ENGLISH POLICY TOWARDS FRANCE DURING THE TRUCES 1389-1417

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ABSTRACT

Christopher John Phillpotts - ENGLISH POLICY TOWARDS FRANCE DURING THE TRUCES 1389-1417.

This thesis investigates the development of the Plantagenets' policy towards their Valois adversaries during the longest period of truce in the Hundred Years War, a period during which the balance of advantage swung decisively from the French to the English. Chapter I analyses the principles behind the conflict on both sides and the unsuccessful attempts to reconcile them in a peace settlement. The difficulties in achieving a peace arose from the differing conceptions of the struggle on the two sides of the Channel. There follows a description of the military stalemate, which by 1389 had led the protagonists to resort to a period of diplomacy and truce as a substitute for war. Chapter II considers the peace negotiations of these years and how they reflect the expanding war aims of the English in regard to territory and its tenure in France. Chapter III is a detailed account of the series of truces that was in force at this time, their terms and the attempts to maintain them, and how these also demonstrate English aspirations. Chapter IV traces the pattern of conflicts fought despite these truces on the frontiers of the Calais March and Guyenne, at sea and within the kingdom of England itself, and the extent to which these were encouraged by the English and French governments. Chapter V considers the occasions on which England was prepared to resume an offensive policy towards France, ranging from the determination of John of Gaunt and Richard II to oppose the expansion of Valois interests in Europe in the 1390s, through the defensive stance of Henry IV, to Henry V's determination to pursue his right to the French crown by military means. Chapter VI attempts to apportion the responsibility for these policies between the king, the Council and other sections of the government, and also the various individuals and groups who exerted an influence over foreign policy at this time. The Conclusion depicts the styles of diplomacy employed by the four main directors of English foreign policy during this period: John of Gaunt, Richard II, Henry IV and Henry V. The deductions of the previous chapters are then drawn upon for a discussion of the changing nature of truces in this central period of the Hundred Years War. It concludes that truces served a function in the quest for a military victory, since only this could end the war, and that a sense of English nationhood was emerging from the experience of prolonged conflict.

PREFACE

This study of late medieval foreign policy is based on the details of numerous diplomatic documents and related records, both English and French. Many of these are available in print, thanks to the industry of earlier generations of historians. I have drawn others from the governmental records preserved at the Public Record Office in London and the Archives Nationales in Paris. I have not attempted to make systematic use of financial records which detail payments made for the journeys of ambassadors and messengers. I have also consulted the miscellaneous manuscript collections of the British Library and the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, and a smaller number of volumes at the Bodleian Library in Oxford, Cambridge University Library and Edinburgh University Library. It is in this second category of manuscripts that most of the unexpected finds have been made.

My thanks are due to the staff of all the libraries and record repositories at which I have worked; to my supervisor Dr. Christopher Allmand for his advice, encouragement and patience during seven long years of research, and also to the late Professor Alec Myers in the initial stages; to my mother Mrs. Beryl Phillpotts for typing the entire thesis; and to Pete Carlyon, Gerry Garrett, Chris Slack and Tony Robinson for assistance with layout and printing, the loan of word processors and instruction in their use.

ABBREVIATIONS

Add.Ch.	Additional Charters.
Add.MSS.	Additional Manuscripts.
A.N.	Archives Nationales, Paris.
Ambassades	L.Mirot and E.Déprez - "Les ambassades anglaises pendant la guerre de cent ans" B.E.C. lix (1898), lx (1899), lxi (1900).
Angleterre et Schisme	E.Perroy - L'Angleterre et le grand Schisme d'Occident (Paris 1933).
Anglo-Norman	M.D.Legge (ed.)- Anglo-Norman Letters and Petitions (Anglo-Norman Text Society, Oxford 1941).
Ann.Ric.Sec.	Thomas Walsingham - Annales Ricardi Secundi et Henrici Quarti ed.H.T.Riley in Johannis de Trokelowe et Henrici de Blaneforde cronica et annales (Rolls Series, London 1886).
B.E.C.	Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Chartes.
BIHR	Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research.
BJRL	Bulletin of the John Ryland's Library.
B.L.	British Library, London.
B.N.	Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.
Bod.Lib.	Bodleian Library, Oxford.
Bouillons	H.Barckhausen (ed.) - Archives Municipales de Bordeaux: Livre des Bouillons (Bordeaux 1967).

Bruges	E.Perroy (ed.) - Anglo-French Negotiations at Bruges 1374-1377 (Camden Miscellany xix, London 1952).
Cal.Signet.	J.L.Kirby (ed.)- Calendar of Signet Letters of Henry IV and Henry V (London 1978).
Cal.S.P.Venice	R.Brown (ed.) - Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts relating to English Affairs existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice and in other libraries of Northern Italy 1202-1509 (London 1864).
CCR	Calendar of Close Rolls.
C.Ch.R.	Calendar of Charter Rolls.
CFR	Calendar of Fine Rolls.
Choix	L.Douët-d'Arcq (ed.) - Choix de Pièces Inédites relatives au régne de Charles VI (Paris 1863-1864).
Conférences	H.Moranvillé - "Conférences entre la France et l'Angleterre 1388-1393" B.E.C. 1 (1889).
CPR	Calendar of Patent Rolls.
C.U.L.	Cambridge University Library.
Dip.Cor.	E.Perroy (ed.) - The Diplomatic Correspondence of Richard II (Camden 3rd Series, xlviii, London 1933).
DKR	P.R.O. Report of the Deputy Keeper.
E.H.D.	English Historical Documents.
EHR	English Historical Review.
England...	J.J.N.Palmer - England, France and Christendom 1377-1399 (London 1972).
Eulogium	F.S.Haydon (ed.) - Eulogium historiarum sive temporis (Rolls Series, London 1863).

Foedera	T.Rymer (ed.) - Foedera, Conventiones, Litterae et cujuscunque generis acta publica inter reges Angliae et alios quosuis imperatores, reges, pontifices, principes, vel communitates (original edition, London 1704-1735).
Froissart	Jean Froissart - Oeuvres (ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove, Brussels 1867-1877).
Hist.Ang.	Thomas Walsingham - Historia Anglicana (ed. H.T.Riley, Rolls Series, London 1863-1864).
H.T.	History Today.
Knighton	Henry Knighton - Chronicon (ed. J.R.Lumby, Rolls Series, London 1889-1895).
Letters of Henry IV	F.C.Hingeston (ed.) - Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign of Henry IV (Rolls Series, London 1860 and 1965).
Lettres de Jean V	R.Blanchard (ed.) - Lettres et Mandements de Jean V duc de Bretagne (Nantes 1889-1895).
Lettres des Rois	J.J. Champollion - Figeac (ed.) - Lettres des rois, reines, et autres personnages des cours de France et d'Angleterre depuis Louis VII jusqu'à Henri IV (Collection des documents inédits sur l'histoire de France, Paris 1847).
Monstrelet	Enguerran de Monstrelet - La Chronique (ed. L.Douët - d'Arcq, Société de l'histoire de France, Paris 1857-1862).
n.a.f.	Nouvelles acquisitions francaises.
Positions des Thèses	Positions des Thèses soutenues à l'Ecole des Chartes.
PPC	H.Nicolas (ed.) - Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council of England (London 1834).

Preuves	P.H.Morice (ed.) - Mémoires pour servir de Preuves à l'histoire ecclésiastique et civile de Bretagne (Paris 1742-1746).
P.R.O.	Public Record Office, Chancery Lane, London.
Rot.Parl.	J.Strachey et al. (eds.) - Rotuli Parliamentorum (London 1783).
St.Denys	M.L.Bellaguet (ed.) - Chronique du Religieux de Saint Denys (Collection de documents inédits sur l'histoire de France, Paris 1839-1852).
Statutes	J.Caley et al. (eds.) - Statutes of the Realm (Record Commission, London 1810-1828).
TRHS	Transactions of the Royal Historical Society.
Usk	Adam of Usk - Chronicon (ed. E.M.Thompson, London 1904).
Waurin	Jehan de Waurin - Recueil des croniques et anchiennes istories de la Grant Bretaigne (ed. W.J. and E.L.C.P. Hardy, Rolls Series, London 1864-1891).
West.Chron.	L.C.Hector and B.F.Hardy (eds. and trans.) - The Westminster Chronicle 1381-1394 (Oxford 1982).

All manuscript references are to the classes of the P.R.O., unless otherwise stated. See bibliography part 1 for a key to class numbers.

Chapter I

THE WAR WITH FRANCE

English diplomacy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was dominated by the struggle with the Valois kingdom of France. The Hundred Years War was regarded as one continuous conflict by contemporaries, despite the truces and lulls in military activity that divided its campaigns. It was considered distinct from the intermittent discords that had arisen between the two countries in the previous two centuries. These resulted from the invasions of England by William I the Bastard and Henry II FitzEmpress. They brought large territorial possessions in France to the English crown, which were in feudal subjection to the crown of France, and as the Plantagenets and the Capetians developed centralised governmental structures, friction was inevitable. The state of war which began in 1337 was not formally ended until the Treaty of Étaples in 1492, although the English presence on French soil was terminated in 1453. Only one interval of incompletely ratified peace interrupted this

period of enmity, in which hostilities were suspended at intervals by truces and their prorogations. The longest of these extended from its signing at Leulinghen in 1389, through various prolongations, until the Agincourt campaign of Henry V.

Constantly interspersed in the military campaigns and interdependent with them, were negotiations for peace or truce between the two sides. They serve as an indicator of the current policies and ambitions of the English kings. Often the manoeuvres they involved were of more importance than the campaigns themselves. By the 1380s, through alliances and the absorption of lesser conflicts, the Hundred Years War had expanded to cover most of western Europe, and had all but exhausted the military capacity of its two protagonists. Negotiations therefore dominated this long truce.

There had already been several attempts to bring the war to an end by diplomatic means. In the Edwardian stage of the war these were principally the Conference of Avignon in 1344 under Papal mediation, and the series of negotiations leading to the treaties of Calais and Brétigny in 1359 and 1360. The Caroline stage of the war was fought harder and more continuously, and by 1375 increasing military exhaustion inclined both parties to a serious consideration of peace. The peace talks of the 1370s and 1380s were conducted in Flanders and Picardy,

with the participation of the highest-ranking personnages from each country, and sometimes the presence of cardinals as mediators (1). The French, alarmed by the suffering of their country in a war of attrition were prepared to augment their territorial offers. The English expanded the area of their concessions; but obstacles prevented these advances from reaching a meeting-point. A series of negotiations was held at Bruges from 1374 to 1377, under the mediation of the Cardinals (2), but when the Great Schism began in 1378, the two parties were deprived of their most effective mediator, an independent Papacy. England made further efforts towards peace during the Chancellorship of Michael de la Pole from March 1383 to October 1386. In December 1383 a meeting was held at Leulinghen, the hamlet in the Picardy marches that was to be the scene of most of the Anglo-French negotiations of the long truce. Offers were exchanged, though their contents are unknown, and a truce was made.It was agreed that both deputations should return home to consult their governments and return in June 1384 with full powers and augmented embassies (3). By the summer however, the French were less conciliatory, and the meeting failed to fulfil the promise of its predecessor. In December 1385 King Leo of Armenia began to mediate between the two parties, and in the following February and March, de la

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(1) B.N.Francais 15490 f.25.

(2) Bruges passim

(3) B.N.Francais 2699 ff.139-140, a brief protocol of the December 1383 meeting.

Pole himself had meetings with the French. Contacts were resumed through Leo in autumn 1386, but the English inclination towards peace ceased with the dismissal of de la Pole (1).

These discussions, and their successors until the end of the war all met the same recurrent obstructions to a peaceful conclusion of the conflict. Anglo-French diplomacy was characterised by "a determined stand against any compromise,and a fanatical defence of every right and title"(2). The immediate motive for the opening of the war was Edward III's assertion of his claim to the French throne by right of his mother Isabelle of France. This clearly distinguished the Hundred Years War from the preceding feudal quarrels between the two monarchs, as a French mémoire of 1390 recognised; should the Plantagenet claim have been surrendered, they would have reverted to their previous feudal relationship (3). The succession crises of 1316 and 1328 were unprecedented in the Capetian dynasty, and settled by faits accomplis rather than judicial decisions. The right of the Plantagenet family was similar to their acquisition of the English throne by descent from the Empress Matilda. The inheritance of such a right implied a duty to God to act upon it. Hence the

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(1) England...71, 84-85.

(2) J.G.Dickinson - The Congress of Arras 1435: a study in medieval diplomacy (Oxford 1955), 133.

(3) B.N.Francais 15490 ff.27v-28. Folios 26-35v of this volume are transcribed in J.Burr - A view of Anglo-French Relations 1389-1399 (Liverpool M.A. thesis, 1936) 41-54.

English interpretation of the struggle was dynastic, a succession dispute. Their claim gave the English kings a legitimate excuse to interfere in all of France, and its usefulness caused the title to be retained until 1801. The treaty of Brétigny represented the failure to implement this claim, not the triumph of English arms. The treaty was never completely ratified, so Edward III kept his title to the French crown.

To counter this, French envoys habitually cited Salic Law, which excluded those descended in the feminine line from the French throne (1). Since most of the proposed final solutions to the war envisaged the surrender of the French title by the English king, English ambassadors customarily opened negotiations with a protestation. This stated that whatever offers they might make in writing or otherwise during the course of the meetings,nothing should detract from the legitimacy of their king's claim to the French crown, this principle being dormant during the talks, unless its abandonment was included in a final agreement. Such a protestation was made in December 1383 (2), August 1393 (3) and again in August 1414 (4).

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(1) B.N.Francais 15490 f.27v; Philippe de Mézières - Letter to Richard II (ed. and trans. G.W.Coopland, Liverpool 1975), 69; J.H.Wylie - The Reign of Henry V i 153-154, citing a thesis composed by Jean de Montreuil in 1402 (B.N.Francais 21381). There is a review of the English claim to the French throne in B.N.Francais 15490 ff.2-14v, apparently composed about 1390.

(2) B.N.Francais 2699 f.139; E.30/1629(1) ff.1,4v. For the dating of this latter document see Appendix 1.

(3) B.N.Francais 15968 f.758.

(4) Foedera ix 209.

Whenever the English felt strong enough to do so, they would insist on the retention of the title. An opening demand might be made for the relinquishment of the French kingdom by the Valois, in the expectation of its rejection by the French delegation. Only at the treaty of Troyes was the principle accepted by both sides. In July 1395 Richard II instructed his ambassadors to France to make the usual protestations, and to ask that he and his heirs should retain the quartering of the fleur de lys in their coat of arms (1). By the twenty-eight year truce that was concluded in March of the following year, discussion of the title was postponed for a generation (2). The advent of the Lancastrian dynasty meant more emphasis on the French claim rather than less, since this stressed the legitimacy of its succession to Richard. When Henry V renewed the war, he characterised himself as heir to Edward III and his kingdom, and therefore to his just quarrel and its obligations.The archbishop of Bourges recognised this connection at Winchester in 1415: to Henry's assertion that he intended to have the crown of France, the prelate retorted that he had no right even to the crown of England (3) After 1420 the Plantagenet claim was based additionally on the terms of the treaty of

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(1) England...256, appendix 5, printed from B.L.Cotton MS.Vitellius Cxi nos.2-3.

(2) E.Cosneau - Les Grands Traités de la Guerre de Cent Ans (Paris 1889), 71-99.

(3) Wylie - Henry V i 490.

Troyes. This had the advantage that the Burgundians were able to recognise the title for this reason, although not because of the original claim derived from Edward III. On this dual basis the claim was restated by the English delegations at Arras in 1435 and at Calais in 1439 (1).

For the Valois kings it was an absolute prerequisite of any final settlement that the Plantagenets should surrender their claim. In 1376 Charles V insisted on this before he would agree to a proposal for a forty-year truce, desiring a settlement of the opposing claims in his favour, as a condition for an agreement designed to suspend them (2). John of Gaunt agreed the title should be abandoned in the draft peace he signed in June 1393 (3). The following January he tried to persuade Parliament that it brought no advantage (4). In May 1395 Charles VI suggested to Richard that he should marry his daughter Isabelle and thereby recognise the Salic succession in France, and therefore his own exclusion from the French throne (5). In 1435, when the military

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(1) Dickinson - Congress of Arras 143 and n.5, 145 n.1.

(2) Bruges xviii.

(3) J.J.N.Palmer - "Articles for a final peace between England and France 16 June 1393" BIHR xxxix (1966), 185 from B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Diii f.112 no.150.

(4) F.S.Haydon (ed.) Eulogium historiarum sive temporis (Rolls Series, London 1863), iii 369.

(5) Mézières - Letter to Richard II 69.

advantage again lay with France, her envoys required Henry VI's withdrawal from his claims on her throne, as a basis for peace (1).

In practice the English recognised that any diplomatic settlement that was not supported by a military preponderance, was bound to include the loss of the title, but they required that a substantial part of France should be ceded to them in compensation. This was what the Council meant by "reasonable mene weyes", when it advised Henry V to send ambassadors to France to negotiate "eny mene wey...offre that were moderyng of youre hoole title or of eny of youre claymes beyonde the see" (2).

The price demanded by the English for this loss varied considerably according to their military fortunes. In April 1354 by the provisional treaty of Guînes, Jean II was prepared to pay Edward III all Aquitaine including Poitou and Limousin, Ponthieu, Calais, Guînes, Anjou, Touraine and Maine, all in absolute sovereignty. The treaty was never ratified, Jean apparently reconsidering that most of the old Angevin Empire was too high a price (3). In 1383, one of the worst times in the war for English arms, the English delegation seems to have been

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(1) Dickinson - Congress of Arras 130.

(2) PPC ii 141.

(3) J.J.N.Palmer - "The War Aims of the Protagonists and the Negotiations for Peace" in K.Fowler (ed.) The Hundred Years War (1971) 58.

prepared to abandon the royal title in return for a guarantee against confiscation of Richard's current holdings in France (1).

Whether the title was to be lost permanently as part of a peace settlement or abandoned temporarily by the terms of a long truce, it was normally provided that the English king should be able to resume it in the event of a breakdown in the agreement. When discussing the 1393 draft peace, the January 1394 Parliament insisted:

> 'que nostre Sire le Roi et ses heirs purront resorter et avoir regresse al noun, title et droit de la corone et roialme de France, si la pees soit enfreinte par la partie de son Adversaire ou de ses heirs (2).'

This would leave England the option of intervention in France. In 1439 the French proposed that Henry VI should renounce his title and Charles VII his homage for a certain period during which Henry could revert to a state of war at one year's notice (3).

A permanent or temporary surrender of the title involved

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(1) E.30/1629 (1) f.4-4v. See below Appendix 1. The territorial terms of the peace offers from the period 1389 to 1417 will be considered in Chapter II.

(2) Rot.Parl. iii 315b.

(3) C.T.Allmand "The Anglo-French negotiations 1439" BIHR xl(1967), 21.

the English in certain legal dilemmas. These tended to appear during the course of negotiations when the English were being deliberately obstructive. They refused to agree to French demands to cease using the title during proposed long truces, for this would be to recognise its illegitimacy (1). Any such demands could be blocked during the first part of Henry VI's reign on the grounds that his ambassadors could not surrender his rights on his behalf while he was still a minor. In 1435 the government instructed its ambassadors that this obstacle made permanent peace impossible (2). In 1431 the Council debated "as to what manere forme of truces shal be condescended, for as pees it seemeth there ne may noon be concluded considering the tendrenesse of the King's aage" (3). Since he claimed that he was rightful king of France, the English king maintained he had no temporal overlord in France except God. Therefore the disposal of this claim was not open to discussion by mortal men. The English envoys produced this argument in November 1418 and at Arras in 1435 (4). Should the English king surrender his title, he would no longer be able to receive the homage of those nobles who wished to take his part, thus

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(1) Palmer, "War Aims" 54.

(2) Dickinson, Congress of Arras 131

(3) PPC iv 95, cited in Dickinson Congress of Arras 131.

(4) Foedera ix 638; Dickinson Congress of Arras 132, 143.

again restricting his ability to renew his intervention in France.At the siege of Rouen Henry V hesitated to make a territorial settlement with the Dauphin lest this prevented him from receiving the duke of Burgundy's homage for Flanders, if he again wished to change sides (1).

Feudal questions made it difficult to adopt the abandonment of the claim as a basis for settlement. The English were only prepared to deliver it in return for as high a price as the French could afford, and were reluctant to lose their licence to make war over all French soil. Compromise on this absolute principle was nearly impossible. When Henry V challenged the Dauphin in September 1415 he suggested Charles VI should retain the throne for the rest of his unhealthy life, but that the succession should be contested between them (2).This postponement of the problem foreshadowed the settlement made at Troyes, by which Henry was to inherit the throne from Charles (3). Finally in 1439 the English could offer no better solution to this intractable question than the argument that there could be two or more kings in one kingdom (4). This admitted defeat in the Plantagenet's

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(1) L.V.D.Owen - The Connection between England and Burgundy during the first half of the fifteenth century (Oxford 1909), 48-49.

(2) Foedera ix 313.

(3) EHD iv no.113.

(4) Dickinson - Congress of Arras 143.

dynastic quarrel with the Valois and admitted defeat also in the struggle to find a peaceful solution to the conflict.

While the English conception of the conflict was dynastic, the French insisted on a feudal interpretation. They considered the central issue to be the confiscation of the Duchy of Guyenne by Philip VI in 1337 from Edward III, as a rebellious vassal. This confiscation was repeated by Charles V because Edward and the Black Prince were notoriously guilty of rebellion. Since the Brétigny treaty was never fully ratified and Charles never renounced his sovereignty over Guyenne, this second confiscation was regarded as the valid act of a lord against a disobedient vassal (1). These were not essentially different from earlier confiscations of the Duchy in 1294 and 1324. The whole war was a struggle to make them effective, which necessitated the expulsion of the English from French soil.

Henry II, Richard I and John all did homage to the Capetian kings for Aquitaine, and Henry III recognised he owed homage for Guyenne by the treaty of Paris in 1259. Later, English theorists attempted to prove that Aquitaine had previously been an allod, and that the treaty of Paris was not valid because the French failed to fulfil the

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(1) B.N.Francais 15490 ff. 27, 30-30v.

obligations it imposed upon them (1). The French cited the precedents of Edward III's homage to Philip VI at Amiens in 1329, his declaration that this was liege homage in 1331 and the fact that he remained peacefully in this homage for the next five years. They rejected the English arguments that Edward was too young to be responsible for his actions, and under the control of his mother and bad counsellors. To the English contention that the homage offered for Guyenne had not previously been liege, the French replied that the duke of Guyenne owed liege homage as did all the peers of France, and by force of earlier agreements made between the kings of England and France (2). In any diplomatic settlement it was essential for the French to demand liege homage from the king of England for those parts of Aquitaine he held by terms of the compromise. This requirement of French sovereignty was necessary to preserve the integrity of the kingdom of France, and the feudal relationship between the king and the peers. Hence the French envoys defined the homage they required from the king of England as that which his forbears had done (3).

While the English always opened negotiations with a protestation about the king of England's title to the

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(1) P.Chaplais - "English arguments concerning the feudal status of Aquitaine in the fourteenth century" BIHR xxi (1948).

(2) B.N.Francais 15490 f.28-28v.

(3) as in December 1383, E.30/1583 f.1 (see appendix 1 for dating), and November 1418, Foedera ix 638.

French throne, the French customarily responded with a protestation that whatever offers were about to be made, nothing could prejudice the right of the king of France to sovereignty over lands within France that might be ceded to the English, and that the king of England should hold all such lands from him in liege homage (1). In discussions involving territorial concessions the French never dropped their demand for liege homage, except in England's separate negotiations with the Burgundian and Armagnac factions. In 1393 the French asked, and John of Gaunt agreed, that Richard or his assign should owe liege homage for the Duchy of Guyenne, as one of the twelve peers of France (2). Throughout the demoralising peace discussions of Henry V's reign, the French remained reluctant to abandon the principle of sovereignty (3). In the negotiations of the 1430s, they again insisted on homage for all lands in France ceded to the English, but after the treaty of Troyes the English regarded freedom from such homage as an irreducible claim (4).

The fundamental objection of the English to the French demands for liege homage, was that this would place the

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(1) Conférences 372; Palmer - "Articles 1393" 182; Foedera ix 211; E.30/1583 f.1; B.N.Francais 15490 ff.25v, 31; Francais 2699 f.139v.

(2) Palmer - "Articles 1393" 182, 184, 185. See page 47 and note] below.

(3) Palmer - "War Aims" 68-69.

(4) Dickinson - Congress of Arras 146, 150.

English crown in subjection to the French crown. It would be an intolerable restriction on the freedom of action of the king of England and his subjects. This was Parliament's principal objection to the draft peace of 1393. The Monk of Westminster commented on the session:-

> 'Displicuit enim in multis, primo quia absurdum esset quod rex Angliae faceret regi Francorum homagium et fidelitatem pro Aquitania et aliis terris suis ultramarinis ac tandem homo ligius suus devineret sicque per hoc omnes Anglicos quotquot erant sub dominio regis Angliae, rex Francorum suppeditaret ac sub servili jugo in posterum detineret (1).'

Edward III had established in Parliament the principle that England and its inhabitants should never be subject to the Plantagenets as kings of France. After the treaty of Troyes had made the unification of the two realms seem probable, the Commons requested and obtained the confirmation of this grant (2). This central point was the axis on which turned all the failed discussions for peace during the Hundred Years War.

This basic division was recognised in all negotiations. During the Caroline war the English would reply to the French protestation concerning liege homage, with their own protestation that the king of England would hold his

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(1) West Chron. 518. See also Rot.Parl. iii 315b. The fate of the 1393 draft will be discussed in Chapter II.

(2) EHD iv 226-227 from Rot.Parl. iv 127; Lettres des Rois ii 393-394.

French lands from the Valois only by fief and ressort (1). In 1383 they protested that the absolute lordship of Aquitaine belonged to the king of England, but that they were willing to recognise, by his homage, the superiority of, and ultimate ressort to, the court of France (2). But in July 1395 Richard II instructed his ambassadors to ask for substantial territorial concessions "sans faire aucune homage" (3). In the negotiations of August 1414 and March 1415, prior to his first invasion of France, Henry V's representatives would not admit Charles' superiority and ressort over the lands to be ceded, but said that they should be held as a neighbour (4). At the Alençon meeting in November 1418 Philip Morgan made it clear to the Dauphin's envoys that the English envisaged holding lands in France in absolute sovereignty, as he had been instructed (5). The stronger the military and diplomatic position of the English, the more favourable the terms they demanded for the tenure of Plantagenet lands in France.

Therefore when her fortunes were at a low ebb in the 1380s and early 1390s, England was prepared to concede some form

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(1) B.N.Francais 15490 f.25v.

(2) E.30/1629 (1) f.1.

(3) England...256 from B.L.Cotton MS. Vitellius Cxi nos.2-3.

(4) Foedera ix 210.

(5) Foedera ix 630, 638.

of homage. In 1387 the peace Richard was negotiating with Charles without the knowledge of the Commission was said to contain the provision of homage for Guyenne, perhaps liege homage (1). In April 1390 the English ambassadors were instructed to offer such homage from himself or his assign as duke of Guyenne, as was done in former times, but the liege homage done by Edward III was expressly excluded as a precedent. No services should be demanded from his assign in the Duchy. However these proposals for simple homage were never put to the French delegation (2).

In June 1393 Gaunt agreed to the French requirement for liege homage, but the draft peace reserved discussion of its arrangements to a personal meeting between the two monarchs (3). The following January the Westminster Parliament was still willing that Richard should do homage, but not that it should be liege homage (4).

Since neither side felt able to abandon its position on the issue of sovereignty, some means had to be found to circumvent this impasse. The conclusion of a long truce, by preserving the status quo, postponed the problem for a future generation. For the French this represented a sacrifice of Valois rights, since the English king would

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(1) West Chron. 204; Hist. Ang. ii 170.

(2) PPC19-20; England...144; Conférences 368.

(3) Palmer - "Articles 1393" 182-183.

(4) Rot.Parl. iii 315b.

continue to exercise de facto sovereignty meanwhile. Richard II's negotiators achieved this in the twenty-eight year truce of March 1396, and Henry V attempted to repeat this delayed settlement in 1415 when he offered to accept the French territorial concessions, provided they were accompanied by a fifty-year truce (1). He contemplated a similar arrangement on October 1418 (2). This combination of a transfer of territory and a long truce, without a final settlement, was known as a half-peace.

A more constructive method of compromise was to limit the effectiveness of French sovereignty over Guyenne by certain modifications to make it more acceptable to the English. The recognition of French sovereignty and the concomitant renunciation of the Plantagenet title to the French crown might be postponed for a period. In 1435 the French proposed this should be seven years, and in 1439 fifteen or thirty years (3). The area under French sovereignty might be reduced by a partition of Aquitaine. In spring 1375 Charles V's delegates proposed a three-fold division, one part retained by Edward in full sovereignty, one part remaining to Charles, and a third ceded to an English prince under French sovereignty. The English preferred a two-fold division excluding Charles' portion

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(1) Wylie - Henry V i 490.

(2) Foedera ix 629-630.

(3) Dickinson - Congress of Arras 152 and n.4.

and increasing the size of the other two. In September 1376 the Papal mediators at Bruges made a similar suggestion for a three-part Aquitaine, with Richard of Bordeaux specified as the English prince, and English sovereignty in Edward's share limited to his lifetime. This meant that on Edward's death the relationship between the two monarchs would revert to the position existing before 1336, and it was therefore unacceptable to the English (1). It might be suggested that the English king should not do homage in his own person, but through a proctor or attorney, as in December 1383 and August 1393 (2). In his instructions of April 1390 Richard stated it was not his intention to do homage personally (3).

Most troublesome were the judicial aspects of the French feudal claims over Guyenne. Valois exploitation of these had enabled them to confiscate the Duchy in 1337 and 1369, on the latter occasion as a direct result of Edward's refusal to recognise Charles V's appellate jurisdiction. When the English party was prepared to concede some form of homage, the modification of these judicial claims came under discussion. In December 1383 the English negotiators drew up a series of proposals for this and handed them to the French delegation, who replied to them

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(1) Bruges xvii-xix.

(2) E.30/1629(1) f.1-1v (see appendix 1); B.N.Francais 2699 f.106; Francais 15968 f.759.

(3) PPC i 20.

point by point (1). In the late 1380s the French possessed a schedule about the modification of sovereignty and ressort (2). In March 1392 at Amiens a meeting was arranged for July to discuss modifications, amongst other matters. The French referred to a document detailing previous discussions about this, which would be handed over to their delegates, after being approved by Charles VI and his Council (3). Possibly both these last two schedules were identical or similar to the first, which may have been referred to repeatedly as a precedent. In August 1393 Richard commissioned a team of lawyers headed by Walter Skirlaw, bishop of Durham, (who had also led the delegation of July 1392) to negotiate about the limitation of the homage superiority and ressort owed to Charles VI, in accordance with the terms of the draft peace agreed by John of Gaunt several weeks previously (4). Their proposals were based on the 1383 schedule, with twenty-three additional articles to which the French replied separately (5).

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(1) See appendix 1.

(2) B.N.Francais 15490 f.26v. Possibly this schedule is Francais 2699 ff.105v-115.

(3) Conférences 373. The version at Bod.Lib. Bodl.885 ff.53-58 may relate to the conference of July 1392.

(4) C.76/78 m.15 printed Lettres de: Rois ii 268-269 from a copy.

(5) B.N.Francais 15968 ff.758-768v. This document refers to the negotiations lately held between the English dukes and the lords of France at Leulinghen and several times to "the present treaty", to which agreements about modifications should be added. The repeated mentions of the dukes of Aquitaine as assigns of the kings of England echo the 1393 draft. See pages 27-28 and n. 1 below.

The English aimed chiefly to eliminate the French king's right to confiscate the duchy, and even claimed that confiscation was not valid in the fief of Guyenne (1). They proposed a guarantee against confiscation in 1383 (2), but by 1390 their position had weakened. Richard's envoys were instructed to ask for modifications to prevent confiscation by reason of Charles' ressort (as had occurred in 1369), but to allow such action for the crime of lèse-majesté, provided it was proved in a just trial. If the French refused to accept this, they were still to ask what modifications Charles was prepared to offer (3). In the 1393 draft it was agreed that his homage sovereignty and ressort would be restricted to prevent confiscation, but the details of the tenure were left to be formulated by the meeting of lawyers from both sides (4). Skirlaw's delegation altered the 1383 schedule to make English recognition of French sovereignty conditional on a guarantee against confiscation, and specifically excluded the possibility of confiscation for lèse-majesté (5). The Parliament of January 1394 reiterated that no confiscation should be possible under the terms of any treaty concluded (6).

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(1) B.N.Francais 15490 f.30v.

(2) E.30/1629 (1) f.4v.

(3) PPC i 20.

(4) Palmer - "Articles 1393" 184-185.

(5) B.N.Francais 15968 ff. 758v, 759v.

(6) Rot.Parl. iii 315b.

When Henry III accepted the treaty of Paris in 1259, he exposed his Duchy of Guyenne to danger from the French crown's claims to hear cases on appeal before Parlement. This judicial encroachment accounted for much of the ensuing friction over the tenure of Guyenne. The English Chancery and law courts had no rights to hear appeals from the Duchy, which operated on a different system of law. So in 1372 Edward III set up his own court of ressort and final appeal, but by the fifteenth century, appeals usually went before specially appointed commissions (1). It was the English contention throughout the 1380s that Charles V had precipitated the renewal of hostilities in 1369, by the improper use of ressort. He had induced the count of Armagnac and the Sire d'Albret to bring their cases to him on appeal, then exploited this to confiscate the Duchy. Therefore it was necessary as a prerequisite to any peace treaty to restrict the French king's right of ressort, thus preventing any recurrence of this sequence of events (2). The English schedule of December 1383 is mostly concerned with a series of complicated proposals to define the relationship between the courts of Guyenne and the royal court of France.

The best English guarantee against a repetition of Charles V's manoeuvre of 1369 was a modification against the

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(1) M.G.A.Vale - English Gascony 1399-1453: A Study of War Government and Politics during the Later Stages of the Hundred Years War (Oxford 1970) 4-5.

(2) B.N.Francais 15490 ff.26v, 30; Francais 2699 f.106-106v; E.30/1629 (1) ff.1, 4v.

compulsory attendance of the duke of Guyenne at the French court. In 1383 it was proposed that the king of England should not be bound to come before Parlement or the Council personally, but appear through a proctor, such as the seneschal of Guyenne, whether for a royal coronation or to answer in matters of justice. In cases involving lèse-majesté he should be able to answer and be acquitted by letter and two or three representatives (1). The English intended this demand should be repeated to the French commissaries in 1390 and 1393 (2). The French were dismissive of the proposal, glossing over the advantage they wished to retain by stating the English king's person would be required "en poyes de cas et rarement" and normally he was excused (3). In the various discussions of modifications in the 1380s and early 1390s, when England was by necessity conciliatory in the question of homage, no wide area of agreement was reached. The essential problem of sovereignty remained.

The boldest solution to the impasse was the alienation of Guyenne by the English king to a cadet line of his own family, which would hold the Duchy in perpetuity under the sovereignty of the French kings. This would have separated the feudal entities of England and France for the first time since William of Normandy crossed the

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(1) E.30/1629(1) f.1v; B.N.Francais 2699 f.106 (where the clause about lèse-majesté is omitted).

(2) PPC i 21; B.N.Francais 15968 f.759-759v.

(3) E.30/1583 f.1; B.N.Francais 2699 f.106.

Channel in 1066. The burden of homage to the French king would be removed from the king of England and transferred to the new duke and his descendants. The Valois could afford to be correspondingly more generous in ceding land to the new English dynasty. This arrangement has been represented by J.J.N.Palmer as the only feasible negotiated settlement of the Hundred Years War. It was the only way in which the English could withdraw from their costly involvement in France without humiliation: the disputed territory would remain in the hands of an English prince, and its assimilation into Valois France was too remote a possibility to be obstructive (1). He draws on a few pieces of tenuous evidence to maintain that the perpetual alienation of Guyenne to John of Gaunt and his heirs under French sovereignty, was the basis of every Anglo-French peace conference from its tentative proposal by the Papal mediators in March 1375 (when it was rejected by the English), to the negotiations for the Twenty-Eight Year truce in 1395 (2). On 2 March 1390, at the end of the Parliament held at Westminster, Richard II invested his uncle, John of Gaunt, as duke of Aquitaine for life under his sovereignty as king of France, with the assent of Parliament (3). To Palmer this action was Richard's declaration of intent to bring the negotiations of the

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(1) Palmer - "War Aims" 55; England...41-42.

(2) England...28-36.

(3) Foedera vii 659-660; Rot.Parl. iii 263a-264a; Hist.Ang. ii 196; West Chron. 414. He had already been referred to as duke of Guyenne on 28 Feb., Foedera vii 658.

previous fifteen years to a peaceful conclusion. His real intention was that Gaunt should found a new ducal dynasty in south-western France. When, as he expected, he relinquished his title to the French crown to Charles VI, the homage Gaunt owed to it for his new Duchy, would also be transferred. Gaunt and his heirs would then be left holding Guyenne directly from the Valois and all feudal ties between France and England would be broken. The two principle obstacles to a final peace, the Plantagenet claim to the French throne and the Valois claim to sovereignty over Guyenne would be removed at a stroke (1).

The implementation of this master-plan was sabotaged by the unwillingness of the Gascons to accept Gaunt as their duke; they are thus held responsible for ruining the best chance for a diplomatic solution to the conflict:

> 'Unfortunately for all concerned, the treaty he (Richard) negotiated with France was wrecked by the Gascons, who revolted in 1394 in defence of their 'liberty' of remaining attached to the English crown. (2)'

In April 1390, when the Council gave instructions to the English delegates sent to negotiate with the French in the first conference since a three-year truce was signed the previous June, no reference was made to a permanent alienation of Guyenne from the English crown. Mention was made of its tenure by a duke, as Richard's temporary

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(1) England...36-41, 144.

(2) Palmer - "War Aims" 55. See also "The Anglo-French Peace Negotiations 1390-1396" TRHS 5th series xvi(1966) 85 and England...42, 160, 163.

assign, presumably alluding to his grant to Gaunt of a few weeks previously. However provision was also made for the future when the Duchy might be held by Richard's heirs (to whom it would revert on Gaunt's death) or any of his unborn sons. The English were prepared to offer only simple homage for the Duchy, which would have been unacceptable to the French, had they ever actually seen the English terms (1). When Gaunt presented the English demands to the dukes of Berry, Burgundy and Bourbon at Amiens in March 1392, he was equally reticent about the perpetual cession of the Duchy to his family. He requested all of Guyenne except Poitou, which Berry was to hold for life from Gaunt as duke, with reversion to the Duchy on Berry's death. Both were to be held from the French crown by an unspecified homage. This arrangement would allow the English to retain the rights of the Duchy over Poitou, and gain its eventual assimilation, without forcing Berry to pay homage directly to Richard. As Gaunt was unlikely to survive Berry, the reversion of Poitou would pass with the reversion of Guyenne, back to the English royal house (2). The French rejected Gaunt's proposals and replied with an extensive territorial offer. Gaunt reported to the Council of Stamford in May that Burgundy and Berry had spoken to him aside, and

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(1) PPC i 20-21.

(2) Conférences 371; Palmer - "Peace Negotiations" 86-87, 87 n.1.

hinted they were prepared to offer more advantageous terms (1). According to the Monk of Westminster, Gaunt related to the Council that the French proposed Berry should retain the parts of Aquitaine in their hands at present, for his lifetime. On his death all of Aquitaine should revert to Gaunt and his heirs in perpetuity, who would render the customary homage for the whole, to the king of France (2). This is the first known proposal for a permanent division between England and Aquitaine since the Bruges conference. Characteristically it was the French party that put forward this feudal solution to what they insisted was a feudal conflict.

By the conference of the following year they had increased the extent of their territorial offer, and refined it by abandoning the idea of Berry's life-tenure of French Aquitaine, but now recognised that Richard's assignment of the Duchy to Gaunt was to be temporary. In the draft peace of June 1393 the English had the phrase "ou aians cause de lui" inserted into several clauses, and stated the English king or his assign would do homage for the Duchy. This was an attempt to avoid Richard paying homage to Charles VI. The French countered this evasion by demanding that during the life-tenure of Gaunt, Richard should do homage for the proprietary right and his uncle for the usufruct. The English rejected this idea of two

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(1) Conférences 372, 377.

(2) West Chron. 490; Vale - English Gascony 28 n.4.

homages for the same land, and the matter was left open to discussion at a personal meeting of the two monarchs (1). The Parliament Roll and the Monk of Westminster state it was proposed Richard should do liege homage for Aquitaine, without mentioning the homage of his uncle. Only the latter says the Duchy was to be held by Gaunt and his heirs in perpetuity, after Berry and Burgundy had held certain provinces for life (2). The diplomatic solution of an Aquitaine permanently separated from England held by a Lancastrian cadet house under Valois sovereignty, was no more than a French proposal in 1392 and 1393, in which Gaunt colluded with the uncles of Charles VI. If the testimony of the Monk of Westminster were to be disregarded, they may not have considered this as an arrangement lasting longer than Gaunt's lifetime.

If Richard intended the Lancastrian dynasty to hold Guyenne for ever, in accordance with an agreement with Charles VI, he must have converted his original life-grant into a grant in perpetuity. The only authority for such a donation, which he implies was in mid-1394, is Jean Froissart, who omits any mention of the earlier life-grant. He states that Richard made the grant in a

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(1) Palmer - "Articles 1393" 183 article V. For a different reading of this clause see Palmer "Peace Negotiations" 88-89. He considers that the French delegates expected Gaunt and his heirs to be dukes in perpetuity, and were concerned lest Richard should create him duke for life only.

(2) Rot.Parl. iii 315b; West Chron. 518.

Council, which approved the action, reserving the homage to himself (1). Froissart's reliability in describing details of feudal tenure is to be doubted. Besides him, only the author of the Eulogium Historiarum suggests the grant was made at the same time as the earl of Arundel's protests concerning it, in the Parliament of January 1394, and his chronology is hopelessly confused. He is wrong too about the terms of the grant, but does not mention a perpetual alienation (2).

In conferring the Duchy on his uncle in March 1390, Richard clearly stated it was'ad totam vitam tuam' and:

> 'Ita semper quod immediate post mortem tuam, idem Ducatus cum omnibus et singulis premissis ad nos et heredes nostros integre revertantur. (3)'

These terms were confirmed in Richard's further letters in November 1390 (4). On 10 September 1394 he wrote again to the Gascons to confirm that the duchy had been bestowed in Parliament at Westminster "ad totam vitam suam." (5)

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(1) Froissart xv 135-136, 157-159. For Palmer's use of Froissart's testimony see England...31, 159 and "Peace Negotiations" 93.

(2) Eulogium iii 370. The events of this parliament are described under the year 1396, but appear to conflate the grant of 1390 with the objections of 1394.

(3) Foedera vii 659-660; Rot.Parl. iii 263; Bouillons 230-231.

(4) Foedera vii 687-688; DKR xlviii 594.

(5) Bouillons 228-229; DKR xlviii 594.

His letter of 6 July 1397 also confirms the tenure was for life (1). These latter two confirmations preclude a grant in perpetuity in Council or Parliament in 1394. The clause in the 1393 draft was a recognition of reality of the life-tenure by the French, not a protest against its possibility.

The donation of March 1390 was to Gaunt:-

> 'habenda et tenenda de nobis, ut de rege Franciae et heredibus nostris, ut Franciae regibus, sub homageo ligeo... ...salvis tamen nobis, ut Franciae regi et heredibus nostris, ut Franciae regibus, directo dominio, superioritate, et resorto ducatus predicti et specialiter reservatis (2).'

This arrangement was confirmed when the terms of the original grant were repeated in July 1392 (3), but was not specified in the letters of September 1394 or July 1397. A version omitting this formula was entered on the Gascon Roll of 1390, but cancelled (4). Richard's purpose here seems to be to emphasise his title to the French crown, by acting in his capacity as king of France when investing a member of the royal family with an appanage. When Charles VI enfeoffed the Dauphin with Guyenne in January 1401, he similarly reserved fealty, liege homage, sovereignty and

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(1) C.61/105 m.12.

(2) Foedera vii 659; Rot. Parl. iii 263; Bouillons 230-231.

(3) Foedera vii 727.

(4) C.61/101 mm.6-7.

ressort to himself and his crown (1). Palmer sees the significance of this clause differently:

> 'When Richard granted the duchy to his uncle as 'king of France' he was suppressing his right to it as king of England. His only possible motive for doing so was to prepare the ground for the final alienation of the duchy: and this being the case, his promise that the grant was for life only cannot be believed... On the whole the evidence suggests that England was to renounce all interests in Aquitaine leaving the duke directly dependent on the French crown, sans moyen. This was clearly the implication of the grant of 1390 (2).'

But the Monk of Westminster stated that the French intention in 1393 was that Richard should do homage to Charles VI, and Froissart that Gaunt was to do homage to Richard (3). In 1390 Charles, like the Gascons, recognised that William le Scrope was the representative of both Gaunt and Richard, and thus that the former held Guyenne from the latter (4). The same recognition is implied in the complex proposal for double homage the French made in 1393. There is no reference in any official document to an intention by Richard to abandon Gaunt's homage to himself for the Duchy to Charles, as an adjunct to his title to the French throne.

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(1) A.N. J.369 no.1.

(2) England... 39-41.

(3) West Chron. 518: Froissart xv 135-136; c.f. England... 40.

(4) Letter from Charles VI to the Sire de Pons 16 Oct. 1390, A.N. J.865 no.7.

The Gascons objected increasingly vociferously over several years to the duke Richard had imposed upon them. Palmer links the development of their struggle to Richard's moves to reach a settlement with France on the basis above. So their rejection of le Scrope as Gaunt's seneschal in August 1392 is a reaction to the French proposal Gaunt had brought before the Council of Stamford in May, although the Council's response had been unfavourable (1). The formation of the Union of April 1394 was a protest resulting from the debate of the draft peace in the January Parliament (although the discussion was again unfavourable), the resumption of negotiations with France and Richard's simultaneous conjectural grant in perpetuity (2). The oath of the Union does not however mention any of these matters.

Apart from Richard's machinations with Charles VI, the Gascons had reasons to oppose his investment of Gaunt, on both theoretical and practical grounds. Since Henry III donated the Duchy to his son in 1252, they were privileged to be ruled only by the king of England or his eldest son, so that Guyenne should never be separated from the crown of England. Richard's grant to Gaunt defied this privilege and all precedents. Certain chroniclers state that this was the objection to Gaunt and the reason why

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(1) Palmer - "Peace Negotiations" 91; Vale - English Gascony 28 n.4; DKR xlviii 593-594; West Chron. 490.

(2) Palmer - "Peace Negotiations" 92; England...160; DKR xlviii 594; West Chron.518.

Bordeaux refused to admit Henry Percy as his seneschal in 1393, and Gaunt himself in 1394 (1). By the terms of the original donation and its confirmation in November 1390, Richard specified that this privilege was to be suspended for Gaunt's lifetime only:

> 'Privileges, per progenitores nostros patriae et subditis Aquitanniae conjunctim vel divisim, ne a Corona Angliae seperari aut extra manum regiam poni valeant concessis, non obstantibus, quae revocare per presentem concessionem non intendimus. Set ea dumtaxat suspendere usque ad terminum vitae tuae et post tui obitum in suo robore perpetuo duratus esse volumus (2).'

But at the same time he contradictorially informed the Gascons there were "sauvez toutdis a vous vos privileges franchises et libertees" (3). They feared that what could be suspended once might be suspended repeatedly, and therefore sought Richard's assurances that the grant could in no way be regarded as a precedent (4). Bordeaux claimed to be inseparable from the English crown forever (5). Some lords of Guyenne were privileged to have no

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(1) West Chron. 484; Ann.Ric.Sec. 158, 169; S.Armitage-Smith - John of Gaunt (London 1904) 370; England...41, 156, 163.

(2) Foedera vii 659-660; Rot.Parl. iii 263b.The mention of the right not to be separated from the English crown was omitted from the cancelled version on the Gascon Roll C.61/101 mm.6-7.

(3) Bouillons 231; Armitage-Smith - John of Gaunt 371.

(4) England...155.

(5) DKR xlviii 593.

mesne lord between themselves and the crown, as Charles VI recognised when making his grant in January 1401 (1). Richard's use of his sovereignty as king of France was also contrary to Gascon privilege:

> 'semper iste ducatus tenuit de Rege Angliae, "et si Rex Angliae nos noluerit habere, tenebimus de nobismet ipsis" (2).'

The absence of this clause from the later confirmations of the grant suggests Richard may have abandoned it as a pointless distinction.

From the beginning, the Gascons were prepared to accept the quinquagenerian Gaunt as duke for what remained of his life, provided he took the customary oath of the dukes of Guyenne to preserve their liberties (3). Their real fear was that if the grant were allowed to be a precedent, the Duchy would be gradually assimilated by France. This they stated in the oath of Union in 1394:

> 'Lodeyt dugat poyre estre de tot en tot separat foras de la corona danglaterra (4).'

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(1) A.N. J.369 no.1.

(2) Eulogium iii 370-371. See also England...155-158.

(3) DKR xlviii; England...156.

(4) Palmer - "Peace Negotiations" 92 quoting E.30/1232 m.5.c.f. Vale - English Gascony 28.n.5.

and again at the Council of Eltham the following year (1). They would only receive Gaunt's officials as Richard's representatives, they specifically excepted their allegiance to the English king and his sovereignty over them in all oaths of obedience to Gaunt, and finally they rejected him altogether by the oath of the Union (2). Richard was eventually obliged to publish all charters guaranteeing Guyenne's attachment to the English crown (3).

In England, Richard's alienation of the Duchy to Gaunt was attacked in the Parliament of January 1394. The proposal of 1392 and 1393 for its tranference to French sovereignty also seems to have met with an unfavourable reaction (4). The French too were unenthusiastic about the effect of Gaunt's new title. When he arrived in Guyenne in late 1394, the Paris government became alarmed. Jean Boucicaut was sent to Bordeaux to ascertain that this expedition was not intended to break the truce with France (5). Gaunt's life-tenure of Guyenne caused some complications in the discussions of sovereignty over the

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(1) Froissart xv 157-159.

(2) DKR xlviii 593, 594; Ann.Ric.Sec. 158; Bouillons 293-294.

(3) England...163 and n.23, 171.

(4) Rot.Parl. iii 313b-315b; West Chron. 490, 518.

(5) J.Buchon (ed.) - Le livre des faits de Jean Boucicaut i p.xx; Froissart xv 151-152. The English had recently captured a fortress in Saintonge and another in Angoulême.

Duchy during the Anglo-French peace negotiations, and provoked consternation on both sides of the Channel and dissent in the Duchy. But he does not seem to have been viewed seriously as the founder of a new dynasty and a living solution to the sovereignty question by either of the protagonists. Nevertheless he was still using the title in August 1396, when it had become apparent that he would never be able to enforce his authority in Guyenne (1).

The Plantagenet tenure of Guyenne had caused friction with the French kings for centuries, but other territories had been acquired by the English in France since the opening of the Hundred Years War, and these also presented problems to a negotiated settlement. Edward III had taken Calais in 1346, and during the Caroline war England had obtained Brest and Cherbourg as "barbican towns" to serve as bases for invasion. To France, an English-held Calais was a permanent and unacceptable military threat; to England it was the indispensible path for further forays into France. Both sides were therefore determined on absolute control of the town. French negotiators demanded its return to French hands, as in Charles V's final offer to the English in May 1377 (2). Their request for its cession was troublesome in the negotiations of 1384. By

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(1) His appointment as lieutenant in Picardy, C.76/81 m.10. Gaunt's failure to establish himself in the Duchy will be further considered in Chapter VI.

(2) Bruges 84.

the late 1380s they had decided instead to insist on the destruction of the fortress, so that neither party could make use of it (1). French envoys put forward this proposal at Amiens in March 1392 and at Leulinghen in 1393. On the first occasion the English ignored it, on the second they vehemently rejected it (2). By June, Gaunt had reached agreement with the French delegation on many points. Richard was now to retain Calais and all its associated territory as defined in the treaty of Bretigny, but the terms of its tenure were still troublesome and left to be decided by a personal meeting between the two sovereigns (3). In all negotiations subsequent to this, the English were not prepared to concede the point they had gained, and there was never again any question of the Valois regaining Calais by diplomacy.

Whereas Calais had been gained by military means, and its retention could therfore be haggled over, Cherbourg and Brest had been obtained on lease from their owners, the king of Navarre and the duke of Brittany, and their eventual surrender was an inescapable obligation. Cherbourg was given to the English for a fixed number of years on a pledge of 25,000 marks (4). Richard recognised

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(1) B.N.Francais 15490 f.26v.

(2) Froissart xiv 383, 385; xv 112; Conférences 373, 379.

(3) Palmer - "Articles 1393" 182-183.

(4) Hist.Ang. ii 214.

that he was likely to lose the possession of Brest by the terms of a peace or truce, when he drew up an indenture with his brother John Holand for its custody in June 1389 (1). Any failure to surrender these towns in accordance with the provisions of their leases, would provoke a renewal of hostilities.

The French government was most anxious to recover Cherbourg, and requested at Amiens in 1392 that it should be returned to Charles of Navarre (2). Negotiations had been continuing for this since 1390, but Richard delayed as long as possible, insisting on having the will of the late king of Navarre examined and expressing qualms because Charles was a Clementist (3). Finally it was agreed in March 1393 to return the town at Michelmas, and later the same month Charles' chief envoy was expected to arrive with the money and the letters of obligation for cancellation (4). Negotiations were still continuing in September, and orders were issued for the restoration in late October (5). The money to pay off the mortgage was raised in Normandy by Charles VI in November, and its

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(1) E.28/1 nos. 54a and 54b. The second version incorporates the corrections and interlineations of the first. Holand was appointed captain 1 June 1389, Foedera vii 622.

(2) Conférences 373.

(3) Dip.Cor. no. 124 and note; Foedera vii 692-693.

(4) E.30/316; C.76/77 m.2.

(5) C.76/78 m.17; Foedera vii 755-757, 759-760; Hist.Ang. ii 214.

receipt was acknowledged by Richard in January 1394 (1). Later, Charles was to purchase Cherbourg outright from Charles of Navarre (2).

England's arrangement with Jean de Montfort, duke of Brittany, for the lease of Brest, was more complicated. In lieu of rent, the duke was given the temporary possession of certain lands in England, including the manors of Sevenhampton in Wiltshire and Rising in Norfolk. However, the latter was part of the honour of Richmond, which the duke claimed by hereditary right anyway. The garrison of Brest was supposed to be maintained at English cost, but it extorted its expenses from the surrounding countryside (3). Montfort pressed for the return of the town in 1396, and negotiations continued throughout that year and early 1397. It was finally agreed it should be delivered at Easter 1397 for the sum of 120,000 gold francs and the promise that neither Montfort nor his heir would ever use Brest for aggressive purposes against England (4).

Rumours of the abandonment of these barbican towns aroused passionate protests in England. Richard's plan to sell

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(1) Foedera vii 764-765; A.N. J.643 no.3.

(2) A.N. J.619 no.17.

(3) G.A.Knowlson - Jean V duc de Bretagne et l'Angleterre 1399-1442 (Cambridge 1964) 24-25; E.28/2 no.51.

(4) Knowlson - Jean V 27-29; M.C.E.Jones - Ducal Brittany 1364-1399 (Oxford 1970) 137-139; Lettres des Rois ii 282-283; PPC i 64-69; Foedera vii 851-853. See pages 209-210 below.

them to the French in 1387 was part of his behaviour which was attacked in the Merciless Parliament of the following year, which referred to "cestes hautes tresons." (1). The surrender of Brest provoked the duke of Gloucester to new criticism of Richard's government in 1397. He took up the case of the unpaid and unemployed garrisons who had returned from Brest and Cherbourg, and were now living off the countryside around London (2). The issue was still emotive enough for Bolingbroke to echo the dead Gloucester's complaints when he landed at Ravenspur in 1399. He claimed in circulatory letters that Richard was planning to sell off all his possessions in France to Charles VI, as he had done with Cherbourg and Brest (3).

A generation later, Henry V's revival of the barbican policy by his capture of Harfleur on the Agincourt campaign, reinforced this obstruction to a diplomatic settlement. During his attempt to mediate between the two monarchs, the Emperor Sigismund tried to circumvent the problem by suggesting that newly-acquired Harfleur should be surrendered to himself and the count of Holland for the

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(1) Rot.Parl. iii 243a.See page 72 below.

(2) St.Denys ii 476-478; A.Steel - Richard II (1941) 230; L.D.Duls - Richard II in the Early Chronicles (1975) 87-88. The duke of Gloucester's role in the "war party" of the 1390s will be examined in Chapter VI.

(3) St.Denys ii 708; Steel - Richard II 264; Duls - Richard II 131 n.46.

duration of the negotiations (1). He intended it should then be restored to France in the promotion of peace (2).

However the idea of abandoning the hard-won and beleaguered Harfleur was not a popular solution in England (3).

The inevitable result of the length of the conflict was that it spilled over the frontiers of France into the kingdoms and lordships of neighbouring allies. The two protagonists had widened their struggle to include all of western Europe, and it had absorbed the various dynastic and territorial disputes of their dependent powers. Plantagenet and Valois princes became inextricably involved in these, which had a momentum of their own, impelling the continuance of hostility even when the chief questions approached a diplomatic settlement. In the 1360s English and French arms clashed in the Castilian succession wars, despite the Peace of Bretigny. Areas of secondary conflict could intrude insoluble problems into otherwise successful themes of negotiation. At Bruges in 1375, the proposal to give Aquitaine to John of Gaunt and his heirs apparently received little discussion, partly beause he was a rival for the Castilian throne to Henry of Trastamara, the French candidate. It would have been

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(1) Foedera ix 362, calendared at CCR 1413-1419 352-353; Wylie - Henry V ii 355; J.H.Wylie and W.T.Waugh - The Reign of Henry V iii (Cambridge 1929) 5, 15.

(2) EHD iv 219, from Aus der Kanzlei Kaiser Sigismunds 121.

(3) Wylie and Waugh - Henry V iii 15.

unwise for Charles V to instal an enemy to the newly-established Henry on his northern border. A French proposal for a forty-year truce the following year foundered because it was to include Castile, thus restricting Gaunt from pursuing his quarrel there. The English were also reluctant to leave most of Brittany under French occupation, and their protégé, Jean de Montfort, excluded. The talks of 1383 and 1384 also failed to reach a conclusion because Gaunt's claim to the Castilian succession was still unsettled, and war had broken out again in Flanders (1). Before a three-year truce could be concluded in 1389, Gaunt's claim had been bought off by Juan I, Montfort was firmly established as duke of Brittany, and hostilities in Flanders had ceased. Temporarily the Anglo-French war was relatively uncomplicated by secondary discords.

The association of other powers in the war by alliance with the main parties raised the question of whether they and their territories should be included in Anglo-French peaces or truces, and whether they should participate in the negotiations leading to them. The Valois and the Plantagenets felt an obligation to protect their allies, to be their champions and defenders in return for the military support they provided. In all the negotiations of the Caroline War and the 1390s, the French customarily opened with a proviso that all they were going to say

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(1) Bruges xvii, xviii; Palmer - "War Aims" 64; Steel - Richard II 104.

would be on behalf of the king of France and all his allies (1). Sometimes the French would insist that by the terms of their king's alliance with Castile, neither could contract a peace or a truce without consulting the other (2). By its alliance with Portugal in 1386, England was obliged to include her in any truce. In the 1390s it was common for England to issue two set of powers to its ambassadors to negotiate, one including the allies of both parties, the other excluding all mention of them (3). Pressure could be exerted to include English allies in a truce, when they seemed in need of support, as with Ghent in January 1384 and Pope Boniface IX in July 1395 (4). Truces between England and France in Richard's reign were normally binding on all their allies, whether they were represented in the negotiations or not. This was the case at Leulinghen in 1389 and 1394 (5), but in the truce of Paris in March 1396 allies were to be excluded from the benefit of the truce if they did not

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(1) B.N.Francais 15490 f.25v.

(2) Wylie and Waugh - Henry V iii 17; B.N.Francais 15490 f.25v.

(3) See for example Foedera vii 667-670, 721-722; C.76/74 mm.6 and 7; C.76/76 mm. 6 and 7.

(4) M.McKisack - The Fourteenth Century (Oxford 1959) 432 n.2; England... 257 from B.L.Cotton MS. Vitellius Cxi nos.2-3.

(5) Foedera vii 626, 771.

assent to it within a time limit, and a separate agreement was drawn up about this (1).

There was also a contrary motive to exclude allies in order to leave areas open for exploitation by a renewal of a secondary conflict. In order to leave Gaunt's claim open, England wished Castile to be excluded from any settlement in 1384, and from the negotiations of 1390, in the hope of concluding a separate peace with her (2). In 1413 Henry V pressed the French into agreeing that both sides could give aid to their allies on both sides of the Channel during the truce (3).

England was most anxious that Scotland should be excluded from the benefit of any Anglo-French peace or truce. The English kings were reluctant to recognise its status as a French ally, preferring to regard it as an English vassal, to which terms should be dictated by its overlord. As the only power possessing a land frontier with England, it was the Valois' most useful ally, whose consent they were obliged to seek before concluding peace or truce (4). France could not afford to diminish its nuisance value which served to deter English invasions of France. Therefore consideration of its omission or inclusion was

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(1) Cosneau - Grands Traités 71, 79-82, 92-93: Burr - Anglo-French Relations 89-90 from A.N. J.644 no.17. The Anglo-French truces of this period and their terms will be considered in chapter III.

(2) Steel - Richard II 104; PPC i 23.

(3) Wylie - Henry V i 155; Foedera ix 59.

(4) B.N.Francais 15490 f.25.

the cause of much friction between English and French ambassadors. At Leulinghen in 1389 the latter successfully held out for Scotland's inclusion in the truce, despite the assertions of the former that the Scots were Richard's rebellious liege men, with whom he would deal fairly (1). The English government wished to exclude all consideration of the Scottish question from the negotiations of 1390 (2); and in 1395 contemplated requesting Charles VI to aid Richard in conquering Scotland, should he decide to confiscate it, on behalf of one of his sons born of Isabelle (3). In the early years of Henry IV's reign, English envoys repeatedly urged that Scotland should be excluded from the benefits of the long truce, since it failed to comply with the provisions. The French were adamant that the truce should continue to cover their ally (4).

Scotland's attitude to its inclusion in a truce was as unpredictable to its allies as to its adversaries. It was included in the truce of January 1384, on the condition of its acceptance, although it was not represented at the conference. At the next conference Scottish envoys

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(1) Hist.Ang. ii 179.

(2) PPC i 21.

(3) England...257 from B.L.Cotton MS. Vitellius Cxi nos. 2-3.

(4) J.H.Wylie - History of England under Henry IV i 336; F.C. Wilson - Anglo-French Relations in the Reign of King Henry IV of England 1399-1413 (McGill University Ph.D.thesis 1973) 138, 204, 206, 210.

arrived, complaining that they had been excluded from the truce. The French laid the blame on the English for delaying the French mission sent to seek King Robert's acquiescence (1). In 1389 it was included in the truce of Leulinghen, which, like all the other allies, it was to ratify before it came into effect. Accordingly, French envoys were sent through England to Robert II to request his compliance with the truce (2). The Scots proved difficult to persuade to abandon their preparations to attack England and enter the truce, but eventually they agreed (3). At the 1393 Leulinghen conference, the uncles of both monarchs agreed that there should be

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(1) J.Campbell - "England, Scotland and the Hundred Years War in the Fourteenth Century" in J.R.Hale, J.R.L.Highfield and B.Smalley (eds.) Europe in the Late Middle Ages (London 1965) 209; B.N.Francais 2699 f.153-153v.

(2) Foedera vii 626; West Chron. 398. On 15 June Richard authorised his ambassadors at Calais to grant a safe-conduct to these envoys to travel as far as the English Council, E.28/1 no.66, another copy at E.28/2 no.45. They were given a safe-conduct to go on to Scotland on 3 July, Foedera vii 631. A Scottish embassy was permitted to pass through England to France on 2 Oct. 1389, C.76/74 m.18.

(3) West Chron. 402-404; Hist.Ang ii 182-183. Richard later reminded King Robert of his oath to observe the truce, E.28/6 no.40.

separate negotiations between England and Scotland in the Marches (1). This was a major concession by the dukes of Berry and Burgundy, which presumably helped to buy Gaunt's agreement that liege homage should be rendered for Guyenne. Scotland was again included in the truce of 1396 on the condition of her assent (2). Accordingly, two French envoys passed through England to Scotland to explain the negotiations to Robert III (3). In May 1400, Henry IV, having extracted a confirmation of this truce from Charles VI, sent three men experienced in Scottish negotiations to inform Robert and request him, his lords and officials to swear to it. Otherwise by the terms of the truce they would be excluded from its benefits (4). In July 1403, the French were unsure of the attitude of their ally to the truce. French envoys were again sent to Scotland with an English safe-conduct to learn Robert's will, only to find the Scots had already colluded in the Percy rebellion (5).

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(1) E.28/6 no.31. This is an order to one of the English envoys to attend a conference at Ayton or Kelso on 9 Sept. It is dated under the Privy Seal at Westminster on 19 July with no year, but refers to the dukes of Lancaster, Gloucester, Berry and Burgundy treating for peace at Leulinghen and states the bishop of St.Davids was one of the other envoys being sent to the Scottish Marches. John Gilbert, bishop of St.Davids was one of eight commissioned to treat peace with Scotland 22 Aug. 1393, Foedera vii 754.

(2) Cosneau - Grands Traités 79; see also p. 44 n.1 above.

(3) Safe-conduct 8 May 1396. C.76/80 m.3.

(4) Foedera viii 144-145.

(5) Foedera viii 318-319; Wylie - Henry IV i 340.

The conglomerates of allies, noble vassals and vested interests headed by Charles VI and his Plantagenet counterparts were not monolithic organisations. Neither protagonist could rely on uniformity of opinion and solidarity of action amongst the ranks of his own party. This made negotiations between the two nascent nations complex and difficult, even impossible at times. Between the two monarchies, Flanders followed independent policies which often ran counter to those of its French and Burgundian overlords. Its most important consideration was the dominant cloth industry, dependent on imports of English wool, which inclined it towards peace with England. Most specifically, the Flemish wished to keep wool moving along the route from the Calais Staple to Bruges. Their opinions were voiced by the powerful body of the Vier Leden, which exerted constant pressure on the French government, and particularly their count, Philip the Bold, to conclude a peace or truce with England. They favoured the negotiation of a separate Anglo-Flemish commercial treaty, but to Philip and his son, John the Fearless, Flemish economic interests were normally secondary to political ambitions within France. The complexities of the division of power between the count of Flanders and the towns confused English foreign policy in the area. A hostile Flanders would provide the French with a base from which to invade England. During the long truce period of 1389 to 1415, there was a real danger that in any renewal of conflict, Flanders would participate on the French side.

On occasion, the Flemish would refuse to fight for the French. In April 1400, Philip demanded the Vier Leden should provide him with 1000 sergeants to serve in West Flanders against the English: this they rejected the following month (1). They refused a similar request for 2000 men in July 1403 (2), and rose in revolt against Duke John's plans to attack Calais in 1406 (3). The Vier Leden expressed their desire to remain neutral in the Anglo-French quarrel in July 1400 and May 1403 (4). A clause in the Anglo-Flemish truces continuously renewed from 1407 provided that the truce was to continue even if war broke out with the French king (5). Efforts had been made previously to secure a separate treaty between England and Flanders. Philip the Bold banned all commerce between them in January 1387. The two trading partners then negotiated for an agreement to remove their commerce from the vacillations of the Anglo-French conflict for the three following years, with no result (6). Thereafter,

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(1) Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 55; S.P.Pistono - The Repudiation of the Twenty-Eight Year Truce: A Study of Anglo-French Diplomatic Relations 1399-1404 (University of Oklahoma Ph.D.thesis, 1970) 80-81; S.P.Pistono - "The accession of Henry IV: effects on Anglo-Flemish relations 1399-1402" Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis lxxxix(1976) 466.

(2) Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 178; Pistono - Repudiation 188.

(3) Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 332 and n.41; Wylie - Henry IV ii 106.

(4) Pistono - Repudiation 81, 181-182; "Accession of Henry IV" 473.

(5) e.g. C.76/92 m.12.

(6) England...91; Pistono - Repudiation 14 and n.21; Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 10.

Flanders' inclusion in the truces of 1389, 1394 and 1396 as a French fief rendered such endeavours unnecessary. In the summer of 1402, representatives of the Vier Leden informed English and French ambassadors at Leulinghen that they wished to be included in any agreement concluded about the truce. Flanders was accordingly recognised as protected by the agreement of August of that year (1). A separate treaty outside the Anglo-French quarrel was becoming increasingly necessary, as the lists of complaints about piracy lengthened on both sides. Against the obstruction of the government in Paris, the Flemish were gradually able to force the acceptance of the principle that Anglo-Flemish commercial relations should be placed outside the war. In June 1404 Charles VI permitted the Duchess Margaret and her son John to negotiate for this (2). Talks continued intermittently for several years, resulting in the conclusion of a commercial truce in March 1407 and an agreement for security in the Channel the following year (3).

The English continued to use their economic interdependence with the Flemish to drive a wedge between

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(1) Pistono - Repudiation 166-167; CCR 1399-1402 547; CPR 1401-1405 201; Foedera viii 274-276.

(2) Letters of Henry IV i 320-324; Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 201, 223, 251.

(3) I have not investigated these negotiations thoroughly, as C.J.Ford intends to construct a detailed narrative of them in his current thesis. See also Owen - Connection chapter 1, Wilson - Anglo-French Relations and Pistono - Repudiation. The part of the resulting agreements in the truce system of Henry IV's later years is considered in Chapter III.

them and their overlords. In May 1412 Henry IV wrote to Ghent, Bruges and Ypres on the subject of John the Fearless' proposed expedition to Guyenne against his new Armagnac allies, requesting that they should maintain their truce with England and should not aid him in any way (1). The Vier Leden replied that they wished to continue the truce, but intended to support John and Charles VI (2). In fact Henry's implied intention to repudiate the truce if they did so was an empty threat, for next month orders were given for the truce to be proclaimed in the Calais March, and in July proclamation was made elsewhere and conservators appointed (3). John's response to Henry's intimidation was to write to his ally, the prince of Wales, on 14 June. This letter stated his case against the Armagnacs and complained of the attempt made to subvert his subjects. He asked the prince to use his influence with his father to make him withdraw from the Armagnac alliance (4).

It was not only the unreliability of allies and vassals, like the Scots and the Flemish, which prevented a clear

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(1) Foedera viii 737. A copy of another letter addressed to the same on the same date is at PPC ii 28-30. Nicolas suggested that the original of this was substituted for the letter printed by Rymer. However the reply of John the Fearless makes it clear that it was Rymer's letter that was sent, quoting it in full, B.N.Moreau 1424 no.55. Nicolas' letter is presumably a rejected draft.

(2) Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 444.

(3) Foedera viii 751, 765, 767.

(4) B.N.Moreau 1424 no.55 (a copy).

continuous direction of foreign policy in France. The obstructions to the negotiation of a peaceful settlement were often exacerbated by divisions of opinion between internal factions in the French court and council. This was especially important during the reign of Charles VI, who was scarcely out of his minority before he began to suffer intermittently from mental illness. The government of France was therefore normally controlled by his close relatives, amongst whom there was a constant rivalry for leadership. Philip the Bold largely controlled foreign policy for the first part of the reign, until he was removed from power in November 1388 by Clisson and the Marmosets. These immediately declared themselves in favour of negotiating a peace with England (1). By August 1392 however, Clisson's irresponsible belligerency had brought the two countries to the brink of war over Brittany. The dukes of Berry and Burgundy had already directed discussions with the English at Amiens, and their return to power when Charles fell ill accelerated their efforts, now there was no danger of peace reinforcing Marmoset influence (2). The following year they negotiated a draft peace with John of Gaunt. In the last years of Richard II and the early years of Henry IV's reign, Louis, duke of Orléans increasingly challenged Philip the Bold's pre-eminence in foreign affairs. Philip was influenced towards détente with England by his Flemish

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(1) St.Denys i 570; West Chron. 372.

(2) Chroniques des Quatre Premiers Valois 325.

subjects, although he resented English meddling in Flanders; he was not keen to allow a separate Anglo-Flemish agreement to detract from his power. He was indignant at the usurpation of Henry IV, but after the return of Queen Isabelle had been accomplished, he became concerned to preserve the truce he had made with Richard. Henry's overthrow might serve Orléanist purposes more than his own. Towards the end of his life, Philip again favoured détente with England. The duke of Orléans favoured warlike action against Henry, whatever private arrangement they may have made in 1399. He was ambitious particularly for the conquest of Guyenne. After Philip's death in April 1404, he directed foreign policy until his assassination, in the face of growing antagonism from John the Fearless.

Vacillations of French policy did not only disrupt the movement towards peace. Military ventures were also impeded. The reluctance of the duke of Berry to participate in the invasion schemes of 1386 and 1387 was contributory to their failure (1). There was rivalry between the dukes of Burgundy and Orléans in their attacks upon English frontiers in France in 1405 and 1406. After Orléans' removal by murder, the bitterness between the French factions gave England not merely a respite from hostilities, but an opportunity to intervene directly in

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(1) F. Lehoux - Jean de France, duc de Berri. Sa vie, son action politique 1340-1416 (Paris 1966-1968) ii 201.

France again. Exploitation of the difficulties of its adversary was not just a temptation, but a necessity.

By the time the Leulinghen truce of 1389 began a generation of official cessation of hostilities, most of the diplomatic solutions to the Valois-Plantagenet quarrel reviewed in this period had already been suggested. Negotiations were dominated by the treaty of Brétigny, by which Edward III was to surrender his French title in return for extensive territory held in full sovereignty. The fact that it had been agreed by both sides, and its eventual failure, influenced English and French diplomats until the treaty of Troyes created a new precedent. The expected repetition of the failure led in 1396 to the adoption of a long truce, a recognition of the failure to achieve a peace treaty. This preserved the status quo, while providing that peace negotiations should continue for its duration. Other long truces had been suggested in the 1370s and 1380s. A half-peace, combining such a long truce with territorial concessions similar to those in the Brétigny treaty but with the Plantagenet title to France retained, had been suggested in 1356, 1360 and 1376 and would recur in the negotiations following the Congress of Arras. The expedient of Richard marrying a Valois princess had already been considered early in his reign. All the ingenious permutations for halting the friction over the English tenure of Guyenne had been proposed before the 1390s. Papal mediators at Avignon in 1344 and Bruges in 1375 had recommended that Edward III should

surrender it in return for compensation elsewhere, in Scotland, for imperial territory or for the Lancastrian estates in England. But this was compensation the Valois had no power to make, nor were they adequate substitutes for Guyenne (1). In March 1375 the mediators also suggested the Duchy should be erected into a fief for John of Gaunt under Charles V's sovereignty. The English rejected this and Gaunt refused it "potissime attento homagio secundum dictam viam domino regi Francie faciendo, quod sibi non placebat (2)." The partition of Aquitaine and modifications to French sovereignty were also discussed in the Bruges negotiations (3).

When the English and French negotiators sealed the Twenty-Eight Year Truce in March 1396, they were recognising that they had reached a state of diplomatic stalemate. Neither side had achieved the necessary military advantage to enforce its dynastic or feudal interpretation of the conflict. A decisive change in the military balance was needed before any peace treaty could be successfully concluded, as had happened in the campaigns preceding the treaty of Brétigny. Henry V attempted to repeat this sequence of events, but his conquest of France had already lost its momentum by the time he forced Charles VI to agree to the treaty of

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(1) Bruges xvi; Palmer - "War Aims" 55-56.

(2) Bruges xvi-xvii, 11.

(3) Bruges xvii-xviii.

Troyes. It only committed the English to continue the exhausting struggle (1). The English could end the conflict victoriously only by seizing France entirely from the Valois. The assassination of John the Fearless in 1419 gave Henry the chance for this, for it brought England the crucial advantage of the Burgundian alliance until 1435. For the French, the only ultimate solution was the complete expulsion of the English from their kingdom. The Valois' confiscations of Guyenne in 1337 and 1369, and their creations of their own dukes, recognised this. Eventually this form of pacification outdistanced all diplomatic constructions:

> 'Characteristically enough, the Hundred Years War was terminated by force, not diplomacy (2).'

But by 1389 the military course of the conflict had also stagnated. During the Caroline war, hostilities occupied a longer time than in the Edwardian war, and truces were shorter. More armies were put into the field; they served for longer and over a wider area. By the time of the 1375 truce, the impetus of the war had begun to degenerate to a process of mutual attrition. The minority of Charles VI and the English government's financial difficulties after

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(1) C.T.Allmand - Henry V (Historical Association 1968) 22-23.

(2) Palmer - "War Aims" 72.

the Peasants' Revolt further reduced the intensity of hostilities. By the constant pressure of a force permanently in the field, Charles V had expelled the English from the greater part of Aquitaine, and in 1377 the Duke of Anjou threatened Bordeaux. But once French tactics had reduced the Plantagenet holdings to the coastal strip around Bordeaux, Bayonne and Dax, they could proceed no further and assumed a more defensive stance (1). In response to the French refusal to stand and fight, the English had employed the chevauchée. This brought no glorious victories, but kept the war on the right side of the Channel, preoccupied French forces with defence, and inflicted considerable damage on enemy territory and morale. This mode of campaign was used repeatedly until 1381 and recommenced with the Duke of Clarence's expedition in 1412 (2). Complementary to this was the English desire to obtain a ring of coastal fortresses round France, which served as starting points for chevauchées and shelter for the returning armies. Their importance as "barbicans" for the defence of England was secondary, since this could never be effective while the French retained any ports on the Channel coast. In addition to Bayonne, Bordeaux and Calais, Brest Cherbourg and Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte were acquired, and attempts were made on Harfleur and Saint Malo in 1378, Nantes in

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(1) P.Contamine - Guerre, État et Société a la fin du moyen age: études sur les armées des rois de France 1337-1494 (Paris 1972) 207.

(2) Contamine - Guerre État et Société 230; England...6; J.R.Alban - National Defence in England 1337-1389 (Liverpool Ph.D.thesis 1977),346-348.

1380, La Rochelle in 1381 and 1382, and Sluys in 1387, an attack to be repeated by Thomas of Lancaster in 1405. The French countered with assaults on St.Sauveur-le-Vicomte, Cherbourg and the Calais march in the 1370s (1). In the 1380s, as the struggle within France reached the limits of its possibilities, the Valois and the Plantagenets sought an advantage by immobilising each others' allies. This trend was given impetus by the advent of the Great Schism, and the rising Castilian ambitions of John of Gaunt. In England, there was debate between the "way of Portugal" or the "way of Flanders." The former was employed in 1381, the latter disastrously in the Bishop of Norwich's crusade in 1383. Richard II invaded Scotland in 1385 and Gaunt took an army to Castile the following year (2).

It was the Castilian alliance which had enabled the Valois to carry the war to the English side of the Channel at last. There had been minor French raids in the early part of the Caroline war on Portsmouth, Gosport and Guernsey, and the East Anglian coast had been threatened. But when the Bruges truce ended in June 1377, a Franco-Castilian fleet made a destructive progress along England's southern coast, landing on the Isle of Wight, attacking Rye, Winchelsea, Hastings, Rottingdean, Gravesend and Stonor, threatening other towns, and carrying off the Prior of Lewes as a prisoner. In the following few years the

(1) England...6-7; Alban - National Defence 341-360; see pages 36 - 41 above.

(2) Contamine - Guerre État et Société 207; Steel - Richard II 98-106; McKisack - Fourteenth Century 431-432; E.H.D. iv no.57.

combined fleet attacked Cornwall, Gravesend and Winchelsea again, and Scarborough was repeatedly threatened. In 1381, the English government feared French and Castilian forces would land on the south coast to exploit the military possibilities of the Peasants' Revolt. Every year English ships were sent to sea to protect coasts and shipping, but often too late to oppose enemy fleets, as in 1377. In 1383 French balingers sent to molest the coast were defeated by a fleet raised by the inhabitants of Portsmouth and Dartmouth (1).

These pin-pricks were of minor significance compared to the continued destruction wrought by English forces in France, and they became infrequent during Charles VI's minority. Their logical extension was a full-scale invasion, and the trend of French military policy was clearly shifting to the offensive with the large-scale expeditions against Flanders in 1382 and 1383 (2). In the 1370s, the English goverment had feared an invasion through Wales, which never materialised (3). The threat became more serious in the mid-1380s, when Charles VI reached manhood and the French gained control of Flanders, with an ideal base for an invasion fleet in the harbour of Sluys. In 1385 a force gathered here under the command of

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(1) Steel - Richard II 74-75; Froissart viii 391-400; Alban - National Defence 45-52, 61 and n.2, 283-284, 332 n.2, 393 and n.2.

(2) Contamine - Guerre État et Société 207, 212, 223.

(3) Alban - National Defence 56-58.

Olivier Clisson, the Constable of France, while a secondary contingent operated in Scotland under the Admiral, Jean de Vienne (1). The following year, Clisson concentrated troops at Tréguier and other ports in Brittany, Normandy and Picardy, but a much larger army and navy "the most deadly threat to England throughout the entire Middle Ages"(2), assembled at Sluys. It was to be led to England by Charles and his uncles of Burgundy and Berry, and the intention was to deliver a decisive blow to the enemy and terminate the struggle:

> 'monseigneur le roy, ayent en propoux de passer en personne a toute sa puissance ou pais d'Engleterre pour grever et domaigier ses enemis at mectre fin en sa guerre (3).'

A prefabricated fort was designed and constructed, to be erected as a secure base for the French beach-head in England, but several sections were captured by the English at sea (4). The French were not able to repeat the scale of these operations in 1387, and only small fleets were gathered at Harfleur and Tréguier by Clisson and Vienne (5).

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(1) England...60,71; Alban - National Defence 65; J.J.N.Palmer "Prêts a la Couronne (1385)" BEC cxxvi(1968) 419-421.

(2) England...74.

(3) England...249, appendix 3 from Archives Départementales de la Cote-d'Or Dijon, B2299 f.1.

(4) England...72-75; Alban - National Defence 69-71; Froissart xi 356-361; xii 1-6,19-20.

(5) England...98; Alban - National Defence 77.

England's scramble to defend herself against these threats betrays panic and confusion. In 1386 it was planned to allow the invading army to penetrate inland and defeat them by scorched earth tactics. England experienced the problems of being on the defensive, as her own troops marauded unpaid around London. The measures employed for resistance were expensive for her government, and detrimental to her peoples' morale (1).

Yet none of these invasion fleets ever set sail. The first force was diverted in July 1385 to recapture Damme, which had been seized by the Gantois to its rear. Meanwhile the Scots had signed a truce with England (2). The preparations for the gigantic host of 1386 were delayed, first by the severe illness of Philip the Bold, and then by continuous adverse weather as the campaigning season lengthened into winter; it does not seem that the duke of Berry was as responsible for the cancellation of the expedition as Froissart alleged. As the departure date was repeatedly postponed, money and supplies ran out, and relations with the Flemish deteriorated dangerously. The weighty enterprise was eventually

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(1) England...72, 75-76; Alban - National Defence 65-68, 72-75, 266, 424(appendix 11); Froissart xi 361-362, 368-374; McKisack - Fourteenth Century 442; Foedera vii 474, 507, 539; CPR 1381-1385 519, 553, 554, 588-591, 597-598; 1385-1389 79, 135, 160, 174,175, 177, 181, 214, 216, 217, 242, 258, 260, 261, 263, 387, 547; CCR 1385-1389 6, 60, 169, 175, 186-187, 190-191, 193-194, 253-254, 261, 264-265, 327, 329; C.76/70 passim.

(2) England...60-61, 72; Foedera vii 526-527.

overcome by its own inertia (1). In cancelling it, Charles VI promised another effort the following year, but this too never sailed. His finances were too exhausted for a repeat performance and the duke of Berry refused to co-operate with Olivier Clisson. The expedition was finally scuppered by the duke of Brittany's imprisonment of the Constable, perhaps at English instigation (2).

With the demise of the 1386 fleet, Engand had resumed an offensive posture. The earl of Arundel was made Admiral on 10 December, and gathered his fleet at Sandwich in the early months of 1387, being nominated as lieutenant to lead it to sea and against enemy coasts on 26 February (3). A month later he defeated a combined French, Flemish and Castilian fleet on its way to Sluys to form the nucleus of the new invading expedition (4). However, he failed to press his advantage and capture Sluys, and so it remained in its troubelsome Valois possession (5). After a refit at Orwell, Arundel took his force to the relief of

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(1) England...77-84; Alban - National Defence 75-77; Froissart xii 1-6, 10-12, 19-28.

(2) Lehoux - Berri ii 201; England...99-101; Jones - Ducal Brittany 106; Froissart xii 27; St.Denys i 480; P.H.Morice (ed.) Mémoires pour servir de Preuves à l'Histoire Ecclesiastique et Civile de Bretagne (Paris 1742-1746) ii 540-542; A.N. K.53 no.70.

(3) England...91, 92; CCR 1385-1389 208-209; C.76/71 mm.13, 18.

(4) England...93; Hist.Ang. ii 153. Safe-conducts for his prisoners (including Flemish and men of Bilbão, Bermeo and Bayonne) to go to seek their ransoms, C.76/72 mm.14,16.

(5) England...93-95 and map p.94.

Brest, besieged by the duke of Brittany since the previous June. There he captured one of the bastides being constructed against the English and destroyed the other (1). In August, Henry Percy the younger, sailed with a small hastily-assembled force and finally drove off the besiegers (2). For the following year, the Appellant government adopted an ambitious, aggressive plan. The earl of Arundel was to join with Duke Jean in Brittany, while John of Gaunt operated from Guyenne, in a double advance into France. Co-operation may also have been expected from King Charles of Navarre, and Duke William of Guelders (3). Accordingly, Arundel was appointed admiral and lieutenant of an expedition to enemy coasts on 12 March and Captain of Brest on 9 April, and assembled a force at Southampton (4). Gaunt was made lieutenant in Guyenne on 26 May, and troops were sent to him with Arundel's fleet (5). But parliamentary business delayed

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(1) Jones - Ducal Brittany 103-105, 158; H.Touchard - Le Commerce Maritime Breton à la fin du Moyen Age (Paris 1967) 104; Hist.Ang. ii 153; Lettres des Rois ii 267; Preuves ii 526; CCR 1385-1389 541. The newly-captured bastide is mentioned in E.28/1 nos.54a and 54b; E.28/5 no.5; E.28/6 no.20.

(2) England...100-101; Jones - Ducal Brittany 106, 159; Hist.Ang. ii 156-157; CPR 1385-1389 358; C.76/72 m.25.

(3) England...127-128 and map p.129; M.C.E.Jones "The ransom of Jean de Bretagne count of Penthièvre; an aspect of English Foreign Policy 1386-1388" BIHR xlv (1972); Froissart xiii 100-106.

(4) England...130; Foedera vii 578; C.76/72 mm.5, 6, 9, 10.

(5) England...126; Foedera vii 583-585.

Arundel's departure until 10 June (1). Meanwhile, the grand plan collapsed. Jean of Brittany agreed to meet the dukes of Berry and Burgundy in May, and reached a settlement with the French government and Clisson in July (2). Gaunt made an agreement with Juan of Castile on 8 July, and a truce with the duke of Berry south of the Loire on 18 August (3). When Arundel reached Brittany, he could do nothing without the horses that were to have been provided by Duke Jean. He went on to land in Aunis, raiding the countryside and threatening La Rochelle, but failed to effect a rendezvous with Perrot le Béarnais in Limousin, before the truce became operative. He returned to England on 3 September (4). The increasing difficulties of financing the war, and the English defeat at Otterburn now necessitated negotiations for truce (5).

If England continued the conflict now, she would lose the initiative back to France. The failure of each side since 1385 to make an impact on the others' territory meant that the French advance into Guyenne in the 1370s dictated the course of the negotiations of the 1380s and 1390s, ensuring that the main debate concerned the extent of what

(1) West Chron. 340; his letters of attorney on 1 June 1388, C.76/72 m.2.

(2) England..., 131-132 and appendix 1k, pp. 235-236; Froissart xiii 118-124, 136-139, 143, 185.

(3) England..., 128; Foedera vii 595-598. The truce was extended on 9 March 1389, A.N. K.53 no.80.

(4) England... 133; Lehoux - Berri ii 226.

(5) England... 134-138; J.A.Tuck - "The Cambridge Parliament 1388" EHR lxxxiv (1969); Knighton ii 298.

Richard was to hold in Guyenne, and the terms of its tenure. The French feudal interpretation of the conflict was therefore in the ascendant. During the Edwardian war, the English had had an effective military presence in northern France, a position restored by Henry V. This allowed discussion of the Plantagenet claims to the whole of France, and therefore in terms of the English dynastic interpretation of the war. Mutual exhaustion had now induced a military stalemate, and truce was necessary both for recovery and to seek new advantages by the acquisition of allies. The conflict between England and France was transferred from the field of battle to the negotiating table.

Chapter 2

ANGLO-FRENCH PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 1389-1417

The theoretical purpose of a truce between two warring kingdoms was to provide the medium for negotiating a final peace. Provision was normally made for such negotiations when truces were signed between England and France. They were conducted by means of meetings between the ambassadors of the two parties, at which they exchanged offers of terms for a settlement. The offers were presented by each side alternately, each increasing the extent of its concessions until the inevitable impasse was reached. This system of alternating and ascending proposals was used to manoeuvre for position and establish points of principle against an opponent. There was a reluctance to open the bidding as this was conventionally seen as a sign of weakness. The party that made an offer that was then rejected by the other side, was not bound by it. Yet in practice, offers made in previous negotiations were introduced into discussions as precedents to extract better terms, particularly if the offer had been made in writing. Envoys would arrive at meetings armed with evidence about previous conferences and agreements. So in

Henry V's instructions to his ambassadors in October 1418, he ordered them to force the Dauphin's party to open the series of peace offers, to cite the Armagnac offer of 1412 if the Dauphin offered less than the terms of the treaty of Brétigny, and to introduce discussion of a long truce only on the basis of previous talks at Winchester (1). Ambassadors' instructions can tell us the most favourable terms a party was prepared to put forward, and their commissions the limit of their power to make an agreement. But the sequence of offers actually made was usually at the ambassadors' discretion, and powers might be left unused. Information about the content of negotiations is derived largely from protocols drawn up for the reports of returning embassies. The reliance on precedent means that the demands, offers and counter-offers of the English and French negotiators during this period of truce form two continuous interlocking series. The claims and concessions the two sides were prepared to make reflect the balance of advantage between them as it swung from the French to the English, and the precise terms express their expectations at intervals in their conflict.

These expectations were most fluid in the territorial elements of proposed settlements. The boundaries of these ranged right across the four comtés and sixteen vicomtés

(1) Foedera ix 628-629.

which were considered to make up the ancient duchy of Aquitaine, "a mosaic of frontiers, whose limits were geographically obscure." (1) In the French memorandum of 1390, the Duchy's lands were listed as including towns as far from English control as Limoges, Cahors, Montauban and Auch (2). In the absence of maps, negotiators computed the value of territorial offers by the numbers of cities, fortresses and dioceses the lands contained(3). The proposed frontiers usually bore no relation to the geographical position of English and French armed strength. During the 1370s, the English had lost Angoumois, Périgord, Limousin, Rouergue, Quercy and part of Agenais and Saintonge. By the 1390s, English Gascony comprised Bordeaux, Bayonne, Dax and Aire, with the Médoc peninsula, the Sénéchausée of Landes, the Bailliage of Labourt, the Vicomté of Orthe and Chalosse. Many outlying fortresses were also controlled by English garrisons (4). The diplomats discussed a much more extensive Duchy.

Negotiators could afford to be flexible about the amount

(1) Vale- English Gascony 163-164.

(2) B.N.Francais 15490, unnumbered page between f.26v and f.27.

(3) Dickinson- Congress of Arras 156; B.N.Francais 15490 f.26. A sheet of scrappy notes on the treaty of Brétigny contains a list of towns ceded by the agreement, B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Diii f.160.

(4) Vale - English Gascony 5-8 and Map 1; Angleterre et Schisme 111; B.N.Francais 15490, unnumbered page and f.27. For the territorial terms offered during this period see the map of Guyenne, the overlays and Table 1 in the pocket inside the back cover.

of land to be ceded, but points of principle were more troublesome. Any feasible settlement would have to include solutions to all the outstanding differences reviewed in the last chapter. Suggestions about homage for English lands in France, the Plantagenet title to the French throne, the tenure of Calais and the inclusion of allies were used as bargaining counters as much as blocks of territory, and were perhaps more important. Financial claims of one side against the other might also be introduced at conferences. Clauses about dynastic marriage and military support sometimes formed part of proposed treaties, and themselves became the subject of further bargaining. All these elements had to be considered in the construction or assessment of an offer for a peace treaty.

Anglo-French negotiations at this period were largely based on the treaty of Brétigny, the last agreed settlement between the two sides, normally referred to as the Great Peace. The observation of treaties involved questions of perjury and honour, of both the consciences and reputations of monarchs. The rupture of the Great Peace was therefore raised repeatedly, long after the deaths of Edward III and Charles V, until the treaty of Troyes provided a new precedent for disputes. From the French viewpoint, the peace of 1360 was made on unjustifiable terms, since it involved the renunciation of sovereignty which was inalienable from the French crown. The Valois diplomats regarded Edward III, the Black Prince

and their officers as responsible for breaking the peace, and King Jean therefore, as discharged from the obligation to deliver his renunciations. They also maintained that not only did Edward fail to expel mercenary companies fighting in his cause from French fortresses as agreed, but even encouraged and supplied them. The fortresses were not delivered to the Valois as in the terms of the peace, and war damage continued to be inflicted on France. Charles VI was not obliged to fulfil the terms of the treaty his grandfather had made and Charles V was fully justified in confiscating Aquitaine in 1369 (1). To the English, the treaty was a reasonable peace fairly based on Edward III's military successes. It was broken by the Valois failure to renounce sovereignty and Charles VI was therefore still bound by the treaty. The English insisted that by tenor of the peace, it should remain entirely in force despite any infraction on either side; the French disputed the interpretation of this article. English negotiators maintained that Edward had done all in his power to expel the mercenaries, and had even offered to take joint action with King Jean against them, but he was too far distant to enforce the order, and the companies disobeyed him. Later it was denied that there was any trace of this agreement in the English archives, and suggested that Edward was only requested to expel these troops and therefore not legally obliged to do it (2). To

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(1) B.N.Francais 15490 ff.29-30; A.N. J.645 no.20.

(2) B.N.Francais 15490 ff.29-30; A.N. J.645 no.53.c.f. Cosneau- Grands Traités 58-59, 62.

the English, the peace was still legally valid, and a powerful body of opinion, including the duke of Gloucester, considered that any settlement should be on this basis (1). In 1390 English envoys were instructed to discuss the re-establishment of the treaty with the French (2), and Henry V's representatives raised this possibility several times (3). More often, the treaty of Brétigny was used as a reference for territorial demands in instructions and at conferences (4). In November 1418, both teams of negotiators seemed confused about the boundaries specified in the treaty (5).

According to the French memorandum of 1390, Charles V's diplomats gradually increased their territorial concessions for final peace until they offered the Brétigny lands minus the comté of Ponthieu and excepting these lands in Guyenne: Poitou, Saintonge north of the Charente, Limousin, Angoulême, Montauban and the lands between the Aveyron and the Tarn. They were also willing to pay 1,200,000 francs, presumably as part of King Jean's ransom. The offer was made under the customary French protestation about liege homage, sovereignty and ressort,

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(1) Froissart xiv 314, xv 80.

(2) PPC i 19.

(3) Wylie - Henry V i 154-155; Foedera ix 210.

(4) e.g. Palmer - "Articles 1393" 184; England...256; EHD iv 209; Feodera ix 628-630. See p. 68 n. 3 above.

(5) Wylie and Waugh - Henry V iii 153-154; Foedera ix 637, 640.

but no other details are given. In the last two years of his reign, Charles was prepared to augment this offer with the comté of Angoulême in the form of a dowry for the marriage of his daughter Catherine to Richard II, but demanded Cherbourg should be returned to the French. When Charles VI succeeded to the throne, he and his uncles offered the same lands, but Angulême's tenure was no longer restricted as a dowry (1). After the stagnation of the war in 1378, the French were gradually prepared to pay more to buy peace.

After the threats of French invasion, and faced with domestic opposition, Richard sought in 1387 to win himself the breathing space of a five year truce, and possibly French military aid against his enemies at home. The status quo would be maintained in Guyenne, Richard rendering homage to Charles with a guarantee against confiscation. Ponthieu would be renounced and Brest, Cherbourg and Calais , with all its march, would be returned to France for unspecified sums (2). This proposal was only a half-peace and provided no solution to the fifty-year conflict. Despite the disastrous English military efforts of the 1380s, it was certainly

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(1) M.d'Autume - "Histoire de Cherbourg de 1354 à 1450" Positions des Thèses (1934) 8; B.N.Francais 15490 ff.25-26.

(2) Rot.Parl. iii 234, 243; Hist.Ang. ii 170; Knighton ii 216, 243; West.Chron. 204.

over-generous, though chroniclers may have exaggerated the terms, and it is not surprising that this was one of the principal reasons for the Appellants' attack on Richard's counsellors.

There had evidently been some exchange of views by letters and messengers but the treaty was to be concluded by a personal meeting between the two monarchs in the Calais march (1). Count Albrecht of Holland had proposed such a meeting to be held on 1 August under his mediation. Later he tried to postpone this and transfer it to Zeriksee, Sluys and Middleburgh. However, Richard insisted that the negotiations should be in the vicinity of Calais, and rejected Albrecht's proposal of a long truce (2). This meeting did not take place but on 5 October, Charles wrote to Richard to suggest an interview in Picardy (3). A French envoy bringing safe-conducts for Richard and others, was captured by Appellant sympathisers (4). In January 1388, the Appellants closed the ports and sought evidence of Richard's diplomatic activity since November (5). Meanwhile, the Emperor and the king of Aragon were

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(1) Rot.Parl. iii 234.

(2) Dip.Cor. no.78 of which the original is at E.28/6 no.9.

(3) Dip.Cor. p.224 n.126. See appendix 2.

(4) Hist.Ang. ii 170.

(5) CCR 1385-1389 388.

enquiring about the negotiations (1). In May, Charles VI had promised to inform the king of Castile about the forthcoming treaty with England (2). The instructions issued to his uncles of Berry and Burgundy, apparently for this conference, suggest that there had been some contact with Richard. These envisaged the return of Brest, Cherbourg, Calais and the Picardy march to France, and also required the fortifications of Calais to be destroyed. However, the French were probably seeking a permanent settlement with an enlarged Guyenne for Richard, as the instructions specify that Charles should retain Rouergue. What homage they would have demanded for this territory is unknown, but the offer would certainly have been made under the usual protestation about liege homage (3). The projected conference never met, the French offer was never put to the English, and Richard's secret negotiations proved abortive. The Appellant faction took control of the government in England, and branded them as treasonable.

By 17 December, the duke of Burgundy was already writing to the new government suggesting a four or five year truce, during which a peace settlement could be negotiated

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(1) Dip.Cor. p.212 n.99; L.Mirot and J.Vielliard "Inventaire des lettres des rois d'Aragon à Charles VI et à la cour de France conservées aux archives de la couronne d'Aragon à Barcelone" B.E.C. ciii(1942) no.10.

(2) A.N. J.916 no.13.

(3) B.N.Francais 15490 f.26; see England..,233-234, appendix 1i.

by the mediation of the king of Armenia. It was not until the following June that pressure from his fellow councillors compelled the duke of Gloucester to reply to this letter. ,He suggested that a conference should be arranged in the Picardy march through contact with the Captain of Calais (1). In the last few years, French arms and French diplomacy had halted English attempts to gain advantages in Flanders, Castile and Brittany, but after the failure of the plan to invade England, the French capacity for offensive war was almost exhausted. The replacement of the royal uncles by the Marmosets in government in November 1388 increased the inclination to peace. The French certainly hoped to extract a final settlement from the expected truce.

At the end of November, the English envoys were issued with powers to negotiate for both peace and truce (2). These were renewed in February 1389 (3). In May, Richard took control of the Council, issued new safe-conducts for the French envoys, and new commissions, adding the earl of Salisbury to his negotiators (4). The French also received a new commission later in the month (5). Perhaps as a result of these changes, peace received little discussion,

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(1) CCR 1385-1389 502-503.

(2) West.Chron. 374; Foedera vii 610-612.

(3) C.76/73 m.9.

(4) Foedera vii 616; C.76/73 m.3.

(5) Foedera vii 623-624.

and a truce for three years was agreed on 18 June (1). However, Richard still considered the conclusion of peace a possibility on the 1 June when he provided for it in an indenture with the earl of Huntingdon about the custody of Brest (2).

In September, a large Council meeting at Clarendon postponed the consideration of articles for peace until a Parliament could meet and John of Gaunt had returned from Guyenne (3). Perhaps this related to proposals brought by the Count of Saint-Pol, who had come to England the previous month to obtain Richard's ratification of the Leulinghen truce (4). It is not known what form was taken by the suggested peace terms discussed here, at the preceding conferences at Leulinghen, or the succeeding Parliament at Westminster.

In April 1390, English ambassadors were issued with powers and instructions for the first peace conference since the signing of the truce. The set of powers they bore allowed them to negotiate peace or truce, either inclusive or exclusive of the allies of both parties (5). They were instructed to ask for the full re-establishment of the

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(1) Foedera vii 622-630.

(2) E.28/1 nos. 54a and 54b.

(3) PPC i 11-12.

(4) West.Chron. 400-402.

(5) Foedera viii 667-669.

1360 settlement, and to discuss which side was responsible for its rupture; but when this was met by the expected French refusal, they were to re-negotiate. They were to ask for the whole of Guyenne as assigned to Edward III by the treaty of Brétigny and the retention of Calais and other fortresses in the Picardy march. In auxiliary instructions, demands for Ponthieu and the remainder of King Jean's ransom were added. The Spanish and the Scots, and similarly the English allies, should be excluded from consideration until after a treaty was concluded. A willingness to renounce the title to the French throne was implied, but the emphasis of the instructions is on the nature of the tenure of English Guyenne. The precedent for liege homage was not to be admitted in any way, nor was Richard willing to do homage personally. Nor should he or his sons be obliged to attend the Parlement, Council or court of France. All these obligations could be fulfilled through a proctor. Modifications should be made to the king of France's ressort so that confiscation was impossible, except for the crime of lèse majesté. Richard's successors might do homage and services to avoid the rupture of the treaty. Meanwhile the duke of Guyenne, as Richard's assign, should do homage for the Duchy, provided no services were demanded from him. This is a reference to the life holding of the title of duke granted to John of Gaunt the previous month, though he is not mentioned by name. If the French rejected the demands for modifications to ressort and for territory in Guyenne, Picardy and Ponthieu, or insisted on the rendering of

services for Picardy and Ponthieu, the ambassadors should report back to the Council (1). The settlement of 1360 still dominated the terms the English were prepared to offer, but they accepted they would have to make considerable concessions when the question of sovereignty over Guyenne was raised.

The French memorandum of this year does not tell us the contents of an offer for settlement, but does indicate the attitudes of the French negotiators and why they were unable to agree with the English. It states that the French instructions contained the proviso that Charles VI should remain sovereign lord of all vassals of those lands that were ceded to Richard as part of a treaty (2). The Duchy of Guyenne is defined in general terms: the original Duchy, its acquisitions by peace treaties, and the present English holdings. It is stressed that the duke mostly held only the homage and first ressort of the vassals, that some ecclesiastical and other vassals ressorted directly to the king, and that most of the lands included in previous territorial offers belonged to these vassals, not to the domains of the Duke or the King (3). It is repeatedly emphasised that the king of England as duke is subject to the French king's sovereignty and ressort, and owes him liege homage, and should therefore return to his ancient inheritance and feudal position. It is admitted

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(1) PPC i 19-24.

(2) B.N.Francais 15490 ff.26v - unnumbered page.

(3) B.N.Francais 15490 ff.unnumbered page - 27, 28v-29.

that modifications should be made to the operation of the sovereignty and ressort. But this document was prepared as a basis for confrontation rather than negotiation. It rehearses all the old arguments about the succession and Salic Law, the liege homage performed by Edward III, the failure of the 1360 settlement and the re-opening of the war in 1369 (1). The French government recognised the strength of its present position:

> 'de present le roy est franc et en plaine franchise et n'est pas, Dieu mercy, si abstrainct ne en telle necessite qu'il doye faire une telle paix si dommageable que fist son ayeul l'an lx(2).'

The two delegations met at Leulinghen in June and negotiated until 4 July (3). Considering their uncompromising positions, it is not surprising that the conference was a failure, and that no peace offers were acually made. The French demanded that the English envoys should recognise the principle that any land ceded to Richard should be held in liege homage, ressort and sovereignty from the French crown; after which they would be willing to discuss the size of the territorial offer and modifications to sovereignty. The English protested vehemently that there had never been any question of liege

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(1) B.N.Francais 15490 ff.26v, 27-30

(2) B.N.Francais 15490 f.29.

(3) Payments to the French envoys:- Raoul de Raineval, B.N.Francais 20590 nos. 21,25, 27; Vicomte de Melun, B.N.Francais 28401 (Pièces Originales 1917) ff. 282, 283, 294.

homage, and that the French should offer the territory and modifications first. They were unable to get beyond this procedural point, and resorted to the possibility of a long truce. They agreed to consult their governments about this and reassemble for a conference on 1 October (1). The ambassadors then reported back to their principals in writing (2). The October conference did not meet. No progress had been made from the intractable stances of the last peace conference in 1384, and the two sides had again turned to the idea of a long truce (3).

The next peace conference did not meet until March 1392 at Amiens. By this time, John of Gaunt had undertaken the direction of English foreign policy and a new style of diplomacy had been adopted. Gaunt himself came to Amiens to negotiate (4), bringing with him a vast following estimated at a thousand men. He was met with great pomp by King Charles and his nobility (5). Richard was not expected to arrive, as Froissart thought, since Charles had already accepted that Gaunt should present the English

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(1) Conférences 367-369.

(2) West.Chron. 436.

(3) However Palmer considers that "the two sides had gone a long way towards a solution when they separated" England...144.

(4) His powers 22 Feb. 1392 to negotiate peace or truce, inclusive or exclusive of the allies of both parties, C.76/76 mm.7 and 6; his protection and attorneys, C.76/76 m.5.

(5) St.Denys i 734-736: Knighton ii 318; Hist.Ang. ii 205-206.

position instead of a meeting of the two monarchs, as planned originally (1). On the 31 March, Gaunt propounded his "peticiones excessivas." (2) Ponthieu was now to be renounced, but all of Guyenne was still claimed. This would include Poitou, the usufruct held for life by the duke of Berry from the duke of Guyenne, and then reverting to the Duchy. Calais, Marck and Guînes would be retained as defined by the peace of 1360, but the form of their tenure was to be discussed by a meeting between the two kings. The remainder of King Jean's ransom was again demanded as an unchallengeable debt (3). Homage would be given for Guyenne and for Poitou, on its reversion, "par les serments anciennement accoustumeez", but with modifications to guard against confiscation (4). No mention was made of Richard's title to the French crown or the inclusion of allies. The English government had moderated its territorial demands a little since 1390, conceding Ponthieu and the temporary possession of Poitou to the French. On the question of sovereignty over Guyenne, its position was less narrowly defined; and the sovereignty of the Calais march was also to be opened for discussion.

(1) Conférences 370-371; Froissart xv 79-80.

(2) St.Denys i 740.

(3) Conférences 371-372. The Council had agreed that the Calais march should be held from the French crown, if better terms could not be obtained, J.F.Baldwin - The King's Council in England during the Middle Ages (Oxford 1913) 496.

(4) B.N. n.a.f. 6215 f.48. This clause is missing from the later copies Dupuy 306 f.84 (from which Conférences was taken), Clairambault 487 f. 136-136v. and Francais 15490. See Palmer, "Peace Negotiations" 87 n.1.

The French envoys replied with a specific territorial offer: Bordelais, Bazadais, Dax, Bayonne, Aire and its country, Agenais, Périgord, Bigorre, Saintonge south of the Charente, Quercy (excluding Montauban and the land between the Aveyron and the Tarn), Angoulême and Rouergue. Rouergue had been re-admitted since 1387, returning the boundaries of Guyenne to those in the second offer of Charles VI's reign. The renunciation of Ponthieu, and the return of Cherbourg and all other lands held or claimed by Richard in France, were demanded. Difficulties that arose over Picardy could be settled by a meeting between the two kings. Froissart may be right in stating that the French asked for the destruction of Calais, since they did both earlier and later. The offer to Richard of 1,200,000 francs was also exactly as precedented. Charles was willing to discharge the English from any payment for damages to France, though the monk of St. Denys believed he demanded 3,000,000 francs for this. The French delegation was insistent that Charles' allies should be included in a treaty, and that Richard would hold all land in France by liege homage, with modifications to Charles' sovereignty and ressort (1). The French position had hardly changed at all. The territories they were prepared to offer still fell short of those of 1360 which the English demanded, omitting Poitou, northern Saintonge, Limousin and Quercy beyond the river Aveyron.

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(1) Conférences 372-373; St.Denys i 740; Froissart xiv 315.

The positions of the two parties were diametrically opposed, but negotiations were continued in the conscious expectation of failure. The English instructions seem to have left little flexibility for negotiation; Gaunt refused to discuss the abandonment of Picardy. His delegation returned "quasi inanes et sine spe concordiae." (1) The negotiators promised to report back to their principals, prorogued the truce for one more year, and arranged another meeting for 1 July at Leulinghen. This was to discuss modifications to sovereignty and make plans for a meeting of the two monarchs. It was also forseen that it might be necessary to make a longer truce (2). Gaunt agreed to this further meeting because the dukes of Berry and Burgundy had taken him aside and led him to believe that they would make better offers next time (3).

Palmer believes that as a result of the Amiens negotiations "The gap between the two sides was narrowed considerably." (4) But the only advance towards peace since the previous conference was the fact that offers had been exchanged at all. The English government was apparently pessimistic about the talks, despite Gaunt's expensive investment in display. In January a tax was

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(1) West.Chron. 486; also Conférences 377; St.Denys i 740; Froissart xiv 385-386.

(2) Conférences 373; Foedera vii 714-718.

(3) Conférences 377.

(4) England.., 145.

collected for this, but alternative arrangements were made for its expenditure should war break out with France (1). On 1 March and 2 April, commissions of array were issued for all counties and the ships of both admiralties to guard against invasion should hostilities recur when the current truce expired on 16 August (2). Within a week, Gaunt's renewal of the truce made these last orders obsolete.

At the end of May 1392, Gaunt presented his report on the negotiations at Stamford to a Council meeting almost the size of a Parliament. Duke William of Gelders was amongst those present and strongly urged that a war policy be adopted against France and Scotland. According to the Monk of Westminster, Gaunt explained that the French demanded the surrender of Richard's claims to the French throne, the removal of the fleur-de-lys from his arms and the renunciation of any rights he had in Normandy and Artois. In return, the present French possessions in Aquitaine would remain with the duke of Berry until his death, and then, reunited with English Gascony, would revert to Gaunt and his heirs in perpetuity. They would render customary homage to the king of France for the whole duchy.These terms, reminiscent of those offered by the French at Bruges seventeen years before, may be no more than the chronicler's confused account of the negotiations that had just taken place. They may however

(1) CFR 1391-1399 24.

(2) CPR 1391-1396 88-95; C.76/76 m.6.

represent a verbal offer made by the French royal uncles to Gaunt at their unofficial meeting, since he had told the French that their written offer was insufficient to communicate to Richard. If so, it suggests a remarkable collusion between these three princes against some of the basic principles of their countries' foreign policies. Gaunt's advocacy of this settlement can be explained by self-interest, since he and his family would be its main beneficiaries. The body of the Council made rigorous objections to the permanent alienation from the crown of these extensive and long-held provinces, for the benefit of one person. Under the control of his uncle of Lancaster, Richard was favourable to the idea, but wished to extract better terms from the French in order to achieve a comprehensive settlement. By the duke of Gloucester's advice, it was decided to refer the matter to a full Parliament, and finally all that was achieved was the formal ratification of the truce prorogation (1).

The July 1392 meeting took place at Leulinghen as arranged (2). The French delegation was instructed to ask for

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(1) Conférances 377; West.Chron. 488-490; Knighton ii 318; Hist.Ang. ii 206-207; Froissart xiv 389; Foedera vii 719-720; c.f. Bruges xvi-xvii 11.

(2) Dip.Cor. no.147; Foedera vii 721-722. The meeting was not delayed until 24 July as Dip.Cor. p.232 n.147. The schedule at Bod.Lib Bodl.MS.885 ff.53-58 may have been issued to the English negotiators for this conference. There are translations at Bodl.MS.710 ff.50v-59 and B.L. Landsdowne 223 ff. 45v-60.

Richard's response to their offer at Amiens and again insist, as in their instructions of 1390, that all vassals and officers of the ceded territories should except the king of France as their sovereign lord when performing homage to the king of England. It was to discuss modifications to sovereignty by reference to a written schedule which was first to be reviewed by Charles and his Council. Indeed no conclusion was to be reached without first consulting the Council. If a truce was discussed, the French envoys were to press for the longest possible, and most of their instructions were concerned with measures for keeping the truce (1). When they confronted the English embassy, they were told that Gaunt was now expecting them to produce better terms than at Amiens. Although the English were empowered to reduce their demands from Gaunt's position in March, they were instructed to hear the improved French offer first. The French delegates, having no orders to make any such offer, maintained the English should first reply to the written offer that they had handed over at Amiens. Fruitless debate ended in deadlock on this procedural point. The French instructions imply a readiness to abandon peace-making in favour of a long truce, and there is evidence that this was discussed. The proposed meeting between Charles and Richard was approved in principle, but the English deputies wanted it excluded from the protocol

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(1) Conférences 373-375; c.f. B.N.Francais 15490 f.26v - unnumbered page.

drawn up at the close of the meeting on 22 July, for fear of displeasing Richard or some of his Council (1). Without the presence of the royal uncles, progress towards peace had almost ground to a halt.

Before they could meet again in the spring, Parliament again assembled at Winchester and rejected the French offer of the previous year, displaying a preference for war. Money was voted for the forthcoming peace conference, but twice as much was to be collected should hostilities recommence and Richard lead an expedition abroad. The duke of Gloucester was now added to Gaunt's team of diplomats (2). His strong views on the conflict with France were well known and intended to counterbalance the ambitions of his elder brother.

The two dukes and their colleagues arrived at Leulinghen in March 1393 with a range of powers similar to those of the previous spring, for peace and truce, but without the option of excluding the allies of both sides(3). Also the government had now agreed to return Cherbourg to Charles of Navarre, in return for the requisite sum (4). This surrendered two points to the French before the negotiations had begun.

(1) Conférances 377-378, 380.

(2) Rot.Parl. iii 300-302; St.Denys ii 74; Ann.Ric.Sec. 155; Knighton ii 321; Hist.Ang. ii 212; Froissart xv 110. Charles VI had asked Richard to appoint a second uncle 7 Sept. 1392, A.N. J.644 no.35.

(3) Foedera vii 738-739; C.76/77 m.8.

(4) E.30/316.

The dukes of Berry and Burgundy carried flexible instructions. They were to pressurise Lancaster and Gloucester to produce a reduced English demand, which they envisaged as including territorial terms conforming to the French offer at Amiens. The French dukes realised that they would now have to improve on this, as they had revealed to Gaunt the previous spring. Depending on how conciliatory the English were, they could increase their monetary offer by 100,000 or 200,000 francs. They were to urge the English to accept the destruction of Calais, as it was an expensive drain of Richard's resources and should be returned to the count of Artois in any final settlement. If the English were unimpressed with these terms, Berry and Burgundy should withdraw the offer of extra money and instead, gradually increase their territorial concessions, but always reserving some important portion of this for a personal meeting of the two monarchs. If this also failed, they were again to resort to discussing a long truce (1). The French government had now abandoned the confrontation of irreconcilable claims in favour of a serious attempt to reach the point of settlement.

Though arranged to start on 8 February, the conference did not assemble until early in March. Charles stayed nearby at Abbeville conveniently placed for consultation or ratification of any agreement. Discussions continued until after Easter. According to Froissart, the English

(1) Conférences 378-380; c.f. England... 145.

vehemently rejected the razing of Calais and the French abandoned the point; and then Richard's uncles demanded a return to the treaty of Brétigny and the arrears of King Jean's ransom. Probably the English position was not so extreme. Berry and Burgundy seem to have made territorial offers concerning the fringes of Aquitaine. Written offers were exchanged and it was decided that each side should consult its sovereign. The truce was renewed for another year on 28 April and the conference adjourned for three weeks (1).

When the delegates reassembled, they made rapid progress. Richard's ambassadors wrote to him on 4 June that the two sides had exchanged written drafts of the points agreed so far and a "certein conclusion" was expected within a few days (2). Twelve days later the four dukes sealed a draft peace which settled most of the outstanding problems. A definitive compromise was reached about the extent of Valois territorial concessions. Limousin, the towns of Montauban and Rodez, the little comté of Gaure and the lands between the Aveyron and the Tarn were added to their offer at Amiens, and Richard was to retain the Calais march as defined by the treaty of Brétigny. The English were finally to renounce their claims to Normandy, Ponthieu, Montreuil, St.Sauveur-le-Vicomte, Poitou and northern Saintonge, (except for La Rochelle), and other

(1) Froissart xv 108-110; St.Denys ii 74-78; Knighton ii 321; West.Chron. 514; Foedera vii 748; Dip.Cor.p.243 n.196.

(2) Anglo-Norman no.133.

lordships mentioned in the treaty of Brétigny or to which the Plantagenets had acquired titles. Other lords of the south-west would do homage to the king of England or his assign for their lands within the boundaries of Aquitaine thus defined. The English possession of Jersey, Guernsey, Oléron and other islands off the French coast was confirmed. Richard was to renounce his claim to the French throne as soon as the outstanding questions had been settled. It was agreed that he or his assign should hold Aquitaine by liege homage from the king of France as one of the twelve peers of France, with modifications to sovereignty and ressort to prevent confiscation. However, the English would not agree to the double homage of Richard for the proprietary right, and of Gaunt for the usufruct during his life-tenure of the duchy. This dispute was left to be decided at a meeting of the two kings, as was the nature of the tenure of Calais and La Rochelle. Entitlement to war damages was renounced on both sides, but the standard French offer for payment of King Jean's ransom still fell short of the standard English demand for a million and a half francs, by 300,000. This too was to be settled by Richard and Charles (1). Cherbourg and Brest are not mentioned, but it seems that the English had agreed to return Cherbourg if Charles VI paid back the mortgage, and a similar arrangement may have been accepted for Brest (2). Each side made protestations

(1) Palmer - "Articles 1393" 182-185; c.f. Cosneau - Grands Traités 40-43.

(2) Froissart xv 126-127; A.N. J.643 no.3.

that its allies should be included, but the text does not deal with the question. According to Froissart, the English embassy jeopardised the treaty by asking for a clause which recognised Boniface IX as Pope, until the French persuaded them the Schism should be treated separately (1). However, Berry and Burgundy conceded that there should be separate Anglo-Scottish peace negotiations and also separate settlements between Gelders and Brabant, and Portugal and Castile (2). The French had proved to be most unwilling that English territory should extend north of the Charente and the English won a notable victory in gaining La Rochelle from them. This, the cession of Calais and a free hand to reach a settlement with Scotland, were the major improvements to the French offers which helped to buy Gaunt's and Gloucester's acceptance of liege homage, and therefore, of the French interpretation of the conflict and the way it should be settled. But Gaunt's major consideration was to establish himself as a semi-independent prince of an enlarged Aquitaine.

Palmer considers that this draft was:

> 'the most promising solution to the long-drawn-out Anglo-French conflict which had so far been devised (3),'

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(1) Froissart xv 124-125.

(2) E.28/6 no.31 (see p.47 n.1 above); E.36/188 f.42v.

(3) Palmer - "War Aims" 65.

and that 'at no point can it be said that English interests were disregarded, let alone sacrificed(1).'

Contemporary English opinion probably agreed with the Monk of Westminster's less enthusiastic assessment:

'Verumtamen modicum profuit Anglicis (2),'

and this draft represents an attempt by Charles' uncles to grasp a settlement from a malleable and not over-scrupulous English delegation. The terms of the agreement were kept secret within the circle of the principal negotiators (3). The English envoys felt obliged to protest that Richard should not be bound by the agreement until he had set his Great Seal to its final form (4).

It was now expected that Richard would cross the Channel from Canterbury, meet with Charles, who was at Abbeville, and quickly proceed to the settlement of the remaining points and the ratification of the completed treaty. Certain French chroniclers believed that it was only the renewal of Charles' illness which prevented this sequence

(1) Palmer - "English Foreign Policy 1388-1399" in F.R.H du Boulay and C.M.Barron (eds.)- The Reign of Richard II: Essays in Honour of M.McKisack (London 1971) 79. See also his analyses in "Foreign Policy" 77; England...146-148; "Peace Negotiations" 82-83, 92; "Articles 1393" 181.

(2) West.Chron. 514.

(3) Froissart xv 122-125; St.Denys ii 82.

(4) Palmer - "Articles 1393" 182.

of events, and therefore the conclusion of peace (1). Certainly Richard moved to Canterbury for the last ten days of May and was preparing to cross to Calais. He was ordering preparations as late as 26 June (2). But a French chronicler stated that the English did not want Richard to go and ratify the treaty (3), and according to Walsingham:

> 'nec etiam Rex Angliae ad quasdam conditiones quas Franci imposuerant, licet Rex Franciae sanus affuisset et incolumis voluit consensisse (4).'

Richard later wrote to João of Portugal that the agreed articles were subject to the approval of both kings (5), and in January pointed out to the Commons:

> 'que rien n'est fait unquore touchant mesme la treitee, que le Roy ne poet eslire de prendre ou lesser auxi franchement come il poast a comencement (6).'

The negotiators at Leulinghen realised there was much to

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(1) England.., 148-149; Palmer - "Peace Negotiations" 84; St.Denys ii 82; Froissart xv 112.

(2) C.76/77 m.2; C.76/78 m.18; B.L.Add.MS. 35115 ff. 22v-23v., the original of Joseph Hunters' notes at B.L.Add.MS. 24512 f.89.

(3) Chronique des Quatre Premiers Valois 331.

(4) Ann.Ric.Sec. 157.

(5) Dip.Cor. no.196.

(6) Rot.Parl.iii 314.

be done before the two kings could meet, so on the same day as the draft treaty, they drew up a timetable for further progress. In August the legal experts of both sides would meet to formulate the modifications of French sovereignty over Aquitaine; and about Michelmas, the same four royal uncles would confer again at Leulinghen to prepare for a meeting between Charles and Richard, which was planned for February 1394 (1). In July, the Vicomte de Melun was sent to ask for a postponement because of Charles' continued sickness (2). In August, a bishop and half a dozen doctors of law from each side were appointed to discuss modifications according to the terms of the indenture made between the dukes, and met in Picardy (3). The English negotiators presented a series of proposals based on the schedule of 1383 with twenty-three additional articles. Similar limitations on the French king's ressort were demanded, and grievances resulting from its misuse recited. The recognition of French sovereignty in Aquitaine and its tenure under homage were made conditional on an absolute guarantee against confiscation, even for the crime of lèse-majesté. Gaunt was to perform homage and appear at the French court by proxy, and would not repeat the homage to Charles or his successors during his lifetime. Those who succeeded Gaunt in the Duchy would not be required to perform more extensive homage.

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(1) England..., 149; "Peace Negotiations" 84; Dip.Cor. no.196; E.36/188 f.42-42v.

(2) St.Denys ii 92; B.N.Francais 28401 (Pièces Originales 1917) f.299.

(3) Dip.Cor. p.243 n.196-197; Ambassades nos.DXIV, DXV, DXVI; C.76/78 m.15.

The king of France's sovereignty was to be further limited so that he could not collect subsidies for war or feudal dues, issue safe-conducts or exemptions from debt, acquire possessions or interfere in ecclesiastical vacancies in the duchy, or himself enter it. The liberties and customs of the Duchy were to be observed, and the judges of the court of France would hear appeals according to these and the definitions of ressort included in the treaty. The duke would be able to make and reform statutes and customs, pass judgement on duels, collect his own subsidies, and mint his own money, French royal coins not being current in the Duchy. The French commission made generally unfavourable replies to the new articles (1). The meeting was unsuccessful, for the Commons commented in January "que nulle moderation d'icelles (liege homage, sovereignty and ressort) est unqore faite,ne les Seigneurs ount null conissance quelle moderation y ferra." (2) Commissions and safe-conducts were issued for the meeting of the royal uncles but Charles' health necessitated a deferment until first February, and then March 1394 (3).

This delay allowed the proposed settlement to come under the critical scrutiny of the Westminster Parliament. Gaunt advocated its terms, trying to persuade the members

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(1) B.N.Francais 15968 ff.758-768v. (similar to Bod.Lib. Bodl.MS. 885 ff. 53-58 but with more extreme conditions added).

(2) Rot.Parl. iii 315.

(3) Foedera vii 752-753; Dip.Cor. no.197, pp.243-244 n.196-197.

that Richard's title to the French throne brought no advantage and Calais was more expensive to maintain than it was worth. The earl of Arundel launched an attack on Gaunt for his cordial relations with Richard and his conduct of the negotiations; he implied that Gaunt had exceeded his mandate and behaved treacherously. He also objected to Richard's grant to his uncle of what was now to be, by manipulation, an enlarged Aquitaine (1). The Commons agreed that peace should be made, and apparently made no objection to the amount of territory the French were prepared to cede, but they vehemently rejected the fundamental principle on which the draft treaty was based, that of liege homage. They considered it absurd that the king and kingdom of England should be placed in a dependent feudal relationship to the kingdom of France, thus jeopardising their liberty. They presented their own terms for a peace: Richard should render simple homage for Aquitaine, with French sovereignty modified to prevent confiscation; the liberty of the English crown and its subjects should be guaranteed; and the Plantagenets should be able to resume their title to the French throne if the treaty was broken by the Valois. About the unsettled questions of the tenure of Calais, King Jean's ransom and

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(1) Eulogium iii 369; West.Chron. 516-518; Rot.Parl. iii 313-314. The Monk of Westminster believed, as in 1392 (West.Chron.490), that the parts of Aquitaine in French possession would be held by the dukes of Berry and Burgundy and revert on their deaths to Gaunt or his heirs to the perpetual disinheritance of the English crown. However these terms do not accord with the text of the draft of June 1393.

the position of allies, they made no comment (1). Parliament's uncertainty about the negotiations is shown by its arrangements for customs duty: less was to be collected if peace or truce was made with France (2). The English govenment now took advantage of the French uncles' concession by attempting to make a separate settlement with Scotland and drive a hard bargain there (3). But the indenture between the dukes of Berry, Burgundy, Lancaster and Gloucester remained a dead letter.

Gaunt returned to Leulinghen late in March with the duke of York, to meet again with Berry and Burgundy (4). He was instructed to treat of "certen things being in variaunce." (5). He reported Parliament's reaction to the draft of the previous June:

> 'significans Francigenis Anglorum ultimam voluntatem (6).'

He was therefore in the difficult position of being

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(1) West.Chron. 518; Rot.Parl. iii 315.

(2) CFR 1391-1399 94.

(3) J.A.Tuck - "Richard II and the Border Magnates" Northern History iii (1968) 46-47; Foedera vii 754; E.28/6 no.31.

(4) Foedera vii 766-767, 769-770; Dip.Cor. p.244 n.196-197.

(5) These instructions were kept in the Treasury in Henry VIII's reign in a box marked B, according to an inventory, but have since disappeared, E.36/186 f.50v.

(6) West.Chron. 518.

obliged to retract his position of the previous year. The French delegation must have rejected Parliament's terms, since any settlement without the essential element of liege homage was unacceptable to them. Instead, the two sides shelved the problem and concentrated on formulating a revised truce to regulate the frontier in Guyenne for the next four years, signed on 27 May (1). No arrangements for further meetings were made and the principal figures of this series of negotiations scattered across Western Europe in pursuit of their own projects: Richard and Gloucester to Ireland, Gaunt to Gascony, Berry and Burgundy to Avignon. Gaunt, Burgundy and Louis of Orléans contemplated embarking on a crusade (2).

Palmer believes that the conference of 1394 resulted in a secret agreement, based on the separation of Aquitaine from the English crown under Gaunt's lordship and French sovereignty. This was never published or implemented because of Gaunt's failure to establish himself in the Duchy (3). The evidence for this hypothetical treaty is derived from Froissart's chronicle and Charles VI's letter to Richard of 1395. Froissart's confused account seems to describe the negotiations of the previous year, despite his reference to a four-year truce, and his mention of an

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(1) Foedera vii 769-776.

(2) England..,149.

(3) England..,31, 150, 160; Palmer - "Peace Negotiations" 84-85; Palmer - "The Background to Richard II's Marriage to Isabel of France, 1396" BIHR xliv (1971) 10-12, 16.

unpublished agreement refers to the draft of June 1393 (1). Later he has Renaud de Corbie say that the negotiations at Amiens and Leulinghen had produced no agreement, and only a temporary truce was in force (2). Charles' letter of May 1395 exhorts Richard:

> 'nous devons diligentment garder que la douce paix...par l'un de nous ne soit brisee ne violee(3),'

but Mézières' longer Épistre à Richard II, which accompanied it, discusses the desirability of making peace, and refers to the current truce (4). The process of peace-making had been suspended and Gaunt's project for a separated Aquitaine was abandoned.

Some contact was maintained between the English and French in the following ten months (5). Then in March 1395, an embassy of Richard's, travelling through Paris to Barcelona to negotiate a marriage between himself and Yolande of Aragon, provoked a quickening in the pace of Anglo-French relations. Charles reacted hurriedly by

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(1) Froissart xv 122-125; c.f. St.Denys ii 82. Froissart also believed the negotiations of 1377 produced a secret treaty, Froissart viii 383.

(2) Froissart xv 182.

(3) Anglo-Norman no.172.

(4) Mézières - Letter to Richard II 3, 4, 8, 9, 24 and passim.

(5) Foedera vii 779; Ambassades no.DXIX; C.76/79 m.2; B.L.Add.Ch. 2937, 2938.

halting the main English ambassador, and sending envoys to London and Ireland to offer Richard the choice of three French brides instead (1). It was perhaps Richard's original intention to generate such a response. Charles also put pressure on the Aragonese court to break off negotiations for the English match (2). In the middle of May, before Richard had had time to send an embassy in reply to Charles' offer, Robert the Hermit was sent to England to propose a more prestigious marriage between Richard and Charles' eldest daughter, Isabelle. He also carried the letter from Charles and the Épistre à Richard II, written by Mézières at Charles' command. The programme contained in these represents a desperate attempt to outbid the attractiveness of Richard's Aragonese project (3). Behind Mézières' rhetoric and complex symbolism can be discerned the French eagerness to achieve a permanent settlement and the apprehension with which they viewed the possible re-opening of hostilities. They advocated a personal meeting between the two monarchs, since they believed that Richard was more amenable to the idea of peace than his uncles or councillors (4). Richard was

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(1) Palmer - "Background to Marriage" 2-5; Usk 9; Foedera vii 794-795; Anglo-Norman no.109.

(2) Palmer - "Background to Marriage" 6-8; Mirot and Vielliard - "Inventaire des lettres d'Aragon" no.105 and p.127 n.8.

(3) Palmer - "Background to Marriage" 8-13; Angleterre et Schisme 363-365 and 365 n.1; Dip.Cor. no.219 and n.219; Anglo-Norman no.172; Mézières - Letter to Richard II xxiv, xxv, xxxii 71.

(4) Anglo-Norman no.172; Mézières - Letter to Richard II 14, 32, 64.

urged to abandon his plans to marry the Aragonese heiress and instead to marry Isabelle, and thereby bring their two families and countries into alliance. This would involve his recognition of the Salic Law of succession to the French throne. The French could afford to expect this, since Gaunt had set the precedent at Leulinghen (1). Compensation for damages would be paid on both sides. If peace could not be settled, a long truce should be made for a hundred years (2).

The French proposal of a marriage alliance changed the pattern of peace-making and Richard's reply to Charles' démarche broke with the policy hitherto followed by his uncle of Lancaster. Gaunt, now in Guyenne, was still expecting a settlement based on the division of the Duchy (3). Having induced the French to make the first move, Richard now had a position of strength from which to make extensive claims and demolish the precedents of June 1393. On 8 July 1395, he instructed his embassy to France to demand, after making the usual protestations, all of Guyenne, Ponthieu and the Calais march as defined at the treaty of Brétigny with no homage to be performed by himself or his heirs. He also revived English claims to Normandy, Maine and Anjou, for the benefit of the future

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(1) Mézières - Letter to Richard II 39-40, 43, 66, 69.

(2) Mézières - Letter to Richard II 24, 49.

(3) Bouillons 265.

offspring of his marriage to Isabelle. Richard and his heirs should retain the quartering of the fleurs-de-lys on their arms, as he bore at present. Charles' younger daughter should be given in marriage to the Earl of Rutland, one of the negotiators. The embassy was to ask for vast sums of money: all the arrears of King Jean's ransom, compensation for war damages to England inflicted since 1337, a dowry of two million francs for Richard's marriage and another of 220,000 francs for Rutland's marriage (which could be reduced to one million and 160,000 respectively during bargaining), and the pledge of three million france as security for Isabelle's agreement to the marriage. Pope Boniface was to be included in the proposed peace, and Charles would be bound to provide military aid to Richard to conquer Scotland, should he decide to confiscate it for the benefit of one of his future sons (1). A comparison with the terms of the 1393 draft makes it clear that such terms, involving the future dismemberment of the Kingdom of France, could never be acceptable to the French in their most conciliatory mood. It was too extreme a position to be meant to serve as a basis for realistic discussion. It was Richard's device to ensure the French would reject his terms outright and counter-offer a long truce based on his marriage to

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(1) England...256-257 from B.L.Cotton MS. Vitellius Cxi nos.2-3; Feodera vii 804-805; the embassy's power to negotiate peace is at E.30/320 and C.76/80 m.18.

Isabelle. This succeeded and Richard had again forced the French to make the first move (1).

The negotiations in Paris resulted on 9 March 1396 in the signing of a marriage contract for Richard and Isabelle and an extension of the truce until 1426 (2). While this twenty-eight year truce continued theoretically in force, and was discussed, reformed, supplemented and quarrelled over, proposals for a permanent peace were put in cold storage. No terms for a settlement are known to have been offered until late in the reign of Richard's successor. However, some of the themes of the discussions of the 1390s continued to recur in Anglo-French relations, compounded with the difficulties resulting from the marriage treaty.

By this treaty, Charles agreed to pay 800,000 francs as dowry with his daughter; 300,000 to be paid at the solemnisation of the marriage, and the rest in yearly instalments of 100,000. The English negotiators agreed that if Richard died before the couple had children, whatever amount of money had been paid beyond the initial sum of 300,000 would be returned to Isabelle. If she was

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(1) c.f. Palmer's opinion at England...170-171: "The very extravagance of the territorial claims shows they were made to force up the price of a cash settlement...If these instructions do not seriously envisage the resurrection of the Angevin Empire, neither is there any reason to believe that they represent a departure from the policy of separating England and Aquitaine."

(2) Foedera vii 813-830; Cosneau - Grands Traités 71-99.

aged twelve or more, she should continue to enjoy her dower until her remarriage. If Richard died before the consummation of the marriage, she should be returned to her father free of all obligations with all her jewels and goods (1). On the 1 May the eight leading English lords, the dukes of Lancaster, York and Gloucester, the earls of Derby, Rutland, Kent and Huntingdon, and the Earl Marshal, swore a solemn obligation to carry out this last clause (2). Although the French court had difficulties in raising all of the required sums and meeting expenses, Richard was paid the 300,000 francs at the wedding in November 1396, together with Isabelle's jewels, goods, horses and carriages (3). He also received the first payment of 100,000 francs the following year (4), and the second a little tardily in March 1399 (5). Therefore, on Richard's death in January or February 1400, his successor became liable to return Isabelle and her property to France, together with 200,000 francs.

Charles's envoys were instructed on 29 January 1400 to ask their English counterparts at Calais that these obligations should be fulfilled, since he had heard that

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(1) Foedera vii 817, 818, 819. See page 198 below.

(2) A.N. J.643 no.11, printed by P.Chaplais in "English diplomatic documents 1377-1399" in du Boulay and Barron - Reign of Richard II 39-40.

(3) A.N. J.643 nos.12 and 13; J.644 no.36; J.655 no.17; Foedera vii 846-847.

(4) C.76/82 m.7 printed Foedera viii 25.

(5) A.N. J.644 no.22 c.f. C.76/83 m.9 dated 19 Oct. 1398, the draft quittance.

Richard was dead, citing the original marriage treaty and the undertaking of the eight English lords (1). Transcripts of this undertaking and Richard's quittance for Isabelle's jewels and goods were made at Paris in July, and copies given to the English envoys at the end of the month (2). An arrangement was also made to allow them to see the original of the English lords' letter (3). Once the French had established the principle, their demands for the return of Isabelle, her goods and dowry became a continuing theme at their meetings with English embassies.

For the next three years French envoys were repeatedly empowered and instructed to demand the return of the 200,000 francs, and raised it in discussion with their English opposites. After they had succeeded in obtaining Isabelle's release at Leulinghen in July 1401, they added the return of her jewels and goods to the money claim (4).

The question of the annuity granted to her by Richard was also raised at first, but soon seems to have been dropped (5). The restitution of the dowry payments was still an outstanding issue in September 1404 (6).

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(1) A.N. J.644 nos. 26 and 31 (a copy of the former at B.N. n.a.f. 7007 f.67.)

(2) Choix i 183; A.N. J.643 nos.11(2) and 13(2); J.645 no.10; B.N.Francais 15968 ff.49-56.

(3) A.N. J.645 no.8

(4) Choix i 183, 219; ii 273-279; Foedera viii 315; A.N. J.645 nos.16, 20, 42, 51.

(5) Choix i 219; ii 278-279; A.N. J.644 nos.26 and 31.

(6) Wylie - Henry IV i 467; A.N. J.645 no.53.

As early as May 1400, the Council advised Henry IV that he was bound by the terms of the obligation he had made as earl of Derby, to return Isabelle to France with her jewels and goods. However they considered she was not entitled to her annuity, as she was under twelve years old. The question of the dowry payments was discussed, but no decision recorded. The Councillors hoped that the whole matter could be avoided by a new diplomatic marriage, presumably between Isabelle and Henry, Prince of Wales (1). Accordingly, the ambassadors to be sent to France were provided with three procurations. The first briefly empowered them to discuss the return of Isabelle, her jewels and goods (2). Both the other two gave them authority to revive the demand for the arrears of King Jean's ransom, a consistent feature of the peace conferences of the last three decades. By one version, they were able to offset Henry's clear debts to France, the dowry payments, against the ransom; by the other, they were to negotiate for new marriage alliances between the houses of Lancaster and Valois (3). It was the latter procuration that was presented to the French, so the English did not offer the 200,000 francs (4). Henry was

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(1) PPC i 118 c.f. Wylie - Henry IV i 130.

(2) Foedera viii 142-143.

(3) C.76/84 m.4.

(4) Copies of this in French and Latin are at A.N. J.645 nos.4 and 4(2). Douet-d'Arcq printed the latin copy in Choix i 167-171. Henry had previously issued powers to negotiate for such marriages in Nov. 1399 and Feb. 1400, Foedera viii 108, 128-129.

attempting to avoid doing so by echoing the 1396 settlement of a long truce based on a marriage, for which he probably would have required exactly the same dowry as had been agreed with Richard.

Henry found it difficult to make the restitutions promised by the 1396 treaty. He had used the dowry payments made to Richard, to prevent the Exchequer from going bankrupt (1). The jewels that Isabelle had brought from France had been distributed amongst his children (2). Returning the queen herself to France, in the necessary degree of state, would be an expensive business which Henry could ill afford, but which would eventually cost him more than 8,000 pounds (3). Since the French refused his marriage scheme, he sought other methods of circumventing his debts. In September, he submitted a list of questions to several lawyers for legal advice. The validity of the 1396 settlement was questioned, because it had not had parliamentary ratification. By its terms, did Isabelle's jewels and goods include what she had been given in England, in addition to what she had brought from France; and did they include the 200,000 francs ? If this had to be repaid, were all eight guarantors of the treaty liable

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(1) J.L.Kirby - Henry IV of England (1970), 91, 105.

(2) PPC i 134.

(3) PPC i 130-133, 136-142, 154. In July 1396 the French royal council estimated it would cost 100,000 francs to escort Isabelle from Paris to Calais (Choix i 134) though further sums were also paid to the dukes of Orléans and Brittany, Jones - Ducal Brittany 141 n.1; B.L.Add.Ch. nos. 3389, 3390, 3392.

for the debt, or could it be drawn from Richard's estate; most importantly, could it be offset against the ransom still due for King Jean ? If Henry did not have to repay the dowry, could he retain Isabelle until her father gave him a quittance for the sum? (1) In November, these questions were sent to the University of Oxford for further legal comment (2).

It was decided to continue to rely on the claim for the 1,500,000 francs arrears of King Jean's ransom. This claim depended on the treaty of Brétigny and Jean's ratification of it, the day after his release. The English maintained that this ratification refuted the charge that Jean was forced to agree to the terms as a prisoner, and they regarded the treaty as still valid. Therefore Charles VI as universal successor to Jean still owed the ransom money to Henry IV as universal successor of Edward III. The debt for the dowry repayments could be offset against this, even though they legally belonged to Isabelle, since because she was retained in her father's power and her marriage had not been consummated, her property was Charles' property (3). On this basis, from July 1400 to November 1404, English embassies followed

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(1) Usk 48-54.

(2) Foedera viii 164 from E.28/8 no.15.

(3) Cosneau - Grands Traités 47; Foedera viii 315-316; A.N. J.645 no.53.

their powers and instructions and countered French claims for the dowry repayments with claims for the ransom (1).

The French response to this was that Charles was not obliged to pay his grandfather's ransom, since Edward III had failed to evacuate his supporters from fortresses in France as he had agreed at Brétigny. As a result, damages were inflicted on the kingdom which amounted to four million florins, which sum had now accrued interest (2). Charles also claimed that Henry had caused losses worth a further million florins (3). In September 1404, Nicholas de Ryssheton wrote an exasperated and repetitive harangue to the French council, setting out at length the English legal arguments about the dowry, the ransom and Edward's agreement to clear the fortresses, amongst other matters. He dismissed the French claim for damages as never having been properly assessed, and certainly not cancelling out the 1,500,000 francs of the ransom arrears. He estimated that discussion of this point could be protracted for a further sixty years, or even perpetually (4). Negotiation about the conflicting money claims seems to have halted with this statement of stalemate.

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(1) Wylie - Henry IV iv 264; Choix i 184; Foedera viii 187, 204, 230, 269, 302, 315-316; PPC i 241-242; A.N. J.645 nos. 9, 13, 53; E.36/188 ff. 34v and 53v.

(2) Choix i 220; A.N. J.645 nos.20. 51, 53. See p.70 above.

(3) P.R.O. 31/8/135 Section 4 from a document in the Archives Nationales, Paris, described as Section Domaniale - Mémoires de la Chambre des Comptes 14925 f.172.

(4) A.N. J.645 no.53.

The threatening stance of the French government had forced Henry to abandon his marriage plans and return Isabelle. In return, he wanted a quittance in terms which relinquished the Valois claims to the dowry and to compensation for damages against France. Draft quittances were drawn up, exchanged and amended by the ambassadors, but the French were adamant in reserving their right to the 200,000 francs (1). Henry's envoys agreed to this form in May 1401 and duly received quittances from Charles and Isabelle at the end of July, which excepted this sum (2). In June 1404, Isabelle was contracted to marry Charles, son of Louis, duke of Orléans. As a dowry her father gave her the remaining 300,000 francs that he had never paid to Richard and all the jewels and goods she had brought back from England. He transferred his claim against Henry and the other English lords for the dowry repayments to Louis of Orléans, to recover for the benefit of this marriage (3). Since Orléans was now in full control of the French government, and he preferred the method of military action to that of negotiation, the claim became absorbed in his personal quarrel with Henry. However, the Plantagenet claim to the arrears of King Jean's ransom remained and was to reappear in later peace proposals.

(1) A.N. J.645 nos. 1 and 13 (copy of former at B.N. n.a.f. 7007 ff. 81-87v; E.28/9 unnumbered.

(2) Foedera viii 194-195, 196-200, 217-219; E.36/188 f.106.

(3) A.N. K.55 no.29.

The idea of returning to a settlement of the 1396 type, based on a marriage alliance between the houses of Valois and Lancaster, had not been abandoned. In March 1405, Richard Young, one of the English negotiators, was issued with some documents from the Treasury, including a proposal for marriage formerly made by Charles VI (1). After Henry of Monmouth became influential in the central government of England in 1406, discussion of his marriage plans became a regular feature of Anglo-French diplomacy. In March of that year, Henry Beaufort, the prince's uncle and leader of the English embassy, was empowered to discuss his marriage to one of Charles' daughters, apparently Marie; and also to treat for peace between the two kingdoms (2). English negotiators continued to be equipped with similar powers up to the conference of December 1407 at Gloucester, one mentioning Marie by name (3). In Autumn 1408 and Spring 1409, peace and marriage were again under discussion, the princess in question being Charles' daughter Catherine (4). For the next few conferences, English envoys were still empowered to negotiate peace, but the commission for marriage was abandoned (5). In this phase, English diplomacy had a more conciliatory tone than the period of confrontation

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(1) Wylie - Henry IV ii 87.

(2) Foedera viii 434-435; Wylie - Henry IV iii 44-45.

(3) Foedera viii 452-453, 504-507; C.76/90 m.6; A.N. J646 no.1; instructions at PPC i 302-303.

(4) Foedera viii 571; Bod.Lib. Ashmole 789 ff.132-133.

(5) Foedera viii 586-587, 601, 637-638.

over the money claims. In December 1406 a parliamentary pronouncement annulled an earlier enactment, so that both the male and female children of Prince Henry's marriage would have rights of succession to the throne, perhaps designed as a concession to Charles (1). In the latter half of 1407, negotiations moved to Paris for the first time in Henry IV's reign (2), and there was a tendency in English diplomatic documents to refer to the "Cousin of France" or the "French party", deliberately avoiding the usual "Adversary of France." (3) Prince Henry's commission of July 1407 even mentions Charles as king of France (4).

This intermittent negotiation for a marriage alliance was initiated by the English. The French considered Beaufort's proposal for Marie in 1406, and, though they did not accept, gave hope that peace would be made (5). In September of the following year, the duke of Berry received the English ambassadors with unprecedented warmth and they were given gifts of gold and silver vessels.

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(1) Wylie - Henry IV ii 463; c.f. the allegation that the English lured the French by suggesting Henry IV was about to abdicate in the Prince's favour, Monstrelet i 126.

(2) see page 223 below.

(3) Foedera viii 499, 504-509; Cal.Signet no.704.

(4) A.N. J.646 no.1.

(5) Wylie - Henry IV iii 45; Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 327.

They therefore expected to reach a satisfactory conclusion on the proposals they had brought to Paris (1). Berry was commissioned to treat for peace with them on the basis of marriage alliances or long truces (2). The French government had accepted the principles on which the English wished to discuss a settlement, but no agreement was reached either in Paris, or when the French envoys travelled to Gloucester in December. Marie was unwilling to forsake her vocation as a nun at Poissy and so she was replaced as a diplomatic pawn by her younger sister, Catherine (3). In September 1408, when English ambassadors again came to Paris to seek a matrimonial alliance, an agreement was drawn up that solemn embassies from each side should meet to discuss the match in Picardy the following February. Later the venue was changed to Paris at the request of the French; but they seem to have quickly lost interest, since they sent the requisite safe-conduct too late for the meeting to take place (4). Discussion of a French marriage for Henry of Monmouth seems to have ended when John the Fearless seized control of the French government in March 1409. In September in

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(1) Cal.Signet no.704; B.N. n.a.f. 7623 ff.205-208.

(2) Foedera viii 522-523. The English copied this to draw up parallel powers for Thomas of Lancaster and their other negotiators at Gloucester, 1 and 2 Dec. 1407, Foedera viii 504-507.

(3) Wylie - Henry IV iii 50; Monstrelet i 152.

(4) Foedera viii 571; Bod.Lib. Ashmole 789 ff.132-133v; c.f. Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 358, citing a letter written in Paris 22 Feb. 1409 saying that it was expected that a marriage and an alliance would be concluded.

Paris it was still expected that peace would be made (1). However a meeting arranged for the sixteenth of this month in Picardy failed to materialise. The French accused the English of not arriving as agreed, while the English claimed the French had sent a herald to cancel the meeting. Accordingly the French Council decided on the last day of 1409 to adopt a policy of war towards England (2). The terms of the 1396 settlement were not to be revived.

There followed a period of hostile attitudes on both sides of the Channel and internal disputes in the governments of both kingdoms. In France the quarrel between the Burgundians and Orléanists developed into civil war, and both sides sought to outflank their opponents by the introduction of English military aid. Accordingly, late in January 1412, the dukes of Berrry, Orléans and Bourbon, and the counts of Alençon and Armagnac sent ambassadors to England to make alliances with Henry IV and his sons. They were empowered to negotiate for the restitution to Henry of the whole duchy of Aquitaine as claimed by him by hereditary right (3). By this action, the Orléanist dukes began a second series of offers for a final settlement that was to last until the end of the truce, and continue beyond , until it culminated in the Treaty of Troyes.

(1) Wylie - Henry IV iii 101.

(2) Foedera viii 621; Choix i 322.

(3) Foedera viii 715-716. In Henry VIII's reign these powers were kept in the Treasury in a box marked C, E.36/186 f.38-38v.

As the envoys crossed Maine en route for Brittany and England, they were pursued by the Bailli of Caen, who captured some of them along with their documents. He forwarded these papers to the Burgundians at Paris, where they were displayed before the king and his Council at the beginning of April. There were several letters to the king, queen and princes of England and the duke of Brittany and his brother; and also blank sheets of parchment with seals of the three dukes and the count of Alençon appended, on which the anticipated agreement was to be written. The instructions for negotiating this were publicly read (1). The Orléanist envoys were instructed to recite the grievances of their lords against the duke of Burgundy, how his machinations had excluded them from the government of France, caused them to be excommunicated and prevented them from obtainig justice from King Charles for the assassination of Louis of Orléans. Therefore, they came to King Henry to seek justice. If they found English opinion to be favourable to their case, the envoys were to speak personally to Henry, offering him the alliance and service of their lords against Burgundy and all his party, and also against the Welsh and Irish. To aid their struggle against Burgundy, Henry should send 300 lances and 3000 archers, for whom the Orléanists would provide four months pay. They would then engineer a peace between England and France, which would exclude the Scots if they refused to agree to an adequate settlement. The Orléanists would also guarantee satisfaction of Henry's

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(1) Monstrelet ii 236-238; Waurin ii 140.

claims for "lands by the sea", and other demands he might make (1). An incomplete English document, apparently drawn up during the negotiations in England, lists the offers and requests of the Orléanists, in similar terms to those to be used in the treaty concluded. They offered their sons, daughters, nephews, nieces and other relatives in marriage to cement the English alliance. They would use their money and property and the strength of their allies to aid Henry in his quarrel. They would give him the entire duchy of Guyenne with no exceptions and aid him to conquer what he did not yet possess. In return he was to assist their quarrel against Burgundy and help them to recover all the damages he had inflicted on them. They ended by appealing to his christian faith to support their just cause (2).

The treaty that was concluded on 18 May incorporated all the points in this document. It was not a peace but an alliance, but by its terms, Henry committed himself to making a settlement:

> 'Intendit etiam dictus Rex et Dux ambobus regnis concordiam ponere, secundum meliorem modum quem ei Deus ministrabit (3).'

He obliged himself to send a thousand men-at-arms and

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(1) Monstrelet ii 238-241; Waurin ii 141-143.

(2) B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Div f.113-113v. This faded and fire-damaged fragment seems to have escaped attention so far.

(3) Foedera viii 741.

three thousand archers to Blois, where they would be paid three months wages by the French dukes, at fixed rates, in advance. Henry obtained considerable concessions from the Orléanists. The marriages were to be arranged at his discretion. Neither party was to come to a settlement with the Burgundians without the consent of the other. In the recovery of damages against Burgundy and his adherents, the losses inflicted by his force of English soldiers in 1411 was to be specifically excepted. In the treaty, Henry used the titles king of England, king of France and duke of Aquitaine. The Orléanists referred to him only as king of England and duke, reserving their fealty to Charles VI; but they admitted Henry's hereditary right to the Duchy, declaring that they would not be breaking this fealty by delivering it to him. They promised to hold all their possessions in the Duchy, estimated at 1,500 fortresses, by homage from him and his heirs as Dukes. So they rejected the Plantagenets' claim to the French throne, but admitted their right to full sovereignty in Aquitaine.

The Orléanists were to deliver immediately to the English, twenty specified fortresses in the central and eastern parts of Aquitaine, of which three belonged to the Sire d'Albret. Other fortresses in the Duchy not in their power, they would conquer at their own expense. The duke of Berry was to hold Poitou, and the duke of Orléans

Angoulême and Périgord, as fiefs of the Duchy. The count of Armagnac was to retain four castellanies he had occupied in Rouergue, paying homage to Henry and his heirs. Poitou and Angoulême were to revert to the king-duke after the deaths of their holders. Henry would meanwhile take possession of the fortresses of Poitiers, Lusignan, Niort and Châteauneuf-sur-Charente as security for the reversions (1). When the reversions took place, English Aquitaine would have the same frontiers as in the treaty of Brétigny with the probable exceptions of Limousin and Quercy south of the Aveyron. The 1412 treaty is comparable to the territorial offers of the French in 1392 and 1393. The arrangement for Poitou is reminiscent of the terms Gaunt had proposed at Amiens, and at the Council of Stamford. Its reversion on Berry's shortly -expected death would place the English in a more advantageous position than they would have gained by the 1393 treaty. As in that treaty, injudicious concessions provided dangerous precedents for future negotiations. On this occasion the effect was the reverse, since the Orléanist lords abandoned the essential French demand for homage and conceded sovereignty in Aquitaine. The clauses about reversions and marriages would bind the fortunes of the house of Lancaster tightly to those of a section of the French nobility, and the dynastic links would reinforce the family's pretensions to both the English and

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(1) Foedera viii 738-742 and CCR 1409-1413 350-352. Two copies of the treaty were in the Treasury in Henry VIII's reign in the box marked C, E.36/186 ff.38,39; see also Vale- English Gascony 59-61.

French thrones. This was perhaps inspired by Richard's schemes of 1395 to 1397, when he sought French marriages for himself, the earl of Rutland, the earl of Derby, Henry of Monmouth and Constance Holland.

Thomas, duke of Clarence, commanded the promised men-at-arms and archers, landing with them in August at St.-Vaast-la-Hougue. But the Orléanist and Burgundian factions had already agreed to cease hostilities and were negotiating a settlement. Before Clarence could reach the rendezvous at Blois, the treaty signed in May was a dead letter. By virtue of a written royal command, the four signatory French lords renounced the alliance on 22 July (1); a month later, at Auxerre, the duke of Orléans repeated the renunciation along with Philip, count of Vértus, his brother (2).

Having been bought off by the Orléanists at Busançais, Clarence plundered his way to Bordeaux and took up his command as his father's lieutenant there. Besides meddling in the complicated politics of the Aragonese succession, Clarence continued to take a hostile stance against the French. Accordingly in February 1413, he tried to rescue something from the wreck of the previous May's treaty, by making an alliance with the two lords who had refused to accept the peace of Auxerre: Bernard VII

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(1) Letters of Henry IV ii 322-325 and Lettres des Rois ii 328-330.

(2) Choix i 352-353; Wylie - Henry IV iv 79; A.N. K.57 nos. 21 and 22.

of Armagnac and Charles d'Albret. This seems to have been principally directed against count Jean of Foix, the chief representative and Captain-General of Charles VI in Guyenne and Languedoc, and ally of the duke of Burgundy. Clarence committed his father to send the same force of a thousand men-at-arms and three thousand archers to the aid of the two lords in Guyenne, if they were attacked by the Burgundians. There was no mention of their wages. Henry was to pay for the garrisons of Armagnac's and Albret's principle fortresses if necessary and promise not to aid the Burgundians against the dukes of Berry and Orléans and their allies. Armagnac and Albret were to receive compensation for damages inflicted on them by the English, and confirmation of their franchises and liberties. The four castellanies in Rouergue mentioned in the May agreement, with the addition of Tournon and Gourdon, were confirmed in Bernard VII's possession. Henry was also to restore certain lands to the two lords, when they had performed their homage. Armagnac and Albret were obliged to do homage to Henry only as duke of Guyenne, rejecting his claim to the French throne. They were to perform simple homage only, before Michelmas 1413, promising liege homage only if three-quarters of their lands were seized by the French. They reserved the sovereignty and ressort of the Duchy to Charles VI as king of France (1). This was a treaty of considerably less advantage to Henry IV than the alliance of the previous year. Much was promised to Armagnac and Albret in return for very little. Above

(1) Vale - English Gascony 63-67 analysing Archives Départementales des Basses-Pyrenées E.59 no.14.

all, Clarence had accepted Charles VI's sovereignty over Guyenne. This is comparable to Gaunt's betrayal of the principle at Leulinghen in 1393, from a weaker English position, and could have provided a dangerous precedent. However, Henry died the following month, so it is highly unlikely that he ever confirmed the treaty, rendering its provisions and concessions null.

His successor, Henry V, pursued the rights he claimed in France with determination through a series of peace negotiations which continued until he elected to support those claims with a re-opening of hostilities. He extended the exploitation of France's internal divisions that had begun in his father's reign, favouring an arrangement with the Burgundians. During 1414, he was negotiating with the Burgundians for an alliance, and simultaneously with Charles VI's Orléanist government for a final settlement. English and Burgundian ambassadors met in conferences at Leicester in May, Ypres in August and at the end of September in St. Omer. From the protocols of these meetings and the English instructions of June and August, can be deduced the ways in which the two prospective allies envisaged a settlement of the war after the defeat of the Orléanists. It was agreed that each party should be able to call on military aid from the other for a period of three months, at the expense of the party that was so summoned. Details of numbers of troops, their wages, transportation and conditions were worked out. Henry, or one of his brothers, or some other notable

captain was to lead the English forces, while Duke John himself was to lead those of Burgundy. Henry was offered the choice of two of the duke's daughters in marriage and chose Catherine, the elder. Neither party was to come to terms with the Orléanist faction without the other's consent, and the alliance would be perpetual. Henry was prepared to meet John personally to conclude the alliance. He instructed his envoys to ask for the active alliance of Burgundy against all the Orléanist lords, including the duke of Berry. He wanted Burgundian military assistance to conquer Aquitaine as far north as the River Loire; Normandy, Maine, Anjou and Ponthieu; and the lordships of Beaufort and Nogent; or at least to recover all territories ceded to the English by the treaty of Brétigny. In these lands Henry entirely reserved his sovereign rights. He also insisted on his right to the French throne and asked for Burgundian assistance to obtain it; or at least Burgundian neutrality in not impeding his efforts to acquire it. If John would recognise Henry as his liege lord and do homage, he would be given an immediate subsidy and rewards in land. Henry wanted the recognition confirmed by John's subjects, especially the Vier Leden of Flanders. As security for the alliance, Henry's ambassadors were told to demand the towns and fortresses of Sluys, Gravelines, St. Omer, Montreuil, Hesdin and Le Crotoy, or others at their discretion. At the St. Omer conference, they decreased this demand to Hesdin, Boulogne and two fortresses,to be

returned when John did homage, or they conquered the Armagnacs' lands (1). Henry V was clearly expecting to improve on the Orléanist alliance made by his father in 1412. His extensive, if flexible, territorial demands recall Richard II's instructions of July 1395, but are still more extreme. Henry's insistance on his French royal title and rigidity about his absolute sovereignty in Guyenne were new trends in English proposals for peace. They were argued from a conscious position of strength and reached their logical culmination in the treaty of Troyes.

John of Burgundy offered the alliance to conquer the possessions of the dukes of Orléans, Anjou and Bourbon, the counts of Armagnac, Angoulême, Alençon, Vértus and Eu, and the Sire d'Albret, the spoils to be divided between himself and Henry, according to the number of troops each employed. After some reluctance, his envoys included the lands of the duke of Berry in the list, excluding the fiefs of Boulogne, Gien, Étampes and Dordan in which he

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(1) Leicester protocol - O.Cartellieri "Beiträge zur Geschichte der Herzöge von Burgund " Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften-Philosophisch-Historische Klasse iv(1913) no.9 pp. 12-20, from Archives Départementales de la Côte d'Or, Dijon, B.296. There are copies of this in the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, at Moreau 802 f.29ff; Cinq Cents de Colbert 64 f.529; Bourgogne 95 f.353. A draft version, coupled with the English instructions of 24 June 1414, is at E.30/1531. The damaged instructions of 31 Aug.1414 are at B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Dv ff.11-12 (14-15). Neither of these instructions seem to have been properly noted before. Wylie mistakenly assigned the latter document to Caligula Dvii and Aug.1416, Wylie and Waugh - Henry V iii 26.n.5 Catherine was the rejected wife of Louis III of Anjou, count of Guise. The English seem to have believed she was a widow, B.L.Cotton MS.Caligula Dv f.17(20). See R.Vaughan - John the Fearless (London 1966), 247-248.

held the usufruct from Duke John. It was agreed that if the combined force proceeded beyond Orléans to conquer Aquitaine, Henry should provide John with another 1500 men-at-arms, beyond the troops already sent, and further securities for his person. After some difficulties, the Burgundians agreed to the English interpretation of Aquitaine as all Edward III or the Black Prince had possessed there at its fullest extent, expressly including Poitou; or as defined at Brétigny, the choice of definition being left to Henry. Throughout the talks, Duke John claimed Charles VI as his superior lord . He wished to be excepted from the enmity of the alliance, not only his brothers of Brabant and Nevers and his brothers-in-law of Savoy and Hainault, with Henry's relatives the king of Castile and the duke of Brittany if he so wished, but also Charles, Dauphin Louis and their successors. When pressed, he conceded that these exceptions should not prejudice Henry's claims to the French throne in any way, nor would he impede his efforts to obtain it. John was reluctant to surrender towns as securities, rejecting the English argument that since he claimed Charles as superior lord, he ought to give more concrete security than the oaths offered by Henry. However, he agreed to continue discussions on the subject of these surrenders (1). A full agreement seemed close, but the duke of Burgundy had been evasive and dilatory

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(1) As previous note and Ypres and St.Omer protocols in Cartellieri "Beiträge" pp.20-30, from Archives Départementales de la Côte d'Or, Dijon, B11926. The attempt to establish an Anglo-Burgundian alliance by Henry V will be discussed in chapter V.

from the start. Before the St. Omer meeting, he had already made the Peace of Arras with his Orléanist opponents, rendering the alliance redundant. The terms of 1414 were another abortive project.

Henry V had also begun to discuss terms with the government in Paris. These negotiations were based on a revival of the scheme to marry him to Catherine of France, last discussed in Spring 1409. On Henry's accession, the duke of York was in Bordeaux and in August 1413 he went to Paris. Here he recommended this marriage, which paralleled that between Richard II and Catherine's sister Isabelle, which he had negotiated in 1396 (1). Accordingly, French envoys coming to England in December 1413 introduced the marriage scheme as the basis for a peace settlement. Henry's deputies accepted the principle, but maintained that no settlement could be made without the "way of justice", the return to Henry of the rights and inheritances he claimed in France which were occupied by the Valois. Since the French were not empowered to make any territorial offers, negotiations were temporarily suspended (2). At the end of January, Henry commissioned ambassadors to go to Paris to ratify the truce that had recently been agreed. They were also empowered to continue the discussion about peace that had been begun. Henry also committed himself not to contract

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(1) Wylie - Henry V i 158-159; B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Dv f.1*(3). In Sept. he stayed in Orléans at the expense of the duke of Orléans B.L.Add.Ch.4311.

(2) Foedera ix 102, 103-104; A.N. J.646 no.14.

marriage with any other woman before 1 May, a date that could be extended at the discretion of his ambassadors (1). They obtained a corresponding promise and extension from Charles VI (2). In June and July, a larger and more solemn embassy was commissioned to go to Paris to continue negotiations about both "the way of marriage" and "the way of justice". They were empowered to extend Henry's commitment to 6 August or later, as they saw fit (3). A notarial copy of Duke Charles of Normandy's promise to pay the ransom of his father King Jean, was drawn up at Westminster for the ambassadors to take with them (4). Probably they also carried copies of the treaty of Brétigny and the instructions of July 1395 (5). The embassy was received by the duke of Berry in Paris in August 1414 (6).

The duke and his fellow delegates were anxious to discuss the proposed marriage, whereas the English refused to make any agreement about this which was separate from the settlement of Henry's claims (7). The French viewed their

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(1) Foedera ix 103-104.

(2) Lettres des Rois ii 346-347.

(3) Foedera ix 131-132, 140-141, 150.

(4) Foedera ix 149-150.

(5) Treaties with France and other countries were copied out by Privy Seal clerks in July, A.L.Brown - The Privy Seal in the early fifteenth century (Oxford D.Phil.thesis 1955), 283.

(6) A.N. J.646.no.14.

(7) Foedera ix 210.

offer of the marriage as a means of escape from making large concessions of territory and sovereignty. Hence the limited powers of their embassy of the previous November. They were seeking a settlement like that of the 1396 truce. The English ambassadors opened by requesting that the crown and kingdom of France should be surrendered to King Henry. After this formal overture, they turned to more serious themes, making an elaborate protestation that discussion of lesser rights would in no way prejudice this claim. They asked for the duchy of Normandy, the comtés of Anjou, Maine and Touraine, all of Aquitaine and the other lands ceded by the treaty of Brétigny, the whole coastline with its towns and fortresses from the river Somme to Gravelines, and superior lordship over Brittany and Flanders. Henry and his heirs would hold these as neighbours to the Valois, who would be able to exercise no sovereignty or ressort nor claim any homage. After several days of discussion and counter-offers from the French, the English reduced their demands to the delivery of all lands ceded at Brétigny, under the same terms of tenure as in that treaty, to Henry and his heirs perpetually, and the lordships of Beaufort and Nogent (1). For the first time they claimed half the comté of Provence, by a right

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(1) Beaufort in Champagne (now called Montmorency) and Nogent-l'Artaud on the river Marne. The claim to these lordships descended to Henry through the house of Lancaster from Blanche d'Artois, second wife of Edmund Crouchback, who purchased them in 1270, Wylie - Henry V i 420 n. 2; Armitage-Smith - John of Gaunt 196-198. In 1404 Charles VI had ceded them to Charles III of Navarre as part of the duchy of Nemours, B.N.Dupuy 223 ff.200-201v, 208-210.

descending from Henry III's queen. And they revived the claim for the remaining 1,600,000 crowns of King Jean's ransom, dormant since November 1404. They insisted that Henry had no intention of marrying Catherine of France without a final peace, as Richard had married Isabelle in 1396. Therefore they discussed the marriage separately, with a show of reluctance, asking for a dowry of 2,000,000 crowns (1). The English demands in Paris followed a similar pattern to the instructions of their envoys simultaneously negotiating with duke John of Burgundy, but encompassed even greater demands to rights and territories. Together they marked a decisive break with Henry IV's policy of recovering an extended Guyenne in full sovereignty in exchange for abandoning the Plantagenet claim to the French throne. Henry V's envoys were instructed not to conclude any agreement in Paris (2). His belligerent stance echoed Richard II's instructions of 1395. But the demands were even more extreme, reviving old claims to Provence, Beaufort and Nogent, and the sovereignty of Brittany and Flanders, as the 1395 instructions had first revived claims to the old Angevin territories of Normandy, Anjou and Maine.

The duke of Berry replied to the second set of English terms, under the normal French protestations. He made a territorial offer of Agenais, Bazadais, Bigorre, part of

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(1) Foedera ix 209-211; E.H.D. iv no.102; A.N. J.646 no.14.

(2) B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Dv f.12 (15).

Auch, the towns of Lescar and Oloron, Saintonge south of the Charente, Périgord, Angoulême, Rouergue, and Quercy, excluding Montauban and the lands between the Aveyron and the Tarn. These borders of Aquitaine were probably the same as Berry and his fellow Orléanists had offered to Henry IV in 1412. Now Angoulême and Périgord were disencumbered from their tenure by Charles of Orléans, but northern Saintonge and the reversion of Poitou on Berry's death had been removed from the terms. The territory was therefore less than in the 1393 draft agreement by La Rochelle, the comtÉ of Limousin and Quercy south of the Aveyron. Berry refused to discuss the claim to Provence, as its lordship belonged to the duke of Anjou not King Charles, and completely rejected the request for the arrears of King Jean's ransom. After much discussion, he offered a dowry of 600,000 crowns to go with Catherine. This was about three-quarters of the dowry that Richard had been promised with Isabelle in 1396. However, Berry closed by saying that King Charles would be generous in augmenting these terms for the sake of peace, and he would himself pursue this as much as was reasonable (1). He had made no mention of Henry's emphatic claim to the French throne, or of the English tenure of Calais and its March. Charles' rights were reserved over the territories ceded, though not stated to be liege homage. The tenure of Aquitaine was not specified in Berry's offer, and the French insistence on liege homage now disappears from the peace negotiations. On all points the French government

(1) Foedera ix 211-212; A.N. J.646 no.14.

was now offering less than in the 1390s, though leaving itself room for manoeuvre in future talks. Its terms did not yet correspond to the weakening of the French position in the last twenty years, or to the problems presented by Henry V's determination to obtain his rights in the "way of justice."

During the ensuing winter, messengers from both sides kept open negotiations for the "way of marriage."(1) In December 1414, Henry commissioned an embassy, which reached Paris in February. Discussions continued until mid-March 1415 (2). A Great Council had advised Henry to seek a compromise with France by negotiation, by which he would surrender some of his claims. Meanwhile he should make preparations for military intervention if the French refused to make a reasonable settlement (3). The English delegation repeated their demands of the previous August for all the Brétigny lands, Beaufort and Nogent, half of Provence and the arrears of King Jean's ransom. The French refused even to make an offer in the way of justice, until the way of marriage was discussed; the English eventually acquiesced, repeating the protestation that no marriage could be contracted before an agreement had been reached about Henry's claims in France. They then repeated the demand for a two million crown dowry.

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(1) Foedera ix 166, 182; Wylie - Henry V i 431.

(2) Foedera ix 183-188; Wylie - Henry V i 435-440; A.N. J.646 no.14.

(3) PPC ii 141.

However, they soon reduced this to one and a half million, and after much bargaining, by successive stages to one million crowns. Catherine was to be provided with clothes and jewels by her father, and conducted to Henry with due pomp at French expense. At this point, the English ambassadors modified their territorial demands to the extent that Ponthieu and Montreuil-sur-Mer would pass to a cadet branch founded by the second son of Henry and Catherine, if they had one, to be held free of homage to the Valois, as in the treaty of Brétigny. They asserted that their instructions from Henry did not allow them to go further than this (1). The French had never again offered Ponthieu and Montreuil since Brétigny, and sometimes requested specific renunciations of rights to these lands. It seems that they were a particularly troublesome issue.

A protocol drawn up on 14 March relates that in the way of justice, the French reiterated their offer of August exactly. In the way of marriage, they accepted responsibility for Catherine's clothes, jewels and conduct to her future husband, and increased the proposed dowry to 800,000 crowns. Queen Isabelle's dowry had been the same number of francs. As the English commented, these terms did not contain the improvements the duke of Berry had led them to expect, and so they felt unable to conclude on either question (2). However, Charles promised to send a

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(1) Foedera ix 212-213, 214.

(2) Foedera ix 213-214.

solemn embassy to England to continue discussions in both matters, and to communicate another offer (1). His representatives had neglected to comment at all on the suggestion of a cadet branch of the Plantagenets holding Montreuil and Ponthieu. Neither side had made any significant alteration to its position since the last conference six months before. Stubbornness on both sides made the desired compromise impossible to achieve.

The pace of Anglo-French diplomacy now quickened, In June 1415, a French embassy crossed the Channel and found Henry at Winchester on the last day of the month. The military preparations, which must have been obvious in England that summer, imparted a greater urgency to their efforts to find an acceptable peace settlement. Henry too was in a hurry, anxious not to lose time for his expedition, which was almost prepared. He therefore declared that the matter should be concluded by the following Saturday, 6 July. During the following week, the French envoys had meetings with various members of the Council and the King himself. As before, the English wished to open talks with discussion of the way of the justice. By referring to a protocol of the conferences of August 1414 and March 1415, they tried to demonstrate that Charles had committed himself to send these ambassadors to make a greater offer than before. The French denied that the text bore this implication at all. They again laid more stress on the

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(1) Foedera ix 214; A.N. J.646 no.14.

proposed marriage and wished to discuss this question first; as in March, the English allowed this. They asked for an increased sum to be offered as Catherine's dowry. The French at first offered 50,000 francs more, then changed this to crowns, to bring the figure up to 850,000 crowns. In return, the English first dropped their demands to 950,000 crowns, and then on 3 July accepted the final French figure. But the French envoys now tried to delay further discussion of the way of justice by entering an argument over what dower Catherine should receive as Queen. They maintained that the customary English figure of 10,000 marks annually should be augmented, since Catherine was from a powerful family and would bring a large dowry besides the peace of the two kingdoms, and hence of Christendom. Moreover, she was a virgin and near child-bearing age. However, beyond a vague statement that Henry was free to increase the pension in the future, the English refused to be drawn into this diversion and the matter was left unsettled (1).

Only the three principal French ambassadors were entrusted to make an offer in the way of justice. The following day, these presented their terms to Henry personally: besides the parts of Aquitaine they had offered at the previous two conferences, they would now concede Limousin with the cities of Limoges and Tulle. This was almost as

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(1) G.Besse - Recueil de diverses pieces servant à l'histoire du Roy Charles VI (Paris 1660) 94-99; A.N. J.646 no.14.

much as in the draft peace of 1393, lacking only southern Quercy. It still fell short of the current territorial aspirations of the Plantagenets, which also included Poitou and Saintonge north of the Charente and the north-eastern areas of Calais, Boulogne, Montreuil and Ponthieu. After Henry had consulted with his coucillors, the French were asked to specify whether he would hold these lands in absolute sovereignty as in the Treaty of Brétigny, or owing some sort of feudal obligation to Charles VI. The ambassadors refused to make any declaration on this question (1). They had not mentioned King Jean's ransom and again avoided the question of the tenure of Calais, but it was the sovereignty of Aquitaine which presented the real problem.

The French were attempting to get Henry to agree to territorial terms before their tenure had been settled. This was the reverse of their position in 1390, when they had insisted on the acceptance of liege homage to Charles, before they would offer lands, and is a measure of the decline of French fortunes since. Now they would not risk mentioning homage at all (2).

Since the English deputies had opened the talks by declaring that Henry would not reduce at all the demands he had made previously, the French terms could not be acceptable to them. To find a way out of the impasse,

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(1) Besse - Recueil 99-105; A.N. J.646 no.14.

(2) See pages 79-80 above.

Henry reversed his prior rejection of a settlement on the 1396 model, and made an audacious offer of a half-peace. On 6 July he offered a general truce for fifty years, which would not prejudice his rights to the crown of France, or to the sovereignty of his lands in France. In return, Charles would surrender to him the lands specified in his latest offer, and give his daughter in marriage with the agreed dowry, jewels and clothes. During this truce, a peace would be negotiated; the lands were otherwise to be returned after the fifty years. Such was Henry's haste, that he demanded the French envoys should conclude the betrothal between himself and Catherine; that they should remain in England while one of their number went to Charles to obtain his consent within one month; and that the surrender of the lands in Aquitaine, and the delivery of Catherine, her clothes and jewels and 600,000 francs or 550,000 crowns of her dowry at Calais, should all be completed by 29 September (1). This arrangement would combine the advantages of the settlements of Brétigny in 1360 and Paris in 1396. Henry would acquire an enlarged Aquitaine under his own de facto sovereignty for the forseeable future. The issue of this sovereignty would be suspended, and he would continue to make use of his claim and title to the French throne. Should the truce break down, he would have the option of further intervention in France. In addition, he would gain a matrimonial alliance with his powerful enemy and neighbour, and a massive dowry, the bulk of it within a

(1) Besse - Recueil 105-107; A.N. J.646 no.14.

few months, in ready cash. Henry was employing diplomatic tactics similar to those of Richard in 1395. Like Richard, he was improving his bargaining position by simultaneously negotiating for a marriage to the king of Aragon's daughter. Like Richard, he tried to turn the great distance between English demands and French offers to his advantage in the conclusion of a long truce with added concessions. Unlike Richard, he had an army ready to exert further pressure, and therefore required correspondingly larger advantages.

The French ambassadors admitted that they had no powers to conclude such a half-peace. However, the ambassadors continued to negotiate about the amount of the initial payment of the dowry and the date of its delivery. During the course of the afternoon, Henry agreed to their figure of 400,000 crowns for the amount, but disagreement about the date persisted (1). The chief aim of the French was probably to spin out the discussions and arrange a date for another conference a few months hence. Meanwhile, the expedition would have to be cancelled. But Henry's unilateral deadline had already been reached and he cut short the negotiations. The French embassy was summoned before him and in the presence of a large assembly of people, including ambassadors from the Empire, Burgundy and Aragon, the archbishop of Canterbury read them a long latin address, which was also delivered to them in writing. This recited the efforts of both sides to come

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(1) Besse - Recueil 107-109; A.N. J.646 no.14.

to a final peace, since the accession of Henry V. It concluded that Charles was not inclined to make a reasonable agreement and had denied justice to Henry's claims in France. Therefore he had no alternative but to resort to a remedy other than diplomacy (1). The French ambassadors were sent home, and the following month Henry landed with his army in Normandy.

By the time the diplomats of the Plantagenets and Valois met again, Henry had taken possession of Harfleur and won the victory of Agincourt. Not only did this expedition increase the value of his military prestige, but it added another point of contention to the quarrel between the two dynasties. Harfleur, like Brest and Cherbourg before it, became another Calais that was too valuable to the English to surrender, and too dangerous to the French to ignore. In the parley between the two armies at Agincourt, Henry is alleged to have offered to return the town, and free all his prisoners without ransom if he were allowed free passage to Calais (2). It is difficult to know exactly what was dicussed, as within a few hours, all the

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(1) Besse - Recueil 109-110; A.N. J.646 no.14. The French were evidently shocked, since they had earlier been assured by the bishops of Durham and Norwich, and the duke of York that all was going well.

(2) St.Denys v554; Jean Juvenal des Ursins - Histoire de Charles VI Roy de France (ed. J.F.Michaud and J.J.F.Poujoulat - Nouvelle Collection des Mémoires pour servir a l'histoire de France Serie I ii Paris 1836), 518; Edmond de Dynter: Chronique des Ducs de Brabant (ed.P.F.X.de Ram, Commission Royale d'Histoire,Brussels 1854-1857) iii 750.

negotiators on the French side were dead or captured (1). However the French, confident in their superior numbers, demanded that Henry should renounce his claims to the French throne and return Harfleur, keeping only his present possessions in Guyenne and the Calais march. Despite his predicament, Henry still required the Duchy as defined at Brétigny, including five specified cities, and also the comté of Ponthieu. He also insisted on his marriage to Catherine, accepting the former French offer of a dowry of 800,000 crowns (2). The terms were mutually unacceptable and the two armies joined battle. Before Henry returned to England, the dukes of Orléans and Bourbon and other prisoners he had taken at Agincourt attempted to initiate a further round of discussions, but the French government was apparently not interested (3).

The next peace negotiations took place on the initiative of an independent third party, the first major mediator since the Bruges conference of the 1370s. The Emperor Sigismund had volunteered to arrange a truce after the fall of Harfleur, but the French were too confident to

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(1) H.Courteault and E.Celier (eds.) Les Chroniques du roi Charles VII par Gilles le Bouvier dit le Héraut Berry (Société de l'histoire de France, Paris 1979) 68.

(2) F.Morand (ed.) Chronique de Jean le Fèvre Seigneur de Saint Rémy (Société de l'histoire de France, Paris 1876-1881) i 251-252; c.f. Waurin ii 209-210.

(3) Lettres des Rois ii 362; Bod.Lib.Bodl.MS.885 f.65-65v (and translations at Bodl.MS.710 f.68v. and B.L.Landsdowne 223 f.62).

accept the suggestion. But in January 1416, the Paris government offered him the inducement of a large salary to mediate a peace agreement (1). In March, Henry was aware that Sigismund was in Paris for this purpose, but still prepared to launch another expedition against France, should it be necessary (2). Both the Emperor and count William of Holland arrived in England in May and presided over a peace conference at Westminster in June, attended by French ambassadors and the prisoners taken at Agincourt. Sigismund favoured a settlement in which Henry returned his recent gains of Harfleur and the prisoners, and the English and French joined him for a crusade against the Turks. It was agreed by Henry that Sigismund and William should take custody of Harfleur until negotiations were complete, but the French would not concur (3). Despite the victory of Agincourt, the balance of military forces had changed little; if open hostilities continued, the cost of Harfleur's defence could turn it into a handicap. Henry's terms for peace were now the full implementation of the treaty of Brétigny, and the perpetual possession of Harfleur and its district, with the pâtis necessary for its support. His military success had extended his demands only by the one town he had captured. By 13 June discussions about Harfleur had

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(1) Wylie and Waugh - Henry V iii 2-3.

(2) B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Dv f.13(10).

(3) Disputed towns had been put into the hands of mediators during truces in 1343, 1350 and 1375, K.Fowler - "Truces" in Fowler - Hundred Years War 189 n.28.

broken down and Henry ordered preparations to be resumed for his expedition to go to its aid. However it was agreed that there should be a further conference, with both Henry and King Charles present, in the Picardy marches. Both sides were to send envoys to Beauvais to make arrangements for this (1).

The July meeting at Beauvais was a disaster. It soon became clear to the English that the French were insincere in the negotiations. They reneged on agreements they had previously made and deliberately delayed proceedings. They made difficulties about entering a three-year truce without the prior consent of their ally of Castile. Henry had already decided not to go to the relief of Harfleur personally whilst talks continued, and the French now hoped to prolong discussions until the town surrendered. The English embassy finally withdrew in disgust, having agreed to another meeting based on Calais. Later, the English were to complain bitterly about French behaviour at Beauvais while the French blamed the failure on Sigismund (2).

When English and French envoys met again at Calais in September, circumstances had altered considerably.

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(1) Wylie - Henry V ii 355; Wylie and Waugh - Henry V iii 5, 14-16; Lettres des Rois ii 362-363; Foedera ix 362; Bod.Lib. Bodl.MS.885 f.65v(translations at Bodl.MS.710 f.68v and B.L.Landsdowne 223 f.62).

(2) Wylie and Waugh - Henry V iii 16-18; Lettres des Rois ii 363; Foedera ix 519; Bod.Lib. Bodl.MS.885 f.66 (translations at Bodl.MS. 710 f.69 and B.L.Landsdowne 223 f.62v).

Henry's double triumph on Assumption day, when he sealed an alliance with Sigismund at Canterbury and his brother Bedford defeated the French fleet at the mouth of the Seine, made the fall of Harfleur unlikely and made the mediator one of his own party. Burgundian troops were threatening Paris and it was known that John the Fearless had agreed to meet Henry and Sigismund at Calais. The French were therefore much more anxious to negotiate a peace, or at least a settlement based on a long truce and the restitution of Harfleur. Our knowledge of what they proposed to Sigismund is fragmentary, but the emphasis was on the marriage to be contracted and a large indemnity to be paid to Henry. They accepted the Emperor's idea of an alliance between England and France, with the aim of fighting a crusade, and wished the allies of both parties to be included in the settlement. Specific territorial offers are not known to have been made, but the French revived the idea of compensating the Plantagenents for the loss of their French title with lands in the Empire (1). Faced with these unrealistic proposals, the English delegation resorted to negotiating a short truce in the first few days of October (2).

During the course of the winter, Henry exerted pressure on the French lords he had captured at Agincourt to recognise his claim to the French throne and accept him as their

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(1) Wylie and Waugh - Henry V iii 24-25; Foedera ix 387-388.

(2) Foedera ix 388-389, 397-401.

sovereign lord. They were anxious for their release and by January, the duke of Bourbon had been induced to accept Henry's terms of the previous June as a valid settlement. The Sire de Gaucourt was to make preliminary arrangements, then Bourbon would cross to France to promote a peace treaty in this form. He promised that if he failed, he would accede to Henry's demands for homage and recognise him as true king of France. However, Bourbon did not go to France, perhaps because of the heavy securities demanded for his return. Hopes of peace in no way deterred Henry from planning another expedition (1). English and French ambassadors met again at Calais in March 1417, at the instigation of count William of Holland, who wrote to Henry in January (2). There seems to have been no progress made towards peace.

At the end of July 1417, Henry launched his second expedition against France. From its landing at Touques, the character of the conflict changed; for Henry had not come to repeat the barbican policy of the Caroline war, but to conquer Normandy. Henceforth, diplomacy was obliged to take account of the English occupation of part of northern France. After Henry's initial successes, the French government requested peace negotiations. The delegations from each side eventually met at the end of November at Bonneville between Touques and Honfleur. They

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(1) Wylie and Waugh - Henry V iii 39-41; Foedera ix 425-430; S.C.1. lvii no.79.

(2) Foedera ix 438, 445. Henry forwarded count William's letter to Thomas Langley at Pontefract, S.C.1. lvii no.79.

first engaged in recriminations about the delays experienced in preparing this conference and previous negotiations of the last two years, the recent arrest of some French heralds and the insufficiency of the safe-conducts provided by the French (1). When the French enyoys finally consented to discuss peace terms, they demanded the return of all recent English conquests in Normandy and offered only part of Aquitaine, probably identical to their final territorial offer of 1415. For this, they returned to the demand for its tenure from Charles VI by liege homage. Henry was not prepared to relinquish any part of Normandy that he had managed to acquire (2). With this addition, his representatives must have continued to require a return to the Brétigny settlement, if they replied with a formal offer at all. His stubborn aspirations contrasted strongly with the unrealistic French attempt to revive discussion of liege homage.

Almost a year elapsed before the two sides next exchanged their terms for a peace settlement. During this time, Henry had completed his conquest of Lower Normandy and begun the siege of Rouen. The French government and king in Paris had passed back to the control of the duke of Burgundy, and the Dauphin's party had established a rival government at Bourges. In the autumn of 1418, the Dauphin

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(1) Foedera ix 517-520.

(2) Bod.Lib. Bodl.MS. 885 f.66 (translations at Bodl.MS.710 f.69 and B.L. Landsdowne 223 f.62v).

sought negotiations with the English, and ambassadors from both sides met in conference at Alençon for two weeks in November. Henry and the Dauphin were concurrently maintaining a correspondence, with a view to reaching an agreement (1).

Henry's envoys were empowered to contract a marriage for him with Catherine of France, though this was not mentioned in their instructions (2). The tone of these instructions is aggressively confident. The duchy of Normandy and other English conquests were not to be considered as subjects for discussion; what Henry had already acquired could not be offered to him. Besides this, there was to be continued insistence on all lands contained in the treaty of Brétigny, with the justification that the Armagnac lords had offered as much in the treaty of 1412. Demands were also to be made for Touraine, Anjou and Maine, the comté of Flanders and the entire coastline from Gravelines to the river Somme, which included Ponthieu, Montreuil and Boulogne (3). Henry would hold all these lands as a neighbour, not subject to Valois sovereignty (4). His envoys probably carried copies of the 1412 treaty and subsequent French offers to

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(1) Foedera ix 647-648, 651-652.

(2) Foedera ix 627.

(3) Foedera ix 628-629.

(4) PPC ii 357. The original of this document, now damaged, is B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Dv ff.36-38 (old foliation 33-35).

support their arguments (1). These terms are very close to those proposed by Henry's ambassadors in Paris in 1414. Military success had now given him a basis to revive his ambitions of four years before.

However, Henry and his Council were sceptical about the Dauphin's power to offer them enough security for a final settlement. Not only was he a minor, but he had no sure title as his father's regent. Both his father and his mother were in the duke of Burgundy's power in Paris. Therefore, the English ambassadors were instructed to listen to the Armagnac peace offers, but not to conclude any peace agreements. It was felt that any agreement the Dauphin made with Henry would need to be confirmed by Charles VI when the Dauphin recovered possession of him; until then, Henry could not consent to renounce any claims he had to the French throne or lands in France. And so the English were to induce the Armagnacs to raise the matter of a long truce, or else raise it themselves, taking as a precedent the suggestion for a fifty-year truce at Winchester in 1415. This too was to be a half-peace accompanied by the delivery of lands to Henry. For this truce he wanted all territory included in the Brétigny peace and the remainder of Normandy, both the part now held by the Armagnacs (including the Comté of Perche) and aid to acquire the part at present in

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(1) Foedera ix 642. Notarial copies of the 1412 treaty drawn up in 1418 are included in an early inventory of the Treasury, B.L. Cotton MS. Caligula Dv f.170; E.36/186 f.38.

Burgundian power. From these demands his ambassadors might dispense with Ponthieu and Montreuil, but nothing was to be concluded without Henry's knowledge. They were to justify these territorial exactions by the suspension of Henry's struggle to obtain his rights to the French crown, and an overt threat to ally with the Burgundians otherwise. It was proposed that John the Fearless should be excluded from this truce and that Henry should lure him out of Paris by a military manoeuvre, allowing the Dauphin to seize the city and the persons of Charles VI, Queen Isabeau and the princess Catherine. The way would then be open for a final ratification of the agreement by Charles.

It was obvious that the Dauphin's main motive for the negotiations was to gain a military alliance with Henry against John the Fearless. Henry instructed his envoys that the alliance was to be the subject of a separate agreement from the truce, and the truce was to be settled first . Henry's additional price for the alliance was the assignment of a share in the lands taken from the Burgundians. His delegates were first to ask for the comtés of Boulogne, Artois and Flanders; then for Flanders and Saint Omer; and finally to insist on Flanders alone. Henry decided not to fight personally with the Dauphin, but to send a force commanded by one of his family. Other questions remained to be decided: should the agreement provide for the release for ransom of any or all of the prisoners taken at Agincourt; and what arrangements would be made for the transfer of Guyenne to Henry? The initial

delivery of several strongpoints (La Rochelle, Poitiers, Niort, Lusignan, Lourdes and Angoulême), coupled with oaths from the Dauphin and other Armagnac lords, was considered as a means of achieving this (1). This is reminiscent of the arrangements made in the 1412 treaty. Henry's territorial demands for truce and alliance, as with those for a peace, show a concern to complete his possession of Normandy and to dominate the whole northern coastline of France from Gravelines to Brittany. His military considerations dictated his diplomacy.

Armagnac diplomacy still concentrated on territorial questions in Aquitaine, as shown in the instructions revealed to the English during the course of the conference. The French ambassadors were given five choices of territorial offers to make to Henry, four of which kept his holdings south of the Charente; the fifth vaguely conceded all lands contained in the peace of Bretigny. Compensation for Aquitaine north of the Charente was to be given in various combinations of Flanders, Artois, parts of Normandy and lands along the river Somme, but the most Henry would be granted in Normandy was his present conquest there. The Armagnac envoys were instructed to ask for a meeting between the Dauphin and Henry to bring the negotiations to a conclusion, a request also made in a letter the Dauphin wrote to Henry during the conference. He was only interested in a short truce during which this meeting

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(1) Foedera ix 628-631; PPC ii 350-358.

could take place. His letter asks Henry to refrain from delaying the peace process by making impossible demands for the French crown and suggests an alliance against the Burgundians. , His ambassadors also carried powers to negotiate a marriage between Henry and Catherine of France, and to give his assurance that he would abstain from negotiating with John the Fearless for a certain period (1). Neither of these were used, for the delegations never proceeded further than unsuccessful attempts at a peace settlement.

The English delegates experienced great difficulty in getting their French counterparts to open the bargaining, although the conference had been called at their request. On the second day, they finally agreed to make a territorial offer of the Calais march, Agenais, Bigorre, Gaure, Saintonge south of the Charente, Périgord, Angoulême, Rouergue, Quercy, Limousin and Poitou. This added Poitou to the 1393 draft treaty and the French offer of July 1415, but still did not include La Rochelle and Quercy south of the Aveyron, which were part of the 1393 settlement. Following their instructions, the English

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(1) Foedera ix 640, 644, 645, 648. J.du Tillet - Recueil des Roys de France (1602), Recueil des Traictez d'entre les Roys de France et d'Angleterre, 215, lists several documents relating to negotiations between Henry V and the Dauphin found in an unmarked bundle under the desks in the French royal treasury:-
The Dauphin's powers to his ambassadors to negotiate peace with Henry and others to negotiate truce, and also their instructions, 2 Nov. 1418 at Chinon. Two further sets of instructions from the Dauphin are dated 26 Dec. 1418 and 6 March 1419 at Gien. A mémoire of the comings and goings, and the Dauphin's offers to negotiate with Henry.
All of these have subsequently disappeared.

disparaged this offer on the grounds that it consisted partly of lands already possessed by their king and that the Armagnac lords had offered more in 1412 (1). It was three days before the Dauphin's ambassadors could be persuaded to improve their terms. In addition to the lands in the first offer, they were now prepared to cede Normandy north of the Seine, excluding the city and bailliage of Rouen, or an equivalent amount of territory in Artois and Flanders, if they should be conquered from the Burgundians. The English rejected this as insufficient (2). So a third offer was made the following day. From the first offer, Poitou was subtracted, but Montreuil was added. This was alleged to consist of the Brétigny lands, except Aquitaine north of the Charente. Henry was to be compensated in Normandy for the omission of La Rochelle, northern Saintonge and Poitou. This offer confused the English. They pointed out that its terms were not equivalent to those in the Brétigny peace (there had been no mention of Ponthieu) and they were not being offered the entire contents of the treaty, as they had been led to believe. Moreover, they could not accept nebulous compensations in Normandy, which was almost entirely under Henry's control anyway. The Dauphinist spokesman admitted that he was not familiar with the terms of the treaty of Brétigny (3). This did not deter him the following week from making a fourth offer of all territory

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(1) Foedera ix 635.

(2) Foedera ix 637.

(3) Foedera ix 637-638.

contained in the treaty, subject to the approval of the Dauphin. It was proposed that Henry and the Dauphin should meet to conclude a settlement in these terms. When the English ambassadors pressed the French to define exactly which contents of the treaty they were offering, and which they wished to reserve to be discussed by their principals, they were told that only geographical limits were to be determined now; questions of sovereignty, ressort and homage would be settled by their respective lords (1). As in July 1415, the French ambassadors were very reluctant to define the mode of tenure of the lands they offered. At first they repeated the old formula, that the king of England should hold them as his predecessors had held them. Then they sought to reserve the whole question to a personal meeting of the principals, conceding to Henry only his lesser rights as duke of Aquitaine (pure and mixed <u>imperium</u>, advowsons of churches, woods and fisheries etc.). Further, they claimed absolutely for Charles VI the sovereignty of the additional territories contained in the English offer (2).

So much were the English in a position of advantage that they extracted all four of these offers from the Armagnacs before they consented to state their own terms for a peace, keeping closely to their instructions. Beyond the

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(1) <u>Foedera</u> ix 640-641.

(2) <u>Foedera</u> ix 638-639, 641, 642.

last French offer of all the Bretigny lands and all that Henry possessed in France at present, they sought the sovereignties and lordships of Maine, Touraine and Anjou, the comté of Flanders and the lordships of Beaufort and Nogent. This offer was quickly rejected by the Dauphin's ambassadors the following day (1). As to the tenure of whatever lands Henry might hold in France, the English delegation rejected the formula that he should hold them as his predecessors had held them, since unlike his predecessors he was the rightful king of France. Therefore, he would not recognise any superior lord but God in these lands, and would hold them as a neighbour to the Valois. Moreover he would not accept the offer of lands he already possessed as a valid offer for peace (2).

Before the French ambassadors would proceed to their second offer, they asked if Henry was willing to negotiate an alliance with the Dauphin. The English gave them an assurance that he was, as Henry himself was to write to the Dauphin on the day after the end of the conference; but they insisted that the matter should be treated separately, after peace terms had been discussed, as this would be the basis for all other agreements (3). They were hoping to lead the French into negotiating a long truce. They responded favourably to the French suggestion for a meeting between Henry and the Dauphin, but said an

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(1) Foedera ix 641-642.

(2) Foedera ix 639,641.

(3) Foedera ix 636-637, 652.

agreement of some sort should be drawn up first (1). They were empowered to give Henry's promise not to negotiate with John the Fearless until January, but refused to concede it unless the Dauphinists would continue to make offers of peace (2). The French stated that they had no power to make further offers and refused to stay beyond the expiry of their safe-conduct. To the English request to discuss other matters, they responded that it was pointless to discuss the question of the marriage and sought a short truce. The English were not interested by this and the conference broke up (3).

The English delegation kept rigidly to the scheme of separate negotiations for a peace, a truce and an alliance, in that order. They employed an aggressive and threatening stance to manoeuvre the Armagnacs into this timetable, as their instructions had implied. The scheme would not work because the Dauphin did not want to conclude a long truce, so it became superfluous to discuss the alliance, or Henry's marriage to Catherine, who was in Burgundian possession anyway. The Armagnac delegation was ill-prepared and confused about geography. Not only were they unsure of the terms of the treaty of Brétigny, but their first and second offers would have left an absurd French enclave of La Rochelle, Aunis and northern Saintonge in English Aquitaine. The territory they were

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(1) Foedera ix 639.

(2) Foedera ix 645, 646.

(3) Foedera ix 642, 643-644, 645.

instructed to offer fell far short of Henry's minimum requirements; the offer of all the Brétigny lands was three and a half years too late. Faced with the perennial problem of sovereignty they could only resort to postponing it for a meeting of the principals, as the French had in 1393 and 1395.

Henry sent his letter to the Dauphin on 25 November, believing that the conference was still in session. He accepted that a meeting should be arranged between them, but warned against the delay of the peace process by the postponement of business from the Alençon conference to their personal confrontation. He was willing to meet the Dauphin when he had taken Rouen, which he regarded as imminent (1). The city surrendered on 19 January 1419. The Dauphin continued to insist on the meeting, and Henry agreed with the ambassadors he sent to Rouen that it should take place on 19 March at some convenient place between Evreux and Dreux. However, the Dauphin broke his oath by failing to keep the appointment, apparently because no suitable place could be agreed. This dashed English hopes of peace and on 1 May the duke of Clarence left Vernon with his troops to counteract the Armagnac threat to disrupt Henry's negotiations with the Burgundians at Meulan (2).

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(1) Foedera ix 651-652.

(2) Bod.Lib.Bodl.MS.885 f.67 (translations at Bodl.MS.710 f.70-70v and B.L.Landsdowne 223 f.63v); B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Dv f.59; Add.MS.38525 ff. 74v, 87-87v.

English discussions with the Burgundian government in Paris began with a conference at Pont-l'Arche in December 1418. For the first time since the Bruges conferences of the 1370s, a united Papacy was able to send its agents to mediate between the English and the French. Therefore a different pattern of procedure was followed. Talks continued later at Mantes and Rouen. Henry's constant demands were for all the land conceded in the treaty of Brétigny, including Ponthieu, and Normandy and his other conquests in France, all to be held in full sovereignty. He also sought marriage with Catherine of France with a dowry of a million crowns, the sum he had required in March 1415. In return, he would renounce his claim to the French throne. Henry hoped to draw the Burgundians into agreeing a definitive settlement which obliged them to combine with him against the Armagnacs. However, the Burgundian ambassadors were not willing to concede this much territory; nor would they agree to its tenure in full sovereignty (1).

Further diplomatic contact with John the Fearless at Provins led to an agreement that Henry should meet the duke with Charles VI, Queen Isabeau and Catherine on 15 May 1419 between Mantes and Pontoise. There was optimism on the English side that this would lead to the signing of

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(1) Wylie and Waugh - Henry V iii 100, 157; Lettres des Rois ii 363-364; Bod.Lib. Bodl.MS. 885 ff 66v-67 (translations at Bodl.MS. 710 ff. 69v-70 and B.L.Landsdowne 223 ff.63-64).

a peace, based on Henry's marriage to Catherine (1), but a letter denouncing French conduct during the negotiations of Henry's reign was prepared to be sent to the Burgundians should they fail to arrive (2). The conference was postponed until 30 May and then met at Meulan for a whole month (3). Henry continued to ask for his terms of the last few months (4), and his ambassadors carried new copies of the 1412 agreement to illustrate the extent of past Armagnac offers (5). The Burgundians were now prepared to agree to the marriage and to Henry's territorial requirements (6). But again, confusion seems to have arisen between the French offer of the Brétigny lands and the English stipulation that the full terms of the treaty should be fulfilled, especially those about sovereignty. Burgundy wanted lands conquered by Henry and granted to his followers to be restored to their original owners. Not only did he ask Henry to renounce his rights to the French throne in the form agreed at Brétigny, but for other guarantees too, including the ratification of parliament. Henry could not assent to such terms unless his possession of full sovereignty over his French lands

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(1) B.L.Add.MS. 38525 f.85 (a copy of Cotton MS. Caligula Dv f.55) and f.87-87v.

(2) Lettres des Rois ii 359-365.

(3) B.L.Add.MS. 38525 f.94-94v.

(4) Lettres des Rois ii 364.

(5) Foedera ix 668-670.

(6) Lettres des Rois ii 372-373.

was assured. Burgundy was approached with offers of negotiation by the Dauphin's envoys and refused to continue the conference with the English (1). Two weeks later at Pouilly, the Burgundians and Armagnacs agreed to combine to attack the English. At the end of July, the English took Pontoise and Henry added it to his list of territorial demands. But John the Fearless would not negotiate further and in August, summoned his troops for a counter-attack (2). Henry had now failed to obtain the agreement of either party in the French civil war to his terms for a settlement. He was therefore obliged to continue his pursuit of his claims by warfare, a costly campaign of sieges from a base in Normandy whose security seemed doubtful.

The triangular balance of forces was dramatically changed on 10 September 1419 when John the Fearless was assassinated on the bridge at Montereau. "The effect on Henry was electrifying" (3). He immediately revised the objectives of his diplomacy. These were outlined in the powers issued to his envoys in October. He demanded that Catherine should be given to him in marriage, but hewas willing to forgo any dowry with her. He would leave the

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(1) Vaughan - John the Fearless 270-272; Owen - Connection 50; Bod.Lib. Bodl.MS.885 ff.67-68v (translations at Bodl.MS. 710 ff.70v-72v and B.L.Landsdowne 223 ff.64-66).

(2) Vaughan - John the Fearless 273-274; Cal.Signet no.970; Choix i 403-404; Bod.Lib.Bodl.MS.885 f.68v (translations at Bodl.MS.710 f.72v and B.L.Landsdowne 223 f.66).

(3) Palmer - "War Aims" 69.

crown of France in the hands of Charles VI for what remained of his life, but govern the country as his regent meanwhile. On Charles' death, Henry and his heirs would succeed to the crown for ever. Charles, Isabeau and their leading supporters would ratify this agreement by letters patent; and all the nobles, prelates, estates, cities and towns of the kingdom were to swear oaths to observe its clauses and co-operate in the continuing struggle against the Armagnacs (1). Now that Henry had raised his terms to the entire kingdom of France in perpetuity, he considered further discussion of amounts of territory to be conceded to him, and Valois claims for sovereignty over it, to be completely redundant. These terms show a decisive break with his previous peace diplomacy; they were to become the basis of the settlement at Troyes seven months later.

The essentials of Henry's conditions for peace were included in his alliances with Philip, the new duke of Burgundy, against the Armagnacs in December; they were also accepted by Queen Isabeau in January. Towards the end of March 1420, English ambassadors assembled with Philip, Charles, Isabeau and Catherine at Troyes. The duke and his negotiators were optimistic that a final peace would be speedily concluded (2). It was not until 20 May that Henry himself came to Troyes and the treaty was solemnly concluded the next day (3). The course of negotiations

(1) Foedera ix 521-523.

(2) B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Diii f.158; Caligula Dv f.65.

(3) Foedera ix 906-907; Cal.Signet no.894.

had expanded Henry's original six points to thirty-one clauses. The dower that Catherine was to receive after Henry's death was now defined, both in England and France. During Henry's regency, Charles was to be cared for in an honourable manner in a befitting place, surrounded by domestic staff who were French speakers. Other clauses stipulated that Henry would govern France according to its established customs, preserving the position of the Parlement and the present administration of justice, and the privileges and liberties of individuals and communities. He would not impose unreasonable taxation of the kingdom or appoint unsuitable persons as his officers there. Until Charles' death, he would not use the title king of France, but style himself as king of England, heir of France, conducting the government of France as regent. Letters patent confirming the treaty were to be granted by English cities, towns and nobles, particularly Henry's brothers, as they were to be granted by their French counterparts. Henry committed himself to continue the struggle against the Armagnacs and the Dauphin on behalf of Charles; both kings and Duke Philip pledged that they would not negotiate for peace with the Dauphin, without the consent of the other two and of the Estates of both kingdoms. All allies of both sides who declared their adherence to the treaty within eight months were to be covered by its provisions, probably a clause of more interest to the French than to Henry. Since October, an agreement had been formulated about the position of Normandy and the adjacent conquests made by Henry since he

re-opened the war. The treaty safe-guarded the position of the ecclesiastical establishment in these lands, provided it endorsed its terms. Normandy was to remain under Henry's sovereignty until he succeeded his father-in-law, when it would be re-integrated into the kingdom of France. Meanwhile, all conquests that Henry made outside the duchy were to be acquired in Charles' name. Philip of Burgundy gained part of the terms his father had asked for the previous year: lands in Normandy belonging to Burgundians that Henry had not granted away to his followers, were to be restored to their original owners; compensation was to be given from territory gained from the Armagnacs for lands that had been so granted. No mention was made of the sovereignty of Aquitaine, however (1). This treaty was designed as a definitive and comprehensive settlement of an eighty-year-old conflict. Not only did it provide for perpetual peace and alliance between the two kingdoms of France and England against all enemies, but for their permanent union under one monarch of the progeny of Henry and Catherine:

> 'et que les deux royaumes seront gouvernez, depuis ce temps que nostredit filz, ou aucun de ses hoirs, parvenra, ou parvenront ausdiz royaumes, non diviséement soubz divers Roys, pour ung mesme temps, mais soubz une mesme personne, qui sera, pour le temps, Roy et seigneur souverain de l'un et de l'autre royaume (2).'

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(1) Cosneau - Grands Traités 102-115; CCR 1419-1422 118-120; E.H.D. iv no.113.

(2) Cosneau - Grands Traités 111.

The treaty of Troyes ended an era of Anglo-French conflict and diplomacy that had begun with the treaty of Brétigny. Previously, juristic arguments between the two nations had centred on the fulfillment of the Brétigny terms; henceforward they concentrated on the validity of the settlement at Troyes (1). It was far more radical than its predecessor, the "Great Peace." It disinherited the Dauphin Charles, legitimate heir of the Valois, confining him to a southern rump of the kingdom for a generation. Had its terms been realised, it would have created a dual monarchy of France and England, a dominant power to transform the political shape of Europe. It was the culmination of Henry V's diplomatic offensive against Valois France, but the commitment to fulfil the promise of its articles involved the Plantagenets in further exhausting military effort.

In this long period of truce beginning in 1389, the exchanges of terms that the two sides envisaged for a settlement indicate the changing war aims of England and France. Increased demands and concessions trace the balance of advantage in the conflict as it swung from the French to the English, an advantage that was ultimately military. At times of confidence, diplomats repeated the same peace offers at successive conferences, or with only minor adjustments, as the French did in the 1380s and the English during Henry V's reign. The stronger side would

(1) See E.H.D. iv no.114; Bod.Lib.Bodl.MS. 885 ff.30-31, 69-71 (translations at Bodl.MS.710 ff.32-33v, 73-77v and B.L.Landsdowne 223 ff.28v-30, 66-70).

take an aggressive stance in negotiations and demonstrate its superiority in points of procedure. When the stubborness of both sides frustrated hopes of peace, they adopted the expedient of a long truce, as in 1396, or turned again to open war, as in 1415.

The division of France between the warring factions of Armagnacs and Burgundians, hastened the ascendancy of England. When English troops actively intervened in the civil war, French diplomacy was obliged to abandon its principal requirement of liege homage for Plantagenet lands in France. After the Armagnac lords agreed that Henry IV should hold Aquitaine in full sovereignty without performing homage by the alliance of 1412, the French were unable to escape the precedent it provided for all of his son's reign. Thereafter, French ambassadors generally avoided mentioning Charles VI's sovereignty over Aquitaine, refused to define it or retreated into old formulae which had become meaningless.

English ambassadors pressed their increasing advantage by expanding their territorial demands. They were never prepared to accept much less than the land conceded by the treaty of Brétigny (except in 1393) and this became the minimum sufficient whenever English arms were in a position to enforce it. Duke Thomas of Gloucester in the 1390s and Henry V as king, regarded it as such. But Henry was not offered the Brétigny lands until 1418, by an Armagnac delegation that was unsure of the terms of the

treaty. French territorial offers lagged behind the changing circumstances of Henry's reign. Even after the expeditions of 1415 and 1417, their peace offers centred on the size of Aquitaine. The contrast between this attitude and Henry's emphasis on Normandy and the north French coast, came to symbolise the difference between the Valois feudal interpretation of the conflict and the Plantagenet dynastic definition. Henry V made demands for Normandy even before his first expedition there. He returned the conflict to northern France; the Henrician war was a continuation of the Edwardian, not the Caroline war. Henry fought as "King of France", not as duke of Aquitaine.

When Henry launched his expedition from Southampton in 1415, the nature of the diplomatic structure based on the treaty of Brétigny and the repeatedly prorogued truces, began to change. The series of truces was at last officially interrupted. The following year, imperial mediation was introduced into Anglo-French diplomacy. In 1417, Henry commenced his conquest of Normandy, rendering the Brétigny terms henceforth inadequate as a comprehensive settlement. In December 1418, Papal mediation was re-introduced to the quarrel. And in September 1419, the murder at Montereau unexpectedly brought Henry the chance of the French throne. Faced with the intransigence of Henry's territorial demands, French envoys had, since 1414, placed the emphasis on his proposed marriage to Catherine, a personal meeting with

Charles VI and a long truce. They sought a temporary settlement modelled on the truce of Paris in 1396. But when Henry was prepared to make such a half-peace, he wanted the advantage of both the Paris and Brétigny treaties combined. At Troyes, he was able almost to dictate terms which enshrined the Plantagenet dynastic view of the war.

Chapter III

ANGLO-FRENCH TRUCES 1389-1417

When the treaty of Troyes was finally concluded in 1420, English and French diplomats had been negotiating for a definitive peace treaty with varying degrees of sincerity for thirty years. Normally they were also empowered to discuss truces. When they failed to agree on peace terms, it was to truce they resorted, since one of the purposes of truce was to provide a setting in which peace could be finally established. Its more immediate purpose was to provide security for persons and property from the ravages of war. In conditions of truce, normal social relations between the non-combatant populations of the kingdoms at dispute could resume. Commerce between sea-ports and towns in border areas which owed different allegiances could recommence in safety. In some areas, particularly Guyenne, truce enabled a nobility, whose

interrelationships by blood and marriage spanned both obediences, to continue their transactions and social preoccupations by something like the customary rules, uninterrupted by the division between "English" and "French".

Truces were long documents, full of detailed provisions that were clearly of the utmost importance to the men who negotiated them. A close examination of these provisions shows what actually constituted a truce, a question to which few have given attention. Comparison of the provisions of successive truces reveals a pattern of changes, as the diplomats struggled to control a conflict which had developed its own momentum on the frontiers during its fifty year course, and to subordinate it to the demands of their foreign policies. The requirement to consider more local interests on these frontiers and at sea further modified this pattern, so that an increasingly complicated structure of truces, agreements and securities was built up during these thirty years. A consideration of the attitudes of the two sides to this truce structure supplements the analysis of the peace negotiations in the last chapter in tracing their policies towards each other.

In 1388, both sides were in need of a suspension of hostilities and a period of normality in order to recuperate from the exhausting effort they had put into war in the last few years. English and French involvement

with their allies in the peripheral theatres of conflict in Castile, Brittany, Flanders and Scotland had faltered. The grand designs and large invasion expeditions of the late 1380s had ended in failure. The first of the long series of truces contributed directly to the miscarriage of the last expedition of the Caroline war. By the time the earl of Arundel and his troops landed in Aunis in 1388, John of Gaunt and the duke of Berry had already agreed on a cessation of warfare south of the river Loire.

The French government had viewed Gaunt's transfer of his army from Portugal to Gascony as a threat, and prepared to reinforce the frontier (1). Richard appointed his uncle as his lieutenant in Guyenne on 26 May 1388 in terms which included the power to make truces there (2). The duke of Berry, acting as Charles VI's lieutenant in Guyenne and Languedoc, empowered envoys to negotiate such a truce with Gaunt's representatives on 8 July (3), and Gaunt issued the corresponding commission three weeks later (4). At Blaye on 18 August, the two delegations sealed a truce ending all acts of war by land between the rivers Loire and Rhône, and at sea between the mouths of these rivers.

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(1) Choix i 81-86; B.L. Add.Ch. 3360.

(2) Foedera vii 583-585.

(3) J.Chavanon - "Renaud VI, Sire de Pons, Vicomte de Turenne et de Carlat, Seigneur de Riberac etc: Lieutenant du roi en Poitou, Saintonge et Angoumois, Conservateur des Trêves de Guyenne, vers 1348-1427" Archives Historiques de la Saintonge et de l'Aunis xxxi (1902) 39.

(4) Foedera vii 595-596.

This was to commence the following week and last until 16 March 1389 (1). On 9 March, the representatives of the two dukes met again at Bergerac and prorogued this truce with some additions until 31 July 1389. Berry was acting under orders from the French government, Gaunt still by the terms of his lieutenancy (2).

The terms of the truce of August 1388 incorporated all the terms of the Anglo-French truce signed in September 1384, the last truce in force which ended 1 May 1385, with a few additional clauses (3). Trade between the subjects of both parties was allowed, except the buying and selling of military commodities. Merchants were to go about their business unarmed, except for swords and daggers, and could not enter fortresses and walled towns without the licence of their lords or captains. In conducting their commerce, they should always pay the dues and customs current in places they visited. In addition to the 1384 truce, it was stipulated that they should pay any new taxes that might be imposed by the lords of either side on these places (4). These clauses were to recur throughout the truces of the 1390s (5). Neither party was to build a new

(1) Foedera vii 595-598.

(2) A.N. K.53 no.80; Chavanon,"Renaud VI", document XLI from Archives Municipales de Périgord E.11/3.

(3) Foedera vii 438-443. For the arrangements for enforcing truces prior to the 1380s see Fowler - "Truces" 189-196 and M.H.Keen - The Laws of War in the Later Middle Ages (Oxford 1965), 207, 211, 214 n.3.

(4) Foedera vii 596-597.

(5) Foedera vii 627,770; Cosneau - Grands Traités 82-83.

fortification, or reinforce an existing one, in the territory of the other, during the truce (1). This prohibition was also repeated in later truces (2). If persons, property or places were detained, stolen or attacked, both parties undertook to surrender all prisoners and goods, restore lands taken, repair all damages, and generally restore everything to its original condition before the truce violation occurred. Such violations were not to be permitted whether for the profit of the perpetrators or for any alleged excuse, such as the schism in the Church. All those who broke the truce should be punished by their own side. A new clause provided that the conservators of both sides should cooperate to compel recalcitrant offenders to pay for damages and surrender booty (3). These provisions were included in a tidier form in the truces of June 1389 and later (4). Significantly, it was stated, as in 1384, that because of any violation, the truce could not be held to have been broken, but would remain in force. Minor truce infractions should not serve as an excuse for retaliation and the recommencement of hostilities (5). This important clause was to be reiterated throughout the truces made in

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(1) Foedera vii 597.

(2) Foedera vii 628, 773; Cosneau - Grands Traités 89-90.

(3) Foedera vii 597, 598. The capture of towns by escalade was specifically forbidden, since it was the opinion of some that this was legal during truces, Keen - Laws of War 17.

(4) Foedera vii 627, 628, 773,774; Cosneau - Grands Traités 89, 91-92.

(5) Foedera vii 598. See Keen - Laws of War 214 and n.3.

this period with France, Flanders, Brittany and Anjou (1). The dukes' negotiators agreed that the truce should be confirmed by letters of the kings on both sides, and that the conservators, and the principal captains and officers they saw fit to designate on each side, should swear to uphold it (2).

The most substantial additions to the 1384 truce were in the clauses concerned with the taking of pâtis and marques. Pâtis were the sums paid by towns, villages and other communities to buy the non-aggression of a neighbouring castle garrison. Sometimes they were paid in goods rather than cash. As conditions of frontier warfare persisted in several parts of France, these random exactions by the soldiery of both parties became regularised into systems of ransom districts. The sums paid by each community were standardised at a constant rate. The ransom districts of the castles in Brittany were regularised in the 1350s, and those around Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte after 1370. From the beginning of the truce in 1389, the English maintained their garrison and castle at Brest almost entirely by the levy of pâtis (3). In 1387 it was proposed that the friction

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(1) Foedera vii 628, 774; viii 475-476, 552; ix 98, 400, 513, 514; Cosneau - Grands Traités 91.

(2) Foedera vii 597-598; see also Foedera vii 628-629, 775; Cosneau - Grands Traités 93; c.f. Fowler - "Truces" 189 for arrangements in truces before 1360.

(3) Jones - Ducal Brittany 148, 162-171; Fowler - "Truces" 204-205; Keen -Laws of War 83, appendix I pp.251-253.

caused by the raising of pâtis at Brest should be avoided by their commutation to one equivalent annual sum to be paid by the duke of Brittany to King Richard. This was never put into effect (1). In January 1396, Richard proposed a similar arrangement for all pâtis except those at Brest, by which Charles VI would pay him an annuity sufficient for the wages of 400 men-at-arms and 400 crossbowmen, amounting to 72,000 francs a year (2). The income from the pâtis was necessary to maintain the English military presence in France. In October 1404, it was estimated that the loss of five castles and their ransom districts by the English would cost them about 36,000 livres per annum in lost pâtis (3).

In 1388, as in 1384, it was agreed that pâtis could be levied in Guyenne during the truce on both sides at the present rates, without the use of violence to collect them (4). Any increase in the current rates or the levy of new pâtis were forbidden, and any money that had been paid as a result of these, should be given back (5). An additional

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(1) C.76/71 m.6.

(2) Foedera vii 812.

(3) B.N. Bourgogne 21 f.34v.

(4) However Gaunt forbade the Sire de Mussidan from levying a pâtis from Perigueux which he had been collecting for the previous fourteen years. Nevertheless Mussidan raided the town and took hostages, cattle and goods in order to extract payment, Fowler - "Truces" 201; c.f. Choix i 155.

(5) The truce of March 1357 and the projected forty-year truce in 1376 had included the abolition of pâtis, but this was not practicable. The effort to control them began with the 1384 truces, Fowler - "Truces" 190,205.

clause now stipulated that if a community refused to pay a pâtis that was legitimately owed, the creditor should seek redress from the conservator designated in the area for the party to which the debtors belonged. If he did not obtain satisfaction within one month of this, he could then take out a letter of marque against the inhabitants of the community for the principal debt only, taking no more than a further quarter of this sum for his expenses, or interest on the original sum. Any overpayment should be restored by order of the conservators (1). Letters of marque were obtained by a creditor from government representatives on his own side, and enabled him to take action against the debtors' party until the debt was recovered (2). The truce specified that they were not to be used to disrupt trade and their use was not to threaten the continuing validity of the truce (3). When it was prorogued in March 1389, problems that had arisen over the granting of marques necessitated the addition of a few clauses about them. These forbade the issue of marques for any reasons other than for the levy of pâtis, as specified in the original truce; creditors were to take suits for other debts before the conservators, the ordinary judges of the district, the royal dukes, their lieutenants or councils, as seemed appropriate to them.

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(1) Foedera vii 597.

(2) F. Ganshof - The Middle Ages: A History of International Relations (trans.R.I.Hall) 312; Keen - Laws of War 218-234.

(3) Foedera vii 595, 597.

Before a letter of marque could be issued for pâtis, proof by letters or witnesses was required of an approach to the conservator and of his response, according to the order of procedure laid down in the truce. Any overpayment beyond the principal debt and a quarter of it for expenses should be repaid within eight days of its extortion, or the creditor would forfeit both the principal debt and the expenses (1). After only a few months, the peaceful regulation of the frontier in Guyenne had required further codification. Before the prorogued truce had run its course, a new dispute about the definition of pâtis had arisen between the captains of the English and French obediences. The question was whether the continued levy of current pâtis should also compel those "appâtissez" to buy safe-conducts, and certificates of their "appâtissement" called "billets" as they did before the truce. At first, Gaunt pronounced that the issue of these documents should not be compulsory, since the truce itself obviated the need for such additional protections. But his representative, the conservator Soudan de la Trave, meeting his opposite number the Sire de Pons at Mortagne-sur-Gironde, maintained that by tenor of his pâtis, they included the payments for these certificates. The Sire de Pons disagreed, but Gaunt now pronounced in favour of his envoy, stating the certificates should continue to form part of the pâtis, since if they ceased, it would be a diminution of the profit from them, which

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(1) A.N. K.53 no.80.

would itself contradict the terms of the truce. Compulsion to buy safe-conducts or any newly imposed certificates was still banned however (1).

It was the function of the truce conservators to meet and settle disputes over details of this sort, and also to adjudge compensation for infractions of the truce. At Mortagne, on the frontier between the two obediences, Soudan de la Trave and the Sire de Pons met not only to decide the question above, but also to repair damages done against the truce since its beginning. The final additional clause of the truce required the conservators of both sides to meet in this manner in the frontier area where the dispute arose. The English truce negotiators appointed conservators for nine districts: Bordeaux, Bordelais and Bazadais; Landes; Agenais and Quercy; Bigorre; Périgord; Auvergne and Rouergue; Limousin; Poitou, Saintonge and Angoumois; and the marches between the rivers Garonne and Dordogne (2). Only in the first two districts did the English have complete control; the others represented outlying fortresses and enclaves in French territory. Each was assigned two or more local lords or captains as conservators, except Bigorre, which the Captain of Lourdes watched over alone. The system of

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(1) A.N. K.53 no.83 issued at Bordeaux 23 July 1389. For "billets" see Fowler - "Truces" 204 and Keen - Laws of War 196 n.7. They were also levied by the garrison of Brest against Breton vessels - Lettres des Rois ii 291.

(2) Foedera vii 598.

districts was different from those in the 1384 truces. The same conservators continued in office when the truce was prorogued in March 1389 (1).

Those who negotiated truces often themselves became conservators. It was the Conservators' responsibility to have the truce published in their areas and ensure it was kept there by the officers of their side. Their functions have been characterised as at once military, diplomatic and judicial (2). They judged cases of debt brought before them, inquired about truce violations, ordered the damages done to be made good and punished the malefactors. They requested the conservators of the other side to perform similar actions for violations perpetrated against their party. They countermanded arrests and issued safe-conducts. They might use force to occupy castles or seize goods that had been taken against the terms of the truce, in order to return them. They could employ imprisonment and confiscation to constrain the guilty to restore what they had taken or repair the damage they had done. If necessary, they could combine with the conservators of the other side in their area to proceed against the obstinate. Usually conservator-generals, acting alone or with others, would oversee large blocks of territory. At sea, these were the admirals, on land the French king's lieutenant-generals and the English lieutenants or seneschals of Guyenne. Subordinate to them

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(1) A.N. K.53 no.80.

(2) Chavanon - "Renaud VI" 60.

were particular conservators, who were local lords, captains and seneschals (1). Sometimes a conservator might find other officials encroaching on his judicial rights to consider cases involving the truce. Renaud de Pons faced challenges from the seneschal of Saintonge and the prévôt of Cognac (2). It seems that the French conservators were paid, for Renaud received a thousand livres tournois a year with his office (3). The conservators had a comprehensive trusteeship over all matters pertaining to the truce; and when additions and changes were made to the terms of a truce, it was they who were charged with effecting them.

While Guyenne was protected by a local truce, English and French ambassadors at Leulinghen were discussing a full truce between the two countries. The duke of Burgundy had suggested a four or five year truce in December 1387, and the following June the English government belatedly accepted the idea of a conference in the Picardy march (4). This conference proved to be long and arduous. The English representatives were empowered to negotiate truce,

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(1) Keen - Laws of War 36-40, 215; Chavanon - "Renaud VI" 58-61; Cosneau - Grands Traités 98; Vale - English Gascony 182-184; Foedera vii 598, 628-629, 639-640, 778-779; viii 648-649 etc.; A.N. J.865 nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 15, 23; K.53 no.80.

(2) Chavanon - "Renaud VI" documents XLII and LVI (the second is A.N. J.865 no.26).

(3) Chavanon - "Renaud VI" document LXI.

(4) CPR 1385-1389 502-503. See pp. 74-75 above.

with the option of including or excluding the allies of both sides on 26 November and again the following 1 February (1). The point of difficulty was the French protestation that their king could not negotiate separately from his allies and was obliged to consult the Scots and the Castilians before concluding a truce. Evidently the French wished to include both these parties, while the English resisted so complete a suspension of hostilities, especially in regard to Scotland (2). After an adjournment, the French point of view prevailed on Richard. He renewed the safe-conducts for the French and issued new powers to his envoys with the inclusion of allies on 14 May (3). The government in Paris issued a corresponding commission a week later and the conference moved quickly to a conclusion (4). On 18 June 1389, the English, French and Castilian ambassadors at Leulinghen agreed to a truce including all the allies of both sides by name. They had to assent to the truce within a suitable time, giving suitable oaths and securities, or be entirely excluded from its benefits. In Guyenne, it was to follow directly on from the truce due to expire there at the end of July, and everywhere else it was to become operational by land and sea on 15 August and continue until three years from that date (5). The following year,

(1) Foedera vii 610-611; C.76/73 m.9.

(2) B.N.Francais 15490 f.25v; Hist.Ang. ii 179.

(3) Foedera vii 616; C.76/73 m.3.

(4) Foedera vii 623-624; Dip.Cor. pp.211-212 n.99; West.Chron.398.

(5) Foedera vii 622-630.

Charles VI ordered the end of watch and ward between the rivers Somme and Loire, recognising that Anglo-French hostilities had effectively ended (1).

Both governments were willing that a longer truce should be made. The English delegates sent to Leulinghen in 1390 were empowered to conclude peace or truce. The inclusion of allies was again optional. The embassy included Sir Richard Abberbury, one of those who had negotiated Gaunt's truce in Guyenne two years before (2). After the conference had failed to make any progress towards a peace treaty, a long truce including the allies of both sides was discussed. The envoys agreed to seek further advice from their principals about this, but it was still seen as secondary to the search for a final peace (3).

For the next peace conference at Amiens, powers were given in February 1392 to the English embassy including Gaunt, and separately to Gaunt alone, to negotiate about truce inclusive or exclusive of English and French allies. This process was to be isolated from the discussions for a peace treaty, for all mention of this was excised from these powers (4). After peace had been considered unsuccessfully for a week, on 8 April, Gaunt and the

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(1) Contamine - Guerre État et Société 231.

(2) Foedera vii 595, 667-670.

(3) Conférences 368-369; see pp. 76 - 80 above.

(4) C.76/76 m.7; c.f. Foedera vii 667-668.

French royal dukes prorogued the truce until 29 September 1393, in exactly the same terms as had been agreed at Leulinghen, including the same allies. Gaunt used the power given to him singly, though the other principal English ambassadors swore to the prorogation personally (1). When the meeting at Amiens broke up, the envoys agreed that the next conference at Leulinghen on 1 July should discuss a longer truce, if it seemed necessary. The French deputies who went to the July meeting were instructed to seek the longest possible truce. Their instructions imply that it was chiefly the French who wished to extend the truce beyond a temporary arrangement.

The suggestion received some discussion, but pre-eminence was still given to offers of peace (2). The primary motive of a peace treaty explains why the conferences of these years were held in the spring, rather than late summer just before the expiry date of the truces.

The next assembled at Leulinghen early in March 1393. The English embassy was given similar powers to the previous year, but this time Gaunt was not to act independently, but jointly with the duke of Gloucester (3). On the French side, the royal uncles of Berry and Burgundy were also commissioned to negotiate about truce (4), but were

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(1) The original at A.N. J.643 no.1 is now missing. There are copies at B.L.Add.Ch. 11310 and P.R.O. 31/8/134 section 10 no.280; see also pp. 80-83 above.

(2) Conférences 373, 374, 380; see pp. 85-87 above.

(3) Foedera vii 738-739.

(4) B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Diii f.113.

instructed to broach the subject of a long truce only after attempts at peace had been exhausted, reversing the emphasis of the previous instructions of July (1). So when the first session of the conference ended on 28 April, the four dukes had no difficulty in extending the Leulinghen truce in the same form for another year. The other ambassadors added their personal oaths to the prorogation (2).

So the truce terms that were agreed at Leulinghen June 1389 remained in force unchanged until 29 September 1394. The forma of the truce was substantially based on the truce Gaunt had made south of the Loire in 1388; terms suitable for Guyenne were now extended to cover the entire conflict. The future of Aquitaine dominated the discussions of truce in these years, as well as those about a peace treaty. This was due to the overriding influence of John of Gaunt, whose chief interest was Guyenne from 1388 onwards, first as lieutenant, then as duke. The concentration on Aquitaine also accorded with the feudal view of the war held by the French. The negotiators at Leulinghen made a few additions and changes for the regulation of the frontier. The garrisons of one side were now allowed to purchase victuals from those in the opposite obedience (3), and this ruling was echoed in

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(1) Conférences 380.

(2) Foedera vii 748; B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Diii f.113; see pp. 87 - 89 above.

(3) Foedera vii 627.

later truces (1). The proscription of new fortification was repeated, but now reinforced by a clause which forbade the raising of new fortresses or the reactivation of disused ones within seven leagues of a stronghold of the opposing party (2). This also found its way into later tryces, with the distance further defined as twenty miles in areas where this measurement was used (3). As before, it was the question of pâtis which received the most attention. It was still permissible to levy the pâtis that were current between the rivers Loire and Rhône when the truce was sealed at Blaye in 1388, and in Brittany, Normandy and elsewhere after 1 May 1389. Arrears were subject to collection, but increases in the rates of existing pâtis or the levy of new ones, were still banned.

The clause laying down the precedure for recovering debts owed as a result of pâtis via the conservators and letters of marque, was now completely omitted. Perhaps the French envoys at Leulinghen, concentrating their efforts on the inclusion of the French allies in the truce, were careless in allowing the English to dispose of these regulations. Efforts were made to rectify the depopulation of settlements where the inhabitants had fled to avoid pâtis.

A new clause stated that subjects of either side who returned to their tenements in the orbit of a castle whose

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(1) Foedera vii 771; Cosneau - Grands Traités 83.

(2) Foedera vii 627.

(3) Foedera vii 773; ix 97; Cosneau - Grands Traités 88.

pâtis had lapsed before 1388, would be bound to pay its lord or captain only those dues owed by custom to the lord of the place, and would be subject to his jurisdiction and licence to cultivate the land (1). This clause was included in the truces of the 1390s (2).

The French were clearly unhappy with these arrangements as it was the English who benefitted most from the rigorous application of the pâtis system. At Amiens in April 1392, the French delegation asked Gaunt that the pâtis should be reduced, since if the English meant to keep the truce, they only needed to take sums sufficient to keep their fortresses secure. In June 1392 and February 1393, French ambassadors were instructed to repeat the request and ask that ordinances should be made for the peaceful collection of the pâtis. In 1392, the French wanted to add other measures to the truce. One made the kings themselves responsible for compensation for damages inflicted by their subjects in violation of the truce. Its words echoed a clause of 1388 that had been dropped in 1389. Other projected clauses prohibited each king from helping and harbouring the others' rebels, encouraging private wars amongst the others' subjects and inducing his opponent's subjects to come into his obedience (3). The English managed to repulse French efforts to incorporate these terms into the truce.

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(1) Foedera vii 627.

(2) Foedera vii 722; Cosneau - Grands Traités 87-88.

(3) Conférences 373-374,380; c.f. Foedera vii 597.

At these conferences the French also asked the English to replace their conservators with men of sufficient authority to enforce obedience to the truce and sufficient probity to keep it themselves (1). The English negotiators at Leulinghen in 1389 had been empowered to appoint the conservators on their side (2). For Guyenne they had repeated the same names for the same areas specified in the 1388 truce. The captains of Calais, Guînes, Hammes, Cherbourg and Brest were to enforce the truce in Flanders, Picardy, Artois, Normandy and Brittany, and the two admirals at sea (3). All these Conservators retained their offices when the truce was prorogued in 1392 (4). The French named conservators for Flanders; Picardy; Normandy (with particular conservators for le Pays de Caux and Normandy north of the Seine); Brittany; the three comtés of Anjou, Maine and Touraine together; and the admirals at sea. In Aquitaine, their conservators' districts were Poitou; Berry; Périgord, Saintonge and Angoumois; Limousin; Auvergne; Bourbonnais; and Agenais, Gascony, Bordelais and Bayonnais with the whole Duchy of Guyenne and all Languedoc (5). Their appointments were continued in the prorogation of 1393 (6). One of the conservators for Périgord, Saintonge and

(1) Conférences 373-374, 380.

(2) Foedera vii 610.

(3) Foedera vii 639-640, 717; S.C. 1/63 no.279.

(4) Foedera vii 718; B.L. Add.Ch. 11310.

(5) Foedera vii 629; B.N.Francais 26730 (Pièces Originales 246), Craon no.87.

(6) B.L. Cotton MS. Caligula Diii f.113.

Angoumois was again the Sire de Pons. He served in this capacity for all the truces between 1384 and 1415, and was called "le père protecteur et conservateur des deux Aquitaines" by Charles VI (1). His companion was Enguerrand Sire de Coucy, Charles' captain-general in Guyenne. He left the Vicomte de Meaux as his deputy there when he joined the crusade to Barbary in 1390, but was again active in the area in 1392 (2). The English conservators in the outlying parts of Aquitaine were not of an equivalent eminence. They included several notorious routier captains such as Ramonet de Sort and the Bastard of Guarlens in Auvergne and Rouergue, Nompar de Caumont in Agenais and Quercy, and Pierre Arnaud de Béarn (Pierrot le Béarnais) in Limousin. These last two had raided the lands of the Sire d'Albret during the truces of the 1380s. The Sire de Mussidan, conservator in Périgord, raided Périgueux in April 1389. The trade of such men was continual warfare and their appointments as conservators added further sanction to their activities by the English government. They were more likely to protect the interests of their own party than willingly enforce the reparation of damages done to the other party. But to fail to appoint them was to risk losing their allegiance, and they were in effective control of their own areas.

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(1) Chavanon - "Renaud VI" 5, 37-38; A.N. J.865 no.6.

(2) B.W. Tuchman - A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous Fourteenth Century (1979) 450, 491; H.Lacaille - "Étude sur la vie d'Enguerran VII de Coucy, Comte de Soissons" Positions des Thèses (1890) 89; Froissart xiv 25.

Encouragement of routiers kept up continual pressure on the French frontiers without the necessity of paying their troops (1).

However, John of Gaunt envisaged his personal acquisition of an extended Aquitaine by negotiation rather than by military conquest. By the time he returned to England from Bordeaux in November 1389, he must have realised that the current conservators, stripped of their obligations over the payment of pâtis that he had assented to in August 1388 and March 1389, were insufficient to pacify the Duchy. In order to regain central control of the truce, three commissioners were appointed at the end of February 1390 to supplement the efforts of the conservators. They were ordered to make good the infractions of the truce committed by the English, where the conservators had failed to act, but this was not to diminish the conservators' powers. Additionally, they were to enforce articles which Gaunt had agreed with the French, presumably those included in the Guyenne truces, but omitted from the Leulinghen truce. The commission referred to Gaunt as duke of Guyenne, although his title was not to be confirmed until several days later (2). He entrusted this task in his new Duchy to Jean de Trailly,

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(1) Fowler - "Truces" 201-202 and n.78; Keen - Laws of War 117; see p.170 n. 4 above.

(2) Foedera vii 656-658.

the new mayor of Bordeaux, his predecessor David Cradok (1), and Cradok's son Richard, captain of Fronsac Castle (2). Richard Cradok was in Aquitaine from March to August, delivering Privy Seal letters about keeping the truce, and the repair of breaches of it, to various English captains there (3).

At the beginning of July 1390, the poor maintenance of the truce was raised at the Leulinghen conference. It was decided that the English and French delegations should refer the question back to their principals, so that they could provide for the better conservation of the truce (4). Three weeks later, the French envoys, Nicole de Rancé, Nicolas de Saint Rémy and Morelet de Montmor, were in England, complaining of the seizure of certain castles in Guyenne by Richard's subjects (5). A Council meeting, whose members were to include Richard Abberbury, was summoned to meet on 29 August (6), and on the two following days the envoys were issued with letters of passage to return to France (7), and a safe-conduct was

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(1) C.61/101 mm. 9 and 14.

(2) Foedera vii 642.

(3) Ambassades no.DVII.

(4) Conférences 368.

(5) Dip.Cor. no.123 and p. 221 n.123. Rancé was not paid for the journey until 6 Aug. so perhaps the embassy did not reach England until after this date, B.N.Francais 28915 (Pièces Originales 2431) de Rancé nos. 4 and 5.

(6) Dip.Cor. p.221 n.123.

(7) CCR 1389-1392 569.

drawn up for ten French commissioners to attend to truce infractions in Guienne with a small force of men-at-arms and crossbowmen. They included Rancé, Montmor and his brother, Braqué de Braquemont, Hue de Boulay and Jean de Blaisy (1). However, Rancé and Montmor were still in England in late September (2), and by 18 November, Rancé and Braquemont had still not left Paris for Guyenne (3). A corresponding English commission of eight including Trailly, Richard Cradok, William Elmham, the Gascon judge Bertrand d'Aste and Gaunt's seneschal of Guyenne, William Scrope, was appointed on 3 September (4). Cradok and Elmham crossed to Bordeaux to join the others in October (5). In response to the French complaints, they were ordered to enforce the evacuation of the castles by the English captains on pain of their forfeiture and banishment as rebels, co-operating with the French commissioners and using force if necessary. They were also empowered to remove conservators who failed in their duties, and replace them with better men, and to compel English captains and garrisons to swear to keep the truce (6). Charles VI wrote to the Sire de Pons complaining that English conservators were amongst those responsible for

(1) C.61/101 m.4.

(2) Dip.Cor. p.221 n.123.

(3) B.N.Francais 28915 (Pièces Originales 2431) de Rancé nos. 6, 7, 8; Francais 26978 (Pièces Originales 494) Braquemont nos. 17 and 18.

(4) C.61/101 m.4.

(5) Foedera vii 684; CCR 1389-1392 210; C.61/101 m.3.Scrope had already gone in July, C.61/101 m.3.

(6) C.61/101 m.4.

taking the castles and were continuing to break the truce. He commanded him to meet with Scrope, inform him of the breaches that had been committed, and superintend the return of the fortresses to their rightful owners (1).

The commissioners seem to have achieved some results. In February 1391, Rancé, Braquemont and Boulay were actively pursuing the Albrets for infractions of which the English commissioners had complained. Between 1390 and 1392, Blaisy succeeded in buying out the routier companies fighting in Richard's name in Quercy, Auvergne and Rouergue, ending their twenty year "appâtisement" of these territories. English commissioners were also active in the attempt to evict garrisons from castles taken in defiance of the truce, though when Mérigot Marchès was questioned at his trial at the Châtelet in July 1391, he alleged that the commissioners had instructed him privately to retain his fortresses, as an English expedition to Guyenne was planned (2). In spring 1392, Richard Cradok was again in Guyenne repairing breaches of the truce (3).

Although when King Richard ratified the truce prorogation

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(1) A.N. J.865 no.7. For this paragraph see also Fowler - "Truces" 199.

(2) Fowler - "Truces" 200 n.73, 203; Keen - Laws of War 38, 94-99, 149, 253 n.1; P.R.O. 31/8/135 Section 1 no.2. from A.N. Cartons des Rois. There had been a previous effort to evacuate the fortresses in these territories in 1387-1388, Keen- Laws of War 95 n.2; B.L.Add.Ch. 3362.

(3) Ambassades no.DXII.

in May 1392, he confirmed the conservators of 1389 in their posts, it was soon considered that the list for Guyenne was inadequate or out-of-date. On 1 July, it was superceded by the appointment of new conservators in reorganised districts, though the area of France they covered was the same as before. Nine conservators were to serve in the central district of Bordeaux, Bordelais, Lower Gascony and Landes and three or four in the others: Agenais; Bigorre and Toulousain; Saintonge and Angoumois; Poitou, Limousin and Auvergne; Périgord; and Quercy and Rouergue. The personnel overlapped the 1389 list and the commissions of 1390, though some lords and captains had inevitably been excluded. Richard Cradok and Bertrand d'Aste were commissioned to serve in all seven districts. (1). Through these two agents, Gaunt retained control of the operation of the truce in Guyenne. The French kept the same conservators as before but again supplemented them with a commission of Boulay, Braquemont and Rancé (2). At Leulinghen in 1393, the French embassy was again instructed to ask the English for better conservators and to complain about English infractions, presenting a list of towns and castles their troops had seized in and around Guyenne in the last few years, some of which they still occupied (3). When the draft peace was concluded in June, it was agreed that each side should send a knight to

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(1) Foedera vii 724-725. Cradok received letters of protection to go to Guyenne 4 July, C.61/103 m.6.

(2) Foedera vii 730.

(3) Conférences 380.

Guyenne by 1 August to deal with attempts made against the truce, followed shortly by more important delegates (1). But a few days earlier, Richard had already nominated a panel of eight comissioners, most of whom had served in 1390, though Cradok was no longer amongst them. They were granted the same vigorous powers as the commission of September 1390 (2). No attempt seems to have been made to adhere to the agreement that Gaunt had made at Leulinghen.

Between 1390 and 1393, Gaunt was prepared to co-operate with the French government to end the endemic warfare in Aquitaine, but he resisted French pressure for a general reduction of pâtis, which would threaten the English ability to maintain a cheap military presence. The independence of the "English" garrisons in the frontier areas was eliminated in the effort to bring the armed subjects of the Duchy under central control. The main function of the truce in these years seems to have been the establishment of the projected principality that Gaunt was seeking for himself in the current peace negotiations.

In the Leulinghen conference of spring 1394, Gaunt's powers coupled him with the duke of York, as he had been linked with his brother of Gloucester the previous year, and there were again separate powers for the whole embassy. This time they were not given the option of excluding the allies of both sides from the truce (3).

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(1) E.36/188 f.42v.

(2) Foedera vii 747.

(3) Foedera vii 769-770; C.76/78 m.8.

The English were in a weak position in the talks, because they were discarding the draft peace of the previous June, and so they were prepared to concede this point to the French at the outset. On the French side, the dukes of Berry and Burgundy were empowered to negotiate for peace or truce (1). Whichever was given prominence, the discussions were lengthy, for an agreement was not made until 27 May. Probably the French were pressing the English to assent to a very long truce, to substitute for the peace treaty that had been lost. A new truce was agreed to last four years from the expiry of the present truce at Michaelmas. The allies of both sides were to be included, provided that they confirmed it within a reasonable time. The oaths of the principal lords and captains of both sides were to be exchanged between England and the French allies, particularly Scotland and Castile. Allies who refused to confirm the truce, and lords and captains who refused to swear to it when required to do so, would be deprived of all its benefits (2).Since hostilities were suspended until autumn 1398, the series of springtime peace conferences in Picardy came to an end.

Both sides returned to the conventional form of conservators' areas for the new truce, with no supplementary commissioners. The French seem to have

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(1) C.47/30/8 no.17.

(2) Foedera vii 769-775 C.76/79 mm.7-5; see above pp.97-99.

retained the same areas as in 1389, with almost the same personnel as conservators (1). The English conservators in Guyenne however, were again reorganised into a new pattern of seven districts: Bordelais; Bazadais; Landes; Agenais; Bigorre; Périgord and Sarladais; and Poitou, Saintonge and Angoumois with the march of Limousin, with the lieutenant or seneschal of Guyenne and the mayor and constable of Bordeaux acting as general conservators for the whole duchy. Most of the conservators' names are familiar, but Ramonet de Sort and Pierrot le Béarnais now disappear finally from the list (2). The areas of Quercy, Rouergue and Auvergne were now entirely excluded from the jurisdiction of the English conservators, reflecting the success of Blaisy's activities against the routiers there two years before. All of Quercy and Rouergue had been included in the Duchy defined in the draft peace of 1393. That the French compelled the English to abandon the superintendance of this territory now, marks the end of the idea of an extended Aquitaine under John of Gaunt's rule; this idea and the draft peace based around it, failed together. Gaunt was now obliged to be content with the Duchy as it was presently held under the control of English arms, with its frontiers regulated and pacified by the conservators. The French also introduced new methods of procedure for the conservators into the truce, aimed at eliminating the infractions committed on the English side

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(1) C.47/30/8 no.17, Charles VI's ratification of the truce. This document is torn at the bottom, leaving the list of conservators incomplete.

(2) Foedera vii 775.

in recent years. Castles, towns and fortresses were not to be acquired by one side from the other by any means. If a fortress was captured, the victim of the attack had the right to recover it by force and punish the transgressors, calling upon the aid of the conservator of the offending side with up to fifty soldiers; or he could summon this conservator to effect the restitution of the fortress and the punishment. The conservators of both sides were required to act in concert, if the malefactors proved unwilling to vacate the fortress. Raiders could be arrested and imprisoned by the officers of the territory where they committed their depredations, or if they were more than three leagues away from one of their own fortresses, provided the conservators on the raiders' side were informed within fifteen days. The conservators of both sides would then meet to judge the case, execution of the judgement belonging to the conservators of the damaged party. If the raiders managed to get away into their own territory, their own conservator was then bound to deliver them to his opposite number, and repair the damage done from the raiders' assets. If necessary, the conservator of the damaged party should aid him, again with up to fifty soldiers.

It was probably the French delegation that most influenced the <u>forma</u> of the new truce, against protracted English opposition. Additional clauses dealt with the question of traders who were permitted to enter walled towns and castles by unauthorised persons, and arranged that any

point in the truce which proved to be dubious or ambiguous was to be decided by a commission appointed by both principals. Again the clauses dealing with the collection of pâtis were completely redrawn, replacing the regulations of the 1388 and 1389 truces. The French at last established the principle that the pâtis should be reduced. Conservators especially commissioned by both kings were to tour the Duchy and investigate current pâtis, decreasing the rates which were excessive, without allowing any increases. The amount a town or village was capable of paying was to be assessed by the number of its hearths and the resources of its inhabitants. The levy of pâtis due to fortresses that had recently passed from one obedience to the other, was to cease, so that parishes would not be paying protection money to their own side. Those "appâtissez" were to have eight days grace to pay before the captain, to whom the pâtis were due, could approach the conservators and request them to enforce payment. If payment was still not made within thirty days, the captain could then execute the pâtis by distraining the persons and goods of the debtors, provided he did not occupy places or employ arson and murder, taking a further fifth of the sum for his expenses and damages, a smaller fraction than in the 1388 truce. If the defaulting inhabitants fled before him, the captain was obliged to request the conservators or judges of the area where they had sought refuge, to enforce payment. The conservators were bound by oath to give him satisfaction in this. Further measures were now inserted

into the truce to encourage the re-population of areas where the inhabitants had fled from the pâtis since the beginning of the 1388 truce. If they returned, or new settlers arrived, they were not to be liable for the arrears of pâtis, nor was anyone to be "appâtissez" in more than one place, the rates and any disputes to be decided by arbitration of the conservators. Pâtis could not be levied in any place where they were not current in 1388, because of depopulation or otherwise. The truce now forbade all letters of marque and licences for reprisals, except those marques that had already been adjudged reasonably. Cases of debt were to be taken before the local conservator or judges. All those who disobeyed this prohibition were to be regarded as truce-breakers, and punished as such by the conservators, paying a double compensation to the victims of their reprisals (1). Marques and reprisals were often used as legal cover for raids and counter-raids conducted to acquire booty. The diplomats now sought to pacify the frontier by halting the cumulative process of reprisal warfare. On 22 June, the English general conservators were commissioned to judge in cases involving the wrongful use of marque and reprisal, and also to review and reduce the current pâtis, the relevant clauses of the truce being quoted in full in their commission (2). The French government banned the

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(1) Foedera vii 771-772, 774-775. The inhabitants of the castellany of Bourg-sur-Gironde threatened to abandon their homes if they were not relieved of the burdens of pâtis and marques, E.28/6 no.95.

(2) Foedera vii 777-779.

licensing of reprisals by the Sire de Pons and its other conservators in January 1396 (1).

The clause prohibiting marques and reprisals was repeated in the truce of 1396 (2). In later agreements about this long truce, commissions to preserve it and later truces with Flanders and Brittany, the revocation of grants of marque and reprisal was ordered (3). Nevertheless, the system was still used. Shortly after the 1394 truce, the inhabitants of the castellany of Bourg-sur-Gironde complained to the government in London that the excessive pâtis the French exacted from them had not been reduced and they were still suffering greatly from letters of marque that the French took out against them (4). Their misfortunes continued: in January 1409 the French government ordered the Sire de Pons to issue letters of marque against Blaye and Bourg for the pâtis they owed to the French castle of Montendre, but then rescinded the order (5). After the miscarriage of the draft peace, the French government and its diplomats at Leulinghen were resigned, in spring 1394, to the continued military occupation of Guyenne by both sides. Now that a settlement was no longer regarded as imminent, they sought

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(1) A.N. J.865 no.11.

(2) Cosneau - Grands Traités 83-84.

(3) G.A.Knowlson-Jean V duke of Brittany (1399-1442) in relation to England (Liverpool M.A.thesis 1934), 33; Choix i 218; Foedera viii 220, 230, 276, 301, 308; C.76/86 mm.2 and 12; B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Diii f.153.

(4) E.28/6 no.95.

(5) A.N. J.865 no.20.

to regularize this frontier society and limit its turbulence for as long a period as the English would accept, which was four years.

Before the new truce had run a year of its course, English ambassadors were in Paris negotiating for the marriage of King Richard and the princess Isabelle. King Charles had asked for a delay until 24 July 1395 (1), but they had received their powers to treat for peace on the 5 July and for the marriage on 8 July and one had already left on 1 July (2). In Paris they were entertained by the royal family, and received gifts and a favourable response about the marriage from the royal council, then returned to London early in September (3). The same ambassadors received powers on 7 October and returned to Paris, three leaving again in December. William Scrope went to Paris in January 1396 with power for himself and the earl of Rutland and the Earl Marshal, who had remained there, and negotiations were continued for more than three weeks (4).

From the instructions that Scrope carried, it is clear that the French negotiators had already drawn up draft versions of all the articles that were to be included in the marriage contract and delivered them to the English.

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(1) A.N. J.644 no.35.

(2) Foedera vii 802-803; Dip.Cor. p.252 n.223; Ambassades no.DXXII; E.30/320; C.76/80 m.18.

(3) Angleterre et Schisme 366 n.2; Froissart xv 182; B.L.Add.Ch. 3375.

(4) Angleterre et Schisme 376 and n.1; Foedera vii 803; Dip.Cor. no.223 and p.252 n.223; Froissart xv 232; C.76/80 m.18; B.L.Add.Ch. 3381; B.N.Bourgogne 21 f.27.

Richard's replies to them were to be incorporated in the final agreement. He accepted that Isabelle should renounce her rights of succession to the kingdom of France and all lordships within it for herself and her heirs, provided this did not prejudice the right to the French throne which he claimed by descent from Edward III, and provided that Isabelle retained the possibility of inheriting part of Bavaria through her mother. He was content to provide for the daughters of the marriage, should he have a son by a subsequent marriage, and to grant Isabelle an annual dower of 200,000 nobles, which she should continue to receive if she was widowed, even if she went to live in France and there was war between the two kingdoms, provided she did not remarry. He also agreed to the clauses by which the principal lords on each side obliged themselves as security that the marriage contract would be fulfilled or the defaulting party would lose the full sum of the dowry, and that Isabelle should be free to return to France in the event of her husband's death. Both sides agreed that the French should bear the cost of Isabelle's clothes and jewels, and her escort as far as Calais (1).

Only the question of the dowry remained to be bargained over. Richard had reduced his initial extravagant demands for two million francs in the instructions of the previous July, to acceptance of the French offer of 800,000 francs, provided that Isabelle's jewels were worth another

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(1) Foedera vii 811-812.

100,000. The French had proposed that 200,000 should be paid at the time of the wedding, followed by annual payments of 100,000, until the sum was complete. Richard asked that the first payment should be of 300,000 francs. If the French would not agree to this, he suggested the extra 100,000 should be kept ready for him by Charles and his relatives, to be paid whenever he required them; and if they still would not agree, that they should be prepared to assist him against his own rebellious subjects instead. This last proposal was never discussed because the French agreed to pay 300,000 francs at once, though they made no guarantee about the jewels. The French draft stipulated that 500,000 francs of the dowry should be returned if Richard died without having children by Isabelle, but Richard wanted this reduced to 400,000. In the end, the French figure was written into the final contract, but only 400,000 was to be given back if it was Isabelle who died childless (1).

On these terms, the marriage contract was concluded in Paris on 9 March 1396 (2). Charles ratified this on the 11th (3), and the Earl Marshal performed a proxy marriage with Isabelle the following day (4). A dispensation for

(1) Foedera vii 811-812, 817-818; England... 173-174; c.f. Foedera vii 804-805 and page 102 above.

(2) A.N. J.643 no.6; copy at B.N.Dupuy 152 ff.7-15v, of which there is a copy at Burr - Anglo-French Relations 20-35.

(3) Foedera vii 813-820. A transcript of the contract was drawn up under the seal of the prévôté of Paris 14 April, A.N. J.677 no.18.

(4) Froissart xv 237.

the marriage had been issued a few days earlier by the bishop of Paris by Apostolic authority (1), but the dispensations of Boniface IX and Benedict XIII were not issued until July and August, in time for the actual wedding between Richard and Isabelle (2). Richard also ratified the agreement quickly, on 9 May (3), and a few days later he sent a letter to Charles with the Vicomte de Melun, promising to fulfil all that was in the contract and sending the letters of security required from his principal lords by its terms (4).

A further Anglo-French truce was signed on the same day as the marriage contract, and negotiations for the truce and the marriage had been coupled throughout. Richard's first embassy to France in July 1395 was empowered to negotiate for peace, not truce (5), and the French council considered that a peace settlement should accompany the marriage (6). However, the peace terms Richard instructed his embassy to demand were not a basis for discussion, but a manoeuvre designed to provoke the French into proposing an extension of the current truce (7). By forcing them to make the first offer of truce, he aimed to put them in a

(1) A.N. J.643 no.9.

(2) Foedera vii 836-837; A.N. J.653 no.13.

(3) A.N. J.643 no.7. and C.76/80 mm.11-9.

(4) Dip.Cor. no.228; see p.104 and n. 2 above.

(5) E.30/320 and C.76/80 m.18.

(6) Froissart xv 182.

(7) England... 256-257 from B.L.Cotton MS. Vitellius Cxi nos.2-3. See p.102 above.

weak negotiating position, as his envoys had been at the last conference in the previous year. A long truce had always been an option other than a peace treaty to settle the conflict, ever since the forty-year truce was discussed at Bruges in 1376 (1). In recent years, a long truce had been mooted at the conferences of July 1390, July 1392 and possibly in 1393, mostly by the French diplomats (2). Recent Anglo-Breton diplomacy had several times considered the possibility of an Anglo-French truce of twelve years or more, and even a marriage treaty (3).Five years of conferences in Picardy had merely brought England and France to a diplomatic stalemate in the search for a peace treaty. The English were now militarily weaker in Guyenne than they had been when John of Gaunt arrived there in 1387. In these circumstances Richard could not hope to gain any territorial concessions to accompany an extended truce, making it into a half-peace; instead he was seeking the advantages of dynastic marriages and large cash payments, and a suspension of hostilities during which he could make use of them. His second embassy in October had a clause added to their powers, enabling them to extend the truce for another five years in its present form. The French Council, if it could not have peace, preferred to have a truce that would last for a generation. Accordingly the English powers of 30 December and the instructions of the following day

(1) Bruges pp.xvii-xviii and nos. XXXI and XXXVIII.

(2) Conférences 368-369, 373, 374, 380; see above pp. 80, 86, 177, 178, 179.

(3) Jones - Ducal Brittany 214; E.30/289a; C.76/71 m.6.

envisaged an extension of twenty-eight years, which would make a total of a thirty-year truce with the two years before the current truce expired at Michelmas 1398 (1).

The truce was signed according to these terms and ratified by both kings on the same dates as the marriage contract (2). The forma was almost exactly the same as in the truce of 1394. A new clause provided that the truce was to continue, even if the marriage was prevented or terminated, by death or otherwise (3). The same allies were included in exactly the same terms, although Richard had specifically requested that the Scots were to be excluded if they were unwilling to conform to the truce (4). On the same day, the English negotiators signed a separate undertaking that Richard would not give any assistance to those of his allies who did not swear to keep the truce and therefore disqualified themselves from its benefits (5).

The truce recorded the names of the same conservators serving in the same areas as in 1394 (6). However, on the

(1) Foedera vii 812; C.76/80 m.18.

(2) Cosneau - Grands Traités 71-99; C.76/80 mm.8-5; A.N. J.643 no.15(3).

(3) Cosneau - Grands Traités 91.

(4) Cosneau - Grands Traités 79-82, 92-93; Foedera vii 812.

(5) A.N. J.644 no.17; transcript at Burr - Anglo-French Relations 89-90.

(6) Cosneau - Grands Traités 93-98 and 97 n.1., from A.N. J.643 nos. 15(2) and 15(3).

same day the English negotiators signed a supplementary agreement by which conservators who had been named in 1394 and proved unsuitable, should be replaced, although their powers did not allow them to do this at the making of the truce itself (1). Conservators were no longer to be responsible for the reduction of the rates of pâtis; an alteration in the clause of 1394 provided that a commission drawn from both sides should circulate in the Duchy and review the payments and the way they were collected (2). It appears that when the French had suggested the extension of the truce for twenty-eight years in late 1395, they also proposed that all pâtis should be terminated. In his instructions of New Year's Day 1396, Richard counter-proposed that the pâtis paid to Brest should remain in force and that in compensation for the loss of the Guyenne pâtis, he should receive an annuity from France . All monies paid from the English obedience to the French were to cease however (3). On 26 January, he re-issued the instructions, substituting a recommendation for a commission of three or four persons from each side to moderate the current pâtis, excluding those in Brest and the Channel Islands (4). This modification of the 1394 arrangement was more feasible than the first English suggestion; it probably represented a compromise between the positions of the two parties.

(1) A.N. J.644 no.18.

(2) Cosneau - Grands Traités 84.

(3) Foedera vii 812.

(4) Foedera vii 812-813.

Another supplementary agreement was made in these terms and signed on the same day as the truce. The commissioners were to be outsiders to the Duchy to avoid the bias the local Conservators had shown: Thomas Percy and William Elmham with a cleric for the English; the Vicomte de Melun, Guillaume le Bouteiller and Nicole de Rancé for the French. They were to assemble at Paris by 1 May 1396 and proceed to Guyenne, reviewing all pâtis there by the end of August. Any cases which they could not decide were to be referred to the royal uncles meeting in Picardy at Michelmas, together with all the evidences that had been collected, so that final adjudications could be made (1). Powers for the English commissioners were issued on 23 April; Ralph Selby was chosen as the cleric and Henry Percy the younger replaced his uncle Thomas. Three days later, they received further powers which ordered them to proceed in the business without actually visiting the places "appâtissez", if the French would agree to it (2). Percy went to France bearing a safe-conduct for the French commissioners (in which the Count of Sancerre had replaced Melun) with an escort of 120 (3).Selby followed in May with another which allowed them 200 (4).On

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(1) A.N. J.644 no.16.; transcript at Burr - Anglo-French Relations 91-95.

(2) B.N.Moreau 1423 no.42; C.76/80 m.2 (beginning only enrolled).

(3) Foedera vii 832-833. Percy received letters of attorney 26 April and letters of protection 28 April, C.76/80 m.14.

(4) C.76/80 m.12. Selby was paid four month's advance wages for the journey 9 May, E.28/6 no.61.

23 May, Sancerre, Bouteiller and Rancé were issued with powers which mirrored those of the English (1).

Having withdrawn from their commitment to tour the Duchy, the English commissioners continued to be obstructive by failing to attend meetings with Sancerre and his colleagues (2). Evidently the joint commission achieved nothing to alleviate the problems caused by pâtis, for it was left to Richard and the royal uncles meeting at Calais in November to ban all pâtis beyond the borders of the Duchy and reduce the rates of those within it by a quarter. This was to be a temporary measure until the matter could be discussed further by the uncles in spring 1397 (3). The conservators of both sides were informed of the decision the same month. In Saintonge, the Sire de Pons tried to persuade the provincial Estates to vote money to compensate for the garrisons' loss of income. At Saint-Jean-d'Angély, disturbances resulted because it was believed that pâtis were reduced to a quarter of their current level, instead of three-quarters (4).The agreement of November 1396 was never implemented and the royal uncles did not meet in the spring. The French charged the English with unwillingness to fulfil the obligation they

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(1) B.N.Moreau 1423 no.42.

(2) A.N. J.644 no.23, copy at Bod.Lib.Carte MS. 112 ff.156-158v.

(3) Angleterre et Schisme piece no.XIII from B.N.Dupuy 564 f.269; c.f. England...175.

(4) Chavanon - "Renaud VI" 45; Fowler - "Truces" 207 and n.92; A.N. J.865 no.12.

had made, but without result; the burdens of marque and pâtis continued to weigh upon the populace of Guyenne. The French were similarly frustrated in their attempts to settle the outstanding question of the pâtis of Normandy and the Channel Islands (1). In the early years of Henry IV's reign, they repeatedly called upon the English to effect the reduction of pâtis, as required by the truce of 1396 (2). English ambassadors were empowered to attend to this and agreed to discuss it, but pâtis remained an insoluble problem (3). Eventually the Tours truce of 1444 banned them altogether, replacing them with a direct tax, the taille (4).

If Richard was reluctant to fulfil all the clauses of the truce and its concomitant concords, he was eager for the completion of the marriage treaty. In June 1396 he sent William Scrope back to Paris, charged to collect oaths to the truce from Charles VI, his uncles and brother, such as Richard and his relatives had performed in the presence of the Vicomte de Melun. He was also instructed to request that the princess Isabelle should be brought to Calais by 1 August, or at least a week or two afterwards. Richard was prepared to accept her with only two thirds, or even

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(1) A.N. J.644 no.23.

(2) Foedera viii 317; Choix i 216-217; A.N. J.644 no.33; J.645 nos. 20 and 51.

(3) Foedera viii 195, 219, 223-224; C.76/84 m.4.

(4) Fowler - "Truces" 207.

half, of the promised money and jewels, provided the remainder was delivered at Michelmas. He intended to be at Calais to meet her and proposed a conference there between himself and the dukes of Berry and Burgundy (1). Evidently Richard was in a hurry to get possession of Isabelle before the French could have a chance to withdraw from their commitments. On 2 July, Charles and his Council acceded to Richard's request for a meeting with the duke of Burgundy, and the duke of Berry too if he should return from Poitou in time, but affirmed what had been stated to the English envoys in March, that Isabelle, her robes and jewels , and the first dowry payment could not be ready until Michelmas (2). They tried to persuade Scrope that Richard should delay his journey to Calais until the time that Isabelle could be delivered to him. Nevertheless, on 15 July the Council drew up plans for the financing of Burgundy's journey to Calais the following month and his reception of Richard in French territory, although it was still uncertain if the conference would take place and what would be discussed (3).On the 28 July, Charles wrote to Richard that he was expecting him to arrive shortly in the Calais marches and was sending

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(1) E.30/326 printed in Chaplais - "Diplomatic Documents" 41-42. Richard had been in contact with the duke of Orléans in April, B.L. Add.Ch. 3384. He started to prepare for his journey to Calais as early as 17 May and ordered the assembly of the necessary shipping in June and July, Foedera vii 834; C.76/80 m.3; C.76/81 m.12.

(2) A.N. J.644 no.21, partially printed in Chaplais - "Diplomatic Documents" 42-43.

(3) A.N. J.644 no.36.

Burgundy there, and possibly Berry too (1).Richard crossed the Channel on 7 August and a week later Burgundy met him and his uncles of Lancaster and Gloucester at Guînes. At Richard's request, arrangements for the marriage were hastened forward. It was also agreed that the two kings should meet when Isabelle was handed over (2).The French had been keen for several years that Richard should meet Charles, believing that he would be more amenable than his uncles and advisers to establishing a peace settlement. Such an encounter had been arranged in the draft peace of 1393 and was one of the elements in Mézières' scheme to bring peace to Christendom that was incorporated in the French démarche of May 1395 (3). The two delegations remained at Calais for a week. After Burgundy had returned to Paris, Charles wrote to Richard that he would bring his daughter to Saint Omer on 15 October (4).

Richard ordered the arrest of ships for his passage and crossed back to Calais on 27 September, leaving the duke of York as his regent in England (5). In France, the Council ordered more money to be raised in order to meet

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(1) A.N. J.644 no.21. On 30 July the duchess of Burgundy was also expecting Richard to arrive soon, B.N. Bourgogne 21 f.27v.

(2) Angleterre et Schisme 378; St.Denys ii 444-446, 450.

(3) Lettres de Rois ii 256-257 or Anglo-Norman no.172; Philippe de Mézières - Le Songe du vieil pelerin (ed.G.W.Coopland) 312 v 1; see pp. 90, 94, 100, and n.4 above.

(4) Anglo-Norman no.174.

(5) Foedera vii 839, 841; Angleterre et Schisme 378.

the extra expenses which the ceremonies at Calais would entail (1), and transported it to Saint Omer by early November (2).In October, the leading nobility of both nations gathered in the Picardy marches. On the 24th, Richard swore an oath that he and his subjects would keep the peace for eight days before, and eight after his meeting with Charles (3), and an agreement was published detailing the security measures for the interview (4). The two rival monarchs finally met on the 27th at a group of pavilions pitched mid-way between Guînes and Ardres, with a great display of friendship. Four days of ceremony and gift exchanges followed, on the last of which Isabelle was delivered to her future husband. Richard and Charles again swore oaths to observe the truce faithfully and devote themselves to the search for a final peace, and also to assist each other as allies against all men. The marriage took place in Calais on 4 November. The following evening, Richard and the dukes of Berry, Burgundy, Lancaster and Gloucester, the earl of Rutland and the vicomte de Melun drew up an agreement there about the next

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(1) Choix i 130-134; B.L.Add.Ch. 44; B.N.Clairambault 633 f.56.

(2) B.L.Add.Ch. 3386, 14017, 14019 .

(3) A.N. J.655 no.23(2); copies at B.N. n.a.f. 7007 f.37-37v and Dupuy 152 ff.19-20.

(4) A.N. J.655 no.23; copy at B.N. n.a.f. 7007 f.35-35v.

peace conference, joint Anglo-French measures to end the schism and the pâtis of Guienne (1).

It was probably at Calais that the two sides agreed on the other element of this temporary settlement, the return of Brest to the duke of Brittany. The English government recognised that it was under an obligation to give the fortress up, should final peace or a long truce be made between England and France (2). As soon as Duke Jean heard about the signing of the truce in March 1396, he sent letters and envoys to London to demand the return of Brest by terms of the obligations signed by Richard and six of his nobles in 1378 (3). Richard agreed at the end of November to surrender the town and the castle, provided Jean paid him 120,000 francs at Hesdin by the following Easter (4). In March 1397, Jean sent an embassy to England to try to get the price reduced, but only the place of payment was changed, to Rennes. The duke was also to pay a sum to cover the pâtis from when the lieutenant of Brest ceased to levy them on 25 March, until he vacated the fortress. He would surrender the letters of obligation of Richard and his nobles, and he and his son had to swear

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(1) Angleterre et Schisme piece XIII from B.N.Dupuy 564 f.269; St.Denys ii 452-472; Ann.Ric.Sec. 188-194; Oriel College (Oxford) MS.46 ff. 104v-106v; B.L.Add.MS. 17906 ff.4-6; Add.Ch. 3400; B.N. Bourgogne 21 f.28v; A.N. J.644 no.19.

(2) Jones - Ducal Brittany 84; C.76/71 m.6.

(3) Lettres des Rois ii 278-281, 284-286; CCR 1392-1396 459.

(4) Jones - Ducal Brittany 138, citing Archives Départementales de la Loire - Atlantique E.120 m.6.

that Brest would never be put to military use against the English (1). Accordingly, Richard commissioned envoys to receive the money and deliver the fortress (2). William Scrope received the 120,000 francs at Paris in May (3), and on 19 June the attorneys of the earl of Huntingdon, as captain of Brest, were paid 30,000 francs there by Duke Jean, in compensation for the pâtis and other revenues (4).The town and castle were finally returned to Jean on the last day of June (5). Indirectly it was Charles VI who paid Richard for the restoration of Brest too, for he paid Jean 150,000 francs as a dowry when his daughter Jeanne married the heir of Brittany in 1396, and another 10,000 francs in January 1398 for his attendance at the conference between Guînes and Ardres fifteen months earlier (6).

The interim settlement was still not complete for Richard had not fully published the twenty-eight year truce. At the Calais meeting of November 1396 it was agreed that the truce should be proclaimed throughout both kingdoms (7). Charles carried out this promise and ordered watch and

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(1) Lettres de Rois ii 282-284; PPC i 64-67.

(2) Foedera vii 851-853; PPC i 67-69.

(3) Jones - Ducal Brittany 138 n.4.

(4) B.N. n.a.f. 5216 no.18.

(5) Jones - Ducal Brittany 139. He issued a quittance for it 12 June, Preuves ii 678-679.

(6) Jones - Ducal Brittany 138, 141 n.1.

(7) St. Denys ii 470.

ward to cease in his whole kingdom, exept on some of the coasts (1). In Guyenne there was tension between the two sides. Friction arose between the Sire de Pons and Jean Trailly, mayor of Bordeaux, about the dispute between Guiot Potart and twelve burgesses of Bordeaux, a case of reprisal and counter-reprisal that had been in litigation since 1394. In February 1398 Trailly, as conservator-general for the English in Guyenne, wrote to Pons complaining about judgements he had delivered in the case and enquiring whether it was safe for those of the English obedience to enter Pons' jurisdiction without suffering from marques and reprisals. Trailly was openly suspicious of Pons' intentions and warned him that he would retaliate with similar action (2). In July 1397 Charles VI had a vidimus of Richard's ratification of the truce drawn up, presumably for use in negotiations with the English (3). He sent three embassies to Richard requiring him to publish the truce in Guyenne, the last in August 1398. He reported that the English captains there had openly declared their intention to renew the war when the present truce expired at Michelmas, threatening that he would be compelled to reciprocate if they did so and that Richard's party would thereby be responsible for breaking the truce, just as it was beginning. He suggested an envoy should be sent speedily to the Duchy to

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(1) Contamine - Guerre État et Société 231.

(2) Chavanon - "Renaud VI" 42-43; Fowler - "Truces" 202-203; A.N. K.54 no.44.

(3) A.N. J.643 no.15(2).

avoid this course of events, followed by publication by a delegation of higher rank (1). Four days before the expiry of the four-year truce, the Council in Bordeaux wrote to Louis de Sancerre, the French constable and conservator-general, that it had still not been officially notified of the new truce by Richard. Nevertheless, it had required the English captains on the frontier to observe it and asked for a similar undertaking in regard to the French captains (2). Meanwhile, Richard had finally yielded to French pressure and ordered the proclamation of the truce in the Duchy on 30 August, exactly a month before it was due to take effect (3).

The Anglo-French settlement of 1396 to 1397 recognised the failure of the attempts that had been made to achieve peace in the last twenty years by postponing the problem for another thirty. The military weakness of the Plantagenets in the 1390s made it imperative for them to gain a few years' cessation of hostilities in order to recuperate; and therefore they were prepared to accept the inclusion of the French allies in the truces of these years as the price that had to be paid. In 1395, King Richard considered it essential that his claim to the French throne should be retained so that it could be exploited when the truce expired. Whilst he envisaged

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(1) A.N. J.644 no.23; copies at B.N. n.a.f. 7005 and Bod.Lib.Carte MS. 112 ff. 156-158v.

(2) Fowler - "Truces" 189, citing Archives Départementales de l'Hérault A1 f.241-241v.

(3) Foedera viii 43.

extending the truce for five years, the French government wanted a longer arrangement, guaranteed by a dynastic marriage and the personal meeting of the two sovereigns. The English would then be left with the rump of Guyenne, stripped of the pâtis system by which they exploited France, probably in perpetuity. Richard extracted as much as he could from the negotiations, without in any way impairing his title to the French crown and the quarrel that he derived from it. His de facto possession of both the royal title and absolute sovereignty over English Guyenne was assured for a generation, the present position immobilised in an armed peace. He acquired a marriage alliance with the leading royal family in Europe and gained the prestige of meeting its head as an equal. More tangibly, the Valois paid him enormous sums to buy the long truce and the restoration of Brest, about three quarters of a million francs in cash and jewels, with another 300,000 still owed at his deposition. Richard gained the maximum possible advantage from the agreements to which he had sworn by hastening the French into fulfilling their obligations, then not discharging, or delaying the performance of his own. By 1398 his chief interest in maintaining the truce was pecuniary and it was no longer regarded as the prelude to a final peace.

The following year, Richard's deposition by Henry of Bolingbroke threw the whole settlement into doubt.

Returning from exile in France, and recently allied to Louis of Orléans (1), Henry probably expected the Valois to sanction his usurpation. He quickly attempted to resume a peaceful relationship with France, ordering the ratification of Richard's letters confirming privileges to French merchants (2), issuing a safe-conduct for French ambassadors to come to England (3), and sending Walter Skirlaw and Thomas Percy as his own ambassadors to France, empowered to arrange a confirmation of the truce and make further agreements about mutual aid (4). However, the French government reacted adversely to news of the changes in England. The resumption of watch and ward was ordered along the Norman coast and south of the Loire, garrisons were strengthened in Boulogne and Picardy, the river Somme was closed at Abbeville to prevent grain exports to England and a naval expedition was prepared at Harfleur (5)The request of Skirlaw and Percy for a safe-conduct was ignored and their herald arrested. Their report, sent to the Great Council early in February 1400, led it to consider that war was more likely with France than a new

(1) Choix i 157-159.

(2) E.28/7 no.17, 15 Nov. 1399.

(3) Foedera viii 98. The Religieux of St.Denis gives an account of this embassy to England, St. Denys ii 730-732. Wylie believed this referred to the mission of Oct. 1400, Henry IV i 154. Henry wrote to Charles 2 Nov. 1399, promising to send envoys to reply to the approach he had received from this embassy, E.28/26 no.4.

(4) Foedera viii 109.

(5) Contamine - Guerre État et Société 231; Choix i 154; Wylie - Henry IV i 121;S.P. Pistono -"Henry IV and Charles VI: The Confirmation of the Twenty-Eight Year Truce" Journal of Medieval History iii (1977) 353, 361.

truce, or a confirmation of the 1396 truce. Their messenger William Faryngdon related their unfavourable reception by the French authorities and the French attempts to subvert the English position in Guyenne. This, coupled with news of extensive Scottish raids across the Border, prompted the Council to make emergency arrangements for the raising of men and money (1).

But the immediate danger had already passed. With the collapse of the revolt of the earls and the death of King Richard at Pontefract, which seems to have been more certainly known at Paris than at Westminster (2), French plans to intervene in England ceased. Now that Henry's position was firmly established and his rival dead, there was some doubt as to the legitimacy of such an intervention. Charles could no longer fight on behalf of his son-in-law whilst preserving the truce that had been made between them; that truce now concerned his assign or successor whoever it might rightfully be. Contact was made with Skirlaw and Percy at Calais (3), and the French Council found it impossible to deny their assertion that the truce should not be broken because it had been made

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(1) Foedera viii 125-127; B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Diii f.125, the credence of the English ambassadors at Calais to William Faryngdon. It is now damaged and very faded (readable only under ultra-violet light), and does not seem to have been noted before. The herald was probably Lancaster.

(2) See the doubts of the Council in Feb., PPC i 107, 111-112; and Walsingham's assertion that he starved himself to death on 14 Feb., Hist.Ang. ii 243.

(3) B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Diii f.125.

between the two kingdoms and their subjects and the allies of both sides, not the persons of Charles and Richard. Also a clause in the truce forbade the re-opening of hostilities during its term, no matter what events took place on either side (1). Accordingly a confirmation of Charles' adherence to the twenty-eight year truce was drawn up on 29 January (2). On the same day an embassy was sent to meet with the English envoys in Picardy, instructed to excuse the delay in the negotiations on the grounds that Charles and the other Valois lords had been absent from Paris. The French ambassadors were empowered to affirm Charles' intention to keep the truce and to draw up letters in their own names promising this (3). The French government was only prepared to give ground to the English on this question as slowly as possible, whilst ensuring that negotiations continued, so making the truce effective whether officially confirmed or not. Three weeks later it instructed its envoys to press for the longest possible adjournment on the pretext that Charles needed to consult the assembly of his great council, as English kings were accustomed to seek the advice of Parliament. They were to endeavour to satisfy the English, first by hinting that the French meant to keep the truce, then by stating it openly and delivering their own letters expressing this. Finally they could hand over

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(1) Choix i 189-190. For this clause see page 168 above and Cosneau - Grands Traités 91.

(2) Foedera viii 124; A.N. J.644 nos. 24 and 24(4).

(3) A.N. J.644 nos.24(2), 27,31.

Charles' confirmation of the truce, and request equivalent letters in Henry's name (1). The matter was discussed in several sessions of talks at Leulinghen in February and March (2). At the last of these meetings, the English ambassadors were equipped with powers to demand the oaths of Charles and his principle lords and officers to observe the truce, and notarial letters witnessing these oaths (3).This aggressive approach extracted Charles'confirmation of 29 January from the French envoys, without the surrender of equivalent letters of Henry. Further talks were postponed until June (4). The English embassy returned to Leulinghen with Henry's confirmation dated 18 May, its wording copied from Charles' letters, with another variant version (5). It was commissioned to agree a truce confirmation with the French, but no longer to demand oaths (6). The French embassy also carried powers

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(1) A.N. J.644 nos. 31(4), 34.

(2) Foedera viii 129; A.N. J.644 nos. 28, 28(2), 28(3), 28(4), 30. It seems a local truce was declared to cover the meetings until the confirmation of the main truce was complete,St.Denys ii 744-746.

(3) Foedera viii 132; PPC i 119-120.

(4) Another copy of the confirmation was drawn up on 4 March for delivery to the French delegation, A.N. J.644 no.24(5). On 18 March it was instructed to show the letters to Skirlaw, despite the rumoured execution of Percy in London, A.N. J.919 nos. 4 and 4(2). It probably did so when it met the English on 19 March, A.N. J.644 nos. 28(2) and 28(4).

(5) Foedera viii 142. Copies at A.N. J.645 nos. 3 and 5, and J.919 no.1.

(6) C.76/84 mm. 4 and 6; A.N. J.645 no.4; Choix i 167-171.

to discuss the truce (1), and a further copy of Charles' confirmation dated 31 May (2). It was instructed to hand over this new copy if the English required it and to demand Henry's confirmation in return (3). The two documents were exchanged and the recognition of the twenty-eight year truce was complete. During the course of the summer, Henry issued orders that the truce was to be observed at sea towards the French and their allies, except the Scots and the Frieslanders, who were continually guilty of violations (4). Though the Valois regarded him as a usurper, they had no alternative monarch to regard as legitimate since Richard's demise. Henry had won a diplomatic victory by inducing them to hand over their letters of confirmation first.

However, he failed in his attempt to strengthen further the 1396 settlement and the legitimacy of his régime by marriage alliances with the Valois. In November 1399 Skirlaw and Percy were commissioned to negotiate marriages between the children of Henry and those of Charles and his uncles (5). Henry was perhaps considering some extension of his arrangement with Louis of Orléans or even a French

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(1) Choix i 171-173, another copy at B.N. n.a.f. 7007 f.71-71v.

(2) E.30/339A.

(3) A.N. J.644 no.33. Copies at B.N. n.a.f. 7007 f.61; B.L.Add.MS. 11298 ff. 5v-6v.

(4) CCR 1399-1402 134-135, 169; C.P.R. 1399-1401 271, 350, 352.

(5) Foedera viii 108.

marriage for himself (1). The English envoys received similar powers in February and May (2). By now the princess Isabelle was widowed and the Council hoped to avoid returning her to her father with her jewels and dowry by marrying her to Henry of Monmouth (3). But the French government refused to respond to any suggestion of marriages (4). When it was finally decided to send an envoy to Isabelle in October 1400, he was instructed to forbid her, on her parents' behalf, to enter any agreement to marry again in England which might impede her return to France. Several attempts had been made to persuade her to this (5). Thenceforward Henry had to try to maintain the twenty-eight year truce without the support of the dynastic marriage that was the other main component of the 1396 settlement.

After the English had gained confirmation of the truce, the French dominated the negotiations with their demands for Isabelle's return under the terms agreed in 1396 (6). They alleged to the king of Scotland that this was the

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(1) Pistono - "Confirmation" 359; Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 46-47.

(2) Foedera viii 128-129; Choix i 167-171; A.N. J 645 no.4; C.76/84 mm.4 and 6.

(3) PPC i 118; Pistono "Confirmation" 362.

(4) A.N. J.644 nos. 33 and 34.

(5) Choix i 194-195; Froissart xvi 370; Wylie - Henry IV iv 261.

(6) See page 104 above.

only reason they had for meeting Henry's representatives at all (1). From the first meeting onwards, the French ambassadors requested the princess's return, at first in general terms and then insisting on September or October, or by 1 November at the latest (2). In July, a copy of the obligation of the eight English lords to return her after Richard's death was drawn up to support the French case (3). At the suggestion of the English side, a decision was made to send envoys to England to pursue the matter (4). In September, Jean Hangest and Pierre Blanchet were charged to visit Isabelle personally and to discover how she was being treated, and also to make demands for her return directly to Henry, his Council and the other lords named in the obligation, still insisting on the term of 1 November (5). This proved futile and in Spring 1401 the French ambassadors were still being ordered to request Isabelle's restoration urgently, with 24 June now regarded as the most convenient date (6). In response to these repeated solicitations, Henry promised, prevaricated and delayed. Unable to repay the 200,000 francs of Isabelle's

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(1) Choix i 189.

(2) Choix i 171-172, 183; A.N. J.644 nos. 31, 31(4), 33, 34.

(3) B.N.Francais 15968 ff.49-56.

(4) Choix i 190, 196. A safe-conduct was issued for Hangest and Blanchet at Westminster 19 Sept. 1400, C.76/84 m.1. Their mission did not therefore take the English by surprise, as Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 85.

(5) Choix i 185-186, 193-197; Wylie - Henry IV iv 263.

(6) A.N. J.645 nos. 1,2,13.

dowry or to persuade the French to agree to her marriage to his son, he sought to sell her back to them for the highest price of diplomatic advantage he could extract. In May 1400 he reluctantly empowered his envoys to reply to the French requests for her return (1). They required their French counterparts to show them the original of the English lords' obligation (2), and as a result, offered that Isabelle should go back to France the following February (3). When the French demanded it should be before November, they were evasive, proposing that French representatives should come to England (4). Henry probably hoped that transferring the negotiations to England would lead to recognition of his position as king by the Valois.

In October, the tranportation of Isabelle to Calais was regarded as imminent, but at the end of the month Henry told Hangest that the 200,000 francs would not be returned with her; she could go one month after a suitable form of quittance had been agreed (5). The following spring he was trying to draw the French into discussions of truce violations at the meeting arranged to discuss Isabelle's return (6). But the French could not be duped into recognising Henry's title or surrendering their claim to

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(1) C.76/84 m.4, printed Choix i 167-171.

(2) A.N. J.645 no.8.

(3) A.N. J.645 no.9.

(4) Choix i 185, 196.

(5) Foedera viii 162; A.N. J.645 no.1; Wylie - Henry IV iv 259-260, 263-264; Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 86, 89.

(6) Foedera viii 186-187.

the dowry repayment. They adamantly refused any discussion of the maintenance of the truce until Isabelle was restored to France (1). When Hangest and Blanchet came to England, they cancelled a meeting that had been arranged in Picardy, in order to give effect to this condition (2). Finally it was agreed by indenture that Isabelle should return in July 1401 and that four days later, envoys from both sides would meet at Leulinghen to discuss infractions of the truce and the reduction of pâtis (3).By their consistent and determined stand, the French diplomats forced Henry to sell Isabelle for no more that this minor conference . When she was handed over at Leulinghen on 31 July, he lost the hostage which guaranteed that the French government would continue the truce. French policy towards England was now unrestricted.

In composing the quittance for Isabelle's return, the French were careful not to refer to Henry as Richard's successor, or name him as king of England (4). But the English ambassadors at Calais tricked Isabelle into

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(1) A.N. J.645 nos.1 and 13.

(2) E.28/9, letter from the English envoys Walter Skirlaw, William Heron and Richard Holm at Canterbury, Thursday 14 Oct. 1400, to the councillors in London about their meetings with Hangest and Blanchet. c.f. the French instructions, Choix i 195-196.

(3) Foedera viii 194-195.

(4) A.N. J.645 no.1 instructions for negotiating the matter of the quittance.

sealing a quittance in which she named Henry as "nostri mariti successor" (1). When she was in French hands, a protestation was issued in her name denouncing this admission, stating that it was given under the threat of violence and a return to England (2).The Valois were not prepared to accept the legitimacy of the title of the man they regarded as Richard's murderer, considering that the rightful succession belonged to the descendants of Lionel of Clarence, though there was some confusion as to who these were (3). This created problems in negotiating with Henry. Charles could not give an audience to Skirlaw and Percy in December 1399, since to receive their credentials, issued in Henry's name as king, would be to give tacit recognition to the title he had usurped (4). A similar problem arose over the safe-conducts requested for English envoys to go to Paris to witness Isabelle's oath confirming her quittance when she reached the age of majority, as had been agreed in the indenture of May 1401 (5). English ambassadors were not able to visit Paris again until September 1407 (6). In their efforts to avoid

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(1) Foedera viii 217-218.

(2) A.N. J.656 ff.94-95v.

(3) See the memorandum of 1414 in J.H.Wylie - "Memorandum concerning a proposed marriage between Henry V and Catherine of France in 1414" EHR xxix (1914) 322-323.

(4) Choix i 188. His letter to Skirlaw and Percy was insistent that negotiations should be held in Picardy, as they reported to the English Council, B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Diii f.125.

(5) A.N. J.645 nos. 1 and 20. c.f. Foedera viii 195.

(6) B.N.Francais n.a.f. 7623 ff.205-208. French envoys went to Gloucester in Dec., see page 111 above.

calling Henry king, the French government at first referred to the duke of Lancaster, "le seigneur qui vous a envoiez ou vostre seigneur", "messages envoiez de la partie d'Engleterre", the person who calls himself king of England and similar formulae (1).Its representatives were instructed to resist pressure to show commissions in which he was called "son cousin d'Engleterre" (2).When he was sent to England, Hangest carried powers and credentials using this term, but refused to show them to Henry, greeting him in his own name instead of on Charles' behalf (3). From spring 1401, however, Charles normally referred to Henry as his cousin (4). In 1399 Henry called Charles cousin (5), but after the rebuff of Skirlaw and Percy, he issued two sets of powers to his envoys, one referring to his Adversary of France and the other to the ambassadors, proctors and nuncii for the French party (6). But once negotiations were established, he reverted to describing him as his Cousin of France (7). In 1406 he again became Adversary of France (8). The conflict was now symmetrical:

(1) Choix i 171, 193; B.L.Add.Ch. 1397; A.N. J.644 nos. 31 and 33.

(2) A.N. J.644 nos. 33 and 34.

(3) Choix i 185-187; Wylie - Henry IV iv 262.

(4) A.N. J.645 nos. 2, 14, 16, 29, 30, 31, 32, 38, 40, 46.

(5) Foedera viii 98, 108-109; E.28/26 no.4.

(6) Foedera viii 128-129.

(7) Foedera viii 142, 143, 186, 188; C.76/84 mm.4 and 6; C.76/85 m.5; C.76/86 mm.2 and 11; E.28/18 no.46.

(8) Foedera viii 434; C.76/89 m.4; C.76/90 m.6. In 1407 he was once called king of France, A.N. J.646 no.1.

each protagonist regarded the other as a usurper.

Despite the French government's attitude to Henry's royal title, it could not legally break the truce with England, nor did it intend to do so, as the French envoys were instructed to reiterate in November 1401 (1). Therefore it tried to do the maximum possible harm to Henry by methods outside the legal scope of the truce: by encouraging rebels and third parties to fight against him in their own names, with French forces intervening only indirectly and unofficially. It was hoped that an anti-Lancastrian revolt would solve the French dilemma of continuing a contract with an unrecognised party (2). French agents evinced no great willingness to enforce the provisions of the truce and so punish those fighting a covert war on France's behalf (3). In fact France was unprepared to resume full-scale war because of financial problems and the uncertainty of a divided political leadership. The Valois were anxious that Henry should not precipitate a ruinous conflict by renouncing the truce on his side. It was therefore necessary to continue negotiations with the English for as long as possible, preserving the truce by repeatedly discussing it, in contrast to the aggressive stance towards Henry himself.

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(1) Choix i 217.

(2) See A.N. J.645 no.20. The extent of the Anglo-French conflict during the truce will be considered in the next chapter.

(3) C.J.Ford "Piracy or Policy: The Crisis in the Channel 1400-1403" TRHS 5th Series xxix (1979) 67, 70, 76.

French embassies were often instructed to seek the longest possible interval when arranging the next successive meeting (1), and their English opposites were well aware of their delaying tactics (2). Above all,they were not to allow the sequence of negotiations to be broken.

Henry was not in a position to recommence an official war either. The circumstances of his acquisition of the throne placed him in constant danger of domestic rebellion; campaigns in Scotland and Wales were a drain on his insufficient financial resources; and in the Duchy of Guyenne security was precarious and fidelity doubtful. But he was compelled to respond to aggressive French action wherever it occurred and so the English were no more inclined than the French to punish truce violations on their side. At the same time, Henry was as eager as the Valois to maintain the existence of the truce by a continuing series of negotiations, and the main purport of the instructions he issued to his envoys in November 1401 was to prevent the French terminating them (3). The Council had decided to refrain from war as long as the French gave undertakings to keep the truce alive (4). Several times the English ambassadors accused the French side of intending to kill it (5), and in June 1403 Henry

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(1) A.N. J.644 no.31(4); J.645 nos. 43, 47 and 51; Choix i 219-220.

(2) Foedera viii 231; A.N. J.919 no.13.

(3) Foedera viii 231-232.

(4) PPC i 143-144, 176, 178.

(5) A.N. J.919 nos. 11 and 15; B.L.Add.Ch. 12505.

threatened to suspend all further talks until he was given assurances by the French government that it had not authorised the provocations of Louis of Orléans. But all his envoys could obtain was another statement that the French had never broken the truce and did not intend to do so (1). Henry wanted the French to commit themselves further by proclaiming the truce anew and repeatedly commissioned his ambassadors to arrange this (2). At first they refused, claiming that the original publication in France and Charles' letter of confirmation should suffice to indicate their intention (3). However they were more amenable after Isabelle's return and their envoys were authorised to accede to the English requests, if it proved necessary (4).The conferences meeting at Leulinghen in August 1402 and August 1403 agreed there should be a new proclamation by both sides, but this does not seem to have been acted upon (5).Henry also wanted the French to participate in accords supplementary to the truce and accordingly empowered his ambassadors to make additions to it (6). Initially the French government would not discuss this, citing its obligations to consult its allies (7). It

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(1) Foedera viii 310-311; A.N. J.645 no.43.

(2) Foedera viii 187, 224, 301; C.76/84 m.4; C.76/86 m.2; A.N. J.645 no.9.

(3) Choix i 184; A.N. J.644 no.33.

(4) Choix i 217; Foedera viii 317; A.N. J.645 no.31.

(5) Foedera viii 275-276.

(6) PPC i 241; Foedera viii 187, 224, 301; C.76/84 m.4.

(7) Choix i 191; A.N. J.644 no.33.

was reluctant to draw up any new contracts with Henry, as this would imply some recognition of his royal title by accepting his person as the representative of the kingdom of England. Henry hoped these additional agreements would achieve precisely this end, besides limiting the latitude of French aggression (1).

Henry's Council had discussed the maintenance of the truce in Guyenne in the first year of his reign (2), and just before the two sides met at Leulinghen to effect Isabelle's restoration, he appointed his two admirals as conservators of the truce at sea, commissioned to deal with infractions on both sides (3).His ambassadors met the French again at Leulinghen on 3 August 1401, four days after the surrender of Isabelle as arranged, and persuaded them to agree to an indenture containing measures in support of the truce (4).The consideration of truce infractions was to be divided into three areas: the admirals were to go to Calais and Boulogne on 11 November to arrange a meeting on the frontier to settle violations at sea; similarly English and French commissioners were to be at Bordeaux and St. Jean d'Angély for infractions in Guyenne and the reduction of pâtis and other commissioners

(1) See B.L.Add.Ch. 1397, where the lieutenant of Calais complains the Burgundian chancellor has renegued on an earlier recognition of Henry's title, in favour of the formula, "He who calls himself king of England", 2 Oct. 1403.

(2) E.28/7 no.73.

(3) Foedera viii 152 (which should be dated 19 July 1401) 213-214.

(4) Foedera viii 219-220 and A.N. J.645 no.24.

also at Calais and Boulogne for infringements in Normandy and Picardy. This recalls the arrangements made to enforce the truce at Bruges in 1376 (1). The indenture repeated exactly the clause in the truce which prohibited the acquisition of castles, towns and fortresses by one side from the other (2), and revoked all current letters of marque and reprisal in accordance with its terms. Ships and merchandise that had been captured or arrested since the truce began, were to be returned to their owners; and in cases where the captured goods had disappeared, compensation was to be awarded by the arbitration of the admirals or conservators. Aggrieved parties could undertake journeys to recover their goods without obtaining a safe-conduct and the conservators were obliged to ensure the restitution of what they sought. Proclamations were to be made on both sides that merchants could trade in the areas covered by the truce without the need for new safe-conducts. These measures added little to the 1396 truce except an agreement for further meetings, but amplified and clarified its most topical terms. They were sufficient to achieve the English objective of committing the French to its continued existence. The indenture was subject to the approval of both principal lords, to be notified to the opposite side in Picardy by 29 September. Henry published the agreement on 12 September (3), and a few days later appointed panels

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(1) Bruges no.XLV.

(2) c.f. Cosneau - Grands Traités 88.

(3) C.76/85 m.1.

of conservators for Guyenne, and Picardy and Normandy and reappointed the admirals to keep the truce at sea (1). The French government agreed to the three meetings (2), but its response to the other clauses was more equivocal. French envoys were instructed to point out that both the clause prohibiting the acquisition of fortresses and the freedom of merchants to trade without safe-conducts were covered in the truce. Since Charles accepted that this truce was in force, there was no need of an additional declaration. The clauses against letters of marque and providing for the restoration of captured goods were accepted, provided the English took steps to prevent their countrymen violating the truce and repaired the breaches they had committed so far (3).

Just over a year later on 14 August, English and French ambassadors signed and sealed a further indenture at Leulinghen (4). The undeclared war at sea between English and French privateers had meanwhile come to dominate the tension between the two kingdoms. The agreement reflected the desire of both sides to limit its extent by continued adherence to the truce, to prevent its escalation into a full-scale conflict. The indenture opened by stating that the truce should continue in force despite the many violations recently committed on both sides. It

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(1) Foedera viii 223-224; E.28/9.

(2) E.28/9 unnumbered.

(3) Choix i 215-220.

(4) Foedera viii 274-276.

reiterated the agreement of August 1401 in declaring that new safe-conducts were unnecessary for injured parties travelling to obtain restitution of their captured goods and for merchants to trade goods, though these were to be granted without problem if they were asked for; and the injunction against letters of marque and reprisal was repeated still more forcefully. In addition, prisoners taken on both sides were to be freed without the payment of ransoms or any other sums resulting from their captivity. Pirates and those banished from either kingdom were not to be harboured in the sea-ports of either side, but were to be arrested and punished as stipulated in the truce. They should be compelled to restore captured ships and merchandise to their victims. Cases of violations which had not been settled by the ambassadors, were referred to the conservators, if committed by land, and the admirals if by sea (and the warden of the Cinq Ports when his area of jurisdiction was involved), for investigation and action (1). Anything they could not settle was to return again to the ambassadors at Leulinghen on the following 1 May for final judgement. It was also agreed that the truce should be published again in both kingdoms so that trade could be securely re-established. All the articles of the indenture were subject to the written ratification of the two kings to be exchanged on the frontier of Picardy by 29 September. Accordingly, French envoys were sent back to Leulinghen in

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(1) This measure was suggested in the French instructions, A.N. J.645 no.20.

September empowered and instructed to notify the English of Charles' acceptance of the agreement and to publish it in the neighbouring ports, provided that the English did likewise (1). Henry did not send his envoys to Leulinghen at this time, but signified his assent by their letters. As the French seem to have anticipated, he delayed the publication of the indenture in an attempt to dissuade them from their threats and aggressive acts. An order for its publication in the Calais march was finally issued on 18 October, to be obeyed within four days of its receipt (2).A month later, Henry appointed the captains of Calais, Guînes and Hammes or their lieutenants as conservators of the truce in Artois, Picardy, Flanders and the Calais march, empowered to amend violations of the truce (3). At this time his ambassadors pressed the French to order their conservators to meet their English counterparts to settle infractions when requested, as required by the terms of the truce (4). In February 1403, orders were issued in England for the arrest of banished pirates in accordance with the terms of the new indenture (5). Offenders from England, Brittany, Normandy, Picardy and Flanders were specified. Henry therefore recognised that

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(1) C.47/30/9 no.1; A.N. J.645 nos. 37 and 38.

(2) Foedera viii 279-280; A.N. J.645 nos. 55(2) and 55 (copy at Bod.Lib.Carte MS. 113 ff.111v-112v).

(3) Foedera viii 282-283.

(4) A.N. J.645 no.51. See page 192 above.

(5) CPR 1401-1405 201.

the provisions of the truce and the indenture covered the Flemish, as they had requested they should do (1). Nevertheless, a few months later the French envoys were instructed to complain that continuing English privateering ran counter to English obligations in the truce and the indenture of August 1402. They were to request a further agreement which would ensure that breaches of the truce were repaired without evasion (2).

English and French embassies met for this purpose at Leulinghen in May and June 1403, but the English were unwilling to proceed to another accord until they obtained assurances from the French about the actions of Louis of Orléans in regard to the truce (3). Eventually the ambassadors signed and sealed an indenture on 27 June (4). This repeated all the clauses of the August 1402 agreement. It concluded with a protestation from both sides that none of its contents constituted a modification of the truce which would remain in force in its original form. Extra sentences in the clauses about the liberation of captured pirates and the banning of letters of marque and reprisal stressed their comprehension in the terms of

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(1) CCR 1399-1402 547.

(2) A.N. J.645 no.51.

(3) Foedera viii 310-311; A.N. J.645 no.43.

(4) Foedera viii 305-309. There are several copies at A.N. J.645 no.44; Bod.Lib. Carte MS. 113 f.242. This was not an agreement to observe the truce until 1 March 1404, as Pistono - Repudiation 201; St.Denys iii 102-104; Ann.Ric.Sec. 372.

1396. A programme of future meetings was arranged. On 1 September, by which date the indenture was to be published on both sides, prisoners held in England and France would be freed at Calais and Boulogne respectively. On 5 September the conservators, admirals or other commissaries would meet at Leulinghen to assess the expenses owed by each prisoner to his captor for his maintenance and transportation. Apart from this, the prisoners were to be exempt from all further payments, even if they had started paying their ransoms. The conservators and admirals would deal with unsettled cases of infractions by 1 March following, on which date those remaining would be referred back to the ambassadors meeting at Leulinghen. Additional measures had been agreed however, to deal with the privateering war for once and for all. When Hangest and Sains brought the draft of the indenture before the French Council in Paris on 10 July, they were instructed to object to two rigorous clauses which were subsequently removed. One stipulated that no ship should be armed by either party without the licence of its principal lord and a certificate issued by its admiral, which the French complained would place intolerable restrictions on the trading ventures of Charles' subjects the Genoese, Flemings and Bretons. The other compelled the admirals, conservators and other judicial officers to pay compensation to injured parties if a case of infraction had not been settled within two months, whether the guilty party had been arrested or not. At the French request, substitute clauses required them simply to take an oath to

act quickly in response to any complaint and effect restitution of stolen goods; port officials, sworn to observe the contents of the indenture, would arrest any pirates who came into their ports with their vessels and prizes. These were to be kept in safe custody and an inventory compiled for the benefit of those who had been robbed. The French Council wanted the sea made secure by the withdrawal of armed vessels to port. A clause was therefore inserted into the indenture by which all armed ships were to be recalled to port by proclamation before 1 September. However Hangest and Sains were instructed to maintain that any agreement additional to the truce and to the indenture of August 1402 was unnecessary (1). All the new clauses of the indenture in its final form were therefore the work of the French; it was evidently a compromise between the French need for a pacification of the sea and the English desire for a written agreement that compelled the conservators to operate the truce. On 21 July before the indenture had been finally concluded, Henry ordered pirates and those under sentence of banishment from either kingdom to be arrested at Plymouth and Dartmouth, in accordance with its terms (2). Five days later, his ambassadors at Calais wrote to their French opposites requiring them to sign agreements on the following day (3). Accordingly on the 27th, the two sides

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(1) Foedera viii 308-309; A.N. J.645 no.47.

(2) CPR 1401-1405 283.

(3) A.N. J.919 no.15.

signed two short agreements for commissions of both sides to meet and prisoners to be exchanged at Leulinghen in September, as had been arranged in the main indenture (1). At the end of August, several clauses of the indenture were included in a separate agreement between England and Flanders (2). Already the English were complaining that the Count of Saint Pol had obstructed the proclamation of the Anglo-French agreement at Boulogne (3). English and French commissioners did meet at Leulinghen in September, but postponed the liberation of prisoners until 20 November, agreeing that their captors should be cited in writing to appear on that date (4). In March 1404, the French ambassadors accused their English opposites of not respecting the agreement they had signed (5). Meanwhile the lieutenant of Calais and the French lieutenant of Picardy and West Flanders had agreed an additional security for fishermen of both sides in the Channel during the herring season. Until 1 January in the quadrilateral formed by Southampton harbour, the mouth of the Seine, Gravelines harbour and the Isle of Thanet, they could fish without disturbance and should be received peacefully in

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(1) Foedera viii 309 and 310, signed by the French; A.N. J.919 nos. 16 and 17, and B.L.Add.Ch. 12499, signed by the English.

(2) Foedera viii 327-328; E.Varenbergh - Histoire des Relations Diplomatiques entre le comté de Flandre et l'Angleterre au moyen age(Brussels 1874) 544.

(3) A.N. J.919 no.11.

(4) Foedera viii 330-331; A.N. J.919 no.20; J.645 nos. 49,49(2), 50.

(5) B.L.Add.Ch. 12507.

ports of the other side, if pirates or weather drove them there. The lieutenant of Calais sent the draft agreement to the Council on 10 October 1403 (1), and it was then forwarded to Henry at Bristol. He replied on the 21st, assenting to it (2), and the security was issued under the Great Seal on the 26th (3). At the end of the year, Henry was prepared to extend it (4). In September 1404, a similar seasonal security was concluded, its area of coverage extended eastward to a line between Scarborough and the eastern frontier of Flanders (5).

The effect of this series of agreements supplementary to the 1396 truce was to alter its centre of gravity from Guyenne, for whose frontier its terms had originally been created, to Picardy and the Channel, where friction between English and French subjects was causing the most disquiet for their governments, After the process of settling truce infractions was decentralised in 1401, no new provision was made for the more remote problems of the Duchy. During the discussion of these supplementary agreements and as a result of them, there was a continuous

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(1) B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Div f.25 (badly damaged by fire).

(2) Cal.Signet no.163.

(3) Foedera viii 336-337. A similar exchange of securities was contemplated by the French in Oct.1385, G.le Sueur - Antiquitez de Boulogne-sur-Mer, Mémoires de la Société Academique de l'arrondissement de Boulogne-sur-Mer ix (1879) 194.

(4) Letters of Henry IV i 188-190.

(5) C.76/87 m.2.

series of Anglo-French meetings with the ostensible aim of repairing breaches of the truce. English and French commissioners assembled and exchanged lists of infractions alleged to have been committed by the other side, and each case was then considered (1). In the first two years of Henry's reign, his commissions to his ambassadors to discuss truce violations laid emphasis on those perpetrated in Guyenne (2). The French embassy for the conference of June 1400 was empowered and instructed to discuss infractions (3), and it appears that they raised at least one case of English piracy which had been committed against the vice-admiral of France (4). Thereafter, the French ambassadors refused to talk about truce violations and would not receive the list the English had drawn up, until the return of princess Isabelle had been finalised (5). The agreement of August 1401 resulted, and in accordance with its terms, Henry empanelled commissioners for the three meetings in Picardy and Guyenne (6), and ordered injured parties on the English side to attend them (7). By default of the French

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(1) See Keen - Laws of War 215-217, for a discussion of meetings of this type.

(2) C.76/84 m.4; Foedera viii 187.

(3) Choix i 172; A.N. J.644 no.33.

(4) A.N. J.919 no.2.

(5) Foedera viii 194-195; A.N. J.645 nos. 13 and 15(2).

(6) Foedera viii 223-225, 229-230; PPC i 176; E.28/9 unnumbered (damaged letter to John Doreward 13 Oct.); E.28/11 (two damaged letters to Hugh Lutterell, 26 Oct.); C.76/86 m.12.

(7) Foedera viii 229.

government, the meetings were all postponed until 30 November, which aroused English suspicions of its intention to keep the truce (1). French commissioners were eventually sent to both Picardy and Guyenne with appropriate instructions (2). The meeting between Bordeaux and Saint Jean d'Angély does not appear to have taken place, probably because of Gascon reluctance to reduce the pâtis. The northern meeting was held at Leulinghen on 10 December: lists of infractions at sea were exchanged and further consideration of them was postponed until 3 April 1402 (3), as had been specified in the English instructions (4).

Another delay put this meeting back until 15 July. English commissioners were empowered to go to Picardy to consider violations committed in Picardy, Normandy and the Channel (5). English subjects who had suffered from these were summoned to attend on this day, as was John Hawley of Dartmouth, a notorious English pirate (6). The French powers and instructions referred to all infractions of the Anglo-French truce and also to the need to moderate pâtis

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(1) Foedera viii 231; B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Div f.20 (letter from the French envoys at Paris to the English envoys at Calais, 18 Nov. 1401 damaged by fire).

(2) Choix i 215-220.

(3) PPC i 179-180; A.N. J.645 nos. 18,19,36(1).

(4) Foedera viii 231-232.

(5) C.76/86 m.2.

(6) Foedera viii 263-264; C.76/86 m.1.

in Guyenne, where the French government stated that it was sending envoys for this reason (1). Lists of claimed violations at sea were exchanged and discussed when the two commissions met in August (2), but clearly the principle of reprisal applied at the negotiating table as on the high seas. The French would only agree to return ships they had captured if the English restored the prizes for which they had been taken in reprisal. By the agreement signed at this meeting, cases of infraction were the responsibility of the conservators and admirals until the following 1 May. The French envoys sent to confirm the agreement in September were instructed to bring the list of French complaints up to date (3).

Henry empowered his commissioners late in the following April, but the meeting was again delayed by French procrastination, first until late in May, then until June 1403 (4). English and French powers differed in the same way as in the previous year (5).The French commissioners were instructed to complain that the English admirals had

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(1) A.N. J.645 nos. 20 and 31.

(2) B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Dv f.169(old foliation 162); Bod.Lib.Rawlinson MS. B.120 f.191v; A.N. J.645 nos.17, 18, 28, 35, 36(2); J.1031A no.1.See p. 345 below.

(3) A.N. J.645 no.38.

(4) A.N. J.1050 no.4 (letter from the earl of Somerset to the French envoys 26 May); Foedera viii 302-303 (summons for English aggrieved parties to attend at Leulinghen 22 May). Meanwhile the earl of Rutland, lieutenant of Aquitaine, sent his chancellor to the Sire de Pons to discuss truce violations in the Duchy, Vale - English Gascony 180.

(5) Foedera viii 300-301, 317.

not acted against truce-breakers when required, and that French merchants were therefore obliged to resort to reprisals to recover their losses at sea. By contrast, the Sire d'Angoudessant, conservator for Picardy, had performed his duties diligently. It was again stated that French envoys had been sent to Guyenne to attend to violations and reduce the pâtis there (1). When the talks were resumed in July, the French embassy was further empowered and instructed to introduce consideration of the latest English infractions, and lists of truce-breakers were again exchanged (2).

By the terms of the July indenture, as modified when the English and French commissioners met in September, prisoners would be freed at a meeting at Leulinghen on 20 November and the next meeting would be on 1 March 1404 to discuss violations. Accordingly Henry issued powers for his commissioners for the first of these meetings (3), and those on the English side holding prisoners were cited to attend (4). The English delegation arrived on time and contacted the French ambassadors (5). However, they found that the French government had closed the roads around the

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(1) A.N. J.645 no.51.

(2) A.N. J.645 nos. 46, 47 and 48; J.919 no.18.

(3) A.N. J.919 no.20.

(4) Foedera viii 337.

(5) A.N. J.919 nos. 20(2), 21.

Calais enclave and suspended trade between the two countries (1). Over the next eighteen months, English diplomats maintained an almost constant presence at Calais, striving to bring the French to the negotiating table for the meetings to which they had agreed. One of their number, Nicholas de Ryssheton, wrote a series of letters of increasing length and mounting inculpation to the French ambassadors, the French royal Council and the duke of Burgundy. Duke Philip, appointed regent during King Charles' illness, was seen as the predominant force in the French government. It was complained repeatedly that the French had failed to attend the arranged meetings of 20 November and 1 March and that they had therefore broken the oaths they had made in their lord's name and nullified the value of his and their own seals. The accused ambassadors made excuses but these were rejected. When they claimed that the inclusion of the earl of Somerset in the English commission raised a procedural difficulty, because no Count had been appointed in their side, Ryssheton pointed out that the earl, as captain of Calais, was often named as an envoy but did not attend the meetings. When they claimed that English truce violations prevented useful meetings, Ryssheton and his colleagues countered that they had responded to the duke of Burgundy about breaches on their side, but had received no explanations for those committed by the French. Each letter pressed the French to state if they were willing to

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(1) Letters of Henry IV i 429-431.

meet for the purposes agreed in the 1403 indenture and to specify a date (1). In February 1404, Henry empowered his commissioners to postpone the 1 March meeting for two weeks (2), and this offer was made to the French ambassadors, without positive result (3). As late as November 1404, English ambassadors received powers according to the terms of the indenture of July 1403 and the meetings of 20 November and 1 March, dates which had long since passed (4).

Amid the vacillations of policy caused in Paris by the rivalry of Philip of Burgundy with Louis of Orléans to direct the government in the early part of 1404, a decision emerged before Philip's death to prosecute active war against Henry. An estimate of the cost to the French crown of aggressive war in Picardy, Guyenne and at sea was drawn up, the total amounting to 1,212,500 francs (5). An order to raise an aide throughout Languedoc, Languedoil and the Dauphiné was drafted in the royal council at the end of January and published on 12 March. This was to cover the cost of the next campaigning season against "Henry of Lancaster", who had usurped the throne of

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(1) Letters of Henry IV i 170-174, 214-225; B.L.Add.Ch.12500 and 12507; A.N. J.919 no.23; J.645 no.53.

(2) C.76/87 m.7.

(3) B.L.Add.Ch. 12507.

(4) Foedera viii 377-379.

(5) A.N. J.1025 no.13, undated.

England, and his supporters (1). The collection of the money was in train in July (2). On the fourteenth of this month, an alliance was signed in Paris between Charles and Owain Glyndŵr against "Henry of Lancaster", their mutual enemy (3). S.P.Pistono believes that these actions and the escalation of hostilities amounted to a declaration of war and the renunciation of the truce by France, which technically ended when the French ambassadors failed to meet the English on the 1 March 1404 (4). On the 9 March the French ambassadors accused the English of committing all acts customary to pure enemies in open war and doing damage worth 500,000 florins (5). Charles' order to levy the aide accused Henry and his followers of public war and doubled the value of the damage (6). In September Ryssheton counter-charged the French with many acts of war against the truce and the repudiation of continued negotiation (7). These denuncations were an exchange of fire in the diplomatic skirmishes which intensified in

(1) P.R.O. 31/8/135 Section 4, from A.N. "Section Domaniale - Mémoires de la chambre des Comptes 14925 f.172".

(2) B.N.n.a.f. 3623 no.209; B.L.Cotton MS.Caligula Div ff.69 and 70.

(3) T.Matthews(ed.) - Welsh Records in Paris(Carmarthen 1910) 25-31.

(4) Pistono - Repudiation, Chapter VI,The French repudiation of the Twenty-Eight Year Truce, especially pp.215-216, 234-236.

(5) B.L.Add.Ch. 12507.

(6) P.R.O. 31/8/135 Section 4.

(7) A.N. J.645 no.53.

proportion to the military campaigns. The commitment of Charles and his family to a personal vendetta against "Henry of Lancaster" was not equivalent to a public war between the kingdoms of France and England. The twenty-eight year truce had been made between the two kingdoms and remained in force (1).

However, French intentions towards the truce were sufficiently questionable for Henry to send a special envoy to France to challenge its government to decide between truce and war. Sir John Cheyne was commissioned on 6 March to deliver to Charles, letters from Henry himself and the temporal and spiritual lords and Commons of the kingdom of England, drawn up in Parliament on 25 February, and to receive a reply to them (2). These letters complained again of the challenges of Louis of Orléans and Waleran of Saint-Pol and of warlike preparations to blockade Bordeaux. They exhorted Charles and the whole community of the kingdom of France with biblical quotation and threats of the Last Judgement to continue to observe the truce and send envoys to discuss violations. Otherwise England would be forced into war (3). This was a direct appeal from the representatives of the kingdom of England to the representatives of the kingdom of France to

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(1) See pp. 215-216, 223-224 above.

(2) E. 28/18 no.46. He received an advance payment of £100 on the same day, E.28/18 no.45. He received instructions on 25 April, PPC i 223; and left London 29 April, E.28/18 no.44.

(3) Foedera viii 348-350.

make a definite statement in support of the truce between them. It was designed to bypass the personal animosity of the Valois towards Henry and break the frustrating impasse reached by the commissioners at Calais. Henry regarded the mission as crucial: he orderd the captains of the Calais March to refrain from all hostilities which might jeopardise it during the two months Cheyne's journey was expected to take, except towards the Count of Saint-Pol (1). The French government avoided picking up the gauntlet thrown by Henry, by repeating the expedient of refusing to provide a safe-conduct for his envoy to go to Paris (2). The Count of Saint-Pol threatened to take him prisoner if he could catch him (3). Cheyne was still at Calais on 6 June, when he had a notarial copy made of the letters he carried (4), which he was eventually able to hand over to the French ambassadors, Hangest and Boisratier. English diplomacy was now concentrated on obtaining a reply to these letters. English ambassadors for the next few months were empowered and instructed to demand a response (5), and Ryssheton insisted in his letters to the French Council and ambassadors (6), all to no avail.

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(1) E.28/14 no.904.

(2) B.L.Add.Ch. 12500.

(3) B.L.Add.Ch. 12504.

(4) Foedera viii 350-351. Cheyne reported back to the king at Leicester 28 July 1404. The Exchequer was ordered to account with him for his wages 12 Feb.1405, E.28/18 nos. 43 and 44.

(5) PPC i 241; Foedera viii 368, 377-379.

(6) Letters of Henry IV i 374-376; A.N. J.645 no.53.

With the end of the campaigning season, French interest in negotiation revived. Correspondence between the two sets of ambassadors recommenced in September 1404 with a view to a meeting in November (1). The English embassy received powers and instructions in mid-November. It was ordered to resume discussions to free prisoners and repair breaches of the truce from the point at which they had been left, and continue them until the following May. It was also to ask for a new supplementary agreement about the truce, since all previous methods of eliminating violations had broken down (2).It was hoped that in making a new accord, the French would again be led into a statement of the truce's continued existence. However, the scheme seems to have foundered in mutual recriminations about abortive attempts to meet (3). In spring 1405, the English government was again willing to resume negotiations about the truce (4), but the ambassadors of both sides were overtaken by military

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(1) Letters of Henry IV i 312, 329-331; A.N. J.645 no.53. Henry had commissioned the lieutenant of Calais to make a local truce to cover the talks on 21 July, C.76/87 m.4. This was due to expire on 1 Nov.

(2) Foedera viii 377-379; PPC i 240-242.

(3) B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Div f.78, letter from the French ambassadors to the English ambassadors. The date is uncertain but probably the end of Nov. 1404.

(4) E.28/20 no.30; E.28/21 no.22, letters from Henry and the Council to the ambassadors in Picardy, 17 April and 15 May 1405. See also PPC i 255-256.

events before they could assemble themselves in a conference (1). Negotiations were taken up again in spring 1406. The English ambassadors received powers in March to modify the existing truce and reform violations of it (2). These powers were repeated in June 1407 (3). But on both these occasions and in October 1406, the embassies carried other powers to conclude completely new truces and appoint conservators for them (4).

The effective results of the agreements and conferences of Henry IV's early years were negligible in their declared intentions of suppressing violence between the English and the French. However, each successive indenture referring to the truce confirmed its continued existence;and the meetings to settle infractions led to almost continuous diplomatic contact between the two governments. When the ambassadors of both sides could not succeed in meeting, they maintained an intermittent correspondence. These contacts were continued in a spirit of increasing insincerity, but neither side was sufficiently confident of its position to make a final break. Late in 1406 the French government raised money to fight the English (5)

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(1) There is an account of the exchanges of these months in Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 287-301.

(2) Foedera viii 434.

(3) Foedera viii 484-485.

(4) Foedera viii 432-434, 453-455; C.76/90 m.7.

(5) B.L.Add.Ch. 6780.

and forbade the export of corn to England (1). On 2 October a proclamation was issued in Charles' name denouncing Henry's usurpation and recognising the earl of March as Richard's true heir (2). But the 1396 truce was never specifically renounced. Certainly it remained the basis of all English commissions to negotiate. As a legal fiction it had been a useful line of defence, perhaps a protection against the French invasion of England, which had seemed probable in the 1380s. By mutual consent it had kept the widening conflict under some control. Although the truce remained valid, it had become a dead letter in the frontier areas. Both kings could now finance and launch major expeditions against each other as usurpers, straining the conception of a guerre couverte to the limits, and there was a need for new truces.

In the frontier zones, local authorities endeavoured to alleviate the burdens of war by their own efforts. English lieutenants and seneschals in Guyenne, the wardens of the Scottish Marches and French lieutenants and captains-general were empowered to make particular truces, covering limited areas for those under their authority (3). The lieutenants and captains at Brest had also been able to make local truces with the duke of Brittany (4).

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(1) Wylie - Henry IV ii 415.

(2) Wylie - Henry IV ii 314.

(3) Keen - Laws of War 209-210; Vale - English Gascony 7, 180-184.

(4) Jones - Ducal Brittany 150, 152.

John Holland received such a power in 1389 (1), and truces were subsequently made with the duke (2). Nicholas Rysshetон argued in 1404, in relation to the Vier Leden of Flanders, that subjects could lawfully oblige themselves to a truce, provided it was not to the prejudice of their lord (3). In south-western France, where the personal feuds of the greater noble families were inextricably entwined in the wider conflict, they retained the right to make private truces to protect their lands and local trade (4). This applied also to towns: Périgueux and Bergerac negotiated several "suffertes" with English captains at this period, buying respite from the ravages of war (5). English captains had concluded particular truces with members of the Armagnac and Albret families in the 1380s (6). In 1404, Gaillard de Durfort, seneschal of Guyenne, negotiated a truce with the Count of Armagnac in Les Landes at the height of the French offensive against the Duchy (7). In 1407 and early 1408, when the war in the

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(1) E.28/1 nos. 54a and 54b.

(2) Fowler - "Truces" 186 n.8, quoting Archives Départementales de la Loire- Atlantique, E.120 nos. 13 and 14.

(3) B.L.Add.Ch. 12504.

(4) Keen - Laws of War 212; Vale - English Gascony 185-186, 191.

(5) J.Machet de la Martinière - "Les guerres anglaises dans l'ouest et le centre de la France: Poitou, Saintonge, Angoumois, Limousin, Périgord, 1403-1417", Positions des Thèses (1899), 89, 90, 93, 94, 95.

(6) Fowler - "Truces" 204 n.84; Keen - Laws of War 37, 209 n.4, 212, 213 n.3.

(7) Vale - English Gascony 49,181.

Duchy had reached an exhausted stalemate, the English authorities there agreed to a series of particular truces with the Albrets, the Armagnacs,and the Sire de Pons for Saintonge, Angoumois and Périgord (1). The town of Bayonne also made a commercial truce with Brittany (2).

These local initiatives for particular truces influenced the policies of the governments in Paris and Westminster. In 1406 the political advent of Henry of Monmouth and the Beauforts brought an interest on the English side in making new truces. English envoys were empowered to conclude new truces, both general and particular (3). In 1407, France was in need of a respite from her recent military endeavours, especially as the rivalry between John of Burgundy and Louis of Orléans developed, culminating in the latter's assassination in November. This inclination towards rapprochement with England ended when John the Fearless seized control in Paris in March 1409, though it re-emerged when he was hard-pressed by the Orléanists in the following year.

At the beginning of May 1407, French ambassadors were sent to Picardy, carrying powers to conclude a temporary truce between the river Somme and the sea coast, including the

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(1) Wylie - Henry IV iii 87; Vale - English Gascony 53, 182-185; J.Chavanon - "Renaud VI" 49-50,157; Fowler - "Truces" 204 n.84.

(2) Touchard - Commerce Maritime Breton 119.

(3) Foedera viii 432-434, 453-455; C.76/90 m.7.

town of Gravelines and all western Flanders along the coast as far as Nieuwpoort. This was to cover the negotiations with the English embassy, which were expected to require some time, a similar arrangement to the local truce used in the latter half of 1404 (1). Accordingly on 28 July, the earl of Somerset, acting as Henry's lieutenant in Picardy, Flanders and Artois, and on his orders dated ten days previously, issued a truce at Calais for this area, to last until 8 September. This short truce summarised the clauses of the 1396 truce which forbade acts of war against persons, goods towns and fortresses, required reparation of all violations and stated that truce should not be broken whatever ruptures of it were committed. It was agreed that the subjects and allies of both sides should not do anything contrary to the current truce during this term (2). This particular truce was therefore little different from the agreements of 1401, 1402 and 1403 in acknowledging the continued validity of the twenty-eight year truce, but implied that limits could be set to its observation.

When the English ambassadors went to Paris in September 1407, the duke of Berry was given a general power to negotiate with them to reach a peace settlement, including by means of general or particular truces for long or short periods (3). A few days later, the French ambassadors,

(1) B.L.Add.Ch. 16223.

(2) A.N. J.646 no.2.

(3) Foedera viii 522-523 and Bod.Lib.Carte MS. 113 ff.262-264.

acting under their original commission of May, agreed with the English at Paris that the truce for Picardy and West Flanders should continue to run from 20 September to 1 November, with three added clauses. One summarised the stipulations of the 1396 truce that the subjects of both sides could continue lawful trade and business with each other, except in armaments and other forbidden goods, provided that they only entered fortresses with the captains' permission; the others extended protection to the fishermen of both sides for this term and stated that this agreement would in no way prejudice the commercial security recently made between England and Flanders. Conservators were appointed and provision made for the truce's publication (1). The Picardy and West Flanders truce was no longer regarded as a temporary arrangement to protect Anglo-French negotiations, which were not now taking place in Picardy, but as a new truce with its own value. It was subsequently renewed until 15 December, probably by the captains of Calais and Boulogne (2).

On 25 October, the duke of Berry commissioned ambassadors to go to England in the same terms as he had been commissioned (3), and equipped them with a draft extension of this truce until the end of March (4). When the French

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(1) B.L.Add.Ch.16223.

(2) A.N. J.646 no.4.

(3) Bod.Lib.Carte MS. 113 ff.263-264.

(4) E.30/1251.

envoys arrived at Gloucester at the beginning of December, Henry had their powers copied to make parallel commissions for his son Thomas of Lancaster and four English diplomats (1). On the 5th, the two delegations extended the truce until the term specified by the French (2). Two days later they made another particular truce for the Duchy of Guyenne in almost exactly the same form (omitting the references to the fishermen and the commercial truce with the Flemish), to begin 15 January 1408 and last three months (3). It is clear from the instructions to the English negotiators that they would have preferred to conclude a general truce between the two kingdoms and their allies. They were ordered to insist that Owain Glyndŵr should not be included amongst the French allies, as he was a subject of the English crown. They were to maintain that the twenty-eight year truce had not been broken, since neither lord had ever defied the other, and seek a declaration by the French that the truce continued in force. Only if they refused this were they to turn to the discussion of particular truces (4). It was therefore the French government that wished any new agreements to be particular truces, to avoid commenting on, or making a commitment about the status of the truce of 1396.

(1) Foedera viii 504-507.

(2) A.N. J.646 no.4.

(3) Foedera viii 507-509: Bod. Lib. Carte MS. 113 ff.260-268. It was not published at Périgueux until the end of Jan., Martinière -" Guerres anglaises", 89.

(4) PPC i 302-303. Henry had written to the Exchequer to order the original of the 1394 truce to be sent to him at Gloucester, presumably to serve as a model for a new general truce, SC 1/63 no.494; Cal.Signet no.706.

In February 1408 the duke of Berry commissioned envoys to go to England to renew the truces. At Calais they agreed two prorogations of the Picardy and West Flanders truce, first with the lieutenant of Calais until 30 April, then with the earl of Somerset until the end of May. They found Henry's court at Pontefract, and there both truces were extended until 30 September (1). In September, English ambassadors paid a return visit to Paris and prolonged the two truces until 1 May 1410. The Guyenne truce was now expanded to include the comtés of Toulouse and Poitou, as the French denied the English assertion that this latter was part of the Duchy. It was also stipulated that combatants should not traverse enemy territory that was under truce in order to attack land not included in it. The negotiators also concluded a general truce at sea, coupled to both the particular truces, with the express purpose of protecting Anglo-French trade. The French government was again apparently the initiator, since it was foreseen in the French power. This truce was to commence 1 November and also last until 1 May 1410 (2). Its terms differed from the indenture of 1403, in that they aimed to guarantee trade between the Channel ports, rather than check endemic privateering. Ships were allowed to shelter from weather or pirates in ports of the

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(1) Foedera viii 515-518, 519, 521-524. The prorogation of the Guyenne truce was only published at Périgueux on 19 June, Martinière -"Guerres anglaises" 89.

(2). Foedera viii 553-560; E.30/1521(16); Bod.Lib.MS.Ashmole 789 ff.128-131v. The French confirmation of the truces was issued at Paris 26 Sept. 1408, C.47/30/9 no.6; Chavanon - "Renaud VI" no.LXVIII, from Archives Municipales de Périgueux EE.17.

other side, but not otherwise without the licence of the appropriate authorities, at the risk of being excluded from the benefits of the truce. Their masters were able to recover all goods lost in storms and washed ashore, pursuing any who might have taken them before the courts of the territory. Retention of these goods was not to be permitted for marque and reprisal, or any other reason. Captures and robberies of persons, goods and ships at sea were to cease. All breaches of the truce were to be repaired by the offending side and the transgressors punished, these violations not being regarded as abrogating the truce and recommencing war. Neither principal was to engineer any action contrary to the truce, but this should not restrict him from fulfilling his obligations to aid his allies at sea (1). On 28 September, the two delegations made another agreement that the truce for the sea would be notified to France's allies of Scotland and Castile, who should inform the English government by Easter 1409 whether they wished to be included in it or not (2).The English ambassadors were probably willing to make these concessions about the French allies in order to buy more progress in the negotiations for a marriage between Henry of Monmouth and Catherine of France. An agreement for a conference about this was signed the same day (3). By French design, the ad hoc security arrangements of July 1407 had grown into a

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(1) Foedera viii 552-553.

(2) Bod.Lib.Ashmole MS. 789 ff.131v-132.

(3) Bod.Lib.Ashmole MS. 789 ff.132-132v.

tripartite system of truces which had effectively replaced the twenty-eight year truce.

Four days before the truces were due to expire again, two English envoys were commissioned to negotiate new ones (1). Either they or the Lieutenant of Calais succeeded in proroguing the truce for Picardy and West Flanders until 1 July 1410 , but the other two lapsed on 1 May. The seneschal of Guyenne wrote that this had left a state of open war in the Duchy (2). The ambassadors of both sides finally met at Leulinghen on 21 June 1410 and agreed all three truces should run to 1 November, those for Guyenne and the sea recommencing on 1 and 8 August respectively (3).They also made a supplementary agreement for the better observation of the truces. This included the form of the orders that the principals should send to their conservators, exhorting them to repair infractions and punish offenders diligently and requiring them to swear to do so. They should appoint deputies in ports and frontier towns to arrest those who brought in captured goods and make inventories of them. The conservators were to have sole charge of the restoration of such goods, and masters of ships leaving port were obliged to swear to them to observe the truce at sea. It was forbidden to shelter truce-breakers or buy stolen goods from them. Future

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(1) Foedera viii 632.

(2) E.30/1521(16).

(3) Foedera viii 641-648. The French Council had therefore reversed the decision it took on the last day of 1409 for a policy of war, Choix i 322.

conferences were arranged to settle infractions and negotiate for peace (1). Several of these points were proclaimed with the truces for Picardy and the sea in the English sea-ports (2).

The next conference meeting at Leulinghen in October, November and December 1410 extended the three truces, first for a month, then for a further month, and finally for a whole year, until 1 January 1412 (3).It appears that they ceased to operate on this date in Guyenne and at sea, leaving only the shadowy protection of the 1396 truce over most of France. In Picardy the truce probably ran until 1 January 1413 (4).When the duke of Clarence's expedition ended in negotiation at Busançais in November 1412, he promised to refrain from all acts of war until 1 January 1413. It was agreed that letters of truce would be drawn up for Languedoc and Guyenne as far north as the river

(1) C.47/30/9 no.7.

(2) Foedera viii 649-650.

(3) Foedera viii 668-674. Messengers were sent to the Sire de Pons to inform him of the first prorogation on 2 Nov. and of the third prorogation on 16 Jan. He was ordered to have it proclaimed throughout Guyenne and pass the letter on to the English conservator at Bordeaux, A.N. J.865 no.16; B.L. Add.Ch. 3408. Henry IV did not ratify the prorogations until 18 Feb., or order their proclamations until 25 March, Foedera viii 672, 674.

(4) According to Monstrelet ii 231, the Seigneur de Dampierre and other French ambassadors renewed the truces with England for one year at Leulinghen about Jan.1412. See also B.L.Add.MS. 24062 f.150v, where Henry V states the truce ended 1 Jan. 1413. In Oct. 1413 the French complained that the English capture of Balinghem in 1412 had been a violation of the truce, A.N. J.646 no.8. The cluster of letters of marque and English policy towards captured goods at sea in 1412, suggest the truce had ended there 1 Jan. See below p. 368 and n.3.

Loire for this term and that during this time a conference in Picardy should discuss peace and longer truces for Guyenne, Picardy, Normandy and elsewhere (1).It is doubtful whether these terms were ever ratified by Henry IV. In February 1414, the duke of Bourbon, as royal lieutenant and captain-general in Guyenne, empowered the Sire de Pons to negotiate a truce with the English for two or three months in the Duchy (2).This was rendered otiose the following month when Pons was appointed conservator for the new general truce lately concluded at London (3).Meanwhile, English and French ambassadors had met at Leulinghen in September 1413,protected by a local truce until 1 October, which they prolonged until 11 November, for the security of further diplomatic contacts. They revived the truce for Picardy and West Flanders to run from 1 October to 1 June 1414. Henry V's representatives insisted on translating its terms from French to Latin and wanted to add the clause from the truce for the sea, which allowed the principals to aid their allies. The French rejected this as irrelevant and obsolete, and eventually two versions of the truce were drafted, with and without the clause, to be submitted to Henry and Charles (4).

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(1) A.N. K.57 no.28.

(2) A.N. J.865 no.22.

(3) A.N. J.865 no.23.

(4) Foedera ix 56-60; A.N. J.646 no.9. c.f. Foedera viii 553.

Predictably, Henry ratified the version with the clause (1). He was probably providing for his projected alliance with John of Burgundy. Before the truce could expire, it too was swallowed up in the general truce of January 1414.

This system of truces was overseen, not by specially appointed panels of conservators in several districts, but mostly by the officers whose jurisdictions were involved. The admirals of both sides and the warden of the Cinq Ports were the conservators for the truce at sea, and for the Picardy truce they were the captains of Calais, Guînes and Boulogne or their lieutenants, and a few other local notables on the French side. The Guyenne truce was served by the seneschal of Guyenne, and the mayor and constable of Bordeaux on the English side. On the French side, conservation of the truce was at first divided into two districts by the river Dordogne, but when it was redefined to cover Toulouse and Poitou in 1408, the Sire de Pons took charge of the whole, with the seneschals of Toulouse, Carcassone and Rouergue as subordinate in their seneschausées (2). Throughout the period of these truces, English ambassadors were commissioned to determine violations in the same form as they had been from March 1406 (3). There is nothing to suggest that they were

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(1) Foedera ix 68.

(2) Foedera viii 508, 553, 558, 560, 644, 645, 648-649, 670-671, 674; Chavanon - "Renaud VI" 50, 170; C.47/30/9 no.6; B.L. Add.Ch. 16623; Bod.Lib.Ashmole MS. 789 f.131v; Carte MS. 113 f.267v.

(3) Foedera viii 433, 454, 485, 546, 585, 599, 636, 669, 695.

successful in doing so. A meeting arranged for 16 September 1409 in Picardy, which was to discuss violations, failed to take place, each side blaming the other for the breakdown (1). A safe-conduct had been issued for the French admiral to attend the negotiations (2), Thomas Beaufort, admiral of England, succeeded in meeting him at Wissant on 12 January 1410, where they drew up an agreement for a further meeting in the March on 15 March. Beaufort was accordingly equipped with a range of powers and the French Admiral received a further safe-conduct, but they probably remained unused (3). When the truces were renewed at Leulinghen in June, it was agreed that the two admirals should meet in the March of Picardy at the end of August to settle infractions of the truces for Picardy and the sea. All injured parties were to apply to them to obtain justice. Commissions of two knights and a clerk from each side would be appointed to act similarly in Guyenne (4). A proclamation was issued to this effect and a safe-conduct granted to the admiral of France (5), but the meetings are not known to have taken place. During the spring and summer of 1411, several commissions to adjudicate violations were made in new forms, which stated that no provision had yet been made for this since the truces began. It was now arranged for

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(1) Foedera viii 621; Choix i 322. See p. 114 above.

(2) Foedera viii 594.

(3) Foedera viii 620-624; C.76/93 m.15.

(4) C.47/30/9 no.7.

(5) Foedera viii 649-650, 652.

aggrieved French parties to pursue their cases before the English courts on appeal, a reciprocal scheme that had apparently been agreed at the last meeting (1). None of these preparations brought any result. Truce violations came under discussion at the conference of September 1413 at Leulinghen. However the English ambassadors wished to consider infringements committed since the twenty-eight year truce came into force, whilst the French were only prepared to discuss the truces that had been made with Henry IV since 1407. They postponed the solution to this impasse to future negotiations (2). Of the three truces of 1407-1408, those for Picardy and Guyenne added nothing to the 1396 truce and were minor in scope compared to the agreements of 1402 and 1403. The truce for the sea was the fullest in its forma and it was the admirals who were most active in the attempts to deal with the infractions of these years. With the addition of the points agreed in June 1410, the tripartite truce system was intended, by both sides, to have the practical effect of removing the threat of war from Anglo-French sea-borne trade and fishermen. The French government intended it to have the legal effect of replacing a long truce with a short one.

England had two other truces to protect commerce running concurrently, with the French fiefs of Brittany and Flanders. The crucial role of the wool trade with England

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(1) Foedera viii 678, 682, 697; PPC ii 17; C.76/94 mm. 17 and 21. King Henry forwarded a complaint of capture and ransom to the commissioners, E.28/23 no.28.

(2) A.N. J.646 nos. 8 and 9.

in the Flemish economy had long impelled the Vier Leden to seek securities additional to the twenty-eight year truce. In the summer of 1402, they requested the English ambassadors in Picardy that they should be recognised as included in the truce (1). From July of this year until August 1403, they negotiated at Calais and London for the recovery of ships and merchandise seized by English privateers from Flemings contrary to the truce (2). In March, the Flemish envoys drew up a short agreement with the Council, forbidding reprisals against English merchants and goods in Flanders until the next meeting and allowing Flemings to trade freely with England, even if their goods were carried in French ships. French merchandise, however, was not to be concealed under false Flemish ownership (3). English and Flemish deputies met again in August and made arrangements for a conference to repair truce violations in November, until which time the truce would be re-published and observed. The English also presented a draft concord containing several articles from the indenture they had signed with the French in June 1403, including those which provided for the release of prisoners and the licencing of armed ships by the principal lords and the admirals on each side. Flemish ships and goods would be exempt from English depredations,

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(1) CCR 1399-1402 547.

(2) Foedera viii 276-277, 286, 303, 312-313; CCR 1402-1405 27; Varenbergh - Histoire des Relations 540-543; Pistono - Repudiation chapter 5.

(3) Foedera viii 312-313; Varenbergh - Histoire des Relations 543. The indenture was delivered to the Exchequer in Oct., PPC i 219.

but their ownership must be established by letters under the seals of the home ports, carried by the ships' masters, and each ship should be painted with the arms of Flanders and its port. The Flemish should not give any aid at sea to the French, the Scots or others regarded as England's enemies, convey their goods, or pass these goods off as their own. Each side was to appoint three conservators (1).This attempt to segregate the shipping of Flanders from the Anglo-French conflict at sea, was not welcomed by its count, Philip the Bold. In April 1403 he jeopardised the negotiations and broke the agreement of March by seizing English goods at Sluys. The efforts of the English to obtain restitution or compensation dominated the discussions of the summer (2) and continued as a theme of Anglo-Flemish relations into Henry V's reign. By October, Philip had interposed himself between the two negotiating parties and was attempting to move the talks from Calais to the neutral ground of Leulinghen. He had altered the draft proposal of August, in particular excising a reference to Henry as king of England (3). The Flemish envoys were unable to cross the blockade to attend the Calais meeting in November, the draft agreement of

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(1) Varenbergh - Histoire des Relations 543-546; Foedera viii 327-328; Archives Départementales du Nord, Lille B.534/18342L, printed Ford - "Piracy or Policy", 78. See p. 234 above.

(2) Pistono - Repudiation 186, 189-190; Varenbergh - Histoire des Relations 544-545; Foedera viii 327-328.

(3) B.L.Add.Ch. 1397.See p.228n. 1 above.

August was never ratified and that of March lapsed (1). Philip then rejected the legitimacy of the negotiations and substituted his own ambassadors. He and his successors, the Duchess Margaret and John of Burgundy, successfully excluded the Vier Leden from the process of formulating a commercial truce, to the resentment of the English diplomats whose commissions were dictated by the French and Burgundians to avoid all mention of them (2). However, when agreement was finally reached, the English required and obtained the Vier Leden's letters of confirmation (3).

In these diplomatic exchanges, Philip, Margaret and John acted by authority of powers and instructions issued in the name of Charles VI to provide security for the continuance of Anglo-Flemish commerce, even if open war should begin again between England and France, repeated in June 1403, May 1404 and June 1405 (4).These established the principle that the Flemish could remain neutral in a war between England and their French sovereign lord. Precautions in the instructions forbade the surrender of copies of the

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(1) Pistono - Repudiation 190-191. c.f. pp.241-242 above. The March agreement had been prorogued until the Nov. meeting, Foedera viii 327.

(2) A.N. J.573 no.2; B.L.Add.Ch. nos. 12500, 12503, 12504.

(3) Foedera viii 475; B.L.Add.Ch. 58420.

(4) Pistono - Repudiation 182-183; Choix i 249-251; Wylie - Henry IV ii 106; A.N. J.573 no.2.

powers to the English or the conclusion of any agrement without further reference to the king (1).The Vier Leden had requested such neutrality several times and refused to order reprisals against the English. They refused to provide soldiers to Philip in May 1400 and July 1403 to serve against the English (2). Charles' instructions included a clause promising to refrain from the conduct of war in Flanders and demands for military service from its inhabitants, reserving all his feudal and sovereign rights and the access of his ships to Flemish ports. Philip interpreted this to mean that a French invasion force could be billeted on Flanders and launched from its ports against England,as had been intended in 1386 (3).A purely commercial agreement was envisaged: in the event of war, the demilitarisation of Flanders would apply only to non-noble Flemings.

Throughout these intermittent negotiations, the ambassadors continued to discuss truce violations between the English and the Flemish, stretching back to 1401 (4). In order to promote progress, orders were issued on both sides to prohibit privateering (5).In Spring 1405, the

(1) A.N. J.573 no.2.

(2) Pistono - Repudiation 80-81, 172, 181, 182, 188; "Accession of Henry IV" 466, 473; Varenbergh - Histoire des Relations 491; Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 55, 178.

(3) Choix i 249-251.

(4) PPC i 294; Foedera viii 444, 475; A.N. J.573 no.2; B.L.Add.MS. 36879.

(5) Varenbergh - Histoire des Relations 493; B.L.Add.Ch. 12502, 12505.

Burgundian envoys suggested a four-month truce to cover the talks. Henry assented to this at Worcester, but it does not seem to have become operative (1). In the latter half of 1406, there was an improvement in prospects. At the beginning of October, Henry issued a simple safe-conduct for the fishermen of France, Flanders and Brittany to fish anywhere at sea until 2 February 1407 (2). His ambassadors had been instructed that Breton fishermen should be included in the French letters of security, which should be confirmed by the duke of Burgundy (3). They forwarded to him a one-year security under Charles' name issued on 22 September for the fishermen of England, Calais and other English lordships, Flanders, Picardy, Normandy, Brittany and all France generally, which looked forward to a one-year commercial treaty between England and Flanders (4). Following their advice, Henry issued fresh letters copied from the terms of this interim security, adding a clause which allowed the fishermen to take refuge from the weather in ports of the other side (5). By the meeting of 24 October 1406, the substance of the commercial treaty was agreed, but there

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(1) Cal.Signet no.347; E.28/21 no.22 a letter from the Council to the ambassadors at Calais 15 May 1405. c.f. Wylie - Henry IV ii 83, 105; Vaughan - John the Fearless 23. The negotiations were broken off when Thomas of Lancaster raided Sluys. See p. 365 below.

(2) Foedera viii 451.

(3) PPC i 293.

(4) B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Diii f.143.

(5) Foedera viii 459-460; the report of the ambassadors to Henry, 28 Nov., B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Diii f.145.

remained some troublesome points to be settled. It was to apply to merchants, their servants and agents, ship-masters and sailors, pilgrims, English clerics going to Rome, and fishermen. The English had to abandon their effort to have "ambassadors and others" included in these categories. Under pressure from the London merchants, they also asked for the restitution of any goods captured by the French at sea and taken to Flanders, but they had to compromise with an article which forbade captured goods to be disembarked and sold in the ports of either party. If this injunction was broken, then the port-officers were liable for restitution of the goods or payment of compensation. The English wanted the Flemish to be obliged to keep guard against piracy in their sea-marshes on pain of restitution of the captured goods, but they would only accept responsibility for the area between the upper and lower tide-lines. Henry was prepared to tolerate this, provided the matter was postponed for inclusion in a separate treaty about the sea. The English objected to having to moor their ships together in Sluys harbour and wished to dispose them freely in Flemish ports as other foreign merchants did, a freedom which was written into the treaty. One of the main features of the treaty was the provision of a road between Calais and Gravelines, and then through the Dunes to Bruges, along which the merchants of both sides could travel securely. The English tried unsuccessfully to exclude French merchants from this and Henry would finally only agree to it if the merchants' safety was guaranteed by Charles, or

at least by John of Burgundy. Otherwise negotiations should be broken off and merchants would travel under armed escort as in war time. It was agreed that each side should designate its section of the road and mark it clearly before 1 May 1407 and that the English should not bring their dogs into the Dunes to hunt rabbits. The status of Gravelines itself was a point of dispute. The Burgundians refused to include it in the cessation of hostilities, but the English pointed out that in August 1403 and subsequently, the town had been recognised as part of Flanders and its garrison's activities as restricted by any agreement the Flemish made, and they won the point. The treaty ordained that the relevant categories of persons would be safe at Calais and Gravelines, and raids by the garrisons of these and other fortresses against the other party's territory would cease (1).

The terms of the commercial treaty were finalised on 30 November and ratified at Paris by John of Burgundy on 10 January and Charles VI on 15 January. The ambassadors also agreed additional points which John ratified at Lille

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(1) English instructions July 1406, PPC i 292-294; excerpt from later instructions, B.L. Cotton MS. Caligula Diii f.146; indenture between the ambassadors at Calais 24 Oct., Varenbergh - Histoire des Relations 546-548; report of the English ambassadors to Henry IV 28 Oct., B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Diii f.145; English instructions 18 Nov., ibid f.144 (legible under ultra-violet light). c.f.the 1403 terms, Foedera viii 327; Varenbergh - Histoire des Relations 545-546; see also Vaughan - John the Fearless 41 and Keen - Laws of War 208 n.2.

on 6 February. Henry ratified both parts at Westminster on 10 March (1). They form a long and meticulously detailed contract, obviously the result of protracted stubborn bargaining. They were never called a truce, but always "points and articles" or "security and provision", and regarded as supplementary to the twenty-eight year truce (2). Besides the above points, free trade was established at sea between England, Calais and Flanders and all warlike acts against it forbidden. The security for fishermen was subsumed in the terms agreed, including the clause Henry had added, which was now extended to merchant ships. Detailed provisions were made for merchants and sailors to leave their arms in their ships in the ports of the other party and for the entry of the protected persons into walled towns. Pirates and privateers were not to be sheltered in ports so that they could attack those of the other party. Delegations of up to ten persons were allowed to travel to seek reparation for violations without requiring a safe-conduct and the agreement was not to be regarded as broken because of any violation. Merchants of other countries were allowed access to Calais and Flanders without risk of attack. There were to be no seizures of goods or arrests for marque and reprisal. The agreement applied in all

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(1) Varenbergh - Histoire des Relations 548-572; Foedera viii 469-478. For all the Anglo-Flemish negotiations since 1402 see the bibliographies at R. Vaughan - Philip the Bold (London 1962) 183 n.1. and John the Fearless 20 n.1, 158.

(2) In their powers of 3 July 1406, the English ambassadors were commissioned to discuss the confirmation and renewal of the 1396 truce, Foedera viii 444-445.

Burgundian lordships as far up the Rhine as Cologne. On 20 April 1407, the English and Burgundian ambassadors met again at Calais and exchanged their letters of confirmation. They agreed the letters should be published in the ports of both sides before 15 June, and the agreement would have force for one year from this date. Because of this delayed start, captains who were at sea were not allowed their customary forty days grace before they were obliged to observe the treaty (1). After a five-year diplomatic struggle, Anglo-Flemish commerce was at last protected from the Anglo-French conflict.

English and Flemish envoys met again at Calais on 1 June 1408. The Flemish came already equipped with letters of prorogation of the commercial treaty issued by Charles and John for one year and three years. It was agreed to accept the latter. Henry issued corresponding letters on 10 June and the Vier Leden ratified the extension on 13 June (2). The envoys arranged a further meeting to settle a security for the straits of Dover, covering all of the sea north-east of a line between Winchester and Saint Valery, so corresponding to the land truce for Picardy and West Flanders. Charles and Henry ratified this in October and November (3).It was also to run until 15 June 1411 and

(1) B.L.Add.Ch. 58420. For the forty-day custom see Keen - Laws of War 140.

(2) PPC i 310-311; Foedera viii 530-532; Varenbergh - Histoire des Relations 548-572; B.L.Add.MS. 36765 (the one-year prorogation that was not used). Henry ordered the prorogation to be proclaimed 26 June, E.30/1580.

(3) Foedera viii 548-551; PPC i 311; C.76/92 mm.11 and 12.

apply to the same groups of persons as the commercial treaty, even if there should be open war between England and France. French merchants, as well as Flemings, were now guaranteed safety within these bounds. The security had been under discussion in 1406 as part of the commercial treaty, with the provisional boundary drawn between Dover and Wissant. This was removed westward to Winchelsea-Boulogne to protect the victualling of Calais, then to Winchelsea-Saint Valery to protect the mouth of the Somme. The new security substituted for the English proposal that the Flemings should guard their sea-marshes (1). The commercial treaty and the security at sea were proclaimed anew in December 1409 (2). In May 1411, both were extended for a further five years until 15 June 1416 (3).

However, when the English Council had begun negotiations for this renewal in November 1410, it was dissatisfied with the current agreement and instructed its commissaries to seek a new truce with Flanders for three years or more. Otherwise they were to prolong the existing securities for the same term with some additional clauses (4).

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(1) Varenbergh - Histoire des Relations 548; B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Diii ff.144, 145; Add.Ch. 58420.

(2) Foedera viii 614; PPC i 322.

(3) Foedera viii 687-688; Wylie - Henry IV iv 25; C.76/94 mm. 8, 13, 14.

(4) PPC ii 3-4, 5-6.

Several powers were issued for this purpose in the following months (1). In the event, the securities were extended in the same form, but certain agreed points were added to them. Both sides should appoint conservators dwelling in the Marches, sworn to repair violations and punish offenders diligently. If any prizes were brought into port, the conservators were to take them into custody and make inventories of their contents to protect the right of the owners. The captors and their vessels would be arrested and the local population forbidden to shelter and victual them, or buy their stolen goods. Captured goods and ships would be returned to their owners as soon as they produced letters proving their ownership and their inclusion in the securities, the release being made on a bond if the captors continued to claim any rights in their prizes. If the prizes had been looted or their contents divided and sold, the captors and vendors would be obliged to give their bonds to pay compensation to the wounded parties, or suffer imprisonment until the payment was made. The principals were bound to see that any reparation that was adjudged, was made within three months. Reprisals were not to be taken under letters of marque for any violation that had not been sanctioned by one of the principals, either before or during the term of the five-year prorogation. If such an attack had been authorised by one of the principals, he would be required

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(1) Foedera viii 659-660, 677-678; C.76/94 m.17.

to make due reparation. Only if he refused or delayed for more than six months would it become lawful to take reprisal by the seizure of goods and debts. These additional articles are in part reminiscent of those of the 1403 agreement. They represent another attempt to end the common practice of issuing letters of marque, which continued despite all the prohibitions against it. John the Fearless and Henry ratified the new clauses in June (1), and the English Council acted in compliance with them in July (2). When the ambassadors of both sides met at Calais on 21 August, they had been published on both sides, but the Flemish had delayed in appointing their conservators. It was agreed that the conservators should renew their oaths to observe the securities annually and meet to determine outstanding complaints and quarrels at least once a year (3).

The following May 1412, Henry required assurances from the Vier Leden that they intended to adhere to the securities, now that John the Fearless intended to attack his allies the Armagnacs (4). In June and July, he ordered them to be proclaimed anew, provided they were first proclaimed on

(1) Foedera viii 688-691 (another copy at B.L.Add.Ch. 11158); Varenbergh - Histoire des Relations 572-578, where dated 15 June (another copy at B.L.Cotton MS.Caligula Diii f.153, where dated Lille, 12 June). c.f. Vaughan - John the Fearless 161-162.

(2) C.76/94 m.4.c.f. K.B.McFarlane -"Anglo-Flemish Relations in 1415/1416" Bodleian Quarterly Record vii (1932) 44 n.9, where he thought the new agreement was unratified.

(3) B.L.Add.Ch.12508.

(4) Foedera viii 737; PPC ii 28-30. See p.51 above.

the Flemish side, a procedure apparently suggested by the Vier Leden (1). When the next time for renewal was approaching in February 1416, John instructed his envoys to ask for another extension of at least five years, with the authorities of the Cinq Ports, the Calais Staple and the Vier Leden obliged to make reparations for the damages inflicted by their fellow countrymen. Henry V's recent victorious march through Artois prompted John to seek additional assurances against all attacks on Flanders and Flemings by land and sea. However the English were expected to insist on the settlement of claims for violations stretching back to 1403, before they would agree to the prorogation or enlargement of the treaties (2).In May, the English agreed to an extension of one year, with another conference arranged to discuss reparations, further prorogations and additions to the securities. Both sides undertook to guard the designated sea-ports and roads effectively, so that merchants could be well-received and do their business without obstacle (3).The Flemish still wanted the treaties established for a longer period, suggesting in July 1417 an extension of ten or twelve years or longer. But this did not accord with Henry's policies. They were prolonged again until Easter

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(1) Foedera viii 751, 767; C.76/95 m.9.

(2) Bod.Lib.MS.French a.2, analysed in McFarlane - "Anglo-Flemish Relations" 41-45.

(3) Wylie - Henry V ii 297-299; Foedera ix 352-353, 354; PPC ii 191, 193; Varenbergh - Histoire des Relations 504-505; B.L.Add.Ch. 12510; C.76/99 mm.27-30.

1419, and then until 1 November 1419, rather tardily on both occasions (1). There do not appear to have been any more additions to the terms.

Although these provisions and securities did not in name constitute a truce, they were enforced by conservators from their first renewal in June 1408 onwards. It was the Flemings who first suggested they should be appointed and Henry IV complied in July (2).On the English side it was the Calais officers end establishment who served as conservators: the captain, his lieutenant, the mayors of the town and the Staple (3).To these the warden of the Cinq Ports and the admiral were added, and in July 1412 the mayors of Sandwich and Winchelsea, apparently as a result of the recent exchange of correspondence between Henry and the Vier Leden (4).In 1416 the Flemings, while satisfied with the conservators at Calais, found those in England ineffective and asked for better ones (5). Several meetings between the commissaries of both sides to adjudge reparations for infractions were arranged, as specified in the original security (6).In 1407, 1411 and 1416, they

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(1) Vaughan - John the Fearless 162-163, 171; Wylie - Henry V ii 301; Foedera ix 476-480, 481, 483, 784; Varenbergh - Histoire des Relations 506-508; PPC ii 250-257; CPR 1416-1422 138-139; B.L.Add.MS. 14820k.

(2) PPC i 312-313; Foedera viii 541-542.

(3) C.76/92 m.1; C.76/95 mm.9 and 12.

(4) Foedera viii 691, 765; PPC i 322-323.

(5) Bod.Lib. MS. French a.2.

(6) Foedera viii 475.

were scheduled for 1 August, which suggests the idea of a regular annual conference at Calais had emerged (1). Other meetings were projected for August 1408, November 1409, May 1410, February 1412, October 1413 and in 1414. Unlike their equivalents in the Anglo-French truces, most of these meetings seem to have taken place and dealt with some business, though the question of the seizures at Sluys in April 1403 remained unsettled (2).The maintenance of frequent diplomatic contact protected commerce on both sides.

When the Anglo-Flemish commercial treaty was first signed, John the Fearless sent a copy of Charles' ratification to Duke Jean V of Brittany with a demand that he should publish it. Duke Jean refused however, and it was not until the treaty was renewed in 1408 and the security for the Dover Straits added, that he approved them (3).He had already commenced negotiations with his step-father of England for a treaty of truce, peace or alliance. His envoys came to England in April 1407, and on 30 May, Henry ordered proclamation to be made in the western ports forbidding attacks on Bretons until 1 November (excluding those of Saint Malo, who were outside of Jean's obedience)

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(1) B.L.Add.Ch. 58420, 12508, 12510.

(2) Vaughan - John the Fearless 162; PPC i 311, 321-323; Foedera viii 614, 625; Varenbergh - Histoire des Relations 499; Wylie - Henry V i 150; B.L.Add.Ch. 12508; Bod.Lib. MS.French a.2.

(3) Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 341, 343 n.80, 364; B.L. Add.Ch. 12501.

in order to protect the travelling diplomats and their endeavours (1). On 11 July, both Henry and Jean issued a simple truce for one year, allowing free trade between Brittany and the English possessions (Bordeaux, Bayonne and the islands off the French coast were specifically mentioned) and providing for the reparation of infractions (2). Proclamation of the truce was ordered in the west country at the end of September and in November the authorities in Guyenne were ordered to accept the validity of writs sold by the duke to English ships sailing there, because the truce had established peaceful relations (3). In the following months, Henry acted against piracy at Calais, Poole, and in the Channel Islands and the west country in accordance with the truce (4). In the summer of 1407 therefore, the safety of English commerce was secured on both flanks.

In 1408, the Anglo-Breton truce was extended for one year, excluding the island of Bréhat, a Penthièvre possession in rebellion against Jean (5).In 1409, the prorogation was

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(1) Foedera viii 483-484; C.76/90 mm 11 and 12. c.f. G.Warner (ed.) The Libelle of Englyshe Polycye (Oxford 1926) 9-11.

(2) Foedera viii 490-491. Knowlson, followed by Touchard, is wrong in stating that truce had been made in July 1406 and the order of 30 May was a proclamation of this, Knowlson - Jean V 47, 54-55, 56; Touchard - Commerce Maritime Breton 104, 106, 111.

(3) Foedera viii 499-500, 503.

(4) CCR 1405-1409 217-218; CPR 1405-1408 418, 419, 421; C.76/91 mm.17 and 21.

(5) Foedera viii 542-543.

for two years, and Bréhat no longer excepted (1). In May 1411, the truce was prolonged for another two years from 6 July (2), but following the recent five-year prorogation of the commercial treaty with Flanders, Jean of Brittany desired a more permanent settlement. At the end of October, he sent his envoy the Sire du Juch to England, bearing a ten-year prorogation, beginning 1 January 1412. Henry issued corresponding letters on 21 December, adding a clause which allowed modifications and supplements to the terms, and a week later commissioned Ralph Greenhurst to negotiate these additions with Juch (3). A separate schedule of terms was drawn up, forbidding letters of marque and reprisal and stating that the truce would not be regarded as broken because of any violation. Stolen ships and goods should be restored to their owners and damages paid, levied on the home-ports of the captors. The captors and their prizes should be arrested on entering port, along with those who victualled them and buyers and receivers of stolen goods, and the guilty punished. There were certain similarities with the points added to the Flemish treaty in the previous May. The terms were elaborated in an agreement between Juch and Greenhurst drawn up in February 1412. The two principals were to confiscate all property stolen on both sides and deliver it to each other's representatives, with a fine of

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(1) Foedera viii 591-592.

(2) Foedera viii 710; ix 82; CPR 1408-1413 318; C.47/28/7 no.28.

(3) Knowlson- Jean V 68-70; Foedera viii 710-712; ix 82.

up to one eighth of the property's value levied on the captors (1).The new agreements were proclaimed in April(2).

After the death of Henry IV, Duke Jean again sent envoys to England to confirm the continuation of the truce, which had not mentioned the heirs and successors of the principals. At Westminster on 3 January 1414, they made a new truce with Henry V's representatives to last ten years, expressly including St. Malo and Bréhat. The new king had definite ideas about rationalising the truce system. The new truce was expressed in Latin instead of French and the first part of the forma was taken from the terms that had recently been revived for the Picardy and West Flanders truce. The second part was a new set of regulations covering the truce at sea. Armed ships were not to leave port until their masters, owners or freighters had offered security to the port officers that they would observe the truce and not take their prizes to ports in other territories. If there was any violation, restitution would be made to the wounded party with damages and interest paid, for which the officers of the home port of the captor would be liable, and the captor's ship confiscated by his lord. Captors entering ports with prizes would be arrested, the prizes confiscated and an inventory of their contents made, pending inquiries into

(1) Preuves ii 865-867; Lettres de Jean V v 166-167.

(2) Foedera viii 732.

the case by the conservators, before which there should be no sale of the stolen goods. The duke would not receive into his territory or supply with food and money, anyone banished from England or armed enemies of the king nor permit his own subjects to participate in war against him. The king's enemies would not be allowed to come into Breton ports with prizes taken from the English and dispose of them by sale, nor would the duke and his subjects disguise these enemies, their goods and ships as their own, on pain of exclusion from the truce. But the English were allowed to bring prizes taken from the king's enemies into Breton ports (1). These terms were a further elaboration of the rules necessitated by continuing piracy in the Channel. But the truce was no longer simply for the purpose of protecting commerce. It now established the military neutrality of the duchy for the next ten years. Henry ordered its proclamation in February and ratified it in April (2). In August 1415, while he was besieging Harfleur, he had it proclaimed again at Dartmouth, Plymouth and Exeter (3).

The conservators for the truces with Brittany on the English side were those whose jurisdictions involved maritime cases: the admiral, the warden of the Cinq Ports

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(1) Foedera ix 80-85 c.f. Warner - Libelle 13.

(2) Foedera ix 112, 122-123; C.76/97 m.2.

(3) Foedera ix 309.

and the archbishop of Canterbury as chancellor (1). As with the Flemish treaty, they were first appointed in 1408. On the Breton side the conservators included the duke's admiral and marshal, the governor of the comté of Nantes and the Sire du Juch, though Juch himself was involved in piracy and does not appear as a conservator in 1414 (2). As England and Brittany moved towards a political rapprochement, the efforts of the conservators and the Councils were supplemented by commissions to reform violations and award reparations, beginning with the power to John Blount and Thomas Field in September 1411, in the same terms as had been used for the French truces in April (3). At the end of February 1412 Blount was sent to Brittany to receive back the goods and vessels taken from the English since the truces began in 1407 with damages and interest, according to the agreement made that month (4). In 1412, 1413 and 1414, commissions of enquiry into captures at sea were appointed, complaints were received and compensation was arranged (5).The day after they signed the truce at Westminster in January 1414, the deputies of both sides met at London to discuss infractions. They drew up a schedule agreeing that

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(1) Foedera viii 542-543, 591-592, 710-711; C.47/28/7 no.28.

(2) Foedera ix 82, 85; Knowlson - Jean V 72.

(3) Foedera viii 702-703, c.f. 682; Knowlson - Jean V 67-69.

(4) C.76/95 m.15.

(5) Knowlson - Jean V 76; CPR 1408-1413 381, 428, 433, 476; CPR 1413-1416 224; Foedera viii 764; ix 116; CCR 1409-1413 385; C.76/95 m.7; C.47/30/9 no.11.

enquiries about claims for damages should be made in the ports of both sides by the conservators, or special commissioners, and that they should arrest the offenders and take the stolen goods or their value into custody. On 1 May they should meet on the island of Guernsey to settle all outstanding cases, excepting those where judgement had already been given, but not executed (1). In June, Henry V sent envoys to Brittany to pursue the matter of violations, and those Englishmen who had suffered attacks were ordered to accompany them (2). In October, they and the Duke's representatives agreed a list of Breton infractions of the most recent truce, and this became the basis of English claims for compensation in 1415 (3). It appears that there was a genuine desire on the side of the English government to minimise the friction caused by piratical ventures between the seamen of its south-western coasts and Brittany. It was impelled as much by the attractions of a Breton alliance as the need to protect the interests of English subjects.

When Henry V ascended the throne therefore, both ends of the Channel were covered by truces and securities with Brittany and Flanders, but the 1407 truces with France had lapsed. Only the uncertain 1396 truce prevented a state

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(1) Foedera ix 85-88. The schedule was confirmed 18 April, Foedera ix 123.

(2) Foedera ix 143-144; CCR 1413-1419 180; Cal.Signet 786; Lettres de Jean V no.1181; C.76/97 m.23.

(3) Foedera ix 163-166, 194-195; Knowlson - Jean V 87-90; Wylie - Henry V i 103-104; Touchard - Commerce Maritime Breton 109 n.249.

of open war with France, and Henry determined to take his stand on its continuing validity, which the truces of his father's reign had undermined. This was discussed in the Council in June 1413 and Henry Chichele drew up a memorandum to present to the king (1). In July, he and other envoys were sent to France to negotiate a new truce and require Charles to observe the old one. They were provided with a vidimus of Charles' letter of 31 May 1400 confirming the 1396 truce (2).When they met the French ambassadors at Leulinghen in September, they cited this and proposed the truce should be confirmed again on both sides and insisted on proceeding to reparation of violations against it. The French refused to acknowledge their claims or even report them to Charles, saying that they had been forbidden to swear any oaths concerning the 1396 truce or the infractions which resulted from it. They would only discuss breaches of the truces made between Charles and Henry IV. It was eventually agreed that there should be another meeting at Leulinghen on 1 May 1414 to consider relations between the kingdoms, before the truce for Picardy and West Flanders expired again (3).

But French ambassadors were sent to London as early as December 1413, as the Paris government felt impelled to

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(1) PPC ii 129-130.

(2) Foedera ix 35-38.

(3) A.N. J.646 nos. 8 and 9.

respond to Henry's aggressive stance. They offered him the hand of Catherine of France and avoided the impasse about the validity of the 1396 truce by concluding a new general truce with the English deputies in January to last one year from 2 February. It included the allies of both sides, provided that they accepted it within three months.

It was Henry who now had an advantage to gain by protecting his putative alliances, and he included the king of Castile, Jean of Brittany, Ludwig of the Palatinate and the count of Holland in the list. Almost all the terms were taken from the 1396 truce, omitting the references to Richard's marriage to Isabelle and the schism, which was now regarded as the sphere of General Councils. The conservators' rules about aiding each other with fifty soldiers against raiders and occupied fortresses and the arrest of raiders more than three leagues away from their fortresses were also excised . The clauses of 1394 about marque and reprisal, pâtis and the repopulation of deserted areas were deleted. The reduction of pâtis was no longer written into the truce; a new clause stated that there was to be no prejudice to those that were current. Refugees returning to the lands they had fled, were protected from further payments of dues. Another new clause excluded prejudice to any previous truce between the parties, meaning that of 1396, in the same way that Henry had recently made a new truce with Brittany without this abrogating the one that aready existed. The English deputies wanted the truce to be written in Latin instead of French, but the French

disagreed, so it was drawn up in both languages to avoid further argument . It was the same in essence as the twenty-eight year truce, with the clauses which might work to the disadvantage of the English position removed. The absence of any regulation of pâtis shifted the centre of its balance away from Guyenne. The conservators' districts returned to the pattern of 1394 and 1396 and several of the same conservators or their descendants were appointed on the French side (1).The Sire de Pons again served in Périgord, Saintonge and Angoumois (2). There can be little doubt that Henry V was responsible for the form taken by the London truce. Through it he stressed his inheritance of the English throne, his claims to France and his policy towards France from Richard II.

Henry confirmed the truce and had it proclaimed in England and Picardy towards the end of January 1414 (3).It was proclaimed in Guyenne on 30 April (4).Charles ratified it when the English ambassadors were in Paris on 10 March (5).A few months later it was supplemented by the Statute of

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(1) Foedera ix 91-101 in the name of the French ambassadors. A copy at B.L.Cotton MS.Caligula Div ff.131-133v in the name of the English ambassadors, a faded and fragmentary corrected draft. Its pages should be read in this order:- 131v, 131, 132, 132v, 133v, 133.c.f. Cosneau - Grands Traités 82-93 and pp.192 - 194 above.

(2) A.N. J.865 no.23.

(3) Foedera ix 101, 110-111.

(4) Vale - English Gascony 69 n.2.

(5) Foedera ix 118-119. A copy of the truce was made for the ambassadors in the Privy Seal Office, Brown - Privy Seal 283.

Truces. This made breaches of truces or safe-conducts, or aiding and abetting these crimes, punishable as treason. Resident conservators were to be appointed in every port and associated with two lawyers in each, in standing commissions of enquiry into violations. All prizes captured from the king's enemies had to be reported to them and all shipmasters had to swear to them to observe truces and safe-conducts before going to sea on pain of forfeiture (1). The Statute brought into line, on the English side, all the regulations of maritime relations with Brittany, Flanders and France and her allies, and filled the gap left by the demise of Henry IV's general truce at sea. Henry V meant the English conduct of the new truce to be exemplary in this troublesome element in order to establish the full justice of his case against Charles.

During 1415 there were four short extensions of the London truce, to 1 May, then to 8 June, then to 15 July and finally to 1 August (2).Each extension was designed to

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(1) Wylie - Henry V i 330-331; C.F. Richmond - "The Keeping of the Seas during the Hundred Years War 1422-1440" History xlix (1964) 295 n.58; C.F. Richmond - Royal Administration and the Keeping of the Seas 1422-1485 (Oxford D.Phil. thesis 1963) 95; Statutes ii 178-181.The conservators were to be provided with a landed income of £40 per year and forbidden to take fees, gifts or retainers. They would have the same jurisdiction as the admirals and the warden of the Cinq Ports, except the death sentence was reserved to these officers. The statute was not to be regarded as null because of any violation of its terms.

(2) Wylie - Henry V i 436, 444; Foedera ix 183, 196, 197, 199, 201, 221, 225-227, 260, 262-268; PPC ii 153-154; C.47/28/7 no.31, a corrected draft of Foedera ix 260.

cover the next stage of the peace negotiations through which Henry was conducting his diplomatic offensive to recover Plantagenet rights in France. His interest in truce prorogations was limited to this and he ensured that they were short, to maintain the momentum of the talks. The later extensions were probably requested by the French diplomats to stave off the invasion he was preparing. But they could not win a long enough respite to outlast the campaigning season. On 6 July, he told the French ambassadors at Winchester that since their lord had denied him justice in his claims, he was obliged to appeal to the justice of God and seek a different remedy, calling upon God and man, heaven and earth, to witness the rectitude of his actions (1).On 28 July, he wrote to Charles from Southampton announcing his intention to obtain his rights by just recourse to arms, sending a final ultimatum to surrender what he demanded, as the law of Deuteronomy required. A reply was sent from Paris on 24 August promising to resist force with force (2).Fighting began on the Calais frontier on 2 August 1415, the day after the last extension of the London truce expired (3).By this exchange of defiances Henry and Charles invalidated any truce that might exist between them, including the twenty-eight year truce. In the ensuing campaign, which culminated at Agincourt, both sides recognised that there was a state of open war for the first time since 1389.

(1) A.N. J.646 no.14.

(2) N.H.Nicolas -History of the Battle of Agincourt(London 1832) Appendix no.1 pp.5-7.c.f. p. 254 above.

(3) Monstrelet iii 78.

After this interlude of warfare, a return to a state of truce was discussed in the following year. In the conferences at Westminster and Beauvais, a general truce for three years was considered, but the French ambassadors prevaricated and suggested a one-year truce instead (1). After his successes in August, Henry was no longer interested in a truce of this length and generality. At Calais on 3 October 1416, his representatives concluded a truce with the French ambassadors to run from 9 October to 2 February 1417, covering Picardy and West Flanders, and all the seas from Morocco to Norway. Allies of both sides were included if they certified their acceptance at Calais or Boulogne within six weeks. The principals were to ratify it by 1 November. A few short clauses forbade all acts of war and allowed the subjects of both parties to conduct lawful business and trade. As usual, the truce was not to be considered as broken because of any violation. Several other clauses concerned allied shipping, which had current importance following the Castilian and Genoese participation in the sea-battle at the mouth of the Seine. Pending the confirmation of the truce by their lords, the masters and owners of allied ships would swear, on the security of their ships and goods, to the principal of the opposite party to observe the truce, or be excluded from its benefits. They could then obtain safe-conduct from the principals or the

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(1) Wylie and Waugh - Henry V iii 15, 17; Bod.Lib.MS. Bodl.885 f.66.See pp. 139 - 140 above.

captains of Harfleur or Calais to return to their home ports (1).For Henry this short truce served the two purposes of suspending the threat at sea from France's allies and protecting the peace negotiations in Picardy for a few months. He had it proclaimed in the English ports on 13 October and ratified it a week later at Westminster (2).It was prorogued until 15 March 1417 but probably lapsed on this date or shortly afterwards (3).

Meanwhile Henry's intermittent negotiations with John of Burgundy had led to another truce between them which was not of a commercial nature. In February 1416 John, seeking further security for Flanders, had instructed his ambassadors to excuse the participation of some of his Flemish vassals at Agincourt on the grounds that he and the Flemish nobility owed military service to Charles VI for their fiefs, and had not made war on Henry on their own account (4).In June, his envoys in London made a truce with Henry to run from 13 July until Michelmas 1417. It was a personal truce between the two princes: each undertook not to make war on the other or damage his lands, possessions or subjects by land or sea. Essentially this removed Flanders and Artois from the war,

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(1) Foedera ix 397-401; Wylie and Waugh - Henry V iii 25. See pp. 140-141 above.

(2) Foedera ix 401, 404.

(3) Wylie and Waugh - Henry V iii 41; Cal.Signet nos. 797, 798.

(4) Bod.Lib. MS. French a.2.

easing the pressure on the Calais frontier (1).In a concomitant agreement, Henry promised to make no treaty with the Armagnac lords against John during the term of the truce (2).The comté of Boulogne was added to the truce in May 1417, and it was extended first until Easter 1418 with the comté of Saint-Pol added, then until Michelmas 1418 (3).By this time the Burgundians had regained control of Paris and the government of France.

Therefore when Henry invaded Normandy in July 1417 with the intention of conquering it, the left flank of his advance was protected by a truce. In November he secured his right flank when he concluded truces with Duke Jean of Brittany for himself and Yolande of Anjou, guardian of Duke Louis of Anjou, Jean's son-in-law. The truce of January 1414 with Brittany needed some reinforcement since Jean had answered Charles' summons in the 1415 campaign and his brother the Count of Richmond had fought at Agincourt. The new Breton truce ran from 16 November until Michelmas 1418,covering the duchy and Jean's other lordships in France and all lands in Henry's obedience. It too forbade deeds of war and damage to lands, possessions and subjects. The king and duke were not to receive in their territories those in arms against the

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(1) Foedera ix 383; J.Boitel -"Les Appels à l'Angleterre des Partis Francais en Lutte 1411-1418" Positions des Thèses (1942) 19.

(2) B.L.Add.Ch. 55499.

(3) Foedera ix 451, 470, 562, 563; Wylie - Henry V ii 300-301; Wylie and Waugh - Henry V iii 85 and n.5;CPR 1416-1422 138.

other, or allow armed fleets to gather in their ports or armed groups of more than a hundred to cross their lands to attack the other. Jean would recall all Bretons to the duchy by 20 December and ensure they observed the truce. Free trade and free movement at sea were allowed and the truce would not be broken by any violation. If fortresses were seized they would be returned and the infraction repaired. The truce with the Angevins covered Anjou and Maine for the same period. It was similar but shorter, and allowed Henry and his subjects free passage through Angevin lands (1).Henry aimed to pacify the western marches of his nascent Norman conquests. Anglo-Breton truces were extended to the Norman-Breton border region for the first time. These two truces were prorogued several times and were still current at the end of 1419. They were agreed to last indefinitely until one of the parties chose to revoke them (2). Efforts continued to be made to enforce the truces with Brittany both at sea and on the land frontier, by commissions of enquiry and reparations, without a great deal of success (3).

In northern France, Henry employed truces with the French

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(1) Foedera ix 511-515; Wylie and Waugh - Henry V iii 68-69; CPR 1416-1422 138.

(2) Foedera ix 613-614, 663; Cal.Signet nos. 842, 853; CCR 1413-1419 524-525; Knowlson - Jean V 107-108; B.L.Add.MS. 38525 f.74v.

(3) CCR 1413-1419 500-503; Foedera ix 614; PPC ii 243-244; Touchard - Commerce Maritime Breton 118-119, 123-124; C.76/101 m.3.See also Foedera ix 550.

princes as part of his military strategy, to neutralise possible opponents and allow him to concentrate on his thrust through Normandy to Paris. His Duchy of Guyenne did not figure in this grand plan and it was left to the authorities there to negotiate local truces on their own initiative. There were several in 1415 with the Sire de Pons and the Albret and Armagnac families (1). In July 1418 they made a truce with the new heads of these two families to last until Christmas. This was later prorogued until the following Easter, then to June 1419. It suited Henry's purpose to keep the Duchy peaceful, so he endorsed the truce and its extensions (2).It became part of the network of truces by which he isolated his foes. Of the nine great feudatories named as the Dauphin's supporters at the conference of Alençon in November 1418, three were at truce with Henry (the count of Armagnac, and the duke of Anjou and his mother) and three were his prisoners in England (the dukes of Orléans and Bourbon, and the count of Vendôme) (3).

At this conference, the Dauphinists requested a short truce to cover further peace negotiations and in particular a meeting between Henry and the Dauphin. But

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(1) Chavanon - "Renaud VI" 54; Vale - English Gascony 179, 186-187;M.G.A. Vale - War, Government and Politics in English Gascony 1399-1453 (Oxford D.Phil.thesis 1967) 234.

(2) Vale - English Gascony 187-188; Foedera ix 602, 625, 661, 690.

(3) Foedera ix 643.

the proposal was rejected by the English who considered that the Dauphin did not have sufficient authority to represent the adverse party of France (1). In spring 1419, Henry made such a truce with the Burgundian government to protect his conference with Charles and John the Fearless at Meulan (2). Another truce with a similar purpose was agreed in December 1419, and prorogued several times until a conclusion was reached in the peace negotiations at Troyes (3).

Truces were themselves a compromise between two irreconcilable positions in the search for peace. Consequently the period under consideration was characterised and defined by truces, predominantly the long truce signed in Paris in 1396. By 1388 the framework of truce regulations for the land had already been established; but it had proved impossible to end endemic warfare in France. In frontier areas, conflict had its own momentum. The independent companies ceased to be a factor early in this period, but there remained the indestructable system of marque and reprisal, overseen by conservators who might themselves be routiers involved in violations of the truces they were entrusted to preserve intact. Permanent frontier garrisons financed themselves

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(1) Foedera ix 645; PPC ii 357. See p. 152 above.

(2) B.L.Add.MS. 38525 f.87v. See p. 155 above.

(3) Lettres des Rois ii 374-375. See p. 157 above.

from the non-combatant population by the levy of pâtis and raids into enemy territory. It seems that only particular truces, locally made and locally enforced, were effective in the frontiers. At sea, it was still more difficult for a prince to control his privateering subjects. During this long period of truce, the deleterious effect of the ship-masters' activities on international relations became apparent. With each successive truce, there was a proliferation of ever stricter regulations of maritime affairs. But it remained beyond the capacity of governments to overcome piracy.

When put into operation, the idea of a long truce proved unwieldy: under the constant pressure of infractions, it needed repeated redefinition and clarification. It was complicated by the insincerity of both sides in observing it. This permitted a war of attrition to be maintained without taking the risks of open war. The commonest clause of these truces made a final rupture of the treaty impossible, no matter how the cases of violation accumulated. Even though the twenty-eight year truce was ignored and abused, the French could not pronounce it invalid, though they could refuse to make a statement of its validity and try to supersede it with other truces. The English considered it to be legally in force until Henry V's defiance in 1415, but only he was able to make the viewpoint effective by incorporating its terms into a new truce. This stubborn stance on the legal status of a previous treaty, which the French preferred to regard as

null, parallels the attitudes of the two sides to the peace of Brétigny. When Henry IV obtained Charles VI's confirmation of the Paris truce in 1400, the principle was established that a truce was made not merely between two princes, but between the states and allies they represented, therefore the truce should continue whatever the fate of the princes. England and France were at truce even though neither of their kings recognised the other and could even seek to have him displaced. Truces had always covered the right to engage in trade, but in 1407 a series of truces began whose primary purpose was to protect the commercial interests of the subjects of both sides, even when these ran contrary to the political interests of their princes. The idea was emerging of a community whose considerations in international relations were independent of dynastic politics and could override them.

The measures each side wished to include in a truce, and the form on which it reached an agreed compromise, indicate its aspirations and relative strength in a similar way to its peace offers. The Valois preferred to suspend the war by a long truce rather than end it by a peace treaty, to avoid purchasing Plantagenet rights with an expensive cession of lands. As the conflict changed in tone from a feudal quarrel with Charles VI at an advantage, to a dynastic quarrel with Henry V at an advantage, the concentration of the truce terms shifted from Guyenne to the sea, to northern France. From Gaunt's

concern to establish himself in the Duchy, they passed to Henry IV's preoccupations with defending the weakness of his usurped throne and promoting the wealth of his kingdom, and to Henry V's determination to obtain his family's rights in France. After 1415, his truces were adjuncts of his military campaigns. A truce was not a state of peace, but an interlude in a state of war, and at its end, open war recommenced. Its purpose was not necessarily a prelude to peace, but often a period of recuperation preparatory to a fresh attack.

Chapter IV

CONFLICT WITHIN THE ANGLO-FRENCH TRUCES

Although the period from 1389-1415 was officially one of continuous truce, in practice military activity was far from completely suspended. It has been claimed "No medieval truce was ever properly observed, and...no one expected it to be." (1). On the frontiers of the English possessions in France, the two factions lived in a state of almost permanent infraction of the truces. But it was not simply a question of petty border violations, raids and counter-raids: both governments expected a certain level of unofficial warfare to continue into the truce. When his indenture for the captaincy of Brest was drawn up in June 1389, it was stipulated that John Holand should receive wages at the wartime rate if there should be war in Brittany during a future truce or peace (2). After the Leulinghen truce was signed, the French government still had more than 2,000 troops on its payroll to guard the

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(1) Keen - Laws of War 214.

(2) E.28/1 nos. 54a and 54b.

frontiers and deal with routiers, about half the number it maintained whilst conquering English territory between 1369 and 1380 (1). In December 1396 it was still paying wages for war service to troops in Périgord (2). Although no major expeditions were successfully launched against France between the earl of Buckingham's chevauchée in 1380 and that of the duke of Clarence in 1412, there was a guerre couverte between the English and the French from Henry IV's accession onwards. This was fully recognised in the Anglo-Flemish negotiations of August 1403, when it was a factor allowed for in a projected agreement to protect commercial shipping (3).

The French could not acknowledge their attacks on Henry's subjects without repudiating the protection provided by the twenty-eight year truce, so they concealed them under the colours of allies and independent third parties. By mutual consent, privateers could be treated as pirates, and routiers as common robbers, allowing a war of attrition to continue under the cover of the truce, without the dangers of open war. The French sent ships under Scottish flags and Scottish commanders to prey on English shipping and then would not acknowledge responsibility for restoring English losses. The English

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(1) Contamine - Guerre État et Société 210,230.

(2) Preuves ii 676-677.

(3) Ford - "Piracy or Policy" 65.

ambassadors were well aware of the deception (1). It was often convenient for both sides to regard the Bretons and the Flemings as Charles' allies rather than his subjects. This enabled the English to take retaliation against their shipping and even their territory, without breaking the truce. The French considered Wales to be fair game in the same way by virtue of the pretended authority of their ally Owain Glyndŵr as prince, but the English insisted that he was a rebellious subject (2). If allies and their lands could be excluded from the truce because they refused to abide by it, so too could individuals. By their personal defiances of Henry, Louis of Orléans and Waleran of Saint-Pol put their actions outside the scope of a truce between the kingdoms of England and France. Theoretically they conducted private wars against the usurper, for private reasons. Consequently they were as exempt from the truce's protection as from its restrictions (3).

It was in the marches of Picardy that the forces of Henry of Lancaster and Charles of Valois confronted each other most directly. A double ring of English and French fortresses surrounded the Calais enclave (4). Two months

(1) A.N. J.645 nos. 55 and 55(2). This method of circumventing the truce was specifically forbidden in the security for the sea between England and Flanders in 1408, Foedera viii 550.

(2) PPC i 302.

(3) e.g. The earl of Somerset was permitted to attack the comté of Saint-Pol in 1404, E.28/14 no.904.

(4) K.Fowler - The Age of Plantagenet and Valois (London 1967) map VI p.72.

after Henry had seized the throne, the lieutenant and treasurer of Calais reported to the Council that the Marches were peaceful (1). By January the situation had changed; over the next three years, the English government several times sent troop reinforcements and supplies to Calais and repaired its fortresses in the March, in response to threatening rumours from the French and Flemish ports (2). In February 1403 the count of Saint-Pol sent a letter of defiance to Henry, stating his intention to damage him by land and sea outside the kingdom of France and the king of France's quarrel, in retaliation for the death of his brother-in-law, Richard II, and in December he sent his herald Ligny to Westminster with a further message of challenge (3). Waleran of Saint-Pol had rights to the lands of his deceased wife, Maud Holand, by the courtesy of England. He had visited England in 1390 and 1396 (4); as late as 1401, as conservator and captain-general in Picardy, he wrote to the captain of Calais stating his intention to observe the truce (5). In 1404 Henry and his ambassadors made a series of protests to the French and Burgundian governments about the

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(1) E.28/26 no.9.

(2) CCR 1399-1402 39-40; PPC i 83; Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 149; Foedera viii 125; B.L.Cotton MS.Caligula Div f.19; E.28/9 unnumbered; E.28/24 no.17; E.28/26 no.98; E.28/28 no.9.

(3) Foedera viii 348; Monstrelet i 67-69.

(4) C.76/75 mm.11,13 (twice); C.76/81 m.11; S.C.1/63 nos. 276,277. In 1390 Richard sent him £100, CCR 1389-1392 216.

(5) Quoted by Rysshetон in 1404, A.N. J.645 no.53.

defiances of the count of Saint-Pol and the duke of Orléans and their subsequent hostile actions. They argued that as Charles' liege subjects, Waleran and Louis were obliged to respect his oath confirming the truce and demanded to know if Charles had approved the sending of their letters (1). They regarded the two French lords as excluded from any benefit of the truce; additional securities were required for the ambassadors at Calais, in case they attacked them whilst they were negotiating in Picardy (2). Saint-Pol opened his campaign in August 1403 with the ambush and capture of John Lardener, captain of Oye Castle, whom he held to ransom at one of his fortreses (3). He then turned his attention to the Channel.

Philip of Burgundy took his part in this co-ordinated hostility to the English. A plan was drawn up for a siege of Calais by three thousand men-at-arms and a thousand archers, with a further three hundred troops guarding the Norman and Picard frontiers. It was expected to last five months (4). Philip began a blockade of the Calais march and contacted traitors in the garrison. The plot was discovered and Hugh Lutterell resigned as lieutenant. The Council decided to send reinforcements to the garrison,

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(1) Letters of Henry IV i 170-174, 214-225; Foedera viii 348; B.L.Add.Ch.12504; A.N. J.645 no.53.

(2) Wylie - Henry IV i 336; A.N. J.919 nos. 12,21; B.L.Add.Ch. 12504.

(3) A.N. J.645 no.53; J.919 no.11; E.28/18 nos. 13,50.

(4) A.N. J.1025 no.13. Early in 1403 Philip's son Antoine married the daughter of the count of Saint-Pol and Maud Holand, Monstrelet i 70.

first under the command of the earl of Somerset, then under Sir John Pelham (1). But the projected siege did not materialize. Hostilities in the March in 1404 and early 1405 were limited to border raids by both sides, in which the comtés of Guînes, Boulogne and Saint-Pol suffered. The English garrisons of Calais, Guînes, Marck, Oye and Hammes were spurred on by the failure of the government to pay them (2). In January 1405, Henry ordered the officers of the Staple to seek out the intentions of the French for hostile action and sent spies to Bruges (3). In April, the independent reports of several different spies agreed that the French were about to blockade Calais by land and sea. They were prepared for a long siege and had already assembled 7,000 troops, with cannon and siege engines. The council at Calais considered that the purpose of this was to divert Thomas of Lancaster's proposed expedition to rescue Guyenne by appearing to offer battle; but it was confident that if sufficiently supplied with men, materials and victuals, it could deal with this feint (4). In response, Henry ordered the revictualling of Calais and sent Sir John Arundel back to his captaincy at Marck (5). In the event, it was at Marck that the French attack fell

(1) Wylie - Henry IV i 389-390; Cal.Signet no.167; E.28/12 no.4. See pp.241-242 above.

(2) Wylie - Henry IV i 396; St. Denys iii 120; Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 226, 227, 283-284,294, 295; E.28/14 no.904; E.28/28 no.40.

(3) E.28/17 no.54.

(4) E.28/20 no.65.

(5) E.28/14 no.75; E.28/20 no. 64.

on 12 May, but only by a relatively small force led by the Count of Saint-Pol, who was now allied to Louis of Orléans. He attacked with his banners flying as a sign of open war and took the town, but the garrison held out in the castle. Three days later it was relieved by a force from Calais, which drove the besiegers back to Saint-Omer. Saint-Pol also detained the bishop of Rochester, who was travelling without the precaution of a safe-conduct (1). On 1 July Henry was still expecting Calais to be besieged (2), but nothing happened this year.

The threat came much closer in 1406. In April, John the Fearless, now count of Flanders, was appointed lieutenant and captain-general for Picardy and West Flanders (3). In August and September the government in Paris became worried by the build-up of English troops in the Calais enclave and expected an attack across the frontier (4). The English laid siege to the fortress of Balinghem and John was sent to relieve it. He then undertook to besiege Calais and its attendant fortresses by land and sea. For

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(1) The English took important prisoners but a counter-attack on Ardres failed, Monstrelet i 100-105; Varenbergh - Histoire des Relations 494; Wylie - Henry IV ii 90-96; Vaughan - John the Fearless 20-21, 146; Keen - Laws of War 17, 107, 114,202. The bishop undertook judicial proceedings against the duke of Burgundy and the count of Saint-Pol as a result of this arrest, Foedera viii 480, 627-628; C.76/92 m.9.

(2) E.28/22 no.30. The duke of Burgundy asked for troops and money from Paris to besiege Calais but was refused, Monstrelet i 107-108.

(3) Monstrelet i 125-126, 130.

(4) B.L.Add.Ch. 1398, 6780.

this purpose he mustered 4,350 soldiers at Saint Omer on 2 and 3 November, including contingents led by the count of Saint-Pol and the Sire de Heugueville, master of the crossbowmen, besides his own retainers. The English were expecting an army gathered from France, Flanders, Holland and Brabant under the command of John, his brother Antoine of Limburg and the Sire de Heugueville, most of whom could be considered as outside the truce. Crossbows were brought from Rumania, cannon from the Low Countries and siege equipment from Bruges and Sluys; John cut down a whole forest near Saint-Omer to make siege engines and two bastides (1). Although he was starved of money from Paris to pay the troops and had strained his own finances to the limit, he was prepared to move against the English fortress of Guînes on 8 November. But to his great fury he received orders from Charles to abandon the attack, perhaps because of the expense, perhaps to avoid a final rupture of the truce. The siege train was put into storage in the abbey of Saint Bertin at Saint-Omer (2). In late October, Henry summoned his retainers and collected ships for an expedition to relieve Calais (3). His ambassadors there warned him that Duke John persisted in his hostile intention, despite the progress in the talks

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(1) Foedera viii 336 (misdated to 1403), 456; Monstrelet i 135-136; B.N.Bourgogne 57 f. 295-295v; A.N. J.919 no.24.

(2) Vaughan - John the Fearless 39-40; Monstrelet i 136-138; B.N.Bourgogne 57 f.26-26v (letters from Jean Chousat, his receiver-general of finances, who wished to resign).c.f. Owen - Connection 28-29; Wylie- Henry IV iii 61.

(3) Foedera viii 336, 456; Wylie - Henry IV iii 63.

for a commercial treaty with Flanders (1). At the end of January the town's captain, the earl of Somerset, told Henry that he expected a siege shortly (2); Henry again ordered his retinue to join him and ships to be arrested (3). Calais was in crisis, insufficiently supplied with victuals and artillery, with a desperate and unpaid garrison on the brink of desertion. Over the next few months, the Council managed to struggle through its financial problems to maintain the military establishment there (4). Fortunately for the English, John the Fearless had insufficient resources to make a second attempt in Spring 1407 and by the summer the area was covered by a new truce (5). After he ordered Louis of Orléans' assassination in November, he and his rivals in Paris had other preoccupations.

Duke John threatened the Calais march again early in 1410, when he was governing in Paris. The French Council decided on a policy of war on the last day of 1409 and preparations were made for an attack on Calais (6), probably when the truce expired on 1 May. In response to the renewed danger, Parliament assigned three-quarters of

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(1) B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Diii f.145.

(2) E.28/23 no.20.

(3) Foedera viii 466; Wylie - Henry IV iii 64; CPR 1405-1408 309, 354.

(4) J.L.Kirby - "The Council of 1407 and the Problem of Calais" H.T. (Jan.1955), 44-50; Letters of Henry IV ii 145-148; E.28/23 nos. 3 and 20.

(5) See p. 252 above.

(6) Wylie - Henry IV iv 32; Choix i 322.

the wool subsidy it voted for the coming year to the keeping of the Calais march and the wages of its garrisons (1). On 7 February, the admirals were ordered to hold all ships over thirty tons in readiness for an expedition to resist the duke's attack. But English agents set fire to the stores and engines he had gathered at Saint Omer (2). The planned campaign was again abandoned and the truce for Picardy and West Flanders was renewed for a few months (3).There was raiding on both sides in 1412, probably after the expiry of this local truce. The initiative now lay with the English and they were able to take Balinghem. The count of Saint-Pol counter-attacked Guînes (4). The purpose of the English raids was to harrass the duke of Burgundy's rear as he advanced to attack the Armagnacs; in conjunction with the expedition of the duke of Clarence they formed an overall strategy for an English intervention in France. Similarly when open war broke out in August 1415, the Calais garrison began raids across the frontiers to act in concert with Henry V's landing at Harfleur and his subsequent march from Normandy (5). The

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(1) PPC ii 7-9.

(2) Wylie - Henry IV iv 34; E.28/23 no.26.

(3) See p.257 above.

(4) Wylie - Henry IV iv 72-73; Varenbergh - Histoire des Relations 502. In Oct. 1413 the French complained of the capture of Balinghem as a violation of their truce with Henry IV, A.N. J.646 no.8. See p.258 and n.4 above.

(5) Wylie - Henry V ii 110; Foedera ix 314-315: St.Denys v 550; Monstrelet iii 78.

town of Boulogne was felt to be in danger of a siege by the expected conjunction of the two forces (1).

The French failed to launch the full-scale attack on Calais which would probably have been regarded as the definitive rupture of the twenty-eight year truce. After the crisis of 1407, the balance of military advantage on the March began to tip in England's favour, under the cover of the new series of truces. By Henry V's reign the English position there was as strong as ever and ready to serve as a base for a new assault on Valois France.

The English territorial holdings in Aquitaine survived a similar period of crisis, but here the military struggle was fought harder and over a greater depth of frontier. The fighting in south-west France was not occasioned purely by Henry IV's usurpation, but was connected to the continuous competition by the greater and lesser nobility for political advantage and control in the region, a contest in which the Valois and the Plantagenets often appeared to be only ineffective and frustrated umpires. The Duchy had not been entirely pacified by the series of truces beginning in 1388. During the campaigns of the late 1380s the English had been driven back from the defensive line of the river Charente (2). Both before the truces began and during their first few years there was

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(1) C.Phillpotts - "The French Plan of Battle during the Agincourt Campaign" E.H.R. xcix (1984) 61 n.3.

(2) Chavanon - "Renaud VI" 38-39; Froissart xiii 273.

military activity by the count of Armagnac and agents of Charles VI to force the English routiers to evacuate the fortresses they had held in the eastern parts of the Duchy (1). The agreements Armagnac had made with individual captains for this purpose were recognised in the truce of August 1388 (2). But this did not eliminate the activity of the routiers, many of whom, like Ramonet de Sort, took service with Armagnac for his perennial struggle against the house of Foix. In 1395 forces loyal to the English were involved in a private war between the Seigneur of Barbazan and the count of Pardiac (3). Early in 1399, the Captal de Buch enlisted some English garrisons for his war for the succession to Foix, fought against Charles VI's constable, Louis of Sancerre. This caused Sancerre to threaten the pâtis the English received from the Sénéschaussées of Toulouse, Quercy, Agenais, Landes, Bazadais and Bigorre, which would probably have provoked full-scale war between the two obediences (4). Those professing allegiance to Richard had still been seizing fortresses in the Duchy in 1390, violations which occasioned the sending of English and French commissions

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(1) Keen - Laws of War 94-96, 149; Lacaille - "Enguerran VII" 89; P.R.O. 31/8/135 Section 1 no.2; B.L.Add.Ch. 3362. See p. 187 above.

(2) Foedera vii 597.

(3) Keen- Laws of War 87 and n.3, 126 n.4, 109 n.1. Nompar de Caumont allied with the count of Foix in May 1394, P.S.Lewis - "Decayed and Non-Feudalism in later Medieval France" BIHR xxxvii (1964) 182 no.6.

(4) Fowler - "Truces" 207.

to enforce the truce (1). By 1394, John of Gaunt had abandoned his attempt to consolidate control over an extended Duchy and the commissioners ceased their attentions to truce infractions. In 1394 and 1395 "English" troops seized fortresses in Saintonge, Angoulême and Auvergne. Gaunt denied responsibility for these captures, which were reversed by the efforts of maréchal Boucicaut (2). Raids for pâtis, booty, cattle and prisoners to ransom continued into the truces, at Périgueux in 1388 and 1389, in the Pays d'Albret in 1390, in Saintonge and Angoulême in 1391 (3). The French continued to employ letters of marque against the town of Bourg-sur-Gironde and reprisals against Bordeaux merchants in the Potart case (4). In 1398 they confiscated the fortresses of the Sire de Limeuil (5) and in 1399 the lands of count Archambaud of Périgord, driving him to seek refuge in England (6). These local tensions and violations constantly threatened the continued existence of the truce. In 1392, the Mayor and Jurats of Bordeaux warned

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(1) Dip.Cor. no.123 and p.221 n.123; C.61/101 m.4; A.N. J.865 no.7. See pp.184-187above.

(2) Buchon - Boucicaut I xx.

(3) Fowler - "Truces" 200 n.73, 201 and n.78; Choix i 154-156; A.N. J.865 nos. 8 and 9.

(4) Chavanon - "Renaud VI" 42-43; E.28/6 no.95; A.N. K.54 no.44. See pp. 211 above, and 334 below.

(5) A.N. J.865 no.14.

(6) Wylie - Henry V i 133. The arrest of Périgord's brother, with his ships, was ordered in 1401 and 1402, CCR 1399-1402 461; 1405-1409 67.

Gaunt of the French intention to attack Bordeaux (1) and the government in Paris expected the English party in Guyenne to make open war on the expiry of the four-year truce at Michelmas 1398 (2).

The Duchy was considered to be Gaunt's sphere of influence from his arrival there in Autumn 1387 onwards (3), and he seems to have taken responsibility for its military support from England. His arrival at Bordeaux and his military preparations there alarmed the French government, which raised money to reinforce the frontiers and oppose an expected expedition from England (4). In Spring 1388 the Appellant government sent victuals to Gaunt (5) and reinforcements under the command of Thomas Percy (6). But Gaunt turned his attention to negotiating a truce and his anticipated attack never came (7). It appears that he indented to take troops to Guyenne again in 1390, but abandoned the idea (8). This was presumably the expedition of which Mérigot Marchès had heard when secretly told to

(1) Anglo-Norman no.150.

(2) A.N. J.644 no.23.

(3) Angleterre et Schisme 252; Lehoux - Berri ii 224.

(4) Choix i 81-86; B.L.Add.Ch.3360.

(5) CCR 1385-1389 376.

(6) Angleterre et Schisme 255 n.5. Percy had recently served Gaunt as admiral and ambassador on his expedition to Castile.

(7) See pp. 166-167 above.

(8) J.J.N.Palmer - The Career of Henry Bowet, bishop of Bath and Wells, later archbishop of York (Oxford B.Litt.thesis 1964) 37 n.4.

retain his fortresses by the English truce commissioners (1). Gaunt did take a large force to the Duchy in Autumn 1394 (2). Charles and his uncles feared he intended to use it to break the four-year truce and sent Jean Boucicaut to ascertain that he did not (3). Percy may have taken more troops over in March 1398 (4). Gaunt's son, John Beaufort, was appointed lieutenant of Guyenne in September of this year and ships arrested for his passage there, with his retinue, but his departure was repeatedly delayed by Richard's orders (5). The English government did not neglect the Gascon's need for military aid during the truces of the 1390s and in April 1400, Henry IV continued this policy by sending a small force to the Duchy under the command of Henry Bowet, Hugh Despenser, Gaillard de Durfort and Nompar de Caumont (6). Shortly after his usurpation, he conferred the title Duke of Aquitaine on his eldest son (7).

King Charles responded in January 1401 by creating his eldest son, the new Dauphin Louis, duke of Guyenne as Peer

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(1) Fowler - "Truces" 203; Keen - Laws of War 98.

(2) Knighton - ii 321; Ann.Ric.Sec. 167.

(3) Buchon - Boucicaut I xx; Froissart xv 151-152.

(4) Vale - English Gascony 31.c.f. Wylie - Henry IV i 122. In 1397 Matthew Gournay was serving in Guyenne, CCR 1396-1399 36; E.28/10 unnumbered.

(5) CPR 1396-1399 432, 558; CCR 1396-1399 354; C.61/105 mm.3,6,7,8; E.28/26 nos. 53 and 64.

(6) Vale - English Gascony 31-32, 247; Palmer - Bowet 54-55; Lettres des Rois ii 304; CPR 1399-1401 271.

(7) Wylie - Henry IV i 66.

of France, with immediate seisin of the Duchy. The grant was for life only, the Duchy reverting to the royal domain on Louis' death (1). It echoed Philip VI's creation of his eldest son as duke in September 1345. It implied an intention to enforce Charles V's confiscation of the Duchy and was intended as a provocation to the new régime in England. Louis performed homage to Charles for the Duchy at the end of February 1402 (2), and was given full administration of it in January 1410. He may have been present during the French campaign in Guyenne in 1406 (3). The duke of Berry also resumed his lieutenancy of Languedoc and Guyenne in 1401 (4). In England, Parliament was informed of the grant to Louis, which was considered to indicate the danger of open war in Guyenne (5). Throughout the negotiations of 1401, the English ambassadors complained to the French that the grant was an infraction of the truce as it altered the status quo in the Duchy to the detriment of the Plantagenets' rights as dukes of Aquitaine (6). A more material loss occurred as a result of the Captal de Buch's defection to the French obedience and his homage to Charles for the comté of Foix on 10 March 1401. As part of the price for this

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(1) A.N. J.369 no.1. c.f. the terms of the grant to Gaunt in March 1390 discussed above at pp. 24, 28-31.

(2) A.N. J.645 no.23.

(3) Martinière - "Guerres anglaises" 86, 90.

(4) Fowler - Plantagenet and Valois 126.

(5) Rot.Parl. iii 454.

(6) Foedera viii 195, 223; Choix i 220; A.N. J.645 no.15.

inheritance, he surrendered five frontier fortresses into French hands, the most important of which was Bouteville, the last remaining English outpost on the river Charente, occupied by Louis of Orléans in April (1). This cession also contravened the twenty-eight year truce (2). The English ambassadors at Calais warned the Council through William Faringdon that provision should be made against French aggression in Guyenne as early as February 1400, when the duke of Orléans was holding the sons of the Captal hostage (3). In the spring of 1401, the authorities at Bordeaux were also asking Henry for military aid (4).

Accordingly in July 1401, the Council decided to send the earl of Rutland to Guyenne as lieutenant with a force of a hundred men-at-arms and a thousand archers. He was also given the custody of Fronsac castle. When he sailed in September 1401 he was accompanied by Matthew Gournay, seneschal of the Landes, with another small force, the exiled count of Périgord, the captain of Courbéfy and Edmund Thorp, the new mayor of Bordeaux. Rutland was to remain in Guyenne until early 1403 (5).

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(1) Vale - English Gascony 46-48; J. de la Martinière -"Instructions secrètes donnees par Charles VI au Sire d'Albret pour soulever la Guyenne contre Henri IV" B.E.C. lxxiv (1913) 337; Palmer - Bowet 59-60; Foedera viii 223; B.N. Duchesne 108 ff. 111-115.

(2) Cosneau - Grands Traités 88 clause 10; Foedera viii 223.

(3) B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Diii f.125.

(4) B.L.Cotton MS, Caligula Div f.60.

(5) Vale - English Gascony 42,44,181,246,248; PPC i 119, 181; CCR 1399-1402 380; CPR 1399-1401 551-553; C.61/108 mm.6,7,8,10; C.61/109 m.9; E.28/9; E.28/10.

During this period, Louis duke of Orléans made a decisive intervention in French policy towards Henry's rule in Guyenne. Orléans was amongst those who had given Henry a warm welcome in Paris when he was exiled by Richard in 1398. His duchess made Henry a gift of jewelry and he was probably involved in Henry's negotiations for a marriage with the duke of Berry's daughter Marie (1). In June 1399 he made a personal alliance with Henry for mutual aid against all their enemies, to last as long as the current Anglo-French truce or any peace treaty that replaced it. It was witnessed by Thomas Erpingham, Thomas Rempston and John Norbury, Henry's closest associates in exile. Henry excepted from its scope both Richard and Charles, Richard's allies, and his own relatives, vassals and allies. Orléans did not except any of his family specifically; he later claimed that Henry had nullified the alliance by his actions against Richard, because he was the ally of Charles (2). It appears that the alliance was instigated by Orléans and was just one of the collection of alliances he made from 1398 onwards. Most of these sought support in the Rhineland as a counter-weight to Burgundian expansion into the Low Countries, but they also included lords from France, Brittany and Scotland (3). Henry later alleged that this

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(1) Pistono - Repudiation 21-23; Wylie - Henry IV i 85; B.L.Add.Ch.3066.

(2) Choix i 157-159; Monstrelet i 46,49-52,54-55,60.

(3) A.N. K.54,55,56,57.

alliance too was directed principally against Philip of Burgundy and also that his own enterprise against Richard had the prior knowledge and approval of Orléans and even a promise of aid (1). This latter accusation was used by the Burgundians against Orléans posthumously (2). In July 1399 the duke of York, as guardian of England for Richard, took measures to oppose an assault on Calais and an invasion of southern England from Picardy (3). After the success of his venture, Henry maintained contact with the Orléanist faction in France. It appears that Casin de Serenvilliers, a close retainer of the duke of Berry, was in England in September 1399 (4). Followers of both Berry and Orléans attended Henry's coronation (5). When Henry sent his first ambassadors to France at the end of November, commissioned to contract marriages and leagues for mutual aid, he may still have been thinking of Marie of Berry as a bride for one of his family, and an extension of his alliance with Orléans (6). Henry claimed that subsequently he twice received messages from Orléans that he wished the alliance to continue but that it should be kept secret, firstly through a knight of Orléans' livery, and secondly through some English subjects (7).

(1) Monstrelet i 59,60.

(2) Vaughan - John the Fearless 71.

(3) CCR 1396-1399 518; CPR 1396-1399 592.

(4) Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 26.

(5) Wylie - Henry IV i 85.

(6) Foedera viii 108-109.

(7) Monstrelet i 61.

The first message probably came in June 1400, when Orléans paid Serenvilliers, Hector de Pontbriant, Charles de Savoisy and Étienne de Saint Mys to go to England, ostensibly for a tournament (1). The second presumably came through one of the English embassies.

Whatever the truth of the arrangements of private friendship between Louis of Orléans and Henry of Lancaster, they soon turned to public enmity. Orléans began to accumulate quarrels against Henry. Already, count of Angoulême, in 1400 he was granted the comté of Périgord and sent troops to enforce his claim in June 1401 (2). He acquired the alliances of Archambaud de Grailly, the renegade count of Foix, and his sons in April 1401; David, earl of Crawford, who fought as a French privateer under the cover of the Scottish flag, in January 1402; and Waleran, count of Saint-Pol, in July 1404 (3). He posed as the protector of his niece, the young Queen Isabelle, and as champion of her rights in England. In June 1404 she was betrothed, and in June 1406 married to his son Charles; her dowry included the claim for the 200,000 francs repayment from Henry (4).

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(1) Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 58-59; B.L.Add.Ch. 11397; B.N. n.a.f. 3639 nos.361 and 364. Orders for their safe-conduct - Foedera viii 140,151; CPR 1399-1401 356.

(2) Vale - English Gascony 46; B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Div f.60. According to Monstrelet he was granted the Duchy of Aquitaine in 1407, Monstrelet i 151-152.

(3) Ford - "Piracy or Policy" 71; A.N. K.56 nos. 8 and 25; K.57 no.9.

(4) Monstrelet i 56-57, 126 and n.2,129; A.N. K.55 no.29. See p. 110 above.

Orléans transferred his new hostility to the field of chivalric combat. In May 1402 he sponsored seven French champions to fight and defeat seven English in a mêlée at Montendre (1). In August he sent a personal challenge to Henry for a combat with a hundred armed men on each side to take place in the northern marches of Guyenne. The victor would take the loser as a prisoner (2).He followed this with a more insulting letter in March 1403. He imputed Henry's honour and complained of his maltreatment of Queen Isabelle. He repudiated their alliance because of the deposition of Richard, accused Henry of acquiring his throne dishonestly and implied that he had caused Richard's death (3). A third letter written in October 1403, on the eve of a campaign in Guyenne, repeated this charge more openly (4). Orléans intended that these calumnies should damage Henry's international reputation and provoke an aggressive response from the English, who could then be held responsible for the general breakdown of the truce.

He succeeded in drawing Henry's aggression, at least verbally, for his replies stated his intention to come to Guyenne with an army at some future time convenient to himself and meet Orléans in open battle, stressing the

(1) Wylie - Henry V i 324.

(2) Monstrelet i 43-45.

(3) Monstrelet i 52-57. Payment to Champagne king-of-arms and Orléans herald for delivering this letter 1 April 1403, B.N. n.a.f. 3640 no.427.

(4) Wylie - Henry IV i 336, 388, 394.

need to defend his rights in France. To the original challenge he disdainfully replied that he could not accept challenges from those inferior in rank. He maintained that Orléans' request for a combat contravened both the truce and their alliance, which he thereby regarded as null. To the second letter Henry responded at length, in detail and in kind. He denied all Orléans' charges, offering to prove his innocence with his body, and hinted accusations of involvement with sorcery, dishonourable treatment of women, and conspiracy against King Charles (1). To the third letter he did not reply. The English ambassadors protested against Orléans' bellicosity to their French counterparts in October 1402 (2). In May and June 1403, they suspended the current truce negotiations at Leulinghen, refusing to continue until they had received a formal statement that Orléans' letters had not been sent with the consent of Charles or his council; but the French remained evasive (3). In 1404, English complaints continued to be made about Orléans' conduct, coupled with that of the count of Saint-Pol (4). Since the French government refused to respond to the English allegation that the duke and the count were in breach of the truce, the English government chose to regard them as

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(1) Monstrelet i 46-49, 57-66. See also pp. 315 and 316 above for Henry's comments on the alliance.

(2) A.N. J.645 nos. 55(1) and 55(2) (copy at Bod.Lib.Carte MS. 113 ff.111v-113).

(3) Foedera viii 310-311; A.N. J.645 no.43. See pp. 227 and 233 above.

(4) PPC ii 82; Foedera viii 348; Letters of Henry IV i 170-174, 214-225; A.N. J.645 no.53. See p. 301 above.

acting on their own authority, and therefore as outside of the truce (1).

Although Louis of Orléans could be considered as engaged in a private war against King Henry, he exploited all the resources of the French crown to further his territorial ambitions in Guyenne at the expense of the English crown. As governor of the aides for war in northern France, he raised funds to oppose the earl of Rutland's forces in May 1402 (2). His allowance from Charles for the defence of the comté of Angoulême was raised for the year October 1402 to September 1403 (3). A five-month campaign was planned in Guyenne to parallel that in Picardy (4).The advent of Orléans in the Duchy transformed local frontier warfare into a series of campaigns of conquest, like those of the 1380s. At Christmas 1403, Matthew Gournay warned Henry that Orléans intended to attack Bordeaux, whilst in the south, the count of Armagnac had sent a defiance to Pons de Castillon, threatening to damage the English obedience and stating he was acting as an officer of the king of France. He had raised money in Toulouse and was expected to direct his attack against Pierre-Arnaud de Béarn and the towns of Dax, Aire and Saint-Sever.

(1) Nicholas Ryssheton drew the distinction between these two ways of making war on Henry in his letter to the grand council of France 24 Sept. 1404, A.N. J.645 no.53. See p. 302 and n.2 above.

(2) Ford - "Piracy or Policy" 71; Pistono - Repudiation 141-142; Vaughan - Philip the Bold 56-57.

(3) B.L.Add.Ch. 4292.

(4) A.N. J.1025 no.13.

Seneschal Durfort was standing on the defensive in Agenais and Tursan (1). Henry was already expecting the encirclement of Bordeaux by the count of Saint-Pol at sea and Orléans on land, with whom were the Count of Clermont, Charles d'Albret constable of France, and Renaut de Trie, the French admiral. Neither of these forces was able to establish itself, though Bayonne was effectively blockaded by land and sea (2). Having driven off Saint-Pol, English ships went on to raid La Rochelle and the Île de Ré. In late 1403, there was also raiding in the Limousin and Périgord (3), and Armagnac penetrated the Duchy from the south, capturing Marmande on the river Garonne (4).

In Summer 1404, there was again a French raid by sea on the Bordelais and an English counter-raid against La Rochelle and the neighbouring islands, where money was being raised for a campaign by Charles d'Albret, as royal lieutenant north of the Dordogne. He began by besieging the outlying English fortress of Courbéfy, which surrendered after a seven-week siege, and went on to take Saint-Jean-de-Côle, Montagrier and Saint-Méard-de-Dronne. This destroyed the

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(1) B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Div f.37. For some of the fortresses mentioned in the following pages see the map of Guyenne in the pocket inside the back cover.

(2) Wylie - Henry IV i 388-389; Foedera viii 348; CCR 1402-1405 222; CPR 1401-1405 325. The Council in London received reports that Orléans and St.Pol would use their fleet to invade England, E.28/12 no.4. In Sept. 1404 Orléans paid for banners that had been made for the campaign he had intended to conduct in England, B.L.Egerton Ch.141.

(3) Martinière - "Guerres anglaises" 84.

(4) Wylie - Henry V i 116.

English salient running through northern Périgord into Limousin, and lost them the pâtis of the area, worth 36,000 livres a year at the estimation of Jean Chousat. Albret relieved English pressure on the French town of Bergerac by taking the castles of La Force and Madurand on the river Dordogne, and bought the temporary neutrality of several other fortresses in Périgord. He intended to continue to Bordeaux, but lack of money to pay his troops forced him to withdraw through Périgueux to Pons and Cognac (1).

Simultaneously, Clermont was conducting a campaign in the south with his companion-in-arms, the Vicomte of Castelbon, eldest son of the count of Foix. In Bigorre they stripped Jean de Béarn of all his castles except Lourdes and Les Anglès, which paid for a local truce for thirteen months. They were unable to cross Béarn to attack the English castle of Mauléon in Soule, but the count of Foix forced its garrison to buy a truce which kept it in the French obedience for one year. On the eastern frontiers of Chalosse, Clermont was unable to impose pâtis and met with defiance, except at the four small villages of St. Gein, Vielle-Tursan, Arboucave and Pimbo. The local nobility were loyal to the English crown in Chalosse and Béarn, where many of them were followers of the count of

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(1) Wylie - Henry IV i 444, 459; Martinière - "Guerres anglaises" 83-84; Monstrelet i 94-95; E.28/14 no.288; E.28/15 unnumbered; E.28/20 no.43; CPR 1405-1408 10; PPC i 242,254; B.L.Egerton Ch.19; B.L.Cotton MS.Caligula Div ff.69, 70,73-73v, 77; B.N.Bourgogne 21 f.34v. Courbéfy was variously spelt Courbussin, Curboffyn, Querbuffyn.

Foix. They deserted their own castles and rallied to the defence of Saint-Sever at their own expense, when Clermont and Castelbon came to besiege the town. After this reverse, Clermont planned to move north to make a junction with Albret's forces but nothing came of the plan. Durfort organised the defence of the Landes and Agenais and also negotiated a local truce with the count of Armagnac. The seneschal of Armagnac was amongst those later thanked by Henry for the loyal defence of Saint-Sever (1).

In December 1404, Clermont bought the allegiance of Lauzun in Agenais for King Charles and in the following summer he was active in southern Périgord. He captured Monsaguel and Badefols and purchased the surrender of Castelnau, but Anglo-Gascon forces gained control of Brantôme, Carlux and the fortresses of the Sire de Limeuil (2). Meanwhile the siege of Mortagne-sur-Gironde was begun by the Sire de Pons in May 1405 and completed by Albret at the end of June. Albret then went on to besiege Chalais, which fell

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(1) Vale - English Gascony 165-169 and Map IV (which should be supplemented by the lists in E.28/14); Monstrelet i 94; B.L.Cotton MS.Caligula Div ff.73v, 74-76v, 77-77v; E.28/14 nos.6, 9, 10, 11, 13,16,18, unnumbered; E.28/15 unumbered. Jean de Béarn had acquired Les Anglès before Feb. 1401, C.61/108 m.26. King Charles of Navarre gave information about Béarn to Bertrand de Montfort, but his report to Henry is too damaged for its nature to be discovered, B.L.Cotton MS.Caligula Div f.32.

(2) Vale - English Gascony 205-206; Wylie - Henry V i 146; Martinière - "Guerres anglaises" 86; B.L.Cotton MS Caligula Div f.126.

early in September (1). The count of Armagnac advanced with more speedy success down the Garonne valley, capturing Porte-Sainte-Marie, Aiguillon, Tonneins, Caumont, Bazas and Langon. Whilst he threatened the Médoc and Bordeaux itself from the landward side, they suffered raids from the sea and a blockade by galleys from Castile and La Rochelle. Eventually the citizens of Bordeaux were able to pay Armagnac to withdraw, before either Albret or Pons could join him in an assault on the city (2).

In 1406 the French took advantage of the territories they had gained for an attempt to overrun English Guyenne in one season. An army led by Albret, Clermont and the count of Alençon recaptured Brantôme after a two-month siege. A number of other fortresses were acquired in Limousin, Périgord and Agenais. An aide was levied both for the duke of Burgundy to attack Calais and for the duke of Orléans to lead a campaign into Guyenne. Orléans set out from Paris in September and joined Albret's forces at Barbezieux in October. From here, he sent an ultimatum to the English towns of Libourne and Saint-Emilion to change their allegiance. He hoped to cut Bordeaux off from

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(1) Chavanon - "Renaud VI" 47; Martinière - "Guerres anglaises" 85. The Sire de Lesparre warned Henry that Albret would besiege Mortagne on 28 Nov. 1404, E.28/15, unnumbered.

(2) Vale- English Gascony 50; Wylie - Henry IV ii 315-320; Choix i 271; J.L. Kirby - "The Siege of Bourg 1406" H.I. xviii (1968) 57; B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Div f.97. Clermont and Castelbon had warned Durfort of their intention to besiege Porte-Sainte-Marie late in 1404, E.28/15 unnumbered.

England by seizing both banks of the Gironde. To this end he besieged Blaye and Bourg, the former agreeing to abide by the fate of the latter. Clignet de Brabant, admiral of France, attempted to blockade the estuary but his fleet was broken up by a squadron from Bordeaux in a fight off Saint-Julien-de-Médoc. Lack of funds and disease amongst his troops during three months of siege forced Orléans to abandon his investment of Bourg in January 1407 and return to Paris (1). The failure of this campaign lost the French much of the ground they had gained and saved English rule at Bordeaux. A section of Orléans' army moved south to capture Les Anglès and besiege Lourdes. It was feared that Saint-Sever, Dax and Bayonne would be in danger from Albret and Armagnac, should the castle fall. Lourdes finally surrendered in October 1407 after a long siege, and the English lost control of Bigorre (2). The following month, Louis of Orléans was assassinated in Paris (3). First as the ally of Henry, then as his enemy, his policy towards England had been largely motivated by his rivalry with the dukes of Burgundy for predominance in France. With his death, the series of campaigns aimed at the destruction of English Guyenne came to an end.

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(1) Martinière -"Guerres anglaises" 86-88; Wylie - Henry IV iii 75-84; Kirby - "Siege of Bourg" 57-60; Wylie - Henry V i 133, 146; Vale - English Gascony 53; Chavanon - "Renaud VI" 48-49; Foedera viii 456; Monstrelet i 132-134; B.L.Add.Ch.6780; B.N.Bourgogne 57, f.26-26v.

(2). Wylie - Henry V iii 84-85; E.Privat - "Charles III le noble, roi de Navarre: ses rapports avec la France" Positions des Thèses (1898) 124; B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Div ff.107, 108.

(3) Monstrelet i 258-263.

During these years of crisis, the English government did little to respond to the threat of Orléans and his lieutenants, despite a continual stream of requests for help from Bordeaux and Bayonne. The Council was occasionally summoned to consider the problem of Guyenne and provide for its safety (1). Henry made promises to send troops there commanded by himself, the Prince of Wales, or his second son Thomas (2). Small forces accompanied the new mayors of Bordeaux, Hugh Lutterell in 1404 and Thomas Swinbourne in 1405, when they travelled to the Duchy (3). Apart from this, the Gascons received no help in manpower, but only in money, munitions and victuals. Corn was sent at government expense to Bordeaux, Bayonne and Saint-Sever to break their blockades and a sum of money to be distributed amongst those who had defended Saint-Sever (4). Money, armour and artillery were sent to the captain of Chalais castle when it was in peril (5). The garrison of Fronsac castle sent several petitions to England asking for the arrears of their wages (6).

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(1) PPC i 243, 291.

(2) PPC ii 81-82; CCR 1402-1405 199; E.28/13 unumbered 16 Aug. 1404; E.28/15 nos. 32,40,43; E.28/20 no.65; E.28/17 nos. 44,47.

(3) PPC i 222-223; Wylie - Henry IV ii 56; C.61/109 m.2; C.61/110 m.5.

(4) PPC i 222-223; Cal.Signet nos. 388,397,398; E.28/14 nos. 9,11,18,134; E.28/22 no.51; E.28/24 no.75.

(5) B.L.Cotton MS.Caligula Div ff.30v-31; E.28/17 nos. 44 and 47; E.28/19 no.21.

(6) Vale - War Govt. and Politics 323,325; E.28/23 no.25; E.28/28 nos.76 and 77.

Provision was finally made for this from the proceeds of the wool subsidy in 1410, and also for a small expedition to Guyenne and rewards for the loyal Gascon nobility. More than three times the total for Guyenne was assigned to the defence of Calais. When the subsidy was found to be insufficient for the estimated expenses, the planned expedition was dropped (1). Only when Louis of Orléans himself returned to the Duchy in 1406 did the English government make a serious effort to send a relief force. Ships were sent to the mouth of the Gironde under the command of the earls of Arundel and Warwick and Henry Pay (2). Henry summoned his retainers and assembled shipping for an expedition which he intended to lead first for the succour of Calais, then, after the duke of Burgundy's withdrawal, to reinforce Guyenne. Lack of organisation and finance caused it to be postponed repeatedly until April 1407, then abandoned (3). Shortly afterwards the frontiers of the Duchy were protected by particular truces and in December 1407 a new truce covered the whole of Guyenne (4). Beleaguered and neglected, English Guyenne survived an unequal struggle with the forces of France on its own initiative and largely on its own resources.

In Saintonge, Angoumois and Limousin, the truce seems to have held through the exhaustion of both sides, but in

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(1) PPC ii 7-9, 16.

(2) Wylie - Henry IV iii 81-82.

(3) Foedera viii 336,456; PPC i 280-281 (misdated 1405); CCR 1405-1409 261,259,257; CPR 1405-1408 309,354.

(4) See pp. 251 , 254 above.

Périgord, desultory frontier warfare continued after the departure of Louis of Orléans. Initially the Anglo-Gascons gained several fortresses including Castelnau, Bigarroque, Limeuil and Roque-Gageac. But they gradually lost ground again, particularly during a campaign by Albret late in 1409 and early in 1410, when these four places were lost by siege or purchase (1). Early in 1412, Poitou was occupied by Burgundian forces. In August the duke of Clarence arrived in France to fight with the Orléanists. After the treaties of Auxerre and Busançais he set out for Bordeaux, crossing Poitou and passing near La Rochelle and Saint-Jean-d'Angély (2). He had been appointed lieutenant in Aquitaine before he left England (3), since Henry hoped to recover the Duchy by the terms of his treaty with the Orléanists. Shortly after this scheme came to an end at Busançais, John Cornwall contracted to serve Clarence for a further three months in France and Guyenne with a hundred men-at-arms and four hundred archers with the purpose of acquiring fortresses (4). Clarence had promised to abstain from warfare only until 1 January 1413. In February he made a military alliance with Albret and Armagnac for a war against Jean, count of Foix (formerly the Vicomte of Castelbon) (5). But on

(1) Martinière - "Guerres anglaises" 88-90; Wylie - Henry V i 146.

(2) Martinière - "Guerres anglaises" 90-91; Vale - English Gascony 62. Clarence's expedition will be considered more fully in Chapter V.

(3) Foedera viii 758-760.

(4) A.N. K.59 no.5.

(5) See above pp. 119-120, 258-259.

hearing of the death of Henry IV, he decided to return to England with some of his troops in April (1). Thomas Beaufort, earl of Dorset, remained behind with 240 men-at-arms and a thousand archers and was appointed lieutenant in July. William Clifford, the new constable of Bordeaux and captain of Fronsac, took the indentures and wages over from England in September. Dorset remained in the Duchy until summer 1414 (2).

The presence of this expeditionary force brought the English considerable gains. They took Biron, Villamblard and Grignols in Périgord, and Sauveterre in Agenais, but it was in Saintonge and Angoumois that they recovered most of their strength. Dorset took Ribérac, Aubeterre, Barbezieux and Montendre, and in June 1413 penetrated across the Charente near Chateauneuf for the first time since the 1380s. He besieged Taillebourg, captured Soubise and sacked Sablonceaux. In August, he defeated a French force sent from Paris under Jacques de Heilly and took him prisoner. The duke of Bourbon arrived with reinforcements in November and took back Soubise at the second attempt. He razed Taillebourg but was unable to drive the English out ot Barbezieux and Aubeterre (3). In

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(1) Wylie - Henry IV iv 86; Henry V i 118-119.

(2) Vale - English Gascony 246; Wylie - Henry V i 138,142; Foedera ix 42; PPC ii 128-129; B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Dv f.2.

(3) Wylie - Henry V i 129,134-137: Martinière - "Guerres anglaises" 92-93; Choix i 364.

February 1414, hostilities between the English and French in the Duchy were ended by the London truce (1).

However, fighting continued in Guyenne in 1414 and 1415 between the houses of Armagnac and Foix. The barons of Bordelais, who were English subjects, participated in this war as allies on both sides, despite prohibitions to the contrary made in Bordeaux (2). There was also fighting between Armagnacs and Burgundians in Poitou, where the count of Richmond besieged the castle of Parthenay in 1415 (3). As negotiations moved towards a climax in England and the truce was prolonged for only short periods, both English and French prepared for conflict in the Duchy. In April 1415 the duke of Bourbon advanced through Saintonge and threatened Blaye (4). In May, Henry V appointed John Tiptoft as seneschal of Guyenne; he arrived with his troops at Bordeaux in time for the outbreak of open war in August (5). It was considered possible that Henry himself would bring his army to Guyenne, either landing there directly or marching south through France, as his brother Clarence had done (6). However, for the remainder of

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(1) See above pp. 285-287.

(2) Wylie - Henry V i 132; Vale - English Gascony 171-179.

(3) Preuves ii 921; P.Anselme - Histoire Genealogique et Chronologique de la maison royale de France i 459.

(4) Wylie - Henry V i 138.

(5) Vale - English Gascony 76, 245; PPC ii 153-154, 155,167; C.61/116 m.5.

(6) Vale - English Gascony 71-76; Wylie - Henry V ii 6.

Henry's reign, warfare in the Duchy was limited to frontier fighting in Saintonge, Angoumois, Limousin, Périgord and Agenais. The English government at Bordeaux was under no serious threat and its forces operated as far afield as Albi and Aixe-sur-Vienne. With Henry's attention focused on the north, the Gascons were again obliged to rely on their own resources, particularly the artillery of Bordeaux, which brought them successes in the early 1420s (1).

After Louis of Orléans began his attack on Guyenne, the twenty-eight year truce was disregarded in the south, making the negotiation of new truces a necessity for the relief of the Duchy (2). But all externally made truces and treaties were overridden by the endemic frontier warfare and the permanent struggle between the houses of Foix and Armagnac. It was this that dictated the more ephemeral allegiances of the local nobility to English and French, Burgundian and Orléanist. The campaigns of Foix and Armagnac against the English in Henry IV's reign aimed chiefly at eliminating their outlying fortresses, which they found troublesome by reason of the pâtis they levied, and so were not very different from the activities of the late 1380s and early 1390s. The decisive thrusts towards Bordeaux by Louis of Orléans and Charles d'Albret, who

(1) Martinière - "Guerres anglaises" 94-96; Vale - War Govt. and Politics 284,293; Wylie - Henry V i 134; iii 82; B.L.Cotton MS Caligula Dv ff.31,34 (old foliation 28 and 31); Add.MS. 38525 ff.89-90.

(2) See pp.249-251, 254 above.

fought as an officer of France rather than a local magnate, stalled in a series of sieges. Although financial and domestic difficulties obliged Henry IV to neglect the Duchy during the years of greatest danger, English rule in Guyenne survived. By the early part of his son's reign it had recovered its position of the 1380s.

In the early years of Henry IV's reign, there was also a dramatic increase in Anglo-French hostilities at sea. It was not possible at this period to achieve overall control of the sea, though the English needed to keep secure their sea-borne communications with Calais and Guyenne. The war at sea could therefore never have the decisive importance of the war on land, but it was well-suited to a war of attrition aimed at undermining the commerce and naval capacity of the opposing side. It was employed in this manner by both sides during the Caroline war and again became prominent in the indirect warfare of Henry IV's reign (1). Piratical conflict had been almost continuous at a low level between French, Flemish and English mariners in the North Sea and the Channel, rising to a peak of activity when King Charles intended to invade England from Sluys in 1385 and 1386 (2). Several English

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(1) C.F.Richmond - "The War at Sea" in Fowler - Hundred Years War 98,103,108. See pp.58-59 above. French activity against English commerce began in 1369 with the seizure of the person and goods of John Spenser at Saint Malo, a dispute that was still unsettled in 1401, C.76/80 m.3; A.N. J.645 no.36 article 35; J.645 no.17 article 35.

(2) A.Saul - "Great Yarmouth and the Hundred Years War in the Fourteenth Century" BIHR lii (1979) 106. See p.60 above.

ships were lost to the French and Flemish in the years preceding the Leulinghen truce (1), and damage from French raids was reported along the south coast, though this may have been the continued consequence of the raids of the 1370s (2). One ship, from Newport in the Isle of Wight, was captured during the truce of 1385 and in retaliation Richard ordered Norman merchandise to be impounded at Southampton (3). French, Flemish and Breton shipping also suffered from the activities of English admirals and privateers (4).

These hostile acts were not entirely ended by the truce which Gaunt made south of the Loire in 1388 and by the Leulinghen truce of 1389. At least one vessel was taken on each side in contravention of the Guyenne truce: a Castilian ship with a cargo of wine belonging to two merchants of Boulogne (5) and a barge of Lesparre (6). A short local truce between Gravelines and the river Somme

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(1) CCR 1385-1389 2,56,167; CPR 1385-1389 492; A.N. J.645 no.17 article 30; J.645 no.36 article 30; B.L.Egerton MS. 1845 ff.54v-55, from Archives Départementales du Nord B.1404.

(2) CPR 1385-1389 66,277; CPR 1388-1392 8,84,368,377.

(3) CCR 1385-1389 7, 29, 51, 63, 161-162.

(4) Touchard - Commerce Maritime Breton 104, 108; Keen - Laws of War 40 n.3, 205; Richmond - Admin. and Keeping of Seas 86; CCR 1385-1389 17, 46, 48, 56,73,164,196,548; CCR 1389-1392 379, 410; CPR 1385-1389 86, 236, 323, 364, 434, 511, 521; E.28/1 no.68; B.L.Add.Ch.6352; A.N. J.645 no.18 article 19; J.645 no.35 article 39; J.919 no.7 article 19. See also p. 62 above.

(5) A.N. J.645 no.35 article 40.

(6) Chavanon "Renaud VI" Document XLII.

to cover the negotiations at Leulinghen in 1388 was violated when a ship from Dieppe forced three Englishmen onto the shore and took them prisoners there (1). Shortly after the Leulinghen truce began, the Sire de Hamby, one of the French conservators in Normandy, captured Philipot Lambert of Guernsey with his ship the Mary of Dartmouth (2). In the early 1390s other vessels, persons and merchandise on both sides were taken and robbed at sea or arrested in port (3). Amongst these, a wine-barge of La Rochelle was robbed and burned at Le Bec d'Ambès in November 1393. The owner of the cargo, Guiot Potart, had a number of Bordeaux merchants and their goods seized in the following year as a reprisal, one of whom died in prison. The legal ramifications of the case caused friction between the English and French conservators in the area, early in 1398 (4). Potart had two further losses of wine cargoes in 1395 at the hands of the English (5). After the conclusion of the twenty-eight year truce, relations between the two sides at sea deteriorated. In

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(1) A.N. J.645 no.36(1), petition of Margot widow of William Kent. John Kent stood as one of the pledges for the legal expenses of the three men: see below p.338

(2) A.N. J.645 no.17 article 6; J.645 no.36(1) article 6; J.645 no.36(2) article 42. See also CPR 1388-1392 85.

(3) CPR 1391-1396 520; CCR 1389-1392 34; CCR 1392-1396 183,184-185, 239,324; E.28/6 no.91; A.N. J.645 no.35 articles 75, 82, 84; J.645 no.36(1) petition of John Balier merchant of Dartmouth; J.645 no.36(2) article 27.

(4) Chavanon - "Renaud VI" 42-43; Fowler - "Truces" 202-203; A.N. J.645 no.35 article 8; K.54 no 44. See pp. 211 and 310 above.

(5) A.N. J.645 no.35 articles 9 and 11.

November 1396, the very month that Richard married Isabelle at Calais, the mayor of Sandwich forcibly confiscated a wine-ship of La Rochelle driven into his harbour by adverse weather, but restored the bulk of the cargo which belonged to Lombard merchants (1). Incidents on both sides increased over the next three years, the English taking the initiative against the French (2). On three occasions English pirates murdered the entire crew of the vessels they had captured (3). English merchants suffered more heavily in 1399, particularly Philipot Lambert, who lost a loaded ship and was himself twice imprisoned, firstly at La Rochelle by a man alleged to be a lieutenant of the French admiral, and secondly in Brittany as a reprisal for the arrest of a group of Bretons at Southampton. On the second occasion he was threatened with the loss of his head if he did not pay the ransom demanded (4). In September 1399, merchants of Fowey and elsewhere in Cornwall and Wales were arrested with their vessels and merchandise in Brittany, because Henry of Bolingbroke had established himself in England (5).

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(1) A.N. J.645 no.35 article 41.

(2) CCR 1396-1399 113, 165; CCR 1399-1402 119,319,395; CCR 1402-1405 481; CPR 1399-1401 164; E.28/17 no.45; A.N. J.645 no.17 articles 28 and 31; J.645 no.20; J.645 no.35 articles 76, 80, 88; J. 645 no.36(1) articles 28 and 31; J.919 no.10.

(3) A.N. J.645 no.18 article 20; J.645 no.35 articles 77 and 79; J.919 no.7 article 20.

(4) A.N. J.645 no.17 article 39; J.645 no.36(1) articles 7,11,39,40; J. 645 no.36(2) articles 43,44,47.

(5) E.28/4 no 97. It is unfortunate that this letter to the duke of Brittany, perhaps the last issued in Richard's name, should be very faded and difficult to read even in ultra-violet light.

This is the first sign from the French side of the Channel of a policy directed against Henry's acquisition of power in England, even before he had assumed the crown.

In 1400 and 1401, the level of conflict rose steeply as English and French privateers engaged by turns in excessive reprisals for their losses. Philipot Lambert captured a Breton barge carrying Rochellois wine in May 1400, in retaliation for the losses he had incurred the previous year (1). He acquired a further grievance in June when the Lawrence of Totnes, which he co-owned, was taken with its cargo in a Norman harbour (2). Lambert responded at Easter 1401 by detaining a French vessel called Philippot le Herissie, and robbing it of as much of the cargo of salt as his own boat could carry (3). Another chain reaction resulted from the capture of a barge of Richard Spicer of Plymouth by the pirates of the Île de Bas early in 1400 (4). Spicer took his revenge against French and allied shipping, taking three French, two Breton and one Castilian vessels in March, April and May (5). Some of the wine in the Castilian ship belonged to

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(1) A.N. J.645 no. 35 article 44. For reprisals at sea from 1399 to 1402 see Table 2 in the pocket inside the back cover.

(2) A.N. J.645 no.17 articles 17 and 41; J.645 no.36(1) articles 17 and 41; J.645 no.36(2) article 46.

(3) A.N. J.645 no.35 article 55.

(4) CPR 1399-1401 276; A.N. J.645 no.36(1) article 19.

(5) CCR 1399-1402 150; Cal.Signet no.48; C.76/84 m.8; A.N. J 645 no.18 articles 1,2,3,4; J.645 no.35 articles 1,42,43,45,74; J.919 no.7 articles 1,2,3,4.

Bartholomew Brotier from near La Rochelle. He combined with his fellow merchant Guillem Bourdin, who had sustained losses in two barges captured by the English, to take the Trinity of Plymouth and two barges of Dover in September 1400 (1). One of these barges, the Katherine, was owned by William Sparre, a man of sinister reputation, who took two ships within sight of the royal officials at Calais in August 1402 (2). French officials became involved in another series of captures when a barge belonging to Guillem de la Hougue, vice-admiral of France, was taken off the Scottish coast in June 1400 by English pirates under the command of William Prince (3). In response Hougue arrested the Grace-Dieu of Southampton and a ship owned by William Sterre and his associates of Yarmouth, to hold against the return of his barge (4).In reprisal for this and other grievances against the French, Sterre preyed upon the fishing-fleet of Dieppe in 1401 (5). Two fishing-boats of Étaples were captured by the men of Yarmouth in June 1402, perhaps also at the instance of William Sterre (6). Another series began with the capture

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(1) A.N. J.645 no.17 articles 5,15,24; J.645 no.18 articles 5 and 21; J.645 no.28; J.645 no.35 article 2; J.645 no.36(1) articles 5,15,24; J.919 no.7 articles 5 and 21.

(2) CCR 1399-1402 547; S.C. 1/43 no.132.

(3) A.N. J.645 no.35 article 98; J.919 no.2.

(4) A.N. J.645 no.17 articles 12 and 13; J.645 no.28; J.645 no.36(1) articles 12 and 13.

(5) CCR 1399-1402 429; A.N. J.645 no.18 articles 18,24,25; J.645 no.35 articles 49,54,96; J.919 no.7 articles 18,24,25; J.919 no.8.

(6) A.N. J.645 no.35 articles 5 and 6.

of the Margaret of Rye in June 1400, the murder of its master, and the robbery of the goods and cash found in it (1). In 1401 its owner, John Kent, countered with the seizure of four French vessels, a barge and a balinger of Brittany, and a ship of Dunquerque (2).In March 1402 he took a Dutch barge, the Saint George of Kampen,containing wine owned by Rochellois and Flemish merchants which was retained as a lawful prize (3).The most troublesome reprisals were occasioned by the arrest of the Juliane of Dartmouth at La Rochelle in Spring 1401, apparently because of robberies committed by its crew against the merchant Pierre de Pise (4). The Dartmouth fleet retaliated by capturing the Saint Katherine of Abbeville in June 1401, and in November eight wine-barges of Talmont-sur-Gard and La Rochelle were arrested in Dartmouth harbour at the request of the co-owners of the Juliane. Amongst those who sustained damages in this mass arrest were Pierre de Pise and Guillem Bourdin (5). The same month as the Saint Katherine was taken, Wibert de Fretun took a barge called the Falcon of Cardiff, carrying

(1) A.N. J.645 no.17 articles 2 and 38; J.645 no.28; J.645 no36(1) articles 2 and 38.

(2) A.N. J.645 no.18 articles 10, 13,14,15,16; J.645 no.28; J.645 no.35 articles 13,53,85; J.919 no.7 articles 10,13,14,15,16.

(3) Ford -"Piracy or Policy" 73,75; A.N. J.645 no.35 article 59.

(4) A.N. J.645 no.17 article 3; J.645 no.28; J.645 no.36(1) article 3.

(5) CCR 1399-1402 446; C.76/86 m.1; A.N. J.645 no.18 articles 11, 31, 32, 33, 34; J.645 no.28; J.645 no.35 articles 7,14,15,16,47; J.919 no.7 articles 11,31,32,33,34; J.919 no.8.

the merchandise of some London traders. In August 1402 English and French ambassadors arranged to exchange the two vessels, but although the Falcon was returned, the French could not obtain restitution of the Saint Katherine (1). Also in 1401 two ships of Harfleur were arrested in English harbours in separate reprisals on behalf of Nicholas of Exmouth and Guillemot Henry of Guernsey (2). At least two-thirds of the French vessels taken by the English privateers in 1400 and 1401 were in direct reprisal for crimes committed by the French (3). Reprisals remained a factor in 1402 though no longer the dominant one. About Easter, Richard Spicer and his brother took two Flemish merchants and their goods, and held them prisoners, in retaliation for the imprisonment of their relative William Wykham at Sluys (4). Harry Pay of Poole lost five vessels to the French and their allies, and took two in return (5). On 1 May, Guiot Potart again lost a cargo of wine when a Castilian ship was taken by the privateers of Plymouth and Fowey (6). Two days later, he

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(1) A.N. J.645 no.17 articles 20,21,22,37; J.645 no.28; J.645 no.36(1) articles 20,21,22,37; J.645 no.51.

(2) A.N. J.645 no.17 article 25; J.645 no.19 article 12; J.645 no.35 article 19; J.645 no.36(1) article 25; J.919 no.7 article 12.

(3) See Ford - "Piracy or Policy" 67, 68-69.

(4) S.P.Pistono - "Henry IV and the English Privateers" EHR xc (1975) 326-328; Foedera viii 276-277; CCR 1399-1402 546-547.

(5) A.N. J.645 no.35 articles 61,69; J.645 no.36(2) articles 8,9,10; J.919 no.40.

(6) A.N. J.645 no.35 article 31

arrested the Leonard of Dunster at La Rochelle (1).

It can easily be seen that this practice of reprisal and counter-reprisal escalated the conflict and broadened its geographical scope. But the pyramidal growth of the reprisal chains does not solely account for the increase of hostilities at sea in 1400 and 1401. Besides a few pirates on both sides operating for their own profit, there was a political purpose about the activities of Laurens de Marine, lieutenant of the French admiral at Saint-Malo. He was responsible for taking both the Lawrence of Totnes and the Margaret of Rye in the same week in June 1400 (2). In July 1401 he sank the Mary of Fowey with a cannon shot, retrieving as much of the cargo as possible before the sea filled the ship; and the following month he took the Margaret of Sandwich (3). In 1402 and 1403 the conflict became more general and rose to a climax, with large numbers of ships being taken on both sides. Activity seems to have died down in the second half of 1403 (4). The level of conflict was sufficient to cripple commerce and communication at sea in the early part of Henry IV's reign. King Charles found it difficult

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(1) A.N. J.645 no.36(2) article 22.

(2) A.N. J.645 no.17 article 2; J.645 no.28; J.645 no.36(1) articles 2,38,41; J.645 no.36(2) article 46.

(3) A.N. J.645 no.36(1) articles 32 and 34.

(4) A.N. J.645 nos. 35 and 36(2); J.919 no.18. See also the graph at Richmond - Admin. and Keeping of Seas, between pp. 166 and 167, drawn from Calendars of Patent Rolls and Close Rolls 1399-1485.

to maintain diplomatic contact with Scotland in 1400 (1), and Henry was concerned that enemy ships were disrupting trade with London (2). There is some indication that late in 1401 English privateers were so confident of their power in the Channel that they were extracting tolls from ships passing along it (3). By August 1402 the actions of the Norman privateers and retaliations against them made it dangerous for any English ship to leave port singly (4). Even in 1404 Venetian galleys returning from Sluys and London avoided the vicinity of Sandwich because of its powerful fleet of privateers (5).

In these uncertain circumstances merchants reinforced the safety of their sea voyages by obtaining safe-conducts, though by terms of the truce and the agreements of 1401 and 1402 this was not strictly necessary (6). They were considered to exempt ships from reprisals (7). The admirals had powers to grant these safe-conducts by virtue of their jurisdiction over the sea, though Renaud de Trie

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(1) Choix i 188.

(2) PPC i 120-121.

(3) A.N. J.645 no.35 article 85.

(4) S.C. 1/43 no.131. The Normans had previously been considered a dangerous force in the Channel in July 1389, CPR 1388-1392 85.

(5) Cal.S.P.Venice no.147.

(6) Foedera viii 219,276.

(7) e.g. CPR 1408-1413 389-390.

delegated such powers to the Sire de Pons for the south-western coast in 1405 (1), and Breton merchants received safe-conducts from the English authorities in Guyenne, Calais, Brest and the Channel Islands, and under all three seals of the English government (2). But the additional security did not always protect them from attacks. In January 1405, Henry reproved his admiral of the south and west for granting safe-conducts to Bretons, whom he regarded as hostile, but they had already been violated by the Plymouth privateers (3).

Before 1401, violations of truces and safe-conducts were properly dealt with by the truce-conservators for the sea with appeal to the English Council and the Parlement de Paris. Instances of this procedure can be seen in operation in the late 1380s and 1390s in the cases of the three Englishmen captured on the coast of Picardy, the barge of Lesparre, John Balier, a ship of Regnierville, English goods seized at Harfleur and Guiot Potart (4). Recourse was still had to it in 1400 and 1401 (5), but by now aggrieved parties were turning increasingly to the

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(1) A.N. J. 865 no.15.

(2) Touchard - Commerce Maritime Breton 106-108, 119, 124; Keen - Laws of War 205; CPR 1408-1413 235.

(3) E.28/17 nos. 7 and 8.

(4) Chavanon - "Renaud VI" Document no XLII; CCR 1392-1396 324; A.N. J.645 no.35 article 84; J.645 no.36(1) petitions of John Balier and Margot Kent; K.54 no.44.

(5) A.N. J.645 no.17 articles 5,23; J.645 no.35 articles 10,21,74; J.645 no.36(1) article 18.

reprisal system to recover their losses. In the 1380s and early 1390s, Richard had granted letters of marque to take reprisal against French and Bretons for truce violations at sea (1), even to Dutch merchants (2), but the issue of letters of marque was banned by the truces of 1394 and 1396 (3). The French government was the first to break this prohibition by granting letters of marque to Guillem de la Hougue and Guillem Bourdin in 1400 (4); it later instructed its ambassadors to claim that all French actions at sea were taken to compensate French merchants for English crimes (5). Henry and his admirals followed suit in Summer 1401 with marques to Guillemot Henry, John Kent and William Sterre (6). One method of taking reprisal or making a profit from piracy was to seize prisoners at sea to hold for ransom. This included those of low rank such as fishermen, and even children. These actions became a particular feature of the long struggle between the mariners of Brittany and the south-western ports of

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(1) CCR 1385-1389 7,29, 51, 63, 161-162; CCR 1392-1396 184-185; CPR 1391-1396 243; Touchard - Commerce Maritime Breton 108.

(2) CPR 1385-1389 158.

(3) See pp. 194-195 above.

(4) A.N. J.645 no.17 articles 12,13,15.

(5) A.N. J.645 no.51.

(6) A.N. J.645 no.18 articles 12,13,24,25.

England from 1403 onwards (1), but they were also used in other areas (2). Each sea-port was normally both a perpetrator and a victim in the system of piracy and reprisal, which might work to its profit or its loss. Yarmouth, for example, lost more than it gained (3).

The attempts of the English and French governments to limit and control the conflict at sea by treaty in the supplementary agreements of 1401,1402, 1403 and 1410, and the consequent meetings held to settle truce violations, were reviewed in the last chapter (4). The mounting toll of captured vessels jeopardised the agreements that had absorbed so much of the ambassadors' efforts and kept the fragile truce in being. The French ambassadors were repeatedly instructed to demand the amendment of English offences at sea against the truce and the supplementary agreements (5). The English ambassadors wrote several times to their French counterparts asking them to restrain

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(1) Touchard - Commerce Maritime Breton 107,117,124; Knowlson - Jean V 51-52; Wylie - Henry IV iii 101 n.8; Knowlson - Jean V in Relation to England 25; CPR 1401-1405 499; CPR 1405-1408 90-91,224,230-231; CPR 1408-1413 177,309; CPR 1413-1416 117; C.76/87 m.8; C.76/88 mm.2,6,12; C.76/89 m.2; C.76/90 m.21;E.28/17 no.8; Lettres de Jean V nos.172, 229, 230,259, 479,503, 509, 623, 636, 656, 661, 665, 666, 668, 677, 681, 696, 733, 865.

(2) e.g. Wylie - Henry IV ii 108 n.2; PPC i 355; Sueur -Antiquitez de Boulogne 171; CPR 1405-1408 211,288; 1408-1413 92; 1413-1416 411; C.76/95 m.21; A.N. J.645 no.51.

(3) Saul - "Yarmouth" 113,115.

(4) See above pp. 228-241, 257-258,260-262.

(5) Choix i 216; A.N. J.644 no.33; J.645 no.51.

the activity of their privateers which brought them no advantage, but brought into question the signing, publication or continuance of the accords made between them (1). The lists of violations at sea that each side drew up to present to the other, provide the basis of the information known about the conflict at sea (2). The cases in these lists were individually considered by the ambassadors and argued between them, but their primary concern seems to have been to evade or delay responsibility for the restitution of the ships and merchandise taken. In August 1402, both sides blamed the crimes on allied nationals outside their jurisdicion or persons who had been exiled, refused to consider them because of a technicality or because the complainants had not appeared, claimed restitutions had been made already, or simply denied the infractions had been committed. Most often, the captor would only agree to make restitution if what he had lost was restored to him (3). The reprisal system was carried over from the open seas to diplomacy. In accordance with the agreement of 1402, orders were issued to arrest a list of offenders banished by both sides, including John Kent and Wybert de Fretun, lest their activities lead to the outbreak of war (4). In April

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(1) B.L.Add.Ch.12507; A.N. J.645 nos. 25 and 55; J.919 no.15.

(2) See appendix 3.

(3) A.N. J.645 nos. 17,28; J.919 nos. 7 and 8.

(4) 17 Feb. 1403, CPR 1401-1405 201. Repeated 9 Feb.1409, CCR 1405-1409 486-487.See pp.231,232 above.

1403 the earl of Somerset went to Calais to capture pirates (1), and in July, when another agreement was signed at Leulinghen, Henry ordered the arrest of all pirates and banished persons who violated its terms (2). Efforts were also made to arrest individually-named pirates, including William Prince, Henry Pay, William Barbour and John Hauley (3).

But several Englishmen who captured ships from the French and their allies were permitted to operate at sea by their government. During the later stages of the Caroline war, licences were issued to privateers such as Hauley, William Terry and John Tutbury to take enemy ships at sea during specified periods (4).This was an inexpensive method of maintaining a presence at sea, since the privateers financed themselves and were permitted to retain whatever they took. Henry employed a similar system in 1400 against the truce-breaking Scots, preparatory to his land expedition against them. Prince, Terry, Tutbury, John Brandon and others were licensed to take ships from the

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(1) CPR 1401-1405 276.

(2) CPR 1401-1405 283. Similar orders 1404 and 1411, CCR 1402-1405 280, 294-295, 309, 312-313, 318, 364; CCR 1409-1413 186, 214. See p. 235 above.

(3) CPR 1401-1405 198-199, 279; CCR 1405-1409 166,175; petition of Hauley to be released from the Tower E.28/28 no.86.

(4) Alban - National Defence 272-273; Richmond - Admin. and Keeping of Seas 175; CPR 1385-1389 209, 339,342; CCR 1385-1389 388. Janico Dartas may have been acting in a similar capacity in the late 1390s when he armed a balinger which was stolen by some Genoese mercenary mariners, E.28/6 no.92.

Scots and the Frieslander pirates, though not those of France and her allies (1). William Prince's capture of Guillem de la Hougue's barge in June was regarded as permissible because it was carrying supplies to Scotland (2).No time limit was put on these licences. In 1402, 1403, and 1404 Hauley, Brandon, Pay, Mark Mixtow and others, were licensed or commissioned to patrol the seas against the king's enemies (3). John Hauley was undisputed leader of the fleet at Dartmouth, where most of England's shipping was concentrated in November 1403 (4). He had been mayor of Dartmouth and was retained by Richard II, whom he served as deputy-admiral. He was employed on commissions to attend to the defence of Dartmouth and communications with Guyenne,and to conduct enquiries about the capture of ships at sea, although he was involved in such actions himself. His son and namesake served Henry V

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(1) CPR 1399-1401 271, 291, 352. Terry and Tutbury received similar licences to operate against the Scots in March 1402, CPR 1401-1405 55.

(2) Ford - "Piracy or Policy" 67. See p. 337 above.

(3) Hist.Ang. ii 272, 275; CPR 1401-1405 133, 198, 274, 457; Ford - "Piracy or Policy" 66, 72, 76; PPC i 234; E.28/9 unnumbered; E.28/10 unnumbered. Henry V issued some similar commissions, CPR 1413-1416 116, 363-364. This method of keeping the sea was again used systematically in 1436, Richmond - "Keeping of the Seas."

(4) E.28/12 no.4.

in France and at sea (1). Henry Pay of Poole was employed less on government service, but he too served Henry V in the garrison at Calais (2). Other privateers such as Richard Rowe and Edmund Arnold, also served the crown in other capacities (3). The English admirals were sometimes involved in the capture of ships themselves or endorsed the activity of privateers (4). Besides these professionals, members of the noble and knightly class participated in the conflict at sea directly or indirectly, such as Sir John Cornwall, Thomas earl of Arundel, Edward Courtenay, Sir Robert Umfraville, Sir Thomas Carew and John Talbot, Lord Furnival (5).

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(1) CPR 1391-1396 569; 1401-1405 298; 1405-1408 152; 1413-1416 35, 36; CCR 1402-1405 199; CCR 1413-1419 9; PPC ii 81-82; J.S.Roskell - The Commons in the Parliament of 1422 (Manchester 1954) 190; Letters of Henry IV i 270-273:E.28/9 unnumbered; C.76/95 m.19; C.76/98 m.18; C.76/101 m.2; C.76/102 mm.1 and 11. For captures made by Hauley and his lieutenants see:- Pistono -"Privateers", 325-326, 329; CCR 1392-1396 174-175; 1402-1405 89-90, 100; 1405-1409 437; 1409-1413 264; 1413-1419 501-503; CPR 1405-1408 418,419; 1408-1413 381; Ford - "Piracy or Policy" 69,72,75-76; Keen - Laws of War 205; A.N. J.645 no.18 articles 11,21,31,32, 33, 34; J.645 no.28; J. 645 no.35 articles 22, 23,24,25,26,27,35,94, 97; E.28/1 no.68; C.76/86 m.1.; C.76/88 m.2.

(2) C.76/98 m.24. For Pay's crimes against French subjects see:- Ford - "Piracy or Policy" 72; Pistono - "Privateers" 329; Wylie - Henry IV i 443-444; CPR 1401-1405 279; CPR 1405-1408 228-229; A.N. J.645 no.35 articles 61, 69. See also p. 339 above.

(3) Richmond - Admin. and Keeping of Seas 41; CCR 1413-1419 93; CPR 1413-1416 35; E.28/12 no.4; C.76/95 m.19.

(4) Touchard - Commerce Maritime Breton 108; Lettres de Jean V no.668; A.N. J.645 no.35 article 13.

(5) CPR 1405-1408 477; 1413-1416 348; CCR 1409-1413 264, 369; 1413-1419 503; C.76/90 m.21; A.N. J.645 no.35 articles 12 and 18.

These connections between the English government and the captors suggest that activity at sea was directed, or at least encouraged, from Westminster. When he first used the privateer system against the Scots in the summer of 1400, Henry IV was anxious to preserve the twenty-eight year truce, which he had just succeeded in confirming, and so he forbade attacks on the shipping of France and her allies (1). This injunction seems to have been obeyed, for after Hougue's barge, no further French ships were taken until March 1401. In this year Henry was prepared to sponsor reprisals against French provocations by issuing letters of marque. In 1402, he first licensed privateers to fight enemy shipping in general. Henry advanced by stages to a policy of war to damage the French at sea, but it continued to be covered by the fiction of piracy in order to maintain the truce (2). The French were under no illusions about the inspiration of the attacks against them and accused the English of waging open war (3).

But Henry's increasing commitment to the actions of his privateers did not increase his control over them. English tactics included intercepting neutral vessels and removing French merchandise from them, but the distinction between French and neutral goods was often ignored. In the latter

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(1) Foedera viii 147; CCR 1399-1402 134-135, 169; CPR 1399-1401 349-350.

(2) Ford - "Piracy or Policy" 66-67, 72, 76.

(3) B.L.Egerton Ch.19; P.R.O. 31/8/135 Section 4 from A.N."Section Domaniale-Mémoires de la Chambre des Comptes 14925 f.172."

half of 1402 and 1403, Henry was trying to negotiate a separate agreement with the Flemish which would effectively declare them neutral in the Anglo-French quarrel, and accordingly he attempted to enforce the truce in regard to Flemish shipping. In August 1402 he and his ambassadors at Calais tried to get reparations made for captures of Flemish vessels and goods, some of which involved John Hauley. Hauley, Mixtow and the Spicer brothers were ordered to appear before the Council to explain their actions (1). In January 1403, in response to a roll of complaints presented by the Flemish ambassadors, those who had grievances against the Flemish, and the eighteen captains who had committed the crimes on the roll, including Hauley, Pay, Mixtow, Prince and the Spicer brothers, were summoned before the Council in the following month (2). None of these appeared, so the whole process was postponed until 1 July at Calais (3). At Calais in August, an agreement was under discussion which constituted "a carefully defined code of practice for official English fleets", excluding Flemish ships from the conflict, but allowing attacks against the French and the Scots to continue (4). This was never ratified however,

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(1) CCR 1399-1402 545, 546-547; S.C.1/43 no.131; C.76/86 m.1.

(2) Foedera viii 286; CCR 1402-1405 27; C.47/32 no.24b (attached slip of parchment). Orders had already been issued to arrest William Prince for taking two ships of Sluys, CPR 1401-1405 198-199.

(3) Foedera viii 303-304, also at CCR 1402-1405 76 and E.28/11, unnumbered and faded.

(4) Ford - "Piracy or Policy" 65-66; Pistono - Repudiation 184. See pp. 263-264 above.

and the crimes of the privateers against the Flemish continued to accumulate. Although encouraged by the government, they could not be relied upon to conform with its policies.

There was little Flemish participation in the attacks on English shipping in the first few years of Henry's reign (1). The Vier Leden refused the demands of Philip of Burgundy to order retaliation against the English for Flemish losses (2). Philip therefore took his own reprisal, ordering the confiscation of £10,000 worth of English goods at Sluys in April 1403. The petitions of English merchants and ambassadors failed to obtain the restoration of these goods, and the unresolved claim continued to poison Anglo-Flemish relations well into Henry V's reign (3). A further dispute began in 1404 when the Flemish took as prisoners at sea the bishop of Hereford and 168 fishermen from northern England. Despite the efforts of Duchess Margaret and the authorities at Calais, hostility increased, and Henry abandoned the attempt to neutralise Flemish shipping in the conflict at sea (4).

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(1) Pistono - "Privateers" 322 n.3; A.N. J.645 no.36(1) article 18; J.919 no.18 articles 12 and 14.

(2) Pistono - Repudiation 163, 172, 181.

(3) Pistono - "Privateers" 323; Pistono - Repudiation 179-181, 186, 189-190; Varenbergh - Histoire des Relations 491, 544-545; McFarlane -"Anglo-Flemish Relations" 45; B.L.Add.Ch. 1397, 12508; Foedera viii 327-328. See above p. 264.

(4) Vaughan - John the Fearless 20; B.L.Add.Ch. 12502, 12505; E.28/17 no.53.

The Bretons were more active against English ships than the Flemish, both before and after Henry's usurpation (1). The French ambassadors refused to respond for the crimes they had committed and referred the English to the duchess of Brittany, though the English considered that Breton infractions were within the French admiral's jurisdiction (2). The French did however accept responsibility for the actions of the privateers of St. Malo, who were outside ducal obedience. They were the perpetrators of a considerable proportion of the captures at sea in these years, often acting in concert with their fellows of Harfleur (3).

More deliberate than the impunity of the Breton pirates from the reparation system was the French concealment of their privateering campaign under the flags of their allies of Scotland and Castile. The English ambassadors complained to the French about the participation of Castilians in this campaign and the French privateers' use of north Spanish ports to dispose of their prizes (4). But the French insisted that they had no jurisdiction over

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(1) E.28/4 no.97; E.28/17 no. 7; A.N. J.645 no.36(1) articles 1,4,7, 10, 11, 19, 33, 40; J.645 no.36(2) articles 19, 43, 44, 45; J.919 no.18 articles 30, 31.

(2) Wylie - Henry IV i 384; A.N. J.645 no.17 articles 1, 4, 7, 10, 11, 19, 33, 40.

(3) A.N. J.645 no.36(1) articles 25, 26, 27, 32, 34, 41; J.645 no.36(2) articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 13, 14, 15, 18, 32, 33, 46; J.919 no.18 articles 2, 5, 10, 15, 16, 19, 20, 23, 25, 28, 29, 39, 40; c.f. Warner - Libelle 9-11.

(4) A.N. J.645 no.36(1) articles 9, 14, 29; J.645 no.36(2) articles 2, 4, 5, 8, 20, 21, 28, 29, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41; J.919 no.18 article 1.

infractions committed by Castilians, and that redress should be sought from the admiral of Castile (1). The English government attempted to limit reprisals to French cargoes carried in Castilian ships (2). The French use of the Scots to cover their activities was more blatant. Privateers operated from the Norman ports nominally in the pay of Robert of Scotland, whose subjects were considered to be making open war against the English, but clearly under the command of the French government (3). In particular David, earl of Crawford, who became the ally and retainer of Louis of Orléans in January 1402, sailed from Harfleur in March with a fleet of French ships and mariners to conduct a prolonged raid against English merchant shipping (4). English complaints met with denials by the French ambassadors that King Charles was in any way responsible for the deeds of the Scots (5). The deception was transparent and meant to be so.

As on the frontiers of Picardy and Guyenne, the French made use of the private quarrels of individuals as a device to avoid the provisions of the truce. Wybert de Fretun was an esquire of the comté of Guînes, who had

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(1) A.N. J.645 no.17 articles 9, 14, 29.

(2) Ford - "Piracy or Policy" 70, 74; CCR 1402-1405 57-58; CPR 1401-1405 276.

(3) Keen - Laws of War 114; Letters of Henry IV i 218-219; S.C. 1/43 no.131; A.N. J.645 no.55.

(4) Ford - "Piracy or Policy" 71-72, 76; E.28/26 no.98; A.N. K.57 no.9.

(5) A.N. J.645 nos. 20 and 51.

refused to take an oath of fealty to the new king of England. When the English responded by burning his house down, he defied Henry and fitted out two ships to conduct a campaign of revenge against English shipping (1). He was commissioned by French officials at Abbeville to protect the port's trade, with the approval of the French government (2), and later the English referred to him as captain of Boulogne. It was he who took the Falcon of Cardiff in June 1401 and a Plymouth ship at about the same time (3). In August 1402 the English ambassadors at Calais reported to the Council that Fretun and Jean Clerc of Abbeville, who had also been active against English vessels, were banished from the kingdom of France but now in the pay of the king of Scotland, in whose name they continued their depredations in two armed barges (4). Under cover of this banishment and the Scottish flag, the French ambassadors refused to take any responsibility for Fretun's misdeeds, though it seems that some of his associates were executed, and by May 1403 they alleged he was dead (5). Jean, Sire de Bethencourt, was similarly regarded as a free agent. In reply to English complaints

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(1) Monstrelet i 72.

(2) Ford - "Piracy or Policy" 67.

(3) A.N. J.645 no.36(1) articles 20, 21, 22, 23, 37; J.645 no.28.

(4) SC.1/43 no.131. For Jean Clerc's previous captures see A.N. J.645 no.36(2) articles 17, 26; J.919 no.18 article 46.

(5) CPR 1401-1405 201; CCR 1405-1409 486-487; A.N. J.645 no.17 articles 20, 21, 22, 23, 37; J.645 nos.20,51, 53, where Rysshetон quotes a letter of Duke Philip of Burgundy.

of his activities, the French ambassadors stated that he had undertaken a private expedition to conquer the Canary Islands and was therefore beyond the reach of King Charles' jurisdiction (1). As part of his private war against Henry, Waleran of Saint-Pol armed two ships at Gravelines early in 1403 (2). Late in the year he did considerable damage to English ships in the Channel then moved on to the mouth of the Garonne and attempted to blockade it. In England it was believed he intended next to sail to destroy the English fleet in its home-ports (3).

Through the agency of the Scots, the Castilians and the Bretons and these private wars, the French could inflict harm on the English at sea whilst technically keeping the truce, but the French admiral claimed to be able to take action within the truce against the inhabitants of the Channel Islands, under letters of marque for the pâtis they owed him. By this means he justified the attacks of the captain of Saint Malo on the Lawrence of Totnes, Guillemot Henry's barge and three other Guernsey ships. These pâtis had been left outstanding in the 1396 settlement (4). In these and other captures, Laurens de

(1) A.N. J.645 no.17 article 8; J.645 no.20; J.645 no.36(1) article 8.

(2) Ford - "Piracy or Policy" 77 n.68; A.N. J.645 no.53. See p. 302 above.

(3) Wylie - Henry IV i 384, 389; CCR 1401-1405 222; E.28/12 no.4. See p. 321 above.

(4) A.N. J.644 no.23; J.645 no.17 articles 17, 25, 26, 27. See pp. 336, 339 above.

Marine seems to have been acting in his capacity as the French admiral's lieutenant. Another of his lieutenants had arrested Philipot Lambert in 1399 and his vice-admiral, who was a truce-conservator at sea, took reprisals for his own losses (1). In 1403, when Fretun sacked the island of Alderney, the Sire de Heugueville, one of the ambassadors negotiating with the English, allowed him to land his booty at Le Crotoy, despite the supposed banishment (2). The overt connivance of the French government and its officials in privateering against the English probably began shortly after it was obliged to confirm the twenty-eight year truce in June 1400. Despite the gradual escalation of its efforts to damage the Lancastrian regime at sea over the next three years, this policy of piecemeal attacks did not achieve results. The English responded in kind at every stage and, at least until September 1402, seem to have captured more vessels than they lost.

The change in character of the border warfare in Picardy and Guyenne that took place in 1403 is also reflected in the hostilities at sea. The French government withdrew its support from the privateering campaign and in July, required that the armed ships of both sides should be recalled to port (3). Under the influence of Louis of

(1) See pp. 335, 337, 340 above. For the extent of the French officials' involvement see Ford - "Piracy or Policy" 67.

(2) Wylie - Henry IV i 379; Letters of Henry IV i 216-218.

(3) A.N. J.645 nos. 46 and 47. See p. 235 above.

Orléans, French policy was transformed from a war of attrition into a war of strategy. Some harassment of the supply of English arms, soldiers and victuals to Calais was begun (1), and raids were launched against the coast of England, principally its privateering bases. Following Wybert de Fretun's pillage of Alderney in June 1403, a Breton fleet under Jean de Penhoët, Admiral of Brittany, defeated a group of English privateers off Saint-Matthieu in July. In August the count of La Marche and his brothers, under orders from the French government, set out from Brest to attack Dartmouth. Diverted by adverse weather, they instead captured seven ships off Plymouth and went on to sack and burn the port. They then sailed to Jersey and Guernsey, plundering the islands and extracting pâtis from the inhabitants (2). In December, the count of Saint-Pol led a force from Harfleur, which included the Sire de Heugueville, to the Isle of Wight. The French remained there for a few days, raiding villages and carrying off fishermen and sheep, but Waleran quickly withdrew when threatened with a counter attack, to the detriment of his reputation and the discontent of those who had invested in the expedition (3).Henry had been expecting an attack in the Southampton area for some months and he swiftly summoned troops to oppose the

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(1) CPR 1405-1408 89; C.76/89 m.12; A.N. J.919 no.18 articles 45 and 47.

(2) Monstrelet i 69-70, 71-72; Letters of Henry IV i 216-218, 220; Foedera viii 325; Ann.Ric.Sec. 375; Wylie - Henry IV i 379, 382-384.

(3) Monstrelet i 91-92; Ann.Ric.Sec. 378; B.L.Add.Ch.12507.

invasion and alerted the fortresses of the south coast, though it soon became clear that these measures were no longer needed (1). In April 1404 a joint Norman and Breton fleet set out from Saint-Malo to attack Dartmouth, led by Penhoët and Guillaume du Chastel. Disagreement arose between them about whether they should attack the port and, after some days of hesitation, du Chastel and his following attempted a landing in which Penhoët refused to participate. The attackers suffered a heavy defeat at the hands of the local populace who killed du Chastel and took a large quantity of prisoners, including his two brothers, Tanguy and Henri (2). Henry ordered that the prisoners should not be released without his licence and wished to interrogate the most prominent, but over the next few years they trickled back to France and Brittany in return for ransoms (3). At about the same time, there were other French landings on the Isle of Wight, where the invaders demanded pâtis in the name of Queen Isbelle but were forced to retire empty-handed, and on Portland where they again lost several important prisoners (4). In 1405 ships were fitted out to fight the English at Rouen and Saint-Pol-de-Léon, and a combined Breton and Flemish fleet

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(1) Foedera viii 342-343; CCR 1402-1405 82-83; Cal.Signet nos.166, 931; E.28/12 no.4; E.28/23 no.2; B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Div ff.33v-34.

(2) Monstrelet i 121-122; Ann. Ric. Sec. 383-384.

(3) Lettres de Jean V v no.873; Foedera viii 357, 358, 362, 381; CCR 1405-1409 1, 138-139; CPR 1401-1405 472,484; CPR 1405-1408 286; Cal.Signet no.239; B.L.Add.Ch.232; C.76/88 mm.2, 9, 10, 16.

(4) Wylie - Henry IV i 436; Ann. Ric. Sec. 381; CCR 1402-1405 396; Foedera viii 356.

sacked Hornsea on the Yorkshire coast, but on the return journey it was defeated and captured by the privateers of Hull (1). Early in 1406, Charles de Savoisy led a fleet from Boulogne to blockade the mouth of the Thames and capture vessels coming from Gascony (2).In the spring and summer, Savoisy and the Castilian Pero de Niño raided along the south coast from Cornwall to Havant and then Jersey, but they were repeatedly repulsed by local forces (3). Orders from Paris halted the expedition which the new admiral, Clignet de Brabant, was preparing at Harfleur to attack the English at sea (4), and after this, French raids came to an end. There are some indications of the damage they had inflicted along the south coast (5), but they were not as devastating as the comparable raids of the 1370s. After some initial successes, French maritime strategy failed to achieve results and like the campaigns in Picardy and Guyenne, it lost momentum and governmental support late in 1406.

England's defences were too well prepared for the sporadic French efforts to make much impact on its coast. Beginning in 1401, Parliament granted several subsidies to

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(1) Lettres de Jean V iv no.120; Ann. Ric. Sec. 413; B.N. n.a.f. 7622 ff. 458v-460v.

(2) Wylie - Henry IV ii 408-409; CCR 1405-1409 93-95.

(3) Wylie - Henry IV ii 319-328; iii 46-49; Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 264-268.

(4) Monstrelet i 127.

(5) CPR 1405-1408 26; 1408-1413 201-202.

Henry for the defence of the kingdom, as it had done to Richard in 1384 and 1393 (1). In the late fourteenth century, fortifications had been built or improved to resist coastal attacks at Hadleigh, Queenborough, Dover, Canterbury, Cooling, Bodiam and Dartmouth, and to counter deeper invasions at Farleigh Hungerford, Nunney, Donnington, Wallingford and Gloucester (2). Early in Henry's reign, fortifications at East Tilbury, Falmouth and Dartmouth received attention (3).In January 1401 Henry unsuccessfully ordered thirty-nine balingers and seventeen barges to be built at the expense of various towns to oppose the threat of enemy invasion, an echo of similar orders in the 1370s (4). Besides these permanent precautions, effective defence depended on accurate advanced information of enemy intentions. News and rumours received through espionage networks in France were relayed to England by the ambassadors or officials at Calais. In appropriate circumstances a small single vessel would be sent to sea to discover the positions and intentions of enemy fleets (5).

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(1) G.L.Harriss - "Theory and Practice in royal taxation: some observations" EHR xcvii (1982) 812-814.

(2) Richmond -"War at Sea" 101; Alban - National Defence 240-253.

(3) Foedera viii 271; CPR 1405-1408 152; E.28/25 unnumbered.

(4) Alban - National Defence 278-280; Richmond - "War at Sea" 109; Foedera viii 172-174.

(5) Alban - National Defence 289-314; E.28/9 unnumbered; E.28/20 no.30; E.28/26 no.98.

In response to news of an impending attack on the coast, it was usual to commission the array of forces to oppose it in the counties or dioceses that were threatened, or to summon the retainers of the crown, and to order a watch along the coast and the preparation of beacons to warn of the enemy approach. Such precautions were taken in March 1392 and July 1399, but their greatest concentration is in the early years of Henry IV's reign. There was another group of them in 1415 when Henry V attempted to secure his kingdom against a counter-invasion during his intended expedition to France (1).When enemy fleets were cruising at sea seeking English merchant ships to attack, orders might be sent to the ports that ships were not to go to sea (2). Trading vessels might be supervised into convoys for their greater protection. This was common practice for ships bringing wine from Bordeaux or taking wool to Middelburg before the 1389 truce (3), and the ambassadors at Calais advised a similar arrangement to frustrate the Norman privateers in August 1402 (4). The system was revived for the wine-fleets to Bordeaux late in 1403 and

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(1) Foedera viii 123, 138, 270-271, 374, 402; ix 253, 255, 304; CCR 1399-1402 574; 1402-1405 82-83, 222,244-245; 1413-1419 218; CPR 1391-1396 88-95; 1396-1399 592; 1399-1401 209-214; 1401-1405 296, 298, 424, 429; 1405-1408 61-62, 149, 231, 303, 306; 1408-1413 223; 1413-1416 65; Lettres des Rois ii 317-319; PPC ii 168, 186; Wylie - Henry IV i 386, 433; iii 67, 102; Henry V i 448.

(2) CPR 1405-1408 421; CCR 1409-1413 3, 7-8; E.28/16 unnumbered, 23 Dec. 1405. For an earlier instance of this in June 1387 see CCR 1385-1389 327.

(3) Alban - National Defence 274; CCR 1385-1389 12, 170, 257, 293, 348, 435.

(4) S.C. 1/43 no.131.

again in 1413 (1).The most effective form of maritime defence was to assemble a squadron by the requisition of merchant vessels and send it to sea before the approach of the French fleet in order to deter attacks on English shipping and coastal raids (2). This simple strategy was employed before the Leulinghen truce (3), and the preparation of sea patrols began again in 1400 (4). The activities of these official squadrons increased in November 1403 with the appointments of Thomas Beaufort and Lord Berkeley as admirals, and the greater threat of French raids. In December a plan was drawn up in the Council to combat the expected attack of the count of Saint-Pol and the duke of Orléans. A group of sea-captains estimated that there were 260 ships in English ports, mostly at Dartmouth, not counting the King's ships in the north and those in Ireland and Wales. The Dartmouth and Thames fleets were to take up their position off the coast of Guernsey and a hundred vessels picked from them would seek out the fleet of Orléans and

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(1) CCR 1402-1405 199; Foedera viii 325; ix 47; Cal.Signet no.180; PPC ii 81-82; E.28/16 unnumbered.

(2) Richmond - "Keeping of Seas" 291-292; C.F.Richmond - "English Naval Power in the Fifteenth Century" History lii (1967) 1-6.

(3) CCR 1385-1389 169; E.28/2 no.41.

(4) Ford - "Piracy or Policy" 66, 72; CPR 1399-1401 487-488; 1401-1405 70-71, 124, 132, 506; CCR 1402-1405 268; Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 193 n.47, 271; Foedera viii 126-127; PPC i 120-121, 221, 234; ii 56; E.28/19 no.6; E.28/28 no.24.

Saint-Pol in the Seine estuary or elsewhere, and attack it at sea (1). When French intentions again threatened English shipping and coasts in 1406, Henry experimented by entrusting the keeping of the sea to the merchant community, but the arrangement was terminated after less than six months (2). In the later years of his reign, squadrons were again gathered to patrol the sea, and the Council allocated money to the Admiral for maritime defence (3).

At the same time as the French were beginning their attacks on English coasts, the English were also taking the offensive across the Channel. In the summer of 1403 there were small raids against La Rochelle, the island of Ré and the coasts of Poitou, Normandy and Picardy (4). The first large raid sponsored by the English government was in retaliation for the count of La Marche's sack of Plymouth in August. In November 1403 William Wilford led a fleet to the Breton coast, captured and destroyed many ships, made two landings, raided deep inland and burned

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(1) E.28/12 nos. 4 and 13; E.28/28 no.38; B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Div ff.33-34v.

(2) Richmond - Admin. and Keeping of Seas 175; Foedera viii 437, 439, 449, 455; CCR 1405-1409 156-157; Hist.Ang. ii 272.

(3) Wylie - Henry IV iii 81-82, 102; PPC ii 9, 14; E.28/23 nos. 26 and 47.

(4) H.G. Richardson - "Illustrations of English History in the Medieval Registers of the Parlement of Paris" TRHS 4th Series x (1927) 74-75; B.L.Egerton Ch.19; Add.Ch.12507; A.N. J.645 no.51; P.R.O. 31/8/135 section 4 from A.N."Section Domaniale-Mémoires de la Chambre des Comptes 14925 f.172v".

Saint Matthieu before returning (1). This punitive attack was part of the fiction that the war at sea was between England and Brittany and it did not therefore constitute an infraction of the Anglo-French truce (2). In the summer of 1404 there were further English raids against La Rochelle and Guérande (3), and also the island of Cadzand near Sluys (4). A much heavier blow was struck against this same area the following year. In February, Henry appointed his second son Thomas as admiral and in March as lieutenant for an expedition overseas. He was provided with a fleet of twenty large ships, twenty barges and twenty balingers, with cannon, gunpowder, bows and arrows, over the next two months (5). Thomas and the earl of Kent set sail from Sandwich in the middle of May 1405. It was apparently intended that they should take their 700 men-at-arms and 1400 archers to the relief of Guyenne (6), but a hasty decision was made to divert the force against the Flemish coast in retaliation for the count of Saint-Pol's assault on Marck on 12 May; perhaps this was

(1) Ann. Ric. Sec. 375-376; Letters of Henry IV i 167-170; c.f. Warner - Libelle xxiii-xxiv, 11-13.

(2) On 26 Aug.1403 English ports were ordered to assemble men-at-arms, archers and mariners to make war on the Bretons, who had contravened the truce as allies of France, Foedera viii 325.

(3) Wylie - Henry IV i 444; Knowlson - Jean V 43; Lettres de Jean V iv no.95; B.L.Cotton MS.Caligula Div f.77.

(4) Richmond - "Naval Power" 5; Vaughan - John the Fearless 20.

(5) Foedera viii 388, 389; PPC i 259-260; Cal.Signet no.283; CPR 1405-1408 59; C.76/88 m.9; E.28/20 no.23.

(6) E.28/20 no.65.

without the knowledge of the king or the Council, who were preparing to conclude a four-month truce with the duke of Burgundy to cover Flanders (1). The fleet appeared before Dunquerque and Nieuport but Thomas reserved his chief attention for Sluys, where the English goods seized two years earlier had still not been restored. He burned and pillaged Cadzand and other areas around the town, and made an unsuccessful assault on the castle. The English were forced to withdraw after several days, when the duke and his brother Antoine approached with troops (2). Thomas's objective appears to have been the destruction of Sluys as a base of military operations against England. In June he re-appeared off the Norman coast, landed at St. Vaast-la-Hougue and ravaged the eastern Cotentin (3). This was probably a warning threat to Cherbourg, which had been purchased by King Charles the previous summer. For the remainder of Henry's reign, English raids against the French coast were sporadic and on a much smaller scale. English troops appeared at Hennebont (4), and Oostende (5)

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(1) Cal.Signet no.347; E.28/21 no.22. See p.267 above.

(2) Vaughan - John the Fearless 21-22; Varenbergh - Histoire des Relations 494-495; Wylie - Henry IV ii 100-104; Monstrelet i 107.

(3) Wylie - Henry IV ii 105; Choix i 269; B.L.Add.Ch.51.

(4) Lettres de Jean V iv nos. 306, 307, 390.

(5) Vaughan - John the Fearless 24.

in 1406, in Ponthieu (1) and at Guérande and Auray in 1407 (2), off the Norman coast and at Bréhat (where the earl of Kent, Henry's admiral, was mortally wounded) in 1408 (3), at Fecamp in 1410 (4), and at St. Aubin, Dieppe and le Tréport in July 1413 (5). These later attacks were during intervals in the truce at sea. Henry's measures in the maritime conflict, both defensive and offensive, were taken in response to French aggression, mirroring French actions at every successive stage, and eventually the English were able to outrun the French capacity for hostility. Raids continued to be made against the French coast to demonstrate the superiority that had been achieved; they were "a matter of reprisal, of exhibitionism, even of jingoism" (6).

It is a measure of the English advantage at sea that Henry was able to establish the securities and truces with Flanders and Brittany in 1407. However, during the whole lifetime of these treaties there were numerous infractions committed against them on both sides, both on the high seas and in harbours (7). The contest between the Bretons

(1) F.C.Louandre - Histoire d'Abbeville et du comté de Ponthieu jusqu'en 1789 (1844-1845) i 275.

(2) Touchard - Commerce Maritime Breton 104.

(3) Wylie - Henry IV iii 103-104; Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 338-339. See p. 278 above.

(4) Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 400.

(5) Wylie - Henry V i 150-151; Monstrelet ii 376. Richard Hawkwood was operating here under Henry V's commission, CPR 1413-1416 116.

(6) Richmond - "Naval Power" 5.

(7) See pp.268-283 above and appendix 4.

and the southern English ports reached a climax in 1407. The Bretons were most active during the early part of the year with the encouragement of the duke and his admiral, Jean de Penhoët, who was entitled to one tenth of the profits (1); but English mariners continued to take extensive reprisals after the truce was signed in July (2). There was another concentration of attacks on English shipping by prominent Breton noblemen in 1414 shortly after the new Anglo-Breton truce had been negotiated with Henry V, and possibly as a protest against it (3). Sincere efforts were made by the dukes of Burgundy and Brittany and the kings of England to enforce these two truces. Henry IV and Henry V ordered enquiries into the capture of Breton and Flemish ships, restitutions to their owners and the arrest of notorious culprits including John Hauley, Philipot Lambert, John Prendergast, William Long, Lawrence Tutbury, Guy Busch and William Prince (4). English and Flemish envoys meeting at Calais in August 1411 worked out in detail the reparation for individual violations. Both the English Council and the Vier Leden rejected the use of letters of marque and reprisal at this time, but they were

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(1) Knowlson - Jean V 51-52; Lettres de Jean V v nos. 621, 622, 623, 677, 678, 694, 771, 915.

(2) CCR 1405-1409 217-218; CPR 1405-1408 418,419,421; Cal.Signet no.705; C.76/91 mm 17, 21; S.C. 1/41 no.195.

(3) Touchard - Commerce Maritime Breton 122 n.64; Knowlson - Jean V 88-89; Lettres de Jean V v no.1196. See pp. 280-281 above.

(4) CPR 1405-1408 420; 1408-1413 235, 316, 317, 318, 428, 432; 1413-1416 36-37, 116; 1416-1422 267; CCR 1409-1413 210; Foedera ix 116.

nevertheless still in use on both sides (1), and in October 1412 Henry threatened to employ them to avenge the plunder of a ship of Dover at Dunquerque (2). Later in 1412 and in 1413, it was the English policy to restore Flemish, Breton and Castilian property that was captured, but to divide French ships and goods amongst the captors, since the truce with France at sea had lapsed on 1 January 1412 (3). The duke of Brittany would occasionally issue letters of reprisal against his own subjects in order to effect the restitution of English goods (4). However in Henry V's reign, exasperation with the activities of the pirates sometimes overrode the legal requirements of the truces; letters of marque were issued, Flemish and Breton ships were ordered to be seized and reprisals were taken on all sides (5). The privateers that had once been encouraged by governments were now out of their control and no amount of regulation by truces could eliminate their piracy.

Henry V attempted to legislate against piracy by the Statute of Truces in 1414, but if the purpose of this was

(1) PPC i 353-357; B.L.Add.Ch. 12508; C.76/94 m.4.

(2) E.28/23 no.49.

(3) CPR 1408-1413 476; 1413-1416 35-36; CCR 1409-1413 376; 1413-1419 10, 21.There was a cluster of letters of marque issued against the French in late 1411 and early 1412, CPR 1408-1413 323, 351-352, 354; Foedera viii 755; C.76/95 mm.13 and 21. See p. 258 above.

(4) CPR 1413-1416 224; 1416-1422 444. c.f. C.76/80 m.3 (1396).

(5) CPR 1413-1416 116, 409; 1416-1422 74, 81, 444; CCR 1419-1422 171; Lettres de Jean V v nos. 1217, 1218; Touchard - Commerce Maritime Breton 108.

to pacify the Channel and reduce friction with Brittany and Flanders, it was a failure (1). When Henry resumed the war in 1415,his first action was to eliminate the French privateering base of Harfleur. The capture of this town and the naval victories of the duke of Bedford and the earl of Huntingdon in the mouth of the Seine in 1416 and 1417 ended the threat posed by the Clos des Galées at Rouen. Henry's eventual occupation of Cherbourg and the entire Norman coast established English security in the Channel, but to maintain it, regular patrols were necessary in every campaigning season from 1416 to 1420, when the new dual kingdom could afford to dispense with its navy. These naval squadrons were based on a group of about thirty royal ships and loyal captains who included Thomas Beaufort earl of Dorset, Pons de Castillon and John Hauley the younger (2). Measures for the defence of the English coasts and the shipping in its harbours were still considered necessary however; there were particular threats by the Franco-Genoese fleet in 1416 and the Castilians in 1419 and 1421 (3). Control of the sea was never absolutely secure.

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(1) See p. 287 above.

(2) S.Rose - The Navy of the Lancastrian Kings (Navy Record Society 1982) 48-52; Richmond - Admin. and Keeping of Seas 23-24, 26-28, 29 n.2., 32; "Naval Power" 1,6; Roskell - Commons 1422 190; Wylie - Henry V ii 6 n.7; PPC ii 208-209; CPR 1416-1422 10, 112, 199-200, 319; Foedera ix 372, 791.

(3) CPR 1416-1422 270, 323-324; CCR 1413-1419 346-347, 472-473, 525-526; Cal.Signet no.856; Foedera ix 350, 702, 793.

It was the French government which first transformed the clashes at sea from piracy to policy in 1400 and it drew an equal response from the English government in 1401. But the French war of attrition at sea failed to inflict any permanent damage on the English merchant community or achieve predominance in the Channel. The war of strategy was more expensive to the French treasury, but also failed to make a lasting impression on the English coasts. The English raids seem to have been more effective and continued for longer. But the war at sea had its own momentum and was soon beyond the control of the governments that had initiated it. Henry IV pursued a cheap but dangerous policy in unleashing his privateers against the French and endorsing their activities. They had taken their own actions according to their own system of reprisals regardless of the 1396 truce in its early years and they were to show the same disregard for the truces with Brittany and Flanders after 1407. When privateers were no longer needed for their nuisance value against an enemy, their depredations undermined precarious diplomatic structures and made it difficult to maintain good relations with potential allies and neutral parties. Henry IV and Henry V therefore tried to subordinate English actions at sea to royal military control by substituting official squadrons for the privateers. Despite the amount of government attention they absorbed, the hostilities at sea were always secondary to the war on land and Henry V only achieved some measure of permanent control in the Channel by occupying both its coasts.

As in the 1380s it was logical for the government of Charles [VI] to extend its attacks on English shipping and coasts to an intervention in England itself (1). Since its policy required that the fiction of the twenty-eight year truce should be maintained, this was not again attempted by a large-scale royal invasion across the Channel, but by guerres couvertes under the banners of allies and independent third parties, as in all the other theatres of war considered above. The device of a French invasion of England under the Scottish flag had been foreshadowed in the 1380s. In August 1383 it was agreed that a thousand French men-at-arms and forty thousand francs should be sent to Scotland to aid Robert II to make war against the English (2), but a year later, Scots envoys arrived at the conference at Boulogne complaining that nothing had been sent (3). In June 1385 the French admiral, Jean de Vienne, acting as Charles' lieutenant in Scotland and England, brought troops and money to fulfil the obligation. He and the earl of Douglas first attacked the East March in July, but when Richard advanced from Berwick to Edinburgh with an English army, he raided into the West March where he inflicted some damage. He and his troops returned to France in November (4). In 1386 the English Council

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(1) See p. 59 above.

(2) Campbell - "England Scotland and the Hundred Years War" 208.

(3) B.N.Francais 2699 f.153.

(4) Campbell - "England Scotland and the Hundred Years War" 209-210; McKisack - Fourteenth Century 439-440 and n.1; CPR 1385-1389 230; CCR 1385-1389 25, 658; A.N. J.677 nos. 14 and 15; B.L.Add.Ch. 9322 and 11356.

considered that the expected French invasion might begin on the north-eastern coasts, to take maximum advantage of Scottish assistance (1), and in February 1400 Henry's nervous Great Council was told to expect Franco-Scottish attacks in the Marches,if provision was not made for their defence (2). But it was not until 1402 that French troops arrived in Scotland, when the earl of Crawford's fleet brought a small company of knights led by Jacques de Heilly, who was in the pay of Philip of Burgundy. They participated in the earl of Douglas's raid into Northumberland and Durham and in his defeat at Homildon Hill by the Percies in September (3). Heilly, Pierre des Essarts and Jean Dormy were amongst the prisoners that the earl of Northumberland exhibited to Parliament in October; the French were still arranging their ransoms in 1404 and 1405 (4). The earl expected the French to be active in the Marches again in the summer of 1403 (5), and the French government apparently intended to send armed help to Scotland in 1405 (6), but neither of these threats materialised and the Valois lost interest in attacking the Lancastrians through Scotland.

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(1) CCR 1385-1389 190.

(2) Foedera viii 125.

(3) Wylie - Henry IV i 291-293; Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 125 n.12. See p. 353 above.

(4) Wylie - Henry IV i 293, 297; Foedera viii 323, 379, 393; C.76/88 m.2.

(5) PPC i 203.

(6) B.L.Egerton Ch.19.

The nascent Lancastrian dynasty received an early challenge when the earls of Kent, Huntingdon and Salisbury and their supporters rose in rebellion in January 1400. The revolt quickly ended in fiasco at Cirencester, but Henry continued precautions against a possible French invasion in support of it. Commissions of array were sent to the counties and the clergy, coastal fortresses were reinforced, the captain of Calais was ordered to send information about French troop movements and the ports were closed to prevent news of the revolt reaching France and Flanders. Prominent rebels were charged with conspiracy to introduce the French into England, and convicted (1). It is possible that the earls had some contact with the French government before the revolt, but it preferred to await the outcome of the venture rather than engage in any co-ordinated action. The earl of Kent paid a visit to Queen Isabelle at Sonning during the rising (2), and a French fleet gathered at Harfleur under the command of the count of Saint Pol, which the Council deemed likely to invade the lordship of Pembroke, part of Isabelle's dower lands (3). But the rebellion remained a domestic affair. Following its failure and Richard's death, French plans to intervene in England were suspended

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(1) A.Rogers - "Henry IV and the Revolt of the Earls" H.T. xviii (1968) 278-283; Wylie - Henry IV i 96-109, 124; Pistono - "Confirmation" 360-361; CPR 1399-1401 209-214, 385; CCR 1399-1402 34, 37, 38; Foedera viii 120, 123, 138.

(2) Hist.Ang. ii 243.

(3) Wylie - Henry IV i 121; Froissart xvi 231-232; PPC i 108.

for several years, especially whilst Henry still held Isabelle as a hostage (1).

There is no sign of any French collusion in the Percy rebellion of July 1403, though Henry again took the precaution of closing the ports (2). However, the rising demonstrated to the French government the instability of Henry's régime and the aspirations of the house of Mortimer. Henceforward it recognised the legitimacy of the earl of March as Richard's successor (3), but it remained reluctant to give any material support to a rebellion before it had achieved some measure of success. In December 1403 and early in 1404, there was a plot in Essex in favour of King Richard, supposedly still alive in Scotland, which centred on the countess of Oxford and several local abbots. The plotters expected the support of Louis of Orléans and the count of Saint Pol, who would land with French troops and Queen Isabelle at Orwell. But the French court accepted that Richard was dead and Louis was already arranging the marriage of Isabelle to his son (4). He certainly contemplated an expedition to England in

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(1) See p. 215 above. There may have been some French involvement in the plots centering on the pseudo-Richard kept by the Scots - Wylie - Henry IV i 403, 450-451; Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 126-127.

(2) Wylie - Henry IV i 363; Cal.Signet no.154; CCR 1402-1405 93.

(3) Wylie - Henry IV ii 314; Wylie - "Memorandum". See pp. 218, 223, 249 above.

(4) Wylie - Henry IV i chapter XXX pp.417-428; Alban - National Defence 324 n.2; CPR 1401-1405 424, 431, 432, 465, 468, 472, 480, 493, 514; CCR 1402-1405 328; Foedera viii 353; E.28/16 unnumbered.

1404 and had banners made for it (1). During the latter part of the year, the Council received warnings of his intention to launch a fleet from Brittany and of other French naval preparations at Harfleur and Sluys (2). In February 1405 there was another plot involving the duke of York and his sister Lady Despencer. She abducted the young earl of March and his brother from Windsor and fled towards Glamorgan, but was arrested at Cheltenham. She had sent an esquire called Morgan to carry news of the scheme to France and Flanders; Henry ordered the Council to intercept him in London and closed the ports again (3). Later in the year, when the second Percy revolt was collapsing, the earl of Northumberland sent a letter to Louis of Orléans, suggesting co-operation against Henry (4). However, when Northumberland went to Paris in the summer of 1406, and pleaded desperately for French troops to fight Henry, offering hostages to ensure his loyal service, he was rebuffed and obliged to return to Scotland (5). Perhaps the Valois could not forgive the Percies their role in Richard's deposition. Later in the year there was a rumour that Northumberland had arrived back in the north with French supporters and Henry ordered that

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(1) B.L.Egerton Ch.141.

(2) Wylie - Henry IV i 467-468; B.L.Cotton MS.Caligula Div f.59.

(3) Wylie - Henry IV ii 41-52; CPR 1405-1408 125; B.L.Cotton MS. Vespasian F iii no.5 (Cal.Signet no.936).

(4) Wylie - Henry IV ii 263.

(5) Monstrelet i 130-131; Wylie - Henry IV ii 381.

the former Percy castles should be well guarded (1). In the next reign, Henry Scrope was accused of negotiating with the French and receiving bribes from them to form the Southampton conspiracy (2), but this allegation was probably an aspect of Henry V's propaganda or of his paranoia. The French government never committed itself to support any of these internal rebellions.

It was much more interested in the Welsh revolt of Owain Glyndŵr. Glyndŵr himself was in communication with the Scots, the Irish, the Percies, the Mortimers and other dissident elements within England. He probably colluded in the Percy rebellions of 1403, 1405 and 1408, and Lady Despencer's plot in 1405; he supported the Mortimer claim to the English throne and signed the famous Tripartite Indenture with Northumberland and Edmund Mortimer, probably also in 1405, dividing the kingdom between them (3).The success of Henry's coup d'état in 1399 had been due in part to preparations made in his Marcher lordships in south Wales. When Richard landed there from Ireland, he was unable to obtain any assistance from the Welsh, but rather his possessions suffered from their raids (4).

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(1) Cal.Signet no.668.

(2) Hist.Ang, ii 305-306; C.Ross -The Yorkshire Baronage 1399-1433 (Oxford D.Phil.thesis 1950) 191.

(3) J.E.Lloyd - Owen Glendower (Oxford 1931) 46-48, 53, 59-60, 69-71, 92-94, 100, 127-128, 134; Wylie - Henry IV ii 378-381.

(4) R.R.Davies - Lordship and Society in the March of Wales 1282-1400 (1978) 84-85; D.Johnston - "Richard II's Departure from Ireland July 1399" EHR xcviii (1983) 792, 794, 795.

Nevertheless Glyndŵr was led by the inexorable logic of his revolt to broaden his activities from border disturbances in 1400 by successive stages to the control of large areas of Wales in 1404 and the defiance of Lancastrian legitimacy by adopting the title prince of Wales. The recurrent problem of the Welsh revolt forced Henry to conduct expeditions into Wales in 1400, 1401,1402 and 1403,and was a considerable drain on his financial and military resources in these years, but it was not until the early months of 1405 that Glyndŵr suffered a series of serious setbacks (1). Late in 1403 he began to draw support from France and Brittany. A naval squadron under Jean d'Espagne assisted the Welsh in attacks on Kidwelly in October, Caernarvon in November, Caernarvon again and Anglesey in January 1404. In April the Council sent five ships from Bristol to relieve the western Welsh fortresses and drive d'Espagne away (2).The same month a Welsh esquire was amongst those captured in the Breton débacle at Dartmouth and summoned to Henry's presence for questioning (3). Glyndŵr was aware that he needed to transform this casual co-operation into some international endorsement of his pretensions. He was formally crowned as prince at a parliament at Machynlleth in the presence

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(1) Lloyd - Owen Glendower Chapters IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX; PPC i 185-186; CCR 1399-1402 371, 469-470, 574; 1402-1405 478-479; CPR 1399-1401 518, 520; 1401-1405 439; 1405-1408 61; Foedera viii 159, 272, 353.

(2) Lloyd - Owen Glendower 76-77, 79-81; Wylie - Henry IV i 429-430; PPC i 221; ii 77; Cal.Signet no.90.

(3) Foedera viii 358. See p. 358 above.

of envoys from France, Scotland and Castile (1). He reminded Charles VI of his father's support for Owain Lawgoch in the 1370s, which had alarmed the English with the spectre of a French invasion of Wales (2). His representatives travelled to Paris and on 14 July 1404 drew up an alliance between Owain and Charles, specifically directed against Henry and promising that neither would make a peace or truce with him without giving the other the opportunity to be included. Glyndŵr ratified the alliance at Aberystwyth in January 1405 and shortly afterwards it was noted as excepted in the Tripartite Indenture (3).

One of the French negotiators was the count of La Marche, who had already been commissioned to take a force of eight hundred crossbowmen to Glyndŵr's aid and shortly afterwards became an ally of Louis of Orléans. He organised his expedition first at Harfleur, then in Brittany, and at the end of August the English Council sent out its privateers to intercept him. But in mid-October he was still delayed at Brest because of lack of funds, and when he finally put to sea, winter weather prevented him

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(1) Lloyd - Owen Glendower 82.

(2) Davies - Lordship and Society 74 n.28; Alban - National Defence 56-58. In 1386 a Welsh esquire contributed 97 men to Charles' invasion force in Flanders, B.N. Francais 28572 (Pieces Originales 2088) Naillac no.15; in Nov. 1394 another received payment from Louis of Orléans, B.L.Add.Ch. 3368.

(3) Lloyd - Owen Glendower 83-86; Foedera viii 356, 365-368, 382; Matthews - Welsh Records 23-39, 75-82.

leaving the shelter of the Breton coast (1). In July 1405 an expedition led by the Sire de Heugueville, master of the crossbowmen, marshal Jean de Rieux and admiral Renaud de Trie sailed from Brest and successfully landed in Milford Haven. During August they took the town of Haverford West, joined Glyndŵr at Tenby and went on to capture Cardigan and Carmarthen. Then the Franco-Welsh force marched eastward through Glamorgan and Gwent, until it was confronted by Henry with the county levies a few miles west of Worcester, at the end of the month. Neither side felt strong enough to take the chance of battle and after a week of skirmishing and standing to arms, difficulties of supply forced the rebels and their allies to withdraw. Some of the French left Wales in November but some could not get away until the following spring. The English admiral and privateers harrassed their shipping very effectively, making the transportation of troops in both directions difficult (2). Early in 1406, Glyndŵr sent another embassy to Paris, but the French government had already lost interest. In a proclamation in October, Charles stated that he would have provided more help to the Welsh if it had led to a general rising in England. The French were only interested in Wales as a

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(1) Lloyd - Owen Glendower 88; PPC i 233-234; Choix i 299; Monstrelet i 69-70 (where the two expeditions of La Marche in 1403 and 1404 are confused); B.L.Egerton Ch.19; B.N.Bourgogne 21 f.34v; A.N. J.426 nos. 29, 30, 31; K.57 no.16.

(2) Lloyd - Owen Glendower 101-105, 106, 126; Monstrelet i 81-84; Cal.Signet no.939; Hist.Ang. ii 272; Choix i 269, 270, 299-300; CCR 1402-1405 460; Foedera viii 406; CPR 1405-1408 61-62; B.L. Egerton Ch.19.

way into England and it had proved a disappointment in this repect, compounded with logistical problems and a lack of booty. In December 1407 English envoys succeeded in making truces with France which excluded any mention of Glyndŵr as Charles' ally. The alliance of 1404 was thereby disregarded and his status as Henry's rebellious subject accepted by both sides (1). He sent at least two further embassies to Paris to ask for aid, in 1410 and 1415, but apparently without result (2). Isolated from foreign support, the Glyndŵr revolt gradually crumbled, largely because of the efforts of Prince Henry (3).

French attempts to destabilise the new Lancastrian régime by intervening in the kingdom of England were always irresolute and ended in failure. Henry IV survived all internal and external challenges and in 1406 the policy was abandoned. The pattern was similar in the other theatres of Anglo-French conflict during these truces: the Calais March, Guyenne and the sea. Until 1403 the French pursued a war of attrition, merely a raising of the normal level of frontier truce violations and piracy, in which they gained no more than they lost. In late 1403

(1) Wylie - Henry IV ii 312, 381; Lloyd - Owen Glendower 126-127,133; PPC i 302-303. See p. 254 above.

(2) Lloyd - Owen Glendower 143 n.5; Wylie - Henry V i 445; ii 57 n.7; Henry IV iii 157 n.9, 268-270; Monstrelet i 256; B.N. n.a.f. 20528 p.175 (f.118v). It is possible that French troops served in Wales in 1408 and 1409, Monstrelet i 259; Foedera viii 588. Welshmen were serving Charles of Orléans in France in 1411 B.L.Add.Ch.3409; and the son of a rebel of Llanstephan was killed on the French side at the battle of Agincourt, CPR 1413-1416 395.

(3) Lloyd - Owen Glendower chapters XII and XIII.

they adopted a war of strategy that was closely connected to the private quarrels that Louis of Orléans and Waleran of Saint-Pol fostered against Henry. This consisted of ambitious plans for co-ordinated attacks against the English on all fronts, to expel them from France and transfer the war to English soil. When these schemes did not come to pieces under the strains of their own organisation, English garrisons in Picardy and Guyenne,and England's privateers and coastal defences were able to withstand the threats posed. In this struggle, they were often inadequately supplied with men and money by the English government; they fought alone on their own resources and initiative, so inevitably central direction of England's war policy was not maintained.

By late in 1406 it was clear that Henry's rule would not collapse under the pressure of the guerres couvertes; the policy was abandoned, guerre ouverte was avoided and a new series of truces began. By stretching the rules in this way, the French created uncertainty amongst both contemporaries and historians about the extent to which conflict within a truce was possible without destroying it. This policy of indirect attacks failed to remove the Lancastrians from the English throne or French territory. Their escalation of the covert conflict rebounded against them when Henry IV applied the same principles in his alliances with the Burgundians and Armagnacs, which enabled him to intervene directly in France.

Chapter V

ENGLISH OFFENSIVE POLICIES TOWARDS FRANCE

Over the last two chapters a pattern of truces, sometimes scarcely perceptible against a background of Anglo-French conflict, has been traced. These guerres couvertes, varying in intensity, were conducted largely on the intiative of the French. There were also occasions in this period when aggressive English diplomacy threatened to transform them into a guerre ouverte, as the English government considered the renewal of offensive war on a large scale. At times the directors of English foreign policy were prepared to go to war to achieve the objectives which can be deduced from the development of the negotiations for peace treaties and truces, or to protect what they regarded as their vital interests. These could be interpreted very widely when England was in a position of strength relative to France. The English might threaten to abrogate truces or refuse to extend them. In order to be able to intervene in France, it was essential

for the kings of England to retain their title to the French throne and all the pretensions attendant upon it(1).

The course of the peace negotiations demonstrate that there was a motivation towards peace on the English side in the latter half of Richard II's reign. On the French side of the Channel it was believed that king Richard himself truly desired to make a final settlement,but was restricted by his relatives and the English nobility, whom the French sought to circumvent by arranging a personal meeting between the two monarchs. Mézières portrayed Richard as enthusiastic for peace from the time of Leo of Armenia's mediation onwards, in contrast to the attitude of his uncles, the Black Boars:

> 'les Noir Sangliers et la chevalrie de la Grant Bretagne de ce qu'ilz ont refuse la paix au royaume de France, et de ce qu'ilz ont regule et restraint la puissance de leur roy, afin qu'il n'ait puissance a ladicte paix d'acomplir son desir (2).'

He alleged that Richard made the first move towards friendship between the two kings (3). Froissart also represented Richard as consistently favourable towards a peace settlement and credited him with initiating the

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(1) See p. 9 above.

(2) Mézières - Songe 119; Letter to Richard II 32. See pp. 100, 207 above.

(3) Letter to Richard II 19.

project of his marriage to Isabelle. He coupled John of Gaunt with Richard in this pacific policy, saying he regarded an Anglo-French peace as a necessary prelude to a crusade to counter the Turkish threat to Christendom (1). Twentieth-century historians have followed these indications in their analysis of Richard's personal motives and policy. According to Perroy, peace with France was an obsession for Richard which began to take hold in 1386:

> 'chez le jeune monarque, la naissance d'une idée fixe: faire sa paix avec Charles VI, dont la cour brillante le fascinait (2).'

He was therefore drawn progressively into the political sphere of the Valois until he eventually met Charles in 1396 and became the servile promoter of French policy in Europe for the last three years of his reign, a rôle in which he drew his sole domestic support from Gaunt. He believed that his new father-in-law's military aid was an essential element in his struggle to crush the recalcitrant English nobility and establish an autocracy (3).This idea originates in an unguarded threat Richard made against the Appellant lords in 1387 and a

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(1) Froissart xv 80-81, 147, 182, 237-238. c.f. p. 100 above.

(2) Angleterre et Schisme 353.

(3) Angleterre et Schisme 363, 386,390; E.Perroy - The Hundred Years War (Trans.W.B.Wells London 1951) 197, 199.Steel followed the same lines, though his interest in foreign affairs was limited, Richard II 20, 212-213.

misconception about the negotiations for Isabelle's dowry in 1396, now dispelled by John Palmer (1).

Palmer has offered a more moderate explanation of Richard's position in Anglo-French relations, though it is still not without its sensational aspects. He presents both Richard and Charles as genuinely seeking a final peace in these years, with the support of their uncles and the aristocracy of both countries. In their sincere negotiations they were inspired by idealistic notions of rescuing Christendom from the perils of schism and Islam. However, Richard was not prepared to engage in a policy of appeasement. In his pursuit of a "firm but soundly based peace" he laid the foundations for "the genuine peace and real co-operation which was to be the hall-mark of the mid-1390s." The climax to his diplomacy was not the settlement of 1396 but the draft peace of 1393 and the hypothetical treaty of 1394, based around the separation of Guyenne from the English crown under a dynasty founded by Gaunt. His policy was consistent throughout the 1390s, even when he issued the extreme instructions of July 1395, despite the domestic criticism it attracted. The renewal of the war for any reason was "an exorbitant price which he was not prepared to pay, and rightly so." He regarded the truce and marriage of 1396 as a less satisfactory arrangement than the 1394 treaty and the diplomacy of his

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(1) Knighton ii 217; Palmer -"Foreign Policy" 76; England.., 173-174. See p. 198 above.

last years was therefore a relative failure (1). Whilst these views dispense with the naivety and fanaticism which burdened Richard in the earlier portrayal, a re-examination of English foreign policy in the 1390s suggests it was neither so consistent nor so motivated by altruistic pacifism as Palmer believes.

The youthful Richard made his début in the field of foreign affairs in 1387 with his démarche for a half-peace of five years with France, involving the performance of simple homage for Guyenne and the sale of Brest, Cherbourg and Calais to the French. He was also prepared to return Jean de Blois to Brittany on payment of his ransom. Although these terms were too conciliatory to the French, Richard showed himself to be determined and sure of his objective. He insisted that his meeting with Charles should be near Calais and rejected count Albrecht's suggestion of a long general truce. Some of the elements of his later policy are already evident: a diplomacy of bold strokes; a lack of interest in the "barbican" towns; and a desire to withdraw from the conflict with France for several years in return for financial compensation on a large-scale. The Appellants cut short his diplomatic manoeuvres, but when he asserted his control over the Council in May 1389, new life was breathed into the negotiations with France and the three-year truce of

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(1) Palmer - "Foreign Policy" 77-79, 107; "Peace Negotiations" 81; England... 142-143, 171. See above pp. 24-25, 91-92, 98.

Leulinghen quickly followed (1). In these middle years of his reign, as later in the 1390s, Richard felt that England needed a breathing-space to recover from the effort of conflict, but not necessarily as a prelude to a final peace settlement:

> 'melius sibi videbatur a bellorum tumultu ea parte aliquantulum respire et in pace quiescere quam continuis guerrarum vexationibus anxiari (2).'

At the conference of 1390 the English were willing to make a longer truce, but by now John of Gaunt was making his influence felt in foreign policy and the emphasis of the English instructions was on the tenure of an enlarged English Guyenne under a peace settlement (3). By 1392 this influence was paramount.

After the abandonment of his ambitions for the Castilian throne, Gaunt arrived in Guyenne and sowed the seeds of his later peace policy. He may have negotiated for a marriage between his daughter Catalina and the duke of Berry, before it was agreed that she should marry the heir of Juan I of Castile (4). In August 1388 he scuppered the earl of Arundel's expedition by making a truce with Berry

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(1) See pp. 72-76, 175-176 above.

(2) West. Chron. 204. See pp. 165-166, 212 above.

(3) See pp. 76-78, 177 above.

(4) Froissart xiii 111, 126, 276; Lehoux - Berri ii 231n.

south of the Loire (1), using the powers at his disposal to effect a cessation of hostilities on the borders of his new lieutenancy of Guyenne. The settlement he had made with Juan in July, which was regarded unfavourably by the Appellant government, included the sale of his claim to the Castilian throne for an initial payment of 600,000 francs and an annual pension of 40,000 francs. Since he had failed to break the Franco-Castilian alliance and make a separate peace between England and Castile, he now favoured a peace with France to ensure the continued receipt of his pension and the position of his two daughters, Philippa, queen of Portugal and Catalina, shortly to be queen of Castile. This remained a motive throughout the 1390s, and helps explain Gaunt's support for the 1396 settlement (2). His territorial ambitions were now diverted to Guyenne. On his arrival there in 1387 he may have collected taxes using the title of duke, although he was not granted his life-tenure of the Duchy until 1390 (3). He fixed upon Guyenne as his prospective principality, envisaging himself as the semi-independent ruler of an enlarged Duchy, perhaps in imitation of Duke Philip of Burgundy. Like Philip, Gaunt wished to be the governing mentor of his native kingdom, with his own territory partly inside and partly outside the kingdom and his own foreign spheres of interest. Philip's lands had

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(1) See pp. 64, 166-167 above.

(2) Froissart xv 81, 238; P.E.Russell - The English Intervention in Spain and Portugal in the Time of Edward III and Richard II (Oxford 1955) 506-507, 509, 512.

(3) Froissart xii 346.

two superior lords, the emperor and the king of France, but he ruled them as one unit and received ambassadors from all over Europe. Later Louis of Orléans tried to emulate him, exploiting the same middle ground to acquire lands, vassals and allies (1). Angevin and Orléanist schemes for Italy form other parallels. Gaunt sought to implement this ambition through his personal conduct of English diplomacy at the peace conferences of 1392, 1393 and 1394, in which he colluded with Burgundy and Berry against the hereditary claims of their two nephews. In order to establish himself in the Duchy, Gaunt required an absence of Anglo-French hostilities; in order to multiply its area, he needed the terms of a peace settlement. Therefore the tenure, extent and pacification of Guyenne dominated the negotiations for peace and truce in these years, and Gaunt thereby acceded to the French feudal interpretation of the conflict. Through supplementary truce commissioners he attempted to regularise the frontiers and gain central control of the operation of the truces and the collection of pâtis. After the conference of 1394 he abandoned the idea of an enlarged Duchy created by a peace treaty and held under both English and French sovereignty, and instead concentrated on occupying the Duchy as currently constituted and with its frontiers secured by revised truce regulations. Special commissioners were no longer sent to limit Anglo-Gascon belligerency (2). Once in control of the Duchy, in either

(1) Vaughan - Philip the Bold 58, 80, 107.

(2) See pp. 85, 91, 99, 179, 184-191, 310 above.

of these forms, Gaunt would protect his north and south flanks by dynastic alliances with Castile and Brittany. His tenure of the Duchy was for life only, so he could not found a dynasty there, but since Richard and Queen Anne remained childless, he may have regarded himself or Bolingbroke as the natural heir to Richard's English throne and French pretensions, reuniting the crown and the Duchy in his family. In the winter of 1390-1391, when it appeared unlikely that he would gain his objectives through peace negotiations, he was not averse to planning an expedition against the French in the Duchy, financed by a parliamentary subsidy (1). Gaunt advocated an Anglo-French peace as an indispensible prelude to a wider settlement of the divisions of Christendom, principally the Schism and the organisation of a crusade against the Turks, and he showed some interest in organising a joint crusade with Philip of Burgundy and Louis of Orléans (2). But these European considerations were subordinate to the personal short-term advantages he could gain from a general peace: his interests in Spain and Guyenne were best served by the cessation of French interference in south-west Europe.

Gaunt and his son Bolingbroke seem to have had a persistent interest in Brittany. Throughout this long period of truce, England was repeatedly to consider an

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(1) Palmer - "Foreign Policy" 98; Jones - Ducal Brittany 125. See pp. 187, 311 above.

(2) England...194-195, 200-204; B.L.Add.Ch.3371-3374, 3376,3377.

alliance with Brittany, the power most purely concerned with the triangular relationship between London, Paris and Bordeaux. The variations on this theme in Anglo-Breton relations are an indicator of English intentions towards the French adversary. Jean de Montfort, duke of Brittany, had been brought up in England, paid liege homage to Edward III, signed an alliance with Richard II in 1378 and was then re-established in the duchy. Monfort purposed to live as much as possible as an independent prince, by playing off the two major combatants against each other:

> 'He learnt that compromise, deceit and duplicity were essential parts of his stock-in-trade as a politician (1).'

In England he had a "Breton lobby" of knights and esquires, paid by annuities from his English lands, to promote his interests in the court and the Council. In his negotiations with England he always sought to protect his position and avoid providing her with the tangible military aid he had promised by the terms of their alliances. This precarious neutrality brought profits to Breton traders, who exploited the enmity of the two parties to transport goods between them. In the 1380s and 1390s, Montfort's principal objective in regard to England was the recovery of the honour of Richmond and the

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(1) Jones - Ducal Brittany 92.

castellany of Brest (1). The tenure of the honour of Richmond, now an earldom owing liege homage to the king of England, had been a bond between the ducal family and England since the twelfth century. The revenues from its lands were potentially more profitable than those from the Duchy itself. The earldom was alternately confiscated and restored as the exigences of English foreign policy demanded, and it was the subject of repeated claims sent to England by Jean IV and Jean V. Gaunt had held the lands from 1361 to 1372 and Queen Anne partially controlled them from 1384 until her death in 1394 (2). Another link was forged by the English lease of Brest, which they were reluctant to relinquish because of its value as a bargaining point in the negotiations with France. Its return was repeatedly requested by Montfort, who was not even permitted to enjoy the revenues of the lands he had been granted in exchange in England. The reversion of Castle Rising was granted to the duke of Gloucester in May 1386 and the reversion of Sevenhampton to the duke of York

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(1) Jones - Ducal Brittany 184-189, 194, 197-198, 201-202; Touchard - Commerce Maritime Breton 131, 132, 135, 138; Knowlson - Jean V 10n.11, 22-23. The "lobby" apparently included John Devereux, Edward Dalyngrigge and Richard Fodryngay, PPC i 32; M.C.E.Jones - John de Montfort England and the Duchy of Brittany 1364-1399 (Oxford D.Phil.thesis 1966) 250; E.28/2 no.51.

(2) Jones - Ducal Brittany 16-17, 97-98, 99, 104, 120n.1, 172-174, 177, 181-182, 183, 185, 189-193; B.P. Wolfe - The Royal Demesne in English History: The Crown Estate in the Governance of the Realm from the Conquest to 1509 (1971) 242; P.Jeulin - "Un grand honeur anglais, le comté de Richmond, possession des ducs de Bretagne" Annales de Bretagne xlii (1935); Knowlson - Jean V 13-15, 24, 25, 27, 29-30, 44, 61-63; Lettres des Rois ii 180-181; CCR 1385-1389 12, 77; C.Ch.R. 1341-1417 307, 309, 327; Foedera vii 553-554; viii 38-39, 64-65, 79; PPC i 6, 17-18a, 47-50, 64; CPR 1399-1401 24; C.76/71 m.8.

in February 1391. The English garrison at Brest caused constant friction by its wide interpretation of its right to levy pâtis from the surrounding country. In March 1387 a draft agreement was made by which the English occupation was to continue until the signing of a final peace or a long truce with France, all the pâtis were to be commuted to one annual payment and all acts of war were to cease on both sides. This was never implemented and all the problems continued until the return of the town in 1397 (1). England's need for security on her sea-routes to the Bay of Bourgneuf, Gascony and Portugal was a powerful motive in obtaining the alliance or neutrality of Brittany. The duke claimed the right to issue writs for ships sailing along these routes, and there was a continuing dispute about the refusal of English captains to apply for them. The English government's recognition or rejection of these writs also depended on the requirements of its policy towards France (2).

Although he was relatively financially independent of the French crown compared to the apanaged princes, Montfort was also bound to Charles VI by homage for his duchy. He had performed liege homage to Charles V in 1366, but only recognised his obligations as those of simple homage. In 1381 by the second treaty of Guérande he agreed to do the

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(1) Jones - Ducal Brittany 98, 104, 183, 193; CPR 1385-1389 147; CPR 1388-1392 377; Foedera vii 709; PPC i 48-49; C.76/71 m.6. See also pp. 39, 169-170 above.

(2) Jones - Ducal Brittany 97; Touchard - Commerce Maritime Breton 103; Fowler - Hundred Years War 5; PPC i 49.

same ambiguous homage to Charles VI and broke with the English alliance, swearing to expel English counsellors and garrisons from Brittany and to oppose English and Navarrese actions in France. He confirmed the treaty in April and performed the homage in September. He sent forces to oppose Despenser's crusade in 1383 and to join Charles' invasion fleet in 1386, and permitted his subjects to fight with the French in Flanders and Castile. The succession to Montfort in the Duchy was uncertain until a son and heir was born in 1389, which made him less reliant on England and more inclined to achieve a rapprochement with the kingdom of France and the Valois dynasty. He continued his feud with the rival claimants, the Penthièvre family, and their lieutenant Olivier de Clisson, confiscating the Penthièvre lands in 1384. In February of this year he made an alliance with the dukes of Berry and Burgundy, since all three were threatened by the increasing power of Clisson in Brittany and Poitou, and at the French court. A further alliance with Berry in May 1387 was directed specifically against Clisson. However, the two dukes and the rest of the Valois court frequently pressurised Montfort to settle his perennial dispute with the Penthièvre faction. At first reluctantly, but with increasing willingness, he submitted the quarrel to royal arbitration: in December 1387; at Blois and Paris in July 1388, escorted by Berry and Burgundy: and at Tours December 1391, escorted by Berry and the count of Sancerre; and to the mediation of Charles' envoys in the winter of 1390 to 1391, and of Philip of Burgundy in 1394

to 1395. He received a pension from Charles in May 1390 and part of his price for the Tours settlement was the betrothal of one of Charles' daughters to his heir. The effect of the truce was to propel the duke of Brittany gradually towards a stabilisation of his position in France (1).

The confusion, duplicity and frustration intrinsic in English foreign policy, as Commissioner, Ricardian, Appellant and Lancastrian viewpoints battled for dominance in the few years before the Leulinghen truce, are reflected in relations with Brittany. Despite earlier negotiations by Michael de la Pole with the Penthièvre family for the deliverance of Jean de Blois without the payment of a ransom, the Council and Parliament assured Montfort in 1387 that he would not be released. In March and April 1386 Richard granted Blois and the profit obtainable by his ransom to Robert de Vere,to defray the costs of his conquest of Ireland. Richard contrived to have him freed at Calais in November 1387 and he married Clisson's daughter the following January. Orders to receive the ransom money were followed a week later by an

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(1) Jones - Ducal Brittany 34, 47, 91, 93-94, 97, 99-100, 106, 109, 121 n.1, 127, 131-132; Touchard - Commerce Maritime Breton 103-104; England...101-102, 131-132; Lehoux - Berri ii 216-217, 219-220, 223, 268, 278-282; F.L.Bruel - "Essai sur la vie et le rôle d'Olivier IV Sire de Clisson et de Belleville, Connétable de France 1336-1407" Positions des Thèses (1903) 48-49; Choix i 51-52; Preuves ii 534, 815; St.Denys i 510-512; BEC lviii (1897) 379-380; Froissart xiii 86-90, 118-124, 136-139, 143-144, 185; xiv 353-354, 362-367; xv 207-208; B.N.Francais 29108 (Pieces Originales 2624), Sancerre nos. 43 and 58; B.L.Add.Ch.3350.

order of the Appellants to arrest all concerned, with the money and the documentation (1). The prospects for an Anglo-Breton alliance fluctuated. Montfort continued diplomatic contact even when he was beginning the siege of Brest in 1386 (2). In February and March 1387, negotiations resulted in the draft agreement about Brest and the ineffective restoration of Richmond to Montfort. Before Arundel's expedition could take advantage of this new amity, Montfort had signed the new alliance with the duke of Berry and decided to continue the siege (3). Although English and Breton envoys were active before and after Montfort's seizure of Clisson in June, no agreement seems to have been reached before Hotspur's expedition set out (4). Brittany came under increasing pressure from Clisson and the French court in the remainder of 1387 and in the winter, Montfort again made a pact with English envoys. Confident of this, he failed to obey Charles VI's summons to Orléans at Easter 1388. In June, Arundel was empowered to treat with him and Richmond was again regranted. But Montfort had agreed in May to meet Berry

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(1) England..., 63, 97, 105, 112; Jones - "Ransom of Penthièvre"; Ducal Brittany 101-102, 107; Montfort England and Brittany 204, 210, 219; Bruel - "Clisson" 49; CPR 1385-1389 132; Rot.Parl. iii 232b; PPC i 48; Foedera vii 503, 565; C.76/70 mm.26, 32; C.76/72 m.17.

(2) Jones - Montfort England and Brittany 211; C.76/70 m.7; C.76/71 m.24.

(3) England..., 97; Jones - Ducal Brittany 104; Foedera vii 553-554; C.Ch.R. 1341-1417 307; C.76/71 m.6.

(4) Jones - Ducal Brittany 105; Montfort England and Brittany 214, 218n. 1; England...99-101; St. Denys i 480; Froissart xiii 216-217, 232-234; CCR 1385-1389 344, 428, 652; C.76/71 mm.2, 6; C.76/72 m.22.See above pp. 62, 63.

and Burgundy at Blois, made a truce with Clisson in Paris in July and failed to co-operate with Arundel's expedition (1). Another Anglo-Breton alliance was under discussion in August and September, Richmond was granted to Montfort again in November and diplomatic contact continued into 1389, but the negotiations at Leulinghen made this redundant (2). Montfort's purpose in this series of alliances was to reinforce his domestic security; he was not interested in offensive action against the French.

Following the signing of the Leulinghen truce in 1389 there appears to have been a genuine desire in both Westminster and Paris to keep the peace and enjoy its benefits. Offenders against this and the previous truce were arrested and imprisoned (3). Several French envoys travelled from the French court to London in the summer of 1390, to visit Enguerrand de Coucy's daughter, to make purchases for Charles VI, to arrange better truce conservation in Guyenne and for unknown purposes (4). John Beaufort and other Englishmen travelled through France to participate in the Barbary crusade (5). Tournaments were

(1) Jones - Ducal Brittany 107, 109, 111; Lehoux - Berri ii 217-220, 223; England... 126-127, 130-133; Foedera vii 586-587; C.Ch.R. 1341-1417 309. See p. 64 above.

(2) England ..., 133-134 and appendix 11; Jones - Ducal Brittany 110, 113n.2; PPC i 6-7; Dip.Cor. p.212 n.100; C.Ch.R.1341-1417 312.

(3) CCR 1389-1392 22, 34, 129, 379, 410.

(4) Lehoux - Berri ii 267 n.4; Tuchman - Distant Mirror 450; B.N.Francais 20976 nos. 168 and 169. See also pp. 185-186 above.

(5) B.N.Francais 20590 nos. 10 and 68.

held at St. Inglevert and Smithfield in 1390 with an international cast of knights and esquires. These have been seen as a demonstration of the solidarity of Anglo-French chivalry in the context of the new-found peace (1). But chivalric challenges could also be used to demonstrate personal and international rivalries, as can be seen by those of Louis of Orléans to Henry IV, and of Henry V to the Dauphin (2). In the absence of warfare, a nation staked its fighting reputation on its performance in feats of arms.

Frequent contacts with France did not make the English government at all confident that the three-year truce would hold or that it would be renewed. Subsidies were granted in Parliament in 1390 for the defence of the kingdom and war in Guyenne (3). In November 1391, finance was gathered and in spring 1392 ships and soldiers were arrayed in preparation for a resumption of hostilities when the truce expired in August (4). Financial preparations were also made in case the truce ended at Michelmas 1393 or Michelmas 1394 (5).

(1) England... 185; Steel - Richard II 189; Kirby - Henry IV 29.

(2) See pp. 11, 318 above.

(3) Rot. Parl. iii 279; CPR 1388-1392 249; Palmer - "Foreign Policy" 98; Jones - Ducal Brittany 125. See p. 390 above.

(4) Rot. Parl. iii 285-286; CFR 1391-1399 24; CPR 1391-1396 88-95; CCR 1389-1392 495, 522; Baldwin - King's Council 493-494; Harris - " Royal Taxation" 813; C.76/76 m.6. See p. 84 above.

(5) Rot.Parl. iii 300-302; CCR 1392-1396 106, 251; CFR 1391-1399 94. See pp. 87, 97 above.

Whilst John of Gaunt made considerable efforts to achieve a peace settlement with France in the early 1390s, this did not preclude offensive action to protect English interests and allies in Europe, in particular the Urbanist Papacy and the duke of Brittany. In April 1390 an attempt by Philip of Burgundy to transfer Flanders to the Clementist obedience was pre-empted by the English government threatening to renew its interest in an alliance with Ghent (1). A far more serious threat was posed to Pope Boniface the following year by a French plan to intervene in Italy with a huge army. Under pressure from Clement VII, the Angevins and Louis of Orléans, then duke of Touraine, Charles VI probably agreed to the scheme shortly after the death of Urban VI in October 1389. Charles, accompanied by the major peers of France including the dukes of Berry, Burgundy, Bourbon and Touraine, the counts of Savoy and Saint Pol,and Enguerrand de Coucy, was to assemble his army at Lyons in March 1391 and invade Italy, beginning with Lombardy and the Romagna. Clement was to be installed in Rome and the duke of Anjou in Naples; the kingdom of Adria was to be created out of the Papal States for Louis of Touraine, and Lombardy and Treviso were to be added to the dominions of his father-in-law, Gian Galeazzo Visconti of Milan. Charles perhaps aimed ultimately at an imperial coronation. France's alliances with Scotland and Castile were renewed and an agreement made for Wenzel of Bohemia to remain

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(1) England... 192-193; Palmer - "Foreign Policy" 83.

neutral. The dukes of Burgundy and Touraine and Jean de Vienne were sent to conclude the final arrangements with Visconti in January 1391, while the duke of Berry went to Avignon to dissuade the count of Armagnac from going to the aid of Florence (1). In their absence in February, Charles received the two English envoys Thomas Percy and Lewis Clifford, whose mission forced him to cancel the expedition (2). They warned him and his council that:

> 'se le roy va sur la pape de Romme, qu'il ront les treves (3).'

In order that he should be able to abandon the project without appearing to be compelled to do so, they offered Charles a personal meeting with Richard to discuss peace, a meeting long desired by the French. On 24 February an agreement was made that the two kings and their uncles should meet in the Picardy March on 24 June, with a preliminary meeting of councillors from each side to settle the details of the conference (4). The previous day, Charles had ordered the advance payment of 2,000 francs to Pierre de Villaines for the expedition to

(1) Palmer - "Foreign Policy" 86-94; Lehoux - Berri ii 271-276; M. de Bouard - La France et l'Italie au temps du Grand Schisme d'Occident 123-127; Hist.Ang. ii 201; Froissart xiv 83, 280-283.

(2) Dip.Cor. no. 126 and p. 223 n. 126.

(3) Chroniques des Quatre Premiers Valois 317.

(4) Conférences 369-370; Froissart xiv 286-288.

Lombardy (1). The decision to cancel it was therefore taken very quickly. By early March, Charles had informed Clement that the invasion would not take place that year because of the agreed meeting (2).

The démarche of Percy and Clifford to Paris anticipated the mission of the Abbot of Nonantola from Rome to England. When he came before Richard at Sheen on 24 June, the very day of the planned conference in Picardy, he requested that no peace settlement should be made with France which did not contain undertakings by Charles that he would not send troops into Italy, nor permit them to go there from France, nor interfere in the affairs of the Church and the Empire on behalf of Clement VII, nor intervene in other parts of Italy; otherwise the peace should be considered as broken and he should suffer the appropriate penalties. He also asked that Richard should send an embassy to Wenzel to ask him to take up a concordant position and that he would agree to a subsidy for the defence of the church. Richard replied that the peace-making process was uncertain, but that he would make no agreement that did not specifically protect the Pope, the Empire, the States of the Church and the kingdom of Naples (3).

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(1) Villaines gave his quittance for the payment on 28 Feb, B.N.Clairambault 133 p.8821 no. 45.

(2) Palmer - "Foreign Policy" 99; Angleterre et Schisme 356 n.4.

(3) Dip.Cor. no. 133 and p. 226 n. 133; Hist.Anq. ii 200-202; West. Chron. 458, 467-472.

'Si vero tractatus pacis per Gallicos offeratur hac vice qui concludi poterit et secure firmari, nostrae intentionis existit ante conclusionem eandem pro desiderio beatitudinis vestrae tales conditiones apponere quae commode et honeste per partem nostram poterunt obtineri (1).'

Richard and Gaunt took their obligation to Boniface seriously. At the end of 1392 Charles was informed of Boniface's promise to Visconti that the English would attack France, if Milan should decide to join Boniface's league and the French took action against her. In May 1393 Gaunt tried to insist on Boniface's inclusion in the draft peace and his delays in the negotiations led to the cancellation of the expeditions of Louis of Orléans and the duke of Bourbon to Italy. Richard again asked for Boniface to be covered by a peace treaty in July 1395 (2).

An attack on Boniface was regarded as a casus belli and in early 1391 England was prepared to break the Leulinghen truce and recommence the war in Guyenne in order to avert the French descent upon Italy (3). The mission of Percy and Clifford was reinforced by a diplomatic offensive spanning western Europe. In December 1390 Richard wrote

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(1) West. Chron. 472.

(2) Palmer - "Foreign Policy" 100-102; Froissart xv 125-126. See pp. 91, 102 above.

(3) See p. 398 above. The ships of the Cinq Ports were summoned for an expedition overseas as late as May 1391, CCR 1389-1392 259.

to João of Portugal about his truce negotiations with Castile, stipulating that any agreement should leave him free to assist the English in a war against France (1). In January 1391 embassies were sent to Navarre to begin the process of returning Cherbourg, to Castile on Gaunt's behalf to ask for an Anglo-Castilian peace and alliance, or at least a long truce, and to the count of Armagnac and the Sire d'Albret to encourage them to enter the English obedience (2). Armagnac had recently become the ally of Brittany, Florence and the exiled Visconti brothers. The English envoys apparently encouraged him to set out on his fatal expedition to Italy (3). His ally Mastino Visconti had travelled to England in 1390. In the Low Countries, William of Guelders was encouraged by a payment of 2,000 pounds (4) and advantage was taken of the quarrel between William of Ostrevant and his father Count Albrecht. William had attended the Smithfield tournament and Richard had made him a Knight of the Garter, to the astonishment of the Frenchmen present. In February 1391 he came to England and Richard retained him at a fee of 500 marks yearly for miltary service, but by September he had returned to his French allegiance and performed homage to Charles for Ostrevant (5).

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(1) Dip.Cor. no. 109.

(2) Foedera vii 680-682, 692-693.

(3) Bouard - France et Italie 119-123; Froissart xiv 291-311.

(4) Palmer - "Foreign Policy" 96-97.

(5) Palmer - "Foreign Policy" 83; West. Chron. 452; Hist.Ang. ii 207; Froissart xiv 264-269; Foedera vii 695-696; A.N.J.520 nos. 26, 28, 28(2).

Once the objective of halting the French invasion of Italy had been achieved, all this diplomatic activity lost its urgency and the proposed peace conference in Picardy became redundant. The English tried to evade the commitment by employing delaying tactics. Several letters were sent from Richard to Charles in Spring 1391, suggesting that there should be a preliminary meeting between councillors from both sides to dispose of the bulk of the business before they themselves met. Later the English offered three different methods of procedure: John of Gaunt should go to France to negotiate about peace with Charles, a person in the trust of the French king should come to England to negotiate with Richard or ambassadors from both sides should meet in a peace conference (1). Gaunt was preparing to go to Calais in June and July 1391, for this purpose (2). Throughout the rest of the year and early in 1392 there was a continual exchange of envoys between England and France, as the French pressurised Richard to keep his appointment with Charles (3). Richard continued to raise money for a personal meeting from Parliament and from loans (4). In December the French

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(1) Conférences 370-371; Dip.Cor. nos. 129, 132.

(2) Letters of protection for members of his retinue, C.76/75 m.2; C.76/76 m.16.

(3) English envoys to France included Thomas Blount, Lewis Clifford, John Clanvowe, Richard Rounhale, Lord Despencer, B.L.Add.Ch. 156; Hist.Ang. ii 198; Dip.Cor. p. 225 n.129; Froissart xiv 355-356. French envoys to England included Taupin de Chantmerle, Hanart de Campbernard, Jean de Saquainville, Sire de Blaru, Pierre de Vilaines, St.Denys i 710; West. Chron. 478; Hist.Ang. ii 198; Dip.Cor. p.225 n.132; C.76/76 m.14.

(4) Rot.Parl. iii 285b; E.28/1 no.30.

finally agreed to the conference with Gaunt at Amiens and the English Council appointed a delegation for this in February 1392 (1). Gaunt had successfully restrained the ambitions of the French in Italy and the Papacy by threatening them with the prospect of a renewal of war and tempting them with the prospect of a peace settlement, a settlement which he would negotiate to serve his own ambitions.

The Amiens conference resulted only in a prorogation of the truce for one year and before this became operable a new crisis over Brittany threatened to precipitate open war again. Afer the Marmoset coup of November 1388, when the interests of Clisson moved to the centre of French government policy, there was intermittent friction between Montfort and the Valois. Montfort failed to fulfil the terms of the July 1388 truce with Clisson and Charles encroached on ducal lands. Disputes also arose about Charles' right to appellate jurisdiction in the duchy and the nature of Montfort's liberties there. He endangered preparations for the Italian expedition by his seizure of La Guérche and Champtoceaux, and his negotiation of an alliance with the count of Armagnac. Despite the bishop of Meaux's mediation of a new agreement between him and Clisson in March 1391, tension with Paris and the Penthièvre family continued throughout the year, until the dukes of Berry and Burgundy induced him to come to Tours in December to make another settlement. It was felt the

(1) Conférences 371; Froissart xiv 355-357; Baldwin - King's Council 493, 496.

Breton problem should be resolved before the conference at Amiens, in order not to give the English a diplomatic or military advantage (1). But neither England nor France could maintain their hold over Duke Jean for more than a few months at a time and eventually the limits of French tolerance of this constant tergiversation were bound to be reached. In June 1392, when Pierre de Craon attempted the assassination of Clisson in Paris and royal troops found Craon's castle of Sablé defended in Montfort's name, Charles determined to launch a retaliatory expedition against Brittany, despite the opposition of the dukes of Berry, Burgundy and Bourbon. In late July and early August a large royal army assembled at Le Mans, whose leaders included Jean de Vienne, Pierre de Villaines, Jacques de Heilly and the counts of Sancerre and Saint-Pol. Despite the news that Craon had fled to Barcelona, Charles insisted on pressing on to Brittany, where he intended finally to displace Duke Jean and hold the duchy in trust for his heir (2). The royal uncles warned Charles' advisors that this, like the Italian expedition of the previous year, would be regarded as a casus belli by the English:

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(1) Jones - Ducal Brittany 112, 120-123, 126-127; Lehoux - Berri ii 268, 277-282; Froissart xiv 323, 363-366.

(2) Froissart xv 4-34; St.Denys ii 16-18; Preuves ii 597-616; Contamine - Guerre, État et Société 223-224; H.Courteault - "La faite et les aventures de Pierre de Craon en Espagne" B.E.C. lii (1891) 431, 434; Jones - Ducal Brittany 128-129; Bruel - "Clisson" 49. Craon was later a protégé of Richard II, served on his second expedition to Ireland and left England after his deposition. In 1408 he was connected with Montfort's son, Jean V, CPR 1396-1399 553, 576, 577; C.76/84 m.23; Lettres de Jean V v no. 1022.

'Le duc de Berry et le duc de Bourgoigne manderent et escripent a monseigneur de la Riviere, au Besgue de Villaines et au conseil du roy de France que, se le roy entroit en Bretaigne pour faire guerre, que les treves seroient rompues et la guerre recommencie (1).'

Diplomatic contact had been maintained between England and Brittany between the withdrawal of Arundel's expedition in 1388 and the signing of the Leulinghen truce in June 1389. Thereafter, throughout 1390 and 1391, Montfort's envoys and servants travelled fairly frequently to England, but the English government does not seem to have reciprocated. Montfort's men took various goods out of England for his use, including bows, horses, lead and currency, but most frequently they came to request the return of the earldom of Richmond (2). The corollary of this was that an Anglo-Breton alliance was under discussion. Sometime in the autumn of 1388 Montfort sent his proposals for an alliance to the Appellant council. He apologised for his failure to co-operate with Arundel's expedition and promised to maintain his alliance with Richard in support of his quarrel in France. He asked for a substantial English expedition to the duchy, with a preliminary force

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(1) Chroniques des quatre premiers Valois 331. The attitude of the English may be reflected in their intransigent stance at the conference at Leulinghen in July. See pp. 85-87, 178 above.

(2) Jones - Ducal Brittany 113 n.2, 121 n.1; Montfort England and Brittany 237, 248, 250; Angleterre et Schisme 106; PPC i 17, 18-18a; Dip.Cor. p. 212 n.100; Preuves ii 576; CCR 1389-1392 142, 260-261; C.47/28/6 no.26; C.76/74 mm.8,15,18; C.76/75 mm.4,8,10; Edinburgh University MS. 183 f.81-81v.

of 1,000 or 2,000 men, as soon as possible, to whom he would deliver towns and castles which were to be returned to him in the event of the conclusion of a final peace or a long truce. Such a treaty was not to be made without his consent and he was to be represented at the negotiations. Richmond and the lands granted to him in exchange for Brest were to be returned to him and should he desire to retire to England, the king would grant him annual rents worth £10,000 and maintain the right of him and his heir in the duchy. If he should die without a male heir, this right would pass to the king (1). The Appellants opened truce negotiations with France rather than take up Montfort's invitation, but in August 1389 he was proposing another alliance by which he would exchange his fortresses in Guyenne for Richmond. Richard was considering sending an expedition of 2,000 men-at-arms and 2,000 archers to Brittany to prevent Charles taking advantage of the truce to attack Montfort. Discussions were based on the Anglo-Breton alliance of 1372 but the suggested exchange was considered impossible by the terms of the current truce, so the talks proved slow and unproductive (2). However, they continued along the same lines and in late 1390 or early 1391 a draft alliance was drawn up by the English, adapted from the terms of the alliance of March 1380. This stated that Richard could not make war during

(1) Jones - Ducal Brittany 212-214 from B.L. Cotton Ms. Julius B vi ff. 55-56. See also ibid 110-111; England.., 133-134 and appendix 11; and p. 397 above.

(2) West. Chron. 400; Dip.Cor. no.100; PPC i 6-7, 18-18a; CCR 1389-1392 58; Jones - Montfort England and Brittany 238.

the present truce and also made other allowances for the truce and for Gaunt's life-tenure of the Duchy of Guyenne. The terms concerning the return of Montfort's English lands, his retirement to England with a pension of 10,000 pounds in compensation for the king's receipt of the revenues of Brittany and the king's inheritance of Brittany if there was no heir, were all added from the 1388 proposals. The expeditionary force was not only to take possession of the fortresses but also to levy pâtis on the countryside to maintain itself and also to receive payment for all its initial and excess expenses from the duke. The fortresses were to be returned if a final peace or a truce longer than twelve years was signed between England and France. Brittany would be included in such a treaty but the duke's consent was no longer required. Also omitted was the duke's exemption from doing homage for Brittany should the king of England gain possession of the French throne (1). This draft alliance formed a part of the intense English diplomatic activity against France in the winter of 1390 to 1391. The attempt to impose some disadvantageous terms on Duke Jean displays a caution in making a commitment to him that was based on bitter experience. He sent a reply accepting most of the terms and reviving his request for 2,000 men-at-arms and 2,000 archers paid by the king for half a year. Should he wish to return to Brittany from his retirement in England he could take possession of the fortresses again, provided he

(1) E.30/289a. c.f. Foedera vii 236-239. The differences between the two are analysed at Jones - Montfort England and Brittany appendix vii.

paid the garrisons a quarter-year's wages to cover their costs of returning home. He also asked that his feudal duties to Charles should be recognised in the event of a peace settlement, that debts should be written off on both sides by general quittances, that his writs for the sea-route to Guyenne should be accepted as valid and that no pâtis should be levied by the Brest garrison (1). With the passing of the crisis over the Italian expedition, Anglo-Breton relations entered the doldrums for a few months (2).

Their pace quickened again in the winter of 1391 when the English began an effort to outbid the attractions of the settlement at Tours. In November Montfort hired some English troops from Bordeaux under the command of John Cornwall (3). In December an English embassy was sent to Brittany equipped with comprehensive powers, another grant of Richmond and a commission to investigate conditions and truce infractions at Brest. Diplomatic contact continued in both directions until the summer of 1392 (4). Considerable stress was laid in the instructions of December on the negotiation of marriages between

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(1) PPC i 89-93.

(2) In March Queen Anne's lease of Richmondshire to Henry FitzHugh was reviewed and confirmed, CPR 1388-1392 393; Jones - Ducal Brittany 192.

(3) B.N. n.a.f. 5216 no.17. c.f. Froissart xiv 350.

(4) Jones - Ducal Brittany 127-128; Foedera vii 709; Baldwin - King's Council 500; C.Ch.R. 1341-1417 327; CPR 1391-1396 13; C.76/76 mm.1,8; B.L.Cotton MS. Julius B vi f.14.

Montfort's two eldest children and the families of the dukes of Lancaster and Gloucester. Almost certainly Gaunt's grandson Henry of Monmouth was the intended bridegroom for Montfort's daughter. Montfort's plan for a double marriage alliance with the count of Armagnac had presumably died with the count. The two children were to be sent to England as a security for the alliance. Richmond was to be returned if an alliance was finalised and a promise was made that Gaunt would provide for Breton interests at the next peace conference. The instructions were vague and cautious about the sending of an expedition and the delivery of fortresses, but advised the ambassadors to keep as closely as possible to the articles drafted previously (1). In this phase the Anglo-Breton alliance passed through several successive drafts, each accumulating minor alterations. The fortresses to be delivered were now specified and included Nantes, Vannes, Ermine, Quimper, Concarneau, Morlaix and the Ile de Batz. Discussion of the marriages was dropped but the children were still to come to England, even if a truce was signed, and they were not to marry without the king's consent. The duke was allowed to reserve his duties to the King of France in the event of peace, to be included in an Anglo-French peace or truce as an English ally, to have debts on both sides remitted and to receive the delivery of Richmond when the alliance was concluded (2). As he travelled to the Amiens conference in March 1392, Gaunt

(1) PPC i 36-40.

(2) See appendix 5.

was sent a memorandum of the latest terms under discussion, but he was not willing to jeopardise the chance of a peace settlement without knowing whether Montfort agreed to them or not (1).

However, negotiations for the alliance had clearly not been completed when the assassination crisis broke in the summer. The English government had prepared itself for a renewal of war at the end of the Leulinghen truce and may have begun to impress ships for an expedition to Brittany which was afterwards cancelled (2).The mayor and jurats of Bordeaux wrote to Gaunt to ask for armed assistance, because they feared Charles VI had hostile intentions towards Guyenne (3). But the danger of war was miraculously averted by the sudden insanity of Charles just beyond Le Mans, and the consequent return of the dukes of Berry and Burgundy to the control of the government and the disgrace of Clisson (4). Palmer considers this episode as:

> 'the product of a combination of circumstances which was never likely to recur...and in no way the result of the settled policies of either

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(1) PPC i 45-47 and 46 n.1. Jones regards these documents as pertaining to the 1393 conference, Ducal Brittany 130-131.

(2) See p. 398 above; E.28/26 no.82, petition of some shipmasters of Cley for discharge at the Exchequer for the wages they had returned, referring to the time of King Richard.

(3) Anglo-Norman no.150.

(4) Froissart xv 41-72.

> government. It was an aberration which was swiftly corrected and never repeated...war over Brittany had never been very likely. By the summer of 1391, when the Italian crisis had been resolved, the pattern of good relations was already solidly established (1).'

On the contrary the three policies involved in the triangular relationship between England, France and Brittany were in a constant state of flux in the early 1390s, as they had been in the late 1380s, nor was Brittany's independent rôle between the two kingdoms over. The crisis of 1392 served to bring to an end Clisson's irresponsible belligerency at Paris; Berry and Burgundy were more amenable towards Gaunt's designs on Guyenne. Nevertheless, Montfort no longer needed to secure his position with an English alliance, and inclined towards an arrangement with the French king and his uncles. Despite Montfort's obvious deviousness, the English could not afford to discard his alliance by failing to protect him; he was a necessary counterweight to the Franco-Scottish alliance.

Anglo-Breton contacts were limited over the next two years and seem to have been mainly confined to Montfort's complaints to the king and Council about the continued detention of his earldom of Richmond, the release of Jean de Blois, the excesses of the garrison of Brest and the

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(1) England...143.

non-recognition of his writs for the sea-route to Guyenne (1). All these were long-standing causes of contention and received no satisfaction. However, in the summer of 1394 the French were concerned that the troops Richard was assembling for his expedition to Ireland were really destined to support Montfort in his war with Clisson in Brittany and that Henry of Monmouth was about to marry Montfort's daughter. Philip of Burgundy was sent to Brittany to forestall both these possibilities by mediating between Clisson and Montfort and reminding the latter of his obligations to the French crown (2).

Early in 1394 Gaunt had sent envoys to Duke Jean, presumably about the marriage scheme for his grandson (3). It was almost to come to fruition late in the following year. When Richard summoned him to return from Guyenne, Gaunt chose a somewhat eccentric route back to England. In November 1395 he lingered in Brittany on the excuse of contrary winds and in December he was escorted from the Breton border at Pontorson via Rouen to Calais by Jean de Vienne (4). While he was in Brittany, he and Montfort hammered out the terms of an alliance between them and a marriage treaty between Henry and Montfort's daughter

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(1) PPC i 47-50; Lettres des Rois ii 291-294; CCR 1392-1396 57.

(2) Jones - Ducal Brittany 124, 132-133.

(3) Jones - Montfort England and Brittany 269.

(4) Anglo-Norman no.19 (misdated to 1394); Pierre Cochon - Chronique Normande (ed. C.de.Beaurepaire, Société de l'histoire de Normandie, Rouen 1870) 196; Armitage-Smith - John of Gaunt 386-387; Knighton ii 322; Froissart xv 182; B.L.Add.Ch. 3379.

Marie. Marie was to be brought to Brest and married there. As a dowry Montfort promised 150,000 francs in cash, the land he had confiscated from the Dame de Raïs, and the castellanies of Brest and Renan. Should the Raïs lands be recovered by the Dame de Raïs in the case she had brought before the Parlement de Paris, and should Brest be returned to Montfort by a final peace between England and France, equivalent lands within Brittany would be provided in compensation. The cash and the lands within Brittany were to be delivered to Gaunt to hold in the names of Henry and Marie. The title to Brest was dependent on Gaunt securing the return of Rising to Montfort and he also obliged himself to persuade Richard to grant Richmond effectively to Montfort. Marie was to receive a dower of 2,000 marks each year from lands purchased in England. The lands in Brittany were to be held under Breton sovereignty and both parties to the alliance reserved their allegiance and homage to their respective kings. Damages against Brittany and the taking of pâtis beyond the sums previously agreed, were to cease (1). Despite his failure at Bordeaux to establish more than the titular possession of his new Duchy, Gaunt was still seeking to extend his territorial interests in France and to monopolise English holdings and policy there, apparently with a view to further peace negotiations with the Valois. In doing so he made dangerous concessions to French and Breton rights of feudal superiority, which recall the terms to which he had

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(1) Bod.Lib. Carte MS.113 ff. 226v-234v, a much fuller version than Preuves ii 644-645; Preuves ii 657.

acceded at Leulinghen in 1393, and in the arrangements for Brest, Richmond and Rising he made promises that were outside his authority.

Richard was entirely excluded from these negotiations and was not prepared to approve of the marriage treaty, since he was promoting a matrimonial link between John Holland's family and the Breton ducal house (1). Charles VI out-manoeuvred Gaunt on the diplomatic marriage market with Richard's collusion, by the negotiations with England for matches between his daughters Isabelle and Michelle, and Richard and Henry of Monmouth. Montfort was now in danger of isolation. He agreed to fulfil the terms of the Tours settlement by marrying his son and heir to Jeanne de France in September 1396, and again in July 1397, and in July 1396 he married Marie to Jean of Alencon (2). Relative neglect by England now moved Montfort towards a rapprochement with the Valois. He ended his feud with the Penthièvre and Clisson faction by an agreement in October 1395 and surrendered his claims to the comtés of Rethel and Nevers in November 1397. In 1398 he was receiving payments from the French court (3).

Gaunt had miscalculated badly: he was no longer in control of English policy towards France. In the interval

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(1) Anglo-Norman no. 268; Jones - Ducal Brittany 135, 136.

(2) Jones - Ducal Brittany 134; England... 175-176; St.Denys ii 442; A.N.J.644 no.21.

(3) Jones - Ducal Brittany 140, 141 n.1; Bruel - "Clisson" 49-50; Froissart xv 207-208.

since his departure from England for Guyenne, an independent Ricardian policy had emerged, characterised by an aggressive and impatient diplomacy and a predilection for manipulation, in stark contrast to Gaunt's direct approach and ostentatious display of the early 1390s. The new policy is most clearly seen in Richard's instructions to his embassy to France in July 1395, in which he used excessive demands to break with the precedents that Gaunt had set in the draft peace at Leulinghen two years before, and to manoeuvre the French into a disadvantageous negotiating position. The elements discerned in his démarche of 1387 can again be traced in the negotiations of 1395: the use of bold initiatives, the desire for a truce of five year's duration and for generous monetary compensation from France (1). Now that he was a widower, Richard used his own marriageability and that of others to make new approaches to France and other powers in western Europe. There was a renewal of interest in allies on the periphery of the Anglo-French conflict and the possibilities they presented for the encirclement of French interests, as in the early 1380s (2).

Ricardian diplomacy first began to appear early in 1394 with the instructions to an embassy sent to Scotland in February to demand very harsh terms from Robert III, followed in April by a proposal for a marriage treaty

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(1) See pp.101-103, 199-200, 386-387.

(2) c.f. p. 58 above.

between the two royal families (1). In August he approached Rupert of the Palatinate for an alliance and perhaps the Wittelsbachs for a marriage treaty (2). Early in 1395 Richard may have considered marrying a Navarrese princess . In March he sent an embassy to ask for the hand of Yolande of Aragon. An Anglo-Aragonese alliance would have served as a counterweight to France's alliance with Castile, and the match would have broken the betrothal between Yolande and Louis of Anjou, ending the possibility of Aragonese support for his claims on the kingdom of Naples (3). In making this proposal, Richard commenced an interest in the Iberian peninsula, which had previously been regarded as Gaunt's exclusive sphere of influence. It recalls Gaunt's own marriage to Constance of Castile, since Yolande had a claim to the Aragonese succession. Other Anglo-Aragonese marriages were under consideration in 1396 and 1397 (4). In May 1395 Charles warned Richard against seeking to acquire a kingdom and hinted that this would be regarded as a casus belli in France (5). Mézières considered the renewal of the war by

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(1) Tuck - "Richard II and Border Magnates" 46-47. See pp. 91, 97 above.

(2) Foedera vii 785; England... 167; Palmer - "Background to Marriage" 3n.2.

(3) Palmer - "Background to Marriage" 2-8; England... 167-168; Usk 9; C.76/79 m.2. See pp. 99-100 above.

(4) Palmer - "Background to Marriage" 14 n.2; Dip.Cor. pp. 253-254 n. 236.

(5) Lettres de Rois ii 257.

either side to be a distinct possibility at this time (1). The French provided for the possibility of an English attack in their alliances with Milan in November 1394 and Florence in September 1396 (2).

The net result of Richard's machinations was the settlement with France finalised in October 1396, based on his marriage to Isabelle and the twenty-eight year truce. One of the theoretical purposes of a truce was to allow the negotiation of peace (3), and in the French council in 1396 many believed that a final peace treaty should be a prelude to the marriage between Richard and Isabelle (4). In his commissions, in the marriage treaty itself and throughout the subsequent discussions over the summer, Richard expressed his hope to the French that the marriage would result in a peace settlement (5). This hope was reiterated by both kings when they met at Calais in October (6). At this time it was agreed that the royal uncles from both sides should meet in a peace conference in April 1397, which was also to review the question of

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(1) Mézières -Letter to Richard II 16, 17, 51.

(2) Bouard - France et Italie 155, 217.

(3) Fowler, "Truces" 184.

(4) Froissart xv 188.

(5) Froissart xv 232; Foedera vii 814, 815; Angleterre et Schisme pièce XV; A.N. J.643 no.6; J.644 no.21.

(6) Ann. Ric. Sec. 193; St.Denys ii 458. See p.208 above.

pâtis, since the commission which had been appointed had failed to reduce them (1). The same agreement also drew up a plan of joint action for dealing with the schism. A joint embassy consisting of two knights and two unbeneficed clerks from each kingdom was to assemble in Paris in February 1397 and go to both Boniface and Benedict to induce them to agree to the voie de cession, the French method of ending the schism. Both kings also agreed to write to Wenzel to persuade him to send a similar mission. It was envisaged that a new Pope would be elected by the two colleges of cardinals by the end of September 1397. It appears that the ambassadors were to threaten the rival popes with the withdrawal of obedience by both kingdoms if they did not agree (2). Richard had indicated his willingness to discuss the union of the church during the summer of 1396 and had already been persuaded by Philip of Burgundy to send envoys to the two popes (3). Also at Calais in October, Richard agreed to co-operate with Charles in sending an expedition to Lombardy in spring 1397. Ostensibly this was to promote good relations between England and France and to enforce the termination of the schism, but Richard perhaps viewed it as an outlet for the ambitions of Thomas Mowbray, the

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(1) Angleterre et Schisme pièce XIII; St.Denys ii 470. See pp. 202-204 above.

(2) Angleterre et Schisme pièces XIII, XV; St. Denys ii 470-472.

(3) St. Denys ii 446; Angleterre et Schisme 368-369, 377-378; A.N. J.644 no.21.

earl of Rutland, and the Holands. In March, Boniface gave John Holand, earl of Huntingdon, extensive powers as gonfalonier of the Church and captain-general of its forces, including the ability to raise money for the campaign as a crusade against schismatics (1). This does not imply that Richard and Boniface viewed the expedition as a means of imposing the voie de cession on both Papal candidates. Another element of the 1396 settlement, the return of Brest to the duke of Brittany, was probably agreed at Calais and implemented in June 1397 (2). Richard was not interested in retaining the "barbican" towns and quite prepared to sell Brest back to Brittany for the right price.

To Palmer, Richard's main aim throughout the 1390s was to establish a stable peace and it was this he continued to strive for during and after the negotiations of 1395 to 1396. Pistono follows him in believing that the marriage and the long truce:

> 'created a congenial climate in which the monarchs of England and France could arrive at a final settlement of their differences,'

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(1) Palmer - "Foreign Policy" 103-104; D.M.Bueno de Mesquita (ed.) - "The Foreign Policy of Richard II in 1397: some Italian letters" EHR lvi (1941) 628-629; Angleterre et Schisme 343; Ann. Ric. Sec. 200; Rot.Parl. iii 338a-338b; Lettres de' Rois ii 298-300; Froissart xv 308.

(2) See pp.39,209-210 above.

but that Richard's deposition cut short this process; and Perroy thought that Richard allowed his policy on the schism to be dictated by the Valois court (1). However, Richard's activities and selective inactivity in the last three years of his reign do not bear out these beliefs and by 1399 the atmosphere of Anglo-French relations was far from congenial.

At the French court the optimistic mood of the last few months of 1396 was dispelled by the news of the disaster at Nikopolis, which arrived on Christmas Eve. This led to the postponement of the projected expedition to Lombardy (2). In the parliament of January 1397, the Commons, whilst respectfully thanking Richard for his conduct of the meeting with Charles the previous October, firmly dissociated themselves from the proposed expedition and its consequences. Richard replied with platitudes about the promotion of peace and the elimination of tyranny to explain the obligation he had made to Charles, and finally said he wished to be free to dispose of English military resources as he willed (3). But his willingness to co-operate with the French to intervene in Italy had

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(1) Palmer -"Foreign Policy" 78-79; J.J.N.Palmer - "England and the Great Western Schism 1388-1399" EHR lxxxiii (1968) 522; England.., 168; Pistono - Repudiation 4, 238; Angleterre et Schisme 383,390.

(2) St Denys ii 520; Froissart xv 355.

(3) Rot.Parl. iii 338a-338b; Lettres de Rois ii 298-300.

certainly ended by the summer (1). In March, Richard referred to his new father-in-law as his Adversary of France, whilst still allowing the possibility of a final peace treaty (2). The peace conference arranged for April was postponed, apparently because of delays on both sides, but when Richard sent the earl of Rutland, Thomas Mowbray and William Scrope to Paris to ask that it should be held before Whitsun, they were told of further delays on the French side, particularly because the duke of Berry was away from the court, and that on his return, an embassy would be sent to Richard to arrange a new date. The conference was never to meet, neither side continuing to press for it, and with it disappeared the process of regulating the pâtis of Guyenne (3). Charles was evasive about continuing the peace negotiations which would inevitably involve further concessions to England, until Richard had committed himself to the voie de cession to end the schism and participated in French policy in Italy.

In August 1396, in accordance to his promise to Philip of Burgundy, Richard had sent the abbot of Westminster to both Popes with letters concerning the voie de cession.

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(1) Bueno de Mesquita - "Foreign Policy of Richard II" 630-631, 634. The instructions of an envoy going to the lords who had offered to serve the king in Lombardy may belong to this period, although Palmer prefers to place it in 1391, B.L.Cotton MS. Nero B vii f.6.

(2) In a grant of the custody of Hammes Castle to Thomas Swynbourn, C.76/81 m.5. c.f. p. 224 above.

(3) Foedera vii 850; A.N. J.644 no.20. See p.204 above.

However his accreditation addressed Boniface as Pope, and Benedict as the cardinal of Luna. Benedict refused to give him an audience unless he was addressed as Pope and the abbot swiftly abandoned his mission at this point (1). For the planned joint embassy of February 1397, Richard delayed sending his contingent until April (2). The English envoys accompanied the French to Avignon and Rome, but they were nonentities of no previous diplomatic experience who concentrated their efforts into gaining benefices from Boniface. They returned to England in November, having achieved nothing (3). Richard also sent envoys to co-operate with Charles' efforts to present the voie de cession to the Emperor Wenzel and the Diet of Frankfurt (4). Now that Richard had fulfilled the agreement of October 1396 in the letter if not the spirit, he made no further moves in accordance with the French method of ending the schism. Both he and Gaunt held the viewpoint contrary to that of Charles: until the French first gave ground in a permanent peace settlement, England could not participate in action for the union of the Church co-ordinated by the French. In the summer of 1398, Charles sent Jean Courtecuisse and Nicole Paynel to England, armed with letters to Richard, Isabelle, Gaunt

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(1) St.Denys ii 448-450; Anglo-Norman nos. 171,172; C.76/81 mm.10,12.

(2) Foedera vii 850; A.N. J.644 no.20; K.1482 no.4 (formerly Archivo General de Simancas B 1. Microfilm only now at A.N. 21.Mi.86); C.76/81 mm. 4,5.

(3) Angleterre et Schisme 380-382, 417, pièce XV.

(4) Angleterre et Schisme 382 - 383; Anglo-Norman no.175; Froissart xvi 83-88.

and the English Chancellor, to bring Richard into line with Wenzel, Henry of Castile and the other rulers who had agreed to support the voie de cession. They were instructed to urge him to follow the French example of withdrawing obedience from the Popes, to induce them to resign. As a concession to the known English preference for a General Council, they proposed an assembly of the clergy of Christendom with similar powers which would execute the voie de cession and proceed against both Popes (1). Richard insisted that before taking any action he must consult the English clergy, who were known to be opposed to the withdrawal of obedience. In November he finally submitted the French suggestions to the universities of Oxford and Cambridge for consideration, but only five days later he ratified a concordat which had been negotiated with Pope Boniface. The universities again rejected the voie de cession in favour of a General Council. Richard needed Boniface's support both for his domestic policy, which required much reshuffling of bishops, and for his foreign policy in the Empire and Italy (2). Without a quid pro quo Richard's co-operation with Charles for the union of the Church soon turned into competition between English and French methods.

Meanwhile Richard maintained pressure on the French by delaying the publication of the twenty-eight year truce in

(1) Angleterre et Schisme 384-386, 416-418, pièce XV; Anglo-Norman no. 180; B.N.Dupuy 564 f.268-268v; Palmer - "England and Great Western Schism" 519-520.

(2) Angleterre et Schisme 340-349, 384-387, 419-420, pièce XVI; Froissart xvi 134-136; Foedera viii 62.

Guyenne until the last possible moment, in August 1398. By this stage, it could no longer be viewed as the prelude to a final peace treaty (1). English policy was now directed at containing the advance of French influence into several areas of western Europe and gaining for Richard a place there that was equal in prominence to that of Charles. When France transferred her alliance from Milan to Florence in September 1396, Richard countered with a rapprochement with Milan, and several Visconti marriages were under review. In the summer of 1397, when Charles again asked Richard to send troops to join the postponed expedition to Lombardy, which was now to be led by Bernard of Armagnac, he responded by asking Charles to intervene to secure Gian Galeazzo against attack. In spring 1398 he requested him to prevent Armagnac and other French subjects from entering the war between Florence and Milan, and he was apparently prepared to send Henry of Bolingbroke with English troops to the aid of Milan, where he was to marry Lucia Visconti. Pope Boniface was the medium of exchange between Richard and Gian Galeazzo (2). As in 1392, England had prevented a French campaign in northern Italy by blunt and aggressive diplomacy.

In the last three years of his reign, Richard constructed a defensive wall of pensioned princelings along the Rhine,

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(1) See pp. 210-213 above.

(2) Bueno de Mesquita - "Foreign Policy of Richard II" 631; 634 635, 637; Bouard - France et Italie 230-231; Palmer - " Foreign Policy" 102-103; Dip.Cor. no.226; Foedera vii 835.

bound to him by the obligations of liege homage and military service, to halt further Burgundian advances into the Low Countries. This included Guelders-Juliers, Cologne, Berg, Ravensberg, the Rhine Palatinate and numerous minor lords (1). In July 1397 it was stated that the exception of Charles from some of these alliances was to end after three months (2). This was the area where a renewal of Anglo-French conflict seemed most likely to break out. In August 1397 William of Guelders, England's most consistent ally, invaded Brabant in pursuit of a long-standing quarrel and Philip of Burgundy sent troops under the count of Saint-Pol to expel him in 1398. Philip had persuaded the duchess of Brabant and Limbourg to recognise his son Antoine as her heir (3). Had she died before Richard's deposition, it seems probable that he would have gone to war, with the aid of William and the rest of his Rhenish coalition, to prevent Antoine's succession and thereby a decisive transfer of power in the region. This would have necessitated breaking the truce, since Guelders and Brabant were included in it as the allies of each party, but in the event Duchess Jeanne was to live until December 1406.

Richard's diplomatic activities in the Rhineland also had

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(1) Foedera vii 854-856, 858-859; viii 1-6, 21-24, 36-38, 66, 80-82; CPR 1396-1399 25; Dip.Cor. p.253 n. 230, no. 231, p. 253 n. 231; E.30/1088; E.30/1358; E.30/1514; C.76/82 m.15; Palmer - "Foreign Policy" 80, 85-86.

(2), C.76/82 m.13.

(3) Vaughan - Philip the Bold 99-101.

another purpose, for he was trying to persuade the electors of the Empire to replace Wenzel as king of the Romans by himself. Pope Boniface was again the key figure who might be able to secure his election. In June 1397 the dean of Cologne came to England as an ambassador and informed Richard that his election was assured. However this was a common theme of

diplomacy in the 1380s and 1390s, and at different times the Valois princes Louis of Orléans, Philip of Burgundy and Charles VI himself were suggested as imperial candidates (1). But it is a measure of the extent of Richard's ambitions to equal or replace Charles as the foremost secular ruler in Europe.

Other areas also received attention. In June and July 1398 Richard licensed the Dartmouth privateer Edmund Arnold to take English troops to serve João of Portual against the Castilian-backed rebellion of his brother Dinis (2). He complained to Charles about the Scots' infractions of the truce and extracted a promise from him that a French embassy would be sent to bring them into line (3). It was in the interests of both Charles and Richard that Brittany should be brought into the truce and remain peaceful until the return of Brest was complete.

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(1) Ann. Ric. Sec. 199; Hist.Ang.ii 222; Bueno de Mesquita "Foreign Policy of Richard II" 631-634; Angleterre et Schisme 342-343; Palmer - "Foreign Policy" 93-94.

(2), Foedera viii 29, 40, 41.

(3) Foedera vii 850; A.N. J.644 no.20.

Richard maintained friendly relations with Montfort without seeking a new alliance during this period. At the duke's petition he interceded with Charles about the judgement in favour of the Dame de Raïs by the Parlement de Paris in April 1396 and again in April 1397 (1). He also made enquiries about the Ile de Ré and the town of Saint-Malo on Montfort's behalf (2). The duke continued to petition for the return of the earldom of Richmond and for the acceptance of his writs for the south western sea-route (3). The writs were recognised in the agreement made for the return of Brest (4). In March 1397 Richard made the request for Richmond the responsibility of the next Parliament (5). In April 1398 Montfort himself visited England and was granted the earldom, although curiously it was also granted to his sister, Joan Basset, and two of the envoys who had been involved in Anglo-Breton negotiations (6). He probably did not gain effective possession of Richmond before his death and was unable to extinguish the increasing interest of Ralph Neville in the honour. Henry IV granted the whole honour

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(1) Jones - Ducal Brittany 95, 135-136; Lettres des Rois ii 277-278, 285, 287; Dip.Cor. no.227, p. 252 n.227; Foedera vii 831-832 (draft of this at E.28/4 no.42), 835; Letters of Henry IV i 19-20; A.N. J.644 no.20.

(2) Foedera vii 851; PPC i 64.

(3) Lettres des Rois ii 278-280, 281, 286.

(4) Lettres des Rois ii 283; draft of this clause at B.L. Cotton MS. Julius Bvi f.27.

(5) PPC i 64.

(6) CPR 1396-1399 350; CCR 1396-1399 265; Foedera viii 38, 64; Jones - Ducal Brittany 140.

to Neville for life in October 1399 (1). Similarly Montfort seems to have gained some temporary hold on the English lands and revenues granted to him in exchange for Brest, but Neville and others also received grants of these during the 1390s (2). The grant of Richmond always required reciprocation in the form of an Anglo-Breton alliance and in May 1398 Montfort signed a short alliance with Richard in simple terms. It provided that Richard would send him three hundred men-at-arms and three hundred archers for a quarter- or half-year, in the event of a resurgence of civil war in Brittany (3). Following this Guillaume du Chastel and some other Breton knights received English pensions (4). The comparatively small number of troops specified in the alliance and the apparent ease of its negotiation show that it was not intended for an imminent offensive against France. Richard was more interested in intimidating France through her north-eastern flank, than through her north-west. He was concerned only to retain Brittany on his list of allies and outside of complete French control.

Richard's rigorous attitude towards French interests in Europe does not suggest that the settlement of 1396 had

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(1) Jones - Ducal Brittany 195-196; CPR 1392-1396 596; 1399-1401 24; B.L.Add.Ch. 20582; Ross - Yorkshire Baronage 10-11, 13-14, 231, 246-247.

(2) Jones - Ducal Brittany 194; CPR 1396-1399 39, 267; CCR 1392-1396 462-463; 1396-1399 141.

(3). PPC i 79-80.

(4) CPR 1396-1399 545, 556; C.76/83 m.7.

turned him into an upholder of French policy, nor that peace with France was his chief interest. He hurried the implementation of the settlement forward to gain all possible advantages from the French, whilst fulfilling his own obligations superficially, or delaying them. He acquired a dynastic marriage, large sums of money and the suspension of hostilities with France,which enabled him to divert his energy and new resources into diplomatic and military ventures in Italy, the Empire and Ireland. In 1386 he had assigned the profits to be obtained from the ransom of Jean de Blois to finance Robert de Vere's conquest of Ireland (1); in 1399 French money paid for his own Irish campaign, in the shape of the cash instalments of Isabelle's dowry (2). Richard also used the 1396 settlement to promote the interests of a group of his relatives through advantageous marriages and military expeditions abroad. Besides his own major proposals to Yolande and Isabelle, these years are characterised by a plethora of projected marriages. The earl of Rutland was variously proposed for the daughters of the counts of Bar and Alençon, or the sister of the count of Harcourt, Charles' daughter Jeanne and Visconti's sister-in-law. Henry of Monmouth was suggested for Charles' daughter Michelle, and his father Henry of Bolingbroke for an Aragonese princess, the daughter of Charles of Navarre and Lucia Visconti. There were also proposed matches between

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(1) CPR 1385-1389 123, 132.

(2) Johnston - "Richard II's departure from Ireland" 797-798.

unspecified English nobles and Robert of Scotland's children and Isabella of Aragon (1). The expedition to Lombardy in 1397 was to have been led by Rutland, Thomas Mowbray and John Holland, and that of 1398 by Henry of Bolingbroke (2). Despite the concentration of Ricardian diplomacy on this inner group, it is not necessary to believe with Perroy that Richard's intended goal was:

> 'l'entente avec les Valois, indispensable pour l'etablissement de l'autocratie (3).'

A change in his attitude towards the truce with France is discernible from about July 1397 onwards. By this time, Brest had been returned to Montfort, the English envoys had departed to Rome and Avignon, in accordance with the commitments Richard had made at Calais and it was clear that the peace conference of the uncles would not meet. No further concessions were to be expected from the French, territorial, marital or financial. The chief reason for maintaining the form of the truce was to obtain the remainder of Isabelle's dowry payments.

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(1) Dip.Cor. no.229A and p. 253 n. 229A, no.226, pp. 253-254 n. 236, nos. 202, 220; Anglo-Norman nos. 109, 174; Palmer - "Background to Marriage " 14 n.2; Bueno de Mesquita - "Foreign Policy of Richard II" 635, 637; Foedera vii 804-805, 850; A.N. J.644 nos. 20, 21; England... 175.

(2) See pp. 421, 426 above.

(3) Angleterre et Schisme 390.

In the negotiations for the truce and the marriage in 1395 and 1396 Richard insisted on retaining his claim to the French throne, symbolised by the quartering of the fleurs-de-lys on his arms. He also revived claims to territories held by his Angevin ancestors in France (1). The quartered arms of England and France were a particular feature in England between 1394 and the end of the reign and Richard perhaps adopted the cosse de genet as a badge to stress his descent from Geoffrey of Anjou (2). He also constantly wore around his neck the eagle containing the oil given by the Virgin to Thomas Becket, which bore the promise of the recovery of the lands lost by his ancestors (3). This emphasis on his claims in France implies an intention to pursue them when circumstances allowed. Military exhaustion and stalemate necessitated a period of truce for the purposes of recovery and the search for new positions of advantage in the European power structure. Richard conducted an imaginative foreign policy, but it was not directed at peace. Had he lived until all the dowry payments for his marriage were complete, he may well have chosen to intervene again in France.

There is some evidence that the French maintained friendly contacts with the English royal family late in Richard's

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(1) See pp. 101-102, 197 above.

(2) Fowler - Plantagenet and Valois 193.

(3) EHD iv 173.

reign, particularly Philip of Burgundy (1). However at sea and on the frontiers of Guyenne, there was clearly tension throughout the 1390s and this increased in its quantity and violence after the twenty-eight year truce was signed (2). "Already before the deposition of Richard II it was a most uneasy truce." (3) Hostile actions by the French increased in 1399, not only on the frontiers but at the centre of government, where they were inspired by Louis of Orléans (4). It was in these circumstances of emerging French aggression that Henry of Bolingbroke was welcomed in Paris by Louis as a guest and a potential ally (5). It is possible that Richard made protests at Paris against the proposed marriage between Henry and Marie de Berry (6). Tacit Orléanist support was probably given to Henry's enterprise against Richard a few months later. In Brittany, where Montfort had only a few months to live, there was disapproval of the usurpation and some English merchants and their ships were arrested in consequence (7).

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(1) Vaughan - Philip the Bold 108, 219; Wylie - Henry IV iv 176; Angleterre et Schisme 119 n.3.

(2) A.N. J.865 no.11. See pp. 35, 211, 298-299, 310-311, 334-335.

(3) Fowler - "Truces" 207.

(4) England... 222-226.

(5) B.L.Add.Ch. 46. See p. 315 above.

(6) Kirby - Henry IV 50; England... 224.

(7) Jones - Ducal Brittany 141; E.28/4 no.97. See p335 and n. 5 above.

Once Henry had gained the crown his initial moves towards France were conciliatory. He began by seeking a confirmation of the twenty-eight year truce and diplomatic marriages, at first unspecified and then between his eldest son and the newly-widowed Isabelle, which would avoid the complications of repaying part of her dowry to France. Therefore he wished to continue and strengthen the terms of the settlement of 1396. Richard's marriage to Isabelle had created a diplomatic precedent which both Henry and his son showed an interest in repeating throughout their reigns. However in 1400 the French refused to consider another marriage. They expected the circumstances of Henry's usurpation to compel him to reverse Richard's policies and reopen the war, so they made defensive military preparations (1). Henry first realised that his friendly approaches to France would not be welcomed at the Great Council held at Westminster on 9 February 1400, in the uncertain days following the aftermath of the revolt of the earls. The arrival of William Farringdon with his warnings about French intentions in Guyenne and on the Scottish border, and the news he brought that the English envoys had not been allowed to proceed to Paris to negotiate, precipitated hasty preparations for raising troops and money to oppose the threat of a France that would probably not confirm the

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(1) Wylie - Henry IV i 107. See pp. 106, 214, 218-219 above.

truce. Calais was re-provisioned and troops were sent to Bordeaux (1). Since negotiations nevertheless continued at Leulinghen, this was perhaps an exaggerated reaction. Each side was now nervous of an immediate attack from the other, and this beginning set the tone for Anglo-French relations for the rest of Henry's reign.

No terms for a peace settlement are known to have been offered during the reign and it is only from the last few years of the reign that terms proposed for alliances with the French factions have survived. It is therefore difficult to discern Henry's aims and motives in pursuing the quarrel with France with any degree of certainty. As Richard's opponent in 1399, he probably regarded himself as the inheritor of the viewpoint of the duke of Gloucester, formerly his fellow Appellant and lately the murdered victim of Richard's regime (2). He may also have inherited some of his father's ambitions in France. Like Richard, he appreciated the symbolism of Becket's miraculous oil and showed the eagle to the French envoys he received at the beginning of his reign (3). It is therefore likely that he regarded a return to the provisions of the treaty of Brétigny, with its emphasis on an enlarged Guyenne held in full sovereignty, as the proper basis for a final settlement with France and that he entertained no serious ambition for the French throne.

(1) Foedera viii 125-127; B.L.Cotton MS Caligula D iii f.125. See pp. 214-215, 301, 312, 314, 373 above.

(2) See p. 40 above.

(3) St.Denys ii 730-732.

In the negotiations for a Burgundian alliance in 1411 he was interested in military aid to recover Plantagenet possessions in the Duchy which were now occupied by the Armagnac faction. In his alliance with the Armagnacs in 1412 he accepted a Duchy somewhat smaller in extent than in the Great Peace, even after the reversions had been acquired, and his title to the French throne was not admitted (1). However Henry began the trend of Lancastrian neglect of Guyenne. It is an indication of the weakness of the middle years of his reign that he was able to send very little help to the Duchy when it was in danger of being overrun by the French (2).

Henry was unable to adopt an offensive policy towards France because of the constant drain on his military and financial resources by the Welsh revolt, and his precarious position in England. It was recognised by the Council in 1401 that lack of money made it inadvisable to recommence the war, and this inability to take the initiative continued beyond the time that the start of the civil war in France created new possibilities for intervention there, until the negotiations for alliances with the Armagnacs and Burgundians in 1411 and 1412 (3). Until at least 1407 English military activity in Guyenne, the Calais enclave and in the war at sea, was undertaken

(1) Vale - English Gascony 55, 56, 58, 59, 71, 216; PPC ii 19-20. See pp. 117-118 above.

(2) See pp. 326-327 above.

(3) PPC i 144. See pp. 226, 377 above.

in response to anticipated French attacks or to successive stages in the escalation of the local conflicts by the French (1). This lack of opportunity for anything except defensive action inclined Henry to keep the twenty-eight year truce in force after he had extracted a confirmation from the French government in June 1400, by a process of republication, supplementary agreements and continuous negotiations, until a new truce system began in 1407 (2).

But the English government did consider declaring open war against France. In June 1401 a large council of temporal lords discussed re-opening the war and it was suggested that an ultimatum should be sent to Paris to demand that the French observe the truce. Finally it was decided to comply with the latest agreement for the return of Isabelle to France and it was not until Cheyne's mission of 1404 that the English resorted to the expedient of the ultimatum (3). At a very large Great Council at Westminster in mid-August 1401, a more definite decision seems to have been taken to prosecute war against France and Scotland, but this was probably cancelled when news arrived of the first agreement supplementary to the truce, drawn up at Leulinghen two weeks previously (4). Shortly afterwards the earl of Rutland's expedition sailed to Bordeaux. By the terms of Rutland's indenture as

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(1) See above Chapter IV, especially pp. 301-303, 305-306, 314, 326-327, 349, 356, 366.

(2) See pp. 218, 226-228, 247-249 above.

(3) PPC i 143-145. See pp. 245-246 above.

(4) PPC i 155-164; Usk 69. See pp. 228-230 above.

lieutenant of Guyenne, it was foreseen that Henry or his eldest son would lead an expedition to the Duchy during the three years of his office (1). If Henry, or possibly the prince of Wales, had personally conducted a campaign in France it would certainly have abrogated the truce and precipitated a state of open war, a prospect which the French as well as the English wished to avoid. However, Henry several times threatened to take this course in response to the impending destruction of his overseas possessions by Valois forces. In December 1402 and April 1403, in his replies to the provocative letters of the duke of Orléans, he stated his intention to take troops to Guyenne to fight for his rights there (2); in December 1403 and again late in 1404 he proposed to make the journey there (3). The long truce probably came closest to collapse in 1406 when Henry again referred to his Adversary of France rather than his Cousin of France, and the dukes of Burgundy and Orléans made their most determined efforts against the Calais March and Guyenne. In this year, Henry twice intended to sail on an expedition, first to clear a French blockade of the Thames and then to go to the rescue of Calais and Guyenne (4). Later in the reign, when England was able to take the offensive, Henry decided to undertake the personal

(1) Vale - English Gascony 42-43. See p. 314 above.

(2) Monstrelet i 48, 64-66. See p. 318 above.

(3) Wylie - Henry IV ii 33-34; CCR 1402-1405 199; PPC i 280-281; E.28/15 nos. 40, 43; E.28/16 no.45. See p326 above.

(4) Wylie - Henry IV ii 409; iii 63; CCR 1405-1409 93-95, 257, 261; Foedera viii 336, 466. See pp. 224,248-249, 304-306, 327.

direction of the troops that were sent to the aid of the Burgundians in 1411 and in alliance with the Armagnacs in 1412. He intended to take the latter expedition straight to Guyenne. On both occasions he was probably prevented by ill-health (1).

In the field of diplomacy the French restricted Henry's scope for action by refusing to conduct full diplomatic relations in the normal manner. Between December 1399 and September 1407 they would not concede safe-conducts to English envoys to go to Paris, nor did they send any ambassadors to London, except once to seek the restoration of Isabelle. All discussions had to be held on the frontier in the March of Picardy. Nor would the French talk about anything except the operation of the truce and their financial claims against Henry. After Philip of Burgundy blockaded the roads around Calais in November 1403, they effectively cut off all negotiations until spring 1406. It was only in 1407 that the French government became willing to discuss new truces, peace and marriages, and to receive English representatives in Paris to do so (2). The French sought to impose a diplomatic isolation on Henry in the first half of his reign, regarding him as an unrecognised usurper.

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(1) Wylie - Henry IV iv 37-40, 52, 70-71, 73; PPC ii 29; Foedera viii 700, 728, 730, 733; CCR 1409-1413 166, 240-241, 339. A letter of protection to serve in the king's company in Guyenne was issued as late as 27 June 1412, C.76/95 m.10.

(2) B.L.Cotton MS Caligula D iii f.125. See pp. 223-224, 241-248, 264-265, 302.

Faced with intransigence over negotiations and increasing military challenges from the French, it was incumbent on Henry to circumvent them in the wider diplomatic sphere of alliances, though he did not have the same ambitions for personal aggrandizement in Europe that Richard had held. He insisted on regarding Scotland as excluded from the provisions of the truce by its persistent infractions so that he could deal with it independently of his relationship with France. But the Percies' victory at Homildon Hill in 1402 and the fortuitous capture of the young King James in 1406 were more effective in neutralising the effects of the Franco-Scottish alliance than his own campaign of 1400, his diplomatic pressure or his clients among the Scottish nobility (1). Henry's negotiations with the Vier Leden for a separate commercial treaty attempted to eliminate the source of another military threat to England. In 1403 these aimed at an agreement which would have excluded Flemish ships from the conflict at sea, but Philip of Burgundy brought a halt to these talks, also victims of his blockade of Calais, and thereafter subordinated them to his own conception of Flemish neutrality in commerce (2). Henry also failed to prevent the dukes of Burgundy expanding their area of domination in the Low Countries. He was unable to retain the alliance of Guelders-Juliers or gain the alliance of Cleves-Mark, although he sent envoys for this purpose. He was in no position to oppose Antoine of Burgundy's

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(1). See pp. 45-47 above.

(2) See pp. 50, 263-266, 350 above.

succession to Brabant in December 1406. In the Rhineland he established an alliance and a family connection with the Emperor Ruprecht, but this did not bring him any material advantage (1). In European diplomacy Henry scored no successes against the French in the first half of his reign.

As in previous periods of hostility towards France, England turned to the possibility of an alliance with Brittany, where Montfort had been succeeded as duke by his twelve-year-old son Jean in November 1399 (2). Some contact was maintained with Brittany, mainly through Antoine Rys and Nicholas Aldrewych, who had received the joint grant of the honour of Richmond with Joan Basset. They conducted secret negotiations which resulted in April 1402 in the marriage by proxy of Henry to the Duchess Jeanne, who had been recognised as regent of Brittany for her son (3). Henry probably hoped to gain control of the regency and certainly to exercise some influence in Brittany. Most particularly he probably wanted Jeanne's children brought to England where he would control their future marriages, as in the alliances discussed in 1391 and 1392 (4). He may also have hoped for some military advantage from a new alliance with Brittany and the

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(1) E.28/9 unnumbered, 6 and 12 July 1401.

(2) Monstrelet i 32.

(3) Wylie - Henry IV i 261-262; iv 199; Kirby - Henry IV 137-138; CCR 1399-1402 43, 244, 379; CPR 1401-1405 67; C.76/84 m.18.

(4) Knowlson - Jean V 37. See p. 411 above.

administration of Jeanne's dower lands, the comté of Nantes. He needed a consort of royal rank: besides being dowager duchess of Brittany, Jeanne was also the daughter of the king of Navarre, another former English ally.

The earliest preparations to bring Jeanne and her retinue to England were made shortly before the proxy marriage, but there were considerable delays before she set out on the journey. After several false starts she was finally escorted to England in February 1403 to be married to Henry and crowned (1). In the interval, Philip of Burgundy arrived in Brittany to assert Valois control there. In October 1402 Jeanne surrendered to him the government of the Duchy and the custody of her sons, apparently under pressure from the three Estates of Brittany. In November a comprehensive family alliance was sealed between Philip and Jeanne and the sons of each. She was allowed to take her daughters with her to England but Philip took the young duke and two of his brothers to Paris in December. French royal garrisons occupied the strong points in the duchy and in January, Duke Jean did homage to King Charles for Brittany. Philip also gained control of the comté of Nantes. In March 1403, Jeanne appointed Tristan de la Lande as its governor and formally

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(1) Knowlson - Jean V 36-40; Wylie - Henry IV i 263-264, 306-310; iv 200, 203, 221; Cal.Signet no.107; CCR 1399-1402 468, 550; CPR 1401-1405 136, 198; Letters of Henry IV i 104-107; PPC i 188-190; Foedera viii 280, 281, 285; E.28/11 unnumbered 18 Oct. 1402; E.28/13 unnumbered and damaged; E.28/16 unnumbered 9 Dec. 1404; B.L.Add. MS 24512 f.80; B.N.Francais 5624 ff.47-49v.

surrendered custody of it to Philip (1). It must have been in connection with this that his councillor, Jean de Saulx, came to England in company with one of Jeanne's esquires the following month (2). In return, Philip made a loan of 14,000 écus to Jeanne, repayable from the revenues of the duchy. Duke Jean paid off the debt several years later (3). Most of the advantages Henry expected from his marriage to Jeanne had therefore been lost or sold before she even reached England. Nor was he able to exploit the marriageability of her two daughters. Jean V tried to arrange for their return as early as May 1404 and in 1406 Parliament insisted on their expulsion from England along with other members of Jeanne's household. The following year, Jeanne mortgaged the comté of Nantes, where she seems to have regained some measure of control, to Tristan de la Lande for a contribution to the dowry of her daughter Blanche, who was marrying the eldest son of Count Bernard of Armagnac, Jean vicomte of Lomagne (4).

Jean V's minority ended in December 1403 and he returned to Brittany the following month to take up its governance.

(1) Wylie - Henry IV i 307-308; Knowlson - Jean V 38-40; Monstrelet i 34-35; Preuves ii 723-724, 740-741, 815; C.76/87 m.23. La Lande and his companions took bows, arrows and other goods from England to Brittany, C.76/87 m.23.

(2) Foedera viii 299-300; C.76/87 mm. 15,16.

(3) Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 155 and n.111; Lettres de Jean V v nos. 1021, 1060, 1090.

(4) Knowlson - Jean V 50, 53-54; Wylie - Henry IV i 411; ii 425-426; Lettres de Jean V iv nos. 10, 161, 199; v. nos 737, 797. Jeanne had also assigned her Navarrese dowry to Jean V, C.47/28/7 no.4.

Philip's death on 27 April 1404 enabled him to dispose of the last vestiges of Burgundian tutelage (1). Jean's main concern was to protect the independence of Brittany, but his cautious character made his policy unimaginative and insular compared to his father's exercises in brinkmanship. He was most conciliatory to the neighbour that was most powerful, but preferred inactivity to promoting an ally's interest. Hence he favoured an entente with England but made her no promises of material assistance and he was more inclined towards a consistent relationship with the French crown. In 1407 he began to receive payments from Charles, first as instalments of his wife's dowry still owed to him, then as pensions and gifts (2). Breton subjects participated in the campaigns against the English in Wales in 1403, and in Guyenne and at sea in 1404 and 1405 (3). Anglo-Breton relations at sea worsened rather than improved in the years following Jeanne's marriage to Henry, but it is not necessary to see this as the Bretons' protest against the marriage, as has been asserted (4). Breton privateers had been active against English shipping since before Henry's accession and it was possible for a Nantois ship-owner to claim immunity from

(1) Knowlson - Jean V 43; Vaughan - Philip the Bold 53.

(2) Knowlson - Jean V 59, 63-64, 77, 103, 180; Lettres de Jean V v nos. 903, 955, 981, 1013, 1016, 1021, 1022, 1027-1029, 1036, 1038-1040, 1042, 1044-1046, 1054, 1060, 1062, 1068-1070 etc.

(3) Lloyd - Owen Glendower 76; Preuves ii 746, 747; Lettres de Jean V iv no.120.

(4) Knowlson - Jean V 43; Touchard - Commerce Maritime Breton 104, 117; Pistono - Repudiation 218; Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 157.

reprisals because he was a subject of Queen Jeanne (1). Henry regarded the Bretons as his enemies in the early months of 1405 and with good reason, for Jean V had apparently assented to the French policy of active war against him (2). In 1406 and 1407 Anglo-Breton hostility at sea reached a peak, the English raided the Breton coasts and Duke Jean sent ships and troops to assist Louis of Orléans in his siege of Bourg (3).

Nevertheless during these years of hostility both sides continued to issued safe-conducts for the purposes of trade and paying off ransoms (4), and there was a continuous stream of Breton envoys crossing and re-crossing the English Channel. Most of these were concerned with Queen Jeanne's ownership of the comté of Nantes and the presence of her household in England (5).

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(1) CPR 1401-1405 282. See pp. 343-344 and n.1, 352 n.1 in Chapter IV.

(2) E.28/14 no. 75; E.28/17 no.7; E.28/20 no.65; B.L. Egerton Ch.19. See p. 342 above.

(3) Lettres de Jean V iv nos. 378, 402; v nos. 410, 412, 423. See pp. 325, 365-367 above.

(4) Touchard - Commerce Maritime Breton 106-107, 124.

(5) Kirby - Henry IV 167; Wylie - Henry IV i 411; iii 101; iv 203; Knowlson - Jean V 46; Cal.Signet no. 162; Foedera viii 482-483; C.47/28/7 no. 5; C.76/87 mm. 7, 10, 11, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24; C.76/88 mm.6, 10, 11, 15; C.76/91 m.17; E.28/16 unnumbered 6 Dec. 1404; Lettres de Jean V iv nos. 6, 10. However Jean Langnyth's mission in June 1404 seems to have been to King Henry alone, C.76/83 m.3. As late as Nov. 1412 Henry provided a safe-conduct to Jean Moryn for three years to supply Jeanne's household from sources in Brittany, C.76/95 m.2. He was still acting in this capacity in July 1418, Foedera ix 603.

In April 1406 began a new series of embassies, involving the duke's envoys rather than Jeanne's, and leading to the Anglo-Breton truce of 1407 and its renewal in 1408 (1). At first Henry wished Anglo-Breton maritime affairs to be included in the security he was negotiating for Flanders, but he appears to have acceded to Jean V's desire for a separate truce (2). This excluded the Penthièvre stronghold on the island of Bréhat and in September 1408 English forces under the earl of Kent, Henry's admiral, co-operated with the Bretons to attack and destroy it (3). Duke Jean's attitude to England was shifting from enmity to entente.

Other changes in France in 1407 gave Henry greater latitude in formulating his foreign policy. Louis of Orléans' policy of trying to remove Henry from England and Guyenne by guerres couvertes was ended and a new truce system was brought into operation. Orléans' assassination on 23 November removed Henry's chief enemy at the French court and created possibilities for offensive action in France, though England's continuing financial difficulties required a delay before advantage could be taken of this. But when circumstances allowed, Henry reversed the French

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(1) Knowlson - Jean V 53; Cal.Signet nos. 696, 702; C.76/89 m.10; C.76/90 mm.11, 12,16,22; C.76/91 mm.17, 18, 22.

(2) PPC i 293; B.L.Add.Ch. 12501. See pp.277-278 above.

(3) Wylie - Henry IV iii 102-104; Monstrelet ii 35. See above pp. 278-279, 366.

weapon of warfare within a truce against them with the aim of gaining an extended Guyenne by force of arms. Indeed he regained an advantage not enjoyed by the kings of England since the treaty of Brétigny, for in his negotiations for alliances with the Burgundian and Orléanist factions, they ceased to demand liege homage for his projected holdings in France (1).

In Brittany there had been a realignment of alliances. Jean V distanced himself from the duke of Burgundy's influence and made an alliance in September 1406 with Louis of Orléans, who abandoned his earlier contacts with the Penthièvre party (2). Meanwhile, John of Burgundy had married his daughter Isabelle to the count of Penthièvre (3). In 1407 the vicomte of Lomagne was wed to Jean V's sister Blanche of Brittany, a marriage which had been contracted some years previously. Lomagne's father, Bernard of Armagnac, had been an Orléanist ally since November 1403 (4). In May 1408, Jean V renewed his Orléanist alliance with Louis of Orléans' widow and son, and in June, he allied with the count of Alençon who was married to his sister Marie of Brittany (5). Jean V's increasing involvement with these members of the Orléanist

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(1) Monstrelet i 154-165; EHD iv no.95. See pp. 14,53,381.

(2) Lettres de Jean V iv no.542.

(3) Monstrelet i 131; Vaughan - John the Fearless 247.

(4) Lettres de Jean V iv no.323; Knowlson - Jean V 50, 54;, A.N. K.56 nos. 25(2), 25(3).

(5) Choix i 309-310; Knowlson - Jean V 59.

faction culminated in his participation in the League of Gien in 1410 (1). It is possible that Henry encouraged and supported these moves.

As the French nobility were being polarised into two distinct groups, Jean V came into danger from the new Burgundian-Penthièvre combination. In December 1408, shortly after his return to Paris, and again in August 1409, the duke of Burgundy prepared to invade Brittany in favour of the count of Penthièvre and in retaliation for the joint Anglo-Breton action at Bréhat. The three Estates of Brittany warned him that they would resist in defence of their duke (2). There are some indications that Jean V was seeking an English alliance at this time. There were some Breton missions to England and in October 1409 he sent Armel de Châteaugiron to Henry to offer him homage for the earldom of Richmond, a truce and an alliance (3). If the restitution of Richmond was under discussion, its normal corollary, the provision of English troops to Brittany, must also have been considered. When the French Great Council met on the last day of 1409, it was stated that the English had made preparations for war (4). Henry, like his father in 1392, may have been trying to deter a French invasion of Brittany by threatening a military intervention in return. However, Jean V yielded

(1) B.L.Add.Ch. 7926.

(2) Preuves ii 815-816; Monstrelet ii 35-36. Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 366-367 has confused the chronology.

(3) Preuves ii 827; C.76/92 mm.8, 9.

(4) Choix i 322.

to the Burgundian pressure and submitted his disputes with the Penthièvre family to the arbitration of Charles and his Council (1). The feud ceased to be a factor in Anglo-French relations for several years.

Diplomatic contact was maintained with Brittany over the next few years and resulted in the prorogation of the truce for ten years in December 1411 and the agreement about infractions of February 1412 (2). This firmly established the principle that there should be a peaceful relationship between England and Brittany and implied the intention of a closer connection. When the Sire du Juch came to England in Spring 1411, he was accompanied by envoys from the other Orléanist lords, including the count of Armagnac's retainer Jean de Lupiac, who had previously received safe-conducts for embassies to England in March 1408 and March 1410 (3). The Breton Admiral Jean de Penhoët, who came in September 1411, also had Orléanist connections (4). These mysterious negotiations may account for the presence of English, Welsh and Gascon troops on the Orléanist side in the civil war that had broken out in France. Some of these were recruited by Jean V's brother Arthur. A hundred men-at-arms and two hundred archers from the Bordelais were serving the duke of Orléans under

(1) Monstrelet ii 36, 64.

(2) Cal.Signet no. 760; Foedera viii 667, 675, 684, 702; Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 369 n.178, 419 n.9; C.76/94 m.9. See pp.279-280,282 above.

(3) Foedera viii 512, 684; C.76/93 m.17.

(4) Foedera viii 702; Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 420 n.15.

Lord Clifford in 1411 but he retired when he heard of the earl of Arundel's expedition in support of the Burgundians. The following summer, six hundred Gascons were with the duke of Berry at Bourges (1). The first signs were appearing of an English military intervention in France in co-operation with the Orléanist or Armagnac faction.

But in the second half of Henry IV's reign a new power emerged in the Council and in the making of foreign policy which eventually led to a contrary trend in offensive policies towards France. Prince Henry and his uncle Henry Beaufort appear to have become influential in foreign affairs from March 1406 onwards. At this time began a renewal of interest in concluding a peace settlement with France based on a marriage between the Prince and a daughter of Charles VI. Simultaneously, negotiations began for new truces with France and Brittany, though the preference on the English side was for a new general truce, rather than the interlocking system of particular truces that the French forced it to accept (2). In Paris, the counterpart to this new influence was the duke of Berry, who conducted most of the diplomacy with the English between 1407 and 1409. It was in connection with the peace and truce discussions of this period that his

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(1) Vaughan - John the Fearless 94; Wylie - Henry IV iv 35; Monstrelet ii 202, 291-292; B.L.Add.Ch. 3409, 3413, 3414.

(2) See pp. 111-113, 251, 254-257, 447 above.

trusted esquire Casin de Serenvilliers, who had been in England in 1399 and 1400, received a series of safe-conducts to go there again between May 1406 and March 1409 (1). These talks ended without a conclusion in this latter year.

It is probable that in this first stage of his ascendancy the Prince worked in harmony with the intentions of his father. But after he took control of the Council in December 1409, he adopted a more aggressive attitude towards France and Plantagenet claims there,and decided the opportunity was now ripe for a military intervention. In contradiction to his father he favoured an alliance with the Burgundians to effect this. He was responsible for the subsequent negotiations with them and remained committed to the idea of a Burgundian alliance for the rest of the reign and beyond. England's economic links with Flanders provided a motive for such an alliance, but this was not Prince Henry's primary interest. Of the two available factions, the Burgundian was the more advantageous to his strategic ambitions for northern France. When he became king, he showed a consistent interest in gaining control of the duchy of Normandy and the coastal provinces between it and Calais. In his expedition of 1415 he captured a Norman town and set out to march his army along the coast to Calais. In 1417 he returned to conquer the whole of Normandy. From 1414 to

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(1) Foedera viii 579; Cal.Signet no.735; Wylie - Henry IV iv 209; C.76/89 mm.1, 6; C.76/91 mm.6, 16, 17, 18. See above pp. 316-317.

1419 in his negotiations with French governments and factions, Burgundians, Orléanists, Armagnacs and Dauphinists, he repeatedly demanded Normandy, Ponthieu, Montreuil-sur-Mer, Boulogne, Artois and its towns, the whole coastline from Gravelines to the river Somme and the sovereignty of Flanders in various combinations (1). These territorial requirements would be facilitated by the friendship or neutrality of the Burgundian bloc. The renewal of interest in northern France shows that the trend of Henry V's ambition was away from an extended Guyenne and towards re-opening the question of the Plantagenet claim to the French throne. His assiduous pursuit of the Burgundian alliance as both prince and king, demonstrates that these ideas had become fixed in his mind before his accession to the throne. For John the Fearless too the commercial interests of his Flemish subjects were secondary to his wider ambitions. He sought a rapprochement with England to improve his position against the Orléanists but his continuing bonds with Valois France always made it impossible for him to commit himself fully to an English alliance. While the Dauphins Louis and Jean lived, there was always the prospect of a Burgundian queen of France after Charles VI's death (2). Like the dukes of Brittany, John of Burgundy wanted the weight of England to tip the balance of forces in France in his favour, without giving anything material in return.

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(1) See above pp. 122, 127, 131, 134, 144, 145-147.

(2) Vaughan - John the Fearless 247, 250.

The question of an Anglo-Burgundian alliance apparently arose out of the negotiations to prorogue and improve the securities with Flanders in 1410 and 1411, with which Prince Henry was particularly concerned in his capacity as captain of Calais (1). In response to a suggestion communicated by a Burgundian envoy in July 1411, the prince was licensed by his father in September to send his representatives to discuss an alliance based on his marriage to one of the duke of Burgundy's daughters. The proposal was evidently still at an early stage. The prince's envoys were instructed to ask what lands or goods the duke would give with his daughter and what military assistance he required against the Orléanists, requiring that he provide an exactly similar number of troops to the king and the prince in times of necessity. In particular the English were interested in aid to recover Guyenne. The duke was to be allowed to except Charles VI from the enmity of the alliance and the king and the prince would undertake to make no alliance with the Orléanists, provided the duke would do likwise. It was hinted that the king himself might lead troops to the aid of the Burgundians (2). The English envoys do not seem to have achieved much when they met Duke John at Arras, but he sent expensive gifts to the English king, queen and prince. It was rumoured in France that he had offered to cede Gravelines, Dunquerque, Dixmude and Sluys and also

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(1) Foedera viii 660-661. See pp. 272 - 274 above.

(2) Foedera viii 698, 699; PPC ii 19-24.

Cherbourg to Henry IV and to assist in the conquest of Normandy. This was Orléanist propaganda, but it accords well with the terms Prince Henry was to ask of the Burgundians when he became king (1). Duke John bargained over the alliance with the king of England as an equal to a sovereign prince, not as a prospective vassal.

The conclusion of an alliance, however was not a prerequisite for the sending of English troops to fight in the Burgundian interest. In September 1407 John Cornwall was licensed to take sixty men-at-arms and five hundred archers to fight for John, bishop-elect of Liège and a Burgundian ally, against the Liègois (2). John of Burgundy hired English troops in 1410 (3), and in September 1411 William Bardolf led a force of four hundred esquires and horse-archers from Calais to fight for him in the Montdidier campaign (4). In October he was joined at Arras by a much larger force from England under the command of the earl of Arundel, one of the envoys sent by the prince to negotiate his marriage. This force participated in the Burgundian advance through Péronne and Pontoise to re-occupy Paris, distinguished itself in the assault on St. Cloud and then served in the siege of Étampes. Most

(1). Monstrelet ii 189; Vaughan - John the Fearless 92, 248; Wylie - Henry IV iv 36; Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 429 n.49, 431 n.54; d'Autume - "Histoire de Cherbourg" 9; Boitel - "Appels a l'Angleterre" 15-18.

(2) Foedera viii 497.

(3) Wylie - Henry IV iv 35.

(4) Wylie - Henry IV iv 55-56; Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 429 and n.44; Monstrelet ii 186,189; Vaughan - John the Fearless 91; B.N. n.a.f. 20528. p.194.

of the English were paid off and returned home in mid-December, but some remained in the duke of Burgundy's service a while longer, including Bardolf, John Gray and Gilbert Umfraville (1). Bardolf's and Arundel's troops received payments from both Duke John and Charles VI's treasury, but both expeditions were also paid wages through the prince's own chamber and his administration at Calais, and they served in France by his orders (2). At least five hundred Englishmen continued to serve in the Burgundian forces in the campaigns of 1412, presumably with the prince's connivance (3).

Negotiations for the Burgundian alliance continued into 1412. The duke's embassy came to England to discuss further a marriage between Henry of Monmouth and Anne of Burgundy and an alliance between Henry IV, the duke and the eldest sons of each. The ambassadors were well received by the king at Coldharbour and Rochester and made satisfactory progress with their business, returning to

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(1) Wylie - Henry IV iv 57-63; Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 429 n.49, 431 and n.55; Vaughan - John the Fearless 91-92, 94, 141; B.L.Add.Ch. 52, 53, 240; Monstrelet ii 189, 198-208, 219-220; B.N. Clairambault 55 p.4185 no.75; Foedera viii 700; CCR 1409-1413 166, 240-241.

(2) Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 429 and n.44, 431 and n.55; W.R.M. Griffiths - The Military Career and Affinity of Henry Prince of Wales 1399-1413 (Oxford M.Litt. thesis 1980) 124, citing S.C.6/775/12 m.12d; G.Demay - Inventaire des Sceaux de la Collection Clairambault à la Bibliotheque Nationale (Paris 1885-1886) i 35; E.28/30 no.22; B.N.Clairambault 55 p. 4185 no.75; n.a.f. 20528 pp. 192, 194, 195, 196; Foedera viii 705, 708.

(3) Wylie - Henry IV iv 63 n.8, 72; Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 445-447 and nn. 106,107; B.N. n.a.f. 20528 pp. 243, 249.

Paris early in March (1). A return embassy was prepared, from which Duke John expected a conclusive result, but it was never sent (2). Henry IV had reasserted his control of the government and the prince was no longer a member of the Council. When Henry received advantageous offers from the Orléanists he broke off the negotiations with the Burgundians and in April issued a proclamation forbidding his subjects from going to the aid of either party in France (3). Evidently this was aimed primarily at the prince: at the end of May he and the earl of Arundel were obliged to write to the duke of Burgundy to disengage themselves from the promises they had made to him, which they did with expressions of regret (4). In the latter half of 1411 the prince and the duke had maintained a semi-secret correspondence carried by specially trusted envoys of low rank, in addition to the formal diplomatic contacts. This continued into the summer of 1412, even while the duke of Clarence's expedition to assist the Orleanists was preparing in England and operating in France (5). On 14 June, John the Fearless wrote a long

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(1) Foedera viii 712-713, 721; Monstrelet ii 232-233; Wylie - Henry IV iv 64, 211.

(2) Wilson - Anglo French Relations 431 n.58; B.N. Moreau 1424 no.55.

(3) Monstrelet ii 247, 260, 293; Foedera viii 728.

(4) B.A.Pocquet du Haut-Jussé - "La Renaissance littéraire autour de Henry V roi d'Angleterre" Revue Historique ccxxiv (1960) 335-338.

(5) Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 429 n.44, 430 n.51, 431, n.54, 436, 442-444, 445 and n.101, 447; Wylie - Henry IV iv 89 and n..8; Henry V i 148; Pocquet du Haut-Jussé - "Renaissance Littéraire" 334.

letter to Prince Henry expressing his disappointment and indignation at the change in direction of English policy and asking him to remonstrate with his father to resume their friendly discussions (1).

Diplomatic activity designed to lead to an Anglo-Orléanist alliance began early in 1412 but it proved difficult for the envoys of the French lords to reach England to negotiate. Two successive safe-conducts were issued for them by Henry in February and March, but some of them were captured with their documents as they crossed Maine, and in April Henry sent a squadron to sea to act as their escort, as Burgundian ships had been sent to intercept them. Eventually he received the embassy at Eltham and a successful conclusion was rapidly reached. The envoys then returned to France to find their masters at Bourges (2). By the alliance of 18 May, Henry promised to send an expeditionary force four thousand strong to France, and two days later the prince and his three brothers swore to observe the treaty (3). Other diplomatic preparations were made for the new offensive against France. On his left flank Henry sought assurance from the Vier Leden on 16 May that the Flemish would abide by their securities with

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(1) B.N.Moreau 1424 no.55. See p. 51 above.

(2) Wylie - Henry IV iv 64-68, 211; Monstrelet ii 236-237, 257, 266; Anglo-Norman 432-433; Foedera viii 715-716, 718,-719, 726, 732; B.L.Add.Ch.15319. See pp. 114-115 above. The mission of Henry's esquire of the body, Thomas de la Croix, in Feb. was perhaps connected with these arrangements, E.28/23 no.41; C.76/95 n.19.

(3) Foedera viii 743. See pp.116-118 above.

England during the impending clash with the Burgundian faction (1). He strengthened his right flank by an alliance with Brittany. A safe-conduct for the Breton envoys Châteaugiron and Lupiac was issued at the same time as the second safe-conduct for the Orléanist embassy. Châteaugiron came to London in May and on 3 July in St. Paul's Cathedral swore to a simple and formal alliance between Henry and Duke Jean V (2). This was a natural consequence of Jean's rapprochement with England expressed in the ten-year-truce and of his association with the Orléanist faction. Henry V still claimed his alliance in the first truce he made with the French (3).

The ambassadors of the duke of Brittany and the count of Alençon were allowed to export arms and gunpowder components for their lords when they returned to France (4). Before the Orléanist alliance had even been signed, Henry summoned a Great Council to London to hear and endorse his intentions towards France and military preparations were begun. After he had decided not to lead the expedition himself, his second son Thomas, newly created duke of Clarence, was appointed to the command. Amongst those who intended to take part were the duke of York, the earls of Oxford and Ormond, Thomas Beaufort,

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(1) See pp. 51, 274 above.

(2) Foedera viii 727; Wylie - Henry IV iv 211; B.N.Francais 2714 ff.63-65v.

(3) Foedera ix 94.

(4) Foedera viii 754, 756.

John Cornwall, William Swynbourne and Thomas de la Croix. Loans were raised to finance the expedition from the dukes of Clarence and York, leading churchmen and the municipalities of London and Norwich. Clarence and his followers were contracted to serve for five months, to go to Blois to fulfil the treaty obligations to the Orléanists, then to recover Guyenne. Clarence was also appointed lieutenant of the Duchy. The possibility that Henry might cancel the expedition was allowed for in the indentures, in which case the force was to serve for two months elsewhere (1). In its initial organisation this expedition had much more of an official royal character than that of 1411, but once it had landed in France, it operated as the private enterprise of the lords who had invested troops and money in it.

On 10 August 1412, the duke of Clarence and his troops landed at St.Vaast-la- Hougue and ravaged the Cotentin, repeating his actions of 1405. They were shortly welcomed by the count of Alençon and Arthur de Richmond, although they were now too late to fight for the Orléanists, since John of Burgundy had pre-empted the English advance by launching a royal expedition against his opponents at Bourges and forcing them to accept the Peace of Auxerre. Nevertheless Clarence, now joined by the six hundred

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(1) Foedera viii 733, 745-746,748, 749, 750, 751-752, 754, 757-760, 762-763; CPR 1408-1413 403, 418-419. 421; CCR 1409-1413 339; Wylie - Henry IV iv 73-75; E.28/23 no.47; C.76/95 mm. 7, 8, 10, 14; A.N. K.59 no.1. There is a damaged draft of Clarence's indenture at B.L.Cotton MS Caligula D iv f.130.

Gascons who had been among the defenders of Bourges, pressed on through Normandy, Maine and Touraine to the appointed rendezvous at Blois. The Orléanist lords were unable to pay him the promised three months wages, so in search of reimbursement he burned and looted his way through Touraine, Berry, Bourbonnais, Orléanais and Poitou on an extended chevauchée which rivalled that of his grandfather Gaunt in 1373. He operated with impunity since Charles VI's order to assemble forces at Chartres to repel the invaders was widely ignored, each of the French princes attempting merely to defend his own territory and pass the problem on to his neighbours (1). In accordance with the terms of the Peace of Auxerre the Orléanist lords renounced their English alliance, but Clarence refused to accept the letters from their heralds and called upon the Orléanists to fulfil the terms of the alliance, hinting menacingly that had he not considered himself as obliged to them, he would have accepted a better offer from the duke of Burgundy (2). The Orléanists were therefore compelled to purchase the withdrawal of Clarence's army. It appears they sent him a series of envoys, payments and gifts before bringing him to a final agreement at Busançais on 14 November 1412. He agreed to abandon the places he occupied without destroying them, and remove his

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(1) R.Lacour - "Une incursion anglaise en Poitou en novembre 1412" Archives Historiques du Poitou xlviii (1934) 12-14; Wylie - Henry IV iv 76-77, 80-81; Monstrelet ii 291-292, 299-300; B.L.Add.Ch. 54, 55, 251, 3411, 3412, 3417, 3431-3433, 3457, 10911.

(2) Monstrelet ii 293; Letters of Henry IV ii 328-332. See above p. 119.

troops to Guyenne, abstaining from all war until 1 January. He also promised negotiations in Picardy for final peace or a long truce. In return, he would receive safe-conducts for those of his followers who wished to return to England through Brittany or Calais and 150,000 écus to settle all debts to him. This was to be paid in two instalments on 30 November and 25 December and as security for its payment he was given jewels, plate and seven hostages, including Jean, count of Angoulême. The expected money was apportioned amongst the leaders of the English army, the sum in question now being 210,000 écus (1). But the duke of Berry still found it difficult to move the English troops across Poitou into Guyenne. The commanders did not take the most direct routes and were inclined to linger with their companies in different places, until gifts and guides were sent to induce them to proceed. There was only one skirmish however, and the English all drifted into Bordeaux in December. Berry had garrisoned the chief Poitevin castles and raised an aide and loans to hire troops to defend Poitou against the marauders. He now had similar difficulties disbanding these companies and removing them from the comté (2).

When he arrived in Bordeaux, Clarence continued to pursue an offensive policy towards France, though whether this

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(1) Monstrelet ii 303-304; Lacour - "Incursion" 30, 32; A.N. K.57 no.28; K.59 nos. 3, 4; J. 865 no.21; B.L.Add.Ch. 237-239, 247-250, 1399, 1400, 3422-3430, 3434-3436, 6321-6326.

(2) Lacour - "Incursion" 8, 14-30, 32-36. See p328 above.

was with his father's knowledge or approval is uncertain (1). He raised taxes and made new indentures with his captains for a further campaign. He became brother-in-arms with the duke of Orléans, and made an alliance with the count of Armagnac and the Sire d'Albret, perpetuating the relationships formed in the treaty of May 1412 though with considerably less advantage. On the frontiers of the Duchy he adopted an aggressive attitude and his troops pillaged indiscriminately (2). On hearing of his father's death he abandoned these moves and returned to England. The duke of York followed later, passing through Orléans and Paris in pursuit of a diplomatic initiative of his own, and Thomas Beaufort remained in Guyenne as lieutenant to conduct a campaign there (3). The financial consequences of the 1412 expedition lasted much longer, for the money promised by the treaty of Busançais was not paid on time and Clarence took the count of Angoulême and the other hostages to England. Aides and loans were raised to finance their return and several payments were made in 1413 and 1414. The duke of Orléans was still trying to secure his brother's release in 1416, 1417 and 1418 by raising new loans and making payments through bankers, by which time he himself was a prisoner in England. After the battle of Baugé, in which Clarence was killed and the earl of

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(1) Pons de Castillon's mission for Henry 29 Oct. 1412 may have been to the duke of Clarence at Bordeaux, C.76/95 m.6.

(2) Wylie - Henry V i 116-117; Vale - English Gascony 62-67; Vale - War Govt. and Politics 326; Monstrelet ii 305; B.L.Cotton MS Caligula Dv f.2; A.N. K57 no.29; K.59 no.5. See pp.119-120,328above.

(3) See pp.125, 329 above.

Somerset was taken prisoner, Orléans attempted to arrange the exchange of Angoulême for Somerset. Only John Cornwall seems to have been fully paid what was owed to him. The count of Angoulême remained a prisoner until 1445 and the Beauforts, as Clarence's heirs, continued to claim his ransom throughout the fifteenth century (1).

In the latter half of 1411 and 1412 England was again able to take the initiative in her military struggle with Valois France. This period was therefore marked by a selective hostility towards the French at sea and an acquisitive aggression by the garrisons of the Calais enclave (2). It might appear that there was a consistent English policy at this time to aid the weaker of the two parties in France and change sides when it became the stronger, making English military force an indispensible factor in French politics. The assistance of the English troops was decisive for the Burgundian victory in 1411. But in the early months of 1412 Henry IV was prepared to continue the negotiations his eldest son had begun for the Burgundian alliance, until he knew that the Orléanists would offer him an enlarged Guyenne. His policy at this time was opportunist in pursuit of this goal. The duke of

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(1) Lacour - "Incursion" 30-31; C.76/100 m.4; B.L.Add.Ch. 57-66, 70, 71, 234, 253, 255-258, 268-270, 274, 297, 306, 1401-1408, 3437, 3440, 3441, 3448-3451, 3455, 3456, 3458-3460, 3462, 3478, 3482, 3483, 3488, 3491-3495, 3497, 3532, 3538, 3549-3552, 11434, 11448; A.N. K59 nos. 4, 7, 14, 16; K.58 no.6; K.64 nos. 37(3-7 and 9).

(2) See pp. 307, 368 and 3 above.

Clarence's actions in France appear to have been entirely independent of the wishes of either his father or his brother. English foreign policy towards the end of Henry IV's reign was as much a product of the faction politics in England as of those in France.

When his son succeeded to the throne as Henry V, he imposed unity and consistency on policy towards France by the force of his personality and his determination to pursue the logic of his claims. He regarded himself as inheriting these claims to the French throne from Edward III and Richard II, and his stress on the continuity of the Plantagenets' birthright removed the stigma of his father's usurpation. Henry V was the continuator of Edward III's military offensive against France and also of Richard II's diplomatic offensive. In its aggression and its predilection for manipulation his diplomatic method resembled that displayed by Richard in his last years. If it was more rigid in its demands and responses, this was because Henry was in a position of greater strength and advantage (1).

Like both Edward and Richard, Henry was prepared to resign his title to the French kingdom in return for compensation consistent with his military and diplomatic strength. At no point in his reign was he prepared to accept less than all the lands and all the terms conceded by the treaty of Brétigny, even when he was faced with the might of the

(1) Allmand - Henry V 14. See above pp.6, 123, 128, 286.

French army on the field of Agincourt, and he always demanded more. Nor was there any question in his negotiations with the French of all parties, that he intended to hold all his territory in France in full sovereignty, as a neighbour to the Valois, not as their vassal. This indicates a decisive break with his father's readiness to accept an enlarged Guyenne and the laxity of Gaunt and Clarence over the principle of sovereignty. These essential differences were not grasped by French diplomats, not even by the Burgundians at first. In 1414, the duke of Burgundy offered Henry an alliance to conquer lands in south-western France but Henry was interested in lands beyond the borders of Aquitaine and north of the Loire. When the Armagnacs finally offered him all the Brétigny lands in November 1418, their diplomacy had only just caught up with Henry's requirements of 1415 (1). Although he left a campaign in Guyenne open as an option in 1415 and apparently intended an offensive there to enforce the Troyes settlement, Henry largely ignored Guyenne, except for insisting on his rights to the Duchy. The Gascons conducted their own wars and made their own truces. When the treaty of Troyes replaced the Brétigny terms in May 1420 the Duchy was not even mentioned (2).

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(1) E.30/1531 mm.2,3. See pp.122-123,161-162. For the view that until 1416 he was interested only in the implementation of the Brétigny terms and only sought the French throne from Sept. 1419 onwards see Palmer - "War Aims" 66, 69-70.

(2) Wylie - Henry V ii 6, 40; Vale - English Gascony 71-76, 81, 216; PPC ii 158. See above pp. 159, 293, 330-331.

Henry was convinced not only of the rectitude of his claims to the French throne, but also of his obligation to pursue them to the full. He went to war against the French as an appeal to the judgement of God, whom he regarded as the only competent judge of his quarrel against Charles. Through warfare he tried to achieve a final solution to the conflict which three-quarters of a century of legal and diplomatic wrangling had only succeeded in complicating, and therefore to establish a peace based on Anglo-French unity. The lands he acquired during this process were not to be regarded as a conquest, but as the recovery of rights which had been detained against justice. His early successes in these endeavours served to assure Henry that he had God's support and he presented himself as God's instrument for the punishment of the sin of the French (1).

These motives accorded with current theories about just war as they had evolved from the writings of St. Augustine through the works of the canonists. According to these principles a just war must be fought to redress an injury and there should be no reasonable alternative to a recourse to arms, since justice had been refused to the

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(1) Allmand - Henry V 15-17; M.W. Labarge - Henry V, The Cautious Conqueror (London 1975) 99, 189; Cal.Signet no. 879; Monstrelet iii 112. For a contrary view of Henry's motives see Vaughan - John the Fearless 205: "Henry V of England, one of the most aggressive and shifty products of an age of violence and duplicity, prepared and executed an invasion of France for his own advantage and renown, behind the usual smokescreen of ambassadors."

injured party. It was also legitimate to make war in self-defence. There was a duty to fight for both these purposes; to neglect to do so was to be tolerant of sin (1). When Henry finally broke the truces between England and France in July 1415 it was therefore necessary for him to place the onus for the breakdown of diplomatic negotiations on the French. He insisted that he had striven to obtain a reasonable peace but Charles had refused his requests for justice and delayed the talks so long that he was obliged to resort to the force of a just war (2). His manipulation of the theory of just war does not negate his sincere belief in it. He gathered written evidence to support his view of the renewal of war. Privy Seal clerks copied out truces and treaties, including the Orléanist concessions of 1412, a precedent which Henry regarded as an important element in his argument. A collection of documents was made at Bordeaux concerning his rights in Aquitaine, and reviews were drawn up both of the arguments since the beginning of the conflict, and of Henry's own conduct of the diplomacy of the "way of justice" (3). Henry intended that his presentation of the case should have both a foreign and a domestic audience. He justified his policy towards France to Parliaments, Great Councils, Convocations and the community of London, receiving expressions of support in return, and he kept

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(1) Keen - Laws of War 8-9, 66-71, 225.

(2) Besse - Recueil 96; Monstrelet iii 78: Lettres des Rois ii 360, 361-362; A.N. J.646 no.14.

(3) Brown - Privy Seal 283, 307n.78; Lettres des Rois ii 359-365; Bod.Lib.MS Bodl.885 ff. 37-38, 65-68v; E.36/188.

London informed of the progress of his campaigns in a series of Signet letters that were meant for public consumption. His propaganda in England gave him a double image as a heroic conqueror and also as a rightful lord returning to recover his inheritance after the French had contemptuously refused him justice (1). He circulated documentary evidence of his commitment to the "way of justice" to the royal courts of Europe in order that his attack on France might be judged favourably by the international community of Christendom. In July 1415, on the eve of his first invasion, he had copies of the 1412 treaty made and in January 1416 copies of a protocol of the negotiations of 1414 and 1415, and sent heralds to take them to the Council of Constance, the Emperor and the other princes of the Empire, the Iberian kingdoms and Scandinavia (2). The narrative propaganda piece Gesta Henrici Quinti seems to have been aimed at both an English audience and the international gathering at Constance. Its purpose was to justify both Henry's attack on France, in particular promoting support for his second expedition in 1417 by an account of the success of the first, and also

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(1) Allmand - Henry V 11; Wylie - Henry V i 425-428, 432, 453, 455; ii 235, 296, 308; iii 36; PPC ii 140-142; Cal.Signet nos. 966-970; Rot.Parl. iv 63; Lettres de~ Rois ii 361; Brown - Privy Seal 259 n.19; J.W.McKenna - Royal Political Propaganda 1399-1509 (Cambridge Ph.D.thesis 1965) 65-66. See also the curious letter copied at B.L. Landsdowne MS. 762 f.3 purporting to be from Henry to Charles.

(2) Wylie - Henry V i 512; PPC ii 192; Foedera ix 208-215; E.30/1695.

Sigismund's volte-face from neutral mediator to English ally (1). In this international propaganda exercise Henry was following the examples of John of Burgundy, who had circulated Jean Petit's justification of tyrannicide throughout Europe, and Charles VI, who had sent descriptions of the actions of the Cabochiens and requests for their extradition to several foreign courts, including Henry's (2).

It is against this background of the establishment of a valid case in terms of the theory of just war, that the extraordinary demands Henry made to the Valois must be viewed. His early diplomatic contacts with the French were concerned with his rationalisation of the truce system. He brought the Anglo-Breton truce into line with the terms of the Picardy truce and tried to bring all the various conflicts at sea under the aegis of the Statute of Truces. He called upon the French to extend and discuss the recently expired truces and to accept the continued validity of the twenty-eight year truce. In January 1414 he succeeded in re-establishing the essential terms of the 1396 truce by the new London truce. His purpose was to return the struggle to the legal position of Richard's reign, removing all the obfuscation imposed by the French

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(1) J.S.Roskell and F.Taylor (eds.) Gesta Henrici Quinti (Oxford 1973) Introduction, xxiii-xxix, xliii; J.S.Roskell and F.Taylor - "The Authorship and Purpose of the Gesta Henrici Quinti" B.J.R.L. liv (1971-1972).

(2) Vaughan - John the Fearless 70, 193; Bod.Lib. Rawlinson B.120 f.191v.

in the truces since 1407 (1). This would provide the proper context for the consideration of his claim to the French throne.

His representatives first put forward this claim and the French first rejected it at the Leulinghen conference of September 1413. During the conferences of 1414, both with the Burgundians and with the French governments, the English ambassadors insisted on stating Henry's title to the French kingdom, and requesting its surrender (2). When French envoys came to England in December 1413, they were told that any settlement must be based on the "way of justice" and this remained the emphasis of the English negotiating stance in all the talks leading up to the French embassy to Winchester in July 1415. In the later phases of these, Henry put pressure on the French by shortening the periods of the safe-conducts and truces he conceded, and by setting a deadline of a week to reach a conclusion at Winchester. He continued to stress his readiness to reach a just settlement, offering a half-peace at the last moment as a way of breaking the deadlock in the discussions. The defiance read and delivered to the French ambassadors at the end of the conference reviewed his efforts in the "way of justice" since his accession (3). Henry's two letters to Charles in

(1) Foedera ix 35-36; B.L.Add.MS. 24062 f.150v. See above pp. 262, 280, 284-287.

(2). Wylie - Henry V i 153-154. See pp. 122, 127 above.

(3) See pp. 125, 132-137, 287-288 above.

April 1415 urged on this process, calling for adequate compensation for the surrender of his French title and drawing attention to the benefits that peace would have for the divided Church. His letter of defiance at the end of July was a final summons to Charles to do him justice, referring again to the judgement of God which awaited them both. Charles' reply of 14 August similarly appealed to the theory of just war, stating his right to oppose Henry's aggression by force and placing the responsibility for the renewed hostilities on the English party (1). In his communications with Charles and his sons before the negotiations leading to the treaty of Troyes, Henry continued to insist that his claim to the French crown was irrefutable and to justify his military presence in France by the Valois' denial of justice to him: in his challenge to Dauphin Louis in September 1415 (2); in his demand to Charles from Touques in August 1417 to surrender the kingdom, and the subsequent correspondence leading to the abortive conference at Bonneville (3); in the conference with the Dauphinists in November 1418 (4); and in the letter of denunciation prepared, but not sent, in May 1419 (5).

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(1) Nicolas - Agincourt appendix 1 pp.1-7; PPC ii 153, 154; Monstrelet iii 78-81. See p. 288 above.

(2) Foedera ix 313; Nicolas - Agincourt 72 n.a, 216.

(3) Foedera ix 482-483: Bod.Lib. Arch.Seld. B.23 f.61v; Wylie and Waugh- Henry V iii 97. See pp. 142-143 above.

(4) Foedera ix 643, 644. See pp. 10, 146, 151 above.

(5) Lettres de Rois ii 364-365. See p. 155 above.

Henry always realised he would have to support his diplomatic offensive in the "way of justice" by a recourse to arms and prepared for it from the beginning of his reign. The English raid on St.Aubin, Dieppe and le Tréport in July 1413 (1) was probably intended as a warning to France of his belligerency. He made public in councils and parliaments his intention to recover his inheritance by force if necessary; in November 1414 Parliament advised him to prepare an expedition whilst continuing diplomatic contact and arrangements were made for the payment of wages (2). He stockpiled war materials, ordered siege engines and cannon from Bordeaux and created a separate ordnance department. He increased the number of royal ships from seven at his accession, to thirteen in 1415 and to a peak of thirty-six in August 1417 (3). The expedition was formally announced to a Great Council on 16 April 1415 and indentures were drawn up for it in the succeeding weeks. These envisaged one years' service in France or Guyenne: Henry was already intending a prolonged war of conquest. Extensive preparations finally assembled an expedition ready to leave by 1 August, the day the last

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(1) Wylie - Henry V i 150-151; Monstrelet ii 376; CPR 1413-1416 116.

(2) PPC ii 140-142, 150-151; Wylie - Henry V i 24, 322, 391, 432, 453.

(3) Wylie - Henry V i 159-163: Vale - English Gascony 72; Fowler-Plantagenet and Valois 116; Richmond - Admin. and Keeping of Seas 29; Rose - Navy of Lancastrian Kings 34-37, 48.

truce extension expired (1). The obvious signs of the mobilisation reinforced the diplomatic pressure Henry was exerting on France.

However, the military adventure of 1415 did not achieve the objectives of Henry's policy. The expedition soon lost momentum at the siege of Harfleur, and though its eventual surrender converted it from a French privateering base into a new English barbican town, French counter-attacks in 1416 circumscribed the activities of its garrison and made it difficult to retain (2). The hurried march to Calais during which Henry was out-manoeuvred and brought to battle by the French, was a campaign of the Edwardian type, intended as a military progress along the coastline in which Henry had shown great interest in his diplomacy. The victory at Agincourt confirmed Henry in his belief that God was on his side and had enormous value for prestige and propaganda, but it had little effect on the balance of military forces within France other than eliminating several Orléanist leaders. Henry apparently had every intention of capitalising on the success of Agincourt by launching another campaign in the following season (3), but he was still attracted by the prospect of a négotiated settlement and used his chief asset, the Agincourt prisoners, to try to initiate the process. He

(1) Foedera ix 218, 222-223, 298; PPC ii 157-158; CCR 1413-1419 268; CPR 1413-1416 344; Wylie - Henry V i 445, 456, 479, 531; B.L.Add MS. 38525 ff.35-40v; C.47/2/49 no.7.

(2) Wylie - Henry V ii 332-339. See pp. 40-41, 139-140.

(3) Wylie - Henry V ii 235, 296.

considered releasing some of the most prominent on parole to go to France and persuade the government to open discussions. However the French did not take up the offer, nor would the prisoners agree to the arrangements for Sigismund's custody of Harfleur at the Westminster conference of June 1416. The terms Henry tried to negotiate through the duke of Bourbon and the Sire de Gaucourt early in 1417 also proved abortive (1). The attempt to re-open the "way of justice" through the Agincourt captives was therefore a failure, but the question of their release remained a negotiating point in Henry's favour.

In 1416 Henry continued his preparations to break the French blockade of Harfleur, despite the activities of Sigismund as mediator, intending at first to sail himself to its relief (2). The exceptional naval victory of the duke of Bedford in August decisively altered the military situation and the effect on the French negotiating position was soon apparent. Followed by the earl of Huntingdon's success at sea in June 1417 and regular English patrols, it allowed Henry to control the Channel for the rest of his reign (3). When Henry's next

(1) Foedera ix 362; Nicolas - Agincourt 215, 290-291, Appendix pp. 24-28; B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Dv f.45. See pp.138,139,141-142 above.

(2) Foedera ix 344, 345, 355, 362; CPR 1413-1416 415; Wylie - Henry V ii 352, 354, 357; B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Dv ff.12-13.

(3) Foedera ix 376-377; EHD iv no.109; Wylie - Henry V ii 358-366; Richmond - Admin. and Keeping of Seas 21, 26-28; "Keeping of Seas" 285; "Naval Power" 1; Rose - Navy of Lancastrian Kings 49. See pp. 141, 369 above.

expedition landed near Touques in August 1417 it was to conduct a different sort of campaign. He planned a systematic long-term conquest of Normandy. He continued the campaign throughout the winter and took part of his administrative machine with him, including the Signet office and sections of the Chancery, the Exchequer and the Privy Seal Office, foreshadowing his dual lordship of England and Normandy (1). The campaign necessarily consisted of a series of sieges and much progress was made in lower Normandy until May 1418. Then the pace slowed and there was little change until Henry captured Rouen in January 1419 after a prolonged investment. Then he moved slowly up the Seine valley, taking Pontoise at the end of July (2).

The protraction of the war of conquest had inclined Henry by October 1418 to negotiate a settlement with one of the two factions within France. Without a peace or truce it was realised that he would have to continue his piecemeal acquisition of France, siege by siege, until it extended to the whole kingdom, or else defend his present holdings in Normandy. This would involve constantly paying an army of occupation in the Duchy and Henry dared not make further financial demands of its inhabitants. Brigands' activities and the failure to attract the nobility into

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(1) Brown - Privy Seal 99.

(2) Vaughan - John the Fearless 264-265, 273; Wylie and Waugh - Henry V iii 50-64, 71-74; Cal.Signet nos. 966-970; EHD iv no.110; Choix i 404; Lettres des Rois ii 339-343; B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Dv f.59. See pp. 142-143 above.

the English obedience made the possession of Normandy insecure and it was considered unlikely that it would withstand the pressure of the Burgundians and the Dauphinists, should they combine against it. Therefore Henry responded to the Dauphin's approach and agreed to the peace conference at Alençon (1). After the fall of Rouen, Henry still sought a peace treaty from both the Dauphin and the duke of Burgundy and moderated his demands for satisfaction in the "way of justice" (2). The failure of these talks obliged Henry in April 1419 to expand his campaign beyond the frontiers of Normandy into France (3). In August, when Henry reported the capture of Pontoise to the Londonders, he added wearily that since the enemy would not make peace, he must continue the war (4).

This loss of momentum and the reaching of an eventual impasse were inevitable as English energies were dissipated against the town walls of France. This course could be avoided by the improvement of Henry's position in the alliance structures within France and in the wider European sphere, and moves in this direction formed part of the diplomatic preparations for his offensive policy. He negotiated to prevent Castile and Genoa giving further support to Charles VI; he sought marriage alliances with Aragon and Navarre; he renewed the contacts Richard II had

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(1) Foedera ix 630; PPC ii 350-351, 356. See above pp.144-153.

(2) See pp. 153-156 above.

(3), B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Dv f.59.

(4) Cal.Signet no 970.

made in the Rhineland and pursued new interests in southern Italy. His most prestigious alliance was with the Emperor Sigismund, sealed at Canterbury in August 1416 (1). Within France Henry reduced the burden of his military tasks by a network of local truces with the dukes of Burgundy, Brittany and Anjou, the Albrets and the Armagnacs. He also tried to persuade the southern lords to perform homage and fealty to him and to exclude them from his negotiations with the Dauphin at Alençon (2). Like Henry IV, he needed to exploit all the divisions in the French aristocracy.

Henry V did not show the same interest in a Breton alliance that his father and grandfather had, but rather it was Jean V who took the initiative. Late in 1413 he quarrelled with the duke of Orléans in Paris and thereafter broke his links with the Orléanist faction and moved towards a rapprochement with the Burgundians (3). In October 1414 he alleged to John of Burgundy that he had refused Charles VI's summons to send troops to fight against him and he also requested a personal meeting with him (4). In August 1415, when Henry landed near Harfleur, Jean V's envoys were meeting John of Burgundy at Rouvres (5). These contacts finally resulted in a Breton-Burgundian

(1) See pp. 136, 142 above.

(2) Foedera ix 597, 631; Wylie and Waugh - Henry V iii 83. See pp. 290-293 above.

(3) Monstrelet ii 403, 409.

(4) Preuves ii 894-895.

(5) Wylie - Henry V ii 122.

alliance in February 1417 (1). Jean V contacted Henry V early in his reign to renew the ten-year truce he had made with his father and Henry obliged his envoys to agree to a new truce in January 1414. This established the duke as a neutral and it appears that henceforward Henry claimed him as an ally (2). In order to promote the health of the quasi-alliance, Henry made serious efforts in 1414 to make this truce work and in the latter half of the year an English embassy was active in Brittany, attempting to make a final settlement of infractions (3).In 1415 Jean V approached Henry to renew the Anglo-Breton alliance of 1412 and at the end of July, on the eve of his departure for France, Henry sent an embassy to Brittany for this purpose (4). In August he emphasised Breton neutrality by having the truce proclaimed again in his south-western ports (5). But it seems that no formal alliance resulted.

In spring 1417 Jean V requested a personal interview and arrangments were made to bring him to England, but it is unlikely that he made the journey. Henry's second invasion of Normandy brought a greater urgency to Jean's request, and though he would not agree to the meeting until he was given a safe-conduct that included the security of his

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(1) Lettres de Jean V v nos. 1235, 1316.

(2) Knowlson - Jean V 84-85. See pp. 280-281, 285 above.

(3) Cal.Signet no 786; Lettres de Jean V v no. 1181; C.76/97 m.23. See pp. 283, 368 above.

(4) Foedera ix 297-298; Wylie - Henry V i 104; ii 122; Knowlson - Jean V 93.

(5) Foedera ix 309.

lands, he finally came to Henry at Alençon at the end of October 1417 (1).This meeting resulted in new truces covering Brittany, Anjou and Maine, extending Breton neutrality and immunity from attack from the sea to the land (2).

By one of the clauses of this truce, Duke Jean promised to recall to Brittany those of his subjects who were fighting against the English. Despite all Henry's efforts to establish Breton neutrality, he could not prevent some Breton participation on the French side. Jean's brother Arthur of Richmond besieged Parthenay on behalf of the Orléanists in 1415 and left the siege to play a leading part in the campaign leading up to the battle of Agincourt, where he was taken prisoner. Jean himself answered Charles VI's summons to resist the English with reluctance. He attended the war council at Rouen but demanded the return of St. Malo to his possession as his price for fighting. He managed to advance slowly enough to be still at Amiens with his contingent when the battle was fought (3). If Jean dared not refuse Charles in 1415, he dared not oppose Henry in 1417 and he quickly saw that the change of power in Normandy could bring commercial advantages to the Bretons. Brittany supplied the English

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(1) Wylie and Waugh - Henry V iii 67-68; Knowlson - Jean V 99-100; Lettres de Jean V v nos. 1241, 1284; Foedera ix 446-447, 503, 506.

(2) See pp. 291-292 above.

(3) Wylie - Henry V ii 122, 123; Knowlson - Jean V 94-95; Nicolas - Agincourt 223 n.a; Preuves ii 917, 921; Monstrelet iii 97, 102.

army there with victuals and even some troops and horses over the next two years (1). Jean V was less skilful at steering a middle course between England and France than his father had been. By 1419 he saw his role as that of a mediator between the two sides, visiting Henry at Rouen in March to prepare for his interview with Charles (2). In 1420 he was taken prisoner by the count of Penthièvre, and the Dauphinist party hoped to exploit this to put the Penthièvre family in possession of the Duchy. Henry considered Jean's alliance sufficiently valuable to respond favourably to the duchess's petitions that he should intervene on behalf of the captive duke and release Arthur of Richmond. In Normandy the earl of Salisbury was prepared to aid the barons of Brittany against Dauphinist attacks. After his release Richmond served Henry in the Meaux campaign of 1421 and as captain of Ayvry-la-Chance (3). Henry aimed to exclude Brittany from the Anglo-French conflict rather than place any reliance on military aid from the duke. After he had established his presence in Normandy he was able to exert some control over Jean V, though Breton raids over the Norman border remained a problem.

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(1) Knowlson - Jean V 105-106.

(2) Knowlson - Jean V 112; B.L.Add.MS. 38525 f.75.

(3) Lettres des Rois ii 342, 375-378, 392; Foedera ix 876-877, 894-895; Knowlson - Jean V 122; R.G.Little - The Parliament of Poitiers and the Kingdom of Bourges: A Study of War Government and Politics during the Early Years of the Reign of Charles VII of France 1418-1436 (Oxford D.Phil. thesis 1980) 55, 341; B.L.Cotton MS. Julius Bvi f.37.

Henry expected much more from an alliance with John of Burgundy and continued the interest he had shown in this as prince, when he succeeded to the throne. Such was the power wielded by the duke of Burgundy within France that if he became a firm ally, the acquisition of other alliances on the periphery of France became superfluous. Duke John re-established contact with Henry soon after his accession, sending some envoys to England. As a consequence, an English embassy crossed to meet John at Bruges and Lille in September 1413 to revive the suggestions of a marriage between Henry and one of his daughters , and a military alliance. The renewal of negotiations between the duke and the French government seems to have prevented any agreement being concluded, but a Burgundian ambassador was in London the following winter (1). In 1414 the initial moves again came from Duke John, who sent an embassy to England which resulted in the detailed bargaining at the conferences at Leicester, Ypres and St. Omer over the summer. Henry was willing to arrange a personal meeting with John and the St. Omer meeting ended with an agreement that further talks should be held in England, but by the terms of the Peace of Arras, John swore he would make no treaty with the English (2). Nevertheless he sent Copin de Viesville to England in

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(1) Wylie - Henry V i 149, 151-152; Pocquet du Haut Jussé - "Renaissance Littéraire" 334-335; Foedera ix 34; Monstrelet ii 403-404, 406.

(2) Wylie - Henry V i 396, 397, 402, 411-416; Vaughan - John the Fearless 201, 205-206; Cal.Signet no.769; Foedera ix 120, 136-138, 142; E.28/30 unnumbered; C.76/94 m.4. See pp. 121-125 and p.123 n.1, p.124 n.1 above.

October and November 1414 (1). In July 1415 Viesville and other envoys were present at Winchester and in August Henry sent Philip Morgan to continue discussions with Duke John during his siege of Harfleur (2).

Although negotiations for an Anglo-Burgundian alliance had reached an advanced stage in 1414, they had not come to fruition before Henry's first landing in Normandy. The precise size of the force Henry was to send to France, the payment of its wages and its transportation were discussed to the satisfaction of both sides. Unlike the intervention of 1411, considerable concessions were demanded before the duke received English military aid. The objectives of the alliance were defined as the recovery of Guyenne as held by the treaty of Brétigny for the sole benefit of Henry and the shared conquest of the lands of the Orléanist lords, but problems arose over John's attitude to King Charles and the duke of Berry. Henry wanted him to commit himself to fight both of them and to fight in all parts of France in support of Henry's claim to the French throne. But John would not close his options by renouncing Charles as his superior lord and would only agree not to obstruct Henry in pursuit of his claim. The fluctuations in his relationship with the government in Paris made him reluctant to make any obligation to Henry or even to show

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(1) Wylie - Henry IV i 416; Foedera ix 158, 179; E.28/30 unnumbered.

(2) Wylie - Henry V ii 105 and 106 n.1; Foedera ix 304; PPC ii 167; Besse - Recueil 109; CCR 1413-1419 210, 211.

a consistent interest in negotiating with the English (1). His role in the military events of 1415 was ambiguous. He denied he had any alliance with the English, ordered the muster of troops and stated his intention to lead them against the invaders. Whether because of an understanding reached with Philip Morgan or in reaction to the Orléanist attempts to exclude him from the royal army whilst making use of his vassals, he did not himself set out and prevented his heir the count of Charolais from going. His troops threatened Paris during the later months of the year. However, Burgundian contingents did fight at Agincourt and his two brothers, the duke of Brabant and the count of Nevers, were killed there (2). In his instructions to his Flemish ambassadors a few months later, John excused the participation of his Flemish vassals on the grounds that both he and they owed military service to Charles for their fiefs, but they had not made war on Henry "principally and in chief" (3).

Henry's victory made John of Burgundy more anxious to negotiate with him and he sent embassies to England in January and May 1416. Henry took full advantage of the increased strength of his position, accepting an extension

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(1) Cartellieri - "Beiträge" 12-30; E.30/1531: B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Dv ff.14-15; Boitel - "Appels a l'Angleterre" 18-19.

(2) Vaughan - John the Fearless 207-208; Boitel - "Appels a l'Angleterre" 19; Wylie - Henry V ii 94, 99, 103, 106 n.1, 107, 169, 173, 181, 281-283; Monstrelet iii 90, 93, 99, 112; A.N. K.61 no.2.

(3) McFarlane - "Anglo-Flemish Relations" 42, from Bod.Lib. MS. French a.2.

of the securities for Flanders for only one year instead of the five requested in May, and obtaining a truce which established the neutrality of Flanders and Artois, with an agreement to make no treaties with the Armagnacs, in June.

In July an English embassy met John at Lille and returned with his acceptance of an invitation to meet Henry at Calais in October (1). Henry was drawing the duke into an alliance step by step. He came to meet Henry and Sigismund at Calais only after elaborate security precautions involving the delivery of the duke of Gloucester to the count of Charolais as a hostage (2). The talks took place in an atmosphere of secrecy and mistrust. John was presented with the draft of a statement by which he would recognise Henry's claim to the French throne and agree to support it by warfare against all his enemies in France, not excepting Charles VI or the Dauphin from any alliance that was to be made unless as a dissimulation. He would also perform liege homage and fealty to Henry after he had conquered a considerable portion of France. These demands restricted the duke's freedom of action far too much to be acceptable to him; it is not known what he was offered in return (3). Henry had overplayed his hand and failed to conclude the grand tripartite alliance he desired. A lull in diplomatic activity followed; the purpose of the

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(1) Wylie - Henry V ii 295; Wylie and Waugh - Henry V iii 19-20; Foedera ix 328, 354, 364, 374; Cal.Signet no.791; C.76/98 m.2. See pp. 275 , 290-291 above.

(2) Foedera ix 390-393; E.30/1761; C.76/99 m.16.

(3) Foedera ix 394-396; Wylie and Waugh - Henry V iii 26-28; Vaughan - John the Fearless 213-214; Boitel - "Appels à l'Angleterre" 19; E.28/32 nos.65 and 66.

negotiations of the summer of 1417 was only to extend the securities for Flanders and the truce with Duke John (1). Although not as advantageous as an alliance, these truces secured Burgundian neutrality on the left flank of Henry's assault upon Normandy. John of Burgundy neither opposed nor supported the English invasion of 1417, but took advantage of it to launch his own campaign against the towns around Paris (2). The truce covering Flanders, Artois, Boulogne and Saint-Pol was renewed again in March 1418, but expired at Michelmas (3). John's effective neutrality ended when he entered Paris in July: when Henry sent a poursuivant to ask if he would keep the truce, he replied that he would give battle, so Henry was obliged to regard him as an enemy (4). As guardian and protector of France once more, he prepared troops to go to the relief of Rouen at the end of the year.

In these circumstances, Henry considered forming an alliance with the Dauphin against Burgundy. He would fight the duke in the name of his own quarrel rather than the Dauphin's, excluding him from the truce to be made between them. The principal military objective would be to lure the duke out of Paris, so that the Dauphin could regain control of the city and his father, without which the

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(1) See pp. 275, 291 above.

(2) Wylie and Waugh - Henry V iii 79-81; Vaughan - John the Fearless 215-219.

(3) Wylie - Henry V ii 301-302; Wylie and Waugh - Henry V iii 83; Cal.Signet no. 484. See p. 291 above.

(4) Cal.Signet no 968.

English considered the security of his alliance dubious. English troops might also serve the Dauphin at his own expense. As his price for the alliance, Henry wanted territory in north-eastern France that was to be conquered from the Burgundians. However, the conference at Alençon never reached the point of discussing this proposal (1). Henry also had some contact with the count of Penthièvre at this time (2). The primacy of Burgundy in Henry's diplomacy was soon restored. Between December 1418 and June 1419 there was a series of negotiations covered by short truces in which Henry tried to draw the duke of Burgundy into an alliance against the Dauphin based on the terms of a peace settlement between himself and Charles. But on 13 July the Duke agreed to co-operate with the Dauphin against the English by the treaty of Pouilly. His envoys continued to follow Henry's camp from Mantes to Pontoise, but came to no conclusion in their talks with him. After Henry's demonstration of strength at Pontoise, Duke John prepared to attack him (3). He continued his tactics of evasion and dilatoriness in his arrangements with the Dauphin, which ended in his death on the bridge at Montereau in September. John's assassination was decisive for Henry's offensive policy towards France, for it finally brought him the Burgundian alliance and the possibility of ending the war by a full military conquest.

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(1) PPC ii 352-353. See pp. 145-146, 151 above.

(2) Foedera ix 655.

(3) Vaughan - John the Fearless 273-274; Varenbergh - Histoire des Relations 508. See pp. 154-156, 294 above.

He redrew his plans for a peace settlement with Charles and these served as the basis for his alliance with John's son Philip in December 1419 and for the Treaty of Troyes the following May (1).

The settlement at Troyes did not relieve Henry of the burden of the struggle, but rather committed the English to a policy of complete conquest. The diplomatic offensive also continued for it was now necessary to obtain the recognition of the treaty by those members of the French aristocracy who were not actively supporting the Dauphin. These included Henry's captive the duke of Bourbon, the count of Saint-Pol, the duke of Lorraine and the houses of Albret and Foix (2). The most important and the most difficult to bring within the purview of the treaty was Jean V of Brittany. He signed the treaty of Sablé with the Dauphin in May 1421 and his brother Richard fought with the Dauphinists. When Jean finally authorised his ambassadors to ratify the treaty of Troyes on his behalf, they delayed so long on their journey that they did not reach Henry V before he died (3).

The settlement at Troyes ended an era of Anglo-French diplomacy which had been dominated by the treaty of

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(1) E.H.D. iv 223-225. See pp. 55-56, 156-157 above.

(2) Vale- English Gascony 88-92, 216: CPR 1416-1422 324; Foedera ix 923; Choix i 412-413; B.L.Cotton MS, Caligula Dv ff. 71-72v, 73; B.N. Lorraine 6, nos. 151-155.

(3) Knowlson - Jean V 119-124; Roskell - Commons 1422 94, 166.

Brétigny. By 1389 the possibilities of the Great Peace as a foundation for a diplomatic solution to the developing conflict had almost been exhausted. Neither side could afford to abandon its position over the question of liege homage and it was only Gaunt's personal willingness to do so that brought them close to a negotiated settlement in 1393. The conclusion of truces, particularly long truces, was as much an admission of the failure to achieve a peace as a preparation for further discussion (1). Therefore a period of extended truces punctuated with peace talks followed. The peace talks were used to manoeuvre for positions of advantage in the conflict, since diplomacy was an extension of war, as much as war was an extension of diplomacy. The truces provided recuperation from the long years of struggle, but also the opportunity to break the stalemate of the war by the acquisition of new allies and by checking the advance of hostile interests abroad. Both England and France used this period of truce to widen their influence into new areas of Europe and inevitably their interests clashed. In this way a truce could be used as a preparation for war, or even as an instrument of military policy, as it was by Henry V (2).

Negotiations for peace and truce did not therefore preclude the pursuit of offensive policies toward France by the rulers of England but it is not possible to discern much consistency in these policies. Changes of monarch,

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(1) See pp. 14-15, 54-55 above.

(2) See pp. 165-166, 297, 433 above.

faction politics and financial restraints all contributed to prevent the development of long-term coherent policy. This is particularly apparent in Anglo-Breton relations, where the interest of England in an alliance acts as a barometer for its current attitude to France (1).This recurrent adaptation of policy to circumstances was largely changed when Henry V imposed a clear sense of purpose and maintained it throughout his reign. He provided his policy with a firm theoretical base in the idea of a just war and a military base in Normandy. However, there are signs that this policy was stagnating by 1419. There was often a wide gulf between the objectives of English foreign policy and its achievements. The dukes of Brittany and Burgundy repeatedly frustrated attempts to turn them into allies against France. The capacity of English arms to acquire territory in France was nearly always overestimated. Despite the vacillations and failures of English policy, the Plantagenet claim to the French throne was not abandoned and so the continuance of the conflict was assured.

During this period the balance of advantage in the conflict swung from France to England, but it was not a smooth movement. The position in the last five years of Richard II's reign was ambiguous and untested, and the first half of Henry IV's reign makes an interruption in the pattern, in which negotiations were based on the 1396 truce rather than the treaty of Brétigny. The initiative

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(1) See pp. 395, 413 above.

clearly lay with France, both militarily and diplomatically, but Henry was always able to use the threat of open war in response. In the latter half of his reign French interference in the periphery of the conflict faltered and ceased; English intervention in France again became feasible. The movement was accelerated by the aggression of Henry V; in his reign the transformation of the conflict from the French feudal interpretation to the English dynastic interpretation was completed, and codified in the treaty of Troyes (1). From his landings in Normandy in 1417 onwards he endeavoured to give military effect to this interpretation, but death intervened before he could complete this enormous task.

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(1) See pp.5-7,12,27,64-65,160-162,296.

Chapter VI

THE FORMULATION OF ENGLISH FOREIGN POLICY.

In the previous chapters an effort has been made to identify English policies towards France during this period in regard to peace, truce, war and international influence. Now an attempt must be made to trace these policies to their genesis in the English government and governing classes, and determine how foreign policy was made. It is difficult to discuss the formulation of foreign policy in an age in which there was such a lack of consistency in the conduct of foreign affairs. The medieval government had no distinct department of state to deal with internatonal relations. Its diplomatic activity was subjected to greater physical constraints than that of later times. Communications were slow and inefficient: letters might be delayed or not arrive at all; ambassadors' journeys overseas depended on favourable weather conditions; their theoretical immunity from arrest and attack was often ignored and their letters of safe-conduct violated. Nor did the government have much control over events abroad, at sea or on the borders of

its territories. Military commanders and allies proved wayward; border magnates and privateers followed their own rules, and by necessity made their own arrangements with the enemy. Their independent actions towards enemies, neutrals and allies were bound to have a bearing on international relations, and the government found it difficult to maintain central direction of the truces and other diplomatic agreements it made.

A kingdom's diplomatic activity was based around the pursuit of the king's hereditary claims and obligations, not a national policy with defined long-term goals.It is not possible to speak of the English government acting on a consistent programme for peace over a period of a quarter of a century. Foreign policy was subject to constant improvisation and adaptation, its objectives in terms of territory, tenure and titles depending on the state of the military balance and the interplay of truce and war. It was therefore almost myopically opportunistic.It did not deal in such comparatively modern concepts as the balance of power, which only emerged from the Italian political system into the rest of Europe at the end of the fifteenth century (1). Foreign policy also suffered from abrupt changes of direction because of domestic upheavals, not just changes of monarch, but also the rise and fall of aristocratic factions and the prominence of certain interest groups in the community of the realm.

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(1) E.W.Nelson - "The Origins of Modern Balance of Power Politics" Medievalia et Humanistica i (1942) 125-142.

Such unity and continuity as there was in foreign policy derived from the person of the king, since government was still essentially personal. Even so, it was certain characteristics in the conduct of diplomacy that recurred throughout a reign rather than long-term policies. Henry V's reign is so outstanding because he was an exception to this pattern, single-minded in the enforcement of his claims over a ten year period. Not only the style of foreign policy was dependent on the king's character, but also the extent to which he directed it or delegated responsibility. The king made all the important decisions and ordered nearly all the commissions under which embassies were sent out. He might retain a personal involvement in their conduct of negotiations. The English delegations to the peace conferences of the early 1390s repeatedly referred the terms under discussion to the notice of Richard II before proceeding to a conclusion (1). Henry IV instructed his envoys to Scotland in 1401 to report back to him should they reach an impasse in their talks (2).Henry V displayed a disinclination to take counsel or delegate to others where his main interests in France were concerned. He took sole responsibility for his foreign policy and kept a close watch over the conduct of English diplomacy with France even when he was on campaign. His ambassadors to Paris in 1414 were ordered to report back to him without making an agreement, and his envoys to Armagnac and the Albrets in 1418 to notify him formally of

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(1), See pp.80, 83, 87, 89 above.

(2) PPC i 169.

their actions (1). The embassy he sent to negotiate with the Dauphinists in October 1418 was told to conclude no agreement without his consent and keep him informed of their progress at least once a week (2). Henry negotiated personally with the French ambassadors at Winchester in July 1415 and with Jean V of Brittany at Alençon in November 1417 to make truces with Brittany and the Angevins (3). In January 1417 he sent a diplomatic letter to John Tiptoft which he considered so confidential that he wrote it in his own hand and sealed it with his Signet of the Eagle, not entrusting it to his secretary who held the ordinary Signet (4).

Ordinarily foreign policy was directed by a partnership of the king and the Council.The Council and the Privy Seal office, which was intimately connected to it, formed the nearest things to a bureau for foreign affairs and its secretariat. The Council constantly considered diplomatic matters, its flexible structure and procedure being well suited to the variety of the work, and the Privy Seal was the most appropriate for both its domestic and foreign business, since it was informal, speedy and secret. The Keeper of the Privy Seal and the other higher officers, and those who sat with them on the Council, often

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(1) B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Dv f.12(15); Foedera ix 103, 597.

(2) Foedera ix 630, 631, 651.

(3) See pp. 133, 480 above. Foedera ix 511, 513.

(4) Foedera ix 427-430.

themselves served the king as diplomats. Both the Council and the Privy Seal normally remained at London and Westminster, while the king travelled around the country, and therefore it was the Council that received correspondence from ambassadors negotiating in Calais and Picardy, which it would pass on to the king when it was felt to be necessary. The Council always met without the king, but when he was away from Westminster, it took on additional responsibilities, relieving him from the pressure of routine business and carrying out the instructions he sent it by his Signet letters. However, it was the more mundane aspects of diplomacy that concerned the Council acting alone; it did not make fundamental policy decisions without the king, although the pattern of survival of its records probably under-emphasises its advisory role. Debates between the Councillors were not normally recorded, since they were reluctant to be identified with individual opinions, especially those of non-noble rank. The aim was to present an impression of unanimity (1).

Sometimes the Council would refrain from acting on diplomatic questions that came before it, or decline to negotiate with foreign envoys who presented themselves to it, until the king had communicated his intention about the matter (2). These were not matters which it was beyond

(1) Baldwin - King's Council Chaps. X-XV; Brown - Privy Seal 283-284.

(2). Cal.Signet nos 108, 163; PPC i 54-55, 59, 63, 133, 134; E.28/9 unnumbered, a letter to the king about two alternative forms of the quittance for the return of Queen Isabelle, sent by the ambassadors at Calais.

the competence of the Council to discuss, but it handled all its business in partnership with the king. There was continuous correspondence and communication between them by Signet letters and councillors acting as messengers. The king tended to make a final decision after the Council had considered and debated a question or drafted a diplomatic document. The Council did not take responsibility for decisions without obtaining the king's formal consent (1). In foreign affairs this consent normally performed an active function in the procedure, as when Richard II made corrections to the instructions for an embassy to Brittany in 1391 and Henry IV asked to review a Privy Seal letter to the king of Portugal, which he had ordered the Council to draft (2).

The relationship between the king and the Council was therefore close and personal, and central to the conduct of government; they were not rivals for power in the constitution. In a rare dispute between the king and the Council in 1389, about the Earl Marshal's new indenture for the wardenship of the East March, it was the Council that had to give way (3). The powers of the Council might fluctuate with political changes, particularly in regard to control over royal finance, but the respective functions of the king and the Council in regard to foreign policy changed little. Even when the Council took over

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(1) Baldwin - King's Council 382-383, 400, 505; PPC i 110; Cal.Signet no 341.

(2) PPC i 36-40, 280-281.

(3) PPC i 12b-12d.

most of the aspects of government, the king continued to order instructions and commissions for embassies to be made, using his Signet to do so. The king tended to make frequent use of the Signet, which always followed him closely, at times when he was distant from the Council either politically, or geographically because he was on campaign. When used extensively, especially as a direct warrant to the Great Seal, it was often associated with an effort to bypass the process of consultation and consent with the Council and act independently. Richard II relied heavily on the Signet during the chancellorship of Michael de la Pole in 1383-1386, his two Irish campaigns, and the last two years of his reign. Henry V made much use of it during his absences in France (1). The Council continued to cope with a constant flow of trivial administrative matters despite changes made to its powers and composition. It was considered important that the nobility should be represented on it in their hereditary capacity as the king's natural counsellors, and that if it was dominated by men of lower rank it would become a mere adjunct of the royal household. This was regarded as a danger particularly in the early years of Henry IV's reign, when he relied mostly on a close-knit group of knights and esquires. Therefore the ebb and flow of aristocratic faction at court influenced the membership of

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(1) Brown - Privy Seal 89, 277, 282; J.Otway -Ruthven - The King's Secretary and the Signet Office in the Fifteenth Century (Cambridge 1939) 8, 40, 43, 46, 52; M.Aston - Thomas Arundel: A Study of Church Life in the Reign of Richard II (Oxford 1967) 338; J.A.Tuck - "Richard II's system of patronage" in du Boulay and Barron - Reign of Richard II 6-7; Cal.Signet introduction pp.1,2,3.

the Council and the foreigh policy decisions it advised the king to make.

The areas in which the Council was competent to advise the king were very wide and not at all circumscribed by definition. There are a number of indications of where the Council was at work in the diplomatic field, besides the occurrence of documents in the portion of its records that survives as the Public Record Office class "Council and Privy Seal Files" (E.28). Petitions and letters were addressed to it both by English ambassadors and foreign rulers (1), and visiting envoys appeared before it. The king sent it Signet letters to refer matters to it and to order it to draw up commissions and instructions for ambassadors and letters to be sent abroad (2). When issuing letters, the king often stated he was acting "by advice of the Council" or, less usually,"by assent of the Council", or they might be warranted "by the King and the Council".

The routine maintenance of two generations of conflict with France had brought within the Council's range some matters of a military nature which were necessarily connected with foreign relations. It supervised measures for the defence of the kingdom against foreign attack and organised the finance for them (3). It arranged the

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(1) e.g. by the duke of Brittany in 1392, PPC i 47-50.

(2) PPC i 13; ii 154.

(3) Cal.Signet no.856; PPC i 177-179, 233-234, 250; ii 10; Foedera viii 342-343; E.28/23 no.2.

disposition of ships available to keep the sea, and the provisioning and equipping of the royal ships. This naval responsibility also involved supervising payments to the Portuguese squadron sent to the aid of Richard II in 1389 and the despatch of ships to collect Queen Jeanne in 1402 (1). The defence of the Scottish border came within the Council's purview and by extension, the organisation of expeditions into Scotland and the fate of Scottish prisoners (2). Similarly it was concerned with frontier areas in France. The indentures for the custody of Brest came before it in 1389 (3).It repeatedly arranged for the defence of Calais and dealt with the problems that arose there; in particular it coped with the crisis of the early months of 1407 (4). It also oversaw the despatch of troops and provisions to Guyenne, received requests from Gascon envoys, and discussed appointments and internal disturbances within the Duchy (5).

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(1) E.28/12 nos. 4 and 13;E.28/23 no.26; E.28/18 no.7; E.28/2 no.5; E.28/11 unnumbered; Foedera viii 147; PPC i 126; Cal.Signet no.180; see above pp. 362-363.

(2) Foedera viii 146, 278-279; PPC i 119; Tuck - "Richard II and Border Magnates" 44; West.Chron. 350; E.28/28 no.45.

(3) PPC i 14-14a; E. 28/1 nos. 54a and 54b; E.28/2 no.58.

(4) Cal.Signet nos. 167, 295; Kirby -"Council and Calais"; E.28/12 no.4; E.28/14 no.75; E.28/17 no.54; E.28/18 nos.13 and 50; E.28/22 no.30; E.28/20 no.30; E.28/24 no.17; E.28/26 nos. 9 and 98; E.28/28 no.9; E.28/29 nos. 28 and 42; see p. 306 above.

(5) E.28/7 no.31; E.28/9 unnumbered;E.28/11 unnumbered E.28/24 no.24; E.28/28 nos.76 and 77; E.28/14 no.134; Cal.Signet no.388; PPC i 119, 126, 178, 222-223, 243, 250, 291. See pp. 326-327 above.

As part of its judicial function, the Council had an interest in captures of ships at sea. These actions were normally beyond the reach of Common Law because they took place outside the kingdom, and aggrieved parties who were aliens could not sue in the Common Law courts. The Council was bounded by no such restrictions. These cases were also heard in Chancery and the admirals' court, and the Council took over cases on appeal from the latter. But at this time of mounting lawlessness at sea, when the English made attacks not only on enemy ships, but also on those of friendly and neutral nations, and suffered losses in retaliation, it was the flexible response of the Council that proved the most useful to the victims. Unlike the Common Law courts, the Council did not award damages, but ordered the restitution of the stolen property, including financial losses and expenses incurred (1). In response to complaints, the Council adjudged and ordered captured ships and merchandise to be restored, or listed in an inventory and kept safely until a final decision had been made about them (2). In cases where satisfaction could not be obtained by such judgements, it ordered arrests and

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(1) Baldwin - King' Council 272-278; Feodera viii 96-97. See also p. 342 above.

(2) PPC i 354, 355; Baldwin - King's Council 497, 501-502, 510, plate III; E.28/1 no.72; E.28/17 nos 53 and 60; E.28/19 no.34; E.28/20 no.37; E.28/28 no.61; C.49/47 no.19.

reprisals for the benefit of the victim (1). The cases were initiated by petitions addressed to the Council, or forwarded to it by the king, from both English merchants (2) and foreign merchants (3), who had suffered losses. The Council also received letters relating to the cases from foreign rulers and town authorities (4). It summoned offenders before it and heard the testimony of witnesses before proceeding to judgement. This process is seen at work particularly in the late 1380s and early 1390s, when several cases were adjudged against the English admirals, even when the king had taken his share of the booty captured (5). But by 1402 and 1403 it was receiving long lists of complaints of captures drawn up in schedules from the Hanseatic League, Castile and Flanders. The perpetrators of these acts, and those who had sustained losses at the hands of the subjects of these nations, were

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(1) Baldwin - King's Council 498; CCR 1389-1392 461; E.28/4 no.10; E.28/13 unnumbered, 18 Aug. and 19 Sept.; E.28/24 no.96.

(2) E.28/1 nos.45 and 72; E.28/6 no.92; E.28/13 unnumbered 18 Aug.; E.28/15 unnumbered, letter to King James of Scotland 24 Nov.; E.28/24 no.96.

(3) Cal.Signet no.693; Foedera viii 270, 284; Baldwin - King's Council 507-508; E.28/13 unnumbered, petition of Jacob Bodeker; E.28/17 no.60; E.28/20 no.37: E.28/28 nos.71 and 72.

(4) PPC i 24-26; Baldwin - King's Council 509-510; E.28/6 no.39(this is the letter from Richard II to Joan I of Aragon, stated to be lost at Dip.Cor. no.141); E.28/13 unnumbered, petition of Jacob Bodeker.

(5) PPC i 13, 14d-17; Baldwin - King's Council 498-499, 501, 507-510, plate III; E.28/6 no.39; E.28/8 nos. 26 and 33; E.28/14 no.285; E.28/20 no.37; C.49/47 no.20; C.49/48 nos. 9 and 12.

summoned before the Council en masse (1). Through its expanding responsibility for events at sea, the Council came into diplomatic contact during this period with Flanders, Holland, Guelders, Scotland, Denmark, the Hanseatic League and Prussia, the kingdoms of Portugal, Castile and Aragon, and Genoa and Milan. Friction at sea with France and Brittany came within the scope of the truce conservators and ambassadors, however (2).

It was a short step to proceed from this judicial activity to receiving foreign ambassadors and negotiating agreements with them about maritime affairs. The Council discussed the restitution of captured ships with Aragonese envoys in 1392 (3) and drew up a treaty with the Frisians in 1401 to pacify their conflict with the English at sea (4). In Henry IV's reign it negotiated with Venetian envoys and the duke of Holland over customs regulations (5), and provided for the protection of Portugal's merchants from reprisals for the debts incurred by its ambassadors (6). In the first year of Henry V's reign, it considered letters of marque that had been granted against the Genoese and

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(1) Letters of Henry IV i 103-104; Foedera viii 286, 303-304; 312-313; C.47/32 no.24 rolls 1 and 2; E.175/3 no.13; see p. 350 above.

(2) See pp. 342-345 above.

(3) Baldwin - King's Council 497, 499.

(4) Foedera viii 193; PPC i 175.

(5) Cal. S.P.- Venice no.169; Baldwin - King's Council 523-525.

(6) E.28/24 no.95.

also received envoys from Holland (1). In 1419 Henry ordered the Council to negotiate with the Genoese ambassadors not only about compensation for English goods taken, but also about neutrality in the Anglo-French war (2). In the reigns of Henry IV and Henry V, it was normally the Council that received envoys from Prussia and the Hanseatic towns and treated with them about the balance of compensation payments for ships captured and goods impounded on both sides. It also discussed the privileges of Hanse merchants in England, and the complaints of English merchants about friction with the Hanse establishment at Bergen in 1411-1412 (3).

As a further development from these concerns, the Council acquired a responsibility for the security agreements with Flanders. It was involved in the discussions with the Flemings in June 1389 and negotiated an agreement with their envoys in March 1403. It advised the king about the safe-conducts for fishermen in December 1403 and a four-month truce in May 1405. At this time Henry IV passed on diplomatic documents concerning the talks to the Council, because he was too busy to deal with them, and from here on, it seems to have directed the efforts to achieve a commercial truce. After this was obtained, the prorogations remained its responsibility for the rest of

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(1) PPC ii 132.

(2) PPC ii 255-257.

(3) Foedera viii 112-113; PPC i 223, 319, 320; ii 132; Cal.Signet no.726; Brown - Privy Seal ii 275; E.28/23 no.45: E.28/28 nos. 65, 82 and 83.

the reign and also during the time that Henry V was fighting in France (1). The Council's interest in the negotiation and maintenance of truces with the kingdoms of Scotland and Castile can also be seen as connected to its judicial and military areas of competence (2).

But besides these functions, the king would delegate to the Council the details of diplomacy with countries on the periphery of the main conflict with France. It was concerned in attempts to negotiate the terms of several alliances, including diplomatic marriages. In the 1390s it supervised the composition of alliances with the counts of Foix and Armagnac, and the duke of Brittany (3). Early in Henry IV's reign it acted for the king in his efforts to gain the allegiance of the Scottish earl of March and the lord of the Isles (4). It was involved in the discussion of marital connections between Henry's family and the king of the Romans, the count of Cleves, the king of Denmark and the duke of Albany (5), and in the

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(1) PPC i 256-259, 292-294, 310-313, 353; ii 3; Cal.Signet nos.175, 347, 669, 848, 862, 874; Foedera viii 312-313, 327, 444-445, 459-460; E.28/1 no.67; E.28/2 no.46; E.28/21 no.22; E.28/28 no.64; E.28/32 no.87; C.49/13 no.9; See p. 365 above.

(2) Foedera viii 73-74, 166; PPC i 32-33, 250, 319, 320; ii 82, 125-126;C.47/30/9 no.8.

(3) Baldwin - King's Council 498; PPC i 43, 79-80, 89-91.

(4) PPC i 182; Foedera viii 146, 245.

(5) PPC i 222, 225-228, 291-292; Letters of Henry IV i 97-99; Foedera viii 192 -193, 215, 265-267; Brown - Privy Seal, appendix of documents no.45, from H.M.General Register House, Edinburgh - Inventories and Treaties-Treaties with England no.10.

endeavour to retain the alliance of the duke of Guelders (1). The extent to which Henry V was prepared to entrust diplomacy with these peripheral countries to the Council, when he was concentrating on the war in France, is apparent from a letter of October 1418, in which he writes that he is sending on some Bavarian ambassadors from the siege of Rouen to the Council in England, on the grounds that it was better informed than he about English relations with Flanders, Holland and the German princes(2).

The Council might also be concerned in the central matter of England's foreign policy, the conflict with France. It gave advice to the king not only about truces with France and reparations for infractions, as in May 1400 and June 1413 (3), but also about some of the most important questions arising, such as the message brought by French envoys in November 1399 (4), the return of Queen Isabelle and her dowry (5), and the challenge of the count of Saint-Pol (6). It was involved in the proposed mediation

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(1) E.28/26 no.96.

(2) Cal.Signet no.848.

(3) PPC i 119; ii 129-130; Foedera viii 142.

(4) E.28/26 no.4, a draft letter to Charles VI in which the reference to the Council has been crossed through. It is fully legible only by ultra-violet light.

(5) Foedera viii 152-153; PPC i 118, 129-130; E.28/9 unnumbered, undated letter from the Council to the ambassadors at Calais, sent via Lord Grey. See p.106 above.

(6) PPC ii 82.

of Albrecht of Holland in 1387 (1), and considered drafts of a letter to be sent to France in April 1415 (2). In the late 1380s and early 1390s it discussed the fundamental problem of the terms on which peace was to be made with France and closely supervised the embassies sent to negotiate for this (3); but on these occasions the Council was large and heavily aristocratic in its membership and the consideration of this question soon became reserved for Great Councils which were formally summoned. The ordinary Council was not normally called upon to ratify or give its formal consent to treaties, though in September 1401 it assented to the agreement recently negotiated with the French, as it was a subsidiary document concerning the maintenance of the truce (4); in March 1407 it was mentioned as a party to Henry IV's ratification of the securities with Flanders, since it had been specially concerned with their negotiation (5); and in July 1410 it warranted his ratification of the truces with France, during the time that the Prince of Wales was controlling the government through the Council with little reference to his father (6).

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(1) Lettres des Rois ii 288-289 and the original at E.28/6 no.9.

(2) PPC ii 153-154.

(3) PPC i 11, 20-23, 45; Baldwin - King's Council 496; E.28/2 nos. 39 and 48.

(4) C.49/13 no.4.

(5) Foedera viii 473, 476.

(6) Foedera viii 646.

The Council might be involved at all stages in the despatch and conduct of embassies. Occasionally it discussed the choice of envoys who were to carry letters and messages to peripheral areas like Iberia, Italy, Germany and Scandinavia (1). It might arrange for the passage of ambassadors overseas (2), or for advance payments to be made to them (3), and often supervised their accounting with the Exchequer for their wages after their return (4). Ambassadors' procurations might be ordered or drafted in a Council meeting, or issued to them by the Council. Although these documents were often warranted by "the King and the Council", many more were warranted by the king alone. Drafting them was a matter of constant communication and co-operation between the two (5). The most confidential documents carried by ambassadors were their instructions and similarly these were sometimes drawn up in the Council (6). On one occasion, Henry V deputed a committee of five diplomats to draft instructions for an embassy to the duke of Burgundy

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(1) PPC i 281, 319; ii 192; Baldwin - King's Council 501.

(2) E.28/21 no.37.

(3) Baldwin - King's Council 503-504; Letters of Henry IV i 99-100; E.28/11 unnumbered, dated 28 June and 1 July; E.28/18 no.26.

(4) E.28/15 unnumbered, dated 21 Nov.; E.28/18 no.43; E.28/22 no.41; E.28/27 nos. 49 and 55.

(5) e.g. procurations for embassies to the French, Foedera viii 203-204, 224-225, 267, 300-302, 324-325, 513-514, 546-547; PPC ii 154; E.28/9 unnumbered, dated 13 Oct.

(6) PPC i 19-24, 223, 292-294; ii 153-155; E.28/6 no.31.

and their names are recorded in the Council minutes (1). It was normal throughout this period, and for embassies to all countries, for English instructions to be sealed with the Great Seal, the Privy Seal and the Signet (2), whilst French instructions were sealed only with the king's secret seal and countersigned by his secretary (3). In England it seems that the usual sequence was for the secretary to seal the instructions with the Signet and for the king to send them on to the Council or the officers to be sealed with the other two seals (4). They therefore passed through all the grades of government from the personal to the formal, but the purpose of the triple sealing seems to have been to make them as binding as possible, rather than to signify the assent of the Council. They normally originated with the king, whether as a draft forwarded for sealing or as an order for Councillors' to compose instructions at their own discretion. Rarely, the seals might be used in other combinations, as in the instructions to negotiate with the duke of Albany sealed with the Privy Seal and Signet in January 1410, when there was no chancellor (5), the use of

(1) PPC ii 167.

(2) PPC i 19-24, 114-115, 168-173, 238-240, 240-242; ii 5-6, 13, 20-24; Cal.Signet no. 639; Foedera vii 804-805, 811-813; viii 72, 153, 231-232; ix 345, 628-631; E.28/9 unnumbered, undated letter sent from the Council to the ambassadors at Calais via Lord Grey.

(3) H.Debraye - "La Chancellerie et les lettres royaux sous le regne de Charles VI 1380-1422" Positions des Thèses(1904) 28.

(4) Cal.Signet no.639; Foedera viii 153; E.28/15 unnumbered, dated 6 Nov.

(5) PPC i 323-327.

the Great and Privy Seals together when the Signet was with Henry V in France (1), and the Privy Seal alone in 1390 and 1391, when the Council seems to have been especially influential in foreign affairs (2).

Some embassies were instructed to inform the Council of their actions or refer back to it when points of difficulty were reached in their negotiations (3). The Council would sometimes report changes in circumstances to embassies that had already set out, or advise on problems they encountered, particularly those embassies sent to Calais to meet French or Flemish envoys (4).There were clearly times at which the Council played a fuller part in the conduct of diplomacy with France than others.In 1389 and the early 1390s it made decisions to send embassies to treat peace, appointed their personnel and drew up instructions which specified the terms for a settlement (5).John of Gaunt's voice was dominant in the Council at this time. It was probably almost as active in 1400 and 1401 when Henry IV placed great reliance on a group of knights and esquires, but this activity tailed off as the king grew in confidence and the Council gradually became

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(1) Brown - Privy Seal 275.

(2) PPC i 27-33, 36-40.

(3) PPC i 19-24, 33-34, 127; Foedera viii 132.

(4) E.28/1 no.67; E.28/2 no.46; E.28/9 unnumbered, letter from the ambassadors at Canterbury to the councillors at London, undated but written 14 Oct.1400; E.28/12 no.4.

(5) PPC i 7-8, 11, 19-24; Baldwin - King's Council 493, 496.

more aristocratic (1). Henry V seems to have deliberately associated his Council with his negotiations with France in spring 1415, when he was planning his first expedition (2). Usually, however, the Council was confined to an executive role in diplomacy, dealing with the details and mechanics while the king made the final decisions. The king needed the advice and expertise of the Council, but he did not need its consent to send embassies.

When the king required the Council to act as an assenting body, it was expanded to the form of a Great Council, whose personnel included many of the spiritual and temporal lords and sometimes knights from the shires, as in 1392 and 1401. But unlike Parliament, the members were chosen at the king's discretion and summoned by writs of Privy Seal (3). Great Councils consented to the prorogation of the truce with France in May 1392 (4), and the implementation of the agreement to return Queen Isabelle in 1401 (5). It was felt that the king should not commit the country to war or a final peace without obtaining the agreement of a Great Council. It was a Great Council at Westminster in January 1389 that decided on a

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(1) PPC i 120, 178; Foedera viii 132.

(2) PPC ii 153-154, 167.

(3) Baldwin - King's Council 106-109.

(4) Foedera vii 719-720; Hist.Ang. ii 206; see p.85 above.

(5) PPC i 145.

royal expedition against Scotland (1). The large aristocratic councils held in 1389 and the early 1390s, sometimes twenty-five or thirty strong, which discussed the conduct of the peace negotiations with France, culminated at the end of May 1392 in the formally summoned Great Council at Stamford, which was almost as large as a Parliament.Here William of Guelders proposed a policy of war with France and John of Gaunt reported the terms he had been offered for peace at Amiens. These terms were considered and rejected, principally because of the opinion of the shire-knights (2).Great Councils also discussed relations with France in February 1400, June 1401 and August 1401. The last of these seems to have decided on a policy of war until news of the latest agreement with the French about the truce arrived (3).

It appears that a rare decisiveness was displayed in May 1392 and August 1401, perhaps because of the presence of a large number of knights and esquires from the shires on these occasions. When the lords met alone they were more cautious about speaking for the nation as a whole. In September 1389, the Council at Clarendon postponed the despatch of an embassy to France, so that the terms for a settlement could be considered by the next Parliament and

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(1) West. Chron. 376-378.

(2) West. Chron. 488-490; Knighton ii 318; see above pp. 26-27, 84-85.

(3) Foedera viii 125-127; PPC i 102-106, 143-145, 155-164; E.28/9 unnumbered, dated 21 July 1401; see pp. 372,435-436,438 above.

John of Gaunt should he return to England meanwhile (1). At the Stamford Council the duke of Gloucester wished the peace terms that Gaunt had brought, to be referred to a Parliament (2). In the Great Council called to Eltham in July 1395, to consider the requests of the Gascon envoys about the grant of the Duchy of Guyenne to Gaunt, most of the lords were reluctant to express an opinion and tried to pass the responsibiity on to the dukes of York and Gloucester. No conclusion was reached and the king made the final decision (3). Similarly in June 1401 several lords wished the king or Parliament to make the decision about war, and in February 1400 the consultation process seems to have been confined to a request for funds to organise the defence of the kingdom (4).

Henry IV summoned further Great Councils in January 1402, February 1405, January 1406 and March 1411, all of which probably discussed the state of relations with France (5). The Great Councils of May 1412, September 1414 and April 1415 were assembled in order to hear declarations of the king's intentions towards France rather than to advise him about them. Nevertheless, the presence of the lords was important at these times, so that they could endorse the

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(1) PPC i 11. See p. 76 above.

(2) Froissart xiv 389.

(3) Froissart xv 162-163, 165; Baldwin - King's Council 135-137, 504-505.

(4) PPC i 102-106, 144.

(5) PPC i 178-179; ii 6-11; Cal.Signet no.524; E.28/11 unnumbered, dated 14 Jan. 1402; E.28/17 no.55.

policy of pursuing Plantagenet rights in France and launching expeditions to recover them. The September 1414 meeting expressed an opinion about the balance of war and diplomacy in Anglo-French relations, but it was one that accorded entirely with Henry V's approach to the problem (1). When the king was prepared to direct foreign policy, it was the function of Great Councils to approve his actions formally and agree to whatever measures of practical support that were necessary, thereby establishing the participation of the noble and knightly class.

A similar role was played in foreign policy by Parliaments, which were assumed to represent all the classes of the whole kingdom.This was the reason why the letters John Cheyne carried to France in 1404 were drawn up in the names of all the spiritual and temporal lords and commons of parliament and addressed to their counterparts across the Channel, so that one nation might appeal directly to another (2). However the capacity of Parliament to make independent policy decisions was very limited. When Richard II was absent on his first expedition to Ireland, it was considered that all it could do without him was grant a subsidy (3). The only

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(1) PPC ii 140-142, 155-158; Foedera ix 222-223; E.28/23 no.45; see pp.8, 130, 459, 468, 473 above.

(2) Foedera viii 348-350.

(3) PPC i 50-52; E.Curtis - Richard II in Ireland 1394-5 and Submissions of the Irish Chiefs (Oxford 1927) letters 16 and 17.

indications that Parliamentary ratifiction might be required for international treaties were the suggestion that the lack of it invalidated the marriage treaty of 1396 and John of Burgundy's request for it in June 1419 (1).It has been seen that Great Councils sometimes passed on questions concerning relations with France to Parliaments rather than express opinions themselves.In March 1390 Parliament discussed terms for a peace with France and an alliance with Brittany which had been referred to it by the Councils at Clarendon and Reading (2), and the Winchester Parliament of January 1393 rejected the peace offer that Gaunt had brought before the Council of Stamford the previous May. Consideration of particular problems might be deferred until the next Parliament met, as with the return of Richmond to the duke of Brittany in March 1397 and relations with Scotland in September 1401 (3).The involvement of Parliament in English policy towards France followed a similar pattern to that of the Council and the Great Council. Following on from the 1380s, when Parliament had judged between "the way of Portugal" and "the way of Flanders" and criticised the independent foreign policy of King Richard, the Parliaments of March and November 1390, November 1391 and January 1393 reviewed the peace negotiations, requested Gaunt and Gloucester to

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(1) See pp. 107, 155 above.

(2) PPC i 18-18a.

(3) PPC i 64, 172; see p. 429 above.

lead embassies and made provision for a renewal of war (1). In 1393 Parliament took over the critique of foreign policy from the Council, as if Gaunt was obliged to seek an increasingly broad mandate for his diplomacy, progressing from large Councils to a Great Council to Parliament, but encountering more and more opposition at each stage. He submitted the terms of the draft peace he had negotiated in 1393 to the Parliament of January 1394 before the king had made any decision about it. The Commons passed comment on the principles behind the English position in the conflict with France, proposed their own essential points for a final settlement and heard protests from the earl of Arundel about Gaunt's conduct of the negotiations and his acquisition of the Duchy of Guyenne (2).In his later years, Richard II was less prepared to accommodate the opinions of Parliament. When it criticised the proposed expedition to Lombardy in January 1397, he made it clear that he meant to have his own way (3).In November 1414, Parliament followed the Great Council in respectfully recommending a mixture of diplomatic pressure on France and military preparation, a policy Henry V was already pursuing, and the lords agreed terms for the payment of their wages on the future campaign (4).

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(1) Steel - Richard II 188-189; see pp. 24, 87 above.

(2) See pp. 7,9, 15, 17, 21, 29,35, 93,95-97 above.

(3) See p. 422 above.

(4) PPC ii 150-151; see pp. 468 , 473 above.

Parliament influenced foreign policy directly by expressing its viewpoint or consent less often than indirectly through its other functions. In Richard's reign it received and answered the petition of some English merchants about the debts of the Portuguese ambassadors of 1385, an affair which overshadowed relations between the two countries for a generation (1). In 1409 and 1410 negotiations with Venetian envoys were held up until the next Parliament, because customs regulations could only be changed with its assent (2), and in 1414 Henry V turned to Parliament to rationalise the truces at sea by the Statute of Truces (3). Periodically the Commons gave vent to English xenophobia by insisting on the expulsion of aliens. When the royal household was purged of foreigners in February 1404, Queen Jeanne was allowed to retain her daughters and some attendants, but these fell victim to the deportations of 1406, throwing away some of the few diplomatic pawns Henry IV possessed at the time (4). Parliament frequently considered measures for the defence of the kingdom and the English possessions overseas and for the keeping of the sea, and made adverse comments when it thought them inadequate. It affected foreign affairs through its concerns for legislation and the safety of the realm.

(1) E.28/24 nos. 95 and 96.

(2) Cal.S.P.-Venice nos. 169, 172, 175, 183.

(3) See pp.286-287 above.

(4) A.L.Brown - "The Commons and the Council in the reign of Henry IV" EHR lxxix (1964) 10, 13, 20; Wylie - Henry IV i 411; PPC i 289; Rot.Parl. iii 571; see p.444 above.

But it was through its control over the crown's extraordinary revenues that Parliament exerted most influence over royal policy. Through Parliaments and Convocations, the various classes of the kingdom participated financially in the king's foreign policy, and they expected some achievement in return for their investment, and some measure of control over how it was employed (1). Parliaments voted subsidies to pay for national defence, expeditions abroad and the expenses of negotiating peace or truce. Often they would specify the uses to which the money should be put; if it was for peace talks and these failed, the funds might be transferable to military uses, as in 1391 (2). The Parliament of 1410 assigned three-quarters of the wool subsidy for the defence of Calais, and protested that previous subsidies had not been spent on the defence measures for which they had been granted (3). Sometimes Parliament obtained the appointment of Treasurers of War to oversee the spending of subsidies until the next Parliament, as in March 1390 and November 1404. In 1406 the Commons insisted on auditing their accounts (4). Parliament put pressure on government actions by demanding redress for its complaints before granting supplies of money. In 1401 it attempted to

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(1) C.T.Allmand - "The War and the Non-Combatant" in Fowler - Hundred Years War 163-164.

(2) See p. 398 above.

(3) Harriss - "Royal taxation" 817; see pp.306-307 above.

(4) Steel - Richard II 184; Brown - "Commons and Council" 10, 20; Wylie- Henry IV i 412.

have this recognised as a general principle but it was unsuccessful (1). Richard II tried to free himself from dependence on parliamentary grants in the last years of his reign, and Henry IV tried to overcome his financial crises without summoning parliaments, by turning directly to his lords and councillors for grants and loans. Henry V found that nothing succeeded with Parliament like success. His impressive victories persuaded the Commons to grant him generous subsidies which financed further campaigns.

Convocations normally followed the lead of parliaments in granting subsidies, and their debates played no part in the formulation of foreign policy. However, the Convocations and Universities were sometimes consulted about ecclesiastical affairs with international dimensions, when the king needed to portray his policy as representative of the clergy and theologians of the kingdom. In June 1398 the Convocation of York province and the justices, summoned to a Council meeting at Nottingham, were ordered to consider the legal implications of translations in England made by Papal provision (2). The following November, Richard referred the French proposals for the voie de cession to the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge for deliberation (3). Similarly in July 1409 the

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(1) K.B.McFarlane - The Nobility of Later Medieval England (Oxford 1973), xix 295; A.Rogers - "The Political Crisis of 1401" Nottingham Medieval Studies xii (1968) 85, 86; Brown - "Commons and Council" 6.

(2) PPC i 80-81.

(3) Foedera viii 62-63; see p. 425 above.

archbishop of Canterbury assembled his Convocation and representatives of both universities at St.Paul's to discuss the proposals brought from the Cardinals at Pisa (1). The Convocations and the universities were each subsequently represented by their own envoys at the Councils of Pisa and Constance. Sometimes it was necessary for the conduct of foreign affairs to obtain a specialist legal opinion. The legality of the grant of Guyenne to Gaunt was adjudicated by a panel of five lawyers at the Council of Eltham in 1395 (2). In September 1400 a group of lawyers was called upon to decide whether Henry IV was legally bound to return Queen Isabelle, her goods, jewels and dowry to France, and the following November these enquiries were passed on to the University of Oxford (3). These bodies played only a minor and "service" role in the construction of policy towards France.

Within this process of formulation of policy by the king, the Council and various representative intitutions, there moved individuals, political factions, bodies of opinion and interest groups who all exerted an influence on the course of foreign relations. These were sometimes dominant in the court and Council, but more often they were factors which could not be ignored. Sometimes their influence was paramount in certain geographical areas or particular aspects of English diplomacy. In the late 1380s and early

(1) Cal. S.P.-Venice no.174.

(2) Baldwin - King's Council 136, 505.

(3) Foedera viii 164; Usk 48-54; E.28/8 no.15; See above pp. 107-108

1390s, there was pressure on both the English and French courts to make peace and unite in a grand crusade to the east, from the exiled king of Armenia and Philippe de Mézières. Mézières invented a comprehensive programme involving all sections of west European society. Richard II and Charles VI were to meet personally and achieve a peace settlement by generous concessions to each other which ignored the obstructions of their belligerent relatives. A General Council with supreme authority would then meet to end the schism in the church, followed by a crusade to recover the Holy Land and save Christendom from the advance of Islam (1). Mézières exerted influence through the four evangelists of his Order of the Passion: Jean de Blaisy, Robert the Hermit, Louis de Giac and Otto de Granson. Blaisy was active in pacifying the frontiers of Guyenne between 1390 and 1392 (2), and the French court occasionally used the Hermit as an envoy to England, as in 1392 and 1395 (3). Granson was retained by both Richard II and Gaunt, accompanied Henry of Derby's expedition to the Holy Land in 1392 and was at the Burgundian court from 1393 to 1395 (4). The members of the Order of the Passion

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(1) Mézières - Songe I 118v2, 119v2; III 275v2-278r2, 311r1-314r2; see pp. 99-101, 383 above.

(2) See pp. 186-187 above.

(3) Anglo-Norman nos. 10, 172; Dip.Cor. nos. 151 and 219, and p.250 n.219; Angleterre et Schisme 363, 365 n.1; Conférences 375-376; A.N. J.644 no.35(8).

(4) CCR 1392-1396 63; CPR 1391-1396 342; E.C.Lodge and R.Somerville - John of Gaunt's Register 1379-1383 (Camden Society 3rd Series lvi-lvii, London 1937) 7n., 31, 99, 152, 160, 269, 271; L. Toulmin-Smith - Expeditions to Prussia and the Holy Land made by Henry Earl of Derby (Camden Society lii, London 1894) lxv, 179, 226, 264, 309.

included the duke of York and the earls of Rutland and Northumberland, and its patrons Gaunt, Gloucester and the earl of Huntingdon, but Mézières' chief support came from the unstable mind of Charles VI. At the Amiens conference Charles suggested an Anglo-French crusade against the Turks to Gaunt and at the Leulinghen conference of 1393, Robert the Hermit intruded himself into the discussions (1). Mézières' dreams of international co-operation could make little headway against the realities of the perennial quarrel between the Plantagenets and the Valois, but the ideal was taken seriously on both sides of the Channel and provided part of the rationale for the peace negotiations of the 1390s.

The person most deeply concerned in these negotiations on the English side was John of Gaunt. In November 1389 he returned to England from his lieutenantcy in Guyenne, following a summons from Richard to come and play his part in the government of the kingdom (2). A few weeks later Gaunt made a determined effort to make his mark on English politics, of which he had been a distant observer for several years, at the Council of Reading, where he presided over the pacification of the quarrels of the 1380s. He was formally appointed to the Council in Parliament in January 1390 and, with the duke of Gloucester and the Chancellor, established control over

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(1) Froissart xiv 386-387; xv 191-192.

(2). Hist.Ang. ii 193: West.Chron. 406; PPC i 14c-14d, 18; Foedera vii 641,648.

all grants made out of crown revenue (1). During the next year he quickly built up his influence in England until he was the dominant figure. An important stage in this was the hunting-party he held at Leicester in July that was attended by the king and queen, the dukes of York and Gloucester, and other important magnates. Here Gaunt persuaded a timorous Richard to recall from exile his former protégé, John of Northampton (2). His influence had extended to foreign policy by the time the instructions for the embassy to France were drawn up in the Council in April 1390 (3). Since he was not the king, Gaunt was obliged to direct the negotiations with France through the Council and his position as the chief ambassador, and eventually to submit his conduct of diplomacy to the consideration of Great Councils and Parliaments. By 1392 he was pre-eminent in the Council, stating his opinions on questions before they were debated by the other members (4).His power was based on a close relationship with Richard, who made little effort to direct policy until 1394, despite his sudden self-assertion in May 1389. The king retained ultimate control over foreign affairs, but through either indolence or lack of confidence, he was content to place his reliance in Gaunt and the Council(5).

(1.) Hist.Ang. ii 194-195; Rot.Parl. iii 262a; West.Chron. 406-408; PPC i 18a-18b.

(2) Knighton ii 313; West.Chron. 440-442; R.L.Storey - "Liveries and Commissions of the Peace 1388-1390" in du Boulay and Barron-Reign of Richard II 149.

(3) See p. 387 above.

(4). Baldwin - King's Council 498, 499.

(5) Steel - Richard II 193; J.A.Tuck - Richard II and the English Nobility (London 1973) 138.

There was a body of opinion in England in the 1380s and 1390s that was opposed to the peace policies of Richard and Gaunt. This favoured a policy of war towards France until military victory was obtained, or at least a return to the Brétigny terms in any peace treaty, and objected to the proposed returns of the Calais March, Brest and Cherbourg to French control (1). Although this group was connected to and descended from the Appellant faction, it never formed a cohesive "war party".It remained inactive in the background of politics for several years following the failure of the earl of Arundel's campaign in 1388 and the dismissal of the Appellants from the government in May 1389. But discontent with Gaunt's peace policy revived in 1393 and 1394, perhaps invigorated by the bellicose statement of William of Guelders at the Council of Stamford in May 1392 (2).

Duke William of Guelders was England's most faithful ally but he had been rendered ineffective by the last campaign of the Caroline war. His family were old allies of Edward III (3), and in June 1387 Richard II retained him with an annuity to fight against France and Burgundy.In obedience to his contract, he issued a defiance against Charles VI

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(1) See pp. 39-40, 71, 73 - 74 above.

(2) See pp. 84, 512 above.

(3) A.N. J.522 no.11.

and Philip the Bold the following month (1). In autumn 1388 a Franco-Burgundian punitive expedition brought the submissions of William's father, mother and brother, and finally his own, and he referred his dispute with the duchess of Brabant to Charles VI and an independent tribunal (2).The quarrel continued however and lapsed into open warfare again in 1397 (3). William, who succeeded to his father's duchy of Juliers in 1393, maintained his alliance with Richard, visiting him in 1390 (when he performed homage at Windsor), 1392 and 1396, and intending to do so in 1394 before the queen's death necessitated a postponement (4). Henry IV continued these contacts and tried to renew the arrangement William had had with Richard (5). But in June 1401, Charles VI bought the perpetual service and homage of William, his brother Reginald (who succeeded him the following year) and their leading vassals, to be directed specifically against England (6). Guelders and Juliers were absorbed by the

(1) Foedera vii 535-537, 556; Froissart xii 183; xiii 33-34, 36-39, 48; Knighton ii 271; Palmer - "Foreign Policy" 84; Vaughan - Philip the Bold 97; C.76/72 m.21; C.U.L. Mm vi 63 f.151. Palmer suggests that the Commissioner government in England deceived William by drafting the defiance and delivering it to Paris without his consent, England...96 and appendix 1g.

(2) Lehoux - Berri ii 229; Vaughan - Philip the Bold 97-98; A.N. J.522 nos.18, 19, 20; c.f. Hist.Ang. ii 175.

(3) Vaughan - Philip the Bold 101; Dip.Cor. no.123, p.221 n.123. See p.427above.

(4) Hist.Ang. ii 206-207; Dip.Cor. nos. 203 and 204, p. 221 n.123, p.237 n.161; E.28/1, facsimile at Baldwin - King's Council plate VII.

(5) Letters of Henry IV i 33-34; Foedera viii 189-190, 191-192; Kirby - Henry IV 117; Wylie - Henry IV i 89.

(6) Wylie - Henry IV i 89; A.N. J.522 nos. 24, 25,26,29.

inexorable advance of the influence of Valois Burgundy into the Low Countries.

The most intransigent of Gaunt's domestic critics was the earl of Arundel. His family had grown wealthy from war service and profits in France and he did not need the income from crown grants and appointments that were the fruits of royal favour (1). He consistently promoted the prosecution of the war by land and sea,and had much popular support. His political career went into eclipse after the period of Appellant rule and he obtained no more military commands. He obtained a licence to leave England and travel overseas (2).In 1391 and 1392 he concorded with Gloucester in believing that any peace should be based on a return to the terms of the treaty of Brétigny and the payment of the remainder of King Jean's ransom, but the level of his influence had sunk so low, that he was forced to pay lip-service to Richard's policy in public (3). Arundel's comprehensive attack on Gaunt in the Parliament of January 1394 was the culmination of the opposition to the peace policy, but he failed to drive a wedge between Gaunt and Richard, and remained politically isolated himself (4).

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(1) A.Goodman - The Loyal Conspiracy: The Lords Appellant under Richard II (London 1971) 114.

(2) E.28/2 no.40.

(3). Froissart xiv 314.

(4) See p. 96 above.

Arundel was intermittently associated with the duke of Gloucester, who had led the last chevauchée into France in 1381. Gloucester largely depended for his income on the patronage of the crown and was always struggling to get it based in land. He was in debt to the crown between 1392 and 1394 because of his short-lived lieutenancy of Ireland. He held the title to some lordships in Poitou which he would have liked to recover by war or diplomacy (1). Gloucester objected to the terms that were being negotiated with France in 1392, though he was prepared to agree in the Council that Calais should be held by homage from Charles VI with suitable modifications (2). The Parliament of January 1393 requested that he should take part in the peace discussions because of his known views, but he appears to have acquiesced in Gaunt's acceptance of the draft peace and the return of Cherbourg. The Monk of Westminster alleged that Gaunt bought him over to his viewpoint with promises of land. Gloucester lost his former popular support by this transaction (3). His continued alienation from the advocates of war is shown by his absence from the list of those who guaranteed Arundel's good behaviour in August 1394. He was with Gaunt at Pontefract and shortly afterwards joined Richard's

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(1) Goodman - Loyal Conspiracy 60, 86, 88, 92-94, 104, 165-166; Baldwin - King's Council 503; Wolfe - Royal Demesne 58.

(2) Froissart xiv 314; xv 80; Baldwin - King's Council 496; see p. 85 above.

(3) West. Chron. 518; see pp. 87, 91 above.

expedition to Ireland (1). He had been deprived of the first place in the Council since Gaunt's return in 1389 and he may have supported the proposal to separate Guyenne under Gaunt as a means of keeping him out of England again (2). By 1396, however, he had returned to his former opinions, objecting strongly to Richard's marriage to Isabelle and intriguing actively against it (3). Later, Henry IV portrayed himself as the heir to these opinions(4).

In taking this standpoint on the conflict with France, Arundel and Gloucester probably felt they were representing the aspirations of the noble and knightly classes. The English nobility was still a warrior class, which regarded warfare as its function in society and an expression of its honour. It was a nobility of service, serving its kings militarily in the French campaigns and expecting them to lead it to war. It was through war service to the crown that its members achieved advancement. The English aristocracy may have made profits from the war, but this was not the primary motive for its involvement.It was more of a consideration for the class of professional soldiers, knights, esquires, men-at-arms and archers, whose captains were often drawn from the

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(1) CCR 1392-1396 368; Anglo-Norman no.29; Goodman - Loyal Conspiracy 75, 133.

(2) Froissart xv 154; Baldwin - King's Council 136-137, 505.

(3). Froissart xv 238, 300-301; xvi 2-8, 15-17.

(4) McKenna - Propaganda 11 n.1, 120.

younger sons of the nobility and gentry, particularly in the border areas. For them there was the possibility of considerable profits derived from ransoms, plunder and pâtis, though those who made very large gains were probably the lucky few. For some, warfare provided the means to invest in land and ascend into the nobility (1). For many more it was a way of life and a source of income, and the prospect of a peace settlement or a long truce threatened them with unemployment. On the frontiers in France, garrisons were reluctant to withdraw from their fortresses when truces were made. Men like Mérigot Marchès amassed great wealth as routiers in Guyenne and had a vested interest in the continuation of the war (2). At Calais the government found it necessary to pay the garrison a quarterly bonus besides its pay, when it could not take booty during a truce (3). In England, the duke of Gloucester maintained that the prosperity of young knights, esquires and archers depended on the war as they had no alternative employment. In the Parliament of January 1393 the young knights expressed a preference for war over peace, and they were supported by the majority of the Commons (4). The cessation of the war raised the possibility of violence coming home to England, as

(1) M.Powicke - "The English Aristocracy and the War" in Fowler - Hundred Years War 126-131; J.A.Tuck - "Why Men Fought in the Hundred Years War", H.T. xxxiii (April 1983) 36-40; McFarlane - Nobility 20-33, 40, 83, 161-162.

(2) Fowler - "Truces" 198; Fowler - Plantagenet and Valois 170-171.

(3) Kirby - "Council and Calais" 48.

(4) Froissart xiv 314; xv 109; St.Denys ii 74.

captains returned bringing their unpaid retinues, as when Brest was returned to the duke of Brittany in 1397 (1). Knights and esquires were retained by the crown on an unprecedented scale at the end of Richard's reign and the beginning of Henry IV's reign, perhaps to curb the martial energies of a potentially dangerous class (2).

There was a violent reaction to Gaunt's peace negotiations from this class in Cheshire in 1393, whilst the English and French delegations were meeting at Leulinghen. Armed bands led by Thomas Talbot, Nicholas Clifton and John Massy swore to kill the negotiators because they intended to attach Richard II to the kingdom of France by his liege homage (3). These events were perhaps connected with the disturbances that had troubled Yorkshire for some years, the feud between the Beckwith gang and some of Gaunt's officials in Knaresborough Forest (4). Cheshire had always been a prominent recruiting ground for soldiers, partly because criminals could take refuge there by the advowry system. Consequently it was an area noted for violence and

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(1) See p. 40 above.

(2) A.L.Brown - "The Reign of Henry IV: the establishment of the Lancastrian regime" in S.B.Chrimes, C.D.Ross and R.A.Griffiths (eds.)- Fifteenth Century England: Studies in Politics and Society (Manchester 1972) 19.

(3) Ann.Ric.Sec. 159-160; CPR 1391-1396 239; for Massy see CPR 1391-1396 77 and N.B.Lewis - Indentures of retinue with John of Gaunt enrolled in Chancery 1367-1399 (Camden Miscellany xxii, Camden [illegible] 4th Series i, 1964) 95-96.

(4) CPR 1388-1392 513: 1391-1396 284-285; Ann.Ric.Sec. 160; West.Chron. 442-444, 516; J.G.Bellamy - "The Northern Rebellions in the later years of Richard II" BJRL xlvii(1964-1965).

periodic outbreaks of disturbance and rebellion. There was constant friction with Arundel's lordships of Holt and Bromfield and Yale, and further disorders occurred in 1394, when John Stanley brought troops to frighten Chester, in 1400, in connection with the revolt of the Earls, and in 1403 in connection with the Percy rising (1). Gaunt dealt with the 1393 revolt partly by recruiting the rebels for an expedition to Gascony, which suggests it was occasioned by the prospect of military unemployment.

Richard later established close links with Cheshire, which he transformed into a principality in 1397 and where he recruited his notorious bodyguard (2). In 1393 his sympathy lay with the insurgents to some degree and he felt it necessary to deny that he was encouraging them (3). Talbot was his retainer and had been captain of Guînes. He later escaped and was never brought to trial, but probably served on both of Richard's Irish expeditions and was retained by Richard again in 1397. Clifton was also retained and made keeper of Bolsover in Derbyshire in 1396 (4). Gaunt and Gloucester were not informed of the rising,

(1) Goodman - Loyal Conspiracy 113-114; M.J.Bennett - "'Good Lords' and 'King-makers': the Stanleys of Lathom in English politics 1385-1485" H.T. xxxi (July 1981) 13; P.McNiven - "The Cheshire Rising of 1400" BJRL liii(1969-1970) 375-396; PPC i 111-112, 208; Cal.Signet no.930.

(2) R.R.Davies - "Richard II and the Principality of Chester 1397-1399" in du Boulay and Barron - Reign of Richard II 256-279; Wolfe - Royal Demesne 58, 76.

(3) Foedera vii 746.

(4) CPR 1388-1392 377; 1391-1396 182, 560, 662; 1396-1399 252, 495, 550; CCR 1389-1392 305, 316; Curtis - Richard II in Ireland 58, 60, 71, 88, 144.

but first heard of it from the French ambassadors, and hurried to England to dispose of this opposition. This was against the will of Richard and the Council. Gaunt dealt swiftly and efficiently with first the Yorkshire disturbances and then the Cheshire rising. He protested his innocence of the rebels' accusations and, more effectively, gave them military employment. Little use of force was necessary (1). Gaunt had reacted energetically to quash a revival of the inclination to war, which he had reason to suspect was connected with Richard's court.

Arundel acted very suspiciously during the rising. He gathered a large number of retainers and fortified himself in his castle of Holt, apparently awaiting the outcome of events before committing himself to either side. He may have been the origin of the rumours about the negotiations that sparked off the troubles. In Parliament in January 1394 Gaunt accused him of aiding the rebels and he was obliged to retire from the Council for a while (2). In April he was pardoned for conspiracies, treasons and insurrections with the commons. In August, Arundel offended Richard at Queen Anne's funeral, was imprisoned in the Tower for a week and made to swear an oath not to make unlawful assemblies (3). By 1397 Richard had lost patience with his obstinate opposition and the earl lost

(1) Ann.Ric.Sec. 160-162.

(2) Hist.Ang. ii 214; Ann.Ric.Sec. 165-166; Davies - Lordship and Society 58, 74-75.

(3) Rot.Parl. iii 351a; CCR 1392-1396 307, 368; CPR 1391-1396 406.

his head.

In the 1390s, when the series of truces had ended overt hostilities between England and France, it became urgent on both sides of the Channel to find new outlets for the warlike propensities of the nobiity and the professional soldiers, if dangerous situations like the Cheshire rising and the intrigues of Gloucester and Arundel were to be avoided. Richard II provided one such outlet through his personal enthusiasm for campaigns in Ireland to gain control over the Irish chiefs and nobility, which he financed partially with money gained through diplomacy with France (1). In 1392 it was decided to occupy the duke of Gloucester with the lieutenancy of Ireland and an expedition there, but the Council soon changed its mind about this (2). When the 1394 campaign was announced it was said to be welcomed by the young knights as another opportunity for war (3). It was intended to channel the ambitions of Gloucester, Thomas Mowbray, the Hollands and the earl of Rutland, who were all given lands and titles in Ireland. Gloucester was soon disillusioned however, and returned to England early in 1395. Since it was also intended to colonise Leinster with Englishmen, the Irish wars might have been planned to absorb the energies of the young knights permanently. Similarly in 1399 it was

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(1) See pp. 395, 431 above.

(2) Baldwin - King's Council 498, 500, 503; Goodman - Loyal Conspiracy 59-60.

(3) Froissart xv 134-135.

Richard's young circle of the Duketti who participated in the Irish campaign and who were meant to benefit from it. There was also a large contingent recruited from Cheshire (1). In France the crusade to Tunis in 1390, the count of Armagnac's expedition to north Italy in 1391, and the projected royal and Angevin invasions of the Italian peninsula can be interpreted as other attempts to re-deploy superfluous soldiery. From England, Henry of Bolingbroke went on a crusade to Prussia in 1390 and Gloucester set out to follow him in 1391,but turned back. Gaunt began preparations for a crusade to Hungary in 1394. The proposed expeditions to Lombardy in 1397 and 1398 would have served to redirect the aspirations of Mowbray, Rutland, the Hollands and Bolingbroke to a distant country (2). Henry IV mobilised the royal and Lancastrian retainers to launch an expedition against Scotland in the first campaigning season of his reign. Soon he had plenty of fighting in Wales and on the Calais and Guyenne frontiers to keep the English occupied. But by 1407 there were signs of restlessness again, when John Cornwall was licenced to take sixty men-at-arms and five hundred archers to fight at Liège (3). Cornwall was also a prominent jouster.When warfare was unavailable, tournaments and feats of arms provided a

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(1) Curtis - Richard II in Ireland; Steel - Richard II 208-209; Goodman - Loyal Conspiracy 62, 133; Tuck - Richard II and Nobility 170, 173-175; Davies - "Principality of Chester" 278.

(2) See pp.420-421, 432 above.

(3) CCR 1405-1409 216.

substitute.Although they were meeting-points for an international warrior caste, they often had xenophobic overtones (1).

The habit of war was nowhere more difficult to break than in the Duchy of Guyenne. The complicated relationship between the crown and the Duchy was one of the most important factors in Anglo-French relations. The Duchy brought little financial benefit to the crown and was often reliant on England for food imports (2). The maintenance of the English position there depended on the loyalty of its inhabitants to the king as duke, and particularly the loyalty of the nobility and the towns. The local nobility's patterns of allegiance were dictated by inheritance structures rather than geography, and by a mixture of temporary alliances and traditional ties, especially to the houses of Foix and Armagnac, whose feud over Bigorre dominated the region from 1251 to 1425. The nobles of the south-west frequently changed sides between the French and English, as the early career of Renaud de Pons and the tergivisations of the Sire de Limeuil in Henry IV's reign show (3). The crown was obliged to treat them with a blend of discipline and generosity, making them grants of annuities and offices, which were regarded

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(1) See p. 398 above.

(2) Vale - English Gascony 8, 203; Fowler - Hundred Years War, introduction, 4,13; Fowler - Plantagenet and Valois 47.

(3) Vale - English Gascony viii, 90, 154, 165, 166, 170-173; Chavanon - "Renaud VI" 2.

as heritable possessions, portions of the ducal demesne and estates confiscated from rebels. Henry IV appointed Gaillard de Durfort as seneschal in December 1399 in order to satisfy local sentiments, although he proved scarcely adequate for the job. The loyalty of Gascon towns depended on the manipulation of urban factions, royal grants and confirmations of privileges, and respect for urban liberties by royal officials. The towns generally felt their privileged position would be better preserved under Plantagenet rule than that of Charles VI (1).

In return for their continued allegiance the Gascons expected the king of England to provide them with military support, to redress their grievances and to refrain from interference in their internal affairs. When the Duchy was nervous of attack or hard-pressed, letters were sent to England from the town authorities, the captains of frontier castles or the archbishop of Bordeaux, requesting the despatch of English reinforcements. These letters were occasional in the 1390s and became numerous in the middle years of Henry IV's reign. Henry's lack of response provoked accusations of desertion from discontented Gascons (2). Envoys also travelled from Guyenne to England seeking material aid and answers to their complaints from

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(1) Martinière - "Instructions secrètes" 337; Vale - English Gascony 8, 30, 41-42, 44-46, 53, 170, 203, 205, 206.

(2) Vale - War Govt. and Politics 292; see above pp. 326-327.

the Council (1). In the absence of funds to send any more concrete assistance, the English government would send sets of letters to individuals and communities in Guyenne, thanking them for their good service and asking them to continue it (2). Under Henry IV and Henry V the Gascons received very little help from England and were obliged to conduct the war and negotiate truces almost independently (3). Through this decentralised warfare and diplomacy, they exerted an independent influence on the course of Anglo-French relations.

A serious miscalculation by Gaunt about the Gascons' attachment to their privileged status contributed to the failure of his peace policy in the early 1390s. His careless treatment of their liberties provoked such determined opposition that he was unable to establish himself as the semi-independent ruler of the Duchy (4). When Richard granted him the title of duke in March 1390, he revoked all alienations of the lands and revenues of Guyenne made by himself or his predecessors, to the benefit of Gaunt. This stimulated a vigorous reaction both in itself and because the terms were rumoured to

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(1) e.g. Baldwin - King's Council 504; Wylie - Henry IV ii 424; iii 272-273, 275-276; C.61/108 m.26; C.76/85 m.10; C.76/89 m.5; C.76/90 m.6; C.76/92 m.7.

(2) e.g. those in E.28/14 and B.L.Add.MS. 24062 ff.115-120.

(3) See pp.330-332,466 above.

(4) See pp. 32-36 above.

include all Gascon privileges. By the end of the year, Richard had been forced to withdraw the revocation (1). The Gascons had very practical reasons for objecting to Gaunt's rule. When he confirmed their privileges in September 1391 he specified that the Duchy would be governed by his officers or their deputies (2). From the concessions he granted to the Estates in March 1395, it is clear that these officials, and the way they abused their position, were resented. Specific complaints were made about perversions of justice, hanging and torturing, the seizure of houses as quarters, the protection of runaway serfs and the farming of offices (3). Gaunt's seneschal, William le Scrope, interfered in the commune of Bayonne in 1392 to ensure that the Lancastrian protégé Pelerin du Vilar became mayor. Vilar was ejected in 1395, and in 1398 and 1399 the faction politics of Bayonne broke into open violence. At this time it was suspected Gaunt intended to seize control of the town (4).

Gaunt had already tried the threat of force to obtain possession of his Duchy after he returned from the conference at Leulinghen in June 1394. In September he set out with a large armed following and landed at Libourne. He requested admittance to Bordeaux and Bayonne, but was refused. In January 1395 he was still asking merely for

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(1) Foedera vii 662, 687-688.

(2) Bouillons 293.

(3) Bouillons 259-267.

(4) Vale - English Gascony 32-37.

passage through Bordeaux. In March he was finally allowed to enter the city on condition that he exercised no suzerainty until an agreement had been reached. Within the next week he made settlements with the jurats of Bordeaux and the three Estates of Guyenne, conceding all their demands. Gaunt was willing to pay a high price for the Duchy, for he now bestowed gifts and privileges liberally on Bordeaux and the principle nobles. The dispute over his tenure of Guyenne was not resolved, but it was agreed that it should be submitted to the judgement of Richard (1). However, no decision was reached when the matter was argued before the Council of Eltham. Gaunt remained in Guyenne until late in 1395, but achieved little, despite the expenditure of vast sums of money. Richard therefore recalled him and he returned to England "spe frustratus" (2). The Gascons were unwilling to accept the rule of a separate duke without stringent conditions, since this would entail a reduction of their independence. Through his mishandling of the acquisition and exercise of ducal rule, Gaunt alienated the most important sections of Gascon society, although they remained loyal to Richard. Because of his unpopularity, it was uncertain whether they would accept his son Henry IV as king in 1399.

The French government tried to take advantage of this uncertainty to subvert Gascon loyalties to the English

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(1) Knighton ii 321; Ann.Ric.Sec. 169; Eulogium iii 370-371; Bouillons 244-245, 253, 257, 259-267, 269.

(2) Eulogium iii 371. See also Froissart xv 182; Ann.Ric.Sec 188.

crown. Late in 1399 or early in 1400 it conducted secret negotiations in Guyenne to encourage some of the nobility to rebel in favour of the deposed and imprisoned Richard, in particular with Archambaud de Grailly, Captal de Buch. It acted through the person of Charles d'Albret rather than in its own name, in order not to jeopardise the continuance of the truce by a direct infraction, as it was later to conceal its guerres couvertes under the colours of allies or individuals for the same reason. It was hoped to repeat the success of 1369 by inducing the nobles of Guyenne to appeal to Charles VI against Henry (1). It appears that the duke of Bourbon also held a meeting with representatives from Bordeaux, Bayonne and Dax at Agen to persuade them to change the allegiance of the towns from English to French, but they rejected his proposals. The towns all submitted to Henry's proctors during 1400, though Bayonne was forced by the resolute action of a group of local nobles to stop a deviation towards an understanding with France and Castile. Henry was able to take control of English Guyenne in this year through the agency of his seneschal Durfort, the archbishop of Bordeaux and the three proctors he sent to receive the allegiance of the Duchy in his name. He confirmed the privileges of the Gascons and promised to send troops to defend them (2).

(1) Martinière - "Instructions secrètes" 332-340.

(2) Wylie - Henry IV i 121-122; Vale - English Gascony 29, 30, 31, 40-42; Martinière - "Instructions secrètes" 337; Palmer - Bowet 55-58; B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Div f.1; C.61/107 mm. 9, 10, 14; E.28/8 m.90; E.28/27 no.53.

However, he could not prevent the Captal passing into the French obedience and the alliance of Louis of Orléans, in return for Charles VI allowing him to succeed to the comté of Foix, though by the time this was finalised in March 1401 the danger of a wholesale defection in the Duchy had passed. The affair was the subject of some sharp diplomatic exchanges between English and French ambassadors in 1401 (1). Archambaud's intentions were uncertain at first, and the council at Bordeaux was prepared to intercede with Henry on his behalf, but by 1404 both he and his eldest son were active on the French side (2).His younger son Gaston remained in the English obedience and in 1405 there seems to have been a possibility that Archambaud himself could be brought back into the fold (3). But Foix stayed French and eventually passed to the Burgundian faction. Therefore Gaunt's failure in Guyenne in the early 1390s left a legacy in the Duchy which worked to England's disadvantage in her relations with France at the start of his son's reign. But the Gascons continued to believe that their interests were best served by maintaining their ties with the Plantagenets, and English Guyenne survived.

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(1) PPC i 195; A.N. J644 no.33; J.645 nos. 1 and 15.

(2) B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Div ff. 60, 61; see above pp. 313-314, 317, 322-323.

(3) Vale - English Gascony 52, 154-155, 167, 169; E.28/14 nos. 6,14,18; E.28/15 no.32.

The north of England was a similar frontier area in which a local independent-minded nobility predominated, living by feuds and constant petty warfare. The nobles of the north formed an isolated group in the English aristocracy, within which the Percies and the Nevilles had emerged as the two supreme families, their power based on their command of local loyalties rather than influence at the king's court.The crown had no choice but to make them responsible for the safe-keeping of the border with Scotland, and as wardens of the Marches they controlled considerable military resources at the crown's expense. Through the wardenships and their frequent appointments as negotiators with the Scots, the northern barons had a great deal of influence on the course of Anglo-Scottish relations; in the border areas, where they made local truces and held march-days, they had almost exclusive control over them. Since they lived by raiding and plundering, they had little incentive for pacifying the border. But by Richard's reign the development of the wardenship system had led to closer financial links between the border and the central government, and tempted the crown to interfere in the northern barons' sphere of influence. In the early 1380s there was friction between Gaunt and Henry Percy, earl of Northumberland, over power on the border and in 1389 Percy objected to Richard's appointment of Thomas Mowbray as warden of the East March. Richard and Gaunt both showed favour to the Nevilles in the 1390s, thus threatening to disturb the balance between the two great families in the north, and late in his

reign, Richard introduced members of his court party into border offices (1). In reaction to this, the Percies and the Nevilles joined Bolingbroke as his principal supporters when he landed at Ravenspur in 1399, and so moved to the centre of the English political stage. But they now had to divide their attention between the north and the royal court. Percy interests were represented at Westminster by Thomas earl of Worcester, who was an active councillor and prominent as a diplomat in Anglo-French relations. The loss of his place at court and the failure of Northumberland and his son to obtain a monopoly of border offices from Henry IV were probably the chief reasons for their rebellion in 1403. After its failure, Northumberland lost his official position on the border but kept his power as a magnate. This impelled him to rebel again in 1405, using archbishop Scrope of York as a cover of respectability. The ill-organised insurrection was dispersed by the ingenuity of Ralph Neville, earl of Westmorland. Westmorland attended the court rarely in the early years of Henry's reign, and then probably only to protect his interests against the encroachments of the Percies. From 1404 to 1407 his interests at court were

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(1) Tuck - "Richard II and Border Magnates" 27-35, 39-45, 48-49, 51-52; J.M.W. Bean -"Henry IV and the Percies" History xliv (1959), 212-214; Goodman - Loyal Conspiracy 52; R.L.Storey - "The North of England" in Chrimes, Ross and Griffiths - Fifteenth Century England 130-134; R.L.Storey - "The Wardens of the Marches of England towards Scotland 1377-1489" EHR lxxii (1957).

watched over by his brother Lord Furnival (1).The northern barons' formulation of foreign policy was therefore always confined to the affairs of the Scottish border, particularly truces and their infractions, but in the first half of Henry IV's reign they were also influential in the central counsels of the realm.

At this time Westmorland appears to have had a special interest in relations with Brittany. He had been accumulating interests in Jean IV's English lands in the late 1390s, culminating in Henry's grant of Richmond to him in October 1399. In February 1400 he retained for life Antoine Rys, Nicholas Aldrewych and John Perian, who were involved in negotiating the marriage of Henry to Jeanne of Brittany over the next two years and who were later members of her household in England (2). Perhaps Westmorland originated the policy of Henry's marriage to Jeanne. Henry's motives for the marriage are not altogether clear, and it is difficult to know how much influence Jeanne exerted over him and his policy. Parliament was acutely suspicious of her household, insisting on the expulsion of various members in 1404, 1406 and 1416 (3). She was instrumental in persuading

(1) Bean -"Henry IV and the Percies"; Brown - "Commons and Council" 7; Brown - Privy Seal 61-62; Baldwin - Kings Council 143,149; Brown - "Reign of Henry IV" 7-11, 14; Storey - "North of England" 134-137; P.McNiven - "The Betrayal of Archbishop Scrope" BJRL liv (1971-1972); Rogers - "Crisis 1401" 91-92, 93, 94.

(2) Kirby - Henry IV 137, 167; Tuck - "Richard II and Border Magnates" 51; see pp. 429-430, 442 above.

(3) Wylie - Henry IV i 411; ii 425-426; Henry V ii 323.

Henry to make truces in Picardy and with her son Jean V of Brittany in 1407 (1).Later she quarrelled sharply with Jean over her dower lands in Brittany (2).In 1411 and 1412 she aligned with the prince of Wales in supporting the idea of an alliance with the Burgundians and was herself in touch with John the Fearless (3). Probably because of her family connections abroad, Queen Jeanne had a shadowy influence on English foreign policy in Henry IV's reign, but it is now difficult to discern.

In the last few years of the reign she appears to have been involved in the faction politics that extended from the control of the government into the area of foreign policy. The prince and his uncle Henry Beaufort made their mark in England's diplomacy with France from March 1406 onwards, although the prince did not take his place on the Council until nearly the end of the year.For the next three years this diplomacy was characterised by negotiations for a peace based on the marriage of the prince to a Valois princess and the development of the new structure of particular truces. During this time he became the centre of an aristocratic party which included the Beaufort brothers, the young earls of Arundel and Warwick, Lord Scrope of Masham and his own brother John of

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(1) Foedera viii 484, 490; A.N. J.646 no.2.

(2) Knowlson - Jean V 90-92, 110.

(3) Wylie - Henry IV iv 68 and n.3, 78; Vaughan - John the Fearless 92. Knowlson maintained that Jeanne encouraged Henry to conquer France, so that her son Jean might succeed him as king of France, but this is absurd, Knowlson - Jean V 55, 80.

Lancaster, and which was increasingly critical of Henry IV's chancellor, Thomas Arundel.This group took full control of the Council between January 1410 and December 1411, favouring an intervention in France in combination with the Burgundians.There followed the negotiations for an alliance with John the Fearless and the earl of Arundel's expedition in 1411, which had the character of the prince's private venture. He was eager to take over the kingdom and suggestions were made that his father might abdicate in his favour (1). During the time that he and his friends controlled the Council, foreign rulers regarded him as virtually the co-ruler of England. He presided over Great Councils, received petitions and negotiated for alliances in the name of himself and his father. He probably had the full direction of policy towards France and Flanders at this time, though not towards other areas. This seems to have lasted until February 1412, for as long as the alliance discussions with Burgundy were kept alive (2).

But the prince's party had already been expelled from the Council in December 1411. King Henry and Thomas Arundel took control again and favoured an arrangement with the Orléanists.The alliance of May 1412 and the expedition of

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(1) K.B.McFarlane - Lancastrian Kings and Lollard Knights (ed. G.L.Harriss, Oxford 1972) 106-108; Baldwin - Kings Council 161-163; Brown - Privy Seal 80, 90; Brown - "Commons and Council" 25, 27; A.R.Myers - "John of Lancaster, Duke of Bedford 1389-1435" H.T. x (1960), 461; see pp.111-112, 451-458above.

(2) Foedera viii 715-716, 721; PPC ii 6, 20; E.28/28 nos. 45 and 84.

the duke of Clarence then followed (1). Arundel now headed a party opposed to the prince which included Thomas of Clarence and the duke of York. King Henry tried to remain aloof from factions, but was increasingly associated with these men. In the summer of 1412 there was a danger that civil war would break out between him and his impatient eldest son. A peace was arranged in July by terms of which the armed followers of both camps were to join Clarence's expedition (2).This amalgamation of two opposing factions into one enterprise abroad recalls Richard II's endeavours to avoid trouble at home by shipping off his nobility and soldiery on foreign adventures.

On his accession in March 1413 Henry V replaced Thomas Arundel as chancellor by Henry Beaufort, but the old divisions did not continue into the new reign. The duke of Clarence returned to England from Bordeaux to take up his place at the new court and the duke of York slipped easily from one party to the other, as usual, via some unauthorised diplomacy at Paris (3). One of the difficulties that Henry IV had faced at the beginning of his reign was a lack of nobles to serve him in governing the kingdom, because of the large number of minorities. This problem was intensified by the deaths and forfeitures

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(1) McFarlane - Lancastrian Kings 108-109; Baldwin - King's Council 163-164; Brown - Privy Seal 83, 91, 207; see pp. 119, 457-464 above.

(2) McFarlane - Lancastrian Kings 109-110.

(3) See pp. 125, 463 above.

which occurred in the events of 1403 (1). This was not a problem that Henry V had, since all the minors had now grown up. He succeeded in uniting the English aristocracy into a true nobility of service for his wars in France. He received their expressions of support for his aggressive policy towards France in the parliament of November 1414 and the Great Council of April 1415 (2). Then he threw their combined weight against his enemies across the Channel and achieved success:

> 'The king, with aristocratic support, was well-nigh invincible; the reverse situation was, per contra, disastrous (3).'

It was not only noble and military groupings that could influence the course of England's foreign policy. There was an increasing tendency for the needs of the merchants of the kingdom to be taken into account and it was seen as the king's duty to defend the interests of his mercantile community. The merchants' needs were for prosperous trade and security at sea, and the pursuit of these might often run contrary to the dynastic and political ambitions of the king. The series of truces with Flanders and Brittany from 1407 onwards were designed primarily for their benefit. Indeed, merchants were involved in the process of negotiating the securities with Flanders. In 1405 the Council consulted the London merchants about the extent of

(1) Brown - "Reign of Henry IV" 7, 11-12.

(2) PPC ii 151, 158.

(3) Powicke - "Aristocracy and War" 125.

their trade in Flanders, for the purpose of the talks at Calais, and additions were made to the draft of a four month truce according to the merchants' advice (1). The merchants of the Calais Staple might communicate directly with the Vier Leden, send representatives to meetings of English and Flemish envoys, or even negotiate themselves with merchants sent by the other side (2). In 1411 the Council commissioned William Walderne, a merchant of London, to serve on an embassy to discuss the truce with Flanders (3). It was quite normal for a merchant to be chosen in this way as a member of an embassy to the Hanseatic League and Prussia. Examples in this period include Richard Donyngton of Hull in 1404, who ended his mission in prison in Stralsund (4), and William Brampton of London, who had to make the whole journey by sea, since he was too frail to ride a horse, and lost his life in a shipwreck (5). Sometimes in order to recover sums owed to them, merchants decided their interests were best served not by peace at sea but by hostile action. They petitioned the king and the Council to grant them letters of marque and reprisal against specific nations. Often

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(1). PPC i 258; E.28/21 no.22.

(2) Letters of Henry IV i 253-255; E.28/11 unnumbered and damaged letter to Hugh Lutterell dated 26 Oct; E.28/28 no.64.

(3) Foedera viii 677-678.

(4) Cal.Signet no.203.

(5) Wylie - Henry IV ii 71, 77; Cal.Signet nos.260, 342; E 28/21 nos.33, 36; E.28/28 no.68.

these letters would be issued to merchants in defiance of the provisions of truces which forbade them (1).

The merchants normally communicated their views about the defence of the sea to the government through the medium of parliamentary petitions and debates, but occasionally the Council also consulted representatives from the ports. Leading London merchants might sit on the Council from time to time, as Richard Whittington and William Brampton did in the first year of Henry IV's reign (2), but usually this was connected with their loans of money and contracts of supply to the government. In December 1403 the Council consulted prominent mariners about a plan for the defence of the sea, and in 1406 the keeping of the sea was entrusted to the merchant community by an agreement made in Parliament, following a request by the Commons that a provision should be made for this. It did not prove to be a success (3). Similar experiments were tried in 1378, 1383 and 1436, and suggested in 1379 (4). In July 1413 the Council again asked the London merchants for advice about the safety of trade at sea (5).

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(1) See pp. 343, 349, 367-368 above.

(2) Brown - "Commons and Council" 8; Baldwin - King's Council 151; Brown - Privy Seal 202; PPC i 121; E.28/7 no.36.

(3) See pp. 362-363 above.

(4) Richmond - "Keeping of Seas" 292-294; Richmond - "War at Sea" 109-110: Richmond - Admin. and Keeping of Seas 174-175.

(5) PPC ii 131-132.

It was in the government's interest to promote the prosperity of the trading community because it relied upon the merchant marine for military purposes. Usually the king himself had only about half a dozen vessels, though Henry V managed to increase the number to thirty-six by 1417 (1). England mostly raised the ships she needed by impressment and paid a fee to the owners from 1380 onwards. The Cinque Ports owed a service of fifty-seven ships for forty days, which they were frequently called upon to perform, though their contribution was becoming less useful as their prosperity declined. In November 1403 the Council estimated England's total naval resources at 260 ships, not counting those belonging to the royal household, or in Ireland and Wales (2). There were periodic attempts to improve naval strength by ordering various towns to build ships for the defence of the realm. Henry IV unsuccessfully tried to acquire thirty-nine balingers and seventeen barges by this means in January 1401 (3).

Both England and France needed their allies to bolster their naval resources. Neither possessed enough ships to launch a major offensive on their own account. Froissart states that Charles VI had to collect ships from Seville to Prussia for the 1386 expedition (4). Fighting galleys

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(1) Rose - Navy of Lancastrian Kings 32-37.

(2) E.28/12 no.4.

(3) Alban - National Defence 278-280; Foedera viii 172-174.

(4) Froissart xi 358.

in particular were lacking in northern waters and were usually obtained from Iberia and Italy. Portugal was England's chief source of warships. Portuguese galleys served the English in the early 1370s (1), and by the treaty of 1386 João I agreed to provide Richard II with ten galleys for a season at his own expense (2). England continued to receive naval aid from Portugal until the truce of Leulinghen. In June 1389 Richard paid off six galleys which had remained at Southampton all winter and served at sea since the beginning of April (3). Henry IV also asked João to send him some galleys (4). It was rumoured João and his sons would join Henry V's expedition in 1415, and later his ships guarded the Seine for Henry during the siege of Rouen (5). The English also occasionally used Italian ships. Genoese tarits were pressed into service during the invasion scares of the 1380s (6), and in 1417 Henry V hired some Genoese ships and requisitioned some Venetians (7).

But English and French requirements were now extending to include the northern maritime powers. Dutch ships were

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(1) Alban - National Defence 277.

(2) Foedera vii 520; Dip.Cor. no.73, p. 203 n.73.

(3) Russell - Intervention 415-416, 493 n.4, 527-528; C.76/72 mm.2 and 3; E.28/2 nos. 5 and 36; E.30/1690 and 1691.

(4) PPC i 280-281.

(5) Wylie - Henry V i 449-450.

(6) C.76/71 mm. 21 and 22; C.76/72 m.24.

(7) Wylie and Waugh - Henry V iii 46.

hired for the 1386 invasion fleet at ruinously high rates (1) and for Gaunt's expedition to Castile the same year (2). A Zeeland ship served in Henry Percy's force in 1387 (3). For his expeditions of 1415 and 1417 Henry V sent envoys to hire shipping in Holland and Zeeland (4). On the latter occasion two Danish ships were also requisitioned (5). England's policies towards the powers peripheral to the Anglo-French conflict were therefore conditioned not only by the motive to protect and promote the trade of its merchants, but also by its naval needs.

During this long period of truce, England's foreigh policy was influenced by a variety of different individuals, interest groups and aristocratic factions whose consequence waxed and waned with political fortune, and by sections of the community of the kingdom of England and its overseas possessions, whose presence was constant. These expressed their opinions through the Council, Great Councils, Parliaments and, in the case of the formulation of policy towards the schism and the General Councils of the church, in convocations and university assemblies. At this time the Great Council emerged as a distinct and formally constituted body, which was appropriate for the process of consultation and consent about policies of

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(1) Froissart xi 359; xii 29

(2) Russell - Intervention 413.

(3) C.76/72 m.20.

(4) Wylie - Henry IV i 449; Wylie and Waugh - Henry V iii'45 n.9, 46; Foedera ix 215-217; C.47/28/7 no.30.

(5) CCR 1413-1419 397.

peace and war with France. As it represented the whole nobility of the realm, and sometimes the gentry of the shires too, its meetings demonstrated the participation of these classes in the policy pursued. When parliaments endorsed policies, towns and their merchants were also represented by the burgesses. The ordinary continuous Council handled the day-to-day business of diplomacy, the minutiae of the accreditation of embassies and drafting documents, and gave effect to the orders the king sent it. It also acquired responsibility in the fringe areas of foreign policy and areas which required sustained meticulous attention, such as the maintenance of truces, relations with the mercantile powers of Flanders and the Hanseatic League, and the uninterrupted flow of solicitation concerning international piracy. It was this attention that a peripatetic king could not give. All this work was undertaken by delegation from the king; there was no defined division between their areas of activity and normally they worked in conjunction.

It was the king himself who made foreign policy, though he tended to concentrate on the central matter of the conflict with France. Therefore a king's personal style of foreign policy can be discerned throughout the period of his rule in his selection of the different elements of diplomatic practice that were available to him, such as dynastic marriages, military alliances, the retention of client princes and nobles abroad, personal meetings with foreign rulers, the use of mediators, grand conferences

and secret correspondence. When it was not the king who was the main director of foreign policy, but another individual like John of Gaunt in 1390 to 1394 and the prince of Wales in 1410 and 1411, he could only act as the principal member of the Council, which played a fuller part in making decisions than usual. He was obliged to make greater use of parliaments and Great Councils, since he lacked the direct personal authority of the king.

If the king was to retain the confidence of his kingdom in foreign affairs, he needed to demonstrate the participation of all sections of the community in his policy. His policy therefore had to accommodate many different interests, so no consistent comprehensive policy emerged for any length of time. Nor did the king's degree of control over events on his frontiers and beyond permit predetermined policy too far in advance. Opportunities were missed and advantages not pressed, especially in areas that were delegated to the Council, which tended to take a short-term view. The one continuous thread of foreign policy was the claim of the Plantagenets to the French throne and the condition of this depended on the military balance between England and France.

CONCLUSION

It has been argued in the last chapter that the formulation and direction of English foreign policy at this time was normally the king's business but that he was far from being an autocrat in this field. There were four directors of foreign policy during the period under review: John of Gaunt, Richard II, Henry IV and Henry of Monmouth, as both prince and king. It is in the manner in which each of the four conducted their diplomacy that the main lines of consistency can be traced.

John of Gaunt largely controlled foreign policy from the beginning of 1390 to the summer of 1394, though King Richard took an interest in it in these years and was capable of expressing his opinions. Gaunt never became king, but his family ambitions were wide enough to include the succession (1). He was the richest man in England and retained followers on a vast scale with generous fees (2).

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(1) Eulogium iii 369-370.

(2) T.B.Pugh - "The Magnates Knights and Gentry" in Chrimes, Ross and Griffiths - Fifteenth Century England 107.

He seems to have been an arrogant man, very concious of his position as one of the foremost princes of Christendom, with interests and activities that extended over most of western Europe during his long career. The diplomatic style of such a man was not likely to consist of small business-like meetings.In England he acted as the leading member of a large and aristocratic Council, in which his formidable personality tended to stifle debate, and he presented his policy to the wider representation of Great Councils and Parliaments. In his negotiations with France he operated through large-scale conferences at Amiens and Leulinghen in which the emphasis was on ostentation and ceremony for the benefit of a considerable audience. It was a diplomacy of direct discussion between Plantagenet and Valois princes which aimed to achieve a compromise by the successive surrenders of points on both sides. His acceptance of the French demands for liege homage for Guyenne is a measure of how far his foreign policy was dominated by his ambition to establish a semi-independent principality for himself in the Duchy. To accomplish this ambition by negotiation he needed to control the operation of the truces and make them effective, and bring the Anglo-French conflict to a final settlement. His failure over the course of six years to instal himself either in a Duchy expanded by negotiation or in its current form, left the English in a weaker position in Guyenne. However, he resisted French attempts to eliminate the English pâtis system and took prompt action to prevent the French attacking English allies in

Italy and Brittany. Like many of his contemporaries, he sincerely believed in the ideal of a crusade against the Turks by a unified Christendom and took active steps towards this.

Gaunt had a sinister reputation on both sides of the Channel as:

'ung vieil Sanglier Noir, duc des Leopars (1).'

It was not only in the conferences of Amiens and Leulinghen that he was regarded as an unreliable negotiator, sacrificing the interests of the crown to promote his own. When he was appointed to treat peace with Scotland in May 1383, he was known to be eager for a settlement to release resources for the support of his Castilian claims, so he was specifically instructed not to abandon any English possessions (2). In negotiating his agreement with Juan of Castile at Bayonne in 1388, Gaunt ignored England's interests and instructions from home, by not insisting the treaty should include a separate Anglo-Castilian peace. He also prevented news of the proposed marriage of his daughter to the duke of Berry from reaching England, and by the truce he made with

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(1) Mézières - Songe 116v2.

(2) Tuck - "Richard II and Border Magnates" 40.

Berry, wrecked the earl of Arundel's expedition to Guyenne (1).In negotiating the marriage treaty with Brittany in 1395, he acted without reference to Richard in England, conceding disadvantageous promises that he was not entitled to make (2).It is quite feasible therefore, that Gaunt's signing of the draft agreement in 1393 should be regarded as treacherous.In the Parliament of January 1394 Arundel accused him of exceeding his mandate and the Monk of Westminster states that men of lesser rank would have been denounced as traitors immediately if they had suggested such terms (3). Contemporaries readily accused Gaunt of treason. In August 1394 he wrote to Richard from Pontefract to deny such rumours of treachery (4).During his trial in Parliament in January 1397 Arundel again rounded on him:

> 'Et si tu, Johannes, bene esse examinatus, plura fecisti tu contra regem quam ego (5).'

When Gaunt returned to England at the end of 1395,

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(1) Russell - Intervention 504-505, 512; Angleterre et Schisme 257; Foedera vii 587-588, 679-680; West.Chron. 195, 323; Froissart xiii 116.

(2) See pp. 414-416 above.

(3) Rot.Parl. iii 313b; West.Chron. 518. See above p.96.

(4) Anglo-Norman no.29.

(5) Eulogium iii 375. The trial of Arundel is one of the few events described in any detail in this part of the chronicle.

following his recall from Guyenne, Richard received him coldly:

> 'Susceptusque est a Rege, prout decuit, debito cum honore; sed, ut quidam asserunt, non amore (1).'

This contrasts strongly with the warmth of their relationship described by Richard and Arundel in January 1394. In the interval the suspicions raised about Gaunt's conduct of the 1393 negotiations in Cheshire and in Parliament, his failure to achieve a final settlement with France, his lack of progress in Guyenne and finally his untrustworthy conduct in Brittany had disillusioned Richard with the policies and ambitions of "l'egoïste Lancastre" (2). Gaunt's political career now became less active. He no longer pursued his own projects but acted as a firm supporter of Richard's rule and policies. With the collapse of his foreign designs, his interest in diplomacy subsided. Apart from his almost purely formal role at Richard's meetings with the French in August and October 1396, which were as ceremonious as his own conference at Amiens, his only active part in it was the negotiation of a truce prorogation with the Scots in March 1398 (3). Gaunt had shown himself to be a skilful diplomat at Bayonne in 1388 and Leulinghen in 1393. If he often

(1) Ann.Ric.Sec. 188.

(2) Angleterre et Schisme 257.

(3) Tuck - "Richard II and Border Magnates" 49-50.

negotiated on his own account rather than according to England's interests, this may not have been a distinction he drew in his own mind.His inability to appreciate the motives of others led him to make serious miscalculations and suffer the consequences.

After some uncertain beginnings in 1387 and 1389, Richard II directed his own foreign policy only from the autumn of 1394 onwards. Ricardian diplomacy appeared during John of Gaunt's absence in Guyenne and was eventually to take over areas that had previously been regarded as his exclusive spheres of influence, like Iberia and the Duchy itself. Richard's personality was unpredictable and enigmatic, and he was given to violent changes of mood, though he was not the shambling neurotic portrayed by Steel (1). Those around him could not rely on retaining his trust. He operated his policy through a close-knit group of young nobles whose careers he promoted in military expeditions abroad and the European marriage market.These nobles and a group of prelates, household officers and knights who formed the rest of his "court party", provided the pool from which he drew his diplomatic personnel. Experienced negotiators like Walter Skirlaw and Richard Rounhale, who had been employed by Gaunt, now disappear from view for the rest of the reign.

The foreign policy of Richard and these men was marked by a restless and aggressive energy.There was nothing

(1) Steel - Richard II 203.

hesitant about it; its diplomacy consisted of resolute moves, crude but effective. Richard was inclined to use manipulation and deception rather than the direct, open diplomacy of Gaunt's great conferences.In the negotiations for peace, truce and marriage with France in 1395 and 1396, he was always able to provoke the French into making the opening offer, an important way to gain an advantage through a procedural point. Rather than continue fruitless lines of negotiation in the hope of reaching an eventual compromise, which was bound to involve abandoning points of principle, he preferred to change the direction of discussions and obtain all the advantages that were available. At the Calais meeting in 1396 he made solemn promises to the French about the regulation of pâtis, the publication of the long truce, the English attitude to the schism and joint intervention in Italy, which he probably had no intention of fulfilling. He took a devious course towards building up a base for international power.

Richard's foreign policy involved the receipt and expenditure of large sums of money. He forced the French to buy his withdrawal from the conflict with enormous cash payments and spent them on military ventures overseas and the retention of client princes. In particular he aimed to build a barrier of English allies along the Rhine as an answer to the most pressing problem of England's foreign relations, the expansion of Valois power into the Low Countries. In building up an alliance structure and counteracting the extension of French interests into new

areas, Richard adopted a strategy that was as broad as Europe, though he showed little interest in the defence of Christendom as a whole through the crusading movement. He was seeking an exalted place for himself amongst the princes of Christendom. In October 1396 he established his status as equal to that of Charles VI by meeting him as a brother between Guînes and Ardres, and soon he was scheming to be elected as Emperor, in order to surpass Charles as the leading secular ruler in Europe. Meanwhile he continued to employ the symbolism of his claims in France, which he had no wish to abandon.

The orientation of his foreign policy was too oblique to be popular at home. Richard did not take account of other currents of opinion, scarcely tolerating criticism in Parliament. Nor did he cater for the interests of some powerful elements on the English side, such as the merchants and the barons of the north. His innovative and dynamic policy died with his deposition.

The deposition restricted the scope of Henry IV's policy almost from the beginning. After the initial few months of confidence, Henry realised that the fate of the 1396 settlement was doubtful. The Valois refusal to recognise him as king created technical difficulties for the continuance of Anglo-French diplomacy, and the French exploited these to keep him isolated. But he eventually overcame these problems by sheer survival.As long as he lasted the French were obliged to find a way to talk to

him or take the risks of a full-scale guerre ouverte. The possibility of the latter passed away with Louis of Orléans in 1407.

In the first half of his reign, Henry also faced domestic difficulties resulting from his usurpation. The series of rebellions and the dangers that Guyenne and Wales might be lost to English control altogether, all contributed to a worsening financial crisis.These preoccupations had led to a serious loss of energy and direction in foreign policy by 1405, when Henry was engaging in almost no diplomatic activity himself and the first onset of his illness occurred. However the Council continued to pursue discussions with the Flemish, but the initiative was now coming from below, from the merchant community and from the ambassadors at Calais themselves.

England's capacity for effective action abroad contracted geographically. Several of England's allies, such as William of Guelders and Jean IV of Brittany, had been personally attached to Richard, and were unwilling to continue their arrangements with the man who had supplanted him. Henry failed to halt the Burgundian advance into the Low Countries, and gained no real advantages from his marriage to Jeanne of Brittany. In Iberia he failed to exploit possible contacts through his sisters, the queens of Portugal and Castile. He allowed relations with these kingdoms to be dominated by friction over piratical attacks and the outstanding debts of the

Portuguese ambassadors of 1385, and he showed no interest in Aragon or Italy at all. He was merely fortunate in being able to neutralise the threat across the Scottish border. In Henry's reign, English policy showed a new interest in northern Europe, an area Henry knew well from his Prussian crusades. He was asked to act as a mediator between the Poles and the Teutonic knights and he married his daughters into Germany and Scandinavia. However he did not seek foreign matches for his four sons. Proposals of marriage for the prince of Wales and John of Lancaster probably originated in the prince's own party. In 1409 Henry took an important step in advancing England's prestige in Europe, by sending an English delegation to participate in the Council of Pisa. He was moving to fill a space left by the reduction of French influence and his son was to take this a stage further at the Council of Constance.

England was therefore forced onto the defensive in Henry IV's reign. Henry was tenacious in insisting on the validity of the twenty-eight year truce and resisting French threats on all fronts until he was able to reverse the trend. But the policies of the second half of his reign were disappointing and incoherent. His ambitions, insofar as they were expressed, were confined to the recovery of Guyenne, and his policies towards France were unimaginative compared to those of Richard II and Henry V. He permitted sectional interests to take over English policy at sea and on the frontiers, and the actions of his

last years were hampered by illness and faction disputes within his own family.

Henry of Monmouth exerted an intermittent and partial control over English foreign policy during the last years of his father's reign. When he succeeded to the throne the clarity of his objectives dispelled the incoherence and inconsistency of his father's policies.He shifted attention away from Guyenne entirely, intending to intervene in northern France and acquire territory there in order to re-open the question of the Plantagenet claim to the French throne. He was completely convinced of the justice of his case and the need to test it by the ordeal of war, and in this he obtained the support of the whole community of the realm. Confronted with the tangled problem of the seventy-five-year-old Anglo-French conflict, he preferred to draw his sword and cut the Gordian knot. He was impatient for success, determined to end the established pattern of a protracted war of attrition ending in an inevitably abortive peace conference. But it was apparent even before the fall of Rouen in January 1419 that warfare alone would not fulfil his ambitions and so he was obliged to turn again to diplomacy.

Henry kept diplomacy with France under his close personal supervision. Whilst on campaign he made frequent use of Signet letters to transmit his orders. From August 1417 onwards he had these written in English and dictated the

more important ones himself, which accounts for their rather abrupt manner (1).

Henry retained an affection for Richard II's memory, recalled from his youth when he accompanied him on his second expedition to Ireland. When he became king he had Richard's body re-interred at Westminster. He emphasised the inheritance of his claims and policies from Richard through restructuring the truces on the basis of the 1396 settlement and issuing instructions to negotiate for peace, which appear like a development of Richard's instructions of July 1395. Henry also inherited a manipulative diplomatic practice from Richard, though his technique was to intimidate the French envoys rather than to entrap them. He negotiated with both French parties at once and made excessive demands to force the pace of negotiations. He used short truce prorogations and ultimata in order to extract offers from the French and prevent them using delaying tactics. His later truces with the French feudatories were elements in his military strategy. He extorted concessions in negotiating procedure in order to demonstrate his superior strength. He forced the French to accept the separation of different matters for discussion and the English order of priority; he obliged the French to open the process of exchanging offers; he insisted on having the resultant agreements drawn up in Latin rather than French.

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(1) Cal.Signet introduction, 6 and 7

Since he negotiated from a position of advantage, Henry adhered rigidly to the terms he demanded, repeating the same demands at several successive conferences. His claim to the French throne was constantly reiterated; he always insisted on the implementation of the terms of the Brétigny treaty as a minimum requirement and that he would accept no overlord but God; he would not surrender any part of Normandy once he had conquered it. Not until the treaty of Troyes was he able to impose his conception of the conflict at the conference table.

Although Henry concentrated on France he was ambitious for England to be at the centre of European events. In the lists of allies included in truces, Henry claimed to have the alliances of the Emperor, the king of Portugal, the city of Genoa and the lordships of Man and the Isles, as Richard had; but he also added the count of Holland, Ludwig of the Palatinate, King Eric of Norway, Sweden and Denmark and, on various occasions, Brittany, Castile and Aragon (1). His ambassadors travelled throughout Europe. He made an alliance at Canterbury with the Emperor Sigismund on equal terms and joined him in his endeavours at Constance to end the schism and reform the church. Had his scheme for a dual Anglo-French monarchy been realised, it would have been the preponderant power of Europe. Following this achievement Henry hoped to lead a crusade for the salvation of Christendom.

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(1) Foedera ix 93-94, 397.

In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Christendom was still felt to be a single community, united by its faith and common laws. The long Anglo-French conflict came to be regarded as the worst of its internal feuds. The schism accentuated this rift, as all the countries of Europe aligned with either a French pope or a pope supported by the English. It was widely believed that the Anglo-French quarrel should be settled before the problem of the schism could be solved and Christian princes could unite for the grand crusade against the Turks. John of Gaunt sometimes expressed this opinion (1). The conflict was spreading outwards across Europe in ever-widening rings, as each side tried to encircle the foreign interests of the other, particularly during this long period of truce. During the Caroline war it had extended to the Iberian peninsula and now it threatened to subsume the Rhineland, Italy and the Celtic fringe in the same way. Most of the new alliances produced no notable results and so appear in retrospect as ambitious and extravagant (2). The preparation of a major offensive involved mobilising a network of alliances that spread right across Europe. The process of making final peace necessitated a consideration of all these allies' needs and the settlement of each of the lesser conflicts between them. The war had transformed England from a small kingdom on Europe's edge to one of its most important powers, ranking second to France in terms of effective

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(1) Angleterre et Schisme 358.

(2) Richard II's bid for the imperial crown is described as a "fantastic dream" by McKisack - Fourteenth Century 476.

influence. Through diplomacy, the king of England could reach out his hand to affect the course of events in Italy, and aspire to the Imperial crown or the arbitration of the disputes of Christendom.The extent of this influence contracted for a while under Henry IV; Henry V's policy concentrated England's attention into the fighting in France again from 1417 onwards. With the end of the war her international status was much reduced.

Henry V first broke the truce in 1415, but the Agincourt campaign was relatively short and altered the military situation only marginally, and truce was resumed again the following year. But it was his second expedition of 1417 which was the real turning point of the war, when he began the conquest of Normandy and campaigned on through the winters. It initiated a policy from which there was no turning back and began a new phase of English ascendancy in the conflict lasting until 1435. For this reason it has been taken as the terminal point of the period under review in this thesis.

The sealing of the Leulinghen truce in June 1389 has been taken as the starting point, for the unity of the period consists of its truces. The long truce of 1396, made on the basis of the <u>forma</u> of 1394, forms the central framework of a complex of general and particular truces, prorogations, agreements, securities and provisions. An attempt was made in Chapter III to clarify exactly what truces were in force during this period, and precisely

what restrictions and obligations they imposed on the two protagonists. The concept of a truce came under increasing strain during these thirty years, as each side strove to continue a war of attrition against the other without investing in full-scale public war. By the 1380s precautions against the breakdown of a truce had already led to the adoption of a clause stating that it would not be invalidated by accumulating violations. Frontier friction which mainly concerned individuals and small communities was acceptable, in the form of letters of marque and reprisal, the enforcement of pâtis, raid and counter-raid. In the 1390s efforts were made to bring these activities under some sort of regulated control, and marques and reprisals were nominally banned. Each side remained under arms however, and a low level of warfare seems to have been expected, beyond these continuous petty infractions. From the time that the truce was confirmed between the kingdoms in 1400, it had to contain the mutual non-recognition of the two kings, and the private nature of the feud between the Valois and the Lancastrians began to distort the idea of a truce. Between 1400 and 1403 the process of reprisal and counter-reprisal at sea was encouraged to escalate by successive stages into a widespread privateering war. The truce could now include the encouragement of the opponent's rebels and guerres couvertes conducted under the guise of personal quarrels or the flags of allied countries. From 1403 onwards it could include major expeditions organised and financed by the two governments against each other in a war of grand

strategy. By 1407 the truce had come to the point of being totally ineffective in the frontier zones, so that new particular truces were needed to pacify these areas. These agreements were locally made before the policy was taken up by the two central governments. During the first half of Henry IV's reign it was the French who led the way in stretching the rules of the truce to allow an escalation of conflict for their benefit. But they suffered the consequences when England was strong enough to apply the mutated rules against them in 1411 and 1412.

The concept of truce therefore became devalued during the period under review. It reduced the level of warfare rather than ended it, and it became obvious that a long truce with static terms was not even able to do this. However, the idea of truce remained strong enough to prevent an open war. This would have been caused by certain major hostile acts like an expedition led by the king or his heir in person (though not apparently by his younger sons or brothers), as was threatened several times by Henry IV; an assault on a vitally important town such as Bordeaux or Calais, as seemed probable in 1405 and 1406; or a direct invasion of England by a French army. The twenty-eight year truce was therefore worth retaining.

Although the new truce system which developed from 1407 onwards undermined its validity, it was not repudiated until the exchange of defiances in August 1415.

When the two sides agreed on a long truce they were

accepting that they had reached a stalemate in their efforts to reach a negotiated settlement of the conflict.The subordination of pâtis collection to central control recognised that war had become endemic in the border lands. The designation of regular meeting-places exactly on the borders between the two obediences in the Picardy march, the Duchy of Guyenne and the island of Guernsey (for meetings between English and Breton representatives) tended to diminish the status of Anglo-French negotiations towards that of the March-days and Love-days held at regular intervals on the boundaries of the Scottish marches and the marcher lordships in Wales. It was easy to begin war but difficult to stop it. It developed its own momentum in areas beyond central control: amongst the routiers and barons of the frontier zones; in the reprisal chains, privateering and piracy out on the high seas; in the conflicts between allies on the periphery of the Anglo-French struggle, which had been adopted as sub-sections of the main war. Underlying the seeming inevitability of this continual conflict was the ethos of a noble ruling class which directed it to practise warfare, and the existence of a professional soldiery in a symbiotic relationship with the Hundred Years War.

The Plantagenets' claim to the French throne obliged them to continue fighting until they obtained a satisfactory settlement. They accepted terms at Brétigny and Troyes, but were never able to put them into effect. John of Gaunt

was prepared to accept the draft peace of 1393, but the English parliament would not permit his concession of liege homage to the French. Eventually the only way out of the diplomatic impasse created by the two irreconcilable viewpoints of the struggle was a military victory by one side or the other: either a complete conquest of France siege by siege, or the expulsion of the English from Guyenne. During the Caroline war the latter had seemed most likely, but by 1419 Henry V believed he could gain the objective of the French crown. An examination of the terms of the truces and the peace offers in the intervening period traces the movement of the balance of advantage as it swung from the Valois feudal interpretation of the war to the Plantagenet dynastic interpretation.

Truce could provide a few years respite from the long struggle before a renewal of war. This brought the opportunity to recover from damage, to regain financial stability and to search for an improved position in the alliance structures of Europe. England was often willing to resume open war, or to threaten to do so, whether on the expiration of a short truce or by abrogating a long truce. Truces served a function in England's quest for a military victory rather than providing a means to achieve a negotiated settlement.

But a new purpose was also emerging in the truces. In the negotiations to confirm the twenty-eight year truce in

1400 the principle was establised that the truce was made between the two kingdoms and the subjects and allies of each, not the persons of the two kings, and it was not dependent upon them. Therefore it should continue to be in force even though there had been a change in the ruling family on one side. In 1407 and 1408 there began a series of truces and securities to cover English relations with Flanders and Brittany and at sea, whose primary function was to remove commerce from the Anglo-French conflict, in response to the war of attrition which had set out to damage it in recent years. This was for the benefit of a mercantile community whose interests were independent of the quarrels and ambitions of the two dynasties. This line of development continued until, in the 1430s, the Libelle of Englyshe Polycye could recommend that English foreign policy should concentrate on the control of the Channel to promote trade, implying the rejection of the war to acquire territory in France.

The conflict had severed the centuries-old feudal connection between the kingdoms of France and England. Parliament was insistent that no peace settlement should allow the English crown to be subjected to the French. The long struggle impelled the participation of all ranks of the king's subjects on both sides and consequently a conciousness of separate English and French national indentities appeared. The English were insisting on, and achieving, their recognition as a nation, as at the Council of Constance where formal nation status was only

attained against protracted French opposition. Henry V would no longer accept the French language as the natural medium of diplomacy, and began to replace it with English as the informal language of the administration. His victories in France accelerated the English tendencies towards patriotism and xenophobia. The prolonged experience of the Hundred Years War was transforming England from a kingdom into a nation.

APPENDIX 1

Schedules of proposals for the modification of French sovereignty over Guyenne in December 1383:
English proposals, E.30/1629(1), partial copy at E.30/1629(2).
French replies, E.30/1583, copy at E.30/1615.

The English made their demands in Latin, the French responses are stated to be translated from Latin into French. The date of all these documents is given as April 1389 in P.R.O. List and Index xlix, and E.30/1629(1) is variously endorsed in later hands as "Henri VI" (f.5v.) and "l'an 1 de Henri IV" (f.6v.). On internal evidence they are later than the deaths of Edward III (E.30/1583 f.1) and Charles V (ibid.f.3) and the bishop of Hereford was one of the English envoys (E.30/1629(1) f.1). This refers to John Gilbert, who served on embassies to France as bishop of Hereford in 1381, 1383 and 1385 and was translated to the see of St.Davids in May 1389, Foedera vii 338, 413, 466, 617. These schedules appear to relate to the negotiations of December 1383 at Leulinghen, where Gilbert was one of the English ambassadors and an exchange of documents was made whose description accords with the substance of the above four documents, B.N.Francais 2699 f.139-139v. A French translation of the English demands, with some differences and with the French responses added after each article, is included in the same volume of manuscripts as this protocol of the 1383 conference, ibid. ff.105v-115.

These 1383 schedules are related to an extended family of manuscripts in Latin, French and English, scattered between London, Oxford and Paris. Their precise relationship is obscure, but clearly they were considered important enough to be copied repeatedly:-

B.N.Francais 2699 ff.105v-115 (in French), perhaps a French schedule of the late 1380s.
B.L.Harley MS.861 ff.51-58v. (in Latin).
B.L. Landsdowne 223 ff.45v-53 (in English).
B.L.Cotton MS. Tiberius Bxii ff.130-138 (in Latin).
Bod.Lib. Bodl.MS. 710 ff.50v-59 (in English).
Bod.Lib. Bodl. MS. 885 ff.53-58 (in Latin).
This version probably represents a schedule issued to the English envoys for the meeting of July 1392 at Leulinghen.
B.N.Francais 15968 ff.758-768v (in Latin), a French schedule relating to the meeting in Picardy in August 1393, following the agreement of the draft peace in June.

APPENDIX 2

Letter from Charles VI to Richard II, dated 5 October. Perroy printed this letter and dated it to 1390, Dip.Cor, p.224 n.126. Palmer redates it to 1387 in England.., appendix 1h, but on questionable grounds. It would not have been impossible for Charles to move from Gisors to Paris in one day in 1390, as he states. He also says the signature of the secretary Yves Derian makes the year 1390 impossible. In fact Derian did sign other letters in March, April and October 1390, January and March 1391, in the same volume as Palmer cites (B.N.Francais 20590 nos. 27, 30, 31, 57) and elsewhere (A.N. J.865 nos. 7 and 8) and as far apart as 1384 (B.N.Francais 20590 no.19) and 1396 (A.N. J.865 no.12).

Therefore the date of the letter remains open to question, although it fits neatly into what is known of the diplomatic exchanges of 1387.

APPENDIX 3

Lists of truce infractions at sea:-

Complaints of the English against the French, Castilians and Bretons (41 articles and two petitions) presented by the English 4 August 1401 and again 10 December 1401, A.N. J.645 no.36(1).

The belated French replies to these August 1402, A.N. J.645 no.17.

French complaints against the English (35 articles) presented 10 December 1401, A.N. J.645 no.18.

English replies to these August 1402, A.N. J.919 no.7.

Complaints of the English against the French (48 articles) presented 26 July 1402, A.N. J.645 no.36(2).

French complaints against the English (98 articles), probably presented on the same day, A.N. J.645 no.35.

Restitutions offered by the French August 1402, A.N. J.645 no.28.

Restitutions offered by the English August 1402, A.N. J.919 no.8.

English complaints against the French (47 articles) presented 27 July 1403, A.N. J.645 no.48 and J.919 no.18.

For these meetings to discuss infractions see pp.237-241 above. See also the lists noted as being held in the English exchequer, E.36/186 f.129; Bod.Lib. Rawlinson B.120 f.191v; B.L. Cotton MS. Caligula Dv f.169 (old foliation 162). These overlapping lists can be supplemented by entries on the Patent Rolls and Close Rolls, but these only concern cases in which the English government chose to intervene. I have not considered the list of Castilian complaints at C.47/32/24a and the lists of Flemish complaints at C.47/32/24b, E.30/1280, E.30/1281, E.30/1628, Archives Départementales du Nord, Lille, B.546/15093(92) and B.533/105031-3. C.J. Ford promises a complete chronological catalogue of Flemish maritime losses in his current thesis, Ford - "Piracy or Policy" 74 n.54.

APPENDIX 4

Violations of the securities and truces with Flanders and Brittany from 1407 to 1422.

Infractions of the securities with Flanders:-

CPR 1405-1408 420; 1413-1416 110, 223, 344-345, 410-411, 414-415; 1416-1422 202-203, 390, 418.

CCR 1409-1413 282; 1413-1419 311, 513-514; 1419-1422 84.

PPC i 354-357.

Vaughan - John the Fearless 160, 162.

Wylie - Henry IV iv 27.

Wilson - Anglo-French Relations 339 n.63.

E.28/23 no.49; C.76/100 m.7.

B.L. Cotton MS. Caligula Dv f.29; Add.Ch. 12508.

Infractions of the truces with Brittany:-

CPR 1408-1413 64, 177, 309, 373, 381, 433, 473-474,476; 1416-1422 203, 204, 209, 324, 384, 388, 444.

CCR 1405-1409 437, 459-460; 1413-1419 500-503.

Cal.Signet no.838.

PPC ii 248-249.

Touchard - Commerce Maritime Breton 108, 122, 132, 140.

Richmond - Admin. and Keeping of Seas 99.

E.28/30 unnumbered; C.76/91 m.17; C.76/95 m.7; C.47/30/9 no.11.

B.L.Cotton MSS. Caligula Dv f.64; Vespasian F iii no.57; Julius B vi ff.30, 35.

APPENDIX 5

Drafts of an Anglo-Breton alliance December 1391-March 1392.
The chronological relationship of the drafts appears to be as follows:-

1. B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Diii f.99. A very rough draft with many alterations. At this stage the fortresses to be delivered had not been specified and the decision was left to the councils of both sides. A clause was included concerning the capture of Breton barons by English forces: they were to be handed over to the duke of Brittany.

2. PPC i 41-44 and B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Diii ff.96 and 97. These last two are both halves of an indenture, with different alterations added to each by the English and the Bretons respectively. The king assented to the terms of f.96, provided the duke agreed to them and communicated his assent before 2 February 1392. The list of fortresses was now finalised and the clause about Breton barons dropped.

3. B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Diii f.98, drawn up according to the additions to f.97, with one clause altered slightly more. The time limit was extended until the first Sunday in Lent.

4. B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Dv f.54, drawn up according to the alterations to Caligula Diii f.96, but very badly damaged by fire and almost totally illegible.

5. B.L.Cotton MS. Caligula Diii f.95. The children are not to be married without the king's consent and are to come to England even if there is a truce.

6. B.L.Cotton MS. Julius Bvi f.17. The duke is to be included in any Anglo-French peace or truce as an ally of England.

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TABLE 1:
TERRITORIAL TERMS OF PEACE OFFERS.

English Offers
- in reversion
- homage only
- flexible demand

French Offers
- as dowry of princess
- in reversion
- homage only

AQUITAINE

Bordelais & Bazadais | Bayonne | Dax | Aire | Lescar and Oloron | Bigorre | Agenais | Gaure | Auch | Périgord | Quercy north of Aveyron | Montauban & S.Quercy | Rouergue | Angoulême | Limousin | Saintonge S.of Charente | Saintonge N.of Charente | La Rochelle | Poitou | Channel Is.Oléron etc. | Calais March | Ponthieu | Montreuil-Sur-Mer | Boulogne | Somme to Fortresses Gravelines | Artois | Flanders | Maine | Anjou | Touraine | Beaufort and Nogent | Moiety of Provence | Brittany | Brest | Cherbourg | Harfleur | Rouen | Upper Normandy | Lower Normandy | Kingdom of France

NORMANDY

1360 Treaty of Brétigny	OVERLAY 1
1377 Charles V's offer	
1380 Charles V's offer	
1383-1384 French offer	
1387 Richard II's half-peace	
1387 French instructions	
1390 English instructions	
1392 Gaunt's offer at Amiens	OVERLAY 2
1392 French offer at Amiens	OVERLAY 3
1393 Draft peace	OVERLAY 4
1395 English instructions	
1412 Armagnac Alliance	OVERLAY 5
1414 English alliance terms	
1414 Burgundian alliance t'ms	
1414 First English offer	
1414 Second English offer	
1414 French offer	OVERLAY 6
1415 English offer at Paris	
1415 French offer at Paris	
1415 French offer-Winchester	OVERLAY 7
1415 English offer/½ peace	
1415 French offer-Agincourt	
1415 English offer-Agincourt	
1416 Henry V's peace terms	
Nov.1418 Eng.instr.- peace	
-½ peace/alliance	
1418 First Armagnac offer	~~OVERLAY 8~~
1418 Second Armagnac offer	
1418 Third Armagnac offer	
1418 Fourth Armagnac offer	
Nov.1418 English offer	
1418-1419 Eng. peace terms	
Oct.1419 English powers	
1420 Treaty of Troyes	



Table 2:

REPRISALS AT SEA 1399-1402
(see pp. 336 - 340 above).

English vessels arrested, captured or destroyed.
English persons arrested, captured or killed.
English cargoes arrested, captured or destroyed.
English money seized.

French

Breton

Flemish

Castilian

Dutch

Scottish

1401

April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November

ship of Walter Dupont
St. Jean d Dieppe
Notre-Dame d Polet-les-Dieppe
St. Jean d Dieppe
Fishing-boat d Dieppe
barge of Guillemot Henry
St. Valentin of Harfleur
goods of Nicholas of Exmouth
St. Salveur d Harfleur
Philippot le Herissie
Falcon of Cardiff
exchange agreed
St. Katherine of Abbeville
Juliane of Dartmouth
St. Marie d Talmont
wine of Guillen Bourdin
St. George d Talmont
St. Cristofle of Talmont
barge d Talmont (Jean Dove)
barge d Talmont (Jean Messin)
barge d Talmont (Jean Foucher)
St. Marie d La Rochelle
crayer d Pierre de Pise
ship of Dunkerque
balinger d Brittany
St. Jean d Beauvoir
fishing-boat d Polet-les-Dieppe
barge d Buing
barge of St. Malo
goods of Paris and Rouen
ship of Rouen

1402

March
April
May
June
August

Two Flemish merchants taken by the Spicer brothers
William Wykham imprisoned at Sluys
Leonard d Dunster
St. Jean d Bermeo
wine of Guiot Potart
Two fishing-boats d Étaples
ship and barge of Henry Pay
Michelle of Poole
Perrin de Bert
St. Salveur d'Oléron
Marie of Poole
James of Poole
Two ships taken near Calais
St. George of Kampen

THE DUCHY OF GUYENNE

THE DUCHY OF GUYENNE



THE DUCHY OF GUYENNE



OVERLAY 2

GAUNTS OFFER AT AMIEN

THE DUCHY OF GUYENNE



OVERLAY 3

FRENCH OFFER AT AMIENS 1802

THE DUCHY OF GUYENNE

DRAFT PEACE 1313

OVERLAY 4

THE DUCHY OF GUYENNE



ANGLO-ARMAGNAC ALLIANCE

OVERLAY 5

THE DUCHY OF GUYENNE



OVERLAY 6
FRENCH OFFER 14/

THE DUCHY OF GUYENNE



OVERLAY 7 - FRENCH OFFEN
AT WINCHESTER 1415

THE DUCHY OF GUYENNE