxxii (1959), 1-23 and for a critical examination of the sources on Essex in Ireland the same author's 'Contemporary sources for Essex's lieutenancy in Ireland, 1599' in IHS., xi (1958-9) pp.8-17.
 4. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 4.
 5. Ibid., 270

when writing to him from Greenwich;

'What displeases us most is that it must be the Queen of England's fortune who hath held ... down the greatest enemy she had to make a base Irish kerne to be accounted so famous a rebel.' (1)

The queen's choice of Mountjoy as his successor to lead the army and complete the re-conquest of Ireland proved a happier one. (2) Mountjoy, and others in Ireland, like the Anglo-Irish lord, Thomas Butler, 10th Earl of Ormond, (3) Sir George Carew, the president of Munster (4) and Sir Arthur Chichester, the governor of Carrickfergus, would later earn her praises. The queen was well informed firstly by Lord Burghley, who had made a remarkable series of Irish maps, and after his death in 1598 through his son's wide range of correspondents in Ireland, and far reaching intelligence service. (5)

In spite of the frequent dispatches from Ireland (which wearied her) the queen must have experienced difficulty in knowing what or whom to believe as intriguers, politic 'trimmers', adventurers and crooked administrators pursued their own purposes to the impoverishment of the crown and of Ireland. And just as there were

1. Cal. Carew MSS., iii, 315

2. F.M.Jones, Mountjoy, the Last Elizabethan Deputy (DUBLIN), 1958), passim.

3. From his accession to the earldom in 1554 to his death in 1618, Ormond was the dominant military figure in southern Ireland. His career can be followed in Cal. Ormond Deeds, ed. E.Curtis, v, vi, (Irish MSS. Comm. 1943)

4. For one collection of Carew letters see those from Sir Robert Cecil to Sir George Carew in Camden Soc. no. lxxxviii ed. J.Maclean (1864). For the queen's personal letter to Mountjoy on receiving the news of the Spanish landing see F.Moryson, Itinerary, iii, 21-22, (4th October 1601)

5. Lord Burghley appointed Robert Lythe in 1567 to make a complete cartographic survey of Ireland and that principal secretary's own marginalia on early maps may show him to have been the most map-minded statesman in England at the time. See G.A. Hayes-McCoy, 'Contemporary maps as an aid to Irish history, 1593-1603' in Imago Mundi, xix (1965), 32-37

notable divisions and jealousies in the English privy council so too were there in the Dublin administration.⁽¹⁾ News of divided English opinion spread to the Irish: "Trust not in the English, for they are not sound among themselves, and the Council is divided ... we shall be strong enough for the English" Donnell McCarthy reported to the Bishop of Cork.⁽²⁾

However, in answer to a crisis that threatened the safety of the nation after Essex's failure, the queen and council expended a considerable effort in supporting Mountjoy's putsch in the subjugation of Ulster, the ultima Thule of Gaeldom and fountain head of resistance. The time for cautious compromise and moderate measures was at an end. From 1599 until the queen's death soldiers, money and arms were sent across the Irish Sea; though the military potential of late Elizabethan England was limited by weakness in the administration of resources yet, the final result, the submission of Ulster, proved the nearest match of performance with intention achieved by the late Elizabethan state.⁽³⁾

The effort put into subjugating Ireland was prodigious and shows a queen and government tenacious of the sovereignty of Ireland. In terms of cost Sir Julius Caesar's accounts of army charges in Ireland give a total of £1,845,696 spent between October 1595 and the end of the reign.⁽⁴⁾ Lord Treasurer Middlesex in 1620 considered that Ireland had cost Elizabeth more than three million pounds and near the lives of 100,000; this last figure is widely exaggerated (see Tables 1 to 3 in Chapter Three below).⁽⁵⁾ As sacrifices were

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1. For some of the queen's censures on the Dublin council see CSPI., (1599-1600), 114-117, 178, 212, 216.
 2. CSPI., (1600), 71
 3. See Chapter Three below
 4. B.L.Lansdowne Ms., 156, ff.253-258
 5. F.C.Dietz, English Public Finance, 1558-1641, vol.ii (1964), 435 For earlier government expenditure in Ireland, 1541-1556 see B.Bradshaw, The Irish Constitutional Revolution of the Sixteenth century (Cambridge, 1979), p.262, footnote 13.

made it became more and more important for the English to conquer.

Among others John Clapham articulated that opinion:

"Indeed, the wars in Ireland, gathering strength by continuance of time, and being maintained with the loss of so many worthy men and the expense of such a mass of treasure might seem a matter dishonourable. But if the quality of the place and condition of the people be duly weighed, it will appear that it had been more easy to have conquered a kingdom elsewhere than to have reduced that land to obedience ..." (1)

The letters of the queen and council echo those sentiments, dwelling on the anguish the war had brought, 'the alienation of Our people's mind from Us ...' and the burden it had placed on the exchequer. (2)

That very burden made a satisfactory conclusion all the more imperative. It was Mountjoy's aim to prosecute the war to the bitter end; his determination dictated ruthlessness in burning crops and starving out the rebellious. In a memorable sentence to Cecil he summed up his aim:

"And till it [Ulster] be so reduced and the name of O'Neale or Earl of Tyrone utterly suppressed never look for a sound peace in Ireland ..." (3)

However, to argue that England's war aims were simply the pursuit of a pragmatic programme of total conquest to establish sovereignty and that such aims were justified by rebellion and the consideration of England's safety omits the religious dimension of the conflict.

Rebellion in Ireland was often confounded with an adherence to catholicism and popery. Mistakenly, as it proved, many thought if submission to Rome was weakened or loyalty to Rome removed then the cause of English law, order and reformation must prevail. At

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1. E. & Conyers Read (eds.) John Clapham's Certain Observations concerning the life and reign of Queen Elizabeth (Philadelphia, 1951), 58
 2. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, iii, 225
 3. CSPI., (1601-1603), 8

least in their official statements some of the newly arrived English in Ireland did not distinguish their policies from the cause of the Reformation.⁽¹⁾

Over the centuries the Anglo-Irish fostered an attitude that the native Gaelic Irish were barbarous, and in the sixteenth century the new English had little trouble in convincing themselves that the Irish were pagan also. All of this was part of the polemic of conquest, expressed in a propaganda campaign, unfortunately believed in, and at times acted upon to justify the killing of non-combatants.⁽²⁾ To have acknowledged the Irish as christian, would necessarily mean to have acknowledged them as civilized; this the more out-spoken of the Elizabethan adventurers would not do. It is strange that so many of the renaissance soldier-administrators, well travelled, and read in the classics, should have been largely blind, (or apparently so) to an appreciation of early christian Gaelic culture.⁽³⁾ It was however a commonplace of the renaissance writing that a barbaric people must first be brought to civility before they are taught the truths of christianity.⁽⁴⁾

Some protestant clergy were at one with the majority of officials and adventurers in Ireland in a policy of coercion. The proselytising work of zealots like Adam Loftus of Dublin and Thomas Jones of Meath sought to exact a compulsory respect for the reformed religion from the Irish, who instead clung to their own religion. Both bishops complained of slackness in the activities

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1. R.Dudley Edwards, Church and State in Tudor Ireland (Dublin, 1935) is the standard authority on the religious aspect of the war.
 2. N.Canny, The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland: a pattern established, 1565-1576 explores the mental attitude of the English in sixteenth century Ireland towards the Irish people around about the 1560s and 1570s and in ch. 6 sees the lines hardening to justify a programme of inhumanity.
 3. For a critique of N.Canny's thesis see B.Bradshaw, 'The Elizabethans and the Irish' in Studies, lxvi (Spring 1977), 38-50
 4. E.Spenser's View of the Present State of Ireland (ed. W.L.Renwick, Oxford, 1970), passim.

of the Court of High Commission to Whitgift, archbishop of Canterbury; "her majesty hath expressly directed them not to stir or meddle in matters of religion" with the result that the work of the Commission had been discontinued for six years, priests had been given their liberty which many had used to encourage rebellion, and, in the opinion of both bishops "it would seem that her Majesty was prepared to allow constant breaches of the law".⁽¹⁾ Another protestant bishop, William Lyon of Cork, "preached against all "cessations" and truces with the Gaelic Irish saying that they never did any good "to this savage and barbarous nation, but service", by which he meant military service or oppression, "and justice without partiality" by which he meant English justice."⁽²⁾

There is little evidence in the 1590s of a thorough-going protestant evangelizing programme as part of the re-conquest. Many believed the reform of religion in Ireland impossible before the re-conquest was complete, and this mentality was commonplace among the late Elizabethans in Ireland. However, they did fear that Irish Catholicism might make re-conquest more difficult.⁽³⁾ From the conquistadores' viewpoint the activities of friars, priests and Jesuits were not regarded as christianizing or civilizing influences but rather as part and parcel of the rebellion to keep the Gaelic Irish in a state of resistance. "The priests", wrote Carew, "have in their devilish doctrines so much prevailed against the people as for fear of excommunication very few dare to serve against the rebels".⁽⁴⁾ Meyler McGrath, convert protestant archbishop of Cashel, in writing to Cecil on 19 January 1600 claimed that the

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1. CSPI., (1600), 76-80
 2. CSPI., (1599-1600), 475-478
 3. CSPI., (1598-1599), 166, 173, 208, 305, 354, 429-430 for examples.
 4. Cal.Carew MSS., iv, preface, lxxii

priests were "the very root and spring of whom all traitors do grow" and professed incredulity that the government did not have some of them caught and banished; otherwise, he said, "Ireland will never be quiet".⁽¹⁾ But catholicism was encouraged in Gaelic Ireland as much by the belligerence of the new English in the 1590s as by counter-reformation activities. The trend of identifying Gaelic Ireland with catholicism became more evident in the exceptionally repressive 1590s. It is of interest that in the welter of "Plans" and "Plots" for the reformation of Ireland, "reformation" generally means repression with little or no mention of religious reformation, especially in the final years of the re-conquest.⁽²⁾

The protestant clergy, who were supposed to have been the driving force of reforming religion in Ireland, were generally not men of ability. English literati such as Edmund Spenser had a low opinion of them: they were either "unlearned" or "men of some bad note, for which they have forsaken England". Should England send good and honest ministers, Spenser thought that even then they could do no good: "what good shall any English minister do amongst them by preaching or teaching which either cannot understand him or will not hear him".⁽³⁾ Another castigated both English and Irish

1. CSPI., (1599-1600), 407-408.

2. Cal. Carew MSS., iii, 105, 180, 333; ibid., iv, 478; CSPI., (1596-1597), 234-235, 250, 254, 266, 292, 403; ibid., (1598-1599), 160, 162-165, 171-172, 328-329 a selected list of "projects" and "plots" for Ireland in the late 1590s.

3. W.L.Renwick (ed.) Spenser's View of the Present State of Ireland (Oxford, 1970), 88, 89.

clergy alike as "lewd and ignorant",

"divers of the English have not one word of latin, divers of the Irish broken latin, meeter for the tavern than the temple ... going in mantles and Irish 'trooses' tippling of ale and acqua vitae, getting of bastards and never giving themselves to study or preaching". (1)

Over twenty years later, 1619, William Lithgow, who travelled Ireland wrote in the same vein of the clergy:

"Sermons and prayers they never have any ... the alehouse is their church ... their text, Spanish sack ... their singing of psalms the whiffing of tobacco". (2)

Comment on sixteenth century Ireland and the Irish flowed easily from the pens of statemen, clerical and lay, and from commanders and captains with a barely disguised interest in colonizing the land of Ireland. Some of the best known English renaissance writers wrote much of Ireland: Edmund Spenser, perhaps the foremost poet of Elizabethan England, Edmund Campion, historian and poet, John Davies, philosopher, poet and lawyer, Geoffrey Fenton, classicist, and John Hooker, lawyer and biographer of Sir Peter Carew, the mid-Tudor adventurer who typified the land-hungry west-countryman.⁽³⁾ Fynes Moryson, Mountjoy's chronicler, was especially perceptive and prolific on Ireland and the Irish, but was nonetheless prejudiced against them. So too was Thomas Stafford, Sir George Carew's apologist in his celebrated Pacata Hibernia. Some of the titles of their works betray a specious polemic, "Plots for the Reformation of Ireland", "Remedies", "True Causes and Discoveries", "A looking glass for her Majesty wherein to view Ireland" and "Discovery, Recovery and Apology" to name but a few

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1. CSPI., (1598-1599), 430
 2. W.Lithgow's Adventures in Ireland, 1619 in Ulster Jn. of Archaeology, xvii (1911), 90.
 3. N.Canny, The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland: a pattern established 1565-1576 (Harvester, 1976), chapter four.

drastically curtailed titles. The last, by the unfortunate Captain Thomas Lee, is typical of the genre:

"I finde it is good to deale with Irelande as a carefull surgeon is accustomed to deale with a bodye full of dangerous and infested wounds, that is to applie medicines to those partes which are nearest unto the head and the heart before they doe practize uppon the rest of the members" (1)

Lee went on to liken the province of Munster to the head, and the Pale to the heart, while Connaught was "the bellye or somewhat lower" Ulster "a legge ... remote member full of foull canker and other grosse diseases";⁽²⁾ in the final section of his tract, "Apology", Lee thought it a great honour to a prince to bring such a people unto perfect obedience.⁽³⁾

Barnaby Rich also favoured the medical analogy when he wrote for the queen's eyes: "Learn with the physician first to knowe the disease, then remove the cause, and so cure the sickness". He went on to analyse the chief cause of rebellion in Ireland as the ambitions of the great Gaelic and Anglo-Irish lords, to shake off the English crown and tyrannize their tenants. "Pardons and protections" only emboldened the Irish in rebellion. In this Rich ^{was} ~~is~~ but echoing the justifications of many other writers who, by defaming Irish lords, allowed the new English officials to pose as the champions of the people ridding them of the tyranny of the great lords' exactions. Rich also made the interesting claim that since the wars began "the greatest cause hath ben wrong informacions delivered unto your Majesty and honourable council ..." suggesting that the government in England was badly informed on the state of Ireland. And finally, he recommended a remedy for Ireland in the

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1. B.L.Add.Ms., 33, 743, ff.1-188 - Lee's "Discovery, Recovery and Apology" f.53
 2. Ibid., f.54
 3. Ibid., f.146

well known formula: "this reformacion muste be settled by force, yet famine must be an especiall mean whereby to accomplish it".⁽¹⁾

How revealing is Barnaby Rich's justification of the re-conquest by using the argument that the Irish were barbarians, who

"preferred to live like beasts, voide of lawe ... more uncivilized, more uncleanly, more barbarous and brutish in their customs and demeanours than in any other part of the world that is known".⁽²⁾

Racism re-inforced the cant of conquest.

Some writers have accompanying histories of Ireland, for example, Fynes Moryson, but a few, Spenser, Campion and Stanihurst even show appreciation of Gaelic culture and institutions, but others use history as part and parcel of the justification for conquest, such as Bagenall, Davies and Gainsford. Another commonplace of English sixteenth century commentators on Ireland is the prescription that "a barbarous country must first be broken by a war before it will be capable of good government".⁽³⁾ The conquerors were thus made paladins of rectitude, and their victims brutish monsters. A captain John Baynard advised, like so many others, famine and force as the only means to subdue Ireland.⁽⁴⁾ Thomas Stafford compared Munster with Italy where the "banditti ... do live between the power of the king of Spain and the Pope".⁽⁵⁾ The adjective "Tartarian" used so frequently by these writers of Irish society was virtually an Elizabethan cliché. To many it appeared that the reduction of Ireland to a state of civility was a renaissance mission. Those with more than a literary curiosity,

1. PRO.SP.63/205/no.72

2. Barnaby Rich, Description of Ireland (1610), ch. iv, account of the Irish nation.

3. H.Morley (ed.), Sir John Davies' A Discovery of the True Causes why Ireland was never entirely subdued ... in Ireland under Elizabeth and James I (1890), 219

4. PRO.SP.63/205/no.72.

5. S.O'Grady (ed.) Thomas Stafford's Pacata Hibernia, ii (1896), 305

like Lee, Baynard, Rich and captains in the army who had ambitions for Irish land had various prescriptions for Irish ills: the reduction of septs to shire lands, the use of martial law by the sheriffs, "to have a lieutenant over everie sheere after the manner of England",⁽¹⁾ the extinction of Irish sept names, the 'proper' adoption of surnames, education in the English language, conversion to the reformed religion, and the abolition of the Brehon laws and lawyers and bardic institutions. In short they sought the obliteration of the Gaelic way of life and promotion of anglicization.⁽²⁾ As part of the furtherance of these aims they advocated, and many of them during the war practised, fostering divisions among the Irish themselves on the classical principle divide et impera.⁽³⁾ By the 1590s the time for moderate programmes had passed.

Some writers contented themselves with statements of high indignation on how the law was flouted; others, such as we have seen, prescribed remedies for the state of Irish society. A study of sixteenth century English writers on Ireland tells us as much about the writers themselves as they do of their subject; they are, as David Quinn has summarized, "curious, surprised, hostile, censorious, nationalistic, reforming and paradoxically at times, sympathetic and brutal almost in the same breath".⁽⁴⁾ Motivated often by land hunger and personal ambition in Ireland they were hardly impartial and objective.

If conquest was seen as a means of self aggrandizement by many Elizabethan adventurers the war often frustrated such ambitions.

1. B.L.Add.Ms., 33, 743, f.60

2. For the importance of the bardic order in Gaelic culture see B.O'Cuiv, Seven Centuries of Irish Learning (Cork, 1971), passim.

3. Sir Henry Docwra^{was} divided the O'Donnells, is but one example.

4. D.B.Quinn, The Elizabethans and the Irish (New York, 1966), 191

By the end of the century many of the governing class were lamenting the misery, poverty and desolation the wars entailed, and the disastrous consequences to their own profits brought about by the debasement of the Irish coinage and of tying Irish trade to England.⁽¹⁾ Observers of the minting of base coin for Ireland like John Chamberlain feared that the policy was but a prelude "to purge our owne money of the best juice".⁽²⁾ Even those who made fortunes in Ireland bewailed the short-sightedness of pillage and plunder during the war. With more insight than most Edmund Spenser saw the envy and greed of the governing class as major hindrances to good rule: "the country suffered", he wrote, "and good government became impossible for conscientious men".⁽³⁾

While good government may have suffered some officials made Irish fortunes. It was said of Sir William Fitzwilliam: "Never a man went from Ireland of his calling with more money and less love".⁽⁴⁾ Richard Boyle made a fortune in Cork.⁽⁵⁾ Roger Wilbraham feathered his nest as solicitor-general of Ireland as Lord Burghley's endorsements to charges brought against him in 1597 suggest.⁽⁶⁾ Sir George Cary, treasurer-at-war from 1599 to 1606 made wealth out of his office and from the debasement of the Irish coinage. Eight years after his death a legal action was brought against Cary's heirs and executors for frauds amounting to £150,000 in the administration of his office.⁽⁷⁾ Less dramatic instances of captains and muster masters who turned public money to their own private gain will be

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1. CSPI., (1601-1603), 225-234, 247-250; 383-384; 545-550; 636-638.
 2. S.Williams (ed.) Letters of John Chamberlain, Camden Soc., no.79 (1861) 101, Chamberlain to Carleton, 3 February 1601
 3. H.Morley (ed.) 'Spenser's View of the Present State of Ireland' in Ireland under Elizabeth and James (1890), 130-132
 4. B.L.Add.Ms., 4793, f.78
 5. T.O.Ranger, 'Richard Boyle and the making of an Irish fortune' in Irish Historical Studies, x, (1957), 257-297.
 6. PRO.SP.63/201/no.154, Charges against Sir Roger Wilbraham, 1597.
 7. H.Hall, Society in the Elizabethan Age (2nd ed.1887), 123-129

noted later. While many examples of a rise to riches can be found, service in Ireland could equally break lesser officials and those who pinned their hopes on colonial land gains.⁽¹⁾ If large debts can be construed as evidence of an honest official career it may be that Lord Mountjoy was above suspicion; he complained to Cecil that he was likely to return from Ireland a beggar.⁽²⁾

There is little doubt that many of the Elizabethan adventurers who occupied positions in the army and administration were aggressive and greedy in enriching themselves in Ireland, and ~~was~~ saw in the overthrow of the Gaelic lords the best means of self-aggrandizement. Many, like Sir Richard Bingham and Sir Conyers Clifford in Connaught posed as the champions of the common people against the exactions of the "hellhounds" of lords whose only principle according to Barnaby Rich towards their tenants was "defend me and spend me".⁽³⁾ Captains and commanders lost no opportunity to stress the "tyranny" of O'Neill and O'Donnell over their followers when they wrote to the privy council or to Cecil.⁽⁴⁾ They seemed anxious to stress this stance as the deliverers of the common people to justify a harsh or "forward" policy which frequently ended in the seizure of property.

How far official English policy went along with these attitudes of the adventurers in Ireland is difficult to assess. It would be also difficult to sustain the contention that an overall empirical policy of total conquest, much talked of in the 1560s and 1570s, was ruthlessly and systematically followed through to the 1590s.⁽⁵⁾ The queen's government could not afford a consistent policy of total

1. D.B.Quinn, 'The Munster Plantation; problems and opportunities' in the Journal of the Cork Historical and Archaeological Soc., lxxi (1966), 19-40.

2. CSPI., (1600-1601), 174; ibid., (1601-1603), 570

3. CSPI., (1592-1596), 407; (1598-1599), 130.

4. Ibid., (1598-1599, 158, 447, 451; (1600) 66, 96, 126; (1600-1601), 166, 167

5. N.Canny, op.cit., chapter eight, "Conclusion: a pattern established".

conquest. At times official policy from the queen and council was at variance with what many captains and commanders in the field thought best, and delays in communication exacerbated the problem. The military situation in the 1590s was never static; text-book strategy was often rendered useless by a quick witted and quick footed enemy. In such circumstances individual commanders often took severe courses of action formerly denounced by government. It is scarcely surprising that the subjugation took so long.

In the English official mind there seems to have been only one name for troubles in Ireland "rebellion"; and the main cause of its too frequent occurrence - the half measures taken by England.⁽¹⁾ Most Elizabethan statemen^s, who had anything to do with Ireland spoke with a superior confidence of "the godly conquest" and the "perfecting of Ireland to obedience". Many of their schemes for the settlement of Ireland wrongly assumed that the English themselves would not be divided by dissensions such as the feuds between Sir William Russell and Sir John Norris,⁽²⁾ between Sir Geoffrey Fenton and Sir Richard Bingham⁽³⁾ and that between Sir Ralph Lane and Maurice Kyffin, the latter sent to reform abuses in the muster office headed by Lane.⁽⁴⁾ These personal antagonisms at government level hindered smooth administration in both civil and military establishments, and at times gave advantages to the Irish enemy. The results of a difficult war was disillusionment. The queen and council in England bemoaned the enormous cost in lives, money and supplies the re-conquest of Ireland entailed. The Earl of Sussex hampered by difficulties as

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1. H.Morley (ed.) Sir John Davies' A Discovery of the True Causes why Ireland was never entirely subdued ... in Ireland under Elizabeth and James (1890), 218-221
 2. CSPI (1596-1597), 21, 49, 51, 54, 138-139, 158, 159, 207-209, 242, 304, 496.
 3. Ibid., 37, 68, 77, 112-113, 131-132 (Fenton and Bingham's quarrels)
 4. Ibid., 190, 214, 215, 252, 263, 292, 305, 314, 318, 337, 391, 464-465, Lane and Kyffin's differences.

lord deputy once wished the island of Ireland sunk in the sea.⁽¹⁾

The queen grew weary with reading the Irish dispatches, and Sir Robert Cecil confessed to Lord Thomas Howard in 1600:

"It cost me some labour before I went to bed and I protest it brake my sleep (no easy matter, I thank God) to contemplate how that land of Ire has exhausted with land of promise." (2)

(ii) Irish Aims.

From the Irish point of view the war was clearly a defence against the spread of English administration and an alien religion, and in defence of the Gaelic order, which, as it proved, was in the last decade of its autonomous existence. Historical scholarship has begun to give detailed surveys of Gaelic society, sympathetic to its values, and arguing that over centuries the Gaelic way of life was sufficiently flexible and attractive to absorb many English settlers.⁽³⁾ G.A.Hayes McCoy's writings in particular have shown a resurgent Gaelic society in Ulster in the late sixteenth century sufficiently organized and equipped to withstand subjugation by English culture and customs or anglicization under Hugh O'Neill, second Earl of Tyrone.⁽⁴⁾ Nicholas Canny traced the hibernicization of the Pale in the 1560's and 1570s and demonstrated that Gaelic society was far from being in the arrested state of development claimed by contemporary English renaissance writers.⁽⁵⁾ And in a recent case-study in Gaelic ideology

1. Cal.Carew MSS., i, 302

2. HMC., Salisbury, x, 345

3. See the bibliography under Nicholls, K., O'Domhnaill, S., S.Hayes McCoy, G.A., Canny, N., Bradshaw, B., Edwards, Dudley, R., Clarke, A., and Quinn, D.B.

4. Especially in 'Gaelic society in the late sixteenth century' Historical Studies, iv, (1963), 45-61

5. N.Canny, 'Hugh O'Neill and the changing face of Gaelic Ulster' in Studia Hibernica, x (1970), 7-35; The Elizabethan conquest of Ireland, 1565-1576 (Harvester, 1976), chapters one and seven.

Brendan Bradshaw sees an emergent self-conscious nationalism articulated in bardic poetry, though not of the faith and fatherland variety beloved of Irish nationalist historians since the seventeenth century.⁽¹⁾

The defence of native institutions and lands was fiercely upheld not only in Ulster but in Connaught, south west Munster and the Wicklow area south of Dublin which blocked the Pale from access to the anglicised area of the south east, to name but the larger areas of Gaelic control. For this reason the war was prolonged and went beyond the confines of Ulster involving the movement and maintenance of large forces. And, since the native Irish were largely without towns the war was mainly a guerilla one in which the nature of the terrain and the structure of an agrarian society became significant factors.⁽²⁾

Irish society was complex. The new English arrivals found an unfamiliar social system, a language they could not understand, and a deep-seated resistance and resentment at English encroachments and rule.⁽³⁾ From the English military and administrative point of view the Irish who dwelt in the Pale and acknowledged crown authority were considered subjects and had therefore in theory the protection of English law. Irish outside the Pale were the Irish enemy, while the Anglo-Irish who resisted the government were "English rebels", though as the century progressed all who resisted were termed simply rebels and traitors.⁽⁴⁾ By the 1590s the time honoured procedure of trying to govern Ireland through Dublin, the Pale and an Anglo-Irish

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1. B. Bradshaw 'Native reaction to the Westward Enterprise: a case-study in Gaelic ideology' in the Westward Enterprise edited by K.R. Andrews, N.P. Canny and P.E.H. Hair (Liverpool, 1978), 65-80.
 2. G.A. Hayes McCoy in A New History of Ireland, iii, Early Modern Ireland 1534-1691 edited by T.W. Moody, F.X. Martin and F.J. Byrne (Oxford, 1976), chapter four.
 3. See N.P. Canny, The Elizabethan Conquest, chapter seven for the hatred of the Irish to the English in the 1560s and 1570s, and for examples of it in the 1590s - CSPI. (1598-1599), 432, 440, 441
 4. Cal. Patent Rolls of Ireland, Elizabeth, preface, xxxi

élite had virtually broken down when so many of that élite had ceased to be instruments of English policy.⁽¹⁾ To some extent Ireland then was a loosely organized system of semi-independent Gaelic lordships and septs who shared a common language and culture and whose autonomy was generally accepted by the Irish. The exactions of the lords on the native peasantry seem to have been severe, but in this period more is heard of the depredations caused by their armed retainers and mercenaries which gave their masters reputations for tyranny and the new English an excuse for interference. In 1607 Sir John Davies, then attorney general, likened 'the O'Neill' to the fifteenth century Earl of Warwick, "the O'Nevill in Yorkshire".⁽²⁾ An essential difference between the Gaelic and Anglo-Irish lords was that the latter gave a theoretical allegiance to the English crown regarding themselves as the representatives of the English interest in Ireland, while some Gaelic lords gave promises of loyalty only occasionally when it suited them. But both types of lords resented the new English administrators, military men and adventurers. And broadly speaking the system of landowning was different between the two; in Gaelic society land belonged to the sept, while land ownership under the feudal Anglo-Irish lords was theirs to be allocated in return for services.⁽³⁾

The majority of a population of probably less than a million in late sixteenth century Ireland practised a way of life with its roots in antiquity based on a rural economy of cattle, other animals and tillage.⁽⁴⁾ Contemporary observers often seem surprised at the amount and quality of well tilled arable land. Their preconceived

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1. N.P.Canny, 'The formation of the Old English élite in Ireland' (O'Donnell Lecture, National University of Ireland, Dublin, 1975)
 2. CSPI., (1606-1608), 213, Davies to the Earl of Salisbury, 1 July 1607.
 3. K.Nicholls, Gaelic and Gaelicised Ireland in the Middle Ages (Dublin, 1972); M.McCurtain, Tudor and Stuart Ireland (Dublin, 1972) 39-42.
 4. R.A.Butlin, 'Land and people, c.1600' in a New History of Ireland (short title), p.147.

notions of a primitive Gaelic society led them to expect a purely pastoral economy dependent on cattle and milk. However, the bulk of evidence from the war years leaves little doubt about the importance of cattle as wealth; the frequent mentions of preys of cattle by both Irish lords and commanders of English garrisons are as much noted as victories in battle. Sir Henry Docwra's Derry garrisons in a raid on Inch Island in Lough Swilly, for example, seized a prey of 2,000 sheep, 250 cows and 200 horses.⁽¹⁾ As will be seen in chapter ten the plunder and slaughter of cattle by a half-starved soldiery gave the native Irish good practical reasons for self-defence and preservation in the 1590s.

Practical reasons for self-preservation apart, the truth of Irish aims in the war are not easy to learn. A major difficulty in the way of ascertaining the native Irish mentality in the sixteenth century lies in the lack of a substantial body of literature such as can be found on the English and Anglo-Irish side. It is well known that the monastic Irish annalists betray a naive grasp of the political and military realities of what was happening in Ireland in the 1590s,⁽²⁾ and though the bards had a clearer understanding it is another question as to how far their songs, poetry and satire percolated down to the level of the Gaelic peasantry.⁽³⁾ Furthermore any writer on sixteenth century Ireland who knows no Gaelic has to a great extent to rely on what can be deduced from English sources, and Gaelic sources in translation.

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1. CSPI., (1600-1601), 94. One estimate of O'Neill's wealth in 1598 claimed he had no less than 120,000 milch cows in county Tyrone and three times that number in barren kine and other cattle - CSPI., (1598-1599) 384-385. And when Docwra raided O'Kane's lands in 1601 he burned "such a quantity of corn and houses as I should hardly have believed so small a circuit of ground could have afforded it if I had not seen it". CSPI., (1601-1603), 202
 2. Annals of the Kingdom of Ireland by the Four Masters edited and trans. by J.O'Donovan, vols. v-vii (1501-1616) Dublin, 1851 (hereafter AFM)- see for example their brief entries, mainly unembroidered facts of Docwra's military actions in Derry and Donegal, vol.vi, 2189-2193. For an interpretation of their work P.Walsh, The Four Masters and their Work (Dublin, 1944).
 3. B.Bradshaw, article cited in the Westward Enterprise, p.66

In one of the more perceptive and objective passages of Fynes Moryson's Itinerary he attempts an analysis of why the native Gaelic Irish resisted the English advance so stubbornly. His list of causes include the treasons practised by Hugh O'Neill as Earl of Tyrone, the severity of Sir Richard Bingham as Governor of Connaught,

"the hatred of the conquered against the Conquerors, the difference of religion, the love of the Irish to Spaine ... the extortions of the sheriffes and sub-sheriffes buying these places, the ill government of the Church among our selves, and the admitting Popish Priests among the Irish". (1)

He went on to claim that the "fier of Rebellion now kindled" was allowed to become a "devouring flame" because timely hands were not laid on the leaders "to prevent their combination", and because "Pardons and Protections" had been granted to many who had formerly abused this clemency. Finally, he blamed the employment of Irish in the English forces for the prolongation of the war.⁽²⁾

It is evident from the Irish state papers alone that the new English recognised that Irish hatred of them greatly increased from the late 1580s to the outbreak of and during the Nine Years War. The murders and mutilations that accompanied the rising in Munster to exterminate the English colony there in October 1598 left them in no doubt of that hatred. William Saxey, chief justice in Munster, reported to Cecil the horrors that had taken place. The English had their throats cut, but not killed

"some with the tongues cut out of their heads
others with their noses cut off ... infants
taken from the breast and the brains dashed
against the walls ... and the heart plucked
out of the body of a husband in view of
his wife ..." (3)

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1. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, ii, 189-192
 2. See chapter two below under "The employment of Irish and Scots soldiers in the Elizabethan army".
 3. PRO.SP/63/202/pt.iii/no.127, William Saxey to Sir Robert Cecil, 26 Oct. 1598.

No one can doubt that atrocities took place but the accounts may well be exaggerated. Hatred and revenge on both sides seems to have penetrated to every level of society. A summary of the state of Ireland in 1597 claimed that there was universal hatred for the English and no part of Ulster free from hostility to the queen.⁽¹⁾ A discourse to the queen in 1598, stated that there could be no "agreement possible between two equal contraries, English and Irish".⁽²⁾

Throughout the history of warfare in Ireland one trend is clear, the failure of the Gaelic Irish to unite in resistance to incoming English forces. This failure is partly explained by the localized nature of Gaelic society. However with the advent of Hugh O'Neill who came out firmly on the side of the Ulster Gaelic chiefs about 1594 Gaelic resistance took on a more cohesive aspect than had been the case in earlier rebellions.

The rebellion was helped by Hugh O'Neill's aptitude to exploit growing hatred against the exactions of the new official class in Ulster. A build-up of grievances against them can be clearly traced. The O'Donnells in Donegal had expelled Humphrey Willis the sheriff appointed there; Hugh O'Neill pursued his own vendetta against the marshal, Sir Henry Bagenal, O'Neill's brother-in-law; Hugh Maguire fought against the tyrannical conduct of Sir Richard Bingham; the McMahons frequently complained of Captain Henshawe, sheriff in Monaghan, and the O'Reillys fought against Sir Henry Duke and Sir Edward Herbert, sheriffs in their own county of Cavan.⁽³⁾ Many of these Ulster septs had been individually fighting to keep out English influence before the O'Neill war started. Not until O'Neill became the accepted leader of this particular group of Ulster lords

1. Cal.Carew MSS., iii , 179, 216

2. PRO.SP.63/202/pt., iv, no.59 n.d. but endorsed "A briefe discourse of Ireland by Spencer"

3. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 149-158

did the localized hostilities become a serious Ulster war of defence, which later involved the rest of Ireland. Between 1593 and 1595, Ulstermen repulsed all attacks in the two main entrances into their province, over the Blackwater river near Armagh, and over the Erne at Beleek, Ballyshannon and Enniskillen.⁽¹⁾

The few who have written on O'Neill see him clearly as the most prominent diplomat, outstanding military strategist, and ablest leader of the Gaelic Irish in this final resistance to the re-conquest.⁽²⁾ The councils in Dublin and in London feared the power and authority he had over the inferior chiefs in Ulster, and that the magnetism of his leadership might attract the support of Anglo-Irish lords lukewarm in loyalty to England at the best of times. Alliances between the Anglo-Irish and the native Gaelic Irish, many cemented by intermarriage, could give a dangerous cohesion to the rebellion. Edmund Butler, of the traditionally loyal house of Ormond, who joined the McGilpatricks in their disaffection against the new English administrators, had a son married to one of O'Neill's daughters.⁽³⁾ Though O'Neill's persuasion and threats to old loyal Anglo-Irish like the Dillons and Lord Barry of Cork proved futile, his appeal "To the Catholics of the Towns in Ireland" probably secured some adherents especially when he stressed the religious justification for the war.⁽⁴⁾

All who have tried to understand O'Neill's motives before and during his conduct of the nine years war have discovered a very

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1. G.A.Hayes McCoy, 'The Army of Ulster 1593-1601' Irish Sword, i (1950) 107-114.
 2. Hugh O'Neill awaits a definitive biography. C.P.Meehan, The Fate and Fortunes of the Earls of Tyrone and Tyrconnell (1870); S.O'Faolain, The Great O'Neill (new ed. Dublin, 1970); J.Mitchel, Life and Times of Aodh O'Neill (N.Y. reprint 1868). Important articles on O'Neill by N.Canny, M.Walsh and T.O'Fiach; see the bibliography under these authors.
 3. H.Wood (ed.) Sir James Perrott's Chronicle of Ireland, 1584-1608. (Dublin, 1933), 150
 4. PRO.SP.63/207/pt.1/nos. 65, 123, 130

complex character. The English thought him a skilful and dangerous conspirator, at one time affecting to want the queen's favour by a show of submission while at the same time writing to Rome and Spain pleading assistance for the defence of the Catholic Church.⁽¹⁾

As the war progressed the English used a wide variety of terms when referring to O'Neill: "viper of the kingdom", "archtraitor", "the chief rebel", "the northern Lucifer", "the running beast", "the head and fountain of this mischief" and "that base woodkerne".⁽²⁾

Some who have written on O'Neill, like G.A.Hayes McCoy and N.P. Canny, argue that he was in advance of his time in believing in the need to centralize power in Ireland, and that this belief transcended his personal ambition for power.⁽³⁾ He may have seen the nominal rule of Spain over Ireland as a direct substitute for English rule, or he may have imagined that a strongly active and central government, hitherto unknown in Ireland, would check the excesses of Anglo-Irish and Gaelic lords provided that that authority was not English.⁽⁴⁾ O'Neill may have begun his struggle simply to obtain mastery over his own lands in Ulster, but encouraged by papal and Spanish support and eventual material help from Spain he extended the war into a new dimension, an all out effort to eliminate English rule.⁽⁵⁾ To many of his followers the aims of the war had developed into a stand for Gaelic independence, and the free exercise of their religion.⁽⁶⁾

1. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 122

2. CSPI., (1599-1599), 33, 232, 450, 505, 507: ibid., (1601-1603) 159, 415

3. The state papers stress O'Neill's personal aggrandizement claiming he wanted to be king of Ireland - see for example, CSPI., (1598-1599), 319; ibid., (1599-1600), 235

4. In Hugh O'Neill, Earl of Tyrone and the changing face of Gaelic Ulster' N.Canny shows O'Neill to have been ruthless in establishing his power in the O'Neill lordships - Studia Hibernica, x (1970) 7-35

5. J.J.Silke; 'The Irish appeal to Spain' Irish Ecclesiastical Record series 5, no.92 (1959), 279-290, and 362-371.

6. G.A.Hayes McCoy chapters three and four in A New History of Ireland.

There is no doubt that Hugh O'Neill saw catholicism as a potent unifying force. To some extent it united the Anglo-Irish and the native Gaelic, it crossed barriers between town and country and between lords fighting for the restoration of their privileges and the people for their liberties. Whether he liked it or not the leaders of the catholic church saw in Hugh O'Neill their deliverer from an imposed alien religion. O'Neill had himself been brought up a protestant at the court and in the Earl of Leicester's household, but when back in Ireland and certainly in the 1590s his allegiance to catholicism is undoubted. By then too he had sufficiently strengthened his position in the O'Neill lordship to have himself inaugurated 'the O'Neill', the symbol of Irish independence, encouraged it was said by the catholic bishops.⁽¹⁾

To O'Neill there were many advantages in projecting the war as a holy crusade in league with the papacy and Spain against the new religion of the invader and colonizer. No other factor would bring together those disparate elements more thoroughly than a common catholicism. One of the earliest occasions in which O'Neill stated the restoration of catholicism as a war aim can be seen in the joint letter with O'Donnell of September 1595 to Philip II of Spain declaring the renewal of the war in the name of religion. They asked for two or three thousand soldiers, money and arms "to restore the faith of the Church and secure you a kingdom".⁽²⁾ At the same time Francis Mountford, an English priest, wrote in similar vein to Don Carlos⁽³⁾ Both letters were intercepted by

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1. HMC., Salisbury, iv, 565. The date of his inauguration as 'the O'Neill' is variously given as 1593, 1595, 1597.
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 3. Ibid., 123, signed Amicus tuus ignotus - O'Neyll and countersigned Franciscus Montortius.

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the English intelligence service,⁽¹⁾ and it was thought that the queen generally made a point of reading such letters.⁽²⁾ In his July 1596 call to the gentlemen of Munster to join the rebellion O'Neill stressed that "the highest to the lowest shall assist Christ's catholic religion and join in confederacy and make war with us".⁽³⁾ His letter from Dungannon in November 1599 to rouse support in the towns stated this war aim categorically:

"... upon my salvation I fight chiefly and principally for the catholic faith to be planted throughout all our poor country as well in cities as elsewhere..."

and ends by "praying God to move your flinty hearts to prefer the commodity and profit of our country before your own private ends".⁽⁴⁾ He urged Cormac McDermott "to expel the enemies of the Church".⁽⁵⁾ He upbraided Barry of Cork for "serving against us and the Church",⁽⁶⁾ and told him in another letter a week later 25th February 1600 that by not joining his forces he had "separated himself from the unity of Christ, his mystical body, the Catholic Church ...".⁽⁷⁾ And he told John FitzEdmonds and his sons to "fight for your conscience and the right".⁽⁸⁾

The Anglo-Irish lords of Cork and Limerick unmoved by these letters of persuasion were visited by O'Neill in a ferocious incursion or 'journey of retribution' burning and pillaging the towns and villages on Lord Barry's lands in particular; the state papers give two hundred and twenty such towns and villages, a palpable exaggeration; towns here are confused with townlands, the

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1. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 122, 123 endorsed "Intercepted"
 2. HMC., Salisbury, xii, 93
 3. Cal. Carew MSS., iii, 179, O'Neill from Strabane, 6th July 1596.
 4. Cited in C.P.Meehan, The Fate and Fortunes of Hugh O'Neill (Dublin, 1886) pp.21.23
 5. PRO.SP.63/207/pt.i/no.85a, 3 February 1600
 6. Ibid., no. 123(i), 13 February 1600
 7. Ibid., no. 130, 25 February 1600
 8. Ibid., no. 131, 23 February 1600

sub-division of landholdings, sept or clan lands, the approximate Gaelic equivalent to folk land in England.⁽¹⁾ Lord Barry of Cork was treated as a defector by O'Neill. Whereas in the Desmond rebellion, 1579-1583, his forces were the mainstay of the rebels, in the 1590s Barry was a firm supporter of the English.⁽²⁾

During the prolonged negotiations of 1596 with the council in Dublin, and through it with the queen^{and} the privy council in England, O'Neill and O'Donnell stressed liberty of conscience in their petitions.⁽³⁾ The queen was annoyed that her representatives had given ear "to such presumptuous and disloyal petitions", and that her commissioners in Ireland had made a truce on terms she did not like. Her answer on the question of "free liberty of conscience" was that O'Neill and O'Donnell did not mention this in their earlier submissions, and that the petition of March 1596 demonstrated "a later disloyal compact made betwixt them and other rebels without any reasonable ground".⁽⁴⁾

The substance of the Irish petitions, submissions and complaints made at this time, 1596, highlight why they were fighting a war; they were essentially against the encroachments of garrisons, the activities of sheriffs and soldiers, and for the restitution of their lands and liberties and above all the free liberty of conscience in the exercise of their religion.

However much O'Neill tried to use the common catholicism of rebel Gaelic and loyal Old English to bring about a common hostility to English rule in Ireland he did not greatly succeed. The harshness of the war effort did more to do that than his efforts to use

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1. PRO.SP.63/207/pt.i/no.132, names of towns and villages destroyed between 13 February and the 27 February, 1600.
 2. Annals of the Four Masters, vi, 2150
 3. Cal. Carew MSS., iii, 133, 151, 152, 153-159 for these petitions and answers.
 4. Ibid., iii, 167 'Answers to the rebellious Earl of Tyrone'

catholicism. There was little evidence in ^{the} Pale of any general movement to join O'Neill or indeed from the towns. They did not appear to equate their catholicism with rebellion and saw no incompatibility between their loyalty to both Crown and catholicism at least at the beginning of the war. What did strain their loyalty was the new class of bureaucrats, soldiers and would-be land and office holders who moved into Dublin and the Pale. And as the allegiance of the Anglo-Irish to the English Crown grew lukewarm they came increasingly under suspicion. Nor did protestantism unite all on the English side; not all of the new bureaucratic class were loyal protestants. Some were English recusants seeking a haven in Ireland where there was a greater degree of tolerance for catholicism than could be found in the England of the 1590s.⁽¹⁾

In his efforts to make the war a religious crusade O'Neill wanted assurance that the pope would excommunicate those who supported the English crown policy.⁽²⁾ Although Pope Clement VIII did not give such an assurance O'Neill used the threat of excommunication to bring him support which the English government believed would have been otherwise withheld. Carew, in a position to observe the power of O'Neill's persuasions in Munster, was certainly of that opinion. Dermot, bishop of Cork and Owen Hogan, vicar apostolic, helped O'Neill by threatening Lord Barry of Cork with excommunication claiming they had "received an excommunication from the pope against all that doth not join in this catholic action."⁽³⁾

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1. R.Dudley Edwards, 'Ireland, Elizabeth I and the Counter-Reformation' in Elizabethan Government and Society, edited by S.T.Bindoff, J.Hurstfield and C.H.Williams (1961), 319, 331, and for the impact of the reformation on one English shire see for example, K.E.Wark, Elizabethan Recusancy in Cheshire, Chetham Society, 3rd series, xxix, (Manchester, 1971)
 2. J.Hagan (ed.) 'Some papers relating to the Nine Years War' in Archivum Hibernicum, iii, (1914), 241, 296.
 3. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 362-363

In fact the most O'Neill gained from Clement VIII was an indulgence for all his followers of the type usually given those setting out to fight for the recovery of the Holy Land; in its terms O'Neill was entitled: "Captain General of the Catholic Army in Ireland". The indulgence was not the same thing as a papal command to Irish catholics to take up arms, still less an excommunication of those who did not join O'Neill's forces. (1)

At the court of Rome, O'Neill had much support from Peter Lombard, the papal nominee to Armagh. (2) However, there, too, he had enemies, who were not prepared to believe that his motive was primarily the defence of the catholic faith in Ireland. They may have cast doubts on the purity of O'Neill's motives to the pope, who clearly was not going to give him unqualified support. (3)

At the Irish college in Brussels a group of catholic loyalist students assured the papal nuncio of their conviction that Hugh O'Neill was chiefly concerned to establish his own ascendancy. As proof they put forward to the nuncio the rumoured allegations that O'Neill was in conspiracy with the Earl of Essex in 1599, and that O'Neill's declarations that he fought for the freedom of the catholic religion ought to be distrusted. (4)

However, the actual terms of the truce he had won with Essex, and those he wished to have ratified with the English government in 1599-1600, show O'Neill to have had genuine religious concerns. He was then at the apex of his power yet still religious aims were an important part of his policy:- Ireland was to be reconciled to the Holy See, prisoners of religion were to be released, Irish catholics

1. For a printed latin copy of the Indulgence see PRO.SP.63/207/pt.ii/no.95

2. J.J.Silke, 'The Irish Peter Lombard' in Studies, lxiv, no.254 (1975), 143f.

3. J.J.Silke, 'Hugh O'Neill, the catholic question and the papacy,' IER., 5th ser., civ (1965), 65-79

4. J.Hagan (ed.) 'Some papers relating to the Nine Years War from the Borghese Collections of MSS^o Vat. Archives in Archivum Hibernicum, iii, (1914), 274-285.

were to be promoted to church livings, the churches were to be restored, catholicism was to be preached, a catholic university was to be founded, and he and his followers were to "peaceably enjoy all lands and privileges that did appertain to their predecessors two hundred years past".⁽¹⁾

The demand for the restoration of lands was inextricably mixed up with his war aims; but for O'Neill, land, religion, and former rights all simply added up to the removal of English rule, a veritable declaration of all out war. When Cecil read the terms O'Neill outlined he wrote on the margin of the original copy from O'Neill "Eutopia".⁽²⁾ Once again the queen advised that the reformation of religion should not be insisted on as it made the people more obdurate; she did not wish to make persecution in religion an excuse for rebellion. Cecil, too, in a Star Chamber speech in 1599 after Essex's failure in Ireland echoed the queen's reply to the Irish petitions three years earlier:

"It is well known the laws are not for religion as they are in England; to receive a priest or hear a mass in Ireland is no felony".⁽³⁾

In advising Sir George Carew in September 1600 the privy council wrote:

"that it is as yet inconvenient to take any sudden or sharp course for reformation of their blind superstitions, being with strong head so generally carried away with opinion of conscience; so we must put a great difference betwixt the secret exercise of their religion and practice of treason under colour of religion ... "⁽⁴⁾

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1. CSPI., (1599-1600), 279-280
 2. Ibid.
 3. PRO.SP.63/205/no.246
 4. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 457-459

The privy council went on to command Carew to show great wisdom and discretion in the just execution of the law on "the offenders in treason without any inconvenient disturbance for matter of religion".⁽¹⁾ The penalties for recusancy were not vigorously pursued in Ireland at this time because in a partially conquered country the government did not have the machinery or personnel to carry them out. Some repressive measures against the catholic clergy were, however, enforced; they were, for instance, specifically excluded from the general pardon issued in 1600.⁽²⁾

As much as Elizabeth and her council wanted to keep religion out of the war in Ireland, O'Neill and his followers wished to have it brought to the forefront of their war aims. O'Neill intensified his appeals to Rome, to Spain, and to the Archduke Albert, requesting the last, for example, to grant licence to all Irish soldiers in the Low Countries to return to Ireland to assist against the English.⁽³⁾ In his negotiations with Rome O'Neill stressed that he never made terms which did not include liberty of conscience,⁽⁴⁾ and in his many dealings with Spain he emphasized 'the extirpation of heresy' from Ireland.⁽⁵⁾ The Spanish council reporting to Philip III in July 1600 on the state of Ireland noted, "Most nations dislike Spain, The Irish love it. It is just that they be succoured."⁽⁶⁾

Contemporaries leave much evidence of their war aims, yet it would be misleading to interpret their writings at face value or present, as they did, a herculean conflict of civilizations, a struggle of English renaissance civility against a primitive Gaelic

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1. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 457-459
 2. Ibid., 501-502
 3. J.Hagan (ed.) art.cit., in Archivium Hibernicum, iii, (1914), 235
 4. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, preface, lvi, lvii.
 5. Ibid., 350
 6. CSP., Spanish (1587-1603), 674

barbarism. The private ambitions of Gaelic lords like O'Neill, O'Donnell and Maguire, of Anglo-Irish nobility such as the Earl of Ormond and Lord Barry, and of parvenu royal officials like Fenton, Cary and Chichester cannot be divorced from the higher flown statements of war policy. In this sense it is not easy to identify nationalist, patriotic or religious sentiments as the only motives in the war. And, as in all wars, once begun, the conflict generated its own momentum.

CHAPTER TWO.Recruitment and composition of the Elizabethan forces

"Hearing a press for soldiers, they'll start
 Else hide themselves when we come
 Their wives then will say, 'To press we ye may
 Our husbands are not at home" (1)

(From The Song of a Constable by James Gyffon,
 constable of Albury in Oxfordshire, 1626.)

(i) Theory and Practice of Recruitment.

"Levies of soldiers and arms for Ireland" is a frequently mentioned subject in the state papers and privy council registers of the 1590s; it is surprising the subject has not attracted a scholarly monograph. The writings of J.Fortescue, C.G.Cruickshank, L.Boynton, G.Parker and A.Howell Lloyd on Elizabethan military history provide insights into the theory and practice of military affairs, but there is very little published on sending troops to Ireland in the period. A.Howell Lloyd's of 1973 is probably the last major work in English dealing with late Elizabethan military affairs. (2) C.Falls' pioneer work on Elizabeth's Irish wars while giving a brief chapter on administrative arrangements for the army in Ireland deals primarily with military action in Ireland. (3) A.L.Rowse's two chapters on Ireland draw on the work of Falls, Hayes McCoy and Cruickshank. R.Bagwell's magisterial three volumes on Tudor Ireland while providing the soundest contextual framework do not deal with the recruitment and transportation of troops.

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1. A.V.Judges (ed.), The Elizabethan Underworld (1930, reprint, 1965), 489.
 2. See bibliography under the authors mentioned.
 3. Falls uses but one example from Derbyshire to illustrate how all levies were sent out; chapters four to six below illustrate a wider variety of methods.

These authors, apart from specialised articles noted throughout the chapter, represent modern English writing on military administration in the period.

In every aspect of Elizabethan government a gulf can be found between the intentions of the queen and privy council and the practical application of their orders in the shires. The recruitment of forces is no exception: a clear difference between what the queen and privy council wanted in men and money from the shires for the Irish war and their response may be discerned from the selected shires studied in chapters four to six.⁽¹⁾ By the acts dealing with the militia: "An Act for the taking of musters" and "An Act for the having of horse, armour and weapon"⁽²⁾ every able-bodied man between the ages of sixteen and sixty was subject to military service when needed, and was required to fit himself out with arms commensurate to his income and station in life according to a ten point scale from £5-£10 a year up to £1,000 and over in land and goods. In times of emergency even citizens below the lowest income limit were assessed by the justices of the peace acting as commissioners for musters to furnish some warlike "equipment or furniture".⁽³⁾ The obligation to supply equipment was checked by inspection to see that it was provided: a missing bow could carry a fine of ten shillings every quarter and a "missing" horse as much as ten pounds.⁽⁴⁾

The main objective of this legislation was to ensure trained bands in every shire from the nation's manpower. In theory all sections of the community were obliged to contribute to the militia

1. See below chapters four to six.

2. 4 and 5 Philip and Mary, c.2, and c.3

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

and home defences: shires, towns, the clergy, recusants, who had to contribute money as a penalty for their disloyalty, lawyers like the gentry were considered wealthy enough to provide horses, and in times of emergency impressments for overseas service, wandering rogues and vagabonds and prisoners from the gaols were conscripted. And this meant that the majority of troops sent overseas in Elizabeth's reign were untrained men taken up more or less against their will.⁽¹⁾

The statutory basis of the militia which Elizabeth inherited helped to bring about a radical change in the military organization of the nation by setting the nobility and gentry firmly within a national system thereby putting an end to the quasi-feudal method in which the nobility raised troops for the Crown from their own tenantry.⁽²⁾ The queen inherited on paper a unitary and efficient military organization: in practice it was far from perfect. Shire authorities pleaded inability to meet the Crown's demands, and in some places put up opposition to the government's muster masters who were charged with selecting, training and equipping the militia and levies to be sent out to the wars; and some shires refused to pay the muster master's salary.⁽³⁾ Furthermore the government experienced difficulty in subordinating municipal corporations to the authority of the lords lieutenant of the shires as towns continued to cite the privileges of their ancient charters to avoid mustering their citizens with the shires.⁽⁴⁾ Likewise

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1. L.Boynton, The Elizabethan Militia (1967) introduction and chapter one.
 2. J.J.Goring, "The military obligations of the English people, 1511-1558" unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1955, and his "Social change and military decline in mid-Tudor England" in History, vol. 60 no.199 (June, 1975), 185-197.
 3. W.P.D.Murphy (ed.) The Earl of Hertford's Lieutenancy Papers, 1603-1612 in Wiltshire Record Society, 23 (1969), 103.
 4. PRO.SP.11/12/18r. lords lieutenant not to spare "any lyte (lect) or town or borough though the same be a county of itself".

the clerical estate sought to maintain its exemptions from a previous age,⁽¹⁾ and likewise servants of the nobility claimed exemptions from musters. Individuals evaded taxation imposed to raise funds to have the levies sent out.

Orders to raise soldiers for the Irish war came down in a chain of command from the queen and privy council, who had ultimate control of military affairs in war and in peacetime, to the lord lieutenant, the figurehead of local government, then to his deputies, then to the justices of the peace not deputies, and eventually to the constables of the hundreds, the watches in the towns and the churchwardens in the parishes.⁽²⁾ Wherever and whenever there was no lord lieutenant the privy council sent instructions and orders to the justices of the peace acting as commissioners for musters, or exceptionally in this period, to the high sheriff.⁽³⁾ Captain Barnaby Rich, who had seen long army service in Ireland, wrote much on military matters. From one of his tracts, "The Manner of choosing soldiers in England" an extract illuminates the simplicity of the theory and the complexity of the practice:

'The Prince, or Counsayll, sendeth down theyr warrant, to certayne Commissioners of eurye such Shyer where they mynde to haue suche a number of Souldyers to bee leuyed and appoynted. The Commissioner he sendeth hys precept to the hye Constable of euerye Hundred; he geueth knowledge to euerye petye Constable of euerye Parish within his cyrquet, that uppon such a daye he must bring two or three able and suffycient men to serue ye Prince, before such Commissioners, to such a place.

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1. J.J.N.McGurk, "The Clergy and the Militia 1580-1610" in History, vol. 60, no. 199 (June 1975), 198-210
 2. For the working of lieutenancy in Kent see my M.Phil. thesis, "Lieutenancy in Kent, c.1580-c.1620" University of London, 1971.
 3. APC., xxvii, 109-110 for an example of this in Kent, and Cheshire County Record Office (hereafter CCR), DDX.358/1/f.33v.

The petty Constable, when he perceyueth the wars are in hand, forseeing the toyles, the infinite perills ... that is incident to Souldyers, is loth that anye honest man, through his procurement, shuld hazard himselfe amongst so many daungers; wherefore, if within his office there hap to remayne any idle fellow, some dronkerd or seditious quariler, a priuye pricker, ... these shall bee presented to the seruyce of the Prince; and what seuryce is to bee looked for amongst such fellowes, I thinke may easily be deemed.' (1)

As soon as the number of recruits required from each village parish and hundred was gathered the entire body was transferred to the charge of a captain or conductor to be taken to the port of embarkation. He was paid 'conduct money', a sum of eight pence a day per head to provide for the expenses of the march. The men were expected to cover a dozen miles a day. The conductor of the men out of the shires to the ports was not invariably the same conductor that took them on the second stage of their journey to Ireland.

In the ports the mayor, commissioners for musters, and the government muster master (when there was one) took responsibility for keeping the men under control. Sometimes the government muster master in the port was given full authority of the troops, thereby relieving the local authority. Maurice Kyffin, for instance, at Chester in 1595 helped the port to requisition ships for the levies, acted as paymaster and took responsibility for food supplies, and yet his proper task and office was simply to muster the levies as they came in from the shires to Chester. Once aboard ship, the men became the responsibility of their captains and the

1. Cited in J. Harland (ed.), The Lancashire Lieutenancy under the Tudors and Stuarts, pt. i, Chetham Soc., xlix (1859), p. xxii, introd. In Henry IV, pt. 2, III, ii, William Shakespeare gave a vivid picture of a typical levy in which the recruiter is the villain.

shipmaster; and, once in Ireland, they awaited orders from the commanders and were destined either for garrisons or the field army.⁽¹⁾

The majority of impressments for Ireland in these years were raised through the normal channels of command: the queen's commission for raising a fixed number of soldiers, followed by privy council instructions to the lords lieutenant and their deputies, who in turn sent orders to the justices of the peace, who in turn gave orders to the constables and captains and conductors. The levies were mustered, armed clothed and billeted at the expense of the local shires with some financial help from the crown in the time-honoured institution of coat and conduct money.⁽²⁾ At least this administrative machinery meant that an army could be assembled when needed and disbanded when its task was done, and was cheaper than a standing army.⁽³⁾

In the last decades of the reign, the existence of the lords lieutenant gave the government much greater and systematic control over the raising of troops than the earlier systems of commissions of array,⁽⁴⁾ and indentures, i.e. contracts with an individual noblemen to provide soldiers.⁽⁵⁾ The lords lieutenant, usually noble,

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1. This in barest outline is how the process of recruitment went on, but modifications to this account will be given in chapters four to six below.
 2. A.Hassel/Smith, "Militia rates and militia statutes, 1558-1663" in The English Commonwealth 1547-1640 edited by P.Clark (1979), essays in honour of Joel Hurstfield.
 3. C.G.Cruickshank, Army Royal (Oxford 1969), 190-195 discusses the arguments for and against a standing army in Henry VIII's reign.
 4. A quasi-feudal system whereby an individual was authorised by the monarch to raise a given number of men. There are isolated examples of its use in Elizabeth's reign; for example, the queen ordered Sir Matthew Morgan to levy two hundred 'shot' for the siege of Rouen. HMC., Salisbury, iv, 183.
 5. By indenture, the sovereign contracted to pay an individual for the provision of soldiers. Elizabeth did not use this system. The indentures mentioned in Elizabethan records are not contracts but receipts to say that council orders had been executed.

wealthy landowners in the shires, and often privy councillors, combined the virtues of exercising local authority and of acting for central government. The system then made the queen and council strong enough in theory to disregard exemptions and privileges in emergencies, and, above all, disregard the custom whereby the trained bands could not be sent abroad on military service.⁽¹⁾

Although all fit men were liable to service with the militia, for foreign expeditions a distinction was made between trained and untrained soldiers in a shire. The queen did not have the resources to keep a permanently state-financed army, but the development of a system of trained bands during her reign was the next best thing and gave some recognition to specialization for war. Military historians now agree that some of the influences of the military revolution, which had taken place on the continent, were beginning to make an impact in England in the organization of trained bands and in the greater use of firearms.⁽²⁾

Training, especially in firearms, was costly; trained soldiers were clearly the best material for an army, but it had been considered imprudent to send them out of the country. They were the mainstay of national defence and hence were formally exempt from foreign service.⁽³⁾ This exemption, however, had the undesired effect that on occasions of impressments for Ireland and elsewhere the trained bands became a refuge for those trying to escape going abroad with the army. However, as the demands for men for Ireland

1. For example, 500 of the London trained bands were ordered to Ireland in 1602, see ch. three p.

2. C.G.Cruickshank, op.cit., ch. 7; H.J.Webb, Elizabethan Military Science (1965); M.Roberts, The Military Revolution, 1560-1660 (Belfast 1956). J.R.Hale, 'Armies, Navies and the Art of War' in New Cambridge Modern History, ii, (Cambridge 1958), 171-208.

3. HMC., Salisbury, iv, 468.

increased, the trained bands were themselves increasingly raided for the Irish service.⁽¹⁾

It can be argued that the Irish war in the 1590s virtually necessitated a permanent army of occupation in Ireland which proved ever more costly as the O'Neill rebellion enveloped the nation; the number of garrisons multiplied, and the numbers in the field army increased so that under the commands of Essex and later of Mountjoy, Elizabethan drafts to Ireland amounted to a permanent army. At the end of Mountjoy's conquest of Ulster in 1602 there was a proposal for the establishment of a permanently paid militia to be trained and employed in Ireland, which came to nothing.⁽²⁾

Ideally the government wanted the yeomen farmers and better class labourers and tradesmen in both the army in Ireland and in the trained bands at home, as they were thought to be better able to pay for their own training and weapons.⁽³⁾ On one occasion in 1596 a number of labouring men was drafted for Ireland, but as it became generally known that their employers were unwilling to take them back into work once their military service was finished, the privy council decided to rescind the order and have the labourers replaced by the sons of freeholders who would make good soldiers and not be unemployed on their return.⁽⁴⁾ Sometimes official fears were expressed about the possible foolhardiness of arming the lower orders of Elizabethan society. In Kent, for example, William Lambarde pointed out to his lord lieutenant, William Lord Cobham, the dangers in first arming men and then "insulting them".⁽⁵⁾

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1. J.J.N.McGurk 'Levies from Kent to the Elizabethan Wars, 1589-1603' in Arch. Cant., lxxxviii (1973), 57-72, which excludes levies sent to Ireland.
 2. HMC., Salisbury xii, 590, Edwards Hayes to Sir Robert Cecil, 7th January 1603.
 3. APC., xiv, 55-56.
 4. Ibid., xv, 99-100.
 5. Staffordshire Record Office (hereafter SRO), D.593/S/4/11/1 (i-iv), 13th December 1587.

Throughout the 1590s the privy council's advice, was to choose as far as possible freeholders' sons, husbandmen and farmers' sons for the war. And they would have liked the drafts of unwilling recruits or conscripts to be leavened by a goodly number of ordinary, and gentlemen volunteers, who generally answered the call up of their own free will, and therefore made better soldiers. There were many enthusiastic sons of the gentry and yeomanry who had many reasons for joining the forces, most important being the hope of a captaincy. Yet their ambition was often less than glorious, for command of a company could, for the unscrupulous provide a lucrative income at the soldier's and queen's expense.⁽¹⁾

Near the end of the queen's reign Lord Chief Justice Popham indicated the ideal type needed for military re-inforcements when he wrote to Sir Robert Cecil:

'New supplies might be of gentlemen of the best sort, to be accompanied with their friends, neighbours and tenants, who would keep their companies full for their own safety, and expedite the service for their speedier return.' (2)

But, as the demands for the Irish war grew heavier there was little likelihood that the government could gain the numbers or the types they wanted without the county authorities resorting to arbitrary conscription.

The privy council, commanders in Ireland, and literate external observers could all paint the picture of the ideal type of recruit needed in the wars but in practice the rogues, vagabonds and idlers, 'the masterless men', were drafted for service in Ireland in a policy of social cleansing, which was often achieved at the

1. See Chapter Ten below under "Pay".

2. HMC., Salisbury xii, 315, August 22nd 1602.

expense of the army. That the Elizabethan government regarded vagabondage as a major social problem can be seen in the numerous proclamations in the 1590s dealing with ruined smallholders, and the unemployed farm workers who roamed the countryside living on nothing a year at the expense of the respectable.⁽¹⁾ It was very often these 'masterless men' that were picked up by the constables as recruits for the Irish war.

The evidence for this from the records sent in by commissioners for musters, muster masters, mayors of the ports of embarkation such as those of Chester, Bristol and Barnstaple, as well as the receiving military commanders in Ireland, is overwhelming in indicating that most troops for Ireland were unsatisfactory. After viewing and mustering a levy brought to Bristol for embarkation the commissioners reported to the privy council:

'There was never beheld such strange creatures brought to any muster ... they are most of them either lame, diseased, boys, or common rogues. Few of them have any clothes; small weak starved bodies taken up in fairs, markets and highways to supply the places of better men kept at home ...' (2)

Sir Edward Wingfield, one of the commissioners at Bristol, wished he could paint so that "he might have sent a picture of those creatures who have been brought to him to receive for soldiers." Cecil, he mused, might have wondered how it was possible to find in England and Wales "so many strange decrepid people ... except they had been kept in hospitals."⁽³⁾

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1. M.St.Clare Byrne, Elizabethan Life in Town and Country (1957 reprint) 154; P.Hughes & J.F.Larkin, Tudor Royal Proclamations, iii (1969), nos. 762, 779; P.A.Slack, 'Vagrants and Vagrancy in England 1598' Econ. Hist. Rev. xxvii, 2nd ser. no.3.
 2. HMC., Salisbury xii, 169, May 29th 1602.
 3. Ibid

Matthew Sutcliffe, a noted contemporary writer on military matters, deplored the fact that local captains deliberately used the impress as a chance "to disburthen the parish of rogues, loyters, drunkards, and such as no other way can live." And, if better men were selected, he went on to write,

'it is for some private grudge and of those that are chosen if they have either friends, favor or money, most of them are dismissed.' (1)

In August 1600 the privy council complained that troops recently sent from the city of London to Ireland were not raised by a properly conducted levy but by a search for rogues and vagabonds, who then deserted; the city authorities were promptly ordered to implement the original instructions, because out of the original 350 men ordered only 140 had arrived at Chester for embarkation.⁽²⁾ On other occasions, without expressly stating it, the privy council concurred with the accepted view that it was those who were the least worth in a community that could be best spared for the wars. In 1601 the council positively commanded this course of action:

'Idle persons to be pressed in Kent ...
and those who do live by shiftinge and
bade meanes in places neere the city'

to the lord lieutenant.⁽³⁾

It was the proper business of the muster masters and commissioners for musters viewing levies at the ports to see that the men sent to Ireland were 'serviceable', and their arms adequate; it is not surprising that at various times some of their reports appear to give a bad reputation to certain shires on account

1. M.Campbell, The English Yeoman under Elizabeth and the Early Stuarts (Yale, 1942), 352.

2. APC., xxx, 620-621.

3. APC., xxxii, 74.

of the 'insufficient', 'loose', or 'lewd' persons they had recruited.

The lord lieutenant of Huntingdonshire, Lord St. John Bletso, had fifty of his recruits sent back from Chester by the mayor as they were "of low stature and having other defects";⁽¹⁾ he excused these defects, but Henry Hardware, the mayor of Chester, wrote to Cecil to say he had refused a whole batch from Huntingdon.⁽²⁾

"Northampton has sent very ill men, not forty good ones (out of a hundred)". "Never a county send such hither as they", reported John Baxter, a conducting captain at Chester to Cecil.⁽³⁾

Various batches from the Welsh shires were also refused; the Earl of Pembroke was reprimanded for the poor quality of fifty recruits from Radnor in 1598.⁽⁴⁾

Often the fault of under-strength companies and of the bad quality of the soldiers lay with the conductors from the shires, and with the captains taking the men to Ireland. Once a contingent had reached port it was often too late to improve its quality; John Baxter, for instance, had to go ahead with his unsatisfactory company from Northampton.⁽⁵⁾ Abuses began with the first muster in the shire, then multiplied en route to the port, where a second muster by the mayor, and by specially appointed commissioners revealed discrepancies from the numbers originally ordered and inadequacy in the quality of the recruits.

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1. PRO.SP.12/274/69, the commissioners of musters to the lord lieutenant, 4 March 1600.
 2. PRO.SP.12/274/92, Henry Hardware, mayor of Chester, to Cecil, 2nd April.
 3. HMC., Salisbury xii, 164, Baxter to Cecil, 22 May 1602.
 4. APC., xxix, 43-44.
 5. HMC., Salisbury, xii, 164.

It was the captain's responsibility to fill up his company to replace those who refused or deserted, and often they did this by pressing in the criminal and semi-criminal. In Exeter, a Philip Hart, for example, was released from gaol by the queen's order and told to serve under Captain John Dowdall in Ireland.⁽¹⁾ At Rochester in October 1601, Captains Hugh Kenrick and Henry Fortescue found their companies thirty-seven short of the levy sent out of Suffolk, so they made up their numbers by taking up idle men in Kent and from those 'that pass to and fro in the Gravesend barge'. They also wanted a warrant from the Earl of Nottingham, the Lord Admiral, then at Rochester, to take up "tapsters, ostlers, chamberlains" of which, they said, "the country now aboundeth".⁽²⁾

Captains and conductors found a profitable side-line in defrauding the crown by pocketing bribes to have men discharged, and even occasionally encouraging desertion, they could then pocket coat and conduct money, assigned for these troops, and could make their companies appear at full strength by drafting "stand-ins" at the review and muster in the ports. It was, for example, reported from Barnstaple that the conductor of a levy from Hampshire allowed seven men to run away.⁽³⁾ A conductor of a Derbyshire levy to Chester in 1600 stood accused of releasing seven soldiers on his way to the port and of replacing them with others.⁽⁴⁾ And in the same county of Derbyshire there is a confession of one William Ward about bribes taken by Captain John Tolkerne and two other officers for discharging soldiers in March 1598.⁽⁵⁾

1. HMC., City of Exeter, 370

2. HMC., Salisbury, xi, 441, 22 October 1601.

3. HMC., Salisbury, xi, 431.

4. HMC., Rutland, i, 358-359, 1600.

5. Talbot Papers, N., f.340, the conductor in this case had been chosen by the lord lieutenant, Gilbert, Earl of Shrewsbury.

Thomas Allen, a yeoman of Staffordshire gave five pounds to Captain Norton in 1596 "for not serving her Majesty on her last voyage in her wars".⁽¹⁾ When twenty-two escaped from Lancashire and Lincolnshire levies sent to Chester, the council sent their names to the commissioners in those shires, instructing them to find out from those arrested how much they paid for their liberty.⁽²⁾

Complaints of abuses in the system of raising troops inevitably tend to attract more notice in the sources than messages of congratulation for services well performed, and yet improvements in the type of men recruited, and of the good quality of their equipment are occasionally noted. The mayor of Chester specifically commended to the privy council a particular levy of fifty men from Anglesey in 1601.

'They came to this city very well apparelled with caps, cassocks, doublets, breeches, nethersocks, shoes and shirts, which gave great discontentment to the residue of the soldiers which had no apparell and to us some trouble for their pacification ...' ⁽³⁾

The privy council congratulated a levy from Oxfordshire and Berkshire in December 1598 on the speed with which the men were assembled, and of the good quality of men and equipment. Lord John Norris, the lord lieutenant, whose sons served in high commands in Ireland, was commended for the excellence of that particular piece of service.⁽⁴⁾ The Earl of Bath when viewing a draft of soldiers from the west country in October 1601 reported to Sir Robert Cecil that many of the thousand men mustered and viewed 'are very tall men and well armed and willing to serve'.⁽⁵⁾

1. S.A.H.Burne (ed.), Staffordshire Sessions Records, iii, (1933), 170.

2. APC., xxxii, 359.

3. HMC., Salisbury, xi, 474.

4. APC., xxix, 398

5. HMC., Salisbury, xi, 443.

Therefore not all the drafts to Ireland in these years were the unsatisfactory rogues, vagabonds and gaol-birds of Elizabethan England. It must be recalled that companies of untrained raw recruits were often given some training by the muster masters and captains while waiting in the ports for favourable winds for Ireland, and that often, too, such companies were leavened with some from the trained bands and with a few gentlemen volunteers.

There is little doubt, however, that the majority of the levies sent into Ireland consisted of pressed men, who had little stomach for the task of subduing an enemy fighting a guerilla war in a terrain of bog, bush and mountain. There was a great reluctance to serve in Ireland; "Better be hanged at home than die like dogs in Ireland" became a common saying in Chester.⁽¹⁾ The class of men generally recruited made desertion prevalent, as the frequency of its mention testify, so that it was always difficult for commanders in Ireland to keep full ranks.⁽²⁾ Sir George Carew, the commander and president in Munster commiserated with Lord Mountjoy, the lord deputy, on how difficult it was to "keep unwilling minds together that are not inclined to be soldiers, and how fearful the name of Ireland is to pressed men in England."⁽³⁾ For such reasons the government had on occasion resorted to re-deploying veteran troops from the Continent to Ireland.

1. CSPI., (1592-1596), 489

2. AFC., xxxi, 360; desertions from Lincs.; ibid., 392 from Flintshire; and from the mayor of Chester's military papers, M/MP/8/45-52 for a batch of examples on desertions at Chester.

3. Cal. Carew MSS., iv, 338

(ii) Re-deployment.

The first major contingent of hardened English troops to be sent to Ireland from the continental wars were those who had fought under Sir John and Sir Henry Norris in Brittany. On the successful conclusion of that campaign the winter of 1594 the government intended that 2,000 of these seasoned soldiers should go to Sir John Norris then in Ireland as Lord President of Munster, but by June 1595 appointed 'Lord General of her Majesty's forces in Ulster.'⁽¹⁾ Throughout February 1595 the authorities in Dublin expected the arrival of 2,000 Brittany soldiers, as they were called.⁽²⁾ By the 11th March 1595, 1,553 of them put in at Plymouth, and of that number 1,300 arrived at Waterford by the end of March.⁽³⁾ Weak from their sea journey and lacking victuals and accustomed to short marches in France some of their captains were hesitant to march their men on to Dublin from Waterford. When they were eventually mustered and viewed "at the greene in Dublin" before Sir William Russell, lord deputy, he professed disgust at their defective arms and clothing "both worn out with long use and not lately supplied". "What", quoth he, "are these the olde soldiers we hear so much of? They look as if they come out of the goeles in London."⁽⁴⁾ A report to Lord Burghley reckoned that there were not above 1,100 of them.⁽⁵⁾ They were promptly dispatched to Sir John Norris on the borders of Ulster, which according to the Four Masters had by then "rose up in one alliance and one union against the English."⁽⁶⁾

1. PRO.SP.63/178/54

2. PRO.SP.63/178/63, 100

3. PRO.SP.63/178/90, i, ii, iii.

4. H.Wood (ed.), Sir James Perrot's Chronicle of Ireland, 1584-1608 Irish Manuscripts Commission (hereafter, IMC.), Dublin, 1933, p.103.

5. PRO.SP.63/179/42

6. Annals of the Four Masters, edited by J.O'Donovan, vols. v-vii (Dublin 1851), vi, p.1951 (hereafter AFM)

At the relief of the Monaghan garrison and battle of Clontibret, 27 May 1595 "the Brittaines bands did carry themselves most valiantly and skilfully in the fight".⁽¹⁾ That statement from the muster master general Ralph Lane to Lord Burghley of 7 June 1595 may have flattered the government's wisdom in having the Brittany veterans employed in Ireland but hardly disguised the truth of a defeat at Clontibret at the hands of the Irish.

The next large re-deployment exercise took place in the recruitment of the Earl of Essex's celebrated 'army of Ireland', a force of some 16,000 foot and 1,300 horse in 1598/99 when 2,000 experienced troops were ordered from the Low Countries to Ireland in exchange for the same number of raw recruits to be levied in England to be sent to the Low Countries.⁽²⁾ Indeed, this re-deployment was a measure of the determination of the Elizabethan government to subdue Ireland.⁽³⁾ The States General in the Low Countries took the raw recruits in place of the veterans but refused to employ the officers sent over from England with the recruits, and their unplaced officers volunteered for the Irish service under Essex.⁽⁴⁾ Sir Henry Docwra became the chief conductor of these Low Countries' veterans to Ireland for the Earl of Essex.⁽⁵⁾ The Privy Council ordered that 1,400 were to be taken out of Sir Francis Vere's companies in his field army and 600 from Sir Edward Norris in garrison at Ostend: missing numbers were to be made up from Sir

1. PRO.SP/63/180/19

2. PRO.SP.63/202/pt.iv/no.17

3. PRO.SP.12/268/123, the queen to the lords lieutenant, November 1598.

4. HMC., Salisbury, viii, 499, 507, 508 for examples.

5. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 22, 41, 42, Docwra to Essex, 25 January 1599

Robert Sidney's garrison in Flushing.⁽¹⁾ And, from England

Sir William Knollys became responsible for dispatching the recruits to replace them of the Low Countries.⁽²⁾

In this triangular re-deployment exercise affairs did not go smoothly or quickly. Both Docwra's and Knollys's letters to the Earl of Essex tell a tale of bad management and lack of co-operation on the part of Sir Francis Vere in the Low Countries. Knollys wrote that when he arrived in Flushing nothing was ready for the reception and disposal of the raw recruits he had brought. No arrangements had been made for billeting and victualling his men and he did not know what was to become of the captains he had with him.⁽³⁾ Knollys wrote despairingly to Sir Robert Cecil pointing out: "There is a great fault somewhere in making new orders contrary to those of the privy council".⁽⁴⁾ Furthermore, Knollys made plain to Essex that only 400 of the veteran troops had arrived in Zealand for transportation to Ireland and were "without a captain or any other officer to conduct them to Ireland."⁽⁵⁾

Essex wanted the best and the most experienced of the Low Country troops. What he obtained were men from Sir Francis Vere's broken companies, that is to say, men described by Knollys as "the worst men and the worst armed",⁽⁶⁾ and by Docwra as "far inferior in their experience and readiness to your lordship's expectation".⁽⁷⁾ The contingent meant for Ireland turned out to be 500 short of the

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1. PRO.SP.12/269/12/ 15, Sir Edward Norris to Sir Robert Sidney
 2. PRO.SP.63/194/114-116b - the schedule by shires for the recruits. The full volume PRO.SP.12/270 is chiefly concerned with the build up of Essex's army for Ireland.
 3. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 36, 37, Knollys to Essex, two letters, 22 January 1599
 4. PRO.SP.12/270/27, Knollys to Cecil
 5. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 36
 6. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 36
 7. Ibid., 42

required total, and those brought together for embarkation to Ireland do not appear to have been paid.⁽¹⁾ Tempers were frayed and a feud arose between Docwra and Vere which deepened when the privy council sent severe reproaches to Vere.⁽²⁾ Five of the companies were supposed to have been sent from the Brill garrison, but Dudley Carleton marvelled in his letter to John Chamberlain that such a number could be ordered from a garrison that had but "two companies left and those for the most part Dutch and married men".⁽³⁾

However, the general opinion persisted that veterans from the continental wars made better fighting material for the forces in Ireland than hastily trained raw recruits from England. The Earl of Nottingham, the lord admiral, thought two thousand of them worth eight thousand of the so-called trained men from England. "There was never a Prince so deceived as Her Majesty had been with this word of trained men" he wrote to Cecil on the occasion of new demands for re-inforcements for Essex's fast dwindling army.⁽⁴⁾ By the 1590s the Netherlands had become a practical training ground for troops for Ireland. Since the formal alliance of 1585 the queen kept a force of some 5,000 foot and 1,000 horse there in return for the possession of Flushing and Brill. The garrisons there needed constant re-inforcements and each time, according to Francis Vere, their commander, of the old fighting stock of the Earls of Oxford, they were sent "the very scum of the world", swept from the gaols and taverns; and that as soon as they had been trained into soldiers they were ordered elsewhere.⁽⁵⁾

1. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 42.

2. APC., xxix, 621.

3. PRO.SP.12/270/10.

4. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 338.

5. J.W. Fortescue, History of the British Army, i (1899), 156

In return for these seasoned troops Irishmen were sometimes sent to the wars in the Low Countries to replace veterans.

Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester, for instance, wanted to have:

'600 or a 1,000 of your idle Irish men ...
very meet to be out of the country, for they
be hard and abide more pains than our men ...
till they have been as well trained with
hardiness as they have ...' (1)

Such a trend of policy could misfire, as it did when Sir William Stanley defected with his Irish companies to the Spaniards at Deventer.⁽²⁾ Yet if there were risks involved in employing the Irish in the wars abroad, to employ them in the queen's forces in Ireland was surely doubly dangerous.

(iii) The employment of Irish and Scots soldiers in the Elizabethan army.

The recruitment of Irish into the English forces became a vexed problem during the last years of the re-conquest. The tradition of Irish soldiers fighting for England on the continent or in Ireland, was not new; for instance they fought with Henry V at Agincourt, and in the service of Henry VIII.⁽³⁾ Early in the queen's reign it was decided not to permit more than five or six Irish soldiers to serve in each royal company for it was thought to be dangerous that Irish troops should out-number English. There could be no certainty of their loyalty and good behaviour, particularly if in a battle their countrymen proved to get the upper hand.⁽⁴⁾

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1. J. Bruce (ed.), 'Correspondence of Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester, during his government of the Low Countries in the years 1585 and 1586' in the Camden Soc., xxvii (1844), 26. Sir John Perrott when lord deputy in Ireland (1584-88) also advised the council in Dublin to send Irishmen into Flanders, C. McNeill (ed.), 'The Perrott Papers' in Analecta Hibernica, xii (1943)
 2. For Sir William Stanley and the subsequent history of Irish forces in Spain see B. Jennings (ed.) The Wild Geese in Spanish Flanders 1582-1700 (IMC., Dublin, 1964).
 3. W. G. Strickland, "Irish soldiers in the service of Henry VIII", Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland In. 6th ser., xiii (1923), 94-97., (hereafter R.S.A.I.)
 4. Cal. Carew MSS., i, 355

There were, however, good strategic arguments for their employment. To recruit some Irish into the companies prevented them from serving with the enemy and saved England supplies. Was it not the classical policy of an occupying army to divide the enemy? Lord Mountjoy, like so many military commanders had read Caesar's Gallic Wars and tried to apply classical precedents in typical renaissance ^{fashion} vein. (1) He requested the privy council's permission on one occasion:

'to wage some of these Irish by agreement and for a certain time (so that he could) consume many of the rebels and by the rebels consume many of them and both for the good of the service ...' (2)

In seeking the granting of such a request it is presumed that the motives of the chief commander were more honourable than some of his captains who were keen to fill their companies with the Irish on the assumption that they would accept lower pay; the Irish thereby became a means "to cover their frauds and make gains". (3) The hope that there would be but five or six Irishmen in each English company was a pious one. In 1602 the council expressed concern to Mountjoy that there were "six whole companies of mere Irish in Connaught, and those Connaughtmen ... especially whilst they are employed in their own countries and at their own doors." Mountjoy was advised to reform the situation as soon as possible, and told that Irish companies may expect no money for apparel which they "are known never to use", and, that their pay should not necessarily be equal to the English. (4)

From his experience in Munster Sir George Carew thought that the Irish would not "serve under the colours at less pay than the

1. F.M.Jones, The Last Elizabethan Lord Deputy - Lord Mountjoy, (Dublin, 1958), passim.

2. Cal. Carew MSS., iv, 50, Mountjoy to the privy council, 1st May 1601.

3. CSPI, (1598-1599), 258.

4. Cal. Carew MSS., iv, 219.

queen allows"; he had a deep distrust of the Irish in his companies.⁽¹⁾
 The blustering Captain Nicholas Dawtrey,⁽²⁾ on the other hand, pointed to the positive advantages to the queen of employing the Irish if they were taken abroad to fight. He offered to lead a company of them to fight with him in Brittany. He wrote:

'The queen shall leave at home many of her people of England ... disarm her ill-disposed subjects of Ireland whose rebellions are supported by those trained soldiers ... she shall save the spending of more treasure in Ireland and fourthly they [the Irish soldiers] will do more spoil upon the enemy than three as many soldiers of any other nation ... for there can be no better soldiers upon the earth than they be, either for the use of their weapons or the strength of their bodies and minds ... they will keep health when others with a little extremity will lie by the wall ...' (3)

It was not so much regard for the fighting qualities of the Irish which led to the recruitment of Irishmen but the urgent need to replace the dead, the deserted and the wounded. Many captains could not wait on the vagaries of the wind to bring fresh levies out of England and the temptation to fill their places with Irish was very great. Many of them, like Dawtrey, preferred the Irish fighting man to the inferior pressed man from England or Wales and made a virtue out of necessity; Irish courage and hardihood became proverbial.⁽⁴⁾

Many Englishmen remained cautious about the use of Irishmen. Fynes Moryson complained about filling up companies with Irish soldiers and estimated, perhaps for effect, that at least one third of the queen's forces in Ireland was composed of Irish.⁽⁵⁾

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1. CSPI. (November 1600-July 1601), 162.
 2. J. Dawtrey, in The Falstaff Saga (1927), claimed that Captain Nicholas Dawtrey was the original for Shakespeare's Falstaff.
 3. HMC., Salisbury, iv, 567, Captain Dawtrey to Sir R. Cecil, 21st July 1584.
 4. J.A. Froude, The English in Ireland (1901), 11.
 5. C. Litton Falkiner (ed.), Illustrations of Irish History (1904), 291, citing Fynes Moryson's Commonwealth of Ireland (1617).

Philip O'Sullivan Beare, writing later than Moryson, but with an Irish bias, reckoned that the Irish comprised about half the armed forces in the queen's army, and remarked that the Irish were conquered not so much by the foreigner as by one another.⁽¹⁾

Sir Edward Stanley in writing to Cecil in May 1597 from Dublin alleged that of 7,000 men in the queen's pay in Ireland 4,000 were Irish. He reminded Cecil:

"How dangerous a thing this is, to train them up in the use of arms who are daily running away to the enemy ... ready to turn the points of their swords into our bosoms".⁽²⁾

Sir Robert Cecil may have been remote from action in Ireland, but few had a better grasp of the overall difficulties from frequent reports either from captains who wrote to him or brought their news to the council and court. Cecil warned Mountjoy to observe "what hath been the fruit of entertainment of the Irish in companies either with Sir Henry Docwra or Sir Arthur Chichester", and advised him to pension their leaders "to maintain the rascals as well as they can" rather than that the queen should entertain their followers as well.⁽³⁾

And in the final years of the re-conquest the government suggested that Irish who wanted to serve should be sent to the continental wars, and their places taken by levies out of England, and that those already serving in English companies should be allowed to decline through natural wastage.⁽⁴⁾

Official policy clearly disapproved of the practice of using Irish soldiers in the queen's army,⁽⁵⁾ but in practice no lord

1. P.O'Sullivan Beare, Historiae Catholicae Iberniae Compendium (Lisbon, 1621) translated and edited by M.J.Byrne in Ireland under Elizabeth (1903), 40, 41, 57, 69, 160.
2. CSPI., (1596-1597), 289
3. Cal. Carew MSS., iv, 156, Cecil to Mountjoy, October 1601
4. CSPI., (1598-1599), 156.
CSPI., (1599-1600), 81, 117, 258, 384, 385; ibid. (1600), 4, 326, 407
5. Ibid., (1601-1603), 19, 24, 126, 127, 320

deputy in Ireland could do without them. Sir John Perrott, when President of Munster in the 1570s, said the Irish were indispensable to the forces. In October 1598 the Irish Council promised the Privy Council to take every possible measure to diminish Irish numbers in the forces, but admitted, "we cannot thoroughly purge the army of them".⁽¹⁾ Until the end of the war every commander in Ireland, Carew, Docwra, Chichester and Mountjoy continued to employ Irish soldiers. Mountjoy often expressed the hope that when the army was strengthened with Englishmen he could

"begin to cast the Irish out of our companies, since they must continue good subjects, or starve if they go out, and yet have the sword hang over them wheresoever they go." ⁽²⁾

In a memorandum of June 1601 to the privy council he said that the Irish in the army must be

"necessarily maintained, for we take so many men from the rebels and give unto ourselves facility to plant the foundation of their own ruin, and both with us and against us waste them by themselves ..."

This was the practical counter argument to official policy and Mountjoy went on to give instances of how this worked during the course of the war.⁽³⁾

The Irish element in the English fighting force on the queen's pay roll, and therefore mercenaries, must be distinguished from the hostings or "risings out" which loyal Irish chiefs raised temporarily and locally for service with English commanders. Although they often proved less dependable than those on the pay-roll their value as allies outweighed the dangers of their return to the rebels. At their most co-operative they could police their own

1. CSPI., (1598-1599); 273

2. Cal. Carew MSS., iv, 90, 91

3. Ibid.

districts, provide guides and scouts in difficult terrain, help to transport victuals to garrisons, provide intelligence of enemy movements, and in skirmishes aid the regular troops in fighting.⁽¹⁾

If it was a risk to employ Irish troops, it was equally a risk to let them go. The lord deputy often urged that whenever the armed forces were reduced no haste should be used to "dissolve the Irish in the companies" since many of them so discharged would prove to be ready trained soldiers for the Irish side.⁽²⁾ When O'Neill won at Clontibret in Monaghan in 1595 Sir Henry Bagenal's men were astounded to see a force of musketeers "in red coats like English soldiers" coming against them.⁽³⁾ During the period of his loyalty to Elizabeth O'Neill had the services of six English captains to train his companies to fight the queen's enemies. It is said that he managed to change the men who served under these captains from time to time so that many more than the intended six hundred received military training at their hands. Professor Hayes McCoy has shown that O'Neill had an army trained in firearms in the English fashion of companies under captains, and that he had adopted the English convention of "dead-pays".⁽⁴⁾ Moreover, among the formerly loyal English captains who remained in O'Neill's service during the rebellion, Hugh Mostyn, Alexander Walshe, the brothers Richard and Henry Hovenden and Richard Tyrell became well known traitors; Henry Hovenden became O'Neill's secretary.⁽⁵⁾ In a report of "divers Welshmen concerning the Earl of Tyrone" of

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1. CSPI., (1598-1599), 27, 77, 109, 175, 286, 363, 387, 434, 435
 2. Fynes Moryson, The Commonwealth of Ireland (edition cited), 291.
 3. CSPI., (1592-1596), 322.
 4. G.A. Hayes McCoy, 'The Army of Ulster, 1593-1601' in Irish Sword, i, (1950-1951), 105-117; ibid., 'Strategy and Tactics in Irish Warfare' in IHS., ii (1941), 255-275; 'Tide of victory and defeat' in Studies, xxxviii (1949), 158 ff.
 5. Cal. Carew MSS., iii, 87, 89; ibid., iv, 53, 54, 200 for examples.

January 1599, it was said that O'Neill had in his service 500 Welshmen whom he had made officers and "rewardeth with double pay above the Irish nation", and that therefore no Welshmen should be used in service against Irishmen "because they were not to be trusted."⁽¹⁾

When English armed forces in Ireland were at a low ebb in numbers and morale during the winter of 1598 the Irish Council urged the Privy Council to counteract the continual loss of men by employing Scottish mercenaries. They argued that the Scots were "inured to the manner of the Irish war, and specially to tread bog and the bush" and that their employment would blight the hopes of the Irish who had been accustomed to aid in men and munitions from Scotland.⁽²⁾ A Scot in writing to Sir Robert Cecil reminded him "how abundant in people Argyleshire is", and that they were like the Irish in "suffering cold, hunger and long marches, and are a great deal more desperate", so that they would be glad to serve the queen for little pay. It was his opinion that men from Argyllshire would be a great deal fitter for the Irish war than Englishmen. He argued that two regiments of them led by English captains would be more easily maintained than one English regiment, and that at all times they would take on "desperate services and enterprises" and meet the Irish in their own form of fighting.⁽³⁾ Sir Richard Bingham also wrote to Cecil in January 1599 supporting the Irish Council's suggestions for the employment of Scots especially in Ulster against O'Neill; "

"a regiment or two of Scots would do exceeding great service, besides the discouragement it would be to all the rest of the traitors to hear that their friends were waged against them";

but all this advice fell on deaf ears in London.⁽⁴⁾

1. CSPI., (1598-1599), 462 But see Table 3, Chapter Three.

2. CSPI., (1598-1599), 330

3. Ibid., p.437

4. Ibid., p.447

In every plan put forward for the settlement of Ireland prior to the 1590s, it was rather the expulsion of the Scots from Ulster that was always considered to be a necessary preliminary step for peace. It is then interesting that there was serious discussion of employing Scots as mercenaries against the Irish. In Queen Mary's reign an Act of Parliament forbade the sending in of any Scots to Ireland, "retaining them or intermarrying with them" to prevent any alliance between the Irish and the Scots.⁽¹⁾ However, throughout all the rebellions in Ulster the terms of this Act were more honoured in the breach, as can be seen from the numerous orders to the Ulster chiefs, O'Neills' and O'Donnells' ^{To} ~~should~~ expel any Scottish mercenaries they had employed.⁽²⁾

When it became clear by 1594 that O'Neill had firmly come out on the side of the Gaelic Irish the council in Dublin seriously took up the question of raising Scots mercenaries by sending an experienced sea captain and negotiator, captain George Thornton, to bargain with the Earl of Argyll and the clan of the McLeans for a body of 'redshank' soldiers as they were called. But nothing was effected by October of 1595.⁽³⁾ Sir William Russell, lord deputy in 1596, then recommended to the English privy council the policy of employing Scots, among a long list of other recommendations. By 1596 all of Ulster and Connaught lay under the

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1. The Statutes at Large, i, 329 for the Act 3 & 4 Philip and Mary. The Act remained a dead letter until 1612 when a Dublin Parliament repealed it: 'the cause of the making of the said Act is utterly taken away by the happy uniting of the kingdoms of England, Scotland and Ireland under one Imperial Crown.'
 2. Cal. Carew MSS., iii 96, 162, 278, 522.
 3. PRO.SP.63/183/77, October 1595.

sway of the northern rebels. Russell wrote:

'If a force of 3000 Scots, well chosen and governed by some honourable commander ... might be drawn into Ulster to serve upon the back of the Earl (of Tyrone), and the same 3000 Scots to be joined with the garrison of Lough Foyle ... it would be to good purpose for the speedy achieving of this war.' (1)

The recommendation fell on deaf ears, probably because too much was hoped for from the truce that year. In any case a garrison at Lough Foyle was still a matter of discussion, not of reality. It is also suggested that the time for negotiating with King James VI of Scotland was ill chosen, for it is thought that he was then probably helping O'Neill; however no proof of this can be brought forward. (2)

After English forces had been seriously depleted by a disastrous defeat at the Yellow Ford in August 1598 the proposal to employ Scots was again considered by the council in Dublin. It wanted King James to raise an army of Lowland Scots but, clearly timorous of such a measure, the Dublin Council wanted the Scots' king to promise a full withdrawal when they had completed their service. (3)

During 1600 the Council in Dublin, supported by the muster master general in Ireland, Sir Ralph Lane, continued to importune

1. Cal. Carew MSS., iii, 197, 'A Declaration' by the lord deputy and council.
2. CSPI, (July 1596-December 1597), 431
3. Ibid., (1598-99), 329. For contemporary accounts of the battle of the Yellow Ford see Cal. Carew MSS., iii, 280-281; CSPI., (1598-99), 227-228, an account of the lieutenant of horse there, Capt. Montague. From the Irish side there is the narrative of Philip O'Sullivan Beare in his history of Catholic Ireland trans. and ed. M.J.Byrne as Ireland under Elizabeth (Dublin 1903). Though he wrote in 1621 O'Sullivan had oral reports from many who had taken part; in general historians are cautious in their reliance on O'Sullivan for he represents the exiled Catholic viewpoint of sixteenth century Irish history; c.f. R.Dudley Edwards, Ireland in the Age of the Tudors (1977), 191.

Sir Robert Cecil to have the scheme for Scottish mercenaries put into effect. They seemed, however, to be unable to make up their minds on the desirability or otherwise of Highlanders or Lowlanders. Adam Loftus, on the Irish council, would have liked a force of Highlanders to move against O'Byrne's men who held sway in the Wicklow mountains, south of Dublin and the Pale. The Scots Highlanders were, he thought, especially suited to mountain warfare and, he added, they could be "hired good cheap".⁽¹⁾

By November 1600 nothing had been done about employing Scots but the English privy council informed Sir Henry Docwra, the commander of the Lough Foyle garrisons, that they had overtures from a Scottish chieftain then ⁱⁿ a feud with Hugh O'Neill, to recruit a force of his men for Docwra's assistance at Lough Foyle.⁽²⁾ Such a force of mercenaries was apparently enlisted, but they never served with Docwra; indeed, shortly after this information a small body of Scots were found serving under O'Neill instead.⁽³⁾ Throughout this period King James and the Estates in Scotland seemed lukewarm about Anglo-Scottish collaboration in Ireland. Highlanders were never actually sent against the Irish. Given the nature of the war in the north of Ireland it was a more pertinent English policy simply to keep the Scots from aiding their kinsmen, particularly in the Antrim area.⁽⁴⁾

The English commander Sir Arthur Chichester was firmly set against the involvement of the Scots. His hostility to them is well attested;⁽⁵⁾ he greatly distrusted the comings and goings

1. CSPI., (April, 1599-February 1600), 389, 409, 450.

2. PRO.SP.63/207/pt. vi, 16.

3. Cal. State Papers, Scotland, (1589-1603), 789, 796.

4. G.A.Hayes-McCoy, Scots Mercenary Forces in Ireland (1937), ch.2.

5. CSPI., (November 1600-July 1601), xlv-xlvii where Sir Arthur Chichester's troubles with the McSorley McDonnells in Antrim are summarised in the preface.

of Sir Randall MacDonnell's kinsmen; they normally resulted in conspiracies, such as happened when Sir John Chichester's brother was slain in 1597. At Carrickfergus he always had the Scots on his doorstep, not just from the proximity of the Mull of Kintyre and the Isles, but from their presence in Olderfleet Castle on the haven above Carrickfergus, for that fortress had been sold to them in December 1597.⁽¹⁾ Sir Arthur's commission, dated 8th April 1600, gave him authority "to pursue with fire and sword such Scots as are there landed or shall land".⁽²⁾ However, he could not put this into effect until the English privy council and Sir Robert Cecil had made up their minds whether or not, in difficult negotiations with King James, the Scots should be better treated as friends rather than as allies of the northern rebels.⁽³⁾ Sir Arthur Chichester's relations with the Scots, the McSorleys and the MacDonalds, both in times of truce and of hostility, were little different from his experience against the Irish enemy in the war.

In the discussion on the employment of Scottish mercenaries, gallowglasses and redshanks, as they were called, the common-sense and cautious view prevailed; there was the risk of their changing sides, and the difficulty of controlling or eventually expelling them once they were in Ireland. Sir Geoffrey Fenton, secretary to the Dublin Council, stated these views and won the day; he wrote that it had ever been

"the rule of policy in this government to keep the Scots out of Ireland, as a people that have wild pretences to Ulster and have long time footed in some parts thereof ..."⁽⁴⁾

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1. CSPI. (July 1596-December 1597), 492; ibid. (1598-March 1599) pp. 6, 9.
 2. G.A.Hayes-McCoy, op.cit., p.318; APC., xxxi, 307-308.
 3. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, II, 326
 4. PRO.SP.63/194/67., Fenton to Cecil, 6 February 1597.

The bulk of the evidence on recruitment for the late sixteenth century Irish war strongly indicates ^{that} the majority were unwilling conscripts with little or no training, especially when their presence was urgently wanted in Ireland. Military service in Ireland had a notorious reputation. The conscripted man faced serious handicaps; his pay was usually in arrears, he was frequently defrauded by his captain and often left short of life's necessities. The common rumour was that few soldiers returned from Ireland, for if the enemy did not end their lives, want and sickness did.

It is not to be greatly wondered if such men were mutinous, or deserted when they had the opportunity, either when unfavourable winds detained them at the ports of embarkation, or whenever a chance came in Ireland, and there some went over to the Irish enemy. Muster masters and mayors of ports were quick to blame losses on the criminal and quasi-criminal types recruited. The government put the blame on the captains' and conductors' inefficiency and fraud; even after attempts had been made to reform the recruiting system through the appointment of muster masters and commissaries for food and clothing abuses continued.

However, under the competent military leaders sent over to end the war after Essex's débâcle, English soldiers in Ireland and their Irish allies eventually proved successful against an elusive enemy fighting a type of war of which the English had little experience. Those who were in agreement with the queen and council's wishes that there should be as many English as possible in the ranks of the army insisted that the English soldier was just as brave and enduring as his Irish or Scots counterpart. The

author of a "Discourse of Ireland" written during the war, opined:

'The Irish churl will never bear arms nor fight in his own defence; but the English farmar or clown, after he hath been once or twice upon service, will serve as sufficiently and as valiantly as most soldiers in garrison and therefore the more English the better for the State.' (1)

But the problem of carrying out this policy was highlighted by Thomas Platter, who travelled widely in the English shires at the time of Essex's recruiting campaign for his army of Ireland:

'The country has good soldiers, but they do not care to go abroad; when soldiers are required, and idlers are found loitering in the towns, they are given money, and whether they will or no, are forced to leave forthwith, and if they are caught deserting their case has been dealt with and justice done forthwith ...' (2)

The mixed nature of the queen's forces in Ireland made up as they were of English, Welsh and Irish, and of impressed men, volunteers and veterans from the Low Countries would strongly suggest that it is too simplistic to polarize the protagonists in the war into English and Irish in a nationalistic sense. When many Irish in the English forces fought their own countrymen, and English deserted to the Irish enemy national identities became blurred after long service in Ireland. Christopher St. Lawrence, a well known captain in the nine years war, when brought before the privy council to answer his alleged implication in the Essex plot, and there told he was an Irish man, replied:

I am sorry that when I am in England I should be esteemed an Irishman, and in Ireland an Englishman. (3)

May not this captain's identity crisis have been shared by many of the less articulate common soldiers? Between 1594 and 1602 large

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1. CSPI., (1601-1603), 252, footnote transcribing this marginal comment.
 2. C.Williams (trans. & ed.) Thomas Platter's Travels in England, 1599 (1937), 184.
 3. A.Collins (ed.) Letters and Memorials of State from the De L'isle and Dudley papers (1746), ii, 137.

levies of them were recruited in the cause of conquering Ireland; the demands for these men and the money to equip them put heavy burdens on the shires of England and Wales, and the following chapter surveys that overall burden.

CHAPTER THREE

A Survey of the demands made on English and Welsh manpower for
for the Irish War(i) The demographic background

All classes of Elizabethan society were affected by war. A few wrote of the bearing of arms in the service of queen and country as a noble profession, but their sentiments were shared by the 1590s neither by the conscripts sent into Ireland nor by those called upon to pay for the war.⁽¹⁾ Support for an unpopular war in men, arms, and money was grudgingly given; the complaints of rich and poor alike and their reluctance to give practical assistance to foreign campaigns is well attested. The rich withheld horses or sent their poorer specimens; and they generally passed on the military taxes imposed on them to those less able or less unwilling to pay. The well known lawyer, antiquarian and justice of the peace, William Lambarde, said as much to his lord lieutenant William, Lord Cobham in 1587 remarking that dutiful men would find themselves more and more charged and "theire chearfull rediness the cause that they are more urged on".⁽²⁾ Elsewhere Lambarde pointed out how the impressed man "comes as willingly to serve as does the beggar to the stocks or the dog to hanging".⁽³⁾

The 1590s was a period of stress for the English people: outbreaks of plague, particularly severe in London in 1593, and a

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1. See the bibliography under Rich, Barnaby; Digges, Thomas; Churchyard, Thomas; Harrison, William; and Derricke, John.
 2. Staffordshire Record Office (hereafter SRO), D.593/S/4/11/1 Lambarde to Cobham, 13th December 1587. This letter is not in the Folger edition of Lambarde's works.
 3. Cited in P.Clark, English Provincial Society: Religion and Politics in Kent, 1500-1640 (Harvester, 1977), 222

bad run of harvests from 1594 to 1597 co-incided with heavy demands for war. Alongside increased taxation price inflation continued, and a rise in population exacerbated the scarcity of goods and employment. Hardship was aggravated by soldiers returning from the war. The efforts of the 'political nation' to ameliorate these stresses are reflected in the statutes, proclamations, and privy council orders of the time, ~~and~~ all of which greatly increased the duties of the justices in the shires.⁽¹⁾ Parliament became critical of crown policies; at court there was faction, and in the nation at large sporadic outbreaks of disorder.⁽²⁾

Before turning to the demands for soldiers for Ireland it would be helpful to know the size of the population drawn upon, but gaps and uncertainties in the evidence have reduced demographic estimates to calculated guesses for not until the census of 1801 do we have comprehensive information on the population of England and Wales. The data used by economic historians and those of the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure from parish registers, subsidy and diocesan returns have all to be hedged about by qualifications not least that these sources were ^{compiled} not for demographic purposes but for the fiscal, military and ecclesiastical needs of the Tudors.⁽³⁾

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1. J.H.Gleason, The Justices of the Peace in England, 1558-1640 (Oxford, 1969), ch.vii; A.J.Slavin, The Precarious Balance: English Government and Society (The Borsoi History of England, III, 1450-1640, New York, 1973) chapters six and seven.
 2. P.Clark and P.Slack (editors), Crisis and Order in English Towns 1500-1700 (1972) which suggests that riots were localized and moderate but see B.Sharp, In Contempt of all Authority: Rural Artizans and Riots in the West of England, 1558-1660 (University of California, 1980)
 3. See for example the caution used by W.G.Hoskins in The Age of Plunder (1976), 219-220 when discussing such sources for population, and E.A.Wrigley and R.S.Schofield, The Population History of England 1541-1871 (1981) Appendix 5, pp.563-569

There is, however, general acceptance among historical demographers that the population of England and Wales was increasing in the Elizabethan period.⁽¹⁾ The muster returns made in 1570 of the "whole numbers of the shires and towns fit to bear arms" gives a figure of 589,981, which when multiplied by the suggested multiplier of six recommended by W.G.Hoskins gives a total population of 3,539,886.⁽²⁾ W.G.Hoskins also estimated a total population of 3.80 million from the 1603 ecclesiastical census.⁽³⁾ Although attempts to use such sources as a reasonable guide to population are not thought to have been successful by the Cambridge Group, E.A.Wrigley's and R.S.Schofield's estimates from parish registers~~■~~ evidence, using back projection, are not dissimilar: Their figure for 1571 is 3,270,903; in 1591 they give a figure of 3,899,190, and in 1601 they give a figure of 4,109,981.⁽⁴⁾ Whatever source is used the upward trend in the population is clear. William Lambarde in Kent remarked the decades of peace before the 1590s were "the mother of riches ... the father of many children".⁽⁵⁾ And in one of his celebrated charges to the Maidstone juries Lambarde said that:

"the number of our people is much multiplied nowadays not only young folk of all sorts but churchmen of each degree do marry and multiply at liberty, which was not wont to be, and on the other hand we have not, God be thanked, been touched with any extreme mortality either by sword or sickness that might abate the overgrown number of us" (6).

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1. E.A.Wrigley (ed.) An introduction to English Historical Demography (1966), 266; F.V.Emery, 'England circa 1600' in A New Historical Geography of England edited by H.C.Darby (Cambridge, 1973) 250-254
 2. E.E.Rich, "The population of Elizabethan England" in Econ.Hist.R., 2nd series, ii (1950), 248, 251, 255
 3. W.G.Hoskins, The Age of Plunder (1976), 219
 4. E.A.Wrigley and R.S.Schofield, op.cit., p.569, and Table A3:1, 528
 5. SRO.D.593/S/4/11/1, Lambarde to Cobham, 13 December 1587
 6. Cited in C.Read (ed.) William Lambarde and Local Government (Ithaca, 1962), 182.

Historical demographers suggest reasons for the increased Elizabethan population to have been more complex than Lambarde indicated; new methods of farming, the division of large estates, and the rise of local industries are nowadays suggested as reasons for relative overpopulation in the sixteenth century.⁽¹⁾ The agrarian revolution and industrial re-organization of late Elizabethan England created unemployment which the Elizabethan Poor Law and efforts to regulate trade tried to control.⁽²⁾

About three-quarters of this population lived in the countryside in small village communities or, in some shires, on isolated farms; and, of those in the small market towns, provincial cities and in London the majority had been born and bred in rural conditions.⁽³⁾

The more populous area lay south of a line running from the Wash to the Bristol Channel.⁽⁴⁾ Within this southern area some 20% of the nation lived in the Thames Valley, the most populous shires being Kent, Surrey, Somerset, Devon, Gloucester, Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex.⁽⁵⁾

Out of the total population Sir Thomas Wilson reported that only 300,000 able-bodied men were said to be fit to bear arms in 1588. "But to say that the halfe or 3rd parte of them were fitt to be hommes d'armes ... I can neither affirme nor believe".⁽⁶⁾

Even if this pessimistic estimate of 100,000 eligible and fit men for military service could be called upon for defence or for foreign wars it does help to put into perspective the demands made upon the shires for soldiers for the Irish war in the 1590s for only about

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1. W.G.Hoskins, The Age of Plunder (1976), 156-157
 2. R.H.Tawney & E.Power (eds.) Tudor Economic Documents, ii (1924)
 3. J.Thirsk, "The Farming Regions of England" in the Agrarian History of England and Wales, iv, (Cambridge, 1967), 1-20.
 4. Map of Distribution of Population by Dr.J.Sheail in W.G.Hoskins, The Age of Plunder (1976), p.20
 5. H.C.Darby (ed.) Historical Geography of England (1963), 304-309
 6. F.J.Fisher (ed.) "The State of England anno domini 1600 by Sir Thomas Wilson" in Camden Miscellany, 3rd. series, xvi, (1936) 16-23.

30,000 men were sent from England to Ireland representing about 0.76% of the English population; so, too, does the suggestion made in 1598 to the Earl of Essex by one Thomas Saltern that if each parish of England and Wales provided one or two able and serviceable men a large army could have been recruited to revenge the reverses then taking place in Ireland.⁽¹⁾ And yet at the period of greatest military pressure, 1598-1601, (See Table 2) the 21,000 soldiers in field and garrison in Ireland proved a considerable burden on the late Elizabethan state.

Some contemporaries believed the realm was over-populated and that men could be well spared for overseas adventure. Richard Hakluyt, the younger, the well known *compiler* and writer saw the nation "swarming at this day with valiant youthes" and he held out the hope that large vagrant population might be shipped to the New World to better their ways.⁽²⁾ D.B.Quinn in investigating such writers, showed that those who had read their Machiavelli turned their thoughts to colonization as an outlet for an unemployed surplus population. In this respect Ireland, as well as the New World, was viewed as a land to be colonized. Walter Raleigh, Thomas Smith, Edmund Spenser, the elder Essex and Francis Bacon were all concerned and involved in the first English colonial experiments in Ireland.⁽³⁾ But colonies in Ireland were mainly thought of as a way to solve the military problem of governing Ireland rather than a way of exporting surplus English population. This is evident in the way some Elizabeth writers recommend that Ireland be colonized by the Dutch, or as one, Sir Parr Lane advised by a mixture of Dutch and Scots.⁽⁴⁾

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1. HMC., Salisbury, viii, 426
 2. Cited in W.Notestein, The English People on the eve of Colonization (New York, 1954), 256.
 3. D.B.Quinn, "Renaissance influences in English Colonization" the Prothero Lecture in TRHS., 5th series, 26 (1976), 84-87.
 4. D.B.Quinn (ed.) 'A Discourse of Ireland, c.1599' in the Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy, volume 47 (1942), no.3, pp.151-166; and for Sir Parr Lane's treatise on Ireland, apparently little known, Bodleian Library, Tanner Ms., 458, ff.65-71 n.d.

(ii) Overall view of demands.

In periods later than the Elizabethan the army provided a time-honoured career for penniless younger sons. A standing army, as such, did not exist in Elizabeth's reign, and her forces in the 1590s were based on drafts of conscripted men. The totals of men sent to Ireland and abroad are shown on Table 1. The figures for Ireland cover the period of the Nine Years War; the totals of men sent from the individual shires to the continental wars are taken from C.G.Cruickshank's work and cover a longer time-span, 1585-1602. The figures to Ireland and to the continent are not, therefore directly comparable but they do give a rough indication of the relative demands for men.⁽¹⁾ The bracketed figures in Table 1 indicate the rank of each county, London, for instance, stands first, sending most soldiers to the continent and Ireland, while Kent stands second in numbers sent abroad but only 27th in the numbers sent to Ireland. The figure for each county in column one in Table 1 is the 1577 muster return, except for Herefordshire which did not muster in 1577, hence the 1580 returns are used, and the figure for Yorkshire is that of 1573 because the returns for 1577 and other years do not exist. These muster returns also give a relative notion of the individual manpower of the shires and are also ranked by a bracketed number after the muster figure.⁽²⁾

In Table 1 the English shires are broadly grouped into five geographical categories: western maritime shires, inland shires,

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1. C.G.Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army (2nd edition, Oxford, 1966), Appendix, 3. I have not used this author's totals of men to Ireland partly because no references to schedules are given, but mainly because I have independently researched this over the period of the Nine Years War.
 2. The 1577 muster returns are chosen because that year's mustering proved to be the most reliable one before the 1590s demands for the Irish war, see E.E.Rich, "The Population of Elizabethan England" Econ.Hist.R., 2nd series, ii (1950), 251-254

TABLE 1: TROOPS LEVIED FOR IRELAND AND ABROAD

Shires	Muster 1577	Ireland 1594-1602	Abroad 1585-1602	Total
<u>Western Maritime</u>				
Devon	10,000 (5)	1,730 (3)	900 (14)	2,630
Cornwall	7,043 (10)	815 (13)	350 (21)	1,165
Somerset	12,000 (2)	1,234 (7)	1,660 (6)	2,894
Gloucestershire	9,821 (6)	1,664 (4)	900 (14)	2,564
Lancashire	6,000 (15)	1,403 (5)	300 (22)	1,703
Cheshire	<u>1,640 (27)</u>	<u>869 (10)</u>	<u>150 (24)</u>	<u>1,019</u>
Totals:		7,715	4,260	11,975
<u>Inland Shires</u>				
Berkshire	5,615 (17)	579 (29)	1,155 (8)	1,734
Buckinghamshire	4,302 (22)	669 (25)	1,055 (10)	1,724
Bedfordshire	1,000 (31)	592 (28)	850 (16)	1,442
Oxfordshire	4,500 (21)	629 (26)	1,090 (11)	1,719
Warwickshire	3,170 (23)	841 (12)	625 (19)	1,466
Northamptonshire	2,300 (26)	1,275 (6)	1,050 (12)	2,325
Leicestershire	1,040 (30)	725 (17)	150 (24)	875
Nottinghamshire	1,040 (30)	705 (19)	150 (24)	855
Staffordshire	1,601 (28)	683 (23)	75 (26)	758
Derbyshire	5,901 (16)	668 (24)	75 (26)	743
Worcestershire	1,500 (29)	691 (21)	-	691
Shropshire	2,500 (25)	711 (18)	138 (25)	849
Wiltshire	5,353 (18)	795 (15)	910 (13)	1,705
Rutlandshire	600 (32)	220 (36)	50 (27)	270
Herefordshire	6,102 (14)	<u>956 (9)</u>	<u>300 (22)</u>	<u>1,256</u>
Totals:		10,739	7,673	18,412
<u>South-East</u>				
London	-	2,269 (1)	7,915 (1)	10,184
Kent	11,203 (3)	600 (27)	3,850 (2)	4,450
Middlesex	6,293 (13)	295 (34)	850 (16)	1,145
Essex	9,253 (7)	794 (16)	1,900 (5)	2,694
Hertfordshire	2,600 (24)	439 (32)	1,275 (7)	1,714
Surrey	6,865 (11)	<u>225 (35)</u>	<u>750 (18)</u>	<u>975</u>
Totals:		4,622	16,540	21,162
<u>East</u>				
Yorkshire	40,187 (1)	2,160 (2)	800 (17)	2,960
Lincolnshire	5,348 (19)	1,045 (8)	600 (20)	1,645
Norfolk	9,148 (8)	700 (20)	1,050 (12)	1,750
Suffolk	10,552 (4)	800 (14)	1,150 (9)	1,950
Huntingdonshire	1,000 (31)	482 (30)	200 (23)	682
Cambridgeshire	1,000 (31)	<u>479 (31)</u>	<u>600 (20)</u>	<u>1,079</u>
Totals:		5,666	4,400	10,066
<u>South Coast</u>				
Dorsetshire	5,056 (20)	690 (22)	860 (15)	1,550
Hampshire	8,109 (9)	860 (11)	1,925 (4)	2,785
Sussex	6,436 (12)	<u>300 (33)</u>	<u>2,610 (3)</u>	<u>2,910</u>
Totals:		1,850	5,395	7,245

Total of Irish Levies: 30,592
Total Levies Abroad: 38,268

OVERALL TOTAL: 68,860

south-eastern, eastern, and south-coastal shires. After London (1) and Yorkshire (2) the western maritime counties, especially Devonshire, Gloucestershire, Lancashire and Somersetshire are most heavily drawn upon for the Irish war. Gloucestershire can be considered maritime because the Severn estuary goes deep into the shire, and because of its proximity to the port of Bristol, the second most important port for the embarkation of troops to Ireland. (See Chapter Eight). Cheshire stands tenth in contribution of Irish levies largely because it was the main hinterland to Chester, the most important of the ports for Ireland. (See Chapter Seven). Cornwall ranked thirteenth, a relatively high rating in view of the shire's small extent and alleged poverty.⁽¹⁾ This group of six shires contributed 25% of the overall total of 30,592 infantry levies sent to Ireland between 1594 and 1602 which probably indicates that it was government practice to recruit heavily from the shires nearest to Ireland and thereby to save conduct money.⁽²⁾

The inland shires in Table 1 were not so heavily drawn upon. Northamptonshire's 1,275 infantry indicates that it was the sixth most heavily drawn upon English shire.⁽³⁾ Herefordshire's figure of 956, high for an inland county, putting it ninth in the overall ranking, may be explained by the heavy recruitment in the shire by the Earl of Essex for it was a county in which he held much land and influence. Herbert Croft, a deputy lieutenant in Herefordshire, pointed out Essex's heavy demands on the shire in a complaint to Sir Robert Cecil:

"The continuance of the Irish wars makes us in these parts to fear that our countries are like to feel the burden ere long of levying more soldiers with which we have been for these many years exceedingly afflicted by reason that my Lord of Essex has ever drawn a charge upon us such as we groan under but know not how to remedy ..."⁽⁴⁾

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1. A.L.Rowse, Tudor Cornwall (1969), passim
 2. See the introduction to Part Two below
 3. See Chapter Five (i) below
 4. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 420, Croft to Cecil, 29 December 1599

The other inland shires were not so heavily drawn on and all fifteen contributed 35% of the overall total.

In the six shires of the third group, the South-East, London's contribution of 2,269 greatly exceeds that of any shire, representing 7.4% of all the infantry levies sent into Ireland. This demand made upon the ever-expanding metropolitan area collectively known as London reflected its large population of about 250,000 by the year 1600.⁽¹⁾ One way London met its military obligations was by levying vagrants,⁽²⁾ but when the government was hard pressed for soldiers on the occasion of the Spanish landing in Ireland in 1601 London was ordered to use 500 men from its trained bands.⁽³⁾ Both measures, the drafting of vagrants and the raiding of trained bands, were also resorted to in the shires. Essex's figure of 794 is the second largest of the group but in terms of the national effort its contribution ranked sixteenth. As a group, London and the south east contributed only 15% of the overall total of men sent to Ireland.

Of the six eastern English shires in Table 1 Yorkshire contributed the second highest figure of soldiers to the war which reflects its size, and the fact that its lord lieutenant, as President of the Council of the North, could draw on the four most northerly counties of Northumberland, Durham, Cumberland and Westmorland.⁽⁴⁾ These four counties do not appear in the tables, and the large Yorkshire number of 2,160 probably included small levies from them. Though geographically remote from Ireland, Lincolnshire's 1,045 men sent there stands comparison with the four

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1. F. Freeman Foster, The Politics of Stability (Royal Historical Society, 1977), 7
 2. APC., xxx, 620, 621; ibid., xxxii, 27, 145
 3. W.H. and H.C. Overall (eds.) An analytical index to the series of Records known as Remembrancia, A.D. 1579-1664 (1878), 245, January 1601
 4. F. Brooks, "The Council of the North" (Historical Association, 1953), passim.

western maritime shires which also sent out over a thousand men. Clearly the government thought Lincolnshire wealthy and populous enough to sustain its demands.⁽¹⁾ These six eastern shires raised a total of 5,666 men representing 19% of the overall total of soldiers sent to Ireland.

In the final category of shires in Table 1, the three shires of Hampshire, Dorsetshire and Sussex the coastlines of which directly face the continent of Europe, contributed but 6% of the overall total of Irish levies. The much greater demands made on these three counties for levies for the wars in France and the Low Countries than those of Ireland is clear from Table 1; Sussex, for example, while ranking thirty-third in Irish levies ranks third for continental levies though the longer period, 1585-1602 over which levies were raised for abroad must be taken into account.

The significance of geographical proximity to war is underlined by the number of troops sent abroad to the continental wars of France and the Low Countries. Table 1 shows that London and the South-East sent 43% of all troops sent there, the large group of inland shires 20%, the south-coast shires 14%, the east 12% and the western maritime shires only 11%. London's contribution alone, was enormous representing 20% of all troops sent abroad, and in the case of its contribution to Ireland it stood pre-eminent.⁽²⁾ Kent, Sussex, Hampshire and Essex, all close to the European mainland, were the next four shires most heavily drawn upon for continental levies. Rutlandshire, Staffordshire, Derbyshire and Shropshire, were least drawn upon for these levies. In the instances of the five shires to be studied in more detail in later chapters Kent ranks (2)

1. W.G.Hoskins, The Age of Plunder (1976), 16

2. F.Freeman Foster, The Politics of Stability (Royal Historical Soc.) 1977, ch.8; V.Pearl, London and the Outbreak of the Puritan Revolution: City Government and National Politics (1964), ch.1.

for foreign levies but (27) for Irish levies, Northamptonshire (12) in foreign levies but (6) in Irish, Derbyshire (26) abroad and (24) in Irish, Lancashire (22) abroad and (5) in Irish, and Cheshire (24) in foreign levies and (10) in Irish.⁽¹⁾ It becomes obvious

from Table 1 that the government drew most heavily upon the populous London and home counties area for the wars abroad, but most heavily on the western maritime shires for the Irish war.

The muster returns of 1577 in Table 1 while not a fully reliable guide to population, as we have seen, show, nevertheless a relative correlation between those counties with a high muster figure and those drawn upon heavily for either Ireland or the wars on the continent. Yorkshire, for example, with the highest muster figure was also second in the number of men sent to Ireland, but then Yorkshire is the largest county in England; Kent, stands third in muster figures and second in troops sent abroad, and Devon, fifth in musters is also third in the number of its men sent to Ireland. On the other hand, Lancashire but fifteenth in the 1577 muster was nevertheless fifth in the number of its troops sent into Ireland, and Northamptonshire's low muster rank of twenty-sixth is at odds with its high figure of troops to Ireland making the shire sixth in that respect, see Table 1.

It may be an obvious point of comparison between the shires but the physical size of a county is also clearly a factor in the numbers of men recruited: Yorkshire, Lincolnshire and Devonshire, all big counties sent out large numbers to either Ireland or to the continent, in comparison with the smallest shires of Rutlandshire, Bedfordshire, Buckinghamshire, Leicestershire and Cambridgeshire.

1. See below chapters four to six.

If we turn to consider the counties' contribution of infantry levies in Table 2 a number of major points emerge.⁽¹⁾ During the Nine Years War the government made demands for levies on sixteen separate occasions, but not from every county each time. Gloucestershire, Leicestershire and Northamptonshire were each levied fourteen times; Cheshire, Herefordshire, Lancashire, Nottinghamshire and Warwickshire were asked thirteen times; and Bedfordshire, Buckinghamshire, Derbyshire, Shropshire, Staffordshire and Worcestershire were levied on twelve occasions.⁽²⁾ These fourteen counties were most often called upon for Irish levies but this did not necessarily mean they sent the most men. Yorkshire levied on only nine occasions provided the second highest number of recruits simply because each demand was so large. London, too, was levied infrequently but heavily.

On the other hand small but frequent demands could produce a high total figure from a comparatively small shire. Herefordshire, levied on thirteen occasions, provided an overall total of 956 troops for Ireland which appeared to give substance to the complaints of Herbert Croft to Sir Robert Cecil in 1599.⁽³⁾ The shires on which small, but infrequent demands fell are noticeable in Table 2: Sussex, Surrey, Middlesex and Rutlandshire. Sussex, for instance, was asked for Irish levies on only four occasions. Surrey, Sussex, and Middlesex also sent out numbers of troops to Ireland infrequently though some of the large London levies drew upon the manpower resources of Surrey and Middlesex.⁽⁴⁾

1. Table 2 is based on correlated figures from HRO.SP.12/260/40; 268/124; 274/15; 275/12; 271/37; 285/20; and, SP.63/208/pt.iii/numbers 194/27; 261 and PRO.E.101/65/5-28; 66/19; 67/4

2. Worcestershire was not levied for the wars abroad, See Table 1.

3. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 420

4. Remembrancia, 236, 237, 245; APC., xxxii, 27, 145

Table 3 sets out how the Irish war impinged on the thirteen shires of Wales. Geographical proximity to Ireland as well as the convenience of the ports of Chester, Bristol, Haverfordwest and other havens dictated that Wales would suffer much in the 1590s from the demands of war. Dr. L. Owen calculated the mid-sixteenth century Welsh population at about a quarter of a million.⁽¹⁾ Over the eight to nine year period Wales was asked on fourteen occasions to provide levies amounting to a total of 6,611 men (See Table 3). This represents 2.9% of the Welsh population compared to English levies amounting to only 0.76% of the English population, therefore in relation to its size and population Wales was the more heavily drawn upon for the Irish war. An official comparison made in 1595 supports that conclusion, showing that of 11,996 soldiers sent from both England and Wales between 1594 and 1598 Wales sent 2,996, or in other words a quarter of the total.⁽²⁾

Table 3 reveals an approximate relationship between the Welsh shire's population figures and the numbers of soldiers demanded from them for the Irish war. Anglesey, twelfth in population is also ranked twelfth in the number of soldiers. Glamorganshire with the second highest population figure is also second in the number of soldiers; Merionethshire was eleventh in both respects, Montgomeryshire sixth in both, and Radnorshire, while ninth in population, was tenth in the number of soldiers for Ireland. In contrast Carmarthenshire with the highest population figure, was only third in the list of soldiers, while Denbighshire, doubtless because of its proximity to

1. L.Owen, "The population of Wales in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries" in THS of Cymmrodorion (1959), Tables pp.107-113 and for a population density map based on this article see J.Thirsk, The Agrarian History of England and Wales, 1500-1640, iv (Cambridge, 1967), 144

2. PRO.SP.12/268/124, 125, schedule of soldiers sent to the wars (1598)

Table 3: INFANTRY LEVIES FROM WALES TO IRELAND, 1594-1602

Shire.	Population estimate	Oct. 1594	June 1595	March 1596	Oct. 1596	April 1597	Aug. 1598	Jan. 1599	Jan. 1600	June 1600	Dec. 1600	April 1601	Aug. 1601	Oct. 1601	Jan. 1602	July 1602	Total	% of pop.
Anglesey	9,770 (12)	-	46	30	-	-	-	50	50	50	-	-	-	50	10	-	236 (12)	2.4
Brecon	21,190 (4)	-	35	50	100	100	100	50	-	100	15	15	25	50	-	50	590 (5)	2.7
Caernarvon	14,920 (8)	-	46	30	50	100	100	50	50	100	15	15	40	60	20	30	606 (4)	4.1
Cardigan	17,320 (7)	-	46	30	100	100	50	50	-	50	15	15	25	30	-	-	411 (10)	2.3
Carmarthen	34,375 (1)	-	-	100	100	100	100	50	-	100	25	25	50	60	-	-	610 (3)	1.7
Denbigh	22,482 (3)	50	-	50	100	100	100	50	50	100	15	15	30	60	20	30	670 (1)	2.9
Flint	12,570 (10)	50	-	50	100	100	50	50	50	50	10	10	20	30	10	20	500 (8)	3.9
Glamorgan	29,493 (2)	-	35	50	100	100	100	50	50	100	20	20	50	50	-	-	625 (2)	2.1
Montgomery	18,972 (6)	-	46	30	50	50	100	50	-	100	20	20	40	60	20	30	566 (6)	2.9
Monmouth	-----	-	35	50	100	100	100	50	50	50	20	20	30	40	-	-	545 (7)	-
Merioneth	10,520 (11)	-	46	30	50	50	50	50	-	-	10	10	25	30	20	50	371 (11)	3.5
Pembroke	20,079 (5)	-	35	50	100	100	-	-	-	100	15	15	40	40	-	75	470 (9)	2.3
Radnor	14,185 (9)	-	46	30	50	50	50	50	-	100	15	15	25	30	-	-	411 (10)	2.8
Totals:	225,826	100	416	580	1,000	900	550	300	1,000	195	400	590	100	285	6,611	2.9		

PRO.SP.12/248/87; 261/62; 267/51; 268/55; 270/15,30; 274/27

PRO.SP.63/208/pt.3, f.261; 194/27, 165;

PRO.E. 101/66/19-132 - Welsh indentures.

City of Chester Records - Mayor's Military papers; M/MP/11-13; Mayor's Great Letter Book, M/1/1 (1595-1602)

Muster rolls - M/MP/7/ff.24-38 - roll for the 1596 levies; M/MP/11, Flintshire roll of Dec.1600; M/MP/12/1-20,22-25 (1601)

For population estimates see L.Owen, art.cit., THS. Cymmrodion (1959), pp. 99-113

G.Owen, The Taylor's Cussion - pt.1 (facsimile edition, 1906), ff. 52-83. Sixteenth century commonplace book of G.Owen

(1552 - 1613) on Pembrokeshire. My thanks to A.Fletcher of the University of Sheffield for this reference.

The figures in brackets after population estimate gives the ranking of the Welsh shires, and the figure in brackets after the total of each shire the ranking in severity of demands.

the chief military port of Chester and its long border on the Deeside estuary, sent out the highest number of soldiers though but third in population. None of the Welsh shires are far from the ~~sea-side~~^{east} but the greatest numbers were clearly recruited from those bordering the sea, Denbigh, Glamorgan, Carmarthen, and Caernarvon. The latter seems to have been the most heavily drawn upon for Irish levies in relation to its population, a fact not lost on its deputy lieutenant, William Maurice, who registered a number of complaints about government demands from such a poor county.⁽¹⁾

In Anglesey, likewise, the authorities objected to the constant demands for men, but it was in fact the least recruited part of Wales. The real objections from the justices in Anglesey stemmed from their claims for total exemption from Irish military levies on the grounds that their island was dangerously exposed to invasion being "very open with six places fit for enemies to arrive well known to the French and Spanish nations".⁽²⁾ But the Elizabethan government gave no exemptions to privileged places, and, in any case, did not take seriously the possibility of an invasion through Anglesey at this time. Anglesey and Pembrokeshire were anciently exempt from foreign service on account of their vulnerable locations, but past privileges of exemptions were more often than not ignored by the privy council in the 1590s.

There is no doubt about the impatience of the late Elizabethan government with the "pretended privileges" of chartered towns and other "exempt" areas wishing to ease themselves of the burdens of raising levies, but it is also clear from the increasingly sharp tone of the privy council's letters in the 1590s that it had a

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1. J. Ballinger (ed.) Calendar of Wynn Papers (Aberystwyth, 1926), nos. 159, 173, 183.
 2. E. G. Jones, "Anglesey and Invasion, 1539-1603", Trans. Anglesey Antiquarian Society (1946), 26-37

struggle to ignore the clamour for exemptions.⁽¹⁾ Gloucester city protested against an imprest of men in 1596 as a violation of municipal privileges;⁽²⁾ Macclesfield likewise in 1599,⁽³⁾ Coventry in 1601 and Exeter in 1602,⁽⁴⁾ while the Cinque Ports in Kent and Sussex and the Stannaries in Devon looked to the patronage of their lords warden to protect their ancient privileges against the encroachments of the lieutenancy.⁽⁵⁾ Many corporation records, however, show no distinct impressments of soldiers which may well indicate that lieutenancy officers and commissioners for musters were able by agreement and understanding with the mayors of many towns to take up vagrant and masterless men inhabiting these towns by drafting them into the shire levies for the Irish war.⁽⁶⁾ This was certainly the case in London, Oxford, Chester and Bristol.⁽⁷⁾

Tables 1 to 3 show that the total infantry levies from the shires of England and Wales to the last Elizabethan war in Ireland was 37,203, an annual average of 4,640 troops. If we accept C.G. Cruickshank's estimate that the total number of able-bodied adult males eligible for military service was probably between 200,000 and 250,000⁽⁸⁾ the total men levied for Ireland, 37,203 represents between 14.9 and 18.6% of the total men available.

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1. The subordination of the towns to the shires was not as complete in Elizabeth's reign as stated in J.J.Goring, "Military Obligations of the English people, 1511-1558" unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1955, University of London, pp.197-199.
 2. APC., xxvi, 277-278
 3. APC., xxx, 788-789
 4. Ibid., xxxii, 191 (Coventry); HMC., Salisbury, xii, 151 (Exeter)
 5. J.J.N.McGurk, "Lieutenancy in Kent, c.1580-c.1620" M.Phil., thesis University of London (1971), chapter three for the Cinque Ports and A.L.Rowse, Tudor Cornwall (1969), 389 for the Stannaries
 6. The published corporation records of Nottingham, Ipswich, St. Albans, Norwich, Southampton, Exeter and Plymouth show no distinct impressments for Ireland.
 7. Remembrancia, 245; H.E.Salter (ed.) Oxford Council Acts (1928), and for Chester and Bristol see chapters seven and eight below.
 8. C.G.Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army, (2nd edition, Oxford, 1966), 24

While it would be foolhardy to conclude that the Irish war of the 1590s was an unprecedented drain on the manpower resources from the communities of the realm, this proportion was, nevertheless considerable. It must, however, be recalled that there was an increase of English population at this time, and that towns used the Irish draft to rid themselves of undesireables; such considerations place the demands for men for Ireland in a more balanced way than has sometimes been presented. Nationalistic and partisan histories of Ireland, especially those of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries often concluded too readily that the English and Welsh shires were "bled white" by the demands of the Elizabethan government for the subjugation of Ireland.⁽¹⁾ However, the demands to meet the various crises were relentless throughout the nine years war. And in periods of major crises no shire escaped. It may be noted from Tables 2 and 3 that when the Spanish landed at Kinsale in September 1601 not a single English or Welsh shire was exempt from the levies raised to fight them in October 1601. Thereafter the three further levies of the reign show some government attempt to spread the burdens of raising troops; all nine of the English shires and seven Welsh shires which furnished levies in December 1601 were exempt from the demands in January 1602. And for the final levy of July 1602 nine English shires from those not exempted in January 1602 were passed over and six more exempt in Wales.

Table 4 sets out the numbers of the much smaller levies of horse hands sent to Ireland in the four crisis years of the war, 1598 to 1601.⁽²⁾ These levies represent the responses of the

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1. For examples, M.Haverty, The History of Ireland (Dublin, 1860); A.Stopford Green, The Making of Ireland and its Undoing (1909)
 2. By common consent military historians show how the heavily armed cavalry was in decline in the sixteenth century both in the militia at home and for the wars abroad - L.Boynton, The Elizabethan Militia (1967), 76, 77; G.Parker, "The Military Revolution, 1560-1660 - A Myth" Journal of Modern History, xlviii (1976), 207-208

TABLE 4: HORSE LEVIES AND WEALTH OF ENGLISH SHIRES

County	1522 Loan Yield	1598-1601 Horse provided	Ranking in horse provision
Kent	13,164 (1)	51	1
Norfolk	11,771 (2)	46	3
Essex	11,207 (3)	47	2
Wiltshire	11,190 (4)	18	12
Devon	10,576 (5)	16	14
Suffolk	10,444 (6)	44	4
Somerset	9,097 (7)	20	10
Lincolnshire	7,417 (8)	35	7
Northamptonshire	6,995 (9)	23	8
Hampshire	6,293 (10)	37	6
Gloucestershire	5,850 (11)	14	16
Sussex	5,810 (12)	22	9
Berkshire	5,035 (13)	13	17
Dorset	4,630 (14)	14	16
Surrey	3,631 (15)	6	23
Oxfordshire	3,363 (16)	19	11
Cambridgeshire	3,332 (17)	17	13
Warwickshire	3,221 (18)	10	20
Cornwall	3,106 (19)	4	24
Hertfordshire	3,070 (20)	18	12
Leicestershire	2,803 (21)	10	20
Buckinghamshire	2,661 (22)	20	10
Bedfordshire	2,413 (23)	10	20
Huntingdonshire	2,342 (24)	11	19
Worcestershire	2,055 (25)	15	15
Middlesex	1,707 (26)	17	13
Staffordshire	1,500 (27)	13	17
Shropshire	1,249 (28)	18	12
Herefordshire	1,088 (29)	7	22
Nottinghamshire	1,065 (30)	12	18
Derbyshire	953 (31)	15	15
Rutlandshire	712 (32)	8	21
Yorkshire	---	43	5
Lancashire	----	20	10
Cheshire	----	17	13
London	20,000	10	20

Total: 720 h.

Annual Total: 117 (1598); 110 (1599); 183 (1600); 310 (1601)

- (1) Column 1 from W.G.Hoskins, The Age of Plunder (1976), 22,23
- (2) Column 2 correlated from APC., xxviii, 588, 589, 590; ibid., xxix, 116-118 ibid., xxx, 435, 440; ibid., xxxi, 313; ibid., xxxii, 278-286
- (3) According to these schedules in the privy council's registers the two years of heaviest horse demands were 1600 and 1601.
- (4) The privy council was not always well informed before making demands of individual gentry; in Lincolnshire, for example, one gentleman charged with providing a lighthorse in 1601 had been dead for many years - HMC., Salisbury, xii, 439
- (5) The provision of lighthorse had become the special responsibility of the justices of the peace; this is borne out by comparing, for example, the list of those asked for horse in 1601 in APC., xxxii, 275-277 with the rosters of the commissions of the peace for the same year, for example, in the appendices to J.H.Gleason, The Justices of the Peace in England, 1558-1640 (Oxford, 1969)

justices the clergy and the recusants, the traditional providers of horse, to the government's demands. In the normal procedure for raising horse levies the privy council sent letters under the sign manual signifying the queen's orders to individually named country gentlemen each to provide a light horse and rider, fully accoutered. These letters make clear that the horses were to be raised "without a common charge of the meaner sorte". In other words the gentry were to bear the financial burden and not pass it on to their tenants.⁽¹⁾ To equip horse and rider and have them sent into Ireland was more expensive than, for instance, sending out a small levy of twenty pikemen; a fully equipped cavalryman cost about £30, a fully armoured pikeman only about 30s.⁽²⁾

It would be unwise to claim that a county which provided many horse must have been wealthy. Nevertheless there does seem to be a correlation between wealth (as measured by the 1522 Loan) and the provision of horse, see Table 4. Several of the wealthier shires sent relatively large numbers of horse: Kent, Essex, Norfolk, Suffolk, Hampshire, Lincolnshire and Northamptonshire. Kent was by far the richest county in wealth and the provision of horse. Norfolk, Suffolk, Lincolnshire and Hampshire were noted as traditional shires for the breeding of horses.⁽³⁾ The link between the wealth of counties and the recruitment of horse levies cannot, however, be made in every case: Wiltshire, Devonshire and Somersetshire, among the very wealthiest counties rank only twelfth, fourteenth, and tenth in providing horse. And Lancashire, considered among the poorest counties of the realm, provided a good number of horse

1. AFC., xxxii, 275-277

2. For examples of these costs see chapter four on Kent, following.

3. J.Thirsk (ed.) "The Farming Regions of England" in Agrarian History of England and Wales, iv, (Cambridge, 1967) passim

perhaps because of its proximity to Ireland and the convenience of its ports.⁽¹⁾ The low number of ten horse from London (see Table 4) despite its undoubted wealth is explained by the capital city's exemption from the provision of horse; the fact that ten were levied in 1599 simply shows that some of the gentry with London residences and business ventures had not been able to play off their London interests against their county responsibilities in contributing to the war effort.⁽²⁾ The privy council wrote to the Lord Mayor of London in July 1601 on the problem of "men of good substance" whose "estates lyeth in divers partes of the realme ... harbouringe in London" to that they lived "unprofitable to the State". The problem was of long standing and the Lord Mayor was ordered to co-operate with the privy council in finding out the names of those "shiftinge themselves from the burden of such taxes" especially those who were justices of the peace in shires bordering London.⁽³⁾

Clearly the rôle of the cavalry in the Irish war was limited, the numbers involved being so much smaller than infantry. The highest demand for horse coincided with the Spanish landing in September 1601 and then only 310 horses were asked from the gentry. There is plenty of evidence, rehearsed in later chapters, that both cavalry and infantry levies were widely unpopular throughout England and Wales, but to what extent the demands for soldiers turned public opinion against the war in Ireland is an imponderable question. Before considering the year by year demand for soldiers for Ireland in more detail it must be emphasised that numbers of men ordered by the privy council and numbers of men in action in Ireland were more often than not very different.

1. See chapter six below, Levies from Lancashire and Cheshire.

2. APC., xxix, 639

3. APC., xxxii, 47-49

(iii) Year by Year demand for men: 1595

At the outset of his rebellion in February 1595 Hugh O'Neill, second Earl of Tyrone, was believed to have an armed strength of 4,000 musketeers, 1,000 pikemen and 1,000 cavalrymen.⁽¹⁾ At the same time the English force in the field army under Sir Henry Bagenall, Marshal of the Army, was reported at 1,500 foot and 250 horse.⁽²⁾ As the confederacy of the Ulster chiefs, O'Neill, O'Donnell, Maguire and O'Rourke presented a formidable threat to the isolated English garrisons on the southern borders of Ulster the Elizabethan government decided to withdraw 2,000 veteran troops from Brittany to aid Sir John Norris in a projected Ulster campaign.

The strength of the re-deployment exercise can be followed in the report of Sir Henry Norris who led them out of Brittany; 1,616 veterans embarked at Paimpol. Of these 1,553 were fit when they put in at Plymouth for re-victualling, and when the force eventually mustered in Dublin in April 1595 its strength was down to 1,400, the shortfall being accounted for by sickness, desertion and "dead pays".⁽³⁾ Earlier in October 1594 privy council orders had been issued to ten English shires and two Welsh shires to raise 1,100 new recruits for Ireland. (See Tables 2 & 3) Both the levy of veterans and of the new recruits proved inadequate as the reversal of English arms at the battle of Clontibret in Monaghan demonstrated in May 1595. ³ The following month, June, further orders went out to thirteen English shires and ten Welsh to raise another 1,176 men for Ireland. (See Tables 2 & 3)

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1. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 107, 'An anonymous discourse for Ireland, 1595'
 2. Ibid., p.190, report of Lieutenant Tucher, 1st June 1595
 3. PRO.SP.12/178/90, Sir Henry Norris to Lord Burghley, 13th March 1595

By August 1595 the certificate of the army musters in Ireland gave the following totals: 4,040 infantrymen, 657 horsemen, and 158 Irish kerne, a grand total of 4,855.⁽¹⁾ In October 1595 Hugh O'Neill, by then the undisputed leader of the Irish, made a truce with the government's forces which was to last until the new year, and despite minor outbreaks of hostilities the truce was prolonged by further negotiation until May 1596.⁽²⁾

1596

The year in Ireland was one of uneasy truce, of warlike declarations and preparations for further fighting. Sir William Russell, the Lord Deputy was of the opinion that "this kingdom is not otherwise to be kept than by force".⁽³⁾ In consultation with the Irish council in Dublin he outlined what was necessary to suppress the northern rebellion "in the prosecution of a sharp war". Their recommendations to the English privy council may be summarized:

In Ulster: 3,920 foot, 400 horse, 200 pioneers,
400 kerne. In addition to launch
an expedition to Lough Foyle of 1,000
foot, 100 horse and 200 pioneers.
In Connaught: 3,000 foot, 300 horse, 100 pioneers,
200 kerne.
In Munster: 200 foot.
In Leinster and the Pale: 1,000 foot.

Finally, a force of 3,000 "well chosen and governed Scots".⁽⁴⁾ The total establishment of over 14,000 men recommended proved to be far too ambitious for the English government to accept. Anticipating this reaction, perhaps, the Dublin council prepared more modest estimates. Reckoning from the muster master's books that there were but 4,510 foot and 555 horse fit for service, not counting those in garrisons or in broken companies, that is under-strength

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1. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 127 "Certificate of the horse, foot and kearne in her Majesty's pay in Ireland, 1595"
 2. CSPI., (1592-1596), 441, 450
 3. HMC., Salisbury, vi, 351-352, Sir Wm. Russell to the Queen, 28th August, 1596
 4. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 196-199, "A Declaration by the Lord Deputy and Council 1596".

companies, the Dublin council reported that the very minimum re-inforcements they would need were 4,600 foot, 245 horse and 200 pioneers.⁽¹⁾ But the total effect of the year's levying in England and Wales of 3,255 (Tables 2 & 3) was to raise the number of troops in Ireland only to 5,732 foot and 617 horse;⁽²⁾ another report gave the army's strength then as 5,432 foot and 492 horse.⁽³⁾ In either case the total was far short of what the Dublin council would have liked.

1597

During the year the Irish administration constantly pressed for more soldiers and particularly horses even though fighting had virtually ceased in Ulster.⁽⁴⁾ Russell, as Lord Deputy, was glad to prolong the truce with O'Neill for, as he admitted, the army was in a sorry state "very unable to make head against O'Neill".⁽⁵⁾ Russell was on bad terms with his chief military commander, Sir John Norris; they were jealously divided on policy and military strategy. Russell was recalled from office in Ireland in May 1597 and replaced the same month by Thomas, Lord Burgh as Lord Deputy. But both Burgh and Sir John Norris died in October 1597 so that civil and military authority in Ireland was put into the hands of a committee of justices under the Earl of Ormond. No lord deputy was appointed to succeed Burgh until the Earl of Essex was appointed with the title of Lord Lieutenant General in 1599.⁽⁶⁾

1. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 198

2. PRO.SP.63/196/38

3. HMC., Salisbury, vi, 543-544 "A list of her Majesties forces in Ireland, December 1596.

4. APC., xxv, 190, 204

5. T.Birch, Memoirs of the Reign of Queen Elizabeth from the year 1581 till her death vol. 1 (1754) 277

5. G.A.Hayes McCoy, 'Tudor conquest and counter-reformation, 1571-1603' in A New History of Ireland, III (Oxford, 1976), 124

Prior to Russell's recall in May 1597 the English privy council sent out warrants to the lords lieutenant of twelve English shires to raise 600 foot to be sent to Ireland under Francis Croft as conductor,⁽¹⁾ and on the insistence of the new deputy in Ireland, Lord Burgh, a further 1,000 was ordered to be raised from Yorkshire, Gloucestershire, Devonshire and Cornwall. (See Table 2) Burgh's insistence was strengthened by rumours of Spanish aid to be sent into Munster and acted as a spur to the English administration.⁽²⁾ The privy council also ordered the Welsh levies and others which had been discharged the previous October 1596 to re-assemble at the ports in April 1597. (See Table 3) Six dead pays were allowed in each hundred but the number of deserters especially in the Welsh, Derbyshire and Staffordshire levies was high.⁽³⁾

After the year's programme of re-inforcements to Ireland of over 2,600 troops the government expressed ^{its} annoyance to Lord Burgh that by June 1597 little had been accomplished, and that the muster books came over "alwaies very generallie and uncertainlie" and, considering they were the muster master's, the books were most disorderly.⁽⁴⁾ Sir Ralph Lane was then muster master general in Ireland and his books purported to show a view of the forces in Ireland as if there were 8,000 men on the pay-roll.⁽⁵⁾ On his return Sir William Russell who had generally been a failure in Ireland, told the government plainly that in his view there ^{were} ~~was~~ hardly 5,000.⁽⁶⁾ By July 1597 the government issued a set of orders to reform the musters and pay of the queen's army in Ireland.⁽⁷⁾ Maurice Kyffin, appointed

1. CSPD., (1595-1597), 383, 404

2. APC., xxvii, 90

3. Ibid., 68, 69, 76

4. APC., xxvii, 243, the p.c. to Lord Burgh, 22nd June 1597

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 266-268

to check the muster office in Ireland, then reported by the end of the year that there were twenty-one bands of horse, and seventy-eight companies of foot stationed in Ireland. The horse band in Ireland was normally 50 strong, and the foot band, 100. Therefore Kyffin's total of 7,800 foot and 1,050 horse was higher than the official figure given by Sir Ralph Lane.⁽¹⁾

1598

"A summary report" of the state of Ireland from the Irish Council at the end of 1597 made it clear to the English government that "all the late rebellions in Ireland have had their beginning in Ulster", and that the latest rebellion amounted to "a universal Irish war, intended to shake off all English government".⁽²⁾ In response to the grave situation in that year the government called for an unparalleled effort from the shires. The overall total for that year was 5,450, the highest annual total for the war years (See Table 2).⁽³⁾

Early in February 1598 1,100 veterans were mustered in Picardy for Ireland. The Earl of Ormonde was told to expect 900 of them in Munster, but only 612 arrived in the port of Waterford.⁽⁴⁾ The privy council ordered 1,500 to be levied from England and in July 1598 a force of 1,472 landed in Dublin from England, 128 short. Early in August Sir Samuel Bagenal, brother to the Marshal, Sir Henry, had orders to conduct 600 men from Chester to Olderfleet, near Carrickfergus, and at the same time Colonel Egerton was to conduct 1,350 from the port of Plymouth; both contingents and 100 horse were intended to form a garrison to be planted at Lough Foyle.⁽⁵⁾ Nineteen shires

1. PRO.SP.63/97/89, 91; 99/39, and APC., xxvii, 243

2. Cal. Carew MSS., iii, 271-273

3. The November and December levies 1598, that is 1,000 raw recruits and 2,000 veterans from the Low Countries were in effect part of the build up for the Earl of Essex's forces in 1599. Low Country veterans are not part of Table 2.

4. PRO.SP.63/202/pt.1/88

5. APC., xxviii, 524, 527

were asked to contribute numbers varying between 50 and 200; London was first asked for 400 but this was later abated to 300. (See Table 2) This force did not sail until the 28th October 1598, too late to prevent the greatest disaster ever to happen to an English army in Ireland, the Battle of the Yellow Ford which took place on the 14th August.⁽¹⁾ As a result of the disaster it was considered too dangerous to go ahead with the plans for Lough Foyle and Bagenal's and Egerton's recruits were landed instead at Cork, Kinsale and Waterford; their arrival was reported by Edmund Spenser on his return to England who said that though the soldiers were untrained raw recruits they were well equipped and that Sir Thomas Norris, president of Munster was taking their training in hand.⁽²⁾

In November of the same year, a further 1,050 men were called from Bedfordshire, Berkshire, Worcestershire, Oxfordshire, Dorsetshire, Wiltshire, Leicestershire and Warwickshire.⁽³⁾ (See Table 2) This force was destined for Connaught to re-inforce Sir Conyers Clifford, governor of that province. They arrived in Dublin under the conduct of Sir Arthur Savage whence they marched to Athlone, the assembly place for entry into Connaught, and arrived by the end of January 1599.⁽⁴⁾ In December 1598 re-deployment of troops was again tried as we have seen in some detail in the last chapter; 2,000 veterans from the Low Countries were sent to Ireland, and to replace them a similar number of new recruits sent from England to the Netherlands. In this way the Netherlands became a training ground for English soldiers fighting in Ireland.⁽⁵⁾ Both the November and

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1. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 280-281
 2. PRO.SP.63/202/pt.iv/15
 3. APC., xxix, 312
 4. HMC., Salisbury, viii, 487, 488
 5. See chapter two under Re-deployment.

December levies of this year became part of the large army build up for the Earl of Essex's take over of the army in Ireland the following year.⁽¹⁾ Perhaps because of the fluidity of numbers in the Irish service at this time there is no satisfactory estimate of the strength of the forces from the Irish administration until the following year, 1599.⁽²⁾ On the other hand we know from Captain Francis Stafford's report of December 1598 that Hugh O'Neill's armed strength had increased to 1,043 horse and 3,540 foot, and that his military successes had done much to spread the rebellion throughout Ireland encouraging the most southerly province of Munster to rise against the English colonists there.⁽³⁾

1599

Recruitment for the Earl of Essex's forces continued through the winter of 1598/99. To aid the build up of his army in Ireland a great levy of 3,000 was demanded from the English shires in January 1599, speedily followed by a further demand in February from more English shires, and, except from Anglesey and Pembrokeshire, all the Welsh shires to make up an additional levy of 1,000 men.⁽⁴⁾ In Tables 2 and 3 the totals for 1598 and 1599 necessarily overlap to indicate this winter levying for Essex, (See Tables 2 and 3). No previous commander in Ireland had had such an army, an official establishment of 1,300 horse and 16,000 foot.⁽⁵⁾ However, before Essex's fatal truce with O'Neill and return to England, it is thought that his effective forces had decreased to about 11,250 foot and 925 horse.⁽⁶⁾

1. See Tables 2 and 3.

2. None to be found in the State papers, Domestic or Ireland, Moryson or Carew.

3. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 287

4. APC., xxix, 237, 312, 358, 388, 491, 547, 572

5. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, ii, 222-229; Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 295, Essex's army.

6. J.Dymmock, "A treatise of Irelande" edited by R.Butler in Tracts Relating to Ireland, ii (1843), 42

1600

When Mountjoy was appointed Lord Deputy on 21 January 1600⁽¹⁾ he inherited the forces left by Essex, under 12,000 foot and under 1,000 horse. In the government's instructions to Mountjoy it was stated:

"We have resolved to maintain an army of 12,000 foot and 1,200 horse ... you are not to exceed these numbers except for some notorious peril to the kingdom ..." (2)

Fynes Moryson, later in 1600 to be Mountjoy's secretary, however, states that the Lord Deputy Mountjoy signed "The lyst of the Army to bee a direction to the Treasurer at warres, for the payment thereof, from the first of Aprill in the yeere 1600" which gives a total of 14,000 foot and 1,200 horse.⁽³⁾ The discrepancy of 2,000 foot between what the government intended and the list signed in Ireland highlights the perennial difficulty in these years of knowing the exact strength of the army in Ireland. However in January 1600 levies of 3,300 in the English shires and 300 in the Welsh shires were raised for Ireland for the designated force to be sent to Lough Foyle under Sir Henry Docwra, but, of course, under the overall command of Mountjoy. (See Tables 2 and 3)⊙

In the first months of the year 1600 all the military advantages appeared to lie with O'Neill and his confederates. The uncertainties aroused by Essex made it possible for O'Neill to make a veritable 'royal progress' throughout Munster in the winter of 1599/1600. None opposed him. However, the arrival in Ireland of Mountjoy, Carew and Docwra began to turn the tide of Irish successes by May 1600. Carew was to break O'Neill's grip on Munster, Docwra

1. J.Morrin, (ed.) Cal. Irish Patent Rolls, ii (1862), 564

2. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 356.

3. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, ii, 290-293, the army list was signed 24 March 1599 (Old style)

would lodge garrisons in his rear along the Foyle (See maps 1, and 2) driving a wedge between O'Neill and O'Donnell, and Mountjoy, consummate soldier-administrator, would harrass and spoil the enemy at large in his many "journeys" especially to the borderlands of Ulster where lay the centre of the rebellion.⁽¹⁾ To supply this programme of re-conquest the government sent frequent re-inforcements to strengthen and set up garrisons, to aid the field forces and, above all when the time came, to resist the Spanish who landed at Kinsale in September 1601.⁽²⁾

Meanwhile in June 1600 a total of 2,050 recruits were ordered from England (See Table 2) and 1,000 from the Welsh shires (See Table 3), the third and last time during the war that Wales was asked to provide such a high number. From Tables 2 and 3 it will be seen that shires heavily recruited in June 1600 were given a lighter order for the admittedly smaller demand of 1,000 recruits for the December 1600 levy from both England (805) and Wales (195). Nine English shires were exempt from the December levy, and though only Anglesey was exempt in Wales its overall total of 195 may represent the government's awareness of its large contribution in June.

From 1598 to 1600 there had been a growing demand for cavalry contributions from the traditional providers of horse, the justices, the clergy and the recusants. The greater expense of sending out fully-equipped horsemen, the unpopularity of ^{their} ~~its~~ use in armed combat in Ireland at this time, and the reluctance of the gentry to provide horses all dictated that the numbers sent to Ireland would be small: 117 in 1598, 110 in 1599 and 183 in the year 1600. (See Table 4)⁽³⁾

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1. G.A.Hayes McCoy, in A New History of Ireland, iii (1976), 130
 2. See Appendix 4 for a list of garrisons, and for the Spanish in Ireland in 1601 J.J.Silke, Kinsale (Liverpool, 1970)
 3. Numbers of horse from the schedules in APC., xxviii, 588, 590; ibid., xxix, 116-118; ibid., xxx, 435, 440

In these years, and indeed to the end of the war, small groups of gentry sometimes were part sharers^{res} in satisfying privy council demands for horses; in Lancashire, for example, seven gentlemen joined in partnership to send out a single light horse.⁽¹⁾ And in 1598 and 1600 the clergy provided horse for Ireland through the diocese. 'Recusant horse' came under the jurisdiction of the lieutenancy in most cases.⁽²⁾ In 1600 the gentry of Kent, Yorkshire, Lincolnshire, Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex supplied the greatest numbers; Surrey, Herefordshire, Leicestershire and Rutland provided two each, Cornwall and Devonshire none.⁽³⁾

1601

In Ulster Sir Henry Docwra's garrisons at Lough Foyle needed reinforcement by April 1601; sickness and desertions had thinned down his original numbers of nearly 4,000 foot to possibly half that number.⁽⁴⁾ In April the government decided to levy 1,000 foot and 40 horse from England and Wales to supply the losses at Lough Foyle.⁽⁵⁾ (See Tables 2 and 3)

In Munster Sir George Carew's forces were in the most vulnerable part of Ireland in view of the rumours circulated by June 1601 of a Spanish invasion to land probably on the Munster coasts. Carew wrote to the privy council:

"sixe thousand men might bee levied for this service; whereof two thousand to bee sent presentlie for Waterford, and the rest to bee in a redinesse at an houre's warninge to make speedy repair to the sea-coast uppon the first notice of this invasion" (6)

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1. L.Boynton, The Elizabethan Militia (1967), 182
 2. J.J.N.McGurk, 'The Clergy and the Militia, 1580-1610' History (June, 1975)
 3. APC., xxxi, 313
 4. CSPI., (November 1600 - July 1601), 112, 113.
 5. APC., xxxi, 318
 6. From an unedited copy of Thomas Stafford's Pacata Hibernia, p.318.
 ^ (Dublin, 1870), I, 318

The privy council responded by ordering a levy of 2,000 from thirty-three shires in England and Wales; 275 to be embarked at Barnstaple by the 6th August, 830 at Chester, and 895 at Bristol by the 9th of August.⁽¹⁾

When the privy council's original and general order of 23 July 1601 for 2,000 came to be shared out among the shires it can be seen from Tables 2 and 3 that the total was in fact 1,850.

The discrepancy can only be accounted for by the vagaries of the Elizabethan Council's arithmetic. All were so seriously delayed by contrary winds that they did not begin to arrive until the first week of September, a few weeks before the Spanish landfall in

Munster.⁽²⁾ Don Juan del Aguila and some 4,000 Spanish soldiers put in at Kinsale on the 23rd September 1601, an event that changed the entire direction of the war in Ireland from Ulster to Munster, and one which evoked the largest programme of re-inforcement since

1598/99.⁽³⁾ News of the landing appeared to take a long time to reach London, but in the first week of October orders fell thick and

fast on the shires of England and Wales to call up 5,000 men for Ireland. (See Tables 2 and 3). ^{Some} 2,000 were to sail from Rochester, 2,000 from Bristol and Barnstaple, and 1,000 from Chester.⁽⁴⁾

⁽⁴⁾ At the same time clothing contracts were made with merchants to supply the necessary number of winter suits. The clergy and gentry were asked to contribute nearly 300 horse, and the lawyers were to pay graduated contributions of £10, £20 or £30 towards the expense of sending them. John Wood, a victualling merchant, won the contract to provide food to feed about 8,000 soldiers in Munster at an estimate of £13,300.⁽⁵⁾

1. APC., xxxii, 82, 83.

2. See Part II Embarkation and Transportation of Troops to Ireland.

3. See Tables 2 and 3.

4. APC., xxxii, 241-242

5. APC., xxxii, 222, 234, 249, 251, 266, 278-286

As might have been expected, the greatest demand for horse came at this crisis. The queen's orders under the sign manual were sent out to 275 individually named country gentlemen in the English shires and to 16 in the Welsh counties each to furnish a fully accoutered lighthorse and rider for Munster. The shires sending most horses were Lincolnshire, Devonshire, Northamptonshire, Yorkshire and Hampshire in that order; those sending least were Surrey and Cornwall, and five Welsh shires contributed a total of 16. From the named list of gentry 87 asked to contribute were knights. Hampshire had the greater number of these at 12. And by a comparison with the rosters in the commissions of the peace the majority asked for horses were justices of the peace.⁽¹⁾ The clergy of both provinces were to supply 60; from Canterbury, 45 and from York, 15.

The privy council analysed the results of this levy of horses. Of the total 351 ordered from both the gentry and the clergy, 46 horses were missing, and 31 sent back from the ports as "insufficient", and "therefore there were wanting in all the number of 77". This should have left 274 to be transported; but the privy council's analysis under the heading of "Sent and transported" gives 291.⁽²⁾

Once again contrary winds, especially at Bristol and Barnstaple, delayed the re-inforcements; they began to arrive in Ireland from about the 10th of November.⁽³⁾ Mountjoy, the lord deputy, reminded Sir Robert Cecil that the Spaniards had begun "the war of the Lowe Countries and hath bin maintained with few more natural Spaniards than are arrived here already".⁽⁴⁾ By the 14th of November the

1. AFC., xxxii, 275-277; 278-286, gentry lists; J.H.Gleason, The Justices of the Peace (Oxford, 1969), the commissions of the peace in the appendices.

2. AFC., xxxii, 405

3. HMC., Salisbury, xi, 443, 454, 461, 468, 484

4. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, iii, 10.

Queen's ships and the forces from Rochester under the Admiral Sir Richard Leveson had arrived at Cork.⁽¹⁾ The Irish council in Dublin remarked that this news was:

a matter of great comfort to us, as we perceive it is most joyful to his lordship [Mountjoy] ... God has sent us these great succours, prepared by her sacred Majesty and expedited by her most honourable and careful mynestery ... " (2)

Mountjoy, however, in writing to Sir George Carew was less sanguine about the newly arrived levies. Many of them were raw recruits, much upset by a bad voyage so that numbers died on their first night in Ireland. Of others Mountjoy said "I think there be not ten of them that can shoot in a gun". He sent 1,000 of them to Cork to rest until cabins were made for the sick.⁽³⁾ The Irish council reported the safe arrival of 1,000 foot and 100 horse from Bristol, and 1,000 foot and 140 horse from Barnstaple and Ilfracombe where some of the Bristol contingent had been blown off course. They dis-embarked at Cork, Youghal and Waterford by the 12th of November 1601.⁽⁴⁾ Fynes Moryson reckoned 10,100 ^{foot} and 1,000 ^{horse} as the army's strength at the beginning of 1601, and in his "Lyst of the Army at Kinsale" November/December 1601 he gives 11,800 ^{foot} and 857 ^{horse}. The difference made by the arrival of recruits is apparent in the infantry's case but not in the instance of horse.⁽⁵⁾

Following the demands of October 1601 the privy council was almost apologetic in asking for a further levy of 2,000; but, as may be seen in Table 3 under December 1601, when the individual shires, mainly the west country ones, were given their individual

1. CSPI., (1601-1603), 181, 182

2. Ibid.

3. Cal.Carew MSS., iv, 164.

4. CSPI., (1601-1603), 182

5. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, ii, 385-389; and in vol. iii, 40-43.

quotas the total demands on this occasion came to 1,630.⁽¹⁾ The round figure of the privy council's first mention of a new levy did not once again tally with the total asked from the individual shires. These numbers were also delayed, and though the siege and battle of Kinsale had been fought and won on Christmas Eve 1601 the government did not cancel the levy in the new year, but on ~~the~~ insistence from Ireland ~~for more men~~ decided instead to increase the original order of 2,000 to 4,000 "notwithstanding the often and great leavies of late in this kingdom". The first batch of 2,000 were ordered to sail on the 10th January 1602, and the second on the 20th of January.⁽²⁾

1602.

The reasons for the increased demand for men even after the victory at Kinsale are not far to seek; sickness, desertion and mortality took a severe toll during the winter's siege.⁽³⁾ It was also generally assumed that the Spanish defeat would "sharpen and stir the King of Spain to a further stomach and fresh invasion".⁽⁴⁾ The lord deputy and particularly Sir George Carew in Munster were for a long time in great fear of their return.⁽⁵⁾ To the privy council the lord deputy wrote:

"it will not then any longer be the war of Ireland, but the war of England in Ireland to the infinite danger and cumber of them both ... " (6)

Their fears were well founded for King Philip III of Spain had ordered a second fleet and an even stronger land force than the one

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1. Table 2 under December 1601
 2. APC., xxxii, 475-477
 3. Cal.Carew MSS., iv, 179-204 for a collection of English and Spanish eye-witness accounts of the siege of Kinsale.
 4. CSPI., (1601-1603), 261.
 5. Cal.Carew MSS., iv, 223, 225, 235, 236, 265, 277, Sir G. Carew's fears of Spain.
 6. Ibid., 284

which had fought at Kinsale, but it was not clear to English intelligence whether these forces were intended for Ireland, for the Netherlands, for England, or simply for the defence of Spain itself.⁽¹⁾

The ability also of the Irish enemy to continue the struggle in Munster, and in Ulster on O'Neill's return there, was far from broken. Apart from fears of a Spanish return Carew in Munster needed new forces to mop up pockets of resistance, and in particular to take the strong fortification of Dunboy.⁽²⁾ In Ulster, Docwra was not in a position to plant further garrisons especially the long-awaited one at Ballyshannon, and needed about another 1,000 troops.⁽³⁾ Mountjoy confessed to the weakness of the army in the field which badly needed men and victuals for what proved to be his final "journeys" to aid Docwra and Chichester in Ulster.⁽⁴⁾

It was to supply these needs of Ireland in the final stages of the war that 4,000 first ordered in December 1601 were asked to be sent in January 1602. The severity of this and previous demands seems to have induced the privy council, contrary to previous orders and practice, to allow the shires in certain cases to take the men out of the trained bands of the home militia.⁽⁵⁾ On this occasion London sent out the unprecedented figure of 500 of its trained men,⁽⁶⁾ In general, the response from the shires was reluctant and there were exceptionally long delays in the arrival of men in Ireland; some reports of their arrival in Ireland from the military commanders

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1. CSP., Spanish, (1587-1603), 711,-716
 2. P.O'Sullivan Beare's Historia Catholicae Iberniae Compendium (Lisbon, 1621) trans. in pt. by M.Byrne as Ireland under Elizabeth (Dublin, 1903), 153-156
 3. CSPI., (1601-1603), 263, 360, 391, 488, 534.
 4. Ibid., 377-381
 5. See in chapters 4,5,6 where trained bands were used in Lancashire, Kent, and Northamptonshire on this occasion.
 6. Remembrancia, p.245, the government promised to pay for the apparel and arms possibly to sweeten the severe demand for these 500 from the trained bands.

are dated in May, June, and, in one instance, July 1602.⁽¹⁾

A final levy of 2,015 from England and Wales was ordered in July to sail in August. On the 9th of August 1602 the privy council informed Carew that "2,000 men levied in sundry shires of this realm are appointed to be embarked at Chester, Bristol and Barnstaple and transported to Cork" to sail on the 15th August.⁽²⁾ Mountjoy told Carew that they needed "that number at least to fill our weak companies".⁽³⁾

By the first week of September 1602 these levies were still at the ports, and news from the port authorities gave different numbers from those ordered in July and August. While 1,000 were supposed to have gone to Chester, only 850 embarked there on September 4th. This contingent was then blown onto the Wirral, and at another attempt only got as far as Beaumaris.⁽⁴⁾ From Bristol it was reported that of the 800 ordered to the port their number was greatly diminished by desertion; this levy, too, suffered on account of the perversity of the winds. It is not clear how many in fact embarked at Bristol.⁽⁵⁾ Of the 200 ordered to embark at Barnstaple, the mayor reported that 165 sailed on the 24th August before the winds became contrary.⁽⁶⁾ Reports from Ireland mention troop landings not at Cork their original destination but at Waterford on the 22nd of September and the 11th of October.⁽⁷⁾

No further military levies were needed. As the winter of 1602 approached Mountjoy began to reduce the army in Ireland.⁽⁸⁾ However, a full army list from Carew's papers for January 1603 shows totals of 12,100 foot and 1,000 horse.⁽⁹⁾ In January and February Mountjoy

1. HMC., Salisbury, xii, 154, 196; CSPI., (1601-1603), 385, 414

2. Cal.Carew MSS., iv, 293.

3. Ibid., p.306

4. HMC., Salisbury, xii, 346

5. Ibid., p.369

6. Ibid., p.320

7. Cal.Carew MSS., iv, 338; CSPI., (1601-1603), 499

8. CSPI., (1601-1603), 519, 534, 535

9. Cal.Carew MSS., iv, 396-398

and his commanders completed the re-conquest. O'Neill, unaware of the Stuart succession in England, made his submission to the dead queen Elizabeth in the person of her lord deputy, Mountjoy at Mellifont Abbey on the 30th March 1603. Mountjoy knew of the queen's death on the 24th March. Had O'Neill known also, it is probable that he would have negotiated more favourable terms at Mellifont with King James I. ⁽¹⁾

To correct the view that Ireland absorbed the total military resources of England and Wales it must be recalled that during the same period that Elizabethan England was fighting the war in Ireland she sent large forces into France and the Netherlands, as well as the notable expeditions to Cadiz (1596) and ^{to} Porto Rico (1598), and had to prepare home defences on account of the renewed attempts by Spain at invasion of England itself in 1596 and in 1599. ⁽²⁾

These defence measures and the continuing state of war in Ireland by increasing the number of combatants put military organization on a firmer basis but the system of musters and levies did not develop into a standing army. And yet, the forces maintained in Ireland ^{were} ~~was~~ the nearest approach to a paid army of 'professionals' that Elizabethan England and Wales made. The government constantly harped upon the need for an efficient military organization and soldiery in the interests of economy, but, as we have seen, it also wanted a policy of social cleansing at home which, in the end did not lead to efficiency among the forces; in that conflict of aims lay some of the troubles in raising, organizing and transporting these military levies into Ireland in the 1590s.

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1. N.Canny, 'The Treaty of Mellifont and the re-organization of Ulster, 1603' in Irish Sword, vol.9 (1969/70), 249-262
 2. E.P.Cheyney, History of England from the defeat of the Armada to the death of Elizabeth, i and ii, (1914-1926), passim;
L.Boynton, The Elizabethan Militia (1967), ch.v.

The last decade of the queen's reign was one of dis-enchantment, of war weariness exacerbated by harvest failures and plague, and although there were localized outbreaks of riot and disorder in opposition to royal demands there was no large scale revolt against them while the queen lived. A 'precarious balance' between order and disorder, between the demands of the crown and the ability of the nation to pay, was maintained. The response to these demands for an unpopular war in Ireland is some measure of governmental success in the interests of centralization, unity and order. The queen and privy council may have established a unitary military organization by the 1590s but this did not mean that it was an efficient military machine; privileged persons and places were able to escape, evade or minimize military exactions, counties were able to change, ignore and contest demands and captains and conductors of troops appear to have been able to practice fraud at will. Examples of these tendencies of local resistance to central government will be evident in later chapters. The overall view in this chapter outlined the Elizabethan government's demands and the nation's ability to provide armed forces to meet the various crises in Ireland, 1594-1602. The next three chapters hope to examine in local detail how the government's military needs for Ireland impinged on Kent, Northamptonshire, Derbyshire, Lancashire and Cheshire - the reasons for this selection of shires have been stated in the preface, and the numbers of soldiers asked from them are heavily underlined in Table 2.

CHAPTER FOUR

Levies to Ireland from Kent.

(1) Background.

The connection between the county of Kent and Ireland in the Elizabethan age may, at first glance, appear tenuous; unlike the men of Devon, prominent in Irish martial activity and colonization, the men of Kent (and Kentish men) are but scantily noticed in this context.⁽¹⁾ Kent, as a maritime county, was heavily recruited for the wars in the Low Countries and France because the proximity to those theatres of warfare reduced the government's bill for transport of men and supplies in the post-Armada period.⁽²⁾ But from 1595 until the queen's death Ireland increasingly absorbed the attention of the privy council and considerably taxed the resources of the realm. Whereas in the early 1590s it was the northern shires and Wales that were mostly drawn upon to provide men, horses, arms and armour for the Irish war, in the final phase of re-conquest, 1598-1602, levies were raised from all over the realm as the government exercised extraordinary zeal to quell the Irish rising and to prevent a Spanish foothold in Ireland. In spreading the burden on a war weary nation, shires remote from Ireland, such as Kent, were asked to send substantial levies to the war efforts of the chief military leaders in Ireland.

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1. N.P.Canny, The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland, a pattern established 1565-1576, (Sussex 1976), 72, 73 notes the predominance of west countrymen in the Ulster project of colonization in 1566.
 2. J.J.N.McGurk, "Levies from Kent to the Elizabethan wars", Archaeologia Cantiana, (hereafter Arch. Cant.) lxxxviii (1973), 57-72 deals with a wider field, but briefly notes levies to Ireland, p.68-70.

According to W.G.Hoskins' calculations Kent was the most populous county of England at the beginning of the sixteenth century; and, excluding the Cinque Ports, the county was by far the richest when reckoned on the basis of loans and taxation.⁽¹⁾ Calculated guesses of the shire's total population in the sixteenth century vary. A.P.Usher gave a figure of 235,000 by the end of the century.⁽²⁾ E.Hasted, the eighteenth century historian of Kent, thought that 200,000, of which 60,000 were able-bodied men, represented the Elizabethan Kentish population.⁽³⁾ W.K.Jordan reckoned a Kentish population of about 140,000 in the year 1570 rising to about 160,000 by the year 1600.⁽⁴⁾ Peter Clark the latest historian of the county in the period 1500-1640, calculated that Kent's population rose from about 85,000 in 1500 to about 130,000 a century later.⁽⁵⁾

On the basis of a complete muster of the able-bodied male population in 1560 of 15,158, and by using a multiplier of seven suggested by W.G.Hoskins, we can derive a population figure of 106,106 in that year.⁽⁶⁾ A similar muster in 1577 gave a total of the able-bodied males of 11,203, and by using the same multiplier we have a population figure of 78,421.⁽⁷⁾ In 1580 the county returned a complete muster of 12,131, and on the same basis, thereby gave a population figure of 84,917.⁽⁸⁾ The year prior to the Armada the county's complete muster of able-bodied men came to 12,694 thereby

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1. W.G.Hoskins, The Age of Plunder (1976), 15, 23
 2. A.P.Usher, An Introduction to the Industrial History of England.(1920)
 3. A.Hasted, Kent, i (1790), 302
 4. W.K.Jordan, 'Social Institutions in Kent', Arch. Cant., lxxv (1961), 3
 5. P.Clark, English Provincial Society from the Reformation to the Revolution Religion, Politics and Society in Kent, 1500-1640 (Harvester, 1977), 6.
 6. E.E.Rich, 'The Population of Elizabethan England' in Econ.H.R., 2nd ser., ii (1950), 248, 251; W.G.Hoskins, Local History in England (1959) pp.146-147.
 7. E.E.Rich., art. cited, p.254
 8. Ibid.

indicating a Kentish population of 88,858 for that year.⁽¹⁾ The county's consolidated muster returns of 1588 came to 12,657, which, by using the same multiplier, gives a similar total to the previous year of 88,799.⁽²⁾

Recent historians' estimates of the county's population in Elizabeth's reign, ranging from 130,000 to 160,000 are thus much larger than estimates derived only from musters, ranging from c.78,000 to c.105,000, a discrepancy which should in itself serve as a warning against placing too much trust in muster lists as a complete record of Kent's able-bodied male population. Nevertheless, the muster lists of 1560, 1577, 1587 and 1588 are the only indication we have of the man-power base of the county, and suggest that between 12,000 and 15,000 men were available for the demands of war.⁽³⁾

However, the demands of war on the county were heavy in view of its contributions both to the Irish war and to the continental wars, where many from Kent replaced Low Countries veterans redeployed in Ireland. In the official correspondence of Sir John Leveson,⁽⁴⁾ principal deputy lieutenant to the lords lieutenant of Kent, William and Henry Cobham, is a table of the numbers of men ordered to be levied in the county from March 1591 until the coronation of King James in July 1603 both for the continent and Ireland.⁽⁵⁾ Apart from one detail the figures are not contradicted by other evidence in the privy council registers or from other sections of Leveson's

1. PRO.SP.12/208/26, 'Kent, 6 Januarii, 1587'
2. SRO.,D.593/S/4/22/42v. to 43. The total in this muster roll of 12,657 conflicts with the total of 10,806 given by E.Rich for Kent that year.
3. The census of 1801 gave Kent a de facto population of 308,667, see the VCH., Kent, iii, 358.
4. The Leveson lieutenancy collection of over 10,000 items is in the Staffordshire Record Office - SRO.D.593/S/4. Manuscripts dealing with the forces for Ireland have not been previously used either in my thesis M.Phil. (London 1971) or in the publication 'Levies from Kent to the Elizabethan wars, 1589-1603' in Arch. Cant., lxxxviii (1973), 57-72.
5. SRO.D.593/S/4/10/9 - the table, n.d. but in a bundle of 1603

extensive lieutenancy papers.⁽¹⁾ The aim of the table seems to have been a complete survey of demands for men on Kent, for it mentions service within the realm as well as outside, for example, soldiers sent to London "to guard her Majesty at the execution of Essex"; "to guard the Kinge at his coronation" in 1603, and forces assembled at Sandwich to meet the Spanish threat of August 1599. It was probably compiled as a private record for the use of the deputy lieutenants of Kent, for no fair copy was apparently presented to the privy council. As an example of an informal check list of troops demanded it is unusual among local lieutenancy records.

TABLE 1.

Total levied in Kent, 1591-1603 (Leveson lieutenancy records)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>For What Place</u>	<u>Captains.</u>
27 March 1591	200	Flushing	Edward Brooks Henry Masters
12 Nov. 1591	100	Dieppe	-
19 Feb. 1592	270	Dieppe	Charles Johnson Henry Poore
13 Oct. 1592 Staid 21	50	Brittany	Sir John Norris
24 May 1593	300	Boulogne	-
16 July 1593 Staid 30	135	France	Oliver St. John
5 April 1594	70	Low Countries	Sir Francis Vere
20 July 1594	250	Brittany	George Morton
<u>14 June 1595</u>	<u>5h.</u>	<u>Ireland</u>	-
Aug/Nov. 1595	600	To be put ready	-
9 April 1596	2,000	Dover to Calais	-
29 May 1596	150	Boulogne	I fynd no excursion

Cont'd...

1. Under 26 August 1598 the levy of 100 f. was not 'staid', see below. B.L.Add.Ms. 34,128 provides a useful cross check to Leveson's table, but only from 1596.

Total levied in Kent 1591-1603 (Leveson Lieutenancy records)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>For What Place</u>	<u>Captains.</u>
20 Sept. 1596	135	Boulogne	John Brooke
3 May 1597	300	Calais	Thos. Gates Thos. Wyatt Thos. Wilford
14 July 1597	50	Picardy	To supply these companies
3 Nov. 1597	400	Dover to Ostend	Discharged by Q's letters
<u>16 July 1598</u>	<u>4 h.</u>	<u>Ireland</u>	-
<u>26 Aug. 1598</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>Ireland</u>	<u>Staid (for a few weeks)</u>
1 Jan. 1599	400	Low Countries	Morris, Wilsford, Scott, Morgan, Lonsell
<u>9 Jan. 1599</u>	<u>25h.</u>	<u>Ireland</u>	<u>Sir John Brooke</u>
25 March 1599	30	L. Essex guard (vide Babington's acquit. for 90	
26 Aug. 1599	4,000 besides h.	Sandwich passage	-
<u>9 Jan. 1600</u>	<u>6 h.</u>	<u>Ireland</u>	To the Treasury of the Chamber £120
<u>12 Jan. 1600</u>	<u>100</u> at £3.10s. the man	<u>Ireland</u>	Henry Hart; and paid Sir Henry Dockwray for 6 targets
<u>26 June 1600</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>Ireland</u>	Edward Trevor, Conductor
<u>-</u>	<u>19h.</u>	<u>Ireland</u>	Lords letters to particular persons, £30 the horse - £510
14 Feb.	300	London, to guard Her Majesty at execucon of Essex	All paide by H. Majestie
<u>26 April 1601</u>	<u>3 h.</u>	<u>Lough Foyle</u>	£66.13.4d.
20 July 1601	300 at £3.10 the peece £1,050 sent into the Exchequer	Ostend	Thomas Stocke
<u>6 Oct. 1601</u>	<u>200</u>	<u>Ireland</u>	Edward Dodington Geo. Blundell.

Total levied in Kent 1591-1603 (Leveson lieutenancy records)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>For What Place</u>	<u>Captains</u>
<u>Eadem</u>	<u>2,000 to</u> be billeted at Rochester	<u>Ireland</u>	Cooke, Clifford, Fortescue, Roberts, Gilbert etc.
<u>6 Jan. 1602</u> Staid 20	100 no arms nor apparalle	<u>Ireland</u>	Thomas Stocke
22 April	150	Low Countries	Sir Francis Vere
<u>28 July</u>	50 £3.10s. for arms and apparell for each man	<u>Ireland</u>	Thomas Stocke
15 Martii	Vagrants and Volunteers	Low Countries	-
July 1603	100	To guard the King at his coronation.	

The numbers in Table 1⁽¹⁾ represent those ordered by the government from the shire of Kent, and needless to say were not in every case the same numbers actually conducted to the ports of embarkation. Replacements by captains and conductors, as well as desertions, made muster returns as unsatisfactory to the privy council for administrative purposes as they are today for the historian seeking an accurate account of military strength.⁽²⁾

However, bearing this in mind Kent's intended contribution over a seven year period, 1595-1602, was 1,352; fifty-two light horse and 600 foot or infantrymen went to Ireland, and 700 foot to the Low Countries to release experienced soldiers for Ireland. C.G.Cruickshank's study of the longer period, 1585-1602, shows that Kent sent out 4,600 men, 2,250 to France, 1,600 to the

1. Levies intended for Ireland are underlined in the table above. It will be noted that of the 36 occasions on which Kent was asked to supply armed forces, 13 of them were to meet the demands of the Irish war. SRO.D.593/S/4/10/9

2. See chapters two and three above.

Netherlands, and 750 to Ireland.⁽¹⁾ Clearly the Irish war made lesser demands on the county of Kent than did the continental wars from 1585 to 1602, but equally the demands of the war in Ireland dominated levies from Kent in the last few years of Elizabeth's reign. Man-power however can hardly be replaced on a yearly basis. The Irish levies of 1,352 in the 1590s from a possible mustered manpower of c.15,000 in the county represented a nine per cent drain on the county's labour force.

The 1590s, apart from being a decade of heavy demands for soldiers, was one of high mortality rates from outbreaks of plague and of near famine following bad harvests from 1594 to 1597, which probably affected the county's population rise more than the loss of man-power to military service. These conditions may explain the remark of Sir Thomas Scott, deputy lieutenant for East Kent in 1593 that "there be not nowe in the partes aboute such store of men as heretofore".⁽²⁾

(ii) Kent levies.

Local administration in Elizabethan Kent, as elsewhere, was a complex mixture of medieval survivals and new institutions, like the lieutenancy: Kentish hundreds had been anciently grouped into six lathes; Sutton-at-Hone, which was traditionally divided into Upper and Lower, stretched along the Medway; Aylesford lay further east, and was divided into North, South and East Aylesford; Scray occupied the north coast of the county to the border of Sussex.

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1. See Appendix No.3 in C.G.Cruickshank's Elizabeth's Army (2nd ed., Oxford 1966) p.291, but no references are supplied to support his totals. The contemporary compilation above Table No.1 for the years 1591-1603 shows a total of 3,253 men sent out of Kent to both the continent and to Ireland - SRO.D.593/S/4/10/9.
 2. KCA., U1115/6/12, Sir Thomas Scott's official correspondence.

These three lathes were traditionally known as West Kent. In East Kent were the three lathes of St. Augustine's, Hedling and Shepway. Early in the sixteenth century the two former had joined together and became known as the lathe of St. Augustine. Throughout Elizabeth's reign the lathe was used as the administrative base for the trained bands of the militia and for raising levies for the wars abroad. By the last years of the queen's reign the lathe was becoming a residual administrative base having been overtaken by the new petty sessional districts for judicial and general administrative purposes.⁽¹⁾

The rise to importance of the 'new' institution of lieutenancy saw the virtual demise of the sheriff's traditional military role, though in Kent the lords lieutenant and their deputies continued to use the lathal divisions of the shire for military organisation, used historically by the sheriff as the unit of his jurisdiction.⁽²⁾ The five lathes contained sixty-six hundreds within which lay 413 parishes.⁽³⁾ The military administrators, the deputy lieutenants, who were also justices of the peace, made their assessments for military taxation on the subsidy books, which valued a man within his parish of residence, though frequently his income came from estates in other parishes or hundreds, and in some cases families such as the Cobhams, Culpeppers, Sidneys, St. Legers, Scotts and Leveson had incomes from outside the county itself.⁽⁴⁾

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1. 'Lieutenancy in Kent, c.1580-c.1620', M.Phil thesis (London 1971), 42, 46.
 2. T.E.Hartley 'The Sheriffs of the County of Kent, c.1580-c.1625' Ph.D. thesis, (London 1970) passim.
 3. E.Hasted, Kent i, 254, and for the list of hundreds in Kent B.L.Lansdowne Ms. 276, ff.185-186. For the corporate liberties within the county, and the relationship of the lieutenancy to the Cinque Ports see my M.Phil. thesis, chapters 1 and 3.
 4. W.Berry, Pedigrees of Families in the County of Kent (1830); A.M.Everitt 'The Community of Kent in 1640' in The Genealogists' Magazine xiv (1963) 229-258; J.R.Scott Memorials of the Family of Scott of Scot's Hall (1876)

The relationship between military assessment and the subsidy would give rise to complaints in the 1590s in Kent as elsewhere that the poorer were over-taxed while the richer escaped realistic contributions.⁽¹⁾

Throughout the period of heavy recruitment of men for Ireland the lieutenancy of Kent was held by the Brooke family, William and Henry Brooke, 10th and 11th Lords Cobham; their deputies, most of them with military expertize, carried the chief responsibilities in raising, equipping and sending out the levies. The prominent deputy lieutenants included Sir John Leveson, Sir Thomas Fane (the younger), Sir Thomas Walsingham, Sir Peter Manwood, Sir Thomas Scott of Scot's Hall, and Sir Thomas Wilsford.⁽²⁾ The outstanding leader of this group of deputies in Kent was Sir John Leveson of Halling. Son of a metropolitan newcomer to the county, Leveson married into the Manwood family, became neighbour and friend of the Cobhams as well as colleague on the bench with William Lambarde, the premier topographer historian of Kent. As a soldier he came to take a major part in the defence arrangements at the time of the Armada, later served with Lord Willoughby in France, and served throughout the 1590s as the principal deputy lieutenant for the Lords Cobham.⁽³⁾

The arrangements made in Kent for raising, equipping and sending out military levies to Ireland are documented in detail in Sir John Leveson's lieutenancy papers, which for this period are more comprehensive than the like records of most other English shires.

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1. See below the conclusions to this chapter.
 2. For brief biographies of these deputies see Appendices nos. 11, iii in my M.Phil. thesis, pp. 241-246. Biographical information on Leveson was submitted to the History of Parliament in 1968 for inclusion in the forthcoming History of Parliamentary members in the sixteenth century.
 3. Sir John Leveson did not earn an entry in the DNB, whereas his cousin Sir Richard Leveson the Admiral did.

So complete is the picture that can be drawn from Leveson's letters, accounts and general official papers of the details of raising troops for Ireland in these years that an extended analysis of Kent is justified in this chapter.⁽¹⁾ The chief section of this source for the war in Ireland contains eleven bundles of documents, but other evidence is found throughout the entire collection when it deals with military service overseas.⁽²⁾ The lack of numerical sequence in the collection results from the fact that when first discovered in Dubrobin, a seat of the Dukes of Sutherland, Leveson's descendants, they were arranged in bundles roughly by subject matter and tied up with parchment strips, with notes of content in sixteenth century hands, an original archival arrangement that the Staffordshire Record Office retained in its catalogue; hence there are overlaps of subject matter and of dates amongst the bundles of documents.

The abundance of the evidence for the theme of soldiers for Ireland in the 1590s from Kent scattered throughout this collection, and its correlation with other sources dictates a chronological approach for the sake of clarity. It is hoped that such an approach, by putting the spotlight on the military organisation of one shire, will substantiate the picture of the national levies broadly delineated in the previous chapters. There is also sufficient variation in the organisational details of each levy for Ireland, as well in the performance and results achieved, to make a detailed recital of routine administration meaningful. The crises in Ireland that called for these successive demands for troops are briefly noted.⁽³⁾

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1. No similar coverage of local lieutenancy records has been found for the 1590s for the other shires treated here - Northamptonshire, Derbyshire, Cheshire, Lancashire and Wales, see Chapters 5 and 6.
 2. The main section on levies for Ireland is SRO.D.593/S/4/69/1-11.
 3. These crises have been given greater attention in the previous chapter.

1595.

The government may have been mindful of the burden of former Kentish contributions to the wars in France and the Netherlands⁽¹⁾ when in the summer of 1595 the county was asked to send only six light horse when O'Neill's rebellion was well under way.⁽²⁾ That summer the county had mustered its trained bands in the five lathal divisions of Sutton-at-Hone, Aylesford, St. Augustine's, Scray and Shepway.⁽³⁾ The government's request then for six horsemen became administratively eccentric, a fact not lost on the county authorities, and the lord lieutenant William Lord Cobham managed to have an abatement of one of the light horse.⁽⁴⁾

Lord Cobham amended the council's original order so that one horse, one rider, one set of accoutrements and arms suitable for light cavalry were to be levied on each of the five ancient divisions of the shire. Despite the apparent neatness of this arrangement doubts were cast by the justices of the peace as to whether the cost should be a common charge on the county as a whole or should be borne by those who traditionally kept horses, in other words, themselves.⁽⁵⁾ The justices should have been well aware that provision of light horse for overseas warfare had come to be regarded by the government as the special ^{responsibility} ~~provenance~~ of the justices of the peace, the clergy, and recusants of substance.⁽⁶⁾

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1. SRO.D.593/S/4/22/41, and for the figures between 1588 and 1595 see Appendix No.vii, p.250 of my M.Phil. thesis, (1971).
 2. Lambeth Ms., 1393, f.5 "Levies of arms and men in Kent", which sometimes supplement the Leveson collection, D.593/S/4 when they are not duplicates.
 3. Ibid., ff.27-29d.
 4. Ibid., f.28
 5. Lambeth Ms., 1393, ff.8, 9, 22, 23.
 6. J.J.N.McGurk, "The Clergy and the Militia, 1580-1610" in History, lx (June 1975), 198-210, and "Lieutenancy and Catholic Recusants in Elizabethan Kent" in Recusant History (March 1974), 157-170.

The justices, however, did not want the burden to fall completely on their own shoulders; they resolved their doubts at a meeting in the Star Inn, Maidstone on the 18th June 1595, where they agreed that for the setting forth of the five horsemen they would make a collection on the basis of the last subsidy from those rated at £10 in land and those at £15 in goods.⁽¹⁾ Did they not after all bear burdens as landowners over and above the services they rendered as justices? Did they not supply horses, equip, train and maintain them? And were they not further taxed to finance the infantry musters of the shire?⁽²⁾ Having justified their decision to make the cost a common charge they agreed that £27. 8s. was sufficient to buy the horse, equip both horse and rider, and leave enough money to supply an allowance for the rider's purse to feed himself and his horse on the way to the port of Chester.⁽³⁾ In the event Sir John Leveson, the principal deputy lieutenant and justice, found that it cost £31. 8s. to send his man, Hugh Southern, fully equipped to Chester. The effect of inflation on prices would not have come as a surprise to any of the Kentish justices at this time, though war as a cause of inflation in the late sixteenth century does not yet appear to have been intensively studied by historians.⁽⁴⁾

From their experience in sending out troops, infantry or horse, to the continental wars, and indeed from active service there, such local officials as Sir John Leveson, Sir Thomas Scott and Robert Bing

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1. Lambeth Ms., 1393, f.23
 2. Ibid., f.23d. but the discussion is elaborated in SRO.D.593/S/4/37.
 3. SRO.D.593/4/37/3.
 4. For the effects of war on early Tudor England see G.Elton, "Taxation for war and peace in early Tudor England" in War and Economic Development, J.M.Winter (ed.), 1975. For military costs on Kent in the 1590s see P.Clark, Religion, Society and Politics In Kent, chapter 7.

were well versed in the routine ordinances "for the raising, arminge, conductinge and transportinge of men" and of choosing "a mete and sufficient person to take chardge of leadinge them to the porte",⁽¹⁾ and in those tasks, as Sir Peter Marwood complained when he became a deputy in 1600, of being subjected "to the displeasures of our friends and enemies".⁽²⁾ The lieutenancy papers illustrate the local problems of even a small levy very well. In 1595 the council thought the levy of horse well performed and the lord lieutenant was congratulated on his county's efforts.⁽³⁾ The council was content that good men had been recruited, equipped and sent to Chester. However, in the county there were disputes about the liability to pay for them and great difficulties arose in finding suitable men to ride the horses. William Place, for instance, who had been invited to be one of the horsemen, excused himself:

"because of the late dangerous sicknesse I am fallen into an infirmitie called the piles whereof I am scarce able to go much lesse sitt upon a horse ..."⁽⁴⁾

When the five horsemen reached Chester they were seriously delayed waiting for an easterly wind so that they had to petition Sir John Leveson for further means of sustenance claiming they were becoming destitute at Chester.⁽⁵⁾ They were but a small part of the 100 horse and 1000 foot hourly expected by General Sir John Norris, who with the Lord Deputy, William Russell, was preparing an expedition to Ulster.⁽⁶⁾ But these re-inforcements did not arrive in Ireland until late August 1595.

1. N.L.Harl. Ms., 168, f.118.

2. G.Scott Thomson, Twysden Lieutenancy Papers, 1583-1668 (Kent Records, x, 1926), 93.

3. Lambeth Ms. 1393, f.5, "Levies of arms and men in Kent".

4. SRO.D.593/S/4/33/3 - William Place to Sir John Leveson, June 1595

5. SRO.D.593/S/4/37/3 (ii).

6. Cal. Carew Mss., iii, p.118.

1596 and 1597

During the uneasy truce in Ireland with O'Neill in November 1595 both sides built up military strength, but Kent, very heavily burdened with demands for France, was not asked for forces in the recruitment for Ireland which went forward between February and September 1596. The one exception to this was that the clergy of the province of Canterbury were asked to furnish 300 horse and 285 foot;⁽¹⁾ the privy council's letter to Lord Cobham clearly stated that the soldiers supplied by the clergy of Kent were not to be mixed in with the forces of the county because they were to be "used for her Majesty's special service" - a phrase which at this time meant the Irish service; but

"if any of the clergy cannot find sufficient men for their armour and furniture the lord lieutenant may choose some able men for the purpose".
(2)

How many men this involved is not known.

The county was again exempted from the national levy of 1,000 men called to Ireland in September 1596 when eighteen shires contributed.⁽³⁾ Kent's commitment to the sieges of Boulogne (May and September 1596) may well have been the cause of its exemption. There was mounting resentment in any case over the deployment of 2,000 of its trained bands for Calais in April 1596.

This heavy deployment may explain why the privy council did not make any demand from Kent for the crises in Ireland in 1597, either.⁽⁴⁾ In this year, too, continental demands fell heavily on

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1. Lambeth Mss., 2009, f.64
 2. G.Scott Thomson, (ed.) "The Twysden Lieutenancy Papers, 1583-1668" in Kent Records, x (1926), 103
 3. CSPD., (1595-1597), 292-293
 4. B.L. Add. Mss., 34, 128, f.87r.

Kent; 300 soldiers had been armed and apparelled, and trained at the county's cost for the Earl of Essex at Calais in May at a charge of £1,200; 50 men had been sent into Picardy in July, and 400 had been levied, armed and sent to Dover for Ostend. Though they were discharged, their impress and conduct cost the county £100.

The lack of military demands on Kent in these two years was the lull before the storm. O'Neill had been consolidating his position in Ireland and without speedy re-inforcement the English military position in Ireland was on the verge of collapse. The Dublin council reported on 5th November 1597 that there was no part of Ulster "that standeth for her Majesty".⁽¹⁾ Lord Semple wrote that many English were fleeing to Galloway in Scotland so strong was O'Neill in Ireland.⁽²⁾ John Chamberlain wrote on 17th May 1598 to Dudley Carleton:

Matters in Ireland growe daily worse and worse so that unless they have round and speedy succoures all is like to go to wracke. ⁽³⁾

And Lord Burghley reflected on 2nd January 1598, shortly before his death, how profitable and convenient it would have been for the queen to make peace with Spain so that Ireland then could "be reduced to quietness".⁽⁴⁾

1598

Lord Burghley did not live to see the nadir of English military fortunes in Ireland, O'Neill's victory at the Yellow Ford

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1. Cal. Carew Mss., iii, 271-272, Irish Council's Report of 5th Nov. 1597.
 2. PRO.SP.12/252/15
 3. S.Williams (ed.) Letters written by John Chamberlain during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, Camden Soc., lxxix (1861), 9, May 17th 1598.
 4. PRO.SP.12/266/3, January 2nd 1598. Burghley's words echo those of his son when negotiating peace with Henry IV the previous year. HMC., Salisbury xxiii (addenda), p.45 - March 23rd 1597.

on August 14th 1598, which encouraged every rebellious element in Ireland. That event, however, spurred the government to order on 26 August new levies of 1,500 men from nineteen shires, and of this total the shire of Kent was asked to contribute 100 men and four horse.⁽¹⁾

The county's deputy lieutenants decided on a proportion of 19 soldiers to be recruited from each of the five lathes thereby allowing for the customary dead pays. The company was armed at the county's cost in the proportions of 25 pikes, 50 calivers and 20 muskets, but of the calivers only 20 were "fully furnished with sworde, dagger, touch-boxe, bullet-bagge, flaske, matche and moulede".⁽²⁾ Sir John Leveson reckoned the cost of each lathe at £25.15.4d. but he considered that the four hundreds of the lathe of Scray (being the smallest) should contribute half that amount at £12.17.8d.⁽³⁾

In the directives of 26th August from the privy council on behalf of the queen, the reasons for the levy are stated:

... forasmuch as the necessitie of our service in our Realme of Irelande doth require a further reinforcement of men to be sent thither by reason of a late accident fallen out thear ... (4)

The order to have the soldiers levied, mustered, furnished with coats, armour and weapons with all expedition is followed by what was becoming a customary complaint in the 1590s in these matters:

And for that in former lyke levies there hath beene so little regard had both to the personablenesse and abilities of bodies in the men, and to their furniture also that a verie greate parte of them hath ben founde utterlie insufficient to be used in the service of the warres (5)

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1. APC., xxix, 156; D.593/S/4/66/3 (iii) the general order to the shires and the specific demand from Kent.
 2. SRO.D.593/S/4/66/3 - 26th August 1598, "the schedule of arms".
 3. SRO.D.593/S/4/66/3 (iii), Leveson to the other deputies August, 1598,
 4. Ibid., 66/3 (i) "By the queene" to Lord Cobham, 26th August 1598.
 5. Ibid.,

Two days later on 28th August 1598 the privy council wrote more precisely to Henry Lord Cobham elaborating on the former strictures on the choice of men, telling him that his deputies had taken up "loose and idle people" to disburden the county of the unprofitable classes without any consideration for "the advancement of her Majesty's service or regard of her direction". Had not the queen told him, they hectorred, that such levies were a hindrance to the service, a trouble to her subjects, and the men so levied a danger to their own lives? Did they not know from past experience that the result of such recruitment was large scale desertion? These complaints were made by way of warning for at that time the deputies and constables had not put the machinery of recruitment into action.⁽¹⁾

In response Sir John Leveson sent out even more detailed instructions to the constables who took up the men in the villages and parishes. He underlined that they had to be "of able bodies and of convenient years" and warned his constables that before the men were brought to the general muster the justices themselves would see them. Apparently in former levies the making of a muster roll had been neglected. His instruction was that precautions "be taken to write the names, surnames, owt of what parishe and division everie soldier was taken". Apart from the obvious check for the muster master this precaution also helped to trace the place of origin of "soch men as doe runn away".⁽²⁾

The levy was ordered to be ready by the 15th September 1598, which gave the county authorities two weeks to have the men rounded up and equipped. Further instructions, when their conductor to Chester had been appointed, were sent to Lord Cobham who ordered that the justices

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1. SRO.5.593/S/4/66/3 (ii), the privy council to Cobham, 28th Aug. 1598.
 2. SRO.D.593/S/4/66/3 (iii) Sir John Leveson to the constables, Sept. 1598.

themselves "repaire to the villages to see that good choice is made of sufficient men in the required numbers" and that they were to make up the muster roll, that "this service is to be performed by them not by the constables."⁽¹⁾

An apparently innocent postscript to the council's letter asking the county to "forbear to be at the chardge to provide the coats", caused a furore of protest over the question of supplying the coats for the levies. The government had contracted with two London merchants, Urry Babington and Robert Bromley, to supply coats for the entire national levy, and have the coats delivered to the captains at the ports of embarkation.⁽²⁾ It was at this point that the county would be charged for the coats:

the countie shall then not presentlie be chardged until the apparell is made redy at the port and then onlie at the rate as you have previously done⁽³⁾

The protest to the lord lieutenant Cobham against these arrangements and against the London merchants came from influential landowners in the shire: Sir Thomas Fludd of Milgate, Surveyor General of the Kent fortifications, erstwhile Paymaster of the forces sent to France with Lord Willoughby in 1589; Sir Nicholas Gilborne of Charing, Scout Master General at the time of the Armada; and Sir Thomas Walsingham of Scadbury, deputy lieutenant and member of Parliament for Rochester in 1597 and 1601, and later for the county in 1614.⁽⁴⁾

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1. SRO.D.593/S/4/67/3 (ii), privy council to Lord Henry Cobham.
 2. CSPD., (1598-1601), 151 for the sums they were paid later for this contract.
 3. SRO.D.593/S/4/67/3 (ii) - council to Lord Cobham
 4. When the sixteenth century History of Parliament is complete we shall know more about the lives and commissions of many others who were justices in Elizabeth's reign. J.H.Gleason, The Justices of the Peace in England, 1558-1640 (1969) gives a general survey.

Their lengthy protest was written a few days after they had received Lord Henry Cobham's summary of the privy council's orders, and they used the controversy over the coats to launch a list of other grievances, exposing not only a surge of jealous feeling against the London monopolist merchants, but also their opposition to the burden of government demands. They wrote:

...we and others the gentlemen of these partes doe greatlie mislyke that the cotes for the hundred men sett forth oute of this county for Ireland are appoynted to be provyded by some of the marchants of London... (1)

They rounded on the council that they "had scarcely hadd two dayes respyte to furnish and sett forth our men and sometimes lesse", that of late they had "greate chardges to have armes and armour and furniture reddy uppon anie sudden occasion". And now that they had provided good strong and well-lined coats for the winter use of soldiers "for which we have long since disbursed reddy mony", in which no one has made gains, "which happily will not soe fall owte in the marchants provision", they wanted their own arrangements to stand. (2)

Whether or not they got their way is not clear in this conflict of local and national interests. The government's intention was to centralize the supply of army coats by contracts with merchants and aimed at cutting out the frauds of captains and others who wanted to get their hands on the troops' clothing allowance. (3) The justices in Kent clearly regarded the arrangement as novel for their county, and had already provided coats and may have wished to protect local tailors.

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1. SRO.D.593/S/4/66/3 (iv) sent by five justices from Bearsted, 2nd Sept. 1598.
 2. Frauds against the crown were exposed in 1616 involving the treasurers at war in Ireland, and the London merchants, Babington and Bromley, over the provision of soldiers' coats. H.Hall, Society in the Elizabethan Age (1888) 125, see chapter ten.
 3. B.L. Add. Mss., 34, 128, f.87v. "Kent, paid to Sir John Stanhope for four horses for Ireland, August 1598."

The levy of the 100 foot, and 4 horsemen, was ready by 15th September. They went as part of the national levies to Munster disembarking at Waterford, Cork and Kinsale in early October.⁽¹⁾

1599

It has been suggested in chapter three that it was prevalent governmental practice to recruit armies from those shires nearest the theatres of warfare, and when possible to release veterans from the continent for the Irish war. Kent, nearer to the Low Countries and France than to Ireland, was heavily drawn upon in January 1599. When the order went out in January 1599 to draft 2,000 men from the Home Counties and London for the Low Countries, so that a like number of Low Country veterans could go towards building up the Earl of Essex's expedition to Ireland, the shire of Kent was asked to contribute 400 to that total whereas the county's total to Ireland was but 600.⁽²⁾

Perhaps the queen was conscious of the strain on the man-power resources of counties surrounding London when she wrote in a circular to their lords lieutenants, "wee would not burden our subjects with these greater forces whenever of our princely love to them we have ever been sparing".⁽³⁾ Following this, the privy council's letter to Cobham in Kent, with more detailed instructions for levying, arming and clothing the 400 from Kent, was almost apologetic in tone, but the councillors went on to liken the state of Ireland to a disease for which speedy and effectual remedy was immediately required.⁽⁴⁾ This mild tone to the authorities in Kent was a

1. APC., xxix, 94, 156

2. PRO.SP.12/268/121, draft copy, and f.122 fair copy.

3. SRO.D.493/S/4/66/5 (i) Henry Lord Cobham's copy of the queen's letter and sent out to his deputies.

4. SRO.D.593/S/4/65/5 (ii), the privy council's letter to Lord Cobham.

direct contrast to a letter the previous year when the county was directly accused of evading public burdens when

"the chardges of these levies ought to be borne chearfullie and willinglie ... and leavied ratablie and in due proportion upon all ... of habilitye, as hold in that countie any landes or any dwelling places ..." (1)

The recruitment of the 400 in Kent went ahead before and just after Christmas 1599. From the indentures made between the captains and the deputy lieutenants on behalf of the crown we can see that the men were taken up from all over Kent to make four companies of 100. No dead pays appear to have been permitted. The recruits were brought to Margate and allowed 8d. a day for four days conduct money. Each company was divided into equal divisions of "shot" and pike, but the "shot" was by now traditionally sub-divided into those armed with calivers and muskets. (2) Two captains were appointed for their conduct into the Low Countries: Edward Scott of the family of Scott's Hall, prominent in military and public affairs in the eastern half of the county, (3) and Peregrine Wingfield, who had previously accompanied his father, Sir John Wingfield on Essex's Cadiz venture in 1596. Peregrine Wingfield was specially recommended by the Earl of Essex for this task. (4)

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1. AFC., xxix, 601; the privy council to Lord Cobham, 25th Feb. 1598
 2. PRO.E.101/65/27, the two indentures made the 8th and 9th Jan. 1598/99. Indentures at this period were no longer of the type which were formerly contracts to certain captains to raise recruits, but simply receipts to the county authority from those appointed to lead the men to the port of embarkation and sent up later to the council as proof of the execution of their orders.
 3. KCA/U/1115/06, the official correspondence of Sir Thomas Scott as deputy lieutenant in east Kent; much of it concerns the overseas military affairs of his sons, John and Edward Scott.
 4. SRO.D.593/S/4/66/5 (iv), the Earl of Essex commending Peregrine Wingfield as captain. Sir Edward and Sir Richard Wingfield were cousins and both were eminent captains in Ireland. Sir Richard was created Lord Viscount Powerscourt (o.s.p., 1634), Sir Edward succeeded to his Irish estates. Cal. Carew Mss., iv, 200, 233, 244, 400, 437.

These men who went out from Kent, as from elsewhere, to the Low Countries that winter of 1599 replaced 2,000 supposedly experienced troops from the garrisons of Sir Francis Vere in the Netherlands. Sir Henry Docwra was given the charge of leading the veterans to Ireland to reinforce the great army of the Earl of Essex.⁽¹⁾

At the same time that the shire of Kent was indirectly assisting "the service of Ireland" by releasing veterans, the officers of the lieutenancy were also busily engaged in implementing the privy council's order that they should also furnish 25 horse to be sent directly to Essex in Ireland under the leadership of Captain John Brooke.⁽²⁾ Once again Sir John Leveson acted as co-ordinating deputy for this service and took the responsibility of the lord lieutenant in seeing that the horses, riders, their arms and armour were well provided.⁽³⁾ However, internal squabbles broke out over his assessments on the five lathes to fund the undertaking. Those of Sutton-at-Hone argued that the charges "were more than our arranged proportions in former tymes", and that they had "not gathered that whole some of 83 li, iiis. because many doe refuse to pay their taxes". Sampson Lennard and Thomas Scott then wanted direction: "what course we shall take with them that thus refuse".⁽⁴⁾ This was one of many indications that the county was war-weary from the demands of men, money and arms.⁽⁵⁾

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1. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 41, 42, Docwra to Essex, 25th Jan. 1599.
 2. SRO.D.593/S/4/48/3 and S/4/66/2, two bundles which deal with this Kentish levy of horse; the latter found later at Dubrobin Castle were so clearly part of the Leveson collection that they were then catalogued with the full collection SRO.D.593/S/4.
 3. SRO.D.593/S/4/66/2 - Sir John Leveson's arrangements for the levy.
 4. SRO.D.593/S/4/66/5, the justices of Sutton-at-Hone to Sir John Leveson, 4th Jan. 1599.
 5. And during August 1599 the county's trained bands assembled at Sandwich to meet a Spanish invasion that did not materialize, but the preparations for which cost the shire £1,000 - B.L.Add.Ms^g., 34, 128, f.87v.

Leveson and his fellow justices of the peace, who were familiar with the subsidy books of the county decided upon a tax of 2s.2d. in the pound on the value of lands held by a landowner in his parish of residence. They calculated that each division should contribute £150 to the total of £750 - 25 horses and riders, each costing £30.⁽¹⁾

However, the extant receipts of monies collected from the five lathes tell a different story. St. Augustine's and Scray contributed £76. 2. 9d.; Aylesford, £80. 2. 8d.; Shepway, £72. 0. 0d.; and Sir John Leveson's own lathe of Sutton-at-Hone, £83. 3. 0d. These totals, here summarized from the receipts, came to less than half the sum required to finance the service.⁽²⁾

But no slackness was imputed to Sir John Leveson; his zeal, on the contrary, caused complaints from his fellow justices and landowners.⁽³⁾ If we look, for instance, at the total assessment of £1,425 in lands for the lathe of Aylesford, then at the suggested rate of 2s. 2d. in the pound, about £158 should have been collected there rather than the sum of £80. 2. 8d. The under-achievement of the collection to meet the military expenses may have been caused by many landowners dwelling elsewhere as absentees and by others under-assessing themselves in the subsidy; both tendencies helped the landowners avoid the full burdens of military taxation.⁽⁴⁾

The details of how the deficit was made good in this instance in Kent are not clear; perhaps, as happened on other

1. SRO.D.593/S/4/66/2.

2. Ibid.

3. Lambeth Ms., 1392, ff.75-79

4. For a general treatment of the problems of military rates and legislation on the militia see A.Hassell Smith, "Militia Rates and Militia Statutes 1558-1663" in The English Commonwealth 1547-1640, (Leicester U.P., 1979), pp. 93 - 110.

occasions, the arms store in the county was drawn upon as a supplement, though this course of action was as much officially discouraged as was the practice of taking out men from the trained bands for overseas service.

1600

In January and February the county of Kent was called upon to levy and arm one hundred infantry and to have them sent to Chester.⁽¹⁾ The normal channels in a line of communication from privy council to the constables in the shire went into action under the direction of the lord lieutenant's principal deputy, Sir John Leveson. His notes, lists, accounts, receipts and miscellaneous correspondence for this particular levy bespeak efficient and effectual military organization.⁽²⁾

The indenture drawn up by Henry Hart, the conducting captain, shows that in fact 90 men were drafted thereby allowing for ten per cent dead pays. The geographical spread of the places within Kent from which they were recruited shows that rarely were two or more taken from the same village, town or parish. The highest incidence of soldiers then recruited from any one place is three from each of the following: Gravesend, Canterbury, Dartford, Edenbridge and Benenden.⁽³⁾

Under Sir John Leveson's direction the deputy lieutenants drew up a schedule indicating how the levy was to be armed; 40 of them were to carry calivers, 12 to have "bastard muskets", 12 to carry muskets of the heavier variety requiring rests, 20 to have the

1. SRO.D.593/S/4/68/1 (i), the privy council to Lord Cobham.

2. Ibid., 68/1, 2, 3, 4.

3. Ibid., 68/2, Henry Hart's indenture, 15th Feb. 1600

full equipment of the pikeman, and 6 were to be halberdiers. Firearms accounted for the greater proportion of weapons in this levy as in most levies in the 1590s elsewhere. To provide arms and the customary armour associated with each soldier's characteristic weapon - pikemen were always "furnished with corslets" for example - the shire had to collect sums of money amounting to £379.8.4d.⁽¹⁾

This sum was to be collected across the lathal divisions of the shire in the following proportions:

Table 2.

<u>Military taxation to equip Henry Hart's Company</u>				
<u>February, 1600</u>				
		£.	s.	d.
Upper division of Sutton-at-Hone	46.	3.	3.
Lower division " " " "	29.	17.	9.
North division of Aylesford	37.	18.	10.
East division " "	18.	19.	5.
South division " "	18.	19.	5.
Four hundreds of Scray	37.	18.	10.
Seven hundreds " "	37.	18.	10.
The lathe of Shepway	75.	17.	9.
The lathe of St. Augustine's	75.	17.	9.
Total:		<u>£379. 12. 0. (2)</u>		

Each lathe was to provide £75. 17. 9d. with the exception of Sutton-at-Hone, which was Sir John Leveson's division and was to provide £76. 1. 0d; the extra 3s. 3d. was ear-marked for his clerk's fees; but the surplus of 3s. 8d. in the sums to be

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1. SRO.D.593/S/4/68/3 (i) - Leveson's accounts, Feb. 1600.
 2. Ibid., 68/3 (iii, iv).

collected over the cost of the arms is more than likely an arithmetical error on the part of Sir John Leveson's clerk.

The items of clothing provided for each soldier are given in Sir John Leveson's clothing accounts, and followed a list drawn up by the privy council, which had given much thought to the winter clothing of the troops in Ireland.⁽¹⁾ The lord lieutenant, Lord Henry Cobham, forwarded the list to Leveson. It is of interest in that the privy council had clearly been persuaded by commanders in Ireland to make use of Irish mantles and brogues, the issue of which the council had formerly forbidden.⁽²⁾ The details of the winter apparel of a levied soldier, which follow, have also been found for other Irish levies, for example from Derbyshire and Lancashire, which in turn suggests a standardization in the soldier's clothing by 1600.

The apparell appoynted for everie souldier

A canvas doublet

A payre of venetians of broadcloath

Two shirts and two bands

One payre of shoes and two payres of brogues

A payre of kersey stockings or two payres of Irish frieze

A cassock verie longe of broadcloath or an Irish mantle.

Henry Hart was the captain or conductor who took the men to Chester. His receipts for conduct money came to £53. 6. 8d. He left Dartford with his company on 11th February 1600 but did not arrive at Chester until March 1st; a fortnight was the usual time allowed to conduct levies from London to Chester, and at twelve miles march daily, Hart's men were just outside the time span allowed. For his own "entertainment in conducting the said men" Henry Hart was allowed £4. 16s.⁽³⁾ The Kentish levy brought with

1. SRO.D.593/S/4/68/5.

2. Cal. Carew Mss., iii, 334, and for discussion of the question Cal. SP. Ireland (1596-1597), 381, 383, 413.

3. SRO.D.593/S/4/68/2, the covering letter to Hart's indenture.

it six targets, purchased in Kent at the rate of 30s. 0d. each,⁽¹⁾
and delivered by Hart to Sir Henry Docwra in Chester.⁽²⁾

Like so many other levies sent to end the war in Ireland this one was destined for Lough Foyle in Ulster where garrisons were part of the strategy of Lord Mountjoy to ring the province with forts. Sir Henry Docwra, commander at Lough Foyle, needed almost continual re/inforcement. Further levies were raised from the realm in June 1600 for that re/inforcement.

The queen was troubled with the burden laid on the nation at large because of the Irish war, and wrote that this bothered her more than "our infinite expenses there"; nevertheless, because Lord Mountjoy had made a good beginning that summer, "the issue must be good, if the army there be re/inforced for a few months" for O'Neill (called a monster of traitorous ingratitude) "threatens the very safety and peace of England".⁽³⁾ Accordingly, in June 1600 another levy was ordered.

After the preamble of the queen's letter to the shires aiming to set out the reasons for the demands that inevitably followed from the privy council, the call went out to twenty-seven shires to draft the first levy of 2,000; of that number the county of Kent was asked to recruit fifty infantrymen.⁽⁴⁾ Chester again was the port for the whole levy; they were to be there by 25th July 1600, that is to say within a month of the original orders to the shires.

This urgency of this levy is much reflected in the expeditious way in which the county authorities in Kent recruited men, and had them

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1. SRO.D.593/S/4/68/3 (i, ii, iv).
 2. Ibid., 68/3, vii, Sir Henry Docwra's acquittance for the targets.
 3. PRO.SP.12/275/10, June 20th 1600
 3. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/1, (i), the privy council to Henry Lord Cobham.

sent under the conduct of Captain Edward Trevor to Chester. The entire exercise proved efficient due largely to the work of the conducting captain. The Leveson papers are particularly informative on the levy.⁽¹⁾

In the first place there was no delay in having the orders sent to the responsible deputy lieutenants, Sir John Leveson, Sir Thomas Walsingham and Sir Peter Manwood.⁽²⁾ The queen had informed the privy council on 25th June 1600,⁽³⁾ the privy council wrote to Henry Lord Cobham on 26th June, and he had copies made and sent with his covering letter at five o'clock in the morning of 27th June.⁽⁴⁾ Sir Richard Trevor and Sir John Trevor had already sent their letters strongly recommending Captain Edward Trevor to conduct the fifty from Kent together with the fifty from Sussex to Chester.⁽⁵⁾ He was chosen and the manner in which he carried out his duties justified his relatives' recommendations. He arrived with his contingent four days earlier than required, and, what is more remarkable, with all fifty from Kent. Although one, Gascome from Maidstone, did run away Trevor got another man in his stead and apparently furnished him at his own expense.⁽⁶⁾ Lord Henry Cobham received a letter of special commendation on behalf of

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1. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/1 (i - ix); 69/2, the indenture and 69/3 (i - vi), accounts.
 2. Sir Thomas Walsingham of Scadbury, nr. Chislehurst, d. 1630, Manwood of Hackington nr. Canterbury, responsible for East Kent, d. 1625.
 3. SRO.D.593/S/4/66/4, from the queen to Henry Lord Cobham with the royal signature, 25th June 1600; and D.593/S/4/69/1 (i) is a copy of this letter.
 4. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/1 (ii); Leveson received his on 28th June at Dartford by eight o'clock in the morning.
 5. Sir Richard Trevor, knighted by Russell, the lord deputy in Ireland 1597 - Cal. Carew Mss., iii, 259; deputy lieutenant in Denbighshire and unsuccessful rival to John Salusbury in the parliamentary election of 1601. For Captain, later Sir John Trevor, see "Corruption and Sir John Trevor", Howell A. Lloyd, Trans. Hon. Soc. of Cymmrodorion (1975), 77-90. J.E. Neale, The Elizabethan House of Commons (1949), 113-121
 6. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/1 (iii), Sir John Trevor to Sir John Leveson on behalf of Captain Edward Trevor, 4 July 1600.

the queen for "The extraordinary regard and forward endeavours" of the officers of the lieutenancy - captains, justices and constables.⁽¹⁾ Such is the barest outline of the welter of evidence for this particular levy from Kent; it is now necessary to take a closer look at its organization.

From the government's angle the two most important aspects of any such piece of military service lay in the choice of reliable and fit fighting men, and the selection of an honest and competent captain to lead them. In this instance, since only one ran away and since Edward Trevor's work was lauded from all sides, the levy appears to have been carried out in an orderly and satisfactory manner.

In a final letter of 24th August 1600 concerning Edward Trevor's services, Sir John Trevor, a commissioner for musters at Chester, pointed out to Leveson that his relative did not have an easy journey with his men to Chester. He wrote:-

... he had moch to doe to keepe them together and from runninge away yet he broughte them all thither savinge one Gascome of Maydstone who escaped hym and whom you I hope will see punished if he bee founde in those partes. Nevertheless he saved your creditt with the Lords and his owne with you, he got another man in his steed whome he furnished at his owne chardge.

He commented that Edward's service was all the more commendable in that other captains conducting troops to Chester lost twenty of their fifty men, and some "others not many fewer".⁽²⁾ But the financial dealings of the deputies and justices of the peace suggest that they were not above the frauds practised by some captains in both England and Ireland.

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1. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/1 (vii) - privy council to Lord Cobham, 21 Aug. 1600.
 2. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/1 (viii), Sir John Trevor to Sir John Leveson, 24 Aug. 1600.

From the details of Edward Trevor's indenture the fifty soldiers were taken from all over the shire and, as in Henry Hart's previous indenture, it can be seen that not more than three came from any town, village or parish. Two parts of the indenture survive; one with Trevor's signature, the other signed by Sir John Leveson and Sir Thomas Walsingham.⁽¹⁾ The proportion of firearms to pikes was the same as Henry Hart's company, and because Trevor's numbers were half those of Hart, he had 20 with calivers, six with heavy muskets, six with light muskets, twelve pikemen and six billmen armed like the pikemen. Apart from the calivers all carried "close hilted swordes and daggers."⁽²⁾

In earlier levies there had been in Kent "verie ill choice" of swords and daggers, so apart from his specific weapon of pike, musket, bill or caliver, each infantryman was given a sword of "good Turkie blade and of good close hilts", hence the emphasis here on this item of arms. To the chagrin of those in Kent who had formerly supplied the army coats, the order went without argument to the London merchants, Babington and Bromley; but on this occasion the queen's allowance to the county for coat money was eight shillings per coat, so that in fact the county had to find less than half the actual cost, since in the 1590s the army coat cost about 15s. 0d. All the financial papers, even petty accounts from the hundreds, make the point that they did not include any allowance for conduct money "because this county is not charged with arnie."⁽³⁾ These concessions in coat and conduct money to the shire of Kent on this occasion were an inducement to have the service efficiently administered.

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1. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/2, the indenture of Edward Trevor.
 2. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/3 (i), the distribution of arms in the levy.
 3. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/3 (iii - vi) accounts of money received by J. Leveson.

Sir John Leveson drew up the rates for buying the arms; at first his schedule was intended for west Kent but he persuaded Sir Peter Manwood to adopt the same rates for east Kent⁽¹⁾ where Manwood was the prominently active deputy. The schedule indicated the following prices:-

30s. 0d. for each pikeman fully furnished with
armour.

30s. 0d. for each billman or halberdier.

30s. 0d. for each musketeer fully furnished.

24s. 0d. for each bastard musketeer fully
furnished.

20s. 0d. for each caliver.

(2)

These charges for buying arms were higher than the county had formerly experienced and Sir John Leveson thought fit to explain the increases by noting that halberds or bills cost 6s. 8d. each and that the "close hilted swordes and daggers cost iiijd the peece above the rate they have been accustomed". He also calculated that to hire carts to carry the arms to Chester would cost 6s. 8d. a day for 30 days "to goe and com" but he hoped that the hire of carts would not be charged to the county.⁽³⁾ This was^{so} much hot air because Captain Edward Trevor had promised to buy the arms at Chester and at the rates agreed to "save the poore men to carrie their armes for as farr as the port at a great chardge to the countrey".⁽⁴⁾ Edward Trevor may not have been totally altruistic about saving the energies of his men or the county of Kent, additional charges for he was aware that his influential uncle, Sir Richard Trevor, was then one of the commisioners of musters appointed to view the men and arms when they arrived in Chester.⁽⁵⁾ By arming

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1. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/3 (i) "The charge of the arms bought in west Kent".
 2. Ibid., 69/3 (vii) Sir Peter Manwood - his account.
 2. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/3 (i)
 3. Note to Sir Peter Manwood "at these rates he (Trevor) will free us of hiring a carte" and hoped he would make speedy agreement on the rates so that he can "continue with him (Trevor) for us all". Attached to the schedule No. 4 above.
 4. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/1 (iii) - as reported by Sir John Trevor to Leveson.
 5. APC., xxxi, 418; SRO.D.593/S/4/69/1 (i)

his levy at Chester there was less chance of defects at the muster, and a fully armed company would redound to the credit of the conducting captain.

The financial accounts for this levy appear to have been hastily compiled or to have survived in rough drafts; they are complicated in that East and West Kent accounted separately, Leveson for the west and Manwood for the east. However they show the total cost of the levy was £191. 4. 0d. arrived at from the expenditure of £63. 4. 0. on arms, £100 on coats, conduct money at 8d. a day for fifteen days, £25 and an allowance of 4. 0d. a day to Edward Trevor for his own conduct and entertainment. But in the accounts cast up for Trevor a total of £156. 4. 0. is shown arrived at in the following manner: £131. 0. 0. for coat and conduct money, less £38 on account of the government's allowances leaving him £93 for coat and conduct but to which was added £63. 4. 0. for the arms to be purchased at Chester. This last item is not specifically stated but assumed from the total of £156. 4. 0. There appears to be no record that Trevor disbursed £63. 4. 0. at Chester for arms or that he did not.⁽¹⁾

It would appear that there was some knavery on the part of the Kent authorities, and it should most likely be laid at Sir John Leveson's door. Two indications support this, hard though it may be to believe that he was so transparent in a fraud. The fact that the soldiers' clothing allowance was subsidised by the government's 8s. 0d. each for the coats is not made abundantly clear in his accounts, and in Sir Peter Manwood's accounts for the 8s. 0d. is written as 4s. 0d.⁽²⁾ Furthermore conduct money at 8d a day for

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1. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/3 (iii, iv) Sir John Leveson's accounts.
 2. Ibid., 69/3/ (v), Sir Peter Manwood's accounts.

fifteen days also appears in Leveson's accounts whereas the county was let off this expense in the privy council's directives.⁽¹⁾

It cannot be fully proved that both deputies collected taxes from the county to raise money towards which the government had already provided an allowance, but the suspicion remains.

In sharing the cost between east and west Kent there was a difference of opinion between Leveson and Manwood over the latter's claim that he had extra expense in hiring a barge "to carry the soldiers from Gravesend to Blackwall".⁽²⁾ However, in his final set of accounts Sir John Leveson spread the 15s. 0d. in question across the five lathes so that each paid an extra 3s. 0d. to cover the hire of the barge. Sir Peter Manwood remained dissatisfied for he did not agree that Sir John Leveson paid one half for the west part of Kent.⁽³⁾ Rightly he showed that he paid for arms £35. 9. 5d., which was more than half the total for arms at £63. 4. 0d. Perhaps this difference of opinion was another manifestation of the traditional rivalry between the "two Kents" - east and west; and when Kentish men spoke of "the west" they were understood to mean west Kent.⁽⁴⁾

On the more serious note of possible frauds on the part of the deputy lieutenants we would not expect to find evidence in their own accounts; such an allegation cannot be proved from them. The usual beneficiaries of fraud in coat money were either the suppliers who sold short, and there were many complaints from the Irish council on this, or the captains, who by the end of the reign

1. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/3 (ii)

2. Ibid., 69/3 (vi), Manwood to Leveson. Manwood was M.P. for Sandwich in 1589, 1592, 1597, 1601, for Kent in 1614, and for New Romney in 1620, D.N.B., s.v. Manwood, Peter.

3. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/3 (ii), as noted by Sir John Leveson.

4. A.Everitt, "Kent and its Gentry, 1640-1660", Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1957, p.5.

were outbidding the clothiers in defrauding the Crown and thereby depriving their own men.⁽¹⁾ However, a legal case was brought forward in Kent in 1618 which throws some unfavourable light on the actions of the deputy lieutenants. An enquiry⁽²⁾ then was opened up by Sir Robert Brett, Sir James Semple, and Thomas Hetley into charges that the deputies in Kent had fraudently converted to their own use coat and conduct money paid out by the crown amounting to nearly £1,000 between the years 1592-1602. The named deputies were; Sir John Leveson, Sir Thomas Scott, Sir Thomas Sondes and Sir Thomas Wilford, who by then were all deceased. Their heirs and executors fought the case.⁽³⁾ The instigators of the enquiry were granted letters patent by King James to benefit from all such sums that had been wrongfully converted. The heirs petitioned the privy council showing that the patentees were ignorant of the past services of the deceased and since they expected to profit from the enquiry they were "partiall judges and unfitt to censure the proofs and accountes". Had they not also damaged the good reputation of these men and their heirs? Eventually the privy council intervened and stopped the suit. The case was unusual as such frauds, common among captains, conductors of troops and merchants, were rare among deputy lieutenants who often had more than a local importance.⁽⁴⁾

If Sir John Leveson was guilty at this time then the remark of Captain Edward Trevor that he desired to conduct these men

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1. C.G.Cruickshank, op.cit., pp.91-101
 2. SRO.D.593/S/4/63/1 - a group of twelve documents dealing with the charges and counter charges made in 1618/19. There is further evidence of allegations of fraud in coat and conduct money in Kent in the Scott Papers - KCA, 06/42.
 3. SRO.D.593/S/4/63/1.
 4. Sir John Leveson, d. 1615; Sir Thomas Scott, d. 1594; Sir Thomas Sondes, d. 1593 and Sir Thomas Wilford, d. 1610. There are brief biographies of these in my M.Phil. thesis (1971), Appendix III, pp.242-246.

"not owte of anie gayne to be made by the exchange of men or by abusinge the allowances", must have rang ironically in Leveson's ears.⁽¹⁾ The fact that the statement was made at all by a conductor of troops may indicate how common such abuses had become.

The private ambitions, differences of opinion between the deputies in Kent, and indeed their possible frauds, may all have been momentarily forgotten in the glow of a private letter of thanks and commendation to them from the privy councillors on behalf of the queen addressed on 21 August 1600 to Lord Cobham and his deputies. Cobham's clerk, probably at his direction, underlined the more unctuous phrases, and had the letter circulated to his deputies.⁽²⁾

Captain Edward Trevor crossed with the levies to Ireland in August 1600 and saw action with Lord Mountjoy at the Moyry Pass - hills and woods between Dundalk and Newry - in the campaign of 25th September to 10th October.⁽³⁾ One dispatch mentions "Captain Trevor shot",⁽⁴⁾ clearly not mortally, for he was again mentioned in the army lists of January 1603 as captain of a company of 100 foot in an un-named garrison in Ulster.⁽⁵⁾

During the summer months of 1600 the government was determined to give as much help as possible to Lord Mountjoy in Ireland.

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1. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/1 (iii), reported by Sir John Trevor to Sir John Leveson on Edward Trevor's behalf.
 2. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/1 (vii), the privy council to Henry Lord Cobham, 21st Aug. 1600, but the paraphrased letter in the council's register, APC., xxx, 598 is dated 22nd Aug. 1600.
 3. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, II, 336, 342.
 4. Cal. Carew Mss., iv, 498 "The Lord Deputy's Proceedings", Nov. 1600
 5. Ibid., iv, 397, "The list of the army as it stands the 1st January 1602" (O.S.).

Hence apart from the infantry levies there was a call on the gentry - individually named - of every English shire, and selected from those worth £20 a year in land, leases or fees, or at £100 value in goods,⁽¹⁾ each to furnish a lighthorse. The privy council's minute of 29th June to the named knights and gentlemen is specific:

Wee do therefore hereby lett you understand that her Majesty's pleasure is to require of you one light horse well furnished with a curasse, a light horseman's staffe of a good and sufficient length, one pistoll, and especiallie a good sworde, and withall a fitt and able man to serve on the same
(2)

The cavalry levy was to be at Chester by 25th July. The privy council added, somewhat hopefully considering the conditions in Ireland, that the gentry were in effect lending both man and horse for the queen's service "because it is intended at the ende of this action ... both the one and the other (God willing) shalbe returned unto you".⁽³⁾ The government's intentions behind this levy are made clear in Sir Robert Cecil's notes: this is not meant to be an imposition but a tryall of men's affection^s; "make a declaracion of the cause, the use, and the good that is lyke to follow by applying a thorough remedy ... to recover a kingdome so neere loosing"; he even gave thought to which kinds of men should be approached, noting: "the Cornmen are of the best ability", and in the margin, "Mawlt men, Sheep men, and grasiers".⁽⁴⁾

The order was addressed countrywide to 183 named gentry of whom nineteen, the highest number, were Kentish gentry. These nineteen

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1. Hatfield House, Cecil Papers, 24/67 r.
 2. APC., xxx, 434-440
 3. Ibid., 434-435.
 4. Hatfield House, Cecil Papers, 24/26 r. to 67 v., "A Consideration of divers things that do belong to the present execution of that contribution which the necessity of this present tyme doth require". On f.67 v. the clerk refers to the war in Ireland as "the breaking out of civill warr in Irelande in Queen Elizabeth's reign".

were selected from more in the shire who could have met the government's valued assessment of wealth.⁽¹⁾ Four knights head the list; Sir Moyle Finch, Sir Henry Cutts, Sir Michael Sondes and Sir John Roper; all nineteen names appear on a similar list of gentry providing light horse in 1595, or contributing to a levy of cavalry in that year.⁽²⁾ But when a further "tryall of their affections" was again asked of the English gentry at the time of the Spanish landing in Ireland, October 1601 the Kentish gentry appear to have been exempt.

From a litany of the county's military expenditure we can see that this levy cost each one £30, a total of £570.⁽³⁾ At Chester the commissioners for musters viewing these levies found defects in the Kentish contingent, and because of their delay in sailing and troubles made by their conductor, Captain Lisle, "stirring the Kentish men to stand upon terms not much different from mutiny", embarkation for Ulster did not take place until 19th August 1600.⁽⁴⁾

1601

After the levies of the summer of 1600 no other levies were called for until April 1601, and then only for the three light/horse, or petronels, so called from their characteristically

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1. Such as Sir John Leveson, Sir John Scott, Sir Thomas Walsingham of Scadbury, Sir Alexander Culpepper and Sir Thomas Waller. The nineteen names were: the four knights and Peter Manwood, Thomas Kempe, Samson Leonard, William Sidley, Martin Bareham, John Smith, James Cromer, Thomas Scott, Thomas Potter, John Hales, Norton Knatchbull, George Bing, Anthony Sucher, John Tufton and Richard Smith.
 2. SRO.D.593/S/4/38/2, "Names of those appointed to finde launces, 1595".
 3. B.L. Add. Mss., 34, 128, f.87 under "Anno 1600. A levy of 19 horse taken owte of the Countie by letters from their Honours to severall gents. at 30 li. each horse with his Rider and Furniture".
 4. HMC., Salisbury, xiv, 136

dominant weapon, the long pistol. This was to be Kent's contribution to a national levy of 1,000 foot and 40 horse, which was intended for Sir Henry Docwra's garrison at Lough Foyle,⁽¹⁾ The queen's letter to Henry Lord Cobham pointed out that in Ireland there had been of late "so many successes in all our prosecutions of those rebels ... [that] there must needs follow a speedie conclusion of that unnatural rebellion". Reluctant to put the people to greater charges "than by necessitie we are forced to do", the queen asked for a levy of three horse, and advised the lord lieutenant "to lay the charges upon the better sorte", and "to make choice of good men", since defective levies only caused a renewal of the charges to both crown and county.⁽²⁾

Precise instructions followed from the privy council;⁽³⁾ Lord Cobham had copies made of both letters, and added his own letter to stress pertinent phrases of the queen's and council's letters for the benefit of his deputies. In a postscript he asked for a list of names of "suche persons as you shall thincke meete to lay this charge upon". The request may indicate that Henry Lord Cobham was not as conversant with "the men of substance" in his lieutenancy as his father, William Lord Cobham, had been.⁽⁴⁾

Service conditions in Ireland, and in the Lough Foyle garrisons in particular, had a bad reputation. Perhaps to counter this these official letters took pains to point out that the garrisons planted "where the Archetraylor most usurpeth" were thoroughly accommodated with good lodgings, victuals, and had everything

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1. APC., xxxi, 311-313, the total list is there given which adds up to 38, not 40.
 2. SRO.D.593/S/4/54/3 (i) - the original of the queen's letter to Cobham, there is a copy of this in S/4/69/4 made by Cobham's clerk, 28th April 1601.
 3. SRO.D.593/S/4/54/3 (i₁).
 4. SRO.D.593/S/4/54/3 (iv) Cobham's letter to his deputies, 30th April 1601.

necessary for the subsistence of the army.⁽¹⁾ The privy council echoed the queen's sentiments to the lords lieutenants of the shires:

... in regard of her Majesty's deere of affection to all that are exposed to perill for her and their country, she hath not spared for any chardge how great soever the same hath ben to her coffers ...
(2)

Much stress was placed on the quality of rider; they were to be well exercised horsemen, and therefore special choice should be made of northern men "because they are best skilled both to serve on horsebacke and do also knowe best how to use their horses well".⁽³⁾ The remark must have caused some ill feeling in Kent, Essex, Hampshire, and Suffolk which also contributed to this levy of cavalry. The horsemen were to be armed in the following manner:-

... with curattes, murryons, horsemen's staves and long pistolls, Turkey swordes with baskett hiltes and horsemen's coates ... (4)

All were to be ready for embarkation at Chester by 20th May 1601, where ships had already been provided by the mayor for their transport to Lough Foyle.⁽⁵⁾

From Sir John Leveson's papers we can see how these directives were carried out in the county. At the inspection of the three horses in the county, one of them was returned as "insufficient", but was speedily replaced.⁽⁶⁾ The justices of the peace shared the cost of the entire operation at a total of £66. 13. 4d. which was

1. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/4 (i), Cobham's copy of the queen's letter.
2. AFC., xxxi, 312
3. SRO.D.593/S/4/54/3 (i), the same remark in the queen's letter.
4. SRO.D.593/S/4/54/3 (ii), the privy council's letter, Cobham's "vera copia."
5. AFC., xxxi, 312
6. SRO.D.593/S/4/54/3 (iv) from a summary of the financial accounts which shows that the replacement horse cost an extra 2s. "for the bringinge of hym at the bolt".

cheap when it is recalled that Sir John Leveson had sent out a horse to Ireland in 1595 at a cost of £31. 8..0d.,⁽¹⁾ but of course Sir John Leveson may have inflated his account in 1595. In this levy of three light horse, the accounts on the other hand show the three horses themselves, cost £30. Other items of expenditure included:

three saddles of buffe with bit and stirrups - £3. 0. 11d.; three longe french pistolls - £3. 4. 0d.; three coates of Kentish broadcloathe lyned throwe with white stays and trycord with white lace and with white buttons - £6. 7. 0d.; three sutes of apparell, three hattes, three pair of boots, three swordes, and three hangers - £10. 0. 0d. (2)

The carriage of their arms to Chester cost 10s. 3d. Each rider was given conduct money of 4s. 0d. a day for ten days to feed himself and his horse. The records are silent on the names of the riders, their transport from Chester, or their arrival at Lough Foyle in Ulster, their intended destination.⁽³⁾

Before the year 1601 was out the Spanish landing at Kinsale on 21st September 1601 drove the government to demand more men, horses, money and arms for Ireland; Kent did not escape. At first, on 6th October, 100 infantry were demanded, but this was almost immediately increased to 200 on 7th October.⁽⁴⁾ They were to be assembled at Rochester and there join the national levy of 2,000 for shipping to Munster. Both exercises impinged on the resources of the county as Sir John Leveson became responsible for the levy within the county and for the arrangements at Rochester.⁽⁵⁾

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1. SRO.D.593/S/4/37/3.
 2. SRO.D.593/S/4/54/3 (iv), Sir John Leveson's accounts, which also tally with the amount given in B.L.Add. Mss. 34,128, f.87 of £66. 13. 4d. for the levy to Lough Foyle.
 3. Like the other 36 horse at Chester these were intended to fill up "decayed" horsebands. The normal cavalry band was 50 strong at this time.
 4. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/6 (i) and (ii), 6 and 7 October 1601.
 5. For the assembly and billeting of this army for Ireland at Rochester see below under Part 2 - Ports, Chapter Nine.

From Sir John Leveson's lists and correspondence with the other deputy lieutenants it is plain that the levy of 200 was to be equally recruited from east and west Kent. In West Kent the lathe of Aylesford was to recruit 40 men; Sutton-at-Hone likewise was to provide 40; and the four hundreds of the lathe of Scray in West Kent, Milton, Tenham, Boughton and Faversham were to provide five men each. From East Kent the lathes of St. Augustine and Shepway were ordered to recruit 40 men each, while the seven hundreds of Scray that lay within East Kent were to provide 20 men. In other words the overall distribution of recruitment was simply that of 40 men from each of the five lathes of Kent. ⁽¹⁾

Nevertheless the proportion of pikes ~~of~~ ^{or} "corselets" to firearms ~~or~~ "shot" differed among the recruits of East and West Kent; the western recruits consisted of 22 corselets, 18 calivers, 40 muskets and 20 bills while those from the eastern half of the shire had 24 corselets, 40 calivers, 24 muskets and 12 bills. Firearms, such as muskets and calivers, being the more expensive to supply, the total cost for East Kent came to £109. 12. Od., while the cost for the western part of the shire was £98. 0. Od.; a total for the shire as a whole of £207. 12. Od., an average of little over £1 for each soldier's arms. ⁽²⁾

Sir John Leveson did not have enough arms in the county to equip the Kentish levy as is clear from his dealings with Edmund Nicholson, the London arms supplier, who had won the government's contract to fit out the entire levy of 2,000 men. ⁽³⁾ Leveson bought 180 swords of Turkish blades with basket type hilts at

1. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/7 and 8; S/4/54/2.

2. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/7, the account for West Kent; *ibid.*, S/4/54/2 the account for East Kent, October 1601.

3. APC., xxxi, 472-473.

9s. 8d. each from Nicholson, and for other items of arms and armour he paid out a total of £103. 12. 10d.⁽¹⁾ The 200 suits of apparel cost £400, towards which the crown paid a 4s. 0d allowance for the coats. Conduct money of 8d. a day was provided for each soldier's march to Rochester, the overall cost coming to £53. 6. 8. The port was, of course, a local one and recruits from Shepway and St. Augustine's lathes were given only a day to get to Rochester.⁽²⁾ The conductors of this levy to Rochester were Captains Blundell and Dodington and the Kentish levy of 200 (with 100 from Sussex) boarded the Warspite and set sail for Munster on 27th October 1601.⁽³⁾

Sir John Leveson's financial accounts for the levy to Rochester appear to balance despite eccentric arithmetic, lack of double-entry book-keeping, and the inconsistent use of arabic and roman numerals. Such features serve to remind us of the essential amateurism in the execution of the many tasks of the Elizabethan justice and deputy lieutenant. What is not clear is how the money was collected in the shire. A total of £620 had to be raised in the county to equip and send the levy.⁽⁴⁾ In the normal method of financing a local levy the justices worked out a rate of tax depending on abilities to pay and the severity of the demand for troops. In Kent, as elsewhere, the justices used the information of the subsidy books, usually in their possession in the county, to decide who should pay and what amounts. In July 1594, for example, the Kentish justices agreed on a rate of 3d. in the £. on lands and 2d. in the £. on goods on all those listed in the subsidy books to raise sufficient

1. SRO.D.593/S/4/54/2; other items included musket rests 6d. each, bags for carrying bullets, 4d. each, and like prices for bandoliers and scabbards. Copies of draft accounts also in SRO.D.593/S/4/69/7 and 8.

2. SRO.S.593/S/4/69/8 (i-iv)

3. HMC., Salisbury, xi, 449 and see Chapter Nine below.

4. B.L.Add. Ms., 34, 128, f.88 r.

money to have 250 soldiers sent to Brittany, the exact sum is unknown.⁽¹⁾ Likewise in May 1596 the subsidy books were again used to raise £89. 3. 1d in military taxes by charging all in the books 8d. in the £ on their lands and 5d. in the £, on their goods.⁽²⁾ At times the Crown assumed part of the financial responsibility for sending out troops as we have seen in the accounts of the levies so far.

In the instance of the 1601 levy of 200 men to Rochester the Crown's financial contribution of £53. 6. 8d. represented only about 9 per cent of the total of £620. Leveson's accounts do not say how the balance was raised in the county, but it is clear from two separate lists of identical names from the hundred of Eyhorne in the east division of the lathe of Aylesford, one a list of subsidy assessments, the other a list of payments made that the information provided by the subsidy books was again used at this time to calculate a military tax.⁽³⁾

One indication that the tax was not considered equitable came from the lathe of Scray where the inhabitants resented bearing an equal share of the expenses of the levy because, as they claimed, many of their lands lay in the less productive hundreds of the Weald of Kent, and they considered themselves poorer than the men of St. Augustine's or of Sutton-at-Hone. Thomas Roberts of Glassenbury, one of their spokesmen, doubted if he could arm his recruits except out of the equipment of the trained bands, which, he asserted, "will breede double mischief".⁽⁴⁾ Michael Sondes, a justice of the peace, also complained about the inequitable distribution of the recruits to be raised, and therefore of the unequal costs the quota would put

1. SRO.D.593/S/4/36/3-5

2. Ibid., S/4/46/6

3. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/7 (i), (ii)

4. SRO.D.593/S/4/54/2 (iii), Roberts to Leveson, 9 October 1601.

on his area in the lathe of Scray.⁽¹⁾

1602

The last Elizabethan levies to leave Kent for Ireland were part of the national effort to wipe out pockets of resistance after the victory at Kinsale. Some in Kent, and elsewhere may have wondered why there was a need for a further call-up of 100 infantrymen in Kent in January 1602, and an additional 50 by June of the same year. The preambles to signet letters, and in privy council directives, spelt out the necessity for these forces, even after so much had been achieved in Ireland. Once again, Leveson's lieutenancy records show how the chain of command went into action. The queen's signet letter, the privy council's directives and the more detailed instructions of the lord lieutenant, Henry Lord Cobham, were all copied out by Leveson's clerk for the benefit of the deputy lieutenants.⁽²⁾ While all of this was normal procedure, there are features of these levies which were not typical of some earlier levies in Kent.

In the first place the queen's letter to Cobham is at great pains to let him know, and through him the entire local administration of the county, that the government was conscious of all the recent demands and was therefore making a generous gesture by freeing the shire:

from the chardge of the armes and apparell
as heretofore wear directed to be payd for
in the former leavys shalbe nowe payd at
our owne chardge... (3)

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1. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/8 (v), Sondes to Leveson dated, "43 Elizabeth".
 2. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/9 (i), the queen's letter, 6th Jan. 1602, bearing the royal signature. S/4/69/9 (ii) is a copy in which key phrases have been underlined, and repeated in other copies.
 3. Ibid., S/4/54/2, a further copy from Leveson's clerk.

The county had simply to raise able-bodied men under a competent conductor to march them to Greenwich by 17th January, thence to sail to Southampton to join the rest of the troops by 26th January. The conductor's wages and the company's conduct money would be reimbursed to the county of Kent from the Exchequer when the certificate was presented.⁽¹⁾

The concession in the costs was doubtless pleasing to the county's authorities, but not in the way the government proposed to give them; they asked that the whole levy be taken from the trained bands of the shire, a course of action the government had always forbidden. Hostility in Kent became very great, and was led by the lord lieutenant.⁽²⁾ Was not such a procedure formerly condemned as unacceptable and reprehensible? Would it not lead directly to the "decay" of the trained bands? Would it not deplete the county's store of arms, armour and all kinds of "war-like furnitures"? Whereas formerly an occasional few trained men were sent in the many drafts of raw recruits, the novelty of this command lay in the fact that the government wanted to send out a complete and fully equipped trained band. The county authorities had never liked the expedient of even sending out a handful of their trained men because the gaps so created in the bands had to be filled with "men of like sufficiency for the service".⁽³⁾ But no matter how strongly put their arguments were the government unequivocally stated its demand;

"And because wee have ben informed of late that the trayned bands are both more sufficientlie provyded and abler of bodyes than these untrained men ... wee doe hereby commaund you to levy this saide number oute of those trayned bandes (4)

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1. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/9 (iii), privy council to Cobham, 7 January 1602
 2. Ibid., S/4/69/9 (iv) Cobham to the deputy lieutenants, Leveson, Scott and Walsingham, 8 January 1602.
 3. Ibid., and cf. APC., xxxi, 318-321
 4. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/9 (i), copy of the queen's letter, 6 January 1602 and another copy in ibid. S/4/54/2

What may have given the government the idea at this time was a full mobilization of the trained bands the previous May. The government's muster master, Thomas Wyatt had reported the military potential of the county and showed that it could well afford to have a hundred trained men taken out for Ireland.⁽¹⁾

Table 3.

Totals from the muster master's rolls of
Kentish trained bands, May 1601.

<u>Division</u>	<u>Trained</u>		<u>Untrained</u>		<u>Total</u>
St. Augustine's	580	528	1,108
Shepway	380	316	696
Scray	380	232	612
Aylesford	756	234	990
Sutton-at-Hone	580	---	580
			Overall total:		<u>3,986</u> (2)

Of nearly 4,000 men in the Kentish militia over half were armed; 678 muskets, 628 calivers and 897 pikes. But the demand to have a hundred of them taken out of the shire for Ireland went against every local loyalty. Henry, Lord Cobham, instructed his deputies on 8 January 1602 to use every possible means to avoid any raiding of the county's trained bands. He did not say why he was countermanding the government's order other than that the trained bands "be spared for divers greater considerations" and he trusted that his deputies would "finde just as able-bodied and as serviceable men throughout the shire" because the total required was not that great.⁽³⁾

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1. SRO.D.593/S/4/54/5 "Lyst of Trained Bands in Kent, May 1601" signed by Thomas Wyatt, muster master, and by Henry, Lord Cobham, lord lieutenant and lord warden of the Cinque Ports.
 2. Ibid., the number of trained ^{men} had increased in Kent since the 1591 certificate which shows a total of 3,223 under 26 captains - cf. SRO.D.593/S/4/58/13
 3. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/9 (iv) Cobham to his deputies, 8 January 1602.

As elsewhere, the reluctance to use trained men for overseas service was evidently deeply entrenched in Kent for the trained militia was the backbone of county defence.

The outcome of this resistance is uncertain but it seems likely that the privy council's original order to have trained militiamen was successfully disobeyed by the county's military administrators. Captain Thomas Stock, again chosen as the conductor of the levy, listed 75 men on his muster roll none of whose names appear on the county's muster roll of trained men in May 1601.⁽¹⁾ It may be that the remaining 25, not listed in Stock's indenture, were taken from the ranks of the trained. In that sense the county of Kent continued previous practice of having a leaven of trained in a draft of untrained conscripts. Stock's indenture, drawn up at Greenwich 19 January, contains 20 names from each of the lathes of Aylesford, St. Augustine's and Sutton-at-Hone, 10 from Shepway and 5 from Scray thus making up the total of 75 men. He was paid £10 conduct money to march his men to Greenwich and from there he put in a request for a further £28. 5s. 4d. to conduct his levy to Southampton to join the rest of the forces going to Ireland.⁽²⁾ But the weight of evidence suggests that his levy was discharged at Greenwich⁽³⁾ but one item in Leveson papers suggests that only 20 were "staid" at Greenwich, this could mean that 20 men were rejected at the muster as unsuitable.⁽⁴⁾ However, there is no indication of the further movement of Stock's men to Southampton.

By early summer 1602 Lord Mountjoy and other commanders in

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1. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/9 (v) "Indenture of Thomas Stock made with the deputies Sir John Leveson, Sir John Scott and Sir Thomas Walsingham 19 January 1602" - cf. the muster roll of May 1601, ibid., S/4/54/5
 2. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/9/v Stock's request enclosed with the indenture.
 3. B.L.Add.Ms., 34, 128, f.88 "a hundrede men at Greenwich ... agayne discharged".
 4. SRO.D.593/S/4/10/9 - reproduced as Table 1 above.

Ireland needed more fresh men; the Spanish had landed munitions in May, while in Ulster Sir Henry Docwra wanted additional forces for Ballyshannon.⁽¹⁾ To meet these needs 2,000 were demanded of the English and Welsh Shires, in what proved to be the last major levy of the reign, John Chamberlain gave a vivid description of how the levy was raised, writing to Dudley Carleton 8 May 1602 he said:

"we are sending 3000 men (sic) tether (to Ireland) which are leveing in the west and north country. Sir Francis Vere's voluntaries come not in so fast but that we are faine to come to a presse of 1,000 men out of the neighbour shires and 2,000 out of this towne which is so disorderly performed by taking, and, as it were, sweeping and carrying them violently to the shipps that it is a generall grevaunce and scandall at home and a great dishonour to be heard of abroad" (2)

Half were intended for the northern Irish garrisons of Carrickfergus and Ballyshannon, and the rest for distribution in other Ulster garrisons or for the lord deputy in the field. Kent was asked to supply fifty infantrymen. Unlike the January orders there was no mention in the queen's signet letter of 28 July 1602 that the government would pay for their arms and apparel, or that the men be taken from the trained bands.⁽³⁾ Henry Lord Cobham as lord lieutenant ordered military taxes to be collected to cover each soldier's expenses which were estimated at £3. 10s., a total cost of £175, pointing out that the county was to pay all the expenses because "the queen had of late a large financial burden in sending out the fleet to the coast of Spain".⁽⁴⁾ The queen's and council's letters emphasised that the men were to have "able and serviceable

1. CSPI., (1601-1603), 274, 302, 380

2. S.Williams (ed.) Chamberlain's letters, Camden Society, lxxix (1861), 130-131

3. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/10/(i), the queen to Cobham, 28 July 1602

4. Ibid., S/4/69/10/(iii), Cobham to Leveson for West Kent; the copy for Sir John Scott of east Kent in Scott family papers, KCA. ULL15/06/31.

bodies", and added defensively:

"only the ill-disposed could imagine that anie cause coulde have moved Us to hazard our people's lyves ... yf wee coulde prevent the perill of that State and Crowne of Irelande by anie other meanes ..." (1)

Cobham's letters to east and west Kent went out to the deputies at midnight 30 July and the men were to be equipped and marched to Bristol by 15 August.⁽²⁾ Captain Thomas Stock was again chosen to conduct the levy which was hurriedly raised. His correspondence indicates that the men assembled at Dartford Heath on 8 August which left only seven days to get to Bristol where 800 other soldiers were to sail for Dublin.⁽³⁾

By treating in detail each levy sent out of Kent to Ireland between the years 1595 and 1602 we may see how government demands regularly impinged on the man-power resources of one shire to meet the main crises in Ireland; namely the outbreak of the rebellion in 1595, the English losses sustained at the Yellow Ford in 1598, Essex's army of 1599, the Spanish landing at Kinsale of 1601 and the final campaigns to defeat O'Neill and O'Donnell in their homelands of Ulster in 1602. In each crisis Kent made a contribution; its largest provision for the Irish war was in October 1601 of 200 for the army of 2,000 which was organised for shipping at Rochester.

The detailed chronological treatment of the local evidence serves to illustrate the mainly uniform system of raising troops for foreign war by means of the officers of the lieutenancy.

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1. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/10/(i) - signet letter to Cobham, 28 July 1602
 2. PRO.SP.12/284/73, instructions to the vice-admiral on shipping this levy - 9 July 1602.
 3. J.MacLean (ed.) Letters from Sir Robert Cecil to Sir George Carew Camden Society, lxxxviii (1864), 126, August 9th 1602 where he tells him "how her Majesty hath directed the other 800 men to Dublin."

Sir John Leveson proved to be the most energetic and efficient of the Kentish deputies. The chief conductors of the troops out of Kent, Henry Hart, Edward Trevor and Thomas Stock, seemed to have been above reproach in their work, but other military administrators, including deputy lieutenants, ^{do} ~~did~~ not always appear to have been entirely honest in their financial management of the levies.

Both halves of the shire shared the burden of recruiting the levies in equal proportions, but not without resentment and complaint from the inhabitants of the lathe of Scray, and resistance to the use of its trained bands for the Irish service; however, the quality of troops raised appears to have been good. There were few deserters from Kent for example in comparison with recruits from North Wales. Captain Lisle who accompanied troops from Chester to Ireland thought well of the Kentish recruits in August 1600, saying that "except he might have Kentish men he would not conduct the supplies".⁽¹⁾

(iii) War Weariness in Kent.

Government demands for men, money and arms for the Irish war in Kent, as elsewhere, helped to bring about disillusionment with the Elizabethan regime. England, one historian commented "generally grew weary of an old woman's government".⁽²⁾ By the beginning of the new century it was becoming increasingly difficult to raise levies as the government sensed and feared a hostile

1. HMC., Salisbury, xiv, 136, Captain Nicholas Dawtry's report to Sir Robert Cecil from Chester, 19th August 1600.

2. G.Goodman, The Court of King James I, (ed. J.S.Brewer, 1839), I, 97.

attitude to its demands. And though the government had reiterated that the rich bear the brunt of military taxes, it seems clear that many of the rich gentry escaped some of these burdens.⁽¹⁾

For instance, in 1597 defaulters "included many of the principal men in the county of Kent".⁽²⁾ Some alleging^{ed} financial embarrassment, others claiming^{ed} incorrect assessments, and some^{said} that the letters for loans had been addressed to the wrong people.

Sir John Leveson wrote in 1601 of the high discontent in the minds of some heavily charged that "it has given us more experience of dislike than since our first acquaintance with the service of the county."⁽³⁾ In 1602 fifty-five persons in Kent were noted for their failure to pay ship money tax, and a similar number for refusals to pay gun/powder tax.⁽⁴⁾

The grumbles of the Kentish gentry about the burden of official duties in levying men and money, billeting soldiers, in supervising the collections of the subsidies and purveyances, and their frequent meetings of quarter and special sessions of the peace are much in evidence in Sir John Leveson's extensive correspondence.⁽⁵⁾ Sir Peter Manwood, justice of the peace and deputy lieutenant, spoke for others in his position when he said "we stand upon slippery ground, subject to all men's censures and open to the displeasure of our friends and enemies."⁽⁶⁾ Military administration was only one burden. All who served as deputies in Kent during the years of war with Ireland were also justices of

1. APC., xxiii, 39; xxiv, 130 for examples.

2. SRO.D.593/S/4/42/4 - a bundle of 53 letters to Leveson seeking abatements.

3. SRO.D.593/S/4/42/3: S/4/54/1 - (1597).

4. SRO.D.593/S/4/55/12, n.d. but in bundles of 1602.

5. For the myriad tasks of the justices of the peace as the magistracy and lieutenancy overlapped in personnel and functions, see Chapter 14 of my M.Phil. thesis - University of London, 1971.

6. G.Scott Thomson (ed.) "The Twysden Lieutenancy Papers, 1583-1668" in Kent Records, x (1926), 93.

the peace, and as such their tasks multiplied in the 1590s.⁽¹⁾

By relying on men such as Leveson, Scott, Walsingham, Manwood, Lambarde and Fludd to carry out the duties of implementing government orders in the shire the Elizabethan regime enjoyed a cheap and reasonably efficient local government but the cost to them was heavy.

Resistance to war taxation led to the privy council's writing to Henry Lord Cobham about evasion, pointing out that it was well known that there were many in Kent, well provided with lands and houses, who managed to avoid all charge for the queen's service so that an unjust burden was placed on those least able to bear it.⁽²⁾ The chief offenders in this respect were "citizens" of London, in other words, those Kentish landowners who had London residences, and who managed to escape assessments on all or some of their property by means of this dual residence.⁽³⁾ Servants of great noblemen, such as those of the Lords Cobham, by reason of their traditional exemption from taxes, also came under government censure "who by pretence of their service free themselves from the burden".⁽⁴⁾ The lord lieutenant was instructed to exempt no one, to rate all lands and houses in due proportion, to take bonds of those refusing, and to have them "answer the same before the council board."⁽⁵⁾

On their part, the county's gentry and ruling class complained of the high price they had to pay for the queen's service. Thomas Scott, the younger, blamed his debts in 1597 on

1. W.Holdsworth, A History of English Law (1903 ed.), i, p.124.

2. AFC., xxix, 601, the privy council to Henry Lord Cobham, 25th February 1598; the full letter is also in SRO.D.593/S/4/66/5 (iv)

3. The Lords Cobham maintained a London house at Blackfriars; Sir John Leveson one at Aldersgate. For Kentish gentry lodging in London see A.M.Everitt, Change in the Provinces: the Seventeenth Century (Leicester, 1969), 9, 17.

4. AFC., xxix, 601

5. Ibid.

his father's zeal for the royal service;⁽¹⁾ Michael Sondes protested to Leveson that if his services "deserve not ordinary favour then I must hereafter more carefully look that my employments in her Majesty's service ... breed me less expenses",⁽²⁾ and Sir Thomas Wilsford, a deputy lieutenant, complained that because of his duties in the county he had lost £500 by not pursuing his legal practice in the Westminster courts.⁽³⁾ Sir John Leveson, the recipient of so many complaints as the main deputy lieutenant in the period, did not complain about heavy financial exactions in the royal service, but he did cavil at times on account of the "continual writing, postings of necessaries and toil".⁽⁴⁾

Refusals to pay local and county taxes were among the more common offences at the Kent quarter sessions in the last years of the reign.⁽⁵⁾ The Leveson papers suggest that rural opposition to royal demands was widespread in the county in 1599.⁽⁶⁾ The military burden was only one financial strain on Kent. By the end of the century the county had difficulty in financing the gaols, the relieving of maimed soldiers, and maintaining poor relief in general. The ordinary citizen in the late 1590s had a multitude of worries; fear of foreign invasion, hatred of spies, tax collectors and government purveyors, the fear that his dwelling would be taken over by a captain to billet his men, or of disorderly conduct from disbanded and frequently unpaid troops or mariners. However, the

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1. SRO.D.593/S/4/42/4, letters and petitions to Leveson to be released from paying loans; some were addressed to William Lord Burghley but evidently forwarded to Leveson asking him to provide further information.
 2. Ibid., S/4/42/4, Sondes to Leveson.
 3. Ibid., Wilsford to Leveson; these three complaints are but a sample.
 4. Cited in G.Scott Thomson (ed.) Twysden Papers, Kent Records, x, (1926), p.91.
 5. KCA., Q/SR/1-5; Q/SM/15, f.8 and also letters from the justices of East Kent to Leveson on the "manie that doe refuse to paie their taxes", SRO.D.593/S/4/66/5 (v), 4th Jan. 1599.
 6. Ibid., S/4/11/9; 42/4

cause of the eleven riots which occurred in Kent between 1585 and 1603 was shortage of food, and not government or local taxation to finance military preparations.⁽¹⁾

It is not easy to isolate the military costs of the Irish war on the county of Kent from its own military commitment to defence or from Kent's continental levies. Nor is it clear from Sir John Leveson's financial accounts to what extent the Crown shouldered part of the financial responsibility for setting forth levies. However the reluctance and refusals to pay military taxes of so many in Kent suggest that the injection of government funds, especially its partial payment of coat money and full payment of conduct money, did little to alleviate the burden of fitting out armed expeditions to Ireland.

The actual sums of money raised within the county for the Irish war show a little of the price Kent had to pay for this war as well as the relentless regularity of the government's demands:

Table 4.

<u>Money raised in Kent to send levies to Ireland.</u> ⁽²⁾	
1595	5 horses and riders at a total cost of £137. 0. 0.
1598	100 foot £350. 0. 0.
"	4 horses and riders £120. 0. 0.
1599	25 horses £750. 0. 0.
1600	100 foot at £3. 10s. the man £350. 0. 0.
"	50 foot " " " " £175. 0. 0.
"	19 horses at £30 each £570. 0. 0.
1601	3 horses £ 66.13. 4.
"	200 foot £620. 0. 0.
1602	100 foot (stayed) yet assembly cost £ 10. 0. 0.
"	50 foot at £3. 10s. the man £175. 0. 0.
<u>Total sum</u> <u>£3,323.13. 4.</u>	

1. Peter Clark, "Popular protest and disturbance in Kent 1558-1640" in Econ. Hist. Rev., 2nd ser., xxix (1976), 368 et. seq.
2. Total sums taken from B.L.Add.Ms., 34, 128, ff.87v-88, and from SRO.D.593/S/4/10/9; S/4/69; S/4/66. Overall, Kent may have paid about £107,000 in direct and indirect taxation in the period of 1589-1604 - P.Clark, op.cit., p.228.

The crown, as is well known, had to raise loans during the 1590s to meet the extraordinary expenses of the war; many of these were raised in privy seals through the administration of the lieutenancy. The Kentish gentry, in a long litany of the county's financial burdens, claimed that they had given the crown nearly £7,000 under this system, and that "... no part as yett repayde, the forbearance whereof is grevous to divers who expected that they tooke upp the same uppon interest".⁽¹⁾ The allegation was exaggerated, for only on one occasion, in 1596/7 in the reign, were such loans not repaid.⁽²⁾

The justices of the peace reckoned that Kent had paid out a total of £10,911. 13. 4d. to meet the expenses of sending out men and arms to the Low Countries, France and Ireland from 1596 to July 1602.⁽³⁾ Ireland, we have seen, accounted for £3,323. 13. 4d., of this a little over one third of the total, or an annual average of £474 over the seven year period of the Irish hostilities.

Therefore, as with the numbers of levied men, Kent does not seem to have been unduly burdened with the cost of the war in Ireland. In the year 1601-1602 for example, one of particularly heavy military demands, Kent contributed £578. 17. 0. to the costs of arming and clothing soldiers.⁽⁴⁾ During the same year Lancashire paid £1,125 to the Exchequer for the same costs, Dorset £650, Glamorganshire £782. 10. 0., Montgomeryshire £140, and Merionethshire £147. 10. 0.⁽⁵⁾ Overall the Irish war cost the Elizabethan

1. B.L.Add.Ms., 34, 128, f.88.

2. See chapter 10 of my "Lieutenancy in Kent, c.1580-1620", M.Phil. thesis: University of London, 1971.

3. B.L.Add. Ms., 34, 128, f87v.

4. PRO.SP.12/285/65, "Receipts of sums paid out of the shires from Michaelmas 43 Elizabeth to Michaelmas 44 Elizabeth".

5. Ibid., ff.61, 64, 67, 68, 71.

government £1,845,696 during its last four years.⁽¹⁾ Sir Robert Cecil estimated that the war cost £300,000 a year when writing to Sir George Carew in November 1602.⁽²⁾ Beside such figures the war effort of the shire of Kent shrinks into perspective.

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1. B.L.Lansd.MS., 156, ff.253-258 from Sir Julius Caesar's accounts, and for a summary of "The cost of Queen Elizabeth's wars" see HMC., Salisbury, xv, 2. Other accounts show that military expenditure formed a major part of the national expenditure - PRO.SP.12/285/21, 55-80; ibid., 287/59; SP/63/212/37.
 2. J.Maclean (ed.), Letters of Sir Robert Cecil, Camden Society, lxxxviii (1864), 147-148.

CHAPTER FIVE

Levies to Ireland from the midland shires of Northamptonshire and Derbyshire.

(i) Background

Northamptonshire and Derbyshire have been chosen to illustrate how government demands for the Irish war fell on inland shires in contrast to demands on the maritime shires of Kent, Lancashire and Cheshire. Both Northamptonshire and Derbyshire have relatively rich muster, lieutenancy and subsidy records, though these do not compare with the wealth of detail found for Kent in the Leveson letters and papers. How the Irish war impinged on the man-power of each shire will be considered separately. In conclusion, a comparison of their responses to government demands can be made.⁽¹⁾

John Leland, antiquary and topographer, described ^{the} ~~and~~ midland shires in his celebrated Itinerary as "champion ground somewhat plentiful of corn but mostly laid to pasturage".⁽²⁾ W.G.Hoskins calculated on the basis of the 1522 assessments for the loan that Northamptonshire stood fourth among the wealthy shires of England, and Derbyshire among the poorest. In the same assessment, "the

1. For Northamptonshire: J.Wake (ed.) Musters, Beacons, Subsidies in the County of Northants., 1586-1623, Northants. Rec. Soc., iii, (1926) (hereafter M.B.S.), J.Goring & J.Wake (eds.), Northants Lieutenancy Papers, 1580-1614, Northants. Rec. Soc.; xxviii (1975), (hereafter N.L.P.) HMC., Buccleuch, i and iii; HMC., Salisbury and HMC., Beaulieu.

For Derbyshire: The College of Arms, Talbot MSS., letters and papers of Gilbert, 7th Earl of Shrewsbury. The relevant mentions of levies to Ireland in the period have been xeroxed by courtesy of the Council of the College of Arms, but many have been damaged apparently by flood in the 18th century. For a report on the whole collection see G.Batho (ed.) Calendar of the Shrewsbury and Talbot Papers (1971).

2. Cited in M.St.Clare Byrne, Elizabethan Life in Town and Country (1957), p.111.

most sweeping of all tax assessments since Domesday", Derbyshire rated £1.4 per thousand acres compared to Northamptonshire's £10.9.⁽¹⁾ Northamptonshire had fifteen market towns to Derbyshire's ten.⁽²⁾

Thomas Fuller, the seventeenth century historian, described the physical extent of Derbyshire:

"The two extremes of this shire, from north to south extend to thirty-eight miles, though not fully twenty-nine in the broadest part thereof. The south and east are therefore very fruitful, whilst the north part, called The Peak, is poor above and rich beneath the ground ... (3)

Early in the seventeenth century Derbyshire produced little grain except oats, the only cereal crop to thrive on poor and wet soils. It was the main crop of the Derbyshire Peak district. The county as a whole was said to have been unable to satisfy its own demand for breadcorn and beer. Derby town itself was the main corn market and was supplied principally by way of the River Trent.⁽⁴⁾

Though poor in arable land Derbyshire was rich in lead; Thomas Fuller wrote that the best lead in Europe was to be found there, and the demand for lead increased towards the end of the sixteenth century with the new wave of building.⁽⁵⁾ It was Derbyshire lead that roofed and plumbed the impressive Hatfield House raised by the Cecils.⁽⁶⁾ By the end of the century the justices in the shire said that farmers were in danger of being out-numbered by workers "in lead mines, coal mines, stone pits and iron works", so that the county, still largely afforested, was becoming dependent on corn imported from Danzig brought from Hull

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1. W.G.Hoskins, The Age of Plunder (1976), 25, 75, 77.
 2. J.Thirsk (ed.) The Agrarian History of England and Wales, 1540-1640, iv, (Cambridge, 1967), 474.
 3. J.Freeman (ed.) Thomas Fuller's Worthies of England (1952), 107.
 4. J.Thirsk (ed.) op.cit., 99, 106, 171, 186.
 5. J.Freeman, op.cit., p.104.
 6. L.Stone, Family and Fortune (Oxford, 1973), 72

along the Trent.⁽¹⁾ Though Derbyshire is marginally larger than Northamptonshire (1,005 square miles and 997.8 square miles respectively) contemporary comment strongly suggests that Northamptonshire was more populous, richer in its agrarian economy and abler to meet the burdens of war than Derbyshire. Northamptonshire had 292 parishes and Derbyshire 181 which in itself suggests the greater population of Northamptonshire.⁽²⁾ The county possessed more seats of the gentry, had more market towns, a greater acreage under tillage, and had sent out more infantry and cavalry to the wars abroad than had Derbyshire (See Table 1 in chapter three).

William Camden wrote of sixteenth century Northamptonshire:

"Northamptonshire is situate in the very middle and heart, as it were, of England. A champain countrey it is, exceeding populous, and passing well furnished with Noblemen's and Gentlemen's houses, replendished also with towns, and churches insomuch that in some places there are 20, in others 30 steeples with spires or square towers within view at once ..." (3)

John Norden, the queen's map maker, wrote of the shire:

"most comfortable for travellers, not only in the delightful perspects which are delightful to wayfaring men; but also in regard of plenty of towns, parishes and villages which are so universally dispersed that in every two or three miles at the most is found a place of ease for the wearisome traveller ..." (4)

And John Leland wrote, "there dwelleth for the most part a gentleman in every village of Northamptonshire"; and, because of its reputation in this respect, the county was later called the "Heralds' Garden" and the "County of Squires".⁽⁵⁾

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1. F.V.Emery, "England circa 1600" in a New Historical Geography of England edited by H.C.Darby, (Cambridge, 1973), 285.
 2. E.A.Wrigley and R.S.Schofield, The Population History of England, 1541-1871 (1981), Table 2.4, p.41.
 3. W.Camden, Britannia (1695 edition), 430.
 4. Cited in M,St.Clare Byrne, op.cit., p.100.
 5. Cited from Leland's, Itinerary in Northants. Past and Present. (1948), no.1, p.5.

It is not possible to give accurate figures for the sixteenth century population of either Northamptonshire or Derbyshire. By using the muster returns of 1577 Northamptonshire would seem to have a population figure of 16,100 and Derbyshire a higher total of 41,307. But Northamptonshire was notorious for under/estimating and under-assessing its military potential for musters and trained bands, and therefore population estimates based on these returns raise considerable doubt about their accuracy.⁽¹⁾ And other sources which make it possible to estimate a late sixteenth century population in other counties have not survived for Northamptonshire.⁽²⁾ The latest historians of population in England point to the many factors which make muster returns unreliable for population estimates: evasion, mortality from epidemics, migration especially at times of invasion scares and the general social mobility of the period, which is now well recognised.⁽³⁾ However, muster returns in principle cover all males between the ages of 16 and 60 and are therefore an indicator of available manpower. The consolidated returns of 1560, 1569, 1573, 1577 and 1580 in Northamptonshire and Derbyshire suggest an average of 3,000 fit and armed men in Northamptonshire and 4,000 in Derbyshire. But perhaps, the 1588 returns which deal with those actually armed and trained ready to meet invasion that year are a better indicator of manpower availability; in 1588, in Northamptonshire there were 1,240 and in Derbyshire, 1,600.⁽⁴⁾

1. M.B.S., pp. lxiii - iv

2. Ex.inf., P.I.King, chief archivist, Northamptonshire Record Office.

3. E.A.Wrigley and R.S.Schofield, op.cit., pp. 567-569

4. E.E.Rich, "The Population of Elizabethan England" in Econ. H. R., 2nd ser. ii (1950), 253-255.

(ii) Northamptonshire levies.

Like the shire of Kent, Northamptonshire was divided into east and west for judicial, administrative and military arrangements; the west comprised the hundreds of Sutton, Guilsborough, Fawsley, Warden, Norton Towcester, Wymerseley, Cleley, Spelhoe and Nobottle Grove; the east those of Corby, Rothwell, Higham Ferrers, Hamfordshoe, Orlingbury, Huxloe, Willibroke, Polebrooke, Navisford and the liberty of Nassaburgh.⁽¹⁾ The sources available for study are paltry.

The papers relating to musters, beacons and subsidies for 1586-1623 deal for the most part with the ten hundreds of the western division of the shire,⁽²⁾ and the Northamptonshire lieutenantancy papers, 1580-1614, deal chiefly with the training and costs of the shire's militia, and not with foreign levies.⁽³⁾

The geographical position of the county, bordering nine others, made it almost inevitable that many of its gentry held properties in the neighbouring shires as well, so that the privy council had a difficult task in getting them realistically assessed for taxation.⁽⁴⁾ When threatened with military taxes, loans on privy seals and assessments for horse and armour some of the gentry in Northamptonshire could manage to "haue lefte the Cuntrie". A high proportion of its gentry held high offices in the state: Burghley, Hatton, Mildmay, and the Fitzwilliams were all near neighbours in the north east of the shire. Powerful statesmen, such as these, and important gentry like Sir Richard Knightly and Sir Edward Montagu, found ways to ease their public burdens at the expense of smaller men and yeomen.⁽⁵⁾

1. M.B.S., p.xviii, introduction.

2. HMC., Appendix to the First Report, p.32.

3. N.L.P.

4. L.Boynton, The Elizabethan Militia (1967), 83-85.

5. N.L.P., appendix no.3.

When Sir Christopher Hatton, lord lieutenant of Northamptonshire died (November 1591) the privy council did not appoint another lord lieutenant of the shire until 1605 when Sir Thomas Cecil, Earl of Exeter and brother to Sir Robert Cecil, was appointed in King James' reign.⁽¹⁾ In the intervening period the privy council dealt with Northamptonshire through its high sheriff and commissioners for musters, but many in these offices, such as Sir Richard Knightly and Sir Edward Montagu, had formerly been deputy lieutenants in the county.⁽²⁾ As in other shires during the 1590s Northamptonshire resisted the government's attempt to have an outside muster master placed over military affairs in the county. The commissioners for musters in October 1599, for example, insisted to Sir Robert Cecil that a local captain be nominated to that position. That year the privy council had appointed a Mr. Young as muster master in Northamptonshire; the commissioners for musters made it clear that they "entertained Young for that time and dealt with him liberally at his departure", but that they wanted a local man who would be less chargeable and more agreeable to their wishes.⁽³⁾ The muster master was generally an ex-professional captain responsible with the commissioners for sorting out recruits to learn the use of appropriate weapons; he therefore played a significant rôle in the government's effort to improve the levies, but there was considerable friction over whether the county or central government should pay his salary.⁽⁴⁾ It is however, noteworthy, that when the counties had a say in appointing their own muster master, as in Kent and Wiltshire, the friction over

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1. N.L.P., p. xxxiii of the introduction, and see D.N.B. s.v., Cecil, Thomas.
 2. The commissioners of musters appointed in 1595 were the sheriff, John Reade, Sir Thomas Cecil, Sir Richard Knightly, Sir Edward Montagu, Sir William Hatton and Sir John Spencer - HMC., Buccleuch, iii, 36.
 3. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 363
 4. L. Boynton, The Elizabethan Militia (1967), 107, 180, 181.

payment was lessened.⁽¹⁾ Generally speaking the privy council left the appointment of muster masters to the lords lieutenant, but in Northamptonshire, and in other shires where there was no lord lieutenant the privy council took a direct hand in the appointment, which in the case of Northamptonshire in 1599 was not successful.⁽²⁾

The following table summarizes the response of Northamptonshire to the privy council's demands for the years of the Irish war as a whole. The number of men given represents the privy council's order, not the actual number sent, which was often less due to the allowance of dead pays and desertions.

Table 1. Northamptonshire levies for Ireland.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Number of Foot</u>	<u>Number of Horse.</u>
1595 (February)	150.....	-
1595 (June)	55	-
1596 (March)	39	-
1596 (September)	100	-
1597 (June)	56	-
1598 (August)	100	3
1599 (January)	50	-
1600 (January)	150	-
1600 (June)	100	6
1600 (December)	25	-
1601 (April)	40	-
1601 (August)	100	-
1601 (October)	150	14
1601 (December)	60	-
1602 (July)	100	-
Totals:	1,275 foot	23 horse

1. Sir Thomas Wilford frequently acted as muster master in Kent, but was also a deputy lieutenant in the 1590s, and in Wiltshire, Captain John Baynard petitioned Cecil to be muster master in his native shire in 1597 - HMC., Salisbury, vii, 499.
2. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 363. And for the privy council's interference in the shires in the appointments of muster masters - APC., xxv, 191, 311, 358; xxviii, 232; xxix, 639; xxxi, 50.
3. PRO.SP.12/244/44; 268/125 274/15; APC., xxx, 416, 437, 445, 790, 798; xxxi, 23, xxxii, 83, 107, 225, 241, 275, 289, 476; M.B.S., iii, passim, H.M.C., Salisbury ix, xii passim.

Captain Parr Lane, a local man and son of Sir Robert Lane of Horton, was muster master in 1595,⁽¹⁾ and in that year he had a commission to draft and equip 150 soldiers for the Irish war.⁽²⁾ The proportion of arms in this contingent was unusual for the mid-1590s in that the majority were simply pikemen; 140 pikes to 10 muskets. Parr Lane's statement of accounts show that he received £375 from military taxes for this draft, out of which he paid 10s. for each army coat, 15s. for each corselet, 4s. for a pike, 5s. for a sword, and 15s. each for the ten musketeers. The total paid out including wages came to £264.13.4d., leaving a balance in credit to the county of £110.6.8d.⁽³⁾ In June 1595 a further draft of 55 was ordered from the county but evidence for it does not appear in local records, though it is shown clearly on the government's schedules.⁽⁴⁾

In March and September 1596 two levies were ordered from the county for Ireland; the March levy was a re-inforcing batch of 39 sent to Chester, half of them pikes "saving some few halberts" and the rest "shot", or a quarter muskets and a quarter calivers.⁽⁵⁾ The provision of their winter coats was the responsibility of the shire, but on this occasion the council said that the crown would contribute 4s. to the cost of each coat, which by this time varied between 15s. and 17s. The council's instructions also said that these coats were to be "of good cloth, well lined, and of blue colour".⁽⁶⁾

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1. HMC., Salisbury, v, 524.
 2. M.B.S., p.cix. In the Bodleian, Tanner MS., 458, ff 65-71 v. there is a biased but interesting treatise n.d. but by Sir Parr Lane on the character of the Irish in the context of the war, and which advocates that Ireland be colonized by the Dutch, since unlike the English "they have leadd in their feet" - ibid., f.69v.
 3. PRO.SP.12/244/44 - Parr Lane's accounts, February 1595.
 4. PRO.SP.12/260/40; 268/125 - schedules of men for foreign service.
 5. M.B.S., Northants. Rec. Soc., iii, p.cx - introduction.
 6. M.B.S., Northants. Rec. Soc., iii, introduction, cx.

The documentation is fuller for the September levy of 94 men sent into Ireland.⁽¹⁾ In the usual manner, speaking in the queen's name, the council addressed its instructions from the court at Greenwich on the 10th of September 1596 to the sheriff and five named commissioners for musters to have 94 men levied for Ireland, allowing six dead pays. With greater emphasis than normal the council enjoined:

... ther be speciall choice maide of hable and likelye menn knowne to be of good behaviour and not vagrant and of the bassar sorte which kinde of people commonlye so soone as they cann finde the meanes to escape doe runne awaye from their captaines ... (2)

The council chose Captain Parr Lane, the muster master of 1595, to lead them "beinge a gentellmann of that countreye and of good reputacion".⁽³⁾ The company was to be divided into equal proportions of shot and pike; 47 pikes, 23 muskets and 24 calivers. Their coats are specially mentioned by the council when it advised the county authorities to

see them furnished with coats of some mixt color well lyned because the winter season dothe approche ...

and said that there would also be an allowance of 4s. the coat from the crown.⁽⁴⁾ The usual instruction for drawing up the muster roll was given whereby the name, surname, weapons, armour and the parish of origin of each soldier had to be written. This Company was then ordered to march to Chester by the end of September "wher ther is allredy provision made of convenient shippinge for theyr (sic)

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1. Full transcript of the council's letter in M.B.S., pp.32-34; abstract in HMC., Buccleuch, 230.
 2. Ibid., the council added the names of Sir George Fermor and Richard Wingfield to the list of commissioners for musters, cf. J.Wake & J.Goring (eds.), Northants. Rec. Soc., xxvii, (1975), p.xxxii.
 3. M.B.S., p.33.
 4. Ibid.,

more speedye and safe transportation ..." The council was also concerned at this time about the loss of armour from runaway soldiers and advised the county commissioners to take bonds of twice the value of their armour, to see that restitution be made, or to give sound proof of how the armour was lost or wasted in the service.⁽¹⁾

Sir Edward Montagu had the task of arranging a meeting between his fellow commissioners at Northampton to discuss the orders and instructions from the council to which Captain Parr Lane was also invited.⁽²⁾ We are not told anything of the quality of the levy raised, but their captain, Lane, had probably trained some of them as muster master. In addition, no doubt there would have been the inevitable temptation to rid the parishes of the sturdy beggars to fill up the vacancies in the contingent.

The military rates for furnishing and sending out this levy under Captain Parr Lane are given in full for the parishes in the hundreds of the western division of Northamptonshire, but not for the eastern half:⁽³⁾

	£.	s.	d.
Fawsley Hundred	23.	11.	0.
Sutton	21.	16.	0.
Wymersley	23.	10.	0.
Newbottle	16.	16.	8.
Clelye	14.	2.	0.
Guilsborrowe	24.	14.	6.
Norton	8.	2.	0.
Towester	7.	15.	0.
Warden	9.	9.	0.
Spelloe	11.	13.	0.
Northampton town	8.	0.	0.

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1. M.B.S., Northants Rec. Soc., iii, pp.33, 34.
 2. Ibid., p.cxi of the preface. Sir Edward Montagu (d.1602) was the chief deputy lieutenant under Sir Christopher Hatton at the time of the 1588 Armada preparations.
Ibid., p.xcix, preface.
 3. M.B.S., Northants. Rec. Soc., iii, pp.30-32.

Tudor arithmetic gives the total of these amounts as £168.12.2., but the modern calculation is £169.9.2. Had an equal amount been raised from the eastern division, then the commissioners would have been provided with £338.18.4. from the whole county to send out this levy. The rates of the parishes varied from 57s. on the parish of Stanton to 7s. on that of Charwellton; the hundred giving the most money was Guilsborough, and Towcester the least. These varying rates would have been long since established by the justices of the peace, and, as in Kent and elsewhere, based on the assessments in subsidy books of the shire.

The commissioners then agreed with the captain for his allowances for coat, armour and weapons. He received 40s. for each corslet, 35s. for each musket, 30s. for each caliver, the name of the weapon or characteristic piece of armour standing in each case for a soldier's total equipment. The cost of each coat 13s.4d., was offset by the queen's allowance of 4s., the shire authorities thus paying less than 10s. the coat. Parr Lane was allowed 10s. the man for conduct to Chester; for his own expenses and those of his under-officers he had £30. A sum of £10 was allocated "for the gaole" either a payment to the county sheriff for relieving the gaol of occupants - or possibly a fee for imprisoning recalcitrant recruits? The total of agreed allowances for the levy came to £319.13.3.; the total of collections from the county, £338.18.4d., a credit balance therefore to the county treasury of £19.5.0.⁽¹⁾

These financial arrangements are typical of what was happening in other counties whenever there was an order to raise a company of troops for Ireland, and vary little from similar arrangements already

1. M.B.S., Northants., Rec. Soc., iii, 32. Captain Parr Lane petitioned the privy council for arrears of pay for service in Ireland and his petition mentions that he was wounded - PRO.SP.63/200/122, i, 29 August 1597. Thereafter Parr Lane is unmentioned in the Irish records.

considered for the shire of Kent. The sending out of Irish levies were certainly an insistent burden on county finance. The queen's commission for raising troops, the detailed orders from the privy council, the collection of men and money and their conduct to the port when marshalled, were universally the chief elements in the administrative system. Occasionally we hear of the difficulties encountered in actual practice. During the 1597 levy in Northamptonshire we get such a glimpse behind the administrative outline of the system.⁽¹⁾

Sir Thomas Mulsho wrote to his uncle Sir Edward Montagu about his activity in June 1597 as he went about impressing a draft for Ireland:

I am at my wits end, and cannot tell what to do to be rid of this service. We prest and gave 6d. apiece to fourscore and fourteen men at Kettering, and charged them upon pain of death to appear at Northampton upon Monday, at which time there appeared but three score and six men that the captain would take, and many did not appear at all, but as seemeth, are run away ...

Sir Thomas Mulsho's tale of woe went on to relate how he sent out the bailiffs to catch the runaways, of how he was short of match and powder for basic training, of how the captain he had chosen proved "hot and choleric". This captain did not want to hasten their assembly or departure until the 24th June, so that Mulsho's troublesome responsibility for the draft continued for the next two weeks.⁽²⁾

The following summer in August 1598 Northamptonshire levied 100 infantry for Sir Samuel Bagnal's army of 2,000, which was intended to

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1. Because of the discrepancy in numbers mentioned in Mulsho's letter with that in the government's schedule - the latter figure has been taken for the master table in ch. 3. In any case by the time the captain set off with this levy the difference amounted to 10 men. PRO.SP.12/268/125 - government schedule gives 56 from Northants.
 2. M.B.S., Northants. Rec. Soc., iii, p.cxi.

revenge the defeat of his brother, the marshal Sir Henry Bagnal, at the Yellow Ford, though no details of this levy survive. When the second Earl of Essex was gathering his forces for Ireland in 1599, Northamptonshire levied, mustered and armed 50 men to join a further 50 from Derbyshire. It would appear that a dispute followed ^{concerning} on who should be their captain. On behalf of the Northamptonshire commissioners, Erasmus Dryden wrote to the Earl of Essex recommending Robert Craddock as "well known in the county, for honest parentage, good report, and great sufficiency in martial affairs". The counties always wanted to have the patronage of appointing their own captain to lead their own men. Dryden spelt this out to the Earl of Essex: "our countrymen will more gladly yield themselves to his [Craddock's] command than of a stranger".⁽¹⁾

Fifty men from Northamptonshire for the proposed large army for the Earl of Essex does not appear an excessive demand, but the summer of 1599 with its serious invasion scares from Spain also involved much mustering and training in the county for home defence, and not for Irish levies.⁽²⁾ And the strain involved is hinted at when Henry Wake of Sawey Lodge, a notable Northamptonshire justice of the peace, was also put in charge of a commission to prevent and punish spreaders of rumours discouraging the people of the shire from the queen's service. A rumour was put about in August 1599 that the queen was either dead or seriously ill. Henry Wake and his fellow commissioner, Sir Arthur Trogmorton alleged they knew the instigators but that since they dwelt in Buckinghamshire but being "out of the precinct of our command" they were not going to "set down their particular names" unless asked to do so.⁽³⁾

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1. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 48, 49, Erasmus Dryden and other Justices of Northamptonshire to the Earl of Essex, 29th January 1599. Dryden was grandfather of the poet and head of a family that benefited from monastic property at Canons Ashby. The name of the rival Derbyshire captain to lead the levy is not known.
 2. PRO.SP.12/272/11, 12 - August 1599
 3. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 302, 303.

On Lord Mountjoy's take-over of the Irish command from the Earl of Essex the government's anxiety brought one of the heaviest demands for men on Northamptonshire, a levy of 150 in January 1600. Other counties were asked for more: Lincolnshire, Lancashire and Yorkshire for 200 each, the highest. Like Northamptonshire, Surrey was asked for 150. Twelve other shires had demands of 100 each, and eleven of 50 each.⁽¹⁾ In June of the same year a further levy of 100 was ordered from the county as re-inforcements for the north of Ireland,⁽²⁾ and finally, on December 5th that year Northamptonshire had an order for 25 by way of re-inforcements for the army in Ireland.⁽³⁾

The government was probably conscious of the heavy burden on the shires in 1600. In the December levy other counties, like Northampton, were asked for only small numbers of men, such as 15 from Bedfordshire, Derbyshire, Leicestershire and Surrey.⁽⁴⁾ The heavy burden may explain why the privy council wrote to the commissioners in Northampton to say that the government would provide both apparel and arms "to prevent a great part of their expenses".⁽⁵⁾ This response might also owe something to the prompting of Sir Thomas Cecil, brother to the chief secretary, Sir Robert Cecil, and Northamptonshire justice of the peace. He had asked that "the poor soldiers" be given coats for their journey to Chester, arguing that because of these Irish wars the men "ought rather to have two hearts put into them than one discouraged", for he never knew people more unwilling to go to a place "reported by all that come thence as

1. PRO.SP.12/274/15.

2. AFC., xxx, 416

3. AFC., xxxi, 23.

4. Table No.2 in chapter three.

5. HMC., Buccleuch, i, 235.

full of misery and poverty".⁽¹⁾ Between January and December 1600 Northamptonshire raised a total of 275 infantrymen for Ireland and six horse, one each from Sir Edward Montagu, Sir George Fernor, George Sherley, Robert Spencer, Edward Griffin and John Bruydell.⁽²⁾ And while the government called upon 14 shires to send wheat to the soldiers in Ireland the winter of 1600, it did not ask any of Northamptonshire.⁽³⁾

But heavier demands on the county were still to come the following year. It is surprising that the local lieutenancy records make no mention of the demands of the Irish war on the county for the year 1601, the year of the Spanish landing in Ireland and a time when the trained bands and county store of arms were being raided elsewhere for the exigencies of the Irish service. This lack of local mention of levies sent out, may have misled the editors of the Northamptonshire Lieutenancy Papers to generalise:

After 1599, as the danger of invasion receded, the shires of England became increasingly neglectful of their military responsibilities ... and in Northamptonshire, as elsewhere, men were able to put away their pikes and calivers, and devote their spare time to more peaceful pursuits. (4)

But the military demands from the government on Northamptonshire in 1601 hardly gave the commissioners for musters, the justices, sheriff constables and bailiffs a leisured year for peaceful pursuits. Instead, the years after 1599 show the heaviest calls upon the county

1. PRO.SP.12/274/55, Thomas, Lord Burghley to Secretary Cecil, February 1600. In September 1602 when he heard from Cecil that the Irish war was almost over, Thomas reflected that if the queen made a complete conquest "she might say, what none of her progenitors can since Richard II's time, that she made a conquest of all Ireland ... the glory whereof will eternize [sic] her name throughout all Christendom...."
PRO.SP.12/285/8, Thomas Cecil to Robert Cecil, 15th September 1602.
2. APC., xxx, 437
3. Ibid., pp.792-795
4. J.Goring & J.Wake (eds.), Northamptonshire Lieutenancy Papers, 1580-1614, Northants. Rec., Soc., xxviii (1975), xxxiii.

for the Irish war: in the year 1600, 275 foot; for April-December 1601, 364 foot, and in July 1602 a further 100.⁽¹⁾

The largest draft of the year 1601 was the 150 men mustered and marched to Rochester to form part of the army of 2,000 assembled there for shipping to Munster. The men from Northamptonshire were under the charge of Captains Lover and Parr Lane at Rochester where they boarded the Crane and Garland for Cork.⁽²⁾ At Rochester there was confusion over their coats. They came already provided whereas the government had contracted with London clothing merchants to supply coats for all levies assembling at Rochester. The privy council alerted Sir John Leveson and Sir Thomas Walsingham, in charge at Rochester, advising them to avoid a double charge for the Northamptonshire coats.⁽³⁾ The government had already paid coat and conduct money for the Northamptonshire company of £67.2s.⁽⁴⁾

At the same time that these men were levied and equipped the government's order for voluntary contributions of horse from named individual gentry went forward. Each gentleman, wrote the privy council, had "to furnish and sett out one horse" at his "owne chardge". The reason for this contribution was plainly stated:-

"You have before this tyme no doubt understood of the arrivall of the Spanish fleet and army in the Province of Monster".⁽⁵⁾

In sending the queen's wishes the privy council said they did not want to add much more by way of persuasion, because such insistence at this time of danger "were to prejudicate you in your owne good disposicion". Ralph Mason, the government messenger to Northamptonshire, delivered these letters to fourteen gentlemen of the shire, most of

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1. APC., xxxii, 83, 107, 225, 241, 275, 289, 476, which proves the danger of ignoring national records in a local context.
 2. See chapter nine below, and SRO.D.593/S/4/54/2., October 18, 1601.
 3. APC., xxxii, 289
 4. Ibid., pp.317, 365.
 5. Ibid., p.275-278.

them well known justices and commissioners. One of their names beginning "Edward" has been so thoroughly struck off the list as to be illegible; but a marginal note against his name reads "To be spared hereafter". In the neighbouring shires the gentlemen of Derbyshire were asked for eight horse, Lincolnshire for eighteen, Nottingham for five and Leicestershire for six.⁽¹⁾

Northamptonshire appears to have met the privy council's demands for the Irish war without much financial strain, which may indicate the shire's comparative prosperity.⁽²⁾ The county's comparative prosperity among the sixteenth century midland shires did not, however, ensure the levying of high quality recruits for the war. John Baxter, a conductor of Northamptonshire soldiers in 1602 informed Sir Robert Cecil of the ill choice of recruits from the shire, "not forty good ones" he wrote; and he added, as a parting shot, "never a county sent such men hither as they [the commissioners for Northants] yet must take them if the wind serves."⁽³⁾

(iii) Derbyshire levies for the Irish Wars.

There are many common features of local and central government arrangements for raising and sending out levies to Ireland in Derbyshire and Northamptonshire (and, indeed, in other shires). But unlike Northamptonshire, Derbyshire was under the control of a lord lieutenant in the period, Gilbert Talbot, seventh Earl of Shrewsbury (1552-1616).⁽⁴⁾ The Talbot family held the lieutenancy of Derbyshire, Staffordshire and Nottinghamshire at various times and their papers in the College of Arms are a source not only for the family's history,

1. APC., xxxi, 281.

2. For the struggle of the county's gentry against government assessments in the 1580s see M.B.S., p.lxxiii, lxxiv, and see section (iv) below.

3. HMC., Salisbury, xii, 164.

4. D.N.B., s.v., Talbot.

but for their services to the Crown.⁽¹⁾

Gilbert Talbot, seventh Earl of Shrewsbury, lost the lieutenancy of Nottinghamshire to the Stanhope family in the feuds between both families. He did not enjoy the same full confidence of the queen as did his father, George Talbot (1522-1590)⁽²⁾ and although much at Court, Gilbert did not become a member of the privy council until 1601.⁽³⁾ He was, however, well informed of events in Ireland, though Sir Robert Cecil warned him that the news he was so avid for might turn out to be no more reliable than that found in the "Gazetta of Venice". Shrewsbury had a wide range of correspondents in Ireland and at Court; they included Sir John Talbot, his relative, the Earl of Ormond⁴, Sir George Carew and Captain Laurence Esmond in Ireland and Fulk Greville and Sir Robert Cecil at Court.⁽⁴⁾

The papers of father and son are drawn upon to assess the war effort in Derbyshire a purpose for which they do not appear to have been used before. In his Elizabeth's Irish Wars C^{ynil} Falls illustrated the system of levying troops from one Derbyshire contingent but he relied on the calendar of some of the Shrewsbury papers,⁽⁵⁾ and his survey is neither complete nor accurate. In particular he did not correlate the local material with the privy council registers.⁽⁶⁾ The Earl of Shrewsbury was never present himself during the mustering and equipping of these levies but like other lords lieutenant such as the Lords Cobham in Kent relied upon his deputies. In Derbyshire

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1. G.R.Batho (ed.) HMC., Calendar of the Shrewsbury and Talbot Papers (1971), introduction.
 2. W.T.MacCaffrey, "Talbot and Stanhope: an episode in Elizabethan politics", in BIHR., xxxiii (1960), 73-85.
 3. APC., xxxi, 467, 29th June 1601.
 4. College of Arms, Talbot MSS., K., f.9 (John Talbot); Lambeth Palace Library, Ms., 704, f.35 (Earl of Ormond); Talbot Ms., K.f.45 (Sir George Carew); ibid., K., f.58 (Sir Robert Cecil) The latter told Shrewsbury to expect a visit from Greville with all the news "even from the Privy Chamber door to the Porter's Lodge" - 25 September, 1602.
 5. HMC., Rutland, i, pp.326-381
 6. C.Falls, Elizabeth's Irish Wars, (1950), 55-58

the most notable deputy lieutenants were Sir Humphrey Ferrers and John Manners; they bore the burden of implementing the government's order with respect to Irish levies. The following table brings together the total response of Derbyshire to the privy council's orders for the years of the Irish wars.

Table 2.

Derbyshire Levies to Ireland.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Number of Foot.</u>	<u>Number of Horse.</u>	
1595	100	3	
1596 (August)	50	-	
1597 (June)	23	-	
1598 (August)	100	1	
1599 (January)	50	-	
1600 (January)	100	-	
1600 (June)	50	3	
1600 (December)	15	-	
1601 (April)	-	3	
1601 (August)	50	-	
1601 (October)	60	8	
1601 (December)	20	-	
1602 (July)	50	-	
Totals:	668 foot	18 horse	(1)

The Tyrone rebellion impinged early on Derbyshire when the unusual number of 138 men was ordered to be recruited in June 1593 but not sent to Ireland. The privy council's instructions to the lord lieutenant, Gilbert, Earl of Shrewsbury, made it plain that the levy was not to be sent out until "one daies notice shalbe next given". No port of embarkation is mentioned, nor is there mention of a conductor's name, though in earlier levies from both Derbyshire and Staffordshire Captain Hastings Greasley was frequently a conductor.

1. Table based on College of Arms, Talbot MSS., ii, H.140; L., 180, 228, 218, 244, 255, 283, 284, 287, 292, 303; K., 13, 17, 19, 28; M., 1, 71; N., 302, 329, 335, 339-343, 353, 365, 371, and cross-referenced to the privy council's letter to Derbyshire in volumes, APC., xxx, xxxi, xxxii.

The occasion of this demand was an expected invasion of Ireland by Spain, but the fears proved groundless, and the day's notice to depart was never given.⁽¹⁾ For this reason the levy is not included in Table 2.

The first firm call on Derbyshire for men came in March 1595; the county was to raise a full company of 100 infantrymen.⁽²⁾ Captain Nicholas Merriman, his ensign Henry Pullen, and lieutenant Patrick Fleming were appointed to lead them. The council told them that six dead pays were warranted.⁽³⁾ Sir Humphrey Ferrers, John Manners and John Harper, deputy lieutenants, were given authority to purchase arms for this company from a William Grosvenor at Chester. By the 23rd April 1595 the levy was fully equipped and marched to Chester for transportation.⁽⁴⁾

In June the same year the privy council ordered three light horse fully equipped for Ireland.⁽⁵⁾ The High Peak area of the county was made responsible for the costs; the sums of money collected there varied from £2.13.4. to 6s. Though agriculturally poor the High Peak of Derbyshire was well able to afford the cost of equipping these three horses and riders because its gentry owned much of the underground riches in coal and lead mines.⁽⁶⁾

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1. Talbot MSS., N.f. 140, May 1593; H.f.543, privy council to Gilbert, Earl of Shrewsbury, 24th June, 1593.
 2. Talbot MSS., I., f.182, the queen's letter under the sign manual to the Earl of Shrewsbury, 8th April 1595. He was "to forbear to putt the countrey to anie chardge for their coate untill further direccion shalbe given".
 3. HMC., Rutland, i, 326-30. Captain Nicholas Merriman was used by William Russell, the Lord Deputy, to negotiate with Sir Turlough O'Neill of the Fews in S. Armagh to keep him from joining Hugh O'Neill of Tyrone. Cal. Carew MSS., iii, 232.
 4. Ibid., and HMC., Salisbury, iv, 507
 5. Talbot MSS., I., f.182.
 6. Cecil wanted Shrewsbury to have the Peak area ^{quarried} mined for marble, see L.Stone, Family and Fortune (Oxford, 1973), 102.

No further demand was made on Derbyshire until the 27th August 1596 when the Earl of Shrewsbury was ordered to levy 50 foot; three dead pays were to be allowed and the levy were to join up with a like number of fifty from Staffordshire.⁽¹⁾ The council's insistence throughout the 1590s that these recruits were to be well chosen and well provided in arms and apparel is sufficiently repeated to suggest that Derbyshire, like elsewhere, was not sending out its best able-bodied men to Ireland in these years.⁽²⁾ The warnings do not appear to have been particularly heeded on this occasion, as only twenty-nine out of forty-seven joined the Staffordshire group.⁽³⁾ The two shires made responsible for the full levy, both under the same lord lieutenant, began to play ^{off} one against the other when complaints flowed in about the defects in the levies, Staffordshire claiming that their men for Ireland were "of sufficient personage and agilitie".⁽⁴⁾ Clearly loyalties lay not to the artificially and government created area of lieutenancy but to the ancient individual shires.

In 1597 the Earl of Shrewsbury was directed to recruit but twenty-three foot and to send them to Chester, where their conductor reported that four had run away, and that the equipment they brought with them out of Derbyshire was so poor that he had to replace it by purchases from armourers in Chester.⁽⁵⁾ There is, however, no sign that he sent the bill for remedying the county's arms back to the deputy lieutenants. This levy was to join 560 other men "to fill upp the decayed bandes in Ireland", and the expenses of

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1. HMC., Salisbury, vi, 558; APC., xxvi, 161.
 2. Talbot MSS., H., f.543, I., f.182, 218, 265; K., f.13; N., f.329.
 3. APC., xxvi, 164; xxvii, 75.
 4. Talbot MSS., N., f.276.
 5. APC., xxvii, 75

their coat and conduct money were to be repaid by Sir Henry Wallop, the Treasurer at War in Ireland,⁽¹⁾ who received vast sums of money to pay armies in Ireland from the exchequer.

There had been so many deserters in the last two levies from Derbyshire that the privy council saw fit to write sternly to the Earl of Shrewsbury to have orders put into effect for the arrest and imprisonment of "such soldiers as have runne awaie with ther armes and have returned into the present countie out of which they were levyed". They pointed out how damaging to morale it was when other levies were going forward in the shire, that deserters should escape; "others mighte practise the lyke lewdness to the dissapointinge of her Majesty's Service, and thereby incur deservedlie the losse of their lyves". The deputies, Ferrers and Manners, were ordered to have these men rounded up; eighteen deserters from Derbyshire were named.⁽²⁾ The council appeared to have had an informant of these men's names, and in a postscript to Shrewsbury they asked him to let Sir Edward Bowes know exactly how many of them had been arrested in the shire.⁽³⁾

In spite of all the council's letters to cure abuses, they persisted; for Derbyshire, as elsewhere, had a fair share of Falstaffs, Captains Skill and Pill.⁽⁴⁾ One particular conductor of troops out of the shire, John Tolkerne, was accused of letting seven of his soldiers go, and replacing them by undesirable characters; in other words he hired and fired to make a profit out of the "queen's money". In a subsequent confession Tolkerne admitted that he took

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1. PRO.SP.12/262/159, April 1597. Docquets from the Warrant Book to pay Sir Henry Wallop the Treasurer at War in Ireland are frequent in the 1590s., e.g. in Oct. 1596. "Warrant to pay Sir Henry Wallop £2,174.13.4. for a month's pay for 2,000 soldiers to be sent into Ireland." CSPD. (1595-1597), 300.
 2. APC., xxvii, 76
 3. Talbot MSS., I., 255 and f.257, the privy council to Shrewsbury, 9th and 28th April 1597.
 4. See the dialogue between Barnaby Rich's imaginary characters Captains Pill and Skill cited in C.G.Cruickshank's op.cit., 29.

bribes, but that he was not the only military officer in Derbyshire to do so.⁽¹⁾

The demands on the county gathered pace between July 1598 and June 1600 when in all 300 foot and four horse were called forth from the area. In July 1598 100 recruits were ordered first to Plymouth,⁽²⁾ but later to Chester. On August 28th, when news of the defeat at the Yellow Ford came through, the county was asked to send fifty more men, but this last order was cancelled on September 10th 1598.⁽³⁾ However, fifty men were dispatched from the county in January 1599 to join up with 50 more from Northamptonshire. Sir Matthew Morgan, who had been designated to command a new garrison at Ballyshannon in Ulster, was to conduct this force from Chester; should they arrive in Chester ill-equipped, he promised to see them well furnished himself with coats and arms.⁽⁴⁾ On the 12th January 1600 the Earl of Shrewsbury was commissioned to recruit a further 100 men in Derbyshire; 20 pikes, 10 halberds, 24 muskets, 40 calivers. Six dead pays were allowed in the company.⁽⁵⁾ The deputies then agreed to levy £400 on the shire to meet their expenses, half of which was sent to a London clothing merchant for their coats, £150 of which was reserved for weapons and armour, and £50 for other charges.⁽⁶⁾

On paper, this service for January 1600 appeared efficiently

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1. Talbot MSS., I., f.292; N., f.340, the confession of William Ward about Tolkerne's bribes, 4th March 1599.
 2. Talbot MSS., I., ff.277-279
 3. Ibid., I., f.283, 284, 287.
 4. Ibid., N., f.335.
 5. Ibid., N., ff.329-335, 337, 339, arrangements made by the deputies and sheriff meeting at Chesterfield, 14th February 1599.
 6. Ibid.

ordered and costed. Each soldier was to have:-

A canvas dublett. A paire of Venetyans of broad clothe. Two shirts and two bandes. One paire of shoes, and two paire of brogues. One paire of Kersey stockinges or two paire of Irish frieze. A hatte cappe. A cassock of very long broad clothe and lyned throughout or an Irish mantle. (1)

In raising, costing and equipping these levies the two deputy lieutenants Humphrey Ferrers and John Manners had complained of over-work, even though by 1599 they appear to have had the assistance of a further deputy in Thomas Greasley.⁽²⁾ The levy of 94 was marshalled by the 10th March and placed under a conductor, Walter Browne, for the five day march to Chester. The type of soldier recruited did not prove satisfactory: the conductor had to change nine of them; three others ran off; near Chester two more escaped, and at Chester a further two were rejected as unsuitable by the muster master in the port.⁽³⁾ There were also serious delays. The original orders said they were to be at Chester by the 20th February, but they did not arrive there until the 12th March 1600.⁽⁴⁾

On the 26th June 1600 the privy council directed the lord lieutenant and his deputies to raise 50 more foot as re-inforcements for Ireland. Not regarded as a company or part of a company no dead pays were allowed and they were to be at Chester by the 25th July.⁽⁵⁾ The levy was to include some carpenters, masons and smiths who were ordered to take their tools and instruments to

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1. Talbot MSS., N., f.360; and see Chapter eleven.
 2. Greasley's name appears with the other deputies in the Talbot Manuscripts after 1600 - e.g. Talbot MSS., N., f.352, 356, but there is no notice of his appointment in the council's registers.
 3. Talbot MSS., N., f.365, Ferrers and Manners reported to the lord lieutenant, 23rd April 1600.
 4. Ibid.,
 5. Talbot MSS., K., f.13, the p.o. to Shrewsbury, 26th June 1600.

Lough Foyle.⁽¹⁾ The council's letter could hardly have been circulated around the officers of the lieutenancy and to the justices and constables before the end of June, which would have left about twenty days to have the men assembled, equipped and given a few days basic training at the hands of the shire's muster master before their five days march to Chester.

The privy council was again concerned about the quality of the recruits from Derbyshire; its officers in charge of raising the levies were warned and reprimanded through the Earl of Shrewsbury;-

Touching the choise of serviceable and sufficient persons, a matter so often, and so earnestlie called upon by us in all our letters upon lyke occaysions and so slenderlie regarded as it greeveth us to see the little effect our admonicions have taken by the evill choise of so many lewd and dissolute persons as have and do continewallie either runn awaie before they come to imbarque, or abandon their service very soone after their coming into Ireland ... (2)

The ideal category of men to be made into soldiers in the government's view were yeomen farmers and sons, and skilled labourers and artizans, but these were able to buy or bribe their way out of the drafts. The localities could least afford to lose their best men so that their replacements from the shire, towns villages or parishes were often those the local authorities wished to get rid of.⁽³⁾ But on occasions there are signs of a humane concern from some lieutenancy officials; Shrewsbury, for example, wrote to his deputy, John Manners, on behalf of an impressed man, Draycot Smith of Mickleover who had come back out of Ireland to look after his aged parents; in the lord lieutenant's opinion Smith

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1. Talbot MSS., . . . ff.17.19. A Similar request for skilled artisans for Sir Henry Dockwra's garrisons at Lough Foyle went to the Lord Mayor of London, and to Cheshire and Staffordshire - AFC., xxx, 430.
 2. Talbot MSS., K., f.13, privy council to Shrewsbury, 26th June 1600, but that like reprimands went to other lords lieutenant is evident from AFC., xxx, 412-416.
 3. See above chapter two.

had been drafted in the first place out of ill feelings against him, and he should therefore be released from his obligation and allowed to stay at home.⁽¹⁾

Opportunities for escape, and on the part of the conductor to practice fraud multiplied on the march out of the shire to the port and such problems are illuminated by Sir Robert Cecil's full set of instructions for conductors which survive in the Talbot papers.⁽²⁾ Some of these self-same instructions are found from time to time throughout the privy council's directives to all lords lieutenant, yet the complete set of instructions sent to Shrewsbury suggest either that the Derbyshire conducting captains were more guilty of abuse, and had more runaways than elsewhere, or that Shrewsbury was more careful to keep instructions which in other counties have been lost. Since these instructions were specifically for the benefit of the conductors of troops to the ports a more detailed treatment of them will be given in the introduction to Part Two below.⁽³⁾

For the so called voluntary contribution of horse in June 1600 the queen's letters of request went to John Manners, Francis Leake and William Cavendish in Derbyshire to furnish three light-horse for Ireland.⁽⁴⁾ The letters assured them that they were chosen rather than others for the confidence the queen had in them, and "good opynion of your willing mynde to do her service". It was the government's intention that these horses and riders were on loan and "both the one and the other (God Willing) shalbe returned unto you" at the end of the action. In neighbouring Northamptonshire

1. HMC., Rutland, i, 371.

2. College of Arms, Talbot MSS., K, f.30 r. and v. undated but signed by R.Cecil.

3. Part Two: The embarkation and transportation of troops to the Irish war.

4. APC., xxx, 440

six gentlemen were so requested, in Kent nineteen, six in Cheshire, seven in Lancashire, and in Leicestershire two.⁽¹⁾

Before the year 1600 was out a fresh call came for 15 musketeers to be fully equipped in the county and sent to Lough Foyle as re-inforcements. The deputy lieutenants reckoned that their arms would cost 30s. a head, their cassocks 16s. each, advance pay of 10s. each, and 4s. conduct money each, or £3 per man. By adding £5 for their conductor, they calculated a bill of £50 to be levied on the shire for sending out this small levy.⁽²⁾

On the 28th April 1601 the privy council asked for three light-horse to be sent as part of a national levy of forty by the way of re-inforcement for the cavalry bands at Lough Foyle.⁽³⁾ The council's letter made much of the fact that it was a small number, and that Derbyshire was being spared from furnishing foot, then being demanded from many other shires. They particularly wanted well-chosen and well exercised horsemen, and therefore wanted "Northern men, because they are best skilled both to serve on horsebacke and do also knowe best how to use their horses well."⁽⁴⁾

In May, a list was made out in the county of those who had to contribute to this levy. There appears to have been sent one protest from a Derbyshireman who had to pay 25s.⁽⁵⁾ For the final horse levy of the reign from Derbyshire, in October 1601, the privy council reverted to the tone of June 1600 in appealing to the good nature of the gentry to set out one horse at their own expense. Letters under

1. APC., xxx, p.434 "The Names of the Gentlemen that are to furnish horse, 29th June 1600." That the government did not expect a full turn out from the 183 written to is clear from their letters to the mayors of the ports. The mayor of Chester was told to expect 100, the mayor Bristol to have shipping for 40, but in the event 173 horse arrived at the portss. - APC., xxx, 452, 484, 485, 486, 522.

2. Talbot MSS., K., ff.15-17.

3. APC., xxxi, 313; Kent sent 3, Nottingham 2; York, 10.

4. Ibid.

5. Talbot MSS., N, 376, ii

the signet were sent to 163 named persons throughout England, and the clergy were required to furnish 45 horses.⁽¹⁾ Eight members of the gentry were asked in Derbyshire; in addition to the three who supplied horses in June 1600 they requested them from Sir Humphrey Ferrers, John Stanhope, William Bassett, John Willoughby of Rysley and Henry Zacheverell of Morley. The horses and riders were to be at Chester by the 28th October, where 50 were destined for the Earl of Thomond's forces.⁽²⁾

As the levying of the eight horse was going forward the Earl of Shrewsbury was also ordered to raise fifty infantrymen with the news that a Spanish fleet was carrying an army to Ireland. Their arms and apparel were to be provided by the government, but the shire had to collect £3.10s. a man to be forwarded to the Exchequer.⁽³⁾ Hardly had this been done, when Shrewsbury was asked to furnish another 25 on September 29th 1601, and a week later he was asked to increase that 25 to 60 infantrymen.⁽⁴⁾ By 16th October the deputies Ferrers, Greasley and Manners reported to the Earl of Shrewsbury that this last levy of 60 had been dispatched to the port of Bristol.⁽⁵⁾ For the final levies from the county Derbyshire sent out a further 200 footmen as re-inforcements to Mountjoy's "mopping up" campaign early in 1602, and when fears of a further Spanish attempt on Ireland became rife, Derbyshire sent out 50 men in July 1602, the last levy of the reign for Ireland.⁽⁶⁾ The deputy, Sir John Manners wrote from Haddon Hall to Shrewsbury at his London residence in Broad Street that the Derbyshire men were sent out "in good sorte to Ireland" under

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1. APC., xxxi, 278-286, list of gentry to furnish horse.
 2. Ibid., pp.311, 312, 317, 319.
 3. Cal. Carew MSS., iv, 116. These 50 were joined to 50 from Nottingham to form a company under the conduct of Captain Hansard.
 4. APC., xxxi, 225, 242.
 5. APC., xxxii, 347.
 6. See the table No.2 in Ch. 3, pp. APC., xxxi, 476.

the conducting captain, Jobe Lavender.⁽¹⁾

In concluding the previous section we saw how the 1602 levy from the neighbouring midland shire of Northampton was criticised by its conducting captain, John Baxter.⁽²⁾ The conducting captain of the Derbyshiremen, Jobe Lavender has left no comment on his experience, but the praise of the deputy lieutenant, Sir John Manners for his own work in the Derbyshire levy, hardly impressed his correspondent, Robert, Earl of Salisbury.⁽³⁾

(iv) War weariness in Northamptonshire and Derbyshire.

The military pressures for men and money for the Irish war in the 1590s, chronicled in detail for these two midland shires, show how the government's demands impinged on inland shires not conveniently sited for the transportation of men and arms to the ports. The relentless demands affected not only the lives of those sent out, but also the purses of those who remained. By far the majority of recruits were unwilling conscripts. There is little mention of gentlemen volunteers from these shires. George Manners, son of the deputy Sir John Manners in Derbyshire, and perhaps the cavalrymen voluntarily supplied in June 1600 and October 1601, were perhaps the only genuine volunteers. The Irish war held little attraction for this kind of private soldier. Even administrative office in Ireland was avoided; a lawyer, Sergeant Thomas Walmsley thanked the Earl of Shrewsbury profusely for procuring his delivery from "the wyld bogges of Ireland", not wishing to lose his health and a thousand marks a year in the office of a chief justice in the Irish administration.⁽⁴⁾

1. Talbot MSS., M., f.71

2. HMC., Salisbury, xii, 164

3. Talbot Ms., M., f.71

4. G.R.Batho (ed.) Calendar of Shrewsbury and Talbot Papers, (ii) 1971, pp.133, 135.

In the two midland shires in the 1590s there appears to have been little overt reaction to the effects the war was undoubtedly having on the counties. War weariness and reluctance, however, came out in other ways; passive resistance shown in the long delays in having military taxes collected, an aversion towards sending out the better and trained soldiers, evasions from the draft by those able to pay captains' bribes, under-assessments by the rich when funds were needed, and downright defaults of payment.⁽¹⁾

It is hardly coincidental that when the frequency of government demands increased from 1599 the quality of the levies decreased and the reluctance to collect the necessary military taxes rose in proportion to demands. The Earl of Shrewsbury was reprimanded for Derbyshire's negligence in delaying the collection of military taxes to re-imburse the Exchequer for the costs of apparel for the June 1600 levy. The privy council ordered that "the money may be presently collected and sent up without delay", warning him that should the queen hear of this neglect "shee would surely take much mislyking of this great neglect in matters concerning her service."⁽²⁾

Northamptonshire too had been previously so warned in 1598 for not sending up "monies towardes the charge of apparelling soldiers", long since requested. The sum in question was £40, and the county "haveinge paid no parte of the money" was directly commanded to have the sum gathered under the authority of the commissioners of musters.⁽³⁾ A further reminder to them from the council indicated the difficulties the local officers had in making the collection "by reason that divers inhabitants of the townes and some gentlemen doe refuse to pay the rates

1. Under-assessment was commonplace. In 1593 the Lord Treasurer was reported in the House of Commons as saying that in the City of London, for example, tax assessments were ludicrous - S. D'Ewes, Journal of all the Parliaments (1963 ed.), 483.

2. APC., xxx, 318

3. Ibid., 306.

sett downe by you the commissioners ..."⁽¹⁾ The privy council instructed the commissioners if refusals persisted to take bonds of those that do so "for their appearance before us at the Courte to answere the same".⁽²⁾ Refusals, however, continued in Northamptonshire, which called forth a stern letter of rebuke from the council to Sir Richard Knightly and Sir George Fermor accusing them of not sending in the names of those refusing military taxes.⁽³⁾ Even when they eventually had sent the names to the council, there was a further complaint that they were not energetic enough in having "the said persons ... sent up to us by you to answere their neglect".⁽⁴⁾ The entire episode serves as an example of how local sympathies and interests were maintained in opposition to central government demands by the Northamptonshire commissioners, hardly the stance which the government expected when they were appointed to the commission of musters. The disparity between what the government set out to do and what it was able to do is apparent in the whole sphere of mustering and levying men and money for the Irish war.

One Northamptonshire man, Thomas Robinson, who had consistently refused to pay up eventually made his way to London to appear before the council's board, not however, to answer his misdeeds but to plead that he was "chardged farr beyond his abilitie by the evill will and meanes of Thomas Barker, the high constable". Robinson won his case against Barker, who, it was proved, raised more money than he should have done on pretence of her Majesty's service and "employeth it to his owne use".⁽⁵⁾

1. APC., xxx, 357; 6th June 1600.

2. Ibid.

3. APC., xxx, 650

4. Ibid., 651

5. APC., xxx, 696-697, 29th September 1600

The customary method of paying extraordinary government war expenses was simply to rate inhabitants by the subsidy books, and in every parliament from 1589 to 1601 the government did its utmost to have these traditional assessments increased, by simply trebling and in 1602 quadrupling the rate of taxation.⁽¹⁾ It is generally thought that these rates then fell very heavily on the lowest tax-paying categories, small farmers and minor merchants in the towns, the people already hard pressed by military demands. From an analysis of the subsidy lists in Northamptonshire, it is now well known how the landowning gentry were able to reduce government assessments for the raising of lighthorse, and to make sure that their assessments for the subsidies remained unchanged.⁽²⁾

The privy council's letter of December 1601 to the commissioners for musters in Northamptonshire argued that not enough money was brought in, and suggested raising the traditional assessments. The need, they wrote was plain:⁽³⁾

to expulse the enymie out of her Majesties
kingdome of Irelande where he hath alreddy
sett foote and is lately seconded with newe
forces and further aydes daielely expected ...

The commissioners, therefore, were to take great and special care to make their assessments proportionally to men's ability to pay. No justice of the peace ought to be assessed below the sum of £20 in lands, and they were to begin with themselves to set a good example. However, the privy council's badgering was to no avail with the Northamptonshire gentry; the assessments listed for 1602 are almost exactly the same as they had been in 1600 when a total

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1. J.E.Neale, Elizabeth I and her Parliaments, 1584-1601 (1957), ch. 4 passim.
 2. M.B.S., Northants. Rec. Soc., iii (1926), 54-80, the subsidy of 42 Eliz. I, and ibid., pp.84-111, the subsidy of the year 44 Eliz. I.
 3. M.B.S., iii, p.81 where the privy council's letter is transcribed.

of £419. 8. 8. came in from the shire subsidy. The £10 difference in 1602 is likely to have been the result of bad arithmetic or copying rather than representative of any increase.⁽¹⁾ The confidence of the Northamptonshire gentry in resisting government pronouncements and wishes is yet another instance of the gulf between intended central government policy and actual practice in the shires. Time and time again the privy council's letters stress that the rich farmers, landlords and business men are to take on the heavier part of military and other taxes, and not to pass on the burdens to those least able to meet them. The complaint was voiced by Sir Walter Raleigh and Sir Robert Cecil in the last parliament of the reign.⁽²⁾ However, the case of inequitable assessments is a difficult one to prove without a thorough examination of the difficult evidence of shire payments recorded in the Exchequer Abbreviates, and a knowledge of the real incomes of the taxpayers.⁽³⁾ The crown was not merely dependent on the subsidies but used other sources of revenue during the war years; loans on privy seals, purveyances, the sales of crown lands, especially in 1590, 1599, 1601 and grants of monopolies as well as ship and gunpowder taxes.⁽⁴⁾ The crown, therefore, could not afford to rely solely on the wealthy gentry, for in Northamptonshire, Derbyshire and elsewhere they seem to have paid less than their share of the war effort.

Shrewbury's deputies complained to the Earl of their great and continual labours in realizing the government's demands for soldiers.

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1. M.B.S., iii, the subsidy lists of 1600 and 1602, pp.54-111. William Lambarde pointed out in 1581 how the £20 p.a. property provision for a J.P. was long obsolete having been first laid down in 12 Richard II and 18 Henry VI, unrepealed statutes. Lambarde's Eirenarcha cited in J.H.Gleason, The Justices of the Peace in England (1969), 48.
 2. J.E.Neale, Elizabeth I and her Parliaments, 1584-1601, (1957), ch. iv, passim.
 3. For studies in aristocratic finances see L. Stone, Family and Fortune (Oxford, 1973).
 4. R.R.Outhwaite, "Who bought Crown Lands? The pattern of purchases 1589-1603", in BIHR., xliv (1971), p.18, and for loans on privy seals in Kent see chapter ten of my M.Phil, thesis, (1971).

Manners left the Earl in no doubt about his difficulties; there was but one justice of the peace, Francis Cockayne, in the large area of the High Peak of Derbyshire to aid him, and by 1600 he had requested the Earl for the third time to take pity on his age and infirmities and have another deputy lieutenant appointed to join him in his work for the levies.⁽¹⁾ Ferrers, too, complained of the continual labours involved in raising and sending out these levies, as well as of their great expense, adding that he too "greatly suffered from the infirmitie of the stone". The Earl apparently suffered from the same illness since Ferrers offered to send him some of his medicine.⁽²⁾

In Derbyshire, as elsewhere, there were also inevitable confusions in carrying out orders, as letters were delayed, instructions changed within a few days on one another, or when communications failed within the shire itself between deputies and constables. An initial order for troops dated 30th January 1599, for example, was not received in Derbyshire until the 13th February, and intended the levy to be at Chester by 20th February. Such haste tended to raise tempers in the military administration.⁽³⁾ Delays and confusions of communication became symptomatic of a lack of enthusiasm for a war which held little profit, and all tended to frustrate government intentions and hopes for well conducted, well chosen, and properly equipped levies, a picture we have seen paralleled in the shire of Kent in the same period.

Negative attitudes on a popular level towards the Irish war can be glimpsed from quarter session records, where they exist.

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1. Talbot MSS., N., ff.200, 202 (for 1590), N., f.362 (for 1599)
 2. Talbot MS. H., f.853; I., ff.247-253; M., f.1.
 3. Ibid., I., f.292.

Unfortunately there are no surviving Quarter Sessions records of the county or town of Northampton in the sixteenth century, and though the Derbyshire Quarter Sessions files begin in the late sixteenth century there is insufficient detail to indicate military reluctance until the middle of the seventeenth century.⁽¹⁾ However, the records of the Staffordshire sessions, a shire within the jurisdiction of the Earl of Shrewsbury as lord lieutenant, provide evidence of absentees from levies, desertions, irregularities in the musters and typical reluctance in fulfilling military obligations at the time of the Irish war.⁽²⁾ The Act of Parliament, 4 & 5 Philip and Mary, c.3 imposed a forty shilling fine for absence from the musters, but by the 1590s the fine was an inefficient deterrent; and it must be recalled that this Act was the only important military statute of the Tudors. It is surprising that there was no parliamentary statute governing the raising of expeditionary forces for Ireland and elsewhere overseas. In the shires the officers of the lieutenancy, most of them justices, often made use of special sessions of the peace to deal with defaulters; the common assumption that little was done to enforce the orders and proclamations governing military demands is not warranted.⁽³⁾

Many of the indictments in the Staffordshire sessions records are for assaults on the constables while executing their duties in drafting men to the levies. William Abell and John Leake, for instance, were imprisoned for beating up John Russell, constable of Uttoxeter, when rescuing a recruit from his grasp.⁽⁴⁾ In the Easter sessions of 1596 a forged certificate came to light which would have

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1. Ex. inf. Joan Sinar, county archivist, Derbyshire, and P.I.King, county archivist, Northamptonshire.
 2. S.A.H.Burne, (ed.), The Staffordshire Quarter Session Rolls, iii, (1933)
 3. See chapter 2 above on Recruitment.
 4. S.A.H.Burne, op.cit., iii p.201.

allowed Thomas Watton, yeoman of Hales in Shropshire, to stay unmolested in Wolverhampton when he should have been impressed in Sir John Hawkins' fleet at Chatham.⁽¹⁾

For the unscrupulous captain the impress became a source of profit; John Wellis, a constable of Handsworth, for instance, arrived with six soldiers for Captain Norton, who then rejected five of them, but was bribed for their release. Norton then pressed the constable, Wellis into service to replace one of the rejects "not withstandinge the worst of them ther refused were more sufficient for servise then (Wellis) beinge above the age of xl yeares". To gain his own release from the captain Wellis paid Norton ten shillings, and to the clerk of the muster, George Atkins, a further eight shillings.⁽²⁾ In a later indictment Captain Norton appeared again in an even greedier light when he took five pounds of Thomas Allen of Loxley to procure his release from the draft.⁽³⁾

It is of interest that the surviving and available evidence of slackness in military duties comes from the last years of Elizabeth's reign when increasing demands for Irish levies brought more opposition. The constables presentments for absence "apud lez musters" abound in these Staffordshire records for 1598-1602; many of them refer to the militia of the county but an increasing number have a direct bearing on the drafts for Ireland. John Whiston of Areley seems a notorious case, thrice charged to appear at the shire's musters, and thrice refusing to be pressed for Irish service, and, while on the run committing a wide variety of offences. Thomas Jackson of Eccleshall evaded serving because "he useth to hyde himself

1. S.A.H.Burne, op.cit., iii, pp.149, 150.

2. Ibid., iii, p.156

3. S.A.H.Burne, op.cit., iii, p.170.

from all musters and very lately hid himself three daies on a rye mowe of William Rodons and was fed by Rodons' wife".⁽¹⁾ Thomas Fishwick

"otherwise Hughes, late of Feckham forrest in co. Worcs. lab. pressed for Ireland from the township of Whiston in Staffordshire, did not attende his Captaine thither"

Fishwick was also accused of being in the possession of "fyue kaies", which he denied were his at his trial.⁽²⁾ Presentments from the constables of those refusing to appear at the musters increase in frequency from two or three in the early 1590s to seven in 1599, to thirty-six in the year 1600 and to fifty-nine the following year.⁽³⁾

In both midland shires, Northamptonshire and Derbyshire, though similar and popular evidence from recruits in sessions' records is not forthcoming, the muster books of Northamptonshire and the Talbot papers for Derbyshire suggest that the counties met the demands of the war with protests, delays and reluctance. Northamptonshire was more vigorous in opposition to the privy council than Derbyshire, though there are enough complaints throughout the Talbot papers to indicate that the levies for Ireland were found expensive and burdensome in Derbyshire. The general impression preserved in the Talbot papers is one of greater concern about the quality of troops from Derbyshire than that given in the Northamptonshire records, but the comparison may simply stem from the fact that the Talbot papers were better kept.

No levy for Ireland from either shire was particularly mentioned for its efficiency or commended for its completeness. The general quality of their levies was unremarkable. Derbyshire had the greater number of deserters among men destined for Ireland; for example, of

1. S.A.H.Burne, *op.cit.*, iv, (1936), 107, 140, 157.

2. S.A.H.Burne, *op.cit.*, iv, 295-297.

3. *Ibid.*, pp.376, 422, 476.

the 50 ordered in 1596 from the county only twenty-nine were sent.⁽¹⁾ Neither shire had occasion to raid its trained bands for the Irish service in the way Kent had been ordered to do this; in fact, the commissioners for Northamptonshire wrote to Sir Robert Cecil that "there is not one man of them [the trained bands] but before he will go to Ireland will give his captain £20, £30 or £40 to put another in his room".⁽²⁾ Despite a constant stream of exhortation from the privy council to choose "able and sufficient men" the majority of the men sent to Ireland were unwilling conscripts, prone to desert, and who had therefore to be replaced at additional expense to the government. The fact that Derbyshire had a lord lieutenant and Northamptonshire did not seem to have made a difference either to the administration of the counties' military affairs or to the efficiency or otherwise of sending troops to the Irish war.⁽³⁾ Both counties were reprimanded for slackness in collecting military taxes; neither the deputy lieutenants in Derbyshire nor the commissioners for musters in Northamptonshire expressed any enthusiasm for "the service of Ireland". But then the central government's troubles with the gentry was hardly confined to the last decade of the reign or to Northants and Derbyshire at a time when the gentry in Parliament were opposing the Crown on such issues as monopolies, foreign policy and the succession. Their slackness in the shires in assessing themselves for taxation and in training the militia and raising Irish levies were symptoms of a restiveness under crown control that would become more acute under the first Stuarts.

1. APC., xxvii, 76; xxvi, 164.

2. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 43

3. J.Wake (ed.) Montagu Musters Book, introd., pp. xxxviii-xli where Northamptonshire's commissioners choose men to rid the shire of undesirables rather than those fit to serve in the war.

A comparative view of what the government expected from both shires leaves no doubt that Northamptonshire was the richer in its ability to provide men, horses and money for the wars. Military taxation was based on a graduated scale of assessments in lands and goods, and it is unlikely that the privy council was much wide of the mark in its assessment of the ability of shires or of individuals to provide men and money for war. Derbyshire sent 668 foot and 15 horses to Ireland between the years 1595 and 1602, and 75 foot to the continental wars in the queen's reign; Northamptonshire sent out 1,275 foot and 23 horses to Ireland and 1,050 foot to the continent in the same period. While the individual levies in each year were never very large, nonetheless they were frequent; Derbyshire was called upon twelve times to provide Irish levies compared to Northamptonshire's fifteen occasions, and, as can be seen from Tables 1 & 2 in this chapter the frequency was stepped up between January 1599 and October 1601. The average number of men levied over the seven year period was 165 a year for Northamptonshire and 98 a year for Derbyshire, a difference which again mirrors the greater ability of Northamptonshire to meet the late Elizabethan government's demands for the war. (1)

1. Figures based on Table 2 in Chapter three, and Tables 1 & 2 in this chapter.

CHAPTER SIX

Levies to Ireland from the maritime shires of Lancashire and Cheshire.

(i) Background to Lancashire levies.

In this period of Anglo-Irish hostility geographical convenience dictated that the Elizabethan government would draw large numbers of recruits from the maritime shires of Lancashire and Cheshire. Soldiers from these areas could be assembled earlier and at less cost to the government than from inland and more distant shires. Convenience and economy may have dictated that the entire area of the North West be treated as a whole for the purpose of levies, but in every other sense, Lancashire and Cheshire were disparate in character and tradition. Though the lieutenancy of the Stanleys', Earls of Derby covered both Lancashire and Cheshire, two deputy lieutenants were appointed to act within each county.⁽¹⁾

The government treated both shires and North Wales as a unity in 1575 when it was thought that the North West could raise £20,000 a year to support the lord deputyship of Sir Henry Sidney in Ireland, but the scheme foundered because of Sidney's political ambitions.⁽²⁾ It was, however, the strategic importance of the North West to the defence of the realm that made the government view the area as a whole in the measures taken against invasion scares. The presence at the Spanish Court of Sir William Stanley of Hooton, the notable betrayer of Deventer to the Spanish in 1587, increased the probability of an invasion plan directed to England through the North West. In May 1590

1. G.Scott Thomson, 'The origin and growth of the office of deputy lieutenancy in TRHS., 4th ser., v (1922), 155.

2. Cal.Carew MSS., iv, 477, "The note for Ireland of Sir H.S.", 1575.

the privy council warned the Earl of Derby that intelligence reports indicated that Sir William Stanley was to lead a Spanish attack by way of Anglesey as a base for an invading force into Lancashire and Cheshire. Derby was ordered to put both counties into a state of military readiness, and to re-inforce defences at Anglesey, but nothing came of the invasion scare.⁽¹⁾

Commissions of lieutenancy to the Earls of Derby enabled the Crown to centralize administration in an area comparatively remote from the centre of government. The Derbys held regular commissions of lieutenancy from 1551 to 1640, except for one notable break in continuity from 1594 to 1607. Henry, 4th Earl died in September 1594, and Ferdinando, eldest son and successor, died in April 1595; thereafter financial disputes in law with Ferdinando's widow are thought to have weakened Derby influence in local and national affairs. William, 6th Earl, (1594-1642) is not mentioned in county affairs in the 1590s, until in 1607 he received his first commission of lieutenancy.⁽²⁾

The period of the break in lieutenancy coincides with the Irish War and government orders for the raising of men and money fell to the high sheriffs and commissioners for musters in both Lancashire and Cheshire.

Whether they held commissions of lieutenancy or not the Earls of Derby traditionally regarded themselves as the chief magnates in Lancashire. Henry, 4th Earl, was, for instance, sensitive about his position when he took his deputy, Sir Richard Mollineux, to task in 1591 for keeping privy council letters in his house thereby ignoring "the place and calling of his social superior". The Earl wondered why privy council "directions for matters in this county of Lancashire"

1. APC., xix, 155, 156

2. HMC., Salisbury, xi, 405, and see B.Coward, 'The Lieutenancy of Lancs. and Cheshire in the 16th and 17th centuries' in THSIC., n.s.xix (1967), 41; but the article generally ignores the demands of the Irish war on both shires.

should not have first been sent to him".⁽¹⁾ A further indication of Derby power in Lancashire can be seen in the maintenance of large numbers of armed household servants and tenants well into the sixteenth century long after the nobility at large had discontinued the practice of retaining.⁽²⁾ The pre-eminence of the Derbys' did not then simply depend upon commissions of lieutenancy from the Crown.

Apart from the Earls of Derby, a coterie of about ten wealthy and powerful families in Lancashire acted as high sheriffs, knights of the shire, justices of the peace and commissioners for musters, and also sat on the many other commissions whereby Elizabethan government sought to centralize its control; the Heskeths of Rufford, Gerards of Bryn, Hollands of Denton, Houghtons of Houghton Tower, Mollineux of Sefton, Traffords of Trafford, Byrom of Newgate, Shireburnes of Stonyhurst and Leghs of Lyme. B.G.Blackwood's work shows how this group of families held the monopoly of offices among the Lancashire county elite.⁽³⁾

Lancashire, the sixth county in size of England, was predominantly pastoral in the sixteenth century, and was among the poorest of the shires as recent research on the geographical distribution of wealth suggests, standing thirty-sixth in wealth of the English shires.⁽⁴⁾ Historians of agrarian economy see three distinct farming regions in the county; a central zone of mixed farming from the Mersey to the

1. AFC., xxiv, 256, 257

2. F.R.Raines, (ed.), The Derby Household Books, Chetham Society, xxxi, (1853), pp. 23, 24, 84-88.

3. For the Lancashire county elite see J.Harland (ed.), Lancashire Lieutenancy under the Tudors, Chetham Society, xlix (1895), i, passim and B.G.Blackwood, The Lancashire Gentry and the Great Rebellion, Chetham Society, n.s. xxv (1978), chapter one.

4. R.S.Schofield, "The geographical distribution of wealth in England, 1334-1649" in Econ. Hist. Review, 2nd series, xviii (1965) 504 ff. and for the wealth of the ruling gentry in Lancashire, P.R.Long, "The wealth of the magisterial class in Lancashire, c. 1590-1640" unpublished M.A. Manchester University, 1968.

Lune, a pastoral zone of the coastal plains, and a highland zone of mixed farming and some mining. For the greater part of the century large tracts of mosses near the coast and along the chief rivers, Mersey, Ribble and Lune, stayed undrained. Spinning and weaving supplemented agricultural earnings in the south and east of the shire, and mining did the same to the west and the north.⁽¹⁾

The author of a project for raising crown revenue in 1575 by first fruits of ecclesiastical offices, thought the see of Chester, which included most of Lancashire, too poor to support a bishop.⁽²⁾ Bishop Vaughan of Chester asserted in 1603 that it was common knowledge "how little able the small revenues of this see is to defray the charges thereof".⁽³⁾ The lay subsidy roll of 1593 of fifty-seven parishes in Lancashire shows a total tax collected of £1,038.9.4d.⁽⁴⁾ By 1625 the lay subsidy in the county had increased to £2,490.0.0.,⁽⁵⁾ but it remained among the poorest counties of the nation. Its Ship Money valuation in 1636 of £1,000 was the lowest per acre apart from Cumberland.⁽⁶⁾

Writers on sixteenth century Lancashire generally call attention to the county's conservatism and slow rate of change, evincing the long survival of feudal forms of tenure, and of the practice of retaining as well as the fact that bad communications emphasised its remoteness from London.⁽⁷⁾ William Camden, hardened traveller and topographer, admitted to being troubled in spirit "with a kind of dread" as he approached the boundaries of Lancashire, but he (thankfully) pressed on "trusting in the divine assistance".⁽⁸⁾

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1. J.Thirsk (ed.), The Agrarian History of England and Wales, iv (1967), 80-89.
 2. J.Strype, Annals of the Reformation, II (i) (Oxford ed., 1820-1840), 575-576.
 3. HMC., Salisbury, xii, 669
 4. Lancashire Record Office, IRO/DDF/2430, f.3v., lay subsidy, 1593.
 5. IRO., DDN/1/164, Houghton Lieutenancy Book, 1625-1640, f.5.
 6. W.G.Hoskins, The Age of Plunder, (1976), appendix no.1, p.245
 7. C.Haigh, Reformation and Resistance in Tudor Lancashire (Cambridge, 1975), 46.
 8. Cited in J.Parkes, Travel in England in the 17th Century (1925), 300.

Christopher Haigh, the historian of the county's Tudor Reformation, may have exaggerated the isolation of Lancashire in writing that it "was not quite part of England" and in stressing that Lancashire had its own structure of government in the Duchy and Palatine of Lancaster⁽¹⁾

The historian of the Duchy points out that only two of the twenty-two palatine judges were local men under Queen Elizabeth.⁽²⁾

From the geographical point of view Lancashire's lines of communication in the sixteenth century were not on the main north-south artery, which lay, on the Yorkshire side of the Pennine chain, but were directed north and west to Scotland, the Isle of Man and Ireland. Its trading connections were with Yorkshire, Northumberland and Durham rather than with London and the south, and overseas with Ireland, Spain, and Portugal rather than with the Low Countries, France and Germany.⁽³⁾

Manchester was the county's largest town, notable in John Leland's time for its two market places and its one parish church. Liverpool "a paved town" had about six streets and was much frequented by Irish merchants. Warrington had a large market, but Wigan "as big as Warrington was better builded", and had merchants artificers and farmers, but above all coal-mines nearby.⁽⁴⁾

In studying the social institutions of Lancashire from 1480 to 1660 Professor W.K.Jordan saw the county experiencing a rapid and continuous population increase in the 16th century reaching by 1600 between 105,000 and 120,000 inhabitants, but his bias is towards the lesser figure.⁽⁵⁾ Dr. B.G.Blackwood argues that population growth

1. C.Haigh, op.cit., p.46

2. R.Somerville, A History of the Duchy of Lancaster (1953), 470, 471, 473, 474.

3. W.K.Jordan, The Social Institutions of Lancashire, Chetham Soc., xi, 3rd ser., (1962), ch.1.

4. W.G.Hoskins, The Age of Plunder (1976), 16, 17.

5. W.K.Jordan, The Social Institutions of Lancashire, pp.1-2, footnote 1.

in the seventeenth century was not continuous citing the evidence of the hearth tax assessments of 1664 which indicate a Lancashire population of 150,669.⁽¹⁾ Against these two population estimates any estimate based on Lancashire's muster returns during the century will produce a very low total. For instance, in 1577 the county mustered 6,000 men, its highest return, which when multiplied by seven as suggested by W.G. Hoskins gives a total population of 42,000.⁽²⁾

(ii) Lancashire levies.

Considering the large numbers sent from Lancashire to Ireland in the 1590s (See Table 2) the documentary evidence on the Irish service is surprisingly thin in the local records. J.Harland's two pioneering volumes on Lancashire lieutenancy under the Tudors and Stuarts end in 1594 for the queen's reign.⁽³⁾ The Lancashire Lieutenancy Minute Book, in bad condition and unfoliated, runs from 1601 to 1640, and is mainly administrative in content being copies of letters to and from the privy council.⁽⁴⁾ And the Houghton Lieutenancy Letter-Book covers the later period, 1625-1640.⁽⁵⁾ If we look at the county's muster returns to gauge its military potential and therefore its ability to meet governmental demands for the Irish wars the result is also disappointing for the 1590s. Muster returns exist for the 1560s, 1570s and 1580s, and for the years 1608, 1618 and 1625, thus leaving a notable gap for the years of the last

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1. B.G.Blackwood, The Lancashire Gentry and the Great Rebellion, Chetham Soc., n.s., xxv (1978), pp.3, 4, 29 and note 14.
 2. See Chapter Three which notes the difficulties in estimating population from muster returns.
 3. J.Harland (ed.), Lancashire Lieutenancy, parts 1 and 2 (1859).
 4. LRO., LV/80, Lancashire Lieutenancy Minute Book. I am grateful to the archivist for letting me see this manuscript before its withdrawal for repairs.
 5. LRO., DDN/1/64, Houghton's Lieutenancy Letter Book, 1625-1640. It is of interest that in this later period Lancashire supplied 877 pressed men between 1625 and 1638 at a cost to the shire of £2,824 - LRO., DDN/1/64, ff.31, 39v., 149, 153, 156.

Elizabethan war in Ireland. This lack of county muster returns in the 1590s indicates that in the north training, mobilization and mustering of the militia was regarded as a luxury since there were so many demands for recruits for Ireland, and since home defence was then more pertinent to the vulnerable southern shires. A greater number of muster returns exist for the 1590s, for example in Kent, and for the last great mobilization for home defence in 1599 against possible Spanish invasion in the south coastal shires.⁽¹⁾ By contrast, however, the years prior to the last Elizabethan war in Ireland show a copious mustering and arming of Lancashiremen for Ireland as well as for the county's home defences. In 1560 the general muster of the shire showed 3,993 able-bodied men; in 1569, 4,763; in 1577, 6,000; in 1588, the armada year, the deputy lieutenants certified that Lancashire could furnish 1,170 trained men made up of 700 calivers, 300 pikemen, 80 archers, 20 lances, 70 billmen; and, in addition, there were 265 horsemen. Known levies sent into Ireland from the county were: fifty archers in 1566, a hundred infantrymen in 1574, thirty pioneers the next year, two dozen skilled artificers in 1576, and untypically in 1580, a hundred of the trained bands of the county. Finally in the decade 1580 to 1590 about four hundred foot were ordered for Ireland, but one levy of a hundred was discharged in the emergency of the year 1588.⁽²⁾ The editors of the Victoria County History of Lancashire claimed that Tudor Lancashire was always on a war footing with a higher proportion of its male population soldiers than any other shire. But it must be recalled that the Elizabethan government expected every free and able-bodied man to keep arms and armour ready for use in every shire

1. See chapter four on Kent levies and musters.

2. J. Harland (ed.) Lancashire Lieutenancy, pt. 1, pp. 21, 22, 61, 62, 66, 67, 111, 132; pt. 2, pp. 144, 164, 201, and notes, 27, 215, 216, 226.

of the realm, and in that sense war preparations and defence measures were part of everyday life.⁽¹⁾

The gaps in the local evidence for Lancashire levies to Ireland in the 1590s makes it difficult to deal in detail with each levy's organization in the way in which it was possible in the previous chapters or, indeed for similar levies sent from Cheshire to be considered later in this chapter. However, from central government records it is possible to show how the burdens were spread within Lancashire's hundreds (See Table 1), and to indicate the annual burden on the county as a whole during the Irish war of the 1590s (See Table 2)

The military organization for raising Irish levies and the money necessary to set them forth was not inherently different in Lancashire than elsewhere; the hundreds of the shire were administered by high constables and bailiffs acting under orders from the high sheriff and commissioners for musters in the absence of a lord lieutenant and his deputies.⁽²⁾ Not found elsewhere, however, in local records of military organization, are copies of a "President (sic) for Preceptes", a form drawn up by the commissioners for musters in Lancashire for the convenience of the "bailiffe of a hundred" to enable him to carry out the recruitment orders passed on by the high constable of the hundred. Blanks are left for the bailiff to fill in the number of recruits, the dates of their assembly, and the meeting place. The form is headed: "These are in Her Majesty's name to require you that presentlie you deliver to the constables of the hundreds of ... the no. of ... to be at ..." This administrative

1. VCH., Lancashire, ii, 223.

2. The office of high constable, though much mentioned, has received little attention in local studies. For the office in general see H.B.Simpson, "The office of constable" in EHR., x (1895)

device was clearly a check on how the commissioners' orders were implemented, but no example of a completed bailiff's form has been found.⁽¹⁾ ~~As elsewhere,~~ The letters of the queen, privy council, sheriff's and commissioners for musters reflect ~~the same~~ ^{a similar} chain of command that we have seen for the counties treated in the previous chapters, namely, the queen's letter of command to raise a specified number of troops to the county's authorities, a following letter from the privy council elaborating the initial order, then the Lancashire muster commissioners' orders to the constables of the hundreds to translate the overall demand into a precise quota in each hundred. But this bare administrative outline was not always followed out to the letter.

By long tradition the accustomed assembly places for soldiers levied in each Lancashire hundred were: Wigan for West Derby and Leyland hundreds, Manchester for Salford, Whalley for Blackburn, Preston for Amounderness and Lancaster for Lonsdale.⁽²⁾ A typical example of how the Lancashire commissioners for musters divided up an order for 100 men between the six hundreds of the shire may be taken from the order in April 1602 when the government wanted Lancashire to provide 100 soldiers for Ireland; they divided the order in the following manner: West Derby 24, Salford 24, Blackburn 18, Amounderness 19, Lonsdale 16 and Leyland 9 (See Table 1). In general more men were levied in the more populous hundreds of South Lancashire.⁽³⁾

We cannot gain ~~Gaining~~ an impression of the relative armed strength of the individual Lancashire hundreds to set against the quotas demanded

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1. IRO., IV/80/, f.9, the form is damaged.
 2. IRO., IV/80/ ff. 6-8 of the Lieutenancy Minute Book.
 3. J.P.Earwarker, 'List of freeholders in Lancashire in the year 1600' in Lancashire and Cheshire Record Society, no.12 (1885), pp.229-251. See also J.P.Smith, The Genealogists' Atlas of Lancashire (Liverpool, 1930), 1.

in the last years of the queen's reign ^{in.} ~~cannot be done for~~ the 1590s, for, as we have seen, muster certificates are wanting. However, the armed strength of the county is known hundred by hundred for the year of the queen's accession: Salford mustered 1,142 of which 350 were trained; Lonsdale 469 of which 350 were trained, Amounderness 582 of which 300 were trained, West Derby 672 of which 430 were trained, Blackburn 813 of which 400 were trained, and Leyland a curious figure of 46 armed and unarmed men, and oddly, 170 trained men.⁽¹⁾ Under the year 1608 the county's Lieutenancy minute book is lined to give the full military strength of each hundred under the headings of muskets, calivers, bills, archers and pikemen. Unfortunately the clerk of the lieutenancy only filled in 1,453 armed men of Salford and Blackburn, 224 armed and 1,876 unarmed men of Amounderness, and there his muster certificate ended.⁽²⁾

Considering the financial charges incumbent on ^{the shire for} sending out regular levies from Lancashire to Ireland in the 1590s it is surprising not to find evidence of internal quarrels between the inhabitants of the six hundreds of the shire over the allocation of quotas of men required. As in other shires the high sheriffs and commissioners for musters followed long established precedents in their allocation of men and therefore of the taxes necessary to furnish them so that there was nothing unusual about their procedures other than the regularity of the demands in the last years of the reign.⁽³⁾ There is much scattered evidence on how the county authorities divided up the shire's overall demands from the government, and though it is not complete in the case of every levy sent to Ireland the five full occasions in Table 1 show how the burdens were spread. At times a

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1. E. Baines, History of Lancashire (1824 edition, re-print, 1968), 49.
 2. IRO., IV/80/, f.15
 3. Hundred proportions of men and money are noted for the 1570s and occasionally in the 1580s in J. Harland, op.cit., part i, passim.

shire levy seemed to have been raised as a whole unit without any indication of division by the ancient hundreds; this was the case in January 1600 when the muster roll merely shows the dwelling places of the 200 recruits.⁽¹⁾ Likewise in 1598 Captain Edward Tarbock's indenture for 200 Lancashiremen simply lists them by name without giving either dwelling place or hundred.⁽²⁾

Table 1: Quotas of soldiers in the Lancashire Hundreds.

<u>Hundred:</u>	<u>Nov.</u> <u>1594</u>	<u>Dec.</u> <u>1600</u>	<u>Oct.</u> <u>1601</u>	<u>April</u> <u>1602</u>	<u>July</u> <u>1602</u>	<u>Hundred Total</u>
Salford	14	5	21	24	7	71
Lonsdale	16	5	24	16	8	69
W. Derby	24	8	36	24	12	104
Blackburn	18	4	27	18	9	76
Amounderness	19	5	42	19	9	94
Leyland	9	3	0	9	5	26
Total shire levy	100	30	150	110	50	(3)

Table 1 shows the hundred of West Derby furnishing the most men for Ireland on those five occasions with the exception of October 1601 when Amounderness sent the greatest number, and invariably the small size of the hundred of Leyland is reflected in the numbers required from it.⁽⁴⁾ Proportionately the numbers of horse levied are much the same as the infantry proportions in the hundreds, except in the case of Amounderness and Leyland. In May 1602 eighty-nine horses were

1. IRO., DDHe/61/13, muster roll of January 1600 in the Hesketh MSS.
2. PRO., E101/65/28, 'Edward Tarbock, captain, indenture of the 19th July in the 40th yeare of Elizabeth'.
3. Figures based on J. Harland, *op.cit.*, ii, pp. 234, 235 for the year 1594, and on the extant Lancashire muster rolls in the PRO. E101/65/28. This box of Exchequer records, documents not individually numbered, contains many of the third part of the tripartite indentures or lists of soldiers sent by captains to the privy council.
4. Table 1.

charged to be furnished and sent out of Lancashire; 30 from West Derby, 20 from Salford, 11 each from Blackburn and Lonsdale, 4 from Amounderness and 13 from Leyland.⁽¹⁾ This kind of detail cannot always be reconstructed in other counties, for example in Northamptonshire, Derbyshire and Kent.

From these particular demands on the separate hundreds of the county of Lancashire we turn to the annual levies on the county as a whole. Table 2 sets out these levies. And, as elsewhere, demands for the large numbers of soldiers from the county tend to reflect the military crises in Ireland, Essex's expedition of 1599, Mountjoy's expeditionary forces of 1600 and the Spanish crisis of the winter of 1601. The demands for smaller forces generally represent batches of re-inforcements.

The frequency of demands for soldiers from Lancashire suggests that the government took more account of the geographical proximity of the shire to Ireland than its comparative poverty. During the period of the "Nine Years War" Lancashire was asked to send infantry forces on thirteen separate occasions involving a grand total of 1,403 soldiers.⁽²⁾ In this respect Lancashire stood fifth among the English shires in the number of infantry sent out in those years.⁽³⁾ And in the earlier period of Irish rebellions, those of Shane O'Neill and of the Desmonds, Lancashire also sent out large numbers of troops, 604 in all.⁽⁴⁾ It was only in the small demands for the more expensive cavalry units that the Elizabethan government showed, perhaps, an awareness that Lancashire was not a wealthy shire.

1. IRO., IV/80/f.11 'Numbers of light horse within the county of Lancashire and who are charged to make the same, 21st May 1602'

2. Table 2.

3. See Chapter three, Table 2.

4. J. Harland (ed.) Lancashire Lieutenancy, i, 22, 62, 65, 75, 76, 111-119, 132, 139-174. For a narrative account of the Desmond rebellion J.J.N. McGurk, 'The Fall of the Noble House of Desmond, 1579-1583' Parts, i, and ii, in History Today (Sept. Oct., 1979), 578-585, and 670-675.

Table 2: Lancashire levies to Ireland.

<u>Date.</u>	<u>Number of foot.</u>	<u>Number of horse.</u>	<u>Ref.</u>
1594 (Oct.)	100	-	(1)
1596 (Sept.)	47	-	(2)
1597 (April)	56	-	(3)
1598 (June)	200	1	(4)
1599 (January)	200	-	(5)
1600 (January)	200	-	(6)
1600 (June)	100	7	(7)
1600 (August)	50	-	(8)
1600 (December)	30	-	(9)
1601 (April)	40	-	(10)
1601 (August)	100	-	(11)
1601 (October)	150	12	
1601(December for 1602 January)	80	-	(12)
1602 (April)	100	-	(13)
1602 (July)	50	-	(14)
Totals:	1,403 f.	20 h.	

1. PRO.SP.12/248/87

2. APC., xxvi, 346; APC., xxvii, 21-28, these Lancashire troops joined up with 47 from Cheshire to form a single company - CCR., Cholmondeley's Letter Book, f. 33v.

3. APC., xxvii, 26-28

4. APC., xxviii, 524-525

5. CSPD., (1598-1601), 151

6. IRO., DDHE/61/13

7. APC., xxx, 416, 436

8. Ibid., 566, 598

9. Ibid., xxxi, 23, these were re/inforcements for Lough Foyle.

10. Ibid., p.318, further L. Foyle re/inforcements.

11. The original order of August 1601 was changed to an increased demand of 150 by October; the October number therefore is used for the total not the August figure.
APC., xxxii, 83, 107, 225

12. IRO., IV/80/, f.3 of the Lancashire Lieutenantcy Minute Book.

13. Ibid., ff.5, 6; but see Table 1 where the quotas in the hundreds equal, 110.

14. CCR., M/MP/13, a paper muster roll of the names of the Lancashire and Cheshire soldiers at the port of Chester in July 1602.

Overall, Lancashire was more heavily drawn upon for the Elizabethan Irish wars than the far wealthier shires of Kent and Northamptonshire.

Contrary to what one might expect levies of numbers under 100 men in each shire did not join up to make joint companies of a 100 in Lancashire and Cheshire. More often than not Lancashiremen joined forces with small levies from North Wales, for example in August and December 1600.⁽¹⁾ And, on one occasion when Lancashire was twenty-two soldiers short of the required quota at Chester, the commissioners for the musters there combined the Lancashiremen with a similarly under-strength company from Lincolnshire.⁽²⁾ By these cross-county arrangements the process of breaking down local loyalties of soldiers might have begun. Yet the captains, conductors and muster masters, who organised Lancashire troops for Ireland were invariably local men. The privy council was usually content to leave such choice to the shires, but in the last decade of the reign there was an attempt, largely unsuccessful, to have the office of muster master controlled by central government. In Kent, and in Northamptonshire, the privy council failed to get its appointees.⁽³⁾ In Lancashire, the council's attempt in 1601 to displace the local muster master, Captain Lathom, also failed. Lathom had been muster master in the county from 1595, and when he was employed at sea in 1596 Richard Bridges, a servant to the Earl of Derby, and later a conductor of troops to Ireland, filled the vacancy that year.⁽⁴⁾ In 1601 the privy council pressed the Lancashire authorities to accept Hugh Done, an experienced soldier, but a Cheshire man, and claimed in their letter to the high sheriff and commissioners for musters that Lathom had resigned his position as muster master. But Captain Hugh Done did not get the post.⁽⁵⁾ The previous year Lord Mountjoy highly

1. Table 2 under (8) and (9) footnotes.

2. APC., xxxii, 359-360

3. See Chapters four and five.

4. APC., xxv, 335.

5. APC., xxxi, 285.

recommended Done for a captaincy in Ireland but only on condition that he led Cheshiremen.⁽¹⁾ Done did not apparently get his captaincy in Ireland either for he does not appear among the captains in Ireland in 1600.⁽²⁾ All accounts indicate that Lancashire was able to keep control of its forces in the hands of local men.

Lancashire's emphasis on local control over its military affairs did not, however, improve its quality in 'the service of Ireland'. In 1594 the mayor of Chester complained of the poor standard of men and armour sent from Lancashire that year.⁽³⁾ In their defence the commissioners for the Lancashire musters, Ralph Ashton and Richard Holland explained to Lord Burghley how their recruits had defaced their armour on the march from Warrington to Chester, but that the defects in their arms and armour were not as great as Foulke Aldersey, the mayor of Chester, had made out. They had made it their business to go to Chester and their checking up on Aldersey's allegations found "the Lancashire armours good and serviceable".⁽⁴⁾ In 1599 the constables and bailliffs in Manchester were taken to task by the council for recruiting disorderly persons and vagabonds for the Irish service.⁽⁵⁾ When the October 1601 Lancashire levy assembled at Chester eighty of them were sent back to Lancashire as "unservicable" by the commissioners reviewing the levies at the port, and the county was ordered to make up the numbers from the trained bands of the shire.⁽⁶⁾ A further twenty-two of these Lancashire recruits deserted.⁽⁷⁾ The Lancashire levy of eighty raised in January 1602

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1. CSPI., (1600), 232, 279. Done served in Ireland in 1599 under Sir Henry Harrington and later "followed Essex in his last voyage at sea", HMC., Salisbury, viii, 317
 2. Done may or may not have been the Master Done who was wounded fighting with Mountjoy in the Moyry Pass, 1600 - Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, II, 269, 341.
 3. PRO.SP.12/250/49, the mayor of Chester to the Sheriff and justices in Lancashire, 21 December 1594
 4. PRO.SP.12/251/3, the commissioners for musters in Lancashire to Lord Burghley, January 1595.
 5. W.E.A. Axton, The Annals of Manchester (1886), 44.
 6. IRO., IV/80, ff.2-4
 7. APC., xxxii, 359-360

was so bad that the commissioners at Chester turned them all back; the privy council supported the commissioners' action and ordered Lancashire yet again to make up the defects out of their trained bands.⁽¹⁾ And, finally, a report from Ireland commented that of all soldiers sent into the country those from Lancashire "were most faulty in desertion".⁽²⁾

Half-heartedness for the Irish service was occasionally obvious when commissioners for musters used the ploy of asking for clarification of privy council instructions. In Lancashire the difficulties of immediate communication with London about precise instructions prolonged delays. When the Earl of Essex was recruiting his "army of Ireland" in January 1599 the Lancashire commissioners were ordered to have 200 men in a state of readiness. They received that order on the 16th January but did not muster and view the assembled force at Wigan until the 12th of February. From Wigan on the 12th February they wrote to Sir Robert Cecil to say that they "could not proceede further for want of dirreccions from your council which as yett wee have not receaved". The original letter of demand had promised that precise instructions would be sent to Richard Houghton, the high sheriff. Clearly, experienced commissioners such as Houghton, Ashton, Holland, Preston and Mollineux, who had all signed the letter to Cecil, were well practised in viewing and sending troops to Chester and Liverpool, but they had not been given the precise date for the troops' dispatch to the port.⁽³⁾

A similar levy of 200 raised in the county the following winter of 1600, part of Sir Henry Docwra's Lough Foyle expedition, led to further failures in communication between the commissioners and the

1. IRO., LV/80, ff.3-4, 7 January 1602.

2. CSPI., (1600-1601), 161

3. Hatfield House, Cecil Papers, 59/64, the Lancashire commissioners to Sir Robert Cecil, 12 February 1599.

privy council. The muster roll for that contingent shows the sheriff, Robert Hesketh, and his two main commissioners, Richard Holland and Richard Ashton, chiefly responsible for their muster and review. The conductors were local men, Robert Parker and Richard Assheton. The roll gives the full name of each soldier, his place of residence, the type of weapon he carried, and even of the occupations of three, who are named as bricklayers. This levy allowed six dead pays in each hundred as the proportion of arms indicated: forty pikes "armed with corselets, pauldrons and morrions", twenty halberds, armed like the pikemen, twenty-four "bastard muskets", and eighty calivers; every man was to carry a sword and dagger. Firearms predominated at 128 to 60, indicating the importance of muskets and calivers by the end of the century.⁽¹⁾

While arrangements went smoothly in the recruitment and viewing of this levy for Sir Henry Docwra's expedition, there were financial complications over the arrangements to pay coat and conduct money, between the commissioners in Lancashire and the privy council. The council suggested to the county that an estimated sum of £400 should be raised in the shire in military taxation to cover coat, conduct money and the conductor's fees, and that since the recruits would be apparelled in Chester by the mayor and commissioners that the mayor be paid directly from the county, for "the place is nerer unto you and maie be done with lesse chardge of the countrey".⁽²⁾ Then in the normal manner Lancashire would be re-imbursed coat and conduct money

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1. IRO., DDHe/61/13, Hesketh of Rufford MSS. Robert Hesketh s. and h. of Sir Thomas Hesketh, Lord of Houghwick and Rufford. Richard Holland was High Sheriff of Lancashire in 1573, 1582, 1596 and died in 1618. There are several Richard Ashtons at this period, for example of Middleton, of Downham and of Lever, see J. Harland, op.cit., ii, p.249
 2. APC., xxx, 54

from the exchequer under warrant from the Lord Treasurer. It is not clear whether or not the Lancashire authorities raised £400 from the county, or whether they paid the mayor of Chester coat money. But when Lancashire asked for an un-itemised sum of £400 in re-imbusement the council wanted exact details of how much money had been collected, how much had been spent on the coats, how many days conduct money had been allowed, and what allowances had been given the conductors; otherwise, it could not request the Lord Treasurer to issue a warrant to the exchequer to pay Lancashire the sum.⁽¹⁾ The Lancashire authorities did not supply the privy council with all the answers required and did not succeed in its original plan to get an overall sum in re-imbusement from the exchequer. Authorization was given in June 1600 to pay Richard Ashton, one of the Lancashire commissioners, specifically itemized sums: £40 for coat money, £33.6s conduct money, to cover five days to have the levy assembled at Chester, and the sum of £3.8s. for the conductor's fees.⁽²⁾ The county's commissioners probably feared that they would not be fully reimbursed for coat and conduct money from the exchequer which was in any case slow to repay the counties, with delays commonly of six months. The Cheshire authorities suffered similar difficulties on the same occasion, January to June 1600.

When Sir Cuthbert Halsall was High Sheriff, 1601, Lancashire was again in financial trouble with the privy council for buying up soldiers' coats which had apparently been brought back to England from Ireland by Captain John Baxter, a commissary for coats and victuals

1. AFC., xxx, 119

2. Ibid., 450

to the soldiers at Lough Foyle. Baxter had been sent for to answer his illegal trade at the council board; there, he claimed the coats had been seized by the port officers in Chester, and he denied that he had received any money for them. Halsall, the Lancashire Sheriff, had clearly bought up some of these coats for a privy council letter scolded him:

wee cannot allow of your doing or of any
that shal goe about to buy any of the
provant apparel provided for the souldiers (1)

That Halsall as sheriff of the county may have been trying to save the county expense for future coat money is hardly in doubt; he may also have been ignorant of the illegal source of the suits of apparel, and there is no evidence that he was acting corruptly in the way that the deputy lieutenants in Kent apparently did.⁽²⁾

During the period of heaviest demands on Lancashire from June 1598 to October 1601 there were fears among the county's leaders that they were going to be ordered to raid the trained bands to meet the required number of recruits, as, indeed, had been done in Cheshire and elsewhere, especially in London. (See Table 2 in Chapter Three)

Sir Richard Mollineux, of great influence in Lancashire, wrote to Sir Robert Cecil 19 March 1599 thanking him for giving special favour to Lancashire in exempting its trained bands from the Irish service at the last levy. Mollineux wrote that he had made bold to declare this exemption at the county musters and that the soldiers were so thankful that they asked him in the name of the whole shire to present their thanks, especially since they had heard that the trained bands of Cheshire had been raided for the Irish war.⁽³⁾ But Lancashire's

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1. APC., xxxi, 256, the p.c. to Sir Cuthbert Halsall, 30 March 1601 Halsall was again High Sheriff in 1612. He was the natural son of Sir Richard Halsall of Halsall and succeeded to the patrimonial inheritance, J.Harland, op.cit., ii, p.245 and note 85
 2. See chapter four, Kent, under the year 1600, Captain Trevor's levy.
 3. PRO.SP.12/270/60, 'Sir Richard Molyneux to Secretary Cecil from Croxtath, 19th March 1599'.

exemption from using its trained bands did not last; we have seen how in October 1601 and again in January 1602 the county was ordered to make up defects and replace deserters from its trained bands.⁽¹⁾ In these last years of the war more trained soldiers were drawn out of the trained bands of the militia in order to raise the quality of the raw recruits, especially from West Derby, with its greater reserve of trained soldiers.⁽²⁾

(iii) Resistance to war demands in Lancashire.

No particular class of persons in Lancashire appears to have sought exemption from military liabilities, as they did, for example in the Cinque Ports, the Stannaries, the ancient universities and in parts of the City of London. Nevertheless, resentment at military taxation manifested itself among the inhabitants of Furness and Michael because tenants on Crown lands there did not pay the same as the rest. The privy council ordered the commissioners to meet the stewards of the crown manors in the area and the spokesmen for the aggrieved inhabitants to:

devise and sett downe some suche order for
the proportioning of the said taxes . . .
agreable to equitie and indifferencie to
bring both sides unto an agreement in the
same (3)

In view of the late Elizabethan government's dislike of the exemptions of privileged places it is unlikely that the crown tenants in Furness and Michael were able to ~~continue in~~ ^{persist with} their low tax contributions.

The gentry proved unco-operative in their traditional rôle of providing light horse. When in 1586 the county's justices of the

1. APC., xxxii, 359-360; IRO., LV/80, ff.3-4

2. PRO.E101/65/28

3. APC., xxix, 561-562, the p.c.

peace were required to provide extra light horse there was no reply.⁽¹⁾

By 1595 an increasing number of Lancashire gentry combined in groups of four, six and even eight to provide a single light horse.⁽²⁾ To

what extent this tendency resulted from the increased expenditure to

fit out cavalry in the 1590s, the poverty of the Lancastrian gentry,

or evasion by the richer members is difficult to assess. From the

Heralds' Visitation lists of the 1560s, Dr. C. Haigh reckoned that

the Lancastrian gentry formed a smaller proportion of the total

population than in most other areas "having one gentleman for every

800 people".⁽³⁾ But by using Freeholders' lists Dr. B.G. Blackwood records 763 gentle Lancashire families in the year 1600 representing a higher proportion of gentle families than Yorkshire's 641 or Kent's 700.⁽⁴⁾

Whether numerous or not the Lancashire gentry owed £200 in *respect* ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~overdue~~ payments for sending out horses to Ireland in the year 1600.⁽⁵⁾

A comparison of the named gentry in Lancashire ^{ON} ~~for~~ the two occasions when they were asked to provide light horse for the Irish war, June 1600 and October 1601, clearly indicates that the numbers ^{did not constitute} ~~were far from~~ a complete roll call of the wealthier families in the county.

1. L. Boynton, The Elizabethan Militia (1967), 88, showing that the majority of the shires were opposed to the scheme for additional light horse from the gentry.
2. L. Boynton, op. cit., p. 182
3. C. Haigh, Reformation and Resistance in Lancashire (Cambridge 1975) p. 107.
4. B.G. Blackwood, 'The Lancashire Gentry and the Great Rebellion' Chetham Soc., xxv (1978), 5.
5. AFC., xxx, 306

Table 3. Lancashire Gentry furnishing horse.

<u>June 1600</u>	<u>October 1601</u>
Sir Richard Mollineux	Sir Richard Mollineux
Sir Richard Houghton	Sir Richard Houghton
Sir Cuthbert Halsall ¹⁸	Edward Tarbock
Edward Standish	Edward Standish
Richard Ashton	Richard Ashton
Ralph Ashton	Ralph Ashton
Richard Holland	Thomas Preston
	Edward Norris of Speke
	Richard Sherbourne
	James Anderton
	Robert Hesketh
	Richard Bold. (1)

Most recalcitrant, however, were recusants expected to supply horse, or contribute to their cost. They stand out in Lancashire as a group defying or evading government demands for the Irish war. When Lord Strange described his native county of Lancashire in 1583 as "this so unbridled and bad a handful of England" he more than likely had the catholic recusants in mind.⁽²⁾ They have been much studied from the point of view of political and religious disaffection, but their reluctance to aid with cavalry levies to Ireland has not been much noticed. Recusancy was, of course, common in Lancashire, although recent research shows that Catholic gentry in the county were less numerous than hitherto supposed, a mere 28%.⁽³⁾

Government pressure on recusants was always greater in times of foreign invasion scares, and the dangerous state of Ireland in the 1590s intensified this. Close to Ireland, and linked by trade, many in Lancashire were in touch with the Irish catholic population.

1. APC., xxx, 440 and xxxii, 283. For brief biographical notices of many of the listed gentry see J.Harland, op.cit., i and ii passim in the copious footnotes in F.R.Raines, op.cit., pp.95-215. P.R.Long, 'The wealth of the magisterial class in Lancashire, c.1590-1640' unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Manchester 1968 shows that for the Lancashire gentry trade was more profitable than office holding, pp. 147-157, 159.

2. Cited in C.Haigh, op.cit., p.46

3. B.G.Blackwood, op.cit., p.28 relying on C.Haigh's and J.Bossy's work on recusant history. Puritans may have been less than 15 per cent among the gentry, though in the hundred of Salford they out-numbered Catholics, see Table 15 in B.G.Blackwood, op.cit., which also shows West Derby hundred with the greater number of Catholic gentry.

The dangers of these contacts to the established church were well appreciated in Elizabeth's reign.⁽¹⁾ It was said of South-West Lancashire that "from Warrington all along the sea coast, all the gentlemen, except Mr. Butler, were of the Roman Catholic faction."⁽²⁾ Bishop Vaughan of Chester wrote to Cecil in 1602 of the district as "the most corrupt place in Lancashire".⁽³⁾ The bishop's letters from 1598 to 1601 illustrate his difficulties in having recusants, who refused to pay monies for the Irish service, arrested. In January 1598 he reported that many chief recusants "who were to be apprehended for non-payments" had gone to London seeking to procure their release from appearing before the ecclesiastical commissioners at Chester; he wanted Sir Robert Cecil to have an example made of some of them, so that his own authority in Lancashire would thereby be supported. The bishop saw little point in having them incarcerated in Lancaster gaol, "for the prison is ill-kept; recusants there can go and come as they like to hunt, hawk, and go to the horse races at their pleasure."⁽⁴⁾ In writing to Thomas Hesketh, an attorney of the Court of Wards and Liveries, Bishop Vaughan stated that despite the help of the sheriff, Richard Houghton, "it is almost impossible to seize them [recusants] because they had so many kindred, spies and alliances".⁽⁵⁾ Houghton listed seventeen recusants who "refused to contribute to the support of the service in Ireland", and could not be found, except four who had been arrested, Edward Langtreay, William Anderton, John Asheton, and Elizabeth Tidesley.⁽⁶⁾ Langtreay was later released from his

1. J.S. Leatherbarrow, Elizabethan Recusants in Lancashire, Chetham ~~London~~ Society, 2nd series, no. 110 (1947) passim.

2. VCH., Lancashire, II, p. 53

3. HMC., Salisbury, x, 344, and see John Bird's report to Cecil on the dangers of contacts between Lancashire and Ireland, HMC., Salisbury, ix, pp. 18, 19.

4. CSPD., (1598-1601), 14, Vaughan to Cecil, 14 January 1599.

5. Ibid., p. 7, Vaughan to Hesketh, 14 January 1599.

6. Ibid., pp. 7 and 8, Houghton's list of seventeen recusants.

obligation to furnish a light horse "in respect of his late reformation and conformity".⁽¹⁾

In recounting his problems to Cecil Bishop Vaughan remarked that most recusants withdrew from their homes when his pursuivants were out in search of them, so that for three weeks' work he could only record three arrested.⁽²⁾ During Sir Richard Mollineux's period of office as sheriff in 1599 he had to enforce law and order against a recusant riot in which Bishop Vaughan's pursuivants were beaten up by the armed servants of the Norrises of Speke and others in February 1599.⁽³⁾ When telling Cecil of what had been done at the special assize called to deal with the rioters Vaughan said that it all took place in that part of the shire "full of seminary priests and gentlemen recusants that harbour them". He named Edward Earlston, William Blundell of Crosby, Henry Lathom of Mossborough and Henry Travis of Hardshowe.⁽⁴⁾

In another report Robert Hesketh, an active commissioner against recusants, added the Norris family of Speke to Vaughan's list of chief offenders among the gentlemen recusants of Lancashire.⁽⁵⁾ Vaughan's final remark in this report to Cecil in January 1600 expressed an opinion, not found elsewhere, that the recusants in his diocese "have been much encouraged by our ill success in Ireland". In expressing the natural fears of Cecil and the government at large of what would happen should England lose Ireland to Spain Vaughan may simply have been seeking to strengthen his own hand against the Lancashire recusants.⁽⁶⁾

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1. CSPD., (1598-1601) p.148, Vaughan to Cecil, 8 January 1599.
 2. Ibid., p.7, Vaughan to Cecil, 14 January 1599
 3. Ibid., p.170, Mollineux to Cecil, 19 March 1599.
 4. Ibid., p.389-390, Vaughan to Cecil, 31 January 1600.
 5. Ibid., p.466, Hesketh to Cecil.
 6. Ibid., p.389, Vaughan to Cecil, 31 January 1600

From a list of February 1598 of twenty-eight recusants who were to contribute towards the cost of sending horse to Ireland the commissioners hoped to raise £280; all in the list were assessed at sums between £5 and £20 a year and eight were asked to contribute on account of their wives' recusancy.⁽¹⁾ However, only seven of the 28 paid a total of £60.⁽²⁾ John Bird, who had "twenty-five years experience of Ireland" reported to Cecil that Edward Norris of Speke, worth £500 a year, had never been presented for his recusancy "through fear of his greatness".⁽³⁾

In September 1598 Bishop Vaughan received a batch of common form letters to send out to recusants asking contributions of £15 each to provide horse for the Irish war; five were asked for the full £15 and twenty were required to give £7.10s each and five of this category were widows of recusants.⁽⁴⁾ The poor response to these letters so angered the privy council that the bishop was ordered to see all defaulters sent under bonds to the council board, to answer "their contemptuous and unsubjectlyke behavvour"; and, the sheriff and all justices of the peace were to aid him in their arrest.⁽⁵⁾

In view of the number of Lancashire recusants who were asked for contributions for the Irish war it would appear that many escaped scot free. The bishop's visitation of 1598 detected 498 recusants for the diocese of Chester, many of whom must have lived in Lancashire. By 1601 episcopal returns showed 754 recusants, and those of 1603 show almost 2,000 in the five deaneries of the Chester diocese.⁽⁶⁾

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1. PRO.SP. 12/266/80, Vaughan's List, February 1598
 2. PRO.SP. 12/270/41, list of payments to Sir John Stanhope treasurer of the chamber, 18 February 1599.
 3. HMC., Salisbury ix, 18, 19, Bird to Cecil, 11 January 1599.
 4. APC., xxix, 220
 5. Ibid., pp. 300-301
 6. C.Haigh, op.cit., 330.

Levies of horse and monetary contributions to send them out were naturally asked only of the wealthier gentry among the recusants, yet their recalcitrant mood, and their confidence in resisting government demands in this respect may have made recusants more noticeable in the military records of Lancashire than elsewhere.⁽¹⁾

In conclusion, Lancashire, though poor, was asked to raise 1,403 infantrymen for Ireland, which at an average cost per head of £3.10s. in the 1590s would have cost the county £4,910. Twenty horses and riders equipped at £30 each would have cost an additional £600. Recusants proved reluctant to contribute to this part of the war effort. And as we have seen, the quality of the men, arms and armour supplied from Lancashire for the Irish service was not ~~their~~ ^{of the} best on every occasion. Lacking clear evidence from the Lancashire recruits themselves one could speculate how far those who deserted did so for religious reasons. Some of the commanders in the war appreciated that the raw material of so many English levies ~~were~~ ^{was} "commonly catholic", though the historian of Tudor Ireland, R.W.Bagwell, dismissed this as "sanguine rhetoric ... the now customary mode of speech of leaders of Irish sedition".⁽²⁾

(iv) Background to Cheshire's levies.

Tudor writers such as John Speed, William Smith and John Leland noted the industry, prosperity and independence of the people of the ancient palatine county of Chester. Speed, who mapped the shire, said it was forty-seven miles one way and twenty-six the other;

1. For the way in which the government set about disarming recusants in one shire, Kent, see J.J.N.McGurk, 'Lieutenancy and Recusancy in Elizabethan Kent' in Recusant History (March, 1974), 157-170
2. R.W.Bagwell, Ireland under the Tudors, iii (1890), 15.

Leland noted the traditional independence and ancient survival of its gentry families, while Smith praised the sturdy virtues of its yeomen, and remarked upon their hatred of Scots.⁽¹⁾ Through inter-marriage and office holding a group of about twelve families became the ruling elite of the shire; Cholmondeley of Cholmondeley, Fittons of Gawesworth, Venables of Kinderton, Brereton of Handforth and Brereton, Savage of Rock Savage, Warburton of Arley, Smith of Hough Hatherton, Stanley of Hooton, Davenport of Davenport, Booth of Dunham-Massey, Wilbraham of Woodhey and Duttons of Hatton and Dutton.⁽²⁾ Between 1590 and 1640 these families and their cadet branches formed the backbone of county administration in providing every deputy lieutenant, three-quarters of the sheriffs, over a third of the justices, and the majority of members of Parliament representing the shire. The crown and privy council therefore relied on their voluntary co-operation to enforce its will in the shire.⁽³⁾

Until 1594 both Cheshire and Lancashire were under the lieutenancy of the Earls of Derby, but as in Lancashire in the absence of a commission of lieutenancy the crown and privy council directed its orders between 1594 and 1607 to the high sheriff and commissioners for musters. Two of the commissioners took prominence over the others,

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1. W.Harrison, 'Leland's Itinerary' in Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire (hereafter THSIC), xxviii (1910), pp.40-58; W.Smith's account of Cheshire in King's Vale Royal is edited from D.King's edition in 1656 by G.Ormerod, The History of the County Palatine and City of Chester (1819), I, pp. 103-112. J.Beck, Tudor Cheshire (Chester, 1969), chapter one.
 2. For the Cheshire county elite's continuing influence into the mid-seventeenth century, J.S.Morrill, Cheshire 1630-1660; County Government and Society during the English Revolution (Oxford, 1974) and G.P.Higgins, 'County Government and Society in Cheshire, c.1590 to c.1640' unpublished M.A. thesis, (University of Liverpool, 1973), pp.22, and P.J.Marriott, 'Commission of the Peace in Cheshire 1536-1603' unpublished M.A. thesis (University of Manchester, 1974), passim.
 3. G.P.Higgins, op.cit., Chapter Two, 'The County Community'. Under the early Stuarts about twelve families of the Cheshire élite held posts in the Irish administration, see J.S.Morrill, op.cit., p.17.

Sir Hugh Cholmondeley⁽¹⁾ and Sir John Savage;⁽²⁾ Cholmondeley had been deputy lieutenant under Henry, 4th Earl of Derby until 1594 and Sir John Savage's father, the second deputy lieutenant in the same period. Sir John Savage succeeded his father in December 1597; he became anxious in August 1599 ^{because} ~~that~~ his name was omitted whenever the privy council wrote to the authorities in Cheshire; he wrote to Thomas Lake at the privy council:

After my father's death (December 1597) I was appointed deputy lieutenant of Cheshire but have been omitted in late letters ... (3)

In fact there was no commission of lieutenancy given Cheshire and Savage must have erroneously assumed that he had succeeded to all his father's previous offices. Again, as in Lancashire, the surviving correspondence of the privy council with the county authorities is entitled "A lieutenancy letter-book" whereas its contents are chiefly addressed to the High Sheriff and commissioners for musters.⁽⁴⁾

As elsewhere, the military demands of central government for musters, trained bands, Irish levies, and military and other taxes were based on the hundreds of the shire. Cheshire was divided into seven hundreds: Bucklow, Macclesfield, Broxton, Nantwich, Edisbury and Wirral. Their high constables and bailiffs were responsible to the commissioners of musters who received a continual stream of orders from the privy council relating to the demands of the war escalating in Ireland. They were the responsible agents for the raising and

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1. Cheshire Record Office, Chester Castle (hereafter CRO), Cholmondeley of Cholmondeley MSS. Sir Hugh was knight of the shire, 1585, chief commissioner for musters in Cheshire and Chester in the 1590s, escheator of the county, 1600., d.1601.
 2. F.R.Raines; 'The Derby Household Books' Chetham Society, O.S., xxxi (1853) 144-145 for an account of the Savages of Rock Savage.
 3. PRO.SP. 12/272/23, John Savage to Thomas Lake at the p.c., 9 August 1599
 4. CRO., DDX, 358, ff.1-84, Lieutenancy Letter Book of Sir Hugh Cholmondeley 1595-1604, and cf. IRO., LV/80 - Lancashire Lieutenancy Minute Book.

viewing of Irish levies and rectifying their defects in numbers of men and quality of arms. They were to make sure that other levies passing through Cheshire to Chester proceeded in an orderly manner, and they were to help the mayor of Chester in his billeting, mustering, viewing and embarkation of the troops.

The Cheshire hundreds contained 122 parishes, each with a number of villages and townships giving a scattered rural population in the sixteenth century. Northwich and Nantwich were the more populous hundreds. There is no official estimate of the county's population in the sixteenth century, but Dr. B. Harris, editor of the *Victoria County History of Cheshire* suggests a figure of about 55,000.⁽¹⁾ Norman Dore, local historian of Cheshire, on the basis of wills, genealogies, the Poll and Hearth taxes came to a figure of between 70,000 and 75,000 for the mid-seventeenth century. For the city of Chester's population Dr. Harris suggests 5,000 to 6,000 in the sixteenth century, and Norman Dore a figure of about 7,500 in the mid-seventeenth century.⁽²⁾ The highest muster return of 1595 gives a total of 4,000 able-bodied men, exclusive of Chester, so that with a multiplier of seven, a population of 28,000 is suggested. But as in Lancashire this is surely too low, and confirms the inadequacy of population estimates arrived at on the basis of musters.

The man/power base whence these levies were selected for the Irish war may be, as usual, more reliably determined from the muster certificates, and those for Cheshire indicate a smaller military potential than Lancashire's. In 1570, 1,640 men were mustered, in 1573, 3,000, in 1577, 1,640, in 1580, 3,000 and in 1595, 4,000.⁽³⁾

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1. From conversation with Dr. B. Harris, editor Victoria County History, Cheshire.
 2. I am grateful to Norman Dore for his help with these population estimates.
 3. CRO., DDX/358/1, ff. 1-11v., and see E. E. Rich, 'The population of Elizabethan England' in Econ. Hist. Review, 2nd ser. (1950), 254.

For the last year Lancashire by comparison mustered 6,463 men.⁽¹⁾ Cheshire's round figures suggest conventional muster returns, and hardly precise figures of all able-bodied males between the ages of 16 and 60. The 1580 muster certificate was sent in on printed forms, an unusual practice as the privy council did not send out printed forms on every occasion. The Cheshire justices described their 1580 certificate as "a pye of squares"; they said the number all the able-bodied furnished men was first given as 2,000, then at 1,000 because "the armytriton in his unskilfulness hath sett downe his figure of 1 in shewe lyke to the figure of 2".⁽²⁾

With this relatively small number of men, and scarce resources Cheshire thought itself hard-pressed for levies. Although Cheshire was a large exporter of cheese, and had almost all its land enclosed by 1600 the county was not notably wealthy.⁽³⁾ In calculating the comparative wealth of the shires for the first half of the sixteenth century on tax yields such as subsidy returns W.G.Hoskins found no data for Cheshire other than the benevolence of 1545, which yielded £640 from Cheshire, which can usefully be compared to Kent's yield on the same benevolence of £6,471.⁽⁴⁾ In 1580 the commissioners for musters complained to the Earl of Leicester that in their small county of Cheshire the queen and non-resident nobles owned much of the land without contributing to local resources.⁽⁵⁾ When preparing defences at the time of the Armada the Cheshire justices complained that prices were rising so fast that the money collected for these preparations would be insufficient.⁽⁶⁾ In the 1590s

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1. CRO., DDX, 358/1, ff.28-29 where the Lancashire muster certificate is given with Cheshire's for the year 1595.
 2. CSPD., (1547-1580), 679
 3. G.E.Fussell, 'Four centuries of Cheshire farming systems', THSIC., no.106, (1954), 58-60
 4. W.G.Hoskins, The Age of Plunder (1976), Table 1.3, p.24 and Appendix 1.
 5. PRO.SP.12/162/12
 6. PRO.SP.12/209/98

captains supervising the county's store of arms and armour remained unpaid for five consecutive years, and though warned by the council the county's authorities were either unable or unwilling to pay the captains.⁽¹⁾ The council took little heed of the county's pleas of poverty and in October 1594 directed the high sheriff and commissioners that in addition to the 200 trained in April 1594 they were to keep 100 more well trained and ready armed for speedy service to Ireland if required.⁽²⁾ In the 1590s, as we have seen, the government was driven to ask that proportions of men from the trained bands be called out to improve the quality of the drafts of conscripts for the Irish war. Cheshire was no exception, and despite the county's deep-seated reluctance to draw upon the expensively trained men of the militia the ruling elite in the county had to agree to government orders to this effect in 1594, 1596, and the 1599 levies.⁽³⁾ It must also be recalled that as fire-arms became predominant in the last years of the queen's reign we must presume some training on the part of the raw recruits not designated as pikemen.

(v) Cheshire Levies.

Cheshire, the natural hinterland of the port of Chester, shared the multiple burdens which the Irish war of the 1590s brought.⁽⁴⁾ Apart from fulfilling the direct privy council demands for specific numbers of men and arms, as well as horse, the surrounding villages and parishes adjacent to Chester were often made liable for billeting the levies which marched on Chester from every shire of the realm.

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1. PRO.SP.12/212/27
 2. PRO.,SP.12/250/18, to the High Sheriff and justices of Cheshire, October 1594.
 3. CRO.,DDX/358/1/ff.26, 28, 33v., 40.
 4. See Part II, chapter seven.

Captains and conductors, who had lost men through desertion, were likely to call upon the same villages and parishes to make up their numbers.⁽¹⁾ With this in mind the numbers in Table 3 of the demands made on Cheshire may be considered but a part of the entire, and untold, contribution the county made to the war effort.

Cheshire was asked to provide soldiers for the war on twelve occasions over the period 1594 to 1602, nearly the same number of times as Lancashire, but fewer men were demanded. Less than a thousand men over a nine year period may not appear excessively demanding; the smaller geographical area of Cheshire may explain why Cheshire sent out 534 foot less than Lancashire; yet, each county sent out the same number of horse, a possible indication of the greater prosperity of Cheshire gentry.⁽²⁾ The six gentry sending furnished horse in June 1600 were: Sir Hugh Cholmondeley, Sir Randall Brereton, Sir William Brereton, Sir Peter Leigh, Peter Warburton of Arley and William Brereton of Hanford.⁽³⁾ In 1601 eleven members of the gentry were asked: Sir Richard Brereton, Sir William Brereton, Sir Peter Leigh, Sir John Savage, Sir George Booth, Thomas Venables, Peter Warburton, Thomas Wilbraham, Thomas Holcroft, Richard Gravener and John Dutton.⁽⁴⁾

As in Lancashire the heaviest demands on the county came between June 1598 and June 1600, reflecting crises in the armies in Ireland. The increase from 25 to 60 between August and October 1601, together with the demand for eleven horse is merely a reflection of what was happening in other shires on the occasion of the Spanish landing at Kinsale.⁽⁵⁾ In these last years of the war the complaints

1. For examples, APC., xxx, 229, 230

2. Table 3

3. APC., xxx, 440, Cheshire gentry furnishing horse, June 1600

4. APC., xxxii, 283, October 1601.

5. Table 4.

Table 3.

Cheshire levies to Ireland.

<u>Date</u>	<u>No. of foot.</u>	<u>No. of horse.</u>	<u>Ref.</u>
1594 (Oct.)	100	-	(1)
1596 (Sept.)	47	-	(2)
1597 (April)	47	-	(3)
1598 (June)	150	-	(4)
1599 (Jan.)	200	3	(5)
1600 (Jan.)	100	-	(6)
1600 (June)	50	6	(7)
1600 (Dec.)	20	-	(8)
1601 (April)	25	-	(9)
1601 (August)	25)		
1601 (Oct.)	60)	11	(10)
1601 (Dec.)	20	-	
for 1602 (Jan.)			
1602 (July)	50	-	(11)
Totals:	869 f.	20 h.	

1. PRO.SP.12/248/87 - Original order was for 200. Second order to train and keep in readiness for Ireland 100 men - PRO.SP.12/250/18
2. This levy was to join the Lancashire contingent. Six dead pays clearly allowed in the 100, hence 47 in each half. CRO.,DDX,358/1, f.33v., Cholmondeley's letter book.
3. APC., xxvii, 21-28
4. CCR.,DXX/358/1, f.34
5. Hatfield House, Cecil Papers, 88/49, r.; APC., xxix, 490
6. CSPD., (1598-1601), 377
7. Hatfield House, Cecil Papers, 88/49 r.; APC., xxx, 416, 436
8. APC., xxx, 566, 598
9. APC., xxxi, 23, reinforcements for L. Foyle garrisons.
10. Ibid., 318. The original order for 25 in August was increased to 60 in October - not therefore separate levies; 60 not 85 accounted in the total. APC., xxxii, 83, 107, 225, 242, 283.
11. CCR.,M/MP/13, mayor's military papers, muster roll at the port of Chester July 1602.

of the justices in Cheshire suggest that the Irish effort had denuded the shire of arms and armour and all other kinds of "warlike necessaries".⁽¹⁾ As elsewhere, the county arsenals became a source of supply for these levies to Ireland, an understandable expedient when the price of providing new fire-arms was 50% greater than in the earlier years of the reign.⁽²⁾

The way in which the commissioners for the musters in Cheshire divided up the demands for men among the seven hundreds, and the consequent rating on each for the necessary money to have the soldiers equipped in the case of each levy, ~~and~~ differs from the Lancashire quotas in that military rates are given.

Table 5. Quotas of men and money in Cheshire hundreds.

<u>Hundred.</u>	<u>March 1596</u>	<u>Sept. 1596</u>	<u>June 1598</u>	<u>Oct. 1601</u>
Macclesfield	Men 25 Rate £75. 3. 4	9 £25. 2. 0	25 £100. 5. 4	12 - - -
Edisbury	Men 16 Rate £48. 16. 0	4 £16. 16. 0	16 £ 64. 7. 4	7 - - -
Nantwich	Men 21 Rate £75. 1. 0	7 £24. 19. 6	31 £ 99. 0. 6	10 - - -
Broxton	Men 21 Rate £69. 1. 0	7 £21. 2. 2	21 £ 90. 13. 2	7 - - -
Northwich	Men 20 Rate £59. 5. 0	6 £18. 14. 0	20 £ 77. 19. 0	7 - - -
Bucklow	Men 24 Rate £63. 1. 0	7 £21. 3. 4	24 £ 84. 14. 4	10 - - -
Wirral	Men 23 Rate £60. 7. 8 ⁽³⁾	7 £20. 15. 6 ⁽⁴⁾	23 £ 81. 3. 2 ⁽⁵⁾	7 - - - ⁽⁶⁾
Totals of soldiers	150	47	150	60

1. PRO.SP.12/230/74 - complaints of the Cheshire justices.
2. C.G.Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army (2nd ed. Oxford, 1966) pp.115-116
3. This levy was sent out of Cheshire to aid Essex in his Cadiz venture at a cost to the county of £450.15.0. The commissioners noted "this chardge was layd according to the mize", CRO.,DDx/358/1, f.26
4. This levy went to Ireland under Sir Urian Leigh, who had been knighted by Essex at Cadiz. Stockings and shoes came to 4s.6d. the men's coats at 16s each, conduct money 3s.4d. CRO.,DDX/358/1/f.35v.
5. The second largest levy to Ireland from the county. The commissioners reckoned the total cost to the county at £599.12.10 - CRO.,DDX.358/1,d.45v.
6. No local evidence for this levy has been found, the numbers are counted from the indenture among the exchequer records - PRO.E.101/65/17 (a) signed by the conductor, Thomas Venables, and Thomas Ashton, the sheriff in 1601.

Unlike the lieutenancy records for Kent in the 1590s those of Cheshire are disappointingly thin. Nevertheless, from Cholmondeley's letter book and elsewhere the progress in mustering, equipping and sending out two levies from Cheshire, in September 1596, and in June 1598 can be followed in detail.⁽¹⁾ These two levies illustrate how Cheshire organized forces for Ireland.

On the 27th August 1596 the queen wrote to the sheriff and commissioners for musters stating that it had become necessary to increase forces in Ireland; Fifty able men were to be levied, mustered and put into a state of readiness with coats, armour and weapons. They were to be committed to the charge of an able captain, who would be designated by the privy council's instructions.⁽²⁾ These instructions received in Cheshire on the 10th September appointed Sir Urian Leigh, a local man, the eldest of four sons of Thomas Leigh of Adlington in the hundred of Macclesfield.⁽³⁾ In the letter of appointment Leigh is spoken of as "a Gent(leman) of good reputation and knowne unto you."

The council's directives elaborated the queen's order; they allowed three dead pays on the 50, but wanted them armed in the proportion of 23 corslets with pikes, 12 calivers and 12 muskets, and because the winter season was approaching they wanted the soldiers to have "coates of some mixtd. collour and well lyned". All were to be ready at Chester on the last day of September, or sooner should there be "convenient shipping there for theire transportacion into the realme of Irelande." They were to join up with another 47 from Lancashire "to make one bande", at the assembly place in

1. CRO.DDX.358/1, ff.33v.-38; 44-46r.

2. CRO.DDX.358/1, f.33v., copy of the queen's letter, 27 August 1596.

3. Sir Urian was supposedly the hero of the ballad "The Spanish Lady's Love". He married Margaret da. of Sir Edmund Trafford, and in 1619 was one of the three d. ls. of Cheshire - F.R.Raines (ed.) The Stanley Papers, ii, Chetham Soc. xxxi (1853), notes pp.100-101; Angus-Butterworth, Old Cheshire Families (1932), 99-102.

Warrington.⁽¹⁾

The sheriff and commissioners divided up the demand of 47 on the seven hundreds, and calculated for each hundred the sums of money the constables needed to levy.⁽²⁾ Formal commands then went out from the commissioners to the constables to recruit the soldiers:

"These shall be to will and commande you that you be before us at Tarvin on Tuesday the 28th of this month by nyne of the clocke in the forenoone and to bring with you one hable and sufficient man, suche a one as is knowne to be of goodbehaviour, not vagrant, nor of baser sorte for we are very strictlie commanded that soch be impressed for her gracious Majestie's sayd service in Ireland . . . " (3)

The levying and collection of the military rate of £148.12.6. to equip and clothe the 23 pikemen and 24 "Shot" from the Cheshire hundreds were carried out between the 10th and 18th of September.

We do not hear of the levy again until it came before the commissioners for view and muster, William Brereton, deputy mayor of Chester, and Maurice Kyffin, the government's muster master, at the port of Chester, October 1596.⁽⁴⁾

From the muster master's report and the captain's muster roll, the one annotating the other, we learn that the company under Sir Urian Leigh passed muster, but not until the captain changed "the men delivered out of Lancashire . . . insufficient and defective" for "voluntaryes of his owne followers".⁽⁵⁾ Sir Urian also changed some of the Cheshire men, not because they were insufficient, but because "the capten was desirous to have some of his owne friendes and tenants in their place." Maurice Kyffin, the muster master at Chester,

1. CRO.DDX.358/1, ff.34r. and v., 10 Sept. 1598.

2. See above Table 5

3. CRO.DDX.358/1, f.35r. headed "To the Constables of - - - -"

4. The exact date of their muster at Chester is uncertain, but the muster roll is dated 12 October 1596.

5. PRO.SP.63/194/132-133 "The muster rolle of Sir Urian Leigh his company mustered at Chester, 12th Octobris 1596".

reported that this course of action had been permitted by the commissioners in the shire and by him at the port "because there was no corruption used therein by anye of his officers, and he the said capten assured us upon his creditt that there was none."⁽¹⁾ The company thus re-constituted largely of Cheshire men, was deemed, "exceedinge Fayre", and in number four or five over and above the abatement of the six dead pays allowed, standing at 34 musketeers, 38 pikemen, 23 calivers and seven officers. Among the officers were Captain Leigh's two brothers, Ralph and Thomas Leigh, the former lieutenant, the latter, ensign, and his son Thomas Leigh, serjeant. Ralph and one of the Thomas's were later killed at the Yellow Ford in August 1598 in Ireland. The company lacked a surgeon but Sir Urian asked that the pay for one should not be deducted until he "can provide himself of a skilful surgian".⁽²⁾

From "Payments to Sir Urian Leigh, knight, capten of 100 footmen" it can be seen that he was given £3.2.8 conduct money, 1d. a mile for the sixteen miles march from Warrington to Chester. For imprest money he received £15.8s., and since he arrived with 47 men at Chester a day before the Lancashiremen he was paid an additional £1.11.4d. for the day of the 11th October. Further payments indicate the company was delayed on account of bad weather: "for two weekes pay for the company beginninge the xii and endinge the xxiiij of October, £46.13.4d. as well as £7.14s. for the officers . . ."⁽³⁾ Indeed, the last item of these accounts show that Leigh's company was held back a further week after the 24th October "by reasone this bande was the laste embarqued, £xx."⁽⁴⁾

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1. PRO.SP/63/194 f.133 d., marginal notes by the commissioners William Brereton and Maurice Kyffin at Chester, who inspected both the company and the muster roll.
 2. PRO.SP.63/194/133r. marginal note on the muster roll.
 3. PRO.SP.63/194/223 r. and v., 13 September 1596.
 4. PRO.SP.63/194/238 - Payments October 1596.

We pick up the progress of Leigh's company in Ireland on the 13th November 1596 when it was reported that "Sir Urian Leigh arrived (at the Lord Deputy's camp at Rathdrum, 29 miles s.w. of Dublin in Co. Wicklow) bringing with him a prisoner from Dublin one of Feagh McHugh O'Byrne's followers. Sir William Russell, then Lord Deputy, ordered Leigh's company to march to the garrison at Drogheda, 23 miles north of Dublin, where it remained until drawn out to fight with the lord deputy's field forces against Ulster the following autumn. It is a rare instance of where an English company can be followed through to the scene of its military action in Ireland.⁽¹⁾

The government's demand on Cheshire in June 1598 for 150 soldiers to re/inforce defective bands in Ireland because of the continuance of the rebellion, left similar records in Cholmondeley's letter book to those of Sir Urian Leigh's company in 1596. The correspondence for levying, mustering and equipping the 150 suggested a greater degree of urgency than in 1596. The queen's letter was sent to the commissioners on 13th June 1598, the privy council's directives on the 18th, the orders to the constables for men and money on the 26th, and the men were to be at Chester under the captaincy of Peter Warburton, a local man, by the 9th of July.⁽²⁾

Among the specific directions sent by the council to Cheshire, half the force were to be pikemen, half "shot", and of the "shot" the greater part were to be musketeers; they were to be given training in fire/arms, and the recruiters were not to admit "anie rogues and vagabonds in the nombre of them". Their billeting, victualling and shipping had already been arranged between the council and the mayor of

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1. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 252, 253, in Russell's journal (June 1594-May 1597)
 2. CRO., DDX.358/1, f.44r. the queen's letter under the signet; ibid., f.44v., the council's directives; ibid., f.45r. the commissioners instructions; and ibid., f.47r. is a recommendation from the Earl of Essex that Captain Peter Warburton be muster master of the shire of Cheshire.

Chester, and hence no delays were to be allowed in the execution of the service.⁽¹⁾

The recruits from the four hundreds of Nantwich, Wirral, Edisbury and Broxton mustered at Cobbler's Cross, near Tarporley on the 4th of July; and, on the same day those from the other three hundreds at Knutsford. This was expeditious mustering since the orders went out to the constables on the 26th of June.⁽²⁾ Captain Peter Warburton's part "of the tripartite roll indented", dated the 9th of July at Chester shows that the full demand of 150 was mustered and viewed that day at Chester. The men are named by their hundred of origin, christian name and surname, divided into the proportion of weapons required by the council's orders.⁽³⁾ There is no sign of how long they stayed in Chester, or of when they sailed for Ireland. The general impression is one of an efficient piece of service from Cheshire, perhaps because the muster master was also their captain and conductor to Chester; and, perhaps, because they were all Cheshiremen, not joined with the recruits of a neighbouring shire, there were no changes of men.

To provide money for this levy the sheriff, Sir Edward Warren and the commissioners for musters rated the sum of £599.12.10 proportionately on the hundreds depending on the numbers each recruited; they reckoned conduct money at 3s. 4d. for each soldier, a coat and cap for each at 16s., shoes and stockings at 4s. 6d. and hose and doublet at 14s. They paid Captain Warburton in two instalments of £20 and £30 as Captain and Muster Master.⁽⁴⁾ In these accounts no prices of weapons are given. This omission, perhaps,

1. CRO.,DDX.358/1/f.45r.

2. See Table 5 for the quotas on the hundreds.

3. CRO.DDX.358/1, ff.47 and 48, the muster roll.

4. CRO.DDX.358/1, f.45 v. "the rates for the monie so supplie this service, 26 June 1598", *ibid.*, f.48 v. a copy of the Lord Treasurer's letter, 10 July 1598, shows payments of £35 and £30 to Captain Warburton. The schedule in answer to the inquiry of September 1600 in Cecil Papers, Hatfield, 88/49r. states these payments as £20 and £30.

indicated that they were supplied out of the county's arsenal. If £599.12.10d. had been collected in military taxation, and ^{estimating} the total expenditure on the levy ~~at~~ ^{at} £333.15.0., there should have been left in the hands of the commissioners for the county a sum of £265.17.10d. There was nothing unusual or suspicious about a county having surplus funds from military taxation but for the fact that Cheshire had already been ordered to institute an inquiry into the misappropriation of military taxes in July 1596, ⁽¹⁾ and twice after the Warburton levy, in December 1599 and June 1600. ⁽²⁾

In ordering the inquiry, and a "true accompt to be yeelded" the privy council claimed in its letter of the 26th July 1596 to Sir Hugh Cholmondley and the commissioners for musters in Cheshire that over the years from before the Armada crisis of 1588 sums of money had been levied on the Cheshire inhabitants "for armour, weapons and setting forthe of souldiers", which came to the hands of "certen persons which have not imployed the same to those uses". The justices were to find out and report who had received sums of money in each hundred "for her Majesties service these nyne yeres paste", how they used the money, and what sums remained in their hands "unpayd to the greate defraudinge and discontentment of the people." ⁽³⁾

The findings of the subsequent inquiry produced a series of complex financial accounts to 'prove' not mis-appropriation of public funds but non-payment of military taxes on the part of some unidentified persons in six of the seven hundreds, and to show a marginal over-estimation of what taxes were needed. The total sum ordered to be taxed was £2,449.8.6., that collected was only £2,190.12.8d. Of this £2,140.7.4d. had been disbursed. Sir Hugh Cholmondeley and Sir John

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1. CRO.DDE.358/1, f.32r., p.c. to Cheshire, 26 July 1596.
 2. Hatfield House, Cecil Papers, 88/50, the covering letter to the Schedule from Cheshire, September 1600, referring to the p.c.'s letters of inquiry, December and June.
 3. CRO.DDX./358/1, f.32 r.p.c. to commissioners for musters in Cheshire 26 July 1596.

Savage held the balance of £50.5.4d. Taxes un-paid amounted to £258.15.10 indicating the difference between the sum ordered to be taxed and that collected. Of that unpaid total, £39.12.10 was owed from Macclesfield, £34.12.8 from Nantwich, £18.12.11 from Wirral, £8.19.9 from Broxton, £41.12.10 from Bucklow and £115.3.10 from Edisbury. No account is given for Northwich hundred.⁽¹⁾

The neat balancing of the totals contrast with the clerk's methods of arriving at them; undated and random jottings of county taxes and expenses over the nine year period, but not in chronological order, his omission of any accounts from Northwich, and his note of uncertainty under the Edisbury account "whether uncollected of the countrie or in the handes of the then justices of the peace wee can by no enquiry learne"⁽²⁾ would all appear to cast some suspicion on the correctness of the totals.

The privy council was clearly not satisfied. In December 1599 it wanted a further inquiry instituted in Cheshire. There was no reply;⁽³⁾ it wrote again in June 1600 to the effect that the queen and her people are defrauded by those who convert taxes to their own use having been credibly informed of these abuses in Cheshire, and among "gentlemen of honest reputation."⁽⁴⁾ The council wanted a full statement of what happened to monies levied, who had received it, how it had been delivered, and what portion had been detained, and it expected a speedy reply. The sheriff, Thomas Smith, and four commissioners, Sir John Savage, William Brereton, John Egerton and Thomas Wilbraham, replied to Sir Robert Cecil on the 16th September 1600 with a schedule of accounts for the previous 'two' years, and a covering letter.⁽⁵⁾ The schedule is not very revealing simply

1. CRO:DDX:358/1, ff.40-41v., undated accounts.

2. Ibid., f.41v.

3. Hatfield House, Cecil Papers, 88/50, p.c. letter Dec. 1599.

4. APC., xxx, 405, p.c. to H.S. and commissioners, 22 June 1600

5. Hatfield House, Cecil Papers, 88/50, 16 September 1600.

indicating that a sum of £19.15.5. remained in the hands of Sir Edward Fitton from all monies received either by taxation or received from the Exchequer.

Nevertheless, under the heading "for the service of 150 souldiers for her Majesties service of Irelande in July 1598" the sums given are different from those in Cholmondeley's letter book for the identical service in Cheshire. In the schedule it is stated that £602.19.6. was levied on the county, and that £602.13.8. was expended, and the balance of 5s. 10d. was also spent on the next levy for Ireland.⁽¹⁾ The Cholmondeley letter book gives £599.12.10 as the sum levied; and from the items spent on each of the 150 soldiers of Warburton's company a total of £333.15.0. can be calculated.⁽²⁾ Both letter book and the schedule agree that the county had £67.2s. from the exchequer, but disagree on the amounts paid the muster master and captain, Peter Warburton. The letter from the Lord Treasurer in the letter books shows two instalments of £35 and £30 to be paid Warburton, whereas the schedule sent in September 1600 gives instalments of £20 and of £30 paid Warburton, who "noew hath refused securitie for payment thereof".⁽³⁾ Therefore it seems possible that there had been some mis-appropriation of public money among the Cheshire county officials in the 1590s, and that, as elsewhere, there was trouble over who should pay the muster master's salary, the county or the government.

The demands for men and money from Cheshire were not the only demands; Cheshire was an agricultural shire, famed for its cheese,

1. Hatfield House, Cecil Papers, 88/f.49r., the schedule under 1598.
2. CRO.DDX., 358/1, f.45v. - of the Cholmondeley letter book.
3. Hatfield House, Cecil Papers, 88/49r. and of .DDX.358/1, f.48 v. copy letter of the Lord Treasurer's letter to Cheshire, 10 July, 1598.

butter and farm produce. Hence it was much called upon by the army victualling contractors. While some complained of resulting food shortages, many in Cheshire may have profited by the trade in supplying victuals for the forces in Ireland. When the Earl of Essex was recruiting his Irish army of 1599 he told the privy council not to have the victualling contractors search remote counties for cheese and butter, such as Essex and Suffolk, but to have them take up these commodities in Cheshire, Lancashire and Wales, and thereby avoid decay of the goods on long inland journeys.⁽¹⁾ Such victualling policy worked to the disadvantage of the county in years of dearth, 1596 and 1598, years also of a large military presence in Ireland; grain shortages in the city of Chester and in the county then became acute. And as prices rose, so too did resentment at having to ship grain to feed the armed forces in Ireland.⁽²⁾

The justices of Cheshire wrote indignantly on the 12th of October, 1596 to the privy council of how Mr. George Beverley, the government's victualling contractor for Ireland, had been sent into Cheshire by the Lord Deputy and Council in Ireland "to take up and transporte from hence into Irelande 500 quarter bushells of wheat". In unequivocal terms they pointed out the great scarcity "of bread corne in all this countrey . . . because of the continuall wette that hath fallen ever sithence Aprill laste . . . " A straight refusal to comply with the order followed, which stressed that there was insufficient grain in Cheshire that winter to feed its own inhabitants. Finally, they wrote, that in future demands of the same kind, the council must recall the "pore estate of our countrey".⁽³⁾ George Beverley
 Victualler to the army again in September 1598 remarked to Sir William

1. HMC., Salisbury, vi, 447

2. AFC., xxvi, 132, 133, 257; ibid., xxx, 24, 25, 236

3. CRO.DDX.358/1, f.37, Cheshire to the p.c., 12 October 1596.

Knollys, comptroller of the Queen's household

"The cheese of this Country [Cheshire] is a victual apt and ready to be shipped to serve the soldiers in Ireland, and heretofore hath usually been provided in the winter season, to serve the soldiers for their victualling in Lent, when beef and other victual faileth." (1)

In December 1600, Cheshire sent 600 quarters of wheat to Ireland, but that was among the lowest of the grain contributions that year; Somerset and Sussex, for example, sent 1,500 quarters each, Cornwall and Hampshire, 1,200 each; only Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire at 500 quarters each sent less than Cheshire. (2) These demands are a reminder that the Irish war not only cost the shires in men, money and arms, but that the army had to be largely fed out of England, a fact often emphasised by English captains from Ireland. (3)

As elsewhere, the county of Cheshire gave clear signs of disenchantment with the government's demands in the 1590s. The impressment of troops was held in universal distaste. We have already seen the county's negligence in not making regular and proper returns to the exchequer of military taxes and expenditure. And there is other evidence of the county's reluctance to provide men and money. When loans were collected to support the army in Ireland in 1598, the contribution of £500 due from Cheshire was wanting. (4) Macclesfield wanted to take a stand on the privileges of its letters patent to gain exemption from all military services. This was refused by the privy council in 1598. (5) In 1599 the inhabitants of the Wirral petitioned the privy council for a similar exemption because of their continual burdens with the passage of levies for Ireland. (6) On the 30th November 1600 the council had to write to

1. PRO.SP.63/202/pt.3/no.78 - Beverley to Knollys, 23 September 1598 from Chester.

2. AFC., xxx, 795

3. PRO.SP.63/208/pt.i/no.119, Captain Alford from L.Foyle.

4. CSPI(1598-1599), 30, Irish Council to the p.c., 21 January 1598.

5. AFC., xxviii, 72

6. Ibid., xxix, 593.

the sheriff and commissioners for musters in Cheshire about "certaine townes and landes in that countie (who) doe refuse to contribute towardes such publique chardges for post horses, carts and carriages"; the county was reminded that "no pretence of charter or other privileges ought to free them in theis occaysons of her Majesty's services."⁽¹⁾ In May 1601, Thomas Watson, an agent of the ~~war~~ ^{at war} treasurer in Ireland, complained to the privy council that carts used to convey munitions from the Tower of London to Chester, and which should have been sent to Dublin were "sold in various parts of Cheshire, and for mean prices".⁽²⁾

In conclusion: the experience of raising troops, mustering and equipping them for the Irish war in Cheshire and Lancashire exhibits similarities and contrasts. The administrative system in both, under high sheriffs and commissioners for musters, worked as efficiently as those shires which were under lords lieutenants. And though the personnel of the shirevalty changed annually, the office was circulated among a closely knit group of county gentry in both shires who continuously occupied the commission for musters. In Lancashire, Sir Richard Mollineux stood out as the prominent commissioner, and in Cheshire, Sir Hugh Cholmondeley. And though it may have been expected that both Lancashire and Cheshire would join up their smaller levies to Ireland they did not necessarily do so.

Despite corruption in the military finances of both shires, an aspect of late sixteenth century public life from which no shire studied appeared totally innocent,⁽³⁾ and rising resentment at the

1. APC., xxx, 788, 789

2. CSPI., (1600-1601), p.331

3. See J.Hurstfield, Freedom, Corruption and Government in Elizabethan England (1973), ch.5.

demands of the war, the amount of money and numbers of soldiers from both Lancashire and Cheshire made a considerable contribution to the national war effort; 1,403 foot from Lancashire and 869 from Cheshire. At an average cost of £3.10s. to send a soldier equipped to Ireland their respective numbers would have cost the shires £4,910.10s. and £3,041.10s.; and, to each sum must be added an approximate total of £600 each to send out horse. Coat and conduct money from the Exchequer was normally in arrears, and their amounts never covered the full costs.

Clearly neither shire sent out its bravest and best men, the majority being conscripts. Those from Cheshire appear to have had the better reputation. Lord Mountjoy in writing to Cecil in June 1600 for re-inforcements suggested that they be raised in Cheshire "where [the captain] will be able to draw men of good quality to the service".⁽¹⁾ As we have seen, there were more mentions of desertion among Lancashiremen both within the county and from Ireland than of Cheshire desertions.

Lancashire county authorities made more of their difficulties in communication with London than Cheshire's. However more roads converged on Chester than north of the Mersey in the sixteenth century.⁽²⁾ This may have accounted for the greater speed in executing orders for levies in Cheshire. The county was the hinterland to the City and Port of Chester, a war operations' base. In this sense Cheshire county was subject to frequent directions from central government in a way Lancashire, and other shires, were not. The greater frequency of letters between the privy council

1. CSPI.(1600), 232, Mountjoy to Cecil, 11 June 1600.

2. F.V.Emery, "Communications circa 1600" Fig. 62 in A New Historical Geography of England ed. by H.C.Darby (Cambridge 1973), p.11.

and the commissioners for musters in the county of Cheshire, evident from the council's registers, was a measure of that control. The importance of the city and port of Chester, towards which so many levies for Ireland marched, gave the surrounding shire of Cheshire, through which many of them came, almost an equal importance in government eyes as the chief port of the north for military operations in the 1590s. Part Two of this thesis studies these levies in the ports and their transportation to Ireland.

PART TWO

Embarkation and transportation of troops to the Irish War

"Our Marriners observe the sayling into Ireland to be more dangerous, not onely because many tides meeting, makes the sea apt to swell upon any storne, but especially because they every find the coast of Ireland covered with mists, whereas the coast of England is commonly cleare, and to be seene farre off"

Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, iv, 191.

PART TWO

THE EMBARKATION AND TRANSPORTATION OF TROOPS TO THE IRISH WAR

Introduction: An overall view of the levies and the ports.

The Elizabethan government knew how important it was to get companies of recruits quickly to their destination. It was essential to the efficient prosecution of the war that the ill-assorted levies of raw recruits be marched expeditiously from their assembly points in the shires the moment the companies were complete. "Coat and conduct money" was the only institutional arrangement for the movement of troops in the sixteenth century - the coat money being the soldier's uniform allowance, and conduct money, the daily rate of 8d to cover food and lodgings. When the raising of levies became frequent during the Irish war leaders were appointed to see them safely to the port of embarkation; at times of large levies the commissioners for musters in the ports ordered these leaders or conductors to stay with their men in port helping to keep order. On some occasions the captain, under whom they were going to serve in Ireland, collected and led his new recruits out of the shires, acting in that capacity as a conductor. Whether a commissioned captain or not, the conductor was given a fixed amount of time to get his men to port, and therefore a fixed allowance of conduct money from the county authority, which it later recovered from the exchequer.⁽¹⁾

1. City of Chester Records (hereafter CCR), M/MP/8/126, a list of 20 conductors in 1598 at Chester; five are designated "Captains".

The frequency of levies to Ireland brought about a uniform set of procedures for their conduct to the ports, which were re-iterated by the privy council to the officers of the lieutenancies. However, a particular set of instructions sent by Sir Robert Cecil to the Earl of Shrewsbury survive in the Talbot papers showing that the many individual directives of the council had been brought together for the guidance of conductors to prevent abuses on the march.⁽¹⁾

The first instruction is a public warning to the assembled company that after a recruit received the "queen's purse money", and was placed under a conductor, he was not to run away, on pain of "death as a felon accordinge to the lawes of the Realme". The conductor was then to draw up a tripartite indenture showing the soldier's name, surname and parish; "one part to be sent up hither with more speed than heretofore hath byn used, the other to be delivered unto hym, the third to remayne in the countrey". The conductor was not to postpone this duty until he was at the port, nor was he to alter the indenture in any way. Most important he was not to change any of the men or, "he will answeere the same at his uttermost perill".

Should any soldier fall sick on the way, or get lame on the march, the conductor had to hand him over to the mayor of the next town they came to, or to a justice of the peace with a signed report showing why he was unable to finish the march. Should any soldier on the march attempt to run away "he shall be followed with hue and cry as a felon", and, if caught by the local constables, he was to be assigned to the gaol and tried at the next sessions of the peace in the county of his arrest. When the conductor had delivered his men over to the authority of the mayor of the port, or other commissioners

1. College of Arms, Talbot MS K. f.30r. n.d. but signed by Cecil.

of musters he was to bring back with him "ample certificate from the maior of the porte of the deliverie over of so manie soldiers as he doth receive in the county". If it appeared from the certificate that men are wanting at the port for reasons other than sickness, the conductor should not only forfeit the gains in money he made, but be committed to prison to "remayne there until wee be advertised of his lewd dealinges that some seveare and exemplar punishment maie be inflicted upon him".⁽¹⁾

These instructions were designed to prevent the fraudulent conductor lining his pocket at government expense to the detriment of the army. However, the indenture system could be manipulated by the conductor. He could sell freedom to his entire company once clear of the shire in which it was levied and arrive in Chester carrying only a muster roll. There he could procure, through agents, the men and arms he needed at the port for muster and review. The commissioners would review them as correct, and duly inscribe the muster roll to that effect. The corrupt conductor could then pay off his agents, who, in turn paid off the men who went home to await another occasion to be soldiers for a few hours. If such a conductor was also a captain commissioned to recruit a company and lead them to Ireland he could repeat the ruse in Ireland where he could try to get further payment from the treasurer-at-war for his fictitious company. The deception was easier in Ireland for on muster days there he could play the game with real soldiers hired from other companies or from among the Irish.⁽²⁾ No case of such extreme fraud had been found in England, but that lesser frauds took

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1. College of Arms, Talbot MSS., K., f. 30r (n.d.) There are a number of such passes in the mayor of Chester's military papers, for example, those of Gabriel Wethenhall and Jasper Rutter, constables of Nantwich certifying that, Daniel Storey of Lincolnshire was too ill to proceed to Chester, and signed at the request of his conductor, William Lilly - CCR/M/MP/10/5, 2 July 1599.
 2. APC., xxxi, 21-22; CSPI (1596-1597), 172.

place is quite clear, such as the substitution of handfuls of men and the use of "stand-ins" at musters, or passé-volants. Chester, as the main military port for Ireland, had the reputation of being spelunca latronum - a robbers' cave.⁽¹⁾

The government attempted to prevent fraud firstly by requiring more detailed information on indentures. From merely recording the soldier's name, his weapon and the parish or village from which he was levied, those of the late 1590s were expected to describe details of the soldier's appearance, and the full equipment he carried.⁽²⁾ This made detection easier should the conductor be suspected of changing his men. Secondly, by the 1590s the privy council began to appoint experienced captains as conductors to lead recruits all the way from the shires to Ireland. Captain Henry Harte, for example, was frequently employed as a conductor of levies. Such centrally employed captains were resented in the shires for they thwarted the wishes of the county authorities to choose local conductors. We have seen examples of this resentment in previous chapters, especially where captains were commissioned to conduct companies made up from men from more than one shire. Both measures, widening information on indentures and appointing well established captains as conductors, did not necessarily guarantee that levies would be perfectly conducted to the ports; abuses persisted until the end of the war.⁽³⁾

At the ports the mayors had authority to hire privately-owned merchant vessels to transport the troops, their arms, victuals and *impedimenta*, though on occasion ships of the royal navy were used,

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1. There is no mention of corruption on this scale in the mayor's military papers in Chester; CSPI (1596-1597), 172; ibid. (1598-1599), 219.
 2. CCR./M/MP/11/5, 6; M/MP/7/32, 35; M/MP/11/1-14 examples of indentures from captains and from conductors.
 3. For examples HMC., Salisbury, xi, 431, APC., xxxi, 21 and in chapters seven and eight below.

for example for the levy of 2,000 men at Rochester in October 1601.⁽¹⁾
 Ships' masters did not willingly abandon their trading interests to transport troops and bargained greedily to better "the queen's price". Adverse winds delaying the departure of levies, often for weeks, lowered men's morale, and raised the cost of transporting troops still further. The frequency of levies to Ireland in the 1590s multiplied such problems and forced the government to seek greater controls over ship-owners and masters and strengthen the authority of the mayors in the ports.⁽²⁾

Earlier Irish rebellions such as Shane O'Neill's in the 1560s, and that of the Desmonds in 1578-1583 had, of course, given the Elizabethan privy council much practice in the military logistics of transporting large bodies of troops to Ireland. In this respect a "plott" or plan in the Cottonian manuscripts drawn up on the occasion of the Desmond rebellion, 1579 for sending out 2,000 troops is of interest as a precedent showing "in what shiers men may most commodiously be levied for the service of Ireland; the best places to embarque, and their landinge places in Ireland." As we may expect, men from North Wales and adjoining shires went to Chester for Dublin; those from South Wales and bordering shires to Bristol for Waterford, and those from the west country to Barnstaple, Padstow and Falmouth for Waterford.⁽³⁾

The much larger troop movements of the years 1594-1602 show that the three ports most frequently used by the government were, Chester, Bristol and Barnstaple. In addition Plymouth, Southampton and Portsmouth were used as reception ports for veterans from the

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1. See chapter nine below, and for the English merchant service see G.V.Scammell, "Manning the English merchant service in the Sixteenth Century" in Mariner's Mirror, lvi (1970), 131-154.
 2. The evidence may be seen in the following chapters.
 3. B.L.Cottonian MS., Titus B., xii, f.322.

Low Countries on their way to Ireland. And Haverfordwest, Holyhead, Ilfracombe and Beaumaris, though not used to launch primary levies, were frequently used as refuges whenever troop ships were blown back by bad weather; in that sense these western and smaller ports could be called secondary embarkation ports.⁽¹⁾

Commanders in Ireland, particularly Sir George Carew in Munster, held forthright views on the west country ports from which most of his troops came. "Brystowe is a cursed port, for from other places passages are won ... from Brystowe I never expect a packet", he wrote to Mountjoy in August 1602.⁽²⁾ He told Sir Robert Cecil on 20th August 1602 that "the meetest place for the answering of all winds is Barnstaple or Padstow", and condemned Ilfracombe as being "too far within Severn". The return trip was much easier. Noting the prevalence of the westerlies Carew remarked that he had no trouble in finding winds or shipping "to go from here (Cork) to England".⁽³⁾ Yet the crossing either way could still be difficult. Fynes Moryson, Mountjoy's secretary, complained of "the tempestuousness of the Irish sea" and of mists on the Irish coasts.⁽⁴⁾

Similar expression of difficulty in communication came from other commanders; Sir Henry Docwra at Derry and Sir Arthur Chichester at Carrickfergus and the lord deputy Lord Mountjoy did not seem to take account of the difficult operations in the ports. Some idea of the size of these operations is given in Table 1 which sets out the numbers of men and horses ordered to the ports between 1594 and 1602.

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1. APC., xxviii, 204, 529, 530; xxix, 65; xxx, 758; xxxi, 182, 205 for examples of weather-bound troops at Haverfordwest.
 2. Cal. Carew MSS., iv, 316; Carew to Mountjoy, 25 August 1602
 3. CSPI., (1601-1603), 475, Carew to Cecil, 20 August 1602.
 4. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, iv . . . 191.

TABLE I
ANNUAL TROOP MOVEMENT TO THE PORTS

PORT	1594	1595	1596	1597	1598	1599	1600	1601	1602	TOTALS
Chester foot horse	1,000	1,500 300	900 30	1,260	1,800 100	2,550 200	5,430 300	3,965 116	700	19,105 1,046
Bristol foot horse	-	-	700	800	950 200	1,000 100	2,020 54	3,170 248	1,635	10,275 602
Barnstaple foot horse	-	-	400	400	- 16	-	350	1,420 66	815	3,385 82
Plymouth foot horse	-	1,553	-	-	1,350 400 50	-	-	500	-	3,403 400 50
Southampton foot horse	-	-	-	-	500	-	-	-	510	1,010
Rochester foot horse	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,600	-	1,600
Milford foot horse	-	-	-	-	300	400 100	-	-	-	700 100
Weymouth foot horse	-	-	-	-	400	-	-	-	-	400
Fowey foot horse	-	-	-	-	300	-	-	-	-	300
Padstow foot horse	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	100
TOTALS:	1,000	3,353	2,030	2,460	6,366	4,350	8,154	11,085	3,760	40,678 foot 1,880 horse

(1) Table compiled from privy council orders in APC., xxv-xxxi, passim and correlated with the individual port tables in Part II.

The annual totals of levies ordered to the ports confirms the considerable national effort to subdue the rebellion in Ireland, and the cumulative numbers demonstrates a massive burden on the chief ports of embarkation though no single expedition from the ports to Ireland equalled in strength the Essex venture to Cadiz when 6,500 men sailed in 144 ships from Plymouth on the 3rd June 1596.⁽¹⁾

The cumulative totals indicate that the greatest pressure was on Chester and Bristol. Chester had by far the greatest burden of the Irish levies to transport; its total of infantrymen represented 47% of all infantry levies and 55% of the horse, and the port was used in each year of the war. Bristol was second in importance with 25% of infantry levies and 32% of the horse; Barnstaple and Plymouth accounted for 17% of infantry and 7% of the horse, which leaves the other six ports with 11% of the infantry levies and 6% of the horse. Rochester's single experience of launching an army of 1,600 arose because the privy council ordered the use of the royal navy conveniently at hand in the Medway.⁽²⁾

The total of levied men sent to the ports is similar to the total of men previously ordered to be levied in the shires: the infantry total ordered to be levied from the shires of England and Wales was 37,203 and the grand total of infantry ordered to the ports is 40,678; the difference of 3,475 is largely explained by remembering that nearly 3,000 sailing from Plymouth had not then been ordered from the shires but were re-deployed men in transit from the Low Countries to Ireland.

This near coincidence between these two totals suggests that the Elizabethan authorities did manage to get the required number of men

1. HMC., Salisbury, vi, 205-208; Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 178

2. See below chapter nine.

en route to the ports. Whether or not the same numbers of men embarked at the ports is not always possible to test since muster rolls appear to have rarely been taken at the point of embarkation.

CHAPTER SEVENChester, the chief military port for Ireland.1. The Port of Chester.

In 1558 Chester ranked as one of the main six head-ports in the kingdom.⁽¹⁾ A national list of 7,000 mariners of the 1580s designated 74 at Chester and 61 at Liverpool. In a national list of 1,383 ships of less than 80 ton Chester had thirteen. By 1595, however, Chester stood only twelfth in a list of eighteen ports,⁽²⁾ and it seems that the port was in decline in the late sixteenth century.⁽³⁾

Nevertheless, of all the north-west ports, Chester was the most important; it exercised jurisdiction over all havens, creeks and member ports on the north Welsh and Lancashire coastlines, including Liverpool, from Barmouth round the coast to the Dee and Mersey estuaries, and along the Lancashire coastline as far as the river Duddon.⁽⁴⁾

Trade with Ireland formed the basis of Chester's overseas activity, which by the 1590s accounted for two-thirds of its imports and almost its entire exports. Dublin was the most important Irish port for Chester's trade, and the establishment of St. Werberg's Church in Dublin by sixteenth century Chester merchants bespeaks the impact of that trade.⁽⁵⁾ Yet Chester's local importance as a civil

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1. R.C.Jarvis, 'The head-port of Chester, and Liverpool its creek and member' in THSLC., 102 (1950), 69-79
 2. HMC., Salisbury, v, 393
 3. D.M.Woodward, The Trade of Elizabethan Chester, Occasional papers, no.4 (1970), 1-4, University of Hull.
 4. J.Beck, Tudor Cheshire (Chester, 1969), Figure 1, p.9
 5. St. Werberg's, Dublin now belongs to the Society of Friends. St. Werberg is the patroness of the City of Chester.

port for Irish trade was increasingly matched by its use as a military port and base for the late Elizabethan government in the transportation of men, money, arms and victuals to Dublin, Carrickfergus, and to the garrisons established along the Foyle in north west Ulster.⁽¹⁾

Because of increasing navigational difficulties at and near Chester military levies were often embarked from the Deeside harbours along the Wirral, or from Liverpool. There were ten anchorages on the Wirral side of the Dee; Portpool, Shotwick, Burton, Denhall, New Quay, Neston, Gayton, Heswall and Redbank.⁽²⁾ Liverpool too was used, and it was from there that the expedition of the elder Earl of Essex went to Ireland in 1573, and that port, too, saw much of its sorry return.⁽³⁾ In the summer of 1600 when large numbers of soldiers left Chester for Ireland they embarked from several harbours; Captain Humphrey Willis, a conducting captain to Lough Foyle on board the Angel of Hilbre, wrote that recruits were embarked at Neston, Hilbre, Liverpool and Chester on the 22nd April, and that by the 24th they were anchored awaiting the rest of the fleet at Hilbre Island. The whole fleet sailed on the 25th reaching Carrickfergus on Belfast Lough on the 27th.⁽⁴⁾

The mayor of Chester was the key local official in the control of troops in the town, and his multifarious duties are reflected

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1. Until 1660 there are no Admiralty papers as such, records of ships are to be found throughout the State and Exchequer records, port books, and mayor's papers. Records of the Commissioners of Victualling do not begin until the Commission was instituted in 1683. See Guide to the Contents of the Public Record Office, ii (1963), 15
 2. J.Leland's Itinerary ed. by Toulmin Smith (1906-1980), iii, 91-92 gives the earliest accounts of Hilbre and West Kirby. Hilbre Island had a customs house in 1582, and ten alehouses. Wirral Notes and Queries, i, 35, 81
 3. J.A.Twemlow (ed.) Liverpool Town Books (Liverpool, 1918), ii 120, 121, 147.
 4. CSPI., (1600), 200, 209, and for like accounts of normal passages to Ireland ibid., (1601-1603), 173; HMC., Salisbury, xi, 24, 488

in his military papers in the 1590s.⁽¹⁾ His headquarters, known as the Pentice, stood beside St. Peter's Church at the market High Cross where a gibbet was menacingly placed, a threatening spectacle to likely deserters and other criminals. Whenever military levies were in port the mayor moved around with a body-guard traditionally armed with halberds.⁽²⁾

Though a civilian official, elected each October, the mayor acted much more like a military agent of the privy council when levies were resident. His authority to act as such stemmed from his inclusion in the commission for musters of levies of soldiers and arms, and it was clearly a mayoral responsibility to supervise the levies until they had embarked.⁽³⁾ His office called for powers of discretion and tact in dealing with the privy council, muster masters, captains, conductors of troops from the shires, and the mayors of other ports. In every aspect of the levies' administration in the port of Chester the mayor, his deputy and disciplinary staff of sheriffs and bailiffs were much involved.⁽⁴⁾ It was the mayor's responsibility to provide billets for the incoming soldiers, and ships for their transportation. With his disciplinary staff he needed to be able to deal with the unruly behaviour of conscripted men, who more often than not caused unrest among the citizens.⁽⁵⁾ And with the commissioners for musters in the port and captains selected to conduct levies to Ireland it was his duty to help curb desertion from the ranks. An added responsibility was the careful collection and sifting of news for the Government, an important task in wartime and the already heavily burdened mayor had to provide post horses

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1. Chester City Records, henceforth, CCR, Mayor's military papers, M/MP; mayor's assembly books, A/B, mayor's great letter books, M/L, and mayor's files, M/F.
 2. J.Beck, op.cit., p.19
 3. APC., xxxi, 86, 87, 295, 296; xxxii, 70, 71, 126, 127 for examples.
 4. The sheriffs' files and writs in the Chester City Record Office for the 1590s are unusable in their present state needing repair and cataloguing.
 5. CCR., M/MP/8/8-14 examples in the mayoralty of Thomas Smith, 1596.

for the speedy forwarding of any dispatches coming from Ireland to London, and in the other direction he had to supply post barks to send news and orders to the Irish civil and military administration in Dublin. However, each mayor had these burdens only for a year; and it is significant that none of the mayors of Chester elected between 1588 and 1604 had a second term of office.⁽¹⁾ First, the impact of the demands of the Irish war in the numbers of horse and foot levies sent to the port of Chester for transportation to Ireland will be considered.

1. G.Ormerod, History of the County Palatine and City of Chester, i (1819), p.182 for a list of the mayors and sheriffs of Chester in the sixteenth century.

ii. The Troops in Chester.

The major rôle of Chester in the prosecution of the Irish war can clearly be seen from the numbers of men and horses which converged on the port to meet the demands of the army in Ireland.

These are set out in Table 2

Table 2 Military Levies in Chester.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mayor responsible</u>	<u>Intended for....</u>
Oct. 1594	1,000 f.	Foulke Aldersey	Sir Wm. Russell's Ulster campaign. (1)
April/July 1596	1,500 f. 300 h.	William Aldersey	Sir John Norris - Ulster (2)
Oct./Nov. 1596	900 f. 30 h.	Thomas Smith	Sir Wm. Russell's & Sir John Norris (3)
April 1597	1,260 f.	Sir John Savage d. suc. by Thos. Fletcher	Sir Henry Bagenall's forces (4)
July 1598	1,000 f. 100 h.	Richard Rathbone	Sir Samuel Bagenall for L. Foyle. (5)
Sept. 1598	800 f.	Richard Rathbone	Sir Richard Bingham in Connaught (6)
Jan/March 1599	2,550 f. 200 h.	Henry Hardware	Earl of Essex's army (7)
Jan/April 1600	2,800 f. 200 h.	Henry Hardware	Sir Henry Docwra's expedition to L.Foyle (8)
July/Aug. 1600	2,000 f. 100 h.	Robert Brerwood	Lord Mountjoy Dublin (9)
Dec. 1600	630 f.	R.Brerwood d. suc. by Richard Bavand	Sir H. Docwra L. Foyle. (10)

1. PRO.SP. 12/268/124, 125

2. APC., xxv, 258-260, 262-265; CSPI., (1592-1596), 342-343

3. CCR., M/L/1/109

4. CCR., M/MP/L/1/117, 119, 121.

5. CCR., M/MP/L/1/ 151, 157

6. CCR., M/MP/L/1/ 161-166; APC., xxviii, 153.

7. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 72, 89, 96, 106-108, 113

8. PRO.SP.12/274/18; APC., xxx, 69, 91, 101-106.

9. HMC., Salisbury, x, 268-269; APC., xxx, 412-416.

10. APC., xxxi, 21-23; CCR., M/MP/11/1-14

Table 2/cont.

April/May 1601	830 f. 40 h.	Richard Bavand	Sir H. Docwra Ballyshannon.	(1)
July/Aug. 1601	830 f.	John Ratcliffe	Sir George Carew Cork	(2)
Sept/Oct 1601	1,650 f. 76 h.	John Ratcliffe	Carrickfergus 300f. 26h. L.Foyle 700f. 50h. Mountjoy 650f.	(3)
December 1601	655 f.	Hugh Glaseor	Mountjoy and Carew in Munster	(4)
July 1602	700 f.	Hugh Glaseor	Mountjoy's Ulster Campaign	(5)
<hr/>				
Total	19,105 f. 1,046 h.			
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Over the eight year period batches of soldiers and cavalry troops of horse went to the port of Chester on fifteen occasions making it by far the busiest port of embarkation for Ireland, and the grand total of soldiers involved was 1,046 cavalrymen and 19,105 infantrymen. Of these totals not all would have actually sailed and arrived in Ireland; some were discharged, others deserted and their numbers were not always filled up as they should have been. For example, the levy of 1,500 f. ordered to help Sir John Norris in April 1596, was 231 infantrymen short of the total since it was reported by the mayor that 1,269 foot had been shipped at Chester, and that of the remainder, some had not passed muster, some were sick, some were in prison, and some had escaped. But numbers were made up, for a week later the number of foot reported as being safely on board was said to be 1,418. Of the 300 horse ordered from the

1. APC., xxxi, 315

2. CCR., M/MP/12/ 1-22, muster rolls

3. APC., xxxii, 233-239, 242, 260-262

4. APC., xxxii, 474-478

5. CCR., M/MP/13, muster book of the shire levies sent to Chester.

clergy on that occasion only 150 sailed with the 1,418.⁽¹⁾ It is not clear when the rest of the horse went to Ireland, but the 30 horse sent in the October levy were latecomers to the port from the 300 ordered in March 1596; (see Table 2). Likewise, in the levy of horse of September 1601, when 76 horse were supposed to be transported from Chester, only 63 were sent according to the government's own reckoning.⁽²⁾ (See Table 2).

On three occasions levies of 2,000 and over were ordered to Chester: in January to March 1599 when the Earl of Essex organized his great army for Ireland; early in 1600 when Sir Henry Docwra assembled his expeditionary force for Lough Foyle, and in August 1600 when Lord Mountjoy and Docwra needed massive re-inforcement.⁽³⁾

An intractable problem in considering these figures is how many men deserted and were not replaced before embarkation. Captains frequently embarked their men in a hurry to take advantage of favouring winds and called no final muster roll in the port. The round figures of the levies may also hide the fact that six dead pays in every hundred were beginning to be allowed, but whether this perquisite for the captains, was allowed in the port or when they landed in Ireland is not made clear in the case of every levy.⁽⁴⁾

It is clear that the shipping of troops followed a seasonal pattern; the end of April to October was the most favoured time of year, but the exigencies of the war in Ireland dictated that on four occasions the levies at Chester were sent out in the winter period.⁽⁵⁾

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1. Lambeth MS., 2009, ff.64, 68 - orders to the clergy; APC., xxv, 315, 326, 331-333; PRO.SP.63/186/82; 188, 25
 2. PRO.SP.63/209/211
 3. See chapter three above under 'Year by Year demands.'
 4. See Table 2 above. C.G.Cruickshank's 'Dead pays in the Elizabethan army' EHR., liii (1938), 93-97 does not clarify this point.
 5. Table 2 above.

Crises in Ireland did not all occur in the summer. Commanders in Ireland generally tried to avoid winter campaigns, with the exception of Lord Mountjoy, an exception that partly explains his success. Bad weather and adverse winds delayed every winter levy at Chester from 1595 to 1602. Docwra's expedition to Lough Foyle, and the re-inforcements sent out in December 1600, and December 1601 were particularly badly affected.⁽¹⁾

Because of the frequency of levies to Chester in these years the city and port was rarely without troops. Even when they were expeditiously embarked from the port the city and its mayor had to face the problem of returning sick, maimed and un-serviceable soldiers, particularly from the north of Ireland after 1599, many of whom stayed to swell the problem of poverty in the city.⁽²⁾ One of the few advantages of being the principal embarkation port was that the mayor could rid the city of undesirable people by using them to fill shortages in the companies. Foulke Aldersey, mayor in 1595, told Lord Burghley that to make up numbers in Chester in July of that year "some were taken upon the highway, and some out of their beds without shoes, doublets . . ." ⁽³⁾ Captain York's companies were down in number in August 1600; the mayor, Robert Brerwood told the privy council how Captain York had searches made "in the streets and suspected houses" for the idle and vagrant, fourteen of whom were impressed, and of how his action in the search "so feared all those idle fellows that loitered here" that they fled out of Chester.⁽⁴⁾ But this opportunity did not out-weigh the

1. Table 2 above.

2. CCR., M/MP/12/34-45 examples of sick passes given in Ireland, signed by Sir Henry Docwra, Sir Arthur Chichester and other captains for sick and wounded soldiers to return to England. See Chapter Twelve.

3. PRO.SP.63/181/no.40, Aldersey to Burghley, 19th July 1595.

4. PRO.SP.63/207/pt.v./no.5, Brerwood to the p.c., 6 September 1600.

burdens of coping with soldiers and the constant passage of troops through the city; and its "service of the sea" led to a demand from Chester to the privy council, as in other ports, to have its citizens exempted from military service.⁽¹⁾ The inhabitants of the Wirral petitioned the privy council for the same exemption, on the grounds that it acted as a constant thoroughfare for troops between Chester and its subordinate ports.⁽²⁾

To illustrate the problems of assembly and the launching of troops from Chester the organization of Sir Henry Docwra's army and expedition to Lough Foyle from Chester between January and April 1600, and the subsequent reinforcements sent from Chester to his garrisons along the Foyle may serve as a case study. In the mayor's military papers, the chief local source, there is a gap for the three months of the expedition, but not for the re-inforcement period of December 1600 and April to May 1601, but the recruitment for and assembly at Chester of Docwra's expedition are strongly reflected in the major national sources.⁽³⁾ The importance of planting garrisons at Lough Foyle had long been envisaged by the Elizabethan government and by every lord deputy and commander of note in Ireland. The government ear-marked Sir Henry Docwra for "the most desperate assignment" in the winter of 1600, as he would later describe his task. A veteran campaigner in the Netherlands and Spain, and under Sir Richard Bingham and the Earl of Essex in Ireland, Docwra was to achieve what Essex had merely talked about.⁽⁴⁾ His full and formal instructions, as well as letters patent giving him his commission, make clear his

1. APC., xxix, 593. Other claims for similar exemption, Pembroke's, APC., xxviii, 301; Lowestoft's, APC., xxxii, 389, Liverpool's in J.Twemlow (ed.) Liverpool Town Books, ii (1935), 113.

2. Wirral's petition for exemption in APC., xxix, 593

3. CCR., M/MP/9 (to October 1598): M/MP/10 (ending October 1599): M/MP/11 begins in December 1600 with the re-inforcement period of Lough Foyle.

4. Sir Henry Docwra's Narration ed. by J.O'Donovan in Celtic Miscellany (Dublin, 1849), 236, 237. The Annals of the Four Masters, ed. J.O'Donovan vi (Dublin, 1851), 2189 claimed that Docwra led 6,000 men first to Dublin but Docwra's account is certainly correct.

responsibility for every stage of the expedition from Chester.⁽¹⁾

In Chester, Docwra had to co-operate with the mayor, Henry Hardware, in supervising the levies that came in to form the backbone of his army. Some 3,000 foot and 200 horse were to be levied in the English and Welsh shires and directed to be at Chester by the last day of January 1600.⁽²⁾ Their first destination in Ireland was to be Carrickfergus where they were to pick up an additional 1,000 troops before going on around the north Irish coast to put in at Lough Foyle. The privy council hoped that then Sir Henry Docwra would have sufficient men to plant an additional garrison at Ballyshannon, a key crossing point from Connaught into Ulster.⁽³⁾ All of these hopes are reflected in Docwra's commission.

It was the mayor's task, with the government's commissary for shipping, Robert Davies, to requisition enough ships for the force. The mayor, Henry Hardware, and Sir Henry Docwra were to act as commissioners for musters in receiving the men as they came in, checking the conductors' rolls and in taking a view of the men, the armour, arms, and their defects. The mayor was to take up his normal responsibility of seeing the men dieted at 3d the meal and to give "2d a day to make up viii d. by the daye to every souldier to serve him for other necessary occasyons". The government was to see to their apparel by means of contracts with clothing merchants, but the mayor and Docwra were not to issue the suits to the soldiers until they were safely on board.⁽⁴⁾

The government planned and hoped for an efficient military expedition to be launched with the first favourable wind. In

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1. Lambeth Palace Lib. MS., 621, f.75, copies of his letters patent; Lambeth Palace Library MS., 632, ff.189-192, Docwra's instructions summarized in APC., xxx, 101-106.
 2. APC., xxx, 10, 12, 102
 3. Docwra's Narration, ed. cit., p.237-238
 4. APC., xxx, 54, 102.

practice, difficulties and delays beset the expedition. There were complaints from some shires, especially Hereford and the Welsh borderlands, about difficulties in recruiting great numbers so soon after Essex's army had been raised the previous year. Herbert Croft on behalf of Herefordshire wrote to Sir Robert Cecil "to let this poor county be exempted" from the burden of levying more soldiers.⁽¹⁾

Lord Mountjoy, much involved in gaining support for the Lough Foyle expedition, reported from London that the name of Ireland, "but principally Lough Foyle" scared off recruits, and that even those already in receipt of imprest money "have quitted the service."⁽²⁾ Though all the soldiers were supposed to have assembled at Chester by the last day of January, levies were still coming in by mid-February and in depleted numbers.⁽³⁾ The total number of 3,000 infantrymen ordered to Chester was reduced to 2,800 since 100 levied in Devon, and 50 each in Cornwall and Dorset were ordered to sail from Barnstaple instead of Chester.⁽⁴⁾

The first stage of the operation, the assembly, mustering and billeting of the men began to fray the nerves of the commissioners for musters and ill-feelings broke out between Henry Hardware the mayor, and Sir Henry Docwra, the chief commander. The mayor accused the commander of refusing to accept men and armour from the shires because of minor defects, and of delaying the departure of his troops unnecessarily; the commander accused the mayor of not doing enough to keep order in the city, and of not helping in the muster and view of the soldiers.⁽⁵⁾ Though it had long been customary for the

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1. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 420, Croft to Cecil, 29 December 1599
 2. PRO.SP.63/207/pt.i/110, Mountjoy to Cecil, 16 February 1600 n.s.
 3. PRO.SP.63/207/pt.1/111, Hardware to the privy council, February 1600
 4. APC., xxx, 102,
 5. PRO.SP.12/274/92, Hardware to Cecil, 2 April 1600.

mayor to act as a commissioner for musters in his port, Henry Hardware refused to assist Docwra in this duty until he had received precise instructions from the privy council to do so.⁽¹⁾ When desertions became rife the privy council put the blame squarely on the mayor's shoulders with the result that relations between mayor and commander deteriorated even further. From then onward and at every stage of the organization of the expedition Docwra contradicted and criticized the mayor's work. To justify himself Henry Hardware wrote to the privy council of how difficult it was to discern deserters from the levies in Chester at that time:

many lewd and evil-disposed persons have shrouded themselves within this citty under the name of soldiers and given advantage to divers for their escapes which hardly could be prevented despite vigilant watches appointed ... the soldiers did daily escape with those frequently in the markets being nothing different from them in attire ... (2)

In a separate letter to Sir Robert Cecil of 2 April Hardware reported eighty deserters from Docwra's levies at Chester; one of them had been caught for the second time escaping "in woman's apparel". He blamed the large number of deserters onto the conductors of the levies from the shires.⁽³⁾ Hardware evidently under-estimated the number of desertions since at the end of February the privy council ordered 250 men to be raised in London and Middlesex to fill the vacancies "of such as are run away at the port of Chester",⁽⁴⁾ and the council commanded the mayor to aid Sir Henry Docwra in keeping order and preventing any further escapes and mutinies.⁽⁵⁾

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1. PRO.SP.63/207/pt.i/111, Hardware's complaints to the p.c.
 2. PRO.SP.63/207/pt.i/111, the same to the same.
 3. PRO.SP.63/207/pt.2/77, Hardware to Cecil, 2 April 1600, a copy of the same letter in PRO.SP.12/274/92.
 4. APC. xxx, 69 gives 300 from London and Middlesex, but ibid. p.255 shows payments to the conductor, Vincent Skynner, for 250 soldiers.
 5. APC. xxx, 155, 156, 163, 164.

By the end of February the situation grew even worse in Chester; the privy council informed the mayor that in the interests of stopping desertion he was to allow Sir Henry Docwra to keep the conductors of the companies "untill the imbarkinge of the soldiers" and to pay them by the day as allowed by their counties of origin.⁽¹⁾ Ordinarily conductors would have handed the men over to their future captains, but these came slowly to their charge in Chester and though ordered to be there by the lord deputy, Mountjoy, only about half the captains were present in Chester by 15 April. According to one report ten captains and the lieutenants of six companies were at Chester to aid the embarkation, but nine captains "had not yet arrived out of Munster", and Sir John Bolles appointed to be Docwra's second in command was still in Dublin on 15 April.⁽²⁾

The privy council and Lord Mountjoy became so anxious about the delays in Chester, that Mountjoy visited Chester on 14 February to enquire into the situation; his report to the privy council confirmed the poor quality of the soldiers, who were "unlikely to do Her Majesty any service in her wars". Those from parts of North Wales were "most of them taken out of prison or are boys". However, Mountjoy did not lay blame on either Docwra or the mayor.⁽³⁾ He dined with the mayor on the 17th and went into Wales on 19th February to get shipping for Ireland.⁽⁴⁾

From early in January the mayor had stayed sufficient shipping in both Chester and Liverpool to embark the soldiers; thirteen sloops or hoys had been commandeered and a Flemish ship of

1. AFC., xxx, 145, 146

2. PRO.SP.63/207/pt.2/108.

3. PRO.SP.63/207/pt.1/106, Mountjoy to the p.c. 15 February 1600.

4. G.Ormerod, History of the county Palatine and city of Chester,
i (1819), 201

120 tons able to take 300 men, anchored in the Dee, was pressed into the service.⁽¹⁾ Captain George Thornton, a naval captain of much experience, had the command of the convoy and was given protection by the Queen's ship, the Moon under Captain Thomas Button, and two crompters carrying small cannon.⁽²⁾ The privy council took the precaution of issuing an open warrant to all mayors and officers of ports on the western coasts ordering them should the expedition from Chester be driven by foul weather into their ports, to "victual and relieve them" until the wind and weather served to finish their voyage.⁽³⁾

By 2 April the soldiers were still in Chester. On that day both the mayor and Docwra wrote independently to Sir Robert Cecil about the expedition. The mayor claimed that there was sufficient shipping stayed for the transportation of horse and foot if Docwra would allow the ship owners to take on board as many as they were willing to carry. This Docwra would not allow; the over/crowding in the ships would cause sickness and the force would arrive in Ireland unfit.⁽⁴⁾ Docwra's letter to Cecil gave a fuller picture of what was happening in Chester: the ships' masters and the sailors "were desperately bent to quit their barks" not having been paid for three months, and not having the liberty to follow their own business; the victualling ships had been loaded but only with sufficient goods, Docwra thought, for about 1,000 men, and the artillery and munitions were ready to be shipped; most of the captains had by then arrived, and though there were defects in most

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1. HMC, Salisbury, x, 12, Hardware to the p.c., 22 January 1600
 2. PRO.SP/63/207 pt.i/15, the Moon to be at Chester January 16th
 3. APC., xxx, 114, p.c. warrant of 22 February 1600
 4. PRO.SP.12/274/92, Hardware to Cecil, 2 April 1600

companies, Docwra claimed that he could make up the numbers from those that came out of Ireland, and deserters "were better worthy of punishment than entertainment or rather their captains that bring them over".⁽¹⁾ Lord Buckhurst, the lord treasurer, was in doubt whether he should arrange payments for such deserters as Docwra and the mayor of Chester were re-employing, or whether they should be kept in prison as men destined to be hanged.⁽²⁾

By 15th April the main body of the expedition was still in Chester, not delayed then by an adverse wind, but by the need to lay aboard victuals for the sea journey, and hay, oats and water for the horses.⁽³⁾ From the beginning of the expedition's assembly the mayor had warned of the food shortage in Chester.⁽⁴⁾ Docwra appointed Captain George Thornton, the naval commander, to take up victuals in the Isle of Man, anticipating further shortages when they arrived at Carrickfergus, but Thornton came away empty-handed. Captain Mollineux, the deputy governor of the island, had orders not to deliver any victuals without immediate payment.⁽⁵⁾ The Lough Foyle expedition finally sailed from Chester on April 24th, without a final muster and review. Sir Henry Docwra assured Sir Robert Cecil that the horses shown at the previous muster were in fact the same as those actually on board, but could not say the same of the infantry and he did not want to lose a good wind by a full muster on land.⁽⁶⁾ They arrived at Carrickfergus the night of 28th April. Henry Hardware, the mayor, wrote to the privy council

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1. CSPI., (1600), 68, 69, Docwra to Cecil, 2 April 1600
 2. HMC., Salisbury, x, 108, Lord Buckhurst, to Sir R. Cecil, 12 April.
 3. CSPI., (1600), 121, Docwra to Cecil, 24 April 1600
 4. HMC., Salisbury, x, 12, Hardware to the p.c., 22 January 1600
 5. HMC., Salisbury, x, 136, George Thornton to H. Hardware, 1 May 1600
 6. CSPI., (1600), 121, Docwra to Cecil, 24 April 1600 "From the shipboard".

on 4th May of the departure of the expedition, and to say he was sending in his accounts.⁽¹⁾

A similar story of muddle and delays complicated the sending of reinforcements to Docwra's garrisons in December 1600. Captain Henry Hart came from Lough Foyle to conduct 630 men from Chester. The privy council was surprised to hear from the mayor, Robert Brerwood, on 26th January 1601 that Hart's re-inforcements were still land-bound "considering how long the wyndes have contynued lately good".⁽²⁾ There were at least twenty deserters at one attempted embarkation, and their places were ordered to be filled with vagrants in Chester.⁽³⁾ Hart's re-inforcements ordered in December 1600 did not arrive in Lough Foyle until 10 March 1601.⁽⁴⁾

A further 830 foot and 40 horse were ordered to Chester by the 20th May 1601 for transportation to Lough Foyle under the command of Captain John Vaughan.⁽⁵⁾ Particular instructions for the viewing of the horse at the port were sent out on 1 May; the commissioners were to note the height, colour, age, and marks of every horse, "his pace, and out of which county sent ... the sufficiency of the rider, his name, surname, and countrey where he is borne."⁽⁶⁾ In addition to the foot and horse large quantities of accessories were to be shipped from Chester to Lough Foyle: tools, utensils, picks, shovels, spades, as well as three lasts of corn powder, and one of cannon powder, and sheds for storage to be ready made in Chester for shipment.⁽⁷⁾ On this occasion the enterprise was accomplished more

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1. HMC., Salisbury, x, 136, Hardware to the p.c., 4 May 1600.
 2. CCR, M/MP/11/1-14, the muster rolls of the 630 re-inforcements; APC., xxxi, 86, 87, 128, 141, on Hart's delays at Chester.
 3. APC., xxxi, 128, the p.c. to the mayor, 29 January 1601
 4. CSPI., (November 1600 - July 1601), 212, 26 March 1601
 5. APC., xxxi, 323, Instructions to the commissioners at Chester, 1 May.
 6. Ibid., pp.324, 337, 338, Captain George Ruthall to have charge of the horse.
 7. APC., xxxi, 331-333. See Glossary for last of powder.

efficiently. The embarkation took place on the 25th May; they sailed the following day arriving in Lough Foyle four days later on the 30th May. The muster master at Lough Foyle reported them as "very sufficient and faltles", and Captain John Field, one of Vaughan's helpers at Chester said that in his opinion "never did supplies . come in fuller nomber and better plighte to this armie".⁽¹⁾

The last batch of Lough Foyle re-inforcements to be launched from Chester presented a different picture from Vaughan's contingent. Of the 1,650 foot ordered to Chester by the 20th October 1601, 700 were designated for Lough Foyle, 300 for Carrickfergus, and the remainder for Dublin.⁽²⁾ At the muster in Chester held the 20th October by the mayor, John Ratcliffe, and Captain Launcelot Alford 90 men were missing from the 700 designated for Lough Foyle.⁽³⁾ When Captain Alford finally arrived in Lough Foyle on November 11th it was found that only 565 men out of the 700 had arrived in Ireland, some 135 short. In his report Alford blamed the mayor of Chester who had not victualled the men in the city but had insisted on settling them in the countryside about Chester where desertion was more easily accomplished. Alford also complained that the mayor refused to assist him in other ways and disclaimed all responsibility since the soldiers were billeted outside the city technically outside his jurisdiction.⁽⁴⁾

This study of the transportation of Docwra's troops through Chester illustrates the difficulties of what should have been a straightforward operation. Wind and weather upset government's plans,

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1. PRO.SP.63/208/pt.ii/103. Humphrey Covert, the muster master at Lough Foyle to Sir Robert Cecil, 31 May 1601. Captain John Field wanted Covert's post cf PRO.SP.63/208/pt.iii/15, Field to Cecil, 11 June 1601.
 2. Table No.2 above.
 3. CSPI., (1601-1603), 173, Alford to Cecil, 19 November 1601 from Lough Foyle.
 4. Ibid., p.174.

difficulties arose between the mayors of the port and commanders sent to co-operate with them in the work of assembling, billeting and transporting troops to Ireland, and desertions resulted in fewer soldiers arriving in Ireland than had been ordered.

The frequent delays in Chester posed a major problem of keeping the troops in order in the city. One expedient would have been to give the mayor powers of military law to deal with mutineers and deserters. The mayor of Chester does not appear to have asked for this power, the mayor of Bristol did request it and was refused.⁽¹⁾ Military law only began to take effect once the levies had left England. The courts martial, which administered military law, tried criminal soldiers only on active service which was deemed to begin when ships set sail, and the courts martial were controlled by the army provost marshals.⁽²⁾ These officers are to be distinguished from the lieutenancy officers also called provost marshals who were appointed in times and places of disorder with wide powers of arrest which extended to both civilians and soldiers alike.⁽³⁾ A number of the latter were appointed in many areas of extensive disturbance in England in the 1590s to help the justices and constables to maintain law and order. The mayor of Chester's military papers show that such provost marshals were active in Chester in 1600 and 1601.⁽⁴⁾

1. HMC., Salisbury, xii, 170

2. PRO.SP.63/207/pt.i/no.26 where the Earl of Ormond complained to Cecil that the Mayor of Limerick committed soldiers to his own prison refusing to hand them over to the provost Marshal, 14 January 1600.

Military law is to be distinguished from martial law, the suspension of the ordinary common law; the concept of martial law remained ill-defined until the Petition of Right, 1628, see W.Holdsworth "Martial law historically considered" in LQR., xviii (1902), 117.

3. L.Boynton, "The Tudor Provost Marshal" in EHR., lxxvii (1962), 437. Etymologically marshal refers to the master of horse, while martial, derived from Mars, classical god of war.

4. CCR., M/MP/12/14 where the provost marshal asked the mayor, John Ratcliffe for the help of four men to curb disorder among the troops in June, 1601.

For the most part, when riotous and mutinous conditions prevailed at Chester the mayor had to rely on the ordinary course of law. He could call on two sheriffs, one called "the queen's sheriff" the crown's representative at Chester Castle, the other the county of Chester's sheriff - the City being a county of itself by charter of 1507.⁽¹⁾ In addition the government's muster master in the port, whenever there was one appointed, the commissioners for musters, the conductors of the shire levies, and captains awaiting to lead their companies to Ireland were all expected to aid the mayor in the keeping of order in the port when levies were present.

The niceties of which law, military or civil, under which the mayor of Chester acted in his disciplinary duties in war time conditions may not have been clear to some of his citizens and soldiers.⁽²⁾ However, at times of mutiny and desertions the mayor was left in no doubt how to act by precise orders from the privy council. Serious disorder and mutiny broke out among the soldiers in Chester in March and April 1596, again in 1599 on the occasion of the Earl of Essex's expedition, and the next winter of 1600 when Sir Henry Docwra was preparing his Lough Foyle expedition.⁽³⁾ In each case long delays awaiting favourable winds, with resultant food shortages in the city, lay at the root of much discontent, which was aggravated by the ruling from the privy council that soldiers were not to be given their coats until embarkation. It was hardly surprising that mutinies took place on the occasions of these four winter levies. Sometimes soldiers from different shires

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1. The sheriffs' files and writs in the CCRO for the 1590s cannot be used in their present state of dis-repair.
 2. J.R.Hale in editing Certain Discourses Military by Sir John Smythe (Cornell, 1964) gives insights into contemporary confusions on civil and military authority in the late Elizabethan era.
 3. APC., xxv, 331-333; xxx, 110, 145, 155, 164

quarrelled and fought among themselves, often over mutual thefts, and assaults in alehouses were commonplace.⁽¹⁾

The most serious mutiny at Chester took place in February 1600 when Docwra's soldiers were awaiting embarkation; its immediate and chief cause was that the soldiers were not to be given their army coats until on board ship. Three ring-leaders emerged from among the mutineers; George Chapman, William Bornell and John Sturdefall, of whom Chapman became the most notorious. He boldly organised the main body of revolt at the High Cross around the gibbet to which he mockingly pointed as being too feeble a structure to hang up five hundred men, and sarcastically remarked in his speech to the rebels that the authorities could have made the gibbet more frightening by drawing a face on it to scare them. Chapman then encouraged his followers to take arms and defy captains' orders until they had been given their coats. The revolt grew, and in the subsequent state of disorder in Chester about 325 soldiers took the opportunity to desert.⁽²⁾

Henry Hardware, the mayor, ordered the sheriff's to have the ring-leaders arrested; they were caught and put in the Northgate prison, the only gaol in the city.⁽³⁾ Sir Henry Docwra calmed the revolt by conceding their demand to have the army coats issued. Though this was contrary to his orders, the privy council commended him for this action.⁽⁴⁾ When the privy council learned of the full scale of the mutiny in Chester it wanted the mayor to make a more exemplary punishment of the ring-leaders than mere imprisonment in the local gaol. "Wee have thoughte good", the council wrote to the

1. CCR., M/L/1/24, 25; and Quarter Sessions Files, QSF, nos. 46, 49, 51 indicate thefts by soldiers in Chester.

2. PRO.SB.12/274/73, March 5 1600; APC., xxx, 163, gives 325 deserters.

3. APC., xxx, 155, 156.

4. Ibid., p.163.

mayor, "that they shalbe sent up hither from sheryfe to sheryfe, their feete tyed under the horsese bellye" until they reached London where they were to be imprisoned awaiting trial in Newgate prison.⁽¹⁾ They were taken to London for interrogation, for a privy council letter a year later to the mayor and Sir Richard Lewkenor, chief justice of Chester, informed them that examinations had been taken in London of the prisoners and that they were to be sent back to Chester "to receive trial where their offences were committed". Chapman had died in Newgate prison; John Sturdefall and William Bornell were to be sent back to Chester.⁽²⁾ Their subsequent fate in Chester is not known as the first gaol delivery list of prisoners sent from the Quarter Sessions to Chester Castle which survives is for the year 1603 to 1604.⁽³⁾

Mutinies in Chester were only occasional but desertion was a constant problem. It was a moot point whether recruits who ran away at the port were strictly deserters from the army for, strictly speaking, they had not yet begun active service.⁽⁴⁾ Whether deserters or not the veritable warren of small medieval streets in Chester made the city a bolt-hole for them. Many citizens in Chester became adept in hiding soldiers "until the ships be gone for the gaine of their armour and apparell".⁽⁵⁾ Few, it was reported in 1601, were ever re-captured by the constables of the city and its environs, "so cunning they are in passing by all towns, bridges and Highways."⁽⁶⁾ But that some were caught, is shown by the examinations

1. APC., xxx, 164-165

2. APC., xxxi, p.52

3. CRO., QJB/1/3/ff.279-280v. gaol delivery roll of 1603/4.

4. J.R.Hale (ed.) Certain Discourses Military by Sir John Smythe (Cornell, 1964)

5. APC., xxxi, 141, 142.

6. HMC., Salisbury, x, 268.

of about twenty deserters before quarter sessions courts in 1600 to 1601. The defendants' statements illuminate some attitudes to military service. Thomas Foxley, a Cornishman, stated that he was to serve under Captain Grimes but that because of a sore leg he was unfit for the service and paid the captain's lieutenant 45s. for his discharge. John Holland of Denbigh said he was a "supply soldier" and received 15s. to go "in another man's place" but because he demanded his coat from Captain Yelverton he was arrested for mutiny. Hugh Masterson of Thorne, Somersetshire stood accused of stating that it was more profitable in Ireland to serve Hugh O'Neill, Earl of Tyrone than the Queen of England. Thomas Hoddy of Buckinghamshire said he deserted "from a town in the Wirral" to go home and support his mother. Two Staffordshire men gave similar excuses for deserting.⁽¹⁾

Chester mayors attempted to curb desertion. Henry Hardware, for example, let the privy council know in August 1600 of his zealous activities. When viewing troops with the commissioners for musters he read out to them previous warnings from the privy council that any of them who should run away or entice others to do so would be executed 'according to law' and others "put into the galleys". To prove his point the mayor had a group of former deserters, who were awaiting trial in Northgate gaol, brought out to the gibbet "in show to be hanged", with ropes round their necks and standing upon the ladder". On the pleadings of their captains and colleagues, and on their own repentance they were pardoned on the scaffold on condition that "if any one man of their companies did either mutiny for apparel or run away, that they, together with these offenders should receive the

1. CCR., QSF/File no. 49, ff.91, 138, 142, 143, 144

extreme rigour of the law". Henry Hardware assured the privy council that his firmness "struck terror into their hearts", "prevented the running away of whole hundreds" and "has wrought much quiet in our city."⁽¹⁾

However, the problem of desertion in Chester remained between 1600 and 1601. The privy council became insistent that it received the names of those deserting, the names of the parishes and villages they came from, and the names of their conductors to Chester; and, it wanted the mayor to distinguish types of deserters; those that had run out of Ireland to Chester, and those that "rune awaie when they sholde go thither".⁽²⁾

Licenses, passes, and notes of authorization to leave the army in Ireland were normally granted to sick and maimed soldiers to return to England, but they had to be signed by high ranking army officials. The privy council had been aware that the system of passes was used as cover for desertion.⁽³⁾ In its instructions to the civic officers in the ports the privy council ordered the scrutiny of the papers of all persons arriving in port; any returning soldier suspected of holding a counterfeit pass was to be arrested to await trial. The pass was to show clearly the signature of either the soldier's captain, his commander-in-chief, or that of the muster master.⁽⁴⁾ The existence of such passes in the mayor's military papers in Chester are reminders of one of his chief duties in controlling the passage of persons through his port. One such pass gave authority for a group of sick soldiers to return to

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1. HMC., Salisbury, x, 268-269, Hardware to the privy council, 7 August 1600
 2. APC., xxx, 245, 246, April 1600
 3. APC., xxiv, 72, 73, orders to the ports to arrest soldiers without proper passes, February 1592.
 4. APC., xxx, 55, 56

England "to be relieved amonge their frends" dated October 1599 and signed by Sir Ralph Lane, then muster master general in Ireland.⁽¹⁾

Some individual passes are signed by Sir Henry Docwra and by Sir Arthur Chichester, chief commanders at Lough Foyle and Carrickfergus.

The standard formula on these passes reads: "Permit the bearer a dyseased soldier to return to the shire out of which he was preste".⁽²⁾

The problems of desertion and vagabondage were naturally allied. All who moved about the country in Elizabethan England were required by statutes to hold a pass, testimonial or form of ~~id~~identification.⁽³⁾

The system allowed the genuinely sick and maimed to get back to the place of his birth or where he was first levied.⁽⁴⁾ During the

Irish war years the mayors of ports had money available from the treasurer-at-war to make initial payments, usually 5s., to enable a wounded man to return home, if he held a pass properly signed.⁽⁵⁾

But the vagabond "wounded" soldier with a counterfeit pass could be successful in begging, and so commonplace was this class of beggar in the 1590s that the character became the stock in trade of much late Elizabethan literature satirizing professional roguery, for example, 'Brainworm' in Ben Jonson's Everyman in his Humour (1601).⁽⁶⁾

Sometimes the authorities made genuine errors in suspecting people of being vagrants. John Norden, the celebrated cartographer, who necessarily travelled much about the country, had to petition Sir Robert Cecil for the ratification of his pass when, having been mistaken for another man of the same name he was deprived of his pass

1. CCR., M/MP/10/14, 16

2. CCR., M/MP/10/42, 43 passes signed by Docwra, Chichester and by Captain Bingley.

3. 5 Eliz., c.4, vii in the Statute of Artificers, 1563;
14 Eliz., c.5, v, Act for the punishment of vagabonds, 1572.

4. See chapter twelve.

5. Ibid.

6. CSPD., (1591-1594), 120, 342

without which he claimed he could not finish "the descriptions of the shires of England".⁽¹⁾ Sir Arthur Chichester in writing to Sir Robert Cecil alerted him to a large scale disappearance of legally provided passports:

"John Borretter of Otterspool in Lerpoole was taking on board forty maimed and unserviceable men to ship them to Chester with my passports, and the wind not serving very fair, he set them all ashore and is departed with all their passports."

Chichester wanted Cecil to write to the mayor of Chester to have Borretter arrested on his arrival.⁽²⁾

The examination of cases brought before the quarter sessions court in Chester in 1600 and 1601 reveal a traffic in forged and corruptly obtained passports which helped to disguise the scale of desertion out of Ireland, and the expense to which some soldiers went to avoid the Irish service. Richard Trott, Thomas Crewe and John Russell, from Somerset, soldiers of Captain Ralph Bingley's company, were accused of making forged passes for soldiers to leave the service at Lough Foyle. They admitted receiving sums of 20s., 13s., and 6s. for these forged documents. Richard Trott stated maybe in an attempt at extenuation, that many soldiers would run away once they were in Ireland.⁽³⁾ Thomas Patrick of Sutton-under-Whitstone-Cliffe, Yorkshire, a lieutenant to Captain Harman, stated that he left Ireland with a passport signed by Captain Flowers, a sergeant major in Munster; he denied forging passports for Timothy Foxley and Thomas Allanbie, soldiers. He also referred to another passport made by Captain Harman "at the barke side in New Key". The fact that a passport was made at New Quay in the Wirral, a port of

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1. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 433, Norden to Cecil, 1599. John Norden map maker was born in Somersetshire - DNB., s.v. Norden, John.
 2. CSPI., (1601-1603), 415, 416, Chichester to Cecil, 22 June 1602.
 3. CCR., QSF/File No.49, f.27, 13 August 1600

embarkation for Ireland, implied that Harman had prepared a corrupt passport for any soldier who may or may not have been to Ireland in the first place.⁽¹⁾ John Taylor, Leonard Houseman and John Preston, impressed Lancashire soldiers, told the court how they procured corrupt passports from one Billings. Houseman said he was "a broken man" and had paid Billings 30s. for his passport from Ireland, and Preston stated that he had paid 20s. for his.⁽²⁾ Robert Smyth, James Hardy and Hugh Browne, impressed men from Yorkshire, and George Kydd, impressed in the City of London, admitted the possession of forged passports signed in the name of Captain Harte. They claimed that William Ryder, "a conductor of London souldiers" had forged them. Smyth said he paid Ryder 10s and gave him his arms and coat; Browne said he had given 18s. as well as his arms and coat, while Kydd, the Londoner, said he gave Ryder 4s. his arms and coat. All said they had been stopped by the constables at Tarvin and brought back to the city constables in Chester.⁽³⁾ Under examination Ryder claimed that the three Yorkshiresmen had compounded with Captain Harte for their discharge, and that Harte had ordered him to write out their passes for which Harte received 25s. and himself 9s., but Ryder admitted that he had written Kydd's pass without Harte's prior knowledge or permission.⁽⁴⁾

In addition to crimes of forged and corrupt passports to cover desertion the city of Chester's quarter session records give evidence of various other crimes imputed to soldiers billeted in the city. Out of 153 cases before the courts in 1600 and 1601, 38 indicate individual soldiers or groups of soldiers among the defendants. Thefts of clothes purses, pewter and leather goods from landlords and

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1. CCR., QSF/File No.49 f. 86, October 1601
 2. Ibid., File No.50, f.109, date missing, damaged and incomplete
 3. Ibid., File No.49, f.140, January 18, 1601.
 4. Ibid., f.145, n.d.

landladies accounted for twenty of these cases.⁽¹⁾ Richard Browne, for example, stole from the White Horse where he was billeted. Twelve cases involved assaults and brawls in the alehouses and on the streets between soldiers and citizens.⁽²⁾ Five soldiers from Norfolk, Nottingham and Rutland were suspected of murdering John Eaton, one of the sheriff's officers, but the accusation did not appear to result in a charge.⁽³⁾ Edward Alexander, Captain Harte's lieutenant, was imprisoned in Northgate gaol for assaulting his landlady at the Crown.⁽⁴⁾ A group of four Catholic recusants were arrested at the Saracen's Head in possession of psalters, 'the romane breviary', 'the romane catechisme' beads and crucifixes. Three of them had travelled from Leicester and one, William Leake, from Fleet Street in the City of London. He denied he was a Jesuit but was 'catholiquely affected and perswaded'.⁽⁵⁾ The other cases were a mixture. William Shaw of Formby was accused on non-delivery of victuals at Lough Foyle and Thomas Elvinge was examined about horse saddles brought back to Chester from Lough Foyle. Two captains, Yelverton and Berkeley, were accused of selling arms to one John Swan when their companies were about to embark for Ireland. Robert Metcalfe of Preston admitted among other crimes that he came to Chester to make money 'among the horsemen in the city' as he was skilled "at the newe cutt on the cardes".⁽⁶⁾ Lewis Kyffin of Llansillen, Denbighshire came to Chester hoping to be hired as a soldier "in some man's steed" and was arrested for pick pocketing

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1. CCR.QSF/File no.49 (1600-1601), passim
 2. Ibid., ff.25, 28, 92, 111, 113, 119, 132
 3. Ibid., f.132, assault and death of John Eaton, 16 January 1601
 4. Ibid., ff.12, 25, 28
 5. Ibid., ff.100-102. It is of interest that many of the names of these Chester inns survive now as hotels or public houses.
 6. Ibid., ff.24, 88

in the Chester corn market.⁽¹⁾ Faced with such problems the sooner the mayor could get the soldiers embarked the better it was for the general peace of the city.

iii. Shipping troops and sailing delays.

The requisitioning of ships was among the mayor of Chester's foremost and most urgent duties for the speedy embarkation of the levies.⁽²⁾ His authority to have merchant vessels taken up stemmed from the privy council's orders to him.⁽³⁾ The mayor clearly needed the backing of the highest authority to overcome the reluctance of ships' masters and owners to give their services at the queen's price. They considered soldiers unprofitable cargo and difficult to handle. If their ships were summarily impressed, as the privy council made plain to the mayor they could be, then the vessels were in the government's service.⁽⁴⁾

Thomas Smith, mayor in 1596, drew up a list of 47 ship owners whose vessels he could impress into the service, but on the occasion of large levies the mayor had to spread his net widely calling on help from the dependent ports such as Liverpool.⁽⁵⁾ The crown's officer, the muster master in the port, co-operated with the mayor in bringing pressure to bear on ships' owners. However, the privy council sought to control the ships' owners more directly by appointing official transport supervisors, Robert Davies for Chester and Liverpool and John Goyce for the west country ports and Bristol;

1. CCR., QSF/File no.49, f.142

2. CCR., M/MP/8/21, 22

3. APC., xxx, 110, 145, 146, 164 for 1599 examples.

4. CCR., M/L/1/109, i-iv; 121/81-85, examples of ships taken up 1596-1599

5. CCR., M/MP/12/30, list of ships n.d. but in the 1596 bundle of mayor's papers.

their main responsibility was to hire and impress ships in the required numbers for the transport of troops.⁽¹⁾

In theory it was then possible for central government to exercise a greater control over the movement of troops by sea. The two officials, sometimes called captains, sometimes commissioners for shipping, were empowered to transfer surplus ships to where they were needed. In 1599, for example, John Goyce was ordered to send seventeen vessels from Barnstaple to Chester to meet the greater needs of the levy there.⁽²⁾ But the mayor's account of this flotilla noted only "90 Bastaple mariners in 9 ships, arriving at Chester, 28th March 1599".⁽³⁾ In practice the privy council's order to John Goyce had not been fully executed. On the other hand, Robert Davies had commandeered sufficient ships for the shipping of the Essex army contingents then at Chester in February 1599 as is plain from his, "A note of the shipping at Chester" sent to Sir Robert Cecil.⁽⁴⁾ "In Chester water" 23 vessels for 1,500 men; "in the river of Liverpool" 9 vessels for 300 men, "in the river Wyer" 9 vessels for 500 men, and "in the river of Formbie", 3 vessels for 200 men. The numbers of horses mentioned 356, at Chester, 122 at Liverpool, 48 at the Wyer and 16 at Formby greatly exceeds the 200 originally ordered to Chester for Essex's army.⁽⁵⁾ In his note Davies lists the vessels by name.⁽⁶⁾

Contrary winds and bad weather in an age of sail delayed most expeditions out of Chester to Ireland. The elements frequently upset government intentions, played havoc with embarkation arrangements,

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1. CSPD., (1598-1601), 159, a summary of instructions to Davies and Goyce in 1599, where they are called commissioners for the taking up of shipping.
 2. APC., xxix, 511
 3. CCR., M/MP/10/1, 28 March 1599
 4. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 86
 5. See Table 2 above
 6. The names of all known ships used in the Irish service are listed in Appendix 1.

and drove many convoys back onto the north coast of Wales. The prevailing westerlies proved a major obstacle to the efficient prosecution of the war, and partly explains the prolongation of hostilities.

When Sir William Russell was sent to Ireland as Lord Deputy in July 1594 he set off from Chester on the 11th July, and waited at Hilbre until the 14th when his party put out to sea. The wind then proving contrary they were blown back up the estuary as far as Gayton, where they dis-embarked. For the next four days Russell went hunting with the Earl of Derby at Neston where the Earl had a lodge. Russell put out to sea again on the 18th July but only got as far as Holyhead where his entourage was forced to dis-embark and remain a week. They took ship again on the 31st of July and landed that night at Howth Head near Dublin almost three weeks after they had set off from Chester. Russell's experience illustrates the kind of delay which could occur even in summer months.⁽¹⁾

In winter delays were worse still. Captain Dutton left Chester with 94 soldiers and five officers on the 17th of November 1596.⁽²⁾ Four days later he was blown back on the Welsh coast near Holyhead, and for the next seventeen days was penned there by unfavourable winds.⁽³⁾ During their stay in Holyhead the soldiers proved a nuisance to the justices of the peace and the local inhabitants, though the entire company were Welsh, from Flintshire. William and Hugh Lewis, two justices from Anglesey, wrote three times to the mayor of Chester on the 24th November, 27th November and December 10th demanding speedy re-payment for the food and lodgings

1. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 220-260, a summary of the 'Journal of Sir William Russell, Lord Deputy of Ireland, 24 June 1594 to the 27 May 1597' in B.L.Add.MSS., 4728

2. CCR., M/MP/8/20, Thomas Smith, mayor of Chester to the council in Dublin announcing the departure of Dutton's company, 17 November 1596.

3. CCR.M/MP/8/36, Dutton to Smith, 7th December 1596.

of Dutton's men.⁽¹⁾ In the meantime, an undisclosed number deserted with their arms and equipment. Dutton put the remainder to sea again on the 10th December, but they were back for a second time in Holyhead on the 13th.⁽²⁾ By that time the privy council's order for the discharge of the levies that winter reached Holyhead and Dutton had a difficult time restraining his men from going home before he had received confirmation of the government's discharge orders from the mayor of Chester.⁽³⁾ Meanwhile, the earlier deserters were being searched for in Flintshire by the deputy lieutenants and constables to recover them, their arms and apparel.⁽⁴⁾ Dutton's experience is but one example of how costly the vagaries of wind and weather could prove to the government, involving extra food and extended lodgings, and the loss of men, coats, arms and armour through desertion.

Delays seem to have been philosophically accepted: "Our 2,000 men are attending the wind at Chester", wrote Lord Buckhurst to Sir Robert Cecil, "so as when God is pleased, they are to pass, we can do no more."⁽⁵⁾ The mayor at Bristol on a similar occasion said that patience was the only remedy.⁽⁶⁾ Robert Brerwood, mayor of Chester, told the privy council in January 1601 of how the ships had set off but were forced onto the Wirral and there embarked thrice, but in the end the ships' masters "were enforced to unship them". Anxious to be on the right side of the privy council Brerwood added: "Any negligence or want of care in me I would rather die than deserve."⁽⁷⁾

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1. CCR., M/MP/8/36, ff.23. 26, 38, William & Hugh Lewis to Thomas Smith, mayor of Chester. They acknowledged part payment on the 28 December but asked for full payment to be made - ibid., f.59
 2. Ibid., f.56, Dutton to Smith, 16 December 1596
 3. CCR., M/MP/8/L/1/114, p.c. to the mayor of Chester, 2 December 1596
 4. CCR., M/MP/8/48-49, Dutton's notes of arms missing; ibid., f.72 the d.l.s. of Flintshire to the mayor on the means to recover the deserters and equipment.
 5. CSPI., (1600), 342, Buckhurst to Cecil, 11 August 1600
 6. HMS., Salisbury, xii, 407
 7. HMC., Salisbury, xi, 24

Occasionally, the wind, oddly enough, was set fair at Liverpool but not at Chester. A levy in October 1596, meant to sail all together from both Chester and Liverpool, became divided as those from Liverpool got out to sea.⁽¹⁾ If the wind was not gale force troop ships could cross by tacking into contrary winds, as they did from Bristol in September 1602.⁽²⁾ But best of all was a voyage with the wind set fair. Captain Willis described such a passage from Chester when his ships gathered off Hilbre on the 24th April 1600, set off on the 25th and reached Carrickfergus on the 27th April.⁽³⁾

Delays were not invariably caused by adverse weather conditions; the tardiness of ship owners to have their ships used for the carriage of troops, the reluctance of captains to set off without full complements of men and arms, and the failure of shire levies to meet assembly dates at Chester could all cause shipments to miss favourable winds. Sir Robert Cecil made a digest in November 1600 of information received "On the causes why the soldiers lying at severall portes to be transported for the service of Ireland are not yett gone." He found that most ports suffered fog and westerly winds; at Chester they were awaiting the arrival of winter coats from Babington and Bromley, merchant clothiers to the government; at Milford the victuallers had not arrived, and at Bristol all the soldiers had not turned up.⁽⁴⁾

Misadventures at sea also show that hazards did not come to an end on sailing; George Wadham, the owner of the Reindeer, wrote to Cecil for £900 compensation for the loss of his ship, pressed for transporting troops to Ireland, and wrecked off the Irish coast near

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1. HMC., Salisbury, vi, 436-437
 2. HMC., Salisbury, xii, 390
 3. CSPI., (1600), 200, 209. And for like experiences and narratives see HMC., Salisbury, xi, 24, 488; CSPI., (1601-1603), 173.
 4. Hatfield House, Cecil MSS., 205/110, November 1600

Drogheda. ⁽¹⁾ A privy council order to the exchequer shows his amount of compensation agreed by the government. ⁽²⁾ Henry Hardware, mayor of Chester, described the adventures of William Wright's ship the Katharine of Hilbre, which carried 100 quarters of oats for the Carrickfergus garrison, but in a storm off the Isle of Man had its mainmast broken yet safely made Dublin. ⁽³⁾

Traffic from Ireland was naturally subject to similar hazards, yet Captain Carleill's experience ^{in 1589} may not have been typical. His ship, the Swallow of Carrickfergus was taken over by thirty Spanish prisoners he was conveying to Chester; they had over-powered the crew and spirited away the ship. The owner, clearly not on board, wanted 200 marks compensation for the ship, and £40 for the loss of ordnance; he estimated his loss at £173. 6s. 8d., but because he had also lost his crew of mariners he thought he should be entitled to any ransoms taken should the escaped Spaniards be caught and redeemed. ⁽⁴⁾

(iv) Communications.

Chester was particularly important in the transmission of intelligence to and from the various theatres of war in Ireland, especially with Ulster for the Lough Foyle and Carrickfergus garrisons, and the Dublin administration and the Lord Deputy relied much on the traffic with Chester for new of government orders. Chester became an important link between England and Ireland during every phase of the war, and the responsibility that fell on the mayor of keeping letters, orders and instructions moving greatly exceeded those he

1. HMC., Salisbury, xiv, 151, 152, October 1598

2. AFC., xxix, 418

3. HMC., Salisbury, x, 136, Hardware to the p.c., 4 May 1600

4. HMC., Salisbury, xiv, (addenda), 183, Carleill to the p.c., 1601.

In fact the date of the letter was probably 1589. Carleill was dead by 1593. Information from Professor D. B. Quinn.

would normally have experienced in times of comparative peace.

The mayor's military papers between 1598 and 1600 contain 25 letters to the privy council and to Cecil, and approximately 40 copy letters and sets of instructions from the privy council to the mayor.⁽¹⁾ And in the Cecil papers between March 1598 and November 1600 there are 33 letters dated at Chester.⁽²⁾ The mayor generally informed the privy council when levies were dispatched from the port, and sometimes he wrote to the Dublin administration to say that reinforcements were on their way.⁽³⁾

Letters and packets of letters were often sent by Cecil and the council with trusted captains accompanying levies to Ireland.⁽⁴⁾ But throughout the war years a "post bark", as it was called, plied between Chester and Dublin.⁽⁵⁾ In February 1599 another post bark was established at Holyhead "as well for serving the packet by land, as for entertaining a bark to carry over and return the packet".⁽⁶⁾ And after Docwra had established garrisons in the Foyle another post bark went to and from Lough Foyle to Chester.⁽⁷⁾ John Francis, frequently referred to as "the post of Chester" in the privy council records and Cecil papers, appears to have helped the mayor in dispatching letters to Ireland and to London. A letter of 24 October 1599 from Francis to Cecil illustrates some of the postal arrangements between London, Chester and Dublin. He said he had received Cecil's letter "of the 22nd inst. this day".

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1. CCR., M/MP/8, passim; M/L/1 - the mayor's Great Letter Book, passim.
 2. HMC., Salisbury, ix, and x, passim
 3. CCR., M/MP/8/18, 20, 33; M/L/1/131 for examples.
 4. CSPI., (1601-1603), 365 - Captain Vaughan; ibid., p.439 Oliver St. John for instances.
 5. APC., xxix, 591; CSPI., (1592-1596), 493
 6. CSPI., (1598-1599), 482 "The stages of the new post laid for the service of Ireland" February 24, 1598 o.s. The post at Holyhead had a yearly allowance of £130.
 7. CSPI., (1601-1603), 412, 413

It had thus taken 48 hours from London to Chester, an expeditious delivery. Cecil wanted to know if previous packets of letters had gone to Dublin. Francis confirmed that he had received these on 9 October, delivered them to "Henry Aynsdale, owner of a bark of this river", and had taken Aynsdale's word that he would procure a certificate of their safe delivery at Dublin.⁽¹⁾ Aynsdale had set sail in his bark the Valentine of Chester on 12 October, but according to this letter from Francis of the 24 October, the Valentine was reported at Chester to be still windbound at Beaumaris.⁽²⁾ Francis hoped it had gone because at the time of writing there was "a show of a favourable wind", and he further hoped it would "by the grace of God be very speedily at Dublin". Other news in his letter spoke of the activities of the other post bark which had been established at Holyhead to ply to Dublin for he said he knew of no other passage "of late out of Ireland, saving the post bark which brought over two packets ... which arrived yesterday at Holie Head". He hoped Cecil had received these, but "yesterday" was the 23 October and Francis's wish suggests a twenty-four hour delivery from Holyhead to London, an exceptionally fast time for the period. Francis's hope was perhaps too sanguine.⁽³⁾

Other small ships, like Henry Aynsdale's were apparently pressed into the government's postal service. Robert Harris, master of the Katharine of Hilbre was hastened on to Dublin with letters in January 1598; he later demanded compensation since he had to sail with these letters "before he was fully freighted".⁽⁴⁾ A privy council

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1. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 377, "Jo. Frauncis, Post of Chester, to Sir R. Cecil"
 2. CCR., M/MP/12/30 where the Valentine is stated of being of Liverpool, and for some of the activity of this ship in Docwra's service see CSPI, (1601-1603), 190-191
 3. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 377
 4. CCR., M/L/5/244-246, January 1598

letter to Richard Rathbone, mayor of Chester in 1598, showed the government's anxiety to hasten its letters to Ireland; it asked if there were any of its dispatches delayed at Chester. If so, they were to be sent immediately to Holyhead where "they shalbe sent by syding and other paynes of rowing if necessary".⁽¹⁾ At times of major crisis in Ireland, such as that of the Spanish landing at Kinsale in October 1601, the privy council was troubled in not hearing from Ireland for a period of five weeks.⁽²⁾ The difficulties of distance and the state of the posts was a frequent talking-point with many late Elizabethan correspondents. Sir John Norris in writing to Cecil in March 1596 said his letters would carry "so stale a date as makes me send them only to show they were written."⁽³⁾

However there was a regular postal service to Ireland, horses and riders being maintained at post stages via Chester between London and Holyhead; endorsements to letters indicate the stages on the route: London, Barnet, St. Albans, Brickhill, Towcester, Daventry, Coventry, Coleshill, Lichfield, Stone, Nantwich, Chester, Rhuddlan, Conway, Beaumaris, Holyhead.⁽⁴⁾ Some endorsements also give a clear idea of the time taken. One example, on a letter from Richard Rathbone, mayor of Chester to the privy council of the 23rd March 1598 may suffice, but may not be typical of the speed of delivery:

"For her Ma^{ts} affayres.
To the right honourable the lls: and others of her. Ma^{ts}
moste honorable privey Counsaylle: haest post haest,
post haste.

At the citie of Chester the 23 days of
March at 6 in the evening. Richard
Rathburne, Maior.
At Nampwich at 9 at night
At Stone at owne clocke paste midnichte

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1. CCR., M/MP/8/L/1/148, 7 June 1598
 2. APC., xxxii, 437
 3. CSPI., (1592-96), 493
 4. APC., xxix, 590, 591

At Lichfield at five in the morning
 At Colsell betwixt 7 and 8
 At Coventry after 10 a clocke in the morninge
 At Daventry past 1 afternoone
 At Toster past 3
 Brickhill at 6
 At Sent Albones at 10 of the cloke at nite
 barnet at 12 a Clocke at nyght" (1)

Letters from the Irish council and from the Lord Deputy sometimes arrived at Beaumaris rather than Holyhead for dispatch to London.

The authorities on Anglesey asked the mayor of Chester to obtain some allowance for their services in forwarding mail on the government's behalf. (2)

When nothing was done by Chester the magistrates at Beaumaris enlisted the support of the Lord Deputy, Lord Thomas Burgh (1597), to get the mayor of Chester to bring the matter to the notice of the Lord Treasurer. (3)

A year later the mayor of Beaumaris, Thomas Bulkeley, reminded the mayor of Chester of his constant troubles and expense in sending mail to Ireland, and to London "without consideringe the chardges", and that he must get authorization for him from the privy council to have the charges defrayed by the government because, the task, "as the state of thinges at this presente standeth is like to be frequente". (4) Bulkeley does not appear to have mentioned specific sums of money for these services, but a ship hired at Holyhead for Ireland cost £10 a month, and the annual charges in 1599 there for postal services was estimated by the privy council at £634-18-4d. (5)

Communication between the privy council and the commanders in Ireland and vice-versa was, of course, hindered by the difficulties

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1. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 113. The practice of marking official letters with "haste, post, haste", and "For life" became common in the middle of the sixteenth century. J.A.J.Housden, 'Early Posts in England', EHR., xviii (1903), 717
 2. CCR., M/MP/8/L/1/12, Wm. Sparowe to T.Smith, mayor, 12 November 1596
 3. CCR., M/MP/L/1/133, Thomas, Lord Burgh to Thomas Fletcher, mayor, 12 May 1597
 4. CCR., M/MP/L/1/163, Thomas Bulkeley, mayor of Beaumaris to Richard Rathbone, mayor of Chester, 20 September 1598.
 5. APC., xxix, 590-592

of the sea passage. Changing circumstances in Ireland sometimes meant that events over-took privy council orders making them irrelevant to new conditions. For example, the overthrow of Sir Henry Bagenall in August 1598 made the council's orders to send Sir Samuel Bagenall, his brother, on an expedition to plant garrisons at Lough Foyle irrelevant and impossible to achieve.⁽¹⁾ Sometimes rapidly changing orders from the privy council caused confusion.⁽²⁾ The double demand for large levies in October 1601 caught out John Ratcliffe, the mayor of Chester, who wondered if he was right in thinking that one of the levies was for Lough Foyle, or whether their destination should have been Waterford since the Spaniards had put in at Kinsale in Munster. A privy council directive of the 18th of October told him to set his mind at rest and follow the original order to send 700 of the soldiers to Lough Foyle and 300 to Carrickfergus and to receive this "for a playne and fynall dyrection".⁽³⁾

(v) Chester's relations with Liverpool.

One particular complication for the authorities at Chester was the lack of co-operation from the mayors of Liverpool who provided essential ships and billets for troops bound for Ireland. The privy council treated Liverpool as a dependency of Chester, a position resented and contested by the mayors and councils of Liverpool.⁽⁴⁾ The fortunes of the levies ordered to Chester in 1596 illustrate the rivalry between the two ports very clearly.

In October 1596 the privy council ordered Thomas Smith, mayor of Chester, to provide sufficient shipping for 900 men from Yorkshire

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1. APC., xxviii, 578, 608-610 orders sent in July, 16 and the 23rd.
 2. See ^{the} confusions caused Archbishop John Whitgift in implementing rapidly changing privy council orders for clerical levies in my "The Clergy and the Militia, 1580-1610" in History, lx (June 1975), pp. 207-208
 3. APC., xxxii, 287
 4. CCR., M/MP/L/1, mayor's Great Letter Book, and M/MP/8 mayor's military papers which reflect the rivalry with Liverpool; R.Muir, History of Liverpool (1970 reprint ed.), 76-80.

and North Wales, part of a 2,000 levy intended to re-inforce the army in Ireland, to see to their billets until the wind proved favourable, and to provide enough victuals for their sea passage. His expenses were then to be re-imbursed from the Treasurer-at-war in Ireland, Sir Henry Wallop.⁽¹⁾

To ease the burden on Chester 300 soldiers of this levy were to be billeted and shipped from Liverpool, and Thomas Smith, mayor of Chester, preemptorily stayed enough shipping at Liverpool for the purpose. William Moore, mayor of Liverpool, expressed great surprise to Smith that he should have made a general stay of shipping at his port without his consent.⁽²⁾ In a further letter Moore wrote that he did not question the authority of the privy council's instructions, but that he did consider that the mayor of Chester exceeded those instructions by extending his authority over Liverpool.⁽³⁾ Moore went on to refuse to have the 300, adding that "Lerpoole is a desolate place in winter", and that her Majesty's service would not be advanced in sending soldiers there.

It was hoped that the levy would be ready by the 9th of November, but by the 10th only 550 soldiers had arrived in Chester, and those out of Yorkshire came without any armaments.⁽⁴⁾ By the 12th, Moore of Liverpool, still annoyed about the high-handed action of Smith of Chester in having ships stayed at Liverpool, wrote to say that if he could justify his action on the mere phrase "commissioners without restraint" in the council's instructions, then he (Smith) might as

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1. CCR., M/MP/L/1/109, 13 October 1596. Wallop was Treasurer at war from 1579-1599, and succeeded by Sir George Cary in that office 1599-1606. Both were posthumously accused of peculation, but merchants' complaints against Wallop aroused government suspicions in his life-time - CSPI. (1596-1597), 413. For the case against Sir George Cary see H.Hall, Society in the Elizabethan Age (1886), 126-132.
 2. CCR., M/MP/8/5, William Moore to Thomas Smith, 6 November 1596
 3. CCR., M/MP/8/6, the same to the same, 9 November 1596
 4. CCR., M/MP/8/8-10, Smith to the privy council, 10 November 1596

well stay ships in London and ended by re-iterating his refusal to take any soldiers.⁽¹⁾ Smith ignored this and replied to Moore on 14th November that he had already dispatched 100 Denbighshire soldiers under Captain Roger Billings, and that he wanted them properly cared for in Liverpool until they embarked.⁽²⁾ He sent precise orders on how Billings' company were to be fed, and warned that "200 others would follow shortly".⁽³⁾

The fait accompli by Smith and the early incidence of a favourable wind saved further acrimony between the two mayors. Roger Billings reported that he and his men arrived in Liverpool on Sunday 14th of November and embarked on The Hope of Liverpool on Tuesday 16th. While in Liverpool each man had four meals at the rate of 4d the meal.⁽⁴⁾ Smith wrote to the Dublin administration that 94 soldiers and six officers had departed before there was time to get a nominal roll and account of their arms, but did not doubt that their captain would perform that duty on his arrival.⁽⁵⁾

Within two weeks Liverpool billeted a further over-spill of levies from Chester. Captain Price put up a Welsh company in the town on the 6th December 1596 where he had difficulty in retaining his men, and ten deserted.⁽⁶⁾ The mayor of Liverpool appears to have had no objection on this occasion, but sent his bill to the mayor of Chester "for the entertaininge of Captaine Prees' companie".⁽⁷⁾ But he was not willing to co-operate any further; from the examination

1. CCR., M/MP/8/13, Moore to Smith, 13 November 1596

2. CCR., M/MP/8/14, Smith to Moore, 14 November 1596

3. Ibid.,

4. CCR., M/MP/8/17, n.d. account signed by R.Billings.

5. CCR., M/MP/8/18, Smith to the Irish council, 16 November 1596

6. CCR., M/MP/8/52 - list of soldiers "who deserted with their arms" endorsed "ffor Captaine Prees", 13 November 1596.

7. CCR., M/MP/8/57, Moore to Smith, 19th December 1596.

of one William Pye, it appears that the mayor refused to feed Pye and his companions and had them returned with a pass to Chester, because they belonged to a different company, that of Captain Henry Malby.⁽¹⁾ Such actions drove the new mayor of Chester, Sir John Savage, to ask Lord Burghley in April 1597 whether or not Chester had any authority over shipping at Liverpool.⁽²⁾ There was no reply.

The levy of December 1596 was not in fact sent to Ireland; the troops were ordered back to their homes to remain in a state of readiness for future service.⁽³⁾ The prevalence of westerly gales that winter, made the privy council abandon the attempt. Weather conditions, and the local quarrels of Liverpool and Chester must have proved as much a hindrance to the furtherance of the "service of Ireland" as the activity of the enemy.

In April 1597 the privy council ordered these levies back to port together with an additional 560 recruits.⁽⁴⁾ Aware of the imminent descent of soldiers William Moore, mayor of Liverpool, implored Chester not to send any soldiers because of the poverty of the victuallers, and the high prices and scarcities in Liverpool. He had, however, stayed three ships to aid in transportation.⁽⁵⁾ The mayor of Chester, Sir John Savage, quickly replied that Liverpool had to stay further shipping, enough for an extra 560 men, but that he would send as few soldiers as possible.⁽⁶⁾ Robert Moore, deputy mayor in Liverpool, taking up the matter with Chester that it would be impossible to supply meals at less than 6d a time, and that

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1. CCR., M/MP/8/58, examination of William Pye at Chester, 23 December 1596
 2. CCR., M/MP/L/1/90, Sir John Savage to Lord Burghley, 18 April 1597
 3. CCR., M/MP/L/1/114 copy of the p.c. letter, 2 December 1596 to discharge contingents of men at Chester and Liverpool.
 4. CCR., M/MP/L/1/121, the p.c. to the mayor of Chester, 7 April 1597
 5. CCR., M/MP/8/87, Moore to Savage, 16 April 1597
 6. CCR., M/MP/8/91, Savage to Moore, 18 April 1597

the entire exercise could not be carried out at Liverpool without a special commission to purchase grain.⁽¹⁾ William Moore also wrote to say he needed proof of the mayor of Chester's authority.⁽²⁾

The arrival of the soldiers ended the bickering, for both mayors agreed to ask the privy council for a special allowance to cover the expenses of victualling in port at the rate of 6d the man in view of the high prices.⁽³⁾ They cited the precedent of November 1594, a time of great scarcity, when the government had allowed 6d per meal. From Lord Burghley's instructions to disburse "£400, £500 or £600" and their receipts it appears that the increased allowance was permitted.⁽⁴⁾ Altogether, 1,260 soldiers were sent to Ireland by the end of April of which Liverpool billeted and shipped 500. Behind them they left the mayors wrangling over the re-imburements of expenses.⁽⁵⁾

That Liverpool continued to share in Chester's work of sending out levies is clear from the mayor's military papers for the years 1598 and 1600, but numbers sent to Liverpool from Chester are not stated, nor is there any further evidence of squabbling; perhaps the Liverpool mayors, William Dixon and John Bird in those years, were more conciliatory characters than William and Robert Moore in 1596 and 1597. But in 1601 and 1602 trouble broke out again. Giles Brooke, Liverpool's mayor in 1601, put the city's case against what he called "the abuses wherewith Liverpool hath for a few years, in the latter time of these last wars of Ireland, been pressed by our too near neighbour of Chester" He asked the privy council in

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1. CCR., M/MP/L/1/97, Robert Moore to Savage, 23 April 1597
 2. CCR., M/MP/L/1/98, William Moore to Savage, same date.
 3. CCR., M/MP/L/1/100, the mayors to the p.c. 24th April 1597; and for the precedent of November 1594, PRO.SP.12/250/35.
 4. CCR., M/MP/L/1/127, Lord Burghley's instructions, 26 April 1597, and *ibid.*, L/1/129, 131 receipts of money, sums of £400, and £600, from the treasurer-at war's department in Ireland, 7 May 1597
 5. CCR., M/MP/L/1/57, 63, 104, 107, 110a, 110b, letters on re-imburements and receipts.

future to direct its letters "as heretofore hath been accustomed, unto the mayor of this town", which had not been done in the 1590s. Giles Brooke went on to claim that Liverpool could put up a thousand foot and fifty horse at competitive rates by using the towns round about and could comfortably accommodate 700 "within our town ... at one time". His letter catalogued the "insults" of Chester to Liverpool, "over these four years past". "They term us to be a member of Chester ... challenge a superiority over us where it is evident that this is the chiefest port between us and the Land's End of England, Milford only excepted".⁽¹⁾ The tune that Liverpool was a poor and desolate place had changed but not the reason for the basic antagonism between the ports. It is of interest that Liverpool had already begun to claim its own superiority as a port, resenting the commandeering of its ships, and having them sent out to Hilbre to await troops from Chester.⁽²⁾

In the following year, 1602, the mayor, and the burgesses of Liverpool continued to assert the greater convenience of Liverpool as a port for the transportation of troops to Ireland, using their own ships and sailing directly from Liverpool, not via Hilbre at the behest of Chester. At length the privy council invited delegations from both ports to settle the problems of precedence and convenience between them. The mayor of Chester, Hugh Glaseor, sent his recorder, Robert Whitaby; no delegate was sent from Liverpool to the council's meeting in London. Whitaby maintained Chester's position as the

1. HMC., Salisbury, xii, 466

2. R.C.Jarvis in 'The head-port of Chester and Liverpool, its creek and member' THSLC., (1950), 102, p.78 argues that the "dependency of the Lancashire havens upon the port of Chester has got itself confused with the question of delimitation of the ports ... entirely separate matter from dependency" Yet clearly from the correspondence between Liverpool and Chester on Irish levies Liverpool's dependency on Chester was resented and contested in the 1590s.

head-port, arguing for the use of Liverpool's ships at Hilbre and Chester, and pointing out that 'the carriage of arms, furniture, habilements of war, and victuals from Chester to Liverpool "will be much more charge to her Majesty than the conveying of their ships from Liverpool to the port of Chester". In his plea Whitaby painted a picture of the havoc that would be caused by insolent and unruly soldiers robbing and spoiling the countryside if they were sent out of Chester. And from what is known of desertions in Chester he went on to argue, perhaps unconvincingly, that if the soldiers were not shipped from Chester they would run away and disperse themselves "as hath been often seen". Thus Whitaby argued against sending any further contingents to Liverpool, and by not having a delegate Liverpool lost an opportunity to make its case. The lords of the privy council dismissed Chester's delegate with a decision to leave "the course which hath been formerly used for the transport of soldiers from Hilbre to be continued until they shall show just cause to the contrary."⁽¹⁾

Arguments about precedence and superiority between Chester and Liverpool were not permanently settled by the privy council but by the gradual silting up of the Dee which gave Liverpool the upper hand from the late seventeenth century. Their rivalry in transporting troops to Ireland reflected in the mayor of Chester's military papers has been described in some detail as an interesting and little known aspect of their relationship.

1. Robert Whitaby's arguments at the privy council summarized in J.Touzeau, The Rise and Progress of Liverpool, 1551-1835 (Liverpool, 1910), pp.139-140 from J.A.Picton's Memorials of Liverpool (1873), 85, 86. It is curious that the rivalry of Chester and Liverpool in 1602 is not mentioned in the Liverpool Corporation records edited by J.A.Twemlow Liverpool Town Books, i, ii, (1935)

(vi) Victuals and supplies.

The transport of victuals was organized in much the same way as the transport of troops, the mayor having responsibility for procuring ships and sailors.⁽¹⁾ Large consignments of bread, wheat, rye, fish, beef, mutton, cheese, butter and beer were contracted from victualling merchants, whose main task was to buy up food in England and get it to the army's commissaries for victual in Ireland. The pressure of the Irish war helped to develop the contracting system between merchants and government in the supply of food to the army; this was more efficient than purveyance, the crown's right to commandeer goods and services for its own use, or, a system of free enterprize where merchants working on their own account, followed and sold provisions directly to the troops. Private victualling was much open to abuse, even to the sale of goods to the enemy if he offered a higher price. Under contract, however, the merchant undertook to procure, transport, and deliver various quantities of victuals to the army; he was paid half his bill on signature and gave the privy council a bond to guarantee his half of the bargain. The balance due to him was paid within six days of the privy council receiving a certificate from the mayor of the port that the food shipped was delivered and in good condition, and his bond became redeemable when he sent in his receipts from the army's commissaries of victuals on the delivery of the goods in Ireland.⁽²⁾

Merchants competed for contracts to supply individual garrisons, the army in whole provinces, and occasionally the entire army in Ireland.⁽³⁾

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1. CCR., M/MP/I/1/89, list of victualling ships, 1597; M/MP/12/ receipts for provisions put aboard, 1598
 2. CCR., M/MP/10/3; M/MP/I/1/20, 161, examples of mayoral certificates. For the details of a typical contract for victuals - AFC., xxix, 273.
 3. CSPD., (1559-1597), 21-23, merchant competition, and for a contract to supply the whole army, PRO.SP.63/211/258, July 1602.

John Jolles and William Cockayne, for example, supplied victuals for 9,500 soldiers in the three provinces of Leinster, Connaught and Ulster in August 1601.⁽¹⁾ By means of the contracting system the government gained greater control of supplying the troops not only with food, but with apparel and arms as well, and, in theory, this extension of the contracting system in the last years of the war, approximately from 1598 to 1602, should have secured more efficient transit of these goods into Ireland. Stores of foodstuffs shipped with levies were forbidden to be broken into despite long delays waiting on favouring winds even should there be a time of dearth in the port as happened in 1596 and 1597 in Chester.⁽²⁾

While victualling the troops in Ireland created a new market for a few years and benefited a few, the necessary bulk purchases of victuals in and about Chester led to food shortages and high prices. Foulke and William Aldersey, mayors in 1594 and 1595, were for instance, concerned about the activities of William Beecher and George Leicester, agents of victualling merchants. In a time of serious shortage of food they had bought up so much corn, butter and cheese that they had forced up prices in the environs of Chester even further. The mayor wanted them to go elsewhere for provisions, and would have liked the government to place curbs on the demands made by the army victuallers.⁽³⁾ The government's intention in The Book of Orders to ensure fair distribution of food in time of famine appears to have had little effect on the situation in Chester.

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1. APC., xxx, 194, 196-203, 217, 294, 303, 394, 410, 553, 619, 623, 686, 724, 728, examples of payments to Jolles, Cockayne and John Wood who supplied all the Munster garrisons in 1600 and 1601.
 2. It was not until the late 1590s that the government shouldered the risks involved in sea transport - APC., xxix, 485-460.
 3. PRO.SP.12/251/61, the mayor to the p.c., 17 March 1595.

Thomas Fletcher, who succeeded as mayor on the death in office of John Savage complained to Sir Robert Cecil of how the city of Chester had become impoverished because of the levies to Ireland, and because of the war with Spain "a place wherewith the merchants had all their intercourse".⁽¹⁾ It was a view with which the privy council had some sympathy for later in 1599 it supported the Chester merchants' request for a licence to ship 10,000 dickers of calf-skins overseas, and in so doing the council agreed that the Irish rebellion had damaged the city "being very much charged for the Queen's service".⁽²⁾

With large numbers of soldiers, tons of victuals, thousands of coats and sets of arms and armour converging on Chester it is not surprising to find some merchants profiteering and smuggling, activities which were an almost natural accompaniment of war.⁽³⁾ William Aldersey, mayor in 1595, stated that there was no merchant in Chester that could be trusted.⁽⁴⁾ Agents acting for a victualling contractor in May 1595 came under suspicion of selling butter, cheese and corn at a profit in Chester instead of having these goods shipped to Ireland.⁽⁵⁾ The governor of the Isle of Man, Peter Liyr, complained to the mayor of Chester in January 1597 about the treacherous behaviour of Chester merchants on his island.⁽⁶⁾ Other merchants in Chester were examined in 1598 for exporting corn without a licence.⁽⁷⁾

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1. HMC., Salisbury, viii, 298, Fletcher to Lord Burghley, 8 August 1598
 2. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 424-425, p.c.'s opinion on Chester's merchants petition, "Endorsed, 1599".
 3. PRO.SP/63/205/125; 206/59; 208/pt.i/72 for examples.
 4. CCR., M/MP/8/2
 5. Ibid., 8/1 and 1b.
 6. Ibid., L/1/69, Liyr to the mayor, 13 January 1597.
 7. Ibid., L/1/144.

There was also an illicit trade in apparel and arms which were provided "at Her Majesty's charge for the souldiers"; in some cases it was suspected that the habilements of war came back from Ireland to be re-sold in Chester.⁽¹⁾ Swords, daggers, rapiers, horses' saddles, and on one occasion six horses were brought back to Chester by Captain Whyte's lieutenants; the reason was not given. When the privy council heard of the return of horse it wrote to the mayor of Chester, Robert Brerwood, on 4th August,

"wee doe not a littel mervaille that the Lord Deputie would give him [Whyte] leave to transport any horssees out of that realm consideringe wee doe send over thether horsse from hence to fill up the bands".⁽²⁾

The Irish war years gave rise to much disloyal trading in arms which found their way to the Irish enemy. In 1597 merchants were interrogated in Chester over shipments of arms that went to Hugh O'Neill in Ulster. A certain Thomas Long was accused of having gone to Ireland with a consignment of muskets procured in Manchester and shipped through Chester to O'Neill.⁽³⁾ In 1598 the privy council gave orders to stay consignments of arms and munitions at Chester and Bristol because of fears that they were intended for the enemy.⁽⁴⁾ Severe warnings and reprimands were sent to the mayors of ports that the Irish were receiving arms and munitions which may have been bought at fairs at Chester, Bristol and London.⁽⁵⁾ The reality of this illegal and treasonable trade was also attested to by the high command and others in Ireland. William Saxey, chief justice in Munster, graphically described the crooked merchant's progress and profit when writing to Sir Robert Cecil in December 1599.⁽⁶⁾ Sir Henry Docwra admitted that arms

1. CCR., QSF/File no.49, 12, 24, 136 illegal sale of arms in 1600, 1601.

2. APC., xxx, 556, p.c. to Brerwood, 4 August 1600

3. PRO.SP.63/199/107

4. APC., xxix, 244.

5. PRO.SP./63/205/125

6. PRO.SP.63/206/59

were embezzled at Derry and found their way to the enemy and back to Chester where they were likely to be re-sold in a cycle of frauds.⁽¹⁾ The Company of Armourers, Gun-makers and Cutlers in Chester pointed out other disorders and abuses to the privy council in an effort to eliminate them. Many persons, they said, bought arms and armour from captains and others returning from Ireland, which were ostensibly old and unserviceable, but "they trymmed and dressed them ... and re-sold them to the countries thereabouts" to the un-doing of the Company's proper trade, to the "deceitfull utterance of olde armes for newe", and, "which is the greatest offence, defraudinge her Majesties service".⁽²⁾

Opportunities for much greater frauds in financial deals multiplied from May 1601 on the introduction of a new debased coinage into Ireland in an effort to pay for the war at reduced cost.⁽³⁾ And to facilitate the movement of treasure and the payment of merchants, ship owners, the mayor, and soldiers, an exchange was established in Chester. But the merchants used the difference in value between English stirling coin of the realm and the new Irish coinage to their own profit, a practice which the subsequent inquiry into the abuses in the exchange revealed.⁽⁴⁾ The physical movement of treasure presented obvious security problems also. On one occasion the privy council was alerted in time to foil a plot by two Welshmen, John Salisbury and Peter Wynn to rob £10,000 at Chester.⁽⁵⁾

1. PRO.SP.63/208/pt.i/72

2. APC., xxxi, 444-445

3. APC., xxxi, 286. R.Bagwell, Ireland under the Tudors, iii (1890) 395-398 for the effects of the debased coinage on the army in Ireland.

4. CSPI., (1601-1603), 506-511 "Memorandum on the abuses in the exchanges"

5. CSPI., (1600-1601), 302; APC., xxxi, 191-192

Throughout the privy council's registers in the Irish war years the number of warrants authorizing the Lord Treasurer to have payments made to the mayor of Chester noticeably increase from 1598 to 1601.⁽¹⁾ And the papers of William Knight, clerk to the mayor for Irish affairs, indicate as well the size of some of these financial transactions: £1,800 in 1595; £400 in 1596; £600 in 1598, £562-12-10 in 1599, and £1,000 in 1600. These are but sampled items from those papers and do not indicate the full cost to the government for Irish services at Chester.⁽²⁾ As is well known from the many petitions for payment of arrears for war and other services the government of late Elizabethan England was slow to pay.⁽³⁾ This is reflected in the way in which the mayor of Chester had on occasion to borrow money from wealthy citizens to meet the urgency of his creditors until government funds arrived. In 1601, John Ratcliffe borrowed £600 from Lady Mary Cholmondeley to help in victualling and transporting 1,000 foot and 76 horse.⁽⁴⁾

The tasks of the authorities in Chester, particularly of the mayor, were evidently multiplied in the war years, and did not end when levies left Chester. Throughout this chapter we have seen some of these problems created by the government's demands to have troops billeted and transported and of their impact on the city and port of Chester. It may be significant of the attitude of the late Elizabethan government that the privy council commended and thanked the mayor for his work in the promotion of "the service of Ireland"⁽⁵⁾ on only three occasions, in 1595, 1597 and in 1601.

1. APC., xxxi, 18, 77, 88, 117, 363, 380, 423, 424.

2. CCR., M/MP/8/L/1, 73, 107, 111, 129, 131, 153

3. Many examples may be found, for instance, HMC., Salisbury, viii - xii passim

4. APC., xxxii, 323

5. APC., xxv, 421-422; xxviii, 115; xxxi, 338-339

Sir John Savage was particularly singled out for his good government in having troops transported to Ireland, especially since he "saved some good part of her Majesty's charges", and yet was able to give "good satisfaction to all parties". The privy council ended its letter of thanks to Sir John Savage with the wish that others would use similar care so that "wee would bee less troubled in giving directions and the Queen's service better ordered than it is".⁽¹⁾

1. AFC.; xxviii, 115, to Sir John Savage, mayor of Chester, 11 May 1597. Sir John Savage died in his mayoralty year on 5 December; Thomas Fletcher was elected in his place, 9 December - G.Ormerod, History of the County and Palatine of Chester, i, (1819), 200.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Bristol, Barnstaple, and other western ports in the Irish war(i) The transport of troops through Bristol

Like Chester, Bristol was important to the late Elizabethan government in providing ships and a base for the assembly and transport of troops to Ireland. Military traffic in the 1590s gave employment to ships and mariners whose normal trade with Spain and Portugal had been stayed because of the Spanish war, but it is unlikely that the movement of troops and habilements of war was very profitable and can scarcely have compensated the merchants who had lost that trade. Bristol's traditional Irish trade was with the southerly Irish ports of Waterford, Wexford, Cork and Youghal, and Galway on the Atlantic coast; timber, hides, linen, fish were its significant Irish imports,⁽¹⁾ but with the intensification of hostilities at the end of the queen's reign the character of Bristol's traditional Irish trade changed sharply.⁽²⁾

This change was not altogether beneficial. Formerly noted for its wealth of ships and ship-building, the mayor and corporation petitioned the privy council in 1595 for lessening of government services stating that their fleet had been reduced to "eight or ten small ships", that their ship owners and merchants were "undone" by the war, and that "now this poor place" found the burdens of the Irish war too much to bear.⁽³⁾ In January 1598

1. D.B.Quinn & K.W.Nicholls, 'Ireland in 1534' in the New History of Ireland iii (Oxford, 1976), 37

2. J.Vanes (ed.) Documents illustrating the overseas trade of Bristol in the sixteenth century, Bristol Record Soc., xxxi (1979), 14

3. J.Latimer (ed.) Annals of Bristol in the Sixteenth Century (1900), 1.

Lord Burghley listed Bristol among the ports "manifestly decayed in trade"; the citizens blamed this on the evils of war and piracy and on the greed of London merchants in monopolizing overseas markets.⁽¹⁾

And though again in 1598 Bristol pleaded poverty and asked for a reduction in the levies to be sent into the port, none was then or later allowed by the privy council. (See Table 2)

In spite of these pleas of poverty Jean Vanes, the latest student of Bristol's sixteenth century trade, concludes that there was no disastrous decline in Bristol's shipping at the end of the century,

but rather an increase in the number of smaller ships in Bristol in the 1590s, many owned in partnerships.⁽²⁾

Smaller vessels could overcome the problems of silting and tide and were able to come in the three miles from the mouth of the Avon to the city's harbour. The mayor and corporation enforced an admiralty high court ruling barring ships of above a hundred tons from the city's harbour, and the larger ships anchored off the Avon at Hungroad three miles from Bristol, or off the Severn at Kingroad near Portishead.⁽³⁾

Set between the rivers Frome and Avon with sheltered tidal harbours Bristol was well placed for trade and shipping with Ireland. During earlier Irish rebellions Bristol had much experience in billeting and sending out troops, and appeared to have suffered much in the process. In 1566, 1569, 1579 and 1583 large levies for Ireland converged on the city and port. For example, Colonel Edward Randolph's 2,000 men set off from Bristol in July 1566 on an ill-fated

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1. CSPD., (1598-1601), 2. In a list of ships built in English ports between 1581 and 1594, seven are included from Bristol and twenty-five from London - PRO.SP.12/250/33.
 2. J.Vanes, .The Port of Bristol in the Sixteenth Century. Historical Association (Bristol Branch, 1977), 13.
 3. J.Vanes, art.cit., map facing p.8. And for a description of Bristol in 1568 William Smith's in B.L.Sloan MS., 2596, f.77. For the ruling of the high court of admiralty see R.G.Marsden (ed.) Select Pleas in the Court of Admiralty in Selden Soc., ii (1897), 187

expedition to Lough Foyle against Shane O'Neill's rebellion.⁽¹⁾

In August 1579 a riot of over six hundred west country soldiers caused the city to erect a gibbet in the High Street to strike terror into the rioters. Bad weather delayed them for five weeks at a cost to the city of £483. 8s. 9d. In December 1579, nine hundred troops which quickly departed, still cost the city £443.⁽²⁾ And in July 1580 five hundred soldiers were billeted in Bristol for nearly six weeks, causing frequent disorders and costing £1,160 for food, billets and the hire of ships. The city was, of course, re-imbursed for these crown services from the exchequer, but normally after a long delay.⁽³⁾

During the 1590s, however, Bristol was of much lesser importance than Chester as a staging post for the levies to Ireland. And west country ports were used to ease the pressure on Bristol as troops were sent to Barnstaple, Milford Haven, Padstow, Plymouth, Weymouth and Southampton. Perhaps, as a result few local records give evidence of troops in Bristol? There are no mayors' military papers and the passage of troops through Bristol to Ireland has left little mention in the Mayor's Court Actions (1567-1761)⁽⁴⁾ or in the Quarter Sessions files from 1595 to 1705.⁽⁵⁾ And the Great and Little Audit Books were searched in vain for the years 1597-1601 for the city's expenses of sending out troops to Ireland.⁽⁶⁾ The City Chamberlain's

1. PRO.SP.63/18/41, instructions to Randolph, 8 July 1566
2. HMC., Appendix to the Sixth Report, 74, 103
3. Bristol Archives Office (hereafter BAO), Miscellaneous MSS., 8029, f.5
4. I am grateful to Miss Close of the Bristol Archives Office for searching the Mayor's Court Actions File.
5. BAO., Sessions File 1595-1705, erroneously 1605 on the spine, is unfortunately the only one of its kind in the BAO, and the indictments, recognizances, presentments, jury lists and judgments are all of the eighteenth century.
6. Before 1640 these Audit books do not include income or expenditure from rates or loan transactions or accounts of money held by the city; many pages are blank for the 1590s.

accounts and the Ordinance Book of the Common Council note only minor expenses as evidence of troop movements, and then chiefly of the later seventeenth century.⁽¹⁾ This account, therefore, is mainly based on national records from which the full extent of Bristol's involvement in the transportation of soldiers to Ireland can be gleaned. The result is set out in Table 1.

Over the eight year period military levies of horse and foot were sent to Bristol on fourteen occasions: the grand total of troops involved was 10,275 foot and 602 horses; the comparable figures at Chester were 19,105 foot and 1,046 horses on fifteen occasions.⁽²⁾ On four occasions, levies of over a thousand were ordered into Bristol, but none over two thousand as had been the case in Chester. The majority of troops in Bristol were destined for the more southerly theatres of war in Ireland, hence the preponderance of levies sent to Sir George Carew, the President and military governor of Munster, but like Chester, re-inforcements were also sent to Sir Henry Docwra's garrisons at Lough Foyle in Ulster.⁽³⁾ As with Chester the largest levies were sent in the peak years of military action in Ireland: for Essex's army in 1599, Mountjoy's in 1600, the Spanish landing at Kinsale in 1601, and the aftermath and completion of the re-conquest by the summer of 1602. And like Chester, levies ordered to go to Ireland in the winter months, between November and March had greater difficulty in getting there on account of the weather.⁽⁴⁾ Delays increased desertions and expenditure and no doubt prolonged the war. Of the totals in Table 1 not all

1. D.Livock (ed.) City Chamberlain's Accounts in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, Bristol Record Society, xxiv (1966), 100, 105, 106, 111, 123, 129.

2. Unlike the relationship between Chester and Liverpool, Bristol experienced no rivalry from Gloucester which played the role of a river port supplying Bristol, see T.S.Willan, Studies in Elizabethan Foreign Trade (Manchester, 1959), 84

3. See Table 2 in Chapter Seven, and Table 1

4. APC., xxxi, 421; xxxii, 87, 152

Table 1. Military levies to Bristol.

Date	Number	Mayor responsible.	Intended for
May 1595			Sir J. Norris (1)
Oct. 1596	700 f.	William Yate	Sir Wm. Russell Dublin, stayed. (2)
May 1597	800 f.	William Yate	Sir Henry Bagenal. (3)
June 1598	550 f. 200 h.	William Ellis	(4)
Oct. 1598	400 f.	William Ellis	Sir Sam. Bagenal Dublin - (5)
Jan/March 1599	1,000 f. 100 h.	John Hort	Earl of Essex (6)
Jan/March 1600	1,200 f. 18 h.	John Hopkins	Lord Mountjoy Sir G. Carew (7)
Aug./Sept. 1600	600 f. 36 h.	John Hopkins	Sir G. Carew Cork (8)
Dec. 1600	220 f.	John Hopkins	Sir Henry Docwra Lough Foyle (9)
July/Aug. 1601	895 f. 40 h.	Wm. Vawer	Sir G. Carew Cork and Waterford (10)
Oct. 1601	1,025 f. 208 h.	Wm. Vawer	Lord Mountjoy Earl of Thomond Kinsale (11)
Dec. 1601/ Jan. 1602.	1,250 f.	Wm. Vawer R. Horte	Sir G. Carew Cork (12)
Jan. 1602	835 f.	R. Horte	Cork - additional (13)
July/Aug. 1602	800 f.	R.HHorte	Sir G. Carew Sir G. Thornton (14)
Totals.	10,275 h.	602 h.	(15)

1. PRO.SP.63/179/65; BAO., account books for 1595 have perished, J.Latimer, Annals, p.103
2. APC., xxvi, 240,243,244; Cal.Treasury Papers (1557-1696),p.2 gives 750 men.
3. APC., xxvii, 24.
4. APC., xviii, 524, 529
5. PRO.SP/63/194/no.74b; APC., xxx, 240; xxix, 237-240
6. APC., xxx, 5,6,42,51; HMC., Salisbury, viii,487; Salisbury, ix, 68,91,96,108.
7. APC., xxx, 42, 64, 65, 111, 113, 171, 140, 144; xxix, 576
- 8.. HMC., Salisbury, x, 227, 264, 267-268, 294, 321, 322; and see Table No.3
9. APC., xxxi, 13, 14, 16, 20-23 P.
10. APC., xxxi, 315-318; xxxii, 82, 83, 206
11. APC., xxxii, 240-242, 294, 297; HMC., Salisbury, xi, 484
12. APC., xxxii, 443, 444, 479: HMC., Salisbury, xii, 169
13. APC., xxxii, 474-478
14. Cal.Carew MSS., iv, 331, 335, 350.
15. For the indentures of levies from S. Wales to Bristol, PRO.E.101/66/19 ff.109-137, but they are incomplete for the years 1598 and 1600.

sailed to Ireland. The October 1596 levy of 700 foot, (500 from South Wales and 200 from Gloucestershire) were sent home partly because they had been unduly delayed in embarking in the first place, and partly because a truce was made in Ireland during the late summer of 1596.⁽¹⁾

Like the mayor of Chester, the mayor of Bristol was beset with the problem of filling up gaps in the shire levies. In 1598 the mayor, William Ellis was ordered to complete the numbers in the shire companies by drafting "loose and idle persons in and about the city".⁽²⁾ In February 1600 John Hopkins, the mayor, certified that 70 soldiers had gone missing from over a thousand ordered to the port. Furthermore he complained that the deputy lieutenants of Pembrokeshire had failed to send their quota of 150 men then required from that county.⁽³⁾ The privy council took the deputy lieutenants of Pembrokeshire to task for this failure of duty. They had asked for exemption from the levy at the last moment:

even when at the very date those men shoulde have been at the Porte you direct your lettres unto us to excuse the levying of so greate a number⁽⁴⁾

Pembrokeshire appears to have got away with not sending any of the 150 men to Bristol.⁽⁵⁾ The privy council also scolded the mayor, John Hopkins, for delays in not notifying the council earlier, for not noting the names, counties and other details of deserters in his port, and for not telling them whether or not he had already filled up the vacancies.⁽⁶⁾

1. APC., xxvi, 243-244.

2. APC., xxix, 485

3. APC., xxx, 111

4. APC., xxx, 65

5. Pembrokeshire did not send any levies to Ireland from 1598 to June 1600. See Table 3 "Infantry levies from Wales to Ireland, 1594-1602" in Ch. 3 above.

6. APC., xxx, 111

Despite the smaller overall scale of military operations in Bristol compared to Chester's the mayor, council and citizens experienced similar difficulties and problems in billeting, feeding and keeping levies of troops in order, as well^{as} transporting them to Ireland. The mayor had continual troubles bargaining with ship owners, coping with delays and keeping order. Disorders were as common in Bristol as in Chester, and caused as much anxiety to the mayoral authorities. The more serious outbreaks of riotous behaviour occurred when there were many soldiers in the port. The commissioners for musters in the city in 1601 pointed out to the privy council that the mayor should be empowered to deal with deserters and mutineers under military law, and that it was a pity in their view that military law operated only after troops had left England.⁽¹⁾ The mayor, William Ellis in 1599, was stoned by the soldiers when he aided in quelling a fight as soldiers were being herded on board ship. The ringleader was tried and given a mock show of execution.⁽²⁾ During 1601 it was said that the citizens of Bristol could not pass the streets in quiet at night because so many frays took place between the soldiers themselves and with citizens. Other reports claimed that the citizens "flew to arms" and beat the soldiers, driving many to take refuge in their transport ships.⁽³⁾ And during the six week delay in the departure of the last levy of the reign from mid-May to the beginning of July 1602 outbreaks of violence between soldiers and citizens became a nightly occurrence. And on 26 May the mayor and commissioners for musters had to quell a mutiny which broke out among the contingent from Gloucestershire. The ringleaders were arrested, a preacher sent

1. HMC., Salisbury, xii, 170

2. J.Latimer (ed.), Annals of Bristol, i (1970 reprint), 15

3. Ibid.

to them in prison to prepare them for execution, and the next morning with halters about their necks, all the troops standing by, they mounted the gallows: 'after they had said their prayers and expected no life', the commissioners ordered them to be untied and spared. It was reported that the example wrought much good and quiet in the city.⁽¹⁾

The privy council was as anxious as the mayor to have soldiers embarked as quickly as possible since delays involved additional costs; its letters to the mayors of Bristol invariably urge them "to use all meanes to hasten them awaie".⁽²⁾ A privy council letter ordering the shipping of 895 soldiers to Munster in July 1601 advised the mayor, William Vawer, to have the ships ready

"at King's Roade where they may be ready to sett sail with the first convenient wind, for by the stay of shipping in Hunge-roade they lose the opportunity of the winde to the hindrance and prejudice of the service" ⁽³⁾

and "by that means occasion is given soldiers to escape". Clearly the privy council was informed of local conditions at Bristol, and of the chief opportunity for desertion, delays caused by weather.⁽⁴⁾

During the period of the war there were complaints about desertion on ten occasions in privy council letters.⁽⁵⁾ In December 1600 Captain Crompton, conducting 220 re-inforcements from Bristol to Lough Foyle, ran into foul weather and was forced to put in at Haverfordwest where a complete company from Gloucestershire and many of the Welsh deserted. Crompton complained to the privy council that these men were unfit to have been employed in the first place. The

1. HMC., Salisbury, xii, 169

2. APC., xxxii, 167

3. APC., xxxii, 168

4. APC., xxxii, 168

5. APC., xxvi, 243, 244; xxviii, 529; xxx, 326, 396, 578, 671; xxxi, 13, 14; xxxii, 222

council sent on his letter to Lord Chandos, the lord lieutenant for Gloucestershire with strict orders to have the deserting company hunted down.⁽¹⁾ This one instance shows the difficulty of ascertaining the numbers of soldiers actually transported from the port to Ireland. The council's threats and reprimands to the mayors, the commissioners for musters, and conductors of levies into Bristol appear to have had little effect in stemming the losses. Council orders to the commissioners at Bristol in 1600, Edward Gorges, Samuel Norton, Hugh Smith and Nicholas Stallinge, alternated rebukes and encouragement. On the 2nd of March 1600 the council wrote:

wee cannot but impute unto you some faultes of slackness and negligence otherwise it was impossible for so many to escape through the countrey gone without anie recovery or apprehencion ... (2)

In a further letter to the same commissioners of the 16th March the privy council praised them:

wee knowe of your greate paines in attendance at the embarkation in ordering, disposing, and embarquing the soldiers ...

and they were told that but for their praiseworthy efforts there would have been even more deserters.⁽³⁾

It seems too, that Bristol was troubled by deserters fleeing from Ireland, perhaps to a greater extreme than Chester, especially after 1599 when hostilities were concentrated on Munster. The deserter with a counterfeit pass, purportedly licensing him to return to England, became a problem in most ports since he was difficult to detect from among the vagrants posing as soldiers with feigned wounds who lived mainly by begging.⁽⁴⁾ The problem of the

1. APC., xxxi, 182-184

2. APC., xxx, 139-140, the p.c. to the commissioners, 2 March 1600

3. Ibid., 174, the same to the same, 16 March 1600

4. F. Aydelotte, Elizabethan rogues and vagabonds (Oxford, 1913), passim.

"genuine" deserter became acute in 1599 and the privy council alerted all port officers that despite strict orders to commanders and captains in Ireland to allow no soldier to return without good reason, and then only with an orderly passport, "ther are daily very many that are suffered to come over" and most of them able and serviceable men.⁽¹⁾ To help to stem the flow of deserters from Ireland the port authorities were ordered not to disembark any soldiers without a strict examination of their passports, and to permit only those sick, maimed and with correct passes signed by their commanding officers to be landed. Any passes carried by able men were to be seized and sent to the privy council so that the captains signing such passes could be censured. Able soldiers returning without any license were to be imprisoned until "the occasion is ripe to see that they are imprested anew" and sent back to Ireland with the next shipping, because many of these soldiers "doe give forthe very slaunderous speeches to discourage others" from military service in Ireland.⁽²⁾ However, unlike Chester's quarter sessions records, Bristol's sessions' books and other judicial records such as the Mayor's Court Actions give no indication that these privy council directives resulted in the capture and trial of deserters returning from Ireland.⁽³⁾

This set of orders from the privy council in February 1599 appears to have had little effect on the problem of desertion. In exasperated tones the privy council wrote in April 1600 to all port officers that "this notorious disorder being growen to such an intollerable measure must cost some of them [the deserters] their

1. APC., xxx, 55-57, the p.c. to port officers, 5 February 1599

2. Ibid., 56

3. BAO., Sessions Minute Books (1595-1705); Mayor's Court Actions (1567-1761) and the Writ Books (1574-1836) give no evidence of cases in the 1590s. No Q. Session records or Coroner's Court records survive until the 18th century.

lives by due execution of law", and that others "must be put into the galleys".⁽¹⁾ In June 1600 the privy council bitterly informed the Irish Council in Dublin that they "receaveth continually letters from Bristol ... of the daily retorne of able and sufficient soldiers in grete numbers oute of Ireland".⁽²⁾ And in August 1600 the Lord Deputy Mountjoy complained to Sir George Carew in Munster that the soldiers who continually flocked to Bristol "must be out of your province of Munster".⁽³⁾ Carew was conscious of his responsibility. Earlier in May he had written to the Mayor of Bristol to get him to stay the ship of William Williams which was carrying many soldiers without passes. Although Carew had forbidden "any soldier without a pass under my hand" to embark for England many had evidently managed to do so.⁽⁴⁾

In the 1590s Bristol's Chamberlain's accounts show how the city's vagrancy problems were complicated by such deserters and by the influx of Irish beggars. From 1596 the accounts record quarterly payments of 6s. 8d. to "the beadle of the rogues" whose task it was to search out deserters, and to differentiate them from the common rogues; to aid him he had a staff of assistants who were provided with ships. The Common Council also regularly appointed a second officer "the beadle of the beggars", who had authority to ship Irish beggars back to Ireland at a cost to the city of a shilling a head for their passage.⁽⁵⁾ There can be little doubt that Bristol was more affected than Chester by returning deserters who exacerbated the city's social problems.⁽⁶⁾

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1. APC., xxx, 245-246, the p.c. to port officers, 13 April 1600
 2. APC., xxx, 459, the p.c. to the Irish Council, 30 June 1600
 3. Cal. Carew MSS., iii, 424, Mountjoy to Carew, 12 August 1600
 4. CSPI., (1600), 162, Carew to Cecil, 7 May 1600
 5. BAO., The Mayor's Audits, ff.31, 52, 66, 74, 77, examples of the quarterly payments in 1599 and 1600.
 6. Bristol merchants brought in hundreds of Irish peasants as servants to England through the port in the early 17th century J.J.Silke, "The Irish Abroad, 1534-1691" in A New History of Ireland (Oxford, 1976), 600.

On the other hand Bristol had, in the first half of the sixteenth century, attracted large numbers of Irish boys seeking apprenticeships - they may or may not have been an asset to the city.⁽¹⁾

Another major burden on Bristol stemmed from the exercise of the government's right to hire ships and their crews to transport troops. As in Chester ships were hired by the Crown at the best bargaining price the mayor could gain, which in the 1590s was 8s. per head for each man's passage to Ireland which did not include his victualling on board ship. In 1596 the privy council protested to William Yate, the mayor, against his contracting with ship owners to carry soldiers at the rate of 10s. a head; he was commanded to re-negotiate a better price with them.⁽²⁾ This was probably achieved for Yate was highly commended by the council in May 1596 for the efficient arrangements he had made in transporting and victualling 800 soldiers, which contrasted with the pilfering and waste of public money and goods occurring in other ports.⁽³⁾ Not all mayors had the same success as Yate. On the 9th December 1600 John Hopkins wrote to the privy council for advice on what rate to allow ships' masters, "whether after the rate demanded at xs. a man, or accordinge to Her Majesty's rates used heretofore". The privy council gave him a simple rule of thumb, "to chose that course which is most for the ease of her Majesties chardge". If the ships masters and owners continued to make immoderate demands he was to let them know so that the queen could justly take their ships for her service. Hopkins was also told he had authority to impress pilots, and to imprison them if they refused her Majesty's service. He was reprimanded for over-estimating victuals for the voyage because very many of the soldiers

1. D.Hollis (ed.), Calendar of the Bristol Apprentice Book, 1532-1542 (Bristol 1949) passim.

2. APC., xxvi, 339

3. J.Latimer, op.cit., 116

get sea sick for "the most parte of the tyme of their passage, and do not spend their victual".⁽¹⁾ Hopkins was not the only mayor to be berated by the privy council, William Ellis, mayor in 1598/99, was censured in March 1598 when he was blamed for the delay of the levies and accused of slackness in not providing a ship to carry food to Cork.⁽²⁾ Ellis earned further censure in March 1599 for ignoring John Goyce, the government's transport commissary appointed to help the mayor with the shipping, when embarking troops. Goyce's appointment and duties were similar to those of Robert Davies in Chester in commandeering troop ships, but on this occasion Ellis apparently did not want his help.⁽³⁾

Privy council orders to the mayors of Bristol, as to officials elsewhere, were peremptory; they were ordered to provide the services of billeting, victualling and transporting the troops sent into the city and port. And, in the first instance, the mayor and corporation were expected to pay all the expenses incurred, to be later, and often much later, re-imbursed when the privy council reminded the Lord Treasurer to issue warrants for repayments from the exchequer, or from the treasurer at war in Ireland. The council's registers proliferate with such reminders and warrants, and show very clearly some of the cost of the Irish war effort to the state.⁽⁴⁾

When the levies of 700 soldiers were in Bristol from October to December 1596 William Yate, the mayor, received £300 from Sir Henry Wallop, treasurer-at-war in Ireland, for their transportation.⁽⁵⁾ The mayor told the privy council that this amount was £50 short as he had

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1. APC., xxxi, 16-18, p.c. to Hopkins, mayor, 15 December 1600
 2. APC., xxix, 353
 3. APC., xxx, 166. For the renewal of John Goyce's commission see CSPD., (1598-1601), 159
 4. BAO., Great Audit Book (1532-1785) is mainly concerned with record of payments of loans to and by the corporation, and with charities, and not with the mayor's military expenses.
 5. APC., xxvi, 313, 338

contracted with the ships masters to carry the soldiers for 10s. a head. The cost of billeting and feeding the soldiers (at 8d the day per soldier) for sixty-five days amounted to £1,516. 13s. 4d. Most of this expense had fallen on the city for, as the mayor was quick to point out, the captains of the companies had come with only seven days' imprest money to cover their stay in Bristol.⁽¹⁾ When the despatch of the levy to Ireland was abandoned a warrant went out on 30 November to issue the mayor of Bristol a sum of £531. 13. 4. to be used to send the levies home to Gloucestershire and South Wales. The mayor discharged the hired ships, and stored the arms and armour of the soldiers. The entire and futile enterprise proved very costly to the city.⁽²⁾

In the winter of 1599-1600 when 1,200 soldiers were delayed at Bristol the privy council appeared more sensitive to the mayor's financial difficulties and caused an advance of £800 to be sent him in April 1600. The balance of £1,798-10-3 to "make upp the whole summe of his demaundes", was paid the mayor at the end of May. Later that year, in September, the mayor of Bristol had to meet the cost of feeding and shipping 600 infantrymen under Captain Patrick Arthur, and 36 horses under Captain Arthur Hyde to be sent to Sir George Carew in Munster. The privy council ordered an advance payment of £500 in September for the mayor, but the full expenditure of £1,500-17-10 was not fully re-imbursed until the 2nd of November.⁽³⁾

The financial difficulties of the government in the 1590s are well known; the delays in re-paying the mayor of Bristol, among other government creditors, is one indication of those difficulties. Because the government was slow to pay, the mayor of Bristol, like the mayor

1. APC., xxvi, 339

2. Cal. Treasury Papers (1557-1696), 2

3. APC., xxx, 113, 254.

of Chester, had to borrow money from wealthy citizens to defray immediate expenses. In December 1600 the mayor, John Hopkins borrowed £1,000 from one Cuthbert Gerrard to cover costs in sending out the re-inforcements to Lough Foyle under Captain Crompton.⁽¹⁾ The expense of billeting and transporting this levy evidently did not cost as much as £1,000 for the mayor eventually received expenses of £456-7-9 in January 1601.⁽²⁾ In January 1602, there is further evidence of the government's straightened finances. It asked the mayor, aldermen and common councillors for loans to pay for victualling and shipping a large levy. The mayor was called upon for £100, each alderman £20 and the councillors for sums between £10 and £20. The total amounted to £670. Those failing to pay were to have as many soldiers billeted on them as the mayor thought fit. A demand for a second loan was made in May of the same year.⁽³⁾

These loans were eventually repaid but their recovery entailed a journey by the city's chamberlain to London. And such visits to London were, in themselves, expensive. One chamberlain in 1598 took twelve days in a journey to London to obtain war expenses from the government, hiring horses at 2s. a day, paying wages to servants at 6d a day, and their food and lodging at 6s. 8d. a day. He also paid the Lord Treasurer's secretary 10s. "for his pains in examining my accounts", which apparently took two days "for his charge was very much disliked, and evil taken by my Lord Treasurer". The chamberlain obtained a sum of £1,160-8-8 $\frac{3}{4}$, which, "thanks be to God could not be faulted in one half-penny".⁽⁴⁾

1. APC., xxxi, 40

2. APC., xxxi, 116, warrant to pay the mayor of Bristol, 28 January 1601.

3. J. Latimer (ed.) Annals of Bristol (Bristol, 1908), 16

4. Ibid., citing the Mayor's Great Audit Book for 1598

Bristol, like Chester, was also a place of banking and exchange and for sending treasure to Ireland, though its mint did not operate in Elizabeth's reign.⁽¹⁾ As at Chester there is evidence of the precautions taken at Bristol for the transit of treasure to Sir George Cary, treasurer-at-war in Ireland. Cary's agent, Thomas Watson, drew up a description for the privy council dated 14th May 1601 of measures taken at the exchange in Bristol:

That whereas Bristol being a place remote, far from the Treasurer himself, or any of his people of great trust, and far from your Lordships' eyes; and having appointed one Wilson to attend the exchange there, he hath in his discretion, for the safety of Her Majesty's treasure, made choice of Mr. Pitt, Chamberlain of Bristol, a man of good report and estate ... the money to remain in Mr. Pitt's house, where his man shall confine himself to live, Mr. Pitt to keep a key to the chest, and his man the other ... (2)

In December 1601 Wilson wrote to Watson of the lack of money at Bristol, and the arrival of creditors with bills of £460 and £800. He claimed to have pacified them and prevented them running up to the Court in London. But rumours that there would be no money to pay such bills before March "maketh men despair and at their wits end", he said, and added,

"You may be sure want of money will be a mighty hindrance to the army for there are now at least ten or twelve barques to whom monies are owing that would presently carry over all sorts of victuals for the army if these bills were paid ... for want of money now they are not able to put to sea." (3)

Lack of money at the Bristol exchange to pay creditors at a critical time in the war, the period of the Spanish landing in Kinsale, was serious enough, but, as in Chester, it was compounded by many abuses. A memorandum of abuses in Bristol alleged that merchants, trading on

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1. C.E.Challis, The Tudor Coinage (Manchester, 1978), 8
 2. CSPI., (November 1600-July 1601), 330, Watson's memorial to the p.c.
 3. CSPI., (1601-1603), 222, Wilson to Watson, 15 December 1601

the difference between the £ English and the new debased coinage in Ireland, the £ Irish, made fortunes. They were said to have sold goods in Ireland at three times their price, despite the safeguards in the queen's proclamation setting up exchanges.⁽¹⁾ The long list of abuses of the merchants in the memorandum suggests that they had hindered the war effort, overburdening the exchange with excessive bills, punishing the army with excessive prices, and causing a distrust and "distaste" for the new money.⁽²⁾

As in Chester, there were allegations and counter-allegations of abuses of public funds in Bristol during the war years. The mayor, William Ellis, for instance, was accused of charging the government for victualling Sir Henry Danvers' troops of horse in 1599 though he only provided ships for their transport. The abuse came to light when Sir Henry Danvers made a claim for their victualling at Bristol from Sir George Cary, the treasurer-at-war in Ireland. But Danvers' troop of horse did not all arrive nor embark at the same time and the mayor, Ellis, may have paid for the feeding of the stragglers. The accusations against him were never fully proved.⁽³⁾

Customs duties in the port were another obligation which could be evaded. If true, the accusations made by Thomas Watkins imprisoned at the instigation of the Customer-inward, John Dowles, suggest widespread evasion. Watkins wrote to the privy council and to Sir Robert Cecil enclosing lists of frauds practised in the Bristol customs from 1594 to 1599. One list comprising eight pages accused John Dowles, the Customer-inward, of collusion with merchants to avoid paying custom

1. CSPI., (1601-1603), 508-511, "Memorandum on the Abuses of the English merchants committed in her Majesty's exchange", 4 November 1602.

2. Ibid., 510

3. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 96, 108, 111

dues; a second list told how Dowles sold bonds or contracts of employment so that within six years the Queen was defrauded of £4,000; a third list outlined the abuses of John Andrewes, Customer-outward of the port of Bristol, and a final list exposed John Dowles' "sinister dealings in deceiving Her Majesty of the prisage rents".⁽¹⁾

As in Chester, the government also suffered losses from disloyal trading in Bristol. John Bird, an informant in July 1599, claimed that at Bristol Fair "an extraordinary concourse of buyers of all kinds of warlike provisions for the strengthening of the Irish rebels" took place, and fancifully perhaps, asserted that the buyers were mainly Jesuits in disguise. Bird wanted the privy council to issue a proclamation signifying that no arms should be sold to anyone without bonds being taken of the buyers.⁽²⁾ In Professor Willan's opinion "the only really satisfactory branch of Bristol's trade was the trade with the rebellious Irish".⁽³⁾ Considerations of disloyalty hardly disturbed the Bristol merchants' attempts to benefit from war-time conditions. And these attempts might have extended even to piracy. Sir George Carew claimed that the seas around Munster were "haunted with pirates which do ordinarily trade between Bristol and Cork".⁽⁴⁾

In conclusion, many aspects of Chester's experience in the Irish war years can be paralleled in Bristol. The mayor had similar problems in his dealings with the privy council, with ship owners, and with the levies in the port. Bristol, however, richer in the number of seamen than Chester was ordered to provide seafaring men

1. PRO.SP.12/274/57, i, ii, iii, February 1600

2. PRO.SP.63/205/125, July 1599.

3. T.S.Willan, Studies in Elizabethan Foreign Trade, (Manchester, 1959), 86

4. Cal. Carew MSS., iv, 125, Carew to the p.c., 14 August 1601

for the ships of the royal navy at Chatham. In August 1601 in answer to a government imprest order for seamen, John Hopkins, the mayor, sent up 86 to Chatham, but said that he had kept back 120 mariners "to take over the soldiers and furniture to Ireland."⁽¹⁾ There was no such demand on Chester in the period. In most ports delays caused by unfavourable winds led to disorderly and mutinous behaviour and low morale among the waiting troops and encouraged desertion in the port. At times of scarcity, such as 1596 and 1599, prices rose, and as in Chester, the mayor of Bristol had difficulty in feeding the unwelcome levies of those years. Whereas the mayor of Chester used Liverpool as an additional port for billeting and transporting surplus numbers of troops, the mayor of Bristol had no similar facility, but the numbers of soldiers he had to cope with were less.⁽²⁾ Common to most ports were delays in winter levies, frauds in the musters, and in the exchange.⁽³⁾ It is not surprising that Carew in Munster forecast that Ireland would cost England a greater price than it was worth;⁽⁴⁾ or, that Sir Robert Cecil should pray in October 1601: "God in heaven send us rid of this continual vexation".⁽⁵⁾

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1. PRO.SP.63/209/29, Hopkins to Cecil, 13 August 1601.
 2. The overall numbers in Chester of horse and foot was 20,151, those in Bristol came to 10,877.
 3. Sir Anthony Cooke's experience in conducting a horse levy to Ireland February/March 1599 was especially troublesome and unparalleled at Chester see HMC., Salisbury, ix, 111-112
 4. Cal. Carew MSS., iv, 169, Carew to Cecil, dated "1601".
 5. Ibid., 156, Cecil to Carew, 19 October 1601.

(ii) Barnstaple.

Barnstaple, a member of the head-port of Exeter, was well placed for communication with Ireland. In the ship money assessments of 1619 it ranked fifth among the maritime towns of the south and west.⁽¹⁾ The more celebrated ports of Plymouth, Falmouth, Southampton and Portsmouth were more important in coastal defence and the prosecution of the Elizabethan continental wars. Plymouth became more important as a staging port in the re-deployment of veterans from the continent to Ireland. But, after Chester and Bristol, Barnstaple stood third in the transit of primary military levies to Ireland, transporting over 3,000 troops in a five year period. This activity gave sporadic employment to merchants, townspeople and sailors at a time when Barnstaple's export trade in cloth and tin, and import trade in wine, iron and wool had declined.⁽²⁾ And Barnstaple's patent to trade with ~~the~~^{West} Africa was due to expire in 1598.⁽³⁾ Like all the Devonshire and Cornish ports Barnstaple's privateering had also declined by the 1590s. Only two privateers, the Unicorn and the Prudence were operating in 1598, whereas earlier there had been as many as eight such ships active from the port.⁽⁴⁾

During the war with Ireland Barnstaple's town records reflect some glimpses of the military preparations in the port, but like Bristol's these are meagre.⁽⁵⁾ They do show the same kind of problems met with in the busier ports, delays because of contrary winds, desertions in the port and from Ireland, and troubles in bargaining with ship owners. The government's anxiety to have troops

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1. S.R.Gardiner, History of England, iii (1883), 288 n.
 2. T.S.Willan, Studies in Elizabethan Foreign Trade (Manchester, 1959) 80, 82, 82, 110.
 3. CSPD., (1598-1601), 16 - a petition to continue that trade
 4. K.R.Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering (Cambridge, 1966), 31, 32, 33.
 5. J.R.Chanter & T.Wainwright (eds.) Barnstaple Records, i, ii (1900); J.B.Grimble, Memorials of Barnstaple (1830)

expeditiously embarked in good order and in full numbers ensured the mayor of Barnstaple a regular correspondence with the privy council that few mayors of such remote towns experienced. The numbers ordered to the port are set out in Table 2.

The government used the port of Barnstaple on ten occasions over a five year period for sending out almost three thousand infantrymen and less than a hundred horse. As in the other ports the October levies of 1596 were sent home and called back the following April.⁽¹⁾ As one would expect almost every levy ordered to Barnstaple came in from the hinterland shires of Devon, Cornwall and Somerset, though in October 1601 Hampshire sent 100 men to Barnstaple. Captain Edward North who was to receive the Hampshiremen at Barnstaple for Ireland complained that their conductor allowed seven of them to escape.⁽²⁾

The February/March 1600 levy of 200 though bound for Carrickfergus was ultimately intended for Lough Foyle with the rest of Sir Henry Docwra's fleet from Chester. The mayor, Roger Beaple, reported to the privy council that all went well in embarking the levy for Carrickfergus because of the efficiency of their conductor, Captain Abry York, who accompanied them on the voyage. The ships were made ready with victuals, the men and their war-like equipment reviewed and found satisfactory "so that God continuing the wind fair, they will sail on Saturday till when they await a morning tide".⁽³⁾ Their departure time, however, did not co-incide with those waiting at Chester with the result that this levy of 200 from Barnstaple arrived in Ireland before Docwra's levies had left Chester.⁽⁴⁾ And in December

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1. See Table 2 wherein the total do not include the abortive levy of October 1596.
 2. HMC., Salisbury, xi, 431, Captain North to Cecil, 15 October 1601
 3. HMC., Salisbury, x, 50, The mayor of Barnstaple to the p.c. 4 March 1600.
 4. See the case study of Docwra's expedition from Chester in Chapter Seven.

Table 2. Military levies to Barnstable.

Date	Number	Mayor responsible.	Intended for
Oct. 1596	400 f.		Sir Wm. Russell Dublin: stayed. (1)
April 1597	400 f.	Nicholas Downs	Dublin. (2)
Dec. 1598	16 h.	Nicholas Downs	Sir A. Chichester (3)
Feb. 1600	200 f.	Roger Beaple	Sir A. Chichester Carrickfergus (4)
Dec. 1600	150 f.	Geo. Stanberry	Sir H. Docwra Lough Foyle (5)
April 1601	170 f.	John Delbridge	Sir H. Docwra Lough Foyle (6)
Sept. 1601	275 f.	John Delbridge	Waterford and Kinsale (7)
Oct./1601 Nov.	975 f. 66 h.		Earl of Thomond Waterford and Kinsale. (8)
Jan./1602 Feb.	650 f.	George Stanberry	Sir G. Carew Cork (9)
July 1602	165 f.	George Stanberry	Sir G. Carew Cork (10)
<hr/>			
Totals	2,985 f. and 82 h.		

1. APC., xxvi, 243, 346, 406, 407.
2. APC., xxvii, 23-26; xxviii, 599
3. APC., xxix, 589
4. APC., xxx, 41, 42, 102, 262, 388
5. APC., xxx, 790, xxxi 23
6. APC., xxxi, 296, 314, 318, 325, 326, 363;
CSPI., (1600-1601), 301, 365, 377, 380.
7. APC., xxxii, 71, which gives a levy of 27 soldiers, but all subsequent references to the levy indicate 275, ibid., 126, 127, 83.
8. APC., xxxii, 312, 313; HMC., Salisbury, xi, 454, 461, 490, 491.
9. HMC., Salisbury, xii, 13, 50, 51, 154.
10. HMC., Salisbury, xii, 277, 320

1600 and in April 1601 Barnstaple transported 150, and 170 re-inforcements for Docwra's garrisons then established in Lough Foyle.⁽¹⁾

But Barnstaple advanced the government's service at Lough Foyle in other ways than in the transportation of levies and subsequent re-inforcements. Barnstaple mariners were retained by Sir Henry Docwra, the commander at Lough Foyle, for patrol services in two crompters according to his letter to the privy council in May 1600.⁽²⁾

Privy council warrants also make it clear that it was from Barnstaple that the London victualler, William Webb, operated in transporting food to Docwra's garrisons in his own ship the God Saviour.⁽³⁾ When Docwra needed more small ships to patrol the Foyle he suggested that Barnstaple would supply them. The privy council duly sent an order to the mayor, John Delbridge, for three small pinnaces of about 12 ton each suitable for both rowing and sailing, to be bought from their owners "at such reasonable prices and rates as the same may be worth". The type and equipment needed for each boat was described in great detail which suggests that the privy council was simply passing on Sir Henry Docwra's instructions to the mayor of Barnstaple.⁽⁴⁾ The boats were to have "a mayne mast, fore-mast, two small cables of 6 inches and a hallser of 4 inches, two good anchors of 200 lb. weight ... 12 oares or 24 foote and sailes with other tacklings ..."⁽⁵⁾

Barnstaple also supplied ships for transporting levies from other ports; seventeen, for example, were ordered to be fully victualled and sent to relieve the pressure on shipping at Chester, but in the

1. See Table 2.

2. CSPI., (1600), 174, Docwra to the p.c., 11 May 1600

3. APC., xxxi, 325, 326, 380 warrants to pay Webb, £200 and £ 81-6-8

4. The detail and verbosity of Docwra's letters to the p.c. and to Cecil are much in evidence in the Calendars of the State Papers, Ireland, (1600), (1601) (1601-1603)

5. APC., xxxi, 422-423

event, only nine were actually sent.⁽¹⁾ And, an unspecified number of Barnstaple ships helped in the movement of Sir Henry Danvers troops of horse from Bristol to Essex's army in March 1599.⁽²⁾

From April 1601 until the end of the war Barnstaple was more concerned with sending forces to Munster to aid the military build-up to repulse the Spanish, and it is in its supplying of the war in the south that the importance of the port really lies. On the 17th of September 1601 John Delbridge, the mayor, wrote to Sir Robert Cecil when he heard the news of the Spanish fleet heading for Ireland:

It is the firste reporte that came of it to this place and it beinge of soch importance I thoughte it my duty to informe ...⁽³⁾

Barnstaple's services in shipping troops and horses to Munster occupied the months of August to November 1601 when for the first time during the war a levy of nearly 1,000 was ordered to the port (over a thousand with the cavalry included.)⁽⁴⁾ It was a period of strain and tension for the new mayor, George Stanberry, as is evident from his correspondence with the privy council and with Sir Robert Cecil, who had the main direction of the government's war effort. At first things went well. The earl of Bath was sent to Barnstaple to aid Stanberry in the muster and view of the 975 foot and 66 horse ordered there in October 1601. He reported that most of the men had arrived by the 20th and 21st of October in reasonable order, many of them "tall men well armed and willing to serve", and that their only fear was that they would arrive in Ireland too late to fight the Spaniard. However, the captains who were to take charge of them to Ireland had not by then arrived in Barnstaple.⁽⁵⁾

1. AFC., xxix, 365, 613-616

2. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 96, William Ellis, mayor of Bristol to the p.c. 9 March 1599 pointing out that the Barnstaple ships had not then arrived in Bristol.

3. PRO.SP.12/285/23, Delbridge to Cecil, 17th September 1601.

4. See Table 2.

5. HMC., Salisbury, xi, 443, Earl of Bath to Cecil, 23 October, 1601.

Mayor Stanberry wrote twice to Sir Robert Cecil on the 28th and on the 31st October with the same complaint about the captains' absence from the port.⁽¹⁾ Two weeks later Captain Patrick Arthur, who was to transport the horse from Barnstaple began operations. By the 6th of November they were ready to sail. Of the 66 horse he chose 53 as "able and sufficient", and 40 of those he described to Sir Robert Cecil "as good both men and horses as ever went into Ireland", but for the most part "the men are ill-armed with swords, armour and pistols". He remarked to Cecil that the "foot are still here" when those sent to Bristol were "no doubt in Ireland long since".⁽²⁾ It was on November 8th that Sir Anthony Cooke, the long awaited captain, reported the embarkation of the infantry, 300 of them in the forenoon and the remaining 675 in the afternoon of the 8th.⁽³⁾ By the 10th of November, the mayor, George Stanberry confirmed that 975 foot and 53 horse were under sail for Munster.⁽⁴⁾ All three reports mention the unfavourable weather conditions which partly delayed the embarkations. The mayor was at great pains to exonerate himself from any blame for the long delays of the levies in his port, asking Cecil "to clear our creditts with the lords that no further imputation be made than we justly deserve".⁽⁵⁾

An even longer delay of troops in Barnstaple occurred in January 1602 when 350 Devon men and 300 Somerset men were ordered to the port.⁽⁶⁾ They were so poorly equipped that the commissioners for musters and the mayor selected only 400 of them, and these did not

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1. HMC., Salisbury, xi, 454, 461, Stanberry to Cecil, 28 & 31 October 1601
 2. HMC., Salisbury, xi, 480-481, Captain Patrick Arthur to Cecil, 6 November.
 3. Ibid., 487, Cooke to Cecil, 8 November 1601.
 4. Ibid., 490, Stanberry to Cecil, 10 November 1601
 5. Ibid., 461, The same to the same, 31 October 1601. At the same time, the busiest one of his mayoralty, Stanberry was engaged in a feud with the Bishop of Exeter - APC., xxxii, 262-263.
 6. See Table 2.

depart until the end of February.⁽¹⁾ At this time the mayor complained to Cecil of desertions: "some of the men daily run away in spite of a continual watch by day and night". A few were caught with hue and cry, and the mayor assured Cecil that these would be kept safely in prison.⁽²⁾ Not until May 1602 did the final 200 of the original 650 leave Barnstaple for Munster. The last levy of the reign was in July 1602. On 1st August 1602 the mayor had shipping ready for the 165 soldiers to be sent to Cork.⁽³⁾ They were not unduly delayed, setting sail on the 24th August, but were forced back onto Ilfracombe by contrary winds where they were once more billeted a mere seven miles from Barnstaple.⁽⁴⁾ Sir George Carew reported their arrival in Waterford, though they had been intended for Cork, on the 7th September 1602, over a month from their setting sail from Barnstaple.⁽⁵⁾

Communication between Barnstaple and London was a lengthy and difficult business. At one stage Stanberry suspected that privy council directions to him had been intercepted.⁽⁶⁾ To improve communications between north Devon and London, the mayor and common council in Barnstaple established a "foote poste" from Barnstaple to make connection with a foot post that left Exeter for London every Tuesday; in this way, it was claimed, the time of sending and receiving letters from and to London was cut from twenty days to eleven.⁽⁷⁾ In common with Chester and Bristol, Barnstaple was used to forward

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1. HMC., Salisbury, xii, 13, Stanberry to Cecil, 10 January 1602.
 2. Ibid., 50-51, the same to the same, 10 February 1602.
 3. APC., xxxii, 434, 435, 443-444
 4. HMC., Salisbury, xii, 320, mayor to Cecil, 24 August 1602.
 5. Cal. Carew MSS., iv, 331, Carew to Mounthoy, 7 September 1602.
 6. HMC., Salisbury, xi, 461, Stanberry to Cecil 31st October, 1601
 7. J.R.Chanter & T.Wainwright (eds.) Barnstaple Records, ii (1900), 215.

letters from Cecil and the government to the Lord Deputy and Irish Council. Cecil erroneously believed in 1601 that there had been a regular post bark or boat plying between Barnstaple and Dublin.

Stanberry, the mayor explained to Cecil:

for post bark, here is none, as you suppose,
but if it be your pleasure I will provide
one to lie in readiness to answer all
occasions hereafter ... it will be very
expedient during the time of this service... (1)

Sir George Carew considered Barnstaple one of the better ports for rapid communication with Munster, and in view of this and of the Spanish crisis at Kinsale it seems extraordinary that a regular post boat had not been instituted. (2)

Barnstaple collectors and receivers accounts in the 1590s give some indication of the presence of the levies in the port, and of the impact of war preparations on the town's treasury. A recurrent item of expenditure from the town's treasury throughout the 1590s is payments to the constables for pressing men for the Irish levies, and for pressing mariners for the ships to transport them; sums of £3.14.4., 9s., 6s.8d., 12s. and 1s.6d are recorded for these services. On one occasion the town made a gift of 10s. to certain soldiers pressed out of the town; on another a gift of 1s. to a "poor soldier that had his hand cut off". In 1600 the town paid 3s. 4d. for sending several letters to Ireland, and in 1601 a gibbet was erected near the High Cross to deter would-be rioters and deserters at a cost of 6d to the town's treasury. And in the same year an unwanted Irishman was sent from Barnstaple to Ilfracombe for transportation back to Ireland at a cost of 2s. 3d.

1. HMC., Salisbury, xi, 497, Stanberry to Cecil, 17 November 1601
2. CSPI., (1601-1603), 475, Carew to Cecil, 20 August 1602.

To honour the arrival of Sir Robert Bassnett, the government's Commissioner for musters in 1599, Barnstaple put on a civic banquet costing 10s., and in the same year, Sir Arthur Chichester, the Governor of Carrickfergus and future Lord Deputy of Ireland, and a Devonshireman, was also honoured by an apparently grander banquet costing the town £1. (1)

These are petty sums recorded. A more impressive measure of Barnstaple's services to the crown is the government's re-imbursments to the mayors for the billeting, feeding and transportation of levies though the sums involved reflect the comparatively small scale of these services. In 1598 payments of £390 and £100 were made; in February 1599, £300; in December 1600, £353-3-7 and £150; in 1601, £81, £30, and £340. And in 1602 the mayor of Barnstaple's account with the government for Irish war services was closed with the larger payments, no doubt long in arrears as at Chester and Bristol, of £1,127 and £1,611-7-6. (2) These sums were necessarily less than those required to send the much larger forces from Chester and Bristol.

In other respects, too, Barnstaple does not compare with the more important ports in the transit of troops to Ireland. There are fewer mentions of disorders caused by troops in the town and, there are few mentions of desertions in the port and apparently none from Ireland. But in common with all the ports dealing with Irish levies Barnstaple received directives from the privy council to take precautions against the return to England of "able and serviceable" soldiers out of Ireland. (3) Though Barnstaple's traditional trade was with Ireland there is no mention in the war years of disloyal trading as had been the case at

1. J.Chanter & T.Wainwright (eds), Barnstaple Records, i (1900), 60, 61; ii (1900), 106-110, 122, 131, 145.

2. APC., xxviii, 599; xxix, 615; xxx, 262; xxxi, 102, 314, 325, 380; xxxii, 363, 417, 418.

3. APC., xxx, 55, 56.

Chester and Bristol. Nevertheless as an ancilliary port for shipping troops to the south of Ireland, and in supplying ships to other ports, Barnstaple was important to the late Elizabethan government.

(iii) Other western ports and the Irish war.

The English Channel ports from Falmouth to Portsmouth, vulnerable to threats and attempts at invasion from Spain in the post Armada period, bore the main burden of the realm's defence measures.⁽¹⁾ When additional demands were made on them by the government for the Irish war the port authorities were quick to point to their great charges for defence. Plymouth, Weymouth, Falmouth and Milford Haven made much of their undisputed vulnerability, and the "nakedness" they would experience if their ships and men were unduly called upon for "the service of Ireland". Nevertheless, as the Irish war effort stepped up from 1598 these ports became involved though to a lesser extent than Chester, Bristol or Barnstaple.⁽²⁾

From Table 3 following, it may be seen that of this group of ports Plymouth and Southampton sent out the greatest numbers, and that they were concerned also with the re-deployment exercises when Brittany and Low Countries' veterans were brought back from the continent for service in Ireland. Milford Haven, Padstow, Fowey and Weymouth were involved in shipping small 'primary' levies: Milford 300 in 1598, 400 in 1599; Weymouth, 400 in 1598; Fowey, 300 in 1598, Padstow, 100 in 1602. Milford Haven stands out as more important in the shipping of horse levies than any other port in the Table;

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1. W.MacCaffrey, Exeter, 1540-1640 (Harvard, 1958), 244ff.; M.Oppenheim, The Maritime History of Devon (Exeter, 1968), 44-49
 2. AFC., xxv, 277-278 for defences at Plymouth, 1596; PRO.SP.12/279/1 for complaints from Plymouth on inadequate defences; PRO.SP.12/272/25 for like complaints from Weymouth and for a discussion of Milford Haven's defences, PRO.SP.12/259/11.

Table 3. Military levies to other ports.

Date	Number	Port	For	
March 1595	1,553 f.	Plymouth	Re-deployed troops from Brittany for Sir J. Norris Waterford.	(1)
July 1598	300 f.	Milford	Dublin: Earl of Ormond.	(2)
August 1598	1,350 f. 50 h.	Plymouth	Re-deployed from the L.C.s First for L.Foyle, destination changed to Carlingford for Sir Samuel Bagenall and Col. Chas. Egerton	(3)
October/ November 1598	500 f. 400 f. 400 f. 300 f.	S'hampton Weymouth Plymouth Fowey	Youghal Cork Cork Kinsale	(4)
January/ February 1599	400 f. 100 h.	Milford	Waterford	(5)
October 1601	500 f.	Plymouth	Kinsale	(6)
December/ January 1602	510 f. 100 f.	S'hampton Padstow	Cork Cork	(7)

Totals to each port:

Plymouth	3,803 f. 50 h.
S'hampton	1,010 f.
Milford	700 f. 100 h.
Weymouth	400 f.
Fowey	300 f.
Padstow	100 f.

Total of all ports:

6,313 f. 150 h.

1. PRO.SP.12/178/90, i, ii
2. APC., xxviii, 524-530
3. Cal. Carew MSS., iii, 281-283
4. APC., xxix, 237-244, 255, 256.
5. APC., xxix, 543; CSPD., (1598-1601), 159- 50 carriage h. from Milford.
6. HLC., Salisbury, xi, 425
7. APC., xxxii, 476, 481 for Southampton, and ibid., 444 for Padstow.

in January/February 1599 it transported 100 horse and 50 carriage horses to Ireland, The latter not being fighting forces are not included in the Table. Milford Haven and Padstow were also concerned with what may be called 'secondary embarkations', along with Haverfordwest and Ilfracombe, as troop ships were blown back on their nearby coastal regions. Where secondary embarkations took place the numbers are not included in Table 3 since the initial embarkations took place from Chester, Bristol and Barnstaple. In this respect these four minor ports played an important additional rôle in the salvaging of men and equipment for crown services in Ireland.

Plymouth was the most important port of this group; all the Cornish ports and havens were administratively under Plymouth, and it was from Plymouth that the largest numbers of troops sailed to Ireland. The first in March 1595 was a re-deployment exercise when Sir Henry Norris conducted a force of 1,553 experienced soldiers out of Brittany under orders to have them sent to his brother Sir John Norris, second in command under the Lord Deputy, Sir William Russell in Ireland.⁽¹⁾ James Bagg, mayor of Plymouth, did not appear to have been unduly burdened with the levy since Sir Henry Norris simply dis-embarked his sick men, sixty-three of them, and re-victualled his ships in Plymouth for the remainder of the voyage to Ireland.⁽²⁾ Norris claimed in writing to Lord Burghley from Plymouth on the 13th March 1595 that "if the wind had not been contrary they would have gone straight to Waterford."⁽³⁾

The second large levy to Plymouth took place in August 1598. On the 16th August before the news of the defeat at the Yellow Ford had reached England the government had already ordered a force of

1. See Chapter Three under 1595

2. PRO.SP.12/178/90, i, ii, Sir Henry Norris to Burghley, 13 March 1595

3. Ibid.

2,000 recruits from the shires. Sir Samuel Bagenall was to lead 600 from Chester and Colonel Charles Egerton to lead 1,350 and 50 horse from Plymouth.⁽¹⁾ The government's intention was that they should be used to plant a garrison in the Lough Foyle area, and Egerton's force was to be made up of Low Countries veterans as well as new recruits. There were in fact many veterans from the Earl of Essex's Cadiz adventure of June 1596 and from his Islands Voyage of the summer of 1596 already in Plymouth, and it is not clear how many of them were to join Egerton's force. Plymouth had been responsible for the embarkation of both Essex's ventures and saw their return; for instance, the spoils of Cadiz first came into the port of Plymouth.⁽²⁾ Soldiers and sailors back from both ventures had orders to be maintained in Plymouth, Falmouth, Portsmouth and other channel ports against possible Spanish reprisals.⁽³⁾ The mayor of Plymouth, John Trelawney, and the commissioners for musters began to exhibit the strains of organizing Egerton's force of 1,350 foot and 50 horse during August 1598.

Mayor Trelawney complained to the privy council of his problems in providing enough ships and was told that as Vice-Admiral of the Devon coasts he had wide powers to commandeer ships from Dartmouth and elsewhere. But he ran into difficulties in driving bargains with the ship owners, who demanded a rate of 2s. the ton besides wages and additional charges for victualling their ships' crews. Trelawney sent up their demands to the privy council which expressed annoyance at being sent "so uncertain a demand ... wee cannot guesse what this chardge maie amounte to ...". They ordered the mayor to make no such

1. Cal. Carew MSS., iii , 281-283, Instructions for Sir S. Bagenall. The Yellow Ford had taken place on the 14 August 1598

2. CSPD., (1595-1597), 202-203

3. CSPD., (1595-1597), 271-275, 373, 457, 529-530

agreement, but to do what other mayors had done, that is to say, make an agreement either by the poll or by the tonnage to include all charges for transporting the soldiers.⁽¹⁾ In the event the mayor agreed with the ship owners on a tonnage rate rather than the usual rate by poll which obtained in Chester and Bristol.⁽²⁾

The town of Plymouth was obviously feeling the financial strain of the levy. William Stallenge, Cecil's agent and servant in Plymouth, wrote to Cecil on the 30th August 1598 that the mayor and inhabitants wanted more money, "not being able longer to furnish the charge of the companies of soldiers to be shipped here". He said the mayor had exhausted all possible means "to procure money of the inhabitants" even to the extent of taking up money at interest, but that he cannot obtain more than he had already disbursed.⁽³⁾ Though Stallenge thought the mayor had overestimated the amount of shipping needed by taking up a thousand ton, two of the commissioners for musters, Sir Ferdinando Gorges and Sir George Carey, wanted three hundred or four hundred more with which to transport the 1,350 men and 50 horse. Meanwhile accommodating the men was posing a problem. Of the thirteen companies, five were lodged in the town, and the other eight in the adjoining parishes, but the military authorities wanted them all billeted in Plymouth, an impossible demand "unless the inhabitants shall forsake their houses".⁽⁴⁾

A serious state of tension grew up between the civic and military authorities in Plymouth. It appears, for instance, that mayor Trelawney did not inform Colonel Egerton, who was to conduct the

1. APC., xxviii, 623-624

2. CSPD., (1598-1601), 85, 86.

3. CSPD., (1598-1601), 85, 86

4. Ibid.

levy to Ireland that Cecil had changed the intended destination of the levy from Lough Foyle to Carlingford. The new direction sent to the mayor in Plymouth on the 22nd August was clearly the result of the government's information on the state of Ireland after the defeat of the Yellow Ford.⁽¹⁾ Subsequently on the 13th September 1598 Cecil wrote to the commissioners at Plymouth demanding a full explanation of what had happened to his letter of the 22nd of August giving the new direction for the levy; he wrote: "write to me, as you will stand to it, where the fault is, and let every ass bear his own burden".⁽²⁾ From Ireland on October 9th Colonel Egerton wrote to the privy council that he never received the letter but that he had since received a copy.⁽³⁾

The deteriorating relations between the mayor and the military authorities transmitted itself to the troops, leading to low morale and desertions especially among the Somerset, Wiltshire and Hereford companies. The troops were insubordinate. A captain of one band, John Hales, angered by the mayor's refusal to supply his men with fire-wood, ordered his men to make fire-wood out of the towns stocks. Another captain, one Gibson, found the situation intolerable and went to the privy council with a catalogue of complaints about how the soldiers waiting in Plymouth were treated. Sir Ferdinando Gorges, Colonel Egerton and Captain Harris, the chief commissioners in the port, repeatedly wrote to the privy council about their difficulties, the delays, the defects in arms and armour, the lack of gun-powder, and their shortage of money.⁽⁴⁾

The privy council replied accusing both military and mayoral authorities of slackness in the queen's service; they were to

1. HMC., Salisbury, viii, 344-345; APC., xxix, 73, 74

2. Ibid.

3. CSPI., (1598-1599), 284, Egerton's report of his passage to Ireland to the p.c., 9th October 1598 from Drogheda, near Carlingford.

4. APC., xxviii, 598, 599; xxix 73, 74, 81-83, 88, 89, 194.

take arms from the town's stores to make up defects, and not put a new charge on the government by buying more; the council wanted to know what had become of the arms "left in your custody the last year upon the retorne of the Earl of Essex"; as for powder, they had ten lasts, which was plenty, and, as for shipping, a thousand ton "in reason seems enough"; finally, as regards money, £600 was being sent from London with the mayor's brother, Robert Trelawney. Then, pointing to the real cause of all the trouble in Plymouth, the privy council berated the military authorities on the "ill correspondence that is betwixt you and and the towne", otherwise they would surely have known of a matter of such importance as the change of destination for the levy, from Lough Foyle to Carlingford.⁽¹⁾

The mayor of Plymouth's account for the services performed for this levy was settled with the government by two payments: one in November 1598 of £974-2-6, and another on the 28th January 1599 of £172-2-8.⁽²⁾ Egerton's soldiers had been allowed twenty days victualling, ten of meat and ten of cheese and butter, with an allowance of 8d a day to the infantryman and 18d a day to the cavalryman. Their victualling ships were well supplied out of the west country; they had stored on board cheese, meal, butter, pease, oatmeal, salt, sherry, brandy, and enough beer to provide each soldier a quart a day for forty days. Three clerks accompanied the fleet to supervise victuals, ordnance and treasure.⁽³⁾ One of the largest items of expenditure was for arms bought for the soldiers, amounting to £364-13-9, which suggests that the privy council's directive to use the stores in the town had either been ignored, or perhaps there

1. APC., xxix, 121-124, the p.c. to the mayor and commissioners.

2. APC., xxix, 259, 503.

3. Ibid., 84 and 123

were no arms in the stores left from the Earl of Essex's Islands Voyage the previous year.⁽¹⁾ Egerton's fleet left Plymouth on the 9th September, having been in port over three weeks. North-easterly gales drove them south to Youghal and Cork but, according to Egerton's report to the privy council, they re-assembled at Waterford on the 14th September, sailed for Dublin eleven days later, and by 4th October put in at Drogheda. The sailors on one of his ships, the Reindeer, took over the ship after the soldiers had landed, and pillaged its contents including "one hundred and four score and nine pounds of my money", flooded the ship and made off in a pinnace belonging to Sir Ferdinando Gorges, the Little John of Plymouth.⁽²⁾

Plymouth was less involved in the October/November levies 1598 when only 400 foot out of the 2,000 ordered to be raised by the government from the west country and midland shires were ordered to the port. The government spread the burden over several west country ports: 400 to Plymouth, 500 to Southampton, 300 to Fowey or to Padstow, 400 to Weymouth, and 400 to Bristol.⁽³⁾ The nearest port to the shire of origin of the recruits was used; hence, for example, Captains Digges, Caesar and Kemish were sent to Southampton to conduct Hampshiremen; Captains Southwell, Cotterell and Dutton, Cornishmen to Fowey. All captains and their soldiers were to be at the ports by the 15th November.⁽⁴⁾

The mayor of Southampton, John Jeffreys, and the mayor of Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, John Mocket, expressed the ability and willingness of their ports to billet and ship their contingents.⁽⁵⁾

Plymouth's mayor, Martin Whyte, who had overall authority over the

1; CSPI., (1598-1599), 284

2. Ibid.

3. AFC., xxix, 237-244; under Southampton 300 is a mis-print for 500 which figure is given in the mayor's letter to Cecil, HMC., Salisbury, viii, 414-415, of the 30 October 1598

4. AFC., xxix, 255-256, list of 20 captains.

5. HMC., Salisbury, viii, 408, 409 - Weymouth; ibid., 414-415 Southampton.

Devonshire ports wrote to Cecil claiming he could provide food and ships for five or six hundred soldiers, but in the event Plymouth was designated 400.⁽¹⁾ Fowey was considered more suitable than Padstow to embark the Cornishmen though its mayor, Mr. Mohun, tried to have the burden passed on to Padstow because his small and poor port had been greatly charged towards the expenses of fortifying Falmouth. Christopher Harris, deputy lieutenant of Cornwall, put Fowey's case to Sir Robert Cecil together with the objections of the shire to the demands of the Irish service. He complained that 300 recruits then to be raised from "our poor countrey will be more burdensome than any charge that I have known heretofore, levies from Cornwall have seldom been more than a third part unto Devonshire, and now almost equal".⁽²⁾

Southampton was ordered to embark the greatest number in October/November 1598. It was not in the flush of economic prosperity; Lord Burghley had noted that it was among the ports "manifestly decayed".⁽³⁾ When asked to contribute ships to the navy in 1595 the port had pleaded its inability and appealed to Sir George Cary, Captain of the Isle of Wight, for help in meeting the quota of ships and mariners demanded.⁽⁴⁾ Its rôle during the war years, like several south coast ports, was primarily defensive, a fact reflected in the records. The state papers are full of defence measures taken in Southampton, Portsmouth and the other ports vulnerable to attack from Spain; but the local records have left no trace of the transit of troops to Ireland in November 1598 or for the December/January contingent of 1602, and regrettably the mayor's records for the years 1590 to 1603 are non-existent.⁽⁵⁾ A report to Sir Robert Cecil from

1. HMC., Salisbury, viii, 417, Plymouth.

2. Ibid., pp.427-428, Harris to Cecil, 6 November, 1598. The demand on Devonshire for the levy was 400 recruits. Cornwall's shire musters had declined from 8,000 in 1596 to 4,000 in 1599. PRO.SP.12/273/91 - 'Remembrances for Cornwall, 1599'.

3. CSPD., (1598-1601), 2, Reflections by Lord Burghley, 2nd January 1598

4. APC., xxv, 162

5. T.B.James & A.L.Merson(eds) Third Book of Remembrance of Southampton 1514-1602 (4 vls., Southampton Univ. Press, 1979) has no reference to these levies.

one of the captains sent to Southampton, Charles Caesar, on the 25th of November contains a rare mention of the transit of troops. He said that most of the soldiers had arrived by the appointed date the 15th, but that they were delayed a fortnight "expecting a fair wind". If shipping and victuals had been promptly provided they could have sailed on the 23rd, but all was not ready until . . . two days later. The men had embarked and he hoped within two or three days "to be landed in Ireland, where God bless our actions to His glory, our prince's honour, and our country's benefit" - unusual sentiments from an ordinary captain in the Irish wars.⁽¹⁾ This levy from Southampton was bound for Youghal in Munster to re-inforce Sir Thomas Norris there.

The overall levy of 2,000 largely sent from these west country ports in November 1598 was a near panic measure on the government's part when almost the entire province of Munster was in rebellion. Their individual times of arrival from the various ports into Ireland are not known, but Sir Thomas Norris in charge in Munster sent a message by the hand of Edmund Spenser, the celebrated poet, on his return to England from the ruin of his fortunes at Kilcolman, near Cork, after the destruction of the Munster plantation earlier that year. Norris said that 1,600 of the levy had put in at Cork and Youghal and 400 into Waterford. Reports of arrivals of troops in Ireland normally give different figures from those reported on embarkation, Norris's therefore is unusual in that the numbers tally, but it is hard to believe that this levy did not suffer any desertions.⁽²⁾

None of the English Channel ports were involved in the embarkation of Essex's army of 1599, nor with the transportation of recruits raised

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1. HMC., Salisbury, viii, 453-454, Charles Caesar to Cecil, 25 November, 1598
 2. APC., xxix, 255, 256, 268. For Spenser's sixteen years of service in a minor official capacity in Ireland see W.L.Renwick (ed.), A View of the Present State of Ireland by Edmund Spenser (Oxford, 1970), 171-174.

to replace the many Low Countries soldiers sent to aid Essex in Ireland, though Thomas Heton, merchant of Southampton and customer of the port, was asked to supply "three hundred tonnes of Beere, two hundred quarters of Mawlte and a thousand quarter of Oates" as part of the provisions for Essex's army.⁽¹⁾ Heton was the owner and builder of the ships the Bevis and the George used in the Irish service.⁽²⁾ Milford Haven, however, transported 400 foot and 100 horse from South Wales as part of Essex's grand army. On the occasion of the Spanish landing at Kinsale Plymouth was used to send out 500 foot. And in the last levies sent through this group of ports, Southampton sent out 510 foot and Padstow 100 to Cork in December/January 1602.⁽³⁾ At first the privy council asked the authorities at Southampton to have enough shipping prepared to transport 1,000 soldiers by the 20th January 1602.⁽⁴⁾ The mayor objected to this, pleading the poverty of the port, but said that he could arrange to feed, billet and ship half that number, which was agreed.⁽⁵⁾

The impact of the Irish war on this group of ports cannot be measured simply in terms of the numbers of troops embarked. They were important as centres for the collection and transmission of intelligence of enemy movements to the government; travellers to and from such ports as Plymouth, Falmouth and Southampton were frequently examined before the mayors; pinnaces were maintained for spying on Spanish and Irish ship movements, and post barks plyed to and from Padstow to Ireland.⁽⁶⁾ For the benefit of the Irish service fast

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1. I am grateful to A.C.J. Jones, deputy archivist, Southampton Record Office for this reference and for help in searching the mayor's accounts.
 2. For Heton's ships, CSPD., (1598-1601), 129; Third Book of Remembrance of Southampton, editors' notes, 51, 53.
 3. See Table 3 above.
 4. AFC., xxxii, 458
 5. Ibid., 481
 6. HMC., Foljambe, 9, 89, 90-91; CSPD., (1598-1601), passim.

running posts were established to carry packets and letters to and fro between Plymouth and Falmouth, and by 1601 a like service was established between Plymouth and Padstow.⁽¹⁾ The Cecil papers of the time are full of letters communicating news from Ireland.⁽²⁾ They were observed by the Spanish enemy. One Hortensio Spinola on a mission to examine all the defences of the Channel ports was induced to give the privy council an exact and detailed description of the position, ships, artillery and fortifications maintained at Plymouth, Dartmouth, Southampton, Portsmouth and Poole.⁽³⁾ And the privy council registers for the late 1590s indicate the impact of the war in many other ways. At the time of Kinsale, for instance, all the west country ports were ordered to impress mariners and 500 were assembled at Plymouth and sent to Chatham for the manning of the queen's ships.⁽⁴⁾ After the victory at Kinsale, Plymouth took in Spanish prisoners.⁽⁵⁾ Weymouth, Portsmouth and Plymouth transported ordnance and munitions to Ireland.⁽⁶⁾ At Southampton "divers parcels of armour" were seized on board the Elizabeth of Southampton returning from Galway; its master William Thompson was arrested.⁽⁷⁾ As Ireland became waste the army depended more on provisions from England; the west country shires of Cornwall and Devon shipped surplus grain, 2,200 quarters of wheat, for instance, in 1600.⁽⁸⁾ And, in all of these activities, the attentions of the piratical "Dunkirkers", caused disruption and losses in the ships laden with supplies for the army in Ireland.⁽⁹⁾

1. APC., xxxi, 20, 418; ibid., xxxii, 304.

2. HMC., Salisbury, viii, ix, x, xl, under letters from the mayors of ports.

3. CSPD., (1598-1601), 178-179, Declaration of H. Spinola, April 1599

4. APC., xxxii, 136-137, 255; CSPD., (1598-1601), 284

5. PRO.SP.12/283/18, a list of 37 living and 3 dead Spanish prisoners were put in at Plymouth, 13 December 1601.

6. APC., xxix, 260

7. APC., xxx, 100-101

8. Ibid., 795

9. HMC., Salisbury, x, 425, 426, 427, 431.

CHAPTER NINERochester and the Irish levy of October 1601.

No contemporary observer under-estimated the danger to both Ireland and England when a Spanish army of about 4,000 landed unopposed at Kinsale on 21st September 1601.⁽¹⁾ The crisis on which the entire course of the war turned had been long expected. The council's registers for September and October 1601 clearly display the urgency to conquer the Spanish invaders and Irish insurgents.⁽²⁾ The government immediately ordered 2,000^{men} to be assembled at Rochester to sail for Waterford; a further 2,000 to be sent from Bristol and Barnstaple for Cork, and 1,000 to sail from Chester for Ulster.⁽³⁾ The government made no apology for the new demands; their cause was well advertised. Orders fell thick and fast on the shires and ports, the mayors of ports were told to have shipping ready, and because of their experience in former services the privy council's letters simply said "wee need not give you any further instructions."⁽⁴⁾

Rochester had not been previously used for shipping levies to Ireland, but in October 1601 the presence of the royal navy's ships under Admiral Sir Richard Leveson at Chatham and Rochester enabled troops to be embarked without delay. Of the four major ports involved in the largest embarkation exercise of the war Rochester took the greatest share.⁽⁵⁾ Next to Chatham, the home

1. Cal.Carew MSS., iv, 179-200 extracts of Sir George Carew's journal on the military action at Kinsale, and CSP., Venetian (1592-1603), 477-478 for the views of the Venetian ambassador to England on the siege of Kinsale.

2. APC., xxxii, 77-79, 107, 222-226, 239, 240-242, 278, 280-286

3. APC., xxxii, 241-242.

4. APC., xxxii, 261

5. See Table 1 in the introduction to Part II.

of the Elizabethan admiralty, Rochester was a naval centre of importance; it had good anchorage, stored the navy's ordnance, had easy access to London, and above all possessed excellent dockyards at the estuary of the Medway.

Two years earlier in August 1599 Rochester had been a key position in home defence preparations for the expected Spanish invasion, which was wrecked by storms before reaching the English Channel.⁽¹⁾ Thomas Platter, a traveller in England in 1599, described how he saw the queen's battleships lying at anchor in the Medway at Rochester. He wrote,

"on the one I inspected I counted fifty-four great carthouns (cannons) and more, each in its proper place pointing out to sea; the warships are very well fortified and strong, so that from a distance they resemble a castle" . . . these ships are always provided with a great number of soldiers, pipes and drums, and all that appertains to war." (2)

The presence of the navy in the Medway prompted Sir Robert Cecil in April 1600 to advise its use for a speedy transportation of troops to Munster, but in the event, this did not then happen.⁽³⁾ But the presence of the Spanish in Ireland in late September dictated a quick and efficient embarkation of troops to aid Mountjoy and Carew in Munster.

Perhaps, indicative of urgency the privy council directed the complete operation at Rochester in October 1601 through the lord lieutenant of Kent in co-operation with the admiralty, and not through the mayor of the city. On the 6th October the council informed Henry Lord Cobham, lord lieutenant of Kent, of their plans to assemble 2,000 troops at Rochester, and instructed him

1. CSPD., (1598-1601), 317, 334, 335.

2. C.Williams (trans. & ed.), Thomas Platter's travels in England, 1599 (1937) pp. 150-152.

3. CSPI., (November 1600 - July 1601), 301.

to have 200 sent from Kent.⁽¹⁾ Cobham forwarded the council's orders to his deputy lieutenants, Sir John Leveson and Sir Thomas Walsingham "at xii at Midnighte, 6 of October" from his house at Blackfriars.⁽²⁾ Thereafter, the responsibility for arrangements at Rochester fell to Sir John Leveson, Cobham's chief deputy, in whose jurisdiction Rochester lay.⁽³⁾ The only indication of the lord lieutenant Cobham's subsequent interest in events at Rochester was his letter of October 12 to Sir Robert Cecil, his brother-in-law, forecasting social disorder in and around Rochester with 2,000 soldiers converging on the area. He advised Cecil to have Sir John Leveson command the conductors of levies to remain with their companies

"consideringe how hard a matter it will be to contain them, being strangers, and lodged abroad in the villages from running away and committing of outrages usual with such kind of people." (4)

The government certainly expected unruly behaviour and prepared for it by appointing Sir Thomas Wilford provost marshal to keep order and prevent desertions in the environs of Rochester; Wilford had previously held the same office in Kent in 1595 and in 1599.⁽⁵⁾ Rochester, especially the Gadshill area, had experienced gang warfare on the return of the Portugal fleet in November 1589, and on the return of Lord Willoughby's expeditionary

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1. APC., xxxii, 237, p.c. to Lord Henry Cobham, wrongly dated 7 October.
 2. SRO., D.593/S/4/69/6, Cobham to the deputies, 6 October 1601.
 3. The more important Leveson papers for this service are the sections SRO. D.593/S/4/69/6 (i-viii); 69/7 (i-xii); 69/8 (i-ix); 54/2 (25 items).
 4. HMC., Salisbury, xi, 423, Cobham to Cecil, 12 October 1601.
 5. SRO. D.593/S/4/69/6 (ii) - Wilford's appointment as provost marshal, October; his earlier appointments - Rymer's Foedera, xvi (1727), 279-280, and SRO. D.593/S/4/52/4 (1599)

force from France in December the same year.⁽¹⁾ The memory of serious disorder then may well have prompted the appointment of a provost marshal, but, in any case, provost marshals had become a semi-permanent officer associated with the lieutenancy in the 1590s because of the likely breakdown of law and order on occasions of invasion scares, food riots caused by harvest failures, and the continual levying and passage of troops in the late years of the decade.⁽²⁾

Apart from precautionary measures, the privy council had to initiate all the major preparations for an efficient embarkation of the army at Rochester. It made contracts by October 5th with the London clothing merchants, Babington and Bromely to supply winter suits of apparel, and with Edmund Nicholson for arms and armour needed in addition to those carried from the shires.⁽³⁾

On October 7th the council ordered the shires sending troops to Rochester to have them there by the 14th of October; Essex was to send 300, London 400, Norfolk, Suffolk and Kent 200 each, Northampton 150, Sussex 100, Hertfordshire, Cambridgeshire, Berkshire and Oxfordshire, 60 each, Middlesex, Huntingdonshire and Buckinghamshire 50 each, and Bedfordshire and Surrey 30 each.⁽⁴⁾ And by October 8th victualling contracts had been made.⁽⁵⁾

Eleven out of the sixteen contingents arrived in Rochester on the 15th October, a day later than the stipulated order; those from Suffolk, Norfolk, Buckinghamshire and Northamptonshire were still expected on the 17th, and do not appear to have arrived until the 19th and 20th. Sir John Leveson had the overall responsibility

1. KAO., QM/SB/139, 275

2. L.Boynton, 'The Tudor provost marshal' in EHR., lxxvii (July 1962), 437-455

3. APC., xxxii, 234, 472-473.

4. APC., xxxii, 241, schedule of companies to Rochester.

5. APC., xxxii, 251.

of the levies as they arrived and kept the privy council informed of deficient numbers in every contingent.⁽¹⁾ Many were down in number on arrival. Captains Kenwick and Fortescue, who were to lead the Suffolk men in Ireland, complained that the conductors out of Suffolk had thirty-seven men short of their 200 on arrival.⁽²⁾ Leveson reported eleven missing from Sussex, five from Huntingdon, one from Bedfordshire, and that none of the London bands had arrived by the 20th of October.⁽³⁾ By the 22nd the council became very concerned about the deficient numbers in some companies, and ordered Sir John Leveson to have the companies made complete by impressing "idle and vagabond persons in Gravesend . . . and other places in the county to make upp the numbers compleat in each company."⁽⁴⁾ Nevertheless, it was found on the day of embarkation, the 27th that there were still eighty-eight soldiers missing.⁽⁵⁾

From the dates of their arrival at Rochester until the 27th October Sir John Leveson had the task of organizing their accommodation and feeding. By efficient management Leveson used the villages around the Medway for billets. In Stroud, for instance, he located the men from his own shire, Kent; at Sittingbourne those from Northamptonshire, Suffolk and Middlesex, and at Milton those from Norfolk, Buckinghamshire and Huntingdonshire. The bands from London appear to have been dispersed among other companies for no specific captains had been appointed over the London contingents.⁽⁶⁾ Clearly the billeting operation brought some

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1. SRO., D. 593/S/4/69/7, vi, "A lyst of the severall companies"
 2. HMC., Salisbury, xi, Kenwick and Fortescue to Earl of Nottingham Lord Admiral, 22nd October 1601 from Rochester.
 3. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/7/vii, Leveson to the p.c., 18th October 1601.
 4. SRO.D.593/S/4/54/2, the p.c. to Leveson, 22nd October 1601.
 5. See Table 1 below.
 6. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/v-viii and 69/7 passim, billeting arrangements.

profit to innkeepers, alehouse owners and ordinary householders, and some cargo ship owners gained from the transport of victuals and the habillements of war.⁽¹⁾ There is little evidence of the "outrages" forecast by Lord Henry Cobham during the ten days or so of the billeting period; but there was some riotous behaviour at the actual embarkation on the 27th.⁽²⁾

Experienced members of the privy council advised Sir John Leveson that the suits of apparel supplied from the London merchants should not be distributed until the soldiers boarded ship. This had been among their foremost orders and the practice of the mayors at Chester and Bristol on similar occasions.⁽³⁾ "Coats" in these military records frequently denoted the full suit of apparel. Sir John Leveson listed in his notes the full suit of winter apparel for distribution to each soldier at Rochester;

"a cassocke of brode cloth, a payre of venetians (trousers), a doublet of canvas, a hatte cappe, two shirtes of lynen cloath, two bandes of Holland cloth, three pare of carsie stockinges and three payre of shooes."⁽⁴⁾

Either unaware that winter apparel would be provided at Rochester, or not taking risks about its lack, the Northamptonshire contingent arrived in Rochester already apparelled in winter clothing. When informed by Leveson, the privy council pointed out that Northamptonshire had ignored their instructions, or at best did not remember

"the former order which hath ben taken . . . for the furnishinge of the apparell of the souldiers by certein marchants withhome contract is made for that purpose." ⁽⁵⁾

Leveson's papers show that he had the Northamptonshire coats

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1. Inns and alehouses were traditional billets for soldiers.
 2. See below p. . . .
 3. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/6, iii, six members of the p.c. to Sir J. Leveson 19 October 1601.
 4. Ibid., 69/6/ v and APC., xxxii, 275, for a similar list of winter clothing for soldiers to Ireland.
 5. SRO.D.593/S/4/54/2/1 the p.c. to Leveson, 18 October 1601.

returned to the county, which could have caused consternation among that contingent had he not distributed the government's issue at the same time. In this way Leveson carried out the letter of the privy council's instructions on the distribution of the winter suits.⁽¹⁾

After mustering the soldiers and inspecting their arms, Sir John Leveson reported adversely on those sent from Norfolk.⁽²⁾ In the interests of expediting embarkation the privy council ordered Leveson "to finde the meanes to furnish them there in Rochester with so moch other good arms as you shall finde to be needfull". Leveson then remedied the defects in the Norfolk arms apparently at his own expense, though he was later re-imbursed by the Exchequer.⁽³⁾ The council reprimanded the commissioners for the musters in Norfolk firstly for sending only 192 instead of 200 soldiers, and secondly because the levy was

"furnished with so bad and insufficient armes . . . and for the moste parte unserviceable, as if they were meant rather to tender the same for a false shewe than to make any use thereof especially for so important a service as is now in questyon." (4)

The council did not rest with a reprimand for Norfolk's negligence; in ordering the Lord Treasurer to issue warrants for re-imburements of expenses to be made for sending out the levies they instructed him in the case of Norfolk:

". . . because the county of Norfolk is to receive the sum of £93 or circa it is thoughte meete that somme shall not be paid unto them havinge by their want of care in the provision of armour forced Her Majesty to be at this extraordinary charge, but convert it towardes the payment of money laid out by Sir John Leveson in part satisfaction thereof . . ." (5)

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1. PRO.D.593/S/4/69/8/1; 69/7 v, vi.
 2. ibid., 54/2/3, 4
 3. APC., xxxii, 304, the p.c. to Leveson and commissioners at Rochester
 4. APC., xxxii, 314, 315 the p.c. to Norfolk commissioners, 27 October.
 5. APC., xxxii, 353-354

The full story of Sir John Leveson's expenses in the twelve days of military preparations at Rochester cannot be shown in detail because of the partial and rough notes of his financial transactions in his papers for October 1601. He made much ado about what he was personally owed as one set of notes reveals:

"290¹ 19s.8d disbursed for diet over and above
the 266¹ 13s.4d advanced, and also 115. 14s.6d
disbursed for the defectes of the armes of
Norfolk . . . soe there is owed to me in all
406. 14s.2d owt of which I paid 206.14s.2d . . ."
(1)

He then stated the overall total of £530.3s. for lodging and dieting 1,600 soldiers.⁽²⁾ The normal rate for the soldier in billets was 8d a day, of which 6d was for food and lodgings, and 2d for the supply of other necessities;⁽³⁾ food and lodgings therefore for 1,600 men over twelve days should have given a total of £480. Leveson clearly had calculated on 8d a day for food and lodgings alone; even then his arithmetic is wrong by 3s. 8d. His financial accounts also show that he had been refunded coat and conduct money of £53. 6s. 8d. for the levy of 200 men from Kent who joined the general embarkation at Rochester.⁽⁴⁾ But regretably there is no balance sheet among his financial papers for the entire operation. The captains' acquittances of monies paid them by Leveson show that most companies were paid from the 15th to the 27th of October, but all captains claimed a half-day's allowance of pay for the 27th, the day of embarkation. Leveson's settlement of these claims depended upon the time of arrival; Captain Parr Lane's men from Northamptonshire, for example, were paid from the 20th, those from Norfolk from the 19th, and those from Suffolk for the 21st. None of

1. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/7 (ix-xii)

2. ibid.

3. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/6/iii, iv.

4. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/8, i-iv, receipts of coat and conduct money.

Leveson's accounts indicate that he paid for the London contingents of 400 men since he constantly referred to only 1,600 rather than the total 2000 soldiers at Rochester.⁽¹⁾ It is more than probable that the London bands embarked not at Rochester but at Queensborough, at the confluence of the river Swale and Medway near the Isle of Sheppey; the Admiral in charge of the fleet Sir Richard Leveson, cousin of Sir John Leveson, reported to Cecil that he had embarked more soldiers at Queenborough on the 28th of October,⁽²⁾ probably the London bands. Leveson's labours were recognised even before his duties were complete. The privy council thanked Sir John Leveson in a commendatory letter:

"wee doe verie well allowe and commend the care used by you for the lodging, dieting and well guardinge of the saide men . . ."

and the council went on to urge him to continue his vigilance until the soldiers had departed Rochester.⁽³⁾

In the organization of the actual embarkation Sir John Leveson was assisted by Sir Henry Palmer, vice-admiral of the Kentish coasts, and Sir John Trevor, constable of Upnor Castle on the Medway, but their main task was to guard the ships for the Admiral, Sir Richard Leveson, who was to command the fleet to Ireland.⁽⁴⁾ To supervise the loading of munitions, Mr. Darrell was sent down from the Ordnance department in the Tower of London; his report to Cecil stressed the precautions taken. Only 50 soldiers were allowed on board the munitions ships, but none of them were allowed to have access to the hatches. In this way, claimed Darrell "the munitions shall be transported with much more safety and these ships shall go more like men-of-war than transporters."⁽⁵⁾ Furthermore, the Admiral

1. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/7/(i-xii)

2. Hatfield House, Cecil Papers, 205/110r., Sir Richard Leveson from the Downes, 5 November, 1601 to Sir Robert Cecil.

3. APC., xxxii, 294, the p.c. to Sir John Leveson; see Table 1.

4. HMC., Salisbury, xi, 449, Palmer and Trevor to the Earl of Nottingham.

5. HMC., Salisbury, xi, 439, Darrell to Cecil, 20 October 1601.

was warned by the privy council to take special care

"to restrayne the use of taking tobacco
in any of the shippes wherein the powder
and munytion is loden." (1)

The allocation of soldiers to ships, and under the captains
who were to lead them, as well as the numbers missing are set out
in the following table.

Table. 1. The disposition of soldiers at Rochester in the
Queen's ships, October 1601.

From	Number ordered	Captains	Ship, Tonnage, No. Wanting.
Essex	300	Sir A. Cooke Sir A. Clifford	<u>The Defiance</u> (470 tons)
Kent	200	Edw. Doddington Geo. Blundell	<u>The Warspite</u> (500 tons) (13 men wanting)
Sussex	100	Capt. Hanks	<u>The Warspite</u>
Suffolk	200	Kenrick and Fortescue	<u>The Garland</u> (500 tons) (37 men wanting)
Norfolk	200	Butler and Sheffield	<u>The Swiftsure</u> (360 tons) (8 men wanting)
Huntingdon	50	Norton	<u>The Garland</u>
Buckingham	50		<u>The Swiftsure</u> (8 men wanting)
Northampton	100	Parr Lane	<u>The Garland</u> (7 men wanting)
Northampton	50	Lover	<u>The Crane</u> (160 tons)
Middlesex	50		(10 men wanting)
Cambridge	60	Wade	<u>The Non-Pareil</u> (500 tons)
Hertfordshire	40		(3 men wanting)
Hertfordshire	20	Chatterton	<u>The Non-Pareil</u>
Oxfordshire	60		(2 men wanting)
Bedfordshire	20		
Berkshire	60	Brett	<u>The Non-Pareil</u>
Surrey	30		
Bedfordshire	10		
Totals:	1,600	15 captains	6 ships; 88 men wanting. (2)

1. APC., xxxii, 289, postscript of the p.c. letter to Sir J. Leveson.

2. Table based on SRO.D.593/S/4/69/6,7,8; the tonnage of the ships from PRO.SP.12/286/37,38 'The Queene's Majesties shippes' (n.d.) including the six here, but the total list shows 39 ships, 4 galleys and two hoys or sloops. William Lambarde in his Perambulation of Kent 'Estate of the Navie Royall' (1826 ed. reprinted, 1970), 314 made an identical list probably from the same source of public records. The Non-Pareil was formerly known as the Philip and Mary but renamed before the 1588 Armada.

The table shows that each captain had a nominal roll of 100 men each, except the two Essex captains who had 150 each. The majority of these captains are later found in command of foot companies at the sieges of Kinsale and Dunboy in Munster. It is probably significant that those levies which were billeted in Sittingbourne and Milton, the furthest from Rochester had the most men missing on embarkation, while those from Essex, which were billeted in Rochester had none missing at the ships. The only county levy split up on embarkation was from Northamptonshire; they boarded the Crane and Garland. The Defiance and the Non-Pareil took 300 men each but the Garland of similar tonnage took 350 soldiers.⁽¹⁾

Sir Richard Leveson, the Admiral, commissioned to lead the fleet, commanded the Warspite, his Vice-Admiral, Sir Aymas Preston commanded The Garland, Walter Gore, the Defiance, George Somers the Swiftsure, Edward Manwaring the Crane and Humphrey Reynolds the Non-Pareil. All the naval commanders except Sir Richard Leveson were veterans of a decade or more of noteworthy sea-service. The Merlin, a 40 ton galley under Captain Thomas Fleming, which had returned from Lough Foyle in October, also went with the fleet, but did not appear in the official list for the transportation of the troops. Six victualling ships were hired, mainly from London: the Marigold under William Willis, the Rueben of Lee under Joseph May, the Desire of London, under William Lawrence, the Arcana of London, under Thomas Covert, the Mayflower of Gillingham, under Thomas Salkeld and a crompter, the Garland under Raymond Hurlock. Before the commissioning of Sir Richard Leveson's fleet there were two men of war and some hired merchantmen on the Irish station, the Tremontana under Captain Plessington, and the Moon under Captain

1. Table 1.

Thomas Button, and both were queen's ships.⁽¹⁾

A report of the proceedings at Rochester at the time of embarkation from Sir Henry Palmer, the Vice-Admiral of the Kentish coasts, to the Lord High Admiral, the Earl of Nottingham, on 27th October gives an insight into the activity and work on the Medway in the carting and storing of victuals, arms, armour, and the sorting of soldiers into the ships. Palmer made particular mention of the organizing ability of Sir John Leveson "whose pains among the soldiers have been exceeding great," of how he sent some bands down to him and Sir John Trevor at St. Mary's Creek where "we attended to ship them as fast as they came." Palmer went on to say how the three of them went about their work directing operation from barges and long boats and of how "this evening, (28th) the last man was set on board". His report told of some of the realities of the operation from the soldiers' viewpoint, of how many of them complained of over-crowding in the ships, and of how some crews feared that "for want of room in the ships ... being pestered ... they shall not be able to work."⁽²⁾ Comments like these of actual conditions on board troop ships bound for Ireland are rare at this period.

The privy council, partly because of its proximity to Rochester, and partly because of Sir John Leveson's conscientious reporting, was kept fully informed of every stage of the operation. The privy council wrote anxiously to the admiral, Sir Richard Leveson, with strict orders to husband the victuals on board so that they would be well provided on landing; his ships' officers were to enforce economies,

1. SRO.D.593/S/4/69/7; PRO.E/2239 - Pipe Office Declared accounts; and for the ships on the Irish station, M. Oppenheim (ed.) 'Naval tracts of Sir William Monson', Navy Rec. Soc., ii (1902), 126, and for the fortunes of the Moon and Merlin and their Captains see T. Glasgow Jr. 'The Elizabethan Navy in Ireland' in Irish Sword, vii (1965-66), 304.

2. HMC., Salisbury, xi, 449, Palmer and Trevor to the Lord High Admiral Endorsed "Chatham the 27th past 8 in the nighte, Rochester at 10 in the nighte, Dartford at 6 in the morning".

and captains of soldiers were not to open stores of victuals intended for their sojourn in Ireland on any pretext such as the "pretended use of their soldiers".⁽¹⁾

To inform and encourage the awaiting commander in Munster, Sir George Carew, in whose territory the Spanish had landed, the Lord High Admiral the Earl of Nottingham wrote to him; "there never was such a fleet of the Queen's ships so suddenly sent out by any admiral before", and he hoped the gunners and cannoniers which were on board "will be able to do good service". Sir Richard Leveson did not report until 4th November; he then wrote to Sir Robert Cecil telling how the wind and weather had served favourably on 27th October, and that the following day more soldiers embarked at Queenborough, which we have seen, were most likely the four hundred Londoners. All the next day, the 29th, he said he could not put out to sea "by reason of the fogg", and though he set off again on the 30th he had to anchor off "Sue Beacon" (un-identified) for the next three days "being taken with a forcible wynde at East". By 4th November, the date of his letter to Cecil, a west-south-westerly carried his ships to the Downs.⁽²⁾

The troops from Rochester did not land in Ireland until 12th November. In the first instance, they put in at Cork some twenty miles east of Kinsale harbour where the Spanish were entrenched. Two days later Lord Mountjoy reported their arrival in Kinsale to Sir George Carew, and he painted a far from encouraging picture of the new levies:

"Our men out of the Queen's ships are landed. I think there be not ten of them that can shoot in a gun; and so extreme hath been the weather since their coming that I was fain to send 1,000 of them to Cork to relieve them for a while, or else I fear most of them would have died before they could have made cabins." (3)

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1. APC., xxxii, 289, p.c. to Sir Richard Leveson.
 2. Hatfield House, Cecil Papers, 205/110, r.v. abstracts of letters made by Sir Robert Cecil.
 3. Cal. Carew MSS., iv, 164, Mountjoy to Carew, 18th November 1601.

Further reports from Ireland confirm that the other launchings of troops from Bristol and Barnstaple had arrived in Munster approximately at the time of the queen's ships under Sir Richard Leveson:

Our forces from England have arrived safely: -
 1,000 f. and 100 h. from Bristol at
 Castlehaven ... 1,000f. and 140 h. from
 Barnstaple and Ilfracombe put in at Waterford,
 Cork and Youghal ... (1)

The decisive battle and siege in which they took part was much written about at the time, and in recent years has attracted much research. (2)

A number of circumstances made the experience of embarking troops at Rochester different from the same service in other ports. The privy council was in more immediate contact with operations at Rochester partly because of the proximity of London, but mainly because of the competent handling of communications, and of the service in general by Sir John Leveson, the deputy lieutenant of Kent. Unlike similar operations at Chester, Bristol and Barnstaple and elsewhere, the government dealt with a single unified authority at Rochester, the premier deputy lieutenant of the county, and not through the mayor of the town. Because the queen's ships were used there was no need on the government's part to have civilian vessels taken up. Throughout the operation there is no evidence of friction between the naval commanders and the army captains: and while the soldiers were billeted, there was no friction between civilians and soldiers such as had taken place in Chester and Bristol.

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1. CSPI, (1601-1603) 181-182, dated 14 November.
 2. See the bibliography for the work of J.J.Silke, T.Glasgow, G.Hayes-McCoy, F.M.Jones, C.Falls, Dudley Edwards for later work on Kinsale. Contemporary accounts in Cal. Carew MSS iv, Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, iii, the Pacata Hibernia, Cal. S.P. Ireland (1601-1603) 240 ff. from the English side; from the Irish in the Annals of the Four Masters, and collected accounts of Kinsale in Folger Shakespeare Lib. MS. Coll. Xd, 393 (microfilm).

An air of efficiency in billeting and embarking the soldiers appears to have pervaded the service at Rochester which is clear from Sir John Leveson's records of the events, but the fighting qualities of the troops assembled at Rochester was much criticised both in the port and on their arrival in Ireland. The chief crisis of the Irish war having arrived with the presence of the Spanish at Kinsale gave the service at Rochester a sense of urgency lacking in the launching of levies, prior to 1601, from the other ports.

PART THREE

Elizabethan soldiers in Ireland

"Never by my consent shalt thou train them up in wars. For he that sets up his to live by that profession can hardly be an honest man or a good Christian. Besides it is a science no longer in request than use. For soldiers in peace are like chimneys in summer" (1)

(Lord Burghley in a letter of advice to his son Robert on the bringing up of his family)

Quoted by J.Hurstfield, The Queen's Wards (1958), 257
from F.Peck's, Desiderata Curiosa, 2 vols. (1732-1735)

PART THREE

Elizabethan military service in Ireland

The final part of this thesis concentrates on the service and welfare of the soldier in field and garrison in Ireland, and considers his return and the relief measures taken for sick and wounded, thus attempting to follow his complete military fortune. There is a need to re-write the wider history of the late-sixteenth century war in Ireland but this section does not attempt such an ambitious enterprize, focussing more narrowly on the impact of the war on the common soldier.

In almost any period of history the private soldier leaves but scant records of his life. In late Elizabethan times, however, his voice can occasionally be heard through petitions on his behalf, from his captain's letters and dispatches, and indirectly in the many regulations sent by the privy council to govern his conduct, in the codes of military discipline issued by his chief commander, and from the complaints of the civilian population about his behaviour. At best the private soldier may get a mention in dispatches, at least he appears as a name on a muster roll, and at worst, his name may appear on a casualty list, or simply numbered among the dead.

His fortunes in the army in Ireland depended on whether or not he was with the field army or in garrison, whether he originated from town or countryside, whether he was an impressed vagrant or a gentleman volunteer, and whether he was an experienced veteran of the wars or a raw recruit. Most of all, whether he was English, Welsh or Irish the quality and conditions of his life were at the mercy of his company captain.

The general condition of the Elizabethan soldier in Ireland was, by one accord, hard and cheerless. The Irish service was not popular; it was well known to be "the most miserable war for travail, toil and famine in the world".⁽¹⁾ Sir George Carew wrote about his soldiers in Munster that "the travel and hard diet they endure passeth all the soldiers in Europe".⁽²⁾ Thomas, Lord Burghley, as Lord President of the North remarked that recruits going to Ireland needed two hearts putting into them.⁽³⁾ So discouraging had the Irish service become that "better be hanged at home than die like dogs in Ireland" became a cliché in Chester.⁽⁴⁾ The troops scattered in garrisons throughout Ireland, many of them in remote places, and those in the field army on the march were generally under-paid, under-fed, ill-equipped and low in morale.

Some companies were considered untrustworthy because their Irish soldiers were sometimes secretly in sympathy with their fellow countrymen in the enemy ranks and therefore liable to desert; other companies gave the impression to some commanders of being on the edge of voluntary disbandment, and there were cases of mutiny. Troops, arms, money, victuals and munitions sent into Ireland from 1594 to the end of the war were said to disappear "as though in some Serbonian bog".⁽⁵⁾ The queen, privy council, and the high command in Ireland might issue orders, rules and instructions to be carried out by a hierarchy of officials - muster masters, clerks of the check, commissaries for apparel, victuals, arms and munitions - but rules were ignored or broken, and there was much chaos in administration. All of which made a bad situation intolerable.

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1. PRO.SP.63/202/pt.2, no.38, requests of captains to the p.c., 18 May 1598
 2. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 36
 3. PRO.SP.12/274/44, Thomas, Lord Burghley to his brother, Sir Robert Cecil February, 1600
 4. CSPI (1592-1596), 489, Hugh Bellot, bishop of Chester to William Lord Burghley, 13 March 1596
 5. CSPI (1598-1599), preface, lxviii

CHAPTER TEN

The maintenance of the army in Ireland(1) Soldiers' pay and army costs.

In theory army companies in Ireland received a proportion of their wages each week known as "lendings" and the balance, known as "full pay" was made up at six monthly intervals. The treasurer-at-war was supposed to issue each week to captains the sum of money their companies were entitled to, from which the company clerk paid the individual soldiers.⁽¹⁾ The private's wages were 8d a day, reckoned for the year at £12.3.4; from this £4.2.6. was deducted for two suits of summer and winter clothing, known variously as "off-reckonings" or "defalcations".⁽²⁾ In theory the private soldier was left with annual wages of £8.0.10. By the system of lendings 2s.8d. a week was paid to the soldier (£6.18.6 per annum), and the balance of full pay, £1.2.4., was made up in two six monthly instalments. The weekly lendings were intended as subsistence payments for the soldier's food and drink, ~~and~~ from which, until reforms were introduced in 1600, he was also expected to pay for his gunpowder, match and repairs to his weapons.⁽³⁾ Overall the Elizabethan government provided sufficient money to meet the pay of the army, but treasure arrived from England at irregular intervals making it impossible to pay the soldiers regularly by the week. Furthermore whenever money did arrive the system of payment was so open to abuse that both lendings and full pay were often in arrears causing hardship and dissatisfaction. Thus payment of soldiers was a haphazard business.⁽⁴⁾

1. CSPI (1598-1599), 146-150 "The humble requests of the captains of Ireland", 18 May 1598 illustrates the system of payment and its weakness.

2. From defalcatio medieval latin, to scale down, deduct.

3. See chapter eleven under Arms and Armour.

4. J.W.Fortescue, A History of the British Army, i, (1899), Bk.II, ch.iv.

A number of officials were concerned with army pay; the treasurer-at-war, the muster master general, the clerk of the check, the auditor, the captain and the company clerk. In England commissioners examined the annual accounts of the treasurer-at-war. In Ireland the treasurer-at-war was responsible for the whole financial administration of all revenue received from England, and, he made payments on warrants from the privy council, from the Lord Deputy and from the Irish Council in Dublin. These warrants and the acquittances or receipts of the payees were his discharge against the crown for the allowances of his account.⁽¹⁾ Sir Henry Wallop acted as treasurer-at-war from 1580 until retirement in 1599; Sir George Cary succeeded him for the rest of the war and until 1606. Both were alleged to have made private fortunes at the queen's expense.⁽²⁾

The muster master's department was supposed to centralize all records of the numbers of men in the companies after field and garrison troops were mustered and reviewed, in theory once a month, by subordinate muster masters. Their rolls or returns were to record all absences on leave or sick leave so that these rolls gave the treasurer-at-war all the information he needed to reckon pay. Without accurate muster rolls on active service the government could not get value for money since they were the technical basis for the distribution of pay, rations and apparel. All distribution was the responsibility of the captain and the company clerk. That the pay of the common soldier should have been in the hands of the captains was considered "a notorious abuse" by military writers such as Matthew Sutcliffe, and generally thought so by everyone but the

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1. Cal. Patent Rolls (1558-1560), 120-121, show, for instance, how Sir William Fitzwilliam as treasurer-at-war balanced his accounts.
 2. Instructions to Sir George Cary on appointment as treasurer outline the ideal execution of the office - Cal. Carew MSS., iii, 290-292, March 22nd 1598. For the exposure of Cary's frauds in the office see H. Hall, Society in the Elizabethan Age (1886), 128-132. And for the accusations against Sir Henry Wallop, CSPI., (1596-1597), 413.

captains.⁽¹⁾ But in theory the muster office kept a check on the captains. The muster master's deputies were to make inspections at irregular intervals, and at short notice to make it difficult for captains to fill up their bands by ad hoc hirelings. Had the muster office been permitted to work according to the rules it would have given the government an accurate account of the state of the forces in Ireland. In practice muster arrangements in Ireland were in a constant state of confusion. Sir Ralph Lane, muster master general from 1592, Though ~~he~~ complained often to the privy council about the abuses of captains and put up schemes for reforming the musters and his secretariat,^{he} was himself under fire from the government's muster agent, Maurice Kyffin, who was sent to help Lane reform the musters in Ireland. Both wrangled and complained about each other's activities. Kyffin reported to Burghley of the confusions and corruptions among the muster officials themselves. And in practice, at the end of the line of administration in pay, the muster masters were at the mercy of the captains and their company clerks who were frequently in collusion.⁽²⁾

The resident muster masters for the Derry garrisons under Sir Henry Docwra, Humphrey Covert and Anthony Reynolds for the years 1600 to 1602, wrote vivid accounts of their hardships and ill-usage at the hands of the captains. Covert wrote to Cecil:

"the captains are most violently bent against my proceedings in the musters and daily myself and such as I use in this employment, are boldly threatened to have our throats cut".⁽³⁾

Only when Covert's zeal for the duties of his office cooled was he tolerated by Docwra and his captains until he resigned in June 1601.⁽⁴⁾

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1. C.G.Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army (Oxford, 2nd ed., 1966), 143.
 2. For the differences between Lane and Kyffin, CSPI., (1598-1599) 12, 13, 43, 71, 72, 73, 96, 97, 152. For complaints of Lane's negligence, Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 263, ibid., iv, 63. Lane presented a full account of two and a half years' service to Cecil and wanted to be exonerated from all blame, CSPI (1598-1599), 491
 3. CSPI., (1600-1601), 284, Covert to Cecil, 22 April 1601
 4. PRO.SP.63/208/pt.ii/no.17; ibid., no.103 (May 1601); ibid., 208/pt.iii/no.16, 12 June 1601, Covert's letters to Cecil describing his difficulties.

Reynolds, Covert's successor, on the other hand, tried too many tricks to outwit the captains in their frauds; he employed "an intelligencer" in each company paying him 12d a week so that he boasted to Cecil "the captain shall not know his strength better than I do".⁽¹⁾ Some of the muster returns Reynolds made of the Derry garrisons showed an uncomfortable discrepancy with those sent in by the commander, Sir Henry Docwra.⁽²⁾ Eventually, the captains, angered by Reynolds' methods, had him arrested, with the connivance of Docwra on a trumped up charge of whoring with the preacher's maid; his bi-monthly statistics then ceased to be sent in to the muster master general. When his freedom was granted Reynolds appears to have given up the struggle to make honest returns and reform abuses in Derry.⁽³⁾ In their reports neither Covert nor Reynolds accused individual captains of fraud. Nor did Henry Bird, muster master in Newry who to Cecil complained only in general terms of disorders and abuses committed by the Newry captains.⁽⁴⁾ And in answering privy council criticism against captains in Munster for using hirelings from the towns on muster days, Sir George Carew told the privy council that "so gross an error cannot escape the commissaries knowledge and therefore he must participate with the captains in that fault".⁽⁵⁾

The muster officials never succeeded against the captains' abuses and many continued to profit from the fraudulent distribution of pay, food, clothing and arms. The captain appointed and had control of all subordinate company officers: a lieutenant, ensign, sergeant, drummer, preacher, cannoneer, surgeon, and about six

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1. PRO.SP.63/209/62, Reynolds to Cecil, 5 September 1601
 2. Ibid., 209/62 b. For abstracts of Reynolds' muster certificates CSPI., (1601-1603), 60, 61, 102, 179, 189
 3. CSPI., (1601-1603), 214, 215
 4. CSPI., (1600-1601), 27, Bird to Cecil, 22 April 1601
 5. Ibid., 162, Carew to Cecil, 25 January 1601.

corporals, the normal establishment of an infantry company.⁽¹⁾ A profiteering captain's company clerk, also his appointee and under his control, worked with him to circumvent the system of musters, checks and inspections. The common soldier's wages, food, and clothing ~~was~~ ^{were} the captains' responsibility and their lack was frequently laid at his door.⁽²⁾ In C.G.Cruickshank's opinion the captains in Ireland "raised the arts of deception and corruption to a level of efficiency that has perhaps never been attained in any sphere since".⁽³⁾ Ideally, the company clerk should have co-operated with the muster master to save money and should have seen to it that justice was done to the soldiers. He was ideally placed to expose abuses. Like all the Elizabethan army officials the duties of the company clerk were thoroughly defined by military writers: in theory he should have been fully conversant with his company's list since he was expected to record each soldier's name, his place of origin, and what equipment and clothing he had received from his home shire so that he would be in a position to know exactly what deductions had to be made from the soldiers' wages. The company clerk was expected to visit the sick and wounded, list their names, the place of their billets, and then to inform the muster master general of the numbers unfit for service in his particular company. If he added more names than those genuinely unfit and was caught out he forfeited a week's pay. And when clothing was distributed it was his duty to see that no soldier was presented twice on pain of a month's imprisonment.⁽⁴⁾

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1. PRO.SP.63/209/244 b. "The pay for a bande of a 100 footemen" 14 December 1601.
 2. CSPI., (1598-1599), 208 allegations of Hugh Tudor, servant to Maurice Kyffin, made against the captains.
Ibid., 443-445 criticisms made in general of the captains in Ireland by Sir Robert Cecil in his "Observations on the condition of Ireland".
 3. C.G.Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army (Oxford, 2nd edition, 1966), 139-140
 4. B.L.Cott.MSS., Galba, C, viii, ff.238b-239b, Captain Thomas Digges' view of the ideal company clerk. It is of interest that it was a Captain Thomas Digges who persecuted Reynolds as muster master in the Derry garrisons.

The basic unit then for all administrative and financial purposes was the company, and its captain the lynch-pin between the higher command and his soldiers. Once again, in theory the captain was their leader in battle, skirmish and siege, their representative and defender with the higher command, and he was responsible for feeding, clothing and arming them. However if the adverse criticisms made against the captains in Ireland in the 1590s are believed many of them became instead the exploiters of their men. It was said that "only the common soldier shared with the Queen the honour of being a mere victim".⁽¹⁾ Since only a rudimentary supervision of pay existed some captains could swindle the government by maintaining fewer men than there were officially on the list of their companies. Others with little thought for the welfare of their men, economised on the services they were paid to provide, or charged excessively for them. In the opinion of one observer the queen would have been better off paying such captains a £1,000 to keep out of the army.⁽²⁾ In effect, the military company was virtually a private enterprise, and its captain an entrepreneur serving his own interests as well as the public service.⁽³⁾

The choice of captains was then crucial to the army's efficiency. In writing to Sir Robert Cecil, Sir John Dowdall, commander of Duncannon fort, Waterford, reported in January 1600 that a primary cause of all abuse in the army lay in the choice made of captains. Many of them, he said, were given office from

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1. J.E.Neale, "Elizabeth and the Netherlands, 1586-1587" in EHR., xlv (1930), 373-396
 2. CSPI., (1596-1597), 172, Memorandum, unsigned, n.d.
E.G.Atkinson the editor of this volume says it is probably from Maurice Kyffin to Sir Robert Cecil.
 3. G.Parker, Europe in Crisis 1598-1648 (1979), 73 ff.

favour not merit, and were unsuited for the leadership of soldiers being:

"... more inclined to dicing, wenching, and the like ... rather than spare a penny will suffer their soldiers to starve, as is daily seen in this kingdom, but others are gentlemen and worthy, yet fitter for the wars of the Low Countries and Brittany where quarters were in good villages than here on waste towns, bogs, or wood ... " (1)

Hugh Tudor, deputy to Maurice Kyffin, the muster agent in Ireland, had written of the captains in 1598 that they were:

"rich in apparel to maintain their pride and lasciviousness, their drunkenness ... their carouses, their tobacco and tobacco pipes ..." (2)

The privy council reserved the right to appoint captains, but their appointment was usually left to the commander-in-chief in Ireland who was expected to know the relative merits of those applying for captaincies.⁽³⁾ On one occasion Lord Mountjoy was accused of favouritism in his appointments but he defended his choice because those he picked were men of military ability.⁽⁴⁾

Though the commander in chief had a free hand to promote lieutenants to vacant captaincies, he sometimes bowed to petitions from his sub-commanders giving them authority to appoint captains whenever vacancies occurred. He permitted Sir Henry Docwra, for instance, to fill his own vacancies at Derry, but on one occasion refused the like facility to Sir George Carew in Munster.⁽⁵⁾

Absenteeism on the part of many captains from Ireland became a serious problem from the beginning of the war. If a captain had a reasonable excuse to be absent he normally obtained a pass from his commander to return to England. Many, however, took unofficial

1. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 353-355

2. CSPI., (1598-1599), 209

3. CSPI., (1596-1597), 59

4. CSPI., (1600), 503

5. Cal.Carew MSS., iv, 137, Carew's complaint on the matter to Mountjoy, 1 September 1601.

leave particularly in the period between Essex's failure and Mountjoy's appointment to supreme command.⁽¹⁾ Even at a critical time, the muster before the battle of Clohtibret in May 1595, nineteen captains and officers are noted as absent in the muster lists.⁽²⁾ In January 1598 Sir Ralph Lane, muster master general told Burghley of the "ruinous errors caused by the absence of captains from their charges in garrisons".⁽³⁾ Lord Justice Cary complained to Sir Robert Cecil in October 1599 that some captains stayed in England: "If they will, or shall receive Her Majesty's pay, it is fit they should forthwith be commanded to their charge".⁽⁴⁾ The privy council assured Cary and the other justices of Dublin council that they warned all absentee captains to return without delay, and they were not to be paid for the period of their absence.⁽⁵⁾ But by November 1599 the Dublin council still complained to the privy council in England of the "maim to the service" on account of absent captains.⁽⁶⁾ Sir Geoffrey Fenton, the Irish secretary of state, in writing to Cecil in May 1601 said that at that time it was not right that any captain should be absent "when the service is like to grow hot in all places" and that he should dismiss all those captains attendant at court to their charge in Ireland.⁽⁷⁾ When called before the privy council's board some captains swore that they had no companies in Ireland,⁽⁸⁾ and others, it seems, were content to sub-let their companies as long as there was no need for their presence to watch their profits. Absenteeism, it was alleged by Sir Ralph Lane and the Dublin council, encouraged the soldiery to plunder the countryside

1. CSPI., (1599-1600), 248, 212, 192, 193

2. The muster lists at Clontibret published in Irish Sword, ii (1957), 368 ff.

3. CSPI., (1598-1599), 43, 72

4. CSPI., (1599-1600), 192, 193

5. Ibid., 212

6. Ibid., 248

7. CSPI., (1600-1601), 358

8. CSPI., (1599-1600), 255, 424

thereby spreading rebellion in their wake.⁽¹⁾

The captains of the Pale had a particularly bad reputation for allowing their men in lieu of pay "to spoil the subjects as if they were rebels"; spoliation appears to have been an almost established procedure in the Irish wars as elsewhere in the sixteenth century.⁽²⁾ There are many instances of disorderly companies of soldiers taking out their anger on the peasantry and townsfolk whenever their pay, apparel or victuals were not forthcoming, inflicting on them the harrassment, which they were employed to do on the rebel forces. Complaints about the behaviour of the soldiery fell thick and fast on the Dublin administration and on commanders, especially after 1598.⁽³⁾

However, captains were not completely to blame for the poor state of the common soldier in Ireland. Many of the better sort, it was claimed, maintained strong companies "out of their own purse and credit and have neither been repaid nor rewarded".⁽⁴⁾ Many captains like St. Lawrence, Dutton, Crofts and Leigh went personally to the privy council to petition payment of arrears of pay.⁽⁵⁾ Mountjoy told Cecil in February 1601 that the army would never be strong until the queen paid well in money and victuals stating that the "incommodities that do arise from their lack hath lost the Queen far more lives than by the sword".⁽⁶⁾ Mountjoy, too, took the captains' part in their demands for an increase of pay and of the number of dead pays from six to ten, which was the customary dead pay allowance in the Low Countries. When Cecil received a request for this increase in July 1598 he simply put a cross against the item.⁽⁷⁾ However, by 1599 pay

1. CSPI., (1600), 442, 505.
2. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 260-265, 'Declaration of the present state of the English Pale of Ireland ... June 1597'
3. CSPI., (1598-1599), 62, 68, 208, 297, 429-430, 433, 436, 444 instances of complaints in the year 1598-1599.
4. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 354
5. APC., xxx, 389, 610-611, 550, 483, 215, 780, captains petitions in 1600
6. CSPI., (1600-1601), 175, Mountjoy to Cecil, 4 February 1601
7. PRO.SP.63/207/pt.2/115, 'Humble requests of the captains of Ireland' with marginal notes by Sir Robert Cecil.

was increased; the weekly lendings to soldiers went up to 3s. 4d. In January 1600 Mountjoy suggested to Lord Buckhurst, the lord treasurer in England, that the soldiers be given the full pay of 4s. 8d a week, which implied that dead pays for captains should also be paid at that rate.⁽¹⁾ Buckhurst's answer compromised advocating that soldiers be paid at the full rate of 8d. a day⁽²⁾ but abolishing the dead pay system in Ireland from June 1600. The captains tried to have dead pays re-instated at the full rate of 8d a day the following year in May 1601,⁽³⁾ and, the survival of the system is demonstrated by the muster certificates of Anthony Reynolds which show dead pay allowances being paid to captains in the Derry garrisons until the end of the war. The proposal to have dead pays abolished was impractical because these payments were not merely bonuses for the captains but to provide a fund from which the captains could support preachers, cannoneers and surgeons.⁽⁴⁾ Reynolds' certificates in 1601 indicate claims for 180 dead pays to subsidize 60 preachers and cannoneers, and in 1602 claims for 120 dead pays for 40 preachers and cannoneers.⁽⁵⁾ Whether many preachers were actually employed is doubtful. Not one was listed on the payroll in Munster in January 1600.⁽⁶⁾

The cavalryman needed higher pay than the infantryman to maintain his position. Not only had he to feed his horse but also a horseboy who normally accompanied him on a native hackney. Irish horseboys

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1. PRO.SP.63/207/pt.i/no.76 "Certein pointes necessarie for the armie in Ireland" Mountjoy to the privy council, January 1600.
 2. APC., xxx, 415
 3. PRO.SP.63/208/pt.ii/no.84 in a Memorandum concerning the new coinage, May 20 1601.
 4. In Buckhurst's proposals for reform these positions were to be filled by the gentlemen volunteers who were to be paid a shilling a day with no benefit to the captain - PRO.SP.63/207/pt.i/no.7 "Consideration touching Ireland causes" 43 points in the handwriting of Thomas, Lord Buckhurst, January 1600.
 5. PRO.SP.63/209/62 a, b, certificates of July/August 1601; ibid., 209/197 a, b, certificates of October/November 1601; ibid., 212/18 certificates of August 1602
 6. PRO.SP.63/207/pt.i/no.8, William Jones, Commissary for Munster to the privy council, 6 January 1600 from Youghal.

foraged for their masters, cleaned their arms and armour, and in these duties became the scourge of their own countrymen.⁽¹⁾ In 1590 a horseman's pay at 6 $\frac{3}{4}$ d a day was clearly inadequate. Sir William Fitzwilliam, lord deputy in 1591, set out the problem to Lord Burghley:

"No horseman is fed a meal under 3d sterling which taken out of his 6 $\frac{3}{4}$ sterling - being 9d Irish - by the day, there remaineth but $\frac{3}{4}$ sterling, or a penny Irish to feed his horseboy, his horse, and to furnish him of weapon and apparel, with armour ..."⁽²⁾

Sir George Carew, master of ordnance from 1590 to 1596, was also much concerned in seeking an increase in pay for cavalrymen; he made representations to the treasurer-at-war, Sir Henry Wallop, to Fitzwilliam, to the Dublin administration, and, when visiting the court, to the queen, but all to no effect.⁽³⁾ When reporting his interview with the queen to the lord deputy Fitzwilliam, Carew said that "she replied as she pleased, but nothing was concluded".⁽⁴⁾ However, in 1598 the horseman's pay was increased to 18d Irish a day for one year, double what it had been in the early 1590s.⁽⁵⁾ In Essex's army in 1599 there were three rates of pay: 800 horsemen were paid 12d a day, 200 more 15d, and 300 at 18d a day.⁽⁶⁾

Numerous lists of "establishment of the army" and "charges of the army" in the Irish state papers, in Moryson's Itinerary and the Carew papers indicate the various wages paid to soldiers between

1. C.Falls, Elizabeth's Irish Wars (1950), 37, 41
2. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 55, Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 18 June 1591
3. Ibid., pp.18, 19, 41, 53, 54
4. Ibid., p.58, Carew to Fitzwilliam, 18 July 1591
5. PRO.SP.63/202/pt.iii/no.144
6. Table 1.

Table 1

The Pay of the Earl of Essex's Irish Army, 1599

<u>Officers:</u> The Lord Lieutenant of the Army.....	£10 per diem	
Lieutenant of the Army	£ 3 " "	
General of the horse	£ 2	
Marshal of the Camp	£ 1.10s "	
Sergeant Major of the Army	£ 1	
Lieutenant of the Horse	£ 1	
Quartermaster	£ 1	
Judge martial	£ 1	
Auditor General		13.4d
Comptroller general of the victuals ...		10s.
Lieutenant of the ordnance		10s.
Surveyor of the ordnance		11.8d.
Clerks of the munitions (2) at 5s a day		10s.
Four corporals of the field at		6s8d each
Four commissaries of victuals three at		6s
One commissary of victuals at		8s
Carriage Master		6s8d
Twenty Colonels		10s. each
<u>Total for the officers for a year</u>	<u>£13,127-16-8d</u>	
<u>Horse:</u> The pay of 1,300 h. divided into 26 bands:		
Captains of Horse		4s. a day
Lieutenant of h.		2s.6d.
Cornets		2s.
300 horsemen at 18d a day		
200 " " 15d		
800 " " 12d		
<u>Total for the horsebands</u>	<u>£31,408-5-0 p. annum</u>	
<u>Foot:</u> The pay of 16,000 footmen divided into 160 bands:		
Captains of each band		4s. a day
Lieutenants		2s.
Two sergeants, a drummer and a surgeon		12d
Ensign		18d
94 infantrymen and six dead pays in each		8d
<u>Total for the foot-bands</u>	<u>£228,246-13-4d p. annum</u>	
<u>Extraordinaries: £6,000 a year</u> to be allowed by concordatum		
For Spies, Guides, Messengers, hiring of Barkes, keeping of Prisoners, carriage of treasure, victuals and munitions, Buildings, repairs and rewards for services and necessaries for the Clerks.		
<u>Sum total:</u>	<u>£277,782-15s</u>	(1)

1. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, II, pp.222-224. The editor of the Cal.Carew MSS., iii, pp.288-289 gives a similar establishment but wrote £5,000 a year for extraordinaries. In calculating totals the exchequer used a set of tables as a ready-reckoner with divisions of the week into six days, the month into three weeks and the year into thirteen months for companies of soldiers from 100 to 5,000; PRO.SP.12/250/41, 42 examples of these for the year 1594.

1598 and 1602 and show beyond doubt that the pay of the forces was the most expensive item in the war. The point can be made by just one example, the pay of Essex's forces in 1599 (See Table 1).

The wages in Table 1 were those for the field army of the Earl of Essex, and did not include the pay of non-combatant administrators. The treasurer-at-war's fee was, for example, 35s. a day, and that of the muster-master general 11s.6d. a day. The President of Munster was designated an annual salary of £133.6s.8d. and additional sums of £10 a week for his diet, 30s.6½d. a day for his guard of horse and foot, and 14s. a day for his provost marshal. The chief justice in the President's Munster Council earned a fee of £100 a year, the second justice £66.13.4d., an attorney of the Council a fee of £13.6.8d., and finally the Clerk of the Council an annual fee of £20. The total for the President and Council of Munster came to £1,657.13.9½d. a year.⁽¹⁾ Connaught did not have a President and Council but a governor; his annual salary was £100, and the payments to his establishment of justices, provost marshal and clerk amounted to an annual total of £909.12.6d. Leinster or that part of its province lying outside the Pale had a much lesser establishment to pay than either the provinces of Munster or Connaught, but its annual wages came to £301.17.8½d.

There was no establishment for the province of Ulster which remained unsubdued in 1599, but provision for the garrisons on its borders at Dundalk, Drogheda, Newry, Carrickfergus and minor forts in Cavan, and for the then projected Lough Foyle garrisons was thought to amount to £1,277.10s. For the warders of forts and garrisons throughout Ireland, Fynes Moryson calculated a wage bill for the year

1. Fynes Moryson Itinerary II, pp. 222-228

1599 at £3,031.0.7½d. And for commissaries, pensioners and almsmen, not mentioned in the sums above or Table 1, fees and pensions were thought to absorb about £2,385.8.5½d. Fynes Moryson reckoned the yearly charge in all at £299,111.3.7d. whereby, he said, "the heavy burthen of this yeeres warre in Ireland will appeare".⁽¹⁾ Yet such sums were still insufficient. Delays in the arrival of treasure brought real want to the common soldier; in January 1600 the Irish administration told the privy council of how they borrowed over £6,000 and issued half-pay and half-victuals to eke out their resources.⁽²⁾

No officer, not even the high ranking president of Munster, had authority to issue warrants to pay for extraordinary expenses until the privy council's pleasure was known.⁽³⁾ The lord deputy assessed in advance the expenses he was likely to incur under the heading of "extraordinaries", which normally included such items as the cost of carriage for munitions, sea transport charges, the building of bridges and boats, the repair of forts, and rewards to spies, messengers and guides. In Table 1 we saw that the Earl of Essex was allowed £6,000 a year for such services. The government in London tried to keep such expenses down. In November 1599 Sir Robert Cecil scrutinized a list of extraordinary charges from Dublin and advised the Lord Treasurer: "I pray your Lordship do but cast your eye upon them, for I will pick good matter to stop many wild demands". Against the item "Governor of Atherdee, Governor of Killmallock" he wrote, "A needless office"; against "for works and reparations done upon Her Majesty's house of Kilmainham, £153-6-8", he wrote, "A house of pleasure without Dublin, and therefore a

1. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, II, p.229

2. CSPI, (1599-1600), 386

3. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 115-116, Dudley Norton to Cecil, 24 March 1599

superfluous charge".⁽¹⁾ In contrast commanders in the field wanted expenses increased in 1601; Mountjoy told the privy council that £6,000 was totally inadequate for extraordinaries when, for example, the repairs in one year to three forts alone at Philipstown, Athlone, and Maryborough had cost £900.⁽²⁾ But there is no indication that the privy council allowed Mountjoy any increase on the £6,000 formerly given his predecessor for extraordinary expenses.

Queen Elizabeth and her privy council frequently complained of the vast financial burden of the Irish war. Sir Robert Cecil claimed that the queen would "feeble but small sence of victory" considering that during four years, 1598-1602, Ireland cost £300,000 a year.⁽³⁾ The Dublin muster officials reckoned that for the half year ending the 30th September 1602 army charges came to £148,276-8-2 $\frac{3}{4}$ of which £113,349-3-6 $\frac{3}{4}$ was paid out in wages, and the remainder in clothing costs, but that set against these outgoings the queen saved £15,000 by the checks on "lendings" and on "apparell".⁽⁴⁾ For the whole period of the war the identifiable costs of maintaining the army in Ireland amounted to £1,845,696.⁽⁵⁾ By comparison the army maintained in Brittany from 1591 on a smaller scale and for a shorter period cost the English treasury, £199,775-18-1 $\frac{1}{2}$.⁽⁶⁾

Early hopes that the war in Ireland would pay for itself and that, once subdued, Ireland would yield a profit to the English Crown proved illusory. The establishment and maintenance of garrisons, and the support of a mobile field army under the lord deputy, expensive

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1. PRO.SP.63/206/16 - A book of concordatums ... Novembris 1599
 2. PRO.SP.63/209/53 - Mountjoy to the p.c., 3 September 1601
 3. J.Maclean (edited) The Letters of Sir Robert Cecil (Camden Society), vol. 88, (1864), 147-148
 4. PRO.SP.63/212/37, September 30th 1602
 5. B.L., Lansd.MS 156, ff.253-258
 6. CSPD., (1595-1597), 8

in themselves, were made more so by corruption in every aspect of military administration. In the final months of the war and just before her death Queen Elizabeth is supposed to have said to her Court:

I find that I sent wolves not shepherds to govern Ireland for they have left me nothing but ashes and carcasses to reign over. (1)

And Mountjoy claimed in March 1601 that he could conduct a more effective war with 12,000 well fed and paid men than "with sixteen thousand in pay as now they are". (2)

We have seen some evidence of how fraudulent officers increased the costs of war and the misery of their soldiers; further evidence of this may now be seen in the provisioning and apparelling arrangements of the armed forces in Ireland.

(ii) Provisioning the soldiers

Providing sufficient victuals for the steadily growing number of troops in Ireland in 1590s proved a severe test of efficiency for the Elizabethan government and the victualling commissariat. The private soldier bought his food out of his daily wage of 8d., but the government and the victualling commissaries were the agents responsible for buying, distributing and delivering bulk purchases of foodstuffs for garrison and camp. Many plans or projects to feed the army from Irish resources came to nothing with the result that the soldiery had to be fed from England by means of victualling contracts made with merchants. Whenever supplies failed or distribution broke down the soldiers lived off the countryside.

1. F.Chamberlain, The Sayings of Queen Elizabeth (1923), 308

2. PRO.SP.63/208/pt.i/no.122

Attempts to victual remote garrisons cut off from Dublin by the Irish enemy occasioned some of the bitterest fighting of the war. The sieges of Enniskillen in 1594, of the Blackwater fort in 1595, or Armagh in 1598 and of Maryborough fort in 1599 all began after efforts to bring in supplies to those garrisons.⁽¹⁾ The garrison at Castlemaine, near Cork, was in straightened circumstances in October 1599 because the Irish would not allow the troops there to be victualled according to one commissary's report to the Earl of Essex.⁽²⁾

The staple diet of the Elizabethan soldier in Ireland was made up of loaf bread, biscuit, butter, cheese, peas or beans, oatmeal and beer, supplemented by rations of salted beef, dried cod, ling or herring. A typical food allowance for the soldier in 1598 consisted of a pound of bread and a pound of biscuit a day, half a pound of butter for three days, a pound of cheese for three days, and two pounds of salted beef, or eight herrings, or one large Holland ling shared between four men one day a week. Failing ling one large "Newland fish" or one and a half small Newland fish each was supplied each day.⁽³⁾ Robert Ardern, a commissary for victuals in Munster, outlined a soldier's victuals for the week in 1599:

1 lb. biscuit or $1\frac{1}{2}$ lb. loaf of bread each day of the week On Sunday, 2 lbs salt or $2\frac{1}{2}$ lbs salt or $2\frac{1}{2}$ lbs fresh beef. Monday, 1 lb. Holland cheese. Tuesday $\frac{1}{2}$ lb of butter. Wednesday 1 quart of great oatmeal called cleas. Thursday 1 lb. of English cheese. Friday the third part of a large dried cod. Saturday $\frac{1}{2}$ lb of butter.
Memo The like proportion shall be served every second week; only in lieu of the 2 lbs of beef on Sunday, 1 lb of bacon or 1 lb of salt pork is to be delivered with one pint of pease (4)

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1. PRO.SP.63/203/77, Captain Thomas Reade to Cecil, 14 March 1599
 2. PRO.SP.63/205/f.205, commissary for victuals to Essex, 12 October 1599.
 3. PRO.SP.63/205/no.26, April 16, 1599 - "the allowance of victual for everie soldier servinge in the realme of Ireland".
 4. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 350

Bread, biscuit and cheese needed no cooking and were the obvious rations on long marches. Victuallers provided fish if they had no beef, but fish did not travel well and was not therefore a popular substitute. In May 1599, when writing to the privy council requesting further supplies of victuals, the Earl of Essex specifically excluded fish on the grounds that "it neither keepeth well, nor pleaseth the soldier, who by such victuals hath so much to provoke his thirst and no provision to quench it".⁽¹⁾ In contrast, in one of his many lists of requirements sent to the privy council, Sir Henry Docwra from Lough Foyle asked especially for "Newland fish" though his men were seated in the best fishing waters in Europe, and were well furnished with fishing equipment.⁽²⁾ Docwra was well aware of this for his five page description of Lough Foyle, a valuable account of the area's topography and wild life, particularly stressed the wealth of fish:

"... the mouth of the Lough is good fishing for cod, Culmore good for herring from August to September ... all along the Liffer excellently good for salmon from June to the end of August and all winter long the area is stored with the greatest plenty of fowl that I think any part of Christendom yeilds ... " ⁽³⁾

The privy council made their irritation plain to Docwra for asking for "Newland fish" to be imported; to them his letters must have read more like a sportsman's guide than the observations of a military commander. The council's practical response was to order fish and especially salmon nets from the London merchants, Jolles and Cockayne, to be sent to Docwra at Lough Foyle.⁽⁴⁾ Yet Newfoundland fish

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1. PRO.SP.63/205/no.54, Essex to the privy council, 9 May 1599
 2. APC., xxx, 11, 12 - items fro L.Foyle "netts for fyshing of sondry sortes".
 3. PRO.SP.63/207/pt.vi/no.84, i, ii, iii and 85. A description of L.Foyle enclosing three sketch maps of Derry, Lifford and Dunalong - ibid., 84, i, ii, iii. See chapter eleven below
 4. APC., xxxi, 348

continued to be brought to Lough Foyle. Ironically in 1601 when a large consignment of it came in to his garrisons Docwra reported that his men refused to eat it, and that in order to avoid waste he would send it to Sir Arthur Chichester's men at Carrickfergus.⁽¹⁾

Among proposals to keep down the charge of victualling the army in Ireland, Nicholas Weston, the mayor of Dublin in 1598, suggested that the citizens of Dublin could feed 1,000 soldiers for the forty days of Lent with "good Newfoundland fish ... delivered at their garrison places northward fronted upon the sea." Despite the need to feed over 16,000 men in Ireland at that time the privy council did not appear to have embraced the suggestion with any enthusiasm.⁽²⁾

A more common device for feeding the army from the land was for the field army, or for garrisons out on incursions, to plunder cattle from the Irish. Mountjoy, writing in 1600 of an incursion into the Wicklow Mountains against the O'Byrnes, described how he had "spoiled and ransacked, swept away most part of their cattle and goods, burnt all their corn, and almost all of their houses".⁽³⁾ Docwra never failed to mention in his letters whenever his men took in spoils of cattle.⁽⁴⁾ Much of the wealth of the native sixteenth century Irish lay in their herds and such plunder necessarily embittered the warfare. Far from condemning the practice the privy council condoned spoliation; in their instructions for setting up the garrison at Lough Foyle the privy councillors advised Sir Henry Docwra:

Yf anie prey of cattell or victuals be taken
 from the enemy wee doubt not but you will see
 the same so ordered and expended for the use of
 the souldyers as the victuals provided by Her
 Majestie maie be the more spared and stretched
 out to serve the armye for a longer season ... (5)

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1. CSPI., (1600-1601), 209-215, Docwra to the P.C., 9 March 1601
 His 10½ page letter is fully transcribed by the editor of the calendar.
 2. PRO.SP.63/202/pt.iii/no.123, Weston to the p.c. 22 October 1598.
 3. CSPI., (1600-1601), 178
 4. In 30 of Docwra's letters to the p.c. and to Cecil from 1600 to 1602 preys of cattle, sheep and horses taken from the Irish are mentioned in about half of them: CSPI., (1600-1603), passim;
APC., xxx, xxxi and in HMC., Salisbury, ix passim.
 5. APC., xxx, 103 "Instructions as to the Plantation at Lough Foyle"

In most reports of engagements with the Irish enemy the taking of cattle is often mentioned. When the private enemies of the Earl of Essex wanted to denigrate his Irish campaign they called his battles little more than cattle raids. It seems likely that the government counted on this occasional meat supply. After the victory of Kinsale the government reduced the soldiers' meat allowance of 2 lb a week to $1\frac{1}{2}$ lb, but because of rising prices wanted the soldiers to pay the same rate as if they had been issued 2 lb of meat. The captains and their soldiers regarded the new measure as nothing more than yet another abuse on the part of the victuallers. Mountjoy wrote two sharp letters to the privy council on 8 and 24 of March 1601 stating that unless the former rates and allowances were re-inforced he could not prevent "a generall mutiny of the Army, in regard the soldiers are weak, and much enfeebled by the late siege of Kinsale".⁽¹⁾

In the last decade of the century prices of all kinds of commodities were rising as has been shown by E.H.Phelps Brown and S.Hopkins, and that at a time when the soldiers' wages were static.⁽²⁾ The government noted in a comparative list how "sea victuals", that is those sent to the army, had risen in price from the year 1585 to 1595, wheat from 20 shillings to 40 shillings a quarter; beef from 12s.6d. a cwt. to 20s., ling from £3 a cwt. to £5.5s., butter from 40s. a barrel to £4, cheese from 28s. per wey to 55s., malt from 15s. to 26s. and beer from 24s. a tun to 36s.⁽³⁾ A typical set of costs of the soldier's daily ration was reckoned at $1\frac{1}{2}$ d. for bread

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1. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, iii, 124, 142, Mountjoy to the p.c.
 2. E.H.Phelps Brown & S.Hopkins, 'Seven centuries of the Prices of Consumables compared with Builders' Wage-rates' in Economica no.92 (November 1956), n.s., xxiii, pp.296-314, see fig.1, p.299.
 3. CSPD., (1595-1597), 101.

or biscuit, $\frac{3}{4}$ d. for three ounces of butter, 1d. for six ounces of cheese, $\frac{3}{4}$ d. for three-quarters of a pint of oatmeal. Delivery charges were calculated at $\frac{1}{2}$ d. for each soldier, so that the cost of a single day's basic ration was $4\frac{1}{2}$ d., without meat or fish, over half a soldier's daily wage.⁽¹⁾ Captain Dawtrey in reporting to the privy council gave some prices of other foodstuffs in the army in the year 1598. Fresh beef was then 1d. a lb., salt beef $1\frac{1}{4}$ d. a lb., bacon 3d. a lb., herrings eight for $2\frac{1}{4}$ d., peas 1d. a quart and beer "very good and strong" 4d. for three quarts.⁽²⁾

Beer was essential to the soldier's diet and health for if he drank water he could easily fall victim to disease if he could not distinguish spring water from surface water. The soldier's drink allowance drawn up by the privy council was, in theory, a generous one; half a pint of sack a day, a quart of beer and quarter of a pint of whisky or aqua vitae every second day.⁽³⁾ A popular medicinal drink among the garrisons at Lough Foyle was a mixture of sack, liquorice and crushed aniseed balls, ingredients listed among the many items required by Sir Henry Docwra for his soldiers.⁽⁴⁾ Fynes Moryson, who had a keen eye for eating, drinking and social habits, noted that the Irish "have no beer made of malt and hops, nor yet any ale" but that they drank milk, beef-broth, and when in towns, Spanish wine, which they called "The King of Spain's Daughter" and "usequebah or uisghbeagh" that is to say whisky or aqua vitae. Beer had to be imported along with other victuals.⁽⁵⁾ In contrast the Irish brand of whisky appears to have been more popular with the

1. APC., xxix, 272.

2. PRO.SP.63/202/pt.ii/no.53, Dawtrey to the p.c., 31 May 1598

3. APC., xxix, 70

4. APC., xxx, 11.

5. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, iv, 200

soldiery than the imported English, whenever they could afford to buy it.⁽¹⁾ Presents of Irish whiskey or the promise of "usequebahs" are mentioned by captains in writing to their friends in England.⁽²⁾

Inevitably abuse crept into the sale of the soldier's drink. Beer, for example, was delivered to Sir Henry Docwra's men in Derry at the contract price of £6 the tun and allegedly sold to the soldiers at £16 the tun. Another rumour said that the Derry captains converted the beer to their own use "whereby the soldiers were enforced to drink water". There appears to have been no brewhouses at Derry, and there is no mention of malt merchants delivering the raw materials for beer-making at Lough Foyle.⁽³⁾ One muster master, Humphrey Covert, tried to eliminate the extortion in the sale of beer at Lough Foyle by having it first sold to the garrisons' victuallers rather than to the captains. Covert then persuaded the commander, Docwra to order his captains to pay their men 1d a day drinking money. Beer was then bought from the victuallers at 2d the quart. This arrangement gave the soldier the chance of at least a pint of beer a day, but was a far cry from the ideal drink allowance prescribed by the privy council.⁽⁴⁾

Once again the gap between theory and practice was obvious; the fact that a system of provisioning had evolved by 1600 was no guarantee that it would work efficiently. Plenty of food and drink appears to have been supplied by the system of contracts, as is evident in the payments to the merchants by warrants from the exchequer. The Irish council noted in July 1602 the overall sum

1. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 8, 77, 79, 175

2. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 232, 243, 313, 434 mentions of presents of Irish whiskey sent to Edward Reynolds, the Earl of Essex's secretary and agent at court.

3. CSPI., (1600-1601), 112, 113 answers to questions raised in privy council concerning the government of Lough Foyle under Sir Henry Docwra, unsigned, but dated December 1600.

4. Ibid., 113.

of £31,954-3-4 which was to be paid to merchants contracting to provide food and drink for the soldiers for periods of three to six months in all parts of Ireland.⁽¹⁾ There was also a well defined commissariat for the delivery and distribution of food in each province where stores or magazines had been set up in the chief towns. But problems, difficulties and complaints multiplied in the last years of the war about feeding the army.⁽²⁾ The difficulties of transporting food by sea and the problems inherent in keeping food wholesome in a damp climate led to allegations of waste in the victuals sent out of England. One of the chief reasons for the appointments of muster masters to garrisons from 1599 was the prevention of waste in the stores.⁽³⁾

The government made sufficient and generous contracts with the merchants to supply the army and was very concerned about waste, and irritated beyond measure when reports came in to it from the Irish administration in Dublin, and from individual commanders, of a state of near starvation among the soldiery.⁽⁴⁾ Mutual recriminations followed: Sir George Cary, treasurer at war, blamed the merchants for sending corrupt victuals and claiming that they made unreasonable gains;⁽⁵⁾ the merchants blamed the captains for preventing them carrying out the proper tasks of the victuallers;⁽⁶⁾ the captains blamed the government for lack of and arrears of pay, and finally the government put the blame for the poor state of the army on to the Dublin administration especially in the winter months of 1598/99.⁽⁷⁾

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1. APC., xxx, 194, example of a warrant to pay John Wood, merchant, £2,417-3-9, and ibid., 724, payments of £10,000 to William Cockayne and John Jolles merchants supplying the army in Ireland.
 2. PRO.SP.63/211/93, July 24, 1602.
 3. PRO.SP.63/208/pt.ii/no.38, Humphrey Covert, muster master at Lough Foyle to the p.c., 22 April 1601 reporting measures taken to prevent waste of food and clothing in the garrisons.
 4. CSPI., (1598-1599), 59, 165, 334, 340: Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 354, 355; and iv, 427, 429 in which the misery of the soldiers is stressed.
 5. CSPI., (1599-1600), 26, 278, 350
 6. Ibid., pp.35, 36
 7. Ibid., p.276

Two of the more important London merchants at the heart of the controversy, John Jolles and William Cockayne who had gained large contracts to feed the army in 1599 were anxious to clear their reputations from allegations of negligence and fraud made against them by George Beverley, the chief comptroller of army victuals, to both the Irish Council and the Privy Council. Jolles pointed out on 29th July 1599 to Lord Buckhurst, the Lord Treasurer in England, that Beverley in Dublin could have no idea of what proportions, or of what provisions had arrived in Cork, Galway, Newry, Carrickfergus or in any port other than Dublin for delivery to the various commissaries of victuals, or about their condition and quality, and that therefore the allegations made against him and his staff of servants and factors were nothing but lies. From his own exact knowledge of what had been delivered to the commissaries in three provinces of Ireland "there is yet no want but good store of victuals ... and enough to supply all wants that can justly be demanded". Jolles went on to argue that his efforts were being undermined by the treasurer-at-war, Sir George Cary, who was furnishing certain captains with money to distribute to the soldiers so that they could buy food elsewhere than from the army stores or magazines with the result that the commodities he had had delivered were inevitably decaying.⁽¹⁾ On a previous occasion in May 1599 Jolles had sent in a series of complaints to the privy council of how his staff of servants and under officials were beaten up by captains and other officers when they demanded bills from them for the delivery of goods.⁽²⁾

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1. PRO.SP.63/205/119, Jolles to Buckhurst, 29 July 1599
 2. CSPI., (April 1599-February 1600), 35, 36 and 45

A major problem encountered in victualling the soldiers was the simple fact of delays suffered by the victualling ships from England because of the prevalence of westerly winds in an age of sail. Captain Kingsmill at Mallow near Cork, one of many who wrote much to Sir Robert Cecil from Ireland, said "whatsoever is employed for the service here comes not directly from Bristol but must have six winds to blow before we can receive it".⁽¹⁾ Few foodstuffs could be preserved for any length of time so that the poor state of much food on arrival aroused a string of complaints from the soldiers and the Irish Council. One letter of complaint on 2 June 1599 said that in the four victualling ships then arrived in Dublin harbour all the cheese had perished.⁽²⁾ Colonel Egerton from Carrickfergus pointed out that the soldiers there had had no delivery of victuals from May to October.⁽³⁾ Sir Samuel Bagenal saw some of the soldiers of the Newry garrison "fall dead in marching with very poverty and want of victuals."⁽⁴⁾ The Irish council said it grieved them to see the poor state of the soldiers, "like prisoners half-starved for want of cherishing", and because they feared mutiny they borrowed £4,000 on bonds, lent their own money, and put their plate to pawn.⁽⁵⁾

Yet the treasurer-at-war, Sir George Cary, continued to complain that victuallers were gaining by selling corrupt food to the army.⁽⁶⁾ In November 1599 the privy council wrote to the Irish council to institute a full inquiry, to have them appoint an officer with every commissary of victuals in the ports and towns to be

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1. PRO.SP.63/205/148, Kingsmill to Cecil, 22 August 1599
 2. PRO.SP.63/205/75, Irish council to the privy council, 2 June 1599
 3. CSPI., (1598 - March 1599), preface, lxix
 4. CSPI., (1598 - March 1599), 476
 5. Ibid., p.357
 6. CSPI., (April 1599 - February 1600), 278, 350

present at the view of victuals to find out where the faults lay, and to have Robert Newcomen, then chief comptroller of victuals, sent to England "with all his books and reckonings".⁽¹⁾ Subsequent reports revealed abuses on the part of the providing merchants, the bad state of some victuals on arrival in Ireland, the neglect of government stores of victuals in some garrisons, abuses practiced by some captains through their company clerks in selling the soldiers short rations,⁽²⁾ the obtuseness of victuallers in not declaring proper rates for the issue of victuals,⁽³⁾ and the extraordinary revelation that some captains conveyed away provisions out of Ireland and had them sold at La Rochelle.⁽⁴⁾ One Captain John Baynard who wrote to the Queen in December 1599 listing twelve abuses in the army, indicated that the soldier would rather have 2s in money than 5s worth of the victuals that came out of England.⁽⁵⁾ William Jones, the commissary for musters in Munster, made the same point to Sir Robert Cecil,⁽⁶⁾ as did the Irish council to the privy council on the 10th December 1599.⁽⁷⁾

The Queen and council appear to have done everything possible to ensure that the army was fed; victualling contracts were made for all levies going to Ireland,⁽⁸⁾ and in Ireland the victualling commissariat was organized in each province and centred on the government's stores in towns and garrisons. But all the time they had to struggle against widespread dishonesty and the westerly winds which made the passage to Ireland difficult and often disastrous to the cargoes in the victualling ships. The judgment of Sir John Fortescue,

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1. CSPI., (April 1599 - February 1600) 276
 2. AFC., xxxi, 122, 123, 124, 125
 3. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 116, 316
 4. CSPI., (1598 - March 1599) 462, report endorsed by Cecil "Captains that steal from Ireland"
 5. PRO.SP.63/206/116 "The opinion and advice of Captain John Baynard, December 1599"
 6. CSBI., (April 1599 - February 1600), 484, Jones to Cecil, 17 February, 1600
 7. Ibid., pp.310-312
 8. J.W.Fortescue, A History of the British Army, i (1899), 146.

the historian of the British army, that no sovereign of England neglected the soldiers "more wantonly, wilfully, and scandalously than Elizabeth" is not borne out by a comprehensive study of the privy council's records.⁽¹⁾ The huge contracts for food supplies seen in the warrants for payments to merchants, and the near state of starvation of so many soldiers are difficult to reconcile if the practical difficulties in getting the food to the soldiers and the ubiquitous practice of fraud are ignored. It was no fault of the government that some of the years of greatest military activity in Ireland from 1596 to 1601 coincided with years of exceptional dearth of grain in England following bad harvests. W.G.Hoskins shows that 1596 was a disaster, with an average price of 83 per cent above the norm for grain, and that there was panic legislation with widespread near-starvation and a real threat of rebellion in many parts in 1597 and 1598.⁽²⁾ Though the government tried to cover up some of the reasons for price increases by blaming private traders in grain its very exports to Ireland increased dearth at home. By the end of the century the government's need to supply grain to the Irish military effort seemed to have become a priority overriding the need to stabilize food prices in England. Riots broke out over corn prices in Sussex in March and April 1597, in Oxfordshire the riots were serious and there were widespread disturbances in Norfolk; most depositions make it clear that hunger was the chief cause.⁽³⁾

Despite all the government's efforts the army in Ireland from 1598 to 1599 was not well victualled: The evidence of the Irish state papers of a hungry and discontented army is strong, as is the

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1. CSPI., (1599-1600), 45, 68, 107, 300, 347, 379, 393, 469, examples.
 2. W.G.Hoskins, 'Harvest fluctuations and English economic history, 1480-1619' in Agricultural History Review, (1964), xii, pp.28-46, see Fig. II, p.39
 3. CSPI., (1595-1597), 316-320, 342-345, 401; APC., xxvii, 55, 56

cause, profiteering and corruption. It was said of Sir Thomas North's company in December 1596 that they were "miserable, unfurnished, naked, and a hunger-starven band", and that many of his soldiers died wretchedly at Dublin "some whose feet and legs rotted off for want of shoes".⁽¹⁾ The Dublin council reported to the privy council in January 1598 that the "lamentable state of the army doth not a little grieve us".⁽²⁾ Captain Atherton wrote to the Earl of Ormond from Carrickfergus in January 1598 of the great lack of victuals in the garrison.⁽³⁾ The privy council was told in February 1598 that

"such is the universal scarcity here of all kinds of victuals, as, in many parts of Leinster and the English Pale, the common people are already driven to eat horseflesh";
(4)

Sir Geoffrey Fenton spoke of a nation "already entered into famine".⁽⁵⁾

In Newry the garrison mutined for lack of food in February 1598, and when a paymaster James Carroll was sent to them from Dublin the soldiers would have torn him to pieces but the the intervention of their officers.⁽⁶⁾ Fynes Moryson wrote that the common English soldiers in 1599, "by poverty of the warre ... by the late defeates, by looseness of body, the natural sicknesses of the Country were altogether out of heart".⁽⁷⁾

(iii) The soldier's clothing

In Part 1 we saw how the shire levies were provided with clothing, either in the county of origin, or more often when the

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1. CSPI., (1596-1597), 194-195
 2. CSPI., (1598-1599), 2.
 3. Ibid., p.11, Atherton to Ormond, 5 January 1598
 4. Ibid., p.62, Dublin council to the p.c., 27 February 1598.
 5. Ibid., p.68, Fenton to Cecil, 28 February 1598
 6. Ibid., p.59, Richard Wackely to Sir Ralph Lane, 19 February 1598
 7. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, II, 273

soldiers were on the point of embarkation. There was no such thing as a national uniform in the sixteenth century, though soldiers from the same shire would, as a rule, be fitted out in much the same way. Infantrymen were frequently dressed in motley or russet, a practice in which the military historian, Sir Charles Oman, saw an early instance of "adaptation to environment" or camouflage^e since Ireland, like England, was then much afforested.⁽¹⁾ On occasion the cavalry were issued with red cloaks in the classical tradition. One of the earliest mentions of "red coats" is the description by Philip O'Sullivan Beare of an English force arriving in Munster, 1582, during the Desmond rebellion.⁽²⁾ A preference for red coats or cassocks began to appear during the O'Neill war; English soldiers under the Marshal Sir Henry Bagenal were surprised to find themselves confronted by Irish troops in red coats "like English soldiers". The explanation lay in O'Neill's loyal period when he had been given six English captains to train six companies for the queen's forces, and no doubt the red coats which surprised Bagenal's men at Clontibret in 1595 had belonged to that loyal period.⁽³⁾ In 1599 when the clergy had to raise cavalry for Ireland Archbishop Whitgift decided that his horsemen should be dressed in tawney or blue, which he said had been the custom. But throughout the war years there was no pressure put on clothing contractors to provide suits of a standard colour.

Sir John Harrington who served under Essex in 1599 left one of the fullest descriptions of a private soldier's clothing and the

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1. Sir Charles Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century (1937), 385
 2. Philip O'Sullivan Beare, Historiae Catholicae Iberniae Compendium (Lisbon, 1621), edited and translated in part by M.J.Byrne, as Ireland under Elizabeth (Dublin, 1903), 27
 3. CSPI., (1592-1596), 322, an early mention of red coats, later known universally as the characteristic English military colour.
 4. Lambeth Palace Library MSS 247, f.118

cost then of the various items: a winter coat of Kentish broadcloth lined with cotton, (17s. 6d.); a canvas doublet with white linen lining (12s. 6d.); a pair of Venetian breeches lined with linen (13s. 4d.); two shirts with bands (8s.); three pairs of ox-hide shoes (7s.); and three pairs of kersey stockings (8s.) During the summer he was issued with two pairs of shoes and a pair of stockings and a hat (3s.)⁽¹⁾ Nicholas Weston, the mayor of Dublin in 1598 described the apparel for an officer and its cost:

"a cassock lined with bays and trimmed with silk lace (18s.6d.) a doublet with silk buttons (12s.); two shirts and two bands (7s. 9d.); three pairs of neat leather shoes, (5s. 3d.); three pairs of kersey stockings at 2s. 2d. the pair; broadcloth Venetians with silk lace (12s. 6d.) ; and a felt hat coloured with a band (4s. 6d.)."

Weston calculated that the winter apparel of an officer could have been made in Dublin for £3. 7s. and his summer wear for 17s. 11d, and the common soldier's winter apparel for £2 13s. 8d and his summer's at 14s. 4d. Weston was of the opinion that much money could be saved in clothing the troops, 19s. on an officer's clothing and 15s. 8d on the common soldier's, if they could be apparelled from the City of Dublin rather than by the London merchants, Babington and Bromley. He reckoned that £780 on every 1,000 soldiers could be thereby "saved to Her Majesty's coffers". But nothing came of his plan which was perhaps an unreliable under-bid to get the trade for Dublin.⁽²⁾

The privy council repeatedly urged the shire authorities to fit out their levies generously with clothes other than coats, but the general tendency was to give the recruits the minimum official

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1. Thomas Park (ed.) Sir John Harington's Nugae Antiquae (1804), i, 17.
 2. PRO.SP.63/202/pt.iii/123, "a plot for furnishing the provant apparel by Nicholas Weston, mayor of Dublin and five others of the inhabitants of the said city for the good of the soldier, and the great relief of the now decayed citizens."

clothing allowed by the institution of 'coat money' of which the counties paid only a quarter and the government the rest. Shire authorities knew that the soldiers would be given further clothes on their arrival in Ireland. Once there as for any army fighting overseas, clothing was issued twice a year, for winter and summer. During the 1590s the supply of suits of apparel was mainly in the control of merchant clothiers under contract to the Crown. The distribution of the suits to soldiers was done by the captain and his company clerk; the common soldier was thus at their mercy for both food and clothes. At every level of providing this clothing abuse and fraud became prevalent, particularly among those captains who were in the army simply to make money. Despite efforts on the part of the government to reform the actual distribution many captains retained control over a lucrative source of additional income.⁽¹⁾ The nature of the evidence is such that it is impossible to say how many captains in Ireland profited on their soldiers' clothing.

Some captains had the welfare of their men at heart and wrote to Sir Robert Cecil about the hardships their soldiers had to suffer in Ireland. Hugh Mostyn, a Flintshireman with twenty-seven years service in Ireland, was typical of the better captains. He wrote from Connaught to say his men were "in a cold country, under a cold climate, where no relief is, but what they carry with them". It was his greatest wish that every shire should send out troops to Ireland with

"one blanket, one rough sheet, four pairs of spare shoes, three pairs of stockings, two spare shirts, and all of which will be bought for 20s of money or thereabout; it would be better for the soldiers to want their blue coats than these necessities."

1. APC., xxix, 238; and, for a typical warrant to pay a clothing merchant, PRO.SP.12/267/43, docquet to pay £2,443 16s. 8d. for winter apparel for ten bands of men, and £627. 6s. 8d. for summer apparel.

He added:

"the country where I was born when they do send me for Ireland, do usually give xxs. each soldier to drink, which is better to be bestowed as aforesaid". (1)

Mostyn's is one among many such letters to Sir Robert Cecil.

Sir Henry Brouncker painted a miserable picture of the state of his forces, blaming the lack of clothing and victuals on Cecil. (2)

William Jones, a Munster commissary, told Cecil in 1600 that the soldiers there were as poor in apparel "as the common beggar in England", and though it was mid-winter they had not yet received their suits, and many had not got the previous summer's clothing allowance. (3)

Sir Arthur Chichester, the commander at Carrickfergus, wrote to Lord Mountjoy on 14th May 1601 about the extremities of his garrison: "we are in as great want of clothes as of money, and of them both more than ever I formerly saw in the Queen's wars".

He pointed to the difficulty in keeping men in discipline saying that it was unreasonable "to inflict punishment where dues are so long withholden". However, he added that "their daily employment, some killing, and a little booty puts them out of minding of these wants many times". (4)

Hugh Tudor, an experienced muster official on Maurice Kyffin's staff before 1598, spoke of the captains "rich in apparel" and of the "nakedness" of many soldiers. (5)

The Irish council also spoke of the "poverty and nakedness" of many troops arriving in Dublin. (6) Even allowing for Elizabethan exaggeration in the word "naked" there is enough evidence to suggest that the common soldier was generally ill-clothed for warfare in Ireland.

Captain Francis Stafford, who went to Chester to conduct a contingent

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1. PRO.SP.63/202/pt.iii/185, Mostyn to Cecil, November 1598
 2. CSPI., (1598 - March 1599), 37-39, Brouncker to Cecil, 22 January 1598.
 3. CSPI., (April 1599 - February 1600), 483-484, Jones to Cecil.
 4. CSPI., (Nov. 1600 - July 1601), 357, Chichester to Mountjoy, 14 May 1601
 5. CSPI., (1598 - March 1599), 209
 6. Ibid., p.357

complained of the Buckinghamshire men as the "worst appavelled" and of the Londoners dressed in "London cassocks made of northern clozth, which by wet doth so much shrink that they will this winter stand them in little stead".⁽¹⁾

The reasons for the poor state of the common soldier's clothes are similar to those which applied to his food. Delays in the deliveries of suits, mal-distribution when they arrived, and frauds perpetrated by the clothiers, commissaries for apparel, and the captains lay at the heart of all the troubles over clothing the troops. From 1598 until the end of the war two London clothing merchants, Uriah Babington and Robert Bromley, won the main contracts with the Crown to provide summer and winter suits. Other merchants, whose trade they had cornered, such as James Quarles and William Holliday, accused them of pocketing vast sums of public money.⁽²⁾ Holliday alleged that Babington and Bromley had defrauded the Crown of £27,000 between 1597 and 1600 by the simple device of supplying only two thirds of the number of suits originally contracted. He also accused them of giving the captains money instead of clothes, 24 shillings for instance, instead of a winter suit, for which the Crown had already paid them 40 shillings. They thus made an unjust profit of 16 shillings on each suit, and there was no guarantee that the captain would spend even the 24 shillings on his soldier's clothes. Holliday reckoned that when these London clothiers had contracted to clothe a thousand men only six hundred received suits, and that the money which should have clothed the remaining four hundred they shared out with the captains.⁽³⁾

Even if Holliday's testimony against Babington and Bromley was biased there is other evidence to show that Babington and Bromley

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1. CSPI., (1598 - March 1599), 286
 2. HMC., Salisbury, vii, 202, 203.
 3. HMC., Salisbury, xi, 535, 536

were not above board in their contracts with the government. The Irish administration claimed in 1598 that the merchants had delivered only 2,500 suits for all the forces in Ireland and that they were forced to share out all available supplies so that every soldier would get something, at a time when the merchants reported they had supplied all the forces for the winter.⁽¹⁾ In May 1599 William Beecher, a wealthy London citizen, and former associate of Babington and Bromley informed on them to Sir Robert Cecil. He claimed they owed him £4,000 and that they had promised him "a third share of the profits of any business they may have from the Queen".⁽²⁾ Cecil took no action on this information probably because Beecher had himself come under severe criticism from the privy council in 1594 because of his under-hand dealings in clothing the troops in the Low Countries.⁽³⁾ Further evidence was offered by John Bryde, an employee of Babington and Bromley, who wrote to the privy council that they had sent him to Bristol to persuade the mayor to certify the shipment of a larger number of suits than had in fact been sent to Ireland, and he went on to say that should he be allowed to examine the merchants' accounts and the port books at London, Bristol and Chester he would be able to prove all his allegations against Babington and Bromley.⁽⁴⁾ In a later law suit of 1616 brought against the heirs and executors of Babington and Bromley counsel for the Crown brought to light that these merchants provided only 6,300 suits of apparel for 12,000 soldiers in the winter of 1599. Nothing had been done about their frauds at the time and their contracts to clothe troops in Ireland were renewed each year until 1606.⁽⁵⁾

1. CSPI., (1598-1599), 464

2. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 178-179, Beecher to Cecil, 23 May 1599

3. CSPD., (1591-1594), 25

4. HMC., Salisbury, xvi, 75-77

5. H.Hall, Society in the Elizabethan Age (2nd edition 1887), 127

It is probable that the privy council knew what was happening to army apparel. It said it was ready to believe that the clothiers were profiteering, and that muster masters, commissaries and captains had their mouths silenced by bribes.⁽¹⁾ Lord Mountjoy was ordered to carry out a full investigation on the supply of apparel to his troops but there is no apparent evidence that he did so.⁽²⁾ In view of the distress caused so many soldiers from a lack of proper apparel, and the fact that the government was aware of the frauds, it is extraordinary that it did not pursue the inquiry. Lord Buckhurst, the lord treasurer, seems to have gone on depending on Babington and Bromley to supply clothes for the army,⁽³⁾ despite the complaints against them. The details of their frauds were only exposed in 1616 when the Crown sued the merchants' executors for the recovery of misappropriated funds; this law suit implicated many from the treasurer at war, Sir George Cary, down to minor officials in the fraud. Perhaps at the time the government was not willing to suspect ^{that} Cary, a trusted servant of the crown and a relative of the Queen, could be part of the fraud.⁽⁴⁾ He sounded sincere enough in the turmoil of Essex's failure in Ireland and the bankruptcy of the Irish administration when he wrote to Cecil:

"I find the perils and hazards such, that I protest unto your honour that I never had a quiet night's rest sithence I first came into this cursed land". (5)

Accounts of the military companies remained unsettled that year and every department of the administration was in confusion; the short supplies of apparel and its poor quality were but symptoms that all was not well with the army or its administration in Ireland.

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1. CSPI., (1599-1600), 442
 2. CSPI., (1599-1600), 442
 3. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 253, Buckhurst to Cecil, 30 July 1599
 4. H.Hall, Society in the Elizabethan Age (2nd edition, 1887), 125-130 outlined the case against Cary as being unprecedented in the history of speculation.
 5. CSPI., (1599-1600), 466

The previous treasurer-at-war, Sir Henry Wallop, had outlined a scheme in July 1597 whereby the soldiers could be clothed in Ireland with garments of Irish make, which he claimed, would be "far better cheape", and more durable than those sent out of England. He suggested Irish frieze coats, and especially the Irish mantle, which kept the soldier dry by day and gave him shelter by night when billets were poor, and Irish linen shirts, would cost less than 30 shillings an outfit.⁽¹⁾ The government was not sympathetic to the idea, and Lord Burgh, lord deputy in 1597, disapproved of Wallop's scheme on the grounds that Irish clothes, though cheaper, would be made by rebels who would then receive "Her Majesty's good coin" to buy arms and munitions to maintain their rebellion.⁽²⁾

The respective merits of the Irish frieze mantle and the English broadcloth cassock were long debated but the privy council did not believe that English soldiers could carry an Irish mantle and still be able to fight. Though sound in itself Wallop's proposal to clothe the soldiers with such mantles had an ulterior motive; had it been agreed to it would have entailed large sums of money being sent to Ireland to make the purchases there, and as treasurer-at-war he was allowed a percentage of monies carried to Ireland by him.⁽³⁾ Lord Burgh made a different suggestion to Lord Burghley in September 1597 of how savings could be made in clothing the soldiers by having the garments made of "coarser and cheaper stuff", or by "suiting the foot [infantry] but once a year in the winter", except for "stockings and shoes which must be oftener furnished". He added: "nothing can be better than to provide the apparel out of England."⁽⁴⁾

1. CSPI., (1596-1597), 359

2. Ibid., pp.381, 383

3. Ibid., p.413

4. Ibid., pp.392, 399

The question of clothing the soldiers in Ireland was raised again in "The Humble Requests of the Captains" in May 1598 which yet again emphasized the superior merits of the Irish frieze mantle.⁽¹⁾ In his marginal notes to these requests Sir Robert Cecil wrote opposite the word "mantle" :

"our difficulty in this article is, that by this means our English shall become in apparell barbarous, which hath hiterto ben avoided".⁽²⁾

Nicholas Weston, mayor of Dublin, counselled the use of clothes made in Ireland to bring work to his citizens.⁽³⁾ Captain John Baynard advised the queen on the adoption of Irish made garments for the troops.⁽⁴⁾ And the Earl of Essex favoured them, claiming his troops would keep their health much longer if English cassocks and shoes were replaced by Irish mantles and brogues.⁽⁵⁾ Under the weight of opinion the government relented in 1600 and gave orders to the clothiers to issue either a mantle or a long broadcloth coat, and also recommended the use of brogues instead of shoes, though it was not stated whether or not these items should be of Irish or of English make.⁽⁶⁾

Some measure of reform was brought into the distribution of suits of apparel by Lord Mountjoy, who in 1600 instructed the clothing merchants, Babington and Bromley, to have apparel shipped to several convenient ports in Ireland and not all to Dublin so that there would be a minimum of delay in distribution to the garrisons.⁽⁷⁾ But the scheme tackled only one of the many problems. Abuses continued mainly because the captains were able to keep final control over the soldier's food and clothing allowances. The reports of

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1. PRO.SP.63/202/pt.ii/38, 18 May 1598
 2. PRO.SP.63/202/pt.iii/55 "Errors to be reformed in Ireland" 1598
 3. PRO.SP.63/202/pt.iii/123, Weston to the p.c., 22 October 1598
 4. PRO.SP.63/206/no.116, "The opinion and advice of Captain John Baynard to the Queen" December 1599
 5. PRO.SP.63/205/no.109, Essex to the p.c., 15 July 1599
 6. CSPI., (1599-1600), 310
 7. PRO.SP.63/207/no.72 "Instructions for the Lord Mountjoy, 1600"

Humphrey Covert and Anthony Reynolds, muster masters at Lough Foyle, for instance, indicate the stranglehold of the Lough Foyle captains over their men's necessities of life.⁽¹⁾ The privy council commented on the fraudulent dealings of the captains:

"we do plainly perceive that divers of the captains there do wholly convert Her Majesty's pay into their own purse."⁽²⁾

Though general criticisms of the captains as a body are very frequently made by both Irish and English administrations it is of interest that not a single captain seems to have been punished for the neglect of his men, nor a single one named for frauds in depriving men of their coats in Ireland.

The weight of evidence, however, suggests that the common soldiers were the victims of their superiors' dishonesty. It is not difficult, with hindsight, to see how frauds were carried out; supplies came out of England at irregular intervals because of the difficulties of the sea passage, arrangements for feeding and clothing the soldiers were not settled into a routine, and the numbers to be fed and clothed were constantly changing. And the trust reposed in the main clothing contractors, Babington and Bromley, seems to have been badly misplaced.⁽³⁾ The government appears to have done all it could to see that the soldiers were properly and sufficiently fed and clothed; the debt left by the queen of £17,864 to her successor "for the apparel of the forces in Ireland" may be viewed as one measure of the Crown's efforts to look after its forces in Ireland in the late 1590s. But, even so it was not enough.⁽⁴⁾

1. PRO, SP.63/208/pt.ii/no.17, report from L.Foyle, 22 April 1601; ibid., 209/no.114, report from the same, 30 September 1601.

2. APC., xxx, 807

3. HMC., Salisbury, viii, 162; ibid., ix, 253

4. For the queen's debts to King James which included £60,000 incurred on the Irish exchange during the debasement of the Irish coinage - B.L.Add.MS., 36, 970, f.17 ff; B.L.Lansd.MS., 151, ff.76-86

CHAPTER ELEVEN

The Elizabethan soldier at war.

A military history of the 1590s in Ireland in general and of Ulster in particular could be written from the state papers Ireland alone; such a history would inevitably emphasize English superiority in arms and their eventual victory gained under the tactical and strategical genius of Lord Mountjoy. The defeated had few contemporary apologists; it was not until the early seventeenth century that Irish accounts of the war appeared in works by Peter Lombard, John Lynch, Philip O'Sullivan Beare and Geoffrey Keating which generally portray the military action as an Irish Catholic war of defence.⁽¹⁾ The eighteenth century historian of Ireland, Dr. Thomas Leland, balked at the task of writing a history of the war, proclaiming that the affairs of Ireland were so fully and exactly recounted by contemporaries that an entire book would be required for the 1590s, "a labour to be imposed neither on the writer nor on the reader".⁽²⁾ Nineteenth century historians, such as Froude, passed judgements in high-toned denunciations of the barbarities perpetrated on both sides, and later nationalistic historians such as John Mitchel and Alice Stopford Green kept the memories of atrocities alive.⁽³⁾ The new history of our age, while not ignoring the evidence of cruelty, aims at an objective understanding of the circumstances and climate of opinion that brought hostilities to a head,⁽⁴⁾ and suggests that contemporaries were concerned about the

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1. For the titles of their works see bibliography under printed sources.
 2. T.Leland, History of Ireland, ii (1773), 328
 3. J.A.Froude, The English in Ireland (1881 edition);
A.Stopford Green, The Making of Ireland and its undoing
 4. T.W.Moody, F.X.Martin & F.J.Byrne (editors) A New History of Ireland: Early Modern Ireland, 1534-1691, iii (Oxford, 1976)

morality of war. Professor D.B.Quinn points to the debate that went on in England about the morality of "harsh or just treatment" of the Irish, a debate similar to that conducted in Spain with regard to the Indians.⁽¹⁾ In Ireland there was some sympathy expressed for the Irish and Old English not in arms against England; Sir William Warren for example, reminded Cecil in 1599 that "the Irish are not such devils as they are thought to be".⁽²⁾

For the most modern historians of sixteenth century Ireland the English victory at Kinsale marks the end of the war and the end of the Gaelic order.⁽³⁾ And yet, the final struggle to end O'Neill's power in Ulster continued for a further fifteen months after Kinsale from December 1601 to March 1603. This brief but important phase in the re-conquest is not much noticed by historians, hence the emphasis of this chapter is on the activities of the Ulster garrisons. The letters from Ulster in this period of Sir Henry Docwra at Derry and Sir Arthur Chichester at Carrickfergus throw new light on the final stages of the war.⁽⁴⁾ It was normal practice for military leaders in the field of action to send messengers with verbal reports to Dublin where many were written up by Sir Geoffrey Fenton, the Irish Secretary of State, and sent to Sir Robert Cecil and ~~the~~ the Privy Council. Written despatches from the field are not common and, those that survive were hastily and

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1. D.B.Quinn, "Ireland and Sixteenth Century Expansion" in Historical Studies, i (1958), 28. "The topic", writes Professor Quinn, "requires much further investigation".
 2. CSPI (1599-1600), 306, Warren to Cecil, 5 December 1599.
 3. N.Canny puts the end of the Gaelic order at 1607 with the celebrated Flight of the Earls, see his "Hugh O'Neill, Earl of Tyrone and the changing face of Gaelic Ulster" in Studia Hibernica, x (1970), 7.
 4. Many of their letters are to be found throughout CSPI between the years 1600 and 1603, and in the Cecil papers, calendared HMC., Salisbury, ix-xii. I have made a tentative collection of Sir Henry Docwra's official correspondence from Ireland.

sketchily composed.⁽¹⁾ The aim of this chapter, however, is not to compete with the standard histories of the war but to examine the fighting conditions of the Elizabethan soldier especially in Ulster, and to show how he was affected by the strategy, tactics and arms and armour used in the conflict.

(i) Strategy and tactics.

The setting up of manned forts or garrisons in and around centres of resistance to be "a bridle upon the Irish",⁽²⁾ ~~and~~ which eventually would become centres of English influence, was a favoured Tudor strategem in the conquest of Ireland. Many of long service in Ireland like Captain Thomas Lee advised that at the initial stage of setting up a garrison "the soldiers must be ready to fight for the ground where they purpose to sett downe and that obtayned they are to expect daylie assaults", and earlier in his treatise Lee remarked: "that they must breake their sleepe who will do good service in Ireland."⁽³⁾

At the beginning of the war there was little trace of earlier English influence in Ulster except in the small widely separated garrisons of Carrickfergus, Olderfleet (now Larne), Carlingford, Newry, Enniskillen, and Monaghan. By the end of the war, however, Mountjoy's captains had hedged Ulster about with a line of manned forts from Derry south along the Foyle to Castlederg; across the south-western borders of Tyrone at Newtownstewart, Omagh, Clogher and Augher and along the river Blackwater at Armagh, Mountjoy and Charlemount. This series of garrisons completed a line of English

1. For example, John Lyle's brief despatch on storming O'Madden's castle sent to Fenton in March 1595 mentions that fuller details will be given him in Dublin "by the bearer John Birmingham, from the defaced castle of Cloghan, in Losmagh, 13th March 1595" PRO.SP.63/187/47, i.

2. CSPI (1599-1600), 164

3. B.L.Add.MS., 33, 743, f.74, and f.97d.

military communication which stretched around Ulster from Derry to Carrickfergus. (See Map 2 of the introduction and Map 3 in this chapter) The English strategy of establishing these military posts on or near the Ulster borders had begun with a garrison at Armagh in 1551.⁽¹⁾ Many of the engagements of the war were fought around the garrisons positioned in the especially hard-won approaches to the O'Neill and O'Donnell lordships from the south east and south west where the Ulstermen utilized the difficult terrain in a long drawn out defensive war. O'Neill was able to prey on English relief forces which escorted supplies and re-inforcements to the garrisons on his borders. The relief of Monaghan, for example, on 27 May 1595 led to a full-scale battle in which O'Neill was victorious at nearby Clontibret.⁽²⁾

Before Mountjoy's arrival in Ireland in February 1600 all military attacks mounted against Ulster from the south proved to be failures, notably those of Lord Burgh and Sir Conyers Clifford in July 1597 and that of Sir Henry Bagenal in August 1598.⁽³⁾ In Mountjoy's plans his most important strategic provision was the establishment of a strong force to O'Neill's rear in Lough Foyle, the deep inlet from the sea into Ulster's northern coast which divided O'Neill's lands from O'Donnells.⁽⁴⁾ The area had long been recognised as the most suitable position from which to attack O'Neill's forces for it cut off aid to him from Scotland, and prevented his linking up with O'Donnell to the west of the Foyle, with O'Dogherty on Innishowen and with O'Cahan or O'Kane in the areas now known as Coleraine. It had the additional advantage that the Foyle could be

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1. G.A.Hayes McCoy, "Strategy and tactics in Irish warfare" in Irish Historical Studies, ii, no.7 (1941), p.
 2. G.A.Hayes McCoy, Irish Battles (1969), 95-103
 3. R.Colles, History of Ulster, ii (n.d.), 54, 55.
 4. CSPI., (1599-1600), 446

reached by sea.

Much practical knowledge of Lough Foyle had been gained from Sir Henry Sidney's expedition against Shane O'Neill in 1566 when a thousand men sailed from Bristol under Colonel Edward Randolph and put in at Derry on the Foyle.⁽¹⁾ For nearly thirty years thereafter the Foyle was much discussed by strategists. In the 1590s the Foyle featured in every plan for the subjugation of O'Neill and his confederates.⁽²⁾ Captain Nicholas Dawtrey proposed in May 1594 that three well placed garrisons at the Foyle, Carrickfergus and Blackwater "inclosing Tirone in a triangle" would finish the war in three years.⁽³⁾ In June and July 1598 active steps were taken to send Sir Samuel Bagenal with a force to Lough Foyle, but he was re-directed to Dublin after the defeat of his brother, Sir Henry Bagenal, at the Yellow Ford in August 1598.⁽⁴⁾ The control of the Foyle was among Essex's plans in 1599 but he did not attempt an Ulster expedition.⁽⁵⁾ His successor, Mountjoy, appointed Sir Henry Docwra for "the most desperate assignment" of installing garrisons along the Foyle, and finally brought to fruition what had for years been talked about.⁽⁶⁾ In chapter seven above we saw how Docwra prepared his expedition at Chester and its embarkation.

Docwra, a Yorkshireman, was an experienced soldier, a veteran campaigner in the Low Countries and Spain, and in Ireland under Sir Richard Bingham and the Earl of Essex, but he had no previous experience in Ulster. He was a prolific writer of long letters to the privy council, to Cecil and to Mountjoy, and, in semi-retirement in 1619, wrote an account of his Irish services known as the Narration.⁽⁷⁾

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1. For the fate of Randolph's expedition see T.Wright, History of Ireland (1848), 413-414.
 2. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 105-108, 196-199; 203 for examples.
 3. CSPI., (1592-1596), 247
 4. See Chapter Three under 1598
 5. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 265, 316
 6. Lambeth Palace Library MS., 621, f.75 "Letters Patent to Sir Henry Docwraye"
 7. Docwra's Narration (short title) edited by J.O'Donovan in Celtic Miscellany (Dublin, 1849)

Docwra and his garrisons at Lough Foyle were equally much written about by the muster masters, Humphrey Covert and Anthony Reynolds sent to the Foyle to report on work and progress. Their criticisms, the accusations of the privy council against Docwra ("we never hear but of new demands and little service")⁽¹⁾ and the allegations of Mountjoy and Cecil of Docwra's inactivity gave him such a bad press that his very real achievement in controlling north-west Ulster has been under-estimated. His captains and men made incursions from their hard won garrison positions into Donegal, Coleraine and north Tyrone; they planted fortified positions at Ballyshannon, Omagh and Dungiven in addition to a string of forts along the Foyle.⁽²⁾ It was Docwra's men's drive south into Tyrone at Newtown and Omagh which emboldened Mountjoy's forces in 1602 to push north from the Blackwater to Dungannon.⁽³⁾ But the contribution of Docwra's soldiers has been over-shadowed by the more spectacular raids across Lough Neagh of the Carrickfergus garrison under Sir Arthur Chichester, and the northward ~~push~~^{rush} of Mountjoy's mobile field forces into the heart of Tyrone.⁽⁴⁾ One of Docwra's last letters from Derry to the privy council of February 23rd 1603 relates in detail how his forces "mopped up" the last pockets of rebel resistance in Co. Tyrone including a graphic account of the storming of Island McHugh, one of O'Neill's celebrated "crannogs" or island forts in the middle of a lough. Captain Nicholas Pinner, the leader of the assault party spent a fortnight in taking the island. The fort's commander "an old fugitive from me", wrote Docwra, "an offender so notorious that he could not hope for pardon" finally surrendered with a store of arms, powder and match.⁽⁵⁾

1. APC., xxxi, 192

2. See Maps 1, 2, and 3 following and CSPI. (1601-1603), 525, 526

3. CSPI., (1601-1603), 463, 391-392

4. Ibid., 152, 207, 325, 336; 417, 421, 444, 446, 467, 469

5. PRO.SP.63/212/134, Docwra to the p.c., 23 February 1603.

Raids and excursions upon the enemy from the comparative security of the camps in garrison were more profitable in that they secured "preys of cattle" and more adventurous than hard labour in building forts in which according to Docwra they had to fight for every stick and stone.⁽¹⁾ Many of his soldiers became so work-shy that they smashed their spades and shovels.⁽²⁾ Great numbers fell prey to sickness. (See Chapter Twelve) In almost every letter to the government in England Docwra requested more men, building materials and tools not to speak of arms and victuals. After six months in the garrisons along the Foyle Docwra's requests became so many and insistent that the Queen let it be known through Sir Robert Cecil to Sir John Bolles, Docwra's second in command, that "she is nether willing to charge her counties with more levies having so lately exhausted them especially when it is likely to raw men such a place will rather serve now for a grave than a garrison"; the most that could be done for him from England, the Queen said, was to provide enough victuals to maintain his numbers throughout the winter of 1600; Docwra was advised to get re-inforcements from soldiers already in Ireland.⁽³⁾ However, re-inforcements were sent to Lough Foyle in December 1600. (See Chapter Three, Table 2).

Docwra sent a remarkable sketch map of Derry, his chief garrison, to the privy council; the detailed key to the map and his long description of Derry in his Narration admirably describe the situation and indicate to some extent the realities of life in an Elizabethan garrison in Ireland.⁽⁴⁾ The Derry fort, and others along the Foyle, such as Lifford, Culmore and Dunalong were erected under the supervision

1. Narration, edition cited, p.239

2. CSPI., (1600-1601)m 160

3. Ibid., (1600), 417

4. PRO.SP.63/207/pt.vi/no.84, i "The island and fort of the Derry, 1600".

of a Dutch engineer, Joyes Everard, and his deputy surveyor of works, Thomas Rookwood. They may have been the authors of the two maps reproduced as Maps 1 and 2 which had been sent to the privy council.⁽¹⁾

The naturally fortified position of Derry, moated by the Foyle on three sides and by bogland to the northside is clearly sketched. A walled fort with six flanks defended by pieces of artillery represents the chief fortified position, the nucleus of the later walled city of Londonderry.⁽²⁾ Subsidiary forts at bottom left and right of the map guarded the bogside and were commanded by Captains York and Digges. (See the key to Map 1). The map also shows how Docwra's soldiers converted former ecclesiastical and monastic buildings for the use of the garrison, and this is also known from Docwra's letters and Narration and the Four Masters, whose own abbey at Donegal was similarly used by the Elizabethan soldiery.⁽³⁾ A hospital (see chapter twelve) and Docwra's own house at H in the key to the map are situated almost in the centre of the main fort; these, too, were former ecclesiastical buildings.

The number of sailing ships on the Foyle may represent the river's traffic and not those provided for defence since in his extensive writings Docwra mentions only two ships retained by his garrison for river defence.⁽⁴⁾ The prominently marked gallows outside the walls of the main fort is not mentioned in the key to Map 1, but a gallows was certainly used by Docwra in hanging hostages whenever


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1. PRO.SP.63/207/pt.vi/no.84, ii, "The Lifford", For the military engineers see Appendix 2. These maps do not appear to be well known.
 2. For a brief architectural history of Derry see A.Rowan, The Buildings of Ireland: north-west Ulster (1979), 364 ff., and for the city's early history T.W.Moody, The Londonderry Plantation, 1609-1641 (1939)
 3. Narration, edition cited, p.238; AFM., vi, 2192. The destruction of medieval church buildings in their conversion to secular uses in Elizabethan and Jacobean Ireland would seem to be a strangely neglected subject.
 4. The two ships kept on the Foyle in December 1600 were The Grace of God of Newcastle and the Samaritan of London; the Peter of Drogheda and The Hoy of Dublin were discharged - PRO.SP.63/207/pt.vi/no.64, December 8.

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"The Iland and forte of the derry"

- A - the yland of the Deree fygured as it lyeth
- B - the grete forte or towne
- C - the forte of the landing where Capt. York lyeth
and the Storehouse
- D - the little forte where the sergeant maior lyeth
Capt. Digges
- E - the ryver coming from the Logh by Culmore
encompassing moste parte of the island and
flowing upp towardses Dunalong
- F - Captain Fleming his shipp
- G - A Chappell fortified where Capt. Coach lyeth
his company
- H - The Hospital within the grete forte nexte S.H.
Doocra his lodging
- I - The going downe from the hilly side of the iland
into the bogge marked within mark I
- K - Three borken kloysters and one high pyramid or
tower of antiquity
- L - The high woody hills along the river of O'Canes
side where the enemie often lyeth
- M - The storehouse and bakehouse within the little
forte
- N - The three issues to go in and oute
- O - The flankes figured with the artillerie, six
peeces, 5 of mettall one of yron
- P - The fountaines, excellent well undre
the hyll
- Q - The bogg on the north side

This yland makes the pointes a little longwayes but
by reason I would figure parte of Captain Fleming's shipp

this yland is highe grounde but the countrey aboute it
is farre higher, yet it is a strong plot of ground" (1)

1. PRO.SP.63/207/pt.vi/no.84 i (1600). Inscription on the
map - top right.

pledges with neighbouring Irish rebels broke down.⁽¹⁾ The practice of pledgecraft, as it was called, was a common tactic in breaking down Irish resistance and much used by other commanders such as Carew in Munster and Chichester in north east Ulster. The key to map 1, which appears to be in Docwra's handwriting, brings out the less obvious features on the map.

In the main strategy of reducing Ulster the ^{stationing} ~~lodgment~~ of forces at Derry by Docwra in May 1600 was the most important single disposition of the war. But the taking of Lifford fort and castle, an important O'Donnell fortress upstream from Derry at the confluence of the Finn and the Foyle would not have been possible but for the defection from O'Donnell of Neill Garve O'Donnell to Sir Henry Docwra.⁽²⁾ Map 2 illustrating the fort established at Lifford shows the large presence of Irish troops with the English forces; the Irish were Neill Garve O'Donnell's men. There was less defensive artillery at Lifford than at Derry, and more prominence appears to have been given by the mapmaker to the soldiers' accommodation at Lifford than at Derry. A key similar to that on the Derry map describes the details:


"The figure of the Liphard as it lyeth and the situation thereof:-

- A - The moste faire greene walkinge place or place of arming among the quarters.
- B - The grete forte and kj yron peeces
- C - Captain Harrison's hous next the grete fort
- D - The Storehouse or magazine
- E - The river flowing from Dunalong and coming upwards beyond Strabane
- F - The little fort newly made and the corps de garde
- G - The olde forte which the enemy kept err it was won
- H - The Englishmen's cabins as well footmen and horsemen
- I - The Irishmen's quarters horse and foote
- K - A little brook of water and a bogg which doth empale the quarters from one side to the other . . .
- L - The way to go out on the north side of the qrts.
- M - Fair meadow to Strabane but great hills beyond and of all sides great store of turfe Lande and woods
- N - Granary hous and corp de garde in the olde forte
- O - The Landing place to unload suche stores as is sente upp from the Derry

(3)

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1. CSPI. (1601-1603), 21, Docwra to the p.c. 10 August 1601 said he was keeping some of the McSwineys hostage "to be martyred" to strike terror to all traitors.
 2. CSPI. (1600), 490, 521, 530, 534-535, Neil Garve O'Donnell, brother of Red Hugh taking over of Lifford Castle.
 3. PRO.SP.63/207/pt.vi/no.84 ii "The Lifford"

The Lifford



The Lifford.

East

The figure of the Lifford as it lies
and the situation thereof.

A. The most part of the great wall
or part of army and the quarters
B. The great gate and 7-year passers
C. Captain Keimora's house
D. The Sheshons or magat's
E. The river flowing to the
Lifford
F. A little gate made by a ramp
G. The gate made by a ramp
H. The gate made by a ramp
I. The gate made by a ramp
J. The gate made by a ramp
K. The gate made by a ramp
L. The gate made by a ramp
M. The gate made by a ramp
N. The gate made by a ramp
O. The gate made by a ramp

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Derry and Lifford were the two main garrisons established by Docwra's forces in a line of others along the Foyle from the estuary at Culmore up to Strabane, they aimed to keep O'Neill and O'Donnell apart. Those around Carrickfergus were bases for incursions to the shores of and across Lough Neagh into Tyrone. And from Ballyshannon and Beleek detachments of troops would move out to fortify and garrison fording points over the River Erne and thereby put a barrier between O'Donnell and O'Rourke to prevent attacks on the province of Connaught. If they did not always succeed in keeping O'Donnell at home in Donegal they served to harrass him when he was returning laden with spoil.⁽¹⁾ And in the last stages of the war the forts and garrisons established by Mountjoy on the southern borders of Ulster at Charlemount, Mount Norris and Mountjoy helped to link up with those of Docwra and Chichester. Ulster was thus ringed by forts on all its borders in which garrisons were established capable of supporting one another. The major strategy was to penetrate O'Neill's lands by the manoeuvre of simultaneous attacks from separate bases.⁽²⁾ Map 3 following shows the concentration of all these forts around Ulster, and Appendix 4 gives more details.

How many soldiers were employed in the different garrisons? The question poses difficulties. The muster master's returns should provide the answer, but these were irregularly compiled and when they were sent to the government the details of individual garrisons are often missing or subsumed in overall totals. This is particularly true of the period prior to 1600. Maurice Kyffin,

1. CSPI (1600), 202, 260, 265, 279, 291, 305

2. F.Moryson, Itinerary, II, pp.41, 47, 49; Cal.Carew MSS., iv, 94

the government's agent sent to check the Irish muster office, complained to Lord Burghley in 1596 of how he often asked Sir Ralph Lane, the muster master general, for detailed numbers in the army but could not "get any roll, escript or scrowl from him".⁽¹⁾ In 1598 the privy council wanted to know the numbers of soldiers in the Ulster garrisons. In reply the Dublin administration said, "it will be hard to set down the precise numbers . . . seeing they are often increased and diminished as the occasions of service and want of victuals require".⁽²⁾ And when pressed to account for the numbers of "bodies, armour and weapons of 7,466 men sent to Ireland at various times", the Dublin administration could not give precise details saying that the men had been "altered and transposed" from one captain to another, and by deceits of many captains "changed from English to Irish" while some soldiers were also discharged the service without their knowledge in Dublin.⁽³⁾ The only figures available before 1600 for the northern garrisons come from Lane's muster certificate in 1595: at Carrickfergus there were 210 foot under three captains, at Armagh, 240 foot under four captains, at Newry 340 under five captains, at Drogheda 240 under three, at Dundalk 180 under three, and at Carlingford 120 under two captains.⁽⁴⁾ A total of 1,330 soldiers under 20 captains on the Ulster borders out of a general total of 4,040 foot under 47 captains in Ireland was a heavy concentration of troops in Ulster, but the province was after all the focus of rebellion. However, the proportion of soldiers in Ulster declined as O'Neill's forces and rebellion increased so that when Essex disposed his forces in September 1599 he was only

1. PRO.SP.63/196/44, M.Kyffin to Lord Burghley, dated 1596.

2. CSPI., (1598-1599), 137

3. Ibid., p.138

4. PRO.SP.63/184/nos. 21-46, Lane's muster certificates, 1595.

able to fortify and garrison Newry with 950 foot and 50 horse; Carrickfergus with 550 foot and 30 horse, and Dundalk with 350 foot and no horse, a total of 1,850 foot and 80 horse on the Ulster borders out of a grand army of 14,422 foot and 1,231 horse according to Fynes Moryson.⁽¹⁾

By contrast the number of places fortified and the number of troops deployed in them steadily increased from 1600 to 1603 under Lord Mountjoy. Map 3 identifies the newly erected forts under his overall direction of the war, those for which he was personally responsible, and those of his chief Ulster commanders Docwra and Chichester. On seven separate occasions between November 1600 and May 1603 Fynes Moryson noted how Mountjoy re-distributed his soldiers to meet the needs of his incursions. In November 1600 he had 600 foot and 125 horse stationed at Carrickfergus, 450 foot in Mount Norris, 800 foot and 50 horse in Newry, 100 foot at Carlingford, 650 foot and 50 horse at Dundalk, and 600 foot and 75 horse at Ardee. By then Sir Henry Docwra's 3,000 foot and 100 horse were already lodged in the forts along the Foyle, (see Map 3).⁽²⁾ This deployment of soldiers varied but little until October/November of the following year, 1601. By then the Carrickfergus garrison had increased to 850 foot and 150 horse, Mount Norris decreased to 600 foot and 50 horse, Newry's garrison of 850 foot under Sir Francis Stafford reduced to 450 foot. The 600 soldiers gained from these two reductions at Newry and Mount Norris were used to help build up the garrison at Armagh which by 1602 held 800 foot and 125 horse under Sir Henry Davers; and the previously abandoned fort at the Blackwater was re-established with 350 foot under the veteran of the fort, Captain Thomas Williams.

1. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, II, 253

2. Ibid., p.345, but see Chapter Twelve for the reduction of forces at Lough Foyle on account of sickness.

At Lecale, near Downpatrick, (Co. Down) a new garrison of 300 foot was constituted under Sir Richard Moryson. From all of these forts on the border of south east Ulster the Lord Deputy Mountjoy withdrew small bodies of men to augment his mobile field force when making his "northern journeys" to harass O'Neill's forces.⁽¹⁾

For the Kinsale crisis of December 1601 Mountjoy withdrew some of northern garrisons; for example, 200 foot from Lecale, 600 from Armagh and 436 horses were assembled from the north and from the Pale to fight at Kinsale.⁽²⁾ After the victory at Kinsale Fynes Moryson's army lists of April 1602 show a renewed concentration of soldiers in and around the Ulster borderlands; approximately 1,000 in the east of Ulster, 1,500 on the south-east, 2,000 in the west along the Foyle, and about 3,000 lodged in the various garrisons from Donegal to Ballyshannon and along the Erne loughs and river. (See Map 3) Of the total forces in Ireland, April 1602, those bordering Ulster accounted for about 44% of the infantry and 34% of the cavalry of totals of 16,950 foot and 1,487 horse.⁽³⁾

In the pursuit of this overall strategy of ringing with forts the boggy, hilly, and in places thickly wooded terrain of Ulster Mountjoy required courage and resourcefulness from his soldiers to survive and to fight the enemy in an area that was still terra incognita to the English until the final penetration of the province in the last year of the war.⁽⁴⁾ In isolating and surrounding the enemy Mountjoy had the notable advantage of sea-power in support of land operations especially at Lough Foyle and at Kinsale; and, where overland routes for victualling forts proved hazardous he used ships to send in provisions at Carrickfergus, Lecale and Carlingford

1. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, II, 345, 359, 431, 432.

2. Ibid., III, 11, 12-14

3. Ibid., III, 151; percentages calculated on Moryson's army lists.

4. G.A.Hayes McCoy, "Contemporary maps as an aid to Irish history, 1593-1603" in Imago Mundi : a review of early cartography (1965), vol.19, pp.32-37

in eastern Ulster.⁽¹⁾ Where suitable and necessary in a land of loughs and rivers many of Mountjoy's commanders put armed men into flat-bottomed boats to launch attacks. Chichester, for example, from Carrickfergus had a flotilla of such boats for his raiding parties across Lough Neagh under the supervision of one of his captains, Hugh Clotworthy.⁽²⁾ Docwra had armed boat patrols at the mouth of the Foyle,⁽³⁾ and Henry Folliott, commander at Ballyshannon, used many armed boats and barges on the river and loughs of the Erne.⁽⁴⁾ Docwra also used Captain Fleming's ship as a prison ship in the Foyle, partly illustrated on Map 1.⁽⁵⁾

While the setting up of garrisons and making excursions from them into the enemy's territory was the chief manoeuvre in subduing Ulster, Mountjoy also used his forces in additional strategies and tactical initiatives. Unlike previous commanders in Ireland he made his men fight during the winter months, he employed them in surprise attacks, he had them cut down the enemy's corn, burn their stores and drive off their cattle. Among the Irish he was noted for his meanness in granting pardons and in refusing parleys or conferences.⁽⁶⁾ In action he gave a personal lead, careless of his own safety, and expected the same bravery from his officers. Dr. Latware, his chaplain was killed beside him; George Cranmer, his chief secretary was also killed near him; Fynes Moryson, Cranmer's successor, was wounded in the thigh; one of the gentlemen of his chamber was killed, a second wounded and a third unhorsed; his own favourite horse was shot under him and his greyhound shot dead at

1. CSPI., (1600), 342, 523, 524; ibid. (1601-1603), 561, 562.

2. Ibid., (1601-1603), 63, 64, 396-397.

3. Ibid., (1600), 313, and see Map 1.

4. Ibid., (1600), 280

5. See Map 1. Docwra described the dramatic escape of McSwiney Ne Doe from the prison ship to Sir Robert Cecil in a letter of 29 August 1600 - PRO.SP.63/207/pt.iv/no.97.


6. F.M.Jones, Mountjoy, the last Elizabethan Deputy (Dublin 1958) chapters seven and twelve.

his stirrup.⁽¹⁾ The chief commander clearly put himself in the firing line as an example to his men.

Among his field officers Mountjoy cultivated an able and loyal group of brave men, for example, Oliver St. John, Sir Oliver Lambert, Sir Richard Moryson, Sir Henry Davers, Sir Christopher St. Lawrence, and among the loyal Irish, the Earl of Thomond, Lord Dunkellin and the Earl of Ormonde. When accused of being lax with his captains, and of favouring young men in appointments to captaincies Mountjoy ably defended his actions; most of his captains, he told Cecil "are older than Alexander was when he had conquered all the world".⁽²⁾

Like Leicester in the Netherlands, Mountjoy issued a code of military discipline, severe in theory, but seemingly moderate in application; like all such military codes it aimed at raising the morale of the soldiers, and sought to make the administration of the army more effective.⁽³⁾ Captains were expected to read out these military regulations to their men and to swear in each man by placing his hand on the company's colours or standard to obey them.⁽⁴⁾

Desertion carried the death penalty, but so did the sale of arms and victuals to the enemy, cowardice in the face of the enemy, and fornication; these were the commonly listed capital offences in most military codes of the period, but Mountjoy's ^{code} also stressed harbouring rebels, breaking rank, and sleeping on sentry duty.⁽⁵⁾

~~list.~~  Desertion, the risky safety valve of a desperate soldiery, became a serious problem in Ireland. When Cecil and the privy council told Mountjoy that he was not doing enough about the problem of

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1. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, II, 269. Such incidents also illustrate the accuracy of the Irish marksmen.
 2. CSPI., (1600), 517, Mountjoy to Cecil, 27 October 1600.
 3. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 502-505, Mountjoy's military code.
 4. For typical soldier's oaths of loyalty see for examples, B.L.Add.MS., 30, 170, f.35 and Add.MS., 23971, ff. 3 v-4.
 5. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 50

desertion he gave the government a straight answer:

"I can assure you I have already in divers places hanged sixteen; and if you would but do the like on the other side, we should keep our men the better. If you would give order in all the ports to stay such as come over without pass and to hang some of them, and send the rest back we should keep their company the better . . . "

(1)

Mountjoy repeated this stricture again in August 1600, and in October.⁽²⁾ And yet, Mountjoy was not as severe (or as sadistic) in his government of the army as Sir William Russell (1593-1596) had been whose journal contains many entries on the execution of soldiers:- "A Brittany soldier hanged, drawn and quartered for murder" (27 May 1595); "two soldiers hanged, drawn and quartered for treason, another executed with them for helping a prisoner to escape from Dublin Castle" (28 May 1595); "one of Captain Montague's horsemen executed for running away" (13 October 1595); "Captain Tucher's sergeant and two soldiers executed for yielding up the fort at Ballinacor" (Co. Wicklow) (22 September 1596); "Certain soldiers who ran away . . . were put to cast dice for their lives, and one of them, who cast least, was executed" (29 May 1596); such are typical notes in Russell's Irish journal.⁽³⁾

The ordinary soldier in Ireland was certainly in constant danger, whether in garrison or in the mobile field armies arranged for "journeys" on "actions of war" as the Elizabethans called attacks on and skirmishes with the enemy. And, by all accounts, the soldier was almost certainly in a state of physical discomfort from wet weather and hard labour at siege works and fortifications in garrison or, exhausted by exacting marches in difficult country on "journeys".

1. CSPI., (1600), 94

2. Ibid., (1600), 351, 505

3. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, pp.226 ff. under the dates in the text.

Mountjoy, for example, kept his field forces mobile demanding a ten mile march a day when on campaign, and he kept in the field for longer periods than any of his predecessors so that he had the "opportunities to assaile and spoyle any one of the rebels on the sudden".⁽¹⁾

In organizing his field army Mountjoy banded a number of companies together into regiments under a commander. At the Moyry Pass in October 1600 his army fought in regimental order, and in August 1601 his field forces were in four regiments of 825, 875, 750 and 500 each.⁽²⁾ But these were ad hoc arrangements organized for particular engagements; the army was not yet based on the regiment. The chief unit for pay, records, rations and military action was still the company. The size of a company in Ireland was intended to be 100, but long serving and experienced captains could have companies of 150 and 200.⁽³⁾ Veterans from Brittany arrived in Ireland in 1596 in companies of 250 but Sir William Russell, then lord deputy, had them re-formed into companies of 100.⁽⁴⁾ Mountjoy, in contrast, had no rigid ideas about the standard size of a company. He argued that many of his officers deserved large companies, and that they normally employed able lieutenants to cope with larger numbers. And he also forestalled attempts to have under-strength companies eliminated. The privy council's ideas were different. It wanted to make the companies uniform at 100 men to avoid waste and provide more captaincies when the number of troops increased after 1599.⁽⁵⁾ However, the muster of Mountjoy's field troops in September 1600 at Faughart near Dundalk the entrance to the Moyry Pass indicates that he had successfully resisted the move to make uniform numbers in the

1. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, II, 269-270

2. Ibid, 270

3. CSPI., (1600), 506; Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 128, ibid., iv, 396-398

4. G.A.Hayes McCoy, Irish Battles (1969), 93

5. CSPI., (1592-1596), 310, 311 for an example.

companies. There he had seven companies of 200, ten of 150, twelve of 100 and "50 men of Dublin"; the total of the nominal roll or "in list" was 4,150, but Fynes Moryson noted the actual numbers mustered at 2,640, of whom 702 were Irish soldiers, nearly a quarter of the force. Some "in list" not at the muster were warders in nearby forts who were not allowed to leave their posts for the muster. Moryson also remarked that sick and hurt men numbered 315 and that others were badly armoured.⁽¹⁾

Contemporary writers on the martial arts such as Thomas Digges, Gervase Markham, Thomas Styward and Barnaby Rich, all of whom served in Ireland, devoted treatises to the formation of troops in battle array with routine pike formations and flanking "shot", but their textbook examples were rarely applicable to battles against an enemy fighting a defensive guerilla type war in difficult terrain.⁽²⁾ In any case, artificial formations were quickly abandoned in the heat of battle, and apart from the military actions at the Yellow Ford in August 1598 and at Kinsale in December 1601, pitched battles were rarely fought in Ireland. Small scale skirmishes and sieges were more common and required fit and alert troops in mobile company units ready to improvise offensive and defensive action. In this type of action corporate discipline and collective movement hardly mattered, but intelligent initiative and familiarity with a variety of weapons did. Mountjoy and his commanders demanded these critical qualities from their men when engaging the enemy in skirmish, siege and guerilla tactics.⁽³⁾

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1. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, II, 334-336
 2. Examples of their mathematical formations in C.Falls, Elizabeth's Irish Wars, (1950), 42-45, and for some examples of their writings see the bibliography.
 3. For examples in one year, 1600, see CSPI., (1600), 14-16, 33, 36, 44, 52, 67, 103, 113-116, 192-196, 199-202, 336-339, 436, 558, for skirmishes with the Irish rebel forces.

The war was not a glorious one, remembered for its heroism, but for students of strategy it provides a wide variety of military engagements from the traditional medieval type siege, and even a duel of strength between two leaders, to the more up-to-date formal battle, sophisticated skirmish and combined naval and land operations.⁽¹⁾ The march of Sir Henry Bagenal's forces from Newry to Armagh to relieve Captain Thomas Williams' beleaguered garrison just north of Armagh at the Blackwater on 12 August 1598 illustrates the type of engagement which began as a formal battle, but, because of Irish tactics, ended in disorder, retreat and defeat for Bagenal's men.

Bagenal had about 4,000 foot and 300 horse, a large force for Ireland at the time; they included raw recruits, some Irish, and about 900 veterans from the continental wars. The 40 foot companies were marshalled into six regiments, each about 500 strong; each regiment had the pikes massed in the centre, and the "shot", calivers and muskets, were on the flanks and each regiment marched out of Newry about 100 yards apart. In the intervals came the cavalry units, the trains of carriage horses and oxen laden with supplies for the Blackwater fort, and with materials for making causeways over marshy ground. From head to tail the line of march was about a mile long, but to be ready for battle Bagenal ordered each pair of regiments to join up in a fighting formation of vanguard, main "battle" and rearguard. Two wings of light-armoured shot, "the fólorn hope", were sent out in front of the vanguard to annoy the enemy, create

1. The survivals of medieval forms of warfare into the late Renaissance period would bear investigation; English methods lagged behind those of the continent see for example, G. Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659 (Cambridge, 1972) chs. 1, 2. A notable duel to the death of both was fought between Hugh Maguire and Sir Warham St. Leger near Cork, February 1599, and is but one example of many hand-to-hand combats in the context of a mêlée - CSPI (1600), 14, 15, 16, 18, 33, 36

disorder and tempt them to making a premature attack.⁽¹⁾ Captains Turner and Lee led out this advance guard; Sir Henry Bagenal and Sir Richard Percy led the vanguard; Colonel Cosby and Sir Thomas Maria Wingfield, the main battle, and Colonel Cuny and Captain Billings the Rearguard.⁽²⁾ One report described the march: "We marched severally some six or seven score paces" distance between each regiment, our way being hard and hilly ground within caliver shot of wood and bog on each side, which was possessed wholly by the enemy continually playing upon us.⁽³⁾ Among the small hills, behind the trees and in the bogs O'Neill, O'Donnell and Maguire had more than 5,000 troops.

The fighting began about half past eight in the morning that is almost as soon as the regiments left camp; by ten o'clock they were in the thick of it. O'Neill's hidden "shot", protected by the nature of the terrain from counter-attack by the English horse, subjected the long line of columns to the ordeal of attack on the march. Bagenal's entire force, from ^Tfolorn hope to Billing's men in the rear, came under fire. Shortly after the first regiment passed the Callan brook, at the Yellow Ford, named from the colour of the banks and bed of the river, Percy's men were confronted by trenches, five feet wide, four feet deep, and surmounted by 'plashed' thorn hedges.⁽⁴⁾ They struggled on to gain a hill beyond the trenches far ahead of Bagenal's men; Percy's were cut off by the enemy and fighting for their lives. Percy then ordered a retreat to close the gap between his now disordered regiment and the main body; when his

1. CSPI., (1598-1599), 227-229, Captain Montague's report of the battle at the Yellow Ford, 14 August 1598.
2. Ibid., p.241, the reports of Captains Ferdinando and Kingsmill.
3. Ibid., p.227, Captain Montague's report.
4. Ibid., Colonel Billings report, ibid., pp.253-254 repeats the main features of the action found in other reports.

men wheeled about in disarray they were charged by Irish light horse. Captains Richard Percy and William Devereux reported on Percy's regiment's efforts to disengage:

"Our retreat was more in disorder than our going on because our loose wings, having spent their powder coming in, gave way to the enemy, being both horse and foot, to charge us in the rear, which our new men quitted and threw away their arms." (1)

Percy was stunned with a gunshot on the breastplate and thrown down "into the mud" but was rescued by his Irish horseboy; the majority of his regiment perished. Evan Owen, Percy's ensign, seeing all was lost, broke the flag-pole which he carried, wrapped himself in the colours "and would not part with them until he was slain". The folorn hope and the first regiment of the vanguard were thus destroyed.

The few survivors joined what was left of Bagenal's regiment which had suffered severe losses at the trenches. Bagenal then led forward with a small body of horse but as he reached the scene of Percy's disaster he raised the visor of his helmet to view the field and was struck by a shot in the face and killed. Wingfield, assuming command, decided retreat was imperative. He ordered Cosby's regiment back and directed the rearguard to hold the ford to cover the withdrawal. At first Cosby's men began to fall back in good order, but then disobeying orders, went forward again to the fray. Unsettled by this and furiously assailed by the Irish, the ranks broke and Cosby was taken prisoner. Wingfield's men went to help and succeeded in rescuing many of Cosby's men but in the attempt Wingfield lost most of his musketeers. (2) Troops of horse from the rearguard helped Wingfield's and Cosby's men to disengage and retreat towards

1. CSPI., (1598-1599), 277-278 Reports on the battle, 2 October.

2. Ibid., 225-226, 228, 236, 237 other reports of the battle.

Armagh. Billing's regiment was sent on to clear the way back to

Armagh. Billing's report then described what took place:

"the enemy charged us with horse and foot, to the number of two thousand foot and four hundred horse, having long entertained skirmish and by reason of the great number . . . coming so near and fast upon us, we were forced four or five times to charge with out colours in the head of the pikes, by reason our shot was so beaten, and our new men bringing the rest to confusion; thus in the fight our regiment could not gain a butt's length in three-quarters of an hour . . ." (1)

Meanwhile, Wingfield fought a rearguard action, abandoned the saker, the largest piece of ordnance they had, and large quantities of supplies, arms and equipment to lighten the withdrawal. Fortunately Billing's and Cuny's men got to the ford before the enemy could cut off their retreat. Although the Irish horse got between Billings and Armagh, as he reported later, "we shot off the three pieces of ordnance which made the enemy to stand".⁽²⁾ Under the protection of Montague's horse, who had taken over from Sir Calisthenes Brooke who had been seriously wounded, the whole remaining force, van, battle and rear reached Armagh and fortified themselves in the cathedral and town. The misery of the survivors after a day's bitter fighting and a night on guard in the ruins of Armagh can be easily imagined.

Over 2,000 of Wingfield's army reached safety. Some troops of horse were sent out to clear the way to Newry which was reached the following day with little loss. Captain Montague rode on to Dublin to bring the news of the defeat to a shocked Irish council, ~~who~~ ^{which} sent a supplicatory letter to O'Neill, which the Queen later condemned.⁽³⁾ Why O'Neill did not follow up his success remains something of a mystery; he allowed Wingfield and his force to march

1. CSPI., (1598-1599), 253-254 "The opinions of Captain Billings on the defeat at the Blackwater, August 1598.

2. Ibid., p.254

3. CSPI., (1598-1599), 257-259, Queen Elizabeth to the Irish Council, 12 September 1598.

to Newry and out of Ulster into the Pale.⁽¹⁾ Fynes Moryson

commenting on the Yellow Ford pointed to its far-reaching results for the rest of the war:

" . . . the Rebels obtained a great victory . . . I terme it great, since the English from their first arrival in that Kingdome, never had received so great an overthrow. By this Victory the Rebels got plenty of Armes and victuals, Tyrone was among the Irish celebrated as the Deliverer of his Country from thraldome and the Combined Traytors on all sides were puffed up with intolerable pride. All Ulster was in Armes, all Connaught revolted, and the Rebels of Lemster swarmed in the English Pale, while the English lay in their garrisons . . . and lived in continual feare to be surprised by them". (2)

The Irish victory at the Yellow Ford demonstrated the difficulty the English had in overcoming O'Neill's forces. The Irish could choose their own time to attack and their own ground. By ambushes and surprise attacks they frequently caught the English enemy on difficult river or bog crossings or in the narrow defiles of mountain passes, and, until Kinsale, enjoyed considerable success. Their tactics had long passed into the poetic lore of the bards:

"A troop of horse at the mouth of a pass,
A wild fight, a ding-dong fray of foot,
These are some of the delights of Donnachadh's sons
In seeking the contest with the foreigners . . ." (3)

The trapping of Sir Henry Harrington's forces in the Wicklow Mountains,⁽⁴⁾ and the similar fate of Sir Conyers Clifford in the Curlew Mountains (Co. Roscommon), both incidents taking place in 1599 when Essex was supreme governor in Ireland, illustrate this favoured Irish tactic.⁽⁵⁾


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1. G.A.Hayes McCoy in Irish Battles (1969), 128 speculating on why O'Neill did not follow up his victory says that the war was costing him £500 a day to keep his forces in the field, and that then he knew and feared the planned English landing in Derry, and wanted to be free to resist it.
 2. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, II, 217
 3. Translated from the Gaelic of Laoiseach Mac an Bhaird as "Civil Irish and Wild Irish" in K.Hurlestone Jackson, Celtic Miscellany (1951), 237
 4. CSPI (1599-1600), 58-60, 81, 83-91
 5. Ibid., pp. 113, 119, 121, 123, 130-131.

Map 4 which follows represents in one view several phases of Sir Henry Harrington's action and defeat; the positions and actions are referred to by a lettered key to inscriptions on the original rare pen and ink sketch which eloquently describe the fight. As at the Yellow Ford the previous year, the Irish ambushed the marching columns and caught Harrington's forces in boggy ground at a river crossing. The disorder of the retreat, the cavalry charges and the playing of "loose shot" on the regimental formation of Harrington's men can all be plainly seen on Map 4. The key to the action reads:

- " G. From his Mountain came the Rebels shott downe all alongst this bogg side.
 H. Along this waie the Rebbels loose shott plaid upon ours.
 I. Heer plaid our loose shott to answeere theirs.
 E. This waie came the Rebels baattaile to the green close and so turned downe to the highe waie
 F. On this side the River came their loose shott to the foorde
 P. Heere laye our shott at rest.
 O. The eccecution was don upon our men alongst this highe waie by the Rebbels battaile in grosse which by strengthe they put me from
 K. This waye went Captain Loftus his men to Wicklowe who never were followed.
 D. Heer I charged with the horse into the highe waie
 C. Heer our horse charged betweene the Battels againe and I fetched off Capt. Atherton with some 22 horse.
 B. Heer brake our battel and here fell downe all our colours and Captain Lindley to this bogg which I brought of with 12 horse.
 A. At this round field the horse charged the Rebels all the foote hauinge recovered into Monishorlee.
 L. Monishorlee
 M. A highe waie towardes the Sea
 N. The highe waie from Ranelagh to the Foorde" (1)

The tide of Irish military success in skirmishes, ambushes, sorties and attacks on English columns began to turn with the determination of Mountjoy to make a total conquest; he had learned from his predecessors' errors, he would meet Irish tactics with equal ingenuity, and above all he would concentrate his forces, as we have seen, on invading and subduing Ulster, the "fountain head of all rebellion". But O'Neill's forces were equally determined to deny

Map 4. Sir Henry Harrington's defeat near Wicklow, 1599



Reduced facsimile of Trinity College Manuscript 1209, no. 12
The original is 12" by 12" 3"

the English any passage into Ulster from the south, not only across the Blackwater but also through the Moyry Pass, the defile in the hills below Slieve Gullion mountain through which the road ran from Dundalk to Newry. (See Map 3) This area saw some of the most prolonged, dogged close fighting of the whole war in September and October 1600. Reports give glimpses of the grim realities of what became known as the battle for the Moyry Pass. It demonstrates the misery of war for the English soldiers in Ireland even more clearly than the battle at the Yellow Ford. The Moyry Pass had been likened by one historian as Mountjoy's Somme, because of the continual and heavy rainfall.⁽¹⁾ Captain Nicholas Dawtrey who served in the fight said he never saw such rain in thirty-seven years. For the twenty days they were in the area between Dundalk and Newry Dawtrey said, "I could never say that all the clothes on my back were dry".⁽²⁾ William Farmer, a surgeon present with Mountjoy's troops wrote:

"The weather was most inconstant, rain boisterous winds, storms and tempests . . . the tents often overthrown, rent to pieces . . ." (3)

Many reports speak of extreme "wind and weather", and of "foul and tempestuous" conditions "for the space of ten days".⁽⁴⁾

The Irish cut and camouflaged field trenches across the army's marching route. Moryson wrote that they had:

"raised from mountaine to mountaine, from wood to wood, and from bogge to bogge, long tranverses with huge and high flankers of great stones, mingled with turffe and staked on both sides with pallisades watled". (5)

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1. C.Falls, Elizabeth's Irish Wars (1950), 264
 2. CSPI. (1600), 531, Dawtrey's report to Cecil, 28 October 1600
 3. W.Farmer, "Chronicles of Ireland 1594-1613" edited by C.Litton Falkiner in EHR., xxii (1907), 119-120
 4. CSPI. (1600), 453, 459, 467, 469.
 5. Moryson's Itinerary, III, 155.

"These barbarous people", wrote Mountjoy, "far exceeded their custom and our expectation" in erecting such defences.⁽¹⁾ Dawtrey said the pass was so defended it would not have been easy "for swine to pass through much less men".⁽²⁾

Mountjoy struck camp on 20 September on Faughart Hill, near the entrance to the Moyry Pass "which O'Neill with all his forces had possessed six or seven days before our coming". His men had to fight for wood and water as the enemy kept making sorties and skirmishes on the camp. All during the first night O'Neill's scouts kept the sentries alerted. In the brief intervals of fair weather Mountjoy ordered his men out to make sorties on the enemy who harassed them. By the 25th September the rain gave way to a heavy mist and under its cover the English cautiously advanced their folorn hope led by Captain Thomas Williams, the surviving commander of the former Blackwater fort, and three regiments into the mouth of the pass. Williams' advance guard surprised and quickly overran the Irish sentinels. The first entrenchment though hotly defended was taken by the English. A hundred and forty yards further on they took a second trench and barricade, but there they were halted by fierce resistance on all sides.⁽³⁾ Most reports agree that Mountjoy ordered a retreat after the trial of the defences. As the English fought their way back the Irish re-occupied the trenches and fired on the retreating soldiers from the rear and from the flanks of the pass. Reports of casualties claimed 120 Irish and 7 English killed and 30 wounded.⁽⁴⁾ "The 27th, 28th, 29th and 30th, and the first of October we were forced to lie still by reason of the continual rain and sending abroad to furnish the wants of our army". When a force

1. CSPI., (1600), 522, Mountjoy's report to the p.c., 28 October

2. Ibid., p.531, Dawtrey's report to Cecil, 28 October 1600.

3. Ibid., pp.459 f. "Journal of the Lord Deputy's proceedings, from 20 September to 3 October, 1600; and, the reports above in 2, 3 and 4.

4. See chapter twelve on casualties.

was sent to Carlingford to bring in victuals on 30 September "we entertained a light skirmish", but the battle for the pass was not renewed in earnest until 2 October.⁽¹⁾ The size of the Irish forces must have been substantial. Mountjoy who reckoned his own forces to be 3,450 foot and 375 horse reported the "rebel is held to be more foot and horse than we be in the field".⁽²⁾ With a typical lack of precision about numbers the Four Masters simply wrote of O'Neill's forces: "The Irish swarmed around Mountjoy's whole force like bees issuing from the hollows of bee-hives".⁽³⁾

On the afternoon of 2 October Mountjoy's men launched a second attack on the trenches and suffered about 120 casualties. Despite the bravery of his troops who endured "terrible volleys of shot at the barricades" the assault was insufficiently powerful to overcome the resistance at the barricades, the flooded streams and the narrow causeways. Holding what they had gained, about a mile into the pass, exposed the soldiers to constant fire from the higher ground on each side, and once again Mountjoy sounded a retreat. Encouraged by this the Irish "fell on again very hotly", but the English horse under Sir William Godolphin and Sir Henry Davers "charged on that uneven ground, where never horse served before" to help what Mountjoy called "a gallant and an orderly retreat"; in other words his men had to fight every inch of their way out of the pass to regain camp.⁽⁴⁾

On Sunday afternoon, October 5, Mountjoy made a third attempt to break through by a flanking movement and attack; three regiments of foot and a hundred horse were ordered out. Sir Charles Percy's

1. CSPI., (1600), 459-460

2. Ibid., 421-423, Mountjoy to the p.c. on preparations for his attack on the Moyry, 12 September 1600. He left the Earl of Ormonde guarding the Pale with 2,700 f. and 157 h.

3. AFM., vi, 2225

4. CSPI., (1600-1601), 27-21, "A brief journal of my Lord Deputy's second voyage into the north; 1600" unsigned but clearly Fynes Moryson's from the description of his personally narrow escape in the fight.

regiment was sent to scale the high ground to the left above the pass and to move forward until they could enfilade the trenches from above. Oliver St. John's regiment followed in support, and the third regiment and horse moved forward along the lower ground led by Mountjoy. Percy's men, only about 250 strong, came under heavy fire and later against pike charges, but they kept the Irish off until Oliver St. John's shot supported them with their fire.⁽¹⁾ Meanwhile in the pass the Irish were driven from the trenches at the cost of 110 English soldiers. Although Percy and St. John's men came down from the high ground to help the fight in the pass, no further advance proved possible.⁽²⁾

In the stalemate Mountjoy withdrew his forces. He marched back to Faughart near Dundalk on October 10 to rest his men and O'Neill withdrew his force to Armagh, going himself to his island fortress of Lough Lurcan between Newry and Armagh.⁽³⁾ Mountjoy admitted from camp near Dundalk

"we are no whit farther from our business . . .
to make this way a secure gate and passage
to beat this proud rebel out of the north" ⁽⁴⁾

The effects on his men of their sojourn from 20 September to 5 October and the three major days' fighting seem to have been played down in reports except in Captain Nicholas Dawtrey's letter to Cecil where he spoke of many horses dying and many men sick and wounded and that he was hard put to get timber to keep a fire in camp "for me and my raw soldiers without the which they had been all dead in that camp". And although he plied his men with whiskey and wine "I could not keep them from dropping . . . with the country disease". He believed the "extremity of the weather killed more men than the

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1. Details from Sir George Cary's report of the fighting to Cecil - CSPI., (1600), 467, October 9, 1600
 2. CSPI., (1600) 467-469 reports of the fighting.
 3. CSPI., (1600), 469, Mountjoy to Sir G. Carey, 10 October ibid., p.489, O'Neill reported as at Lough Lurcan.
 4. Ibid., p.469-470, Mountjoy to Carey, 10 October 1600.

enemy in all the fights we had with them". And Dawtrey added that his commander, Mountjoy, did not omit to fight whenever there was a couple of hours of fair weather.⁽¹⁾

Mountjoy on 17 October moved out from Dundalk with all his forces in another attempt to destroy the fortifications in the pass. One eyewitness described them as "a villainous piece of work and an impossible thing for any army to pass without an intolerable loss".⁽²⁾ Mountjoy was again frustrated by the weather and the Irish resistance and was forced to alter his winter campaign plans. He had been frustrated by delay in the despatch of victuals from England, and by widespread sickness in the Lough Foyle garrisons which prevented Docwra's men from co-operating with him as had been intended.⁽³⁾

By November he was content to erect a new fort eight miles from Newry on the way to Armagh, calling it Mount Norris, in memory of Sir John Norris, his revered master in the art of war, where he installed 400 foot and enough provisions for six weeks under Captain Blaney.⁽⁴⁾

He then marched his soldiers back towards Dundalk by way of Carlingford where they expected to be victualled. At Carlingford on 13 November 1600 he had to resist a fierce Irish attack resulting in a reported 200 Irish deaths. On the English side "we lost not twentie, but above threescore were hurt".⁽⁵⁾

On 13 and 14 July 1601 Mountjoy's field army successfully stormed, at the second attempt, the fort on the Blackwater; the action provides a good example of where Mountjoy outwitted the enemy,

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1. CSPI., (1600), 530-533, Dawtrey to Cecil, 28 October 1600
 2. Ibid., p. 483, Captain Henry Clare's report to Cecil 20 October 1600
 3. This is deduced by C.Falls, Elizabeth's Irish Wars (1950), 266 but it does not appear from Mountjoy's long report to Cecil CSPI., (1600), 513-520 that he intended Docwra to co-operate with him in the attacks on the Moyry. He did later in July 1601 when he assaulted the Blackwater fort near Armagh.
 4. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, II, 338
 5. Ibid., pp.339-342, In this encounter Mountjoy lost his chief secretary, Charles Cranmer, nephew to Archbishop Cranmer, Fynes Moryson filled the vacancy.

learned from his predecessor's past errors, and in which he employed artillery to good effect.

On the north side of the Blackwater river O'Neill had an extensive and elaborate system of trenches and defensive outworks surrounding the fort itself. Mountjoy's men arrived at the southern bank on 13 July 1601. Unlike Lord Burgh in 1597 he did not at first attempt a direct assault across the river but drew up his soldiers outside the range of O'Neill's musket fire, planted a robinet and a falcon, two pieces of small artillery, on a nearby hill and bombarded the main Irish force which retreated to a wood beyond the river meadows. To distract the enemy he sent detachments of men in a flanking manoeuvre to occupy another hill which almost overlooked the main fort held by the Irish. He then foiled an attempt by the Irish to out-flank this force by sending a squadron of horse across the river, who then retreated when they had given cover to the detachments taking the hill over the fort. During the night of the 13th July he re-positioned his field pieces disguising them with gabions, wicker baskets filled with earth. Although he came under fire from the Irish trenches during this night operation he did not allow his musketeers, and calivermen to reply. The Irish spent their powder ineffectually in the dark; at dawn the English opened fire at close range and quickly cleared the trenches. At that point Mountjoy sent in his "armed men" an infantry force of pikes covered by flanking "shot" to storm over the 300 yards of the shallow river and assault and sieze the Blackwater fort.⁽¹⁾ Sir William Godolphin commanded the assault force, and Captain Thomas Williams was restored to his former command with 25 men in the Blackwater fort.⁽²⁾ Mountjoy

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1. Account based on F. Moryson's Itinerary, II, 407-408. The Irish quit the trenches and ran to the woods, when they saw the foot companies enter the water. CSPI (1600-1) Fenton to Cecil, July 1601.
 2. CSPI., (1601-1603), 15, 55: Moryson gives 350f. at Blackwater.

then harried the surrounding countryside especially O'Hanlon's lands in long-range skirmishes with the enemy up the river to Benburb.⁽¹⁾

The emphasis of military action switched from Ulster to Munster during the winter of 1601 with the Spanish landing at Kinsale on 23 September 1601. The campaign around Cork and Kinsale from September to Christmas is illustrative of almost every type of military engagement; small scale defensive action against Spanish sorties, skirmishes, and assaults on fortified bases, the full scale siege of a castle and walled town aided by naval bombardment, and a formally pitched battle.


Though out-numbered by the Spanish in Kinsale, and trapped between the Spanish and the Irish forces, English strategy, tactics and bravery inflicted the greatest defeat on the enemy on Christmas Eve 1601 at Kinsale. English horse troops under Sir Henry Davers, Captains Graeme, Taaffe, Power and Fleming forced O'Neill's horse to retreat and then broke up his closely packed ranks of shot and pike by flanking attacks. O'Neill had the men and equipment to fight where he could make the terrain work for his soldiers, as at Clontribret, Yellow Ford and the Moyry Pass, but at Kinsale his Ulstermen were forced to fight a formal pitched battle dictated by Mountjoy. O'Neill's horse was driven back onto his own main battle, creating disorder in the ranks, forcing them to retreat despite their superior numbers. The Spaniards, hemmed in by Carew's forces in the town of Kinsale, and under bombardment from surrounding artillery implacements outside the walls of the town and from cannon aboard the ships in the harbour, failed to sally forth in aid of their Irish allies.⁽²⁾

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1. CSPI., (1601-1603) 15, Richard Graeme to Cecil, 9 August 1601.
 2. There are about 23 contemporary accounts of the siege and battle of Kinsale; the better known are in Cal.Carew MSS. iv, 191-204; CSPI (1601-1603), between pp.216-243, but the fullest single account is Fynes Moryson's Itinerary, III, pp. 40-92. The best modern account is J.J.Silke's, Kinsale: the Spanish intervention in Ireland (Liverpool, 1970)

The English hotly pursued the retreating Irish, killing 1,995 and wounding 76 of them according to Moryson.⁽¹⁾ Another report said that by nightfall 1,200 Irish lay dead about the fields and 2,000 arms captured. Another despatch to Cecil from Sir Edward Wingfield, who led the cavalry charge said they pursued the Irish for two miles killing 1,000 and wounding 800: "we lost four killed and six hurt. The day before we lost but one man . . ."⁽²⁾ The next day, Christmas Day, Mountjoy fired off a victory volley. Don Juan Aguilá, the Spanish commander in Kinsale thinking this the expected signal from the Irish sallied forth only to be defeated. Two further sallies that night and the next day were inconclusive, but despairing of further Spanish aid and angered by the Irish retreat, d'l'Aguilá surrendered with the honours of war on 6 January 1602.⁽³⁾

Various scenes from the period of the siege, 17 October to 6 January 1602, and not merely the final battle at Kinsale, can be seen on Map 5 but the overall tactics of the final battle are obscured on the map because a number of previous engagements with the Spaniards are also depicted. However, the formations of pikemen into squares with wings of shot protecting them are clearly portrayed.⁽⁴⁾ The top left hand corner shows the ships in Kinsale harbour, and inscriptions on the map at that place indicate how batteries of artillery were trained on Kinsale. The bottom left hand corner shows the approach of the Irish. The inscription reads: "Here the Rebels and the Spaniards first presented themselves the 21st December"; it will be noted their regiments are drawn up in a wedged-shaped formation with the colours raised higher than the upright pikes. Immediately

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1. F.Moryson, Itinerary, III
 2. CSPI., (1601-1603), 239-240, Wingfield to Cecil, 25 December. For mentions of high mortality rates in the trenches and camp at Kinsale see CSPI. (1601-3), 208, 216, 219, 220-221, 273, 329 and Chapter Twelve following.
 3. Folger Shakespeare Library MS., X.d. 393, ff.16-19, a little known contemporary account of Kinsale in a commonplace book, c.1625.
 4. Map 5 from F.Moryson's Itinerary, III, facing p.96. Inscriptions on the map refer to the Spanish as "Enimies" and to the Irish as "Rebells".



From Fynes Moryson's Itinerary, III, facing p.96, reduced to one third of the original facsimile, and in Pacata Hiberniae (1633)

opposite another inscription reads "Her Maiesties forces marchinge towardses the enemye, the 21st Decembre" in five regiments to face the enemy's eight. The bottom right hand corner illustrates a cavalry attack breaking up a formation of Spanish pikemen. A section of the map on the top right shows "the rebells main battaile overthrown by our horse" and "Tyrone and O'Donnell with the rebell horse runninge away". (See Map 5) The English main camp is featured left of centre.

Many contemporary accounts glow with the flush of victory but occasional glimpses tell of the misery of the soldiers under the conditions of a winter seige. Moryson said sentries froze to death at their posts, and men who were fit and well perished in a few days from cold or fever. At one time two hundred deserters were rounded up and sent to Waterford "to be returned to camp or executed".⁽¹⁾

Carew wrote to Cecil in the middle of the siege period on 13 December:

"There has never been a more miserable siege than this, in which many die, many more are too sick to serve, and other run away from faintness of heart . . . " (2)

Many other despatches spoke of "cold and extreme fowl weather", and men wasted by hunger and disease in the camp.⁽³⁾

In the search for a quicker end to the war assassination of the chief rebel leaders was tried out as an English tactic. In September 1597, for example, Lord Burgh promised a spy £1,000 to kill O'Neill as an inexpensive way to end the war.⁽⁴⁾ In 1599 Sir Robert Cecil was busy finding a Scottish agent to make an attempt on O'Neill's life.⁽⁵⁾ Sir Richard Moryson, governor at Dundalk engineered a plot

1. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, III, 66

2. CSPI., (1601-1603), 216, Carew to Cecil, 13 December 1601

3. Ibid., pp.220, 239, 240, Cal.Carew MSS., iv, 195-203.

4. CSPI., (1596-1597), 395

5. CSPI., (1599-1600), preface, lxxvi

for O'Neill's head in November 1600, but the would-be assassin, Henry Oge O'Neill failed "in his courage or in his faith".⁽¹⁾ Mountjoy marvelled to the privy council shortly before he initiated terms with O'Neill that:

never traitor knew better how to keep his own head than this; nor any subject have a more dreadful awe to lay violent hands on their sacred prince, than these people have to touch the person of their O'Neales . . . (2)

Though Mountjoy did not appear to have put a price on O'Neill's head he offered two thousand crowns to anyone who would bring in Richard Tyrell's head; Tyrell was a renegade English captain fighting on the Irish side; his men terrorized the midlands and west from island fastnesses in the Shannon, and Mountjoy "proclaimed his head" in February 1600.⁽³⁾

A most effective and cruel means of shortening hostilities was the devastation of crops, and it was used systematically from 1599 to 1602. A scorched earth policy was universally recognised as a legitimate method of warfare. The Earl of Essex's Munster "journey" of mid-May to mid-July 1599 was deliberately undertaken to destroy local crops so that the chiefs of the area could not feed mercenaries brought into Munster from Connaught.⁽⁴⁾ It was a ploy used by the Irish, too. O'Neill and O'Donnell destroyed crops on lands around garrisons planted in Ulster: O'Neill burnt out villages, corn stores and crops in the field on his own incursions into Munster, and O'Donnell did likewise in his attacks on Connaught.⁽⁵⁾ The grim effect of the policy is suggested by a letter from the Earl of Ormond to the privy

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1. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, II, 354
 2. CSPI., (1601-1603), ii, Mountjoy to the p.c., 26 February 1603.
 3. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, II, 355
 4. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 307, part of Essex's journal, May to July 1599
 5. O'Clery's Life of Red Hugh O'Donnell, edited P.Walsh (Dublin, 1948), Part 1, 87; F.Moryson, Itinerary, II, 332.

council in January 1600 telling them how he had quelled the Desmond rebellion with fire and sword: "their corn and houses being burned did bring famine amongst them that they were driven to eat one another".⁽¹⁾

The greatest exponents and practitioners of the scorched earth tactic were Mountjoy, Carew and Chichester. Carew began his presidency of Munster in 1600 by burning corn and drowning cattle on McCarthy's lands in Cork.⁽²⁾ George Flower, one of his captains, and formerly Essex's sergeant major in Munster, described the methods he employed around Rosscarbery:

"leaving not a grain of corn within ten miles of our way wherever we marched . . . and took a prey of 500 cows which I caused to be drowned and killed".⁽³⁾

Mountjoy wrote to Cecil of his operations in Leinster in August 1600 describing how his men, both captains and soldiers alike, cut down the wheat with their swords.⁽⁴⁾ He advised Carew that unless they destroyed the corn "the Irish would be as strong as ever, and O'Neill maintain more men than I ever knew him keep".⁽⁵⁾ The Irish Annalists noted Mountjoy's destructive methods and described the English soldiery using "harrows, p^ocas, scythes and sickles to destroy ripe and unripe grain."⁽⁶⁾ And Fynes Moryson described in equally graphic detail the results of his master's methods in the final drive against Ulster:

"we found everywhere men dead of famine . . . one O'Hagan protested unto us that between Tullogh Oge (Tullaghoge) and Tome (Toome) there lay unburied a thousand dead . . ." ⁽⁷⁾

The distance between the two places mentioned is little more than twelve miles.

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1. PRO.SP.63/207/no. 61, Ormond to the p.c., 30 January 1600
 2. D.McCarthy (ed.), Life and Letters of Florence McCarthy Mor (1867), ch.8
 3. Ibid., pp.242-243
 4. CSPI., (1600), 338, Mountjoy to Cecil, 7 August 1600
 5. Cal.Carew MSS., iv, 113, Mountjoy to Carew, 28 July 1601.
 6. Annals of the Four Masters, vi, 2187. praca a Munster term for a spiked harrow to uproot weeds.
 7. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, III, 208

The evidence that these are not isolated examples of devastation, but that the tactic was generally used until the ultimate submission of O'Neill in March 1603, is overwhelming. Moryson's Itinerary, Docwra's "Narration", Stafford's Pacata Hibernia, and Carew's, Chichester's, and Mountjoy's letters to Cecil, all speak of the famine and widespread destruction which was part of the war. "It is famine, not the sword that must reduce this country to what is expected", wrote Chichester to Cecil.⁽¹⁾ And Captain Francis Shane wrote:

"As long as the Irish shall be suffered never so little tillage with their cows, they will never quail . . . "⁽²⁾

Captain Edward Blaney found the country people in north Monaghan, an area which he was later to possess, ready to starve since the cutting down of the green corn.⁽³⁾

Mountjoy at least was squeamish about the effects his methods had had on the civilian population. He wrote to Carew from Ulster in July 1602:

"We do now continually hunt all their woods, spoil their corn, burn their houses, and kill so many churls as it grieveth me to think that it is necessary to do it . . . " ⁽⁴⁾

Sir Calisthenes Brooke, too, distinguished for his bravery, applied for a transfer to the Low Countries claiming he was not fulfilling his proper calling as a soldier in the Irish war, which he said, required huntsmen not soldiers.⁽⁵⁾ Carew and Chichester appear to have had few such qualms about action against civilians; the evidence comes not from the strictures of the Irish Annalists, as one

1. CSPI., (1600), 147, Chichester to Cecil, 2 May 1600

2. Ibid., (1600-1601), 196, Shane to Cecil, 22 February 1601

3. Ibid., p.247, Blaney's dispatch to Mountjoy in the latter's to Cecil, 31 March 1601 from Drogheda

4. Cal.Carew MSS., iv, 264, Mountjoy to Carew, 2 July 1602

5. Cited in W.Renwick's edition of Spenser's View of the Present State of Ireland (Oxford, 1970), 219

might expect, but from the evidence of their own letters. Chichester boasted of his ruthlessness to Cecil: "We must kill and destroy all that comes to our hands", he wrote in December 1600,⁽¹⁾ and in May 1601 he was more specific to Cecil about his work:

"I burned all along the Lough (Neagh) within four miles of Dungannon, and killed a 100 people, sparing none of what quality, age or sex soever . . ." (2)

Of his raid into O'Hanlon's lands in Armagh, Chichester said he found the area:

". . . as plentifully stored with corn as any part of England, but I will labour by all means to destroy it, which will cut their throats faster than our swords, from which flight keeps them . . ." (3)

In contrast, there is little mention in Sir Henry Docwra's many letters of a scorched earth policy or of barbarities against civilians.⁽⁴⁾

This policy worked because it denied food to the Irish while the English forces could be steadily supplied from England, though the expense of maintaining the army from England was so great that in the last two years of the war the government was forced to debase the Irish coinage to support the war effort.⁽⁵⁾ In one other respect the English had a complete advantage. The Irish were never in a position to challenge or disrupt English sea-power in any significant way. The only disruptive naval challenge from the Irish came from the pirate fleet commanded by a remarkable woman, Grace O'Malley, known as the pirate queen of Connaught whose fleet manned by O'Malleys and

1. CSPI., (1600-1601), 84, Chichester to Cecil, 16 December 1600

2. Ibid., p.334, the same to the same, 15 May 1601

3. Ibid., p.448, the same to the same, 25 July 1601

4. Docwra's self-praise in many letters may be regarded with caution; at the time the lord deputy and the p.c. suspected many of his pronouncements on what he did at L.Foyle. His part in the war awaits an historical assessment.

5. M.Dolley in "Anglo-Irish Monetary policies, 1172-1637", Historical Studies, vii (1969), 58 sees the Elizabethan debasement of the Irish coinage as a fitting end to the Tudor exploitation of the island - "shillings Irish were struck which contained no more silver than an English three-penny piece passing as a great Irish".

O'Flaherties made shipping difficult on the Atlantic sea-board of Connaught until 1598.⁽¹⁾ English sea-power was effectively used to plant garrisons at Lough Foyle, Ballyshannon and Carrickfergus, to aid in raising the siege of Kinsale, and to send in supplies, re-inforcements and the habiliments of war via Lough Foyle, Belfast Lough, Carlingford and Dundalk for the north, Dublin, Waterford and Cork for the south, and Galway and Limerick for the west.

In achieving the re-conquest of Ireland strategies and tactics were employed which became commonplace in European warfare. Mountjoy and his commanders took hostages, ignored offers of truce, destroyed crops in country harbouring rebels, and in burning stores, villages and in driving off cattle starved the enemy of food and shelter. Their light flying columns of troops, which became the equal of the Irish in mobility, hunted out and harried pockets of resistance.⁽²⁾ And in Ulster particularly these operations were based on a network of garrisons and fortified blockhouses which the Irish, apparently lacking artillery in the main, could not storm. In this way Mountjoy, unlike previous lord deputies, concentrated on the main design of destroying O'Neill's main power-base in his Ulster homelands. And in so doing spared neither himself, his men, nor, above all the Irish.

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1. M.L.Schwind, in "Nurse to all rebellions: Grace O'Malley and Sixteenth Century Connaught" in Eire-Ireland, xiii (1978), 40-61 is, perhaps, the best modern account.
 2. Such tactics were not innovatory in Irish warfare, Sir Humphrey Gilbert in 1579 killed civilians, spoiled and wasted the enemies the resources on the counter revolutionary principle that if fish live in water as rebels live among the people the way to kill the fish is to dry up the water, see G.Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659 (C.U.P., 1972), passim for similar tactics in the Netherlands, and his "The Military Revolution", 1560-1660, a Myth" in the Journal of Modern History, vol48 (1976) p.205 footnote 27 citing Thomas Churchyard's Generall Rehersall of Warres (1579) on Humphrey Gilbert's campaign in Ireland.

(ii) Arms and Armour

The Elizabethan soldiers who carried out the reconquest did so with the new infantry weapons of the time, muskets, pikes and calivers. Muskets and calivers were the predominant attacking weapons of the war. The celebrated English long-bow was obsolete by the end of the sixteenth century; archers as a classification of troopers in muster rolls disappear by 1595 when the privy council ordained that archers should no longer be enrolled in the companies as efficient soldiers.⁽¹⁾ Firearms, or 'weapons of fire' revolutionized warfare as more than half the infantry carried guns; soldiers armed with them, the muskets and calivers, were collectively known as 'shot'. The pike was the major defensive weapon carried by less than half the infantry. It was a stout shaft of wood, usually of ash, twelve feet long and upwards, and tipped with sharpened iron^{blade}; it was used to resist cavalry or to hold off enemy pikemen. The physically strongest men in the company carried the pike. As well as firearms and pikes, swords and daggers were used, and the sword and the targets (or round shield) became the characteristic weapons of hand to hand fighting.⁽²⁾

Artillery posed problems for marching or mobile field forces; communication by road was notoriously bad especially in Ulster; Sir Henry Bagenal, for instance, tried to use field cannon at the Yellow Ford, in August 1598, but had to abandon them in boggy ground on his retreat.⁽³⁾ Mountjoy made better use of small field artillery, pieces like the "falcon" and "robinet", in his attack across the Blackwater in July 1601.⁽⁴⁾ Cannon, however, was most effective in

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1. C.Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century (1937), 384
 2. G.A.Hayes McCoy, Irish Battles (1969), 93, 94; and see Glossary.
 3. CSPI., (1598-1599), 242, Captain Kingsmill's account of the Yellow Ford.
 4. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, II, 408

its traditional rôle of attacking or defending fortifications.

Given time to make strategic gun emplacements and plenty of shot cannon proved very valuable at a number of sieges during the war.

The four contemporary pictorial maps following illustrate successful

English attacks with the use of cannon. The first, (Map 6) shows

Captain George Bingham's cannoners in action during the siege of

Maguire's castle at Enniskillen in February 1594. Supporting

musket fire from emplacements across the river Erne and from long

boats on the Lough to the rear of the castle is also clearly

portrayed. The map was sketched by a soldier, John Thomas, who took

part in the siege.⁽¹⁾ The second, (Map 7) shows the Earl of Essex's

forces firing cannon across the River Suir in a successful siege

of Cahir Castle in May 1599.⁽²⁾ The Queen in a letter to Essex of

the 19th July 1599 dismissively referred to his siege of Cahir Castle

as of no great matter "to have taken an Irish hold from a rabble of

rogues".⁽³⁾ The third (Map 8) shows the Earl of Thomond and Sir

George Carew drawing up a saker and falcons to batter Glin Castle,

near Limerick on the 7th and 8th of July 1600. The map shows large

cannon, probably the sakers, in action. Part of the inscription

reads: "the flankes where the saker did batter". Captain George

Flower led the final attack on the castle keep driving some of the

defenders to leap from the battlements into the river below.

1. B.L.Cottonian MS., Augustus, I, ii, 39, reproduced here to one sixth smaller than the original by kind permission of the British Library Manuscript Dept.


2. From Sir Thomas Stafford's Pacata Hibernia (1810 ed.), illustration facing p.76, reproduced to half the size of the original as Map 4 following.

3. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 315, The Queen to Essex, 19 July 1599

"Taken the ix of Februarie 1593 by Captten
John Dowdall, then Governour, Made and drawn
by John Thomas, Soldier"




1. PRO.SP.64/1/13, John Thomas's original pen and ink drawing.
A coloured lithograph copy in B.L., Cottonian MS., Augustus I, ii, 39
from



Cahir Castle taken by the
Earl of Essex in anno
1599

1. Thomas Stafford's, Pacata Hibernia, I (1810 edition) facing p.76



A Description of the Plot of the Glin taken by the Rebels under the Command of the Right Honourable George Carter Knight Lord President of Munster the 27th of August 1651. It contains 200 feet in breadth & 1000 in length according to the Properties thereof as described.

- 1 The barracks before the gate
- 2 The breach under the window of the Hall three hours after the Rebels entered upon the service of the year Under the Command of Captain Tower the Lord of Thomond
- 3 The Prisoners taken by the Rebels
- 4 The entrance into the great Hall
- 5 The entrance from the Hall into the Castle
- 6 The flank or wharf of the Castle
- 7 The bastion on the top of the castle where Captain Flower remained
- 8 The Rebels burnt by the Rebels at our approach
- 9 The key where the Rebels did live
- 10 our trenches
- 11 Captain Flower's Harrier
- 12 the flight of the Rebels before our landing and a prayer book in the hand
- 13 the two of three men
- 14 the three quarters
- 15 the knights of the Glin standing to behold our Battery


1. Thomas Stafford's Pacata Hibernia (1810 edition), facing p.112

Stafford's account of the siege described the difficulty of firing the canon:

The next day, when wee looked that the cannon should begin to play, the Cannonniers found the Peece to be cloyed, all the art and skill which either the Smith or himselfe could or did use, prevailed nothing. The President (Sir George Carew) who is a man that knowes well how to manage great Artillery, commanded that the peece upon her carriage (as she was) shoulde be abased at the tayle, and elevated at the musle, as high as it might bee: then he willed the Gunner to giue her a full charge of powder, roule a shott after it, and to giue fire at the mouth, whereby the touch-hole was presently cleared, to the great rejoicing of the Armie, which of necessitie in attempting the Castle (without the favour of the Cannon) must have endured great losse. This particular I thought good not to omitt, because it may be an instruction to others, whensoever the like accident should happen. (1)

Cannon are much mentioned in accounts of the famous siege of Dunboy Castle on Bantry Bay, Cork which was successfully stormed by Sir George Carew in June 1602, (Map 9) and large cannon both in defence and attack are clearly pictured.⁽²⁾ The inscriptions show how the ordnance was brought by sea on June 10th and brought to within firing range of the castle's main entrance and planted there on the 16th June. The main inscription reads: "The Castle of Dunboy taken by assault, the 17 and 18 of June 1602 blowne upp with powder the 22 of the monthe afore Said." Fynes Moryson

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1. Thomas Stafford, Pacata Hibernia (1810), edition, pp.115-116
 2. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, III, p.288. Accounts of the Dunboy siege will be found in the Pacata Hibernia, ii, 283, and in P.O'Sullivan Beare's, Historiae Catholicae Iberniae Compendium (Lisbon, 1621), iii, chs. 8-12. The author's uncle, Donall O'Sullivan Beare defended Dunboy Castle with a Spanish garrison against Sir George Carew until it was eventually taken 17,18 June 1602, and blown up on the 22 June.



1. Fynes Moryson's Itinerary, III, facing p.288 from the Pac. Hib.

described how

"our forces incamped within musket shot of the Castle, but not within sight of the castle, a rising ground lying between the Campe and the Castle, so as the great shot from the Castle flew over the Campe without doing any hurt". (1)

After two days battery "the English assaulted the breach, and possessed part of the Castle"; fighting went on in the castle for a day and a night before the English "were by force made full Masters of it". In the capture the English took a demi-culverin, two sakers, a brass falcon, five minions and an iron falcon used by the Spanish and Irish in the long defence. Moryson then described how the castle was destroyed: "nine barrels of powder taken in the Castle, were imploied to blow it up, lest any Spaniards or Rebels might after make use of it". (2)

All sixteenth century weapons had disadvantages; the pike while excellent in defence, required an exceptionally strong soldier to use it offensively and, without the support of "shot" the pikeman was vulnerable to the enemy's missile fire. Maps 2, 3, and 5 above clearly show the squares of pikes being used both for defence and attack supported by wings of "shot". (3) The caliver and musket were much better as offensive weapons but their effective range was comparatively short, and the rate of fire slow. Barnaby Rich, the military author who had served in Ireland, reckoned that though the caliver had a range of between 350 and 400 yards it was only effective under 300 yards, and he estimated that its rate of fire could vary between 10 and 40 rounds an hour. The heavier musket was more effective over 300 yards, it could fire heavier balls which could shatter armour, but it needed a support or rest ^{and} ~~but~~ was awkward to use while moving, and it had

1. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, III, 285

2. Ibid.

3. See Maps 3 and 5, the clearer examples of this formation.

an even lower rate of fire than the caliver.⁽¹⁾ Firearms of any type were, of course, of little use in heavy rain. Both sides in the battle of the Moyry Pass, 1600 abandoned their pieces "for neither side could take fire in the rain", and were forced "to betake themselves unto their swords".⁽²⁾

Firearms had not entirely superceded older weapons on the Irish side. The Irish, for example, employed Scottish archers at Clontibret 1595. O'Donnell's men used javelins when they re-took Enniskillen in the same year; Captain John Fuller was killed in that engagement by a throw of a javelin,⁽³⁾ and near Derry, Sir Henry Docwra was wounded by a javelin.⁽⁴⁾ O'Clery's *Life of Red Hugh O'Donnell* give a very detailed account of the types of weapons used by the Irish. At the Yellow Ford they had

"plenty of broad-shouldered darts, and broad green spears, with strong handles of good ash. They had straight, keen swords, and light shining axes."

In the battle for the Curlew Mountains between Sligo and Roscommon, O'Clery speaks of O'Donnell's forces as having

"loud-sounding, straight shooting guns, and ... strong bows ... and bloody venomous javelins ... strong keen edged swords and polished thin edged battleaxes, with large headed, smooth narrow lances ... and long smooth spears ..." (5)

The spears and lances were probably pikes, but it is of interest that axes, javelins and bows were still in use. The primitive nature of some weapons mentioned in these Irish sources may give a misleading

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1. Barnaby Rich's, Pathway to Military Discipline cited in H.Webb, Elizabethan Military Science (1965), 93
 2. CSPI., (1600), 524 ff. "The Lord Deputy's Journal of his journey unto the north", 28th October 1600, endorsed by Sir Robert Cecil.
 3. P.O'Sullivan Beare's portion of the History of Catholic Ireland, edited by M.J.Byrne as Ireland under Elizabeth (Dublin, 1903), 81,
 - 4.. Docwra's, Narration, ed. cited, p.242
 - 5.. L.O'Clery's Life of Red Hugh O'Donnell, edited by D.Murphy (Dublin, 1893), 167, and see P.Walsh's edition (*Irish Texts Soc 1948*), I, 175-6

impression of an ill-equipped Irish soldiery. In fact this is far from the case. Carew thought some of the Ulster soldiers who fought against him in Munster in 1600 to be "the best furnished men for the warre, and the best appoynted wee have seene in this Kingdome".⁽¹⁾ The Earl of Essex in writing to the queen acknowledged the Irish were more skilful in handling their weapons than the English.⁽²⁾ Others said that O'Neill's men were a better trained force than the queen's, as good marksmen as France, Flanders or Spain could show, and "came as little short of the English for proportion and provision as they were for the skill and use of arms".⁽³⁾

From English muster lists it is clear that firearms of "shot" were carried by about 60 per cent of the company, pikes and halberds by 40 per cent. In the 1596 levy for Ireland the "shot" amounted to half the total. One in four of these were armed with muskets, and the other three with the light caliver; the other half of the total were pikemen, and a few halberdiers.⁽⁴⁾ The general tendency throughout the war was not only to increase the proportion of firearms against pikes but also to increase the light calivers as against the heavier muskets, because lighter guns were more suited to Irish military operations. A muster list made before the battle of Clontibret of Sir Henry Bagenal's force in 1595 illustrates this tendency, and also shows how the proportions between weapons could vary between companies.

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1. Stafford's Pacata Hibernia, 43
 2. Cal. Carew MSS., iv, preface, lxi, footnote.
 3. For some English captains' opinions of Irish soldiers see CSPI., (1596-1597), 27, 38, 151; ibid., (1598-1599), 38, 338, 507.
 4. AFC., xxv, 262

<u>Captain</u>	<u>Pikes</u>	<u>Calivers</u>	<u>Muskets</u>	<u>Halberds</u>	<u>Total</u>	
Wm. Mostyn	38	46	10	-	94	
H. Mostyn	34	48	12	-	94	
C. Collier	30	44	10	10	94	
J. Goring	34	50	10	-	94	
N. Merriman	28	46	10	10	94	
R. Cuney	33	41	10	10	94	
J. Conway	38	46	10	-	94	
T. Harcourt	30	53	9	2	94	
R. Mansell	40	50	-	4	94	(1)
<u>Totals</u>	<u>305</u>	<u>424</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>846</u>	

In this muster firearms predominated, making up approximately 65 per cent of the company against 35 per cent pikes and halberds, but between companies a wide variation can be noted which was likely due to availability of particular weapons, or the lack of them at the muster and review. Many of the soldiers in the muster were comparatively untrained recent recruits and perhaps for that reason there is no mention of swords which required much skill in close quarter fighting. The halberd, not yet an exclusively ceremonial weapon, was used by the commander's bodyguard, and to protect ensigns carrying the colours. There is no mention of the bill, with its hooded blade and spike, which resembled ~~and~~^{the} halberd, and was obsolescent in the 1590s. Carew, Master of Ordnance, remarked in 1590 on the futility of the government sending him "old brown bills" and "long bows": he told Burghley that these weapons "are held in such scorn, that unless I should sell them to the farmers of the Pale ... I am in despair to utter them". (2)

A more experienced force than that mustered at Clontibret drew up a three-lined battle formation under Sir Conyers Clifford and fought in the Curlews, a high range of hills between S. Sligo and Roscommon, on Sunday 5th August 1599. The Vanguard led by Sir Alexander Ratcliffe had 385 men with firearms and 186 "armed",

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1. L. Marron printed Bagenal's muster lists in the Irish Sword, ii (1957), 368 ff.
 2. Cal. Carew MSS., iii, 40, Carew to Burghley, 26th July 1590

that is with pikes; Lord ~~Berea~~ Dunkellin commanded the "Battle" line with 256 "shot" and 165 "armed"; and Sir Arthur Savage led the Rearguard having 344 "shot" and 160 "armed".⁽¹⁾ Pikes, halberds and targets, collectively called "armed", were about the same proportion as at Clontibret 34 per cent compared with 35 per cent.

Mountjoy's muster at Dundalk, in 1600, however, shows the proportion of pikes and targets, "armed men", at 42 per cent. By the following year, when Mountjoy mustered near Newry in June 1601, there were 291 pikes, 112 targets, 635 calivers and 125 muskets in his total force of 1,250, a proportion of 39 per cent "armed men", 3 per cent lower than in his muster of the previous year.⁽²⁾ The preference for the lighter firearm can be seen in the orders sent in to the Ordnance officers in London to despatch to Ireland a thousand calivers as against only one hundred muskets.⁽³⁾

As we saw in Part 1 the soldiers were supposed to arrive in Ireland already armed, but arms arriving from the shire levies were never enough. The Dublin council wrote to the privy council in May 1598 asking for good quantities of weapons to be speedily sent for they calculated:

"By the death and running away of soldiers, and by their selling and embezzling their arms, as well to the rebels as to the country people, and through weapons being broken, lost and consumed there cannot but be a great want of the same".⁽⁴⁾

And, in May 1599 the Earl of Essex reminded the privy council that "when re-inforcements come over they bring arms ... for here in service the arms decay faster than the men"; he added that the stores were so diminished as to be of little help to any new levy.⁽⁵⁾ Lord

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1. S.O'Domhnaill, "Warfare in sixteenth century Ireland" in I.H.S., v, no.17 (1946), 29-54
 2. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, II, 334-336, 403
 3. APC., xxx, 374
 4. CSPI., (1598-1599), 138
 5. CSPI., (1599-1600), 30. The Irish called Essex the "Earl of Excess" and that he "never drew sword but to make knights" - ibid., p.260

Mountjoy advised the privy council in January 1600 to have

"3,000 especial good swords, broad and basket-hilted provided ... for those swords sent out of the counties with the soldiers are nothing worth". (1)

Joshua Aylmer in reporting a skirmish near Cork in April 1600 to Cecil tells him how a company of infantry lacking firearms and armed only with sword and pike encouraged the enemy so much that the whole force would have been overthrown had not the horse troops come to the rescue, and that "in that fight we lost thirty horses". (2)

Mountjoy pointed out to the privy council what happened to the army when a soldier broke his firearm. If his captain, not having an allowance for broken arms, turned him into a pikeman, and "so our shot prove very few, and our pikes many more than we have use of". (3)

The proportions of arms in the muster lists, however, as we have seen, do not support Mountjoy's view to the privy council in July 1601; though muster lists, on the other hand, probably show unbroken firearms. Sir Arthur Chichester however voiced a complaint against the defective guns sent with re-inforcements to him, which reiterated Mountjoy's opinion of arms from the shires: "... the pieces break like glass being old rotten barrels put into new stocks". He particularly blamed conductors of troops out of Yorkshire who brought up cheap arms in Chester "not thinking of the loss and danger it brings unto us who are to adventure our lives with them". (4)

It does not appear to have been the government's fault that arms were often wanting; contracts with arms suppliers appear to have sufficiently covered the numbers in the levies sent over to Ireland, and yet the ordnance office in Dublin continually sought additional arms and munitions, and commanders constantly petitioned

1. CSPI., (1599-1600), 448

2. Ibid., (1600), 113

3. Ibid., (1600-1601), 441

4. Ibid., (1601-1603), 207

for more supplies. And military failure was often blamed on lack of arms. Sir Henry Docwra's Lough Foyle garrisons, for instance, occasionally blamed their lack of success on the want of arms.⁽¹⁾

Infantry forces of "shot" and "armed men" formed the bulk of the fighting forces. Cavalry, potentially the principal arm and most powerful force on the battlefield, never achieved prominence in late Elizabethan Ireland. Its hey-day lay in the future with Oliver Cromwell and the New Model Army.⁽²⁾ The heavily armed knight on a charger was clumsy and expensive; chargers were likely scarce having to be well fed and exercised and ~~its~~ ^{Their} riders extremely skilled for the use of the lance on horseback was "a thing of much industry and labour to learn".⁽³⁾ Therefore heavy cavalry fully armed are hardly mentioned in the 1590s simply because their place was gradually taken over by the light horse or demi-lance, so called because their chief weapon was still the lance or horseman's staff.

In Ireland the cavalry was arranged in troops of 100, 50 and 25, and at times bands as small as ten or twelve are mentioned in accounts of raids and skirmishes such as those undertaken by Docwra's scattered garrisons into Donegal, Innishowen and north Tyrone.⁽⁴⁾ But the smaller units of horse can also be found mentioned in the many army lists throughout Carew's papers and in Fynes Moryson's Itinerary.⁽⁵⁾ There were far fewer cavalry forces than infantry active in Ireland. In muster lists totals of 1,200 horse and 14,000 foot are typical. The army list of 1595, for example, shows 657 horse to 4,040 foot.⁽⁶⁾

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1. CSPI., (1599-1600), 227, 228; (1601-1603), 25, 126, 144, 155, 164
 2. D.Murphy, Cromwell in Ireland (Dublin, 1883), see index under Army parliamentary, pp.434, 435
 3. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 365, Mountjoy's ordinances, February 1600
 4. PRO.SP.63/208/pt.ii/19; ibid., 207/pt.iii/133; ibid., 208/pt.iii/12 mentions of cavalry action in Docwra's letters, June 1600 - June 1601.
 5. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 127, 288; ibid., iv, 92, 93, 296; Moryson's Itinerary, ii, 345-348, 431; ibid., iii, 40, 41, 146, 249, 338.
 6. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 127-128

In the field army under Mountjoy in 1601 there were 124 horse to 2,150 foot,⁽¹⁾ while in the great concentration of forces at Kinsale there was but a total of 857 horse as against 11,800 foot.⁽²⁾

Small bands of horsemen were vulnerable to a resolute pike formation in a square especially when the enemy deliberately chose uneven terrain on which an old fashioned cavalry charge could prove disastrous. Occasionally, as at Kinsale charges were successful where the Irish had been driven onto open ground and there forced to fight on English terms. John Derricke's celebrated Image of Irelande (1581) has well known wood-cuts showing English cavalry using the lance underhand, in contrast to the Irish, who used it overhand; they show the horseman's lance resembling the pike in length and head, but as thicker at the butt and bored through at the butt end to take a leather thong for fastening onto the arm.⁽³⁾ By the 1590s a proportion, ideally a third of the cavalry units, carried firearms, variously termed harquebusiers, argualiters, pistoleers or petronels and collectively known as "shot on horse".⁽⁴⁾ Mountjoy's set of army ordinances issued in February 1600 state that "a third of the horse be shot-on-horseback", so that, as the ordinance went on to say, the meanest horses will be as serviceable as the greatest.⁽⁵⁾ By the end of the sixteenth century the arquebuse had a standard bore or calibre and the phrase then in use "arquebuse of calibre" soon became abbreviated to caliver.⁽⁶⁾ Calivers or hand-guns were an early form of the matchlock with a 'snaphance', and, because one form developed by German cavalry earlier in the century was held against

1. Cal. Carew MSS., iv., 92-94

2. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, iii, 40-43 "The Lyst of the Army at Kinsale the twentieth of November 1601".

3. J.Small (edited) The Image of Irelande by John Derricke, 1581 (1883), Plate No.ix, for example.

4. See Glossary

5. Cal. Carew MSS., iii, 365, Mountjoy's ordinances, February 1600

6. J.Fortescue, A History of the British Army, i, (1899), 137, 101-103

the chest to fire they became known in England as petronell from the French poitrinal.⁽¹⁾ The smallest hand-gun, the pistol, became more versatile with the development of the wheel-lock which did away with the need for match. Some of these horsemen carried three such pistols "two in cases and one at the girdle", or at the hinder part of the saddle."⁽²⁾ And all cavalrymen carried a sword and dagger as a secondary means of defence. Like his colleagues on foot with a musket or a caliver the shot on horseback also needed "a flash and touchbox for his piece" and a bullet bag at his girdle, the ancestor of the bandolier.⁽³⁾ When the horseman came face to face with the enemy he could either charge into the *mêlée* or engage him from a short distance with his shot, wheeling away to re-load and returning to fire.⁽⁴⁾ This, at least, was the theory, but theory rarely had the chance to be tested in practice for only on a few occasions such as at Clontibret and Kinsale did the Irish accept the challenge of the open battlefield.⁽⁵⁾

The army had no means of making gunpowder in Ireland. All supplies had to be imported from England. Its manufacture and supply came under the overall control of the ordnance office. Licensed powder makers had to import sulphur, but saltpetre was artificially made from lime, ashes and earth treated with animal excrement; there was a plentiful supply of charcoal, the third essential ingredient in England.⁽⁶⁾ In 1599 the powder makers

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1. C.Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth century (1937) pp.84-87
 2. Cited in H.Webb, Elizabethan Military Science (1965), 117
 3. J.Fortescue, op.cit., p.137
 4. C.Oman, op.cit., p.86
 5. CSPI., (1592-1596), pp.320 ff. for the battle of Clontibret, and for the use of cavalry at Kinsale, see CSPI., (1601-1603), 240 ff.
 6. Cal.Patent and Close Rolls, ii, p.188 for licences to make gunpowder for the ordnance department of the Tower.

contracted to supply the government a hundred lasts of gun-powder a year at 7d the pound, and any surplus was authorised to be sold to private merchants at 10d the pound.⁽¹⁾

Shipping and distributing gunpowder to Ireland caused problems in the prosecution of the war. Delays in transport, careless storage in the ships and bad weather conditions meant that consignments of powder and match arrived in Ireland wet, rotten and therefore unusable. Sir Henry Docwra, for example, checked the unloading of munitions in Derry from the George of Chester to find the match and powder wet and deficient.⁽²⁾ There was often insufficient powder sent and accidental powder explosions further reduced the valuable commodity. Stocks of powder ran dangerously low. On one occasion, for instance, there was not a single barrel of powder in Dublin while 44 cart-loads were waiting to be shipped from Chester.⁽³⁾

Even when powder was delivered in good condition it would not necessarily be used, for the private soldier was expected to buy his own gunpowder. The soldier knew that the more powder he used the less money he would have for life's necessities. When the Earl of Essex wanted a free issue of gunpowder the idea was dismissed as being against all reason, equity, good order and justice.⁽⁴⁾ Some captains were strongly against the custom of their men having to purchase their own powder. One of them said it turned brave men into cowards. Another claimed that the practice made the soldier unwilling to burn powder "because he by that means thinketh he should starve his belly or his back".⁽⁵⁾ The pressure by the captains to

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1. C.G.Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army, (2nd ed. Oxford, 1966), 127
 2. CSPI., (1601-1603), 25:
 3. Ibid., (1600-1601), lxi
 4. Ibid., (1599-1600), p.380
 5. PRO.SP.63/202/pt.ii/38

have the unreasonable practice changed bore fruit when Buckhurst, the lord treasurer, agreed in January 1600 to give soldiers in Ireland free issue of powder when about to go into action.⁽¹⁾

In Mountjoy's time there was also occasional issue of free powder for training sessions as well as for battle. A satisfactory state of affairs was finally reached in 1601 when the privy council decided that the private soldier would not in future have to bear the cost of gunpowder nor replace arms lost on the field of battle.⁽²⁾

The safe-keeping of stores of munitions in Ireland was aided by a proclamation of the Dublin council on 20th August 1595, restricting storage to "common halls or town houses of cities or towns" and reserving issue only to authorized army personnel.⁽³⁾

But this did not prevent abuse. James Perrot claimed in his Chronicle that this proclamation would have done much to prevent an illicit trade in powder "if it had byn well observed ... but nyther proclamacion nor lawes will prevyale unlesse they be well executed".⁽⁴⁾ Captains and other officers were accused of taking out barrels of powder on pretence of immediate service, then selling or pledging it so that official stocks were sometimes empty, putting soldiers in danger of their lives. At Clontibret Captain Nicholas Merriman ran short of ammunition and powder so that he had to send out a detachment of pikes "to charge upon Tyrone's shot". In that battle the Irish were said to have expended fourteen barrels of powder or 1,400 lbs. to the English ten barrels.⁽⁵⁾

The city's corporation records noted in the same month that two companies of recruits marching out of Dublin were "taken with a

1. CSPI., (1599-1600), 380

2. APC., xxxii, 337

3. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 120

4. James Perrot, The Chronicle of Ireland, 1584-1608, edited H.Wood I.M.C. (Dublin, 1933), 110

5. G.A.Hayes McCoy, Irish Battles (1969), 124-128

Scarborowe warninge ... all unfurnished for powder and shot".⁽¹⁾

In every war human error can cost lives: accidents with gunpowder were frequently reported from the Elizabethan forces in Ireland. In May 1598, for example Captain Wilton's men at Enniscorthy in Wexford facing the rebel forces of Owney O'Moore were devastated when one Goldwell "wolde not give them powder tyll he sawe wheather theare weare cause of service or not". O'Moore observing the confusion attacked "so that the soldiers coming thicke together to receive powder, it fell on fire and so was consumed". O'Moore pressed home his advantage and "before ten of the clocke before noone thear was slayne of the Queene's souldiers 309 and the rest putt to flight to save themselves". The English force was almost wiped out; William Farmer, a surgeon with the army, in reporting the incident said that there were only about 400 men in all in the Enniscorthy garrison.⁽²⁾ At the Yellow Ford in August 1598 a soldier went to fill his flask from the open powder barrel with a lighted match in his hand, the inevitable explosion which followed helped to cause the retreat and rout.⁽³⁾

The absence of match could be almost as troublesome. In August 1601 Sir Henry Docwra's planned excursion to link up with Mountjoy's incursion into the heartlands of Tyrone had to be called off when it was discovered that no match had been provided. In his Narration Docwra recalled the embarrassment:

I called for the clerke and asked him the reason. Hee tould mee hee had it not, Nowe (says I) did yow not tell mee yow had 60 barrells: I tould yow (saide he) that I had 60 barrells of powder, and soe I had, but of match yow asked mee nothing ... (4)

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1. Cal. of the Ancient Records of Dublin, ii, ed. J.T. Gilbert (1891) pp. 349-350. "A Scarborough warning" a 16th century expression for any sudden movement.
 2. William Farmer, 'Chronicles of Ireland 1594-1613' edited C.L. Falkiner in EHR., lxxxv (1907), 108
 3. P. O'Sullivan Beare's portion of his history translated and edited by M. Byrne, Ireland under Elizabeth (Dublin 1903), 110
 4. Docwra's Narration, and CSPI., (1600-1601) 426; APC., xxxii, 181-189, the privy council's rebuke to Docwra.

The clerk's literal following of instructions led to the expedition's failure to meet up with Mountjoy, and led to sharp criticism from the lord deputy and privy council. Docwra made amends later by the successful capturing of Donegal castle and abbey from O'Donnell; but again the danger of powder was illustrated when the powder magazines blew up in the abbey killing about thirty of the newly established garrison.⁽¹⁾

During the war the greatly increased use of firearms hastened the obsolescence of heavy armour. In a guerilla war in which the skirmish rather than the set battle was the most characteristic action the soldier needed to be lightly accoutered. The chief military historian of the war, G.A.Hayes McCoy, has shown how little armour was worn other than morions or helmets "well stuffed" for comfort, and cuirasses made of layers of ox-hide to protect the chest and back. The traditional metal corselet, the body armour of the pikeman was more rarely used. The traditional pikemen wore the corslet, a metal shell for the torso, pauldrons, vambraces and tasses, metal plates protecting shoulders, arms and thighs, and gauntlets for the hands and wrists. Captains rightly considered such a weight of armour to be an encumbrance in Ireland.⁽²⁾ These items of armour continued to be supplied but lay unused. Humphrey Cover, muster master at Lough Foyle told Cecil in December 1600 that

"no headpieces or armours for footmen be now, or hereafter sent to Lough Foyle, because they are never worn ... but negligently scattered and buried in the soil of every quarter".⁽³⁾

Captain Dawtrey reported in February 1601 that it was a common fault

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1. CSPI., (1601-1603), 92-95, Docwra to the p.c., 28 Sept. 1601 ibid., pp.97-99, Docwra to Cecil report of the Donegal disaster. The abbey was the home of the Four Masters whose Annals, a vast compendium of Irish history was partly written there.
 2. G.A.Hayes McCoy, Irish Battles (1969), 62, 92, 110 ff. 124, 127. For the names of pieces of armour see Glossary.
 3. CSPI., (1600-1601), 113, Covert to Cecil, December 1600.

that no pikemen in Ireland "weareth curates and morions."⁽¹⁾ The well known war of words between military writers of late Elizabethan England on the relative merits of the long bow and the gun had its counterpart in the argument about protective armour.⁽²⁾ But it would seem that soldiers in Ireland decided for themselves upon the lightest possible body protection when in action. Sir George Bouchier, master of ordnance in 1594, asked Lord Burghley's permission to exchange or sell a thousand corslets "of an old fashion".⁽³⁾ Sir Uriah Leigh even wanted to abandon the traditional morion or steel helmet in favour of caps for his Cheshire company of 1596. Leigh regarded morions "as needless" but he was apparently persuaded by the Cheshire commissioners to use the helmets.⁽⁴⁾ And though it was often reported that by comparison with the English the Irish soldier wore little or no armour, it is clear from Irish accounts of engagements that they too wore the morion, and some of their cavalrymen wore chain mail over padded jackets in the same manner as the English lighthorseman. In 1600 for example, an Irish ambush was detected when the sun-light glinted off their morions.⁽⁵⁾

Reports of fighting illustrate the effectiveness of some body protection and the foolhardiness of its absence. Dermot O'Connor, an Irish captain, said he saved his life from a musket ball by taking it on his target indicating that the old fashioned shield still had a use outside hand to hand combat in a sword fight.⁽⁶⁾

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1. CSPI., (1600-1601) p.183, Dawtrey to Cecil, 9 February 1601
 2. M.J.D.Cockle (editor), A Bibliography of English Military Books 1642 and of contemporary foreign books (1900) is the best guide to contemporary military writers, and for selected arguments and counter arguments see J.R.Hale, The Art of War and Renaissance England (Folger Shakespeare Library, Washington, 1961) passim.
 3. CSPI., (1592-1596), 230, Bouchier to the p.c., 10 April 1594
 4. PRO.SP.63/194/133d., Sir Uriah Leigh's muster roll and letter. Mountjoy's instructions of 1600 emphatically order his soldiers to wear their morions - PRO.SP.63/207/pt.i/72, January 1600.
 5. P.Walsh (translator and editor) O'Clery's Life of Red Hugh O'Donnell (Dublin, 1948)
 6. D.Murphy (ed.) O'Clery's Life of Red Hugh O'Donnell (Dublin 1893), 167

O'Sullivan Beare's report of a duel between Rory O'Donnell, the younger brother of Red Hugh, and an un-named English sergeant described how the sergeant's jerkin of ox-hide "whether owing to the toughness of the leather, or some spell" saved him for a time until O'Donnell forced him into a river and held him under water at pike point until he drowned.⁽¹⁾ Sir Henry Bagenal at the Yellow Ford having raised his visor was struck in the face by a bullet and was killed.⁽²⁾ Sir Henry Docwra was luckier to have survived a head wound from the cast of a javelin because he was wearing his helmet.⁽³⁾

Armoured or not soldiers inevitably died. William Farmer, the army surgeon, wrote of Sir Henry Norris's fatal wound: "shotte into the legge and all the bones broken, which came to a gangrene whereof he died". In his account of the battle of the Moyry Pass, September 1600, Farmer dwelt on some of the injuries with a professional interest:

Sir Oliver Lambert was shott in the syde, Sir Christopher St. Lawrence in the neckbone, Captaine Gainsford in the hypp, Captain Rush in the bellye, Captain Harvey in the kne pan, four or five lieutenantes hurte and one slayne. Sir William Godolphin had his horse braynes dasht in his face ...

Later at Carlingford, November 1600 Farmer noted further injuries: Sir Henry Danvers was shot "in the thygh", Captain Handford "in the raynes of the back"; Captain Trevor "in the arme", and Sir Thomas Norris died "of an apoplexie which grew in his head after a wound".⁽⁴⁾

Accurate contemporary accounts of battles are rare; the vanquished were seldom in a position to commit to writing a version

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1. P.O'Sullivan Beare in edition cited, M.Byrne, Ireland under Elizabeth (Dublin, 1903), 137
 2. Ibid., p.111
 3. Docwra's, Narration, edition cited, p.229
 4. W.Farmer's Chronicles of Ireland ed. by C.Litton Falkiner in the EHR., lxxxv (1907), 113, 115, 118, 119

of what they thought had gone wrong, even if they knew, and had had an overall view of the action. The victorious, for their part, tend to exaggerate their success and are more concerned with the fact of their victory than the method of its achievement. However, war in any period and on any scale can be seen as a competition in which the participants seek to inflict maximum suffering on each other. Military histories which ignore this basic and central fact to concentrate on the glories of victories in arms or to explain away defeats on the battlefield do not give the whole story. For many of the soldiers the experience of injury or death was probably a more pressing reality than the elation of victory. While precise figures are difficult to obtain, and where they exist are generally misleading in this period, it is thought that casualties from hostilities, disease and inadequate medical care were high in the last years of the Irish war; this aspect is the concern of the final chapter.

CHAPTER TWELVE

The Casualties of War

This final chapter set out to consider the war's casualties the sick, the wounded and the dead. In every sixteenth-century war disease was a greater killer than battle wounds; the nine year war in Ireland was no exception. Army surgeons, and field hospitals tried in vain to cope with both. For those who survived, welfare measures were taken in England when they returned from the war.

(i) Casualties and Care in Ireland.

A combination of inadequate and bad food with the "raw and waterish" Irish climate and often poor lodgings in garrison brought on "the disease of Ireland", most likely a general term for ague and dysentery, which singly or together became the lot of many a soldier after a couple of months in the country.⁽¹⁾ One soldier wrote to Lord Burghley that his health had not stood up to the diet; he had been sea-sick on the voyage, and had fallen victim to dysentery because he slept on the hard ground.⁽²⁾ His experience was typical. Captain Nicholas Dawtrey wrote to Cecil on 9 February 1601 that his cavalrymen had not been able to endure even a month's ill weather, some of them dying of agues and fluxes, others lying sick, hurt and impotent. "I gave them passport" he wrote, "for they were good for nothing but to hang upon their master's beef-pot and buttery".⁽³⁾ An anonymous writer of a scheme to defeat O'Neill, sent to Sir Henry Brounker on 12 March 1598, mentioned that O'Neill "has a friend that never yet failed him, the disease of the country, fatal, as

1. CSPI., (1596-1597), 148, 263

2. PRO.SP.63/44/49

3. CSPI., (1600-1601), 182

you know to all of our nation at their first lying in camp."⁽¹⁾

Irish rebel soldiers were wont to say that their four best captains were Captains Hunger, Toil, Cold and Sickness.⁽²⁾ Many dispatches from Ireland mention that sickness killed more men than the sword, and that it particularly affected newly arrived recruits. Patrick Barnewall in writing to Cecil 10 August 1600 from Dublin said:

"if their garrisons at first be in places far from relief, they fall into sickness and diseases, and so drop away, or are sent back again to England".⁽³⁾

Outbreaks of sickness among the soldiers were generally attributed to a change of diet, air, and the "foulness" of the Irish weather, to which all kinds of maladies were attributed. Ignorance of the first principles of hygiene, and the excesses of the soldiers were more likely reasons.⁽⁴⁾

Of all the large scale levies of soldiers that went to Ireland that to Lough Foyle under Docwra suffered the most from outbreaks of disease. Dysentery and typhus, as it now appears, struck the Derry garrisons within six months of their landing there.⁽⁵⁾ Of a landing force of nearly 4,000 there were hardly 1,500 fit men remaining a year later; in the next six months from September 1600 to March 1601 the loss of men from disease seems to have continued among the re-inforcements sent in December 1600.⁽⁶⁾ Docwra attributed the cause of the sickness to the "distemperature of the air ... which exceedeth all credit to such as feel it not",⁽⁷⁾ but the Irish annalists were probably closer

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1. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 100
 2. PRO.SP.63/202/pt.iv/no.75 - a discourse on Ireland, unsigned, 1598
 3. CSPI., (1600), 341, Barnwall to Cecil, 10 August 1600
 4. Ibid., 243, 406, 415, 455, 473, 489, 531, 532, mentions of bad weather as a cause of diseases in one year.
 5. PRO.SP.63/207/pt.v/no.2, Docwra to Cecil, 2 September 1600
 6. This proportion is deduced from Covert's muster certificates - PRO.SP.63/208/pt.ii/no.17, and the needs of re-inforcements at Derry in December 1600 and in April 1601 - APC., xcxi, 21-23, 315
 7. PRO.SP.63/207/pt.v/no.2, Docwra to Cecil, 2 September 1600

to the truth when they wrote of the state of Docwra's soldiers:

... they were diseased and distempered in consequence of the narrowness of their situation [i.e. over-crowded] and the old victuals, the salt and bitter flesh meat they used, and from the want of fresh meat, and other necessities to which they had been accustomed ... (1)

While Docwra wrote of "seas of sick men daily increasing ... some by counterfeiting, some by hurts and other casualties by the hand of God", the privy council was of the opinion that lack of exercise and idleness were the real reasons why so many of Docwra's men fell "into sundry diseases". (2)

Even well fed garrisons in Ireland often suffered from what the Elizabethans called "the looseness of the country disease, or flux". Dysentery was liable to break out in any camp that stayed in one place for more than a fortnight because of ignorance of the basic principles of hygiene. (3) As an antidote to dysentery Docwra laid in stores of 4,000 lbs of liquorice and 1,000 lbs of aniseed to make medicinal drinks but they do not appear to have worked. Fynes Moryson suggested that the flux did not affect the Irish because their favourite drink was usequebah or whiskey. (4) And it was a disease that did not greatly affect Lord Mountjoy's field army; except at the siege of Kinsale he generally kept his men on the move, thereby reducing the incidence of camp diseases. Bad food, a wet climate and poor lodgings appear to have been the chief causes of so much sickness among the Elizabethan forces in Ireland.

Medical attention to the battle wounded had by all accounts improved, but much depended on the speed with which the wounded

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1. Annals of the Kingdom of Ireland by the Four Masters (translated and edited by J.O'Donovan, Dublin, 1851), vol.vi, 2209, hereafter AFM.
 2. APC., xxx, 578, p.c. to Docwra, 10 August 1600
 3. P.Logan, 'Pestilence in the Irish Wars: the earlier phase' Irish Sword, vol.7 (1966), 285-288
 4. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, iv, 192, and for his description of Irish drinking habits, ibid., p.197

were removed from the field to the surgeon. Captain Hugh Mostyn, who claimed twenty-seven years experience of fighting in Ireland, vividly described in November 1598 the fate of the wounded in battle. He had often seen soldiers attending to the "carriage of their wounded comrades", an act of mercy that involved further peril, "for the longer they be carried, the more danger and trouble shall be with them". He went on to say:

"when they are hurt ... unless the wounded man be able to shift for himself, or have great friends in the camp (which every common soldier hath not) he is but lost, and so the longer they are forth, the more will increase their wounded men ... and hinder the service..."

He recommended that a hospital be established on the grounds that if soldiers saw their wounded fellows going to "warm beds to surgery" there is no doubt "but each soldier will put forward his best foot, and show himself most valiant".⁽¹⁾

Any assessment of numbers wounded and killed in the war is likely to be inaccurate. Contemporary reports of killed and wounded on both sides tend to exaggerate the losses of the enemy. The Irish Annalists, for example, tend to use vague phrases like "a great number were killed", "hundreds lay slain on the field of battle" and similar phrases can be found in English reports of Irish losses.⁽²⁾ When numbers of killed and wounded are given they tend to be round figures, which may justly be suspected as inaccurate. We might have had more accurate figures of casualties if a Clerk of Casualties, mentioned in 1595, had kept a tally throughout the war. But Sir Robert Napper, Chief Baron in the Dublin administration, saw no use for the office, and recommended to Lord Burghley in March 1595 that the "office of clerk of casualties be suppressed".⁽³⁾ There is no

1. CSPI., (1598-1599), 385-386, Mostyn to Cecil, November 1598

2. AFM., vi, passim, and many reports throughout the eight relevant volumes of the CSPI.

3. PRO.SP.63/178, 118, 118(i), Sir Robert Napper to Lord Burghley, 26 March 1595 (n.s.)

further mention of such a clerk, and there are no surviving casualty figures that he might have drawn up.

Sometimes the number of English casualties was deliberately concealed. O'Sullivan Beare wrote that it was an English custom to conceal their own dead, and expose their slain enemies in public places.⁽¹⁾ Sir Ralph Lane, the muster master general, wrote to Lord Burghley after the English defeat at Clontibret in 1595 that "more men were hurt in the late service than was convenient to declare".⁽²⁾ Serious histories of the war agree that loss of life from hostilities was less than from sickness, but we shall probably never know the exact figures of losses, or the numbers sent back to England, or re-habilitated for service. Contemporary dispatches of skirmishes, battles and sieges give some numbers of the killed and wounded. Table 1 sets them out. We can be more confident of the numbers of officers killed or wounded for they were usually named. Of the 475 captains who served in Ireland during the O'Neill war (See Appendix 2) over 65 were killed or died of wounds in Ireland, and about 50 were seriously wounded which suggests that captains were more active in military engagements than some reports would have us believe. Very often mentions of Irish rebel losses give a single figure for the killed and wounded, but where other sources differentiate the killed and wounded on the Irish rebel side these have been used in Table 1. Finally no adequate figures were recorded for Irishmen who died fighting on the English side. Fynes Moryson, for example, dismisses Irish losses on the English side. In his account of the skirmish at Monaghan in July 1601 he wrote:

"Captain Esmond ... was sore hurt... and forty or fiftie of our side slaine. We cannot learne that any English were among them so as we account our losse to be no more than the taking of the Captaine ..." (3)

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1. O'Sullivan Beare's, History of Catholic Ireland ed. M.J.Byrne Ireland under Elizabeth (Dublin, 1903), 122
 2. CSPI., (1592-1596), 333, Lane to Burghley, 28 June 1595
 3. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, II, 437

Table 1

Numbers killed and wounded on each side in main engagements

Date	Place	Killed: Wounded (English side)		Killed: Wounded (Irish side)		
May 1593	Balleek Ballyshannon	3	20	300		(1)
June 1594	Enniskillen	56	69	200		(2)
May 1595	Enniskillen	15	-	-		(3)
May 1595	Clontibret	31	109	100		(4)
November 1597	Carrickfergus	180	40	-		(5)
August 1598	Yellow Ford	1,300	60	300	400	(6)
May 1599	Wicklow Mts.	200	-	-	-	(7)
June 1599	Ardee	8	-	-	-	(8)
August 1599	Curlew Mts.	241	208	200	300	(9)
April 1600	Cork	-	10	98	120	(10)

/ cont.

1. CSPI., (1592-1596), 163-166
2. P.O'Sullivan Beare's history edited M.J.Byrne, Ireland under Elizabeth (Dublin, 1903), 72; CSPI., (1592-1596), 262
3. CSPI., (1592-1596), 317, 319
4. Ibid., pp.321, 322, 327, 331
5. CSPI., (1596-1597), 441-446
6. Accounts of the Yellow Ford listed in G.A.Hayes McCoy, Irish Battles (1969), 128-130
7. CSPI., (1599-1600), 81-82, 83-91, and for a map showing the action in the Wicklow Mountains see the reproduction of Trinity College Dublin, Library MS 1209, no.12 above p.
8. CSPI., (1599-1600), 67
9. Ibid., pp.113-114; and for an Irish account of this battle see D.Murphy (ed.) O'Clery's Life of Red Hugh O'Donnell (Dublin, 1893) pp. 211-213
10. T.Stafford's Pacata Hibernia, I, (unedited and n.d.) 54, 59.

Table 1/cont.

Date	Place	Killed: Wounded		Killed: Wounded		
		(English side)		(Irish side)		
July 1600	Glin Castle Limerick	11	21	80	-	(1)
August 1600	Carriagfoyle Kerry	-	-	32	-	(2)
September 1600	Kilmallock Cork	17	6	120	80	(3)
October 1600	Moyry Pass Dundalk/Newry	200	400	400	300	(4)
November 1600	Carlingford	20	60	200 k. and w.		(5)
March 1601	Tyrell's Island Westmeath	14	21	37	40	(6)
May 1601	Lifford Dunalong	1 5	- 2	40 200 k. & w.	-	(7)
July 1601	Benburb	26	79	200 k. & w.		(8)
September 1601	Monaghan	50	-	30k.	-	(9)
	Newry	10	30	-	-	(10)
	Newtonstewart	50	-	-	-	(11)
	Derry	40	-	-	-	(12)
	Donegal	29	-	"many slain"		(13)
November 1601	Kinsale (a sortie)	3	10	21	-	(14)
December 8, 1601	Kinsale (a sortie)	40	-	50	-	(15)
	Kinsale Siege	1	6	1,200	800	(16)
June 1602	Dunboy Siege	80	7	134	-	(17)
Totals:	28	2,631 : 1,158 :		5,982 k. & w. Irish & Spanish		

1. Stafford's Pacata Hibernia, 54, 59

2. Ibid., p.129

3. Ibid., p.150

4. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, II, 305-306

5. Ibid., p.342

6. CSPI., (1600-1601), 203

7. Ibid., 190, 338, 364, 365.

8. PRO.SP.63/208/pt.iii/83 i.

9. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, II, 437.

10. CSPI., (1601-1603), 65

11. CSPI., (1601-1603), 102

12. Ibid., 60

13. Ibid., pp. 98, 99

14. F.Moryson, III, 31-32

15. CSPI., (1601-1603), 219

16. Cal.Carew MSS., iv, 179-200

17. Stafford's Pacata Hibernia, II, 525-527.

The figures in Table 1 give an idea of the casualties suffered on both sides in twenty-eight major engagements, but are not comprehensive. We do not know how many Irish were killed and wounded by Sir Arthur Chichester's sorties from Carrickfergus, or how his own forces suffered. And during the post Kinsale scorched-earth policy of Mountjoy there are no figures for the various acts of devastation then carried out. Moreover, after the battle in the Curlews in Connaught, August 1599, there is little mention of military action from that province. And whether the figures for each of the twenty-eight battles, skirmishes and sieges given in Table 1 are reliable is open to doubt. Nevertheless contemporary dispatches leave us in no doubt as to which were the worst encounters of the war.

At the outset of the war the struggle to possess Enniskillen, and other fording points on the River Erne, as Belleek and Ballyshannon, occasioned much loss of life: on the three major engagements, 74 English were killed and 89 wounded. Among Hugh Maguire's attacking forces almost half his men were lost, though by May 1595 his soldiers re-took Enniskillen slaughtering the fifteen remaining English soldiers in the garrison.⁽¹⁾ At Clontibret, one of the fiercest battles of the war, the English claim to have lost but 31 killed and 109 wounded may have been under-estimated, for the Irish claimed to have accounted for 700 English dead. Irish losses reported vary between none and 400.⁽²⁾ Lieutenant Tucher's report from the battlefield of 100 enemy slain and many hurt is the figure taken for the Table 1.⁽³⁾

The worst disaster to befall any single garrison in the war happened to Sir John Chichester's forces ^{near} Carrickfergus where

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1. CSPI., (1592-1596), 163-166; 317, 319
 2. G.A.Hayes McCoy reconstructed the action of the battle in his Irish Battles (1969), 87-105
 3. Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 109-110, Lieutenant Tucher's report, 1 June 1595

O'Neill's Scottish allies wiped out 180 men from a garrison of not more than 250.⁽¹⁾ Lieutenant Hart, who was present, saved his life like thirty others by swimming over the river Olderfleet. He listed the names of the officers killed and wounded:

"Officers slain: Sir John Chichester, his lieutenant, and both his sergeants. Captain Rice Mansell, his lieutenant and both his sergeants. Lieutenant Price, both his sergeants and his drum. Lieutenant Walsh, his ensign, sergeants and drum.

Officers hurt: Captain Merriman, Lieutenant Hill, Lieutenant Hart." (2)

His report outlined how many of the casualties occurred because they lacked powder:

"our shot were beaten into the battle ... the enemy came so closely with their horse that they killed our men within two pikes' length of our battle".

Sir John Chichester, the governor of the garrison, tried to rally his men "because they would not stand", but he was shot in the leg, "whereupon he took his horse, and coming down the hill was shot in the head, which was his death's wound". After their commander's death "the soldiers utterly dismayed ... dissolved the battle"; "Captain Merriman and Lieutenant Barry did with their horses take the river and swim over into the Island Magee". Captain North's horse was shot under him three or four times. Captain Constable was taken prisoner, when he received a head wound. Captain Merriman was shot through the shoulder. Finally, Hart summed up the losses:

"The number of our men that were lost in my judgment were about nine score, and there were hurt between thirty and forty, most of which recovered". (3)

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1. CSPI., (1596-1597), 441-443, Lieutenant Hart's report, 4 November 1597
 2. CSPI., (1596-1597), 442-443
 3. Ibid.

At the Yellow Ford the English had their highest losses of the war in a single set battle, but the numbers engaged were large for the period: Sir Henry Bagenal commanded about 4,000 foot and 320 horse; O'Neill by Irish accounts had 4,050 foot and 600 horse and by English estimates 6,000 to 8,000 men. It is not clear whether the English loss of 1,300 included about 300 Irish who deserted to the winning side. In the battle 14 English captains were among the dead, a measure of the seriousness of the defeat.⁽¹⁾

Sir Henry Harrington, the commander in the Wicklow Mountains in May 1599, explained his heavy defeat to the Dublin council by blaming his infantrymen's cowardliness "who would never once couch their pikes or offer to strike one stroke for their lives". He tried to minimise the casualties by pointing out, "no captain lost but Captain Wardman; and Captain Loftus hurt in the leg but I hope without danger". Loftus later died of this leg wound.⁽²⁾ Captains Atherton, Mallory and Linley, all participants in Wicklow, wrote fuller reports than Harrington's giving the full measure of the disaster; all corroborate that over 200 of their men were killed out of about 450 because of the cowardly retreat of so many pikemen.⁽³⁾ Mallory reported, that Captain Loftus's sergeant, who led a loose wing of pikes and shot, "quite forsake us ... and ran away to our place of garrison".⁽⁴⁾ Captain Lindley was alone in stating that "they were beaten back by the bitterness of the weather",⁽⁵⁾ but he did blame the beginning of the rout on Captain Loftus' men "who quit their places in the battle". Linley said that 44 of his own men were killed, and at

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1. CSPI., (1598-1599), 224-229; 231-233; 236-238; Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, II, 216-217, which gives 1,500 soldiers killed. Modern narratives of the battle in R. Bagwell, C. Falls, G.A. Hayes McCoy - see bibliography under these authors.
 2. CSPI., (1599-1600), 58, 59, Harrington to the Lord Chancellor Loftus 29 May 1599. Captain Loftus was the Chancellor's son, see Appendix 2
 3. Ibid., pp.83-91, Captains' reports in July 1599.
 4. Ibid., p.88, Mallory's report
 5. Ibid., p.89, Linley's report

that point in his report he condemned Captain Loftus for his own inactivity in the battle, and mentioned that Irishmen in the companies of the English "never took their horses, nor made any service that day".⁽¹⁾

Sir Conyers Clifford's defeat in the Curlew Mountains, August 1599, was generally put down to the inexperience of his raw recruits, and to the ambush tactics of the Irish. Clifford had 1,496 men in three regiments of 571, 421, and 504. Of the ordinary soldiers, 231 were killed and 196 wounded, and of the officers, 10 were killed and 12 wounded.⁽²⁾

Between the battle in the Curlews in August 1599 and Kinsale in November/December 1601 it will be seen from Table 1 that the battle, or series of skirmishes and battles, to secure the Moyry Pass in September/October 1600 caused the heaviest casualties.⁽³⁾ Most accounts of the month's fighting there agree with William Farmer that the "outrageous wether", "grete stormes of windes and tempestes" and "continuall rayning for the space of five daies" greatly hindered Mountjoy's progress.⁽⁴⁾ But the same reports do not agree with Farmer's casualty figures. Those given in Table 1 are from Fynes Moryson, who was present with Mountjoy. Farmer a surgeon with the English forces may or may not have been in the Moyry Pass. In the first serious skirmish on the night of 20 September 1600 Farmer said the English lost but one man and six or seven hurt, whereas of the enemy "many were slain". On the 22 of September "Captain Dawtries lieutenant slewe two of them [the Irish] with his own handes", and Sir Henry Danvers's troop slew

1. CSPI., (1599-1600) p. 91

2. Ibid., pp.113-114, "A note of the army under the command of Sir Conyers Clifford, at the Curlews, Sunday, the 5th of August 1599" Endorsed by Sir Robert Cecil "this shews how many are slain".

3. Table 1

4. William Farmer's "Chronicles of Ireland 1594-1613" edited by C. Litton Falkiner in EHR., lxxxv (1907), 117, 118

another two and took Murtagh McShane prisoner. For the main fight on 2 October Farmer reckoned 30 killed and 130 wounded on the English side and over 500 of the Irish killed and wounded, and, for the battle which engaged Sir Charles Percy's regiment, Farmer said that they "killed 500 of the comon sort besides 14 of their chiefest gentlemen" whereas only Sir Robert Lovell was killed on the English side. Moryson's casualty figures and Farmer's are clearly at variance with one another.⁽¹⁾

The single English casualty at Kinsale, one John Taylor, cornet to Captain Richard Graeme, mentioned in at least three accounts, more than likely refers to the action of Christmas Eve 1601 and not the ten week period of the siege as a whole in which hundreds, if not thousands, died of cold, disease and hostilities.⁽²⁾ Sir George Carew's letter to Cecil reporting Kinsale suggests that one English death was a grotesque misrepresentation. He wrote:

Kinsale was bought at so dear a rate, as (while I live) I will protest against a winter siege, if it may be avoided. I do verily believe that at that siege and after (the sickness there gotten) we lost above 6,000 men that died ...⁽³⁾

The Irish Annalists state that Irish losses were not great,⁽⁴⁾ but English accounts agree that they had accounted for 1,200 dead and about 800 wounded of the enemy. O'Sullivan Beare wrote that the English had about 15,000 men at the beginning of the siege but that 8,000 perished by the sword, hunger, cold and disease.⁽⁵⁾ As for the final battle O'Sullivan claimed O'Neill lost but 200 foot and the

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1. William Farmer's *Chronicles of Ireland 1594-1613* edited by C.Litton Falkiner in EHR., lxxxv (1907), 118, 119
 2. Three lesser known accounts of Kinsale by participants are: Folger Shakespeare Lib.MS., 393, x.d., ff.10-16 in *Historical Commonplace Book*, c.1625; William Farmer's "*Chronicles of Ireland*" (ed.cited), p.125 and in "A Letter from a Souldier of Good Place in Ireland" printed pamphlet of 25th March 1602, written at Cork 13th January 1602 and signed "I.E.". This last account is reproduced in A.Kinney, Historical Documents of the Age of Elizabeth, (Connecticut, 1975), 345-360.
 3. Cal.Carew MSS., iv, 305, Carew to Cecil, 11 August 1602
 4. AFM., vi, 2,283
 5. O'Sullivan Beare, *History ...* edited by M.J.Byrne, p.145

English three noblemen, suggesting once again that English losses in the final battle were slight.⁽¹⁾

Men wounded in battle were supposed to be treated by army surgeons. Each captain was supposed to employ one in his company. In the absence of a surgeon the soldiers knew that if they were hurt they would have no skilled medical attention, which may have made them very cautious in battle. It is clear from complaints in many dispatches that not every captain employed a surgeon during the war.⁽²⁾ A physician or "chirurgion" was generally obtained for military forces in one of two ways: either he was sent by the Company of Barber Surgeons in London, which in return for its charter's privileges was required to send a medical officer and assistants to forces serving overseas, or he was impressed by a particular captain, who was then responsible for his pay and seeing to it that he carried out his duties.⁽³⁾ The military surgeon possessed neither rank nor distinction; in recruiting warrants he is invariably classed with drummers, fifers, armourers, smiths and carpenters. Like the common recruit he had no love for military service. In 1598, for example, when six surgeons were taken up for the Irish service, one bought his discharge for £6, and it is likely that another escaped by providing a substitute.⁽⁴⁾ During the greater part of Elizabeth's reign the normal pay for a military company's surgeon was twelve pence a day; by about 1590 this sum was increased to twenty pence.

From 1595 a "Surgeon General of the Army" was instituted and one William Kelly was appointed at a stipend of 2 shillings a day which

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1. O'Sullivan Beare, *History ...* edited by M.J.Byrne, p.147
 2. H.J.Webb, art.cit., 261
 3. H.J.Webb, 'English military surgery during the age of Elizabeth' in Bulletin of the History of Medicine, vol.15 (1944), 261.
 4. S.Young, The Annals of the Barber Surgeons of London (1890) 320-321

was raised by means of a benevolence from the captains, 2d from some, 1d and $\frac{3}{4}$ d. from others. When Kelly died in 1597 the same allowance was continued to his successor Walter Newton.⁽¹⁾ This system of paying the Surgeon General was unsatisfactory, and the privy council decreed in 1599 that the Surgeon General receive one man's pay out of every company in Ireland. A soldier's pay was 8 pence a day and since there were then about eighteen companies the surgeon general would receive twelve shillings a day, three times that of a captain's pay, but out of this the Surgeon General had to pay his assistants.⁽²⁾ This new system of payment in Ireland had long been the custom in the Low Countries, but many captains complained against the deduction of a man's pay from company funds to pay for a surgeon, who they claimed was rarely present.⁽³⁾

The gap between what was administratively and humanely desirable, a surgeon to each company, and the general lack of surgeons in practice during the Irish war is clear. The Lough Foyle and Ballyshannon garrisons provided places for only two surgeons each for between three and four thousand men. Each was to have three assistants to be paid from the surgeon's stipend, at 10 shillings a day.⁽⁴⁾ William Jones, the Commissary for Musters in the whole province of Munster in 1600, wrote to the privy council in January 1600 in terms which suggested that there was not a single surgeon in his entire province:

"If an allowance went to some skilful chirurgeon . . . he might do some good when the camp were in the field, and appoint some men of skill as his deputies in the garrisons".⁽⁵⁾

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1. CSPI., (1600-1601), 241-242, "Concerning the defalcations out of the army in Ireland, for preachers, physicians, surgeons and cannoneers".
 2. APC., xxx, 107; 108
 3. CSPI., (1600-1601), 241, 242
 4. CSPI., (1599-1600), 396
 5. Ibid., 383, 384

Henry Bird, a commissary for musters in Ulster, in writing to Cecil in November 1600 bemoaned the fate of so many sick and hurt men lying in the garrison in Newry "without officers or others to attend them", adding, "it would have grieved any Christian heart to see so many perish for want of looking onto".⁽¹⁾

However, under Mountjoy's general administration of the army the general care of the sick and wounded seems to have improved. Fynes Moryson's "Lyst of the Army ... to bee a direction to the Treasurer-at-Warres for the payment thereof from the first of April in the yeare 1600" states that sixteen surgeons were to be paid; the chief or Surgeon General, not named, was to be paid £5, and the Lord Deputy's Doctor of Physick also £5 a week. The remaining fourteen surgeons were to be dispersed "in the provinces and garrisons at thirty or forty shillings a peece the weeke".⁽²⁾

Considering that the total number of foot companies was 14,000 and the cavalry 1,200, the number of surgeons to be paid would appear to have still been very inadequate, and, in any case there is no clear evidence that sixteen surgeons were actively employed in their posts from 1600 to the end of the war.⁽³⁾

Nevertheless, from letters and reports sent to Cecil and the privy council it is clear that Mountjoy cared for his sick and wounded soldiers. Captain Nicholas Dawtrey, for instance, described to Cecil how Mountjoy sent sick and hurt men to the nearest towns "to get their health or recovery", and that often he sent his own "surgeon, fissiones (physicians) and divines "to be sure of their estate ... to give them both bodily and ghostly comforts", but that

1. CSPI., (1600-1601), 26

2. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, II, 295

3. There is no mention of such a number of surgeons employed in the four volumes of the CSPI dealing with the army between 1600 and the end of the war.

no soldier was given these facilities except "by his exact warrant".⁽¹⁾

When questioned by the privy council about the numbers of sick and hurt men he kept sending to Dublin Mountjoy sent a reply by Captain Sir Oliver St. John:

As for soldiers dismissed and remaining in Dublin, they are sick and are come with their Captains' leave, either to the hospital for their recovery or for their passports (to England) if they be irrecoverable, which in that case I grant to none but such as the surgeon, physician, or mustermaster do certify me to be utterly unserviceable, and most of them I view myself before ...⁽²⁾

Military hospitals were regarded as a necessary investment for the army in Ireland. They reduced the numbers of sick and wounded returning to England, who roaming through the countryside of England and Wales were a positive discouragement to recruitment. And they helped keep soldiers alive to fight again. Seasoned captains knew that those soldiers who had weathered their first bout of dysentery were worth three raw recruits.⁽³⁾ Captain John Baynard lamented the waste of "sick and hurt soldiers that have died in the open streets merely for the want of some succour".⁽⁴⁾

For these reasons lord treasurer, Buckhurst and Sir Robert Cecil wanted military hospitals set up in each of Ireland's four provinces "by the allowance of a soldier's pay out of every band" and that the "house rents, reparations and bedding appertaining to the said hospitals be borne and provided by the Queen's Majesty".⁽⁵⁾ When Lord Mountjoy set down "Certain points necessary for the army in Ireland, offered to their Lordships' consideration" in January 1600,

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1. CSPI., (1600), 532, Dawtrey to Cecil, 28 October 1600
 2. Ibid., p.505 "... several answers to be made by Sir Oliver St. John ... as he shall find occasion in speech, either with Her Majesty or with their Lordships". October 1600
 3. CSPI., (1599-1600), 350
 4. Ibid.,
 5. Ibid., pp.377- 396.

he gave more detail on the provision of hospitals:

That there be several hospitals maintained, at Cork for Munster, and at Dublin and Drogheda for Leinster, every hospital to have two overseers that shall be honest householders in the towns, a Master that must be a surgeon or a physician, a servant and four women to attend the sick and hurt men, and a hundred beds furnished for them

The Overseers to have nothing for their pains, the Master at 5s. per diem, his servant 12d. four women at 6d. the peece, and this entertainment to be levied uppon the army ... rents, reparations, and bedding to be defrayed by Her Majesty (1)

In practice the only hospitals which were established for the army were at Dublin, Derry and at Cork; no mention is made of one for Drogheda or for the province of Connaught. Though much discussed before Mountjoy's time, the army hospital in Dublin does not appear to have been established until May 1600,⁽²⁾ and in the course of its operation it appears to have been inadequate to cope with the numbers of sick and wounded sent to Dublin, for many sick and wounded soldiers returned untreated to England during the last years of the war.⁽³⁾ The number of beds in the hospital in use is not known. The hospital at Cork was necessitated by the nearby siege of Kinsale in the winter of 1601. And that at Derry was a response to mass illness among the Derry garrisons in autumn 1600.

The Derry hospital was built by the commander, Sir Henry Docwra. It was situated in the centre of the great fort next to Docwra's

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1. CSPI., (1599-1600) 448. H.J.Webb in 'English military surgery in the age of Elizabeth' in Bulletin of the History of Medicine, vol.15 (1944), 261-262 is clearly inaccurate in stating "there was seldom more than two surgeons assigned to the entire army", and that there was "but one army hospital in all of Ireland", p.262. He is also wrong in stating that Sir Henry Docwra wrote to Lord Burghley in September and December 1600 - Lord Burghley died in August 1598, Webb means Sir Robert Cecil, his son and successor.
 2. Nicholas Weston, Mayor of Dublin, put forward a hospital scheme in October 1598 and reckoned it would cost the city £1,000 a year - CSPI., (1598-1599), 296-297. Mountjoy sent £150 to the Dublin Corporation for the hospital in May 1600 - CSPI., (1600), 209
 3. CSPI., (1600), 334, 341, 449; (1600-1601), 165 and see section (ii) of this chapter.

own house. The hospital was frequently mentioned in his many letters to London, and in the Narration he compiled of his services at Lough Foyle.⁽¹⁾ It was one of the first buildings constituted by the garrison. It was built "within the walls of an old church, fitted out with 28 beds, far too few to take the sick and wounded men who flooded into it". War casualties were far too numerous. Docwra ruefully remarked, "I do not know that the best hospital in London cannot contain the sick men in the army".⁽²⁾ Even such a small hospital proved a struggle to establish. Docwra assumed that his soldiers would willingly work at its construction, but, instead, they had to be compelled under threats to complete the work. And there was an early lobby, successfully resisted, for using the hospital as an ammunition dump.⁽³⁾ When it came into use it was sensibly suggested that soldiers suffering from infectious diseases "of whom the tenth man doth not recover" should be separated from the wounded "of whom there is greater hope of recovery".⁽⁴⁾

The charge of governing the Derry hospital was given to an overseer and an unspecified number of assistants. There was certainly one surgeon in the Derry garrisons for his signature, "Thomas Dowghton, surgion" appears on lists of sick and wounded men discharged from Lough Foyle together with Sir Henry Docwra's signature, but whether or not Dowghton was the Master of the hospital is not known.⁽⁵⁾ The assistants working in the hospital were to be paid 4d a month "allowed from every man's pay to maintain it". On the basis of eighteen companies of 150 each the monthly contribution

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1. PRO.SP.63/207/pt.vi/no.84, Docwra's map of Derry reproduced above in Chapter Eleven.
 2. CSPI., (1600), p.113; Cal.Carew MSS., iii, 374-376 for a list of provisions for the Derry hospital.
 3. CSPI., (1600), 113
 4. CSPI., (1600-1601), 113
 5. City of Chester Record Office, M/MP/12/38, list of discharged soldiers signed by Thomas Dowghton and Sir Henry Docwra.

for the pay of the assistants and upkeep of the hospital would have been £45., but the Lough Foyle companies were under strength after September 1600 so that the full allowance for the hospital was probably rarely met.⁽¹⁾ Nevertheless Docwra seems to have taken some pride in the Derry hospital. Nearly every aspect of his administration came under official censure but he always roundly defended his military hospital.⁽²⁾

While there was some provision, even though inadequate, for the care and treatment of the sick and wounded on the English side, we know little or nothing of how the sick and hurt fared on the Irish side. One report of "intelligences that came into the English camp" after the battle of the Moyry Pass in November 1600 claimed that O'Neill's wounded were not sent home into their towns to be healed "because every wounded man must have two whole men at the least to carry him", and that to avoid weakening his forces he left his wounded in their cabins where they had "no other salves applied to their sores than their country salve, butter".⁽³⁾ Another report from Sir Griffin Markham suggested that O'Neill "so heavily armed his men with drink" that, being senseless, they hardly noticed their hurts.⁽⁴⁾

The treatment of the dead on both sides, when bodies were not recovered for burial by their friends, indicates some of the brutality of the age and the ferocity of the war. Decapitation of the killed seems to have been a common practice from the frequent mentions of "heads brought into camp", of "heads sent up to Dublin" and of "heads sent" to commanders as evidence of soldiers' victories in skirmishes

1. CSPI., (1600), 406

2. Between March 1599 and 1603 Docwra wrote over 50 letters to London: understandably one of the items he requested for Lough Foyle was "writinge paper - one reame, and incke - one gallon" - CSPI., (1600), 95

3. CSPI., (1600-1601), 29

4. Ibid., 21

and battles. Many of the slain Irish had their heads sent to Dublin for public exposure on the gates of the city. One Thomas Ball was paid £15 for the gruesome carriage of seventeen heads of the followers of Feagh McHugh O'Byrne to Dublin in December 1596.⁽¹⁾ And when their leader Feagh McHugh O'Byrne was eventually captured and slain his head was sent to the English court, which greatly angered the Queen that "the head of such a base Robin Hood was brought solemnly into England".⁽²⁾ Lord Burgh, lord deputy in 1597, complained that the air about Dublin was "so thick corrupted" with "the heads daily brought in".⁽³⁾

The English treated their own dead with some respect. The bodies of notable commanders were returned to England for honourable burial. The corpses of Lord Burgh and Sir Henry and Sir Thomas Norris "were embalmed, and were rowled up in cearclothes and carried over into England to be buried".⁽⁴⁾ But scant respect was paid to English corpses by the Irish. After the capture and killing of Sir Conyers Clifford in the Curlews the Irish sent his head to Red Hugh O'Donnell as an earnest of their victory.⁽⁵⁾ It was said of the Mayor and citizens of Limerick that when the constable of Limerick Castle had been killed they cut off his head "and played at football with it". It was reported that the same citizens had killed a Lord Justice and buried his body with other Englishmen in their cellars.⁽⁶⁾ O'Clery wrote about the aftermath of the Yellow Ford when Irish soldiers returned to the battlefield "and proceeded to strip the people who had fallen ... and to behead those who were severely wounded there". Whether this was an act of mercy, revenge,

1. CSPI., (1596-1597), 214

2. Ibid., p.300

3. Ibid., p.315

4. William Farmer's Chronicles, edition cited p.115

5. CSPI., (1599-1600), 332

6. CSPI., (1600), 13.

or for loot is not clear.⁽¹⁾ Looting the war dead was a common practice on both sides. Fynes Moryson mischievously described the looting of the Spanish dead by the English after Kinsale:

"And in generall among the dead bodies many were found to have spels, characters, and hallowed medalls, which they woare as preservations against death, and most of them then they were stripped, were seene to have scarres of Venus warfare ..."⁽²⁾

Decent burial of the enemy dead is little mentioned; occasionally corpses seem to have been thrown into loughs. Acts of ignominy on the bodies of the enemy seem to have been the norm.

It would seem that the ordinary Elizabethan soldier was condemned to a grim fate in Ireland. If he escaped death in battle he might easily succumb to sickness and could expect "no succour or relief generally of the inhabitants, although they hold amongst themselves that charity is a grand merit".⁽³⁾ And the provision of surgeons and hospitals was clearly inadequate for the large numbers of sick and wounded. It is hardly surprising that the raw recruit dreaded the very name of Ireland and went reluctantly to service there, and that often he deserted to fly back to England and, even at times, to the enemy. To those who returned honourably to England, we finally turn.

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1. P. Walsh (ed.) D'Clery's Life of Red Hugh O'Donnell (Dublin, 1948), 183, 185.
 2. Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, III, 55
 3. CSPI., (1599-1600), 350, Captain John Baynard's address to the Queen, endorsed "1599 December".

(ii) Provision for the relief of disabled soldiers in England.

Despite the strictures of that notable historian of the army, Sir John Fortescue, on the queen's lack of care for the sick and wounded men who faithfully served her there was a steady improvement in their treatment during the war.⁽¹⁾ For example, sick leave with pay was beginning to be allowed; if a soldier had to return to England he was kept on the muster roll, and as long as he came back to his company within three months with a certificate from a justice of the peace or from a high constable he was paid during his absence. It seems however from the many petitions to have ordinary arrears of pay made up that sick pay to that general extent was not the norm among the common soldiers in Ireland. On one occasion for example the privy council advised the lord deputy in Ireland that a wounded captain who had returned to England for treatment should not have his pay stopped.⁽²⁾ The government's interest extended to the care of disabled soldiers too. From 1593 disabled soldiers and sailors, because of their increasing numbers, became recognised for the first time as a distinct category of poor deserving relief. It is thought likely by Dr. Joan Kent that Sir Robert Cecil drew up the preamble to the first of three Acts which helped disabled soldiers and sailors.⁽³⁾ The 1593 Act for the relief of the poor emphasised that like the lame, blind, diseased and impotent poor, maimed soldiers and mariners were incapable of earning a livelihood, and

1. J.W.Fortescue, History of the British Army, (1899), i, p.157

2. APC., xxxii, 194

3. J.R.Kent, 'The Social attitudes of members of Parliament, 1590-1624' (University of London, unpublished Ph.D., 1971), 41

therefore dependent on alms and relief:

Yt is agreable with Christian charitie,
pollicie and the honor of our naycon that
suche as have adventured their lyves and
loste their lymmes or disabled their bodies ...
in the defence and service of her Majestie
and the state sholde at their retorne be
relieved and rewarded ... (1)

The date 1593 may be significant in that it coincided with the beginning of the war in Ireland, but what was probably instrumental in the passing of the Act was the queen's annoyance with the appearance of wandering soldiers in London. It was said in 1593 that "the queen is troubled whenever she takes the air with these miserable creatures".⁽²⁾ It was suggested in the house of commons in 1593 that since Parliament had provided money for the wars it should also provide money for the relief of those deprived by war of the means to relieve themselves "who cry uppon us daylie in the streets."⁽³⁾

At the committee stage of the 1593 ^{bill} ~~Act~~ Sir Thomas Cecil, the member for Northampton, suggested that maimed soldiers could be well provided for from a tax on inns and alehouses. If the 60,000 such hostelries were to pay a noble annually, the £20,000 a year so raised would support five guest houses for twenty maimed soldiers each, giving each soldier an annual pension of £10 as well as providing a salary of £20 a year to the governor of each guesthouse. His figures were contested, and the lavish provision derided by many including Sir Walter Raleigh who said it was not fitting that the "most beggarly people of the land should be charged with so onerous provision".⁽⁴⁾ Sir Robert Cecil argued that if Parliament showed the way the charitable and well disposed in all the shires

1. 35 Eliz., c.4, from the preamble to the Act.

2. PRO.SP.12/244/125

3. B.L.Lansd.MS., 73, f.130-130v.

4. The debate is rehearsed in J.R.Kent, thesis cited, pp.46-48

of the realm would remember the maimed soldiers in their wills and alms.⁽¹⁾ But in the end all schemes for raising funds for the "maimed and impotent soldiers" were rejected in favour of a parish rate.

The justices of the peace of each county were to organize the fund for the relief of the genuinely maimed in war, and from their own members appoint treasurers to pay out pensions to those qualified. A parish rate not above 6d and not below 1d was to be levied on subsidy men assessed at 40s. in lands, or £5 and above in goods. Counties of less than fifty parishes were to be assessed in groups of parishes to be determined by their justices of the peace. And the Act was to apply to all soldiers maimed since 1588 and to those who would be maimed in the future.⁽²⁾ In the subsequent Acts for the Relief of the Poor, 1597 and 1601, it was claimed that the previous rates were insufficient to provide for the increasing numbers of returning wounded soldiers. By the 1597 Act the rates were raised to not above 8d a parish and not below 2d; in London the limit was extended to 2s. a parish but the average was not to exceed 8d. a parish.⁽³⁾ And by the 1601 Act the rate was further raised to an average of 6d a parish, and the London limit to 3s. a parish.⁽⁴⁾ In 1598 an order in the House of Lords laid down a scale of contributions from the clergy and nobility for the same fund: 40s. from archbishops, earls, marquesses and viscounts, 30s. from bishops, and 20s. from every baron.⁽⁵⁾

A set of accounts of the rates levied and collected from the parishes and townships of the hundreds in Cornwall for the maimed

1. B.L.Lansd.MS., 73, f.130v.

2. 35 Eliz., c.4 (1593)

3. 39 & 40 Eliz., c.17

4. 43 Eliz., c.3

5. PRO.SP.12/244/ff.118,119

soldiers' fund shows how the system was supposed to work; a weekly rate of 2d on each parish and a quarterly rate of 2s.2d was collected by the churchwardens, remitted to the high constables of the hundreds, who in turn passed the money to the treasurer of the fund, an elected justice of the peace. The arrangement appears to have been a typical implementation of the Acts of Parliament.⁽¹⁾

It was not long before there were complaints that this legislation was not being carried out.⁽²⁾ It was said in 1598 that some justices of the peace sent the wounded from place to place, to where they had been impressed or to where they had been born, and refused to sign their certificates, thereby forcing them to be treated as vagabonds and common rogues.⁽³⁾ The Act of 1597 had ordered that in those cases where there were insufficient funds to provide for a maimed soldier in the shire where he had been pressed, he was to be sent to the county where he was born, or had last inhabited. The government soon discovered that this rule was confusing, and led to the failure of either county to provide relief. To clear the confusion Sir Robert Cecil brought in an amendment to the Act in 1601 to the effect that the maimed soldier was to be relieved only in the shire where he was born for, as he said, "only in a man's cuntrye eyther charitie, kindred or commiseration will breed pittye".⁽⁴⁾

In so far as it is known there was only one hospital founded in England exclusively for disabled soldiers; it was built in Buckinghamshire to house thirty-six "maimed unmarried soldiers" to give those from the town of Buckingham, and the three hundreds

1. PRO.SP.12/288/73/75, maimed soldiers' fund in Cornwall.

2. PRO.SP.12/244/f.125

3. Ibid., f.125

4. B.L.Stowe MSS., 362, f.223 v.

of Buckinghamshire a permanent home. The licence to have the hospital erected also gave authorization to the shire to purchase land for their maintenance, but it was not to spend more than £200 a year in such purchases.⁽¹⁾ In addition, Lord Burghley showed his personal concern for ex-soldiers by endowing a hospital for thirteen poor men of Stamford Baron in Northamptonshire, particularly for those who had been honest soldiers and were unable to work.⁽²⁾

Most towns, especially the cathedral cities and the two ancient universities towns, had almshouses but not specifically for wounded soldiers. Some ex-soldiers petitioned for rooms in such almshouses through influential friends, and sometimes the privy council ordered a particular trustee of an almshouse to provide a disabled soldier with the next vacancy.⁽³⁾ Occasionally provision was made for retired soldiers of long and distinguished service by appointment to a sinecure, such as the post of gunner in the Tower of London offered to Stephen Langdon as a reward for his services,⁽⁴⁾ or the oddly incongruous post of "Guider" in the Dunstable almshouse offered to Barnaby Danvers who had "lost both his legs". The Earl of Bath indicated that there was a vacancy as the former "guider" of Dunstable was in St. Alban's gaol "for foul murder".⁽⁵⁾

Distinguishing the genuinely maimed soldier from the rogue was a major problem. The government's confining of relief to soldiers in their home counties was to enable local communities more easily to separate the genuinely maimed in war from malingerers, rogues and vagabonds, and to detect those who went about with counterfeit certificates. The Act for the Relief of the Poor, 1596 had made

1. CSPD., (1598-1601), 13

2. J.R.Kent, thesis cited, p.37

3. See Appendix No.3.

4. CSPD., (1598-1601), 388

5. APC., xxxii, 366

those caught passing themselves off as wounded soldiers punishable as rogues and vagabonds.⁽¹⁾ A spate of government proclamations in the late 1590s against beggars posing as disabled soldiers indicated that the problem greatly increased with the demobilization of soldiers from Ireland.⁽²⁾ Edward Hext, the treasurer for the maimed soldiers' fund in Somerset in 1597 sent a counterfeit pass to the privy council claiming that the relief provided by the Act was an encouragement to soldiers to desert and "fynd suche swete by this statute as they are become contyiall travellers by counterfeit pasports".⁽³⁾

In January 1598 Lord Burghley reflected on the "discommodities uppon dissolving of soldiers"; if left in Ireland, he thought, they will make waste or provoke new rebellion, or return to England to live disorderly.⁽⁴⁾ In September 1598 a special proclamation was issued against idle, able bodied rogues exacting money in London and near the court on pretence of having been wounded in the wars.⁽⁵⁾ The relief of deserving poverty and the suppression of vagrancy were always intertwined problems for the Elizabethan government.

The identification of genuine soldiers in need was all the more important when the available funds ran short, as happened in the last years of the reign when the number of sick and wounded returning from the war increased.⁽⁶⁾ This may be seen from the increased number of petitions to the privy council for pensions for the disabled soldiers; fourteen in 1595, twenty-seven in 1596/7 and forty in 1599.⁽⁷⁾

1. 39 & 40 Eliz., c.17

2. P.Hughes & J.F.Larkin, Tudor Royal Proclamations, iii (New Haven, 1964-9) nos. 740, 745, 762, 779, 796.

3. R.H.Tawney & E.Power, Tudor Economic Documents, ii, (1924), 343

4. CSPD., (1598-1601), 2.

5. PRO.SP.12/268/54

6. See Appendix 2.

7. AFC., xxviii - xxxii (1597-1603), passim under petitions.

Edward Hext may not have exaggerated when he informed the privy council that there were three to four hundred wandering soldiers

"in a shere, and though they goo by too and three in a Comapnye, yet all or the moste parte yn a shere do meete eyther att feare or markett, or in some Alehowse once a weeke ..." (1)

Hext may well have been referring to demobilized soldiers at large and not simply the returning disabled, but as we have seen it became increasingly difficult to differentiate the deserving from the counterfeit wounded. It is doubtful if all the necessary pensions could be paid at the statutory rates. Petitions to the government, to high ranking commanders and to captains on behalf of illiterate soldiers increased.

The government tried to limit the problem in England by putting pressure on the lord deputy and the Dublin council to relieve the wounded with pensions payable in Ireland and not to send them home for such relief. In the case of Anglo-Irish soldiers the government intended that they should stay permanently in Ireland, and a few lists of pensions granted by the Dublin administration in the last years of the war appears to have supported the privy council's wishes.⁽²⁾ In the case of Mark Le Strange ~~was~~ the privy council referred his petition to Lord Mountjoy:

"he hath bene a longe suitor unto her Majestie for a pention ... since he has long service in Ireland ... wee have thoughte it moste convenyent to returne him unto you". (3)

And in other cases referred to the lord deputy the privy council

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1. R.H.Tawney & E.Power, editors, op.cit., p.345
 2. CSPI., (1599-1600), 240; ibid., (1603-1606), 125, 251, 420-429
 3. APC., xxxii, 142.

seemed determined to shift responsibility to the Irish administration:

"consideringe the great occacions her Majestie hath daylie more and more to expend her tresor, both by reason of the unnatural wars in that kingdome and the charge she is put unto for the defence of the realme, it is no tyme (as you can judge) to move Her Highnes in this kynde of suites ...". (1)

But in general helpless soldiers were sent back to England without hesitation. In Derry, for example, Sir Henry Docwra and his surgeon Thomas Doughton, signed a list of forty-two sick and wounded men to be sent back to their homes; their signed certificates survive in the mayor of Chester's military papers. (2)

Chester, the port of embarkation for so many soldiers, was also the point of re-entry to England on their sorry return. It would have been a natural place for a hospital, such as the one founded in Buckinghamshire but there is no evidence that the city of Chester had one during these years. Instead, the mayor had authority to pay small sums of money to hasten the wounded out of the city to their places of birth or imprest so that they would not mope about the streets of the town and discourage fresh levies. Such payments proliferate in the mayor's books in the years 1597 to 1602. For example, in the years 1597 and 1598 ex gratia payments were made by the Mayor and Common Council to:

Richard Evans, soldier, with one arme, xiid.
To a lame soldier of London, xiid.
To three Yorkshire soldiers; ii sh. eache
To a poor soldier havinge a canker and a pox, xiid.
To a sick soldier of Cherry Norton, xiid. (3)

Since county justices of the peace through their treasurer of the maimed soldiers' fund were responsible for disbursing relief to

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1. APC., xxxii 143, and for examples earlier in the war, APC., xxv, 386 and 391
 2. CCR.M.MP/12/38, list of forty-two soldiers discharged from Lough Foyle garrisons, 6 March 1600.
 3. F.J.Furnival, 'English entries from the Mayors' Books, Chester 1597-1598' edited in Early English Texts Society No.108 (), pp.168-171.

the returning wounded soldiers one might expect quarter session rolls to contain evidence of the pensions paid from the county fund, but not all do. For instance, throughout the published Staffordshire quarter session rolls there is no mention of such a fund in the years 1595-1603.⁽¹⁾ In Kent, on the other hand, the sessions rolls for the 1590s show much activity on the part of the justices of the peace for the relief of the "military poor", disabled soldiers and their dependents.⁽²⁾ It may be indicative of the Elizabethan aim of streamlining administration that the rate for the maimed soldiers' fund was levied at the same time as that for gaol money, but it may also reflect the prevalent association of poverty and crime. The assessments on the parishes of the north division of the lath of Aylesford towards both funds were settled at the mid-summer quarter sessions at Canterbury in 1595 where a rate of 20d a week for gaol money and of 19d a week for the maimed soldiers' fund were agreed.⁽³⁾ Treasurers to administer the fund were elected at Easter each year from among the justices, the first two being Michael Sondes of Throwley and Timothy Low. Sondes did not want the post and wrote indignantly to Sir John Leveson saying the office was "thrust upon him".⁽⁴⁾ Later sessions rolls from 1600 show treasurers still being appointed for the fund and for the county's stock,⁽⁵⁾ and presentments of grand juries and high constables of the hundreds show that more persons were being presented for defaulting in their payment of gaol money than for not contributing to the maimed soldiers relief fund.⁽⁶⁾

1. S.A.H.Burne (ed.) The Staffordshire Quarter Session Rolls, i - iv (William Salt Arch.Soc. (1931-1936), passim).

2. This aspect is not noted by P.Clark in his Religion, Politics and Society in Kent, 1500-1640 (Harvester, 1977)

3. B.L.Add.MSB., 41137, f.182. This manuscript is Lambarde's original of the Eirenarcha which eventually went through seven editions by 1610, see W.Holdsworth, History of English Law, iv (third edition, 1945), 118.

4. SRO.D.593/S/4/39/10, August, 17th 1595

5. KCA., Q/SR/1

6. KCA., QM/SB/80, 142 (i-iv) samples of presentments.

Pensions paid in Kent varied in accordance with need: an annual pension of £4 was awarded John Bishopenden at Canterbury in 1601.⁽¹⁾ Five pensions were granted at Maidstone varying in amount from six to ten shillings to be paid each quarter year.⁽²⁾ Nicholas Crampton, "disabled in the wars of Ireland" was awarded a £6 annual pension; he was paid this for two years; six years later he petitioned the privy council to bring pressure to bear on the justices in Kent for four years' arrears of pension and its continuation. The privy council wrote them a sharp rebuke, but we do not know if it resulted in redress for Crampton, and, perhaps, his case may have not been a deserving one.⁽³⁾

The Lancashire rolls give evidence of similar activity on behalf of wounded soldiery. For the year 1601 the Lancashire justices chose James Assheton and John Braddel to be treasurers of the fund in the Manchester area, and William Traves and James Banks for the Lancaster, Preston and Ormskirk areas, succeeded in the following year by James Holt and John Fleming. In their sessions the justices in Lancashire ruled that the treasurers of the maimed soldiers' fund "shall make the high constables of the hundreds their deputies to distrain for the sums taxed on the parishes," and that if any place becomes vacant in an almshouse a wounded soldier can there be relieved so that "the collection for him will cease". Fines of 10 shillings were to be imposed on the churchwardens who failed in their duty of collecting the money, and fines of 40 shillings on defaulting constables; such fines were themselves to be paid into the maimed soldiers' pension fund.⁽⁴⁾ Pensions were mentioned: the inhabitants of Dalton in Furness were ordered to collect 18d a week for John Wilson, a wounded soldier; Preston was ordered to give 2 shillings

1. KCA., QM/SR/2m, 2d. no.10, Canterbury, Ephiphany, 1601.

2. KCA., QM/SM/35

3. J.Tait (ed.), Lancashire Quarter Sessions Records, 1590-1606 for the Chetham Society, n.s., lxxvii (1917), 102, 135, 138

4. Ibid., 176, 246

a week to Henry Bushell, Wigan 12d a week to Thomas Owen, Ormskirk a similar sum for Thomas Cookson; and annual pensions were granted: 40 shillings to John Whitston and £3-6-8 to Thomas Parre both of Ormskirk. When the justices of the peace met at Preston they could not decide to which parish Michael Lea belonged but they took order that his immediate need as a maimed soldier be relieved by a collection made by the ordinary overseer of the poor in Preston.⁽¹⁾

Wiltshire quarter sessions show larger pensions granted there and give more detail about their recipients. In 1599 a pension of 50 shillings was granted to William Shiler who had served under Captain Edward Digges in Munster, and the same was given to Thomas Willis who had served under Captain Edward North. Both soldiers presented certificates signed by William Waad, clerk of the privy council. In September 1600, the Wiltshire justices granted Henry Venn a £5 pension for "his hurt and services" in the Irish wars. At the 1601 sessions in Wiltshire the justices struck off eight pensions and ordered the Treasurers of the fund to make payments only to those pensioners present in person at the next sessions.⁽²⁾

An important part of the work of the sessions had to do with restoring lapsed pensions and fulfilling requests from the privy council for pensions for ex-soldiers. The Wiltshire quarter sessions records provide many instances of all of these functions. And as the Wiltshire certificates generally name the captain under which a soldier was sounded, the part of Ireland in which he served is fairly easy to find out by identifying the captain's garrison of company from the army lists.⁽³⁾ Robert Bungey, for example, who received a

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1. J.Tait (ed.) op.cit., pp.252, 253, 261, 272, 275
 2. HMC., Various Collections, I, Wiltshire Quarter Sessions Rolls, edited by W.D.Macray (), 69, 70
 3. Army Lists in CSPI., (1595-1602); Cal.Carew MSS., iii, iv and in Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, II, III.

pension of £5 had served under Captain Charles Egerton and Sir Samuel Bagenal colonel of foot in 1599 in Ulster; Thomas Dogett had been a footsoldier of Captain Dillon's company in Kilkenny; Christopher Strong had served as a cavalryman under Sir John Chamberlain at Lough Foyle; and John Dankett had served under Sir Arthur Savage in the garrison at Carrickfergus.⁽¹⁾

As in other shires some of the petitions to the Wiltshire justices for pensions were supported by privy councillors and other eminent noblemen. King James' himself ordered the Wiltshire justices to grant a pension to Richard Somner, a gunner who became deaf "by the noise of the cannon shot". The order was signed by Sir Julius Caesar. Somner was granted twenty nobles, that is about £20.⁽²⁾ Sir Walter Raleigh signed John Duckett's certificate; Duckett was given 20 shillings "present relief" and a pension of £5 a year.⁽³⁾ In the shire of Kent Sir William Cobham, the lord lieutenant, supported soldiers' petitions;⁽⁴⁾ in Cheshire and in Wales Robert Earl of Essex signed certificates.⁽⁵⁾ And the commanders in Ireland, Lord Mountjoy, Sir George Carew, and Sir Arthur Chichester, frequently signed certificates for aged and wounded soldiers' relief. In this way humanitarianism fleetingly united the common soldier and the great ones of the realm. Some soldiers of exceptionally long military service petitioned the monarch directly; Thomas Westroppe wanted to resign his pension of £18 a year for life for his long military service in Ireland in return for a thirty-one year lease of lands to the value of £30 a year.⁽⁶⁾ George Smith petitioned King James for a pension

1. HMC., Various Collections, I, pp.70, 71

2. Ibid., p.77

3. Ibid., pp.85, 86

4. SRO.D.593/S/4/11/8

5. HMC., Salisbury, ix, passim: J.H.E.Bennett & J.C.Dewhurst (eds.) Quarter Sessions Records in Cheshire in Record Soc. of Lancs. & Cheshire, xciv (1940), 46

6. PRO.SP.12/276/8, n.d.

saying he had served thirty-three years in Ireland and in Denmark and that he was at Cadiz and the Island of Rhé. Smith's petition was referred to the Wiltshire justices who allowed him 20 shillings to help him on his journey out of the county to an unspecified destination.⁽¹⁾ Some idea of the considerable petitioning in these years is given in Appendix 3 which collects 189 petitions for pensions and alms-rooms, the restoration of lapsed pensions, arrears of pensions and requests for an increase of pension recorded in the state papers and the privy council registers.⁽²⁾

Worcestershire quarter sessions records show that relief was sometimes extended to the dependents of wounded soldiers. Anne Nash of Burdley in Worcestershire petitioned for her weekly allowance of 2 shillings which had not been paid to her for over a year, her husband having been "pressed for a soldier in Ireland", and presumably wounded in action.⁽³⁾ Margaret Glover of Ripple in the same county petitioned the justices that her daughter had married Richard Sanders who was taken up for Irish military service "from whence he has never returned to the utter undoing of his poor lame distressed wife and children". The quarter sessions court awarded her 4d. a week.⁽⁴⁾

It is very clear that a maimed soldier needed to stand up for himself and petition for relief, if he was to receive it. Richard Coitte petitioned the Worcestershire sessions court himself as "a lame and impotent soldier" having been drafted many years ago to Ireland; "by lying on the ground he had fallen into great lameness", and he now wanted a pass to let him go to King's Hospital in London

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1. HMC., Various Collections, I, p.99
 2. Appendix 3
 3. J.W.Willis Bund (ed.) Worcester Q. Sessions Papers, 1591-1643 (1899), i, 68
 4. Ibid., i, 76, 77

there to be treated.⁽¹⁾ John Sampson stated to the court that he had been a soldier in Ireland under Queen Elizabeth "for the full term of eight years", and that he had been wounded many times. The court granted him 13 shillings and six pence.⁽²⁾ Henry Cotterell, a maimed soldier living in London, petitioned the Worcester justices that since the charges to go to Worcester every quarter for his pension was very great, he would be much helped if his allowance could be paid every half year.⁽³⁾

Until 1601 the justices continued to send maimed soldiers back and forth between the places of their birth and their impressment to avoid the burden of paying pensions. The Hertfordshire justices were reprimanded by the privy council in 1599 for refusing a pension to Edward Gouldhurst having sent him to Middlesex where he was born:

"It is not unknown to you that it resteth in the choice of the party hurt or maimed to be relieved either in the place where he was borne or the county out of which he was impressed."

Their letter continued with the well known complaint that there were too many wounded soldiers in and around London at that time, and the Hertfordshire justices were peremptorily ordered to see to Edward Gouldhurst's needs.⁽⁴⁾ We have seen that the Act of 1601 for the relief of the poor was amended to stipulate that such as Gouldhurst in future would be relieved in the place of their birth.⁽⁵⁾

The concern of the late Elizabethan government for the maimed and wounded does not appear to have been continued into King James's reign. Captain Sir Oliver St. John who had been wounded in Ireland raised the matter in the 1604 Parliament on behalf of wounded captains; many of his class he pointed out had spent their fortunes, their best

1. J.W. Willis Bund (ed.) op.cit., p.345

2. Ibid., cited in the introduction, p.cxlviii. It is by no means clear that there was such a thing as a "full term" of service in Ireland. Sampson may mean that he was in Ireland for the full duration of the O'Neill war.

3. Ibid., introduction, p.cxlviii

4. APC., xxix, 235

5. 43 Eliz., c.3 (1601)

means and their time to do her Majesty's service there and the wounded among them were deprived and not rewarded after the Queen's death. In peacetime these men were forgotten and were likely to perish from want.⁽¹⁾ The question, however, was not raised again in Parliament until 1621. Many, perhaps, did not regard wounded captains as deserving of public assistance since it was generally recognised that many of them had profited by Irish lands but some, as may be seen in Appendix 3, did not prosper.⁽²⁾ Having survived the war, they found equal difficulty in surviving the peace.

1. Commons Journals, i, 153 and see J.E.Neale, 'The Commons Journals in the Tudor period' in TRHS., 4th series, iii (1920), 136-170

2. Commons Debates, 1621 edited by W.Notestein, H.Simpson and F.H.Relf (New Haven, 1935), ii, 403-404.
It is surprising that in his work on social institutions and charities W.K.Jordan did not distinguish military poor as a separate category, which the late Elizabethan government had done. The chief concern of his work was private charitable benefactions in his Philantrophy in England 1480-1660 (1959); The Charities of Rural England, 1480-1660 (1961); Social Institutions in Kent (1961); and Social Institutions in Lancashire (1962)

CONCLUSION

"Many are now of the opinion that no two things are more discordant and incongruous than a civil and a military life. But if we consider the nature of government, we shall find a very strict and intimate relation betwixt these two conditions ..."

(N.Machiavelli, *Arte della Guerra*, edited and translated by J.Mazzoni and M.Casella, Florence, 1929), p.265.

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This thesis has been concerned with the English effort to fight the Nine Year's War in Ireland. It is hoped that it adds another dimension to modern research on late Elizabethan England which illustrates the strains of a centralizing Crown policy clashing with provincial autonomy. On the Irish side, the few historians studying late Gaelic Ireland have shown how Gaelic lordships were in the process of absorbing smaller political entities into larger territorial principalities such as Hugh O'Neill's in Ulster. The war in late sixteenth century Ireland may be considered as a conflict between two systems of government embarking on programmes of modernization, which partly explains why the war was prolonged.⁽¹⁾

The aim of this thesis has been to study, in detail, the Elizabethan effort to maintain forces in field and garrison in Ireland. Crown demands for men were answered reluctantly; the necessary taxation to have them sent out of England and Wales was resented, and the conscripted soldiers showed their attitude by

1. For late Elizabethan England see the bibliography under Neale, J., Rowse, A.L., Hurstfield, J., Smith Hassall, A., Elton, G.R., McCaffrey, W., Clark, P., for examples. And, for late Gaelic Ireland see under Hayes McCoy, G.A., Edwards Dudley R., Silke, J., O'Domhnaill, S., Canny, N., Bradshaw, B., Lyon, J.F., Nicholls, K.

frequently deserting. But despite this lack of enthusiasm for the Irish war in the English and Welsh shires the re-conquest was finally achieved. With no tradition of an organized army or general staff and with hand to mouth financial provision for the needs of large scale land and sea operations Ireland was re-conquered if not permanently pacified between 1594 and 1603.

The demands of the Irish war gave the Elizabethan government opportunities for imposing its will on the shires, towns and ports and, on the whole, central government gained ground. Part One of this thesis may be said to have pointed to the centralizing policies and tendencies of the late Elizabethan state in recruiting and organizing levies for Ireland. The state impinged more heavily on the daily lives of the queen's subjects because of the relentless regularity of demands for these levies in the 1590s than ever before. The state had always been able to impose its will in demanding support for small expeditions to quell local rebellion in Ireland. What was new about the 1590s was the scale of the operation. The government had to maintain a semi-permanent military establishment in Ireland, varying in strength as crisis followed crisis, and a more rigorous supervision by central government was essential if the war was to be concluded successfully. It is hoped, therefore, that Part One of this thesis dealing with the administrative machinery involved in mustering, recruiting, and arming, Part Two covering the billeting and transporting of the levies from England and Wales to Ireland is of interest to more than the military historian. The demands of war can hardly be divorced from the society on which it was inflicted. In a small way the collective evidence of this thesis as a whole makes a comment on the character and workings of the late Elizabethan state.

The demands the Irish war made on the shires and ports increased and highlighted the government's bureaucratic and financial problems. The number of soldiers, seen especially in the Tables of chapter three, the billets and ships to transport them and therefore the money required, which the queen and privy council managed to get from the shires and ports over a period of eight to nine years, represented an enormous effort in the interest of retaining the sovereignty of Ireland. How did the Queen and government manage to avoid a major clash with the nation over the constant demands of the war? The short answer must be the general agreement of the nation with the Queen's and council's commitment to the safety of the state. The Elizabethan military struggle in Ireland was partly motivated by the threat to England's security; as long as England was at war with Spain the open seaboard of Ireland invited Spanish interference in much the same way that the queen and council in England supported the Dutch rebels in their struggle against their Spanish masters in the Netherlands. And, at Kinsale in 1601, the Irish war took on an international aspect when England fought her last land battle with the Spanish, albeit at the cost of Irish blood. It can also be argued that the queen avoided a major clash with the nation because, unlike her successor, she used the prerogative sparingly, kept factions at court under control, and maintained "a precarious balance" between the demands of the Crown and the temper of the nation at large even though the Irish war almost upset that balance. An English domestic crisis could easily have taken place over the question of sending out the trained bands, statutorily exempt from overseas service. Former rights in this respect were ignored in the Irish emergencies of the reign when the queen and privy

council ordered the shires on a number of occasions to raid their trained bands for soldiers. The general prevailing opinion was that

"Her Majesty may by her Highness' prerogative compel her subjects to serve beyond the seas" (1)

The widespread character of the rebellion in Ireland, its strength under O'Neill's leadership, invasion threats directly from Spain and indirectly through Ireland dictated a firm and "forward" policy towards the shires in raising troops, and above all towards the prosecution of the war in Ireland.

Nevertheless, from the study of recruitment in chapter two, its results in terms of numbers in chapter three, and from the selected shires studied in chapters four to six it can be concluded that the burdens of the Irish war were greatly resented because they were so frequent and heavy, not because the localities thought they were constitutionally wrong in principle or unnecessary, though, as we have seen, some areas such as the Cinque Ports, Stannaries and some chartered towns cited their past exemptions to the privy council in an attempt to be freed of military demands. From the samples of assessments for military taxation seen in chapters four to six, the governing élites in the shires were not noteworthy open-handed in assessing their ability to pay for the war. In the 1601 parliament Cecil saw little chance of a change in a prevailing system of taxation in which the rich were under-assessed and the poor squeezed secundum sanguinem as Cecil said in parliament. (2) In parliament the gentry loudly supported the queen's Irish war policy; in the shires they were unwilling to pay for it. Many of them wondered

1. APC., xxvi, 4

2. J.E.Neale, Elizabeth 1 and her Parliaments, 1584-1601 (1957), 414

that Ireland consumed so much; ⁽¹⁾ Cecil bemoaned that that "land of Ire has exhausted this land of promise". ⁽²⁾ His papers at the end of the reign showed £4,326,923 expended from taxation and the sale of lands, and he claimed that that revenue was £651,131 short of the charges of the wars. O'Neill's rebellion is listed there as costing £1,924,000 whereas the previous major rebellion in Ireland that of the Desmonds in 1579 had cost but £254,960. ⁽³⁾ The sums of money raised by the gentry, clergy and recusants were small compared to the costs of the war. An average sum of £6,000 a year had been taken from the gentry and recusants in the decade 1588-1599. ⁽⁴⁾ Fines and miscellaneous payments brought in about £7,000 in 1600, £9,000 in 1601, and £8,500 in 1602. ⁽⁵⁾ The lay subsidy of 1601 brought in £80,000 and the clerical one of the same year about £20,000. But these sums were small when it is considered that Lord Mountjoy's expenditure in Ireland between April 1601 and March 1602 was estimated at £322,502.0s.1¼. ⁽⁶⁾ By comparison, in the much longer period, 1558 to 1574 the cost of the Irish administration was estimated at £490,000 of which £370,000 had to be found in England. ⁽⁷⁾

The fears of the queen and government of a strong reaction to the exceptional demands for the Irish war in men and money can occasionally be seen in the preambles of her letters and those of the council to the lords lieutenant, high sheriffs and commissioners for musters in the shires, especially from 1599 to the end of the war.

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1. PRO.SP.12/269/6, 19
 2. HMC., Salisbury, x, 345
 3. HMC., Salisbury, xv, 2
 4. PRO.SP.12/270/36
 5. PRO.SP.12/271/108; ibid., 286/56
 6. Cal.Carew MSS., iv, 503-504
 7. Cal.Carew MSS., i, 484

And the fear of resistance to excessive monetary demands drove the government to other well known financial expedients such as the sale of crown lands, the increase in rents for the farm of the customs, the revival of benevolences and loans on privy seals. Heavy war costs also meant that the queen was not lavish in bounties to loyal servants, but the Irish war created a few new major offices such as Treasurer-at-War and Muster Master General each requiring a large staff in Ireland and a number of lesser posts in England such as the government's shipping commissioners and provost marshals in the ports. Like so many Tudor officials their salaries were inadequate; many therefore showed much ingenuity in making profits out of their offices, which, as we have seen was clearly the case with Sir Hugh Wallop, Sir George Cary, treasurers-at-war in Ireland, and Sir Ralph Lane, muster master general.⁽¹⁾

The difficulties of raising funds for the war and the constraints the crown had to operate ^{under} led to frustrations in the prosecution of the war. It was not a coincidence that after 1599 council directives to train the home militias became less demanding; in 1601, for example, the shires were ordered only to train the militia on two days once a year;⁽²⁾ the year coincided with peak military activity in Ireland which necessitated economy at home in the interests of saving powder and arms for the Irish war. William Knollys, uncle of Essex, expressed his fears to Cecil in May 1599 about the effect the dangerous state of Ireland would have on England:

' . . . in the end that state Ireland must perish of a consumption, and it cannot but so infect England as it may grow into the like danger . . . ' (3)

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1. See above, chapter ten.
 2. APC., xxxi, 406
 3. HMC., Salisbury, ix, 188-189

The sentiments expressed by a John Petit to Peter Halins in 1599 appear to have been widespread among those who reflected on the effects of the Irish war was having on England:

'There is strange talk of Irish matters, as that country is sent as a plague to the English, considering the number of gallant men slain there since those wars began, with the cost it has been and is, and the multitude of soldiers sent to finish those wars and cannot end them' (1)

Both comments may be said to have underlined the fact that the weakness of government in the queen's last years was exacerbated by the Irish war. Financial straits and price inflation had made the sinews of government creak at just the time when a strong policy was needed to re-conquer Ireland, and this war, conducted at a distance in an age of sail, proved frustrating and so expensive that it virtually left the Elizabethan state bankrupt. The conclusion can hardly be avoided that Ireland was considered important enough by the late Elizabethan government to impel it to go to great expense in men and money to retain sovereignty of the island. It is therefore surprising that some later historians appear to have played down the Elizabethan effort to re-gain Ireland in the 1590s.⁽²⁾ By showing the numbers of soldiers raised by government orders this thesis highlights the determination of the queen, the chief secretary, the privy council and the high command in Ireland to carry out the military conquest despite all difficulties. That determination to overcome many and varied difficulties has been seen in practical terms when the troops were shipped from the ports. Despite delays from contrary winds, difficulties of

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1. PRO.SP.12/273/7, J.P. (alias John Petit) to Peter Halins, October, 1599
 2. For examples in A.L.Rowse, The England of Elizabeth (1964); W.T.MacCaffrey, Queen Elizabeth and the making of Policy (1981); L.Stone, The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558-1641 (Oxford, 1965) tend to treat Ireland as a pawn in the power struggle between England and Spain.

communication between London, the ports and Ireland, bad relations between mayors and commissioners for musters, the reluctance of ship owners and masters, and the frequent incidence of desertion from the levies it was a remarkable achievement on the part of central and local authorities to assemble 40,678 infantrymen and 1,880 horse at the ports, and to get the great majority of them into field armies and garrisons in Ireland.⁽¹⁾ The local efforts in Chester, Bristol and Barnstaple in fulfilling government demands may also be regarded as a triumph of the Elizabethan's government's ability to gain co-operation from the port authorities though, from the ship owners' viewpoint, the 'trade' in soldiers was generally unprofitable and difficult 'cargo'.⁽²⁾ But the wider question of what social and economic effects the raising, supplying and transporting of troops to Ireland had on England and Wales in the 1590s has only been of marginal concern in this thesis. To a great extent this task remains to be done.⁽³⁾

The hope, often expressed by Elizabethan writers of "Discourses and Plotts for Ireland" that the Irish war would pay for itself and that the government of Ireland would become self-supporting was a pious one, and not supported by the findings of this thesis, even though the Irish partly paid for their own conquest in fighting on the English side (See Chapter Two). Such hopes are generally to be found in the rhetoric of would-be colonizers who used the dangerous situation in Ireland as a bargaining point to get constant supplies

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1. See Part Two, Table 1.
 2. See Appendix 1, 'Ships in the service of the Irish war'
 3. To arrive at a just estimate of the economic effects of the Irish war may well prove to be an intractable problem; the assessment and collection of taxes shire by shire needs investigation; the war expenditure, noted in general terms here bears further inquiry; and, in both areas, revenue and expenditure, peace-time needs would have to be isolated from those of war, and that in a period of endemic warfare.

out of England from which some feathered their nests. As may be seen from Appendix 2 where captains are shown to have gained lands in Ireland, land greed and a developing colonial attitude towards Ireland had clearly begun among the soldiers employed in the 1590s before the great influx of Jacobean planters. But those who sought position and profit in Ireland, whether as commanders or as captains, frequently found much hardship and frustration. Few did well out of the war. Most of the profits were made, not by junior military men and gentlemen volunteers, manipulating dead pays and muster rolls but by those who took on lucrative army contracts and by the Treasurers at War who had large resources at their disposal. It is small wonder that not a few of them turned to exploit the government and their own soldiers, as we have seen in Chapter Ten, with little regard for the war effort, their political masters, or military commanders, much less the enemy and civilian population. Contemporaries and historians are agreed that one of the main factors militating against a proper settlement of Ireland was that after the conquest the disbanded soldiery who remained in Ireland were unsuitable as colonists and unlikely agents of English law and order; their record in acts of mutiny, brutality and pillage would appear to bear out this judgement. However, in late-sixteenth-century Ireland it would also appear there was little to choose in merciless barbarity and acts of devastation between English and Irish soldiers. One commentator, Patrick Tipper, claimed in 1604 that the cause of all disorder in Ireland arose from the misgovernment of the English who "are not only English but military men who delegate to inferior officers" and that they sold their lands "bestowed by the late Queen Elizabeth" and conveyed the money out of Ireland to the impoverishment of the country.

Understandably, Tipper recommended the removal of all military men from Ireland to relieve the financial burden on both countries.⁽¹⁾

What the queen and literate captains thought of the war is partly seen in proclamations, privy council orders, official reports and in the many letters to and from Ireland. What the queen's ordinary subjects thought of the Irish war was not given written expression but their reluctance to provide men, horses and money was eloquent. The Elizabethan soldier certainly understood his oath "to doe all loyall true and faythefull sarvice unto the Queene" but how far this extended to Ireland may have given him doubts.⁽²⁾ His monarch's legal sovereign rights over another country may well have been too intangible a concept for him to risk life, limb and absence from home. And yet it was such reluctant soldiers, lifted from their villages in the cause of a war many hardly understood, who eventually helped to bring Ireland into submission in the last days of the queen's reign.

At the end of the war their demobilization was anticipated with dread in many ports and shires; some of the soldiers had been vagrants or criminals whose return was not expected. Others had performed honourable service and came back wounded to their native parishes a sorry witness of the horrors of war. Some went home un-paid, and others were unable to take up their former employment. Shires were burdened with paying pensions for their maimed soldiers and the steady increase of masterless returning soldiers added to the problems of poverty and vagrancy in a decade when these problems strained the

1. HMC., Salisbury, xxiii (Addenda 1562-1605), 201-203. Personal profit-making in Irish lands was encouraged by the English government after the war, but to what extent the expectations of the captains seeking lands were fulfilled has not been fully researched. T.O.Ranger, 'Richard Boyle and the making of an Irish fortune, 1588-1614' in IHS., x (1956/57), pp.257-297 is a notable exception.

2. B.L.Harl., MS. 168, f. 109 b "The oathe to be ministered unto the soldiers upon their enteringe into Paye".

meagre resources and nascent shire poor law administration as never before.

By May 1602, as the war was nearing its close, the privy council claimed that it was the Irish war, not the conflict against Spain in the Low Countries or in France, which had impoverished England.⁽¹⁾ The war went on for nearly nine years because organized Gaelic resistance in Ulster under Hugh O'Neill and Hugh O'Donnell was then at its peak, and equally because the Elizabethan government had ploughed too much in men and money into Ireland to lose sovereignty over it at the end of the day.⁽²⁾ Sovereignty was re-established, but how securely is a matter for debate. Many contemporary descriptions of Ireland at the beginning of the seventeenth century leave the impression that the peace secured in 1603 was more the peace of exhaustion on both sides than the Pacata Hiberniae the queen would have desired.⁽³⁾

Whether the Elizabethan re-conquest vindicated the human and material loss of the war is not a question this thesis is concerned with. But it is clear from subsequent events that the war provided no long term solution for Ireland. In view of the rebellions of 1608, 1641 and the Cromwellian conquest there was tragic irony in the comments of Sir John Davies, written about 1612 when attorney general of Ireland under King James I,

we may well conceive the hope that Ireland, which heretofore might be properly called the Land of Ire, because the irascible power was predominant there for the space of four hundred years together, will henceforth prove a Land of Peace and Concord . . .

Such a hope proved to be as unrealistic as his other wish that in the

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1. H.Spencer Scott (ed.) The Journal of Sir Roger Wilbraham in Camden Miscellany, x (1902), 50
 2. CSPI., (1600-1601), 125
 3. T.Stafford, Pacata Hiberniae (un-edited re-print, 1810), 3

next generation the Irish would "become English in heart and tongue" so that the Irish Sea would be the only difference between the countries.⁽¹⁾ Even a realist like Lord Mountjoy was unduly optimistic when he said that "Ulster may easily be made one of the quietest countries of Ireland".⁽²⁾ The ability of Gaelic Ireland to re-assert itself was under-estimated, and early Jacobean plantations of Ulster did little to conciliate the Irish to their new masters, many of them recent antagonists in the Elizabethan war.⁽³⁾

In the short term the Elizabethan re-conquest was a military success, and a political one, but only in so far as the various peoples of Ireland, Gaelic Irish, Anglo-Irish, New English and Scottish were brought under the sovereignty of the English crown. In the long term the re-conquest was a failure in that it left a smouldering foundation for future resistance to the exercise of English power, an aspect of Anglo-Irish relations forseen by Sir Henry Docwra when he wrote to the privy council in August 1601: "The Irish even in the next generation will do everything they can to expel us".⁽⁴⁾

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1. Sir John Davies, A discovery of the true causes why Ireland was never entirely subdued . . . until . . . his majesty's happy reign (1747 edition), 281.
 2. CSPI., (1601-1603), 8.
 3. Appendix 2 indicates Elizabethan captains who became Irish landowners, or servitors, after the war.
 4. CSPI., (1601-1603), 21

The Queen's Ships (1)of London (2)

Hope	Thomas
Quittance	Marigold
Tremontana	Triumph
Charles	Daniel
Moon	Isaac
Garland	Peter Bonaventure
Popinjay	Anne
Amity	Samaritan
Dreadnought	Swallow
Swiftsure	Flying Hart
Foresight	White Hind
Achates	Hare
Revenge	Falcon
Tiger	Ruben of Lee
Bull	Mayflower of Gillingham
Lion	Desire
Crane	Arcana
Merlin	Elizabeth of Hampton
Defiance	Mary Katharine
Non-Pareil	Benjamin
Warspite	Fortine
Adventure	Hercules
Lion's Whelp	Humphrey
Handmaid	Charell
Spy	

(1) T. Glasgow, Jr. "The Elizabethan Navy in Ireland, 1558-1603" in Irish Sword, vii (1965/66), pp. 291-307.

From the time of the Desmond rebellion, 1579-1583 and to the end of Elizabeth's reign a small royal warship remained in Irish coastal waters known as "Her Majesty's Irish Galley". It was mainly for the use of the Lord Deputy. The Handmaid, Popinjay and Tremontana were used in this capacity.

(2) Twelve of the twenty-four London ships listed were victualling ships in the Irish service. The Isaac was a small pilot ship. CSPI (1596-1597), 152, 242, 243, 281, 335, 338, 401, 402; ibid. (1598-1599), 83, 198, 215, 284, 406, 407; ibid. (1600), 105, 141, 208, 209, 254, 411; ibid. (1600-1601), 12, 53, 331, 332; ibid. (1601-1603) 23, 86, 303, 607; CSPD., (1595-1597), 439, 455.

Of Chester and dependent Ports

<u>Chester</u>	<u>Liverpool</u>	<u>Hilbre</u>	<u>Beumaris</u>
Grace of God (1)	Ellen (1)n	Katharine (1)	Swallow (2)
Sunday (3)	Marie (3)	-John (1)	Bull (2)
Cuthbert (4)	Peter (4)	-George (4)	Galleon (2)
Good Luck (1)	Magull (4)	-Jesus (4)	Sunday (2)
Luke (3)	Eagle (4)	-Harry (4)	-Suzanne (2)
Henry (3)	Marie-George (4)	Elizabeth (1)	-Searcher (2)
Hopewell (3)	Falcon (4)	Eagle (4)	-Mary (2)
Elizabeth (1)	George (4)	Toby (4)	
Speedwell (3)n	Saviour (1)	Trinity (1)	<u>Caernarvon</u>
Grace (3)	Bartholmew (4)	Bride (4)	Mary Mostyn (2)
George (3)	Henry (4)	Laurence (1)	Jesus (2)
Bartholmew (1)	Elizabeth (1)	James (4)	Grace (2)
Michael (2)	Phoneix (3)	Margaret (3)	<u>Formby</u>
Anne (2)	Quest (3)	Nicholas (1)	Dragon (2)
Brave (2)	Stephen (1)	Sunday (4)	Gregory (3)
Primrose (4)	Michael (3)	Ellen (4)	<u>Alt</u>
Mary Magdalen (2)	Valentine (3)		Jesus (2)
William (1)			Mary (3)
Curtlege (2)			Michael (3)
John Abel (3)		Delight of <u>Frodsham</u> (1)	
Charity (3)		Elizabeth of <u>Gayton</u> (1)	
Angel (4)		Trinity of <u>Eastham</u> (3)	
Eagle (3)		William of <u>Northam</u> (1)	
Jonas		John of <u>Wallasey</u> (1)	
		Mary of <u>Heswall</u> (3)	
		James of <u>Heswall</u> (4)	

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- (1) CCR., M/Mp/12/30; M/L/5/104; M/MB/28; M/ML/2; M/ML/5, 244-250; M/L/1/111/15; - mentions in the mayor of Chester's military papers.
- (2) K. A. Wilson, "The Port of Chester in the late Middle Ages" 2 vols. unpublished Ph.D. thesis of the University of Liverpool, 1965, vol.2 appendix C. p.99 ff. selected when the individual ships are known from other sources to have served in the Irish war of the 1590's.
- (3) HMC., Salisbury, ix, 86, Robert Davies, commissary for transport at Chester to Sir Robert Cecil mentions these ships when organizing the transportation of the Earl of Essex's army to Ireland, 1599.
- (4) E.A. Lewis (ed.) "Analyses of the extant Port Books of N. Wales" in the Cymmrodorion Society, xii (1927), passim.

<u>Of Bristol</u>	<u>of Barnstaple</u>	<u>Plymouth</u>
Adventure (1)	Unicorn (4)	Antelope (3)
Mary Fortune (1)	Prudence (4)	Arthur (6)
Unicorn (1)	Falcon's Flight (4)	Dolphin (6)
Pleasure (1)	God Saviour (4)	Elizabeth Bonaventure (6)
Minion (1)	Amity (2)	Fortune (2)
Flying Dragon (1)	<u>of Southampton</u>	Nicholas (6)
Gift of God (1)	Elizabeth (3)	Trinity (6)
Exchange (1)	Flyboat (3)	Unity (6)
Raven (2)	Primrose (2)	Christian (6)
Green Dragon (2)	Welcome (2)	Crescent (2)
Francis (2)	Minion (3)	Conqueror (2)
Hopewell (2)	Bevis (6)	New Year's Gift (2)
White Lion (2)	George (6)	The Little John (5)
		Plough (5)
Rose (2)	<u>of Portsmouth</u>	<u>of Weymouth</u>
Madame (2)	Advice (2)	Pearl (2)
True Love (2)	Diana (2)	Francis (2)
Phoenix (5)	<u>of Fowey</u>	<u>of Poole</u>
<u>Of Newport</u>	Nightingale (6)	Eagle (6)
George (4)	William & John (6)	Unity (4)
content (4)	<u>of Padstow</u>	Alice Bonaventure (4)
Angel (5)	Margaret (4)	<u>of Falmouth</u>
<u>Of Milford</u>	Honour (6)	Fortune (4)
Mary Tasker (6)		
<u>Ships of Irish Ports used (5)</u>		
Sunday of <u>Waterford</u>	Minion of <u>Carrickfergus</u>	
Peter of <u>Drogheda</u>	Mary of <u>Lusk</u> (nr. Dublin)	
Honey of <u>Drogheda</u>	George of <u>Waterford</u>	
Prosper of <u>Drogheda</u>	Mary Fortune of <u>Waterford</u>	
Jolly of <u>Dublin</u>	Jonas of <u>Dublin</u>	
Hoy of <u>Dublin</u>	Jesus of <u>Dungarven</u>	
Peter of <u>Dublin</u>	Margaret of <u>Wexford</u>	
Lord President		Total = 190

(1) J. Vanes, "The Port of Bristol in the Sixteenth Century" *Bristol Branch. Historical Association*, (1977)

(2) HMC., Salisbury, vii, 446; *ibid.*, 449; *ibid.*, viii, 452, 242, 258, 175, 236, 559, 503; *ibid.*, ix. 503

(3) T.B. Jones & A. L. Merson (Eds.) Third Book of Remembrance of Southampton (Univ. of Southampton, 1979) 456, 468, 273, n., 415, n.

(4) PRO.SP.63/210/50a, list of victuallers' ships, Feb. 1601.

(5) CSPI., (1600), 105, 209, 208; *ibid.* (1600-1601), 53, 165, 425

(6) CSPD., (1595-1597), 152, 411, 486; *ibid.* (1598-1601), 75, 155, 300, 427, *ibid.*, (1601-1603), 85, 99, 140, 226.

Appendix 2Alphabetical List of Captains (1)

ALFORD, Launcelot	Commander of Culmore garrison 1601, grantee of Irish lands.
ALLERTON, ---	Fought against O'Byrnes in Battle in Wicklow Mts. 1599.
ALLEY, ---	Capt. of foot in Connaught, 1599.
APSLEY, Allen	Commissary for victuals in Munster, colonist in Munster 1598, grantee of Irish lands 1605.
AP, Hugh Rice	Capt. of foot in Kells garrison.
ARTHUR, Patrick	Conductor of troops, spy and courier, grantee of Irish lands.
ARVE, Andrew	Capt. of foot in Munster, 1602.
ASHENDON, Sir Wm.	Capt. of foot at Carlingford garrison in 1595, wounded in action.
ASHLEY, Henry	Capt. under Carew in Munster, 1601.
ATHERTON, Henry	Sergeant Major in Wicklow and commander at Mount Norris, 1602; wounded in action.
ATHERTON, Richard	Succeeded Capt. Egerton in command at Carrickfergus Jan. 1598, then Capt. at Naas under Sir Richard Bingham, 1599.
ATKINGSON, Roger	Capt. of the garrison at Newtownstewart 1602. Provost marshal at L. Foyle, grantee of Irish lands, 1604.
AUDLEY, Lord George	Col. of foot in Munster. Grantee of Irish lands. 11th Lord Audley Earl Castlehaven, d. 1617.
AUDLEY, John	Capt. of 100 foot in Newry Fort 1595, killed in action 1596.
AYLMER, Sir Gerald	Capt. of horse in Dublin, grantee of Irish lands, knighted in Dublin 1598.
BADBEY, Thomas	Capt. of 150 foot, L. Foyle, wounded in action.

(1) DNB, Captain has an entry in the Dictionary of National Biography.
 L.C., Low Countries veteran.
 Name of county underlined indicates the shire of place of origin.

- BAGENAL, Sir Henry Marshal of the army 1598, killed in action at Yellow Ford, DNB, Staffordshire.
- BAGENAL, Sir Nicholas Marshal of the army, 1580s. Grantee of Irish lands in Armagh and Down. Author of a Description of Ulster, 1586.
- BAGENAL, Sir Samuel Colonel in Leinster, 1598. Brother of Sir Henry. Commander of Greencastle (Co. Down).
- BAKER, James Brittany captain under Sir J. Norris 1595. Member of Parliament 1613.
- BANGOR, Roger Captain in Galway 1595, wounded in action, killed in action 1596.
- BANKS, Henry Killed in action at Yellow Ford, 1598.
- BAPTIST, --- Capt. of foot Westmeath 1595 under Earl of Clanrickard.
- BARKER, James Capt. of foot under Carew in Munster 1601.
- BARKER, John Capt. of foot Armagh 1595, L.C.
- BARRETT, Edmund Spy, grantee of Irish lands in Erris, Co. Mayo.
- BARRY, John Capt. of foot in Mountjoy's field army 1601.
- BARNWELL, Patrick Wounded in action at Tyrell's Pass, Westmeath, grantee of Irish lands (loyal Irish).
- BARTON, --- One of Essex's captain, 1599.
- BASSETT, Edward Capt. of foot at Dundalk and at L. Foyle 1600.
- BAXTER, John Fought against the Burkes under Sir R. Bingham in Connaught. Wounded in action. Commissary of victuals, Ballyshannon 1602.
- BAYNARD, John Capt. of foot in the Pale. Author of a long report on Ireland to the Queen, 1600.
- BAYNARD, John Killed in action 1598, Wiltshire.
- BELL, Edward Chief engineer in 1595.
- BELL, William Military engineer, 1595.
- BENTLEY, Ralph Capt. of 100 foot, Drogheda. Somerset.

- BERKELEY, Sir Francis Constable of Askeaton Castle 1602 (nr. Limerick). Grantee of lands in Limerick. Member of Parliament 1613.
- BERKELEY, Sir Henry Wounded in action at Carlingford and Kinsale. Grantee of Irish lands.
- BERKELEY, Sir John Sergeant Major at Kinsale, killed in action 1602. Gloucester.
- BERRY, Sir Benjamin Capt. of the Guard in Dublin, 150 foot at Dungannon 1602. Knighted by Mountjoy 1600, special mention of his bravery.
- BETHEL, Hugh Capt. of foot at Carrickfergus. Grantee of Irish lands. Yorkshire.
- BETHEL, Robert Capt. of foot in 1595, Conductor of troops from North Wales.
- BEVERLEY, George Comptroller of victuals, 1600.
- BILLINGS, Roger Drogheda, Carlingford, capt. of foot. Wounded in action 1600.
- BINGHAM, Sir George High Sheriff of Sligo. Brother of Sir Richard. Killed in action in Connaught.
- BINGHAM, George Cousin of Sir Richard, killed in action.
- BINGHAM, John Marshal of the army (1598). Grantee of lands in Co. Mayo.
- BINGHAM, Sir Richard Governor of Connaught. Marshal of the Army in 1598. Grantee of lands in Ireland. DNB.
- BINGLEY, John Deputy to the Treasurer-at-War Sir George Carey in 1599.
- BINGLEY, Ralph Captain at Lough Foyle, wounded in action 1601, grantee of lands in Ireland.
- BIRKENSHAW, Sir Ralph Comptroller of Musters in Ireland 1599.
- BLAKE, John Constable of Limerick Castle 1595. Native of Galway and of suspect loyalty in 1600.
- BLANEY, Edward Commander Mt. Norris, Monaghan, Kinsale. Wounded in action. Governor of Monaghan 1602. Lord Blaney 1621. Grantee of Irish lands. Founder of Castleblaney (Monaghan), d. 1621, Welsh.

- BLOUNT, Charles
Lord Mountjoy, Lord Deputy 1600-1603, Earl Devonshire 27 July 1603, DNB, Devon.
- BLOUNT, George
Commander, Dunasse, nr. Limerick, grantee of Irish lands, Worcester.
- BLOUNT, James
Negotiator with O'Neill, Gaelic speaker, grantee of Irish lands.
- BLUNDEL, George
Capt. at Augher (1602), wounded in action at Kinsale 1601; Lancashire.
- BODLEY, Sir Josiah
Trench master, Kinsale, Surveyor of forts, castles - author. Governor of Newry 1601. Commander in Armagh, 1602. Brother of Sir Thomas Bodley. Died 1616. DNB.
- BOICE (Boyce), Thomas
Capt. of 100 foot in Munster.
- BOLLES, Sir John
Colonel under Essex. 2nd in command at L. Foyle. Capt. at Ballyshannon; Lincolnshire.
- BOSTOCK, Ralph
Kinsale, capt. of 100 foot in Munster, 1600. Grantee of Irish lands.
- BOSWELL, Ralph
Killed in action in the Wicklow Mts. 1599.
- BOURCHIER, Sir George
Master of Ordnance under Essex 1599. Grantee of Irish lands, DNB, Devonshire.
- BOYNE, Henry
Fought in Donegal against O'Donnell in 1600.
- BOYS, Thomas
Capt. of 100 foot in Naas, Kildare (1600). Conductor, Norfolk.
- BOWEN, Robert
Provost marshal of Leinster, 1602.
- BRADBURY, Jonas
Capt. of foot in Munster 1601.
- BRADY, Walter
Constable of Cavan Castle, 1595, loyal Irish.
- BRERETON, Randall
Killed in action at Kinsale, Lancashire.
- BRETT, James
Killed at the siege of Cahir Castle in 1599.
- BRETT, Randall
Commander at Dundalk 1598. Killed in action. Grantee of Irish lands.
- BRETT, Richard
20 years service in Ireland by 1593.
- BRETT, Thomas
Capt. of foot in 1595.
- BRISKETT, Ludovic
Clerk of casualties 1594, grantee of Irish lands, Co. Leix.

- BRABAZON, Anthony
Capt. of foot in 1597 in Connaught.
Capt. of foot in Offaly 1600.
- BROCKETT, Sir John
Constable of Duncannon Castle 1602.
- BROMLEY, ---
Capt. of foot at Dundalk, 1599.
- BROOKE, Sir Basil
Commander in Donegal under Docwra.
Grantee of lands in Donegal. Built
fortified manor from the Castle and
Abbey of Donegal.
- BROOKE, Sir Calisthenes
Capt. of horse. Wounded in action
at Yellow Ford.
- BROUNKER, Henry
Knighted by Lord Burgh 1597.
Captain at Drogheda. Essex.
- BROWNE, Nicholas
Conductor of troops 1600. Grantee
of Irish lands, killed in action.
- BROWNE, Sir Valentine
Conductor of troops. Grantee of
Irish lands in Munster. Bristol.
- BROWNE, Thomas
Killed in action 1600.
- BURGH, Lord Thomas
5th Lord
Lord Deputy, killed in action at
Newry, 14th Oct. 1597.
- BURGH, Sir Thomas
Son of Lord Burgh, Capt. of 150
foot in Connaught.
- BURKE, Lord
Capt. in Wicklow, wounded in action.
- BURKE, Sir Thomas
Killed in action in Curlew Mts. 1599.
- BUSHELL, Edward
At the siege of Cahir Castle 1599.
Earlier wounded in Wicklow Mts. under
Sir H. Harrington.
- BUTLER, James
Killed in action at Leix in July 1598.
- BUTLER, Thomas
10th Earl of Ormond, "Black Tom".
L.L. of the forces in 1597.
Cousin to the Queen, K.G., d.1614.
DNB.
- BUTLER, Sir Walter
Capt. of horse in Kilkenny 1599.
Grantee of Irish lands.
- BUTTON, Thomas
Capt. of the Moon at Kinsale.
- CAHILL, Thomas
Interpreter (Irish) - loyal.
- CAPELL, Edward
Capt. of foot in Munster 1601.
- CAREW, Sir George
President of Munster (1600. Earl of
Totnes. Grantee of Irish lands.
Author, Devonshire, DNB.

- CAREY, Sir George
Treasurer-at-War in succession to Sir H. Wallop, 1599. Interim Lord Deputy 1603-1604, succeeded in the office by Sir Arthur Chichester. Devonshire, DNB.
- CAREY, Richard
Capt. in Wicklow, killed in action.
- CARROLL, James
Capt. of 100 foot in Offaly.
- CARY, George
Capt. at siege of Cahir Castle 1599, killed in action.
- CARY, Sir Hugh
Capt. of 150 foot in Trim, 1599.
- CARY, Richard
Capt. of foot 1595.
- CAULFIELD, Sir Toby
Governor of Charlemount Fort. Knighted 1603. Grantee of Irish lands, killed in action. Oxfordshire, DNB.
- CAVANAGH, Donal
Capt. of foot 1595. Loyal Irish.
- CHAMBERLAIN, Sir John
Col. under Essex, Capt. of horse, L. Foyle. Killed in action 1600.
- CHAMPERNON, Sir Arthur
Quarter Master General under Essex 1599.
- CHATTERTON, Thomas
Fought at Kinsale, grantee of Irish lands.
- CHICHESTER, Sir Arthur
Commander of Carrickfergus, Col. 1603. Lord Deputy 1605-1614. Grantee of Irish lands. Devonshire, DNB.
- CHICHESTER, Sir John
Knighted by Sir Wm. Russell, 1597. Capt. Carrickfergus, brother to Sir Arthur, killed in action by Sir Randal Macdonnell 14th Nov. 1597.
- CHICHESTER, Sir Thomas
Capt. of foot to Sir Arthur. Grantee of Irish lands, Devonshire.
- CLARE, Henry
Capt. of foot Limerick, Kinsale, Galway. Killed in action.
- CLARKE, Sir William
Knighted at siege of Enniskillen, Sept. 1594.
- CLIFFORD, Sir Conyers
Governor of Connaught 1596. Grantee of Irish lands, killed in action in the Curlew Mts. 1599. Kent, DNB.
- CLIFFORD, Sir William
Killed in May 1593 at Tulsk, Co. Roscommon.
- CLOTWORTHY, Hugh
Served under Sir A. Chichester. Took charge of his flotilla of boats on Lough Neagh 1602. Grantee of lands around Masserene, Co. Antrim.

- COACH, Thomas Capt. of 100 foot at L. Foyle, grantee of Irish lands.
- COLLAM, Roger Capt. in Munster and in Monaghan (1602) and grantee of Munster lands.
- COLLEY, Sir George Capt. at Offaly, d. 1614.
- COLLIER, Christopher Fought at Clontibret, Monaghan. Worcestershire.
- CONWAY, Sir Fulke Capt. of horse at Carrickfergus 1602. Constable Athy fort in 1599. Grantee of Irish lands.
- CONWAY, Jenkin Capt. of foot in 1595.
- COOKE, Sir Anthony Capt. of horse under Essex and Mountjoy, nephew of Sir Robert Cecil. Killed in action at Cadiz.
- COOKE, Sir Richard Secretary to Sir Wm. Russell, Lord Deputy 1593-1594.
- CONSTABLE, Robert Capt. at Carrickfergus, taken prisoner, ransomed for £1,000 and the release of James McSorley's brother.
- CONSTABLE, Sir William Capt. of 100 foot Dundalk, Kinsale, wounded in action and knighted by Essex. Yorkshire, DNB.
- COOPER, Roger Capt. of foot in Munster under Carew. L.C. Capt. Cornwall.
- COOTE, Anthony Kinsale; 1598, grantee of Irish lands in Munster. Norfolk.
- COOTE, Sir Charles Kinsale, 1601. Capt. of 100 foot at Mallow, 1602. Grantee of lands in Leitrim and Cavan, 1603. Built Jamestown (Leitrim). Norfolk.
- COPELEY, Thomas Capt. with Mountjoy on Ulster campaign. Military engineer.
- COPPINGER, Thomas Capt at Waterford in 1598. Grantee of Irish lands.
- COSBY, Alexander Capt., killed by the O'Moores in 1596 at Stradbally.
- COSBY, Sir Francis General of the Kerne, brother of Alexander, grantee of Irish lands.
- COSBY, Sir Henry Corporal of the Field in 1598. Served under Sir Conyers Clifford in the Curlew Mts.

COTTRELL, Timothy Capt. of foot, Cork, 1598.

COVERT, Humphrey Muster master at L. Foyle - resigned 1601.

COWLEY, George Constable of Rosscarberry Castle, Cork.

COX, --- Fought in Wicklow, killed in action 1599.

CRANMER, George Secretary to Lord Mountjoy, killed in office 13th Nov. 1600, succeeded by Fynes Moryson.

CROFT, Sir Richard Capt. of 100 foot at Kilkenny.

CROFTE, Richard Capt. under Mountjoy, conductor, wounded in action, Oxfordshire.

CROFTS, Sir Henry Scout Master at Kinsale, wounded in action, grantee of Irish lands.

CROMPTON, Anthony Conductor of troops - Bristol. Gloucester.

CROMWELL, Edward, Lord Served under Essex, Constable at Dundalk 1599. Imprisoned in the Tower for his part in the Essex plot.

CROSBY, Patrick Conductor, grantee of Irish lands. Lancashire.

CUFFE, Henry Muster master in Munster, one of Essex's secretaries. Grantee of of Munster lands. Commander of 180 foot Killmallock (Limerick) 1601.

CUNY, Richard Capt. of 100 foot 1595. Staffordshire.

DALE, Dennis Capt. of foot in Monaghan under Mountjoy, 1601.

DANVERS (Daverson), Charles Sir
Capt. of horse, wounded in action, Essex.

DANVERS (Daverson), Sir Henry Col. of horse under Essex; 200 foot in Leinster (1600), Lieut. Gen. of the horse at Kinsale and wounded in action. Gov. of Armagh 1601, Gov. at Dungannon 1602. Earl of Danby, d. 1626, Wiltshire, DNB.

DARCY, Sir Francis Fought in the Curlews, Capt. of horse in the Pale, killed in action 1600.

DARRELL, Marmaduke Surveyor of victuals for the navy 1599-1603.

- DAVELLS, Henry Constable of Dungarven, wounded in action. Grantee of Irish lands.
- DAVENPORT, William Knighted at Rouen by Essex 1591. President of Munster after Carew (1607).
- DAVIS, John Surveyor of Ordnance under Essex 1599.
- DAWTREY, Nicholas Muster master and Capt. of foot in Co. Down. Grantee of Irish lands. Author.
- DEARING, Anthony Capt. at L. Foyle. Grantee of lands in Dublin. Capt. in Munster, 1595.
- DELVES, George Knighted 1591 by Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam.
- DELVIN, Lord Commander at Mullingar (1600). Grantee of Irish lands.
- DENTON, Sir Thomas Killed in action 1599.
- DENNY, Sir Edward Col. of foot under Essex. Grantee of lands in Kerry. Wounded in action, (died). Munster planter at Tralee.
- DE ROSE, Levan Military engineer at the Moyry Pass 1601. Dutch.
- DIGGES, Edward Capt. of foot L. Foyle, sergeant major 1600. Grantee of Irish lands. Commander at Rathmullan (Co. Donegal).
- DIGGES, Thomas Leinster Capt. of foot and 100 foot at L. Foyle.
- DILLON, Garrett Capt. of 100 foot Munster (1600). Grantee of Irish lands. Killed in action at Kinsale.
- DILLON, Tibbot Fought in the Curlews, wounded in action. Grantee of Irish lands (loyal Irish). Killed in action.
- DOCWRA, Sir Henry Commander of L. Foyle garrisons. Gounder of modern Derry. Wounded in action. Author. DNB, Yorkshire.
- DODDINGTON, Edward Bravery at Kinsale. Capt. of 100 foot, Munster. Grantee of lands at Dungiven, Co. Tyrone, but discharged with pension 1611.
- DONE, Hugh With Mountjoy at the Moyry Pass, wounded there 1601. Given a sinecure 1605 at 2s.3d. a day, "Master of the Lieutenants Game" in Ireland. Cheshire.

- DOWDALL, Sir John
Capt. at Enniskillen in 1594,
100 foot Munster 1600. Grantee of
lands near Enniskillen.
- DUKE, Sir Henry
At Enniskillen, 1594. Commander of
the Co. Louth forts. Grantee of
lands in the Pale. Died of wounds.
- DUNSANY, Lord
Capt. of horse under Mountjoy (1600).
Grantee of lands in Co. Westmeath.
Loyal Irish.
- DUTTON, Geoffrey
Capt. of 100 foot at L. Foyle;
100 foot in Drogheda (1601).
- DUTTON, Sir Thomas
Scout-master General. M.P. for
Dundalk 1613 in Irish Parliament.
- EATON, George
Scout-master in Connaught, 1593.
Capt. of foot at Clandeboy, 1595.
- ECKARSALL, James
Constable of Enniskillen Castle in
1594.
- EDMUNDS, ---
Wounded in action at Yellow Ford (1598),
wounded in action in Wicklow (1599).
- EDNEY, Walter
Capt. of foot at L. Foyle (1600).
Grantee of Irish lands.
- EDWARDS, Nicholas
Clerk of Munitions at Armagh (1595).
- EGERTON, Charles
Capt. of foot at Dundalk, 1596 and
at Carrickfergus 1598. Son of
Sir Thomas Egerton, Lord Keeper in
England. Killed in action in Wicklow
Mts., 1600.
- ELLIOTT, Robert
Planned to assassinate O'Neill (1600).
Spy for Cecil in Spain and Ireland.
- ELLIS, Edmund
Capt. of foot at L. Foyle. Provost
Marshal (1608) L. Foyle.
- ELSDON, ---
Killed in action at Yellow Ford, 1598.
- ESMOND, Laurence
Capt. of 100 foot Wexford and at
L. Foyle (1600). Wounded in action.
Grantee of Irish lands - Pale family,
but married an O'Flaherty.
- ESSEX, Robert Devereux,
2nd Earl.
Lord Lieutenant of Ireland (March-
November 1599). Beheaded Feb. 25th
1601. DNB.
- EVANS, Sir William
Col. of horse under Essex in 1599.
- EVANS, Matthew
Killed in action at Yellow Ford (1598).

- EVERARD, Joyes Military engineer for Docwra in 1600. Dutch.
- FARMER, William Surgeon with Essex and Mountjoy. Author of A Chronicle of Ireland.
- FENTON, Sir Geoffrey Served in the Irish campaigns of the 1580s. Knighted 1589. Secretary of State in Ireland in the 1590s. Author and translator of classics. DNB.
- FIELD, Jonathan Muster master, Leinster, Pale, 1600.
- FILDEW, William Killed by his own men on Isle of Arran, 1595.
- FINCH, George Constable of Athlone Castle, 1602.
- FISHER, Sir Edward Capt. at Carrickfergus and at Newry (1600). Vice-Constable Maryborough fort (1602). Grantee of Irish lands.
- FITZGARRETT, Sir Edward Capt. of 100 foot Munster (1600). Wounded in action. Loyal Irish.
- FITZGERALD, Gerald Capt. of foot Leinster 1595, loyal Irish.
- FITZWILLIAM, Sir William Gov. of Fotheringay Castle at the execution of Queen Mary of Scots, 1587. Lord Deputy - retired 1598. Kept a journal of his Irish services. Northants, DNB.
- FLEMING, --- Mentioned for his service against the O'Malleys and O'Flaherties on the west coast of Connaught in the 1590s. Helped Docwra to guard the Foyle; his ship used as a prison hulk there 1601. Returned to England 1602.
- FLEMING, Garret Capt. of horse in Munster. Wounded in action.
- FLOWER, George Sergeant Major in Munster (1600). Wounded in action at Kinsale. Capt. of 150 foot (1602). Grantee of lands in Mallow, Co. Cork.
- FLOYD, Walter Capt. of 100 foot under Essex and Docwra at L. Foyle.
- FLUDD, Ellis Capt. of 100 foot Mullingar (1599).
- FOLLIOT, Sir Henry Commander of Ballyshannon and Bundoran castles. M.P. in 1613. Knighted by Essex 1599. Commander at the Blackwater fort, 1601. Grantee of Irish lands.

- FORTESCUE, Henry Killed in action at Yellow Ford, 1598. Devonshire.
- FORTESCUE, Sir William Knighted by Mountjoy, 1600. Devonshire.
- FOWLE, Robert Provost marshal in Connaught. Killed in action 1596.
- FRECKLETON, Ferdinando Capt. of 100 foot Newry (1599).
- FULLER, John Capt. of 100 foot Monaghan. Killed in action in Enniskillen (1594).
- GAINSFORD, Thomas Wounded in action in the Curlews and at Wicklow, and wounded in action in the Moyry Pass. Author of The True and exemplary history of the Earl of Tyrone, (1619).
- GAISCOIGNE, George Commissary victuals, L. Foyle. Wounded in action at Kinsale, Cornwall.
- GARDENER (Gardiner), Robert Low Countries Capt. killed in action near Kilkenny in 1599 fighting under Essex.
- GARRETT, Edward At. Ballymahon 1596. Capt. of foot at Kinsale.
- GATES, Sir Thomas Sergeant major in Munster, 1598. Knighted by Essex at Cadiz, 1596. Governor of Virginia, America 1611-14.
- GIFFORD, Richard Capt. in Roscommon 1597. Killed in action at Crohan Castle, Offaly, 1598.
- GIFFORD, Sir Thomas Capt. of horse in the Pale (1600).
- GODE, Francis Capt. of 150 foot at Galway.
- GODOLPHIN, Sir William Capt. of horse under Essex, and at L. Foyle. Grantee of lands.
- GODWIN, William Capt. of the Guard in Dublin (1599).
- GORE, Paul L. Foyle, capt. of 100 foot. L.C., Sussex. Grantee of Irish lands.
- GORING, John Capt. of foot at Clontibret, Herefordshire.
- GOSNALL, Robert Secretary to the Earl of Essex 1599. Corporal of the field at Kinsale 1601.
- GIBSON, --- Killed in action near Dublin in a skirmish, 1598.
- GRAEME, George Capt. of foot in the Pale. Much wounded in action, and mentioned in dispatches 1601.

GRAEME, Sir Richard
Mainly responsible for the defeat of the Sagan, or pretended Earl of Desmond in 1600. Capt. of horse in Munster, at Kinsale. Knighted by Mountjoy 1600, discharged 1602. Grantee of Irish lands.

GRANT, Richard
Clerk of Munitions at Waterford, 1600.

GREEN, Richard
Fought against the pretended Earl of Desmond (1600). Grantee of lands in Leix.

GUEST, Lionel
Bravery - wounded in action at Kinsale.

HALES, ---
Capt. of 100 foot at L. Foyle, 1600.

HALLSAL, Sir Cuthbert
Capt. under Essex, knighted by Essex, Dublin 1599. Lancs.

HANDFORD, ---
Wounded in action. Captain under Essex, 1599.

HANLON, Hugh
Killed in action (1600). Loyal Irish. Ulster.

HANSARD, Sir Richard
Arrived in Ireland as Capt. of horse in 1600. Lieut. of Ordnance under Ormonde in Munster. Quarter-Master of Mountjoy's field army, 1601. Fought at Kinsale and was Trench-Master there. Governor at Carlingford and wounded there 1602. Knighted 1602. Granted lands in Lifford, Co. Donegal, 1610. Lincolnshire.

HARCOURT, Sir Edward
Capt. of horse 1595.

HARCOURT, Thomas
Constable of Monaghan fort in 1602. Conductor of a Cheshire Co. of 100 foot in 1595. Cheshire.

HARPOLE, William
Capt. of 100 foot in Munster under Essex, Mountjoy. Constable of Carlow Castle in 1602.

HARRINGTON, Sir Henry
Commander at the Curlews (1600) and in the Wicklow Mts., 1600. Capt. of 100 foot, Leinster.

HARRINGTON, James
Son of Sir Henry. Killed in action 1598.

HARRISON, Samuel
Capt. of 100 foot in Connaught, 1602. Wounded in action.

HART, Henry
Constable of Culmore fort, 1600. L. Foyle. Kent.

- HARVEY, Sir Gerard
 Knighted at Cadiz, 1596. Sergeant Major in 1599. Capt. of 100 foot in Munster, wounded in action. Grantee of Irish lands. Discharged 1602. Bedford.
- HARVEY, Philip
 Constable of Maryborough fort, 1596-1602.
- HARVEY, Roger
 Capt. of Guards, Kinsale. Constable of Castlehaven (1601). Killed in action.
- HARVEY, Thomas
 Conductor of horse from Chester, 1600.
- HARVEY, William
 Scoutmaster- wounded in action at the Moyrie Pass, 1601.
- HAWETT, Richard
 Deputy Clerk of Fortifications, 1600, Munster. Killed in action at Cork, 1603.
- HEATH, Austin
 Capt. of a Brittany Company in 1598 under Sir S. Bagnall. Wounded in action and died of wounds fighting O'Donnell at Lifford.
- HENSHAWE, Thomas
 Constable of Rathlin Island garrison. Grantee of Irish lands. Killed in action at Yellow Ford, 1598.
- HENSLOW, Henry
 Capt. of pioneers at Kinsale, 1601.
- HERBERT, Sir Edward
 Capt. of horse, Dublin. Gov. of Enniskillen in 1594. Grantee of Irish lands.
- HETHERINGTON, David
 Capt. in Mountjoy's field forces, 1600.
- HIGHAM, Thomas
 Capt. of 60 foot for the Earl of Clanrickard in 1595.
- HIGHAM, ---
 Capt. of 100 foot Westmeath, in the Pale. Killed in action at the Lifford, 1600.
- HILL, Moyses
 Constable of Olderfleet Castle near Carrickfergus, 1595. Provost Marshal Ulster (1603). Grantee of lands in Larne. Devonshire.
- HOBY, Francis
 Capt. of foot in Munster under Carew (1601). Capt. in Augher fort, 1602.
- HOLCROFT, Geoffrey
 Capt. of foot in Galway (1602).

IVY, Paul Engineer, Surveyor for the army (1601). Dutch.
 IZOD, John Capt., 2nd in command at Carrickfergus under Sir A. Chichester in 1600.
 JACKSON, Thomas Capt. under Mountjoy, 100 foot (1601).
 JENNINGS, --- Killed in action in 1599 at Adare, near Limerick, Killmallock.
 JEPHSON, John Capt. of horse in 1599 under Essex. Fought with Sir Conyers Clifford in the Curlews. At Carrickfergus 1601/2 - incursions into Co. Tyrone. Married daughter and sole heiress of Sir Thomas Norris, acquiring the Mallow (Co. Cork) estate. M.P. for Hampshire in 1620. Hampshire.
 JERMYN, Sir Thomas Capt. of 150 foot in Connaught, 1599.
 JOLLY, John Master gunner at Dunboy siege, 1602.
 JONES, Ellis Capt. at L. Foyle, 1600.
 JONES, William Muster master in Munster, 1600.
 KEATING, Redmond Capt. of foot 1595 - loyal Irish.
 KELLY, John Corporal of the field under Sir Wm. Russell (1596).
 KELLY, Henry Capt. of foot under Carew in Munster, (1601).
 KEMISH, Anthony Capt. of 100 foot in Munster. Discharged 1602. Wiltshire.
 KENRICK, --- Capt. of 150 foot under Ormonde, 1599.
 KEYS, Edward Constable of Blackwater fort until 1595.
 KILLIGREW, Simon Constable of Mountjoy fort in 1602. Cornwall.
 KING, George Conductor of troops to Munster (1600). Grantee of lands in Clontarf, nr. Dublin.
 KINGSMILL, Francis Capt. of 100 foot under Essex in Munster. Grantee of Irish lands.
 KINGSMILL, George Capt. of 100 foot in Munster, wounded in Dunboy siege (1602).
 KNOLLYS, Sir William Capt. of foot under Essex in 1599.

- KNOWLES, Sir Thomas
 Capt. of 60 foot in Armagh, 1595.
- KNOWLES, Sir Thomas
 Capt. of horse 1595.
- LAMBERT, Sir Oliver
 Served 24 years in Ireland.
 Captured, wounded in action, lost
 a leg. Knighted in Cadiz 1596.
 Colonel of foot under Essex, 1599.
 Very active in Leix and Offaly 1600.
 On Mountjoy's recommendation Governor
 of Connaught 1601. Constable of
 Athlone 1603. Grantee of lands in
 Co. Cavan. DNB., died 1618. Hampshire.
- LAMBYN, Thomas
 Capt. in the Pale, grantee of Irish
 lands.
- LANE, Parr
 Capt. under Lord Burgh 1596-7.
 Author of a Discourse on Ireland.
- LANE, Sir Ralph
 Muster master general 1592 -
 knighted 1593.
- LANGFORD, Roger
 Capt. of 150 foot at Inisloughan
 (between Lurgan and Armagh), 1602.
- LANGTON, Richard
 Killed in action at the Yellow Ford,
 1598.
- LATHAM, John
 Capt. of Brittany Co. under
 Sir J. Norris in Ireland, 1595.
 Wounded in action.
- LATWARE, Dr. ---
 Chaplain to Mountjoy at Carlingford,
 killed in action (1600).
- LEE, Thomas
 Capt. of 12 horse at Naas fort.
- LEGGE, Edward
 Capt. of 100 foot at Carrickfergus.
- LEIGH, Edmund
 Capt. of 100 foot at L. Foyle.
 Grantee of Irish lands.
- LEIGH, Edward
 Capt. of 100 foot at Omagh garrison,
 1602. Cheshire.
- LEIGH, Thomas
 Sir Urian's brother. Capt. of
 100 foot at L. Foyle, at Newry, 1599.
Cheshire.
- LEIGH, Sir Urian
 Capt. of 100 foot. Killed in action
 at Cadiz. Cheshire.
- LESTER, Mark
 Capt. of 100 foot at Clontibret,
 1595.

- LEVESON, Sir Richard
Admiral of the Queen's ships at Kinsale, 1601. Cousin of Sir John Leveson. Knighted by Essex at Cadiz, 1596. Vice-Admiral of England, 1604. DNB., Staffordshire.
- LINDLEY, Henry
Capt. of 100 foot, Drogheda, 1600.
- LISLE, Francis
Capt. of 100 foot at L. Foyle, discharged 1602.
- LISTER, Edward
Capt. of 100 foot at Ballymore and L. Foyle (1600), wounded in action.
- LLOYD, Ellis
Capt. of 100 foot at L. Foyle. Wounded in action at the Curlews, 1599. Grantee of Irish lands.
- LOFTUS, Adam
Son of the Archbishop of Dublin. Killed in action in Wicklow, 1599.
- LOFTUS, Sir Dudley
Capt. of horse, 1595.
- LOFTUS, Edward
Capt. of 100 foot at Naas.
- LOFTUS, Sir Thomas
Capt. of 100 foot in the Pale.
- LOVELL, Sir Robert
Capt. of 150 foot in Connaught, killed in action in Dundalk, 1600.
- MALBY, Henry
Capt. of 100 foot in Connaught, 1602. Yorkshire. Grantee of Irish lands.
- MALBY, Sir Nicholas
Military governor of Connaught in 1580s. Yorkshire.
- MANN, John
Provost Marshal at L. Foyle, 1601.
- MANNERING, Edward
Capt. in the field with Mountjoy, 1600.
- MANSELL, Rhys
Capt. of Lancs. band at Clontibret in 1595, killed in action at Carrickfergus. Flintshire.
- MANSFIELD, Richard
Capt. of foot at Newry, 1595.
- MARBERRY (Mallory)
L.C. Captain. Capt. of 100 foot in Kilkenny, discharged after Wicklow defeat, 1599.
- MARKHAM, Sir Griffin
Knighted by Essex at Rouen 1591. Capt. of horse under Essex 1599. Wounded in action in the Curlew Mts. 1599.
- MARSDEN, Richard
Muster master at Lifford, 1601.

MARSHALL, Michael Capt. of foot in Leix under Sir Wm. Russell, 1597. Gov. of Maryborough Fort, 1598.

MARTIN, William Killed in action at Sligo in 1596 under Sir Richard Bingham.

MASTERSON, Henry Capt. of 100 foot in Wexford. Wounded in action (1600). Grantee of Irish lands. Cheshire.

MASTERSON, Thomas Seneschal of Wexford. Constable of Ferns. Grantee of Irish lands. Cheshire.

MASTERSTON, Sir Richard Capt. of 100 foot, Munster (1600). Killed in action. Constable of Wexford and Ferns castles, 1602.

MAY, William Capt. of 100 foot at Galway, 1602.

MAYNARD, Thomas Muster master in Munster, 1596-1603.

MERRICK, Sir Gilly Capt. under Essex. Executed for part in Essex plot 1601.

MERRICK, Richard Muster master at L. Foyle - dismissed by Docwra.

MERRIMAN, Nicholas Capt. of 100 foot, Carrickfergus (1595). Drowned crossing Irish Sea. Derbyshire.

MacSWINEY, Sir John Capt. with Clifford in Connaught. Killed in action, 1599. Loyal Irish.

McDONNELL, Hugh Duff Capt. of foot, 1595. Loyal Irish.

MICHELBOURNE, Edward Capt. of foot under Essex and under Docwra in 1600.

MINCE, Joshua Capt. of 100 foot in the Ards Peninsula, 1600. Killed in action, 1601.

MINSHAW, --- Capt. of 100 foot at Cork under Carew, 1602.

MOLYNEUX, Samuel Clerk of Works in L. Foyle, 1600. Clerk Gen. of Royal Works in Ireland, succeeded by Josiah Bodley, 1608.

MONTACUTE, Edward Capt. at Wicklow, discharged for cowardice, 1599.

MONTAGUE, Charles Capt. of 100 foot at L. Foyle, 1600.

- MOORE, Sir Edward Negotiator with O'Neill, interpreter 1595/6 and Constable of Philipstown in 1595 until 1602. Garrett Moore his son and successor.
- MOORE, Sir Garrett Capt. of horse at Navan and Kells, 1599-1600.
- MORDAUNT, --- With Bingham in Connaught 1593. Constable of Glinn Castle, Limerick, 1600.
- MORGAN, Edmund Capt. in Essex's 2nd Regiment in 1599, and with Docwra.
- MORGAN, John Capt. of foot. Killed in action at Yellow Ford, 1598.
- MORGAN, Sir Matthew Knighted by Essex at Rouen, 1591. Col. of foot under Essex, 2nd in command of Ballyshannon and at L. Foyle.
- MORGAN, Robert Capt. of 100 foot under Essex, 1599.
- MORRIS, Edward Capt. of foot at Kinsale. Capt. of the Arboe garrison, 1602. Grantee of Irish lands, Co. Cavan.
- MORYSON, Fynes Traveller and author. Chief Secretary to Lord Mountjoy. Wounded in action at Carlingford, Nov. 14th 1600.
- MORYSON, Sir Richard Knighted by Mountjoy 1600. Active in Leix, Dundalk and at Kinsale. Carried Mountjoy's despatches from Kinsale to England. Governor of Lecale (Co. Down) 1601. Governor of Waterford, 1603. President of Munster with the Earl of Thomond. Elder brother of Fynes Moryson. DNB.
- MOSTYN, Hugh Capt. of 100 foot, Connaught. Flintshire.
- MOSTYN, Sir Thomas Knighted by Essex in Dublin, 1599. Flintshire.
- MOSTYN, William Conductor of troops. Capt. in Mayo, 1596. Flintshire.
- MOYLE, Henry Naval capt. in the 1590s. Conductor of troops to Carew.
- NELSON, Marmaduke Capt. of 100 foot at Navan and Kells, 1599.
- NETHAM, --- Spy for Carew in Munster. Grantee of lands in Munster.

- NEWTON, John Capt. under Essex. Grantee of lands in Kilkenny, 1598.
- NORRIS, Sir Henry President of Munster, Brittany commander, wounded in action and died of wounds, 1599. Brother to Sir John and Sir Thomas.
- NORRIS, Sir John L. General in Ireland with Sir Wm. Fitzwilliam, Lord President of Munster. Killed in action, 1597. DNB., Oxfordshire.
- NORRIS, Sir Thomas At Clontibret, 1595, and Lord President of Munster in succession to his brothers. Wounded in action and died 1599. Grantee of lands in Mallow, Cork. DNB., Oxfordshire.
- NORTH, Sir Thomas Capt. in Munster, 1601. Killed in action. Gloucestershire.
- NORTON, Gregory Capt. of 100 foot, Carrickfergus, 1600.
- NOWELL, George Constable of Duncannon fort, Waterford. Killed in action, 1600.
- NUCE, --- Wounded in action at siege of Castlehaven, nr. Kinsale, 1601. Capt. at Cashel, Tipperary.
- NUGENT, Christopher 3rd Lord Delvin - son of Earl of Westmeath. Loyal Irish.
- NUGENT, George Provost marshal at Ballyshannon, 1602.
- O'BRIEN, Donough 3rd Earl of Thomond. Council of Munster, 1599. Died 1624. DNB.
- O'BRIEN, Murrough 4th Baron Inchiquin, killed in action 29th Nov. 1597, Belleek. Loyal Irish. DNB.
- O'CARROLL, Sir Charles Capt. of 100 foot in Leinster, Pale, 1600. Loyal Irish.
- O'CONNOR, Murtagh Oge Capt. of foot, 1595. Loyal Irish.
- O'DONNELL, Niall Garve Representative of the elder branch of the O'Donnells. The chieftaincy taken by Red Hugh. Niall Garve joined forces with Sir H. Docwra at L. Foyle 1600 as a Capt. of horse and foot. Unrewarded for his service. Implicated in the O'Dogherty rebellion 1608. Died in the Tower of London after 17 years imprisonment, 1626. DNB.

- O'NEILL, Turlough MacHenry Capt. of foot with Mountjoy. Intermittently loyal.
- O'REILLY, Hugh Capt. of 100 foot, Kells, Leinster, 1600. Loyal Irish until his revolt, Dec. 1601.
- O'REILLY, Maelmuire Capt. at Yellow Ford. Killed in action. Loyal Irish.
- ORME, Roger Capt. of 100 foot at Trim, Leinster, 1599.
- ORRELL, Lewis Capt. of 100 foot at L. Foyle, 1600. Capt. of 100 foot at Aynough, 1603.
- OUSLEY, Edward Capt. of 100 foot in Munster 1601. Gloucestershire.
- OWEN, Hugh Provost marshal Gen. 1599. N. Wales.
- PANTON, Thomas Capt. of foot with Mountjoy; conductor. Discharged 1602.
- PARKER, John Capt. of foot in 1595.
- PARKER, Nicholas Capt. of 100 foot Munster, under Essex, 1599. Hampshire.
- PARSONS, John Capt. of 60 foot, Athlone 1595. Killed in action at Kells, 1597.
- PERCY, Sir Charles Col. of foot under Essex and under Mountjoy.
- PERCY, Sir Richard Knighted for military services in Ireland by the Lords Justices in 1599. In 1600 Capt. and Governor of Kinsale. Grantee of lands in Cork. Brother of the Earl of Northumberland.
- PETIT, Christopher Capt. of 200 foot Leinster, 1600. Killed in action.
- PHILLIPS, James Capt. of 100 foot at Ballyshannon, 1602.
- PHILLIPS, Thomas Capt. of 100 foot, Athy in Leix. Grantee of lands at Limavady, Co. Derry, 1603, and Coleraine.
- PIGGOTT, George Capt. of horse in the Pale. M.P. for Queen's Co. in 1613. Grantee of Irish lands.
- PINE, Henry Constable of Moghelly Castle, Cork, 1599.

- PINNER (Pinnar), Nicholas L.C. veteran with Docwra at L. Foyle, 1600. Active against O'Donnell in Donegal. Pensioned at 4s. a day in 1604. Employed as engineer in Italy. Returned to Ireland 1610. Involved in the Jacobean Plantation schemes in Cavan and Leitrim. Succeeded Sir Josiah Bodley as overseer of forts. Author of the Pynnar Survey, 1618. Died c.1640. DNB.
- PLUNKETT, Richard Capt. of 100 foot in Connaught under Essex, 1599.
- POLLARD, --- Capt. of 100 foot, Essex's army. Grantee of lands at Castlepollard, Meath.
- POOLEY, Sir John Capt. of 150 foot, L. Foyle, 1600.
- POWER, Anthony Col. of foot under Mountjoy; led a flying squad at Kinsale.
- POWER, Sir Henry Deputy President of Munster. Col. of the army, 1602. Brittany Capt. M.P. for Queen's Co., 1613. Grantee of lands in Leix.
- POWER, William Capt. of 100 foot, Munster under Essex, (1599).
- PRESTON, Sir Amias Vice-Admiral in 1601 at Kinsale. Knighted at Cadiz 1596. DNB.
- PRICE, John L.C. veteran. Capt. of 100 foot under Sir Wm. Russell, 1597. Wounded in action.
- PRODGERS, --- Wounded in action at Killmallock siege, 1598.
- RADCLIFFE, Sir Alexander Capt. of the vanguard of Essex's regiment, 1599. Killed in action in Curlew Mts.
- RADCLIFFE, --- Killed in action at Yellow Ford, 1598.
- RAND, --- Capt. of 100 foot at L. Foyle, killed in action at Donegal Abbey.
- RAVENS-CROFT, Anthony Capt. of 100 foot at Newry, discharged 1602.
- READ, Thomas Constable of Maryborough fort in 1599.
- REYNOLDS, Anthony Muster master at L. Foyle, 1601-3.

- RICH, Barnaby
In Ireland in a varied military career from 1573. Grantee of Ulster lands. Noted author of military tracts and fiction. Pensioned at 2s.6d. a day in 1597. DNB., Essex.
- RIDGEWAY, Sir Thomas
Capt. of horse at L. Foyle, 1600. M.P. for Tyrone, 1613. Grantee of Irish lands. DNB., Devon.
- ROBERTS, John
At Kinsale, mentioned for bravery, lieutenant.
- ROCHE (Roach), ---
Served under Sir Thomas Norris in Munster, 1598. Wounded in action, 1599.
- ROE, Francis
Kinsale, Capt. of 100 foot at Ards and at Mountjoy fort, 1602. Grantee of lands in Tyrone.
- ROOKEWOOD, Thomas
Capt. and Deputy Surveyor of the L. Foyle works for Docwra.
- ROONEY, William
Capt. of 100 foot, Connaught 1599.
- ROPER, Thomas
Capt. at Carlingford, and at Ballymore (100 foot). 150 foot at Kells.
- ROTHERHAM, Sir John
Knighted by Mountjoy, 1600.
- ROTHERHAM, Sir Thomas
Went to Ireland 1596. Served under Clifford at the Curlews, 1600. Later that year wounded in action under Mountjoy on an Ulster campaign. At Kinsale, 1601, mentioned for bravery. 1603 - Governor of a fort nr. Galway. Knighted 1605. Mayor of Galway 1612. Surveyor of Forts in Ulster 1617. Joint patent with Pinner as director-general of castles and forts, 1618. Grantee of lands in Armagh, Fermanagh, Cavan, Longford, Offaly, Leitrim. Bedfordshire.
- ROWLEY (Romley), Thomas
Killed the day after the Yellow Ford while smoking a pipe.
- RUSH, Anthony
Brother of Sir Francis, killed in action at the Moyry Pass, 1600.
- RUSH, Sir Francis
Capt. of 150 foot at Leix, 1599. M.P. for King's Co., 1613. Died 1629.
- RUSSELL, Edward
Capt. of horse, 1595.

- RUSSELL, Sir William Lord Deputy, recalled 1597.
- ST. JOHN, Oliver Accompanied Mountjoy to Ireland, 1600. Commander of horse in Leinster, 1601. Wounded in action. Knighted by Mountjoy, 1601. Colonel of the Army, 1602. Master of the Ordnance in Ireland, 1605-1614. Lord Deputy of Ireland, 1616-1622. Viscount Grandison, 1622. DNB., Wiltshire.
- ST. LAWRENCE, Christopher Capt. of horse under Mountjoy at Kinsale, and at Monaghan. Col. under Mountjoy and previously under Essex. Col. of the army, 1602. DNB., Devonshire.
- ST. LEGER, Sir Warham Vice-President, Munster. Killed in duel with Hugh Maguire, 1599. DNB.
- SALISBURY, John Capt. of 100 foot in 1599 under Earl of Ormonde.
- SALISBURY, Owen Capt. of 100 foot at Philipstown, Offaly, 1599.
- SAVAGE, Sir Arthur Col. of foot under Essex and Mountjoy. Gov. of Connaught after Sir C. Clifford in 1600.
- SAVAGE, Sir Thomas Capt. in Connaught. Grantee of Irish lands.
- SAXEY, William Capt. of 150 foot in Munster, 1600, under Carew.
- SECKFORD, Henry Constable of Carrickfergus, 1601 - a rival to Sir A. Chichester for the command of Carrickfergus. Capt. of Masserene garrison, 1602.
- SEGER, Stephen Constable of Dublin Castle, 1595.
- SEGRAVE, James Killed in action at Clontibret, Monaghan, by Hugh O'Neill.
- SHANE, Sir Francis Constable of Ballymore fort, 1599. Capt. of 150 foot in Leinster. Grantee of lands in Longford.
- SHEFFIELD, Henry Capt. of 100 foot in Kilkenny in 1599. Capt. of 100 foot in Munster, 1600. Grantee of Irish lands. Discharged in 1602.
- SIDLEY, Ralph Capt. of 100 foot at L. Foyle, discharged in 1602.

- SIDNEY, John
Capt. of Brittany veterans in 1598.
Capt. of 100 foot at Coleraine,
1603. Claims to lands in Co. Derry,
1606.
- SKIPWITH, Henry
Capt. of foot in Munster 1590s, at
Kinsale. Wounded in action. Constable
of Kinsale, 1611. Died 1630. Yorks.
- SLINGSBY, Francis
Naval Capt., Kinsale 1601. Capt. of
100 foot in Munster 1602. Grantee
of lands in Munster.
- SMITH, Roger
At Drogheda, 1595. Constable of
Castle Park nr. Kinsale, 1601.
- SMITH, William
Cannoneer at Kinsale, at Castle Park,
nr. Kinsale.
- SPENCER, Thomas
Capt. of 100 foot in Munster, 1600.
At Kinsale, killed in action 1601.
- SPENSER, Edmund
Author/poet. Clerk to the Munster
Council until 1598.
- SPRING, Thomas
Constable of Castlemaine Castle 1595.
Munster colonist.
- SOUTHAMPTON, Earl of
Col. of foot under Essex. Col. of
horse under Essex at Moyry Pass.
- STAFFORD, William
Capt. of 100 foot at Mullingar, 1599,
discharged 1602.
- STAFFORD, Francis
Capt. of 100 foot at Newry in 1599;
200 foot. in Leinster, 1600. Grantee
of lands at Portglenone (Antrim).
Berkshire.
- STAFFORD, Thomas
Secretary to Carew in Munster, author
Pac. Hib.
- STANLEY, Sir Edward
Capt. in Wicklow, 1597. Lancashire.
- STAUNTON, Edmund
Capt. of foot under Sir William Russell
in 1597. Capt. of foot under Mountjoy.
Killed in action. Family servitors
in Mayo. Warwickshire.
- STREET, Henry
Capt. of 100 foot, Westmeath 1595.
Killed in action at Yellow Ford.
- SYMMONDS, Nicholas
Constable of Kilclief Castle, Ulster,
1602.
- TAFFE, Sir William
Capt. of foot, Munster. High Sheriff,
Cork. Capt. of horse at Kinsale.
Grantee of Irish lands.

- TALBOT, Sir John
Commander of Ballancargy fort (Co. Cavan),
1601.
- TASBOROUGH, Sir Thomas
Capt. in the Pale, knighted by Essex
in Dublin. Bucks.
- TAYLOR, William
Corporal of the field at Kinsale,
1601.
- THOMAS, Hugh
Carriage Master, 1595. Leinster.
- THORNTON, Sir George
Provost marshal in Munster 1589.
Naval Capt. in the 1590s. Knighted
by Essex, 1599. Commander of
Killmallock Castle in 1600. Grantee
of lands in Co. Limerick.
- TIBBOT, Ne Long
Capt. of 100 foot in Connaught.
Loyal Irish.
- TIRRELL, Sir John
Capt. in Leinster. Loyal Irish.
- TOLKERNE, Nicholas
At Kinsale, Conductor of troops.
Bristol.
- TRACY, Nicholas
Capt. of 100 foot in Leinster, 1599
under Ormonde.
- TREVOR, Edward
Capt. of 100 foot, Newry.
Moyry Pass, wounded in action, 1600.
- TREVOR, John
Capt. at Carlingford. Wounded in
action. Grantee of Irish lands.
- TREVOR, Sir Richard
Knighted by Sir Wm. Russell, 1597.
Grantee of Irish lands.
- TUCKER, ---
Capt. in the Pale, 1595. Constable
of Ballincor fort, Wicklow, 1597.
- TUDOR, Owen
Capt. of a Brittany Co. in 1598.
N. Wales
- TURNER, Richard
Sergeant major under Lord Burgh,
killed in Burgh's attempt on the
Blackwater, 1597.
- TURNER, Robert
Capt. under Essex 1599, killed in
action 1600.
- TURRETT, William
Capt. of horse under Essex.
- VAUGHAN, Sir Francis
Killed in action at Blackwater fort,
1597. Brother-in-law to Lord Burgh.
- VAUGHAN, John
Capt. of 150 foot at L. Foyle.
Conductor. M.P. for Donegal, 1613.
Baron Vaughan, 1621. DNB.

- WALKER, Thomas Wounded in action 1597. Failed in a plot to kill Hugh O'Neill, 1601.
- WALLER, Sir Thomas Knighted by Lord Burgh at Blackwater, 1597. Kent.
- WALLOP, Sir Henry Treasurer at War in Ireland 1580-99. Capt. of 100 foot at Carrickfergus, 1595. Knighted by Essex, 1599.
- WARDMAN, --- Killed in action in the Wicklow Mts., 1599.
- WARREN, Sir Henry Capt. of 100 foot Leinster, 1600, Pale - family.
- WARREN, Sir William Constable of Newcastle, Co. Down, 1600.
- WATERHOUSE, Sir Edward Capt. in Dublin, member of Irish Council.
- WAYMAN, Edward Provost marshal in Connaught, 1600. L.C. veteran.
- WELSH, Henry Capt. in Munster, 1601 - formerly in Spanish service.
- WENMAN, Edmund Capt. of 12 horse in Connaught, Provost marshal, 1602.
- WENMAN, Francis Capt. in Munster. Grantee of Irish lands.
- WHITE, Thomas Capt. of 50 horse, 1600.
- WILLIAMS, Phillip Secretary to Lord Deputy, Burgh and to Sir John Norris, 1597. Wounded in action in Armagh, 1601. Author.
- WILLIAMS, Thomas Capt. of 150 foot, Leinster. Commander at the Blackwater fort, with 150 foot. Capt. of 100 foot, Ards. Wounded in action at Benburb, 1602.
- WILLIS, Humphrey Muster master at L. Foyle; killed in action.
- WILMOTT, Sir Charles Governor of Kerry, Col. under Mountjoy, 1602.
- WILTON, Edward Wounded in action at Yellow Ford, 1598. Capt. of foot under Essex, 1599.
- WINDSOR, William Capt. of 100 foot at Mullingar, 1599. Active under Chichester in the Lough Neagh area, 1602.

WINGFIELD, Sir Edward Capt. of horse under Essex. Grantee of lands in Wicklow. Viscount Powerscourt.

WINGFIELD, Sir Richard Marshal of the Army (1600) and at Kinsale (1601). Wounded in action. Died 1634. Grantee of lands in Tyrone.

WINGFIELD, Sir Thomas Capt. of 200 foot, Leinster. Capt. of 150 foot, Navan.

WOOD, Thomas Capt. of 150 foot under Docwra. Fought against O'Cahan. At Omagh, 1602.

WOODHOUSE, Edward Capt. of Brittany Co. in Dublin.

WORLOCK, --- Capt. under Essex and at L. Foyle, 1600.

WRIOTHESLEY, Sir Henry 4th Earl of Southampton. Capt. of horse under Essex. Attainted Feb. 19th 1601, restored 16th May, 1603.

WYNAMAN, Thomas Marshal of Connaught under Essex, 1599.

WYNN, Thomas Capt. at Kinsale and at Drogheda, 1602.

YELVERTON, Charles Capt. of 100 foot at Trim, 1600. Conductor. Discharged 1602. Northants.

YORK, Abry Conductor of troops to Ireland. Discharged 1602. Kent.

YORK, Sir William Capt. of horse 1595.

SOURCES FOR THE LIST

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APPENDIX NO. 3.Register of relief awarded disabled and aged soldiers from petitions1595 - 1603

<u>Name.</u>	<u>County.</u>	<u>Pension or/and alms-room</u>
Benedict Allen	Warwickshire	Refused - to be paid a pension.
Hugh Skurfield	Pembrokeshire	Referred to the Id. Mayor of London.
Richard Collier	Oxfordshire	Annual pension (unspecified)
James Rice	Monmouth	Annual pension (unspecified)
Wm. James	Monmouth	Annual pension of £15
Wm. Denrye	N'humberland	Annual pension (unspecified)
Edw. Lee	Suffolk	Annual pension (unspecified) His pension later continued to his widow, and arrears of £4
Meredith Watkins	Brecknock	'The statutory pension' to continue
John Ashley	Berkshire	Refused - to be paid a pension
Capt. Baynton	Leicester	Pension to be continued
Owen Llewlllyn	Brecknock	'Of great need of a pension'
Thos. Stukeley	Devonshire	Pension of £20 a year.
Wm. Evans	- - -	Alms-room in Durham Cathedral
John Tyndell	- - -	Alms-room in Durham Cathedral
Thos. Smyth	Kent	Annual pension (unspecified)
Rich. Franklyn	Lincolnshire	Annual pension (unspecified)
Bryan MacGrannel	- - -	Alms-room in Westminster - but eleven placed before him.
James Pryce	Monmouth	Alms-room - Westminster.
Wm. James	Monmouth	Pension of £8 p.a. to continue
Geo. Helmers	Newcastle	Annual pension (unspecified)
Aneas O'Daleholan	Ireland	Sent back to the L. Deputy for a pension.
Phil. Smith	Radnorshire	An annual unspecified pension
Thomas Smith	Kent	An annual unspecified pension
John Johnson	Warwickshire	An annual unspecified pension
Wm. Booth	Berkshire	Pension of 12d a week to continue
Jas. Davidson	Kent	Alms-room in Rochester Cathedral "lost both hands"
Richard Sende	Durham	Alms-room in Durham Cathedral
Richard Butcher	Essex	An annual unspecified pension.
Richard Hutton	Essex	An annual unspecified pension.
John Saville	Essex	An annual unspecified pension.

1. APC., xxv, xxvi, xxvii, passim, between the years 1595-1597

Darby O'Fally	Ireland	"To be placed in a standing garrison"
John Rowland	Hereford	Alms-room in Ledbury.
Wm. Smitheman	Shropshire	Annual unspecified pension.
Wm. Cordey	Wiltshire	Pension to be re-instated
John Saville	Yorkshire	Pension of £6.13.4 to be restored.
Thos. Ketterwell	Berkshire	Alms-room in Donnington Castle
Thos. Bankes	Stafford	Pension of £10 to be reduced to 54s.4d.
John Bennett	Norfolk	A yearly stipend
Wm. Buxton	Northants.	A statutory pension
Thos. Cheswis	Cheshire	A statutory pension
Wm. Warren	Essex	A statutory pension
John Dalton	Shropshire	A statutory pension
John Parry	Denbigh	A statutory pension
John Roberts Den	Denbigh	A statutory pension.
Nicholas Sharpley	Devonshire	A statutory pension
John Rogers	Devonshire	A statutory pension
Rich. Emmes	Staffordshire	A £10 a year pension
Lycen Phillips	Glamorgan	A £15 a year pension - was paid only £4 "musket shott in the thighe"
Thomas Proterch	Hereford	Pension refused - to be given.
Ewd. Gouldhurst	Herts.	Pension refused - sent to Middlesex.
Nicholas Hook	Shropshire	"No money left to give Hook"
Wm. James	Monmouth	Former allowance £15 (1595) to be restored (1598)
Richard Langton	London	The statutory pension.
Ralph Norris	Surrey	The statutory pension 'lost one legg'
Rob. Skinner	Northants	The statutory pension
David Jones	Radnor	A £10 annual pension
David Rush	York	A £10 annual pension
John Rowland	Worcester	Alms-room in Worcester Cathedral (next on the list when an imate died)
Wm. Sora	Surrey	An annual pension (unspecified)
Edw. Varneham	Surrey	An annual pension (unspecified)
Geo. Watkins	Staffordshire	An annual pension (unspecified)
Robert Yates	Yorkshire	An annual pension (unspecified)
John Young	London	Alms-room in St. Thomas's Hospital
Barnaby Danvers	Northumberland	Alms-room in Durham refused "lost both leggs"
William Worne	Devonshire	An annual pension (unspecified)

1. APC., xxvii, xxviii, xxix passim, between the years 1597 and 1599

Nicholas Ingram	Dorsetshire	An annual pension (unspecified)
Albert Atkinson	Surrey	An annual pension (unspecified)
Geo. Warburton	Shropshire	An annual pension
Rob. Day	Norfolk	Arrears to be made up and pension restored him.
John Rogers	Devon	Pension to be restored
Rice Powell	Brecknock	An annual pension
Wm. Hulles	Surrey	An annual pension
Rice Williams	Anglesey	An annual pension
Peter Cade	Dorset	An annual pension
John Appleby	Surrey	An annual pension
John Green	Ireland	Sent back to Ireland for a pension 'he carrieth about with him very sufficient evidence - by the losse of one of his armes'
John Lye	Ireland	Sent back to benefit from the 'reversion of a good pension'
Barnaby Danvers	N'humberland	Sinecure of 'Guider' in Dunstable hospital.
Wm. Ingeram	Lincolnshire	Pension by Id. Mayor of London
Thos. Yates	Leicestershire	Pension to be restored from 1598.
Adrian Mason	Southampton	Alms-room in Univ. College, Oxon. refused sent to 'God's House in Southampton'.
Richard Norris	Surrey	Advancæ of 20s. wanted to free him from prison then a pension of £4 per annum.
John Price	Surrey	Arrears of his £3 p.a. pension. Supported by Sir Wm. Howard.
Wm. Ramsey	Surrey	An annual pension
Edw. Lloyd	- - -	Pension of 12d a day 'hurt in the Irish warrs'
Wm. Evans	- - -	Alms-room in Durham Cathedral
R. Franklyn	Lincolnshire	Pension of £6 p.a. 'held by Wm. Roth now dead.'
Alex. Tweddell	- - -	Alms-room in Durham (Dec.1596)
Evans Jones	- - -	Alms-room in Worcester (1597)
Roger Cocksey	Kent	Alms-room in Canterbury
John Shente	Winchester	Pension of 40 marks a year on the rec. of the Queen to the Bp. of WINCHESTER
Pelham Burton	- - -	Pension of £10 a year for life, in addition to his former £20 given in 1594 for 'war services'.
Hugh Myles	Kent	Sinecure of porter of the Gravesend Blockhouse at 8d a day.

1. APC., xxx, xxxi, xxxii, passim; CSPD.(1595-97), 9, 292, 306, 308, 322, 345, 352, 429, 466.
between the years 1599-1603

Wm. Sara	Lincolnshire	Alms-room in Peterborough
Wm. Keyes	Kent	Alms-room in Canterbury
David Williams	- - -	Sinecure of gunner in the Tower of London at 6d a day.
Thos. Bird	- - -	Pension of 4d a day
Edmund Beckford	- - -	Sinecure of a gunner at Carlisle at 8d the day.
Mat. Slyman	London	Sinecure of gunner in the Tower of London at 6d. a day.
Geo. Watson	London	Pension of 2sh. a day (1598)
Geoff. Storey	London	Pension of 2sh. a day 'lately held by Francis Clayton.'
Richard Handley	Kent	Alms-room in Canterbury 'loss of sight with gunpowder'
Edw. Francis	- - -	Pension of 12d a day
Edw. Prim	- - -	£50 p.a. 'in consideration of war service'
Richard Langton	London	Pension of 6d a day
Richard Beaumont	London	Pension of 12d a day
Richard Lath	London	Grant of an alms-room (unspecified)
Peter Wyatt	Oxfordshire	Alms-room in Christchurch College
Finnis McGullichodie	Ireland	Pension of 6d a day
Stephen Seward	Berkshire	Alms-room in Donnington Castle
James Beverley	Leicester	Alms-room in Leicester town
Darby Murfield	Chester	Alms-room in Chester
Oliver Randall	- - -	Pension of 3sh a day for life "utterly maimed and impotent by wounds in the war"
Rowland Atkinson	- - -	Alms-room in Carlisle
Wm. Howell	Worcester	Alms-room in town of Worcester
Roger Pearce	Gloucester	Alms-room in Gloucester Cathedral
Chris Brewton	Norfolk	Alms-room in Norwich Cathedral
A.B.	Kent	The first vacancy in Rochester for 'a poor wounded soldier' - alms-room.
Henry Venn	Wiltshire	£5 annual pension
Wm. Chiler	Wiltshire	Pension of 50s. p.an.
Rob. Bungey	Wiltshire	£5 pension
Thos. Doggett	Wiltshire	£5 pension
John Dankett	Wiltshire	£5 pension
Wm. Bread	Wiltshire	£4 pension
John Warne	Wiltshire	£4 pension
Chris. Strong	Wiltshire	£5 pension

1. CSPD., (1595-97), 466, 476, 503 (1598-1601), 5, 13, 94, 63, 70, 73, 80, 93, 94, 155, 198, 199, 209-215, 230, 388, 505; HMC., Various Collections I, 69, 70, 71.

Roger Rashwood	Suffolk	20s immediate relief in Wilts. and pension of 53/4 (1602)
Wm. Christopher	Wilts.	£4 pension
Laurence Goofe	Wilts.	£4 pension
Thomas Willis	Wilts.	66/8d pension
Andrew Simes	Wilts	20s. granted
Thos. Poore	Wilts	£3.6.8d pension
Thomas Hill	Wilts	Pension taken off him two years previously to be restored (1602)
Roger Hunton	Wilts	£5 pension
John Thomson	Wilts	Given £2 on condition that he returned to Ireland.
John Golding	Wilts	Pension of 4 marks.
Henry Baker	Wilts	Pension of 4 marks.
Thos. Jones	Wilts	To be supported by Sir Oliver Lambert, his cousin, 'wounded at Kinsale'.
Thos. Hameling	- - -	Pension refused
Thos. Tatton	Wilts	£4 pension, formerly had one of £3.6.8.
John Duckett	Wilts	£5 pension
Wm. Knight	Wilts	£4 pension
John Wilkins	Wilts	£5 pension to cease as he gained as he gained an alms-room in Mr. Sutton's Hospital'
Walter Gilbert	Wilts	Payment of 40s.
Nicholas Mereweather	Wilts	Pension of 5 marks.
Arthur Carter	Wilts	Wanted an increase on his pension of £3.6.8.
John Allen	Wilts	Payment of 40s.
Geo. Inges	Wilts	Pension of £3.6sh.
Thos. Parre	Lancashire	Pension of £3.6.8d.
Thos. Sharples	Lancashire	Pension of £3.6.8d.
John Whitsons	Lancashire	Payment of 40s.
Henry Bushell	Lancashire	Pension of 2sh. a week.
Thos. Owen	Lancashire	Pension of 12d. a week.

1. HMC., Various Collections. I, 72, 77, 78, 79, 80, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 89, 91, 93, 99, 102, 103; J.Tait (ed.) Lancashire Q. Sessions Papers pp. 74, 102, 135, 138, 141, 159, 164, 261, 272.

Thomas Reynolds	- - -	40s. pension "lost one of his hands"
Christopher Hundsworth	- - -	20s. pension "lost his nose".
John Wilson	London	40s. pension
Maurice Croft	London	66/8 "being in grete distress"
Edmund Barrett	Co. Mayo	2/6 per diem pension
Edward Boorne	Ireland	1s. a day in consideration of services.
O'Mulloy, (Capt.)	Ireland	To be given priority for a pension in Ireland, wounded (1597)
John Bingham (Capt.)	Ireland	Long service in Connaught, maimed asked for his debts to be paid.
Edw. Golde	Devon	Wife and children in great want, because of his absence in Ireland.
John Danyell	- - -	In much debt because of the war "hunted by creditors".
Owen ap Hugh	N. Wales	"maimed in the hand" needing relief
John Baxter (Capt.)	- - -	Deep in debt-maimed while saving Sir Richard Bingham's life in 1586.
Robert Pigott (Capt.)	Ireland	Extreme misery in the queen's service.
Thos. Horne's wife	Ireland	Destitute since her husband's death in Ireland.
Ant. Crompton (Capt.)	- -	Long service in the war in Ireland petitions for the means to live.
Ludovic Bryskett (Capt.)	Ireland	No means to satisfy his debts.
Henry Malby (Capt.)	Yorks	Long service, great losses, needs means to sustain wife and children.

1. Cal. Patent Rolls, Ireland (..... J. Morrin, 1861) passim HMC., Salisbury, ix, 56, 422; ibid., x, 14, 15, 16, 35, 140, 148, 370, 384, 441, 462, 463; CSPI., (1600), 449, 450

Joan Grimdisch	---	Widow, to have a 21 lease of the Customs of the Port of Dublin: her husband the previous farmer of the Customs.
Geoffrey Story	---	Has been a humble petitioner for six years for a pension; had served Queen Mary and Her Majesty for 40 years. Direct petition to Lord Burghley, 1597.
John Birchall George Goodman Edward White Martin Leslie John Crofton Gilbert Gardener	Roscommon	All six petition for the restoration of lands and good in Co. Roscommon, and amends for all the losses suffered at the hands of the rebels. Petitions to the privy council.
Alice Pynnock	Dublin	Petitioned the Dublin Council for £85 "for the diet of the Countess of Desmond".
John Baggott	---	Lost both legs in the service against Feagh McHugh - petitions the Dublin Council for relief and maintenance.
Henry Wilson	---	"A common soldier" petitions for arrears of pay of £28.5s.
Thomas Reynneck	---	Of 36 years service in the wars in Ireland and wounded many times wanted a 40 year lease of lands in the Pale to the annual value of £30.
Anne Partridge	---	Widow, husband slain (1599) given a grant of £10.
Edward Walker	---	A Dutchman maimed granted 30 shillings to help him to his own country.
Leys de la Brett	---	A Frenchman maimed granted 40 s. to help him to France.
Lady Frances Burgh	---	Widow of Lord Burgh, slain petitioned Queen Elizabeth to have her portion of tithes restored. The Queen wrote to Mountjoy (21 July 1600) the same date as Lady Burgh's petition to have this done.
Mabel, Countess of Kildare	Maynooth	Petition to the Queen on her "poor desolate and distressed estate". Lost all her sons in the war. Wants the continuance of the Queen's favour.

Mary Jackson ---

Widow, Husband slain, granted
£6.13.4d. from the Dublin Council
"to carry her home into England,
her native country".

William Knight ---

A grant of £6.13.4d. for keeping
two orphan daughters of Richard Fitton,
slain in the war, "not any of their
blood taking care of them". (1)

(1) CSPI, (1592-1596), 511, 544; (1596-1597), 198, 325, 405; (1598-1599),
438; (1599-1600), 240; (1600), 328, 500, 37; (1600-1601), 165.

Appendix 4 : Identification of Forts and Garrisons
for Map 1 (Introduction) and Map 3 (Chapter eleven)

1. Coleraine (Co. Derry)

A major O'Kane (O'Cahan) stronghold. Attacked frequently by Sir Henry Docwra 1600-1602. On O'Cahan's submission in 1602 the site fell to Docwra's soldiers. Granted in the Jacobean Plantation to Captain Thomas Phillips.

(CSPI (1600), 188, 253, 267; (1601-1603), 325; (1603-1606), 322, 341)

2. Culmore (Co. Derry)

Sir Henry Docwra erected earthworks around an existing castle in May 1600 to command the River Foyle to Derry. J. Everaert, the Dutch engineer responsible for the later fortifications. Garrisoned with 100 f. under Captain Henry Harte in 1602.

(CSPI (1601-1603), 257, 263, 267, 525)

3. Burt (Co. Donegal, now Newtowncunningham)

A strongly fortified position taken by Docwra in 1601. One of the O'Dogherty castles frequently attacked by the O'Donnells. Garrisoned with 100f. under Captain John Vaughan in 1602.

(CSPI (1600-1601), 277, 325, 339; (1601-1603), 364, 375)

A contemporary sketch of Burt Castle by Robert Ashby in PRO.SP.63/208/pt.ii/ no. 71 (v) May 1601.

4. Derry

Site taken by Docwra in May 1600. Five miles upstream from the Foyle estuary Docwra made Derry the strongest fortified area on the river demolishing most of the medieval buildings in so doing. In 1600 Docwra had about 3,000 f. and 200 h. along the river. Docwra the founder of modern Derry. In 1608 Sir Cahir O'Doherty's rebellion re-took the forts' but between 1614-18 Captain Edward Doddington built masonry walls and bastions.

A contemporary sketch of all the sites along the Foyle by Robert Ashby in PRO.SP.63/208/pt. ii/ no. 71 (iv) and an early plan in Trinity College Dublin, MS 1209,24.

5. Lifford (Co. Donegal)

An O'Donnell castle where Red. Hugh O'Donnell entertained the Spanish ambassador Don Alonzo Copis in 1596. Taken by Neill Garve O'Donnell for Sir Henry Docwra in 1600. Noted as a good strong fort of lime and stone, Lifford commands the rise of

the Foyle at the confluence of the Mourne and Finn rivers.
Granted to Sir Richard Hansard in the Jacobean Plantation.

CSPI (1601-1603), 322, 476, 629.

6. Dunalong (Co. Derry)

Established as an outpost of Derry by Sir Henry Docwra in May 1600. In 1601 garrisoned with 650f. but 400f. to be ready for the field operations under Sir John Bolles.

CSPI (1601-1603), 266, 298, 525; F. Moryson, Itinerary, II, 389
Plans of in T.C.D. MS. 1209, 14, 17, 19 and PRO.M/PF. 335(1)

7. Dungiven (Co. Derry)

A stronghold of the O'Cahans' taken by Docwra in August 1602. Garrisoned with 150 men under Captain Lewis Orrell. Castle built between 1604-1611. Lands and abbey of Dungiven claimed by Sir John Sidney in 1606.

CSPI (1601-1603), 444, 445, 455, 463, 476 (1603-1606), 484

8. Castlederg (Co. Tyrone)

Fort and garrison established in 1602 by Neill Garve O'Donnell for Sir Henry Docwra. Castle built by Sir John Davies in 1609 the grantee of the area in the Jacobean Plantation.

CSPI (1600-1601), 410 (1601-1603), 47, 48, 95

9. Newtownstewart (Co. Tyrone)

Fort and garrison established by August 1602 with 100f. under Captain Roger Atkinson. Sir Josiah Bodley's report on some Ulster forts in 1608 claimed it was unnecessary to maintain a garrison here should Omagh and Lifford be well kept. Site of a Norman castle and maintained by the O'Neills until the Elizabethan re-conquest.

J. Buckley, "Report of Sir Josiah Bodley on some Ulster forts in 1608" in Ulster Journal of Archaeology, 2nd ser. xvi (1910) pp. 61-64. and CSPI., (1601-1603), 22, 365, 92, 476, 525.

10. Omagh (Co. Tyrone)

Outpost of Derry established by Sir Henry Docwra in 1602. Garrisoned with 100f. by Captain Edward Leigh in 1603. Captain Ormond Leigh built a fortified plantation house in 1611. Erroneously stated as being "some twelve miles from Dungannon" by Fynes Moryson. Omagh and Dunganannon are about 28 miles apart.

F. Moryson, Itinerary, III, 167 : CSPI (1601-1603), 22, 442, 444, 463, 476, 525, 566. Plan of Omagh in PRO.M/PF. 50 c. 1610.

11. Desert Martin (Co. Derry)

Uncertain whether the site was taken by Chichester or Doowra, but there were plans to build a fort in 1611. Captain William Windsor was active in this area of n. of Lough Neagh in 1602.

CSPI (1611-1614), 39, 121, 275-276.

12. Toome (Co. Antrim)

Sir Arthur Chichester captured Toome castle in June 1602, and the fort erected by O'Neill on the opposite (west bank) of the River Bann was also taken at the same time. Garrisoned by Captain Thomas Phillips with 150f. in Oct. 1602.

CSPI (1601-1603), 334, 356, 419, 448; F. Moryson, Itinerary, III, 185.

13. Masserene (Co. Antrim)

Captured by Sir A. Chichester in April 1601 near the site of the later town of Antrim. Garrisoned with 100f. under Captain Henry Seckford in 1602.

The fort is mis-located in CSPI (1600-1601) 447 as being in Co. Down.

See also CSPI, (1601-1603), 63, 64, 246, 287, 134, 415.

14. Arboe (Co. Tyrone)

Garrisoned with 100f. under Captain Edward Morris in November 1602. Fort built near Arboe Point on the western shore of Lough Neagh; like so many of these early seventeenth century forts built to restrict the movement of O'Neill's forces in the final Elizabethan conquest of Ulster.

CSPI. (1601-1603), 521, 523.

15. Mountjoy (Co. Tyrone)

Fort built by Lord Mountjoy's forces in July 1602, and like the other Ulster forts of 1600-1603 it is laid out on the principles of artillery fortification. The position was of importance being on the route to Dungannon in the final stages of the war. A small castle was added in 1605, probably by Capt. Francis Roe, who served under Sir Arthur Chichester.

Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, III, 167, 302; CSPI. (1601-1603), 523

16. Dungannon (Co. Tyrone)

Chief seat of the O'Neills since the middle ages. Fort and garrison established by September 1602 under Sir Henry Danvers, 20h. and 150f. Sir Arthur Chichester built a new castle to replace the O'Neills' by 1610 it had a constable and twelve warders.

Like so much of the land of Ulster Dungannon was granted to Sir Arthur Chichester in the Jacobean Plantation; he re-built the town and had obtained for it a charter of incorporation. But the town destroyed in the 1641 rebellion.

Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, III, 166; CSPI (1601-1603), 9, 11, 64, 415, 417 A. Rowan, The Buildings of Ireland - north west Ulster (1979), 256 ff.

And for a map of Dungannon in 1598, PRO.M/PF. 311.

17. Inishloughan (Co. Antrim)

Taken by Sir Arthur Chichester and Sir Henry Davers in August 1602. Garrisoned by Captain Langford with 150f. September 1602. Site not identified - thought to have been between Belfast and Lurgan.

G.A. Hayes McCoy, Ulster and other Irish maps c. 1600 (IMC, 1964), 11.

18. Lurgan (Co. Armagh)

Plan of an early seventeenth century fort in TCD., MS. 1209, 32 "Fort of Balle Loergan Sir Edward Blaney his undertaking". Identified as Lurgan by R. Hayes in Manuscript sources of the History of Irish Civilisation, vii. 125 but suggested in P. Kerrigan's list of seventeenth forts, fortifications and garrisons, Irish Sword, 1982, p.9 as probably Castleblaney in Co. Monaghan.

19. Charlemount (Co. Armagh)

A principal fort in the subjugation of Hugh O'Neill, erected by Mountjoy's forces in June 1602. Later castle built, 1611. Sir Toby Caulfield in command with 150f. in 1602. "From this Campe the Countrey was plaine and open to Dungannon, being distant some six miles saw Tyrone's chief house there to be set on fier.." F. Moryson, Itinerary, III, 166.

For plans of the fort see P. Tohall "Charlemount fort, Co. Armagh" in Irish Sword, iii (1958) 186.

20. Blackwater (Co. Armagh)

Fort first built by Walter, Earl of Essex in 1587: another by Hugh O'Neill in 1596 which was captured by Lord Burgh in 1597, and a third fort built July 1601 further upstream on the Tyrone bank of the river by Lord Mountjoy's forces. Commanded by Captain Thomas Williams with 150f.

CSPI (1601-1603) 201; and see Irish Sword, ii (1955), 213-215.

21. Augher (Co. Tyrone)

In the army lists of September 1602 Augher noted as garrisoned by Sir Henry Davers with 80h. and 400f. under Captains Hansard, Blundell and Hobby. In the Jacobean Plantation granted to Sir Thomas and George Ridgeway who built a castle in 1610, known as Spur Royal.

CSPI (1601-1603) 488. A. Rowan, The Buildings of Ireland : North West Ulster (Penguin, 1979), 112-114. Plan of Augher Fort in c.1610 in PRO.M/PF. 117.

22. Armagh (Co. Armagh)

Ecclesiastical capital of Ireland and key position in the Ulster re-conquest. A spearhead established here while the Mountjoy forts at Charlemount, Arboe, Mount Norris and Moyry were being constructed. Garrisoned with 150f. under Sir Henry Davers in November 1601. In September 1602 under Sir J. Bodley.

G.A. Hayes McCoy, Ulster and other maps, c.1600 (I.M.C., 1964), 6
CSPI (1601-1603), 201.

23. Mount Norris (Co. Armagh)

Fort erected in November 1600, called after Sir John Norris. Sir Josiah Bodley reported on its state in 1608. Site not yet identified. Garrisoned in September 1601 by Sir Samuel Bagnall with 50h. and 150f. under Captain Henry Atherton.

CSPI (1601-1603), 201; J. Buckley, "Report of Sir Josiah Bodley on some Ulster forts in 1608" in U.J.A., 2nd ser. xvi (1910), 61.

24. Monaghan (Co. Monaghan)

Fort erected in 1602. Sir Edward Blaney built the castle and fortified the town walls in 1614. Monaghan was the chief seat of the McMahons.

Plan of the castle in TCD., MS. 1209, 32: CSPI (1601-1603), 458, 487.

25. Bellanacargy (Co. Cavan)

Noted as a small fort in Sir Ralph Lane's muster list of August 1601 under Sir John Talbot, and in Sir Ralph Birkenshaw's muster list of March 1602 as having six warders on the payroll. Listed as a ward in 1610 and 1611.

CSPI (1601-1603), 16, 347; (1611-1614), 160.

26. Lough Oughter Castle (Co. Cavan)

The castle stands on an island in Lough Oughter four miles n. west of Cavan town and was an O'Reilly castle until the end of the sixteenth century. The site became an important strategic point in the later 1614 Irish rebellion.

CSPI (1611-1614), 7-9.

27. Moyry Castle (Co. Armagh)

Fort erected by Mountjoy's forces in June 1601. An important strategic position in the re-conquest of Ulster.

Mountjoy requested the services of a Dutch engineer to improve the fortifications in October 1601. Mountjoy used the base to link up the garrison there with Sir Arthur Chichester's forts in reducing the lands of Magennis.

CSPI (1600-1601), 382, 388, 396, 401; (1601-1603), 115.

28. Greencastle (Co. Down)

One of the few forts held by the English in 1597. There had been a castle on the site since the mid-thirteenth century. Often referred to in the Irish state papers as Carlingford, since the castle commanded the harbour of Carlingford. Held by Sir Henry Bagnall until his death at the Yellow Ford in 1598, then taken over by his brother Sir Samuel Bagenall. The site became an important victualling point and a magazine, especially in the final stages of the re-conquest.

CSPI (1600), 56, 221, 271, 256, 489; (1601-1603), 191, 261, 677.

29. Kilclief (Co. Down)

In Sir Ralph Lane's August 1601 muster list Kilclief fort was under the command of Nicholas Fitzsimon and ten warders. There was a castle on this site from the early fifteenth century.

CSPI (1601-1603), 16, 347; and see An archaeological survey of Co. Down (Belfast, HMSO., 1966), 233-235.

30. Donegal (Co. Donegal)

First taken by the English in 1591; re-taken by O'Donnell in 1592 and re-captured by Sir Henry Docwra's forces in 1601. Granted to Sir Basil Brooke in the Jacobean Plantation in 1610, who built a fortified manor from the ruins of the castle and abbey. It had been the major seat of the O'Donnells from the late fifteenth century.

A. Rowan, The Buildings of Ireland: North West Ulster (Penguin, (1979), 239-240: and see J. Buckley (ed) Report of Sir J. Bodley on some Ulster fortresses in 1608" 61-64.

31. Bundoran (Co. Donegal)

Referred to in the state papers as "Bundroes" a garrison post in the Ulster re-conquest to aid the establishment of a garrison at Ballyshannon by sea. (See map 2) Held by Sir Henry Folliott in the Jacobean Plantation.

Plan of the fort in TCD., MS. 1209, 16: CSPI (1603-1606), 564.

32. Ballinafad (Co. Sligo)

Small castle built in 1590 and housed a garrison throughout the first thirty years of the seventeenth century. Ballinafad was known as "The Castle of the Curlews" in reference to the nearby mountains of that name. The scene of Sir Conyers Clifford defeat in August 1599.

CSPI (1596-1597), 92, 97, 106, 118; (1599-1600), 113, 119, 121-125.

33. Carrick-on-Shannon (Co. Leitrim)

The fort commanded an important crossing on the river Shannon into Connaught. Known as Carrickdrumrusk; the prefix is an English confusion of Carraig = rock, and Caradh = a ford or weir. No evidence of numbers in the late sixteenth century garrison. The strategic importance of the fort declined in the early seventeenth century with the rise of the nearby town defences of Jamestown.

CSPI. (1608-1610), 508

34. Jamestown (Co. Leitrim)

Sir Charles Coote walled and fortified the town by 1612. Rewarded with lands in the area; fought at Kinsale, commanded 100f. at Mallow. Jamestown became important as the gateway to the west in the 17th century.

CSPI. (1601-1603), 200, 350, 522; ibid, (1615-1625) 336, 338

35. Maryborough (Co. Leix)

The fort constructed in the mid-sixteenth century as a central stronghold for the plantation of Queen's County. An important outpost of the Pale throughout the war, 1593-1603. The location is now Portlaoise.

CSPI, (1600-1601) 56, 97, 351; ibid, (1601-1603) 201, 346, 599

36. Togher (Co. Leix)

A fortified position five miles north of Maryborough to aid communication between the garrisons of Maryborough and Philipstown in King's County, (Co. Offaly) and Dublin, 47 miles distant.

CSPI, (1598-1599) 204, 357, 506; R. W. Bagwell, Ireland under the Tudors, iii (1890), 370.

37. Ferns (Co. Wexford)

There had been a castle on the site since the 13th century. In the muster list of August 1601 Sir Richard Masterson designated constable with ten warders.

CSPI, (1601-1603) 16, 331, 346.

Notes:

- (a) The list makes no claim to be comprehensive, but identifies all garrisons marked, ▲ on Map 1 of the introduction. Places of outstanding importance throughout the war such as Dublin, Limerick, Cork, Kinsale, Galway are not listed but marked on Map 1.

- (b) This list can be used also to identify the forts and garrisons on Map 3 in chapter eleven on which a pattern of fortification can be seen on four chief approaches to the conquest of Ulster; along the Foyle, across the Erne at Ballyshannon, Bundoran and Beleek, from Carrickfergus to Lough Neagh, and from the south through the Moyry to Armagh and Tyrone.

Forts at Enniskillen, Beleek and Rathmullan on Lough Swilly are not on Map 1 but on Map 3 (ch. eleven).

- (c) P. M. Kerrigan in 'Seventeenth century fortifications, forts and garrisons in Ireland: a preliminary list' Irish Sword (May 1982), 4-24, 136-156 is an important list for Stuart Ireland. The fullest report on the sixteenth century Ulster forts is that of Sir Josiah Bodley edited by J. Buckley, 'Report of Sir Josiah Bodley on some Ulster fortresses in 1603' in Ulster Journal of Archaeology, 2nd. ser., xvi (1910), 61 ff.
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GLOSSARY

- Argualiter In the late middle ages a mounted archer, by the 16th century a cavalryman carrying a caliver and snaphance. In common parlance a paltry fellow
Fr. argoulet (Oman)
- Bawn Cattle enclosure or fortress anglicized from the Gaelic badhun, and sometimes anglicized as "booley"
(I.E.D.)
- Bonnaught Billeting, free quartering of soldiers, from the Gaelic buannadha (I.E.D.)
- Bill A weapon with point and blade combining the use of a pike and battle-axe. (Oman).
- Brehon Early Irish legal institutions and laws formally abolished in the Hilary term of 1605 (Walsh)
- Caliver The standard fire-arm of the period which made the harquebus (q.v.) obsolescent by the mid 16th century: it weighed about 12lbs. but was itself superseded by the lighter musket. (Fortescue).
- Corslet The upper body armour of the pikeman, and used to denote the fully equipped pikeman or infantryman. (Cruikshank).
- Creaght Anglicised collective term for herds of cattle, their drovers and guards from the Gaelic Caoruigheachta
(I.E.D.)
- Crompster Small sailing ship with crooked prow. The Advantage, Crane and Quittance belonged to this type and were used in the Irish war from the 1590's - from the Dutch Kromsteven (O.E.D.)
- Cuirass Body armour reaching to the waist consisting of a breast-plate and back-plate fastened by leather thongs, and the whole piece sometimes covered by leather. (Oman)
- Culverin A piece of large ordnance about 4,000 lbs weight and of 5½ inch calibre. (W. Harrison)
- Dag or Dagge Small hand-gun or pistol
- Dead Pay Many meanings: (i) wages drawn in the name of a deceased soldier (ii) pay continued to a soldier no longer active, a pension, (iii) an allowance or bonus to a captain which in Ireland was 6% of his company, and the last meaning is the usual one in the 16th century. (Cruikshank)
- Demi-Lance The term variously denotes (i) a unit of heavy cavalry (ii) the cavalryman (iii) his chief weapon the lance (iv) a general term for the lightly-armed cavalryman.
(Oman)

- Dicker A measure of ten units, hence a dicker of hides, a bundle of ten Latin decuria. (Smith)
- Ensign The standard of a company and the standard bearer. (Fortescue)
- Falcon A piece of ordnance about 800 lbs and 2½ inch calibre. (Harrison)
- Field-piece A field gun mounted on a carriage (Oman)
- Furniture Weapons, armour, munitions, accoutrements of war hence "warlike furniture" (Fortescue)
- Gabion A wicker basket filled with sand or earth, a sand-bag (O.E.D.)
- Halberd Like the bill (q.v.) but becoming ceremonial in late 16th century usage. (Oman)
- Harquebus Portable but heavy musket fired from a rest. "Hackbut" another English form apparently from the German hackenbuchse or "hook-gun" from the hook-shape of the projecting cock. Arquebus is the French form (Oman)
- Horse Generic term for the cavalry and see petronel and demi-lance
- Hoy Merchant vessel for coastal and cross channel trade
- Kerne The poorest armed Irish soldier. "Footmen armed with a sword and target or a bow and sheaf of arrows with barbed heads" (Dymmok) "Naked Kerne", "wood kerne" and "loose kerne" used as a term of abuse by English writers and Irish writers used it of native marauders. (Walsh)
- Last A large amount which varied with the class of goods hence a last of wool, 12 sacks, a last of malt, 80 bushels and a last of powder, 2,400 lbs or 24 barrels. (O.E.D.)
- Morion A visorless high crested helmet of Spanish origin worn by infantrymen (Oman)
- Minion A piece of ordnance, weight 1,000 lbs and calibre 3½ inch (Harrison)
- Musket Hand gun with match-lock about 20 lbs. The first mention of a company of musketeers in England in 1587. (Oman)
- Muster-roll The official list of officers and soldiers in a company normally of 100 men in list but 94 by the poll.
- Pauldron Protective armour for the shoulders.

<u>Petronel</u>	A long pistol used by the cavalry fired with the butt against the chest; (ii) a horseman so armed. (Oman)
<u>Pike</u>	The characteristic weapon of the infantryman in defence, the pike was about 16 to 18 ft. long with pointed head of iron or steel. "Squares of pike" used to stop cavalry charges. (Cruikshank)
<u>Pioneer</u>	A labourer, who aided the army to dig trenches and clear obstacles. His characteristic tool the pick-axe French <u>pioche</u> (Oman)
<u>Provant master</u>	Officer in charge of the commissariat; the term quarter-master not in 16th century use. (Smith)
<u>Rising Out</u>	Term used in 16th century Ireland for the general hosting of horsemen and kerne for defence purposes. (Walsh)
<u>Saker</u>	A small cannon of about 1,500 lbs and 3½ inch calibre (Harrison)
<u>Snaphaunce</u>	A flint-lock used in pistols and muskets (Oman)
<u>Target</u>	A light shield often made of wood and covered with hide (Fortescue)
<u>Tasses</u>	Small inter-locking pieces of mail armour to protect the thighs and lower trunk, chain mail. O. Fr. <u>tace</u>
<u>Touch-box</u>	Small box for priming powder or tinder (O.E.D.)
<u>Trench master</u>	Officer in charge of preparing entrenchments
<u>Troop</u>	A unit or company of cavalry (O.E.D.)
<u>Tun</u>	A cask of about 252 gallon (Smith)
<u>Wey</u>	A standard for the weight of dry goods varying with commodities - for example a wey of cheese was 224lbs, of corn, six quarters, of wool, 162 lbs. (Smith)

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