

**Power, participation and development on Mount Kilimanjaro:  
the non-governmental sector and the state in Tanzania**

Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the University of  
Liverpool for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by

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*In memory of William and Betty*

## **Abstract**

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**Claire Charlotte Mercer**

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The suggestion that non-governmental organisations, as part of a wider ‘civil society’, might form the basis of a reinvented development in sub-Saharan Africa has gained currency within the literature during the post-impasse era of development studies. This thesis critically examines these claims made by and for the non-governmental sector through the lens of the Tanzanian experience. Drawing on an emerging post-Marxist framework within development studies which attempts to productively engage a materialist ontology with certain insights of poststructuralism, the thesis examines both the material and the discursive relations in which the non-governmental sector has become embedded at both national and local levels in Tanzania.

Two major themes in the literature are pursued through a qualitative research methodology which places emphasis on understanding the meanings attached to the non-governmental sector by different actors. The first of these is the nature of NGO-state relations, and the second is the process of participation and the related notion of empowerment. In the first instance, an overview of the national NGO sector in Tanzania reveals the spatial inequities and the contested nature of the role of NGOs in national development, particularly through an analysis of the process surrounding the formulation of the government’s NGO Bill. This reveals the national state’s attempts to steer NGOs towards service provision rather than social and political development activities. The analysis then moves to the local level in Hai District, Kilimanjaro Region, where the interweaving of the non-governmental sector with the local state in social service

provision has meant that spatial inequalities in access to resources abound as local patronage networks flourish in the absence of a clear division of labour between the state and non-governmental actors. Finally, the thesis argues that the local development discourse on Mount Kilimanjaro plays a pivotal role in shaping participation (especially for Wachagga women) in non-governmental activities. However, the exclusion of minority groups from participating in non-governmental groups means that the socio-economic and political status quo in the region remains unchallenged. The thesis thus concludes that the basis for proclaiming a reinvented development around the notion of participatory development as practised by NGOs has been overstated.

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# List of Contents

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Abstract.....	i
Acknowledgements.....	iii
List of contents.....	iv
List of tables.....	vii
List of maps.....	viii
List of figures.....	ix
Acronyms.....	x
Glossary of Kiswahili and Kichagga terms.....	xii
<b>Chapter One: ‘Reinventing development’ in a liberalised era: ‘civil society’ and NGOs in Africa.....</b>	<b>1</b>
Introduction: (re)presenting Africa .....	2
Development lost: ‘all downhill since Vasco de Gama’ .....	5
Discourses of development .....	13
‘Reinventing development’: ‘civil society’ in Africa .....	19
‘The brave new world of NGOs’ .....	30
NGOs: the good, the bad and the ugly.....	34
Outline of thesis .....	40
<b>Chapter Two: Changing power relations?: participation, em(power)ment and NGOs.....</b>	<b>43</b>
Introduction.....	44
A genealogy of participation: contested meanings and conflicting agendas .....	45
Women in development policy: from welfare to empowerment .....	51
Em(power)ment: changing power relations? .....	58
Concepts of power in development theory .....	58
The concept of empowerment.....	62
NGOs: participation and em(power)ment.....	67
Women’s groups: strategies for change? .....	73
Summary: changing power relations?.....	82
<b>Chapter Three: The development of Tanzanian associational life in historical perspective .....</b>	<b>84</b>
Introduction.....	85
Tanzania .....	86
The impact of the colonial period on associational life .....	89
The role of cooperatives: the KNCU .....	91
The colonial education policy.....	93
Associational life under British rule .....	95
The road to independence .....	97
Independence .....	102
The Arusha Declaration: <i>ujamaa</i> .....	104

Women, <i>ujamaa</i> and the UWT .....	111
Authoritarian rule and economic decline .....	117
Towards liberalisation.....	121
New development discourses: liberalisation, gender and national identity...	123
Summary: Tanzanian associational life in historical perspective .....	129

**Chapter Four: “The Government has fears and hopes about NGOs”: NGOs in a liberalised Tanzania .....**

<b>Chapter Four: “The Government has fears and hopes about NGOs”: NGOs in a liberalised Tanzania .....</b>	<b>132</b>
Introduction.....	133
National level research.....	134
The Tanzanian NGO sector after liberalisation .....	135
The growth of the Tanzanian NGO sector .....	138
The heterogeneity of the NGO sector .....	139
International NGOs .....	141
National NGOs.....	142
Religious organisations in Tanzania .....	152
Local NGOs .....	153
The privatisation of development .....	153
NGO-state relations.....	157
The NGO policy process: controlling the agenda.....	157
Government attempts to control NGOs .....	160
NGOs as social service providers .....	162
A fragmented community .....	164
Summary: “The Government has fears and hopes about NGOs” .....	166

**Chapter Five: “*Tunapenda sana maendeleo*” : Hai District, the Chagga and NGOs .....**

<b>Chapter Five: “<i>Tunapenda sana maendeleo</i>” : Hai District, the Chagga and NGOs .....</b>	<b>170</b>
Introduction.....	171
Local level research .....	173
A note on positionality and research politics .....	174
Research methodology.....	182
Hai District.....	191
The Chagga .....	197
Social inequality among the Chagga.....	204
Women and gender relations in Chagga society.....	208
Research villages.....	214
The non-governmental sector in Hai District.....	218
A privatisation of development in Hai? .....	219
Types of non-governmental actors.....	221
CBOs.....	222
NGOs .....	225
Donor NGOs, bi- and multi-lateral organisations.....	227
Summary: the non-governmental sector in Hai .....	230

<b>Chapter Six: Privatisation or polarisation? The non-governmental sector and the state in Hai.....</b>	<b>233</b>
Introduction.....	234
State and non-state actors in service provision in Kilimanjaro.....	235
State/non-state service provision in Hai: dichotomy or continuum? .....	239
Education and health services .....	241
Women’s groups in Hai: privatised development? .....	270
Patronage networks among women’s groups.....	271
Local development in Hai: blurring the public/private divide.....	280
The public and the private: a synergistic relationship?.....	280
The non-state sector: part of a development panacea? .....	282
The local state: in search of a rôle.....	284
Summary: the polarisation of development .....	287
<b>Chapter Seven: (De)constructing participation in Hai: <i>maendeleo</i>, the non-governmental sector and the legitimation of inequality .....</b>	<b>290</b>
Introduction.....	291
The development discourse on Kilimanjaro: NGOs and access to resources.....	292
<i>Maendeleo</i> as an economic survival strategy.....	293
Discourses of development: power, status and the non-governmental sector .....	306
Participation and empowerment.....	314
“Unequal participation” .....	315
Constructing participation.....	325
Participation: NGOs v the state.....	336
Summary: (De)constructing participation.....	348
<b>Conclusions: Power, participation and development on Mount Kilimanjaro: (a story of) the non-governmental sector and the state in Tanzania .....</b>	<b>352</b>
Transcending the boundaries of NGO research .....	353
NGO myths: reconceptualising NGO-state relations.....	354
NGO myths: questioning participation and empowerment.....	356
NGO myths: reinventing development .....	360
Development research: NGOs as the subject of critical inquiry.....	362
<b>References .....</b>	<b>365</b>
<b>Appendices.....</b>	<b>391</b>
Appendix One: Inventory of interviews conducted .....	392
Appendix Two: Household interviews in Wari .....	400
Appendix Three: Community-Based Organisations in Hai District .....	402



## List of Tables

---

Table 4.1 Regional origin of NGOs registered with the Ministry of Home Affairs ..	137
Table 4.2 Registration dates and sectoral activities of all NGOs registered with the Ministry of Home Affairs in Tanzania, 1994 .....	144
Table 5.1 Description of wealth ranks of all households (HH) in Wari village .....	188
Table 5.2 Summary of characteristics of household interviews .....	189
Table 5.3 Average assets of respondents to household interviews .....	189
Table 5.4 Occupations of men and women in Hai District (%).....	215
Table 5.5 Summary of social services in research villages.....	217
Table 5.6 NGOs in Hai District .....	221
Table 5.7 Types of NGO activity.....	221
Table 5.8 Donor support to CBOs .....	222
Table 5.9 Summary of other bi- and multi-lateral, and Tanzanian NGO activity in Hai .....	229
Table 5.10 Women's groups in four research villages.....	232
Table 6.1 Main providers of education services in Hai .....	261
Table 6.2 Main providers of health facilities in Hai .....	261
Table 7.1 Nronga time line .....	295
Table 7.2 Samaki Maini time line.....	295
Table 7.3 Wari time line .....	296
Table 7.4 Kyengia time line.....	296
Table 7.5 Wealth rankings of all women's group members in Wari village .....	316
Table 7.6 Wealth rankings and cow donations (Kalali only) for members of Nkwarungo, Ifiyo and Kalali women's groups in Wari village .....	317
Table 7.7 Indicators of wealth and status held by households with an active member of a women's group in Wari .....	318
Table 7.8 Indicators of status and wealth of women's group leaders in Wari.....	320

## List of Maps

---

Map 3.1 Tanzania in East Africa showing major political boundaries.....	87
Map 5.1 Location of Hai District and Kilimanjaro Region in Tanzania.....	172
Map 5.2 Research villages in Hai District .....	184
Map 5.3 Ward boundaries within Hai District.....	193
Map 5.4 Villages in Hai District .....	194
Map 6.1 Health service provision in Masama Division, Hai District.....	242
Map 6.2 Health service provision in Machame Division, Hai District.....	243
Map 6.3 Health service provision in Lyamungo Division, Hai District .....	244
Map 6.4 Health service provision in Siha Division, Hai District .....	245
Map 6.5 Non-primary education provision in Masama Division, Hai District.....	246
Map 6.6 Non-primary education provision in Machame Division, Hai District .....	247
Map 6.7 Non-primary education provision in Lyamungo Division, Hai District.....	248
Map 6.8 Non-primary education provision in Siha Division, Hai District.....	249
Map 6.9 Primary school provision in Masama South Ward, Masama Division, Hai District .....	250
Map 6.10 Primary school provision in Masama West Ward, Masama Division, Hai District .....	251
Map 6.11 Primary school provision in Masama East Ward, Masama Division, Hai District .....	252
Map 6.12 Primary school provision in Machame North Ward, Machame Division, Hai District .....	253
Map 6.13 Primary school provision in Machame Uroki Ward, Machame Division, Hai District .....	254
Map 6.14 Primary school provision in Machame West Ward, Machame Division, Hai District .....	255
Map 6.15 Primary school provision in Machame South Ward, Machame Division, Hai District .....	256
Map 6.16 Primary school provision in Machame East Ward, Machame Division, Hai District .....	257
Map 6.17 Primary school provision in Siha East Ward, Siha Division, Hai District .....	237
Map 6.18 Primary school provision in Siha Central Ward, Siha Division, Hai District .....	258

## List of Figures

---

Figure 4.1 Numbers of currently registered NGOs by period of registration.....	138
Figure 4.2 NGOs in Tanzania by sector, 1994.....	140

## Acronyms

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AA	African Association
AAWORD	Association of African Women for Research and Development
ADP	Area Development Programme (World Vision Tanzania)
AMAP	Aid Management and Accountability Programme
ANGOZA	Association of Non-Governmental Organisations in Zanzibar
BAKWATA	<i>Baraza Kuu la WaIslam Tanzania</i> (Tanzania Muslim Council)
BAWATA	<i>Baraza la Wanawake Tanzania</i> (Council of Tanzanian Women)
CBO	Community-Based Organisation
CCM	<i>Chama Cha Mapinduzi</i> (Party of the Revolution)
CDA	Community Development Activity
CDO	Community Development Officer
CDP	Community Development Project (World Vision Tanzania)
CDTF	Community Development Trust Fund
CSDP	Child Survival and Development Programme
DAWN	Development Alternatives for Women in a New Era
DDT	District Development Trust
DFID	Department for International Development
GAD	Gender And Development
HDETF	Hai District Education Trust Fund
IFI	International Financial Institution (IMF and World Bank)
IGA	Income Generation Activity
IIG	International NGO Interest Group
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KCCDP	Kyungukyelwa Church Community Development Project (World Vision Tanzania)
KIWODEA	Kilimanjaro Women Development Association

KKKT/ELCT	<i>Kanisa Kiivangelisti Kilutheri Tanzania</i> (Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanzania)
KNCU	Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union
KNPA	Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association
MCH	Maternal and Child Health Care
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAFO	Primary Health Care Ambassadors
PHC	Primary Health Care
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
PMO	Prime Minister's Office
RRA	Rapid Rural Appraisal
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
TACOSODE	Tanzania Council for Social Development
TANGO	Tanzania Association of Non-Governmental Organisations
TANU	Tanganyika African Native Union
TFL	Tanganyikan Federation of Labour
TGNP	Tanzania Gender Networking Programme
TTACSA	Tanganyika Territory African Civil Service Association
UMATI	<i>Huduma za Uzazi wa Mpango</i> (Family Planning Association of Tanzania)
UN	United Nations
UPE	Universal Primary Education
URT	United Republic of Tanzania
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UWT	<i>Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania</i> (Union of Tanzanian Women)
WAD	Women And Development
WID	Women In Development
WIDEF	Women In Development Fund
WVT	World Vision Tanzania

## Glossary of Kiswahili and Kichagga terms

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<i>Baba</i>	father
<i>balozi</i> (pl. <i>mabalozi</i> )	ten cell leader
<i>banda</i>	shed
<i>baraza wa wazee</i>	Church council
<i>Diwani</i>	elected member of District Council
<i>fereji</i>	traditional irrigation furrows on Mount Kilimanjaro
<i>jitegemea</i>	self-reliance
<i>khanga</i>	brightly patterned cloth worn by most women
<i>kihamba</i> (pl. <i>vihamba</i> ) ( <i>Kichagga</i> )	clan land surrounding the homestead consisting of banana grove and coffee bushes
<i>kitenge</i> (pl. <i>vitenge</i> )	printed cloth worn by most women
<i>kitongoji</i> (pl. <i>vitongoji</i> )	sub-village
<i>maendeleo</i>	development
<i>Mama</i>	mother
<i>mbege</i> ( <i>Kichagga</i> )	banana beer
<i>Mchungaji</i>	Pastor
<i>Mwenyekiti</i>	Chairman
<i>Mwivangilisti</i>	Evangelist
<i>mzee</i> (pl. <i>wazee</i> )	old man, generally a term of respect (female version: <i>bibi mzee</i> )
<i>pombe</i>	banana beer
<i>porini</i>	farm land on the lower slopes of the mountain used or cultivating maize and beans
<i>serikali ya kijiji</i>	village government
<i>shamba</i>	farm land

<i>Tumaini</i>	hope
<i>Uingereza</i>	England
<i>ujamaa</i>	political slogan referring to Nyerere's policy of self-reliance following the Arusha Declaration in 1967
<i>ukoo (Kichagga)</i>	clan
<i>Wazazi</i>	( <i>Jumuiya ya Wazazi</i> ) Tanzanian Parents' Association

# **CHAPTER ONE**



## **'Reinventing development' in a liberalised era: 'civil society' and NGOs in Africa**

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### **Introduction: (re)presenting Africa**

“The closeness of the tropical world to Liverpool is manifest along its waterfront and in its dockside industries....The School [of Tropical Medicine] is still governed by representatives of Liverpool ship-owners and merchants, and of the University of Liverpool, a symbol of the close and reciprocal ties of Liverpool and the tropics in many fields of human endeavour” (Lawton 1964:372-374).

“Africa is probably the most fascinating and dynamic area, and the scene of some of the most dramatic political changes, in the tropical world today. Along with remarkable economic and social developments and the political transformation of recent years, there has been outstanding progress in the scientific study of the continent, especially since the end of the Second World War. In this advancement of knowledge geographers have contributed significantly” (Steel 1964:2-3).

In writing about Africa from the Department of Geography in Liverpool, I am situated in a department with a history of close interest in the continent, as the two above excerpts from *'Geographers and the Tropics: Liverpool essays'* (Steel and Prothero 1964) exemplify. However, the nature of geography as a discipline has undergone significant change during the last three decades, and more recently, the postmodern turn within the social sciences has caused (some) geographers to pause and reflect on many of the assumptions of their work. In particular, the 'crisis of representation' associated with the postmodern turn has been of concern for those geographers (and other social scientists) whose work attempts to represent the lifeworlds of others (or 'Other(s)'). In the late 1990s any geographer who might claim the existence of “close and reciprocal ties” between a city such as Liverpool and “the tropics” would no doubt be taken to task by critical thinkers wishing to point out Liverpool's relatively happier position within global processes of unequal exchange (of capital and of knowledge). Similarly, the notion that geographers are

contributing towards the advancement of the “scientific study of the continent” postcolonial and postmodern critiques which argue that the exercise of (Western) power has been intimately bound up with the production of (Western scientific) knowledge (Escobar 1995, Said 1978).

This thesis is concerned with the role of the non-governmental sector<sup>1</sup> in the Tanzanian development process. In employing a qualitative research methodology, its main concern has been to understand the role of the non-governmental sector from the perspective of different individuals and groups in Tanzania (Eyles and Smith 1988), including officials of national and local government (in Hai District, Kilimanjaro Region), NGO staff, village elites, and women and men in villages. As such, it is inherently concerned with the lifeworlds of Others in a former British colony which is now one of the poorest countries in the world. The poststructuralist, feminist, and ‘indigenous’ (Madge 1993) critiques of the production of knowledge have raised important issues surrounding the politics of such a research project (Ake 1979, Asante 1987, England 1994, Katz 1994, Kobayashi 1994, Madge 1993, Mohanty 1991, Mudimbe 1988, Sidaway 1992, 1993). How is it that I, as a white, Western, middle-class woman can go to a former British colony to carry out research in the pursuit of objective ‘knowledge’? How can I presume to objectively collect data and interpret it ‘correctly’ in order to write what will be disseminated (predominantly in the West, in English-speaking journals) as knowledge about Tanzania? What are the implications of interviewing poor Tanzanian men and women about their lives in an attempt to “get at the truth” (Devereux and Hoddinott 1992:34)?

I do not assume to have the answers to these important questions. In drawing attention to the situated nature of the data presented in this study, I am not seeking to absolve the power/knowledge problematic through reflexivity, as if the admonition that we in a powerful position vis-à-vis ‘the researched’ somehow cancels out the

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<sup>1</sup> While a fuller interpretation of this term is given below, it is useful to point out here that the terms non-governmental organisations, non-governmental sector, non-governmental actors, and NGOs, are

problem (Patai 1991). I merely wish to point out that this thesis does not claim to be an accurate or 'truthful' representation of the non-governmental sector in Tanzania, and in Kilimanjaro in particular. It is one of a myriad of possible representations, or stories. No doubt if it had been carried out by a male researcher, a Tanzanian, a German, an older married woman, or a Muslim, a different story would have been constructed between researcher and researched. However, I would argue that this does not necessarily mean that the story which *is* presented, can be easily disregarded. As I shall argue in this chapter, research on NGOs has been in the main, somewhat parochial (Hulme 1994, Vivian 1994), and a study which attempts to critically place the non-governmental sector within its wider institutional and socio-cultural environment is a useful starting point for broadening the debates on NGOs and their contribution to the development process.

Moreover, while I accept much of the poststructuralist critique of the production of 'objective science', my own research experience suggests to me that power relations, at least during the field research process, are not always one-way. During an average week in Tanzania (in which I might have interviewed village peasants and elites, government officials, and NGO staff, all both male and female) I would be, by turns, rich, powerful and white (in comparison to the poor in the village), poor, insignificant and white (in comparison to some NGO staff, some government officials, and some village elites), pitied (for not being married or being a proper Lutheran), envied (for access to a car and money), patronised (by government officials, NGO staff, village elites), looked-down upon (because of my age and marital status), looked-up to (because of my relative education), scrutinised (for being the 'Other' in the village), and even exploited<sup>2</sup>. Following Keith (1992) and Marcus (1992), I am therefore reluctant to toe the reflexive line in an attempt to mitigate the unequal power relations inherent in this work. This is not to question that my positionality as the researcher did not affect the nature of the questions I asked and the data I collected (see Chapter Five). It is merely to suggest that the

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used interchangeably in this work to avoid the monotony of constantly referring to the 'non-governmental sector' (which, as will become clear below, is my preferred term).

power relations embedded in the research process are complex, and not always necessarily unidirectional. As Patai has observed:

“Ultimately we have to make up our minds whether our research is worth doing or not, and then determine how to go about it in ways that let it best serve our stated goals....But in an unethical world, we cannot do truly ethical research” (Patai 1991:150).

### **Development lost: 'all downhill since Vasco de Gama'<sup>3</sup>**

The study of development in the poorer regions of the world, namely Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, suffered something of an impasse during the 1980s (Booth 1985, 1994b, Corbridge 1990, Schuurman 1993a). Broadly stated, this was driven by a recognition that Marxist approaches to development were theoretically flawed, and that they were becoming less able to explain diversity and change within the 'Third World'<sup>4</sup>. A variety of poststructuralist critiques of the totalising tendencies inherent in the theory and practice of development began to take shape, from a range of standpoints including feminism, postmodernism and postcolonialism (Escobar 1995a, 1995b, Esteva 1992, Mohanty 1988, Sachs 1992, Shiva 1988, Slater 1992, Spivak 1987). Simultaneously, the late 1980s saw the fall of the Berlin Wall and the apparent triumph of market capitalism, captured infamously by Fukuyama's polemical tract *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992). Socialism, and its attendant versions of Marxism, were deemed to have failed in terms of achieving

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<sup>2</sup> I would not wish to go into particular details here, but an example of one incident involved the plagiarism of my work into a consultancy paper by a senior government official.

<sup>3</sup> (Watts 1993:258).

<sup>4</sup> The use of the term 'Third World' in reference to the countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean is rejected in this work, and is only used here in this first instance in keeping with the literature under discussion. The appropriateness of the 'Third World' as a geographical, and an imagined, entity, has been widely discussed (see Friedmann 1992b, Harris 1986, Hettne 1990, Norwine and Gonzalez 1988, Wolf-Philips 1987), and in particular, the diversity of the countries subsumed under the banner 'Third World' has given rise to much criticism of its continued usage. Moreover, the ideological baggage which attends the term, inseparable from the violence of colonialism and imperialism (despite the fact that it was originally coined partly to engender solidarity among the poorer countries during the Cold War era), renders it a highly loaded term. Other synonyms include the 'South', the 'global South', 'Less Developed Countries', 'Underdeveloped Countries', and 'Developing Countries'. These terms have their various merits and demerits, but central to all of them is an attempt to pigeon-hole poorer countries into one homogenous category, the defining characteristic of which is the relative poverty of these countries vis-à-vis the West. Therefore, throughout this work, Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean are referred to, where appropriate, by name.

**PAGE**

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## **'Reinventing development' in a liberalised era: 'civil society' and NGOs in Africa**

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### **Introduction: (re)presenting Africa**

“The closeness of the tropical world to Liverpool is manifest along its waterfront and in its dockside industries....The School [of Tropical Medicine] is still governed by representatives of Liverpool ship-owners and merchants, and of the University of Liverpool, a symbol of the close and reciprocal ties of Liverpool and the tropics in many fields of human endeavour” (Lawton 1964:372-374).

“Africa is probably the most fascinating and dynamic area, and the scene of some of the most dramatic political changes, in the tropical world today. Along with remarkable economic and social developments and the political transformation of recent years, there has been outstanding progress in the scientific study of the continent, especially since the end of the Second World War. In this advancement of knowledge geographers have contributed significantly” (Steel 1964:2-3).

In writing about Africa from the Department of Geography in Liverpool, I am situated in a department with a history of close interest in the continent, as the two above excerpts from *'Geographers and the Tropics: Liverpool essays'* (Steel and Prothero 1964) exemplify. However, the nature of geography as a discipline has undergone significant change during the last three decades, and more recently, the postmodern turn within the social sciences has caused (some) geographers to pause and reflect on many of the assumptions of their work. In particular, the 'crisis of representation' associated with the postmodern turn has been of concern for those geographers (and other social scientists) whose work attempts to represent the lifeworlds of others (or 'Other(s)'). In the late 1990s any geographer who might claim the existence of "close and reciprocal ties" between a city such as Liverpool and "the tropics" would no doubt be taken to task by critical thinkers wishing to point out Liverpool's relatively happier position within global processes of unequal exchange (of capital and of knowledge). Similarly, the notion that geographers are

contributing towards the advancement of the “scientific study of the continent” postcolonial and postmodern critiques which argue that the exercise of (Western) power has been intimately bound up with the production of (Western scientific) knowledge (Escobar 1995, Said 1978).

This thesis is concerned with the role of the non-governmental sector<sup>1</sup> in the Tanzanian development process. In employing a qualitative research methodology, its main concern has been to understand the role of the non-governmental sector from the perspective of different individuals and groups in Tanzania (Eyles and Smith 1988), including officials of national and local government (in Hai District, Kilimanjaro Region), NGO staff, village elites, and women and men in villages. As such, it is inherently concerned with the lifeworlds of Others in a former British colony which is now one of the poorest countries in the world. The poststructuralist, feminist, and ‘indigenous’ (Madge 1993) critiques of the production of knowledge have raised important issues surrounding the politics of such a research project (Ake 1979, Asante 1987, England 1994, Katz 1994, Kobayashi 1994, Madge 1993, Mohanty 1991, Mudimbe 1988, Sidaway 1992, 1993). How is it that I, as a white, Western, middle-class woman can go to a former British colony to carry out research in the pursuit of objective ‘knowledge’? How can I presume to objectively collect data and interpret it ‘correctly’ in order to write what will be disseminated (predominantly in the West, in English-speaking journals) as knowledge about Tanzania? What are the implications of interviewing poor Tanzanian men and women about their lives in an attempt to “get at the truth” (Devereux and Hoddinott 1992:34)?

I do not assume to have the answers to these important questions. In drawing attention to the situated nature of the data presented in this study, I am not seeking to absolve the power/knowledge problematic through reflexivity, as if the admonition that we in a powerful position vis-à-vis ‘the researched’ somehow cancels out the

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<sup>1</sup> While a fuller interpretation of this term is given below, it is useful to point out here that the terms non-governmental organisations, non-governmental sector, non-governmental actors, and NGOs, are

problem (Patai 1991). I merely wish to point out that this thesis does not claim to be an accurate or 'truthful' representation of the non-governmental sector in Tanzania, and in Kilimanjaro in particular. It is one of a myriad of possible representations, or stories. No doubt if it had been carried out by a male researcher, a Tanzanian, a German, an older married woman, or a Muslim, a different story would have been constructed between researcher and researched. However, I would argue that this does not necessarily mean that the story which *is* presented, can be easily disregarded. As I shall argue in this chapter, research on NGOs has been in the main, somewhat parochial (Hulme 1994, Vivian 1994), and a study which attempts to critically place the non-governmental sector within its wider institutional and socio-cultural environment is a useful starting point for broadening the debates on NGOs and their contribution to the development process.

Moreover, while I accept much of the poststructuralist critique of the production of 'objective science', my own research experience suggests to me that power relations, at least during the field research process, are not always one-way. During an average week in Tanzania (in which I might have interviewed village peasants and elites, government officials, and NGO staff, all both male and female) I would be, by turns, rich, powerful and white (in comparison to the poor in the village), poor, insignificant and white (in comparison to some NGO staff, some government officials, and some village elites), pitied (for not being married or being a proper Lutheran), envied (for access to a car and money), patronised (by government officials, NGO staff, village elites), looked-down upon (because of my age and marital status), looked-up to (because of my relative education), scrutinised (for being the 'Other' in the village), and even exploited<sup>2</sup>. Following Keith (1992) and Marcus (1992), I am therefore reluctant to toe the reflexive line in an attempt to mitigate the unequal power relations inherent in this work. This is not to question that my positionality as the researcher did not affect the nature of the questions I asked and the data I collected (see Chapter Five). It is merely to suggest that the

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used interchangeably in this work to avoid the monotony of constantly referring to the 'non-governmental sector' (which, as will become clear below, is my preferred term).



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development for large parts of the world. Meanwhile, the escalating debt crisis and the imposition of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in many countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean meant that the quality of life and socio-economic conditions in these countries deteriorated rapidly. The charge was therefore laid at the feet of development studies that they had become "irrelevant" to the real world of development (Booth 1985, Edwards 1989). Given these significant problems, what could the study of development look like in a post-impasse era? Indeed, could (or should) 'development' as practice and as theory, continue to exist?

These have been some of the major questions fuelling a number of publications in recent years (Booth 1994b, Brohman 1996, Crush 1995, Corbridge 1993, Cowen and Shenton 1996, Escobar 1995a, Gardner and Lewis 1996, Hettne 1995, Nederveen Pieterse 1991, 1998, Power 1998, Sachs 1992, Schuurman 1993a, Simon and Närman 1999, Slater 1992). Nederveen Pieterse (1998) usefully divides the emerging schools of thought into three main positions; mainstream development, alternative development, and post-development. However, he makes the point that these positions are neither mutually exclusive, nor internally cohesive (see also Booth 1994a on post-impasse research). Furthermore, he suggests that alternative development, broadly understood as being fundamentally concerned with human development rather than with economic growth, and initiated through a combination of bottom-up approaches, participation, and grassroots co-operation, has been successful only insofar as many of its concerns have been incorporated into mainstream approaches as carried out by official international development agencies and NGOs. In this way, there is now very little to choose between the mainstream and the alternative development positions, an issue which is exacerbated by the apparent lack of "theoretical cohesion" within the alternative development literature (Nederveen Pieterse 1998:349). Brohman has attempted to outline the fundamentals of the alternative development position, which he lists as follows: a concern with the redistribution of wealth; a focus on small-scale, bottom-up and community-based projects; an emphasis on the need to fulfil basic needs and an associated move away from definitions of development which focus on economic growth; a recognition of the need for community participation; and a reorientation towards self-reliance

(1996: 219-220). However, he also concedes that such alternative development 'strategies' are "generally eclectic and [do] not depend on any well-defined theoretical base" (1996:219). The suggestion made by Nederveen Pieterse that mainstream and alternative developments may even be conflated to produce Mainstream Alternative Development (or MAD) does not seem out of place. Furthermore:

"[A]lternative development travels under many aliases – appropriate development, participatory development, people-centred development, human scale development, people's self-development, autonomous development, holistic development, and many elements relevant to alternative development are developed, not under its own banner, but under specific headings, such as participation, participatory action research, grassroots movements, NGOs, empowerment, conscientization, liberation theology, democratization, citizenship, human rights, development ethics, ecofeminism, cultural diversity, and so forth. Such dispersion does not facilitate the generation of a coherent body of theory. Many alternative development sources do not refer in any methodological way to one another, but keep on generating alternatives from the ground up, in the process reinventing the wheel without zeroing in on fundamentals" (*ibid.* 1998:351-352).

In terms of constructing a theory of alternative development, the apparent link between alternative development and non-governmental organisations (Bebbington 1997, Brohman 1996, Drabek 1987, Farrington *et al* 1993, Korten 1987, Thomas 1992) is also further cause for concern, as this thesis will show. The problems associated with NGOs as deliverers of an alternative development, particularly in terms of participation and empowerment, are central to the concerns of this thesis and are discussed in greater depth below and in Chapter Two. Nevertheless, it is as well to point out here that development as carried out by NGOs does not amount to an alternative development paradigm in and of itself (Nederveen Pieterse 1998), partly because of the variety of NGO types and NGO approaches, but also because of the mainstreaming of NGO methods in development. Alternative development, therefore, has become very much bound up with (mainstream) practice rather than with a separate, identifiable alternative theory of development.

On the other hand, post-development (or anti-development) is a different position which has drawn theoretical inspiration from what Watts has termed the "Foucauldian turn" in development studies (1995:57) which belongs to a body of poststructuralist work, encompassing both postmodern and postcolonial critiques. However, as we shall see shortly, it does share with alternative development a propensity to focus on a broadly defined 'civil society'<sup>5</sup> as a peg on which to hang hopes of the possibilities for entering a post-development era (see Escobar 1995, Crush 1995; Booth 1994a, Watts 1993).

A radical reaction to the impasse in development studies, post-developmentalists reject the mainstream (and the alternative, for that matter) notion of development; as Esteva remarks, "[d]evelopment has evaporated" (1992:22). Metaphors of dissipation and abandonment feature prominently in post-developmental writing; from Sachs' "idea of development" which "stands like a ruin in the intellectual landscape" (1992:1), to Escobar's history of development, which can be read as "the loss of an illusion, in which many genuinely believed" (1995a:4). Thus post-developmentalists are writing the obituary of the idea of development (Sachs 1992). 'Alternative development' is a misnomer as the idea of 'development' remains integral to such an approach, according to the post-development position. Development has not only failed to improve conditions for those it promised to help, but the effects of its projects, programmes, and the whole manner of its operations, have often been unpropitious for ecological, social, cultural and political processes in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. And yet it remains as an ideology of progress through the discursive production of knowledge about 'development', and the 'Third World' which it seeks to produce as the 'Other' (Said 1987; Escobar 1988, Mohanty 1988, Sachs 1992). Therefore, the post-developmentalists argue that the Western idea of development must be abandoned. It is a lost paradigm; or to borrow Watts' paraphrase of the post-development position:

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<sup>5</sup> 'Civil society' as a problematic concept is explored in greater depth below; however, at this point it is worth explaining that 'civil society' is placed in inverted commas throughout this work in order to convey the ambiguous and questionable nature of the concept in an African context.

"There has been no progress since 1400 according to Wallerstein; indeed the record shows an overall decline - all downhill since Vasco de Gama" (1995:46).

While the inherent problems within 'development' as a Western concept have been revealed by post-development writing, the central issue which remains is 'where to from here?' (Booth 1994a, Corbridge 1998, Nederveen Pieterse 1998, Power 1998, Simon 1999). Post-development has been criticised for its tendency towards privileging diversity, difference, locality, and resistance; which may be important, but how does this help the 'real world' of development? (Booth 1994a, Simon 1999). As Nederveen Pieterse points out, "what is the point of declaring development a hoax....without proposing an alternative?" (1998:366). As intimated above, much of the post-development literature sees a new way forward in what Escobar generically refers to as 'new social actors'<sup>6</sup> (see Escobar 1995a, 1995b, also Crush 1995, Fals Borda 1988, Kothari 1987, Nandy 1989) which have arisen in protest against the hegemonic discourses of development and modernity. However this in itself is also problematic:

"...[W]hereas dependency theory at least implicitly held out the hope of a future post-revolutionary state as a remedy, post-modern writing places its faith either in nothing, or in social movements of various kinds combined with the international NGO network" (Lehmann 1997:571).

It is thus argued that post-development writers are inadvisably biased in favour of New Social Movements (NSM) and actors within 'civil society' (Lehmann 1997,

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<sup>6</sup> 'New social actors', otherwise referred to as New Social Movements (NSM), refers very broadly to a range of institutions, organisations, groups and movements which may be understood to have risen up 'from the grassroots'. They are popular movements actively resisting the hegemonic discourses of 'development'; "These movements are essential to the creation of alternative visions of democracy, economy and society" (Escobar 1995b:212). Exactly what constitutes a NSM is somewhat difficult to assess; Escobar speaks of urban popular movements, Christian communities, peasant mobilisations and workers groups, to name but a few. Whether NGOs are incorporated under the general NSM banner is less clear; several critics of postmodern writing on development tend to assume that NGOs are an inherent part of the postmodern approach (see Lehmann below). I would suggest that this depends very much on the type of NGO (see below for a fuller discussion), although in general, I doubt that, particularly in Africa, the emerging NGO sector corresponds to the postmodern imaginary of a 'post-development era'. Furthermore, much of the NSM literature focuses on the Latin American and Asian experiences. As Watts has noted, "Africa....is noticeably absent" (1995:59). (See Mamdani and Wambi-dia-Wamba (1995) on social movements in Africa for a different view, although their case studies come mostly from North Africa).

Nederveen Pieterse 1998, Schuurman 1993, Simon 1999, Slater 1992, Watts 1993). Schuurman, for example, argues that, rather than being a site of resistance *against* modernity, NSM are precisely an expression of struggles for access *to* modernity, from which they have been alienated by the 'aborted modernity project' of development in the 'Third World' (1993b, 1993c, also Nederveen Pieterse 1998). Certainly, this thesis will argue that the non-governmental sector on Kilimanjaro is understood to provide access to modernity, progress and 'development' for those involved with it (Chapter Seven).

However, not all post-development writers share this rather rosy view of 'civil society' in which the poor and disenfranchised are able to participate and mobilise against dominant forces in society. As Porter observes:

“[T]here is no generalizable evidence to support the contention that widespread participation resolves resource conflicts, favours the poor, or makes for better planning or resource allocation processes. There is scope and value in community participation, but the bigger issues, such as access to shelter, land, capital, or viable public entitlements cannot be dealt with adequately by unbridled incantations towards NGOs or local politics. Either participation is irrelevant to the major issues, or where it is relevant....the fashionable focus on 'the community' or NGOs tends to neglect the essential role of the local state in articulating locality beyond the parochial to the generalizable interest” (Porter 1995:83).

The inherent problems in espousing the participation of the poor in movements which champion their concerns is a central issue throughout this thesis.

Others have attempted to engage more productively with the postmodern critique of development. Booth, for example, notes the value of the renewed interest in the “diversity of development experiences” (1994a:3) which may inform a new linkage between development theory and practice. There is an acknowledgement that a focus on agency and resistance can inform an understanding of the ways in which development is socially constructed across space and time (Booth 1994a, Slater 1992). Moreover, and of particular interest in the context of this thesis, there is a move towards understanding how both structure and agency shape the experiences

and the material realities of 'development' (Booth 1994a, Corbridge 1993, Slater 1992). Corbridge in particular argues that, rather than dismissing the "nihilistic excesses" of postmodernism outright, certain insights of postmodernism might be engaged with a materialist ontology in order to inform a more useful and relevant post-Marxist<sup>7</sup> development studies (1993). Crush (1995), in the introduction to what is an inherently Foucauldian project of dismantling the discourses of development, is thus able to suggest that:

"In arguing that more attention should be paid to the language of development, we need simultaneously to resist the submersion of the world by the words of development. Though development is fundamentally textual it is also fundamentally irreducible to a set of textual images and representations....the essays in this volume implicitly reject the conceit that language is all there is" (Crush 1995:5).

Following Booth (1994), Corbridge (1993), Crush (1995), and Slater (1992), the notion that the material and the representational should not be divorced from one another in the study of development forms a suitable point of departure for this study. This thesis is concerned with the notion within much of the alternative development (and some of the post-development) literature that 'development gridlock' in sub-Saharan Africa may be transcended, at least in part, through the increased involvement of the non-governmental sector in a broadly defined 'development process'. It attempts to move away from mainstream studies which evaluate NGO projects in narrowly defined terms, or which tend toward an ontological eulogising of

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<sup>7</sup> Broadly understood in the context of this thesis, post-Marxism is taken to be a body of work which is fundamentally driven by a materialist ontology, but which differs from classical Marxism in its attempts to move away from a teleological viewpoint (the poststructuralist critique) (see Corbridge 1989, also Slater 1992). It seeks to transcend class reductionism by considering other aspects of inequality such as cultural and social difference, and thus is able to engage with postmodern activities such as discourse analysis. Corbridge outlines post-Marxism thus:

"....[A] set of discourses which share with Marxism a materialist ontology, and a commitment to causal analysis and a concept of determination. It further accepts that the capitalist world 'economy' is structured by a systematically unequal distribution of assets and capabilities which leads to contradictions in the processes of accumulation; post-Marxist political economy seeks to understand these processes, antecedents, and effects. Post-Marxism departs from some traditions of Marxism: (a) by opposing a methodological exclusivism born of dogmatic privileging of certain concepts; (b) by opposing propositions which speak of the necessary primacy of the economy (as an epistemological protocol); (c) by attaching itself to a generalised theory of exploitation and class which is at some remove from the labour theory of value; (d) *by opposing functionalist accounts of power, the state, and civil society*; and (e) by opposing those dualisms which oppose capitalism in general to socialism-in-general" (Corbridge 1993:451, emphasis added, see account of 'civil society' below).

the non-governmental sector (Hulme 1994, Simon 1999, Vivian 1994). Such studies are neither helpful nor are they able to capture the complex social and political relations, and cultural conditions, with which non-governmental organisations must necessarily engage in order to bring about social change. Rather, through an examination of the non-governmental sector in Tanzania, this thesis seeks to illustrate the utility of a broader approach to understanding how non-governmental organisations become engaged in 'development'. It is argued that, in order to fully understand the implications for change, non-governmental actors need to be examined in terms of their interactions with local social, political, economic and cultural dynamics<sup>8</sup>. This thesis illustrates the significance of an analysis which considers how the process of development is both generated and understood through the construction and interpretation of particular discourses, but also, how the material benefits of development are felt unequally by different people.

There are three major components to such an argument which have been differentiated in the analysis by scale. Firstly, the dynamics of the Tanzanian national NGO sector are examined in historical perspective through a consideration of non-governmental organisations based in Dar es Salaam, which reveals the tensions and weaknesses in an institutionally 'young' NGO sector, and in its relationship with donors and the state. In particular, the use of the language of appropriation and suspicion by divisions within the state suggest an inherent mistrust of the NGO sector in Tanzania and an attempt to steer NGOs away from 'political mobilisation' towards the relative safety of social service provision. Secondly, the analysis moves to the district level and looks at the non-governmental sector in Hai District, Kilimanjaro Region. The central concern here is the way in which state and non-governmental sectors interweave with one another in the provision of social services and in the support of grassroots organisations in such a way as to produce a 'polarisation of development' which is inequitable and highly influenced by patronage networks and the distribution of power within the district. Finally, the analysis turns to the village scale where the activities of local and international NGOs

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<sup>8</sup> I would further argue that environmental concerns are also central to a full understanding of how an NGO operates in a given locality, although this thesis does not deal directly with this issue.



have become inherently bound up in local socio-cultural understandings of *maendeleo* (development), which ultimately legitimises unequal participation in non-governmental activities, and the enjoyment of the material benefits from NGO activity by local elites and other wealthier groups. In this way, the thesis attempts to interweave a concern for both the discursive and material ramifications of the non-governmental sector's involvement in 'development'.

### **Discourses of development**

"Mesmerized by the glamorous notion of development, I was mentally slow to scale its ideological contours, to comprehend how development ideology is produced and reproduced, how it is propagated across space and through time, how it conquers the minds of native elites, and how it paves the path for a monolithic culture of materialism which stigmatizes poverty and the poor. Increasingly, it has dawned on me that my own development odyssey served as an autopsy of how the imported discourse of development had possessed the mind of a national ruling class, and how such a mindset had, in turn, played a major role in deepening the social roots of poverty - all, of course, in the name of development" (Shrestha 1995:266).

Discourse analysis within development studies stems from the work of Foucault (see *inter alia* Foucault 1972) and seeks to uncover and problematise the power relations which produce knowledge about 'development' and those who are in need of 'development', as elaborated by Shrestha above (Escobar 1995, Grillo 1997, Watts 1993). Discourse can be seen as a narrative or a set of 'signifiers' through which particular knowledge(s) (or 'truth(s)') are represented. Therefore, it is not simply a question of *what* is said, but what this *represents*, or as Grillo puts it; "A discourse (e.g. of development) identifies appropriate and legitimate ways of practising development as well as speaking and thinking about it" (1997:12). Moreover, multiple subject positions are constructed through the dissemination of, and resistance to, particular discourses (e.g. relating to gender, race, nationality, and ethnicity). Not only does this acknowledge the agency of the subject (which may or may not be seen as structurally constrained), but the unidimensional nature and fixity of the subject is challenged. The workings of dominant development discourses, then, are central to an understanding of the ways in which societies (and individuals within them) experience the development process.

According to one recent study of development discourses (Crush 1995), the aim is to uncover "the forms in which it [development discourse] makes its arguments and establishes its authority, the manner in which it constructs the world" (1995:3). Pre-empting the charge of 'armchair contemplation', Crush argues thus for the significance of such an approach:

"As most of us are aware, development rarely seems to 'work' - or at least with the consequences intended or the outcomes predicted. Why then, if it is so unworkable, does it not only persist but seem continuously to be expanding its reach and scope? Could it be that development does in fact work very well? It is just that what it says it is doing, and what we believe it to be doing, are simply not what is actually happening. And if this is so, then perhaps we need to understand not only why the language of development can be so evasive, even misleading, but also why so many people in so many parts of the world seem to need to believe it and have done so for so long" (1995:4).

There is an intimation here of the significance of power relations to the development discourse approach, which was central to Foucault's own analyses of society (which is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two). To return briefly to Escobar (1995), possibly the most well-known exponent of development discourse, it is the power of the West over the 'Third World' which has been produced and regulated since 1949<sup>9</sup> through the discourse of development. In his analysis, the set of institutions which emerged out of the end of Second World War in order to facilitate development in the 'Third World', including governments and planning agencies, have interacted in such a way as to produce a "discursive practice that sets the rules of the game" (1995:41). In this way, the 'Third World' has been measured, problematised, defined, and objectified, according to a particular (Western) version of knowledge which impacts negatively upon the people and countries it was supposed to be developing (the 'Other(s)'). While a full discussion of Escobar's thesis is not possible here, there are several critical points which are worth stating. Escobar's work tends towards a single homogenous notion of 'development', thus enabling him

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<sup>9</sup> According to Escobar (1995) the underdevelopment of the Third World (his chosen term which is reproduced here in accordance with his original argument) began on 20th January 1949, with Harry

to speak of 'the development project' emanating from the West. This has been criticised as being heavily centred on the North American experience, while subsuming a whole plethora of approaches, institutions and experiences of 'development' under one banner (Lehmann 1997, Nederveen Pieterse 1998, Simon 1999). Moreover, he speaks of *the* discourse of development, which again, essentialises a whole set of discursive practices which operate as part of 'development' (Grillo 1997). It is far more useful to talk of discourses of development (or development discourses) in order to draw attention to the fact that discourses are actively constructed by a wide range of actors and may differ across space and time (see Arce *et al.* 1994). Indeed, the influence of locality on the social construction of development has begun to be well-recognised (what Pred and Watts (1992) have referred to as 'the reworking of modernity'; see also Dahl and Rabo 1992, Pigg 1992):

"Much of the discourse analysis, broadly understood, also dovetails with the recognition that all societies create their own modernity, and hence the question becomes *on what terms is it....debated and defined and who gets to participate*. The idea of 'reworking modernity'.... sees popular culture and memory as much as 'globalization' as central ingredients in the recipe of late twentieth-century development" (Watts 1993:265-266, emphasis added).

The notion that a particular socio-cultural understanding of development can be constructed locally is cogently illustrated in Chapter Seven through an analysis of the construction of development discourses on Kilimanjaro. It is quite evident that the social construction of development is influenced by a variety of discourses which range from international development discourses (e.g. on the desirability of NGOs and Women In Development (or WID<sup>10</sup>)), to national discourses (e.g. on the importance of 'self-reliance') and local discourses (e.g. on Chagga cultural norms and values). Moreover, as Watts suggests, these discourses represent and legitimate a particular dynamic process of 'development' in which not all members of a society may be able to participate. The exclusion of certain groups from 'development' emerges strongly from the analysis of Kilimanjaro.

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Truman's speech on the 'fair deal' for the world which would help to solve the problems of the poorest areas.

James Ferguson's (1990) innovative study of Lesotho which analyses the ways in which Lesotho, and in particular the lives of the people of Thaba-Tseka District, are structured by the language of 'development' (which appears in inverted commas throughout the book), is particularly instructive here. He argues that the discourse of development serves to legitimate a certain type of development intervention. In analysing the ways in which this project operates within Thaba-Tseka, Ferguson shows how the discourse of development constructs an image of Lesotho as a poverty-stricken country, the saviour of which arrives in the form of 'development', in this case a livestock project which expanded into an integrated rural development project, funded by the Canadian International Development Agency. However, Ferguson is not interested in exposing the project's relative failures or successes for their own sake; rather, he wishes to show how the 'instrument effects' of development discourses serve to create and reproduce 'the anti-politics machine'. In this way, 'instrument effects' (after Foucault 1979) are the side-effects of failure, "effects that are at one and the same time instruments of what 'turns out' to be an exercise of power" (Ferguson 1990:255). The instrument effects of the Thaba-Tseka project serve to depoliticise poverty and legitimise the expansion of bureaucratic state control, thus serving the 'anti-politics machine':

"In this perspective, the 'development' apparatus in Lesotho is not a machine for eliminating poverty that is incidentally involved with the state bureaucracy; it is a machine for reinforcing and expanding the exercise of bureaucratic state power, which incidentally takes 'poverty' as its point of entry - launching an intervention that may have no effect on the poverty but does in fact have other concrete effects....[i]f the 'instrument effects' of a 'development' project end up forming any kind of strategically coherent or intelligible whole, this is it: the anti-politics machine" (Ferguson 1990:255-256).

However, Ferguson does not wish to imply that the anti-politics machine is part of a wider conspiracy to thwart development efforts. The mechanics of the process and their 'instrument effects' are only apparent in retrospect, and are not necessarily the direct result of planners' intentions. Furthermore, while his analysis sees the

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<sup>10</sup> See Chapter Two.

'instrument effects' of the CIDA project as an expansion of state power, a different process operates in Kilimanjaro, whereby the overall outcome of the development process is an exacerbation of existing socio-economic inequalities.

Two other studies which merit discussion here are those focusing on Nepal by Pigg (1992) and Shrestha (1995). These authors examine the effect of the development discourse, or *bikas*, on rural subjectivities in Nepal. Shrestha's chapter is particularly interesting as it is written in autobiographical style as a personal account of one man's experience of growing up in rural Nepal, surrounded by images (and some of the spoils, courtesy of USAID) of *bikas*. Pigg's article is an anthropological account of the village experience of *bikas* within Nepal, focusing in particular on the ways in which the ideals of *bikas* are communicated through education. What is striking from Pigg's and Shrestha's work is the ability of *bikas*, of the discourse of development, to pervade people's consciousness, and to take on local meaning through a hybridisation of *bikas* and local cultural values. This is a process akin to that taking place on Kilimanjaro. Shrestha and Pigg argue that new identities and ideals are produced, which displace many previous beliefs and values. As Shrestha laments with hindsight, people had "colonized minds" (1995:277). People and places became subject to value judgements according to their level of *bikas*. *Bikas* was particularly associated with material things, with Western objects (Shrestha describes the plane, Land Rover and rehabilitated school which became symbols of *bikas* in his village), and Western (white) people, and with the ability to speak English. Pigg refers to the "ideology of modernization" (1992:499) which was embedded within *bikas*. To be underdeveloped, or *abikasi*, was to be ignorant, backward, or simply "people who don't understand" (Pigg 1992:507). Moreover, the materiality of *bikas* was clear: "There was money in *bikas*....[D]evelopment was thus no longer just a concept. It became a practice which fortified, and even exacerbated, the existing class hierarchy" (Shrestha 1995:268). The overall impact of this discourse of development was, however, something of an empty dream, particularly as it became clear that the achievement of *bikas* was becoming ever further from the poorest peoples' grasp:

“....our expectations had been raised. Disappointment became more frequent as the gap between the promise and the reality widened. Since wants were rising, poverty had grown a new face. It had a much deeper materialistic undertone than ever before. Poverty was never so frightening and degrading in the past. We did not help ourselves either. Self-reliance and co-operation gave way to despondency and dependency. In the past, if a trail was damaged, the villagers from the surrounding villages organized a work force and repaired it. Now the villagers felt that somebody else, a foreign donor or government agency would come and fix it. Nowadays, nothing moves without foreign aid...[a]lthough the poor were never asked if they wanted to be helped or preferred Westernized development at all, now they too seem to have been intoxicated by the brew called foreign aid” (Shrestha 1995:275-276).

While there are parallels between the Nepali and Kilimanjaro cases, there is one significant point of divergence. Pigg’s and Shrestha’s account of *bikas* posits it as a force which overrides existing identities and cultural norms and values. In Kilimanjaro, I suggest that this process is a little more complex, in that the discourse of development which has emerged has engaged with, and has been heavily influenced by, particular local cultural values. Thus the dominant development discourse on Kilimanjaro is not an entirely externally-imposed set of practices, but rather, is both actively constructed and influenced by locality and local actors.

To conclude this section, in the light of the foregoing discussions of alternative- and post-development theories and the claims which are made for actors within society (or ‘civil society’) by their adherents, it would seem to be quite clear that any discussion of the NGO sector in Africa must be situated within a wider consideration of the notion of ‘civil society’. However, as I shall argue below, this is related more to the assumed linkage between ‘civil society’ and NGOs within much of the literature, rather than to any rigorous analytical assessment of the appropriateness of such a link. The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. The notion that ‘civil society’ may form the basis of a ‘reinvented development’ (as suggested by the alternative and, to some extent, the post-development positions<sup>11</sup>) is critically

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<sup>11</sup> The post-development position would reject the idea of a ‘reinvented development’ precisely because the notion of ‘development’ remains central. Nevertheless, as outlined above, many post-development writers imagine a broadly defined ‘civil society’ to be central to the achievement of a post-development era.

discussed, which leads to the rejection of the usage of 'civil society' as a generic term to refer to NGOs in Africa. This discussion also questions the idea that 'social capital' is central to an understanding of local development in Africa. An overview of the literature on NGOs is then offered, which includes a discussion of NGO typologies. The central themes of participation, power and empowerment and the role of NGOs in fostering these processes are highlighted here but are discussed in greater depth in Chapter Two. Finally the chapter concludes with an outline of the structure of the whole thesis.

### **'Reinventing development'<sup>12</sup>: 'civil society' in Africa**

The state in Africa, which has occupied a central position in discussions on development across the continent for so long, has suffered something of a decline over the last decade. There are two central dimensions to such a decline, both of which can be traced to the hegemonic rise of neo-liberalism in the 1980s associated with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The first can be located in the discourse of 'withdrawal', 'failure' and a general 'crumbling' of the edifice of the African state under Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), a process which has gathered speed since the middle of the 1980s (Bratton 1988, Doornbos 1990, Olukoshi and Laakso 1996, Riddell 1992). The second is embodied in the pendulum swing across the social sciences away from the study of 'the state' in Africa towards a society-centred approach to understanding processes of development, which, as discussed above, has largely come to settle on notions of 'civil society', 'democracy' and 'good governance' (Diamond *et al.* 1988, Harbeson and Chazan 1994, Robinson 1994, Rothchild and Chazan 1988, World Bank 1989, 1997). The state in Africa, while still providing the reference point for these new debates, has therefore ceased to be widely regarded as the central (or only) actor in African social, economic, and political processes. In its place has arisen a new discourse, simultaneously influenced by neo-liberal concerns for new institutions in development (Evans 1996b, Hadenius and Ugglä 1996, World Bank 1997); alternative development concerns for bottom-up, participatory approaches to

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<sup>12</sup> Watts (1995:47).

development (Brohman 1996, Hettne 1995, Korten 1987, Lehmann 1990); and by postmodern alternatives *to* development (Crush 1995, Escobar 1995, Mamdani and Wamba-dia-Wamba 1995, Schuurman 1993); all of which focus on the potential for democratic development to be brought about by 'civil society' and (new) social movements.

At the same time, the world has witnessed an upsurge in 'civil society' organisations, most notably in non-governmental organisations which have proliferated since the mid-1980s across sub-Saharan Africa (Bratton 1989, Fowler 1991, 1993, Ndegwa 1996). While the fascination with 'civil society' (and in particular with NGOs) has in part been fuelled by the literatures on alternative development and post-development, it is important to note that, at the same time, it has also been propelled by the processes of economic and political liberalisation which have swept the African continent. The current donor preference for organisations within 'civil society' to act as service providers cannot be divorced from the neo-liberal project associated with the World Bank and IMF (the International Financial Institutions, or IFIs) of 'rolling back the state' across the African continent.

The idea of 'civil society', therefore, seems to fit the bill for both parties, a convergence which has been labelled the 'New Policy Agenda' (Edwards and Hulme 1995, Robinson 1994). As Watts has noted:

"A key question might be to explore how the current impasse, the effort to reinvent development, is distinctive, a distinctiveness that....resides not in the existence of post-modern alternatives to development....but in the confluence around civil society....as the way out of development gridlock" (Watts 1995:47).

Taking our cue from Watts, the notion of a 'reinvented development' built around the concept of 'civil society' requires some unpacking. Originally a term which emerged in reference to eighteenth century Europe and nineteenth century America, 'civil society' has recently enjoyed something of a renaissance in discussions on



development in Africa<sup>13</sup>. Very broadly, there are two traditions around which a notion of 'civil society' has been built, although in practice they have become less distinct than this would suggest. The first of these can be termed the liberal school, associated with the work of *inter alia*, Hobbes, Locke, Paine and de Tocqueville, while the second tradition has emerged from a Marxian perspective, and can be associated with the writings of Hegel, Marx and Gramsci (Allen 1997, Bickford 1995, Bratton 1988, 1994, Fatton 1992, Hyden 1997, Kunz 1995, Mamdani 1995, McIlwaine 1998, Young 1994). The liberal interpretation saw 'civil society' in Europe and America as a free and liberal sphere between the state and the household wherein vibrant and democratic associations acted as a bulwark against state power. The Marxist interpretation, on the other hand, drew on the Hegelian tradition which tended to see conflict arising across both state and society, rather than between them:

“...[C]ivil society for Hegel was not a natural condition of freedom but a *historically produced* sphere of life....Hegel conceptualised civil society as a contradictory construct. For him the state does not arise *against* civil society, but in continuous conflict with it. Rather than the picture of a harmonious and non-contradictory sphere, civil society is seen as a contradictory combination, ridden with conflict between classes and groups” (Mamdani 1995:603-604, emphasis in original).

The Hegelian tradition, therefore, saw 'civil society' in Europe as a sphere of (conflictual) private interests which existed between the family and the state. Building on this, Gramsci later characterised 'civil society' as the ensemble of associations (religious and educational, for example) which come into existence in order to ensure the ideological hegemony of the ruling classes (Bratton 1988). Claiming a “somewhat uncertain descent from Gramsci” (Allen 1997:330), although more likely heavily influenced by the writings of de Tocqueville (McIlwaine 1998), writers within the liberal school have recently appropriated the interpretation of 'civil society' as independent associations and organisations. 'Civil society', therefore, understood from a liberal position as associations which exist outside of, and (significantly) in opposition to, the state, has become common parlance in the

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<sup>13</sup> While this trend is similar for Asia, the Caribbean and Latin America also, this discussion will focus on the literature related to sub-Saharan Africa only.

Africanist literature (see for example Bayart 1986<sup>14</sup>, Bratton 1988, 1994, Clark 1995, Hadenius and Ugglå 1996, Harbeson and Chazan 1994, Hyden 1997, Makumbe 1998, Rothchild and Chazan 1988).

Moreover, the positive attributes associated with the liberal school's interpretation have been assumed to inhere within 'civil society' in Africa. Thus it is often posited as being an essentially democratic, grassroots-oriented sphere which is responsive to people's needs. This is most noticeable in World Bank discourse on 'civil society', which emphasises its ability to counter state power and provide services where the state is failing:

"The first strategy [to prevent state collapse] emphasizes the reinforcement of civil society as a way of increasing the resilience of social institutions that may be able to fend off anarchy even if the state is very weak. A rich associational life may enable communities to maintain local law and order, support a safety net, and resist official corruption or exploitation" (World Bank 1997:160).

"A hopeful recent development is a growing array of self-help community initiatives, particularly in elementary education, basic health care, and local services such as waste disposal. These initiatives have often sprung from the state's own failure to provide such services effectively. Although they can seldom fully substitute for a well-functioning government administration, they offer a partial escape from the current morass" (World Bank 1997:163).

Similarly, other authors have highlighted the "innate goodness" (Young 1994:47) of 'civil society' in Africa:

"The hypothesis of this book is that civil society is a hitherto missing key to sustained political reform, legitimate states and governments, improved governance, viable state-society and state-economy relationships, and prevention of the kind of political decay that undermined new African governments a generation ago" (Harbeson 1994:1-2).

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<sup>14</sup> But contrast with Bayart (1993). While Bayart does not, in general, belong in the liberal stable, his essay 'Civil society in Africa' (1986), one of the first publications to use the term in the contemporary African context, provisionally defines civil society as being in opposition with the state; "society in its relation with the state....in so far as it is confrontation with the state" (Bayart 1986:111), although he then goes on to argue that 'civil society' as a 'social space' is somewhat more complex than this definition would appear to suggest. He later develops the idea of 'straddling' between the state and society (1993), a key concept which is returned to below.

Thus, the idea of a distinct 'civil society' in Africa which is characterised by vibrant, democratic organisations able to counter state power and provide services where the state cannot (the so-called 'Heineken factor' (Gibson 1993)) has gained considerable currency within the literature.

A related recent development has linked an understanding of 'civil society' as associational life to the notion of 'social capital' (Brown and Ashman 1996, Evans 1996a, 1996b, Hadenius and Ugglå 1996, Hyden 1997, Narayan 1997, Smillie 1995, Widner and Mundt 1998, World Bank 1997). The entry of 'social capital' into the development lexicon in the 1990s was prompted by Robert Putnam's (1993)<sup>15</sup> influential work on democracy and governance in Italy, although he was not the first to use the term (see Coleman 1988, 1990, also Bourdieu 1986, 1993). However, it has been Putnam's comparatively conservative understanding of 'social capital', taken broadly to mean the horizontal networks and organisations within 'civil society', which has influenced several development theorists and practitioners, not least of which now include the World Bank:

“...[S]ocial capital [is] the informal rules, norms, and long-term relationships that facilitate coordinated action and enable people to undertake cooperative ventures for mutual advantage” (World Bank 1997:114).

A similar definition offered in a World Bank study makes the links between 'social capital', and 'civil society' as associational life, even clearer:

“Social capital can be defined as the web of groups, associations, networks, and norms of trust at the community level that form the social underpinnings of poverty and prosperity (Putnam 1993)” (Narayan 1997:3).

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<sup>15</sup> Putnam concluded that high levels of 'social capital', defined as “features of social organisation, such as networks, norms and trust, that facilitate coordination and co-operation for mutual benefit” (Harriss and de Renzio 1997:920), could explain the political and economic differences between regional governments in northern and southern Italy. The vibrancy of 'social capital', or 'civic-ness', in northern Italy, as evidenced by associational life (such as choral societies, bird-watching groups, and bowling associations), newspaper readership and political participation, was identified as the most important factor in fostering regional democratic 'good governance' and higher levels of socio-economic performance (Putnam 1993).

'Social capital' has thus become a new 'buzz-word' in discussions within the development literature which focus on the renewed interest in citizenship, institutions, and the notion of governance. For some, it inheres in 'civil society', either as "the quantity and quality of associational life" (Narayan 1997:1), or as "networks of trust and collaboration" which "span the public/private divide" (Evans 1996b:1122), or as "local organizations and networks" which are able to "mobilise and utilise local resources and energies for problem solving" (Brown and Ashman 1996:1477). Such ties, norms and linkages are to be supported and encouraged in order to create the conditions for democratic development to take place. Following Putnam, a recent World Bank study on poverty in Tanzania highlighted the positive impact of 'social capital' on the income-earning capacity of whole villages (Narayan 1997). Associational life, taken as a proxy for 'social capital', was measured in each village, and found to be highly correlated with levels of wealth:

"...[H]ouseholds in villages with higher levels of social capital have significantly higher expenditures than households in villages with low levels" (Narayan 1997:60).

'Social capital' is therefore understood to be a "productive asset" (Narayan 1997:77), but which is also able to "exercise influence on political efficacy" (Widner and Mundt 1998:22). The late 1990s has witnessed a proliferation in the literature which seeks to scale the contours of this notion of 'social capital', and consider how best it might be harnessed, facilitated, or produced through particular public/private synergies (Evans 1996a, 1996b, see also Brown and Ashman 1996, Hadenius and Ugglå 1996, Winder and Mundt 1998).

Nevertheless, a critique of the use of Putnam's ideas in the development context has recently emerged (Beall 1997, Harriss and de Renzio 1997, Putzel 1997, Sharpe 1998), which points to the "curious neglect of politics" (Putzel 1997:939) and the general absence of a consideration of power relations from analyses of 'social capital', an argument which is taken up in discussions of state and non-governmental provision of social services on Mount Kilimanjaro in Chapter Six. Related to this has been the development of a strong critique of the liberalist-inspired notion of

'civil society' within the literature, much of it stemming from what can be loosely termed as the post-Marxist school of thought on state-society relations in Africa and which also centres on notions of politics and power (Allen 1997, Bickford 1995, Callaghy 1994, Gibbon and Bangura 1992, Fatton 1992, Mamdani 1995, Migdal *et al* 1994, Stewart 1997, Young 1994). There are several arguments within this broad perspective, the first of which takes issue with the positing of 'civil society' as an unproblematic sphere of democratic virtue:

“The romantic attribution of essentially democratic and egalitarian properties to both the informal sector and (especially) civil society tends to further downplay the ambivalence of many of the characteristics of the latter in Africa (and probably not just in Africa). If the African state embodies a shifting array of secular, national, ethnic, localistic and parochial practices, then this is also true of civil society....The point is *that civil society has no determining essential properties*, neither 'democratic' nor 'undemocratic'” (Gibbon and Bangura 1992:21, emphasis added).

This relates to a wider point about the ideological underpinnings of the renewed interest in 'civil society', which have been identified as unmistakably neo-liberal (Allen 1997, Callaghy 1994, Mamdani 1995, Young 1994). It can be no coincidence that at the precise historical moment when the state in Africa should be undertaking an unprecedented programme of retrenchment, the idea of 'civil society' should also have gained currency, as Young elaborates:

“Little by little the tantalizing dreams of a more abundant life, which the integral state was pledged to achieve, vanished and were displaced by a cynical image of the state and its agents as nothing more than predators....The 1980s were a difficult decade for states....Reaganism, Thatcherism, the great 1982 social retreat of Mitterand, the Berg Report, structural adjustment programmes, and finally the collapse of state socialism....[and] at the end of the 1980s [demands for] democratization....Enter civil society” (Young 1994:42-43).

Given the tendencies among some donor agencies and the IFIs to restructure the African state, is it any wonder that 'civil society' should now be so widely regarded as a vital ingredient for democracy across the African continent? Allen argues that the close association between neo-liberalism and 'civil society' renders the concept highly circumspect in the African context, “apart from the grant-seeking NGO and

the academic, it is proponents of the 'liberal project' who need civil society....Africanists can dispense with it" (1997:337: see also Callaghy 1994, Young 1994). Moreover, from a postcolonial perspective, it has been argued that the eurocentrism inherent in the transfer to the study of contemporary Africa, a term which was initially developed to describe particular historically-produced political conditions in America and Europe, amounts to nothing more than "history by analogy" (Mamdani 1995:607, see also Bickford 1995, Booth 1994a).

This relates to a broader set of questions about what is 'civil' in African 'civil societies' (Azarya 1994, Bickford 1995, Kunz 1995, Makumbe 1998). As Gibbon and Bangura (1992) point out above, 'civil society' is as likely to be as riven with corruption and undemocratic practice as is the state. Moreover, in the liberal view, 'civil society' was developed in the European/American context to refer to that part of society which "defines the nature and principles of political life from which government itself results" (Harbeson 1994:16). In other words, it required a politically active society which promotes both the 'civil-ness' and democratic nature of the polity. However, the question remains as to the applicability of this liberal view of 'civil society' to contemporary African political life. Bickford thus elaborates:

"Civil society, correctly used, implies "a form of universal citizenship within the nation-state, based on the one hand on the principles of individualism and on the other on the participation of these individuals in public life, a participation which in turn was based on the mutuality of citizens in the form of compacts, contracts, and the moral, economic, social, and political ties binding these individuals" ([Seligman 1992]:111). If any of these components are missing, then we are discussing something else – not civil society but associational life, for example, or non-governmental organizations, all of which, by the way, may be decidedly *uncivil*" (Bickford 1995:207, emphasis in original).

Thus, to speak of 'civil society' as associational life is essentially to misuse the concept according to its original meaning. 'Civil society' then becomes a normative construct to which African countries should aspire (Bickford 1995, also Bayart 1986). The point here is that, as Azarya comments, "If civil society just means

society, then we should call it society without superfluous attributes" (1994:88). The search for an identifiable 'civil society' in Africa which mirrors the European or American experience has led commentators to conclude that the associational life which does exist is "weak" (Makumbe 1998:311), or "underdeveloped" (Bratton 1994:52), and thus needs to be 'strengthened'. Such an argument supports the increasing donor tendency to fund organisations of 'civil society', which in practice means that more money is channelled to NGOs. Within the academic community, similar linkages between NGOs and 'civil society' are made, such as Hyden's assertion that NGOs are the "backbone of civil society" (1995:44). The following statement from Marcussen indicates this tendency quite clearly:

"Following from the retraction of the state, not least as fostered by structural adjustments and other policies embedded in neo-liberal ideology, it has largely been left to NGOs (as intermediary institutions) to fill gaps and, in particular, to strengthen civil society through support to local groups of people and local organisations and community structures, to help in implementing decentralisation policies, to assist in empowering the locals and foster democratisation" (Marcussen 1997:420).

Several issues arise here which are indicative of a wider (liberalist) literature on 'civil society' and NGOs. Firstly, Marcussen succinctly lays out many of the assumed benefits of 'civil society'/NGOs as discussed above. Secondly, the penchant for conflating 'civil society' with NGOs which Marcussen illustrates has attracted a certain amount of criticism. The "faddish tendency" (Bickford 1995:212) which with all associations are homogeneously labelled as 'civil society' (see for example, Bebbington and Riddell 1995, Clark 1991, Landell-Mills 1992) neither stands up to analytical rigour (as shown above), nor acknowledges the inherently undemocratic tendencies also found within the NGO sector itself (Gary 1996, Ndegwa 1996, Stewart 1997). It is quite possible that 'civil society' itself may be divided, which is shown to be the case in the Tanzanian NGO sector at both national and local levels (see Chapters Four, Seven and Eight). Thirdly, an implicit state/'civil society' dichotomy is set up which, it is being increasingly recognised, does not reflect the African experience (Bayart 1993, Fatton 1992, Gibbon and Bangura 1992, Mamdani 1995, Migdal *et al* 1994, Stewart 1997, Stokke 1994, Tandon 1991). As was pointed

out above, much of the literature in the late 1990s has been pervaded by the metaphors of 'retreat' (of the African state) and 'growth' (of organisations within 'civil society'). Similarly, geographical metaphors which describe 'civil society' as a 'space' or 'location' outside of the state are also prevalent (McIlwaine 1998). This tends to posit state and 'civil society' as two distinct (and oppositional) entities which are bound together in a zero-sum equation: as one withdraws, the other necessarily flourishes. Such a dichotomy echoes the metaphors prominent in earlier work which saw the state as "suspended above" society, unable to penetrate society and thus bring peasant producers into the market (Hyden 1980, 1983). Rather, recent work has argued that conceptualising state and 'civil society' as two separate bounded spheres does not take into account the possibility that the two may be interlinked in a number of ways. Bayart's (1993) notion of elites 'straddling' both the public and private sector, and Migdal's (1994) notion of the 'state-in-society' are useful starting points from which to explore the notion that state and 'civil society' in Africa may not be separate (see also Fatton, who writes of the "web of relations between state and 'civil society'" 1992:143). It also allows power relations which cut across both state and society to be incorporated into the analysis of contemporary African political and economic processes. The notion of the interweaving of the state with the non-state is a central issue which is taken up in Chapter Six.

This discussion has attempted to highlight some of the tensions inherent in using the term 'civil society' with reference to developmental NGOs in Africa. It is not suggested that the concept should be wholly rejected, but rather, that its use should be carefully exercised. While this thesis is not centrally concerned with the nature of 'civil society' in Tanzania, it is nevertheless concerned with the role of the non-governmental sector in development in Tanzania: and this is clearly an important distinction. It is therefore imperative to make it clear from the outset that the conflation of 'civil society' with NGOs is rejected in this study. Throughout, the terms non-governmental sector, non-state sector and NGOs are used interchangeably to refer specifically to independent and autonomous development organisations and groups. The term 'associational life' is used to refer to the wide range of organisations and associations which also operate autonomously, but which may not



necessarily be expressly development-oriented. It is not suggested that a realm of organisations and interests usually subsumed under the banner of 'civil society' does not categorically exist in Tanzania: rather, it is to try and move away from employing what is, essentially, a problematic term in referring to such a wide range of organisations and interests. Those organisations, groups, and interests which are often labelled as 'civil society' could perhaps be more fruitfully and analytically usefully labelled as something else (perhaps even precisely in those terms). Through the use of more specific terms such as the 'non-governmental sector' and 'associational life', this thesis attempts to avoid the pitfalls associated with an unproblematised employment of the term 'civil society' as described above.

### **'The brave new world of NGOs'<sup>16</sup>**

In a startling precursor to mainstream development thinking in the 1990s, Hyden was, in 1983, one of the first academics to suggest that non-governmental organisations held vast developmental potential for African countries:

“...[A]ny future poverty programmes in Africa have to be conceived with much greater involvement by NGOs. Serving as intermediaries between local groups and government, they are set to play a particularly important role in the years to come” (1983:128).

According to Hyden, NGOs could boast several 'definite advantages' (which Fowler (1988) later termed 'comparative advantages') over the state, which included an ability to work much closer with poorer sections of society, a highly motivated and altruistic staff, an ability to be economic and cost-effective, an adaptability to rapidly changing circumstances, and an independence from the state (Hyden 1983:120-122). Over a decade later, while the debates surrounding NGOs have broadened and are informed by a wide range of empirical studies and evaluations, as well as an array of theoretically- and empirically-based critiques, there nevertheless remains a tendency among some authors to hold up these 'comparative advantages' in support of the notion that the NGO sector, in some shape or form, can be viewed as a panacea for development problems (Cernea 1988, Clark 1991, 1995, Drabek 1987, Elliott 1987,

Garilao 1987, Korten 1987, 1990). Such a notion, for reasons outlined below (and throughout the thesis), would seem to be a rather optimistic view. Moreover, and particularly in the light of the alternative- and post-development literatures, NGOs have become central to an analysis which places an emphasis on participation, empowerment and democracy as vital ingredients in bringing about sustainable social and political change (Clark 1991, Diamond 1988, Edwards and Hulme 1992, Fowler 1988, 1993, Friedmann 1992, Healey and Robinson 1992, Lane 1995, Landell-Mills 1992, Lehmann 1990, Marcussen 1996, Smillie 1995). At the same time, the fact that NGOs allegedly 'do' development cheaper, faster, and better, has not escaped the notice of the official international aid community. In a bid to decrease the role of the state in Africa, which as outlined above has become the cornerstone of World Bank policy towards sub-Saharan African countries, an increasing amount of donor funds is now diverted away from the state towards NGOs.

The convergence of both economic and political interest on the global NGO sector, labelled the New Policy Agenda (Edwards and Hulme 1995, Robinson 1994), has meant that NGOs have become one of the most important actors in international development. In practical terms, NGO numbers have grown exponentially (particularly in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean), fuelled by increasing official international aid assistance (Bebbington and Riddell 1995, Bratton 1989, Clark 1991, Edwards and Hulme 1992, Fowler 1991, Powell and Seddon 1997). Although precise estimates are difficult to obtain, several indicators point to the increasing significance of NGOs in international development. OECD figures indicate that US\$2.2 billion was channelled through NGOs in 1992/93, while World Bank estimates place the figure for the same period at US\$2.5 billion (ODI 1995). A further ODI study estimated that between 10 and 15 percent of all aid to developing countries (over US\$6 billion) was being handled by NGOs (ODI 1996). According to Edwards and Hulme:

"There are now some 4,000 development non-government organisations in OECD member countries alone, dispersing almost three billion US dollars'

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<sup>16</sup> Fatton (1992:135).

worth of assistance every year. They work with around 10,000 to 20,000 'Southern' NGOs who assist up to 100 million people" (1992:13).

To say that NGOs have experienced growth over the last two decades is, therefore, something of an understatement. At this point it is worth pausing in order to consider what exactly it is we are referring to in using the term 'NGO'. Fowler (1995) notes that the term originated from a United Nations resolution passed in 1950 which identified non-state organisations which could be accredited to the Economic and Social Council. It is the non-state status of NGOs which remain their defining feature today. During the 1940s and 1950s major UK NGOs such as Oxfam and Catholic Relief Services emerged in order to engage in post-war relief operations, principally in Europe. As these organisations grew and expanded their mandate to work in poorer countries, the term NGO became synonymous with large, Northern-based organisations with paid staff, who carried out relief and development work in other countries. With the rise of the Southern NGO sector over the last twenty years, this definition has needed some rethinking. In the main, NGOs are now taken to be independent, not-for-profit organisations which are concerned with improving the quality of life for disadvantaged people (Vakil 1997). In this dissertation, the term 'non-governmental sector' is used to refer to those non-state groups and organisations which are working for a broadly defined 'development' (i.e. sustained social, economic and political change), and is interchangeable with 'non-state sector'. 'Non-governmental sector' is used in preference to 'NGO' as it is able to encompass a broader range of non-state activities which might not necessarily be considered as 'NGOs' in the strictest sense. In this study, 'NGO' refers to large, usually Northern- or urban- based development organisations with paid staff, while 'non-governmental sector' refers to a broader range of non-state activities including religious organisations, community groups, hometown associations, District Development Trusts (DDTs), official donors *and* NGOs.

These distinctions follow the popular understanding of the term 'NGO' in Tanzania<sup>17</sup> (which is often equated with the agency names emblazoned on the side of four-wheel drive vehicles, a reflection of their visibility and plenitude more than anything else). While most Tanzanians would identify Community Development Trust Fund (CDTF) as a (Tanzanian) NGO, probably fewer people would describe the Lutheran Church as an NGO (excepting those it employed), and even fewer would describe their local parish women's group as an NGO. And yet, all of these groups are engaged in developmental activities, ostensibly outside the realm of the state (although as Chapter Six makes quite clear, linkages with the state are becoming increasingly important for non-governmental actors), and as such must surely be recognised as being an integral part of the non-governmental sector in Tanzania. Finally, the non-governmental sector is not, by definition, understood to be a non-profit sector in the Tanzanian context. As subsequent chapters will argue, part of the appeal of the non-governmental sector in Tanzania lies in the opportunities for personal accumulation or income-generation which it offers.

It is also necessary to outline the relative usage of 'non-governmental sector' and 'associational life' in this study. As discussed above, associational life is a term used in preference to 'civil society'. While associational life encompasses the non-governmental sector, it is not restricted to organisations which are concerned with development. Therefore, it may include trade unions, human rights organisations, and social movements, for example. The historical development of Tanzanian associational life is discussed in Chapter Three in order to place an understanding of the contemporary non-governmental sector in Tanzania in its historical socio-economic and political context.

Typologies of NGOs abound, drawing distinctions between NGOs in terms of their constituency, their origin (North or South), their aims and objectives, and their size, among other things (see for example Bratton 1989, Clark 1991, Fowler 1995, Gary 1996, Vakil 1997, Wellard and Copestake 1993). Following Bratton (1989), for the

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<sup>17</sup> It is important to note here that these 'popular' understandings of NGOs are not the same as the Tanzanian Government's definition of an 'NGO', which is discussed in Chapter Four.

purposes of this dissertation the typology used will be based upon differentiation by scale. A major distinction is initially drawn between NGOs based in the North and NGOs based in South. In this study, Northern NGOs are referred to as International NGOs (INGOs) while those based in Dar es Salaam or the regions with a remit to work only in Tanzania are referred to as Tanzanian NGOs, a distinction which will be used mostly in discussing the national NGO sector in Tanzania in Chapter Four. Distinct from these organisations are those which are far more local in their scale and approach. Such organisations in this study include women's groups, youth groups, and projects based in one or two villages (such as PAFO in Wari, see Chapter Five). While such groups are often known as Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) in the literature, the term is not used a great deal in this study. Much of the discussion in later chapters focuses on the non-governmental sector as a whole (e.g. in Hai District) rather than only on CBOs.

### **NGOs: the good, the bad and the ugly**

The NGO literature can be broadly separated into three different types. Firstly, there is the 'practitioner-oriented' literature, mostly comprising specific evaluations and reports, which focuses on issues of best practice, lessons to be learned, and outcomes of project interventions<sup>18</sup>. Secondly, there is a large and ever-increasing empirically-based academic literature which seeks to link a broad concern for the NGO contribution to development with a range of issues including NGO-donor relations, NGO-government relations, the contribution of NGOs to 'civil society', democracy and good governance, the contribution of NGOs to processes of participation and empowerment, PRA and other participatory research methods, NGOs and alternative development, and NGO service provision, to name but a few (see *inter alia* Bebbington 1997, Bebbington and Riddell 1995, Bratton 1988, 1989, Clark 1991, Edwards and Hulme 1992, 1995, 1997, Fowler 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, Friedmann 1992, Harbeson *et al.* 1994, Kiondo 1993, 1995, Lehmann 1990, Semboja and Therkildsen 1995). Thirdly, there is an increasing consideration of NGOs within broader discussions of social and political theory, particularly among those

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concerned with democracy, collective action and social change (Bratton 1994, Crush 1995, Escobar 1995, Fatton 1992, Ferguson 1990, Gibbon and Bangura 1992, Mamdani 1995). While it is often taken for granted within the practitioner-oriented literature that NGOs are manifestly a 'good thing', the two academic literatures are divided between the adherents and the detractors (and a variety of positions in-between). This section is not particularly concerned with assessing NGOs' comparative advantage, or indeed, whether they can 'do' development cheaper, faster and better; instead, this section will pull out various strands in these debates which help situate the issues discussed throughout this thesis, and will thus focus on NGO-state relations (Chapters Four and Six), donor-related issues (Chapter Four), and the role of the non-governmental sector in service provision (Chapters Four and Six). The role of the non-governmental sector in fostering participation and empowerment (Chapter Seven) is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two.

It has been argued by Edwards and Hulme (1995a, 1995b, 1997) and Fowler (1993) that NGOs are likely to face increasing constraints in meeting both the political and the economic aspects of the New Policy Agenda of official aid organisations and donors. They see an inherent contradiction in supporting NGOs for their participatory, democratising work with the poorest, while at the same time channelling more money to them in order that they might take on a greater role in service provision. While both of these are considered to be among NGOs' comparative advantages, the question remains as to whether NGOs can deliver on both counts:

"Cost-effective service provision by NGOs on a large scale rests on standardized delivery systems and internal structures able to absorb large amounts of external funding....[T]he qualities required to support the role of NGOs in democratization are very different: independence from external interests, closeness to the poor, and a willingness to confront those in power" (Edwards and Hulme 1995a: 851).

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<sup>18</sup> Examples of this literature would include NGO in-house evaluations, publications from NGO-related organisations such as INTRAC in the UK, and project reports such as those found in the Oxfam journal *Development in Practice*.

Despite this seeming contradiction, NGOs have increasingly become major recipients of official aid flows. As outlined above, this policy of supporting NGOs dovetails with the neo-liberal paradigm espoused by the IFIs and implemented largely via SAPs, which prescribes the rolling back of the state and the nurturing of the private sector. In many African countries this has ultimately resulted in severe cutbacks in government expenditure, particularly on social welfare services such as health and education. It cannot be overlooked that the positive attitude of the IFIs and international donors towards NGOs may have less to do with the perceived comparative advantages of the non-governmental sector than it has to do with an ideologically motivated attempt to support private actors in taking over from, or at least substituting for, the state.

The World Bank estimates that in the early 1970s donor money accounted for 1.5% of NGO income. By the mid-1990s this had risen to about 30%, although exact figures vary between countries; 10% of UK NGOs' funding is from official sources, while official funds comprise a far greater proportion of NGOs' incomes in other OECD countries, including the USA (66%), Canada (70%), Italy (77%), Belgium (80%) and Sweden (85%) (ODI 1995). The cumulative effect of increased donor funding on NGOs is a central concern within the literature. NGOs are described as 'filling in the gaps' left in the wake of the retreating state (Clark 1995, Marcussen 1997); but this raises questions as to what kind of a role NGOs are able to take on in development if they are being funded primarily to plug gaps in state services (Fowler 1991, 1993). The increased funds available and the shift towards developing partnerships between Northern and Southern NGOs has meant that Southern NGOs have become dependent on Northern NGOs' and donors' funding and, consequently, on their agendas (Edwards and Hulme 1996, 1997, Fowler 1995a, Powell and Seddon 1997). In some African countries, NGOs have only recently been able or allowed to operate (such as in Tanzania, also Ethiopia (Campbell 1998)) and they are therefore an institutionally 'young' group. They have not yet had the chance to develop their own expertise and comparative advantage before huge amounts of money has become available for them. 'Briefcase NGOs', donor-driven NGOs, NGOs run by ex-civil servants and academics are all too common in sub-Saharan

Africa (Clark 1995, Kiondo 1993, Powell and Seddon 1997). Urban-based elites have access to donor discourses about what is 'in' (i.e. the new development buzzwords) and are able to put together funding applications which tie in with what donors want to hear. Such donor-driven activity is exacerbated by the fact that there is widespread knowledge that NGOs and donors 'have money, will spend'. The overall effect is that a whole range of organisations are competing for funds to carry out similar projects. Moreover, organisations may propose certain programmes because they know that donors want to fund them (as in the case of, for example, the current trend of women's and children's projects), rather than because it is what they are good at.

Given the realities of NGO funding, the notion of NGOs' 'comparative advantage' over the state becomes highly questionable. Several commentators have suggested that the merits of NGOs have been "oversold" (Bratton 1989:572), or as Azarya (1994) has pointed out, that NGOs look good simply because they are the only alternative to the discredited state:

"The fact that NGOs are not governments thus becomes a positive factor in its own right – whatever their weaknesses or disadvantages, they are not the government and that is enough for some" (Powell and Seddon 1997:6).

However, there are still those who argue that NGOs do hold advantages over the state. Edwards and Hulme (1992) point out that NGO successes have been considerable, though localised. They initiated a debate which was centrally concerned with exploring ways in which NGO impact could be 'scaled up' (although in later publications Edwards and Hulme recognised many shortcomings of the NGO approach, 1995a, 1995b, 1996). Edwards (1999) suggests that NGOs can be particularly successful in poverty alleviation when they involve strong linkages with states and supportive financial services. At the same time, NGOs' ability to alleviate poverty has come under some scrutiny, and while a study by Riddell and Robinson (1992) for the ODI suggested that up to 75 percent of projects surveyed were having a 'positive impact' on poverty alleviation, it was nevertheless the case that NGO success at meeting the needs of the poorest was less obvious. Bratton (1989), while



generally positive about NGOs' contribution to poverty alleviation, suggests that if NGOs are to have a greater impact, they must begin to have an input at the policy level.

On a different note, Fowler (1995b) suggests that the real advantage of NGOs lies in their ability to tap into a vast amount of potential funding. Moreover, despite his critique of NGO-funding and the pressures it places on NGOs to be able to engage in democratising work, he nevertheless adheres to some of the original 'comparative advantages' of NGOs, particularly their ability to work with marginalised groups of people, the focus on community participation, and the emphasis on meeting the specific needs of each locality. Similarly, there are those who advocate (tentatively, in some cases) that NGOs are able to foster democratisation, participation, and grassroots empowerment while maintaining their comparative advantage in service provision (Bebbington and Riddell 1995, Carroll 1992, Clark 1995, Diamond 1988, Farrington *et al.* 1993, Fowler 1997, Howes 1997, Landell-Mills 1992, Mwansa 1995, Riddell and Robinson 1992, Tripp 1992).

The relationships between NGOs and states themselves have also come under a certain amount of scrutiny. As Bratton (1989) and Fowler (1991, 1993) have observed, despite the economic advantages of NGO activity for social service provision, governments tend to perceive NGOs as a political threat first, and as service delivery agents second. Fowler terms this the 'NGO paradox', whereby various bureaucratic barriers are erected in order to protect state legitimacy and to contain NGO political influence. Thus, while NGOs are increasingly supported by donors because of their perceived democratising influence, it is precisely this role of which governments are wary. Gary (1996) describes the situation in Ghana, where the imposition of a SAP encouraged the state to allow NGOs a greater role in development in the country. He describes NGO-state relations as "an arena of struggle for resources and power" (1996:163), in which the state attempted to circumscribe NGO activities (to social service provision only) through legislation. While the initial draft of an NGO Bill which required mandatory registration by all NGOs was successfully halted by NGO protest, the experience of Ghana clearly illustrates government attempts to co-opt

NGOs into a service provision role. Ndegwa's (1996) study of NGOs in Kenya reveals a similar picture of NGO-state relations. The NGO Co-ordination Act which was introduced in 1990 was aimed at controlling and monitoring NGO activity in the country, although again, persistent lobbying by some NGOs managed to remove some of the more draconian measures contained within the Bill. The similarities between the Ghanaian and Kenyan cases, and the current process of drawing up an NGO Bill in Tanzania, are strikingly evident in Chapter Four.

However, this is not simply to cast African states in their (by now caricatured) omnipotent role. While the African developmental state has attracted much criticism (see for example, World Bank 1989), it cannot be ignored that the current support for non-state actors serves to actively undermine the state, thereby justifying the continued funding of the non-governmental sector vis-à-vis the ineffectual state (Bebbington and Riddell 1995, Fowler 1991, Gibbon 1995, Hearn 1998, Kiondo 1995, Marcussen 1996, Stewart 1997). This has led some authors to argue that both a strong state *and* a strong society are required for effective development to take place (Friedmann 1992, Stewart 1997). Therkildsen and Semboja (1995) observe that in East Africa, the general push towards the privatisation of service provision (i.e. the taking over of services by private actors, including the non-governmental sector) has not mirrored the European experience, in that both non-state and state sectors have continued to play an important role. This suggests the emergence of a different picture of state-society relations to those who argue (or imply) that the state in Africa is withdrawing from the provision of social services (for example Clark 1995, Kiondo 1993, 1995). This issue is taken up in greater depth in looking at state and non-state service provision in Hai District in Chapter Six.

The aim of this discussion has not been to set up NGOs as a straw man (sic) which can then be systematically knocked down throughout the rest of this thesis. My objectives here have been twofold; firstly, to illustrate that any "unbridled incantations" (Porter 1995:83) towards the innate goodness of NGOs are not only simplistic, but that they should also be treated with a certain amount of circumspection; and that secondly, analyses of the role of the non-governmental

sector have been impoverished by a separation between the practitioner-oriented literature, and the (two strands of) academic literature. This has led to the increasing insularity of the three types of NGO-related literature. It is not suggested here, necessarily, that all three should start to read each other's work, but rather that a more nuanced and informed understanding of the ways in which the non-governmental sector engages with 'development' processes in Africa is more likely to be engendered by an eclectic approach which privileges neither theory nor practice. This thesis suggests that it is possible to transcend the tendency towards narrow epistemologies within the development literature by adopting a broader approach which simultaneously looks at social, political, economic, and cultural issues, and how non-governmental actors interact with these.

## **Outline of thesis**

Chapter One has offered a broad discussion of the development literature relating to the issues raised and the concepts used in this thesis. The argument is structured into the following chapters which are outlined below.

Chapter Two, '*Changing power relations?: participation, em(power)ment and NGOs*', critically discusses the notion of participation and empowerment within the development literature with particular reference to NGOs. A focus on the gender and development literature arises partly because later analysis centres on the experiences of women's organisations in Hai District, Kilimanjaro, and also because much of the literature on empowerment is written from a feminist, or gender and development, position. This chapter seeks to highlight the problematic nature of the concepts of participation and empowerment, and to suggest that studies which focus on 'community participation' often overlook power relations which serve to divide 'communities'.

Chapter Three, '*The development of Tanzanian associational life in historical perspective*', situates the discussion of the non-governmental sector in Tanzania in this thesis in historical context through an examination of associational life in Tanzania since the early twentieth century. The objective of the chapter is to show how organisations within Tanzanian society have experienced periods in which they

have been permitted to flourish, and also in which their activity has been heavily constrained by the state. This is particularly important for the analysis of the contemporary non-governmental sector in Tanzania which follows in Chapter Four, *“The government has fears and hopes about NGOs”: NGOs in a liberalised Tanzania*. One of the principal arguments put forward in this Chapter is that the NGO sector at the national level in Tanzania is institutionally young and has not had time to develop before being swamped by donor funding. This Chapter offers an overview of the non-governmental sector in Tanzania and critically discusses the relations between different types of NGOs, donors and the state and the implications of these for the role of the non-governmental sector in a liberalised Tanzania.

Chapter Five, *“Tunapenda sana maendeleo”: Hai District, the Chagga and NGOs*, brings the analysis to the district level. Hai District, Kilimanjaro Region is the location for the local-level field research, and a discussion of the politics of research and the methodology is given here before an outline of the socio-economic geography of Hai District. This is followed by an ethnography of the Chagga, and an overview of NGO activity in the district.

In Chapter Six *‘Privatisation or polarisation?: the non-governmental sector and the state in Hai*’, the suggestion in much of the literature that NGOs are moving in to ‘fill in the gaps’ left by the withdrawing state is shown to be an over-simplification of the role which NGOs are playing in local development. It is argued that a continuum of state and non-state actors has arisen in both social service provision and in the support of women’s organisations. This interweaving of state and non-state actors is shown to be taking place largely unsupervised by the local state which is leading to the emergence of an unequal distribution of resources, suggesting that it is giving rise to a ‘polarisation’ of development.

The final analytical chapter, Chapter Seven *‘(De)constructing participation in Hai: maendeleo, the non-governmental sector and the legitimation of inequality*’ examines the politics of participation and empowerment in the non-governmental sector in four villages. It is argued that through an understanding of local development discourse (*maendeleo*), it is possible to build up a picture of participation in which people

become involved in development activities in order to gain access to power and resources for the individual, the group or the village. In this way, participation and empowerment are processes very much bound up in local cultural value systems and are severely at odds with large international NGO (e.g. World Vision Tanzania) visions of participatory development. Moreover, it is largely the local elite and middle wealth groups who are able to participate in non-governmental activities, leading to the exacerbation and the legitimation (through association with 'development', which is understood to be inherently good) of local inequalities.

In the final chapter, '*Conclusions: Power, participation and development on Mount Kilimanjaro: the non-governmental sector and the state in Tanzania*', the main findings of the thesis are summarised and the implications for theory, practice and further research are discussed. Overall, the thesis suggests that the manner in which an increased role for the non-governmental sector in Tanzania has reinforced existing inequalities rather than challenging or changing them raises serious questions about the efficacy of building a 'reinvented development' around the notion of NGOs and participatory development.

# **CHAPTER TWO**

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## **Changing power relations?: participation, em(power)ment and NGOs**

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### **Introduction**

The idea that poor people can take control of their lives and challenge the structures which oppress them has captured the imagination of many practitioners, NGOs, government agencies and academics alike. This process is broadly described as either participation or empowerment; in fact, the former is often assumed to lead to the latter. The participation and subsequent empowerment of the marginalised currently occupies pivotal status within the notion of a reinvented development, of alternative development(s), and increasingly, of mainstream development; in a sense, there is a very real danger that participation and empowerment may become all things to all people. At the same time, the apotheosis of participatory and empowering processes within development theories and practices has tended to obfuscate issues of power and inequality which necessarily arise within the development process, and in particular within non-governmental engagements in development.

The notions of participation and empowerment are central to this thesis. Research at both the national and the local levels in Tanzania explored the premise that the NGO sector is necessarily participatory and is able to pursue a more inclusive and empowering development among the poor and the marginalised. In particular, the proliferation of women's organisations at the local level in Kilimanjaro raises questions about the nature of women's participation and the extent to which this may or may not translate into greater power for women in the community. The aim of this chapter is to outline the current debates surrounding participation and empowerment within the development literature in order to set the context for the empirical material which follows. To this end, three major lines of discussion are pursued; firstly, a genealogy of the concept of participation reveals the myriad



meanings attached to it, and its more recent association with the idea of empowerment. A discussion which traces the position of women in development policy also seeks to highlight the emergence of the concept of empowerment in relation to women. Secondly, a discussion of the literature on power and empowerment which draws on both the poststructuralist and gender and development critiques of power relations points up the inherent weaknesses in the (broadly feminist) notion that women can be empowered relative to men, or that (in more general terms) the poor and marginalised can be empowered. This leads into the third section which critically discusses the possibilities for non-governmental actors, and women's organisations in particular, to foster participatory and empowering development. It is suggested that such an approach does not realistically engage with the constraints presented in the form of unequal power relations embedded within society.

## **A genealogy of participation: contested meanings and conflicting agendas**

The resurrection of 'participation' as a central tenet of development theory and practice during the 1990s by both neo-liberal and more radical actors and commentators on the development stage might suggest that an apparent consensus has been reached about 'development' and how to 'do' it (Mayo and Craig 1995, Mayoux 1995). However, this conceals a multiplicity of interpretations which have shaped different types and modes of participation, such that it is now "beginning to look like a portmanteau concept" (Nelson and Wright 1995:4). Despite this ambiguity, 'participation' has become one of the keywords in development, particularly in the project literature:

"[participation] is trumpeted by agencies right across the spectrum, from the huge multi-laterals to the smallest people's organisations. Hardly a project, it seems, is now without some 'participatory' element" (White 1996:6).

Moreover, participation is not only associated with the work of NGOs, which have been instrumental in promoting a participatory approach to development since the 1980s, but also with governments and multilateral institutions, which have

discovered participation and are now extolling its virtues as an essential ingredient in democratic notions of citizenship and sustainable development. As outlined in Chapter One, what was once a central tenet of alternative development has now become pivotal within mainstream development theory and practice. Thus in the 1997 World Development Report, the World Bank allocates a central role for participation in enhancing state capacity:

“...it means making the state more responsive to people’s needs, bringing government closer to the people through broader participation and decentralisation” (World Bank 1997:3).

Despite the international development community’s fascination with participatory approaches, ‘participation’ itself remains a contested term which embraces a wide range of definitions and agendas (Desai 1995, Galjart 1995, Mayoux 1995, Midgley 1986, Moser 1993, Nelson and Wright 1995, Oakley *et al.* 1991, Rahman 1995, Rahnema 1992, Stiefel and Wolfe 1994, White 1996). Many authors writing on participation identify distinct (and sometimes contradictory) phases in its metamorphosis which makes it difficult to chart a precise course of the ‘uses and abuses’ of participation (White 1996). Furthermore, few authors make the important distinction between participation as ‘community participation’<sup>19</sup>, and other, more ‘traditional’ forms of participation which are not associated with development ‘projects’. Most discussions about participation in the development literature are actually referring to ‘community participation’, which is seen as quite distinct from political and traditional forms of participation, referred to in the African context as ‘formal’ and ‘nonformal’ participation respectively (Chazan 1982, Hirschmann 1991, Rahnema 1992). Following Chazan (1982), political participation is taken here to refer generally to electoral politics, while traditional forms of participation refer to ‘ascriptive’ associations, such as kinship associations, ethnic associations and hometown groups<sup>20</sup>. Chazan’s conceptualisation of nonformal participation includes interest-group voluntary activities such as religious societies, women’s groups and

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<sup>19</sup> Also referred to as ‘popular participation’, ‘grassroots development’, or ‘development from below’ (Desai 1995).

<sup>20</sup> See for example, March and Taqqu (1986) and Wipper (1984) for accounts of women’s traditional organisations in Africa. Wipper also makes a distinction between ‘ascriptive’ and ‘voluntary’ organisations among women in Africa, which is similar to that drawn by Chazan here.

self-help groups. However, as the definition of the non-governmental sector used in this thesis (as outlined in Chapter One) incorporates such activities, I prefer to view such modes of participation as forms of ‘community participation’. Desai (1995) suggests that community participation:

“... assumes an activity in which the community takes part and the involvement of at least one other party, usually a government agency or a non-governmental organisation. There seems a tacit assumption that the other party is the initiator of the activity” (Desai 1995:38).

To this definition I would explicitly add that CBOs are an important mechanism for facilitating community participation. However, in this study, I prefer to use the term ‘participation’ rather than ‘community participation’. The uncritical use of conceptions of participation which assume homogeneous communities in which all people participate equally must be seen as inherently problematic, as later discussions in Chapters Six and Seven will illustrate. Suffice it to say here that the ‘community’ in ‘community participation’ is often something of a misnomer<sup>21</sup>. It therefore would seem more appropriate to relinquish it altogether. In the context of this thesis, while it is recognised that participation is a heterogeneous term, it is used here to refer to forms of participation at the local level which are usually associated with development projects or programmes initiated either by governments or an external agency, or as a result of membership of a CBO.

Participation in its broadest sense was first associated in the South with the post-colonial project of nation-building and modernisation during the 1950s and 1960s (Lane 1995, Mayoux 1995, Midgely 1986, Stiefel and Wolfe 1994). Referred to as

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<sup>21</sup> Crow and Allan (1994), drawing on the literature which focuses on the experience of ‘community’ in public policy in Britain, argue that the notion of community must essentially be seen as a contested one. This is often reflected in planning policies which may build on either a positive or negative image of community according to the policy issue under consideration e.g. policies of community care build on an altruistic and sharing community image, while policies to combat crime focus on the ‘breakdown’ of community networks. While this work is set in a different context, it highlights the tendency for planners to adopt a rosy image of community which is not necessarily grounded in reality. The concept of ‘community participation’ as espoused by ‘development experts’ suffers from much the same assumptions about ‘community’ among countries of the South. Desai (1995, 1996) also draws attention to the fact that much of the literature on community participation often does not adequately allow for local stratification and unequal participation (see also Galjart 1995, Mayoux 1995, Midgely 1986, Oakley *et al.* 1991, Pelling 1998). These are central issues in Chapters Six and

the community development movement, 'participation' in this sense essentially meant the contribution of labour power, or 'mobilisation'. Throughout the South, governments adopted the notion of participation as a slogan for nation-building and mobilisation. According to Nelson and Wright:

"Early post-war models of development were based on the image that capital penetration, commoditization and industrialisation would transform a traditionally isolated, subsistence peasantry into participants in a modern economy and in the politics of the nation state (Ferguson 1990:15,56). This use of participation suggested people were not economically and politically active before development came along. In this construction of people as objects of a national programme of development, their participation in projects often meant contributions in the form of labour, cash or kind" (Nelson and Wright 1995: 2-3).

NGOs and international agencies engaged in participatory projects also interpreted this in terms of technical assistance for modernisation. Much development work during the 1960s was thus focused upon helping communities to learn and accept new technologies<sup>22</sup> (Lane 1995).

However, with the move away from mobilisation for modernisation in the 1970s, participation became associated with the basic needs approach to development (Oakley *et al.* 1991). This was heavily influenced by the United Nations' research programme which focused on popular participation, and which had a major impact on development theory and practice and the role each attached to participation. The World Conference on International Women's Year (Mexico 1975) and the UNICEF/WHO Alma Ata Conference in 1977 both served to give currency to the idea of 'popular participation', stressing the role of communities in providing their basic needs for health care, among other considerations (Midgley 1986). The idea of participation also became popular among those working in urban development and housing in the South, and projects based upon 'sites and services' and self-help housing became widespread (*ibid.*). Part of the appeal of participation stemmed from the disillusionment with state attempts at 'development' (modernisation), and

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Seven which examine the ways in which the non-governmental sector in Hai serves to exacerbate existing inequalities.

participatory approaches became central to 'utopian other developments' which began to emerge during the 1970s (Midgley 1986, Oakley *et al.* 1991, Stiefel and Wolfe 1994). International agencies and NGOs alike used participatory methods, stressing the involvement of communities in projects which aimed to meet their basic needs, which would allow them to become self-reliant and thus no longer 'need' the state (Nelson and Wright 1995). Tandler (1982, in Lane 1995) has suggested that this model of participation is more akin to an 'enlightened top-down' approach rather than a participatory and bottom-up one. The limited influence of the communities involved and the ultimate control over the project by the implementing agency has raised questions about the 'participatory' nature of such an approach (Lane 1995), an issue which is returned to below.

With the widespread adoption of SAPs throughout the South in the 1980s, participatory approaches entered the IFIs' project portfolios. While Stiefel and Wolfe (1994) suggest that participation 'lost ground' in international discourse during the 1980s, Nelson and Wright (1995) argue that it was exactly at this time that organisations such as the World Bank began to adopt the rhetoric of participation. The World Bank's response to the heavy critique of the SAPs:

"....appropriated the earlier language of the non-governmental organisations about self-sufficiency. This rhetoric was, however, double-edged. Soon the World Bank was arguing that the state should not be omnipresent and 'clients' should be involved in the production of their own services. Structural adjustment policies were accompanied by an emphasis on 'community' and 'family' (i.e. principally women) taking on welfare and service responsibilities formerly ascribed to the state. The crucial difference between this notion of self-sufficiency and the earlier ideas of non-governmental organisations was that this work was unresourced" (Nelson and Wright 1995:3).

As Mayoux (1995:236) points out, participation became 'institutionalised' during the 1970s and 1980s. The perceived failure of the developmental state and the IFIs' neo-liberal project which advocated the hegemony of market forces and the 'rolling back of the state' shifted the onus of development from the state to 'the people', who were

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<sup>22</sup> Arguably the best-known example of this approach is the Green Revolution (see Wilson (1992) and

expected to 'participate', or to take on more responsibility for services. However, by the late 1980s, and increasingly into the 1990s, more radical NGOs were beginning to see participation in a less instrumental way, and to argue instead for participation as 'empowerment'.

This distinction has been identified by many authors who differentiate between participation as a 'means', and participation as an 'end' (Lane 1995, Moser 1993, Nelson and Wright 1995, Oakley *et al.* 1991, White 1996), or 'efficiency' versus 'empowerment'<sup>23</sup> (Mayoux 1995, Moser 1993). Proponents of the first interpretation argue for participation on the grounds that it enables resources to be used far more efficiently and effectively. Advocated predominantly by actors from the political Right (development agencies in the 1980s, including the IFIs), and also by many NGOs in the 1970s and 1980s<sup>24</sup>, the involvement of project 'beneficiaries' in the consultation, planning, execution and evaluation of a project is seen as a means by which to achieve project goals more efficiently, while ensuring a certain measure of sustainability. It also allows for local input and expertise. In practice this has often meant that communities are consulted only at the beginning stages of a project, or are merely required to contribute labour to help finish a project. This is the extent of their 'participation' (Desai 1996, Hashemi 1995, Smith 1987).

However, in the 1990s participation has increasingly been seen (mostly by NGOs concerned with 'empowerment' and those on the political Left) as an end in itself. Certainly, several of the NGOs discussed in later chapters of this thesis expressly describe their work as empowering. Although infrastructural project goals remain an integral part of an agency's work, the actual participation of communities in guiding and managing the project becomes far more important:

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Lawrence (1988)).

<sup>23</sup> The efficiency versus empowerment distinction is used by Moser (1993) to distinguish between development policies for women and is discussed in greater depth below.

<sup>24</sup> This is not to present NGOs as an homogenous category. Many development agencies and NGOs have since moved away from the efficiency approach towards the empowerment model of participation. However, it is worth noting that not all NGOs have done so, and many still belong to the 'participation as means' category of actors. Lane (1992) draws a distinction between those NGOs which still operate under the 'means' paradigm (which she refers to as the modernisation/community development NGOs), and 'empowerment' NGOs.

“Participation is seen as an integral and inseparable aspect of any definition of development leading to a wider process of social transformation and potential challenge to existing power structures” (Mayoux 1995:237).

In this interpretation of participation, it is the act of participating which is of paramount significance, as it fosters an awareness of inequalities and enables participants to begin to challenge existing structures of subordination. While it is an approach developed in order to ‘empower’ communities, it has become particularly associated with radical development policies for women.

### **Women in development policy: from welfare to empowerment**

From Women In Development (WID) through Women And Development (WAD) to Gender And Development (GAD), development policies which focus on women have mirrored the major trends in development policy and practice over the last fifty years as outlined above from a participatory perspective, moving from modernisation to basic needs to the ‘compensatory measures’ linked with SAPs (Moser 1993). Kabeer (1994) has identified two main conceptions of changes in women’s policies. The first is associated with Buvinic (1983, in Kabeer 1994) who drew a distinction between welfare, equity and anti-poverty approaches to women in development, while Moser (1989, 1993) put forward a distinction between the efficiency and the empowerment approaches. Moser (1993) sets out quite clearly a continuum which incorporates both these conceptions, which moves from welfare, to equity, to anti-poverty, to efficiency, to empowerment. She stresses that these approaches should not be seen as linear or mutually exclusive. In a comprehensive overview, each approach to women’s development is evaluated in terms of its ability to meet either women’s practical or strategic gender interests, a distinction first made by Molyneux (1986)<sup>25</sup>.

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<sup>25</sup> Practical gender interests refer to women’s immediate felt needs arising out of women’s gendered position within the existing sexual division of labour, and often include issues of domestic provision and public welfare, while strategic gender interests involve moves to overcome women’s structural gendered subordination such as the right to reproductive choice and the abolition of sexual discrimination. For the original statement on practical and strategic gender interests see Molyneux (1986:284, also 1998:231). Moser (1989) has subsequently taken Molyneux’s original conceptualisation and referred to women’s practical and strategic *needs*, a conceptualisation which has become widely used in discussions of women in development.

It was not until the 1970s that women were recognised as a 'category' which could be added to development policy (Escobar 1995). The exposure for the Women In Development (WID) approach gained during the UN's designated Women's Decade 1976-1985 was key in bringing about this change (Kabeer 1994, Moser 1993). Prior to the 1970s, women were viewed by the development industry as "unable or unwilling to enter the modern world" (Parpart and Marchand 1995:13), and were thus ignored by the two preceding development decades. Heavily influenced by colonial representations of women as backward, tradition-bound chattels to their male kin, women were viewed (if they were viewed at all) as obstacles to development (Kabeer 1994, Parpart and Marchand 1995). Thus the welfare approach to women, influenced by early liberal feminist scholarship, which emerged during the 1950s and 1960s saw women only in terms of their roles as mothers and homemakers. Interventions for women focused on such issues as maternal and child health, and nutritional training (Chowdhry 1995). Women were viewed as passive recipients of development. Furthermore, their potential contribution to development was based on their reproductive role<sup>26</sup> in the sense that benefits were passed on to the family (Kabeer 1994, Moser 1993).

However, the liberal critique which developed in the 1970s in response to the welfare approach, epitomised in Boserup's '*Women's Role in Economic Development*' (1970) and heavily imbued with Northern feminist ideas on equality, specifically drew attention to women's productive role. It demonstrated to development planners that women needed to be brought into the development process in a far more economically efficient manner. Moser (1993) considers this as the beginning of the WID approach to development. For the first time women were considered as active participants in the development process. The equity approach (as the first approach within the WID paradigm was termed) sought to bring women into the market,

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<sup>26</sup> Moser (1989, 1993) argues for the triple role of women, which sees their work as related either to their reproductive, productive or community roles. In this conceptualisation, women's reproductive role involves their childbearing and childcare responsibilities, their productive role relates to their income-generation activities (often agricultural labour or informal sector work involving petty trade), while their community role recognises women's organisational capacity to lobby local service

providers (state or non-state) for better community services, as it is often women who are responsible for providing family access to these services e.g. water, health.



thereby focusing on the inequalities between women and men in the gender division of labour, while also attempting to challenge structures of subordination in the home (Moser 1993). However the approach proved unpopular with development agencies, partly due to difficulties in implementing certain policy changes at national levels, and partly because it was deemed by Southern governments and other institutions as “threatening” (Moser 1993:62) and neo-colonial. Similarly, women and governments in the South attacked the equity approach and its advocates as “bourgeois imperialist sympathisers” (Moser 1993:65). Activists and academics in the South saw development itself (in economic terms) as a greater obstacle to women’s subordination rather than equality, with which feminists in the North were concerned. More radical feminists have since criticised the equity approach for interpreting the ‘problem’ of women’s development in logistical terms and for failing to challenge women’s subordination or Northern gender stereotypes (Parpart and Marchand 1995).

The critique of the equity approach led to the second WID policy, known as the anti-poverty approach, a ‘toned-down’ version of equity (Moser 1993:66). Linked to the international development community’s concern with basic needs and poverty alleviation in the mid-1970s, the anti-poverty approach sought to increase poor women’s productivity, predominantly through small income-generating activities (IGAs), (Chowdhry 1995, Kabeer 1994, Moser 1993). However, the IGAs supported by international agencies and NGOs often reinforced women’s traditional roles and failed to address structural issues of poverty (Chowdhry 1995). Women and ‘women’s problems’ were still defined by their family role (Kabeer 1994). Furthermore, although the basic needs approach to development incorporated the notion of participation, women’s projects rarely contained procedures for facilitating participatory planning (Moser 1993). Chowdhry sees the anti-poverty approach as distinctly influenced by colonial discourse:

“...it dismisses Third World women’s agency and reinforces the myth that Third World women are a homogenous group, without voice or skills. In this approach, Third World women have been objects that need help, not subjects who could be active participants in the development process” (Chowdhry 1995:33).

Although the anti-poverty approach attempted to alleviate women's practical gender needs by raising their incomes, Moser (1993) asserts that increased employment or IGA opportunities for women are unlikely to address women's strategic gender needs unless women can gain a greater degree of autonomy as a result.

A further critique which emerged out of the equity approach to women's development in the 1970s is the Women And Development (WAD) perspective. Based on the Marxist-inspired approaches to development such as dependency theory and radical feminism, it was asserted that women have always played a role in the development process, and that this role served to sustain global patterns of inequality (Rathgeber 1990). The underlying assumption was that the restructuring of the international economic system would improve women's lives. Young (1993) takes DAWN<sup>27</sup> as representative of the WAD approach, in that their analysis of women's subordination is inherently bound up with the structural position of the South within the global economic system.

The third and most widely-implemented WID approach emerged in the 1980s. The efficiency approach coincided with the hegemonic rise of neo-liberal economic policies within the IFIs, and, although women were recognised as economic agents in their own right, this was heavily overshadowed by the burden placed on women as a result of economic austerity (Chowdhry 1995, Elson 1992, Kabeer 1994, Moser 1993, Parpart and Marchand 1995):

“Its [the efficiency approach] purpose is to ensure that development is more efficient and effective through women's economic contribution. Women's participation is equated with equity for women. It seeks to meet practical gender needs while relying on all of women's three roles and an elastic concept of women's time. Women are seen primarily in terms of their capacity to compensate for declining social services by extending their working day. It is a very popular approach” (Moser 1993:69-70).

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<sup>27</sup> Development Alternatives for Women in a New Era, a coalition of women academics and activists based in the South.

All three WID approaches have been criticised for their Northern liberal ideological underpinnings and their inability (or unwillingness) to challenge women's structural subordination. The underlying goal of modernisation was never questioned; rather, it was assumed that women needed to be 'added' to development as it currently existed. Women needed to be brought into the market and public sphere in order to benefit from it. Later, women's work was needed in order to support the neo-liberal development project, but in a way which severely disadvantaged women by placing increasing demands on their time. Underlying these policies was a discourse which viewed women as irrational objects, whose major contribution to development was inherently tied to their traditional roles as wives and mothers. As Kabeer points out, although WID succeeded in bringing women into development dialogue, this was achieved on unfavourable terms for, and through colonial representations of, women in the South. What was needed, she says, was a theory of "male power and conflicting gender interests" (1994:38).

Part of the problem with the WID approach was that it argued that women in both the North and the South faced similar problems by virtue of their being women. This was extrapolated from the liberal notion of "disembodied rationality" which underscored the assertion that women were similar to men (and thus capable of taking on men's role in development) (Kabeer 1994). Moreover, all women were similarly disadvantaged by the market and relegated to the private sphere (*ibid.*). The Gender And Development (GAD) approach which arose in the 1980s, advocated by socialist feminist activists in both the North and the South, looked for other ways of conceptualising women's role in development. DAWN and AAWORD<sup>28</sup>, an organisation of African researchers, argued against this model of "global sisterhood" (Kabeer 1994:32, Mohanty 1991). Sceptical of the Northern feminist agenda of equality, women in the South argued that 'women' could not be viewed as a homogenous group; that differences in terms of class and race must also be taken into account, and that issues of neo-colonialism, apartheid and poverty must be tackled (Kabeer 1994, Mohanty 1991, Sen and Grown 1987).

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<sup>28</sup> Association of African Women for Research and Development.

The GAD approach, then, influenced as it is by Southern women and their experiences, looks at the social construction of gender and gender relations rather than 'women' as a category, and attempts to understand class, race and gender inequalities within the global dimensions of development<sup>29</sup> (Parpart and Marchand 1995). Similarly, the postmodern feminist critique of WID has focused on colonial representations of women in development policy and the failure to address wider issues of women's subordination (Chowdhry 1995). This critique focuses on issues of power, difference and gender, and has been influenced by the voices of women in the South. It calls for the specificities of women's lives to be appreciated, emphasising the historical, spatial and social conditions of women's lived experiences (Parpart and Marchand 1995). Kabeer (1994:81) argues for "reversals of hierarchies of knowledge", in that development policies for women should start with Third World women themselves.

Influenced by both socialist feminism and postmodern feminism, over the last decade writers and activists in both North and South have begun to advocate the concept of 'empowerment' as an approach to women in development policy:

"...the empowerment perspective argues for a development that is more squarely embedded in the particular experiences faced by women and men in the South....elements of class, ethnicity and race intersect with gender to form alliances between men and women. This perspective focuses on grassroots organisations that seek to empower women by increasing their collective capacity towards self-reliance. They call for the redistribution of power, both intranationally and internationally, so that poor women can participate in controlling and influencing the directions in which development occurs" (Chowdhry 1995:36-38).

This approach draws heavily on the contention that, in contrast to previous WID approaches which stem from Northern feminist knowledge about Others, the knowledge which Third World women themselves have accumulated about their everyday lives and their experiences should form the basis from which any notion of empowerment should be developed (Mohanty 1991). In this sense the empowerment

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<sup>29</sup> This is not to suggest that women's movements in the South did not exist before this point. See, for example, Jayawardena (1982) and Wieringa (1995) for a discussion of the history of women's organisations and the development of feminist movements in the South.

approach has been strongly influenced and independently advocated by women and scholars in the South (Moser 1989, Sen and Grown 1987<sup>30</sup>). Many writers see women's strength in their collective organisation, and empowerment approaches advocated by the more progressive development agencies and NGOs emphasise the transformative potential of women's organisations (Chowdhry 1995, Kabeer 1994, Moser 1993, Rowlands 1997, Sen and Grown 1987). However, only a few NGOs and Southern-based groups and networks such as the Self-Employed Women's Association in India (SEWA) and the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh have implemented successful empowerment programmes through women's organisations (Moser 1993). This is largely because the empowerment approach, if implemented whole-heartedly, seeks to challenge embedded structures of power and subordination, and is thus highly contentious.

### **Em(power)ment: changing power relations?**

Participatory approaches have increasingly come to see participation as an end in itself rather than as a means by which to achieve project goals more efficiently, as outlined above. This has involved the recognition that “‘participation’, if it is to be more than a palliative, involves shifts in power” (Nelson and Wright, 1995:1). To incorporate such a shift in development thinking and practice, participatory approaches are now imbued with the language of ‘empowerment’. A recent addition to mainstream development thinking, ‘empowerment’ remains a contested term, interpreted and practised in a myriad of forms and with varying degrees of success. As Rowlands (1995, 1997) points out, this stems from the ambiguity surrounding the root concept of empowerment, that of power. While power has been the subject of

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<sup>30</sup> According to Sen and Grown, DAWN's interpretation of empowerment can be outlined as follows; “We want a world where inequality based on class, gender, and race is absent from every country, and from the relationships among countries. We want a world where basic needs become basic rights and where poverty and all forms of violence are eliminated. Each person will have the opportunity to develop her or his full potential and creativity, and women's values of nurturance and solidarity will characterise human relationships. In such a world women's reproductive role will be redefined: child care will be shared by men, women, and society as a whole....the transformation of the structures of subordination that have been so inimical to women is the other part of our vision of a new era. Changes in laws, civil codes, systems of property rights, control over our bodies, labour codes, and the social and legal institutions that underwrite male control and privilege are essential if women are to attain justice in society” (Sen and Grown 1987:80-81).

much debate within social science<sup>31</sup>, the following overview will focus on the notion of power within the context of the development and empowerment literature. Much of this is written from a feminist standpoint and thus the (perhaps over-) emphasis on women's empowerment is not intentionally part of the argument developed here. It is, however, necessary to discuss the issues raised by feminists in order to gain some understanding of the notion of empowerment.

### **Concepts of power in development theory**

Broadly, two approaches to power can be identified within the development literature which draw on the works of Lukes, Giddens and Foucault. The first interprets power as a zero-sum entity, a property to be owned, often in the context of institutions and interpersonal decision-making. The second sees power as subjectless, existing in the interactions between discourse, institutions and actors, and therefore embedded in wider society. As will become clear, these two conceptualisations of power greatly affect the way in which an empowerment approach is implemented by development agencies.

Within the first approach, Lukes (1974) has identified the 'one-dimensional' and 'two-dimensional' views, which focus on power as exercised within a decision-making context. In the first instance, power is exercised by influencing decisions over which there is observable conflict, while in the second instance, power is exercised by preventing that conflict arising in the first place: by controlling the agenda. Giddens has termed this form of power as 'non-decision-making' (1979:90). In development policy this conception of power, associated as it is with power over decision-making agendas, views empowerment as the ability to participate in decision-making processes, through gaining access to positions of economic, social and political power (Rowlands 1997). Kabeer (1994) argues that the WID perspective draws heavily on these ideas, in advocating that increasing women's income (through IGAs) can lead to their ability to make more decisions at the household level. However, part of the problem with a zero-sum approach to power implies that women's increased power (or their access to bases of political, social and

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<sup>31</sup> See for example, Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982), Giddens (1979, 1984), Hartsock (1990), Lukes (1974).

economic power) necessarily requires that men's power be reduced, which makes it a deeply unpopular approach.

Moreover, feminists have argued that the conventional view of power as decision-making is essentially 'neutral', and does not adequately account for the ways in which power is distributed within society (Kabeer 1994, Nelson and Wright 1995, Rowlands 1997, Young 1993). Lukes developed a third view of power, the 'three-dimensional view', which moved beyond the notion of observable or unobservable conflict, and suggested instead that the exercise of power could engender 'false consciousness':

“...is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial? To assume that the absence of grievance equals genuine consensus is simply to rule out the possibility of false or manipulated consensus by definitional fiat” (Lukes 1974:24).

This third model of power allows us to transcend the zero-sum approach to power, to go beyond decision-making processes associated with individuals, and to consider the societal distribution of power through relations of gender, class and race (Nelson and Wright 1995). Kabeer points out that it is closely linked to the feminist notion of 'the power from within'. She argues that women must recognise (through their experiences) and analyse for themselves how structures of subordination work against them, in order to generate for themselves the will and knowledge to enable them to participate in a manner which recognises their 'interests'. However, she also acknowledges that women's ability to 'know' other ways of being and doing (i.e. to recognise their strategic gender needs) are inherently constrained by their everyday experiences. In this respect she is wary of positing a:

“....'false consciousness' against the standard of some objectively given set of interests....Attempts at empowerment have to take note of the trade-offs that

women make in order to cope with the ramifications of oppressive relationships in their lives” (Kabeer 1994:228).

Similarly, Rowlands (1997) prefers to see power in more generative terms, as ‘power to’ rather than ‘power over’. Her analysis draws on a Foucauldian perspective in that power is not a static given, but is relational. Moreover, power is seen as being intimately bound up with knowledge, and incorporates an understanding of resistance as a form of power (Mackenzie 1992a, Rowlands 1997), also associated with the work of Scott (1985) and Friedmann (1992). These writers view the methods used by the poor and disenfranchised to cope with everyday survival as the ‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott 1985). Rather than using zero-sum conceptions of power and their assumption that power is an entity which is possessed by individuals, these writers prefer not to view the poor as entirely powerless. Instead, they argue that the non-conformity (or resistance) of the poor is expressed in a variety of ways, from Friedmann’s informal sector (active participation rather than passive compliance vis-à-vis state or external development initiatives) to Scott’s ‘weapons’ (foot dragging, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, gossip and language, for instance). Scott therefore argues against the Gramscian notion of hegemony and false consciousness<sup>32</sup> as a process which shapes the lives of a powerless group.

Many feminists, on the other hand, see the concept of ‘internalised oppression’ as a serious obstacle to be overcome by women. From a feminist perspective, Foucault does not adequately deal with issues which “interfere with the individual’s agency and choice” (Rowlands 1997:12, also Hartsock 1990). For Rowlands, a feminist approach to empowerment must first identify, and then actively seek to overcome, women’s internalised oppression as the barrier which prevents them from participating in development. There are three dimensions to such a model of empowerment: personal, relational and collective. This builds on the idea that

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<sup>32</sup> Scott writes; “*Hegemony* is simply the name Gramsci gave to this process of ideological domination. The central idea behind it is the claim that the ruling class dominates not only the means of physical production but the means of symbolic production as well. Its control over the material forces of production is replicated, at the level of ideas, in its control over the ideological “sectors” of society - culture, religion, education, and the media - in a manner that allows it to disseminate those values that reinforce its position. What Gramsci did, in brief, was to explain the institutional basis of false-consciousness” (1985:315).



women must first develop a sense of self, dignity and self-confidence, before they can negotiate and influence decisions within a relationship. Collective empowerment then seeks to 'multiply' that effect by bringing people together to achieve a greater impact, either at the village level or within national or international political structures and fora.

Within the development literature, then, there are two models of empowerment which draw on differing underlying views of power: the first seeks to increase people's ability to take part in decision-making processes, by increasing their participation in social, economic and political structures (power over), while the second is more concerned with the ways in which people learn about and begin to question their position vis-à-vis wider society (power to). In the latter sense, empowerment is seen as a process which must be experienced, rather than an attribute which is 'bestowed' or 'given'. In the context of this study, a broadly poststructuralist understanding of power relations would appear to be the most useful:

"Power, then, is seen to be more fluid, more pervasive and more socially embedded than the conventional focus on individual decision-making would suggest" (Kabeer 1994:229).

Following Rowlands (1995, 1997), if power is seen as relational and socially embedded, then any notion of empowerment must seek to challenge these structures of subordination.

### **The concept of empowerment**

Friedmann's (1992) work on empowerment is possibly one of the few holistic approaches to the concept in the development literature which does not focus entirely on women (although he does consider the possibilities for women's empowerment as a major component of his argument). He views empowerment as central to any workable notion of an alternative development. He argues for a whole-economy model which takes the household and its interactions with the political, economic and social spheres as the starting point. Simultaneously, he develops the notion of

'inclusive democracy', the process of empowerment which enables people to critically engage with oppressive structures in society. The process of empowerment thus aims to strengthen people's social, political and psychological power. However, he does not view power in zero-sum terms; firstly because he sees everyday acts of resistance as forms of power; and secondly because his broad view of empowerment advocates the need for both a strong state and a strong 'civil society'. This is useful as it takes the notion of empowerment beyond the individual and collective scales and explores the possibilities at national level, and in this sense, Friedmann sees the ability of 'civil society' to effectively operate at a national scale as a vital ingredient for any notion of an alternative development to be sustainable. At the same time, the assertion of the need for both a strong state and 'civil society' suggests that the two can reinforce each other through a synergistic relationship.

On the issue of women, Friedmann sees them as constrained by their poor access to the 'bases of social power'. Women's self-empowerment thus involves the improvement of their access to such power, through the meeting of practical and strategic gender needs. He views women's cooperative efforts as particularly useful in fostering empowering situations for women. In fact, Friedmann notes the importance of collective organisation in general. He notes that the significance of mutual aid and cooperation, the chance to learn new skills, the conviviality and potential for building self-dignity should not be overlooked in any process of empowerment.

Thomas (1992), in another conceptual overview which is not ultimately concerned with gender relations, traces the origins of the term empowerment to the work of Freire and Schumacher. Freire's ideas of *conscientization* suggested that poor people could develop their critical faculties through education, particularly through literacy programmes. Rather than being an individual or community-based exercise, Freire ultimately saw the ability to question structural causes of oppression as a route to achieving social class empowerment. His analysis of poverty was essentially class-based, and thus poverty could only be transcended through an overtly political strategy. Schumacher on the other hand, was more concerned with practical means

for overcoming the economic causes of poverty. He espoused the benefits of self-reliance and teaching people to cope with their everyday lives (through 'tools for self-reliance') rather than analysing structural issues of subordination and poverty.

It becomes quite clear, then, that very different analyses of empowerment have emerged within a development context, ranging from the overtly political to the more conservative 'technical fix' approach. Friedmann's contribution represents perhaps the most holistic approach to the issue, although his ideas are too recent to have had any impact on development practice (the all-sector approach also makes empowerment difficult if pursued merely by the non-governmental sector alone). Freire's and Shumacher's ideas have both enjoyed a certain amount of currency within development projects, albeit with very different types of organisation as each author is essentially arguing for a very different type of intervention (Thomas 1992). Those NGOs interested in providing technical expertise and knowledge can quite easily draw on the Schumacherian notion of empowerment through self-reliance and appropriate technology, while Freire's ideas on literacy and political action were originally utilised by more progressive NGOs which were explicitly concerned with the political empowerment of the poor. However, the Freirean notion of *conscientization* has largely been used in the Latin American context, and to a lesser extent in other parts of the South. In reality, as development agencies have increasingly adopted the notion of empowerment as a central aspect of their work, both approaches have been woven into a more general approach to 'empowering community development' which seeks to address people's practical, and more strategic social, economic and political needs.

Turning now to the notion of empowerment as it is used within the feminist literature, there is a particular focus on the notion of empowerment through women's organisations and mass movements (Friedmann 1992, Kabeer 1994, Moser 1993, Sen and Grown 1987, Rowlands 1997, Young 1993). Proponents of women's organisations as an effective vehicle of women's empowerment concentrate on the *process* of empowerment: on the ways in which women can come to think critically about the ways in which their lives are socially and politically constructed. Many

authors are often quick to point out that empowerment cannot merely consist of women's IGAs in order to increase incomes, which is the popular WID approach. Batliwala (1993, in Rowlands 1997) notes that development projects which place an emphasis on increasing women's income often fail to encourage women to challenge wider structures of subordination. Often the overall effect of such initiatives is to increase women's work burdens by placing more demands on their time and energy. Thus, income-generating projects, if they are to be undertaken, need to be complemented by measures to increase women's critical awareness of their gendered experiences. This is not to deny women the opportunity to increase their incomes, but, as Rowlands points out, "...if she continues to carry the full responsibility for domestic duties.... 'empowerment' has actually increased her burden" (1997:132).

The need for a mix of practical with strategic gender needs has been identified by Moser (1989) as an appropriate approach to achieving women's empowerment. She argues that projects which immediately address women's practical needs can simultaneously build awareness about more strategic issues. She gives the example of GABRIELA in the Philippines which operated a tapestry-sewing project for women while leading discussions on women's legal rights. However, evidence of such projects does not abound and concern has been expressed regarding some of the larger development agencies and their 'empowerment' approaches. Mackenzie (1992b) deconstructs the World Bank's discourse on empowerment and, among other considerations, finds that the 'decentralising' and 'grassroots' language masks an approach to development which relies on women's unpaid labour in order to facilitate 'community development' (in other words, the efficiency approach to WID). The assumption that women have 'free time' to devote to development activities often underlies many approaches to 'community' development (Moser 1993:103). It is therefore imperative that projects do not rely solely on women's labour as their only valuable input, but that they seek to raise women's awareness if empowerment is to take place.

Despite the focus on women's empowerment in this discussion, I do not wish to suggest that all men have no claims to empowerment either; most discussions of empowerment do, after all, see it as a gender issue rather than simply as a women's

issue. This in-depth consideration of the notion of empowerment as it relates to women is a reflection on the development literature; feminist writers have increasingly advocated empowerment as a strategy for women to overcome gender subordination, and, given the scope which the concept holds for women's potential to overcome internalised oppression, this seems entirely appropriate. Nevertheless, I would argue that despite the fact that a poor man can still wield power over his partner as a result of embedded gender subordination within society, it must be recognised that poor men also suffer from structural subordination in terms of race and class, and that the notion of empowerment holds as much potential for liberating poor men as it does for poor women. Several feminist writers have recognised this in various ways. Batliwala notes that the breaking down of gender subordination will benefit men as well as women:

“Women's empowerment, if it is a real success, does mean the loss of men's traditional power and control over women in their households....the point is often missed, however, that the process of women's empowerment will also liberate men.....They will be relieved of gender stereotyping, just like women” (Batliwala, in Rowlands 1997:24).

Young (1993) also views the transcendence of structural gender oppression as a positive event for men:

“Just as women must organise together to gain the sense of self-worth and understanding of the wider context of their lives that empower and make long-term co-operation possible, so must men undergo a process of reflection and transformation which makes it possible for them to recognise the ways in which their power is a double-edged sword. It structures their relations with other men in competition and conflict, and makes co-operation and building on advances highly problematic” (Young 1993:159).

Rowlands, on a less positive note, points out that for women to overcome internalised oppression requires “a change of attitude on the part of men” (1997:132). Her experience with women in Honduras suggests that often the most difficult part of the empowerment process for women is actually overcoming internalised oppression, and renegotiating their relationships with their partners. This is made difficult by the

“obstacle of *machismo*<sup>33</sup>”, or men’s unwillingness to relinquish their ‘power over’ their partners (ibid:132). Rowlands does see benefits for men in a renegotiation of gender power relations, in that the increasing contribution of women to household decision-making means that men no longer have to carry the burden by themselves. However, this would seem to draw on the zero-sum model of power which focuses on decision-making, rather than the generative ‘power to’ model upon which Rowlands bases her theory for women to overcome internalised oppression. This seems to be a flaw in the feminist model of power/empowerment which sees power as generative. Although it may offer potential for women’s empowerment, it remains difficult to square this with men’s experiences of power as ‘power over’. As Batliwala points out above, “women’s empowerment...*does mean the loss of men’s traditional power and control over women in their households*” (1993, in Rowlands 1997:24, emphasis added). While power for women is seen as generative, as ‘power to’, power for men is still termed as ‘power over’. If men remain reluctant to relinquish this ‘power over’, then women’s attempts at developing their ‘power to’ may ultimately be constrained. This would suggest that the ‘real’ empowerment of women remains a problematic issue.

It remains the case that discussions about empowerment do not speak directly of empowering men. Empowerment is usually either about women, the ‘poor’, the ‘marginalised’, the ‘community’, or the ‘beneficiaries’. While feminists may argue that men do not need to ‘be empowered’, it does at least seem to be a valid point that, until a viable model of em(power)ment can be developed, the inherent conflict between women’s and men’s experiences of em(power)ment (‘power to’ versus ‘power over’) suggests that any efforts to empower women are going to remain marginal. This is a central issue in the discussion of women’s groups in Kilimanjaro in Chapters Six and Seven. This ambiguity casts a certain element of doubt over the

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<sup>33</sup> *Machismo* is recognised as a particular understanding of patriarchy in Latin America, although its precise meaning is somewhat unclear. MacEwen Scott writes, “In essence, machismo is an ideology of masculinity which emphasizes male dominance and virility. It defines the relations between men (aggression, honour, pride) as well as men’s behaviour towards women (sexual conquest, jealousy, possessiveness)....Machismo is underpinned by a patrilineal kinship system, a legal system that endorses male power within the household, prostitution and illegitimacy, and a separation between public and private spheres. It is primarily an ideology....and does not necessarily reflect actual

feasibility of the empowerment approach to development. Other commentators have critically evaluated the empowerment approach as implemented by development agencies on various grounds, and these are discussed below.

### **NGOs: participation and em(power)ment**

In Chapter One I outlined the reasons for NGOs' unprecedented growth in both numbers and in public prominence. Many advocates of NGOs have pointed out that NGOs are far better placed to carry out participatory and empowering development than are governments (Cernea 1988, Clark 1992, 1995, Drabek 1987, Edwards and Hulme 1995, Fowler 1988, Healey and Robinson 1992, Lane 1995). State attempts to foster participatory development have been uneven at best, particularly in Africa (Hyden 1983, Tripp 1992). Decentralisation programmes and other efforts to devolve central control have often been mired by bureaucratic inertia, or the unwillingness of the state to relinquish power to lower echelons of government. Midgely (1986) concludes that state efforts to encourage participatory development often fail to involve communities fully in decision-making, despite the rhetoric employed to the contrary. Essentially, he finds the "manipulative tendencies" of the state tend to thwart the rhetoric of participatory development (1986:150). However, despite the state's chequered history with participatory approaches, participation has once again become a central tenet of government development policy in the South, associated as it is with liberal democratic theory and its emphasis on creating an 'enabling environment' (see World Bank 1997). Within this context though, the prospects for states to foster genuine participation are again questioned. With the emphasis on an 'enabling environment' to encourage market forces, private ventures and self-help initiatives, it is worth asking whether local participation is likely to go any further than instituting the 'participation as means' approach. Challenging social structures and power relations is not part of the neo-liberal agenda. Therefore, there seems to be very little scope for popular participation or empowerment to take place at the local level within such a framework.

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behaviour. However, it has structural effects which undermine women's position in the family and wider society" (MacEwen Scott 1994:79).

On the other hand, as outlined in Chapter One, NGOs are often defined in terms of what governments are not: small-scale, closer to the poor, flexible and willing to experiment and adapt to local needs. Many advocates of the NGO approach to development consider them to be more appropriate vehicles for encouraging participatory and empowering development:

“Where an NGO is the external agency, projects invariably are smaller, function as independently as they can within the limitations of the context in which they operate, are usually more flexible in the use of resources and are more able to be innovative in response to local conditions. Characteristically also, a great number of NGO projects see participation as a distinctive process and seek to support and develop this process without the constraints of time and targets. Participation in such projects is more linked to wider, structural issues and not limited to contributions or project management. Finally, it is argued that NGOs are often staffed with people openly committed to the radical changes that participation implies are less constrained by the professional nature of their work” (Oakley *et al.* 1991:176-177).

Thus the potential advantages of NGOs as agents of participatory and empowering development have been noted by many (see for example Desai 1995, Fowler 1988, Lane 1995, Midgely 1986, Oakley *et al.* 1991, Smillie 1995, Thomas 1992). However at the same time it is often recognised that there can be a sizable gap between NGO rhetoric and project reality (Desai 1995, Nelson and Wright 1995, Oakley *et al.* 1991, Stiefel and Wolfe 1995).

NGO project documents and staff often speak of the ‘community’ in which they are working. However one of the major problems with NGO attempts at fostering local participation is this assumed notion of ‘the community’: a homogenous and unstratified entity, in which all members can expect to participate in a project and gain equally (Desai 1995, 1996, Galjart 1995, Midgely 1986, Nelson and Wright 1995). Critical commentators argue that ‘communities’ are often difficult to identify (where, or what, are the boundaries? according to what criteria are people considered members? (Crow and Allan 1994)), and heavily stratified along lines of gender, race and class. The assumptions that consensus can be reached about a community’s needs, and that all people can participate equally would therefore appear to ignore local power relations (Galjart 1995, Mayoux 1995, Yuval-Davis 1994, in Rowlands



1997). Desai's (1995, 1996) study of slum-dwellers' associations in Bombay illustrates how local inequalities are merely exacerbated by non-governmental activity. While she found that the CBOs which were meant to represent the slum-dwellers' interests were dominated by the local elite, she also noted that they were barely 'representative', in that very few slum dwellers actually participated in decision-making or discussions. While the local leaders espoused the virtues of participation by the people, in actual fact very little 'participation' was occurring. The ability to participate was highly correlated with levels of income, prosperity, education and employment, giving rise to what Desai terms "*unequal participation*" (1996:235, emphasis in original), a process which is also emerging within the non-governmental sector in Hai District (Chapter Seven). The majority of the slum-dwellers knew nothing of their CBOs' agenda. Separate groups for women also tended to marginalise women's activities: "they primarily remain 'women's projects' and as such will not be of central importance to the community as a whole" (Desai 1995:68). Effectively, the powerlessness of the slum dwellers is perpetuated by a system whereby the only channel of communication with higher authorities is through the community leaders.

A further problematic issue is the ambiguity surrounding the terms 'participation' and 'empowerment' at the project level. While they can be couched in project documents in terms of 'transformative development', in reality 'empowerment' is often shelved in favour of 'mobilisation' or 'animation' (Stiefel and Wolfe 1995). Beneficiary groups are expected to give of their time and labour in order to 'participate' in projects, or to ensure its efficient implementation ('pseudo participation' (Oakley *et al.* 1991:15)). This has certainly been the case with the World Vision Tanzania project in Hai (Chapter Seven). It has been pointed out that, while directly contradicting the rhetoric of empowerment, on a more practical level this kind of approach cannot always expect success (Mayoux 1995, Nelson and Wright 1995):

"The expectation that participants will provide volunteer or cheap labour in the process of participating....may be unrealistic. The opportunity cost for the participants may be too high" (Nelson and Wright 1995:16).

Stiefel and Wolfe interpret this general ambiguity and vagueness surrounding participation and empowerment, particularly the extent to which they are interchangeable with 'mobilisation', 'self-reliance', and 'dialogue', as an attempt by many development agencies (including NGOs) to obfuscate the real issue thrown up by empowerment: that of changing power relations. As Desai notes, it would seem that agencies which speak of participation, essentially "want politics without politics" (1995:41).

As so many of its advocates have pointed out, the process of empowerment has to be a *political* one (Desai 1995, 1996, Friedmann 1992, Kabeer 1994, Rowlands 1997, Stiefel and Wolfe 1995). It seeks to redistribute power within society in order to redress the imbalances experienced by the socially, psychologically, economically and politically marginalised. Any effort to redistribute power is therefore an inherently political process. Too often, empowerment or participation can be viewed by agencies which are not committed to the empowerment process as just another project input, another 'buzz word' to which the required lip-service must be paid. However, herein lies an inherent contradiction. Academic commentators on empowerment have noted that 'real' participation and empowerment, if it is to have any lasting effect on a community, cannot be bestowed, but must be generated from within, the impetus must come from the community itself (Rowlands 1997). Advocates of participation argue that 'spontaneous' participation is far better than 'imposed' participation through external agency projects (Midgely 1986). If this is the case, however, how does this square with various development agencies' unrelenting objective to 'empower' people? How is it that 'power to' can be generated by those who essentially have 'power over'? (Kabeer 1994, Mayoux 1995, Neslon and Wright 1995, Rowlands 1997).

This is an important issue which is often overlooked by many of those in the development industry. Academics, however, have increasingly questioned the practical and ideological implications of NGOs' attempts to 'empower' people (Rahnema 1992). These questions are not so much concerned with how to 'do'

empowerment and issues of best practice, but rather whether empowerment should be (or can be) 'done' by external agencies at all. The involvement of any external agency may merely ensure the perpetuation of top-down approaches (Rowlands 1997). Stiefel and Wolfe (1995) have pointed to the problem of over-reliance by communities on NGOs and donors as a result of project interventions, despite NGO rhetoric about empowerment (also Rahnema 1992). It is also recognised that the project cycle is not particularly conducive to fostering social change. NGOs, as they become increasingly popular channels for official donor aid, have come under pressure to bureaucratise their operations in an effort to be more accountable to their donors. Project reports, accounts, audits, and evaluations must all be submitted to donor organisations for scrutiny, and tangible results must be forthcoming at the end of a project cycle (which are typically of short duration, often no longer than five years). Part of the problem with this is that empowerment is a long process, and is difficult to measure objectively. Donors, on the other hand, are more interested in seeing results quickly, so that they can pass on the good news to their patrons and sponsors, and the wider public, to whom they are accountable. Given these institutional constraints, it becomes clear to see how:

“...one advocate of community participation was not only doubtful about whether its principles would be widely adopted but ‘whether such an approach can be implemented at all’” (Galjart 1981, in Midgely 1986:37).

In fact, a not entirely cynical position would be to interpret the perpetuation of the myths of participation and empowerment by the development industry as a way of legitimising its existence (Rahnema 1992, also Ferguson 1990). Rahman (1995) suggests that participatory initiatives survive purely because they do *not* challenge the status quo. Related to this point, Midgely (1986) asks why, if spontaneous participation is deemed to be preferable, do development agencies continue to attempt to foster participatory and empowering development? He points out that people in communities have always had their own, traditional way of ‘participating’ (also Rahnema 1992). Why should Northern ideas about participation and empowerment suddenly be the ‘right’ way to participate? As Midgely summarises:

“...if spontaneous participation is so highly prized, why do the proponents of community participation continue to advocate its promotion through the use of interventionist strategies and techniques of various kinds. It is surely compatible with the ideals of spontaneous participation that local people be left to solve their own problems through their own initiative and effort. Another contradictory aspect of the advocacy of spontaneous participation is the widespread belief that ordinary people in the Third World have little potential for participation...United Nations publications have consistently argued that local communities are apathetic and indifferent and that they require the stimulus of external change agents if they are to participate meaningfully in social development. It is odd that the same organization should at the same time extol the virtues of spontaneous participation” (Midgely 1986:152).

Notions of participation and empowerment remain inherently problematic and vociferously contested. Yet, they also remain the centrepiece of many development programmes and alternative development paradigms. One of the most practical ways in which empowerment is encouraged in development projects is through the formation and support of women’s groups. The next section will consider the literature on these in some detail, as later chapters will be focusing on issues raised by the institutionalisation of women’s groups as the answers to women’s problems in Tanzania at both national and local levels. ×

### **Women’s groups: strategies for change?**

“Participation is the point where women are taking decisions alongside men equally. To reach this level, however, mobilisation is necessary. *By organising themselves and working collectively, women will be empowered to gain increased representation, which will lead to increased empowerment and ultimately greater control*” (UNICEF 1993 in Karl 1995:109, emphasis added).

Within the development literature, feminist writers, development practitioners and development agencies have increasingly extolled the virtues of women’s organisation as the most appropriate vehicle through which women’s meaningful participation and empowerment can be effected. From such divergent standpoints as radical feminism, WID, and mainstream neo-liberalism, women’s groups, organisations and movements are imbued with the capacity to ‘empower’ women. Of course, the nature of this ‘empowerment’ and the reasons why women’s organisations should be

capable of fostering such a change differ greatly according to each ideological viewpoint.

The literature on women's organisations and movements in the South is voluminous and this is not an attempt to review it comprehensively in its entirety. Furthermore, the focus on current types of women's organisation is not meant to imply that women in the South have not organised historically<sup>34</sup>. Rather, the aim is to review critically, in the light of the above discussion on empowerment and power, the arguments made about the suitability of women's groups as agents of structural change.

Typologies of women's groups have been offered by various writers. The classic statement on women's organisations was made by DAWN, who stated that the emancipation of women would be brought about through the empowerment of individual women and their organisations (Sen and Grown 1987). They distinguished between six different types of group or organisation: traditional service-orientated organisations; organisations affiliated to a political party; worker-based organisations; externally-funded organisations; project-based grassroots organisations; and research groups. On a local scale, women's groups are seen as fostering women's critical consciousness, encouraging them to "use organisational strength to counter gender biases and rigidities inside the home" (Sen and Grown 1987:82). At the national level, women's organisations are vital instruments of political mobilisation and consciousness raising, while at the international level lobbying becomes their most important role.

It thus becomes clear that the kinds of women's organisations which are being propounded are not 'traditional' types of organisation, such as groups for feasts, funerals, weddings, births, savings clubs, beer clubs, harvesting groups, self-help groups, ritual cult groups, or informal social and religious groups (Tripp 1994). In their discussion of women's informal groups, March and Taqqu (1986) distinguish between 'active' and 'defensive' types of organisation, a conceptualisation very similar to that of practical and strategic gender needs. Those which are defensive are

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<sup>34</sup> See footnote 29 above.

the traditional groups which they see as arising out of women's position within the sexual division of labour, including childcare and childbirth, domestic work, and family catastrophe networks (or women's practical gender needs). They form the function of a safety net against poverty, unemployment, abandonment and illness (March and Taqqu 1986). On the other hand, defensive groups can also develop a sense of solidarity from which a certain political consciousness can grow. These women's groups then become part of women's 'active' strategies for change, developing women's confidence, organisational and leadership skills, and providing new avenues for accessing resources. While they may not directly address or challenge male domination over women, they do still "redistribute power and resources in some very important ways" (March and Taqqu 1986:41). It is these types of organisation which March and Taqqu consider the most likely to be able to foster 'change' for women. Ultimately they suggest that most women's groups lie somewhere on a continuum between defensive and active strategies.

The appropriateness of this defensive/active categorisation has been brought into question, however. For example, Bülow (1997) argues that a more useful interpretation of women's groups can be developed if we move away from this defensive/active dichotomy which implies that gender struggles are acted out in terms of visible power struggles of opposition and resistance. She prefers to view women's groups as part of a more subtle strategy through which women (and men) renegotiate and reconstruct gender identities at the local level (see also Sheyvens 1998). This will be returned to later. However, it is clear that the types of women's groups which are deemed 'appropriate' for effecting women's empowerment are more recent forms of groups and organisation, as elaborated by Sen and Grown (1987; see also Moser 1993). In the Tanzanian context, they are dominated by groups concerned with welfare, social services and income-generating activities (Tripp 1994), but also include networking and lobbying organisations, research organisations and church-affiliated groups.

The arguments for women's collective empowerment are diverse. The development industry and governments in the South are particularly keen on promoting small,

community-based women's groups, which are viewed as the most appropriate method for integrating women into the market in a more economically productive manner (Feldman 1984, Thomas 1988, Wipper 1984). Thus women's IGAs are possibly the largest single category of women's groups in any country<sup>35</sup>. There is an underlying assumption that increasing a woman's income automatically impacts positively on her socio-political empowerment, particularly by enabling her to take a greater part in decision-making in the home (Kabeer 1994). This is best achieved by encouraging women to form income-generating groups. Essentially, this view seeks to address women's practical gender needs and is based on a zero-sum view of power as exercised in decision-making situations.

Some feminist writers concur with at least part of this view. Moser, for example, sees increasing economic independence for women as a vital stage in their empowerment:

“The entry point for debate and negotiation at the intra-household level for women can come at an individual level from increased economic independence. As Bhatti in her study of women workers in the *beedi* (crude cigarette) industry in Allahabad, India, states, ‘A greater economic role for women definitely improves their status within the household. A majority of them have more money to spend, and even more importantly, have a greater say in the decisions to spend money’ (1980:41)” (Moser 1993:206).

However, the key point which sets feminists apart from proponents of WID and neo-liberalism is that organising around practical gender needs (for example, through IGAs) is often the first step from which women can begin to confront their structural gender needs (Johnson 1992, Kabeer 1994, Moser 1993, Sheyvens 1998, Tripp 1994, 1997, Young 1993). In the Latin American context, Johnson shows how mothers' clubs in Peru enabled women to develop a collective consciousness about their structural gender needs and subordination. She describes this as an empowering process because women became aware of their own abilities to organise and to raise their incomes, while developing a sense of solidarity and self-reliance and a critical

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<sup>35</sup> Wamalwa (1991) notes the preponderance of women's IGAs as opposed to other networking and advocacy groups as sponsored by the Women's Bureau of the Kenyan Government. See also Feldman (1984) for a further critical analysis of the role of the Women's Bureau and women's groups in Kenya.

consciousness about their systematic gender subordination (Johnson 1992). Similarly, Young (1993) argues that organising around practical gender needs has ‘transformatory potential’, in that women can come to realise that they have the capacity to question and confront unequal gender relations. Tripp refers to the opportunity for women to develop a ‘new consciousness’ through participation in women’s organisations, “they allow women to think of themselves as a *collectivity* capable of meeting new challenges” (Tripp 1994:152, emphasis added). The idea of women’s collective capacities is very strong in the feminist literature, and indeed is an important feature of much of the empowerment literature. As Kabeer points out:

“...given women’s disenfranchisement from most sources of institutional power, their collective strength is seen as the most important transformatory resource at their disposal...[T]he organizational capacity of poorer women is seen as a vital instrument for articulating their interests within the development process. However, it has to be built up through a conscious process. If it existed naturally, then the disempowerment of the poor would not be an issue” (Kabeer 1994: 253).

She describes how various NGOs working in Southeast Asia have seen women’s groups and organisations as an integral part of the empowerment process, including the Grameen Bank, SEWA, Nijera Kori and Saptagram. Rowlands (1997) and Young (1993) also stress the importance of women’s organisations, but within a wider social context which requires empowerment on an individual as well as a collective level, in order to be effective. Young is of the view that “empowerment includes both individual change and collective action” (1993:158). In this way, individual empowerment is enhanced by the empowerment of the collective. Empowerment in this sense is not about increasing incomes, but is more concerned with challenging structural issues and power inequalities. Other authors also see women’s groups as important in the sense that they offer a place for women to relax and share their experiences with other women. This can help women to realise that they are not alone, and a sense of shared experiences is a valuable asset for a group of women to develop. As noted above, Rowlands (1997) has developed a framework for empowerment which starts with personal empowerment, and which then progresses to deal with relational and collective empowerment. In her view, in order



for a group to become empowered, or to be able to address their structural gender needs, the individuals of that group must themselves be empowered.

Essentially, while feminists may differ in their perceptions of the importance of increasing women's incomes, it is quite clear that, according to the feminist literature, the most significant role which women's organisations can play in women's empowerment is in enhancing collective capacities, encouraging collective consciousness about shared experiences and allowing women to organise around their structural gender needs.

Despite the apparent consensus on the role of women's organisations in effecting structural change, such a strategy is not without problems. On a practical level, studies have shown that women's groups are not equally accessible for all women, both at the national and local scales (Feldman 1984, Mayoux 1995, Pickering *et al.* 1996, Wamalwa 1991). Feldman's (1984) study of the Women's Bureau in Kenya, a government body for channelling funds to women's organisations set up in 1975, concludes that 90 percent of rural women were effectively excluded from government development programmes. Through both geographical concentrations of funds, actual membership of organisations, and socio-cultural norms which discouraged younger women from joining, the majority of women in rural Kenya did not benefit from government support of women's groups (which were mostly agricultural or IGA projects). Similarly, Wamalwa (1991) argues that, although women's groups in Kenya are important mechanisms which enable women to pool resources and 'express themselves' on a social level, they ultimately do not foster equal participation. In a study which closely resembles the situation on Mount Kilimanjaro discussed in Chapter Seven, Wamalwa observes that members are drawn disproportionately from the 'middle peasantry', and are married, middle aged women who are not constrained by demands on their time or financial concerns. While the women's groups serve to give women some recognition of their (perceived) role in national development, these women's groups simultaneously serve to marginalise women's interests and prevent their mainstream participation (Wamalwa 1991).

Other authors have documented the inequalities of participation at the local level. In their study of women's groups in Uganda, Pickering *et al.* (1996) argue that many women felt they could not join their local groups because they were illiterate, poorly dressed and constrained by domestic responsibilities. Mayoux (1995), in a thorough critique of the promotion of women's groups as a strategy for increasing women's participation and empowerment, argues that communities cannot be assumed to be homogenous, and that inequalities and hierarchies which exist between women are likely to be reproduced by any organisation which they form:

“Certain categories of women, such as older women, mothers-in-law, first wives, richer women, benefit more than others and are often anxious to preserve their privileges within the system rather than challenge it. These women are often the leaders in the community, and are often those influencing the direction of participatory projects....Many ‘grassroots’ women's organisations merely reflect rather than challenge gender and other forms of inequality” (Mayoux 1995:244).

Young (1993) has also argued that community differences and inequalities can hamper the progress of women's projects, and eventually serve to reproduce existing inequalities, while some participants may use local groups for personal advancement. Mayoux (1995) points out that these differences between women pose a problem in that it can be difficult to reach ‘community’ consensus about women's needs and interests given the various local power inequalities. While women's practical and strategic needs are difficult to identify due to cultural and ideological systems which encourage women (and men) to internalise ideas about gender relations, it must also be recognised that those women who do wield power in the community may “use and manipulate gender stereotypes to obtain support for their own individual or group interests” (Mayoux 1995:243). In this sense, women's groups can become an inherent part of local strategies which seek to reproduce patterns of power and control, rather than to confront and challenge them. This is a central issue discussed in some detail in Chapter Seven in looking at women's organisations on Kilimanjaro.

A major problem with much of the development literature is that the advantages for women through organising are often assumed (Mayoux 1995). This is associated,

particularly in the project literature, with the positive impact which raising women's incomes is deemed to have. Although this has been discussed above, it is worth adding here the point which Mayoux (1995) makes, based on her work in Nicaragua and India. She points out that women's ability to reap the benefits from their participation is constrained by power relations at the household level. Even if women are able to increase their incomes through a local project, that income can either be appropriated by her husband, or is seen as a substitute for the male contribution to household welfare. In such cases, a woman's increased cash income does not trigger fundamental changes in household power relations. On a social level, the fact that not all women are able to participate in the first instance raises questions about the assumed benefits of women's groups. Furthermore, decision-making procedures within groups are often confined to a few elite women (Mayoux 1995). The scope for meaningful participation of the majority of women is therefore limited.

This then raises the question about the overall ability of women's groups to meet women's practical and strategic gender needs and to foster sustainable change in local (national, international) power relations. While the arguments for women's organisations as empowering mechanisms are seductive, it remains important to set women's groups within their wider economic and socio-cultural context. Women's groups exist in communities which are stratified along lines of gender, class, age, religion, and race. Evidence which suggests that these groups can challenge and actively renegotiate these inequalities is somewhat thin. Yet, it is precisely this ability to address structural causes of gender subordination which women's groups are heralded as possessing. As Mayoux argues:

“The degree to which women benefit from participation will depend crucially on the type of participation and the degree to which underlying inequalities in access to resources and power are explicitly addressed” (Mayoux 1995:250).

Other feminist writers also stress that women's empowerment can only be achieved through the addressing of structural gender needs, or the ability of groups to help women to actively formulate and pursue their political agendas (Kabeer 1994, Young

1993). Yet it remains that part of the problem with many women's groups at the local level is that, rather than serve as channels through which women can come to challenge local structures of subordination, women's groups only reinforce gender inequalities while increasingly marginalising women's interests and claims to take part in 'development', as argued by Desai in her study on slum organisations in Bombay:

*"The men from the slums did not object to the fact that separate meetings....and training schemes (such as cookery and sewing classes) were held for women, because they found these activities culturally acceptable. Thus, the ideological and political subordination of women also extends to women's organisations, where, as within society as a whole, they are allowed only a mere supportive role"* (Desai 1996:229, emphasis added).

On the other hand, it has been argued that women and women's groups can adopt 'subtle strategies' in order to confront gender subordination and disempowerment (Bülow 1997, Sheyvens 1998). In this view, women can begin to make small steps towards empowerment by working within the constraints imposed on them by the cultural norms and values held about gender roles within their society. It is argued that feminists should not be quick to criticise these efforts as inconsequential in political terms, as these strategies often represent huge moves forward for women within their local context (Sheyvens 1998). Using evidence from the Solomon Islands, Sheyvens argues that women's lives are being changed by these subtle strategies which do not openly challenge the status quo. Similarly Bülow (1997) argues that women's groups in Kilimanjaro are involved in a process of small gains for women within their local cultural context. Rather than passively adhering to dominant ideas about women and gender roles, these women's groups are part of women's active strategies of renegotiating and reconstructing themselves and their role in society:

*"[the women's groups] manage simultaneously to combine very contradictory images of femaleness that enables them to negotiate access to essential resources and to widen their room for manoeuvre. The cumulative effect of their collective action is a renegotiation of definitions of femaleness and a contestation of their gender position"* (Bülow 1997:21).

There is a certain attractiveness about such an argument which attempts to recognise women's collective agency, but the question remains: access to resources *for whom?* manoeuvre *for whom?* It is doubtful that women's organisations can have an equally positive impact for all women in any given community. I would argue that the constraints on women's groups to effectively empower all women must be taken into consideration. Essentially, as Kabeer points out, it must be kept in mind that:

“It is only when the participation of poorer women goes beyond participation at the project level to intervening in the broader policymaking agenda that their strategic interests can become an enduring influence on the course of development” (Kabeer 1994:262).

### **Summary: changing power relations?**

This chapter has argued that the potential for change offered by an approach to development which embraces the notions of participation and empowerment cannot be assumed, and must therefore be treated with some caution. Moreover, there are also inherent problems associated with the non-governmental sector approach to development, which is largely accepted to be broadly participatory and empowering almost by definition. One line of argument has been that although the participatory process is inherently political, NGO lip-service paid to the rhetoric of ‘participation as end’ has not been matched by NGO practice which tends to focus on ‘participation as means’. Placed within the wider context of state retrenchment and financial strain across sub-Saharan Africa, this facet of participation is indeed problematic, and firmly places NGOs at the centre of an agenda which is primarily concerned with the private provision of social welfare. As will be argued in Chapter Six, simply ‘adding’ non-governmental actors to social service provision does not necessarily improve services.

A second important critique which has emerged from this discussion relates to the idea of ‘community’ which is implicit in much of the work on NGOs and participation. In positing ‘community participation’, or arguing that ‘women’ (all women?) can engage in the development process in an empowering way, the politics of social relations are conveniently ignored. Instead, I have argued that the existing

inequalities in any community are likely to have a significant impact on who can participate in the development process. In particular, patriarchy and other cultural norms and values relating to the role of women are highly likely to shape the extent and nature of their participation in development activities.

Finally, and following on directly from the last point, this discussion has raised questions about the possibilities for empowerment to take place within this approach to development. Two issues have been raised in particular; firstly, how can women (or other oppressed or marginalised social groups) increase their 'power to' while other groups continue to hold 'power over'? Secondly (and relatedly), how can external organisations, in positions of having 'power over', foster an empowerment process which instils in people the 'power to'? The participation and empowerment processes are inherently political in nature, yet there is very little discussion in the literature of the tensions and problems this raises for the conceptualisation of 'development'.

# CHAPTER THREE

## The development of Tanzanian associational life in historical perspective

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### Introduction

“This is the objective of socialism in Tanzania. To build a society in which all members have equal rights and equal opportunities; in which all can live at peace with their neighbours without suffering or imposing injustice, being exploited, or exploiting; and in which all have a gradually increasing basic level of material welfare before any individual lives in luxury” (Nyerere 1968a:340).

“In traditional African life the people were equal, they co-operated together, and they participated in all the decisions which affected their lives....[O]ur task, therefore, is to modernize the traditional structure so as to make it meet our new aspirations for a higher standard of living. This can be done provided we hold fast to the basic principles of traditional living, while we adapt its techniques to those of the twentieth century” (Nyerere 1968c:405).

This was Nyerere’s vision of the future of an independent Tanzania at the time of the Arusha Declaration in 1967. In this declaration he outlined the developmental ideology of *ujamaa* (meaning ‘familyhood’), which shaped Tanzanian development policy until the mid-1980s. His objective was to build a cohesive, modern nation on the foundation blocks of socialism, multiracialism and egalitarianism (Rubin 1996). While Tanzania was unique among African countries in embarking upon this particular exercise of development through African socialism, it was only to last for two decades before it became unsustainable, and the winds of liberalisation began to blow through the Party<sup>36</sup>. Much has been (and continues to be) written about the Tanzanian experiment (see *inter alia* Bernstein 1981, Coulson 1982, Havnevik 1993, Hyden 1980, O’Neill and Mustafa 1990, Raikes 1978, Shivji 1976, Sundet 1994, Yeager 1989). My primary aim in this chapter is to provide an overview of the most significant elements of Tanzania’s development policies which have directly

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<sup>36</sup> At independence the ruling party was Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). TANU remained in power on the Tanzanian mainland, but merged with the Afro Shirazi Party of Zanzibar following the Zanzibari revolution in 1964, at the time when the United Republic of Tanzania was



impacted on the nature of Tanzanian associational life, in order to set the discussion on the contemporary Tanzanian non-governmental sector (Chapter Four) in its historical context. The nature of associational life, and particularly its change over time, is inherently bound up with issues of political ideology and economic policies pursued by the one-party state in the years after independence. Furthermore, the experience of women, and discourses about women in Tanzania's development, will be reviewed. This is necessary in order to understand the national context within which gendered identities on Kilimanjaro are constructed, and in particular, the role of women in development in Tanzania (to be explored in Chapter Seven).

## Tanzania

Tanzania is a highly diverse country in terms of peoples, cultures and environments. The population is predominantly rural, and 84 percent of the total population of the country (30 million) are engaged in subsistence agriculture (Economist Intelligence Unit 1997). According to the 1988 census, women comprise 51 percent of the population, and perform the bulk of subsistence agricultural requirements<sup>37</sup>. Twenty-four percent of the total population live in urban areas, including the larger towns, Mwanza, Arusha and Moshi, and the city of Dar es Salaam (EIU 1997, see Map 3.1).

Standard measures of wealth collated by the IFIs reveal Tanzania to be one of the world's poorest countries, ranking third from the bottom of the World Bank's table of basic indicators (World Bank 1997). In 1995 the GNP per capita in 1995 was US\$150 per annum, while the economy grew at an average of one percent per annum


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formed. Later in 1977 TANU was renamed *Chama cha Mapinduzi* (Party of the Revolution, CCM) as part of a new Party constitution.

<sup>37</sup> The 1988 census reported 90 percent of the population to be engaged in agriculture, 75 percent of whom were women (URT 1992). Research undertaken in the 1970s revealed women's substantial role in the (declining, see note 57 below) rural economy:

"...peasant women [are] doing 70 percent of the hoeing and weeding, 60 percent of the crop harvesting, 80 percent of the portage of crops from field to home, 80 percent of the crop storage, 90 percent of the food crop processing and 60 percent of the marketing of excess, including transportation to market, 95 percent of the care and feeding of the young and aged, 90 percent of the water and fuel portage, and 50 percent of the seed planting and cutting and care of domestic animals and stables (Chale 1979:5, quoted in Geiger 1982:56).

Map 3.1 Tanzania in East Africa, showing major political boundaries



© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996.

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1997.

between 1985 and 1995 (EIU 1997). Aid amounted to 29.9% of GNP in 1994 (World Bank 1997).

Inflation in 1997 stood at 21.5 percent, while foreign debt amounted to US\$7.3 billion (EIU 1997). That Tanzania is an impoverished country, heavily dependent upon agriculture (which in 1995 accounted for 57 percent of GDP) is quite clear. Other sectors, such as transport and trade (22 percent), manufacturing (6.7 percent) and mining (1.4 percent), are small in comparison (EIU 1997). Despite these bleak statistics, Tanzania fares slightly better in the UNDP human development indicators tables. In 1997 it was placed 149 (out of 175 countries), roughly in the middle of the 'low human development' countries (UNDP 1997). This is largely due to the relatively high adult literacy rate, which in 1997 was 54.3 percent for women and 78.8 percent for men (UNDP 1997), and which relates directly to the Universal Primary Education (UPE) policy discussed below.

The population is made up of 120 ethnic groups, none of which dominates socio-political space at national level. The largest is the Sukuma, inhabiting the area south of Lake Victoria and comprising only 13 percent of the population (Yeager 1989). None of the other ethnic groups constitute more than 5 percent of the population. Four of the other larger ethnic groups are the Makonde of south east Tanzania, the Nyamwezi of Tabora Region, the Haya of western Lake Victoria and the Chagga of Kilimanjaro. District and village level fieldwork for this study was carried out in Kilimanjaro, and the Chagga will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. Tanzania also has a considerable Asian population, which is predominantly urban-based and engaged in various business activities<sup>38</sup>. Generally, Tanzania has enjoyed a relatively peaceful existence since independence, partly due to the fact that no one ethnic group is dominant, and partly due to Nyerere's nation-building policies, such as the promotion of *Kiswahili* as the national language, which sought to create harmony and a sense of national, rather than ethnic, identity.

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<sup>38</sup> Bryceson estimates that in 1948 the Asian population in Tanzania numbered approximately 46,254. This represented a huge five-fold increase over 27 years, fuelled by immigration and a natural growth rate of 2-3 percent a year (Bryceson 1990:71).

## The impact of the colonial period on associational life

Between 1891 and 1961 Tanzania was administered by European powers, initially by the Germans (from 1891 until the end of the First World War), and thereafter by the British until independence in 1961. The British ruled Tanganyika, as the mainland was known before the union with Zanzibar in 1964, according to the mandate of the League of Nations. In addition, European influence was experienced through the missionary societies, the first of which arrived in Tanganyika before the Germans. By 1885 there were five missionary societies in the territory (The Holy Ghost Fathers, The Universities Mission to Central Africa, The Church Missionary Society, The London Missionary Society, and The White Fathers), all of which set up stations in various regions (Iliffe 1979). Although initially independent, the missions were working closely together with the colonial government by the 1930s, especially in areas such as education, as we shall see below.

There were several aims of the British colonial regime in Tanganyika. Given that the League of Nations Mandate stipulated that the territory was to be ruled in the interests of “peace, order and good government”, and of “the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants”, the government opted for a policy of indirect rule (Yeager 1989). The main elements of this, at least in the short-term after the First World War, included the expulsion of all Germans and the acquisition of the imperial firms of the German regime, the discouragement of settlers on a large scale and the re-establishment of order by staffing the administration with Britons (Iliffe 1979). In the long-term, the British policy combined altruism and self-interest (*ibid.*). It was intended that the British would eventually give the territory over to the Africans for self-rule, however, this was not assumed to take place in the near future. In the meantime, the policy of indirect rule seemed to fulfil British ambitions in Tanganyika:

“Both Conservative and Labour parties were committed ‘to guide colonial peoples along the road to self-government within the framework of the British Empire’, but the war and the loss of India appeared to give Africa new strategic and economic value. While a creative colonial secretary, Arthur Creech Jones, advocated economic development, social reform, and political advancement, other ministers either saw Africa in strategic terms or

concentrated on its contribution to Britain's reconstruction [post WWII]. They resolved the contradiction by denying its existence. 'There is no conflict', the Foreign Secretary declared, 'between the social and economic development of these overseas territories to the advantage of their people, and their development as a source of supplies for Western Europe'" (Iliffe 1979:437).

A major objective of the colonial regime was the expansion of agriculture for export to Europe. The system of cultivation established under German rule by plantation companies, white settlers and African smallholders was continued in the British period; producing cotton, coffee, and sisal. This production of primary commodities, fuelled by European expansion and industrial revolution, served to integrate Tanganyika into the world capitalist system (Coulson 1982). Combined with the imposition of taxes, it also forced many Africans into wage labour on settler estates. The encouragement of cash-cropping among Africans created regional disparities which favoured agriculturally-fertile areas, notably the coffee growers on Mount Kilimanjaro and in Bukoba, over others. Thus one of the long-term effects of colonial rule was the emergence of regional disparities which remain significant today (Iliffe 1979). It was these areas inhabited by the Chagga and the Haya which later became important in the rural cooperative movement and subsequently the nationalist movement.

The policy of indirect rule, which sought to justify British presence by 'allowing' local tribal chiefs to head native authorities so appearing to be relatively autonomous of the colonial administration, simultaneously fulfilled the British intention of 'training' an African elite to whom the British could hand over power when they decided to leave. This native authority had legislative and executive powers; there were native courts, and a native treasury which collected taxes, some of which went to the colonial government, and some of which were retained by the authority for local investment (Iliffe 1979). However, these chiefs were responsible to the British Provincial and District Commissioners:

"Chiefs were expected to do what the British told them, and those who took too independent a line were replaced, regardless of the legitimacy of their claims to be chiefs" (Coulson 1982:95).

There was very little political space for Africans outside of this highly bureaucratised system (Yeager 1989). In fact, the discouragement of any African political awareness or participation was an integral part of colonial policy. The British did not want a class of educated Africans challenging the status quo. What they did want, however, was a sympathetic elite with whom the British could associate themselves, and through whom they would still have some leverage once they had physically left the territory (Iliffe 1979). It is ironic, then, that at least two of the means through which the British sought to fulfil this strategy actually provided part of the stimulus for the nationalist movement which ousted the British much earlier than they had anticipated. The first of these is the cooperative movement, and the other the colonial education policy. Both of these were intended to create a class of elite Africans who, under British guidance, could demonstrate business acumen and who could administer the territory along British guidelines.

### **The role of cooperatives: the KNCU**

The Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association (KNPA), the first cooperative in Tanganyika, was registered in 1925 with the help of Charles Dundas, a colonial official. Despite reservations about African collective associations and their possible political overtones, the colonial government was at least prepared to support the cooperatives, because it would train certain Africans in business, thereby creating the African elite needed for self-rule. Coffee had transformed the Chagga into peasants<sup>39</sup> during the 1920s, with a crop growing from 100,000 trees in 1916 to 987,175 trees in 1925 (Iliffe 1979). The KNPA was led by, and represented, the elite on Mount

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<sup>39</sup> There has been a huge debate about the nature of the 'peasantry', in Africa, and in Tanzania in particular (see Bernstein 1981, Hyden 1980, 1983, 1986, Kasfir 1986, Raikes 1978, Shivji 1976, Williams 1985). The central argument has been concerned with whether African farmers remain 'uncaptured' by the state, and choose not to participate in the wider capitalist economy, preferring to remain self-sufficient (Hyden 1980, 1983). Such a notion has been widely criticised for overstating the self-sufficiency of peasants, and it is posited that peasants are far more integrated in an exploitative fashion into the global capitalist system than Hyden's thesis suggests (Kasfir 1986). I refer to Africans as 'peasants' here, following Iliffe's interpretation:

"Peasants live in small communities, cultivate land they own or control, rely chiefly on family labour, and produce their own subsistence while also supplying larger economic systems which include non-peasants. Characteristically, peasants belong to states which exploit them...[S]imultaneous involvement in local community and wider state distinguishes peasants both from tribesmen, whose

Kilimanjaro: the mission-educated and the large land-holders. Coffee production encouraged socio-economic differentiation at the local level also:

“In 1930 only one man in three grew coffee. Of those who did, 96 per cent owned less than a thousand coffee trees, normally planted among the bananas in their *vihamba*<sup>40</sup>. The remainder - probably less than 500 men - owned nearly a hectare or more of coffee, often growing it in distinct plantations with hired labour” (Ilfie 1979:275).

The KNPA represented a certain class of interests on the mountain. Nevertheless, it became an important vehicle for representation among the Chagga. By 1927 conflict had arisen between the KNPA; the settlers who wanted the government to ban African coffee-growing; the chiefs, who felt that their power had been usurped by the KNPA; and the local Provincial Commissioner, whose sympathies lay with the settlers and chiefs (Coulson 1982). Gradually the KNPA was undermined by the government, and was eventually disbanded in 1931 (Coulson 1982, Ilfie 1979). However, the KNPA was replaced by the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union (KNCU) only a few years later. This was largely due to British support (from some quarters<sup>41</sup>) for cooperatives. The KNCU was controlled by government, however. It was European-run, was supervised by an official registrar, and was considered under the control of the chiefs, particularly Chief Abdiel Shangali of Machame, who was popular with the colonial administration (Ilfie 1979). For these reasons problems emerged again in 1937, when particularly low prices and the perceived KNCU monopoly on buying coffee resulted in riots, and the deportation of dissidents:

“The crisis of 1937 was not only a vivid example of peasant action, but in Tanganyika’s wider history it was both the nadir of African impotence and an important advance in political consciousness” (Ilfie 1979:281).

It is the awakening of political consciousness which is of greatest importance here. Other cooperative societies emerged in Tanganyika over time, although slowly and with government caution. It was particularly keen that cooperatives should not be

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societies are more exclusively local, and from farmers, who employ non-family labour and are chiefly concerned with the wider market” (Ilfie 1979:273).

<sup>40</sup> *vihamba* (sg. *kihamba*) (*Kiswahili*): the banana and coffee plot within which Chagga homes are built.

<sup>41</sup> As Coulson has pointed out; “...the idea of African marketing cooperatives had support in high places, not least London where the Fabian socialist Sydney Webb (Lord Passfield) was Colonial Secretary” (1982:62).

political associations. By 1959 there were 617 cooperatives organising and mobilising a significant proportion of the rural population (Coulson 1982). The issue of cooperatives will be returned to below in the context of the struggle for independence.

### **The colonial education policy**

The British administration's education policy provides a window on the racial segregation which characterised colonial Tanganyika. There were many places at schools for European children, and also for Asian children, while the largest group, the Africans, had three options: children of the chiefs could go to mission schools, or the elite government Tabora School; poorer children could go to 'practical training schools' which taught agricultural practices and were run largely by missions; or children did not go to school at all. Following the First World War, the British allowed this triple education system to develop, and in 1933, 51 percent of European children had school places, 49 percent of Asians, and 1.84 percent of Africans (Coulson 1982).

Additionally, educational opportunities were highly contingent upon the region of the country in which Africans lived; in those areas where Christian missionaries had settled there were many schools, which enjoyed government support, but Muslim areas (particularly the coastal area) found that they got no support because of missionary pressures. These educational options served the colonial regime well, as did the cooperatives, because they provided a small number of educated Africans who could be trained in administrative tasks, while other Africans would learn the essentials of cash-cropping, and yet others would receive no education at all (Coulson 1982). The British were constantly aware of the threat which an African educated class could pose to them.

The missions, however, wanted to produce as many converts as possible, particularly in the face of competition from other missionary societies. They therefore set about establishing schools in order to educate local people who would, in turn, spread the word of God among their kinsmen:



“By 1912 there were 171 mission stations in mainland Tanzania, with 616 European and 1694 African staff, including the catechists and teachers who ran 1119 schools for about 100,000 pupils, although the effective number of pupils may have been less than this, perhaps 60,000....Mission education, with its combination of reading, writing, arithmetic, and Christianity, was the ideal means of creating a new class of literate officials, cut off from their tribal origins, different in important ways from their tribally-educated cousins, and with loyalties to those who had educated them and so given them the chance of a new life” (Coulson 1982:83).

Thus schools were established in order to train African evangelists. However, as Coulson states, these mission schools were often largely irrelevant to the majority of the local population, equipping students with skills which were more useful to them in a formal sector job rather than as a member of their traditional society. It was a highly ideological education which extolled the virtues of Christianity, and was generally available only to a select minority (particularly the sons of chiefs).

The state and the church developed close ties from the 1920s and the government paid 90 percent of mission teachers' salaries (Havnevik 1993). However, the church can also be associated with the nationalist movement as many of those activists in the Tanganyika African Native Union (TANU, the party which eventually won independence) had been educated at mission schools. The provision of education was one of the key factors responsible for the growth of a nationalist consciousness (Coulson 1982).

As suggested above, certain areas were much better served than others with regards to schools. In Kilimanjaro, for instance, the authorities levied a tax on coffee sales to the KNCU, which was invested in schools for the area (Coulson 1982, Iliffe 1979). Primary and secondary schools were built<sup>42</sup>, and it is estimated that Universal Primary Education (a later policy of Nyerere) was achieved in Kilimanjaro during the 1950s (Coulson 1982).

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<sup>42</sup> See Chapter Six for more detail on this.

### **Associational life under British rule**

The British colonial administration did not provide a conducive environment for the formation and operation of associational life. Kiondo (1993) notes that, according to the Tanzania Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (TANGO) directory (1994), only 11 of the 163 registered Tanzanian NGOs were founded during the colonial period<sup>43</sup>. Similarly, the “Directory of Non-Governmental Organisations in Tanzania by 31st December 1994” (United Republic of Tanzania 1995), records 813 NGOs, only five of which had registered prior to 1961<sup>44</sup>. Kiondo further points out that the majority of these organisations were either local affiliates of British NGOs (such as the Tanzanian Society for the Preservation and Care of Animals, affiliated to the RSPCA), or constituted the local professional or propertied classes (such as the Tanganyika Law Society, or the Tanganyika Farmers’ Association which required prospective members to own a minimum of five acres of land plus a considerable livestock herd). Kiondo suggests that this lack of non-governmental activity can be attributed to the ‘weakness of modern civil society’ (1993:164) (see Chapter One for a critique of this line of argument) and the unsympathetic nature of the colonial authorities towards the development of such a ‘civil society’.

However, others have suggested that a broad range of non-state activity could be found in urban areas during the colonial period, including the Church, Muslim organisations, missionary societies, and movements which emerged as a result of the nationalist struggles (Ishumi 1995, Kiondo 1993, Munishi 1995, Sivalon 1995, Tripp 1992). Tripp (1992, 1997) argues that a rich variety of associations proliferated in Dar es Salaam which included burial societies, informal social clubs, hometown associations, and groups to provide loans and give advice on jobs. These groups were often formed in order to help new migrants in Dar es Salaam, and tended to bring together those of the same ethnic group. According to Tripp, 51 such groups were registered in Dar es Salaam by 1954 (Tripp 1992). For example, the Zaramo Union, one of the largest ethnic-based groups with a membership of 3,500, brought together members of the Zaramo tribe in order to fight local issues and contribute

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<sup>43</sup> The TANGO Directory lists only those NGOs registered with TANGO.

<sup>44</sup> The Government’s directory lists only those NGOs registered with the Registrar of Societies in the Ministry of Home Affairs.

towards the development of their villages of their home region (*ibid*). These types of organisation were generally perceived as a threat by the colonial authorities. African forms of participation were not encouraged to flourish because of the potential problems they could pose to the British colonial regime. Indeed, it was these organisations which were the precursors of the independence movement, as they provided avenues for collective meeting and sharing of ideas, often for the expression of nationalist and anticolonial sentiments. TANU (Tanganyika African Nationalist Union) was the most overtly political organisation to emerge during this period, evolving out of the African Association (AA), founded in Dar es Salaam in 1929.

The churches and mission societies also constituted an important role as part of associational life (being non-governmental actors) in the colonial era, as discussed above in their provision of education to African elites. There was a tendency to 'carve up' the territory between them, so that they did not encroach on one another's space:

"By the 1890s, the Holy Ghost Fathers had moved further inland to establish a mission station and a school in Morogoro, the UMCA was operating in Zanzibar, Magila, Masasi and the Lake Nyasa areas of Likoma and Liuli, the CMS was working in Mpwapwa, while the White Fathers were operating in the Lake Victoria area of Bukumbi and the Lake Tanganyika area of Ujiji and Karema, and the LMS was established in the Lake Tanganyika regions of Urambo and Ujiji" (Ishumi 1995: 154).

While Christianity spread fast, claiming as much as 25 percent of the population by 1957 (predominantly Roman Catholics), Islam was also an important force which spread quickly between 1916 and 1924, increasing its numbers of converts from 3 percent to 25 percent of the population during this time (Tripp 1992). Islam was actually the first 'foreign' religion to reach the territory in the tenth century (van Cranenburgh 1995).

The religious organisations became very important as social service providers (Iliffe 1974, Ishumi 1995, Munishi 1995, Sivalon 1995). It is estimated that 70 percent of African primary school children attended schools of religious organisations by 1960, and 55 percent of African secondary students were enrolled at religious-run schools

(Munishi 1995). In the health sector, religious organisation-run health facilities again were predominantly utilised by the rural African population. Although they provided only 42 percent of hospital beds, government-owned facilities were aimed at Europeans and were situated in urban areas. Non-governmental organisations also provided 81 percent of primary health care facilities, again in rural areas. The rural focus of religious organisations' health and education facilities meant that they were the main health providers for the rural African population (Munishi 1995, Tripp 1992).

It can thus be appreciated that colonial Tanganyika had an extremely varied associational life, in the form of urban community groups, activist and political organisations, professional and propertied-run organisations, trade unions, labour movements, and organisations for women and youth, as well as a considerable missionary presence throughout the country which was particularly active in providing services to the African population. By the 1940s, several of these forms of organisations were at the forefront of the campaign for independence from Britain.

### **The road to independence**

The discussion so far has focused on issues which are particularly relevant to the development of associational life in colonial Tanganyika. The period leading up to independence is expressly significant, as it witnessed a growth of African organisations, particularly the trade unions and cooperatives, some of which became actively involved in political issues, and some of which did not. This section will discuss the Tanganyikan road to independence, with particular reference to such organisations.

The late 1940s and the 1950s in Tanganyika was a period characterised by the increasing growth, and demands of, workers' organisations which bombarded the government with petitions for increased wages, better conditions and benefits. It was also a period in which the colonial government attempted to suppress political participation by Africans and sought to control their organisations, for fear of the consequences of political opposition. Three of the most crucial types of these

organisations were those of the African civil servants and teachers, the trade unions and the cooperatives.

Those Africans who had been educated at Tabora School<sup>45</sup>, or other such well-respected institutions, comprised an elite, many of whom were in the civil service. The most high-ranking of all African civil servants, Martin Kayamba, who had been educated at Tabora, formed the Tanganyika Territory African Civil Service Association (TTACSA) in 1922, a union of Christian and Muslim civil servants in Tanga. It was the first workers organisation formed by Africans (Ilfiffe 1979). This was the precursor of TANU, which eventually championed the struggle for independence (Coulson 1982). The main impetus for the formation of the TTACSA was low wages brought about by the Second World War. The TTACSA comprised Africans who were either clerks or skilled workers, excluding labourers (Ilfiffe 1979). In direct opposition to Kayamba's association was the African Welfare and Commercial Association in Dar es Salaam. This organisation, although it did not outlive the AA, was more overtly political and worked quite closely with the labour movement, and by helping the dockers in Dar es Salaam formed the beginnings of the trade union movement (Coulson 1982).

The first strikes in Tanganyika were organised by the dockers, first in Tanga in 1937, when 250 men stopped work for two days, and the more organised and large-scale effort in Dar es Salaam in 1939. They were complaining about low wages and benefits, but their efforts were not rewarded as their company could recruit a new labour force relatively easily. However, this was only the beginning:

“Between 1939 and 1947 Dar es Salaam's dock workers organised three major strikes, each marking a stage in the growth of solidarity, organisation and understanding of the economic and political system, until the last, in 1947, made the dockworkers the vanguard of Tanganyikan labour as a whole” (Ilfiffe 1979:401).

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<sup>45</sup> The most exclusive government school in Tanganyika, initially only open to sons of government and native authority employees. It later became the equivalent of an English public school, whereby entrance was through a national examination (Ilfiffe 1979). Many of Tanzania's 'elite' leaders, including Nyerere, have been 'old boys' of the school.

The strike in 1947 was decisive. Three days after the dockworkers had struck, railway workers in Morogoro, Dodoma, and Tabora joined the strike, and four days later those at Kigoma and Mwanza also struck. The authorities reacted “vigorously”, arresting forty-five people and imprisoning more for a year (Iliffe 1979). The strike ended in Dar es Salaam after twelve days. The tribunal which followed ordered recommended wage increases of 40-50 percent and an end to casual labour employment (Coulson 1982). The 1947 strike precipitated the first dock workers’ union, the Dockworkers and Stevedores Union which was formed in October 1947 and registered in January 1948. Still government attempted to control the movement, by seconding an officer to the union and later, following further strikes and violence in 1950, by dissolving the entire union and sacking all workers (Coulson 1982).

After this experience of unionism organised from below, the government discouraged trade unions. After 1955, trade unionism was revived, led by educated Africans in a more top-down movement. This was tolerated by the government because it was recognised that it was in its interests to have a well-paid, permanent labour force (Coulson 1982, Iliffe 1979). In 1955 a central union was launched, the Tanganyikan Federation of Labour (TFL), created to coordinate all other unions, which at this time included the Railway African Union, the African Commercial Employees’ Association, and the Tanganyika African Government Servants’ Association. The TFL was organised by well educated Africans, who had gone either to Tabora School or to mission schools. In fact many of them had gone to school with the leaders of TANU. However, the trade unions were not supposed to be political, and thus there could be no cooperation between TANU and TFL, although this changed later. Similarly, the cooperatives, which had grown throughout the 1950s, encouraged by the government’s Social Development Department (Yeager 1989), risked deregistration if they were found to be involved in politics. The cooperative movement grew to a total of 573 organisations in the rural areas by 1959, incorporating 324,994 members (Coulson 1982). Although both the trade unions and the cooperatives were closely supervised by colonial officials, and were ultimately dependent on government for fixed prices and to agree wages, they formed formidable opposition to the government:

“...they played a decisive role in the independence campaign - the unions by organizing strikes and boycotts in the towns and on sisal plantations, the cooperatives by promoting the expansion of African cash-cropping in the rural areas and by seeming to demonstrate African ability in business” (Coulson 1982:108).

Meanwhile, TANU was growing substantially. It became the first political party in Tanganyika in July 1954, and was accepted by the Registrar of Societies having redrafted its constitution. In 1955 Julius Nyerere, educated at Tabora School, Makerere College in Uganda, and Edinburgh University, gave up his teaching job in order to commit himself full-time to leadership of TANU. The colonial authorities attempted to be obstructive (for example TANU was prohibited in the Lake and Tanga regions until 1958), and various laws were passed which made it difficult to speak out, or publish African nationalist material. Public servants were also forbidden to join TANU. However, TANU membership grew from 15,000 members in 1954 to over 200,000 in 1957 (Coulson 1982), with 134 branches throughout Tanganyika in 1955 (Yeager 1989). This was compounded by various measures taken by the British which were interpreted by educated Africans as moves to consolidate colonial rule (Iliffe 1979). The political campaign was buttressed by stepped up trade unionism and cooperative actions in the late 1950s which mobilised people in both Dar es Salaam and the rural areas. A series of strikes by the Local Government Workers Union (1956), national sisal plantation workers in 1958, the Dar es Salaam bus strike (1957), and the breweries strike in 1958 suggested not only that TANU and TFL were working together, but also that the British regime was under serious threat from non-violent forms of resistance:

“When the General Election of September 1958...produced fifteen TANU-supported candidates from fifteen seats, there was really nothing the British could do but leave. But by this time Governor Edward Twining had given up; it was left for his successor, Richard Turnbull, to announce in October 1958 that Tanganyika would develop as an African state. Thirty-eight months later it was independent” (Coulson 1982:117).

### ***Women in the struggle for independence***

The particular contribution of women to Tanzania's struggle for independence has been highlighted by several authors (Geiger 1982, Iliffe 1979, Rubin 1996, Tenga and Peter 1996). Bibi Titi Mohamed, who in 1954 was the first woman to be enrolled in TANU, became the leader of the TANU Women's Section in 1955. Nyerere, apparently concerned to raise the status of women within TANU, was a driving force behind the Women's Section initiative. The original aims of the organisation were to: mobilise women as well as men to join the party; to try and bring men and women together in the struggle for liberation; to ensure the security of the TANU leaders; and to raise funds through various activities including dances (Tenga and Peter 1996). Bibi Titi's role in organising and mobilising women in Dar es Salaam and later throughout much of the countryside was of great importance in spreading TANU's message:

“...Bibi Titi in particular and the TANU Women's Section generally were largely responsible for politicizing Dar es Salaam in 1955, and for insuring that forty thousand people would attend Nyerere's first public TANU meeting....By October, when TANU held its first conference, Bibi Titi had enrolled five thousand members in the Women's Section, and by the end of that year, TANU had more women than men card-carrying members” (Geiger 1982:47-48).

However, despite the importance of women and Bibi Titi in particular to the nationalist movement, patriarchal sentiments still surfaced at TANU meetings or in everyday circumstances. Iliffe refers to men who complained about being addressed in meetings by “a woman like Bibi Titi” (1979:532). He suggests that the emancipation of women was inherently constrained by existing patriarchal structures and cultural norms:

“Bibi Titi Mohamed said it was necessary that women should be eligible for employment, but a married woman should not be allowed to work in the party without her husband's consent....Mzee Takadiri said that he agreed with Bibi Titi that they should not accept a married woman to work in TANU without receiving a letter from her husband after seeking his consent....the meeting applauded this elder” (Iliffe 1979:532, citing the typescript of a party conference in Tabora).



Geiger points also to the fact that the majority of women were not allowed to vote in the election which gave TANU the majority of legislative seats (1982). Only literate women, or homeowners, were given the vote. In this way, many members of the TANU Women's Section were actually excluded from voting at all (Geiger 1982), despite their central role in creating a mass anti-colonial movement throughout the country. However, the women's wing of TANU survived, and became the *Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania* (Union of Tanzanian Women, UWT), affiliated to TANU, in 1962. The role of UWT in Tanzania's socialist experiment will be explored further below.

## Independence

On the eve of independence Tanganyika was led not by one social or ethnic group, but by a small group of educated Africans, headed by Julius Nyerere. The social base of the nationalist movement was made up of a small, but well-organised labour force and a large mass of poorer farmers (Havnevik 1993). It is important, however, to keep in mind that the colonial encouragement of cash-cropping had led to certain regional disparities, and the Chagga, Haya and Sukuma agricultural producers in particular had expanded their role in the national economy (Yeager 1989). Havnevik (1993) has suggested a framework for analysing Tanzania's<sup>46</sup> post-independence development model, which divides the period between 1961 and 1986 onwards, into stages characterised by distinct economic policies and discourses of development, which for reasons of clarity and conciseness, will be employed here.

In the immediate aftermath of Tanzania's independence, very little change actually took place. The departing British left several reports on policies which they suggested should be implemented in order to develop Tanzania along the capitalist lines they had pursued during the colonial era. The most well-known of these was 'The Economic Development of Tanganyika' produced by the World Bank, advocating long-term mechanisation and modernisation of agriculture (Coulson 1982). Thus the initial period after the British left saw no great changes in policy

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<sup>46</sup> In December 1963 Tanganyika joined with the island of Zanzibar to become the United Republic of Tanzania (URT), and is henceforth referred to as Tanzania.

(1961-1967). The emphasis was on modernisation, which in the first and second three-year development plans was to be achieved through foreign capital-assisted import-substitution-industrialisation. Agriculture was to be modernised through support to progressive farmers, mechanisation, and the moving of farmers into nucleated villages. In particular, the government was concerned with the task of “modernising” the peasantry:

“‘Peasant’ agriculture was backward, not sufficiently oriented towards the market, and needed an infusion of expert technical advice and infrastructure to put it on the right track....The issue for the newly independent government became how to most effectively transform peasant society to best achieve ‘modern’ nationhood” (Rubin 1996:252).

The new Tanzanian government also wanted to expand cooperatives to non-cash-crop areas, to reduce the influence of Asian traders and to boost production (Havnevik 1993). These policies were accompanied by a high percentage of British civil servants still in the country, and (waning) British aid to help the government establish itself, which set limits to Africanisation<sup>47</sup> (Coulson 1982, Havnevik 1993).

There were also high expectations from those who had supported TANU in the fight for independence. They had been promised better social services, wages, and benefits. When it appeared that the Tanzanian state was not able to achieve these goals, the threat from well-organised labour unions posed a significant problem for the new government. It was for these reasons, then, that Nyerere began to take steps to constrain associational life, a policy which became more prominent after the Arusha Declaration in 1967. Various moves were taken to strip the labour movement in particular of its potential power. In 1962 three Acts were passed which limited the rights to strike, disallowed civil servants to join unions, and gave the TFL more power over its constituent unions (Coulson 1982). The Preventive Detention Act of 1962 was used against trade union leaders or chiefs who posed any challenge to TANU. Later in 1964 the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA) Act allowed only one union which was affiliated to TANU. Nyerere announced that Tanzania was to become a one-party state in 1965, in a new Constitution which saw

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<sup>47</sup> i.e. the taking over and running of the government apparatus by Africans.

the state's role as an "unifying factor and a provider" (Havnevik 1993 p39). While these policies have been hailed as 'authoritarian' and 'statist' (Kiondo 1993), Havnevik argues instead that the Tanzanian state chose a variety of methods for development, not all of which were authoritarian, such as the remaining autonomy of the cooperatives.

### **The Arusha Declaration: *Ujamaa***

"In African society....we lived as families, with individuals supporting each other in terms of equality...the community was a unit in which every individual was important, and among which the goods available were shared without too great inequality. This attitude is, basically, what we mean by saying that traditionally African society was a socialist society. And when we say that Tanzania is aiming at building 'African socialism' we mean that we intend to adopt the same attitude in the new circumstances of a nation state which is increasingly using modern techniques of economic production" (Nyerere 1968d: 198-199).

"Industries will come and money will come but their foundation is *the people* and their *hard work*, especially in *agriculture*. This is the meaning of self-reliance" (Nyerere 1968b:246, emphasis in original).

The Arusha Declaration was accepted by the National Committee of TANU in Arusha on 29 January 1967. It embodied an ideology of development, termed *ujamaa*, based on socialism and self-reliance. *Ujamaa* was more than just a new government policy: it was a discourse of development which sought to shape national identity (Rubin 1996).

The Arusha Declaration laid out TANU's intention to build a socialist society, founded on the principles of human rights, equality for all, and freedom of expression. An interventionist state was to regulate the accumulation of wealth and thus ensure the existence of a classless society. The policy of self-reliance was integral to the ideology of the Declaration. It stated that the government could not be expected to provide social services for the entire population, while also pointing out the risks of over-reliance on external aid. Emphasis was put on rural development and agriculture, on the basis that development would be down to the hard work of the

people. The main impetus for attempting to boost agricultural production was the need to support urban-based industrialisation. The state needed to 'capture' the agricultural market in order to direct the surplus towards the support of industry, which was also state-controlled (Sundet 1994). The Leadership Code was the most controversial component of the Declaration, which sought to eradicate the abuse of power by party officials by removing their right to any personal investments outside of the party.

Again, while Kiondo (1993) interprets the Arusha Declaration as the onset of authoritarianism, Havnevik looks at it in a different way:

"I prefer to argue that the Arusha Declaration was based on a broader nationalist paradigm and its primary aim was to change the direction of societal development so that the TANU leadership, the bureaucrats and the social base of the nationalist movement would grow closer together" (Havnevik 1993:43).

The day after the Arusha Declaration was published, Nyerere announced that all banks were to be nationalised, and within one week, eight firms, six foreign-owned import-export houses, insurance brokers, and seven subsidiaries of multi-national corporations were nationalised (Coulson 1982). The creation of these parastatals allowed the state effectively to take control over the economy. By 1974, at least 139 parastatals had been created (Havnevik 1993).

Nyerere's education policy (outlined in his paper 'Education for self-reliance') sought to reform the education sector to give basic education for all rather than the elite few (Samoff 1987). The goal of Universal Primary Education (UPE) was set in 1969, with the aim of providing practical training for the all of the country's youth by 1977. This meant that, having attended primary school, graduates would not necessarily attain formal sector jobs, but would be expected to become agricultural producers (Coulson 1982). It also meant a massive expansion within a short period, leading to poorly trained teachers, and shortages of teaching materials. However, achievements can be seen in the numbers enrolled; 190,000 children in 1967 compared to 670,000 in 1976 (Coulson 1982).

The policies outlined in ‘Socialism and rural development’ were the blueprint for the *ujamaa vijijini* (*ujamaa* in the villages) exercise. The forerunner of *ujamaa* had been attempted in the early 1960s as part of the drive towards the modernisation of agriculture, which had been abandoned in 1966 due to the falling prices of crops. The policy in 1967 was different in that it envisaged rural development through the resettlement of:

“....a small group of politically committed farmers who worked together on a communal farm, using their savings to purchase equipment that would benefit the group” (Coulson 1982:239).

The initiative in the late 1960s was characterised by the persuasion of villagers to move (as opposed to the use of force), although the movement of people into nucleated villages was slow and agricultural yields showed ‘negligible success’ (Havnevik 1993). Coulson (1982) observes that by 1968 only 180 resettled villages had been established. This movement of people, however, was coupled with large-scale schemes to improve the supply of social services, the argument being that it was easier for the government to provide services to the rural population if they lived in nucleated locations (Havnevik 1993). This policy of voluntary resettlement changed as the party entered its more authoritarian period, identified by Havnevik as 1972/73 to 1978/79, and to which we shall return below.

While the Arusha Declaration was ostensibly a government policy designed to boost agricultural production and industrialisation, Nyerere’s *ujamaa* was also a discourse of development which attempted to unite Tanzanians and develop a sense of national identity. The overarching drive behind the adoption of the Arusha Declaration was the pursuit of ‘modernisation’, ‘progress’ and ‘development’, through the application of increased production, egalitarianism and self-reliance. National slogans and mottos promoted the ideology of *ujamaa*: the national motto, ‘*Uhuru na umoja*’ (freedom and unity); the slogan of the Arusha Declaration, ‘*Ujamaa na kujitegemea*’ (socialism and self-reliance); and the *ujamaa* philosophy, ‘*Uhuru ni kazi*’ (freedom is

work) (Rubin 1996). Through these slogans and various speeches, Nyerere entreated the Tanzanian population to 'participate' in their own development:

“Indeed, as far as we are concerned, the people’s freedom to determine their own priorities, to organize themselves and their own advance in welfare, is an important part of our objective....because only through this participation will people develop” (Nyerere 1973:333, cited in Tripp 1992:228-229).

The adoption of *Kiswahili* as the national language also served to bring a certain sense of national cohesion. Rubin suggests that Nyerere’s nationalist ideology was founded on the “unifying principles” of *Kiswahili*, developmentalism and traditionalism (1996:255). She argues that *ujamaa* constructed an ideal of a ‘modern’ African society by building on idealised traditional images of African life. She further points out that while ethnic groups in Tanzania are highly diverse and internally stratified by age and gender, Nyerere’s general formulation of the Tanzanian “imagined community” was able to appeal to some traditional aspect of every ethnic group within the country:

“By identifying local cultural values of cooperation, hard work, caring, and social equality in such general terms, and attaching them to Nyerere’s vision of the forward movement of the nation into modernity, each ethnic group was free to read into the President’s statements the specific formulation of these values specified by their own cultural codes” (Rubin 1996:255).

At the same time, the developmental nature of the state allowed it to pursue economic development in isolation from political issues:

“By articulating the position that economic development was an independent process, the Tanzanian state could suppress mass political organizations without acknowledging that such actions contradicted other elements of the national ideology, such as widespread political participation....These assumptions make possible the formulation of rural development policies founded on increasing government intervention into all aspects of social life” (Rubin 1996:255).

The discourse of *ujamaa* embodied within Nyerere’s “fatherly visions of guided participation” (Sundet 1994:43), created a national identity (which was open to local interpretation) based upon a curious hybridisation of traditionalism and

modernisation. It imagined the nation as the “African extended family writ large” (Rubin 1996:264). It also legitimated the state’s penetration of society in the pursuit of ‘development’ and ‘modernisation’, so that despite the rhetoric which drew on traditional values, in essence, *ujamaa* was an attempt to transcend such cultural norms. As Sundet observes:

“...since the uneducated masses of the people were seen as inherently backward and intransigently ‘traditional’, political activity became defined as a means of mobilising the people in state-led development efforts” (Sundet 1994:40).

### ***Non-state actors under the Arusha Declaration***

The *ujamaa vijijini* policy was partly designed to facilitate social service provision, in that moving the rural population into recognised centres would make the government's task of providing social services somewhat easier. As far as health facilities were concerned, however, the government's success was mixed. Church organisations remained important health providers throughout the 1970s. The government concentrated on building rural health centres and dispensaries because they were cheaper units to construct and run. The national target was to provide every 50,000 people with one health centre by the year 2000, but by 1994 the government had only achieved one centre for 98,190 people<sup>48</sup> (Munishi 1995). The government did take over some of the church-run facilities, such as the Kilimanjaro Christian Medical Centre (owned by the Lutheran Church) and the Bugando Hospital (owned by the Catholic Church), and other Church-owned facilities became "designated" government facilities, but a law passed in 1977 allowed "authorised organisations" (namely the armed forces, parastatals and religious organisations) to run their own facilities (Munishi 1995). However, the government still attempted to remain the paramount provider through bureaucratic measures which deterred or slowed down religious organisations from building and registering new facilities. Despite this, religious organisations' contribution to health care could not be completely erased by government.

Similarly, the Arusha Declaration stated that all schools and training institutions were to be taken over by the government:

"This aimed, among other things, to streamline and control the curriculum of the schools, to enhance ideological conformity, to eliminate denominational influences and to ensure equal ("mass") access to educational opportunities" (Ishumi 1995: 156, insertion in original).

All non-public secondary schools were nationalised in 1971, including private trust-funded and mission schools. Only seminaries were excluded from this exercise. However, the non-governmental sector continued to remain important for secondary

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<sup>48</sup> This was still an achievement, considering the comparative figures in 1961 was 466,000 for one centre (Munishi 1995).



education, albeit in a small way (Ishumi 1995). This was because the non-state sector was classified as “authorised and government-approved organisations with non-profit motives”. Thus organisations such as the Tanzanian Parents’ Association (TAPA), marketing co-operatives and religious NGOs were permitted to provide education services (Munishi 1995). However, such schools only really appeared in areas with strong co-operative movements or TAPA associations<sup>49</sup>.

Similarly, all primary schools, including community schools built entirely on local initiative, were taken over by government during the *ujamaa* period (Samoff 1987). In 1974 the Universal Primary Education policy took this further, setting the not insignificant goal of putting all Tanzanian children of primary school age through school by 1977:

“In the event, extraordinary energies and resources were mobilised. Primary school enrolment was doubled, some 37,000 new classrooms were constructed, and 40,000 new teachers were trained between 1973 and 1977. By the early 1980s, nearly all Tanzanian children could find school places” (Samoff 1987: 339).

Thus, while NGOs remained important providers of secondary education, the government maintained its monopoly on primary schools.

The concept of ‘self-reliance’ is also central to a consideration of non-state activity in health and education provision, as many facilities built by villagers in the spirit of ‘self-reliance’ were taken over by the government under *ujamaa*. In fact, while self-reliance was posed as the ideological principle upon which the development effort of the nation was to build, it actually became:

“... a highly dubious and contradictory concept. Without self-help, resources for service provision would be totally inadequate. On the other hand, the popular and NGO initiatives were regarded as supplemental and transient, as the state was presumed to be the benevolent provider....The extensive involvement of donors in the area of social services raised further questions about the concept of self-reliance” (Munishi 1995 p145).

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<sup>49</sup> Such as Kilimanjaro and Kagera (Ishumi 1995).

The period following independence was thus characterised by the Tanzanian state's attempts to control all economic, social and political space. This was achieved through the expansion of the state machinery into all modes of economic and social organisation, and particularly into social service provision.

### **Women, *ujamaa* and the UWT**

The majority of general texts on Tanzania's developmental history tend to omit, or to deal only briefly, with women's experiences of *ujamaa*. Indeed it is a group of (predominantly) female authors who expressly address this issue (see for example, Bujra 1990, Creighton and Omari 1995, Geiger 1982, Mascarenhas and Mbilinyi 1983, Rubin 1996, Tenga and Peter 1996, Swantz 1985, Tripp 1992, 1997). Rubin (1996) has argued that nationalist ideology and discourses of development contain assumptions about gender. Despite the rhetoric of equality for all within the discourse of *ujamaa*, she suggests that it was nevertheless constructed around particular interpretations of men's and women's role within the rural economy:

“The Tanzanian government, for all its use of traditions of complementarity, still utilized an attitude toward women that borrowed, supported, or paralleled Western and local paternalisms towards women and maintained specific and circumscribed ideas about women's correct roles in society, ideas which emphasized domesticity and dependence” (Rubin 1996:256).

Furthermore, an inherent contradiction lay at the centre of *ujamaa* with regard to women. On the one hand, women were entreated to 'build the nation', to participate and contribute towards national development, principally by adhering to government policy within *ujamaa* villages. Women's contributions were overtly recognised, as were some of the constraints on their increased agricultural production (such as lack of inputs and inadequate tools), while some women were, for the first time, able to take up positions on village councils. Government rhetoric officially recognised that women had traditionally been subordinated, and that women must become 'equal' in order for the nation to develop: .

“....[I]t is true that the women in traditional society were regarded as having a place in the community which was not only different, but was also to some extent inferior. It is impossible to deny that the women did, and still do, more than their fair share of the work in the fields and in the homes. By virtue of their sex they suffered from inequalities which had nothing to do with their contribution to the family welfare....If we want our country to make full and quick progress now, it is essential that our women live on terms of full equality with their fellow citizens who are men” (Nyerere 1968a: 339).

However, at the same time, women were constrained in their ability to participate in *ujamaa* by their dual roles<sup>50</sup> (Rubin 1996). Rubin argues that women’s double burden of domestic and household agricultural work made it difficult for women to carry out their cooperative agricultural work on village farms (also Bujra 1990). She points to instances in which women refused to carry out cooperative work on the grounds that they were already too busy with domestic chores, and other women who preferred to resist their domestic roles by participating in cooperative agricultural activities (Rubin 1996). Despite this contradiction, Rubin acknowledges that *ujamaa* did at least “legitimate women’s contributions to village and national economic and political life” (1996:259).

Other authors do not view the *ujamaa* period in quite such positive terms for women. Bujra (1990), for example, argues that the failure of *ujamaa* to address the structural conditions of women’s subordination served to heighten their oppression rather than to address it. Women remained alienated from access to both land and the proceeds from their (increased) labour, thus further entrenching existing patterns of patriarchal land tenure systems and household inequalities. Villagisation did not attempt to reallocate land among individual members of a larger productive community. Rather, customary land tenure systems in which women’s access to land is defined in terms of their relationships to their male kin remained unchanged. This is often a precarious situation for women as, having no legal right to any land of their own, they can be left with no land to farm in the event of a divorce or abandonment (Bujra

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<sup>50</sup> The reference to women’s dual roles here follows Rubin (1996). However, following Moser (1989, 1993) I would argue that women’s *triple* roles must be taken into consideration, in order to take account of women’s role within the community. In this way, women are constrained by their reproductive, productive and community roles, making full participation in the demands of cooperative agricultural labour even more difficult. See Chapter Two for a discussion of women’s triple roles.

1990). Similarly, although *ujamaa* required women (as well as men) to work on communal farms, it was the men who controlled the proceeds from such labour, as the following quote from a woman in Mbeya shows quite clearly, “‘The husband is the boss’, said one woman; ‘he decides how much cash from coffee to give the wife’” (Mbilinyi, quoted in Bujra 1990:57). The increased communal agricultural labour required in *ujamaa* villages generally fell disproportionately upon women. During the later stages of *ujamaa* when the government’s increased need for foreign exchange led it to exhort the rural population to increase production for the market, the challenge was thrown out to women:

“This continuing imperative [to increase production] is disguised by ideological formulations that present women themselves as the problem. Thus under the heading: ‘Women told to grow cash crops’ we find the Chairman (sic) of the UWT urging women to ‘engage in cash crop production in a bid to supplement family incomes instead of depending on their husbands’” (Bujra 1990:56).

Bujra also notes the general exclusion of women from decision-making posts. Although Rubin (cited above) suggests that women gained from *ujamaa* in the sense that they were able to take on a greater decision-making role in the community (and sometimes at even higher levels), it would appear that the inclusion of women in democratic forums has been mixed. Following von Freyhold (1979), Bujra asserts that women were either not allowed or were discouraged from participation in village councils<sup>51</sup>. In this way, Bujra considers *ujamaa* to have “done little to improve the lot of rural women” (1990:58), particularly in the sense that it served to increase their workload without allowing them access to the proceeds from such labour. Contrary to the rhetoric of equality central to *ujamaa*, it nevertheless drew upon, and reinforced, traditional ideas about women’s role in society, which essentially defined them in terms of their obligations to the family, household, community and, by extension, the nation (Bujra 1990, Geiger 1982, Rubin 1996).

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<sup>51</sup> Bujra cites the following from a study by Mascarenhas and Mbilinyi to support her point: “If we are called to a village meeting there must be work to do that day. If they [men] are discussing money, we are not called. When women do speak up they fear scorn. Men say “Who are you to speak? You are only a woman” [or as another woman in Mbeya put it]: We are afraid to talk, afraid

An analysis of the Party's organisation for women *Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania* (UWT), reveals a similar interpretation of women's roles, again obscured somewhat by official rhetoric. The TANU Women's Section which had been so important in gaining support for the independence struggle, and as a vehicle for teaching TANU objectives to women, was affiliated to TANU following independence in November 1962<sup>52</sup>. UWT initially comprised all leaders, members and branches which had formerly constituted the TANU Women's Section. In 1977 when TANU merged with the Afro Shirazi Party of Zanzibar to create the *Chama cha Mapinduzi* (CCM), UWT was among the first organisations to become affiliated. The stated objectives of the organisation had barely changed since 1962<sup>53</sup>.

The UWT was concerned with supporting several types of projects, including women's education and literacy campaigns, maternal and child health care, and hygiene and house-keeping. Party meetings were held to provide political education for women, which focused on their potential services to children and youth, particularly in terms of establishing day care centres, nurseries, and training schools for girls. UWT also encouraged women's income-generating activities by conducting lessons in small business management, cooperatives and handicrafts

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to be beaten by husbands who say, "You should be home cooking" (Mascarenhas and Mbilinyi 1983, quoted in Bujra 1990:57-58).

<sup>52</sup> In the original 1962 constitution of the UWT, the objectives of the organisation were given as follows:

"to unite all the women of Tanganyika under one organisation; to maintain unity and respect of the nation; to foster the development of women in respect of economic, political, cultural, educational, and health matters; to work jointly with the ruling party and government for all; to fight for and maintain respect, justice for the women of Tanganyika, Africa and the world at large; to collaborate with all women organisations in the world whose policies were not in contradiction with national policies and objectives; and to maintain mutual relationships with all friendly parties with TANU in accordance with the policy of socialism and self-reliance for the benefit of the country regardless of skin colour, tribe, religion, material well-being or nationality" (quoted in Tenga and Peter 1996).

<sup>53</sup> From the Constitution of the UWT in 1978 (quoted in Tenga and Peter 1996:149-150):

"i) to unite all Tanzanian women: through which the national policy of socialism and self-reliance and party policies regarding women's liberation could be spread and interpreted to the Tanzanian women; ii) which co-operates and leads all women in various activities concerning family welfare, development, defence, culture, and many others; iii) which unites all women mentally and practically under the leadership of the party, to maintain the policy of Ujamaa and self-reliance; iv) which defends and promotes equality and dignity of the whole nation; v) to liberate all women of Tanzania from oppression and from all traditional beliefs and values which deny their development and of the nation as a whole; vi) which co-ordinates UWT with other national organisations under the party to foster national development; and vii) to maintain mutual relationship with UWT and other African women and the rest of the world for the common struggle of their liberation, and the struggle against imperialism and all kinds of exploitation".

(Geiger 1982). As Geiger points out, the UWT moved from an initial concern to mobilise and unite women with men in the struggle for independence, towards a position whereby women needed to 'develop' and become 'modern', albeit understood as it was in a traditional sense which saw women's role and interests as tied to their 'natural' position as wives, mothers and homemakers. By 1978, the UWT had added the word 'liberation' to its constitution (clause (v) above), regarding women as needing deliverance from traditional cultural values and patriarchal exploitation, which hampered the development of the nation (Geiger 1982).

The structure of the UWT allowed it to penetrate the rural population relatively effectively. Although figures are likely to be inaccurate, it has however been estimated that 180,000 to 250,000 women belonging to one of 3,000 mainland branches comprised UWT membership in 1979<sup>54</sup> (SIDA 1978, cited in Geiger 1982). The structure of the organisation mirrored that of the CCM, with a national leadership, and regional, district and branch (village or workplace) committees. In this way, the Party was able to communicate its policies for national development and women's role within it in an effective manner. UWT proposals also had to conform to national government policy in order to win approval (particularly in terms of financial assistance). In this way, the government was able to control to a certain extent, the ways in which women participated in development activities. For example, Bujra (1990) points out that, as well as contributing labour to family and communal plots, women were often expected to work one day a week on a UWT plot in their villages.

Geiger (1982) raises the question of the effectiveness of the UWT. On a practical level, it was hampered by under-funding and a dearth of well-educated staff to run it, which is more a criticism of the colonial education policy which largely excluded girls, than of the women themselves. Moreover, she questions the organisation's impact on the liberation of women. She suggests that the projects pursued by the UWT achieved very little in addressing women's oppression, by failing to challenge

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<sup>54</sup> This is corroborated by the research undertaken in Hai District, Kilimanjaro Region. Every village in the district had had a UWT project of some kind in the past, some of which still nominally existed (see Chapters Five and Seven).

male control of the household income. Although the UWT promoted women's income-generating activities of several kinds (beer brewing, hotels, poultry projects, shops), Geiger argues that "...earning more income would do little more than increase the amount of responsibility for household and child maintenance that their husbands would shift to their shoulders" (Geiger 1982:58), a conclusion which mirrors that of Rowlands (1997), and Batliwala (1993) as discussed in Chapter Two<sup>55</sup>. Furthermore, the degree and nature of women's participation must be questioned. Various studies cited by Geiger illustrate that rural women in villages are often too busy, or not interested, or not allowed, to 'participate' in meetings, particularly Party discussions. A criticism often levelled at UWT is that it lacks any real leverage at 'grassroots level': that is, its leaders lack any legitimacy with, or knowledge about, women's lives in villages. In this sense, the only women participating are the leaders, often urban dwellers. In those villages where IGAs are actively undertaken, they are often viewed as shareholding companies by the women involved. That is, they run a semi-cooperative business among a few women, who share the dividends between themselves. Members are kept to a minimum number in order to ensure high returns to investments (Samoff 1974).

The emphasis of the UWT on women's practical needs of childcare, youth issues, and women's IGAs build on traditional assumptions about 'women's work', while failing to actively address women's strategic gender needs<sup>56</sup>, essentially meant that the UWT was unable to challenge and ultimately to change women's position in society:

"It is not surprising, then, that most projects and forms of assistance directed at rural women remain confined to development within a traditional definition of their family and household roles and responsibilities. While men are exhorted to produce more and to build the nation and socialism, women's projects are rationalised (if they are approved and funded at all) on the ground that women's increased skills and productive capacities will improve the

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<sup>55</sup> Geiger's conclusions about the impact of women's IGAs supports the argument made by Rowlands (1997), discussed in Chapter Two, that in order for women's empowerment to be achieved, increasing women's income alone is not enough. Real changes in the power relations within the household, which allow women to overcome their internalised oppression and renegotiate oppressive relationships, are more likely to allow women to enjoy the fruits of their labour, and moreover, may equip them with the leverage to decrease their workloads.

<sup>56</sup> For a discussion about women's practical and strategic gender needs see Chapter Two.

standard of living of the family....a root cause of many of the UWT's failings rests with the unwillingness of the Tanzanian government to move from rhetoric to concrete action in addressing the issue of unequal gender relations in Tanzanian society. More specifically, there has been an unwillingness to confront the issue of women's subordination and lack of control over their own labour power in the rural family and household" (Geiger 1982:59).

In this way, although the discourse of development embodied in *ujamaa* proclaimed equality for all, in reality it drew on traditional attitudes and cultural norms which perpetuated male dominance over women, woven into a new national project devoted to 'modernisation' and 'progress'.

### **Authoritarian rule and economic decline**

The inherent paradox in the policies of the 1960s and 1970s came to the fore during the period identified by Havnevik as 1972/73 to 1978/79. On the one hand, government policy encouraged peasant participation, egalitarianism and democracy, while on the other it blocked off avenues for popular participation and created state avenues instead (such as the UWT, see Tripp 1992, Yeager 1989). The state sought to abolish all possible fora for opposition, and with this, to bring society under its direct control. This was reflected in the 1975 amendment to the Constitution which placed the National Assembly under the Party's leadership, and furthermore by the Party's 1977 Constitution, which specifically spelled out that "all activity of the organs of the state of the United Republic shall be conducted under the auspices of the party" (Tripp 1992: 228). The cooperative societies were banned in 1976 and replaced with "cumbersome, inefficient" state marketing boards (Tripp 1997:66). The decentralisation policy of 1972 saw local governments abolished and replaced by civil servants directly responsible to the Prime Minister's Office (Coulson 1982). Tripp observes that local papers described the decentralisation policy as an attempt to encourage greater democratisation and local participation in decision-making. However, "[d]ecentralization proved in practice to be a move towards greater centralization" (Tripp 1997:70). Autonomous organisations such as the Dar es Salaam University Student Organisation, the UWT, the Tanzanian Parents' Association, and the national youth organisation were all brought under the Party's wing. While small informal associations may have continued to be important at the



grassroots (and particularly at the urban) scales (Tripp 1992), the formations of formal organisations was effectively curtailed. Only religious organisations, or organs affiliated to the party, were permitted to operate. Participation became a possibility only via recognised state channels (*ibid*). This is reflected in the number of NGOs registered according to the '*Directory of Non-Governmental Organisations in Tanzania by 31 December, 1994*' (URT 1995) between 1961 and 1986. In total 36 organisations registered in the whole 25 years, including; 10 social service NGOs, 4 economic service NGOs, 4 religious NGOs, 2 international NGOs, 1 professional/educational NGO and 1 environmental NGO. These 36 NGOs constituted only 3.1 percent of all NGOs registered with the government in 1994, and comprise in the main NGOs either formed by professionals and elites, or religious organisations. Thus there were no officially recognised 'bottom-up' NGOs which emerged during this period.

Villagisation was now forced. District officers competed to resettle the highest number of people (Couslon 1982). By the end of 1971 there were 4484 villages, which had increased to 7684 by February 1977, involving 13 million people (*ibid.*). As Havnevik observes, "[a]bout 70 percent of the rural population had been resettled in the course of about three years" (1993:48). This resettlement was accompanied by the waning of *ujamaa* and communal production rhetoric, and a focus instead on the need for the full-scale modernisation of agriculture. Other methods were employed such as the implementation of bye-laws governing agricultural production, and new means of agricultural marketing. In the wake of disappointing agricultural production since villagisation had started, the state was attempting to gain greater control of the agricultural surplus, which it desperately needed to counter-balance rapid economic stagnation (Havnevik 1993).

From the mid-1970s economic decline had set in. Essentially, the massive expansion of the state apparatus, its hegemonic role in managing the economy and social service provision were not sustainable, particularly in the face of external shocks which occurred in the late 1970s (Tripp 1997). Firstly, the expansion of parastatals and the crop authorities had not been accompanied by a rise in accountability, and

through mismanagement and embezzlement they began to drain state resources. Agricultural decline was initially disguised by boosted figures for subsistence production, but dwindling yields and the emergence of trading on unofficial markets indicated that decline had indeed begun<sup>57</sup>. In particular, the agricultural sector suffered from the shortage of foreign and domestic inputs, transport, and fuel, resulting in huge amounts of produce rotting away as it awaited transportation to markets (Tripp 1997). The decline in agricultural production had a negative impact on Tanzania's trade balance, which fell into deficit during the 1970s, causing a chronic foreign-exchange crisis. Expenditures on health, education and water declined from the early 1970s, despite the relative gains made during the 1960s. The state became more dependent upon external aid, despite the rhetoric of the Arusha Declaration which indicated self-reliance at the national level to be of paramount importance. This reflected the state's shift from supporting the agricultural sector to the industrial; figures show that between 1974-1976 foreign aid to industry increased from 8 percent to 29 percent, while social services also received an increasing proportion, from 9 percent to 11 percent (Havnevik 1993). During the period between 1973 and 1981 total aid coming into Tanzania grew from US\$100.3million to US\$701.9 million (*ibid.*). A decline in industrial productivity caused by the underutilisation of capacity was exacerbated by the shortage of foreign currency. This caused industrial wage levels to be eroded which was paralleled in both government service and peasant incomes:

“The squeezing of the peasantry and wage earners was accompanied by increased state authoritarianism, increasing inefficiency and a growth in unaccounted expenditure in government and parastatals. These trends gave rise to an increasing loss of political legitimacy on the part of the state and the party. Thus, when external events triggered off the economic crisis in 1978/79, the crisis which emerged also had clear social and political dimensions” (Havnevik 1993:54).

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<sup>57</sup> The following observation from Tripp reveals the extent of decline in agricultural output:

“In the 1960s Tanzania had the highest rate of increase in food production for all of Africa in the 1960s and was exporting food to neighbouring countries. By the mid-1970s the country was importing food, and by the mid-1980s food accounted for 20 percent of all imports” (1997:62-63).

The decrease in agricultural activity was compounded by rising demand, particularly in urban areas. Between 1973 and 1984, the urban population grew from 7 to 14 percent of the national total, placing greater demands on rural production and imports of food (Bryceson 1990).

These external shocks comprised the break up of the East African Community in 1977, the OPEC oil price rises of the late 1970s, and the war with Uganda which began in 1978<sup>58</sup>. These events all had a negative impact on the Tanzanian economy, which was already reeling from domestic imbalances. All social welfare indicators dropped, industrial and agricultural output stagnated, and the annual growth rate of GDP fell from 2.1 percent in 1979-81 to 0.6 percent in 1982-84 (Havnevik 1993). There was rising unemployment and decreasing opportunities for formal sector jobs.

In the 1980s these problems were compounded by dwindling levels of aid coming into the country. As western governments and multilateral agencies began espousing the benefits of laissez-faire economics, even the Scandinavian countries which had previously been so supportive withdrew their aid to Tanzania's statist development model:

"The Government's dependence on foreign assistance for its public expenditures was to prove a double edged sword as donors shifted from supporting to opposing the high level of state economic intervention, and to perceiving the latter as one of the causes of Tanzania's economic crisis" (Kiondo 1993:167).

While the Tanzanian government was under pressure to agree a SAP with the IMF, aid flows into the country dried up. For a government 50 - 70 percent reliant upon aid for health, education and science, technology and higher education this was tough indeed (URT 1991, cited in Munishi 1995). This economic crisis escalated into a crisis of legitimacy for the state also, as public health and education standards began to decline in the early 1980s (Gibbon 1995, Kiondo 1993). To add to these problems, corruption and non-accountability also became rampant in the face of increasing economic hardship:

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<sup>58</sup> The demise of the EAC prompted the Tanzanian government to invest in its own harbour, railways, civil aviation, and posts and telecommunications services and administration. Havnevik suggests that these investments were closely related to the concomitant increase in imports, the value of which doubled between 1976 and 1978 due to import liberalisation in 1977 (1993). Similarly, the war with Idi Amin's Uganda increased military spending, while causing severe disruption to agricultural production and transport services. Tripp estimates that the war cost Tanzania US\$500 million (1997:64).

“The growth of statism in Tanzania had also meant the development of a large non-accountable public bureaucracy. Partly as a result of the growing economic crisis....and partly as a result of rapid inflation and the plummeting value of public sector wages, the public service became increasingly inefficient and corrupt” (Kiondo 1993:167).

The government reluctantly entered into negotiations with the IMF in 1979 but a SAP was not agreed until 1986. During this time, the government attempted its own economic restructuring programs, in the form of the National Economic Survival Program (NESP) in 1981 and the Structural Adjustment Program of 1982. The latter of these was more in tune with the multilateral agencies' policies and the IMF agreed to back the Economic Reform Program (ERP I) in 1986 (Havnevik 1993, Kiondo 1993). By this time Nyerere had stepped down as President and had been succeeded by his own choice of Ali Hassan Mwinyi. ERP I was followed by ERP II in 1989 and the 'Economic and Social Action Plan' of 1992. These arrangements with the IFIs marked the end of Tanzania's socialist experiment.

### **Towards liberalisation**

The moves towards economic liberalisation have been matched more recently with political reform. Following the publication of the Nyalali Report in 1991, the government abandoned the single-party state form it had considered a central requirement for development following independence, and began to consider moving to multi-partyism. The government acted upon the recommendations quickly and a number of opposition parties and independent newspapers soon emerged (Booth *et al.* 1993, Gibbon 1995). Tanzania's first multi-party democratic elections held in 1995 were “poorly conducted and highly controversial” (EIU 1997). They were won by the CCM candidate, amongst claims of “electoral irregularities” (*ibid*). At the same time, wide-ranging economic reforms were being implemented as part of the structural adjustment process supported by the IFIs. Initially, the IMF instructed Tanzania to remedy its balance of payments' situation, by devaluing the Tanzanian Shilling and restricting government expenditure, which involved lower budgets for ministries, the withdrawal of subsidies, and the introduction of user charges for some services. Later on, the IMF imposed more structural policies designed to restrict the

state's involvement in the economy and allow market forces to take over (Kiondo 1993). This also involved streamlining the civil service (50,000 jobs were ordered to go between 1993-94) and the selling off of parastatals (of which there were approximately 400) (Gibbon 1995). The co-operatives, reintroduced in 1982 in an attempt to boost peasant production and the marketing of produce (Maghimbi 1990), were also badly hit by the financial adjustments, and duly found their credit facilities cut off in the early 1990s.

The Tanzanian adjustment experience has now lasted over a decade and much has been written on the success, or otherwise, of the process (see for example, Booth 1991, 1994c, Booth *et al.* 1993, Campbell 1991, Gibbon 1995, Raikes and Gibbon 1996), and it is beyond the scope of this discussion to go into these debates in any detail. However, suffice it to say that the 'results' seem to have been mixed. Certainly, at the local level the opening up of the economy has meant that more consumer goods are available for those who can afford them (Booth *et al.* 1993). Despite this, macro-level growth rates have remained poor. Between 1991 and 1993 the Tanzanian economy grew at a rate of 3.8 percent per annum which, although above the population growth rate (3 percent, World Bank 1997), has prompted questions as to the extent of the relative growth of formal and informal sector activities (Gibbon 1995). Tripp (1992, 1997) for example, has shown how people in the urban setting have increasingly turned to informal activities in recent years such as shoe-shining, pastry-making and watch-repairing in the face of economic struggle, suggesting that the informal economy has indeed grown, perhaps faster than the formal economy<sup>59</sup>. Furthermore, exports have not increased since the beginning of liberalisation, remaining at between US\$300-400 million per annum, and inflation has remained high at over 20 percent (Gibbon 1995, 1996):

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<sup>59</sup> Although the argument could be made that this is exactly the intention of SAPs. Reviewing the sub-Saharan African experience of the informal sector, Meagher observes:

"The expansion of informality is thus anything but the triumph of small-scale actors; it is, on the contrary, a process of socio-economic restructuring instigated by the state and various groups within the formal sector in an attempt to maintain and expand their share of income in the context of economic crisis" (1995:279-280).

She points out that this process is exacerbated by structural adjustment programmes, which forces more people to resort to eeking out a living within the informal sector, which "relieves the state and formal sector firms of the costs of the reproduction of labour" (Meagher 1995:278).

“Of more concern still are the basic social indicators. Infant mortality...fell from 122 in 1980 to 117 by 1985, but this fall then slowed to 115 by 1991. Life expectancy at birth, which had been 47.2 years in 1980, rose to 48.0 years in 1985 before falling to 47.3 in 1991. Primary school enrolments, which stood at 93 percent of the relevant age group in 1980, declined to 72 per cent in 1985 and 63 percent in 1991 (all figures from Global Coalition for Africa, 1992)” (Gibbon 1995:15).

Other commentators have also noted with some concern the declining trend since the beginning of the adjustment period in state expenditure on social services, particularly on education (Ferreira 1994, Narayan 1997). It would seem that there are still great strides to be made in improving the quality of life for the majority of Tanzanians.

### **New development discourses: liberalisation, gender and national identity**

While state policies have shaped the economic and political life of Tanzania since independence, they have also served to send out strong messages about development, national identity and gender, as was explored above in the *ujamaa* period. As the era of state authoritarianism came to an end in the 1980s and the economy opened up to the forces of liberalisation, so the discourse on development espoused by the state took a new turn which marked a break with the ideology of *ujamaa*.

While the discourse of *ujamaa* focused on cooperation, egalitarianism and community, the new development discourse, which has been shaped by the processes of structural adjustment and liberalisation, promotes “[t]he image of the new Tanzanian citizen....efficiency, competitiveness, individualism, and capabilities in the marketplace rather than cooperation in the field and in the home” (Rubin 1996:264). Although the government has adopted this new discourse of development, with its implications for national identity, the extent to which all Tanzanians themselves have embraced this new identity must be called into question. The language of *ujamaa* can still be heard, and is still a potent force in the Tanzanian imagination, particularly in the context of development, as later discussions from Hai District in Kilimanjaro will illustrate (see Chapter Seven). The power of the rhetoric of *ujamaa* is evident in

its continued use today, from government officials to villagers, as this excerpt from a Tanzanian newspaper reveals:

“The Prime Minister Mr Frederick Sumaye has urged Tanzanians to discard the idea that their development would be brought about through foreign aid....[H]e added that people should continue with the spirit of self-help, including payment of the development levy<sup>60</sup>, so as to enable their respective local councils to provide them with services” (*Guardian* 05.03.97).

However, it is quite clear that the rhetoric of self-help, and particularly of non-reliance on foreign aid, has acquired a new liberalised slant: self-reliance is now interpreted as paying ones taxes. Tanzanian identity as espoused by the government’s discourse of development is a mixture of old and new policies. In Chapter Seven, it will become apparent that discourses of development circulating at the local level in Kilimanjaro are influenced by both the modern and traditional, in the sense that they simultaneously draw on the discourse of *ujamaa* and local interpretations of the international development discourse in order to construct a local discourse on development.

Similarly, the notion of women’s role in development within the new discourse of liberalisation draws on previous ideas from *ujamaa*, while also incorporating international ideas about ‘Women In Development’ (Bujra 1990). Although liberalisation policies tend to see workers as genderless in theory (Rubin 1996), in practice ‘old’ ideas about women and their roles still prevail.

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<sup>60</sup> Development levy is the tax to be paid to the government by every adult over 18. Actual rates vary between regions according to the per capita income of that region (Chiteji 1998, personal communication). In 1996/97 the development levy in Hai District, Kilimanjaro Region was Tsh.2,000/=, which is payable by all men over 18, and all employed women over the age of 18. It is probably higher in Kilimanjaro than the levy in other, poorer regions. For example, in Njombe District in the Southern highlands, all adults over 18 were obliged to either pay development levy, or carry out several labour days on development projects (Lucas 1998, personal communication). Until 1969 women were exempt from paying the tax, although those who earned an income were required to pay. The debate which took place in the National Assembly during the late 1980s over whether all women should pay the development levy was instructive in revealing the concerns of women from different classes. While female parliamentarians, eager to gain ‘equality’ for women, pushed for a change in legislation, it was quite clear that poorer women felt it was unfair to tax them, on the grounds that they earned so little (Tripp 1997). Eventually the Prime Minister announced in 1991 that local councils could exempt women from paying development levy. Thus women’s eligibility to pay tax differs between districts.

Meena (1991) has shown how the efficiency approach to women inherent within structural adjustment programmes has impacted negatively on women in Tanzania. She argues that women are the “shock absorbers of socio-economic crises” (1991:170). In general terms, structural adjustment policies have served to increase women’s workload without granting them access to the proceeds from their labour. Government incentives to increase outputs of cash crops at the expense of food crops translates into diminished incomes for women, who usually control food crops while their husbands take care of cash crops (and the cash). Cuts in social services budgets have placed extra burdens on women in terms of user fees, or through sheer lack of services. Meena points out that, given the fertility rate in Tanzania of seven live births per woman, women spend a good proportion of their lives in particular need of maternal and child health services, which are often unavailable or of poor quality. She further argues that women come under greater pressure to eke out a living by engaging in the informal sector, and that this also increases their workload.

Tripp (1992, 1994, 1997) has also carried out research on women’s informal sector activities in Tanzania as income-generating strategies within the context of structural adjustment. She shows how women in Dar es Salaam have turned to many petty business activities, such as making pastries, braiding hair, frying fish, and selling *khanga*<sup>61</sup>. However, as she points out, these kinds of activities fall within the realms of what is considered to be ‘women’s work’, and, although they raise women’s incomes, they are unlikely to threaten male authority within the household (Tripp 1990, cited in Rubin 1996). As Rubin points out:

“Women are the target of special attention in many of these efforts in capitalist economic development. The vocabulary of their involvement, however, emphasized their contributions of labour rather than their intellect, or it emphasized their “natural responsibilities to family” rather than their managerial or leadership capacities. This is a different vocabulary from that of earlier decades of *ujamaa*. The new terminology reflects a tension between, on one side, the ideology that empowerment of women is crucial to national development, and on the other, an ideology of female domestication” (Rubin 1996: 262-263).

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<sup>61</sup> The brightly-coloured cloths which all women in Tanzania wear, particularly when working.



Although Rubin sees this inherent paradox within liberalised development rhetoric as quite different to *ujamaa*, I would argue that in many ways the new discourse of development mirrors the same assumptions and cultural values held about women's work and women's role in development which were evident in *ujamaa*. Despite exhortations to women that they must be at the forefront of development, this is often presented within specific interpretations of women's traditional roles as mothers and homemakers. The debate may have moved on slightly, in the sense that the government now talks of women's 'empowerment' and 'participation', but this is most likely to be a result of the 'trickle down' effect of international development discourse on women on national policy, a point which is returned to below.

The Government of Tanzania recognised the need for an official ministry to deal with women's issues in 1990, when the Ministry of Community Development, Women's Affairs and Children was established (Tripp 1994). The mere fact that women's issues should be dealt with by a ministry also concerned with community development and children indicates the government's perception of women's role in development. As Rubin (1996) points out, despite the rhetoric about women's equality, the government still sees women's role as primarily concerned with children and childcare, and with activities concerned with the home and domestic duties, and service to the community. As the following excerpt from an article in the Dar es Salaam *Guardian* entitled 'Initiate development projects - Nagu<sup>62</sup> urges women' reveals:

"Women societies have been challenged to utilise profitably the training they get in increasing and improving their welfare by initiating various small projects....Minister Nagu said that the time for *women's liberation through self-reliance* was now and insisted that there was no reason to hinder the move. "*Food processing* is one way in which a woman may get relaxed if well utilised, *from a frequent routine kitchen attendance*", the minister pointed out" (*Guardian*, undated, emphasis added).

Again there are references to the language of *ujamaa*, but moreover, it is apparent that the 'technical fix' approach is deemed appropriate, in this case by enrolling women in a workshop funded by the Danish Government on food processing and

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<sup>62</sup> Mary Nagu, the Minister for Community Development, Women's Affairs and Children.

entrepreneurship skills. In this way, the government is unwilling to address underlying issues of inequality which serve to suppress women, but is quite happy to encourage such development projects which reinforce their traditional roles as domestic workers, a view which would appear to be widely shared, at least among the national press. This is a further case of addressing women's practical needs while ignoring the issues raised by their strategic gender needs. A similar article in *The Express* entitled 'Women manage development' (26.06.97) suggested that "women are managers of the development process in Tanzania and that any development assistance by aid donors should be targeted to them". It went on to propose that women, in order to fulfil such a role, needed to lessen their workloads, which could be achieved through the attainment of modern agricultural implements. What is particularly interesting about this article is that it is a report on a statement made by a female academic based at the University of Dar es Salaam (who also incidentally "convenes" an NGO based in Dar es Salaam). It would seem that many women share a similar view on their role (or, in the case of educated, urban women, on the role of their rural-dwelling sisters) as the government. This is also evident in discussions which followed the 1997 budget announcements. One article in *The Guardian* reported that female parliamentarians were urging other women MPs to "block the budget on the grounds that if the proposals are implemented they will cause immense suffering to women and children" (27.06.97). Raising the price of kerosene, for example, would force bus fares up, thus compelling children to walk rather than catch the bus to school, while women in rural areas would have to "reverse to outmoded ways of providing lighting by using fuelwood". The article went on to state that the rights of women and children must be defended by all female MPs "because women and children are the backbone of national life".

A brief perusal of the government's 'Policy on women in development in Tanzania' (URT 1992) further shows how the discourses on women's empowerment and participation are intricately woven into a representation of their role as domestic servant, childbearer and community worker. As before, women's primary role is seen in terms of their natural nurturing abilities, "Tanzania accepts and recognises the important reproductive role played by women in society....They are in fact the

nurturers of society” (URT 1992:2). Women are seen in their traditional role as mothers and home-makers, and it is stated that while full recognition must be given for this, women also need to be brought into the development process in order that it may “fully utilize their abilities/potentials” (URT 1992:5). However, at the same time, the government refers to the need for women’s empowerment, their increased participation and liberation. The manner in which ‘empowerment’ is defined is revealing:

“This entails: (i) recognising their potentials in the society; (ii) recognising their ability to make decisions which affect their lives; (iii) utilising the resources and produce of their labour; and (iv) having the ability to acquire, utilize and promote science and technology which will reduce and ease their daily workload” (URT 1992: 6-7).

In this way, women are to be integrated into development as it already exists, through various ‘technical fixes’. The fact that women may already ‘participate’ in numerous ways, and that their participation is inherently shaped by a patriarchal system of gender relations which denies women access to land or to the proceeds from their labour, is not addressed. The structural inequalities which perpetuate women’s oppression are not recognised as part of the government’s plan for ‘liberating’ women. Instead, the visibility of a discourse of development which perpetuates traditional values with regard to women, essentially guides the ways in which women can participate in development:

“Cultural expectations of how “good” women and mothers are to behave serve to mitigate against women’s participation in the political arena. They reinforce institutions that discriminate against women to prevent their involvement not only in parliament<sup>63</sup> and other national institutions but even more so in local organizations” (Tripp 1994:166).

I would further argue that it is precisely these cultural expectations which also structure the ways in which women *can* and *do* participate, particularly in local organisations, and to which Tripp herself does allude (1990, cited in Rubin 1996). In

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<sup>63</sup> As of 1992, 15 percent of parliamentary seats in the National Assembly are reserved for women. However, as Tripp (1997) points out, not all female politicians are advocates of “women’s issues”. It does not necessarily follow, then, that an increase in women holding positions of power translates into greater recognition for women’s interests. Furthermore, the ability of such a small percentage of women to make any kind of difference must be questioned.

this way, the types of projects carried out under UWT are still carried out twenty years later, albeit by different organisations, and couched within a different discourse of development. This will become apparent in Chapters Five and Seven, in discussions of women's groups in Hai District. The activities which these groups undertake are still heavily influenced by ideas about what constitutes 'women's work', and what it is culturally acceptable for women to do.

## **Summary: Tanzanian associational life in historical perspective**

This chapter has described two major processes in Tanzania's development history: firstly, the development of associational life within the parameters set by the state; and secondly, the construction of Tanzanian identities through changing discourses of development. I have shown how associational life evolved during the struggle for independence, particularly through the trade union and cooperative societies. The socio-political space for associational life became increasingly controlled by the state during the period of *ujamaa* and beyond, as the state's financial crisis deepened towards the end of the 1970s. While the state entreated Tanzanians to 'participate' in the effort to build the nation, this was to be effected only through state channels. Furthermore, the Tanzanian imagination has been bombarded (particularly throughout the *ujamaa* period) with ideas about modernity, progress and development, which have been embedded in particular visions of Tanzanian identity and gender relations. During the *ujamaa* phase, Tanzanians were exhorted to 'build the nation' on cooperation, egalitarianism and hard work. Women's particular role in this, underlined by policies of the UWT, focused on traditional interpretations of their productive, reproductive and community roles. In particular, women found themselves performing much of the extra labour required on communal farms, without gaining access to either the means or the rewards of their increased production. A comment by Roger Lewin cited in Bujra (1990:55) is instructive:

“While the men debate enthusiastically women fall asleep during *ujamaa* meetings. They have worked so hard in the course of the day to make *ujamaa* living a reality that they are too exhausted to stay awake”.

In the present liberalised development model, women's roles have not changed to any great extent, as they are still primarily viewed as mothers, and as domestic and community workers. The major change in government rhetoric is the filtering down of the language of 'empowerment' from international discourses about women and development. However, it is still woven into a policy for women which draws on traditional conceptions of 'women's work', and the need to 'integrate women into development'. At the local level, these national discourses translate into local understandings about women's work, and what it means to be a good, modern and progressive Tanzanian woman and man. This process will be explored in greater depth at the local level in Chapter Seven.

The Tanzanian development model has undergone huge changes over the last three decades, moving from state-led authoritarian measures towards economic and political liberalisation. As Havnevik points out:

"The post-colonial model promoted by Nyerere and the nationalist movement could not overcome the challenge posed by domestic crises and pressures as well as a hostile external environment. The developmentalism of the nationalist movement became discredited because of overt state regulation and control of a basically inefficient and undynamic character. The trade-off between developmentalism and the absence of democracy had not worked. In the end the people were left with neither development nor democracy. In turn this initiated a process, albeit gradual, in which people started to organise by themselves" (Havnevik 1993 p61-62).

It is to this process of social organisation (ostensibly) outside of the state to which we will now turn.

# CHAPTER FOUR

## **“The Government has fears and hopes about NGOs”<sup>64</sup>: NGOs in a liberalised Tanzania**

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### **Introduction**

Chapter Three outlined the development of Tanzanian associational life vis-à-vis the state, illustrating the manner in which it has been, by turns, both active and constrained. For a variety of reasons which are explored below, associational life has experienced exponential growth since the mid-1980s and is beginning to take on an unprecedented role in the development process in Tanzania. This chapter follows on directly from the analysis developed in Chapter Three, focusing specifically on the non-governmental sector rather than a loosely defined associational life, and looks at the form and role of the non-governmental sector in Tanzania as it has developed during the period of liberalisation. Using a variety of sources the analysis charts the growth and the emerging heterogeneity of the sector before moving on to consider the major characteristics of international, national and local NGOs respectively. A number of problematic issues are highlighted, including the influence of donors, the overall weak capacity of the NGO sector in Tanzania, and the notion that the growth of a largely unaccountable and elite-centred non-governmental sector indicates a wider ‘privatisation of development’ (Kiondo 1995). There then follows a discussion of NGO-state relations and intra-NGO relations as played out around the NGO Bill which is currently in preparation. It is illustrated that the non-governmental sector in Tanzania has emerged within an unstable economic and political environment which is placing a certain amount of stress on what is a relatively young and unequal NGO sector. This raises questions about the ability of the NGO sector to fulfil many of the developmental claims made by and for it in Tanzania.

### **National level research**

During the research period (June 1996-June 1997) I was affiliated as a Research Associate to the Department of Geography at the University of Dar es Salaam. Staff

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<sup>64</sup> Government NGO Division Coordinator (interview).

in the department were instrumental in the initial weeks of the research period, in discussing the research proposal and suggesting possible avenues of research.

One of the inherent problems with the Tanzanian NGO sector is the lack of comprehensive information about it. Research in Dar es Salaam<sup>65</sup> attempted to do three things; firstly, to collect documents on NGO activities throughout the country which might be held either by the Government, donors or TANGO<sup>66</sup>; secondly, to interview a range of NGOs about their work in Tanzania, their relations with the state, and with each other; and thirdly, to gain an understanding of the government's policy on NGOs. To this end, a range of embassies, and international and national NGOs were visited in order to find out about their work in Tanzania (a list of those interviewed can be found in Appendix One). The NGO Division at the Vice-President's Office also became an important source of information. This Division holds the most comprehensive list of NGOs operating within Tanzania (*The Directory of Non-Governmental Organisations in Tanzania by 31 December 1994*, (URT 1995) hereafter the '*Directory*'). However, this list is not geographically comprehensive. Obtaining an overall picture of the work of NGOs throughout Tanzania is therefore extremely difficult, and has been based in this thesis upon interviews carried out in Dar es Salaam, Arusha and Kilimanjaro (see Appendix One), discussions with the NGO Division, several consultancies on NGOs in Tanzania<sup>67</sup>, and the work of the Tanzanian political scientist, Andrew Kiondo, on the Tanzanian NGO sector (1993, 1994, 1995).

Moreover, gaining an insight into the NGO sector in Tanzania is complicated by the ambiguity surrounding the legal interpretation of the term 'NGO'. In general terms, 'NGO' as used by the Tanzanian Government refers to a wide range of organisations such as those encompassed within the definition of 'non-governmental sector' offered in Chapter One. Certainly, the Government's NGO '*Directory*' includes (incomplete) information on a wide range of organisations broadly understood within

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<sup>65</sup> The entire fieldwork period lasted from June 1996 to June 1997. June, July, September and two weeks in June 1997 were spent in Dar es Salaam. The fieldwork period on Kilimanjaro is discussed in Chapter Five.

<sup>66</sup> Tanzania Association of Non-Governmental Organisations, see below.



the context of this thesis to form part of the 'non-governmental sector', such as religious organisations, international NGOs, women's organisations, and region, district or village-based social welfare groups. However, during 1996/97 the legal definition of an NGO was about to change as part of the government's NGO Bill<sup>68</sup>, a process which at the time of writing is still on-going (and which is returned to in more detail later).

Interviews with individual NGOs in Dar es Salaam, Arusha and Kilimanjaro<sup>69</sup> focused on the work of that agency, where it worked in Tanzania, and relations with the state, donors and other NGOs. Due to the initiation of the government's NGO policy during the period of fieldwork, NGO-state relations very much to the forefront of many NGOs' agenda. Interviews therefore also concentrated on the policy process, particularly with those NGOs who were involved in various committees set up to inform the process. This was also the major item for discussion with the NGO Division at the Vice-President's Office.

## The Tanzanian NGO sector after liberalisation

"This Directory of Non-Governmental Organisations registered and operating in Tanzania, is the second to be published by the Prime Minister's Office. When the first Directory was published in 1993, a little over 200 NGOs were registered. This second publication shows that there were 813 NGOs registered in the country by the end of 1994. The increasing number of registered Non-governmental organisations manifests the growing role, and importance, NGOs are assuming in the social economic development (sic) of our country" (URT 1995:xxxiii).

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<sup>67</sup> van Cranenburgh and Sasse (1995), Hayata (1995), Vlakveld (1995).

<sup>68</sup> According to a draft National NGO Policy which was ratified at an NGO conference convened by the government's NGO Division in February 1998, an NGO is defined by the Tanzanian Government as:

"...a private voluntary grouping of individuals or associations which is autonomous, non-partisan and not for profit making organisation which is organised locally, nationally or internationally for the purpose of enhancing the economic and social equity of target groups as mutually agreed by all stakeholders" (NGO Division 1998:25-26).

Whether this definition will become law remains to be seen.

<sup>69</sup> The selection of NGOs which were interviewed was heavily based upon the information available in the 'Directory'. Those NGOs with a broad interest in socio-economic development were targeted and attempts to interview as many as possible in the given time frames were made. It is not suggested that the small sample interviewed is representative of the entire Tanzanian NGO sector; however, several recurrent themes emerged from these interviews which are discussed in this chapter.

Since the mid-1980s the Tanzanian non-governmental sector has flourished. The precise extent of this growth remains largely unknown as indicated by the sheer range of recent estimations, which place the number of NGOs at between 813 (URT 1995) and 1,000 (AMAP 1997). This uncertainty has arisen predominantly due to the equivocal nature of NGO registration throughout the country, which is related to the ambiguous legal process surrounding NGOs in Tanzania, a point of discussion below. The most comprehensive list available of NGOs in Tanzania is contained within the Government's *'Directory'* (URT 1995), which lists those organisations registered with the Registrar of Societies in the Ministry of Home Affairs<sup>70</sup>. However it is most likely that this document grossly underreports the extent of non-governmental activity. There is a wide variety of organisations throughout the country which have neither registered at the national level nor joined one of the NGO umbrella organisations. For example, in Hai District, Kilimanjaro Region, at least 96 organisations which fall under the non-governmental sector banner<sup>71</sup> were recorded as being active, and only two of these were registered at national level. One of these, World Vision Tanzania, is an international NGO, and the other, Primary Health Care Ambassador's Foundation (PAFO), is a village-based NGO organised by a member of the local elite with access to national and international patronage networks. It would thus seem that only those NGOs with high profiles, and who form part of a regional, national, or international elite network, tend to register with the Ministry of Home Affairs in Dar es Salaam (indeed, they may be the only ones who *know* about registration at national level).

Given the irregularity of NGOs' registration, it is difficult to generalise about the entire Tanzanian NGO sector. For example, it is unclear as to whether the regional distribution of NGOs (table 4.1) is an accurate geographical portrayal of NGO activity. Despite the likelihood of underreporting, it is quite clear that the three regions which seem to have the most NGOs (Dar es Salaam, Arusha and Kilimanjaro) are generally well-noted in Tanzania as having disproportionately more

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<sup>70</sup> NGOs in Tanzania currently register with one of four Ministries, although the Ministry of Home Affairs is the main one. However, this has caused a great deal of confusion and presents problems for NGOs' legal status. These issues are discussed in greater depth below.

non-governmental activity than other areas (van Cranenburgh and Sasse 1995, Hayata 1995). The fact that these are also three of the more prosperous areas of Tanzania raises questions about the received wisdom that NGOs work with the very poorest, an issue which is further addressed in Chapters Six and Seven.

*Table 4.1 Regional origin of NGOs registered with the Ministry of Home Affairs*

Region	Number of NGOs	% of NGOs
Dar es Salaam	433	59.1
Arusha	73	10.0
Kilimanjaro	43	6.0
Morogoro	23	3.1
Mara	16	2.2
Dodoma	15	2.1
Bukoba	13	1.8
Tanga	13	1.8
Mbeya	13	1.8
Iringa	12	1.6
Ruvuma	12	1.6
Mwanza	12	1.6
Rukwa	11	1.5
Kagera	9	1.2
Mtwara	8	1.1
Tabora	7	1.0
Pwani	4	0.5
Singida	4	0.5
Shinyanga	4	0.5
Zanzibar	4	0.5
Kigoma	3	0.4
Lindi	1	0.1

Source: URT (1995).

NB: This table shows only those NGOs included in the 'Directory' which have a stated address. Of 813 in the Directory, 80 had no address.


### **The growth of the Tanzanian NGO sector**

As outlined in Chapter Three, the growth of NGOs in the country has not been at all constant (Figure 4.1). In particular, very few NGOs registered during the period before 1986. The following period, between 1986 and 1990, also experienced a slow rate of NGO formation. It is not until the period after 1990 that a huge surge can be

<sup>71</sup> These include all types of non-state activity including church groups, women's organisations, and international NGOs, and are discussed in Chapters Five, Six and Seven.

detected in the registration of all types of NGOs. Of the 813 NGOs registered, 74.3 percent of them were registered after 1990 (this figure may even be higher as nearly 20 percent of the NGOs had their dates of registration missing in the 'Directory'). This recent growth of NGOs has also been noted by several academics and commentators on Tanzania (van Cranenburgh and Sasse 1995, Gibbon 1995, Kiondo 1993, Hayata 1995, Tripp 1996, Vlakveld 1995).

*Figure 4.1 Numbers of currently registered NGOs by period of registration*



Source: URT (1995)

The massive expansion of NGO activity in the 1990s can be explained by several factors. Possibly the most important of these have been the changes in the political and economic environments which have taken place as discussed in Chapter Three. However, the burgeoning of Tanzania's NGO sector is not a response to changing domestic policies alone (albeit shaped to some extent by international forces<sup>72</sup>). The international development rhetoric which places an emphasis on the increased role for NGOs in development has been accepted to varying extents within donor circles<sup>73</sup>

<sup>72</sup> In an interesting departure from studies which suggest that Tanzania has adopted wholesale liberalised economic and political policies because of international pressures, Tripp (1997) points instead to actions of resistance and objections by urban, and often poor, Tanzanians, which have often left the state with no option but to back down or to change particular policies.

<sup>73</sup> It is not suggested that all donors have given up working with governments in favour of NGOs; in fact, it is clear that in the late 1990s, donors (such as DfID) are pursuing a sector-wide approach to development rather than working through either the state or non-state channels alone (Cox and Healey 1998).


and has had an important impact on the growth of all types of NGOs, throughout many countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. In Tanzania, this has meant that more funds have become available for non-state channels. Also, certain IFIs and bilaterals have withheld official aid from the Tanzanian Government. For example, in 1993 the Canadian government decided to withdraw bilateral aid to the Tanzanian government (US\$ 25 million), and to channel all remaining aid through the NGO sector instead (van Cranenburgh and Sasse 1995).

Nevertheless, it is difficult to measure the exact amount of donor aid which has come into the country to support NGOs. It has been estimated that “about US\$33 million is channelled yearly to NGOs and CBOs [in Tanzania] by just eight of the bilateral donors” (Hayata 1995:51). Additional to this, the private donations made by organisations from around the world, international NGOs financial inputs to their southern branches and local NGOs, and other forms of funding outside of bilateral agreements, suggests that considerable external resources are available for NGOs into which the Tanzanian sector has only recently tapped.

### **The heterogeneity of the NGO sector**

The range and type of organisations covered by the term ‘NGO’ in Tanzania is immense. With the explosion in the sheer volume of the sector has come a proliferation of ‘types’: NGOs identifiable by their different operational scales, patronage networks, funding arrangements, activities and objectives, and target groups, among other considerations. According to the *‘Directory’*, the most common

*Figure 4.2 NGOs in Tanzania by sector, 1994*



Source: URT (1995)

types of organisation are economic services and religious NGOs, after which social service NGOs, professional and educational NGOs, environmental and women's NGOs are also numerous (figure 4.2). The smallest groups are health NGOs, youth NGOs, international NGOs and umbrella NGOs.

It is possible to identify three broad types of NGO in Tanzania; the international, the national, and the local NGO. This discussion makes use of a distinction according to organisational scale as in practice the different types of NGO operate quite independent of one another, and are characterised by differing concerns and modes of operation. There is very little information and experience shared between international and national NGOs, and even less between international and local NGOs. This relationship is characterised by a certain amount of animosity and suspicion, certainly on the part of national NGOs, towards international NGOs. The salient characteristics and issues associated with each NGO type are discussed below.

### **International NGOs**

According to the '*Directory*' there are 63 international NGOs in the country. These NGOs are often based in the North (mostly Europe, North America, Australia and Japan) and have opened a branch in Tanzania, financed by the Northern NGO, and run according to their organisational objectives. They are often staffed partly, particularly at managerial levels, by expatriates. International NGOs are expected to register with the Ministry of Home Affairs, although not all of them do. They tend to work more or less where they wish and implement projects according to their own mandate. Some NGOs collaborate with government (even if this is just to contact the relevant ministry or district authorities), but in practice it is down to the individual NGO whether they do this or not. There is currently no formal mechanism through which international NGOs can report to, or be held accountable to, the government, although with the implementation of the new NGO Bill this is likely to change, as discussed below.

The international NGO sector works in many regions throughout the country on various types of projects, detailed information on which was not available from most NGOs. Even so, a few patterns may be discerned. Firstly, it was clear that many NGOs had come to Tanzania to help with the refugee problems in the Kagera and Kigoma regions, and were now looking to stay on and start development activities in the country (e.g. Africare, CARE Tanzania, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)). Other NGOs had also been implementing their own projects for a while and had come to the

conclusion that they should start trying to 'build capacity' in local organisations instead of planning and implementing their own projects (e.g. CARE Tanzania, World Vision, CONCERN). This would entail the international NGO becoming more like a donor, contracting out projects to local NGOs, a role which the NGO Division at the Vice-President's Office is keen on promoting.

International NGO projects or programmes were most concerned with issues of sustainable development, women and children, participation, and working with the poorest and disadvantaged groups. However, projects are neither evenly distributed around the country, nor do they concentrate in the areas of greatest need. The refugee areas, the Lake Zone, Dar es Salaam, central regions such as Iringa, Dodoma and Morogoro, and northern regions such as Kilimanjaro and Arusha, were all areas which seemed to receive most international NGO attention (Hayata 1995). These do not correspond with the poorer parts of the country, such as the southern regions of Ruvuma, Lindi, and Mtwara, and the western regions of Rukwa and Tabora. It seems that one of the main reasons for working in more prosperous areas is that logistically, it makes things easier for the NGO. As van Cranenburgh and Sasse have observed:

"The Dutch CFAs [co-financing agency] have a tendency to work in Northern Tanzania which seems to result from a relatively higher accessibility and perhaps from higher developmental potential" (1995:48).

International NGOs do constitute an important presence in the country, however. Despite this, they have only recently sought to come together in order to share information and experiences, which has been precipitated largely by the government's NGO policy formulation process. These issues, and the international NGOs' relationship with government, will be explored below.

### **National NGOs**

National NGOs in Tanzania comprise those organisations whose roots and modes of operation lie entirely in Tanzania and with Tanzanians. They are not 'branches' of Northern NGOs set up in the country, but are autonomous organisations. They raise



funds either through membership fees and income-generating activities, or by obtaining grants from donors and international NGOs. They operate on a larger scale than local NGOs, and thus may be based in Dar es Salaam with projects in other regions, or simply work in the regions. The larger ones (such as Community Development Trust Fund) have a sizable waged staff and concentrate on providing services to beneficiaries, who do not have to become members. NGOs established to help members only are much more common at the local NGO scale. Other national NGOs are run by volunteers or paid staff on a part-time basis (usually because they have other jobs).

Most of the NGOs listed in the TANGO directory and the Government's *'Directory'* fall into the national, or local NGO categories (in table 4.2, all those NGOs which are not in the 'International NGO' category are either national or local NGOs, although the *'Directory'* does not categorise NGOs in this way). Common NGO types include; economic services, religious NGOs, social services and professional/educational.

It is interesting to note, however, that among the types of NGO which have grown the most since 1990, are youth NGOs and women's NGOs. Neither of these two categories could boast one NGO prior to 1986, indicating a sudden expansion in these groups. There are two issues associated with this; the first is that more women's groups are springing up as women form their own groups in order to increase their incomes in the face of economic hardships (as suggested by Tripp 1992, 1997). The majority of the women's NGOs listed are concerned with raising 'women's socio-economic development', and providing some form of childcare. Of the 56 women's NGOs registered in the *'Directory'*, 41 are based in Dar es Salaam, suggesting that urban women are more able to take this course of action (although of course, there are many more women's groups in rural areas which have not registered, as Chapter Five exemplifies).

This proliferation of women's NGOs could therefore represent a trend of women coming together to increase their incomes. Certainly, for the women's groups

discussed in Kilimanjaro in Chapter Seven, income-generation is an important aspect of these organisations' activities. It is also highly possible that these women's organisations have existed for some time but have only chosen to register recently. As the discussion on women's groups in Chapters Five and Seven will show, it is

**Table 4.2: Registration dates and sectoral activities of all NGOs registered with the Ministry of Home Affairs in Tanzania, 1994**

Type of Org.	<1986	% of sector	1986-1990	% of sector	>1990	% of sector	Un-known	% of sector	Total
Umbrella	1	33.3	1	33.3	1	33.3	-	-	3
Economic Services	5	2.5	7	3.6	163	82.7	22	11.2	197
Environmental	2	3.1	1	1.5	37	56.9	25	38.5	65
Health Services	-	-	-	-	24	54.6	20	45.4	44
Prof/Educ.	2	2.0	3	3.4	65	66.3	28	28.6	98
Social Services	10	9.5	3	2.8	81	76.4	12	11.3	106
Women's NGOs	-	-	3	5.4	46	82.1	7	12.5	56
Youth NGOs	-	-	1	3.8	23	88.5	2	7.7	26
Religious NGOs	6	3.9	3	1.9	127	81.9	19	12.3	155
Int. NGOs	2	3.2	3	4.8	37	58.7	21	33.3	63
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>3.1</b>	<b>604</b>	<b>74.3</b>	<b>156</b>	<b>19.2</b>	<b>813</b>

Source: van Cranenburgh and Sasse (1995), URT (1995). NGOs are disaggregated according to categories given in the directory.

quite clear that several women's groups in the villages in Kilimanjaro have existed in some shape or form since the UWT era.

However, I would suggest that it is also highly possible that the increase in women's and youth's NGOs is a response to current donor preferences. International donors, and even northern NGOs, are increasingly adding the 'gender factor' to their programmes in the light of recent discourses about gender, and women, in development. Similarly, youth projects are also gaining backing from many donors. This factor may be encouraging some women, particularly the more educated with access to knowledge about donor preferences, to start women's NGOs in the hope of obtaining funding. This correlates with the high percentage of women's groups in Dar es Salaam, as many women there are more likely to have access to such information.

There are other NGOs listed in the directory under other headings which specifically mention that women's and youth's 'development' are part of their objectives. A survey carried out by the European Union which looked at the activities of 37 Tanzanian NGOs found that:

"Most NGOs indicate a wide variety of objectives in several sectors, with a very small member base. It is clear that the more trendy your subjects are the more chance there is to be funded. Newly registered NGOs have noticed this and they become very flexible in their behaviour" (Vlakveld 1995:25).

*Umoja wa Maendeleo ya Bukwaya*<sup>74</sup>, an NGO based in Musoma, Mwanza Region, provides an example of this. It was registered in 1994 and states its objectives as:

1. Promoting socio and economic development [sic] of Bukwaya, especially, education, primary, secondary and technical, production in agriculture for food and cash, environmental protection, fishing, livestock, health, housing, nutrition, water supply, energy.
2. Promoting income generating activities for youth and women.
3. Fund raising" (URT 1995:54-55).

Given the recent date of registration, the wide range of activities and the addition of women and youth, this NGO suggests that it is a young organisation which has not yet developed a particular focus. Consequently, its mission statement reads like a 'shopping list' of community projects waiting for a donor.

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<sup>74</sup> Unity for the Development of Bukwaya.

In an environment in which (some) NGOs are familiar with donor rhetoric (often because they are run by elites with access to information about donor preferences), the possibility that NGOs list women's and youth's concerns among their activities simply in the hope of gaining access to funding is a very real one in Tanzania. This means that particular 'buzzwords' are merely added to mission statements without any real appreciation of what they might mean, or entail, in practice. For example, during an interview with a Tanzanian NGO in Dar es Salaam, it became quite clear that while the NGO was concerned about gender inequalities, it had not adequately thought through the implications of the the kind of the project they intended to carry out should they receive funding:

“...women in Songea, she wakes up very early in the morning, and she is the last one to go to bed...when she comes home and she starts preparing the meal for the day...women in the rural areas get a lot of problems, so we intend to establish a unit, so that these groups can obtain credit to allow them to establish small businesses, which will impact on improving their lives, for themselves, their children, and also the entire community” (ActionAid Tanzania 20.07.96).

This is typical of a large number of the women's NGO initiatives in Tanzania, whether those run by women for themselves or incorporated into other objectives by an NGO (which, usually, are run by men). Almost all groups concerned with women's activities want to boost their 'socio-economic development' by engaging in some kind of income-generation activity, which usually involves activities which are considered to be 'women's work' (such as tailoring, preparing food). While this is an arguably legitimate aim, the NGOs seem to be addressing women's development through a purely welfarist or efficiency Women In Development approach . In other words, they are more concerned with meeting women's practical gender needs rather than their strategic gender needs.' The general lack of advocacy, human rights and legal advice NGOs in Tanzania in general suggests that the NGO sector is more about answering people's immediate economic needs than it is about long-term change, or empowerment. There are a few exceptions to this rule, such as the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP) based in Dar es Salaam which is

involved in advocacy, women's rights, and AIDS campaigns. BAWATA<sup>75</sup>, the national women's umbrella organisation and possibly one of the best-known NGOs concerned with advocacy and lobbying in Tanzania, is also an exception (Mulligan 1998). However, the impact of so few organisations can only be minimal, particularly in rural areas, as discussion in Chapter Seven will reveal.

Other commentators have also suggested that some Tanzanian NGOs may be donor-driven because of the parallels between NGO mission statements and international donors' priorities (van Cranenburgh and Sasse 1995, Kiondo 1995, Hayata 1995, Vlakveld 1995). As well as women and youth, other current donor 'buzz-words', such as participation, sustainability, and 'capacity building', find their way into proposals and constitutions. NGOs dealing with AIDS, the environment and pastoralist issues are also popular among donors. As one informant remarked:

"We'll [donors and NGOs] all be fighting over each other to get at some Maasai and give them water" (KKKT Project Development Officer, Arusha).

The tendency to fit in with donor preferences among Tanzanian NGOs has been related to a further problematic issue; that of weak NGO capacity (van Cranenburgh and Sasse 1995, Vlakveld 1995). While NGOs in some other African countries (such as Kenya), and international NGOs, have many years of operational experience behind them, the Tanzanian NGOs which have sprung up over the past decade are far younger, and thus inherently 'weaker'. Also, the Tanzanian political environment during the initial decades after independence must also form part of an explanation for the 'weak capacity' of NGOs in the 1990s. The donor and international NGO community in Tanzania generally refer to Tanzanian NGOs as being 'weak', or having low institutional capacity. The fact that many are donor-led suggests that they have not had time to discover and develop their own particular comparative advantage. Rather, they try to do everything at once without having developed the specific skills, knowledge or managerial capacity to be either effective or sustainable.

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<sup>75</sup> *Baraza la Wanawake Tanzania*, Council of Tanzanian Women.

A further problem associated with a donor-driven and institutionally-weak NGO sector is that of fraudulent, or 'briefcase NGOs'. This popular term refers to NGOs which appear to be genuine (they often have constitutions, members' lists, an office address etc), but which in actual fact are set up with the sole purpose of obtaining funds for the organiser's personal use. The Tanzanian media have become close followers of the problem (e.g. *Guardian* 04.06.97). Kiondo (1993) refers to such a case in Tanzania in 1991, when a member of staff within the upper echelons of the NGO Mission to the Needy was accused of appropriating funds which were paid into foreign accounts and given to family members (and subsequently dubbed by the media 'Mission to the Greedy'). Certainly, there has been a proliferation of NGOs associated with elites, which Kiondo (1993, after Shivji 1991) terms Elite-Centred NGOs (ECENGOs):

“...they normally present themselves as geared to serving the interests of the most disadvantaged in society but in reality are simply new vehicles for accumulation” (Kiondo 1993:179).

While it may be inevitable that educated and well-connected individuals are better placed to start NGOs, the rise of elite-centred NGOs has been accompanied by a lack of transparency and accountability which has emerged as endemic within the Tanzanian NGO sector. Part of the problem here, which Kiondo alludes to above, is that many elites have found that since the liberalisation of the economic and political arenas, there have been fewer opportunities for the embezzlement of government funds. The increasing diversion of international donors' funds to the NGO sector away from the government, has meant that NGOs have become targets for elites who see them as an easy way to make money. The difficulty here is that the elites who engage in this kind of activity are often government employees (or former government employees). The setting up of NGOs among civil servants is not an unusual practice, and it breaks down the inherent non-government/government dichotomy usually taken for granted in discussions about NGOs, an issue which is raised at the local level in Chapter Six. Kiondo (1995) later developed the notion of the 'privatisation of development' in relation to elite-centred NGOs, which is returned to below.

The weak nature of the Tanzanian NGO sector, and the well-publicised problems with briefcase NGOs, has led many donors and international NGOs to become wary of working with them. Several donors do not fund NGOs directly anymore because of their weak capacity (for example, Dutch bilateral aid, USAID). A study for the ODA of donor activities in Tanzania found that bilateral donors preferred to fund NGOs from their home country. For example, the Dutch bilateral programme funds the Netherlands Organisation for International Development Cooperation (NOVIB), the Inter-Church Co-ordination Committee for Development Projects (ICCO), the Central Agency for the Co-financing of Development Programme (CEBEMO), and the Humanist Institute for Cooperation with Developing Countries (HIVOS), four of the predominant Dutch NGOs working in Tanzania (Hayata 1995). Embassies in Dar es Salaam usually have a budget for the funding of local projects, outside of bilateral agreements. These are often small, and it must be taken into consideration that the majority of NGOs, and certainly those outside of Dar es Salaam, are not aware of these opportunities.

Another aspect of Tanzanian NGO-donor relations is that of 'donor-dependency'. There is very little scope for NGOs to fund raise locally, and in most cases NGOs automatically look to donors for external funding. However, donors have become concerned that the projects they finance are not sustainable. They know that once their grant or project finishes, there are no resources available to ensure its upkeep. This is symptomatic of a deeper conflictual relationship which exists between donors and NGOs. On the one hand, donors complain that NGOs are dependent upon them and that their programmes are not sustainable. On the other, NGOs know that donors have a lot of money to allocate, and attempt to keep abreast of their preferences for allocating funding so that their own objectives fit with those of the donor. In light of the discussion in Chapter Two about the need for donors (or NGOs) to legitimise their existence, it could be argued that donors perpetuate Tanzanian NGOs' dependence on them through their continued funding activities. It is not suggested here that a way forward could be found if donors were to leave the country; but rather, it seems that donors in Tanzania are not always fully aware of the implications

of their presence in the country, and that they are too quick to criticise an NGO sector that really has not had sufficient time to develop on its own initiative before large-scale donors flooded the country with funding. It is very much the donor organisations in Tanzania who have 'power over' the Tanzanian NGOs. Moreover, the general reluctance of donors to fund Tanzanian NGOs now, (as opposed to ten years ago when little was known about the NGO sector and donors had not yet become disillusioned with Tanzanian NGOs' 'weak capacity'), is in direct contrast with the new agenda emerging, particularly among international NGOs and the Government of Tanzania. This agenda argues that the role of international institutions should be to boost the capacity of the Tanzanian NGO sector by working with and through them more, rather than carrying out their own projects themselves. The conflicting agendas of international NGOs and donors concerning their roles vis-à-vis Tanzanian NGOs raises questions about the motivating forces behind their involvement in the Tanzanian development scene. At present the situation seems to be that both international NGOs and donors are attempting to carve out a constituency and a role for themselves in Tanzania's development process.

Finally, no discussion of the Tanzanian NGO sector would be complete without considering the country's umbrella organisations, TANGO and TACOSODE<sup>76</sup>, both of which represent two rather different constituencies. TACOSODE is the older organisation, founded in 1965 with the purpose of facilitating information sharing among NGOs. The current management all have permanent employment in other jobs and work at TACOSODE time-permitting. TACOSODE also undertakes some of its own social development projects as well as being a forum for networking. With 54 members, it is considered to work with 'older' NGOs (i.e. those which have been registered for longer amounts of time) and is associated with NGOs working on socio-economic development. TANGO, on the other hand, is the better known and larger umbrella organisation. It was formed in 1988 with a membership of 23 NGOs, which by 1996 had grown to 235. TANGO's lists its objectives as acting as an umbrella for NGOs in Tanzania, developing a code of conduct for NGOs, while also

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<sup>76</sup> Tanzania Council for Social Development. A third umbrella organisation, the Association of Non-Governmental Organisations in Zanzibar (ANGOZA) is responsible for NGOs on the islands and is thus not covered in this discussion.



providing training and consultancy services to 'sustain activities of constituent NGOs'. It has published a directory of its members and also publishes a bi-monthly magazine (*Semezana*) in English and *Kiswahili*, which carries stories about NGOs in the news, articles about particular NGOs, international issues concerning NGOs and general TANGO business. Again, managerial staff of TANGO have other full-time jobs, for instance the chairman is the president of another NGO, the African Relief and Development Consultancy Association (AFREDA), which is involved (among other things) in consultancy to NGOs, research, and training.

As has already been pointed out, the members of TANGO are predominantly based in Dar es Salaam (at least 62 percent according to addresses listed by the TANGO membership list of 1996). The charge has been levelled at TANGO that it only represents a small constituency, and thus is not an effective umbrella at all (van Cranenburgh and Sasse 1995). International NGOs (e.g. Africare, CARE Tanzania), for example, find that although they join TANGO in the interests of networking, there are few benefits to be had from membership of the organisation. This is felt even more by NGOs not based in Dar es Salaam:

"We don't feel their presence, I've not felt any impact, they've not sent me any information, they've been very quiet .... I don't know much about them, but I was advised to register as a member and I thought it was a good idea so I did it but .... I really don't know much about TANGO" (PAFO Director, Wari Village, Hai District).

Action Aid Tanzania, a Tanzanian NGO based in Dar es Salaam, also expressed disappointment with TANGO:

"TANGO has left us alone....they were supposed to have these things actually, a reference room, have a center where NGOs and their members could come and do some research, or do some writing....it doesn't exist" (ActionAid Tanzania Director).

There also seems to be some confusion surrounding the relative roles of both TANGO and TACOSODE. While both consider themselves umbrella organisations for Tanzanian NGOs, NGOs themselves are often unsure about which one to join,

and whether joining one would aggravate the other. The role for each organisation is certainly unclear.

### Religious organisations in Tanzania

Religious organisations have been treated separately because they can be both national and international NGOs. Many of the international NGOs in the government's directory are actually religious organisations, such as the Mennonite Economic Development Associates Tanzania (from Canada), and Christian Outreach (from the UK). Thus, while Figure 4.2 showed that religious NGOs are the second largest group of NGOs in Tanzania, there are probably even more than these numbers suggest.

It is estimated that in 1990 Tanzania was made up of eight million Muslims, five million Roman Catholics, four million Protestants (Lutherans, Baptists, Moravians and Presbyterians) and six million more following a traditional African religion;

“None of the churches in Tanzania enjoys a near monopolistic position in religion as, for instance, the Catholic church in Latin America. Churches compete with Islam and among each other to gain their constituencies. Development efforts can strengthen their position in this competition” (van Cranenburgh and Sasse 1995:33).

Each church thus takes an active role in development activities in their respective areas. At the national level, each religious organisation has a council which oversees the work it does throughout the country, for example, Islamic activities are coordinated by BAKWATA<sup>77</sup>, and Lutheran activities are coordinated by the KKKT<sup>78</sup> head offices in Arusha. Development projects cover a wide range of activities, such as primary health care, hospitals and dispensaries, women's projects, water and sanitation, and school projects, among others. The density of church activity is not constant throughout Tanzania, and current patterns are directly attributable to missionary presence in both the late nineteenth and throughout the twentieth centuries. It has been suggested that in remote areas where government

<sup>77</sup> *Baraza Kuu la Waislam Tanzania*, Tanzania Muslim Council.

<sup>78</sup> *Kanisa Kiivangelisti Kilutheri Tanzania*, Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanzania.

support is very weak, the church has become the main institution (van Cranenburgh and Sasse 1995) and provider of services. Some measures have been taken in an attempt to coordinate church activities, such as the Council of Christian Social Services and the Christian Medical Board of Tanzania which were established in 1992 to oversee health projects. The government seems to be keen to encourage more religious organisations to take a greater role in service provision, a role which they are not necessarily happy to take because of the huge expenditures involved (van Cranenburgh and Sasse 1995). Nevertheless, religious organisations remain an important service provider in Tanzania (Sivalon 1995), and thus constitute a large proportion of the NGO sector.

### **Local NGOs**

Local NGOs are small organisations run by Tanzanians and based in one village, ward, or district. They are more often referred to as Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) in recognition of their smaller operational scales. It is very difficult to generalise at the national level about CBOs, firstly because they are effectively invisible in national level documents, and secondly because they are so numerous. These are probably the type of NGO in Tanzania about which the least is known, on an aggregate scale, due to poor or non-existent registration procedures at district levels. The most comprehensive research to date has been undertaken by Kiondo (1994, 1995), discussed below. However, Chapters Five, Six and Seven of this thesis deal with issues surrounding local NGOs in Tanzania in far greater detail.

### **The privatisation of development**

In one of the most recent and comprehensive studies of local level development institutions operating in Tanzania, Kiondo (1994, 1995) presents evidence from nine districts<sup>79</sup> which suggests that the rise of NGOs and CBOs and their respective donors and patrons has been one of the most important vehicles for development, and signifies a wider 'privatisation of development' at the local level in Tanzania. It is

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<sup>79</sup> Kiondo (1994, 1995) examines the non-governmental sector in nine Tanzanian districts (listed here with regions in parentheses): Ilala (Dar es Salaam), Hai (Kilimanjaro), Pemba South (Pemba South, Zanzibar), Tanga (Tanga), Songea (Ruvuma), Same (Kilimanjaro), Newala (Mtwara), Kondoa (Dodoma), Bukoba Rural (Kagera).

contended that, 'when the state withdraws' (1995:109) from service provision, the private sector (NGOs, CBOs, the Church, Islamic institutions, donors, patrons, and contributions from villagers) moves in to supplement state provision. However, while any heightened role for NGOs is normally assumed to expedite greater accountability to, and popular participation among, the poorest, Kiondo is cautious as to whether this emerging private sector (dominated as it is by NGOs in their various forms) can live up to such expectations. This is predominantly due to the importance of local or national elites, patronage networks and donors within this framework. The importance of these actors in local development and their mode of operation, which lacks any democratic mechanism through which accountability to the local population can be ensured, are the defining features of Kiondo's 'privatisation of development'.

Both Gibbon<sup>80</sup> and Kiondo bring attention to several problems associated with the privatisation of development as it is currently operating in Tanzania. According to Gibbon, approximately half of all CBOs in Kiondo's study were linked to some kind of external donor, patron, or NGO, who usually provided capital input. For Gibbon, this donor dependency, discussed in some detail above, raises questions about the sustainability of local development if it is to be heavily reliant upon external support. Moreover, questions of power and political gatekeeping are pertinent. The rise of patron-client relationships as an inherent part of new local level development, whereby CBOs become clients vis-à-vis local or national patrons, raises the possibility that development activities may serve to consolidate the power bases of the elite. This is linked to the issues of accountability and legitimacy, which Kiondo asserts are necessarily compromised by the lack of formal mechanisms which ensure patrons' accountability to their clients. The most prominent example of this is the growth in numbers of District Development Trusts (DDTs), a kind of hometown association, of which Kiondo estimates there were between 800 and 1000 in Tanzania in 1993 (1995:109). These DDTs are often set up by local or national elites to provide a service (most commonly education) in their home area. However,

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<sup>80</sup> Kiondo's work (1994, 1995) appears in edited collections by Peter Gibbon who provides editorial introductions upon which this discussion also draws.

Kiondo asserts that these trusts, run by a council of elites, business persons, and civil servants, which operate through levying local taxes, are usurping the local state:

“The current research suggests that the Development Trust/Trust Fund phenomenon in Tanzania is generally less about the supplementation of weak and ineffective local government by voluntary initiative (although this is going on) than it is about the privatisation of local government - or at least an increasing range of locally-devolved services which have hitherto been under state control. Together with user charges, in most cases taxes or cesses formerly reverting to state institutions are these bodies’ main income source. “Privatisation” is an apt description of the process since the trusts have no formal mechanisms such as elections based on universal suffrage for ensuring their accountability to those paying taxes or cesses....Accountability in the Development Trusts/Trust Funds....seems to be at best to local elites and in some cases to elites which are not really local at all” (Kiondo 1995:163).

Other problems associated with the privatisation of development include the extent to which the increasing redirection of resources away from the state into the private sector serves to undermine the state. As outlined above, Kiondo asserts that local contributions are collected like taxes by private DDTs rather than by local government. Civil servants and extension workers are ‘seconded’ to NGOs and DDTs, while the general lack of government funds for district development budgets stands in stark contrast to the resources which are apparently available from donors and NGOs. Furthermore, the sheer nature of the ‘voluntary sector’ is called into question by the apparent equation of ‘voluntarism’ with economic activity. Despite some NGOs’ involvement in social development activities, the overwhelming majority of CBOs are concerned with income-generation:

“The prioritisation of economic development by actors in the lower social strata presumably relates to the situation of acute economic need which the great majority has felt since at least the late 1970s. But....even the better-off sections of rural Tanzanian society often seem to see voluntary collective action and business activity as identical, and there are elite-oriented NGOs and CDAs<sup>81</sup> as well as elite attempts to ‘privatise’ more plebeian CDAs for their own economic advantage” (Kiondo 1995:165-166).

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<sup>81</sup> Community Development Activity, or CBOs.

Finally, an ‘ethnicisation of development’ is also alluded to, in reference to the growing religious undertones of local level development, particularly among CBOs. This is generally noted in association with the Christian/Muslim divide, and is in reference to the wider problems surrounding the political union between, and the ethnic composition of, the mainland and the islands, although such issues fall outside the scope of this discussion. However, both Gibbon and Kiondo argue that the privatisation of development may serve to intensify existing regional disparities, favouring those areas which had a strong missionary presence and which therefore benefited from schooling earlier than other parts of the country:

“The best-resourced communities (which generally means those which benefited most from missionary presence) are in the best position to promote their own development, win the presence of NNGOs<sup>82</sup> and bilateral donors, and so on” (Gibbon 1995:32).

Several of these issues are taken up in greater detail in discussing the non-governmental sector in Hai District in Chapter Six.

This section has provided an overview of the major characteristics of the NGO sector in Tanzania in the 1990s. The intention has been to raise important themes and issues which will be relevant in later analyses of the non-governmental sector in Hai District, rather than a comprehensive description of the entire NGO sector. Thus issues surrounding local NGOs, women’s NGOs, relations between NGOs and donors, the privatisation of development, and NGOs and the state, are developed throughout the rest of this study. It therefore remains here to consider the relationship between NGOs and the state at national level.

## **NGO - State relations**

The recent history of the Tanzanian state’s relationship with the non-state sector has already been discussed in detail in Chapter Three. In this section, it is the intention to consider briefly the state’s reaction to the growing importance of the non-governmental sector at the national level. There are also significant nuances of the

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<sup>82</sup> Northern NGOs.

NGO-state relationship to be uncovered at the local level, and these follow in Chapters Five, Six and Seven.

The issue of NGO-state relations was of particular importance during the fieldwork period due to the government's on-going NGO policy formulation process. This policy, prompted by an NGO and World Bank workshop (NGO Division, undated (c)) is expected to fill the legal void which currently exists in relation to NGOs in their current (heterogeneous) forms, as well as laying down guidelines, a code of practice for NGOs, the establishment of various coordinating and NGO-government liaison bodies, and the clarification of the division of labour between the government and NGOs. In 1992 an NGO desk was set up in the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) to facilitate the policy process. This desk has since become the NGO Division under the Vice-President's Office (rather than the PMO), which signifies the importance of the policy to the government.

### **The NGO policy process: controlling the agenda**

The rapid growth of the NGO sector in Tanzania in recent years, the inadequacy of existing legislation, and the growing need for dialogue between state and NGOs has impressed upon the government the need for an NGO Bill which is specifically tailored towards the modern NGO sector:

“The NGO sector in Tanzania has developed rapidly and is increasingly recognised important (sic) by the Government” (NGO Division, undated (a)).

“The government has realised that NGOs are now playing an important role, both international and national institutions, therefore a unit needed to be set up to create an enabling environment for the NGO sector” (Government NGO Division Co-ordinator).

However, the policy process has highlighted several other, underlying, aspects of the relationship between the state and the non-governmental sector than simply the inadequacy of the existing legal framework. For NGOs, it has raised issues of NGO cooperation and networking, and NGO relations between international and local organisations. For the government, on the other hand, the policy process has sharply brought into view the amorphous nature of the NGO sector in Tanzania, and has

thrown up issues and problems relating to the effective management and co-operation of and between NGOs, and between NGOs and the state.

Despite the absence of any law which pertains to NGO registration *per se*, there are four acts through which NGOs can register under the current legal apparatus. These are; the Societies Ordinance Cap. 337 of 1954; the National Sports Council of Tanzania Act No.12 of 1967 (as amended by the National Sports Council of Tanzania (Amendment) Act No.6 1971); the Trustees Incorporation Ordinance Cap. 375; and the Companies Ordinance Cap 212. There are, then, four registrars for NGOs, under the Ministries of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Ministry of Justice and Legal Affairs, and the Ministry of Industries respectively (NGO Division, undated (b)). This causes problems for the coordination of the whole NGO sector, while also allowing NGOs to be registered according to differing laws and regulations. Thus the major thrust behind the new NGO policy is the need for coherent legislation designed specifically for NGOs, both in the interests of the government and NGOs, and also for coordination and information purposes.

The policy process is also a chance for the government to lay down a formal set of guidelines, which govern NGO practice and modes of operation, and cooperation with government:

“The NGOs policy is geared to delineate the roles various actors play in the promotion of development....Pronouncement of an NGOs policy will enable the country to realise the maximum utility of the work of NGOs....The thrust of the policy is to provide a conducive environment for NGOs to collaborate with government, donors and the community to bring about development” (PMO, 1995).

However, factions within the government have made clear attempts to control the policy process. This is most obvious in the fact that initially, the policy was to be formulated by the NGO Division only, with no input from the NGO sector. However, various NGOs became involved in an *ad hoc* and random manner as they found out about the policy process and demanded to be able to contribute (e.g. Africare, CONCERN and CARE Tanzania). At an UNDP/ILO-funded workshop on the policy (Dar es Salaam November 1996), a Steering Committee was established,



comprising members of the government, the NGO Division, and also international and national NGOs, so that the NGO community would be able to have some input. It was decided that in order to produce the NGO Bill in a participatory manner, a series of workshops would be held all over the country to discuss a draft policy outline, and invite local NGO input (ILO 1996). The government therefore lost its monopoly over the process as a result of pressure exerted by several NGOs (and donors who were funding the policy process) who demanded to be involved<sup>83</sup>.

However, the actual policy formulation process has been beset with problems relating to donors (to fund the process, e.g. workshops), the conflicting agendas of various parties, and a generally slow and confused pace of progress. For example, UNDP financed the first workshop through the ILO in November 1996. Thereafter further funds to enable the Steering Committee to carry out the tasks defined at the workshop, and particularly for the workshops which were to be held in various regional locations, were not forthcoming, and the policy process had ground to a halt by the end of the fieldwork period (June 1997). Moreover, several of the international NGOs were concerned about the overriding interests of various individuals and institutions involved with the policy. One of the reasons that funding for the process dried up was that other actors had begun to formulate policies outside of the government-organised process, and were advising donors that their funds would be unnecessarily spent on the government process. At least two other bills external to the government's Steering Committee have been drafted, one by the Tanganyika Law Society (a Tanzanian professional NGO who were funded by the United States Information Service (USIS) to write the Bill) and one by the Ministry of Justice. Another institution, AMAP<sup>84</sup>, has gathered together a group of mostly Tanzanian NGOs to discuss cooperation and the formation of an NGOs apex body, again, separate from the government process. The picture which emerges is one of a

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<sup>83</sup> This mirrors the experience of the NGO Bill formulation processes in both Ghana (Gary 1996) and Kenya (Ndegwa 1996), as outlined in Chapter One.

<sup>84</sup> The Aid Management and Accountability Programme (AMAP) is a programme within the Ministry of Finance (although it claims not to be a government department) which is aimed at "improving donor resource mobilisation, allocation, utilisation and accountability", and sees itself in the role of facilitator/donor in the establishment of an NGO apex body in Tanzania (AMAP 1997).

confused process, in which various actors and groups of NGOs, are attempting to exert their influence over the policy:

“With the policy process, NGOs want a discussion with all parties and types of NGOs, and the government doesn’t. It couldn’t care less whether the bill is produced in a participatory way or not. The fear is that soon the government will say to [NGO Division Director] what’s going on? where’s the bill? and then push something through Parliament and that will be it. The USIS and the ILO who started these various other processes and have not seen them through have not helped this at all....And why the ILO? Of all the UN bodies that could have funded this process, why give it to the ILO who knows nothing about NGOs? They funded a two-day seminar and gave everyone nice briefcases, then pulled out” (CARE Tanzania Country Representative).

### **Government attempts to control NGOs**

Despite these attempts by various organisations and individuals to influence the policy process, the government is clear about the policy and who will eventually produce the Bill:

“We [the government] don’t have to cooperate with anyone. The World Bank have planted somebody to write an NGO policy. But they will have to submit it to the government, and we won’t take nuisances. *The government has got the upper hand*” (Government NGO Division Co-ordinator, emphasis added).

This attitude contrasts starkly with the official policy process, the emphasis of which has been placed on a participatory process which plans to draw on the experience and opinions of many types of NGO from around the country. Similarly, a perusal of background and draft papers from the government’s NGO Division (NGO Division undated (a), (b), (c), PMO 1996, ILO 1996) reveals a paradox in the government’s approach to NGOs. On the one hand, the government acknowledges that the main role of an NGO policy is to provide an enabling environment in which NGOs can operate. However, discourses surrounding the policy are imbued with the language of control, and of the encouragement of NGOs in their economic roles as service providers:

“What is needed is a partnership [between NGOs and government] - NGOs have got to be *harnessed and brought to fruition*” (Government NGO Division Co-ordinator, emphasis added).

“The main goal of NGOs policy [sic] is to promote development by use of NGOs via collaborative institutions like the government and donors in a coordinated way for the benefit of the public. This is in recognition of the following:

- Limitation of the public sector in providing all the resources required for social and economic development;
- NGOs are community based and are present at the ground level, thus, they have a potential role to play in service delivery and mobilisation of resources for development;
- The changing policies of the Government towards reducing its role and size;
- Changed attitudes on development policies which put more focus on direct access to target groups or beneficiaries;
- The present attitude of donors to channel assistance through NGOs” (PMO, 1995:2-3).

In this way, the government regards the NGO sector as a potential economic resource which needs to be brought under state control:

“...given the fact that NGOs have been mushrooming the government had to devise some system or guidelines on *tapping the resources diverted from the government to NGOs* and introducing some mechanism for *checking that these resources are being used properly*” (Government NGO Division Co-ordinator, emphasis added).

The government’s draft policy proposes to set up mechanisms for accessing information about how much money NGOs get, and how they use it. It also attempts to influence prospective NGO projects by awarding tax exemptions to those NGOs whose programmes fit directly into national development plans (NGO Division, undated (b)). A high degree of government-NGO collaboration is outlined in the policy, especially at local government level, through such measures as the attachment of local government staff to NGOs, the supplementation of NGO projects by local government, and the sharing of costs (NGO Division, undated (b)). The draft policy would also require NGOs to “submit annual plans indicating their activities, requirements, expectations, sources of income and materials to facilitate exemptions” (NGO Division, undated (b):25). Despite the heavy government-NGO collaboration which the draft policy proposes, it is claimed that the government “will continue to

respect the independence of NGOs and will create an enabling environment to enable the country to profit from their unhindered presence” (NGO Division, undated (b):21). The independence of NGOs would surely be at risk under such close scrutiny from, and collaboration with, government. Should such a policy become law, NGOs could very well become an appendage of the state.

### **NGOs as social service providers**

As has been outlined above, the government sees the advantages of NGOs as economic, rather than political:

“By their operations, NGOs supplement government efforts in the delivery of services to the public. It is therefore the role of the government to ensure their orderly and smooth operation” (PMO 1995:1).

Very little mention of NGOs’ potential for change, empowerment or the strengthening of communities is made. In one instance it is quite clear that NGOs must not be linked in any way to a political party (NGO Division, undated (b)). The case of BAWATA (the national women’s umbrella NGO, reputed to be the largest NGO in the country with 150,000 members (*Daily News* 1998)) is instructive here. Originally formed at the behest of the UWT, it went on to undertake a comprehensive advocacy and electoral education campaign during the run-up to the 1995 elections. Accused of partisan behaviour (inciting women to vote for the main opposition party), the government threatened BAWATA with deregistration. In March 1998 BAWATA won a temporary injunction which allows it to carry on operations until the court case is heard (*Daily News* 1998, *Guardian* 1998, Mulligan 1998). This case reveals the heavy hand with which NGOs may be dealt should they be perceived as being involved in political activities (and certainly those in opposition to the CCM).

Government literature on NGOs recognises the ability of NGOs to ‘mobilise the grassroots’, but this is couched in purely economic terms which focus on the economic gains from encouraging community participation, rather than stressing personal, or community, empowerment. Within the context of liberalisation and structural adjustment the state is interested in encouraging private actors (e.g. NGOs,

individuals) to take on a far greater a role in socio-economic development. The strengthening of ‘civil society’ is discussed with regard to the need to “promote community participation in socio-economic activities and as checks and balances instruments for protecting group interests as well as protecting against poor standards of goods and services in the market” (NGO Division, undated (b):5). In fact, several references are made to the ‘tangibility’ and ‘discernibility’ of NGOs’ impact in communities, suggesting that results are to be measured in physical terms (such as schools, dispensaries) rather than through more intangible effects such as heightened political awareness, or the ability to articulate opinions and needs at the village (or higher) level. Indeed, one of the roles of the NGO Division is stated as:

“To ensure that NGO programmes and projects focus in social services so that they realistically reach the intended beneficiaries” (NGO Division, undated (a):3).

This not only reinforces the government’s policy of steering NGOs towards social service provision, but it also reflects the government’s reasoning that in order to reach communities effectively, development efforts must focus on social services, with the implication that other NGO objectives such as empowerment, are neither valued nor desired by the state. However, the government’s plans for the NGO Bill do at least engage with the problem of weak capacity among Tanzanian NGOs, in stressing the need for NGO networking, capacity building and training. Nevertheless, while institutional development is an important issue, the implications of this must be considered: surely institutional development is an NGOs’ prerogative, and not that of the government? These issues may well come to the fore, should these aspects of the government’s draft policy survive into the final Bill.

### **A fragmented community**

The government policy also provides for several NGO-government coordinating bodies. Between several documents (NGO Division undated (a), (b), (c), PMO 1995 and ILO 1996), the following are all offered:

- a National Coordinating Committee;

- an NGO-Government of Tanzania Liaison Committee;
- a National NGOs Forum;
- an NGO Coordination Board;
- AMAP (1997) have also put forward their plans for an NGOs Apex Body.

Several of these initiatives would fulfil the same role, and essentially, the government is proposing two bodies; an NGO-Government committee and a national NGO committee. These are suggested in the interests of information sharing, and NGO-government coordination to avoid duplication, which the government recognises as a problem.

The heterogeneous NGO sector in Tanzania is certainly haphazard and uncoordinated in respect of networking and information sharing. A national NGOs committee is most certainly needed. At present, intra-NGO relations have remained *ad hoc*, strongly linked to personal social relationships, and tend to suggest a preference for linking with other NGOs of similar 'type'. In other words, national NGOs tend to keep in contact with other national NGOs, either based in the same locations, or on the basis of personal relationships. International NGOs in Dar es Salaam, and Arusha respectively, for example, tend to know each other's work, and staff mix socially. On a smaller scale, it is common for NGOs from one country to be in particularly close contact, such as American NGOs. The umbrella organisations do little to mitigate this, as each is associated with its own 'group' of NGOs:

“See, officially, there's no mechanism [for inter-NGO discussion, information sharing]. This IIG<sup>85</sup> is comprised of international NGOs, so we're here [draws circle on his paper]; TACOSODE is comprised of older, established NGOs who work primarily in social development, they're here [draws another circle on paper, far from first one]; and then TANGO is comprised of newer NGOs involved in women's issues, environment, and income-generating activities, they're here [draws another circle, far from other two]; and then in Zanzibar you have ANGOZA....and so you don't right now have a mechanism, unless it's informal” (Africare Country Representative).

This problem is highlighted by the lack of information exchanged between national and international NGOs. The relationship between the two types of NGO is

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<sup>85</sup> International NGO Interest Group, which is explained below.

characterised by suspicion and antipathy on the national NGOs' part, who regard international NGOs as competition for funding. This is paralleled within government circles, where, as discussed above, there is a feeling that national NGOs need to take a greater role within the country's development:

“The government wants more local NGOs to have a bigger role, for example with the refugees in Kigoma, local NGOs were forced out by international NGOs because they don't have the capacity to deal with such problems and then the government asked the international NGOs why there were no local NGOs there” (World Vision Tanzania Country Director).

This 'factionalism' amongst NGOs has become more pronounced by the policy process, which has brought the NGO sector together for the first time over a single issue. One of the biggest problems here has been the over-representation of Dar es Salaam based NGOs in policy debates. The UNDP/ILO workshop held in November 1996 included 65 participants, who broke down into the following groups:

- 37 Tanzanian NGOs based in Dar es Salaam or Zanzibar;
- 10 Government representatives;
- 8 international NGO representatives;
- 8 international agencies;
- 2 NGOs based outside of Dar es Salaam.

Similarly, the AMAP meeting (June 1997) which discussed the possibility of establishing an NGOs forum independent of the government's efforts, invited 24 participants, only 4 of whom were not based in Dar es Salaam. In this case, all of the other 20 were high-profile national NGOs: there were no international NGOs present, TANGO was not present, and TACOSODE refused an invitation because the AMAP initiative was not part of the recognised policy process being led by government (AMAP 1997).

The international NGOs have formed a group, known as the International NGOs' Interest Group (IIG), which grew out of informal social discussions about the international NGO sector between a few individuals. The *raison d'être* of the IIG is

to pool international NGO experience and present a unified position on particular issues, for example, to the Steering Committee of the NGO policy process.

Therefore, aside from the national/international divide between NGOs, there are also other groups staking their claim to be involved in the policy process; such as (some) NGOs based in Dar es Salaam, NGOs affiliated to TANGO and TACOSODE, and NGOs working with the AMAP initiative.

### **Summary: ‘the government has fears and hopes about NGOs’**

This Chapter has looked at the nature of the evolving NGO sector in Tanzania and has highlighted some of the problematic issues associated with this process. While much of the literature would assume that a larger NGO sector taking on a greater role in development is manifestly beneficial, the analysis in this chapter has suggested that the Tanzanian NGO sector is experiencing a certain amount of difficulty in fulfilling such claims. Part of the problem stems from the very recent institutional foundations of the majority of non-governmental actors, which has been compounded by the increasing interest in official donors in funding NGOs rather than government departments. The availability of funding has encouraged NGOs to attempt to run before they can walk.

The chapter has also considered the progress made by the government’s NGO policy process<sup>86</sup>, and the relationships between NGOs and the state which have been illuminated through this process. Groups of NGOs are well aware that they could potentially lose out if the final policy is not favourable towards them. For example, international NGOs are keen to see their interests represented fairly, while moving towards the new role which is emerging for them in Tanzania:

“International NGOs have a big stake in the policy process - we could be edged out....The role of the international NGOs is now to build capacity among local organisations and there should be a policy environment to

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<sup>86</sup> At the time of writing it is unclear how far the policy process has progressed since the period of fieldwork, and thus to what extent the government has been able to retain any form of ‘control’ over the NGO Bill and therefore the NGO sector.



promote this, or other interests can take over” (CARE Tanzania Country Representative).

Also, national NGOs want to promote their organisations above international programmes so that they may strengthen their organisations and take a larger role in national development<sup>87</sup>. Thus the NGO policy will be significant for the future of NGO operations within the country.

The NGO policy is central to the government’s plans for NGOs and the role which it sees for them in Tanzania. This is partly borne out of frustration on the government’s part, as it attempts to reign in the NGO sector which is mushrooming at a fast pace, and which is subject to very little regulation and coordination. Registration of new NGOs was suspended in 1996, pending the inauguration of the NGO Bill (*Guardian* 1996), but there is also a suspicion on the part of the NGOs that the government is ultimately driven by a desire to control the NGO sector;

“The whole point of the government’s initial policy was to really sort of control and monitor NGO activity” (Africare Country Representative).

“There is a fear of where a freer civil society may go, especially after multipartyism. There are elements within the government that would want to control local NGOs. International NGOs have had freedom throughout the 80s and 90s but over the next few years there may be more control over them....they are definitely tightening up immigration for expats” (CONCERN Country Representative).

The government has accepted the NGO, IFI and donor rhetoric which sees a new role for governments now in providing an enabling environment in which private initiatives can operate freely. However, the government is also acutely aware that the Tanzanian NGO sector does not necessarily embody the virtues extolled of it (e.g. briefcase NGOs, the weak capacity of NGOs). The government plans therefore suggest tighter government control, and also point to the need for training and information sharing, in order that NGOs might become more effective economic agents. Notwithstanding this, government perceptions of NGOs are infused with the

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<sup>87</sup> Some national NGOs are also keen to access more funding, which they believe would be easier if international NGOs played a smaller developmental role in the country.

belief that they are potentially dangerous, as this quote which formed the very last comment at the UNDP/ILO NGO workshop in November 1996 reveals:

“There are so many good intentions in the operations of NGOs but it is a key of life that unguided good intentions can easily be contaminated by the satanic bad intentions” (ILO, 1996:50).

The last words in this chapter shall go to the government’s NGO Division Director, who neatly sums up the issues at stake in the policy process for both NGOs and government:

“The government has fears and hopes about NGOs: one, NGOs haven’t been transparent, they haven’t been submitting annual reports; two, the government suspects that NGOs are not working according to their constitutions; three, briefcase NGOs; four, NGOs involved with assisting the masses are involved in politics, when they are supposed to be apolitical; five, government is a government. It is the government who is giving them the freedom to operate in Tanzania, registering them, giving them tax exemptions etc - NGOs should be more loyal to their government than to their donor. But we need NGOs as part of the government - so we need collaboration, transparency, and to talk to minimise fears and suspicions. NGOs are suspicious of the government as they think it has a hidden agenda: one, they are afraid of history repeating itself, for example the cooperative movement was successful but the government suddenly dismantled it; two, NGOs feel the government is very bureaucratic, not very pro-NGOs, not involved in government plans, and development plans etc. The question over the role of NGOs brings even more suspicion, especially in the demarcation of roles between NGOs and government - it is necessary for NGOs to supplement government efforts. *What is needed is a partnership - NGOs have got to be harnessed, and brought to fruition*” (Government NGO Division Co-ordinator).

# CHAPTER FIVE

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## ***“Tunapenda sana maendeleo<sup>88</sup>”*: Hai District, the Chagga and NGOs**

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### **Introduction**

Thus far, this thesis has examined the course of Tanzania’s development and the new role for NGOs at the national scale, based on research, sources and observations in Dar es Salaam. A central line of argument throughout the following chapters will be to demonstrate how national discourses of development and ideas about NGOs have filtered down to the local level. This chapter will introduce the local setting for the analysis which follows in Chapters Six and Seven. Fieldwork was carried out in Hai District, in the west of Kilimanjaro Region, northeast Tanzania (map 5.1). Although the District covers the western half of the mountain and extends southwards and westwards into the Maasai steppe, this analysis is focused on the Chagga who live on the mountain slopes<sup>89</sup>.


Before progressing to an analysis of the non-governmental sector in Hai, it is necessary to understand something of the social, economic, political and cultural geography of the area. Following a brief consideration of the organisation of the local state and the role of the Church, an ethnography of the Chagga lifestyle is outlined which focuses on the processes of social stratification and change which have taken place on the mountain during the twentieth century. The Chagga are a highly stratified group, and issues of social inequality surrounding coffee production and gender roles are addressed. The geography of the four villages in which research was conducted is then considered. The final part of the chapter is concerned with an overview of the range of non-governmental organisations currently operating in Hai

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<sup>88</sup> “We [Chagga] like development very much”, a comment I heard frequently while interviewing Chagga about development in their villages.

<sup>89</sup> Despite this focus on the Chagga, Chapter Six looks at the non-governmental sector’s contribution to service provision throughout the whole District, including non-Chagga and mixed (i.e. Chagga and Maasai) villages.

*Map 5.1: Location of Hai District and Kilimanjaro Region in Tanzania*



District. First, however, research politics and the research methodology are discussed.

### **Local level research**

One of the primary aims of this thesis is to examine the activities of a range of non-governmental actors at a local level: that is, to look at village-based groups, national NGOs, and international NGOs. In the UK, prior to my field research in Tanzania, the most detailed information on the NGO sector available was in the work of the Tanzanian political scientist Andrew Kiondo (1993, 1994, 1995). From his work it was clear that Kilimanjaro Region, and Hai District in particular had a wide range of non-governmental organisations active in development work. While it was assumed that this might be an appropriate place to carry out the research, the exact field site remained to be identified on arrival in Tanzania, where it was anticipated better information would be available with regard to NGO activities throughout the country. However, as discussed in Chapter Four, such information was not readily available in Dar es Salaam. Various consultations with staff in the Department of Geography at the University of Dar es Salaam, other fieldworkers and NGO staff in Dar es Salaam suggested to me that Kilimanjaro would be a suitable place in which to carry out the research. A short preliminary visit during August 1996 to Moshi (administrative headquarters of Kilimanjaro Region) and Arusha (administrative headquarters of Arusha Region) towns, during which several interviews and discussions were held with NGOs, KKKT officials, and government officials, confirmed this (see Appendix One for list of interviews held). A range of non-governmental organisations operate projects in Hai District including; World Vision Tanzania (WVT) which runs a community development project in the Sanya area of Hai District; a Tanzanian NGO (PAFO, see below) which runs a village-based primary health care project in Wari village; a wide range of village-based women's organisations involved mostly in income-generating activities; and, among other things, the Lutheran Church which plays a very important role in local development activities in the region. Hai District therefore seemed to be a suitable location in which to carry out the field research.

Research in Hai began in late September 1996 and carried through until the end of May 1997 (with a break from work in December). Briefly, the work proceeded as follows; a survey of all health and education services and NGO activities was undertaken from which four villages which encapsulated a range of these activities were chosen for further study. In each of these villages focus group discussions were held with male and female groups to explore issues surrounding social service provision, and the role of NGOs in providing these. Focus group discussions were also held with members of CBOs to discuss their activities. Interviews were also carried out with village leaders, staff in health and education establishments, and relevant local government officials in order to gain an understanding of their perspective on social services and the role of NGOs in providing these. One village, Wari, was then selected for closer study as there were several active non-governmental organisations within the village. The focus village research involved wealth ranking the households within the village and interviewing men and women from across the range of socio-economic groups in order to learn more about how socio-economic position affects access to social services and participation in non-governmental activities. Each of these stages is elaborated upon below. First, however, there follows a discussion on the positionality of the researcher during the research process and the issue of language and translation.

### **A note on positionality and research politics**

As outlined in Chapter One, the postmodern and cultural turns in the social sciences have ushered in a recognition of the need for a more reflexive approach to fieldwork among some geographers, particularly among feminist writers (Edwards 1994, England 1994, Howard 1997, Katz 1992, 1994, Keith 1992, Kobayashi 1994, Madge 1993, 1997, McDowell 1997, Robson 1997, Sidaway 1992, Smith 1996, Winchester 1996). Geography, among other social science disciplines, has suffered a “crisis of representation” (Sidaway 1992:404) which has questioned the manner in which ‘objective scientific knowledge’ about ‘Others’ and their lifeworlds is produced by an apparently omniscient, disembodied, and impartial observer. A more critically reflexive approach to research has been called for, which seeks to position the researcher within the research process and acknowledge the impact which this may



have on the data collection and any 'knowledge' which may result from this. For some, particularly feminist writers, this move has been closely related with an attempt to make the research process more empowering and politically activating for those involved (Katz 1994, Kobayashi 1994, McDowell 1997). Within the development literature, there is a similar argument for research which transcends the "safari research project" (Sidaway 1992:404) or "rural development tourism" (Chambers 1983:10), and which is able to engage with respondents so that it might have a positive effect on their lives (Cernea 1991, Chambers 1983, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c, Edwards 1994, Goss 1996). Moreover, it has been increasingly recognised that research carried out in Africa, Asia, Latin America or the Caribbean has to come to terms with the links between power, authority and knowledge embedded in such a research process, to which I alluded in the opening paragraphs of this thesis (Madge 1993, 1997, Patai 1991, Radcliffe 1994, Sidaway 1992).

These debates are significant in the context of this dissertation. In undertaking a qualitative study I am necessarily involved in attempting to understand a set of processes from the point of view of 'Others', who are themselves highly differentiated (for example; employees of the state or the local state; NGO staff and beneficiaries; village elites and poor peasants; men and women; Lutherans, Roman Catholics and Muslims). There are two important issues which I wish to highlight here: my position as the researcher vis-à-vis the researched, and the issue raised by undertaking foreign language research.

### ***'In the field'***

Being a young white woman who, in the local field context, is relatively rich has surely been a significant factor in collecting data in Tanzania, although as I suggested in Chapter One, I do not feel that the power relations embedded in this research process have always been entirely one-way. Nevertheless, as Madge observes, "Who we are (or who we are perceived to be) will inevitably influence the information we (are allowed to) collect" (1997:295). Certainly, who I was perceived to be (from the standpoint of different informants) greatly affected the dynamics of each interview situation. Thus, interviews carried out by myself, in English, with

government officials and (some) NGO staff (all of whom were usually male), were often occasions upon which I was made to feel the 'underling'. This was no doubt related to my gender and relatively young (and unmarried) status in a patriarchal society in which status is achieved with age and marriage. However, these markers of social inferiority were no doubt offset to some degree by my ethnicity, relative education (in some situations) and nationality. In this respect, my position vis-à-vis the researched was ambiguous, in that I did not fit easily into a particular local socio-economic identity. This was probably a factor which contributed to the fact that I often found interviews with female Tanzanian officials more difficult than those with men. My ambiguous status may have helped to gain access to certain people, but once there, I may not have been taken as seriously as (for example) a British or Tanzanian male researcher. This in itself may have some benefits, as England (1994) and Robson (1997) have noted; being an honorary man, or being perceived as a 'threat' (or not) can allow female researchers access to certain types of information. I have no way of knowing the extent to which these issues affected my data collection, although I suspect that they were a significant factor.

My experience of village-level fieldwork was more complex. During the fieldwork period in Kilimanjaro Region I lived (alone) in the pastor's house in the compound of the Lutheran Church in Nshara village, Machame North Ward, which was roughly three kilometres along the main road from Wari, the village which later became the focus village for the study. I did not undertake any research in Nshara. From October 1996 to May 1997 I worked with a female research assistant (RA) who lived in the neighbouring division. She was a Chagga in her late thirties, employed as a government agricultural extension officer, who knew the area in which we were working but was not directly connected to the majority of people with whom we came into contact (although we often unearthed several distant friends and relatives during the course of the research!).

Living in a mountain village was very important for the way in which local people perceived me and my project, and informants were often surprised<sup>90</sup>, but visibly

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<sup>90</sup> The majority of ex-patriates who live or work in this area tend to reside in Moshi or Arusha towns.

pleased, to learn where I was living. Living in Machame also offered some opportunities for participant observation, but these were limited by my language skills and my gender and status<sup>91</sup>. However, my language did improve (through necessity) while living in the village. Although my main research village was only three kilometres away (the other three villages were even further away) most informants had little to do with, or were barely aware of, my domestic arrangements (no doubt in contrast to my neighbours in Nshara). Although living on Lutheran Church property meant that I ran the risk of alienating myself from Muslim villagers, I did not experience any direct negative consequences of this. Options for living in a safe and respectable place<sup>92</sup> were quite limited in Machame, and moreover, the accommodation had been arranged by a local contact who was an Nshara Church Elder, and it would have been rude to refuse the perfectly suitable arrangements he had made.

During the fieldwork period between September and November 1996 my RA and I relied on local transport, which comprised buses, transit vans, and pick-up trucks (and some long walks!). However, it soon became apparent that this arrangement was not satisfactory. Journeys required several changes of bus and could take a long time, particularly to the villages under the World Vision project (see below), and my RA had three young children at home to whom she had to return at a reasonable time. I therefore managed to rent a car for the period between January and May 1997 which increased our productivity manyfold. The obvious disadvantage of renting a car was that during this period I arrived in villages by (white, four-wheel drive) vehicle and thus perpetuated the image of the project worker/field researcher “dropping in” temporarily. However given the logistical issues this was a problem I had to accept. Where possible we would park and leave the car and walk around the village, although, in Wari village (where most of our time was spent), given its size (just over 1000 households), time constraints, and the fact that our period of intensive household interviews coincided with the long rainy season (March-May), we used

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<sup>91</sup> For example, it would not have been socially acceptable for me to wander around the village alone, or attend bars by myself in the evenings.

<sup>92</sup> During interviews, informants who had been informed of my place of residence usually approved of it on these grounds, and I accept that, according to local cultural values, people would generally expect a young unmarried woman to live in a safe and respectable place.

the car more often than not. Moreover, as I spent far greater time in Wari village, where I was carrying out the focus study and household interviews, and where key informants came to know me better (see below), the effects of arriving by car were mitigated to a certain extent. However, there were other benefits to having a car in the villages; I was often able to give informants, other villagers, and neighbours lifts, and on one particular occasion I was able to take a seriously ill young woman to hospital (see Robson 1997 for a similar experience).

Of more importance to the data collection is the issue of research assistance and translation. I worked with my RA partly because of her gender and her status as a married woman which I felt would be a crucial component in interviewing women about their involvement (or non-participation) in village women's groups. Again, due to the patriarchal nature of Chagga society, it seemed unlikely that women would respond well to a male RA. On the other hand, the fact that my RA and I were both women was not necessarily a disadvantage in interviewing men in the villages, which was probably a combination of my RA's professionalism, and men's interpretations of my ethnicity, nationality, and education. Interestingly, I found that men were less inclined to behave in a condescending manner towards me when I was accompanied by my RA (which is not to suggest that *all* Tanzanian men treated me with condescension when interviewing them alone).

Although my conversational *Kiswahili* improved a great deal while in Tanzania, it was not of a sufficient standard to carry out interviews alone. Translation was thus the major reason for employing an RA. However, working with a Chagga woman became indispensable to the research process. My RA was more than a translator; she was a culturally-informed intermediary who introduced me to, and brokered interviews and meetings with, government officials, village elites, and men and women in the villages; she advised me on the acceptance of the interview questions and group discussion topics; she knew when a particular situation or informant should not be pursued (or, conversely, when they might be pressed for elaboration of a particular point (but see below on this)); and she offered cultural background to, and interpretation of, particular interview situations, conversations and events which

took place on a day-to-day basis. At the same time, the majority of informants we interviewed, particularly several of the women, responded to her style of interviewing and conversation, so that interviews often became ‘a bit of a chat’ (albeit a directed and focused one). After several interviews (particularly with women) we talked for a while and I was asked questions about life in *Uingereza* (England), the position of women in British society, and other issues related to the interview topics.

However, despite the positive elements of working with a female Chagga RA, I do not wish to claim that this mitigated the “violence of fieldwork” (i.e. the disruption to Others’ lives (England 1994:85)), or moreover, that this enabled me to unearth ‘the truth’ while carrying out this research in Kilimanjaro, or that this thesis is an accurate representation of socio-economic relations on the mountain at the end of the twentieth century. This is particularly the case in carrying out research in another language, and in relying on someone else to translate (Devereux 1992, Smith 1996). Obviously it would have been desirable if I could have had a good enough grasp of *Kiswahili* to carry out interviews myself, but due to the time constraints imposed by the PhD programme this was not possible prior to fieldwork in Tanzania.

The problem of ethnographic representation, particularly in relation to the use of language, is a matter of some debate within the postcolonial, cultural and feminist literatures (Keith 1992, McDowell 1997, Patai 1991, Radcliffe 1994, Smith 1996, Winchester 1996). However, Smith argues that this problem is must be recognised by all qualitative researchers, and not only those working in another language:

“All interpretative research involves the representation and appropriation of Others’ experiences as well as the researcher’s. It requires interpretation across cultures of socially constructed meanings” (Smith 1996:162).

Furthermore, she argues that the act of translating between languages and cultures can destabilise the ‘home’ language to the extent that dominant meanings are challenged, and new, hybrid understandings can be forged in the interstitial spaces between the researcher and the researched (Smith 1996, also England 1994). This is

a particularly interesting argument in the context of this dissertation, which deals with locally-constructed understandings of concepts such as ‘development’ (*maendeleo* in *Kiswahili*). In exploring the particular meanings attached to *maendeleo* on Kilimanjaro, it becomes quite clear that ‘development’ as understood by the Chagga is a very different concept to ‘development’ as understood by international NGOs and the international development community. It is not particularly concerned with notions of participation, empowerment, and social justice; all of which are currently central to the hegemonic international development discourse. Rather, ‘development’ is a socially constructed concept which incorporates elements of socio-economic development, modernity, and personal power and prestige according to Chagga culture. The scope for misunderstandings relating to interpretations of ‘development’ (and their negative consequences) is quite clear in the case of the World Vision project (discussed in Chapter Seven).

Moreover, in discussing the notion of “getting at the truth” (Devereux and Hoddinott 1992:34), it is important to recognise the socially constructed nature of the interview process itself (Valentine 1999, Winchester 1996). I have already suggested that my (multiple) subject positions will have had some bearing on the data to which I was allowed access (Madge 1997). The idea of being *allowed access* is central here. I was told a particular story on Kilimanjaro by a range of informants. People often did not want to discuss particular issues, nor did they respond (in the way I had hoped they would) to particular questions (especially in relation to household relations, discussed below, and see note (6)). Informants wished to present themselves (or their women’s group, or their family, or village) in the best possible light to an outside observer. However, the particular stories told by informants are significant in and of themselves, and in collecting several similar stories, certain issues (and particular or conflicting versions of the ‘truth’) arise out of them. Furthermore, I was uneasy about gaining access to socially sanctioned information. During interviews my RA would sense the willingness of an informant to answer questions, and act appropriately, but we refrained from asking difficult questions<sup>93</sup> or pressing people

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<sup>93</sup> These may include questions relating to specific levels of income, the division of wealth and assets among household members, and highly personal aspects of relationships within the household (particularly domestic violence).

who obviously did not wish to answer particular questions. Certain insights would no doubt have been central to this study, but I am not sure that, as a researcher, I have the right to be privy to such information.

As Sidaway (1992), Madge (1997) and Patai (1991) have pointed out, the question of whether ethical research is possible in developing areas needs to be placed within a wider context which acknowledges that research is situated within an unethical world. In recognising the situatedness of this research, as I suggested in the opening paragraphs of this thesis, I do not claim either that the research process was particularly empowering for anybody involved (see discussion below on PRA), nor do I claim to be carving out an interstitial space either for myself or for the researched, from which the voice of the 'Other' can be heard, and from which a particular version of the 'truth' can be constructed. I am not sure that this is either possible or desirable. As Keith observes, "all ethnographic writing [is], in part, an act of betrayal" (1992:554). Quotations from interviews<sup>94</sup> are used in the text as an illustration of a particular argument or point of view, rather than in any overt attempt to allow the researched to 'speak'. Following Smith (1996), I do suggest, however, that the act of translating across languages and cultures does not necessarily diminish the significance of the data (or 'story', see McDowell 1997, Valentine 1999) presented here, and in fact, can move towards facilitating the emergence of new understandings of particular concepts (such as 'development') from a different point of view, a 'third space'. This is not to seek to transcend the inherent problems in representing Others through the (unequal (unethical?)) research process, but rather to try and suggest ways in which the research process can at least engage productively with some of the more stringent critiques which have emerged in recent years. Following England (1994) it is, finally, important that as researchers we take responsibility for our work and acknowledge that the research process is a highly personal one.

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<sup>94</sup> All names of informants used throughout this thesis are pseudonyms. Those interview excerpts which have been translated from either Kiswahili or Kichagga are marked with an asterisk.

## **Research methodology**

In order to gain an understanding of the role of the non-governmental sector in Hai District, two major avenues of research were pursued. The first related to the role of non-state actors in social service provision, and focused on health and education as two important social welfare services. The second was concerned with processes of participation in non-governmental activities and the possibilities for empowerment and social change. The approach to this study was entirely qualitative, based on interviews and focus group discussions with a range of informants. Interview content differed with the informant and the purpose of the interview; however, all were open-ended questions, most of which were formulated in the field.

### ***District level research***

Initially a district-wide survey of non-governmental actors was carried out by talking to the Ward Community Development Officers (Ward CDOs) or Village Secretaries for each ward (see Appendix One). Information was collected on schools and health services in every village in the district (there are 66), including who they are owned by (i.e. the state or, for example, KKKT), how they are financed, and whether they have received any external assistance from a patron, NGO, or donor. Details on non-governmental organisations, community-based groups, Tanzanian NGOs, and donors supporting CBOs in each village were also collected (see Chapter Six). The Ward CDOs were also asked about their role vis-à-vis various non-governmental groups, and what they thought NGOs were contributing towards development<sup>95</sup> in Hai. This gave a broad overview of NGO activity in the district and facilitated the selection of appropriate villages in which to look at the research questions in more detail. During the course of the research period, a series of interviews were also carried out with district officials (see Appendix One). These interviews concentrated on the relationship between the various departments of the local state and relevant NGOs (for example, non-state actors in education, and the District Education Department), the registration and co-ordination of NGOs at district level, and the importance and

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<sup>95</sup> The concept of 'development' and the different meanings attached to it by different actors are discussed in greater depth in Chapter Seven. However, it is worth pointing out that in interview situations informants were asked to define what they meant by the word 'development'.




potential contribution of non-state actors to development from the local state's point of view.

### ***Village level research: attempting PRA***

Four villages were chosen in which to carry out further research: Wari, Nronga, Samaki Maini and Kyengia (see map 5.2). These villages were chosen because between them, a range of non-governmental actors were active, and the villages themselves differed in socio-economic terms (see below). In each village, interviews were held with representatives from the range of social service providers in health and education, in order to find out how they had been established, and to ascertain the role of the state and non-state sectors in supporting them. Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) exercises were also carried out with village residents (or 'beneficiaries') in order to learn more about their views on social services and development projects in their villages.

PRA was developed out of the Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) approach to evaluating development projects in the 1980s and early 1990s, and is closely associated with the work of Robert Chambers (1983, 1994a). PRA is a set of exercises designed to make the research process more active and empowering for the researched, which seeks to "enable local people to share, enhance and analyse their knowledge of life and conditions, to plan and act" (Chambers 1994c:1437, see also Edwards 1994). RRA was developed in the late 1970s in response to the type of project reports and evaluations which resulted from 'rural development tourism' and large-scale questionnaires which were unreliable and time-consuming (Heaver 1992). Although RRA gained in popularity during the 1980s, PRA also became increasingly popular (particularly among NGOs) as it became apparent that RRA was essentially an extractive approach to project appraisal. PRA uses many of the same kinds of techniques as RRA (such as venn diagrams, village social mapping, village histories and time lines, matrix scoring and ranking, wealth ranking) but in a manner which involves local people to a far greater extent. The research exercise is supposed to become one in which the researched learn from the experience, as well as the researcher (Goss 1996, Heaver 1992, Marsden *et al.* 1994, Peil 1982, Scoones 1988).

*Map 5.2: Research villages in Hai District*



In each village, a series of focus groups were held during which several PRA exercises were used. The first of these was with a group of elderly villagers who constructed a village history using a time line. This consists of placing cards on which important events in the village's history are written in chronological order on the floor in the middle of the group. This facilitates discussion about important events in the village's history and allows changes to be made, and other events to be added, as the participants see fit. A second set of focus groups were conducted with separate groups of men and women (one in each village for each gender). Initially these groups attempted to use several PRA methods to discuss social services and non-governmental organisations in the village, such as ranking exercises, venn diagrams, beans exercises, and village maps<sup>96</sup>. The group was directed by the RA and tape recorded for her to transcribe and translate later. However, after the first meeting it was decided that this approach to group discussions was not particularly productive. Many of the participants found it difficult to grasp the point of the exercises and the discussions were dominated by one or two older women. Moreover, it was very difficult to capture all of the verbal exchanges on tape.

This experience is in direct contrast to those who suggest that PRA as part of a focus group can be an empowering process for those involved (Chambers 1994a, 1994b, Goss 1996). Thereafter, focus groups were held as general group discussions which covered a set range of issues such as social services, non-governmental organisations and economic and social activities in the village. Group discussions were held with separate male and female groups in each village, and with members of each women's group in each village. While the problem of group discussions being dominated by one character was often an issue about which little could be done (due mostly to cultural norms about social status and which villagers have the right to speak over

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<sup>96</sup> Ranking exercises attempt to differentiate between services by ranking each service according to a set of criteria decided upon by the group. Venn diagrams use different sized circles to represent services, institutions and groups in the village. They are placed on the floor in the middle of the group around one circle which represents the village, and arranged according to importance in the village (size of circle) and degree of closeness (overlap or proximity with other circles, including that which represents the village). During beans exercises, each participant is given an equal number of beans which represents their annual income. Cards are placed on the floor which (following discussion) represent major areas of expenditure. Each participant then 'spends their beans' proportionately between the cards in order to represent their outgoings in an average year. Finally, village mappings

others), these group discussions were easier to run and more straightforward than the PRA exercises which caused much confusion (although wealth ranking was used in Wari village, see below).

Additional to the focus group discussions, a series of interviews were held with key informants in each village (leaders of NGOs and community groups). In the two villages under the World Vision project (Samaki Maini and Kyengia) interviews were held with village development committees. During the research period two big project meetings relating to the Sanya ADP and the Kyungukyelwa Church Community Development Project were held which I was able to attend (see below for details on the WVT projects). Interviews and discussions were also held with staff at both the project and head office levels (see Appendix One for more details). In obtaining research permission from WVT to look at the Sanya ADP, it was requested that I present both a plan of intention and an overview of the results to the staff at head office. I was thus invited to give two seminars to WVT staff after which I received feedback and comments on the research.

In Nronga village, as well as the focus group discussions, interviews were held with the Chairlady and the Manager of the Nronga Women Dairy Cooperative. Several interviews were also conducted with members and non-members of the project in order to gain some insight into the significance of the project for women in the village.

### ***Focus village research***

While the group discussions and interviews in the four villages raised many significant issues, it was found that they were not suited to more in-depth questions and responses. Therefore, Wari village was chosen as the focus village for the research, in which a set of in-depth interviews would be undertaken to pursue some of the issues raised in the focus groups in more detail, such as access to services, and participation (or non-participation) in non-governmental activities. In undertaking more in-depth interviews in Wari I aimed to gain a greater understanding of the

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involve the group drawing a map on a large piece of paper which represents the village, indicating any

social, political and cultural dynamics within which the non-governmental sector was embedded in Hai. Wari was selected from the four villages primarily because my RA and I had started work there first (of all the four villages) and we had become familiar faces for several key informants (see below). Furthermore, a range of service providers were present in Wari village, as well as three separate women's groups. As it had become quite obvious during the focus groups that women's groups were one of the most important ways in which village members group together in order to take part in development-related activities, there was an opportunity to learn more about how these different groups interacted with one another and with other institutions in the village.

There were three main components to the focussed research in Wari. The first entailed obtaining a census of the village (I employed the daughter of one of my key informants to do this), as a recent census was not available at the village office. This collated very basic information about households<sup>97</sup>; the name of the household head, how many adults and children were presently living there, and whether any members of the household were 'away' (i.e. temporarily or permanently migrated). A village census was needed in order to produce a wealth ranking of all the households (not individuals) in the village. Wealth ranking exercises were done within each sub-village (*kitongoji*<sup>98</sup>) of Wari (there are nine) with a small focus group, usually comprising both men and women, although this was not always possible. Each focus group started with a short discussion on measures of wealth within their sub-village, whereupon four or five categories were agreed upon to represent different levels of wealth among people within the village. The group were then given a set of cards each with the name of every household head in their sub-village written on it (hence the need for the census). They were asked to place each household into the appropriate wealth category. These exercises were generally quite successful and generated a lot of animated discussion. If one or two ranked groups were too large

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important features or places.

<sup>97</sup> In the context of this research the 'household' is defined as a group of people (ostensibly) sharing a common budget, who are usually living under one roof and who usually eat from the same kitchen. This is the typical household composition among the Chagga, based on a monogamous marriage. Household heads are usually the eldest male, although a high incidence of temporary or permanent migration has led to an increasing number of female-headed households.

the informants were asked to sub-divide them again. Although there were some divergences between sub-villages, there was enough overlap between all nine wealth rankings to produce a general description of characteristics of different wealth groups in Wari village (table 5.1).

**Table 5.1 Descriptions of wealth ranks of all households (HH) in Wari village**

Wealth Rank	% of HH in Wari	Description
1	2.5	Extremely wealthy, owns businesses, cars, large modern house, children may be educated up to university (possibly out of Tanzania e.g. Kenya), “most advanced people in the village”
2	8.0	Wealthy, can educate children to high levels, nice house and big farm, 3-4 cattle, can help neighbours and hold big ceremonies, may have a job, runs businesses
3	26.3	Has a concrete house, 2-3 livestock, can usually educate children to Form 4, may own a car, fair-sized farm, may be employed (e.g. as teacher), or run small businesses
4	46.8	Manages daily subsistence, 1-2 cattle, 1-2 acres of farmland, educate children to Standard 7 (sometimes Form 4), often have concrete homes (although some made from mud), may receive help from relatives
5	16.4	Very poor, cannot educate children, food insecure, little or no land, lives in a mud shack, may work as labourer, or be unable to work, e.g. sick/disabled/old, dependent on neighbours and relatives

The second part of the focus study used the wealth rankings to guide the selection of in-depth interviews with households. There were five aims in interviewing individual households in Wari: firstly, to interview households across the socio-economic spectrum; secondly, to interview households which had both members and non-members of women’s groups; thirdly, to interview both men and women; fourthly, to interview both Muslims and Christians, and fifthly, to interview households within each sub-village. With these criteria in mind, particular households were chosen from the census in an attempt to cover all of these different social groups. However, in practice, interviews were often dictated by who was at home when we called. Thus, more women were interviewed than men as they were often the only ones at home during the day. Furthermore, although we attempted to interview households from wealth category (1) on several occasions, neither male

<sup>98</sup> *kitongoji* (pl. *vitongoji*) (*Kiswahili*): sub-village.

nor female household heads were ever available when we called. Given that we carried out the most intensive interviewing period during the main rainy season (March – May), at which time most families are busy planting maize in their lowland plots, the sampling strategy became reactive rather than proactive. A full list of households interviewed is given in Appendix Two (summarised in tables 5.2 and 5.3).

**Table 5.2 Summary of characteristics of household interviews**

Wealth rank	Total no. of interviews		Gender		Member of HH participant in any women's group?		Religiosity	
	Total	Male	Female	Yes	No	Lutheran	Muslim	
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2	7	1	6	6	1	6	1	
3	19	4	15	16	3	16	3	
4	13	5	8	4	7	8	3	
5	18	9	9	4	14	14	4	
Total	55	17	38	30	24	44	11	

**Table 5.3 Average assets of respondents to household interviews**

Wealth rank	No. interviewed	Kihamba (acres)	Porini <sup>99</sup> (acres)	Cattle
2	7	1.9	3.9	3.0
3	19	1.8	1.2	2.5
4	11	1.2	0.8	1.3
5	18	0.7	0.7	1.0
Total/ave	55	1.4	1.7	2.0

N.B. Wealth Rank (1) is not included in the table as the household interviews did not include any households from this category.

Interviews were generally carried out with the individual respondent only, although in some cases spouses, children, parents or neighbours joined in (see Valentine 1999 for the relative advantages and disadvantages of this). The purpose of these interviews was to gain more of an understanding of different socio-economic groups experiences with social services in the village, the particular meanings attached to

<sup>99</sup> *Porini* (Kiswahili): land (also referred to as *shamba*) on the lower mountain slopes used for cultivating maize and beans.

'development', and reasons for participation and non-participation in community development activities.

The wealth ranking was also important in gaining an insight into which social strata were able to participate in local community development activities. Members' lists were acquired from each women's organisation in the village, and compared against the wealth rankings (see Chapter Seven).

The final part of the focus study consisted of a series of interviews with key informants in the village. These were carried out towards the end of the fieldwork period when significant research issues and questions had become pertinent. These included the three most recent village chairmen, the Pastor and Evangelist at the two Lutheran Churches in Wari, the Mosque leader, the Ward Community Development Officer, leaders of the women's groups and the Kalali Church Women's Department, the KNCU Secretary, and the staff of the small primary health care NGO based in Wari (PAFO). Key informant interviews were also carried out with six villagers (five men and one woman, of differing socio-economic status) whom my RA and I came to know relatively well over the fieldwork period. These focussed on issues which had not been the direct subject of other interviews; questions about local and national politics, Chagga customs, and change in the village over time.

The research thus utilised a range of qualitative methods in order to build up a picture of the role of the non-governmental sector within the villages. It would have been particularly interesting to carry out the same level of in-depth interviewing in all four villages in which different types of non-governmental actors were working, although this was not possible within this study due to time constraints. Nevertheless, a broad overview of the work of different non-governmental actors was obtained during the course of the research which was supplemented and informed by the in-depth interviews and key informant interviews carried out in Wari village. The stories obtained from these interviews built up a picture of the wider social, cultural, political and economic processes within which the non-governmental



sector in Hai is situated. It is to an introductory discussion of Hai District, and the Chagga people, which we now move.

## **Hai District**

Hai District is one of five rural districts in Kilimanjaro Region, principally comprising the western slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro, as outlined above. It is known, as is Kilimanjaro in general, as being one of the more affluent parts of Tanzania (Howard 1994, Kiondo 1995, Samoff 1974, Stambach 1996a), and its inhabitants, predominantly the Chagga (particularly on the mountain, although other parts of the region are inhabited by different ethnic groups, such as the Pare), are said to possess a certain “business prowess” which distinguishes them as one of Tanzania’s most entrepreneurial groups (Kiondo 1995:116). As outlined in Chapter Three, this relative affluence is associated with the region’s experience with missionaries (who built schools), and the coffee crop, which constitutes 30 percent of the national coffee export (Howard 1994), and which shall be returned to below.

The District is overwhelmingly rural, with 92.6 percent of the population living in rural areas (URT 1994). The main towns are Boma Ng’ombe, which houses the new District headquarters and lies on the main road between Arusha and Moshi and is more accessible than the old District headquarters at Sanya Juu town, which lies in the west of the District. There is a huge difference between settlement patterns on the mountain and on the plains, which are not obvious from average district figures. The average population density in Hai is estimated at 84 people per square kilometre (according to the 1988 census), however densities as high as 700 people per square kilometre have been recorded in the most populous agro-ecological zone, the coffee-banana belt<sup>100</sup> (URT 1994). This consists of an almost continuous belt of coffee and banana gardens (*vihamba*) which span the southern slopes of the mountain, between the elevations of 1,100 and 1,800 metres above sea level, extending from Rombo in the east, through Moshi Rural, to the west of Hai District. The soils and rainfall in this zone makes it one of the most fertile areas in Tanzania. In contrast, the plains

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<sup>100</sup> Lema (1997) estimates that in Machame (Hai), population densities between 650 and 1000 people per square kilometre have been recorded.

areas are much drier and far less heavily populated. Villages are smaller, bounded units rather than contiguous as they are on the mountain, and are often inhabited by a mix of Chagga, who have been forced to move away from the mountain because of land shortages (see below), and Maasai. Estimates of the population of Hai District in 1988 place the figure in the region of 196,901 (URT 1994), and in 1998, 224,467<sup>101</sup>. According to 1988 figures, 46 percent of the population are under 15 years old, and 71 percent under 30.


Hai District Council, one of five districts within Kilimanjaro Region, is based in Moshi town, roughly fifteen kilometres away to the east along the Arusha-Moshi highway. Beneath the District, there are four Divisions (Machame, Lyamungo, Masama and Siha) each corresponding to approximate old chiefdoms on the mountain, and incorporating parts of the plain directly beneath them. These are further divided into wards (map 5.3). The lowest official unit of organisation is the village, which is made up of several sub-villages (*vitongoji*), which can range in number between two and fifteen (map 5.4). Each *kitongoji* has a chairman<sup>102</sup>, who is automatically a member of the village council, and is responsible for daily issues within his sub-village, such as settling minor disputes, or organising communal labour. During the *ujamaa* period official organisation extended as far down as the ten household unit, known as the *balози* (pl. *mabalози*). Each ten households would have a leader, who was the Party's link between the individual and the village council. In the late 1990s, *mabalози* still exist, but are used more for administrative purposes, such as collecting household data for taxes<sup>103</sup>. In the villages, one of the most important decision-making units is the village council (*serikali ya kijiji*), the other being the Church council (*baraza wa wazee*, returned to below). The *serikali ya kijiji* is made up of all the *vitongoji* leaders and other eminent local people who are considered educated or well-organised. Village chairmen are voted for on a five-

<sup>101</sup> The last available census carried out in Tanzania was in 1988. According to official statistics, population in Hai grew by 14.2 percent between the 1978 and 1988 censuses. Based on this statistic, the figure for 1998 given here is an estimate assuming the same growth rate.

<sup>102</sup> Although women were sometimes elected ten-cell leaders (*balози*) or to sit on the Village Council, there were no female Village Chairmen (sic) in Hai District.

<sup>103</sup> Taxes, or development levy, are collected by village secretaries. In Kilimanjaro in 1997, the tax was Tsh2,000/=, for every man and employed woman over the age of 18 (interview, Hai District Assistant Planning Officer).

*Map 5.3: Ward boundaries within Hai District*



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Map 5.4: Villages in Hai District



year basis, and do not earn a salary for their positions, although they may be paid some 'allowances' intermittently. The chairman is assisted by a village secretary, who is paid by the local state, and is often a much younger, educated person than the chairman, which can cause a certain amount of friction (Hai District Assistant Planning Officer). The chairman and secretary are assisted by ward level officers, including the Ward Executive Officer, the Ward Agricultural Extension Officer, and the Ward Community Development Officer.

The Church has had a profound impact on Kilimanjaro. The Chagga had been trading with coastal peoples for some time previous to the arrival of the first German missionaries at the end of the nineteenth century (Moore 1986). However, the impact of the Church was to have far-reaching consequences. Over time, the Catholic and Lutheran missionaries settled and established mission stations across the mountain, essentially carving it up into predominantly Roman Catholic, and Lutheran sections. Much of Hai is predominantly Lutheran. The missions were particularly important in providing health and education services in the villages (see Chapter Six). It has been estimated that today, approximately 90 percent of the Chagga population in Machame are Lutherans<sup>104</sup> (Stambach 1996a), although in other areas, Catholicism predominates. A growing number of Muslims can also be found in some villages (see Chapter Seven).

Perhaps the most significant impact which the missions had on Kilimanjaro was to introduce coffee. The first tree was planted at the Kilema Catholic Mission in 1918 (Swantz 1985) and slowly instigated a huge change in Chagga agricultural practice across the mountain. Initially the missions (and later the colonial settlers) had wanted the Chagga to work on their coffee farms, but farmers were keen to plant their own coffee. Indeed, the colonial government later encouraged the Chagga cultivation of coffee for export (Moore 1986), although struggles over the control of coffee continued throughout the colonial period (as outlined in Chapter Three). The production of the Chagga coffee crop served to integrate the Chagga into the world

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<sup>104</sup> Machame has a particularly strong connection with the Lutheran Church, as it was the first place in which the missionaries settled at the end of the nineteenth century. Nkwarungo Church on the border of Wari and Foo villages is one of the first churches built on the mountain.

economic system, but also introduced huge socio-economic inequality, as we shall see below.

Today, the Church is possibly the most important organising institution in the villages on the mountain. Mosques play a similar role for Muslims, but the sheer numerical dominance of Lutherans and Roman Catholics elevates the Church's position. In the villages in which I worked and lived (which were predominantly Lutheran), Sunday morning services are a public event, where best clothes are worn, and people meet one another. At Nshara Church a market was even held straight after the service. Churches also engage in developmental activities, which are explored in Chapters Six and Seven. The Church's activities fall under the jurisdiction of the Church council (*baraza wa wazee*), which is usually made up of older men and women (*wazee* and *bibi wazee*), who are recommended to join the council by parishioners, and led by the pastor and the evangelist. Also, as I shall argue below and in Chapter Seven, religiosity is central to Chagga culture and Chagga identities.

Despite the importance of the Church, formal politics have also played a central role in shaping the structure of power in the district. During the initial period of TANU activism in the late 1950s, politics on Kilimanjaro were very much bound up in local issues. For example, the struggle between the areas of Marangu and Machame over the paramount chiefship was a central feature of local politics for some time (Samoff 1974). However, following independence, Kilimanjaro politicians developed an outward (national) orientation which was based upon maintaining and consolidating Kilimanjaro's position vis-à-vis the national structures of power, particularly within TANU. Although TANU (and later CCM) enjoyed more or less widespread support during the *ujamaa* era within Kilimanjaro, national policies which were deemed to be harmful to Kilimanjaro encouraged a certain amount of anti-government sentiment (*ibid.*). This resistance to central control has been taken to its logical conclusion in the liberalised political atmosphere of post-Nyerere Tanzania. Moore (1993) notes that within six months of political liberalisation, twenty-three new parties had been formed in Tanzania, two of which can be accurately described as ethnic Chagga

parties. CCM is now much less powerful than it ever was on the mountain, and parties such as Chadema and NCCR-Mageuzi<sup>105</sup>, which are strongly identified with Chagga politicians, are competing (often with considerable local support) for constituencies in Kilimanjaro.

### The Chagga

It is thought that the Chagga have lived on Mount Kilimanjaro since approximately 1700, when a group known as the Konyingo were displaced by a mix of peoples, including Kamba, Taita and Maasai from the north, and Pare, Kahe and Shambaa from the south (Moore 1986, Stambach 1996a). Chagga culture and lifestyle is intimately bound up with the *kihamba* production regime (Setel 1996) which centres on the coffee-banana groves among which they live (although the *kihamba* has only been associated with coffee production since the early twentieth century). Traditional Chagga beliefs focus on the *kihamba* and the ancestral graves within it. Ancestors are believed to be able to exert influence on the living and many Chagga beliefs and rituals are concerned with respecting, and pacifying, the ancestors.

The Chagga are a patrilineal society organised around the principles of kinship, lineage relations and land tenure (Stambach 1996a). Lineage land is supposed to be kept within the patriline, or clan, as a source of wealth which is to be perpetuated rather than bought or sold (*ibid.*). The banana groves themselves are integral to social relations. Boys and girls learn early in life their roles in Chagga society within the groves; boys, to plant and irrigate the banana trees, and girls, to harvest the trees, and tend to the cattle (*ibid.*). The irrigation system on Kilimanjaro is a complex system of channels (*fereji*) which capture water higher up the mountain and direct it through the banana groves (Grove 1993). Access to water is strictly regulated and farmers are responsible for closing off channels to their banana groves on certain days, by using banana leaves. The channels themselves are assumed to have magical powers, and are often named after chiefs or the first ancestors who managed the channels (Stambach 1996a). Cattle are also integral to the Chagga lifestyle, and most people on the mountain now have improved dairy cattle which gives them milk.

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<sup>105</sup> Chadema (*Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo*): Party for Democracy and Development; NCCR-Mageuzi (National Convention for Construction and Reform).



Cattle are stall-fed, ostensibly because of land shortages, but also in an attempt to fatten them. This is associated, as is the banana grove, with the concentration of value and wealth within the lineage (Stambach 1996b). Additional to the mountain *kihamba*, most families cultivate rented plots on the lower slopes and plains (*porini*) around the mountain with beans and maize. Stambach suggests that the “magico-religious dimensions” and notions of the accumulation of wealth associated with *fereji*, the *kihamba*, and cattle, are all central to the Chagga cultural identity (1996b:553-556).

The *kihamba* typically consists of a coffee-banana grove, within which a living house, kitchen, and cattle stall is built. The parcelling of land into *vihamba* over the centuries has increasingly led to fragmentation, and the average size of plots is ever decreasing<sup>106</sup>. Land is passed from fathers to sons, although in some rare cases daughters may receive some land. The youngest son receives the *kihamba* and the living house, while the eldest son is given other parcels of land which his father may hold. Middle sons are in the most precarious position, and often migrate, or are reliant on their father’s goodwill to secure their access to land. Given the current situation of land scarcity, it is appreciable that land is a valuable asset. Pressure on land has accumulated as population densities have increased in the twentieth century<sup>107</sup>, but is also attributable to land alienation, and coffee cultivation (Lema 1997).

Under German rule, the lower slopes beneath the Chagga were alienated by the German administration and cultivated by settlers, producing coffee, rubber and sisal. Later, the British established the Kilimanjaro Forest Reserve in 1921, to the north of the Chagga settlements. Effectively, the Chagga were unable to expand north or south, but were constrained within a strip of the mountain. The introduction of coffee and the widescale cultivation of the crop by the Chagga involved the

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<sup>106</sup> An estimated figure for the 1960s suggests that the average *kihamba* size was 3.2 acres, while a study in the 1970s showed that half of the population had less than one acre of land (Swantz 1985:92). The data which I collected in Wari village in 1997 reveals that the average plot size was 1.4 acres, while the average *kihamba* size of the poorest people was 0.7 acres (see Chapter Eight. These figures are based on a sample of 55 households in Wari village).

<sup>107</sup> Population growth in Kilimanjaro has been rapid throughout the twentieth century. Between 1921 and 1948 the population more than doubled (from 128,000 to 267,700), and more than doubled again between 1948 and 1975 (Setel 1996).

cultivation of previously open spaces. The value attached to coffee was soon realised and land became even more important than it had been previously (Lema 1997). Cattle, which were traditionally left to roam free, began to be stall fed as open spaces came under cultivation. As the population rose, so too did pressure on the land. This has resulted in a high rate of migration out of the area, particularly by young males (Setel 1996). They go to Moshi town or further afield to Arusha, Mwanza, Dar es Salaam, or Nairobi. Those who move further away to find work leave a wife on their *kihamba* land if they are married. This is an insurance policy against losing their land while they are away. Husbands who live and work in another town or city often only return to the mountain for Christmas, other holidays, and weddings and funerals. Others who do not have wives on their plots on the mountain may stay away permanently, setting up their homes in their new environment. During the 1960s and 1970s for example, the population of Moshi town grew rapidly, and became the “most predominantly male city in Tanzania, and had the highest proportion of unmarried adults of any urban area in the country” (Setel 1996:1171).

Although the traditional Chagga lifestyle has, been constantly reshaped and remoulded by processes of change, particularly during this century, certain aspects of Chagga culture remain at the heart of life on the mountain (Moore 1986). Stambach (1996a, 1996b), in her study of the Chagga of Machame, suggests that local cultural notions centre around the control and expansion of wealth to include “new material forms” (1996b:557). As discussed above, Chagga are primarily concerned with keeping wealth within the lineage, and where possible, with increasing that wealth, associated with the *fereji*, cattle ownership, and the *kihamba*. In the 1990s, there are new ways of achieving this aim, and Stambach focuses on the symbolic wealth embodied within secondary school education. She observes that, rather than fundamentally changing Chagga culture, secondary schooling represents a widening of Chagga values to include new resources, namely the familiarisation with an international popular culture, which is seen as “modern” and globally oriented. Moore (1996) has also suggested that the 1990s has presented new forms of resources to the Chagga of Kilimanjaro, and that struggles have already begun to

emerge in an effort to control these. She points to the opportunities presented by political liberalisation, in the form of the two Chagga-connected political parties (Chadema and NCCR-Mageuzi) which both attempted to bid for national power during the first multi-party elections in 1995. Furthermore, a dispute within the Lutheran Church over the Kilimanjaro and Meru areas represented a bid for control of powerful resources. The Meru people wanted to secede from the Northern Diocese of the Lutheran Church (essentially covering the Kilimanjaro and Meru regions), in order, Moore suggests, to gain greater local control over the church's resources. Violence ensued, during which crops were burned, houses burned down and five people killed. Despite this, the Meru won their case, and were duly awarded their own diocese (Moore 1996).

It is important to see these new bids for access to resources within the current economic context in which the Chagga now find themselves. Political and economic liberalisation has had a profound impact on the lives of people on the mountain, and not merely in an economic sense, as intimated by Stambach and Moore above, a theme which will be returned to in the following chapters. Perhaps one of the biggest changes has been the demise in the fortunes of coffee producers. During the *ujamaa* period, the coffee cooperatives were the local agents to whom farmers sold their coffee. In Hai District, the KNCU was a focal point for all farmers, with a rural cooperative society based in most villages. It gave producers a fixed price for their coffee, and distributed the payments at staggered points during the year in order to assist farmers with the local agricultural cycle. In this way, although farmers only sold their coffee once a year, they received their money at the times at which they needed funds in order to plant maize for the long rains (March - May), and the short rains (October - November). Furthermore, the cooperatives provided farmers with inputs for their coffee<sup>108</sup>, and equipment such as sprayers, sequitors and pulping machines could be hired. Coffee became the principal source of income for the majority of farmers, which led to a relative degree of prosperity on the mountain. Many farmers were able to send their children to school (i.e. they could afford to pay

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<sup>108</sup> Farmers assumed that they were getting their inputs for free, but at the time, the KNCU would deduct money from a farmer's coffee sales in order to cover for the price of inputs (Wari KNCU Assistant Secretary).

secondary school fees), they invested in building stone houses with corrugated iron roofs, and communities were able to contribute towards the building of local services (see Chapter Six).

However, since the government's policies of economic liberalisation have been instituted, the cooperative's credit facilities have been effectively cut off, while at the same time, private buyers have been allowed into villages for the first time, setting up independent buying posts. Combined with the lower prices for coffee on the world market since the 1970s, village producers in Hai have been badly hit. The coffee trees on Kilimanjaro are generally old (at least 50 years) and need uprooting and replanting, or at least, a great deal of inputs to keep up production. However, most people cannot afford either the inputs, or to uproot and replant<sup>109</sup>. Private buyers in the villages do not provide inputs, and farmers (apart from the larger and more prosperous) find it difficult to afford inputs on their budgets,. The amount of coffee being bought on the mountain is continually decreasing<sup>110</sup>, although it is very difficult to gauge how much coffee is sold through the private buyers. For example, in Wari village, private buyers (e.g. Milcafe, Dormans) set up their buying posts in 1994. Although the Chagga display a strong sense of loyalty towards the KNCU, and an inherent distrust of the private buyers, a certain amount of coffee is undoubtedly sold to these private buyers (principally as they offer higher prices<sup>111</sup>). However, most people do not admit to selling to the private companies, and insist that they still sell to KNCU, a claim which is not substantiated by KNCU's falling

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<sup>109</sup> A further disincentive exists in the form of government legislation, which bans farmers from uprooting or cutting down coffee trees (Lema 1997), although this was not mentioned to me as one of the hindrances affecting farmers in Hai.

<sup>110</sup> According to local records, the amount of coffee sold to the KNCU in Wari would generally fluctuate between 100,000kg, and 76,000kg a year. However, by 1994 only 16,000kg was sold to the KNCU, and by 1996, this had further dropped to 13,000kg (Wari KNCU Assistant Secretary). Similarly, records kept at Hai District Administration showed a sharp decrease in the amount of coffee produced. In 1976/77, production for the district was estimated at 5,889 tonnes, while in 1990/91, this figure had fallen to 2,855 tonnes (Hai District Council 1997).

<sup>111</sup> One of the reasons for falling sales at Wari KNCU was given as the competition from the private companies. In 1996, while KNCU was buying 1kg of coffee for between Tsh500/= and Tsh700/=, the private buyers were paying between Tsh800/= and Tsh1,200/= (Wari KNCU Assistant Secretary). One interviewee in Wari estimated that 99 percent of people are now selling their coffee to private buyers. As he observed, "KNCU has no money anymore so people are forced to sell to individuals [buyers]".

crop sales<sup>112</sup>. This distrust of the private companies is evident in the following comments from the Wari KNCU's Assistant Secretary:

“Maybe in the future, the aim of the individual buyers is to ‘surprise’ the rural cooperative society [i.e. take business away from the KNCU], so that when it collapses they will be able to buy coffee at any price they like....people will end up with no coffee because they will not be able to manage it [i.e. afford to live and produce coffee on such low prices]”.

A similar attitude was held by one prosperous farmer from the chiefly clan<sup>113</sup> in Wari:

“I sell coffee to the KNCU. But if you sell to KNCU you don't get money, but I still like KNCU to exist, because there's history in it. In five to ten years even individual buyers will collapse, so it's better to keep the KNCU going, otherwise farmers will suffer. These individuals haven't built anything firm, they can leave easily. *Mimi napenda KNCU*<sup>114</sup>.... I won't sell to individual buyers even for Tsh5,000/= per kilogram. Individual buyers don't consider whether farmers get inputs”.

It is quite clear that certain farmers (often the richer ones) are staunchly loyal to the KNCU. However, it would seem that economic necessity has increasingly forced poorer farmers to sell what coffee they still have to the private buyers. It remains the case, however, that farmers' incomes on Kilimanjaro have suffered considerably due to these changes in coffee marketing. As one poor farmer explained:

“Now I sell to private buyers. I don't plan to sell to KNCU again, they have no inputs....Poor farmers have no alternative than to sell to private buyers at a higher price....Few people can afford inputs after getting their money. I can't really afford to buy inputs, that's why I've cut the tops off of my coffee trees, although now they have sprouted and they need spraying as they are full of insects. How can I afford to buy even half a kilogram of copper to spray them? I cut the trees so they'd need less inputs. [CM: are you diversifying because of this?] I earn most of my living from carpentry. Sometimes local people give me work, I have no other real source of income”.

<sup>112</sup> The majority of farmers interviewed in Wari village said that they either did not sell coffee anymore as they could not afford inputs, or that they still sold to KNCU. Only one or two farmers admitted to selling to one of the private companies. Group discussions with coffee farmers in Kyengia and Samaki Maini revealed similar attitudes.

<sup>113</sup> Although chiefs no longer exist, their patriline is still recognised as former *mangi* (chiefs), and many members of the clan are considerably richer than their neighbours, partly because of the amount of alienated land which was given over to chiefs during the British colonial period, and also because they have retained the contacts and prestige established during the period of *mangi*.

<sup>114</sup> “I like KNCU”.

Some farmers are attempting to diversify, for example, by producing vegetables, particularly tomatoes (Lema 1997). Many Chagga I interviewed had vegetable gardens (which is advocated by the Church health workers, and village health workers, and PAFO, see below), and women would either sell the produce to their neighbours or take it to the local market. Similarly, several women mentioned that they sold milk, either to neighbours, to a local village shop, to traders who took it into Moshi for resale, or to the women's milk cooperative in Nronga (see below, and following chapters). Some female household heads who had uprooted their coffee trees had begun to plant livestock grasses to feed their cattle. Nevertheless, many Chagga complained about the harsh economic conditions in which they now found themselves. Much of it is blamed on the KNCU for no longer providing inputs, although people in general did not say why the KNCU could no longer extend credit and other services to the farmers (i.e. due to liberalisation policies being pursued by the government). Many thought that life was much more expensive now, especially as health and education services have to be paid for, as these comments from women in Wari village reveal:

“Life today is harder than in the past. Every woman is thinking a lot about her children, there is an outbreak of disease [HIV]. School expenses are very high, and generally the means of getting money is quite difficult. Hospital expenses are very high, and also feeding children is difficult if you don't have enough money. Husbands contribute to the family but not very much because they don't have the means to earn good money” (Wari women's focus group discussion).

However, herein lies a strange paradox in the ways that the Chagga think about themselves. On one hand, Chaggas see themselves as a relatively 'developed' group within Tanzania. Several Chaggas I interviewed spoke of the 'backwardness' of other ethnic groups in Tanzania, particularly the Maasai (also Stambach 1996b). By self-definition, Chaggas see themselves as 'intelligent' and 'hard-working' people, the implication being that they have reaped the benefits of this in socio-economic terms. At the same time, however, they complain that they have been 'neglected' by the national government, and that the development which has taken place in Kilimanjaro has been entirely down to the Chagga, the Church, and donors. Due to the government's perception that Kilimanjaro is now 'too developed', the

government ignores the area and directs resources to other places (see also Chapter Six). Many Chagga expressed the view that the government did not like them, or was inherently opposed towards the Chagga. It seems that, on the one hand, the Chagga are resentful for central government neglect, and think that the state should provide more services for them, while on the other, they are proud of their history with the Church, and their ability to 'develop' without the state. Indeed, their industriousness is seen as central to Chagga identity, while links with the Church and external donors are valued as an inherent part of the Chagga way of life, and a means by which 'development' can be achieved. This echoes Stambach's observation that schooling represents a certain outward-orientation of the Chagga, and a desire to accumulate knowledge about 'modern' and 'popular' culture (1996a, 1996b). These ideas about Chagga identities, modernity and development are further explored in Chapter Seven.

### **Social Inequality among the Chagga**

The process of change undergone by the Chagga during the twentieth century has wrought many transformations in their society (Moore 1986). One of the most profound of these has been the social stratification brought about by the introduction and large scale production of coffee for the export market (Howard 1994, Iliffe 1979, Moore 1986, Setel 1996, Swantz 1985). Prior to the introduction of coffee, the Chagga were not a particularly differentiated society. Chiefs were wealthier than their subjects, and certain patrilineages benefitted from chiefly patronage, although it could not be said that they formed a distinct wealthier 'class' (Moore 1986). Chiefs were responsible for parcelling out *kihamba* and *shamba* land, which was allocated to patrilineages, and could be petitioned for on a yearly basis. In times of famine and extreme need, wealth was redistributed within the chiefdom by the chief (Howard 1994, Moore 1986). In return, Chagga provided labour for their chief. When coffee was introduced however, the value of *kihamba* land rose tremendously. The colonial authorities distributed coffee seedlings to encourage the production of coffee for export, giving the seedlings to the chiefs, their patrilineages, advisors and elders first, enabling them to become the first to cultivate the crop and appropriate land (Swantz 1985). As Setel describes it:

“...[T]he success of coffee cash-cropping spawned a land-grab among Chagga clans with clear winners and losers; the former tending to come from among chiefly lineages and their allies, and the latter from among the weaker lineages. Furthermore, British and German policies of land alienation restricted the geographical expansion of the Chagga population. This combination of forces compounded the effects of population growth, leaving increasing numbers of men landless, and without the ability to mobilize alternative mechanisms for acquiring a *kihamba*” (Setel 1996:1171).

Furthermore, the Chagga custom of passing land to youngest and eldest sons left middle sons in the most insecure positions, many of whom were recruited to work on settler farms during the colonial period (Howard 1994). Later, it was often middle sons who were among the first to migrate away from the mountain in order to find paid work. With the expansion of coffee cultivation, and growing population densities, it became increasingly difficult to acquire *kihamba* land, and only the very richest could afford to accumulate new land. The value of education rose immensely, as it came to be seen as a route to an alternative means of obtaining an income, which partly fuelled the expansion of educational facilities on the mountain. This inequality in land tenure brought about by coffee cultivation has been exacerbated by the Chagga farming system (*Kilimo cha Kichagga*) centred around the *kihamba* (Stambach 1996a, 1996b);

“[D]iscourses of farming on Mount Kilimanjaro emphasize the importance of limiting and containing wealth. “Farming” there represents (among other things) a means to create and sustain social differences” (Stambach 1996b:557).

Attempts to accumulate wealth within the *kihamba* (and thus within the patrilineage) centre around access to water rights via the *fereji* system and the keeping and lending of cattle. Irrigation is controlled by “heads-of-rivers” who determine access to water from the *fereji*. Differential access to what is an ostensibly collective resource serves to create and sustain inequalities between lineages. Similarly, while the tethering of stall-fed cattle is seen as a means of “fixing” wealth to lineage land, the lending of cattle to geographically distant relatives, or as part of bridewealth offerings, serves to limit the circulation of wealth within certain patrilineages (*ibid*).



Traditional Chagga culture emphasised reciprocity and cooperation, which was linked to beliefs in the powers of the ancestors (Howard 1994). Poorer lineage members were often assisted by their wealthier kinsmen, and labour obligations were often mutually shared (Swantz 1985). The change in production relations associated with coffee, however, turned labour into wage employment (often casual labour, on both settler and richer Chagga farms), and a nucleation of clan-based obligations towards the immediate family, rather than towards the patriline (Howard 1994, Swantz 1985). This was observed during my own fieldwork in Hai. Several informants explained how the role of the clan has diminished over the years. One *kitongoji* leader in Wari observed:

“In the past, all social activities were done by the clan members themselves, such as circumcisions, weddings, funerals. Nowadays these things are being done by anybody, or in hospitals, although clans still come together, but they are not as close as they used to be. People contribute less money and time to clan festivities....now a lot can be contributed by friends, which never used to happen. The major function of the clan now is to attend weddings and funerals....People don't have much money to spend on their clan, everyone is struggling to support his own family”.

Another farmer observed that, “people used to be able to get financial and material support from their clan, but now people have to rely on themselves much more”. One poorer farmer explained that he could only invite his neighbours of similar standing to any festivities he hosted, as he was too poor to entertain the richer members of his *ukoo*<sup>115</sup>:

“If I get ill only my wife will be responsible, but if I die, a lot of my *ukoo* members will come to discuss the funeral. Even if I get problems, there are some clan members who are very rich and would not help me if I went and requested help from them. That's why I try to keep cows, chicken and fish, because if I get problems then I can sell them”.

It is therefore apparent that huge differences among the Chagga have developed during the twentieth century. Popular conceptions of the Chagga tend to focus on their relative affluence rather than this internal stratification, which has been partly responsible for the perpetuation of their reputation as an entrepreneurial group.

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<sup>115</sup> *Ukoo* (Kichagga): clan, lineage.

Certainly, many Chagga have benefitted from the transformations which have taken place since the introduction of the coffee crop, and there is a group of relatively wealthy people who still live, or who maintain lineage land, on the mountain. As Howard (1994) points out, the Chagga are over-represented in secondary and tertiary education institutions, the civil service, and senior business and management positions<sup>116</sup>, Kilimanjaro has more health and education facilities than other regions, and owns a large proportion of Tanzania's improved breeds of cattle kept on smallholdings. Simultaneously, however, there are signs of poverty and socio-economic strain, particularly since the coffee price crashes in the 1970s. For example, the region has a higher rate of severe protein-calorie malnutrition than other poorer regions, such as Tabora and Dodoma<sup>117</sup>. It also suffers from huge young male out migration<sup>118</sup> (Setel 1996), and many farmers are attempting to eke out a living on plots of under one acre (Swantz 1985). This has been associated with a general decline in mutual sharing of labour and resources within the extended patriline, although certain practices remain common, such as the lending of cows to relatives<sup>119</sup>. Moore (1986), recounting the various disputes, accusations and legal wrangles within one patriline, observes:

"As economic differentiation takes its modern turn, the disparity between the land- and cash-poor and the salaried becomes irreparable, and the ideal of equivalent reciprocity between kinsmen becomes more permanently difficult to realize....An outsider's first sympathy is with the weak members of the lineage, and their wives and children, the victims of this harsh system and the demographic and economic pressures that make its effects so extreme. But those on top are precariously placed, too. Their resources are not sufficient to carry the poor relatives along without serious risk to themselves. And they know that there is not enough land for their own sons....Influence is needed to

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<sup>116</sup> In 1967, the Chagga constituted 3.7 percent of the national population, and yet 12.4 percent of secondary school students came from Kilimanjaro (Howard 1994:239). Many Chagga also occupy prominent positions within government or opposition parties, and business (well known examples include Augustine Mrema, who became the Deputy Prime Minister in 1993, before leaving the CCM to join the opposition party NCCR-Mageuzi, and Reginald Mengi, the Director of IPP, one of Tanzania's biggest private companies).

<sup>117</sup> Children between the ages of 1 and 5 in Kilimanjaro were found to have a severe protein-calorie malnutrition rate of 5 percent, while children in Tabora had a rate of 1 percent, and children in Dodoma, 4 percent (Howard 1994).

<sup>118</sup> In the 1970s male out-migration was recorded at 25 percent in Kilimanjaro. Setel estimates that "Chagga society in rural areas has been experiencing the slow social loss of adult men for at least 30-40 years" (1996:1172).

<sup>119</sup> In Wari village, many women whom I interviewed explained that they had been "lent" a cow by one of their relatives.

obtain many necessities. Personal networks loom larger than formal organizations, and goods and information move outside the official system” (Moore 1986:308).

Although Moore is describing the situation during the early 1980s when Tanzania’s economic crisis was at its height and goods were very difficult to obtain, many of the processes she observed are still relevant in the late 1990s in the context of the non-governmental sector, as shall become clear in Chapters Six and Seven.

### **Women and gender relations in Chagga society**

While Chagga society has undergone huge changes since the introduction of the coffee crop, the particular impact on women has been extensive. However, just as Chagga society has become highly stratified as a result of this process, so ‘women’ have also become a highly differentiated group, a central theme which is brought out below and in greater detail in Chapter Seven.

In the pre-colonial era, Chagga cosmology saw both women and men as equally vital in the maintenance of the patrilineage (Stambach 1996a). Men were the prime reproducers of the clan, while women were the providers of food and bearers of sons (Bülow 1995). It was of paramount importance that a man had a male heir in order for the patriline to be continued (Swantz 1985). If a first wife did not produce a son, a man would take a second wife. Despite the centrality of women to the maintenance of the patrilineage, women were in general subordinated to men, although they had recourse to various methods of exerting power, such as cursing, becoming an elder (*bibi mzee*), and performing rituals (Bülow 1995, Stambach 1996a). Indeed, Stambach (1996a) is keen to point out that, although ‘traditional’ ideas of womanhood in Chagga culture do focus on the bearing and raising of children, and on food preparation, an equally important part of femaleness is concerned with “controlling the signs associated with maleness: tally sticks, *ngoso* plugs, fire brands, banana tree products<sup>120</sup>” (1996a:33). In this way it is important to appreciate that women were not wholly without power or importance within pre-colonial Chagga culture.

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<sup>120</sup> These items are all associated with traditional male initiation rites.

Transformations which have taken place during the twentieth century have, however, impacted negatively on many Chagga women. The ramifications of coffee cultivation and hardships associated with Tanzania's economic crisis in the 1970s and 1980s, and again in the 1990s (as a result of SAPs) have been most serious for women in Chagga society, especially the poorest women. While the control of the most valuable assets within Chagga culture has remained largely in the hands of men, women have been responsible for supplying labour in order to support the system (Bülow 1995, 1997, Howard 1994, Moore 1986, Swantz 1985).

All households on the mountain are tethered to the subsistence economy in some measure, regardless of status, wealth or source of income (i.e. formal sector jobs, agriculture, petty labouring). As long as a man has a *kihamba*, part of the sustenance of the household must come from the produce of the *kihamba* (Moore 1986). Within Chagga culture, women are primarily responsible for domestic activities (including childcare). It is the duty of the woman to feed the family from products of the *kihamba* (bananas and vegetables), the *shamba* (maize and beans), and whatever she can afford to buy at the market. Meat also forms an integral part of the Chagga diet, when it is available or can be afforded (often only the richer households can afford to eat meat on a regular basis). Slaughtering cattle has always been a man's job, although there are now plenty of butcher's shops in villages from which people can purchase meat. When it is part of a meal, meat is provided by the husband, and he should be given the largest or best part. Cattle are also purchased by men, principally because they are so expensive. Traditional cattle (zebu) have by and large been replaced with improved grade cattle, which produce greater quantities of milk. The labour associated with livestock is performed by women and children, particularly cutting and portering grasses for feeding. These grasses are often cut from the *shamba* land in the *porini*, which involves a very long walk back up the mountain with huge bundles of grasses carried as headloads.

It is women's duty to harvest the bananas from the *kihamba*, although men plant and manage it. General labour in the *kihamba* on the banana trees is done mostly by women as it is considered shameful for men to do this work (Swantz 1985), although

this may be changing with necessity, as I often encountered men working in their *vihamba*. The bananas can be sold to neighbours, or at the market, and any money earned is the woman's to keep. Local beer (*mbege*<sup>121</sup>) brewed from certain types of bananas also falls within women's domain, although the actual trees belong to men, and women must have the permission of their husbands to cut them (Moore 1986). Many women brew beer at home, either for neighbourly and household consumption, or for festivities, or for sale to local bars (*pombe* shops). Again, money earned from beer brewing is kept by the woman. Money earned from beer, bananas, and also from beans harvested from the *porini*, constitute women's legitimate incomes (Swantz 1985). A woman should not attempt to earn more money than her husband, as it is taken as a sign that she wants to terminate the marriage, or thinks herself "above" her husband (Bülow 1995, 1997, Moore 1986, Stambach 1996a, Swantz 1985). Income from coffee and maize are controlled by men, although women also perform much of the labour for these crops as well<sup>122</sup>. Coffee is inherently associated with male rights to the *kihamba*, precluding women's access to any income gained from its sale (Moore 1986). Swantz (1985) argues that the production of coffee has been achievable principally through the utilisation of women's increased labour, based on pre-colonial production patterns of mutual and shared labour. In this way, women's labour on their husbands' coffee trees and *shamba* is not remunerated, but is given as her labour obligation to the household. She has little or no control over the planning or use of her labour, nor does she benefit from the proceeds of it. As Moore has observed,

"[W]omen had no access to the coffee income. Men felt no obligation to share the cash itself with them....even at the level of the household, coffee changed the balance of relationships" (1986:117-118).

The widescale out-migration of men has increased women's burdens, as they are left behind on the *kihamba* to secure the husband's lineage tenure, but they also become solely responsible for cultivating both the *kihamba* and the rented *shamba* plot in the

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<sup>121</sup> Banana beer is known interchangeably as *mbege* (*Kichagga*), or *pombe* (*Kiswahili*).

<sup>122</sup> Most of the labour required for coffee is performed by men, although women contribute to picking and processing; nevertheless, it remains that the most back-breaking agricultural work is predominantly performed by women, particularly in the *porini*.

*porini* (Moore 1986, Swantz 1985). When husbands return intermittently to the village, they keep the money earned from coffee and maize sales:

“The wife shoulders the responsibility for the family. How she manages this depends not only on the income level of the husband but also on his willingness to support his family. It is common that the man thinks that because his wife has her *shamba* she does not need the cash income he earns. Since the women are supposed to manage the family subsistence, men have not become fully aware of the increased strains created by higher prices and the greater number of food and utility items that have to be purchased” (Swantz 1985:94).

Women, therefore, have not benefitted from the increased income from coffee sales, at least in personal terms. Those married to wealthier men have been able to build good houses, employ casual labour on their farms, and send their children to secondary school, but the money remains controlled by men. However, in recent years, economic pressures and the falling incomes generated by coffee have led to new problems at the household level, and have encouraged men and women to seek new ways of earning incomes, a key theme explored in Chapter Seven.

Throughout their lives, women remain the wards of their male kin (Moore 1986). According to Chagga customary law, women were not permitted to hold alienable rights to land, although the Law of Marriage Act (1971) in Tanzanian legislation recognises women’s rights to land<sup>123</sup> (Moore 1986, Swantz 1985). Traditional Chagga culture dictates that a girl or woman is the property of her father until she is married, at which point she becomes the property of her husband and goes to live in his house on his *kihamba*, which he must build in order to be married (Moore 1986, Stambach 1996a). It is generally only through marriage that a woman may gain access to land. Should there be problems within the marriage, a woman may return to her father if her own children are still young. Indeed young wives are often viewed with caution by the husband’s patriline, as she comes from another *ukoo* and her loyalties may still lie with them (Swantz 1985). When her youngest son comes

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<sup>123</sup> For the majority of women however, gaining legal title to land remains the exception rather than the rule. However, in some cases daughters are allocated part of their father’s land, and some educated women are shunning marriage as a means of gaining access to resources, and are choosing to earn their own incomes and buy their own land instead (Stambach 1996a).

of age, he becomes responsible for his mother in the event of marital problems, or if she is widowed. In this way, women's loyalty is eventually tied to her youngest son, and her husband's lineage heir (*ibid*). When her sons marry, this gives a woman a certain amount of power within her husband's family, which is often wielded over new wives. In this way, the changes in women's status and loyalties serves to "break up the solidarity of women as a group" (Swantz 1985:84). Particularly in their later stage of life as *a bibi mzee*, women can exert power and influence, especially with regard to cursing (often other women). Typical curses are thought to cause infertility, illness and general misfortune.

The extent to which Christianity, education and other influences the 'West' have changed many of these practices is unclear. Sorcery and witchcraft are denounced from the pulpit, and yet, as Stambach notes, she had "yet to meet" a Chagga who doubted that such things existed (1996a). While several interviewees in Wari maintained that sorcery is no longer practised nor believed in, other informants spoke of their livestock which had died because of cattle cursing (thought to be perpetrated by jealous neighbours).

The Church, and increasing access to education in particular, have brought about various social changes in village life on the mountain, many of which have already been described above. Stambach (1996a) notes the ways in which girls' secondary education is associated with a 'new type' of woman in Machame, to whom she refers to as *madada ya mjini*, (sisters of the town) as opposed to *mama wa nyumbani* (housewives). These women do not conform to local ideas about marriage, economic dependency on the husband, and work on the farm. They often have jobs in Moshi town, and have no aspirations for marriage: instead, they aim to support themselves. However, such women are in the minority. The majority of women who do not have access to secondary education stay in the village and continue to live on their husbands' and fathers' *vihamba*. However, even for these women, Christianity has had an impact on the ways in which men's and women's roles are perceived (Bülow 1995, Swantz 1985). The impact of Western and Christian notions of maleness and the association between men and the male public sphere has translated

into a connection between men, and formal education, money and the market (Bülow 1995). Men control the cash crops while women deal with food production for the household. Men also occupy salaried positions of status, such as teachers, civil servants, evangelists and pastors. Many men have gone into business or petty trade, although such activities are accorded less status as they are deemed not to involve hard work, either physical or mental (Bülow 1995, Setel 1996). Women, on the other hand, have come to be seen as mothers and housewives at the centre of the Christian nuclear (monogamous) family. Prestige and status for women is attached to their role as respectable, subservient wives and mothers, although as Bulow points out, "to be good Christians and good citizens women must at the same time be educated and development-minded in order to fulfil their roles as modern mothers and housewives" (Bülow 1995:8). For Muslim women and men, similar ideas about modernity and development shape the construction of male and female identities.

New ideas about what is 'modern', 'developed', and Christian, have been assimilated into Chagga culture, giving value to new concepts, and reinterpreting older practices in a new light:

"Preparing the same kinds of ideological sandwiches for Africa that it creates for home consumption, the industrial part of the world packages objects and ideologies 'to go'. But it would be a signal error to think of what is contemporary in Africa today as simply made up of foreign exports. On Kilimanjaro there is also an ongoing local production of 'how to': how to be, how to think, what to have, what to do, how to organise things, all within the parameters of possibility set by happenings on the large scale. Continuously under construction, being invented, is a locally formed version of how to proceed, individually and collectively" (Moore 1996:588).

On Kilimanjaro, external ideas about development and modernity have become inextricably intertwined with local cultural values about wealth, status, and men's and women's roles in society. The ways in which local subjectivities are constructed by a set of wider discourses is further examined in Chapter Seven. However, it is important to note the contemporary socio-economic context in which these processes are taking place, which have been examined above. The transformations brought about by the incorporation into the world market through the coffee crop have been exacerbated recently by economic pressures associated with structural adjustment,



rendering many Chagga men and women in precarious economic circumstances. Chagga society on the mountain has become highly stratified, with huge differences developing between rich and poor, and between and among men and women. Women are subordinated to men in terms of their access to resources and their status as mothers and housewives, although there are ways in which women can achieve a certain amount of prestige, by presenting themselves as good, modern, Christian (or Muslim), and development-minded women. It is in this context of the need for access to resources and culturally acceptable prestige that the non-governmental sector in Hai can be understood as a relatively new, but vital development agent. Chapters Six and Seven examine this in more detail.

### **Research villages**

The analysis presented in Chapters Six and Seven is based on research carried out in the mountain villages of Wari, Nronga, Samaki Maini and Kyengia (although Chapter Six considers patterns and processes within the District as a whole). As outlined above, these villages were chosen initially because of the range of non-governmental projects working within them (see below), although they also differed in socio-economic terms. Geographically, the villages all lie within the coffee-banana belt between 1,100 and 1,800 metres, and thus are bound into the *kihamba* regime of production for at least part of their incomes and sustenance. However, their differing proximities to Moshi town has an effect on the off-farm activities in which people participate. Wari and Nronga villages in Machame are within far easier reach of Moshi, rendering the division between rural and urban a relatively small one. Many people travel to work each day in Moshi and return home to the mountain at night, lending the area a slightly "suburban feel" (Stambach 1996a:30).

The tarmac road which leads up from the Arusha-Moshi highway, through several villages (including Wari) to Foo village in Machame, is regularly served by small buses, pick-ups and private vehicles in which drivers often give lifts to passengers, facilitating business connections with town, and also with Arusha and Dar es Salaam. Traders come up to mountain village markets and load up their pick-ups with bananas, or women travel into Moshi (or further) to sell their own produce. Kyengia

and Samaki Maini, on the other hand, lie further to the west of the District, in Siha. Passengers can travel on buses which leave from Sanya Juu, a small town at the foot of the mountain slopes which used to be the old District headquarters. However, travelling times are longer, as Sanya Juu is roughly 20 to 30 minutes drive away from the Arusha-Moshi road, and transport to the villages beyond it is facilitated by infrequent pick-ups along dirt tracks. Kyengia village is particularly difficult to get to, as it lies a few kilometres from the main Boma Ng'ombe-Sanya Juu road, and there are no pick-up services which run to the village (except for market days in Lawate) principally because of the poor state of the track. Links with Moshi are thus less convenient, and people are less tied into the urban economy than they are in Machame. This has implications for informal sector activities, petty trade and formal sector jobs. Few households on the mountain survive on the produce of their farming activities alone, and men and women are constantly engaged in income-generating activities, particularly if they do not hold a formal job (although even those with poorly paid jobs engage in the informal sector, see table 5.4 below).

*Table 5.4 Occupations of men and women in Hai District (%)*

Sex	Office and sales	Agriculture	Industry	Unemploy'd/ Inform. sector
Male	6.7	46.6	8.3	38.4
Female	3.7	40.9	3.0	52.4

Source: URT (1994)

Wari and Nronga villages, with their links to Moshi, are much better situated in order to take advantage of the possibilities for income-generation in town. Those in Samaki Maini and Kyengia are far more likely to either stay in the village, or to travel only as far as Sanya Juu.

This reflects a general difference between the areas of Siha and Machame. Machame is widely perceived by the Chagga as one of the more 'developed' parts of the mountain. Stambach notes that "local representations of Machame as 'a little Europe' and as 'the most educated rural area in Tanzania'" (1996a:5), reveals the manner in which Machame is perceived locally (and nationally) as more developed than neighbouring areas on the mountain, even by government officials. For

example, when discussing the World Vision project in Hai (see below), the Hai District Assistant Planning Officer explained that he advised the NGO to go and work in the Siha area, as areas such as Machame “are already well-developed. Villages in Machame have (intermittent) access to electricity, although only the wealthiest can afford to install it in their homes (only 6.9 percent of homes in the District have access to electricity, URT 1994). The area’s links with the Lutheran Church are particularly strong (as Machame was one of the first places to be settled by missionaries), and complaints are common about the favouritism of the Bishop of the Northern Diocese, himself from Machame, in directing resources towards the area (Moore 1996). Even within Machame, there are villages which are perceived as more ‘developed’ than others, such as Nronga. One farmer in Wari told me that Nronga was “a developed village” because it had a village tractor and the Nronga women’s milk cooperative<sup>124</sup>. When discussing the village’s reputation with men in Nronga village, they explained that Nronga was successful because of the villagers’ hard work and determination, and the benefits of early mission education and Christianity (men’s group discussions, Nronga). Indeed, it was pointed out that “it’s not easy to see roaming people in Nronga”, with all that this implies for the value attached to industriousness and the stigma attached to laziness and unproductiveness. The village has benefited substantially from remittances sent back from the diaspora of Nronga residents, many of whom have left the mountain to take up high-status positions within the public and private sectors. The men estimated that 75 percent of the villagers’ income now comes from remittances (men’s group interview, Nronga).

Villages on the mountain are relatively large<sup>125</sup>. Several are divided into a number of parishes, as parish boundaries differ slightly from official village boundaries. For example, in Wari village, there are two Lutheran churches, Kalali and Nkwarungo. Kalali parish constitutes five *vitongoji* of Wari village (Kalali, Kisau, Mafoi, Mwera and Urara), and Nkwarungo parish includes the other four *vitongoji* of Wari (Ifiyo,

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<sup>124</sup> These local notions of development and the ways in which local women’s groups contribute to them are explored in Chapter Eight.

<sup>125</sup> According to the Hai District Planning Office projections for 1996 based on the 1988 census, Wari village has 1068 households (5874 inhabitants), Nronga 619 (3407 inhabitants), Kyengia 635 (3500 inhabitants) Samaki Maini 706 households (no estimate for inhabitants is given for Samaki Maini).

Kyalia, Nkwanambo and Rengua), and several *vitongoji* from Foo village also (Nkwamwasi and Nkwamwatu). All four villages in which further research was carried out are predominantly Lutheran, although in Wari village there are a number of Muslims, most of whom live in the two *vitongoji* of Mafoi and Mwera. There are two mosques in Wari, one based in Mwera and a new one which is being built in Kalali, next to the Kalali Lutheran Church, near the market area.

Kalali market is held twice a week on Mondays and Thursdays, where local women come to buy and sell their produce and traders from Moshi come up to the village. Household items, produce, clothes (including *khanga* and *vitenge*, the two most popular types of cloth worn by women) and shoes are also on sale at the market. The market takes place in a large square of shops and hotels (small cafes known as *hoteli*) selling household goods, meat and *pombe*. There are other small shops dotted throughout the village selling similar items.

**Table 5.5 Summary of social services in research villages<sup>126</sup>**

	Primary schools	Secondary schools	Health facilities
Wari	5	1	3
Nronga	2	1	1
Samaki Maini	3	2	1
Kyengia	4	0	0

While all four villages are Chagga inhabited, predominantly Lutheran, and dependent upon coffee, bananas, maize and beans to varying extents, there are important differences between them. The villages in Machame are in general wealthier than those in Siha, particularly in terms of access to off-farm income-generating opportunities, farm sizes, and livestock ownership. Although no data were collected on this, general observations and conditions in the villages suggested this to be the

These figures are likely to be reasonably accurate. I carried out a village survey in Wari in 1996, and recorded 1079 households.

<sup>126</sup> The relative roles of the state and non-state sectors in providing these services is discussed in detail in Chapter Six.

case. In particular, the paucity of shops and services in Kyengia stood in sharp contrast to the (relatively) well-served villages of Nronga and Wari (see table 5.5). The villages also differed in terms of the numbers and types of non-governmental activities taking place. The following section describes the types of non-governmental organisations active within Hai District as a whole. Although information was recorded for all villages in the District<sup>127</sup>, the characteristics of many of the types of activities are based on the groups active in Wari, Nronga, Samaki Maini and Kyengia.

### **The non-governmental sector in Hai District**

Hai District has a long history of non-state organisational activity, principally through the Lutheran and Roman Catholic Churches, and the KNCU (elaborated upon in Chapter Six). The 1980s, however, saw an 'invasion' of Hai by various bi- and multi-lateral organisations, donors and large international NGOs (Kiondo 1995:130). This has been matched by a huge groundswell of small-scale, village-based groups (tables 5.6 and 5.7 below), some of which are supported by international donors. Before considering these organisations however, the discussion will first outline the arguments which Kiondo makes for the 'privatisation of development' (discussed in Chapter Four) in Hai District. An overview of the main types of non-state actors in Hai is then given which looks at CBOs (religious and non-religious women's groups, and men's and youth's groups), NGOs (Primary Health Care Ambassadors Foundation, World Vision Tanzania), and donor NGOs, bi- and multi-lateral organisations (Community Development Trust Fund, Kilimanjaro Women Development Association, Women In Development Fund, UNICEF and others).

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<sup>127</sup> The analysis covers the whole District apart from the largest ward, Siha West. Stretching round the back of the mountain towards the Kenyan border, the ward is not permanently settled and has very few services. Most of the area comprises large farms, on which migrant labourers work seasonally. Furthermore, government officials in Siha East and Siha Central advised me that there were no NGOs or community organisations in the area.

### **A privatisation of development in Hai?**

In Hai District, Kiondo argues that the legacy of missionary presence has contributed towards the development of a thriving and wide-ranging non-state sector. There are two major features of this non-state sector (or 'private sector' according to Kiondo) in Hai District which lend weight to the 'privatisation of development' thesis. The first is embodied in the plethora of what he terms CDAs (Community Development Activities) which are roughly equivalent to CBOs as defined in this thesis. Kiondo argues that the vast majority of these CDAs are patronised by the growing number of international agencies flocking to Hai:

“Local and central government also gives a certain amount of support, but this is generally confined to the 41 registered CDAs. Of the latter, about 75 percent receive significant external support from one or more of all these [international] sources. It is very rare for a CDA group to operate with only marginal or even no external support. Only one group in the sample fell into this category” (Kiondo 1995:132).

According to Kiondo, on aggregate these CDA groups had an approximate total membership of 3,300 in 1993, of whom 94 percent were women. Of all the groups, two thirds were women's groups, while the others were men's or youth's groups (data which are corroborated by that presented below). Kiondo suggests that these CDA groups are dominated by women's groups engaging in income-generating activities, particularly in capital-intensive projects such as zero-grazing dairy cattle, and that they are heavily reliant on donors. The activities of other groups, especially those who do not receive funding of any kind, or those organised under the auspices of a religious institution, are not discussed in relation to Hai District. These women's groups are discussed largely in terms of their function as semi-cooperative businesses, and it is in this sense that they point towards a 'privatisation of development'. While Kiondo's findings are significant, the possibility that these women's groups may exist for other reasons besides the accumulation of profit (and it is implicit that several of these women's groups are indeed generating a sizeable income) is not adequately addressed; similarly, the central question of why local development organisations should be numerically dominated by women's groups is not discussed. It is suggested that women form income-generating groups in order to

boost their incomes, as patriarchal gender relations in Kilimanjaro serve to impoverish women: in this sense, it is suggested that women's CDAs form to meet women's practical gender needs. A central aim of this research was to go beyond the 'privatisation of development' thesis and consider the extent to which the social and cultural geography of the Chagga of Hai District has shaped the nature and role of the non-governmental sector, and in particular, women's groups (Chapter Seven).

The second significant part of Kiondo's argument for the 'privatisation of development' in Hai is bound up in discussion of the Hai District Education Trust Fund (HDETF), a District Development Trust (DDT) set up by local elites to provide secondary schooling. The HDETF falls under the remit of the District Education Office and was established in 1988. It is funded through a district bye-law which adds an additional Tsh.50/=<sup>128</sup> a year to every taxpayer's contribution. Kiondo asserts that the HDETF "works as a form of privatised local government" (1995:131) as it has usurped the local government's role by collecting taxes and distributing the funds among schools as it sees fit. Managed by "district officers, councillors, leading parents, religious leaders and business leaders" (1995:131), the fund is essentially in the hands of an unaccountable local (and national) elite.

Thus Hai is one of the districts in Kiondo's study which illustrates some of the prime examples of the privatisation of development. While the HDETF is operating as a privatised form of local government, the women's groups work as "business operations constituted on a semi-cooperative basis" (Gibbon 1995:31). Indeed, the relative density and successful economic activity of local CBOs in Hai, particularly their ability to attract donors, suggests that the area is a veritable seedbed of enterprising community institutions, which are even able to negotiate a certain amount of accountability from their patrons:

"[R]eally dynamic self-organisation was again most evident in Hai....Here certain client groups became organised in advance and independently of patrons, and for these, the patron/client relation is a negotiated one - even if it is often negotiated by brokers rather than with ordinary people themselves.

<sup>128</sup> The exchange rate between UK Sterling and the Tanzanian Shilling at the time of research was approximately Tsh.1,000/= to £1.00.

To this extent donors and NGOs can be to some extent held responsible for their actions, and the rudiments of culture of accountability can develop” (Kiondo 1995:172-174).

Kiondo’s research is a significant contribution to an understanding of the role of non-governmental sector in Tanzanian development, and how it is being shaped by various political processes. However, I would suggest that the privatisation of development thesis is unable to fully account for the phenomenon of the women’s CBOs, a category of actors which is far more heterogeneous and complex than portrayed, and which is inherently bound up in the social and cultural geography of Kilimanjaro (see below, Chapters Six and Seven). Furthermore, while Kiondo implies that social services are provided by a mixture of public and private actors, the implications and workings of this at the local scale are not explored. Similarly, the politics of patronage and brokerage are discussed, yet the role of the local state in brokering relationships between CDAs, NGOs and donors is also largely ignored. The close intertwining of state and non-governmental actors has emerged as a key characteristic of the non-governmental sector in Hai, and it is this relationship which this thesis has attempted to understand in greater depth (Chapter Six).

### **Types of non-governmental actors**

*Table 5.6: NGOs in Hai District*

<b>Type of NGO</b>	<b>No. of Groups</b>	<b>% of Groups</b>
International	1	1
National	0	0
Local (CBOs)	96	99
<b>Total</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>100</b>

*Table 5.7: Types of NGO activity*

<b>Type of NGO activity</b>	<b>No. of Groups</b>	<b>% of Groups</b>
Service provision/community empowerment	2	2
Women’s income-generating activities	77	79
Men’s income-generating activities	2	2
Youth projects – training	9	10
Village projects - income-generation	3	3
Other	4	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>100</b>



**Table 5.8: Donor support to CBOs**

No. of Donors	No. of Groups	% of Groups
5	1	1
3	1	1
2	8	8
1	41	43
0	45	47
Total	96	100

Source of Tables 5.6 – 5.8: interviews with Ward Community Development Officers

### **CBOs: women's groups under religious institutions<sup>129</sup>**

Women's groups which operate under the aegis of a religious institution are the most common type of community-based organisation in Hai District. Attached to either their local Mosque, Lutheran Church, or Roman Catholic Church, these groups are managed by the mosque or church leaders, and local well-educated and influential women (see Chapter Seven). Despite their different religious origins, the activities of these women's groups are very similar. Most involve some kind of religious instruction, but they are also involved in such activities as running tailoring schools (for young girls), needlework, knitting, keeping vegetable gardens, general handicrafts, selling livestock feeds, a few milling and oil-extracting machine projects, and some zero-grazing. There is usually also a rota for keeping the place of worship clean and tending church gardens and graves.

It is a policy of the Lutheran Church to encourage that each Parish should have a women's group. The groups under the Lutheran Church are the most active in terms of their projects and organisation. Each group has a committee (comprising Chairlady, Secretary and Treasurer) although they are ultimately under the jurisdiction of the Pastor and Evangelist (usually men) of their Church. The projects are mostly income-generating activities. Women sell their handiwork after Church on Sundays, and profits go into a Church women's account rather than accruing to individuals. These funds are supposed to be for the women to use as and when they wish, however, they need permission from the pastor and evangelist in order to

<sup>129</sup> While basic information on all the women's groups in the District was collected (see Appendix Three), the details and descriptions in this section are based on the women's groups interviewed in Kyengia, Nronga, Samaki Maini and Wari villages, brief details of which are given in Table 5.10 at the end of this chapter.

withdraw any money<sup>130</sup>. None of the Lutheran Church women's groups in the research villages had used any of the money they had raised, although they knew it was there and for their use. The women's groups are also often involved in parish kindergartens (virtually all the kindergartens in the district are under the Church or the Mosque), and tailoring schools for young girls. Generally the groups meet once a week to practise their handicrafts, but some groups are more active than others. The church groups are given some financial support from the Lutheran Church, but outside agencies are not encouraged to fund the groups as separate entities. Rather, the groups are supported through the Church's international links. However, the Church does not provide a great deal of money to these groups: in some cases women start their group with their own contributions only (and then return profits to their KKKT account). The one instance of a KKKT women's group with an outside donor had obtained this through their church's special links with German Lutherans<sup>131</sup>.

### ***Other women's groups***

This category is the second largest after religious groups. There were at least 64 such groups in Hai which ranged from large organisations such as the milk co-operative in Nronga with over 400 members to much smaller groups with less than 10 members such as *Jitegemea*<sup>132</sup> Women's Group in Kyengia. An important factor in disaggregating this category of groups is the number of donors from which they have received support (Table 5.10 and Appendix Three). Of all the non-religious women's groups in the district, 49.2 percent have no donor, 38.5 percent have only one and 12.3 percent have more than one donor. This is significant as it has a direct bearing on the activity and scale of operation of a group. Those with at least one donor are able to run higher capital-intensive activities than those which rely merely on member's contributions. Women's groups with several donors (at the top of the

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<sup>130</sup> Pastors are allowed to take a percentage of the women's group income for general purposes, as they see fit. Some women's groups chose to use their money as a donation to their church. One women's group in Magadini, Siha Central, decided to donate a new altar to their church with their fund money (KKKT Women's Department Chairlady for West Hai).

<sup>131</sup> The women's group at Nkwarungo Church, Wari village, received cows from a German donor, no doubt because of the church's particularly strong links with German Lutherans as it was the first Lutheran church to be built by the missionaries in Kilimanjaro.

<sup>132</sup> *Jitegemea* (Kiswahili): self-reliance.

table in Appendix Three) are involved in activities such as zero-grazing and oil-extracting or milling machine projects, which require high capital inputs and also give high returns. Those with one donor typically engage in activities such as the making and selling of handicrafts and *mbege*, buying and selling various goods at the market, cultivating livestock grasses, maize and beans, and there are even a few with milling machine projects. These types of activity generally require lower inputs and reap lower returns. The women's groups with no donors are involved in similar types of projects as those groups with one donor, but these groups are running at a lower operational scale, at least financially, and therefore make even less profit, if indeed any is made at all. It is important to note, however, for all groups in this category, that profits accrue to the group which are then shared out among the individual women, as compared to the religious-based groups where profits are 'looked after' by the church. However, the fact that 49.2 percent of all non-religious women's groups have no donor indicates that the majority of the groups in the district are small-scale, very low capital activities. They often have few members (between 10 and 25), are less active and rely only on what small amounts of capital they can raise among themselves. Only a few women's groups are making substantial profits, and those groups usually have a large member base, competent leadership, and at least one donor (but often more than one). Chapter Six looks in more detail at some examples of successful women's groups in Hai.

### ***Other miscellaneous groups***

Although women's groups represent the majority of CBOs in Hai, there are a few other types which should be mentioned. There are nine youth groups, two men's groups, and several others which include village projects, men and women's groups, and in one case the UMATI (Family Planning Association of Tanzania, see below) village representatives in one ward grouped together with a grant from UMATI to form their own NGO. The youth and men's groups are involved in similar types of projects; carpentry for the youth (which in all cases translated as boys), funded either by the Danish Volunteer Service or CDTF (a national NGO, see below); and bee-keeping for the men (also funded by CDTF). All these types of groups were small with between 5 and 15 members only.

**NGOs: Primary Health Care Ambassadors Foundation (PAFO)**

Primary Health Care Ambassadors Foundation (PAFO) is a Tanzanian NGO founded and directed by the doctor from Kisau *kitongoji*, Wari village. It was registered in Tanzania as an NGO in 1994 and has an international board of directors. In Hai, its main activities are based in Kisau. Dr Masawe has been given land in the *kitongoji* by a local clan, near his home, and the project is being developed there, with the intention to work in other areas at a later stage<sup>133</sup>. PAFO is a community-based service and training organisation which receives its funding predominantly through the Director's contacts. The most important of these is Medical Ambassadors International, an international NGO for whom Dr Masawe works part-time and which in return lends some support to the pilot project being undertaken in Kisau by PAFO. Other sources of support come from Dr Masawe's personal links and networks both within and outside of Tanzania, which were established during the course of his national and international medical career.

PAFO's work in Kisau consists mainly of primary health care and 'community health evangelism'. Children in the *kitongoji* are screened for various preventable health problems, and the results shared at a general parents meeting, during which easy and cheap methods to combat the children's health problems are discussed. In Kisau PAFO has helped villagers to construct improved pit latrines and improved cookers (which used low-cost technologies developed or adapted by the Director). The NGO has also provided some villagers with modern bee-hives and has taught farmers how to dig their own fish ponds, while also training parents about basic hygiene and household sanitation. Other activities of the NGO include the construction of a hospital in Kisau, some agricultural extension services (the World Bank was interested in funding PAFO through the Ministry of Agriculture to slowly take over agricultural extension in the area (Ministry of Agriculture 1996)), and the 'training of trainers' for 'community health evangelism', a series of courses which Dr Masawe teaches all over East Africa for Medical Ambassadors International. 'Community health evangelism' (the belief that full health cannot be achieved unless one is also in harmony with God) is PAFO's approach to primary health care and

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<sup>133</sup> At the time of research, PAFO had also started some work in the parishes of Uswaa and Shiri.

involves training members of the community to be able to deal with household health problems while also promoting hygienic practices and spiritual health within the household. Kisau has a team of about 20 Community Health Evangelists (CHEs), each of whom is responsible for ten households. PAFO has been working in Kisau since 1995 and has two members of permanent staff.

### ***World Vision Tanzania***

World Vision Tanzania (WVT) is the national partner of World Vision International, a large international Christian NGO whose headquarters are in California, USA. WVT has been active in Tanzania since the 1970s when it engaged in emergency relief work. Since its national office opened in Arusha in 1981 it has pursued a more developmental role. It is one of the largest international NGOs working in Tanzania, with a total of 72 projects throughout the country. Within Hai district, WVT has been working in Siha since the early 1980s. Initially projects were carried out through local churches. In Siha the Kyungukyelwa Church Community Development Programme (KCCDP) was one of WVT's first projects. The project covered four villages in Siha Central (Samaki Maini, Nrao Kisaranga, Mowo Njamu and Koboko). It was being phased out in 1997 and replaced with WVT's new vehicle for development, the Area Development Programme (ADP). The Sanya ADP works in all 15 villages in Siha East and Central wards, and has been operational since 1992 (in the villages not already covered by the KCCDP). The project includes very different types of villages, as Siha East and Siha Central are a mix of Chagga inhabited mountain villages, and the villages on the plains (including the market town of Sanya Juu) which are a mix of Chagga and Maasai.

The ADP focuses on whole communities (rather than on parish congregations as was the practice under the CDPs), and seeks to achieve community development through projects which encourage as much community participation and ownership as possible. Projects undertaken by the KCCDP/ADP in Siha include laying/upgrading water pipes to ensure a reliable, potable supply; agriculture support, rehabilitation of health and education buildings, and some evangelism. This has been mostly aimed at the Maasai-inhabited villages on the plains as the villages on the mountain are

already predominantly Lutheran. Communities elect members to sit on the ADP committee to represent them, while WVT communicates and guides the ADP through a Project Co-ordinator (PC, a member of WVT staff) who attends meetings and oversees the progress of the project. The funding for ADP projects comes from child sponsorship organised through World Vision, funds from WVT, some government contributions (particularly in terms of local expertise) and from community contributions in cash and kind.

Since it began, the Sanya ADP has rehabilitated 18 classrooms and built another 7, rehabilitated one dispensary and constructed another, built a technical school for carpentry, and has completed phase one of the work on a potable water supply system which has so far served the district hospital at Kibongoto and the town of Sanya Juu. It is WVT's intention that ADPs should have a lifespan of 15 years, in which case the Sanya ADP should continue until 2006<sup>134</sup>. Over this time period WVT hopes to build the capacity of the communities with which it works in order to enable them to meet the challenges of their own development. To this end, popular participation, empowerment, capacity building and ownership are important programme elements which WVT tries to encourage and nurture as part of the ADP process.

### **Donor NGOs, bi- and multi-lateral organisations**

Many of the NGOs identified in Appendix Three appear as donors only. These include CDTF, KIWODEA, Svillupo 2000, WIDEF and UMATI. Those donors linked to particular CBOs in the research villages are discussed at greater length in Chapters Six and Seven, but for now a short description of those donors who do not feature heavily in the ensuing chapters will be offered.

The Community Development Trust Fund (CDTF) is a Tanzanian NGO based in Dar es Salaam which was founded in 1962. It works in rural areas throughout the

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<sup>134</sup> At the time of research the future of the Sanya ADP was uncertain. WVT now considers that there are other areas of greater need in Tanzania, and that the ADP strategy is not necessarily the best use of the organisation's resources, particularly in the mountain villages (interview, WVT Country Director). This issue is returned to in Chapter Eight.

country and its work in Hai focuses on supporting women's, men's and youth groups by providing milling machines, bee-keeping and carpentry equipment respectively. Another Tanzanian 'donor-type' NGO is the Kilimanjaro Women Development Association (KIWODEA), a regional umbrella NGO for all women's groups in Kilimanjaro region. It was founded by the Kilimanjaro Regional Community Development Officer (RCDO) in 1993 and is now managed by the RCDO and her colleagues within the regional administration and other prominent people involved in local (Moshi) NGOs. KIWODEA is represented in each district in the region by the District Community Development Officers. The organisation has received funds from private sources including high-profile Tanzanian businessmen and politicians, and the Ministry of Community Development, Women and Children. Its aim is to empower women through awareness campaigns and training, although its main activity to date has been the administering of loans to women's groups throughout the region. In Hai, KIWODEA has given at least nine loans to women's groups (according to Appendix Three). These loans are repayable to KIWODEA at a 20 percent interest rate. A similar agency is the Women in Development Fund (WIDEF), which is a government fund administered by the Ministry of Community Development, Women and Children. WIDEF has its own unit at the Ministry in Dar es Salaam, where the staff refer to themselves and WIDEF as an 'NGO'. It was unclear how it worked at the district level, but women's groups in Lawate and Koboko villages have received funds from them.

*Huduma za Uzazi wa Mpango* (UMATI) is the Family Planning Association of Tanzania and is entirely funded by the Japanese Government. In Hai it has trained Community-Based Services (CBS) agents in every village who offer advice to women. They also provide free contraceptives (mostly pills). UMATI has also donated many sewing machines to women's groups particularly those groups attached to their local churches.

In addition to these donors, bi- and multi-lateral organisations have been involved in Hai since the late 1980s, and have worked both directly with the District Council and with CBOs. These have included FAO, various Nordic agencies, the New Zealand

Government, the German Government and UNICEF. The most recent of these is the Boma Ng'ombe-Uroki Water Supply Trust, a project funded through German-Tanzanian co-operation and is the first non-governmental consumer-oriented rural water supply organisation in the country (*Guardian* 1997). Pipes and taps were laid from Masama down to Boma Ng'ombe, providing potable water as part of a project which would charge user fees in order to maintain the system.

**Table 5.9 Summary of other bi- and multi-lateral, and Tanzanian NGO activity in Hai**

<b>Bi- and multi-lateral organisations</b>	<b>Tanzanian NGOs</b>
Danish Volunteer Service (funding youth carpentry groups)	Tanzanian AIDs Project (information and awareness)
World Bank (school rehabilitation)	SWAAT (AIDs work)
UNDP (rehabilitation of traditional irrigation furrows)	MUTAN (AIDs work)
ILO (road construction)	
SIDA (educational materials)	
JICA (irrigation studies)	
DFID (enquiry into adult morbidity and mortality)	
Austrian Government (rehabilitation of secondary schools, construction of wells)	

Various other bilateral donors and national NGOs have been active in Hai for some time (see table 6.9 for a summary of some of these). UNICEF has also been involved in Hai between 1987 and 1996 with its Child Survival and Development Programme (CSDP), administered in close collaboration with the District Administration. This had many elements, including the support and some rehabilitation of dispensaries and health centres and the setting up of feeding and weighing stations throughout the district. As with UMATI, village representatives were trained in child and maternal care and provided with essential drugs kits.



Children below five years were checked for health problems and if necessary mothers were advised to take them to clinics. The CSDP also visited schools to check pupils' conditions. When the project ended in 1996, Hai District Council passed the Hai Maternal and Child Care Services by-law which attempts to continue to support the community workers trained by the CSDP and to provide them with drugs through local taxation. According to Appendix Three UNICEF has also assisted several women's groups by providing funds.

### **Summary: the non-governmental sector in Hai**

This chapter has reviewed the general characteristics of Hai District, the Chagga, and the non-governmental sector in order to introduce the local setting for the analysis which follows in Chapters Six and Seven. It has been argued that the Chagga, although a relatively affluent group within Tanzania, are a highly stratified society, with many wealthy and poor families living in close proximity to one another. The Chagga are also a patriarchal society and the position of women remains socially and economically subordinated to men, although some women are able to wield power as they grow older and gain status within their family roles. Differentiation has resulted from unequal land allocations at the time of the introduction of the coffee crop, and the subsequent crash of coffee prices on the world market. The fall in coffee prices and the liberalisation of coffee marketing has rendered coffee cultivation too expensive for many poorer Chagga. Agricultural diversification, an increase in off-farm incomes (where possible), and informal sector activity, have been the main responses.

At the same time, a wide range of non-governmental activity has emerged within the relatively small district of Hai. While the largest component of this activity is comprised mainly of small women's CBOs, there are also CBOs and NGOs to be found with one (or more) international donors. Hai has also become a focus for international NGOs and donors, as exemplified by World Vision Tanzania and other bilateral and multilateral organisations discussed above.

The diverse non-governmental sector which has grown up in Hai over the past decade represents a new resource for the Chagga, both in personal and collective terms. In this sense, the overall nature of the NGO sector in Hai, with its emphasis on income-generating groups and general social welfare activities, reflects the general characterisation of the national NGO sector discussed in Chapter Four. In particular, the absence of advocacy groups, campaign organisations or those fighting for particular issues is marked, as it is at national level. The following two chapters explore the nature of the emerging NGO sector in Hai in greater detail. Chapter Six considers the role of the non-governmental sector in service provision, looking in particular at the relations and coordination between the local state and the non-governmental sector. Chapter Seven then explores the impact of the non-governmental sector at the village level, and focuses on the ways in which local participation is facilitated, particularly among women. While the non-governmental sector offers access to resources, participation is also inherently bound up with local notions of 'development'.

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**Table 5.10: Women's groups in the four research villages**

Group and village	Year started (in present form)	No. of members	Contributions	Donors	Activities
Nronga Women Dairy Cooperative Society, Nronga	1988	c.400 although more women use facilities	Unknown	FAO DANIDA, Nordic Project, Blue Eagle Foundation, FES, Technoserve	Buying and marketing milk in town (Arusha, Moshi, Dar es Salaam), selling livestock feeds, artificial insemination, providing credit
Kalali Women's Group, Wari	1988	c.120	Tsh.1,050/=	CDTF Svilluppo 2000	Milling machine, threshing machine, saving for oil-extracting machine, selling livestock feeds, dairy cattle
Ifiyo Women's Group, Wari	1990	20 (plus 50 "inactive")	Tsh.5,050/=	Ex-MP for Hai, New Zealand Ambassador for Zimbabwe	Building girls' tailoring school (now inoperative)
Nkwarungo Women's Group, Wari	1989	c.30	Tsh.1,000/=	KKKT, German Lutherans,	Growing and selling livestock grass, keeping dairy cattle, selling milk
Lakitore Women's Group, Samaki Maini	Unknown	15	Unknown	KKKT (no material support)	Tailoring, knitting, gardening, learning home economics
Ngaroni Women's Group, Samaki Maini	Unknown	30	Unknown	KKKT (no material support)	Home economics, gardening and keeping livestock, lending calves
Mese Women's Group, Samaki Maini	1995	6	Unknown	KKKT (no material support)	Cultivating maize and beans, knitting
Sango Women's Group, Samaki Maini	Unknown	c.30	Tsh.1,000/=	KKKT (no material support)	Knitting, selling kangas, making and selling pastries
Tumaini Women's Group, Samaki Maini	1995	c.25	Tsh.10,000/=	None	Communal savings group: aim is for every woman to contribute Tsh.50,000/= by 1999 for milling machine
Jienedezeze, Kyengia	1996	23	Tsh.7,000/= over 6 months	None	Building a banda for selling livestock feeds
Orumwi Women's Group, Kyengia	1996	16	Tsh.10,000/=	None	Buying and selling livestock feeds/concentrates
Jitegemea, Kyengia	1993	8	Tsh.1,000/=	None	Brewing and selling mbege (local brew)
Kirisha Women's Group, Kyengia	1994	13	Tsh.50,000/= over 3 years	None	Saving for milling machine, giving loans to members

# **CHAPTER SIX**

## **Privatisation or polarisation? The non-governmental sector and the state in Hai**

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### **Introduction**

This chapter explores the interrelationships between the national and local state, the non-governmental sector, and individuals in supporting developmental activities in Hai District. A useful point of departure for such an analysis is found in Kiondo's (1995) work (elaborated upon in Chapter Four) which argues that development in contemporary Tanzania can be characterised by a new form of privatisation which ultimately facilitates the hi-jacking of local development efforts by elites and their patronage networks. His analysis of Hai District draws on the non-governmental contribution to the provision of health and education services and the activities of CBOs (which translates to a focus on women's organisations as they are the most numerous CBOs in the district), which is followed in the analysis developed here as these are three of the major areas of non-governmental activity in Hai. However, while Kiondo's work raises some important questions about the politics of the non-governmental sector in local development, I argue here that his notion of the 'privatisation of development' does not go far enough in explaining the emerging relationship between state and non-governmental actors in Hai District. Furthermore, the privatisation of development offers little insight into an appreciation of why women's groups have become so prominent, in numerical terms, in the District. This chapter will take a closer look at the interweaving of the various actors involved in service provision and women's activities in Hai, and will consider the implications for the debate about the state and non-state contribution to development, 'developmental synergies' and social capital. It is argued that a greater role for the non-state sector in local development is not necessarily commensurate with more equitable and effective social service provision, nor with truly grassroots activities which benefit the poorest and marginalised groups. In this sense,

local development in Hai is characterised by a polarisation, rather than a privatisation, of development.

### **State and non-state actors in service provision in Kilimanjaro**

Kilimanjaro has been a contested arena for access to power and resources in the national context since the introduction of the coffee crop in the early twentieth century (Samoff 1980).<sup>135</sup> Since then, the Chagga, religious institutions, the colonial authorities, local politicians, and the national government, have vied at different times and for different reasons to promote their own agendas and to control development in the region. The provision of services in Kilimanjaro thus became intimately bound up with contests for constituencies and legitimacy. For these reasons, a complex pattern of service provision has sprung up in Hai since the arrival of the missionaries, supported by an increasingly wide range of providers and donors. While the local government has remained one of the principal agents in service provision in the 1990s, other actors continue to provide their own services or to subsidise government services, including the Roman Catholic and Lutheran Churches, BAKWATA, several NGOs and CBOs, international donors, privately-run services, and contributions made in cash or kind by the local population. All of these non-governmental sources are instrumental in providing Hai with its principal services in health and education.

The national government has never been able to consolidate its power base in Kilimanjaro Region. During the early TANU era of nation-building, which attempted to pursue an egalitarian and regionally-balanced development strategy, the Chagga were well aware of the advantages which their area held over other, less developed parts of Tanzania, and remained reluctant to yield to the redistributive policies of the independent government. Thus a 'tension' developed between Kilimanjaro and the rest of Tanzania which was characterised by the former's attempts to shield itself from national policies which were deemed harmful to its prosperity and development (Samoff 1974). The Party's *ujamaa* policy which encouraged the rural population to

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<sup>135</sup> The region referred to as Kilimanjaro by many authors, including Samoff in this instance, generally refers to the geographical area surrounding the mountain rather than the political entity which exists in the 1990s. It is used here in the context of the importance of coffee farming for the whole area, and

move to nucleated settlements did not have a huge impact on Kilimanjaro, partly because people were already settled so densely that the move towards new 'cooperative villages' made little difference to them<sup>136</sup> (Moore 1986). During the *ujamaa* period, the region remained an outpost of capitalist activity, tied into the global economy through the production of coffee (Samoff 1980). The revenue raised for Tanzania by Kilimanjaro coffee became one of the country's major exports and allowed the region a certain degree of autonomy from a central government which could not afford to jeopardise coffee production:

"The Tanzanian government has faced successive obstacles to introducing socialism in Kilimanjaro and to redistributing income from Kilimanjaro to other areas of the country...Because of the importance of coffee revenue to the Tanzanian economy and because Kilimanjaro's educational advantages enabled its citizens to assume prominent roles and have substantial influence in the national leadership, the values and orientations consonant with capitalist development have been spread beyond the region's borders. Kilimanjaro's local dominant class have been able to oppose socialist development strategies largely by redefining them so they are not at odds with their own interests" (Samoff 1980:13).

In this sense, the national state has never been looked upon by those in Kilimanjaro as the benevolent provider; rather it has been widely perceived as a suspicious interloper determined to redirect development away from the region. However, this is also partly due to the fact that the Chagga have never really needed to rely on the state, at least in terms of service provision. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the missionary legacy remains indelibly marked on the landscape. Missionaries constructed and managed health and educational facilities from the early twentieth century, but more importantly, they linked Kilimanjaro into the global network of resources afforded through the institution of the Church. The relatively good access to education on Kilimanjaro allowed many Chagga to reach the higher echelons within the state, and more recently within the private sector (which has also been instrumental in attracting further resources to particular villages within the region, as will be explored below). Secondly, the importance of the coffee crop cannot be overemphasised. The revenue

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remains relevant as Hai District is inherently subsumed within all references to "Kilimanjaro" as an area of study.



brought into the region by coffee was ploughed back into local infrastructure, through *ad hoc* organisations which sprang up to administer new private schools, and also through the KNCU's education fund, which levied a tax on coffee sales to support the building of private schools (Samoff 1987). Thus the Chagga were able to organise themselves and use their advantages (such as the missionary legacy) in order to further their progress.

The expansion of private schools in Kilimanjaro since independence provides a good example of the way in which the Chagga have been able to organise locally and to provide educational facilities largely independent of government. During both the 1960s when the party was pursuing redistributive development policies, and the 1970s when the 'Education for self-reliance' policy had got underway, demand for education on Kilimanjaro remained high. The Chagga were particularly keen to build more secondary schools, which directly opposed the government's policy of expanding primary education to enable all Tanzanians to gain a basic education. Samoff explains how the Chagga organised themselves in order to satisfy local demand in the face of such restrictive central government policies:

"As this process unfolded, local residents, not national officials, had the primary initiative. Within the local area, the churches, able to provide leadership and draw on external funds, maintained their central educational role. An alliance of local politicians and church leaders, with local mass support, was thus effectively able to deflect a national redistributive policy" (Samoff 1987:338).

Ishumi (1995) has suggested that it was only in places like Kilimanjaro which had had strong cooperative movements (the KNCU) or which had a certain degree of national political influence which were able to expand schooling in this way; certainly private schools did not flourish in a similar way throughout the rest of Tanzania between the 1960s and the mid-1980s. By 1969 Kilimanjaro had approximately twice the national proportional average of students enrolled in primary school. Similarly, by the mid-1980s, "fully 42 per cent of all the private secondary schools in the country were in Kilimanjaro Region, whose residents were 5.3 percent of the total mainland Tanzania

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<sup>136</sup> However, this is not to suggest that the discourse of *ujamaa* did not have any impact on Kilimanjaro, as Chapter Seven will argue.

population” (Samoff 1987:341). Indeed, while Samoff’s discussion relates to the wider Kilimanjaro area, within Hai itself several primary and secondary schools were built by local farmers in the years after independence. Many of these schools subsequently became government schools as part of the government’s nationalisation drive which took place in 1971. Primary schools have since remained under the jurisdiction of government. However, due to increasing demand for secondary education and the state’s increasing inability to meet this demand, the government was forced to return non-state secondary schools to their original sponsors in the mid-1980s (Munishi 1995). In the mid-1990s, Hai has nineteen secondary schools; eight belonging to the Lutheran Church, five to the government, four to the Roman Catholic Church, and two to the *Jumuiya ya Wazazi* (Tanzanian Parents Association).

It is difficult to draw such a detailed picture of the history of health provision in Hai or Kilimanjaro more generally, as it has not received as much attention in the literature as has education. Many rural health centres were built throughout Tanzania with government funding although actual construction work was carried out by local villagers as part of ‘self-reliance’. Following the Arusha Declaration certain non-governmental and church-run facilities were handed over to the government, although it is not possible to be specific about facilities in Hai which were affected by this policy. The Kilimanjaro Christian Medical Centre just outside Moshi, which was run by the Lutherans, was handed over to the government in the 1970s, whereupon it became the zonal referral hospital. It has since been handed back to the Lutheran Church for management. In Hai, most health facilities were constructed and managed either by the state or a religious organisation, suggesting less community involvement in organising for health care than for schooling. This may well be a reflection of the Chagga desire for education (Stambach 1996).

Therefore, non-state providers have always either supplemented state efforts, or provided their own entirely, in Hai since before independence. The only recent major change has been the influx of international development agencies, and the rise of locally-based CBOs and NGOs as important actors in local development, both of which have been steadily increasing in number since liberalisation in the mid-1980s.

### **State/non-state service provision in Hai: dichotomy or continuum?**

Debates about the state and the non-state sector in development often assume a dichotomous relationship between the 'public' and the 'private' spheres (Evans 1996a, 1996b, Gibbon 1996, Gibbon and Bangura 1992, Milroy and Wismer 1994, Stewart 1997). As outlined in Chapter One, metaphors of state 'withdrawal', and of NGOs 'filling in gaps', implicitly sets up a dichotomy between the two spheres (e.g. Clark 1991, Kiondo 1995, Marcussen 1997, Rothchild and Chazan 1988, World Bank 1989). Such an analysis views both sectors as part of a zero-sum equation in which the increasing contribution of NGOs and community groups to local development is necessarily a response to a decrease in public provision. For example, several writers characterise state-society relations in Africa by processes either of incorporation (e.g. rural-urban migration, civil service employment) or disengagement (e.g. informal sector, black market) (Azarya 1988, Chazan 1988, see also Hyden 1980, 1983). In this sense, non-state activities (or 'civil society', according to these authors) are viewed as disengagement (or 'exit') from the state. What this overlooks is that the actors within the non-state sector do, in fact, make rather large use of linkages, personal networks and ties *with* the state. As Gibbon *et al.* have observed:

“...the rigid distinction between state and non-state, public and private....is misplaced in the African context. A fundamental feature of African economies is in fact the predominance of grey economic activity in which these sectors become not only blurred but blended” (1992:16).

Similarly, Bayart (1986, 1993) suggests a 'straddling' between public and private spheres in Africa<sup>137</sup>, while Fatton (1992) argues that state and society must be seen as an 'organic totality' rather than as 'distinct and opposite worlds'. Moreover, both Bayart and Fatton suggest that such a process is highly infused by unequal power relations, to which we shall return later. Therkildsen and Semboja (1995) have also argued for an

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<sup>137</sup> Bayart (1993) expressly suggests that Tanzania may be the only country in Africa in which elites were constrained from using their public positions for private gain, by the Leadership Code of the Arusha Declaration which required all government officials to declare their private assets in an attempt to curb accumulation and rent-seeking activities. Nevertheless, within the current liberalised environment, the possibilities for 'straddling' in Tanzania are substantial. Moreover, Bayart's notion of 'straddling' is significant here because of the conceptual possibilities contained therein, rather than in order to directly refer to particular individual accumulation strategies across the public/private divide.

approach to the evolving nature of service provision in East Africa which not only recognises the contribution of NGOs but which acknowledges the continued importance of the state, and the subsequent ‘blurring’ of the public/private boundary to which this has given rise:

“This straddling between the public and the voluntary sector is a key feature of privatization of service provision in East Africa” (Therkildsen and Semboja 1995:28).


It will be argued below that this is certainly the case in Hai District in the 1990s. The ‘overlapping’ of service providers for education and health facilities in the district indicates clearly that individual services rely on a range of providers to sustain them, rather than simply on a singular actor from the ‘public’ or the ‘private’ sphere alone. For example, while primary schools are essentially considered to be government services, they rely on NGOs, international donors and parents’ contributions in order to carry out building or rehabilitative work, or for day-to-day running costs. At the same time, these schools are considered ‘government’ services because teachers’ salaries are paid for by the state, and they are government registered. While it is recognised that teachers’ salaries constitute the largest recurrent cost for any school, it is still important to acknowledge that pigeon-holing these schools as either ‘public’ or ‘private’ services would be to ignore the input of both sectors in keeping these schools open. Furthermore, the sources of support for health and education shown in these maps suggest a complex set of relationships between actors. It is suggested here that service provision in Hai District is characterised by a continuum of state and non-state providers. In this way, the traditional boundaries between the public and private are collapsed, enabling a more dynamic interpretation of institutions and their interaction in providing services. It is also a more useful lens through which to look at the political economy of service provision in Hai and for understanding the inequalities which result.

### **Education and health services**


The provision of basic education and health services are two of the most important developmental roles of any government. Maps 6.1-6.18, which form the basis for the discussion which follows, show the main providers for health, primary and non-primary

education services in the ten permanently settled wards in the district. The symbols indicating the service providers are not placed in any order of importance. Rather, the intention is to convey visually the 'continuum' of state and non-state service providers in health and education. In this sense, some services are wholly governmental and do not receive inputs from other sources, such as the government health clinics (maps 6.1-6.4). They are administered and funded by local government, even if the essential drugs kits or other resources are donated to the government by international agencies. Other services however, such as primary schools, which are also officially 'government' services, also receive support from other non-state resources (maps 6.9-6.18). These other sources are indicated where appropriate by separate symbols. For example, every primary school is illustrated as being provided at least by 'government' and 'contributions' (while some may also have further sources of funding). This reflects the fact that, for example, while government may remunerate teachers and provide some materials for rehabilitation or the building of extra classrooms, as outlined above, parents must also meet much of the schools' daily running costs.


Map 6.1: Health service provision in Masama Division, Hai District



**Map 6.2: Health service provision in Machame Division, Hai District**




**Map 6.3: Health service provision in Lyamungo Division, Hai District**







Map 6.4: Health service provision in Siha Division, Hai District




**Map 6.5: Non-primary education provision in Masama Division, Hai District**



**Map 6.6: Non-primary education provision in Machame Division, Hai District**




**Map 6.7: Non-primary education provision in Lyamungo Division, Hai District**




**Map 6.8: Non-primary education provision in Siha Division, Hai District**

*Map 6.7: Primary school provision in Masama South Ward, Masama Division, Hai District*




Map 6.9: Primary school provision in Masama South Ward, Masama Division, Hai District



**Map 6.10: Primary school provision in Masama West Ward, Masama Division**




**Map 6.11: Primary school provision in Masama East Ward, Masama Division, Hai District**







**Map 6.12: Primary school provision in Machame North Ward, Machame Division, Hai District**




**Map 6.13: Primary school provision in Machame Uroki Ward, Machame Division, Hai District**




**Map 6.14: Primary school provision in Machame West Ward, Machame Division, Hai District**




**Map 6.15: Primary school provision in Machame South Ward, Lyamungo Division, Hai District**




**Map 6.16: Primary school provision in Machame East Ward, Lyamungo Division, Hai District**



**Map 6.17: Primary school provision in Siha East Ward, Siha Division, Hai District**



**Map 6.18: Primary school provision in Siha Central Ward, Siha Division, Hai District**



At this juncture two points of caution should be noted. Firstly, despite the fact that the analysis which follows argues that there is an inequitable distribution of resources within the district, it does not use data on varying population densities in the district to support this. It would have been useful for the analysis to show how population densities vary within Hai, however due to the nature of the information available in the field this was not possible. As a (very) general guide, the villages on the mountain (north of a line which runs approximately from Koboko in Siha Central through Lawate and Mbosho, to Urori in Machame East) are highly densely populated while those on the plains are far less dense in comparison. Given this scenario, it would be expected that more services and non-governmental actors would be present on the mountain. The data illustrated in maps 6.1 to 6.18 is equivocal about drawing such a conclusion, possibly indicating that population distributions are not particularly significant in influencing the distribution of either state or non-governmental resources for health and education services. Furthermore, because of the nature of the data collected, it was not possible to calculate population thresholds and catchment areas for various social services (which to a certain extent would be of only marginal use as the constituent areas for some services, particularly several of the secondary schools, include Moshi, Arusha, Mwanza and Dar es Salaam). Thus, it is not possible to draw conclusions about the distribution of resources vis-à-vis population density as part of this analysis.

The second note of caution is with regard to the maps of social service provision. These are not intended to be complete representations of social service provision in Hai District. This is because of the quality of the data which was collected for most of the schools and health facilities in the district. Information about state and non-governmental contributions towards social service provision in the majority of the villages relied on the knowledge of the Ward CDOs and thus is likely to be rather general (for example, few Ward CDOs could give details about private donations to social services). In this sense, the information shown in Maps 6.1 to 6.18 is presented here only as a guide to state and non-governmental provision. However, the information which was collected from health and education facilities in each of the four



research villages was far more detailed. It is the data from the four research villages upon which the analysis and the conclusions in this chapter is based.

### ***The interweaving of the state and non-governmental sectors***

The interweaving of state and non-state actors in social service provision is not immediately obvious when considering the main providers of health and education services. The state in Hai has retained a central role in providing health and education, despite the historical impact of the Roman Catholic and Lutheran churches, and the Chagga success in organising locally to build their own schools (Tables 6.1 and 6.2).

***Table 6.1 Main providers of education services in Hai***

Main provider	Primary school	Secondary school	Day care centre	Technical / carpentry	Tailoring school
Government	123	5	0	1	0
KKKT	0	8	15	3	2
BAKWATA	0	0	4	0	0
RCC <sup>138</sup>	0	4	0	1	0
Contribs.	0	0	1	0	0
Other	0	2 ( <i>Wazazi</i> )	0	1 (WV)	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>123</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>2</b>

***Table 6.2 Main providers of health facilities in Hai***

Main provider	Hospital	Clinic	Dispensary	PHC <sup>139</sup>
Government	1	10	13	1
KKKT	1	1	3	1
BAKWATA	0	2	1	0
RCC	0	0	7	0
Contributions	0	0	1	0
Other	0	0	16 (private) 2 (WV) 1 (UNICEF)	1 (PAFO)
<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>3</b>

Sources: author's own research

The main providers are based on responsibility for managing a particular facility. The state emerges as the sole provider in primary education, and second only to the Lutheran Church in secondary education. In health care, state clinics outnumber any

<sup>138</sup> Roman Catholic Church

<sup>139</sup> Primary Health Care.

other provider and there are only three more private dispensaries than state-managed ones.

Despite this apparent dominance by the local state, interpreting service provision in this way (i.e. by managerial responsibility) conceals a great deal of supplementation of state provision, as maps 6.1 to 6.18 make quite clear. Various non-state providers have proved vital in providing equipment, training, running costs, and in rehabilitating infrastructure. The most important of these are the user fees which enable facilities to keep running. These range from those which are compulsory and payable by law (e.g. HDETF, Hai Maternal and Child Care Fund), to those which are payable upon consumption of a particular service (e.g. private dispensaries). Not all state services require these subsidies. Government clinics, for example, of which there are ten in Hai, do not charge users for the drugs they need, nor for consultation. However, the government has plans to change this, and 'cost-sharing' is slowly being introduced into all government health services. Kibongoto hospital, situated in Mae village, which is part Hai District hospital and part TB national referral hospital, introduced cost-sharing in 1995. Patients must now pay for all services except maternal and child health services. The consultation fee in 1997 was Tsh.300/= (£0.30).

User fees are payable by law for primary schooling. The Universal Primary Education (UPE) tax was set at Tsh.200/= per student per year until 1997, when it increased five-fold "due to inflation" to Tsh.1,000/= (Hai District Education Officer). On top of this, primary schools set their own rate of annual contributions for parents, which varies between schools. The lowest annual contribution per student in the four research villages was found to be Tsh.2,800/= (£2.80) at Kitahemwa Primary School in Kyengia, which included Tsh.1,000/= UPE, and Tsh.1,800/= to pay the cook, provide the food and to pay for the upkeep of the school farm. Such a low contribution was unusual; other schools in the four villages charged on average Tsh.4,000/=. The most expensive schools charged Tsh.5,000/= per year per student (Samaki Primary School in Samaki Maini, Machame Primary School and Nkwarungo Primary School in Wari), which again covered the UPE tax and students' meals in school. Some schools, such as Nkwarungo, also required parents to contribute a tin of maize and a bag of beans

towards pupil's meals. As parents also have to provide their children with equipment and uniforms, primary schooling can be very expensive. Despite these expenses, primary schools remain state services because they are managed by the District Education Office. Teachers' salaries are paid by the state, and in some cases the government provided the initial materials to build the schools in the 1960s and 1970s. Villagers then erected the schools themselves, and have since assumed responsibility for their upkeep and rehabilitation; although this has arisen more out of state neglect than out of choice. This is not to suggest that schools in Hai are of a particularly high standard. Often parents cannot afford the obligatory contributions (some respondents in Wari explained how their children had been sent home when they had repeatedly failed to pay their primary school contributions) or to help with rehabilitation or building work, and many of the schools in the four villages are in a poor state, in urgent need of rehabilitation, extra classrooms, and equipment. As the Headmaster of Nkwarungo Primary School remarked, "Sometimes we have no chalk - what are we supposed to write with, our fingers?"

There are two ways in which the local state gives material support to primary schools; either through the Hai District Education Trust Fund (HDETF), or through the Ward Development Budgets. Both of these channels are only made possible through taxation. Two taxes are payable by law by every man and every employed woman over eighteen; the development levy of Tsh.1,000/=, twenty percent of which goes directly to the appropriate Ward Development Budget, and the HDETF levy which is Tsh.50/=. Money is also raised for the HDETF through charging a tax on every kilogram of coffee sold to the KNCU (Tsh.10/=). The HDETF is administered through the district's Education and Culture Committee headed by the District Education Officer. Funds are distributed according to perceived need, and schools are encouraged to apply to the fund for money. Kiondo (1995) perceives the HDETF to be important in Hai: he interprets it as a privatised form of local government, dominated by local and national elites, who are unaccountable to the local population. However, it would be a very difficult task to divorce the HDETF from the local government, and particularly from the education office and its staff. Those local councillors elected to sit on the Education and Culture Committee are the same 'local elite' who sit on the board of the HDETF. The fund

seems to be more about supplementing poor central government resources through a local tax rather than a wholesale and questionably legitimate 'privatisation' of local government.

Moreover, the fund has very little impact within schools in the district. Of the fourteen government schools visited during the research, only two primary schools had received anything. Machame Primary School received twelve desks, and Nronga Primary School received teaching aids and funding for teachers to attend seminars. Clearly the HDETF is not a major provider for schools in the district.

The Ward Development Budgets are similarly of little benefit to the majority of schools. By giving the Ward Councils responsibility for allocating a small amount of local taxes to ward development, the state is "fostering participatory and sustainable development"<sup>140</sup> (Hai District Assistant Planning Officer). Twenty percent of the development levy collected by the Village Secretaries is thus given to the Ward Councils for designation within the ward. In practice, the Ward Councils have about Tsh.800,000/= (£800) to allocate within their ward. Only one school reported receiving anything at all from the ward funds; Naluti Primary School in Nronga had received Tsh.200,000/= in 1996, which they used for purchasing building materials in order to rehabilitate part of the school (map 6.14). These ward funds are so small that they cannot be expected to make any significant or sustainable contribution towards the provision of social services.

It therefore becomes quite clear that schools in the district are essentially reliant upon parental and village contributions to meet running costs. As maps 6.5-6.8 for non-primary education services illustrate, the contribution of non-state sources is considerable. Even for primary education (maps 6.9-6.18) all schools are supplemented by village contributions. Wari Secondary School in Wari village provides a detailed illustration (map 6.6). Opened in 1982 under the *Jumuiya ya Wazazi*, the local residents

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<sup>140</sup> These are now buzz-words for officials in Tanzanian local governments, associated with a new drive towards decentralisation. Local governments in Tanzania were abolished in 1972 when all local administration was taken over by "deconcentrated central government institutions" (Eriksen 1997:257). Although labelled 'decentralisation', this period was marked by particularly heavy central government control over the regions and districts. In 1982 elected local governments were re-instated, and decentralisation is now back on the political agenda.

collected money and constructed the school, and approached the *Wazazi* as an appropriate private body under which they could register the school. At that time there were few secondary schools in the surrounding villages and people from the whole of Machame North and some parts of Lyamungo, the neighbouring division, also contributed. Initially the parents wanted the school to be a technical school, but could not afford the necessary tools, and so in 1988 the school was reregistered as Wari Secondary School, with an agricultural rather than technical bias. As a private secondary school, its main income derives from students' fees. In 1996-97 the fee for a boarding student was Tsh.120,000/=, plus Tsh.10,000/= caution money and Tsh.6,000/= advance medical expenses. Day students pay a lesser rate of Tsh.70,000/=, plus Tsh.15,000/= lunch money. In 1996-97 the school has eighty-eight students, less than twenty-five percent of whom come from the surrounding villages; and only a small proportion of those come from Wari itself. This is partly because several other secondary schools have since been built in neighbouring villages (Nronga has a Lutheran secondary school, and there is a government girls' secondary school in Foo). Most of the students at Wari Secondary School are from Dar es Salaam, Arusha, and Moshi. Teachers are paid by *Wazazi* and by the school's board.

However, the school has been experiencing financial difficulties (the Headmaster estimated that it had a recurrent budget deficit of 25 percent) and the two villages now 'responsible' for the school (by bye-law) Wari and Foo, are now imposing a tax on every household of Tsh.1,000/= in order to keep the school running. Additionally, all local businessmen will be asked to contribute Tsh.2,000/= per business licence owned, and all those with local *pombe* shops will be asked to contribute Tsh1,000/=. As the Headmaster put it, "it will hurt poor families but it is a bye-law that these two villages look after the school".

The school has also received some support from other non-state actors. The National Education Trust Fund in Dar es Salaam donated science and laboratory equipment worth Tsh.2million/=. The KNCU often used to donate money from their education fund, for example they gave the school Tsh400,000/= in 1992, but since the liberalisation of the cooperatives this avenue of funding has become unavailable. The

HDEF has pledged its support to the sum of Tsh.15million/= but it was unclear when funds would become available.

Other schools in the district are increasingly looking to other non-state providers to donate money for rehabilitation or school extension. Machame Primary School received various materials from DANIDA in 1995, including cupboards, iron bars and cement, organised through the District Council which “chose some schools to be renovated” (Headmistress, Machame Primary School). Nkwamwatu Primary School has a library funded by German Lutherans in celebration of the centenary of the arrival in Wari of the first missionaries. Nkoraya Primary School in Nronga receives regular donations from a local resident who now lives and works in the United Arab Emirates. Other schools rely on more local resources: the village government of Samaki Maini was able to roof the staff room by donating the licence fees collected from the vendors at the local market to Siha Primary School. Local remittances (within Tanzania) can also prove very important in those villages where many residents have moved away to towns to undertake business. Such a village is Nronga, where roughly seventy-five percent of the village income is made up of remittances (Nronga mens focus group). The Headmaster of Naluti Primary School in Nronga considered the money donated to the school by residents working elsewhere in the country to be of the school’s most important sources of funding.

While user fees and private donations are the most important resources for primary schools, the Lutheran Church is the single most important provider of secondary education within the district, supporting eight of the nineteen secondary schools. These schools do not receive any financial input from government but are wholly under Lutheran church management: similarly there is little communication between the church and the District Education Office concerning matters related to the secondary schools. However, these schools are heavily reliant on parental contributions. For example, Nronga Secondary School was constructed in the early 1980s with local parents’ contributions, and registered as a Lutheran school after consultation between the parents and the Lutheran Church. In 1996-97 the school had 386 students, including boarders and day students, approximately 20 percent of whom came from Nronga.

Annual fees for boarders are set at Tsh.130,000/= , and for day students at Tsh.100,000/=. Students who come from outside of Nronga must contribute a further Tsh.5,000/= for buildings, while the parents of those pupils from Nronga are expected to contribute their labour when any building work needs to be done. The school has received some help from the Christian Education Board of Tanzania and the British Council English Language Teaching Support Project, which both provide some teaching equipment. Despite being run by the Lutheran Church, therefore, it seems clear that church-run schools require as much local subsidy as state-managed schools, while also looking to external donors for support where possible. The church-run schools may be at an advantage in that they have access to a different set of resources available through the global network of churches, but it would seem that despite this, they are in similar financial circumstances to the state-managed schools, and are essentially dependent upon local taxation and user fees.

The other important actor in education in Hai recently has been World Vision Tanzania (WVT). In two of the four villages covered by the field research (Samaki Maini and Kyengia) WVT has been active in supporting both education and health facilities. At Samaki Primary School in Samaki Maini World Vision provided the materials and villagers built three classrooms, and at Ngarony Primary School in Samaki Maini two classrooms were constructed. In Kyengia, Kitahemwa Primary School received 20 bags of cement which they used to build the foundations for two more classrooms, and Kyengia Primary School also received 20 bags of cement with which a school latrine was constructed. However, the two classrooms started at Kitahemwa are not finished and the school plans to ask for parental contributions of Tsh.2,000/= to finish the project.

World Vision has also been supporting health services in the Siha area. In Samaki Maini, Levishi government dispensary (built by local villagers with materials donated by government) has been connected to the water system which the Sanya ADP is installing, and some materials have been donated towards the building of a new maternal and child health section. However, according to the Doctor in Charge, UNICEF has been the dispensary's "main sponsor", particularly in providing materials

and equipment for the Maternal and Child Health clinic. This link with a multilateral donor was forged through officials at the District Administration.

The government health centre in Wari village is one of the few services which is still heavily reliant upon state resources. Drugs and consultation are free (although this is likely to change in the future), and medical supplies and staff remuneration are the responsibility of local government. The only donation which has come from a non-state actor has been the rehabilitation of the physiotherapy unit in 1991 by NORAD, who were directed to the health centre by the District Administration. The health centre is in a poor state of repair and is in severe need of rehabilitation, as the Clinical Officer-in-Charge explained:

“We have no money for renovation, no petty cash to replace breakages, no ambulances for emergency transfers. We are short of bedding and mattresses and other medical facilities...we have a connection to the village tap water supply but it is currently dry, so we are getting our water from furrows and springs”.

The health centre, which was built in 1945, has recently acquired a new neighbour in the form of the Kisiki dispensary, owned by BAKWATA. Built in 1996, the dispensary is immediately adjacent to the government centre. It is much smaller and has the capacity to admit only six patients, while the government centre can accommodate thirty-five patients, and also has an Maternal and Child Health (MCH) clinic. According to the clinical officers in charge, the government health centre treats approximately 2,500 new cases a month while the Kisiki dispensary treats 100 new cases. Patients at the private Kisiki dispensary have to pay for their drugs plus a consultation fee of Tsh.300/=. Staff salaries and running costs are met by “somebody who is running the dispensary through BAKWATA” (Clinical Officer). In fact, it is unclear exactly who runs the dispensary, or why it has been built next to the government health centre. The land upon which the dispensary has been built belongs to an influential Muslim family in the village, the head of which is the *kitongoji* leader and is also a leader at the local mosque, Kalali. The first application for planning permission was denied by the Social Services Committee of Hai District Council



because of the dispensary's proximity to the government health centre, but was granted after a second application when one particular Councillor argued that it should be allowed to proceed on the grounds that the government health centre often had no drugs.

The other major type of health facility found within Hai District is also situated in Wari. Nkwarungo Hospital is managed by the Lutheran Church and receives most of its funding from KKKT. Until 1995, 4 percent of its annual budget came from central government, but this source of funding has since been withdrawn. The hospital is now entirely reliant upon patients' fees, but due to the fact that many people cannot afford to pay for their treatment, the hospital estimates that it is only collecting 60 percent of fees due. As the Hospital Secretary remarked, "we are spending more than we are earning and budgeting for, and we are borrowing from friends inside and outside the country". Nkwarungo is thus planning to introduce a community health insurance scheme, whereby users enrol as a group and pay a premium to cover the likely cost of their treatment needed in a year. One possible obstacle to the introduction of such a programme is in persuading farmers to pay the premium. The concept of paying an insurance premium in advance, particularly if one does not fall ill, is one to which most WaChagga farmers are unaccustomed. As the Hospital Secretary put it, "the change from socialist to capitalist is something that people will have to learn to accept....this capitalist model is the way forward".

This section has provided an insight into service provision and how it is supported by looking at the provision of health and education facilities in four villages in Hai District. It has shown how state and non-state actors interweave with one another in order to fund social services. Within this pattern of provision, it is important to recognise that the actual extent of state and non-state support for individual facilities varies all over the District (maps 6.1-6.18 make this quite clear). For example, some primary schools may have received several donations from various sources while others are completely reliant upon local sources only, for example, user charges, contributions and either government or Church support. However, it is a matter for concern that within this emerging institutional environment, resources are not evenly distributed among

facilities. For example, Wari village has five primary schools, but only one school has received any external help, while the others have been reliant upon local resources and remittances. Machame Primary School in Wari has received materials donated from DANIDA, and also twelve desks from the Hai District Education Trust Fund, both of which were decisions made at the District headquarters. The particular workings of personal patronage networks was not part of the remit of this research. However, it remains clear that there are no obvious formal structures in place which objectively foster equality in the distribution of resources. While it was not part of this research project to assess service quality, the lack of co-ordination among providers and their uneven distribution between facilities raises questions about sustainability and quality.

### **Women's groups in Hai: privatised development?**

In his analysis of the role of the non-governmental sector in development in Hai, Kiondo (1995) identifies a large number of Community Based Organisations (CBOs) which are numerically dominated by women's groups. He characterises these women's groups as:

“...basically income-generating cooperatives of some kind, although they may carry out other social development functions....[t]he growth of CDA groups in Hai has tended to go hand in hand with the phenomenon....of the increasing significance of zero-grazing - or rather, relatively capital-intensive zero-grazing - and a related growth in raising dairy cattle” (Kiondo 1995:132-133).

In this way Kiondo conceives of these women's 'semi-cooperative businesses' as capital-intensive, heavily patronised by donors, and relatively successful. However, this conceals the fact that within this categorisation of women's groups, there is a broad spectrum of activity which ranges from small-scale beer brewing to large-scale capital intensive dairy farming and product marketing (Table 5.10 and Appendix Three). Moreover, there are also women's groups which exist in theory but which have abandoned their projects or which have failed to attract a donor and interest has waned, or which seem to meet for reasons other than income-generation.

Furthermore, these women's groups challenge the notion that the public and the private, or state and non-state, can be separated, or even that they can be identified as meaningful analytical terms. Although Kiondo does not explicitly interpret the women's groups in terms of the public/private divide, he does see them as a central feature of the privatisation of development, and therefore a part of the private sector. I argue, over the next two chapters, that the women's group phenomenon in Hai is not simply a matter of women's businesses, although this is an important element of what is happening. In Chapter Seven I argue that there are several discourses operating at different levels about women and their roles both in Chagga society and in national development which heavily influence the formation of these women's groups. In this Chapter, I explore these women's groups in terms of their activities and their relationships with donors and patrons, and show that the state/non-state continuum identified in service provision is also a major feature of these CBOs.

### **Patronage networks among women's groups**

The most successful women's groups, in terms of income generated, the numbers of active members, and the frequency of activities undertaken, are those which have received external help. This is not simply to equate success with viable economic activity; however, one of the often-stated primary objectives of many of the women's groups is to raise women's income. Being able to do this on a relatively wide scale with the input of several donors is deemed, in local terms, to be indicators of success. Thus, as Kiondo notes, patronage networks become highly important for these women's groups. There are three main ways in which patronage is sought among women's groups in Hai; through the local state, through the church, and through personal, social or kinship ties.

The local state has become one of the most important resources for women's groups in Hai; not because it has its own resources to distribute, but rather due to the role which it has come to play in the relationship between CBOs and donors. Kiondo discusses in some detail "the new politics of patronage and brokerage" (Kiondo 1995:165) which has arisen among community development organisations and donors, but an analysis of the role of the local state in this framework is conspicuous by its absence. In fact, the

local state in Hai emerges as one of the most important brokers between women's groups and donor organisations. A number of the capital-intensive women's groups have been able to attract international or national donors precisely because they are well-connected to the local state. Similarly, several of the smaller-scale women's groups have received donations from Tanzanian NGOs as a result of their relationship with their Ward Community Development Officers (CDOs). Both regional and national women's NGOs connected to the regional or local state have utilised the Ward CDOs to promote their organisations and recruit new members in the villages. The role of the Ward CDOs thus becomes central to any consideration of the part played by the local state in supporting women's groups.

### ***The local state as a broker of development***

The Nronga Women Dairy Cooperative is possibly the most successful women's group in Hai District. It has the largest member base of all groups (over 400), and has received donations and support from two bilateral organisations (FAO and Danida, and Nordic Project), two international NGOs (Blue Eagle Foundation and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES)), and one Tanzanian NGO with international links (Technoserve). Since 1988, it has developed a milk marketing system and now provides back-up services to its members, all of whom are women. The cooperative started milk processing with a cream separator which they bought with their own contributions, but this proved to be loss-making as there was no local market for the milk. Most people in the village kept their own dairy cows, and it was difficult to reach the nearest town, Moshi, as Nronga is one of the most inaccessible villages in Machame (it is reached from the main tarmac road to Nkwarungo Hospital by a steep and precarious track which traverses the ravine separating Nronga from Nkwarungo). In 1988 the society was assisted by FAO and Danida who provided a pick-up truck, which allowed the women to transport their milk into Moshi. FES and Nordic Project also donated equipment, such as milk cans and materials for the cooperative building. Now they sell approximately 300-400 litres of milk a day in Moshi and Arusha, and 500-600 litres in Dar es Salaam, mostly to the Nronga diaspora (the milk is transported to Moshi early enough to catch the Dar Express coach service which arrives in Dar es Salaam by 3pm). The cooperative also has a shop selling agricultural and livestock goods, which women can buy on credit.

Women who sell their milk to the project every day receive their money at the end of every month. In 1997 the cooperative bought each litre of milk for Tsh.180/=, and sold it for Tsh.250/= in Moshi and Tsh.260/= in Dar es Salaam. Annual profits do not usually fall below Tsh.500,000/= (£5,000).

The project has continued to expand since the pick-up truck was donated in 1988. In 1991 Technoserve started a three-year free training course for the cooperative's management, which covered technology, accounting, marketing and management. The milk cooler needed its own generator as the local electricity supply was unreliable and the cooperative secured a loan from the Blue Eagle Foundation of the USA in order to buy one in 1996. Profits have been used to develop the cooperative and its facilities, and recently the cooperative has invested in the shop, a building to house the milk cooler, and a kiosk for selling milk in Moshi. Future plans for expansion are ambitious and include a hostel for people who come to visit the project to learn from its success, a new vehicle, a tractor for transporting livestock feeds, a small milk-processing system for producing ghee, butter and chocolate, and to expand membership to meet local demand.

External donors have been instrumental in contributing to the commercial success of the Nronga cooperative, and the local and regional state has played a major role in advertising Nronga to prospective donors. FES, for example, was "pointed in the project's direction" by the district (Nronga Co-operative Manager). Similarly, the project "got help from the District Agricultural Officer as they were dealing with milk" when looking for prospective donors (District Assistant Community Development Officer). In 1993 the manager of the project was selected to accompany the Regional Community Development Officer on a study tour of women's groups in Mbeya, and since then has been seen as a prominent figure in women's development in the region. The project has "a good relationship" with the local state and is renowned throughout Kilimanjaro for its success (Nronga Co-operative Manager), and even on a national scale it is well-known (the government's NGO Division Co-ordinator has family ties to Nronga). It is often used as a 'showcase' project for women's development in the region:

“...they know this co-op is working, so they [people from Hai District and Moshi] bring visitors to Nronga to learn, so we have many visitors” (Nronga Co-operative Chairlady).

The case of Nronga is particularly interesting as it is one of the most prosperous and influential villages in the district. Many residents have risen to high positions in government and within the private sector, and remittances from such people living outside of the village support a number of village development projects, such as the rebuilding of the village access road (men’s focus group discussion). Indeed, it is the demand for Nronga milk from these migrant workers which has helped contribute to the project’s success. Nronga village has thus become well-positioned in national and local social networks required for obtaining access to donors and other support, within which the local state has played a central role.

The local state has also proved useful in its role as broker for other women’s groups which undertake less capital-intensive projects. According to Appendix Three, for example, KIWODEA has given donations to at least nine women’s groups, while WIDEF has assisted at least four groups. The Ward Community Development Officers play an instrumental role in spreading awareness about these organisations. Both KIWODEA and WIDEF conceive of themselves as NGOs although they are both administered through regional and national government departments (respectively) in practice. At the village level then, it falls to the Ward CDOs to hold meetings about these NGOs and explain to women the potential benefits of joining them:

“We have directives about these [KIWODEA and BAWATA] from the region and the district” (Ward CDO Machame North).

“...it’s not easy for groups to get funds from KIWODEA or WIDEF unless I can recommended them” (Ward CDO Siha East).

“KIWODEA tries to organise women’s groups by giving them loans and training, helping their projects. Through Ward CDOs, who know who and where these groups are, if they are able to pay the fee for KIWODEA they can join....so groups become members through their Ward CDOs” (Hai District Assitant Community Development Officer).

Thus several women's groups within Hai had received donations from KIWOODEA and WIDEF which support activities such as buying milling machines and running small cafes. However, the women's groups first have to pay to become members of KIWOODEA (Tsh.5,000/= for the whole group) and then in order to become eligible for a loan they have to contribute Tsh.50,000/= to the organisation. Loans are given between Tsh.100,000/= and Tsh.250,000/=: and have to be repaid at an interest rate of 20 percent. According to the Regional Community Development Officer who co-founded the NGO, none of the groups which have been given loans have paid back in full yet. Several of the women's groups I spoke with in the four villages had heard of KIWOODEA, but they did not seem very clear on the system of giving loans. Others had paid their money to be members and had since heard very little from the Ward Community Development Officers, who become the brokers between the 'NGO' and the women's groups. The members of *Tumaini* Women's Group in Samaki Maini explained that their Ward CDO had "explained KIWOODEA to us and took our Tsh.5,000/= to register us and she gave us a receipt", and more than this they have not heard (*Tumaini* Women's Group discussion).

A similar story unfolded in relation to BAWATA. Again, BAWATA is a (national) women's umbrella NGO which seeks to recruit new members in villages through the Ward Community Development Officers. However, the intentions of the organisation remain unclear in relation to the women's groups. Those who had been 'educated' by their Ward CDO about BAWATA seemed to be uncertain about what the organisation was trying to do or what, more specifically, they could expect from membership of the NGO. Members of Kirisha Women's Group in Kyengia explained that their Ward CDO had advised them to join BAWATA "because BAWATA is mostly funded by donors from Scandinavia and so they may contribute ideas and seek help" (Kirisha Women's Group discussion), and had collected the membership fees from them (Tsh.500/= each). That was two years ago. Since then they have heard very little from their CDO, or about BAWATA.

There are other ways in which the local state has become intricately bound up with women's groups in Hai. In Wari village, Ifiyo Women's Group has strong links with

the village government. Several of the members sit on the council, and the group's first leader was also the village UWT leader in the 1980s. This strong connection with the village government enabled the women's group to receive donations via the patronage of the now ex-MP for Hai District. This link proved important for the group when the MP moved to Zimbabwe and persuaded the New Zealand Ambassador to Zimbabwe to donate funds to the group also. Thus the women's group was able to start work on building and buying the necessary equipment for a tailoring school with materials donated through this patron.

### ***The Church as patron of women's development***

The Lutheran and Catholic churches are the most important patrons for women's groups in Hai. Approximately half of all women's groups listed in Appendix Three were founded by their parish Church. There are actually more women's groups attached to the church than listed; but many of these do not engage in income-generation activities and are groups for prayer, singing and church duties. As outlined in Chapter Five, it is the policy of the Lutheran Church for every parish church to have a women's group. According to the Church, Women are seen as central to community life and it is the Church's responsibility to equip them with the necessary skills and knowledge in order to fulfil their roles as wives, mothers and community members. The women's groups are forums where such things can be discussed and taught. Some women's groups also have an income-generating activity, but these are additional. The women's group at Nkwarungo church, Wari village provides a good example of this. There is a women's group which meets to learn about home economics and to study the Bible, and there is also a dairy project which is run by a small number of women who decided to join together and contribute some money towards buying a cow. Appropriate announcements were made in Church, and those women who joined each paid Tsh.1,000/= (approximately 100 women joined). While they have formed their group under the auspices of the Church, and carry out activities within the Church's grounds, KKKT itself has not donated any funds to the group, although the women's group uses the cow *banda* (shed) in the Church grounds. However, through the Church's international network (Nkwarungo is the missionaries' first church and therefore has strong links with Germany) a cow has been donated to the group.



Similarly, women's groups in Samaki Maini were closely related to the local Church. The village of Samaki Maini comprises two parishes each with their own Church, and therefore each with their own women's group. The groups undertake such activities as knitting, gardening, making and selling pastries. These are small activities which are run by the Church's Women Department, and all profits go into the Church bank account. This money is looked after by the Church and is available for the women (in consultation with the church leadership) but none of the groups in the four research villages had used the money to invest in their small projects. Many of the groups were saving to buy a milling machine. One group (Ngaroni) had some cattle, although it was unclear whether their church had donated these (it is more likely that the cattle were privately owned). The Chagga custom of sharing and lending cows is practised among the group.

Thus the Church is an important patron of women's activities within Hai. This section has concentrated on the Lutheran Church as this was the dominant religion in the four villages; however in some parts of Hai the Roman Catholic Church plays a similar role. Mosques are less numerous within the district, although Wari village has two. There is a women's group at Kalali mosque but it became inactive due to leadership problems. However, it is clear that religious institutions play an important role in encouraging and supporting women's groups and their activities. This will be explored further in Chapter Seven.

### ***Private networks and patronage***

The final important patronage link for women's groups in Hai to be considered here is the role played by local elites and private or social networks, which are the main patrons of local development discussed by Kiondo (1995). The Kalali women's group based in Wari village provides a good example of elite and private patronage. It was started in 1988 by Mama Angellah, a relatively wealthy local woman with employment as a divisional magistrate. She was a member of the Nkwarungo Church Women Department but decided that it would help local women if she could find some help or a donor to support the kinds of activities they would like to do, such as obtain a milling

machine. At the same time, KKKT decided to split Wari into two parishes, Nkwarungo and Kalali, and another Church was thus built at Kalali. Mama Angellah duly became active in the Kalali women's group as this was nearer her home. However, rather than attempting to start any activities within the Church's Women's Department, she decided that a separate group of women who could contribute ideas and money would be more appropriate, and it was announced in Kalali Church that any women interested could pay Tsh.1050/= to join. Although the women collected Tsh.100,000/= it was not enough to buy a milling machine. Mama Angellah consulted a prominent *mzee*<sup>141</sup> of the village, a member of the chiefly clan, whose son worked for the Tanzanian NGO CDTF. Through these personal links, CDTF was approached and duly provided the Kalali Women's Group (as Mama Angellah's group became known) with a milling machine for which they paid in three instalments. However, the machine was faulty and CDTF eventually sent Tsh.300,000/= to the group to pay for a replacement threshing machine. As this did not cover the whole cost of the machine the women asked their husbands to contribute some money. One of the women's husbands (the Director of PAFO), was able to act as broker between the women's group and an Italian NGO (Svillup 2000) while he was in Italy working for AMREF<sup>142</sup>. Representatives from Svillup 2000 came to Kalali in 1991 and 1994 and bought the women's group fifty cows in all. They also purchased a threshing and milling machine for the group. By offering the milling machine service on market days, the group has made good profits. They have bought two containers in order to store and sell livestock feeds. They now have Tsh.3million/= in their bank account and are planning to buy an oil-extracting machine. They have an agreement with the Nronga Women Dairy Cooperative to sell milk to them which is bringing profit to members and the group. The cows have also begun to calve and new calves are being given to more members all the time. Svillup 2000 have offered the group a butter-making machine which they have accepted, and although they have been promised a lorry they have not yet obtained it.

The story of Kalali women's group is a clear example of how private networks and access to elites can be translated into access to a wide (even international) range of donors. The success of the group has been entirely down to their ability to obtain

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<sup>141</sup> *Mzee* (Kiswahili): literally meaning old man, but also indicates wisdom and seniority.

donors through local contacts, primarily due to the position of the Chairlady, but also due to a few influential husbands' private and employment-related networks.

This section has looked at the main ways in which women's groups are patronised by the Church, the state and through private networks with local elites. It has shown that it is not only private networks which are important, but also that the Church and the local state can play major roles either as patrons themselves or in acting as brokers between women's groups and national or international donors.

### **Local development in Hai: blurring the public/private divide**

This chapter has used Kiondo's work on the non-governmental sector in Tanzania as a starting point to explore the complexity of non-state activity in Hai. In doing this I have argued for a framework which does not set up the 'public' and the 'private' spheres as dichotomous and bounded entities. A more useful framework for looking at development activity in Hai is a continuum of state/non-state (or non-governmental) activity. This has been seen in the provision of health and education services, and in the patronage links supporting the most numerous of non-governmental actors in the district; women's groups. There are several important issues which can be drawn out of the discussion of both women's groups and social service provision, and it is to these which we now turn.

#### **The public and the private: a synergistic relationship?**

An emerging literature within development studies focuses on new institutions and linkages through which development can be achieved. For example, Evans (1996a, 1996b) argues that there are two ways of interpreting the public/private divide in the 'Third World'. The first is 'complementarity', where the relationship between the two spheres is mutually enhancing, and the activities of both sectors clearly support and complement each other. The other is 'embeddedness', a more challenging viewpoint which sees synergy between the public and the private as a result of the norms and ties of trust and productive informal networks which cross-cut the two. This second view questions the dichotomous model of the public/private, suggesting that informal ties can

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<sup>142</sup> African Medical Research Foundation, an international NGO.

span the two in a synergistic relationship, often through networks of social capital (see Chapter One). Drawing on several case studies from the 'Third World', and in an argument echoed by the World Bank's Development Report a year later, Evans demonstrates how embedded and complementary synergy between the public and private is beneficial for 'development strategies' in the 'Third World':

"In sum, intimate interconnection and intermingling among public and private actors is combined with a well-defined complementary division of labour between the bureaucracy and local citizens, *mutually recognised and accepted by both sides*" (Evans 1996b:1123, emphasis added).

It is important to note that in the only case study Evans considers from an African country (Nigeria), his perception of synergistic relations does not hold true, and in this case of "anti-synergy", the state is identified as being so bureaucratic and financially weak that it "eliminates the possibility of synergy" (1996:1126). What is needed, according to Evans, is "an engaged set of public institutions", in order to ensure that "embeddedness does not degenerate into clientelism" (1996b:1125-1126).

Such a synergistic relationship between the public and the private is not borne out by the evidence presented here from Hai District. Evans' interpretation does not consider the possibility that any intermixing of the public and private spheres may have a negative impact on local development, other than a general 'degeneration into clientelism' which he seems to be suggesting for sub-Saharan Africa. In Hai, the intertwining of the state and non-state sectors has neither demonstrated public/private synergy, nor has it slid wholesale into a morass of clientelistic behaviour. The situation is more complex than either of these two scenarios would suggest.

Some of the major issues related to the growth of the non-governmental sector in Hai include problems such as the lack of co-ordination and information-sharing, duplication of activities, and an uneven distribution of resources within the District. Furthermore the local state in Hai is inherently bound up with the patronage and brokerage ties which have developed between the state, international donors and local women's groups. This is not a new phenomenon, although the introduction of more non-state

actors may have opened up new avenues for such patronage links (Kiondo 1993). However, contrary to Evans' suggestion that public/private synergy can be achieved with a clear division of labour between public and private actors, the relative roles of the local state and the non-state sector in Hai remain unclear at best, and detrimentally ambiguous at worst.

### **The non-state sector: part of a development panacea?**

Despite the assumption within much of the development literature that any increased role for the non-state sector (particularly for NGOs) is positive for development (as outlined in Chapters One and Two) the new institutional environment which is emerging in Hai District raises important issues which question such a viewpoint. In Hai District, despite (or because of?) the increased role for the non-state sector, there is duplication of services, a lack of co-ordination among providers in the same sector (and sometimes even in the same facility), an uneven spread of resources and facilities within the district as illustrated by maps 6.1-6.18, and a lack of communication. Not only is there a lack of information sharing between the state and the non-state sectors, but also among actors *within* the non-state sector, and between departments within the local state itself. Two examples illustrate these points most clearly. Firstly, the Sanya ADP undertaken by World Vision Tanzania has included the rehabilitation of several primary schools in Siha Division. Although World Vision liaised with the District Planning Department, the Education Department remained unaware of the NGO's activities. It was only when the District Education Officer visited one of the villages concerned that he found out about World Vision's project:

“There is no communication between the Education Department and World Vision in rehabilitating schools in Siha. World Vision is a problem to our office - I have heard that World Vision came to this District but they went only to village leaders, they didn't come to the District Council...the Education Department is not happy. We have to know what is going on there...maybe Siha primary schools are not the most needy. When we received money from the IDA we convened a meeting of the Education and Culture Committee and discussed which schools should be rehabilitated and found those in most need” (District Education Officer).

Similarly, the District Medical Officer was unaware of the dispensary which World Vision built at Kashashi village, although the Planning Department claims to have supervised World Vision's activities. From the perspective of World Vision, the District Council is always involved in any ADP because "they should know what is going on" (Sanya ADP Co-ordinator). Local officials such as the District Councillor (*Diwani*) are invited to attend ADP meetings. However the case of the confusion over primary schools suggests that within the District Administration, information is not shared between departments.

Secondly, there is strong duplication in primary health care programmes. Village health workers trained either by local government or the Lutheran Church visit homes and teach villagers the same things about preventive health care and sanitation, and growing vegetable gardens. In Kisau *kitongoji* of Wari, the local NGO PAFO has also recently started a primary health care project. As one Kisau resident explained:

"KKKT seems to be teaching the same as the Doctor [of PAFO]....it's important to have both as it's often difficult to get some people to change their habits, so it needs to be emphasised".

UNICEF has also trained village health workers, and distributed bicycles and drugs kits. Later on UMATI, the Tanzanian Family Planning Association funded by Japanese aid, started a similar project in which they even trained many of the same people and gave them another bicycle. Even given this duplication of activities, coverage was uneven within Wari village, where household interviews were held. Many residents were only visited by one set of health advisors, while others were visited by all of them. It was noted that few Muslim households were visited by the Lutheran Church health workers. These cases of duplication of primary health provision and the District's handling of World Vision Tanzania, suggest that the increasing role for the non-state sector does not necessarily foster an equitable distribution of resources. It also questions the assumption that a greater role for the non-state sector is necessarily good for social service provision.

### **The local state: in search of a role**

Part of the problem is that the local state is constrained by its position within the national governmental structure. Central government continues to maintain considerable control over local government, increasingly so as local governments' revenues continue to fall, and central government grants become the major source for local development (Eriksen 1997, Max 1991). In Hai, the development levy of Tsh.1000/= is not successfully collected from all eligible tax payers. Moreover, since February 1995, there have been no central disbursements for the development budget. Within this debilitating framework, the relative novelty of the non-governmental sector has meant that its role remains ambiguous, as Gilson (1994, 1995) and Mogedal (1995) have demonstrated in the health sector in Tanzania and sub-Saharan Africa in general, respectively. As the Tanzanian Government's NGO policy is currently in formulation there is no legislation which clearly spells out a role for NGOs in local development. Within this context it is difficult for the local state to know how to deal with this amorphous non-governmental sector. There is no District policy on registering and coordinating NGOs, although the Assistant Planning Officer referred to a "directive which asks NGOs to consult the District Council". The details of this could generally not be elaborated upon. The District Community Development Officer outlined the "2-way system" in operation, whereby international NGOs are supposed to report to the District before they work in any village, and local NGOs are supposed to report to the District in order to get help in finding a donor, "so that effectively the District is trying to spread donors evenly over the District". It becomes quite clear that the District's handling of the non-governmental sector is completely *ad hoc*, informal and opportunistic, with all the ramifications for the unequal distribution of resources which this implies. At the same time, many of the development plans put forward in the formal way by the Ward Development Committees and approved by the District Council are subject to change by the Regional Commissioner (Eriksen 1997). Largely due to the paucity of local government revenues, those development projects which are carried out either have little local input or are directed by central government in the form of grants for special projects, so that essentially:

“Planning in Tanzania is therefore clearly a process dominated by the central government and its local representatives (the region, the line ministries and, to a lesser extent, the district commissioners)” (Eriksen 1997:265).

Given these restrictions it is not surprising that local development in Hai should be such an uneven patchwork of services provided by an array of state and non-state actors. Despite this, the local state does appear to be attempting to co-ordinate some parts of the non-state sector, particularly the large international donors. Certainly, the value of non-state contributions to local development are not ignored, and district officials are keen to maintain good relations with international donors. The planning office, whose remit it is to co-ordinate such donors, has a “shopping list” of projects which it attempts to sell to prospective donors. However, the planning office tends only to deal with large donors, rather than smaller NGOs or CBOs, and certainly other non-state providers such as remittances, donations from abroad and religious organisations remain largely invisible to the District Administration.

This is in contrast to the national level situation described in Chapter Four, in which the state is keen to steer NGOs towards a role in social welfare provision. However, at the local level, the role of the NGO sector seems to be open to some interpretation. As outlined above, the contribution to local development made by non-state actors is highly valued. Of course, the drawback of this is that the non-state sector becomes merely another resource for the local state to co-opt or appropriate (which may well be the cause of the Education Department’s ‘problem’ with World Vision - the fact that the distribution of resources remained out of their control). As pointed out in Chapter Two, non-state actors, particularly NGOs, are often interpreted by the state as economic service providers rather than as actors in a process of participatory and empowering development. However, this is not quite so straightforward as it would seem, as government officials are well-versed in the development rhetoric which permeates discussions about NGOs, which is increasingly creeping into discussions of good governance and democracy as fostered by governments. In this way, the boundaries between state and non-state become blurred even further in Hai:

*“The District Council acts like an NGO....there is a special budget for every ward which the wards have control over spending, so they are carrying out*



*sustainable development in an empowering way...* in this way a certain portion of the development levy goes straight to the ward, *a much more participatory and bottom-up approach to development*" (Hai District Assistant Planning Officer, emphasis added).

To suggest that the District Administration can carry out development like an NGO reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the *non-governmental* sector. At the same time, the local state appears to be very aware that it could be undermined by a growing non-state sector, in which case accommodation is preferable to confrontation. This is a very real concern within the literature, that the increasing tendency to fund NGOs will eventually whittle away the capacity of the state (Gibbon 1995, Hearn 1998, Stewart 1997). That the Tanzanian Government should have "fears and hopes about NGOs" would seem to be as relevant at the local scale as it is at the national level. In the context of an increasing role for non-state actors, the role of the local state has become rather vague, particularly in relation to the non-state sector. Formally, the local state is attempting to carve a role for itself as a legitimator of local development. The District Administration is attempting to oversee non-state activity (in order, it may be argued, to co-opt or appropriate it), but problems with information and co-operation have hampered this so far, and have resulted in a large amount of non-state activity remaining invisible to the District, as well as leading to an overall uneven distribution of service providers. For those non-state actors who do co-operate with the District, the administration becomes a 'legitimator' in the sense that non-state providers need local government permission in order to undertake certain activities, for example building a new facility. The BAKWATA dispensary is a case in point; the only state input required was permission to build. Perhaps most importantly however, the local state has become one of the dominant gatekeepers of local development in the District (the others being the Lutheran and Roman Catholic Churches).

This has emerged in both a formal and informal sense. In the formal sense, the local state quite openly states that it directs donors to local groups and social service facilities, and that it has a "shopping list" of potential projects for donors to fund. Within this framework, the crucial point to consider is the extent to which these patronage and brokerage ties to the state are informally influenced by local power

inequalities. It has already been noted that the new institutional environment in Hai operates without any mechanism for ensuring the equitable distribution of resources. It can be no coincidence, for example, that the most successful women's group (Nronga Women Dairy Co-operative) in the District is based in one of the most 'developed' villages. At the same time, other women's groups based in less well-connected villages (for example Kyengia, Samaki Maini) continue to search for donors unassisted, as they have no linkages with local influential people conveniently placed to 'advertise' them to external donors. Similarly, it was noted that Machame Primary School in Wari received donations from two external sources, while other schools in the village relied upon local sources of funding.

Other commentators have noted the inequities which arise from an increased role for the non-state sector in Africa. Fatton (1992) views the non-state sector as a 'privileged niche' in which 'enterprising individuals' can advance their positions. Similarly, Bayart (1993) argues that those who are able to forge a 'relationship' with the state are also those who dominate the private sphere. Moreover, Therkildsen and Semboja (1995) note that, despite the increasing contribution of non-governmental actors in social service provision across East Africa, huge inequalities in access to resources and services remain, or are exacerbated. Beall (1997), in her study of NGO and state contributions to solid waste management in urban Pakistan, finds that the distribution of resources within an institutional environment in which non-state actors are important in service delivery is far from equitable:

"...[E]xisting inequalities in the distribution of urban services across the city were simply reinforced by community organisations mobilising and using connections to achieve improved solid waste management. Moreover, synergy across the public-private divide (Evans 1996), between representatives of communities and governments were seen to reinforce and cement relationships founded on patronage and clientelism rather than to foster more inclusive forms of civic engagement" (Beall 1997:960).

Similarly, in Hai District there is an emerging politics of development in which those villages and individuals who are well-connected (either to the local state, national state, religious institutions or through private networks) are able to utilise such patronage ties

in order to access resources from the local state, donors or other non-state actors. While this does not square with Evans' (1996) or the World Bank's (1997) recipes for synergy and good governance across the public/private divide, it also throws new light on the debate about social capital in Africa. As in the case of public/private synergy, social capital is said to inhere in the social networks which span the public/private divide, and which (it is argued in some quarters, see Chapter One) can be utilised for developmental purposes (according to Putnam (1993), it can be harnessed to improve the developmental potential of entire geographical regions). However, from the above, it is quite clear that the blurring of the public and the private in Hai District has far more to do with personal, group or village political and economic advancement, than it has to do with creating 'developmental synergies'. As outlined in Chapter One, one of the most stringent lines of critique of Putnam's notion of social capital is that it lacks a power analysis. What emerges in Hai is a situation in which the benefits of the interweaving of the non-governmental sector and the state accrue to those in the most powerful positions to access the resources available through either channel. Thus the Nronga Women Dairy Cooperative is in the strongest position to gain access to international donors through links with the local state. Similarly, the Kalali Women's Group is well-connected to local patronage networks which has enabled them to access external resources. At the same time, there are a good number of other women's groups throughout the district (such as those in Samaki Maini and Kyengia) which are not as well-connected as Nronga and Kalali, and thus are less able to access the resources available. In this way, existing inequalities (in this case, between women's groups in particular villages) are exacerbated by the interweaving of the state and the non-state sectors. In the same way, resources are not distributed evenly among social service providers in the district. This amounts to a highly uneven development process in which the state, and various different non-governmental actors, are competing with one another for constituencies.

### **Summary: the polarisation of development**

This chapter has taken Kiondo's work on the privatisation of development as a starting point from which to explore in more detail the role of the non-governmental sector in Hai District. It has shown that, historically, while the state in Kilimanjaro has not been

the only actor in local development, the recent upsurge in community development activities and the influx of international donors into the region has brought about a new set of relationships between the state and the non-state sectors. While Kiondo has characterised the increasing role for the non-governmental sector as a 'privatisation of development', I prefer to suggest that what is taking place in Hai is more akin to a 'polarisation of development'. Firstly, in terms of social service provision, a continuum of state and non-state provision has emerged in which some educational and health facilities enjoy the support of a range of actors (e.g. the local state, the Lutheran Church, private remittances, international donor's donations) while others rely on just one or two of these, combined with user charges or parental contributions. This has allowed particular services to emerge as better-equipped and financed than others, in part because there is little in the way of a coordinating mechanism at the District Administration to channel all of the different providers in a more equitable fashion. Secondly, in terms of community development activities, a wide range of non-governmental groups are active in Hai. An examination of the most numerous of these groups, women's organisations, reveals the interweaving of the state and non-state sectors here also. Thus, the local state has become an important part of many women's groups strategies in their attempts to gain access to resources. Religious organisations, and personal patronage networks, have also loomed large in this new web of non-governmental activity. The cumulative effect is that local elites are far better placed to mobilise resources, which in effect, exacerbates existing socio-economic inequalities.

# **CHAPTER SEVEN**

## (De)constructing participation in Hai: *maendeleo*<sup>143</sup>, the non-governmental sector and the legitimation of inequality

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### Introduction

This chapter explores the patterns and processes associated with participatory development and the non-governmental sector at village level. The motivation for people's participation in non-governmental activities, and the ways in which this is structured by local conditions, are considered. The analysis seeks to look at non-governmental actors as one aspect of a highly complex local situation characterised by its own particular set of social, political, cultural and economic circumstances. The context for much of what influences and constitutes 'the local' has already been discussed in Chapters Three to Six. The objective in this chapter is to explore the ways in which 'the local', and in particular, the Chagga developmental subject, is influenced and shaped by national-level development discourses, through a critical examination of women's organisations, and other non-governmental actors in Hai (namely WVT and PAFO). However, following Moore (1996), it will also become clear that national discourses are not consumed in Hai without contestation. Rather, they interact with local and international discourses of development in order to actively construct local ideas about development (*maendeleo*) and modernity, and the relative roles of both state and non-state sectors, and of men and women, within these. It will become quite clear that this has important ramifications for the non-governmental sector and the scope for participation within and empowerment through it.

Such an analysis draws on the "Foucauldian turn in development studies" (Watts 1995:57) as outlined in Chapter One. This chapter will proceed with a discussion of

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<sup>143</sup> *Maendeleo* (Kiswahili): the Chagga use the *Kiswahili* word for 'development' as there is not a direct translation from *KiChagga* (Stambach 1999, personal communication). *Maendeleo*, meaning growth, progress, advancement and development, stems from the verb *endelea* (to grow, develop, progress or proceed). The socio-cultural understanding of *maendeleo* among the Chagga is a central theme of this chapter.

the non-governmental sector in Hai and the ways in which it represents a new resource to the Chagga. Following on from Chapter One in which it was argued that the material and the representational should not be separated in the study of development, the materiality of the development discourse of *maendeleo* is made quite clear. The analysis will then move on to explore how the non-governmental sector has become intimately bound up with local notions of power and prestige, and how individuals can boost their status by participating in non-governmental activities. This will be developed through an analysis of women's organisations in Hai. Other non-governmental actors' efforts at participatory development are then examined to further examine the structured and contested nature of participation within the broader NGO sector. Finally, the chapter will consider how participation in the non-governmental sector is constructed and how this in turn legitimises the perpetuation of inequalities and serves to leave unequal power relations unchallenged.

### **The development discourse on Kilimanjaro: NGOs and access to resources**

In order to begin to understand how local participation in the non-governmental sector is structured it is useful to start with an examination of the meanings local actors attach to the sector. In Hai, the non-governmental sector has become intimately bound up with the socio-cultural construction of 'development', or *maendeleo*. This has two broad components; the first is concerned with economic development, survival strategies and infrastructural provision; while the second relates to 'development' as access to education, personal status, and adhering to Chagga (and to a lesser extent, Tanzanian) ideals about the subject. These two general components are not mutually exclusive and should be seen as interrelated. In examining these notions of *maendeleo*, two strands of data will be referred to. The first of these are the responses to direct questions about the non-governmental sector and the meaning of *maendeleo*, as carried out in village and district council interviews, and focus group discussions. The complementarity of the responses and the relative ease with which opinions were given indicates that an interpretation

which sees the non-governmental sector as a new resource to be harnessed by individuals, households, groups and whole communities, is widely (and openly) accepted, and is not considered to be controversial in any way. The other strand of data derives from the same interviews, group discussions, and informal conversations, but was not usually elicited in response to direct questions. Instead, ideas about power, status, and gender roles, and the ways in which these are related to notions of *maendeleo* and the non-governmental sector were expressed inadvertently, in passing in relation to something else, or in more informal settings. Expression of these ideas was far more indirect and, I would suggest, therefore less likely to be widely and openly acknowledged. These two strands of data are analysed here in order to critically explore the process of participation at village level.

### ***Maendeleo* as an economic survival strategy**

The changing economic fortunes of the Chagga in terms of the decline in coffee production, particularly for the poorest farmers, was discussed in Chapter Five. Ever-decreasing plots of land and the associated population pressure, out-migration of the youngest members of the community (particularly males) to local towns and further afield, and the deterioration in the circumstances of the coffee cooperatives (and therefore much of the coffee crop) has resulted in a bleak outlook for the majority of those who remain on the mountain. Simultaneously, the District Council has come under increasing pressure as central government disbursements have evaporated and local tax collection becomes increasingly problematic (see Chapter Six). It is therefore logical to suggest that the growth of the non-governmental sector in Hai has represented a significant influx of new resources, both for local government and for the Chagga (Gibbon 1995, Kiondo 1995). As Kiondo points out in relation to the recent proliferation of community-based organisations in Tanzania:

“The picture generally seems to be that the mass of CDA [community development activity] groups are involved in collective extensions of personal economic survival strategies” (1995:171).



I wish to explore this notion further here, and look in closer detail at the ways in which the Chagga, and the local government, view the non-governmental sector and *maendeleo*. This will be useful later as it reveals something of the processes governing NGO participation.

**“Development is educating children and building roads and bridges”**

Moore, returning to Kilimanjaro in 1993, remarked on the ostentatious and ubiquitous signs of ‘modernity’:

“‘Modernity in Africa’ is a theme that evokes visual images. From the public processions of shiny official cars in town to the cherished bicycles of less prosperous urbanites all the way to the plastic pails in rural homesteads, there are hundreds of recognisably ‘modern’ objects to be seen everywhere. They all have meaning in the exhibition of up-to-date respectability, let alone in the competition for prestige...[T]he hierarchical layers of society are clearly marked. At a beer drinking party in the countryside, bottled drink is for the elite; locally produced calabashes of home-brew are for ordinary villagers. Big gold watches and new briefcases are masculine status markers for administrators. There is a ubiquitous system of conspicuous consumption” (Moore 1996:587).

In Hai, this system of conspicuous consumption is clearly evident, from the clothes people wear, the cars people drive, to the ‘modern’ Western items which find their way into rural homes (such as radios, televisions, electronic singing Christmas cards, and tapes of Western music, from George Michael to Snoop Doggy Dogg). Within this environment, participation in the non-governmental sector is most fruitfully understood as a means by which to gain access to scarce resources for the district, village, group, household or individual. This is closely related to Chagga perceptions about *maendeleo* in the modern, economic sense. The centrality of economic development in the Chagga consciousness can be illustrated initially through the village history discussions (Table 7.1-7.4, see Chapter Five for a discussion of methodology). In each of the four villages meetings were held in order to construct a short village history. In every case these meetings became an exercise in charting the infrastructural development of the village. In response to the general prompt, “what has made your village what it is today?”, or “what changes have taken place here

since independence?”, informants immediately referred to the impact of external influences (particularly missionaries), the building of schools and health facilities, the year the church<sup>144</sup> was built, the year a road was completed or a water pipe or electricity<sup>145</sup> was installed.

*Table 7.1: Nronga time line*

Year	Event
1700	Nronga settled
1890s	Missionaries arrived
1920	First primary school (Nronga) built
1924	Nronga church built
1930	Coffee introduced
1960s	End of chiefly rule

*Table 7.2: Samaki Maini time line*

Year	Event
1880s	chiefly rule
1883	missionaries arrived
1909	Siha Sango church built, Siha Primary School built by missionaries
1916	Kibongoto hospital built (approximately)
1925	Coffee introduced
1955	Access road to village built
1966	Siha Middle School built
1972	Siha Secondary School built, work on Levishi Dispensary started (finished 1975)
1975	Samaki and Ngaroni Primary Schools built, village council started
1988	Heiffer Project International came to Samaki Maini
1990	World Vision came to the village and built a technical school and started the water project
1994	World Vision started rehabilitating primary schools

<sup>144</sup> Informants were often Lutherans rather than Muslims because of the sheer numbers of Christians in the villages. However, Muslim informants were often keen to re-tell village histories from their points of view during interviews. See section below on Lutheran-Muslim relationships within the villages.

<sup>145</sup> For those who could afford to be connected, the villages of Nronga and Wari had intermittent access to electricity. In Samaki Maini and Kyengia, the absence of electricity was one of the villagers' biggest complaints.

**Table 7.3: Wari time line**

Year	Event
1700	Wari village settled
1810s	Christianity began
1893	First German arrived
1899	Church built at Nkwarungo
1905	Mud road constructed, hospital completed
1938	Trouble with Europeans over coffee
1944	Machame Girls Secondary School built
1952	1kg of coffee = Tsh 2/=
1957-58	Tarmac road built
1963	End of chiefly rule
1966-67	Electricity installed
1967	Water project

**Table 7.4: Kyengia time line**

Year	Event
Pre-colonial rule	Kyengia existed as a traditional village
1885	Germans arrived, missionaries
1920s	People started sending their children to school, not only the chiefly families
1927	Coffee introduced
1936	Kibongoto cooperative opened
1950s	People started sending their daughters to school aswell
1974	KNCU cooperative opened in Kyengia

The strong association of *maendeleo* with modern infrastructural services became evident during further group discussions and interviews in Wari, and is inherently linked to a general dissatisfaction with the national government among many Chagga (outlined in Chapters Five and Six). Several key informants expressed the view that government has always neglected Kilimanjaro, and the Chagga have had to rely on themselves, the church, donors and NGOs in order to bring about ‘development’;

“...all over the country, CCM brought services to people, but here in Kilimanjaro, it has been brought by individuals, or the church. During *ujamaa* the government concentrated on the coastal and centre areas or the newly formed villages, so people got hospitals, milling machines, schools, even industries were planted near such places – everywhere except Kilimanjaro. CCM thought that Kilimanjaro was already a well-developed place, the Chagga people are well-off and they didn’t need much help from the government. Government leaders, even Mkapa, don’t like Chaggas....government services

in Wari are just a formality, we are not really getting services. The water project only runs from Wednesday to Saturday. So individuals are thinking how can we get these services”<sup>\*146</sup>.

“...I sat with my clan members and persuaded them to give the plot [of clan land] to [Doctor] *because he was going to bring development to Kisau*”<sup>\*</sup>.

“It’s not only Mkapa, also Nyerere... they [national government] don’t consider Kilimanjaro for anything....If an MP goes to ask about water, or schools in Kilimanjaro, he is told that Kilimanjaro already has more than the rest of the country, Dodoma has more water problems. Most of the things being done here are from our own contributions and outside donors”<sup>\*</sup>.

While it is quite clear that the Chagga feel they have been neglected, these comments also reveal why the Chagga see Kilimanjaro as ‘developed’; because it is relatively well-served in terms of modern social development infrastructure. In the case of the clan land given to the Doctor (of PAFO) it is significant that his plans to build a hospital in Kisau *kitongoji* should be interpreted as ‘bringing development’ to Kisau, and that this should be regarded as a good enough reason to relinquish a piece of clan land.

Further insights into local notions of development can be gleaned from the household interviews carried out in Wari, with both men and women. At an initial level, the equation of *maendeleo* with economic infrastructure comes out quite strongly:

“Village development is educating children and building roads and bridges”<sup>\*</sup> (6 F 3<sup>147</sup>).

“Village development is having good living houses for people, good roads, enough plots and health services”<sup>\*</sup> (8 M 4).

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<sup>146</sup> As explained in Chapter Five, all quotations from informants which have been translated from either Kiswahilli or Kichagga are marked with an asterisk.

<sup>147</sup> Quotations which are taken from the set of household interviews carried out in Wari are not identified by names. Rather, numbers are given which correspond to the household interview numbers in Appendix Two, where more detailed information on the interview household is given. The gender (M/F) and the wealth rank (1-5) are indicated in the text to give the reader an idea of the position of the speaker. Thus, each informant is identified by their interview number, their gender, and their wealth rank.

“[Doctor’s] project is good because he is building a hospital, and it will be nearer than Nshara....I don’t have enough money but I will be proud of the finished hospital”\* (34 F 5).

Again, *maendeleo* in the village emerges as commensurate with the provision of modern local services such as schools, health facilities and roads. Moreover, these services are regarded as something of a status symbol. As Esther Swai explains above, although she is not likely to be able to afford treatment at the Doctor’s hospital, the mere placing of such a symbol of ‘development’ in her *kitongoji* boosts the prestige of Kisau. Such a material reading of *maendeleo* is countered by other comments from villagers in Wari which reveal a slightly different interpretation which centres less on large-scale, capital intensive, modern services and more on everyday needs associated with the Chagga lifestyle:

“Development in the household is having a good living house, keeping livestock, improved livestock, selling agricultural produce, and using good agricultural techniques. In the village, it is about villagers having good dairy cows, producing enough milk”\* (3 M 5).

Here, *maendeleo* is interpreted as the ability to participate in the Chagga lifestyle successfully. The role of improved livestock, agriculture and good agricultural practices are central to this notion of *maendeleo*, drawing on the focal cultural importance of livestock and subsisting from the products of the family land. These two interpretations attached to *maendeleo* are mutually reinforcing rather than mutually exclusive and can be seen as a reflection of the Chagga desire to uphold certain elements of the ‘traditional’ lifestyle (livestock, land and agriculture) while simultaneously incorporating as many of the trappings of the ‘modern’ way of life into the village as possible (see Stambach 1996a).

Still other villagers interpret *maendeleo* in terms associated with the communal and self-reliant rhetoric of *ujamaa* prevalent during the 1960s and 1970s:

“Development in the household is to eat well, have a good living house, and to be self-sufficient in everything”\* (7 F 2, emphasis added).

“Village development is about having good living houses, milk cows, good all-weather roads, milling machines, *and a big farm for the whole village where they work together and share the produce*”\* (15 M 5, emphasis added).

This is particularly interesting given the relatively small impact of villagisation policy on Kilimanjaro. It would seem that although Kilimanjaro was, for the most part, already organised into appropriate settlements, the language of development and self-reliance associated with *ujamaa* which circulated at the national level did penetrate the villages to a certain extent. In this way, local ideas about *maendeleo* on Kilimanjaro are infused with the ideas and the ‘old’ rhetoric associated with national development strategies from the 1960s and 1970s (outlined in Chapter Three). Understandings of ‘development’ on Kilimanjaro have not emerged in a vacuum, but rather have been shaped and influenced by the larger, national (and international) context within which they are situated. This will become further evident below in considering women’s motivations for joining village women’s groups.

The suggestion made by Esther Swai above that *maendeleo* is inherently bound up with status and prestige is further drawn out by the following comments from two of the poorer respondents in Wari:

“I can’t tell you anything about development because I have no money. If I had money I would buy a dairy cow, iron sheets for the roof, and educate my children”\* (14 M 5).

“It’s difficult for people of my category to say who’s bringing development to the village”\* (41 M 5).

The intimation here is that *maendeleo* is associated with rich and prestigious people (as well as objects), rather than poorer peasants. Moreover, poorer villagers feel excluded from the process of development, to the extent that they do not even feel able to hold an opinion on ‘development’ in their village (or one suitable to divulge in an interview situation). The fact that they are materially poor defines the exclusionary nature of their relationship vis-à-vis symbols of modernity and progress in the village.

*Maendeleo* is therefore understood by the Chagga as a complex set of ideas relating to economic development, social service provision, and modernity, infused with elements of *ujamaa* national development rhetoric, and local cultural ideals and values. While all of these notions are important for understanding the significance of the non-governmental sector in Hai, it is perhaps the association of *maendeleo* with modernity and access to resources which is the most significant for understanding participation in the non-governmental sector. The state, NGOs, the Church and donors are all seen as resources for modern development in Hai. As will become clear below, the non-governmental sector in particular is overarchingly understood as a new source of resources, and of achieving development, progress, and modernity.

***“NGOs are here to bring development”***

Part of the appeal of the non-governmental sector lies in the general disillusionment of many Chagga with the state, which they consider to have failed them. The feeling that the government has neglected Kilimanjaro has also given rise to a dissatisfaction with village and district level government also:

“It’s just villagers who are bringing development, the village government does not do anything”\* (12 M 3).

“I’ve heard on the radio that there is a village government and a national government but I don’t know what they do”\* (41 M 5).

“Village government? It has died.... the bridge to the main road is damaged, there is no development in the village, no-one is mending the water taps”\* (45 F 2).

Such a negative assessment of village government places greater emphasis on the efforts made by individuals and non-state actors such as NGOs, the Church and donors:

CM<sup>148</sup>: “Who are the important agents of development in Wari?”

Response: “Individuals. Cars are brought by individuals. Most of the contributions for schools are from parents to make sure they are existing. Individuals and institutions like KKKT, and outside donors are important for hospitals”.

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<sup>148</sup> i.e. the author.

CM: "Do you think that Kalali Women's Group makes any contribution to village development?"

Response: "The group's contributions and donors have helped a lot".

CM: "What about the village government?"

Response: "All it does is call the meeting and tell the villagers to contribute money"\* (32 F 2).

The notion that the non-governmental sector "brings development" is prevalent among district government officials as well as within the villages. As the District Community Development Officer explained:

"NGOs are doing a very good job, especially as Tanzania has a lot of problems. NGOs help a lot of groups....they benefit people economically".

This rather rosy view of the non-governmental sector in Hai is echoed by one of the Ward Officers:

"NGOs are here to bring development. They bring health and education services, they are aiming to improve the health of the people and to raise the incomes of the people"\* (Ward CDO Machame East).

The local government takes a positive view of NGOs as it sees the sector as an alternative service provider, and in some cases, as a source of resources for appropriation. For example, the UNICEF Child Survival and Development Programme which operated in Hai between 1987 and 1996 provided all of the Ward Community Development Officers with motorbikes so that they could easily travel to villages to administer the project. However these motorbikes were appropriated by higher-ranking government officials and were either promptly sold or kept for personal use. A senior official at the District Administration lamented local misunderstandings about the NGO sector by rural peoples:

"NGOs could do a lot, but they are a new phenomenon in Tanzania. Many rural people are only interested in NGOs for the immediate economic gain they can get from them. For example, if Technoserve<sup>149</sup> say they will give advice to a village, the farmers want money and concrete results. Knowledge of NGOs and what they are about is minimal in rural areas – they are new, and people don't really understand the concept of NGOs, they just think they are there for money" (Hai District Agricultural Officer).

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<sup>149</sup> An international NGO based in Arusha who work in training community groups. They have worked with the Nronga Women Dairy Cooperative in training the management committee.



However, I would suggest that it is not only ‘rural people’ who hold such views on NGOs. It is quite clear that certain officials in the local government also see NGOs primarily as an alternative source of income for the district (or in some cases, for themselves), and any participatory development work is viewed as secondary. As discussed in the previous chapter, discussions with the District Planning Officers revealed that NGOs and donors are regarded as merely another service provider whose role is to finance social development in the face of diminishing state resources:

“The Planning Office is always looking for new donors, and we try to create good atmospheres so that donors will want to work with us again. We try and sell written up project proposals to donors....the Planning Office has something like a shopping list of projects which we keep for prospective donors.... We have no development budget [from government] so we are completely reliant on donors”.

The non-governmental sector therefore represents an important new source of funds for development for the District Council as much as it does for groups of villagers. While NGOs are viewed primarily in terms of the resources they offer, it is also assumed that NGOs and donors exist in order to finance modern social development.

***“I joined Kalali Women’s Group to get a good cow and sell milk”:  
access to resources via the non-governmental sector***

The focus on NGOs as a new strategy for accessing resources was particularly evident when talking to men and women about the village women’s groups. It became clear that the non-governmental sector is as important an alternative source of income for households as it is at village or district levels. However, access to this income depends heavily on the ‘success’ of the women’s group in question. In Samaki Maini, Kyengia, Nronga and Wari a wide range of women’s groups are active, some of which are more prosperous than others (Chapters Five and Six). Those who see these groups as a way of boosting household incomes are generally members of those groups which are making a regular income. As one member of the

Nronga Women Dairy Cooperative, the most economically successful group in the district, remarked:

“I joined soon after the cooperative started. I had cows but no market, so I had to join to get what I wanted....money”\*.

The importance of the income gained through the more prosperous women’s groups cannot be overestimated for household budgets, as the following quotations make clear:

“I use my profits at the moment for our farm as we are expecting the short rains soon...If we have problems we can get a loan from the shop according to how much milk you sell everyday. I have used a loan for school fees, tending sick people, or an urgent call somewhere”\* (member of Nronga).

Respondent: “Village development is things like milling machines, Ifiyo Women’s Group, and cars”.

CM: “Why do you think Ifiyo Women’s Group is important for village development?”

Respondent: “So that they [women] can do things together and can get income to use in the household”\* (husband of member of Ifiyo Women’s Group).

“I joined Kalali Women’s Group to get a good cow and sell milk”\* (member of Kalali).

“Even here at Kisau women wanted to start their own NGO....because people here are poor, they need to get some money, women need to get some money, to send children to school”\* (husband of member of Kalali Women’s Group).

Both men and women recognise the economic benefits of the women’s groups. The extra income earned is seen as a vital part of the household budget, particularly in the context of decreasing coffee harvests:

“The importance of coffee has declined over the last few years....now there is less overall production. Now we are keeping dairy cows, selling calves, and the milk project [Nronga Women Dairy Cooperative] is contributing a lot to help families”\* (Men’s group discussion, Nronga).

It is quite clear that the economic incentive for joining women's groups is generally recognised to be substantial, and is one of the most important motivations for becoming involved in local development activities for women, although as we shall see below, there are other factors related to status and prestige which are also significant. The economic incentive is acknowledged by men as well as women, and some men are very keen for their wives to join local successful women's groups. The Nronga Women Dairy Cooperative has a constant stream of requests from potential members. Other people (men as well as women) decide to start a women's group themselves, such as one sub-village chairman keen to initiate a women's group himself (with his wife as chairlady, no doubt a strategy designed to boost his own status as much as his wife's income):

“I have heard about a lot of other women's groups in the other villages, and I wondered why Kisau has not got one organised. I called a meeting at the village office and discussed the possibility of setting up a women's group. We want to keep chickens and fish, for sale and for consumption....I have written the project proposal, but I need to take it to the district to find out about funding. The idea of the project is to raise household incomes”\*.

The implications for women's participation inherent in such comments is discussed below, as is the focus on the potential for women's groups to 'help families' and 'household' incomes, rather than *women's* incomes.

The association of the non-governmental sector with accessing resources creates several problems in relation to information-sharing between groups, as identified in Chapter Six. As the District Agricultural Officer pointed out, many community-based organisations in Hai see themselves as being in competition with one another to gain access to donor funds. This does not encourage village organisations to keep in contact with each other and share ideas, experience and information. One Ward Officer explained the situation in his ward:

“All the NGOs in Machame East are independent of one another, they don't cooperate amongst themselves. Every individual group has its problems, they never share. No two groups are supported by the same donor, so every group

struggles to get its own funds from different sources....it's difficult for them to cooperate"\* (Ward CDO Machame East).

This situation was very clear in relation to the women's groups in the four villages. Kalali Women's Group has two milling and threshing machines, one diesel donated by CDTF and one electric donated by Svillup 2000. When the second machine was received, CDTF requested that the diesel machine be donated to another women's group in Machame East. According to two of the members of the Kalali Women's Group, they had 'no intention' of donating the diesel machine, as it is useful to keep for days when there is no electricity supply in the village. The milling machine is available for public use on market days and people pay a small fee (Tsh 350/=) for the service. The two members of the Kalali group intimated that the profits of the group may be jeopardised if they were to donate the diesel machine to the other women's group. Similarly, the women's groups in Samaki Maini and Kyengia villages tend to operate separately. There are five women's groups in Samaki Maini, and four in Kyengia, all of whom are engaged in some form of income-generating activity. In particular, several of the groups in each village are trying to save money in the long term in order to buy a milling machine for each group. When asked why several of the women's groups did not try to save together for a machine, one member explained, "because each group wants its own machine". Members of each group knew of the other groups in their village but they preferred to keep their activities separate. Community-based women's groups are thus central strategies in the struggle for access to resources to achieve 'development'. Moreover, this facilitates a highly competitive, rather than collaborative, atmosphere between organisations. Any potential for sharing information and experiences, or for working together to maximise capital or knowledge, is lost.

It is not only the smaller, village-based activities which are viewed as new resources for individuals and the village. Discussions in Samaki Maini and Kyengia revealed that WVT's work is entirely judged on the social development infrastructure which it has helped to rehabilitate or build. Tables 7.2 and 7.4 above illustrate the relative significance of WVT's project in Samaki Maini and Kyengia, the two research villages involved in the Sanya ADP (see Chapter Five). In Samaki Maini, where

WVT has been most active in rehabilitating schools and the dispensary, this was important enough to be mentioned as part of the village's history. In Kyengia, however, where WVT has been less active, it was not mentioned in the village history. People in Kyengia were generally of the opinion that WVT had been of no help to the village because it had failed to deliver on its promises to rehabilitate primary schools, among other things. Still more people had not even heard of WVT in Kyengia and were completely oblivious to the fact that their village was included in such a development project. In Samaki Maini, on the other hand, participants in group discussions were well-acquainted with the social infrastructure component of WVT's activities, as this typical response illustrates:

“World Vision has rehabilitated two primary schools, Samaki and Ngaroni, which both got two new classrooms and a teacher's office at Ngaroni....we used to be dependent on furrow water, water from springs and rivers, but now that World Vision has brought potable water things are better”\* (Men's group discussion, Samaki Maini).

The non-governmental sector in Hai is therefore understood first and foremost as a new set of resources to which individuals, groups, villages or the district administration may have access, illustrated by the attitudes towards the economically successful women's groups and WVT's project. This is closely associated with an understanding of *maendeleo* which centres on the modern and the economic. However, as outlined above, *maendeleo* is also closely associated with Chagga cultural norms and values which must also be recognised as important factors structuring participation in the non-governmental sector.

### **Discourses of development: power, status and the non-governmental sector**

Liberalisation and the associated explosion in development agencies in Tanzania have given rise to new conceptualisations of identity, and new ways of enhancing power and status (see Chapter Three, Bülow 1995, Moore 1996, Rubin 1996). While offering opportunities for economic survival strategies, the non-governmental sector also represents a new set of non-material resources. The growth in the development

industry has ushered in new ideas about identity which are inherently linked to the notion of *maendeleo*. The ‘idea of development’ as it circulates in national and local discourses shapes local subjectivities in Kilimanjaro. As outlined in Chapter Three, this ‘idea of development’ is associated at the national level with processes of economic growth and political pluralism identified with liberalisation (Rubin 1996), the growth of associational life and the non-governmental sector in particular, Tanzanian national identity, and discourses on gender and the role of women in national development. The ‘idea of development’ in Hai is situated within the parameters set by national-level discourses, but is also strongly associated with Chagga cultural norms and values. While *maendeleo* takes on an overwhelmingly economic, modernist perspective within the Chagga imagination, understandings of *maendeleo* are also heavily embedded in Chagga cultural norms and values relating to gender, education, industriousness, religiosity and progressiveness. These are values to which the attainment of prestige and status on the mountain are attached. To be seen to be a ‘good’ Chagga man or woman is to actively engage, or conform, with these ideals. A particular and distinct ideal Chagga subjectivity related to the notion of *maendeleo* is constructed by these norms and values<sup>150</sup>.

This is not to suggest that the recent growth in the development industry has completely re-written local identities. Rather, it has introduced new concepts and new measures of power and status which are given local meaning according to existing norms and ideas (see Moore 1996). Certain groups and individuals are able to work within these constructed notions of power and prestige in order to advance themselves, their families, or their community groups. In actively engaging with these new measures of status and prestige associated with *maendeleo*, individuals and groups can win approval, and boost their own status and position within the community. Thus, while the material benefits of membership of non-governmental groups can be significant, the non-governmental sector has also become an important

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<sup>150</sup> It is not suggested that there is only one Chagga subjectivity. Rather, it is argued that a distinct subject position among the Chagga is related to the ideals bound up within the notion of *maendeleo*, and that this subject position interacts (and may come into conflict) with other Chagga subject positions, such as nationality, gender, religiosity and social class. Having said this, it is imperative to note that the Chagga developmental subject also interweaves with other subject positions, particularly that of religiosity.

factor in defining local identities in Hai. This discussion will focus on women as the huge majority of community organisations are women's groups, the reasons for which will also be considered below.

The status and significance accorded to education is central to the Chagga understanding of *maendeleo*. Education is widely regarded as a route to a formal sector job, and given the problems on Kilimanjaro relating to land holdings discussed in Chapter Five, this has increased over recent years. Moreover, education is understood as an indication of a person's or a place's level of *maendeleo*, as the following comments illustrate:

CM: "Why is Nronga perceived as a developed place?"

1: "People here want to be successful, so they work hard and they always bring money back to the village".

2: "Usually 95 percent of the village have attended school....it's not easy to see roaming people in Nronga".

3: "We were the first people to receive missionaries so we had the chance to get education early and to learn from Christianity. Even before the missionaries traditionally people had respect for each other and they had good unity"\* (Nronga men's discussion).

"Influential people in the village are those who are advanced, they can plan and have been well-educated, they are competent, and like to bring development to the village"\* (male key informant Wari).

"Development in the household is working hard in the home, educating children, and always being active"\* (20 F 3).

*Maendeleo* is portrayed in terms of education, industriousness, and competence, by both men and women. This can be displayed by a place (such as Nronga) or by an individual. The portrayal of *maendeleo* in terms of accepted Chagga cultural values simultaneously implicates those social traits which are frowned upon as 'undeveloped', such as laziness, disrespect and disunity. These attributes are not considered to be part of the true 'Chagga way' and are therefore contrary to the social construction of 'development'. In several discussions these undesirable traits were

either dismissed as being no longer an issue (such as witchcraft<sup>151</sup>), or if they were still prevalent, as being under control (such as *pombe* drinking):

“Chaggas work hard and knew the meaning of self-reliance from an early stage....we [Mushi clan] are particularly against laziness and are displeased with those who are idle”\* (male key informant Wari).

“People believe in witch doctors who come at night and put spells on their livestock, often when a cow dies or doesn’t produce milk after calving, people think this is due to witchcraft. This is not a traditional Chagga belief, it came from the coast, and it’s not very common now”\* (male key informant Wari).

CM: “Why are there more NGOs in the north of the ward?”

Response: “In the lower area, they believe in witch doctors although they have started to change because of the missionaries. Since 1988 people have started to go to dispensaries and forget about witch doctors....the upper villages are richer and more educated”\* (Urori Village Secretary).

“*Pombe* shops used to be a problem....people know it retards development, and now they only drink when they have finished work, not during the day when they should be in the *shamba*”\* (Wari Village Chairman).

Despite the suggestion that *pombe* drinking is under control, other comments suggest that drinking local brew is as much a part of Chagga culture today as it has always been:

“Samwel Masawe [candidate for village chairman] doesn’t drink *pombe* and is very into the Bible – so people thought if he doesn’t drink *pombe* and is chosen to lead the village then he may ban *pombe* shops”\* (male key informant).

What emerges from these comments is a very clear picture of the ideal construct of the Chagga man or woman: he or she has attained some degree of education, the children are able to attend school, adults are hard-working and never idle, they only drink *pombe* when their work is done (and not in public *pombe* shops, in the case of women), they do not believe in ‘backward’ ideas such as witchcraft or traditional healing, and they listen to the teachings of their religion and live according to them.

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<sup>151</sup> It is possible that the denial of ‘older’ practices such as witchcraft and traditional healing during discussions and interviews is more a reflection of an unwillingness to discuss such things with an outsider, than it is a ‘true’ comment on social practice among the Chagga today. However, the important point here is the way in which the *discourse of development is constructed*. Whether or not it represents the ‘truth’ does not detract from the significance of the opinion held. The Church and modern medical practitioners have taught against witchcraft and traditional healing on Kilimanjaro



Women must also fulfil their roles as good housewives and mothers (as discussed in Chapter Five), while men must be seen to live up to cultural expectations surrounding male roles (such as industriousness, providing for the family, fulfilling their clan role). This constructed Chagga developmental subject, which is essentially a reflection of accepted socio-cultural norms among the Chagga, is projected onto understandings of 'development'. In this way, *maendeleo* is everything that a 'good' Chagga should be. What is key here is that the rhetoric surrounding the non-governmental sector in Hai is associated with these Chagga traits, thus participation in or association with the sector offers an opportunity for people to present themselves as 'developed' and 'good' Chagga men and women.

The non-governmental sector is understood as being inherently concerned with *maendeleo*. Becoming involved in any kind of non-governmental activity, therefore, links the individual to 'development', and to the positive socio-cultural values associated with it. Being part of a community-based women's group, for example, represents an ability and a willingness to take part in local development. To appear to be 'development-minded' and a 'progressive person' is bound up in the Chagga imagination with education, modernity and industriousness. Those who are not members of groups are described as 'uneducated' and as not 'knowing'. As the leaders of one of Wari's Lutheran Churches remarked during a discussion about why some women do not join their local group:

*Mchungaji*: "The problem is a lack of education. Most women don't understand the benefit of joining other women [in women's groups]. Some women are too proud and rich, and don't feel they need to join a women's group when they are rich enough, what would they gain?"

*Mwivangilisti*: "Some women are proud because they are too jealous to share their knowledge with other women"\* (*Mchungaji* and *Mwivangilisti*<sup>152</sup>, Nkwarungo Church Wari).

CM: "What do women gain from joining these groups?"

Response: "They learn a lot about childcare and looking after the household."

CM: "How do you think this helps women's position in the village?"

Response: "It helps women a lot, some members could not get cows on their own, so they are getting cows and milk. Also it keeps women busy rather than

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and many people are aware that it is stigmatised as backward. A desire to portray the Chagga to an outsider as a development-minded and progressive group of people may also be significant here.

<sup>152</sup> *Mchungaji* (Kiswahili): Pastor; *Mwivangilisti* (Kiswahili): Evangelist.

wasting time in pombe shops. Also doing household visits you learn a lot....about mats, making tea....that you can try and do in your own home”\* (49 F 2).

In the first excerpt, members of groups are accorded a particular status of being educated, understanding the benefits of membership, and willing to share knowledge, while non-members are regarded as ignorant and non-development-minded. In both discussions the undesirability of traits such as pride, jealousy and *pombe* drinking in public are highlighted and accorded to women who do not participate in women's groups. These representations of participants and non-participants in women's groups constructs the members as respectable Chagga women who *understand* (because they are 'educated') the benefits of local development.

Furthermore, membership of groups is often *directly* associated with 'development' and 'progress'. Several women made a direct connection between the two when talking about the benefits they gained from participating in their groups:

“I joined the women's group to get good progress in my household”\* (7 F 2).

“...I wanted to work for development and acquire my daily needs in my home”\* (*Tumaini Women's Group* discussion, Kyengia).

Furthermore, participating in women's groups which boost incomes enables women to improve their status by sending their children to school:

“It is very important to be in the women's group because it can help us to raise the status of our families by paying school fees for our children”\* (*Jiendeleze Women's Group* discussion Kyengia).

This is closely tied in with the socio-cultural value attached to education and schooling, and the links made between this and 'development'. Women are therefore able to conform to local and national development discourses which encourage them to be active, development-minded and industrious. By taking an active part in the non-governmental sector they are fulfilling Chagga ideals about what it means to be a good, Christian or Muslim modern Chagga housewife, and national ideals about the role of women in the household, community, and the nation.

The gendered nature of the discourse of development is also highly significant in producing norms and expectations with regard to women's role in development. The interweaving of local, national, and international discourses on women's role in development have shaped local action to the extent that the majority of community-based organisations in Hai are *women's* groups, and in fact is a key characteristic of development processes in Hai overlooked by Kiondo's privatisation of development thesis. Men's groups only account for 2 percent of the non-governmental sector in Hai (table 5.7). This is no doubt related to the greater participation of men in formal sector jobs, and that fact that male income-generating activities take place either on a smaller or an individual scale, or as part of a specific business venture. Moreover, male income-generation is not bound up with local ideas about participating, as a member of a larger group, in the NGO sector. On the other hand, business is not regarded as a suitable activity for a respectable Chagga woman, particularly by the Church, although this does not deter women from engaging in petty trade or running small businesses. What is important here is the local *idea* of respectable gender roles. Forming groups under the aegis of the Church, mosque, village government or local community development office is regarded as a safe and respectable activity for *women* to engage in. Although many of these groups have recently formed (i.e. within the last five or six years), a substantial number of the groups have existed in various forms since *ujamaa*. As outlined in Chapter Three, the UWT encouraged women to form groups in villages during the height of *ujamaa*. This has given rise to a certain familiarity with the concept of women organising in groups as an inherent part of local development. Moreover, the strong association which has developed in the Chagga consciousness between women, development and collective action has fostered acceptance of women's organisations within a patriarchal society. The more recent focus of the international development community on women and women's organisations as a vehicle for development has merely encouraged the formation of more women's groups outside of political structures. Elite men and women on Kilimanjaro have access to such knowledge and encourage women in their villages to start something together:

“We heard about women’s groups announced on the radio and in the newspapers, and we heard of Nronga, and we started to think why didn’t we start our own?”\* (Chairlady, Kalali Women’s Group).

Further incentives come from the District Community Development Officers, who, as outlined in Chapter Six, meet with women in villages and teach them the received virtues of women’s organisations, and explain how national and regional NGOs such as BAWATA and KIWODEA give loans to help village women’s groups. In addition, the Lutheran Church has a distinct policy which aims to have a women’s group in every parish. The Church’s vision of the role of men and women in development is spread from the pulpit, and women are encouraged to join their parish women’s groups in order to learn more about their roles as housewives, mothers, and being good community members. As the Pastor of Kalali Church commented:

“[The women’s group] was founded by the Church because they found that women at the Church had nothing to keep them busy, nothing to produce for families” (*Mchungaji Kalali Church, Wari*).

The Church’s policy for women is thus based upon accepted ideas about women’s work, the invisibility of women’s contributions to the household and community, and also the Chagga predilection for being productive and keeping busy.

Women’s groups are also increasingly attached to mosques. Within this environment, accounting for the recent proliferation of women’s groups would seem to be quite straightforward, although it is important to acknowledge the influence of the national rhetoric surrounding women’s groups under one-party rule during the 1960s and 1970s. Certainly, some of the women interviewed were under the impression that they were still members of their UWT village group, when in fact the UWT groups have withered since the 1980s, although their memberships have often been re-incarnated into ‘new’ women’s groups which are no longer affiliated with UWT, and which have different names and slightly different objectives. The expansion in women’s village-based organisations must therefore be understood as arising from the intersection of a highly gendered national development policy with the international focus on women’s organisations, and with socio-cultural practices in

Kilimanjaro, all of which are couched in terms of women's contribution to 'development'. In this way, the recent expansion of the development industry has reinforced and given new currency to the (state's) initial idea that women must form groups in order to contribute to development.

Thus far this chapter has discussed the ways in which the Chagga developmental subject position has been shaped by the discourse of development associated with the growth in the non-governmental sector. A key issue is that the new discourse of development has not been wholly consumed in Hai without contestation, but rather has been appropriated and attached to existing norms and values among the Chagga, so that previous socio-cultural values associated with 'the Chagga way' are now understood also to denote 'development', modernity and progress. The non-governmental sector has therefore come to represent a new set of vital resources on the mountain, both in economic, and social terms. However, a central characteristic of social relations on Kilimanjaro is socio-economic stratification. The following section examines how different socio-economic groups are able to engage with the non-governmental sector, and considers the ramifications of these processes for participation and empowerment to take place.

### **Participation and empowerment**

In Chapter Two I critically discussed the concepts of participation and empowerment and highlighted the ways in which the origins, meanings and empirical validity of the two concepts are highly contested within the literature on gender, development and non-governmental organisations. The assumption that participation and empowerment are unproblematic concepts which can be simply 'added' to community development projects with magical results for all concerned was challenged. In particular, I questioned the notion of the homogenous and unified community which is often assumed to exist as a 'level playing field' prior to any development project intervention. Related to this was a set of questions about the nature of participation itself and whether it is possible to foster 'meaningful' participation within the parameters of a development project. Furthermore, I questioned the assertion that empowerment may result from participation in

development projects, particularly in the case of women. These questions relating to participation and empowerment are central issues in the remaining sections of this chapter.

### **“Unequal participation”<sup>153</sup>**

A central theme which has been explored throughout this study in relation to the Chagga is the extent to which social stratification has emerged since the colonial period. The gap between rich and poor families living in close proximity in the mountain villages has become a well-recognised feature of the Chagga social environment. Unequal socio-economic relations have come to shape all areas of life on the mountain and the non-governmental sector in Hai is no exception. As argued above, the non-governmental sector is perceived as a new reservoir of economic and social resources. While it provides access to the material resources understood to be an integral part of *maendeleo*, it also has shaped local identities to the extent that participation in non-governmental activities is inherently bound up with ideas about *maendeleo*, and thus being a good Chagga. However, a fundamental issue is that access to these resources is not universal. Opportunities for participation are therefore highly structured according to the position of an individual within Chagga society.

#### ***The importance of wealth and status***

Within village-based organisations, socio-economic hierarchies become extremely important factors determining inclusion and exclusion. In Wari village, details on members of women’s groups and their households were collected, including their perceived wealth and the positions held in important institutions in the village (see discussion of wealth ranking in Chapter Five). Although a pattern of inclusion and exclusion is not universal, a general picture emerges in which the very poorest women are not participating in local women’s groups (Tables 7.5 and 7.6). It is the ‘middle peasantry’ (broadly interpreted as wealth groups 3 and 4), and a substantial proportion of the upper peasantry (wealth group 2) which are most active in the village women’s groups. The poorest wealth group (5), and also the richest wealth

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<sup>153</sup> Desai (1996:235), see Chapter Two.

group (1) are the most under-represented groups in terms of membership of women's groups. In the case of the Kalali Women's Group, which has distributed cows donated from an Italian NGO to some of its members, the middle and upper peasantry are again disproportionately among the recipients (table 7.6). In fact not one household ranked (1) or (5) received a cow from the group.

**Table 7.5 Wealth rankings of all women's group members in Wari village**

Wealth rank	Standardised no. of HH in Wari	Total no. of members of all groups	% of members of all groups
1	8.1565	40.8	19.6
2	2.5013	60.0	28.8
3	0.7595	62.3	29.9
4	0.4273	33.3	16.0
5	1.2181	12.2	5.8
Total		208.6	100.1

**Table 7.6 Wealth rankings and cow donations (Kalali only) for members of Nkwarungo, Ifiyo and Kalali women's groups in Wari village**

Wealth rank	% women Nkw'go	% women Ifiyo	% women Kalali	% Kalali women with cows
1	39.2	0	8.3	0
2	42.1	9.4	22.7	22.0
3	10.1	51.8	40.7	51.5
4	7.2	11.3	24.6	26.5
5	1.4	27.5	3.7	0
Total	100	100	100	100

N.B. Tables 7.5 and 7.6 shows members of women's groups in each wealth group, where the number of HH in each wealth group has been standardised according to the total number of households in the entire village, as in the results presented in the wealth rankings in table 5.1.

At this point it is worth explaining the wealth rankings (see also discussion of methodology in Chapter Five). These are used as a guide to household wealth only, although the accuracy of the rankings in relation to the households which were interviewed were generally found to be very good. It was quite clear from Table 5.1 (Chapter Five) that a good proportion of the villagers in Wari are relatively prosperous. The biggest rank group (4) is taken as the 'average' standard of living (in wealth ranking sessions informants described this group as *wastan*, meaning normal or average). These households are not considered to be 'poor' in this study.

It is wealth group (5), identified during discussions as either *maskini* (poor) or *fukara* (almost destitute) who are considered to be the very poorest and marginalised people in the village. Thus it is wealth group (5) to which the term 'poor' refers in the context of this discussion.

Furthermore, participation in these community organisations is linked to the status of an individual or the household (Table 7.7). Women from households whose members are prominent in the village, through association either with the Church, Mosque, village government or the KNCU, are also often involved in their local women's organisation. These are not the only markers of status within the village (for example, prominent businessmen would be another proxy) but they do provide a reliable approximation of relative position within the village. It is particularly significant to note that the majority of members of Kalali Women's Group included in table 7.7 are among those who received cows from the group. A high proportion of recipients are therefore not only among the middle and upper peasantry, but are also among the higher status households. Moreover, there are no households ranked (5) included in table 7.7, indicating that the poorest group in Wari is generally excluded from positions of status in the village.



**Table 7.7: Indicators of wealth and status held by households with an active member of a women's group in Wari<sup>154</sup>**

Name of household head <sup>155</sup>	Positions held by members of household ( <i>Mama</i> or <i>Baba</i> <sup>156</sup> )	Cow (Kalali)	Wealth Rank
Nemrudi Mushi	<i>Mama</i> : member of Nkwarungo WG <i>Baba</i> : Chairman of Wari KNCU, church elder, senior member of ex-chiefly clan	n/a	1
Adalbert Mushi	<i>Mama</i> : member of Nkwarungo Women Department <i>Baba</i> : Chairman of Rengua sub-village, sits on Village Council, senior member of ex-chiefly clan	n/a	2
Ramad Mushi	<i>Mama</i> : founder, Kalali Mosque WG	n/a	2
Jasper Shoo	<i>Mama</i> : member of Kalali WG <i>Baba</i> : church elder	No	2
Godi Shangali	<i>Mama</i> : member of Ifiyo WG <i>Baba</i> : church elder	n/a	2
Felex Shoo	<i>Mama</i> : member of Kalali WG, on board of Kalaoli KKKT Women Department <i>Baba</i> : church elder	No	2
Nathan Mwashwa	<i>Mama</i> : Secretary and Treasurer of Kalali KKKT Women Department <i>Baba</i> : advisor to Kalali WG	n/a	2
Richard Petro	<i>Mama</i> : member of Kalali WG <i>Baba</i> : church elder	Yes	3
Victor Tarimo	<i>Mama</i> : member of Kalali WG <i>Baba</i> : sits on Village Council	Yes	3
Coster Joseph	<i>Mama</i> : member of Kalali WG <i>Baba</i> : church elder	Yes	3
Umben Zakayo	<i>Mama</i> : member of Kalali WG, on board of Kalali KKKT Women Department	Yes	3
Simon Mwangwa	<i>Mama</i> : Chairlady of Ifiyo WG <i>Baba</i> : Chairman of Ifiyo sub-village, sits on Village Council	n/a	3
Peniel Rumisha	<i>Mama</i> : member of Ifiyo WG <i>Baba</i> : sits on Village Council	n/a	3
John Zablon	<i>Mama</i> : member of Ifiyo WG <i>Baba</i> : church elder	n/a	3
Teresia Mwangwa	<i>Mama</i> : ex-leader of Wari UWT, member of Ifiyo WG, sits on Village Council	n/a	3
Japher Masawe	<i>Mama</i> : member of Kalali WG <i>Baba</i> : church elder	No	3
Simbo Martin	<i>Mama</i> : ex-leader of Wari UWT, member of Kalali WG	Yes	3
John Kirenga	<i>Mama</i> : member of Kalali WG, on board of Kalali KKKT Women Department	Yes	3
Peniel Kirenga	<i>Mama</i> : member of Kalali WG <i>Baba</i> : church elder	No	3
Mwashuka Swai	<i>Mama</i> : member of Kalali WG, on board of Kalali KKKT Women Department	No	3

<sup>154</sup> Indicators of status for the purposes of this table include; membership of women's groups (Kalali, Ifiyo and Nkwarungo), executive positions held in any women's group or KKKT Women Department, position on the board of Wari KNCU, position on Council of Church Elders (Nkwarungo and Kalali), position on Wari Village Council, position as Chairman of a Wari sub-village, and senior membership of the ex-chiefly clan.

<sup>155</sup> Pseudonym.

<sup>156</sup> *Mama* (Kiswahili) mother, usually wife of head of household.

*Baba* (Kiswahili) father, usually male head of household.

Judica Masawe	<i>Mama</i> : member of Kalali WG, on board of Kalali KKKT Women Department <i>Baba</i> : church elder	No	3
Hussen Shoo	<i>Mama</i> : member of Kalali WG <i>Baba</i> : Chairman of Urara sub-village, sits on Village Council	Yes	3
Mrs U. Swai	<i>Mama</i> : member of Kalali WG, church elder	Yes	3
William Muro	<i>Mama</i> : member of Kalali WG, on board of Kalali KKKT Women Department	Yes	4
Charles Muro	<i>Mama</i> : member of Kalali WG, on board of Kalali KKKT Women Department	Yes	4
Simbaufoo Mushi	<i>Mama</i> : member of Kalali WG <i>Baba</i> : church elder	Yes	4
Philipo Masawe	<i>Mama</i> : member of Kalali WG, Chairlady of Kalali KKKT Women Department <i>Baba</i> : church elder	Yes	4
Simbo Masawe	<i>Mama</i> : member of Kalali WG <i>Baba</i> : church elder	Yes	4
Semu Masawe	<i>Mama</i> : member of Kalali WG <i>Baba</i> : church elder, Assistant Chairman of Wari KNCU	Yes	4

This is not to suggest that *all* members of women's groups come exclusively from the middle peasantry, or from households with relatively high status within the village. For example, while 29 'elite' households are listed in table 7.7 above, a further 23 households of similar status did not have any members of a women's group. Simply belonging to the village elite does not therefore automatically translate into women's participation in local organisations. It would also be useful to consider other factors which may also have an impact on participation in women's organisations, such as the level of education and occupation of the woman, her personal and family networks, and her husband's occupation<sup>157</sup>, but due to the size of the population of Wari village this was not possible during this study. Nevertheless, there remains a strong influence of wealth and status on women's participation in their local organisations, which is particularly evident among the leadership of the women's groups (table 7.8). It is quite clear that leaders are drawn from the middle and upper peasantry (wealth groups 2, 3 and to a lesser extent, 4) and are often also

<sup>157</sup> Much of this analysis is based on the assumption that Chagga households consist of a male head with a female partner. I feel this is justified due to the strength of local values about the centrality of marriage within the extended family and the community at large. However, this is not to deny the existence of female-headed households, which are increasingly prevalent, especially in cases where the male household head has migrated to a city to find work. More significantly, members of women's groups come overwhelmingly from married households where the husband is either present or returns regularly.

**Table 7.8 Indicators of status and wealth of women's group leaders in Wari**

Name <sup>158</sup>	Position and comments on status (where known)	Wealth Rank
Martha Mwanga	Chairlady Ifiyo WG, married to sub-village Chairman	3
Teresia Mwanga	Committee member Ifiyo WG, ex-leader of Wari UWT, a ten-cell leader, sits on Village Council	3
Neema Mushi	Committee member Ifiyo WG	3
Aikande Zebedia	Committee member Ifiyo WG	3
Louise Mushi	Chairlady, Nkwarungo KKKT Women Department, married to senior member of ex-chiefly clan	1
Nancy Masawe	Chairlady, Kalali Women's Group, employed as a magistrate in a local court, husband is a businessman	3
Eva Kwayu	Secretary, Kalali Women's Group, husband employed by electricity company	3
Isaria Masawe	Chairlady, Kalali KKKT Women Department, retired secondary school teacher, husband is employed as a local Ward Secretary	3/4
Witness Mwashu	Secretary and Treasurer, Kalali KKKT Women Department, husband is advisor to Kalali WG	2
Adeline Shoo	On board of Kalali KKKT Women Department, husband is a church elder	2
Anankira Kirenga	On board of Kalali KKKT Women Department, member of Kalali WG, received cow	3
Tasimbora Muro	On board of Kalali KKKT Women Department, member of Kalali WG, received cow	4
Aisa Muro	On board of Kalali KKKT Women Department, member of Kalali WG, received cow	4
Anna Masawe	On board of Kalali KKKT Women Department, married to a very prosperous businessman	1/2
Mrs U. Swai	On board of Kalali KKKT Women Department, a church elder, member of Kalali WG, received cow	3
Neema Kidin	On board of Kalali KKKT Women Department, a teacher	3
Elly Mwashuka	On board of KKKT Kalali Women Department	3

distinguished either through their occupation, other positions held within the village, or the status of their husband (all of the women are married).

The over-representation of better-off and higher status women within women's groups was a feature often commented upon by a range of informants. While those directly involved in women's organisations are often keen to demonstrate that they are helping the poorest members of the community, other commentators are less convinced:

“Most of the women's groups are formed by not very poor women and very few NGOs have rich women. It's difficult to start an NGO with a mix of rich and poor women because at first most NGOs start with their own contributions so it's difficult to agree on what to contribute. Most of the rich women are

<sup>158</sup> Pseudonym.

self-sufficient and don't want to co-operate with the poorest women, so NGO members are usually of the same status"\* (Ward CDO, Siha East).

Entrance fees and contributions for women's groups was found to be common practice throughout Hai, particularly for those groups surviving on their own resources without external help. Contributions range from relatively small sums (Tsh1,000/=) to quite substantial amounts (such as one group in Kyengia which planned for members to contribute Tsh50,000/= over three years, see Chapter Five). The problem of paying an entrance fee to join women's organisations was highlighted by households whose female members had not joined their local group:

"CM: Why didn't your wife join the Kalali women's group?

Response: We heard about it but we couldn't afford it. We knew how much it cost"\* (41 M 5).

"I have heard about Kalali Women's Group but it was too expensive"\* (42 F 5).

While women are often discouraged from participating in their local women's organisations for financial reasons, many women also expressed their non-participation in terms related to perceptions of their own status and prestige vis-à-vis other women, and the constraints placed upon them by their workloads:

"I'm a member of Nkwarungo church but I'm not a member of the women department. I would very much like to join, but the problem is time. I have to stay here and look after the children, the livestock, go to the market - I don't have time to attend meetings at the church"\* (53 F 3).

"Some women don't join because they feel inferior, they think that members are rich, can afford things and can be close to the church, they are in good positions"\* (49 F 2).

While members of groups are usually among the better-off sections of the community, they are also generally active members of the Church (or Mosque), they dress well and have good homes (concrete buildings), are often married to husbands with formal sector jobs, and may have either worked or attained some secondary schooling themselves. In this sense, these women are able to conform to the ideas

and norms associated with being a good Chagga woman, while also participating in development activities, associating the individual with all the positive cultural values that this implies. Poorer women find it very difficult to participate in group projects with these women as they feel inferior and looked-down upon. The majority of members are also older married women. As discussed in Chapter Five, Chagga women are not a homogenous group and prevailing cultural values accord older married women status and prestige, particularly relative to younger unmarried women, which is a further disincentive for younger women to participate.

A word of explanation is needed here with regard to the fact that women from the very richest households (i.e. from wealth group 1 and 2) are not as active as might be expected. Unfortunately the household sample in Wari did not include any households in group (1), although the reason for this may well explain these women's relative non-participation. Many of these women are businesswomen in Moshi or further afield and are very rarely at home in the village. Furthermore, their relative wealth and status in the village is such that they have no immediate need to boost either of these through joining a women's organisation. From the perspective of those in the village, these women are viewed as 'rich and proud'. As pointed out by the Pastor of Nkwarungo Church above, these women "don't feel they need to join a women's group when they are rich enough, what would they gain?" (*Mchungaji Nkwarungo Church, Wari*).

### ***The role of religion***

The question of religiosity is also central here. Religion plays a critical role in defining identities in Hai, and the majority of the population are either Lutheran, Roman Catholic, or Muslim. In Wari village, the Lutheran Church is the dominant religion for historical reasons associated with the pattern of missionary settlement, although there is also a substantial Muslim community. Despite an accepted code of mutual tolerance, a certain amount of friction does exist between the Muslim and Lutheran communities and is often played out in various public spheres. This friction is also expressed spatially within the village, and certain *vitongoji* within Wari are predominantly Muslim areas, with Muslim primary schools, a dispensary

funded by a Muslim organisation (BAKWATA), and two mosques. The claims to dominance by Lutherans, however, which is generally covertly expressed, is quite clear in relation to the women's organisations. This was exemplified by the omission of the (albeit defunct) women's organisation which had until recently existed under Kalali mosque during discussions in Wari (mostly with Lutherans).

This Christian-Muslim friction is not openly acknowledged, and in fact the Lutheran women of Kalali Women's Group pride themselves on the fact that they do not bar Muslim women from joining, although this is more likely to be in the spirit of tolerance of others as taught by the Church than it is to do with genuine concerns about mixing with Muslim women. This was quite clear during discussions in Wari with members of all three women's groups (Kalali, Ifiyo, and Nkwarungo). It was clearly stated (by Lutheran women, although nobody objected) that KKKT and the mosque co-operate with one another through Kalali Women's Group. However, directly after the meeting, several Muslim women complained in private that Kalali Church did not really co-operate with Muslim women at all, and that they wanted to start their own group for Muslim women again. It transpired that only one Muslim woman is a member of Kalali Women's Group, who is the wife of a particularly prominent businessman in the village. As one (Lutheran) woman explained:

“Most of the members are Christians, and they should go to Church, it is difficult to join the group if you don't attend church. Although, we have accepted some Muslims. We mix with some Muslims so that we cannot be accused of isolationism, it's only that Muslims are invited to attend big meetings, but they are not committee members”\* (40 F 3).

The following exchange between two Muslim women encapsulates the issues surrounding the participation/exclusion of Muslim women from Christian organisations:

1: “It is difficult to start our own [Muslim] group, even though we have heard of Kalali and others. No-one has stopped us from joining a group, we are allowed. I'm a Muslim but I believe that people under all religions are people of God and so I must respect those of other religions. But some years ago....40-50....people had differences, Christians and Muslims didn't co-operate, but nowadays this is no longer a problem. But Kalali Women's Group is under the Church and they don't let Muslim women know what is going on.

We could join even though it's under the Church. When the library was built at Nkwamwatu Primary School, we went and celebrated together with Christians. But why is it that Christian women don't alert Muslim women about their activities? The next house is Christian, she is a member of Kalali Women's Group and she has a cow – so we are wondering how she got the cow! It's not the fault of Christian women, it's also the fault of Muslim women for not trying to find out what's going on”

2: “How could we make a follow-up, they haven't invited us?!”\*

Several issues are raised here which echo the values identified earlier as being associated with being a 'good' Chagga, such as the implication that (undesirable) Christian-Muslim conflict is a problem of the past and the assertion that people are more tolerant today. Moreover, the two women are unsure as to whether Muslims are entitled to join Kalali Women's Group because it is under the Church, a view which is widely held among Muslim women:

“I would like to join [Kalali Women's Group] but there are no opportunities for me....Kalali Women's Group is under the Church so Muslims can't join”\* (27 F 5).

The confusion surrounding the status of Kalali Women's Group vis-à-vis Kalali Church will be returned to below, however the point remains here that to be seen to 'fit in' and to belong to the 'right' social group is an important factor governing participation. One woman who had been Chairlady of Ifiyo Women's Group in the past but who had eventually been discouraged to lead the group by the members lamented:

“Ifiyo women have a certain calibre – if you're not born here and are not either Muslim or Lutheran then they are not happy with you. I was born in Kilema [East Kilimanjaro] and I'm a Roman Catholic”\* (female key informant Wari).

### ***Hierarchies of prestige***

The social position of a woman and the household from which she comes is therefore central to an understanding of the ways in which participation in local women's organisations is structured. Chagga women are differentiated according to age, marital status, religion, wealth and status. Hierarchies of prestige are thus produced according to local norms and values, which heavily influence a woman's

opportunities to engage with the non-governmental sector. The membership of women's groups in Wari is overwhelmingly characterised by older, married women who come from the middle and upper peasantry. A large majority are Lutherans, although Muslim women are able to participate in Ifiyo Women's Group which is not linked to the Church in any way. Those women in leadership roles are often from higher status households, while a good proportion of the membership is drawn from similar households, although not universally. Similar processes of unequal participation have been found by Bülow (1995, 1997) among women's groups in Kilimanjaro, and Desai (1995) among community organisations in Bombay. As argued in Chapter Two, communities are not homogenous entities and local organisations are likely to reflect existing hierarchies rather than alter them (Mayoux 1995). In Wari, a large section of the village are excluded from participating in local non-governmental activities, principally because they are poor and of low status. Moreover, according to NGO lore, these are precisely the target beneficiaries of the NGO sector, the 'poorest of the poor'. Their exclusion becomes somewhat clearer when the nature of women's participation in village women's groups is considered. Furthermore, patterns of inclusion and exclusion can be more generally related to the contested nature of participation within the non-governmental sector and the local state in Hai.

### **Constructing participation**

Thus far this discussion has shown that at the village level, particularly among women's groups, the participatory process is characterised by a highly unequal set of social relations which serve to privilege certain sections of the community. The following section goes beyond this to examine the nature of the participatory process itself in two ways; firstly, by critically examining women's participation in village women's organisations and the possibilities for fostering empowerment therein; and secondly, by exploring the disjuncture between rhetoric and reality surrounding participation in the non-governmental sector in Hai more generally. The picture which emerges is one in which the process of participation is constructed in different ways and according to different actors' agendas. The net effect (or 'instrument



effect' after Ferguson (1990)) is that participatory development actually succeeds in perpetuating existing inequality rather than challenging it.

### ***Women's participation: empowering women?***

I have already suggested that women join women's groups for strategic reasons related to the economic and social gains available, but the nature of women's actual participation in local organisations in Hai requires some elaboration. As outlined in Chapter Two, 'participation' as it is extolled in NGO lore is understood to be an active process whereby an individual engages productively with a group or an NGO, to the extent that they have a real input into the project or group activity, may take an active part in decision-making, and are cognisant of the most important activities, developments or procedures relating to the group or project. It is argued that this 'full', or 'real' participation can ultimately promote the empowerment process. In Hai however, women's involvement in their local groups generally does not proceed along such lines. The extent of women's participation ranges from the nominal (where the group exists virtually in name only and has ceased operations), to the minimal (where the committee may meet regularly and be fully aware of activities but the majority of the membership have little idea of what is happening and are only advised of developments at annual meetings). In between there are a number of women's groups which are lying dormant while 'waiting for donors', or whose activities only require infrequent meetings. In nearly all cases, it is the executive committee of each group which is the most active in terms of decision-making and meetings. As observed above, these roles are usually filled by women belonging to the local elite. Furthermore, the majority of the positions on the executive committees have not changed hands for several years. In this way, the leadership, and most active roles within the women's groups, tend to remain with elite members of the community. In those cases where leaders have left the group for various reasons, there may be a long time lag before their positions are filled, such is the inactivity of the organisation. For the ordinary members, very little is required of them in terms of active input, as the Nkwarungo Women's Group in Wari illustrates:

“We started a small group of a few women who can contribute something....we announced to all KKKT women [women attending Nkwarungo Church] that

anyone interested could join for a membership fee of Tsh1,000/=....the Women's Group has a committee of seven although currently there are just four. One died, one left the village and one is sick. But we are thinking of calling a meeting to sort this out....most of the members are not active. Many don't contribute but they are asking if there is any profit. We are thinking of calling a meeting for all members to say that if anyone is unwilling to do as required then maybe they should leave the group. It is better to remain with a few who are interested and working properly. *Members should pay their fees and buy their shares, and they should attend meetings and activities of the group.* The committee meets once a month and the whole group meets twice a year"\* (committee members of Nkwarungo Women's Group Wari, emphasis added).

For the members of the Nkwarungo Women's Group, the primary aim of their involvement is to fund the groups' livestock-keeping activities. This has required donations upwards of Tsh1,000/= and intermittent communal labour, such as the collecting of wood to build a new *kibanda* (cow hut). Those unwilling to 'work properly' face expulsion from the group. From the members' perspective, this has entailed very little participation on their part:

"I contributed some money, Tsh1,000/=, for the cows, and we have obtained Tsh1,000/= profit since then. But I do not have time to go there and sit in a meeting. Other women are discouraged because it is almost 4-5 years since we contributed the money for the cows and up to now we haven't seen any good profit. Most of the women think the leaders are using the money for their own benefit, so they don't see why they should contribute ideas and money....I don't know what's going on with the project since I paid my Tsh1,000/= and got my Tsh1,000/= profit. Now they have so many activities including the cows that I don't know what they are doing....I don't know, I don't participate"\* (55 F 3).

Although Ndeeshi implies that it has been her own choice not to participate (or at least, she is unable because of her domestic workload), her participation is nevertheless couched in terms of financial support to the group. The intimation that funds are embezzled, although this cannot be substantiated, does at least raise questions about the legitimacy of the leadership and the degree of accountability to members.

Nkwarungo Women's Group can be contrasted with the more commercially successful Nronga Women's Dairy Cooperative Society. Members have frequent contact with the organisation as they have to physically go to the offices once a month in order to receive the payments for their milk sales to the cooperative. Committee members are voted in once a year so that there is a regular turnover of position-holders. The Manager, a former Nronga UWT leader and primary school teacher by profession, has remained in her post since the organisation was founded, although this is apparently due to popular demand. Well-attended meetings are held for the entire 400-strong membership three times a year at which decisions and developments are discussed, although the management enjoy a relatively high degree of legitimacy among the members. Members are also familiar and satisfied with the long-term objectives of the organisation, which include acquiring a tractor and a small bus. As two members explained;

“Now that we have the project we can earn monthly and do something with the money. Also because women take care of the children, we can now pay school fees....now we have enough money for the family, we have good homes, we can work together with our husbands to make good homes”.

“Before the project, women stayed at home with the family and looked after the children. Now the project has made this much easier”.

Despite Nronga's relative commercial success, the extent to which women can participate and be 'empowered' remains modest. Certainly, women are aware of the group's activities and feel fully involved in the organisation, and appreciate the extra income gained through the project. An organisation such as Nronga is likely to be achieving more for women's self esteem than some of the other, less successful organisations in Hai. It enjoys a higher degree of visibility and status within the village and is recognised as being an important income-earner for a large number of households, even by male villagers. However, benefits of membership are interpreted entirely in terms of gains for the family rather than for the woman. This point will be returned to below.

Women's groups in Kyengia and Samaki Maini tend to mirror the experience of the Nkwarungo Women's Group rather than the Nronga cooperative. In particular, several of the women's groups in these two villages have joined one of the two women's umbrella organisations, KIWODEA and BAWATA (see Chapters Four and Five). These umbrella NGOs which use Ward CDOs to recruit women in villages, offer loans to groups which pay to join. However, many of the women who had joined one of these organisations did not fully understand either the aims of the NGO, nor what they could expect for their membership fee. In one case, the members of a group had paid their fees to join BAWATA to their Ward CDO, whom they had not seen since (a matter of years). While such incidences point to the lack of accountability of the umbrella organisations and some Ward CDOs, they also suggest a general lack of interest among members, or a lack of communication between leaders and their members. Moreover, it is clear that members of some women's groups are not making demands on these types of organisations for greater legitimacy. The possibility that this is largely because they do not feel able or willing to take such action cannot be overlooked.

This lack of communication and interest is particularly evident in the case of the Kalali Women's Group, which has several links to external patrons and donors, including CDTF (which donated the diesel milling machine) and Svillup 2000 (an Italian NGO which donated the electrical milling machine and the cattle). The relationship between Kalali Women's Group and Kalali Church is also somewhat unclear. Although officially the group is independent (according to the Chairlady), in reality much of the village (including the group's members, the Pastor at the church and the Chairlady for KKKT Northern Diocese Women's Department) consider it to be part of the work of the Church. Indeed, the group was organised through the Church and several of the group's activities take place within Church grounds. As in the case of Nkwarungo, women were encouraged to join the group during Church services:

“I was one of the first women to join [Kalali Women's Group] because I was a leader in the Church and the message came through the Church....we were told to join by the Church to set an example to other women”\* (40 F 3).

Many of the members are under the impression that the milling machine and the cattle were actually donated by the Lutheran Church itself. In this way, the Church is able to gain legitimacy within the village by being associated with 'development' activities, women's development, and helping the community. This also reflects a lack of communication (or interest) between the leaders and the members about the group's donors and the role of the church in supporting the group. Some members are even less clear on the group's activities;

"I go to meetings and exchange views, sometimes we divide the profit. I don't know where the cows came from, I didn't ask....and I don't remember the last time I attended a meeting, I'm busy most of the time"\* (45 F 2).

It thus becomes clear that the nature of women's participation in the majority of women's groups in Hai is minimal. To the extent that women may attend meetings, these usually have a social purpose rather than a political one, in the sense that decision-making processes are not transparent or inclusive of members, and important information regarding the organisation, its future plans, its donors and its activities are not passed on. It is unlikely that such minimal levels of participation can play an active role in fostering the empowerment of the majority of women, nor is it apparent that these women would wish to be 'empowered' through these organisations.

However, from the women's point of view, there are gains to be made from membership of local groups. Obviously for those women involved in successful economic groups, the extra income which can be earned is a huge incentive, as outlined earlier. Furthermore, women are able to gain socially from taking part in activities outside of the home:

"I want to be with other women, I can't stay inside without knowing what other women are talking about. We are getting cows, education, and relaxation of mind"\* (10 F 2).

“I can’t stay at home idle without exchanging ideas with other women. My grandchildren are noisy so meetings are a time to relax....there aren’t many other opportunities for women in the village”\* (13 F 2).

These social benefits, redolent of the ‘subtle strategies’ discussed in Chapter Two (Bülow 1997, Sheyvens 1998) are certainly important gains for women. According to the patriarchal norms of Chagga society there are few opportunities for women to meet and discuss issues affecting them other than at Church, Mosque or the market, or during the course of their daily domestic chores. However the ways in which these social gains, and indeed, the benefits from extra income earned, impact at the household level is a highly contested process, as the following excerpts (which are worth reproducing here at length) reveal;

CM: “Does anyone do any small businesses or income-generating activity in the household?”

Reponse: “Yes, one of my daughters brews *mbege* and sells it to a local barman. It is mostly women doing these small businesses, men are not doing this. Women are contributing a lot to household development. They do more than men”.

CM: “Why are there many women’s groups but no men’s groups?”

Response: “They don’t want to. Most husbands cannot even afford their own clothes, women have to struggle to buy them for them”.

CM: “But don’t men get money from coffee?”

Response: “Most of them like drink. Most men wake up in the morning, go out for a walk, when they come back the wife will have made tea, lunch or dinner and he has done nothing. But who is paying the school fees? Most of the time it is women”.

CM: “Who do you think is important for development in Wari?”

Response: “Women. We had a meeting for women here and discussed household development, we discussed the weaknesses of our husbands, so women should think what they can do and use whatever they earn to look after the household and the family. Mama Masawe, the chairlady for the church women department, organises these meetings to discuss development in the household. All things in the home are being bought by women – we go to the market, sell some bananas, get Tsh2,000/=, and think: how can I use this? Then we buy cups and spoons... we are learning these things in our group”.

CM: “Have things changed for women?”

Response: “It’s a better life than before because we are now allowed to have money and are allowed to buy things for the house eg cows, a bed – we are allowed to do this by our husbands”.

CM: “Why?”

Response: “Women have attended meetings and learned, and now men have come to learn that women can bring development to the household, so most men are now giving their women freedom to do their own things”\* (38 F 3).

“I don’t want my wife to be a member of this women’s group if there is no [economic] benefit [research assistant explains that many women benefit in terms of learning traditional Chagga household skills]....Why are women in Kilimanjaro more unprogressive than men, wanting to learn things that their grandparents used to do?....Many women have hard lives here, especially as they are not able to divorce easily, although if I were a woman being beaten I would leave....There are some bad men and some bad women who do nothing to contribute to household development but sit in bars all day drinking *pombe*. People who cannot contribute should not get married!”\* (male key informant Wari).

Response: “Women do not join groups for several reasons; domestic problems, husbands are not willing to allow their wives to go out; women are busy from 6am to 6pm, they have no chance to get out.... for example, it is only through my work that I can get out of the house, if not what would I do? My husband wouldn’t let me out”.

CM: “Do you see things changing in households?”

Response: “A lot. We get improvement in our homes, looking after livestock, childcare, generally looking after the household”.

CM: “Are there any changes in household relations?”

Response: “When we [women’s group] meet we discuss our household problems, if you just stay in the house you can’t discuss with anyone or get any ideas”.

CM: “What relative contributions do men and women make to households?”

Response: “Households differ, the majority of men and women can sit together and discuss and plan, but in the minority of households the husband spends all his time and money on *pombe*”\* (female key informant Wari).

“How can I get my wife into Kalali Women’s Group? We are having some few quarrels, she went to KCMC [Lutheran Church hospital] a while ago, and while she was away I found a lot of things in our home to do with witchcraft which belong to her. Now that she has come out of hospital she is too afraid to return home and she is living with her parents, although I have sent four people to try and bring her home. I need her at home to look after the children....I want to try and get her into the group because it can help the household, and maybe we could get a cow”\* (male key informant Wari).

1: “Our husbands are happy because we get cows and milk for our families and the project has helped the community. When I first started to sell milk my husband wanted to take the money, but now we are on good terms and I can keep it”.

2: “I was given a cow by the group but my husband took it and sold it to someone else....”

1: “But I sold my calf and bought bricks straight away so that my husband could not get his hands on the money, I wanted to build an out-house for work”\* (female key informants Wari).

The insights which these comments give on household relations and the ways in which these shape women's participation in local groups reveal something of the nature of the struggle between men and women in contemporary Chagga society. In particular, the notion that the ideal spouse must actively contribute towards 'household development' emerges strongly, as does the ideal that men and women co-operate equally in the running of the household (a strong message from the Lutheran Church). Nevertheless it is clear that women are beginning to take a larger degree of responsibility within the household. According to two of the female informants, this is primarily because men are increasingly shirking their household responsibilities (often in favour of frequenting local *pombe* shops). It has therefore been left to the women to compensate for the 'weaknesses of our husbands'. In the excerpt from the interview with the first woman, this is seen as a positive thing. Women are learning, in their various groups, how to take more responsibility for the household, and how to manage household finances. A slightly different picture is painted by one of the other women in which the women's group is one of the few opportunities to be 'let out', and in the final discussion, (the same woman) reveals that her husband took the cow she received from the women's group and sold it for himself. She focuses on the negative images of the control of a husband over his wife and the male propensity for drinking. The fact that this woman is employed as a Ward CDO, and is therefore responsible for encouraging women's groups in villages, does not seem to have helped her in her domestic situation (and raises the question of how she can help other women's groups make a difference in women's lives). Male attitudes towards the women's groups are also raised. The first woman views the women's groups positively because they have made men aware of women's capacities for contributing to 'household development'. The comments from the male informants, on the other hand, suggest that as far as the men are concerned, women's groups are useful either for gaining extra income for the family or for encouraging their wives to engage in 'accepted' activities. This is particularly the case for the second man, who wants his wife to join a group because she has been displaying behaviour considered to be unacceptable for a 'good' Chagga woman (witchcraft, refusing to return to family home), and also because 'it would help the *household*, and maybe we could get a cow'. The benefits of his wife's membership



is valued in terms of economic gain for the *family*, not for the woman, an attitude which has been referred to on several earlier occasions.

It is thus important to recognise that membership in women's groups can help women by boosting their incomes, which may allow them to play a greater role in their household. To a certain extent, women's practical gender needs are met by some of the groups. For example, those groups which focus on teaching women practical skills such as how to run a household on a budget, childcare, and livestock keeping methods, are equipping women with useful knowledge which can help them in their daily lives. The KKKT Women Department, which has a branch in every parish, is primarily concerned with teaching such skills:

“Our policy tries to address women's issues with a Christian influence by serving the community at large. We are trying to empower women through participation in tandem with community development and women's role in the community. Women's role is central, they have a big care-taking responsibility. They need to be equipped with the knowledge for rearing children, taking care of employment. This is a peasant society so women are doing the most part of the work. So we want to give women the awareness and skills to cope with the everyday burden of work. We give this to women through groups. They get advice on how to manage the household, education, taking care of the family property, cattle keeping, keeping money, how to aid family income through small projects such as handicrafts and vegetable gardens, health education, community education, civics” (Chairlady KKKT Northern Diocese Women Department).

However, the focus of these women's groups is on equipping women to meet the demands of Chagga society as they stand. Such a program of activities does not include encouraging women to challenge the status quo. Both men and women view membership entirely in terms of possibilities for boosting *household* incomes and *family* status. Little mention is made of *women's* positions and the possibilities for change. It teaches them how to conform with the development discourse which constructs the ideal Chagga wife/mother/daughter. Where women have been able to play a greater economic role in the household, this has emerged partly due to men's neglect of their responsibilities to the family, which may in part be related to the demise in the coffee crop. Women are thus contributing to the running of the

household to a greater extent than that formerly expected of them. This adds to, rather than alleviates, their burdens. With reference to the discussion of the process of empowerment in Chapter Two, it was argued that the process cannot involve women only. The empowerment of women requires “the loss of men’s traditional power and control over women in their households” (Batliwala 1993). Such a loss of patriarchal power does not appear to be taking place in Hai. Following Rowlands (1997), Kabeer (1994) and Young (1993) empowerment can be seen as a political process, which may start in the home with the individual, but which can develop into a communal movement which seeks to address the structural causes of women’s subordination (or women’s strategic gender needs). In Hai, however, the processes governing women’s participation in the non-governmental sector appear to be very different.

Participation in women’s groups in Hai is a highly structured process in which only a certain section of society is able to take the norms and values associated with the dominant development discourse and work within them to further their own concerns, defined as boosting income and status, where status refers to being associated with ‘development’ and being a ‘good’ Chagga. However, the opportunities for this participation occurs only within a small range of possibilities shaped by the development discourse (*maendeleo*), which is an amalgam of international and national development rhetoric, and local norms and values. In this way, women’s participation is channelled into these women’s groups which are culturally acceptable within patriarchal society, and accepted internationally as an appropriate vehicle for achieving women’s empowerment. They operate under the aegis of either the Church, Mosque, or village council, and they may have (male) Church elders appointed as ‘advisors’, which serve to legitimate the women’s organisations. The groups engage in activities which are considered to be socially acceptable for women. Moreover, the groups are comprised of the middle and upper income groups in the village, who may already hold a certain amount of status, wealth or prestige. These women’s groups therefore become a strategy for exacerbating local inequalities, as the better-off groups of women are able to increase

their incomes while presenting themselves as the ideal (female) Chagga subject as constructed by the discourse of development.

### **Participation: NGOs v the state**

Thus far the discussion has centred on the process of participation among women's organisations in Hai, necessitated by the predominance of women's community based groups. In order to understand how women's participation fits into the larger picture within Hai, this final section will consider the broader possibilities for participation among other non-governmental actors in the district and compare this with the efforts being made by the local state. In contrast to the foregoing, the discussion focuses on the institutional visions of participation and the ways in which they are contested in practice.

Broadly, a commitment towards participatory processes is espoused by other non-governmental actors in Hai. Focusing on World Vision Tanzania (WVT) and Primary Health Care Ambassadors Foundation (PAFO, see Chapter Five), participation is understood to be a process which encourages people (or 'the community') to be involved in the decision-making process, so that development is not something which is done 'to' them, but is done 'by' them;

“We see people coming together in communities to plan and implement programmes for their own development....We have a dream where ....transformational development empowers the people of Tanzania to be responsible for their own development” (WVT1995:2-4)

“The main objective of PAFO is to facilitate government and non-government institutions involved in primary health care activities to plan, implement and evaluate their work effectively with full community participation” (PAFO 1997:1).

The notion that the participation process may eventually foster the empowerment of the project 'beneficiaries' is evident in WVT's statement, and also forms part of PAFO's approach to community health care. These organisations have their own ideas about how such a transformation is to be brought about, however. For WVT, the participation and empowerment of the communities with which they work is

probably the central objective of the Area Development Programme<sup>159</sup> (ADP, see Chapter Five). Providing and improving social infrastructure is also important, but is regarded as the mechanism through which people can participate and be 'empowered'. In this way, committees and decision-making fora are established in villages in order to facilitate discussion, involvement, and management at community level. Although this generally requires the greater involvement of committee members rather than village residents, the WVT model sees the whole community meeting regularly and discussing the project, finding ways to overcome problems, and making plans for the future. WVT stresses that community 'ownership' of the project should develop as a result of this level of participation. Guidance is offered by WVT staff, predominantly through the Project Co-ordinator (PC), but the PC's role is ultimately that of facilitator rather than director.

For PAFO, however, community based health care is the prime objective of the NGO. While participatory processes are necessary for the successful fulfilment of these aims, the overall empowerment of the community is not the overarching goal. Participation is facilitated mainly through the parents' meetings which are held in the village at which primary health care issues are discussed, although these are not held regularly (in fact, in Kisau, only two meetings had been held up until 1997). At these meetings parents are encouraged to develop their own strategy for combating health problems in the village<sup>160</sup>. A committee of Community Health Evangelists (CHEs) is also chosen from the village to receive training and carry out household visits to spread awareness about primary health care. The CHEs are particularly active in

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<sup>159</sup> WVT is currently developing a slightly different approach to community development which has been termed 'Appreciative Inquiry' (AI). The AI approach seeks to transcend the enframing of development projects in negative terms by focusing on the positive aspects of a community's existence (Sena and Booy, undated). In other words, development projects start from a frame of reference which asks a community "what works here?", rather than "what are your problems?". It is argued that AI can move away from development which is based on problem solving towards development which builds on the experiences of "things at their best, about people at their best....[AI enters the community to] empower the people through developing local capacity for self-development" (Sena and Booy, undated:6). However, the AI approach is in its early stages within the organisation and is not yet fully implemented by PCs in WVT projects, partly because some difficulties are being experienced translating AI theory into practice (interview with WVT staff).

<sup>160</sup> In direct contrast to WVT's AI approach, PAFO extols the virtues of the principle of problem based learning which states that, "adults learn more effectively when they have a sensitive problem to solve" (PAFO 1997:2).

disseminating ideas for improving conditions within the village developed by the Director of PAFO. For example, CHEs have taught villagers how to build fuel-conserving stoves, fish ponds, and ventilated pit latrines, all using low-cost, ubiquitous materials. The structure and aim of PAFO projects therefore allows less scope for widescale community participation than the ADP approach of WVT.

This Chapter has illustrated the ways in which participation in women's groups has been shaped by the development discourse on Kilimanjaro, and how this has impacted on the nature of that participation. Participation as practised by WVT and PAFO is also somewhat different from the claims made for NGOs within the literature. While the rhetoric surrounding participation and empowerment speaks of the widescale involvement of 'the community' and the active role it is to take in directing the development process, in practice this can be very hard to achieve. Compare, for example, the following accounts of PAFO's primary health care intervention in Kisau. The first excerpt is from the Director, and the second from a (female) villager;

"The approach is very satisfactory, the way we run these parents meetings and at the end of the meeting they really come up with a plan of action and they really feel that the plan of action has come from them. We don't tell them what to do. We just facilitate....One of our objectives is community participation, and our approach we have developed going through schools in order to mobilise and sensitise communities, is a very powerful tool for mobilising communities. We screen school children and highlight certain programmes for health, and we write a certificate for each child, and then call a parents' meeting – so parents sort of internalise the problem, bring the problem home. We have seen this all over, in Mwanza, in Ethiopia, in Kenya – people really come and they are excited. And so, because they made their own plan of action, they make their own decisions, they are empowered. It was interesting, when we had our first meeting here, we found that many children had hookworm, very low haemoglobin and so on, and one and a half years later we screened Kisau village again, and we found some improvements – not very much, there was still hookworm, which had gone down from 50 to 30 percent, but there was some improvement. So we said to the community, "well you still have 30 percent hookworms", and they said, "why is that?", and someone came up with the idea that it is because not all of us have latrines, so they said give us a list of all those who have no latrines. They said, "you guys, we give you two months, if you don't have latrines you are responsible for hookworm in this village!" But we left it to them to make their own decision and that is community empowerment" (Doctor).

“[Doctor] started with a clinic centre for children to find out what their problems are, and he found they were suffering from malnutrition and worms. He called a meeting for parents and advised us to buy shoes for the children to prevent worms. Latrines are also a problem, so he educated us about the latrines and how to construct them using local things....people really appreciated what he was doing and many came to see and learn. He also found that children are lacking milk, so he tried to introduce artificial insemination, he also brought a graded bull to Kisau and started a molasses feed centre for cattle so that farmers could improve their livestock....and he educated people how to use improved economical cookers....there have been very big improvements in Kisau, I cannot compare today to before the project started. We congratulate him for what he has done for the village. The children are a lot better now”\*.

While the Doctor highlights the participatory nature of the community health care programme, the woman's account focuses on Kisau as an object to which development is being 'done'. Certainly, she views the project positively and can see that real improvements have occurred in the village, but in her account the Doctor is the active agent in the process, not the villagers. She does not speak of the parents' meeting as an inherent part of the project at which villagers were able to contribute ideas; rather, she sees the villagers as objects who are 'advised' and 'educated' by the Doctor. The gains from the project are evaluated in terms of the children's improved health and the various small projects which the villagers have learned from the Director. While these, of themselves, are positive changes in the village, the point remains that PAFO may not have been able to empower the villagers in Kisau, in the sense of fostering real and sustainable changes in people's political consciousness. As the Director describes it, the parents' meeting actually singled out those villagers who had not built a ventilated pit latrine and coerced them, through peer pressure, into building one. This is not to question the benefits of improved latrines, but rather, to question the impact of such events on socio-political processes within the village. This method of 'participation' is unlikely to challenge existing structures of inequality within the village. Rather, it creates new norms and measures of inclusion to which people must be seen to conform. Several informants in Kisau spoke glowingly of the project and described what they had learned from the Doctor, how he had improved the village, and many households did indeed have a ventilated pit

latrine of which they were also proud. It was often commented that the Doctor had ‘done a lot for development’ in Kisau. This resonates with the earlier discussion of the cultural construction of *maendeleo* among the Chagga. People are positive about the project principally because it is interpreted as being a ‘development’ activity and is therefore good. Moreover, the majority of households have been able to benefit tangibly from the project, either through building an improved latrine, or from gaining access to a bull or any other of the small improvements made to the agricultural workloads of the villagers. In this way, while the benefits of PAFO’s project may be substantial in terms of improved primary health care, the project does little to raise people’s consciousness about structures which oppress or disadvantage them. It actually serves to emphasize existing ideas about development and therefore does not challenge the socio-political order within the village.

Similarly in Kyengia and Samaki Maini (two villages included in the WVT Sanya ADP) very little in the way of participation or empowerment has occurred, as the following excerpts illustrate;

“It took a long time to lay the pipes because the community had to participate, to pay the workers for their labour. When the project started as a World Vision project it was not seen as a community project and people thought, “this is a World Vision project, it’s not our work”. It took us a long time to educate people that they had to contribute, they didn’t understand, they thought it was all the work of World Vision and that World Vision was providing all the money, so it took time to educate us all....when the villagers were told that they had to contribute money they thought the leaders were trying to cheat them out of the World Vision money and use it for themselves”\* (VDP member, Samaki Maini).

CM: “What does WVT do in Samaki Maini?”

VDP: “It helps with water and schools. Through child sponsorship the goal is to manage to have good schools and clean water for the children”.

CM: “Who decided on these goals?”

VDP: “They are the ideas of the church priest and the village leaders”\* (VDP, Samaki Maini).

“WV came through the churches, they started the KCCDP which was lead by Church leaders, and village leaders were also invited because they are the people who lead the farmers to do the labour, but villagers did not know how the project was going on”\* (KCCDP, Samaki Maini).

Several points emerge from these comments about the nature of the participation process. Firstly, it appears that the idea of participation has been presented to the community in terms of contributions of cash and labour. Certainly, it is clear that this is how the villagers have interpreted the WVT project, and their contribution to it. Secondly, the village is again represented (by a resident) as an object waiting for development to be done 'to' it. Thirdly, it appears that the goals of the project were not decided upon following a full consultation process with the entire community, or if it was, the community feels little ownership of the goals or the project process. Finally, the villagers seem to be generally uninformed about the project, its mechanisms, its representatives, and the NGO itself (i.e. WVT). When asked directly, none of the women present at a group discussion about women's groups in Samaki Maini knew who their village representatives on the ADP were. In Kyengia, where WVT has been even less active in terms of project work, very little was known about the NGO and the project. Many people did not even know that they were part of the Sanya ADP.

This somewhat unparticipatory approach reflects the context within which WVT began working in the Sanya area in the mid-1980s (with the Kyungukyelwa Church Community Development Project, KCCDP). The KCCDP was a product of WVT's (and the wider NGO community's) thinking on development at the time. Of course, since then, development thinking has largely moved away from the 'technical fix' approach concerned with providing schools, health facilities, roads and water but with little concern for sustainability or social justice within the community. The Sanya ADP, of which these villages are now a part, is supposed to reflect the more recent nuanced approach concerned with the *process* of development which places emphasis on participation, empowerment, accountability and capacity building. However, as far as the impact on communities are concerned, WVT's new development discourse does not seem to have translated into action in the villages. Villagers are still expecting WVT to 'do' development for them, an attitude for which, given the historical association of Kilimanjaro with external agents of development, they may not necessarily be held entirely responsible. As Shrestha remarks with reference to the impact of the development industry on Nepal:



“....nothing moves without foreign aid....[a]lthough the poor were never asked if they wanted to be helped or preferred Westernized development at all, now they too seem to have been intoxicated by the brew called foreign aid” (Shrestha 1995:275-276).

Moreover, it is quite clear that the villages covered by the Sanya ADP have had little control over the changing agenda of WVT, and yet they are expected to embrace WVT’s ‘new’ approach to development, and adapt to the NGO’s changing priorities. The consensus on what is good for these villages is decided in WVT head offices in Arusha. The following excerpt from an interview with WVT’s Country Director explains the situation from the NGO’s point of view, and is revealing insofar as it illuminates the NGO’s changing motivations for being involved in the Sanya area of Hai:

CM “Why did WVT work in Sanya in the first place?”

WVT: “....well it was a natural flow of expansion in terms of what we were doing and building up. I think that people at that time were basically just looking for areas to work in. Back in the early 80s the situation in Sanya, Machame, Moshi, was different. Although I still think that that area has always been one of the better-developed areas of the country. And the other thing is that when you’re starting work like this, and you’re looking to get going, you’re looking for successful projects, you want to find places where things will work fairly quickly. As an NGO you need to be strategic about what you’re doing. You can’t walk into places you know are going to be problematic, difficult to work in, and take a long time to get results. You have to have a balance, otherwise you’re just not going to be able to show results to your donors”.

CM: “And now you feel that you [WVT] shouldn’t be in Sanya Juu?”

WVT: “Since then we’ve been working in ten regions of the country.... the needs of this country are not in this area....you go out into the more western parts of the country, where the Sukuma people are living, or Kigoma, you see far needier areas. Those are areas that are neglected by organisations, so we feel we need to be more in those areas now so when we do have a chance to grow and expand that’s where we need to go. The second reason is that one of our priorities is to graduate communities. They need to have certain capacities and once they have those capacities we need to let them go. And as far as I’m concerned, especially up in the north, the hill areas with the Chagga people, there’s no reason for us to be doing community development work there, at the levels that we do....they have leaders, they have people that are quite capable of doing things...to be spending money there, I don’t think that’s wisely used anymore”.

CM: “So how do you see the immediate future of the Sanya ADP?”

WVT: “....we will have to take into account the state of the projects’ completion before we can pull out and also the community’s ability to finish it. In Sanya Juu the community feels that WVT should finish the project, but what we should have done was to get the community to think about other partners. The other problem in Sanya Juu is that as part of the CDP, WVT handed out everything. The ADP approach is different mainly because of the switch from dependency but we shouldn’t be there just because we have the money. You see we don’t want the project approach to development – what we want to do is build capacity but in Sanya Juu we haven’t been doing that. The problem is that both staff and community see the ADP as a 15 year project so the community just sit back and enjoy the ride. We used to phase out projects after the allotted money and time expired....but that’s not enough anymore. Now we should phase out when the community has the capacity to administer its own development. Micro-enterprises would be good there. You know the Northern Diocese is the richest in Tanzania and it’s closely linked to Germany, which is fond of Kilimanjaro”.

What emerges very strongly from this is the changing perception of place in WVT’s work, and how this changes as the priorities of the NGO change. Initially the Sanya area was seen as a desirable place in which to work because WVT needed to be able to show results quickly: in this sense, the relative ‘development’ of the Sanya area was a positive factor. Ten years later however, as the NGO’s priorities change, international discourses of development change, and the NGO becomes concerned with widening its constituency further into Tanzania (into areas “neglected by other organisations”), the perception of Sanya as a ‘developed’ place is interpreted in negative terms, to the extent that the ADP may be phased out before the end of the 15-year cycle. This is a situation in which the NGO holds ‘power over’ the villages under the Sanya ADP, and moreover, has perpetuated the image of the NGO as the benevolent provider.

The Chagga cultural construction of *maendeleo*, understood largely in terms of the provision of modern, infrastructural facilities, is also central to an understanding of the communities’ attitude to WVT. In this way, a certain set of expectations has been built up in Samaki Maini and Kyengia about NGOs, what they do, and how they do it. This situation is exacerbated by the nature of the current interaction between WVT and the communities with which it works. Meetings between WVT staff and the village committee members are infrequent and sometimes poorly attended. The

committee serves as an information channel between WVT and the villages and is ideally a two-way process. In Samaki Maini it appears that the VDP committee members (Village Development Project members who represent the community to WVT) have neglected to relay information back to the community at large, such is the miscomprehension of WVT's projects within the community. Kyengia village is represented to the ADP by the village secretary only (a point to which I shall return below) because, "there was no-one emphasising that the VDP should be there" (Kyengia Village Secretary). The ADP meetings themselves are not particularly conducive to 'participatory processes'. They are frequently dominated by either the PC or one or two vocal village chairmen attempting to make a bid to draw resources to their village. Although women are represented on these committees, those who are not used to discussing issues in public fora often remain silent. Those villages whose representatives do not speak up in the meetings find that they are left behind, as in the case of Kyengia. Moreover, the meetings reveal that WVT staff employ a decidedly top-down approach to development. For example, during a discussion about the slow progress being made with the building of a new dispensary in one village, the following comments were made by the PC and the district representative:

"Maybe the villagers don't know much about what the ADP discusses....these people must be educated so that they understand about what needs to be done in their villages"\* (PC Sanya ADP meeting).

"The village leaders and the villagers should be educated so that they understand the importance of these projects being sent to them"\* (District Counsellor, Sanya ADP meeting).

These comments about the role of the community in the project do not square with WVT's stated transformatory approach to development. Far from being 'owners' of the development process, villagers are seen as objects who neither appreciate the project intervention nor their role in it. Given that the above comments were made in the context of poor turnout for communal labour, it is implied that villagers need to be told to 'do their bit'. While this may be important for the completion of the dispensary, the fact remains that the only contact most villagers will have with WVT

(via its village representatives) is in the context of demands for money, time or labour.

Furthermore, villagers made very little distinction between the way in which local development is facilitated either by WVT or the local state;

“World Vision could help the community and the school but they are not active with the promises they make. Whenever we request anything from World Vision or the District we have to pass through various leaders, like the village committee, Chairman of World Vision, Secretary....and it takes a long time”\* (Headteacher, Kitahemwa Primary School, Kyengia).

“Last year there were three meetings at Sanya, but people from Sanya have never been to Kyengia. I wrote down the requirements of the village but so far there has been no response”\* (Kyengia Village Secretary).

Both the local state and the NGO are deemed to be mired in bureaucracy which impedes development activities in the village. The fact that Kyengia village is represented to the ADP by the village secretary (who is employed by the District Administration) renders the WVT development process at the village level even more indistinguishable from that of the local state. In fact, the village secretary's efforts at representing his village to both the District Council and WVT amounted to the submission of two virtually identical development plans consisting of a long list of infrastructural projects. Given these circumstances, WVT appears to have become yet another service provider as far as the villagers of Samaki Maini and Kyengia are concerned. The process of participation as extolled in WVT literature is not understood at the village level, partly due to poor communication on the part of WVT, and partly because villagers have become used to being the ‘object’ of development which requires little input from them. This is related to the socio-cultural construction of *maendeleo* on Kilimanjaro which centres on modernity and modernisation. To the extent that people are expected to ‘participate’, it is entirely in terms of labour and financial contributions. Therefore, while some villages have benefitted from better educational, health and water facilities gained as part of the WVT Sanya ADP, the extent to which ‘transformatory development’ has been achieved is minimal.

The notion of participatory development has also become part of the official rhetoric of local government in Hai. According to staff at the District Administration, ideas of participation and sustainable development underlie current government policies;

“The idea of decentralisation is that everything is led to the peasants so that they can participate....The education system is nowadays upon the parents, the parents have the right to rehabilitate buildings” (Hai District Education Officer).

“Ten million shillings [of the local tax revenue] is given directly to the wards each year for them to use directly. This is a more participatory way of doing development in the villages and makes people less reluctant to pay their development levy [tax] as they can see where some of their money is going” (Hai Assistant Planning Officer).

“[The work of the Community Development Department] is to mobilise people to work in different projects which will help them to develop themselves. We are motivating people towards their own development” (Hai Assistant Community Development Officer).

It is evident from these excerpts that the local government discourse on participation is closely (and openly) linked to matters of efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and, to a certain extent, accountability, although it is debatable as to whether this is more bound up with issues of income maximisation than it is with a real concern for gaining legitimacy in the villages. No doubt this has been influenced by the circumstances brought about through Tanzania's economic situation and the political and economic conditions attached to structural adjustment.

It is clear, however, that despite NGO rhetoric to the contrary, there is very little difference between participation as state discourse, and participation as NGO practice. Participation is understood in terms of ‘mobilising’ people in villages to take greater responsibility for their own ‘development’, through contributions in terms of cash (tax, contributions towards social services) and labour (rehabilitating social services, forming groups to work for development). Moreover, agents of the

state (of whom the ward community development officers are probably most active) are seen as 'educators' spreading the state's development vision;

“As a Community Development Officer I have to educate the people about what they can do as a community to solve their problems, to achieve their needs by using the available resources, and to educate the NGOs how to keep their books, and so on”\* (Ward CDO Siha East).

In this way, the language of participation is appropriated to serve the local state's needs. Resources are continually diminishing and therefore people must be called upon to contribute more to the process of development. Furthermore, the paternal and top-down nature of participatory discourse in practice is again evident. People have got to be 'educated' about their role in development according to the dominant development discourse.

### **Summary: (De)constructing participation**

The objectives of this chapter have been threefold; firstly, to deconstruct the discourse of development in Kilimanjaro; secondly, to show how the nature of participation is constructed by the development discourse; and thirdly, to examine the ramifications of this for participatory processes to take place within the non-governmental sector. It has been argued that development discourse, as it is understood on Kilimanjaro, is actively constructed through the interaction of international, national and local ideas about development, gender, and the role of non-governmental organisations. These have weaved a particular local understanding of *maendeleo* characterised by two main themes; modern, socio-economic development; and the ideal Chagga developmental subject. It has further been argued that deconstructing the development discourse on Kilimanjaro in this way reveals the contested and constructed nature of the processes governing participation at the village level. Participation is therefore understood to be a political process which is interpreted and used by different actors to achieve a range of ends.

At the village level, the most widespread form of participation in the non-governmental sector takes place within village women's groups. Drawing on the experiences of women with their local groups, a picture of "unequal participation" (Desai 1996:235) has been built up which sees the possibilities for women's participation as being heavily dependent upon their economic and social position within the village. Participation in local community development groups therefore becomes an option for the middle and upper peasantry, while the richest have little need to join, and the poor are excluded. For those women who are involved in some way with a local organisation, the benefits can be substantial in terms of economic gain and boosting personal status. This is particularly helpful in explaining why women continue to belong to groups which are economically inactive or unsuccessful. Being associated with a women's community organisation automatically associates the individual (and the household) with *maendeleo*, and therefore with the ideal Chagga developmental subject. Women's organisations therefore have become a vital component of women's strategies to boost their personal prestige within their communities.

The scope for processes of participation and empowerment to take place within these organisations has been found to be small. This is not to deny that small gains are made for some women as a result of membership of such groups. However, prevailing attitudes within the village relating to women's structural positions have not been altered. This is partly due to the development discourse which has shaped these women's organisations. Women's groups are viewed as an acceptable way for women to organise and take part in 'development' activities, while leaving women's role within the household and community unchallenged. In the case of the Lutheran Church's parish women's groups, they are a forum for teaching women how to cope with their everyday lives as they exist. While the usefulness of such information should not be doubted, such activities are unlikely to foster the processes of participation and empowerment as understood here. This thesis has taken the notions of participation and empowerment to be inherently *political* processes. By remaining silent on issues concerning women's structural gender needs, the women's groups present themselves as apolitical organisations, concerned only with boosting

household incomes and improving women's life skills, as the following comment from the Regional Community Development Officer (and founder of KIWODEA) implies:

“Women development (sic) is not a political thing....we're not going to encourage politics” (Regional Community Development Officer).

However, following Ferguson (1990) I would argue that the overall impact (or to take Ferguson's term, the 'instrument effects') of these organisations is to *depoliticise* what is really taking place: the legitimisation of the status quo. In this way, women's organisations do not attempt to challenge the existing order of things. If anything, they allow certain strata of society to consolidate their positions according to prevailing norms. However, their inherent association with 'development', which is understood to be good, means that the 'instrument effect' of women's groups is to actively legitimise the preservation of inequalities within Chagga society. As outlined in Chapter One, these instrument effects are not necessarily seen as being intentional on the part of any one particular actor, rather, as Ferguson points out:

“If unintended effects of a project end up having political uses....this is not any kind of conspiracy; it really does just happen to be the way things work out. But because things do work out this way....it does become less mysterious why 'failed' development projects should end up being replicated again and again. It is perhaps reasonable to suggest that it may even be because development projects turn out to have such uses, even if they are in some sense unforeseen, that they continue to attract so much interest and support” (1990:256).

While this analysis has been based heavily on women's community organisations, other non-governmental actors have also been critically examined, in order to place the processes of participation associated with women's groups into their wider context in Hai. The participatory process has been shown to be highly contested in the context of other non-governmental organisations' activities, namely PAFO and WVT. While both organisations employ the language of participation, empowerment and transformatory development, it is quite clear that in practice such principles are very difficult to realise. As in the case of women's organisations, this is not to deny



the benefits of the gains made in social service provision by these NGOs. However, the fact remains that both organisations see themselves as actively promoting participatory development through their activities, WVT more so than PAFO. In the case of WVT, the ultimate aim of the NGO is to 'transform life'. Nevertheless, the realities of these projects in the villages do not correspond to the claims made by the NGOs. Both organisations continue to utilise a top-down approach to development which sees communities as 'objects' peopled by residents who must be 'educated' about what the NGO has deemed is best for them<sup>161</sup>. From the villagers' perspective, the development discourse over time has created certain preconceptions about what NGOs do and the ways in which they do it. In the case of WVT, external agencies are therefore viewed as 'bringers of development' who come to the village, construct a school or health facility, and then disappear again. In PAFO's case, while the NGO is based in the village, the status of the Director and his links to external donors serve to perpetuate a similar myth. An NGO development project is something that comes from outside, builds something tangible, and then moves on. More to the point, this is not only what villagers have come to expect from NGOs, it is also what villagers *want* from NGOs. Demands for cash and labour in the WVT project were not met with enthusiasm from the community. There is very little communication between NGO and village, and very little interest from the villagers in the project's operations at village level. In other words, villagers are not interested in being empowered through participatory development projects. What is important to them is to be involved with *maendeleo*, or to become 'developed' in terms of either the household, clan or village, through gaining access to as many of the symbols of modern socio-economic development as possible. The 'instrument effect' of the non-governmental sector, therefore, is to legitimise the situation through association with *maendeleo*. Existing hierarchies of socio-economic inequality are not challenged, and the socio-cultural construction of 'development' is left intact and unquestioned.

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<sup>161</sup> The following quotation, taken from WVT literature, takes this to its logical (paternalistic) conclusion: "We have a dream where....Community-based development sees the capacity of Tanzanians steadily improving through training and attitude changes to the point where *World Vision's mission and values become theirs* and outlive us" (WVT 1995:6).

# **CONCLUSIONS**

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## **Power, participation and development on Mount Kilimanjaro: (a story of) the non-governmental sector and the state in Tanzania**

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### **Transcending the boundaries of NGO research**

The primary objective of this thesis has been to critically examine the role of the emerging non-governmental sector in Tanzania in an analysis which transcends the often narrow or parochial nature of much of the literature on NGOs and development. As Chapter One argued, this literature has remained largely divided among authors whose concerns range from issues of best practice, to specific (NGO) concerns, to theoretical debates, to the extent that few studies have managed to embrace the more salient issues emerging from all three strands. While it is not claimed that this thesis has successfully bridged this divide, it has clearly demonstrated that a far more nuanced insight into the role of the non-governmental sector can be gained through the use of a broad approach which seeks to understand how NGOs are situated within the wider social, economic, political and cultural geographies of the places in which they work. In particular, this thesis has shown that a broadly post-Marxist perspective, which recognises that an understanding of both material and representational processes are important in a given locality, can be useful in a development context. Through a critical analysis of the assumptions of much of the alternative development, (some) post-development, and NGOs in development literatures, this thesis has explored the notion that an increased role for NGOs in sub-Saharan Africa is necessarily beneficial for those whose lives they seek to enhance. In this way, the thesis has three broad contributions, identified by the following sections, to make to the empirical and theoretical debates on the role of the non-governmental sector in sub-Saharan Africa.

### **NGO myths: reconceptualising NGO-state relations**

The recent empirical literature which covers entire national NGO sectors in African countries is somewhat limited, no doubt due to the paucity of good information on such issues, and despite the need for more detailed studies which highlight the major issues facing NGO sectors<sup>162</sup>. This thesis has addressed this issue in the Tanzanian context through an overview of the new space for non-governmental organisations at the national level in Tanzania. Although such an analysis is constrained by the availability of data, it is possible to conclude that the emerging NGO sector in Tanzania is characterised by several problematic issues.

The first of these concerns the institutional weakness of the NGO sector, a factor born of Tanzania's developmental state ideology in the 1960s and 1970s which effectively discouraged non-state forms of organisation and participation. The sudden growth in NGOs in Tanzania has been fuelled by two local manifestations of the globalisation of neoliberal economics; the increasing international funding for NGOs, and the decline in economic circumstances throughout the country associated with SAPs. Chapter Four argued that this has caused the non-governmental sector to be dominated by a group of NGOs which are donor-driven, donor-dependent, and often established by urban elites.

The second issue is that of inter-NGO relations which have become strained as international NGOs and donors seek to take on a larger role in the country's development. The NGO sector is thus internally divided between groups of NGOs (particularly between Tanzanian and international NGOs) and donors, who are all simultaneously attempting to carve out constituencies for themselves in a new liberal polity, so creating problems for the flow of information and the co-ordination of activities. This is particularly evident in the politics surrounding the formulation of the NGO Bill, in which several different parties have staked their claim for a role in the policy process, in some cases even by producing a draft bill of their own.

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<sup>162</sup> Notable exceptions referred to throughout this thesis include Campbell 1998, Gary 1996, Hearn 1998, Kelsall 1998, Kiondo 1993, 1995, Mulligan 1998, Ndegwa 1996).

This brings us to the third issue, the nature of NGO-state relations as played out around the formulation of the NGO Bill. While there is an on-going struggle between NGOs and the state for control of the non-governmental sector (i.e. through legislation), this process has also been marked by state attempts to steer NGOs towards service provision. Within the wider economic context of Tanzania's liberalisation programme, it is quite clear that the Tanzanian state sees a future role for NGOs in supplementing state social welfare provision. Therefore, the national NGO sector in Tanzania is characterised by the politics of various groups of actors attempts to gain access to power and resources.

At the sub-national level, there has again been a lack of detailed studies which look at the NGO sector in a region as a whole (and here again, Kiondo's work (1995) is a notable exception). As a result very little is known about the spatial element of NGO work, how NGO resources are distributed, and how NGOs interact with one another and the state in a given locality. In Chapter Six the analysis of the non-governmental sector's role in service provision in Hai District, Kilimanjaro Region, has revealed that the popular image (or 'NGO myth') within much of the literature which sees a withdrawal of the state being 'plugged' by non-state actors is not an entirely accurate representation of the situation. Rather, a continuum of social service provision has emerged in which both state *and* non-state sectors are important in social service provision, and which has given rise to an interweaving of state and non-governmental sectors in local development. Chapter Six illustrated this continuum of state and non-state provision in both health and education services, and in the formation and support of women's organisations. Furthermore, it became quite clear from the analysis that the interweaving of state and non-state actors has given rise to a polarisation of development at the district scale. This is characterised by the uneven distribution of service providers and donors between services and women's groups, such that existing local inequalities are merely exacerbated through an increased role for the non-state sector.

The role of the local state within this emerging pattern of inequality is a little less clear than at national level. This is partly due to the constrained nature of the local

state within the national framework, and the ambiguity of the NGO-state relations in the (continuing) absence of an NGO Bill<sup>163</sup>. However, the local state has emerged as a broker (along with the Lutheran and Roman Catholic Churches) between services and women's groups, and donors. It has also become a legitimator of local development activities. Nevertheless, explicit attempts to control the NGO sector at the district level are not apparent. This is no doubt related to the embedding of the non-governmental sector within private networks.

At both national and local scales then, this thesis has shown that the relationship between the state and the non-governmental sector is far more complex than much of the (NGO) literature would suggest. That this relationship varies with scale is also an important implication of this work. In particular, the suggestion that the roles of the non-governmental sector and the state at the local level in Tanzania can be characterised as closely interwoven with one another, and guided by existing power relations, supports the growing recognition in the literature that such relations in sub-Saharan Africa can be seen as part of a wider blurring of the public and the private sectors, often by elites (Bayart 1993, Fatton 1992, Gibbon and Bangura 1992).

### **NGO myths: questioning participation and empowerment**

As Chapter Two discussed at some length, NGOs have become associated with the processes of participation and empowerment, and for several authors (both within the alternative development and post-development schools of thought) such notions have become the focus for a new approach to development (or a broader socio-economic and political justice). In Chapter Seven the analysis moved to the village level in order to focus on these issues and to understand the manner in which they might be fostered through an engagement with the non-governmental sector.

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<sup>163</sup> The implications of the findings in Chapter Six would suggest that the Government's final NGO Bill needs to make particular provisions for the governing of the amorphous non-governmental sector at the district scale. In particular, regulations about registration and (at least, minimal) information about activities would theoretically enable the District Planning Office to plan local development in a more equitable fashion than it is currently able to do. However, the heavy monitoring of small and institutionally young non-governmental actors should be guarded against. Nevertheless, a more accommodating, communicative and transparent relationship between the local state and local NGOs should be a goal towards which both sectors can aspire.

Following the discussion in Chapter One which argued for a broad approach towards research into non-governmental organisations, the analysis of the non-governmental groups in the villages of Wari, Nronga, Samaki Maini and Kyengia illustrates how an understanding of local development discourse (*maendeleo*) can inform the manner in which participation is perceived and structured at the local level. The Chagga notion of *maendeleo* is influenced by discourses which circulate at different scales (such as international development discourses (e.g. on NGOs); national development discourses (e.g. on self-reliance); and Chagga discourses (e.g. on gender roles)). These discourses have all had varying impacts on the perception of 'development' on Mount Kilimanjaro, and have been given meaning according to local Chagga cultural norms and values. In this way, *maendeleo* on Mount Kilimanjaro has become an expression of modern, socio-economic development which overlaps with Chagga cultural values about gender, industriousness, and religiosity. In associating NGOs (women's groups, PAFO, WVT) with the notion of *maendeleo*, participation in such organisations becomes desirable because it allows the individual to conform with such norms and values, and, for some, to boost their power and status. Moreover, it also offers the potential for access to material resources. However, it emerges quite clearly from the analysis of the women's organisations in Wari that it is largely the middle wealth groups within the villages which are most active in such organisations. Participation in the non-governmental sector on Kilimanjaro is, therefore, unequal. Furthermore, given the generally nominal nature of this participation the possibilities for women's empowerment (as understood in the gender and development literature discussed in Chapter Two) have been shown to be minimal. It must be recognised that within this framework, individual women are able to boost their personal or family prestige through association with a women's group. This may be empowering for them in a particular way, but it is unlikely to challenge the patriarchal structures of Chagga society.

Furthermore, the analysis of the NGOs PAFO and WVT reveals that there is a disjuncture between beneficiary and NGO understandings of 'participation'. Drawing again on the Chagga understanding of *maendeleo*, it is clear that while NGO rhetoric focuses on the opportunities for empowerment to take place through



participation in an NGO project, beneficiaries are more likely to look at an NGO project in terms of how it will improve individual (or village) status, prestige, and socio-economic development. This has created problems particularly for the progress of the WVT project. It also suggests that 'beneficiaries' themselves are not particularly concerned with 'being empowered' or being able to participate. This echoes the discussion in Chapter Two which argued that the current international development industry's fascination with 'participation' and 'empowerment' is merely another way in which the (ideologically loaded<sup>164</sup>) ideas of development 'experts' are foisted upon people who have been 'participating' in their societies in their own culturally defined ways for generations (Midgely 1986, Rahnema 1992).

In sum, this thesis has shown that the overall impact (or 'instrument effects') of the activities of non-governmental organisations in the villages in Hai has been to preserve the status quo of socio-economic inequalities, which is legitimated through the association of non-governmental groups with the notion of *maendeleo*.

### ***The importance of place***

At this point I wish to pause and consider the issue of place. How unique is the situation on Mount Kilimanjaro? While it was not part of the remit of the research to comment in detail on the entire NGO sector across Tanzania, it is nevertheless useful to attempt to draw out the implications from this work for the non-governmental sector in Tanzania as a whole.

The role of the non-governmental sector in Hai and its position within the Chagga collective consciousness is shaped to a large extent by place: this is, by the specific social, economic, political and cultural geographies of Kilimanjaro. How different would other places' experiences of the non-governmental sector, of patronage networks and external donors, be in regions which have had quite different historical circumstances? The story of development on Kilimanjaro is inherently bound up in the area's experiences with missionaries, and with the relative success of the coffee crop. No doubt the particular unfolding of events in Kilimanjaro has shaped the

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<sup>164</sup> As Schuurman (1993) points out, participation is very much an Enlightenment ideal.

Chagga understanding of *maendeleo*, and it would be particularly useful to understand how other socio-cultural groups in quite different areas of Tanzania construct their local notion of 'development', and how this might shape opportunities and experiences with the non-governmental sector.

Unfortunately there is little work on the socio-cultural relations surrounding the non-governmental sector in Tanzania with which this work can be compared. However Kiondo's (1995) work on the NGO sector in nine districts of Tanzania points up several issues. The first is that Kilimanjaro (as well as other areas such as Songea and Pemba) is relatively well-served in terms of international donors and NGOs. He suggests, as does the analysis in Chapter Four, that it is the relatively richer areas of Tanzania which are experiencing the most dynamic growth and activity among non-governmental actors, to the extent that "unto those who already have, more is added" (Kiondo 1995:168). It is therefore unlikely that the relative density of non-governmental actors found on Mount Kilimanjaro is generally replicated throughout rural Tanzania. This is not to suggest that other parts of Tanzania have not experienced an influx or upsurge of non-governmental activity, but rather that such a growth may be less pronounced than it has been on the mountain (although Dar es Salaam is likely to be an exception to this, as Chapter Four indicated). Secondly, Kiondo remarks that patronage networks, particularly those which link people and groups to high-ranking government officials or nationally-renowned figures within the private sector, are most pronounced on Kilimanjaro. This suggests that the non-governmental sector on Kilimanjaro has access to a wider range of political and economic resources than other places in Tanzania. At the same time, Kiondo notes that while donor and international NGO activities vary geographically, in all nine areas of his study there has been a notable upsurge in community-based activities (also noted by Narayan 1997). It would therefore seem to be a fair assertion that the processes of uneven development associated with the non-governmental sector on Kilimanjaro are to some extent replicated in other parts of Tanzania: where the Kilimanjaro experience diverges is probably in relation to the greater opportunities for patronage networks which its particular social and economic history affords.

### **NGO myths: reinventing development?**

The third and final contribution to academic debates arising from this thesis concerns the implications of the findings for alternative, or post-impasse, theories of development. As Chapter One argued, there has been a “confluence around civil society” (Watts 1995:47) as a theoretical basis for reinventing development, either from an alternative position or a post-development position. Several writers from both of these schools of thought consider the possibilities offered by NSM, NGOs or ‘civil society’ to be a suitable point from which a new development paradigm (or a more inclusive, participatory manner of achieving social, political and economic change) might be developed. While this thesis has not directly considered the issue of NSM, there are several points for discussion which arise from the findings of this thesis.

Firstly, the conclusions from this thesis suggest that those who argue that NGOs (or ‘civil society’) might form the basis of a reinvented development are probably overstating the case for NGOs to redress unequal development processes. Such a proposition is not new and academic commentators are increasingly critically evaluating the position of NGOs and ‘civil society’ within alternative and post-development frameworks (Lehmann 1997, Nederveen Pieterse 1998, Porter 1995, Schuurman 1993, Simon 1999, Slater 1992, Watts 1993). At the same time however, there is still a strong propensity among some authors (particularly those writing on Latin America) to place their faith in broadly defined social actors (see for example, Munck 1999, also Escobar 1995). There remains scope for more critical work which is able to compare the experiences of NGOs, NSM and actors within ‘civil society’ across different regions. Furthermore, while (some) academics eulogise the achievements and role of non-governmental actors, international donors are channelling more funds through them to ‘do’ development. It remains important to question the implications which such strategies may have, particularly for the role of the state in sub-Saharan Africa. The continued predilection for supporting anything which is *not* the state in Africa only serves to reinforce its demise and, as this thesis has shown, does not necessarily benefit people at the local level.

A second, and related point, is the question surrounding 'civil society' in Africa, and the automatic placing of non-governmental organisations within it. Several of the criticisms levelled at the popular (liberalist) notion of 'civil society' and its usage in much of the Africanist literature which were discussed in Chapter One have been highlighted throughout this thesis. The first of these is the assumption that 'civil society' (read the liberalist interpretation, 'NGOs') is 'innately good' (Young 1994), while the second concerns the relationship between 'civil society' (again, read 'NGOs') and the state. In the first instance, this thesis has shown that the non-governmental sector in Tanzania (at both national and local scales) is characterised by struggles over access to power and resources, which has given rise to varying degrees of undemocratic practice and poor accountability. The rather utopian notion that NGOs (read 'civil society') are all-inclusive and participatory has been shown to be highly questionable. In the second instance, NGOs (read 'civil society' again) have been shown to be closely interwoven with the state, particularly at the local level, despite the liberal interpretation which views 'civil society' as a bulwark against state power. In Kilimanjaro, both the non-governmental sector and the local state are central to various actors' strategies to gain access to power and resources. Therefore, the assertion that NGOs are an integral part of 'civil society' in Africa is a highly problematic one, and should not be assumed. In this sense, alternative and post-development writers need to be more circumspect in their commendation of particular types of social action.

Thirdly, the findings of this thesis suggest that a reinvented development cannot rest on vague notions of participation and empowerment. From a theoretical point of view, and one which echoes Nederveen Pieterse (1998) comment on the conflation of alternative and mainstream approaches (which he termed MAD), participatory processes are no longer the vanguard of alternative approaches to development only. In Kilimanjaro, it is quite clear that the local state has adopted the rhetoric of participatory development (although the extent to which this has any bearing on government practice is, of course, questionable). Nevertheless, the point remains that participation has become part of the received wisdom on development practice in the late 1990s, whether this is carried out by governmental or non-governmental

actors. This reduces its power (and 'alternativeness') as one of the defining characteristics of a new development paradigm.

Moreover, this thesis has shown that, from a practical point of view, the participation (and subsequent empowerment) of disenfranchised people is very difficult to achieve. There are two major points to be considered here. Firstly, an idealised notion of 'the community' would appear to remain an integral part of participatory development. Such a romanticised vision of village (or urban) life in Africa conveniently overlooks the fact that societies are divided along hierarchies of power, status, gender, class and race. Increasingly, critical studies are showing that 'community development' is often hi-jacked by the powerful in the community (Desai 1995, 1996, Mayoux 1995). Secondly, the concept of empowerment is flawed by the unequal power relations apparent in any outsiders' efforts to 'empower' others. To use the terminology of Chapter Two, how can the 'power to' be instilled in people by those who (ultimately) have 'power over'? This has certainly been the case in WVT's attempts to engage the Chagga in their (WVT's) vision of community development in the Sanya area. In the case of the women's organisations on Kilimanjaro, participation and empowerment were not the overarching goals of their groups. Essentially, the women involved were more concerned with boosting their personal prestige and economic position.

### **Development research: NGOs as the subject of critical inquiry**

At the beginning of this thesis I stated that one of its main concerns was to explore the role of the non-governmental sector in Tanzania from the viewpoint of a range of different actors. It was recognised that such an undertaking was not without its problems, particularly in terms of representation, and the ethics and politics associated with the research (and writing) process. However, I suggested that a cursory nod in the direction of the poststructuralist critique of the construction of knowledge was not of itself, a sufficient course of action. To point out that the research process is influenced by the researcher, the researched, and the contingencies of fieldwork (as McDowell points out, "research tends to be a mixture of hard slog, serendipitous coincidences and pure chance" (1997:393)) and then to

carry on regardless seems to be rather pointless. I would like to take the opportunity here, then, to bring the thesis back to the point at which it started. I suggested in Chapter One that this thesis does not claim to be a 'truthful' representation of the socio-economic and political relations surrounding the non-governmental sector in Tanzania or even in Kilimanjaro in particular. It is, as is all social research, a particular story, constructed by the interactions between myself and the 'researched'.

Nevertheless, there are particular merits of the methodology used in this study which have been instructive in gaining an understanding of the role of the non-governmental sector in Tanzania which is both broad (national level) and focused (Kilimanjaro). While it is important to acknowledge that the findings of this research are indeed one particular 'story', it is equally important to recognise that they indicate quite clearly that non-governmental organisations can (and should) be the subject of critical inquiry. The advantages of using qualitative methods which incorporate research at both national, district and village levels are that a fuller picture can be built up of the general role of the non-governmental sector in a given country, while in-depth qualitative work in a given locality can also shed light on the social, political, economic and cultural complexities surrounding non-governmental actors. That the non-governmental sector is becoming increasingly important is clearly evident from the Tanzanian case. This fact alone should justify an increasing academic interest in the sector, and is borne out within the literature to a certain extent.

However, as Chapter One pointed out, the literature on NGOs is very much divided between the academics and the practitioners. This makes for a diverse literature on non-governmental issues which is generally (but not entirely) either empirically weak or theoretically uninformed. This study has argued for a slightly more eclectic approach which privileges neither, but which nevertheless is able to draw on useful insights from both theory and practice. The findings presented here suggest that such an approach, when supported by a qualitative methodology, can help to facilitate research findings which are stimulating and useful, both in practical and theoretical terms.

At the same time, it is also important that non-governmental organisations remain the subject of critical inquiry precisely *because* of the increasingly important role which they are taking on in development. This is an issue to which academic commentators can most usefully contribute. While it is important that project-level or country-level studies continue to be carried out in order to throw light on NGO activity, it is also important that the constantly evolving role of the non-governmental sector is scrutinised within the broader context of geographies of global change. This is ever more important as increasing amounts of official aid are channelled through the non-state actors, and structurally adjusting states are advised to let private actors take on greater roles. These are ideologically-driven processes and the impact which they have on the role of non-governmental organisations must continue to be critically examined.

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# APPENDICES

## Appendix One

### Inventory of interviews conducted

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#### Dar es Salaam

- Actionaid Tanzania Executive Director (20.07.96, office, English, taped)
- Africare Country Representative (26.07.96 and 04.06.97, office, English, taped)
- British Council Representative (24.07.96, office, English, notes taken)
- Canadian Organisation for Development through Education (CODE) (21.07.96, office, English, notes taken)
- CARE Tanzania Country Representative (26.08.96 and 10.06.97, office, English, notes taken)
- Community Development Trust Fund Representative (CDTF) (24.07.96, office, English, notes taken)
- CONCERN Worldwide Country Representative (09.06.97, office, English, notes taken)
- DFID NGO Co-ordinator Tanzania (05.06.97, office, English, notes taken)
- Dutch Embassy Education Officer (23.07.96, office, English, notes taken)
- GTZ Country Representative (24.07.96, office, English, notes taken)
- Save the Children Fund Country Director (25.07.96, office, English, notes taken)
- Norwegian People's Aid Country Representative (26.07.96 and 04.06.97, office, English, notes taken)
- TANGO (02.07.96, TANGO office, English, notes taken)
- Tanzanian Red Cross Country Representative (09.06.97, office, English, notes taken)
- United Republic of Tanzania Government NGO Division Co-ordinator (24.06.96 and 05.06.97, office, English, notes taken)
- USAID Program Assistant (23.07.96, office, English, notes taken)
- World Vision Tanzania Country Representative in Dar es Salaam (23.04.97, office, in English, taped)

**Arusha**

Arusha Diocese Development Office Co-ordinator (09.08.96, office, English, notes taken)\*<sup>1</sup>

Community Based Health Care Director, Arusha (09.08.96, office, English, notes taken)\*

East African Support Unit for NGOs Director (EASUN) (05.08.96, office, English, notes taken)

MS Danish Volunteers Principal (07.08.96, office, English, notes taken)\*

KKKT (Head Office) National Health Officer (09.08.96, office, English, notes taken)

KKKT (Head Office) Project Development Officer (06.08.96, office, English, notes taken)\*

**Kilimanjaro Regional Administration/ Moshi**

Kilimanjaro Regional Hospital Secretary (13.08.96, office, English, notes taken)

Regional Community Development Office (30.07.96, 02.10.96 and 08.10.96, office, English/Swahili, notes taken)

Regional Community Development Officer/KIWODEA founder (07.05.97, KIWODEA office, RA, English, notes taken)

Regional Education Officer (01.08.96, office, English, notes taken)

Vicar General, Moshi Roman Catholic Diocese (01.08.96, office, English, notes taken)

KKKT (Northern Diocese Office) Medical Director (13.08.96, office, English, notes taken)

Poverty Africa Liaison Officer, Moshi (20.08.96, office, English, notes taken)

*Kikundi cha Wanawake Kupambana na Ukimwi Kilimanjaro* (Kilimanjaro Women's Group in the Fight Against AIDS) (KIWAKKUKI) (14.08.96, office, English, notes taken)

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<sup>1</sup> Interviews marked with an asterisk were carried out jointly with Tim Kelsall, a PhD candidate from SOAS also working on NGOs in Tanzania. As we wished to interview many of the same people in

**Hai District Administration/ Hai**

District Community Development Officer (17.10.96, office, English, notes taken)

District Assistant Community *Development Officer* (26.03.97, office, English, notes taken)

District Assistant Planning Officer (03.10.96, 04.10.96, 14.03.97, and 26.03.97, office, English, notes taken)

District Education Officer (26.03.97, office, English, notes taken)

District Medical Officer (06.05.97 Kibongoto Hospital, English, notes taken)

District Agricultural Officer (17.10.96, office, English, notes taken)

Village Secretary, Nronga (21.10.96, village office, RA, Swahili, notes taken)

Village Secretary, Shari (21.10.96, village office, RA, Swahili, notes taken)

Ward Community Development Officer and Ward Executive Officer, Machame East (10.10.96, ward office, RA, Swahili, notes taken)

Ward Community Development Officer, Machame South (16.10.96, ward office, RA, Swahili, notes taken)

Ward Community Development Officer, Machame North (14.10.96, respondent's home, RA, Swahili, notes taken)

Ward Community Development Officer, Masama South (15.10.96, ward office, RA, Swahili, notes taken)

Ward Executive Officer, Masama South (23.10.96, ward office, RA, Swahili, notes taken)

Ward Community Development Officer, Masama West (by correspondence)

Ward Community Development Officer, Siha Central (18.10.96, ward office, RA, Swahili, notes taken)

Ward Community Development Officer, Siha East (24.10.96, café in Sanya Juu, RA, Swahili, notes taken)

Ward Executive Officer, Machame South (11.10.96, ward office, RA, Swahili, notes taken)

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Arusha and Moshi we decided to conduct them together rather than individually, as this would avoid having to bother the same people twice for roughly the same information.

**World Vision Tanzania/ Sanya ADP/ Samaki Maini and Kyengia**

WVT Head Office Project Officers (05.08.96, head offices, English, notes taken)

WVT Intern (21.11.96, head office, English, notes taken)

WVT Northern Zone Director (09.01.97, Northern Zone offices, English, notes taken)

WVT Head Office presentation of research proposal/findings (17.01.97 and , head office)

WVT Country Director (23.04.97, head office, English, taped)

Levishi Dispensary, Samaki Maini, Doctor-in-Charge (31.01.97, dispensary, RA, Swahili, notes taken)

Samaki Primary School, Samaki Maini, teachers (20.01.97, school office, RA, Swahili, notes taken)

Ngaroni Primary School, Samaki Maini, Headteacher (20.01.97, school office, RA, Swahili, notes taken)

Siha Primary School, Samaki Maini, Headteacher (20.01.97, school office, RA, Swahili, notes taken)

Samaki Maini women's groups discussions (06.01.97, respondent's homes, RA, Swahili, notes taken)

*Tumaini* Women's Group discussion, Samaki Maini (16 female) (14.01.97, parish church, RA, Swahili, notes taken)

Samaki Maini village history focus group (3 male) (10.01.97, village office, RA, Swahili/Kichagga, notes taken)

Samaki Maini men's focus group (10 male) (11.03.97, village green, RA, Swahili, notes taken)

Samaki Maini youth carpentry groups discussion (6 male) (10.01.97, village green, RA, Swahili, notes taken)

Samaki Maini Village Development Project (VDP – part of Sanya ADP) (3 male, 1 female) (10.01.97, village green, RA, Swahili, notes taken)

Kyungukyelwa Church Community Development Project committee (3 male, 1 female) (17.03.97, village green, RA, Swahili, notes taken)

- Kyungukyelwa Church Community Development Project meeting (11 male, 3 female) (08.04.97, Technical School, Samaki Maini, RA took notes and translated into English)
- Kyengia Village Secretary (16.01.97, respondent's home, RA, Swahili, notes taken)
- Kyengia village history focus group (6 male) (05.02.97, respondent's home, RA, Swahili, notes taken)
- Kyengia Primary School, Headteacher (16.01.97, school office, RA, Swahili, notes taken)
- Kirisha Primary School, Kyengia, Headmaster (16.01.97, school office, RA, Swahili, notes taken)
- Kitahemwa Primary School, Kyengia, Headmaster (03.02.97, school office, RA, Swahili, notes taken)
- Kirisha Women's Group discussion, Kyengia (15 female) (21.01.97, Parish Church, RA, Swahili, notes taken)
- Jitahidi* Women's Group discussion, Kyengia (6 female) (21.01.97, respondent's home, RA, Swahili, notes taken)
- Jitegemea* Women's Group discussion, Kyengia (5 female and sub-village chairman) (03.02.97, Kitahemwa Primary School yard, RA, Swahili, notes taken)
- Jiendeleze* Women's Group discussion, Kyengia (10 female) (07.02.97, co-operative office, RA, Swahili, notes taken)
- KKKT Women's Department, Chairlady for West Hai (17.03.97, office, RA, Swahili, notes taken)
- Sanya ADP Co-ordinator, Sanya Office (24.10.96, office, RA, Swahili/English, notes taken)
- Sanya ADP Project Co-ordinator (PC), Northern Zone Office (09.01.97, Northern Zone Offices, English, notes taken)
- Sanya ADP PC (former) (23.03.97, Lutheran Church conference centre, Moshi, English, notes taken)

**Nronga**

Nronga Women Dairy Cooperative Chairlady (24.01.97, project office, English/Swahili, notes taken)

Nronga Women Dairy Cooperative Manager (07.03.97, project office, English, notes taken)

Nronga Women Dairy Cooperative members (5 female) (04.02.97, project office, RA, Swahili, notes taken)

Nronga interviews with non-members (5 female) (04.02.97, project office, RA, Swahili, notes taken)

Nronga village history (6 male) (10.03.97, village office, RA, Swahili, notes taken)

Nronga men's focus group discussion (9 male) (18.03.97, village office, RA, Swahili, notes taken)

Nronga Primary School Headteacher (30.01.97, school office, RA, Swahili, notes taken)

Naluti Primary School teachers (30.01.97, school office, RA, Swahili, notes taken)

Nronga KKKT Secondary School Headteacher (30.01.97, school office, RA, Swahili/English, notes taken)

**Wari**

Machame *Kituo cha Afya*, (government rural health centre) Clinical officer (24.04.97, RA, Swahili/English, notes taken)

Kisiki BAKWATA dispensary, Clinical officer (24.04.97, RA, Swahili/English, notes taken)

Nkwarungo Hospital Secretary (16.04.97, secretary's office, English, notes taken)

Wari Secondary School Headmaster (08.05.97, Headmaster's office, RA, English, notes taken)

Machame Primary School Headmistress (14.04.97, school office, RA, Swahili/English, notes taken)

Nkoraya Primary School Headmaster (21.04.97, school office, RA, Swahili, notes taken)

Nkwamwatu Primary School Headmaster (21.04.97, school office, RA, Swahili, notes taken)



- Nkwarungo Primary School Headmaster (24.04.97, school office, RA, Swahili, notes taken)
- KNCU Wari Assistant Secretary (20.05.97, KNCU office, RA, Swahili, notes taken)
- Kalali Church Pastor (21.05.97, church office, RA, Swahili, notes taken)
- Kalali Church Women's Department Chairlady (26.05.97, respondent's home, RA, Swahili, notes taken)
- Kalali Women's Group discussion (2 female) (20.11.96, respondent's home, RA, Swahili, notes taken)
- Kalali Women's Group Secretary (07.04.97, respondent's home, RA, Swahili, notes taken)
- Kalali Women's Group Chairlady (30.04.97, respondent's office, RA, Swahili, notes taken)
- Ifiyo Women's Group focus group (13 female) (19.11.96, project building, RA, Swahili/Kichagga, notes taken)
- Ifiyo Women's Group Chairlady (07.04.97, respondent's home, RA, Swahili, notes taken)
- Nkwarungo Women's Group discussion (3 female) (22.11.96, Church office, RA, Swahili, notes taken)
- Nkwarungo Women's Group Chairlady (13.05.97, Church tailoring school, RA, Swahili, notes taken)
- Nkwarungo Church Pastor and Evangelist (13.05.97, church office, RA, Swahili, notes made afterwards)
- Community Development Officer for Wari (Machame North Ward CDO) (15.05.97, village office, RA, Swahili, notes taken)
- Primary Health Care Ambassador's Foundation, Project Co-ordinator (19.11.96, project office, English, notes taken)
- Primary Health Care Ambassador's Foundation, Director (15.01.97, project office, English, taped, also 04.05.97, English, notes taken)
- Ifiyo sub-village wealth ranking (2 male, 2 female) (08.01.97, informant's home, RA, Swahili, notes taken)

- Kisau sub-village wealth ranking (4 male, 1 female) (08.01.97, sub-village chairman's home, RA, Swahili, notes taken)
- Kyalia sub-village wealth ranking (4 male, 2 female, 20.03.97, sub-village chairman's home, RA, Swahili, notes taken)
- Mwera sub-village wealth ranking (3 male, 1 female) (19.03.97, sub-village chairman's plot, RA, Swahili, notes taken)
- Nkwanambo sub-village wealth ranking (5 male) (20.03.97, sub-village chairman's plot, RA, Swahili, notes taken)
- Rengua sub-village wealth ranking (4 male) (15.01.97, sub-village chairman's home, RA, Swahili, notes taken)
- Urara sub-village wealth ranking (4 male, 1 female) (15.01.97, respondent's home, RA, Swahili, notes taken)
- Wari village history focus group (3 male, 1 female) (13.11.96, village office, RA, Swahili/Kichagga, notes taken, four informants, 3 male, 1 female)
- Wari women's focus group (16 female) (14.10.96, village office, RA, Swahili/Kichagga, taped, transcribed and translated by RA)
- Wari village chairman (1987-1992) (15.05.97, respondent's home, RA, Swahili, notes taken)
- Wari village chairman (1992-1997) (17.5.97, respondent's home, RA, Swahili, notes taken)
- Wari village chairman (1997-) (15.05.97, village office, RA, Swahili, notes taken)
- Key informant interviews on local and national politics in Wari (5 male, 3 female) (14.04.97-18.04.97, respondent's homes, RA, Swahili, notes taken)

## Appendix Two

### Household interviews in Wari

#### Characteristics of interview households in Wari

Resp. no/kit.	Sex	Age	Wealth rank	Size of HH	Land k/p	Cows	Sell coffee	Religion	Joined a WG?
1 Ks	M	65	4	5	2/3	2 dairy	yes	L	Kalali
2 Ks	F	56	4	2	1/0	2 dairy	yes	L	Kalali
3 Ks	M	43	5	2	0.25/1	2, bull	yes	L	no
4 Ks	M	69	5	5	0.25/2	2 dairy	yes	L	Ifiyo
5 Ks	F	20	3	6	3/1	3 dairy	yes	L	Kalali
6 Ks	F	50	3	6	3/1	2 calfs	yes	L	Kalali
7 Ks	F	66	2	5	0.5/1(r)	2 dairy	yes	L	Kalali
8 Ks	M	60	4	5	1/0.5	1, 1 calf	yes	L	no
9 Ks	F	62	5	3	1.5/0.5	1 dairy	no	L	no
10 Ks	F	67	2	3	5/4	3 dairy	yes	L	Kalali
11 Ks	M	43	3	7	1/3(r)	2, 2 calfs	yes	L	Kalali
12 If	M	68	3	4	1.5/0	2 dairy	yes	L	Ifiyo
13 If	F	60	4	4	0.5/0	1 bull	yes	L	Ifiyo
14 If	M	52	5	5	0.5/0.5	1 dairy	yes	L	Ifiyo
15 If	F	54	5	3	1/0	1 ind.	yes	L	Ifiyo
16 If	M	69	3	2	3/1.5	2 dairy	yes	L	Ifiyo
17 If	F	50	3	7	1/0.5	3 dairy	yes	L	Ifiyo
18 If	F	63	4	3	2.5/0	none	yes	L	no
19 If	F	80	4	2	2/2	none	yes	L	Ifiyo
20 Mf	F	35	3	7	2/2	2 dairy	yes	L	Kalali
21 Mf	F	23	4	2	none	none	no	L	no
22 Mf	F	66	3	2	1/1	2 dairy	yes	L	Kalali
23 Mf	F	64	4	5	1.25/1.25	1, 1 calf	no	M	no
24 Mf	M	28	4	6	1/1(r)	1, 2 calfs	yes	M	no
25 Mf	F	47	3	4	1/1.5	1 dairy	no	M	no
26 K1	M	92	2	5	3/3	2 dairy	yes	L	no
27 K1	F	31	5	6	1/1.5	1 dairy	no	M	no
28 K1	M	45	5	5	1/1.5	none	yes	M	no
29 K1	M	86	3	2	1/0	2 dairy	no	M	no
30 K1	F	60	3	3	1/1.5	4 dairy	no	L	Kalali
31 K1	F	57	3	3	1/1	1 dairy	no	L	Kalali
32 K1	F	52	2	8	1/3(r)	2 dairy	yes	M	Kalali
33 K1	M	70	5	1	0.25/0	none	no	M	no
34 K1	F	59	5	7	0.5/1	1 ind.	yes	L	no
35 K1	M	65	5	6	0.25/0	1 ind.	yes	L	no
36 K1	F	73	5	2	1/0.5	none	no	L	no
37 K1	F	45	5	7	0.5/1	1 calf	no	L	no
38 Ur	F	73	3	7	5/2	5 dairy	no	L	Kalali
39 Ur	F	52	4	2	0.5/0.5	1 dairy	no	L	no

40 Ur	F	64	3	5	2/0.5	2 dairy	yes	L	Kalali
41 Ur	M	73	5	5	0.75/0	1 ind.	no	L	no
42 Ur	M	55	5	4	1/1.5	1 dairy	no	L	no
43 Ur	F	45	3	4	1.5/1	4 dairy	yes	L	Kalali
44 Ur	F	64	2	9	1/12	4, 4 calfs	yes	L	Kalali
45 Ur	F	53	2	5	2/1	1, 1 calf	no	L	Kalali
46 Mw	F	63	3	6	1.5/2	1 dairy	yes	M	Mosque
47 Mw	F	53	5	2	1/0	1 bull	no	M	no
48 Mw	F	56	4	5	1.5/1	1 dairy	no	M	no
49 Kl	F	38	2	5	1/3 (r)	2 dairy	no	L	Kalali
50 Rn	F	44	3	4	1.5/1.5	3 dairy	yes	L	Nkw'go
51 Rn	F	50	5	3	1/1(r)	1 calf	yes	L	no
52 Rn	F	42	5	6	0.25/0	1 dairy	yes	L	no
53 Nk	F	46	3	3	2/0.5 (r)	3 dairy	no	L	no
54 Nk	F	53	3	5	0.75/1.5 r	2 dairy	no	L	Nkw'go
55 Nk	F	43	5	6	0.75/0.5 r	1 calf	no	L	Nkw'go

ind.	indigenous cow i.e. does not produce much milk
k	<i>kihamba</i>
kit	<i>kitongoji</i> (If = Ifiyo, Ks = Kisau, Kl = Kalali, Mw = Mwera, Mf = Mafoi, Nkb = Nkwanambo, Rn = Rengua, Ur = Urara)
L	Lutheran
M	Muslim
RC	Roman Catholic
p	<i>porini</i>
r	rented plot

## Appendix Three

### Community-Based Organisations in Hai District

No. of orgs	Village	Type of Group	Activity	Support
5	Nronga	WG	Milk cooperative	FAO Danida, Nordic Project, Blue Eagle Foundation, FES, Technoserve
3	Mungushi	WG	Oil-extracting machine	KIWODEA, New Zealand Ambassador, Technoserve
2	Kimashuku	WG	Milling/grinding machine	WAWATA, German donor (private)
2	Mae	WG	Oil-extracting machine	UNICEF, KIWODEA
2	Wari	WG	Tailoring school	New Zealand Ambassador, ex MP (Hai)
2	Wari	WG	KKKT - dairy cattle project	German donor through church, KKKT
2	Wari	WG	Milling machine, selling livestock feeds, dairy cows	Sviluppo 2000, CDTF
2	Wari	NGO - PAFO	Primary health care technology and provision	Medical Ambassadors International, private donors
2	Mungushi	WG	Oil-extracting machine	UNICEF, CDTF
2	Boma Ng'ombe	WG	Oil-extracting, restaurant	UNICEF, KIWODEA
1	Shiri Njoro	WG	Tailoring, milling sunflowers	UNICEF
1	Shiri Mgunani	WG	Milling machine	CDTF
1	Shiri Mgunani	YG	Carpentry, bee-keeping	CDTF
1	Lyamungo Kilanya	WG	KKKT tailoring, dairy	KKKT

No. of orgs	Village	Type of Group	Activity	Support
1	Lyamungo Kilanya	WG	Tailoring, fish project	UMATI
1	Lyamungo Kilanya	YG	Carpentry	CDTF
1	Lyamungo Kati	WG	KKKT tailoring	KKKT
1	Urori	WG	RC Mission tailoring	RC Mission
1	Kashashi	M/WG	KKKT tailoring	KKKT
1	Kashashi	YG	Carpentry	Danish Volunteer Service
1	Lawate	WG	Local brew, tailoring, cultivating maize and beans	Swedish donor (private)
1	Lawate	WG	Buying/selling maize, piggery	WIDEF
1	Lawate	WG	Cultivate groundnuts, selling second hand clothes	WIDEF
1	Lawate	WG	Sell at market eg sugar, soap	KIWODEA
1	Lawate	WG	Sell local brew	WIDEF
1	Mae	WG	UWT milling machine	CDTF
1	Mae	UMATI reps	Horticulture, sewing	UMATI
1	Wanri	WG	Selling fruit and veg at local market	KIWODEA
1	Wanri	WG	UWT milling machine	English donor (private)
1	Kyengia	WG	KKKT - grow and sell veg, livestock feeds	KKKT
1	Samaki Maini	WG	KKKT - tailoring, knitting	KKKT
1	Samaki Maini	WG	KKKT - tailoring, knitting, keeping gardens	KKKT
1	Samaki Maini	WG	KKKT - tailoring, knitting, keeping gardens	KKKT
1	Samaki Maini	WG	KKKT - tailoring, knitting, needlework, handicrafts	KKKT
1	Koboko	WG	Sewing machines, bakery	UMATI
1	Koboko	WG		WIDEF

No. of orgs	Village	Type of Group	Activity	Support
1	Uduru	WG	KKKT - tailoring, needlework	KKKT
1	Nshara	WG	KKKT - tailoring, needlework	KKKT
1	Mbweera	Village group	Library. kindergarten, sewing and typing pools	USA donor (private)
1	Mudio	YG	Carpentry	CDTF
1	Mudio	YG	Sewing machines	UMATI
1	Sonu	WG	Grow veg, livestock fodder, rent sewing machines out	UMATI
1	Kware	WG	KKKT - sell livestock feeds	KKKT
1	Kawaya	MG	Bee-keeping	CDTF
1	Rundugai	WG	Buying and selling paddy rice	KIWODEA
1	Rundugai	YG	Carpentry	DVS
1	Boma Ng'ombe	WG	Local brew, cultivate beans	KIWODEA
1	Boma Ng'ombe	YG	Carpentry	DVS
1	KIA	WG	Restaurant	KIWODEA
1	Lukani	WG	Local brew	KIWODEA
1	Ng'uni	WG	Milk cooperative	FAO Danida
0	Shiri Njoro	WG	Poultry	
0	Shiri Njoro	Village group	Milling machine	
0	Shiri Mgungani	WG	Growing and selling vegetables	
0	Shiri Mgungani	WG	Buying and reselling produce	
0	Mjengeweni	WG	Horticulture for sale	
0	Kikavu Chini	M/WG	Grow vegetables and rice	
0	Kashashi	WG	Horticulture, selling local cloth and livestock feeds	

No. of orgs	Village	Type of Group	Activity	Support
0	Kyengia	WG	Selling livestock feeds	
0	Kyengia	WG	Selling livestock feeds	
0	Kyengia	WG	Planting trees, raising seedlings	
0	Kyengia	WG	Selling local brew	
0	Kyengia	WG	Loans system	
0	Samaki Maini	WG	Collecting for milling machine	
0	Koboko	WG	Piggery	
0	Sanya Juu	WG	Buying and selling at local market	
0	Sanya Juu	WG	Tailoring	
0	Sanya Juu	WG	Selling fish	
0	Magadini	YG	Poultry keeping	
0	Shari	Village project	Keeping dairy cows, milling machine	
0	Shari	WG	UWT shop/bar	
0	Shari	PTA group	Shop	
0	Uswaa	WG	UWT shop, sell pombe	
0	Foo	WG	Sell livestock feeds	
0	Mbweera	WG	Retail shop, training TBAs	
0	Mbweera	YG	Carpentry	
0	Mudio	WG	Raise seedlings	
0	Ngira	WG	Selling agricultural produce, local cloth, traditional matting and needlework	
0	Saawe	WG	Selling livestock feeds	
0	Saawe	WG	Bee-keeping	
0	Saawe	MG	Bee-keeping	
0	Sanya Station	WG	Selling local brew	



No. of orgs	Village	Type of Group	Activity	Support
0	Kware	WG	Tailoring	
0	Kwasadala	WG	Run a restaurant	
0	Mkalama	WG	Cultivating crops	
0	Mkalama	WG	Cultivating crops	
0	Mungushi	WG	Selling local brew	
0	Mungushi	WG	Growing vegetables	
0	Boma Ng'ombe	WG	Tailoring and tie-dye	
0	Mashua	WG	Piggery	
0	Mashua	WG		
0	Mashua	WG		
0	Mashua	WG	UWT shop	
0	Losaa	WG		

